Antisystemic Movements

Antisystemic Movements •

GIOVANNI ARRIGHI, TERENCE K. HOPKINS & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

VERSO

First p u b l i s h e d by Verso 1989 © 1989 G i o v a n n i Arrighi, T e r e n c e K. H o p k i n s & I m m a n u e l W a l l e r s t e i n All rights reserved Verso U K : 6 M e a r d Street, L o n d o n VV1V 3 H R U S A : 29 W e s t 35th Street, N e w Y o r k , NY 10001-2291 Verso is the i m p r i n t of N e w Left Books British L i b r a r y C a t a l o g u i n g i n P u b l i c a t i o n D a t a Arrighi, G i o v a n n i Antisystemic movements 1. E c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s . Sociological perspectives I. Title. II. H o p k i n s , T e r e n c e III. Wallerstein, I m m a n u e l 1930306'.3 I S B N 0-86091-249-3 I S B N 0-86091-964-1 P b k

T y p e s e t by L e a p e r & C a r d L t d , Bristol, E n g l a n d Printed in G r e a t Britain by Bookcraft (Bath) Ltd

To our colleagues, in memonam: A q u i n o d e Bragan^a R u t h First Georges H a u p t Walter Rodney

Contents

Acknowledgements Introduction 1

R e t h i n k i n g the C o n c e p t s of Class a n d S t a t u s - G r o u p in a World-Systems Perspective

ix 1

3

2

D i l e m m a s of Antisystemic M o v e m e n t s

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3

T h e Liberation of Class Struggle?

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4

1886-1986: Beyond H a y m a r k e t ?

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5

1968: T h e Great Rehearsal

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References

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Index

119

Acknowledgements

T h i s set of essays is the fruit of a collaboration of m a n y years a n d primarily of o u r joint participation in the a n n u a l International Colloquia on the W o r l d - E c o n o m y sponsored by the F e r n a n d Braudel C e n t e r for the S t u d y of Economies, Historical Systems, a n d Civilizations; the Maison des Sciences de L ' H o m m e ; a n d t h e S t a r n b e r g e r Institut zur Erforschung Globalen Strukturen, Entwicklungen, u n d Krisen. T h e first four essays were presented respectively at the IVth C o l l o q u i u m , New Delhi, J a n u a r y 4 - 6 1982; the V l t h C o l l o q u i u m , Paris, J u n e 4 - 5 1984; the V l l t h C o l l o q u i u m , Dakar, M a y 2 0 - 2 2 1985; a n d t h e V H I t h C o l l o q u i u m , M o d e n a , J u n e 14-16, 1986. T h e last p a p e r was given at the X l l t h Political E c o n o m y of t h e W o r l d System Conference, held at E m o r y University, Atlanta, M a r c h 2 4 - 2 6 1988. All five essays have been previously published a n d are reprinted with permission; Essay 1 - Review, VI 3, W i n t e r 1983; Essay 2 - Social Research, LIII 1, Spring 1986; Essay 3 - Review, X 3, W i n t e r 1987; Essay 4 - Review, X I I 2, Spring 1989; Essay 5 - in T. Boswell, ed., Revolution in the World-System, Greenwood Press, Westport, C T , 1989. ix

Introduction

T h e concept of antisystemic m o v e m e n t s is one which p r e s u m e s an analytic perspective a b o u t a system. T h e system referred to here is the world-system of historical capitalism which, we argue, has given rise to a set of antisystemic movements. It is the contours of this process that we are proposing to outline here. We are in search of the system-wide structural processes that have produced certain kinds of m o v e m e n t s a n d which have simultaneously f o r m e d the constraints within which such m o v e m e n t s have operated. T h e m o v e m e n t s have h a d their o w n m o d e of selfdescription. This self-description emerged largely out of categories that were formulated or crystallized in the nineteenth-century capitalist world-economy. Class a n d status-group were the two key concepts that justified these m o v e m e n t s , explained their origins a n d their objectives, a n d indeed indicated the b o u n d a r i e s of their organizational networks. T h e c o n t e m p o r a r y d i l e m m a s of these m o v e m e n t s are part a n d parcel of the same p r o b l e m as the d i l e m m a s of the concepts of class a n d status-group. T h a t is why we felt that

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we could not analyze the movements, either historically or prospectively, without first rethinking t h e s e two concepts from a world-systems perspective. We shall not repeat in this introduction t h e a r g u m e n t s that a r e to be found in the articles. We would merely like to suggest that if the structural processes that gave birth to these m o v e m e n t s have been world-scale from the beginning, the organizational responses hitherto have been predominantly at t h e level of the various states. It is because we believe that new organizational responses will begin to surface that will be m o r e world-scale that we think it urgent, not only for theory b u t for praxis, to reexamine the patterns a n d the degree of success of t h e world-system's antisystemic movements heretofore.

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Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group in a World-Systems Perspective

In his well-known b u t often neglected conclusion to Book I of The Wealth of Nations, A d a m Smith defined the interests of "the three great, original and constituent orders of every civilized society," that is, those who live by rent, those who live by wages, a n d those who live by profit (1961: I, 276). His a r g u m e n t was that t h e interests of the first two orders coincide with the general interest of society because, according to his analysis, t h e real value of b o t h rents a n d wages rises with the prosperity a n d falls with the economic decline of society. T h e interests of profit earners, on the other hand, a r e different from, and even opposite to, such general social interest, because to widen the m a r k e t a n d to n a r r o w the competition are always in t h e interest of m e r c h a n t s a n d m a n u f a c t u r e r s . A n d , while to "widen t h e market m a y frequently be agreeable e n o u g h to the interest of t h e public; . . . to n a r r o w t h e competition m u s t always be against it, a n d can serve only the dealers, by raising their profits above w h a t they naturally would be, to levy, for their own benefit, an a b s u r d tax u p o n the rest of their fellowcitizens" (1961:1, 278). Profit-earners not only have an interest contrary to t h e

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general one. They also have a better knowledge of their interest a n d a greater power and d e t e r m i n a t i o n in p u r s u i n g it t h a n those w h o live by either r e n t or wages. T h e indolence of landowners, "which is the n a t u r a l effect of the ease and security of their situation, renders t h e m too often, not only ignorant, b u t incapable of that application of m i n d w h i c h is necessary in order to foresee a n d u n d e r s t a n d the consequences of any public regulation" (1961: I, 276-7). As for the wage-earner, "he is incapable either of c o m p r e h e n d ing the general social interest, or of u n d e r s t a n d i n g its connection with his own" (1961: I, 277). Moreover, in the public deliberations, "his voice is little h e a r d and less regarded, except u p o n some particular occasions, w h e n his c l a m o u r is a n i m a t e d , set on, a n d s u p p o r t e d by his employers, not for his, b u t their own particular purposes" (1961: I, 277). Profit-earners, on the o t h e r h a n d , particularly those who employ the largest a m o u n t of capital, draw to themselves by their wealth the greatest share of the public consideration. Moreover, since d u r i n g their whole lives they are engaged in plans and projects, they have a m o r e acute u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their particular interest t h a n the other orders of society. The Wealth of Nations being a work of legislation, the p u r p o s e of this "class analysis" was to warn the sovereign against the dangers involved in following the advice and yielding to the pressures of m e r c h a n t s and master m a n u facturers. As the h e a d of the national h o u s e h o l d , he should instead strengthen the rule of the m a r k e t over civil society, thereby achieving the d o u b l e objective of a m o r e efficient public administration a n d a greater well-being of the nation. It is not our p u r p o s e here to assess t h e s o u n d n e s s of the advice given by Smith to the national h o u s e h o l d e r or of the substantive analysis on which it was based. R a t h e r , we want to point out those aspects of his analysis that can be considered as4 paradigmatic of political e c o n o m y and that we

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group can find duplicated in c o n t e m p o r a r y class analyses. First, the tripartite social order of which he spoke was a predicate of a particular kind of society; that defined by the territorial reach of a definite sovereign or state. T h e s e were the states of E u r o p e as they had been a n d were being formed within mutually exclusive d o m a i n s operating within an interstate system. Second, his social orders (or classes) were defined on the basis of property relations. T h e ownership of land, of capital, and of labor-power define his three great orders of society. A m o n g the proprietors of capital, w h a t some today would call a "fraction" of capital ( m e r c h a n t s and m a s t e r m a n u f a c t u r e r s ) is singled out for special t r e a t m e n t in view of its political-economic power, of its greater self-awareness of its own interests, and of the opposition of its interests to the general social well-being. T h i r d , t h e interests of each of t h e social orders/classes were identified with its market situation; that is, both their competitive opportunities in relation to each other as classes (and of individuals within each class to each other), and the costs and benefits to each of t h e m of m o n o p o l y p o w e r within markets, u n d e r s t o o d as restriction of entry. In The Wealth of Nations, Smith limited the subjective g r o u n d of collective action by a class to these market interests. M o n o p o l y power in the p r o d u c t as well as in factor markets was traced back to the creation of tolerance of restrictions to entry on the part of the sovereign/state. F o u r t h , market relations were defined within or between national economic spaces. Class conflicts a n d alignments were thus limited to struggles within each state for influence/control over its policies. T h e unit of analysis, in other words, was t h e nation-state, which d e t e r m i n e d both the context a n d the object of class contradictions. Fifth, a "relative a u t o n o m y " of state actions in relation to class interests and powers was presupposed. T h e e n a c t m e n t of laws a n d regulations by the state was continuously traced

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to the powers and influence of particular classes or "fractions" thereof. But the sovereign was a s s u m e d to be in a position to distance himself from any particular interest to p r o m o t e some form of general interest, reflecting a n d / o r generating a consensus for this general interest. If we contrast this analytical framework with that associated with K a r l M a r x ' s critique of political economy (that is, of Smith a n d other classical economists), we notice two consequential shifts of focus: a shift away from state-defined economic spaces to world-economic space on the one h a n d , a n d a shift away from t h e marketplace to t h e workplace on the other. T h e first shift implied that the m a r k e t was no longer seen as enclosed within (or " e m b e d d e d " in) each nation-state as an i n d e p e n d e n t economic space, a n d that the worldeconomy was no longer conceived of as an interstate economy linking discrete national e c o n o m i c spaces. Rather, nation-states were seen as jurisdictional claims in a unitary world market. By effecting the socialization of labor on a world scale, the world market d e t e r m i n e d the most general context of the class contradictions and therefore of the class struggles of capitalist society, which M a r x defined by its constitutive orders, the bourgeoisie a n d the proletariat: T h e m o d e r n history of capital dates f r o m the creation in the sixteenth century of a w o r l d - e m b r a c i n g c o m m e r c e a n d worlde m b r a c i n g m a r k e t (1959: 146). T h i s m a r k e t has given an i m m e n s e d e v e l o p m e n t to c o m m e r c e , to navigation, to c o m m u n i c a t i o n by land. This d e v e l o p m e n t has, in its turn, reacted on the extension of industry; a n d in proportion as industry, c o m m e r c e , navigation, railways extended, in the s a m e proportion the b o u r geoisie developed, increased its capital, a n d p u s h e d into the b a c k g r o u n d every class h a n d e d d o w n from t h e M i d d l e Ages (1967: 81).

T h i s was not a m e r e m a t t e r of trade relations between sovereign states. Rather, the developing bourgeoisie 6

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to a d o p t the b o u r geois m o d e s of p r o d u c t i o n ; it compels t h e m to i n t r o d u c e what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., to b e c o m e bourgeoisie themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its o w n image (1967: 84).

T h e world so created was characterized by a highly stratified structure of d o m i n a t i o n a n d h a d m o r e than m a r k e t interests as subjective grounds for collective action: J u s t as it has m a d e the country d e p e n d e n t on the towns, so it has m a d e b a r b a r i a n a n d s e m i - b a r b a r i a n countries d e p e n d e n t on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of b o u r geois, the East on the West (1967: 84).

T h e second shift implied that the a n t a g o n i s m between the two great classes into which, according to M a r x , bourgeois society as a whole tends to split, the bourgeoisie a n d the proletariat, was no longer traced to relations in the p r o d u c t or factor m a r k e t s b u t to relations in p r o d u c t i o n . In o r d e r to define the interests of the nation a n d of its c o m p o n e n t classes, Smith took leave of the pin factory whose scenario opens The Wealth of Nations to follow the interplay of supply a n d d e m a n d in the marketplace, a n d of class interests in the national political arena. M a r x in his critique of political economy took us in the opposite direction. We take leave not of the shopfloor but of the noisy sphere of the marketplace (and, we may add, of the political arena) "where everything takes place on the surface a n d in view of all m e n , " a n d follow the o w n e r of the m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n a n d the possessor of labor p o w e r "into the h i d d e n a b o d e of production, on whose threshold there stares us in the face 'No a d m i t t a n c e except on b u s i n e s s ' " (1959: 176). In this h i d d e n a b o d e of production, M a r x discovered two quite contradictory tendencies that implied two quite different scenarios of class struggle and social transformation. T h e first was t h e one generally e m p h a s i z e d in Marxist

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literature after M a r x : even if we a s s u m e that in the m a r k e t p l a c e the relationship between t h e owners of the m e a n s of production a n d the owners of labor-power appears as a relationship between equals, in t h e sense that the commodities they bring to t h e m a r k e t tend to exchange at their full cost of p r o d u c t i o n / r e p r o d u c t i o n (which, of course, is not always or even normally t h e case), the relationship would still be a f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n e q u a l one. T h i s is so because of the longer-run effects of capitalist production on the relative value a n d the relative bargaining power of capital a n d labor. Capitalist p r o d u c t i o n , that is, is seen as a process that tends to r e d u c e t h e value of laborpower (its real costs of reproduction) a n d simultaneously to u n d e r m i n e the bargaining power of its possessors, so that the advantages of the reduction of labor's costs of reproduction tend to accrue entirely to capital. T h i s tendency obviously poses p r o b l e m s of realization of the growing mass of surplus labor that capital appropriates in production. T h e s e p r o b l e m s periodically manifest t h e m selves in crises of overproduction that are overcome on the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by c o n q u e s t of new markets, a n d by the m o r e t h o r o u g h exploitation of the old ones. T h a t is to say, by paving the way for m o r e destructive crises, a n d by d i m i n i s h i n g the m e a n s w h e r e b y crises are prevented (1967: 86).

It would seem from the above that t h e u n e q u a l relation between labor a n d capital, continuously r e p r o d u c e d and e n h a n c e d in the workplace, leads capital either to selfdestruction in the m a r k e t p l a c e or to a greater development of the world-economy, b o t h extensively (incorporations) a n d intensively. Given a finite globe, the m o r e t h o r o u g h this development, the greater the self-destructiveness of capital. In this scenario labor plays no role in precipitating capitalist crises except in a negative sense; it is its growing 8

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group subordination in the workplace, a n d c o n s e q u e n t weakening of bargaining power in the marketplace, t h a t are ultimately responsible for the outbreak of t h e " e p i d e m i c of overproduction," as M a r x called it. Labor, or its social personification, the proletariat, plays an active role only in transforming the self-destructiveness of capital into political revolution. T h e increasing precariousness of working a n d living conditions induces proletarians to form c o m b i n a t i o n s against the bourgeoisie. N o w a n d then the workers are victorious, b u t only for a time. T h e real fruit of their battles lies, not in the i m m e d i a t e result, b u t i n the ever-expanding u n i o n o f the workers . . . . T h i s organization of the proletarians into a class, a n d conseq u e n t l y into a political party, is continuously being u p s e t again by the competition b e t w e e n the workers themselves. B u t i t ever rises u p again, stronger, firmer, mightier . . . . A l t o g e t h e r collisions b e t w e e n the classes of the old society f u r t h e r , in m a n y ways, the course of d e v e l o p m e n t of the proletariat. T h e bourgeoisie finds itself involved in a c o n s t a n t battle. At first with the aristocracy; later on, with those portions of the bourgeoisie itself, whose interests have b e c o m e antagonistic to the progress of industry; at all times, with the bourgeoisie of foreign countries. In all these battles it sees itself c o m p e l l e d to a p p e a l to the proletariat, to ask for its help, a n d thus, to drag it into the political a r e n a (1967: 90).

Alongside this scenario, however, as we indicated, M a r x suggested a n o t h e r one, quite distinct in its unfolding. Both in the Manifesto a n d in Capital we a r e told that, along with t h e growing mass of misery, oppression, a n d degradation, the strength of the working class grows too, not so m u c h as a result of political organization aimed at counteracting its structural weakness, but rather as a result of the very process of capitalist production. A l o n g with the constantly d i m i n i s h i n g n u m b e r of the m a g n a t e s of capital . . . grows the mass of misery, oppression,

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slavery, degradation, exploitation, b u t with this too grows the revolt of the working-class, a class always increasing in n u m b e r s , a n d disciplined, united, organized by, the very m e c h a n i s m of the process of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n itself (1959: 763). T h e essential condition for the existence, a n d for the sway of the b o u r g e o i s class, is the formation a n d a u g m e n t a t i o n of capital; the condition for capital is wage labor. W a g e l a b o r rests exclusively on competition between the laborers. T h e advance of industry, whose involuntary p r o m o t e r is the bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the laborers, d u e to competition, by their revolutionary c o m b i n a t i o n , d u e t o association. T h e development of M o d e r n Industry, therefore, cuts f r o m u n d e r its feet the very f o u n d a t i o n on which the bourgeoisie p r o d u c e s a n d a p p r o p r i a t e s p r o d u c t s (1967: 93—4).

Here, therefore, the strengthening of labor in the workplace is the cause of the crisis of capital. As we know, M a r x never m a n a g e d to reconcile these two contradictory tendencies that he discovered in t h e a b o d e of production, let alone to work out fully a n d systematically all their implications for the analysis of class contradictions in capitalist society. Instead, Marx, in s o m e of his historical writings, a n d m a n y followers in their theoretical writings, gave up t h e critique of political e c o n o m y a n d reverted to the Smithian p a r a d i g m of class analysis, reviving rather t h a n carrying out the critique of political economy. In the case of M a r x , this retreat is most evident in his writings on the class struggle in France, in which class interests were defined in t e r m s of a national politicaleconomic space, a n d w h a t goes on in the a b o d e of production simply does not c o m e into the p i c t u r e at all. Obviously, M a r x himself t h o u g h t t h a t the shift of focus he was advancing to analyze t h e overall, long-term tendencies of capitalist society h a d a limited relevance for the concrete analysis of a concrete instance of class struggle at a relatively low stage of development of such tendencies. 10

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group Moreover, even at the theoretical level, the shift of focus away from the noisy sphere of political e c o n o m y did not imply any belittlement of t h e nation-state as the m a i n locus of political power, that is, of t h e m o n o p o l y of the legitimate use of violence over a given territory. T h i s p o w e r e m b o d i e d in nation-states, whatever its origins, could obviously be used, and has indeed generally been used, simultaneously in two directions: as an aggressive/defensive i n s t r u m e n t of intra-capitalist competition in the world-economy, a n d as an aggressive/defensive i n s t r u m e n t of class struggle in national locales. T r u e , the growing density a n d connectedness of world-economic networks on the one h a n d , and the displacement of class contradictions from the marketplace to the workplace on the other, would ultimately m a k e nation-states "obsolete" from both points of view. In outlining this tendency, however, M a r x was only defining t h e situation that t h e capitalist world-economy would asymptotically approach in the very long r u n . T h e farther the class struggle was from the projected asymptote, the m o r e it would take on a political/national character. Even the proletariat, the class which in his view h a d neither country n o r nationality, h a d first of all to wage a national struggle: Since the proletariat m u s t first of all acquire political s u p r e m a c y , m u s t rise to be the leading class of the nation, m u s t constitute itself the nation, it is, so far, itself national, t h o u g h not in the bourgeois sense of the word (1967: 102).

M a r x ' s empirical retreat into political e c o n o m y did not, however, entail a corresponding retreat at the theoretical level. It simply implied a recognition of the distance separating the historical circumstances of nineteenthcentury E u r o p e from the asymptotic circumstances projected in the Manifesto a n d in Capital. Far more than this was implicit in the retreat into/revival

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A ntisystemic Movements of political e c o n o m y by Marxists after M a r x , however. T h e most striking characteristic of t h e theories of finance a n d m o n o p o l y capital, of imperialism a n d of state capitalism, that begin to develop at t h e t u r n of t h e century a n d are later synthesized in canonical f o r m by Lenin, is that they take us back to the noisy sphere of political economic relations. T h e i r m a i n concerns are t h e forms of capitalist competition, a n d t h e class contradictions identified are those defined in terms of market interests a n d state power. However m u c h such formulations m a y or m a y not be justified in terms of the political strategies of the time, we are concerned here with their elevation by epigones into theoretical advances r a t h e r t h a n pragmatic retreats f r o m M a r x ' s critique of Smithian political economy. This theoretical retreat into political economy h a d some justification in the tendencies that c a m e to characterize the capitalist world-economy a r o u n d the t u r n of the century. T h e growing unity of t h e world market presupposed by M a r x ' s p a r a d i g m a t i c shift began to be u n d e r m i n e d by t h e re-emergence of state protectionist/mercantilist policies. These policies increasingly transferred world capitalist competition f r o m t h e realm of relations a m o n g enterprises to t h e realm of relations a m o n g states. As a consequence, w a r a n d n a t i o n a l / i m p e r i a l autarky c a m e to the fore a n d in p r a g m a t i c t e r m s shaped t h e scenario of t h e world-economy. C o n n e c t e d with this tendency, t h e high concentration a n d centralization of capital, characteristic of most of the new l e a d i n g / c o r e sectors of economic activity, led to a resurgence of practices, often backed by state power, that restricted competition within the national/imperial segments into which the world-economy was splitting. States thus r e t u r n e d to the forefront of world-economic life, and monopoly in and through the sovereign b e c a m e once again the central issue a r o u n d which conflicts a n d alignm e n t s a m o n g classes a n d fractions thereof revolved. This situation, which has broadly characterized t h e first half of

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Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group the twentieth century, undoubtedly warranted a revival of political economy as the most relevant theoretical framework for the short- or medium-term analysis of class contradictions and conflicts. We should not be surprised, therefore, to find that the conception of class conflicts and alliances advanced by Lenin fits better theoretically into the Smithian than the Marxian paradigm: the monopoly power of a "fraction" of capital (finance capital and large-scale industry, as opposed to Smith's merchants and master manufacturers employing large capitals) is singled out as the main determinant of waste and exploitation as well as of inter-imperialist rivalries and war (the enmity among nations, in Smithian parlance). It follows that all "popular classes," including the nonmonopolistic fractions of capital, can be mobilized by the party of the proletariat (the "new prince," as Gramsci would have said) to wrest political power from the monopolistic fractions of capital — a prescription analogous to Smith's suggestion that the enlightened sovereign could count on the support of all other orders of society in pursuing the general interest against the particular interest of large merchants and manufacturers. This, however, is not all that was involved in the theoretical retreat of Marxists back into political economy. Monopoly capitalism and imperialism were not treated for what they ultimately turned out to be — cyclical resurgence of mercantilist policies connected with the crisis of British world hegemony and with intensifying tendencies toward overproduction. If they had been treated in this way, the retreat into political economy would have merely implied a recognition of the fact that the path leading the capitalist world-economy to the ideal-typical asymptote envisaged in Marx's critique of political economy was characterized by cycles and discontinuities that could increase, even for relatively long periods, the distance separating historical circumstances from such an asymptote. Instead, 13

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monopoly capitalism and imperialism were theorized as t h e highest a n d final stage of the capitalist world-system, that is, as themselves representing the asymptote. In this way, M a r x i s m as canonized by Lenin has c o m e to be perversely identified as (and therefore with) political economy. W e b e r ' s writings on processes of g r o u p formation in the m o d e r n world a r e u n d o u b t e d l y a m o n g t h e most extensive available. For present purposes we limit o u r attention to his highly influential contrast of classes a n d status-groups (Stande). T h e contrasted categories were at once an advance over the class analysis projected by M a r x a n d a retreat from it. They were an advance because of t h e juxtaposition of status-group formation to class formation. T h e y were a retreat because of the restriction of the processes, a n d t h e resulting elemental forms of social structure, to existent "political c o m m u n i t i e s " (which " u n d e r m o d e r n conditions . . . a r e 'states'") (1968: 904). We require in our work on m o d e r n social change the kind of juxtaposition W e b e r constructed. But in o r d e r to have it, we n e e d to free it from the assumptions he m a d e . A n d , in order to do that, we need to examine those assumptions. M o d e r n sociology would have us believe that W e b e r w r o t e an essay on class, status, a n d party. He did nothing of the sort. It would f u r t h e r m o r e have us believe that he juxtaposed class and status-group as two separate dimensions of something called stratification in m o d e r n societies, both in t u r n separate from t h e state (construed as t h e realm of "parties"), which he also did not do. We then m u s t first set to one side these imposed readings in order to see what W e b e r did do, and so allow ourselves to e x a m i n e the a s s u m p t i o n s he did make. T h i s preliminary exercise can fortunately be quite brief. In the Roth-Wittich edition of Economy and Society (Weber, 1968), C h a p t e r IX in P a r t T w o is entitled "Political C o m m u n i t i e s . " T h i s c h a p t e r is provided with six sections, each titled, the sixth of which is entitled, " T h e distribution 14

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group of power within the political c o m m u n i t y , " a n d subtitled, "class, status, party." It is this section of this c h a p t e r t h a t appears in H a n s Gerth a n d W r i g h t Mills, Essays from Max Weber (1946) as itself a "chapter" (there, C h a p t e r VII) with its subtitle, "class, status, party," as its full title. As s o m e o n e once said, m u c h m a y be lost in translation. 1 For W e b e r in C h a p t e r IX of Economy and Society, t h e r e w e r e two a n d only two possible basic ways for t h e distribution of power in political c o m m u n i t i e s (that is, in the m o d e r n world, states) to be structured: it can be either classstructured or status-group-structured. F o r "power" (undifferentiated here) to be class-structured, the factual distribution of goods a n d services within t h e political c o m m u n i t y or state in question m u s t be market-organized. If so, or in so far as it is so, the distribution of life chances a m o n g the m e m b e r s of the political c o m m u n i t y (and others in its territory) is d e t e r m i n e d by their relative position ("class situation") in the organizing complex of market relations, the basic categories of which are "property" a n d "lack of property." Alternatively, for "power" to be statusgroup-structured, t h e factual distribution of goods and services within t h e political c o m m u n i t y or state in question m u s t be prestige-organized. If so, or in so far it is so, t h e distribution of life chances a m o n g t h e m e m b e r s of the political c o m m u n i t y (and others) is d e t e r m i n e d by their m e m b e r s h i p ("status situation") in t h e organizing complex

1. W e b e r scholars will k n o w that most h e a d i n g s in the R o t h - W i t t i c h edition were provided not by W e b e r b u t by t h e editors of t h e writings c o m b i n e d to form Economy and Society. T h e key s e n t e n c e s f r o m the section u n d e r discussion are for present purposes two: T h e structure of every legal order directly influences t h e distribution of power, e c o n o m i c or otherwise, within its respective [political] c o m m u n i t y (1968: 926). N o w : "classes", "status groups", a n d "parties" are p h e n o m e n a of the distribution of power within a [political] c o m m u n i t y (1968: 927).

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of honorifically r a n k e d c o m m u n a l groups, t h e basic categories of which are "positively esteemed" a n d "negatively esteemed." W h i l e depicted as if positively different, a class-structured distribution of power within a political c o m m u n i t y differs f r o m a status-group-structured distribution only in one governing respect, namely, whether the distribution of goods a n d services is effected t h r o u g h m a r k e t relations (— "class-structured") or instead t h r o u g h non-market relations (= "status-group-structured"), that is, residually. 2 T h e two stated elemental ways in which a given political c o m m u n i t y m a y be socially structured, then, were for W e b e r central categories to use in tracing historically t h e rise of the market — that is, the historical displacement by m a r k e t relations of any a n d all other kinds of social relations t h r o u g h which the "factors" of p r o d u c t i o n are recurrently b r o u g h t together, the resulting p r o d u c t s are "circulated," the e m b o d i e d surpluses are "realized" a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d , a n d the material m e a n s of subsistence are "distributed." To t h e extent that relations a m o n g status-groups organize a n d mediate these flows, the market (the complex of market relations) does not, a n d classes in his terms are u n f o r m e d . To the extent that the m a r k e t organizes the flows, status-group relations do not, a n d status-groups are u n f o r m e d (or better, "eroded," since the historical transformation from feudalism to capitalism in E u r o p e u n d e r p i n s t h e contrast). Still, even given the one-dimensionality of the distinction, it retained in its elaboration a m a t t e r of central importance, that of an sich/fiir sich derived from M a r x . W e b e r m a d e use of it in a particular m a n n e r . Classes in relation to one a n o t h e r , in a given political c o m m u n i t y , are an sich by definition b u t n o t thereby fur sich. H e r e he followed quite 2. It is not until Polanyi (in The Great Transformation [1957] and subsequent writings) gave positive content to "non-market forms of integration" that this residual category began to receive systematic conceptual elaboration. 16

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group u n a m b i g u o u s l y the p r e - M a r x conventional political econ o m y , seeing i m m e d i a t e class interests as given by m a r k e t position a n d h e n c e as theoretically i n d e t e r m i n a t e , so far as collective action is concerned, w h e t h e r it be directly in relation to other classes or indirectly t h r o u g h their relation to the a p p a r a t u s of the political c o m m u n i t y (state). T h e o retically, s o m e t h i n g in addition to class interests m u s t be introduced if o n e is to a c c o u n t for (continuous) collective class action a n d so therefore for its absence. In contrast, status-groups in relation to one a n o t h e r are by definition groups, definitionally endowed with t h e capacity to act collectively in relation to one a n o t h e r a n d to act on their respective behalfs in relation to the state. T h e definitional difference was not arbitrary for W e b e r . A political c o m m u n i t y entails by construction "value systems" (1968: 902), in accordance with which its constituent elements have m o r e or less legitimacy, prestige, a n d so on, in comparison with o n e a n o t h e r , a n d with reference to which they have m o r e or less pride, solidarity, or capacity to act collectively in relation with o n e another. A statusg r o u p structuring of the distribution of power, because the constituent groups are arrayed honorifically by rank, confers on each m o r e or less prestige a n d pride, a n d t h r o u g h that, the solidarity a n d capacity to act collectively in relation to one another. A class structuring of this distribution of power, in contrast, because of t h e m a r k e t principle — which, in its operations for W e b e r , either eliminates all considerations of h o n o r from its relations or is constrained in its working by t h e m — provides its constituent classes with no necessary solidarity in their relations with one a n o t h e r , a n d hence no necessary capacity for collective action in or on these relations. In short, a n d to go a bit beyond W e b e r in this s u m m a r y , status-groups are constituents of a n d thereby carriers of a m o r a l order, in D u r k h e i m ' s sense. Classes are n o t ; if they b e c o m e so, it is by virtue of processes f u n d a m e n t a l b u t different f r o m , a n d 17

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not entailed in, those that constitute them as classes in relation to one another.3 All of this is subject to the very strict proviso that we are examining the possible social structurings of the distribution of power within a constituted political community, a state under modern conditions. Weber himself, however, earlier opened up the possibility of freeing the contrasted categories of class and status-group from this highly constraining premise of their construction. In Section Three, headed "Power, prestige and the 'Great Powers,'" he asserted that states in relation to one another "may pretend to a special 'prestige,' and their pretensions may influence" the conduct of their relations with one another. "Experience teaches," he continues, that claims to prestige have always played into the origins of wars. Their part is difficult to gauge; it cannot be determined in general, but it is very obvious. The realm of "honor," which is comparable to the "status order" within a social structure, pertains also to the interrelations of political structures (1968: 911; italics added). But extending the scope of stratifying processes,4 so that 3. Weber's one theoretical claim in this section, Section Six of the Chapter "Political Communities," reads thus: As to the general economic conditions making for the predominance of stratification by status, only the following can be said. When the bases of the acquisition and distribution of goods are relatively stable, stratification by status is favored. Every technological repercussion and economic transformation threatens stratification by status and pushes the class situation into the foreground. Epochs and countries in which the naked class situation is of predominant significance are regularly the periods of technical and economic transformations. And every slowing down of the change in economic stratification leads, in due course, to the growth of status structures and makes for resuscitation of the important role of social honor (1968: 938). 4. We have departed from Weber's use of "stratification." For a provisional and programmatic formulation of the concept, "stratifying processes," see Hopkins & Wallerstein (1981).

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Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group their operation within the interstate system of t h e worldeconomy is " c o m p a r a b l e " to their suggested operation within one of its units (a political c o m m u n i t y , w h e t h e r sovereign state or colony), runs into deeply serious difficulties. An illustration of this claim is all that t i m e a n d space here permit. W e b e r , in a " f r a g m e n t " on " T h e M a r k e t " ( C h a p t e r VII of Part T w o in the Roth-Wittich edition [1968: 635-40]), distinguished appropriately a n d sharply between t w o f u n d a m e n t a l l y different kinds of "monopolies" e n c o u n t e r e d within a given political c o m m u n i t y . On the o n e side are "the m o n o p o l i e s of status-groups [which] excluded from their field of action the m e c h a n i s m of t h e market." On t h e other side are the "capitalistic monopolies which are acquired in the market t h r o u g h t h e power of property." T h e difference is elliptically specified: " T h e beneficiary of a m o n o p o l y by a status-group restricts, a n d m a i n t a i n s his power against, the market, while the r a t i o n a l - e c o n o m i c monopolist rules t h r o u g h the m a r k e t " (1968: 639). T h e general difficulty we alluded to m a y be exemplified as follows. S u p p o s i n g that, a m o n g our interrelated a n d h o n o r oriented states, the government of o n e creates a "monopoly" within its borders for its few local (national) producers of, say, automobiles, by so raising t h e import duties on automobiles p r o d u c e d elsewhere in the world that they are no longer price-competitive. T h e y are, as is said, "priced out of the market," which a m o u n t s to saying that the government in question has restricted, a n d m a i n t a i n e d its power against, the world m a r k e t for automobiles. Do we construe that situation as c o m p a r a b l e on the world scene to a status-group monopoly within a political c o m m u n i t y , or to a class-formed capitalistic m o n o p o l y ? Or is it a bit of both — class-like because of the rational appropriation of profit opportunities by the automobile firms w h o p e r s u a d e d the government to i n t r o d u c e t h e restrictions; a n d statusgroup-like because of the sentiments of national p r i d e a n d 19

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prestige m a r s h a l l e d in s u p p o r t of a n d g e n e r a t e d by t h e policy? VVe suspect t h e latter. B u t if we a r e right, W e b e r ' s sharply etched structural distinction, b e t w e e n classs t r u c t u r e d a n d status-group-structured distributions of p o w e r within political c o m m u n i t i e s , b e c o m e s a fused c o n c e p t w h e n p u t to use in t h e e x a m i n a t i o n of processes of g r o u p - f o r m a t i o n in t h e m o d e r n world-system. A n d we shall have to g r o u n d anew processes of class-formation a n d processes of status-group-formation, in o r d e r to see t h e m on occasion as fused a n d reinforcing sets of processes rather t h a n b e i n g restricted b y their original a n d careful f o r m u lation as necessarily diametrically o p p o s e d in their operation. T h e intellectual pressure to reify groups, to p r e s u m e their p e r m a n e n c y a n d longevity, is difficult to resist. F o r o n e thing, most self-conscious g r o u p s a r g u e as p a r t of their legitimizing ideology not merely their p r e e m i n e n c e (in o n e way or a n o t h e r ) b u t their t e m p o r a l priority over c o m p e t i n g g r o u p s . G r o u p s that a r e self-conscious, t h a t s e e m to act collectively in significant ways, often s e e m very solid a n d very resilient. We too often lose f r o m sight t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h t h i s solidarity, this reality, is itself t h e p r o d u c t of t h e g r o u p ' s activities in relations with others, activities that in t u r n a r e m a d e possible b y a n d have a direct i m p a c t u p o n t h e rest of social reality. T h e very activities of g r o u p s in relation t o o n e a n o t h e r serve t o c h a n g e e a c h g r o u p s u b s t a n tially a n d substantively, a n d in p a r t i c u l a r to c h a n g e their respective b o u n d a r i e s a n d their d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a n d d e f i n i n g characteristics. P e r m i t us to suggest an analogy. If o n e has a wheel of m o t t l e d colors, o n e that includes t h e whole r a n g e of t h e color s p e c t r u m , a n d if o n e spins t h e wheel, it will a p p e a r m o r e a n d m o r e like a solid white m a s s as t h e s p e e d increases. T h e r e c o m e s a p o i n t of s p e e d w h e r e it is i m p o s sible to see t h e wheel as o t h e r t h a n p u r e white. If, however, 20

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group t h e wheel slows down, the white will dissolve into its c o m p o n e n t separate colors. So it is with groups, even (and p e r h a p s especially) those most central of institutional structures of t h e m o d e r n world-system — the states, t h e classes, the nations, a n d / o r ethnic groups. 5 Seen in long historical time a n d b r o a d world space, they fade into o n e another, b e c o m i n g only "groups." Seen in short historical t i m e a n d n a r r o w world space, they b e c o m e clearly defined a n d so f o r m distinctive "structures." T h e distinction between classes an sich a n d classes für sich is helpful insofar as it recognizes that t h e self-consciousness of classes (and other groups) is not a constant b u t a variable. W e must, however, d r a w o n M a r x a n d W e b e r o n e step f u r t h e r a n d recognize with t h e m that the very existence of particular historical g r o u p s in relation to o n e a n o t h e r is not given b u t is also a variable. It m a y be o b j e c t e d that no o n e ever a s s u m e d that a class or an ethnic g r o u p always existed, a n d that everyone knows that for every g r o u p t h e r e is of course a m o m e n t of its c o m i n g into existence (however difficult this m a y be to specify). But this is not the point we are making. At s o m e m o m e n t of historical t i m e t h e bourgeoisie (the world bourgeoisie or a local version in a given area, or of a given people), the B r a h m i n caste, t h e H u n g a r i a n nation, a n d t h e religious c o m m u n i t y of Buddhists all c a m e (or evolved) into existence. Are we to a s s u m e that each j u s t continued to exist from that point on? We are c o n t e n d i n g that there is a sense in which all these groups are in fact constantly being recreated such that over time we have genuinely new wine in old bottles, a n d that t h e emphasis on the continuity a n d primordiality of t h e g r o u p ' s existence, t h o u g h it m a y b e of considerable ideological value to its m e m b e r s as such, is of very little analytic value to us as observers. T h e transition from feudalism to capitalism 5. T h i s t h e m e is developed in Wallerstein (1980).

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c a n n o t be explained by the struggle of classes t h a t c a m e into real current existence only as the result of that transition. Civil war in L e b a n o n cannot be explained by the struggle of religious groups who have c o m e into real current existence largely as a result of that civil war. W h a t intelligent analysis therefore requires is that we uncover the processes by which groups (and institutions) are constantly recreated, r e m o u l d e d , a n d eliminated in the ongoing operations of the capitalist world-economy, which is an actual social system that c a m e into historical existence Primarily in E u r o p e in the "long" sixteenth century, a n d which subsequently has been e x p a n d e d in space so that it now includes all other geographical areas of the globe. T h e relational concept and, therefore, the actual structures of classes a n d ethnic groups have b e e n d e p e n d e n t on the creation of the m o d e r n states. T h e states are the key political units of the world-economy, units that have been defined by a n d circumscribed by their location in t h e interstate system. A n d this system has served as t h e evolving political superstructure of the world-economy. In the original loci of the capitalist world-economy, the birth of diplomacy, of so-called international law, a n d of state-building ideologies (such as absolutism) all coincide with t h e early functioning of the world-economy. Of course, these states rapidly f o u n d themselves in a hierarchical network of u n e q u a l strength. As new areas b e c a m e incorporated into this capitalist world-economy, the existing political structures of such areas were c o m m o n l y r e s h a p e d in quite f u n d a m e n t a l ways (including even t h e definition of their territorial a n d "ethnic" or national boundaries) so that they could play their expected roles in the relational network of the interstate system. T h e s e states h a d to be too weak to interfere with the flow of the factors of p r o d u c t i o n across their boundaries, a n d therefore with t h e peripheralization of their production processes. H e n c e , in s o m e cases, pre-existing political structures h a d to be "weakened." But

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Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group t h e states also h a d to be strong e n o u g h to e n s u r e the very s a m e flow, the same peripheralization. Hence, in other cases, pre-existing political structures h a d to be "strengthened." But w e a k e n e d or s t r e n g t h e n e d , these recreated or entirely newly created incorporated states e n d e d up as state structures that were weak relative to the states specializing in core p r o d u c t i o n processes within the world-economy. T h e classes a n d the e t h n i c / n a t i o n a l groups or groupings that began to crystallize were crystallized, so to speak, from three directions. T h e y defined themselves primarily in relation to t h e s e state structures t h a t c o m m a n d e d the largest a m o u n t of a r m e d force a n d access to economic possibilities, either t h r o u g h the direct distribution of everincreasing tax i n c o m e or t h r o u g h the creation of structured possibilities of preferential access to the market (including training). T h e y were defined by those in the centers of these structures (and in the centers of t h e world-system as a whole). A n d they were perceived by competitive groups in their relational setting. T h r e e kinds of groups emerged in relation to these state structures — class, national, a n d ethnic groups. W h i l e classes an sich developed in terms of the relation of households to the real social economy, which in this case was a capitalist world-economy, a class für sich is a g r o u p that makes conscious claims of class m e m b e r s h i p , which is a claim to a place in a particular political order. Such a class could therefore only grow up in relation to a given political entity. W h e n E.P. T h o m p s o n (1964) writes a b o u t the making of the English working class, he is writing a b o u t the conditions u n d e r which u r b a n proletarians within a jurisdiction called " E n g l a n d " c a m e to think of themselves as English workers a n d to act politically in this capacity. T h e class " m a d e " itself, as he emphasizes, not only by t h e evolution of objective economic a n d social conditions, b u t by the ways in which some (many) people reacted to these conditions. 23

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Of course, t h e exent to which t h e r e e m e r g e d an English r a t h e r t h a n a British working class already indicated that a key political choice h a d been m a d e . T h e Irish workers, for example, were thereby defined as a different group. T h u s , the construction of a "class" was ipso facto part of the construction of at least two "nationalities," the English a n d the Irish. N o r did this particular story stop there. For we are still seeing today the later consequences of these early developments. Protestant u r b a n proletarians in N o r t h e r n Ireland do not today think of themselves as "Irish." Instead they call themselves "Protestants," or " U l s t e r m e n , " or (least likely) "Britons," or even all three. It is clear that, in reality, to be a "Protestant" a n d to be an " U l s t e r m a n " is in this situation virtually synonymous; to be a "Catholic" a n d to be "Irish" is also synonymous. To be sure, there are Protestants, a n d even J e w s resident in D u b l i n who think of themselves as Irish. T h i s doesn't mitigate the m e a n i n g of the religious terms in N o r t h e r n Ireland. If now some political organization comes along a n d insists on b a n n i n g the use of religious terminology in favor, let us say, of the exclusive use of class terminology, such a group is arguing in favor of a particular political resolution of the conflict. W e r e such a g r o u p to succeed, the reality of the religious groups as social entities might rapidly recede in N o r t h e r n Ireland, as they have in m a n y other areas of the world. An example would be Switzerland, w h e r e people primarily identify as m e m b e r s of linguistic groups a n d only in a m i n o r way as m e m b e r s of religious groups. Is there an I n d i a n bourgeoisie? T h i s is not a question of essences, b u t of existential reality. It is a political question that divides I n d i a n e n t r e p r e n e u r s a m o n g themselves. T o the extent that we can say t h a t t h e r e exists an I n d i a n b o u r geoisie, as opposed to merely m e m b e r s of the world b o u r geoisie w h o h a p p e n to hold I n d i a n passports, it is because there is a belief on the part of these bourgeois that the I n d i a n state a p p a r a t u s has or could have an important role 24

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group In assuring their "class" interests vis-a-vis both workers in India and bourgeois in other areas of the world. The whole line between classes as they are constructed and status-groups of every variety is far more fluid and blurred than the classic presumption of an antinomy between class and status-group has indicated. It is in fact very hard to know when we are dealing primarily with the one rather than with the other. This is especially true when political conflict becomes acute, and this is one of the reasons why the lines between social .movements and national movements have become increasingly difficult to disentangle and are perhaps unimportant to discern. Furthermore, even among traditionally defined status groups, it is not sure that it is very useful to distinguish "nations" from other kinds of "ethnic groups." A "nation" seems to be nothing but a political claim that the boundaries of a state should coincide with those of a given "ethnic group." This is used to justify either secessionist movements or unification movements. In point of fact, if we were to use a strict definition of the concept "nation," we should be hard-pressed to find even one "nation-state" in the entire world-system. This indicates that "nation" is more the description of an aspiration, or of a tendency, than of an existing phenomenon. Whenever the political claim (and/or definition by others) is less than that of state sovereignty, we tend to call this group an "ethnic group," whatever the basis of the claim, be it common language, common religion, common skin color, or fictive common ancestry. The actual history of the construction (reconstruction, remolding, destruction) of classes, nations, and ethnic groups — including the pressure both of "external" groups to create these groups and of the "internal" desire of putative groups to create themselves — is a history of the constant rise and fall of the intensity of these political claims in cultural clothing. There is no evidence that, over the 25

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several h u n d r e d years of the existence of t h e capitalist world-economy, one particular genre of claim has grown at t h e expense of others; each genre s e e m s to have held its own. It would seem, therefore, that assertions a b o u t primordiality are in fact ideological. T h i s is not to say that there has not been systemic d e v e l o p m e n t . For example, nothing herein a r g u e d is inconsistent with t h e proposition that there has been growing class polarization in the capitalist world-economy. But such a proposition would be referring to classes an sich, that is, at t h e level of the real social economy, the capitalist world-economy. Rather, this analysis should be seen as an a r g u m e n t that group formations (solidarities) are processes of t h e capitalist worldeconomy, a n d are a m o n g the central underlying forms of the m o r e narrowly manifest efforts at political organization. In recent years, social scientists of various intellectual schools have b e g u n to return to M a r x ' s critique of political economy, b u t in ways that go b e y o n d the mechanical usages of class analysis that formed t h e ideology of the Second a n d T h i r d Internationals a n d b e y o n d the equally mechanical concept of primordial status-groups that d o m i n a t e d the developmentalist ideology of U S - d o m i n a t e d world social science in the 1950s a n d 1960s. On the one h a n d , in the era of US h e g e m o n y (roughly 1945-70), the unity of the world m a r k e t analytically presupposed by M a r x (when he observed an era of British hegemony) and which was t h o u g h t to have disappeared in the late nineteenth century, was in fact progressively reconstituted. T h e so-called t r a n s n a t i o n a l sought to operate with m i n i m a l constraint by state-political apparatuses. T h o u g h t the concentration of capital increased even further, its transnational expansion out of t h e A m e r i c a n core b e c a m e a m a j o r factor in the intensification of world m a r k e t competition a n d in the consolidation of t h e unity of t h e world market. In this context t h e role played by states c h a n g e d radically, t h o u g h not everywhere to the s a m e extent. Par26

Rethinking the Concepts of Class and Status-Group ticularly outside of the C o m m u n i s t world, the emphasis in their action changed from territorial expansion a n d restriction of inter-enterprise competition within a n d across n a t i o n a l / i m p e r i a l boundaries, to strengthening t h e competitive edge of their territories as locales of p r o d u c t i o n a n d to sustaining the transnational expansion of their respective national capitals. T h e y thereby contributed to t h e enhancem e n t of the density a n d connectedness of world-economic networks that, in turn, u n d e r m i n e d their ability to influence/control economic activity even within their own borders. O n t h e other h a n d , t h e antisystemic m o v e m e n t s have m o r e a n d m o r e taken on the clothing of "nationalliberation movements," claiming t h e d o u b l e legitimacy of nationalist anti-imperialism and proletarian anticapitalism. This has given t h e m great strength as mobilizing movements. But, insofar as they have c o m e to p o w e r in specific state structures operating within the interstate/ system, they have been caught in t h e constraints of this system that has led, a m o n g other things, to conflicts within? a n d a m o n g such "post-revolutionary" states. A cogent analysis of existing trends within the worldsystem requires both a return to basics, in terms of an analysis of the operational m e c h a n i s m s of capitalism as a m o d e of production, a n d a reconceptualization of t h e operational m e c h a n i s m s of the social groups (that are formed, are reformed, a n d of course also disappear) t h a t c o m p e t e a n d conflict within this capitalist world-economy, as it continues to evolve a n d to transform itself.

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Dilemmas of Antisystemic Movements

Opposition to oppression is coterminous with the existence of hierarchical social-systems. Opposition is p e r m a n e n t , but f o r t h e m o s t p a r t l a t e n t , T h e oppressed are too weak — politically, economically, a n d ideologically — to manifest their opposition constantly. However, as we know, w h e n oppression b e c o m e s particularly acute, or expectations particularly deceived, or t h e power of t h e ruling s t r a t u m falters, people have risen up in an almost s p o n t a n e o u s m a n n e r to cry halt. T h i s has taken the form of revolts, of riots, of flight. T h e multiple forms of h u m a n rebellion have for t h e most part b e e n only partially efficacious at best. S o m e t i m e s they have forced the oppressors to reduce the pressure or t h e exploitation. But sometimes they have failed utterly to do so. However, one continuing sociological characteristic of these rebellions of the oppressed has been their "spontaneous," short-term character. T h e y have c o m e a n d they have gone, having such effect as they did. W h e n t h e next such rebellion came, it n o r m a l l y h a d little explicit relationship with t h e previous one. Indeed, this has b e e n one of t h e great strengths of t h e w o r l d ' s ruling strata t h r o u g h o u t history — the noncontinuity of rebellion. 29

Antisystemic Movements In t h e early history of t h e capitalist world-economy, the situation remained m o r e or less the same as it h a d always been in this regard. Rebellions were many, scattered, discrete, momentary, a n d only partially efficacious at best. O n e of the contradictions, however, of capitalism as a system is that the very integrating tendencies that have been one of its defining characteristics have h a d an impact on the form of antisystemic activity. Somewhere in the middle of the nineteenth century — 1848 is as good a symbolic date as any — there c a m e to be a sociological innovation of profound significance for the politics of the capitalist world-economy. G r o u p s of persons involved in antisystemic activity began to create a new institution": the continuing "organization with members, officers, and specific political objectives (both long-run a n d shortterm). Such organized antisystemic movements had never existed before: O n e might argue that various religious sects h a d performed analogous roles with an analogous organization, but the long-run objectives of the religious sects were by definition otherworldly. T h e antisystemic organizations that c a m e into existence in the nineteenth century were preeminently" political, not religious — that is, they focused on the structures of "this world.''

Social Movements and National Movements In the course of the nineteenth century, two principal varieties of antisystemic movements emerged — what c a m e to be called respectively the "social movement" a n d the "national movement." T h e m a j o r difference" Between t h e m lay in their definition of the problem. T h e social movement defined the oppression as that of employers over wage earners, the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. T h e ideals of. the French Reyolution — liberty, equiality, and fraternity — 30

Dilemmas of Antisystemic Movements could be realized, they felt, by replacing capitalism with socialism. T h e national movement, on the o t h e r h a n d , defined t h e oppression as that of one ethno-national g r o u p over another. T h e ideals could be realized by giving the oppressed g r o u p equal juridical status with t h e oppressing g r o u p by the creation of parallel (and usually separate) structures. T h e r e has been a long discussion, within t h e m o v e m e n t s a n d a m o n g scholars, a b o u t t h e differences between these two kinds of m o v e m e n t . No d o u b t they have differed both in their definitions of the p r o b l e m a n d in the social bases of their support. In m a n y places a n d at m a n y times, the two varieties of m o v e m e n t felt they were in direct competition with each other for t h e loyalty of populations. Less frequently in the nineteenth century, b u t sometimes, t h e two varieties of m o v e m e n t f o u n d e n o u g h tactical congruence to work together politically. T h e traditional emphasis on the differences of the two varieties of movement has distracted o u r attention from some f u n d a m e n t a l similarities. Both kinds of m o v e m e n t , after considerable internal debate, created formal organizations. As such, these organizations h a d to evolve a basic strategy to transform their i m m e d i a t e world in the direction in which they wished it to go. In both cases, the analysis was identical. T h e key political structure of the m o d e r n world they each saw to be the state. If these m o v e m e n t s were to change anything, they h a d to control a state a p p a r a t u s , which pragmatically m e a n t "their" state a p p a r a t u s . Consequently, the p r i m a r y objective had to be obtaining state power. For the social m o v e m e n t , this m e a n t that, despite t h e internationalism of their ideology — "workers of t h e world, unite!" — the organizations they created h a d to be national in structure. A n d the objective of these organizations had to be the coming to power of t h e m o v e m e n t in that state. Similarly, for the national m o v e m e n t , the objective c a m e to 31

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be state p o w e r in a particular state. To be sure, the jurisdiction of this state was by definition what the national m o v e m e n t was a b o u t . S o m e t i m e s such a m o v e m e n t sought the creation of an entirely new state, either by secession or by merger, b u t in o t h e r cases this "new state" might have already existed in the form of a colonial or a regional administrative entity. T h e fact that the two varieties of m o v e m e n t defined the same strategic objective accounts for their sense of rivalry with e a c h ' o t f t e r , particularly w h e n a workers' m o v e m e n t sought to obtain p o w e r in an entity out of which a given national m o v e m e n t was seeking to detach a zone in order to create a new state. T h e parallel objectives — obtaining state p o w e r — led to a parallel internal debate on t h e m o d e of obtaining state power, which might be defined in polar t e r m s as t h e legal p a t h of political persuasion versus t h e illegal p a t h of insurrectionary force. T h i s has often b e e n called, reform .versus i revolution, but these two terms have bec0m&~50"0verlaid 1 with polemic a n d confusion that today they o b s c u r e m o r e t h a n they aid analysis. It should be noted that in the case of the social movem e n t , this internal d e b a t e c u l m i n a t e d d u r i n g the period between t h e First a n d Second W o r l d W a r s in the existence of two rival a n d fiercely competitive Internationals, the Second a n d the T h i r d , also k n o w n as t h e conflict between Social D e m o c r a t s a n d C o m m u n i s t s . T h o u g h b o t h t h e Second a n d T h i r d Internationals asserted that they h a d the s a m e objective of socialism, that they were movements based in the working class a n d on the left, a n d even (at least for a while) that they a s s u m e d the s a m e Marxist heritage, they rapidly b e c a m e vehemently o p p o s e d o n e to the other, to the extent that their s u b s e q u e n t occasional political convergences (the " p o p u l a r fronts") have s e e m e d at best tactical a n d m o m e n t a r y . In s o m e sense, this has r e m a i n e d t r u e right up to the present. 32

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements If one looks at the geography of the movements, one quickly notices a historical correlation. Social-democratic movements have b e c o m e politically strong a n d have "come to power" (by electoral means, to be sure, a n d then in alternation with more conservative parties) almost only in the core states of the world-economy, b u t in virtually all of them. C o m m u n i s t parties, by contrast, have become politically strong primarily in a certain range of semiperipheral a n d peripheral zones, a n d have come to power (sometimes by insurrection, b u t sometimes as a result of military occupation by the USSR) only in these zones. T h e only Western countries in which C o m m u n i s t parties have been relatively strong for a long period of t i m e are France, Italy, a n d Spain, a n d it should be noted that Italy a n d Spain might well be considered semiperipheral. In any case, the parties in these three states have long since shed any insurrectionary inclinations. We are therefore in the 1980s faced with the following political history of the m o d e r n world. Social-democratic parties have in fact achieved their primary political objective, coming to power in a relatively large n u m b e r of core states. C o m m u n i s t parties have in fact come to power in a significant n u m b e r of semiperipheral a n d peripheral countries — concentrated geographically in a b a n d that runs from Eastern E u r o p e to East a n d Southeast Asia. And in the rest of the world, in m a n y of the countries, nationalist — sometimes even "radical nationalist" or "national liberation" — movements have come to power. In short, seen from the vantage point of 1848, the success of the antisystemic movements has been very impressive indeed.

The Unfulfilled Revolution H o w are we to appreciate t h e consequences? In gross terms, we can see two consequences that have moved in very 33

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different directions. O n the o n e h a n d , these movements, taken collectively as a sort of "family" of movements, have b e c o m e an increasingly consequential element in the politics of the world-system a n d have built u p o n their achievements. Later movements have profited from the successes of earlier movements by moral encouragement, example, lessons in political tactics, a n d direct assistance. M a n y concessions have been wrested from the world's ruling strata. On the other h a n d , the c o m i n g to state power of all these m o v e m e n t s has resulted in a very widespread sense of unfulfilled revolution. T h e questions have r u n like this. Have social-democratic parties achieved anything m o r e than some redistribution to what are in fact "middle" strata located in core countries? H a v e C o m m u n i s t parties achieved anything m o r e t h a n some economic development for their countries? A n d even then, how m u c h ? A n d furthermore, has this not been primarily to benefit the socalled new class of a bureaucratic elite? H a v e nationalist m o v e m e n t s achieved anything m o r e t h a n allowing the socalled c o m p r a d o r class a slightly larger slice of the world pie? T h e s e are p e r h a p s not the questions that o u g h t to be asked, or t h e m a n n e r in which t h e issues s h o u l d be posed. But in fact these are t h e questions that have been asked, a n d very widely. T h e r e is little d o u b t that t h e resulting skepticism has m a d e deep inroads in the ranks of potential a n d even active supporters of the world's antisystemic movements. As this skepticism began to take hold, there were a n u m b e r of ways in which it began to express itself in ideological a n d organizational terms. T h e period after the Second W o r l d W a r was a period of great success for the historic antisystemic movements. Social democracy b e c a m e firmly ensconced in the West. It is less that the social-democratic parties c a m e to be seen as one of the alternating groups which could legitimately govern t h a n that the m a i n p r o g r a m of the social democrats, 34

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements the welfare state, c a m e to be accepted by even the conservative parties, if no d o u b t begrudgingly. After all, even R i c h a r d Nixon said: " W e are all Keynesians now." C o m m u n i s t parties, of course, c a m e to power in a whole series of states. A n d the post-1945 period saw one long process of decolonization, p u n c t u a t e d by s o m e dramatic, politically important a r m e d struggles, such as Vietnam, Algeria, a n d Nicaragua. Nonetheless, by the 1960s, a n d even m o r e by the 1970s, there began to occur a "break with t h e past" with the rise of a new kind of antisystemic m o v e m e n t (or m o v e m e n t s within the movements) in world-regional locales as diverse a s N o r t h America, J a p a n , Europe, C h i n a , a n d Mexico. T h e student, Black, a n d antiwar m o v e m e n t s in the U n i t e d States; the student m o v e m e n t s in J a p a n a n d Mexico; the labor a n d student m o v e m e n t s in Europe; the Cultural Revolution in C h i n a ; a n d as of the 1970s the w o m e n ' s movements; did not have identical roots or even c o m m o n effects. Each one was located in political a n d economic processes shaped by the particular a n d different histories, a n d by the different positions in the world-system of the locales in which they arose a n d worked themselves out. Yet, by world-historical standards, they occurred in the s a m e period and, moreover, they shared s o m e c o m m o n ideological t h e m e s that clearly set t h e m apart from earlier varieties of antisystemic movements. T h e i r almost simultaneous occurrence can largely be traced to the fact that the movements of t h e late 1960s were precipitated by a c o m m o n catalyst: the escalation of the anti-imperialist war in Vietnam. T h i s escalation posed an immediate threat to the established patterns of life, a n d to the very lives not only of the Vietnamese but of A m e r i c a n youth as well, a n d the war posed a clear threat to the security of the Chinese people. As for E u r o p e a n youth a n d workers, while no i m m e d i a t e threat was posed to their lives a n d security, the indirect effects of the escalation (world 35

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m o n e t a r y crisis, intensification of market competition, a n d so on) a n d the ideological spill-overs f r o m the movements in the U n i t e d States, from the Cultural Revolution in China, a n d from the struggle of the Vietnamese people soon provided e n o u g h reasons a n d rationalizations for rebellion. T a k e n together, all these m o v e m e n t s a n d their Vietn a m e s e epicenter were i m p o r t a n t in disclosing a basic asymmetry in t h e power of systemic a n d antisystemic forces on a world scale. T h e asymmetry was most dramatically exemplified on the battlefields themselves. Following the precedent of the Chinese war of national liberation, the Vietnamese showed h o w a national-liberation movement could, by shifting the confrontation with conventional armies onto nonconventional terrains (as in guerrilla warfare), erode a n d eventually disintegrate the social, political, a n d military position of c u m b e r s o m e imperial forces. F r o m this point of view, the other m o v e m e n t s (particularly the US antiwar m o v e m e n t ) were part a n d parcel of this asymmetrical relation: to different degrees a n d in different ways, they showed how the shift of the confrontation between systemic a n d antisystemic forces onto nonconventional terrain was strengthening t h e latter a n d h a m p e r i n g / p a r a l y z i n g the former. T h e o u t c o m e a n d implications of t h e c o m b i n e d a n d uneven development of the antisystemic m o v e m e n t s of the 1960s a n d 1970s must be assessed at different levels. Locally, the Vietnam war h a d a very "conventional" outcome: the coming to state power of a "classical" antisystemic m o v e m e n t , a n d the s u b s e q u e n t strengthening of t h e b u r e a u c r a t i c structure of this state. Assessed f r o m this angle, at the national level the o u t c o m e of t h e Vietnamese national-liberation m o v e m e n t did not differ significantly from t h e earlier kinds of antisystemic m o v e m e n t s (national a n d social). Globally, however, the V i e t n a m war was a turning point in disclosing the limits of military actions in coercing the periphery into a hierarchical world order. 36

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements T h e s e limits a n d their recognition were t h e o u t c o m e not only of the confrontation on the battlefields b u t also, a n d possibly to a greater degree, of the m o v e m e n t s unleashed elsewhere in the world-system. It was the n a t u r e of these other movements that most clearly m a r k e d a d e p a r t u r e from, a n d a counterposition to, earlier patterns of antisystemic movements. To varying degrees, the Cultural Revolution in China, the student m o v e m e n t s in t h e West, J a p a n , a n d Mexico, a n d the "autonomist" workers' m o v e m e n t s in E u r o p e took as o n e of t h e i r t h e m e s t h e limits a n d dangers of t h e establishment a n d consolidation of bureaucratic structures by the m o v e m e n t s themselves, a n d this was new. T h e Cultural Revolution was largely directed against the bureaucratic power of t h e C o m m u n i s t Party and, whatever its failures from other points of view, its m a i n achievement has been precisely to have prevented, or at least slowed d o w n , the consolidation of party b u r e a u c r a t i c power in C h i n a . T h e student a n d y o u t h m o v e m e n t s t h a t c r o p p e d u p in t h e m o s t diverse contexts w e r e generally directed not only against t h e various bureaucratic powers t h a t tried to c u r b a n d repress t h e m (states, universities, parties) b u t also against all attempts to channel t h e m toward the formation of new, a n d the strengthening of old, b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations. A l t h o u g h the new workers' m o v e m e n t s generally e n d e d up by strengthening bureaucratic organizations (mostly unions), nonetheless the protagonists of these "new" m o v e m e n t s showed an u n p r e c e d e n t e d awareness of the fact that b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations such as u n i o n s were b o u n d to develop interests of their own that might differ in i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m t h o s e of t h e workers they claimed to represent. W h a t this m e a n t , concretely, was that the instrumental attitude of unions a n d parties vis-a-vis the m o v e m e n t was m a t c h e d a n d countered to an unprecedented extent by an instrumental attitude on the part of the m o v e m e n t vis-a-vis unions a n d parties. T h e anti-bureaucratic thrust of the m o v e m e n t s of t h e 37

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1960s a n d early 1970s can be traced to three main tendencies: the t r e m e n d o u s widening a n d deepening of the power of bureaucratic organizations as a result of the previous wave of antisystemic movements; the decreasing capabilities of such organizations to fulfill the expectations on which their e m e r g e n c e a n d expansion h a d been based; a n d the increasing efficacy of direct forms of action, that is, forms u n m e d i a t e d by bureaucratic organizations. On the first t w o tendencies, nothing needs to be a d d e d to w h a t h a s already b e e n said concerning the successes a n d limits of t h e earlier movements, except to point o u t t h a t t h e reactivation of market competition u n d e r US h e g e m o n y since the Second W o r l d W a r h a d further tightened the worlde c o n o m y constraints within which states acted. As for the increasing efficacy of direct forms of action, the tendency concerns mainly the labor m o v e m e n t a n d was rooted in the joint impact of two key trends of the worldeconomy: the trend toward an increasing commodification of labor power a n d the t r e n d t o w a r d increasing division of labor a n d mechanization. In the previous stage, labor movements c a m e to rely on p e r m a n e n t b u r e a u c r a t i c organizations aiming at the seizure or control of state power for two m a i n reasons. First, these labor m o v e m e n t s were largely at the beginning the expression of artisans a n d craft workers w h o h a d been or were a b o u t to be proletarianized b u t whose bargaining p o w e r vis-a-vis employers still d e p e n d e d on their craft skills. As a consequence, these workers h a d an overwhelming interest in restricting the supply of, a n d e x p a n d i n g the d e m a n d for, their skills. This, in t u r n , required trade-union organizations oriented to t h e preservation of craft-work roles in t h e labor process on t h e o n e h a n d , a n d to control over the acquisition of craft skills on the other. Like all organizations that a t t e m p t to reprod u c e "artificially" (that is, in opposition to historical tendencies) a scarcity that affords monopolistic quasi-rents, these craft or craft-oriented unions ultimately d e p e n d e d for 38

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements their success on the ability to use state power to restrain employers from profiting from the operations of the market. T h e artificial (that is, n o n m a r k e t ) restraints were twofold: state rules a b o u t workers' pay a n d conditions; state legitim a t i o n of unionization a n d collective bargaining. T h e second a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t reason for the previous reliance of labor m o v e m e n t s on p e r m a n e n t bureaucratic organizations aiming at state power was related to t h e question of alliances a n d h e g e m o n y . In most national locales, the struggle between labor a n d capital took place in a context characterized by the existence of wide strata of peasants a n d m i d d l e classes which c o u l d be mobilized politically to support anti-labor state policies, a n d economically to e n h a n c e competition within the ranks of labor. U n d e r these circumstances labor could obtain long-term victories only by neutralizing or winning over to its side significant fractions of these strata. A n d this could not be achieved t h r o u g h s p o n t a n e o u s a n d direct action, which o f t e n h a d the effect of alienating the strata in question. R a t h e r , it required a political platform that would appeal to peasants a n d the middle strata, a n d an organization that w o u l d elaborate a n d p r o p a g a n d i z e that platform. By the 1960s radical changes h a d occurred from b o t h points of view, in core regions a n d in m a n y semiperipheral countries. T h e great advances in the technical division of labor a n d in mechanization of the interwar a n d postwar years h a d destroyed or peripheralized in the labor process the craft skills on which labor's organized power h a d previously rested. At the same time, these very advances had e n d o w e d labor with a new power: the power to inflict large losses on capital by disrupting a highly integrated a n d mechanized labor process. In exercising this power, labor was far less d e p e n d e n t on an organization external to the workplace (as t r a d e u n i o n s generally were), since w h a t really m a t t e r e d was the capacity to exploit the interdependencies a n d networks created by capital itself in the workplace. 39

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Moreover, the increased commodification of l a b o r h a d d e p l e t e d the locally available strata of peasants t h a t could be effectively a n d competitively mobilized to u n d e r m i n e the political a n d economic power of labor. As for the m i d d l e strata, the u n p r e c e d e n t e d spread a n d radicalism of t h e student m o v e m e n t s were s y m p t o m s of the d e e p e n i n g c o m m o d i f i c a t i o n of the labor power of these strata, a n d of the greater difficulties of mobilizing t h e m against t h e labor m o v e m e n t . (This process was reflected in an extensive litera t u r e of the 1960s on the "new working class.") It follows that the p r o b l e m of alliances a n d h e g e m o n y was less central t h a n in the past a n d that, as a consequence, labor's dependence on p e r m a n e n t bureaucratic organizations for t h e success of its struggles was f u r t h e r r e d u c e d . As we have seen, for m a n y persons the conclusion to be d r a w n f r o m this analysis is that the antisystemic m o v e m e n t s have "failed" or, even worse, were "co-opted." T h e c h a n g e from "capitalist state" to "socialist state," for m a n y w h o think in these terms, has not h a d the t r a n s f o r m i n g effects on world history — the reconstituting of trajectories of growth — that they h a d believed it would have. A n d the change f r o m colony to state, w h e t h e r by revolution or by nego-~ tiation, has lacked not only the world-historical effects but also, in most instances, even the internal redistribution of well-being so p r o m i n e n t in the p r o g r a m s of these movem e n t s . Social democracy has succeeded no better. Everyw h e r e it finds its o c c u p a n c y of state p o w e r merely a m e d i a t i n g presence — o n e constrained by t h e processes of a c c u m u l a t i o n on a world scale a n d by the twin requirem e n t s of governments: b u r y i n g the d e a d a n d caring for t h e w o u n d e d , w h e t h e r people or property. To t h e chagrin of some, the applause of others, the o n e coordinated effort t o w a r d a world revolution, the C o m i n t e r n / C o m i n f o r m , collapsed completely u n d e r the disintegrating weight of continuing state f o r m a t i o n at all the locations of its operations — its historical center, its loci of s u b s e q u e n t success, 40

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements its other national arenas of strength, its points of marginal presence. Without exception, all current C o m m u n i s t parties are concerned first with domestic conditions and only secondarily if at all with world revolution.

The Transformed Historical Ground We, on the other h a n d , contend, as we said, that from t h e vantage point of 1848 the success of the antisystemic movements has been very impressive indeed. Moreover, that success does not dim in the least when viewed from the vantage point of today. Rather the opposite. For without such an appreciation, one cannot understand where the nonconventional terrain opened up by the most recent forms of antisystemic movement has c o m e from historically and where therefore the movements seem likely to go in the historical future. At the same time, however, the antisystemic movements are of course not the only agencies to have altered the ground on which a n d through which current and future movements must continually form and operate. Those they would destroy — the organizing agencies of the accumulationjorocess — have also been at work, owing partly to an "inner logic," partly to t h e very successes of the movements and hence to the continually transformed historical ground which that "logic" has as its field of operation and contradiction. Above all, the ongoing structural transformation of the capitalist world-economy has in effect opened up the locations in its overall operation where the process of class struggle is proving formative of the sides of conflict, and polarizing in the relations so formed. In the course of the twentieth century, indeed defining it, a massive sea-change has been occurring in the social relations of accumulation. In a sentence, the relational networks forming the trunk lines of the circuits of capital

41

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42

have been so structurally t r a n s f o r m e d that the very workings of the a c c u m u l a t i o n process a p p e a r to be historically altered. It is this ongoing transformation that has continually r e m a d e the relational conditions both of the organizing agencies of accumulation (by definition) a n d of those in f u n d a m e n t a l struggle with them, the antisystemic movements; and so have continually r e m a d e as well the relational character of the struggle itself a n d hence the n a t u r e of the m o v e m e n t s defined by it. To retrace the steps: the life cycles of the various movements have been a part of a n d have helped to f o r m the structural shift; h e n c e the relational struggles defining the m o v e m e n t s as antisystemic; hence the movements themselves a n d the trajectories that m a k e t h e m antisystemic. We depict the ongoing transformation here by outlining three of its faces in the form of structural trends. In o n e guise the transformation appears as simultaneously an increasing "stateness" of the world's peoples (the n u m b e r of "sovereign states" having m o r e t h a n tripled d u r i n g the twentieth century) a n d an increasingly dense organization of the interstate system. T o d a y virtually the whole of the globe's nearly five billion people are politically partitioned into the subject populations of the h u n d r e d and-sixty or so states of an interstate system, which contains a large n u m b e r of formal interstate organizations. T h i s might be called the widening of stateness. T h e deepening of stateness is another matter. H e r e essentially we have in m i n d the growing "strength" of state agencies vis-a-vis local bodies (within or intersecting with the state's jurisdiction). M e a s u r e s of this are of m a n y sorts, f r o m the voluminous expansion of laws a n d of agencies to enforce them, t h r o u g h central-government taxes as growing proportions of m e a s u r e d domestic or national product, to the structural expansion of kinds of state agency, the geographical spread of their locations of operation, and the growing proportion of the labor force formed by their employees. Moreover, like"

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements international airports a r o u n d the world, and for analogous if deeper reasons, the organizational form of stateness (the complex array of hierarchies forming the a p p a r a t u s of administration) has everywhere virtually the s a m e anatomy, the differences f r o m place to place being of the order of variations on a theme. T h e y are variations that no d o u b t m a t t e r a great deal to the subjects of state power, but, worldhistorically, they are nonetheless only variations a n d not qualitative d e p a r t u r e s in form. O n e final point should p e r h a p s be noted here. M u c h has been m a d e of the extent to which, following the accessions to power of social a n d / o r national antisystemic movements, a m a r k e d increase in the structural "centralization" of the state has occurred, that is, a m a r k e d increase in what we're calling here the deepening of stateness. And, examining the trends in state formation within the jurisdictions severally, one at a time, one does see that. However, watching the overall trend in state formation in the m o d e r n world as a singular historical system over the course of the twentieth century, one would be h a r d put to attribute the overall trend to any such "internal" processes or, for that matter, even to the interrelated successes of the particular social a n d national m o v e m e n t s construed collectively as but particular e m a n a t i o n s of a singular complex historical process of the m o d e r n world-system. For even in locations where, seen in t h a t way, t h e world-historical process has been manifestly weakest (the movements least apparently successful), the structural trend in state formation is no less a p p a r e n t t h a n elsewhere. Of even m o r e importance here, in some ways, is the still far greater growth in the density of the interstate system. J u s t using the simplest of assumptions, a n d reasoning purely formally from the fourfold increase in the n u m b e r of states, there is a sixteenfold increase in their relations with one another. But that of course barely scratches the surface. T h e kinds of specialized relations a m o n g the states of the 43

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interstate system have e x p a n d e d nearly as m u c h as the kinds of internal state agency. A d d e d to this there are over a dozen specialized U n i t e d Nations agencies (in each of which most states are related as m e m b e r s ) a n d a very large n u m b e r of regional international organizations (such as O E C D , O P E C , ASEAN, C O M E C O N , N A T O , O A U , a n d so on). If one goes b e y o n d the existence of the voluminous set of interstate relations to the frequency with which they're activated, via meetings, postal mail, cable, telephone, a n d now, increasingly, electronic mail, the density of the interstate system's relational network today is probably several times greater t h a n the c o m p a r a b l e density of the official intrastate relational network of the most advanced a n d centrally a d m i n i s t e r e d country of a century ago (say, France). O n e result is an e n m e s h i n g within each state's operations of the "internal" a n d "external" relational webs a n d processes to s u c h an extent t h a t t h e distinction itself, except p e r h a p s for b o r d e r crossings of people a n d goods, begins to lose substantive force (in contradiction to its nominal force, which is increased with every treaty signed, every package assessed for duty by customs, every postage s t a m p issued). Hence, to a degree a n d extent never envisioned by the successful social a n d national m o v e m e n t s w h e n they eventually gained state power, b o t h what agencies of a state administer internally, a n d how they do this, is increasingly d e t e r m i n e d , to use a W e b e r pairing, not a u t o n o m o u s l y (as befits sovereignty) b u t heteronomously (as befits what?). A second result, a n d one of no less i m p o r t a n c e to o u r subject — the current a n d future terrain on, through, a n d against which present a n d future antisystemic m o v e m e n t s are a n d will be operating — is the degree to which virtually all interrelations a m o n g peoples in different state jurisdictions have b e c o m e dimensions of their respective states' relations with one another. T h i s is not just a m a t t e r of travelers o b t a i n i n g passports a n d visas a n d passing t h r o u g h 44

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements emigration a n d immigration authorities, or of packages having to be sent with export a n d import permits a n d be duly processed, a n d so forth. T h e s e interstate procedures, which daily r e - a n n o u n c e the borders of the respective jurisdictions of each constituent state, are b u t mediations of the m o v e m e n t of people, goods, a n d capital, a n d have been practiced for a r a t h e r long time. T h e "openness" or "closure" of a state's borders to such movements, however — we note parenthetically in passing — has always been less a m a t t e r of that state's policies "toward the world" than of its location in the hierarchical ordering inherent in the capitalist world-economy's interstate system. T h i s location is d e t e r m i n e d not merely by academicians b u t by d e m o n s t r a t e d or credible relational strengths, practical conditions effected by ruling classes. R a t h e r it is a m a t t e r of the interstate system's appropriating all m a n n e r of direct a n d circuitous relations a m o n g people of different countries (state jurisdictions) — w h e t h e r religious, scientific, commercial, artistic, financial, linguistic, civilizational, educational, literary, productive, problem-focused, historical, philosophical, ad infinitum — such that they all become, at the very least, m e d i a t e d , m o r e often actually organized, by the c o u n t e r p a r t agencies of different states t h r o u g h their established or newly f o r m e d relations with one a n o t h e r . T h e effect is to s u b o r d i n a t e the interrelations a m o n g the world's peoples not to raisons d'etat, a practice with which all of us are all too familiar, b u t to raisons du systeme d'etats, a practice with which most of us are all too unfamiliar. T h e r e is, we should briefly note, a set of consequential historical contradictions being f o r m e d t h r o u g h this recreation of all varieties of social relations into networks within either inter- or intrastate frameworks. M a n y kinds of c o m m u n i t y — in the sense of c o m m u n i t i e s of believers/ practitioners — form in a way "worlds" of their own in relation to, in distinction from, a n d often in conflict with all 45

Antisystemic Movements others; that is, those who are not of their c o m m u n i t y , who a r e nonbelievers or nonpractitioners, hence n o n m e m b e r s . T h e s e are often large, encompassing worlds: the Islamic world; the scientific world; the African world (or, in the United States today, the Black world); the w o m e n ' s world; the workers" or proletarian world; a n d so forth. It is far from evident that such communities of consciousness can even persist, much less grow, within the structurally developing inter- a n d intrastate framework. T h e kind of contradiction noted here marks to an even greater extent the popular peace and environmental movements, but that is because they a r e perforce, in today's world, state-oriented; whereas the communities of consciousness we have in mind elaborate themselves independently of stateness (hence, however, in contradiction to it a n d to interstateness, rather than through them).

Division of Labor, Centralization of Capital We have dwelt at length on but one face of the ongoing structural transformation of the capitalist world-economy; that seen through a focus on the plane of the interstate system and its constituent units, the states, and their relations with one another. We have done so for two reasons. O n e is the seemingly e n d u r i n g disposition, on the part of historical social scientists, to carry forward — all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding — the liberal ideological distinction between "state" and "economy," or "state" a n d "market" in some versions, as if these were f u n d a m e n t a l theoretical categories. T h e other is the equally prevalent, although apparently less impermeable, disposition to imagine — again, all evidence, to the contrary notwithstanding — that the capitalist world-economy has evolved rather as an onion grows, from a core of small a n d local beginnings through successively larger rings until the

46

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements outer peripheral skin is formed, all by virtue of, in this view, the self-expansion of capital t h r o u g h its increasing subordination of labor. We turn now to m u c h briefer observations on two m o r e faces of this transformation. A second face is in the organization of the structuring of another p l a n e of the capitalist world-economy's operation, the axial division of labor. T h i s is t h e complex of interrelated p r o d u c t i o n / t r a n s p o r t a t i o n processes that is so ordered that the surplus-value created in the course of production a n d transportation is, historically, disproportionately appropriated at t h e organizing centers of the multiple a n d more-or-less lengthy chains or networks of d e p e n d e n t production processes. T h e relational patterns this ordering entails are thereby r e p r o d u c e d a n d , for additional reasons, their reproduction h a s cyclically deepened the differences in productive capacity between the organizing center or core portions of the axial division of l a b o r a n d its increasingly peripheralized portions. In t h e twentieth century, the u n d e r l y i n g transformation has effected s o m e truly massive alterations in t h e constituent relations of the complex core—periphery axis a n d hence in t h e m a p p i n g of their respective global zones, the results of which — generally rendered as if the result of state policies — a r e broadly known. Of m o r e i m m e d i a t e interest is the extraordinary growth in recent decades of a long-standing agency of t h e organizing center or core of the socialization of production (hence of labor) on a world scale; namely, what is currently called the multinational or transnational firm. In a sentence, m a n y relations a m o n g materially d e p e n d e n t production processes that h a d been exchange relations — or, if newly formed, could have been u n d e r o t h e r conditions (and so of, or potentially of, marketorganized networks of c o m m o d i t y flows) — b e c a m e transformed into (or, if new, formed as) intrafirm relations. T h e elemental a r r a n g e m e n t — centralizations of capital, in the form of firms, entrepreneurially organizing geographically

47

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extensive a n d technically c o m p l e x (for t h e time) c h a i n s of related production operations — is hardly new. It was, after all, w h a t distinguished the chartered m e r c h a n t (sic!) c o m p a n i e s of the seventeenth a n d eighteenth centuries f r o m o t h e r capitalized operations. But in recent d e c a d e s this "elem e n t a l a r r a n g e m e n t " of the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y h a s been increasingly constituted on a scale, a n d in a form of both organization a n d production, that is historically original. T h e transnational corporations' reconstruction of the world-scale division a n d integration of labor processes f u n d a m e n t a l l y alters the historical possibilities of w h a t are still referred to, a n d not yet even nostalgically, as "national economies." A third face of the ongoing structural transformation we are sketchily addressing here shows itself, so to speak, in the massive centralization of capital of the postwar decades. Slowly, haltingly, b u t m o r e a n d m o r e definitely, the central agency of capitalist a c c u m u l a t i o n on a world scale, a world ruling class in formation, is organizing a relational structure for continually resolving the massive contradictions, increasingly a p p a r e n t between the transnational corporations' control over, a n d hence responsibility for, t h e interrelations among productive processes a n d the multiple states' control over, a n d hence responsibility for, the labor forces these production processes engage, m o r e or less sporadically. T h i s structure being organized is basically a sort of replacement, at a "higher level" of course, for the latel a m e n t e d colonial empires, w h o s e d e m i s e the national m o v e m e n t s sought a n d t h e new h e g e m o n i c power, the U n i t e d States, required. T h r o u g h those a r r a n g e m e n t s , a n d such cousins of t h e m as t h e C h i n e s e concessions a n d the O t t o m a n capitulations, the axial division of labor h a d been furthered a n d , subject to the very system's structural cycles, assured. T h e twentieth century's thirty-years' war (1914— 45), insofar as it was a b o u t those a r r a n g e m e n t s , resolved the 48

Dilemmas of A ntisystemic Movements question of h e g e m o n i c p o w e r (a U n i t e d States versus G e r m a n y fight, it was then understood) b u t left for invention the m e a n s of its exercise and, with that, the perpetuation of both the axial division of labor a n d t h e necessary multiple sovereignties, t h r o u g h which the interstate system a n d hence the relations of h e g e m o n y operated. T h e invention was a long time in c o m i n g a n d seems to have emerged fully only, as we said earlier, after the narrowness of the limits of great-power military force h a d finally been established by the V i e t n a m e s e for all to see. Crudely put, what seems to have been going on, by way of a structural replacement of the colonial empires, has been the s i m u l t a n e o u s growth in massive centralizations of capital and a sort of deconcentration of capital (called deindustrialization in present core areas of the axial division of labor). T h e massive centralization has as its agencies quite small ad hoc steering committees of consortia, each c o m p o s e d of several h u n d r e d b a n k s working in close relations both with central b a n k s a n d with international agencies, notably the I B R D , a n d IMF, a n d the BIS. T h e centralization here is at the m o n e y point in the circuit of capital, a n d t h e borrowers are not directly capitalist e n t r e p r e n e u r s b u t are instead states, which in turn use the more-or-less e n c u m b e r e d credits to work with transnationals, operating with undistributed surpluses in various "development" projects, which, as they are realized materially, a m o u n t to w h a t is called by some " T h i r d W o r l d industrialization" a n d result in precisely the "deindustrialization" of previously core areas. T h i s face of the transformation does suggest reconsidering the theoretically p r e s u m e d concatenation of centralization a n d concentration of capital. But even m o r e it suggests reconceptualizing the fundamental n a t u r e of t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n process as it is f r a m e d t h r o u g h t h e idea of t h e circuits of capital. F o r w h e n the i n d e b t e d states r u n into trouble, one of the agencies of this a r r a n g e m e n t , t h e I M F , 49

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steps forward with austerity plans, the gist a n d substance of which a m o u n t to lowering the costs, now internationally reckoned, of the daily a n d generational reproduction of the labor forces of (within?) each of the countries. T h e a r r a n g e m e n t is not per se historically new — one thinks of the O t t o m a n capitulations, for example — b u t it is far m o r e massive and, as a structural array of processes of the world-system, far m o r e frequent in occurrence a n d telling in its implications for the structuring of the a c c u m u lation process as such. Together these three facets of the o n g o i n g structural transformation of the m o d e r n world-system, all of which reveal, to a greater or lesser extent, the structural s u r r o u n d of the state power seized or occupied by antisystemic movements in the course of the twentieth century, a n d indicate the degree a n d kind of reconstitution of terrain with which present a n d future m o v e m e n t s of a like sort have to contend. T h e y indicate as well — t h o u g h this is not here a central concern of ours — the a n a c h r o n i s m of the contents we give to the concepts with which we c o m m o n l y work. T h e d i l e m m a s of the antisystemic m o v e m e n t s are thus in some m e a s u r e the u n i n t e n d e d p r o d u c t of a sort of false consciousness on the part, not of toadies nor even of hairsplitters, b u t of the most engaged of the intelligentsia. T h e r e remains a m a t t e r to e n d on here — to raise as a sort of coda — for nothing before has directly prefigured it. T h i s is the ongoing transformation of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s networks. T h e Communist Manifesto observes: "And that union, to attain which the burghers of the M i d d l e Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the m o d e r n proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years." It is now nearly a century a n d a half since that was written. T h a t sentence has lost n o n e of its force. But it m u s t be understood contemporarily. In the U n i t e d States, in the 1960s, what effected the interrelation of the h u n d r e d - a n d fifty or so Black demonstrations a n d the even m o r e n u m e r 50

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ous public forms of the antiwar movement was television, which is why the c o m m a n d i n g officer of the G r e n a d a operation (Grenada: less than half the size in territory a n d people of an upstate New York county) correctly, from the US government's point of view, decreed there w a s to be no a c c o m p a n y i n g news coverage of the invasion. T h e kind of concern flagged in the Manifesto, the material m e a n s of unity a m o n g those geographically separate, remains central. T h e m e a n s themselves, a n d the very form of their materiality, have been f u n d a m e n t a l l y t r a n s f o r m e d . M o r e a n d m o r e antisystemic movements will find their own cohesion a n d coherence forged a n d destroyed by the newest of the m e a n s of mediating social relations. W h e r e then are we? We are massively, seriously in urgent need of reconstructing the strategy, perhaps the ideology, p e r h a p s the organizational structure of the family of world antisystemic movements; if we are to cope effectively with the real d i l e m m a s before which we are placed, as the "stateness" of states a n d the "capitalist" n a t u r e of capitalism grow at an incredible pace. We know this creates objective contradictions for the system as such a n d for the m a n a g e r s of the status q u o . But it creates d i l e m m a s for the antisystemic movements almost as grave. T h u s we cannot count on the "automaticity" of progress; thus we cannot a b a n d o n critical analysis of o u r real historical alternatives.

51

The Liberation of Class Struggle?

Over the past few decades the relationship between national liberation a n d class conflict — between national-liberation struggles a n d proletarian-liberation struggles — has been presented in three broadly differing ways. T h e national struggle has been seen as a form, or even the form, of the class struggle on a world scale. T h e national struggle has been t h o u g h t of as analogous to the class struggle because a revolutionary m o v e m e n t may organize the oppressed in each case a n d , with victory, effect f u n d a m e n t a l changes in the world-scale social structuring of the a c c u m u l a t i o n process. T h e national struggle a n d the class struggle have also been seen as related historically, a n d so theoretically, b u t as different in kind because their historical trajectories differ, the o n e toward r e p r o d u c i n g the capitalist worlde c o n o m y by extending a n d d e e p e n i n g its interstate plane of operations, the other toward eliminating the capitalist world-economy by eliminating its defining b o u r g e o i s proletarian relation. T h e first we think of as the ideological conception of the relation (between the national struggle a n d the class struggle); the second, as the political conception; the third, as the historical-theoretical conception. 53

A ntisystemic Movements We seek below to explicate these prefatory remarks in three ways. First, we shall sketch the rise a n d subsidence or quiescence of national liberation as a world-historical organizing — or better, reorganizing — force. Second, we shall seek to clarify the differences between, on the o n e h a n d t h e "vertical" relation a n d class categories formed by t h e class struggle, a n d on t h e other h a n d t h e "horizontal" relations of competition a m o n g a n d b e t w e e n "political" leaderships a n d "economic" leaderships that are often c o n f o u n d e d with the "vertical" relations, both practically and theoretically. T h i r d , we shall briefly outline the developmental processes that m a k e t h e class struggle an increasingly overt a n d ramifying force for the transformation of the m o d e r n world-system, while at the s a m e time operating in contradiction to its objectives by confining excessively its expression to changes in t h e relational structures of the interstate system. T h e struggle for national liberation as we have c o m e to know it has a long history. National liberation from what? Obviously, the answer is national liberation f r o m the unequal relations a m o n g different zones of t h e m o d e r n world-system. T h i s system has taken, as we know, t h e form of a capitalist world-economy, which has e x p a n d e d in space over time, incorporated zones previously external to it, subordinated t h e m (economically, politically, a n d culturally), a n d held t h e m tightly within an integrated whole. O n e of the f u n d a m e n t a l ideological t h e m e s of all m o d e r n nationalism has been the struggle for equality — both the hypothetical equality of all m e m b e r s of the "nation" a n d the d e m a n d for equality with "outside" oppressor states/ groups. (Of course, this was only o n e of t h e themes. T h e r e has also been the theme of " u n i q u e n e s s " which, u n d e r certain conditions, could be translated into a justification for the oppression of others.) Egalitarian d e m a n d s in t h e guise of nationalism are already in evidence in the nineteenth, even the late 54

The Liberation of Class Struggle? eighteenth, centuries. T h e struggle of W h i t e colonists for i n d e p e n d e n c e in t h e Americas, the H a i t i a n revolution, the Spanish resistance to N a p o l e o n , M e h e m e t Ali's effort to " m o d e r n i z e " Egypt, the "Springtime of the Nations" in 1848, Garibaldi a n d Kossuth, t h e founding o f t h e I n d i a n National Congress w e r e all reflections of this global thrust. But it is only in t h e twentieth century that we can see national-liberation m o v e m e n t s as a m a j o r organizational p h e n o m e n o n of the world-system. Even before the First World W a r , the political "revolutions" in Mexico, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , Persia, and C h i n a m a d e it clear that, no sooner had the "expansion of E u r o p e " reached its a p o g e e (the last two decades of the nineteenth century), than the counterpressures immediately began to be significant. T h e Russian Revolution of O c t o b e r 1917 was no d o u b t a turning point in the political history of t h e m o d e r n worldsystem. T h e Bolsheviks presented themselves as the protagonist of the working-class struggle for C o m m u n i s m , the outgrowth o f t h e nineteenth-century "social m o v e m e n t " (at that time largely a E u r o p e a n movement) of the proletariat against t h e bourgeoisie. This was no d o u b t t h e case. But from t h e outset, everyone r e m a r k e d on the fact that this "first proletarian revolution" h a d t a k e n place not in t h e m o s t "advanced" capitalist country or countries (where t h e theory h a d predicted it would h a p p e n ) b u t in a relatively " b a c k w a r d " zone. Although m u c h of the s u p p o r t for t h e revolution c a m e from "proletarians" struggling against "bourgeois," surely one element of support for the Bolsheviks took t h e form of a drive for "national liberation." T h a t this latter "nationalist" element was involved a n d was not always c o m p a t i b l e with the o t h e r "class" element in t h e Bolshevik a g e n d a was most poignantly a n d significantly reflected in the s t o r m y career and eventual elimination of Sultan Galiev who called u p o n Bolshevik leaders to redirect their strategy f r o m a concentration on E u r o p e to a concentration on t h e "East." Lenin 55

A ntisystemic Movements himself did try to bring together the world's "socialist" m o v e m e n t s a n d the world's "national-liberation" movem e n t s in the Congress of Baku. Ever since, the cohabitation of these two "antisystemic" forces h a s r e m a i n e d both very real a n d very uneasy. In the last fifty years it has b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e difficult to separate the two rhetorics (socialism a n d national liberation), a n d even to keep t h e m organizationally separate (as the political histories of C h i n a a n d Vietnam both illustrate very well). T h i s c o m b i n a t i o n has been very efficacious. Nonetheless, the cohabitation of these two rhetorics, tendencies, forces, has b e e n at best uneasy, at worst deeply obscuring of social reality. At o n e level, since 1945, national-liberation m o v e m e n t s have been magnificently successful. Almost all parts of the world that in 1945 were colonies of " m e t r o p o l i t a n " states are today i n d e p e n d e n t sovereign states, equal m e m b e r s of the U n i t e d Nations. T h e process by which this occurred was threefold. On the one hand, in a certain n u m b e r of states, there was a significant a m o u n t of organized a r m e d struggle, which culminated in t h e c o m i n g to political p o w e r in the state of the m o v e m e n t that h a d led this a r m e d struggle. In o t h e r states, merely t h e potential for such a r m e d struggle by a movement, given the world context of the m a n y a r m e d struggles going on elsewhere, was e n o u g h to enable t h e m o v e m e n t to achieve power (usually by "electoral" means). Finally, in a third set of states, precisely in o r d e r to h e a d off such movements, the metropolitan p o w e r a r r a n g e d a transfer to power of s o m e so-called m o d e r a t e i n d i g e n o u s g r o u p (what the French called an " independance octroyee"). No d o u b t there a r e m a n y instances in which t h e story falls in t h e interstices of this m o d e l . A n d no d o u b t , too, a few such struggles for the "transfer of power" are still going on, particularly in states that are already "sovereign" (South Africa, various parts of C e n t r a l A m e r i c a , a n d so on). However, the bulk of the struggles for w h a t m i g h t be called "formal" national liberation are n o w over. We a r e now able 56

The Liberation of Class Struggle? to look back u p o n what they have accomplished. On the o n e h a n d , these struggles have accomplished very m u c h . T h e arrogant a n d self-confident global racism involved in colonialism has disappeared or at least gone u n d e r g r o u n d . T h e role of indigenous persons in the political decisions affecting the less powerful states of the world is considerably greater today t h a n it was in 1945. T h e actual state policies of such countries have tended to reflect this "indigenization" of political decision-making. On the other h a n d , the changes certainly have not been as great as the national-liberation m o v e m e n t s h a d anticipated as of, say, 1945. T h e r e are two kinds of explanation for this. O n e is that the control of the state m a c h i n e r y of a state (any state) in t h e interstate system affords less real p o w e r in practice t h a n it does in theory. T h e second is that there a r e internal class struggles going on in the states who have already known "national liberation." T h e s e two factors are linked, b u t it would be clearer to begin the analysis by provisionally keeping t h e m analytically separate. T h e analytical question: " H o w m u c h power does one have w h e n o n e has state power?" is relatively simple to explicate, once o n e distinguishes ideology f r o m reality. O n e of the ideological principles of the m o d e r n interstate system is the totality of sovereignty. Sovereignty, or the indep e n d e n t juridical status of a "state" as recognized by the other state m e m b e r s of the interstate system, m e a n s in theory the right of the government of that state to m a k e laws a n d administer its "internal" affairs w i t h o u t a n y constraints other t h a n those that are self-imposed by the state's constitutional structure. In plain English, every g o v e r n m e n t is s u p p o s e d to be able to do whatever it d e e m s wise within its borders. However, this is in fact not t h e case, even for such powerful states as the U n i t e d States or the U S S R , a n d a fortiori it is not true for the weaker states of Asia, Africa, a n d Latin America. T h e restraints on the power of sovereign states are m a n y . 57

A ntisystemic Movements First, t h e r e are those restraints t h a t exist b u t are "illegitimate." For example, one restraint is the de facto power of outside forces to subvert openly or to seek to modify sub rosa the policies of a given state by s o m e form of "interference" in that state's "internal" affairs. T h i s is a familiar story. Ultimately, such an activity can involve actual military intrusion. Although in s o m e formal sense such practices are "illegitimate" in terms of "international law," they are in fact engaged in with such frequency that any government m u s t take cognizance of these possibilities if it intends to remain in power. H e n c e the threat of such illegitimate interference in practice compels a certain " p r u d e n c e " on sovereign states. Since the interstate system is normally the arena of k n o w n rivalries (for example, at the present time, that between the U n i t e d States a n d the U S S R ) , it is often t h o u g h t that a sovereign state can "escape" t h e threat of interference by one strong state if it links itself politically with that state's principal rival. T h i s is to s o m e extent true, of course. To be sure, it t h e n risks "interference" by t h e state to w h i c h it has linked itself, b u t it m a y consider this prospect less i m m e d i a t e a n d less threatening. T h e real question is not in this prospect. T h e real question lies in t h e realm of w h a t might be called the "legitimate" constraints on t h e powers of sovereign states. W h a t are these "legitimate" constraints? T h e y are those that all the m a j o r powers of the interstate system agree de facto to impose not only on the weaker states b u t on t h e m selves. T h e y are those that m a i n t a i n the existence of an interstate system. T h e s e constraints are m o r e n u m e r o u s t h a n we ordinarily recognize, primarily because they are seldom codified a n d are s o m e w h a t a m o r p h o u s a n d variable in their details. T h e y include w h a t is sometimes called "civilized behavior" a m o n g states. For example, diplomatic i m m u n i t y is a quite sacred principle, rarely violated. T h e social pressure to m a i n t a i n this system is so strong that 58

The Liberation of Class Struggle? states often restrain themselves on matters a b o u t w h i c h they feel very strongly in order to fulfill their obligations u n d e r this principle. A second imposed restraint has to do with trans-state property rights. T h e de facto principle is that all states m a y exercise e m i n e n t d o m a i n on foreign-owned property within their frontiers up to a point. T h a t point is somewhat unclear. But it has not been historically true that any state could in fact nationalize without any c o m p e n s a t i o n . M a n y have tried, b u t the counterpressures have been such that they have all retreated in part. A rapid look at the practices o f t h e government of the U S S R vis-a-vis foreign-property rights will m a k e this eminently clear. (We single out t h e U S S R only to indicate t h a t even a state with its military might a n d ideology conforms to this constraint.) A third imposed restraint has to do with t h e s u p p o r t of oppositional m o v e m e n t s in other countries. All states (or almost all states) engage in such supportive actions. Sometimes they do it intensively. Yet they all do it only up to a point. T h e r e seems regularly to i n t r u d e s o m e limit to comradely assistance. O n c e again the limit is unclear. But the reality is there. If o n e asks how these imposed "legitimate" restraints on sovereignty really operate, often even in w a r t i m e , t h e answer has to be that there are implied threats of force against the violators of the n o r m s , which are efficacious because they are s u p p o r t e d by an exceptionally strong consensus o f t h e world's states. R e g i m e s that flaunt such a strong consensus rarely survive very long. W h e n , therefore, in the early years of a "revolutionary" government, after t h e coming to power of a "national-liberation m o v e m e n t " there is a faction talking about "realism," what this faction is a r g u i n g is t h e n e e d to take cognizance of t h e s e m e c h a n i s m s of the interstate system. W h e n s o m e other m o v e m e n t accuses a regime that has decided to be "realistic" of being "revisionist," the accusation rings true. But t h e "revision59

A ntisystemic Movements ism" is structural, not volitional. Let us be very clear. We are n o t preaching the virtues of "realism" or "revisionism." We are merely trying to explain its repeated occurrence in states w h e r e national-liberation m o v e m e n t s have c o m e to power. But this is of course not t h e whole story. T h e r e is also t h e factor of the class struggle. As long as we live in a capitalist world-economy, there is class struggle, a n d it continues to exist within all states located within t h e world-system, no m a t t e r w h a t its political coloration. Statements of regimes that there does not exist, or t h e r e no longer exists, a class struggle within the b o u n d a r i e s of their state, are ideological statements devoid of analytical substance. T h e underlying social reality of the class struggle continues within all existing states, including those where national-liberation movem e n t s have c o m e to power. T h e question is, w h a t is t h e role of this national-liberation m o v e m e n t in relation to this class struggle in the period after it has c o m e to power, or p e r h a p s we should invert the question a n d ask w h a t is t h e role of class struggle in relation to o t h e r kinds of struggle that typically characterize the capitalist world-economy, t h e struggle between c o m p e t i n g "elites," that is, intra-bourgeois struggles. T h e r e are two varieties of such intra-bourgeois struggles. O n e is the struggle for state power or political c o m m a n d . Its protagonists compete with each other (within a n d outside of parliaments, parties, state bureaucracies, a n d so on) in an a t t e m p t to seize the " c o m m a n d i n g h e i g h t s " of state a p p a r atuses (that already exist or are being created ex novo) a n d , once in control, to enforce t h e sovereignty of t h e state. T h i s e n f o r c e m e n t involves struggles against other states (as e m p h a s i z e d in the previous pages) b u t also struggle against the state's own subjects. T h e outcomes of the struggle a m o n g such c o m p e t i n g political elites for state power on these t h r e e fronts (control over the state a p p a r a t u s , sovereignty in t h e interstate 60

The Liberation of Class Struggle? system, a n d authority over t h e state's subjects) are obviously closely interrelated. In turn they are strongly influenced by the other kind of intra-elite struggle that m u s t also be clearly distinguished f r o m t h e class struggle: the struggle for the appropriation of wealth or economic command. T h e protagonists of this economic struggle c o m p e t e with each other (within a n d outside of markets a n d economic organizations) to obtain as large a share as possible of the wealth p r o d u c e d in the world-economy. T h e larger the share actually obtained, the larger t h e resources that can be mobilized in future struggles. Since "wealth" can be accumulated m o r e easily t h a n "state power," economic c o m m a n d has a cumulative character t h a t is w a n t i n g in political c o m m a n d . We shall later discuss t h e implications of this difference. For now let us n o t e that t h e difference is one of degree a n d that t h e reproduction of economic c o m m a n d also involves a p e r m a n e n t struggle on m a n y fronts. At t h e global level, t h e essential characteristic of the economic struggle is that each actor (normally b u t not necessarily a capitalist enterprise) tries to force competition u p o n the other actors while simultaneously creating for itself a relatively protected niche f r o m which a rent or a quasi-rent (natural, positional, technological, organizational, a n d so on) can be reaped. T h i s struggle continually structures a n d restructures economic activities into core activities (those that afford the appropriation of a rent or a quasi-rent) a n d peripheral activities (those that afford no such appropriation). C o r e niches are never secure for long. As soon as they are created, they invite the direct or indirect counterattack of other e c o n o m i c elites that have been forced by that very creation into less competitive niches. A n d as the counterattack unfolds, previously core activities are peripheralized a n d with it t h e locales a n d the organizations that h a n g on to t h e m . 61

A ntisystemic Movements It follows t h a t mobility (as a m o n g activities, locales, o r g a n i z a t i o n a l forms, a n d so on) is an essential r e q u i r e m e n t for t h e s u r v i v a l / r e p r o d u c t i o n of e c o n o m i c elites, a n d this r e q u i r e m e n t often t e n d s to b r i n g t h e m into conflict with political elites; despite t h e fact that, at t h e individual level, m a n y p e r s o n s m o v e b a c k a n d forth b e t w e e n a political role a n d a n e c o n o m i c o n e . T o b e s u r e , t h e interests o f political a n d e c o n o m i c elites overlap o n m a n y g r o u n d s . T h e very r e p r o d u c t i o n of e c o n o m i c elites r e q u i r e s t h e b a c k i n g of political c o m m a n d , if for no o t h e r r e a s o n t h a n to enforce p r o p e r t y rights a n d c o n t r a c t u a l obligations; a n d w h e n e v e r they can, e c o n o m i c elites are all too keen to exploit or u s e political c o m m a n d to b a c k up or create for themselves rent a n d q u a s i - r e n t positions. Conversely, political elites c a n n o t succeed in their m u l t i faceted struggle for state p o w e r w i t h o u t t h e b a c k i n g of t h e e c o n o m i c c o m m a n d wielded by e c o n o m i c elites. T h i s is particularly t r u e in view of t h e fact m e n t i o n e d earlier t h a t wealth o r e c o n o m i c c o m m a n d a c c u m u l a t e s m o r e easily t h a n political c o m m a n d . T h e implication of this difference is t h a t success a n d failure in t h e struggle for state p o w e r is increasingly related to t h e actors' capability to b r i n g ( c u m u lating) e c o n o m i c c o m m a n d t o b e a r u p o n ( n o n c u m u l a t i n g ) political c o m m a n d . E c o n o m i c a n d political elites are t h u s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a b l e p r e s s u r e t o s h a r e / e x c h a n g e t h e e c o n o m i c a n d political c o m m a n d t h e y respectively wield. As we shall see presently, the p r e s s u r e to do so originates not only in t h e competitive struggles for state p o w e r a n d wealth, b u t also a n d especially in t h e class struggle. W h e n all is said a n d d o n e , however, it r e m a i n s true, first, that t h e logic of t h e struggle for political c o m m a n d is different f r o m that of t h e struggle for e c o n o m i c c o m m a n d ; a n d , second, that this difference is a s o u r c e of conflict a n d struggle b e t w e e n (as well as a m o n g ) political a n d e c o n o m i c elites. F o r o n e thing, conflicts a r e b o u n d to arise over t h e 62

The Liberation of Class Struggle? "terms of exchange" between political a n d economic c o m m a n d . T h e fact that both types of elite benefit f r o m the exchange does not in a n d of itself d e t e r m i n e the terms at which the two parties will agree to carry out t h e exchange. A m o r e or less wide zone of indeterminacy remains, a n d both types of elite will be u n d e r the pressure of their respective competitive struggles to strike the best possible bargain a n d , if pressed too hard, to transform the bargaining process into open conflict. W h a t makes this transformation likely is the fact that political c o m m a n d is typically "territorial" (in the sense that it is b o u n d to a given territory) while economic c o m m a n d is very often, a n d particularly for m a j o r actors, " t r a n s t e n t orial" (in the sense that it operates across territories). In this case too, the difference between the two types of c o m m a n d is one of degree. Yet is is real enough, a n d it leads to a p e r m a n e n t struggle between political a n d economic elites over the "transterritoriality" of t h e latter, that is, their ability to move in a n d out of state jurisdictions rather t h a n being p e r m a n e n t l y a n d completely subjected to any one of t h e m . All these inter- a n d intra-elite struggles are often confusingly discussed as t h o u g h they were part of t h e class struggle. In our view, it is m o r e useful to restrict the concept of class struggle to vertical conflicts that c o u n t e r p o s e groups a n d individuals in situations differently related to t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n . Inter- a n d intra-elite conflicts, in contrast, are typically horizontal conflicts that counterpose groups a n d individuals related in similar ways to the m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n or to the m e a n s of legitimate violence. As such, they are better referred to as competitive struggles a n d labeled as either economic or political intra-elite struggles d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r the p r i m a r y object of t h e competition is wealth or state power. Strictly speaking, in order to be able to speak of t h e existence of class struggle, three conditions m u s t be fulfilled. First, t h e r e is an identifiable pattern of collective or general63

A ntisystemic Movements ized protest. Second, the objectives or t h e forms of t h e protest are such that the struggle is traceable to a class situation (that is, a given relationship to the m e a n s of production) of the participants in the protest. T h i r d , the struggle derives from, or creates a counterposition between, groups differently related to t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to these criteria s o m e struggles (strikes a n d other forms of collective or generalized workplace protest by wage workers, t h e witholding of agricultural surpluses or the cutting d o w n of cultivation by peasants or farmers, the seizure of land by landless peasants, food riots by t h e u r b a n u n e m p l o y e d , a n d so on) have a strong likelihood of qualifying as episodes of class struggle. In other cases ( d e m o n strations, u r b a n a n d rural guerrilla warfare, acts of terrorism, a n d so on), w h e t h e r or not t h e acts of protest qualify as episodes of the class struggle d e p e n d s , a m o n g other things, on their context, protagonists, objectives, a n d so on. T h e p r o b l e m in these latter instances is that t h e form of struggle is m o r e frequently associated with a competitive struggle a m o n g political elites t h a n it is with a class struggle in the sense we have defined it. T h e two types of struggle can of course intersect a n d overlap, a n d they n o r m a l l y do. Q u i t e often, t h e class struggle generates d e m a n d s for l e a d e r s h i p a n d organization that are supplied either by new political elites that e m e r g e out of the class struggle itself or by previously existing elites. In either case t h e class struggle "flows out" into a c o m p e titive struggle for state power. As this occurs, t h e political elites that provide social classes with leadership a n d organization (even if they sincerely consider themselves "instrum e n t s " of t h e class struggle) usually find that they have to play by t h e rules of that competition a n d therefore m u s t a t t e m p t to s u b o r d i n a t e the class struggle to those rules in order to survive as competitors for state power. Conversely, it often h a p p e n s that the inter- a n d intra-elite struggles over political a n d economic c o m m a n d wittingly or unwittingly 64

The Liberation of Class Struggle? stir up the class struggle. In this case, a particular class struggle that emerges initially as an " i n s t r u m e n t " of intraa n d inter-elite competition may very well s u b s e q u e n t l y develop its own m o m e n t u m . In b o t h instances the class struggle intersects a n d overlaps with t h e struggle over political c o m m a n d b u t remains or b e c o m e s a distinct process. Mutatis mutandis, the s a m e could be said of t h e relationship between the class struggle a n d the struggle over economic command. T h e Russian Revolution of 1917 was the o u t c o m e of a very special c o n j u n c t u r e of these three types of struggle, n a m e l y the convergence a n d fusion of particularly a c u t e horizontal a n d vertical conflicts over world political a n d e c o n o m i c c o m m a n d within a n d across national locales. T h e Bolsheviks, skillfully exploiting this c o n j u n c t u r e , seized the c o m m a n d i n g heights of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e in t h e n a m e of the working class. T h e y were thereby faced with the d i l e m m a of w h e t h e r to use this newly-conquered p o w e r to sustain the class struggle within a n d outside their state b o u n d a r i e s or to consolidate their power within a restruct u r e d b u t tendentially stable interstate system. A l t h o u g h t h e eventual solution of the d i l e m m a in t h e direction of the second vector was already foreshadowed at Kronstadt, t h e o u t c o m e was t h e result of long inter- a n d intra-elite struggles in which the rhetorical identification of the political interest of t h e Bolshevik Party a n d the state with the class interests of world labor played a m a j o r role in influencing a n d constraining t h e behavior of all involved. T h i s s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the class struggle in the U S S R to other considerations has h a d two consequences. It has tended to de-legitimize the class struggle when waged against t h e interests of t h e Soviet political leadership a n d its m o r e or less t e m p o r a r y allies. A n d it has p r o m o t e d an ideological polarization in the interstate system that could be, a n d has been, exploited by national-liberation m o v e m e n t s a n d t h e political elites that have e m e r g e d out of t h e m . T h e 65

A ntisystemic Movements c o m b i n e d effect of these two tendencies has been t h e continuing a m b i g u o u s relationship between t h e political leadership of national liberation m o v e m e n t s a n d the class struggle. In the p h a s e of actual struggle for national liberation, that is; in the process of formation of new formally sovereign states, the political elites leading the struggles have used a d o u b l e s t a n d a r d toward the class struggle. T h e legitimacy of genuine episodes of class struggle, as defined above, was u p h e l d or denied according to w h e t h e r they strengthened or weakened the elites' h a n d in the pursuit of the Political K i n g d o m . For example, w h e t h e r a strike was s u p p o r t e d / o r g a n i z e d or not often d e p e n d e d on whether it was directed against the colonial authorities a n d sectors of capital hostile to independence, or against sectors of capital favorable to i n d e p e n d e n c e . This double s t a n d a r d was m o r e strictly enforced when the leaderships of national-liberation m o v e m e n t s depicted themselves as instruments or agents of the class struggle in the interstate system. O n c e national i n d e p e n d e n c e was attained, the use of this d o u b l e standard m e a n t a f u r t h e r narrowing of the legitimacy of the class struggle in the new national locales. T h i s tendency has two q u i t e distinct roots. On the o n e hand, we have regimes that have a t t e m p t e d to consolidate their power t h r o u g h an alliance with the political a n d econ o m i c elites of core zones. In this case, the class struggle was de-legitimized as part of the political exchange between core a n d peripheral elites, whereby the former respect/ protect the formal sovereignty of the latter in exchange for the latter's creation within their national b o u n d a r i e s of an environment favorable to core capital. On the other h a n d , we have regimes that have a t t e m p t e d to consolidate their power through the opposite route of struggle against core elites. In this case, the class struggle within the country was de-legitimized as an obstacle to the former struggle, which was itself defined as class struggle at a higher level. 66

The Liberation of Class Struggle? T h e fact that opposite strategies of consolidation of p o w e r led to similar outcomes from the point of view of the legitimacy of class struggle in t h e T h i r d W o r l d c a n only be understood in the light of the peripheral position of m o s t T h i r d W o r l d states. This position implies little or no c o m m a n d over world surplus, a n d this, in turn, has two implications for the class struggle: (1) from the point of view of its protagonists (social classes) there is not m u c h to be gained from it, so that actual episodes of class struggle are likely to engender frustration rather than class consciousness; (2) u n d e r these circumstances, peripheral elites competing for political c o m m a n d do not normally find social classes u p o n which to constitute reliable bases of power a n d hence have resorted to one of the two strategies m e n t i o n e d above. O u r conception of class struggle as the pivotal process of the capitalist world-economy is t h u s u n r e m a r k a b l y conventional. As struggle, it is conceived to be a struggle over the development a n d organization of productive forces; hence over the directional control of m e a n s of production a n d m e a n s of livelihood; hence over the social relations factually effecting that control. As historical process, it is conceived to be a process that continually forms and reforms the relational classes it joins in conflict. In t u r n , of course, their structuring, consciousness, organization, a n d development vary immensely, a m o n g a n d within the t i m e space structural zones of the world-scale a c c u m u l a t i o n process, owing, as was said in a n o t h e r context, to a "historical a n d moral element." As a result, the process of class struggle a n d the relational character of the classes f o r m e d therein continually occur historically in culturally, organizationally, a n d civilizationally distinctive versions, each as it were with its ownauthenticity a n d originality, which m a r k the scope of its historical presence. Moreover, the ongoing changes which the class struggle effects in the social structuring of the a c c u m u l a t i o n process themselves 67

A ntisystemic Movements transform in locationally distinctive ways the circumstances in a n d t h r o u g h which the class struggle as historical process operates. It is as if the g a m e a n d the players — there are no spectators — were always the s a m e b u t the rules, officials, a n d b o u n d a r i e s of the playing field were novel on each a n d every occasion — a n d not at all that k n o w a b l e until seen in retrospect. We know f r o m the sketch in Part I of the Communist Manifesto h o w M a r x a n d Engels saw that class struggle f o r m e d the two great classes d u r i n g t h e period w h e n the ramifying social division of labor that m a r k e d industrialization of the core at that time was occurring. We know too f r o m the E u r o p e a n writers of the interwar period — Gramsci, Lukacs, Reich, Korsch, for example — h o w deeply state encapsulation of the projected development of the proletariat contradicted t h e uniting of t h e workers of the world. It deflected the formative revolutionary tendencies into national a n d international organs, that is, into organs that work through, a n d so reinforce a n d d e p e n d u p o n , o n e of the f u n d a m e n t a l structures a n d planes of operation of t h e capitalist economy, namely, the relational network we call its interstate system. A n d we know t h e c o u n t e r p a r t movem e n t : in the phrasing of E . H . Carr, W h e n the cause of revolution, having proved b a r r e n in the west, flourished in the fertile soil of Asia, the s h a p e of things to c o m e radically c h a n g e d . . . . T h e [Russian] revolution could n o w be seen n o t only as a revolt a g a i n s t bourgeois capitalism in the most b a c k w a r d western country, but as a revolt against western imperialism in the most advanced eastern c o u n t r y

(1969: 30-31). T h i s we discussed earlier. Samir A m i n d r e w t h e necessary inference for theoretical work, in r e m a r k i n g on t h e a m a z i n g power of Eurocentrism. " T h e vision of the 'advanced' pro letariat of the West bringing socialism as a 'gift' to the 'backw a r d ' masses of the periphery is not 'intolerable' — it is merely refuted by history" (1974: 603), 68

The Liberation of Class Struggle? With the reestablishment of h e g e m o n y in t h e worldsystem u n d e r the aegis of t h e U n i t e d States as h e g e m o n i c power, there developed in t h o u g h t — Eastern a n d Western, N o r t h e r n a n d S o u t h e r n — an effort to b r i n g class struggle a n d national liberation, as conceptions of transformation, into m o r e definite theoretical (not merely historical) relations. We pass over here the kinds of effort we earlier called ideological in character, those where the leadership of nationalliberation struggles was seen as acting in the cause of, a n d by s o m e in the n a m e of, the world proletariat's historical mission. Not m a n y students of t h e capitalist worlde c o n o m y today work with this sort of version, or vision, of the relation between the two constructs. W h a t we called the political form of the relation, however — in which the c o m m o n element of struggle for state power provides t h e g r o u n d for considering the two, the national struggle a n d the class struggle, as historically alternative precursors to socialist revolution — does require brief c o m m e n t . M a n y of us have m o v e d theoretically in this direction if not e m b r a c i n g the formulation explicitly. An influential statement of the theoretical development was by Lin Biao in " T h e International Significance of C o m r a d e M a o T s e - t u n g ' s T h e o r y of People's War." T h e r e it will be recalled he first notes that " t h e proletarian revolutionary m o v e m e n t [i.e., class struggle] has for various reasons b e e n temporarily held back in the N o r t h A m e r i c a n a n d West E u r o p e a n capitalist countries . . ." He s u b s e q u e n t l y asserts that t h e "national-democratic revolution is t h e necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and t h e socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel to t h e nationaldemocratic revolution." T h e national-democratic struggle has of course the form of a united front: " T h e revolution e m b r a c e s in its ranks not only the workers, peasants, a n d the u r b a n petty bourgeoisie, b u t also the national b o u r geoisie a n d o t h e r patriotic a n d anti-imperialist d e m o c r a t s " (1967: 3 5 2 - 3 [emphasis added]). 69

A ntisystemic Movements This is not a theoretical u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the relations between national liberation a n d class struggle with which we can concur, as o u r reflections above probably suggest. T h e r e m a y indeed be theoretical virtue, w h e n arraying the historical alternatives (here, futures) to which nationalliberation struggles could lead (might have led, might yet lead), in the d r a w i n g of an analogy between t h e m a n d the world-historical class struggle a n d the revolutionary transformation the conception entails. T h e r e is, however, no theoretical virtue in, a n d m u c h confusion p r o d u c e d by, the drawing of an analogy between, (1) national-liberation struggles a n d the historical alternatives their a t t a i n m e n t s define and, (2) class struggle on a world scale a n d the historical alternatives it conceptually entails. National liberation in segments of the capitalist world-economy, a n d the transformations it has effected in relations of rule a n d other social relations, have altered the social structuring of the world-historical a c c u m u l a t i o n process. T h a t m u c h is historically evident a n d therefore theoretically to be taken into account. But it has not eliminated the relational conditions t h r o u g h which the a c c u m u l a t i o n process operates. A n d precisely that world-historical elimination, of the relational conditions t h r o u g h which a c c u m u l a t i o n of capital occurs, is what is entailed in the idea of the class struggle as the pivotal process in the transformation o f t h e capitalist worlde c o n o m y into a socialist world order. N o r theoretically, in o u r view, could national-liberation movements, any m o r e t h a n core-zone social-democratic m o v e m e n t s — given their c o m m o n historical focus on securing a n d exercising power within the interstate system — have effected m u c h more by way of change t h a n they have d o n e . If, however, we cease to accord strategic primacy to acquiring such state power within the interstate system, far m o r e becomes historically possible a n d thereby, within the d o m a i n of historically realistic alternatives, theoretically possible. It would seem a d u b i o u s theoretical tenet to assert 70

The Liberation of Class Struggle? that national liberation, in its successive occurrences, is in any way a necessary condition of the revolutionary transformation of the world-economy. It is surely indefensible to claim it as a sufficient condition. T h e structuring a n d restructuring of the world-economy in the period of US h e g e m o n y has been effected in large part by the successes of the national-liberation movements, successes that have hinged in part on the U n i t e d States' b e c o m i n g hegemonic, a n d have in t u r n up to a point actually furthered that hegemony, C u b a a n d V i e t n a m to the seeming contrary notwithstanding. T h r e e aspects of that continuing change largely delimit at present b o t h the spaces into which the class struggle as world-scale organizing process is moving, a n d the enclosing, f r a g m e n t i n g counterprocesses that have worked to prevent any "uniting" of the workers of the world. F u n d a m e n t a l to the forming of the world labor-force — or in Lenin's sense, to the socialization of production, hence of the proletariat of the world — is of course the rapidly growing world-scale technical division of labor, t h r o u g h the a r r a n g e m e n t s constitutive of the operations of transnational corporations a n d integral, as well, to those of socially related state a n d interstate agencies. Frobel, Heinrichs, a n d Kreye have called this "the new international division of labor" (1980). It is n o t to us so obviously "new," a l t h o u g h that is as m u c h an empirical as a conceptual matter. But it surely is not centrally "international" in the usual sense of that term. It is, rather, centrally "world-scale" — however consequential the interstate system m a y be in laying a n d m a i n t a i n i n g the g r o u n d s for the intrafirm integrations of discrete labor processes, a n d the parallel structuring of a c c u m u l a t i o n , that these world-scale technical divisions of labor entail. T h e s e continuing extensions of technical divisions of labor — of labor processes integrated authoritatively t h r o u g h a capitalist firm's planning a n d control structure, 76

Antisystemic

Movements

r a t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h market processes — p r e s u p p o s e of course extraordinary centralizations of (so-called) productive capital. T h e o r y tells us that centralizations of capital of this sort are to be expected a n d are likely to continue, a n d n o t h i n g in recent history suggests that the theory is in n e e d of revision on this score. T h i s growing "technical" interrelation of labor processes, t h r o u g h this m o v e m e n t of capital, interrelates as well of course the workers so associated, plus those at o n e remove as it were, that is, those whose productive talents are p u t to use in providing those directly engaged in world-scale p r o d u c t i o n with m e a n s of wellbeing (via "the h o m e market"). (World-scale p r o d u c t i o n increasingly displaces " h o m e - m a r k e t " p r o d u c t i o n of course, but we leave that aside here.) It is these ligaments of capitalist enterprise on a world scale that, joining ever larger segments of the world's workers, provide o n e of the r a m i fying relational networks t h r o u g h which class struggle is forming the classes it j o i n s together. T h e developmental tendencies contradicting this p l a n e of potential proletarian u n i o n are several. T h o s e at the level of capital proper, opposing this kind of centralization, seem relatively weak (local capital, the state bourgeoisie, a n d so on). T h o s e at the level of labor, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , seem strong, notably of course state policies, sentiments of n a t i o n a l i s m / p a t r i o t i s m , a n d the like. We r e t u r n to this briefly below. A second of the aspects (of t h e o n g o i n g reorganizing of the m o d e r n world-system) is relationally very different. It has to do with the continuing centralization of (so-called) financial capital, a n d concerns the relational networks of increasing governmental indebtedness. ( W h e t h e r some of these relations of indebtedness c o n c e r n "capital" at all, b u t r a t h e r concern appropriations f r o m realized surplus [revenue] for n o n p r o d u c t i v e operations, is an i m p o r t a n t question b u t n o t o n e we can address here.) T h e s e relations f o r m t h e (rather intricately d r a w n ) d e b t o r - c r e d i t o r lines of T)

The Liberation of Class Struggle? struggle in t h e capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y , a n d so do n o t directly entail class-forming effects {pace W e b e r ) . T h e evolving relational network s e e m s , however, to be m o v i n g increasingly, via the interstate system, to f o r m highly m e d i ated b u t definite c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n very large g r o u p i n g s of d e b t o r s a n d very small g r o u p i n g s of creditors, with t h e g r o u p i n g s b e i n g partially parallel in t h e i r f o r m a t i o n to t h e classes b e i n g f o r m e d by class struggle as it is m o v e d (by capital) o u t a l o n g the e n t e r p r i s e - o r g a n i z e d world-scale division of labor. T h e m e d i a t i o n s m a t t e r . F o r t h e a p p e a r a n c e i s that o f t h e creation of offical d e b t o r a n d c r e d i t o r "states," as c o n d i t i o n of t h e i r existence as states. A n d officially classified d e b t o r states are r e q u i r e d , on p a i n of losing t h e i r creditability as states ( a n d h e n c e of losing, in t o d a y ' s w o r l d , their very "stateness"), to r e d u c e t h e cost of their exports by r e d u c i n g t h e costs to capital, direct a n d indirect, of l a b o r within their b o r d e r s . P o p u l a r d e m o n s t r a t i o n s against such officially c o n s t r u c t e d austerity p l a n s are r e p o r t e d almost daily. T h i s world-level, o r g a n i z e d p r e s s u r e to d e p r e s s the living conditions of the w o r l d ' s m o r e a n d less p r o l e t a r i a n i z e d workers is h a r d to c o n s t r u e as o t h e r t h a n a strategic escalation (by capital) of class struggle. It is, however, an escalation (a n e w scale) t h a t is n o t all that easy to a n a l y z e . It occurs via r a t h e r original m e c h a n i s m s , c o n c e r n i n g an area of class struggle t h a t is poorly u n d e r s t o o d theoretically, n a m e l y , t h e c o m p l e x lines d e l i m i t i n g t h e s p h e r e s of necessary labor, relative s u r p l u s value, a n d levels of livelihood (or, normatively, s t a n d a r d s of well-being). A n d it is a sort of pressure, particularly given the c o m p l e x i t y of the relational m e d i a t i o n s t h a t divides p e o p l e s into o v e r l a p p i n g r a t h e r t h a n p o l a r i z i n g g r o u p i n g s . W h e t h e r , t h e n , the g r o u p i n g s t h a t in fact f o r m , as t h e p r e s s u r e d e e p e n s a n d s p r e a d s , will reinforce or w e a k e n t h e e l e m e n t a l class-forming process is still to be d e t e r m i n e d . O n e can speculate, however, t h a t t h e m o r e these p o p u l a r 73

A ntisystemic Movements struggles focus in each national setting on whatever regime is in office, a n d so b e c o m e focused on who speaks in the n a m e of that national people as a whole, the m o r e will such struggles weaken the workings of the world-scale classforming process a n d strengthen the interstate system. T h e more, on the other h a n d , the p o p u l a r m o v e m e n t s j o i n forces across borders (and continents) to have their respective state officials abrogate those relations of the interstate system t h r o u g h which the pressure is conveyed, the less likely they are to weaken, a n d the m o r e likely they are to strengthen, the pivotal class-forming process of the worldeconomy. It seems unlikely, to assess the third historical alternative, that such p o p u l a r struggles would directly b e c o m e integral to, a n d in this way reinforce, the central area(s) of class struggle, except incidentally, here a n d there, owing to local conditions or local organizing a c u m e n . World-historically, then, these local or regional struggles integral to t h e d e b t o r - c r e d i t o r relation of the worlde c o n o m y of the sort we have been talking a b o u t may keep some relations of accumulation uncertain, but probably will not in themselves prove to be a step or stage in the eliminating of the accumulation process as central organizing force of the m o d e r n world-system. T h e third aspect of the ongoing changes in the organizations a n d structures of the capitalist world-economy is the relational tendencies suggested by the "electronic village" notion. Neither of the kinds of centralization of capital previously remarked, let alone the relational structures of d o m i n a t i o n in virtue of which they could occur a n d operate, is theoretically conceivable without the kind of material conditions for the exercise of power that "electronification" provides. T h e relational networks being formed in addition to the one that we are talking a b o u t are truly extraordinarily complex. We who would study t h e m , are often baffled by their reach as well as by their operation; b u t so too are those responsible for a n d to them, w h e t h e r in 74

The Liberation of Class Struggle? " c o m m a n d i n g " or only "local" positions. On the other h a n d , these m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n — constructed for information to move inward, c o m m a n d s to move o u t w a r d — are in place a n d rapidly growing. They are integral to the e x p a n d i n g centralizations of productive capital a n d its corollary, the extending technical divisions of labor. A n d they are even m o r e integral to the e x p a n d i n g centralizations of financial capital a n d its corollary, the e x p a n d i n g official d e b t o r - c r e d i t o r relational networks. These developmental conditions a n d tendencies are not in d o u b t . A n d again, as M a r x a n d Engels observed in Part I of the Communist Manifesto', "that union, to attain which the b u r ghers of the M i d d l e Ages, with their miserable highways, required centuries, the m o d e r n proletarians, thanks to railways, achieve in a few years" (1976: VI, 493). T h e m e t a p h o r of railways seems to be given more weight here t h a n it can bear. But the general point is as clear as it is central to the way they conceive of class struggle as class forming: the m e a n s the bourgeoisie successively expand, in o r d e r to f o r m a n d integrate discrete labor processes (both the technical a n d the social divisions of labor), thereby bring into relation, as well, the laborers whose activities are being interrelated. Beyond the essentially administrative d e p l o y m e n t of electronic m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is the capitalization of it as an historically increasing c o m p o n e n t of ordinary wellbeing, a process increasingly in direct conflict (not necessarily contradiction) with efforts by governments, in virtue of the workings of the interstate system, to define a n d filter for those territorially subject to their rule what is a n d is not information, entertainment, c o m m e n t a r y , a n d so on. J u s t as one direction of electronification, as world-historical process, bears integrally on the central class-forming process by integrating the technical divisions of labor, so the other r e m a r k e d on here bears integrally on p o p u l a r consciousness of conditions of existence — of what is a n d is not tolerable, of what is a n d is not desirable — a n d hence 75

A ntisystemic Movements on t h e abstruse matters of "necessary labor" a n d "relative surplus value." As with t h e d e b t o r - c r e d i t o r relational structures, so (but even m o r e so) with this second dimension of world-scale "electronification": We collectively lack as yet t h e theoretical ideas to gauge the directional i m p e t u s that this ongoing development will give to p o p u l a r struggles and, a fortiori, to gauge t h e array of effects they m a y have on social m o v e m e n t s forming t h r o u g h the structurally shifting loci of class struggle. Such theoretical u n d e r s t a n d i n g is therefore an u r g e n t priority at this t i m e if we wish to f u r t h e r t h e class struggle in this new period before us w h e n t h e initial wave of national-liberation m o v e m e n t s have m o r e or less successfully completed t h e initial tasks they set themselves.

76

1886-1986: Beyond Hay market?

The central fact of the historical sociology of latenineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Europe has been the emergence of powerful social movements which implicitly or explicitly challenged the achievements of triumphant capitalism. These movements generated organizations (parties, unions, mass organizations) that survived long after the early mobilization stage; long enough to become in turn one of the targets of the new social movements of the late twentieth century. It is our contention that the earlier movements were shaped by the social structure of the nineteenth century, one that has been thoroughly transformed in the course of the twentieth century, and that the later movements are precisely the expression of this transformation. Whether and how the old organizations can survive in the new social context largely depends on their capacity to come to terms with the contradictions posed by the dissolution of their social base. The social movements of the late nineteenth century were rooted in the intensification of the processes of capitalist centralization, and rationalization of economic activities. A large variety of social groups (servants and peasants, 77

A ntisystemic Movements craftsmen and low-status professionals, small traders and shopkeepers), which h a d up to then coped m o r e or less with the spread of m a r k e t competition, suddenly found their established patterns of life a n d work t h r e a t e n e d by widening a n d deepening proletarianization, a n d reacted to the threat through a wide variety of struggles. T h e s e struggles owed their p r o m i n e n c e a n d effectiveness to the very processes they were directed against: the capitalist centralization and rationalization of e c o n o m i c activities. In earlier periods, food riots a n d similar forms of protest resulted merely in localized disruptions of law a n d order which at most contributed to s u d d e n accelerations in the "circulation of elites." T h e few struggles at the point of production — in industry or in agriculture — could most of the time be isolated a n d repressed or a b s o r b e d into the n o r m a l processes of capitalist competition. T h e y r e m a i n e d , that is, the "private business" of t h e g r o u p s opposed in t h e struggle. T h e m o r e production was socialized, however, the m o r e the strife between labor a n d capital b e c a m e a social p r o b l e m : t h e very size a n d distribution of the social p r o d u c t were affected by them, with repercussions t h r o u g h o u t the social a n d political system. T h e m a i n weakness of the E u r o p e a n labor m o v e m e n t in t h e period u n d e r consideration lay precisely in t h e fact that t h e processes of capitalist centralization and rationalization had not gone far e n o u g h . By and large, capitalist production was still e m b e d d e d in a social structure in which wage-labor played a limited role. As late as the beginning of the twentieth century, w a g e workers a c c o u n t e d for a majority of the active labor force in only a few states (definitely in the U K , probably in G e r m a n y , and possibly in France). In all states except the UK there were large n u m b e r s of "peasants'" — a differentiated a n d stratified e n s e m b l e of low-status agricultural cultivators with some kind of access to the m e a n s of p r o d u c i n g a subsistence. In 78

all

states,

furthermore,

there were

smaller

but

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nonetheless relatively large groups of self-employed artisans, petty b u r e a u c r a t s and professionals, small traders and shopkeepers, and domestic servants. T h e social weight of these other groups was far greater than their n u m b e r s indicated, because a good proportion of the wage-labor force itself retained organic links with t h e m a n d / o r had strong cultural affinities with t h e m . O r g a n i c links between wage workers and non-wage workers were primarily d u e to the practice of pooling incomes in h o u s e h o l d s f r o m different sources. Many wage-earners were not full-lifetime proletarians b u t m e m b e r s of non-proletarian h o u s e h o l d s w h o sold their labor p o w e r on a m o r e or less t e m p o r a r y basis. T h i s practice was particularly widespread a m o n g peasant households which hired out t h e l a b o r p o w e r of s o m e of their m e m b e r s precisely in o r d e r to preserve their own viability as peasant households. Since these workers were generally in low-pay and low-status jobs, they h a d a strong incentive to retain their links with the peasant households as a form of u n e m p l o y m e n t , sickness, a n d old-age insurance as well as a source of self-fulfillment. If the lower layers of the wage-labor force were populated by peasant workers a n d other part-lifetime proletarians who were the bearers of non-proletarian cultures, the u p p e r layers w e r e populated by full-lifetime proletarians s o m e of w h o m nonetheless also continued to reproduce, f r o m one generation to another, non-proletarian cultures. T h e two most i m p o r t a n t instances were white-collar workers and skilled blue-collar workers. T h e f o r m e r carried out subordinate entrepreneurial functions such as keeping accounts, buying a n d selling, servicing the e n t r e p r e n e u r , a n d supervising the l a b o r process. T h e y w e r e recruited a m o n g the lower strata of t h e professional groups, and, notwithstanding (or because of) their full-lifetime proletarian status, they tended to show an exaggerated attachm e n t to the lifestyle symbols of such elites. T h i s a t t a c h m e n t was generally accompanied by strong sentiments of loyalty 79

A ntisystemic Movements towards t h e capitalist employer, with w h o m they worked in close contact, a n d of w h o m they were living extensions. Skilled blue-collar workers were the bearers of a quite different culture. T h e y were craftsmen w h o wielded complex skills (partly m a n u a l , partly intellectual) on which production processes were highly d e p e n d e n t and on which the income, status, a n d power of the craftsmen, both in the workplace a n d in t h e household, rested. C o n s e q u e n t l y , their greatest preoccupation was the preservation of their monopolistic control over p r o d u c t i o n know-how. T h i s preoccupation identified their interests with those of selfe m p l o y e d craftsmen, m a d e t h e m suspicious of unskilled workers, a n d was a c o n t i n u o u s source of a n t a g o n i s m towards the attempts of t h e capitalist employers to break t h e monopolistic practices of these craftsmen t h r o u g h deskilling innovations. This antagonism of craftworkers towards de-skilling innovations was probably t h e most i m p o r t a n t single factor sustaining a n d shaping t h e development of t h e E u r o p e a n labor m o v e m e n t at t h e t u r n of t h e century. White-collar workers generally played a secondary a n d a m b i g u o u s role, while unskilled blue-collar workers generated great b u t shortlived outbursts of conflict. Generally speaking t h e m o v e m e n t w a s neither based on, n o r did it generate motu proprio, t h e unity of wage-labor against capital. T h e protest of the various sectors was sparked by the s a m e processes of capitalist development, but as the protest unfolded each segment a n d s t r a t u m of the wage-labor force t e n d e d to go in its own direction, often in open or latent conflict with the direction taken by other segments. T h e fact that wage workers constituted either a minority or a small majority of the total labor force a n d that, in any event, the majority of t h e wage workers themselves still bore t h e stigmata of their non-proletarian origin, created serious d i l e m m a s for the leadership of the m o v e m e n t . T h e first d i l e m m a concerned t h e extent to which t h e rank-and-file of 80

Beyond

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t h e m o v e m e n t could be relied u p o n spontaneously to p r o d u c e realistic objectives a n d a d e q u a t e f o r m s of organization. T h e alternative, obviously, was that such objectives a n d organization be b r o u g h t to the m o v e m e n t from t h e "outside," that is, by professional politicians constituted in p e r m a n e n t organizations. T h e Marxists, w h o a r g u e d the necessity of the latter solution, were in conflict with t h e anarchists a n d syndicalists in t h e early stages of t h e movement, even t h o u g h within M a r x i s m itself a n a r c h o syndicalist tendencies survived t h r o u g h o u t the period. T h e m a i n weakness of the anarcho-syndicalist position (and a key reason for its political defeat) lay in t h e fact that, given t h e social context sketched above, t h e s p o n t a n e o u s tendencies of t h e labor m o v e m e n t could only be self-defeating, as they not only heightened t h e internal divisions of the wage-labor force but also were powerless in the face of the economic a n d political mobilization of the n o n wage-labor force against t h e movement. In a situation of this kind, the different a n d partly contradictory objectives of the movement could only be attained through political mediation a n d , ultimately, t h r o u g h control of state power. Political m e d i a t i o n a n d the gaining of state power in t u r n presupposed a centralized direction of the m o v e m e n t ; a n d h e n c e t h e creation of p e r m a n e n t organizations capable, on t h e o n e h a n d , of imparting such direction, a n d on the other, of operating professionally in the political arena. A g r e e m e n t on this point, however, posed a second d i l e m m a concerning the t i m e schedule a n d t h e m e a n s of gaining state power. T w o alternatives presented themselves. On t h e o n e h a n d , the centralized direction of t h e m o v e m e n t could take a gradualist a n d democratic road, as advocated by the reformist wing of the Second International. T h e rationale of this position was that t h e minority status of t h e wage-labor force, as well as its internal divisions, were t e m p o r a r y problems which would in d u e course be taken 81

A ntisystemic Movements care of by the further centralization/rationalization of econ o m i c activities i m m a n e n t in capitalist a c c u m u l a t i o n . H e n c e the task of the leadership was to establish organic links with the movement, a n d fight the democratic battle for parliamentary power without any particular sense of urgency. On the o t h e r h a n d , the centralized direction of t h e m o v e m e n t could take a revolutionary a n d insurrectionary road, as advocated by the currents that were eventually to create the T h i r d International. A c c o r d i n g to this position there was no guarantee that capitalist development would create m o r e favorable conditions for a gradual accession to state p o w e r by working-class organizations. Q u i t e apart from the fact that the representatives of t h e bourgeoisie a n d its allies could not be expected to yield their power peacefully, capitalism had entered a new stage of h e g e m o n i c rivalries a n d mercantilist struggles (the so-called stage of imperialism) which was b o u n d to frustrate t h e expectations of the reformists, while however creating opportunities for the seizure of power by revolutionary vanguards. O n c e in power, as h a p p e n e d in t h e interwar period to a revolutionary party in Russia and to a reformist party in Sweden, f u r t h e r d i l e m m a s arose concerning what socialists could or should do with state power in a capitalist worlde c o n o m y . T h e s e other d i l e m m a s fall beyond our present concern, which is to point out that the social structure that generated the social movements, political dilemmas, a n d organizations of the late nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries was thoroughly transformed in the course of the Second World W a r a n d the subsequent postwar phase of rapid e c o n o m i c expansion. By the late 1960s, peasants h a d dwindled into insignificance in most of Europe. T h e n u m b e r of shopkeepers, small traders, a n d artisans h a d also been significantly reduced. T h e n u m b e r of professionals h a d increased b u t not sufficiently to m a k e a great difference in the overall picture. T h e overall picture was now that between 60 and 82

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90 per cent (depending on t h e country) of the E u r o p e a n labor force h a d c o m e to d e p e n d on wages or salaries for its subsistence. On the basis of this purely formal criterion, t h e E u r o p e a n l a b o r force h a d b e c o m e as fully "proletarianized" as it possibly could. However, in this case sheer n u m b e r s are deceptive. T h i s "proletarianized" l a b o r force in fact h a d a n u m b e r of relatively discrete sections. T h e n u m b e r of salaried professionals was large a n d growing, in most cases over 15 per cent of t h e population in the 1980s. T h o s e in this g r o u p normally h a d a university education, reflecting the h i g h percentage of t h e population attending the university (see T a b l e I). T h e percentage of w o m e n in this category h a d b e e n growing, although m e n still p r e d o m i n a t e d . T h i s g r o u p was well-paid of course, b u t lived primarily on its income. T h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g sector of E u r o p e a n countries employed 30 to 40 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n in the 1980s. T h i s was true even in those few countries w h e r e t h e agricultural p o p u l a t i o n was still over 10 per cent (see T a b l e II). However, t h e m a n u f a c t u r i n g sector w a s divided with increasing clarity on ethnic lines. T h e better-paid, m o r e skilled workers were largely m a l e and native to t h e country, w h e r e a s the less well-paid, less skilled workers were disproportionately d r a w n from radical minorities, immigrants, guest workers, a n d so on, m a n y of w h o m were not citizens (though this may t u r n out to be a transitional p h e n o m e n o n ) . Of course, ethnic stratification of t h e workforce h a d no d o u b t a long history, b u t prior to 1945 t h e ethnic "minority" was largely d r a w n from within a state's b o u n d a r i e s (Irish in Great Britain, Bretons in France) which h a d different citizenship and voting consequences. T h e e x p a n d i n g clerical a n d service sector was in the process of increasing feminization with a concomitant loss of relative status a n d i n c o m e level. T h i s sociological transformation has b e e n going on for a long time. Its impact on the structure of social m o v e m e n t s 83

A ntisystemic Movements Table I Western

No. of university-level students per 100,000 in

& Northern

Europe

Austria Belgium D e n m a r k (1982) Finland France G e r m a n Federal R e p u b l i c (1982) Iceland Ireland (1981) Luxembourg N e t h e r l a n d s (1982) Norway (1982) Sweden Switzerland U n i t e d K i n g d o m (1982) Southern

2,058 2,285 2,159 2,485 2,253 2,289 2,197 1,731 270 2,645 2,151 2,701 1,515 1,572

Europe

Greece(1980) Italy Portugal (1981) Spain (1982) Other countries

with

1,250 1,981 964 1,919 over

1,500 students per

Argentina Australia (1982) Barbados Canada E c u a d o r (1981) G e r m a n D e m o c r a t i c R e p u b l i c (1982) Israel Japan J o r d a n (1982) Korea, R e p u b l i c of L e b a n o n (1982) M o n g o l i a (1981) New Zealand Panama P e r u (1982) Philippines (1981) Qatar

84

1983

100,000

1,962 2,237 1,966 4,169 3,192 2,420 2,746 2,033 1,570 2,951 2,715 2,235 2,612 2,212 2,001 2,694 1,678

Beyond USSR U S A (1982)

Uruguay

Yugoslavia

Haymarket? ] 947 5;355

1,686

1

647

Source: U N E S C O Statistical Y e a r b o o k , 1985, T a b l e 3,10

has b e e n p r o f o u n d . T h e labor m o v e m e n t a n d the socialist parties h a d originally b e e n constructed a r o u n d (male) workers in the m a n u f a c t u r i n g sector whose n u m b e r s , it had been a s s u m e d , would be ever growing. But the m a n u facturing sector levelled off in n u m b e r s a n d percentage in the 1960s a n d began a process of shrinkage. Faced with a sharply declining percentage of t h e labor force in agriculture a n d a levelling-off (and potential decline) in the m a n u f a c t u r i n g sectors, the tertiary sector has necessarily b e c o m e ever m o r e central. However, this sector in t u r n b e c a m e ever m o r e polarized into a salaried professional s t r a t u m a n d a lower-paid s t r a t u m working u n d e r increasingly "factory-like" conditions. As the "internal" reserve labor force (peasantry, small artisans, wives a n d daughters of industrial workers) disa p p e a r e d by virtue of actual incorporation into the u r b a n , proletarianized labor force, the only "reserve" available b e c a m e o n e "external" to the state's b o u n d a r i e s . H e r e , however, o n e m u s t take into account the historical transformation of the capitalist world-economy as a whole. T h e development of national liberation forces in Asia, Africa, a n d Latin America h a d c h a n g e d the w o r l d political rapport de forces, a n d above all the ideological a t m o s p h e r e within which E u r o p e a n social development occurred. In t h e period 1945-60 it could be said that the socialdemocratic parties of Western E u r o p e achieved a large n u m b e r of their intermediate objectives: full organization of the industrial working class a n d a significant rise in their 85

Table II

Percentage of economically active population by occupation Prof. * 0/1

Manas,. 2 '

Clerical 3

Sales 4

Service 5

Agnc.

Year Western & Northern Europe Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France G e r m a n Federal Republic Ireland Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Switzerland Sweden United Kingdom

1984 1970 1983 1980 1982 1984 1983 1981 1979 1980 1980 1984 1971

13.0 11.1 17.0 17.0 14.1 13.9 14.2 11.9 17.3 18.2 15.1 27.3 11.1

5.2 4.6 3.1 3.0 0.3 3.5 2.8 1.0 2.3 4.6 2.4 2.3 3.7

15.6 12.8 13.9 11.9 17.1 17.3 14.1 20.3 17.6 9.6 20.2 11.9 17.9

9.2 10.2 6.0 7.3 7.8 8.6 8.6 8.8 9.6 9.0 8.2 8.0 9.0

10.8 6.7 12.6 11.6 10.7 10.8 8.6 12.9 10.1 12.0 11.3 13.7 11.7

Southern Europe Greece Italy Portugal Spain

1983 1981 1982 1984

9.7 11.5 5.9 6.9

1.7 16.0 0.8 1.4

8.7 9.6

9.3 11.1 8.1 9.0

8.0 11.1 9.1 12.9

Other countries for Hungary Poland USA Venezuela El Salvador Egypt India

Mali

10.2 9.7

Manuf. 7-9

Other

9.1 4.5 2.1 12.5 7.6 5.0 14.9 5.3 5.6 7.1 6.5 5.0 3.0

36.9 45.2 29.4 34.8 30.9 31.8 30.3 36.3 30.0 31.9 34.4 28.7 40.0

0.2 4.9 15.9 2.1 11.5 9.1 6.5 3.5 7.5 7.6 1.9 3.1 3.6

27.8 9.3 23.0 15.6

30.0 20.7

4.8 10.2 5.5 9.1

37.3 35.4

comparison 1980 1978 1984 1983 1980 1982 1980 1976

14.7 11.0 14.7 10.2 4.2 10.5 3.0 1.5

0.7 1.5 10.3 4.0 0.6 1.9 0.1 —

12.0 13.9 15.3 11.2 5.4 8.2 3.7 0.6

4.9 2.8 11.5 12.7 14.1 6.2 12.6 1.9

7.1 3.2 13.5 13.3 8.1 8.5 4.6

10.0 26.7 3.4 14.1 37.5 36.1 53.7

1.0

82.0

50.6 37.4 28.8 32.2 26.4 23.1 18.4 6.9

—

3.5 2.5 2.3 1.7 5.5 3.9 6.1

Source: I L O Y e a r b o o k of L a b o r Statistics 1985, Table 2B (except F i n l a n d f r o m 1984; N e t h e r l a n d s , H u n g a r y , El Salvador, Mali from 1983; Belgium a n d the U n i t e d K i n g d o m f r o m 1977). *Full h e a d i n g s as follows: 0 / 1 - Professional, technical, a n d skilled workers; 2 - A d m i n i s t r a t i v e a n d m a n a g e r i a l workers; 3 - Clerical and related workers; 4 - Sales workers; 5 - Service workers; 6 - Agricultural, a n i m a l h u s b a n d r y a n d forestry, f i s h e r m a n a n d h u n t e r s ; 7 - 9 - P r o d u c t i o n a n d related workers, t r a n s p o r t e q u i p m e n t , o p e r a t o r s a n d laborers; O t h e r M a y i n c l u d e (varying with country): (a) W o r k e r s not classified by o c c u p a t i o n s ; (b) A r m e d forces; (c) U n e m p l o y e d workers; (d) U n e m p l o y e d w o r k e r s not previously regularly e m p l o y e d .

A ntisystemic Movements s t a n d a r d of living, plus accession to a place in the state political structure. But they f o u n d themselves to a significant degree locked into reflecting this traditional central core of the working class whose n u m b e r s were no longer growing. T h e y f o u n d it far m o r e difficult to appeal politically to the three growing segments of the wage-labor force: the salaried professionals, the "feminized" servicesector employees, and the "ethnicized" unskilled or semiskilled labor force. It seems therefore no accident that the three m a j o r varieties of "new" social m o v e m e n t have their social bases in these other groups: the peace/ecology/alternative lifestyle m o v e m e n t s ; the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t s ; the "minority", r i g h t s / " T h i r d W o r l d within" movements. In different ways, each of these movements was expressing its discomfort not merely with the socio-economic structures that governed their lives b u t with the historical political strategy of the social-democratic (and C o m m u n i s t ) parties in p u r s u i n g the need for change. T h e basic complaint of the "new" social m o v e m e n t s a b o u t the "old" social m o v e m e n t s was that the socialdemocratic movements h a d lost their "oppositional" quality precisely as a result of their successes in achieving partial state power. It was argued that: (1) they s u p p o r t e d b o t h state policy and multinational policy vis-a-vis the T h i r d W o r l d a n d the socialist world; a n d (2) they m a d e no effort to represent the interests of the lowest-paid a n d most exploited strata of the work force. In short, the charge was that labor a n d social-democratic m o v e m e n t s were no longer; antisystemic, or at least no longer sufficiently antisystemic. T h e initial response of the "old" social m o v e m e n t was to dismiss the charges of one segment of the "new" m o v e m e n t s as coming from middle-class elements (that is, salaried professionals) w h o w e r e using anti-industrial-worker a r g u ments. As for the criticisms of other "new" m o v e m e n t s (women, minorities), the "old" m o v e m e n t s accused t h e m of 88

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being "divisive" (the traditional nineteenth-century view of the labor movement). T h e relationship of the two sets of m o v e m e n t s — the old a n d the new — has gone t h r o u g h two phases thus far. T h e first phase runs from a b o u t 1960 to 1975. T h i s phase was one of deteriorating relations between the two sets. T h e simmering b a d relations exploded in 1968 a n d the tensions strongly reinforced a period of a c u t e ideological struggle in the T h i r d W o r l d — t h e Vietnam war, the Chinese C u l t u r a l Revolution, the m a n y guerilla struggles in Latin America. Several factors entered to bring this phase to an end. T h e fraction of the new social m o v e m e n t s that b e c a m e most "radicalized" — taking the various forms of Maoist parties, a u t o n o m i s t movements, u r b a n terrorism — failed politically. T h i s was partly because of repression, partly because of exhaustion and a thin social base, and partly because of changes in the ideological tone of struggles in the T h i r d W o r l d (end of the Cultural Revolution in China, socialist wars in Indochina, e n d of "focoism" in Latin America). T h e new conjoncture of the world-economy also had its impact. T h e growing u n e m p l o y m e n t in E u r o p e along with the partial dismantling of the traditional heavy-industry sectors began to reopen for the labor-socialist m o v e m e n t s m a n y ideological questions that h a d been undiscussible in the p e r i o d 1945-65. T h u s t h e social democrats started to reassess their view of t h e new social m o v e m e n t s j u s t at the m o m e n t when the new social movements began to have some inner doubts about the validity of the "new left" tactics evolved in t h e 1960s. T h e period since 1975 has been one of an uncertain m i n u e t in old l e f t - n e w left relations in W e s t e r n E u r o p e . T h e case of t h e Greens a n d the S P D in t h e Federal R e p u b l i c of G e r m a n y illustrates this perfectly. Both parties are constantly in the midst of a m e d i u m - d e c i b e l internal debate a b o u t their relations with each other, able neither to 89

A ntisystemic Movements move closer together nor to move further apart. Both sets of m o v e m e n t s h a v e however b e e n m o r e concerned with their relations to each other t h a n to the other kinds of movements found in the socialist countries or t h e T h i r d W o r l d . We may r e s u m e what we have said t h u s : (1) t h e circumstances giving rise to the drive a n d partially successful organizational forms of the E u r o p e a n left have been totally eroded by the very processes, those of capitalist development, they were created to supersede historically; (2) potentially serious (antisystemic) tendencies instead now c o m e increasingly from social locales not central to the traditional organized forms of the E u r o p e a n left. W h a t , from o u r angle of vision, would seem to lie ahead? T h e principal directional tendency of capital is its centralization on a world scale in t w o forms; financial pools, a n d technically divided a n d integrated labor processes. T h e first is effected through extraordinarily large-scale b a n k i n g consortia m a n a g i n g "public" a n d "private" f u n d s alike a n d mediated by such organs of the world's bourgeoisie as t h e I M F , the I B R D , a n d the BIS. T h e second is effected of course t h r o u g h the multiplying transnationalization of p r o d u c t i o n u n d e r t h e aegis of the transnational corporation. T h i s determining direction of capital on a world scale — oddly e n o u g h , not one that departs greatly from that projected in "the absolute general law of capitalist a c c u m u lation" — entails for antisystemic forces at least three broad consequential subordinate directional tendencies. First, a n d in the present context p e r h a p s foremost, is the ongoing relocation of labor-using m a n u f a c t u r i n g processes to the semiperiphery a n d hence the shift there of the epicenter of "classically" framed a n d c o n d u c t e d class conflict — direct, organized, large-scale c a p i t a l - l a b o r struggles. T h a t epicenter, a n d so its historical trajectory, will h e n c e increasingly be formed within the jurisdictions of the states of that zone, and their politics indeed increasingly reflect the transformation. 90

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Second is the de-nationalization, in effect, of domestic ("national") labor forces. T h e world's workers, increasingly m a d e into laborers u n d e r the aegis of capital, move as they always have in order to be in relation to capital, a movem e n t sharply furthered in speed and extent by developments in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d transportation. M a r x and Engels saw the railroad as shortening to a century, for national proletariats, the time needed to achieve the degree of class organization it took national bourgeoisies, with their miserable roads, five centuries to attain. Ship, air, a n d electronics have for decades now been analogously forming the possibility of an organized world proletariat within "national" locales. T h e possibility is at once eliminated, however, so long as we think with the state-formed consciousness that there are "nationals" a n d there a r e "immigrants," a n d in that way r e p r o d u c e the varieties of racism these historically formed categories inevitably entail. "National" a n d " i m m i g r a n t " are categories of the capitalist world-economy's interstate system; they have no place (except as phenomenologically real conditions to be overcome) in the language of world-scale workers' movements. And t h i r d is the "official p a u p e r i s m " sketched in t h e general law, which, to estimate from recent trends in the US a n d Western Europe, has two principal overlapping social locales, the y o u n g a n d the aged (both m e n a n d w o m e n ) and w o m e n (of all ages). T h e s e were, it will be recalled, the first "officially protected" social segments of labor, in country after country, in the decade or so that " H a y m a r k e t " signifies. "Welfare," too, has its contradictions. It seems likely that the " n a t i o n a l ' V ' i m m i g r a n t " categorization deepens the b u r d e n s of current capitalist development carried by the young, t h e old, a n d w o m e n , b u t it is only a d e e p e n i n g of the destruction of dignity, well-being, and h o p e that their pauperization perse entails. T h e growing contradiction(s) between relations of rule a n d relations of production entail a n o t h e r trio of sub95

A ntisystemic Movements ordinate tendential or "directional" changes. P e r h a p s foremost here will be the growing contradiction of "stateness" in core-area countries, between forming a n d reforming the requisite frameworks of "capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t " of capital, on t h e o n e h a n d ; a n d addressing a n d re-addressing the endless constituencies of "welfare" that that d e v e l o p m e n t continues to p r o m o t e , on the other. T h e contradiction has been central to "stateness," of course, t h r o u g h o u t the interstate system's historical elaboration; in o u r times it has been particularly evident in t h e peripheralized a n d semiperipheralized zones that a r e continually r e p r o d u c e d by the f u n d a m e n t a l world-forming polarization entailed in the capitalist development of capital. In the state regimes of the core zone, governments have been largely spared the politics f r a m e d by t h e contradiction, essentially because coreness d u r i n g US h e g e m o n y entailed a kind a n d degree of "revenue" flow that allowed "redistribution" without (all that m u c h ) pain. T h a t has b e c o m e , a n d will c o n t i n u e to become, less and less so. "Austerity" is the order of t h e d a y not only in Haiti, a n d in Argentina, b u t in F r a n c e . . . We m u s t r e m a r k here in passing w h a t this contradiction, in this form, implies for those of us w h o subscribe to t h e theoretical notion t h a t relations of rule o p e r a t e by virtue of a condition of consciousness known, since W e b e r , as their "legitimacy." Namely, it implies increasingly corrosive effects on the very "right" of the a p p a r a t u s e s of states to compel c o m p l i a n c e with state-promulgated rules ("laws"). This sort of "legitimacy" crisis — e n d e m i c w h e r e "stateness" has been a historically imposed form of relations of rule (for example, via overrule) — s e e m s likely to have initial occurrence in the ideologically distorted form of "nationals" versus " i m m i g r a n t s , " with the rhetorical core being a m a t t e r of "patriotism" — t h e o n e defined d o m a i n of consciousness specifically formed to "legitimate" stateness, as every schoolchild, everywhere, knows without knowing. However, the structured incapacity of states to take care of 92

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their own, as it were, could so help shift m o d e s of u n d e r standing a n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n that the specifically legitim a t i n g d o m a i n of "patriotism" b e c o m e s secondary — b u t to what? Second is t h e seemingly contradictory growth — contradictory to the capitalist development of capital — of " h u m a n rights" as an organizing concern of growing n u m b e r s of intellectuals a n d p o p u l a r leaders, of various persuasions, t h r o u g h o u t the world. To a large extent — f r a m e d , as the issue has been, almost solely in t e r m s of relations of rule (its i m m e d i a t e locus of course, as "issue") — the c o m p r e h e n s i o n of its emergence as reflecting t h e contradictions between relations of rule a n d relations of production (including relations of appropriation) has been slow to form. T h e rights of workers in the end u n d e r p i n all others. Without the former, such "rights" as others may have are b u t certificates issued; a n n u l l a b l e by the particular a p p a r a t u s of "stateness" that forms the confrontational relation. As elsewhere in our conditions of existence, so here too does the c a p i t a l - l a b o r relation organize the terrain of confrontation and discourse. A third tendential development is t h e growing "antiWesternism" of the peoples of t h e peripheralized and semiperipheralized zone of the world-economy's operations. Primarily channelled in a n d t h r o u g h the interstate system, the i m p e t u s for the sentiment lies not in m e r e "antiimperialist" (positively put, "nationalist") m o v e m e n t s b u t r a t h e r in elemental challenges to t h e "Westernism," as e n c o m p a s s i n g civilization, t h a t the capitalist development of the m o d e r n world as historical social system has entailed. T h i s is a d o m a i n of inquiry f r a u g h t with difficulties, both theoretical and historical, for the o n c e colonized and the once colonizing alike (specifically p r e s u m i n g good faith on the- art of each, however central t h e historical divide perforce remains). T h e tendency shows m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y , if less clearly 93

A ntisystemic Movements theoretically, in the question of how relations of rule relate to relations of production. We reach h e r e matters of very considerable civilizational depth, w h e r e even the distinction which we have been working with disappears. For the challenge, in process of realization, is to the "Westernism" of our ways of thinking — and, to short-circuit m u c h — to our ways of conceiving of the "socialism" of a socialist worldsystem a n d so derivatively to our ways of identifying what is or is not "progressive." In brief, in question is — assuming we're collectively a n d actively concerned with furthering t h e transformation of the capitalist world-system into a socialist world-system — "whose" socialism? T h a t , it seems to us, is the query posed by the growing if still m u t e d "anti-Westernism." It addresses directly the a s s u m p t i o n that the coming socialist world-system is of Western m a n u f a c t u r e , so to speak. P e r h a p s the central question is this: how, a n d to w h a t extent, can the well-organized a r m s of progressive movements in Western E u r o p e , f r a m e d as they are by their current forms a n d i m m e d i a t e concerns, r e c o m p o s e t h e m selves into agencies, not of national realization b u t of worldhistorical transformation? T h i s recomposition would m e a n they b e c a m e in the f u t u r e as subversive of the interstate system per se as they have in the past been its products a n d proponents. T h e centralization of capital per se can be neither factually n o r strategically a legitimate concern of movements, it as process being for t h e m formative merely of terrain, not of objective. T h e f u r t h e r processes it entails, however, p r o d u c e the very politics of m o v e m e n t formation a n d growth. T h e first observation above, a b o u t the relocating of the epicenter of overt "classical" class struggle, implies merely a refocusing of Western E u r o p e a n movements. T h e second a n d third, in contrast, entail the redefinition of trajectories. For the de-nationalization of domestic labor forces suggests a f u n d a m e n t a l change, on the part of the left, as to w h a t 94

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"national" m e a n s (thus leaving to the right the systemically formed residues of "primordial" sentiments). To accomplish the reconception will entail a degree a n d kind of substantive a n d rhetorical inventiveness not presently in a s c e n d a n c e within p r o m i n e n t movements. A n d the third, the increasing salience of the g e n d e r question, entails; (1) the elimination from the m o v e m e n t s of yet a n o t h e r (and in a different sense) "primordial" sentiment, a n d (2) the worldscale generality o f — hence organizational subordination to — w h a t is essentially a reforming m o v e m e n t ("capitalism" being quite a b l e "to develop" u n d e r conditions of legal a n d substantive g e n d e r equality). It is the f u r t h e r generalization, from the pauperization of w o m e n to the pauperization of people on a world scale, that is precisely the c h a n g e in consciousness the very effectiveness of the organizations in core zones m a y help to b r i n g about, as part of world-scale m o v e m e n t s that bypass a n d so subvert interstate arrangements. T h e growing contradictions between relations of rule a n d relations of production will in all likelihood occasion a plethora of radical nationalist expressions a n d "movements." But world-scale movements, with e m a n a t i o n s in various national arenas, may prove world historically even m o r e consequential. At least, this is the m a j o r positive direction in which to move.

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1968: The Great Rehearsal

What Was 1968 About?

There have only been two world revolutions. One took place in 1848. The second took place in 1968. Both were historic failures. Both transformed the world. The fact that both were unplanned and therefore in a profound sense spontaneous explains both facts — the fact that they failed, and the fact that they transformed the world. We celebrate today July 14, 1789, or at least some people do. We celebrate November 7, 1917, or at least some people do. We do not celebrate 1848 or 1968. And yet the case can be made that these dates are as significant, perhaps even more significant, than the two that attract so much attention. 1848 was a revolution for popular sovereignty — both within the nation (down with autocracy) and of the nations (self-determination, the Völkerfrühling). 1848 was the revolution against the counterrevolution of 1815 (the Restoration, the Concert of Europe). It was a revolution "born at least as much of hopes as of discontents" (Namier: 1944, 4). It was certainly not the French Revolution the second time around. It represented rather an attempt both to fulfill its 97

A ntisystemic Movements original h o p e s a n d to overcome its limitations. 1848 was, in a H e g e l i a n sense, the sublation (Aufhebung) of 1789. T h e same was true of 1968. It too was born of hopes at least as m u c h as discontents. It too was a revolution against the counterrevolution represented by t h e US organization of its world h e g e m o n y as of 1945. It too was an a t t e m p t to fulfill the original goals of t h e R u s s i a n Revolution, while very m u c h an effort to overcome t h e limitations of that revolution. It too therefore was a sublation, a sublation this t i m e of 1917. T h e parallel goes further. 1848 was a failure — a failure in France, a failure in t h e rest of Europe. So too was 1968. In b o t h cases the b u b b l e of p o p u l a r enthusiasm a n d radical innovation was burst within a relatively short period. In b o t h cases, however, the political ground-rules of t h e worldsystem were profoundly a n d irrevocably c h a n g e d as a result of t h e revolution. It was 1848 which institutionalized t h e old left (using this t e r m broadly). A n d it was 1968 that institutionalized the new social m o v e m e n t s . Looking forward, 1848 was in this sense the great rehearsal for the Paris C o m m u n e a n d the Russian Revolution, for the Baku Congress a n d Bandoeng. 1968 was the rehearsal for what? T h e lesson that oppressed groups learned f r o m 1848 was that it w o u l d not be easy to transform t h e system, a n d t h a t the likelihood that "spontaneous" uprisings w o u l d in fact be a b l e to accomplish s u c h a transformation was rather small. T w o things seemed clear as a result. T h e states were sufficiently bureaucratized a n d appropriately organized to function well as machineries to p u t d o w n rebellions. O c c a sionally, b e c a u s e of wars or internal political divisions a m o n g powerful strata, their repressive m a c h i n e r y might buckle a n d a "revolution" seem to be possible. But t h e machineries could usually be pulled together quickly e n o u g h to p u t d o w n the putative or abortive revolution. Secondly, the states could easily be controlled by t h e powerful strata t h r o u g h a c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e latter's eco98

The Great Rehearsal n o m i c strength, their political organization, a n d their cultural h e g e m o n y (to use Gramsci's t e r m of a later period). Since the states could control t h e masses a n d the powerful strata could control t h e states, it was clear that a serious effort of social transformation would require counterorganization — b o t h politically a n d culturally. It is this perception that led to the formation for t h e first t i m e of bureaucratically organized antisystemic m o v e m e n t s with relatively clear m i d d l e - t e r m objectives. T h e s e movements, in their two great variants of the social a n d t h e national m o v e m e n t , began to a p p e a r on the scene after 1848, a n d their n u m b e r s , geographic spread, a n d organizational efficiency grew steady in the century that followed. W h a t 1848 accomplished therefore was t h e historic turning of antisystemic forces towards a f u n d a m e n t a l political strategy — that of seeking the intermediate goal of obtaining state power (one way or another) as the indispensable way-station on the road to transforming society a n d the world. To be sure, m a n y a r g u e d against this strategy, but they were defeated in the debates. Over t h e following century, the o p p o n e n t s of this strategy grew weaker as t h e p r o p o n e n t s of the strategy grew stronger. 1917 b e c a m e such a big symbol b e c a u s e it was t h e first d r a m a t i c victory of the p r o p o n e n t s of t h e state-power strategy (and in its revolutionary, as opposed to its evolutionary, variant). 1917 proved it could be d o n e . A n d this time, unlike in 1848, the revolutionary government was neither s u b o r n e d nor overturned. It survived. 1917 m a y have b e e n the most d r a m a t i c instance b u t it was not of c o u r s e the only instance of successes, at least partial, of this strategy. T h e Mexican Revolution beginning in 1910 a n d t h e C h i n e s e Revolution of 1911 c u l m i n a t i n g in 1949 also seemed to demonstrate the worth of the strategy, for example. By 1945, or p e r h a p s m o r e accurately by the 1950s, t h e strategy seemed to be b e a r i n g fruit a r o u n d t h e world. All 99

A ntisystemic Movements three m a j o r variants of the historic "old left" antisystemic m o v e m e n t s — the T h i r d International C o m m u n i s t s , the Second International Social D e m o c r a t s , a n d t h e nationalist m o v e m e n t s (especially those outside E u r o p e ) — could point to notable successes: the a r m e d struggle of the C o m m u n i s t parties in Yugoslavia a n d C h i n a , the massive 1945 electoral victory of the L a b o u r Party in Great Britain, nationalist t r i u m p h s in I n d i a a n d Indonesia. It seemed b u t a m a t t e r of d e c a d e s until the goals of 1848 w o u l d be realized in every corner of the globe. T h i s widespread o p t i m i s m of t h e antisystemic forces was nonetheless quite exaggerated, for two reasons. O n e , the institutionalization of US h e g e m o n y in t h e world-system as of 1945 m a d e possible a generalized counterrevolutionary thrust to slow d o w n t h e p a c e of t h e growing political strength of the antisystemic m o v e m e n t s . T h e US sought to "contain" the bloc of C o m m u n i s t states led by t h e U S S R . A n d in Greece, in Western E u r o p e , in Korea, they succeeded in such " c o n t a i n m e n t . " T h e US governm e n t sought to "defang" t h e Western labor a n d sociald e m o c r a t i c parties by rigidifying historic differences between t h e Second a n d T h i r d Internationals a n d b y erecting " a n t i - C o m m u n i s m " as an ideological carapace. T h i s a t t e m p t too was largely successful, within the US itself a n d elsewhere. T h e U S sought t o slow d o w n , dilute, a n d / o r coopt the political expressions of T h i r d W o r l d nationalism a n d , with some notable exceptions like Vietnam, this effort too was largely successful. W e r e the counterrevolution all that h a d occurred politically, however, its effect w o u l d have b e e n m o m e n t a r y at most. A second t h i n g occurred to d a m p e n t h e optimism of the antisystemic forces. T h e m o v e m e n t s in power p e r f o r m e d less well t h a n h a d been expected; far less well. Already in the interwar period, t h e Soviet experience of t h e 1930s — the terrors a n d the errors — h a d shaken the world's antisystemic movements. But in a sense Hitler a n d 100

The Great Rehearsal the long struggle of the Second W o r l d W a r washed away m u c h of the dismay. However, the terrors a n d t h e errors repeated themselves after 1945 in o n e C o m m u n i s t state after another. Nor did t h e social-democratic governments look that good, engaged as they were in colonial repression. A n d , as o n e T h i r d W o r l d nationalist m o v e m e n t after a n o t h e r created regimes that seemed to have their own fair share of terrors a n d errors, t h e o p t i m i s m of t h e antisystemic forces b e g a n to be eroded. W h i l e the US, a n d m o r e generally t h e u p p e r strata of t h e world-system, attacked the antisystemic m o v e m e n t s exogenously as it were, the m o v e m e n t s w e r e simultaneously suffering ailments e n d o g e n o u s to t h e m , ailments which increasingly seemed to be themselves "part of the p r o b l e m . " It is in reaction to this d o u b l e (exogenous a n d endogenous) difficulty of the traditional old left m o v e m e n t s that the new social m o v e m e n t s emerged, m o r e or less in the 1960s. T h e s e new m o v e m e n t s were concerned with the strength a n d survivability of the forces that d o m i n a t e d t h e world-system. B u t they were also concerned with w h a t they felt was the p o o r performance, even the negative performance, of the world's old left movements. In the beginning of t h e 1960s, the concern with t h e power a n d the evil of the p r o p o n e n t s of t h e status q u o was still u p p e r m o s t in t h e m i n d s of t h e emergent new movements, a n d their concern with the inefficacies of the old left opposition was still a secondary consideration. But as the d e c a d e went on, t h e e m p h a s i s began to shift, as the new m o v e m e n t s b e g a n to be m o r e a n d m o r e critical of the old m o v e m e n t s . At first t h e n e w elements sought to be "reformist" of the tactics of t h e old antisystemic m o v e m e n t s . Later, they often b r o k e outright with t h e m a n d even attacked t h e m frontally. We c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d 1968 unless we see it as simultaneously a cri de coeur against t h e evils of t h e world-system a n d a fund a m e n t a l questioning of the strategy of t h e old left opposition to t h e world-system. 101

A ntisystemic Movements At its height, and w h e n it had reached the highest level of screeching, the new left accused the old left of live sins: weakness, corruption, connivance, neglect, a n d arrogance. T h e weakness was said to be the inefficacy of the old antisystemic m o v e m e n t s (the Social D e m o c r a t s in the West, the C o m m u n i s t s in the East, the nationalist governments in the South) in constraining the militarism, t h e exploitation, the imperialism, t h e racism, of t h e d o m i n a n t forces in the world-system. T h e attitude t o w a r d s the war in Vietnam b e c a m e a touchstone on this issue. T h e corruption was said to be the fact that certain strata h a d , t h r o u g h the efforts of past antisystemic action, achieved certain material concessions a n d allowed their militance to be softened by this fact. T h e connivance was the charge of corruption taken o n e step further. It was said to be the willingness of certain strata worldwide actually to profit by t h e exploitation in the system, albeit at a lower level t h a n that of the d o m i n a n t strata. T h e neglect was said to be the obtuseness a b o u t , if not conscious ignoring of, the interests of t h e truly dispossessed, the real lower strata of t h e world-system (the subproletarians, the ethnic a n d racial minorities, a n d of course t h e women). T h e a r r o g a n c e was said to be the c o n t e m p t of the leadership of t h e old m o v e m e n t s for t h e real p r o b l e m s of the lower strata, a n d their ideological selfassurance. T h e s e were h e a d y charges a n d they were not m a d e all at once, or from the outset. It was an evolution f r o m the mild questioning of t h e Port H u r o n f o u n d i n g statement of S D S in 1962 to the W e a t h e r m e n in 1969 a n d after, or f r o m t h e conventional views (if militantly i m p l e m e n t e d ) of S N C C in the early 1960s to those of the Black P o w e r m o v e m e n t s of the late 1960s. It was an evolution from t h e J e u n e s s e E t u d i a n t e C o m m u n i s t e in F r a n c e in t h e early 1960s w h o dared to be "pro-Italian," to the barricades of M a y 1968 in Paris (and the virtually open b r e a k with t h e C G T a n d PCF). It was an evolution f r o m the P r a g u e Spring which emerged 102

The Great Rehearsal in late 1967 to the founding of Solidarnosc in 1980. W h e n 1968 exploded — in C o l u m b i a University, in Paris, in Prague, in Mexico City a n d Tokyo, in t h e Italian O c t o b e r — it was an explosion. T h e r e was no central direction, no calculated tactical planning. T h e explosion was in a sense as m u c h of a surprise to the participants as to those against w h o m it was directed. T h e most surprised were the old left movements who could not u n d e r s t a n d how they could be attacked from w h a t seemed to t h e m so unfair a n d so politically dangerous a perspective. But the explosion was very powerful, shattering m a n y authority relations, a n d shattering above all the Cold W a r consensus on both sides. Ideological hegemonies were challenged everywhere and the retreat, both of the powerful strata of the world-system and of the leadership of the old left antisystemic movements, was real. As we have already said, the retreat turned out to be temporary and the new movements were checked everywhere. But the changes in power relations effected by the movements were not reversed.

The Legacies of 1968 F o u r m a i n changes can be distinguished. First, while the balance of military power between West a n d East has not changed appreciably since 1968, the capabilities of either the West or the East to police the South have b e c o m e limited. T h e T e t Offensive of early 1968 has remained to this day a symbol of the impotence of capital-intensive warfare in curbing the intelligence a n d will of T h i r d World peoples. Within live years of the offensive, the U S A was forced to withdraw from Vietnam, and a new era in N o r t h South relations began. T h e most dramatic expression of this new era has been the frustration of the US government's multifarious 103

A ntisystemic Movements a t t e m p t s to bring the Iranian people b a c k to "reason." It is no exaggeration to say that events in Iran since the late 1970s have h a d far greater inlluence on the internal affairs of the U S A (notably on the rise a n d d e m i s e of R e a g a n i s m ) t h a n events in the U S A have h a d on the internal affairs of Iran. T h i s frustration is n o t t h e s y m p t o m of s o m e peculiar weakness of the U n i t e d States as world power, or exceptional strength of the Iranian state as an antisystemic force. R a t h e r , it is a s y m p t o m of the increased national sovereignty enjoyed by T h i r d W o r l d peoples in general since the withdrawal of the US f r o m V i e t n a m . T h e close parallel b e t w e e n the recent experience of the U S S R in Afghanistan a n d that of the US in V i e t n a m provides f u r t h e r evidence that the u n p r e c e d e n t e d a c c u m u l a t i o n of m e a n s of violence in the h a n d s of the two superpowers simply r e p r o d u c e s the b a l a n c e of terror b e t w e e n the two, but adds nothing to their capabilities to police the world, least of all its peripheral regions. Secondly, t h e c h a n g e s in p o w e r relations between statusgroups such as age-groups, genders, a n d "ethnicities," a m a j o r c o n s e q u e n c e of the 1968 revolution, have also proved to be far m o r e lasting t h a n the m o v e m e n t s which b r o u g h t t h e m to world attention. T h e s e c h a n g e s are registered primarily in the h i d d e n a b o d e s of everyday life a n d as such a r e less easy to discern t h a n changes in interstate power relations. Nevertheless, we can say with s o m e confidence t h a t even after 1973 ( w h e n most m o v e m e n t s h a d subsided), t h e c o m m a n d s of d o m i n a n t status-groups (such as older generations, males, "majorities") c o n t i n u e d in general to b e c o m e less likely to be obeyed by s u b o r d i n a t e statusgroups (younger generations, females, "minorities") t h a n they ever were before 1968. T h i s d i m i n i s h e d power of d o m i n a n t status-groups is particularly evident in core countries b u t may be observed to varying degrees in semiperipheral a n d peripheral countries as well. Thirdly, a n d closely related to t h e above, pre-1968 power 104

The Great Rehearsal relations between capital and labor have never b e e n restored. In this connection, we should not be deceived by the experience of particular national segments of the capital—labor relation or by the short-term vicissitudes of the overall relation. W h a t m u s t be assessed is the likelihood t h a t the c o m m a n d s of t h e functionaries of capital be obeyed by their subordinates over the entire spatial d o m a i n of the capitalist world-economy, a n d over a period of time long e n o u g h to allow for t h e interplay of c o m m a n d s a n d responses to affect the relations of p r o d u c t i o n a n d the distribution of resources. F r o m this point of view, the central fact of the 1970s a n d 1980s has b e e n the growing frustration experienced by the functionaries of capital in their global search for safe havens of labor discipline. M a n y of the locales that in t h e early 1970s seemed to provide capitalist p r o d u c t i o n with a viable alternative to the restive labor environments of the core zone have themselves t u r n e d , one after a n o t h e r , into loci of labor unrest — Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Iran, South Africa, a n d , most recently, South Korea. We m a y well say t h a t since 1968 t h e functionaries of capital have b e e n "on the run." A n d while this heightened geographical mobility has t e n d e d to d a m p e n the unruliness of labor in the places f r o m which the functionaries of capital have lied, it has t e n d e d to have the opposite effect in the places in which they have settled. Finally, in the 1970s and 1980s, civil society at large has b e e n far less responsive to the c o m m a n d s of the b e a r e r s (or w o u l d - b e bearers) of state power t h a n it h a d b e e n before 1968. A l t h o u g h a general p h e n o m e n o n , this diminished power of states over civil society has b e e n most evident in the semiperiphery, w h e r e it has t a k e n the form of a crisis of "bourgeois" a n d "proletarian" dictatorships alike. Since 1973, "bourgeois" dictatorships have b e e n displaced by d e m o c r a t i c regimes in southern E u r o p e (Portugal, Greece, Spain), East Asia (Philippines, South Korea), a n d in Latin America (most notably Brazil a n d Argentina). 105

A ntisystemic Movements Alongside this crisis, indeed preceding a n d following it, has developed the crisis of the so-called dictatorships of the proletariat. Notwithstanding the m a n y a n d real differences that set the P r a g u e Spring a n d the C h i n e s e Cultural Revolution apart, the two movements h a d o n e thing in c o m m o n : they were assaults on the dictatorship of the officials (primarily b u t not exclusively on t h e dictatorship of the C o m m u n i s t Party's officials) dressed up as a dictatorship of the proletariat. In C h i n a , the assault was so violent a n d u n r e s t r a i n e d as to deal a fatal blow to that dictatorship. Subsequently, party rule could be re-established (as it has been) only by a c c o m m o d a t i n g d e m a n d s for greater grassroots democracy a n d economic decentralization. In Czechoslovakia, a nonviolent a n d restrained assault was p u t down speedily t h r o u g h Soviet military intervention. Yet, between 1970 a n d 1980 t h e challenge re-emerged in a m o r e formidable fashion in Poland, eventually shaking t h e Soviet leadership's confidence in the possibility of p a t c h i n g up a c r u m b l i n g hegemony indefinitely by m e a n s of repression a n d purely cosmetic changes in party dictatorship. F r o m all these points of view, 1968 is alive a n d well in t h e sense that its objective of altering the "balance of power in the world social system in favor of s u b o r d i n a t e groups has been highly successful. Yet, this success has been accomp a n i e d by an equally remarkable failure to improve the material welfare of these s u b o r d i n a t e groups. To be sure, some material benefits did a c c r u e to s u b o r d i n a t e groups as a whole from the c h a n g e in the balance of power. But most of these benefits have accrued to only a minority within each group, leaving the majority w i t h o u t any net gain, p e r h a p s even with a net loss. T h i s t e n d e n c y has been most evident a m o n g T h i r d W o r l d states. T h e oil-producing states w e r e able to take advantage of the new balance of p o w e r in t h e interstate system by c h a r g i n g after 1973 a m u c h higher rent for the use of their natural resources t h a n they were ever able to do 106

The Great Rehearsal before 1968. T h i s a d v a n t a g e lasted a b o u t ten years. A few other T h i r d W o r l d states have been able to step up their own industrialization by taking advantage of t h e relocation of industrial activities from core countries. H o w m u c h of a gain this will constitute by the 1990s remains to be seen. But most T h i r d World states, caught between higher prices for energy resources a n d stiffer competition from newly industrializing countries, have experienced even greater impoverishment a n d u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t t h a n they did before 1968. Similar considerations apply to the other s u b o r d i n a t e groups. T h u s , over the last fifteen years t h e progressive b r e a k d o w n of generational, gender, a n d ethnic barriers to the circulation of elites (which has benefitted quite a few m e m b e r s of each group) has been a c c o m p a n i e d by y o u t h u n e m p l o y m e n t , d o u b l e exploitation of women, a n d the immiseration of "minorities" pn an u n p r e c e d e n t e d scale. As for the change in the balance of power between labor a n d capital its benefits have accrued mostly to workers engaged in stepping up t h e a u t o m a t i o n of labor processes, or in servicing the e x p a n d e d markets for elites, or in r u n n i n g the relocated plants in their new locations. For t h e rest, t h e gains of the late 1960s a n d early 1970s have been eroded, at first by t h e great inflation of t h e 1970s a n d t h e n by t h e u n e m p l o y m e n t of the 1980s. It is p r o b a b l y too early to assess w h o is benefitting a n d who is losing in material t e r m s from the crisis of dictatorships. But h e r e too t h e preliminary record seems to indicate that the material benefits of greater d e m o c r a c y have a c c r u e d only to a small fraction of t h e population. In all directions we a r e faced with the a p p a r e n t p a r a d o x that a favorable c h a n g e in the b a l a n c e of power has b r o u g h t little or no c h a n g e in material benefit to t h e majority of each s u b o r d i n a t e group. T h i s a p p a r e n t p a r a d o x has t h e simple explanation that the reproduction of material welfare in a capitalist world-economy is conditional u p o n the political 107

A ntisystemic Movements a n d social s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the actual a n d potential laboring masses. To the extent that this s u b o r d i n a t i o n is lessened, t h e propensity of the capitalist world-economy to r e p r o d u c e a n d e x p a n d material welfare is lessened too. T h e history of the capitalist w o r l d - e c o n o m y since 1973 has b e e n the history of its a d j u s t m e n t to the social upheavals of the previous five years. T h e a d j u s t m e n t has been problematic, leading s o m e to speak of a general crisis of capitalism, because of t h e scope, s u d d e n n e s s , a n d simultaneity of the changes in power relations ushered in by the social upheavals. W h e n changes in p o w e r relations are limited a n d piecemeal, as they usually are, the capitalist world-economy can a c c o m m o d a t e w i t h o u t difficulty imperceptible changes in the overall allocation of resources a n d distribution of rewards. But w h e n the changes are n u m e r ous, significant, and simultaneous, as they were in t h e period 1968-1973, their a c c o m m o d a t i o n involves long a n d serious disruptions in established patterns of social a n d e c o n o m i c life. T h e i n a d e q u a t e access to m e a n s of production, of exchange, a n d of protection t h a t characterizes s u b o r d i n a t e groups makes the latter particularly vulnerable to these disruptions. We should not be surprised, therefore, if m o s t m e m b e r s of the s u b o r d i n a t e groups have experienced little or no i m p r o v e m e n t over the last fifteen years in their m a t e r i a l welfare, notwithstanding, nay even because of, the i m p r o v e m e n t in their p o w e r position. O n e may w o n d e r , however, w h e t h e r this failure of a m o r e favorable balance of power to deliver welfare might n o t be swinging t h e balance of power back in favor of d o m i n a n t groups. T h e cultural a n d political backlash of the late 1970s a n d of the 1980s against everything that 1968 stood for seems to suggest that this is indeed what is h a p p e n i n g . W h i l e still paying lip-service to T h i r d W o r l d solidarity, T h i r d W o r l d states have been engaged in widespread feuding a n d intense e c o n o m i c competition a m o n g themselves. T h e y o u n g e r 112

The Great Rehearsal generations, the w o m e n , the "minorities" have all switched, albeit to different degrees, f r o m collective to individual concerns, while class solidarity a n d unity of political p u r p o s e a m o n g workers are in most places at an historical low. A n d in the epicenters of the struggle for political democracy, the desire for m o r e a n d greater f r e e d o m s is often paralyzed by fears of economic disruption. T h e r e is no denying t h a t f r o m all these points of view 1968 is d e a d a n d b u r i e d a n d cannot be revived by the thoughts and actions of the nostalgic few. G r a n t e d this, we m u s t nonetheless distinguish carefully between the movem e n t s a n d ideologies of 1968 a n d the u n d e r l y i n g structural transformations that preceded and outlived those movements and ideologies. T h e s e structural transformations are the o u t c o m e of secular trends of the capitalist worldeconomy, a n d as such cannot be reversed by any unfavorable c o n j u n c t u r e that might e n s u e f r o m their o p e n manifestation. T h u s , A d a m Smith (1961: II, 213-31) long a g o pointed o u t the negative long-term impact of an ever w i d e n i n g a n d d e e p e n i n g division of labor on the martial qualities of the peoples t h a t a r e most directly involved in it. T h e greater specialization and mechanization of w a r activities t h e m selves could c o u n t e r this negative impact, b u t only up to a point. At the beginning of o u r century, J o s e p h S c h u m p e t e r m a d e a similar point in support of his a r g u m e n t that capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t u n d e r m i n e s the capabilities (as opposed to the propensities) of states to engage in imperialist wars: The competitive system absorbs the full energies of most of the people at all economic levels. Constant application, attention, and concentration of energy are the conditions of survival within it, primarily in the specifically economic professions, but also in other activities organized on their model . . . . In a purely capitalist world, what was once energy for war becomes simply energy for labor of every kind (1955: 69).

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A ntisystemic Movements To this we need only to add that the spatial unevenness of capitalist development has t e n d e d to u n d e r m i n e the martial qualities of peoples precisely in those states w h e r e it has tended to concentrate wealth. Up to a point, core states have been able to counter the ensuing change in b a l a n c e of power implicit in this tendency t h r o u g h an ever-increasing capital intensity of war. But at a certain point — as the experience of the US in Vietnam a n d of the U S S R in Afghanistan have shown in exemplary fashion — f u r t h e r increases in the capital intensity of war bring rapidly decreasing returns, particularly w h e n it comes to policing the periphery of the world-economy. T h e s a m e processes t h a t u n d e r m i n e the p o w e r of core states over peripheral states over the longue duree of the capitalist world-system also u n d e r m i n e the power of capital over labor, of d o m i n a n t over s u b o r d i n a t e status-groups, of states over civil society. An ever widening a n d deepening division of labor m a k e s capital increasingly vulnerable to workplace acts of protest a n d passive resistance on the part of s u b o r d i n a t e workers, regardless of the level of class consciousness a n d organization expressed by those acts (see, in particular, chapter 1 above; a n d Arrighi & Silver, 1984). In order to reproduce, or re-establish, t h e c o m m a n d of capital over labor in the workplace, t h e functionaries of capital a r e i n d u c e d to mobilize an ever-growing p r o p o r t i o n of t h e labor force in wage activities b u t by so doing they revolutionize power relations between t h e genders and a m o n g age-groups a n d "ethnicities." Last b u t not least, the growing complexity of the division of labor within and across political jurisdictions makes the exercise of state power over civil society increasingly problematic. T h e s e are the kinds of process that p r e p a r e d the g r o u n d for, a n d eventually gave rise to, t h e m o v e m e n t s of 1968. Being processes of t h e longue duree, t h e i r unfolding s p a n s the entire lifetime of the capitalist world-economy. T h e explosions of 1968 a n d their a f t e r m a t h can be interpreted as 110

The Great Rehearsal symptom of the fact that the system is approaching its historical asymptote. 1968, with its successes and failures, was thus a prelude, better, a rehearsal, of things to come.

1968: A Rehearsal of What? If 1968 is analogous to 1848 as a failed world-scale revolution and as a world-historical great rehearsal, for what sort of world-revolution may it be the great rehearsal? Can we on analogy project today's underlying secular trends, specify w h a t was new about yesterday's new social movements, and thereby sketch in advance likely trajectories of the confrontations and progressive social changes they suggest? As we move chronologically towards the 1990s and the 2000s, our historical social system, the capitalist worldeconomy, continues to be faced with difficulties in four principal arenas. First, the interstate system is marked by a military standoff between the US and the U S S R and the evident inability of either to control matters of consequence in states of the periphery. Hegemony is giving way to its conceptual counterpoint, the condition of rivalry. T h e possible realignments of alliances between the live m a j o r actors — the US, the U S S R , Western Europe, J a p a n , and C h i n a — are only now beginning. And everyone is approaching such realignments most gingerly and most fearfully. Hence, US hegemony is being eroded without any clear, and therefore reassuring, world order to replace it. Meanwhile, markets of all sorts — capital, capital goods, labor, wage-goods (ordinary), wage-goods ("durable") — are evolving at a rapid pace. T h e y are becoming less and less regulated social m e c h a n i s m s of the circuits of capital and m o r e and m o r e loci of speculation (what liberals call "market forces") and increasingly show (as on 19 October 1987 in equity prices) the kind of jagged price movements which are at once their

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A ntisystemic Movements h a l l m a r k a n d the reason for their always a n d everywhere being objects of regulation. Possibly the G r o u p of Seven (with the I B R D , I M F , a n d BIS) can impose renewed order. Possibly the transnationals' ingestion of markets t h r o u g h vertical integration (and the analogous organization of their c o u n t e r p a r t s in countries of existing socialism) is sufficient for t h e m to a b s o r b a n d so to d a m p e n the price m o v e m e n t s . W h e t h e r , in this sense, the world-scale centralizing of capital is historically far e n o u g h advanced (as suggested by "the absolute general law") to replace the interstate system's market-regulation via h e g e m o n y , we shall all see. Second, the contradiction between labor a n d capital, given b o t h the increasing centralization of capital a n d the increasing marginalization of large sectors of the labor force, will remain elemental. T h e new social m o v e m e n t s have increased the worldwide pressure for higher wagelevels with world capital seeking ever m o r e to respond to this pressure by reducing the size of labor input. As a result, there has perforce been a rising level of material well-being for a significant sector of workers a n d a d e e p e n i n g relative immiseration of m a n y others, h e n c e an absolute a n d relative increase in the inequalities of well-being a m o n g t h e world's workers. T h e r e has been t h u s a widening scope for the m e c h a n i s m of u n e q u a l exchange in world-scale accumulation. At the s a m e time, capital's increasing search for safe havens f r o m organized labor unrest carries with it of course a growing relocation of industrial proletarianization a n d hence of collective efforts to control that process a n d / o r to ameliorate its effects. T h e net result m a y well be an increasingly class-conscious focus to the nationalist sentiment that pervades the zones outside the core, particularly in semiperipheral states (see chapter 3 above). Similar p h e n o m e n a are increasingly occurring is socialist states, notably (but certainly not only) in Poland. 112

The Great Rehearsal Third, the ability of states to control their civil societies is diminishing. Historically, it is t h r o u g h the constitution of civil society, a n d its s u b s e q u e n t extension — notably, t h r o u g h the 1848-engendered "incorporation of the working classes into society" of the late nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries — that one traces the successive transformations of the m o n a r c h i e s a n d patriciates of the nascent capitalist world-economy into its constituent a n d still evolving states. T h e organizing contradiction f r o m t h e inception of stateness, state power versus civil rights a n d liberties, r e m a i n s central to the state—civil society relation. O v e r time, of course, the scope of each has greatly e x p a n d e d , t h u s s h a r p e n i n g the struggle, which t h e post-1968 world-scale " h u m a n rights" m o v e m e n t s profoundly reflect. T h e notion t h a t ruling strata seek to legitimate their rule — so that they are as morally obligated to c o m m a n d as those they claim to rule are morally obligated to c o m p l y — is b o t h very old a n d very widespread. W e b e r ' s central theoretical claim (1968: I, 212-307) — that certain beliefs in p o p u l a r consciousness are an indispensable condition of routine c o m p l i a n c e a n d so of t h e "stability" of the relational network administering the rules — remains plausible. However, the very increase in the efficiency of the ways in which each state controls its civil society, the expansion of an i n s t r u m e n t a l bureaucracy, itself creates the limits of its efficacy by generating an ever m o r e widespread skepticism a m o n g those w h o m the b u r e a u c r a c y is administering. T h e reach of authority has c o m e to be m o r e a n d m o r e d e n i e d , a s b o t h t h e U S a n d U S S R governm e n t s a m o n g others, have increasingly discovered. 1968 symbolized the outburst of such skepticism. F o r a while, t h e c o m i n g to state power of old social m o v e m e n t s limited this corrosion of authority. B u t these n e w regimes were quickly swept up in t h e increasingly "anti-state" consciousness of t h e m a s s of the population. T h i s process has been

spectacularly abetted by the 113

A ntisystemic Movements impact of new technology on the ability of states to control their space. Electronification is physically different f r o m electrification a n d does not so m u c h abridge the space of social relations as abridge t h e capacity to control social relations t h r o u g h controlling their space. T h e implications for stateness remain to be explicated — and experienced. But t h e control of populations t h r o u g h controlling t h e space they a n d their relations with o n e a n o t h e r occupy — as citizenry, as communities, as individuals — is in the process of being f u n d a m e n t a l l y u n d e r m i n e d in the two key directions formed by the m o d e r n world-system's spatial jurisdictions; within states a n d between states. F o u r t h , the d e m a n d s of t h e disadvantaged status-groups — of gender, of generation, of ethnicity, of race, of sexuality — will get ever stronger. We m u s t h e a r G a l l a u d e t here a n d a d d the physically h a n d i c a p p e d , w h o c o m p r i s e t h e t r u e pariah s t r a t u m of historical capitalism. All six status-group relations are deeply different o n e f r o m a n o t h e r , a n d even m o r e so in their specificities in the world's social structures, b u t they share three features. Each was a g r o u n d of a new left r e p r o a c h of the old left. Each in a very real sense is as m u c h a contradiction a m o n g the people as an element of the c a p i t a l - l a b o r or state-civil society contradiction. A n d the oppressed of e a c h explicitly seek not t h e t u r n i n g of t h e tables b u t social equality, not only structurally b u t ideologically as well (in the sense of the elimination f r o m social consciousness of presumptions of superiority/inferiority in relations of g e n d e r , generation, ethnicity, race, sexuality, able-bodiedness). We therefore project p r o b a b l e realignments in the alliance systems of t h e interstate system along with increased s h a r p economic fluctuations, a s h a r p e n e d (and in particular a geographically widened) class struggle, an increasing inability of states to control their civil societies, a n d a persistent reinforcement of the claims to equality by all the disadvantaged status-groups. It is very unclear, in the 114

The Great Rehearsal n a t u r e of things, where this will lead. After 1848, the world's old left were sure that 1917 w o u l d occur. T h e y a r g u e d about how a n d where and when. But t h e m i d d l e - r a n g e objective of p o p u l a r sovereignty was clear. After 1968, t h e world's antisystemic m o v e m e n t s — t h e old a n d the new ones together — showed r a t h e r less clarity a b o u t the m i d d l e - r a n g e objective. T h e y have t e n d e d therefore to concentrate on short-range ones. T h e r e is clearly a d a n g e r that if organizations concentrate on short-range objectives, even in the n a m e of long-range ideals, they m a y sacrifice m i d d l e - r a n g e success or even m i d d l e - r u n survival. We have no answer to the question: 1968, rehearsal for what? In a sense, t h e answers d e p e n d on the ways in which the w o r l d w i d e family of antisystemic m o v e m e n t s will rethink its m i d d l e - r u n strategy in t h e t e n or twenty years to c o m e . 1917, for good or ill, was the result of an e n o r m o u s a m o u n t of collective a n d conscious effort by the world's old left in t h e years following 1848. No d o u b t it was also the result of structural developments in the capitalist worlde c o n o m y . But it would not have h a p p e n e d without h u m a n organization a n d revolutionary p r o g r a m s . T h e risks of drifting are very clear. T h e t e n a n t s of the status q u o have not given up, however m u c h their position is w e a k e n e d structurally and ideologically. T h e y still have e n o r m o u s power and are using it to reconstruct a new inegalitarian world order. T h e y could succeed. Or the world could disintegrate, f r o m a nuclear or an ecological catastrophe. Or it could be reconstructed in t h e ways in which people hoped, in 1848, in 1968.

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A m i n , S a m i r (1974). Accumulation on a World Scale. N e w York: M o n t h l y Review Press. Arrighi, Giovanni, H o p k i n s , T e r e n c e K., & Wallerstein, I m m a n u e l (1987). " T h e Liberation of Class Struggle?" Review, X, 3, Winter, 403-24. Arrighi, Giovanni & Silver, Beverly J. (1984). " L a b o r M o v e m e n t s a n d Capital Migration: T h e U n i t e d States a n d Western E u r o p e in World-Historical Perspective," in C. Bergquist, ed., Labor in the Capitalist World-Economy. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 183-216. Carr, E . H . (1969). The October Revolution, Before and After. N e w York: Knopf. Fröbel, Folker, Heinrichs, J ü r g e n & Kreye, Otto (1980). The New International Division of Labour. C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press. H o p k i n s , T e r e n c e K. & Wallerstein, I m m a n u e l (1981). "Structural T r a n s f o r m a t i o n s of the W o r l d - E c o n o m y , " in R. R u b i n s o n , ed., Dynamics of World Development. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 249-59. Lin Biao (1967). " M a o T s e - t u n g ' s T h e o r y of People's W a r , " in F. S c h u r m a n n & O. Schell, eds, The China Reader: III, 117

A ntisystemic Movements

Communist China, Revolutionary Reconstruction and International Confrontation, 1949 to the Present. New York: Vintage Books, 347-59. Marx, Karl (1959). Capital, Vol. I, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich (1967). The Communist Manifesto. Harmondsworth: Penguin/NLR. Marx, Karl (1959). Capital. Vol. I. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House. Namier, Sir Lewis (1944). 1848: The Revolution of the Intellectuals, The Raleigh Lecture in History, British Academy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Polanyi, Karl (1957). The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press. Schumpeter, Joseph (1955). Imperialism and Social Classes. New York: Meridian Books. Smith, Adam (1961). The Wealth of Nations. 2 volumes. London: Methuen. Thompson, E.P. (1964). The Making of the English Working Class. New York: Pantheon. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1980). "The States in the Institutional Vortex of the Capitalist World-Economy," International Social Science Journal, XXXII, 4, 743-81. Weber, Max (1946). Essays from Max Weber, ed. H. Gerth & C.W. Mills. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press. Weber, Max (1968). Economy and Society, ed. G. Roth & C. Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press.

118

Index

a c c u m u l a t i o n , social relations of 41-2,70 Afghanistan, Soviet U n i o n a n d 104, 110 A m i n , S a m i r 68 anarcho-syndicalism 81 antisystemic m o v e m e n t s concept of 1 counterrevolution 100-01 f u t u r e of 115 national-liberation 27, 3 0 - 3 2 old swept out by new 102-3 organize against state 3 7 - 8 , 99 perceived to have failed 40 rebellion a n d revolution 29-30 r e c e n t 35 social m o v e m e n t s 3 0 - 3 3 state p o w e r and 50 V i e t n a m as epicenter ol a s y m m e t r y 36 see also 1968; revolutions a n d rebellions antiwar m o v e m e n t s 35 A r g e n t i n a 105 aristocracy 9

Baku, C o n g r e s s of 56, 98 B a n d o e n g 98 banks see under capital BIS (Bank for I n t e r n a t ' l Settlements) 49, 90, 112 Black Power 102 Bolsheviks 5 5 - 6 , 65 B o n a p a r t e , N a p o l e o n 55 bourgeoisie 6 - 7 , 9 - 1 0 Brazil 105 bureaucracy, antisystemic movements and 37-8

Capital (Marx) 9, 11 capital banks and banking 49-50, 90 capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t of 9 1 - 3 d e b t o r a n d creditor states 72-4 proprietors of 4 - 5 warfare a n d 103, 109-10 capitalism centralization of 4 8 - 5 0 , 72, 77-8,94-5,112 d e v e l o p m e n t of capital 9 1 - 3 monopolistic 12-14, 19

77 9

Index m u l t i n a t i o n a l firms 47—8, 71-72, 90-91 new relationship with l a b o r 91,105, 107, 112 nineteenth-century 1 r a p i d evolution of 111-12 see als o e c o n o m y ; p r o d u c t i o n Carr, E , H , 68 C h i n a 48, 100, 111 C u l t u r a l Revolution 36, 37, 89, 106 n a t i o n a l i s m 56 r e v o l u t i o n o f 1911 99 V i e t n a m a n d 35 citizenship 83 civil rights 113 class 1 an sich/ftir sich 16-17, 21, 23, 26 historical analysis of 2 5 - 7 M a r x ' s analysis of 6 - 1 0 S m i t h ' s analysis of 3 - 6 , 10 Weber on 14-20 see also status g r o u p s class struggle c o n d i t i o n s for existence of 63-5 distinct from struggle for wealth 6 1 - 3 government indebtedness and 73-4 historical processes 6 7 - 8 nationalist liberation a n d 5 3 - 4 , 6 6 - 7 , 69 within a state 6 0 - 6 1 colonialism 57 c o m m u n i c a t i o n 7 4 - 6 , 91 television's p o w e r 5 0 - 5 1 Communist Manifesto ( M a r x & Engels) 9, 11^50,51,68,75 C o m m u n i s t parties 37, 100 achievements of 3 4 - 5 new m o v e m e n t s reject 88, 102 p r e s e n t c o n c e r n s of 4 0 - 4 1 strength of 33 terrors a n d errors of 100-01,

106

120

c o m m u n i t y , vs state 4 5 - 6 Czechoslovakia, P r a g u e Spring 102-3, 106 deindustrialization 49 Eastern Europe, C o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s o f 33 Economy and Soaety (Weber) 14-15 economy class a n d 26, 67 effect of 1968 on 107-8 groupsand 22-3 intra-elite struggles 6 1 - 3 M a r x on 11 national-liberation a n d 7 0 - 7 1 separation f r o m state 4 6 - 7 structural t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of 18,46-51 transterritorial 63 see also capital; capitalism e d u c a t i o n 83, 84-5 egalitarianism 5 4 - 5 E g y p t 55 1848 clarity of expectations from 115 effects of 9 8 - 1 0 1 origin of antisystemic m o v e m e n t s 30 revolution of p o p u l a r sovereignty 9 7 - 8 electronic village 7 4 - 5 Engels, F r i e d r i c h 9 1 a n d K . M a r x , Communist Manifestos, 11,50,51,68, lb e t h n i c groups 21, 23, 25, 104, 107 in workforce 83, 88 E u r o c e n t r i s m 68 E u r o p e 111 F r a n c e 33, 78, 97, 102 M a r x on class in 10 Frobel, Folker 71

Index

Gaiiev, Sultan 55 G a l l a u d e t , T h o m a s H. 114 G a r i b a l d i , G i u s e p p e 55 G e r m a n y 78, 89 G e r t h , H a n s 15 Gramsci, A n t o n i o 13 The Great Transformation (Polanyi) 16n G r e e c e 100, 105 G r e e n Party ( G e r m a n y ) 89 G r e n a d a , US invasion of 51 Haiti, revolution 55 Heinrichs, J i i r g e n 71 historical process, class struggle 67-8 Hitler, Adolf 100-01 h u m a n rights 9 3 I B R D ( I n t e r n a t ' l Bank for Reconstruction a n d D e v e l o p m e n t ) 49, 90, 112 I M F (Internat'l M o n e t a r y F u n d ) 4 9 - 5 0 , 90, 112 i m m i g r a n t workers 91 imperialism 13-14, 102 I n d i a 55, 100 b o u r g e o i s i e of 2 4 - 5 I n d o n e s i a 100 I r a n 104, 105 Ireland, workers in Britain 24 Italy, C o m m u n i s t Party of 33 J a p a n 37, 111 Jeunesse Etudiante Communiste 102 Keynesianism 35 Korea, S o u t h 100, 105 Kossuth, L a j o s 55 Kreye, O t t o 71 l a b o r 5, 7 - 8 , 83, 110 A d a m Smith on 4, 109 b u r e a u c r a t i c organization 37-40

change in c o m p o s i t i o n of 82-3,85 c o m m o d i f i c a t i o n of 3 8 - 9 , 40 divisions of 4 7 - 8 , 68, 7 1 - 2 new relationship with capital 91,105, 107, 112 o c c u p a t i o n s of 86-7 polarization of 85 strength a n d weakness of 9-10,78-80 l a n d o w n e r s 4, 5 Latin A m e r i c a 89, 105 Lenin, V.I. n a t i o n a l vs class liberation 55-6 ' political e c o n o m y a n d 12-14 Lin Biao69 M a o i s m 89 market relations 5, 6, 16, 19-20 M a r x , Karl a n d F. Engels, Communist Manifesto 9, 11, 50, 51. 68, 75 Capital 9, 11 class a n d 6 - 1 0 , 91 critique of political e c o n o m y

6-12,26 historical g r o u p s a n d 21 retreat t o S m i t h i a n p a r a d i g m

10 Marxism l a b o r m o v e m e n t a n d 81 political e c o n o m y a n d 12-14 M e x i c o 37, 99 Mills, C. Wright 15 national-liberation achievements of 5 6 - 7 class struggle a n d 5 3 - 4 , 6 6 - 7 , 69 e c o n o m y and 7 0 - 7 1 ideological t h e m e s of 27, 5 4 - 6 realism vs revisionism 59—60 state sovereignty a n d 5 7 - 6 0

727

Index n a t i o n a l i s m 93 antisystemic m o v e m e n t s 30-32 g r o u p i n g s 23, 25 1968 c o n f u s i o n a b o u t objectives 115 cry against evils 98, 101-3 legacies of 103-11 o u t c o m e of ? 111-15 Nixon, R i c h a r d M. 35 N o r t h e r n Ireland, labels for p e o p l e 24 oil, effect on n a t i o n a l powers 106-7 Paris C o m m u n e 9 8 p a u p e r i s m , official 91, 95 peasants 79 Philippines 105 Poland 103,106 Polanyi, K a r l , The Great Transformation 16n political e c o n o m y M a r x ' s critique o f 6 - 1 2 M a r x i s m a n d 12-14 politics intra-elite struggles 6 2 - 3 labor movement and 8 1 - 2 r e s h a p i n g of s t r u c t u r e 2 2 - 3 Portugal 105 power antisystemic m o v e m e n t s gain 31-3 Weber on 15 production, class struggle 64, 67 control of 7 - 8 , -108 over- 8, 13 see also capital; capitalism proletariat 13, 79 d i c t a t o r s h i p of 106 Marx on 6-7, 9-10 suffers from g o v e r n m e n t indebtedness 73-4 property 15,59

722

racism 57, 102 m o v e m e n t against 35 reform, vs revolution 32 revisionism 5 9 - 6 0 revolutions and rebellions C u l t u r a l 36, 37, 89, 106 non-continuity o f 2 9 - 3 0 r e f o r m vs 32 state m a c h i n e r y to control 98-9 unfulfilled 3 3 - 4 1 w o r l d 97 R u s s i a n Revolution 55-6, 65, 68, 98,99 see also Soviet U n i o n

S c h u m p e t e r , J o s e p h 109-10 S D S ( S t u d e n t s for a D e m o c r a t i c Society) 102 Second I n t e r n a t i o n a l 32, 81, 100 S m i t h , A d a m 10, 13 on division o f l a b o r 109 Wealth of Nations 3 - 6 , 7 SNCC (Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee) 102 social d e m o c r a t i c parties 8 9 - 9 0 , 100, 101 achievements of 33, 3 4 - 5 , 40, 85, 88 n e w movements reject 88, 102 social m o v e m e n t s 7 7 - 8 2 , 95 effect o f l 9 6 8 104, 107, 114 react against old left 8 8 - 9 0 socialism 94 Soiidarnosc 103 S o u t h Africa 105 Soviet U n i o n A f g h a n i s t a n a n d 104, 110 class struggle 6 5 - 6 repression by 106, 113 revolution in power 82 seealsoCommunist parties; Russian Revolution Spain 33, 55, 105

Index state capital vs welfare 9 2 - 3 civil society a n d o b e d i e n c e 98, 105,113-14,115 class struggles within 15-20, 60-61,64 c o m i n g t o power 3 1 - 3 vs c o m m u n i t y 4 5 - 6 control of economics 5 d e b t o r s a n d creditors 7 2 - 4 illegitimate interference 58 interstate system of 4 2 - 4 intrastate n e t w o r k 44 l a b o r seeks power in 8 1 - 2 obsolescence of 11 property 59 r e s h a p i n g of political structure 2 2 - 3 restraints on sovereignty of 57-60 w i d e n i n g a n d deepening of 42-5,51 status g r o u p s 1, 104, 114 contrast w i t h class 14-20 m o n o p o l i e s 19 nationalist 25 reification of 2 0 - 2 2 i^aZfoethnic groups s t u d e n ^ C S , 37 Sweden, reformists in power 82 Switzerland, g r o u p s within 24 technology, t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of e c o n o m y 18 T h i r d I n t e r n a t i o n a l 32, 82, 100 T h i r d World 100 class struggle a n d 67 effect o f l 9 6 8 106-7 feuding a m o n g s t n a t i o n s 109 national sovereignty of 104 new social m o v e m e n t s a n d 88-9

T h o m p s o n , E.P, 23 Turkey 48, 50 unions, b u r e a u c r a c y of 3 7 - 8 United Kingdom L a b o u r Party 100 w o r k i n g class 23—4, 78 U n i t e d N a t i o n s 44 U n i t e d States economic hegemony 26-7, 48-9,71 erosion of h e g e m o n y 111-12 political h e g e m o n y 69, 100, 103-4 state vs society 113 s t u d e n t m o v e m e n t 37 televised social m o v e m e n t s 50-51 V i e t n a m a n d 3 5 - 6 , 103, 104, 110 W a r for I n d e p e n d e n c e 55 value-systems 17 Vietnam epicenter of forces 35—6, 49, 89, 100, 102, 103 national-liberation m o v e m e n t 56 U S a n d 3 5 - 6 , 103, 104, 110 Wealth of Nations (Smith) 3 - 6 , 7 W e a t h e r m e n 102 Weber, M a x 14, 113 Economy and Society 14-15 welfare 9 1 - 2 Westernism, anti- 9 3 - 4 w o m e n 104, 107 l a b o r a n d 83, 88 world e c o n o m y . ^ e c o n o m y Yugoslavia 100

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