ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE?
STUDIES IN ARTHURIAN AND COURTLY CULTURES The dynamic field of Arthurian Studies is the s...
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ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE?
STUDIES IN ARTHURIAN AND COURTLY CULTURES The dynamic field of Arthurian Studies is the subject for this book series, Studies in Arthurian and Courtly Cultures, which explores the great variety of literary and cultural expression inspired by the lore of King Arthur, the Round Table, and the Grail. In forms that range from medieval chronicles to popular films, from chivalric romances to contemporary comics, from magic realism to feminist fantasy—and from the sixth through the twenty-first centuries—few literary subjects provide such fertile ground for cultural elaboration. Including works in literary criticism, cultural studies, and history, Studies in Arthurian and Courtly Cultures highlights the most significant new Arthurian Studies.
Bonnie Wheeler, Southern Methodist University Series Editor Editorial Board: James Carley, York University Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, George Washington University Virginie Greene, Harvard University Siân Echard, University of British Columbia Sharon Kinoshita, University of California, Santa Cruz Alan Lupack, University of Rochester Andrew Lynch, University of Western Australia
ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE? DESIRE, SEDUCTION, AND SUBVERSION IN A TWELFTH-CENTURY LATIN TEXT
Kathleen Andersen-Wyman
ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE?
© Kathleen Andersen-Wyman, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–6770–1 ISBN-10: 1–4039–6770–9 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Andersen-Wyman, Kathleen. Andreas Capellanus on love? : desire, seduction, and subversion in a twelfth-century Latin text / Kathleen Andersen-Wyman. p. cm.—(Studies in Arthurian & courtly cultures) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–6770–9 (alk. paper) 1. André, le chapelain. De amore libri tres. I. Title. PA8250.A236Z6 2007 809.933543—dc22
2007060045
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: July 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.
To Lawrence B. Andersen
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CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
ix
Preface
xi
Introduction The Difficulty of Reading Andreas’s Text Readership and Historical Context The Critics My Approach Outline Note on Translations and Manuscript Edition
1 4 7 18 25 29 33
I
35
Fish or Fowl (or, Is There a Genre in This Text?) Transgressing the Boundaries of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric Genre Trouble, Reading Instructions, and Other Formalities Deconstructing Gender and Culture: A Reading of the First Five Chapters
II Repetition in Andreas’s Text How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Social Hierarchies How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Religion III On Clerical Intertexts and the Subversion of Seduction Author/ity Positions of Mastery and the Rhetoric of Eros Seduction and Critical Distance On Confessio and the Charm of Free Choice
36 40 48 67 70 90 113 116 131 140 149
CONTENTS
VIII
IV Andreas and Walter Andreas’s Desire Uncovered Identities Readership Feminine Desire and the Transgendered Agents of Andreas’s Text
159 160 173 181
V
201 202 226
Andreas on Women On the Discourse of Misogyny Women’s Religion
188
Notes
237
Bibliography
253
Author Index
267
Subject Index
269
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
his book was made possible in part by an Idaho Humanities Council Fellowship from the NEH (National Endowment for the Humanities), which allowed the research and writing of the final chapter to be completed. I would also like to thank Christopher Jones for his careful reading and useful criticism, especially with respect to the Latin translations and transcriptions and for asking useful and challenging questions about theory. I would also like to thank Jennifer Attebery for the significant personal and professional support. Many thanks are due H. Marshall Leicester, whose creative approaches to literature have been formative, and Jane Chance, whose example, moral support, and practical suggestions are of inestimable value. Many thanks also go to Bonnie Wheeler, whose enthusiasm, intelligent comments, and humane interactions as an editor made the publication process pleasurable. This book would not have been possible at all without the hard work of Dana Andersen-Wyman, whose hours in the kitchen, the yard, the laundry room, and the nursery are worth more money than I care to tally; and thanks to Dana, too, for always finding a way to make hard things look easy. My gratitude also goes to Lawrence and Naomi Andersen for their continual encouragement and example.
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PREFACE
his book offers a completely new reading of the book by Andreas Capellanus (c. 1185), commonly called De amore, once upon a time referred to as the code book of courtly love. The reading shows how Andreas’s text can be seen as a highly sophisticated contentious subversion of the accepted discourses of desire, social hierarchy, and ecclesiastical authority in twelfth-century Europe. Its historical beginning and endpoint is the condemnation and burning of Andreas’s book by Bishop Tempier in 1277. The reading is intended to shed light upon our assumptions about alterity in the Middle Ages, and to help historians of philosophy and literary critics further understand the Condemnation of 1277. It is also hoped that literary critics and theoreticians will be further convinced that there exist excellent examples of literary sophistication from the twelfth century. Feminist scholars will find significant historical and theoretical material to further studies in women’s literacy, misogynist discourse and queer theory. General historians of the Middle Ages and of twelfth century Europe will find plenty of food for thought, both in term of details and general assumptions. This book is also very much for teachers of the Middle Ages. One of its goals is to rescue us from the continued misuse of Andreas’s text. It simply does not work as a handbook for loving or for reading about medieval courtly love, and using it as such confuses our already often befuddled but intellectually honest students. This book is, therefore, also for students. I do not think there is anything in it that is beyond the reach of an interested undergraduate. It will certainly be of use to graduate students. Finally, the book is also for curious readers who are not in any way professional academics. They may find the last two chapters especially interesting, but the book should be generally accessible. I have had so many readers belonging to this category express an interest in the book that I cannot help but address them here and hope they too will enjoy it.
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INTRODUCTION
he impetus for this book began many years ago when I was an undergraduate trying to understand why medieval devotional texts and mystical writings used the language of courtly love and sexual passion to describe religious ecstasies. I was naturally led to study courtly literature and instructed to pay particular attention to the so-called De amore, by Andreas Capellanus, since it was then considered to be something akin to a “codebook” of courtly love. I found Andreas’s text to be singularly confusing. Not only was it contradictory, but its supposed relationship to love did not seem to be even plausibly descriptive, let alone prescriptive, as most scholars then suggested, and as the book on one level pretends to be. It seemed instead as though Andreas used love talk as a way into other topics altogether, which were then still vague to me, and perhaps even as a smokescreen to camouflage sensitive material. Compelled by the mystery, I began in graduate school to read Andreas’s text in earnest, in order to understand it, rather than something else by it. Andreas’s text did not become less difficult and my readings over the years did not square with what critics generally concluded about it, no matter their point of view. I became convinced that the problem lay in their reading of the text in terms of its surface discourse, which is plausibly enough related to “love.” Meanwhile, I had begun to see in Andreas’s text material and sentiment of more import and breadth than rules for, jokes about, or even discussion of heterosexual behavior, the then broad categories of continuing critical response. In contrast, I saw the text’s use of stories to indicate how institutions are created and legitimized. I also began to see that its suggestions about the psychological and social ramifications of the conscription of human desire were complex and possibly subversive. I began to wonder whether this was the real reason it was condemned by Bishop Tempier in 1277. The critical suggestions that it was condemned because it conveyed a set of rules for courtly love, or even because it was
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ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE?
lascivious, seemed weak: there were plenty of other such texts available to Tempier—and plenty more vile—that were not condemned. The same seemed true of suggestions that the text was condemned for its references to magic (which are, on the surface, so minor that only a reading like mine could make them significant) or for its nominalism (a philosophical stance with which it plays but does not offer as “truth”). I began to understand that if I was right, if Andreas’s text subverts the mechanisms that create human institutions, and if it teaches the reader how to free him or herself from their conscriptive forces, then Tempier and his minions had every reason to fear it. Its condemnation began to make sense. It could appear as though I am making a mighty claim for my understanding of Andreas’s text. Why have so few, including me and perhaps one of Tempier’s staff, seen what Andreas’s text is up to? In fact, based on the work of Alfred Karnein, though to very different conclusions than his, I argue briefly in this introduction, under “Readership and Historical Context,” that there is evidence to suggest that a few of the text’s early collectors may well have recognized its rhetorical and social power; however, it is not within the scope of this book to provide a complete analysis of the history of manuscript transmission. As for readers who came after the notorious essentialism of the nineteenth century, when Andreas’s text was dubbed the “code book of courtly love” by Gaston Paris, they/we are hardly to be blamed for reading within the confines (or blinders, if you will) of our discipline. Fortunately that has changed. Thanks to increasingly sophisticated literary theory and criticism (historically comparable, in my opinion, only to that of the high Middle Ages) we are now able to see complexities, and therefore clarities, that were formerly impossible to perceive by virtue of our various horizons of expectation. Given the opacity of Andreas’s text and the nineteenth-century context in which it was appropriated for academic use, it is not surprising that many scholars, educators, and enthusiasts have misused and misinterpreted it during the past one hundred years. It is a difficult text, even for a careful, sophisticated, literate reader regardless of era. Its difficulties will be enumerated below under “The Difficulty of Reading Andreas’s Text” and will be addressed throughout the remainder of this book. Bishop Tempier’s comments in 1277 indicate that he himself did not understand Andreas’s text, although at least one member of the condemnatory committee surely did. It is also unlikely that Drouart la Vache (cleric c. 1290), upon whom so many present-day scholars rely for evidence of early reception, and who enjoyed Andreas’s text primarily for the laughs it provides, understood it. I think it is a mistake, and for a long time in studies of the history of reception a common one, to assume that early or contemporary readings of a work show us how a work was meant to be understood. Any reader can
INTRODUCTION
3
misunderstand a work. The more difficult, the more likely it is to be misunderstood. Drouart’s is the first copy we have of Andreas’s text after its condemnation, but his “translation” of it into French is also a paraphrase that leaves out key passages and whole sections of the book. Clearly Drouart’s translation should not be used as a key to understanding Andreas’s text. Andreas’s text is, as Drouart felt, excellent entertainment, which is one of the few things upon which many of its readers agree. I argue, unlike others, however, that this contributes to its cleverness rather than to its baseness. Beyond this, and more importantly, I hope to show that Andreas’s text is a sophisticated tool for profound social critique, useful in any age. It exposes the manipulation and self-interest inherent in institutions that exist to socialize desire, but it goes further: it undermines the very foundations and genesis of human institutions. Since the text shows a particular interest in how desire is conscripted (by the empowered to keep them so) it makes sense that it occupies itself to some degree with heterosexual relations, which are, of necessity, one of the primary institutions responsible for the conscription of desire in any culture. But Andreas’s text is not so much interested in heterosexual relations as in what the rules are in any social situation, who makes them, how they are made, and whether and how they might be avoided. Andreas explores the same mechanisms with respect to class and gender that he does with respect to heterosexual relations. Although critical perspectives have become increasingly informed and sophisticated, Andreas’s text continues to be read and used as ancillary to other medieval literary works, particularly to courtly material. This approach not only limits what Andreas’s text can be about, but it also limits how his text can be applied to the understanding of other texts. Further discussion of current critical perspectives on Andreas’s text appears below in the sections entitled “The Critics” and “My Approach” and should make my points about the uses of Andreas’s text even clearer. One of the main purposes of this book is to show that once Andreas’s text is understood on its own terms, rather than as ancillary, it is likely to yield even more accurate and fruitful scholarship with regard to its literary context than it has yet done. Further, my reading demonstrates the necessity of reading a text well and carefully before assuming it is useful to explain its literary or historical context. Besides showing that Andreas’s text undermines sacred and secular institutions (the authorities that conscript desire, erotic or otherwise) and the mechanisms that create and maintain them, this book demonstrates how the supposedly misogynistic Book III of De amore is not. Another novel point of view this book provides comes from the possibility that Andreas’s text can be read as an attempted seduction of Walter, the young man to whom the supposed instruction on love is addressed. The historical probabilities will be explored.
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ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE?
The remainder of this introduction is arranged so that readers with little exposure to Andreas studies might gain enough background to understand the rest of the book and so that specialists will be clear about my critical assumptions and contentions. The entire book is arranged so that readers can find which aspects of the material and argument interest them most and focus on those. There is, therefore, a little repetition for readers who need the entire text, and I beg their indulgence. The Difficulty of Reading Andreas’s Text Broadly speaking, Andreas’s text is difficult for reasons that go beyond its obvious contradictions. This section briefly touches upon its odd structure, multiple genres, intertextuality, voicing, and irony—some of the reasons readers assume it is something it is not. To try to avoid even more confusion than Andreas’s text presents on its own, I refer throughout to my own chapters in Roman numerals (e.g., Chapter I) to distinguish them from Andreas’s chapters (e.g., Chapter 1). I use Roman numerals for Andreas’s Books (I, II, and III) when they are mentioned separately, because it is standard practice to do so; but to cite a particular line, I use all Arabic numbers. For example, 1.6.47 would refer to line 47 of Chapter 6 in Book I. Book III, however, has no chapters, so citations will appear as 3.87. Structurally, Andreas’s text is odd to say the least.1 It begins with a preface (Praefatio) that is in fact a short letter to “Walter.” The Praefatio comprises four Latin sentences, the equivalent of three short paragraphs in English. I cite the quantities that follow in terms of English paragraphs, since this will be most easily imaginable to most readers. Liber primus (Book I) follows the preface, beginning with an unusually short and unhelpful accessus or explanation of what is to come. Chapters 1–5 of Book I follow, each the rough equivalent of five to thirteen short- to medium-length paragraphs in English. As their introduction by an accessus would lead readers to expect, these chapters briefly discuss, in more or less treatise form, various definitions related to love. Chapter 6, however, balloons unexpectedly into eight dialogues, a structure and genre for which the reader is entirely unprepared, and each dialogue is longer than any previous chapter. The dialogues are between men and women of varying social status, and they supposedly function as examples of how a man should approach a woman if he wants to “win her love” (which none ever manages to do). The dialogues increase in length, with the eighth dialogue being about twice as long as the next longest. They end up comprising more than half of the entire text, all three books included, with Dialogue 8 being especially disproportionate. After the eighth dialogue, Chapters 7–12, which are ostensibly about what to avoid doing, complete Book I in the same style and lengths as the first five chapters. Book II, called “How to Preserve Love,” contains six
INTRODUCTION
5
chapters of the treatise variety as in Book I, a fifty-one-paragraph Chapter 7 consisting of “various judgments on love,” and a fifty-paragraph Chapter 8, which is a chivalric narrative expounding “the rules for love.” Book III, “The Condemnation of Love,” completes Andreas’s text and is made up of the equivalent of 121 paragraphs, most of which appear to condemn women as a way of condemning love. Andreas’s text is obviously far from structurally balanced. Unlike critics who see Andreas as simply distracted or sloppy, it seems to me that Andreas uses the most space to develop what is most important to him. In the eighth dialogue, a cleric debates with a woman of the highest nobility about exactly what kind of love is the “source of life and all good”—sexual or religious, physical or theoretical. The lady and the notorious “lower half” take the day. What this suggests will be taken up at greater length further on. Let it suffice for now that De amore’s odd structure is more a help than a hindrance to its understanding if we assume there is purpose to its oddness rather than incompetence. Let us not be confused by critical expectations. What Andreas’s text does “wrong” with structure, it also does with genre. Andreas’s text reflects multiple genres: missive, treatise, dialogue, narrative, rulebook, and catalog of misogynist sayings. The different genres in Andreas’s text not only lend surprise and confusion but also begin to hint at the complexity of the text’s intertextuality. The treatise parts of the text, partly because of their structure and mostly because of their subject matter, have led critics to see works like eleventh-century Arabic, The Neckring of the Dove and especially Ovid’s Ars amatoria and Remedia Amoris as being possible prototypes of Andreas’s text.2 The dialogues are reminiscent of troubadour tensons and of Aelred of Rievaulx’s De amicitia spirituali, a set of dialogues on spiritual friendship between men founded upon a work of Cicero on male friendship, from a father to a son. The rules in Andreas’s text echo Abelard’s Sic et non, because they conflict, and rule “books” or advice literature, such as Aurigena’s Facetus, because of (apparent) intent.3 The narratives in Andreas’s text conflate Christian parables with chivalric romances, as do the Lais of Marie de France and the romances of Chrétien de Troyes; although for Andreas the conflation is more overt and exists to more subversive ends. Book III engages works like those of Tertullian, Jerome, and Walter Map against women and marriage. Finally, because Andreas’s text begins with a letter and continues with intimate vocatives to the reader/Walter throughout, the thoughtful reader (for so Andreas calls us and asks us to be) must consider the nature and circumstances of letter writing in the late twelfth century. The problem of intertextuality goes far beyond considerations of genre, however, to considerations of discourses engaged. Andreas’s text engages twelfth-century discourses of desire generally, including mysticism and misogyny, as well as the more basic ones of sexuality, wealth, and power.
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ANDREAS CAPELLANUS ON LOVE?
Although I argue that Andreas’s text is not about courtly love in the sense it generally has been taken to be, it is, like courtly love, clearly also about the relations between rhetoric and desire. So are mystical texts like those of Bernard of Clairvaux and Richard of St. Victor, who wrote only slightly earlier in the twelfth century than did Andreas and whose texts Andreas’s engages. It may be that Andreas learned about the uses of fiction from Richard, who explores them at length in his Benjamin Minor. Unlike the mystical texts, however, Andreas’s is not interested in sublimating the reader’s desire but in exposing the mechanisms that would sublimate it. Andreas’s subversive polyphony uses the mystical discourse of desire as a kind of counterpoint. This will be taken up at greater length in Chapter III. Besides the registers necessarily perceptible from its intertextuality, Andreas’s book creates further registers of meaning (confusion to some readers) by employing a complex system of voicing. First, there is the voice that I call “Andreas the Master.” This is the authorial persona who naively (but self-consciously so) claims to have all the answers, even though they do not work and do contradict each other. Andreas the Master also ventriloquates the obnoxious lines he claims to be appropriate for the men of the dialogues, whose voices echo the Master’s. There are also the voices of the women being courted in the dialogues, and of the ladies at court giving their advice. Their lines are as ventriloquated as those of the men, and they not only refute the Master’s teachings but also make his advice useless. Further, since Andreas’s text continually plays with its author’s femininity as a cleric, gives advice to a feminine readership, and blurs gender distinctions on the social level (as it pretends to be defining them), it is clear that the text is occupied with what could be called the position of the feminine.4 I call this textual voice the “feminine” voice, or the voice of disenfranchised desire. Finally, there is what might be called “the voice from the fissures.” It erupts from the contrapuntal junctures and disjunctures between the voices of Andreas the Master and the feminine voice. It is a “gap” because it rarely expresses itself in words, but it is also not a gap because it forms a locus of meaning. The complicated voicing in Andreas’s text also contributes to the text’s efforts to problematize authority, both textual and social, in three ways. First, it presents an untrustworthy if not scurrilous author (Andreas is not at all afraid to appear contradictory, foolish or immoral—in fact, he seems not only to intend to do so but also to get some sort of perverse satisfaction from doing so). Second, through its many voices, the text presents secular and ecclesiastical authorities on rhetoric, social structure and human relations in Sic et non fashion to show that “rules” and definitions are man-made and contradict one another. Third, and ironically, since the voices accomplish a text that is unusually full of gaps and contradictions, seeing the text as reliable/authoritative in any conventional sense is out of the question. No wonder the casual reader becomes confused.
INTRODUCTION
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Irony, often a result of the voicing, is another complexity with which the reader of Andreas’s text has to contend. Many of the “ironic” loci could be accurately described as passages that force the reader to reread, rethink, and reinterpret because of the contradictions they present.5 For example, there is the problem of giving the reader useless instructions. The Master begins the dialogues by asserting that this is how men of varying social stations must talk if they expect to win love; however, the women in the dialogues, even those of lower station, always reject the men. The Master creates another problem generally considered to be ironic in Book III when he appears to tell the reader not to love after having gone to so much trouble to supposedly teach him how. That particular irony is a surface irony that disappears after close reading but complicates in order to obtain that close reading. So-called ironic problems arise at a different layer of the text as well. For instance, the narratives used by different speakers rarely work the way their narrators intend them to work. A narrative illustrating how reluctant ladies will be punished in hell, for example, ends up reflecting the cruelty and arbitrariness of such doctrinal manipulations by those who hold power (specifically men, the moneyed, and the church) rather than showing how well deserved such punishment is. Finally, and perhaps the most extreme ironic problem of Andreas’s text, one that has been the biggest obstacle for his readers, lies with Book III, which maligns women with the standard misogynistic quips and gripes after having portrayed women throughout the rest of the text as being completely unlike their representations in traditional misogynist discourse. This will be addressed in Chapter V. These “ironies,” while confusing at first, function as reading instructions and quizzes. So far we have only begun to touch upon the tortuous complexity of Andreas’s text. How does one approach such a densely woven—some would claim tangled—web? The next two sections suggest how early readers, other medievalists, and I have gone about it. Readership and Historical Context No original title for the book by Andreas Capellanus emerges from its manuscripts, although several later manuscripts agree to call it De amore. The lack of a title is not unusual or necessarily meaningful for a medieval work; but in the case of Andreas’s text, the lack may be one more indication of the difficulty readers have always had with deciding what the book is actually about. P.G. Walsh gives the options that do appear, probably all added by later copyists: C (thirteenth century) has “Incipit liber amoris et curtesie”; D (fourteenth century) “Incipit de arte honeste amandi et de reprobatione inhonesti amoris,” the words honeste and inhonesti having been added above the line by
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second hand; B (fifteenth century) “De arte amandi, de reprobatione amoris et eius remedio.” But the commonest formula in the manuscripts is “De amore,” with the variations “Tractatus de amore,” “Liber de amore,” “Galteri de amore,” “Liber amoris.”6
These titles indicate a number of interpretive possibilities. Taking the possibilities in the order that they appear above, Andreas’s book may have been thought by a thirteenth-century copyist to be about love and courtly behavior; by fourteenth-century copyist, about decent and indecent love, telling also how nasty indecent love is. A fifteenth-century copyist may have thought it was about the art of loving generally and about the condemnation of love and its remedy. The titles also suggest that the book has been seen as a treatise, a book, and a letter. The titles and suggested genres reflect some of the work’s thematic and structural difficulties: Is this book about love or society? What kind of love does it discuss? Is the love it discusses valuable? If so, to whom? Does the book recommend love? For whom is this book? Finally, Tempier’s prologue to the 219 condemned propositions calls Andreas’s text “ ‘De amore’ sive ‘De deo amoris.’ ” 7 This suggests that in 1277 “On the God of Love” was as likely a name for Andreas’s text as “On Love.” “On the God of Love” is not inept, given that Andreas personifies love and often conflates his personification with the God of Christianity. Most critics refer to Andreas’s text as De amore. Although perhaps adequate, I do not use this title for two reasons: first, it is not Andreas’s; second, it is now steeped in associations with Parisian8 notions of courtly love, and consequently tends to define Andreas’s text in those terms, which themselves have been called into question for a number of reasons.9 Since Andreas’s text comprises a prologue and three “books,” calling it Andreas’s “book” would be confusing, although he calls it such. He also calls it a letter and a treatise, but since it only partially conforms to twelfth-century (or any century) standards for letter writing or for treatises, I do not call it by either of those names. Because the text’s genre is elusive and its content covert, it seems possible that the author left the text without a title intentionally. I therefore simply call it “Andreas’s text.” My appellation has its own problems, however. Mainly, they relate to calling the text Andreas’s, as though his identity were a solid fact upon which to anchor the wayward text. Andreas is in fact an unknown quantity, as textually multiple as he is historically elusive. His historical identity has been established mainly by internal textual evidence, accompanied by a little existing external evidence, but both combined only add up to hints. Taking the internal evidence first, the author refers to himself as “Andreas” as he takes an oath at 2.6.18, and one of his fictional speakers refers to the teaching of “the lover Andreas, Chaplain to the Royal Court” at 1.6.385. Although this is spoken in
INTRODUCTION
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the context of a discussion about the “Court of Love,” and could be a joke or a nom de plume,10 the most thorough scholars have taken this internal evidence as reference to Philip II’s royal court in Paris.11 As for further external evidence, the name of Andreas is found as a signature, twice identifying him as a priest, to nine charters of Champagne. One of these, dated 1182–1186, was granted by the Countess Marie, who appears as a living authority on love in Andreas’s text.12 These dates are relevant if we believe the internal evidence for the text’s dates, which consists of, for example, the date May 1, 1174, on the conspicuously fictional letter from Countess Marie de Champagne at the end of the seventh dialogue (1.6.400). This kind of evidence, combined with the fact that Andreas cites authorities that were favorites in the late twelfth century, leaves critics generally in agreement that the text was written around 1185.13 If Andreas was in fact a chaplain to the royal court at Paris, signing charters would have been one of his duties, besides saying mass for a fee, being in charge of the King’s records, and writing letters of diplomacy.14 Whether or not the signatures on the charters belong to the author of Andreas’s text, I am persuaded that the text’s author was a cleric. First, when writing in what is claimed to be his own voice at the beginning of 1.6 and 2.1–2, he indicates that he has intimate knowledge of clerical clothing and clerical needs—he speaks as an insider. Second, in the chapter on loving nuns (1.8), he claims the experience of nearly loving a nun: what man but a cleric would have been likely to have the “repeated and prolonged access” to a nun that he describes? Third, and most convincing, the issues with which the author seems to be most engaged are usually found to be embedded in several major religious or ecclesiastical discourses: that of mysticism, that of canon law, and that of misogyny. Finally, I find the text’s claim that the author is a clerk to be believable because of his erudite Latin. Because of this, the most commonly held critical view is that the text’s intended audience was other clerics (see, e.g., P.G. Walsh’s Introduction). The recent work of some renowned scholars, such as Catherine Brown, Don Monson, and Albrecht Classen, whom I discuss below, depend upon this view. There is, however, a problem with it: the text tends to offer advice to women more often than to men, or even than to Walter himself, for whom the text is supposedly written. We are therefore forced either to consider the possibility of twelfth-century women being learned enough to be an intended audience for Andreas’s text or to postulate a readership of clerics who see themselves to be in a position somehow feminine, a position I will explain in due course.15 Either hypothesis (or both) would fit with the understanding of Andreas’s text that I propose. To postulate that Andreas had a female readership would not be new. Some critics have thought that perhaps the work was written for the
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entertainment or wooing of noblewomen.16 Even P.G. Walsh, the most recent editor and translator of the text into English, who argues persuasively for a clerical audience, entertains the possibility of Andreas being in love with the Countess Marie, or some other noble woman.17 Andreas’s text may well appeal (in both senses) to women, for one reason or another. But the clerical audience has won the day, for now, primarily on the basis of what modern scholarship thinks it knows about Latin literacy at the supposed date of the text.18 Since facts about the historical context of the text are still as sparse as they are, and since our knowledge of late twelfth-century women’s literacy is growing but still scanty, I do not believe this issue can yet be resolved.19 Andreas himself makes the women in his text seem extraordinarily well read and astute, which could be seen as evidence for such a readership. I lean toward this interpretation. But Andreas also identifies clerics as being effeminate.20 Within the fiction of Andreas’s text, “feminine” is a position anyone can occupy— the position of disenfranchised human goods, the position of the one to be seduced. The dialogues construct such a position, and other places in the text allude to it. Throughout his text Andreas claims to occupy this position to some degree himself. I will return to these and other issues of identity in Chapter IV. Despite all of this, I generally refer to the text as “Andreas’s.” Further historical unknowns include Walter. The work is supposedly for him, and we know even less about a potentially historical Walter than about Andreas. Necessarily briefly, therefore, there is this historical possibility: after showing that Andreas was at least as likely to have been a chaplain at Paris as anything else, Pascale Bourgain makes a good argument for Walter being the son of a chamberlain (also Walter) at Paris. She writes, Et le traité est dédié à un Gautier qui pourrait bien être Gautier de Nemours le Jeune, né en 1163, fils et successeur de Gautier le Chambellan, très en faveur auprès de Philippe Auguste: cet homme “jeune” de 1180 à 1186 environ, débutant à la cour vers 1190, conviendrait d’autant mieux comme destinataire du traité écrit vers cette date qu’il fut gardien du Trésor des chartes où, dans l’inventaire de 1350, figure assez bizarrement, seul texte littéraire parmi les documents d’archives, un exemplaire du De amore.21 And the treatise is dedicated to a Walter who could well have been Walter the Young of Nemours, born in 1163, son and successor of Walter the Chamberlain, very much in favor amongst those near to Philip Augustus. This man, “young” around 1180–86, made his debut at court around 1190 and works especially well as the recipient of the treatise written around this date, since he was made guardian of the Treasury of Charters, where, during the inventory of 1350, strangely enough, the only literary text found amongst the documents of the archive was a copy of De amore.
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Clearly, Andreas’s Walter may have been the historical person, twenty-two years old at the writing of Andreas’s text, and possibly as beloved of Andreas as his text claims. Unfortunately, Bourgain does not tell us any more than that about the manuscript found in the Treasury of Charters; neither does she discuss its possible history. She only suggests that Walter might be responsible for the version found in 1350 in the archive. It is possible that someone—perhaps a later patron, family member or Walter’s successor—fearing to lose the text to Tempier’s flames, hid an illicit copy in the unlikely place. What became of this manuscript is not clear. Also unfortunate, for our knowledge of Walter, Bourgain is less interested in Andreas’s relation to him than in Andreas’s relation to the noble ladies cited as authorities in his text, so she follows the connections with Walter no further. Brackett makes a strong argument for Bourgain’s suggestion about a historical connection between Andreas and Walter, based on historical evidence and the work of John Baldwin.22 Brackett shows that this particular Walter was very well educated and close to the King. Even Brackett, however, calls the evidence of Walter’s connection to Andreas “circumstantial.”23 Although more research needs to be done, the connection with this historical Walter is plausible. Given the evidence we have about Walter, there is at least as good a chance that Walter was a historical character (a young man close to the king) as a convenient fiction, and I tend to see him as the primary recipient of Andreas’s text. That said, it is equally clear that whoever Walter was for Andreas, Andreas’s text invokes a multiple readership: it addresses women and men of all classes, and especially the “assiduous” reader. I do not see this fact to negate Walter as a primary reader but to convey Andreas’s knowledge or belief that his text would, sooner or later, be read by many people. The evidence of manuscript transmission also remains sketchy. Although scholars have agreed for some time that Andreas’s text was probably written in the late twelfth century, the earliest extant manuscripts date from the last quarter of the thirteenth, that is, from about the time the manuscript was burned.24 The earliest witness (c. 1235) is fifty years after the calculated writing of the text, and the earliest complete copy about a hundred years later (c. 1285). Most of the extant manuscripts are fifteenth century and German. Further, the evidence of more distant witnesses needs to be reevaluated since, as Karnein has pointed out, what was formerly believed to be the wide influence of the text is evidence that was compiled under the assumption that Andreas’s book was the code book of courtly love.25 We can therefore make only a few inferences from manuscript transmission about the text’s use or understanding by its contemporaries. Why there is no better contemporary reference to the work remains a mystery, perhaps to be solved only in Bishop Tempier’s fires.
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Since Bishop Ètienne Tempier condemned Andreas’s text in Paris in 1277, someone clearly found it more dangerous than courtly love literature could be in itself. What exactly were the “vanitates et insanias falsas and quosdam manifestos et execrabiles errores” for which is was condemned, however, is yet another topic of critical and historical disagreement. The condemnation of 1277 was Bishop Étienne Tempier’s over zealous response to the pope’s inquiry as to how long-standing contentions between members of the faculty at Paris might be resolved. The issues at hand revolved around the influx of Aristotelian rationalism, which Tempier deeply mistrusted. Over the course of only three weeks, with the help of sixteen anonymous scholars, Tempier compiled a repetitive and contradictory list of 219 execrable teachings. Anyone who taught or listened to them would be excommunicated. The undertaking was sloppy: no more than twenty of the propositions can actually be attributed to Tempier’s enemies, who were primarily members of the faculty of arts at Paris. The doctrine of “double truth,” which some modern scholars have used to explain the condemnation of Andreas’s text, was a notion of Tempier’s, based on Tempier’s misunderstanding of the scholastic notion that something could be true in religion but not in Aristotle and vice versa. Tempier also condemned any teachings treating of occult sciences or prejudicial to faith and good morals. But he in fact condemned only two books: a book on geomancy and Andreas’s text.26 Hissette argues for the text’s scurrilous connection in the bishop’s mind with Romance of the Rose, which had been the wrong kind of popular reading for young scholars for years. Hissette even suggests that since Andreas’s text was particularly condemned, it was probably also particularly popular with students, perhaps even more so than the Romance. Hissette argues, however, that the Romance was the more obvious of the two to exhibit unwanted ideas. He therefore concludes that Andreas’s text was condemned for its conflation of “pure” love with “mixed” and therefore for the kind of flippancy and immorality for which the Goliards had been reproached for some time.27 This is plausible enough, but it does not explain why Andreas’s text was condemned rather than texts that were “worse” for the same reasons that Andreas’s was “bad.” Betsy Bowden claims, without reference, that Andreas’s text contains verbatim some of the 219 propositions. Arguing that Drouart la Vache left out statements that Tempier had condemned in Andreas’s original text, she writes, “The two omitted allegorical passages list precepts of love, many identical to the 219 condemned propositions.”28 This is simply not the case: neither passage uses any of the propositions. Most of the writers on the condemnation, who are historians of philosophy, also claim there are no propositions in Andreas’s text; they therefore agree that it was condemned for its sexual immorality. Surely it was. But this does not account for why other and more immoral texts were not condemned. My reading shows that
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there were plenty of reasons to condemn Andreas’s text. Some of the reasons follow, according to the number of the condemned proposition. Proposition 8 says that our intellect by its own nature can attain to knowledge of the Prime Cause.29 Andreas never says this, but the dialogue between the cleric and the woman of the higher nobility (Dialogue 8) assumes it. Proposition 9 asserts that we can know God’s divine essence in this life. Andreas, again in Dialogue 8, through the lady, argues that amor (Eros) is the source of life and all good, and this can be known. He does not equate the Prime Cause with God’s divine essence, at least in the requisite way. Any knowledge of the God’s divine essence as understood by the orthodox of his day is conspicuously missing from his text. Proposition 16 says that the First Cause is the Cause of all remote causes. Again, Andreas never says this, but many of his arguments assume it—especially those that attribute goodness to sex and sex to a good god. His First Cause is not the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, but the very moved and moving God of Love, Eros, the “fount of life and all good.” Hissette categorizes these propositions as philosophical errors on the knowablity of God. The following propositions have to do with philosophical errors about the human will. Propositions 158–161 are on the appetites and are condemned because they limit free will. Andreas would agree with Tempier that the will is radically free but would give more credence to the appetites since, he would argue, they are good. Proposition 163, that one cannot abstain from that which reason dictates, is a common argument put forward by the men of the dialogues, Dialogue 5 in particular, in order to seduce the women. Perhaps one of Tempier’s men saw this to indicate Andreas’s position rather than a position that is shown by the women to be false. Desire is privileged over reason every time, and their desire is not to have sex. Proposition 168 says that a man acting from passion acts by constraint. Andreas’s letter to Walter assumes this from the very beginning, and I discuss it in Chapter IV. But Andreas agrees with the proposition by virtue of his experience, not for philosophical reasons. Philosophically, he is in accord with Tempier on free will. Clearly, it would be easy to miss the subtleties of Andreas’s point of view and simply credit him with heresy. There are only four philosophical errors related to ethics that might be close to Andreas’s point of view. Proposition 172 says that happiness is had in this life and not in another. Andreas never says this, but after reading his text one is left feeling that if any is ever to be had it had better be had now. Similarly, Proposition 173 says that God cannot be the immediate cause of happiness in man. The Christian God is clearly the source of great unhappiness for Andreas, as I will show at greater length. Only if one sees God as the Fount of Life (the maker of sex as the source of all good, an idea offered by the woman of Dialogue 8) can God be an immediate cause of
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happiness. Perhaps the depth of Andreas’s heresy is becoming clear. Proposition 174 says that man after death gives up all good. Andreas never says this either, but the approach of death is always portrayed as horrible in his text. Proposition 178 suggests that divinatory practices work. Andreas mockingly condemns them as women’s religion in Book III. But since I do not read Book III as misogynous, it is possible that Andreas supports “women’s religion”—practical “magic.” Whether his inquisitors saw it my way is not clear, but his book was condemned with a book on geomancy, the only other book condemned. Andreas could therefore be condemned for 12 of the 179 philosophical errors. Now begin the theological errors, and the proportion here is only a little higher: 12 of 139. There are three propositions about Christian law that Andreas can be said to have held. Proposition 180 states that Christian law impedes the addition of new thoughts. Nothing could be clearer by the end of Andreas’s book than that Andreas not only believes this but also abhors the fact. Number 181 says that there are fables and falsehoods in Christian religion just as there are in others. Andreas shows the absurdity of many Christian doctrines and that they are made up like stories. Proposition 183 says that theological teachings are founded in fables. Again, Andreas’s use of stories, particularly of hell stories, makes it clear that he would agree with 183. As Hissette points out, these propositions are the expression of a sort of naturalism and rationalism—both are rampant in Andreas’s text, and Tempier and his minions feared both. Propositions 185–199 are errors of dogma. Curiously, I can find no parallels for them in Andreas’s text. But Andreas could be condemned for half of the dozen errors about the Christian virtues (200–212). Proposition 200 says that virtues are not possible unless they are acquired or innate. Andreas might even go as far as to say virtue is impossible. This might be closer to the church’s point of view, but his text certainly gives no evidence of any credence in “infused” virtue, virtue given by God supernaturally. His text is singularly devoid of any belief in grace, or rescue from sin or desire, and it complains loudly about this. Proposition 205 says that simple fornication is not a sin. Andreas never says that fornication is not a sin, although his smarter characters imply it. Maimonides said that fornication was not a sin against natural law but a rational prohibition. Aquinas said it was contrary to the good of man therefore proscribed by divine law. Tempier wouldn’t have drawn such careful distinctions. But Andreas argues that fornication can be very useful—more useful than marriage for fulfilling God’s injunction to multiply— and that desire (to fornicate or not to fornicate) ought to be the “rule” for enjoying this natural “good.” Hissette reads Proposition 206 to mean that sins against nature, with respect to abuses in coitus, are contrary to the nature of the
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species but not to the nature of the individual. Andreas undermines the notion of “nature” in this sense completely and argues for beasts as paradigms of true nature, the nature that is the Fount of Life. This includes homosexual behavior but not rape. These were certainly not the accepted prescriptions of the time. It should not be a surprise at this point to see that Andreas supports Proposition 207, that delight in the acts of Venus do not impede the acts or use of the intellect. In fact, his characters find them wonderful grist for the philosophical mill. Andreas is also, obviously, condemnable for 208, that continence is not essentially a virtue. He does not see it as any kind of virtue but as a way of maintaining one’s social acceptability in a society that is simply wrong about what constitutes goodness. Most of the execrable propositions about Christian virtue with which Andreas agrees relate to sex. Proposition 212 is the only remaining one related to virtue that Andreas supports, and it is about poverty. It says that lack of good fortune is not a good catalyst to morality. Andreas would strongly agree. In Andreas’s text, poverty and other forms of ill luck are opportunities for despair, infidelity between people, and lack of faith in God. The last two propositions that fit Andreas at all relate to theology of the end times, and these are only partial. Proposition 214 says that God is not able to give eternal life and to transmute corruptible things. Andreas does not say this, but neither does he affirm its opposite. Again, the Christian God seems only to offer a terrifying and desolate future of judgment and punishment. Proposition 217 claims that to say that God gives felicity to one and not to all is without reason and a figment. This clearly contradicts the doctrines of judgment and hell used so consistently by the church at that time. Andreas undermines hell, exposing it as a fable used to manipulate people. Although Andreas does not suggest heaven is for everyone, or that it even exists, his vision for earthly life certainly includes the good and desire of everyone, regardless of rank, gender, or any other socially inscribed difference. Andreas is condemnable for roughly 24 of the 219 propositions. That is more than can be pinned on any of the faculty of theology or arts at whom the condemnations were aimed. It is no wonder, therefore, that Andreas’s book was singled out. But there is more, as I shall argue through the remainder of this book. Certainly, a book that undermined the foundations of the controlling institutions and set readers free to think for themselves would not only be condemnable as a threat, but the nature of the threat would itself have to be kept quiet. Some have suggested that the two books Tempier condemned were simply chosen as examples. Although this is possible, it is the sort of simplistic explanation that obscures history more often than elucidating it. Luca Bianchi provides a bit more information in noting that the treatise on geomancy was of Arabic origin.30 So were the texts that Christian scholars
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then had of Aristotle. So was the Neckring of the Dove, upon which Andreas’s text could well be based, at least as much as it is on Ovid’s Ars amatoria. Tempier was as suspicious of Averroes and his Islamic culture as he was of Aristotle and his paganism. It could be that the combination of the perceived immorality of Andreas’s text, its possible popularity with students, its questionable doctrines, and its cultural heritage were enough to condemn it. But I think there is more, even beyond its unusual ability to challenge the standard expectations for reading and authority. I think at least one of Tempier’s readers understood the potential threat the text presented to the socialization of desire and, therefore, to existing power structures.31 Even a brief look at the history of later collectors suggests there were more than lascivious or even philosophical reasons for acquiring Andreas’s text.32 And, as Bruno Roy has pointed out, because medieval book production was a laborious and expensive undertaking, “La présence de De amore dans une bibliothèque médiévale correspond donc à un choix fortement motivé.”33 (The presence of the De amore in a medieval library corresponds therefore to a strongly motivated choice.) It therefore seems to me that a book thus collected, and with the companions I am about to name, is unlikely to be copied primarily because it was considered to be cupidinous. The two earliest owners of the work of whom we know are Albertano of Brescia, a lawyer (c. 1238), and Geremia da Montagnone, a judge at Padua (c. 1300). Both wrote on theological issues, and both had troubled relations with the church.34 Karnein cites evidence that supports these two owners as reading Andreas’s work as cupidinous.35 Nevertheless, the evidence suggests to me at least as strongly that a lawyer and a judge would have had vested interests in books on the arts of persuasion and interpretation, as well as on critiques of church teachings about morality—especially those that might relate to social justice. They would, it also seems to me, be most likely among the erudite to be interested in how one might undermine any of the institutions then in power. To suggest that these men of law saw Andreas’s text as being primarily a “dirty book” seems to me to oversimplify to the same degree as to suggest that the text is about courtly love. Roy’s similar oversimplification—that Andreas’s text served as a reference for pastoral work because of its primarily ecclesiastical provenance—is undermined by some of his own evidence. For instance, Roy shows that Drouart la Vache found the work funny and paraphrased much of it into French for the enjoyment of his friends. Drouart called the work cupidinous, and his paraphrase is so. This hardly sounds like pastoral care. Further, although Drouart mollified the condemnation of women in the final book by suggesting that the sentiments therein were meant to apply only to bad women; even mitigated misogyny sounds unlike any of the medieval works on pastoral care that I have read.36 Because Drouart la Vache and others have
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taken it to be funny and cupidinous, others yet have seen it primarily as a series of dirty jokes, as Betsy Bowden has suggested.37 The mistake, in my view, that both Roy and Bowden make is to see the work as being univocally about sex. Reading Andreas’s text as being as serious as it is funny, acknowledging its theoretical and sociopolitical interests, as well as its sexual ones is not only a textual and contextual way to read it but also corresponds to its history. The reading that I propose makes more sense of the history of the work’s manuscript transmission, or of what we know of it at this point, than other readings have yet done. Most copies of Andreas’s text are bound in collections of moral, judicial, or scholarly works, as well as with some religious ones, and they are, not surprisingly, almost always found in ecclesiastical libraries. Of the 174 texts copied with and/or included in volumes with the 35 copies or versions of Andreas’s text, 89 are categorized as religious or moral, 57 are “scholarly,” and 28 are about women or love.38 Of these 28, most are about women (how they ought to behave, etc.). There are a few love poems, though no troubadour poems, as would be likely if collectors saw Andreas’s text as “courtly.” Nor are any courtly romances copied or collected with Andreas’s text.39 Although the kind of manuscripts with which a manuscript is copied and collected is not a guarantee of how the collectors read and therefore categorized a text, collection companions are nevertheless suggestive. From the evidence Bruno Roy supplies, Andreas’s text was primarily categorized with religious, moral, and scholarly works, a few with works on women, fewer with works on love. The collection evidence suggests that Andreas’s text was not necessarily read by collectors before the sixteenth century as being solely, or even mainly, about heterosexual love. Reading Andreas’s text this way seems to be a nineteenth- and twentiethcentury interpretation. Returning to the fact that lawyers collected Andreas’s text40 I would like to quote Roy in further support of my position: “Les hommes de loi médiévaux font le lien entre les problemes ‘vulgaires,’ vernaculaires, et la loi latine. Ils sont au corpus iuris ce que les theologiens sont a la sacra pagina.”41 (Medieval men at law create the connection between popular, vernacular problems and Latin law. They are to the legal corpus what theologians are to the sacred page.) If lawyers were the mediators of language and meaning in the social and secular world, and priests were the mediators of language and meaning in the ecclesiastic and sacred world, and if Andreas’s text occupies itself with those worlds and with the powers and permutations of language in and on them, it is no wonder that lawyers and churchmen collected the text. Andreas’s text is, in fact, useful toward interpreting any “page,” including any aspect of life as it might be perceived by a given reading subject.
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Whoever recommended the condemnation of Andreas’s book to Bishop Tempier probably understood it. The Critics The aim of this book is to offer a new understanding of Andreas’s text, not a careful refutation, explanation, or expansion of all earlier ones. But a quick view of the critical landscape will help to contextualize the point of view for which I argue. Despite the obvious difficulties inherent in reading Andreas’s text, despite its varied readership, and although courtly love has been challenged by scholars as more likely an invention of nineteenth-century French medievalists than a sociological phenomenon of the Middle Ages,42 Andreas’s text is still commonly used in the classroom as a companion or reference work for the study of courtly love literature. Besides being misleading, this approach to Andreas’s text has sociological ramifications in the present. For instance, psychologists have used Andreas’s text to test modern expectations of romantic love.43 Because Andreas’s text was assumed to describe love relations of the past it was also assumed to prescribe those of the future, meaning not only those contemporary to the study but also those of a more distant future. This means that at least some psychological research on love relations has been based on a huge misunderstanding. Among medievalists, however, Andreas’s text has begun to appear too complex to categorize as such a code book and perhaps too complex for readers to reach much of a consensus. Some of the critical uses of Andreas’s text follow. Paolo Cherchi’s Andreas and the Ambiguity of Courtly Love begins with Cherchi’s experience, similar to mine, gleaned when he taught a course on courtly love: Among the required readings was a selection of troubadour poems and Andreas Capellenus’s De Amore, which are traditionally considered complementary because they shed light on each other. Andreas’s treatise was supposed to help interpret the poems we were reading but it didn’t happen quite that way; in fact, the Latin treatise proved to be a cause of great confusion. Using the poems to interpret the treatise was no less confusing. Both texts present a high degree of ambiguity on their own, and adding one ambiguity to another is not the best way to shed light on a problem.
Cherchi’s response to this problem is first to wonder whether courtly love (which his book goes on to define) and Andreas’s text were in fact connected in any way. He finally decides that, because of shared material,
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they are related and that “Andreas was not a codifier of courtly love but an adverse interpreter who, in order to carry out his polemic, chose to mimic courtly lovers in the hope of unmasking their supposed deceitfulness.”44 (Would not the bishop, had his minions read it this way, have approved rather than condemned the text?) Although Cherchi agrees with me that Andreas’s text is in no way a code book of courtly love, he continues to define and understand Andreas’s work only in relation to a more important or primary set of texts about love—for his work, the troubadour lyrics. In order to understand Andreas’s text in an ancillary capacity, not only does Cherchi seem to overlook too much textual data, but he also ends up with no real understanding of the text itself. In fact, he is left with one of the older standard interpretations: that Andreas, the chaplain, believed love was wicked and wrote in order to undermine it. R. Howard Bloch and C. Stephen Jaeger have built theories about medieval culture based on similar commonly held assumptions about Andreas’s text. Like Cherchi, Bloch shares the critical assumption that Andreas’s text exists/existed to enlighten readers about how to behave in heterosexual games of love. Bloch uses Andreas’s text to support his thesis about the relations between romantic love and misogyny—that the former is an outgrowth of the latter.45 This is a perfectly supportable thesis but not supportable, in my opinion, by citing Andreas’s text as being about love and as being misogynous. Jaeger sees Andreas’s text as “a jumble of sentiments explaining, defining, arguing about the refined love of the nobles.”46 In other words, he sees the text as being about courtly love, despite the problems with the concept. And although Jaeger sees Andreas not only as befuddled but also as “a faint-hearted voyager” who “turns tail” and heads for the “safety” of antifeminism (158), he nevertheless uses Andreas’s text to support his view that male protestations of love to males (the “real” courtly love) was more a reflection of homosocial patriotic adulation than evidence of homoerotic feelings or behavior. The continuing misunderstanding of and misappropriation of Andreas’s text clearly has far-reaching ramifications. Let us now turn to standard interpretations of the text itself. In 1986, Toril Moi conveniently summarized the main critical stances from Gaston Paris to the time of Moi’s writing.47 The categories that follow are Moi’s, but I have added more recent critics, as well as my own critical conclusions, to her very convenient categories. The first stance is that Andreas defines, supports, and defends courtly love. Books I and II seriously promote courtly love, and Book III must be seen as a conventional piece of retraction only meant to save the author, a priest, from getting into trouble with the Church. Readers of this opinion include well-known medievalists and writers on love such as C.S. Lewis (The Allegory of Love) and Denis de
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Rougemont (Love in the Western World). This type of reading makes Andreas, in effect, the authority on courtly love. This kind of reading has been the most prevalent until relatively recently. To hold such a point of view, however, one must gloss over the ruptures and incongruities of which Andreas’s text is full and to which it self-consciously points.48 A second group of critics, which includes A.J. Denomy, has not avoided or tried to explain away the difficulties of this text, yet they agree with Lewis and de Rougemont that Andreas’s purpose is essentially serious and that the work is about courtly love. Denomy suggests that Andreas is a proponent of double truth, that all three books are serious, that Andreas holds both the Church and the adherents of courtly love to be right.49 I agree that all three books are serious, but I do not agree that they are about courtly love. The main problem with Denomy’s view, besides that of courtly love, is that there were in fact no medieval proponents of double truth. Double truth was a misunderstanding of Tempier’s: once again, he oversimplified the philosophical notion of his enemies that something could be true in Aristotelian philosophy and false in theology, accusing them of the nonexistent position of double truth.50 Another category of readers and critics suggests that Andreas was necessarily mad or stupid, or simply an ungifted writer. Charles Muscatine calls Andreas “either an ironist or a nasty fool.”51 He seems to choose the latter, since making any sense of an ironic interpretation is very difficult. Don Monson, who has argued strongly for the irony of Andreas’s text, believes Andreas changed his project midstream, failing, as a result, to systematize sayings on love.52 Although Monson has changed his views on irony and has credited Andreas with a more sophisticated (scholastic) approach, and although in his most recent book Monson gives Andreas high praise for his definitions, Monson still concludes that the text is a less than well-organized and less than successful treatment of love.53 Even P.G. Walsh says, “The reader of the De amore is left with the strong impression not of original and deep reflexions by an author of passionate intellectual integrity, but rather of a derivative attempt to codify notions of love which have impinged on him in reading and in discussion.”54 This is a singularly disappointing conclusion to come to, especially after Walsh’s high praise for Andreas’s Latin— disappointing as much for Walsh as for his reader. I prefer to credit an author with at least as much intelligence as his or her reader. Approaching a work from this presupposition is not only prudent and courteous, but it makes for more interesting reading and writing than does any assumption that the author was in some way defective. A group of critics whose conclusions I find to be no more satisfying than those of the above group include medievalists such as D.W. Robertson who see at least part of Andreas’s work as ironic. For Robertson, Books I and II,
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which seem to praise courtly love, are ironic, and Book III, which berates women, is serious, containing Andreas’s “real opinion.”55 Robertson supposes Book III to be evidence that Andreas was a “good” conservative supporter of church doctrines, who “defends the Church and condemns courtly love.” This stance seems likely to be founded on suppositions that Andreas, being a medieval cleric, must have been a “good” Christian and that the diatribes against women that the third book echoes were unanimously taken as appropriate by the Church, at least for certain purposes. I do not believe either of these can be taken as historical givens. Again, Tempier’s group certainly did not see the text this way. The final alternative, which Moi presents as being the opinion of the group into which she fits, is to see all three books as ironic, perhaps even outrageously funny. Michael D. Cherniss’s point of view could be placed among these, but he sees the irony and humor as referencing literary models, not love (of any kind) itself. As early as 1975 Cherniss argued that Andreas’s text cannot be about courtly love, itself a questionable construct; instead, Cherniss argued that De amore is a “comic mock treatise” on amor, based on and parodying literary models current in Andreas’s time. It is certain that Andreas’s text participates in that level of literary awareness. But like the proponents of complete seriousness, Cherniss accounts for inconsistencies in the text by attributing them to sloppiness. He writes, for instance, “Amor is all but forgotten in the eruption of antifeminist invective.”56 And, as is my contention with many excellent readers of Andreas’s text, this sort of explanation does not account for the seriousness with which the text was condemned. I agree that the textual evidence is more conducive to Cherniss’s conclusion than to many others, but, for me, this is only the sort of conclusion one builds from, not at which one finishes. Unlike most proponents of complete irony, such as E.T. Donaldson, I find serious undertows in the work that prevent me from believing that Andreas simply wanted to be outrageous, a position (Donaldson’s) that would make Andreas a sort of boorish practical joker.57 There is no doubt outrage in the work, but it is the very traces of human outrage and frustration in the text that cause me to see Andreas’s work as both ironic and deadly serious. All of these readings share the assumption that Andreas’s text is primarily about courtly love or sex. Even though his theory of courtly love has been officially abandoned by most medievalists, Gaston Paris still influences many readers more recent than those just named, who even see their own work as standing against his.58 Bruno Roy, for example, claims that his ascription of most of the manuscripts of Andreas’s work to ecclesiastical provenance frees it from the realms of courtly love by freeing it from a courtly readership. Yet he infers from these facts, not that the work might not be about love in a
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conventional sense at all but that the work served as a manual of instruction on secular behavior between the sexes for clerics interested in pastoral care.59 Even Betsy Bowden’s most novel and pleasantly scandalous position on the work pushes past the dirty jokes and double meanings apparent in the Latin (based on Old French) to strain every semiotic connection possible in the attempt to reduce the whole work to a linguistic exercise employing dirty jokes as its vehicle—apparently out of the need to keep the work primarily a work on sex.60 Peter Allen’s admirable scholarship, on the other hand, strays, in my opinion, too far from the relations and issues between men, women, classes, and institutions presented by some of the main currents of Andreas’s text. Although Allen argues, in my opinion rightly, that Andreas’s work is about reading and writing, he does not entertain any possibility that reading and writing relate to bodies. The works Allen discusses (he compares Andreas’s text with Ovid’s Ars amatoria and the Romance of the Rose) become, almost univocally, texts on literary criticism that might have been written by a twentieth-century professor of literature.61 Allen’s readings detach the work from any relation to human emotions or affairs and relegate its relevance to the reified upper air only to be found between the ears of intellectually elite readers of the late twentieth century. Perhaps some of the same criticisms could be leveled at my reading. But my hope, and perhaps one of my basic presuppositions, is that intellectually elite readers of any era are not necessarily so detached from their human core/coeur/corps that they are unable to connect the intellectual with the emotional and the physical. I see sociopolitical, religious, and sensual implications in Andreas’s text that would connect its theoretical purport to a historical situation. Even the best and most recent critics miss this, however, mostly in the attempt to continue to see Andreas’s text as about love. Catherine Brown, in her truly brilliant Contrary Things, writes, reductively to my mind and a priori, “One of the most provocative of the medieval reworkings of Ovid has long been Andreas Capellanus’s De amore.”62 But she does not compare Andreas to Ovid; she compares him with Abelard, and she argues that the De amore resembles the Sic et non not only in its assemblage of divergent teachings but also in its endlessly provocative structure, which juxtaposes one teaching (that erotic love is the source of all good) with its opposite (erotic love is the source of all evil). Both the Sic et non and the De amore aim not only to teach us but also to teach us to read—starting with their own contrary, contradictory selves. However, where the Sic et non’s perceptive frame teaches us to resolve quaestiones by mediating their yes and their no, the De amore’s reading instructions seem to leave little room for such mediation, demanding instead that readers embrace one proposition and reject the other. (93–94)
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I agree that Andreas’s text not only teaches us to read, but intends to do so. But love is not the only issue, nor is erotic love the only love at stake. Nor do I agree with Brown’s conclusions. She asks, “How is one to make sense of a text that poses the quaestio ‘the love of women is the source of all happiness, et contra, the source of all damnation,’ and in response delivers a double verdict at once for and against each opposing side?” It is the goal of this book to answer that question, and it does not do so as Brown does. She concludes, The contemplative practices of lectio divina set up conditions wherein the response to contradictory teaching is a hermeneutic not so much either/or as both-and. Andreas’s narrator, however, is no exegete. His precepts allow no both-and. . . . The preceptor teaches either/or. Andreas makes him teach that way. . . . Where Abelard’s oppositional structure is designed to provoke an assidua interrogatio with a guaranteed epistemological and spiritual payoff, Andreas’s assiduous reading process, like the reasoning of John of Salisbury’s logicians, is sealed with the text’s own processes and bounds. . . . We are instructed with Walter to wait for the Bridegroom, but until that apocalyptic Last Moment, we keep reading, commanded that we must choose either earthly or heavenly love, but unable, the more assiduously we read, to distinguish one from the other. (113–115)
Andreas the Master may be no exegete, but Andreas the author certainly is. Brown even says, “Andreas makes him [the master] teach,” showing the difference between the two that she proceeds to try to erase. I shall go on to argue that although Andreas’s text does push the reader to choose, the choices do not lie between heavenly and earthly love but whether or not to continue to believe institutional fables and whether or not to live as though we believe them. Whether or not one believes the Church, one lives in the body, therefore one must accept that Eros is in fact both the source of happiness and of damnation, whether in this life or in the next. Brown’s focus on the choice between loves not only prevents her from seeing d’hors de texte but it also prevents her from seeing Andreas’s consistent subversion of institutions. Albrecht Classen is another recent critic who approaches Andreas’s text through its engagement with dialectics, but he, fortunately, does not privilege its status as “love literature.” In his article “Epistemology at the Courts,” Classen writes, The powerful dialectics at operation in both works force us . . . to refrain from most of the traditional but highly naïve perspectives and to gain a new foundation by seeing The Art of Courtly Love and El libro de buen amor in light
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of medieval epistemology as literary instruments in exploring man’s basic abilities to comprehend his own world by assuming a surprisingly deconstructionist, though nevertheless still thoroughly medieval point of view. Instead of addressing courtly love . . . Andreas and Ruiz utilize the framework of courtly love and the specific courtly language in order to embark on a much more ambitious enterprise, that is, the analysis of human language, communication, and the multiple functions of discourse. (341–342)
I agree. Classen goes on to outline, much as I have done, why seeing the text as being about courtly love has failed. I also agree that Andreas’s “ambitious enterprise” includes “the analysis of language, communication, and the functions of discourse.” But, once again, I do not think Andreas’s enterprise stops there. Although in this article Classen does thus limit Andreas’s purpose, elsewhere Classen explores the possibility that Andreas’s text calls readers to investigate the purpose and significance of communication for human society.63 This is a wonderful study and does not conflict with my own, nor does it go as far. In the above-quoted article, Classen acknowledges the necessity of accepting the “multiplicity of voices” in Andreas’s text if we are to understand it at all, but he relies too heavily on Peter Allen and reads Book III as misogynous.64 Classen concludes, Ultimately the discussion of love does not pursue erotic, physical ends; instead it creates an intellectual framework for the exploration of human nature and our existential conditions. . . . Both Andreas and Ruiz have presented us with literary challenges of the highest order, but the challenges are sweetened, on the surface, with a discourse on love providing the textual springboard for the true philosophical, that is, epistemological, investigations of human existence. (361–362)
I agree that much of Andreas’s purpose is epistemological. Although Classen does not fall into the pit of intellectual detachment from the world, for which I have already criticized Peter Allen, Classen does not discuss the social (and therefore physical) ramifications of Andreas’s text in the terms I do. Nor do I find Andreas’s discussion of “love” to “sweeten” a philosophical enterprise. The torment and ugliness associated with Andreas’s discussion of love is part of that very enterprise, one that we would call as political as philosophical. Again, all of this will be born out over the course of this book. Finally I return to Don Monson’s very recent and interesting booklength study of the relationship of Andreas’s text to scholasticism.65 Although I have profound respect for Monson’s work, I cannot agree with his interpretive approach. He claims to be without an interpretive agenda from the outset, but he assumes that Andreas’s text is about love, and he
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foregrounds his discussion of it with a mild debunking of interpretive enterprise, reducing all attempts to understand the work to circular reasoning (2). He also continues to see Book III as a rejection of love (340) and believes that the chaplain “attempts his customary reconciliation between traditions” (342). Little could be further my point of view or from those of Brown and Classen. Further, Monson concludes, Underlying the entire operation is a fundamental pessimism about the prospects for reciprocity in love relationships, a typically clerical attitude that remains constant throughout the treatise. This pessimism undermines the very elements of troubadour idealism that served as the point of departure for Andreas’s abortive synthesis. Consequently, the final outcome was to a certain extent foreseeable from the beginning (343). . . . The elaborate “disputed question” thus established is not susceptible of a solution at the level of human reasoning, however, hence to the Chaplain’s recourse to the sacred rhetoric of Christian exhortation to provide a kind of resolution at the end. (346)
Andreas once again appears to be somewhat dough-headed in the end, which is not, for me, a very satisfying way to see the text. Further, although Monson sees Andreas’s text rightly enough as a “discourse on discourses” (346), he does not acknowledge its threat to institutions. In fact, from Monson’s conclusions about the text, it is hard to see why Tempier would have bothered to condemn it. Monson cites Andreas’s “moral commitment” (342) but does not see that moral commitment as being in any way antiestablishment. I do. However out of favor or truly questionable, either for philological or theoretical reasons, a “reading” of Andreas’s work may be at this point in the history of literary criticism and theory, the text compels readers to engage in that very human enterprise: the making of meaning. In accord with Richard of St. Victor, I find “exegesis” to be not only one of the great pleasures of the text, but of life as well. Andreas’s text may not be about love, but it is about desire. My Approach Like any reader, how I read is influenced by what I have read. Perhaps I have been even more influenced by medieval books than by modern ones. Arguably, a medieval way of reading has been lost, but lectio divina, however altered, still exists as a practice, and medieval texts describe it. It could be called “monastic reading,” and it is not the essentialist type of reading that some twentieth- and twenty-first-century scholars tend to ascribe to medieval reading generally. It is careful, ponderous, and ruminating, or repetitive. It necessarily includes multiple interpretive levels that are each based upon the assumption that everything is or can be a sign in a system of signification and
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that everything can be simultaneously itself and a presentation or representation of something else. Medieval reading, because of its monastic provenance, generally also incorporated four levels of interpretation: tropological/ metaphorical, literal/historical, anagogical/spiritual, and moral. The practice of lectio divina ensured that texts would be read and mentally “chewed upon” at least four times, according to the four levels, to complete one thorough reading. Besides being aware of and having employed this practice, I also see it as informing Andreas’s instructions to his reader: read carefully and reread. Although Andreas may not have been expecting the specifically religious practice of lectio divina, he was doubtless expecting a kind of attention to reading and interpretation rarely given to texts since the Middle Ages, until, perhaps, very recently. From among medieval texts, my approach to reading has been most influenced by Andreas’s text and by the works of the Victorines, an order of monastics both highly intellectual and deeply mystic, whose main house and most famous writers were centered in Paris, the height of whose influence peaked around the time of Andreas’s supposed writing. I have been particularly influenced by the writings of Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173), known for his creative and thorough exegesis. Richard’s minutely detailed and perfectly connected allegories evince not only exegetical and inventive genius but also a striking sensitivity to the workings of human psychology. Andreas’s text also displays a keen awareness of psychology, but that awareness is made known to the reader through the author’s constructions of his own inclinations and his self-presentations exposed through sundry confessional modes. The works of both Andreas and Richard are foremost among medieval texts that convince me that twelfth-century literary sophistication may well have been beyond anything critics have yet been able to imagine. Finally, the texts of both authors not only instruct the reader to read carefully but also force him or her to do so. Andreas’s text teaches suspicion of socializing practices and the narratives that promote them, whereas Richard’s supports the use of personalized fictions to socialize desire even as it exposes those fictions for what they are. I also base my approach to Andreas’s text upon the ideas of relevant critical theorists of the twentieth century. Among them, my way of reading has been most influenced by Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of “registers,” analogous to symphonic music, voiced in a given discourse. This seems to be a more complete rendition, or at least another version, of the kind of approach to texts begun by medieval theories about the four levels of interpretation. There are also some curiously exciting resonances to be heard with respect to Andreas’s text when one considers not only the particularly complicated voicing of it but also that its method of resolution, like that of contrapuntal polyphony, is based upon multifold contradiction. Many of the discourses in Andreas’s text are
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contrapuntal in that they are opposing and often dissonant, just as voices singing counterpoint sing opposed melodies at the same time and inevitably render dissonance as well as harmony. Whether this is pain or pleasure is left to the discerning subjectivity of the reader/listener. Not surprisingly, Andreas’s text is contemporaneous with the development of contrapuntal polyphony in music. Another of Bakhtin’s theories that I have found particularly useful for reading Andreas’s text, is that of carnival, because Andreas’s text burlesques the powers that be. Its version of carnival, however, seems to me to be potentially more useful toward actually subverting existing systems than as the ritualistic social “steam valve” most instances of carnival seem to be.66 Andreas’s text does not provide the reader a way of blowing off steam but of building it up. Andreas’s text seems to suggest that no hierarchy would be best; meanwhile, like carnival, the world upside down would be an improvement, particularly in the elevation of the lower half of woman. Feminist theory, combined with Foucault on institutions, is also useful with Andreas’s text, because those ideas allow us to become aware of feminine positions as they are constructed by Andreas’s text: not only does it show that the institutions of his time render women marginal but his text performs and reflects the depth of that marginalization. Like the works of Luce Irigaray, for instance, Andreas’s text not only challenges the phallocentrism of institutions of power (psychoanalysis for Irigaray, for Andreas the patriarchal ecclesiastic and social order), but it also splits the subjectivity of the author and reader. Both Irigaray and Andreas present the author’s subjectivity and the reader’s identity as multiple. The works of Teresa de Lauretis and Judith Butler take divided subjects as a premise, but both predicate whatever is identifiable— especially about feminine subjectivity—on the aspects of culture from which the divided subject arises.67 Andreas’s text does the same and does so for masculine subjectivity and class identity as well. Feminine subjectivity currently constitutes a particularly embroiled set of issues and definitions, and since the problems of identification, categorization, and definition are themselves at the root of current disagreement among feminist thinkers, I am not likely to find language that will be completely adequate to the task or satisfactory to all readers. Ironically, my dilemma would not be a problem for any assiduous reader of Andreas’s text, which works from the premise that identification, categorization, and definition are ultimately nothing more than provisional fictions. It is not surprising to me, therefore, that he makes no attempt to overtly name what the real levels of his discourse are about. What I call “feminine desire” in his text is an excellent example. It is my term, not his, although his text is clearly about it. What I mean by feminine desire is both the desire of historical (or real) women and the desire of the disenfranchised (or those in a “feminine” position).
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Since Andreas’s text undermines the processes of categorization and definition at every turn, I am tempted at times to see his text as a medieval Derridian performance. To me there is no doubt that part of what Andreas learned from careful work with texts, language, and scholasticism is a deconstructive as well as a suspicious approach to everything readable. This is perhaps the most important tool that the author seems to want to furnish his reader, and like Derrida (perhaps necessarily) he teaches it by performing it. Like the feminists and unlike Derrida, however, Andreas’s text is more interested in deconstructing culture and the existing systems that perpetuate it than in deconstructing texts per se, although deconstructing texts is clearly, for him, a good place to begin. He begins with his own. Like Derridian texts, Andreas’s text seems in places to aim at nothing less than complete alienation of the reader, but in other places, especially on the subtextual level, it seems to court the reader, to desire acceptance or complicity. Like Roland Barthes, Andreas points to and luxuriates in the gaps inherent in language at all levels, rather than trying to avoid or connect them. He uses them like Derridian pockets or “invagination” to multiply meanings. The author’s pleasure in his own text seems often, also, to be fraught with Barthian anxiety about cruising the reader: he “cruises” with the anxiety of someone already in love, not with the panache of someone looking for love. Indeed Andreas claims he is quite desperately in love and reiterates his devotion to Walter. Since among the multiple types of reader Andreas addresses, only Walter is named, Walter can begin to look a great deal like Barthes’s beloved, absent, reading “other.” Because Andreas portrays himself as multiple, elusive, and ultimately unidentifiable, his textual self-portrait could qualify as postmodern; it is too insistent an entity to be premodern as the term has been defined (one of those historical givens that I challenge). Although both the “other” and the “self ” are constructed as equally unknowable in any essentialist way in Andreas’s text, there is a cruising of the reader by the author. The only identifiable “other” must therefore be simply bodily—d’hors de texte (pace Derrida)—the physical reader/Walter—known or not. Ironically, if the attempted seduction succeeds, it does so only because of the freedom from coercion that the text makes possible. Although much useful and impressive work has been done in the areas of subjectivity and Otherness by medievalists, there still seems generally to be an underlying presupposition that the Middle Ages is somehow essentially “other” than “modernity” (or postmodernity, for that matter) simply because it is past. Surely there is some accuracy in this. Yet does the length of time elapsed necessarily increase the Otherness of a text, even given all the historical and physical gaps that often accompany the passage of time? Along with Lee Patterson, it seems to me that we must assume some very basic similarities
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(“sympathies”) if we are to make anything at all of a text written by another human being at any time period.68 The necessity of relying upon the presupposition of human sympathies, as well as historical context, in order to understand human works applies as much to a relatively contemporary writer such as James Joyce as it does to a medieval writer. I do not perceive time to be any more fundamentally distancing than any other semiotic gap. Some modern and postmodern texts seem to present greater interpretive problems than do some medieval texts. It seems inaccurate, as well as fruitless, to relegate medieval texts to the position of inscrutable Other. In fact, as I read it, Andreas’s text has an investment in subverting the self/other opposition in order to effect at least a reassessment of existing social arrangements if not social change. Through Andreas’s role-play as being among the enfranchised and his simultaneous self-identification with the disenfranchised, his text controverts polarizing systems and causes the reader to question socially attributed difference among people. In Andreas’s text the “Other” is not constituted by “the woman,” “the infidel,” or “the peasant” but is rather presented as an attribute of the so-called self. Given much of the thinking standard in medieval studies, some may want to accuse my suggestions here of being occasionally anachronistic. I would like to suggest that much of what the shapers of our discipline have come to see as anachronistic is of their own invention. I do not argue against the surety that there are differences in human perception and intellection, nor do I suggest that contexts of any kind should be ignored; I do argue against the notion that those differences and contexts must be enclosed monolithically in a particular era. To postulate a historical reality such as “the medieval mind,” once a given for many medievalists, has been considered bad history for some time now. Yet, what is possible for a twelfth-century individual to write or read is still often determined by the preconceptions held by twentieth-century scholars (mostly) about a given era. This is the sort of postulation become premise that is behind much of what has become possible to suggest or not about any medieval artifact. My book is offered, in part, as another effort toward reforming or revising the practices of the interrelated academic disciplines of medieval and contemporary studies. Outline What follows is a chapter by chapter outline of this book, which may be useful to readers who want to focus on only one or two aspects of my argument. It will also give any reader a “map.” “Chapter I: Fish or Fowl (or Is There a Genre in This Text?)” delineates the problems that Andreas’s text presents for readers of any century, and it
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does so in a depth of textual detail that explicates the problems most scholars assume. It is therefore especially useful to readers not deeply familiar with Andreas’s text and for scholars looking for textual references and connections. The chapter consists of three parts. The first, “Transgressing the Boundaries of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric,” discusses the structure of Andreas’s text and shows how it flouts grammatical, logical, and rhetorical convention as well as categories in general. The second part, “Genre Trouble, Reading Instructions, and Other Formalities,” discusses the text’s multiple identity in terms of genre (in more detail than does this introduction) and shows how Andreas undermines his authority as author and Master. It also exposes the reading method Andreas’s text fosters by looking at its charges to the careful reader and its self-referentiality. The third part, “Deconstructing Gender and Culture: A Reading of the First Five Chapters,” should be useful for any reader, as it begins to show textual support for the understanding of Andreas’s text that I have put forward in this introduction. The first five chapters of Andreas’s text, plus the beginning of the sixth, introduce Andreas’s most important issues—the questionable underpinnings of religion and conventional morality, the problems inherent in language and interpretation, the false distinctions between nature and art, homo- and heterosexuality, money, gender, class, and authority, religious prescription, and the (mis)uses of rhetoric. Andreas’s first six chapters contain densely packed layers of signification that are gradually unpacked over the course of the dialogues and Books II and III. I do this reading at the end of Chapter I to textually foreground the rest of this book and to offer a detailed example of the kind of reading towards which Andreas’s text pushes. The reading also allows me to conclude discussion of rhetorical forms and genre by illustrating how Andreas’s text undercuts categorization and definition. “Chapter II: Repetition in Andreas’s Text” begins with a theoretical discussion of repetition that concludes that repetition is always meaningful and that there is no such thing as nonmeaningful variance, perhaps especially in medieval literature. Andreas himself says that “things most often repeated are most likely to be believed,” (1.6.408) a comment that both shows how people tend to get their ideas and that what he repeats ought to be especially noted. This chapter is important as support to my argument that there is method to Andreas’s madness—his use of repetition is seen as intentional and meaningful as opposed to sloppy and random. The chapter divides into two parts: “How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Social Hierarchies” and “How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Religion.” These amplify and further support my reading of his first six chapters and are based mostly on the dialogues (1.6) with some reference to Book II. Close readings show how Andreas’s use of repetition subverts seduction
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attempted by institutions. The dialogues pay particular attention to the use of hell stories and religious and social prescription on sex and marriage. “Chapter III: On Clerical Intertexts and the Subversion of Seduction” naturally follows from the discussion of the dialogues in Chapter II, since it goes into detail about the religious discourses of desire—the key institutions—that Andreas’s text would undermine. This chapter covers several authors of intertexts but focuses primarily on three twelfth-century authors, without rehashing other critical discussion of their relations to Andreas and his text: Peter Abelard, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Richard of St. Victor. All three were known for their theories and practice of exegesis, as well as for how they handled their desire. The first section, “Author/ity,” begins by discussing Abelard’s relationship with Bernard, so that readers not deeply familiar with the twelfth century can get a glimpse of the debates related to desire, the conscription of which is the institution Andreas’s text is most keen to subvert. Although it has clear resonances with Andreas’s text, Abelard’s Sic et non is only briefly mentioned, because among the other intertexts it is the more commonly known and addressed. However, Abelard’s Historia calamitatum and the ensuing letters between the lovers receive a bit more attention in this section because those texts embody and voice the conflict between desire as it is experienced and desire as it is circumscribed by the Church. The next part, “Positions of Mastery and the Rhetoric of Eros,” shows, primarily by looking at some of his sermons on the Song of Songs, how Bernard uses erotic images and allusions to seduce men to monastic life. It also shows how Andreas deconstructs and repudiates Bernard’s method. The section, “Seduction and Critical Distance,” introduces Richard of St. Victor at some length, since many readers are not familiar with him or his work. Some careful readings of pertinent passages from his Benjamin Minor are then offered to show that twelfth-century monastics were not all as coercive and Machiavellian, if I may be so anachronistic, as was Bernard, and that there were some who left crucial choices up to intelligent readers, as does Andreas. By comparing Richard and Andreas, this section also shows that the discourse of desire in the twelfth century could be exquisitely rich and sophisticated and that Richard, a famous and holy exegete, agreed with Andreas about the uses of fiction: fictions are very useful toward socializing desire. In the end, however, Richard conforms to church prescriptions, and Andreas does not. “On Confession and the Charm of Free Choice” is the final section in Chapter III. In it I suggest that confession is a rhetorical engine of seduction, citing Augustine, Bernard, and Aelred of Rievaulx. Augustine and Aelred (like St. Paul, discussions of whom interlace the chapter) are better known as
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intertextual with Andreas’s work, so I do not spend as much time with them as with Bernard or Richard. I show that Andreas’s text also uses confession as a rhetorical mode but in a much less attractive and less coercive manner. I suggest that Andreas’s confessions arise out of the gaps and do not make him look good but that he seems to prefer this kind of self-representation. Whether the reader finds this approach appealing is purely subjective. It is therefore hard to say whether Andreas’s confession is an attempt at seduction. “Chapter IV: Andreas and Walter” argues that seducing Walter may be one of Andreas’s ends. In the section “Andreas’s Desire Uncovered,” I show through word studies and close readings that Andreas’s interest in Walter may be carnal and that Andreas’s text exculpates homosexuality. The next section, “Identities,” is a study of the gaps and various identifications throughout the text to show how Andreas represents himself—a pining lover, abject and undesirable, who cannot help his passion and who cruises his reader. The third section, “Readership,” discusses Walter’s textual identities, his possible relationship to Andreas, and Andreas’s feelings for him. I show how Andreas aligns himself, and perhaps Walter, with a disenfranchised “feminine” readership. I also present evidence for a female readership and finish the chapter with a call for Andreas’s text to be used as evidence for research on women’s literacy in the twelfth century. The final part, “Feminine Desire and the Transgendered Agents of Andreas’s Text,” looks mostly at Book II to demonstrate how institutional rules negate their reason for being while attempting to marginalize desire in general and women’s desire in particular. By looking at Andreas’s use of gendered language, we see how a reader of any sex or sexual orientation is disempowered by the institution but empowered by Andreas’s text. As readers, we are placed in the positions of all those possible readers. “Chapter V: Andreas on Women” shows that Book III is not misogynous but quite the opposite. The first part, “On the Discourse of Misogyny,” demonstrates through a fairly obvious reading of Andreas’s representation of the discourse of misogyny that if one attends to his absurd hyperbole, his repeated suggestions that “all women always” do x evil, it becomes clear that he parodies misogynous discourse. A closer look suggests that in doing so, and by using the examples that he chooses, he challenges religious patriarchy. The final part, “Women’s Religion,” looks closely at discussions of women’s religion as represented in Book III to show that Andreas compares women’s religion (practical, earthy, and magical) to that of Christian men (Neoplatonic and antiflesh). Andreas’s text shows women’s religion to be the more desirable way to live and, surprisingly, the more supported by Jesus himself.
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Note on Translations and Manuscript Edition I rely on P.G. Walsh’s edition, cited throughout, for my understanding of the arrangement of Andreas’s text. The translations of Andreas’s text are my own, unless otherwise noted, and they, too, are based upon P.G. Walsh’s edition. Because I want to offer the most open as well as reliable readings, my translations tend to be very literal. I hope the reader will forgive any awkwardness and enjoy what might not otherwise come to light. I use Walsh’s translations when I want to make a point about his translation. For Latin authors other than Andreas I generally quote the translations of others. All Latin quotations from Migne’s Patrologia Latina (the Latin portion of his Opera Omnia: Patrologiae Cursus Completus) are cited as being from the PL, as is standard practice. Most of the quotations of the Latin of Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermones super Cantica Canticorum (Sermons on the Song of Songs) come from the eight-volume edition, Sancti Bernardi Opera, by Leclercq, Talbot, and Rochais. I refer to this work as S.B. Opera, as is common practice. The numbers in an S.B. Opera citation refer to volume and page. The following abbreviations appear with respect to Latin quotations and translation, primarily in Chapter III and are also standard: SS for Song of Songs (a book from the Old Testament); Cant. for Cantica Canticorum (the Latin title of Songs of Songs); and Sap. for Sapientia (the apocryphal book, The Wisdom of Solomon, found in Vulgate versions of the Old Testament. English references to this work are simply “Wisdom”). I use the New English Bible for Bible quotations in English, unless otherwise noted, as it is the closest in modern English to the Latin Vulgate. All italics appear in the original unless otherwise noted.
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CHAPTER I FISH OR FOWL (OR, IS THERE A GENRE IN THIS TEXT?)
The actors are come hither, my lord . . . The best actors in the world, either for tragedy, comedy, history, pastoral, pastoral-comical, historical-pastoral, tragical-historical, tragical-comical-historical-pastoral, scene individable, or poem unlimited. The Fishmonger, Ham. II.ii Dès qu’on entend le mot “genre,” dès qu’il paraît, dès qu’on tente de le penser, une limite se dessine. Et quand une limite vient à s’assigner, la nome et l’interdit ne se font pas attendre. . . . As soon as the word “genre” is sounded, as soon as it is heard, as soon as one attempts to conceive it, a limit is drawn. And when a limit is established, norms and interdictions are not far behind. . . . Derrida, 177, 203
y briefly regarding Andreas’s text with respect to the problem of its genre, this chapter begins to show the centrality of social issues in Andreas’s text. The first section, “Transgressing the Boundaries of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric,” shows how Andreas’s text flouts grammatical, logical, and rhetorical convention and the notion of categories in general and thus provides clues as to how to read Andreas’s text. Because the text does not follow medieval rhetorical rules of any genre systematically enough to be categorized, naming Andreas’s text becomes more problematic than naming the rose.1 This is not to suggest that rhetorical “rules,” being generally descriptive rather than prescriptive, were always followed, nor is it to suggest that genre is ever a wholly successful way to categorize literature. Nevertheless, the attempt to classify Andreas’s text is enlightening. The second section, “Genre Trouble, Reading Instructions, and Other Formalities,” explores the text’s multiple identity and shows how Andreas undermines his
B
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authority as author and Master, thereby undermining authority generally and showing a “split” in his textual identity. This section also explores the text’s charges to the careful reader and its self-referentiality, another set of clues for reading. The third part, “Deconstructing Gender and Culture: A Reading of the First Five Chapters,” provides a reading of the first five chapters of Andreas’s text, plus the beginning of the sixth, all of which introduce the most important issues in Andreas’s text—the questionable underpinnings of religion and conventional morality, language and interpretation, nature versus art, homo- and heterosexuality, money, gender, class, and authority, all of which are gradually unpacked over the course of the dialogues and Books II and III. This reading exists to textually foreground the rest of the book and to offer a detailed example of the kind of reading Andreas’s text insists upon. Transgressing the Boundaries of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric While the boundaries of the trivium were somewhat fluid in the late twelfth century, especially given divergence of times and places, it is clear that Andreas’s text transgresses whatever boundaries may have existed. The definition of grammar changed considerably during the hundred years between Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1154), who called it “the correct use of words in speech” and John of Garland, who defined it as “the art of coherent composition.”2 In contrast, Andreas’s text seems almost obsessed with the twisted use of language, the lie, the double meaning, which often result in what appears to be the art of incoherent composition. The grammar of his text, in the medieval sense, is transgressive in every way. “Bent” language was a part of grammatical or rhetorical study in the Middle Ages, but Andreas employs it to an extraordinary degree.3 If Andreas was chaplain to Philip II and wrote letters of diplomacy for the king, then his facility and preoccupation with tricky language might have been an occupational necessity. Before we discuss Andreas’s use of bent language any further, however, let us see how the playful twisting behind it works with what Andreas does with genre. Andreas’s text begins as a letter addressed to Walter in terms of an intimate missive salutation. It could be formally classified as belonging to the rhetorical genre of letter writing (ars dictandi) rather than to an explicitly grammatical genre.4 Yet it resists this category through what some critics have assumed to be a misprision of the standard formulae. Julius Victorinus (fourth century), whose work became the foundation of medieval rhetorical standards of letter writing, wrote that epistolae negotiales (letters of negotiation) should contain serious argumentative matter and figurative language, which Andreas’s does,
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and that epistolae familiares (familiar letters) should be clear and brief; Andreas’s text is neither clear nor brief, but it uses an intimate tone and style when addressing Walter. Victorinus contended that it is worse to be obscure in a letter than in an oration or conversation, because the writer’s absence makes it impossible to answer the reader’s questions. However, Victorinus also said, “Letters that are intended to be secret may be couched in language that is unclear to all but the recipient.”5 Since Andreas’s text does contain serious argumentative matter and figurative language, it could qualify as a negotiative letter. What he might be trying to negotiate only comes in hints at a first reading and mostly only with respect to his feelings for Walter. Since the text is so obscure, it may also be secret. What secret does this negotiative and familiar letter simultaneously cover and convey? If any one of my theses about Andreas’s text is correct—the interest in Walter, the suggestions about women and gender, and the instructions for avoiding the machinations of the institutions that conscript desire—the need to cloak as well as to convey is obvious. Victorinus’s prescriptions about letter writing were based upon rhetorical rules for the sermo (informal discourse), which is what Andreas calls the material that follows the Prologue: sermones. The sermo is subdivided into even smaller rhetorical categories. Andreas’s material could qualify as the narratio portion of sermones; yet they do not entirely conform to the expectations of this genre either. For example, even Alberic of Monte Cassino (c. 1087), who was a rhetorician especially attuned to thetext-as-pander, as his point of view would be theorized today,6 wrote that the narratio should be honesta and will be only “if it is brief and clear.”7 However, the parts of Andreas’s text that might qualify as the narratio (Books I and II) are not only protracted and confusing, but they also repeatedly present dishonest arguments, self-presentations, and representations. Whether Alberic’s fourfold outline for epistles in his Dictaminum radii (exordium, narratio, argumentatio, and conclusio), or the fivefold structure, more contemporary to Andreas, of the anonymous Rationes dictandi (c. 1135),8 (salutatio, benevolentiae captatio, narratio, petitio, and conclusio), or any other medieval model is taken as a rhetorical standard, Andreas’s text conforms only enough to show how it is not conforming to an accepted model. Andreas’s Praefatio or Prologue, seems to function as both salutatio and benevolentiae captatio, as they are described by the Rationes dictandi, since it speaks of Andreas’s love and concern for Walter, and of Andreas’s desire to content Walter. There is nothing formally unusual about this. Yet the accessus, which comes next and which tended at the time to function as a directory for ensuing treatise material, poorly describes what actually follows. Further, the accessus was generally supposed to attempt either to relate the
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part to the whole or it functioned as a perambulatory gloss to the translated or transcribed work of an author already dead, not of one’s own work.9 Not only does Andreas’s accessus appear to be the author’s own, but it does not relate parts to the whole, nor does it really represent the work that follows.10 Andreas’s accessus is unusually small. Here it is in its entirety: Accessus ad amoris tractatum Est igitur primo videre quid sit amor, et unde dicatur amor, et quis sit effectus amoris, et inter quos possit esse amor, qualiter acquiratur amor, retineatur, augmentetur, minuatur, finiatur; et de notitia amoris mutui, et quid unus amantium agere debeat altero fidem fallente. (P.G. Walsh, 32) Accessus to a treatise on love First we must see what love is, why it is so called, and its effect; between what persons it can exist, how it can be obtained, kept, increased, diminished, and ended; how reciprocated love is recognized, and what one lover should do if the other is untrue.
Although this accessus could function as a sort of table of contents, it does not do so in an orderly, logical, or complete fashion. The headings of the chapters that follow the accessus also inadequately describe their contents, and they do not follow the outline given in the accessus. For instance, the accessus says nothing about the discussion of “shameful loves,” which is ostensibly the subject matter of the last six chapters of Book I, nor is any mention made of the infamous Book III. Perhaps this approach expects too much of an accessus. Jean Leclercq, for example, writes that the accessus should simply “provide access” to the text that follows it.11 Even so, in the case of Andreas’s text, the accessus actually misleads the reader, not only in terms of content and organization but also in terms of purpose. The only way it can be argued that the accessus does provide a sort of index for the reader is to argue that if Andreas’s accessus does not function in the manner generally expected, then neither does the rest of the text. Andreas’s text leads the reader to suppose it will accomplish one thing when it in fact accomplishes another. According to the accessus, that which follows it is a tractatus. By the end of the twelfth century, tractatus had solidified from a missive form into what would be understood today as a treatise. As the etymology implies, tractatus was a drawn-out handling or treatment of the subject matter and was then, as now, generally associated with a systematic set of analyses, definitions, and logical arguments.12 Andreas’s text, however, does not go on to delineate its “rules” and definitions in a linear, orderly, logical fashion. Andreas’s text only partially fits the formal requirements of a treatise, and, as its equivocal definitions show, it only partially fits the requirements of a treatise’s purpose.
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It is and is not a treatise just as it is and is not a letter. Andreas’s text distends and contracts the proper rhetorical forms and contents of a treatise to make a “shape” much different from what would be expected, and it establishes its own peculiar, nonlinear logic. The first five chapters of Andreas’s Book I, and the first part of the sixth chapter, if they are read with relatively little attention, might pass for the contents of a treatise. But Chapter 6 (“How Love Is Won and in How Many Ways”) balloons, with no apology or explanation, into eight dialogues that consist of more lines than the rest of the text combined: the dialogues make up roughly two-thirds of the entire work.13 If Andreas had been interested in adhering to existing models for treating a topic in dialogic fashion, as has often been assumed, then he had plenty of models to choose from. The two most likely were Cicero’s treatise on friendship (which one of Andreas’s speakers quotes) and Aelred of Rievaulx’s treatise on spiritual friendship, which was based on Cicero’s.14 Unlike these models, whose speakers were historical men intimately known to one another, Andreas’s speakers are anonymous, identified only by social class and gender. They are hypothetical people, exemplifying (supposedly) how to behave and what to expect when a man wants to pursue a woman sexually. Also unlike his models, Andreas does not employ believable settings for conversation, nor do his speakers cooperate to try to solve a problem, answer a question, or draw an argument to a logical conclusion. Rather, they argue defensively and uncooperatively to no mutually agreeable end, and the discourse between them is attributed to the author’s invention by his own voice—there is no suspension of disbelief. For instance, Andreas’s first dialogue begins, “The commoner should approach the common woman and address her as follows,” then come sundry instructions about what to do in response to the range of hypothetical situations that could ensue. Andreas then continues, “After such casual comments you can continue like this: ‘When the Divine Being fashioned you. . . .’ ” and so on. There is absolutely no doubt, at the beginning of each dialogue, that the author wants the reader to see that the dialogues are fictions created by the author. There is no attempt in Andreas’s text to gain the suspension of disbelief that comes so easily through the representationalism employed by Cicero and Aelred. Aelred’s setting is a monastery, and he is one of the speakers—he is never “outside” the dialogues once they have begun. Andreas is very self-consciously not only outside of his dialogues but also their ventriloquist, puppeteer, and script writer. Aelred’s brothers come to him for advice and comfort, and they all have moods, names, and distinguishable personalities; they work together toward the resolutions of the problems presented. Andreas’s characters are clearly that— fictions—identified only by class and gender, and none of his dialogues ends
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with even an agreement to disagree, let alone the promised seduction; rather than any kind of resolution, there is only irresolution. Aelred’s dialogues are connected by the passage of time—the conversation between him and his brothers is subject to monastic rule and daily offices; Aelred is called away for an extended period and meanwhile a best friend of his dies, and when he returns he grieves, and so on. There is little sense of real time or place in Andreas’s dialogues. Cicero’s dialogue remains in the context of one faceto-face dialogue with the son of the friend and, like Aelred’s, refers to their setting in a representational way. Although Andreas’s text is clearly in their tradition, the differences in its mimesis expose and reject the processes that make readers credulous rather than wary. The troubadour tensons constitute another dialogic form to which Andreas’s text is often compared. They are supposedly similar to Andreas’s text in that they are dialogues between lovers, rather than between monastic friends or between father and son. Yet unlike the tensons, Andreas’s dialogues are prose, not poetry, and we discover other divergences: in Andreas’s text, the man consistently and rudely belabors the woman for her love (there is no longing from afar as in the tensons), and the woman consistently finds ingenious means of escape; tensons, on the other hand, often record the woman’s love for the man,15 and they usually show the finesse or anger of the lover, not (as in Andreas’s dialogues) the clumsiness. Also unlike the tensons, none of Andreas’s men actually succeed in winning a woman’s love. For a chapter entitled “How Love Is Won and in How Many Ways,” this seems a singularly odd, even selfsubverting, outcome.16 By the time a reader has discovered this, however, he/she will also have noticed that Andreas subverts all of his authorities, not just possible genre models that might be found to explain what he is doing. Although Andreas’s text clearly subverts its surface attempt to be a formal treatise on love, its agenda does emerge, and, as I hope to show, it is ultimately at least as instructive about its real subjects as is any treatise. Genre Trouble, Reading Instructions, and Other Formalities To suggest that a piece of writing is of a particular genre is problematic because categorization is itself problematic. Categorization always comes after the fact, as a way of facilitating analytical discourse about the writing and therefore must ignore textual differences in favor of similarities, making exceptions to whatever rules it has instituted. When examined closely, it is a rare text that perfectly fits its genre. To discuss genre, perhaps especially in relation to a medieval text, therefore, may seem useless. Yet, Andreas’s text occupies itself with genre, with the institution of conscriptive categories, and not just rhetorical categories, since thematically our attention
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is called to social categories related to sex, gender, and class. Further, Andreas’s text is particularly difficult to label because it enacts or dramatizes the difficulties inherent in the project of categorization, naming, and definition. As a preliminary example, the definitions Andreas’s text offers as such do not work; rather, they muddy the very distinctions and descriptions they claim to draw and seem to undermine the definitional enterprise altogether. The very first chapter, for example, claims to define love: Amor est passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et immoderata cogitatione formae alterius sexus, ob quam aliquis super omnia cupit alterius potiri amplexibus et omnia de utriusque voluntate in ipsius amplexu amoris praecepta compleri. (1.1.1) (Italics mine.) Love is a certain inborn suffering derived from the sight of and excessive thinking upon the beauty of the other sex, from which someone desires above all things to possess the other with embraces and to complete all of love’s commands in the embrace of the other, according to the will of both parties.
By this account, love is both inborn and contrived from sight and thinking. However, something innate cannot logically be the product of thinking, particularly thinking that one must consciously make “excessive.” Andreas nevertheless continues to claim the authority of right reason, recommending that his reader examine the argument carefully and consider its truth: Quod autem illa passio sit innata, manifesta tibi ratione ostendo, quia passio illa ex nulla oritur actione subtiliter veritate inspecta; sed ex sola cogitatione quam concipit animus ex eo quod vidit passio illa procedit. (1.1.8) Moreover, that this suffering is inborn I show you with clear reason, since this suffering (if truly and carefully examined) does not arise out of any action but only out of meditation that the rational soul conceives from that which it sees does this suffering come.
Although Andreas claims that mental action (cogitatione or meditation) is not an action, it had long been considered an action in both in philosophical and monastic circles.17 Given this context, and a necessarily literate readership, taking pains to point out that mental action is not action in fact undermines the credibility of the authorial voice, at least to a reader who is “truly and carefully” examining this argument. What should be an argument that falling in love is natural (something that just happens and for which one is not initially responsible) instead becomes an argument for the opposite: that love is an invention, and the lover is its author/inventor.
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Further, the text goes on to undermine its claim that the suffering in question is innate (put there by God or nature) and therefore innocent. The text proceeds to describe exactly how the process develops: The man clearly engages in a volitional process of mental action, beginning with meditation on a pleasing shape and moving on to imagine mastery in sexual intercourse. In case the lover’s mental duties and actions are not clear enough to the reader, Andreas ends the chapter with the following: Nam quum aliquis videt aliquam aptam amori et suo formatam arbitrio, statim eam incipit concupiscere corde; postea vero quotiens de ipsa cogitat, totiens eius magis ardescit amore, quousque ad cogitationem devenerit pleniorem. Postmodum mulieris incipit cogitare facturas, et eius distinguere membra suosque actus imaginare eiusque corporis secreta rimari ac cuiusque membri officio desiderat perpotiri. (1.1.9–10) For when a man sees a woman suitable for love and shaped to his pleasure, immediately he begins to desire her in his heart; after this, however much he thinks about her, that much more does his love burn until he comes to a fuller meditation. After awhile he begins to imagine the way a woman is made, to separate her members and to imagine them set in motion, and to lay open the secrets of her body, and the service of whose members he desires to have become master of. Est igitur illa passio innata ex visione et cogitatione. Non quaelibet cogitatio sufficit ad amoris originem, sed immoderata exigitur; nam cogitatio moderata non solet ad mentem redire, et ideo ex ea non potest amor oriri. (1.1.13) Therefore this inborn suffering is from sight and meditation. Not meditation in just any way will suffice to begin love, but that which is proven [measured] excessive; for moderate meditation does not usually return to the mind, and from such love is not able to arise.
“Falling in love” is therefore a conscious and arduous undertaking. It is not just the result of an unguarded mental action but of a volitional process of abstraction and invention—the desire to desire, the desire to inflame desire, and the use of the imagination in the entire process. A woman is abstracted by a male imagination that goes on to invent what it will probably never see—the woman’s naked body and the man’s sexual interaction with it. This abstraction is the object of a cultivatedly excessive meditation, what the twentieth century would call obsession. This is not just lust at work; it is a work of artistry or fiction in which lust and desire are mere ingredients. Like creating a written work, making love in this sense requires an immoderate use of desire, abstraction, imagination, and, according to the dialogues, as we shall see, words.
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The kind of meticulous reading I have given so far is at least as much the product of the kind of reading Andreas’s text demands of a reader as it is of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century literary criticism. There are two types of instruction about reading in Andreas’s text. One is the obvious kind, in what the author claims to be his own authoritative voice, which tells the reader about the text and what to do with it, such as the appeal to the careful reader cited above. The other, although more ambiguous on a number of levels, is a practicum, a method of reading, which the text suggests both by undermining and by referencing itself, and which is forced upon any reader who would really try to understand the text. For clarity’s sake, I will begin with examples of the more obvious type of instruction: to read carefully. The passages in which this suggestion is repeatedly embedded are important and complicated and will be even more closely examined in Chapters IV and V because of their content. However, the densest cluster of them appears near the very end of the text (3.117–119), where the reader is addressed as “you” and named Walter. The reader/Walter is told, “haec igitur nostra subtiliter et fideliter examinata doctrina, quam tibi praesenti libello mandamus insertam, tibi duplicem sententiam propinabit” (3.117; “This subtlety and faithfully examined teaching of ours, which we hand to you in person, inserted in a little book, will pledge a double [duplicitous] meaning to you”). We are then told, “Quam si iuxta volueris praesentem exercere doctrinam, et sicut huius libelli assidua tibi lectio demonstrabit omnes corporis voluptates pleno consequeris effectu” (3.118; “If you wish to justly exercise the teaching presented, as an assiduous reading of this little book will demonstrate, you will obtain all pleasures of the body in full effect”). Finally, “Quem tractatum nostrum si attenta volueris investigatione disquirere ac mentis intellectu percipere et eiusdem doctrinam operis executione complere, ratione manifesta cognosces neminem in amoris voluptatibus debere male suos expendere dies” (3.119; “If you desire to diligently investigate our treatise in an attentive search and to comprehend it with the intellectual faculty of your mind, and to complete/fulfill its teaching by the accomplishment of works, you will understand by manifest reason that no one ought to waste his days in the evil pleasures of love”). As obvious as are the reasons to read carefully, there seems to be no promise that a clear teaching is to be found. What a reader finally makes of this text seems to be the real problem posed. The “diligent reader” is addressed in other places in the text, which are also at junctures key to interpretation. At 3.6 Andreas writes, “Cernas ergo, Gualteri, et acuto mentis disquiras ingenio, quanto sit praeferendus honore, qui coelesti rege contempto eiusque neglecto mandato pro mulierculae cuiusdam affectu antique hostis non veretur se vinculis alligare” (“Discern, Walter, and with your sharp and ingenious mind inquire how much
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preferential honor there is for the man who, in contempt of the king of heaven and in neglect of his command, and on account of whose feelings for some insignificant woman is unafraid to bind himself in the chains of the ancient enemy”). There does seem to be a question as to how admirable this kind of man is. He is not simply condemned. It is up to the intelligent reader, using the advice that has come earlier in Andreas’s text, to judge the honor of this man. It could well be, given the argument in Dialogue 8, that sexual love is the source of all good, that the man in question is a kind of hero. At the end of Chapter 5 of Book II (2.5.10), the assiduus lector is called upon to do his own thinking, only this time he is encouraged to add his own ideas to Andreas’s list of signs of reciprocated love. Unfortunately, but typically, most of the signs Andreas lists also signify their opposites, that love is not returned. To set the reader the task of establishing his or her own list not only makes it impossible to miss the duplicity of Andreas’s list, but it also implicates the reader as a maker of meaning (that may or may not be reliable). The injunction also invites the reader to encounter and make conscious the vagaries and possible duplicity inherent in any system of signification, be it social and face-to-face or verbal and textual. Andreas’s text repeatedly calls the reader by name, the intimate “you” or “Walter,” asking for special attention to those loci where no right interpretation seems possible. A final pair of examples may prove even more instructive (or confusing). Andreas calls upon the careful reader only twice in the dialogues: at the beginning of the first dialogue (1.6.21–22) and in the introduction to the eighth or final dialogue (1.6.402). The first passage warns that moving too quickly into love talk and too much flattery is suitable for courting whores but not for ladies; yet the exemplary man of each of the dialogues does exactly these things and thereby enacts the treatment of each woman as a whore. The reader is left not only wondering what the term “whore” means and how it relates to women but also whether the reader is to follow precept or example. The second passage in question, the one in the introduction to the eighth dialogue, calls upon the careful reader to note that the advice for wooing women of the higher nobility is “much the same as what has gone before, in the previous dialogue.” This would make the eighth (and longest) dialogue an optional appendage, as far as wooing goes. The “previous dialogue,” the seventh, in turn references the sixth and the fourth dialogues, both between noble men and common women, rendering the methods prescribed to seduce a countess the same as those to seduce a common woman. The class differences between women become inconsequential. Further, the women are all not only approached as whores, but at some point in each dialogue the woman is usually, by
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reason of manipulation or retribution, accused by the wooing man of actually being a whore. What advice, then, is for the careful reader? At very least that the term “whore” is an empty signifier more often used to manipulate women than to represent something real, and, at least as importantly, that careful interpreters of language can escape seduction. The advice itself may be equivocal on the surface, but there is a definite reading method promoted by the text, which is the second type of reading I named above, and which is more or less forced upon the careful reader by the text’s self-referentiality and self-subversion. The text demands that the reader engage in multiple readings, at least if he/she intends to even try to understand. This would explain why the passage from the end of the work places in the future whatever understanding the careful reader may gain (3.117, the text propinabit [will pledge]; 118, experience demonstrabit [will demonstrate]; 119, cognosces [you will understand]). Further, as initial examples of the text’s self-referentiality, the woman in Dialogue 4 (1.6.190) references the story of love’s palace as if she has already read this story in Dialogue 5 (1.6.225). In the eighth dialogue, the woman who was a widow at 1.6.445 claims to be a maiden at 1.6.452. Like the examples below, these draw the reader back and forth in the text, and in and out of the text, while calling attention to the speakers as textual fictions, products of the author’s invention. The man in Dialogue 6 (1.6.294) cites Love’s command of secrecy, indicating his familiarity with the list of rules both in the previous dialogue (1.6.268, Rule 6) and at the end of the next book, Book II (2.8.46, Rule 13). There are at least seven examples like these, some of them misquotations, which send the reader back and forth between the two lists of rules. Both lists are forged by characters in chivalric romances that are narrated by the wooing man in Dialogue 6 and Andreas the Master in Book II. Further, at the end of the first set of rules (1.6.269) the God of Love (ventriloquated by the wooing man who is ventriloquated by Andreas) cites Andreas’s text to Walter as bearing in Book II some less important rules than he himself has just cited. Such self-referential passages force the reader to search for the “real” advice, which is never found. Meanwhile, the reader is learning to be suspicious of the power and authority of authorial voices and to discern interpretations for him- or herself. Such passages also smack of what a modern reader might call mise en abyme,18 although the reflexivity in Andreas’s text connects on too many levels to qualify simply as an enclosed, miniature model of the whole. Its reflexivity does not create the kind of semantic clarity described in Dällenbach’s theory of mise en abyme but it does lend clarity and support to my notion that one of the work’s sententiae is that meaning must be actively constructed by the reader. Perhaps Derrida’s theory of invagination, which he calls the “law of the law of genre,” is even more to the point here. This law, he writes, is a
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“principle of contamination.” Apparently, once the clarifying line of division is drawn, it also becomes clear that categories inevitably overlap. “A text cannot belong to no genre,” he writes, “it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text; there is always a genre and genres; yet such participation never amounts to belonging.”19 Just as Andreas’s text participates in genres but belongs to none, so also its reflexivity transgresses levels of fiction to create that “pocket of meaning which is greater than the whole,” to mix or confuse categories, and to play with the author/ity that might establish them.20 Genre, as Derrida suggests, is not so much a name for a nature inhering in a thing as it is a way of reading (making sense of ) that thing. To prove his point, he uses the example of using examples: he claims it is the citation of examples that changes the “law of genre” (the injunction of purity) into the “law of the law of genre” (which he describes as “contamination”). Andreas’s text performs a version of this transformation. How the examples in Andreas’s text actually change the rules or precepts also given in it, I find impossible to describe with a general “law,” although it can be said that the examples tend to undermine the precept rather than to support it. Since each example cited in support of a given precept changes it differently, and since the use of examples differs from precept to precept, it seems that each precept and its accompanying examples must be considered on their own terms. Here are a few more of many possible examples: one of the problems with “Andreas’s teaching on love,” the problem of Marie de Champagne, and the problem of subjectivity. We will start with a very typical kind of problem with the Master’s teaching. The man of the seventh dialogue cites “Andreas the lover, Chaplain to the Royal Court” as authorizing the exclusion of the mad and the blind from the court of love: “Quos ab amoris curia penitus esse remotos amatoris Andreae aulae regiae capellani evidenter nobis doctrina demonstrat” (1.6.385; “The teaching of the lover Andreas, chaplain to the royal court, shows us beyond doubt that they are utterly debarred from the court of love”). But if we check the passages where Andreas discusses the suitability of the blind for love, we find, as usual, no simple instruction. In contradistinction to his fiction’s citation of him, he says that blindness only impedes love and that certain kinds of blind men can in fact love (1.5.6). Yet, according to Andreas in the first chapter, beginning love should be impossible for a blind man by definition since sight is a necessary part of love’s construction. The reader is left to decide whether to go back to the Master’s initial definition to judge its worth in this particular context. As for the mad, search as we may, Andreas does not discuss their suitability for love. He only describes the behavior of lovers, usually from a woman’s point of view, as one kind of madness or another. This would render all lovers mad.
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Countess Marie de Champagne is the final authority to whom the speakers appeal by letter in Dialogue 7, and she is an authority in some ways “outside” the text: she is neither its author nor a speaker invented by the author, but she is a historical person. Even so, her response to the supposed letter is narrated by Andreas’s fictional male speaker, rendering it hearsay at best. Further, in her letter, Marie cites rules from Andreas’s Book II (2.8.44 ff.). This textual ploy does not allow Andreas’s text to inscribe into the reading subject any faith in the authority of the text. The reader must choose between faith in him/herself or in untrustworthy authority. The example of Marie transgresses the categories of history/reality and fiction. How distinct these categories were in the Middles Ages is a debated issue,21 but the possibility of their overlap does not change the inversions of perception or frame of reference Andreas’s text creates in the reader. These inversions may bear upon our notions of what history (or reality) may have meant to a particular medieval scholar. Since Andreas shows that history or reality depends upon subjective experience and construction, he was surely at least as aware of this perspective as he makes his reader. Subjectivity is as complex as is everything else in Andreas’s text and is also shown to be constructed partly because the writing/speaking subject in Andreas’s text is fraught with the complications of definition. At 1.6.438, in commenting upon “the point so excellently entered previously” by Andreas the Master (1.6.64), the cleric of the eighth dialogue speaks as though he is writing the text and as though he is a fiction who has “come to life” while fully aware that he is a fiction. At 1.5.6, just preceding the discussion of blindness, Andreas the Master claims that he “shall perhaps explain on another occasion why love burns in a woman at an earlier stage than among men.” But when the topic reemerges, it is on the tongue of the cleric in Dialogue 8 (1.6.453–454). On the difference between pure and mixed love, the cleric of the eighth dialogue is the authority at 1.6.471; however, Andreas is the authority on the subject at 2.6.24. At 1.7.4 and again at 2.1.11 and 2.2.6, Andreas the Master recites the cleric’s sayings on clerics in the eighth dialogue (1.6.490–499) as though the fictional cleric was Andreas’s authority or as though Andreas was the fictional cleric. At 2.2.2 Andreas cites the cleric’s discourse in the eighth dialogue as being clear on jealousy (which it is not) and as though it were either something he had formerly discussed or as though the fictional cleric were the authority. And so it continues. The confusion between fictional authority and historical author permeates the text and has ultimately significant consequences. Further, the reading subject, as Andreas’s text constructs it, is no less complicated than is the writing subject. To the issues of subjectivity and Andreas’s textual identity, I shall return in Chapter IV. For now, these passages exemplify how the text forces the reader to read with suspicion
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and to read reflexively. These examples also suggest that the text is best read several times, keeping other readings and the text’s diverse parts in mind. Deconstructing Gender and Culture: A Reading of the First Five Chapters The final section of this chapter contains a fairly detailed reading of the first five chapters of Andreas’s text as well as of the introduction to the sixth. I place the reading here, where at moments in the explanation it may seem premature, for several reasons. First of all, doing so foregrounds in a textual and succinct way the most important issues in Andreas’s text as a whole: the first five chapters contain densely packed layers of signification that are gradually unpacked over the course of the dialogues and Books II and III. Second, a close reading of these early chapters functions as a more detailed example of the kind of reading Andreas’s text pushes toward. Finally, this section helps conclude the discussion of rhetorical forms and genre because it further illustrates how Andreas’s text undercuts categorization and definition. If in places the reading seems to push the boundaries of the evidence I give, much of “missing” evidence will be presented in Chapter II, on repetition. Although some of what I suggest in this section may not be completely apparent on a first reading, it is unmistakable after the first. I therefore ask my reader not to suspend judgment but to read (this part at least) reflexively. After multiple readings of Andreas’s text, it has become clear to me that Andreas’s text is profoundly occupied with a particular set of ideas, all interrelated. His text repeatedly, obsessively returns to religious prescription or rules, issues such as nature versus art, homo- and heterosexuality, money, gender, class, the rhetorics of love used by church and court, the fictions that found institutions, and authority—in short, the relationship between individual desire and socializing institutions. The first chapter of Andreas’s text, which purports to define love, suggests that what is called “natural” may in fact be artificial, as my reading of it above has already shown; this argument need not be revisited except to note again that it raises a question as to whether the natural and the artificial are entirely distinguishable categories. What I want turn to from Chapter 1 at this point is some evidence of just what kind of active force is behind the artificial: Amor est passio quaedam innata procedens ex visione et immoderata cogitatione formae alterius sexus, ob quam aliquis super omnia cupit alterius potiri amplexibus et omnia de utriusque voluntate in ipsius amplexu amoris praecepta compleri. (1.1.1) (Italics mine.) Love is a certain inborn suffering derived from the sight of and excessive thinking upon the beauty of the other sex, from which someone desires
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above all things to possess the other with embraces and to complete all of love’s commands in the embrace of the other, according to the will of either of the two parties.
Potiri is from potior, which means to have power over or “to be master of.” This suggests that the kind of possessing described in this passage is not just an embrace of the other; it is a power play. Nor does the possession have to be “according to the will of both” parties, as utrius is often construed by translators of the text. If one were to translate Andreas’s text assuming it was a “codebook” for courtly love, “both” would be the teaching it would be assumed to convey. However, utrius indicates one or the other of two, not necessarily both at once. The act of possessing the other, therefore, can clearly be a one-sided enterprise. Given that the inciting gaze is presented as male and the object of the gaze is gendered female, the reader is left with very little option but to envision a man enjoying the embraces of a woman whether she is completely in accord with his desires or not. Artifice comes from the desire to possess or control and is generally perpetuated upon the disempowered by those in power. From the readings I have given of the text’s initial definition of love so far, it is possible to see the beginning of three lines of inquiry that continue throughout the text: (1) whether definitions work at all; (2) whether nature and art are trustworthy distinctions; and (3) whether freedom of choice is ever really possible in hierarchical relations. The tension between nature and contrivance, which Andreas’s text constructs in its own way, continues in Chapter 2, called “Between What Persons Love Can Exist,” specifically in relation to homosexuality. The chapter begins with what looks, at first, like a declamation against homosexual attraction, and it is usually translated as such. But if translated literally, the declamation must be supplied by the reader, if it is to exist at all: Hoc autem est praecipue in amore notandum, quod amor nisi inter diversorum sexuum personas esse non potest. Nam inter duos mares vel inter duas feminas amor sibi locum vindicare non valet; duae namque sexus eiusdem personae nullatenus aptae videntur ad mutuas sibi vices reddendas amoris vel eius naturales actus exercendos. Nam quidquid natura negat, amor erubescit amplecti. (1.2.1) This moreover is a precept to be noted in love: that love cannot exist unless it is between persons of opposite sexes. For between two males or between two females love is not able to claim a place for itself; for two persons of the same sex do not appear to be fitting for the exchange of reciprocal love or for the exercising of its natural acts. For whatever nature denies, love blushes to embrace.
Andreas appears to begin arguing that homosexuals are unfit for love because their love is unnatural. This was an argument presented by the church, via
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citation of revered authority and privileged passages of scripture.22 Even Ovid, considered in the twelfth century to be the most sexually knowledgeable and irrepressible of revered pagans, could be quoted as maintaining that homosexuality was wasteful and womanish, although, not unnatural per se.23 However, Andreas’s passage quoted above does not preclude the possibility of homosexual love—quite the opposite—it brings up the possibility of homosexual love, even detailing that it occurs between women as well as between men. Nor does the passage assert that homosexuality is wrong and cite an ultimate authority such as God or scripture or Augustine or even Ovid: it simply says that homosexual relations “do not appear” to be “fitting” for the exercise of “natural” acts. “Appearance” in Andreas’s text, as I shall show in Chapter II, tends to depend upon public opinion, and it is a word that suggests doubt or possible error of perception. Appearance, that is, public opinion, is the reason homosexual love cannot “claim a place” as “love” between people. The passage therefore asserts that love is, by the art of definition, not by nature, heterosexual. What is natural is defined by some kind of authority, then it becomes a verbal then a social contrivance. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter IV. The final sentence of the passage says love does in fact blushingly embrace the unnatural. Blushes are most commonly used to denote the first signs of love between lovers and are usually more or less innocent.24 Yet blushes, like pallor, their opposite, can and did constitute standard physical significations both for innocent glorified love and for shameful desire or guilty acts. That Andreas employs this particular signifier, the blush, to describe the homosexual embrace proves just how equivocal that embrace may be. Nature may well enjoy it. Chapter 2 ends with this equally equivocal sentence: “Nota etiam quod amans nihil sapidum ab amante consequitur nisi ex illius voluntate procedat” (“Even so, mark that nothing tasty accompanies a beloved unless it proceeds from her [or his] will”). The forms of the genitive singular of illius and the ablative singular of amans are not distinguished according to gender. Technically, the beloved could be either male or female. Sandwiched between passages on homosexuality in 1.2 is the first of many discussions of money. If this were a treatise in the usual sense, then the connection between the middle part of a chapter and its beginning and end would be more apparent. In this case there is an important connection, although it is not immediately visible. The middle part states that a true lover (verus amans; 1.2.3) would give everything away to enjoy the act of love with his beloved, but a wise lover (sapiens amator; 1.2.5) would not, for without his money he could not afford to continue as a lover. Wisdom and truth are presented as being at odds with each other, at least when it comes to love and money.
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So why does a lover need money? According to Andreas’s second chapter, the requisite meditation upon the beauty of the beloved is so excessive, that one must have ample leisure and be amply free of cares (especially financial) to have the time and frame of mind necessary to obsess properly. So what does money have to do with the distinction between homo- and heterosexuality? Later in Andreas’s text, the man not only must buy his leisure to create the requisite fantasies, but he must, to one degree or another, buy the woman as well. Poor lovers are therefore out of the game, at least according to Ovid, says Andreas.25 Heterosexuality in the twelfth century brought with it problems associated with an economic system of exchange whose bottom-line value was a woman’s body, whatever it produced, and whatever property accompanied it. So, although a lover might not be interested in marriage, women would remain a commodity to protect or for which to compete with money or gifts. The dialogues repeatedly raise this issue, as do Books II and III, and it is one to which I shall return. Male homosexuality is free of these rules of exchange. Chapter 2, which is supposed to exclude the poor and the queer, instead begins to indicate that the freedom supposedly indispensable to the lover’s pleasure is logically impossible in heterosexual relationships, since heterosexual relations are fraught with rules—especially about gift giving and marriage. Heterosexual relations, as socially construed and mirrored in Andreas’s text, begin to appear increasingly unlike love. As for the possibility of free will in love, the tiny Chapter 3 conflates the love rhetoric of church and court in terms that are far from free. Called “The origin of love” and quoted in its entirety below, Chapter 3 offers this false etymology and analysis: Dicitur autem amor ab amo verbo, quod significat capere vel capi. Nam qui amat captus est cupidinis vinculis aliumque desiderat suo capere hamo. Sicut enim piscator astutus suis conatur cibiculis attrahere pisces et ipsos sui hami capere unco, ita vero captus amore suis nititur alium attrahere blandimentis, totisque nisibus instat duo diversa quodam incorporali vinculo corda unire, vel unita semper coniuncta servare. (1.3.1–2) It is said, moreover, that “love” is from the word “hook” [amus], which means to capture or to be caught. For he who loves is captured in the chains of desire and wishes to capture another with his own hook [hamo]. Just as a skilled fisherman tries with his little tidbit to attract fishes and to capture them on his crooked hook, so truly does one captured by love strive to attract another person with his blandishments and insists with all his efforts to unite two separate hearts into one body with a chain, or if united to preserve the union forever.
Although the passage puts forward the ideal of freedom of choice in love, these are images of capture and bondage, not of freedom or free will, the
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supposed underpinnings of real love. In this passage, underneath the pleasantry associated with a superficially casual exchange of dirty jokes (e.g., the “hook” as penis) lies a metaphor that, especially in the dialogues, Andreas associates with the game of love: the hunter versus the hunted. In the dialogues, the metaphor is avian and the quarry female. Here, the gender of the “fish” is unspecified. For the quarry, the only difference between hunting and fishing is the bait. The end result is the same: consumption by the empowered. The difference between the hunter and the fisher is that of active aggression versus passive aggression. Although there is no overt violence in this passage, it is implied in every metaphor. The image of making two hearts one, from the troubadour tradition, is conflated with that of making two bodies one, from the tradition of the church. Heterosexual union appears as defined and valorized through the rhetorical terms of both the church and the court. But taken literally, as Andreas’s passage quoted above presents it, the union sounds painful and ultimately impossible: the hearts are somehow removed from two bodies and put, with great effort and the help of a chain, into one body. As Teresa de Lauretis perceptively argues, “Violence is the sign of a power struggle for the maintenance of a certain kind of social order.”26 The heterosexual contract of Andreas’s era was economic, social, and ideological, requiring profound investment to maintain the arrangements based on the difference it claimed. The difference between men and women was constructed to be as deep as the difference between species and therefore potentially violent. Man was pitted against or lived in relation to woman as against or toward beasts, or nature, or his own wicked nature. But she was necessary to the promotion of his worldly achievements, an indispensable helpmate for the man of the world. This subject is elaborated upon in the dialogues, most of which employ the metaphor of hawking to acknowledge the interlocutors’ understanding of the heterosexual contract. When using the hawking metaphor, women and men both acknowledge that women are victims and men predators. The metaphor of entrapment in Chapter 3, fishing, bears yet more nuances in its relation to hunting in the Prologue and hawking in the dialogues. As the Arthurian image of the Fisher King indicates, particularly in Chrétien’s contemporary Conte du Graal, fishing is the sport of the “gelded” religious man, even if he is a king, whereas hunting and hawking belong to the virile worldly man of the court. Fishing may also be categorized as a religious metaphor for entrapment since Jesus called his disciples to be “fishers of men” (Matt. 4.18–20). Monastics of the twelfth century, Bernard of Clairvaux in particular, often considered themselves to be fishers of men, trying to convert men to monastic life through their preaching, their words
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being the hook.27 In Andreas’s time, a convert was not simply one who was baptized into the fold after having been a heretic or of another religion. A convert was a Christian moved to live a “perfect” life, to join a religious order of some kind. It is in the metaphor of fishing that Andreas’s text locates the origin of the word amor, connecting seduction with proselytizing, and his dialogues are clear about the necessity of language to seduction. Andreas’s text indicates that words are seductive, whether toward religious or erotic ends. Although the lover’s phallic “tidbit” is called bait in Chapter 3’s definition of the origin of love, the chapter also refers to the bait as blandimentis, “blandishments” or “flattery.” Flattery is one of the main ingredients necessary for a successful benevolentiae captatio,28 which is the beginning, not just of Andreas’s text but also of a convincing argument, and it is used by all the Fathers. The church, with respect to its quest for converts, is like the male wooer of Andreas’s text, besmirched by a disingenuous and self-interested enterprise—that of capturing its quarry through arguments and tales. Comparing God (or his representative) to a pursuing lover is not innovative on Andreas’s part or on mine. The parable of God as the Bridegroom is older than Christianity and had by Andreas’s time made itself exceedingly visible in Bernard of Clairvaux’s famous sermons on the Song of Songs. Further, Chapter 4, “The Effect of Love,” brings religion under scrutiny even more overtly, since it criticizes the “God of Love” who throughout the text is compared to the God of Christianity.29 Love in Andreas’s text moves between being an emotion, a biological urge, a game, a cosmic force, and a quasi-pagan personification. In its acts as a personification, however, it is a bit too easily confused with the God of Christianity to be labeled simply pagan or Ovidian.30 Further, Love (amor) in Andreas’s text is called the source of all good and the Fount of Life, as is the Christian God, the summum bonum of medieval theology. However, the summum bonum of Andreas’s text turns out to be sexual activity, not the Christian God, and it is directly identified as the source of all good and the Fount of Life (1.6.538–543).31 In some places it is not easy to tell which god, the Christian or the pagan, the text is describing. Andreas’s God of Love becomes personified where it acts as a judge or king and where Andreas claims it to be an unjust master whom he refuses to serve. Yet Andreas’s reasons for refusing to serve this god could just as easily apply to the God of Christianity, and the parallel begins at least as early as Chapter 4. Chapter 4 begins by stating that love creates virtues, that love can make any man generous, handsome, noble, humble, and even chaste (1.4.1–2). A similar ability to transform was attributed to the Christian God, although He did not often, if ever, make one of His servants handsome or noble. Instead, He was said to be able to bestow qualities or virtues that made
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serving Him possible. Chastity, for instance, was a gift especially sought by monks and, if received, usually came after long stormy bouts with temptation.32 Andreas protests that he will not serve the God of Love because that god is “unjust.” That is, the balance between a couple is not necessarily equal, reciprocity is not guaranteed, the woman does not have to love him back or say yes, although he may be compelled to love her. At least, this is what a cursory reading seems to indicate: Hoc ergo tuo pectori volo semper esse affixum, Gualteri amice, quod si tali amor libramine uteretur ut nautas suos post multarum procellarum inundationum in quietis semper portum deduceret, me suae servitutis perpetuo vinculis obligarem. Sed quia inadequale pensum sua solet manu gestare, de ipsius tanquam iudicis suspecti non ad plenum confido iustitia. Ideoque ad praesens eius recuso iudicium, quia “Saepe suos nautas valida relinquit in unda.” Sed quare amor quandoque ponderibus non utatur aequalibus, albi tractatu latiori te plenius edocebo. (1.4.3–4) This therefore I wish always to be affixed in your breast, o friend Walter, that if love could serve himself with a scales in a balanced way so that he might always lead his sailors into a port of quiet after the inundation of many storms, I would bind myself forever with the chains of his slavery. But because he is accustomed to carry a weighted scales in his inconstant hand, I do not place much confidence in the justice of that suspect judge. And for this reason at present I reject the judgment: because “Often he leaves his sailors in powerful waves.”
Surely the passage is to be read as meaning that the God of Love weighs the scales of justice to suit himself, which in the dialogues proves to be to the benefit, small as it is, of the women/the wooed. These images in themselves could also be classified as simply pagan. Yet the metaphor of sailing is at least as suggestive as the metaphor of fishing. Although Ovid used sailing to represent the trials of the lover, it had also been used since the Church’s inception to represent the journey of the Christian soul. The metaphor was so widely spread that churches were even the metaphorical boats in which a sojourner could find safety, hence the churches’ naves. The passage above could just as easily be speaking of the God of the Christian Church as of the secular God of Love. Andreas never once claims, at least not for long, that the Christian God is trustworthy or that He will rescue the believer from his tumultuous desires, the desires that could send him to hell. In fact, Andreas goes on to show quite the opposite and even throws the justice of God into question. No matter what rhetoric Andreas manages to ply, the lover (Andreas/Walter/the reader) is confessedly still in love, against his Christian judgment, helped neither by the secular god to attain his desire nor by the Christian God to reroute or to squelch it.
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Although the nautical metaphors in the above-quoted passage may be as attributable to pagan sources as to Christian, the judicial metaphors are probably mostly Christian. God as judge dominated the iconography of most of the cathedrals existing in Andreas’s day, and the Last Judgment had long been the subject of anxious religious discourse. The God of Love in Andreas’s text seems most like the God of Christianity in those passages where he acts as judge. At the end of Book III, the Christian God “returns” to issue in the apocalypse, death, and the Last Judgment. However, this advent is not presented as help, or even relief, but as a doomsday for which the reader ought to be prepared, even if the author is not. The Christian God of Andreas’s text is to be feared rather than loved, desired, or trusted. God’s grace is as absent in Andreas’s text as is God’s love. To accuse the Christian God of being unjust or of “leaving his sailors in the waves,” is obviously not the kind of statement one in Andreas’s day and position would want to be too clear. Yet, his text does make it clear enough by making the two gods almost interchangeable at crucial junctures throughout the text. Further, the women also fearlessly pose the questions of the disenfranchised not only to the men but also to their God. In contradiction to the claims of Chapter 4, that the God of Love can make any man into a lover, Chapter 5, “The Persons Suited for Love,” asserts that there are some basic qualifications for the part of lover: a person must be sane, capable of sexual intercourse, not too old or too young, not blind, and not excessively lustful. Andreas the Master not only contradicts himself in this way, but in his discussion of why young men are unfit for love, he contradicts canon law based on his own experience. In speaking of age limits appropriate for lovers, Andreas says first, in agreement with canon law on marriage, that the earliest age for boys to “love” (or to be sexually active) is fourteen.33 Andreas then goes on to argue that in fact, from his own experience, eighteen is a better age: Dico tamen et firmiter assero quod mascullus ante decimum octavum annum verus esse non potest amans, quia usque ad id tempus pro re satis modica verecundo rubore perfunditur, qui non solum perficiendum impedit amorem sed bene perfectum exstinguit. Sed et alia ratio efficacior invenitur, quia ante praefatum tempus nulla in homine constantia viget, sed in omnibus variabilis reperitur. Nec enim aetatis de amoris imperii arcanis posset tanta infirmitas cogitare. Cur vero citius in muliere amor quam in masculis exardescit, alibi forte docebo. (1.5.4–5) I say, nevertheless, and firmly assert, that a man is unable to be a true lover before eighteen years, because until that time on account of a modest enough situation he is drenched with shamefaced redness, which impedes love about to be carried out but thoroughly extinguishes [the possibility of ] completed love. But another and more convincing reason is found: that
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before the previously mentioned time nothing constant thrives in a man, but he is found variable in everything. Nor is it possible in such an infirm state to understand the commands of a secret love. Why truly love blazes out more quickly in a woman than in a man, I will perhaps teach elsewhere.
Andreas overrules canon law on the basis of his own experience: boys under the age of eighteen, according to his experience, are (1) hampered by embarrassment (and/or premature ejaculation?) and (2) are inconstant— emotionally and physically unreliable and therefore occasionally flaccid when they ought to be able to firmly assert themselves, false when they should be true, and vocal when they should be silent. Analysis of this passage renders several interesting situations. First, Andreas asserts the “higher” authority of his own experience over canon law, forcing the reader to choose between authorities. Second, since the authority privileged in this passage is experience, and the authority of the author of the passage has already been undermined by his own hand, the reader is invited to consider the potential authority of his (or her) own experience. Third, the author’s experience here seems limited: it includes familiarity with the workings of young men but relies on untrustworthy authorities for those of young women, which he will discuss “somewhere else, perhaps.” Even if P.G. Walsh’s suggestion is correct, that this “elsewhere” is in the final dialogue, between a man and woman of the higher nobility (Walsh cites 1.6.454) the would-be enlightenment comes from a cleric explaining to a woman why she can be constant (therefore bedded) at the tender age of twelve. This is in response to her argument from experience, that her own youthful inconstancy was based on her humanity rather than her gender. The man’s responding argument is from a book he has read, not from his experience with girls, and is therefore more likely to be founded on culturally and textually constructed ideas about gender and sex than on human phenomenon. The man’s book uses the hot and cold theories of the ancient pagan doctors, citing chapter and verse, most of which were ignored by women “physicians” contemporary to Andreas.34 This “elsewhere” is not where Andreas undertakes to explain female sexuality, but is one of many places where the text represents the inadequacy of male, textual, learned authority in the face of subjective experience. Authority is represented as being based upon limited human experience and ideas that, as they are “handed on,” are further limited by being predominantly male and theoretical. That women can “perform” however they are inclined or whatever their age is the “truism” that the cleric of Dialogue 8 offers, but by offering it in contrast to the more intimate or sensitive “knowledge” of the boy, male construction of female sexuality (in disregard of feminine desire) becomes one of the issues highlighted.
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Further on in Chapter 5, Andreas’s assertion that the blind cannot love is qualified by his claim that one who goes blind after he has begun to love can continue to love. But if one takes experience into account, as Andreas models, as well as Andreas’s “exception to the rule” for the blind, one is forced to acknowledge that the blind can love and therefore to question the Master’s “rule” that love must start with sight of the beloved. In his discussion of why the lustful are unsuitable for love, the Master compares them to dogs and donkeys, which are not only symbols of shamelessness and lust but also representatives of the animal nature that humans share with them—something that Andreas points out in this chapter. He also claims he will speak of this later, and when he does, it is to point out that humans are living within their nature (in a positive way) when they respond to their animal instincts.35 Consequently, he challenges not only medieval Christian tradition but also Aristotle. As we can see, Chapter 5 introduces the complexities incumbent upon any doctrinal project, be it philosophical, religious, or social. It also begins the project of placing the incongruities asserted by authorities old and new, sacred and secular, side by side, much in the fashion of Abelard’s Sic et non,36 a project which Andreas continues throughout the remainder of his text. Andreas’s Chapter 5 not only undermines authority, it also begins to push the reader back and forth in the text, to force the reader to read reflexively in order to get the “correct” pronouncements of the authority, another project perpetuated throughout the text. If Chapter 5 begins reflexive reading and the undermining of authority, Chapter 6 puts at issue what kinds of things become challenged when authority is no longer trustworthy: gender, class, founding stories, clergy, the impossibility of language as an honest medium, proper behavior, to name some of the key issues. Chapter 6 also shows what kind of reader “wins”— one who is able to avoid the seductive rhetoric of the empowered. Chapter 6, “How Love Is Won and In How Many Ways,” begins in treatise form, like previous chapters, and provides introductory remarks to the ensuing dialogues that constitute two-thirds of Andreas’s entire work. Chapter 6 begins by rewriting authoritative maxims on how love is most easily gained. But as the text rewrites its authorities, it rewrites itself. It recalls its earlier assertion that there are five means of winning love: good looks ( formae venustate), excellence of character (morum probitate), much eloquent speech (copiosa sermonis facundia), wealth (divitiarum abundantia), and generosity ( facili rei petitae concessione). Andreas, however, overrules previous authority with his own opinion once again: “Sed nostra quidem credit opinio tantum tribus prioribus modis amorem acquiri, duos autem ultimos modos omnino credimus ab aula propulsando amoris, sicut mea tibi suo loco doctrina monstrabit” (1.6.2; “But our greater opinion holds that the first three ways
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ought to acquire love, moreover we believe the other two ways [wealth and generosity] ought to be completely thrown out of the court of love, as my teaching will, in its place, demonstrate to you”). It does, in Book III, as I will explain in Chapter V, but it does so by appearing to do the opposite. Andreas’s Chapter 3 asserts that the appearance of the wooer should be less important to one being wooed than his “character,” that only the “simple” go for appearances, and that the appearance of good character (or nice manners) can make an ugly lover seem handsome. This advice becomes problematic for two reasons. First, the advice is supposed to be from Andreas to Walter, between two male wooers, but here it instructs the wooed, who is supposedly female. Second, since, according to Andreas’s definition of love, beauty is one of the main ingredients necessary for love to begin in a wooer, the wooer is either by definition “simple” (simplex, stupid) or the wooed and the wooer are of such different categories that the same rules do not apply to both. But, since Chapter 6 goes on to recommend character over beauty in the wooed as well, this latter option must be excluded. The wooer and the wooed are therefore both necessarily simplex. Further, “good character” is not described by Andreas as being deeply moral behavior; rather, it amounts to maintaining a good reputation, preservable only by silence. Even love that follows all the rules (pretending for the moment that it could), when the story gets out (which it always does), is said to give the lover a bad reputation, causing angry relatives, separation of the lovers, and their consequent suffering. Attaining one’s desire while remaining socially acceptable is shown to be an impossible enterprise. Any lover—which must also include the reader, since he/she is in Walter’s position—will gain a bad reputation by pursuing love, by reading Andreas’s book. According to his text, to continue reading it is to transgress social expectations in the pursuit of desire. The genuine good character that society claims to require is, therefore, not possessed by the would-be lover, and, even if he can manage to appear to have it, the appearance cannot be kept up forever. A closer look at the introduction to Chapter 6 supports these assertions. Chapter 6 continues its discussion of morality by returning to physical appearances and suggesting that the significations of gender are socially constructed: Sapiens igitur mulier talem sibi comparare perquirat amandum qui morum sit probitate laudandus, non autem qui mulierum se more perungit vel corporis se cultu perlustrat. Non enim potest virili congruere formae mulierum se more ornare vel corporis ornatui deservire. Tales etiam mirificus Ovidius redargendo notavit: “Sint procul a nobis iuvenes ut femina compti, / Fine coli modico forma virilis amat.”
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Sed et si mulierem videris nimia colorum varietate fucatam, eius non eligas formam nisi alia vice primo ipsam extra festiva diligenter aspicias, quia mulier in solo corporis fuco confidens non multum solet morum muneribus ornari. Sicut igitur in masculo diximus, ita credimus in muliere non formam tantum quantum morum honestatem sectandam. (1.6.8–9) (Italics mine.) Wise therefore is such a woman to seek to provide for herself a lover who is praised for his worth with respect to his habits, not however one who anoints himself in the manner of women or examines himself all over for elegance of body. Nor is it possible for manliness to be like the beauty of women, to adorn itself in their custom, or to be subject to decoration of the body. Such ones even marvelous Ovid noted with disapproval: “Away from us young men adorned as women, manly beauty loves to be adorned according to moderate bounds.” But also if you see a woman painted too excessively with a variety of colors, do not pick the beauty of that one unless you first closely inspect her on another day outside festival, because a woman trusting solely in the paint of her body is not much accustomed to be adorned with the gifts of propriety/manners. So as we have said with respect to the male, also we believe in a woman not so much beauty as respectability of manners should be sought.
Mos, moris, which I translate as habit or manners or behavior, can connote character in a moral sense, as Walsh translates it, although it more often carries the sense of social propriety, adherence to expected patterns of behavior or norms. Manners, or self-presentation, seem to best fit the use of the word in this passage and elsewhere in the text. A lover’s worth or value as such is gauged according to his ability to present himself well, and that worth, like the worth of money, is determined by society rather than by the desire of the beloved or by anything that inheres in the lover. Like legal tender, the lover’s worth is ascribed. Lovers, if they are to play the game correctly, must become commodities in an economic system constructed by others—despite the Master’s protestations that love must be free of such encumbrances if it is to be love. Andreas does not, in the end, privilege one kind of ornament over another. He supplants the initially less praiseworthy ornament of makeup and finery with the ornament of good manners (morum probitas), the cultivation of a socially acceptable self-presentation. By making good manners an ornament at all, this passage places the socially acceptable and unacceptable on a par, relativizing any possible moral (or immoral) value inherent in either appearance. Both are contrived facades employed toward the seduction of another. Those who are taken in by or rely upon physical beauty or external artifice are billed as fools. Wit, or the ability to construct and deconstruct appearances, is privileged for both genders. By supplanting
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its first definition of how love begins (excessive meditation on beauty), the text replaces female beauty (the desired object) with interpretive intelligence. Anyone possessing the latter, therefore, becomes (for Andreas) the desired object. Andreas seems to warn Walter about the beauty of women but, in fact, warns him about the dangers of eloquence and seductive rhetoric: Cave igitur, Gualteri, ne inanis te decipiat mulierum forma, quia tanta solet esse mulieris astutia et eius multa facundia quod, postquam coeperis eius acquistis gaudere muneribus, non videbitur tibi facilis ab ipsius amore regressus. Morum probitas acquirit amorem in morum probitate fulgentem. Doctus enim amans vel docta deformem non reiicit amantem, si moribus intus abundet. (1.6.10–11) Beware, therefore, Walter, lest the empty beauty of women deceive you, because the cleverness and considerable eloquence of a woman is usually so great that, after you have begun to take joy in the favors you have acquired from her, it will not seem easy for you to escape from her love. Proper behavior gains a love shining with proper behavior. A learned lover of either sex does not reject an ugly [deformed] lover if he/she abounds inside with good behavior [conformity].
In this passage the empty beauty of which the reader is to beware lies in a woman’s speech more than in her body or physical appearance. It is her eloquence that is dangerously attractive. Ironically, however, rhetorical eloquence, effective flattery, convincing argument, engaging conversation, and psychological manipulation were in the Middle Ages, skills that bore both the power of the serpent over Eve and the privilege of learned men in “upright” positions. The men in the dialogues ply these skills on the women. The women, however, possessing the desired interpretive intelligence, adroitly dismantle the men’s artifice. The text therefore suggests that what ought to be found attractive in and by both sexes arises out of the position of the seducee: interpretive intelligence or language skills that prevent false seduction and promote personal desire. Both the men and the women of the dialogues are eloquent, but the women deceive in order to escape the men, not in order to manipulate them. Andreas, therefore, is telling the reader to be careful of seductive rhetoric, not of women. Andreas’s above quoted passage also begins to suggest that the term “women” is a social one defined by conflicting authorities and poor logic, both of which have little to do with the living, breathing human entities. It also indicates, because of its attribution of men’s manipulative language to women, that women are used as a repository for men of their own evils. These strands continue to be magnified and elaborated upon in Andreas’s text, as later discussion will show.
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Chapter 6 continues in a similar vein with regard to class, showing it to be as much a social construction as gender and as potentially deconstructable as any other hierarchical theory: Mulier similiter non formam vel cultum vel generis quaerat originem, quia “nulli forma placet, si bonitate vacet”; morum atque probitas sola est quae vera facit hominem nobilitate beari et rutilanti forma polere. Nam quum omnes homines uno sumus ab initio stipite derivati unamque secundum naturam originem traximus omnes, non forma, non corporis cultus, non etiam opulentia rerum, sed sola fuit morum probitas quae primitu nobilitate distinxit homines ac generis induxit differentiam. Sed plures quidem sunt qui ab ipsis primis nobilibus sementivam trahentes originem in aliam partem degenerando declinant: “et si convertas, non est propositio falsa.” Sola ergo probitas amoris est digna corona. (1.6.13–15) (Italics mine.) Similarly a woman should not seek beauty or adornment or descent of family, because “no beauty pleases, if it lacks goodness”; and propriety of manners alone truly makes a man to be blessed with nobility, and makes him thrive with the beauty of glowing gold. Since all people are derived from one beginning stock [or entering post] and accordingly we are all drawn out of one natural origin, not beauty, nor bodily adornment, nor even opulence of things, but only honesty of character [ proper behavior] has been used to distinguish the first nobility and introduce difference of family. But there are indeed many whose seed is sprung from those first nobles who have declined, degenerating into the opposite condition; “and if you reverse this, it is not a false proposition.” So only propriety is deserving of love’s crown.
The text is here offering advice to women. They are to look for “true” nobility in a lover, not just the nobility of his social status. That true nobility, unfortunately, lies in morum probitas. While the passage is supposedly promoting goodness, it likens that goodness to the “beauty of gold” then states that opulence of things is no sign of nobility. The text then goes on to point out that, at bottom, all people are alike: all were begotten by a man and drawn from the womb of a woman. What has come to distinguish some people as above others is their ability to project morum probitas—this was, supposedly, how the first members of the nobility came to be. That the text plays the significations of morum probitas—proper behavior, good manners, and honesty of character—against one another is clear not only because the Latin can mean these things but also because the first set of words in quotation marks in the above quoted passage shows that Andreas is aware that there are more precise words for genuine human goodness (such as bonitate) than morum probitas. The latter is an authorial choice for his own purposes. Further, no matter how hard a reader might
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try to cling to the notion that the passage is recommending true goodness as the qualification for true nobility, the last two sentences of it make the attempt futile. The final ergo, that only probitas deserves the crown of love (whatever that crown might mean), supposedly results from and depends upon the previous sentence, which is almost inscrutable. “Sed plures quidem sunt qui ab ipsis primis nobilibus sementivam trahentes originem in aliam partem degenerando declinant: ‘Et si convertas, non est propositio falsa’ ” (1.6.15; “But there are indeed many whose seed is sprung from those first nobles who have declined, degenerating into the opposite condition; ‘and if you reverse this, it is not a false proposition’ ”). The passage seems to suggest that there are many who are noble in social standing who have not retained the nobility of character that won their ancestors their social standing, but it is not clear which part of the statement is reversible, or what it would convey if reversed. Let us experiment with a few of the possibilities. If one takes the proposition to mean that the origin of nobility was with people who behaved well but that since then many noble people have ceased to behave well, reversing the proposition could render the following options: nobility did not begin with people who behaved well, and since then they have begun to behave better; or nobility began with people who behaved ill, and since then they have begun to behave worse; or commoners began as people who behaved ill; and so on. But, according to the unidentified authority in this passage (to make matters worse, in Dialogue 8, 1.6.457 Andreas is quoted as being the author of this rule) the statement will not be false, no matter how one reverses it. Therefore, the only possible sense to be made of this rule, if any can be made, is that people grow good and ill in the eyes of society regardless of social rank, and social rank is attributed regardless of character. The passage in question looks as though it should be arguing, with the classical authors, that bonitate is the original source of social rank. In fact, it says that the ruse of probitas morum is the source of rank. Apparently, then, the passage is suggesting that rank is a social convention developed and supported by those best at conforming to conventions, to the advantage of people like themselves—rank has nothing to do with goodness or anything else that could be called intrinsically valuable. Good manners are learned, acquired, made, not natural to or inherent in a person. No one is born with these, though people are born with rank. The text in fact takes pains to point out the common parentage of human beings, both in the sense of the way people come about through conception and birth, and in the sense of common heritage as children of Adam and Eve, to show that, at bottom, people are people. It seems that rank, like love and money, is created by art, by what might be termed cultural technologies. To challenge the notion that one is born with inherently good or bad qualities, in Andreas’s day, is not far short of
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challenging long-accepted lapsarian theology, which makes people automatically ignoble in God’s eyes because of their birthright of original sin. (Theological doctrine as an inscriptive technology is an issue to which Andreas’s text repeatedly returns, and to which I will return at some length in chapters below.) Andreas’s text also continually returns to the foundational part played by seductive language in creating cultural institutions. Yet his text simultaneously shows that language is only as powerful as the prospective seducee allows it to be. Introducing the dialogues, the Master writes, Sermonis facundia multotiens ad amandum non amantium corda compellit. Ornatum et enim amantis eloquium amoris consuevit concitare aculeos et de loquentis facit probitate praesumi. Quod qualiter fiat, quam brevi potero curabo tibi sermone narrare. (1.6.16) Eloquence of speech frequently compels unloving hearts into loving. The adorned language of a lover is accustomed to excite goads and from discourse makes presumption toward propriety. How that this might be, I will take care to tell to you through speech as briefly as I can.
From this passage, it looks as though language skills should be the foundation of a socially acceptable or good appearance, and that Andreas is going to show Walter how to make himself look good through the art of using language. After this introduction, however, Andreas’s text launches far from briefly into seemingly interminable dialogues, none of which show how eloquent speech (or sermones) make one appear to have a good character and incline the hearts to love of those who do not love. What we see is that eloquence, or sermonizing, has more to do with winning a skirmish, with the attempt to have “power over,” than with actually being able to make oneself look good. None of the exemplary men looks good in these dialogues, and they all speak fluently. The players in these scenes seem more interested in displays of verbal skill than in defending truly held beliefs or in exposing heartfelt emotions, though the speakers continually claim sincerity. Language becomes like cards, like pieces on a chessboard, fungible signs with no real value. Even what those signs might buy or win is never acquired. The woman is never seduced. Not only do we see a lack of earnestness in the arguments, but each dialogue begins with directions from the experienced voice as to how to employ (deploy) the various speeches, most of which are interchangeable even though they are supposed to differ according to class relations. The difficulties of using language as an honest medium, the potential power of language on the human mind and will, and the self-interested use of it by any would-be seducer, especially the institutions of the day—church and court—that prescribe behavior, are expressed in these dialogues by example, explanation and experiment.
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Lovers, clergy, Andreas the Master, and anyone who would seduce through language appears to lack good character. Before Andreas’s text moves on to the dialogues, it returns briefly, but crucially, to the issue of class. Andreas proposes two separate lists of social rank: one for men and one for women, as though the sexes belonged to separate species. Although the lists share terminology, they are presented separately: “Ad hoc imprimis istam tibi trado doctrinam, quod mulierum alia est plebeia, alia nobilis, alia nobilior. Item masculus alius est plebeius, alius est nobilis, alius nobilior, alius nobilissimus” (1.6.17; “Toward this foremost principal [that of seducing by speech] I hand on to you that doctrine: that among women one is common, another is noble, and another more noble; further, one man is common, another is noble, another is more noble, and another is most noble”). Andreas here claims that knowing the givens about social hierarchy will contribute toward acquiring useful language skills; his text’s wording also makes clear that social hierarchies are ascribed. He boldly asserts that “class structure” is a “doctrine.” As such, it can be as fallacious as any. Finally, he asserts that there are not three social classes of people but seven: three for women, corresponding to three for men, with a fourth for men alone. That fourth and highest category is, of course, the clergy. As a rank amongst nobility, it has already been undermined. As if to make impossible any mistake about the arbitrariness of these more or less established divisions and hierarchies, Andreas finishes his instructions about rank as follows: Mulier enim vincta marito ex mariti ordine suam nobilitatem variando commutat. Masculi vero nobilitas mulieris nunquam potest coniunctione mutari. Praeterea unum in masculis plus quam in feminis ordinem reperimus, quia quidam masculus nobilissimus invenitur, ut puta clericus. (1.6.19–20) (Italics mine.) A woman bound to a husband changes her nobility according to the varying rank of the husband. Truly the nobility of a man can never be changed by marriage with a woman. In addition, we find [invent] one rank more in men than in women, because there is found [invented] a man most noble: consider the cleric.
Writing in the plural person of the polite authorial “we,” Andreas claims to find (reperimus) one more rank of men than of women. Although the verb used to describe his discovery does mean “to find,” like invenio, it also means “to invent.” In addition, reperta, a perfect form of reperio, can mean “devices for gain.” It certainly would be to a cleric’s gain to be considered nobler than the highest nobility. Combined with the final puta clericus, as if he offers up the cleric for inspection as well as for admiration, this passage is humorous,
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especially after Andreas names himself as a cleric later in the text. Yet, with Andreas’s text there is always a serious lining attached to the cloak of laughter. This particular gain, that of being the highest in the social hierarchy, was one that the clergy, as an institution, tirelessly sought throughout the Middle Ages, and that goal contributed to war and corruption. War and corruption, and their relation to the church, are issues to which the text returns in the dialogues and in Book III. Finally, this last quoted passage is about marriage as a means of social mobility. Fittingly, the dialogues that follow seem to be more about social institutions than about love. Now that Andreas’s reading instructions and issues of interest have been given their textual bases, let us move on to how Andreas’s text makes meaning through repetition.
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CHAPTER II REPETITION IN ANDREAS’S TEXT
Sed ideo me sciatis in hac parte vos admonere curasse, quia saepius repetita placebunt, maiori soliditate firmantur et attentiori memoria servantur, ac, quum fuerit opportunum, exercentur. (1.6.408) But therefore you must know that I have taken care to advise you in this part, since things most often repeated are eventually approved, become more firmly established and become preserved in the memory more attentively; and, when the opportunity arises, they will be put into practice. Andreas Capellanus, The Man, Dialogue 8, 408 As a process, signification harbors within itself what the epistemological discourse refers to as “agency.” The rules that govern intelligible identity, i.e., that enable and restrict the intelligible assertion of an “I,” rules that are partially structured along matrices of gender hierarchy and compulsory heterosexuality, operate through repetition. Indeed, when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not determined by the rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantializing effects. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the compulsion to repeat; “agency,” then, is to be located within the possibility of a variation on that repetition. J. Butler, 145 Et nonne maius ac laudabilius homini reputatur, si aliquam ex se ipso peroptime artem retineat, quam si eam ex artificio sumpserit alieno? Certe utique est, verum si fateri volueris. (1.6.175) Is it not considered a greater thing and more praiseworthy for a man if he possesses an excellent skill from within himself than if he gets it from the craft of another? Certainly it is so, if you want to acknowledge the truth. Andreas Capellanus, The Man, Dialogue 4, 175
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n this chapter, focusing primarily but not exclusively on the dialogues, I show that the repetition in Andreas’s text, far from being a flaw or mere convention, is a method Andreas uses to draw the reader’s attention to the problematics of acculturated conformity and its transgression. This chapter is divided into two specific areas of focus: “How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Social Hierarchies” and “How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Religion.” I read the various types of repetition in Andreas’s text as significant for three reasons. First of all, Andreas nearly always employs repetition with slight to flagrant variation and usually in contexts where a reader would expect to find conformity to the original version. If Andreas does not just quote sloppily, illustrating, as Walsh would have it, the “limitations of his learning,” what do we make of the difference between Andreas’s version and the original?1 What might his “mistakes” suggest we consider? The gaps caused by the differences place the burden of interpretation at least as strenuously as elsewhere onto the reader. Andreas’s use of repetition places the issue of interpretation, especially of certain passages, foremost. Second, although “nonmeaningful variance” is a term often used by medievalists and others to explain (away) difference or which they cannot (or do not want to) account, linguistic research on repetition shows that there is no such thing as nonmeaningful repetition, even where there is no obvious variance.2 The relevance theory, held as a standard presupposition by those in the field, states that repetition is always relevant since, at very least, it exists to emphasize or clarify what has already been stated or written. Linguist Andreas Jucker tried not long ago to challenge this theory by suggesting that perhaps in informal conversation utterances, such as “uh . . . uh . . . uh,” could be considered nonmeaningful. Instead, he found that even
I
these repetitions work as repair mechanisms in that they recycle material that was obscured by an overlap or they keep a syntactic frame open while the speaker searches for a lexical item with a fairly high informational load. As a repair mechanism, these repetitions reduce the processing effort required from the addressee. . . . Thus relevance theory stands up quite well to the challenge posed by these seemingly irrelevant repetitions. ( Jucker, 57–58)
If repetition is relevant to the making of meaning at this level of linguistic action, it is certainly significant in writing, which is usually a more careful and intentional linguistic display than informal speech; and repetition must be potentially even more meaningful when there is some variance. Third, I do not believe that calling repetition a medieval rhetorical convention explains anything, and it ignores the breadth of types of repetition in rhetorical practice. According to Brian Vickers, “It seems safe to say that
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no theory could ever embrace all the types of repetition used in rhetoric, in literary or in other texts.”3 Vickers says that Cicero, whom Andreas quotes fairly often, used repetition in its “elemental function” “to fix one point in the minds of the audience.”4 Vickers further states, Repetition of a word or phrase, if done properly, changes the listener: he is not the same person afterwards . . . it changes not just the person but the words themselves. Repetition can induce a sustained scrutiny of a word or idea, often for exegetical or hermeneutical purposes. (Vickers, 98)
This certainly describes part of what Andreas does with repetition. Repetition as a rhetorical convention does not take into consideration the necessity for repetition in any kind of learning or lingual interaction. Andreas Jucker writes, “Repetitions have turned out to be . . . so pervasive in language [that] almost all linguistic frameworks and approaches should have something to say on repetitions.”5 Intertextuality is a kind of repetition for which medieval literature was long devalued or belittled as “derivative” by modern readers who privilege “originality.” But originality is a much more problematic concept than repetition. A.L. Becker makes statements such as “None of us can plumb the depth of the plagiarism of our general discourse. . . . My point here is . . . that we continually plagiarize, and most necessarily when we are original.”6 The final part of Becker’s statement seems to be especially applicable to understanding medieval texts. Rather than take the long standard approach to Andreas’s use of repetition, reiterated by Peter Haidu (“It is generally agreed that medieval literature is the most conventional produced in Europe”7), I would like to suggest with Becker that its “plagiarism” is necessary to its “originality.” And I would like to argue along with Fischer that “repetition and variation . . . are mutually dependent: repetition is a powerful force because of the possibility (or sometimes impossibility) of change, and variation can only be perceived against the background of sameness, that is repetition.”8 Rather than taking as a working presupposition Haidu’s notion that “variation from the norm represented by the pre-determined content is discarded as nonmeaningful variance,”9 I take as a presupposition that variations suggest loci of meaning to be discerned or supplied by the reader. Maria-Elisabeth Conte argues that textual cohesion is a construction dependent upon repeated structures and the interpretation of the reading subject: The coherence of a text is the product of an interpretation, a construction of the interpreter . . . the result of a dynamic interaction between the text
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and the receiver, not . . . a property of a static structure. . . . Structural and configurational patterns of texts . . . determine the expectations of the receiver by activating his intertextual knowledge. . . . When searching for a global sense of a text the receiver may have to project a new interpretation on a part of the text the sense of which had already been construed earlier. . . . Textual structures guide or pilot the construction of coherence, which as such is essentially an accomplishment of the receiver. . . . Cohesion, an intrinsic property of texts, is based on those linguistic devices which connect sentences and parts of texts. The text, the object of interpretation, is generally studded with cohesive devices that function as instructions, as a guide to the reader/hearer for constructing coherence. . . . The text as such is not only a guide to interpretation but is also a mechanism of control; it poses restrictions on possible sets of inferences. At any given point, the continuation of a text may confirm or invalidate inferences drawn previously by the receiver. . . . Interpreting a text is an activity of problem-solving that involves continuous readjustment.10
Andreas seems to be keenly aware of this and to make his reader aware of it, too. The use of repeated structures to this end is especially clear in the Dialogues. As quoted above, repetition, on all its levels, is one of those “linguistic devices which connect sentences and parts of texts.” As Stamos Metzidakis writes, “The new is always seen in terms of the old, the unknown in terms of the known. Repetition is that process which allows the reader to grasp any meaning whatsoever.”11 In the case of Andreas’s text, what is repeated supplies guidance for interpretation, “poses restrictions on possible sets of inferences” (Conte, 197) and offers the reader the opportunity to make what little coherence he/she can. The sections that follow provide copious examples from Andreas’s text. How Repetition in Andreas’s Text Subverts Social Hierarchies Beginning with and returning to the genesis of class that Andreas offers in his introduction to Chapter 6, I would like to show in a bit more detail how precarious this story is as a founding history. For clarity’s sake, it is useful to review several previously established points. First, the story is embedded in an illogical, almost incomprehensible, rule of thumb or paradigm for testing truth. Second, its fundamental argument about morum probitas is circular. Third, sexual activity is identified as the source of life. Here is the passage again: Mulier similiter non formam vel cultum vel generis quaerat originem, quia “nulli forma placet, si bonitate vacet”; morum atque probitas sola est quae vera
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facit hominem nobilitate beari et rutilanti forma polare. Nam quum omnes homines uno sumus ab initio stipite derivati unamque secundum naturam originem traximus omnes, non forma, non corporis cultus, non etiam opulentia rerum, sed sola fuit morum probitas quae primitu nobilitate distinxit homines ac generis induxit differentiam. Sed plures quidem sunt qui ab ipsis primis nobilibus sementivam trahentes originem in aliam partem degenerando declinant: “et si convertas, non est propositio falsa.” Sola ergo probitas amoris est digna corona. (1.6.13–15) Similarly a woman should not seek beauty or adornment or descent of family, because “no beauty pleases, if it lacks goodness”; and propriety of manners alone truly makes a man to be blessed with nobility, and makes him thrive with the beauty of glowing gold. Since all people are derived from one beginning stock [or entering post] and accordingly we are all drawn out of one natural origin, not beauty, nor bodily adornment, nor even opulence of things, but only honesty of character [proper behavior] has been used to distinguish the first nobility and introduce difference of family. But there are indeed many whose seed is sprung from those first nobles who have declined, degenerating into the opposite condition; “and if you reverse this, it is not a false proposition.” So only propriety is deserving of love’s crown.
That the rule of thumb is illogical should be evident. It should also be clear that it undermines the authority of Andreas when he postures as an authority. This rule of thumb resurfaces, and to similarly subversive ends, in Dialogue 8 when it is cited by the cleric in defense of his distinction between genders based upon medical textbooks (1.6.457): just as it contributes to undermining class structure in the passage above, so also it contributes to undermining the construction of gender in Dialogue 8. How circular is the surface argument about morum probitas has already been covered in Chapter I. I would like to add here that not only is morum probitas the behavioral standard of measure according to which a person is supposedly judged and socially ranked, but it is also one of those rules or standards in Andreas’s text that can be used to almost any end. The men claim that they and the women have it; the women claim neither do, both to their own ends; and both parties exhibit bad manners as well as good ones. Morum probitas is a linguistic segment whose semantic value is particularly variable, whose execution in action (like righteousness) can never be completely consistent but whose institutional use is fundamental; consequently, its rhetorical value is high, even though its meaning is minimal or diffuse. That sex is the source of everything also resurfaces in Dialogue 8 and elsewhere, and it will be discussed further in later chapters. Here, I refer to it only to note its essential relation to arguments for human equality: for instance, the acknowledgment that we all came into the world by the same
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means, through conception and birth, and that we are all of the same parentage—Adam and Eve. This argument, along with the precarious genesis of class, undermines the foundation of the institution of nobility. In order to show the extent to which Andreas’s text subverts social hierarchy, specifically with regard to rank, let us now turn to the above quoted story of how nobility came to be, to explore its textual exposition more fully. According to the founding story, the first nobles were singled out as superior for rule because of their proper behavior (morum probitas). This raises some problems beyond those already discussed with regard to morum probitas. Who singled them out? If they singled themselves out, how did they do it? Certainly, anyone with enough power (arms and/or wealth) could put themselves in this privileged position, rendering their distinction military and/or mercenary, rather than qualitative. If others—their inferiors—chose them, there follow two problems. First, how can the uncultivated recognize and judge degrees of cultivation that they do not supposedly know well enough to possess themselves? Second, if the ignoble majority do the choosing, then who is to ensure that they will not choose differently in the following generation (or sooner)? If the nobility were appointed by God, is He then responsible when they go bad (which, according to the passage, they do)? The passage does not give a clue as to how the institution of the nobility really began; it simply raises the question in suggestive ways. Rank seems to have become a cultural habit, for whatever reasons, and to ensure its preservation, the maintenance of life as people know it, reasons are invented to support its existence. The passage points to the inadequacy of genealogy as a supporting argument for hierarchical rule and to the inadequate reasons for the enfranchised of Andreas’s day to be so. Andreas’s twists on Cicero’s genealogy of nobility—that the noble naturally arise by proving themselves to be such—are repeated in one form or another in Dialogues 1–4, and 6. Each repetition adds its own embellishment. In Dialogue 1 (1.6.32–33) it appears in the words of the common man to the common woman. He has just told her, since she found his flattery false, that because he is a true lover, no matter how ugly she might be she would look good to him. He then says, since her probitas and morum digniori, not her birth, have made her appear noble, her nobility is more praiseworthy than that acquired by birth. He continues, “Nam homines universos ab initio prodidit una natura, unaque omnes usque ad hoc tempus tenuisset aequalitas, nisi magnanimitas et morum probitas coepisset homines nobilitatis inaequalitate distinguere” (“For from the beginning one nature produced all people, and one and all would have retained equality to this time had not magnanimity [generosity] and proper manners begun to distinguish people by the inequality of nobility”). Here,
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the man claims that the distinctions between ranks were originally related as much to having the adequate wealth to be generous as it was to manners and that the distinctions are fundamentally unjust. The woman does not disagree with him. She simply replies, in order to avoid him, that since he flatters her by calling her noble she should therefore take a noble lover rather than a common one. In Dialogue 2 (1.6.80) the woman, who is of the lesser nobility, introduces the genealogical argument, appending the argument from nature to claim that “non enim otiose vel sine causa fuit ab aevi primordio inter homines ordinum reperta distinction” (“it was no idle or baseless device to divide men at the dawn of time into social classes”) because “sunt ordinis stabilita natura” (“they are ranks established by nature”). At 1.6.91 and 107–108, however, the commoner who is wooing her, to support his claim to her love on the basis of his qualities rather than his birth, uses the argument that behavior was the original criteria for nobility against her. She responds, Si enim, prout asseris, sola morum probitas amoris invenitur digna muneribus et nobilem facit hominem reputari, superfluo antiquitus nobilitatis fuit ordo repertus et tam aperta distinctione discretus, quum manifestum erat omnem hominem moribus et probitate fulgentem nobilem fore vocandum. Et sic nos oportet instanter asserere nobilitatis ordinis institutiores suos in vanum emisisse labores, quod quam sit absurdum probare non insisto. (1.6.107–108) If, as you assert, only proper behavior is found worthy of the gifts of love and makes a man to be reputed noble, the rank of the nobility invented in ancient times and such manifest marks of distinction are made unnecessary; since it was clear that everyone with manners and polity would by this approach be called “shining noble.” Thus it is immediately necessary for us to argue that those who instituted the order of nobility spent their labors in vain, the absurdity of which I do not press to make good.
She contributes the suggestion that the nobility was invented by a particular group for its own benefit. This is simply called “natural.” The “nature” reflected here is definitely “red in tooth and claw,” not qualitatively judicious or even mannerly. To argue that anyone can be noble by behavior brings the whole system crashing down—the absurdity of this possibility, she does not care to pursue. She seems to glimpse something she would rather not, but the question has been raised. The common man responds, “Quamvis nolim tuos sermones arguere, nulla tamen possum ratione videre, si plebeius nobilem in probitate transcendat, quare ipsum non debeat in suscipiendis superare muneribus, quum ab eodem Adam stipite derivemur” (1.6.112; “I do not wish to refute your words, but I see no reason why a
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commoner who is superior in character to a nobleman should not rise above him in the gifts that he receives. For we are all sprung from the same stock in Adam”). From the plebian point of view, people are fundamentally equal, and his supporting example is based on the “natural” equality that arises from having the same parents. But for the woman, and from the point of view of even the lower nobility, the invented hierarchy is worth preserving by falsely labeling it “natural.” In Dialogue 3, in response to her assertion that he is aiming too high, and to the issue of nature raised by the text, the commoner says the following to the woman of higher nobility: Quibus ego sic respondeo, quia meum genus in mea non potuit persona propriis finibus contineri, instinctu quidem istud cooperante naturae. Quum ergo natura ipsa noluit mihi certos ordinis terminos stabiliri nec sublimiorum ordinum mihi voluit claudere fores, si morum non obstet improbitas, unde vos mihi praesumitis certos praefingere fines et ordinum me subiicere? Nam antiquitus illa ordinum reperta distinctio non nisi illis fuit imposita solis qui praetaxato sibi ordine reperiuntur indigni, vel qui proprium ordinem servant, maiori vero digni nullatenus inveniuntur. Et hoc ad eius assero similitudinem quod in theologica invenitur exaratum scriptura, quae dicit legem non esse positam iusto sed peccare volentibus. Praedicta ergo ordinis antiqua distinctio non prohibet me in quorumlibet maiorum militiam numerare vel maioris ordinis praemia postulare, dum tamen nihil possit aliquis meis iuste obiicere moribus. (1.6.134–136) To these things I respond thus: since my nature was not able to be confined in my person according to proper bounds—this surely being by the overwhelming instigation of nature—since, therefore, nature herself refused to make stable in me set boundaries according to rank, nor desired to close to me entrance to the rank of superiors, as long as improper manners did not prevent it, how is it that you presume to confine me within prescribed bounds and to subject me to rank? From ancient times that invented division of ranks has not been imposed unless solely on those who according to an earlier appraisal were found unworthy of the rank allotted to them, or on those who retain their own rank being found wholly unworthy of a higher. This assertion I justify also by the similitude that is found in theology dug up from scripture, which says the law is not laid down for the just, but for those desiring to sin. Hence the ancient separation of class already mentioned does not keep me from counting in the service of anyone superior, or from claiming the privileges of a greater rank, as long as no one can justly object to my behavior.
He uses the argument from nature, provided in the previous dialogue by the woman of higher rank, to opposite ends. He begins with the earlier premise that the ranks are themselves “natural,” but claims that his case is
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different: he has burst through the constraints of what ought to be his nature into the signifying practices of a much higher rank. Since this unnatural behavior was inspired by nature (which in his case really seems to be a combination of lust and ambition), his behavior must be, in fact, natural; therefore, his pursuit must be “right.” His argument also suggests that the woman is keeping him down (or that those of her rank are keeping those of his rank down). This leaves ambition as the source of nobility and competition as the reason for maintaining it. It also calls into question the definition of nature and natural. A false history accompanies the man’s suggestion that social climbing is natural. According to lines 8–11 of the translation above, “from ancient times” divisions of rank were only imposed upon those who were found unworthy of the rank allotted to them or upon those who retained their own rank being found unworthy of a higher. That is, it is supposedly traditional for those who are “worthy” of a higher rank to get it. Although history shows that people did occasionally become noble who were not originally of noble stock, it was not as common as he makes it sound. For women it would have come by marriage, but for men through some sort of deed (usually military) in support of the existing nobility—not through love or marriage.12 “From ancient times,” is a phrase by which a fictional history or genealogy is given authority. One might call it the argument from tradition, a logical fallacy. Rather than introducing a practice that has become venerable because of its goodness, however, the phrase is empty rhetoric used to gain the speaker’s ends. This is the same way the phrase was and is used d’hors de texte, and it is a rhetorical tool which the Master later doubly undermines: “Cuius sententiae licet veteris non est veneranda senectus, quia maximum nobis propinat errorem” (2.6.15; “Although this teaching is allowed as an ancient one, its age is not to be revered, because it launches on us the greatest error”). That the argument from tradition does not stand to reason has far-reaching implications for both church and court. Finally, the man of the third dialogue appends another argument: since scripture and theology claim that the law was made for sinners and not for the just, it follows, by analogy, that rules about rank should be applied according to behavior. He claims to be among the “just,” therefore above the “law.” The implications suggested by the similitude are not new to the man’s argument, but overtly using religion as a parallel to the argument is new. Problematically, the similitude is offered as though it ought to affect existing social practices related to rank in the same way that the “law,” according to Christian teaching, was offered as an incentive to good behavior. But, according to St. Paul, in the passages to which the man alludes (e.g., 1 Tim. 1.9), what came of trying to follow the law was the discovery that no one was in fact just. Everyone sinned, and consequently there was
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need for salvation by the grace of God; righteousness was to be attributed by faith and grace, rather than earned (e.g., see Rom. 3.10–26). I do not suggest here that Andreas was proto-Protestant, only that, characteristically, he points to problems with accepted interpretations of texts and doctrinal prescription. Likewise, since none of the social climbers in Andreas’s text are worthy of a higher rank through behavior (despite their claims) and since, historically, rank was not attributed according to manners or morals but according to birth and systems of exchange, two questions arise. First, what does the passage suggest about religion? Second, what is the social equivalent of the grace of God that would allow for social climbing? In response to the first, “grace” compared to social rank must either mean that social rank disappears in the grace of God, which makes all people equal (Gal. 3.28), or “grace” must be earned in the same way as rank: bought, taken by force, or inherited. This was certainly the case for any institutional relationship of favor with God in the Church of Andreas’s day. In response to the second question, the woman certainly does not possess the power to bestow rank, as Andreas emphatically noted at the beginning of the dialogues (1.6.19). The “grace” that would allow social climbing seems, in fact, not to exist, unless it were to be bestowed/attributed by people generally, as is rule by rank. If the social/theological parallel is to be consistent, the “voice” of the people with respect to social hierarchy must function like the grace of God. But the parallel seems also to make clear that behavior, whatever the concepts behind it, is difficult to change. The similitude indicates that, whatever scripture says, the Christian is in fact no more free of the law than the would-be lover is free of the rules of rank. The grace of God is as absent as is the voice of the people. What is and what ought to be are greatly at odds, with regard to both religious and social practice, and the enfranchised of both of those spheres are implicated as making effort to retain their power by imposing “law” and preventing “grace.” Certainly the lady of the third dialogue supports the “law” of hierarchy. Her response avoids the implications of the common man’s argument, playing only upon his term “militiam” (he colors himself as a would-be knight in her service), indicating that the superior position to which he aspires must not be as natural as he thinks, since (given his inadequate physique and chubby legs) nature apparently did not fit him out to be a knight. Either she does not take his argument seriously or she takes it so seriously that engaging it in earnest would be too threatening. In Dialogues 4 and 6, the tables are turned: noble men are seeking the love of common women; yet both men repeat versions of the commoners’ arguments. The fourth dialogue (1.6.169) begins with the nobleman telling the common woman that love has sent him to her to solve a knotty problem: “Cuius scilicet sit mulieris magis laudanda probitas, utrum nobilis
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sanguine an illius quae cognoscitur generis nobilitate destitiu?” (“Which is more praiseworthy, the woman of noble blood lauded for her probitas, or a woman similarly praised who is known to be without noble lineage?”) She responds (1.6.171) that “on first sight” it must be the noblewoman since probitas is natural to her. But the common woman finally claims that the nobleman has persuaded her (1.6.176) that morum probitas is more praiseworthy in a commoner than in a noblewoman, since any good thing that is rare is especially precious. Pretending to take him at his word as to her probitas, and placing herself in this special position, she then proceeds to adroitly reject his suit on the grounds that his probitas, evidently being inadequate to win a lady of his own rank, is clearly not adequate to win her. These exchanges show that the arguments for social leveling can be offered by men of any standing in order to get what they want from a woman of any standing different enough from their own to preclude marriage. The women do not counter the arguments so much as the attempts to seduce. The arguments for social leveling therefore gain their own register of discourse in Andreas’s text, working as a kind of counterpoint, often dissonant, against the strains of a supposed discourse of seduction. They also function as one version of the nature/art controversy: Is hierarchy natural or artificial? If artificial, then who is its author, who continues to support it? Whom does the artifice serve? A final example of how a repeated version of the argument develops and resonates is found in Dialogue 6 between a man of the higher nobility and a common woman. He asserts that Love’s command is to follow one’s own desire, regardless of any other rules or constraints (1.6.289). Particularly, a lover should not distinguish according to social rank, since Love “ex quolibet genere suum vult exornare palatium et omnes in sua curia aequaliter militare nulla ordinum praerogativa servata” (“desires to adorn his palace from any [human] progeny and desires all to serve in his court equally without observing the prerogative of rank”). Yet he adds, “Plebeia ergo in amoris cuia aequali cum comite vel comitissa meruit ordine permanere” (1.6.289; “Therefore a common woman has the right to remain in the court of Love with equal rank to that of a count or countess”). Whatever this may suggest about Love’s egalitarianism, it is clear here and on other accounts that the nobleman of this dialogue dangles the possibility of sharing his rank (and wealth) before the common woman as a kind of lure to upward mobility. But the woman does not take the bait because doing so would not accord with her own desire, which she describes as being multiple and divided, not singular or simple: Ea quae dicitis satis ratione nituntur, si cor meum propriae annueret voluntati. Mea namque voluntas esset quae proponitis adimplere, sed cor contradicit omnino et dissuadet per omnia fiere quod plena voluntate desidero. Ergo si
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cor contradicit amare, quaeso ut mihi asseratis cui potius sit favendum, cordi scilicet an voluntati. (1.6.310) The things that you say support themselves with enough reason, if my heart would give closer assent to my will. For my will would be to fulfill that which you propose, but my heart contradicts it and dissuades by all means executing that which I desire with my whole will. Therefore if the heart speaks against loving, I ask you to plainly state for me which is the more to be indulged, heart or will?
This woman impressively flexes what little muscle is allowed her. First, she makes the efficacy of his reason contingent upon her desire, which would accord with “Love’s command” as he has defined it. Second, her action (the result of will, in medieval terms) is mitigated by conflicting desires, like St. Paul being unable to do the good he desires to do (Rom. 7.19–25). The nobleman, however, claims never to have heard of this famous type of division, and says, “debetis eligere quod iustitia et veritate defenditur” (1.6.311; “You ought to choose that which is defended by justice and truth”) as though merely mentioning justice and truth somehow solves the problem. They are in fact part of the problem, if a choosing subject is to consider the justice and truth due herself. She responds that “compulsory service is welcome to none” and that if she were in love, then love’s compulsion would accord with her desire. She is therefore stating that she is not in love. What is the unwelcome compulsory service, if not owing the man what he has paid for or capitulating to a higher rank? To accept his offer would be to owe him herself. She wants to love out of desire, not out of obligation. She says, “Quod autem corde non peto quo modo possem amare non video” (1.6.311; “I do not see how it is possible to love that which the heart does not seek”). This common woman prizes the freedom to follow her own desire, which apparently does not include this man, above any wealth or social standing. Andreas initially offered the story about the establishment of nobility under the pretense of explaining, supporting, and affirming the existing system. But by the time the founding story and its companion arguments have been traced through each locus of their repetition, there can be little doubt that valorizing the nobility is not what the text executes. If it valorizes anything, it seems to be the desire and choice of the individual, especially of women and commoners. The bird metaphor employed in Dialogues 2, 3, 4, and 6 undergoes a similar metamorphosis with respect to hunters and the hunted. In its initial use, the metaphor is supposed to substantiate that people can be excluded from loving based on their rank. By its final use, however, not only has the privilege of noble rank been discarded, but the most profound of social
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divisions, according to Andreas’s text, that between men and women, is brought to light for questioning. Let us look at this development more closely. Although it was not unusual for a medieval author to use hawking as a metaphor for loving, in Andreas’s text the repeated metaphor exhibits a certain consistency not found in similar images outside his text. In Andreas’s text, the woman is always the quarry or the victim, while the man is always the bird of prey. Outside of Andreas’s text, a lady might liken her beloved to a falcon she owns, or lovers might simply engage in falconry as part of an upper-class courtship, or a knight wins a falcon for his lady, and so on.13 The bird is always a signifier for phallic power and is only rarely acquired by the lady for herself, but no one uses it to show the predation of men upon women as consistently as does Andreas. In his text, the metaphor appears for the first time on the lips of the incensed noblewoman of the second dialogue in her attempt to rid herself of the plebe who is wooing her. Yet, even she construes herself as quarry: Quis ergo tu es, qui tam antiqua conaris temerare statuta et sub amoris commento maiorum praecepta subvertere tuique generis tanta niteris praesumptione metas excedere? Nam si adeo mei sensus obliviosa manerem ut tua verba me cogerent his quae dicis annuere, cor tamen tuum non esset tam grandia tolerare sufficiens. Numquid enim lacertiva avis perdicem vel fasianum sua potuit unquam superare virtute? Falcones igitur vel astures hanc decet capere praedam, non autem a milvorum pusillanimitate vexare. (1.6.81–82) Who, therefore, are you to try to violate such ancient rules and subvert our ancestors’ precepts under the pretense of love, and with such presumption to attempt to exceed the limits of your kind? Even if I were to endure the obliteration of my senses so that your words caused me to assent to your proposal, your heart would not be sufficient to endure such lofty undertakings. Is a lizard chaser ever able by its own virtue to overcome a partridge or a pheasant? This booty is suitable for falcons or hawks to seize; it should not be vexed by a petty kite.
Although she compares him to a lizard chaser (lacertiva avis) and a kind of vulture, both raptors whose eating habits could be called “base,” while she compares herself to a sumptuous partridge or pheasant, he remains the would-be consumer and she the consumed. He argues that a bird of prey is only as good as its boldness, and since he is bold and has proven himself to be above his parentage he deserves the title of falcon (1.6.100–101). The metaphor, as she began it, is supposed to reflect natural superiority of social rank; but, in fact, it mirrors men as a rapacious breed and women, regardless of so-called rank, as their prey. This also appears to be an understood arrangement.
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Andreas the Master cites the above account, given by the man in the second dialogue, in his preface to the third dialogue, which is between the plebe and the noblewoman. The citation is problematic for two reasons. First, falcon-like behavior in a lizard chaser is cited as though it were an observable fact of nature rather than a metaphor for social climbing. Second, “nature” in this case appears to be a matter of opinion based on sayings that are “borne about” ( fertur): Nam inter lacertivas fertur aves nasci quandoque quasdam, quae sua virtute vel ferocitate perdices capiunt; sed, quia istud ultra ipsarum noscitur pervenire naturam, fertur quod in eis nisi usque ad annum ab earum computandum nativitate haec non possit durare ferocitas. Post multam ergo probationem, si dignus inveniatur, eligi in amore potest a nobiliori muliere plebeius . . . (1.6.122–223) (Italics mine.) For it is borne about that occasionally amongst lizard chasers are born certain birds that by their courage or fierceness capture partridges, but because this achievement is acknowledged to be beyond their nature, people say that such fierceness cannot endure for more than a year, reckoning from their birth. After much probation, therefore, if he is found worthy, it is possible for a commoner to be selected for love by a woman of the higher nobility.
This passage points to how easily hearsay turns into a “natural” “fact.” It also cites a rule in order to show exceptions to it and the flawed, expedient argumentation of the would-be seducer: the man says that even though this sortie from a bird’s nature does happen, it is rare, and such a bird does not usually live long since its unnatural fierceness is generally too much for its true nature; yet, he says that a commoner can be accepted into the love of a woman of the higher nobility if he is put to lengthy testing (1.6.122–123). We are left to conclude, contrary to the man’s own dictum, not only that some of the mutants must live long, in order to endure the testing but also that “nature” is a concept resulting from a flawed, selfserving argument. Further, since lengthy testing turns out to be the requirement for all suitors, the commoner’s qualifications for service need not be different from those of a man of high standing. Social stratification is as much a construct based on poor reasoning and rapaciousness as is the construct of nature. As much as Andreas and the upper classes of his text protest that proper social standing between lovers is necessary, it is not actually promoted by the text. A slightly more problematic repetition occurs in the fourth dialogue, wherein the bold common woman compares her noble wooer to a talking magpie (1.6.172). He apparently sees this as license to take up the hawking metaphor at 1.6.174, and it becomes painfully circumlocutory
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in his usage. After telling her that her parallels do not work and that morum probitas is more praiseworthy in a commoner than in a noblewoman, he employs this parallel in support of his position: Carior enim reputatur fasianus ab accipitre quam ab asture captus, magisque meretur praemium qui plus quam debet exsolvit, quam qui quod praestare tenebatur exhibuit. (1.6.174) A pheasant captured by an accipitre is reputed to be of greater worth than one caught by an asture; and the man who pays more than he owes deserves a greater reward than he who rendered what he was committed to pay.
Setting aside the man’s admission that the woman is purchasable goods, this is not an easy passage to construe because the two raptors being compared cannot be distinguished from one another with any accuracy. P.G. Walsh tries to make sense of the parallel by glossing accipitre as “sparrowhawk” and asture as “large hawk,” although both simply refer to hawks in general. Because Walsh’s distinction makes no sense, given the purport of the text, he translates the passage as being about women, claiming “the pheasant worth of character, the sparrowhawk the common woman, and the large hawk the noblewoman” (88, n. 80). Although this makes sense by itself, it does not in any way fit the context of the man’s argument. Further, the last qui of the passage is a masculine pronoun: the reward in the parallel belongs to a he, not to a she. I would therefore like to suggest that the two terms for birds are as equal as they appear to be and that the passage is, unintentionally on the man’s part, about the man and his reward, not about the woman or hers. Since the man in this dialogue does not prove himself to be terribly bright (obnoxiously egotistical instead), it makes sense that he should become befuddled and foul up his metaphor by making himself equal to his competitors. That he refers to his common prey as a pheasant is flattery, as the next dialogue shows, as have previous ones, but the woman is attributed noble status because she is pursued by a “hawk.” In Dialogue 6, the man of higher nobility is very clear in his use of the hawking metaphor. Instead of clumsily trying to prove his clever opponent to be foolish, as does the previous noble, the man of the higher nobility in Dialogue 6 responds as follows to the objections of the common woman: Mulier ait: . . . O, quam mirabilis astur debet ille iudicari, qui, perdicibus omissis gruibus et fasianis, ex parvis passeribus et gallinarum filiis sibi curat quaerere victum! (1.6.285) Homo ait: . . . Praeterea pulchrius accipiter suo volatu ingeniosam capit alaudem quam pigram qualiam et linea recta volantem. (1.6.290)
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The woman says: . . . How extraordinary ought that hawk to be judged who, having disregarded partridges, cranes and pheasants, takes pains to seek for himself sustenance from small sparrows and the daughters of chickens! The man says: . . . Then too a falcon is more splendid having caught for himself a clever lark in flight than a lazy quail flying in a straight line.
This man admits that he is engaged in chasing the woman for the sport of it, and that this commoner makes the chase more fun because of her wit. Being compared to a lark, she is credited for her eloquence. He also admits in this metaphor that the object of the hunt is his own glory; he does not even try to pretend it will benefit her. As for her self-comparison with sparrows and chickens, sparrows hint clearly enough at her commonness; but filiis gallinarum (the daughters of chickens) smack of the barnyard, and therefore the term seems to hint at “rustic” parentage or peasants in her genealogy. Perhaps we are to suspect that someone in her family has changed rank, from peasantry to that of a merchant. That the plebia of Dialogue 6 is of the merchant class is likely, given that the plebius in Dialogue 2 (1.6.79) is identified as a businessman by the noblewoman who wonders how he, a man who spends his weekdays in trade, has the effrontery to spend is day off (Sunday) playing at love. If this hint is what it appears, the move from peasant to plebe is the only example of successful social climbing in Andreas’s text. The bird metaphor in each of the dialogues above is engaged by the women in support of class distinctions that will help them escape their pursuers, and it is engaged by the men in order to tear down the barriers of class with which the women would protect themselves. In Andreas’s text, class distinction becomes one more empty sign to be filled with whatever valence a wielder of words or systems happens to need. Class distinction is paraded as a useful means to self-serving ends, not as a legitimate institution. The only social distinction that appears to remain fairly consistent in the dialogues is that between men and women; that hierarchy is eventually challenged as well. In order to complete the discussion of class in Andreas’s text, to make clear that through repetition it promotes social leveling, and to continue my argument that this leveling is not envisioned as being just for men, I turn now to the two “classes” that Andreas supposedly excludes from his lists of possible lovers at the beginning of Chapter 6: peasants and whores. Andreas offers the founding story of nobility and parallel lists of social rank before the dialogues in Chapter 6 supposedly in order to show who can love and who cannot. Yet the dialogues show that loving depends on mutual desire, not on prescription relating to rank. The final two chapters of Book I, which follow the dialogues, address the love of peasants and the
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love of whores, respectively. Chapter 11, “De amore rusticorum,” begins as though peasants, being distinguished even from commoners, are to be completely excluded from love: Sed ne id, quod superius de plebeiorum amore tractavimus, ad agricultores crederes esse referendum, de illorum tibi breviter amore subiungimus. Dicimus enim vix contingere posse quod agricolae in amoris inveniantur curia militare, sed naturaliter sicut equus et mulus ad Veneris opera promoventur, quemadmodum impetus eis naturae demonstrat. Sufficit ergo agricultori labor assiduus et vomeris ligonisque continua sine intermissione solatia. (1.11.1–2) But lest you believe our above discussion of the love of commoners to refer to farmers, we briefly append for you [something] about them. We say that it is very difficult for a farmer to be found in the court of a soldier [knight], but naturally, just like horse and mule, they are impelled to the works of Venus, just as the impetus of nature shows them. So for a farmer hard labor and the continuing uninterrupted consolations of ploughshare and hoe are enough.
In the first sentence, commoners are being compared to farmers apparently with the initial intention of showing that farmers, unlike businessmen, do not love. Yet the sentence that follows it indicates that farmers do in fact occasionally love. The final two sentences are problematic because all lovers in Andreas’s text (not just farmers) seem to be motivated, at bottom, by the impetus naturae. Further, the noblewoman of Dialogue 7 has just informed her noble wooer that she is happily married, enjoying love’s consolations at will (like the farmer and his “plough”) and that this is the best sort of love. The distinction between peasants and nobility is lost in the essentials of human (or bestial, since the farmer is thus compared) sexuality. Andreas then explains why it is that even though farmers can love, it is best not to instruct them about it (and therefore, presumably, why they did not show up in the dialogues): Sed etsi quandoque licet raro contingat eos ultra sui naturam amoris aculeo concitari, ipsos tamen in amoris doctrina non expedit erudire ne, dum actibus sibi naturaliter alienis intendunt, humana praedia, illorum solita fructificare labore, cultoris defectu nobis facta infructifera sentiamus. (1.11.2) But even if it is granted that it may happen however rarely that farmers are aroused beyond their own nature by the prick of love, it is not advantageous to instruct them in the doctrine of love, lest they strain toward actions alien to their nature and we experience human estates, usually made fruitful by their labor, made unfruitful for us by negligence of the husbandman.
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Apparently then, the only reason farmers cannot love is that they might prove unfruitful for the upper classes. Their “nature” is as human as any, and that which binds them to the ground they cultivate for others is not nature, but tradition instituted by people. Why are the estates called humana (human) rather than hominis (of men), if not to point to the selfimposed privilege of the landowners and to the humanity—not to the bestiality—of the laborers? Why does Andreas say the work is done for us (nobis) instead of for the nobility (nobilibus) if not to implicate himself and his reader as being among privileged humans who are dependent upon laboring humans for their food and the leisure for learning and “loving”? From this passage, social hierarchy, including the privilege of reading Andreas’s text, is based upon the greed in human nature, not upon the goodness in it, even the goodness of manners. Loving seems both to be presented as a human inclination and promoted as a right, while the justice of owning or conscripting the bodies of others is brought up for question. Chapter 11 then moves from farmers who love to peasant women who do not. Andreas advises Walter, Si vero et illarum te feminarum amor forte attraxerit, eas pluribus laudibus efferre memento, et, si locum inveneris opportunum, non differas assumere quod petebas et violento potiri amplexu. Vix enim ipsarum in tantum exterius poteris mitigare rigorem, quod quietos fateantur se tibi concessuras amplexus vel optata patiantur te habere solatia, nisi modicae saltem coactionis medela praecedat ipsarum opportuna pudoris. Haec autem dicimus non quasi rusticanarum mulerum tibi suadere volentes amorem, sed ut, si minus provide ad illas provoceris amandum, brevi possis doctrina cognoscere quis tibi sit processus habendus. (1.11.3–4) If truly a strong love of those [peasant] women has drawn you, remember to carry them away with plenty of praise, and should you find an opportune place you should not delay to take what you were seeking nor to gain it by violent embrace. For you will hardly be able to soften their exterior hardness to the extent that they might agree to offer you calm embraces, or perhaps suffer you to have the comforts you hoped for, unless the treatment of a little coercion comes first, suitable to their type of modesty. However, we say this not as if to persuade you to the love of peasant women, but so that, if you are provoked toward loving those women, from brief instruction you may know what course is generally taken.
Disconcertingly, Walsh asserts that this is literature, pastorelle, not rape.14 The passage is about sexual assault. It is brutally and graphically to the point. Andreas is careful to point out that he does not recommend this kind of love, only that what he has described is “the course generally taken.”15 “Love” here is lust, just as in every encounter with women in the text. The
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only difference, besides that most women of rank could be protected by their menfolk, seems to be that the higher the woman’s social rank, the more elaborate the suitor’s flattery and approach must be. Curiously, the praises that are to be lavished upon the peasant women (who ultimately have no choice) are the same ones deployed upon the women in the dialogues, whose “exterior hardness” is just as impossible to soften. As for the compulsion recommended for peasants, the men of the dialogues also attempt to coerce, bribe, flatter, and verbally savage their upper-class quarry into submission. The difference between how a man treats peasant and nonpeasant women seems to lie in how much power he is actually allotted by society over their bodies in a given situation, not in his basic approaches to getting what he wants. Andreas’s text suggests that the honoring of human desire (or the lack of it ) should be the element used to determine human interaction. Just as farmers are supposed to be left out of the ranks of love, and yet are not, so also are whores, the group Andreas considers in Chapter 12. I do not think this means that whores and farmers are to be seen as female and male social parallels. Clearly there are female “rustics,” the victims of rape. Rather, I would like to suggest that whores are a kind of inverted parallel to the “highest” class of men, the class that Andreas invents and appends to his social list: the clergy. (What, then, are the social implications of the famous elevation of the lower half ? Certainly they must be even more threatening than a purely sexual revolution.) Whores are on the lowest end of the scale rather than the highest, but like the clergy they work for a living, they are not supposed to be able to love and they do, and whores seem as unable to be unequivocally wicked as clerics seem unable to be unequivocally righteous. “Whore,” meretrix, prostituta, and occasionally pellex, are the text’s terms of derision for any woman who does not do whatever a man sees fit. In fact, each of the women in the dialogues is either called a whore, treated like one, or compared to one, not because she is oversexed or too easy (although this kind of woman is also called a whore) but because she will not yield to the man. Each of the dialogues begins with the quick and facile words of love that Andreas warns are appropriate only when courting whores (1.6.21–22). In Dialogue 1 (1.6.62–63) the man twists the woman’s reluctance into its opposite, suggesting that she is whorishly eager to consummate their relationship. The woman of the higher nobility of Dialogue 3 accuses the commoner who is wooing her of insinuating she is a whore, since he offers, if she accepts his love, to cover for her if she ever does anything, like lie, that might spoil her spotless reputation (1.6.132). Her sensitivity to the issue of exchange in love sets a standard for interpreting other passages on exchange as well as on whoredom in Andreas’s text.
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The particular lie that is consistently identified as meretricious is giving the suitor hope in exchange for a gift, without any intention of granting love’s consolations. Clearly, this kind of woman would be more accurately called a thief or a cheat than a whore, since there is no exchange of goods. Whatever a woman’s qualities are, if the man in the dialogue finds her unresponsive to the rhetoric of his seduction, he usually calls her a whore for it. This appellation is attributed so often and for so many differing, even opposing, reasons that it begins to be funny. In the parable of the ladies’ hell of Dialogue 5, those who are overeager are called whores. But virgins are ranked and despised as lower than whores when the lady being wooed wants to remain a virgin. The cleric in Dialogue 8 compares the woman of the higher nobility to a whore for preferring the lower part of the body to the upper (1.6.546). In Chapter 9 of Book I, women who accept gifts for their love Andreas judges to be worse than whores (1.9.2–3) since whores are at least honest about their motives. He says a true lover despises gifts from her beloved (which somehow does not ring true), but he is to offer them anyway, especially if she is in need. This particular chapter makes it very difficult to tell the difference between a whore and a beloved. Judgment XIX in Book II, rendered by the queen, says that a woman who accepts a gift without returning love is a whore. Yet clearly if she returns love for a gift she has exchanged “goods” and can be termed a whore. These are just a few of the passages I could cite. By the end of Book III, all women appear to be whores or worse than whores, but given that Andreas’s text tends to valorize whores, against the Master’s official protests, perhaps this is not so bad. Since whores are so often used as a metaphor or a standard of comparison in Andreas’s text, it seems strange when whores are discussed as a living reality in Chapter 12 of Book I. Andreas does this in relatively innocuous even gentle terms: Si vero quaeratur, quid de meretricis sentiamus amore, dicimus omnes meretrices penitus esse vitandas, quia ipsarum foedissima commixtio est, et incestus cum eis crimen semper fere committitur. Praeterea meretrix raro se alicui concedere consuevit nisi primo fuerit muneris susceptione gavisa. Immo etsi quando meretricem contingat amare, eius tamen amorem perniciosum constat esse hominibus, quia familiarem cum meretricibus conversationem habere ab omni sapientia reprobatur, et cuiuslibet inde fama supprimitur. Ad earum autem capessendum amorem doctrinam tibi non curamus exponere, quia, quocunque se affectu concedant petenti, haec semper sine precum instantia largiuntur; ergo ad hoc doctrinam postulare non debes. (1.12) If what were our perceptions about the love of whores were truly sought, we would say that all whores should be utterly avoided because mingling with them is most foul, and irreligious crime is usually always committed
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with them. Then too a whore is rarely in the habit of yielding herself to anyone unless first made joyful by the reception of a gift. Indeed if it does happen that a harlot falls in love, nevertheless it stands firm for her love to be pernicious for men, because to have intimate conversation with whores is disapproved by all good sense, and hence the reputation of whosoever [does this] is sunk. Doctrine on capturing the love of these women, moreover, we do not care to explain, since, however affectionately they yield themselves to a suitor, they bestow these favors without the pressure of entreaties; therefore you should not ask for instruction on this.
Irreligious crime is not always committed with whores. Like other women, whores won’t yield without gifts but they are not included in the relatively long Chapter 9 entitled “On love obtained by money.” They do not need entreaties, but based on the dialogues entreaty is useless in any case. Whores do yield themselves affectionately. Chapter 12 shows that the whore is as capable of loving or being in love as anyone. It is simply not to the social benefit of a man to love one. The reasons given for not loving whores are religious and social—there may be sin involved and one’s reputation will suffer. The chapter describes nothing intrinsically wrong with or disgusting about whores: whatever negative aspects there are about being with them are socially attributed. According to the above passage (Chapter 12), the authority of “all good sense” (or prudence or wisdom) that makes the attribution is on a par with the authority of the vulgi, whose opinion shapes the love-behavior of the upper classes in the dialogues. Who these people with good sense might be or what that good sense means is never broached. Collective “wisdom” simply seems to represent authorship for a body of traditional sayings and practices. Although certain auctors can be cited as saying any of the things “the wise” are credited for, such as the creaky foundation of nobility, no one in particular seems to be responsible for initiating the convention. Further, throughout the text what the wise or the vulgar say is interchangeable, and both are used as authority or leverage toward whatever end the speaker has in mind (e.g., 1.6.29–30, 93, 95, 98–99, 106, 119, 292). The rusticanae are similarly cited (e.g., 1.6.428, 430, 523–524), their proverbs vying with those of the fathers. Yet whoever is cited as responsible, the talk or gossip of the lowest classes holds more sway over the speakers’ behavior than does anything else (e.g., 1.6.524). Before completing the discussion of whores, a little more on “what is said” and how it ought to be taken would be in order since this, too, is a locus of repetition key to understanding the text. Vulgi means simply “the common people” in the twelfth century, as well as the so-called vulgar of any class, a derogatory term for people whose behavior is “below” their station. That the discourse of the lowest stratum of society is credited with
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the power it has in Andreas’s text indicates that the particular power of general opinion is not confined to the empowered elite, with whatever education and rhetoric they may have. In fact, the nobles, especially in the eighth dialogue, complain that they are subject to this particular discourse, that is, vulgar opinion and are not free to behave as they would like. The woman even complains that the cleric is more concerned about what the vulgi think than about what God thinks. And the vulgi are not just upperclass gossips: the vulgi and the rusticani/ae are identified as the same group. One of the most powerful authorities in society as Andreas’s text constructs it is therefore located in the speech of the vulgi and the rusticani/ae. Yet since this speech functions to keep existing institutional systems in working order, it does not always serve the interests of the vulgi or the rusticani/ae. Who really authors this speech becomes a difficult question to answer. But what Andreas suggests can be done about it is much easier to answer: there should be some way for people to find their voices and stop being the ventriloquist’s puppet or dummy. This is especially evident in the dialogues, where Andreas ventriloquizes the brilliant escape efforts of the women, the very efforts that show their equality to men and the insulting nature of the social rules that bind them. In a dense but enlightening passage (2.6.15), Andreas both deconstructs traditions and sayings and connects them to the status of women in his society. First he presents an “ancient” tradition that is not one, then recommends that we change it because it is erroneous: Nunc autem discutiamus veterem errorem, et si mulier fidem frangat amanti, quid fieri debeat videamus. Et antiqua quorundam voluit praedicare sententia ea penitus esse in muliere fallente servanda, quae sunt in fallaci amatore narrata. Cuius sententiae licet veteris non est veneranda senectus, quia maximum nobis propinat errorem. (2.6.15) But now let us shatter the old error, and let us see what ought to be done if a woman breaks faith with her lover. The ancient teaching of some wants to proclaim that the same conventions should be wholly preserved in the case of a deceitful woman as were narrated in the case of the deceitful lover. Although this teaching is allowed as an ancient one, its age is not to be revered, because it launches on us the greatest error.
Clearly this is a fake “tradition.” Historically (in reality) unchastity in women was in fact treated with far greater severity than in men.16 I believe he offers a false tradition here because it is easier to evaluate an obviously false one than a commonly accepted one that happens to be bad. The importance of this passage lies in Andreas’s suggestion that just because a
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tradition or opinion is ancient or generally held does not mean it ought to be revered. And if it is harmful or erroneous, it ought simply to be done away with. After the fake tradition, Andreas then presents the real one as the improved substitution for the supposedly erroneous one—he even “slips” and admits it as such: Absit enim quod tali unquam profiteamur mulieri esse parcendum, quae duorum non erubuit libidini sociari. Quamvis enim istud in masculis toleratur propter usum frequentem et sexus privilegium, quo cuncta in hoc saeculo etiam naturaliter verecunda conceduntur hominibus liberius peragenda, in muliere tamen propter verecundi sexus pudorem adeo iudicatur esse nefandum, quod, postquam mulier plurium se voluptati commiscuit, scortum quasi reputatur immundum et reliquis dominarum choris associari a cunctis iudicatur indigna. (2.6.16) Far be it from me to profess pardon for a woman who did not blush to satisfy the desires of two. Nevertheless this sort of thing is tolerated in men because of