Arab News and Conflict
Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture (DAPSAC) The editors invite contributions that investigate political, social and cultural processes from a linguistic/discourse-analytic point of view. The aim is to publish monographs and edited volumes which combine language-based approaches with disciplines concerned essentially with human interaction – disciplines such as political science, international relations, social psychology, social anthropology, sociology, economics, and gender studies.
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Teun A. van Dijk
Luisa Martín Rojo
Michael Billig
Konrad Ehlich
Jacob L. Mey
Mikhail V. Ilyin
Christina Schäffner
Andreas H. Jucker
Ron Scollon †
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, Paris, France Loughborough University
Jan Blommaert
Tilburg University
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona Ludwig-Maximilians Universität, Munich
Paul Chilton
Polis, Moscow
J.W. Downes
University of Zurich
University of Lancaster University of East Anglia
J.R. Martin
University of Sydney
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Louis de Saussure
University of Genève
Volume 34 Arab News and Conflict. A multidisciplinary discourse study by Samia Bazzi
Arab News and Conflict A multidisciplinary discourse study
Samia Bazzi Lebanese University, Beirut
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia
8
TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bazzi, Samia. Arab news and conflict : a multidisciplinary discourse study / by Samia Bazzi. p. cm. (Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture, issn 1569-9463 ; v. 34) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Arab-Israeli conflict--1993---Mass media and the conflict. 2. Mass media--Political aspects--Arab countries. 3. Critical discourse analysis--Arab countries. I. Title. DS119.76.B3995 2009 956.05’4--dc22 2009033359 isbn 978 90 272 0625 1 (Hb ; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8880 6 (Eb)
© 2009 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
For Hani and Diana
Table of contents Acknowledgements List of tables and figures chapter 1 Introduction News representations in times of conflict 1 What is discourse analysis? 3 The case studies in this book 6 Using this book 9 A note on style 10
vii xi
1
part 1 Approaches to media discourse chapter 2 A semiotic approach Analysing the fixed structures of the political sign: A fundamental approach 15 Analysing the motivated meanings of the political sign 21 The social semiotic meaning 21 The mythical meaning 27 The marked meaning 37 Deconstructing the political sign 40 Conclusion 42 chapter 3 An ideological approach The interpellation of subjects by ideological state apparatuses 46 Hegemony and consent 49 Resistance and counter-hegemony 56 “Worthy” vs. “unworthy” victims 63 Conclusion 70
15
45
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chapter 4 A critical discourse analysis approach What do the critical discourse analysts say? 72 Introducing the analytical tools 78 Transitivity 79 Mood and modality 82 Texture 87 Foregrounded themes 88 Lexical cohesion and collocation 90 Speech acts 92 Politeness 94 Relevance (the descriptive use vs. the interpretive use) 99 Conclusion 102
71
part 2 A model of analysis: Analysing Arab media discourse Introduction 103 chapter 5 Analysing the contextual factors Dominant hegemony 105 Interpellation of subjects 111 Power relations: Solidarity vs. enmity 114 Cognition 122 Editorial control 130 Conclusion 135 chapter 6 Analysing text strategy Transitivity 137 Mood and modality 147 Texture 157 Foregrounded themes 157 Collocational cohesion 164 Speech acts and politeness 168 Relevance (the descriptive use vs. the interpretive use) 176 Conclusion 181 part 3 Translation and media
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chapter 7 185 Media translation and conflict The translation of ideology and the ideological role of the translator 187 The profession’s constraints 187 The ideological translation method used in the transcreation of socio-political realities 198 Descriptive translation or interpretive translation? 199 A scheme for analysing ideological translations 202 The contribution of translation theories 202 A new model for the analysis of translation in times of conflict 209 Conclusion 212 Discussion
213
References
215
Index
221
Acknowledgements This book has grown out of a number of roots: empirical research in the world of media; and academic work with professors in the field of cultural studies and languages. In this respect, I would like to express my gratitude to a number of people who were involved with my book from its beginnings. Dr. Yvonne McLaren from Heriot-Watt University, Scotland, and Professor James Dickins from Salford University, England, who gave me their academic advice on an earlier version of this manuscript in 2006. This research work could not have developed into a book without John Benjamins and the concept of the DAPSAC series. I am, therefore, extremely grateful to Professor Ruth Wodak and Professor Greg Myers of Lancaster University, England, for their encouragement with this project and for their comments and reviews on my earlier version which culminated into this book. I also owe a debt of thanks to the editor of this book, Jenifer Spencer from the English Language section of Heriot-Watt University for her exceptional job of copy-editing and for reading every draft of this book in a critical and questioning manner. She has been my intellectual companion throughout this research, providing me with invaluable comments on both substance and form. Most of the research for this project was carried out in Lebanon. Particular thanks are due to my students from ‘The Centre for Translation and Languages’ at the Lebanese University for their indispensable feedback on the main texts of the corpus. Under my courses in journalistic translation, the students conducted their own empirical research on media and language and reached similar conclusions to mine. A rounded picture in the empirical work was not possible without interviewing editors and journalists. A special debt of thanks is owed to the chief editors and journalists from the following media outlets in Beirut for providing insights into real-life representations in the Arab media. I am very grateful to the staff concerned from Al-Manar, Reuters, AFP, Assafir, Al-Mustaqbal, Annahar, Al-Diar, Al-Balad, Daily Star (Beirut), Al-Anwar. I am equally grateful to the copyright holders for giving permission, where required, to reproduce the excerpts used in this book: Al-Manar (Beirut), and the Beirut branches of AFP and Al-Jazeera. I would also like to thank Reuters for their co-operation and advice in the use of extracts from their reports.
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I would like to thank the editorial team of John Benjamin’s Press for their cooperation throughout the production process. My special thanks are due to Patricia Leplae, Johnny Unger, and Isja Conen. Finally, my immense thanks to my family and friends whose love and encouragement were very important in the writing of this book.
List of tables and figures Table 2.1
Mythemes of the Arab-Israeli conflict in typical Arab media discourses Figure 2.1 The syntagmatic (→) and paradigmatic (↓) structures of the political sign Figure 2.2 The semiotic triangle of the political sign Table 3.1 Shifts in representation of Israeli victims in Arabic translations Table 3.2 Shifts in representation of Arab victims in Arabic translations Table 3.3 The rhetoric of worthy versus unworthy victims Table 4.1 The linguistic toolkit used in the analysis of politically sensitive language Figure 4.1 Direct incrimination process with two-participant clause Figure 4.2 Reason for violence structured in the circumstance element Figure 4.3 The mood structure in a politically sensitive text Figure 4.4 Contesting the mood element in counter-hegemony Figure 4.5 A structure for a marked theme in a politically sensitive text Table 5.1 Solidarity and enmity relations between subjects in Arab media discourse Table 5.2 The major cognitive factors or mental representations and interpretations found in Arab media discourse Figure 5.1 The major contextual constraints identified in Arab media discourse Table 6.1 The preferred transitivity system found in political discourse in times of conflict Table 6.2 a) The main collocational network found in Arab media discourse during times of struggle between Arabs and Israelis Table 6.2 b) The main collocational network found in Arab media discourse during times of struggle between Arabs and Israelis Table 6.3 A summary of the text strategies found in politically sensitive media discourse Figure 6.1 Questioning the mood position in giving information and making statements
31 18 19 66 67 69 79 80 81 83 84 89 121 130 136 146 166 167 182 149
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Figure 6.2
Questioning the mood position in obligation, inclination, duty and commitment
A scheme for analysing ideological translations: Table 7.1(i) Phase 1a) Table 7.1(ii) Phase 1b) Table 7.1(iii) Phase 2 Table 7.1(iv) Phase 3
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209 210 211 211
chapter 1
Introduction News representations in times of conflict
I had a suspicion that the language we were forced to write as trainee reporters all those years ago had somehow imprisoned us, that we had been schooled to mould the world and ourselves in clichés, that for the most part this would define our lives, destroy our anger and imagination, make us loyal to our betters, to governments, to authority. For some reason, I had become possessed of the belief that the blame for our failure as journalists to report the Middle East with any sense of moral passion or indignation lay in the way that we journalists were trained. Robert Fisk, Middle East correspondent for The Independent
Moulding the Arab-Israeli conflict in a news report or commentary is a sensitive issue to many governments, organizations and individuals in this world. Many feel involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, for a variety of powerful reasons. These can be related to ideological, religious, or cultural affiliations. They can also be related to strategic, political or commercial interests in the Middle East. The Arab-Israeli struggle is not like any other international struggle or conflict. At its core, it is a struggle over land, between two Semitic nations; it is a struggle between two parallel but never converging cultures; it is a struggle stemming from two different sets of values, beliefs, and visions; it is a struggle over wealth and resources, intertwined with the political and economic interests of both western and regional countries – themselves often in conflict; it is a struggle related to the balance of international and regional powers, and at its heart, representing this global conflict between the East and West and its interactions, lies the Palestinian– Israeli conflict. For more than 60 years, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been a dominant issue in international politics and in the representations of international media. Supported by international powers, the Arabs and Israelis have fought deadly wars. The fundamental reason lies behind the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 in the Middle East. The Arab league opposed the Israeli-Palestinian-state solution, thus declaring the first confrontation between Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq against Israel. In 1967, the Arabs including Egypt, Jordan and Syria formed a defence pact and fought a deadly war with Israel. As a result, Israel seized the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Eastern Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
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In 1973, another deadly war was fought between Syria and, Egypt as allies on one side and Israel on the other. The international powers, the United States (supporting Israel) and the Soviet Union (supporting the Arab states), intervened to secure a ceasefire. In the succeeding decades, more wars were fought, including wars on Lebanon in 1982, 1993 and 2006, and the most recent, the war on Gaza in 2008. Since 1948, the Palestinian cause has been the constant issue at the core of this struggle because of the fact that millions of Palestinians displaced from their homeland have never received a just settlement. The refugee issue and the attempts to Judaise Jerusalem still pose the thorniest obstacles to peace between Arabs and Israelis. Uprising against Israeli rule in the Palestinian territories ignited the Palestinian Intifada (uprising) in 1987 and in 2000, and the bloodiest confrontations between the Israelis and Palestinians. And people all over the world continue to feel involved in this conflict because they are also exposed to it by the constant media coverage reporting the conflict in a way sensitive to their own and their target audiences’ perspectives. Whether these media societies are western or Arabic, Muslim or Jewish, depending on the origin of each media source, both facts and the explanations of these facts are presented from their own political perspectives. Political analysts agree that the Middle East lies in a sensitive area which is not only the cradle of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, but a strategic source of wealth and oil. This has engendered hostility and antagonism between supporters of opposing parties in countries throughout the world.The Middle East struggle became more complicated to the Arabs after the issue of anti-Semitism became of paramount importance in the West at the end of the Second World War. The peace treaties that took place between Egypt and Israel in 1979, returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in the condition that puts Egypt outside the Arab-Israeli conflict and normalizes relations with Israel, only generated further complications. Later, with agreements between Jordan and Israel (1994) and the Oslo Accord signed between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1993, more rifts were generated within the Arab world, and this time amongst Arab-Arab systems. The peace treaties created deep divisions between the rulers who accepted peace with Israel and the Arab masses whose majority still do not accept a settlement with the state of Israel unless the latter accepts the implementation of the Saudi-inspired peace plan adopted by the Arab summit in Beirut, 2002. This Saudi initiative is a formal declaration of what the moderate Arabs have always wanted. The Arab peace initiative calls upon Israel to withdraw from all the territories occupied since 1967, achieve a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, and accept the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. This initiative articulates the firm and common collective beliefs and aspirations which are emotionally, morally, and consistently expressed in Arab or Islamic summits, Arab speeches, religious sermons, educational and cultural practices, and, of course, pre-eminently in the Arab media. Just as
Chapter 1. Introduction
in any other society, in Arab society the expressions or representations of this struggle by cultural, political, and media apparatuses form the frameworks of ideological meanings about the Arab-Israeli struggle. The aim of this book is to take us through the language representations in the media over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Our main focus will be on the Arab media representations. The West, being the powerful party in the world’s current civilisation and media, can easily market its news representations through its dominant media sources. However, this might turn into a dangerous (although bloodless) weapon if such representations serve the political, economic and ethnic interests of the powerful nations only. The less powerful party has its news representations, too. By representations I mean the ideological, symbolic, and cultural components expressed in language, which serve as a way of representing the conflict meaningfully. In this study, I am not interested, in who is right or wrong in their beliefs but in the way meanings are produced, shared and consumed by a particular society through the media apparatus. More specifically, I am interested in analysing media discourse in times of conflict. What is discourse analysis? A substantial amount of work has been carried out during the past two decades on discourse analysis, including media discourse analysis. Many studies are based on conceptions put forward by the French social theorist Michel Foucault (1926–84). Foucault (1972, 1981) discussed meanings within the larger structures of society; that is meaning as discourse. Foucault did not favour the use of the term ideology because it can be seen as a form of repression or imposition. He therefore introduced the term discourse in the sense of power being lived out and negotiated through a society rather than being imposed by the state apparatuses; that is, power being dispersed through the use of language itself. According to Foucault, discourse consists of statements (utterances or texts), and also particular structures, and regimes of truth that work according to dominant power. Discourses are ways of representing a specific subject, how we talk or think about it. A particular discourse has its own coherence, order, a ruling force and practices, which are not stable over time. Power transmitted through discourse can be tracked through its discursive structure or constraints: in other words, the systemic conceptions, knowledge, opinions and ways of behaving that are historically situated within specific contexts and with special effects. These effects, or real consequences, can be seen in many cases, such as the way group members commonly behave when an ideological topic is raised, the common positions they
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adopt, the style in reporting or talking amongst a group about a sensitive event, or the tone and content of speech delivered by this group’s leaders. Foucault explains that a discourse can be produced by many individuals in different institutional settings, e.g. families, prisons and hospitals. He explains to us that when we deploy a discourse, we position ourselves as if we were the subject of that discourse. For instance, an Arab might not personally believe in the political practices of Hamas movement in Palestine against the Israeli civilians. But, if he uses the discourse of “resistance to Israeli occupation” he will find himself speaking from a position that holds that the Palestinians are the oppressed nation. In analysing a discourse, Foucault would argue that our acceptance of a particular representation of a sensitive event emerges from how a conscious being assumes a particular identity, that is becomes a subject, and thinks of itself as directed by, or subject to a given set of social and ethical norms as well as the power relations of a particular society. When the conscious being internalizes those external norms, its existence and its discourse practices become meaningful. As discourses produce meaningful knowledge about a particular subject produced by a particular society: e.g. the discourse of “9/11”, the discourse of “the security fence”, the discourse of “war on terror”, the discourse of “resistance to occupation”, we should investigate how such discourses operate in relation to a particular type of power. This is essential because discourses are in fact part of the way power is transmitted and exercised in the media over those who are “subjected” to it. The sociologist and discourse analyst Stuart Hall (1996) materializes Foucault’s conception of discourse by inviting us to analyse the way discourses have been formed. For instance, analysing the discourse of “the West and the Rest” and the way it was formed. Hall tells us that a discourse is a way of talking about or representing something. The West has produced many different ways of talking about itself and “the Others”. By analysing the discourse of the West, Hall traces its historical and economic processes, its religious identity, its claims to truth, its stereotyping, its social and cultural structure, its forms of knowledge, and its system of representation. Hall believes that the formation of discourse in the West continues to influence our modern world. The discourse of “the West and the Rest” and its effects can be seen in the language itself, in its image of itself vs. “Others”, and its relations of power towards the “Rest”. Foucault’s theorization of discourse and power has inspired other discourse scholars who have developed his approach in other ways. In addition to drawing on ideas from sociology, philosophy and ideology, discourse scholars have added other forms to their exploration of discourse, notably the linguistic analysis of texts. Pioneering works were presented by analysts such as Teun van Dijk, Hodge and Kress, Fowler et al, Norman Fairclough, and Ruth Wodak each of whom tried to fuse important linguistic issues into the study of discourse and power. Fairclough’s
Chapter 1. Introduction
work has been instrumental in finding connections between language and the social power of groups or institutions. As Fairclough tells us: “Critical is used in the special sense of aiming to show up connections which may be hidden from people – such as the connections between language, power and ideology” (Fairclough 2001: 4). Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) seeks to find how language gains power by the use which powerful apparatuses (including the media) make of it. CDA, which has established itself at an international level over the last few decades, continues to demonstrate the ways in which language can express power, challenge foreign power or subvert dominant power. Gilbert Weiss and Ruth Wodak define CDA as follows: CDA might be defined as fundamentally interested in analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language. In other words, CDA aims to investigate critically social inequality as it is expressed, constituted, legitimized, and so on, by language use (or in discourse). (Weiss and Wodak 2007: 15) The purpose of this book is to develop gradually the meaning of media discourse and to illustrate this with examples from the news practices which form relations of power towards “the Other”. The book will develop frameworks of analysis; give explanations; give descriptions; and carry out critical language analysis. We shall see special emphasis on the critical analysis aspect, which seeks to find relations between language use in the media on the one hand and ideology, and cognition on the other. I have chosen a turbulent moment in the history of the Middle East, spanning the years 2001 to 09. The combination of Media and conflict is a fertile topic which unravels to interested politicians and media producers the ideological function of language. That is, it reveals how language can be used to express power and ideology, inflame our patriotic feelings, express our identity, hijack us into national self-absorption with a particular crime committed against humanity (e.g. Sept 11th). We can also ask how semantic and syntactic clichés on the news can, in many cases distort political facts, categorize people and create distance from one race of people to undermine their humanity. We can notice how linguistic representations that challenge the established uses of the dominant powers can reveal hidden “facts” or let us better use Foucault’s term knowledge about reasons behind wars or about victims. In this book we shall explore the discourse of other nations – the Arab nations. The perspective will not be from the “West and the Rest”, but from the perspective of critical discourse analysis. My approach in this book is multidisciplinary, in the sense that it will combine different disciplines from: semiotics (the study of signs); neo-Marxist philosophy on ideology; and pragmatic and functional language analysis of textual evidence, from the discipline of linguistics. My approach will be
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supported by real case studies drawn from different media sources. For all those interested in the political-journalistic-linguistic nexus of power, the book will offer a new descriptive approach to the analysis of media discourse, without subscribing to a particular ideological perspective. As Foucault says: do not ask who I am! The case studies in this book A series of rich examples in the book will focus on an array of bloody or critical events which took place between Israel and the Arabs during the present decade representing the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. These real-life examples have been collected from different media outlets. The sample of Arab media outlets, (e.g. Al-Manar, Al-Jazeera, Assafir) which I have chosen for the international reader are the ones which represent a spectrum of Arab opinion and its expression and articulate the minds of most Arabs you would meet on the street, especially when conflict intensifies. To enter the minds of the Arab populace and to understand their conceptual thinking we need outspoken examples disseminated during intense moments in history. In order to inform our understanding of the use of power in the media language we also need to make comparative analyses between western media texts and their translations or counter-representations into Arabic (e.g. Reuters English vs. Reuters Arabic). The following are the main Arab media outlets chosen for our study of Arab media discourse in the news: Al-Manar: this satellite channel projects itself as the “Resistance and Liberation Channel” or “The Arab-Israeli Struggle Channel”. Al-Manar occupies a leading post among Arab satellite stations and draws millions of Arab viewers from inside the Arab world and overseas. It is an active member of the Arab states broadcasting union, part of the Arab League. According to its editors, Al-Manar’s goal of broadcasting via satellite was “to introduce the resistance as a practice and a culture to the world, to promote the concept of victory in the wake of the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and to support Palestinians in occupied territories”. Many international media agencies, such as the BBC have acknowledged the importance of Al-Manar’s role in the Arab media. Al-Manar is believed to have an influential voice and presents harrowing images of the Arab-Israeli conflict which have a powerful effect on the Arab recipients. Many Arab and international media outlets use Al-Manar as a source of information to report events from Gaza, the West Bank, or Lebanon. In October 2002, Al-Manar won a gold medal in France in an international media competition on news reporting. According to the editor, Al-Manar was the most watched and quoted Arab satellite station, during the 2006-war on Lebanon.
Chapter 1. Introduction
This noisy voice to Israel was a target during the first days of the July-06 war, when Israeli warplanes bombed Al-Manar’s TV building in Beirut, and the building collapsed entirely. However, the broadcasts of the local and satellite channels never stopped and continued to defy Israel from substitute studios, and despite the Israeli targeting, Al-Manar’s technicians continued to activate the live streaming service on the internet. This channel has faced many obstacles to prevent it from reaching some other countries or even continents. Al-Manar editors believe that the Israeli lobby exerted tremendous efforts to label the channel as anti-Semitic and as a result Al-Manar was banned in France and other parts of Europe. Later on, the USA labelled Al-Manar as a terrorist organization; an unprecedented move against a media outlet. The examples I have collected from Al-Manar editors and journalists as well as the station’s website should be able to shed some light on the more outspoken Arab media discourses regarding the Mideast conflict. This outspokenness reflects what can be read amongst Arabs on the internet, what can be heard by people on the street, and what can commonly be heard or read in many Arabic media outlets. Throughout the book, we shall also look at comparative examples of Al-Manar Arabic texts beside the texts from western media sources used by Al-Manar as a source of information. Al-Jazeera: this is another influential and favoured media outlet for many Arabs worldwide. It is also a satellite and electronic media source accessed by tens of millions of Arabs across the globe. Al-Jazeera gained world fame through its exclusive reporting of the US military invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, as well as the airing of videotapes of Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. Its editors claim that Al-Jazeera is the “master of objectivity,” adding that “international television and news agencies do not cover as much because they fear Israel’s reaction.” In March 2008, Israel boycotted the Al-Jazeera Channel accusing it of biased coverage in favour of the Palestinian Hamas movement. At this time, Israel’s onslaught on Gaza took over the screens of the main Arab news channels, including Al-Jazeera. The difference between Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar is that the former would interview Israeli officials, and use less outspoken stereotypes against Israel. However positioned on the spectrum of outspokenness, the discourses of both outlets clearly articulate the political beliefs and the national feelings of the Arab populace and in many instances say what many of the Arab rulers themselves cannot say. Reuters Arabic and Associated France Press (AFP) Arabic: Reuters and AFP are considered the largest international multi-media news agencies, reporting extensively from around the world on topics ranging from financial markets to general and political news including news in extremely sensitive regions. They exert influence
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from their work in almost all capitals in the world, their historical reputation (stretching back for many decades) and their enormous sales in the media market. Both agencies have their news reports translated into many languages, including Arabic. These reports can be found on the internet. According to the editors, “the Arabic content is tailored for the needs and interests of Middle East audiences”. This book will compare examples from the original English texts and the Arabic target texts, to see how news is represented in order to be sold. The aim is to show the analyst how it is possible for news representations to appear subjective to some but objective to others. Our comparative examples, although some were difficult to obtain, unravel ideological shifts in content in times of conflict and shed more light on the relationships between language and ideology, even when they are practised on a less outspoken scale. Another reason behind choosing Reuters Arabic and AFP Arabic texts is because almost all media outlets in the Arab World buy the Arabic versions of Reuters and AFP and use them as sources of information. This provides the opportunity for the analyst to compare the English source texts and their Arabic counterparts to see how the texts, purportedly retailing the same event, may be tailored to accommodate the sensibilities of each group of target readers. Assafir and Al-Mustaqbal: these are popular Arabic newspapers published in Lebanon and echo the common Arab stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Assafir has a high reputation. In fact in May 2009, the Editor-in-Chief of Assafir newspaper was selected from 19 Arab countries as the media personality of the year, winning the Arab Journalism Award for the year 2008, in Dubai. For long years, Lebanon has borne the brunt of conflict between regional and international powers. Our examples chosen from these Lebanese newspapers will deepen our understanding of media representations in times of conflict and from another land in conflict with Israel. At the internal political level, the editors of the two papers have different political affiliations; however, both articulate in an outspoken way the minds of the Arab populace about the Arab-Israeli conflict. In this respect, they are therefore representative of many similarly outspoken papers in the Middle East when conflict with Israel has to be reported. Of course, one would find somewhat less outspokenness in those Arab countries having some degree of alliance with Israel and the US, but in general these newspapers are good examples of the general Arab opinion of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Amongst the other outlets which will be found in this book are examples from Al-Ahram (Egypt), Tishreen (Syria), Al-Rai-Alaam (Kuwait), and Al-Quds Al-Arabi (London). Obtaining access to many texts in this book was not an easy task, particularly the Arabic versions of Reuters and AFP as well as the Arabic versions of Al-Manar
Chapter 1. Introduction
and their equivalent western source texts. This is because doing research on sensitive topics usually touches on the exercise of power by a media agency. The general purpose of our samples is to enable us to investigate media representations in the specific context of the violent events between Arabs and Israelis, that is: accusations and counter-accusations; reasons behind struggle; the victims who have fallen from both sides of the conflict; US efforts to bring an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; the building of a fence between Israelis and Palestinians; and the political relations between the US administration and Israel vs. the US administration and Arabs. Using this book The body of the book lays out for the readers an analysis of all the possible ways we can look at politically sensitive texts, based on a series of perspectives moving from socio-political down to the fundamental elements of the language. As I have mentioned, the book is about the political-journalistic-linguistic nexus of power which should be of interest to the news producer, such as the editor or journalist, the politician, the news analyst, the discourse analyst and the translator who translates the discourse of the “Other”. This book can also be used as a reference by students who follow courses in journalism, politics, applied linguistics, cultural studies, or translation studies. The book is divided into three main parts: Part I (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) provides the reader with ways to approach the analysis of politically sensitive texts. Our approach tries to define in a precise way the important ideological, social and cognitive structures as well as the linguistic strategies that generally characterize politically sensitive discourses. In Chapter 2 we develop a semiotic framework that can explain how political signs (e.g. words, acts or images) encountered in a political media text can be subjectively categorized or interpreted. We shall explore the different layers of meaning which characterize the subjective and mythical dimensions of context. Here, subjective is not used as opposite to objective, nor do I mean mythical in the “false” sense. Subjective and mythical are used in this book simply as cognitive and ideological definitions drawn from influential studies of the way in which discourse expresses relations of power and cultural identity. In Chapter 3 an ideological framework is developed within which we can investigate the ideological content of a political text. Finally, Chapter 4 presents a method of critical discourse analysis capable of revealing how we represent and express our world view and our regime of truth concerning a particular conflict in the language we use.
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Part II (Chapters 5 and 6) will provide us with a unique model of analysis, taking Arab news as a specific case study for those interested in studying Arab media discourse in times of conflict with Israel. The proposed scheme will analyse and test two interlinked networks: the crucial contextual factors that constrain the productions of politically sensitive texts in the ways identified in the previous chapters (Chapter 5), and the linguistic features of text strategy that articulate them (Chapter 6). By text strategy I mean the prevailing linguistic trends which the text producers tend to select, both consciously and unconsciously, at the structural, textual and pragmatic levels of the text to articulate a politically sensitive context and to create special effects. Part III (Chapter 7) will focus on the role of translation in the transcreation of socio-political realities. Translators also have a role to play in the real world, in the contexts studied in this book. They are not neutral bystanders, but participants in the struggle. This chapter can be especially useful for the translation analyst or trainee. In giving case studies which illustrate and widen the application of the translation theories, it shows us what actually happens in the processes of transforming source to target. The chapter proposes a scheme for the analysis of politically sensitive translations. It further raises ethical issues in translation and can be considered as an invitation to world translators to make more conscious decisions about representing the “Others” and their victims. A note on style There is the issue of “busy-ness” in this book arising from the intrinsic nature of the topic. The reader might observe that there are many characters involved in each paragraph: text producers, recipients, politicians, translators, as well as the participants who actually do or suffer the actions or make the speeches in the news. This makes the book applicable to different types of readers: to those whose main interest is in politics, but who still find the language aspect very relevant and interesting, as well as those whose focus is discourse analysis or translation studies. I have tried to keep my feminine voice, where possible, by referring to many participants as she or he. All the examples from different Arab media outlets cited in this book are my translations into English. They were originally published in Arabic to the Arab reader and are back translated by the author for the reader of this book. Some of the Al-Manar examples were also published in the English language and are referred to as such. Al-Manar has its own translators who produce Al-Manar’s news language in English. The English texts mirror the same discourse one would hear on Al-Manar’s
Chapter 1. Introduction
Arabic news. The English versions of Al-Manar are usually transformed forms from TV news to internet news. Al-Manar English examples are taken directly from Al-Manar’s original English source and are labelled clearly as English texts. I have referred to some samples as being source texts (ST), i.e. the text was used as an original source of information, target texts (TT), i.e. a final text into Arabic for the target audience, back translation (BT), i.e. my translation of the TT into English for the English reader. The text producer referred to throughout the book can mean the journalist, the editor, the politician who produces the political text, or the translator who also contributes to text production. It should be noted that the translator referred to in the book is in most cases the journalist or the editor herself/himself who are required to perform translation work while producing their own reports. Many of the examples used are re-sited and subject to further analysis in different and larger contexts in later chapters in order to give our study the multidimensionality and complexity needed for analyses and explanations and to produce well-founded contextual and textual generalities. Finally, I have tried to be as practical as possible. To this end, I have used reallife and human examples from real-life practices in the media. There are many tables and figures for purposes of illustration. The chapters link up with each other in trying to achieve a balance between theory and empirical analysis. I have tried to be as descriptive as possible even in the suggested model of analysis. I expect from the various samples utilized in the study to produce generalizable arguments and explanations. In other words, I let the texts speak for themselves.
part 1
Approaches to media discourse
chapter 2
A semiotic approach When you encounter words in the Arab media such as the invading U.S. forces in Iraq or the separating fence in Occupied Palestine, you are likely to think of different political signs accepted as a norm in the Middle East. So, how can political signs (e.g. words, acts or images) encountered in the daily news be subjectively constructed, categorized or interpreted by their intended text recipients? Why do some political signs seem favourable to some cultures, but unfavourable to others? What gives them their accepted meaning in different cultural contexts? And is there a particular approach the discourse analyst may adopt in order to see how we recipients ascribe non-neutral meanings to texts? Providing answers to these questions has led me, at the outset of my study of political discourse in the media, to develop a semiotic framework within which we can investigate the motivated meanings in the news discourse. Semiotics, or the study of signs, will help us investigate the subjective system of meanings that underlies the news, making its discourse credible and relevant to some but marked or biased to others. Different studies have, in various ways, prepared the ground for the semiotic analysis of media discourse (e.g. Fowler 1991; Hartley 1993; Fairclough 1995a; Jensen 1995). However, these studies do not seem to establish a sufficiently robust and clear semiotic model to the discourse analyst. In this chapter, I will attempt to offer additional insights within a firm semiotic framework. Semiotics is a wide field involving linguistics, philosophy, psychology, literature, anthropology, and media studies; I cannot, therefore, claim to be comprehensive in the semiotic analysis construct in this book but will endeavour to lay a systematic foundation through which the analyst of a politically motivated text can approach the invisible or conventional meanings of the political signs. Analysing the fixed structures of the political sign: A fundamental approach My aim in this section is to reveal a fixed code or structure that seems to be responsible for our unconscious construction and interpretation of the political sign. On this question, I will draw on the ideas of the early-twentieth-century Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure and the American pragmatist philosopher
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and logician Charles Sanders Peirce. Although I do not intend to follow their abstract and philosophical approach to language, it is useful to utilize their fundamental models of what constitutes a sign in order to analyse the established code of meaning in the media discourse. In one dominant tradition, Saussure (1983) offers a dyadic model of the sign which forms the ground base upon which further studies of the sign have developed. A simple illustration of Saussure’s structuralist approach to language would be that the sign means the combination of the “signifier” and the “signified”. The signifier is the carrier of meaning - Saussure’s primary concern, whereas the signified is the mental concept. This dyadic entity gives the sign its signification and fundamental role in our social life. In order to consider this intimate link in the reader’s mind, consider the following extracts from Reuters: Arafat Condemns Jerusalem Bombing, Meets U.S. Demand … Powell got a first-hand view of the carnage in Jerusalem from aboard a military helicopter. He responded by scrapping his meeting with Arafat in the West Bank city of Ramallah… Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 Here, the signifier is the word or the material aspect which can be seen – it could be the image attached with this text or a printed word, e.g. the word carnage and the signified is the mental concept of a human situation, i.e. Israeli people killed in a scene of bloodshed. According to the Saussurean model, the signifier and the signified are related by a conventional relationship or code where one particular word corresponds to one particular idea in an arbitrary way. In times of political struggle, the analyst must initially address the link between a signifier and the signified. The classical case of conventional use by the text producer, is that of a red light meaning ‘stop’ in the case of traffic lights, that is to say, a denotational relationship. However, in times of political struggle this conventional use by the text producer might not always be the case for the receiver. In other words, carnage might not trigger the same mental concept to Arabs involved in this conflict, who cannot be seen to be bound by the same arbitrary meaning. In our case Saussure’s approach is illuminating in that it invites us to consider meanings dictated by our own societies in the media discourse. What we need to focus on is this “associative” link where a signifier triggers a particular signified in a particular society and at a particular moment in history. The framework which will be developed here shows how users in these situations have no choice but to accept an established system of signification. Another key aspect in Saussure’s structuralist analysis of the sign is the meaning or “value” which arises from the differences between signifiers. The differences can be envisaged on two structural axes, the “syntagmatic” (concerning combination
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
or positioning with respect to other signifiers) and the “paradigmatic” (concerning selection or substitution). The plane of syntagm can be seen in words linked or chained according to syntactic rules and can be envisaged on a horizontal axis. To illustrate this notion, consider another excerpt from the same Reuters text mentioned above: Palestinian Information Minister Yasser Abed Rabbo, a senior Arafat aide, accused the United States of applying a double standard by denouncing violence against Israelis but ignoring what he called “massacres” by the Israeli army. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 A linguistic element such as by the Israeli army signifies because it combines with other elements or signifiers in the same sentence, such as what he called “massacres”, in a specific syntactic or sequential order to form a syntagm. Now consider a different type of syntagm or form an Arab usually reads in or hears on Al-Manar news: Israeli occupation army killed 3 Palestinians in Gaza Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 8 June 2006 Israeli occupation kills 3 Palestinian resistance fighters and injures 7 civilians Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 11 June 2006 Israeli occupation kills a Palestinian in the West Bank hours after a Gaza missile strike killed 11 Palestinians Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 14 June 2006 We may observe that the use of a particular syntagmatic structure, such as x killed y rather than y was killed gives Al-Manar’s texts a narrative dimension familiar to its audience, where the convention is based on this sequential or causal relationship to represent the news about Israelis and Palestinians. This particular and constant structuring in Al-Manar’s news representation about the antagonist gives the text a particular functional meaning. In addition to this linear combination, signification takes place on a different axis – the paradigmatic axis. Let us now consider this other rule regarding sign selection by envisaging it on a “vertical axis”. In this way, carnage as we read in the above example can have paradigmatic relations with one of the following signifiers which are absent from the Reuters English text for example: ↓ the attack ↓ the blast site
Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002
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These last signifiers are from the Reuters Arabic text published to the Arab audience on the same event. The Arabic version provides a good example of the different structural contexts within which news items are constructed on a different paradigmatic axis by different producers involved in a particular political struggle. Let me now illustrate how the news can be structurally constructed on these axes or how signs make sense by using the above examples from both English and Arabic Reuters. Here, we need to look at the equivalent relations of combination and substitution in the Reuters Arabic text. This is envisaged in Figure 2.11: Powell → got → a firsthand → view → of the carnage… (Reuters English) Powell → got → a view → of the blast site…
(Reuters Arabic)
But → ignoring → what → Arafat aide → called → “massacres”→ by the Israeli army (Reuters English) While → ignoring → completely → the massacres → which → the Israeli army → has committed → during its military campaign (Reuters Arabic)
Figure 2.1 The syntagmatic (→) and paradigmatic (↓) structures of the political sign
The Arabic representations above reveal a new surface structure. The signs or the linguistic elements are combined and arranged in a different way, e.g. by adding the evaluative adverb completely. Similarly, the paradigmatic relations unravel the new choices or relations of substitutionality to articulate particular belief systems and the involvement of the text producers in the text functions. These syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes are the very foundation of approaching discourse analysis in this book. For example, the critical discourse analysis scheme in Chapter 6 will refer to this structuralist approach to the sign by looking at the particular syntactic structures of words and the choices made by the text producer. By envisaging and representing the syntagms and paradigms of a political sign, the analyst can disclose a structural context within which signs are interpreted, and where their resulting ideological meanings are generated. Rather than adopting the notion 1. Hodge and Kress (1988) state that agents, objects, actions and circumstances should be classified and reclassified on the syntagmatic and paradigmatic planes respectively.
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
that signifiers have fixed conventional meanings, we may then assume that a political sign in media discourse is based upon social and ideological differences and oppositions. Saussure’s structuralist base within which signs are interpreted is pivotal to the understanding of how other media producers including journalists (e.g. in the Arab world) perceive foreign codes in the English texts and reject them as biased. This approach is illuminating in that it can be used to reveal how their signification is unconsciously reassembled on different combination and selection axes to make them ideologically “functional” in the journalist’s own culture. This functional concept will have a bearing upon further functional analysis in our study of Arab media discourse, especially when the linguistic choices examined in the critical discourse analysis scheme later on in this book are probed on the paradigmatic plane. Having seen that signs can be framed or constructed differently on the vertical and horizontal axes to take a particular form and content, we conclude that these apparently fixed codes have socio-political complexities. But before investigating the other invisible meanings of the sign, it is necessary to test another fundamental role of the sign in political reports, in other words, to examine its pragmatic meaning to see how one further makes sense of the sign. In another dominant tradition, Peirce (1931–58) introduced an influential model of the sign, according to which the value of the sign is no longer constrained between a signifier and a signified. Signs start to have successive interpretations when a signified can even become a signifier. It is necessary at this stage to enter the mind of the interpreter of the sign and see how media recipients “make sense” of realities. In this approach, meaning is a process involving three elements in a triadic model: 1. The “representamen”: the form of the sign, for example the word Hezbollah or Hamas we read in a media text. 2. The “interpretant”: the understanding or sense one makes of the above word (e.g. terrorists vs. freedom fighters). 3. The “object”: The thing which the sign stands for (i.e. militant group/ guerrilla fighters vs. a legitimate organization). Figure 2.2 illustrates the semiotic activity responsible for sign interpretation: Interpretant: Sense (e.g. freedom fighters vs. terrorists)
Representamen: Sign form (e.g. the word Hezbollah)
Figure 2.2 The semiotic triangle of the political sign
Object: Referent (e.g. legitimate organization vs. militant group)
Arab News and Conflict
Peirce’s interpretant is similar to Saussure’s signified. Similarly, interpretation comes from conventional rules or habits. However, the interpretant is not constrained within the sign. It is triggered through the individual’s interpretation or through a kind of “dialogue”, i.e. a more or less cognitive process. The interpretant itself could be a sign triggering further interpretants in one’s mind. As Peirce notes: A sign… a representamen is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. (Pierce 1931–58: 2.228) This definition is essential to an aspect of “meaning-making” of which the text receiver is normally unaware. For instance, a sign like a Palestinian bomber stands for a terrorist to a westerner. Paradoxically, it stands for a martyr to many Arabs. This is because different recipients interpret objects by means of their own conventions and habits. Peirce’s representation of the action of the sign is fundamental to our understanding of the subjective and cognitive dimensions of context, since the political sign can only make sense and be relevant when it is shared between the sign producer and the interpreter of the sign. Let me demonstrate with further examples how this semiotic activity works in times of conflict. Consider these cases of media translation from AFP texts into Al-Manar texts (examples collected from an Al-Manar news team): Israeli forces Palestinian suicide bombers Israeli forces killed armed militants AFP source texts
Zionist occupation army Martyrs Zionist occupation army martyred resistance fighters Al-Manar target texts
We may observe that receivers’ interpretations, whether of legal Israeli forces or Zionists, have already been established as habits within a customary discourse. In other words, they have become subjective. We observe in Al-Manar’s examples that both the editor and the journalistic translator decide to empty the source text sign of its original validity and response because they share a different sense with the Arab audience. This brings to attention the taken-for-granted beliefs that give the political text its sensitivity. Hence, the Arab text producer chooses to replace
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
signs rather than relaying the source text form or interpretant. It seems to be a prior decision that foreign interpretants which are politically sensitive should be constantly replaced. In the Arabic texts, the new representation cannot be seen simply as a matter of submitting to the force of the sign. The Arab producer is obviously relaying his or her own interpretants in a new form. This is a particularly clear example of the assumption that ideological forces are largely responsible for the malfunctioning of the triadic action of the western text into the Arabic text. Having seen that signs have non-neutral structures (whether dydadic or triadic) and habitual or unconscious interpretations, I postulate that they also have motivated meanings. In the next section I will identify and analyse the system of meanings that underlies the politically motivated sign in media discourse. Analysing the motivated meanings of the political sign Motivated meanings can be viewed in terms of the social context in which meanings are constructed, or in terms of the underlying mythic elements which support a society’s vision of itself and its history. The subjective way that individuals classify possible oppositions into what is the norm and what is the marked, (which deviates from what they regard as the norm), provides another facet of motivated meaning. The social semiotic meaning Let us at this stage assume that political signs are non-neutral linguistic choices by media users, namely functional in their social meaning as well as intentions. They are indicative of social, cultural and political meanings. To introduce the analysis of the social system of meaning, I refer to the work of the British linguist M. A. K. Halliday whose noted theory on social semiotic (1978) promotes the socio-cultural meaning of the sign. This functional approach of social semiotic builds on Saussure’s structuralist base, (syntagmatic and paradigmatic). However, the interpretation of the sign is now seen as closely attached to wider social contexts including social values and a whole culture. Rather than attributing it to conventional or abstract systems, Halliday focuses on language in use (parole). Signs must be related to surrounding events, users and the relationships between individuals which are part of the structure of society. By stressing this social context, we start reflecting on the contexts that generate texts and discourses where language becomes “functional” and “communicative”. Having seen in the previous section that signs may have fixed structures or models, we can posit that signs also have fixed or prior meanings at the social and communicative level. But how are those socio-functional meanings created? Halliday offers another triadic system of meaning: meaning as “content”,
Arab News and Conflict
“participation” and “texture”. These meanings we make are termed by Halliday “functional- semantic components”. To illustrate, Halliday (1978, 1994) defines three meta-functions in the semantic system: 1. “Ideational”: meaning as “content constructing a model of experience”. The ideational or the representational meaning is concerned with what the news event is about, i.e. expressing content and world view. Consider the following recurrent representations in the Arab news whenever there are military clashes between the Israelis on one side and the Palestinians or the Lebanese on the other: Repeated Israeli aggressions on Lebanon that severely damaged its infrastructure and killed innocent civilians… Source: Al-Mustaqbal Arabic text, 15 July 2006 Gaza is on fire Israeli occupation air force launched its sixth air raid Thursday on the Strip Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 17 May 2007 2. “Interpersonal”: meaning as “participation enacting social relationships”. The interpersonal meaning is concerned with what the news event is doing, either as a written or verbal exchange between a text producer and a text receiver to convey the speaker’s relationship with his/her audience. Consider the sympathies relayed to the respective audiences in the following Reuters English text vs. The Reuters Arabic text: West Bank raid after bus bombing Israeli tanks have entered the West Bank city of Jenin, drawing fire form Palestinian gunmen, after a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 19 Israelis in Jerusalem, witnesses said. Israel’s security cabinet had just ended a meeting called on Tuesday to consider what was likely to be a harsh military response to the morning rushhour bombing, which destroyed a municipal bus filled with school children and commuters. Source: Reuters English text, 18 June 2002 In the Reuters Arabic text published on the same event, we observe a different interpersonal function seen in the following excerpt: Israel’s security cabinet has just ended a meeting to discuss what was likely to be a harsh military response to the Palestinian attack which took place on Tuesday morning and destroyed a full bus. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 18 June 2002
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
3. “Textual”: meaning as “texture creating relevance to context”. The textual meaning is concerned with how the news report is organized with relation to the surrounding situation or discourse in terms of aspects such as text structuring or the choice of lexical items. Through the textual function, the construction of political texts becomes possible or “enabled”. Consider the textual pattern in the following examples which become recurrent in Arab media discourses during times of Palestinian-Israeli clashes: The Islamic resistance… Palestinian resistance groups… the martyrdom operation… fighters martyred… a response to the assassination of…
Viewed in this way, we can distinguish in language use a referential or cognitive function seen within the ideational meta-function, and a non-referential or expressive/ emotive function seen within the interpersonal meta-function. Jakobson (1996) adopts a similar approach with regard to the functionality of language within interpersonal communication. For example, a sign might be “referential” in function if the user intends to impart information; “expressive” to express attitudes or “phatic” to establish or maintain social relationships or communication. A more detailed empirical analysis of how these functions can be seen in the text strategies used by a producer will be given in Chapter 6. As we shall explore later in our critical discourse analysis, Halliday’s triadic system of meaning is actualized by a range of textual devices such as: – Transitivity: responding to the ideational or representational meaning or function; that is to say, what the clause is representing, its process, participants and circumstances. – Mood and modality: responding to the interpersonal function; namely, whether the text producer performs the function of informing or evaluating. – Themes and cohesion: responding to the textual function; in other words, how the media text is actualized in terms of structure and texture. At this point we can see that signifiers or objects in the news text are functional linguistic choices constructed by social and experiential meanings: that is a particular world view, relationships and attitudes. Every structural choice made, for example in syntax or vocabulary, can be seen in relation to a meta-functional system (experiential and interpersonal). Halliday’s semiotic perspective paves the way for a more comprehensive approach to language in the news, for we should start interpreting forms and texts in terms of our social experience and judgments as users of a sign. In another study of “social semiotics”, Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (1988) emphasize that the social meaning of the sign should be related to wider contexts. Signs must be seen as indicative of power, control, historical force, conflicts or agreements. In this context, Hodge and Kress refer us to “ideological complexes” and
Arab News and Conflict
“logonomic systems”. They explain: “An ideological complex exists to sustain relationships of both power and solidarity” (1988: 3). According to this concept, the dominant groups construct the world in a manner that serves their interests over the dominated. This domination can succeed only when the dominated show their solidarity with these structured realities. However, the ideological complex cannot function without another mechanism that controls both “production and reception of meanings”. This semiotic mechanism is labelled by Hodge and Kress a “logonomic system”: from the Greek logos, which means a thought or system of thought, and also the words or discourse through which the thought is presented, and nomos, a control or ordering mechanism. A logonomic system is a set of rules prescribing the conditions for production and reception of meanings; which specify who can claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive, understand) meanings about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why). (ibid: 4) How can this logonomic system be applied to our study of media discourse? At this stage, the analyst needs to question relationships of power and solidarity, the way participants, their actions and circumstances are classified in the text, as well as the “production” and “reception” regimes between news producers and news receivers which eventually add an important component to the manufacturing of news. Let us in the following example consider how participants, their actions and circumstances can be classified in news representations: Compare the following excerpts from different versions of Reuters texts: Arafat has been trapped in his headquarters in Ramallah surrounded by Israeli tanks since March 29, when the Israeli army launched a sweeping offensive in the West Bank after a suicide bombing killed 28 people in an Israeli hotel. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 The Israeli tanks have been surrounding the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah since March 29. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 The Arabic representation shows that the Arabs are constrained by a different logonomic system. That is to say, an Arab consumer of this message will not accept, for instance, the reasons or conditions stated in the English text to justify Arafat’s entrapment. The reception regime in the Arab media would lead to a protest, if the solidarity with Israelis or circumstances of reality exhibited in the English text were relayed into the Arabic text. Also, the classification in the English texts of Palestinian bombers as active agents in killing actions on a regular basis does not seem to
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
be the case in the Arabic text. In this news narrative, the Arabic text would rather foreground Israeli tanks surrounding Arafat. To the Arab audience, this new representation of reality seems to be more reliable, factual and credible than the English representation. By observing both reception and production regimes, we become more aware of the belief systems that control the reality of a motivated political text, particularly in times of political struggle. As Hodge and Kress clearly put it: Social semiotics cannot assume that texts produce exactly the meanings and effects that their authors hope for: it is precisely the struggles and their uncertain outcomes that must be studied at the level of social action, and their effects in the production of meaning. (ibid. 1988: 12) Let us take another example and see how production and reception regimes are responsible for our non-neutral representation and interpretation of the political sign. Consider why the following representation taken from The New York Times on the same event cannot be represented similarly in the Arab media: Arafat responded with the statement denouncing terrorism - the kind sought by President Bush so Powell could go ahead with his postponed meeting with Arafat in Ramallah, where Israeli troops have confined the Arafat to his office. Source: The New York Times, 13 April 2002 Obviously, the US discourse of power over Palestinians has its own classification system and reception regimes, which implicitly contribute to constraining the western interpretation of the political sign. This example reflects different bonds of solidarity in American media, i.e. it sustains the “social fabric” between ruling editors and the ruled audience who both agree that ‘Palestinian terrorism’ should be clearly condemned. Naturally, we cannot expect reciprocity of solidarity in such situations to be endorsed by the Arab media. If, for instance, the representation of the Arafat is applied in the Arab media, a protest will follow, since the general logonomic system of an Arab recipient will not allow this naming practice to be consumed by the audience without offence. We may now consider how this event, its circumstances and modalities were represented in the Arab media: Arafat’s statement comes as a response to US pressure. Washington stipulated that Arafat denounces what it calls terrorist operations in order to organize a meeting between the Secretary of State and the Palestinian President. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 13 April 2002 Similarly, Al-Manar representation (e.g. naming practices, classification of agents) has its specific reception regimes. The editors, broadcasters, translators work under the constraints of their own logonomic system to ensure the functioning of
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Al-Manar’s ideological complex. Examine the following representations of the enemy an Arab would constantly receive from Al-Manar: The invading American forces killed 8 civilians… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 5 April 2003 The occupying soldiers had the audacity to hang Attari, Qassas… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 7 January 2004 Israeli occupation army continued on Monday its crimes against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and occupied West Bank… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 4 February 2008 More Palestinian martyrs joined their antecedents Wednesday and followed the path of martyrdom. Israeli criminal hands continued their crimes against the Palestinians aiming to undermine their resistance against the occupation and tighten the siege against them. In its latest crimes, the Israeli occupation forces launched Wednesday afternoon an air strike in a northeastern neighborhood of Gaza City killing two Palestinians and injuring two others. The identity of the martyrs could not be specified yet. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 27 February 2008 Another useful notion that we can apply here is what Hodge and Kress call “modality markers” or cues in a text, which reflect beliefs of that group about the truth, reliability and facticity of the representation. In our case of news representations, these modality markers or cues indeed reflect the sense of security of particular social and political systems, the beliefs of a particular media outlet about the reliability of a message, its accuracy, or credibility. Consider the above judgements about the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians in expressions such as had the audacity to, joined their antecedents, continued their crimes, or the description of US forces as invading forces which draw on the Arab’s knowledge as well as beliefs about the political situation in the Middle East. Modality also implies the position of participants in relation to their semiotic system, how they make sense of political signs according to their relevant experience of the political struggle in their own countries which is endorsed by the medium they watch or hear on a daily basis. How recipients contest, control or accept this semiotic activity, is elaborated in the detailed text analysis in Chapters 4 and 6. Before we leave this section, it should be pointed out that in contrast to the assumption that a sign is universal in its meaning, the meaning in a sensitive political text builds on world views, relationships between users, and struggles between warring societies. Power, control and different consumption regimes seem to characterize the news text and its semiotic structures (i.e. syntagmatic and
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
paradigmatic). If we contest a particular socio-political meaning of the sign, then our textual representation will differ. Another important question may be whether there are other invisible meanings behind the sign construction or interpretation. To pursue this task, I will refer next to another kind of meaning which is responsible for our taken-for-granted interpretations of the political sign. The mythical meaning Ever since the creation of the state of Israel in the Middle East, there has been a dominant political myth in the Arab world: Israel is a powerful occupying entity. This myth is seen in media images, and in many daily narratives in the Arab media. Indeed, it is stereotyped in a coherent system through public, professional or government discourses and political speeches, through the educational systems in the Arab world as well as through historical narratives. Every society or culture has mythical meanings behind their discourses and these meanings which underlie a form of discourse are endorsed as a universal truth to that particular society. The word myth may cause confusion because it is sometimes used to mean falsehood. But, what is exactly meant by political myths regardless of the concept whether they are false or true? In whatever version a political myth can take, how can its marked narrative become like a ritual, a belief that makes us understand meaning in a particular way; for example, to explain the reason for wars or for fighting over territory; identify a common enemy vs. a heroic group? In order to interrogate the mythical meaning of the political sign we need to understand its mythical structure as well as its orders of signification. By attempting to do this, I will simultaneously bring the Arab myth, through concrete examples, into a terrain that is not its own. Namely, I will present the mythical meaning in the Arab media to non-Arab readers, in order to demonstrate how every society has its own commonsensical beliefs and naturalized causes for a political conflict. At the same time, I will cite examples from different international media discourses on the same events to show different systems of meaning. This method will make us question the dominant cultural and ideological code under which meanings become naturalized. The narration of news stories from an opposing ideology has its own claim to truth and promotes political, ethnic, religious or ideological interests that cannot be denied in times of conflict. My explanations in this section may touch on very sensitive issues taken for granted by media audiences in different societies. My aim is not to say who is right or wrong, but to invite the critical analyst to capture another important semiotic meaning behind a media discourse. To understand the structure of the myth in language and the way its meaning is crystallized into the news story, two important conceptions of the myth, offered by
Arab News and Conflict
the French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and the French cultural semiotician Roland Barthes, need to be considered. Their conceptions will then be related to our semiotic analysis. Lévi-Strauss (1972, 1978), who was influenced by the Saussurean structuralist thinking, explains that a myth is a structured system of signifiers, whose internal sets of relationships are used to chart the structure of other sets of relationships; the content is infinitely variable and relatively unimportant. In his analysis of myths (e.g. Oedipus myth, North American myth and South American myth), LéviStrauss examines the underlying structure of relationships between the fundamental elements of the story, as well as the underlying oppositions rather than the content itself. He proposes the reduction of the myth to its smallest or fundamental units – its “mythemes”, in an analogy with reducing a music note into “tonemes” or language into “phonemes”. Each mytheme is a sentence performing a particular function, or is one event in the story. Mythemes with the same function were given the same number and bundled together and relations were then found. When we read the mythemes, we are not merely reading content, but their unique structure as existing in a single moment in history, every moment, yesterday and tomorrow, i.e. its “totality”. In our case, how can this be applied to analysing media-made myths? To question the mythical meaning in a news story by a particular media institution that has a particular political position about a particular conflict, the analyst should not find meaning in the individual narrative, but in the patterns or the kind of order which lie beneath the myth of a given culture. In an analogy with Levi-Strauss’s’ analyses of myth structures, I suggest reducing stories with similar ideology, even if they have a different content, to fundamental units or a series of the shortest possible sentences consisting for instance of a relation between a subject and a function. Then, the analyst should look for sets of relations developing from similar patterns. Lévi-Strauss calls the sets of relations “bundles of relations” or themes developing from certain patterns. The units eventually form relations with each other, especially if we base them on opposites (e.g. occupier vs. occupied; enemy vs. martyr; outgroup vs. ingroup; Israeli vs. Arab). Let me make this claim concrete by examining the following examples taken from popular Arab media outlets. We can try to reduce the events into mythemes and then lay them out in a pattern to find a particular structure existing in common Arab media discourses about the Arab-Israeli conflict. An Arab analyst would notice that this structure falls on what Lévi-Strauss calls the “synchronic” (up-and-down) axis, in “reversible time”. In other words, it exists in a single moment in Arab history, every moment in Arab history – yesterday as well as today as well as tomorrow. Any Arab may agree that the structure about the Arab-Israeli conflict has been in existence in the same basic shape since the creation of the State of Israel, as well as now and in the future, in the majority of Arab media discourses (e.g. in political reporting, political speeches, and commentaries). The examples below have different content
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
about different victims. The reader is invited after reducing the texts into the shortest sentences to find a common function or theme that reflects the above political myth about Israel being a powerful aggressor or occupier in the Arab world. The martyrdom of tens of people, including children, in continuous raids on Gaza… 2 Palestinian workers from the electricity sector were martyred in an Israeli shelling on Khan Younis… earlier 2 Palestinians were martyred in an air raid on Gaza. An Egyptian child was martyred after she was wounded… bringing the toll to 20 martyrs on Thursday, and to 31 martyrs, including 10 children, since the beginning of the Israeli aggression on Wednesday … 4 children from one family were martyred in a raid… Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 29 February 2008 37 martyrs and Israeli invasion “in the spring” Confronting “the axis of evil” by slaughtering the children of Gaza A real inferno Gaza lived yesterday after the occupation had emptied the lava of its bloody military machinery on Gaza’s streets, houses, and on the heads of its inhabitants in a day of crazy pounding that reaped the lives of more children, raising the toll to 37 martyrs and tens wounded of the open war in the strip and the West Bank… Source: Assafir Arabic text, 29 February 2008 Israel adds Gaza to its historic list of massacres Kfar Qasem, Qbieh, Qana … Gaza. Israel added the strip to its historic series of massacre, since the usurpation of Palestine and still ongoing, after it had committed in Jabaliah camp and Al-Tuffah neighbourhood on Saturday and Sunday a gruesome massacre that reaped 83 martyrs… in the biggest death toll since the occupation of the strip in 1967, which embodied Israel’s threat of Gaza people in a holocaust that burnt in particular children and women; while the resistance succeeded in killing two occupying soldiers and injuring 7… Source: Assafir Arabic text, 3 March 2008 The Israeli death machinery reaps Gaza children… The Israeli war machinery reaped yesterday tens of martyrs and wounded targeting in particular the children amid Israel’s increasing threats that vowed to make the Palestinians pay “ a heavy price” to stop the launching of rockets… Source: Al-Mustaqbal Arabic text, 29 February 2008 Israel Martyrs 28 Palestinians, Including 8 Children Palestinians woke up early Thursday on what it seemed to be their regular alarm, the sound of Israeli rockets and raids. And instead of bidding farewell to nine martyrs, now they have to mourn 28, including eight children. Source: Al-Manar English version, 28 February 2008
Arab News and Conflict
Israeli occupation security forces struck a range of targets in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on Thursday, killing a total of 15 Palestinians, including four children. The deaths come a day after the occupation army martyred 13 Palestinians. Early Thursday evening, an Israel Air Force helicopter attacked a police roadblock near the Gaza City home of Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, in which Palestinian officials said one person was martyred and four others wounded. Four children - all under the age of 16 and three from the same family - were martyred in an IAF strike in Jabalya, a refugee camp in the northern Gaza Strip. Another IAF attack in northern Gaza a short while later martyred a Hamas resistance fighter. Earlier, IAF aircraft struck northern Gaza, killing another Hamas member and one other person. Source: Al-Manar English version, 29 February 2008 By putting this political myth on a binary opposition, we can compare the above structure about Israeli operations and Palestinian victims with the following structure about Palestinian operations and Israeli victims: Hamas Claims Responsibility for Jerusalem Attack The Zionist entity is witnessing one of its worst moments after it got an extraordinary strike in its heart of Zionism. Israeli occupation police were placed on a state of alert and upped security measures in Jerusalem on Friday after the heroic operation in the Jewish religious school killed eight settlers. “We brought in a large number of forces for the security of residents,” the city’s police chief Aharon Franco told military radio.
Eight students at the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in predominantly Jewish west Jerusalem were shot dead and dozens wounded late Thursday when a Palestinian from east Jerusalem entered the building and started firing...
The Jerusalem attack came after more than a week of escalated Israeli violence in and around the Gaza Strip, where more than 130 Palestinians were martyred in eight days, most of them were women and children. Source: Al-Manar English version, 7 March 2008 Hamas claims responsibility for Jerusalem operation amid international condemnation. The Islamic resistance, Hamas, claimed responsibility for the commando operation in West Jerusalem yesterday which resulted in killing 8 Israelis and the martyrdom of its executor… The US was quick to offer its condolences to the Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert, in a telephone call from the US President George Bush who described the attack as “barbaric”. In another telephone call the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said to her counterpart Tzipi Livni “this savage act has no place among the civilized, it is a shock for the conscience of all nations who like peace – there is no reason that can justify this act”. The State Secretary disregarded the fact that this attack
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
came after Israel had killed more than 130 Palestinians amongst whom the majority were civilians and children in continuous raids on the Gaza strip. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 7 March 2008 The Palestinian resistance changes the picture of war with the enemy. 8 Israelis dead and 35 injured in an attack on the first Zionist school in Jerusalem. It is the war in one of its most prominent stations. It is the will of the Palestinian resistance which does not break, in one of its most prominent manifestations and in one of its bravest operations, that has entered an essential modification not only on the balance of blood that has been shedding abundantly for a while in Gaza, but also on the general power balances of the Arab-Israeli conflict and on the ability of the Palestinian fighter to penetrate the State of Israel and to destroy its most important political and ideological sites… it is a heroic operation in all measures, especially in its timing and place. Source: Assafir Arabic text, 7 March 2008 Based on these real-life examples taken from the Arab media discourse, the analyst may attempt to reduce the Arab political myth about the Middle Eastern conflict by finding the smallest possible units. The Arabic narratives can be summarized according to a unifying function. For instance, the function of subjects being the ones performing the action, the type of operations or the features of victims which have additional functions in the narrative. We will observe that these units form relations with each other based on opposites of outgroup vs. ingroup. Eventually, we are likely to arrive at the following mythemes envisaged in Table 2.1 which are narrated in common Arab media discourses: Table 2.1 Mythemes of the Arab-Israeli conflict in typical Arab media discourses Israelis
Israeli operations
Palestinian Palestinians victims
Palestinian operations
Kill, invade, occupy, slaughter children and women.
Continuous raids, military force, massacres, bloody military machinery, death machinery.
Martyrs, innocent children and women, civilians.
Martyrdom Dead or injured, operations, occupying commando soldiers, settlers, operations, have US resistance condolences. movement, heroic/brave operations, can change the balance of power, extraordinary strike.
Resist, succeed in killing Israelis, claim responsibility for an attack, blow themselves up to retaliate, kill settlers.
Israeli victims
Arab News and Conflict
It is worth noting that this structure could be applied to similar conflicts in the Middle East between Israelis and Arabs. Consider how the above constituent structure can be applied to the following excerpt taken from an address by the Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora to the Lebanese people and published in Arab media discourses on the war in Lebanon: During these dark times my thoughts are with each and every one of you: Children huddling in fear in the shelters, those who lost a mother, father and/or sibling. I think about the mothers, the elderly, and those lying wounded in their hospital beds. I direct my thoughts to those that have been cut off from their families and driven from their homes while still being chased and targeted by Israeli warplanes. I shudder at the thought of those children, women and whole families that were massacred in the villages of Marwaheen, Al-Duweir, Al-Bayadah, and others that were killed in cold blood by the Israeli killing machine as they tried to flee in vain from its wrath… Lebanon has continued to bleed since 1948, the year of forced exodus of our Palestinian brethren from their land. Still the suffering and bleeding continues because of the repeated Israeli attacks on our country… Source: Lebanon Under Siege, Higher Relief Council – Presidency of the Council of Ministers, 22 July 2006 The pattern of the mythemes laid out in Table 2.1 is a basic structure in Arab media discourse and in the general discourses of the Arab populace. This pattern can be found in almost all Arab media outlets covering the current conflict in the Middle East, past as well as present and, forseeably, the future. Later in this book I will give this mythical structure accurate linguistic descriptions, bearing in mind that Lévi-Strauss’ structural conception of the myth is important because it invites us to question the way narrative structures in a given culture are reversible, and the way these structures seem to become commonsensical and passed down to the audience. Every political myth has a common structure and rules for combining the elements. It is also built on binary oppositions. The myth of the Arab-Israeli conflict, from an Arab point of view, has one particular aggressor (Israel), one particular worthy victim (Arab victims) and one specific reason (occupation). This, in turn, becomes a basic system of meaning which is responsible for both the construction and interpretation of similar news stories in the Arab world. The cultural semiotician Roland Barthes (1972) offers us another insightful account that we can apply in our analysis of the mythical meaning. Building on Saussure’s call for a science of signs, Barthes takes the relationship between the signifier and the signified beyond its conventional denotation or structure, to give it a cultural and ideological meaning. Barthes’ approach argues that the sign is capable of retrieving and connoting with larger sign systems where the analyst has
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
to be aware of the latent and connotative meanings of the sign. In this context, he introduces his concept of “myth” being a “global sign” loaded with values related to history, geography, morality and ideology. Myth is the actualization of particular meaning systems into our daily and lived experience; in our present study, political news reporting plays a vital role in naturalizing particular meaning systems seen as “heritage”. Theoretically, myth is the product of orders of signification, Barthes (1972): 1. The first order of signification (denotation) combines a signifier and a signified; that is to say, what the form is about. 2. The second order of signification (connotation) combines the above order, which now becomes a signifier, with an additional signified: (signifier + signified) + new signified 3. The third order (sign) combines the signifier and the signified and the myth is seen in this chain of connotations; in other words, in the totality of signs. Contrary to Saussure’s limited structure of the sign, a signified has the capacity to become a signifier on another level, giving the sign a chain of meanings. The “signification” of myth can be analysed in our model and exemplified by referring to some sensitive examples collected from the Al-Manar editorial team of the Arabic news. With this semiotic definition in mind, we can analyse the mythical meaning as shown below. First, here is the original English AFP text which Al-Manar editors have used as a source of information, in addition to other sources, to produce their own Arabic text: Positioning of Israel’s security fence awakens fears Israel will start building on Sunday a massive security fence along the West Bank to thwart Palestinian attacks, but the project has already raised tensions and sparked fears about its long term effect on the region…The Gaza strip is already walled off, reducing the threat to Israel from the area’s armed Palestinians. The new project aims to put an end to the legacy of porous borders between Israel and the West Bank that existed from 1967 until the start of the first Palestinian uprising or intifada… Measures, such as checkpoints and curfews, have only intensified since the second intifada erupted 20 months ago. Israel has come to view the West Bank as a launching pad for suicide attacks…The project aims to “prevent the infiltration of Palestinian terrorists and explosives into Israel”, the defence ministry statement said. The Israeli authorities are being very discreet about the exact nature of this defensive barrier, which will comprise fences trenches and walls equipped with electronic surveillance devices…To the right wing of the political spectrum, voices are being raised, warning that the path of the fence, should not
Arab News and Conflict
follow the Green Line in any way, for fear this would become the official frontier between Israel and a future Palestinian state… Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 Before we examine Al-Manar text, let us examine the mythical meanings in this AFP text to see why they are shifted in the Arabic text. All news stories have a mythical concept sustained by ideological institutions in that society. According to Barthes’ explanation, we shall begin with the first order. The signifier has a literal interpretation, meaning that Israel is building a fence (denotational). Through the second order, the association that is bound to be brought into play by a non-Arab is Israel’s security against Palestinian suicide attacks. In general, a westerner, for instance, is likely to understand the totality of this security sign if she/he connotes the following chain of causes: Palestinian terrorism, the infiltration of Palestinian terrorists, thwarting Palestinian attacks, Israel’s right to self-defence by building a defensive barrier, and probably also the connotation of time (post- September 11th), thus actualizing the myth of ‘the security fence’. The reader who is against Palestinian attacks will see in these signs a “causal process” or “natural relationships” to make the security fence myth functional. It is, as Barthes aptly puts it, a “semiological system” vs. “factual system”. Forms in the same AFP text like porous borders, Palestinian terrorists, infiltration become an “alibi” of the international myths we hear nowadays in international media such as, war on terror, the axis of evil, or even the myth of the security fence. The signified of one form leads to a new signifier combining with an additional signified in a chain of learned connotations. In this case, the form and concept of the security fence “closely corresponds to a function” (Barthes 1972: 119). Here, an Arab is likely to see in the above AFP text what Barthes terms a particular “mythical concept”, and the “appropriation” of the fence concept through this “literalness of meaning”, i.e. calling it security fence, makes it look “legal” and “innocent”. The “instrumental signifiers” in the same text, such as security fence, defensive barrier or reducing the threat to Israel, actualize the mythical concept of Israel’s security. As a result, the meaning system, such as that associated with the word security, becomes a mythology when it becomes the “natural” thing to mean security every time the wall is mentioned in the news. In Al-Manar’s representation which follows (as in all other Arab media outlets), the mythical concept of security is critically and constantly “suppressed” and shifted, which proves that political signs, as Barthes calls them, are essentially motivated. From an Arab point of view, the fence cannot conventionally signify security in the Arab media. Here, the conventionality of security is challenged by the
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
editor or journalistic translator. Consider how naturalized meanings in a western text can be deliberately questioned by Al-Manar editorial team: The occupying authorities will start tomorrow grabbing more Palestinian lands under the pretext of building what they call a security fence… Other Zionist circles warned against following the demarcation of what is called the Green Line for fear that this line would become the official frontier between lands occupied in 1948 and lands under the Palestinian Authority’s control. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 In this context, the new “global signs” are seen in the framing of the new signifiers such as grabbing. This form in the Arab world denotes seizure and has the connotation of grabbing or illegally annexing more Palestinian lands by force. Grabbing, becoming a new signifier, now connotes a new signified expansionism and Zionism, as one usually hears in the Arab media. This series of connotations in Al-Manar texts yields the sign of hostility to or threat coming from Israel. Furthermore, the modal expression, what they call, is another signifier and has the connotation of discrediting what the occupying authorities say. The other signifier in the same clause, occupying authorities, connoting other signifiers in the same text such as occupation since 1948 or Zionism, will lead to new values, causes and effects. This epitomizes Hartley’s view that “news is a myth-maker” (Hartley 1993: 30). Thus, signifiers in the news text become part of everyday news discourse and construct particular beliefs systems in the cognitive environment of the text receiver. It is obvious that the new linguistic system seen in the Arabic text is now interacting with a different myth, i.e. “a system of communication… a mode of signification” (Barthes 1972: 109) that is naturalized by history, ideology, geography and morality. The signifiers that the Arab editor has adapted in the new system have now become functional, and the new audience will even see them as facts, naturalized by a common Arab myth that explicitly views these actions as acts of occupation. I can further postulate that the Arab media, like any other media, has a major role to play when the editorial team decipher foreign ideological connotations that cause a threat to established systems of meaning. As we observe here, the Arab text producer is aware of a myth that has a different causal process. The text producer will intentionally “shatter” this meaning to make it a-functional. Returning to the above example, the producer cannot be seen as an “innocent consumer” of (e.g. the security fence). Barthes refers us here to “the activity of the reader,” who will not let the security myth “rob” the Arabic representation. Paradoxically, the Arab producer then submits to his or her own myth, where the new Arabic signifiers such as those we have seen above become the “accomplice” of the Israeli occupation concept. Consequently, one starts to see new causalities in the Arabic news text that will ultimately be reflected in causality in language structure.
Arab News and Conflict
A particular myth in politically motivated texts usually comes to seek a particular reader in a particular society; as Barthes notes: “it is I whom it has come to seek. It is turned towards me, I am subjected to its intentional force” (ibid: 124). This aspect of transitivity is investigated in depth in subsequent chapters, in which we observe particular structures in the circumstantial elements in the clause. Let me briefly clarify this issue by relating to the Reuters example introduced earlier on Arafat’s entrapment. See how the circumstantial element in the Reuters English news text, when the Israeli army launched a sweeping offensive in the West Bank after a suicide bombing killed 28 people in an Israeli hotel, is not represented in the Reuters Arabic news text. Compare the following excerpts from Reuters: Arafat has been trapped in his headquarters in Ramallah surrounded by Israeli tanks since March 29, when the Israeli army launched a sweeping offensive in the West Bank after a suicide bombing killed 28 people in an Israeli hotel. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 The Israeli tanks have been surrounding the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in his headquarters in Ramallah since March 29. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 We may then conclude that many such expansions or circumstances that incriminate Palestinian bombers are avoided in the Arab media. Simply, they are irrelevant meanings to the Arab audience and do not provide them with what the Arabs see as accurate circumstances for this conflict. Conversely, according to this semiotic conception of the sign, the selected events or circumstances which incriminate Palestinians in the western texts can only loom large in the memory of non-Arab audiences, and to westerners, could possibly connote suicide acts committed on September the 11th. The meaning-made aspects of politically motivated texts should be of equal interest to scholars and students of translation analysts as well; where the source text can be seen as an offer of information, which the translator or text consumer can then transform, keeping the informational elements but rejecting unwanted circumstantial elements. The implications of this aspect in translation analysis and practice are discussed at length in Chapter 7. Barthes semiological system also emphasizes the historical force of the sign that makes a particular code more functional and “natural”, for signs are full of taken-for-granted concepts naturalized by the processes of education, history, law, media, family, morality and government. Hence, a myth claims to be a scientific truth which does not need to be questioned. A political myth is also capable of identifying an enemy. Tudor (1972) elaborates the point that a political myth belongs to a particular group or race against an enemy it identifies. It establishes
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
many claims, such as the extension of territory, the occupation of a territory, or the abolition of unwanted institutions. He further states that all cultures have developed over time their own myths, consisting of narratives of their history, their religions, and their heroes. The political myth is “wishful thinking” or a device that influences reality and can select particular events for inclusion in a myth. We may further conclude that a media institution involved in reporting political struggle can “empty” or “abolish” myths from foreign ideologies. We will see in the following chapter how this subjective dimension of context is also sustained by hegemonic domination and ideological state apparatuses. These mythical insights, in addition to the above socio-political meanings will now pave the way for a consideration of the categorized meaning of the sign, or more specifically “markedness”. The marked meaning We have seen how Lévi-Strauss, in his structural analysis of the myth, stressed that the human mind likes to think in terms of binary oppositions or systems of classification to make meaning possible in a particular society. But how do we actually categorize meanings on the scale of oppositions? Are we really objective when we categorize victims in a political struggle either as terrorists, occupiers, or martyrs? How do we form our habits of categorization, thus judging some signs as being negative or unfavourable if they contradict with the dominant social form? These are core questions addressed in this section. The theory of “markedness” was laid out by the Russian linguist and semiotician Roman Jakobson. However, my account is not going to deal with abstract linguistic systems, but will be applied to real media discourse where we can observe marked textual practices. Jakobson’s theory invites us to consider the following concept: “Every single constituent of any linguistic system is built on an opposition of two logical contradictories: the presence of an attribute (“markedness”) in contraposition to its absence (“unmarkedness”)” (Chandler 2002: 110). Basically, markedness deals with paradigmatic opposition such as: good vs. bad, self vs. other, or martyr vs. terrorist. Here, the marked form is the one deviating from the norm, or “out of the ordinary”. This classification of norm vs. marked comes from the categorization of concepts that one tends to form subjectively. Let us see in the following example how nations in conflict cannot agree on categorized forms of reporting: A pro-Israeli recipient, reading in a media text the form ‘building a security fence along the West Bank’, is likely to think that this form is “unmarked”, “primary”, “less negative” or probably “more favourable” than another form read in many Arab media discourses, such as ‘building a separating fence in Occupied Palestine’.
Arab News and Conflict
To examine the concept of markedness further, let us refer again to the above representation of the fence by Al-Manar: The occupying authorities will start tomorrow grabbing more Palestinian lands under the pretext of building what they call a security fence. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 Naturally, a pro-Israeli is bound to interpret the Arabic form as “marked”, “secondary” or “less favourable”, i.e. biased, whereas, an Arab would interpret it as “normal” or “favourable”. This paradigmatic choice reveals the subjective interpretations of any politically sensitive media text. And the task of the analyst is not to take any form of reality for granted, but to unravel the marked through noting recurrent preferences in text strategy. Being aware of markedness can equally make one see how the unmarked becomes marked and made more visible by the opposing parties to the conflict. Looking into the marked meanings is illuminating in the sense that they move us to think of an ideological code which regulates signs to make them socially functional, natural, relevant and credible. By codes, it is meant there is no neutral reality between a signifier and a signified. The dominant code in any society is able to put pressure on the paradigmatic system to make signifiers appear unmarked. Let us see how the targeted media audience can be constrained by those dominant codes. Conclude what might happen to signifiers if they are replaced on the paradigmatic system. Will they cause ideological threat? I have collected some recurrent examples from both Reuters English and Reuters Arabic where signifiers on the same event have been replaced by the Arabic editors: (1) 17 months of Violence
Source: Reuters English text, 3 March 2002
versus The Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation Source: Reuters Arabic text, 3 March 2002 (2) Washington’s desire to keep a lid on ME violence Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 versus Washington’s desire to calm the situation in the ME Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
(3) The Palestinian uprising Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 versus The Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation Source: Reuters Arabic text, 15 November 2002 The Arab audience is likely to see the new signs which correlate signifiers and signifieds as ‘unmarked’, because they respond to the audience’s own political and social conventions. The Arab audience does not favour the signifier violence, nor its signified, for these signs tend to give negatively marked interpretations about the Palestinian uprising to the Arab audience. The Palestinian uprising against occupation is now the norm in a new categorization system. That is, to the common Arab audience, the new forms in the Arabic text will appear more favourable and unmarked. If the above English signs are relayed into the Arabic texts with their hegemonic meanings intact, they will only appear marked and loaded with negative or biased ideological codes. Examine another type of example taken from Al-Manar on events in Iraq: Three US occupation soldiers were killed in a rocket attack launched by Iraqi resistance on Wednesday in southern Iraq, the U.S. military said. The rocket also wounded two soldiers when it hit a military outpost outside Nasiriya. Source: Al-Manar English version, 13 March 2008 The same favourable meaning is seen in US occupation soldiers, which makes sense and is conceived as favourable to many Arab audiences because it is “dominant” and has been made “ordinary” by the audience’s favourite media outlet. As Chandler expands on the concept of markedness: The unmarked form is typically dominant (e.g. statistically within a text or corpus) and therefore seems to be neutral, normal, and natural. It is thus transparent – drawing no attention to its invisibly privileged status, while the deviance of the marked form is salient. Where it is not simply subsumed, the marked form is foregrounded – presented as different; it is out of the ordinary – an extraordinary deviational special case which is something other than the standard or default form of the unmarked term. Unmarked-marked may thus be read as norm-deviation. (Chandler 2002: 112) Hence, I can postulate that political signs, however they may seem to their own text receivers, have representations and interpretations that are marked. They are not neutral but motivated, because they meet the expectations and classification system of the target audience. And any binary oppositions that have been
Arab News and Conflict
naturalized by a media society reflect a suppressed ideological code. By unravelling the categorization system, the analyst starts to observe how meanings can be naturalized and how political signs become favourable or ideologically suppressed. I can state at this stage that meanings underlying our understanding of politically sensitive events are semiological rather than factual. They are built on fixed structures, have orders of signification, habits of categorization, and a logonomic system that regulates their production and reception regimes. Regardless of the facts regarding who is right or who is wrong in representing the news in times of conflict, we need, as analysts, to deconstruct the structures of both sides in the conflict and to de-naturalize the intrinsic meanings, in order to understand reality and politics in a critical way without the pressure of naturalization. Deconstructing the political sign So far, we have seen that the realities of political signs can be questioned if we analyse their fixed structures, conventional and mythical meanings, or semiological system. By pursuing this framework of analysis, the analyst can unravel more facts about political struggle and suppressed realities in media discourse. To gain a deeper understanding of how one should be brave and question taken-for-granted concepts in the media discourse, the final part of my semiotic enquiry of media discourse relates to the concept of “deconstruction” as proposed by the French poststructuralist philosopher Jacques Derrida. In contrast to accepting the stable meanings of the sign, Derrida (1991) argues that we should question all notions of decidable structures. Without adopting a fixed position, Derrida questions all decidable categories about texts, identities, or meanings by subjecting western semiotics to “deconstruction”. Deconstruction signifies a philosophy of destabilizing or disordering an established order of meaning or assumptions. An established order to Derrida is what is ruled by consensus. Such meanings have pre-determined signifieds, a fixed truth or decidable binary oppositions that control our minds and make our decisions possible. To interpret meaning, one must question the issue of how texts could be “contaminated”. Undoubtedly, this semiotic perspective begs closer attention to the ideological meaning of a politically sensitive news report. It also draws attention to the historical context or “historical themes” instituted by a society. Hence, decoding a foreign text entails the questioning of its embedded ideology, history, politics, morality as well as religious assumptions. Our study of political texts in times of conflict must now look at the boundaries between concepts and words until these boundaries become “blurred”. This means we have to look beyond the stable order of meaning in order to reach those invisible factors and conditions that control
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
them. Deconstruction can enable the critical analyst to see either sympathies or distance in politically motivated texts. Let us consider more examples to see why the analyst should bear in mind the concept of deconstruction. We have already observed that Reuters Arabic avoids the fixed meanings of Palestinian violence that are usually seen in Reuters English. We saw how it was replaced with Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. Let me develop this argument by moving to the representation of this concept in other Arab media outlets: The martyrdom operation in Jerusalem that killed 9 Israelis has proved that the Israeli security measures cannot deter the will of the Palestinians to move the battle into the enemy’s land; and further cannot deter them from fulfilling their warnings to retaliate against Israel’s war on Palestinian camps. Source: Assafir Arabic text, 4 March 2002 By considering the notion of deconstruction, we observe that the Arabic texts disturb the concepts of violence and suicide. These signifiers that have determined or hegemonic meanings in western media are in fact questioned in the Arab media. In this case, violence and suicide are no longer “absolute” and their meanings, according to Derrida, have “no prior presence”. For, an Arab journalist or editor cannot simply inherit a western myth that incriminates Palestinian bombers in this manner. Before relating them to the death of Israelis, Palestinian bombers are seen essentially by Arabs as sacrificing themselves. In the Arabic representation they are not seen as objects, but as young martyrs or blowing themselves up for desperate reasons to resist occupation. Within this semiotic approach, the identities of the Palestinians that were assured in the western text are no longer the same, and thus the meaning of suicide is not “closed”. It seems that the text producer tries to find relations with other signs that surround suicide in the Arabic culture; in Derrida’s terms: the value of the sign is “deferred”. In other words, a signifying element that is present bears the “trace” of absent signs other than itself. To an Arab subject, the sign suicide bomber is deferred differently in that it relates to an Arab’s previous experience and history bearing the concepts that suicide is forbidden in Islam, Arab lands are still occupied, and the Intifada or martyrdom is the only way. The signifying element relays the Israeli and Palestinian identities from a different structural decidability loaded with a specific history. Namely, signification in the Arab media finds relations with other signs rooted in Islam or Arab ideology. Hence, the differences in the Arabic text “interweave” via a different trace that a westerner cannot recognize. A westerner is likely to track the absent concepts of killing innocent people and Israel’s right for defence. Conversely, the concepts of resistance are likely to be absent from a western structure.
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The Arabic representation is now revealing that a politically motivated sign bears the traces of particular established structures and ideologies in the target situation, and that the text producer’s decision is determined by these constraints that either allow the foreign to be relayed or resist it. Derrida invites us to consider in our case, the “space in which such a decision comes to pass in terms of aporias – non-passages or impossible passages. If a decision were to take an established route, or passage, it would be following a pre-determined programme… it would therefore not be a decision” (see also Davis 2001: 93). We may say at this point that the Arab producer’s decision refuses to re-inscribe alien words which have political decidability imposed by alien forces. This is somewhat paradoxical, for in cases of media translation, deconstruction encourages responsibility towards the other by not passing on one’s own predetermined values. However, we will discover later on, in our case studies of translation in Part III, that the translator actually deconstructs the source text to guard against the political implications of a foreign authority that has already established its goals or routes. But in any case, a semiotic enquiry that deconstructs the political sign must examine the passages of both the ‘foreign’ text and what might seem as the ‘non-foreign’ text along with their manufactured truths and prevalent text strategies. Deconstruction will inform our analysis by making explicit the “implicit conventions” whereby decidable politics and power structures become more visible. So far, we have observed that deconstructing the established or pre-determined orders of the foreign text even through the act of journalistic translation indicates that there is a politically sensitive context of the “Self ” and the “Other”, a particular power structure and an institutional bias that need to be made more visible and critically analysed in this book. More specifically, there are ideological forces and alignments in political struggle capable of masking the political signs encountered in the daily news, thus naturalizing them. These important ideological issues that influence our interpretation of the code and sustain the non-neutral meanings of signs still need to be studied from an independent ideological perspective. This will be the scope of the next chapter. Conclusion This chapter has created a semiotic model to help the discourse analyst approach political signs in the media in a more critical way. Without being exhaustive, I have attempted to investigate and identify the important systems of meaning which underlie our study of media discourse in times of political struggle. With concrete examples, I have demonstrated that politically motivated signs can be first conquered if we analyse the frames of combinations and selections, the interpretant,
Chapter 2. A semiotic approach
the chains of connotations, the habits of categorization, the production and reception regimes between the text producer and the text receiver. I further argued that political signs are functional linguistic choices and can cause ideological threat if we tamper with their fixed structures or systems of meaning. Moreover, I argued that politically motivated signs are indicative of a semiological system rather than a factual system. The mythical meaning critically indicates that political signs have a reversible structure with naturalized causes. These important conclusions will have implications in this book for my description and analyses of text strategy; my development of the notion of relevance; the politeness principle; and skopos theory. These conclusions also draw attention to the kind of dominant ideologies that sustain the naturalized meanings of signs.
chapter 3
An ideological approach In recent years, the Arab media have raised the issue of foreign ideology, colonizing terminology, or hegemonic discourses that may be channelled by editors, journalists as well as translators from western media sources into the Arab media during times of political crisis, hence threatening established orders and regimes of truth in the Middle East. Most recently, the Arab media forum held in Tunisia in January 2009 which warned against Zionist propaganda in the international media. The Arab Media Declaration, issued in Cairo in April 2008 and signed by Arab information ministers, stated amongst other things that Arab satellite media outlets should: refrain from inciting any form of terror or violence, while distinguishing between this and the right of resistance to occupation; respect the religious, ethical and social values of the Arab community; protect the Arab identity from the negative effects of globalization; correct wrong information originating from foreign sources; and abstain from broadcasting subjects which endanger the unified Arab positions. Earlier, in a similar vein, the Arab leaders’ summit held in Beirut in March 2002 expressed similar concerns on ideologies of resistance. For instance, the Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad warned against the ‘new war of terminology’ imposed by foreign media. He stressed that accepting a foreign hegemonic terminology or its dominant taxonomies implies colonialism and pointed out that this foreign colonialism is more dangerous than military coercion and can be reproduced simply through using the same textual practices of the West. Al-Assad challenged all Arab leaders and media institutions to legitimate resistance in the daily practices of Arab media. Moreover, the Kuala Lumpur declaration by Islamic leaders held in March 2002, adopted a resolve to combat terrorism and clearly stated that the term ‘terrorism’ could not apply to struggles of resistance of people under colonial or foreign occupation. This consensus on the ideologies of resistance was re-affirmed at the 14th Islamic Conference held in Cairo in May 2002 where President Hosni Mubarak called for a distinction between the right of legitimate resistance and the terrorizing of a nation by continuing to forcibly occupy its lands. Following that, in the second Arab and Islamic Media National Conference held in Beirut in September 2003, it was asserted that Arab media must be extremely careful in
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selecting its terminology, especially when dealing with the Palestinian issue and that all Arab media organizations and politicians must unite when dealing with the Palestinian cause. The conference called upon the Arab and Islamic media outlets to resist what they consider as biased hegemonies and to capitalize on victimization of Palestinians and promote concepts of their heroism in the media discourse. Prominent figures pointed out that the media should address the imbalance that Third World victims receive versus Israeli victims and should resist colonizing terminology that imposes new world orders and distinctions. Similar calls are routinely voiced in the Arab world by leading spiritual and intellectual leaders in mosques and in media outlets against new threats coming through foreign media which suppress important ideological facts. These threats include categories of perception reflecting a colonizing social order, especially during a state of war or conflict with the enemy. The fact that such warnings against foreign ideologies which are likely to cause irritation and offence to the Arab recipients are, in practice, voiced more by Arab intellectuals and senior journalists and editors rather than through representatives of the Arab political systems, brings to attention ideological positions, commonsensical beliefs and the forces of identity, as well as sympathy-based elements behind media discourses. My aim in this chapter is to attempt to identify and explain those important ideological layers of context underlying the production of politically sensitive texts in the media, particularly in times of conflict. The proposed ideological framework will help the analyst explore this “made-legitimate” context which decides our sympathies and preferred readings with regard to a particular news event in the media reports. The selected ideological notions which I have found useful during this analysis of Arab media discourse can also be generalized to analyse any politically motivated discourse from a macro-perspective. The framework of analysis should be useful for the critical analyst in fostering the ability to explain, question, or contest the dominant ideological orders found in a media representation. It should also be useful for the politician, in order to heed the ideological notions in hegemonic discourses, and for the translator, in order to mirror the same “madelegitimate” context into the target text, depending, of course, on the purpose and the politics of translation. The interpellation of subjects by ideological state apparatuses There is no doubt that the forces of identity can reproduce group relations in a dominant social order, or a cognitive order which decides the recipient’s understanding of a particular political event heard or read about in the media. These forces of identity can also shape one’s ideological position towards a particular
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
bloody event and the governments or groups behind them. So, how do individuals become carriers of a particular social structure and how can this structure give them a particular identity, position or subjectivity? On this issue, I will make use of a useful Marxist-oriented notion offered by the French philosopher Louis Althusser (1971) and will then apply it to our case study of Arab media discourse. Briefly, Althusser draws upon the ideas of Marx and Engels who view ideology as dominant ideas and representations appropriate to specific ruling class interests. The Marxists draw our attention to what they call “false consciousness” where one fails to see things as they really are. This false consciousness comes about because a society’s superstructure that is determined by the economic or material base can conceal the real basis of the society. Because the ruling class controls the means of production in society, it can lead the ruled to believe that whatever it morally decides is for their benefit. This makes the ideologies of the ruling class accepted by the ruled as the undisputed system, being the “natural” way of things. Althusser’s important contribution to this theory is seen in what he named “Ideological State Apparatuses” seen in religious, educational, family and communication institutions which ensure the “reproduction” of the ruling ideology, i.e. they do not function predominantly by the repression of the State, nor by economic determinism. Ideological State Apparatuses, including the media, should be seen here as being integral parts in the wider social order that, without repression, help to reproduce the prevailing ideas of the ruling order. Another illuminating ideological concept can also be seen in what Althusser calls the “imaginary relations” of individuals to the real world. To explain this notion, individuals are born as abstract “subjects” but are transformed by their respective ruling Ideological State Apparatuses to be positioned in our case, for example, either as pro-American subjects or anti-Arab subjects, to reproduce a dominant ideology. This process, which Althusser calls “interpellation” or “hailing” of human subjects, is “not the system of the real relations which govern the existence of individuals, but the imaginary relation of those individuals to the real relations in which they live” (Althusser 1971: 155). Hence, people are made into agents of a particular social structure. In the same way as we can hail or address a person in the street, so does ideology address people and give them a particular identity or subjectivity in a given society. Although people can nowadays develop their own belief systems, one cannot deny that individuals are, in many ways, the victims of their own interpellation systems, whether through their own government, family, religion, or educational orders. An apparatus like the media by which individuals are daily subjected to massive inculcation and “cramming” of concepts (e.g. moralism, terrorism, martyrdom or suicide bombing), can forge one’s beliefs about the way specific subjects should be interpellated in a particular conflict, thus, imposing what Althusser calls
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imaginary relations between the ruling ideology and the ruled individuals. By way of illustration, as subjects, the common Arab audience are subjected to an Arab or Arab and Muslim authority, hence their understanding that a human subject who is also an Arab and undertakes self-sacrifice to liberate an occupied land is interpreted as performing an act of resistance to aggression and oppression – which is a key sensitive ideological issue in this context. Many Ideological State Apparatuses in the Arab world naturalize the discourses of resistance by hailing Arab fighters or civilian victims in the Arab-Israeli conflict as martyrs – contributing to the wider social formation of the Arab audience. The audience here seems to perform what Althusser calls “rituals” of a special interpellation system. In our case, the interpellation system in Arab media discourses ideologically hails those Palestinian fighters as ‘martyrs, or freedom fighters’, which is interpreted as a heroic identity, especially during times of violent clashes with Israel, rather than ‘murderers’ with a terrorist identity, as is the case in the West. This “ideological recognition” between the ruling and the ruled in the Arab world is inevitably met by “misrecognition” by a westerner, an outsider, or any individual who does not believe in the concept of attacking Israelis or the concept of suicide bombings. Naturally, the subjects in the West will not recognize a similar interpellation process, i.e. martyrdom. Therefore, we can postulate that ideological recognition is neither universal nor ruled by the same Ideological State Apparatuses. For this reason, the media text producers reproduce specific ideological relations (i.e. perceived relations between individuals and reality) which submit to different ideological or imaginary concepts. One may consider, for instance, how the Americans cannot accept the interpellation process of martyrdom, as illustrated in this excerpt from a speech in which President George Bush makes reference to the Middle East interpellation systems: I call on the Palestinian Authority and all governments in the region to do everything in their power to stop terrorist activities, to disrupt terrorist financing, and to stop inciting violence by glorifying terror in state-owned media or telling suicide bombers they are martyrs. They’re not martyrs. They’re murderers… Source: The Daily Star (Beirut) & Reuters English texts, 5 April 2002 It can be expected that the political media institutions in the West will naturalize the same process of subject positioning, i.e. terrorists, whereas the majority of the Arab audiences, will reject a representation that interpellates a Palestinian subject who carries out attacks against Israelis as “terrorist”. We might occasionally see other choices made by Arab media sources that do not support the concept of martyrdom, e.g. Annahar Lebanese newspaper whose editors and journalists would opt for suicide operations. However, An Arab is not likely to encounter in Arab media discourses a Palestinian subject hailed as terrorist.
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
Another important argument I would like to focus on is the positioning of the journalistic translator by his or her own Ideological State Apparatus, i.e. the translator is also subject to a different authority and might perform a particular interpellation system in the target situation. One might reflect on how this positioning has made the translator refuse to reproduce the relations of production encountered in Reuters English texts, via the following shifts: Dispatching Powell to the region was a risky move by Bush, who has come under fire at home and abroad for doing too little to stop the Israeli-Palestinian violence that has intensified over 18 months. Source: Reuters English text, 18 April 2002 vs. Bush’s decision to dispatch Powell to the region was a risky move after he had been criticized at home and abroad for doing too little to stop the IsraeliPalestinian struggle that has intensified since the outburst of the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation over 18 months. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 18 April 2002 Here, the journalistic translator, being an Arab subject, is seen to be hailed by different ruling politics to reproduce different imaginary concepts that perceive Israel as repressive state. This invisible adaptation becomes more relevant and advantageous in this context as the Arab audience submits to the same dominant belief. There is a further exploration of the issues of translation in Part III of this book. Having seen how politically sensitive media discourses can be constituted by a particular interpellation system and by a particular ideological recognition between the ruling and the ruled, it is plausible to say that this ideological layer of context underlies many of the representations of identity that one accepts as legitimate in the news. It also reproduces the ideological positions of ingroups against outgroups. Of course, there is another factor which helps to constitute these legitimized representations. We may want to consider at this point that ideology does not work merely through the coercion of the State Apparatuses, nor through the daily inculcation of the media apparatus, but also through the people’s consent. This additional concept will be the scope of the following section. Hegemony and consent One of the main objectives of this book is to enter the Arab’s communal conceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict. So, how do citizens constitute political conceptions and absorb a dominant political position? On this issue, I would refer in the
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beginning to some fundamental notions laid by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (in Forgacs 1988). After World War One, Gramsci developed some influential concepts regarding the structures of power in western capitalist societies. His conceptions of “hegemony” and “common sense” have inspired many media and discourse scholars interested in ideological studies. Hegemony, which comes from daily communication with others, implies the compliance of the civil society or the citizens in their own oppression. In other words, the elites equally rule by “consent” and individuals “educate” themselves in this hegemonic philosophy where they accept the dominant ideological influence which is supposed to embody their overall goals and interests. Gramsci highlights the key notion that language, being a channel of communication, embodies one’s worldview, culture, philosophy and history. Hence, we may agree that language of the media sustains particular relations of power, which become persuasively legitimized and almost invisible in one’s discourse production. Hegemony in media language will be viewed as articulating, justifying and maintaining the interests of the “fundamental” or ruling class, as well as winning the active consensus of those over whom it rules. Eventually, this will establish a collective will or a unified political subject over particular signifiers in common use. For example, if the West maintains in international media texts that Hezbollah is Lebanon’s Shiite Muslim fundamentalists/ terrorist group, western nations will, in general, through the influence of the media on the audience, legitimize this naming practice if it seems to be protecting their goals. Consider the following representations in the West about Hezbollah and its members: Israeli accused of spying for Hezbollah An Israeli national was charged in a Tel Aviv district court Thursday with spying for Lebanon’s Shiite Muslim fundamentalist movement Hezbollah, a sworn foe of the Jewish state… Source: AFP English text, 27 June 2002 or: Hezbollah Leader Issues Threat to Israel Hezbollah’s leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, told 10,000 mourners on Thursday at the funeral of a senior commander killed in Syria that Hezbollah was ready to retaliate “anywhere” against Israel, which it blames for the death. No one has claimed responsibility for killing the commander, Imad Mugniyah, one of the most wanted and elusive terrorists in the world, and Israel has distanced itself from any involvement. On Thursday, Israel ordered its military and embassies to heighten security… Source: The New York Times English text, 15 February 2008
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
vs. Lebanon Bids Resistance Leader Moghniyeh Farewell Indeed, the procession of martyrs never stopped, as it’s not meant to stop before complete victory. Once again, a great leader’s martyrdom had given the resistance movement momentum. Lebanon’s Hezbollah held a mass funeral for its martyred commander Imad Moghniyeh in Beirut on Thursday. Source: Al-Manar English version, 14 February 2008 Hegemony in the media, closely linked with the “common sense” of citizens, is important in the study of the structures of power in a given society. Common sense, according to Gramsci, is “the folklore of philosophy” or “popular culture” which in our case has been enriched with mass media culture that has entered into common circulation. It creates a “relatively rigidified phase of popular knowledge in a given time and place”. As Gramsci maintains, many of an individual’s conceptions are imposed and absorbed passively from outside, or from the past, and are accepted and lived uncritically. In our case, the common sense of the Arab audience is partly formed through certain elements in the media representations. Firstly, it is formed through their exposure to the wealth of details, statistics, and pictures the widely watched Arabic channels provide for them from the ground of conflict; detailing the damage in places of conflict (e.g. particularly damage inflicted on “Us”, as we will discuss later on in this chapter) and reproducing the collective memory of the Arabs, for example, Al-Nakbah, that is, the uprooting of the Palestinian people from their homeland when Israel was created in 1948. In addition, they are influenced by the detailing of the oppositional voices to the US and Israel’s collective systems, the constant linking of the Arab-Israeli struggle to Israeli occupation or Israeli aggression; or through the causes of this struggle, as explained by Arab political analysts, politicians or intellectuals. Such elements eventually create taken-for-granted presuppositions about this conflict. Common sense becomes a powerful factor in that it influences the citizens’ ideological readings of violent political events (see the references to cognition and relevance in Chapter 4), and becomes a quite established element of popular knowledge about a particular conflict in a given society. Hence, it is plausible to say that the different hegemonic structures lived uncritically in the Arab world articulate political and historic perceptions about the Arab-Israeli conflict competing with those prevalent in the west, i.e. there is a collective Arab hegemonic structure that has already been accepted by the Arab audience. To illustrate, when a political subject (e.g. resistance to occupation) is represented in Arab discourses it establishes what has been naturalized and made commonsensical. For example, for many of the Arab audiences, it will not be a common sense to articulate the suggestion by Bush quoted above “they’re not
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martyrs”. From this ideological point of view it is possible to explain why different representations occur in a context of differing hegemonies in a given time and society. It is also unlikely for Hezbollah to be labeled in the Arab media as “terrorists” for there is a different common sense in the Arab world that has been rigidified about this group being a resistance organization against Israeli occupation in South Lebanon. This is cemented as popular knowledge in the Arab world, especially within the current context of conflict with Israel. The American political thinker and linguist Noam Chomsky (2008) provides us with a clear explanation of this common sense lived and accepted uncritically in the Arab world or in the Arab media: Israel is annexing valuable land and the major resources, particularly water, and designing settlement and infrastructure projects so as to break the shrinking Palestinian territories into unviable cantons… All of these U.S.backed Israeli programs are, of course, totally illegal, in violation of UN Security Council orders… And the conditions for Palestinians under occupation are very harsh and brutal, as they have been for years… What about Hezbollah?... Hezbollah’s argument is that the only thing that deters Israel is guerrilla warfare. Nothing else prevents Israel from occupation. Israel had, after all, occupied Lebanon illegally for twenty-two years, with U.S. support, in violation of Security Council orders. (Chomsky 2008: 11–15) This explanation, which precisely articulates the commonsensical beliefs of the Arab audience, represents a very sensitive layer of the political context underlying representations about the Arab-Israeli conflict in Arab media discourse. And the role of the critical or political analyst here is to be aware of warring discourses, and of the common sense that lies behind them during times of political conflict. By questioning the confines of hegemonies from both sides of the conflict (during times of struggle), one can see who tries to dominate or suppress whom, especially through linguistic representations as we shall discover in more detail in the following chapters. In light of this hegemonic notion, I still need to examine the position of the Arab editor, journalist and translator. Let us now see how a team of editors and translators construct in practice their own hegemonic systems and commonsensical beliefs in the targeted texts to the Arab audience. Our next example is taken from an AFP text used a source text by Al-Manar editorial teams: US envoy William Burns called here Tuesday for calm on Lebanon’s border with Israel and for support of Washington’s “three-track” strategy for peace between Israel and the Palestinians… Burns said he “reviewed with President
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
Lahoud, President George W. Bush’s three-part strategy” to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Source: AFP English text, 4 June 2002 versus the version found in Al Manar: Burns called for calm on the blue line between Lebanon and occupied Palestine and for support of US efforts to re-launch the settlement process in the area… The American envoy said he discussed with President Lahoud the three-track strategy of President George Bush in an attempt to put an end for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 5 June 2002 The Arabic editorial reaction is part of the collective will maintained by Al-Manar’s audience, specifically taking into consideration the UN resolutions when reporting the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, both Al-Manar’s text producer and audience agree that the land is occupied Palestine and that terms used by them such as, occupied Palestine, or occupied lands in 1948, are represented as such in accordance with the UN resolutions. They also agree that the political situation in the Middle East is not an issue of crisis, but conflict and struggle over land that the US tries to settle unfairly. In other words, the target audience complies in the same manner with the same dominant ideology articulated through the text producer. Hence, with this consent, Al-Manar maintains a collective meaning accepted uncritically in the Middle East, and further participates in derailing the hegemony and common sense of a foreign ideology channeled through the AFP text, that implies a new world order. As the neo-Marxist cultural theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall (1982) succinctly puts it: “having secured the consent of the nation carries the stamp of legitimacy” (Hall 1982: 87). Having seen how politically motivated discourses can be equally legitimized through the “consent” of the targeted recipients in addition to a dominant hegemony, let us now deal with the role of the propaganda system in the manufacture of consent towards media discourses. Another important conception of hegemony is offered by the economist and media analyst Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky. Herman and Chomsky (1994) critically account for the importance of propaganda in the media by referring us to a very influential concept: “the manufacture of consent”. They explain how media biases reflect an underlying elite consensus that shapes all facets of the news. They argue that the owners of the mass media in the USA are powerful ideological institutions serving the goals of the elite in their society. These institutions rely on forces such as the market, business, wealth, power and censorship as a control mechanism to filter the news. Herman and Chomsky highlight five factors which work as “filters” through which information must pass: ownership and
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profit orientation of the leading mass-media firms; advertising as the most important income source of the mass media; sourcing of information which relies on government and elites; flak (the negative response to a media statement or programme which takes the form of complaints or punitive action by the powerful); and anticommunist ideology. Eventually, these help shape media choices, and “the premises of discourse and interpretation”. These forces are also able to ensure the world is portrayed in a way that reflects the interests of both rulers and buyers. In other words, money and power are behind the manufacture of the news and what is perceived as newsworthy, objective and credible is the result of a fusion of political, economic and moral objectives. A propaganda model controlled by the dominant elites and market-profit-oriented forces is not only capable of filtering the news, but equally of marginalizing dissent. Herman and Chomsky go on to say that seeing alternative ways of communicating news becomes difficult to imagine from within an established consensus. In the end, this system will create common interests and will start controlling dissident opinion. The alternative ways will require costly research and might even be threatening because: Messages from and about dissidents... are at an initial disadvantage in sourcing costs and credibility, and they often do not comport with the ideology or interests of the gatekeepers and other powerful parties that influence the filtering process. (Herman and Chomsky 1994: 31) Eventually, the media’s “systematic propaganda” is implemented without “overt coercion” to serve the power of the government which fixes facts in conformity with the priorities of the elite. And the audience, in conformity with the priorities of the elite. And the audience, who depend heavily and uncritically on elite information sources, ultimately participate in propaganda campaigns supportive to elite interests. To illustrate, in current news representations one can perceive systematic propaganda against terrorism, which is seen as the ultimate evil. In an analogy with Herman and Chomsky’s “filter of anticommunism”, the mass media mobilize the populace against this kind of enemy. As we observe, the majority of news outlets worldwide seem to collaborate in mobilizing the audience against this new enemy, terrorism. Those outlets usually succeed in eventually winning consent from the populace for this propagandistic “war on terrorism”. In this context, terrorism is seen as foreign or “ideological” because it submits to outside leaders and organizations that are not part of the belief that “we the people” rule. In Chomsky’s definition of terrorism (2002), he notes that the definition of this concept is vexing and complex, but “there is a solution. The solution is to define terrorism as the terrorism that they carry out against us, whoever we happen
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
to be…” (Chomsky 2002: 81). For instance, one finds in international media one common portrayal of ideological organizations related to Al-Qaeda. Moreover, one finds in western media a similar portrayal of Hamas or Hezbollah, such as ‘Radical Islamic Movement Hamas’, ‘Lebanon-based fundamentalist Shiite movement Hezbollah’ and ‘Lebanon’s Shiite fundamentalist movement Hezbollah’. However, most Arab and Islamic countries refuse to portray these two latter organizations as terrorist organizations. This propaganda on Hamas or Hezbollah is deliberately deleted from all Arabic media representations, for on this issue there is a counter-consensus which deviates from the US established line. The core issue here is that Arabs do not link struggles against occupation to terrorism and refuse to link acts of resistance to what they do consider to be terror attacks, like those carried out on New York in September 2001. This has been stated clearly in many Arab conferences held in the Middle East or in Islamic countries (e.g. Dakar Islamic conference held in March 2008). Another instance can be taken from Damascus 20th session of the Arab summit held in March 2008 where Arab leaders emphasized a similar call to the world about the Arab-Israeli conflict, with respect to what was defined as terrorism. The Damascus declaration termed Israeli attacks on Arab lands (e.g. Gaza) as “war crimes” and stressed differences between terror and the right of peoples to fight occupation. A more recent example on hegemony in the Arab world can be taken from Kuwait’s declaration issued in January 2009 in which the Arab leaders collectively condemned Israel’s attack on Gaza and described it as war crimes. Despite the diplomatic tensions among Arab leaders, the summit declaration reveals what is seen as commonsensical among all Arabs in the current conflict with Israel. Namely, a non-questionable established system of thought responsible for the final productions we see in the Arab media discourse in times of conflict. This counter-propagandic system eventually derails established lines of thought in the West towards those whom the West would classify as outgroups. It should be pointed out before we leave this section that in approaching a sensitive discourse in times of conflict, the analyst needs to identify the hegemonic instincts behind it. The hegemonic order which ensures the filtering of information, manufactures consent, and legitimizes a media discourse is indicative of power interests and most importantly, legitimizes its own reasons for a particular war against a particular nation. This in itself is an invitation for the political analyst to debate how political facts are shaped and legitimized rather than merely constituting the hegemonic position of his or her ideological state apparatuses. It is also an invitation for the critical analyst to criticize a political or social order in the news and to question issues of credibility and representations of truth, and for the discourse analyst to observe how this is reflected in text strategy to maintain existing hegemonic facts about a particular struggle.
Arab News and Conflict
In the earlier discussion in Chapter 2, we have seen that hegemonic discourses are constructed on binary oppositions. We noticed that they are entertained from a position that there is Us and there is The Enemy. Dominant hegemonies can be very resistant to counter-hegemonies. In my following section I will try to address this notion of resistance which is also part and parcel of made-legitimate contexts. Resistance and counter-hegemony Much is said in times of political conflict about resistance to foreign threat. Resistance discourses are usually constituted by political leaders or media institutions whenever there are outgroups posing a threat to Our established political order. Resistance to the foreign has a great deal of impact upon media representations as well as mass-media acts of translation. How can we address theoretically the conception of resistance to foreign hegemonies? Is this layer of context responsible for safeguarding national or hegemonic identity? And how does it legitimize a national discourse against foreign values or foreign threats? Whenever conflicts intensify, one hears about Us and Them, hegemony and counter-hegemony, the enemy, threat, self-defence or resistance. Parties to the conflict will vigorously mobilize their own media outlets to campaign against this enemy. Language becomes a powerful and aggressive tool in this conflict and so do the classification systems involved. The analyst will observe in the text particular reasons behind the sensitive event, or specific examples given by the text producer to make it more evaluative. Hence, reporting the event becomes less detached than the media outlet claims it to be. We see specific reasons and examples given in a politically sensitive text to make it more evaluative rather than being detached from the sensitive event. To explain this, let me focus on what actually happens in the text when conflicts intensify. The examples provided in this section should give us a clear idea about the basic contextual parameters that may characterize the discourse of resistance to foreign hegemony. Examine the following example taken from Al-Manar’s oppositional stance against the US categorization system of nations: Hezbollah issued the following statement: With regard to the release of a report by the US administration through which it gave itself the right to categorize peoples, states and movements, between those it calls moderates who are in harmony with its policies and schemes and those opposing it to preserve their rights, and therefore categorized as terrorists, the following points must be highlighted: First, the US administration is the major sponsor of international terrorism, the murderer of the largest number of innocent people yet and the biggest
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
seller of military killing and torture tools; therefore, this administration has no right to give others certificates of patriotism or terrorism, while it is forcing the peoples of the world including the American people to pay the tax of its mobile wars and the price of its bloodthirsty policies. Hence, when the US administration enlists certain groups on its terrorism list, it is in fact granting them a medal of honor, in the eyes of their peers. It is also categorizing itself and its allies as enemies of the forces of national liberation, who constitute the majority of the people worldwide, thus rendering itself unable to alter its ugly and barbaric picture. Second, releasing this report is, in itself, a blatant provocation and aggression against the targeted peoples and forces. It also constitutes a cover up for direct US massacres from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia to the rest of the world. It is a hush up for the US administration’s indirect massacres perpetrated daily by Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian people who have been blockaded with US arms, support and of course a US decision that has always been against the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds, as if these people have no human rights to defend their interests, determine their fates and live with pride and dignity. Third, the policy of sedition and internal strife has been exposed through the US administration’s instigation of its allies in Lebanon against their own people in the resistance and the opposition, despite knowing that they constitute the majority of the Lebanese people. This makes the US administration a godfather of the scheme of seditions and uncovers its real agenda. Yet instigation and scolding, its tools for failing to fulfill their commitments, will prove futile. However, this illustrates why the July 2006 war took place and explains the US administration’s foiled endeavors due to the Lebanese people’s triumphs over their plot and the Zionist scheme in Lebanon. Fourth, this flagrant US position confirms the soundness of the political choice by the opponents of the US scheme for hegemony and prompts them to adhere more to their elements of force, impregnability and defense. It also makes the peoples of the world more determined to face Washington’s despotic policy, given that it’s the number one danger and the most pressing threat to international peace and stability. On Wednesday the US State Department issued its annual report on so called world terrorism and categorized Hezbollah in Lebanon as the most capable and technical terror groups in the world. Source: Al-Manar English vesrion, 2 May 2008 We clearly observe from this counter-hegemonic discourse that it is governed by counter-categorization and counter-classification systems. It brings to our attention
Arab News and Conflict
the Other’s voice which is impregnated with oppositional stances with regard to the real source of threat, reasons for conflict, claims and anti-claims, belief systems (e.g. social, cognitive, experiential, religious, political) and the politics of identity. To demonstrate this argument more rigorously, let us compare the above example with the following excerpt taken from a speech given by the U.S. President George W. Bush during his visit to Jerusalem in May 2008: President Bush Addresses Members of the Knesset: We gather to mark a momentous occasion. Sixty years ago in Tel Aviv, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed Israel’s independence, founded on the “natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate.” What followed was more than the establishment of a new country. It was the redemption of an ancient promise given to Abraham and Moses and David -- a homeland for the chosen people Eretz Yisrael. Eleven minutes later, on the orders of President Harry Truman, the United States was proud to be the first nation to recognize Israel’s independence. And on this landmark anniversary, America is proud to be Israel’s closest ally and best friend in the world. The alliance between our governments is unbreakable, yet the source of our friendship runs deeper than any treaty. It is grounded in the shared spirit of our people, the bonds of the Book, the ties of the soul. When William Bradford stepped off the Mayflower in 1620, he quoted the words of Jeremiah: “Come let us declare in Zion the word of God.” The founders of my country saw a new promised land and bestowed upon their towns names like Bethlehem and New Canaan. And in time, many Americans became passionate advocates for a Jewish state… The fight against terror and extremism is the defining challenge of our time. It is more than a clash of arms. It is a clash of visions, a great ideological struggle. On the one side are those who defend the ideals of justice and dignity with the power of reason and truth. On the other side are those who pursue a narrow vision of cruelty and control by committing murder, inciting fear, and spreading lies… And that is why the founding charter of Hamas calls for the “elimination” of Israel. And that is why the followers of Hezbollah chant “Death to Israel, Death to America!” That is why Osama bin Laden teaches that “the killing of Jews and Americans is one of the biggest duties.” And that is why the President of Iran dreams of returning the Middle East to the Middle Ages and calls for Israel to be wiped off the map… That future will be a dramatic departure from the Middle East of today. So as we mark 60 years from Israel’s founding, let us try to envision the region 60 years from now. This vision is not going to arrive easily or overnight; it
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
will encounter violent resistance. But if we and future Presidents and future Knessets maintain our resolve and have faith in our ideals, here is the Middle East that we can see: Israel will be celebrating the 120th anniversary as one of the world’s great democracies, a secure and flourishing homeland for the Jewish people… Al Qaeda and Hezbollah and Hamas will be defeated, as Muslims across the region recognize the emptiness of the terrorists’ vision and the injustice of their cause… Source: White House press release English text, 2008: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080515–1.html Now, compare Bush’s text above with a counter-hegemonic discourse, taken from a speech delivered by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah to commemorate the eight anniversary of Liberation from Israel’s occupation to South Lebanon: Sayyed Nasrallah began his speech by praising the martyrs… “Our eighth anniversary coincides with the 60th anniversary of usurping Palestine and the establishment of the oppressive entity. It also coincides with the 30th anniversary of the 1978 Israeli invasion to south Lebanon. Hence this is a time to contemplate and draw lessons whether in Lebanon or in the Arab and Israeli worlds.” Sayyed Nasrallah said that the resistance has served as an example and a strategy in two areas: “There is a strategy for liberation and removing the occupation, and a strategy of defending the homeland and people in the face of aggressiveness, threats and an invasion…This is our message today to Lebanon and the Arab and Islamic worlds; it’s a joint message by the resistance in Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq to the whole nation…” Sayyed Nasrallah added that Hezbollah has also presented a defensive pattern. “Israeli judge Winograd wondered in his report how a few thousand men defeated Israel and withstood weeks of fighting. Your steadfastness, the blood of your martyrs and the resistance have decreased the possibility of war in the region between Israel and Iran or Israel and Syria. I tell whoever is bargaining on a US or Israeli strike on Lebanon, we fought in 2006 and we will fight in any coming war… I tell (US President) George W. Bush and (US Secretary of State) Condoleezza Rice, who spoke of Hezbollah’s defeat, that as long as Hezbollah relies on Allah and his people, you are the ones who will be defeated,” he stated. Source: Al-Manar English version, 26 May 2008 In order to explain oppositional discourses or warring discourses if you like, we need to identify the identity schema which lies beneath intense discourses in times
Arab News and Conflict
of conflict or during struggle for power. The two worlds of Us and Them has been discussed by many influential thinkers (Huntington 1997; Said 1994; Van Dijk 1998). Throughout history, nations tend to think in terms of the two binary oppositions of Us and Them which consequently decide on antagonistic relations, struggle or conflict with Them/ the Other, especially if the Other does not serve our prevailing values, or economic, strategic and power interests. This dichotomy of Us and Them which underlies the sensitive and subjective representations in political discourse, can inflame the patriotic or biased feelings of the targeted populace in times of political crisis. It is also responsible for many of the evaluative descriptions we see in the media discourse – descriptions we unconsciously accept and reproduce in our daily discourses because they touch upon issues of identity. Returning to our question on what constitutes resistance discourses, hence oppositional interpretations of sensitive political events, I would like to adopt Van Dijk’s (1998) conception of the “ideological group schema”. This concept provides a useful and simple explanation in this context. Van Dijk proposes that when groups are in conflict they usually identify themselves in terms of a “polarization schema defined by the opposition between Us and Them… and that groups build an ideological image of themselves and others, in such a way that (generally) We are represented positively, and They come out negatively. Positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation seems to be a fundamental property of ideologies.” (Van Dijk 1998: 69). Van Dijk goes on to cite examples of “Us (Westerners, whites) vs. Them (non-Westerners, blacks)”. If we return to our case of oppositional positions in the Arab media discourse, we may observe a counter-ideological schema seen in the following polarization which obviously “delegitimates” the western conceptions of the Arab-Israeli struggle: Us (Arabs, liberation fighters, resistance) versus Them (Israel, U.S. Administration, occupiers, oppressive entities). This counter-hegemony is part and parcel of ideological discourses. In resisting the authoritative ideology of the foreign, the Arabic texts become similarly filled with ideological content and challenging voices which seem to characterize intense discourses in times of struggle for power. Another important conception which the analyst can observe from the previous examples is what VanDijk terms the “ideological enemy”, which is attributed to Them. In the present study this enemy could either be for example ‘terrorists’/ ‘militants’ from Palestine or Lebanon; or ‘occupiers’/ ‘Zionists’ from Israel. We may recall a famous statement given by the U.S. President George W. Bush in 2001: You’re either with the civilized world or you’re with the terrorists. This enemy becomes
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
legitimized in all language practices and built into the media outlet itself. In a similar way, consider how this conception of the ideological enemy is represented in intense Arab discourses, especially when it comes from a popular resistance leader in the Arab world and in time of war. This excerpt is taken from a speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah televised on all Arab media channels: I begin first with the battlefield… because what is happening in the battlefield is the principal decisive element in the confrontation developments… Firstly, it is the blessings of the legendary steadfastness of the Lebanese resistance in the battlefield, of the Lebanese people, and of the whole of Lebanon in all its sects, areas, and institutions. It is obvious, until now, that the Zionist enemy has not been able to achieve any military accomplishment. It is not I who says so, they say so, the whole world says so, and the political military analysts say so. And when they talk about the continuation of war, they say the enemy [Israel] seeking to accomplish a military achievement which will enable it to enter into political settlement. Everyone admits that until now the enemy has not accomplished a military achievement. As for the destruction of infrastructure, the killing of civilians, the deportation of people, and the destruction of houses, this is not a military achievement in the military sense, this is a barbaric and brutal achievement that cannot be allowed to be invested at the political level. The enemy has not achieved till now any real military achievement, but has wide military failures, and has so far received severe blows on the military level… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 29 July 2006 As I have explained earlier, these different ideological positions and descriptions we see in the Arabic texts about the conflict in the Middle East have already won the assent of their own audiences, particularly the pan-Arab audience, who, in core, support resistance discourses against Israel and its allies in times of war. Another inherent feature is seen in the justifications and expansions given in the politically motivated text against the ideological enemy which will eventually influence the ideological reading positions of the targeted populace. Having seen that politically sensitive texts have their own hegemonic meanings and reasons, and their own group schema, it is plausible to postulate that the critical analyst should look into the social system and power relationships of a community to clarify the orders of what she/he considers as being the counterhegemonic discourse. This is important in enabling the analyst not only to find, probably, a different description of the state of conflict thought to be true by the Other’s discourse, but also to see who is trying to suppress important ideological facts about a particular struggle or a particular war, and who is in fact abusing power or practising oppression. In other words, the critical or political analyst
Arab News and Conflict
should not merely engage in his or her own preferred ideological readings, but also in studying the counter-hegemonic readings of other parties to the conflict. In this concern, I would refer the analyst to the reading positions we should consider while examining politically motivated texts: – accept the original interpretation and reproduce its dominant hegemonic code (preferred reading); or – partly accept the original interpretation (negotiated reading); or – resist the original interpretation (oppositional or counter-hegemonic reading). (see Parkin 1972; Hall, Fiske, Morely 1999). This is equally important for the journalistic translator who needs to decide on whether or not his or her own hegemonic reading positions should intervene in the process of translating politically motivated texts. We cannot deny that this act of resistance actually occurs in journalistic translation. See in the following examples how the Arab translator has intervened in the target text: 12 dead in Hebron attack... it was the deadliest against Israelis in the West Bank city since the start of a Palestinian uprising. Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 vs. Israel starts retaliation for the killing of 12 settlers in Hebron attack… it was the deadliest attack on Israelis in the city since the outbreak of a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation over 2 years. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 15 November 2002 Or: Al-Jihad announces its responsibility for the well-knit operation: Two martyrs turn an occupation camp into an inferno – 12 Israelis dead, one is a commander in Al-Khalil. Source: Assafir Arabic text, 16 November 2002 The oppositional readings we observe in the Arabic texts reflect the competing power interests at play. It is also clear that they presuppose different cognitive beliefs about this conflict. The Arabic text has its preferred reading according to what has been legitimized by the political structures in the Arab world and in terms of the oppositional reading to foreign or threatening representations. This will have implications for the discussion of relevance and translation in Chapter 7 where ideologies with a counter-hegemonic code become a challenging task for translators. In the next section I will explain how a society’s group schema which has already been legitimated by both the elites and the audience interrelates with another sensitive ideological notion- a notion which can inflame one’s sympathies or hostilities towards the victims falling in a given conflict.
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
“Worthy” vs. “unworthy” victims In Chapter 2, I argued that news narratives in a particular society are usually structured on binary oppositions where we tend to find one particular aggressor and one particular worthy victim, regardless of the number of events revolving around the same type of conflict. The interesting question is how can we address this important ideological notion of the worthy or righteous victim and unravel its representation in the news? Let us return to our case of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Jewish state of Israel which was created in 1948 is surrounded by many Arab countries who view it as an enemy state that uprooted many Palestinians from their homeland and caused many wars with its Arab neighbours in order to occupy more Arab lands (e.g. the 1948, 1967, and 1973 wars) in addition to Israel’s wars on Lebanon (e.g. 1982 and 2006). Hence, it is plausible to say that the Jewish state of Israel is surrounded by Arab and Muslim neighbours who have political, ideological and economic dissent with it. In principle, the major Arab countries do not agree with Israel’s policies in the Middle East; nor do they share with it any religious, ethnic or linguistic similarities. As Helsing puts it: Not only does Israel have ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences but its orientation is predominantly Western. The historical roots of its founders and many of its citizens are European, not Middle Eastern. While this has changed, particularly in the last generation, with the rise in numbers and power of Sephardic Jews, Israel will remain a state with no ethnic or religious affinity to the rest of the region. This is one reason that former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres believes it is critical for Israel to become integrated economically into the Middle East. (Helsing 2004: 160) In any conflict, the analyst should attempt to investigate the issue of ethnic power: “When the balance of ethnic power is stable, conflict is unlikely” (Lobell and Mauceri 2004: 5). It is this balance of power which decides on the final shape of the news. As the Arab-Israeli conflict has further been internationalized and caused many outside powers to intervene, the international media, as a result, has made this conflict a focal point in its representation of world news. One sensitive representation that one usually observes about the Arab-Israeli conflict is the representation of the victims who fall on both sides of this armed conflict. Therefore, I wish to add another component to our ideological model of analysis, that is, the sensitive context within which we envisage a sufferer as being the ‘worthy’ victim vs. the ‘unworthy’ victim in times of war or ethnic conflict. Certainly, this concept manifests itself in the textual practices of all world media outlets. In the following
Arab News and Conflict
chapters, these practices will be described and textually analysed, but before I move to this detailed stage of description, I will attempt in this section to explain the notion of worthy vs. unworthy victims from a macro-perspective and provide some examples in which it is materialized. Following the previous discussion of the propaganda system in the news, Herman and Chomsky (1994) further reveal how a propaganda system in the US mass media can control and naturalize the definitions of what they label “worthy victims” or “unworthy victims”. They assert how these definitions are at core political and serve the ends of a dominant ideology. They provide us with extensive examples from the mainstream U.S. media on the treatment of what are seen as unworthy victims whose coverage is: “low-keyed”, “quickly dropped” by the mass media, and does not receive “editorial denunciation for the murderers of the unworthy victims”. On the other hand, worthy victims can be perceived in this context through the generous details given to the victims of our allies or institutions or those who by consensus serve our “societal purpose”, e.g. victims of Palestinian terrorism. Worthy victims are given “fullness and reiteration of the details of the murderer and the damage inflicted on the victim”, their coverage is “generous with gory details and quoted expressions of outrage and demands for justice”, they are given more quotations from witnesses, “wholly sympathetic attention to mourners and weeping people”, the sense of outrage over the killing of innocent people, or through the number of “apologetics” the US administration would give to a party in the conflict. Herman and Chomsky reiterate that the US government is primary flak producer as well as information source, capable of silencing competing sources of information, including the details of victims who come from opposing ideologies or dissident opinion. Let us now make this claim about worthy and unworthy victims more concrete by referring mainly to the journalistic practices in the Arab media. Contrary to the continual focus on victims of terrorism/ suicide bombing as found in western media when Arab militants fight Israel, an Arab recipient would usually find continual focus on victims of occupation in the Arab mass media discourse. This distinction is marked because it is generated within a different context of power relations where, in the Arab world, the struggle for power is meant to resist Israeli occupation of Arab lands, the return of Palestinian refugees to their homeland, and to establish an independent Palestinian state. It is also marked because sympathies and patriotic beliefs about the Arab victims have as a result been constructed on different binary oppositions. Bearing in mind the above explanation given by Herman and Chomsky about the representation of victims in the US media, let us consider the following ideological representations about Israeli victims in Arab media discourses. The examples below are taken from Assafir and Al-Manar media outlets after a Palestinian
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
attack on a religious school in Jerusalem which killed eight Israelis and wounded 35 on 6 March 2008: Targeted Yeshiva Centre: The Mother of Zionist Schools Harav Yeshiva – A brief overview of the mother of the Zionist schools which graduated extremists such as the first commander of the Oregon terrorist groups up to the army rabbis and others who call for settlement and for the Arab blood. Harav Yeshiva centre is the primary site for the Zionist extremism in the enemy’s entity. What we are talking about here is not an ordinary religious school, nor is it a college that only graduates the rabbis of the enemy’s army; but an important landmark for the religious Zionist movement, and a symbol where the history to establish a usurping entity was forged. It is the first religious school which linked the Jewish religion and Zionism, and includes more than 500 students, and 200 of higher studies in Jewish religious studies, with ages ranging between 18 and 30... Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 7 March 2008 Consider now how Assafir newspaper represented the same Israeli victims of the same event: In the heart of occupied Jerusalem, the Palestinian resistance gave its strongest strike, in years, to a Jewish school famous since its establishment for graduating continuous batches of religious assassins, thus killing 8 of its students and injuring about 35, wiping some of the grief off Gaza’s face which lost 130 of its children and women during the last few days, and releasing the reins for a new wave of challenge operations in the heart of Israel, and creating a wave of overwhelming happiness which extended along the pan Arab streets. The Palestinians have waited for a long time to no avail. They waited for a strong Arab position in Cairo that did not materialize. They waited just for a “condemnation” from the UN Security Council, whilst collecting the remains of their children’s corpses during the days of the open massacre on Gaza and it did not materialize. Even the Palestinian authority, President Mahmoud Abbas did not come to their rescue. During the moment in which Israel lives a state of unprecedented readiness, the Palestinians hit the very heart of the Israeli security and one resistant succeeded in penetrating all security measures and military cautions, and gave the “revenge” strike which the Palestinians have long awaited, and it became painful… Just a few hours had passed after the Jerusalem operation, the UN Security Council decided to convene to “condemn the crime”. Gaza’s children, women, elderly and resistant people have been bleeding for days, but the international community decided to take an instant move yesterday evening. The United States (President George
Arab News and Conflict
Bush, his State Secretary Condoleezza Rice), France, Germany, all have adopted the “condemnation” including the Palestinian authority…
Source: Assafir Arabic text, 7 March 2008
Our next examples, in Table 3.1, will take us to shifts in the representation of Israeli victims by the journalistic translator: Table 3.1 Shifts in representation of Israeli victims in Arabic translations English texts
Arabic texts
A suicide bombing killed 28 people in an Israeli hotel… A bombing on a bus near Haifa on Wednesday killed 8 Israelis…
Deleted from the same Reuters text in Arabic.
Powell got a first-hand view of the carnage…
Powell got a view of the blast site…
Source: Reuters English,13 April 2002
Source: Reuters Arabic, 13 April 2002
Palestinian teenagers detonated their car laden with explosives next to an inter-city bus… a Tel Aviv bombing killed 6 people last month…
Deleted from the same Reuters text in Arabic.
Adding to the gloomy mood of Israelis, the international credit rating agency Fitch said it downgraded Israel’s local currency rating due to violence…
Adding to the gloomy mood in Israel, the international credit rating agency Fitch said it downgraded Israel’s local currency rating due to violence …
Source: Reuters English, 22 October 2002
Source: Reuters Arabic, 22 October 2002
An ambulance worker said the Israelis were caught in gunfire in an alley leading from the shrine to settler enclaves…
Deleted from the same Reuters text in Arabic.
Source: Reuters English, 15 November 2002 The morning rush-hour bombing, which destroyed a municipal bus filled with school children and commuters…
The Palestinian attack which took place on Tuesday morning and destroyed a full bus.
Source: Reuters English, 18 June 2002
Source: Reuters Arabic, 18 June 2002
Having seen the representation of Israeli victims in the Arab media discourse, let us turn to the representation of the Arab victims in the Arab media discourse: Banned weapons: Palestinian human rights activists and doctors said the occupation forces uses burning and destructive shells against the civilians in the strip which caused the amputation of limbs of most of the martyrs… Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 6 January 2009
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
Our next example is an excerpt taken from a famous address by Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora at the Stockholm conference for Lebanon’s early recovery and was circulated in Arab daily media outlets: On July 12, fulfilling its threat to set Lebanon back twenty years, Israel started the latest of its seven invasions of our country, killing over 1100 civilians, a third of whom were children; wounding over 4000; displacing one million people, or a quarter of our population, many with no homes to return to; destroying tens of thousands of homes, hospitals, schools, factories, roads, and most of our bridges; severely damaging airports, power stations, fuel depots, and warehouses; enforcing a cruel siege of the entire country… Israel has repeatedly and willfully violated international law and international humanitarian law, including the Geneva conventions… Israel also left thousands of unexploded bomblets resulting from cluster bombs in towns, villages, and hillsides throughout the country in clear violation of international humanitarian law… as by their very nature they cannot discriminate between civilian and military targets, and which are continuing to maim and kill well after the cessation of hostilities… Source: Al-Mustaqbal Arabic text, 31 August 2006 Let us now examine more examples taken from journalistic translations coupled with the editorial brush (Table 3.2): Table 3.2 Shifts in representation of Arab victims in Arabic translations English texts
Arabic texts
Arafat accused the Israeli forces of committing ‘massacres and slaughters against Palestinians…’
Arafat said: We strongly and firmly condemn the carnage and massacres that have been and are being committed by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian civilians and refugees in Nablus and Jenin camp and against Al-Mahd church in Bethlehem and other Palestinian areas over the past two weeks… Source: Reuters Arabic, 13 April 2002
Source: Reuters English, 13 April 2002 Swalha was shot dead by Israeli troops during a sweep for militants… after he threw grenades at the soldiers…
Source: Reuters English, 15 November 2002
Deleted and replaced by the following quotation given by a Palestinian official: This comes in response to the assassination crime of the leader, the hero, the leader of Jerusalem brigade in the West bank, martyr Iyad Swalha… Source: Reuters Arabic, 15 November 2002
Arab News and Conflict
English texts
Arabic texts
Hisham Khrewesh, 20, was killed during a shootout… Ibrahim Atari, a local offshoot of the mainstream Fatah group was gunned down… Hisham Khrwesh, 20, a member of the radical Islamic movement Hamas…
Martyr Ibrahim Atari, father of four children from Alawda brigades, Abdulafw Qassas, and the third martyr Hisham Khrwesh, 20, of the Islamic resistance movement Hamas, were martyred by the bullets of the Zionist occupying army… Source: Al-Manar Arabic, 7 January 2004
Source: AFP English , 7 January 2004
Compare now the portrayal of victims we have seen in the Arabic texts above with the following portrayal in The New York Times: The statement specifically condemned the Jerusalem bombing, which killed 6 people and injured scores (Israeli victims) vs. Palestinians allege many civilians have been killed in the Israeli operation to wipe out militant networks in the W.B. (Palestinian victims). Source: The New York Times, 13 April 2002 Israeli rescue workers struggled to evacuate the wounded from a dusty, exposed alley, the commander of Israeli forces in this divided city was one of those killed… how many of the dead and wounded were civilians… how many were security forces was not clear early this morning (Israeli victims) vs. Soldiers hunted the killers and their accomplices... soldiers shot dead at least 3 Palestinians whom they identified as killers (Palestinian victims). Source: The New York Times, 16 November 2002 This ideological system of thought about the worthy or unworthy is, as Herman and Chomsky further describe it “contrived by the government”, thus conveniently channeled in media discourses. We may then conclude from the above real-life examples that sympathies towards the victims have ideological implications and that people belonging to a specific dominant ideology will accept these classifications about whom they see as being the enemy, the unworthy or the worthy. In whatever degree it takes, the Arab media discourses indicate that that there is a common and unified conception that the Arab victims have a cause and therefore they are the worthy victims in the Arab-Israeli struggle. In a large proportion of international representations on suicide bombing there are examples of what Herman and Chomsky refer to as “quotations or assertions of outrage, indignation, profound shock” (1994: 43) towards Israeli victims, and this is certainly not found in the Arabic media texts. In international media we observe reasons and justification for Israel’s retaliation, whereas in the Arab media we observe reasons for Palestinian retaliation. Moreover,
Chapter 3. An ideological approach
international media gives no sympathy to the Palestinian suicide bombers; nor do they give emotional details to the Arab victims who fall in this struggle such as those an Arab would normally see in the Arab media. In addition, the Arab media (e.g. on the Al-Jazeera website in Arabic) use the rhetoric of worthy victim portrayal through the emotive images one sees concerned with the Arab victims. For instance, images of innocent children being buried after Israeli raids, mothers weeping over the faces of their sons who fall dead in this struggle, or images of destroyed houses with children sitting on rubble. Such representation of the worthy victims through photographic images by popular Arab media outlets attempts to construct the image of the Arab victims lost from international media sources, and to arouse sympathies towards them. More information on representing Others through photographic images can be found in Faris (2002) and Lutz and Collins (2002). Given the above discussion and examples, the analyst should approach the notion of worthy and unworthy victims in any struggle by observing the following macro-representations summarized (without being exhaustive) in Table 3.3: Table 3.3 The rhetoric of worthy versus unworthy victims The worthy victims
The unworthy victims
receive detailed and emotional sympathy
don’t receive emotional details, nor sympathy, they are an object of hostility
receive adequate international condemnation and apologetics from world leaders over their killings
don’t receive international condemnation nor apologetics over their killings
do not receive condemnation if their actions are violent
receive condemnation for their violent actions
receive more quotations by witnesses or officials
receive the least quotations and only to serve the editorial stance
receive negative representations of their murderers
don’t receive negative representations of their murderers
receive assertions of outrage against their enemy
don’t receive assertions of outrage against their enemy
receive technical and full details of the type of destruction inflicted on them
don’t receive technical nor full details on the destruction inflicted upon them unless it serves as a victorious language against them
receive UN-backed resolutions that assert condemnation of the acts of their enemies
don’t receive UN facts that condemn the wrong doings of their enemies
receive prevalent moving images
don’t receive emotional images but images that could serve a victorious claim over them and their wrong acts
receive a politeness strategy from the text producers and editors
receive revengeful language or on the record statements from the text producer/ editor
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The worthy victims
The unworthy victims
the worthy fighters who fall as victims receive strong reasons for retaliating against their enemy
the unworthy fighters who fall as victims do not receive good reasons for their violent actions, except for the reason that they are stereotyped as terrorists
those seen as the innocent victims receive expanded representations of very clear causes for hostilities committed against them
their innocent victims fall as a result from their own leaders’/fighters’ aggression
Thus, a politically motivated text reflects a complex context loaded with specific reasons for hostilities, struggle for power, sympathies towards specific victims and, of course, different ideological beliefs and positions. The above table can help the analyst unravel many facts about the type of coverage given in a political report by a particular media outlet in times of armed conflict. Personally, I believe it would be almost impossible for any media outlet to claim impartiality if asked to give sympathetic details for those they believe to be the “unworthy victim” or fallen victims on the enemy’s side. Conclusion This chapter has attempted to identify some of the important components of the ideological context which underlie politically sensitive representations in the media and render such representations as legitimate and commonsensical to their own targeted audiences. I argued that in order to critically approach the discourses of media outlets on politically sensitive events, the analyst has to examine how the human subjects in a particular conflict are being interpellated in the text, to debate the hegemonic orders absorbed in the text and accepted uncritically by a group and to identify the ideological schema and the predetermined conception of who is being “unworthy” in a particular struggle. Such factors, which maintain the subjective meanings accounted for in Chapter 2, have proved, in theory, to be responsible for an individual’s rigid ideological readings and interpretations of a political event. Regardless of who the Other is envisaged to be, the proposed ideological approach in this chapter should enable the political analyst to question the invisible dominant orders that suppress important ideological facts in the news. Having examined how dominant and hegemonic ideologies, reproduced by political and media apparatuses, can legitimate the final productions of politically sensitive texts, hence influencing the reading positions, we need next to examine how this struggle for power becomes internal or exhibited in the language use itself and in the act of translation. This will be the task of the following chapters.
chapter 4
A critical discourse analysis approach At this point, I would like to speculate on some linguistic questions. Exactly how can ‘unworthy’ subjects be incriminated through the language structure itself? We might want to discover through the language in use: who is assumed to be causing violence in a particular struggle; whose side of the story is being retailed, and how; in which part of the clause are we most likely to find the cause of a struggle; how can text strategy extract one’s sympathies towards the ‘worthy’ victims or ingroups or on the contrary, increase one’s hostility towards the ideological enemy? For instance, what is the difference between Hezbollah will defeat Bush and Israel or you are the ones who will be defeated, seen in one of the Arabic texts in the previous chapter. As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3 there is a structural context exerting pressure on the text structure itself. There are functional linguistic choices (e.g. textual). There are also political signs that need to be made visible and described. Hence, there is a need for rigorous and systematic descriptions to see how the preferred ideological readings and the hegemonic orders of a particular society are reproduced in the text in use. In this chapter, I will find connections between the social, ideological, subjective or cognitive structures on the one hand, and the language structures on the other. More specifically, I need to identify a set of analytical tools appropriate for the investigation of political struggle, power inequality, ideological beliefs, and intentions that lie beneath a politically sensitive text in the media. In this respect, I turn to critical discourse analysis – a modern discipline that seeks to find connections between language use within a society and ideological, societal or cognitive structures (see Weiss and Wodak 2007; Fairclough 2001; Van Dijk 1998). I need to do two things in my critical discourse analysis approach to media discourse. Firstly, I will introduce the reader to the meaning of critical discourse analysis by presenting some of the ground-breaking ideas of critical discourse analysts. Secondly, I will propose my own model of critical language analysis for the discourse, political, media and translation analysts who need to be more aware of the use of language in times of conflict. This linguistic awareness model will be validated and taken into further analysis in the following chapters.
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What do the critical discourse analysts say? Critical discourse analysis (CDA) draws on different disciplines such as classical rhetoric, ethnography, ideology (coercion, hegemony or class struggle), sociolinguistics, functional linguistics, and pragmatics. It is “critical” in the sense that it criticizes the dominant social order through language analysis, whereby the analytic tools of language are devoted to examining a wider social and ideological context (see Billing 2007). Early attempts in Britain in the 1970s by Fowler et al. and Kress and Hodge developed the concept of critical language awareness by relating the language of news to social semiotics, functional linguistics, socio-linguistics, pragmatics and psycholinguistics. They provided a number of linguistically oriented studies of media texts that articulate particular ideological positions. But what exactly is meant by critical discourse analysis – a discipline that has established itself worldwide over the past twenty five years? The critical discourse analysts Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak (1997) define CDA in a very refined way: CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of ‘social practice’. Describing discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation(s), institution(s) and social structure(s) which frame it: the discursive event is shaped by them, but it also shapes them. That is, discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between people and groups of people. It is constitutive both in the sense that it helps to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to transforming it... Both the ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which underlie them are often unclear to people. CDA aims to make more visible these opaque aspects of discourse. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258) In different studies (1995a, 1995b, 1999, 2001), Fairclough seeks to find connections between language and the social power of groups or institutions. He examines, for instance, how textual analysis can in fact contribute to the analysis of media discourse and its hidden or manipulative power. By drawing on the philosophical work of Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault, Fairclough notes that our discourse in practice is constrained by power relations. A news report, for example, can actualize the effects of social power through a consistent handling of causality, agency and ways of positioning readership. In his influential book “Language and
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
Power” (2001), Fairclough proposes a specific procedure for critical discourse analysis. The procedure comprises three dimensions, description, interpretation and explanation. “Description” is concerned with language analysis that makes us aware of power and discourse effects. According to Fairclough, powerful participants in media discourse can control the text by exercising the following types of constraints: – content: that is, what is included or excluded, thus, influencing the audience’s knowledge and beliefs: i.e. vocabulary choices; – relations with readership: such as enmity or solidarity, thus, influencing social relationships: i.e. politeness and formality; – subject or identity: that is, how power positions one as subject. For example, in our case study, the Arab journalist could be positioned by her or his editorial control or power holders as subject in an “emancipatory” discourse against western political domination that in turn influences the classification schemes in the Arabic text. Fairclough’s perspective enables us to deal directly with the more detailed mechanisms involved in the relations between language and the orders of discourse. Here, the order of discourse means the social system and power relationships of a community that determine linguistic variation and choices. In this concern, Fairclough builds on Halliday’s functionalist approach as well as pragmatic approaches to analysing discourse. He suggests examining many features in relation to power and ideology, such as the selection of particular grammar structures (e.g. transitivity and passivisation); modality; categorization in vocabulary; cohesion (e.g. lexical cohesion); informational structuring (e.g. what is thematized or unthematized, foregrounding or backgrounding of information, expansion relations between clauses); making certain voices heard or marginalized; being polite (face and solidarity). Many of these linguistic elements will be defined, exemplified and developed in the next section. “Interpretation” gives “values” to the specific set of textual features found in the text as the analyst enters into the procedure of social interaction. This stage draws upon pragmatic meanings, common-sense assumptions or what Fairclough terms “member resources”; that is, the cognitive aspect needed to interpret a text. Member resources such as beliefs, knowledge and presuppositions are also constrained by power and social institutions. This stage should inform the discourse analyst because it draws attention to the way the text producer and target receiver draw on particular background knowledge systems, ideological assumptions and schemata in terms of cause and effect in order to render the text as credible or common-sensical. We have
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already seen this interpretation process within the semiological and ideological frameworks which I have designed in the previous chapters. “Explanation” is concerned with the ideological reproduction of the social structures. It is related to interpretation where meanings are rationalized and reproduced according to what has already been naturalized by a particular society. In other words, to interpret a text, the analyst has to draw upon an awareness of the social struggles, the political institutions or educational systems that ultimately influence the text producer’s member resources. Chapter 3 has given an account of this explanation procedure which I will take even further in the next chapter. Furthermore, it is worth noting Fairclough’s (2001) conception of “strategic discourse” vs. “emancipatory discourse”. For him, a strategic discourse of a powerful institution seeks to impose new goals, orders or special perspectives in relation to “possible” worlds with special effects through consent or through language. On the other hand, an emancipatory discourse seeks to transform the dominant orders of a colonizing discourse via critical language awareness. In Chapter 7, this argument on emancipatory discourses will be reframed more broadly in relation to case studies of translation. We shall explore how, in many cases, relations of full equivalence between source and translated text cannot be sought if the target language discourse transforms the existing orders or the power relations of the foreign. I would like to propose at this stage that even translation becomes a tool or a form of discourse practice (text production and text consumption) through which media translators can maintain or transform the “globalizing” tendencies of the source text. Hence, I stress the question of power relations and discriminate between cultural relations that can be easily bridged in translation and power relations that can pose a challenge to translators. In the case of translation, when it comes to who causes what to whom with what ideological effects in a sensitive context, shifting looms high in Arab media translation. However, what we have to remember is that decisions related to media translation must build on the emphasis given to specific textual features within a representation that unravels different power structures. We shall explore the importance of marked textual features in the following pages. Van Dijk (1984, 1985, 1988 and 1998) offers another influential contribution to CDA. Van Dijk’s focus is more on issues of racism, bias, ethnic prejudices and cognition in the critical analysis of the media. Here, I would emphasize his conceptions of “cognition” in the critical analysis of a political discourse. I have already discussed the cognitive meaning of the sign and related it to ideological frameworks of analysis (e.g. common sense and the ideological schema). Now let us shed more light on the importance of this cognitive aspect by relating it to language use or texts. According to Van Dijk (1998), discourse is a “social process” that can be sketched in an imaginary triangle consisting of discourse, cognition (i.e. knowledge,
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
beliefs and mental models) and society (i.e. domination and social institutions). As Van Dijk notes, discourse and its mental dimensions (such as its meanings) are multiply embedded in social situations and social structures. And conversely, social representations, social relations and social structures are often constituted, constructed, validated, normalized, evaluated and legitimated in and by text and talk. (Van Dijk 1998: 6) In analysing news as discourse, Van Dijk (1988, 1998) refers thus to the “textual” and “contextual” dimensions of discourse: The textual dimension is concerned with language descriptions where the analyst employs pragmatic, stylistic and rhetorical studies. Hence, textual descriptions should focus upon lexical selection, in what way style can be derogatory, syntactic structures (e.g. agency and passivization), conditional relations between clauses reflecting cause and effect, presuppositions, selective or emotive quoting, thematic structuring, metaphors and speech acts. Similar aspects will be dealt with in the following section. The contextual dimension is related to a cognitive component and a social or ideological structure. In our analysis, what may seem to some as a biased news report or text can be addressed within what Van Dijk calls “preferred mental models”. The latter are concerned with the selection of political information in terms of its relevance and credibility. Van Dijk notes that the socio-cognitive analysis of media discourse is concerned with the subjectivity of experiences, evaluative beliefs, knowledge, attitudes, truth criteria, common sense, the cognitive construction of groups, the group’s identity and the legitimation of power by social and ideological institutions. These elements combine to organize a group’s interpretation processes as well as discourse representations that make them eventually non-neutral. For Van Dijk, the group schema that comprises this original set of beliefs becomes a “biased” one and results in producing a “biased” language. However, “biased” language cannot be recognized as biased by its own group members, but as effective and coherent, for it is naturalized to represent their own common sense. If we revisit President Bush’s speech from the previous chapter, we might want to see why Bush’s rhetorical practices pose a threat to the Arabs. Consider the following excerpt taken from Bush’s address to the Members of the Knesset in Jerusalem: Shalom, what followed was more than the establishment of a new country. It was the redemption of an ancient promise given to Abraham and Moses and David -- a homeland for the chosen people Eretz Yisrael…
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The alliance between our governments is unbreakable, yet the source of our friendship runs deeper than any treaty. It is grounded in the shared spirit of our people, the bonds of the Book, the ties of the soul. When William Bradford stepped off the Mayflower in 1620, he quoted the words of Jeremiah: “Come let us declare in Zion the word of God.” The founders of my country saw a new promised land and bestowed upon their towns names like Bethlehem and New Canaan. And in time, many Americans became passionate advocates for a Jewish state… Source: White House Press Release English text http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/05/20080515–1.html Before long, all Arab media discourses commented on Bush’s style as “biased”. Consider what Al-Jazeera wrote: The address was met by criticisms from the resigned Palestinian government in Gaza and from an official in the Palestinian Liberal Organization who considered it as an alliance with Israel’s leaders in “extremism and bias”… Bush began his speech by focusing on what he called “God’s promise” to establish Israel which he described as the homeland for the “chosen” people. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 16 May 2008 or: “The Israelism” of U.S. President George Bush yesterday was more extremist than his Israeli “host” Ehud Olmert. In his address in the Knesset, Bush offered what could be described as his most dangerous words in announcing complete American prejudice in favour of Israel… Source: Assafir Arabic text, 16 May 2008 Based on Van Dijk’s conception of cognition, the analyst should be able to probe in our above examples what linguistic elements are being ideologically foregrounded or backgrounded in order to make an event cognitively “memorable” and “credible” to the target audience. Van Dijk provides examples of quotations by the protagonist that involve emotional reactions or causes of the political event, the foregrounding of attitudinal themes, or the insertion of relevant information. He notes that discourse structures and strategies (lexical, grammatical or pragmatic) should answer important questions such as: “Who are we? Where do we come from? Who belongs to us? What do we (usually) do, and why? What are our goals and values?” (Van Dijk 1998: 121). Arabic text producers will also produce a style matching with their own beliefs, opinions, values or collective memories of their own audiences. For instance,
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
Al-Jazeera and many other Arab media outlets add to President Bush’s address, representations such as: Bush supports Israel’s security while the Palestinians recall Al-Nakbah [catastrophe of occupation in 1948]. Such beliefs whether about God’s promise for the chosen people or about Al-Nakbah are “grounded in the socially and historically developed, accumulated and (discursively) transmitted experiences of the whole group” (Van Dijk 1998: 91). From this perspective, we can conclude that foreign discourses cannot be negotiated as matters of fact in the Arab media, but as opinions and evaluation about events. As Van Dijk further asserts, what could be seen as “uncontested” knowledge comprises, in fact, false beliefs or half truths, especially when it is not “Ours”. By returning to another central issue of this book, which is media translation, I would emphasize that readership in a politically sensitive news report requires credibility of source and authority as well as reader’s mental models with pre-established schemata about ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. When these elements in the source text do not match equivalent models in the target situation, shifting by the journalistic translator will not raise a protest, especially when the target text does not require direct access to the original by the Arab reader. In fact, a shifted translation will produce a more credible and relevant news report, for example to Al-Manar’s or Al-Jazeera’s viewers who have different expectations and different cognitive models. The question of how language can be an instrument of control in political or media representations has been examined and published in many other influential studies, for instance by Fowler (1991), Lee (1992), Hodge and Kress (1993), Simpson (1993), Hartely (1993), Chilton and Schäffner (2002). All critical language studies agree that there are linguistic features, however they may refer to them: a “grid” of descriptions, “toolkits”, “linguistic reflexes”, or “linguistic behaviour”, that relate to pre-existing prejudices, power and solidarity relations, encouraged or suppressed ideologies, angle of telling, and competing discourses. Such linguistic features can be tracked in the repeated linguistic usage or structure towards a particular group, speech acts used in reporting, modality, provocative presuppositions, politeness and implied meanings, semantic classifications, the use of diminutive lexical descriptions, stereotyping or the negative connotations of the enemy. In the next section, a detailed linguistic model for the critical analysis of politically sensitive language in the media, particularly in time of conflict will be laid out. The linguistic tools presented build on similar grounds to those found in the pioneering critical discourse studies. However, my model below is organized and developed in different fashions in order to articulate the semiotic and ideological frameworks of analysis formulated in Chapters 2 and 3.
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Introducing the analytical tools How can we analyse politically sensitive language in the media or in times of conflict? What are the language tools that can describe the semiotic and mythical structure, the ideological intervention, the causes put forward for a struggle, truth claims, or reversible ideological themes? My selected linguistic features are not exhaustive, but should be key practical indicators to increase awareness of struggle for power via the text in use. Moreover, the analytical framework in this section is qualitative in the sense that it gives evidence of and is sensitive to the ethical and moral issues that seem to arise in the daily practices of media institutions. Such methods may help the analyst explain the characteristics of the data she/he would like to examine in a particular media society. From a structural point of view, the linguistic enquiry in this book builds on both systemic-functional linguistics and pragmatics. The systemic-functional area of enquiry will employ Halliday’s tools that address the text strategy in operation, i.e. transitivity, mood and modality, theme and collocational cohesion. According to Halliday (1994), transitivity is concerned with the analysis of clause as representation; mood and modality with the analysis of clause as exchange; theme and lexical cohesion with the analysis of clause as texture. Critical linguists refer to Halliday’s approach when functional choices in transitivity, modality, structure or collocations are made within the ideational, interpersonal and textual functions of language as explained in the section on social semiotic meanings in Chapter 2. My pragmatic model, which is concerned with principles of language usage and interpretation, will focus on speech acts, politeness and relevance. Pragmatics relates basically to the interpersonal force of language. It is most concerned with the study of communicated meaning as intended by the text producer and interpreted by the text receiver. The pragmatic mechanisms employed in this study, selected from a variety of sources, will show how the text producer uses language to intrude, interact, cooperate, be polite and build relations with the audience to fulfil the assumed goals of the discourse. The pragmatic model suggested in this section also aims to show how it is important to investigate certain linguistic procedures within the overall text strategy in order to interpret a politically sensitive text as coherent and credible. For further readings on pragmatics, see (Austin 1962; Searle 1969 & 1975; Yule 1996a; Grice 1975; Leech 1983; Brown and Levinson 1987; and Sperber and Wilson 1986). Table 4.1 summarizes the selected toolkit along with respective language functions in order to investigate the overall text strategy of politically motivated texts:
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
Table 4.1 The linguistic toolkit used in the analysis of politically sensitive language Language function
Selected linguistic feature
Ideational Interpersonal Textual
Transitivity (includes agency, voice, circumstance) Mood and modality Texture: Foregrounded themes Lexical cohesion (collocation) Speech acts Politeness Relevance (the descriptive use vs. the interpretive use)
Pragmatic
Transitivity Who is behind violence? Who is the worthy victim? And under what circumstances? Transitivity is concerned with the ideational function of language. As Halliday puts it: “meaning as representation… meaning in the sense of content… things happen, and people, or other actors, do things, or make them happen” (Halliday 1994: 106). Simpson (1993) remarks that in discourse analysis the transitivity model “shows how speakers encode in language their mental picture of reality and how they account for their experience in the world around them” (Simpson 1993: 88). In order to analyse transitivity in a politically sensitive text, one must draw on the structure of transitivity. Halliday (1994) postulates a process that consists of three components: – the process itself (represented in a verbal group); – participants in the process (represented in nominal groups); – circumstances associated with the process (represented in adverbial groups or prepositional phrases). Halliday refers to different types of processes, mainly: material (doing), mental (sensing), relational (being), or verbal (saying). As the current study deals with sensitive actions in news events, I will focus primarily on the material process which, according to Simpson (1993), has two types: – Action process done by an animate actor (e.g. suicide bombers have killed scores of Israelis). – Event process done by an inanimate actor (e.g. tanks rolled into the towns of Arabe, Hashmiyah and al-Yamoun…).
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Material processes “processes of doing” are concerned with actions. They have two participant roles: – The actor: the “logical subject” or “the one that does the deed” (Halliday 1994: 109) being an obligatory participant (e.g. Israeli troops took action). – The goal: a second participant (optional) that “undergoes” the process or is affected by it (e.g. Palestinian gunmen have shot dead seven Israelis). As Halliday explains to us “the term Goal implies ‘directed at’; another term that has been used for this function is Patient, meaning one that ‘suffers’ or ‘undergoes’ the process” (Halliday 1994: 109–110). An illustration is given in Figure 4.1: Palestinian gunmen
have shot dead
seven Israelis
Actor
Process
Goal
Figure 4.1 Direct incrimination process with two-participant clause
Halliday further explains that “the concept of extension is in fact the one that is embodied in the classical terminology of ‘transitive’ and ‘intransitive’, from which the term transitivity is derived” (Halliday 1994: 110). In this case, the verb took action above is intransitive and the verb shot dead is transitive. In the latter case we may ask: what did the Palestinian gunmen do to the Israelis? Who caused the shooting, or who is the other entity affected by the shooting (e.g. the seven Israelis)? This last question can be related to the notion of the worthy victim. In the first case, took action, we should ask does the process extend beyond the Israeli troops to the Palestinians? Namely, either the action stopped there for us to conclude it, or else it clearly extended to another participant (i.e. actually, the Israeli troops killed 30 Palestinians). This brings us to the following issue of transitivity and voice. Transitivity and voice When an action is represented, it comes basically in two forms reflecting cause and effect in the experiential function: – Active (e.g. Israeli soldiers killed three Palestinians overnight) – Passive (e.g. a member of an armed faction was killed by Israeli troops) Halliday (1994) suggests the following system of voice: – Middle: with no agency (e.g. The Gaza strip is already walled off). In agentless cases, Halliday explains that “the speaker leaves the listener to locate the source” (ibid: 169).
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
– Effective: with agency that is active and foregrounded (e.g. Occupying forces hanged two Palestinians) or with delayed and passive agency, e.g. (a member of an armed faction was killed by Israeli troops); (100 Palestinians had been killed). Our concern here is representations which are passive or passive and agent-less vs. representations consistently foregrounding one particular agent in a violent and active process. We should also add to our transitivity analysis cases of “nominalization”: “whereby any element or group of elements is made to function as a nominal group in the clause” (Halliday 1994: 41). What should concern us here is that nominalization involving the use of a noun for an action, such as the shootings or the building of the fence, can in fact background or hide agency. (See also Fairclough 2001; Simpson 1993; Hodge and Kress 1993). The third component in the transitivity structure is the circumstantial element which as a process “serves as an expansion of something else”. Circumstantial elements “refer to the location of an event in time or space, its manner, or its cause… a circumstantial element is a process that has become parasitic on another process. Instead of standing on its own, it serves as an expansion of something else.” (Halliday 1994: 150–151). My analyses are particularly concerned with the circumstantial element of cause or reason, for it usually reflects the cognitive aspect of context that renders a politically sensitive event common-sensical and credible to the targeted audience. Halliday further discusses the expansion relations between clauses where a secondary clause can elaborate, extend or enhance the primary clause with a circumstantial feature. Now consider the following circumstances and expansions: Troops also entered three villages near Nablus and Ramallah. The army said it had arrested 40 Palestinians for what it called “terrorist activities”. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002; Israel is facing a terrible and serious challenge. For seven days, it has acted to root out terrorists’ nests. Source: President Bush’s speech on the Middle East, The Daily Star (Beirut) English text, 5 April 2002 Now check the reason for violence represented in Figure 4.2 below: Israel
acted
to root out terrorists’ nests
Actor
Process
Circumstance: cause or reason
Figure 4.2 Reason for violence structured in the circumstance element
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Halliday emphasizes that the distribution of the information in the transitivity system leads to special effects or results. In our case, causes can be encoded in the form of agency (especially foregrounded and active agency) or in the form of the circumstantial component associated with the process, especially those circumstances of cause which reflect reason and purpose. The aim of transitivity analysis is to help to analyse the experiential or ideational function in the text, the cognitive meanings, the commonsensical beliefs about a particular struggle, the preferred readership of a political event, how political reality is variously represented in e.g. Reuters, AFP or Al-Manar. Through selections from the system of transitivity we should be able to analyse who is considered to be causing what to whom; what agents are consistently and actively incriminated; who are the affected participants (i.e. are they the worthy victims?). We can also observe what conditional relations exist between clauses (i.e. what causes are deleted or emphasized and what facts are conditionally related in the circumstantial element to reflect firm beliefs, cognitive bias or to incriminate the ideological enemy), thus creating legitimized content with particular reasons for struggle by the media agency in a process that eventually creates unified political ideas and preferred readership. Moreover, transitivity analysis should enable the analyst to see the mythical structure which has been constructed on binary oppositions. We are bound to see, for instance, the ideological enemy or the “unworthy” as a foregrounded agent in an active process of violence. We are also bound to see the worthy victim as an affected participant. Not to mention seeing the reason behind a particular violence or reasons for retaliation in the circumstantial element. Mood and modality How can the text producer create a political mood in the text and how is it possible to interfere and show a subjective stance? When politicians, editors, or journalists interact with the audience in times of conflict, they usually position the listener or reader to receive facts and information. They can ask rhetorical questions to ponder upon, they make judgements, they offer plans or solutions, state firm beliefs, or show inclination as well as determination to fulfil a particular goal. They can also command, issue threats, or make promises for victory. In other words, they create a specific mood in the text requiring something of the text receiver, i.e. to enact their own power, inflame feelings against the ideological enemy, or win consent from the targeted audience. And whilst the text producer is interacting with the targeted audience, she/he is simultaneously intruding by modifying her or his statements through use of modal expressions (e.g. modal auxiliaries and adverbs) which reflect attitudes or positions.
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
In order to see how the text producer’s mood or position can be described at the language level, I turn to Halliday (1994) again. By mood and modality, Halliday refers to the interpersonal function of language, that is, meaning as exchange or as an interactive event. In the mood system one for example either “gives” information or “demands” something from the listener. “Mood expresses the speech function… giving or demanding information or goods-&-services, which determines the four basic speech functions of statement, question, offer and command” (Halliday 1994: 363). Halliday further states that the mood element could either be a “proposition” (statement or question) or a “proposal” (offer or command). In our current analysis we have to see mood expressing the interpersonal force by examining the event functioning either as a set of strategic statements made to the audience, i.e. asserted through declarative propositions (e.g. The alliance between our governments is unbreakable); or as moving into instructional, obligation or inclination modes, (e.g. Israel will be celebrating the 120th anniversary… AlQaeda will be defeated; or Arafat must condemn the suicide attack in order to meet with Powell. Furthermore, Halliday informs us of the structure of the mood as follows: The Subject (e.g. Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah and Hamas) and the Finite element (will). The finite element indicates tense, or judgment of the speaker or modality (e.g. must, will) or polarity (positive or negative, e.g. Al- Qaeda won’t be defeated to make the issue debatable).The remainder of the clause is called by Halliday the Residue (e.g. be defeated). Halliday also suggests adding a tag question in order to see which mood elements we choose in this tag. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the mood structure: Hezbollah
will
Subject
Finite Mood
be defeated.
Won’t
it?
Finite Subject Residue
Figure 4.3 The mood structure in a politically sensitive text
Mood tag
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What we should observe in a speaker’s discourse is this Finiteness element which expresses in addition to the time, the judgement of the speaker, through: – The main verb (e.g. It is more than a clash of arms. It is a clash of visions, a great ideological struggle…). Here, the Finite element and the lexical verb are “fused” into one word. – Or: the auxiliary that precedes it (e.g. Israel will be celebrating the 120th anniversary). So, why is the Finite element important? As Halliday explains, technically: The Finite element, as its name implies, has the function of making the proposition finite. That is to say, it circumscribes it; it brings the proposition down to earth, so that it is something that can be argued about. A good way to make something arguable is to give it a point of reference in the here and now; and this is what the Finite does. It relates the proposition to its context in the speech event. This can be done in one of two ways. One is by reference to the time of speaking; the other is by reference to the judgement of the speaker. (Halliday 1994: 75) If we revisit the speech of the Hezbollah leader which was mentioned in the previous chapter, we may see how Bush’s Finiteness is contested: “I tell whoever is bargaining on a US or Israeli strike on Lebanon, we fought in 2006 and we will fight in any coming war… I tell (US President) George W. Bush and (US Secretary of State) Condoleezza Rice, who spoke of Hezbollah’s defeat, that as long as Hezbollah relies on Allah and his people, you are the ones who will be defeated,” he stated. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 26 May 2008 Using Halliday’s device of the question tag, Figure 4.4 illustrates how the mood element is contested in counter-hegemony: You are the ones who Subject
will
be defeated.
Finite Mood
Won’t
you?
Finite Subject Residue
Figure 4.4 Contesting the mood element in counter-hegemony
Mood tag
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
In propositions, information can be stated, declared, accepted, denied or doubted in the text, with varying degrees between “it is so… it isn’t so”. In proposals, meaning could be a command or an offer with varying degrees between “do it; don’t do it”, (e.g. the Americans urged Arafat in an English media text vs. the Americans asked Arafat in an Arabic media text) in order to indicate the power or attitude of the text producer towards the sensitive event and participants involved in this event. This brings us to the system of modality. In the system of modality the following types can be considered: 1. Propositions (statements of facts) can be modalized when they indicate degrees of probability (certainly, probably, possibly) or degrees of usuality (always, usually, sometimes), e.g. Sharon refrained from the usual swift military strike. 2. Proposals (commands or obligations) can be modulated when they become imperative, either in the varying forms of obligation (required, supposed, allowed) or inclination (determined, keen, willing), i.e. may do or must do. As Halliday explains, “Modality represents the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal” (Halliday 1994: 362). Consider now the following example: Secretary of State Colin Powell will press Yasser Arafat at their meeting Sunday for “effective action” to end Palestinians attacks against Israel. Powell also is demanding restraint from Israeli forces on the West Bank. Source: The New York Times, 13 April 2002 We may observe the following modulation: Powell will press Arafat
(High inclination)
vs. Powell is demanding Israeli forces
(Lower obligation)
In a similar vein, Simpson (1993) refers to four modal systems (i.e. the attitudinal features of language): – Epistemic and perception modality (inter-related modal systems reflecting knowledge, belief, cognition and perception); – deontic and boulomaic modality (inter-related modal systems reflecting obligation, duty, commitment and desire). For instance we may observe the following system of modality: Prime Minister A. Sharon refrained from the kind of swift military strikes that have followed other major attacks in a Palestinian revolt. Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002
Arab News and Conflict
vs. The Israeli Prime Minister refrained from the swift military strikes that usually follow any suicide attack. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002 This example demonstrates that a sentence can carry desire and obligation on the part of Sharon along with different epistemic representation (i.e. usuality) being modalized in the Arabic text. The purpose of analysing modality in politically sensitive texts during a turbulent period is to reflect the ideological development of texts through these expressions of modality by the text producers themselves. I have already referred in Chapter 2 to the modality markers in the text which reflect beliefs of that group about the truth, accuracy, reliability and factivity of the representation. In our case of news representations these modality markers or cues are best described in the list below. They can help the analyst to conclude the predetermined judgement of the text producer regarding a political event. Let me now identify and describe the following different linguistic expressions of modality that the analyst may refer to in an investigation of text strategy in times of conflict (in the sense of Halliday 1994; Simpson 1993; Fairclough 1995a; Fowler 1991): – Modal verbs or modal auxiliaries referring to the judgment of the speaker, e.g. must, will, can, may, could, should; e.g. It is not enough for Arab nations to defend the Palestinian cause. They must truly help the Palestinian people by seeking peace and fighting terror… Source: President Bush’s speech on the Middle East, The Daily Star (Beirut) English text, 5 April 2002 – Mood adjuncts: “these are so called because they are most closely associated with the meanings constructed in the mood system: those of polarity, modality, temporality, and mood… they tend to occur in a clause near the Finite verbal operator” (Halliday 1994: 82). According to Halliday, an adjunct is realized by a prepositional phrase or an adverbial group; e.g. “he can’t usually hear on the telephone” (ibid: 83), or they must truly help the Palestinian people… – The use of perception modalities (Simpson 1993), i.e. human perceptions which imply the presence of the text producer’s subjectivity behind the media report; e.g. the so-called Green Line, or what Bush called “God’s promise”… – Modal quantifiers such as most, some (Fairclough 1995a), e.g. Palestinian bombers killed scores of Israelis. The aim of analysing mood and modality is to help us see how the text producer interacts with and intrudes on the event itself by an attitudinal use of modalized statements or modulated obligations. This enables us to assess the particular degree
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
of commitment to the truth or security of propositions, claims or what Hodge and Kress (1988) call “counter-claims” made by participants towards the knowledge constructed in a political text. It will also enable us to assess the different relations of power that control the text producer’s attitude towards the event as a whole and the way the text producer churns out judgements about events. As Fowler notes on modality, it “is the grammar of explicit comment, the means by which people express their degree of commitment to the truth of the propositions they utter, and their views on the desirability or otherwise of the states of affairs referred to” (Fowler 1996: 166–167). Texture How can categorized meanings and commonsensical beliefs be enabled and woven into the text? We have already seen that meaning-made aspects of the sign seem favourable to some but unfavourable to others. We also saw that collective meanings can be accepted uncritically by a particular group society and be legitimized and conveniently channelled in strategic discourses. The ideological schema which categorizes groups or victims was also seen to be an important element. So, how can the texture of the politically sensitive text enable those subjective and ideological systems of meaning? I have already referred in Chapter 2 to the textual metafunction of language that creates relevance to context. Halliday (1994) explains that the textual function is an “enabling function” of both the ideational and interpersonal functions. Words and themes must be capable of creating and organizing relevant discourse. Hence, thematic structuring or thematic foregrounding and lexical classification are aspects of skilful linguistic delivery that can foreground the commonsensical meanings of a particular society or institution. This is achieved by vocabulary choices (collocations, synonyms, reference chains that have a particular naming system, diminutives and stereotypes), theme selection and framing and sequencing of propositions. These crucial tools can legitimate inequality, power relations, bias and group prejudices and can equally influence text interpretation by the reader. This sub-section, will attempt to introduce a workable methodology for the analysis of the lexical and thematic selections made by text producers which are important textual devices in legitimating their own undisputed beliefs about a political event and its causes and to position their readership. Halliday’s (1994) model will be employed for the purpose of analysing thematic foregrounding and for classification schemes of vocabulary in politically sensitive texts.
Arab News and Conflict
According to Halliday, selection in the textual system is made through thematic organization and cohesive patterns. In our analysis of a media text, the “creation of texture” should be both “structural” and “cohesive”: (A) structural 1. thematic structure: Theme and Rheme 2. information structure and focus: Given and New (B) cohesive 1. reference 2. ellipsis and substitution 3. conjunction 4. lexical cohesion (Halliday 1994: 334). As our current analyses cannot be exhaustive, two salient features will be selected: “foregrounded themes” in terms of thematic structuring, and “lexical cohesion” within the creation of political news texture. Foregrounded themes According to Halliday, “Clause as message” consists of the Theme-Rheme structure: The Theme is the element which serves as the point of departure of the message; it is that with which the clause is concerned. The remainder of the message, the part in which the Theme is developed, is called in the Prague school terminology the Rheme… the Theme is the starting-point for the message; it is the ground from which the clause is taking off. (Halliday 1994: 37–38) Consider the following points of departure and check how they enable the causes of struggle or the taken-for-granted beliefs in a particular media society to grow and develop in the text itself: But spiralling violence in the Middle East (Theme) # has overshadowed their meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Rheme)… A wave of Palestinian suicide bombing at the weekend (Theme) # prompted Israel to send more tanks into Palestinian cities and villages (Rheme). Source: Reuters English text, 2 April 2002 Here, the analyst should look for the thematic organization of the clauses or paragraphs in the text in order to discover the dominant theme, or what Halliday calls the “thematic line”, from which we know where the text is heading.
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
What the analyst should also investigate (in addition to the dominant themes) is the foregrounded themes within the thematic structure. Halliday explains that a foregrounded theme could be one of the following: – Marked Theme: “A Theme that is something other than the Subject, in a declarative clause” (Halliday 1994: 44) for a specific reason. For instance, In a new attempt to seize more Palestinian lands (Theme) # Israel (Subject) will start building what it calls a massive security fence (Rheme). Source: Al-Manar English version, 15 June 2002 or: Following the attack, (Theme) # Israel (Subject) sent about two dozen tanks into the West Bank city of Jenin (Rheme). Source: The New York Times, 5 June 2002 – Predicated Theme: cleft sentence (i.e. the form it+ be+ …) to foreground particular information in a thematic structure in order to make it explicit, e.g. it is you/you are the ones # who will be defeated vs. you # will be defeated. See how predicated themes in Figure 4.5 can make the clause marked: it Theme
|
is you
|
who
|
Rheme
|
Theme
Theme
|
will be defeated Rheme Rheme
Figure 4.5 A structure for a marked theme in a politically sensitive text
The primary aim of this tool is to characterize the marked themes as well as the winning themes which set the scene from a specific point of departure in a politically sensitive text. If the text has political implications, information will undoubtedly take a marked focus in the clause. That is to say, we can tell where the text is going when we observe how the themes are constructed within a discourse to have a particular effect on the recipient and to make emphasis on particular ideological assumptions. This type of analysis should also help the analyst to establish the kind of preferences in style followed by a particular media agency in order to make their reports newsworthy, credible and saleable. As noted in our first section on transitivity, whether in the transitivity system or the theme-rheme pattern, structure should be seen in the conditional relationships (cause and effect) between clauses that also influence the coherence of our discourse. At this point the notion of expansion, through the circumstantial element of the clause, (see Transitivity above) will effectively support our analysis
Arab News and Conflict
of thematic structuring when the overall hierarchical organization of sensitive texts is investigated. In other words, we should bear in mind the cause of struggle as represented through the agent-goal-circumstantial structure as well as the thematic structure which ultimately lead to preferred readings of political events. For instance, in the critical discourse analysis model I will formulate in Chapter 6, we shall see how the Arabic text producer unconsciously puts the active agents in the theme structure in a killing process, particularly if that agent is the ideological enemy. As Fairclough (1995a) asserts: “global text structure”, that is, information positioning and structuring in media texts, foregrounds and backgrounds political subjectivity in order to lead to special effects. Lexical cohesion and collocation Within the fabric of a politically sensitive discourse, we need to see how lexical cohesion can be another component that characterizes the text producer’s textual strategy. Cohesion here refers to “relations of meaning that exist within the text, and that define it as a text” (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 4). As Halliday (1994) further illustrates: Continuity may be established in a text by the choice of words. This may take the form of word repetition; or the choice of a word that is related in some way to a previous one – either semantically, such that the two are in the broadest sense synonymous, or collocationally, such that the two have a more than ordinary tendency to co-occur. Lexical cohesion may be maintained over long passages by the presence of keywords, words having special significance for the meaning of the particular text. (Halliday 1994: 310) Halliday also gives examples, such as noise… sound; vegetation… plants… grass; smoke… pipe. I will now focus in my textual analysis on collocational cohesion, as this form of cohesion will show us how the ideological group schema, habits of categorization, binary oppositions and hegemonic classifications can be conveniently enacted and enabled in the text itself. Collocation between lexical items can be identified in terms of “some recognizable semantic relation to one another” (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 285). The member set found for instance in Al-Manar texts, e.g. the Zionists, occupying forces, occupation entity have “a very marked cohesive effect deriving from the occurrence in proximity with each other” (ibid: 285). This effect can extend to longer cohesive chains which are established throughout the fabric of a political news report.
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
A further example of a chain of collocational cohesion can be seen in: Zionists… enemy forces; killed… massacred… demolished (as we commonly find in Al-Manar texts). These lexical patterns tend to occur in similar environments by Al-Manar, thus reflecting their own common sense and knowledge system. Ideologically based collocations can also be tested within “chain complexes”. Halliday (1994) and Martin (2001) note that in a transitivity structure, a referential chain of participants (e.g. Palestinian gunmen… attackers… militants) interacts with a process chain of (e.g. ambushed… killing… wounding… throwing grenades) and a goal chain (e.g. Jewish settlers… 12 people) to give a text its own coherence. This part of the analysis seeks to identify the construal of coherence in a politically sensitive text by measuring the lexical chains against one another. Lexical choices in the causal structure (i.e. active agent in transitivity or foregrounded theme incriminating the enemy) will undoubtedly connote specific values in the news text (see orders of signification in Chapter 2). That is to say, the categorization of participants and their actions in a western text vs. those in the Arabic text, carried out through different naming systems, is an integral part of the reproduction of ideology and belief systems in the media outlets. Categorization can be legitimized through: derogatory lexical style, positive evaluation, or use of attributes, overlexicalization (profusion of terms) vs. underlexicalization (lack of a term), and rewording. For instance, examine the following categorization of those seen as outgroups: Derogatory or diminutive lexical style which can be seen in metaphors taken for instance from animal abuse or hygiene (see also Fowler 1991), e.g. Soldiers hunted the killers… to clean these cities of terrorists Source: The New York Times, 16 November 2002 Overlexicalization, e.g. the overlexicalization of Palestinian attacks in Reuters English texts: terrorism… such attacks… violence… terrorist activities… terror infrastructure… revenge attacks against Israel… carnage Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 Underlexicalization, e.g. when Arab media representations would reduce Palestinian carnage/ terror, etc. (as found in the English texts) merely to attacks. The case studies in the following chapters will offer more illustration regarding the lexical classification system found in Arab media discourse. I would propose here that collocations can be best analysed if fitted under the group schema of Us
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vs. Them. Collocation can best be described and analysed when brought to a terrain that is not its own, i.e. when there is a political struggle over representations in the language itself. Another linguistic strategy that makes visible the discriminating practice of a media institution is diagramming the collocation devices of e.g. Israelis vs. those of Palestinians, in a politically sensitive text (see Chapter 6). So far, we may note that the semantic, syntactic and structural aspects of the text are not sufficient tools in text analysis, for there are other invisible forces in the text that are communicated rather than actually seen at the semantic or syntactic levels. The analyst has to examine the communicative force, the presuppositions or the kinds of action performed by the text producers. Therefore, I will attempt in the following sub-sections to define the most salient pragmatic tools that can unravel the intentions behind a politically motivated text. Speech acts How does the text producer exercise power in a politically sensitive text to reflect relations of enmity, dominance over y or solidarity with x? In the pragmatically-oriented approach to analysing language, philosophers of language (e.g. Austin 1962; Searle 1969) have added a new dimension to meaning, which is “action”. Utterances must be investigated as performing a social action according to the text producer’s intention which is expected to be recognized by the audience within a specific speech event. In a politically sensitive text, the reporter or the politician activates a particular discourse by the use of particular verbs that signify values or forces. For example, in a discourse of resistance to western political discourses, Al-Manar text producer can accuse their enemy, alarm the audience, arouse sympathies towards Palestinian victims, warn or report with argumentative representations. In general, speech acts could be threats, warnings, promises or apologies. Among many attempts to classify speech acts, Searle (1969) distinguishes the following core set: – Assertive verbs or representatives: statements of events, facts, descriptions. – Declaratives: declaring war or proclaiming a constitution. – Expressives: expressing states of joy, sorrow, or exaggeration. – Directives: commanding, requesting or demanding. – Commissives: expressing the intention of speaker, e.g. promising or threatening. In examining political discourses, the analyst has to further consider the conditions that make certain speech acts effective in the political text. These appropriate conditions are called “felicity conditions”. For instance, Al-Manar’s discourse includes complex conditions such as the power of this Arab and Islamic institution, the style
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
of Al-Manar’s language which is also recognized and made sensical by their own audience. These conditions, if felicitous, will make Al-Manar’s speech acts appropriate and recognized as ideologically intended for their own audiences. That is, their performance will be based on their felicitousness, more than their truth-value. Speech acts consist of three types of acts: – Locutionary act: a meaningful linguistic utterance. – Illocutionary act: the speaker’s communicative force. – Perlocutionary act: the effect of an utterance on the audience. For example, when a Hezbollah leader utters: the Lebanese prisoners will be released from Zionist jails, (locutionary act that has a meaningful linguistic expression), it means to the Arab audience that he will fulfil his promise, (illocutionary act), with the effect that his Arab audience will believe in this promise till it is fulfilled. Moreover, this force would be called in Al-Manar’s discourses the true promise (perlocutionary act). Consider the perlocutionary effect in the following text published by Al-Manar on the prisoner exchange between Israel and Hezbollah which took place on 16 July 2008: Operation Al-Redwan… Another Sincere Promise Fulfilled The Islamic Resistance and Israel carry out a prisoner exchange on Wednesday dubbed Operation Al-Redwan. The operation is the last of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah’s true pledges… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 16 July 2008 Furthermore, speech acts could be direct or indirect. As Yule (1996a) puts it: “whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function, we have a direct speech act. Whenever there is an indirect relationship between a structure and a function, we have an indirect speech act.” (Yule 1996a: PP 54–55). Thus, a ‘declarative’ like ‘land grabbing’, as used by Al-Manar to ‘warn’ and ‘alert’ Arabs of more land seizure by Israel, is a case of an indirect speech act. In other words, the literal meaning of a representative alone does not convey the full illocutionary force. This indirect force is considered felicitous to the Arab audience with a strong perlocutionary effect when it is recognized by them as ideologically intended. Under speech act theory, cooperation between the text producer and the intended audience should also be examined, especially when implicit meanings are conveyed. At this point in this pragmatic investigation of text strategy it is essential to consider Grice’s (1975) theory of meaning. According to Grice, participants identify common goals and cooperate in conversations as required by the purpose of the conversation. Four maxims or sub-principles express a general Cooperative Principle (CP). The CP and its maxims are summarized as follows:
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– The Cooperative Principle: make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. – The maxim of quantity: make your contribution as informative as required – neither more nor less than is required. – The maxim of quality: your contribution must be true and not spurious. – The maxim of relevance: be relevant. – The maxim of manner: be clear, reasonable. What has to be considered in the current analysis of media discourse is how the Cooperative Principle governs relations between the text producer, or/and commissioner and target recipients to make a particular ideological discourse relevant and as being true description of a state of affairs as we shall explore later in this book. Another area to be investigated is Leech’s (1983) conception of speech acts. Leech suggests that speech-act verbs could be “conditional” vs. “unconditional” as follows: – Conditional verbs give more choice to the recipient, e.g. the US asked Arafat. – Unconditional verbs assume that the recipient will comply unconditionally (i.e. one participant is in full authority and intends uptake by the less powerful to be taken for granted), e.g. the US urged/ pressed Arafat. Leech usefully makes reference to what he terms “the cost-benefit scale” concept. That is, some verbs in our case study could be costly or even impolite for the Arab audience, e.g. Israeli forces hunted Palestinian militants. Moreover, Leech distinguishes between two important speech act verbs that come under Searle’s assertive category above: – informative: to announce or report, e.g. X said/ confirmed; – argumentative: “express the relation between the current truth claim and other truth claims made by S [speaker] or H [addressee]” (Leech 1983: 224), e.g. x claimed/ alleged. An awareness of speech acts should inform our analysis in the sense that we should be able to see what type of speech acts or implied meanings are used against outgroups in a conflict; the way power control impinges on cooperation between the text producer and the intended audience; whether the use of unconditional verbs expresses relations of superiority over the recipient; and the type of assertives (i.e. informative or argumentative) the text producer tends to use in reporting or contending the truth claims of a particular political event. Politeness How can the text producer be polite to the target audience, or the ‘worthy’ victims? How can she/he show sympathy in the text?
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
Politeness is another pragmatic tool utilized by critical discourse analysts to explore the multi-faceted activity of doing things with political texts. Critical discourse analysts usually refer in this concern to Brown and Levinson’s classic work on politeness (1987). In studying politically sensitive discourse, I would refer to two concepts of politeness: politeness in the sense related to face which is used by Brown and Levinson (1987); and politeness as a principle needed to maximize benefits, agreement and sympathy with the target audience, as described by Leech (1983). Brown and Levinson (1987) assume that a model person has a “face” or “public self-image”. They explain that “face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction.” (Brown and Levinson 1987: 61). They define two related aspects: negative face: the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be unimpeded by others. positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others. (ibid: 62) In political discourse interaction, the text producer attempts to maintain these face wants through cooperation with her or his audience. For instance, a news reporter wants the news report to be approved of as being formal, informative and credible. However, this act also entails the commitment of what Brown and Levinson call a “face threatening act” (FTA), e.g. to report speech acts of killing. In other words, the need to balance face in Reuters, for example, derives from the fact that acts of communication with the audience could inherently be imposing or “face threatening” to the public self-image of parties to the conflict. An act of communication could threaten X’s positive face or Y’s negative face. Let us take more examples concerning face threatening acts. In a Reuters text, S (e.g. U.S. administration) ordering H (e.g. Arafat) to do or not to do something threatens the negative face of H (Arafat) who needs a freedom of action. Further examples are: S(e.g. reporter) raising “divisive/ taboo topics” on politics, religion or race; S (e.g. U.S. administration) expressing enmity towards H (e.g. Hamas fighters); S (e.g. reporter) tarnishing H’s image (e.g. a leader of an organization) is an act that threatens the positive face of H (i.e. outgroup), as H normally needs acceptance, approval by others and connections. A face threatening act can in many cases threaten both the negative face and the positive face of H, such as in expressions taken from animal abuse. But in order to “save face” or “redress” the situation, two redressive strategies, proposed by Brown
Arab News and Conflict
and Levinson, are distinguished, as seen, for example, on the part of the journalist working for an Arab media organization: – Negative politeness: showing deference and concern towards the other (e.g. Arafat’s public face), minimizing an imposition on X, or even use of hedging that backgrounds the negative acts of X. – Positive politeness: showing solidarity and common goals towards the other, e.g. showing solidarity with the Arab audience by adding more details about Arab victims. The following are the possible strategies for performing face threatening actions (FTAs), as stated by Brown and Levinson: – Not to commit the FTA at all. – To commit the FTA off record (i.e. giving hints, being indirect). – To commit the FTA baldly on record without redress (i.e. directly where S has power and control over H). – To commit the FTA on record with either negative or positive face redress. Consider now the following statements and see what politeness strategies are followed:
Example A:
First, the US administration is the major sponsor of international terrorism, the murderer of the largest number of innocent people yet and the biggest seller of military killing and torture tools; therefore, this administration has no right to give others certificates of patriotism or terrorism, while it is forcing the peoples of the world including the American people to pay the tax of its mobile wars and the price of its bloodthirsty policies. Hence, when the US administration enlists certain groups on its terrorism list, it is in fact granting them a medal of honour, in the eyes of their peers. It is also categorizing itself and its allies as enemies of the forces of national liberation who constitute the majority of the people worldwide, thus rendering itself unable to alter its ugly and barbaric picture. Source: Al-Manar English version, 2 May 2008 Strategy: An FTA baldly on record, without redress, whereby Al-Manar (S) can win the Arab audience support if US administration’s (H) face is threatened without losing its own (i.e. Al-Manar’s). Example B: Another Sincere Promise…Our Heroes Have Returned… Four helicopters landed at the airport at 20:00. President Michel Suleiman welcomed the heroes and delivered a speech praising Al-Redwan Operation. “Your return brightens the resistance of Lebanon and the Lebanese and
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
underlines your country’s adherence to its citizens and its readiness to sacrifice for its rights. Liberation will remain incomplete as long as Israel occupies our land with mines and cluster bombs. I remind you that Lebanon has the right to regain its occupied territories with every available and legitimate means as stipulated in international laws. This right, we will not give up,” President Suleiman stressed. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 17 July 2008 Strategy: Positive politeness, where both Al-Manar’s reporter and President Suleiman treat the Lebanese prisoners who were released as members of ingroup and heroes whose traits are highly respected, showing that they have common grounds and goals, and therefore they are the “worthy” in a struggle. In doing this, the Lebanese President (S) indicates he wants to “come closer” to Lebanese resistance/ prisoners (H). Simultaneously, the Lebanese President (S) commits an FTA baldly on record without redress against Israel (H). As Brown and Levinson further explain, “positive politeness is redress directed to the addressee’s positive face, his perennial desire that his wants (or the actions/acquisitions/values resulting from them) should be thought of as desirable.” (ibid: 101). In Arabic media representations of a politically sensitive event, we also observe the text producer’s assessment of the “seriousness” of an FTA she/he might encounter in the original text written in English. As Brown and Levinson explain, the assessment of the danger of an FTA is based on the following sociological variables: The social distance (D) between S and H; the relative power (P) of S and H; and the absolute ranking (R) of the various impositions in the given culture. Thus, the choice of a politeness strategy that is encoded in the Arabic linguistic act will rely on the “weightiness” of the face wants involved, as determined by the combined assessment of the above three variables. If the foreign text (used as a source of information by an Arab producer) seems to have a greater distance or is imposing unequal relations of power, one can expect more redressive acts by the Arab text producer or the journalistic translator to save the face wants of the ideology in question. We have seen a previous example implying the presence of the Arab producer’s subjectivity, e.g. what Bush called “God’s promise”. Our text analysis later on will show how a politically sensitive text can go baldly on record against the enemy to serve the preferred readership or a dominant power. This will be illustrated in subsequent text analyses, which will also show how the Arab producer uses redressive action (i.e. give face to Arab addressees) in order, for example, to save Arafat’s negative face. This could be actualized through expressions of deference in Arabic or through modulating the American orders in the mood system. Other strategies involve deleting offensive terms of address or expressions of enmity towards the Arabs or the addition of ingroup-markers of
Arab News and Conflict
closer solidarity. Conversely, the Arab producer can go baldly on record by using her or his institutional stereotypes, such as attributes in naming practices against outgroups (e.g. Zionists). The “payoff ” will be: showing solidarity with Arabs and credibility to the target audience. Here, the newly created stereotypes against e.g. Israel/ the US administration in the Arabic text do not constitute an FTA to the Arabs, but on the contrary are considered “efficient”. Another study conducted by Leech (1983) can enrich our understanding of politeness. Leech notes “that politeness concerns a relationship between two participants whom we may call self and other” (Leech 1983: 131). He explains that the Politeness Principle (PP) is complementary to the Cooperative Principle (CP), especially when one of the latter’s maxims is broken during communication (see speech acts above). The PP is more regulative and enhances social equilibrium if, for instance, the maxim of quality is violated. According to Leech, the PP works through the following maxims (Leech 1983: 132): – Tact Maxim: minimize cost to other, maximize benefit to other. – Generosity Maxim: minimize benefit to self, maximize cost to self. – Approbation Maxim: minimize dispraise of other, maximize praise of other. – Modesty Maxim: minimize praise of self, maximize dispraise of self. – Agreement Maxim: minimize disagreement between self and other, maximize agreement between self and other. – Sympathy Maxim: minimize antipathy between self and other, maximize sympathy between self and other. These maxims can be seen at work when applied to ingroup members who tend to maximize benefit to one another and to enhance positive self-presentation in a political report. Obviously, in warring discourses during times of conflict, one sees in the media what Leech calls “conflictive illocutions” with non-bridgeable politeness gaps and different goals. Therefore, the analyst should examine in political representations more scales as listed below by Leech under the Politeness Principle, such as: – cost and benefit to S; – cost and benefit to H; – degrees of distance reflecting power and authority; – solidarity factor. The Politeness Principle can be seen at work in our analyses in Chapters 5 and 6 at both the contextual level and the textual level. It interacts with different linguistic constructions such as the use of specific illocutionary verbs, collocations, naming strategies and the rhetoric of victim portrayal.
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
Relevance (the descriptive use vs. the interpretive use) How does the text producer achieve the rewarding ideological readings of a political event? How is prejudice manifested in reporting a news story? Critical language analysts (e.g. Fairclough 2001; Simpson 1993; Van Dijk 1988) have utilized the concept of “presuppositions” or assumptions that S makes about what H would accept without protest. Fairclough (2001) notes that presuppositions are essential for the interpretation of texts, for they appeal to background knowledge, but “can also have ideological functions, when what they assume has the character of common sense in the service of power” (Fairclough 2001: 128). An example is an expression like ‘the suicide bombers’ which presupposes in international media that there is a threat to the innocent from acts of terrorism. Yule (1996a) refers us to different types of presupposition that relate to speakers, e.g. existential presupposition which is assumed to be present in any definite noun phrase. For instance ‘the Gaza strip is already walled off, reducing the threat to Israel… eventually the security fence will stretch 220 miles along the Green Line’. Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 Here S is assumed to be committed to the existence of the security of Israel or the threat coming from the Palestinians. We may note that commonsensical presuppositions might be challenged by other readers. In this respect, we should turn to a very important pragmatic notion: “relevance”. For relevance is an element that can equally influence the interpretations of a news event as intended by the news media or the political speaker in order to serve ideological interests. A useful method to account for relevance as a linguistic device that can investigate contested presuppositions seen in the Other’s text is put forward by Sperber and Wilson. They note that the audience “will pay attention to a phenomenon only if it seems relevant to them” (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 156). Relevance to them is defined in terms of “contextual effect” and “processing effort”. Contextual or cognitive effects are the outcome of an interaction between a stimulus that is being newly imposed and a subset of the assumptions that are already instituted in a cognitive system. The processing effort is the effort the cognitive system has to exert in order to yield a reasonable interpretation of any incoming information processed. This means that relevance is a matter of degree. Thus a recipient will establish a balance between contextual effects, i.e. “reward” and processing effort, i.e. “cost”. For instance, we may observe that the different representations encountered in the Arab media have ideological assumptions which are sufficiently relevant for
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the Arab audience to make a politically sensitive text optimally beneficial and for as little processing effort as possible. In other words, the degree of success in achieving relevance to Arab readership is determined by relaying the most relevant information to the new cognitive environment. Examine next why the swap of prisoners between Israel and Hezbollah means victory to the Arab populace; whereas such assumptions of victory are considered irrelevant to a non-Arab who has different commonsensical beliefs about this struggle: All Arabs were mesmerized in front of the screens witnessing a worthy victory… It is a new Arab victory… It is a historical achievement which prides the whole of Lebanon… It is a victory for all those who fought by war, steadfastness, thinking, pen, sticking to their land, or rebuilding their own house every time it is demolished… It is a new reaffirmation to those who “lacked” the evidence that the victory was for those who fought in their steadfastness during the 33 days of fire… Source: Assafir Arabic text, 17 July 2008 Every statement or stimulus in the above media text yields the most satisfactory interpretations by the Arab audience. These representations, along with the predicated themes, undoubtedly strengthen existing assumptions in the Arab society about the Lebanese resistance and with the least processing effort, thus, achieving what Sperber and Wilson call “optimal relevance”. This is why we also see different representations in the translation process itself, for the foreign text used as source of information can be really “cost sensitive” if its presuppositions (or information constituted from its own general knowledge) put the Arab audience through unnecessary processing effort. The Arab audience needs to interpret a politically sensitive report with adequate contextual effects and with minimal cost to their own ideological beliefs (see case studies later in this book). By investigating the style of the politically sensitive text, especially in terms of thematic structuring, lexical categorization, information backgrounding and verbs of reporting, the analyst should be able to gather information about what is actually relevant to those in control of the social system and to their respective audience. As Sperber and Wilson put it, “stylistic differences are just differences in the way relevance is achieved” (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 224). In order to utilize relevance in the current framework of analysis as a “microscope” that can disclose different ideological presuppositions or belief systems, I propose that the following dimensions of language use (as suggested by Sperber and Wilson) be considered within our pragmatic model of text analysis: – The Descriptive dimension of language use: when a mental representation “is entertained as a description of the state of affairs of which it is thought to be true” (Gutt 2000: 36). For instance, describing a desirable state of affairs by
Chapter 4. A critical discourse analysis approach
using expressions like ‘land grabbing’ (in Al-Manar’s news representations) to be a true thought in the Arab media instead of ‘building a security fence’. – The Interpretive dimension of language use when “our mind can entertain a mental representation or thought not in virtue of its being true of some state of affairs, but in virtue of its interpretive resemblance to some other representation” (Gutt 2000: 39). For instance, representation which resembles or repeats a statement that comes from the “worthy” group in a conflict. Here, I mean repeating or reporting what our allies or ingroup members (e.g. officials or eyewitnesses) say, without commitment to truth as a descriptive statement. In other words, the produced text should resemble the content of texts coming from Our allies/ingroups who have their own truth claims and representations. Recall our previous example taken from President Bush’s speech in the Knesset in Jerusalem: We gather to mark a momentous occasion. Sixty years ago in Tel Aviv, David Ben-Gurion proclaimed Israel’s independence, founded on the “natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate.” What followed was more than the establishment of a new country. It was the redemption of an ancient promise given to Abraham and Moses and David -- a homeland for the chosen people Eretz Yisrael. Eleven minutes later, on the orders of President Harry Truman, the United States was proud to be the first nation to recognize Israel’s independence. And on this landmark anniversary, America is proud to be Israel’s closest ally and best friend in the world. Here, Bush’s representation resembles statements of David Ben-Gurion, religious statements from the Torah, and President Harry Truman’s statement. In other words, Bush’s pragmatic text strategy was interpretive to reinforce the existing beliefs of ingroups, thus achieving desired and optimal ideological effects. This interpretive strategy also contests the descriptive truth claims of his enemies. The descriptive and interpretive tools are pragmatic in nature and the purpose of utilizing them in our model of analysis is two-fold: – to investigate the type of relevance the text producer achieves when ingroup or outgroup voices have to be represented in a politically sensitive text; – to further investigate, in Chapter 7, why, during the translation of politically sensitive events in a turbulent moment in history, the journalistic translator avoids interpretive relations with the source text. My analysis of relevance will describe the actual pragmatic use made by the text producer in a politically sensitive moment – whether descriptive or interpretive – to articulate the hegemonic assumptions and to achieve optimal preferred readings.
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Conclusion This critical discourse analysis approach, has tried to show connections between ideological, semiological or cognitive structures on the one hand, and language structures on the other. My suggested model of critical language analysis attempts to give linguistic descriptions to the motivated signs or ideological implications discussed in the previous chapters. Thus far, we can conclude that semantic, syntactic, and pragmatic meanings start to emerge in our approach to media discourse. I have selected specific language tools to show how they can in fact work inter-dependently in politically motivated texts. These tools must be seen as text strategies that work collectively to express the cause of a particular struggle, claims for power, ideological assumptions, group schema about Us and the enemy, and political face wants. The linguistic descriptions utilized in this chapter can be used as checklist by the politician, the reporter, and the political, media, discourse or translation analyst in order to: either examine or create a political report with the preferred ideological effects. What I will try to do next is to draw up a model of analysis, using a combination of the contextual and textual approaches seen so far, and apply this to Arab media discourse, especially in time of conflict.
part 2
A model of analysis Analysing Arab media discourse Introduction Media editors and producers would claim that that their political discourses are strictly credible and objective, reporting events with unbiased content. In my view, to ascertain how a political discourse is made legitimate, credible, polite, apparently objective, and relevant to its own target audience, two interlinked networks should be analysed. The next two chapters aim to lay out a procedural scheme for such an analysis of political discourse in times of conflict. This analysis involves two stages: Chapter 5 will explore the network of contextual factors by which media producers interact with and reflect the dominant hegemonies, particularly with respect to the political power structures; Chapter 6 will expose the network of linguistic text strategies by which the aims of the media producers are achieved, including transitivity, mood and modality and thematic and lexical texture. It will also reveal the role of language in the speech acts and politeness strategies which realise the functional and communicative goals of media producers and editors. A further aspect of our contextual analysis will be covered in Chapter 7 dealing specifically with translation issues that also have a role to play in the final production of political texts in the media. Each chapter in Part II will give illustrations through specific case studies chosen from Arab media discourse. The examples chosen were collected from Arab electronic media and Arab daily newspapers. Reuters Arabic texts, which I have backtranslated into English for the international reader, are of particular importance, for they are used as an important source of information by many Arab media outlets as well as by individuals who prefer to read Reuters Arabic online. Al-Manar texts were collected from the editorial team itself, along with the equivalent texts from AFP (both in English and Arabic) which had been used as a source of information. These Al-Manar texts are those broadcast to their world audiences. Other Manar texts were also collected from their website which produces both Arabic and English versions. The Al-Manar English versions included in this chapter, were translated by a special team who work for this media outlet, and mirror the discourse found in their equivalent Arabic texts. Part II will also deal with cases taken from other popular Arab media sources (e.g. Al-Jazeera,
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Al-Quds Al-Arabi). All examples have been backtranslated into English, except for Al-Manar’s own English version where reference is duly made. I remind the reader that all these media examples are chosen from turbulent times in the Middle East. This will allow us to test many of the constraints and layers of meanings laid out in the previous chapters that lie beneath politically sensitive discourses. Every example, wherever fitted in the sections below, should be able to operate to a certain extent under any of the contextual or textual factors which will be identified in Chapters 5 & 6.
chapter 5
Analysing the contextual factors Dominant hegemony As was pointed out earlier on, hegemony, in political discourse, refers to the ruling political and intellectual structures of a society. This covers how the elite rule by consent, how journalists or media producers educate themselves in this hegemonic order and how the media invisibly legitimize this power. To examine this contextual property, we first have to identify the institutions likely to govern the media productions. So, what institutions govern the final productions in the Arab media? And how can the analyst look for viable cases to study? To begin with, there are many institutions such as family, religion, government, and education that can reproduce a dominant hegemony. Such institutions are cross- dimensional, i.e. they meet with each other or one can lead to the other. In reading the final representations in the media, we read cultural, political, social and ideological dimensions inspired by the past and lessons learned from the past. We also read in them a challenge against foreign political, social or religious threats. As this section cannot be all-encompassing, I shall focus only on the case of political institutions and the role of power-holders in enforcing the dominant order of a given society. As the power-holders’ discourses have a privileged access to public discourse, we shall see how the journalists themselves accept and reproduce (with varying degrees) the prevailing discourses of those political and religious leaders. The constraints that come from higher institutions in the state were introduced in Chapter 3, which provided examples on the role of the Arab or Islamic leaders in legitimizing for example, resistance discourses when conflict intensifies against Israel. We saw this impact on the discoursal commonality in the Arab media, particularly if these discourses seem to protect the regional or national interests. Our case studies below will cite two instances to show how hegemony is engineered at the hands of the elites: Our first case is taken from the sixth Annual International Conference on Al-Quds [Jerusalem] held in Doha in October 2008. The conference, attended by a number of religious leaders, politicians and scholars from around the world,
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concluded in its final statement important hegemonic issues. The following extract is an illustration: …that the public and the Arab and Islamic governments are called upon to act in order to defend occupied Jerusalem… mobilizing the efforts to maintain a high level of awareness and watchfulness in order to stand up to the threats posed before the holy Islamic and Christian sites, especially Al-Aqsa mosque… that facing the Zionist occupation is a consensus point among all Arabs and Muslims, that the political, religious and sectarian disputes must be a secondary issue facing the occupation and its arrogance… that the relevant international organizations have a duty to protect “our” spiritual and cultural heritage, as well as human rights regarding this matter… the statement hailed the Palestinian People and its courageous resistance against the Israeli occupation, as it also hailed the detainees in the Israeli jails. Source: Al-Jazeera; Al-Manar Arabic texts, 14 October 2008 Our second case is taken from an excerpt of a speech delivered by the Lebanese President Michel Suleiman who was sworn in in the presence of Arab leaders in Beirut on 25 May 2008: “The emergence of the resistance [Hezbollah resistance] was a need in the light of the State’s disintegration [Lebanon’s civil war]… its success in expelling the occupier lies in the steadfastness of its men and the grandeur of its martyrs, but with Sheba farms under occupation and the continuation by the Israeli enemy of its threats and its violation of [Lebanon’s] sovereignty, this necessitates a defence strategy to protect our country…”. In his inaugural address the elected President took a swipe at Washington, saying: “I thank the United States nonetheless, seeing that it seems to have been convinced that Lebanon is not the appropriate place for its New Middle East plan.” Source: Assafir; Al-Mustaqbal; Al-Jazeera Arabic texts, 26 May 2008 These two challenging and defensive representations above, having been manufactured through higher institutional discourses of the leaders, were subsequently commended by many Arab media outlets, for they reflect political commonality in the Arab world towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. While the West struggles to impose its dominant order that legitimates terrorism/violence discourses in the world media against Arabs attacking Israelis, the common Arab is seen, in contrast, to give moral and legal grounds to political discourses against the US-Israeli foreign policy in the Middle East. It is therefore proposed that influential speeches or statements manufactured by power holders in a given society, which reach the public at large, can conveniently shape mass media productions and national discourses.
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
For this reason we observe that even Reuters or AFP Arabic representations avoid words such as terrorism when attributed to Palestinian or Hezbollah fighters, for it would contradict with what has already been made legitimate in the Arab institutional context in times of conflict. With this in mind, I will next test the role of this fine property of context in impinging upon the production regimes in the Arab media as well as the reception regimes. Take the following highlighted representations and see how by shifting them they become legitimate, acceptable, and commonsensical to an Arab recipient. The English texts are the original ones and the Arabic texts are the new representations of these to the Arab readers:
Example 1:
Palestinians kill seven as violence escalates ... The mounting Israeli death toll in 17 months of violence was likely to increase public pressure on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, whose popularity in Israel is at an all-time low, to take tougher military action against the Palestinians. Source: Reuters English text, 3 March 2002 vs. The mounting Israeli death toll during the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation was likely to increase public pressure on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, whose popularity is at an-all time low. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 3 March 2002
Example 2:
Arafat condemns Jerusalem bombing ... Powell’s mission to end 18 months of violence was plunged into disarray by a Palestinian suicide attack that killed six people in Jerusalem’s main market on Friday… Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 vs. Powell’s mission to end the continual bloodshed in the Middle East for over 18 months has come into crisis after the last attack carried out by a young Palestinian woman who blew herself up and killed six Israelis and wounded 89 others… Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002
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Example 3:
Powell to brief Bush on Middle East efforts … Dispatching Powell to the region was a risky move by Bush, who has come under fire at home and abroad for doing too little too late to stop Israeli-Palestinian violence that has intensified over 18 months. Source: Reuters English text, 18 April 2002 vs. Dispatching Powell to the region was a risky move by Bush, who has come under fire at home and abroad for doing too little to stop the Palestinian-Israeli struggle that has intensified since the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation over 18 months. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 18 April 2002 Example 4: 12 dead in Hebron attack … It was the deadliest against Israelis in the West Bank city since the start of a Palestinian uprising more than two years ago and raised the spectre of heavy retaliation by Israel’s right wing government. Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 vs. It was the deadliest attack on the Israelis in the city since the outbreak of a Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 15 November 2002 The above shifts in Reuters Arabic texts demonstrate that in a politically sensitive discourse, the Arabic media producers interiorize the dominant ideology in the Middle East during that particular period in the history of conflict, legitimating, accepting and respecting its order. As I have concluded earlier, Arab producers avoid producing a foreign hegemony that contradicts what has already been made legitimate in the Arab institutional context. Reuters own Arabic texts tend to avoid as much as possible describing Palestinian acts as violent, and simultaneously legitimate a new discourse on occupation, thus maintaining the prevalent moral and political orders in the Arab world which commonly believe in the Palestinian’s legitimate right to resistance. Clearly, the Arabic representations accord with the fixed institutional constraint that overtly delegitimates occupation of Arab lands and asserts the Palestinians’ legitimate right to resistance.
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
Let us next see how this hegemonic order changes between AFP source texts and Al Manar Arabic language texts: Example 5: Positioning of Israel’s security fence awakens fears Israel will start building on Sunday a massive security fence … To the right of the political spectrum, voices are being raised, warning that the path of the fence should not follow the Green Line in any way, for fear this would become the official frontier between Israel and a future Palestinian state… Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 vs. The occupying authorities will start tomorrow grabbing more Palestinian lands under the pretext of building what they call a security fence… Other Zionist circles warned against the demarcation of what is called the Green Line for fear this would become the official frontier between territories occupied since 1948 and the territories under the control of the Palestinian authority… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 Example 6: Israeli troops kill three Palestinians in West Bank Israeli soldiers killed three Palestinians overnight in the West Bank including a member of the radical Islamic movement Hamas… Hisham Khrewesh, 20, was killed during a shootout in the Tulkarem refugee camp… Source: AFP English text, 7 January 2004 vs. Israeli forces killed the Palestinian Hisham Khrewesh, 20, who belongs to the Islamic Resistance movement Hamas, during an exchange of fire in Tulkarem refugee camp… Source: AFP Arabic text, 7 January 2004 or: Three Palestinian were martyred by the bullets of the Zionist occupying army overnight... the third martyr from Tulkaram city called (Hisham Khrewesh), 20, from the Islamic resistance movement Hamas… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 7 January 2004
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Example 7:
Israeli accused of spying for Hezbollah An Israeli national was charged in Tel Aviv district court Thursday with spying for Lebanon’s Shiite Muslim fundamentalist Movement Hezbollah, a sworn foe of the Jewish state, public radio reported… Source: AFP English text, 27 June 2002 vs. Israeli public radio reported that Tel Aviv district court charged Thursday an Israeli national with spying for Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Source: AFP Arabic text, 27 June 2002 or: Tel Aviv court charged an Israeli with spying for Hezbollah. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 28 June 2002 Example 8: Burn urges calm on Lebanon-Israel border, support for US peace US envoy William Burns called here, Tuesday, for calm on Lebanon’s border with Israel and for support of Washington’s “three-track” strategy for peace between Israel and the Palestinians… Source: AFP English text, 4 June 2002 vs. US envoy to the Middle East William Burns called in Beirut for calm on the blue line between Lebanon and occupied Palestine and for support of US efforts to re-launch the settlement process in the area. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 5 June 2002 We may conclude that the Arabic texts do not channel the system of ideas, world view, or consensus found in the Reuters/AFP English source texts. This applies to the subjects of fighting groups, legality of lands in the Middle East, or even the prevailing orders of US influence or power in the Middle East. What is seen as legal power, legal land or a legal act in the English text becomes illegal in the Arabic text and vice versa. Al-Manar provides us with further explicit and outspoken examples of this dominant hegemony in the Arab world, e.g. what is morally and legally accepted as a security fence to protect the state of Israel, or what is accepted as a peace process by the US in AFP is carefully deconstructed by Al-Manar producers. Hence, new discourses in the Arabic media take over in order to show that the participants in this process are occupiers, the fence building is another occupation act, or that the peace process is another settlement process with foreign conditions at the expense of Arab lands.
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
Regardless of the fact that they are more visible in Al-Manar’s texts than in Reuters or AFP Arabic texts, all the Arabic texts above produce counter-hegemonic readings to their Arabic audiences. The fact that the dominant hegemonic scene of the English language text is absent from the Arabic language text confirms its powerful legitimating function for a particular society. The new hegemonic reading found in the Arab media discourse will be spelled out later in more detail when the text strategy, specifically the collocational system is analysed. Interpellation of subjects This is another layer of context that is related to hegemony, for it expresses dominant political orders in society but with a special function capable of constructing the participants in the news event in a very subjective manner. Members of a society become subjects (i.e. with subject position or ideological identity) only after they have been “hailed” or “interpellated” as such by their ruling apparatuses (see Chapter 3). To think of a particular participant as a threat object is to construct him continually in the media either as terrorist or occupier to whom the text producer can threaten his political face. Recall this previous example from Al-Manar, on its oppositional stance towards foreign categorization, which here could also be called Al-Manar’s stance against foreign interpellation: Example 1: Murderous U.S. Has no Right to Categorize People Hezbollah issued the following statement: With regard to the release of a report by the US administration through which it gave itself the right to categorize peoples, states and movements, between those it calls moderates who are in harmony with its policies and schemes and those opposing it to preserve their rights and therefore categorized as terrorists, the following points must be highlighted: First, the US administration is the major sponsor of international terrorism, the murderer of the largest number of innocent people yet and the biggest seller of military killing and torture tools… Source: Al-Manar English version, 2 May 2008 This discourse found on the Arabic street and in many other media discourses in the Middle East is an explicit case of the subject positioning. Under this second constraint, the analyst has to define how the underlying ideology of the media consistently subjectifies or interpellates the participants/actors in a conflict, i.e. as powerful, legal entities, as less powerful and victimized, or as dangerous subjects.
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Let us refer again to previous examples of Reuters texts, to see how this layer of context operates jointly with dominant hegemony:
Example 2:
The Palestinian subjects: In Reuters English texts, Palestinian subjects were interpellated as follows: Palestinian leader… Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian authority… woman bomber… the head of the Palestinian group’s military wing... A Palestinian suicide bomber… militant attacks… Palestinians in Jenin, a stronghold of militants. vs. the following, in Reuters Arabic texts: Palestinian President… Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian authority… young Palestinian woman who blew herself up… the leader of Jerusalem’s brigade… the military wing of the Jihad movement… Palestinian… Palestinian woman… activists’ attacks… Palestinians in Jenin. The different interpellation system found in Reuters Arabic texts subjectifies Arafat as President. The woman bomber is interpellated as young but not criminal, Palestinian leaders are legal subjects with recognized authority in the Middle East, Palestinian militants appear to be, in many instances, legal fighting subjects rather than being dangerous subjects. It was further observed that suicide bombers, militants in some Reuters English reports (e.g. 13 April & 22 October 2002), were deleted from Reuters Arabic texts in order to avoid continually subjectifying them as ethically unjustified and lacking a cause in the Arabic situation. Example 3: The Israeli subjects: Notice the alert interpellation system in Al-Manar compared with that found in AFP, whereby the latter has been used merely as a source of information: Israel… Israeli Defence Minister… Israeli authorities… Israeli soldiers… an Israeli army spokesman… Israeli troops… soldiers… Israel… Israel’s domestic security service. AFP texts vs. Occupying authorities… the enemy’s Minister of War… occupying circles… Zionist occupying army… Zionist military spokesman… occupying soldiers… Zionist soldiers… the enemy’s entity… the Zionist security service,
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
whereas the Palestinian subjects are interpellated as: the martyr… a young Palestinian… a Palestinian teenager. Al-Manar texts What are interpellated as legal authorities in the original AFP text are represented as dangerous enemy, institutions, and occupying authorities in Al-Manar discourse. It was also observed that the wanted militants… Lebanon’s Shiite fundamentalist Movement Hezbollah, a network of collaborators (dangerous Palestinian and Hezbollah subjects with illegal authority) in the AFP texts were, predictably, deleted from Al-Manar representations. Arab subjects in Al-Manar are interpellated as noble human subjects or victims of occupation. Similarly, in the Reuters Arabic language reports from this intense period, Israelis are hailed implicitly as occupiers on a number of occasions (e.g. Israeli occupation); whereas Palestinian fighters are not seen to be hailed as illegal militants or dangerous subjects. More visibly, the Palestinian or Hezbollah fighters hailed in AFP as dangerous or fundamentalist subjects are, in Al-Manar, hailed as martyrs or victims of occupation. On the other hand, Al-Manar texts hail Israelis as dangerous occupiers, illegal forces and expansionists. Bearing in mind the concepts of “reversible time” (Chapter 2) and “worthy versus unworthy victims” (Chapter 3), consider more recent examples on the interpellation system in Arab media discourse, taken from a sensitive event regarding the Arab remains versus the Israeli dead bodies in a UN brokered swap deal between Hezbollah and Israel, in July 2008: Example 4: Two dead Israeli soldiers for live detainees and martyrs… Lebanon finally embraced the five released detainees after Hezbollah succeeded to exchange them and the remains of some 200 martyrs with two dead Israeli soldiers in the framework of Operation Al-Redwan, a UN brokered swap deal between Hezbollah and Israel. The operation is the last of Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah’s true pledges. Source: Al-Manar English version, 16 July 2008 Example 5: Arab jubilation and Lebanon ‘all without exception’ welcome the detainees and the martyrs’ remains… Source: Al-Quds Al-Arabi Arabic text, 17 July 2008
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Example 6: Hezbollah hands in the dead bodies of 2 Israelis and receives the remains of eight martyrs …The exchange of the dead bodies of the 2 soldiers captivated by Hezbollah 2 years ago, comes within a deal with Israel under which the latter releases 5 Lebanese detainees including Samir AlQuntar, the leader of Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, in addition to the remains of 200 Lebanese and Arab resistance fighters. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 17 July 2008 By exploring the context of interpellation, we see how the ideological apparatuses (political and media) give different attributes and different emotional descriptions to subjects involved in the Arab-Israeli struggle. How the subjects in a struggle are hailed and identified contributes to the formation of a nation’s political identity. It also makes the Arab recipient engage more patriotically with the text. Later on I shall demonstrate how the text analysis of transitivity where actors (clearly hailed as dangerous or illegal) tend to be syntactically foregrounded and in a predictable manner to reflect this subjective property of context. The interpellation of subjects is also a factor that influences other text strategies, such as collocations and politeness strategies. Power relations: Solidarity vs. enmity In addition to analysing the institutional constraints and interpellation systems, it is necessary for the media/ political/ discourse analyst to examine the relations between the subjects involved in the conflict, and as determined by the dominant hegemonies in society. The relations between subjects in the Arab-Israeli conflict have gradually unfolded in this book. It has been shown that communicants express relations of power through enmity, distance, or superiority or through solidarity in terms of tolerance, sympathy with “worthy” victims or reduction of power differentials. This section will show what control is being claimed by the media agency over what illegal subjects, and what solidarity relations are being emphasized. The analysis of power differentials or ideologically based inequalities will identify solidarity vs. enmity as another contextual property of politically motivated discourse, which equally influences the text producer’s linguistic choices, as will be further explored under modality and pragmatic analysis.
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
Example 1: Examine another excerpt from the Reuters text on Arafat’s condemnation of the Jerusalem bombing, and check what happens in the Arabic representation against the original English representation: Echoing other Palestinian officials, Arafat accused the Israeli forces of committing “massacres and slaughters” against Palestinians during their 15-day-old West Bank campaigns – an allegation the army has denied. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 vs. But the Palestinian President’s condemnation included the Israeli offensive as well. He said in the statement “we strongly and firmly condemn the carnage and massacres that have been and are being committed by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian civilians and refugees in Nablus town and Jenin camp and against Al-Mahd church in Bethlehem and other Palestinian areas over the past two weeks.” Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 An Arab reader would agree that the Arabic representation is the preferred one. For, it restores what Arafat actually said; rather than diminishing power differences with Israelis who as we saw have already been constructed as legal subjects in the original Reuters English text. The Reuters Arabic text emphasizes the existing hostility in the Middle East towards Israeli subjects and conversely sympathizes with Palestinian victims by restoring Arafat’s full condemnation of Israeli attacks. And while the same English text claims power and superiority over Palestinian subjects, e.g. Powell was examining Arafat’s statement, which was issued in Arabic as US officials had urged. Reuters English text we observe that the Reuters Arabic text would represent the following: Powell was examining Arafat’s statement, which was issued in Arabic as US officials had requested. Reuters Arabic text The Arabic production resists the high level of superiority that forces Palestinian leaders to follow the directives of the powerful. The Arabic narrative also tends to
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minimize distance with Arab subjects involved in the struggle by resorting to other types of shifts in the same text, such as: Powell got a first-hand view of the carnage…
Reuters English text
vs. Powell got a view of the blast site…
Reuters Arabic text
Thus, the Arabic version avoids portraying overt hostility towards the act of violence perpetrated by Palestinian bombers, and simultaneously avoids displaying the same level of sympathy towards Israeli victims. The Arab producer also strives to blur power differences with Palestinian subjects if we consider how the woman actor has been removed from the direct scene of violence: The blast detonated by a woman bomber left the area strewn with pools of blood, body parts, shattered glass and charred fruits and vegetables. Reuters English text vs. The blast resulted in pools of blood. Body parts, shattered glass and charred fruits and vegetables were strewn. Reuters Arabic text Instead, the woman actor is thematized at the beginning of the Arabic text and is portrayed as being the first young victim who is affected by this process before the targeted victims: Powell’s mission to end 18 months of violence was plunged into disarray by a Palestinian suicide attack that killed 6 people in Jerusalem’s main market on Friday… Reuters English text vs. Powell’s mission to end the continual bloodshed in the Middle East for more than 18 months has come into crisis after the last attack carried out by a young Palestinian woman who blew herself up and killed six Israelis and wounded 89 others… Reuters Arabic text The hegemonic reading of the Arabic text blurs hostility towards the Palestinian participants. Solidarity relations with Palestinians were expressed more overtly in many Arab media agencies when this event took place. For instance, the same
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
woman bomber has been described as a martyr who blew herself up killing 6 and injuring 89. Al-Mustaqbal; Al-Kifah Al-Arabi Arabic texts, 13 April 2002 The discourse of distance and power over Palestinians that is so sensitive an issue to many Arab producers and recipients, is later seen in the same text through avoidance of the following hyperboles (i.e. overstatements) which reflect an authority-based discourse: The latest bombing raised questions about whether the army was achieving its mission of rooting out suicide bombers. Reuters English text This metaphor borrowed from the domain of “threatening plants” (Van Dijk 1998) to legitimate the greater authority of Israeli subjects and to express hostility towards Palestinian bombers is deliberately deleted from the equivalent Reuters Arabic text. If the Arabic representation was to keep the same metaphoric expression, it would be met with an unfavourable response from the Arab audience. Furthermore, distance from Israeli voices in the Arab media can be observed when the original English representation that included Sharon’s voice, Sharon countered by saying there “cannot be peace with terror” is omitted from the Reuters Arabic text. Let us next consider other examples of authoritarian discourses which seem to draw upon what Fairclough (1995a) and Fowler (1991) call a discourse of “animal control” or “disciplinary discourse”, where the behaviour of dissidents has to be corrected by an exasperated authority: Example 2: Israel weighs retaliation for bus bomb … Israel has responded to previous attacks with tough army offensives that have seemed as much intended to punish Yasser Arafat’s Palestinian authority as to strike at the militant groups that have carried out the bombings. Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 vs. Israel has responded to previous attacks with tough offensives intended to punish the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian authority. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002 The Arabic reading shows that Israel is merely punishing the Palestinian authorities. By deleting the other subjects (i.e. militant groups) whose violent behaviour
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necessitates this “disciplinary” discourse by Israel, the Arabic text claims more hostility towards Israel. In light of the above, consider why the metaphorical representations in English below are deliberately deleted from their equivalent representations in the Reuters Arabic texts: Example 3: Jenin, which like other West Bank cities has been raided repeatedly by Israeli forces in recent weeks in an effort to crush suspected bomber networks. Source: Reuters English text, 18 June 2002 Example 4: Tanks stormed Arafat’s presidential compound and penned him in for 10 days… Israel held to its policy of blaming the Palestinian authority for failing to rein in militants… Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 Example 5: Sawalha was shot dead by Israeli troops during a sweep for militants in the West Bank city of Jenin last Saturday. The army said he was killed after he threw grenades at the soldiers. Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 As the above metaphors give a great deal of power to legal and powerful subjects (i.e. Israel) over punished or marginalized Palestinians, it is not surprising to see them all omitted from Reuters Arabic representations. This shifting consistently minimizes distance with Palestinian subjects to emphasize a different system of inequality in terms of power relations. With regard to relations with Israel, observe the following counter-productions in the Arabic texts: Example 6: Israel weighs retaliation for bus bomb … Adding to the gloomy mood of Israelis, the International credit rating agency Fitch said it downgraded Israel’s local currency rating… Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 vs. Adding to the gloomy mood in Israel, the International credit rating agency Fitch said it downgraded Israel’s local currency rating… Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
We can see in this case that the Arabic text relays information rather than relaying information combined with relations of solidarity. The new reading minimizes relations of solidarity with Israeli subjects who have been already constructed in the Arabic context more as opponents. Example 7: 12 dead in Hebron attack … Hospital officials said 12 people were killed and 15 wounded, but gave no breakdown of settler and army casualties. An ambulance worker said the Israelis were caught in gunfire in an alley leading from the shrine to settler enclaves. Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 vs. Hospital officials said 12 people were killed and 15 wounded, but gave no breakdown of settler and army casualties. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 15 November 2002 In Arabic, the Israeli voice has been removed either to express least solidarity with Israeli victims or to minimize the overt solidarity found in the original English text. This makes the reading of the event look less biased to an Arab recipient. Moving to more obvious claims for solidarity vs. enmity in the Arab media discourse, let’s revisit previous examples from Al-Manar and compare them with the AFP texts which the producers used as a source of information: Example 8: Positioning of Israel’s security fence awakens fears Israel will start building a security fence to thwart Palestinian attacks… Israel has come to view the West Bank as a launching pad for suicide attacks. Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 The various linguistic expressions that claim the right for defence against dangerous participants were all changed in Al-Manar’s text. Take the new claim for power: The occupying authorities will start tomorrow grabbing more Palestinian lands under the pretext of building what they call a security fence… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 14 June 2002 This new broadcast representation in the Arabic situation is void of all descriptions that create distance and hostility towards Palestinian subjects. On the contrary, Al-Manar’s ideological claim for power emphasizes a discourse of occupation and enmity against illegal subjects who are trying to seize by force more Palestinian lands.
Arab News and Conflict
It is observed that all the voices of legal Israeli participants found in the original AFP text, e.g. the statements and quotations by Israeli defence ministry, senior military officials and political spectrums were all deleted from Al-Manar’s text. The Israeli voices that have been kept in Al-Manar’s production were, however, represented with doubt. That is to say, an oppositional discourse in the Arab media discredits the legitimized voices of Israelis by: deleting them, raising doubts about them, or by creating a dialogic interaction with the Arab audience via inserting the voice of the editor, e.g. what they claim/consider/under the pretext: The occupying Israeli army launched a full attack on Ramallah [Palestine] under the pretext of the commandos operation carried out yesterday morning Source: Al-Ahram Arabic text, 6 June 2002 …under the pretext of building what they call a security fence Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 14 June 2002 Sharon inspected the bombed area, and pledged to retaliate, considering what happened as a continuation of Palestinian terrorism. Source: Al-Anwar Arabic text, 19 June 2002 Example 9: Israeli troops kill three Palestinians in West Bank ... Israeli troops wound down a lengthy operation in Nablus designed to round up wanted militants. Six Palestinians were killed during the elevenday operation which also left large-scale destruction. Source: AFP English text, 7 January 2004 While the AFP discourse asserts relations of domination and a strong exercise of power over illegal dissidents, the representation in Al-Manar claims relations of oppression by ‘colonialists’ or illegal subjects, as follows: The Zionist occupying army withdrew from Nablus in the West Bank where they launched a lengthy aggression which continued for eleven days during which they imposed a curfew and destroyed houses they claimed to hide tunnels. The outcomes of the continuous Zionist aggressions on Nablus were 17 Palestinian martyrs, injury of scores, and the arrest of many in addition to targeting historical sites in the city. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 7 January 2004
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
In the same text, Al-Manar exacerbates power differences with Israeli subjects, by emphasising their direct agency in this conflict, e.g. The occupying army killed martyr Khrewesh… Zionist occupying forces had the audacity to execute Attari, father of 4 children… vs. Khrewesh had been killed…
AFP English text
This form of power-display is carefully managed and controlled by the media producers. Let us attempt next to summarize, in Table 5.1, relations between subjects as well as claims for solidarity vs. enmity in Arab media texts in general, and Al-Manar as a representative of an outspoken media agency: Table 5.1 Solidarity and enmity relations between subjects in Arab media discourse Arab media texts
Relations with Israeli and US subjects
Relations with Arab subjects
What do Arab media avoid?
– Authority-based discourses given to US and Israel to discipline Arab dissidents. – Solidarity relations with Israeli victims/ voices.
– A discourse of threatening animals or plants used against Arab participants. – Marginalizing of Palestinian participants.
What do Arab media favour?
– Ideological claim for resistance against Israeli occupation.
– Removing relations of dominance over Palestinian subjects. – Minimizing or removing hostility towards Palestinian bombers. – Blurring differences with all Arab participants in the Arab-Israeli struggle. – Restoring Arab voices.
What does Al-Manar avoid?
– Israel’s right for self-defence. – Foregrounding of Israeli voices.
– Creating distance and hostility towards Arab fighters/ bombers.
What does Al-Manar favour?
– Emphasizing relations of distance and enmity. – Claims for resistance and martyrdom against occupation. – Discrediting Israeli and US voices.
– Overt solidarity with Arab fighters and victims in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Arab News and Conflict
Cognition Enacted hegemonies and power relations emphasized and legitimated by powerholders in a particular society cannot be sustained if people do not find them credible or commonsensical. We often hear the news editors or journalists talking about credibility in producing their news reports, however what is credible to an Arab might not be credible to a westerner. A credible report in times of conflict has to unravel the firm beliefs of a particular society and express them in the most outspoken way. It also has to show a consensus on the reasons for conflict. This consensus can be found in our readings of the news editorials, news reports, political speeches, or public debates. A credible report should be reversible in its meaning (Chapter 2) with a structure carrying both cause and effect. By moving to our study of Arab media discourse, let us explore this layer of context by referring first to what the editorials say in the Arab world in times of intense conflict. Some excerpts from leading newspapers have been chosen to tell us more about the kind of consensus found in the Arab world on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Example 1: Whatever excuses pushed Israel to carry out this aggression [war on Lebanon], the capturing of the three soldiers is not a pretext to put all Palestinians in captivity, to lay siege to Gaza, to strike Lebanon, displace its people, and ruin its economy. We should not shirk our responsibility and should seek to ask the international community to take its responsibility and to focus at present on stopping the war without conditions or obstinacy… what is strange is that the international community in all its organizations falls under the US influence despite the scenes of wreck and destruction which are watched [with silence] by the whole world… this means that there is an international connivance with Israeli crimes against the people of Lebanon, hiding behind the struggles and wars against terrorism and fear of Iran’s nuclear bomb… Source: Al-Ahram Arabic text, 25 July 2006 Example 2: When “the massacres” was the title of the previous editorial condemning the silence of the international community about what is happening in Lebanon, we were not guessing. Israel is Israel that combines savagery, barbarism, and political stupidity, and the US is the US that supports every criminal act perpetrated by its main ally, and they always ask: why do the Arabs and Muslims hate us? … The forbiddens were absent and the massacres were present, yet Qana [a town in southern Lebanon] will remain a wreath
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
of shame on the head of the international community. It will remain a black history in the records of the East and the West. Source: Al-Rai-Alaam Arabic text, 31 July 2006 Example 3: Israel open war on Gaza Gaza strip is coloured with sanguineous red, imprinted with the blood of more than 210 martyrs and 400 wounded in the writing of a new page in the book of the Israeli massacres, exceeding bounds when Israel surprised Hamas headquarters at noon with destructive raids that have struck more than 30 security structures in the strip which resulted in this large number of deaths and casualties, especially amongst Hamas members, despite its having been warned a few days ago to evacuate its headquarters from fear of sudden Israeli military operations. Source: Al-Seyassah Arabic text, 28 December 2008 Example 4: President Assad calls for an emergency summit… Gaza resists with blood… O Arabs.!... The Arabic street stands up for slaughtered Gaza With pure innocent blood, Gaza declared resistance, and freed the reins for the Arabic street to say their word, responding to the calls of Gaza’s children, women and elderly… O Arabs… shattering the barriers of fear, raising their decisive words… NO for a shameful Arab silence… As usual, Syria has been a true reflection of the stance of the Arab populace everywhere when it uprose with overwhelming anger against US-Israeli aggression on our Palestine people in Gaza by facing the official Arab silence on this aggression… in this context President Basshar Asad’s invitation comes, to hold an Arab emergency summit to discuss the ways of facing this Israeli aggression and its repercussions. Syria also sent a letter to the Security Council through which it places the council under its own political and legal responsibilities… Source: Teshreen Arabic text, 28 December 2008 The above examples reflect the subjective and cognitive meanings discussed in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, such as the subjective interpretation of the sign, common sense, group schemata, ideological assumptions and the principle of relevance. What the analyst has to observe is the generalized beliefs of the Arabic street, Arab thinkers/writers, and Muslims themselves, where issues like identity, different political positions and shared knowledge about reasons for this conflict cannot be ignored in the final representation of the media text. When the media producers use the word “credibility” it means they try to relay to the Arab reader information
Arab News and Conflict
and expressions that do not contradict with established belief systems about the current situation in the Middle East; nor with their identity. Although the analysis of mental interpretation and representation is a complex matter, I will attempt in this section to capture some of the salient and successful practices that can render a sensitive political text commonsensical and credible to both text producers and receivers. Our analysis will focus upon the taken-for-granted beliefs and the uncontested shared knowledge that the text producer shares or would like to share with his/her audience about facts in the Middle East. What we need to see now is how generalized ideological assumptions and shared background knowledge can be made visible. That is, we have to examine the built-in belief and knowledge systems, especially those which generalize negative opinions about outgroups avoiding the possibility of being rejected by their respective audiences. In order to reach this goal, I have to make comparisons with the English language texts which were used as sources of information by the Arab media producer. Example 5: Let us revisit Arafat’s condemnation of Jerusalem attack as published by Reuters on 13 April 2002. The English text generalizes assumptions of violence, Palestinian suicide attacks, the carnage caused by a woman bomber, suicide bombings and the Palestinian public’s support for revenge attacks against Israel that cause the killing of Israeli people. It also gives background knowledge, evidence or illustrations about these general beliefs when representations are made on other suicide bombing incidents that killed 28 people in an Israeli hotel, or a bombing on a bus near Haifa that killed 8 Israelis. The negative beliefs about Palestinian fighters are generalized throughout the text to create a main reason for this conflict and to organize a specific schema or conventional knowledge structure about Middle East events to exist in the memory of the recipients, thus constructing particular beliefs and knowledge about people involved in this struggle and about this event which lead to specific interpretations. This is similar to what Van Dijk calls “mental models” where recipients “construct a model of such an event” (Van Dijk 1998: 79) that accords with similar knowledge given in daily western media about suicide bombing events. This “subjective representation of an episode” (ibid: 81) obviously has its own ideological assumptions and beliefs that become shared knowledge and will be recalled when a similar event is activated by the same media agency. Thus, different cognitive representations in the Reuters Arabic text happen when generalized Western beliefs clash with experiences,
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
social memory and subjective interpretations that are constructed differently in the Arab world. Consider the following generalized beliefs and subjective representations observed in the equivalent Reuters text published in Arabic to the Arab reader on the same event: Reuters Arabic tends to generalize assumptions of the attack without further negative representations as found in the English text. The negative structures about Palestinian violence are seen to be either re-lexicalized or deleted. Furthermore, the Arabic text deletes the background knowledge given on other suicide bombing incidents as well as the knowledge structure given on the Palestinian public’s support for revenge. The shifts indicate different belief systems and epistemic knowledge about the real cause of struggle that are shared between the news editor, the journalist, and the targeted recipients. The general belief in the Arab world presupposes that the cause of threat is occupation and that Palestinian attacks come as a result. The Arab audience is likely to recall different subjective memories that are usually pro-Palestinian. Hence, the discursive beliefs of suicide and revenge carried out by Palestinians and being normalized in the original English text will therefore be interpreted as irrelevant or non-credible if relayed intact into the Arabic media. In simple terms, the new representations avoid putting the Arab audience through unnecessary processing effort that will clash with their conventional knowledge and general opinion constructed about this episode. On the other hand, the above Reuters text in English generalizes assumptions of onslaught, campaign or mission to root out bombers caused by Israeli participants. Assumptions of massacres and slaughters caused by Israelis are scare-quoted and given an evaluative belief, i.e. the reporter represents them as an allegation: Arafat accused the Israeli forces of committing “massacres and slaughters”… an allegation the army has denied. Reuters English text Another observation is seen in the assumption underlying “a campaign that has killed at least 200 Palestinians”. Here, the reporter seems not to represent this event as carnage, but as a campaign or mission that comes as a result of suicide bombings. Further, the mental representation of the killing event is supported by Sharon’s reason and his own voice: “there cannot be peace with terror”. This overall cognitive representation is very likely to be interpreted by an Arab recipient as
Arab News and Conflict
a biased one. Therefore, the editorial brush in Arabic produces a counter-schematic structure in Reuters Arabic as follows: The Israeli attack… the military operations… the military campaign… Reuters Arabic text Basically, the Arabic text does not delete any assumptions of attacks or campaigns caused by Israelis. The Israeli attack is repeated throughout the Arabic text, the military operations and military campaign are all relayed into the Arabic text without any omission. But the Arabic text deletes the assumption of allegation, to root out bombers, and deletes Sharon’s reason because these truth criteria do not fit into the generalized beliefs or shared general knowledge of the Arabs who have different evaluations of Israeli military campaigns as we saw in the editorial extracts above. The Arab audience do not commonly believe that massacres are allegations, nor do they believe that it is Palestinian terror that causes Israeli military campaigns. The underlying ideological assumption that monitors such representations stems from the Arabs’ common belief that Israel’s onslaughts and operations are related to its occupation/ aggression policy. In our Reuters example, the Arabic text restores Arafat’s full quotation that represents Israeli attacks as massacres committed by the occupying army. Similar examples of causes and effects can be found in the other parallel Reuters texts: Example 6: Israel has responded to previous attacks with tough army offensives intended to punish Arafat’s authority as to strike at the militant groups that have carried out the bombings. Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 Israel has responded to previous attacks with tough offensives intended to punish the Palestinian President and the Palestinian authority. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002 As the English version maintains negative beliefs about the militant groups that cause Israel’s attacks; the Arabic version retains the first ideological belief that army offensives intend to punish Arafat and his authority but deletes the negative assumptions and reasons given in the background information about militant groups and bombings. The effect on the Arab audience will be to show that Israel merely punishes Palestinians, without providing the justification or belief given in the original text.
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
Another shift at the level of ideological assumptions is found in the same Reuters text: Israel held to its policy of blaming the Palestinian authority for the attack… the Palestinians again denied this. Reuters English text Israeli officials as usual have held the Palestinian authority responsible for the attack in spite of President Yasser Arafat’s denial of these accusations… Reuters Arabic text Here, the Arabic text adds the assumption of accusations in addition to previous assumptions of occupation and inclinations of punishment in the same Reuters Arabic text, thus recalling negative beliefs about Israelis consistent with the generalized opinions in the Arab world about Israel. This assumption is observed to be generalized in many Arab media texts during times of struggle with Israel, thus creating different causes and different effects. Example 7: Palestinians kill seven as violence escalates Source: Reuters English text, 3 March 2002 As noted, the English text headline emphasizes the assumption of Palestinian violence, thus paving the way for reasons for retaliation by Israel. Consider the following reasons given in the same text: The mounting Israeli death toll in 17 months of violence was likely to increase public pressure on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, whose popularity in Israel is at an all-time low, to take tougher military action against the Palestinians. In the Arabic text, these assumptions and reasons have been altered as follows: Palestinians kill seven Israelis in the West Bank Source: Reuters Arabic text, 3 March 2002 The Arabic heading omits the negative assumption of violence caused by Palestinians. Later on, we observe that the same assumption of violence is deleted again and replaced by new assumptions to create different interpretations and different effects: The mounting Israeli death toll during the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation was likely to increase public pressure on Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, whose popularity is at an all-time low. Reuters Arabic text
Arab News and Conflict
The Arabic representation forges the ideological belief that the death toll is caused by other reasons, i.e. uprising against occupation. Therefore, the proposition related to taking tougher military action against Palestinians becomes irrelevant information, therefore deleted from the Arabic text. Example 8: Powell, who arrived back in Washington early on Thursday, ended his illfated peace mission without achieving a cease-fire or Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Palestinian areas … the President said Palestinians must heed leader Yasser Arafat’s recent condemnation of militant attacks… and that Arab states must stop funding and inciting terror… Source: Reuters English text, 18 April 2002 The knowledge system (US peace mission against terror) is shifted in the Arabic text to reflect a different schema. Consider: Powell who arrived back in Washington early on Thursday ended his 10-day mission in the Middle East without achieving any significant progress to end the Israeli-Palestinian struggle, and without reaching a ceasefire or Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Palestinian areas … the President said Palestinians must heed President Yasser Arafat’s recent condemnation of activist attacks… and that Arab states must stop funding and inciting “terror”… Source: Reuters Arabic text, 18 April 2002 Obviously the assumption of peace on the part of the US is not generalized and taken for granted in the Arabic situation. The US is seen to intervene without making any significant progress to stop what is seen in the Arabic context as struggle or uprising but not violence as found in the same English text: Dispatching Powell to the region was a risky move by Bush, who has come under fire at home and abroad for doing too little too late to stop Israeli-Palestinian violence that has intensified over 18 months. Reuters English text Dispatching Powell to the region was a risky move by Bush, who has come under fire at home and abroad for doing too little too late to stop Palestinian-Israeli struggle that has intensified since the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation. Reuters Arabic text Note how the different conception in the Arabic text also scare-quoted the word terror in order to stress that these are the evaluative beliefs of the US administration and that these beliefs cannot be part of the Arabs’ generalized opinions about
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
the Palestinian situation. The next examples from Al-Manar will provide more explicit cases of competing cognitive models. Example 9: In the case of our text on the fence observe how all assumptions in the AFP text have been modified by Al-Manar editor: Security fence… the new project… the security fence… this defensive barrier… to thwart Palestinian attacks… reducing the threat to Israel from the area’s armed Palestinians. Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 vs. Grabbing more Palestinian lands… what they call a security fence … Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 The counter-Arabic representation generalizes negative beliefs about Israel’s policy and constructs the belief of expansionism in addition to occupation. These built-in beliefs are repeated throughout the Manar text to reflect ideologically shared beliefs in the Arab world that interpret Israeli acts as negative or colonial. Furthermore, Al-Manar deletes all background knowledge given in the original AFP text that is not relevant to them. The effect on the Arab recipients is seen in interpreting the event of fence-building as a new threat to Arab lands. Example 10: Burn urges calm on Lebanon-Israel border, support for US peace ... Washington’s strategy for peace… to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Source: AFP English text, 4 June 2002 vs. The US efforts to re-launch the settlement process… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 5 June 2002 This major shift is constrained by the cognitive belief that US efforts are part of a settlement policy that will eventually be at the expense of the Palestinian cause. This subjective representation will be interpreted by Al-Manar’s large audience as credible, for it becomes consistent with their negative schematic structures about the U.S. foreign policies in the Middle East. This important cognitive constraint that sustains and is sustained by dominant hegemonies and power relations will influence many of the syntactic choices in terms of cause and effect, in addition to semantic and pragmatic choices, as will be explored in the next chapter, under text strategy.
Arab News and Conflict
Table 5.2 is an attempt to summarize the ideological assumptions commonly followed in Arab media discourse during Arab-Israeli clashes: Table 5.2 The major cognitive factors or mental representations and interpretations
found in Arab media discourse
Negative beliefs avoided in Arab media discourse
– Carnage and violence are caused by suicide bombers, causing Israel to retaliate. – Suicide attacks cause threat to Israel, the building of the fence and Israel’s operations against Palestinians.
Negative beliefs adopted in Arab media discourse
– Palestinian/Arab attacks are caused by uprising against Israeli occupation, resistance to Israel’s massacres/crimes/aggression/ collective punishment. – Threat comes from Israeli occupation and expansionism. Threat also comes from US settlement policy, US support of criminal acts by Israel or the silence of some Arab leaders.
Editorial control Having seen how political discourses in the media are determined by dominant ideologies, power relations and cognitive systems, we now need to see how these discourses practically and overtly come to action by their own editors. In other words, we need to analyse another contextual factor which relates here to the professional and pragmatic aspect of political discourse. So far, we could hear the voice of the editors behind the ideological representations in the media text. However, we still need to give independent analysis of this important constraint that interacts with the above contextual factors. As explained in Chapter 3, there are filters that allow the media text to be produced. A special reference was made to Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model in which they refer us to the powerful elements of market, profit, business, power, or even disciplinary action that comes from powerful individuals in society or conservative politicians (if required) to filter out the final productions we see on the news. In other words, the media producers who work for a particular agency are well aware of the fact that the media depend on relationships with the government, politicians, market-oriented-profit sources, advertising, and of the need to
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
maintain the image of credibility to their own audiences. This should decide on the communicative function in the text and thus, its acceptability and marketability. In order to examine editorial control, I shall give examples provided by Reuters Arabic editors and Al-Manar editors and show what the producers are actually aware of, and what actions they deliberately take within this practical and pragmatic context. So, what do the Arabic producers (editors, correspondents, journalists, journalistic translators) themselves say? Reuters Arabic online states that the service in Arabic is tailored for the needs and interests of the Middle East audiences. It was learned during the interviews with Reuters representatives in Beirut, that Reuters professional Arabic producers are expected to produce a politically sensitive text that is “credible”, “objective” and “unbiased”. In other words, Reuters journalists and translators should have “a great deal of respect for the Arabic culture, ideology and identity”. Another aspect is disseminating preferred information of interest to the Arabs, e.g. what Hezbollah leader says, or adding the names of the Palestinian victims. Reuters Arabic would also follow the communal approval on naming systems, such as the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat rather than leader Yasser Arafat. Information questionable to Arabs cannot be communicated, especially in the event of political escalation where the target reader is a main priority. The primary control therefore is to produce a communicative and balanced report against what may be seen as bias by the Arab reader. It was also learned that the final productions are expected to take into consideration both market forces to “sell” the news and the Arabic preferred readership. The specific examples provided by Reuters representatives were as follows: – More details are usually given about Palestinian victims in the Arabic text; – additional information can be given, e.g. what Arab leaders actually said, as background information which is of interest to the Arab reader; – the word violence is usually scare-quoted (e.g. “violence”) if it must be kept in the Arabic text; – the word violence can be kept only when referring in general to the relations between Israelis and Palestinians or when referred to as an event; – names of sensitive political organizations are re-categorized. e.g. Hezbollah terrorists is represented as Hezbollah which America and Israel accuse of terrorism; – details from the institutionalized voice of Arab officials are usually added; – minimizing what might be seen as bias or taking sides on the part of the Arab reader, e.g. avoiding literal translations of words such as terrorists. Let us now hear what Al-Manar editors say. I have learned from my interviews with their editors and translators that edits and actions have fine grained policies. Al-Manar takes into consideration the communal approval by the Arab audience at large that there is a war with Israel, there is an occupation of Arab lands, and
Arab News and Conflict
there are firm political positions in the Middle East about the Arab-Israeli struggle. The rationale is to communicate to Al-Manar’s large audience “accurate” and “credible” information to their audiences, and to adopt “firm ideological positions” against whom they may perceive as the ideological enemy. The case of watchfulness can be further seen in cases of translation from different English media sources, such as AFP into Arabic. If the translation is merely to produce an informative text type, the translator’s oversight can be seen in treating the source text as an offer of information that can neither determine the terminology of the Arabic text nor its values (see Chapter 7 on translation issues). Another aspect is that Al-Manar producers ensure that their audience is constantly reminded of a state of war with Israel and Israel’s ideology which is believed to be implemented predominantly by “violence” in the Middle East. They emphasized that Al-Manar’s ideological structure is based on different historical and religious beliefs that should be reflected with efficiency in the Arabic text. For instance, ‘suicide’, being an act forbidden in Islam, is given alternative reading in Al-Manar representation, i.e. ‘martyrdom’; or ‘resistance to occupation’. In disseminating information, they also strive to coin an UN-based terminology, such as Palestinians of 1948 occupied territories rather than Israeli Arabs, for if they accept international media categorization it would mean they recognize foreign ideologies coined by Israel. Al-Manar producers are quick to omit voices in the content that do not serve the Palestinian or Arab cause in its conflict with Israel. The overall editorial system relies heavily on the Arab consensus which is inherent in all their news reports. From interviews with their team it was observed how welltrained the staff are. They are quick to observe any foreign information which is sensitive, objectionable, or which would portray the Palestinian, or worthy victims in a negative light. Examine the following examples cited by the editorial team: – Accurate and full details are usually given to martyrs in occupied Palestine or the Muslim victims in Kashmir; – terminology reflects their own ideology: Israeli Defence Minister vs. Israeli War Minister Israel vs. the Zionist entity; the enemy’s entity; the usurping entity Northern Israeli border with Lebanon vs. Lebanese border with occupied Palestine The disputed region of Kashmir vs. the region of Kashmir occupied by India War against terror vs. American aggression in Afghanistan US forces in Iraq vs. US occupying forces in Iraq; – restructuring of the political text according to priority. For instance, when the producer has to refer to different sources of information, the final product should be rethematized, and rearranged to serve dominant political and cultural values. Namely, if in an AFP text the Palestinian victims are mentioned
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
briefly and at the very end of the text, Al-Manar editorial control would disseminate additional and preferred information about the Palestinian victims throughout the text; – in the event of political escalation or war, emphasis is put on the enemy’s state, the Zionist entity, lands occupied in 1948. This practical aspect adopted by the media producer is another important constraint behind media productions, not to mention the fact that in many countries there are rules and legislations behind the final productions received from a media outlet. And those who contravene rules in their own societies could face punitive measures. Moreover, we have already seen how political and religious apparatuses pre-formulate many of the everyday ideological beliefs encountered in our favourite media outlet or channel. In the case of Al-Manar, we can turn, for instance, to the dominant and hegemonic ideology of Hezbollah, Al-Manar’s elite. Hezbollah ideology is usually seen as an opposition to that of a uni-polar and coercive USA in the Middle East. Their ideological interests against Israel and the USA are energetically defended in the many of Arab media discourses, especially in Al-Manar’s news and political programmes. We also saw in Chapter 3 how intellectuals and political leaders alert the media producers to be careful in selecting ideological terminology, and in the way “worthy” vs. “unworthy” victims should be addressed in times of conflict. By policing the code of ethics in a particular society, intervention in the text becomes a practical and accepted issue. This will now generate a communicative function in addition to those generated by the other contextual factors. The communicative function on its own between the text producer and the text receiver is a pragmatic one. It requires training, experience, and the adoption of techniques. She/he will ensure that under this practical context the politically sensitive text is matching the target’s ideological expectations; giving the information or the details that the Arab audience needs to hear, including some dialogic expressions that get the ideological messages across to the target recipient. Let us track this practical aspect in the following example taken from Al-Manar: Lebanon Palestinians to March on Border More than 100,000 Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are expected to march toward the border with occupied Palestine on May 14 in the context of the Palestinian Authority’s plan to mark the establishment of the Zionist state on Palestinian land, PA officials told The Jerusalem Post Thursday. The PA leadership has, meanwhile, announced that it would boycott any world leader who arrived in occupied territories to participate in the anniversary celebrations.
Arab News and Conflict
The officials said the boycott would be a temporary action, adding that the Palestinians would not receive the guests in the Palestinian territories during their visits to Israel. The PA ambassador to Beirut, Zaki Abbas, has been working in the past few weeks to recruit refugees from various refugee camps throughout Lebanon for the march. Fatah’s top representative in Lebanon, Sultan Abu Aynain, has also been instrumental in organizing the event, the Post has learned. The two have been coordinating their efforts with PA Deputy Minister for Prisoners Affairs, Ziad Abu Ein, who has drawn up a plan calling on Palestinian refugees to “invade” the Zionist entity by land, air and sea in protest against Israel’s anniversary celebrations. The plan states that the Palestinians have decided to implement United Nations Resolution 194 regarding the Palestinian refugees. Article II of the resolution, which was passed in December 1948, says that “refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest predictable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return.” Entitled “The Initiative of Return and Coexistence,” the plan urges all Israelis to “welcome the Palestinians who will be returning to live together with them in the land of peace.” A committee established by the organizers to prepare for the event met at the Al-Bireh Municipality offices this week to discuss ways of rallying support. Abu Ein told participants that more than 100,000 refugees from Lebanon were expected to take part in the march toward occupied northern border. He added that refugees from the West Bank and Gaza Strip would also participate in the events by staging marches toward Israeli checkpoints and border crossings. At the meeting in Al-Bireh, the organizers strongly condemned world leaders and dignitaries who were planning to participate in the Israeli celebrations. “This is the day when the Palestinians were uprooted from their lands,” they added. “It would have been better if these leaders visited the refugee camps which are the victims of Israel’s so-called independence.” The plan calls on the refugees to return to Israel with suitcases and tents so that they can settle down in their former villages. The refugees are requested to carry UN flags upon their return and to be equipped with their UNRWAissued ID cards. The plan asks Arab countries hosting the refugees to facilitate their return by opening their borders. The plan specifically refers to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Source: Al-Manar English version, 2 May 2008
Chapter 5. Analysing the contextual factors
As we may note, the editorial control is seen in this case in the ideologically-based recategorization and renaming of the participants. The categorization process conjures up historical events of the Arab-Israeli struggle. The careful selection of vocabulary also emphasizes the occupation of Arab lands and the conditions of the Palestinian refugees. The editorial brush recalls UN resolutions in the text to give the information they need to communicate. There are also thorough details on the protest and the march that arouses sympathies towards Palestinians and the insertion of statements and quotations of outrage that reflect firm Arab positions, hence foregrounding the institutionalized voices of the Arabs. More action and effort by the text producer is seen in the structuring of the text, e.g. the thematization of “the plan” that supports the rights of Palestinian refugees (see thematic analysis below). Moreover, the editor reminds the audience of the UN resolutions in favour of Palestinian refugees, thus enhancing the cause of Palestinians. This is in addition to the effect of photographic choices which accompany Al-Manar reports. Such edits and actions in the text are not merely informative, but dialogic, communicative, and evocative with special impact on the receiver. Conclusion Let us recapitulate on the contextual constraints in this model of analysis, and consider their subsequent functions: The ideological constraint is determined at the institutional level in terms of dominant hegemonies which naturalize the subject positions and decide on solidarity vs. enmity relations between the participants in the text. Such constraints give the text its ideological and legitimate function and implicitly decide on the kind of dominant discourse and prejudices that can be reproduced in a political news report without the possibility of being resisted by the dominant moral and legal orders of a particular society. That is, they constrain what will be seen by the audience as legitimate discourses and accepted power and group relations. The cognitive constraint is determined by the general and undisputed beliefs and knowledge systems shared by most component members of a particular society. Cognition controls the subjective representation and interpretation of the political event. This factor gives the political text its credible function, especially when it touches upon the evaluative beliefs of a group about what they see as a real cause of threat. The editorial control constraint is determined by the media editors or owners. It is a factor that gives the text its practical or pragmatic function as it controls action and desired results laid down by the media institution. Editorial control also articulates an intended communicative function between the text producer and the text receiver.
Arab News and Conflict
Figure 5.1 below summarizes the main contextual constraints/factors along with their resultant functions as defined in the first part of our model of analysis:
The Contextual Constraints
Hegemony
Interpellation of Subjects
Ideological & Legitimate Function
Solidarity vs. Enmity Relations
Cognition
Credible Function
Editorial Control
Practical & Communicative Function
The crucial factors that constrain the production and interpretation of politically sensitive texts The intended function
Figure 5.1 The major contextual constraints identified in Arab media discourse
Our first part of the analysis of important contexts that seem to constrain the final production and interpretation of a politically sensitive discourse is not meant to be exhaustive. The chosen contexts however have proven to sustain one another. They also interact with the ideational, interpersonal and textual functions of language introduced in the previous chapters. For example, the ideological and subjective representations of the event will be reflected in the ideational or experiential function that maps onto content, syntax and lexical choices. The power claims made in the text as well as the intended communicative function of the media institution will be reflected in the interpersonal function that maps on pragmatic or modality choices. Both the subjective representations or ideological assumptions constructed by the text producer and the intended plan of the editors will be reflected in the textual function that maps onto the structural organization and cohesion of the text. Each factor appears to lead eventually to a particular text strategy. It is therefore necessary at this stage to illustrate this argument through a detailed analysis of those text strategies that actualize and express the contextual constraints defined in our model of analysis. This will be the task of the following chapter.
chapter 6
Analysing text strategy This chapter will begin with an analysis of transitivity, and the way this element of text strategy is used to create meaning which represents the subjective ideas, beliefs and background knowledge of the text producers. Next, the analysis will focus on meaning as interaction between the text producer and his/her audience through selections in terms of mood and modality. Then we will show how the textual function of language seen via thematic structuring and lexical/semantic choices can be seen to reflect dominant ideologies, commonsensical assumptions and the editorial’s control, as discussed under the contextual analysis in the previous chapter. The final sections will utilize the pragmatic tools of speech acts, politeness strategies and the creation of relevance to analyse the intended meaning of the text and what is invisibly conveyed in addition to the visible syntactic, structural and semantic means. Transitivity This section will analyse the way in which the predominant transitivity system, carried through syntax, encodes the predominant experiential value of the political event. Investigation of the transitivity system should also unravel the authorial or editorial stance that tends to incriminate certain groups in a conflict. Our text analysis will focus mainly on Who (agent) did what (process type) to whom (affected participant) and why (under what circumstantial or expansion elements). For easy reference, the circumstantial elements or expansions will be underlined, as shown in the example. The analysis of transitivity will also focus on the type of agency (foregrounded/emphasized vs. backgrounded) as well as cases of nominalization and the system of voice (active vs. passive). As in the previous chapter, a comparative analysis of parallel English and Arabic media texts will be conducted. Let us begin by examining how Reuters
Arab News and Conflict
Arabic texts tend to choose different representations in the transitivity system for the Arab audience: In the three following examples, these different choices in transitivity can be observed to present alternative views of agency, process and circumstance concerning the events being reported. Example 1: Powell’s mission to end 18 months of violence, was plunged into disarray by a Palestinian suicide attack (foregrounded agent with suicide attribute) that killed (material process active in voice) 6 people (affected participants/ victims) in Jerusalem… Arafat (affected participant) has been trapped (passive material process) in his headquarters in Ramallah surrounded (passive material process) by Israeli tanks (delayed agency) since March 29, when the Israeli army (foregrounded agent) launched (active material process) a sweeping offensive in the West Bank after a suicide bombing (foregrounded agent) killed (active material process) 28 people (affected victims) in an Israeli hotel (expansion giving cause for Arafat’s situation)… a campaign (nominalization backgrounding agency) that has killed (active material process) at least 200 Palestinians (affected participants). Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 vs. Powell’s mission to end the continual bloodshed in the Middle East for over 18 months has come into crisis after the last attack (affected participant) carried out (active material process) by a young Palestinian woman (delayed agent with no negative attribute) who (agent) blew (added material process) herself (first affected participant) up and killed (second material process) six Israelis (second affected participant) in Jerusalem… the Israeli tanks (foregrounded agent and active in voice) have been surrounding (material process) the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat (affected participant) in his headquarters in Ramallah since March 29 (the circumstances of location and extent, i.e. place, time and duration are kept but the circumstance of cause given in the original English text has been omitted, thus leaving a different effect). Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 Example 2: Its forces (agent without attribute) reoccupied (material process active in voice) most West Bank cities and towns (affected places) following a spate of bombings in June (circumstance giving reason for reoccupation). Tanks (inanimate actor) stormed (active material process) Arafat’s presidential
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
compound (affected participant) and penned (active material process) him (affected) in for 10 days after a Tel Aviv bus bombing (agent) killed (material process active in voice) six people (affected participants/victims) last month (circumstance of cause giving reason for Arafat’s situation and incriminating bus bombing)… Suicide bombers (agent with suicide attribute) have killed (material process active in voice) scores of Israelis (affected participants/victims). This last sentence is deliberately deleted from the Arabic representation. Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 vs. The Israeli forces (agent with nationality attribute) have reoccupied (active material process) most West Bank cities and towns (affected participants/ place) following a spate of bombings in June (one circumstance of reason is given, whereas the expansion provided in the original English text to give a second circumstance of cause is deleted from the Arabic representation). Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002 Example 3: It was (relational process, i.e. a process of being – according to Halliday: an attributive mode where an entity has some quality ascribed or attributed to it) the deadliest (attribute) against Israelis (affected participants) since the start of a Palestinian uprising more than two years ago (circumstance of extent is observed instead of a circumstance of cause for uprising) and raised the spectre of heavy retaliation by Israel’s right-wing government (the enhancement of retaliation is the effect of the deadliest attack. The latter is seen as cause for retaliation, therefore deleted from the equivalent Arabic text). Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 vs. It was (relational process) the deadliest attack on (not against, i.e. the effect of the attributive mode is decreased in Arabic by replacing against with “on”) the Israelis (affected participants) in the city since the outbreak of a Palestinian uprising more than 2 years ago against Israeli occupation. (A different circumstance is given in the Arabic text and against occupation. The latter is seen as circumstance of cause for the deadliest attack. The subjective representation by the editor also omits the second enhancement provided in the original English text that emphasizes that Israel’s retaliation is a result of the deadliest attack). Source: Reuters Arabic text, 15 November 2002
Arab News and Conflict
We can also observe how other representations seem to change in the same Reuters text in order to give different causes and different effects: Swalhah (affected participant) was shot dead (material process, passive in voice) by Israeli troops (delayed agent) during a sweep (nominalization which omits reference to agent) for militants in the West Bank city of Jenin (a circumstance of extent and location is observed). The army said he (affected participant) was killed (material process, passive in voice with backgrounded Israeli agency) after he (foregrounded agent) threw (material process, active in voice) grenades at the soldiers (soldiers: affected participants. Here we observe a circumstance of cause given to incriminate the foregrounded Palestinian agent). Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 This whole experiential representation that in principle incriminates the Palestinian participant alone has been deleted from the Arabic representation. In the next example, observe how the Palestinian agency in a killing act has been distanced in Arabic: Example 4: The attack was launched some 12 hours after a Palestinian suicide bomber (foregrounded agent with attribute giving cause) killed (material process active in voice) nine people (affected Israeli participants/victims) in an ultra-orthodox neighbourhood of Jerusalem (circumstance of location). Source: Reuters English text, 3 March 2002 vs. The shooting took place some 12 hours after a Palestinian (the agent has no attribute of suicide bomber) blew (active and additional material process) himself up, (first affected participant is the Palestinian) which resulted in killing (material and indirect process that distances the agency of the Palestinian in the killing act) nine people (second affected participants are separated from the first affected participant) in an ultra-orthodox neighbourhood of Jerusalem (circumstance of location). Source: Reuters Arabic text, 3 March 2002 You can now try an analysis of a further example. Notice how the Arabic newspapers would foreground the agency of martyrs. Examine the descriptions given in the material process and against whom. See what attributes are given to the participants, number of affected participants and why, and what expansion elements
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
are given in the news report to enhance the cause of struggle according to the dominant beliefs in the Arab world: Example 5: A martyr from the Islamic movement Hamas (agent) has succeeded in carrying out (first material process) a military operation against an Israeli bus (affected participant), thus killing (second material process) 17 (affected participants) and injuring (third material process) 40 others (affected participants), most are soldiers (affected participants). Islamic Jihad has declared its responsibility for the operation and said in its statement that the operation comes in response to the crimes of the Zionist enemy against the Palestinian people and in revenge for the martyrs of Jenin, Nablus and the martyrs of the Palestinian resistance. The statement noted that the operation falls on the 35th anniversary of Jerusalem’s occupation… (expansion with circumstances of reason, purpose and time to incriminate Israel). Source: Assafir Arabic text, 6 June 2002 By revisiting our previous example concerning the fence, observe how Al-Manar producers alter the original representation in AFP in order to encode the Arab’s experience of the Arab-Israeli struggle in a new syntactic order: Example 6: Israel (agent without attribute) will start building (active material process) on Sunday a massive security fence (affected participant) to thwart Palestinian attacks (circumstance of cause). Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 vs. The occupying authorities (foregrounded agent with negative attribute giving additional cause) will start tomorrow grabbing (active material process) more Palestinian lands (affected participants) under the pretext of building what they call a security fence (different circumstance of cause is given in the Arabic news report to give different reasons). Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 Example 7: H. Khrewesh (affected participant) was killed (material process passive in voice and agentless) during a shootout (a circumstance of extent in a nominalized process)… An Israeli army spokesman confirmed that Hamas activist Khrewesh (affected participant has a negative attribute) had been killed, (material process passive in voice and agentless) saying he (foregrounded agent)
Arab News and Conflict
had first shot (active material process) at Israeli troops (affected participant) who returned fire (the expansion gives a circumstantial feature of cause blaming the Palestinian agent who caused return of fire) … Ibrahim Attari, aged about 30, a member of the Al-Awda Brigades – a local off shoot of the mainstream Fatah group -- (affected participant with attribute) was gunned down (material process, passive and agentless) in the western part of the town (circumstance of location only is given)… Another Palestinian, Abdulafu Qassas (affected participant) was also killed (material process, passive and agentless)… Attari (affected participant) had been killed (material process, passive and agentless) after brandishing a pistol at soldiers (circumstance of cause given to blame the Palestinian participant), while Kassas (affected participant) had been shot (material process, passive and agentless) while hiding in a bush (circumstances of extent and location are given)… Six Palestinians (affected participants) were killed (material process, agentless and passive) during the 11-day operation (circumstance of extent, i.e. duration in a nominalized process) which also left large scale destruction (affected participants are unclear). Source: AFP English text, 7 January 2004 vs. The following transitivity system in Al-Manar will show its own evaluative construction of this event by: foregrounding martyrdom of Palestinians or the negative attributes of “the enemy”; giving Al-Manar’s own reasons of this event as sourced by their own correspondents as expressed below in the circumstantial element; detailing the victimisation of Palestinians as we see in the affected participants: Three Palestinians (affected participants/victims) were martyred (evaluative material process) overnight by the bullets of the Zionist occupying army (agent with negative attributes), two (affected participants) in the city of Nablus where the occupying army (foregrounded agent with negative attribute) had the audacity to execute them (additional evaluative material process) in a special operation (circumstance of manner is given against Israeli participants): Ibrahim Attari, a father of 4 children, Abdulafu Kassas, and the third martyr called Hisham Khrewesh from the Islamic resistance movement Hamas (affected participants)… A Zionist military spokesman claimed that the occupying army (agent with attribute) killed (active material process) martyr Khrewesh (affected participant) after refusing to surrender himself (circumstance of reason claimed by Israelis is given doubt)… The outcomes of the continuous Zionist aggressions on Nablus were 17 Palestinian martyrs, injury of scores, and the arrest of many in addition to targeting historical sites in the city (more affected
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
participants than what was found in the original AFP text. Note that the editorial control resorts to other sources of information in addition to the AFP source). Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 7 January 2004 Let us examine next how Al-Manar tends to maximise the incrimination of the Israeli soldiers and increase the sympathy towards the Arab affected participants against the AFP text used as a source of information: Example 8: A Palestinian teenager (affected participant) was shot dead (material process, passive in voice) by Israeli troops (delayed actor)…. Jihad Mazal, 14, (affected participant) was killed (passive material process) on the doorstep of his home (circumstance of location) as soldiers (actor with no attribute) opened fire (material process) during an incursion in the Northern West Bank town (circumstances of extent and location with a nominalized process)… several tanks and Jeeps (inanimate actors) took part (material process) in the raid during which 2 Palestinians (affected participants) were arrested (indirect material process, passive and agentless). Source: AFP English text, 3 April 2003 vs. The occupying forces (foregrounded agent with attribute) killed (active material process) a young Palestinian, Jihad Mazal, 14, (affected participant)… the martyr (affected participant) was standing (relational process) on the doorstep of his home when the occupying forces (agent with negative attribute and cause) opened fire (active material process) at him (affected). The underlined clause is a manner circumstantial. It is an extension, i.e. it extends beyond the previous clause to foreground the agency of occupying forces and to incriminate them in an active process against innocent Palestinian victims. The occupying forces (foregrounded agent with attribute) used (additional active process) several tanks and jeeps (the affected participant. Note that tanks and jeeps are not used as inanimate actors in the Arabic text in order to emphasise the agency of occupying forces) during the incursion (the circumstance of extent here is preceded by a foregrounded agency with negative attribute) and arrested (active and direct process) two other Palestinians (affected). Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 5 April 2003 Our next example is taken from another media outlet, showing common trends in the construction of evaluative events when conflict intensifies with Israel.
Arab News and Conflict
Example 9: As we are preparing for a new beginning in our efforts towards re-emergence and reform, we find ourselves once again facing Israeli aggression manifested in a continuous barrage of air, sea and land bombing which has spared no one. This attack has dismembered Lebanon, destroyed its infrastructure, violated its sovereignty and trampled the rights and dignity of its people. This killing machine continues its devastation, murder and displacement of the civilian population with no deterrence or restraint. Excerpt taken from an Address to the Lebanese people by the Prime Minister Mr. Fouad Siniora and published in the Arab media. Source: Al-Mustaqbal Arabic text, 22 July 2006 The above excerpt strictly foregrounds one actor with negative attributes (Israeli aggression… this attack… this killing machine) in active processes (dismembered… destroyed… violated… trampled… continues its devastation) against many affected participants (Lebanon… its infrastructure… its sovereignty… the rights and dignity of its people… displacement of the civilian population) and within the enhancing circumstances (in a continuous barrage of air, sea and land bombing which has spared no one… with no deterrence or restraint) in order to encode an ideological worldview and experience. We will now expand on the relational process that indicates the existence of a relationship between two entities or participants. Halliday (1994) suggests the identifying mode (a is the identity of x) or the attributive mode (a is an attribute of x). Recall our previous example discussed under cognition above: Example 10: Israel is Israel that combines savagery, barbarism, and political stupidity, and the US is the US that supports every criminal act perpetrated by its main ally Source: Al-Rai-Alaam Arabic text, 31 July 2006 This example shows that in political discourse we have judgemental processes where the media producer establishes a relationship between two entities to represent the politics of identity set up by consensus in the Arab world. The identifying clauses have a constructed experience of cause of struggle in the Middle East. They show preferences for certain combinations to construe meaning in a marked way. In other words, they are structurally functional where each entity has a particular attribute as well as a particular identifying relationship. The latter is reversible, i.e. instead of describing Israel as being an aggressor, barbaric, etc… its entity has a relationship that can be turned around, e.g. Israel is Israel, or the US is the US. This cognitive structure surely represents the way politics is encoded and decoded
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
in the Arab thinking. Here, the relational process exercised by the media producer is a syntactic text strategy, namely clause as political and ideological representation in expression of world view as well as cause and effect. To recapitulate on these case studies of clause as representation with special emphasis on the transitivity system, we may observe the following: – The varied examples constantly show that there is struggle over cause and effect. – The experiential function tends in general to foreground certain participants (usually outgroups or illegal subjects) who cause a material and negative process that extends to a particular participant (usually ingroups or legal subjects). – The foregrounding of the martyrs to emphasize the experiential element of occupation and victimization. – The Arabic representations avoid passivization or nominalization of Israeli actors. Hodge and Kress (1993) and Fairclough (2001) note that using these forms weakens the causal link between the responsible actor and process thus making it more difficult to recover, in a direct way, the responsible actor in this unpleasant experience. We saw how Al-Manar avoids those cases of nominalization in which the AFP producer has de-emphasised Israeli participants in the process (during a sweep, the shootings, during a shootout, during an incursion, building a security fence) thereby leaving causality unspecified. – In many cases our extended examples from Reuters Arabic avoid foregrounding Palestinian agents. Reuters Arabic distances the agency of Palestinians by deleting the whole causal process that actively incriminates them, by delaying their agency, and by removing their negative attributes or adding new positive attributes to Palestinian agents where agency is delayed (e.g. young). On the other hand, Reuters Arabic tends to foreground the agency of Israeli participants and transforms their passive processes into active ones to emphasize the causal force. Their agency takes the attribute “Israeli” in many cases. We also observe that Reuters Arabic cuts down on the affected Israeli participants or victims. Conversely, more affected Palestinian participants/victims are found with additional processes that reflect different hegemonic and subjective representations (e.g. a Palestinian blew herself up). The additional circumstantial elements found in Reuters Arabic emphasize that the political event is caused by occupation, thus leading to different coherent effects on the Arab recipients. – Our extended examples from Al-Manar texts foreground Israeli agents with attributes of occupation to emphasize this causal force in every similar event. The system of voice is predominantly active and agency usually extends to the affected Arab participants/victims. The actionals or physical processes caused by Israeli agents are given more negative representations or additional processes, such as grabbing or had the audacity to execute them. They are enhanced by different circumstantial elements that give reasons against Israeli participants.
Arab News and Conflict
– It is noted that shifts at the transitivity level were seen in the different reasons given in the circumstantial element. This conditionality of facts under the circumstantial element ultimately lead to different interpretations and cognitive effects. – Relational processes are observed to be judgmental, evaluate the negative results of outgroup actions, generalize fixed political stances, or set up a subjective relationship between two separate entities or participants in the clause. The above main transitivity system that is likely to be found in similar sensitive political discourses can be usefully summarized employing the categorization system on group schema (i.e. ingroups vs. outgroups) from Chapter 3. Table 6.1 registers the main findings of our study on transitivity and clause as representation of participants, processes, and circumstances: Table 6.1 The preferred transitivity system found in political discourse in times of conflict Group schema Agency
Ingroups – Delayed, deleted or nominalized in actions of violence.
– Foregrounded if martyred or victimized.
Outgroups – Mainly have a foregrounded agency with negative attribute that gives an additional cause for violent acts. – Foregrounded agents are usually the illegal subjects.
System of voice
– Passive in general in the acts of killing. If active, it is followed by a reason in the circumstantial element. – Active if the producer shows victory over the number of the unworthy victims killed.
– Mainly active.
Process
– Mainly material. Additional evaluative material processes are given to show sympathy with ingroup affected participants.
– Mainly material. Additional material processes are given to incriminate outgroups. – Relational processes are observed to evaluate the negative results of outgroup actions and to judge them or incriminate them.
Affected Participant
– Many.
– Least or none. – Many affected participants are found only to show victory over the enemy.
Circumstances
– Circumstances of location (place and time) or extent (duration) evading cause.
– Circumstances of cause or manner to incriminate outgroups.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Mood and modality This analysis of mood and modality will examine the interpersonal function of language, as introduced in Chapter 4. What we need to unravel is the attitude of the text producer, through statements and obligations in the political text reflecting I-say-so; it-is-so; so-be-it (Lyons 1977; Halliday 1994). When the media producer subscribes to the factuality of an event, we are bound to see propositions reflecting it-is-so, such as: Example 1: First, the US administration is the major sponsor of international terrorism… releasing this report is, in itself, a blatant provocation and aggression against the targeted peoples and forces… It is a hush up for the US administration’s indirect massacres perpetrated daily by Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian people that has been blockaded with US arms, support and of course a US decision that has always been against the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds, as if these people have no human rights to defend their interests, determine their fates and live with pride and dignity. Source: Al-Manar English version, 2 May 2008 or reflecting I-say-so, as in this excerpt taken from a speech by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and televised on Satellite Arab media channels: Example 2: I begin first with the battlefield… because what is happening in the battlefield is the principal decisive element in the confrontation developments… Firstly, it is the blessings of the legendary steadfastness of the Lebanese resistance in the battlefield, of the Lebanese people, and of the whole of Lebanon in all its sects, areas, and institutions. It is obvious, until now, that the Zionist enemy has not been able to achieve any military accomplishment. It is not I who says so, they say so, the whole world says so, and the political military analysts say so. And when they talk about the continuation of war, they say the enemy [Israel] is looking for accomplishing a military achievement which will enable it to enter into political settlement. Everyone admits that until now the enemy has not accomplished a military achievement. As for the destruction of infrastructure, the killing of civilians, the deportation of people, and the destruction of houses, this is not a military achievement in the military sense, this is a barbaric and brutal achievement that cannot be allowed to be invested at the political level. The enemy has not achieved till
Arab News and Conflict
now any real military achievement, but has wide military failures, and has so far received severe blows on the military level… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 29 July 2006 or reflecting so-be-it, as in these examples from Al-Manar English versions: Example 3: Doha Conference Calls for Protection of Al-Aqsa Mosque The statement called on the Arab and Islamic Parliaments to form committees and activate them to do what is suitable with the threats surrounding Al-Quds and Palestine. It also called on the Palestinian Authority to face what is going on and stop all the meetings with the Israeli occupation officials. “What takes place now and during the next few years will determine the fate of the Al-Aqsa mosque,” the statement continued. “Therefore the public and the Arab and Islamic governments are called upon to act in order to defend occupied Jerusalem.” Moreover, it stressed that facing the Zionist occupation is a consensus point among all Arabs and Muslims, concluding that the political, religious and sectarian disputes must be a secondary issue facing the occupation and its arrogance. It called on Arab and Islamic governments to grant the issue the attention it deserves, and to refrain from treating it as an issue of “Palestinian internal affairs.” “The relevant international organizations have a duty to protect our spiritual and cultural heritage, as well as human rights regarding this matter,” the statement concluded. Source: Al-Manar English version, 14 October 2008 Example 4: Sayyed Nasrallah added that Hezbollah has also presented a defensive pattern. “Israeli judge Winograd wondered in his report how a few thousand men defeated Israel and withstood weeks of fighting. Your steadfastness, the blood of your martyrs and the resistance have decreased the possibility of war in the region between Israel and Iran or Israel and Syria. I tell whoever is bargaining on a US or Israeli strike on Lebanon, we fought in 2006 and we will fight in any coming war… I tell (US President) George W. Bush and (US Secretary of State) Condoleezza Rice, who spoke of Hezbollah’s defeat, that as long as Hezbollah relies on Allah and his people, you are the ones who will be defeated,” he stated. Source: Al-Manar English version, 26 May 2008
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
We can see how the text producer can position the reader to read the event according to the mood created in the text. In the declarative mood, the producer is committing herself/himself to the factuality of the statement. The intended readers are left to question such facts through the checking/mood tags: is it; isn’t it; has it; hasn’t it; do they; don’t they? – the answer being left to the community’s consensus (see Chapter 3). As introduced in Chapter 4, the analyst has to consider the finite element that expresses the judgement of the speaker, and polarity (negative or positive), which makes the matter arguable if we question it. That is to say, we can accept, doubt, deny or disclaim it. Figure 6.1 illustrates the mood element through which we see how the producer can put the audience in the acknowledgement position or the answering position: Original statement
Mood tag
Subject the US administration
Finite is
the Zionist enemy
has not
it they
is not ‘present’ of say: do say
Residue the major sponsor of international terrorism been able to achieve any military accomplishment I who says so say so
Finite isn’t
Subject it
has
it
is don’t
it they
Figure 6.1 Questioning the mood position in giving information and making statements
In the inclination mood, command mood, or demand mood in which the producer expresses intentions to do something, desire or will, or has the authority to ask, request, order, or command, we are left to question both the type of authority and the inclinations expressed in the text through checking tags, e.g. will they; wouldn’t we; can we; shouldn’t they; must we in order to test the power, authority, or intention moods of the text producer as exemplified in Figure 6.2: Original statement
Mood tag
Subject brutal achievements
Finite cannot
the political, religious and sectarian disputes we you are the ones who
must will will
Residue be allowed to be invested at the political level be a secondary issue facing the occupation and its arrogance fight in any coming war be defeated
Finite can
Subject they
mustn’t
they
won’t won’t
we you
Figure 6.2 Questioning the mood position in obligation, inclination, duty and commitment
Arab News and Conflict
Here, the finite element drives the listener either to undertake, reject, obey, or refuse. Within this mood tag, we can test our reaction to what the speaker is trying to exchange with us. As Halliday technically explains in functional grammar analysis: In the act of speaking, the speaker adopts for himself a particular speech role, and in so doing assigns to the listener a complementary role which he wishes him to adopt in his turn. For example, in asking a question, a speaker is taking on the role of seeker of information and requiring the listener to take on the role of supplier of the information demanded. (Halliday 1994: 68) The above tag questions will be answered in a different way by different societies and in terms of what has been hegemonized and accepted as legitimate and commonsensical. Therefore, the text producer engages in statements, promises, threats, and demands through the mood system according to issues relating to power relations, escalation of war, or threats coming from the ideological enemy, and to what has been legitimated by the members of a society. Conveniently, when threats are imminent, the frequency of interaction with the audience increases and as a result the text producer is able to make his/her finiteness element least arguable, denied, or doubted to the targeted audience. Furthermore, as was discussed in Chapter 4, statements can be modalized and proposals can be modulated when the producer intrudes on the text. It was mentioned that statements and proposals come in varying degrees to express main modal systems: epistemic (knowledge, probability, usuality), perception, or deontic (obligation or inclination). In order to further see how the text producer gets involved, or expresses stances of solidarity or enmity, we need to make more comparative analyses between the English source texts and the Arabic target texts. Example 5: In the Reuters English text on Arafat’s condemnation of Jerusalem bombing of 13 April 2002, we observe a declarative mood mediated by the text producer’s involvement as well as his degree of commitment to the truth of this event. He, for instance, asserts that Arafat expressed strong condemnation of terrorism in an apparent attempt (perception modality with high probability) to satisfy U.S. demands and reinstate plans to meet Secretary of State Colin Powell. This modalised assertion by the original English reporter indicates that there is a clear commitment on the part of Arafat to comply with US demands. However, this perception is predictably argued by the Arabic producer when she chooses to modify such subjective
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
opinion given in the English text. Notice the different involvement in the Reuters Arabic version through the following replacement: in an attempt that seems to (a perception modality with lower probability) satisfy U.S. demands in order to meet Secretary of State Colin Powell. The modalized statement in the Arabic text shows a weaker commitment to the truth that Arafat is merely complying. The Arabic producer or the editorial control is telling the audience that Arafat is seen to be under pressure to comply in order to meet with Powell. This modal shift reflects different power relations, in that Arafat is perceived not to be making apparent concessions to US demands but trying to find a way out, which makes the proposition more reliable to the Arab audience. Examine how this perception is similarly articulated in other Arab media outlets, such as Al-Jazeera: Pressures before meeting with Powell Arafat’s statement comes as a response to US pressures, where Washington stipulated that Arafat condemns what they call terrorist operations in order to hold a meeting between the US Secretary of State and the Palestinian President. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 13 April 2002 Moreover, we read in the same Reuters English text mentioned above: Palestinian Information Minister accused the US of applying a double standard by denouncing violence against Israelis but ignoring what he called (lexical verb of perception) “massacres” by the Israeli army. Reuters English text,13 April 2002 This modalized statement shows a weak commitment to the truth and perception of the minister’s proposition. Here, the reporter is claiming distance from what the minister said about massacres. For this reason, we see the following change in the Arabic proposition: Palestinian Information Minister accused the US of applying a double standard by denouncing violence against Israelis but ignoring completely (an added evaluative adverb) “the massacres” which the Israeli army has committed during its military campaign. Reuters Arabic text,13 April 2002 The Arabic producer restores the minister’s original evaluative expression (completely) to emphasize an attitudinal stance against Israelis and to relay the statements the common Arab readers prefer to receive. The Arab reader will find this proposition, being strengthened by the Palestinian minister’s evaluation which signals that he is condemning massacres in the strongest term, more factual and
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epistemically stronger because it conforms with what Arabs believe about power relations between Israel and the US. Furthermore, the editorial control omits the perception modality “what he called” as this tries to distance the Arab reader from the Palestinian minister’s proposition. Hence, the new modal system found in the Arabic text serves to create a strong degree of commitment to the truth of statements given by the Palestinian officials. It is further noted that the general declarative mood of the same Reuters English text is mediated by deontic (obligation) and boulomaic (desire) modal systems, such as: White House and the State Department officials had demanded… urged (high obligation) Arafat… Arafat complied (high inclination). Such proposals are modulated in the Reuters Arabic text as follows: The White House and the State Department officials requested (low obligation) Arafat… Arafat responded (lower inclination). The interaction in the Arabic text between the producer and the audience relays a lower deontic system over Arafat and a lower obligation on the part of Arafat who is responding rather than complying with US proposals. This is also related to a politeness strategy in the text that shows less coercion, enmity towards, or authority over Arab leaders. Notice how the following expressions of obligation (i.e. imperative) are modulated to be low, hence more polite when they concern ingroups: Example 6: The statement called on (polite obligation) the Arab and Islamic Parliaments to form committees and activate them to do what is suitable (polite obligation) with the threats surrounding Al-Quds and Palestine. It also called on (polite obligation) the Palestinian Authority to face what is going on and stop all the meetings with the Israeli occupation officials. “What takes place now and during the next few years will determine the fate of the Al-Aqsa mosque,” the statement continued. “Therefore the public and the Arab and Islamic governments are called upon (polite obligation) to act in order to defend occupied Jerusalem.” Source: Al-Manar English version, 14 October 2008 Example 7: Compare the modalities in the following Reuters English version with the new modality elements shown by the Arab producer in the Arabic version: Israel plans (low inclination) to retaliate… Prime Minister Sharon refrained from the kind of (low usuality) swift military strikes that have followed
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
other (quantifier) major attacks… Israel held to its policy (median usuality) of blaming the Palestinian authority... Suicide bombers have killed scores (modal quantifier) of Israelis in the revolt that began in September 2000 after talks on independence stalled. At least 1,625 Palestinians and 611 Israelis have been killed. Source: Reuters English text, 22 October 2002 vs. Israel is determined (high inclination) to retaliate … Prime Minister Sharon refrained from the swift military strike that usually (modal adjunct with higher usuality) follows any (modal quantifier) suicide attack… The Israeli officials as usual (modal adjunct with higher usuality) have held the Palestinian authority responsible for the attack… At least 1,625 Palestinians and 611 Israelis have been killed in the Palestinian uprising which erupted in September 2000. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 22 October 2002 The examples emphasize the stance of the text producer, who can use different inclination or epistemic modalities reflecting his or her attitude and commitment to the facts, frequency or intensity of the event. We observe that the expressions in the Arabic version are modalized to show a higher frequency of strikes against Palestinians, and a higher degree of usuality in blaming Palestinians. The Arabic text has also been modulated to show a higher inclination to retaliate against Palestinians. The modal quantifiers are used by the text producer to show a different commitment to the truth of the statement. That is, the Arab producer claims that Israeli strikes follow any suicide attack. Moreover, ‘suicide bombers have killed scores of Israelis’ as found in the English text has been omitted from the Arabic text as it modalizes the event statements. That is to say, its representation in the English text shows the large number of Israeli victims in addition to foregrounding the Palestinian agency. Of course, if the statements showing sympathy with Israelis are kept in the Arabic text at the same high level, they will not be accepted as such during the exchange mood with the Arab receiver. Again, the text producer’s involvement is shown in the minimized sympathy with the Israeli victims in order to communicate to the Arab audience the information they need to hear, namely, an informative text in Arabic void of sympathy towards “the unworthy” victim. Let us now move to our comparative analysis of AFP texts and Al-Manar texts: Example 8: Israel will (modal verb of obligation and inclination) start building a security fence to thwart Palestinian attacks… Israel has come to view
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(modal lexical verbs of perception) the West Bank as a launching pad (evaluative expression) for suicide attacks. Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 The obligation and perception systems in this excerpt represent the speaker’s attitude which asserts to the audience that Israel has an obligation towards its own security; therefore will build a security fence. The perception modality in this AFP text shows a high degree of commitment to the truth of propositions which assert that threat comes from Palestinian areas. As we may expect, none of these attitudinal features will be channelled into Al-Manar’s text. In fact, the Al-Manar producer creates different perception and epistemic modalities to instantiate disbelief of the intentions behind the security wall. Consider meaning in the light of the following modal expressions: The occupying authorities will start tomorrow grabbing more Palestinian lands under the pretext of building what they call (modal lexical verb of perception) a security fence… The demarcation of the so-called (perception modality) security wall… The demarcation of the so-called (perception modality) Green Line. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 As we have observed, different truth claims via the use of more evaluative language including modal perceptions reflect overt distance from acts committed by Israel. The modal expressions used by Al-Manar’s editorial team overtly contest the truth and security system found in the propositions of the original text which the Al-Manar producer has merely used as a source of information. This varying degree of commitment to the truth of statements can also be seen via the following modal expressions: Example 9: An Israeli national was charged in a Tel Aviv district court Thursday with spying for Lebanon’s Shiite movement Hezbollah, public radio reported (a declarative with high assertion)… Israel’s domestic security said he was asked to produce a map of the electricity and gas companies … the militant group tasked him with developing a rapport with a senior officer to extract information on military operations (commands with high obligation). Source: AFP English text, 27 June 2002 vs. Tel Aviv court charged an Israeli national with spying for Hezbollah, according to what the enemy’s radio reported (the declarative statement is followed by a perception modality) … the Zionist security services claimed
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
(evaluative verb) that Hezbollah asked the accused to produce a map of the electricity and gas companies in addition to developing a rapport with a senior Zionist officer to extract information on military operations. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 28 June 2002 Here, the declarative mood in Al-Manar modalizes what Israeli officials or radio assert about Hezbollah to weaken outgroups’ truth claims. The use of perception modality along with evaluative verbs to create doubt about Israeli truth claims are considered to be subjective stances expressing Al-Manar’s own view of reality, as well as non-commitment to the truth of Israeli propositions. It is the case of I-sayso or it-is-so where the Arab producer commits herself/himself to the factuality of this new statement. The subjectivity underlying the productions of politically sensitive texts to trigger a dialogue between the producer and recipient can be seen in many similar instances in the Arab media, e.g.: Example 10: However, what astonished the Israelis is that the operation took place in the most heavily-guarded area inside the occupied Palestinian territories, in what they call (perception modality) the Jewish area of Hebron… Source: Assafir Arabic text, 16 November 2002 Perception modality is a prominent feature in political discourse. It is carefully chosen by the text producer to affirm the editorial’s perception of a sensitive political event. It is also reversible in time (see Chapter 2), for it articulates a firm political position that has been adopted without change. Regardless of the year in which the sensitive event took place, the same text strategy will continue to be exchanged with the targeted audience. Check in our last example below (taken from Al-Manar’s English version) how the outgroups’ propositions are always preceded by perception modalities reflecting Al-Manar’s position towards the truth of Israeli propositions, whereas ingroups’ propositions are presented as assertions without modalities: Example 11: Peres in NY Summit Incites Sedition among Muslims Israeli President Shimon Peres exploited Tuesday the interfaith conference held at the New York headquarters of the United Nations to praise what he called (perception modality) “moderate axis” and attack what he called (perception modality) “extremism”… Peres expressed his belief that the conference would contribute to a climate of change and the creation of what he called (perception modality) “an anti-terror coalition.” He also warned that Iran was trying to gain control over
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the Middle East and that this posed danger not only to the Zionist entity but also to the so-called (perception modality) “moderate Arab countries”… Meanwhile, Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah called (unmodalized assertion) Tuesday on Arab and Muslim leaders to ban Peres from the interfaith summit. Delivering a speech through a large screen marking the Martyr’s Day in the Sayyed al-Shouhada’a complex in Beirut’s southern suburb, his eminence said (unmodalized assertion) Peres was responsible for massacres both in Lebanon and in the Palestinian territories. “Take note of when Peres and the rest of the Israelis are arriving at the conference – right while they are tightening the siege on a million and a half Palestinians in Gaza and stepping up their attacks on the Palestinians in the West Bank,” he said (unmodalized assertion). “They should kick Israel out of this conference and prevent Peres from going up on stage and speaking. There are many Jews who are not linked to Israel who could take his place in an interfaith dialogue,” Sayyed Nasrallah added (unmodalized assertion)… Source: Al-Manar English version, 12 November 2008 To recapitulate, what the analyst has to observe is the degree of the producer’s commitment to the factuality of the statement and her/his dialogic mood with the audience. This can be detected through the finite element using Mood tag questions, thus eliciting whether one would debate what the author is claiming in the text or whether one prefers to accept the proposition without such debate. Another technique is seen in the degree of probability, frequency, obligation and inclination the producer employs in the text to make the information credible, reliable and acceptable to a particular society. We concluded that modality degrees mirror power relations as well as the authoritative acts in the text. Perception modalities were also seen to play a major role in establishing a dialogic interaction with the audience towards the credibility of the event and the reliability of the message. Basically, in a politically sensitive discourse, we may conclude that the text producer tends to modalize the antagonists’ statements or propositions (giving them high usuality of violence or high perception of doubt about their truth) or modulate their political inclinations and obligations (giving them high inclination for aggression or coercive obligations to comply), thus, creating more distance from them.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Texture In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that texture, in the Hallidayan sense, focuses on the analysis of both the structural and cohesive aspects of texts. The analysis here will give special attention to the marked structural elements of the text, i.e. the foregrounded themes or foregrounded points of departure that one should observe within a motivated text type. A politically motivated text might appear on the surface as formal and conventional in its presentation. However, our thematic analysis should help us unravel those ideological and cognitive meanings that lie beneath formulaic news reports or political text types. Attention is next turned to lexical cohesion, i.e. the relations within the text through the choice of lexical items that determine cohesive effects. The textual function of language seen via thematic structuring and lexical/semantic choices should reflect dominant ideologies, commonsensical assumptions and the editorial control, as discussed above, under contextual analysis. Foregrounded themes Change we need (Barak Obama, US campaign trail of October 2008) One cannot deny that the marked structural organization of this famous excerpt by the then US President-elect positions the recipient to receive the message in a specific way. The meaning is exclusive here, for we are left to ask one question only: what do we need? The answer would be Change – and nothing else. Now, compare we need change vs. change we need and see if they leave the same effect on you. It might appear that formal news reports broadcast by our favourite media outlets are not marked in terms of structure. This is because these formal news reports usually consist of a series of hierarchically ordered and monitored elements that appear in a sequential order: headline; lead that summarizes the event and sets the scene; the main elements that expound the event; and backgrounds and conditional relationships between sentences to enhance and explain preceding information. Moreover, the general structuring of an expository news report is usually conventionalized by media agencies. In Arabic, expository and informative news report, have a formulaic verbal sentence structure and substantiators (cohesive links) preceding the verbal structure to instantiate the main themes of the news event. This compositional plan is seen to be dominant in all formal news reports including our examples above, e.g. from Reuters Arabic and Al-Manar texts. Nevertheless, one should still scrutinize how a conventional news report can put what is seen as most relevant and important information in the most salient, i.e. thematic positions, whether in the text as a whole or in the clauses and sentences that expand the main themes. Let us see how an expository text-type that
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looks unmarked in its structure, can, in fact, be marked if certain themes are repeated or emphasized throughout the text. As we explained in Chapter 4, in the use of unmarked thematic structure, we find a Theme conflated with the Subject and followed by a Rheme (the remainder of the message). For instance: Example 1: Israel (Theme) # will start building a security fence (Rheme) Israeli Defence Minister (Theme) # will kick off the construction at a ceremony (Rheme) The fence (Theme) # would cordon off the Green Line (Rheme) The Gaza strip (Theme) # is already walled off (Rheme) The first phase of the fence (Theme) # will be built between Kfar Salem and Kfar Kassem (Rheme) The Israeli authorities (Theme) # are being very discreet about the exact nature of this defensive barrier (Rheme) The case of Barta’a (Theme) # is a case in point (Rheme) The Green Line (Theme) # cuts Barta’a down the middle (Rheme) The Palestinians (Theme) # have also slammed the building (Rheme) Source: AFP English text, 14 June 2002 From this example we note that the thematic organization is “grammatically” unmarked (i.e. the theme is the subject). However, thematic foregrounding comes from the dominant thematic references or theme repetition that become the main topic in the text in order to activate particular assumptions upon which the reader builds his/her interpretation of what follows. Analysis shows that there is a thematic pattern that brings to the fore a thematic repetition of Israel, Israeli officials, Israeli authorities, Israeli measures, Israeli media, Israeli voices, the security fence and the construction of the security fence. Secondary themes were given to the case of Barta’a and the last theme was given to the Palestinians. To expound, the dominant themes carry the information units that need to be developed gradually throughout the text. Themes (e.g. including legal/illegal participants, or assumptions) tell where the text is heading and dominant themes distribute the points of departure in the text to be developed later under the rhematic structure. For example, the reporter will put under the rhemes the processes carried out by who is seen as legal vs. illegal participant; the reasons given for the legal participants; the circumstances surrounding the process; or the affected participants. Eventually, thematic contours stamp the text with an ideological character. Ideological thematic representation will only look marked to recipients on the other side of the conflict or to analysts with critical thoughts.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
In our case of Arab media discourse, Al-Manar is bound to manipulate the above themes in the AFP text, which is used by their news team merely as a source of information. Al-Manar’s editorial control will represent reality from a different thematic structural plan that puts, for instance, the following concepts in prominent positions: e.g. occupying authorities, the so-called security fence, the demarcation of the so-called security fence, the case of Barta’a. In other instances from AlManar texts, we observe that the compositional plan foregrounds within the thematic position verbs and events of martyrdom, and so do many other Arab media outlets. Such dominant themes are used as textual tools for activating strategically important assumptions that need to be developed under the rheme units. For instance we note in the Arabic structure: Three Palestinians were martyred (Theme) # by the bullets of the occupying army (Rheme) (Al-Manar, 7 January 2004)… Martyrdom (Theme) # of 10 Palestinians (Rheme) and the occupation (Theme) # shells 2 schools (Rheme and new Theme) # sheltering refugees (Rheme) (Al-Manar, 6 January 2009)… Martyrdom (Theme) # of 10 (Rheme) and pulling (Theme) # of dead bodies (Rheme)…Tens of martyrs (Theme) # were pulled from the rubble of the houses destroyed by the military planes (Rheme) … Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 6 January 2009 We have previously discussed shifts in the transitivity system where actors can be put either in a foregrounded or backgrounded position. This brings us to another point in this analysis where we have to observe how foregrounded actors in killing processes are put in prominent thematic positions. For example, the occupying army (Theme) # had the audacity to execute them (Rheme)… the occupying forces (Theme) # had the audacity to arrest Al-Manar’s correspondent (Rheme)… (Al-Manar, 7 January 2004)… The invaders (Theme) # started their aggression on Gaza (Rheme) (Al-Anwar, 4 January 2009). Here, illegal actors are put in the most prominent positions to make them the winning themes in the text. Revisit our fence text example above: Israeli Defence Minister (Theme) # will kick off the construction at a ceremony in Kfar Salem (Rheme)… The Gaza Strip (Theme) # is already walled off (Rheme1 backgrounding actor), reducing the threat to Israel (Rheme2 giving reason). (AFP) The reporter puts the Defence Minister and Gaza strip as main points of departure to influence the cognitive interpretation of what follows. In other words, attention
Arab News and Conflict
is directed now to the Israeli Defence Minister and the reader will ask what will the Defence Minister do in the rheme. Similarly, the reader’s attention will go to the Gaza Strip and learn later that it is walled off to reduce threat, whereas in Al-Manar, the reader’s attention is directed to the War Minister or the “illegal actor” and attention is next focused on the construction of the wall in occupied Kfar Salem. The Gaza Strip theme has been omitted from Al-Manar’s text as it has different commonsensical beliefs about the cause of threat. Rather, thematic structuring directs attention to the fence. Now, examine the following extract: The War Minister # is expected to give the go ahead signal for the construction in the occupied Palestinian village of Kfar Salem... (Al-Manar) What is referred to in the thematic position in the Arabic text presents the event from a different perspective, i.e. Al-Manar is constantly thematizing illegal actors only to develop this topic under the rheme structure. The rhemes will give negative comments or negative declarative statements about the theme, hence leading to different interpretations. From our earlier analysis of actors in the transitivity system, the reader can understand that foregrounded illegal agents become prominently marked when they are put in dominant thematic positions in politically motivated texts. Next we turn to other cases of foregrounded themes: marked themes where the Subject is not chosen as Theme; or where evaluative connectors can be thematized to show a subjective constructional plan in the text: Example 2: Thus (Theme) # this village (Subject) joins similar Palestinian villages suppressed under occupation (Rheme is underlined). Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 The thematic structure in this sentence puts an evaluative conjunction in a prominent thematic position to make the case of Barta’a more prominent within “the thematic line” of the text on the fence building. It is as if the editorial voice is telling the audience: in this way, there will be more occupied lands. Example 3: In a new attempt to seize more Palestinian lands (Marked Theme) # Israel (Subject) will start building on Sunday what it calls a massive security fence along the West Bank under the pretext of halting Palestinian operations (Rheme). Source: Al-Manar English version, 15 June 2002
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Here the marked theme sets the scene from a different point of departure which makes the audience construct a different mental representation. That is, the audience will build interpretations based upon occupation and the seizure of Palestinian lands. This provides the environment for the development of the message, i.e. the rheme. In the rheme there are the results of occupation, such as fence building and alleged reasons. Let us now revisit previous examples from Reuters texts to see how this text strategy interacts with our previous analyses: Example 4: A day after the suicide attack (Marked Theme) # Arafat (Subject) complied (Rheme)… The marked theme foregrounds the suicide attack against Israelis and emphasizes that Arafat has no other choice this time but to comply with White House demands. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 vs. Arafat (unmarked theme) # responded a day after the attack (Rheme). Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 The Arabic producer avoids foregrounding the suicide theme or the marked representation given in the English text. … Echoing other Palestinian officials (Marked Theme) # Arafat (Subject) accused the Israeli forces of committing “massacres and slaughters” (Rheme)… an allegation (Marked Theme) # the army (Subject) has denied (Rheme). Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 This marked thematic line directs attention to what Palestinians echo or allege. Foregrounding in this declarative statement is meant to focus on allegations rather than facts. According to Halliday’s (1994) functional explanation, echoing and allegation are cases of nominalized themes. “Any nominalization, therefore, constitutes a single element in the message structure. In this case the nominalization serves a thematic purpose… enabling the message to be structured in whatever way the speaker or writer wants” (Halliday 1994: 41–42). It can be argued that nominalization serves a thematic purpose in that it brings attention to different topics rather than directly incriminating legal actors. This was explicitly seen under the analysis of transitivity patterns. Examine next why the Arabic producer directs the thematic line towards a different type of foregrounded themes: But the Palestinian President’s condemnation (a multiple Theme: structural and topical) # included the Israeli offensive as well (Rheme). He said
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in the statement (Theme1) # “We (Theme 2) strongly and firmly condemn (Rheme 2) the carnage and massacres (Theme 3) that have been and are being committed by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian civilians and refugees in Nablus town and Jenin camp and against Al-Mahd church in Bethlehem and other Palestinian areas over the past two weeks (Rheme 3)” (Rheme1). The editorial task replaces the marked themes in the English text with a different marked structure. The Arabic representation adds an adversative to the thematic line (i.e. but) that expresses a judgment to save Arafat’s public face. This evaluative conjunction is not usually found in exposition but is thematically foregrounded in this expository text to express the editorial’s judgment regarding the relevance of this message to Arafat’s condemnation of suicide attacks against Israelis. The rebuttal is a dialogic device by the media producer to thematize Arafat’s stronger condemnation of Israeli attacks. This makes the news event more newsworthy to the Arab audience who need more detailed information based on that point of departure. In other words, the subjective point of departure within this informational structuring provides the environment for the detailed themes and rhemes that follow. What follows in the rhematic structure now thematizes carnage and massacres committed against Palestinians and makes comments on the affected Palestinians. I have also introduced in Chapter 4 the analysis of predicated themes or cleft sentences which should be part of our analysis of marked thematic structures. A predicated theme has the formulation of it+ be+ … We have already seen in our analysis of mood how the text producer interacts with the audience through his non-debatable statements and epistemic propositions that come in a formula similar to it is so or it isn’t so. But how can we also look at this exchange from a structural point of view? Examine the following structural elements composed by the Hezbollah leader whose discourse in the Arab media inflames the patriotic feelings on the Arabic street during times of struggle with Israel: Example 5: It is obvious, until now, (Marked Predicated Theme) # that the Zionist enemy (Subject) has not been able to achieve any military accomplishment (Rheme). It is not I who says so, (Marked Predicated Theme) # they (Subject) say so (Rheme1), the whole world (Subject) says so (Rheme2), and the political military analysts (Subject) say so (Rheme3)… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 29 July 2006
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Examine more instances of marked themes from Al-Manar’s discourse – a text strategy that positions the recipient in a cognitive way to receive the information from the producer’s world view: Example 6: Sayyed Nasrallah: Resistance Stronger than Ever! With pride, honor, and dignity (Marked Theme), # Lebanon (Subject) celebrated on Tuesday the Martyr’s Day, paying tribute to those who have drawn the Resistance path with their pure blood, and pledging to continue the same path until achieving complete victory (Rheme). Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah delivered a speech through a large screen marking the Martyr’s Day in the Sayyed al-Shouhada’a complex in Beirut’s southern suburb where Resistance supporters were gathering long hours before the festival started… “Why November 11, 2008?” (Marked Theme) # Sayyed Nasrallah (Subject) wondered to quickly answer that this was the date of the first operation (Rheme)… “and it was # (Marked Predicated Theme) the cry of the population and the nation,(Rheme), it was # (Marked Predicated Theme) the foundation of the path of Resistance against the enemy”(Rheme). His eminence pointed out that 11/11/1982 has become the martyrs’ day whether a leader, a secretary general, a jihadist or a member martyred in the battle field. Source: Al-Manar English version, 11 November 2008 Example 7: Let Us Put Hands Together and Defend Lebanon It is the spot (Marked Predicated Theme) # where the resistance community (Subject) just loves to hear the leader of the resistance (Rheme). It is the same spot (Marked Predicated Theme) # that the resistance community (Subject) marks the most glorious days (Rheme). It is the same spot (Marked Predicated Theme) # that the Israeli war machine (Subject) destroyed in its lost war in 2006 (Rheme). It is (Marked Predicated Theme) # the Raya playground in Dahye, where Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s Secretary General (Subject) welcomed the released heroes (Rheme). His eminence welcomed political, religious and diplomatic personalities as well as the massive popular gathering. “I welcome you at this national victory. Welcome Samir, Maher, Khodor, Hussein and Mohammed. I welcome the martyrs whom we will receive tomorrow. I welcome Arab and Lebanese martyrs who are the pride of our Arab and Islamic nations,” his eminence said… Source: Al-Manar English version, 16 July 2008
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From the extended examples above, one should note that in media discourse we find what Halliday (1994) calls in functional language analysis “marked combination”, i.e. what the recipient is being invited to attend to as new, or unexpected, or important… “the new element is now mapped on to the Theme… In order to make it explicit that this, and nothing else around, is the news value of this particular information unit, the speaker is likely to use the predicated form it was [x] who…” (Halliday 1994: 59) In conclusion, the thematic structuring of information – determined by the cognitive as well as ideological representations in addition to the editorial’s compositional plan – is a strategy that influences the audience’s interpretation of the news event. The above analysis shows that dominant and repeated themes, marked themes (with evaluative conjunction or themes separated from the subject), predicated themes, and themes foregrounding illegal actors are structural tools that can be used to foreground the ideologically-based structure of a politically sensitive text. This makes a formal news report or a formulaic political report marked and evaluative. These foregrounded themes activate the taken-for-granted assumptions made by the media agency, structure the discourse according to the producer’s position and organize the distribution of information that should be expounded under the rhematic structure in an important way. Thus, these strategies lead to preferred hegemonic readings by ingroups or counter-hegemonic readings by outgroups. So far, we have noted that the structural development and continuity of the political text seem to combine with lexical choices or lexical chains that constitute the textual component of a news report. Therefore, the following section will focus on lexical cohesion as an important strategic tool that cannot be ignored in the current analysis. Collocational cohesion In this section, I want to develop my previous discussions of connotative, favourable and commonsensical meanings, as well as preferred ideological readings. By doing so, I will add a semantic linguistic component borrowed from Halliday’s (1994) notion of “collocational cohesion” in order to investigate the co-occurrence tendency or the particular association between words under discussion. Within this framework of analysis, one should ask, how can ideological descriptions or schemes of categorization be generated at the semantic level? How can we investigate the collocational bond between the items found under a sensitive topic and the tendency of
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
such collocations to feature again in a different text by the same media agency even after so many years? What I will try to do here is to group the participant chains along with their action chains to see how they interact with one another in order to give the text its hegemonic continuity, legal status as well as its cohesive force. Cohesive harmony analysis can be best described if we further associate it with the concept of group schema as explained in Chapter 3. I would relate specifically in this case to Van Dijk’s (1998) conception of “ideological group schema”. The latter touches upon elemental questions, such as: “Who are we?, Where do we come from?, Who belongs to us?, What do we (usually) do, and why?” (Van Dijk 1998: 121). Such questions should be helpful in guiding the analyst in the investigation of ideologically-based lexical choices found in a political text. Tables 6.2 a) and b) attempt to organize and describe the predominant collocational network found in the majority of Arab media outlets during times of conflict. Our network includes the chains found in the above case studies in addition to new examples taken from other media texts. The tables below list the recurrent descriptions of the outgroups (Israelis) and ingroups (Palestinians) that an Arab would read or hear on the news covering major violent events that took place in the Middle East between 2002 and 2009 (see Table 6.2a and 6.2b on pages 166 and 167). The recurrent pattern one registers in a given media society eventually becomes commonsensical. That is to say, the collocation chains habitually go together to enable the legitimating of a particular ideological system, and the target audience accepts them as such. They become the preferred readings in that society and the undisputed political interpretations of a violent event. Thorough lexical analysis shows that Reuters Arabic texts avoid the profusion of terms found in Reuters English texts that exaggerate the illegal status of Palestinian bombers and their actions. Furthermore, Reuters Arabic versions deliberately delete the overlexicalization which comes in the original English texts. In our case study of Reuters Arabic, the Arab producer deletes overlexicalization expressed in metaphors, such as (rein in, crush, sweep, pen in) used against Palestinian participants. Reuters Arabic also avoids the repetition of the attribute Palestinian suicide meant to enhance the negative characteristics of outgroups. Moreover, Reuters Arabic tends to underlexicalize or suppress the negative classifications of Palestinian fighters or Arab participants. The collocational chains relexicalize or delete many lexical items that describe them in a negative way in order to avoid a protest in the Arabic reception. In a predictable way, Reuters Arabic re-lexicalizes some lexical chains related to Israeli participants, e.g. by constantly adding the nationality attribute Israeli or by the frequent addition of the word Israeli occupation in order to emphasize this negative concept, accepted as such in the Arab world. Reuters Arabic avoids the use of metaphorical expressions against all participants in the news event.
Arab News and Conflict
Table 6.2 a) The main collocational network found in Arab media discourse during times of struggle between Arabs and Israelis Scheme of categorization
By Reuters (Arabic)
By Al-Manar
By other Arab media outlets including Assafir, Al-Jazeera, Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Rai Alaam
Participant chains related to Who (Group A)
Israel, Israeli army, Israeli tanks, Israeli forces.
Occupied Palestine, occupied lands since 1948, occupying authorities, occupation army, Enemy’s War Minister, Zionists, Zionist circles, Mossadlinked terrorist network. Enemy’s radio, Zionist spokesman.
Israel, the occupation, occupying forces, occupying authorities, the enemy, Israeli army, Israeli warplanes, destructive war machine, death machinery.
What do they do
Israeli attack, Israeli offensive on Gaza/ Lebanon, Israeli military attacks, Israeli military campaign, Israeli military strikes, Israeli raids, fire, kill, blockade Gaza/ Lebanon, bloodshed.
Grabbing lands, build what they call a security fence. Execute Palestinians, open fire, have the audacity to execute/arrest, continual aggressions, pound the densely populated areas, ignore UN security council resolutions, execute crimes of racial annihilation in Gaza, blood shedding, Zionist raids, ground offensive, massive offensive, closure of humanitarian crossings, blockade, cause shortages of vital supplies including water, refuse to evacuate wounded/martyrs, use white phosphoric shells banned internationally. Claim, allege.
Continuous raids, air raids, invasion, open war, repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon/ Gaza, slaughter, Palestinian blood shedding, empty the lava of its bloody military machinery, crazy pounding, ground/air offensive, closure, cause fuel shortage and power blackouts, gruesome massacres, continuous Israeli holocaust reaps more Palestinian/ Lebanese martyrs, turn Gaza/Lebanon into a theatre for internationally banned weapons, refuse to evacuate the injured/ martyrs. Say, claim, allege, consider.
Why
Israeli occupation, usual military strikes, retaliate.
Occupation, expansion, seizure policy, racial annihilation, holocaust, oppression, aggression, disproportionate war, struggle for land and struggle for existence.
Occupation, Israeli aggression, oppression, Israel’s continuous war of annihilation, holocaust, occupation since 1967, increasing threats, war, struggle, conflict, disproportionate war.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Table 6.2 b) The main collocational network found in Arab media discourse during times of struggle between Arabs and Israelis Scheme of categorization
By Reuters (Arabic)
By Al-Manar
By other Arab media outlets including Assafir, Al-Jazeera, Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Rai Alaam
Participant chains related to Who (Group B)
Palestinian, young Palestinian woman, the ones who carried out the operation, armed Palestinian, Gaza’s activists, activists, Islamic Resistance movement Hamas, the leader of Jerusalem brigade, Hezbollah.
Palestinians, Lebanese resistance, martyrs, Islamic resistance group Hamas, Hezbollah, the resistance, Palestinian resistance men, resistance fighters, Palestinian/Lebanese blood, innocent women, children and civilians.
Resistance, martyrs, Islamic resistance Hamas, resistance group, Hezbollah, Palestinian blood, innocent women, children, and civilians.
What do they do
Carry out attacks, blow himself/herself up, kill, were killed, open fire, fire at tanks, fire rockets on Israel, bombing, suicide attack (occasional).
Were martyred in Israeli aggression, suppressed under occupation, pay sacrifices, keep up defiance in the face of the onslaught, vow victory, manage/ succeed to destroy, or kill Israelis, deter aggression, force Israel to retreat, confront in fierce battles, exchange heavy fire with advancing Zionist forces in open areas, abort occupation plans.
Were martyred, retaliate against Israel’s war, succeed in killing Israelis, resist, deter aggression, keep up defiance, carry out heroic operation, exchange fire with Israeli forces, smuggle arms.
Why
Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation, retaliate, “terror” remains scare quoted in all texts.
Resistance, martyrdom, sacrifice, steadfastness, defiance, dignity, confrontation.
Resistance, martyrdom, steadfastness to defend land, defiance, confrontation.
Al-Manar’s classificatory scheme – like other outspoken Arab media outlets, e.g. Assafir, Al-Mustaqbal, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Al-Jazeera, Tishreen, Al-Rai Alaam – shows overt awareness of the ideological dimension of hegemonic terminology.
Arab News and Conflict
In many of the Arabic national news one observes a habitual re-lexicalization of who is perceived as ingroups or outgroups. For instance, Al-Manar’s text strategy exaggerates the illegal status and negative properties of Israel through the repeated synonyms of occupation and through the use of overstatement such as grabbing rather than seizing. Consequently, the profusion of negative collocations given to Israeli participants enhances those themes which are foregrounding them. On the other hand, Arab participants in the Arab media are given emotive naming systems with synonyms related to their victimisation. Speech acts and politeness Beyond the visible elements of syntax, modality or texture which have been investigated so far in this chapter, there are less visible strategies in which the text producers interact politely with the audience. Speech act analysis will identify the general functions performed (e.g. representative or expressive); define the illocutionary and communicative force (i.e. make a statement, warn, raise doubts, express sorrow over x, express sympathy, be evocative); explain the implied meanings and show cases of indirect speech acts in politically sensitive texts. Speech acts relaying implied meanings show the text producer’s awareness of the political face of the different participants in the text (see Chapter 4 on linguistic explanations). For instance, when Al-Manar alerts the audience about more occupation in Arab lands, it obviously means to threaten the face of the agent in question; but claim common ground with ingroups. Therefore, our analysis will synchronize the politeness strategies, i.e. face- threatening acts vs. face saving acts, with speech acting strategies during the transmission of a political discourse. These two tools are determined by the contextual constraints of power, solidarity or enmity relations, shared background knowledge, and the intended interaction by the editorial control with its respective audience. This will ultimately determine whether the speech act is felicitous or whether a politeness strategy saves vs. threatens the face of a particular group. We have already seen, under editorial control above, how the Politeness Principle might work. That was from a general perspective, but our analysis below will deal with the language aspect. It should be noted from the beginning, that all acts of violence or killing are potentially face-threatening acts for they bring bad news about their agents (whether backgrounded or foregrounded). However, the concern here is with whose face is baldly threatened without redress or whose face is saved and via what redressive politeness strategy. Let us revisit earlier examples and see how they further fit under this pragmatic strategy.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Example 1: The last attack carried out by a young Palestinian woman who blew herself up and killed 6 Israelis (representative speech acts). Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 Based on comparison with the original English version, the additional representative speech act found in the Arabic version blew herself up is meant to imply in Arabic that she is the first affected participant before the killing of the Israelis. In this context, the representative blew herself up connotes a new signified (i.e. sacrifice) to liberate occupied lands, according to the Arabs. This yields an additional act of sympathy in the Arabic situation. The repetition of this act in other Arabic texts makes it an indirect speech act because the declarative is used to express sorrow over the young bombers who blow themselves up to kill Israelis. The new act in Arabic is a covert positive politeness strategy by Reuters Arabic that hedges expressions like suicide bombers, especially when the latter have been directly incriminated in the transitivity system in the original English text. The new act in Arabic Reuters displays less distance with the Arab audience who have different beliefs about the bombers as being desperate. Such intended meaning can be seen more explicitly in the following example taken from Al-Mustaqbal newspaper: A young Palestinian woman blew herself up (representative and expressive speech act in Arabic) in a bus station in the heart of Jerusalem which resulted in the killing of 6 people at least and injuring (representative and expressive speech act in Arabic) 6 others in an operation adopted by “AlAqsa Martyrs Brigades” in clear revenge for the Israeli massacres whose victims were hundreds of Palestinians in Jenin camp in the West Bank and which coincided (indirect speech act) with the visit of US secretary Colin Powell to Israel… Dahlan refused to link between Jerusalem operation and Powell’s visit to Israel, saying “I believe this operation comes as a result of what happened in Jenin and which would leave impact for the coming years and enhance revenge and retaliation that would restrain Sharon”. Source: Al-Mustaqbal Arabic text, 13 April 2002 The case of Arafat’s condemnation of Israeli attacks can also be revisited from this aspect: But the Palestinian President’s condemnation included the Israeli offensive as well. He said in the statement “We strongly and firmly condemn the carnage and massacres that have been and are being committed by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian civilians and refugees in Nablus
Arab News and Conflict
town and Jenin camp and against Al-Mahd church in Bethlehem and other Palestinian areas over the past two weeks.” Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 The representatives added in this Arabic text are “assertive acts” (Leech, 1983) concerned with passing of information about Arafat’s actual condemnation without the truth claims made by the Israeli officials, as was seen in the original English version via the use of argumentative assertion (accused the Israeli forces). This obviously threatens the face of Israeli participants and claims sympathy with the Arabs, adding another positive politeness strategy towards the Arab participants. As for Arafat’s compliance, we can observe the following: The White House requested (conditional directive)… the State Department requested (conditional directive)… Arafat responded (commissive, indicating choice). The unconditional speech acts that were stated in the original English Reuters text (the White House demanded… Arafat complied), have been altered in the Arabic version of Reuters, for, if relayed in the same manner, it means that Arafat’s credibility is threatened in the Arab world. Therefore, they become conditional in the Arabic text. Namely, the event of condemnation will not take place unless Arafat agrees, i.e. responds. Here Arafat is given a choice and hence a negative politeness strategy is observed (i.e. deference). Hence, his political face is saved. Let us see how this act is represented in Al-Jazeera: Arafat’s statement comes as a response to American pressures as Washington stipulated that Arafat condemns what it calls terrorist operations in order to hold a meeting between the US secretary of State and the Palestinian President… The General Secretary of the Palestinian Cabinet Ahmad AbdulRahman stressed in an interview with Al-Jazeera that the meeting between Powell and Arafat is not the issue, the issue lies in the position of the US administration who supports what has been committed by the Israeli occupying forces, and who turns a blind eye to the massacres they have committed against the Palestinians. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 13 April 2002 In this text by Al-Jazeera, we observe that the conditional speech act (stipulated) is followed by a modal expression (what it calls) to further threaten the face of the US administration due to its political position in the Middle East. The added representatives against the US and Israelis are meant to simultaneously enhance a positive politeness strategy with the Palestinians or ingroups. Moreover, Arafat is
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
responding in order to further condemn and in the strongest manner the massacres committed and being committed by the Israeli occupation forces: … The Palestinian President Yasser Arafat condemned in a statement today all terrorist acts targeting civilians whether they were Israelis or Palestinians…The statement strongly condemned the massacres that have been and are being committed by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian civilians and refugees in Nablus town and Jenin camp and against Al-Mahd church in Bethlehem and other Palestinian areas over the past two weeks. Source: Al-Jazeera Arabic text, 13 April 2002 If we revisit the Reuters texts (refer to collocational cohesion above), we note the redressive act in the Arabic situation through the deliberate deletion of expressives with metaphorical structure (e.g. penned in, rein in) implying a higher authoritative status over Palestinians. Such expressions which further have semantic meanings of a Subject with the feature (+animate/-human), would threaten the face of Arab participants. It further presupposes power over Palestinians as well as relations of inequality. Therefore, it is not surprising to see their deletion in the Arabic versions. Reuters Arabic further minimizes the expressive function that shows sympathy with the Israeli victims, e.g. suicide bombers have killed scores of Israelis or adding to the gloomy mood of Israelis as was found in the English version. This means that the Arabic text hedges the positive politeness strategy given to Israeli participants in the original English text. This can be observed in another example taken from Reuters on 12 dead in Hebron Attack of 15 November 2002: Example 2: The settlers were struck down by heavy gunfire which poured into a narrow alley in an attack claimed by the Islamic Jihad group... This representative and expressive speech act in an expository news report implies sympathy and positive politeness strategy towards Israeli participants through the use of a metaphorical expression. For this reason, we may predict its deletion from Reuters Arabic version published on 15 November 2002. Our next examples will deal with the assertive category as introduced in Chapter 4. Compare the following representations and see what happens in the Arabic text: Example 3: The settlers were struck down by heavy gunfire which poured into a narrow alley way in an attack claimed by the Islamic Jihad group…
Arab News and Conflict
Speaking by telephone to al-Jazeera satellite television, the head of Islamic Jihad, Ramadan Shallah, described the attack on the settlers as a ‘remarkable operation’. Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 According to Leech (1983) this is an argumentative or attitudinal assertive since it contends the truth claim made by the Palestinian official. The selective quotation creates distance from and disapproval of what the official has said as it does not show deference towards Israeli settlers struck down by heavy gunfire. The illocutionary force of this argumentative act communicates distance from his statement and further threatens the face of such Palestinian officials. vs. The settlers came under heavy gunfire in an attack claimed by the Islamic Jihad group… Source: Reuters Arabic text, 15 November 2002 The new discourse can be described as a representative speech act that merely states facts without exaggeration against Palestinians. This is another politeness strategy (negative politeness strategy) that leaves the editors with the option to deny expressive acts or overt sympathies with Israeli victims. Further, the same Arabic text opted for the following assertive category: Shallah said (assertive and informative speech act) to Al-Jazeera channel that this “comes in the context of responding to the assassination crime of the hero, the leader of Jerusalem’s brigade, martyr Iyad Swalha. This is part of the series of operations to respond to this crime”. The assertive verb said is not attitudinal (cf. described in the English version) and is concerned with a unidirectional passing of information about the reality of what is said by this Palestinian official. This relays the relevant information to the targeted audience and shows one truth claim (see Leech 1983). This could be another negative politeness strategy followed by the editors to minimize attitudinal imposition against Palestinians coming from the original western text. Such strategies can be found in another moment in history when struggle intensifies between Arabs and Israelis. Check a more recent example taken from Reuters: Example 4: Israeli troops kill two Hamas gunmen in Gaza Israel said (assertive speech act) its troops killed two Palestinian gunmen from the Islamist Hamas movement on Tuesday near the town of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
The incident occurred after a Hamas source said (assertive speech act) the group’s armed wing had claimed (assertive speech act) responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed a woman in southern Israel on Monday. It was the first such attack inside Israel claimed by the group since 2004. “Troops spotted two suspicious men approaching them and identified hitting them,” said (assertive speech act) an army spokesman. Israeli troops frequently carry out raids in the Gaza Strip to hunt (expressive speech act) militants. Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in June after routing secular Fatah forces loyal to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. Source: Reuters English text, 5 February 2008 vs. The Israeli troops killed 9 activists from the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in Gaza today. Hamas armed wing issued an official statement announcing (assertive act) its responsibility for the first suicide attack inside Israel since 2004. Seven members from Hamas were killed in an air raid in a security post in southern Gaza and two others from the armed wing were killed at the hands of the Israeli troops (expressive act) near the borders with Egypt. The Israeli army said (assertive act) it was responding to rocket attacks on South Israel. An Israeli woman was killed in the attack (representative act) and the Palestinian who blew himself up and another Palestinian was killed by the bullets of the police (expressive act). Hamas said (assertive act) that the attackers are Mohammad Salim Alherbawi and Shadi Mohammad Zougheir, both from Hebron in the West Bank… Alherbawi’s mother told Reuters while crying (assertive and expressive act) “I have never expected that Mohammad would carry out a martyrdom operation. He was calm and normal. I was shocked when I saw his name on the TV”
... AbuObaida, the spokesman of Izzideenalkassam Brigade said (assertive act) the attack was a response to “the massacres committed by the occupation”. He noted (assertive act) the killing of 18 inhabitants from Gaza including the son of Mahmoud Alzahhar, a leader in Hamas, at the hands of the Israeli troops last month (expressive act)… Source: Reuters Arabic text, 5 February 2008 We can observe that the positive politeness strategy in the English text towards the Israeli participants has been shifted in the Arabic text. That is to say the positive politeness strategy (i.e. sympathy) is given instead to the Palestinian participants. In general, Reuters Arabic version chooses to quote more Palestinian voices,
Arab News and Conflict
i.e. with more assertives stating reasons for the conflict and relaying more relevant information to the Arab audience. Further, Reuters Arabic includes in its text more Palestinian affected participants/victims with expressives that are not given to the Israeli victim in the same text (e.g. at the hands of the Israeli troops/by the bullets of the police). We may conclude then that unworthy victims can be given representatives without expressives unless an expressive is meant to threaten the enemy’s face. This is why the expressive hunt found in the English version was avoided in the equivalent Arabic text as it shows lack of politeness towards Palestinians in addition to its + animate semantic implicature. As a result, the Cooperative Principle in the Arabic text seems to be maximized with the Arab recipients who surely need the quality, quantity, relevance, and manner of information provided in the Reuters Arabic version when conflict intensifies. Let us next revisit Al-Manar to observe the intensity of the speech acts and politeness used in situations of acute conflict: Example 5: The occupying authorities will start tomorrow grabbing (representative and expressive speech act) more Palestinian lands under the pretext of building what they call (an argumentative speech act to raise doubt) a security fence… Thus, this village joins its Palestinian likes oppressed and secluded under occupation (a representative and expressive speech act implying sorrow and exaggerating threat). Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 15 June 2002 These are indirect speech acts for they are declaratives used to express sorrow over the state of expansionism. The speech acts are stating that there is a land seizure but simultaneously alerting the audience of a new threat coming from occupying authorities. This also functions to remind the audience of the state of war with Israel. Rather than using direct statements in a formal news report, the metaphorical expressions intend to imply that there is a serious threat coming from outgroups and also to communicate an ironic force about the Israeli security myth (see Chapter 2 on mythical meaning). The argumentative speech verb what they call shows the falseness of outgroups’ statements and raises divisive issues that baldly threaten their face. However, we observe a positive politeness strategy towards Palestinians, for the expressives signal exaggeration that implies common ground with their cause, maximize sympathy with them and express sorrow over the seizure policy.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
Example 6: Three Palestinians were martyred by the bullets of the Zionist occupying army… the occupying army had the audacity to execute/arrest them… a Zionist military spokesman claimed… alleged… Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 7 January 2004 Example 7: The Israeli war machinery continues to target civilians Early Saturday morning 13 martyrs have fallen raising the toll to nearly 1205 martyrs and more than 5000 wounded… 6 Palestinians were martyred including two children in a shelling by the Israeli occupation on Gaza strip, including a woman and a child martyred in a shelling by the enemy on a UN-run school where civilians were sheltering in the northern town of Beit Layiya. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 17 January 2009 Again, the representatives in Al-Manar are indirect speech acts used in critical moments in history: firstly, to describe an event or carry a particular truth-value to express the Arab producer’s beliefs; secondly, to simultaneously express sorrow over what is happening to ingroups (e.g. Palestinian victims), thus rendering the repetition of martyrs, civilians, children and women to fit the world of emotions or feelings. Furthermore, the speech acts claim and allege are representative and argumentative assertives, i.e. indirect acts that raise doubts about Israeli’s truth claims. These speech acts baldly threaten Israel’s face and credibility, while showing a positive politeness strategy that maximizes sympathy with Palestinian participants. Such argumentative assertions compare two truth claims: the editor’s position vs. the truth claim made by Israelis. The illocutionary force of these argumentative assertions intends to create doubt and distance from the truth claims of Israeli officials and to threaten their political face without redress. To recapitulate, the analysis of speech acts and politeness strategies in a politically sensitive text can be defined as follows: – The committal of a Face Threatening Act without redress in a formal and sensitive news report can be achieved through the use of representatives in active processes incriminating illegal agents; implied meanings or indirect speech acts; expressives combined with the informative function; argumentative assertions; or unconditional directives. Such acts exaggerate the bad news about outgroups, contend their truth claims, or show a great deal of power and authority over them; thus reinforcing hostilities. Face Threatening Acts without redress threaten both the negative and positive face of outgroups in order to bring more bad news about them and to create more distance. Another conclusion was
Arab News and Conflict
seen in the use of metaphors from a negative conceptual field such as (+animate) or (-human) register, e.g. hunt/rein in x in a formal news report to imply negative meanings against outgroups. This act was seen to be avoided and redressed in our case study of Reuters Arabic versions. The use of (+animate) metaphor cannot be felicitous if not based on commonly shared beliefs between the text producer and his/her audience regarding a specific group. – Negative Politeness can be achieved through hedging or in softening the bad news about the killing acts by favoured groups in a particular conflict. This is achieved via: avoiding expressive acts/implied meanings that would exaggerate the bad acts committed by who is seen as legal groups or ingroups; the most possible backgrounding of ingroups’ agency; the constant use of non-argumentative assertion in order to agree on the truth claims made by ingroups; or via the use of conditional directives to minimize political imposition upon ingroups in order to give them more choice or to save their political face. – Positive Politeness can be achieved through the use of implied meaning, expressives and indirect speech acts that are merely meant to communicate agreement or sympathy with ingroups or worthy victims. It can be established that a formal political news report cannot be seen as merely representative or informative, i.e. value-free, but rather as implicating a function of involvement by the producer. The felicitousness of speech acts hinges on the agreement or sympathy maxims (see Chapter 4) shared between the author and his/her audience. They also depend on the recognized authoritative and legal status of the participants whose face can be either saved or threatened without raising a protest. The latter is related to a Cooperative Principle governing relations between the text producer, commissioner and target receiver who seem to tolerate the types of speech acts and the politeness strategies or expressives given in a formal report according to the ideological stance in that society. Relevance (the descriptive use vs. the interpretive use) Relevance, which can help to analyse the subjective dimensions of context, can be best addressed in terms of cognitive representations either descriptively or interpretively. As introduced in Chapter 4, the descriptive use in political reporting represents thoughts, assumptions or utterances as being true descriptions of a state of affairs; whereas the interpretive use is representation by resemblance to some other thought or utterance. These representations will be our pragmatic tools to analyse what is seen as credible by media producers or receivers, and what assumptions and intentions are being communicated.
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
All the strategies seen so far cannot be considered relevant and credible by the recipient unless these strategies are eventually entertained as true thoughts rather than being entertained as claims made by the media agency. This acceptance as truth can be called the descriptive use by the audience. Descriptive use can succeed via the shared contextual assumptions that save the audience the effort of looking for the desired effects of different text strategies, such as the perception modalities found in Al-Manar (see modality above). But in order to best understand how relevance works in political reporting, it will be related here to one case study. This case study will handle instances of quoting and reporting in order to show what assumptions are believed to be true, what is ideologically more relevant and rewarding to the audience and what subjectivity or desired effects are being strengthened in a particular society during political struggle. Let us revisit our previous examples to see how they work under this further pragmatic use: Example 1: Arafat condemns Jerusalem bombing … Arafat accused (evaluative speech verb) the Israeli forces of committing “massacres and slaughters” (scare-quotes) against Palestinians. Source: Reuters English text, 13 April 2002 The interpretive use seen in the short scare-quotes does not give enough resemblance to Arafat’s full utterance, views and position. Now compare this with the Reuters Arabic version: He said (neutral speech verb) in the statement “We strongly and firmly condemn the carnage and massacres that have been and are being committed by the Israeli occupation forces against the Palestinian civilians and refugees …” Source: Reuters Arabic text, 13 April 2002 The direct quoting is an interpretive use that has a complete resemblance to Arafat’s thought and utterance. In other words, the direct and longer quotation resembles the original in all linguistic properties to confirm the Arab’s negative schemata about Israeli forces and to strengthen an existing assumption about massacres against Palestinians. The longer quotation in Arabic is more rewarding in the Arabic situation for it seems sufficiently relevant to be worth the Arab audience’s attention. Example 2: 12 Dead in Hebron Attack … An ambulance worker said (neutral speech verb) the Israelis were caught in gunfire in an alley leading from the shrine to settler enclaves (interpretive use with maximum resemblance)… The army said (neutral speech verb)
Arab News and Conflict
he was killed after he threw grenades at the soldiers (interpretive use with maximum resemblance). Source: Reuters English text, 15 November 2002 As the interpretive use by the reporter represents to a great extent the thoughts and utterances of Israeli participants, the Arabic version, published on the same date, tends to delete them from the Arabic report. For, the more the reporter in the foreign text echoes the Israeli thoughts or assumptions, the more the Arabic editorial control tends to delete them. …The head of Islamic Jihad R. Shallah described (evaluative speech verb) the attack on the settlers as a “remarkable operation” (scare-quotes with minimum resemblance). Reuters English This minimal interpretive use is given in the Arabic version maximum resemblance via the use of additional and direct quotations taken from other sources as follows: Shallah said (neutral speech verb) “yes there has been an announcement from Jerusalem’s brigades… the information we have now confirms this admission”. Shallah said (neutral speech verb) “this comes in response to the assassination crime of the leader, the hero, martyr Iyad Sawalha. This is part of a series of operations by the brigade to respond to this crime.” (direct quoting with full interpretation of Shallah’s attributed thought and utterance). Reuters Arabic text Here, the direct and lengthy quotation in the Arabic version is more relevant to an Arab recipient because an Arab would be more interested in maximum interpretive resemblance to Arab officials’ representations. Example 3: Israeli troops kill two Hamas gunmen in Gaza Israel said (neutral speech verb) its troops killed two Palestinian gunmen from the Islamist Hamas movement on Tuesday near the town of Rafah in the southern Gaza Strip… “Troops spotted two suspicious men approaching them and identified hitting them,” said (neutral speech verb) an army spokesman (interpretive use with maximum resemblance). Source: Reuters English text, 5 February 2008 vs. the following representations seen in Reuters Arabic text on the same event: The Israeli troops killed 9 activists from the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas in Gaza today. Hamas armed wing issued an official statement announcing
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
its responsibility for the first suicide attack inside Israel since 2004... The Israeli army said it was responding to rocket attacks on South Israel. An Israeli woman was killed in the attack and the Palestinian who blew himself up and another Palestinian was killed by the bullets of the police. Hamas said that the attackers are Mohammad Salim Alherbawi and Shadi Mohammad Zougheir, both from Hebron in the West Bank… Alherbawi’s mother told Reuters while crying “I have never expected that Mohammad would carry out a martyrdom operation. He was calm and normal. I was shocked when I saw his name on the TV”
... AbuObaida, the spokesman of Izzideenalkassam Brigade said the attack was a response to “the massacres committed by the occupation”. He noted the killing of 18 inhabitants from Gaza including the son of Mahmoud Alzahhar, a leader in Hamas, on the hands of the Israeli troops last month… Hamas officials said the men who were killed in the security complex were killed while praying when a rocket hit the complex. The Israeli army said the attack was a response to the rocket attacks launched by the Palestinians on the south of Israel… Source: Reuters Arabic text, 5 February 2008 In the Arabic text, the reader observes more interpretive resemblance with what the Palestinian participants say than what is seen in the English text. This of course makes the Arabic representation more relevant and credible to the Arab recipient. It can be concluded from our intensive examples that the producer is unconsciously bound to use unmarked or neutral speech verbs before quoting or reporting what ingroups say and to do this in a systematic manner. The propositions we saw in Arabic and asserted after a neutral verb are representations that resemble in content, to a large extent, the utterances or thoughts of the Palestinian participants. The Arab audience would find such interpretive representations more relevant as they do not present negative assumptions about the Palestinian voices. Another observation is seen in the deletion of the evaluative speech verbs (e.g. accused, described) before scare quoting what Palestinian officials say. According to Bell (1991), the reporting verbs become evaluative when they reflect the stance of the reporter “to the statement that follows... keying the audience in to how to interpret the speaker’s statement” (Bell 1991: 207). As we saw, those statements that follow evaluative speech verbs are represented with least interpretive resemblance in order to create distance from what outgroups say (e.g. claim… according to what the enemy’s radio said). It can be proposed at this point that all direct quotations with maximum interpretive resemblance are eventually entertained descriptively by the media society. That is, they convey a particular ideological stance that asserts and describes a different state of affairs about the actual event. Let us finally apply this argument to
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Al-Manar’s examples. Compare the AFP text used as a source of information with Al-Manar’s final Arabic representation: Example 4: Burn urges calm on Lebanon-Border, support for US peace … “I also had an opportunity to express our appreciation for the cooperation of the Lebanese government against individual groups connected with the al-Qaeda network and expressed our continuing concern about Hezbollah activities,” said Burns. “Said” is a neutral speech verb following an interpretive representation resembling the thoughts and utterances of Burns. Source: AFP English text, 4 June 2002 vs. After talks with Lebanese President Emile Lahoud in Beirut, Burns expressed the strong US concern about maintaining calm on the blue line and expressed his country’s concern about Hezbollah activities (interpretive use), in his opinion. The latter is an evaluative reporting expression used descriptively to relay a different stance into the Arabic text. Source: Al-Manar Arabic text, 5 June 2002 We observe that the interpretive use is followed by a descriptive use in the Arabic reporting. The content of al-Qaeda has been eliminated from the Arabic version for it contradicts with existing assumptions in the Arab world that believe the two organizations cannot be related to each other. Therefore, the elimination of this assumption (that basically represents the views of Burns) makes it more relevant in the Arabic situation. The evaluative reporting clause is used descriptively to postmodify Burn’s utterances so that the descriptive use put in the reporting clause serves the editor’s judgment regarding the relevance of Burn’s proposition, i.e. that it does not match with the real assumptions of the Arab audience about Hezbollah. The latter is believed to be more or less a legitimate entity in the Arab world. Hence, we can conclude that any ideological stance is a case of descriptive use. This descriptive use is responsible for the competing ideological representations in the Arab media discourse, especially when it touches upon sensitive topics. Furthermore, relevance in the Arabic texts tends to establish maximum interpretive resemblance with the propositions or thoughts and utterances of ingroups and eschews the use of evaluative reporting verbs. Interpretive use with ingroups confirms existing assumptions and gives legitimacy to the statements of ingroups. In other words, maximum interpretive representation enhances the factualness and credibility of these voices rather than distancing them. On the other hand, representations by least interpretive resemblance, preferential quoting, selective
Chapter 6. Analysing text strategy
scare-quoting or the use of attitudinal speech verbs is an overt descriptive strategy, which confirms one’s ideological schema about the event and about outgroup voices that remain distant. The more the text user eliminates an interpretive resemblance with outgroup statements, the more this representation becomes relevant to ingroups’ different assumptions, thus keeping the audience’s processing effort to a minimum in order to benefit from the informative news event. Conclusion In the second part of the analysis we have shown that all components of text strategy, i.e. semantic content, syntactic or structural organization dressed up with pragmatic strategies, work in harmony and in a systematic manner to articulate the contextual factors examined under the first part of the analysis. That is to say, hegemony, interpellation, power relations, cognition and editorial control give legitimate and logical reasons for the final semantic, structural and pragmatic choices found in a politically motivated text. Table 6.3 summarizes our findings of text strategy, from the many examples cited above. It should be noted that these text strategies can either be used or avoided for political reasons. The findings are polarized according to the conception of group schema:
Arab News and Conflict
Table 6.3 A summary of the text strategies found in politically sensitive media discourse Text strategy used against outgroups
Text strategy used for ingroups
– Emphasizes outgroup agency in a thematized position where presupposed incrimination and negative naming systems become structurally prominent. The structural development can be carried forward via expansion. The latter has the capacity to provide the conditions and circumstantial features especially (circumstances of cause and manner) to enhance, extend or elaborate that threat is caused by outgroups or dissidents, thus furthering their incrimination. – Relational processes can be used against outgroups for judgemental purposes.
– De-emphasizes (i.e. using regular cases of nominalization/passivization) or deletes ingroup agency in acts of violence. – Deletes from the transitivity system especially from the circumstantial element causes that incriminate them. It rather utilizes circumstances of extent or location. – Increases the number of affected participants in the transitivity system for those perceived as worthy victims. – Emphasizes ingroup assumptions or perceptions in marked theme structures.
– Modalizes outgroups’ statements and modulates their political inclinations to delegitimate their discourses and create distance from and doubts about them. – When outgroups’s propositions are doubted they are preceded by perception modalities. – Uses finite elements that put the listener in a doubt or challenge position against outgroups.
– Uses modal expressions to support ingroup political stances. Also modulates obligations on the part of ingroups to save their political face. – Ingroup propositions are presented as assertions. – Uses finite elements that put the listener in an acknowledgement, acceptance, or undertaking position.
– Utilizes a negative collocational network with hyperbole that weaves through structure and syntax to enhance outgroups negative actions and characteristics. – De-emphasizes or excludes information on their affected participants or victims from the collocational network or the expansion structure.
– Follows a neutral naming system without attributes to describe ingroup agency and utilizes a positive or legal collocational chain to legitimate/justify their acts in a conflict and to give own reasons.
– Dresses outgroups’ negative actions up with implied meanings, indirect speech acts, or metaphors taken from (- human) domains. – Shows distance from outgroups via the use of unconditional directives when action is demanded.
– Avoids using indirect speech acts, or implied meanings in statements that describe ingroup acts of killing during war or struggle. – Tends to minimize imposition upon ingroups via the use of conditional directives or polite obligations when action is required during times of crisis.
– Baldly threatens their negative and positive face without redressive strategies.
– Uses a negative politeness strategy in order to background ingroups’ direct incrimination, to recognize their legal status, or to minimize imposition upon them. – Uses expansion, hyperbole, expressive speech acts and positive politeness strategy when sympathizing with ingroup victims.
– Quotes them least in the text or quotes them with least interpretive resemblance using attitudinal reporting verbs to suppress their voices.
– Quotes their voices with maximum interpretive resemblance and with neutral reporting verbs to legitimate their voices.
part 3
Translation and media
chapter 7
Media translation and conflict Thus far, we may conclude that the final productions in the media are woven not only by the editorial control and the hegemonic systems in a particular society, but also by translation work carried out by the journalists themselves or the hired translators in a particular media outlet. As massive amounts of Arab media productions count to a great extent on translation work from foreign media agencies into Arabic, the role of translation as a tool in the transcreation of socio-political realities is another important issue to be addressed. Observe this role in the following Arabic target texts taken from Arab media discourse. In this chapter source/ foreign texts, Arabic target texts and back-translations (by the author) will be referred to respectively as ST, TT and BT. Sample A: ST: red wine… white wine… brandy … bacon… pork TT: BT: red grape juice/drink… white grape juice/drink… the drink… jerkey meat… meat Source: subtitles from Fatafeet (popular food satellite channel in the Arab world) Sample B: ST: Minority Sunnis were dominant under former dictator Saddam Hussein and initially associated with al Qaeda-inspired insurgency that followed the 2003 US-led invasion. Source: Reuters English text, 25 November 2008 TT: BT: Minority Sunnis were dominant under late President Saddam Hussein and initially associated with al Qaeda-inspired insurgency that followed the 2003 US-led invasion. Source: Reuters Arabic text, 25 November 2008
Arab News and Conflict
Sample C: ST: Meanwhile, sources on both sides said that a local chief of another hardline Fatah offshoot, Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, had been detained during an Israeli operation in the Jenin refugee camp of the northern West Bank. Palestinian sources also said that soldiers had arrested Dhib Hurani, the local correspondent of Al-Manar, the television station of the Lebanonbased fundamentalist Shiite movement Hezbollah. Source: AFP English text, 7 January 2004 TT:
BT: Meanwhile, Palestinian security sources and Israeli military sources said that the Israeli army arrested during an infiltration operation in the Jenin camp for Palestinian refugees of the northern West Bank a military chief of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades linked to Fatah movement. Palestinian sources said that the Israeli soldiers had arrested Dhib Hurani, the local correspondent of Al-Manar TV station of the Lebanon Shiite Hezbollah. Source: AFP Arabic text, 7 January 2004 We can see that translators in the real world are not neutral bystanders, but actual participants in representing a particular topic: a topic that is reducible to ways of thinking and to relations of power. Having taught translation courses (English-Arabic-English) for seven years, one common question I have always encountered by the students throughout my teaching experience is: should loyalty be to the source text or to the target text? In order to answer this question and at the same time address the role of translation in shaping readers’ reactions and reading positions in relation to a sensitive event, this chapter will focus on three main issues that I find of paramount importance to the translation analyst: the profession’s constraints that decide on the final shape of the target language text; the notions of translation that can describe ideological intervention in translation; and the model of analysis that translators can observe when they are translating ideologically motivated texts. My model at the end of this chapter is not prescriptive, but entirely descriptive. In other words, the model offers some useful ideas for translators or interpreters that they can use if they choose. The model will summarize the main socio-cognitive-political contexts
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
and text strategies concluded in the book and invite the translators to be more aware of their choices. The translation of ideology and the ideological role of the translator The profession’s constraints We have seen in Chapter 5 how the major contextual constraints of hegemony, power relations, cognition and editorial control collectively devise and manufacture the final productions we see in a target text. As an experienced practitioner and teacher of translation, I find it equally important to refer the analyst to another constraint she/he should observe in the field of translation. I would focus here on the commissioned task entrusted to the producer who carries out the translation work (i.e. the journalist who translates or the media translator). This involves the agreements between the commissioner and the producer in terms of financial contracts, training and practice, the purpose behind any translation, ethical accountability, the market constraints, and the audience’s expectations. A key notion from the field of translation studies that I would like to refer to is “skopos and commission in translational action” (Vermeer 1996, 2000). In my view, Skopos theory can successfully contribute to our case study of media translation in times of conflict by offering practical explanations for the kinds of translation produced in the media world. Skopos is derived from Greek, meaning aim or purpose and was introduced into translation studies by Reiss and Vermeer in the 1970s as a technical term for the purpose or aim of translation and the “translational action”. The term “translational action” comes from Holz-Mänttäri’s model that defines translation as a complex action carried out by experts to achieve a particular communicative purpose (see Nord 1997). Skopos theory (Vermeer 1996, 2000) holds that translation is seen as an action with an aim leading to a result, which he calls “a translatum”. (Vermeer 2000: 221). The useful insight of this influential theory is that translation can be considered as “a new offer of information in the target culture about some information offered in the source culture and language” (cited in Nord 1997: 26). This casts light on further decisive contextual factors in the recipient situation that make the translator determine whether the source text needs to be fully reproduced or should be edited. This theory draws attention to the following contexts: – The “defined goal” of the target text: In our case, the defined goal is: the purpose or aim of a translation; what content to translate; does the audience need full access to the ideological position, images or descriptions in the original; how to translate; why to decide to act in a certain way although the translator
Arab News and Conflict
could have produced, for example, a similar effect to the original. As Vermeer puts it, “the end justifies the means… write in a way that enables your text/ translation to function in the situation in which it is used and with the people who want to use it and precisely in the way they want it to function” (cited in Nord 1997: 29). For instance, while translating a politically sensitive report from AFP into Al-Manar’s Arabic news bulletin, the producer should inform without provoking a protest from the Muslim or Arab audience, exclude from the source text what Arabs would see as problematic classifications and achieve political solidarity with ingroups; thus making the translatum or the end text acceptable in the target situation. – The translation “commission”: As Vermeer notes “let us define a commission as the instructions, given by oneself or by someone else, to carry out a given action – here to translate” (Vermeer 2000: 229). In our case, the instructions given to Arab media translators or journalists by their own chief editors to translate but without accepting what they call the “colonial hegemony” found in the foreign text. The commissioner usually defines the goals of news production that are usually negotiated with and accepted by the journalist/translator who chooses to work for this particular commissioner in preference to media outlets with different ideological positions. The concept of a “specified commission” determines the skopos of translation and hence the translation strategy. We can say that the translation shifts we have so far found in the Arabic target texts are part of the translation commission, although Vermeer avoids discussing cases of rewritten texts as encountered in the present study. – The “accountability” or “ethos” of the translator to realize the given goal. Vermeer refines the role of the translator by focusing on her/his ethical part as “co-author” in addition to her/his linguistic skills. This implies the translator’s role in either accepting or resisting the commission, and the way she/he evaluates the surrounding political circumstances of the target society. For instance, Reuters’ translators can tone down the original Reuters English text to show more politeness towards or common ground with the Arabic culture and society, e.g. translating Palestinian leader into Palestinian President or dictator Saddam into late President Saddam. – The “type of recipient”: Here attention turns to the intended addressee-type. Vermeer draws one’s attention to an important issue in translation, namely the possibility of diverting from the source text in goal when the type of recipient is replaced. In our case, we may distinguish between a western audience vs. an Arab audience, who receive without protest the different representations we saw in the above Arabic samples. The translator thus attempts to meet with the specific conditions and communicative needs of the new audience.
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
In addition to aim, action and presupposition of a commission, Vermeer adds other pragmatic notions needed to make the target text functional, such as coherence and effect. In other words, to accomplish a particular communicative goal the target text must be constructed as coherent for the target text recipients, given their conditions and knowledge. However, the aspect of coherence from a cognition-based perspective is not discussed by Vermeer. This issue will be expanded on in a later section. Given that the act of translation is constrained by the commissioned act which the translator accepts and is paid for, and by the purpose of translation, we may conclude that relations of complete equivalence between the ST and the TT in a politically sensitive situation cannot always be fully sought in translation. It all depends on the purpose of translating, i.e. if the target requires full access to e.g. Israeli Prime Minister Tsivi Levni’s full speech, a literal or faithful translation should be performed. And if the target situation requires only the information contained in a ST but without, let’s say, the ST foreign classifications or presuppositions against Arabs, the Arab translator is commissioned to filter and domesticate the foreign source text. In other words, the ST can be viewed as an offer of information which can either be fully reproduced or modified, depending on the purpose of translating. Decisions related to modification depend to a large extent on the ideological content or the ideological schema found in a foreign text. We have already argued that in a news report, sensitive information can be interpreted as evaluative and not factual. Therefore, equivalence at the hegemonic level cannot be implemented by the translator if a faithful reproduction of the foreign text will raise a state of disbelief on the part of the Arab audience, especially when this comes in backgrounded information in a news report. As I have learned from the media editors themselves: “backgrounded information in a news report is a sensitive structure”. Take the following translation of backgrounded information by AFP: ST: Israel says that since its army pulled out of south Lebanon in May 2000 after two decades of occupation, Hezbollah has been working to build a network of collaborators inside Israel and the Palestinian territories. Hezbollah was the forefront of a guerrilla campaign to oust the Israelis. Source: AFP English text, 27 June 2002 TT: BT: Hezbollah resists Israel in Lebanon and Israel accuses it of trying to build a network of spies on its territories since its army pulled out of south Lebanon in May 2002. Source: AFP Arabic text, 27 June 2002 The final background of the English text has been omitted from the Arabic text.
Arab News and Conflict
We have already given adequate linguistic descriptions, semiotic interpretations, and ideological explanations for this phenomenon. What should also be seen at this point is the ideological role of the translation producer of texts about sensitive events, who is fully aware that loyalty to the foreign text can collide with dominant political beliefs in the target situation. As we saw in the above AFP translation, a toning down or a shift in the sensitive representation saves the end product from a protest on the part of the Arab recipients. In this case, the recipients are mainly Arab media editors and journalists, who are more concerned with the informational part of the text, and its relevance in the light of their own existing knowledge of Middle Eastern events. Finally, we may conclude that the ethical role of the translator is seen in examining the truth criteria given in the foreign text. Her or his decision of what needs to be included or excluded results from the dominant and commonsensical beliefs adopted in the target society. As I have learned from the editors, those who perform a translational act (journalists, editors or translators) are powerful participants who are capable of inspecting the source text, rejecting its foreign dictated facts, and are also capable of avoiding its colonial hegemony. Surprisingly, despite the usefulness of the notions of skopos theory in recent translation studies, this theory does not address the ideological factors incorporated in our study. Vermeer (2000) avoids discussion of what he calls “a rewritten text or the like” and remarks that these are beyond his discussion of commission. However, as we can see in our present case, the theory of skopos can be developed in different ways. It can, in fact, provide the critical analyst and translation trainees with many practical answers. Let me put it this way: an awareness of aim and purpose, commission and instruction, type of readership and the receiver’s expectations, and the translator’s accountability can actually aid an enquiry into the ideological function of the translated text and help the translation producer or trainee decide on the appropriate translation technique to follow. Let us next take the skopos theory into wider applications and into political and conflictual contexts ignored by the same theory. I shall provide case studies to illustrate how the notions of skopos theory (aim, purpose, commission, instruction, accountability, and type of audience) contribute to the final shape of the text and its representations of political facts. By representations we mean the shifts in producing another knowledge about the event and a different regime of truth according to a given skopos. Case study 1 is provided by Al-Manar’s editorial team on 12th February 2009, where the English text from Associated Press has been used as a source text (ST) by Al-Manar’s commission; whereas the Arabic text has been used as the final
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
product broadcast for Al-Manar’s audience (TT). The full texts have been segmented and presented in the following order: ST, TT and BT. The leader of Israel’s hard-line Likud Party on Tuesday continued to portray himself as the candidate best equipped to deal with the threats Israel faces. The leader of the Zionist Likud Party continued to portray himself as the candidate best equipped to deal with the threats the enemy’s entity faces. Speaking in the southern city of Beersheba, which has been repeatedly hit by militant rockets from Gaza, Benjamin Netanyahu told reporters that if he was prime minister, he would answer any attack on Israel “with a crushing response.”
Speaking in Beersheba, in the south of Occupied Palestine, which has been repeatedly hit by the rockets of the Palestinian resistance, Benjamin Netanyahu told reporters that if he was prime minister, he would answer any attack on Israel “with a crushing response” according to what he said. Opinion polls for months have predicted a decisive victory for the right-wing former prime minister. But new polls released over the weekend showed the Kadima Party, led by moderate Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, closing the gap. Opinion polls for months have predicted a decisive victory for Netanyahu and the Likud Party. But new polls released over the weekend showed the Kadima Party closing the gap. The two front-runners in the race to rule Israel made last-minute appeals to voters as polls opened on Tuesday in a close general election whose outcome could determine the course of Mideast peace negotiations.
Arab News and Conflict
The two front-runners in the race to rule the enemy’s entity made last-minute appeals to voters as polls opened on Tuesday in a close general election. Some believe that the outcome would determine the course of Mideast settlement. After voting in a balloting branch in TelAviv, Livni called the citizens to follow her step despite the rainy weather which might reduce the number of voters. Addition by Al-Manar from another source of information. Livni was one of the architects of Israel’s punishing offensive against Gaza last month and has been striving to present an image of herself as tough but sensible.
Livni was one of the architects of the aggression on Gaza last month and has been trying to make herself look tough but sensible. Despite the narrow gap between Livni and Netanyahu, polls have predicted that voters will take a sharp turn to the right and elect a parliament dominated by hard-line parties opposed to territorial concessions. Despite the narrow gap between Livni and Netanyahu who cast his vote in Occupied Palestine, polls have predicted that voters will take a sharp turn to the right and elect a Knesset dominated by extremist rightists. That would make it difficult for Livni to form a government even if she wins. That would make it difficult for Livni to form a government even if she wins. Netanyahu opposes ceding land to the Palestinians and favours allowing Israeli settlements in the West Bank to expand, two points that are likely to put him on a collision course with the new US administration.
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
Netanyahu tried in his election campaign to get the citizens on his side by saying that he favours to expand the settlements in the Occupied West Bank. Livni, who hopes to become the first woman to lead Israel in 35 years, has served as chief negotiator with the Palestinians and says a West Bank withdrawal is necessary for Israel’s own security.
Livni, who hopes to become the first woman to lead the Zionist government in 35 years, has served as chief negotiator with the Palestinian Authority and thinks that the possibility of reaching an agreement is more likely if she wins the elections, as she calls for a withdrawal from some of the West Bank lands. Neither is seen getting more than 30 seats in the 120-seat parliament, however, meaning the winner will have to form a coalition with smaller parties. Neither is seen getting more than 30 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, however, meaning the winner will have to form a coalition with smaller parties.
As many Palestinians see no core difference between the Israeli parties, observers see that any coalition with the extremist rightists would undermine the efforts aimed at reaching a settlement in the Middle East and would put Netanyahu on a collision course with the new US administration. Addition and management by Al-Manar. It appears that new ideological readings are constructed while translating. Al-Manar’s skopos demands that the Arabic text should produce an informative text with firm political positions against whom they see as enemy. Thus, the translator can be viewed as an ideological guard, capable of relaying the event while excluding the political views of the Associated Press correspondent. The commissioned act is seen in the different political facts and positions, the different reasons perceived
Arab News and Conflict
behind the Mideast struggle (see threats under cognition in Chapter 5), the different belief systems about the Arab or Israeli participants in this event, the sensitive information which comes in the backgrounded structure of a news report, and the incorporation of additional news coming from Al-Manar’s own correspondents in the Palestinian territories. Explicitly, the commissioned act of translating reflects firm positions stating that: threat always comes from Israel; there is no difference between a centrist or rightist; the core of struggle in not related to Israel’s security, but to its occupation, aggression, and settlement strategies. See for instance how other papers in the Middle East reported this event. The following examples are typical expressions of ideology that would be found in Arab-owned media sources, including the English medium publications. The examples below are ideological readings into this event. Those readings should give the non-Arab reader the reasons we see behind the ideological act in translation, bolded above, an act consistently commissioned in many Arab media outlets whenever conflict intensifies: Ideological reading 1: The Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip for their part said the vote would just produce more of the same. “We don’t differentiate between Zionist leaders as they all committed crimes against our people during many years and are competing to commit more,” said Fawzi Barhum, a spokesman for the group. Source: The Daily Star (Beirut), 11 February 2009 Ideological reading 2: Nasrallah: We have the Right to Possess and Use Aircraft Weapons against Israel Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hasan Nasrallah answered Israel’s threats to attack Lebanon … by saying: We have the full right to possess all kinds of weaponry, including anti-aircraft weapons... pointing there are differences in Lebanon on major political choices… there were more than one choice, one is called the choice of settlement which means to give the enemy concessions to get back some of what the enemy has already usurped from us – we give them settlements on land to give us back a piece of land from here or to repatriate some refugees from there… he said: by going back to the option of settlement we find that when the Arabs grant concessions the Israeli would go for more wars, murder and strings attached… Sayyed Nasrallah emphasized that there was no difference between Labour, Likud, and Kadima regarding their attitudes towards Palestinians and Arabs, stressing that all Zionist parties were the same. Source: Assafir Arabic text, 17 February 2009 By going back to Al-Manar’s translational act in case study 1, we note from a linguistic point of view, that there are new expansions, new perception modalities,
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
and a new collocational system based on the dichotomy of ingroups and outgroups, as laid out in Chapter 6. For instance, observe the new perception modalities in “according to what he said… trying to make herself look tough but sensible… as many Palestinians see no core difference between the Israeli parties”. Other examples are seen in the collocational system “the Zionist Likud party… the enemy’s entity” or the evaluative speech verbs “some believe… she thinks”. These linguistic acts or forms in the target text express the dominant ideological beliefs in the Arab world as illustrated in readings 1 and 2. These linguistic adjustments also arise from the professional aspect whereby every target text has to be revised and edited by Al-Manar senior editors. According to the chief editors interviewed, the new representations in the target text “should be empty from foreign terminology, foreign classifications, and foreign political orientations”. Moreover, the commission requires the journalist who carries out the translation work to refer to additional sources of information if the source text does not give the information or the details that the Arab audience needs to hear, for example, regarding political events or Arab victims. Case Study 2 comprises examples from a film (2009) and from Reuters (18 June 2002). Both examples touch upon the “worthy” vs. “unworthy” victims in the Arab media target texts. Note that the film was watched by a large number of the Arab audience and the Reuters Arabic text was used as a source of information by many Arab media agencies: Example A: The word Jews repeated throughout the Nazi war crime trials in the Oscarnominated film The Reader, 2009. e.g. A: This didn’t happen to the Germans, it happened to the Jews. What are we trying to do? B: We are trying to understand. A: Six women locked 300 Jews in a church and let them burn. What is there to understand? Tell me, I’m asking what is there to understand? The Arabic subtitling of the movie has deliberately omitted any translations to do with the word Jews, thus leaving a different impact on the Arab reader who is not familiar with the English language or the original context.
Arab News and Conflict
Example B: West Bank raid after bus bombing Israeli tanks have entered the West Bank city of Jenin, drawing fire from Palestinian gunmen, after a Palestinian suicide bomber killed 19 Israelis in Jerusalem, witnesses said.
Witnesses: Israel enters West Bank after Tuesday bombing Israeli tanks have entered the West Bank city of Jenin Tuesday evening, drawing fire from Palestinian gunmen, after a suicide attack killed 19 Israelis in Jerusalem, eye witnesses said. Israel’s security cabinet had just ended a meeting called on Tuesday to consider what was likely to be a harsh military response to the morning rushhour bombing, which destroyed a municipal bus filled with schoolchildren and commuters. Israel’s security cabinet had just ended a meeting called to consider what was likely to be a harsh military response to the Palestinian attack which took place on Tuesday morning and destroyed a full bus. Palestinians in Jenin, a stronghold of militants waging a 20-month-old uprising against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, said at least five army tanks and an armoured bulldozer rolled into the city after nightfall.
Palestinians in Jenin said at least five Israeli tanks and an armoured bulldozer rolled into the city after nightfall. The Witnesses said Palestinian gunmen fired at the tanks from inside Jenin’s refugee quarter but the Israelis had not shot back. Two Israeli helicopters as well as F-16 fighter jets were seen over the city, the witnesses said.
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
The Witnesses said Palestinian gunmen fired at the tanks from inside Jenin’s refugee camp but the Israelis had not shot back. Two Israeli helicopters as well as F-16 fighter jets were seen over the city, the witnesses added. They said more army vehicles were approaching Jenin, which like other West Bank cities has been raided repeatedly by Israeli forces in recent weeks in an effort to crush suspected bomber networks that survived an army offensive in April. The army had no immediate comment. They noted more army vehicles were approaching Jenin. The Israeli army had no immediate comment. Again we note that the act of translating avoids channelling the sensitive political positions of the source text into the target text. The Arabic ideological reading does not have the same level of sympathy towards the Israeli victims as found in the English text. This is related to the fact that Arabs commonly believe that their victims killed by Israelis are the worthy victims and that the Arab victims receive no sympathy in world media. Moreover, the Arabic text avoids channelling the authorial discourse over the Palestinians, e.g. the TT eliminates the metaphorical expression in an effort to crush, which in the target situation inferiorizes Palestinians. The Arabic reading also minimizes the incrimination of Palestinians as we see, for instance, in the relexicalization process in the TT (a suicide attack vs. a Palestinian suicide bomber), or the omissions (which destroyed a municipal bus filled with schoolchildren and commuters... a stronghold of militants). The backgrounded information given in the last paragraph in the English text sounds irrelevant to an Arab recipient; hence we note its deletion from the TT. In fact, the Arab audience does not find the reason that bomber networks have caused Israel’s strikes either credible or acceptable. This means that a faithful translation is not an objective as long as the commissioned task requires from the translation producer a text with an informative function combined with less distance from the dominant beliefs of the Arabs. From this case, the ideological role of translation is seen in the commissioned act itself whereby the target producer is entitled to remove the foreign ideological positions or sympathies towards the Jews or Israelis, or the evaluative and interpersonal details related to certain groups, whilst translating a politically sensitive
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event. The shifts we saw in translation are forms of political resistance to an alien media code. This leads to the argument that embedded ideologies with a counterhegemonic code pose a challenge for both translators and translation researchers. Obviously, when a transformation in power is experienced, one should not be surprised to see a transformation in the work of translators. At this point I would like to stress the difference between cultural relations that can be easily bridged in translation and power relations that can pose a challenge to translators. In the case of translation, when it comes to who causes what to whom with what ideological effects in a sensitive context, the translation producer seems to build her decision on the purpose of translating, the commissioned task expected from her, and the audience’s expectations. This decision is intertwined with the contextual constraints of dominant hegemony, undisputed knowledge systems, and the editorial control. Now, the begging question is what translation notions can describe ideological intervention in translation as we saw in the above cases. Many translation theories promote, in principle, a faithful approach to the foreign (whether in both form and effect or in effect only), whatever they may call it: formal or dynamic equivalence (Nida 1964, 2001); semantic or communicative (Newmark 1988, 1996); overt or covert (House 1997); documentary or instrumental (Nord 1991, 2001); foreignizing (Venuti 1998, 1999, 2001); semiotic equivalence (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997); or interpretive (Gutt 2000). But what if the skopos does not require ideological resemblance to the original? The ideological translation method used in the transcreation of socio-political realities Media translations along with their ideological transformations are forms of discourse practice; therefore the target text is a representation that should be studied in its own right. I argued earlier that the recipient whether in the source situation or the target situation is the valid consumer of the political sign. That is, there are specific production and reception regimes involving power relations or ideological presuppositions which are also communicated or legitimized in the source/ target text. Therefore, prescriptive approaches to translation which call for reducing the text to grammatical, semantic or textual units in order to relay the meaning or effect of the original cannot answer the above case studies taken from real-life translations. I have also argued that the new representations reflect what the producer, her elites and her audience believe to be true about the cause of political struggle in the Middle East. Hence, the new representations will be relevant to the Arab audience when they do not raise a protest from them. This communicative effort between the translation producer and the audience involves a “cognitive use”
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whilst processing. Therefore, a cognition-related account for translation should be next addressed. Descriptive translation or interpretive translation? The transformations in the Arabic target texts are usually described by the media producers either as “relevant”, as “our perspective of objectivity” or as “true descriptions” of a politically sensitive event. It all comes down to the reasons believed to be true about a conflict, or to who is “worthy” in a particular struggle and in which moment in history. It also comes down to group-membership criteria and preferred cognitive models which organize a society’s interpretation of an event. As explained, the ideological content of a sensitive political report can be actually interpreted by another media producer as evaluative and not factual or probably irrelevant to “Our” beliefs and collective and historical experiences. Indeed, quite often, media productions worldwide seem to act on the basis of the mythical and symbolic dimensions of power (see mythical meaning in Chapter 2). So when translation has to take place between two different claims to truth, the translator finds herself involved, in the sense that she has to make her target text relevant to the translation purpose, her ideological surroundings, and to the dominant beliefs of her target audience. Viewed in this light, our investigation promotes an inquiry into a cognitionbased account of translation. We need to see how relevance is achieved in the translational act, and what type of relevance can in fact describe the ideological intervention in translation. Ernst-August Gutt’s (2000) theory of Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context is another seminal work in recent translation studies. It can, for our case, describe the kind of relevance used in the translation of the ideological content. Gutt’s theory can also help describe the translation strategy used in the transcreation of socio-political reality. Chapter 4 discussed Gutt’s pragmatic approach that builds on Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) notion of relevance. The theory basically states that one observes relevance by achieving maximum benefit at minimum processing cost for the intended audience. So, how does the target text achieve relevance? Gutt relates this to two different uses, descriptive and interpretive. According to Gutt, the “descriptive use” relates to entertaining thoughts descriptively “in virtue of their being true of some state of affairs” (Gutt 2000: 58). Namely, how one truthfully describes the real world by representing her/his own views and committing to their political truth, for instance, how Al-Manar represents the Palestinian fighter as martyr is intended to communicate in its own right without representing the views or the thinking of the foreign text producer.
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Looking into the practice of translation, Gutt distinguishes a descriptive use of translation where the target text is intended to survive on its own without the target audience’s awareness of the original. If we revisit Case Study 1, we note the audience of Al-Manar are not aware of the existence of an Associated Press text that has its own evaluation, ideological position, and naming strategies (e.g. Israel… the Kadima party led by moderate Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni… for Israel’s own security… peace negotiations). The description of entities and events can therefore be presented descriptively by the Manar translator and the editor, in the sense that the political narration is combined with the firm ideological position of the target situation, believed to be true on this politically sensitive event. The translation with the descriptive use of the Kadima party without led by moderate, the omission of Israel’s own security and the replacing of peace negotiations with settlement, or Israel with the Zionist government, is intended to communicate in its own right. The new representation will be thus more beneficial, felicitous, and accepted by Al-Manar’s large audience. The descriptive use in translation can describe what many journalists and translators would call “a translation that would take into consideration the political facts lived in the Arab society”. Given the constraints of hegemony and commonsense, power relations, editorial control, audience and market forces, it can be said that a translation strategy which follows a descriptive use can avoid political clash in the target situation, create different political realities in the TT, and shape the readers’ reactions or reading positions. The “interpretive use” relates to entertaining thoughts interpretively “in virtue of the interpretive resemblance they bear to some other thoughts” (Gutt 2000: 58). Namely, how one faithfully represents or conveys the thinking or the political position of the Associated Press reporter above. Looking into the practice of translation, the study of an interpretive use of translation has to examine, for instance, whether a translation faithfully represents the events and the views of the original Associated Press text; namely, how the translation communicates the “intended interpretation of the original text”. In our case, we may conclude that the interpretive resemblance (if found) is merely used by Al-Manar within the narration context but not within the evaluative context. This is seen in the resemblance to the narration of events as reported by the original Associated Press producer, e.g., Benjamin Netanyahu continued to portray himself as the candidate best equipped to deal with the threats… speaking in the Beersheba which has been repeatedly hit by rockets, Benjamin Netanyahu told reporters that if he was prime minister, he would answer any attack on Israel “with a crushing response”… Despite the narrow gap between Livni and Netanyahu, polls have predicted that voters will take a sharp turn to the right… Livni who hopes to become the first woman to lead in 35 years has served as chief negotiator …
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These examples show that there is an interpretive use or what Gutt calls a “direct translation” where in this second case the Al-Manar text resembles the original factual event. Here, we can note that the direct translation is used by the Manar producer only when it is void of her or his political intervention. In other words, we are talking about resemblances between texts in terms of events and in terms of narration. Let us then hypothesize that translating for the media in times of conflict will resort to the interpretive use if it does not entail an ideological cost in the target readership. Of course, this matter inherently depends on the skopos or purpose of translating. Although Gutt (2000) favours in all cases “an interpretive translation” that resembles the original in both meaning and value, his useful insight on the use of translations (i.e. descriptive vs. interpretive) can enhance an investigation of the numerous facets of the translation strategy adopted in times of conflict, as the examples and discussion above have shown. Let us next identify and conclude the actual use observed in the final products of ideological translations which transcreate different political realities. This will be done by measuring these translations against the intended degrees of resemblance with the source texts in terms of two possible forms of ideological intervention in translation. In the first case, the ideological intervention happens when an interpretive translation is used merely to resemble factual events in the original text, for instance, in informing the audience about a specific political event, the participants in the event, what they said, what processes took place, when and where, i.e. narration or information without ideological evaluation. In the second case, the ideological intervention happens when a descriptive translation is used to present faithfully the values, the hegemonic views or ideological positions of the target text participants (i.e. TT editors, TT producer and TT audience). This happens through: editorial replacement of ideological descriptions or judgements; omissions of what is irrelevant or non-credible to the target recipients; additions of what is relevant or what the target audience needs to hear; or the restructuring of themes and backgrounded information. In many cases, we observed that descriptions of Palestinian violence or terrorism interpretively resemble the thoughts or ideological assumptions of western institutions. But such claims made by English AFP/Reuters reports are intended to achieve their own hegemonic interpretations in the source environment. This is why the Arab producer refuses to channel them innocently (i.e. interpretively). For instance, when we read in an AFP Arabic translation: Israel will start building on Sunday a security fence separating it from the West Bank to thwart Palestinian operations… vs.: Israel will start building on Sunday a massive security fence along the West Bank to thwart Palestinian attacks (AFP English), we can say that in media translation the translators
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do not commit fully to the values found in foreign media propositions. Although an AFP Arabic text would still strive more than the Manar text to achieve resemblance with the AFP English text, descriptive translation remains a safe option to many journalistic translators from different affiliations. Moreover, let us conclude that all transformations in the TT that happen in the textual practices illustrated in Chapter 6 are mentally entertained as true choices by the text producer. The ideological role of the translator seen through the descriptive use of translation leads to new debates on ideology and cognition in translation studies. It is clear that, in some cases, promoting a specific descriptive use by the target commission seems to achieve optimal political benefits in the target situation. This is a phenomenon that should not be sidelined by translation studies. Only by studying it from a critical point of view, can we begin to understand more about daily translations in the media. This calls into question the prescriptive approaches that advocate a particular translation strategy or techniques determined only by the facts of the original. Hence, my last question is: what translation model can be observed in the translation of ideologically motivated texts? A scheme for analysing ideological translations The contribution of translation theories Most translation theories address the issue of fidelity in translation. There are seminal works which advocate this approach to translation. Take House’s model of “translation quality assessment” (1997) which represents a refined approach to the study of equivalence in translation. Her contribution, like many other studies, directs attention to Halliday’s ideational, interpersonal and textual functions of language that should be heeded in translation (see Chapter 2). That is, the translator has to characterize a primary language function in the ST in order to produce functional equivalence in the target language. From House’s perspective, the ideational component tends to be equated with a “referential” or an “informational text function”, i.e. when information flow becomes a priority. On the other hand, the interpersonal component tends to be equated with a “non-referential” or “involved text function”, i.e. reflecting “the author’s own involvement” in the text, such as the emotive or metaphoric use in the text. House’s model is prescriptive in the sense that it guides the translator to characterize the overall function of the ST; to realize the related register varieties of field, mode and tenor; and to set up a comparison of original and translation to locate changes in register (e.g. formality) or critical mismatches in the interpersonal function, i.e. original author’s stance or intention. House remarks that the
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
stance of the ST author should not be altered in the target situation, and that changes are allowed only to bridge cultural differences. House’s linguistic model is an extremely useful route to the trainee translator because this model sets basic comparisons of two texts in terms of the lexical and syntactic means as well as the textual means (e.g. coherence and theme) that realize the situational parameters of genre, register and language function. House’s model can also guide the trainee in assessing the author’s stance and social attitudes that should be communicated in translation. In my view, this is fine as long as the skopos requires a faithful approach to the source. But how can such a prescriptive approach explain a toning down of a Reuters Arabic translation, for instance, dictator Saddam into late Iraqi President or a recurrent translation strategy that predictably deletes from the TT metaphorical descriptions inferiorizing the Palestinians or their leaders such as Israeli forces penned Arafat in; to root out suicide bombers? To House, shifting is merely allowed to provide the clear content of the original. Cases of a descriptive use, as we saw in the above case studies, would be described by House as a “version”, a “covert error” or “other textual operations”. House believes that they are inadequate translations, because the translator must follow the interpersonal stance of the original. Therefore, a translation phenomenon that involves interpersonal shifts to serve the ideologies or publishing trends of the target text situation falls outside the scope of this normative approach. As House clearly puts it: “a theory of translation quality assessment is not into the business of postulating marketing motives, publishers’ power, best-seller aspirations” (House 1997: 165). If ideological intervention in translation leads to what House calls “errors” or “unwarranted results”, then how can we develop translation studies into wider socio-political contexts? Another prescriptive approach is seen in Nord’s “text analysis in translation” (1991). Nord’s approach affords a further useful insight for the analysis of discourse. This model brings to the fore another functionalist aspect of the translation activity and incorporates more elements of source text analysis. Nord (1991, 1997) suggests the consideration of different contextual or “extratextual factors” that give the text its function and make it meaningful for its receiver in the ST or TT. Here, the analyst or the trainee translator should investigate the instructions given to the translator by her/his commissioner, compare the profiles of ST and TT to see where they might diverge, and address the following concerns: who is the text sender; what is the intended text function (e.g. to inform or appeal); the addressees and their expectations that make communication successful; the medium (newspaper, TV or internet); place and time, where differences could be important; and motive.
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Furthermore, Nord makes reference to the role of the source-text analysis which in our case is important to consider because as Nord puts it “ the source text provides the offer of information that forms the starting point for the offer of information formulated in the target text” (Nord 1997: 62). In text analysis Nord draws attention to what she terms “intratextual factors” that can reveal the functional priorities in the text which lead to special effects. These include content, subject matter, presuppositions, textual construction, lexical means or syntactic orders, for example, thematic organization, choice of lexis, clefting or the adding of necessary details to relay ST presuppositions. Nord’s model of text analysis is very fruitful since it identifies some of the ways in which the comparative analysis between the source and the target can be informed and empirically investigated both at the functional and textual levels. However, this model remains prescriptive in that it sees the translator’s role constrained within a process of “inter-cultural communication” that basically builds on “loyalty” to the source culture. In this respect, Nord distinguishes between “documentary vs. instrumental” translations. In documentary translation the translator produces a document that allows the target recipient access to the exotic culture and ideas of the ST and where the reader is aware that it is a translation. In instrumental translation, the TT recipient reads the TT in a different form without being aware that it was produced for a different ST reader. However, Nord’s conception of loyalty states that in both types of translation the translator remains loyal to the source, and that even when adaptive procedures have to be followed this should be merely for semantic or cultural clarifications. To Nord, shifting becomes “instrumental” only when it achieves comprehensibility in the target culture at the levels of language and register. In other words, her model, designed for the training of translators, basically seeks “language and culture proficiency” (Nord 1997: 78) dressed up with target culture conventions. Again, this does not answer questions on power relations or ideological presuppositions that are also brought to bear on the translator’s final decision. For instance, Nord’s concern would be on how to translate an Arabic expression seen in Al-Manar into English, e.g. In this case a documentary translation would be: Thus, this village joins its Palestinian likes oppressed (and secluded) under occupation; whereas an instrumental translation that is more comprehensible to the English reader would be: Thus, this village joins similar Palestinian villages secluded under occupation.
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
The above illustration shows that the translator’s concern, according to Nord, will be on how to achieve comprehensibility to the target reader. The notions of ideology and power relations are obviously not subsumed into Nord’s analysis. Her two prescriptive strategies cannot describe the ideological act in translation seen in the case studies above. Another prescriptive discourse-oriented approach is adopted by Hatim and Mason (1990, 1997) and Hatim (1997, 2001b). Hatim and Mason’s critical-discourse-analysis-related framework can be applied to both the practice and analysis of translations which again seek loyalty to the original. Their methodology considers a wider network of contextual activity that impinges on the textual process of translation. They draw attention to stylistic variation that should be appropriate to a given situation, e.g. vocabulary choices, level of formality, and the mode of communication. Hatim and Mason draw equal attention to pragmatic elements such as the text producer’s intentions, presuppositions, speech acts, implicatures or the level of politeness. Politeness is addressed in the sense that the translator has to pay attention to, e.g., the “journalistic neutrality” where she maintains distance with her audience in an expository text type, rather than showing a high degree of evaluation which can “obliterate” the identity of the expository text type. Nevertheless, one may disagree with Hatim and Mason’s view that a face threatening act happens only at the level of mismatch in neutrality or in formality. We have already seen that face threatening acts are the result of hegemonic systems, solidarity vs. enmity relations and editorial control. A face threatening act resulting from language incompetence or from using emotive style in a formal report is not the whole issue. Furthermore, Hatim and Mason distinguish another dimension which they term “semiotic”, they note: Adding a semiotic dimension to field of discourse (the experiential component of context) relates it to genres and their conventions. Similarly, tenor (the interpersonal component of context) relates to discourse as an expression of attitude. Finally, genre and discourse find expression in texts through the textual component of context. (Hatim and Mason 1990: 75) To simplify the above statement, the semiotic construct embodies the conventions and cultural presuppositions generated between people in different cultures. Here, they suggest that the translator has to be attentive to what the foreign language can do, how the whole text is structured and with what rhetorical or attitudinal
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intention. In this respect one may consider two further contextual dimensions, genre and discourse within their semiotic meaning: “Genre”: the translator’s awareness of a conventionalized type of text or a communicative event established by ST or TT conventions. Encoding a genre must reflect in the ST or TT what is appropriate to a given social occasion and the purposes of the participants (e.g. the genre of the news report vs. the genre of the scientific report on Al-Manar TV). We can argue here that the professional journalist/translator has no problem with the composition of a news report. In fact, genres are realized, as we have seen, through the descriptive use in reporting in addition to the conventionalized compositional structure. For instance, the use of special perception modalities, the consistent categorization in vocabulary, the incrimination of particular outgroups are the elements which characterize the genre of a political news report by a media outlet. “Discourse”: the translator’s awareness of attitudes such as bias, ideology, power relations, point of view, detachment or emotiveness in text production which have to be preserved in the target text. Hatim and Mason further explain that this broad semiotic activity (cf. our semiotic study in Chapter 2) ultimately yields a specific text type with a predominant function or “rhetorical purpose”. Examples of these could be: instruction e.g. legal text types; detached exposition, e.g. news reporting; or argumentation, e.g. an editorial. In this way, text typology is determined by formality or neutrality in representation, or by intentions of argumentations which in each case the translator has to relay “untainted”. According to Hatim and Mason, detached or unemotive exposition requires a literal translation technique, whereas evaluative or argumentative texts require text management and a freer technique in translation. In both cases, the translator should seek to achieve in the TT equivalent intended effects, and the same rhetorical purpose. In these cases, the analyst has to compare the intentions, power relations, ideational and interpersonal meanings between the ST and the TT and the way they are brought to bear on the “micro-analysis” of the text, i.e. text structure and texture. But this leaves unresolved the issue of the translator’s decision to avoid relaying the rhetorical purpose of the producer of the ST “untainted” into the TT, as we have been observing through the transcreation of socio-political realities in the target situation. According to the reality found in our case studies, relaying appropriate effects of the communicative or intentional dimensions of the original does not seem to be a problem for the professional translators who work for AFP, Reuters, Al-Jazeera or Al-Manar, for example. We can hence hypothesize that media translators dealing with sensitive texts are well aware of the ST level of formality, intention and values, yet still allow a counter-hegemonic reading to creep into the TT. Let us then confirm that the translator’s role in media translation is not merely
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constrained by her or his linguistic competence in both languages, nor in her or his ability to understand and bridge cultural or ideological gaps as defined by the above traditional approaches to translation. I find prescriptive approaches to translation similar to the models of House, Nord, Hatim and Mason, useful only to translation students, interpreters in conferences, or to those who seek a very faithful approach to translation for a specific purpose. Thus, in order to study ideological translations, attention can be turned to a descriptive approach to discover more facts about political contexts and text strategy. This will allow us to widen our application of translation theories. A descriptive methodology invites the analyst to give detailed description and explanation of actual translations, as we have done in the above case studies. A descriptive approach would focus on the norms in the target system which constrain the translator’s choices, as well as the forces of a historical period, rather than on what is in the ST. A descriptive approach tends to examine the recurrent preferences which translators show and without necessarily wishing to impose on the facts of the target system. For reading on descriptive and target-oriented approaches see Holmes 2000; Toury 2000; Hermans 1999. On the target orientation and the translation of ideology, Lefevere (1992) provides us with a productive line of inquiry. In particular, his conception of translation as “rewriting” takes into consideration the ideological pressures or power exercised in the target culture. One of the examples given by Lefevere is the translation into German by Annaliese Shütz, of the diary of Ann Frank (a Dutch Jewish schoolgirl in hiding with her family during the Second World War). Lefevere explains that the translator has deliberately manipulated the original text via the “ideological omissions” of insults, the toning down of the plight of the Jews and the manipulation of adjectives of insults, emotional terminology and descriptions (e.g. puts against the wall vs. shoot) in order to avoid political offence and to sell well in Germany. According to Lefevere: Faithfulness is just one translational strategy that can be inspired by the collocation of a certain ideology with a certain poetics… Translated texts as such can teach us much about the interaction of cultures and the manipulation of texts. These topics, in turn, may be of more interest to the world at large than our opinion as to whether a certain word has been properly translated or not. (Lefevere, 1992: 51) In other words, analysis of this kind of translation will give the world an idea about the firm beliefs of the target society members, their humanity, the way they think of self and other, the censorship or power exercised by the news makers, and the
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ideological role of the translator who contributes to the reproduction of her/his identity and culture. Take next the contribution of deconstruction and postcolonial theories to the study of ideology in translation. Such theories account for the colonial context that marginalizes the image and language of the “Other”, i.e. invaded nations or conquered cultures (Robinson 1997 and Davis 2001). Deconstruction addresses the interplay of forces or power relations that actually operate around ideologically motivated translations – i.e. western texts vs. “third world” texts. According to this approach, postcolonial translators are invited to use translation as a strategy to resist the colonizer’s imposition of ideological values upon the real identity or experience of the Third World (ST) literature, thus, adding an element of ethical responsibility towards understanding the situation and language of the Wholly Other and against predetermined and hegemonic decisions by the dominant. The approach of this postcolonial translation theory, as seen in the work of Niranjana, Spivak, Cheyfitz (see Robinson 1997, Gentzler 2001, Munday 2001), argues that literary translations from invaded cultures (e.g. Indian/Bengali into European languages) have failed to translate the real image of natives from the colonized East because the translator assimilates the differences of their views to suit the norms of western empires, for instance, giving the speech of local characters in a translated novel from Punjab into English accents or registers similar to what is found in urban North America. The advocates of this approach argue that translation should not channel this western colonization, but should communicate these differences which reflect the original’s identity, history or the image of indigenous cultures, i.e. using translation as a tool of decolonization. In other words, this approach prefers a translation strategy akin to literalism to allow western readers access to “third world” source texts without political decidability or interference from “colonial” or “western” discourses. Furthermore, postcolonialists distance themselves from translation strategies that privilege assimilation, manipulation, a rewriting process and thus from a descriptive approach as found in our case studies. At first glance, this approach might seem outside the scope of our case study as it encourages translations to come to terms with the foreign text, specifically the literary one. However, the usefulness of this approach is seen in its investigation of the hegemonic contexts that underlie final productions in translation. Paradoxically, the discourses of the less powerful nations may happen to fall at the target pole as is the case in the present study and not merely at the source pole. Therefore, let us argue that a hegemonic approach should investigate the ideology, power relations, image or energy found in each text, whether in the SL or in the TL in order to understand more facts about warring societies and about issues of political authority and power.
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Having seen that translation theory in its different facets provides partial answers to our case study of media translation and conflict, we now need to set up a new model for the analysis of politically sensitive texts in translation. A new model for the analysis of translation in times of conflict My proposed model of analysis is not prescriptive. It summarizes the major factors as well as the text strategies to be considered during the translation of ideologically motivated texts in the media. The suggested model can be referred to by media translators or analysts when comparisons have to be made with a foreign text, or when translation decisions have to be made. As for decision-making, the model will summarize how decisions are made or can be made on translations in times of conflict. The tables which suggest models useful to the analysts can be also used for another purpose by the translators, in making a clear decision about what they will actually relay to the target text. Of course ideological transformations can be undertaken because translators are informed professionals, but they ought to be equally aware of this critical process which leads to critical translation outputs. Finally, our model will show the translation outcome or strategy that best describes ideological work in translation. The phases involved in this process are summarized in Tables 7.1 (i) – 7.1(iv): Table 7.1(i) Phase 1a) Identify the following factors in both ST and TT: – The dominant and legitimized political positions – The “legal” vs. “illegal” subjects – The “worthy” vs. “unworthy” victims – “Our” enemy – Relations of solidarity vs. relations of hostility – The suppressed or discredited voices – Authorial stance and relations of dominance over what subjects – The generalized and undisputed beliefs on cause of threat/struggle – Reasons given behind acts of violence – Whose political face is being threatened without redress – Backgrounded information about the victims or about “the enemy”
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Table 7.1(ii) Phase 1b) Identify the following text strategies in the text: – The preferred transitivity system – The cause and effect provided in the circumstantial or expansion element – Number of affected participants in the material processes – Reason behind the use of a relational process – The recurrent themes – The foregrounded themes – Agency and presuppositions in the recurrent/marked themes – The perception modality – The modalized vs. unmodalized statements – Mood tag/tag questions in statements, obligations, or inclinations – The modulated obligations, polite obligations vs. coercive obligations – The evaluative adverbs – The modal adjuncts – The modal quantifiers – Cohesion through categorized and predicted vocabulary, repetition, and synonymy – Overlexicalization vs. underlexicalization – Nationality attribute – Representative vs. expressive speech acts – The indirect speech acts – Metaphors with (-) human domains – Conditional vs. unconditional directives – Face threatening acts and politeness strategies (negative or positive) – Quotations with maximum interpretive resemblance – Attitudinal vs. neutral reporting verbs
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Table 7.1(iii) Phase 2 The translator’s decision is/can be made according to the following factors: – The translator’s awareness of the above factors and text strategies even though she/he may not describe them exactly as we did in this book – The translator’s own hegemonic and cognitive systems as explained earlier – The translator’s sympathies with the “worthy” vs. “unworthy” victims – The translator’s political or national affiliations – The translator’s critical and professional skills in choosing target language vocabulary and structure – Editorial control – Collective culture surrounding the translator at work – The translator’s accountability in her own media society – The translator’s intended communicative function with the target audience – Politeness towards ingroups and politeness in language to meet market demands – Market forces – The type of audience and the audience’s expectations – The relevant information required by the audience with the least ideological cost – The additional sources of information made available to the translator from other media agencies – The purpose and aim of a translation
Table 7.1(iv) Phase 3 Translation Output: – Interpretive: a translation resembling the ST ideological evaluation and intended interpretation; or – Descriptive: a translation surviving on its own, having its own ideological evaluation
Once the translator has made a decision on whether to adopt an interpretive vs. descriptive use in translation, it will be easier to decide on a translation method. If the translator adopts an interpretive use in her translation in both content and evaluation, she can with her experience opt for what translation theorists call a covert, overt, foreignized, communicative, documentary, semiotic, or direct translation, etc., as long as the TT has the same ideological function and the same ideological effect. Moreover, the above factors and texts strategies outlined in the above model are effective in two ways: The factors and text strategies of the foreign can either be followed to produce full ideological, cognitive, and communicative equivalence in terms of the legitimate, credible and pragmatic functions; or the translator can scroll through the list merely to ensure that foreign hegemony has not been relayed into the target text.
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Conclusion We have noted that the forms of political resistance to an alien media code can be legitimized and built into the translation commission itself, thus achieving the effects preferred by both the target elites and their target audience. A target text is thus a text laden with ideological, legitimate, cognitive, as well as pragmatic meanings channeled to a target audience. This brought us to the question of loyalty, where loyalty was found to fall in a decision-related area which depends to a large extent on the commissioned task, the purpose of a translation, and the cognitive activity of the translator and her audience. Although the field of translation studies has recently focused on ideology, power relations, cognition and relevance, and critical language awareness in translation, it has been difficult to see how any of these studies to date can empirically investigate a politically sensitive discourse in media translations. It is also difficult to see how these studies can adequately describe its common text strategy which can influence the reading position of the audience. Many approaches to translation are somewhat prescriptive in nature, in that they tend to measure the target text against the degree of linguistic, cultural, pragmatic or semiotic correspondence with the source text. On the other hand, the descriptive and target-oriented approaches to translation which can in fact help provide ideological insights have lacked critical discourse analysis models as we have seen in our critical language analysis in Chapter 6. Furthermore, translation studies on cognition/ relevance have sidelined the descriptive use of translation and the fact that, as we have seen throughout this chapter, its study can lead to important ideological conclusions about people’s way of thinking, reasons behind struggle and conflict, and most importantly the role of language in reproducing dominant ideologies or in shaping people’s minds. Translation has its moral rules, as well, according to the Arab editors and thinkers. As they commonly believe: let us not only translate literally, but look at the same phenomenon from two perspectives, study the foreign in its original context, know its implications, then create our own representations as we see them morally right – from our viewpoint. This does not mean that we are not open to the Other, but rather involves real openness neither totally submitting to the Other nor rejecting it completely.
Chapter 7. Media translation and conflict
Discussion The generalizations reached in our conclusions on the text strategies that can describe and categorize ingroups vs. outgroups feed into wider sets of ethical and ideological issues in media studies. Journalists, news editors or political speakers whose discourses reach the public through the mass media should be able to benefit somehow from the suggested analyses in this book. The linguistic tools are so powerful because they can either legitimate or de-legitimate the discourses of the “Other”. Another way forward would be to investigate further constraints such as religion, other institutional apparatuses, or other cognitive dimensions that influence our daily discourses and interpretations of political events. Also, the critical language tools to investigate politically sensitive discourses are not all-encompassing. Other linguistic tools can be deployed to test ideological content in language. Certainly, an imperative area to be investigated is the visual or image effects attached to politically sensitive texts. Let me finally say that news representations in “our” media society might appear objective, realistic, legitimate, attractive or commonsensical to us and the issue of replacing them might seem so critical and dangerous, especially if it touches upon our homeland, security, or identity. But now there is an open invitation for the analyst to question how representations are coined and to investigate the reason behind their coinage and repeated use in their historical context. We now have the tools to ask questions such as: How were they originated and by what source? Who markets the representations we read and accept unquestioningly? Who channelled the imposition of certain words on us? What are the moral implications behind them – are they defensive or do they have hidden expansionist programmes? Are we actually victims of words and structures imposed on us by our own media institutions? Why do we follow them and would we actually believe in them if we realised that they distort our consciousness of violent events or beliefs about innocent victims? And finally: Should media manufacturers or politicians be the sole legitimizers of our daily discourses? Politics can indeed, through language, influence the mind of the targeted populace. Through engaging in the critical analysis of specific types of ideological discourse we can question and challenge aspects of political control particularly the way it can be reproduced in any media society.
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Index A accountability 131–3, 188 activity of reader 35 actor 79–81 affected participant 80, 82, 137, 145, 169, 174 AFP 7–8, 103 agentless actor 80–1, 145, 176 Al-Jazeera 7 Al-Manar 6–7, 10–11, 103, 131 Al-Mustaqbal 8 Althusser, L. 47–8 Arab peace initiative 2 Arab-Israeli conflict 1–3, 8–9, 32, 48, 51, 55, 63, 122 Assafir 8 assertives 94, 170, 172–5 assumptions 89, 99, 124, 130, 136, 158, 176, 179, 180 see also presuppositions attributes 91, 98, 114, 140, 145, 165 audience 39, 198 see also type of recipient, reception regimes B back translation 10–11, 185, 191 background knowledge 99, 124–6, 129, 137, 189, 194, 197 backgrounding 81, 145 Barthes, R. 28, 32–5 bias 15, 19, 38, 39, 53, 60, 74–6, 82, 131 binary oppositions 30–1, 37, 56, 60, 82, 90 C categorization 37, 39, 56, 87, 90–1, 135, 146, 164 cause of struggle 34, 35, 80, 81, 88, 90, 125–30, 140, 145, 160 see also reasons for conflict Chomsky, N. 52, 55, 64, 68
circumstantial element 36, 79, 81, 137, 145 coherence 78, 89, 91, 145, 189 collective memory 51, 125, 199 commands 85, 92, 149 common sense 27, 50–2, 87, 91, 99, 122, 160, 165 communicative function 21, 78, 92, 95, 131, 133, 135, 168, 176, 188 conditional vs. unconditional act 94, 170, 176 connotation 33, 36, 91, 164, 169 consensus 40, 53–5 conventional code 16, 19, 20, 34, 38 cooperative principle 93–4, 174, 176 counter-hegemonic reading 62, 111, 198, 206 credibility 15, 25, 38, 54, 55, 75, 76, 78, 81, 98, 122, 123, 129, 135, 176, 180, 197 critical discourse analysis 5, 9, 71–2, 75, 77, 102, 213 customary discourse 20 D decidability 40–2 derogatory style 75, 91 Derrida, J. 40–2 descriptive approach to translation 186, 207, 209, 212 descriptive use 79, 100, 176, 206 descriptive use of translation 200, 202, 211 dialogic interaction 120, 133, 135, 155, 156, 162 see also communicative function, perception modality discourse 3–5, 9, 24, 54, 84, 89, 92, 95, 102, 117, 135, 144, 155, 164, 168, 206 distance 97–8, 116, 145, 156, 172, 175, 179
domination 24, 47, 50, 53, 108, 135 E enemy 26, 36, 56, 60, 63, 68, 132, 135, 194 evaluative 56, 60, 77, 135, 154, 164, 179, 189, 197, 199, 200 evaluative conjunction 160, 162 event process 79, 145 expansion 36, 61, 81, 89, 137 see also circumstantial element expressives 92, 168, 171, 173 F face-threatening act 95, 168, 171, 175, 205 Fairclough, N. 4–5, 72–4, 99, 145 faithful translation 197, 198, 202, 207 see also loyalty in translation false consciousness 47 finite element 83, 149–50 foregrounded agent 25, 81, 82, 114, 137, 145, 159 foregrounded theme 87–9, 157–64 foregrounding 39, 76, 81, 145, 158, 164 Foucault, M. 3–4 functional linguistics 23, 78, 150, 164 functional meaning 17, 18, 21, 38 G generalized opinions 123–6, 135 genre 206 Gramsci, A. 50–1 group schema 60–2, 75, 77, 90, 91, 165, 181 see also binary oppositions, categorization Gutt, E. 100–1
Arab News and Conflict H Halliday, M. A. K. 21–3, 78–91, 144, 147, 150, 161, 164, 202 hegemonic classifications 90, 167 Hodge, R. and Kress, G. 4, 18, 23–6, 72, 77, 87, 145 I ideational meaning 22, 23, 78, 79, 136 ideological assumptions 73, 189 ideological translation 190, 193, 197, 202, 209 illegal subjects 113, 145, 158 illocutionary act 93, 168, 172 inclination 82, 85, 127, 149, 152 incrimination 36, 82, 91, 137, 145, 197 indirect speech act 93, 168–76 informative text 132, 153, 176, 190, 197, 201 interpersonal meaning 22, 23, 78, 79, 83, 136, 147 interpretation 19, 25, 87, 99, 146, 158, 165, 199 interpretive use 79, 101, 176 interpretive use of translation 200–1, 211 Intifada 2 involvement of text producer 153, 176, 202 see also dialogic interaction, expressives, presuppositions, perception modality J Jakobson, R. 23, 37 judgmental process 144, 146 L legitimate context 46, 49, 56, 70, 107, 135 Lévi-Strauss, C. 28, 37 lexical classification 87, 165 logonomic system 24 loyalty in translation 186, 189, 190, 203–5, 212 M manufacture of consent 53, 106, 187 markedness 15, 37–9, 89, 90, 158 market forces 53, 54, 130, 200, 203
metaphorical structure 91, 117, 118, 165, 171, 174, 176, 197 modal quantifier 86, 153 mood adjunct 86, 153 mood tag 83, 149 mythemes 28, 31 N naturalization 27, 34, 35, 40, 43, 48, 51, 75 negative politeness 96, 170–6 nominalization 81, 137, 145, 161 O others 5, 9, 10, 42, 58, 60, 69, 98, 208, 212 objective 131, 199, 213 obligation 83, 85, 150, 152 overlexicalization 91, 165 P paradigmatic 17, 18, 27, 37, 38 Peirce, C. S. 19–20 perception modality 85, 86, 150–6, 195 perlocutionary act 93 positive politeness 96–7, 169–76 power relations 74, 87, 97, 118, 135,150, 156, 168, 171, 186, 198, 204, 208 pragmatic meaning 19, 79, 130, 133, 135, 189 pragmatics 78, 92, 95, 99, 101, 137, 168, 176 preferred reading 62, 82, 90, 133, 164, 165 prescriptive approach to translation 202–7, 212 presuppositions 51, 62, 92, 99, 125, 171, 189 processing effort 99, 125, 177, 181, 199 production regimes 24, 107, 133, 187, 198 proposal 83, 85, 150 proposition 83, 85, 154, 156, 179, 180 R reasons for conflict 2, 27, 55, 58, 68, 82, 122, 128, 197 reception regimes 25, 197, 198 relevance 15, 20, 49, 76, 87, 99, 162, 174, 176–81, 190, 197, 199 reliability 26, 156
reproduction 47, 49, 91, 105 resistance 42, 45, 55, 56, 62, 105, 108, 198 Reuters 7–8, 103, 131 reversible time 28, 32, 122, 155 S Saussure, F. de 16, 21, 32 selective quotation 172, 173, 177, 179 semantic 22, 90, 92, 137, 164, 171, 174 semiological system 34–5, 40 signified 16, 33–5, 169 signifier 16–19, 28, 34, 35, 38 skopos 187–98, 201, 203 solidarity relations 24, 96, 98, 121, 135 source text 8, 11, 185, 190, 204 speech acts 92-4, 168, 175 subject positioning 4, 47–9, 73, 111 subjective interpretation 15, 20, 37, 38, 70, 123, 135 subjectivity 47, 155, 177 superiority relations 94 sympathy relations 64, 68, 69, 94, 95, 114, 135, 153, 168, 172, 176, 197 syntactic 17–18, 75, 92, 129, 137, 145 syntagmatic 16–18, 26 T target text 8, 11, 185, 187, 191, 195, 198 text strategy 10, 55, 78, 137, 177, 181–2 textual meaning 23, 27, 78, 79, 87–8, 90, 136, 157 type of recipient 188, 190, 195, 198 U underlexicalization 91, 165 unmarked form 39 unmodalized assertion 155–6 V Van Dijk, T. A. 4, 60, 74–7, 99, 165 voice of others 120, 132, 179, 181 W Wodak, R. 5, 72
In the series Discourse Approaches to Politics, Society and Culture the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 34 Bazzi, Samia: Arab News and Conflict. A multidisciplinary discourse study. 2009. xiv, 222 pp. 33 Hogan-Brun, Gabrielle, Clare Mar-Molinero and Patrick Stevenson (eds.): Discourses on Language and Integration. Critical perspectives on language testing regimes in Europe. 2009. xiii, 170 pp. 32 Ramsay, Guy: Shaping Minds. A discourse analysis of Chinese-language community mental health literature. 2008. ix, 149 pp. 31 Johnstone, Barbara and Christopher Eisenhart (eds.): Rhetoric in Detail. Discourse analyses of rhetorical talk and text. 2008. viii, 330 pp. 30 Powers, John H. and Xiaosui Xiao (eds.): The Social Construction of SARS. Studies of a health communication crisis. 2008. vi, 242 pp. 29 Achugar, Mariana: What We Remember. The construction of memory in military discourse. 2008. x, 246 pp. 28 Dolón, Rosana and Júlia Todolí (eds.): Analysing Identities in Discourse. 2008. xi, 204 pp. 27 Verdoolaege, Annelies: Reconciliation Discourse. The case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 2008. xiii, 238 pp. 26 Millar, Sharon and John Wilson (eds.): The Discourse of Europe. Talk and text in everyday life. 2007. viii, 200 pp. 25 Azuelos-Atias, Sol: A Pragmatic Analysis of Legal Proofs of Criminal Intent. 2007. x, 180 pp. 24 Hodges, Adam and Chad Nilep (eds.): Discourse, War and Terrorism. 2007. ix, 248 pp. 23 Goatly, Andrew: Washing the Brain – Metaphor and Hidden Ideology. 2007. xvii, 431 pp. 22 Le, Elisabeth: The Spiral of ‘Anti-Other Rhetoric’. Discourses of identity and the international media echo. 2006. xii, 280 pp. 21 Myhill, John: Language, Religion and National Identity in Europe and the Middle East. A historical study. 2006. ix, 300 pp. 20 Omoniyi, Tope and Joshua A. Fishman (eds.): Explorations in the Sociology of Language and Religion. 2006. viii, 347 pp. 19 Hausendorf, Heiko and Alfons Bora (eds.): Analysing Citizenship Talk. Social positioning in political and legal decision-making processes. 2006. viii, 368 pp. 18 Lassen, Inger, Jeanne Strunck and Torben Vestergaard (eds.): Mediating Ideology in Text and Image. Ten critical studies. 2006. xii, 254 pp. 17 Saussure, Louis de and Peter Schulz (eds.): Manipulation and Ideologies in the Twentieth Century. Discourse, language, mind. 2005. xvi, 312 pp. 16 Erreygers, Guido and Geert Jacobs (eds.): Language, Communication and the Economy. 2005. viii, 239 pp. 15 Blackledge, Adrian: Discourse and Power in a Multilingual World. 2005. x, 252 pp. 14 Dijk, Teun A. van: Racism and Discourse in Spain and Latin America. 2005. xii, 198 pp. 13 Wodak, Ruth and Paul Chilton (eds.): A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis. Theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity. 2005. xviii, 320 pp. 12 Grillo, Eric (ed.): Power Without Domination. Dialogism and the empowering property of communication. 2005. xviii, 247 pp. 11 Muntigl, Peter: Narrative Counselling. Social and linguistic processes of change. 2004. x, 347 pp. 10 Bayley, Paul (ed.): Cross-Cultural Perspectives on Parliamentary Discourse. 2004. vi, 385 pp. 9 Richardson, John E.: (Mis)Representing Islam. The racism and rhetoric of British broadsheet newspapers. 2004. xxiii, 262 pp. 8 Martin, J.R. and Ruth Wodak (eds.): Re/reading the past. Critical and functional perspectives on time and value. 2003. vi, 277 pp. 7 Ensink, Titus and Christoph Sauer (eds.): The Art of Commemoration. Fifty years after the Warsaw Uprising. 2003. xii, 246 pp. 6 Dunne, Michele Durocher: Democracy in Contemporary Egyptian Political Discourse. 2003. xii, 179 pp. 5 Thiesmeyer, Lynn (ed.): Discourse and Silencing. Representation and the language of displacement. 2003. x, 316 pp.
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Chilton, Paul and Christina Schäffner (eds.): Politics as Text and Talk. Analytic approaches to political discourse. 2002. x, 246 pp. Chng, Huang Hoon: Separate and Unequal. Judicial rhetoric and women's rights. 2002. viii, 157 pp. Litosseliti, Lia and Jane Sunderland (eds.): Gender Identity and Discourse Analysis. 2002. viii, 336 pp. Gelber, Katharine: Speaking Back. The free speech versus hate speech debate. 2002. xiv, 177 pp.
