Ancient Scepticism (Ancient Philosophies)

Ancient Scepticism Ancient Philosophies T h i s s e r i e s p r o v i d e s fresh a n d e n g a g i n g n e w i n t r...

Author: Harald Thorsrud

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Ancient Scepticism

Ancient Philosophies T h i s s e r i e s p r o v i d e s fresh a n d e n g a g i n g n e w i n t r o d u c t i o n s to the m a j o r s c h o o l s o f p h i l o s o p h y of antiquity. D e s i g n e d for s t u d e n t s o f p h i l o s o p h y a n d c l a s s i c s , the b o o k s offer c l e a r a n d r i g o r o u s p r e s e n t a tion o f core ideas a n d lay the i o u n d a t i o n for a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f their subjects. P r i m a r y texts are h a n d l e d i n t r a n s l a t i o n a n d the readers are p r o v i d e d w i t h u s e f u l g l o s s a r i e s , c h r o n o l o g i e s a n d g u i d e s to the p r i m a r y s o u r c e m a t e r i a l .

Published Ancient Scepticism

Presocratics

Hartilti

fames

Thorsrud

Cynics

Warren

Stoicism

William

Desmond

lohn

Seilars

Neoplatonisni Pnuliina

Rentes

Forthcoming The Ancient Commentators

Epicureanism

o n Plato a n d A r i s t o t l e

Tim

Miira

Tuominen

Aristotle Vasilis

Politis

Classical Islamic Philosophy Deborah

Black

Confucianism Ptini

Goldin

O'Keefe

Plato Andrew

Mason

Socrates Mark McPherran

Ancient Scepticism Harald lhorsrud

ACUMEN

© Harald I h o r s r u d , 2009 This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. No reproduction without permission. A l l rights reserved. First published in 2009 by A c u m e n A c u m e n Publishing Limited Stocksfield Hall Stocks field NE43 7 T N www.acumenpublishing.co.uk I S B N : 978-1-84465-130-6 (hardcover) I S B N : 978-1-84465-131-3

(paperback)

British Library Cataloguing-m-Publication

Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Typeset in M i n i o n . Printed and bound by Biddies Ltd., K i n g s Lynn.

F o r her p a t i e n c e , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d love, this b o o k is d e d i c a t e d to L a u r a : amicus

certus

in re incerta

cernitur.

Contents

Preface Sources

ix and abbreviations

x.i xv

Chronology 1

Introduction

2

P y r r h o a n d T i m o n ; the o r i g i n of P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m

17

I

3

A r c e s i l a u s ; the o r i g i n of A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m

36

4

Carneades

59

5

C i c e r o : the e n d o i the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y

84

6

A e i i e s i d e m u s : the P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l

7

S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s : the c o n s i s t e n c y of P y r r h o n i a n Scepticism

102 123

8

Pyrrhonian arguments

147

9

T h e ( o r d i n a r y ) life o f a P y r r h o n i s t

173

Nates

201

Guide

to further

reading

215

References

231

Index

239

Index

of passages

245

vii

Preface

W h e n I w a s a g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t a slogan w a s p r o p o s e d for a d e p a r t m e n t T - s h i r t : " P h i l o s o p h y . W e V e d o n e less i n 2 , 5 0 0 years t h a n m o s t people d o i n a single d a y " T h e s l o g a n w a s rejected. But it reflects a s e r i o u s s c e p t i c a l s e n t i m e n t . W h e n w e c o n s i d e r the r e m a r k a b l e progress m a d e b y s c i e n c e in the past 400 years, p h i l o s o p h y a p p e a r s i n a n u n f a v o u r a b l e light. A t a m i n i m u m , w e w o u l d like to k n o w w h y there is s o little a g r e e m e n t a m o n g p r o f e s s i o n a l a c a d e m i c s r e g a r d i n g the s o l u t i o n s to p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s , their p r o p e r a r t i c u l a t i o n , a n d e v e n the m e t h o d s suitable to r e s o l v i n g t h e m , M y d e s i r e to f i n d a satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n of p e r v a s i v e d i s a g r e e m e n t has s u s t a i n e d m y interest i n the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s , F r o m their a r g u m e n t s a n d strategies, w e c a n c o n s t r u c t v a r i o u s e x p l a n a t i o n s l o r w h y p h i l o s o p h e r s have not a n d p e r h a p s w i l l not r e a c h c o n s e n s u s . T h e r e are, o f c o u r s e , p l e n t y ot n o n - s c e p t i c a l s o l u t i o n s as w e l l , a n d I a m not c o n v i n c e d that I h a v e a satisfactory e x p l a n a t i o n yet. But reflecting o n the a r g u m e n t s o i the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s has p r o v e d to be i m m e n s e l y v a l u a b l e i n getting to grips w i t h the b r o a d i s s u e of the l i m i t s of r e a s o n . T h e S c e p t i c s a l s o h a v e s o m e f a s c i n a t i n g t h i n g s to say a b o u t the p r o p e r r e s p o n s e to o u r r a t i o n a l l i m i t a t i o n s . T h e s e r e s p o n s e s are m e a n t to s h o w h o w S c e p t i c i s m is a v i a b l e p o s i t i o n a n d not m e r e l y a set of a r g u m e n t s c o n f i n e d to the s t u d y o r the c l a s s r o o m . W h i l e I

ix

A NCtENT

SCEPTICISM

c a n n o t say that I h a v e t r i e d to live w i t h o u t beliefs, as the S c e p t i c s suggest w e s h o u l d , their p r o p o s a l s have i n s p i r e d me to t h i n k m o r e clearly about f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s r e g a r d i n g the nature o f r a t i o n a l belief a n d a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d the roles they play i n a c t i o n . It is m y h o p e that this b o o k w i l l e n c o u r a g e readers interested i n these a n d related issues to f u r t h e r their o w n e n q u i r i e s . I have t r i e d not to p r e s u p p o s e familiarity w i t h earlier G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s or w i t h the S c e p t i c s ' c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , i n s t e a d s u p p l y i n g the d e t a i l s w h e r e n e c e s s a r y . I h a v e a i m e d at p r o d u c i n g a c o h e r e n t h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e i n w h i c h to situate the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d t r a n s m i s s i o n o f a n c i e n t s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s a n d strategies. N e a r l y e v e r y p o r t i o n of t h i s a c c o u n t , h o w e v e r , is c o n t r o v e r s i a l . T h i s is w h y I have t r i e d to be t h o r o u g h in p r o v i d i n g references to b o t h p r i m a r y a n d secondary- sources. T h e references c a n always be ignored, but they w i l l b e h e l p f u l for those interested i n p u r s u i n g a p a r t i c u l a r i d e a , e s p e c i a l l y given the v a r i e t y ot plausible i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s that are often a v a i l a b l e . S i m i l a r l y , the g u i d e to f u r t h e r r e a d i n g is p r o b a b l y tar m o r e extensive t h a n m a n y r e a d e r s w i l l r e q u i r e . B u t as it is a r r a n g e d i n s e c t i o n s c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the m a j o r figures a n d p e r i o d s o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m , I h o p e it w i l l p r o v e u s e f u l for f u r t h e r study. I h a d the g o o d f o r t u n e to be i n t r o d u c e d to the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s by Jim H a n k i n s o n a n d P a u l W o o d r u f f , a n d to H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y m o r e generally b y Stephen W h i t e . T h e y w e r e excellent g u i d e s , as well as m o d e l s , a n d h a v e g i v e n m e a great d e a l of e n c o u r a g e m e n t . I a m v e r y grateful to the p u b l i s h e r s a n o n y m o u s readers w h o p r o v i d e d m a n y detailed a n d i n s i g h t f u l c o m m e n t s , as well as to T i m O ' K e e f e , W i l h e l m N i g h t i n g a l e a n d R a l p h A n s k e , all of w h o m r e a d a n d c o m m e n t e d o n the m a n u s c r i p t . A l s o , m y students i n a s e m i n a r at A g n e s Scott C o l l e g e g e n e r o u s l y offered h e l p f u l c o m m e n t s o n e a r l y drafts of the c h a p t e r s . A l t h o u g h it is likely that s o m e e r r o r s or o v e r s i g h t s r e m a i n , this b o o k is far better for the r e v i s i o n s I h a v e b e e n able to m a k e i n r e s p o n s e to this c r i t i c a l a t t e n t i o n . M y t h a n k s to K a t e W i l l i a m s for e x p e r t c o p y - e d i t i n g a n d to S t e v e n G e r r a r d at A c u m e n for s e e i n g t h i s project t h r o u g h a n d for l o c a t i n g the s p e c t a c u l a r p a i n t i n g of C a r n e a d e s o n the cover.

Sources and abbreviations

Anonymous In Tht. = In Tiieaetetum (Commentary

on Plato's Theaetetus)

Aristotle iYE = j\if omachean Ethics Met. = Metaphysics Rh. = Rhetoric Augustine Contra Ac. - Contra Académicos (Against the

Academicians)

Aulus Gellius NA = Nodes Attkae (Attic Nights) Cicero Ac. = Académica (Academic Amic. = De Amicitia (On

Books)

Friendship)

Ait = Epistularwn ad Attiam

(Letters to Attic us)

De Or. = De Oraiore (On the Orator) Div. = De Divinatione (On

Divination)

Fin. = De Finibus Bonorum et Malarwm (On Moral Ends) Fat, = De Fato (On Fate) Inv. = Delnventione

(On [Rhetorical]

Leg. = De Legibus (On the

Invention)

hws)

JVD = De Natura Deorum (On the Nature of the Gods} Off. = De Ojficiis (On Duties) x:

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Orat. = Orator Rep. = De Republics (On the Republic) Top. = Topic a Tusc. = Tusculanae Disputationes (Tuscutan Disputations) Diogenes Laertius DL = Lives anil Opinions of Eminent Philosophers in Ten Books Eusebius Praep. Ev. = Praeparatio Evangelica (Preparation for the Gospels) Lactam ius Div. Inst. = Divinae Institutions

(Divine Institutes)

Philo of Alexandria De Ebr. = De Ebrietate (On

Drunkenness)

Philodemus Index Ac. = Index Academicorum (History of the Academy) Photius Bib. = Bibliotheca (Library) Plato Ap. = Apology Gorg = Gorjias Prof. = Protagoras Rep. = Republic Tiit. = Vieaetetus Plutarch Adv. Col. = Adversus Colotem (Against Colotes) Coin. Not. = De Communibus Notitiis (Against the Stoics on Common Conceptions) Prof. Virt. = De Profectibus in Vtrtute (On Moral Progress) St. Rep. = De Stoicorum Repugnantus (On Stoic Self-Coniradsctions) Vit. Alex. = Vitae Parallelae, Alexander (Parallel Lives, Alexander) Vit, Cat. Mai = Vitae Parallelae, Cato Maior (Parallel Lhvs, Life ofCato the Elder) Sextus Empiric us M = Pros Mathematikous (Latin: Adversus Mathematicos; Against the Professors)

SOURCES

AND

ABBREVIATIONS

PH = Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes (Outlines of Pyrrhonism) Many of the passages from these and other relevant sources are excerpted and translated in: IG = B. hiwood & L. P Gerson (eds), Hellenistic Philosophy: Introductory Readings, 2nd edn (Indianapolis, I N : Hackett, 1997). LS = A, A. Long & D. N. Sedley (eds), Vie HeBemstic Philosophers, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

>:ii:

Chronology

Many of the dates below are approximate (see the Oxford Classical Dictionary and Dorandi 1999). The dating of events in the Academy in the first century ucr. is particularly controversial, as are the dates for the later Pyrrhonists. BCE 399

Death of Socrates

3*7

Plato opens the Academy

347

Death of Plato, Speusippus becomes head of the Academy

334-324

Anaxarchus and Pyrrho travel through Asia with Alexander the Great

335

Aristotle opens the Lyceum

300

Zeno opens the Stoa; Timoji becomes a student of Pyrrho

298

Arcesilaus comes to Athens, eventually studies at the Academy

275

Death of Pyrrho Arcesilaus becomes head of the Academy, initiating its sceptical phase

241

Death of Arcesilaus

230

Death of Timon

156/5

Cameades goes to Rome as part of an Athenian embassy, having earlier become head of the Academy

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

L3T :i<

Canieades retires Death of Canieades, Clitomachus becomes head of the Academy

L10 90 89/3 early-mid 1st

Philo of Larissa becomes head of the Academy Antiochus secedes from Philo s Academy Philo llees to Rome from political instability in Athens Aenesidemus revives Pyrrhonism

century (?) 84

Death of Philo

68

Death of Antiochus

46-44 43

Cicero writes most of his philosophical dialogues Death of Cicero Anonymous commentator on Plato's Theaeteaa

1st century

Philodemus Philo of Alexandria

30-45 C E u lst-2nd century (?)

Agrippa (some time between Aenesidenius and Sevtus)

46-125 125-180 2nd century

Plutarch Aulus Gellius Numenius Aristocles (although he may be as early as the first century B C E )

2nd-3rd century 3rd century

Diogenes Laertius

240-320

Lactam ius

260-339

Eusebius

354-430

Augustine

9th century-

xvi

Sevtus Empiric us

Photius

ONE

Introduction

T h e G r e e k w o r d skepsis m e a n s e n q u i r y o r investigation. B u t a s c e p t i c is not m e r e l y o n e w h o investigates; a l m o s t e v e r y o n e d o e s that. S c e p tical i n v e s t i g a t i o n is d i s t i n c t i v e l y s h a p e d b y the p o s s i b i l i t y o f d e c e p t i o n a n d e r r o r ; a n d it is an i m p o r t a n t c o r r e c t i v e to o u r c r e d u l o u s a n d s o m e t i m e s g u l l i b l e i n c l i n a t i o n s . I n this b o o k w e shall e x a m i n e the two p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o v e m e n t s - P y r r h o n i a n a n d A c a d e m i c - that stretch f r o m a p p r o x i m a t e l y the t h i r d c e n t u r y BCE to t h e s e c o n d c e n t u r y CE a n d together constitute a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m , Both A c a d e m i c and Pyrrhonian Scepticism develop in c o m p l i cated w a y s in r e s p o n s e to e a c h o t h e r a n d in r e s p o n s e to t h e i r c o m m o n d o g m a t i c o p p o n e n t s . I n o r d e r to trace t h e s e lines o f h i s t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e a n d d e v e l o p m e n t , I p r e s e n t the S c e p t i c s in t h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s i n c h r o n o l o g i c a l o r d e r ( w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of C h a p t e r s 5 a n d 6 ) . W h i l e it w o u l d be m i s l e a d i n g to d e s c r i b e the w h o l e of a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m as a u n i f i e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l m o v e m e n t , t h e a n c i e n t S c e p tics d o s h a r e s o m e f a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e s , A s a g e n e r a l i n t r o d u c t i o n , I offer a b r i e f c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o i c o m m o n a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategies a n d c o n c e r n s f o l l o w e d by a s k e t c h of the h i s t o r i c a l n a r r a t i v e to be d e v e l o p e d a n d s o m e r e m a r k s about t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n A c a demics and Pyrrhonists.

1

A NCtENT

SCEPTICISM

Suspension of judgement B y the t i m e the S c e p t i c s a r r i v e d o n the s c e n e there w e r e m a n y c o m p e t i n g a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories available. O n e o i the centra] p r e o c c u p a t i o n s o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y i r o m the P r e s o c r a t ics o n w a r d w a s to a c c o u n t for the v a r i a b i l i t y a n d d e c e p t i v e n e s s o f a p p e a r a n c e s , a n d m o r e g e n e r a l l y to e x p l a i n h o w a n d w h y t h i n g s c h a n g e . T h i s led to a great d e a l of s p e c u l a t i o n a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l a r g u m e n t r e g a r d i n g the relation o f a p p e a r a n c e to reality. B u t o n this i m p o r t a n t i s s u e , a s o n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y t h i n g else, p h i l o s o p h e r s d i s a gree. T h i s fact a d d s c o n s i d e r a b l y to the sceptic's i m p r e s s i o n that we are n o t u p to the task o f e x p l a i n i n g the v a r i a b i l i t y a n d d e c e p t i v e n e s s of a p p e a r a n c e s . P h i l o s o p h e r s as well as o r d i n a r y people disagree w i t h e a c h other about v i r t u a l l y e v e r y t h i n g ; at t i m e s we e v e n disagree with ourselves, T h e s o l u t i o n , it s e e m s , m u s t be e p i s t e m i c : w e n e e d s o m e n o n a r b i t r a r y a n d p r i n c i p l e d w a y to resolve these d i s a g r e e m e n t s . B u t even w i t h regard to the p r o p e r m e t h o d tor r e s o l v i n g d i s a g r e e m e n t s , p h i l o s o p h e r s disagree. A l l of this is grist for the s c e p t i c a l m i l l . But a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m does not d e v e l o p m e r e l y as a r e j e c t i o n o f the a s p i r a t i o n s a n d v i e w s of earlier p h i l o s o p h e r s ; it a l s o d r a w s o n t h e m i n a positive way. P e r h a p s the m o s t v a l u a b l e s k i l l the G r e e k S o p h i s t s (fifth a n d f o u r t h c e n t u r i e s B C E ) offered to t e a c h is the ability to a r g u e p e r s u a sively for or against a n y p r o p o s i t i o n . Protagoras, for e x a m p l e , c l a i m s that o n e v e r y issue there are t w o o p p o s e d a c c o u n t s ( D L 9.51, see a l s o 3 . 3 7 ) , a n d that m a s t e r i n g h i s r h e t o r i c a l t e c h n i q u e s w i l l l e a d to s o u n d , p r a c t i c a l j u d g e m e n t (Prot. 3 1 9 a ) . T h e h i s t o r i a n T h u c y d i d e s , w h o is s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d by the S o p h i s t s , o p p o s e s o n e a c c o u n t o i e v e n t s to a n o t h e r in o r d e r to d o j u s t i c e to the c o m p l e x i t y of h u m a n affairs a n d to a r r i v e at a p r o p e r l y c a u t i o u s , a n d i n f o r m e d , j u d g e m e n t (History

of the Peiopotmesian

War 1 . 2 2 - 2 3 ) . T h e S o p h i s t A n t i p h o n

teaches h i s students h o w to o p p o s e a r g u m e n t s for the s a k e o f l e a r n i n g to be a n effective legal a d v o c a t e . F o r h i s part, A r i s t o t l e c o u n t e r s P l a t o s w o r r y about the u n s c r u p u l o u s use of r h e t o r i c a l p o w e r by c l a i m i n g that a r g u i n g tor a n d against a n i s s u e , a n d d e r i v i n g o p p o s e d

2

INTRODUCTION

c o n c l u s i o n s f r o m the s a m e p r e m i s e s , h e l p s u s to d i s c e r n w h e r e the t r u t h lies (Rh.

L i s Topics 1 . 1 - 2 , e s p e c i a l l y 1 0 1 a 3 4 - 3 6 ) ,

I n genera], the p r a c t i c e o f o p p o s i n g a r g u m e n t s w a s d e v e l o p e d as a v a l u a b l e m e a n s o f a r r i v i n g at p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u d g e m e n t s a b o u t the t r u t h , d e l i b e r a t i v e d e c i s i o n s about the best c o u r s e o f a c t i o n a n d forensic j u d g e m e n t s about i n n o c e n c e a n d guilt. I n m a n y of the S c e p tical a p p r o p r i a t i o n s of this m e t h o d , h o w e v e r , the o u t c o m e is s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g e m e n t [epoche],

e v e n if the g o a l is initially the d i s c o v e r y

o f t r u t h . ( H o w e v e r , C i c e r o s later A c a d e m i c v e r s i o n of t h i s m e t h o d m a r k s a r e v e r s i o n to its o r i g i n a l l y positive e m p l o y m e n t ; see C h a p t e r 5, a n d f u r t h e r b e l o w . ) I n so far as the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s p r o m o t e the s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t , they are quite u n l i k e o t h e r s c h o o l s or m o v e m e n t s . N o r m a l l y w e s e e k to u n d e r s t a n d a p h i l o s o p h e r i n t e r m s of h i s d o c t r i n e s , a n d the a r g u m e n t s h e offers i n s u p p o r t . F o r e x a m p l e , a Stoic believes v i r t u e is sufficient l o r a g o o d life, a n A r i s t o t e l i a n b e l i e v e s w e n e e d s o m e e x t e r n a l g o o d s in a d d i t i o n to v i r t u e to live w e l l , a n d a n E p i c u r e a n believes n o t h i n g is w o r t h w h i l e i n the a b s e n c e of p l e a s u r e . W h e n s t u d y i n g s u c h p h i l o s o p h e r s w e t r y to d e t e r m i n e w h a t their d o c t r i n e s a m o u n t to a n d w h y they b e l i e v e t h e m to be true. W e e m p l o y the s a m e f o c u s w h e t h e r the d o c t r i n e s in q u e s t i o n are p o s i t i v e or negative. A n atheist, for e x a m p l e , a r g u e s that G o d d o e s not exist, o r that w e c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r G o d exists. A n d a n antirealist a r g u e s that there are n o m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t s t r u c t u r e s in the w o r l d , o r that w e c a n n o t k n o w s u c h s t r u c t u r e s exist. E v e n t h o u g h w e s o m e t i m e s refer to s u c h v i e w s as s c e p t i c a l , we m u s t note that the c o g n i t i v e attitude e x p r e s s e d is n o t u n c e r t a i n t y or i n d e c i s i o n , but r a t h e r a k i n d of belief: to d i s b e l i e v e p is to believe that n o t - p . F r o m the a g n o s t i c s s t a n d p o i n t , b o t h the theist a n d the atheist are m i s t a k e n . A n d g e n e r a l l y s p e a k i n g , f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t of o n e w h o has s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t , t h o s e w h o c o n f i d e n t l y d e n y are j u s t as d o g m a t i c as t h o s e w h o c o n f i d e n t l y a f f i r m . F o r this reason the f o r m e r are often r e f e r r e d to as negative d o g m a t i s t s . It is c o n t r o v e r s i a l w h e t h e r a n y ancient Sceptics w e r e negative d o g m a t i s t s . W h e t h e r or not t h e y w e r e ( w h i c h w i l l b e e x p l o r e d case by case in the f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r s ) it i s e a s y to see h o w they m i g h t have

3

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a p p e a r e d to be. A s tar as the sceptic is c o n c e r n e d , n o one, so far, has m a n a g e d to establish a n o n - a r b i t r a r y , p r i n c i p l e d w a y of r e s o l v i n g the u b i q u i t o u s disputes. E v e r y a r g u m e n t has so far b e e n (or at least c o u l d be) r e f u t e d o r m e t w i t h a n e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t . II the S c e p t i c s w e r e so s u c c e s s f u l in r e f u t i n g all a r g u m e n t s , it is h a r d to see h o w they c o u l d resist the negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e . A t the v e r y least it s e e m s t h e y m u s t have b e l i e v e d s o m e t h i n g about o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s , or a b o u t w h a t we s h o u l d d o i n light o f these l i m i t a t i o n s .

Inconsistency T h i s s u s p i c i o n is e v i d e n t i n the frequently r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n that it is i n c o n s i s t e n t to c l a i m to k n o w that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e or e v e n to b e l i e v e that we s h o u l d h a v e n o beliefs. M o r e generally, the project of r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h i n g that n o t h i n g c a n be r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d s e e m s to be a non-starter. E i t h e r the s c e p t i c w i l l p r o v i d e r e a s o n s for t h i s c o n c l u s i o n or he w i l l not. B u t he w o u l d not p r o v i d e r e a s o n s if he thought it w e r e futile to d o so. So he h a s to a s s u m e that we can r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h s o m e t h i n g if he is g o i n g to try to r a t i o n a l l y establish that w e cannot.

O n the o t h e r h a n d , if the s c e p t i c offers n o

r e a s o n s , t h e n it s e e m s w e c a n j u s t ignore h i m . W e m a y restate this p r o b l e m b y c o n s i d e r i n g the status o f the premises i n sceptical arguments,

E i t h e r the s c e p t i c h a s

adequate

j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s p r e m i s e s or he d o e s not. I n e i t h e r case he is i n trouble. I f he has a d e q u a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , s c e p t i c i s m is refuted. I f he d o e s n o t , t h e n w e m a y d e m a n d to be p e r s u a d e d that h i s p r e m i s e s are t r u e . T h e o n l y w a y he c a n d o this is to s h o w that h i s p r e m i s e s are adequately j u s t i f i e d , w h i c h a g a i n u n d e r m i n e s h i s s c e p t i c a l c o n c l u s i o n . ( F o r m o r e o n this a r g u m e n t see C h a p t e r 7.) But the s c e p t i c d o e s n o t n e e d to e m p l o y a n y p e r s o n a l c o n v i c t i o n s i n h i s a r g u m e n t s . I n s t e a d , h e m a y d r a w all that he needs f r o m h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r . Plato often portrays S o c r a t e s a r g u i n g i n this m a n n e r . I n h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h E u t h y p h r o , for e x a m p l e , S o c r a t e s d r a w s out the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f a d e f i n i t i o n o f piety that he p r o b a b l y does

•J

INTRODUCTION

not accept h i m s e l f . I f w e say that piety is w h a t is dear to the gods, a n d we b e l i e v e that the s a m e t h i n g is d e a r to H e r a but d i s p l e a s i n g to H e p h a e s t u s , we w i l l have to c o n c l u d e that the s a m e t h i n g is a n d is not p i o u s (Euthyphro

7 a - 8 a ) . W h e t h e r or not Socrates accepts a n y of

these p r o p o s i t i o n s is b e s i d e the p o i n t s i n c e he is p r i m a r i l y interested i n testing E u t h y p h r o . T h i s is w h y Socrates e l s e w h e r e c o m p a r e s h i m selt to a b a r r e n m i d w i f e w h o gives b i r t h to n o p h i l o s o p h i c a l theses but m e r e l y d r a w s t h e m out o f o t h e r s (Tht.

I43e-l49a).

T h i s style o i a r g u m e n t is c a l l e d "ad hominem",

not i n the p e j o r a -

tive sense o f a n irrelevant attack o n someone's character, but b e c a u s e it relies solely o n the p r o p o n e n t s o w n v i e w s . It is also c a l l e d " d i a l e c t i c a l " s i n c e the a r g u m e n t is essentially part of a d i a l o g u e in w h i c h o n e p e r s o n d e f e n d s h i s p o s i t i o n against the o t h e r s attack. F r o m the s c e p t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e , the c r u c i a l point is that the q u e s t i o n e r n e e d not e n d o r s e e i t h e r the p r e m i s e s or the c o n c l u s i o n of the a r g u m e n t . H e m a y e v e n r e m a i n a g n o s t i c about the s t a n d a r d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n that he h o l d s h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r to, T h e dialectical style of argument

is a c o m m o n s c e p t i c a l strat-

egy, but it is b y n o m e a n s a n e c e s s a r y feature o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h i s strategy s h o w s us o n e of the w a y s o f r e s p o n d i n g to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y charge. II the s c e p t i c is able to engage In his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a r g u m e n t a t i v e activity w i t h o u t c o m m i t t i n g h i m s e l f to a n y beliefs about the efficacy of r e a s o n , the d e s i r a b i l i t y of t r u t h or s o m e o t h e r related matter, t h e n he w i l l not be v u l n e r a b l e to the charge o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y . S i n c e the s c e p t i c n e e d not b e l i e v e a n y t h i n g he is a s s e r t i n g , he c a n n o t be c h a r g e d w i t h i n c o n s i s t e n t l y b e l i e v i n g those t h i n g s . But the p e r s i s t e n c e w i t h w h i c h the c h a r g e of i n c o n s i s t e n c y is l e v elled suggests e i t h e r a persistent m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g or that at least s o m e S c e p t i c s d i d i n fact h o l d s o m e s e c o n d - o r d e r beliefs a b o u t the status of f i r s t - o r d e r beliefs; i n o t h e r w o r d s , p e r h a p s s o m e o f t h e m d i d believe they k n e w that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e or that we s h o u l d h o l d n o beliefs. It is, after a l l , a s h o r t step f r o m the o b s e r v a t i o n that so l a r n o b e l i e ! h a s b e e n adequately j u s t i f i e d to the d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that n o b e l i e f c a n be j u s t i f i e d . A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , have b e e n thought to be negatively d o g m a t i c i n t h i s way. I n C h a p t e r s

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

3 a n d 4 w e s h a l l see w h y this c l a i m is so often repeated a n d w h y it is m i s t a k e n .

Impracticality W h i l e the c h a r g e of i n c o n s i s t e n c y p r e s u p p o s e s that the sceptic has s o m e beliefs, a n o t h e r persistent o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that the s c e p tic h a s n o beliefs. M a n y critics a r g u e that a life w i t h o u t beliefs is i m p r a c t i c a l , c l a i m i n g that one m u s t have beliefs either i n o r d e r to act, or, at least, i n o r d e r to act w e l l a n d live a g o o d , m o r a l life (see S t r i k e r 1 9 8 0 ) . T h i s type o i o b j e c t i o n is aptly d e s c r i b e d b y the G r e e k t e r m apraxia

(inaction).

I n r e s p o n d i n g to apraxia

o b j e c t i o n s the S c e p t i c s d e s c r i b e v a r i -

o u s positive attitudes o n e m a y take t o w a r d s a p p e a r a n c e s w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g the s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t . ( W e s h o u l d note that i n these d i s c u s s i o n s , i n t e l l e c t u a l s e e m i n g s are c o u n t e d as a p p e a r a n c e s a l o n g w i t h o r d i n a r y p e r c e p t u a l s e e m i n g s - so it m a y a p p e a r that the b o o k is g r e e n , a n d it m a y a p p e a r that t w o a r g u m e n t s are equally c o m p e l l i n g . ) T h e r e is n o s t a n d a r d s c e p t i c a l a c c o u n t of h o w life w i t h out belief is possible. T h i s is d u e i n part to differences about the s c o p e of epoche ( h o w m u c h we are to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t ) as w e l l as the p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e attitudes that g u i d e the Sceptics' a c t i o n s . D e s p i t e these differences, the fact that m o s t S c e p t i c s w e r e so k e e n to r e s p o n d to apraxia

o b j e c t i o n s i n d i c a t e s h o w i m p o r t a n t the

p r a c t i c a l i t y o f s c e p t i c i s m is to t h e m . U n l i k e m o s t m o d e m a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y varieties, the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s offered their s c e p t i c i s m as a w a y of life. T h i s is in k e e p i n g w i t h the g e n e r a l H e l l e n i s t i c e m p h a sis o n p h i l o s o p h y as a set of p r a c t i c e s o r s p i r i t u a l exercises ( H a d o t 1995, 2 0 0 2 ) . A s we s h a l l s e e i n C h a p t e r 2, the earliest official a n c i e n t S c e p t i c , P y r r h o , m a k e s the r e v o l u t i o n a r y m o v e of s u b s t i t u t i n g the question " W h a t must I k n o w to live w e l l ? " w i t h the sceptical q u e s t i o n " H o w c a n 1 still live w e l l in the a b s e n c e o f k n o w l e d g e ? " T h e i n s i s t e n c e o n the v i a b i l i t y of s c e p t i c i s m is in s t a r k c o n t r a s t w i t h the w a y m o d e r n a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h e r s often insulate

INTRODUCTION

(heir d a i l y life f r o m their s c e p t i c a l doubts. F o r e x a m p l e , after p r o p o s i n g to take s e r i o u s l y the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e r e is a n a l l - p o w e r f u l evil d e m o n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e c e i v i n g h i m , D e s c a r t e s c a l m s the fears that m i g h t a r i s e f r o m h i s r a d i c a l h y p o t h e s i s : " I k n o w that n o d a n g e r or e r r o r w i l l result f r o m m y p l a n , a n d that I c a n n o t p o s s i b l y go too far i n m y d i s t r u s t f u l attitude. T h i s is b e c a u s e the task n o w in h a n d does not i n v o l v e a c t i o n b u t m e r e l y the a c q u i s i t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e " ( C o t t i n g h a m 1936: 15). T h e p o i n t o f D e s c a r t e s ' s c e p t i c a l j o u r n e y is to e s t a b l i s h the reliability o f h i s c o g n i t i v e e q u i p m e n t , t h e r e b y p r o v i d i n g a f i r m a n d lasting f o u n d a t i o n for the s c i e n c e s . A n d w h i l e he is c o n v i n c e d that s c i e n t i f i c p r o g r e s s w i l l i m p r o v e the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n , h i s attempt to e s t a b l i s h its p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o u n d a t i o n is a p u r e l y theoretical matter. H i s s c e p t i c i s m is a thought e x p e r i m e n t . H e has no i n t e n t i o n o l a l l o w i n g s u c h s p e c u l a t i o n to i n f l u e n c e h i s a c t i o n s , a n d he w o u l d be utterly u n i m p r e s s e d b y the apraxia

objection.

N o n e of the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s start o u t w i t h the v i e w that s c e p t i c i s m is a n a w f u l , it rarefied, c o n d i t i o n that m u s t be

overcome.

A n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m is not so m u c h a p r o b l e m o r set o f o b j e c t i o n s as a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e practice situated in a p h i l o s o p h i c a l w a y of life. A n d , at least for P y r r h o n i a n Sceptics, epoche is a n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d the m e a n s to t r a n q u i l i t y .

1

The distinction between Academics a n d Pyrrhonists A l t h o u g h it is easy e n o u g h to c l a s s i f y the S c e p t i c s a s A c a d e m i c or P y r r h o n i s t (see F i g u r e 1), this sheds little light o n a n y s u b s t a n t i v e differences b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l S c e p t i c s or b e t w e e n the two c a m p s m o r e generally. I n the s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E , the R o m a n a u t h o r A u l u s G e l l i u s refers to the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n A c a d e m i c s a n d P y r r h o n i s t s as a n o l d question treated b y m a n y G r e e k w r i t e r s (NA 11.5.6; see S t r i k e r 1981 J. G e l l i u s uses the f o l l o w i n g t e r m s to d e s c r i b e b o t h A c a d e m i c s a n d P y r r h o n i s t s : skeptikoi

( t h o s e w h o investigate), epfiektikoi

s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ) , a n d tiporetikoi

(those w h o

( t h o s e w h o are p u z z l e d ) . A s to 2

the difference, he reports it in this w a y :

7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

t h e A c a d e m i c s a p p r e h e n d I ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) the v e r y iact 3

that n o t h i n g c a n be a p p r e h e n d e d , a n d they d e t e r m i n e ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) that n o t h i n g c a n be d e t e r m i n e d , w h e r e a s the P y r r h o n i s t s assert that n o t e v e n that s e e m s to be t r u e , s i n c e n o t h i n g s e e m s to be true.

(NA 11.5.8)

Pyrrhonists

Academics

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Vhilo of L a r i s s a ^ \ 159—84 n e t ^ /

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A ntiochus

Aenesidemus

130-68 B C I J~ — _ — C L o c r o

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Figure 1, Academics and Pyrrhonists.

INTRODUCTION

T h e P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c Sextus E m p i r i c u s offers r o u g h l y the s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n in h i s p r e l i m i n a r y d i v i s i o n of k i n d s o f p h i l o s o p h y : T h o s e w h o are c a l l e d D o g m a t i s t s . . . t h i n k they h a v e d i s c o v e r e d the truth . . . T h e s c h o o l s of C l i t o m a c h u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , a n d o t h e r A c a d e m i c s , h a v e a s s e r t e d that t h i n g s c a n n o t be a p p r e h e n d e d . A n d the S c e p t i c s are still investigating. H e n c e the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l k i n d s of p h i l o s o p h y are r e a s o n a b l y t h o u g h t to b e three: the D o g m a t i c , the A c a d e m i c , a n d the Sceptical.

(PW 1.3-4)*

It is c r u c i a l to note that he singles o u t C l i t o m a c h u s a n d C a r n e a d e s as negatively d o g m a t i c A c a d e m i c s , s i n c e we f i n d later that he d o e s not t h i n k that all A c a d e m i c s fit this m o u l d . T h e r e have b e e n , so m o s t people say, t h r e e A c a d e m i e s ; one - the oldest - w a s Plato's, a s e c o n d w a s the M i d d l e A c a d e m y o f A r c e s i l a u s . . . a n d the t h i r d w a s the N e w A c a d e m y of C a r n e a d e s a n d C l i t o m a c h u s . S o m e a d d a f o u r t h , the A c a d e m y of P h i l o . . . a n d s o m e r e c k o n as a fifth the A c a d e m y of Antiochus.

(PH

1.220)

Sextus goes o n to s h o w h o w h i s P y r r h o n i s m differs f r o m e a c h of these A c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n s . A t the b e g i n n i n g of the A c a d e m y , Plato is c l e a r l y d o g m a t i c i n so far as h e m a k e s a s s e r t i o n s about F o r m s , or p r o v i d e n c e , o r the v i r t u o u s lite. A n d at the e n d o f the A c a d e m y , P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s are d o g m a t i c i n a l l o w i n g for s o m e f o r m of a p p r e h e n s i o n (see C h a p t e r 5 ) . It is o n l y the i n t e r v e n i n g p o s i t i o n s of A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s that m i g h t p l a u s i b l y be t h o u g h t to b e the s a m e as P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . But a c c o r d i n g to S e x t u s , C a r n e a d e s m a k e s c o n f i d e n t a f f i r m a t i o n s about t h i n g s b e i n g i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , w h i l e the P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c s d o not. F u r t h e r m o r e , C a r n e a d e s relies o n , o r goes a l o n g w i t h , the way t h i n g s s e e m w h e n he has d e t e r m i n e d they are p l a u s i b l e . P y r r h o n i s t s , b y c o n t r a s t , d o not m a k e s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n s a m o n g a p p e a r a n c e s to w h i c h they y i e l d i n a m o r e p a s s i v e s e n s e . ( W e s h a l l e x p l o r e

4

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C a r n e a d e s ' p l a u s i b l e a p p e a r a n c e s i n C h a p t e r 4 , a n d Sextus' reliance on appearances i n C h a p t e r 9 ) . T h e p r o p e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f these d i s t i n c t i o n s is h i g h l y c o n troversial. I n p a r t i c u l a r it is u n c l e a r w h e t h e r it is fair to d e s c r i b e C a r n e a d e s as negatively d o g m a t i c , a n d p e r m a n e n t l y c l o s e d to the possibility o l discovering the truth. A l t h o u g h C a r n e a d e s does confidently argue a n d affirm that t h i n g s are not a p p r e h e n s i b l e , i n C i c e r o ' s a c c o u n t he d o e s not c l a i m to h a v e a p p r e h e n d e d this {Ac.

2.110).

F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s a f f i r m a t i o n s m a y have b e e n part o f a d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, i n w h i c h c a s e t h e y w o u l d n o t have b e e n a f f i r m e d i n h i s o w n voice. So it is possible to reject C a r n e a d e s ' negative d o g m a t i s m w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g w h a t Sextus says about h i s r e l i a n c e o n a p p e a r a n c e s ; this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w i l l be d e v e l o p e d i n C h a p t e r 4, Sextus sees a n e v e n s m a l l e r difference b e t w e e n t h e P y r r h o n i s t a n d A r c e s i l a u s . I n fact he d e s c r i b e s t h e m as " v i r t u a l l y the s a m e " i n so lar as they m a k e n o a s s e r t i o n s about reality, prefer n o a p p e a r a n c e s o n the basis o f greater plausibility, a n d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (PH

1.232). T h e o n l y s e r i o u s p o i n t of d i s t i n c t i o n is that A r c e s i l a u s

t h i n k s s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t is a g o o d t h i n g a n d assent a b a d t h i n g , w h e r e a s the P y r r h o n i s t w i l l o n l y a c k n o w l e d g e that they a p p e a r so. S o S e x t u s t h i n k s A r c e s i l a u s does after all m a k e s o m e a s s e r t i o n s about reality. (I e x p l a i n A r c e s i l a u s ' c o m m i t m e n t to the real v a l u e o l epoche a s a c o n s e q u e n c e o f h i s S o c r a t i c i n h e r i t a n c e i n C h a p t e r 3.) T h e charge o f negative d o g m a t i s m p r o b a b l y o r i g i n a t e s i n the earliest a c c o u n t of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n A c a d e m i c s a n d P y r r h o n ists. S o m e t i m e i n the first c e n t u r y B C E , a m e m b e r of t h e A c a d e m y , A e n e s i d e m u s , g r e w dissatisfied w i t h the i n c r e a s i n g l y d o g m a t i c t e n d e n c i e s of the s c h o o l a n d set o u t to r e v i v e a m o r e r a d i c a l f o r m o l s c e p t i c i s m , i n s p i r e d by t h e e a r l y S c e p t i c P y r r h o (see C h a p t e r 6 for the r e v i v a l , C h a p t e r 2 for t h e o r i g i n a t i o n ) . I n the first b o o k o f h i s Pyrrhoniais

Discourses,

he c l a i m s that A c a d e m i c s c o n f i d e n t l y affirm

s o m e t h i n g s a n d reject others, w h i l e t h e P y r r h o n i s t s c o n s i s t e n t l y doubt e v e r y t h i n g , a n d d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g ; they d o not e v e n determ i n e that they d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g . A e n e s i d e m u s is right about the i n c r e a s i n g l y d o g m a t i c t e n d e n c i e s i n the A c a d e m y o f the first c e n t u r y B C E . B u t it is u n l i k e l y that he

INTRODUCTION

i n t e n d s to label as negatively d o g m a t i c the entire s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y i n all of its p h a s e s . A t o n e p o i n t he says the A c a d e m i c s ,

especially

the ones now, a p p e a r to b e j u s t Stoics f i g h t i n g against Stoics ( P h o tius, Bib.

170al5-l6j.

It is p o s s i b l e that A e n e s i d e m u s i n t e n d s his

c h a r g e of negative d o g m a t i s m to a p p l y only, or at least mostly, to his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . H e p r o b a b l y s a w the h i s t o r y o f the A c a d e m y as a g r a d u a l d e c l i n e f r o m the r i g o r o u s s c e p t i c i s m of A r c e s i l a u s to the exhausted dogmatic c o m p r o m i s e s of Philo a n d A n t i o c h u s . O n this v i e w , as the A c a d e m i c s c a r r i e d o n their intense d i a l e c t i c a l struggles, e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the Stoics, they w e r e d r i v e n to m a k e m o r e a n d m o r e c o n c e s s i o n s , Specifically in r e s p o n s e to charges o l i n c o n s i s t e n c y a n d i m p r a c t i c a l i t y they e x p a n d e d the n o t i o n o f s c e p t i c a l l y

acceptable

assent, a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y r e d u c e d the s c o p e of epochs.

I n the e n d ,

P h i l o is left r e j e c t i n g o n l y the Stoics' c l a i m s to certainty, a n d A n t i o c h u s b e c o m e s a Stoic i n all but n a m e . I n o p p o s i t i o n to this n a r r a t i v e o f d e c l i n e , we m a y a l s o see the o u t c o m e of the A c a d e m y ' s 200 years' w o r t h of d i a l e c t i c a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h t h e i r o p p o n e n t s i n a p o s i t i v e light. I n that case, the A c a d e m i c s w o u l d h a v e b e e n right to m o d i f y the o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m of A r c e s i l a u s . C i c e r o , w h o c o u n t s h i m s e l f a lifelong A c a d e m i c , s t a n d s at the e n d o f this history. A l t h o u g h h i s v i e w of A c a d e m i c p h i l o s o p h y is c o l o u r e d b y h i s o w n i n c l i n a t i o n s a n d by h i s goal of d i s s e m i n a t i n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y a m o n g the R o m a n elite, he is o u r m o s t

exten-

s i v e a n d s y m p a t h e t i c s o u r c e . A n d h i s v i e w is u n c o m p l i c a t e d b y a n y a w a r e n e s s of a P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l in the first c e n t u r y B C E . S o his r e m a r k s are p r o b a b l y free of p o l e m i c a l interests w i t h r e g a r d to the distinction between Academics and Pyrrhonists. C i c e r o p r o v i d e s s o m e v e r y i n f o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y . I n the Acaciemica,

for e x a m p l e , he e n d o r s e s

a n a c c o u n t that p r o b a b l y reflects A r c e s i l a u s ' o w n v i e w o f the A c a d e m y ' s h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . H e asserts that it is the o b s c u r i t y of t h i n g s that led S o c r a t e s to h i s c o n f e s s i o n o f i g n o r a n c e ; a s even before h i m , it h a d l e d D e m o c r i t u s ,

Anaxagoras,

E m p e d o c l e s , a n d v i r t u a l l y all the e a r l y p h i l o s o p h e r s to say that n o t h i n g c o u l d be c o g n i z e d , a p p r e h e n d e d , or k n o w n ,

11

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b e c a u s e the senses w e r e l i m i t e d , o u r m i n d s w e a k , a n d the course o f o u r lives brief, w h i l e the truth h a d b e e n s u b m e r g e d i n a n a b y s s (as D e m o c r i t u s s a i d ) , e v e r y t h i n g w a s s u b j e c t to o p i n i o n a n d c u s t o m , n o r o o m w a s left for t r u t h , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y e v e r y t h i n g w a s s h r o u d e d i n d a r k n e s s . That's w h y A r c e s i l a u s u s e d to d e n y that a n y t h i n g c o u l d be k n o w n , not even the r e s i d u a l c l a i m that Socrates h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f , i.e. the k n o w l e d g e that h e didn't k n o w a n y t h i n g . (Ac, 1 . 4 4 - 4 5 )

5

C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l a i n f u r t h e r w h a t he m e a n s by the " o b s c u r i t y of t h i n g s " or h o w h i s f a m o u s p r e d e c e s s o r s a r r i v e d at it. W h a t e v e r the case m a y be, A r c e s i l a u s e n d s u p s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g ; a n d b y a r g u i n g against all c o m e r s , l i k e S o c r a t e s , he is s u p p o s e d to h a v e c o n v i n c e d m o s t people to d o the s a m e , C i c e r o d o e s not c l a i m i n t h i s passage (or i n the p a r a l l e l passage at A c . 2 . 7 2 - 7 4 ) that the P r e s o c r a t i c s w e r e fully s c e p t i c a l . H e cites t h e m , as p r e s u m a b l y A r c e s i l a u s d i d , a s n o t e w o r t h y

predecessors

w h o rightly despaired o f acquiring empirical knowledge (Brittain & P a l m e r 2 0 0 1 ) . F o r D e m o c r i t u s , s i n c e o u r p e r c e p t i o n s n e v e r reveal the a t o m i c s t r u c t u r e o f t h i n g s , they c a n n e v e r reveal the t r u t h . A n d i n so far as P a r m e n i d e s d e n i e s the reality of c h a n g e , there is n o k n o w l e d g e to be h a d about n a t u r a l , p h y s i c a l p r o c e s s e s . B u t the A c a d e m i c s refuse to go a l o n g w i t h the negatively d o g m a t i c d e n i a l of the existence or accessibility of t r u t h ; they m e r e l y d e n y that a n y t h i n g is graspable i n the m a n n e r d e f e n d e d by the Stoics (Ac.

2.73).

A r c e s i l a u s a l s o c o u n t s S o c r a t e s a n d Plato a s g e n u i n e S c e p t i c s s i n c e Socrates t h o u g h t that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n ( w i t h the one i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n of h i s o w n i g n o r a n c e ) a n d Plato argues o n b o t h sides o f e v e r y issue, a n d affirms n o t h i n g i n h i s b o o k s (Ac. 2 . 7 4 , 1 . 4 6 ; see C h a p t e r 3). C i c e r o e x t e n d s this h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t , e m p h a s i z i n g , or p e r h a p s c o n s t r u c t i n g , a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n t i n u i t y . Socrates first p r a c t i s e d the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d of a r g u i n g against e v e r y t h i n g a n d o p e n l y j u d g i n g n o t h i n g . It w a s t h e n r e v i v e d by A r c e s i l a u s , c o n f i r m e d or s t r e n g t h e n e d by C a r n e a d e s , a n d f r o m there it c o n t i n u e d to f l o u r i s h

12

INTRODUCTION

right d o w n to h i s o w n age (ND

1.11). C i c e r o c l e a r l y u n d e r s t a n d s

this m e t h o d to c o n s i s t of three c o m p o n e n t s : r e l i e v i n g o t h e r s f r o m d e c e p t i o n s , c o n c e a l i n g o n e s o w n v i e w s a n d s e a r c h i n g for the m o s t p r o b a b l e s o l u t i o n o n e v e r y d i s p u t e d i s s u e (Twsc. 5.11; see C h a p t e r 5). R e l i e v i n g o t h e r s f r o m d e c e p t i o n is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h A r c e s i l a u s ' i n s i s t e n c e o n epochs.

B u t c o n c e a l i n g one's v i e w c l e a r l y i m p l i e s one

has s o m e t h i n g to c o n c e a l , o n w h i c h he apparently has not s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t . A n d s e e k i n g the m o s t p r o b a b l e v i e w l e a d s C i c e r o to e n d o r s e c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s as m o r e l i k e l y to be t r u e t h a n o t h e r s . I n C i c e r o s p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a l l i b i l i s m , the s c o p e o f epochs

has d r a m a t i -

cally c o n t r a c t e d ; o n e m a y n o w believe all s o r t s of t h i n g s as l o n g as o n e stops s h o r t of c l a i m i n g to k n o w a n y t h i n g , C i c e r o c o n s i d e r s this m e t h o d to be a m o n g the greatest gifts that G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y has to offer. S o he m u s t have t h o u g h t that w h a t ever alterations w e r e n e c e s s a r y to p r o d u c e it w e r e i m p o r t a n t steps f o r w a r d . H i s g l o s s i n g o v e r the differences b e t w e e n h i s f a l l i b i l i s m a n d the s c e p t i c i s m o f e a r l i e r A c a d e m i c s c a n be e x p l a i n e d by h i s interest i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a n authoritative genealogy a n d p e r h a p s n o t w a n t i n g to a p p e a r to be a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n n o v a t o r , to w h a t e v e r extent he w a s . It w a s not i n the least bit n e c e s s a r y that the r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m of A r c e s i l a u s s h o u l d g r o w into f a l l i b i l i s m . B u t that it d i d d e v e l o p this way, a n d that C i c e r o w e l c o m e d the g r o w t h , are integral p a r t s o f the o v e r a l l n a r r a t i v e I shall d e v e l o p i n this b o o k . O n a n a r r o w e r v i e w , C i c e r o d o e s not b e l o n g a m o n g the G r e e k S c e p t i c s : he is a R o m a n ; he is m o s t f a m o u s for b e i n g a s t a t e s m a n a n d orator rather t h a n a p h i l o s o p h e r ; a n d he e n d o r s e s a m e t h o d that leads to the a c q u i s i t i o n of fallible, p h i l o s o p h i c a l b e l i e f s . But s i n c e he 0

s t a n d s at the e n d of the h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m , a n d s i n c e he is o u r m o s t extensive s o u r c e for that history, we m u s t take a c c o u n t o l h i s v i e w o f t h i n g s . T h i s is w h y I h a v e i n c l u d e d s u c h a n e x t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n of C i c e r o in C h a p t e r 5.

I also believe

his tallibilist v i e w is w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g o n its o w n m e r i t s . It c e r t a i n l y exerts a great d e a l o l i n f l u e n c e i n the s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r y of ideas, s p u r r i n g o n s u c h figures as A u g u s t i n e , P e t r a r c h , E r a s m u s a n d H u m e , to n a m e o n l y a few (see 5 " T h e l e g a c y of a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m " i n the G u i d e to F u r t h e r R e a d i n g for a select b i b l i o g r a p h y ) .

13

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W h e t h e r w e opt for the p o s i t i v e o r negative a s s e s s m e n t of the A c a d e m y ' s slide i n t o f a l l i b i l i s m , a n d the d o g m a t i c v i e w s ot P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s , it is w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d that s u c h a slide o c c u r s . T h i s d e v e l o p m e n t i n s p i r e d A e n e s i d e m u s ' r e v i v a l ot P y r r h o n i s m . A f t e r A e n e s i d e m u s a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t S c e p t i c A g r i p p a , w h o m we k n o w p r a c t i c a l l y n o t h i n g about, d e v e l o p e d a n e v e n m o r e f o r m i d a b l e set o f s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s ( C h a p t e r 8J. T h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e r e t h e n a p p r o p r i a t e d by S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s a l o n g w i t h m a t e r i a l t r o m A e n e s i d e m u s , o t h e r P y r r h o n i s t s n o w lost to us a n d a g o o d deal of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t r o m the S c e p t i c a l A c a d e m i c s v i a the w r i t i n g s o f C l i t o m a c h u s a n d others. S o P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m , i n its m a t u r e f o r m u l a t i o n , d r a w s on m a n y s t r a n d s of the e a r l i e r S c e p t i c a l t r a d i t i o n , P y r r h o n i a n a n d Academic' G i v e n these facts, the p r o s p e c t of d r a w i n g c l e a r l i n e s b e t w e e n P y r r h o n i s t s a n d A c a d e m i c s as s u c h is s l i m . T h e o n l y u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l point w e c a n m a k e o n this topic is that w h i l e t h e y are all c o n c e r n e d to s h o w that the s c e p t i c a l life is viable, the A c a d e m i c s never p r o m i s e that it w i l l b e t r a n q u i l , w h e r e a s the P y r r h o n i s t s d o . A m o r e p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h is to differentiate e a c h o f the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s o n t h e i r o w n t e r m s . T h e f a m i l y r e s e m b l a n c e s we have e x p l o r e d m o t i v a t e the f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s :

« H o w d o e s the s c e p t i c a r r i v e at *

s c o p e of * *

epochei

H o w m u c h d o e s he s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about - w h a t is the epochei

H o w d o e s he r e s p o n d to c h a r g e s o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y ? H o w does he r e s p o n d to apmxiti

o b j e c t i o n s ? D o e s he a l l o w

h i m s e l f s o m e beliefs or not? A n d m o r e generally, w h a t k i n d o l life w o u l d s u c h a s c e p t i c live? Before t u r n i n g to these q u e s t i o n s a n d the detailed e x a m i n a t i o n of the v a r i o u s S c e p t i c s , w e m u s t first c o n s i d e r s o m e p r o b l e m s i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the f r a g m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e .

i;

INTRODUCTION

Some problems of interpretation It is i r o n i c a l l y fitting that there s h o u l d be so m u c h d i s p u t e a b o u t the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s . T h i s is d u e , o n o n e h a n d , to the m e a g r e a n d f r a g m e n t a r y state of o u r e v i d e n c e , w h i c h m a k e s it difficult to j u d g e the h i s t o r i c a l a c c u r a c y o f v i e w s a n d m e t h o d s attributed to t h e m . T h e r e are m a n y c h a l l e n g e s in s o r t i n g t h r o u g h the e v i d e n c e , w h i c h is often at o n e or two r e m o v e s f r o m the o r i g i n a l S c e p t i c . I n a d d i t i o n to p r o b l e m s of t r a n s l a t i o n f r o m G r e e k a n d L a t i n , there are p o s s i b l e d i s tortions to a c c o u n t for, o w i n g p e r h a p s to the r e p o r t e r s o w n a g e n d a , a lack of c o n c e r n w i t h h i s t o r i c a l a c c u r a c y or p l a i n o l d m i s u n d e r s t a n d ing. T h e g e n r e of the s o u r c e s m u s t also be factored i n , as they range f r o m p o l e m i c a l treatises, s a t i r i c a l verse a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s to b i o g r a p h y a n d d o x o g r a p h y , w h i c h is a c a t c h - a l l d e s c r i p t i o n for a k i n d of r e p o r t i n g a n d a r r a n g i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l d o c t r i n e s or

(doxai

dogmatti}? O n the o t h e r h a n d , d i s p u t e s about a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m are also

fuelled b y p u r e l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s a s w e l l . S o m e t i m e s the e v i d e n c e c a n be r e a d in logically i n c o m p a t i b l e w a y s , at w h i c h p o i n t c o m m e n t a t o r s t u r n for g u i d a n c e to p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n s i d e r a tions a n d s o m e v e r s i o n of the p r i n c i p l e o f charity, w h i c h i n its m o s t g e n e r a l f o r m u l a t i o n c o m m a n d s us to o p t for the m o s t c o h e r e n t a n d plausible c o n s t r u a l we c a n

find.

I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I h a v e t r i e d as m u c h as p o s s i b l e to let the S c e p t i c s s p e a k for themselves. T h a t is, I h a v e s o u g h t first a n d foremost to p r o v i d e h i s t o r i c a l l y a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t s of the d e v e l o p m e n t o f A c a d e m i c a n d P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . T h i s a p p r o a c h has the v i r t u e of l e a v i n g o p e n the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r we s h o u l d take their p o s i t i o n s s e r i o u s l y as live p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p t i o n s . T h a t s o r t o f q u e s t i o n , I believe, s h o u l d be a n s w e r e d o n l y after w e have articulated as c l e a r l y a s p o s sible the h i s t o r i c a l p o s i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n . T o a s s u m e i n a d v a n c e that the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s p r o v i d e us w i t h viable alternatives to o u r c u r rent c h o i c e s o l p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d s a n d p o s i t i o n s r u n s the r i s k of i m p o v e r i s h i n g the past by i m p o s i n g o u r c u r r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s of w h a t is i m p o r t a n t , i n t e r e s t i n g a n d viable. T o see o u r p r e d e c e s s o r s ' v i e w s too n a r r o w l y i n t e r m s of o u r o w n a l s o u l t i m a t e l y l i m i t s o u r

L?

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

c u r r e n t array o f c h o i c e s . S t u d y i n g the h i s t o r y of ideas m a y l e a d u s to d i s c o v e r (or r e d i s c o v e r ) a n e x c i t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l a p p r o a c h that is not c u r r e n t l y b e i n g d i s c u s s e d o r practised. O f c o u r s e , it m a y also lead to the c o n c l u s i o n that s o m e p a r t i c u l a r idea is i r r e t r i e v a b l y foreign to u s , a p r o d u c t of r a d i c a l l y different r i m e s . But this s h o u l d be as w e l c o m e a c o n c l u s i o n as a failed h y p o t h e s i s i n the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s : siiould

be, despite the fact that it g e n e r a l l y is not. It w o u l d be v e r y

strange it the s t a n d a r d o p e n i n g of so m a n y h i s t o r i c a l s t u d i e s - "so and so has b e e n u n j u s t l y n e g l e c t e d " - w e r e a l w a y s t r u e . N o n e t h e l e s s , I t h i n k it is t r u e that until about t h i r t y y e a r s ago, the a n c i e n t S c e p t i c s h a d b e e n u n j u s t l y neglected. T h e s i t u a t i o n is quite different today. T h i s b o o k w o u l d not have b e e n p o s s i b l e if it w e r e n o t for the fact that so m u c h excellent s c h o l a r s h i p h a s b e e n p r o d u c e d , i l l u m i n a t i n g b o t h the h i s t o r i c a l a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l aspects of a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m ; the g u i d e to f u r t h e r r e a d i n g testifies to this. I h a v e d r a w n extensively I r o m the s e c o n d a r y literature i n a r r i v i n g at m y o w n v i e w s . B u t it is c r u c i a l to note, i n c o n c l u d i n g this i n t r o d u c t i o n , that o n v i r t u a l l y e v e r y s u b s t a n t i a l p o i n t o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n there are plausible alternatives to those 1 present. I believe the n a r r a t i v e I d e v e l o p in this b o o k m a k e s the best s e n s e o l the e v i d e n c e , h i s t o r i cally a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , but it s h o u l d be a c c e p t e d , i f it is a c c e p t e d , w i t h the s a m e c a u t i o n w i t h w h i c h it is offered.

16

TWO

Pyrrho and Timon: the origin of Pyrrhonian Scepticism

T h e h i s t o r y o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m officially b e g i n s w i t h t h e e n i g m a t i c character, P y r r h o of E l i s ( c . 3 6 5 - 2 7 5 B C E ) . P y r r h o wrote n o t h i n g h i m s e l f , s o w h a t little e v i d e n c e w e have r e g a r d i n g h i m c o m e s m o s t l y f r o m the w r i t i n g s o f h i s p u p i l T i m o n a n d a b o o k by a n e a r l y c o n t e m p o r a r y biographer, A n t i g o n u s o f C a r y s t u s . O n l y f r a g m e n t s o f these w o r k s s u r v i v e i n t h e a c c o u n t s o f other, later w r i t e r s . D i o g e n e s L a e r t i u s , for e x a m p l e , d r a w s f r o m b o t h i n h i s b i o g r a p h y o f P y r r h o ( D L 9 . 6 1 - 1 0 8 ) . T h e s e later a c c o u n t s l o o k at P y r r h o t h r o u g h t h e lens of w h a t P y r r h o n i s m h a d b e c o m e h u n d r e d s of years later, s o they m u s t be u s e d w i t h c a u t i o n .

1

N e v e r t h e l e s s , i n s e e k i n g to u n d e r s t a n d the h i s t o r y o f G r e e k S c e p t i c i s m it is n e c e s s a r y to r e c o n s t r u c t Pyrrho's p o s i t i o n . T h i s is s o l o r two r e a s o n s . First, the f o u n d e r o f A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m , A r c e s i laus, w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y P y r r h o . A n d secondly, the f o u n d e r o l n e o P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m , A e n e s i d e m u s ( C h a p t e r 6) l o o k e d to P y r r h o as a n i n s p i r a t i o n a l m o d e l o f the s c e p t i c a l life. C l e a r l y w e n e e d s o m e a c c o u n t o l P y r r h o s v i e w s a n d h i s c h a r a c t e r to m a k e sense o f t h i s historical influence. T w o r e c u r r e n t t h e m e s i n the e v i d e n c e are P y r r h o s r e m a r k a b l y t r a n q u i l liie, a n d h i s r e f u s a l to m a k e a n y f i r m d e t e r m i n a t i o n s about things. T h e r e is n o t h i n g u n u s u a l about a G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r p r o m o t i n g t r a n q u i l l i t y as the p r o p e r goal. A n d there is n o t h i n g u n u s u a l

L7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

about the g e n e r a l l y s c e p t i c a l t h r u s t o l h i s view. A n u m b e r ot p h i l o s o p h e r s h a d h e l d , for v a r i o u s r e a s o n s , that c e r t a i n k i n d s o f k n o w l edge are b e y o n d o u r r e a c h , o r that w e s h o u l d r e m a i n indifferent and i m p a s s i v e to fortune. Pyrrho's n o v e l c o n t r i b u t i o n , a n d the j u s tification for h i s status a s father of G r e e k S c e p t i c i s m , is the w a y he c o m b i n e s these: he p r o p o s e s that t r a n q u i l l i t y is w o n b y m e a n s of a f i r m l y u n o p i n i o n a t e d a n d indifferent attitude. N o o n e before h i m h a d suggested that the r e c o g n i t i o n of o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d l e a d to s u c h a h a p p y e n d i n g . O n the c o n t r a r y , it w a s w i d e l y a c c e p t e d that k n o w l e d g e plays a n integral role in attaining w h a t e v e r is c l a i m e d to be the p r o p e r goal of life. A r i s t o t l e ( 3 8 4 - 3 2 2 B C E ) , for e x a m p l e , h o l d s that h u m a n c o g n i t i v e a n d s e n s o r y e q u i p m e n t is s u f f i c i e n t l y m a t c h e d w i t h the s t r u c t u r e o f reality to e n a b l e us to satisfy o u r n a t u r a l desire tor u n d e r s t a n d i n g . N a t u r e s i m p l y d o e s not e n d o w its c r e a t u r e s w i t h n a t u r a l d e s i r e s that c a n n o t , i n p r i n c i p l e , be satisfied. S o a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e is part o f the p r o p e r f u l f i l m e n t of o u r n a t u r e s . K n o w l e d g e is thus a n e s s e n t i a l c o m p o n e n t i n a f l o u r i s h i n g lite; it is b o t h i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e as the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a n a t u r a l d e s i r e a n d i n s t r u n i e n t a l l y v a l u a b l e i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the appropriate ends of a c t i o n . T h i s A r i s t o t e l i a n p o s i tion is p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it p r o v i d e s the c o n t e x t for o u r m o s t i n f o r m a t i v e piece of e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g P y r r h o .

E u s e b i u s ' report of Aristocles' report of T i m o n s account of P y r r h o S o m e t i m e a r o u n d the s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E , a n A r i s t o t e l i a n p h i l o s o pher, A r i s t o c l e s , wrote a b o o k e n t i t l e d On Philosophy

( C h i e s a r a 2001:

x v i i - x v i i i ) . W e w o u l d k n o w n o t h i n g o f t h i s b o o k if it w e r e n o t f o r E u s e b i u s ( r . 2 6 0 - 3 3 9 ) , a C h r i s t i a n b i s h o p , w h o quotes d i r e c t l y f r o m it i n h i s o w n w o r k , Preparation

for the Gospel. G i v e n that Pyrrho's v i e w s

are r e p o r t e d o r i g i n a l l y by T i m o n , w h o is t h e n q u o t e d b y A r i s t o c l e s , w h o is t h e n q u o t e d b y E u s e b i u s , one m i g h t t h i n k the text is o f q u e s t i o n a b l e h i s t o r i c a l v a l u e . F o r t u n a t e l y , it s e e m s that b o t h A r i s t o c l e s and E u s e b i u s have i n lact p r e s e r v e d the actual w o r d s of T i m o n .

IS

PYRRHO

AND

TIMON

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , the passage still c o n t a i n s a c r u c i a l a m b i g u i t y . O n o n e t r a n s l a t i o n , T i m o n m e a n s t o say that P y r r h o t h i n k s t h i n g s are indeterminate-,

o n the other, that they are indeterminable.

I have

i n s e r t e d alternative t r a n s l a t i o n s of the a m b i g u o u s sentence below. O n the first, l a b e l l e d [ M ] for m e t a p h y s i c a l , P y r r h o is m a k i n g a c l a i m p r i m a r i l y r e g a r d i n g the nature of t h i n g s ( t h e y are i n d e t e r m i n a t e ) . O n the s e c o n d , l a b e l l e d [E] for e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l , P y r r h o is m a k i n g a c l a i m p r i m a r i l y r e g a r d i n g o u r k n o w l e d g e ( w e are u n a b l e to m a k e a c c u r a t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a b o u t t h i n g s ) . H e r e is the passage: It is s u p r e m e l y n e c e s s a r y to investigate o u r o w n c a p a c i t y for k n o w l e d g e . F o r if we are so c o n s t i t u t e d that w e k n o w n o t h ing, t h e r e is n o n e e d to c o n t i n u e i n q u i r y into o t h e r t h i n g s . A m o n g the a n c i e n t s too there h a v e b e e n p e o p l e w h o m a d e this p r o n o u n c e m e n t , a n d A r i s t o t l e has a r g u e d against t h e m . P y r r h o of E l i s was a l s o a p o w e r f u l advocate o l s u c h a p o s i t i o n . H e h i m s e l f h a s left n o t h i n g i n w r i t i n g , but h i s d i s c i p l e T i m o n s a y s that w h o e v e r w a n t s to be h a p p y m u s t c o n s i d e r these three q u e s t i o n s : first, h o w are t h i n g s by n a t u r e ? S e c o n d l y , w h a t attitude s h o u l d w e adopt t o w a r d s t h e m ? T h i r d l y , w h a t w i l l be the o u t c o m e for t h o s e w h o h a v e this attitude? A c c o r d i n g to T i m o n , [ M ] P y r r h o d e c l a r e d that t h i n g s are e q u a l l y ated and

unstable

and

indeterminate;

undifferenti-

for this

reason

n e i t h e r o u r s e n s a t i o n s n o r o u r o p i n i o n s tell LIS truths or falsehoods. [E]

P y r r h o d e c l a r e d that t h i n g s are e q u a l l y and immeasurable

and undecidable,

[since]

s e n s a t i o n s n o r o u r o p i n i o n s [consistently! or falsehoods.

indifferentiabie neither our tell us truths

21

Therefore, for t h i s r e a s o n w e s h o u l d not p u t o u r trust i n t h e m o n e bit, but w e s h o u l d b e u n o p i n i o n a t e d , u n c o m mitted and unwavering, saying concerning each individual t h i n g that it n o m o r e is t h a n is not, o r it b o t h is a n d is not, or it n e i t h e r is n o r is n o t . T h e o u t c o m e for those w h o a c t u a l l y

19

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

adopt t h i s attitude, says T i m o n , w i l l be first s p e e c h l e s s n e s s , and then freedom I r o m disturbance.., {Praep.

Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 - 4 [ L S I F ] )

T h e c o r e o f P y r r h o s t e a c h i n g e m e r g e s i n r e s p o n s e to the three related q u e s t i o n s : h o w are t h i n g s b y nature, w h a t attitude s h o u l d w e adopt t o w a r d s t h e m a n d w h a t w i l l b e the o u t c o m e of a d o p t i n g s u c h a n attitude? T i m o n offers these a s p r o b l e m s that m u s t b e r e s o l v e d b y those w h o w i s h to be happy, A n d the s e c o n d q u e s t i o n c l e a r l y a s k s for, a n d is given, a n o r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e : w e should

trust n e i t h e r s e n s a t i o n s

n o r o p i n i o n s . H i e e t h i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f this a c c o u n t i s c o n f i r m e d b y A r i s t o c l e s ' c o m p l a i n t that i f T i m o n h a d i n t e n d e d h i s w r i t i n g to h a v e s o m e beneficial effect, t h e n it w o u l d have to b e by m e a n s o f c o n v i n c i n g us o f the t r u t h of P y r r h o s s t a t e m e n t s (Praep.

Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 6 ) .

H i at is, h e a s s u m e s that t e a c h i n g c a n o n l y i m p r o v e the s t u d e n t b y i m p a r t i n g k n o w l e d g e , o r at least true beliefs, H o w , t h e n , c a n P y r r h o s s c e p t i c a l t e a c h i n g benefit us? W e shall r e t u r n to this issue after d i s c u s s i n g t h e first q u e s t i o n .

Things are indeterminate T h e fact that t h e first q u e s t i o n a d d r e s s e s the nature of t h i n g s m i g h t i n c l i n e us t o w a r d s t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . O n t h i s v i e w , t h i n g s are u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , u n s t a b l e a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e . T o s a y that t h i n g s are u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p e a r s to m e a n that there are n o real, i n t r i n s i c d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n a n y t w o things, S i m i l a r l y , t h e y are i n d e t e r m i n a t e : n o m o r e o n e w a y t h a n a n o t h e r . A n a t o j i i ist w o u l d a c c e p t a r e s t r i c t e d v e r s i o n o f this: there are n o real d i f ferences b e t w e e n t h i n g s w i t h respect to s e c o n d a r y qualities s u c h as c o l o u r s i n c e the a t o m i c c o m p o n e n t s o f t h i n g s are c o l o u r l e s s . A s D e m o c r i t u s f a m o u s l y asserts: " B y c o n v e n t i o n , sweet; b y c o n v e n t i o n , bitter; by c o n v e n t i o n , hot; by c o n v e n t i o n , c o l d ; b y c o n v e n t i o n , c o l o r ; but i n reality, a t o m s a n d v o i d " (Af 7.135; see D L 9 . 7 2 ) . S i n c e a t o m s really d o h a v e s i z e a n d shape, h o w e v e r , t h i n g s are differentiated a n d

20

PYRRHO

AND

TIMON

d e t e r m i n a t e w i t h respect to these p r o p e r t i e s . B u t for P y r r h o , o n the m e t a p h y s i c a l interpretation not e v e n s i z e a n d s h a p e differentiate one thing from another. T h i s m a y s e e m w i l d l y i m p l a u s i b l e o n the g r o u n d s that the regularity o í o u r e x p e r i e n c e o l the w o r l d strongly suggests s o m e u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e . I f t h i n g s are really n o m o r e o n e w a y t h a n a n o t h e r , it b e c o m e s difficult to u n d e r s t a n d w h y the s u n a l w a y s s e e m s w a r m i n g a n d a n i c y lake a l w a y s s e e m s c o o l i n g , o r w h y h e a v y objects a l w a y s s e e m to tail to e a r t h a n d v e r y light o n e s s e e m to rise a n d float. W e d o not k n o w w h e t h e r P y r r h o felt c o m p e l l e d to e x p l a i n the a p p a r ent regularity of o u r e x p e r i e n c e . B u t g i v e n h i s r e j e c t i o n of scientific e x p l a n a t i o n s ( D L 9 . 6 5 ) , it is likely that he w o u l d have d i s m i s s e d s u c h attempts as " e m p t y t h e o r i z i n g " A n d i n d e e d , i f t h i n g s w e r e i n t r i n s i cally i n d e t e r m i n a t e , it w o u l d be futile to t h i n k we c o u l d e x p l a i n any p e r c e i v e d regularities b y r e v e a l i n g s o m e u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e . It w o u l d j u s t b e a brute, i n e x p l i c a b l e tact that m e t a p h y s i c a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p e r c e i v e d regularities. F o r sceptical p u r p o s e s , it is m o r e p r o d u c t i v e to focus o n p e r c e i v e d i r r e g u l a r i t i e s , for e x a m p l e , that the s a m e t h i n g a p p e a r s r a d i c a l l y d i f ferent i n different c i r c u m s t a n c e s : the w i n d feels w a r m to y o u a n d c o o l to m e . T h e v a r i a b i l i t y o f p h e n o m e n a a l o n g w i t h s e e m i n g l y e n d less d i s a g r e e m e n t is a staple o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m . A l t h o u g h there is n o c l e a r e v i d e n c e that P y r r h o d e f e n d s m e t a p h y s i c a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y o n the basis o f variability, this is at least a p l a u s i b l e route ( D L 9.106; see Bett 2 0 0 0 ) . E v e n so, it r e q u i r e s a c r u c i a l p r e m i s e l i n k i n g v a r i ability to i n d e t e r m i n a c y : if A is by nature F(=

d e t e r m i n a t e d F), t h e n

x is i n v a r i a b l y F . T h i s p r i n c i p l e m a y b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n a v a r i e t y of w a y s , d e p e n d i n g o n h o w w e u n d e r s t a n d the key q u a l i f i e r s " i n v a r i a b l y " a n d "by nature". N e v e r t h e l e s s , s o m e t h i n g like it is n e c e s s a r y to get us f r o m the v a r i a b i l i t y o f the w a y t h i n g s s e e m to the c o n c l u s i o n that they are not b y nature a n y m o r e o n e w a y t h a n a n o t h e r

(see

C h a p t e r 6 tor A e n e s i d e m u s ' later p o l e m i c a l use o f i n v a r i a b i l i t y as a condition on truth). R e g a r d l e s s of h o w he a r r i v e d at it, w e c a n f u r t h e r c l a r i f y P y r r h o s v i e w by i n t e r p r e t i n g h i s s e c o n d a d j e c t i v e : w h a t does he m e a n by s a y i n g that t h i n g s are u n s t a b l e ? O n e attractive o p t i o n is that P y r r h o

21

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

d e f e n d s the v i e w Plato attributes to the H e r a c l i t e a n s i n the etctus

Thea-

( 1 5 2 d - e ) ; n a m e l y , that e v e r y t h i n g is c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g i n

e v e r y respect (Bett 2 0 0 0 : 1 3 2 - 4 0 ; Powers 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e rate of change is irrelevant. T h e i m p o r t a n t point is that a t h i n g never h a s p r e c i s e l y the s a m e p r o p e r t i e s I r o m o n e m o m e n t to the next. W e s h o u l d not t h i n k that w e h a v e s t o p p e d the p r o c e s s by t a k i n g a p h o t o g r a p h , s i n c e this f r o z e n m o m e n t d o e s not c o r r e s p o n d to the real n a t u r e of the t h i n g . I n fact, it is not really fitting to call it o n e t h i n g i n the first place. I f all of its p r o p e r t i e s are i n flux, it w i l l not be the s a m e t h i n g o v e r t i m e ; constant c h a n g e w i l l c o n s u m e w h a t e v e r m o m e n t a r y identity w e m a y i m p o s e . I n r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h i s i n s i g h t , we s h o u l d replace the v e r b "to b e " w i t h " b e c o m e s " . It is n e v e r c o r r e c t to say that x is F , but o n l y that x b e c o m e s F. A n d e v e n t h e n , A d o e s n o t r e m a i n F ; n o r does it e v e n -

r e m a i n itself. S o it is e v e n m i s l e a d i n g to talk about all of a thing's p r o p e r t i e s c h a n g i n g i n so far as that p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e u n d e r l y i n g s u b s t r a t u m that m i g h t e n d u r e . B e c a u s e o f this i n d e t e r m i n a c y , P y r r h o c o n c l u d e s that

neither

o u r s e n s a t i o n s n o r o p i n i o n s tell the t r u t h or f a l s e h o o d s . It is clear e n o u g h w h y h e w o u l d t h i n k that t h e y fail to r e p o r t the t r u t h . I n o r d e r for o u r s e n s a t i o n s or o p i n i o n s to report a n y t h i n g it s e e m s t h e y m u s t assert s o m e definite, or d e t e r m i n a t e , p r o p o s i t i o n . A n d i n o r d e r for a n a s s e r t i o n to be t r u e it m u s t c o r r e c t l y report the relevant state o f affairs. I f t h i n g s are i n h e r e n t l y i n d e t e r m i n a t e , n o a s s e r t i o n c a n c o r r e c t l y r e p o r t h o w t h i n g s are. S o m e t a p h y s i c a l i n d e t e r m i n a c y e l i m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a n y s e n s a t i o n o r o p i n i o n c o u l d be true. But w h y d o e s P y r r h o also say that i n d e t e r m i n a c y e l i m i n a t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y that a n y s e n s a t i o n or o p i n i o n c o u l d be false? T h e m o r e n a t u r a l c o n s e q u e n c e to d r a w , it s e e m s , w o u l d be that all p r o p o s i t i o n s are false b e c a u s e they attempt to assert s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e about t h i n g s that are i n d e t e r m i n a t e . P e r h a p s P y r r h o t h i n k s that i n o r d e r for the p r o p o s i t i o n "JC is V

to be false, s o m e d e t e r m i n a t e state

of affairs represented by "x is n o t - F ' m u s t be true. I n other w o r d s , p e r h a p s h e t h i n k s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r o n l y m a k e s s e n s e i n a w o r l d of d e t e r m i n a t e o b j e c t s . I n that case, i n d e t e r m i n a c y w o u l d e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n y t h i n g b e i n g t r u e or false,

22

PYRRHO AND TIMON

P y r r h o m i g h t have a d o p t e d s u c h a n a r r o w c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t is r e q u i r e d for a statement to be false. B u t there is n o e v i d e n c e that ho c i d .

Things are undecidable T h e m o s t c o n v i n c i n g o b j e c t i o n to the m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is the d e c i d e d l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l focus o f A r i s t o c l e s On Philosophy. 1

One

of h i s m a i n tasks in this b o o k is to d e f e n d Aristotle's v i e w that b o t h s e n s a t i o n a n d r e a s o n , p r o p e r l y e m p l o y e d , are reliable g u i d e s i n s e e k ing k n o w l e d g e . T o this e n d , h e argues against c o m p e t i n g a c c o u n t s . P a r m e n i d e s a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s reject the e v i d e n c e of the s e n s e s a n d trust o n l y r e a s o n . P r o t a g o r a s a n d M e t r o d o r u s reject r e a s o n a n d trust o n l y s e n s a t i o n . C y r e n a i c s reject b o t h s e n s a t i o n a n d r e a s o n a n d accept o n l y t h e i r o w n affections or feelings. A n d , finally, P y r r h o a n d his followers reject all a c c o u n t s o f k n o w l e d g e a n d m a i n t a i n that it is o u r nature to k n o w n o t h i n g ( B r e n n a n 1998; C h i e s a r a 2 0 0 1 ) , A r i s t o c l e s c l e a r l y c o u n t s P y r r h o a m o n g those w h o p r o c l a i m that "we are s o c o n s t i t u t e d that w e k n o w n o t h i n g " {Praep.

Ev. 1 4 , 1 8 , 1 - 2 ) .

T h i s is a s t a t e m e n t not a b o u t t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , but rather o u r o w n c o g n i t i v e a n d s e n s o r y c a p a c i t i e s . S i m i l a r l y , he identifies the s u b j e c t to be investigated as o u r c a p a c i t y for k n o w l e d g e . II the m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n w e r e c o r r e c t , o u r i n a b i l i t y to a c q u i r e k n o w l e d g e w o u l d be due to the nature ot t h i n g s a n d not, a s A r i s t o c l e s s a y s , due to a n y facts about u s . I n d e e d , if t h i n g s are i n d e t e r m i n a t e not e v e n G o d c a n have a n y k n o w l e d g e of t h e m . S o , if t h i n g s are i n d e t e r m i n a t e , it d o e s not m a t t e r h o w we are c o n s t i t u t e d , a n d P y r r h o s r e m a r k about o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d be idle. But if the e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a I v i e w is right, h o w c a n we e x p l a i n the first q u e s t i o n a b o u t the nature o f things?

W h e n we refer to t h i n g s

it is s o m e t i m e s u n c l e a r w h e t h e r we m e a n to talk about the t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s or t h e i r effect o n us, or both, It I a m a s k e d a b o u t h o n e y , I c o u l d r e s p o n d either by t a l k i n g about its c h e m i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n or about the w a y it tastes. S i m i l a r l y , P y r r h o c a n r e a s o n a b l y be u n d e r s t o o d as s a y i n g ;

23

ANCIENT

[E]

SCEPTICISM

t h i n g s are e q u a l l y i n d i f f è r e n t i a b l e a n d

immeasurable

and undecidable. In that case, his answe r tells us o n l y about h o w we are affected b y things, that is, it i n f o r m s u s o n l y about o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n a n d c a p a c i t i e s . T h e e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! interpretation a l l o w s u s , a n d p e r h a p s e v e n requires us, to r e m a i n a g n o s t i c about the n a t u r e of t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s . O n this v i e w , w h a t leads P y r r h o to c o n c l u d e that w e are s o c o n stituted as to k n o w n o t h i n g is that " n e i t h e r s e n s a t i o n s n o r o p i n i o n s [consistently] tell us t r u t h s or f a l s e h o o d s " (Pmep,

Ev. 1 4 1 8 . 4 ) . T h e

point is not that s e n s a t i o n s a n d o p i n i o n s h a v e n o t r u t h - v a l u e , but that we are not able to d e t e r m i n e w h a t t r u t h - v a l u e they have. T h e y are not reliable guides; h e n c e the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that they d o not consistently tell the t r u t h or lie. A g a i n , s o m e sort of v a r i a b i l i t y i n the w a y t h i n g s a p p e a r w i l l motivate this p o s i t i o n . A n d a g a i n we w i l l n e e d to s u p p l y a c r u c i a l p r e m i s e , this time l i n k i n g the v a r i a b i l i t y of appearances to o u r i n a b i l ity to d e c i d e a m o n g t h e m . W h e r e the m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w n e e d s a r e q u i r e m e n t o n t r u t h , the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l v i e w n e e d s a r e q u i r e m e n t on j u s t i f i c a t i o n . W e start w i t h the o b s e r v a t i o n that the s a m e t h i n g a p p e a r s i n v a r i o u s , a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e , w a y s : b o t h F a n d n o t - F . It we are u n a b l e to r a t i o n a l l y prefer o n e o f these appearances t h e n w e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about w h a t A really is, by nature. -

T h e later S c e p t i c A e n e s i d e m u s h o l d s s u c h a v i e w o l P y r r h o . H e c l a i m s that P y r r h o d e t e r m i n e s n o t h i n g d o g m a t i c a l l y b e c a u s e of c o n t r a d i c t i o n ( D L 9 , 1 0 6 ) a n d that h e p h i l o s o p h i z e d a c c o r d i n g to the p r i n c i p l e of s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g e m e n t ( D L 9.62), B u t a g a i n , we m u s t bear i n m i n d the p o s s i b i l i t y that he is p r o j e c t i n g h i s o w n v i e w b a c k i n t i m e (Beit 2 0 0 0 : 4 8 - 5 7 ) . It is p o s s i b l e that e v e n T i m o n projects h i s o w n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s c e p t i c i s m o n to P y r r h o . I n that case, T i m o n , a n d not P y r r h o , w o u l d be the first P y r r h o n i s t ( B r u n s c h w i g 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e later t r a d i t i o n , b e g i n n i n g w i t h T i m o n , m i g h t have d r a w n o n l y f r o m the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f P y r r h o s m e t a p h y s i c a l indeterminism. I a m not c o n f i d e n t that the i s s u e c a n be resolved o n the basis of the e v i d e n c e we have. B u t it P y r r h o is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d to s h o w that

2i

PYRRHO

AND

TIMON

r e c o g n i z i n g o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s is not a c a u s e for d e s p a i r but rather a route to t r a n q u i l l i t y , either the m e t a p h y s i c a l o r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l v i e w w i l l d o . S i n c e I find the m o r e m o d e s t , e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a 1 variety slightly m o r e p l a u s i b l e , a n d s i n c e it w i n s the d a y historically, I shall d e v e l o p t h i s a c c o u n t i n w h a t f o l l o w s ; i n effect, I shall p r o c e e d as if T i m o n got P y r r h o right. Before m o v i n g o n to the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d q u e s t i o n s , w e s h a l l n e e d to c o n s i d e r w h a t P y r r h o m e a n s to i n c l u d e i n h i s c l a i m about the nature of t h i n g s .

T h e scope o f " t h i n g s " a n d Pyrrho's m o r a l c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m F o r P y r r h o , the m o s t i m p o r t a n t matters that call for m e a s u r e m e n t or d e c i s i o n are e v a l u a t i o n s of w h a t is g o o d a n d b a d . So, we s h o u l d f o c u s o n the c l a i m that t h i n g s are e q u a l l y indifferentiable, u n m e a s u r a b l e a n d u n d e c i d a b l e w i t h respect to their v a l u e a n d c h o i c e w o r t h i n e s s . T h i s r e a l i z a t i o n s h o u l d m a k e u s appreciate that v a l u e j u d g e m e n t s are c o n t i n g e n t a n d g r o u n d l e s s ; w e are u n a b l e to j u s t i f y a n y c o n v i c tion that s o m e t h i n g is not j u s t a p p a r e n t l y g o o d , but really g o o d . A c c o r d i n g l y , P y r r h o p r o c l a i m s that " c o n v e n t i o n a n d habit are the basis o f e v e r y t h i n g that m e n d o " ( D L 9.61 ), a n d " a p p e a r a n c e s p r e v a i l e v e r y w h e r e " ( D L 9 . 1 0 5 ) . S i m i l a r l y , "there is n o t h i n g g o o d or b a d by nature, but 'these t h i n g s are d e t e r m i n e d b y m e n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c o n v e n t i o n a c c o r d i n g to T i m o n " (M I L 1 4 0 ) . A l t h o u g h this r e m a r k suggests the negatively d o g m a t i c , m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w that v a l u e s d o not exist i n nature, w e s h o u l d note that o n l y the latter h a l f is attributed to T i m o n . S o h i s p o i n t m a y still b e that s i n c e w e are u n a b l e to e s t a b l i s h w h a t is g o o d o r b a d b y nature, we m u s t p r e s c r i b e v a l u e s conventionally. T h u s we m a y take Pyrrho's m o r a l c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m as a n i m m e d i ate c o n s e q u e n c e of h i s v i e w about o u r cognitive l i m i t s . W e are not s o c o n s t i t u t e d as to k n o w w h a t is b y nature g o o d a n d b a d . T h e s e v i e w s m a y have b e e n i n s p i r e d b y h i s c o m p a t r i o t A n a x a r c h u s , w h o c o m p a r e s t h i n g s to the p a i n t e d s c e n e s that we see at the

theatre.

W e w o u l d t h i n k s o m e o n e m a d tor t a k i n g s u c h facades for reality.

25

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

S i m i l a r l y , w e b e h a v e l i k e m a d m e n or d r e a m e r s if we s u p p o s e o u r s e n s a t i o n s are reliable i n d i c a t o r s

of the

true

natures ol

things

( M 7.87-88). A p p l y i n g this to evaluative p r o p e r t i e s , w e w i l l b e h a v e l i k e d r e a m ers a n d m a d m e n if w e take a p p a r e n t l y g o o d t h i n g s for g e n u i n e l y good ones.

J

I n o n e r e v e a l i n g a n e c d o t e w e f i n d t h i s idea a p p l i e d to

justice a n d morality in general. A n a x a r c h u s , along with Pyrrho, a c c o m p a n i e d A l e x a n d e r the G r e a t o n s o m e e x p e d i t i o n s a n d s e e m s to have b e e n b y turns flattering a n d d i s d a i n f u l . After a d r u n k e n q u a r rel, A l e x a n d e r kills h i s f r i e n d C l e i t u s , a n d t h e n i m m e d i a t e l y feels great r e m o r s e . I n h i s d i s d a i n f u l m o o d , A n a x a r c h u s scoffs at h i m for b e h a v i n g like a slave, t e a r i n g the l a w a n d d i s a p p r o v a l o f m e n , w h e n he s h o u l d r e a l i z e that he, l i k e Z e u s , is the l a w ( P l u t a r c h , Vit

Alex.

5 0 - 5 2 ) . A l e x a n d e r s m i s e r y is the result of m i s t a k e n l y t h i n k i n g that h i s a c t i o n w a s i n reality u n j u s t , s h a m e f u l a n d w o r t h y of p u n i s h m e n t . B u t just as the w r i t e r o f the play d e t e r m i n e s the plot, the k i n g decides what justice is. It is difficult to a c c e p t the n o t i o n that w e c a n n o t differentiate g o o d f r o m b a d a c t i o n s e v e n in e x t r e m e c a s e s ; to t h i n k , for e x a m p l e , that A l e x a n d e r s c r i m e is really n o better or w o r s e t h a n the g o o d d e e d s he p e r f o r m e d . B u t P y r r h o n e i t h e r a d v o c a t e s a life o f c r i m e n o r a life of v i r t u e , a s c o n c e i v e d b y h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s . H i s a i m is to relieve us o f p o o r l y f o u n d e d c o n f i d e n c e a n d the d i s t u r b i n g d e s i r e s that it produces. T h e m o r e c o m m o n v i e w a m o n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s is that the p r o b l e m is desire for t h i n g s that t u r n o u t to b e b a d . O n t h i s v i e w , h a p p i n e s s requires c h o o s i n g , if n o t a c q u i r i n g , w h a t is g e n u i n e l y a n d not m e r e l y a p p a r e n t l y g o o d . W e e s t a b l i s h o u r goals in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t we d e s i r e , a n d we desire w h a t appears good. O n e m i g h t start out in p u r s u i t of m o n e y , b e l i e v i n g that it w o u l d be g e n u i n e l y g o o d to be r i c h , a n d t h e n later decide that t h i s is o n l y a n apparent g o o d s i n c e s o m e w e a l t h y people s e e m to be m i s e r a b l e . S u c h e x p e r i e n c e s m a y c o n v i n c e us that there is a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m e r e l y a p p a r e n t g o o d s a n d g e n u i n e ones. A r m e d w i t h this d i s t i n c t i o n , o n e w o u l d never desire s o m e t h i n g as o n l y a n apparent

good.

T h u s we q u i c k l y arrive at the v i e w that we m u s t first d e t e r m i n e w h a t

2(5

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is g e n u i n e l y g o o d i n o r d e r to e s t a b l i s h the p r o p e r goals in the larger pursuit ol happiness. I f w e m u s t j u s t i f y o u r e n d s as g e n u i n e l y g o o d i n o r d e r to be happy, s c e p t i c i s m about evaluative matters w i l l e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y of h a p p i n e s s . B u t P y r r h o d o e s n o t take h i s s c e p t i c i s m to b e s u c h a w e t blanket, S o it s e e m s h e w o u l d have us replace the m o r e f a m i l i a r q u e s t i o n o f w h a t o n e needs to k n o w to live w e l l , w i t h the q u e s t i o n of h o w o n e m a y live w e l l i n the a b s e n c e of k n o w l e d g e . I n r e s p o n s e to A r i s t o c l e s c o m p l a i n t a b o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y of a n y benefit c o m 1

i n g to t h o s e w h o r e a d T i m o n s b o o k s , w e s h o u l d say that i m p a r t i n g k n o w l e d g e is not the o n l y w a y to benefit o n e s students; i n tact, it is not e v e n a possible way. T h e negative c l a i m , t h e n , is that w e are i n c a p a b l e of a c q u i r i n g evaluative k n o w l e d g e , a n d the positive c l a i m is that s u c h k n o w l e d g e is n o t n e c e s s a r y for t r a n q u i l l i t y or h a p p i n e s s . T i m o n asserts b o t h of these, a p p a r e n t l y o n b e h a l f of P y r r h o , in the f o l l o w i n g couplet: " H a v i n g a c o r r e c t y a r d s t i c k of t r u t h , I w i l l relate a f i c t i o n , as it e v i d e n t l y is to m e , / that the nature of the d i v i n e a n d g o o d [exists] forever a n d f r o m these life b e c o m e s m o s t equable for m a n " ( M 11.20; S v a v a r s s o n 2004; cf. B u r n y e a t 1980). T h e r e are a c t u a l l y t w o f i c t i o n s here: first, that the nature of the d i v i n e a n d g o o d exists forever; a n d s e c o n d l y , that these are the s o u r c e of a t r a n q u i l , equable life. T o say that they exist forever m a y be t a k e n to m e a n that t h e y are stable m e a s u r e s of w h a t is good, a n d not m e r e l y c o n v e n t i o n a l o r contingent. B u t a c c o r d i n g to P y r r h o , e v e n if s u c h s t a n d a r d s w e r e real, they are b e y o n d o u r c o g n i t i v e r e a c h . S o they c a n n o t s e r v e as s t a n d a r d s or m e a s u r e s for us to a c t u a l l y use, a n d t h u s they c a n n o t be r e l i e d o n i n a t t a i n i n g a t r a n q u i l life. H e is able to c o n f i d e n t l y assert that these are fictions s i n c e this is a n a p p l i c a t i o n of h i s m o r e g e n e r a l c l a i m that t h i n g s are indifferentiable, i m m e a s u r a b l e a n d u n d e c i d a b l e . C i c e r o focuses o n the p r a c t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s lack of e v a l u ative d i s t i n c t i o n s in h i s r e m a r k s a b o u t P y r r h o (Ac. 2.130; Fin.

3,11¬

12, 4.43, 4.49, 4.60; Off. 1,6). H e attributes to P y r r h o the v i e w that all t h i n g s are equal, that is, that t h e y are all e q u a l l y w o r t h y of c h o i c e o r of a v o i d a n c e . B u t C i c e r o m a k e s it c l e a r that t h i s is part of P y r r h o s c o n c e p t i o n o f v i r t u e as the o n l y g o o d ; e v e r y t h i n g else is i n d i f f e r e n t .

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T h e r e are n o rational g r o u n d s for p r e f e r r i n g o n e t h i n g to a n o t h e r for we are i n c a p a b l e o f d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r a n y t h i n g la m o r e valuable or c h o i c e w o r t h y t h a n a n y t h i n g else. W e m a y feel a p h y s i o l o g i c a l c o m p u l s i o n o n e w a y or another, b u t t h i s is n o i n d i c a t i o n of h a v i n g a r r i v e d at a c o r r e c t a s s e s s m e n t o l a t h i n g s w o r t h . T h e fact that we are n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d to s e e k f o o d a n d shelter does not e n t a i l that we s h o u l d , o r that these t h i n g s are by n a t u r e good, I n o r d e r to m a k e s e n s e o l w h a t we m a y c a l l P y r r h o s c o n c e p t i o n o f v i r t u e we s h a l l n e e d to e x p l o r e h i s a n s w e r to T i m o n s s e c o n d q u e s t i o n : w h a t attitude s h o u l d we a d o p t t o w a r d s t h i n g s ?

P y r r h o ' s p r e s c r i p t i o n : the sceptical attitude I n A r i s t o c l e s ' report ( q u o t e d a b o v e ) , P y r r h o a d v i s e s that " w e s h o u l d not put o u r trust i n [sensations a n d o p i n i o n s ] o n e bit, but w e s h o u l d be u n o p i n i o n a t e d , u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n w a v e r i n g , s a y i n g c o n c e r n i n g e a c h i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g that it n o m o r e is t h a n is not, or it b o t h is a n d is not, or it n e i t h e r is n o r is not". T h e s u g g e s t i o n that we s h o u l d be u n w a v e r i n g and u n c o m m i t t e d raises the p r o b l e m of c o n s i s t e n c y . Is P y r r h o a d v i s i n g us to f i r m l y c o m m i t o u r s e l v e s to the o p i n i o n that we s h o u l d be u n o p i n i o n a t e d a n d u n c o m m i t t e d ? W e s h a l l r e t u r n to the p r o b l e m o f c o n s i s t e n c y i n the next s e c t i o n . F o r n o w we shall c o n c e n t r a t e o n w h a t P y r r h o a d v i s e s us to say, a n d t h u s p r e s u m a b l y to t h i n k . W h a t , for e x a m p l e , w o u l d P y r r h o h a v e us say a n d t h i n k about d e a t h ? A n u n t i m e l y d e a t h is g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t to be u n q u e s t i o n a b l y b a d . B u t a c c o r d i n g to o n e a n e c d o t e , P y r r h o c a l m l y l a c e d h i s o w n i m m i n e n t death o n b o a r d a s h i p i n a s t o r m . U n l i k e the o t h e r s , he d i s p l a y e d n o i n c l i n a t i o n to p a n i c a n d llee. I n s t e a d , the s t o r y goes, he p o i n t e d to a c o n t e n t e d pig h a p p i l y e a t i n g i n the m i d s t of the s t o r m and r e m a r k e d that this is h o w w e o u g h t to be as w e l l ( D L 9.68). T h e pig h a d n o beliefs about w h e t h e r h i s s i t u a t i o n w a s really b a d , a n d i n d i f f e r e n t l y c a r r i e d o n eating, P y r r h o s attitude i n this s i t u a t i o n is c a p t u r e d by the e x p r e s s i o n that d e a t h is n o m o r e b a d t h a n g o o d , o r b o t h b a d a n d g o o d , or

28

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n e i t h e r b a d n o r g o o d . T h i s c o m p l i c a t e d utterance m a y be interpreted i n t w o w a y s . F i r s t , it m i g h t be t a k e n as o n e ( o r all) of three d i s t i n c t c l a i m s : we m a y say e i t h e r that (a) d e a t h is n o m o r e b a d t h a n g o o d , or (b) death i s b o t h b a d a n d g o o d , o r ( c ) death is n e i t h e r b a d n o r g o o d . S e c o n d l y , it m i g h t be t a k e n as o n l y o n e , f o u r - p a r t r e m a r k ; d e a t h is n o m o r e ( i ) b a d t h a n it is (ii) g o o d , or (iii) b o t h b a d a n d g o o d , or (iv) n e i t h e r b a d n o r g o o d . T h i s s e c o n d alternative really d o e s not a l l o w us to say a n y t h i n g positive about d e a t h at all. W h a t we are a l l o w e d to say, roughly, is that death is n o m o r e this w a y t h a n that way, or n e i t h e r w a y (see A u l u s G e l l i u s , NA 11.5.4; D e L a c y 1958). A n d t h i s is w h a t w e w o u l d e x p e c t if P y r r h o w e r e c o m m i t t e d to the n o t i o n that we c a n n o t ever k n o w a n y t h i n g a b o u t the n a t u r e of death. F u r t h e r m o r e , the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d c l a i m s o f the first alternative - (b) a n d (c) - are p r o b l e m a t i c . It w o u l d m a k e s e n s e for D e m o c r i t u s to say, l o r e x a m p l e , that a p a t c h o f s n o w is n o m o r e w h i t e t h a n notw h i t e b e c a u s e i n its real, a t o m i c n a t u r e it h a s n o c o l o u r . B u t P y r r h o w o u l d not accept s u c h a definite a c c o u n t of the nature of t h i n g s . H e w o u l d not, in p a r t i c u l a r , accept the v i e w that it is the nature of t h i n g s to l a c k all c o l o u r . T h i s is f u n d a m e n t a l l y different f r o m his b r o a d e r c l a i m that it is the n a t u r e o f t h i n g s to b e u n k n o w a b l e . S o P y r r h o s h o u l d not e n c o u r a g e us to say that ( c ) d e a t h is n e i t h e r g o o d n o r b a d i n so far a s that m e a n s he k n o w s , o r is e v e n c o n f i d e n t , that death l a c k s any p a r t i c u l a r v a l u e . W i t h regard to the s e c o n d c l a i m ( b ) , it w o u l d m a k e sense for P r o t a g o r a s to say, tor e x a m p l e , that a patch of s n o w is b o t h w h i t e a n d n o t - w h i t e b e c a u s e a t h i n g is what it a p p e a r s to b e , a n d if it a p p e a r s w h i t e to y o u a n d n o t - w h i t e to m e , t h e n it is w h i t e for y o u a n d notw h i t e for m e . A g a i n , P y r r h o s h o u l d not be w i l l i n g to e n d o r s e s u c h a p o s i t i v e v i e w about the n a t u r e o l t h i n g s , F a r f r o m c l a i m i n g that a p p e a r a n c e s reveal the t r u e ( e v e n it s e e m i n g l y c o n t r a d i c t o r y ) nature of t h i n g s , he absolutely d e n i e s that a p p e a r a n c e s c a n i n d i c a t e the n a t u r e o f reality. P y r r h o w o u l d not e n c o u r a g e us to say, o n the basis J

o f c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s , that it is b o t h g o o d a n d b a d . I n s u p p o r t o f the s e c o n d alternative, we s h o u l d c o n s i d e r T i m o n ' s r e m a r k that "the e x p r e s s i o n ['no more'] m e a n s ' d e t e r m i n i n g n o t h i n g , a n d s u s p e n d i n g j u d g m e n t ' " ( D L 9,76). I f P y r r h o w e r e to say that

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death is n o m o r e this t h a n that, we m a y take h i m to m e a n that we c a n d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g about death a n d so m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . W e m u s t r e m a i n u n o p i n i o n a t e d a n d u n c o m m i t t e d , a n d w h e n faced w i t h death w e m u s t be u n w a v e r i n g a n d f i r m i n o u r r e f u s a l to take a position. W h e t h e r o r not P y r r h o w o u l d have c a l l e d this d i s p o s i t i o n v i r t u e , he d i d c l a i m that those w h o develop it a c h i e v e t r a n q u i l l i t y . C i c e r o reports that the followers of P y r r h o h o l d m o r a l i t y ( o r v i r t u e ) to be the o n l y g o o d (Fin.

3 . 1 2 ) . But if n o t h i n g is k n o w n to be g o o d or

b a d by nature, t h e n it follows that P y r r h o does not k n o w w h e t h e r it is t r u l y g o o d to be f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n o p i n i o n a t e d ; n o r c o u l d he c l a i m that t r a n q u i l l i t y is g o o d by nature. I n that case, the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n is o n l y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y g o o d , it it is g o o d at a l l , and we c o u l d d i s m i s s h i s a d v i c e as b e i n g out of step w i t h o u r c u r rent c o n v e n t i o n s .

P y r r h o ' s f i r m l a c k o f c o m m i t m e n t a n d the p r o b l e m o f consistency P y r r h o ' s p o s i t i o n appears i n c o n s i s t e n t . It we are so c o n s t i t u t e d as to k n o w n o t h i n g , it s e e m s we c a n never k n o w that we are s o constituted; n o r c a n we k n o w that t r a n q u i l l i t y is g o o d a n d w o r t h s t r i v i n g for. A n d h o w are w e to b e c o m e f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n o p i n i o n ated if n o t b y a c q u i r i n g firm c o n v i c t i o n s a n d o p i n i o n s ? G e n e r a l l y , we t h i n k a f i r m , stable d i s p o s i t i o n to be a s i g n of d e e p c o m m i t m e n t a n d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , we suspect that the u n c o m m i t t e d are p r o n e to vacillate. O u r e v i d e n c e r e g a r d i n g P y r r h o does not reveal that he even c o n s i d e r e d these sorts of o b j e c t i o n s , m u c h less w h a t h i s r e s p o n s e m a y h a v e b e e n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , there are s e v e r a l different r e s p o n s e s a v a i l able. T h e s e are w o r t h c o n s i d e r i n g as they f o r e s h a d o w later d e v e l o p m e n t s i n both A c a d e m i c a n d P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . O n e w a y to a v o i d s u c h i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s is to a l l o w l o r e x c e p t i o n s to P y r r h o ' s g e n e r a l c l a i m s . P e r h a p s all we c a n k n o w is that we are so c o n s t i t u t e d as to k n o w n o t h i n g , a n d that t r a n q u i l l i t y is the o n l y

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g e n u i n e g o o d . T h e s e c o n v i c t i o n s w i l l e n a b l e us to r e m a i n f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d r e g a r d i n g e v e r y t h i n g else. T h a t is, w e s h o u l d a v o i d all o t h e r o p i n i o n s a n d c o n v i c t i o n s about k n o w l e d g e a n d the good. II P y r r h o c o u l d p r o v i d e s o m e p r i n c i p l e d r e a s o n for m a k i n g s u c h e x c e p t i o n s we w o u l d h a v e a c o n v i n c i n g r e s p o n s e to the p r o b l e m . H o w e v e r , there is n o e v i d e n c e that he m a d e s u c h a m o v e . A n o t h e r s o l u t i o n is to c l a i m that P y r r h o h a d habituated h i m s e l f to r e m a i n u n c o m m i t t e d a n d u n o p i n i o n a t e d . I n that case, h i s t r a n q u i l lity w o u l d not be the p r o d u c t of k n o w l e d g e , or e v e n belief, but rather the p r o d u c t of a d e e p l y r o o t e d h a b i t u a l w a y of s e e i n g t h i n g s . I n s u p port of this s o l u t i o n we m a y appeal to the m a n y reports f o c u s i n g o n h i s r e m a r k a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n . T i m o n is s a i d to h a v e c l e a r l y revealed this d i s p o s i t i o n i n h i s b o o k , Pytho

(.which is n o l o n g e r extant; D L

9.67). T i m o n also c o n s i s t e n t l y p r a i s e s h i m in o t h e r w o r k s for his d i s p a s s i o n a t e tranquillity, h i g h l i g h t i n g h i s Lack o f d i s t u r b i n g beliefs or d o c t r i n e s : P y r r h o is not w e i g h e d d o w n w i t h p a s s i o n , o p i n i o n a n d futile legislation (Praep.

Ev. 14.18.19); he has e s c a p e d f r o m s e r v i t u d e

to the o p i n i o n s a n d e m p t y t h e o r i z i n g o f S o p h i s t s ( D L 9,64). A n o t h e r follower o f P y r r h o , N a u s i p h a n e s asserts that we s h o u l d b e c o m e like P y r r h o i n d i s p o s i t i o n , but that we s h o u l d adopt h i s [ N a u s i p h a n e s ' ] o w n d o c t r i n e s ( D L 9.64). S o m e b i o g r a p h i c a l details p r o v i d e a s k e t c h of h o w P y r r h o m i g h t have a r r i v e d at h i s r e m a r k a b l e d i s p o s i t i o n . W h i l e i n I n d i a w i t h A l e x ander, P y r r h o s teacher, A n a x a r c h u s , w a s c r i t i c i z e d for a t t e n d i n g k i n g s in their courts, S u c h b e h a v i o u r , the I n d i a n critic m a i n t a i n e d , w o u l d m a k e h i m u n a b l e to teach others w h a t is g o o d . W h i l e this probably d i d not trouble A n a x a r c h u s , it d i d have a n effect o n P y r r h o , w h o h a d c o l l e c t e d t h o u s a n d s o f pieces of gold f r o m A l e x a n d e r for a p o e m he h a d w r i t t e n ( M 1.282). P y r r h o w i t h d r e w into s o l i t u d e ( D L 9 . 6 2 ) . H e w a s p e r h a p s c o n c e r n e d to a v o i d the a p p e a r a n c e

of

b e l i e v i n g that k i n g s w i e l d real p o w e r o r that p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t is b e n e f i c i a l . I n k e e p i n g w i t h h i s d i s d a i n for w o r l d l y power, P y r r h o w a s f o n d of q u o t i n g a line f r o m the Iliad in w h i c h H o m e r calls into q u e s t i o n the p r e m i u m the w a r r i o r c u l t u r e p l a c e d o n f a m e or g l o r y : the g e n e r a tions of m e n c o m e a n d go like leaves o n a tree (Iliad 6 . 1 4 6 ) . F r o m this

31

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lofty p e r s p e c t i v e it s e e m s silly to give oneself airs for h a v i n g f a m o u s ancestors or for d o i n g w h a t m a y a p p e a r to be g l o r i o u s deeds. P y r r h o frequently cited other passages i n H o m e r d i s p l a y i n g the i n c o n s i s t ency, futility a n d c h i l d i s h n e s s o f h u m a n i t y ( D L 9 , 6 7 ) . P y r r h o was e v e n fonder of quoting i r o m D e m o c r i t u s , w h o s i m i larly r a i l e d against the d e s t r u c t i v e a n d d i s t u r b i n g effects o f excessive a m b i t i o n a n d d e s i r e . D e m o c r i t u s h e l d that the p r o p e r goal i n life is a persistently c h e e r f u l , tearless, c a l m a n d t r a n q u i l state of m i n d ( D L 9.54). T o a c h i e v e this he a d v i s e d that we m u s t attend to w h a t is p o s sible a n d b e satisfied w i t h w h a t w e have r a t h e r t h a n a l l o w o u r s e l v e s to be c o n s u m e d b y e n v y a n d desire. T h e practice a n d p r e a c h i n g o f s u c h d e t a c h m e n t is not u n u s u a l i n G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y p r i o r to P y r r h o : i n a d d i t i o n to D e m o c r i t u s , D i o g e n e s the C y n i c p r o m o t e d a s i m i l a r d i s p o s i t i o n . B u t o n their v i e w s , d e t a c h m e n t is s u p p o s e d to a r i s e f r o m a c o r r e c t e v a l u a t i o n o f the g o o d s o f fortune, w h e r e a s i n P y r r h o ' s v i e w it arises f r o m a refusal to evaluate s u c h g o o d s i n the first place. I n a n y case, s u c h d e t a c h m e n t

is a h a r d - w o n

accomplishment.

P y r r h o a c k n o w l e d g e s this in the f o l l o w i n g report: " W h e n h e was terrified b y a d o g that h a d r u s h e d at h i m , he a n s w e r e d h i s c r i t i c that it is difficult to e n t i r e l y s t r i p off one's h u m a n i t y , but that one s h o u l d struggle against t h i n g s first by d e e d s a n d t h e n , if that doesn't w o r k , by r e a s o n " ( D L 9.66; see Praep.

Ev. 14.18.26). It p r o b a b l y s e e m e d

to P y r r h o that o u r m o s t i m p o r t a n t struggle is to resist the v e r y h u m a n t e n d e n c y to evaluate t h i n g s as g e n u i n e l y g o o d o r b a d . T h i s t e n d e n c y is m o s t likely to s u r f a c e w h e n d a n g e r l o o m s . W e all tend to see i m m i n e n t h a r m a n d a n u n t i m e l y d e a t h as g e n u i n e l y b a d . B u t P y r r h o a d v i s e s that we l e a r n to see t h e m as n e i t h e r g o o d n o r b a d ; that i s , he p r o m o t e s the d e v e l o p m e n t o f a d i s p o s i t i o n not to evaluate things, a n d m o r e g e n e r a l l y not to s u p p o s e that a n y t h i n g is really, by nature, F . It is u n l i k e l y that one c o u l d s u c c e e d i n s t r i p p i n g away one's n a t u r a l h u m a n t e n d e n c y to c o n s i d e r p a i n a n d d e a t h g e n u i n e l y b a d w i t h o u t s o m e v e r y c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , o n e w o u l d probably not u n d e r t a k e a r i g o r o u s p r o g r a m m e

of c o n d i t i o n i n g unless o n e

c a m e to b e l i e v e that the p r o m i s e d t r a n q u i l l i t y w o u l d be w o r t h it.

PYRRHO

AND

TIMDN

P l u t a r c h attributes to P y r r h o the v i e w that " f r e e d o m f r o m s u f f e r i n g (apatheta)

h a s to be g a i n e d t h r o u g h r e a s o n a n d p h i l o s o p h y "

(Pro).

Virt. 8 2 F ) . A n d this leads us a g a i n to c o n f r o n t the p r o b l e m o f c o n sistency. W h y is the f i r m l y u n c o m m i t t e d P y r r h o not still left w i t h positive c o n v i c t i o n s a b o u t the v a l u e of t r a n q u i l l i t y a n d o u r cognitive limitations? I n a passage p r o b a b l y f r o m T i m o n s Pytho,

we f i n d a

metaphor

that plays a c e n t r a l role i n later P y r r h o n i s m ; the s c e p t i c applies his c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l utterances to t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h s h o w s h o w the utterances are l i k e purgatives i n d r i v i n g out the offensive s u b s t a n c e before e l i m i n a t i n g t h e m s e l v e s ( D L 9 . 7 6 ) . T h u s the e x p r e s s i o n " n o m o r e this t h a n that" applies to itself a n d d i s c h a r g e s the a p p e a r a n c e that the sceptic has a s s e r t e d s o m e t h i n g definite. W h e n he says that he d e t e r m i n e s n o t h i n g , he s h o u l d not be t a k e n as h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d e v e n that he d e t e r m i n e s n o t h i n g . P y r r h o s d i s p o s i t i o n is w h a t is left after the s c e p t i c a l purgatives p e r f o r m t h e i r f u n c t i o n . ( W e shall c o n s i d e r the p u r g a t i v e m e t a p h o r i n greater detail i n Chapter 9.}

5

The outcome: Pyrrho's prudent tranquillity W e t u r n finally to the t h i r d q u e s t i o n . H a v i n g b e c o m e firmly u n c o m m i t t e d r e g a r d i n g the natures o l t h i n g s , o n e is i n i t i a l l y s p e e c h l e s s . It is not c l e a r w h e t h e r this s h o u l d be t a k e n literally, o r rather as a w i t h h o l d i n g of a n y p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n about t h i n g s . E v e n if the initial o u t c o m e is a n a m a z e d s i l e n c e , we h a v e to a s s u m e that the s c e p t i c e v e n t u a l l y a d o p t s s o m e f o r m of s p e e c h to a c c o u n t for P y r r h o s w i l l i n g n e s s to h o l d f o r t h . Sextus d e s c r i b e s a v e r y plausible c a n d i d a t e for s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t able s p e e c h as a k i n d o l n o n - a s s e r t i o n i n w h i c h we refuse to assert ( o r d e n y j a n y t h i n g a b o u t the w a y the w o r l d is (PH 1 . 1 9 2 - 3 , a l t h o u g h h e does not attribute t h i s to P y r r h o ) . I n this case w e s h a l l o n l y r e p o r t h o w things seem without any further c o m m i t m e n t . I f one succeeds i n a d o p t i n g the s c e p t i c a l attitude a n d o n l y says o f t h i n g s that they are n o m o r e this w a y t h a n that o r neither, t h e n he w o u l d , o b v i o u s l y ,

33

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n o longer be a s s e r t i n g a n y t h i n g positive about t h e nature o f t h i n g s w h e n he s p o k e . F o l l o w i n g s p e e c h l e s s n e s s , or n o n - a s s e r t i o n , is t r a n q u i l l i t y . T h e sceptic is n o longer i n c l i n e d o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r ; a s T i m o n s a y s , he w i l l n e i t h e r c h o o s e n o r d e c l i n e ( A f 1 1 . 1 6 4 ) . A s a result he is c o m pletely u n d i s t u r b e d b y w h a t e v e r c o u r s e t h i n g s take. T h e c r u c i a l a s s u m p t i o n at w o r k here is that it is the f r u s t r a t i o n o f o u r beliefs a n d d e s i r e s that is r e s p o n s i b l e for w h a t e v e r d i s t u r b a n c e s w e suffer. ( W e s h a l l e x a m i n e this d i a g n o s i s f u r t h e r i n C h a p t e r 7.) B u t i f P y r r h o c a m e to see p a i n a n d death as n o t g e n u i n e l y b a d , he w o u l d not see t h e m a s t h i n g s to be a v o i d e d " either. A c c o r d i n g Il

to A n t i g o n u s , P y r r h o w a s r e c k l e s s , " a v o i d i n g n o t h i n g a n d t a k i n g n o p r e c a u t i o n s , f a c i n g e v e r y t h i n g a s it c a m e , w a g o n s , p r e c i p i c e s , dogs, a n d e n t r u s t i n g n o t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r to h i s s e n s a t i o n s " ( D L 9 . 6 2 ) . O n this v i e w P y r r h o w a s kept a l i v e b y h i s d e v o t e d students, w h o steered h i m a w a y f r o m s p e e d i n g w a g o n s a n d d a n g e r o u s cliffs. B u t a c c o r d i n g to A e n e s i d e m u s , P y r r h o s s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t d i d not c a u s e h i m to act carelessly i n h i s d a i l y life ( D L 9,62). A n d T i m o n c l a i m s that P y r r h o d i d not depart f r o m n o r m a l , h a b i t u a l o r c u s t o m a r y p r a c t i c e (sunetheia;

D L 9.105),

T h e s e latter r e m a r k s m a y s e e m to c o n f l i c t w i t h the a n e c d o t e s reporting P y r r h o s thoroughly unconventional behaviour. But p r u d e n c e d o e s n o t n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e s o c i a l c o n f o r m i t y . T h e tales o f P y r r h o s r e c k l e s s n e s s a p p e a r to be s e n s a t i o n a l f a b r i c a t i o n s , p r o b ably d e v i s e d to illustrate the s u p p o s e d l y terrible p r a c t i c a l

conse-

q u e n c e s o f s c e p t i c i s m . A l t h o u g h there is n o c o n c l u s i v e textual basis for c h o o s i n g the p r u d e n t over the reckless P y r r h o , I d e f e r o n c e again to h i s s t u d e n t T i m o n , w h o a n n o u n c e s i n a n o t h e r lost w o r k , On the Senses:

" T h a t h o n e y is sweet 1 d o not assert, but I agree that it s e e m s

to b e " ( D L 9 . 1 0 5 ) . A e n e s i d e m u s takes s u c h r e m a r k s to indicate that P y r r h o g u i d e s h i m s e l f by the a p p e a r a n c e s ( D L 9.106), H o n e y s apparent s w e e t n e s s is sufficient to m a k e m e w a n t to eat it; in this w a y a p p e a r a n c e s p r e v a i l over theories o r a r g u m e n t s p u r p o r t i n g to reveal s o m e t h i n g about the h i d d e n nature o l h o n e y (see D L 9 . 1 0 5 ) . I f A e n e s i d e m u s is right, w e m a y say that P y r r h o h a s n o o p i n i o n s about the nature o f s p e e d i n g c h a r i o t s b e y o n d w h a t h i s senses report, B u t it

J4

PYRRHO

AND

TIMON

o n e a p p e a r s to b e r u s h i n g t o w a r d s h i m he w i l l m o v e out ot the way, just a s o r d i n a r y people d o .

Conclusion W h i l e I believe this a c c o u n t of P y r r h o m a k e s the best sense of the f r a g m e n t a r y a n d s o m e t i m e s c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e , it is v u l n e r a b l e to the o b j e c t i o n that it is the p r o d u c t o f later S c e p t i c s p r o j e c t i n g their o w n v i e w s a n d p r a c t i c e s b a c k i n time. G i v e n the s c a r c i t y of e v i d e n c e , h o w e v e r , we c a n n o t be too c o n f i d e n t about the extent to w h i c h the later t r a d i t i o n d e p a r t s f r o m or d e v e l o p s P y r r h o s s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n (but see Bett 2 0 0 0 ) . A n d given the fact that P y r r h o never wrote a n y t h i n g , we are largely d e p e n d e n t o n T i m o n , w h o m Sextus d e s c r i b e s as P y r r h o s p r o p h e t ( M 1.53). B u t if P y r r h o is so o r a c u l a r as to n e e d a p r o p h e t , I b e l i e v e w e are r i g h t to a c c e p t the p r o p h e t s interpretation. F u r t h e r m o r e , the a c c o u n t I h a v e p r o v i d e d a l l o w s us to see the h i s t o r y of P y r r h o n i s m as the d e v e l o p m e n t o f s c e p t i c a l t h e m e s that e m e r g e f r o m the liie o f P y r r h o . F i r s t a n d f o r e m o s t is h i s s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n , w h i c h i n c l i n e s h i m a w a y f r o m a r r i v i n g at any evaluative j u d g e m e n t s . L a t e r P y r r h o n i s t s t u r n their attention e s p e c i a l l y to the d e v e l o p m e n t of a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategies, the a p p l i c a t i o n o f w h i c h leads t h e m to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a n d u l t i m a t e l y to a c q u i r e s o m e t h i n g like P y r r h o s celebrated d i s p o s i t i o n . I n a n y case, P y r r h o s m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the h i s t o r y of S c e p t i c i s m is to p r e s e n t o u r c o g n i t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s i n a p o s i t i v e light as the route to a g o o d , t r a n q u i l liie.

3?

THREE

Arcesilaus: the origin of Academic Scepticism

S o m e t i m e a r o u n d 387 B C E , Plato b e g a n m e e t i n g w i t h h i s students i n a grove, o r p u b l i c p a r k , j u s t o u t s i d e the city w a l l o f A t h e n s , w h e r e he h a d s t u d i e d p h i l o s o p h y as a y o u n g m a n before b e c o m i n g a p u p i l of Socrates ( D L 3.5), T h i s p a r t i c u l a r g r o w w a s n a m e d after a G r e e k h e r o , H e k a d e m o s . T h u s w a s b o r n Plato's A c a d e m y . ' Plato a l s o b o u g h t ( o r was g i v e n ) a private r e s i d e n c e n e a r b y w h e r e he a n d h i s s t u d e n t s ate their m e a l s a n d h a d the o c c a s i o n a l d r i n k i n g party (symposium).

T h e m a i n philosophical business was conducted

b o t h w i t h i n the private h o u s e a n d i n the o p e n s p a c e of the p a r k . W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of a few a n e c d o t e s r e c o r d e d l o n g after the fact, we have n o explicit a c c o u n t o f the m e t h o d s a n d c u r r i c u l a o l the original Academy, H o w e v e r , g i v e n the p r o m i n e n t role p l a y e d b y the t h e o r y

(or

t h e o r i e s ) o f the F o r m s in Plato's d i a l o g u e s , a n d Aristotle's e x t e n sive c r i t i q u e i n On Ideas

( a n d Met.

1.9), it is l i k e l y that they w e r e

m u c h d i s c u s s e d i n the A c a d e m y a s w e l l . Plato's first two s u c c e s s o r s , S p e u s i p p u s , followed b y X e n o c r a t e s , b o t h d e v e l o p e d elaborate a n d d i s t i n c t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r i e s a p p a r e n t l y d e s i g n e d , l i k e the F o r m s , to e x p l a i n the intelligible o r d e r i n the w o r l d ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) . S i n c e S p e u s i p p u s a n d X e n o c r a t e s w e r e b o t h m e m b e r s o f the A c a d e m y p r i o r to Plato's death, the o r i g i n of their m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r i e s is p r o b a b l y to b e f o u n d i n their t r a i n i n g w i t h Plato.

ARCESILAUS

T h e s a m e m a y be s a i d for A r i s t o t l e , w h o w a s a s t u d e n t i n the A c a d e m y l o r twenty years before s e t t i n g off to start h i s o w n s c h o o l . H i s m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w , w h i c h is a p p a r e n t l y d e v e l o p e d in r e a c t i o n to the F o r m s , differs m a r k e d l y f r o m those of h i s A c a d e m i c c o l l e a g u e s . A r i s t o t l e r e m a r k s that e v e n t h o u g h the F o r m s h a d b e e n i n t r o d u c e d by h i s f r i e n d s , he is b o u n d to h o n o u r the t r u t h m o r e h i g h l y (JV£ 1,6,

I 0 ° 6 a l 2 - 1 7 ) . I n d e e d , w e m a y even say that one d i s h o n o u r s

o n e s f r i e n d b y not p o i n t i n g out the flaws i n h i s r e a s o n i n g . A n d we m i g h t , s o m e w h a t o p t i m i s t i c a l l y , h o p e that Aristotle's f r i e n d s i n the A c a d e m y s a w it that w a y as w e l l , A f t e r a l l , Plato h i m s e l f p r o v i d e s s o m e d e v a s t a t i n g o b j e c t i o n s to the t h e o r y of the F o r m s i n h i s o w n

Parmenides. T h e fact that d i s a g r e e m e n t w a s tolerated if not e n c o u r a g e d , a n d the fact that s u c h a v a r i e t y o f p o s i t i o n s e m e r g e d f r o m the A c a d e m y , suggest that Plato w a s not interested i n forcing a n o r t h o d o x interpretation o f the F o r m s o n h i s s t u d e n t s . I n k e e p i n g w i t h the d i a l e c t i c a l spirit o f h i s d i a l o g u e s Plato p r o b a b l y sought to i n s p i r e h i s students to t h i n k for t h e m s e l v e s . A S o c r a t i c t h e m e that e m e r g e s t i m e a n d 1

again In the d i a l o g u e s is that w e m u s t a r r i v e at the t r u t h for o u r s e l v e s if we are to a r r i v e at a l l . T e a c h i n g is not a m a t t e r of p o u r i n g the a n s w e r s i n , but rather l e a d i n g , e n t i c i n g o r aggravating the s t u d e n t to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h for h i m s e l f , I n short, l e a r n i n g c a n n e v e r be forced (see for e x a m p l e Rep. 5 3 6 e - f ) . A n d in so far as the d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p r o m o t i o n o f an official a c c o u n t o f P l a t o n i s m i n v o l v e d s u c h force, it w o u l d not h a v e b e e n p a r t of P l a t o s p l a n tor the A c a d e m y a n d his students. A n o t h e r t h e m e I r o m the d i a l o g u e s that Plato's s u c c e s s o r s f o c u s e d o n is that v i r t u e is sufficient (or n e a r l y s u f f i c i e n t ) for h a p p i n e s s . I n m a k i n g h i s case for the i n t r i n s i c v a l u e o f v i r t u e In the Republic,

for

e x a m p l e , Plato argues that it s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d a s a k i n d of health of the s o u l a n d f u l f i l m e n t of o u r r a t i o n a l , h u m a n nature. Properlyu n d e r s t o o d , virtue is w o r t h w h i l e regardless of its c o n s e q u e n c e s , a l t h o u g h it is v a l u a b l e for its c o n s e q u e n c e s a s w e l l . T h e intellectual pleasures that are available o n l y to the v i r t u o u s are far s u p e r i o r to anyother. W i t h o u t the k n o w l e d g e of the F o r m o f the G o o d that is n e c e s s a r y tor v i r t u e , e v e n the fullest possible k n o w l e d g e of o t h e r t h i n g s is

37

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of n o benefit to u s , a n y m o r e t h a n if w e a c q u i r e a n y t h i n g w i t h o u t the g o o d o f it {Rep. 5 0 5 a - b ) . A s l o n g a s w e l a c k v i r t u e , n o n e o f w h a t we typically t h i n k o l a s g o o d - tor e x a m p l e , h e a l t h , w e a l t h , b e a u t y - is n e c e s s a r i l y g o o d o r b e n e f i c i a l for us, I f I a m i n a v i c i o u s state, these apparent g o o d s are i n fact h a r m f u l i n so far as t h e y m a k e m e better able to a c h i e v e m y v i c i o u s goals. A s l o n g as I d o not k n o w w h a t is g o o d for m e , I a m better oft n o t b e i n g able to a c h i e v e m y e n d s . S p e u s i p p u s a n d X e n o c r a t e s w e r e p r o b a b l y t h i n k i n g a l o n g these lines w h e n they a s s e r t e d that the best life tor h u m a n b e i n g s is o n e i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n a t u r e ( D i l l o n 2 0 0 3 : 77, 142ff.). B u t it is a l s o likely that they d i s a g r e e d a b o u t the details of h o w the p h r a s e " i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n a t u r e " w a s to be i n t e r p r e t e d . T h e t h i r d s u c c e s s o r , P o l e m o , l e d the A c a d e m y for n e a r l y forty years f r o m 314 B C E u n t i l h i s d e a t h i n c.276 B C E . H e does not s e e m to h a v e d i v e r g e d significantly t r o m h i s predecessor, X e n o c r a t e s . Instead, he e m p h a s i z e d the i m p o r t a n c e of e n g a g i n g i n p r a c t i c a l affairs. T h i s is not to say that he i g n o r e d or a v o i d e d theoretical p u r s u i t s , b u t that he c a u t i o n e d h i s s t u d e n t s not to b e c o m e so e n g r o s s e d w i t h t h e m as to lose sight o f their a p p l i c a t i o n s , We s h o u l d not, h e says, b e a d m i r e d for o u r skill w i t h w o r d s , a n d yet be at w a r w i t h o u r s e l v e s i n the o r d e r i n g o f o u r lives ( D L 4 . 1 8 ) . T h e c o n f l i c t he refers to is p r o b a b l y a m a t t e r o f h a v i n g o n e s beliefs a n d d i s p o s i t i o n s at o d d s w i t h one a n o t h e r : b e l i e v i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h i n g s a n d not l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the dictates o f r e a s o n , a n d o u r c o m m o n h u m a n nature, but i n s t e a d l e a r n i n g h o w to talk a g o o d game, T h i s is also a t h e m e that Plato frequently d e v e l o p s in h i s d i a logues; p l a y i n g w i t h w o r d s s h o u l d n e v e r be m i s t a k e n for g e n u i n e p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n . T h e f o r m e r a i m s o n l y at v i c t o r y w h i l e the latter a i m s at u n c o v e r i n g the t r u t h . M a n y of S o c r a t e s

1

interlocutors

suffer, at least i n h i s e y e s , f r o m the m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n that the point of p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate is to w i n a n d be t h o u g h t s u p e r i o r to one's o p p o n e n t . N o t all of the G r e e k S o p h i s t s w e r e u n s c r u p u l o u s ; Plato presents b o t h G o r g i a s a n d P r o t a g o r a s a s at least w e l l - m e a n i n g , a n d there is g o o d r e a s o n to believe that he is n o t e s p e c i a l l y fair i n h i s g e n e r a l p o r t r a y a l of the S o p h i s t s (see W o o d r u f f 1999).

Neverthe-

less, o n e of the S o p h i s t s m o s t h i g h l y p r i z e d s k i l l s was the ability to 1

38

ARCESILAUS

argue o n both sides ot a n y i s s u e . T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y v a l u a b l e w h e n p o l i t i c a l b u s i n e s s is c o n d u c t e d by w a y o f p u b l i c s p e e c h . It is also c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t w h e n d e f e n d i n g o n e s e l l f r o m unjust a c c u s a t i o n s , a l t h o u g h o f c o u r s e it w o u l d w o r k e q u a l l y w e l l against j u s t ones (see Aristophanes'

Clouds).

I n h i s d i a l o g u e s , Plato expresses the w o r r y that the m a s t e r y of s u c h a skill too easily d i s t r a c t s us f r o m the difficult w o r k of e x a m i n i n g o u r o w n lives. T h o s e w h o seek to w i n by a n y m e a n s a n d w h o change their p o s i t i o n solely to a v o i d b e i n g refuted are like patients w h o lie to their doctors.* T h i s a n a l o g y a s s u m e s that one's interlocutor is q u a l i f i e d to d i a g n o s e intellectual c o n d i t i o n s a n d that the p u r s u i t o f t r u t h c a n in fact l e a d to a h a r m o n i o u s life. B u t P o l e m o is o n s o l i d P l a t o n i c g r o u n d i n i n s i s t i n g that b e i n g a clever s p e a k e r is w o r t h l e s s if not h a r m f u l i n the a b s e n c e of a w e l l - o r d e r e d , v i r t u o u s life. N o d o u b t this p o i n t was not lost o n P o l e m o s s t u d e n t A r c e s i l a u s , w h o w a s a n e x c e p t i o n a l l y clever speaker. A f t e r s t u d y i n g a s t r o n o m y a n d g e o m e t r y i n h i s h o m e t o w n of P i t a n e , he c a m e to A t h e n s as a y o u n g m a n ot about eighteen y e a r s o l d ( c . 2 9 8 B C E ) , r o u g h l y the t i m e i n w h i c h P y r r h o ( c . 3 6 5 - 2 7 5 ) , Z e n o (the f o u n d e r of S t o i c i s m , c . 3 3 5 2 6 2 ) a n d E p i c u r u s ( c . 3 4 l - 2 7 1 ) w e r e all f l o u r i s h i n g . H i s older b r o t h e r w a n t e d h i m to b e c o m e a n orator, w h i c h is p e r h a p s w h y he s t u d i e d w i t h Aristotle's s u c c e s s o r , T h e o p h r a s t u s . A r i s t o t l e h a d i n c l u d e d r h e t o r i c a s a legitimate s c i e n c e , w o r t h y o f p h i l o s o p h e r s ' attention, a n d T h e o p h r a s t u s i n c l u d e d it i n h i s c u r r i c u l u m . B u t despite h i s r h e t o r i c a l p r o w e s s , A r c e s i l a u s w a s d e v o t e d to p h i l o s o p h y a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , to one of the l e a d i n g A c a d e m i c s , G r a n t o r . Altogether, A r c e s i l a u s s p e n t about twenty years i n Plato's s c h o o l before b e c o m i n g h e a d h i m s e l f , a p p a r e n t l y w i t h the a p p r o v a l o f his c o l l e a g u e s ( D L 4 . 3 2 ) . T h e a u t h o r ot the Academic

Index

remarks,

"At first he d e f e n d e d the p o s i t i o n a d o p t e d by the S c h o o l f r o m Plato a n d S p e u s i p p u s u p to P o l e m o " (Index.

A c , c o l . 18). If o u r e v i d e n c e

c o n c e r n i n g Arcesilaus' predecessors

is a c c u r a t e ,

t h e n n o single,

o r t h o d o x P l a t o n i s m w a s s h a r e d a m o n g t h e m a l l . S o the p o s i t i o n (thesis) that he i n i t i a l l y a d o p t e d s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as m o r e of a g e n e r a l s t a n c e o r r e s e a r c h a g e n d a t h a n a set of s p e c i f i c c o n c l u s i o n s . I n that sense ( a n d w i t h s o m e s i m p l i f i c a t i o n ) , the p o s i t i o n , or

39

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SCEPTICISM

a g e n d a , o f Plato's A c a d e m y p r i o r to A r c e s i l a u s ' t a k i n g over p r o m i n e n t l y teatured the p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the F o r m s , i n c l u d i n g h o w or w h e t h e r they m a k e k n o w l e d g e of the p h y s i c a l w o r l d p o s sible, a n d the p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the e t h i c a l ideal o f l i v i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h nature.

S c e p t i c i s m i n the A c a d e m y : the P l a t o n i c a n d S o c r a t i c i n s p i r a t i o n A r c e s i l a u s t u r n e d the A c a d e m y a w a y f r o m these p r o j e c t s

and

t o w a r d s s c e p t i c i s m . I n at least o n e i m p o r t a n t respect this m o v e was not r e v o l u t i o n a r y . A s we have s e e n , there h a d a l w a y s b e e n a n i n t e l l e c t u a l f r e e d o m in the A c a d e m y that kept it f r o m b e c o m i n g a m e r e s t o r e h o u s e of d o g m a . B u t the m o v e to s c e p t i c i s m d i d m a r k a n e w a n d d i s t i n c t p h a s e of the A c a d e m y . By the t i m e A r c e s i l a u s b e c a m e h e a d of the s c h o o l , t h e r e w e r e p r o b a b l y n o A c a d e m i c s alive w h o h a d p e r s o n a l l y k n o w n Plato. T h i s m a d e Plato's b o o k s all the m o r e i m p o r t a n t . D e s p i t e h a v i n g a c c e s s to t h e s e b o o k s , A r c e s i l a u s a c q u i r e d h i s o w n c o p i e s ( D L 4 . 3 2 ) , f r o m w h i c h he d e r i v e d h i s s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A s C i c e r o puts it: J

[ A r c e s i l a u s w a s ] the first to adopt f r o m the v a r i e d b o o k s ol Plato a n d f r o m Socrates

1

d i a l o g u e s , e s p e c i a l l y the i d e a

that there is n o c e r t a i n t y that c a n be g r a s p e d e i t h e r by the senses or the m i n d . I n this c o m p l e t e rejection of the m i n d a n d s e n s e s as i n s t r u m e n t s of j u d g m e n t , he is s a i d to have e m p l o y e d an e x c e p t i o n a l l y c h a r m i n g m a n n e r of s p e a k i n g , a n d also to h a v e b e e n the first to establish the practice - a l t h o u g h t h i s w a s v e r y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of S o c r a t e s - o f not r e v e a l i n g h i s o w n v i e w , but o f a l w a y s a r g u i n g against a n y v i e w that a n y o n e else w o u l d assert, {De Or. 3.67 [ M a y & W i s s e 2 0 0 1 ] ; see P l u t a r c h , Adv. Col. 112 l e - 1 1 2 2a) T h a t A r c e s i l a u s d e r i v e d h i s s c e p t i c i s m f r o m Plato's d i a l o g u e s w i l l go s o m e w a y i n e x p l a i n i n g w h y there is n o r e c o r d o l a n y protest or

40

AfcCESILAUS

upheaval following his innovation. Given his powerful rhetorical skill, he m i g h t have sold his colleagues o n the idea that he w a s r e t u r n i n g the i n s t i t u t i o n to its real roots: Plato, a n d S o c r a t e s before h i m , had been sceptics. Earlier A c a d e m i c s , i n c l u d i n g Arcesilaus himself, 5

h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d the s p i r i t o f P l a t o n i c p h i l o s o p h y b y s e e k i n g to articulate, d e v e l o p a n d d e f e n d positive d o c t r i n e s . T h u s he set out to r e i n v i g o r a t e the A c a d e m y w i t h the s c e p t i c a l spirit of its f o u n d e r , h i P l a t o s d i a l o g u e s , C i c e r o c l a i m s , " n o t h i n g is a f f i r m e d , there are m a n y a r g u m e n t s o n e i t h e r s i d e , e v e r y t h i n g is u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a n d n o t h i n g is c l a i m e d to be c e r t a i n " ( A c . 1.46).

A r g u i n g against all comers T h e fact that Plato wrote d i a l o g u e s p r o v i d e s s o m e s u p p o r t for the c l a i m that he never a f f i r m e d a n y t h i n g in h i s o w n voice. I n Berkeley's a n d H u m e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s , by c o n t r a s t , it is g e n e r a l l y clear w h o s p e a k s tor the author, a n d w h a t p o s i t i o n s are b e i n g p r o m o t e d . But i n Plato's d i a l o g u e s it is not c l e a r w h o , if a n y o n e , s p e a k s for the author. It c o n t i n u e s to be e x t r e m e l y difficult to d i s c e r n w h a t Plato t h i n k s , a n d g i v e n the s c h o l a r l y t r a c k r e c o r d there is little h o p e of ever a r r i v i n g at a c o n s e n s u s , let a l o n e a n e n d u r i n g one, r e g a r d i n g an o r t h o d o x P l a t o n i s m that is true to Plato's i n t e n t i o n s , That the d i a l o g u e s c o n t a i n a r g u m e n t s against w h a t e v e r a n y o n e asserts is a l s o p l a u s i b l e e n o u g h , Socrates is c o n s t a n t l y t r o l l i n g l o r n e w a n s w e r s to h i s q u e s t i o n s a n d for n e w i n t e r l o c u t o r s w h o w i l l finally reveal the truth to h i m , C i c e r o s p e c i f i c a l l y tells us that A r c e s i laus r e v i v e d this S o c r a t i c p r a c t i c e of e l i c i t i n g h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s ' v i e w s i n o r d e r to a r g u e against t h e m (Fin.

2.2; ND 1.11; Fat. 4; Ac.

that is, to see w h e t h e r their r e a s o n s really j u s t i f y t h e i r b e l i e f s . Socrates e x p l a i n s this practice i n the Apology

1,16), 6

a s part o f h i s s t r u g -

gle to u n d e r s t a n d the p u z z l i n g p r o n o u n c e m e n t of the D e l p h i c o r a cle; n a m e l y , that n o o n e i s w i s e r t h a n Socrates ( A p . 2 0 e - 2 2 e ) , H e c o u l d not, at first, i m a g i n e h o w this statement c o u l d be t r u e s i n c e he d i s c e r n e d n o w i s d o m i n h i m s e l f , b u t he h a d n o d o u b t that it w a s true, for the g o d w o u l d not lie. S e e k i n g to resolve the oracle's r i d d l e ,

U

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

he e x a m i n e d those w h o h a d a r e p u t a t i o n for w i s d o m , p e r h a p s to better u n d e r s t a n d w h a t he w a s s u p p o s e d to have h i m s e l f . B u t after a l i f e t i m e spent s e a r c h i n g for s o m e o n e w i t h e x p e r t , that is, i r r e f u t a ble, k n o w l e d g e o f v i r t u e , Socrates g r a d u a l l y c a m e to the c o n c l u s i o n that w h a t the o r a c l e m e a n t w a s that he is wisest b e c a u s e he d o e s not believe he k n o w s w h a t in fact he does n o t . So he is slightly better off t h a n all the rest w h o m i s t a k e n l y t h i n k they k n o w what they do not. ( N o t e this is a far c r y f r o m the t r a n q u i l c o n t e n t m e n t that P y r r h o discovers f r o m his ignorance.) I n p u r s u i n g t h i s project, S o c r a t e s m a k e s three i m p o r t a n t a s s u m p tions about k n o w l e d g e a n d virtue. F i r s t , he i m p l i c i t l y identifies k n o w l e d g e w i t h virtue. I n r e a c t i o n to the o r a c l e s a s s e r t i o n that n o one is a s w i s e a s Socrates, he reflects o n the fact that he is not a w a r e of k n o w i n g a n y t h i n g w o r t h w h i l e ( A p . 20c, 21 b ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , he a s s u m e s that if he w e r e w i s e he w o u l d have the relevant sort o f k n o w l e d g e . A c c o r d i n g l y , he investigates the o r a c l e b y l o o k i n g for s o m e o n e w h o h a s the sort of k n o w l e d g e that he l a c k s . S e c o n d l y , i f s o m e o n e h a s this k n o w l e d g e , t h e n he c a n n o t be refuted. T o k n o w p is to k n o w w h y p is t r u e i n s u c h a w a y that n o a r g u m e n t c a n u n d e r m i n e y o u r g r a s p o f that t r u t h (see Gorg.

4 7 3 b ; Merta

85c).

This

a s s u m p t i o n is evident i n the w a y S o c r a t e s goes a b o u t testing the oracle; n a m e l y , b y s e e i n g w h e t h e r a n y o n e c a n c o n s i s t e n t l y d e f e n d h i s v i e w s o n v i r t u e . W h e n Socrates s h o w s h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r is u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to c o n t r a d i c t o r y beliefs about p , we are s u p p o s e d to c o n c l u d e the i n t e r l o c u t o r d o e s not k n o w p. T h e t h i r d a s s u m p t i o n is the i d e a that k n o w l e d g e of v i r t u e is n e c e s s a r y ( a n d p o s s i b l y e v e n sufficient) for p e r f o r m i n g g o o d m o r a l a c t i o n s a n d u l t i m a t e l y for l i v i n g a g o o d life. T h i s is r o o t e d i n a n o t h e r f a m o u s S o c r a t i c p a r adox: n o o n e k n o w i n g l y d o e s w r o n g (e.g. Prot

351b-358d),

T h e u p s h o t is that as l o n g as w e l a c k this c r u c i a l k n o w l e d g e , the o n l y t h i n g really w o r t h d o i n g is to earnestly p u r s u e it. A n d , given the s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n - if y o u have k n o w l e d g e , y o u c a n n o t be refuted - we m u s t not rest c o n t e n t w i t h e v e n the m o s t t h o r o u g h l y d e f e n d e d p o s i t i o n a s l o n g as it is p o s s i b l e that it m i g h t be refuted. A s l o n g as that p o s s i b i l i t y r e m a i n s , w e c a n n o t j u s t i f i a b l y c l a i m to have the k n o w l e d g e that i s n e c e s s a r y for o u r f l o u r i s h i n g .

42

ARCESILAUS

A c c o r d i n g l y , A r c e s i l a u s m o v e s the A c a d e m y away t r o m a b s t r u s e theoretical s p e c u l a t i o n r e g a r d i n g the F o r m s o r o t h e r m e t a p h y s i c a l first p r i n c i p l e s by e m p h a s i z i n g the negative c h a r a c t e r of Socrates' project. U n d e r h i s l e a d e r s h i p , the o u t c o m e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y is the e l i m i n a t i o n o f p o o r l y f o u n d e d beliefs. T h i s is a c c o m p l i s h e d by a r g u i n g against a n y t h i n g that a n y o n e is w i l l i n g to d e f e n d .

Nothing can be k n o w n with certainty G i v e n the nature o f S o c r a t e s ' p r o j e c t , it w o u l d not be s u r p r i s i n g if he c a m e to the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n b e k n o w n w i t h certainty, at least r e g a r d i n g v i r t u e . S u c h a c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d b e h a r d to a v o i d after reflecting o n h i s repeated failure to f i n d s o m e o n e w i t h expert, (i.e. irrefutable, c e r t a i n ) k n o w l e d g e . W h e n e v e r he d i s c o v e r s a p r o m i s i n g c a n d i d a t e , Socrates e v e n t u a l l y f i n d s h i m l a c k i n g . W h e t h e r or not he a r t i c u l a t e d the i m p l i c i t p r e m i s e s , the suggestion o f a n i n d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t is u n m i s t a k a b l e . I n t e r l o c u t o r s A to Y have failed to c o n sistently d e f e n d their v i e w s a n d therefore t h e i r ( i m p l i c i t or explicit) c l a i m s to c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e are false. O n the basis of this e x p e r i e n c e o n e m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y expect that i n t e r l o c u t o r Z w i l l a l s o tail. A n d o n the basis o f that e m i m e r a t i v e i n d u c t i o n o n e m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y infer that e v e r y o n e w i l l fail. F i n a l l y , i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n these failures, one m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e that n o t h i n g (at least r e g a r d i n g v i r t u e ) c a n be k n o w n w i t h certainty. F o r i f k n o w l e d g e of s u c h a n i m p o r t a n t m a t t e r w e r e p o s s i b l e , s u r e l y s o m e o n e w o u l d have a c q u i r e d it. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is n e c e s s a r i l y tentative. T h e fact that n o one passes S o c r a t e s ' tests does not entail that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n . W e m a y just as well c o n c l u d e that Socrates has not c h o s e n his i n t e r l o c u t o r s w e l l e n o u g h or that t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g w r o n g w i t h the tests. I n p a r t i c u l a r , the s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n m e n t i o n e d above, n a m e l y that k n o w l e d g e requires irrefutability, s e e m s too d e m a n d i n g . I n k e e p i n g w i t h o u r o r d i n a r y w a y s of s p e a k i n g , we m i g h t w i s h to say we k n o w all s o r t s o l t h i n g s despite b e i n g u n a b l e to p r o v i d e irrefutable j u s t i fication. O n the o t h e r h a n d , w e m i g h t also i n s i s t that the d e g r e e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n m u s t be p r o p o r t i o n a l to the i m p o r t a n c e of the m a t t e r

13

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

i n q u e s t i o n . It, as Socrates m a i n t a i n s , beliefs about the p r o p e r w a y to live are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t , t h e n we m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y h o l d t h e m to s u c h stringent r e q u i r e m e n t s . B e that a s it may, it A r c e s i l a u s p u r s u e d a s i m i l a r l y S o c r a t i c m i s s i o n , a n d given h i s r h e t o r i c a l power, he p r o b a b l y w o u l d h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d the s a m e s t r i n g of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s , T h u s he w o u l d have a r r i v e d at the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n w i t h c e r t a i n t y by m e a n s of the s a m e sort ot i n d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g . C i c e r o a l s o p r o v i d e s a n alternative e x p l a n a t i o n . H e tells u s that A r c e s i l a u s , again f o l l o w i n g i n Socrates* footsteps, a r r i v e d at h i s c o n fession o f i g n o r a n c e f r o m reflecting o n the l i m i t a t i o n s of o u r m i n d s a n d senses a n d the s h o r t n e s s o f life ( A c . 1 . 4 5 ) .

3

I f i n d e e d h e ever

f o r m u l a t e d this as a n a r g u m e n t , it n e e d not e x c l u d e the i n d u c t i v e r e a s o n i n g . O n the c o n t r a r y , s u c h l i m i t a t i o n s w o u l d in fact h e l p to e x p l a i n the s t r i n g o f d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s that figure in the i n d u c t i v e a r g u m e n t . T h e c r u c i a l p o i n t is that A r c e s i l a u s s e e m s to have r e a s o n e d h i s w a y to the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n b e k n o w n .

The influence of P y r r h o S o A r c e s i l a u s c o u l d h a v e agreed w i t h P y r r h o that w e are not s o c o n stituted as to g a i n c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e of the w o r l d . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , A r c e s i l a u s s e e m s to b e f o l l o w i n g P y r r h o s l e a d w h e n he insists that w i s d o m r e q u i r e s the s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t . T h i s is a n i d e a that we d e f i n i t e l y d o not find i n Platos dialogues.B o t h S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s (PH

1 . 2 3 2 - 4 ) a n d N u m e n i u s (Pmcp.

Ev.

1 4 . 6 . 4 - 6 ) c l a i m that A r c e s i l a u s is like a P y r r h o n i s t i n so far as he refuses to assert a n y t h i n g about the w a y the w o r l d really is."-' L i k e P y r r h o , he refuses to accept the v e r d i c t o f the senses or of r e a s o n as b e i n g true o r e v e n likely to be true. Sextus f u r t h e r c l a i m s that A r c esilaus differs f r o m the P y r r h o n i s t o n l y in e n d o r s i n g the s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t as g o o d . It is l i k e l y that A r c e s i l a u s , like so m a n y o t h e r s , a d m i r e d P y r r h o s l e g e n d a r y t r a n q u i l l i t y . H e m a y a l s o have b e e n i m p r e s s e d by P y r r h o s i n s i s t e n c e that we must s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t in light o f o u r i g n o r a n c e .

•It

ARCESILAUS

But there is n o e v i d e n c e to suggest that A r c e s i l a u s t h o u g h t t r a n q u i l lity is the proper goal in life. S o w h i l e Pyrrho's i n f l u e n c e is significant, it d o e s not s h a p e t h e c o n t o u r s o f A r c e s i l a u s ' s c e p t i c i s m n e a r l y as m u c h as the i n f l u e n c e of Plato a n d S o c r a t e s . It is o n l y b y p o i n t i n g to the figure o f Socrates that w e c a n u n d e r s t a n d w h y A r c e s i l a u s m i g h t have t h o u g h t s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t is good (PH 1.233). I f h e accepts the S o c r a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n that v i r t u e , a s a f o r m of k n o w l e d g e , is n e c e s s a r y for a g o o d life, t h e n we a r e right to resist a n y t e m p t a t i o n to settle for beliefs that a r e not k n o w n w i t h certainty. T o settle for s u c h beliefs w i l l put the s e a r c h for t r u t h to a p r e m a t u r e e n d a n d so c a n n o t be g o o d . O n the c o n t r a r y , s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t is g o o d , but o n l y w i t h respect to o u r c o m m i t m e n t to d i s c o v e r t h e t r u t h .

Z e n o a n d the Stoic i n s p i r a t i o n A r o u n d the t i m e A r c e s i l a u s a r r i v e d i n A t h e n s a s a y o u n g m a n (c.298 B C E ) , Z e n o , w h o also s t u d i e d w i t h P o l e m o i n Plato's A c a d emy, h a d established a n e w philosophical school. Since h e typically m e t w i t h h i s d i s c i p l e s at o n e of the c o v e r e d c o l o n n a d e s ( o r Stoa), c l o s e to t h e A g o r a , they e v e n t u a l l y c a m e to b e c a l l e d Stoics, W h e n A r c e s i l a u s t o o k over as h e a d o f the A c a d e m y in c.268, S t o i c i s m w a s well established a n d flourishing. O n e of the d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f the e a r l y S t o a is a n e m p i r i c a l l y b a s e d e p i s t e m o l o g y that is s u p p o s e d to s h o w h o w the w i s d o m that Socrates s o u g h t w a s p o s s i b l e ( L o n g 1988; F r e d e 1999). T h e e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t is a type o f i m p r e s s i o n that "arises f r o m w h a t is, a n d is s t a m p e d a n d i m p r e s s e d exactly in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t is, o f s u c h a k i n d as c o u l d n o t arise f r o m w h a t is n o t " (Af 7 . 2 4 8 ) . T h e Stoics d e s c r i b e d s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s as kataJeptike,

graspable or g r a s p i n g ;

I s h a l l leave it transliterated as "kataleptic". K a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n s a c c u r a t e l y c o n v e y all the relevant details o f t h e o b j e c t o r state o f affairs f r o m w h i c h they a r i s e . T h e y s o m e h o w guarantee the t r u t h o f the p r o p o s i t i o n s that articulate t h e i r content, Kataleptic impressions provide a crucial path from foolishness to w i s d o m tor t h e Stoics. B y l e a r n i n g to d i s t i n g u i s h kataleptic

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

i m p r e s s i o n s f r o m n o n - k a t a l e p t i c o n e s , w e m a y give o u r assent o n l y to w h a t is true. T h e kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is a n a t u r a l r e s o u r c e , so to speak, that is s h a r e d a m o n g sage a n d f o o l i s h alike. W h e n o n e is i n a n o r m a l a n d healthy c o n d i t i o n , the i m p r e s s i o n s o n e receives are, for the m o s t part, k a t a l e p t i c . But w h e n w e assent to kataleptic i m p r e s sions, we d o not d o so f r o m the s a m e f i r m a n d u n w a v e r i n g d i s p o s i t i o n that the sage does, n o r d o we g r a s p the c o m p l e x , m u t u a l l y r e i n f o r c i n g i n t e r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g these i m p r e s s i o n s . U n l i k e the sages assent, ours is c o n t i n g e n t o n c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d is not r o o t e d i n a c o m p l e t e , systematic g r a s p of reality. S o e v e n i f w e assent to a kataleptic i m p r e s sion (or, m o r e precisely, to the p r o p o s i t i o n i m p l i c i t in the i m p r e s s i o n ) we m a y still quite easily be c o n v i n c e d to a b a n d o n this t r u t h b y s o m e a r g u m e n t o r s o m e o t h e r i m p r e s s i o n . T h e Stoic sage, by c o n t r a s t , is i r r e f u t a b l e a n d u n s h a k e a b l e i n h i s k n o w l e d g e (e.g. D L 7-121, 162, 201; M 7 . 1 5 7 ) . H e r e at last is s o m e o n e , or at least a p o s s i b l e s o m e o n e , w h o c o u l d s t a n d u p to Socrates' relentless q u e s t i o n i n g . I n the a b s e n c e of a real sage to c r o s s - e x a m i n e , A r c e s i l a u s t u r n s his sights o n those w h o w o u l d d e f e n d this i d e a l l y w i s e h u m a n b e i n g . T h e r e are t w o d i s t i n c t a c c o u n t s of h i s m o t i v a t i o n for d o i n g so. A c c o r d i n g to o n e , he w i s h e d to s c o r e p o i n t s b y t a k i n g d o w n a w i d e l y r e s p e c t e d p h i l o s o p h y a n d p e r h a p s a l s o to b o o s t the f a m e of h i s o w n s c h o o l i n the p r o c e s s (Praep.

Ev. 14.4.8; A c . 2 . 1 5 - 1 6 ) .

A c c o r d i n g to the other, he s i m p l y w a n t e d to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h , a n d especially w h e t h e r Z e n o k n e w his optimistic epistemological v i e w to be true ( A c . 2.76). T h e s e t w o a c c o u n t s are c o m p a t i b l e . T h e r e m a y w e l l h a v e b e e n s o m e petty p r o f e s s i o n a l r i v a l r y at w o r k i n a d d i t i o n to the m o r e noble a s p i r a t i o n s . C i c e r o r e c o n s t r u c t s the debate this w a y ; N o n e o f Zeno's predecessors h a d ever explicitly formulated, or e v e n suggested, the v i e w that a p e r s o n c o u l d h o l d n o o p i n i o n s - a n d not j u s t that they c o u l d , but that d o i n g so was n e c e s s a r y for the w i s e p e r s o n . A r c e s i l a u s thought that this v i e w w a s b o t h t r u e a n d h o n o r a b l e , as w e l l a s right for the w i s e p e r s o n . So he a s k e d Z e n o , we m a y s u p p o s e , w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n it the w i s e p e r s o n couldn't a p p r e h e n d a n y t h i n g , but

4G

ARCESILAUS

it w a s a m a r k o f w i s d o m not to h o l d o p i n i o n s . Z e n o r e p l i e d , n o d o u b t , that the w i s e p e r s o n w o u l d n ' t h o l d a n y o p i n i o n s b e c a u s e there w a s s o m e t h i n g a p p r e h e n s i b l e [kataleptic]. S o what w a s that? A n i m p r e s s i o n , 1 s u p p o s e . W e l l , w h a t k i n d of i m p r e s s i o n ? T h e n Z e n o d e f i n e d it thus: a n i m p r e s s i o n f r o m w h a t is, s t a m p e d , i m p r e s s e d , a n d m o l d e d just as it is. After that, A r c e s i l a u s w e n t o n to a s k w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if a true i m p r e s s i o n w a s j u s t like a false o n e . A t t h i s p o i n t , Z e n o w a s s h a r p e n o u g h to see that n o i m p r e s s i o n w o u l d be a p p r e h e n s i b l e if o n e that c a m e f r o m what is w a s s u c h that there c o u l d be o n e j u s t like it f r o m w h a t is n o t . A r c e s i l a u s agreed that t h i s w a s a g o o d a d d i t i o n to the d e f i n i t i o n , s i n c e n e i t h e r a false i m p r e s s i o n , n o r a t r u e i m p r e s s i o n j u s t l i k e a false o n e , w a s a p p r e h e n s i b l e . So t h e n he set to w o r k w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s to s h o w that t h e r e is n o i m p r e s s i o n f r o m s o m e t h i n g true s u c h that there c o u l d not be o n e j u s t like it f r o m s o m e t h i n g false.

(Ac- 2.77)

B o t h A r c e s i l a u s a n d Z e n o agree that the sage h o l d s n o m e r e o p i n ions; that he is infallible ( A c . 2 . 6 6 - 6 7 ) . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for this a g r e e m e n t is their c o m m o n S o c r a t i c i n h e r i t a n c e . T h e r e is n o t h i n g s h o r t of infallibility that w i l l satisfy the S o c r a t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s o n w i s d o m . A s l o n g as it r e m a i n s p o s s i b l e that o n e m i g h t be refuted, he c a n n o t rest c o n t e n t w i t h m e r e beliefs or e v e n w i t h isolated bits o f k n o w l e d g e . I n s o far as o u r h a p p i n e s s a n d w e l l - b e i n g rest f i r m l y o n s u c h beliefs, o n e m u s t c o n t i n u e to p u t t h e m to the test u n t i l they are absolutely s e c u r e d . T h i s i n t u r n requires g r a s p i n g all of the s y s t e m a t i c e n t a i l m e n t s that s u p p o r t the t r u t h of e a c h of the sages beliefs. F o r e x a m p l e , in o r d e r to infallibly g r a s p the t r u t h of Stoic ethical p r i n c i p l e s , o n e m u s t see h o w they are logically related to the p r i n c i p l e s of p h y s i c s a n d theology. " 1

B u t if there w e r e n o t h i n g that w e c a n be absolutely c e r t a i n of, then it s e e m s w e c a n o n l y attain the infallibility of the sage by refusi n g to believe a n y t h i n g at a l l . B e l i e v i n g n o t h i n g is the o n l y w a y to assure that we w i l l never be m i s t a k e n . Z e n o agrees that the sage w i l l w i t h h o l d belief w h e n e v e r he is u n c e r t a i n . A l t h o u g h s u c h c a u t i o n is

17

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SCEPTICISM

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the sage, h i s w i s d o m is c o n s t i t u t e d b y irrefutable k n o w l e d g e . T o get to t h i s c o m p r e h e n s i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e have to rely o n isolated bits o f certainty. T h e s e are d e l i v e r e d to u s b y m e a n s o f i m p r e s s i o n s that originate i n w h a t t h e y represent, a n d that c o r r e c t l y report the details o f w h a t they represent. A r c e s i l a u s raised the o b v i o u s w o r r y that a n i m p r e s s i o n m i g h t appear to satisfy these c o n d i t i o n s a n d yet fail to. Z e n o t h e n a d d e d the c r u c i a l c l a i m that i n o r d e r for a n i m p r e s s i o n to b e kataleptic, there c a n n o t exist a talse i m p r e s s i o n that is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m it; or, i n S e x t u s a c c o u n t , a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is o f s u c h a k i n d 1

as c o u l d not arise t r o m w h a t is not (AÍ 7.252). W e m a y take this r e q u i r e m e n t as m e r e l y a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o r a s u b s t a n t i v e a d d i t i o n . A s a c l a r i f i c a t i o n , w e c a n see Z e n o a p p e a l i n g to the p r i n c i p l e of identity of i n d i s c e r n i b l e s in a r g u i n g that s i n c e n o t w o t h i n g s are e v e r exactly alike, their i m p r e s s i o n s w i l l n e v e r be exactly alike, or i n d i s t i n g u i s h able, either. B u t that s e e m s to m i s s the point of A r c e s i l a u s ' c o n c e r n ; n a m e l y , that t w o i m p r e s s i o n s m i g h t appear

indistinguishable. For

that r e a s o n , it s e e m s preferable to r e a d Z e n o ' s a d d i t i o n as m a r k i n g a first step t o w a r d s a n e x t e r n a l i s t v i e w , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the s u b j e c t does not n e e d to b e a w a r e that the i m p r e s s i o n h e assents to is k a t a leptic i n o r d e r for h i m to g r a s p it as k a t a l e p t i c , ' O n t h i s v i e w , Z e n o 2

begins to b r i n g in c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of h o w kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s are f o r m e d - their c a u s a l h i s t o r i e s - as a w a y of g u a r a n t e e i n g they arise t r o m w h a t is, a n d that they are s t a m p e d a n d m o u l d e d p r e c i s e l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h this. D e s p i t e this m o v e , A r c e s i l a u s went to w o r k c o n s t r u e ting e x a m p l e s of talse i m p r e s s i o n s that are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t r u e ones. C i c e r o reports two k i n d s . O n e type illustrates cases o f m i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n : for e x a m p l e , identical t w i n s , eggs, statues or i m p r i n t s i n w a x m a d e by the s a m e r i n g ( A c . 2 . 8 4 - 8 7 ) . A n o t h e r type i n v o l v e s cases o f i l l u s i o n , d r e a m s a n d m a d n e s s (Ac. 2 . 8 8 - 9 1 ) . A l l o f these e x a m p l e s illustrate A r c e s i l a u s ' g e n e r a l point that for e v e r y true i m p r e s s i o n there m a y exist a false o n e that is q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l to it, a n d thus i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the t r u e o n e . T h e i s s u e , as A r c e s i l a u s c h o s e to u n d e r s t a n d it, is w h e t h e r w e are e v e r actually i n a p o s i t i o n to identify an i m p r e s s i o n as k a t a l e p t i c , regardless o f its c a u s a l h i s t o r y .

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T h e r e is a g o o d r e a s o n to agree w i t h A r c e s i l a u s ' a s s e s s m e n t h e r e . I n the S o c r a t i c spirit, t h e p u r p o s e o i Z e n o s a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e is p r a c t i c a l . H e is not p r i m a r i l y i n t e r e s t e d in s h o w i n g us that i n s o m e abstract, t h e o r e t i c a l s e n s e w i s d o m is a l o g i c a l possibility, or that there is n o t h i n g c o n c e p t u a l l y i n c o h e r e n t about it. R a t h e r , w h a t he w a n t s to e s t a b l i s h is that w i t h t h e p r o p e r t r a i n i n g a n d use of o u r c o g n i t i v e r e s o u r c e s , w i s d o m is a n a t t a i n a b l e i d e a l . T h e r e is n o t h i n g about o u r h u m a n n a t u r e or about the w o r l d that prevents us f r o m a t t a i n i n g w i s d o m ; folly is d u e e x c l u s i v e l y to the c o r r u p t i o n of o u r n a t u r e . S o Z e n o n e e d s to s h o w that s o m e o n e c o u l d a c t u a l l y d e v e l o p his s k i l l s o f d i s c e r n m e n t to s u c h a level that he w o u l d n e v e r m i s t a k e a f a l s e h o o d for a t r u t h - a n d s o the " a r m s r a c e " b e g i n s . I n r e s p o n s e to e a c h of the s c e p t i c a l s c e n a r i o s he w i l l be forced to h y p o t h e s i z e an e v e n greater level o f e x p e r t i s e . E v e n i f the s c e p t i c grants

that

n o t w o i m p r e s s i o n s are in fact q u a l i t a t i v e l y i d e n t i c a l , he c a n a l w a y s i m a g i n e that they are s o i n f i n i t e s i m a l l y close that n o actual p e r s o n s skill c o u l d differentiate t h e m . H i e p o s s i b i l i t y of e r r o r a p p e a r s to be inescapable. If w e accept

this l i n e of t h i n k i n g , a n d i f w e accept t h e i n i t i a l

a s s u m p t i o n that w i s d o m is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h e r r o r , w e have n o t h i n g left to d o b u t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t .

A r c e s i l a u s is c r e d i t e d w i t h

d o i n g j u s t that:

F o r these r e a s o n s [i.e. r e a s o n s that e s t a b l i s h t h e i m p o s sibility o f S t o i c k n o w l e d g e ] , he [ A r c e s i l a u s ] t h o u g h t

that

we s h o u l d n ' t assert o r a f f i r m a n y t h i n g , or a p p r o v e it w i t h assent: w e s h o u l d a l w a y s c u r b o u r r a s h n e s s a n d r e s t r a i n o u r selves f r o m a n y slip. B u t he c o n s i d e r e d it p a r t i c u l a r l y r a s h to approve s o m e t h i n g false o r u n k n o w n , b e c a u s e n o t h i n g was m o r e s h a m e f u l t h a n for one's a s s e n t o r a p p r o v a l to outr u n k n o w l e d g e or a p p r e h e n s i o n . H i s practice w a s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h this theory, s o that b y a r g u i n g against everyone's v i e w s he led m o s t o l t h e m a w a y f r o m t h e i r o w n : w h e n a r g u m e n t s of e q u a l weight w e r e f o u n d l o r the o p p o s i t e sides of the s a m e s u b j e c t , it w a s e a s i e r to w i t h h o l d a s s e n t h o r n either side.

( A c . 1,45; see D L 4 . 2 8 , 32)

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

H e r e we have a picture of a m a n w h o never believes he k n o w s what he d o e s not. N o r d o e s h e even believe w h a t m a y be false. It appears that h e believes n o t h i n g . B u t w o u l d h e have c o n s i d e r e d m u n d a n e e m p i r i c a l beliefs r e g a r d i n g tables a n d c h a i r s to be r a s h a n d s h a m e ful also? It is u n l i k e l y that a n y o n e w o u l d p r i d e h i m s e l f o n k n o w i n g that, l o r e x a m p l e , G r a n t o r is w a l k i n g i n t h e A c a d e m y . I f A r c e s i l a u s had not n e e d e d to argue against s u c h a c l a i m , p e r h a p s h e w o u l d not object to b e l i e v i n g it. T a k e n this way, s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t w o u l d be l i m i t e d to those matters that have b e e n tested a n d refuted, that i s , s h o w n to be u n j u s t i f i e d . A l t h o u g h t h i s s e e m s to be the m o r e c h a r i t a b l e r e a d i n g , A r c e s i l a u s i n fact t h o u g h t w e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (PH 1.232; D L 4 . 3 2 ; Adv. Col. 1 1 2 0 C ) . T o a t t a i n w i s d o m w e m u s t d e v e l o p the u n w a v e r i n g d i s p o s i t i o n to assent o n l y to kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , regardless o f w h a t they are i m p r e s s i o n s o l . M o r e generally, a n d w i t h out p r e s u p p o s i n g S t o i c epistemology, w e m a y say that A r c e s i l a u s a i m e d to d e v e l o p the d i s p o s i t i o n to assent o n l y to p r o p o s i t i o n s sufficiently justified as to e n a b l e o n e to w i t h s t a n d S o c r a t i c e x a m i n a t i o n . I n e i t h e r case, w e m u s t w i t h h o l d assent not j u s t to c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d d i s p u t e d i m p r e s s i o n s about j u s t i c e a n d v i r t u e , b u t also to i m p r e s s i o n s about tables, c h a i r s a n d people a s w e l l ( A i 7 . 1 5 5 - 7 ) .

T h e apraxia

objection, I : s u s p e n d i n g judgement renders us

inactive T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n m a k e s the best sense o l the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n : to

s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g m a k e s lite u n l i v e a b l e . If A r c esilaus h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f beliefs about t h e m e d i u m - s i z e d objects we a l l e n c o u n t e r d a y to day, t h e o b j e c t i o n w o u l d lose its p u n c h . P l u t a r c h r e c o r d s o n e v e r s i o n o f this o b j e c t i o n , a i m e d s p e c i f i c a l l y at A r c e s i l a u s : " h o w is it that s o m e o n e w h o s u s p e n d s j u d g m e n t does not r u s h a w a y to a m o u n t a i n i n s t e a d of to the bath, o r s t a n d s u p a n d w a l k s to t h e d o o r rather than t h e w a l l w h e n h e w a n t s to go out to the m a r k e t - p l a c e ?

11

( Adv. Col. 1 1 2 2 E [ L S 6 9 A ] ; see a l s o Ac. 2 . 3 7 - 3 8 ) .

T h e i d e a is that b e l i e f is a n e c e s s a r y part o f a n y i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n . I n

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t e r m s of Stoic p s y c h o l o g y , o n e m u s t first p e r c e i v e the b a t h as s o m e t h i n g d e s i r a b l e a n d t h e n assent to the related p r o p o s i t i o n " I s h o u l d step t o w a r d s the bath". O n l y t h e n d o e s the e x p e c t e d a c t i o n o c c u r , I f h e w e r e to w i t h h o l d assent f r o m h i s i m p r e s s i o n (or a g a i n , the p r o p o s i t i o n associated w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n ] , then h e w o u l d not m o v e t o w a r d s the bath; he m i g h t just as w e l l m o v e t o w a r d s the m o u n t a i n , or s t a n d c o m p l e t e l y still. I m a g i n e s e e i n g a b o w l of fruit o n a table. Y o u are h u n g r y , so y o u p e r c e i v e the fruit as s o m e t h i n g to be t a k e n a n d eaten. A c c o r d i n g to A r c e s i l a u s , we c a n n e v e r be c e r t a i n about this i m p r e s s i o n - for e x a m p l e , the fruit m a y be w a x - so we m u s t not assent to it. B u t a c c o r d i n g to the S t o i c s , w i t h h o l d i n g o u r assent w i l l keep us t r o m a c t i n g . O n their view, if we r e a c h out tor the fruit t h e n we h a v e a s s e n t e d to the p r o p o s i t i o n that the fruit s h o u l d be t a k e n .

1 3

T o e l i m i n a t e assent i s to e l i m i n a t e a c t i o n . H e r e is A r c e s i l a u s ' reply, as r e p o r t e d by P l u t a r c h : T h e m o v e m e n t of i m p r e s s i o n we c o u l d not r e m o v e , e v e n if w e w a n t e d to; rather, as s o o n as we e n c o u n t e r t h i n g s , we get a n i m p r e s s i o n a n d are affected b y t h e m . T h e m o v e m e n t o f i m p u l s e , w h e n a r o u s e d by that ot i m p r e s s i o n , m o v e s a p e r s o n actively t o w a r d s appropriate objects, s i n c e a k i n d of t u r n ot the s c a l e a n d i n c l i n a t i o n o c c u r . . . S o t h o s e w h o s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t a b o u t e v e r y t h i n g d o not r e m o v e this m o v e m e n t either, but m a k e use o f the i m p u l s e w h i c h leads t h e m n a t u r a l l y t o w a r d s w h a t a p p e a r s a p p r o p r i a t e . W h a t , t h e n , is the o n l y t h i n g t h e y a v o i d ? T h a t o n l y i n w h i c h f a l s e h o o d a n d d e c e p t i o n are e n g e n d e r e d - o p i n i n g a n d precipitately a s s e n t i n g . , . F o r a c t i o n requires t w o things: a n i m p r e s s i o n of s o m e t h i n g a p p r o p r i a t e , a n d a n i m p u l s e t o w a r d s the a p p r o priate o b j e c t that has a p p e a r e d ; n e i t h e r o f these is in conflict with suspension of judgment, (Adv. Col

1 1 2 2 B - D [LS 69A])

R e f l e c t i n g o n o u r a c t i o n s will m a k e this a c c o u n t s e e m p l a u s i b l e . M o s t o f the t i m e , w h e n w e c h o o s e to d o s o m e t h i n g we d o n o t lay out a list ot all the pros a n d c o n s , carefully w e i g h the o p t i o n s a n d

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

t h e n f i n a l l y a r r i v e at a c o n s c i o u s j u d g e m e n t or a s s e n t . I n o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y sorts o f a c t i o n s we s i m p l y r e s p o n d to s t i m u l i w i t h o u t b e i n g a w a r e that w e have a s s e n t e d . T h i s d o e s not m e a n that we h a v e not i n fact assented. B u t the w a y we u s u a l l y use the t e r m " a s s e n t " is to d e s c r i b e a c o n s c i o u s , deliberate a p p r o v a l o l s o m e i m p r e s s i o n or c o u r s e o l a c t i o n . S o in the e v e r y d a y s e n s e of the t e r m , A r c e s i l a u s is right to say that assent is not n e c e s s a r y tor a c t i o n . But the Stoic a c c o u n t of assent is i n fact m o r e subtle a n d p l a u s i ble t h a n this. T h e i d e a that i m p r e s s i o n s m i g h t l e a d i m m e d i a t e l y to a c t i o n c o u l d be c h a l l e n g e d o n the g r o u n d s that it d o e s not e x p l a i n the i n t e n t i o n a l nature of a c t i o n . T o m e r e l y r e s p o n d is n o t to act i n a sense that m e r i t s p r a i s e or b l a m e , n o r does it e x p r e s s a n y t h i n g about the a g e n t s character. I f w e w i s h to e x p l a i n these a s p e c t s o f a c t i o n , we will need more than a crude stimulus-response m o d e l .

u

N e v e r t h e l e s s , A r c e s i l a u s s e e m s to have the b e t t e r o f this exchange. S o m e sort of a c t i o n is c l e a r l y p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t assent. W e shall next c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r l i m i t i n g o u r s e l v e s to t h i s type o f a c t i o n w o u l d be worthwhile.

The aprax'ta objection, I I : suspending judgement makes virtue and happiness impossible A n o t h e r v e r s i o n of the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n c l a i m s that v i r t u e a n d h a p -

p i n e s s w i l l be i m p o s s i b l e to a c h i e v e ii we s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g ( M 7 . 1 5 8 ; Ac. 2 . 2 3 - 2 5 , 2.39), T h i s o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e t h i n g like the Stoic v i e w that v i r t u e r e q u i r e s f i r m c o n v i c t i o n s about w h a t is m o r a l l y right a n d g o o d , a n d that it is b o t h n e c e s s a r y a n d sufficient for h a p p i n e s s . G i v e n this p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , A r c e s i l a u s ' p r o p o s a l to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g effectively e l i m i nates a n y p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g virtue, a n d t h u s a h a p p y life ( i n so far as w e t a k e v i r t u e to be n e c e s s a r y for h a p p i n e s s ) . A c c o r d i n g to S e x t u s , A r c e s i l a u s felt c o m p e l l e d to r e s p o n d to this o b j e c t i o n . F o r the c h a m p i o n o f the " t r u e " S o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n , s u c h a charge w o u l d be d e v a s t a t i n g . Socrates' p r i m e m o t i v a t i o n w a s not s i m p l y to a v o i d e r r o r or r a s h n e s s , but r a t h e r to l e a r n h o w to Lead the

52

ARCESILAUS

best p o s s i b l e life. I f it t u r n s out that A r c e s i l a u s ' m e t h o d is i n c o m p a t ible w i t h that e n d , he w o u l d be h a r d p r e s s e d to j u s t i f y h i s c l a i m to the S o c r a t i c m a n t l e . S e x t u s a s s e r t s that s i n c e ;

it w a s n e c e s s a r y to investigate the c o n d u c t o f life too, w h i c h is not of a nature to be e x p l a i n e d w i t h o u t a c r i t e r i o n , o n w h i c h h a p p i n e s s too, i,e, the e n d of life, has its trust d e p e n d ent, A r c e s i l a u s says that o n e w h o s u s p e n d s j u d g m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g w i l l regulate c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e a n d a c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l b y "the r e a s o n a b l e " [to culogon];

a n d that b y p r o -

c e e d i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h this c r i t e r i o n he w i l l act r i g h t l y ; for h a p p i n e s s is a c q u i r e d t h r o u g h p r u d e n c e , a n d p r u d e n c e resides i n r i g h t a c t i o n s , a n d r i g h t a c t i o n is whatever, o n c e it h a s b e e n d o n e , h a s a r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; therefore, o n e w h o attends to the r e a s o n a b l e w i l l act r i g h t l y a n d be happy.

( M 7-158

[LS69B])

U n f o r t u n a t e l y this is the o n l y piece o f e v i d e n c e for A r c e s i l a u s s c e p 1

tical c r i t e r i o n of c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e . S o w e c a n o n l y c a u t i o u s l y speculate about t h e details a n d h o w it is s u p p o s e d to y i e l d h a p p i n e s s . But first w e m u s t c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r A r c e s i l a u s e n d o r s e s this c r i t e r i o n h i m s e l f o r not.

The dialectical interpretation O n t h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , A r c e s i l a u s n e v e r asserts h i s o w n v i e w s ; i n d e e d , in so far as he h e e d s h i s o w n a d v i c e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , he has n o v i e w s to assert in the first place. I n s t e a d , he elicits h i s o p p o n e n t s ' v i e w s In o r d e r to s h o w t h e m that t h e y are c o m m i t t e d to i n c o n s i s t e n t beliefs a n d therefore that they d o not k n o w w h a t they t h i n k they k n o w . H i s m i s s i o n , l i k e Socrates', is to deflate the c o n f i d e n t d o g m a t i s t s a n d e n c o u r a g e a n o p e n - e n d e d p u r s u i t o f the t r u t h . W e c a n easily see h o w t h i s w o u l d w o r k w i t h A r c e s i l a u s ' a r g u m e n t s against the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n . It is the Stoics w h o insist o n u n s a t isfiable c o n d i t i o n s ; A r c e s i l a u s m e r e l y d r a w s out the i m p l i c a t i o n s

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w i t h o u t a d d i n g a n y t h i n g o f h i s o w n . G i v e n the f u r t h e r Stoic v i e w that the sage n e v e r assents to w h a t has not b e e n g r a s p e d w i t h certainty, it f o l l o w s , again o n Stoic g r o u n d s , that o n e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . A r c e s i l a u s n e e d not c o n t r i b u t e a n y t h i n g o f h i s o w n , W e m a y see h i s r e m a r k s about the eulogon

i n this d i a l e c t i c a l light

r a t h e r t h a n as e x p r e s s i n g h i s o w n v i e w s i n the f o l l o w i n g way. T h e Stoic sage regulates h i s c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h his unwavering, systematic knowledge. By proceeding in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h a t he k n o w s to be t r u l y g o o d , he a c t s rightly. T h i s they u n d e r s t o o d to be p r u d e n c e (phronesis),

w h i c h guarantees a h a p p y

lite. H a v i n g u n d e r m i n e d the Stoic a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e , A r c e s i l a u s t h e n p r o c e e d s to s h o w the Stoics that they have a m p l e theoretical r e s o u r c e s to a n s w e r their o w n o b j e c t i o n s about s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t , e v e n t h o u g h the k i n d o f p r u d e n c e that r e m a i n s p o s s i b l e is a m u c h m o r e m o d e s t s o r t . I n effect, he v a n d a l i z e s the Stoic s y s t e m b y r e p l a c i n g the sages a c t i o n b a s e d o n c e r t a i n t y w i t h the m o r e d o w n to earth a n d r e a d i l y attainable a c t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the reasonable. T h e greatest strength of the d i a l e c t i c a l interpretation is that it saves A r c e s i l a u s f r o m a v a r i e t y of potential i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . F o r e x a m p l e , it he p e r s o n a l l y believes we s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , t h e n it s e e m s he s h o u l d not a l s o a d v i s e u s to regulate o u r l i v e s in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the reasonable, i n so far as that c o n f l i c t s w i t h s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . N o r s h o u l d he e n d o r s e the three S o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e s : (i) v i r t u e is a k i n d o l k n o w l e d g e ; ( i i j the p e r s o n w i t h k n o w l e d g e is irrefutable; a n d (iii) v i r t u e is n e c e s s a r y if not a l s o sufficient for a g o o d lite. B u t if he believes n o n e o l these t h i n g s , he c a n n o t be a c c u s e d o l i n c o n s i s t e n c y . F u r t h e r s u p p o r t for the d i a l e c t i c a l interpretation c o m e s f r o m the fact that all of the v i e w s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h A r c e s i l a u s c a n p l a u s i b l y be s e e n as c o n s e q u e n c e s o f S t o i c c o m m i t m e n t s that w o u l d be p a r t i c u l a r l y u n w e l c o m e to the Stoics.

ARCESILAUS

A n o b j e c t i o n to t h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n A l t h o u g h the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is attractive, it is v u l n e r a b l e to at least o n e p o w e r f u l o b j e c t i o n . It is o d d for A r c e s i l a u s to have b o t h e r e d r e s p o n d i n g to the iipmxia

o b j e c t i o n s i l he w e r e o n l y d r a w -

i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s f r o m the Stoic p o s i t i o n . I f it is o n l y the Stoics w h o are u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to the v i e w that w e s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , then the charge that this m a k e s life u n l i v e a b l e a n d v i r t u e i m p o s s i b l e is all the m o r e d a m n i n g for t h e m , I n that case it w o u l d m a k e m o r e sense for A r c e s i l a u s to a p p l a u d the apraxia

objections

than to r e s p o n d to t h e m . H e w o u l d have m o r e effectively deflated his o p p o n e n t s if he left t h e m w i t h t h e i r o w n i n c o h e r e n t view. S o his r e s p o n s e suggests that he is d e f e n d i n g h i s o w n v i e w : A r c e s i l a u s h i m s e l f t h i n k s that we s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . S i m i l a r l y , if he w e r e o n l y c o n c e r n e d to s h o w the Stoics the i n a d e q u a c y o f t h e i r v i e w , it m a k e s n o s e n s e for h i m to p r o v i d e a n a l t e r n a tive c r i t e r i o n of a c t i o n . B u t let us s u p p o s e for the s a k e o f a r g u m e n t that he g e n e r o u s l y offers the Stoics a viable alternative, I f the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is right, A r c e s i l a u s m u s t have e m p l o y e d the Stoic u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f to eulogon,

for if he p r o v i d e d h i s o w n u n d e r s t a n d -

ing he w o u l d n o longer b e a r g u i n g dialectically. T h e Stoics d e f i n e d the reasonable (to eulogon)

as a p r o p o s i t i o n that has m o r e c h a n c e s

o f b e i n g t r u e t h a n false ( D L 7-76). T h i s is m o r e or less the sense i n w h i c h w e t y p i c a l l y use the t e r m a l s o . A r e a s o n a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n is c r e d i b l e ; it is w o r t h a c c e p t i n g as true e v e n t h o u g h we d o not take the e v i d e n c e o r a r g u m e n t s to be c o n c l u s i v e . It that is c o r r e c t , t h e n A r c e s i l a u s has not i n fact s h o w n the Stoics that m o r a l l y right a c t i o n a n d h a p p i n e s s are p o s s i b l e for t h o s e w h o s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . T h e o n e w h o regulates h i s a c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h to eulogon,

a s the Stoics u n d e r s t a n d that t e r m , w i l l have all sorts

o f beliefs about w h a t o n e s h o u l d or s h o u l d not d o . S u c h a p e r s o n w i l l not h a v e s u s p e n d e d j u d g e m e n t . I n o r d e r for A r c e s i l a u s to a r r i v e at the d e s i r e d c o n c l u s i o n , he w i l l have to p r o v i d e s o m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f to eulogon

s u c h that a c t i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h it is c o n s i s t e n t

w i t h s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . T h i s suggests, c o n t r a r y to the d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , that h i s goal is to s h o w the Stoics that the s c e p t i c is

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able to live a n d f l o u r i s h w i t h o u t the Stoic c r i t e r i o n ; this s e e m s to be A r c e s i l a u s ' o w n v i e w of" the matter (see H a n k i n s o n l 9 ° 8 a ; 8 5 - 9 1 ) .

C o n s i s t e n c y a n d Arcesilaus' Socratic habits A s w e have a l r e a d y seen, it a p p e a r s i n c o n s i s t e n t to b e l i e v e that v i r tue is a k i n d of irrefutable k n o w l e d g e and that one s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g . I f we s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t w e s h o u l d not also h o l d beliefs about k n o w l e d g e a n d v i r t u e ; o n o n e a c c o u n t A r c e s i l a u s m a d e a p o i n t e v e n of s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t w i t h regard to w h e t h e r he w a s i n fact i g n o r a n t (Ac.

1.45). O n the o t h e r h a n d ,

A r c e s i l a u s is frequently a s s o c i a t e d w i t h v i e w s about w h a t k n o w l e d g e r e q u i r e s a n d w i t h the a d v i c e that w e s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . H o w then are we to resolve t h i s apparent i n c o n s i s t e n c y ? T h e rise of S t o i c i s m , e s p e c i a l l y u n d e r the guise of a positive d e v e l o p m e n t of S o c r a t i c p h i l o s o p h y , w o u l d have i n c i t e d A r c e s i l a u s to b r i n g the critical or s c e p t i c a l elements o f Socrates to light. I n r e v i v i n g this s c e p t i c a l practice, he p r o b a b l y a c c e p t e d S o c r a t e s ' m e t h o d o l o g i cal a s s u m p t i o n s as w e l l . T h e p o i n t o f a r g u i n g against e v e r y o n e is to p r o m o t e the S o c r a t i c s e a r c h for t r u t h . It w o u l d be u n a c c e p t a b l y d o g m a t i c , however, if he h a d never t u r n e d his s c e p t i c a l sights o n h i s o w n assumptions.

1 5

O n e s h o u l d not u n c r i t i c a l l y believe a n y t h i n g . O n c e

he h a d d o n e so, he m u s t h a v e f o u n d p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t s o p p o s i n g Socrates' a s s u m p t i o n s . I n o r d e r for A r c e s i l a u s to be a c o n s i s t e n t s c e p t i c he w o u l d n e e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t r e g a r d i n g these m o t i v a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s . It w o u l d follow that he d i d not believe v i r t u e is a n irrefutable k i n d of k n o w l e d g e o r that it is essentia] for a f l o u r i s h i n g life. W h y t h e n d i d he c a r r y o n w i t h h i s s c e p t i c a l practice, b e h a v i n g as if he b e l i e v e d these t h i n g s ? I believe the m o s t plausible s p e c u l a t i o n is to c h a r a c t e r i z e commitments

the

that u n d e r l i e A r c e s i l a u s ' b e h a v i o u r as a - r a t i o n a l :

they are n e i t h e r i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h , n o r v i o l a t i o n s of, a n y r a t i o n a l s t a n d a r d s . W h a t e v e r attitude A r c e s i l a u s c o n t i n u e d to take t o w a r d s his initially m o t i v a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n s , he c a n n o t h a v e t h o u g h t that

56

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r e a s o n r e q u i r e s us to engage i n this S o c r a t i c project. T h e dictates of r e a s o n , tor A r c e s i l a u s , are i n c o n c l u s i v e . T h e i r o n y is that this attitude a r i s e s f r o m a d e e p c o m m i t m e n t to f o l l o w r e a s o n w h e r e v e r it leads. It a p p e a r s that that c o m m i t m e n t c a n n o t itself b e r a t i o n a l , e v e n if A r c e s i l a u s t h o u g h t that initially he h a d g o o d r e a s o n s for a d o p t i n g it. A s a h a b i t u a l activity, A r c e s i l a u s n e e d not feel c o m p e l l e d to d e f e n d it. E v e n after a c k n o w l e d g i n g that there are n o c o n c l u s i v e a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t of the n o t i o n that it is g o o d o r b e n e f i c i a l to b e h a v e this way, he m e r e l y finds h i m s e l l i n c l i n e d to c o n t i n u e . S i m i l a r l y , A r c e s i l a u s ' a c c e p t a n c e o f the n o t i o n that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e m a y be h a b i t u a l , a n d not r a t i o n a l . H i s a r g u m e n t against the Stoic c r i t e r i o n of k n o w l e d g e is c l e a r l y d i a l e c t i c a l , s o h e n e e d not accept the c o n c l u s i o n that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n ( i n the Stoic s e n s e ) . B u t c o n s i d e r i n g h i s s u c c e s s i n refuting all c o m e r s , it m u s t have s e e m e d that k n o w l e d g e is o u t of o u r reach. H e r e a g a i n we m a y a p p e a l to S o c r a t e s for i l l u s t r a t i o n . A f t e r a lifetime of r e f u t i n g t h o s e w h o thought they h a d k n o w l e d g e , S o c r a tes c o n t i n u e d to e n t e r t a i n the p o s s i b i l i t y that he m i g h t yet d i s c o v e r s o m e o n e w h o c o u l d s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d h i m s e l f . T h i s m u s t have s e e m e d a v e r y s l i m possibility. A f t e r years o f s u c c e s s f u l l y refuting h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , A r c e s i l a u s w o u l d be i n c l i n e d to expect that the next i n t e r l o c u t o r w o u l d also fall. T h e idea that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e w o u l d take h o l d as m o r e o f a h a b i t u a l e x p e c t a t i o n t h a n a r a t i o n a l , p h i l o s o p h i c a l j u d g e m e n t or belief that he w o u l d be w i l l i n g to d e f e n d ( C o o p e r 2 0 0 4 ) . A t n o p o i n t does A r c e s i l a u s c o n c l u d e , a n d h e n c e b e l i e v e , that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e , e v e n t h o u g h it m u s t

have

s e e m e d ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) to be the case. ( W e s h a l l r e t u r n to this c r u c i a l c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e s a n d j u d g e m e n t s or beliefs later; see e s p e c i a l l y C h a p t e r 9.) F i n a l l y , w h a t are we to m a k e of l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the r e a s o n a b l e ? A r c e s i l a u s m a i n t a i n s that just as p u r p o s e f u l a c t i o n is possible w i t h o u t assent or belief, s o too is reasonable action. S o m e t h i n g s w i l l s e e m r e a s o n a b l e j u s t a s h i e w i l l s e e m hot; i n b o t h cases s o m e a c t i o n w i l l ensue, regardless o f w h e t h e r I assent to the i m p r e s s i o n . A l l that A r c e s i l a u s a s k s u s to d o is p r o v i d e a n e x p l a n a t i o n of w h y it a p p e a r e d reasonable after the fact. G i v e n the s o c i a l i m p o r t a n c e of

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e x p l a i n i n g o u r a c t i o n s , it is likely that the " r e a s o n a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n " is a i m e d at c o n v i n c i n g o t h e r s that o n e s a c t i o n w a s a p p r o p r i a t e . I I m y a c t i o n or c h o i c e has s o m e a d v e r s e effect a n d I fail to c o n v i n c e others that it w a s r e a s o n a b l e , I w i l l p r o b a b l y suffer u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s . E v e n if m y a c t i o n s have a positive effect, m y c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n w i l l h e l p m e to get the credit 1 d e s e r v e . B y d e v e l o p i n g a d i s p o s i t i o n to p r o v i d e c o n v i n c i n g a c c o u n t s of w h y I t o o k m y a c t i o n to be r e a s o n a b l e , I w i l l for the m o s t part act rightly a n d p r u d e n t l y and

w i l l be happy. A s s e n t i n g to these i m p r e s s i o n s a n d f o r m i n g

beliefs a b o u t w h a t is right a n d w r o n g c o n t r i b u t e s i n n o w a y to m y s u c c e s s ; in fact, g i v e n A r c e s i l a u s m i s t r u s t o f r a t i o n a l l y s u p p o r t e d 1

c o n c l u s i o n s , w e are better off not a s s e n t i n g .

Conclusion T h e k i n d s o f p r u d e n c e a n d h a p p i n e s s that o n e m i g h t e x p e c t f r o m s u c h a life are far m o r e m o d e s t t h a n the Stoic varieties. I n fact, l i v i n g i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the reasonable s e e m s e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y easy. B u t we m u s t recall that u n i v e r s a l s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t is a n e s s e n tial part of t h i s life, a n d we s h o u l d not a s s u m e that this is a s i m p l e matter. F r o m A r c e s i l a u s S o c r a t i c p e r s p e c t i v e , w e all suffer f r o m a 1

p r o n o u n c e d d i s p o s i t i o n to p r e m a t u r e l y put a n e n d to e n q u i r y a n d affirm o u r v i e w s w i t h too m u c h c o n f i d e n c e . W i t h o u t the i r r i t a t i n g benefit of a Socrates w h o relentlessly puts u s to the test, w e are p r o n e to settle c o m f o r t a b l y into o u r c o n v i c t i o n s w i t h o u t e v e n b e i n g a w a r e of h a v i n g d o n e so.

58

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Carneades

N o n e of A r c e s i l a u s ' first three s u c c e s s o r s ( L a c y d e s , E v a n d r u s a n d H e g e s i n u s ) are c r e d i t e d w i t h a n y n o t e w o r t h y a c h i e v e m e n t s :

they

merely continue Arcesilaus' practice. C a r n e a d e s , by contrast, surpasses e v e n A r c e s i l a u s i n h i s r h e t o r i c a l a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l b r i l l i a n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , he invites a n even greater m e a s u r e o l c r i t i c i s m : this m a n a l s o w o u l d b r i n g f o r w a r d a n d take b a c k , a n d g a t h e r to the battle c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a n d subtle t w i s t s i n v a r i o u s w a y s , a n d be full b o t h o l d e n i a l s a n d a f f i r m a t i o n s , a n d c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o n b o t h sides: a n d il e v e r there w a s n e e d of m a r v e l o u s statements, he w o u l d rise u p as violent as a r i v e r i n f l o o d , o v e r f l o w i n g w i t h r a p i d s t r e a m e v e r y t h i n g o n this s i d e a n d o n that, a n d w o u l d fall u p o n h i s h e a r e r s a n d d r a g t h e m a l o n g w i t h h i m in a t u m u l t . . , T h e evil results therefore w e r e the m o r e n u m e r o u s ( t h a n A r c e s i l a u s ' ] . A n d n e v e r t h e less C a r n e a d e s f a s c i n a t e d a n d e n s l a v e d m e n s s o u l s . . . I n fact e v e r y o p i n i o n o f C a r n e a d e s w a s v i c t o r i o u s , a n d never a n y other, s i n c e t h o s e w i t h w h o m he w a s at w a r w e r e less p o w e r f u l as s p e a k e r s .

(Praep.

Ev. 14.8.2, 9—10)

C a r n e a d e s ' p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o n l y s e r v e s to a c c o m p l i s h greater e v i l if w e a s s u m e that he leads people a w a y f r o m true, o r at least b e n e f i c i a l ,

59

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beliefs. T h e p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n i s : w h a t d i d he h o p e to a c h i e v e ? It is u n c h a r i t a b l e to a s s u m e that h e w a s m a l i c i o u s . B u t it is easy to see h o w he m i g h t have a p p e a r e d so. B o t h Socrates (Ap. 2 3 c ) a n d A r c e s i l a u s ( D L 4,37) h a d attracted a large f o l l o w i n g b y p u b l i c l y deflating the intellectual p r e t e n s i o n s o f p r o m i n e n t people. A n d they e a r n e d s c o r n a l o n g w i t h a d m i r a t i o n : they w e r e b o t h a c c u s e d o f c o r r u p t i n g the y o u t h (Ap. 2 3 d ; D L 4 . 4 0 ) . By u n d e r m i n i n g c o n v i c t i o n they a p p e a r to be l e a d i n g p e o p l e astray. T h e y take a w a y the m o r a l c o m p a s s a n d replace it w i t h n o t h i n g . I n 156/5 B C E , C a r n e a d e s , a l o n g w i t h t w o o t h e r p h i l o s o p h e r s , w a s sent by A t h e n s as an a m b a s s a d o r to R o m e (Tusc. 13.21; Div. Inst.

Alt.

4 . 5 ; De Or. 2.155;

5 . 1 5 . 3 - 5 ) . W h i l e there h e p u b l i c l y a r g u e d at

length i n d e f e n c e of c e r t a i n P l a t o n i c a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e o n o n e d a y a n d t h e n refuted h i s o w n a r g u m e n t s the next. H e d i d this, "not b e c a u s e he thought j u s t i c e o u g h t to be d i s p a r aged, but to s h o w that its d e f e n d e r s h a d n o c e r t a i n or f i r m a r g u m e n t s about

it" ( L a c t a n t i u s , Epitome

55.8

[LS 6 8 M ] ) . Cato was

s c a n d a l i z e d by this d i s p l a y a n d d e v i s e d a c l e v e r p l a n to p u r g e the city of C a r n e a d e s a n d h i s fellow p h i l o s o p h e r s as q u i c k l y as p o s sible. H e c r i t i c i z e d the Senate for d e t a i n i n g m e n w h o w e r e able to get a n y t h i n g t h e y m i g h t w i s h b y m e a n s o f their p e r s u a s i v e p o w e r s , and

suggested they vote i m m e d i a t e l y o n the embassy's p r o p o s a l

a n d s e n d t h e m h o m e to A t h e n s ( P l u t a r c h , Vit. Cat. Mai.

2 2 - 3 ) . It

p r o b a b l y a p p e a r e d to C a t o , a n d o t h e r R o m a n s , that C a r n e a d e s w a s i n d e e d d i s p a r a g i n g j u s t i c e , e v e n il that w a s not h i s intent. U n d e r m i n i n g conviction, even poorly founded conviction, can be a d a n gerous b u s i n e s s . I n o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e m o r e p r e c i s e l y w h a t C a r n e a d e s s o u g h t to a c h i e v e by m e a n s ot h i s r h e t o r i c a l b r i l l i a n c e a n d h o w he differs f r o m A r c e s i l a u s , w e shall e x a m i n e a s e l e c t i o n of h i s a r g u m e n t s .

T h e o l o g i c a l arguments, I: against G o d ' s eternity A s w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s a b o u t j u s t i c e , C a r n e a d e s s o u g h t to u n d e r m i n e p o o r l y f o u n d e d c o n v i c t i o n s about the gods. H e r e a g a i n he

ixl

CARNEADES

d i d n o t w i s h to p r o m o t e a t h e i s m , n o r d i s p a r a g e the g o d s ,

but

rather to s h o w the Stoics that they h a d e s t a b l i s h e d n o t h i n g in their t h e o l o g y {ND

3 , 4 3 - 4 4 ; M 9 . 1 8 2 - 4 ) . A l t h o u g h these a r g u m e n t s are

a i m e d s p e c i f i c a l l y at the Stoics, they a p p l y j u s t as w e l l to a n y t h e o l o g i c a l v i e w that u n d e r s t a n d s G o d as a l i v i n g b e i n g , b o t h e t e r n a l and benevolent. If, as the Stoics m a i n t a i n , G o d is alive ( a n d is n o t a p l a n t ) t h e n he is c a p a b l e of s e n s a t i o n . B u t s e n s a t i o n , a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics, is a k i n d ot alteration: " I f G o d is a l t e r e d , he is receptive o f a l t e r a t i o n a n d c h a n g e ; a n d b e i n g receptive o f c h a n g e , he w i l l c e r t a i n l y be receptive o f change for the w o r s e . A n d il so, h e is also p e r i s h able" ( A i 9 . 1 4 6 - 7 ) . S e n s a t i o n r e q u i r e s that the agent be the passive r e c i p i e n t of s o m e t h i n g that effects a c h a n g e i n h i m . W h e t h e r that alteration is tor the better or w o r s e is o u t s i d e h i s c o n t r o l s i n c e he p a s s i v e l y receives it. W e d o not c h o o s e to feel heat or c o l d w h e n we do. A l t h o u g h we m a y try to a v o i d e x p o s i n g o u r s e l v e s to e x t r e m e c o n d i t i o n s , f r e e z i n g to death is u l t i m a t e l y o u t ot o u r c o n t r o l (see ND

3.34). I f o n e is s t r a n d e d o n a s n o w y m o u n t a i n , w h e t h e r or not

o n e c h o o s e s to freeze is beside the p o i n t . S o e v e n t h o u g h n o one c o u l d s t r a n d G o d o n a s n o w y m o u n t a i n , he is, i n p r i n c i p l e , r e c e p tive o f h a r m f u l or d e s t r u c t i v e alterations i n s o far a s he is a s e n t i e n t b e i n g . T o be sentient is to b e v u l n e r a b l e to d e s t r u c t i o n , so G o d cannot be both sentient a n d eternal. T h e easiest w a y out o f this p r o b l e m is to grant that G o d is not eternal. T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this is that a n integral s t a r t i n g - p o i n t for Stoic t h e o l o g y is the c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d n o t i o n that w h a t is d i v i n e is e t e r n a l a n d i m p e r i s h a b l e . T h u s C a r n e a d e s m a y h a v e p r e s s e d the f o l l o w i n g d i l e m m a . E i t h e r G o d is i m p e r i s h a b l e o r h e is not. It he is, then it a p p e a r s he c a n n o t be sentient, s i n c e all s e n t i e n t t h i n g s are p e r i s h a b l e . A n d it he is not, t h e n we are n o l o n g e r w o r k i n g w i t h the c o m m o n c o n c e p t i o n of G o d , c o n t r a r y to the Stoics' c l a i m . A r g u i n g b o t h l o r a n d against the i m p e r i s h a b i l i t y o l G o d is s u p p o s e d to leave u s w i t h n o r a t i o n a l b a s i s to prefer e i t h e r v i e w (see L o n g 1990).

ill

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Theological arguments, I I : against G o d ' s benevolence G o d ' s b e n e v o l e n c e is part o f h i s c o m p l e t e l y v i r t u o u s nature a c c o r d i n g to the Stoics. B u t it G o d has a l l the d i s p o s i t i o n s that w e h u m a n beings c o n s i d e r v i r t u o u s , t h e n he m u s t be subject to at least s o m e of the s a m e c o n d i t i o n s that m a k e v i r t u e p o s s i b l e a n d d e s i r a b l e for us. T h i s led C a r n e a d e s to a r g u e as f o l l o w s :

if a b e i n g does not a n d c a n n o t p a r t a k e of e v i l , w h a t n e e d has he to m a k e a c h o i c e b e t w e e n g o o d t h i n g s a n d e v i l t h i n g s , a n d w h a t n e e d h a s he o f reason a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g ?

We

a p p l y these faculties to a d v a n c e f r o m w h a t is revealed to w h a t is h i d d e n , but n o t h i n g c a n be h i d d e n f r o m G o d , A s for j u s t i c e , w h i c h a p p o r t i o n s to e a c h its o w n , it has n o relevance to the gods, for as y o u Stoics p u t it, it w a s b o r n w h e n m e n b a n d e d together i n c o m m u n i t y . T e m p e r a n c e c o n s i s t s in forg o i n g p h y s i c a l p l e a s u r e s ; i f t h i s v i r t u e has a role i n h e a v e n , there m u s t also be s c o p e for p h y s i c a l p l e a s u r e s there. A s for the i d e a of G o d m a n i f e s t i n g c o u r a g e , h o w c a n w e envisage that, s e e i n g that p a i n or grief or d a n g e r d o e s not i m p i n g e o n G o d ? Yet c a n we p o s s i b l y v i s u a l i z e a G o d w h o d o e s not use r e a s o n , a n d w h o is e n d o w e d w i t h n o virtue? (NB

3.38 [ W a l s h 1997); cf. Atf 9 . 1 3 2 - 7 7 )

T h i s is e v i d e n t l y the i n s p i r a t i o n l o r the s c e p t i c a l d i l e m m a that H u m e a d v a n c e s ( i n Part V o f h i s Dialogues

Concerning

Natural

Religion;

see P r i c e 1964). O n one h a n d , the m o r e w e m a k e G o d like us the m o r e he is v u l n e r a b l e , i m p e r f e c t a n d s u b j e c t to h u m a n f a i l i n g s . O n the o t h e r h a n d , the less we m a k e G o d like us the less c o m p r e h e n s i ble he Is. S o we m a y either o p t for a distant, i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e G o d w h o satisfies o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s of d i v i n e p e r f e c t i o n or a closer, m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e G o d w h o suffers f r o m o u r h u m a n failings a n d is, to that extent, less w o r t h y ot the title.

62

CARNEADES

Theological a r g u m e n t s . III: sorites T h e Stoics believe b o t h that the w o r l d itself is a d i v i n e b e i n g , a n d that it is p o s s i b l e to a c c o u n t l o r p o p u l a r G r e e k , p o l y t h e i s t i c religious v i e w s as well. T h e y a r g u e that elements o r aspects o f t h e d i v i n e b e i n g are t h e m s e l v e s d i v i n e . B u t c e r t a i n l y n o t e v e r y t h i n g in t h e w o r l d is a god. So it is n e c e s s a r y to s h o w h o w w e m a y d r a w a c l e a r line b e t w e e n w h a t is d i v i n e a n d therefore w o r t h y of w o r s h i p a n d w h a t is not. C a r n e a d e s e m p l o y s a sorites a r g u m e n t i n o r d e r to s h o w that n o s u c h p r i n c i p l e d l i n e c a n be d r a w n ( B u r n y e a t 1982b), T h e t e r m sorites c o m e s f r o m the G r e e k w o r d for heap, soros.

If

I place o n e g r a i n of w h e a t o n the table a n d a s k y o u w h e t h e r it is a h e a p , y o u w i l l say n o , If I a d d a n o t h e r g r a i n to t h e first y o u w i l l still say it is not a h e a p . B u t if I c o n t i n u e to a d d m o r e a n d m o r e , at s o m e p o i n t it c l e a r l y b e c o m e s a h e a p . Yet, as a g e n e r a l r u l e , the a d d i t i o n o f o n e g r a i n d o e s not t r a n s f o r m a n o n - h e a p i n t o a h e a p . S o it s e e m s that there c a n be n o h e a p s or, m o r e plausibly, it s e e m s that o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of " h e a p " is too f u z z y to a l l o w us to d r a w clear lines b e t w e e n h e a p s a n d n o n - h e a p s , T h i s f o r m o f r e a s o n i n g exploits the l u z z i n e s s of c o n c e p t s : by m i n u t e a d d i t i o n s ( o r s u b t r a c t i o n s ) of s o m e p r o p e r t y w e f i n d it i m p o s s i b l e to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the c o n c e p t c o n t i n u e s to apply. I m a g i n e s o m e o n e w h o is v e r y p o o r . A d d i n g a p e n n y to h i s b a n k a c c o u n t w i l l not m a k e h i m wealthy, yet if w e c o n t i n u e to a d d p e n n i e s , e v e n t u a l l y he w i l l b e c o m e w e a l t h y ; it is j u s t not clear w h e n w e r e a c h that p o i n t , i f i n d e e d there is a p o i n t at w h i c h p o v e r t y is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o w e a l t h , It does not follow that n o o n e is w e a l t h y . W h a t follows is that w e d o not k n o w t h e precise l i m i t s o f this predicate.

1

W e c a n r u n t h i s a r g u m e n t o n c o u n t l e s s o t h e r adjectives -

for

e x a m p l e , tall, b a l d , t r i e n d l y - as well as m a n y o f the c o n c e p t s that we use o n a d a i l y b a s i s . M o s t w o u l d agree that football is a s p o r t . But is golf a s p o r t ? H o w a b o u t F r i s b e e golf? H o w about v i d e o golf? O u r i n a b i l i t y to c o n c l u s i v e l y d e t e r m i n e w h a t c o u n t s a s a s p o r t or w h o c o u n t s a s b a l d m a y not s e e m t o o t h r e a t e n i n g , but t h e d a n g e r s b e c o m e m o r e a p p a r e n t w h e n w e c o n s i d e r the predicate " i s a person". D e c i d i n g w h o o r w h a t is a p e r s o n has i m p o r t a n t m o r a l a n d legal

63

ANCIENT

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i m p l i c a t i o n s , b o t h for b e g i n n i n g - o f - l i f e a n d e n d - o f - l i f e i s s u e s . T h e m i c r o s c o p i c c l u s t e r o f cells o f a n e w l y f e r t i l i z e d e g g is pretty c l e a r l y not a p e r s o n . B u t a d d i n g a m i l l i s e c o n d s w o r t h o f d e v e l o p m e n t does not s e e m t o be s i g n i f i c a n t e n o u g h t o m a k e the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a p e r s o n a n d a n o n - p e r s o n . A n d yet as d e v e l o p m e n t c o n t i n u e s after b i r t h w e get to w h a t o b v i o u s l y is a p e r s o n . I n these cases there is a greater u r g e n c y a n d necessity i n c o n f r o n t i n g the sorites p a r a d o x b e c a u s e s i g n i f i c a n t a c t i o n m a y well be r e q u i r e d . C a r n e a d e s a p p l i e d t h e sorites to the p r e d i c a t e " i s a g o d " In the following way: I f Z e u s is a g o d . . . P o s e i d o n too, b e i n g h i s brother, w i l l be a god. B u t i f P o s e i d o n is a g o d , t h e [ r i v e r ] A c h e l o u s t o o w i l l be a g o d . A n d i f t h e A c h e l o u s i s , s o is t h e N i l e . I f t h e N i l e is, s o are all r i v e r s . It all l i v e r s a r e , s t r e a m s too w o u l d be g o d s . If s t r e a m s w e r e , t o r r e n t s w o u l d be. B u t s t r e a m s are not. T h e r e f o r e Z e u s is not a g o d either. B u t if there are gods, Z e u s too w o u l d be a g o d . T h e r e f o r e there are n o g o d s . ( M 9 . 1 8 2 - 4 [ L S 7 0 E ] ; see a l s o W D 3 . 4 3 - 4 ) T h i s is a creative u s e o f t h e sorites s i n c e it does not p r o c e e d b y the s i m p l e a d d i t i o n o f s o m e property. I n s t e a d , as i n t h e s p o r t e x a m p l e above, C a r n e a d e s proceeds b y d r a w i n g analogies. B o t h P o s e i d o n a n d A c h e l o u s are large b o d i e s o l water; i f it is t r u e that o n e is a g o d , t h e n the o t h e r m u s t be a g o d also. B u t if the r i v e r A c h e l o u s is a god, t h e n so too is e v e r y o t h e r river. W e m a y c o n t i n u e this line o f r e a s o n i n g u n t i l w e a r r i v e at a p u d d l e in the street: there is n o p r i n c i p l e d place to d r a w the l i n e .

1

I f o n e is i n c l i n e d to w o r s h i p the gods it s e e m s o n e w i l l have to d e t e r m i n e w h o o r w h a t is w o r t h y of s u c h respect. W h a t C a r n e a d e s seeks t o s h o w w i t h h i s a r g u m e n t s is n o t that n o t h i n g is a g o d , but that the Stoics have p r o v i d e d n o c o n v i n c i n g a c c o u n t o f h o w w e m a y m a i n t a i n the c o m m o n G r e e k c o n c e p t i o n of m u l t i p l e gods w i t h o u t a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h e d i v i n i t y o f e v e r y t h i n g . A n d i f r e a s o n c a n tell us n o t h i n g definitive about the nature o r e x i s t e n c e o f G o d , o r t h e gods, we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t .

I>4

CARNEADES

T h i s is p r o b a b l y w h a t A r c e s i l a u s w o u l d have us do. H o w e v e r , it is not as c l e a r i n the case o l C a r n e a d e s , w h o i s s a i d to h a v e d e p a r t e d f r o m h i s great p r e d e c e s s o r by c l a i m i n g that we c a n n o t , a n d n e e d not, s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g (Praep. 2.59;

Ev. 14.7; see Ac.

PH 1 . 2 2 7 - 3 0 ) . W h a t attitude, t h e n , w o u l d C a r n e a d e s have us

take t o w a r d s o u r i n c o n c l u s i v e e n q u i r y i n t o the nature of the gods? W e s h a l l r e t u r n to t h i s q u e s t i o n later.

Ethical arguments: Carneades divisions 1

C a r n e a d e s e t h i c a l a r g u m e n t s e x h i b i t the s a m e p a t t e r n . H e is not 1

interested i n d i s p a r a g i n g v i r t u e or i n c o n v i n c i n g us to

become

v i c i o u s . O n c e a g a i n he is b e n t o n u n d e r m i n i n g the p o o r l y p l a c e d c o n f i d e n c e o f the d o g m a t i s t s . U n l i k e A r c e s i l a u s , w h o a r g u e d against w h a t e v e r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s actually b e l i e v e d (or w e r e t e m p t e d to b e l i e v e ) , C a r n e a d e s b r o a d e n e d the s c e p t i c a l attack i n s e e k i n g to refute e v e r y p o s s i b l e e t h i c a l t h e o r y {Fin.

5.16), M o r e precisely, he set out i n a " d i v i s i o n " e v e r y e t h i c a l

t h e o r y that h a d b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d o r c o u l d b e c o n s t r u c t e d i n a c c o r d ance with certain naturalistic assumptions. Since those assumptions w e r e s h a r e d a m o n g h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , he e m p l o y e d h i s d i v i s i o n to u n d e r m i n e the v e r y project o f H e l l e n i s t i c e t h i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ( A l g r a 1997; A n n a s 2001, 2 0 0 7 ) . A c c o r d i n g to the naturalistic a s s u m p t i o n s , a n e t h i c a l t h e o r y m u s t e x p l a i n w h a t s o r t s of g o o d s we n a t u r a l l y desire, a n d w h y , or l o r what e n d , w e desire them. E t h i c a l development is, in one important respect, n o different f r o m the n a t u r a l , p h y s i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t of a n infant i n t o a n adult; the final stage of d e v e l o p m e n t i s , i n s o m e s e n s e , i n h e r e n t in the p e r s o n s initial c o n d i t i o n . S o o u r c o m m o n h u m a n n a t u r e i n c l i n e s us t o w a r d s c e r t a i n t h i n g s a n d a w a y f r o m o t h e r s , a n d it is o n l y f r o m those n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s that we are able to c o n s t r u c t a f l o u r i s h i n g h u m a n life. It o u r i n i t i a l c o n d i t i o n is n u r t u r e d appropriately, we fulfil o u r teios: o u r n a t u r a l e n d or f u n c t i o n . But there are m a n y w a y s in w h i c h that d e v e l o p m e n t m a y go w r o n g . Just as a l a c k of g o o d n u t r i t i o n w i l l

65

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prevent o n e f r o m a c h i e v i n g the n a t u r a l , p h y s i o l o g i c a l e n d , a l a c k o l u n d e r s t a n d i n g about the p r o p e r goals i n life w i l l p r e v e n t o n e f r o m a c h i e v i n g the n a t u r a l , e t h i c a l e n d . T h u s a c r u c i a l task for e t h i c a l t h e o r y is to teach us w h a t the p r o p e r goals are. By contrast, a c c o r d i n g to s o m e n o n - n a t u r a l i s t i c e t h i c a l v i e w s , o u r p r o p e r goal is to t r a n s c e n d the l i m i t a t i o n s o f h u m a n nature. I n s o m e of P l a t o s d i a l o g u e s , we are e n c o u r a g e d to e s c a p e t h i s life as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e by b e c o m i n g like G o d ( A n n a s 1 9 9 9 ) . L a t e r C h r i s t i a n t h i n k e r s d e v e l o p e d t h i s further, c l a i m i n g that h u m a n nature c a n n o t be perfected b y m e r e l y n a t u r a l m e a n s , but r e q u i r e s s u p e r n a t u r a l intervention. C a r n e a d e s offers three c a n d i d a t e s

for the objects o u r

nature

i n c l i n e s us t o w a r d s : p l e a s u r e , a b s e n c e of p a i n a n d p r i m a r y n a t u r a l t h i n g s (i.e. g o o d s o f the b o d y a n d m i n d s u c h as h e a l t h , beauty or i n t e l l i g e n c e ) . T h e s e s e e m to be the o n l y p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e s , a s we c a n see b y t r y i n g to f i n d o t h e r n a t u r a l i s t i c ( n o n - t h e o l o g i c a l ) g o o d s that d o not fit into o n e o f these categories. T h i s i m m e d i a t e l y gives us three possible a c c o u n t s of w h a t we s h o u l d o r g a n i z e o u r lives a r o u n d . W e m a y say the best lite for h u m a n b e i n g s is: ( I ) to o b t a i n pleasure; ( 2 ) to o b t a i n the a b s e n c e o f p a i n ; o r (3) to o b t a i n the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e s e are the s i m p l e s t t h e o r i e s b e c a u s e they h o l d that nature i m p l a n t s i n us a desire for the t h i n g s we m u s t o b t a i n to live w e l l . But p e r h a p s we s h o u l d i n s i s t that it is not e n o u g h m e r e l y to get these t h i n g s , but that we m u s t d o so in the right way, that is, v i r t u ously. S o they w i l l o n l y be c o m p o n e n t s ot a g o o d life w h e n a c c o m p a n i e d w i t h v i r t u e . T h i s w i l l give us three m o r e o p t i o n s . T h e best lite for h u m a n b e i n g s is; (4) v i r t u e plus p l e a s u r e ; ( 5 ) v i r t u e p l u s the a b s e n c e of p a i n ; or (6) virtue p l u s the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e s e theories w i l l h a v e to e x p l a i n w h y it matters h o w w e get the t h i n g s we n e e d to f l o u r i s h . T h e n a g a i n , p e r h a p s w e s h o u l d o n l y t h i n k o l these as targets to be a i m e d at. I n that case, w e get three m o r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s . T h e best life tor h u m a n b e i n g s i s : (7) to strive for p l e a s u r e ; ( 8 ) to strive for the a b s e n c e o f p a i n ; o r ( 9 ) to strive for the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s . T h e difficult}" here is to e x p l a i n w h y nature i m p l a n t s desires i n u s that we do not n e e d to satisfy in o r d e r to f l o u r i s h (see F i g u r e 2).

CARNEADES

Ethical ends: objects that human nature inclines us towards

Pleasure

Absence of pain

Primary nature things (mental and physical goods: health, wealth, intelligence)

Corresponding accounts of the good life in accordance with human nature

(l) Obtaining pleasure (EPICUREANS)

(4) Obtaining pleasure in a morally good life

(2) Obtaining the absence of pain

(5) Obtaining the absence of pain in a morally good life

(3) Obtaining (and enjoying) the primary natural things

(6) Obtaining and enjoying the primary natural things in a morally good life (ARISTOTELIANS)

(7) Striving for pleasure

(S) Striving for the absence of pain

(9) Striving for the primary natural things (STOICS)

Figure i. C a m r a d t s ' ethical divisions {Fin. 5.15-23, Turn. 5.64-35: Ac. 2.128-31 ).

T h e s e t h e o r i e s are all s u p p o s e d to give u s a c t u a l , p r a c t i c a l g u i d a n c e i n p l a n n i n g o u t o u r lives. A l t h o u g h they all p l a c e a s i g n i f i cant e m p h a s i s o n g r a s p i n g w h a t the p r o p e r targets are, they are not intellectualist: t h e y d o not m a i n t a i n that b e c o m i n g e t h i c a l l y g o o d is s i m p l y a m a t t e r of a c q u i r i n g the r i g h t s o r t of k n o w l e d g e ; or if it is, t h e n a c q u i r i n g k n o w l e d g e w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v e s o m e c h a n g e i n o u r d i s p o s i t i o n s a n d d e s i r e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , they all m a i n t a i n that k n o w l e d g e is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for v i r t u e : i f w e d o not k n o w w h i c h targets are t h e right o n e s to a i m at, w e will o n l y hit t h e m h a p h a z a r d l y a n d b y a c c i d e n t . T o c o n s i s t e n t l y a n d reliably hit t h e

right

targets w e m u s t k n o w w h a t w e are to a i m at (see Fuse, 5.15; J V £ 1.2, l 0 9 4 a 2 3 - 2 5 a n d 1.3, I 0 9 5 a 9 - 1 2 ) , T h e comparisons between ethical views implicit in C a r n e a d e s ' d i v i s i o n s h o w s that they c a n n o t all be true. T o d e f e n d one is to attack

&7

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SCEPTICISM

the o t h e r s . B u t rather t h a n t a k i n g the p e r s p e c t i v e of a p a r t i c i p a n t i n these e t h i c a l debates, C a r n e a d e s places h i m s e l f o u t s i d e , s u r v e y i n g the w h o l e Held. T h i s f r e e d o m I r o m d o c t r i n a l c o m m i t m e n t gives h i m a n o n - p a r t i s a n a p p r e c i a t i o n of the s t r e n g t h s a n d w e a k n e s s e s o f the v a r i o u s p o s i t i o n s , a n d it gives h t m a c o n v e n i e n t f r a m e for h i s s c e p t i c a l attacks. S u c h is C i c e r o ' s a p p r o a c h i n De Fin/bus

w h e n he argues for a n d

against the three m o s t plausible a n d forcefully d e f e n d e d p o s i t i o n s : the E p i c u r e a n ( 1 ) , the A r i s t o t e l i a n (6J a n d the Stoic ( 9 ) . T h e s c e p t i cal a r g u m e n t s that C i c e r o reports against these v i e w s are n o t a l w a y s e x p l i c i t l y attributed t o C a r n e a d e s , but the context m a k e s it r e a s o n able to s u p p o s e that they are h i s , or at least w e r e i n s p i r e d by h i m ,

I n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n E p i c u r e a n a n d Stoic ethics O n e o f C i c e r o ' s central c o m p l a i n t s about the E p i c u r e a n v i e w is that it is i n c o n s i s t e n t . E p i c u r u s , in fact, w a v e r s b e t w e e n (1) a n d ( 2 ) , s i n c e he s o m e t i m e s c o n c e i v e s of p l e a s u r e a s a n active s t i m u l a t i o n of the senses a n d o t h e r t i m e s as the t r a n q u i l a b s e n c e of p a i n / It is clear that m a x i m i z i n g o n e type o f p l e a s u r e d o e s not a l w a y s m a x i m i z e the other. S e e k i n g the a b s e n c e of p a i n w i l l l e a d m e a w a y f r o m m a n y p l e a s u r e s I m i g h t o t h e r w i s e enjoy. A n d s e e k i n g t h o s e active p l e a s u r e s w i l l p r o b a b l y l e a d to s o m e u n w a n t e d p a i n s . W e are b o r n w i t h a n a t u r a l d e s i r e for pleasure. B u t a c c o r d i n g to E p i c u r u s it is the a b s e n c e ot p a i n that c o m p l e t e s or fulfils o u r n a t u r e . I f this is c o r r e c t , n a t u r e s e e m s g u i l t y of m i s l e a d i n g u s . It w o u l d m a k e m u c h m o r e sense to give us a desire l o r the a b s e n c e of p a i n if that is w h a t w e n e e d to f l o u r i s h . E p i c u r u s m u s t e x p l a i n w h y nature s h o u l d i m p l a n t in us a desire for pleasure w h e n the satisfaction ot that desire d o e s not g u a r a n t e e a g o o d life. T h e r e are p o w e r f u l r e s p o n s e s available to the E p i c u r e a n , s o m e o l w h i c h c a n be f o u n d i n C i c e r o ' s defence ( F i n . 1; see also D L 10.121¬ 3 5 ) . H o w e v e r , the s c e p t i c d o e s not n e e d to p r o v i d e irrefutable, c o n c l u s i v e e v i d e n c e that the p o s i t i o n i n q u e s t i o n is false. S c e p t i cal refutation a i m s at s h o w i n g that the d o g m a t i s t s d o not have a n

SB

CARNEADES

adequate d e t e n t e , u s u a l l y b y p o i n t i n g out i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s w i t h i n their t h e o r i e s . It is often p o s s i b l e to p a t c h up the i n c o n s i s t e n c y by m o d i f y i n g the theory, but that i n t u r n w i l l p r o v i d e a n e w target for s c e p t i c a l refutation. T h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f a l w a y s lies w i t h those w h o are p r o m o t i n g a p o s i t i v e v i e w . C i c e r o ' s m a i n o b j e c t i o n to the Stoic a c c o u n t o f t h e e t h i c a l e n d also points to a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y . T h e Stoics c l a i m that the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s are v a l u a b l e , a n d t h u s c h o i c e w o r t h y , but a l s o indifferent w i t h respect to o u r h a p p i n e s s . It is s u p p o s e d l y a m a t t e r o f s t r i v i n g in the right way that c o u n t s ; w h e t h e r or n o t w e s u c c e e d is i r r e l e v a n t . T h e Stoic sage w i l l m a k e e v e r y r e a s o n a b l e effort to m a i n t a i n h i s h e a l t h , for e x a m p l e , b u t this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h h i s f a l l i n g 01 H i s w i s d o m is not m a n i f e s t e d i n o u t c o m e s o v e r w h i c h he has n o ultimate c o n t r o l , but r a t h e r i n a q u a l i t a t i v e state o f m i n d that d i r e c t s h i m to a c t a l w a y s i n the right way. O n c e h e has a c h i e v e d w i s d o m , h i s h a p p i n e s s c a n not be affected b y the p r e s e n c e or a b s e n c e of health or other s u c h so c a l l e d " p r e f e r r e d indifférents''. T h e qualitative state o l v i r t u e a l l o w s tor n e i t h e r i n c r e a s e n o r d e c r e a s e : a c h r o n i c a l l y ill sage w i l l be no less h a p p y t h a n o n e i n great h e a l t h . I n effect, the Stoics a p p e a r to be s a y i n g that s u c h t h i n g s as h e a l t h , strength a n d b e a u t y are w o r t h c h o o s i n g b e c a u s e t h e y are w o r t h h a v i n g , but a l s o that it does not really m a t t e r w h e t h e r y o u have t h e m . C i c e r o presents the Stoics w i t h a d i l e m m a : e i t h e r t h e y m u s t say that the p r i m a r y n a t u r a l g o o d s are really g o o d , o r that they are really n e u t r a l , neither good n o r b a d . I f they go w i t h the f o r m e r o p t i o n , their p o s i t i o n collapses into the Peripatetic v i e w that h a p p i n e s s c o m e s o n l y t h r o u g h a v i r t u o u s a c q u i s i t i o n , use a n d e n j o y m e n t of g o o d t h i n g s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , we w i l l see that the Stoics d o not really believe that s t r i v i n g is all w e n e e d for h a p p i n e s s . I f they go w i t h the latter o p t i o n , their p o s i t i o n c a n n o longer offer any p r a c t i c a l g u i d a n c e ; it w i l l no longer matter w h e t h e r I t r y to p r e s e r v e m y h e a l t h s i n c e it c a n n e i t h e r a d d to n o r s u b t r a c t f r o m m y h a p p i n e s s , So it w i l l not m a t t e r w h e t h e r I try to p r e s e r v e m y h e a l t h or not. I n general, s u c h a t h e o r y w i l l give us n o basis o n w h i c h to c h o o s e o n e t h i n g a n d reject another. C a m e a d e s u s e d to get quite w o r k e d u p by the Stoic c l a i m that virtue is sufficient for h a p p i n e s s (Tusc. 5.83J. O n e o f t h e w a y s he

69

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sought to u n d e r m i n e this c o n v i c t i o n w a s to argue i n s u p p o r t of the first h o r n o f the d i l e m m a , that is, to s h o w that their t h e o r y actually c o m m i t s t h e m to the Peripatetic p o s i t i o n . C a r n e a d e s u s e d to j u d g e the c o n t r o v e r s y [between Peripatetics a n d Stoics] a s a respected arbitrator. S i n c e the s a m e things w h i c h the Peripatetics d e e m e d g o o d s , the Stoics r e g a r d e d as advantages, a n d s i n c e the Peripatetics d i d not c o n t e r m o r e value t h a n the Stoics o n w e a l t h , g o o d health, a n d other things of the s a m e k i n d , he s a i d that w h e n the i s s u e is w e i g h e d w i t h respect to the facts, not w o r d s , there w a s n o c a u s e for dispute.

(Tusc.

5.120; see also Fr>t. 3.41 )

C a r n e a d e s is c l e a r l y out to u n d e r m i n e a c e n t r a l c o m p o n e n t in Stoic e t h i c s : the d o c t r i n e of the p r e f e r r e d indifférents. H o w e v e r , he is not t r y i n g to s h o w that Stoic a n d A r i s t o t e l i a n e t h i c s converge in o r d e r to d e f e n d it. I n d e e d , t h i s is o n l y o n e h o r n o l the d i l e m m a . U n d e r l y i n g the a r g u m e n t , at least i n C i c e r o ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n , is the n o t i o n that w h a t really matters is the life o n e leads, the c h o i c e s one m a k e s , the w a y o n e r e s p o n d s to g o o d f o r t u n e a n d adversity, not the w o r d s o n e u s e s to d e s c r i b e t h e m , or the t h e o r y one appeals to i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n oneself. I f the lives o f m o r a l l y u p r i g h t Stoics are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the lives o f Peripatetics, t h e n the d o c t r i n a l differe n c e s a r e i n s i g n i f i c a n t . T h i s p r a g m a t i c attitude is not offered as a n alternative to p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . C a r n e a d e s is not s a y i n g that r a t i o n a l e n q u i r y is futile, but r a t h e r that d o g m a t i c

commitment

to p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories is futile. S o it w o u l d be s u r p r i s i n g if the participants h a d invited h i m to sit as j u d g e . It he thought they w e r e all equally w r o n g , there is n o t h i n g for h i m to judge. B u t C i c e r o says that the c o n t r o v e r s y u s e d to be d e c i d e d by C a r n e a d e s [controversiam

sotebat iudica re]. S i n c e it is c l e a r l y a p h i l -

o s o p h i c a l dispute, what needs to be d e c i d e d is w h i c h s i d e presents the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l i n g case. I f C a r n e a d e s j u d g e d that o n e p o s i tion is m o r e plausibly d e f e n d e d t h a n the o t h e r s , it is h a r d to see w h y he w o u l d not a p p r o v e of that side h i m s e l f . W h a t attitude t h e n w o u l d C a r n e a d e s have us take t o w a r d s t h e s e i n c o n c l u s i v e ethical theories?

70

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W e shall p o s t p o n e this q u e s t i o n o n e last t i m e u n t i l w e have c o n s i d e r e d h i s a r g u m e n t s against Stoic epistemology.

Epistemological arguments A s w i t h h i s s c e p t i c a l attacks o n t h e o l o g y a n d e t h i c s , C a r n e a d e s d i d not a i m to s h o w that n o b e l i e l is true, b u t rather that n o n e o f the available e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theories h a d e s t a b l i s h e d a n y t h i n g about knowledge. O n c e again, C a r n e a d e s was more ambitious than A r c esilaus:

[ H e ] p o s i t i o n e d h i m s e l f o n the c r i t e r i o n not o n l y against the Stoics b u t also against e v e r y o n e before h i m . I n fact h i s first a r g u m e n t , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d against all o l t h e m together, is o n e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h he e s t a b l i s h e s that n o t h i n g is w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n a c r i t e r i o n ot t r u t h - not r e a s o n , not s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n , not a p p e a r a n c e , n o t a n y t h i n g else that there is; for all of these a s a group d e c e i v e us,

( M 7.159)

4

D e s p i t e d i s a g r e e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g p r o p o s e d c r i t e r i a , it w a s agreed a m o n g H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s that the s u c c e s s f u l c a n d i d a t e m u s t play s o m e role i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the t r u e i r o m the false ( S t r i k e r 1 9 7 4 ) . So C a r n e a d e s a t t e m p t s to s h o w that n o t h i n g c a n fill this role, that is, that we have n o reliable w a y to differentiate the t r u e f r o m the false. A s d e s c r i b e d by the Stoics, the c r i t e r i o n is m o r e t h a n j u s t a theoretical a c c o u n t ; it is s u p p o s e d to be the tool that e n a b l e s us to progress f r o m folly to w i s d o m . W e s a w i n C h a p t e r 3 that b e c o m i n g w i s e , for the Stoics, is a m a t t e r of l e a r n i n g to assent o n l y to kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . T h e p o i n t of e x p l a i n i n g the nature of s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s is not s i m p l y to a s s u r e us that s o m e t h i n g is t r u e , but r a t h e r to s h o w h o w w e c a n assent o n l y to w h a t is true, E x t e n d i n g A r c e s i l a u s ' attack,

Carneades makes a distinction

b e t w e e n t w o a s p e c t s ot a n i m p r e s s i o n : o n e i n relation to w h a t it is a n i m p r e s s i o n ot, a n d the o t h e r i n relation to the agent h a v i n g the

"1

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

i m p r e s s i o n . T h e first relation d e t e r m i n e s w h e t h e r it is true o r false, a n d the s e c o n d w h e t h e r it is c o n v i n c i n g or not. S e p a r a t i n g these aspects m a k e s A r c e s i l a u s ' o b j e c t i o n m o r e v i v i d , a n d it forces

the

Stoics to be m o r e explicit about their p o s i t i o n : a n i m p r e s s i o n w i l l be true or false d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r it agrees w i t h its o b j e c t ( s ) , but this w i l l not d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r o r not the agent finds the i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g ( A i 7.168), O n the other h a n d , the fact that the agent finds the i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g n e e d not tell us a n y t h i n g about w h e t h e r it is true o r false. The

Stoic c r i t e r i o n ,

the kataleptic

impression, includes

both

aspects in s u c h a w a y that its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s is s u p p o s e d to indicate its t r u t h , B u t , as A r c e s i l a u s h a d a r g u e d , for a n y i r r e s i s t i b l y p e r s u a sive a n d t r u e i m p r e s s i o n we c a n i m a g i n e a false o n e that is i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . C a r n e a d e s e m p l o y s a sorites a r g u m e n t to f u r t h e r this o b j e c t i o n , A d v a n c i n g b y m i n u t e degrees we c a n i m a g i n e t r a n s f o r m i n g a kataleptic into a n o n - k a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n , or vice versa, O n e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of the a r g u m e n t goes t h i s way.

[ 1]

3

I f G o d c a n present a s l e e p e r w i t h a pe rsuasive i m p r e s s i o n [of w h a t doesn't e x i s t ] , t h e n H e c a n present the sleeper w i t h a n i m p r e s s i o n that is e x t r e m e l y t r u t h - l i k e , i.e. o n e w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e s the t r u t h v e r y closely,

[2]

I f . . . one that is e x t r e m e l y t r u t h - l i k e , then . . . o n e that's difficult to d i s c r i m i n a t e I r o m a true i m p r e s s i o n .

[3]

I f . . , o n e that is difficult to d i s c r i m i n a t e , t h e n . . . one that can't be d i s c r i m i n a t e d ,

[4]

I f . . . o n e that can't be d i s c r i m i n a t e d , t h e n . . . one that doesn't differ at a l l ,

(Ac. 2.47-49)

T h e i m p r e s s i o n retains its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s t h r o u g h o u t

the steps; it

does not b e c o m e m o r e p e r s u a s i v e as we p r o c e e d . W h a t c h a n g e s is the degree of difference b e t w e e n t h i s v a c u o u s i m p r e s s i o n a n d a true one. T h e i m p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s g r a d u a l l y b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e s i m i l a r u n t i l we a r r i v e at i d e n t i c a l , that is, i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e , p e r c e p tual contents. I n the e n d , t w o e q u a l l y p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s , one v a c u o u s a n d o n e t r u e , differ in n o t h i n g but n u m b e r .

72

CARNEADES

C h r y s i p p u s c u s t o m a r y w a y of d e a l i n g w i t h the sorites is to stop 1

a n s w e r i n g before o n e c o m e s to u n c l e a r cases: " i n the case of a p p e a r a n c e s w h e r e the difference b e t w e e n t h e m is so s m a l l , the w i s e pers o n w i l l h o l d fast a n d k e e p quiet, w h e r e a s i n cases w h e r e a greater difference s t r i k e s h i m , he w i l l assent to o n e of t h e m as t r u e " { A i 7-416; see A c . 2 , 9 1 - 2 ) . S o if the d i f f e r e n c e s are m i n u t e , say b e t w e e n two i m p r i n t s f r o m the s a m e r i n g , the sage w i l l w i t h h o l d assent. R u t i n cases w h e r e there is a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n a kataleptic a n d n o n - k a t a l e p t i c i m p r e s s i o n , the sage w i l l not hesitate to assent to the former. T h e p r o b l e m w i t h this r e s p o n s e is that it a s s u m e s one c a n a c t u ally d e c i d e w h i c h s i t u a t i o n o n e is i n . S u p p o s e that "fifty is f e w " is the content of a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n , a n d that "ten t h o u s a n d is f e w " is the c o n t e n t o l a n o n - k a t a l e p t i c a n d false i m p r e s s i o n . C l e a r l y , fifty-one is a b o u t as far f r o m ten t h o u s a n d as fifty is. S o the sage w i l l assent to the p r o p o s i t i o n that "fifty-one is f e w " a l s o ( A i 7 - 4 1 6 - 2 1 ) . I f there is a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n the e v i d e n t t r u t h of s u c h c l a i m s a n d the falsity of "ten t h o u s a n d is few", there s h o u l d a l s o be a great d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n " f i f t y - t w o is f e w " a n d "ten t h o u s a n d is few". B u t o n c e he starts d o w n that r o a d , there s e e m s to be n o p r i n c i p l e d place to stop a n s w e r i n g . E v e n i f w e s u p p o s e that s o m e w h e r e a l o n g this r o a d the sage w o u l d e v e n t u a l l y receive the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n that o n e h u n d r e d (or w h a t e v e r the n u m b e r m a y b e ) is not tew, he m u s t be a b l e to r e c o g n i z e it a s s u c h . T h i s i m p r e s s i o n m u s t be q u i t e d i s t i n c t f r o m the i m p r e s s i o n that n i n e t y - n i n e is few. But this w o u l d be a r e m a r k a b l e feat of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n s i n c e in e v e r y o t h e r case the a d d i t i o n o f one u n i t is not e n o u g h to t r a n s f o r m tew i n t o m a n y . S o e v e n it the sage receives the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n r e g a r d i n g w h a t is few a n d m a n y , the sorites o b j e c t i o n s h o u l d u n d e r m i n e h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n b e i n g able to c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f y it as s u c h . Similarly, o n e

might be prevented from finding a

kataleptic

i m p r e s s i o n c o n v i n c i n g d u e to e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . F o r e x a m p l e , w h e n H e r a c l e s s t o o d by A d m e t u s , h a v i n g b r o u g h t A l c e s t i s u p f r o m b e l o w the e a r t h , A d m e t u s d i d

"3

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

catch a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n f r o m A l c e s t i s , yet d i d not trust I t . . . . F o r A d met us f i g u r e d that A l c e s t i s w a s d e a d a n d that a d e a d p e r s o n d o e s not rise u p .

(Ai 7.254-56)

T h e i m p r e s s i o n o f A l c e s t i s s e e m s to meet the r e q u i r e m e n t s for b e i n g k a t a l e p t i c : it is f r o m a real t h i n g , a n d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h p r e c i s e l y that t h i n g , a n d a c c u r a t e l y depicts all the relevant details. T o deal w i t h s u c h e v e n t u a l i t i e s , s o m e later Stoics argue that the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n c a n o n l y s e r v e as the c r i t e r i o n o l truth il it has no obstacle ( M 7 . 2 5 3 - 5 7 , 7 . 4 2 4 ) . A s the A d m e t u s e x a m p l e illustrates, the s o r t s o f o b s t a c l e s i n q u e s t i o n are beliefs or m e n t a l states. I f I a m i n a n a n x i o u s or f e a r f u l state of m i n d , 1 m i g h t v e r y w e l l receive a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n a n d yet refuse to assent to it. S i m i l a r l y , if I a m f i r m l y c o n v i n c e d o l s o m e false belief, I m i g h t a l s o be r e l u c t a n t to assent to s o m e o t h e r truth. I f t h e r e are n o s u c h o b s t a c l e s , a s s e n t i n g to a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n is like the s i n k i n g o f a s c a l e s b a l a n c e w h e n weight is p u t o n it. T h e m i n d n e c e s s a r i l y y i e l d s a n d c a n n o t r e t r a i n t r o m g i v i n g its a p p r o v a l to what is p e r s p i c u o u s ( A c . 2 . 3 8 ) . W h e n the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n l a c k s a n y o b s t a c l e s it p r a c t i c a l l y lays h o l d o f us b y the h a i r a n d d r a g s us to assent ( A i 7.257). W h a t these passages suggest is s o m e sort o f n a t u r a l fit b e t w e e n kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s a n d o u r r a t i o n a l faculty s u c h that

these

i m p r e s s i o n s are, at least potentially, c o m p e l l i n g i n a w a y that false ones c a n n o t be. A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w , kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s affect the p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d m i n d i n a w a y that is quite different f r o m the w a y talse i m p r e s s i o n s affect the s a m e m i n d . T h e sage is the o n e w h o has h a b i t u a t e d h i m s e l f not to b e t e m p t e d to assent to false beliefs. T h e fit b e t w e e n h i s r a t i o n a l nature a n d the truth e x p l a i n s h o w this h a b i t u a t i o n is p o s s i b l e . So p e r h a p s it is possible to a c q u i r e the n e c e s s a r y level o f d i s c e r n m e n t , it w e c a n still c a l l it that. T a k e n this way, the Stoic c r i t e r i o n is s i m p l y a guarantee that o n e m i g h t d e v e l o p one's cognitive a n d p e r c e p t u a l e q u i p m e n t in s u c h a w a y that o n e o n l y finds kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s persuasive. ' 1

S u c h a g u a r a n t e e is still c o l d c o m f o r t to the S c e p t i c . C a r n e a d e s follows A r c e s i l a u s in f o r c i n g the Stoics to live u p to the m o r e a m b i tious p r o m i s e of their e p i s t e m o l o g y : s h o w u s i j o w o n e m i g h t b e c o m e

7t

CARNEADES

a sage. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y urgent given their v i e w that n o t h i n g but w i s d o m is really w o r t h w h i l e . W h i l e w e all l a n g u i s h in o u r v i c e a n d folly, it is of little use to b e t o l d that w i s d o m is p o s s i b l e . C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c a l attack e m p h a s i z e s that the relation of a n i m p r e s s i o n to the agent, its p e r s u a s i v e n e s s o r credibility, is p r i m a r y i n o u r

struggle

tor w i s d o m ,

Epoche

and

apmxia

W e c o m e finally to the q u e s t i o n o f what cognitive attitude C a r n e a d e s w o u l d have us take t o w a r d s all this i n c o n c l u s i v e n e s s . T h e s i m p l e a n s w e r is that we s h o u l d w i t h h o l d a s s e n t . B u t d e t e r m i n i n g p r e c i s e l y w h a t he m e a n s b y this is c o m p l i c a t e d by the fact that he m a k e s a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o k i n d s o f assent, o n l y o n e o f w h i c h we are s u p p o s e d to w i t h h o l d . T h e o t h e r is s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e (Ac. C i c e r o reports

2.104).

C a r n e a d e s ' distinction as a key move

i n his

response to the s t a n d a r d objection that s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t m a k e s life i m p o s s i b l e (iipraxia).

T h e Stoics c o m p l a i n e d that if there are no

kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , a s C a r n e a d e s argues, t h e n e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d be u n c l e a r (Ac. 2 . 3 2 ) . C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c a l a t t a c k calls into q u e s t i o n the fit b e t w e e n h u m a n c o g n i t i o n a n d the w o r l d . I n o t h e r w o r d s , it suggests that e v e n if we u s e o u r c o g n i t i v e e q u i p m e n t to the best of o u r ability we m i g h t not m a k e a n y progress t o w a r d s s e c u r i n g i n f a l lible j u s t i f i c a t i o n for o u r beliefs. We m a y d e v e l o p this o b j e c t i o n f u r t h e r i n t e r m s of the two aspects of a n i m p r e s s i o n . B y m a k i n g t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n C a r n e a d e s d r a w s o u r attention to the lact that the subjective p l a u s i b i l i t y ot a n i m p r e s s i o n is n o necessary i n d i c a t o r o f truth a n d v i c e v e r s a . T h a t is all he needs to assert for the s a k e of h i s o b j e c t i o n to Stoic epistemology. B u t this leaves o p e n the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r the subjective p l a u sibility of a n i m p r e s s i o n is e v e n a fallible i n d i c a t o r o f t r u t h , that is, w h e t h e r there is any c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p l a u s i b i l i t y a n d t r u t h . It not, s o m e t h i n g s e e m i n g p l a u s i b l e h a s n o greater l i k e l i h o o d of b e i n g true t h a n s o m e t h i n g s e e m i n g w i l d l y i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e c o n v i n c i n g a n d f a m i l i a r sight o f a f r i e n d is j u s t as l i k e l y to be true as the

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

d r e a m - l i k e , h a z y i m p r e s s i o n o f a c e n t a u r . A s far as w e k n o w , the w a y the w o r l d a p p e a r s is not i n a n y w a y a n i n d i c a t o r o f the w a y the w o r l d is, I f that is w h a t C a r n e a d e s m e a n s , it is easy to see w h y the Stoics w o u l d assert that he is o v e r t u r n i n g life itself a n d d e p r i v i n g us of o u r m i n d s (Ac. 2 . 3 1 ) . I n c o u n t e r i n g the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n , C a r n e a d e s m a i n t a i n s that

there is a n i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n a n i m p r e s s i o n b e i n g m e r e l y u n c l e a r a n d it's b e i n g i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e (Ac. 2.32; Prncp.

Ev. 14.7).

E v e r y t h i n g is e q u a l l y i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e : n o i m p r e s s i o n c a n be g r a s p e d or a p p r e h e n d e d i n s u c h a w a y that w e c o u l d not i n p r i n c i p l e be m i s t a k e n about it. But that d o e s not m e a n that e v e r y t h i n g is equally u n c l e a r . C a r n e a d e s o n l y a i m s to d o a w a y w i t h w h a t n e v e r existed, the Stoic f i c t i o n o f kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t h e leaves us w h a t w e h a v e h a d all a l o n g , p e r s u a s i v e o r c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s , as o u r g u i d e i n p r a c t i c a l matters, R a t h e r than give us a d v i c e about h o w w e s h o u l d act i n the a b s e n c e of c e r t a i n k n o w l e d g e , C a r n e a d e s m e r e l y d e s c r i b e s h o w w e d o act: . . . j u s t a s i n o r d i n a r y life, w h e n w e are i n v e s t i g a t i n g a s m a l l m a t t e r w e q u e s t i o n o n e w i t n e s s , w h e n it is a greater m a t ter, s e v e r a l w i t n e s s e s , a n d w h e n it is a n e v e n m o r e e s s e n t i a l m a t t e r w e e x a m i n e e a c h of the w i t n e s s e s o n t h e basis o f the m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a m o n g the o t h e r s . . .

(Af 7.184)

I n the first level o f s c r u t i n y w e a p p l y the p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n o n its o w n as t h e c r i t e r i o n . I f I receive a n i m p r e s s i o n that is, at first sight, a p p a r e n t l y true, I assent to it a n d act a c c o r d i n g l y ; w e shall c o n s i d e r w h a t is i n v o l v e d i n s u c h assent below. T h e fact that w h a t is a p p a r ently t r u e is s o m e t i m e s false d o e s not b o t h e r u s , a n d n o r s h o u l d it. C a r n e a d e s asserts that:

o n e s h o u l d not, b e c a u s e the rare o c c u r r e n c e o f this [the a p p a r e n t l y true i m p r e s s i o n b e i n g l a l s e ] , d i s t r u s t the o n e that for the m o s t part tells the t r u t h . F o r b o t h o u r j u d g m e n t s a n d o u r a c t i o n s are, as a matter ot fact, regulated b y w h a t applies for the m o s t part.

76

(Af 7,175)

CARNEADES

T h e c l a i m that s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s "tell the t r u t h " for the m o s t part is s i m p l y a w a y o f s a y i n g that they are reliable or trustworthy. I f he h a d meant s o m e t h i n g m o r e , he w o u l d be suggesting a d o g m a t i c alternative to the Stoic a c c o u n t o f t r u t h . H e does not ( a n d s h o u l d not) offer a n y s p e c u l a t i o n as to w h y s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s are l o r the m o s t part reliable. But

i n p r e s e n t i n g the p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n a s a n

alternative

a c c o u n t o f the c r i t e r i o n , he is m a k i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m the s t a n d a r d use of the t e r m " c r i t e r i o n " O n the s t a n d a r d use, if s o m e t h i n g satisfies the c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h t h e n it is true. B u t a c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n m a y be t r u e o r false. At the s e c o n d level of s c r u t i n y , w h e r e the stakes are a bit higher, we e x a m i n e the i m p r e s s i o n s that a p p e a r a l o n g w i t h the o n e i n q u e s t i o n . C a r n e a d e s ' m a k e s the o b v i o u s , but i m p o r t a n t , o b s e r v a t i o n that we t y p i c a l l y d o not receive isolated, i n d i v i d u a l i m p r e s s i o n s ; rather, they c o m e i n g r o u p s . W h e n I e n c o u n t e r m y f r i e n d , I receive i m p r e s s i o n s of h e r clothes, her hair, h e r s h o e s a n d the s o u n d of h e r v o i c e , a l o n g w i t h the objects she m a y be h o l d i n g a n d o t h e r t h i n g s i n the i m m e d i a t e vicinity, a n d e v e n the q u a l i t y ot the light. W h e n the c l u s ter of s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s all a p p e a r t r u e a n d m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e , o u r trust is greater. B u t if one o f these i m p r e s s i o n s a p p e a r s false, if m y f r i e n d s v o i c e s o u n d s c o m p l e t e l y u n f a m i l i a r , t h e n I s h o u l d reject the i m p r e s s i o n that this is m y f r i e n d . C a r n e a d e s d e s c r i b e s t h i s w i t h the a d d i t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t that the c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n n o t be " t u r n e d away", that is, t u r n e d a w a y b y a n a p p a r e n t l y false i m p r e s s i o n a c c o m p a n y i n g it. At the t h i r d level of s c r u t i n y , i n matters o f the h i g h e s t i m p o r tance, we t u r n o u r attention to e a c h o f the a s s o c i a t e d i m p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s a n d a c t i v e l y s e e k to d i s c r e d i t o n e o n the basis of the others. C a r n e a d e s c l a i m s that this is the sort of t h i n g we d o w h e n s c r u t i n i z i n g c a n d i d a t e s for p u b l i c office. It is n o t sufficient that the c a n d i d a t e c o n v i n c i n g l y a p p e a r s to be q u a l i f i e d . C o m m e n s u r a t e w i t h the i m p o r t a n c e o f the p o s i t i o n , we w i l l e x a m i n e h i s c r e d e n t i a l s a n d references. E a c h of these in t u r n w i l l b e put to s i m i l a r tests. I n the end,

the m o s t w e c a n a c h i e v e is c o h e r e n c e a m o n g the e x a m i n e d

i m p r e s s i o n s , but at t h i s highest level o l s c r u t i n y , we w i l l not settle for the c o h e r e n c e ot the i n i t i a l cluster of i m p r e s s i o n s . T h u s w e get

"7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the f i n a l r e q u i r e m e n t that the c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n that h a s not b e e n t u r n e d a w a y h a s a l s o b e e n gone o v e r i n detail. D e s p i t e the fact that the h i g h e s t level of s c r u t i n y still fails to g u a r antee the t r u t h o l the i m p r e s s i o n , we c o n t i n u e to r e l y o n i t If we d o not, that is, i f w e find n o i m p r e s s i o n s c o n v i n c i n g , C a r n e a d e s grants that life w o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d (Ac. 239,

103.

105).

C a r n e a d e s ' p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i o n a n d the t w o t y p e s o f a s s e n t W h a t exactly are we d o i n g w h e n w e rely o n s u c h i m p r e s s i o n s ? W e m a y n o w u n d e r s t a n d the type of assent C a r n e a d e s a l l o w s a n d the type he w o u l d have us w i t h h o l d . F o r c o n v e n i e n c e we s h a l l refer to these as s c e p t i c a l a n d d o g m a t i c assent, respectively. S c e p t i c a l assent is given to p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s that h a v e r e c e i v e d the appropriate level of scrutiny. ( M o r e strictly s p e a k i n g , assent is g i v e n to a p r o p o s i t i o n a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the i m p r e s s i o n . I f we d o not f o r m u l a t e s u c h a p r o p o s i t i o n b y i n t e r p r e t i n g the i m p r e s s i o n s s i g n i f i c a n c e , then it is n o t " s a y i n g " a n y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h w e m i g h t agree.) The

distinction between dogmatic

a n d s c e p t i c a l assent

may

be i n t e r p r e t e d in two w a y s . O n e is that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d h a v e us w i t h h o l d assent i n the m a n n e r that w o u l d c h a r a c t e r i z e assent to a kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n if we w e r e a b l e to i d e n t i f y it as s u c h . I n o t h e r w o r d s , s i n c e we c a n n o t k n o w w h e t h e r a n y i m p r e s s i o n we assent to is kataleptic, we s h o u l d n e v e r assent w i t h absolute c o n f i d e n c e . O n this probabilist

view, a l l that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d have us a v o i d

is the r a s h n e s s of t a k i n g o u r s e l v e s to know w h a t w e d o not; he does not o b j e c t to c a u t i o u s l y b e l i e v i n g that s o m e i m p r e s s i o n is p r o b a b l y true. If this is c o r r e c t , C a r n e a d e s d o e s not c o m p l e t e l y sever the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s a n d the t r u t h . H e m e r e l y p o i n t s out that p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s are fallible a n d that a s far as we k n o w they are all we have. A c c o r d i n g l y , s c e p t i c a l assent w o u l d y i e l d fallible beliefs h e l d w i t h the a p p r o p r i a t e l y m o d e s t a w a r e n e s s that they m a y be false. The

o t h e r alternative is that C a r n e a d e s w o u l d h a v e us w i t h -

h o l d assent to the t r u t h o f a n y p r o p o s i t i o n , O n this sceptical

78

view,

CARNEADES

d o g m a t i c assent is s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f t a k i n g s o m e t h i n g to be true, w h e t h e r i n a m o d e s t or c o n f i d e n t m a n n e r . W i t h h o l d i n g this type of assent w o u l d rule out b e l i e v i n g a n y t h i n g , as w e c o m m o n l y use the w o r d belief. T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g type of s c e p t i c a l assent w o u l d be a m a t t e r of g o i n g a l o n g w i t h s o m e i m p r e s s i o n w i t h o u t t a k i n g it to be true, o r e v e n p r o b a b l y true, T h i s i s s u e c o n t i n u e s to be c o n t r o v e r s i a l . A l t h o u g h a n u m b e r of s c h o l a r s i n recent y e a r s have s u p p o r t e d the s e c o n d alternative, I believe the first is the c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C a r n e a d e s , at least w i t h respect to o r d i n a r y , n o n - p h i l o s o p h i c a l b e l i e f s .

7

A s w e saw in C h a p t e r 3, A r c e s i l a u s offers a v e r s i o n of the s c e p t i c a l r e s p o n s e . A c t i o n does not r e q u i r e assent, all we n e e d is a n i m p r e s s i o n a n d a n i m p u l s e , n e i t h e r o f w h i c h n e e d to be, or e v e n c a n be, w i t h h e l d . W h a t m a k e s c o m p e l l i n g A r c e s i l a u s ' use o f t h i s r e s p o n s e is the n o t i o n that w e often act w i t h o u t c o n s c i o u s l y o r deliberately reflecting o n o u r s i t u a t i o n , C a r n e a d e s i n c o r p o r a t e s s u c h cases in h i s first level o f s c r u t i n y : " i n cases w h e r e the s i t u a t i o n does not give us a n o p p o r t u n i t y for e x a c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the m a t t e r " ( M 7 . 1 8 5 ) . W h e n b e i n g p u r s u e d by e n e m i e s , o n e d o e s not h a v e t i m e to c o n s c i o u s l y deliberate about the e v i d e n c e of one's s e n s e s ; o n e m u s t act o n the b a s i s o f h o w e v e r t h i n g s s t r i k e one at that m o m e n t . But as we r a m p u p the level of s c r u t i n y , this a c c o u n t n o l o n g e r m a k e s sense. Suppose I have carefully a n d thoroughly e x a m i n e d an a p p l e . I h a v e e v e n l e d a bit to m y pet h a m s t e r , w h i c h a p p e a r s fine a f t e r w a r d s . A l l ot m y i m p r e s s i o n s c o n f i r m that it is a g o o d a p p l e s o I take a bite. T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n is that I have c o m e to b e l i e v e the a p p l e is p r o b a b l y o k a y to eat. T h e s c e p t i c a l v i e w w o u l d r e q u i r e m e to say that a l t h o u g h the apple a p p e a r s g o o d after m y c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n , I have n o o p i n i o n a s to w h e t h e r it " r e a l l y " is o r not. But

C a r n e a d e s offers h i s p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s as part o f a

d e s c r i p t i o n about h o w we in fact get a l o n g i n the w o r l d . M o s t p e o ple take the e v i d e n c e of their s e n s e s as g o o d , a l t h o u g h fallible, i n d i cators of the w a y the w o r l d is. T h i s is not to say that they a c c e p t s o m e s o p h i s t i c a t e d m e t a p h y s i c a l t h e o r y a b o u t reality, or e v e n s o m e

~9

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

e x p l a n a t i o n a s to w h y the senses are generally reliable. W h e n w e raise the level of s c r u t i n y , we e x p e c t to i n c r e a s e o u r c h a n c e s of getting t h i n g s right. W e d o not e x p e c t to m e r e l y feel m o r e c o n v i n c e d . The

m a i n p r o b l e m w i t h the s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is that it

requires the C a r n e a d e a n to f i n d s o m e t h i n g c o n v i n c i n g w i t h o u t thereby finding it likely to b e t r u e . Yet these n o t i o n s are s o c l o s e l y l i n k e d that p u l l i n g t h e m apart a p p e a r s to m a k e t h e m b o t h u n i n telligible. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y clear w h e n w e rely o n i m p r e s s i o n s to d e t e r m i n e the best c o u r s e ot a c t i o n . It is quite i m p l a u s i b l e to t h i n k that a n i m p r e s s i o n leads i m m e d i a t e l y to i m p u l s e w h e n w e are s l o w l y and methodically considering possible courses of action along with the relevant e v i d e n c e . S u c h deliberate j u d g e m e n t calls for s o m e k i n d of a s s e n t T h i s is w h e r e C a r n e a d e s persuasive i m p r e s s i o n s a n d h i s variety o l 1

sceptical assent c o m e i n . I n differentiating t w o k i n d s of assent, a n d i n d e s c r i b i n g the levels of s c r u t i n y w e t y p i c a l l y e m p l o y , he s h o w s h o w d e l i b e r a t i o n , a n d not iust a c t i o n , is p o s s i b l e tor the sceptic. W h i l e this m o v e strengthens the s c e p t i c s r e s p o n s e to the apraxia it c o m e s at the p r i c e of l o o s e n i n g u p o n A s a r e s p o n s e to the apraxia

objection,

cpache.

objection, C a r n e a d e s practical crite1

r i o n is o n l y m e a n t to s h o w h o w we m a n a g e i n o r d i n a r y life w i t h o u t kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s . W i t h o n e i m p o r t a n t e x c e p t i o n , e x a m p l e s o l C a r n e a d e s s c e p t i c a l assent a l w a y s o c c u r i n the c o n t e x t o f m a k i n g 1

o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y j u d g e m e n t s : for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r this is Socrates (AJ 7 . 1 7 6 - 7 8 ) , w h e t h e r to flee (Af 7,186), w h e t h e r a c o i l e d object is a r o p e or a s n a k e (AJ 7 . 1 8 7 ) , w h e t h e r to go o n a voyage, get m a r r i e d , s o w c r o p s a n d so o n ( A c . 2.100, 109), T h e p o s s i b l e e x c e p t i o n o c c u r s i n r e s p o n s e to the i n c o n s i s t e n c y o b j e c t i o n . C a r n e a d e s w o u l d not n e e d to assert that he k n o w s k n o w l edge is i m p o s s i b l e ; i n s t e a d he m a y say this is a p e r s u a s i v e intellectual i m p r e s s i o n to w h i c h he assents w i t h the p r o p e r m e a s u r e of c a u t i o n (Ac, 2 . 1 1 0 ) . C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l i c i t l y a s s i g n this j u d g e m e n t to h i m , but it w o u l d h a v e b e e n a n o b v i o u s m o v e to m a k e . E x c l u d i n g this case, C a r n e a d e s is n e v e r r e p o r t e d to h a v e s i n c e r e l y a p p r o v e d of a n y of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s he d e b a t e d . S o m e t i m e s he d e f e n d e d a v i e w s o v i g o r o u s l y he w a s t h o u g h t to a c t u a l l y e n d o r s e it ( A c . 2.139;

CARNEADES

see 2 . 1 3 1 ; Fin. 5 . 2 0 ) . B u t C i c e r o m a k e s it clear that he o n l y a r g u e d for these p o s i t i o n s dialectically. E v e n h i s close f r i e n d a n d c o m p a n i o n C l i t o m a c h u s c o u l d never figure out w h i c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s C a r n e a d e s a c c e p t e d {Ac. 2 . 1 3 9 ) . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n for this is that he d i d not a c c e p t a n y ot t h e m , but c o n t i n u e d , i n g o o d S o c r a t i c f a s h i o n , to seek the t r u t h . I n the m e a n t i m e , he a l l o w s for the o r d i n a r y p r o c e s s o l d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d a s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e assent to p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s r e g a r d i n g the d a y - t o - d a y m a i n t e n a n c e of o u r lives.

The dialectical interpretation A s w i t h A r c e s i l a u s , it r e m a i n s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y that C a r n e a d e s d o e s not e n d o r s e a n y o f h i s a p p a r e n t l y p o s i t i v e c l a i m s , but i n s t e a d d e v e l o p s t h e m all o n the b a s i s o f h i s o p p o n e n t s ' v i e w s . O n a p u r e l y d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , C a r n e a d e s s h o w s o n l y that e v e r y positive, d o g m a t i c v i e w is r a t i o n a l l y i n d e f e n s i b l e i n t e r m s o f its p r o p o n e n t s own

standards.

But if C a r n e a d e s is s h o w i n g the Stoics w h e r e their p o s i t i o n leads, then o n c e a g a i n the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n w o u l d b e their p r o b l e m , not

his. C a r n e a d e s s h o u l d not r e s p o n d to s u c h o b j e c t i o n s b u t

rather

accept t h e m as f u r t h e r c o n f i r m a t i o n of the u n t e n a b l e p o s i t i o n o c c u pied by dogmatists. H o w e v e r , C a r n e a d e s ' d i a l e c t i c a l strategy m i g h t b e m o r e i n d i r e c t . H e m i g h t h a v e s o u g h t to s h o w the Stoics that their p o s i t i o n is not the best available. It he c a n s h o w that Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y is less r a t i o n ally d e f e n s i b l e t h a n s o m e o t h e r a c c o u n t , he w i l l h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d his goal. H e w i l l h a v e s h o w n that the Stoics' c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r e p i s t e m o l o g y is p o o r l y f o u n d e d . T h e elaborate a c c o u n t of p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s m a y be the c e n t r e p i e c e of t h i s i n d i r e c t strategy. T h i s w o u l d also e x p l a i n w h y the a c c o u n t of p e r s u a s i v e i m p r e s s i o n s is not d e r i v e d strictly o n the basis of Stoic c o m m i t m e n t s . C a r n e a d e s w o u l d not be t r y i n g to s h o w what the Stoics are u n w i t t i n g l y c o m m i t t e d to, but rather that there is a better e x p l a n a t i o n available. S i n c e s u c h a m o d e s t , probabilist alternative w o u l d not be a p p e a l i n g to Stoics, w h o

SI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

b e l i e v e d that w i s d o m requires irrefutable k n o w l e d g e , i n the e n d they w o u l d be left w i t h n o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n ; that i s , they w o u l d be l e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ( A l l e n 1994J. But if this w e r e C a r n e a d e s ' strategy it is u n c l e a r w h y he w o u l d not accept this alternative h i m s e l f H e is n o t c o m m i t t e d i n a d v a n c e to epochs,

n o r is he a t t r i b u t e d a n y u n e q u i v o c a l v i e w a b o u t w h a t w i s -

d o m r e q u i r e s . F u r t h e r m o r e , if h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o l s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o priate assent i s a n a c c o u n t o f h o w p e o p l e d o i n fact deliberate, t h e n he too w i l l deliberate i n this way. H i s a d m i s s i o n that life w o u l d be o v e r t u r n e d w i t h o u t c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s to g u i d e the w a y s e e m s s i n c e r e . I I so, C a r n e a d e s w i l l rely o n c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s j u s t as e v e r y o n e does, T h e d i a l e c t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l s o r e q u i r e s that w e e x p l a i n a w a y the e v i d e n c e r e p o r t i n g C a r n e a d e s ' d e p a r t u r e f r o m A r c e s i l a u s ' p o s i t i o n . Sextus m a r k s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , as w e h a v e s e e n , i n t e r m s o f A r c esilaus' M i d d l e A c a d e m y a n d C a r n e a d e s ' N e w A c a d e m y . C a r n e a d e s deviates f r o m A r c e s i l a u s ' m o r e r a d i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n by d e l i b erately c h o o s i n g to y i e l d to s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s rather t h a n f o l l o w i n g a l o n g w i t h o u t a n y s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n o r a d h e r e n c e [PH 1 . 2 3 0 ) .

3

A p p a r e n t l y h i s p o i n t is that C a r n e a d e s violates the s c e p t i c a l s p i r i t o f epoche by b e i n g t o o actively i n v o l v e d o r interested i n getting t h i n g s right, a n d in p r e f e r r i n g o n e i m p r e s s i o n to a n o t h e r o n the b a s i s o f h o w c o n v i n c i n g they are. H i s y i e l d i n g to c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s a c c o m p a n i e s a s t r o n g i n c l i n a t i o n t o w a r d s t h i n g s b e i n g a s they s e e m . I n o t h e r w o r d s , he a c c e p t s that c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s h a v e s o m e e v i d e n t i a l v a l u e , that they are fallible i n d i c a t o r s o f t r u t h . A n d like e v e r y o n e else, he relies o n t h e m i n the c o u n t l e s s o r d i n a r y j u d g e m e n t s w e m a k e everyday.

Conclusion Carneades w a s both more ambitious and more modest than Arcesilaus. H e w a s m o r e a m b i t i o u s i n e x t e n d i n g h i s s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g e p i s t e m o l o g y a n d e t h i c s to c o v e r e v e r y p o s s i b l e t h e o r y that m i g h t be p r o p o u n d e d , A n d he w a s m o r e m o d e s t i n a l l o w i n g

82

CARNEADES

for a k i n d of p o s i t i v e m e n t a l attitude that w e take t o w a r d s t h i n g s we d o n o t k n o w , at least w i t h r e g a r d to p r a c t i c a l i s s u e s . C a r n e a d e s ' v i e w o f s c e p t i c a l assent m a k e s for a m o r e c o n v i n c i n g r e s p o n s e to the apraxia

o b j e c t i o n s i n c e it leaves in place all the o r d i -

n a r y m e a s u r e s of d e l i b e r a t i o n that p e o p l e i n fact employ. A r c e s i l a u s , as I have i n t e r p r e t e d h i m in C h a p t e r 3, is o n l y able to s h o w h o w a v e r y reactive f o r m of a c t i o n is p o s s i b l e . H i s c r i t e r i o n o f a c t i o n d o e s not e x p l a i n h o w the s c e p t i c m a y a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g h i s i m p r e s s i o n s after h a v i n g reflected o n t h e m . C a r n e a d e s ' v i e w a l s o p r e s e r v e s the sceptic's c o n s i s t e n c y in a l l o w i n g h i m to say that it a p p e a r s c o n v i n c ing, but not c e r t a i n , that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e {Ac. 2 . 1 1 0 ) .

S3

FIVE

Cicero: the end of the sceptical Academy

T h e r e are two n a r r a t i v e s w e c a n tell r e g a r d i n g the e n d ot the s c e p t i cal A c a d e m y . A c c o r d i n g to the first, the fallibilist interpretation o l C a r n e a d e s is h i s t o r i c a l l y w r o n g , a n d p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y ill a d v i s e d . It w a s a m i s t a k e to p o s i t i v e l y e n d o r s e the c l a i m s that earlier A c a d e m ics a d v a n c e d dialectically. C o m p a r e d to the o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l a n d p u r e s c e p t i c i s m o f A r c e s i l a u s , the later p r o d u c t is a n e x h a u s t e d a n d degenerate c o m p r o m i s e . A r c e s i l a u s w a s right to insist o n the u n i v e r s a l s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t ; to c o m p r o m i s e o n this p o i n t is to a b a n d o n w h a t is best about A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m . T h i s is the line p u r s u e d by the r e n e g a d e A c a d e m i c A e n e s i d e m u s , w h o m w e shall m e e t i n C h a p t e r 6. A c c o r d i n g to the s e c o n d n a r r a t i v e , o n e v e r s i o n of w h i c h we shall d e v e l o p i n t h i s chapter, A r c e s i l a u s ' s u c c e s s o r s w e r e right to m o d i f y a n d mitigate h i s o r i g i n a l l y r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m . I n p a r t i c u l a r they w e r e right to l i m i t the s c o p e of w h a t we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t

about,

a n d to enlarge the s c o p e o f s c e p t i c a l l y a p p r o p r i a t e assent. V i e w e d i n this way, their c o n c e s s i o n s constitute progress; the c u l m i n a t i o n of m a n y years of p h i l o s o p h i c a l debate w i t h the Stoics, A t the h e a r t o f t h i s dispute is the issue o f w h e t h e r it is e v e r w i s e to a c c e p t a p r o p o s i t i o n that is not k n o w n to be true. I n o t h e r w o r d s , 1

w h a t w i l l the sage d o in the a b s e n c e of c e r t a i n t y ? A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s agree that he w i l l s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . But by m o d i f y -

Sí

CICERO

i n g w h a t it m e a n s to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , C a r n e a d e s a l s o a l l o w s l o r p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n l e a d i n g to fallible beliefs i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n s . F o r e x a m p l e , it s e e m s that the weather is fine a n d the c r e w reliable, so it s e e m s likely that the voyage w i l l be safe. B u t t h i s c o n v i n c i n g i m p r e s s i o n is n o t the p r o d u c t of a r g u i n g p r o a n d c o n ; it is s i m p l y a m a t t e r of e x a m i n i n g the c o n d i t i o n s a n d c h e c k i n g o n e i m p r e s s i o n against a n o t h e r . C a r n e a d e s f a l l i b i l i s m 1

s e e m s o n l y to e x t e n d to p r a c t i c a l matters a n d is not related to his d i a l e c t i c a l method.-

2

T h e s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y ' s final c o n c e s s i o n is to a c c e p t that d i a lectical a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n c a n p r o v i d e fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n s u p p o r t of o n e s i d e o f the d i s p u t e . T h e o u t c o m e is n o longer the p u r e l y negative o n e of u n d e r m i n i n g c o n v i c t i o n . T h i s final step is the d e v e l o p m e n t o l p h i l o s o p h i c a l f a l l i b i l i s m a s a k i n d ot m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m . O n this view, the A c a d e m i c s c o n t i n u e to reject the Stoic a c c o u n t o l k n o w l e d g e , but they e x p a n d e v e n f u r t h e r the r a n g e of s c e p t i c a l l y appropriate assent.

T h e A c a d e m y after the d e a t h o f C a r n e a d e s A f t e r C a r n e a d e s ' death i n c. 128 B C E , his l o n g - t i m e f r i e n d a n d a s s o c i ate C l i t o m a c h u s b e c a m e h e a d ot the A c a d e m y . C l i t o m a c h u s wrote over 4 0 0 b o o k s , m a n y (it n o t a l l ) of w h i c h c o n t a i n e d a r g u m e n t s he h a d h e a r d f r o m h i s m u c h - a d m i r e d f r i e n d ( D L 4 . 6 7 ) . C a r n e a d e s p r a i s e d h i m , s a r d o n i c a l l y , for s a y i n g the s a m e t h i n g s [as C a r n e a d e s h a d ] , in c o n t r a s t to a n o t h e r student, C h a r m a d a s , w h o s a i d t h e m i n the s a m e w a y (Omt.

5 1 ) . T h i s m a y s i m p l y be a m a t t e r of C l i t o m a -

c h u s ' l a c k i n g the o r a t o r i c a l s k i l l s of h i s teacher. B u t it so, it suggests that C l i t o m a c h u s w o u l d not h a v e b e e n as effective at u n d e r m i n i n g h i s o p p o n e n t ' s d o g m a t i c c o n f i d e n c e . It is w o r t h r e m e m b e r i n g that b o t h A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s c a r r i e d o n their p h i l o s o p h i c a l w o r k p r i m a r i l y , if not exclusively, t h r o u g h c o n v e r s a t i o n rather t h a n writing. A f t e r C l i t o m a c h u s death in c . l 10 B C E , P h i l o of L a r i s s a b e c a m e 1

h e a d o f the A c a d e m y . H e h a d b e e n C l i t o m a c h u s s t u d e n t for a b o u t 1

S5

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

fourteen y e a r s , a n d w a s o v e r j o y e d at h i s p r o m o t i o n , r e t u r n i n g the favour b y p r e s e r v i n g a n d a u g m e n t i n g the d o c t r i n e s of h i s teacher. So at least i n i t i a l l y he h e l d to the C l i t o m a c h e a n o r t h o d o x y . I n C h a p t e r 4 I h a v e t r i e d to a r t i c u l a t e w h a t that o r t h o d o x y w a s ; a l t h o u g h this c o n t i n u e s to be c o n t r o v e r s i a l , we s h a l l take this p o s i t i o n as the one P h i l o starts w i t h . I n a d d i t i o n to the c o n t i n u e d o p p o s i t i o n to the Stoic a c c o u n t of kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s , the c r u c i a l e l e m e n t of t h i s p o s i t i o n , or p r a c t i c e , is that the o u t c o m e o f d i a l e c t i c a l a r g u m e n t is a l w a y s negative: e i t h e r the sceptic o r h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t , h a v i n g c o m e to see that r e a s o n p r o v i d e s n o m o r e s u p p o r t for one side of the d i s p u t e t h a n the other. Eventually Philo became disenchanted with Clitomachus

1

(i.e.

C a r n e a d e s ) p r o m o t i o n of epoche b e c a u s e of the c l a r i t y a n d agree1

m e n t o f h i s s e n s a t i o n s {Praep.

Ev. 1 4 . 9 . 1 - 2 ) . P r e c i s e l y w h y P h i l o

b e c a m e d i s e n c h a n t e d w i t h epoche a n d c h a n g e d h i s m i n d is as c o n troversial as w h a t h e c h a n g e d h i s m i n d to. Sextus e x p l a i n s w h a t is d i s t i n c t i v e about P h i l o s n e w p o s i t i o n , w h i c h he Labels the F o u r t h A c a d e m y , i n this w a y ( P f f 1.220; see Praep.

Ev. 14.4): " P h i l o a n d

h i s followers say that as far as the Stoic s t a n d a r d (i.e. a p p r e h e n s i v e [kataleptic] a p p e a r a n c e ) is c o n c e r n e d objects are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , but a s far as the nature ot the o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s is c o n c e r n e d they are a p p r e h e n s i b l e " ( P H 1.235; see PH 1.220; Praep. Ev. 14.4). I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h i n g s c a n n o t be k n o w n i n the m a n n e r the Stoics c l a i m , but they c a n still be k n o w n i n s o m e less d e m a n d i n g way. T h i s v i e w w a s set out in d e t a i l i n Philo's R o m a n b o o k s , so c a l l e d b e c a u s e he wrote t h e m s h o r t l y after c o m i n g to R o m e i n 89/8 B C E . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we h a v e o n l y a few r e f e r e n c e s to these b o o k s i n o u r s o u r c e s , n o n e ot w h i c h elaborate the nature ot P h i l o s n o v e l p o s i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to o n e p l a u s i b l e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , P h i l o s i n n o v a t i o n is to d r o p the i n t e r n a l i s t r e q u i r e m e n t that c a u s e d s o m u c h trouble for earlier d e f e n d e r s o f Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y ( H a n k i n s o n 1 9 9 8 a : 1 1 6 - 2 0 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , for P h i l o it is n o longer n e c e s s a r y to k n o w that one k n o w s of a n y p a r t i c u l a r i m p r e s s i o n that it a c c u r a t e l y c o n v e y s the relevant details. I n effect, P h i l o a l l o w s that c e r t a i n i m p r e s s i o n s reveal the nature o f their object but not the tact that they are so r e v e l a tory. N o i m p r e s s i o n is s e l f - c e r t i f y i n g In the w a y r e q u i r e d by ( s o m e

CICERO

a c c o u n t s o f ) S t o i c e p i s t e m o l o g y , but o n Philo's n e w a c c o u n t s u c h selt-certification is n o t n e c e s s a r y for k n o w l e d g e .

3

W h a t e v e r h i s R o m a n v i e w m a y h a v e b e e n , Philo's f o r m e r s t u d e n t A n t i o c h u s w a s o u t r a g e d by it. H e h a d a l r e a d y a b a n d o n e d the s c e p t i c i s m o f the T h i r d A c a d e m y for a f o r m o f S t o i c i s m . A n t i o c h u s c a m e to believe that the Stoic c r i t e r i o n is the o n l y p o s s i b l e , or at least r e a s o n able, a c c o u n t o f k n o w l e d g e (Ac. 2 . 1 8 - 3 1 ) . T h i s is p r o b a b l y w h y he w a s s o put out b y Philo's n e w , n o n - S t o i c a c c o u n t of k n o w l e d g e , H e w a s even m o v e d to p u b l i s h h i s o w n extensive a r g u m e n t s i n o p p o s i tion (Ac. 2 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . D e s p i t e h i s e n d o r s e m e n t of S t o i c i s m , A n t i o c h u s c o n t i n u e d to consider h i m s e l f a n A c a d e m i c because he believed his view w a s a r e t u r n to the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n of Plato a n d h i s i m m e d i a t e s u c c e s sors ( A c . 1 . 1 7 - 1 8 ) . A n t i o c h u s f u r t h e r a r g u e d that the Stoic v i e w e m e r g e d as a d e v e l o p m e n t o l this o r i g i n a l A c a d e m i c p o s i t i o n ( A c . 2,43). S o i n d e f e n d i n g Stoic epistemology, A n t i o c h u s took h i m s e l f to be c o r r e c t i n g the e r r o r s initiated b y A r c e s i l a u s ' s c e p t i c a l t u r n i n the A c a d e m y , A l t h o u g h Sextus associates A n t i o c h u s w i t h the F i f t h A c a d e m y , it is not clear w h e t h e r he s u c c e e d e d P h i l o i n a n y officially r e c o g n i z e d capacity. S h o r t l y after P h i l o a n d o t h e r p r o m i n e n t A c a d e m i c s fled f r o m A t h e n s to R o m e , Plato's A c a d e m y c e a s e d to exist as a n i n s t i t u t i o n . B u t e v e n if it h a d c o n t i n u e d to exist, n e i t h e r of the p o s i t i o n s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the F o u r t h a n d F i f t h A c a d e m i e s w o u l d q u a l i f y as s c e p t i c a l i n so far as both a l l o w l o r s o m e k i n d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y c o m e s to a n e n d i n either case.

Cicero's mitigated scepticism T h i s e n d , h o w e v e r , is not a full stop. B e t w e e n 46 a n d 4 4 B C E C i c e r o , w h o h a d s t u d i e d w i t h both P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s , a s well as o t h e r p r o m i n e n t Stoic a n d E p i c u r e a n p h i l o s o p h e r s , w r o t e a series of d i a logues d e f e n d i n g a n d d i s p l a y i n g the p r a c t i c e of A c a d e m i c p h i l o s o phy as he s a w i t . I n r e s p o n s e to h i s c r i t i c s , he insists that he h a s not J

c o m e f o r w a r d as c h a m p i o n ot a lost c a u s e : " W h e n m e n d i e , their

87

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

d o c t r i n e s d o not p e r i s h w i t h t h e m , t h o u g h p e r h a p s they surfer f r o m the loss o i a n authoritative e x p o n e n t " (iYD 1.11), S o m e forty years after the A c a d e m y c l o s e d its d o o r s , C i c e r o presents h i m s e l f as j u s t s u c h a n authoritative v o i c e . T h e p r o b l e m is that C i c e r o ' s m i t i g a t e d s c e p t i c i s m is a s i g n i f i c a n t d e p a r t u r e f r o m h i s A c a d e m i c predecessors. H e accepts n e i t h e r the Stoic e p i s t e m o l o g y o l A n t i o c h u s ' F i f t h A c a d e m y n o r the less d e m a n d i n g a c c o u n t o f k n o w l edge that c h a r a c t e r i z e s Philo's R o m a n b o o k s . N o r d o e s he a c c e p t the severe v i e w o f epocke c h a m p i o n e d by A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s / A s w e h a v e seen, for A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters is c o m p l e t e l y u n r e l a t e d to the issue of apraxia.

T h e i r s c e p t i c a l c r i t e r i a s h o w o n l y h o w we are able to

act i n p r a c t i c a l matters. T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f these c r i t e r i a h a s n o t h i n g to d o w i t h the d i a l e c t i c a l s k i l l s of a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n . F o r e x a m p l e , i n v e s t i g a t i n g s o m e a p p e a r a n c e i n the m a n n e r

proposed

b y C a r n e a d e s is not a matter o f a r t i c u l a t i n g r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n t s for and against it. W h a t e v e r c o u r s e o f a c t i o n o n e c h o o s e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h these p r a c t i c a l c r i t e r i a is not the p r o d u c t of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y . A s far as w e k n o w , A r c e s i l a u s never d e s c r i b e s the c o n c l u s i o n o l a n a r g u m e n t as eulogon,

a n d C a r n e a d e s n e v e r d e s c r i b e s the

c o n c l u s i o n of a n a r g u m e n t a s pithanon

(with one possible exception

to be d i s c u s s e d b e l o w ) , C i c e r o , h o w e v e r , translates C a r n e a d e s ' pithanon probabile

w i t h the L a t i n

(i.e. p r o b a b l e or p l a u s i b l e ) a n d s o m e t i m e s veri simile

(i.e.

t r u t h - l i k e ) , a n d m a i n t a i n s that the s o l e p u r p o s e of the A c a d e m i c a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n is to " d r a w out o r l o r m u l a t e the t r u t h or its closest p o s s i b l e a p p r o x i m a t i o n " ( A c . 2.7; s e e A c . 2 , 6 0 , 2 . 6 6 ; ND Fin,

1.13; Tusc.

1.11;

1,8, 2.9; G l u c k e r 1995), R a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y r e v e a l -

i n g larger p o r t i o n s o f o u r i g n o r a n c e , C i c e r o t h i n k s the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d a l l o w s for p r o g r e s s t o w a r d s the t r u t h * A n d these j u d g e m e n t s w i l l clearly h a v e a m a j o r i m p a c t o n the c h o i c e s o n e m a k e s a n d the k i n d of life o n e lives. S o C i c e r o uses the A c a d e m i c d i a l e c t i c a l m e t h o d to a c c o m p l i s h b o t h p o s i t i v e a n d negative e n d s : b y r e v e a l i n g the strength o f the o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s it e l i m i n a t e s u n w a r r a n t e d c o n f i d e n c e w h i l e e s t a b l i s h i n g the degree to w h i c h o n e v i e w is m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n another.

88

CICERO

D e s p i t e the a p p a r e n t n o v e l t y o f h i s v i e w o f the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , C i c e r o c l a i m s that it h a d a l w a y s b e e n the p r a c t i c e o l the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y : the m e t h o d o f a r g u i n g against e v e r y t h i n g a n d

openly

j u d g i n g n o t h i n g o r i g i n a t e d w i t h Socrates, w a s r e v i v e d b y A r c e s i l a u s , s t r e n g t h e n e d by C a r n e a d e s a n d f l o u r i s h e d right d o w n to h i s o w n t i m e . T h i s a p p r o a c h r e q u i r e s t h e A c a d e m i c to m a s t e r all the s c h o o l s of p h i l o s o p h y i n o r d e r to m a k e a w e l l - i n f o r m e d j u d g e m e n t w h e r e the truth p r o b a b l y lies (ND

about

1 . 1 1 - 1 2 ) . S i m i l a r l y , he c l a i m s

that of all the c o m p e t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l sects that arose f r o m S o c rates, as i m m o r t a l i z e d i n Plato's d i a l o g u e s , he f o l l o w s the o n e that he t h i n k s S o c r a t e s h i m s e l f u s e d ; ' l o c o n c e a l o n e s o w n o p i n i o n , to relieve o t h e r s of error, a n d i n e v e r y d i s c u s s i o n to l o o k for w h a t w a s most probable" (Tusc. 5.11). It is p o s s i b l e that C i c e r o s i n c e r e l y t h o u g h t

he w a s p r e s e n t i n g

a n a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t of t h e h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y . B u t e v e n if he w a s a w a r e o f the extent to w h i c h h i s a c c o u n t w a s r e v i s i o n i s t , it is not s u r p r i s i n g that he d i d not present it a s s u c h . I n t h e H e l l e n i s tic p e r i o d , t h e r e w a s n o p r e m i u m o n o r i g i n a l i t y or novelty. A n d C i c e r o w o u l d p r o b a b l y have s h i e d a w a y f r o m p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n n o v a t o r as he w a s a l r e a d y c o n f r o n t i n g

the

p r o b l e m o f c o n v i n c i n g the r u l i n g c l a s s o f the v a l u e o f R o m a n i z i n g G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y . G i v e n t h e i r s u s p i c i o n s o f G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y , it w o u l d have b e e n p a r t i c u l a r l y u n s u i t a b l e for a s t a t e s m a n o f C i c e r o ' s s t a n d i n g to put h i m s e l f f o r w a r d as a n i n n o v a t o r . T h u s w e f i n d h i m u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y m o d e s t i n this regard, d e s c r i b i n g h i m s e l f as a m e r e t r a n s c r i b e r , p r o v i d i n g o n l y the w o r d s w i t h w h i c h to express the b o r r o w e d ideas (Alt.

12.52).

F u r t h e r m o r e , C i c e r o m a y well h a v e felt j u s t i f i e d s i n c e other p r o m i n e n t A c a d e m i c s h a d p r o v i d e d t h e i r o w n r e v i s i o n i s t a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y . A r c e s i l a u s got the b a l l r o l l i n g b y c l a i m i n g to have r e t u r n e d to t h e o r i g i n a l , s c e p t i c a l v i e w s o f P l a t o a n d S o c rates; P h i l o a n d A n t i o c h u s later offered quite different a c c o u n t s of the h i s t o r y of the A c a d e m y , e a c h in s u p p o r t of h i s o w n i n n o v a t i o n ( B r i t t a i n 2001:

169-219).

I n a d d i t i o n to t h e i l l u s t r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n s o f this v i e w , C i c e r o defends h i s A c a d e m i c allegiance b y a r g u i n g t h a t it is the o n l y p r u d e n t

89

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p o s i t i o n to take tor t h o s e starting out o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a tions: [ W e A c a d e m i c s ] are m o r e

free a n d u n b i a s e d s i n c e

our

p o w e r o l j u d g m e n t is i m p a r t i a l s o w e are not c o m p e l l e d by a n y n e c e s s i t y to d e f e n d all those t h i n g s p r e s c r i b e d a n d , as it w e r e , d i c t a t e d b y s o m e authority. F o r . , . [the d o g m a t i s t s ] pass j u d g m e n t about matters w h i c h they h a v e not c o m p r e h e n d e d either y i e l d i n g to s o m e f r i e n d o r captivated by s o m e single [ p h i l o s o p h e r ] w h o m t h e y first h e a r d . A n d t h e y are d r i v e n , a s i f b y a s t o r m , to that v i e w w h i c h they c l i n g to like a r o c k . . . A l t h o u g h I don't k n o w w h y , m o s t p e o p l e prefer to go w r o n g a n d to d e f e n d p u g n a c i o u s l y that v i e w w h i c h they h a v e l e a r n e d to love rather t h a n to seek w i t h o u t b e i n g s t u b b o r n for the v i e w w h i c h c a n be m a i n t a i n e d m o s t c o n sistently.

(Ac. 2.8-9}

B e c o m i n g i r r a t i o n a l l y attached to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m is a trem e n d o u s i r o n y s i n c e p h i l o s o p h e r s p r i d e t h e m s e l v e s o n the r a t i o n ality o f t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s . B u t p h i l o s o p h e r s are like e v e r y o n e else w h e n it c o m e s to f i n d i n g c o m f o r t i n w h a t is familiar. A d h e r i n g to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m c a n p r o v i d e the c o m f o r t of m a k i n g sense out of t h i n g s : or at least the i m p r e s s i o n that o n e h a s m a d e sense out of t h i n g s . C i c e r o ' s p o i n t is that the s a t i s f a c t i o n this p r o v i d e s m a y e n c o u r a g e us to d i s c o u n t or i g n o r e o b j e c t i o n s to o u r p o s i t i o n . S u c h s t u b b o r n n e s s is i n n o w a y necessitated b y allegiance to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l s y s t e m . B u t to a l i g n o u r s e l v e s , say to E p i c u r e a n i s m , w o u l d r e q u i r e us to j u d g e that E p i c u r u s h a d b e e n a w i s e m a n . A n d yet, " d e c i d i n g w h o is w i s e s e e m s to be a p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n of p e o ple w h o are a l r e a d y w i s e " ( A c . 2.9). S i n c e n o o n e starts out w i t h the k n o w l e d g e a n d w i s d o m he d e s i r e s , w e s h o u l d all b e g i n w i t h the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , a n d c a r e f u l l y e x a m i n e the r a t i o n a l m e r i t s ot e a c h competing account belore m a k i n g any judgements. ' 1

E v e n so, w h y s h o u l d we m a k e a tiy j u d g e m e n t s as a result of o u r e n q u i r y ? T h i s is a n e s p e c i a l l y p r e s s i n g q u e s t i o n il w e grant, as C i c ero d o e s , that f i n d i n g o n e v i e w to b e m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n a n o t h e r

CICERO

p r o v i d e s o n l y a fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; f u r t h e r e n q u i r y m a y w e l l s h o w that a different p o s i t i o n is m o r e p r o b a b l e , s o p e r h a p s it w o u l d be m o r e p r u d e n t to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t

until we c a n c o n c l u s i v e l y

settle the matter. C l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h this c o n c e r n is a s e c o n d q u e s t i o n : w h y s h o u l d we t h i n k that f o l l o w i n g this m e t h o d w i l l e n a ble us to progress t o w a r d s the t r u t h r a t h e r t h a n m e r e l y e x c h a n g i n g o n e v i e w for a n o t h e r ? W e s h a l l take these q u e s t i o n s i n t u r n .

W h y s h o u l d w e accept any p h i l o s o p h i c a l beliefs? O n s o m e o c c a s i o n s , C i c e r o s e e m s to e n d o r s e the v i e w that it is never w i s e to b e l i e v e w h a t we d o not k n o w for c e r t a i n (e.g. Ac. 2.66).

In

context, we s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h i s as part o l the earlier A c a d e m i c s ' dialectical strategy. C a r n e a d e s u s e d to e m p l o y two related a r g u m e n t s against the Stoics (Ac, 2.59, (A)

67,

78):

If the sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) he w i l l h o l d an o p i n i o n , T h e sage w i l l n e v e r h o l d a n o p i n i o n ( h e is infallible), T h e r e f o r e , the sage w i l l n e v e r assent to a n y t h i n g ( s i n c e there is n o t h i n g w o r t h y o f h i s a s s e n t ) .

A n d he s o m e t i m e s a r g u e d t h i s way, (B)

If the sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) he w i l l h o l d an o p i n i o n , T h e sage assents (to s o m e t h i n g u n k n o w n ) . T h e r e f o r e , the sage h o l d s o p i n i o n s ( a n d is fallible).

N e i t h e r of these options is acceptable to the Stoics, Since they thought that assent is n e c e s s a r y for a c t i o n , ( A ) w o u l d r e n d e r the sage i m p a s sive. A n d since they t h o u g h t a s s e n t i n g to w h a t is u n k n o w n is a m o r a l as well as a n e p i s t e m i c failing (M 7 . 1 5 7 ) , ( B ) w o u l d r e n d e r the sage foolish. W i t h i n the c o n t e x t of this d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, it m a k e s s e n s e for C i c e r o to a f f i r m that the sage is infallible. B u t it w o u l d be v e r y

01

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

s u r p r i s i n g it he b e l i e v e d this h i m s e l f s i n c e the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d o n l y yields fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n . II w i s d o m r e q u i r e s infallibility, C i c ero w o u l d h a v e to c o n c l u d e that h i s favoured m e t h o d is i n c a p a b l e o l p r o d u c i n g w i s d o m . Similarly, s i n c e he believes that h u m a n c o g n i t i o n is i n e s c a p a b l y fallible, he w o u l d h a v e to c o n c l u d e that w i s d o m is u n a t t a i n a b l e . I n tact, he m a i n t a i n s that Stoic w i s d o m is u n a t t a i n able, o r at least s o lar u n a t t a i n e d . D e s p i t e h i s a d m i r a t i o n tor this lofty i d e a l , he often p o i n t s out that there have n e v e r b e e n a n y real lite Stoic sages - it h a p p e n s m o r e often that a m u l e gives b i r t h (Div. 2.61). E v e n the Stoics w e r e reluctant to a c k n o w l e d g e a n y a c t u a l sages (see B r o u w e r 2 0 0 2 ) . U n l i k e the Stoics, C i c e r o a l l o w s for a m o r e m o d e s t c o n c e p t i o n o f w i s d o m , one that is attainable by real, i m p e r f e c t h u m a n beings: T h o s e w h o act a n d live in s u c h a w a y as to p r o v e their loyalty, integrity, l a i r n e s s a n d generosity, in w h o there is n o e x c e s sive desire, l i c e n t i o u s n e s s a n d i n s o l e n c e , a n d w h o have great strength of c h a r a c t e r . . . let us c o n s i d e r g o o d , as they w e r e a c c o u n t e d g o o d In life , . ,

(Amic.

19)

A l t h o u g h C i c e r o d o e s not e x p l a i n w h a t c o g n i t i v e state s u c h real life v i r t u e a r i s e s f r o m , it is clear that the c o n s t a n c y of those d e s c r i b e d i n this passage is not the p r o d u c t o f Stoic w i s d o m . S i m i l a r l y , w h e n he refers to the c o u r a g e or j u s t i c e o f real R o m a n h e r o e s , he d o e s not m e a n for us to u n d e r s t a n d these as perfect m o d e l s o l v i r t u e . T h e y a c h i e v e d o n l y a s e m b l a n c e a n d l i k e n e s s to (Stoic) w i s d o m (Off.

3.16).

But it is virtue n o n e t h e l e s s . I n g e n e r a l , w h a t C i c e r o f i n d s a d m i r a b l e about real people is their ability to b a l a n c e p r i n c i p l e d , r a t i o n a l c o n v i c t i o n w i t h the gentleness a n d m e r c y that a r i s e s f r o m a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h u m a n fallibility. T h e A c a d e m i c m e t h o d , as C i c e r o c o n c e i v e s it, is ideally s u i t e d to p r o m o t e this b a l a n c e . S i n c e there is n o c o n c l u s i v e e n d to e n q u i r y , one m u s t c o n t i n u e to put h i s fallible c o n v i c t i o n s to the test. T h e o p e n - e n d e d nature o f e n q u i r y is s u p p o s e d to prevent us f r o m b e c o m i n g i r r a t i o n ally attached to o u r v i e w s ; it keeps the v i r t u e o f p e r s e v e r a n c e f r o m d e g e n e r a t i n g into the v i c e of obstinacy,*

92

CICERO

But w e have yet to see w h y w e s h o u l d p e r s e v e r e i n the first place. W h y s h o u l d we believe a n y t h i n g as a result o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y ? T h e a n s w e r is i m p l i c i t i n C i c e r o ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i a l o g u e s : the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y defensible v i e w is the m o s t likely to be true a n d the m o s t beneficial. S u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t m a y guarantee that o n e a v o i d s error, but it a l s o guarantees that p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y w i l l y i e l d n o positive benefits. T h i s is u n a c c e p t a b l e for C i c e r o , w h o sees the a i m s of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l art of t h i n k i n g a n d the r h e t o r i c a l art o l s p e a k i n g as intimately c o n n e c t e d : w i s d o m a n d e l o q u e n c e s h o u l d not be s o u g h t i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m one another, for " w i s d o m w i t h o u t e l o q u e n c e does too little for the g o o d of states, b u t . . . e l o q u e n c e w i t h o u t w i s d o m is generally h i g h l y d i s a d v a n t a g e o u s " (Inv. 1.1; see a l s o L o n g 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e s e p a r a t i o n of these arts yields either a n i n a r t i c u l a t e w i s d o m or a b a b b l i n g s t u p i d i t y (De Or. 3 . 1 4 2 ) . I f we r e m a i n u n c o n v i n c e d b y w h a t is true, or at least likely to be true, it does u s n o g o o d O n the o t h e r h a n d , a foolish e l o q u e n c e is like a w e a p o n in the h a n d s o f a m a d m a n . It the natural e n d of p h i l o s o p h y is to not m e r e l y a i m at but to b r i n g about the i m p r o v e m e n t of h u m a n lite, the p h i l o s o p h e r m u s t m a s t e r the art of p e r s u a s i o n . B u t he m u s t also d i s c o v e r what is truly b e n e f i c i a l b y m e a n s of rational e n q u iry. O t h e r w i s e , he w i l l be guilty o f a babbli ng stupidity. S i n c e nature has not e q u i p p e d us w i t h the m e a n s ot a c q u i r i n g certainty, w e c a n a r r i v e o n l y at p r o b a b l e beliefs r e g a r d i n g w h a t is b e n e f i c i a l . H e n c e if p h i l o s o p h y is to a c c o m p l i s h its n a t u r a l e n d , i u c h beliefs m u s t be sufficient to i m p r o v e the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n . But w h y s h o u l d we a c c e p t this p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n ot p h i l o s o phy i n the first place? If, c o n t r a r y to C i c e r o ' s v i e w , p h i l o s o p h y arose s i m p l y as a n e x p r e s s i o n ot o u r natural curiosity, there w o u l d be n o t h i n g o b j e c t i o n a b l e about treating it a s a c o l l e c t i o n o f i n t r i g u i n g p u z zles. I n d e e d , it w o u l d be o b j e c t i o n a b l e to p r e t e n d that p h i l o s o p h y c a n d o m o r e t h a n satisfy, or at least stimulate, o u r c u r i o s i t y a n d s t r e n g t h e n o u r r e a s o n i n g skills. O n this view, p h i l o s o p h y h a s no i n h e r e n t s o c i a l or p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . C i c e r o ' s a r g u m e n t d e p e n d s o n the Stoic v i e w that w e a l l h a v e a n a t u r a l s y m p a t h y tor m e m b e r s o f o u r s p e c i e s , despite the tact that this s y m p a t h y is often t h o r o u g h l y c o r r u p t e d (Fin. 3 . 6 2 - 6 8 ; see

Rep.

1.39; Leg. 1.16, 28, 32). It i s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r nature to v a l u e

03

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a n d p r o m o t e the p u b l i c g o o d , B u t this r e q u i r e s s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t is g e n u i n e l y b e n e f i c i a l . A n d this r e q u i r e s p h i l o s o p h y , broadly u n d e r s t o o d as the art ot t h i n k i n g . O n c e w e a c k n o w l e d g e o u r n a t u ral s y m p a t h y a n d the c o r r e s p o n d i n g obligation to d i s c o v e r w h a t is g e n u i n e l y b e n e f i c i a l , w e w i l l a l s o be obliged to d e v e l o p a n d p r a c t i s e the art of p e r s u a s i o n . A c q u i r i n g , d e f e n d i n g a n d p r o m o t i n g fallible beliefs about the p u b l i c g o o d is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y part o f d i s c h a r g i n g the s o c i a l a n d p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n of p h i l o s o p h y , A n o t h e r n a t u r a l e n d ot p h i l o s o p h y is to s e c u r e , a s far as p o s s i b l e , a t r a n q u i l , h a p p y a n d v i r t u o u s life. F o r C i c e r o , t r a n q u i l l i t y d o e s not c o m e f r o m s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t a s P y r r h o p r o m i s e s , but rather t r o m e m b r a c i n g the v i e w that v i r t u e is sufficient for h a p p i n e s s , W h a t is m o s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f C i c e r o ' s real life sage is the c o n v i c t i o n that all h u m a n p o s s e s s i o n s are i n f e r i o r to w i s d o m . W i t h this c o n v i c t i o n , one is able to w e a t h e r a n y s t o r m a n d a v o i d d i s t u r b i n g e m o t i o n s s u c h as tear a n d distress: . . . i f t h e r e is s o m e o n e w h o regards as e n d u r a b l e the p o w e r of F o r t u n e a n d all the h u m a n lot, w h a t e v e r c a n befall, s o that n e i t h e r fear n o r a n x i e t y affects h i m , i f he lusts after n o t h i n g , is c a r r i e d away b y n o m e a n i n g l e s s m e n t a l p l e a s u r e , o n w h a t g r o u n d s is he not h a p p y ? A n d if t h i s is brought about b y v i r t u e , o n w h a t g r o u n d s does v i r t u e of itself a l o n e not m a k e people h a p p y ?

(Tusc.

5.17}

T l i i s is the m o s t a u d a c i o u s a n d i m p o r t a n t p r o m i s e m a d e by p h i l o s o phy, A c c o r d i n g l y , C i c e r o repeatedly s u b j e c t s it to c a r e f u l s c r u t i n y , a r g u i n g b o t h for a n d against it in Tusculanac De Fiisibus

Botiorum

et Maloruin

Disputationes

5 and

3 - 5 . B u t the s u f f i c i e n c y ot v i r t u e

r e m a i n s o n l y a p r o m i s e a n d a p o s s i b i l i t y i n s o tar a s we have failed to g r a s p the t r u t h of this c l a i m w i t h certainty. A l t h o u g h the m o s t effective d e f e n c e against the v i c i s s i t u d e s o f lite w o u l d be the firm c o n v i c t i o n that v i r t u e is sufficient tor h a p p i ness, we c a n n o t d i s c o u n t the o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s . A g a i n , the Stoic v i e w a p p e a r s to be t o o d e m a n d i n g , r e q u i r i n g not m e r e l y a n u n a t tainable e p i s t e m i c ideal, but a d e g r e e o f s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y that s e e m s

94

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i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o u r tragility. O n the o t h e r h a n d , a c k n o w l e d g i n g o u r v u l n e r a b i l i t y m a y e n c o u r a g e us to set o u r sights t o o l o w a n d treat o u r w e a k n e s s e s as inevitable. I n the e n d , the extent to w h i c h a real p e r s o n c a n p r e s e r v e h i s t r a n q u i l l i t y i n the race o f s u f f e r i n g is an e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n . But the m o s t effective defence, a n d the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y defensible view, is to believe either that v i r t u e is sufficient tor h a p p i n e s s , or at least n e a r l y sufficient (Off.

3.31; see a l s o Fuse.

5,3-4; A c . 2.134).

verisimilitude a n d philosophical expertise H o w e v e r , it s e e m s that u n j u s t i f i e d , a n d e v e n false, beliefs m a y be j u s t as c o m f o r t i n g a n d beneficial as j u s t i f i e d , p r o b a b l e o r t r u e beliefs. S o w e s h o u l d not t h i n k that the benefits ot a d o p t i n g s o m e b e l i e l p r o v i d e a g o o d r e a s o n for t h i n k i n g it is t r u e . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m of m i t i gated s c e p t i c i s m is that w e s h o u l d adopt the m o s t rationally c o n v i n c ing, p r o b a b l e v i e w b e c a u s e it is m o s t l i k e l y to b e t r u e , a n d b e c a u s e it is w o r t h r i s k i n g e r r o r i n o r d e r to believe w h a t is t r u e . W i t h o u t this c o n d i t i o n , it w i l l still be r e a s o n a b l e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as long as c o n c l u s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n is l a c k i n g . S o a s s u m i n g that w e s h o u l d b e l i e v e the t r u t h , a n d that we are better oft w i t h p r o b a b l e beliefs, it w i l l follow that we s h o u l d b e l i e v e the m o s t p r o b a b l e view. B u t o n e m i g h t object that a n y attempt to e s t a b l i s h that we s h o u l d a d o p t the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e v i e w begs the q u e s t i o n . M o r e generally, a t t e m p t i n g to r a t i o n a l l y establish the reliability o f r e a s o n s e e m s to p r e s u p p o s e the reliability o f r e a s o n . F o r e x a m p l e , C i c e r o s d e f e n c e o f the v i e w that p h i l o s o p h y a i m s at the i m p r o v e m e n t of the h u m a n c o n d i t i o n relies o n the p r e m i s e that we have a n a t u r a l s y m p a t h y for m e m b e r s of o u r species. B u t w h y s h o u l d we b e l i e v e that, e s p e c i a l l y given the a d m i s s i o n that j u s t i f i c a t i o n a l w a y s fails ( o r at least has tailed so far) to be c o n c l u s i v e ? N o m a t t e r h o w extensively C i c e r o d e f e n d s h i s p r e m i s e s , w e w i l l be left w i t h this b a s i c q u e s t i o n : w h y s h o u l d I adopt a belief o n the basis o f a fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n ? Fortunately, we m a y appeal to the existence o f p r a c t i c a l expertise as a n i n d i c a t i o n that the p r o p e r use o f r e a s o n leads us c l o s e r to the

95

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t r u t h . I n s h o w i n g h o w e x p e r t i s e is p o s s i b l e , we m a y c l a i m that it is a matter o l l e a r n i n g to d i s c e r n w h a t is p r o b a b l e (Ac. 2.146"). T h e best e x p l a n a t i o n for the fact that e x p e r t s are m o r e often s u c c e s s f u l t h a n n o n - e x p e r t s is that w h a t they f i n d p r o b a b l e is in fact true. I f e x p e r t i s e a r i s e s f r o m l e a r n i n g to see w h a t is p r o b a b l e , or l i k e the t r u t h , t h e n t r u t h m u s t exist. C i c e r o a c k n o w l e d g e s t h i s a s s u m p t i o n in h i s d e f e n c e ot the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d . A n t i o c h u s h a d o b j e c t e d that the A c a d e m i c s * w o r s t m i s t a k e ; is to take these two r a d i c a l l y i n c o n s i s t e n t p r e m i s e s to be c o n s i s t e n t , first, [ l ] t h e r e are s o m e false i m p r e s s i o n s ( f r o m w h i c h it f o l l o w s that s o m e are t r u e ) ; a n d t h e n a g a i n , [2] there is n o difference at all b e t w e e n t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . B u t t h e y a s s u m e d the first p r e m i s e as i l t h e r e w e r e a difference - h e n c e the f o r m e r is u n d e r m i n e d by the latter, a n d the latter by the f o r m e r .

( A c . 2.44)

I n o t h e r w o r d s , the A c a d e m i c s i n c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n b o t h that there is a n d that there is not a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n true a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . L u c u l l u s c o n s i d e r s this to be the greatest p o s s i b l e r e f u tation o f the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d . C i c e r o c o n c e d e s that this o b j e c t i o n w o u l d be r i g h t , " i l we A c a d e m i c s d i d a w a y w i t h t r u t h altogether. Yet w e don't, s i n c e w e d i s c e r n as m a n y t r u e as false t h i n g s . B u t o u r d i s c e r n i n g is a k i n d o f a p p r o v a l : we don't find a n y s i g n o l a p p r e h e n s i o n " ( A c . 2 . 1 1 1 ) . T h i s is a n o d d r e s p o n s e if we take it as m e r e l y r e a f f i r m i n g the first p r e m i s e [ l ] , that is, there is a difference b e t w e e n t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n s . I f 1 a m a c c u s e d o l i n c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n i n g p a n d ~ p , it w i l l n o t d o tor m e to c o n f i d e n t l y reply that this w o u l d be r i g h t except for the fact that I h o l d p. I n o r d e r for this to be a r e s p o n s e to A n t i o c h u s ' o b j e c t i o n , C i c e r o needs to d i s a m b i g u a t e the k i n d of difference i n v o l v e d in e a c h ot the allegedly I n c o n s i s t e n t c l a i m s . I n the s e c o n d p r e m i s e [2], the differe n c e b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d false i m p r e s s i o n is a matter o f w h a t a c t u a l people are able to d i s c e r n . S o the p o i n t is s i m p l y that there is n o difference that o n e c a n d i s c e r n i n practice. I n the first p r e m i s e [ l ] ,

%

CICERO

the difference b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d i a l s e i m p r e s s i o n is a c a u s a l one. C i c e r o agrees w i t h the Stoics that t r u e i m p r e s s i o n s c o m e f r o m w h a t is the case a n d accurately c o n v e y the relevant details of their object, w h e r e a s false i m p r e s s i o n s do not; he d o e s not d e n y that t r u t h exists. So despite the e v e r - p r e s e n t

p o s s i b i l i t y ot a n i m p e n e t r a b l e

decep-

t i o n , C i c e r o c a n m a i n t a i n that s o m e i m p r e s s i o n s are true a n d s o m e false. So C i c e r o i s not m e r e l y r e a f f i r m i n g the first p r e m i s e

[l|. He

e x p l a i n s w h y A c a d e m i c s d o not do away w i t h t r u t h by s a y i n g that he d i s c e r n s as m a n y true as false t h i n g s . It is likely that s o m e o f the i m p r e s s i o n s he receives are t r u e , e v e n t h o u g h h e is not i n a p o s i t i o n to say w i t h c e r t a i n t y w h i c h t h e s e are. W h e n l i m i t e d to p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r s , t h i s m u c h is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h C a r n e a d e s ' s c e p t i c i s m . B u t C i c e r o believes we c a n d i s c e r n w h a t is p r o b a b l e e v e n i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l , a n d e s p e c i a l l y e t h i c a l , matters. T h e A c a d e m i c sage w i l l guide h i s c o n d u c t , w h e t h e r i n o r d i n a r y , e v e r y d a y matters o r w h e n d e c i d i n g w h a t is m o r a l l y appropriate, b y f o l l o w i n g what appears probable (Ac. 2.110), I n o r d e r to e x t e n d the p r o b a b l e i n this way, w e m u s t a s s u m e t h e r e is a k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d e t h i c a l expertise, a n a l o g o u s to the m o r e t e c h n i c a l varieties, T h e Stoics c e r t a i n l y c o n c e i v e d o l p h i l o s o p h y t h i s way. T h e y m a i n tain that dialectic w a s i n v e n t e d t o e n a b l e us to d i s t i n g u i s h truth f r o m f a l s e h o o d ( A c . 2.91; see D L 7 . 4 6 ) . B u t , C i c e r o a s k s , i n w h a t s u b j e c t is the s k i l l e d d i a l e c t i c i a n able to m a k e s u c h j u d g e m e n t s ? O n e m u s t k n o w m o r e t h a n the p r i n c i p l e s o l d i a l e c t i c to d i s t i n g u i s h t r u t h f r o m f a l s e h o o d . C i c e r o a l l o w s that the d i a l e c t i c i a n m a y judge w h i c h infere n c e s are acceptable, w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s are a m b i g u o u s a n d w h i c h conclusions genuinely follow from w h i c h premises, But this makes dialectic a far m o r e m o d e s t e n t e r p r i s e t h a n the Stoic variety, w h i c h p r o m i s e s , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , the d i s c o v e r y of s u b s t a n t i v e t r u t h s . O n the m o r e m o d e s t a c c o u n t , d i a l e c t i c is a m a t t e r o f r e a s o n j u d g i n g about itseli: the p r o p e r a n d i m p r o p e r use o f l o g i c a l inference. O n this v i e w , it is clear that p h i l o s o p h i c a l expertise w i l l have to rely o n s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n d i a l e c t i c i n l e a d i n g us to t r u t h . E v e n if the p h i l o s o p h e r is able to reveal that s o m e justification is i n a d e q u a t e , it w i l l not follow that the v i e w in q u e s t i o n is false. It w i l l a l w a y s be

07

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a m o r e c o n s i s t e n t a n d m o r e c o n v i n c i n g j u s tification o f that s a m e view. B u t i f w e c a n n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y rule any p o s i t i o n out, we s h o u l d h a v e little c o n f i d e n c e in t h o s e v i e w s that h a v e not yet b e e n refuted a n d c o n t i n u e to a p p e a r probable. T h e i r s u r v i v a l m a y s i m p l y be a m a t t e r of not h a v i n g s u b j e c t e d t h e m to sufficient s c r u t i n y . I I so, the p r o b a b l e n o longer s e e m s to p r o v i d e g o o d g r o u n d s for e v e n tentative a p p r o v a l . The

mitigated sceptics prospects

are p a r t i c u l a r l y bleak w h e n

a t t e m p t i n g to a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g p o s i t i o n s that are intern a l l y c o n s i s t e n t . D e t e r m i n i n g w h o h a s the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n sible v i e w i n s u c h a debate m a y reveal m o r e about the o b s e r v e r s ' p r e c o n c e p t i o n s t h a n the p o s i t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s s e e m s to be the case w i t h C i c e r o ' s o w n alleged refutation o l E p i c u r e a n ethics i n De Finibus

Bonorum

et Malorum

2. It is e s p e c i a l l y s t r i k i n g that C i c e r o

h i m s e l f p r o v i d e s the m a t e r i a l , v i a h i s c h a r a c t e r T o r q u a t u s i n B o o k 1 to meet many, if not a l l , o f the o b j e c t i o n s he levels in B o o k 2. So one m i g h t o b j e c t that C i c e r o ' s fallibilist p u r s u i t of truth is really n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n the p u r s u i t of p e r s u a s i o n ( I n w o o d 1990), I n s u p p o r t of this o b j e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t a l s o c l a i m that the a n a l ogy b e t w e e n the p l a u s i b i l i t y o f s e n s e - i m p r e s s i o n s a n d the p l a u s i b i l ity o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s b r e a k s d o w n w i t h regard to the c r u c i a l factor of p r e d i c t i o n . S c i e n c e a n d t e c h n i c a l expertise rely h e a v i l y o n p r e d i c t i v e failure a s a m e a n s of d i s c o n t i n u a t i o n ; t h e a s s u m p t i o n is that the s t r u c t u r e of the p h y s i c a l w o r l d p r o v i d e s a n objective c o n s t r a i n t . I I the engineer's d e s i g n is not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the l a w s of nature, the bridge w i l l collapse. B u t there is a r g u a b l y n o s u c h c o n s t r a i n t available for the p h i l o s o p h i c a l v e r s i o n o f this m e t h o d . O n e c a n s t u b b o r n l y m a i n t a i n one's e t h i c a l o r m e t a p h y s i c a l v i e w s , w h e t h e r they t u r n out to be t r u e or false, w i t h o u t suffering a n y a n a l ogous c o l l a p s e ,

Socrates and epistemic optimism W h a t i n i t i a l l y a p p e a r s to be o n l y a m i n i m a l c o m m i t m e n t to a p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e t h o d t u r n s out to r e q u i r e s o m e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w s about

98

CICERO

h u m a n nature a n d r e a s o n . I n o r d e r for C i c e r o to be c o n f i d e n t that the p r o p e r a p p l i c a t i o n of the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d w i l l lead us c l o s e r to the t r u t h , he m u s t s u p p o s e that there are s u c h t r u t h s to b e d i s c o v e r e d i n the first place. H e m u s t a l s o s u p p o s e that h u m a n nature p r o v i d e s the k i n d o f objective c o n s t r a i n t o n ethical t h e o r y that p h y s i c a l nature p r o v i d e s tor s c i e n t i f i c theory. S o m e o n e l i v i n g in a c c o r d a n c e

with

talse e t h i c a l v i e w s w i l l not i n fact be happy, despite w h a t he m a y say or t h i n k . It is s i m p l y not p o s s i b l e to live w e l l if o n e h a s false beliefs about w h a t is i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h o u r nature, a n d w h a t is g e n u i n e l y w o r t h p u r s u i n g a n d w h a t is w o r t h a v o i d i n g . I n general, C i c e r o needs the e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c v i e w that t h r o u g h s t u d y a n d p r a c t i c e we c a n c o m e to see w h a t is intelligible i n itself a s p e r s u a s i v e (see Rh. 1.1, 1 3 5 5 a ) . T h i s is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r for us to trust that c o n t i n u e d e n q u i r y a n d a r g u m e n t p r o a n d c o n i n the a b s e n c e of a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h is not a c o l o s s a l w a s t e of t i m e . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e x p r e s s i o n o f this o p t i m i s m is the n o t i o n that the t r u t h c a n n o t be retuted, a n d h e n c e that w h a t has not yet b e e n refuted, despite s e r i o u s efforts to d o so, is likely to be t r u e . S u c h o p t i m i s m is a l s o n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p e r s e v e r a n c e a n d o b s t i n a c y . If nature p r o v i d e s n o c o n straints o n p h i l o s o p h i c a l e n q u i r y , that is, if nature n e v e r gives us reliable i n d i c a t o r s about h o w w e l l we are d o i n g , t h e n all p e r s e v e r a n c e is e q u a l l y f o o l i s h ( o r e q u a l l y w i s e ) . T h e o p t i m i s t i c v i e w that there are s u c h c o n s t r a i n t s , h o w e v e r , i n d i c a t e s that if o n e is p r o p e r l y o p e n - m i n d e d a n d d e d i c a t e d to e n q u i r y , if o n e has really a c q u i r e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l e x p e r t i s e , t h e n w h a t o n e finds p e r s u a s i v e w i l l m o r e likely be true t h a n w h a t o t h e r s find p e r s u a s i v e . S h o r t o l c o m m i t t i n g o u r s e l v e s to s o m e c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h , this fallible, i n d u c t i v e c o n f i r m a t i o n is the best w e c a n a c h i e v e . T h e r e c a n be n o guarantee that the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d l e a d s to t r u t h ; this is w h a t w e s h o u l d expect f r o m a sceptically cautious philosophy. But even w i t h o u t a n y s u c h guarantees, it is n o n e t h e l e s s reasonable to p u r s u e t r u t h w h i l e l a c k i n g a c r i t e r i o n in the full sense. E v e n ii the A c a d e m i c never a d v a n c e s b e y o n d v e r i s i m i l i t u d e , a n d even if he m a k e s n o m e a s urable progress t o w a r d s t r u t h , we m a y still p r e i e r h i s m e t h o d o n the g r o u n d s that it offers a r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r o m i s e b e t w e e n r a d i c a l

:jv,

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

s c e p t i c i s m a n d d o g m a t i s m . It is a n attempt to b a l a n c e the d e m a n d that we d i s c o v e r a n d b e l i e v e the truth w i t h the a w a r e n e s s o f o u r cognitive l i m i t a t i o n s a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n s . K a r l P o p p e r identifies this as the m o s t f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n o f e p i s t e m o l o g y : " H o w c a n w e a d m i t that o u r k n o w l e d g e is a h u m a n - a n all t o o h u m a n - affair, w i t h o u t at the s a m e t i m e i m p l y i n g that it is all i n d i v i d u a l w h i m a n d a r b i t r a r i n e s s ? " ( P o p p e r 1963: 16). A n d he attributes the o r i g i n a l d i s c o v e r y of h i s tallibilist s o l u t i o n to Plato's Socrates. C i c e r o s e e m s to have d r a w n a s i m i l a r l e s s o n f r o m Socrates. D e s p i t e s i n c e r e l y b e l i e v i n g that he failed to k n o w the things he m o s t w i s h e d to k n o w , S o c r a t e s r e m a i n s f i r m in h i s r e a s o n e d c o n v i c t i o n s . E v e n w h e n o n trial tor h i s life, he r e f u s e d to p a n d e r to the j u d g e s or c o m p r o m i s e h i s p r i n c i p l e s . H e c o n t i n u e d to investigate t h e m o s t p r e s s i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l matters to the v e r y e n d ( T u s c 1.71; see Plato Phaedo

107a).

Socrates' w i l l i n g n e s s to abide b y the c o n c l u s i o n s o f h i s a r g u m e n t s is n o w h e r e m o r e a p p a r e n t t h a n w h e n C r i t o tries to c o n v i n c e h i m that h e is b e i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e b y s t a y i n g in p r i s o n a n d forfeiting h i s life. S o c r a t e s replies; N o t o n l y n o w , but a l w a y s a m I the k i n d of m a n w h o is p e r s u a d e d b y n o t h i n g except the a r g u m e n t that o n reflection s e e m s best to m e . 1 a m not able n o w to t h r o w out t h o s e a r g u m e n t s I u s e d before just b e c a u s e this m i s f o r t u n e has c o m e u p o n m e ; for they s e e m pretty m u c h the s a m e to m e . 7

A n d I h o n o r a n d value these a r g u m e n t s even as before. S o u n l e s s we are able to p r o d u c e better a r g u m e n t s right n o w , y o u c a n be sure that I w i l l not agree w i t h y o u . . , (Crito

46b [ G r u b e 1997])

W h e t h e r it is a q u e s t i o n about the i m m o r t a l i t y o f the s o u l o r the j u s t i c e o f s t a y i n g in p r i s o n , Socrates refuses to act o n the basis o l a n y t h i n g but the a r g u m e n t s that s e e m m o s t rationally d e l e n s i b l e . W h a t m a k e s Socrates a w o r t h y ideal tor C i c e r o is that he w a s n e i t h e r fanatical i n h i s c o n v i c t i o n s n o r easily s w a y e d f r o m t h e m .

CICERO

Conclusion Cicero's v e r s i o n o f philosophical iallibilism provides a synthesis o f S c e p t i c a l c a u t i o n a n d Stole c o n f i d e n c e . A s s u c h it is subject to o b j e c tions f r o m b o t h s i d e s . R a d i c a l s c e p t i c s c o m p l a i n it is n o t sufficiently c a u t i o u s , a n d c o m m i t t e d Stoics c o m p l a i n it is not sufficiently c o n fident.

In reply to the r a d i c a l s c e p t i c w e m a y say that a l t h o u g h the

fallibilist is not i m m u n e to error, he is still able to a v o i d the e p i s t e m i c v i c e ot r a s h or hasty assent. I f w e are i n e s c a p a b l y fallible, it is u n r e a s o n a b l e to insist w e s h o u l d believe n o t h i n g that falls s h o r t of certainty. R a t i o n a l integrity for s u c h i m p e r f e c t agents s h o u l d not d e m a n d infallibility. A n d i n r e p l y to the c o n f i d e n t Stoic w e m a y say that the fallibilist is a b l e to a v o i d the v i c e ot d o g m a t i c or

arrogant

s t u b b o r n n e s s . A s w e c a n see f r o m the e x a m p l e o f S o c r a t e s , absolute certainty is not n e c e s s a r y to m a i n t a i n the c o u r a g e o f o n e s c o n v i c tions. V i e w e d i n t h i s way, C i c e r o ' s f a l l i b i l i s m is a p o s i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t of the earlier, m o r e r a d i c a l l y s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e of the A c a d e m i c s .

101

SIX

Aenesidemus: the Pyrrhonian revival

W h a t I h a v e d e s c r i b e d as p r o g r e s s i n the last c h a p t e r w a s s e e n as d e c l i n e by at least o n e m e m b e r of the late A c a d e m y . A e n e s i d e m u s c r i t i c i z e d h i s fellow A c a d e m i c s for b e i n g d o g m a t i c .

1

The long dis-

pute w i t h the Stoics h a d effectively c o m e to a n e n d , a n d the S t o i c s h a d w o n . T h e A c a d e m i c s h a d c o m p l e t e l y a b a n d o n e d their o r i g i n a l l y strict s t a n c e o n epoche a n d n o w m a d e firm d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a b o u t a w h o l e r a n g e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l issues. Aenesidemus committed

h i s s c e p t i c i s m to w r i t i n g , p r o b a b l y

s o m e t i m e in the e a r l y - t o - m i d first c e n t u r y B C E . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , o n l y :

s o m e f r a g m e n t s a n d t e s t i m o n i a s u r v i v e . T h e m o s t extensive reports are about h i s Pyrrhonist

O n e o f these c o m e s f r o m the

Discourses.

n i n t h - c e n t u r y B y z a n t i n e p a t r i a r c h P h o t i u s , w h o is r e m a r k a b l e i n h i s o w n right. I n h i s Bibliotheke, i n c l u d i n g the Pyrrfionist

P h o t i u s s u m m a r i z e s 280

Discourses.

3

books,

It is c l e a r f r o m h i s s u m m a r y

that h e t h i n k s v e r y little o f A e n e s i d e m u s w o r k b e c a u s e it m a k e s n o 1

c o n t r i b u t i o n to C h r i s t i a n d o g m a a n d d r i v e s f r o m o u r m i n d s the i n s t i n c t i v e tenets o f faith (Bib.

170b39-40). Nevertheless, Photius

is a generally reliable s o u r c e ( W i l s o n 1 9 9 4 ) . So despite h i s a s s e s s m e n t o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' s c e p t i c i s m , h e p r o b a b l y p r o v i d e s an a c c u r a t e summary. T h e p r o p e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f that s u m m a r y , h o w e v e r , a l o n g w i t h the g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o l A e n e s i d e m u s ' P y r r h o n i s m , is d i s p u t e d . T h e

111

AENESIDEMUS

central i s s u e is w h e t h e r the r e v i v e d P y r r h o n i s m is a type o f relat i v i s m that a f f i r m s the i m p o s s i b i l i t y ot k n o w l e d g e , o r w h e t h e r it is m o r e c o n s i s t en t w i t h S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s ' later s c e p t i c i s m , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h w e c a n n o t c o n c l u s i v e l y rule out the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n y k i n d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e f o r m e r , relativist v i e w y i e l d s v e r y definite c o n c l u s i o n s about o u r cognitive l i m i t s w h i l e the latter, s c e p t i c a l o n e s h o w s o n l y that we are not able to r a t i o n a l l y resolve m a t t e r s , p o s i t i v e l y or negatively. I n this c h a p t e r I s h a l l d é t e n d the sceptical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l a n d offer an e x p l a n a t i o n ot h o w his apparently relativistic a r g u m e n t s are co n si st ent w i t h S c e p t i c i s m . B u t first we n e e d to briefly c o n s i d e r w h a t he f o u n d o b j e c t i o n a b l e a b o u t his c o n t e m p o r a r y

Academics.

T h e late A c a d e m y ' s

dogmatism

A s tar as A e n e s i d e m u s is c o n c e r n e d , the o n l y live d i s a g r e e m e n t that r e m a i n e d b e t w e e n the Stoics a n d A c a d e m i c s of h i s day w a s r e g a r d i n g the kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n . A n d s i n c e the A c a d e m i c s h a d t a k e n so m u c h Stoic d o g m a o n b o a r d , e v e n this w a s n o m o r e t h a n a f r a t e r n a l quibble. T h e A c a d e m i c s n o w a g r e e d that the p r o p e r u s e of r e a s o n b r i n g s u s closer to the t r u t h ; they o n l y d i s a g r e e d about w h e t h e r we c o u l d a c h i e v e certainty. W i t h i n the A c a d e m y , A n t i o c h u s d e f e n d e d the Stoic v i e w against Philo's w e a k e r c o n c e p t i o n ot k n o w l e d g e , l e a d i n g A e n e s i d e m u s to d i s m i s s t h e m a s " S t o i c s f i g h t i n g against S t o i c s " (Bib.

1 7 0 a l 4 - 1 7 ; Striker 1997).

I n tact, matters w e r e far w o r s e : the f o l l o w e r s of P h i l o w e r e not o n l y d o g m a t i c , but t h e y u n w i t t i n g l y c o n t r a d i c t e d t h e m s e l v e s 170a28-38). The contradiction J

(Bib.

is to m a i n t a i n that one b o t h c a n

a n d c a n n o t d i s t i n g u i s h the true f r o m the false. T h e fallibilist s e e m s to w a n t it both w a y s : we c a n n o t reliably, or c o n c l u s i v e l y , d e t e r m i n e the t r u t h , but we c a n tallibly or p r o v i s i o n a l l y d o so. O n e difficulty is to e x p l a i n w h y fallible j u s t i f i c a t i o n falls s h o r t w h i l e r e m a i n i n g a reliable i n d i c a t i o n ot t r u t h . We c o n f r o n t e d a s i m i l a r p r o b l e m for C i c e r o ' s f a l l i b i l i s m in C h a p t e r 5: h o w is it that we c a n n o t i d e n t i f y the

103

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t r u t h , but w e c a n i d e n t i f y w h a t r e s e m b l e s the t r u t h ? I f w e c a n detect v e r i s i m i l i t u d e , w h y c a n w e not detect t r u t h itself? A e n e s i d e m u s a p p e a r s to be e x p l o i t i n g this p r o b l e m . H e p r o b a b l y argued, m u c h as A n t i o c h u s d i d (Ac. 2 . 3 4 ) , that if we are a w a r e o i the t r u t h o f s o m e s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n or t h o u g h t , there is n o l o n g e r a n y g r o u n d l o r p e r p l e x i t y or d o u b t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , i l w h a t w e are aware of is unclear, w e s h o u l d not m a k e f i r m a s s e r t i o n s r e g a r d i n g it. T h e i n t u i t i o n is that o n l y c o n c l u s i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n is g e n u i n e j u s t i f i c a t i o n . It the S c e p t i c s are able to p r o d u c e s o m e c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e or a r g u m e n t against e v e r y c l a i m , then there w i l l a l w a y s be s o m e r e a s o n tor t h i n k i n g the belief i n q u e s t i o n is false. A n d i n so far a s I h a v e g o o d r e a s o n to t h i n k the belief is false, I have g o o d r e a s o n to t h i n k I d o not k n o w it, a n d that I a m not (at least c u r r e n t l y ) able to j u s t i f y it. T h e r e is thus a t e n s i o n b e t w e e n cautious doubt a n d the c o n f i d e n c e that derives t r o m j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; P h i l o a n d h i s followers c a n n o t h a v e it b o t h w a y s .

5

T h e d e f i n i n g m a r k of the d o g m a t i s m that A e n e s i d e m u s rejects is c o n f i d e n t a n d u n a m b i g u o u s a s s e r t i o n a n d d e n i a l (Bib.

l69b38-40).

T h i s is not s i m p l y a m a t t e r ot u t t e r i n g w o r d s w i t h a c e r t a i n i n f l e c t i o n , b u t m u s t i n c l u d e s o m e degree o f c o m m i t m e n t to, o r b e l i e f i n , the p r o p o s i t i o n s asserted. B y a r g u i n g that there is n o f i r m basis for g r a s p i n g the t r u t h , he s o u g h t to reinstate epochê

a s the p r o p e r goal

( o r at least o u t c o m e ) o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n *

Pyrrhonian relativism W h i l e all o f o u r s o u r c e s associate A e n e s i d e m u s w i t h epochê,

many

a l s o attribute to h i m w h a t a p p e a r to be negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s : for e x a m p l e , t h i n g s are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e , a n d c a n n o t be k n o w n i n t h e m s e l v e s (De Ebr,

175. 187; D L 9 . 8 8 ) / S i m i l a r l y , he is s a i d to

h a v e a r g u e d that s i g n s ( i n a precise, e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s e n s e ) d o not exist, e n d s ( i n the precise sense o f o b j e c t i v e l y c o r r e c t e t h i c a l g o a l s ) d o n o t exist, a n d all s o r t s o f i s s u e s are n e c e s s a r i l y b e y o n d o u r c o m p r e h e n s i o n , i n c l u d i n g the nature of t r u t h , causes, affections, m o t i o n , g e n e r a t i o n a n d d e s t r u c t i o n {Bib. Bett 1997, 2 0 0 0 ) .

104

l 7 0 b 3 - 3 5 ; see also M

11.68-95;

AENESIDEMUS

H o w then are w e to r e c o n c i l e A e n e s i d e m u s ' epochê

w i t h these

negatively d o g m a t i c v i e w s ? A c c o r d i n g to the relativist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , A e n e s i d e m u s w o u l d o n l y have u s s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t a r e s t r i c t e d c l a s s of s t a t e m e n t s , w h i c h does not i n c l u d e the c o n c l u s i o n s to h i s s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s . T h e s e a r g u m e n t s are s u p p o s e d to s h o w that we s h o u l d not b e l i e v e a n y p r o p o s i t i o n of the f o r m "x is byn a t u r e F". I n place o f s u c h a s s e r t i o n s , a n d w i t h a b a c k w a r d glance to P y r r h o , he e n c o u r a g e s us to say o n l y that: " t h i n g s are n o m o r e o f this k i n d t h a n o f that, o r are s o m e t i m e s o l t h i s k i n d , s o m e t i m e s n o t , or for o n e p e r s o n t h e y are o f this k i n d , for a n o t h e r p e r s o n n o t ot t h i s k i n d , a n d for a n o t h e r p e r s o n not e v e n existent at a l l " {Bib.

170al-3).

So it is o n l y c o r r e c t to say a t h i n g has c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s relative

to

s o m e perceiver, or s o m e s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s , N o t h i n g is j u s t w h a t it 1

is simplicter.

H o n e y , w e m a y say, is n o m o r e sweet t h a n n o t - s w e e t ;

but this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h s a y i n g that it r e a l l y is sweet relative to a p e r c e i v i n g agent i n the right c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S i n c e acceptable a s s e r t i o n s take the f o r m "x is c o n t i n g e n t l y , or v a r i a b l y F", we m a y s u p p o s e the o b j e c t i o n a b l e a s s e r t i o n ™x is by n a t u r e F " m e a n s "x is invariably, w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n , F". S o to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t about the natures of t h i n g s m e a n s to w i t h h o l d j u d g e m e n t f r o m a n y p r o p o s i t i o n o f the f o r m "x is i n v a r i a b l y F". O n the o t h e r h a n d , there are t w o s o r t s o f acceptable beliefs. F i r s t , we m a y b e l i e v e that it is not the case that x is by n a t u r e F; for e x a m p l e , it is not the case that h o n e y is by nature sweet. D e n y i n g that a n y p r o p e r t y h o l d s i n v a r i a b l y ot s o m e object d o e s not c o u n t , o n this v i e w , as b e i n g about the nature ot that t h i n g . A e n e s i d e m u s o n l y w i s h e s to e x c l u d e p o s i t i v e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s o f a t h i n g s nature ( W o o d r u f f 1 9 8 8 ) . S e c o n d l y , we m a y believe that h o n e y is sweet i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . P r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliefs are n o t a b o u t the n a t u r e of t h i n g s either, a n d h e n c e are not i n c l u d e d in the s c o p e of the relativist's epochê.

I n g e n e r a l , w h e n A" a p p e a r s F, we m a y believe

that x is c o n t i n g e n t l y , or v a r i a b l y F : it is F tor m e , at t h i s m o m e n t , i n these c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A p r o b l e m a r i s e s at this p o i n t . T y p i c a l l y we t h i n k that a b e l i e f is e i t h e r t r u e o r false, w h e t h e r o r n o t we k n o w w h i c h it is. S o it s h o u l d b e at least p o s s i b l e that s o m e p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliefs are t r u e .

105

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

O n e w a y to e x p l a i n h o w this is p o s s i b l e is to say that s o m e t h i n g n e e d not be i n v a r i a b l y F to be r e a l l y F. T h e fact that it is o n l y F i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s d o e s not m e a n that it is not really F. T h e p r o p e r t i e s a t h i n g has are d e t e r m i n e d by the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h we e n c o u n t e r it. H o n e y really is s w e e t for m e as I taste it right n o w e v e n t h o u g h it is not i n v a r i a b l y sweet. S o m y b e l i e f that h o n e y is sweet for m e right n o w as 1 taste it is true. W h a t is attractive a b o u t this interpretation is that it e n a b l e s us to e x p l a i n w h y s o m a n y n e g a t i v e l y d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s are a t t r i b uted to A e n e s i d e m u s , H e really d i d try to e s t a b l i s h that we c a n n o t k n o w a n y t h i n g about the i n v a r i a b l e nature o l t h i n g s , i n c l u d i n g t r u t h , causes, m o t i o n , s i g n s a n d e n d s . It is i m p o s s i b l e to k n o w w h a t these t h i n g s i n v a r i a b l y are b e c a u s e t h e y are not i n v a r i a b l y a n y t h i n g . H o w e v e r , s u c h a p o s i t i o n s e e m s too d o g m a t i c to attribute to A e n e s i d e m u s . It is h a r d l y the sort o f v i e w w e s h o u l d e x p e c t to f i n d as a r e a c t i o n to the excessive d o g m a t i s m o f h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y A c a d e m ics. T h i s is e s p e c i a l l y the case g i v e n that a s i m i l a r v i e w h a d b e e n e m b r a c e d m u c h e a r l i e r b y the E p i c u r e a n Polystratus i n the t h i r d c e n t u r y (see L S 7 D ) . So it s e e m s u n l i k e l y that this v i e w w o u l d have b e e n p e r c e i v e d as a s c e p t i c a l threat i n A e n e s i d e m u s ' t i m e (first c e n t u r y B C E ) . A l s o , in so far as it suggests a c a u s a l or d i s p o s i t i o n a l a c c o u n t o f p r o p e r t i e s - s o m e t h i n g is the w a y it is at s o m e m o m e n t because o f c e r t a i n c o n t e x t u a l facts - it w o u l d be at o d d s w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s ' o w n a r g u m e n t s a i m e d at u n d e r m i n i n g c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n s (PH

1.180-6). A l t e r n a t i v e l y , we m i g h t say that p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliets are

not about t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , but o n l y a b o u t the way t h i n g s appear. T h u s m y b e l i e f that this h o n e y tastes sweet to me right n o w w i l l be true i n v i r t u e o l the a p p e a r a n c e that it is sweet. S u c h a belief is not about h o n e y itself, but o n l y the w a y it a p p e a r s . T h i s a c c o u n t a v o i d s the charge ot d o g m a t i s m i n so far a s it c o m m i t s the sceptic to n o beliefs about the w a y the w o r l d really is. But, w i t h the notable e x c e p t i o n o l the C y r e n a i c s , G r e e k p h i l o s o p h e r s d o not c o n c e i v e of t r u t h i n t e r m s o f the w a y t h i n g s s u b j e c t i v e l y appear rather than the w a y they o b j e c t i v e l y are ( B u r n y e a t 1 9 8 2 a ) . So if A e n e s i d e m u s m e a n t to p r o m o t e the i d e a that p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d beliefs

106

AENESIDEMUS

are o n l y about the w a y t h i n g s appear, he w o u l d also have to e n d o r s e a v e r y u n o r t h o d o x v i e w about t r u t h i n o r d e r to e x p l a i n h o w s u c h beliefs c o u l d be true. So it is u n l i k e l y that t h i s w a s h i s view, But e v e n if it w e r e , it w o u l d provide n o h e l p i n e x p l a i n i n g h i s a p p a r e n t l y negative d o g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t s . F o r o n t h i s view, h i s b o l d c l a i m that signs d o not exist w o u l d r e d u c e to the m u c h w e a k e r o b s e r v a t i o n that they d o not s e e m to exist, to h i m , at t h i s m o m e n t , in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d e v e n if that w e r e t r u e , it w o u l d constitute a pretty toothless s c e p t i c i s m . A d o g m a t i c o p p o n e n t c o u l d m e r e l y c o u n t e r that it a p p e a r s to h i m that s i g n s d o exist. So o n e i t h e r attempt to e x p l a i n h o w p r o p e r l y relativized beliefs c o u l d be t r u e it s e e m s we are left w i t h o u t a s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n that w o u l d have s u i t e d A e n e s i d e m u s a m b i t i o n to r e v i v e P y r r h o n i s m i n 1

r e s p o n s e to A c a d e m i c d o g m a t i s m , A m o r e p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h , 1 believe, is to reject the a s s u m p tion that g i v e s rise to the p r o b l e m i n the first place. I f rather t h a n a s s e n t i n g to p r o p e r l y relativized a s s e r t i o n s A e n e s i d e m u s s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t about t h e m , w e d o not n e e d to e x p l a i n h o w s u c h assertions c a n be t r u e . T h i s r e m a i n s a n i n t e r e s t i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n , but it p o s e s n o p a r t i c u l a r p r o b l e m for o n e w h o has n o beliefs. F u r t h e r m o r e , h i s negative d o g m a t i s m c a n be d i s s o l v e d by p l a c i n g the s u s p i c i o u s c l a i m s w i t h i n the c o n t e x t o l h i s o p p o s i t i o n a l strategy; h i s a r g u m e n t s for the n o n - e x i s t e n c e of s i g n s , for e x a m p l e , are not e x p r e s s i o n s o f h i s o w n v i e w but part of h i s attempt to balance t h i n g s out. A n d finally h i s r e l a t i v i s m is best e x p l a i n e d as a m o d e s t , s e m a n tic f o r m , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h , w h e n e v e r I say " A a p p e a r s F'\ it m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d that 1 m e a n "A- a p p e a r s F in certain

circumstances"

S e m a n t i c r e l a t i v i s m i n v o l v e s n o m e t a p h y s i c a l or e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s a n d is thus c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a g e n e r a l epoche

(Annas

& B a r n e s 1985). I n w h a t f o l l o w s w e s h a l l develop t h i s s c e p t i c a l interpretation a n d e x a m i n e h o w w e l l it a c c o r d s w i t h the f r a g m e n t a r y e v i d e n c e for A e n esidemus' Pyrrhonism,

107

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Pyrrhonian Scepticism T h e s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n p r o v i d e s a different a c c o u n t o f w h a t it m e a n s for A to be b y nature F , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y w h a t it is w e m u s t -

s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t . O n t h i s v i e w , the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r a n d h o w they are by n a t u r e m a k e s n o reference to i n variability'; it a m o u n t s m o r e s i m p l y to a c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality. S o m e s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n is f u n d a m e n t a l to the entire h i s t o r y of W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y a n d , u n s u r p r i s i n g l y , it gets w o r k e d out i n a large n u m b e r of ways, W e d o n o t n e e d to s p e c i f y a precise sense for the d i s t i n c t i o n in t h i s context, T h e c r u c i a l p o i n t is that any p r o p o s i t i o n o l the f o r m "x is (really as o p p o s e d to o n l y a p p a r e n t l y ) F " s h o u l d be r e a d as "x is b y n a t u r e F". T h i s is a w i d e r c o n s t r u a l o l the e x p r e s s i o n " b y n a t u r e F° t h a n its relativist c o u n t e r p a r t s i n c e it d o e s not l i m i t the nature o l t h i n g s to w h a t they i n v a r i a b l y are. A c c o r d i n g l y , the s c o p e o f s c e p t i c a l epoche is a l s o m u c h w i d e r . O n this v i e w , A e n e s i d e m u s w o u l d not a l l o w us to believe that h o n e y is (really, or e v e n a p p a r e n t l y ) s w e e t i n the a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . But n e i t h e r w o u l d h e a l l o w u s to b e l i e v e that n o t h i n g is by nature g o o d o r b a d , that e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s i g n s d o not exist, or that n o t h i n g c a n be k n o w n as it really is. A l l s u c h beliefs are a b o u t the n a t u r e o l t h i n g s a n d i n v o l v e illicit inferences f r o m h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r to h o w t h e y really are, w h e t h e r c o n t i n g e n t l y or i n v a r i a b l y O n the s c e p t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the p u r p o s e o l A e n e s i d e m u s ' a r g u m e n t s is to b l o c k any s u c h inference.

U n d e c i d a b i l i t y a n d the t e n m o d e s A s part of h i s P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l , A e n e s i d e m u s a s s e m b l e d v a r i o u s k i n d s ot s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s , or m o d e s , d e s i g n e d to i n d u c e

epoche.

I n S e x t u s ' p r e s e n t a t i o n o l these m o d e s , the c e n t r a l strategy is to s h o w that we are not rationally able to a d j u d i c a t e b e t w e e n c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s in o r d e r to d e c i d e w h i c h o n e is true.'' T h e first m o d e calls o u r attention to the v a r i o u s w a y s the s a m e t h i n g a p p e a r s to m e m b e r s o f different a n i m a l species. A l t h o u g h we

108

AES'ESIDE.WUS

d o not, a n d p e r h a p s c a n n o t , k n o w w h a t it is like to be a bat, it is o v e r w h e l m i n g l y likely that things a p p e a r differently to bats t h a n they d o to u s . T h e s a m e p o i n t c o u l d b e m a d e r e g a r d i n g any o t h e r a n i m a l species. W e c a n o n l y guess at w h a t it is like to navigate at n i g h t by radar, w h a t a g r a i n o i r i c e l o o k s l i k e to a n ant, h o w it feels for a fish to e x t r a c t o x y g e n t r o m water, o r h o w it feels to have ones feathers ruffled by the w i n d . It is reasonable to s u p p o s e that all a n i m a l s are attracted by pleasure a n d r e p u l s e d b y p a i n , a n d p e r h a p s e v e n that there is s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l s i m i l a r i t y i n the e x p e r i e n c e o l p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n a c r o s s all s p e c i e s . B u t the p o i n t r e m a i n s that the s a m e t h i n g s are objects ot c h o i c e a n d a v o i d a n c e to m e m b e r s of different species. G i v e n t h i s v a r i e t y of c o m p e t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s o f the s a m e t h i n g s , we are i n c l i n e d to w o n d e r w h i c h , il any, are c o r r e c t a n d h o w we m i g h t d e t e r m i n e this. It is u n a c c e p t a b l e to m e r e l y a s s u m e that o u r s e n s o r y e q u i p m e n t p r o v i d e s e x c l u s i v e a c c e s s to the nature of r e a l ity. A n d a c c o r d i n g to A e n e s i d e m u s , a n y attempt to provide r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n l o r s u c h a stance is n e c e s s a r i l y b i a s e d : " w e o u r s e l v e s w i l l not be able to a d j u d i c a t e b e t w e e n o u r o w n i m p r e s s i o n a n d those of o t h e r a n i m a l s : we are o u r s e l v e s parties to the d i s a g r e e m e n t , a n d h e n c e i n n e e d o l a n a d j u d i c a t o r , rather t h a n capable of j u d g i n g for o u r s e l v e s " (PH 1.59J. T h i s is a c l e a r statement o f the u n d e c i d a b i l i t y strategy: b e i n g party to a d i s p u t e c o m p r o m i s e s o n e s j u d g e m e n t T h i s is n o t a m a t t e r of b e i n g s w a y e d by s o m e p r a g m a t i c interest (as often h a p p e n s in legal c a s e s ) ; it is a m a t t e r of c a l l i n g i n t o q u e s t i o n o n e s v e r y ability to c o r r e c t l y a d j u d i c a t e a m o n g the a p p e a r a n c e s . I n the f o u r t h m o d e , S e x t u s o b s e r v e s that w h a t e v e r c o n d i t i o n one h a p p e n s to be i n affects the w a y t h i n g s a p p e a r : tor e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r one is w a k i n g o r sleeping, y o u n g or o l d , i n n e e d o r satisfied, d r u n k or sober, c o n f i d e n t o r f e a r f u l a n d so o n (PH 1.100). B u t if o n e is a l w a y s i n s o m e set o f s u c h c o n d i t i o n s , t h e n h e w i l l be p a r t y to the d i s p u t e . T h e v e r y i s s u e is w h e t h e r , for e x a m p l e , the w o r l d is as it a p p e a r s to a p e r s o n w h o is i n s a n e . S i n c e m y s a n i t y affects h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r to m e , I a m not i n a p o s i t i o n to a d j u d i c a t e . A n y attempt to p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n o i m y preference w i l l p r e s u p p o s e the v e r y m a t t e r at i s s u e , n a m e l y , w h e t h e r I a m right to prefer sanity,

] LM

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Sextus s u p p l e m e n t s t h i s p o i n t by c o n s i d e r i n g the p o s s i b i l i t y that one m i g h t otter a p r o o f i n s u p p o r t ot o n e of the c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s . I n that case: T h e s o - c a l l e d proof m u s t be either a p p a r e n t to us o r n o n a p p a r e n t . It it is n o n - a p p a r e n t , w e w i l l not p r o p o u n d it w i t h c o n f i d e n c e . B u t i f it is a p p a r e n t to us, s i n c e o u r i n q u i r y is about w h a t is a p p a r e n t to a n i m a l s a n d p r o o f is apparent to us, w h o are a n i m a l s , it w i l l itself i n s o far as it is apparent be subject to i n q u i r y as to its t r u t h . . .

{PH

1.60)

I n o t h e r w o r d s , it the p r e m i s e s a n d inferences c o n t a i n e d in the proof are not a p p a r e n t to us, we have n o proof. A n d if t h e y are apparent to u s , t h e y w i l l not be apparent to s o m e o n e else, or to s o m e n o n h u m a n a n i m a l s . A n d this b r i n g s u s b a c k to the q u e s t i o n of h o w we m a y d e c i d e w i t h o u t b e i n g g u i l t y of i r r a t i o n a l bias. I n effect, any attempt to p r o v i d e a proof w i l l l e a d us to a n infinite regress o r beg the q u e s t i o n . Infinite regress is a n integral part o f the strategy o f a later set of five m o d e s , d e v e l o p e d by A g r i p p a {PH

1.164; D L 9.88; see C h a p t e r 8 ) . It

s e e m s u n l i k e l y that A e n e s i d e m u s e v e r p r o p o u n d e d this a r g u m e n t h i m s e l f . Sextus p r o b a b l y a p p e n d s it to the o r i g i n a l A e n e s i d e m a n m o d e s in o r d e r to s t r e n g t h e n the case. B u t w e d o n o t n e e d to set off an infinite regress i n o r d e r to argue that b e i n g party to a d i s p u t e puts us in the p o s i t i o n of b e g g i n g the q u e s t i o n . T h e o n l y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n n e c e s s a r y is o n e that also plays a central role in Sextus' P y r r h o n i s m ; n a m e l y , that a n a r b i t r a r y p r e f e r e n c e c a n n o t s e r v e as r a t i o n a l justification. I n any case, t h i s u n d e c i d a b i l i t y strategy is c l e a r l y antithetical to m e t a p h y s i c a l r e l a t i v i s m . I n o n e sense, the relativist has n o n e e d to d e c i d e b e t w e e n the a p p e a r a n c e s ; p r o p e r l y r e l a t i v i z e d they m a y all be true, a n d h e n c e t h e r e r e a l l y are n o c o n f l i c t s i n the first place. S o it w o u l d be m i s l e a d i n g to d e s c r i b e the relativists a s s e m b l y o f v a r i a b l e a p p e a r a n c e s as a n o p p o s i t i o n a l m e t h o d (as b o t h Sextus a n d D i o g e n e s d o : PH 1 . 3 ] - 3 3 ; D L 9 . 7 8 ) . A t best we c o u l d say the relativist a r g u m e n t a i m s to d i s s o l v e the m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n that s u c h

AENESIDEMUS

a p p e a r a n c e s c o n f l i c t . B u t a g a i n , it w o u l d be o d d to d e s c r i b e t h i s as pitting o n e a p p e a r a n c e against

another.

U n d e c i d a b i l i t y is just a s c l e a r l y a n t i t h e t i c a l to negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e negative d o g m a t i s t refuses to d e c i d e b e t w e e n c o n f l i c t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s not because he is u n a b l e to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h is t r u e , but rather b e c a u s e he h a s d e c i d e d that n o n e of t h e m are t r u e . U n l i k e the sceptic he is not e v e n i n p r i n c i p l e o p e n to the p o s s i b i l i t y that he m a y e v e n t u a l l y d i s c o v e r the t r u t h about t h i n g s b e c a u s e he believes there is n o s u c h t r u t h to d i s c o v e r .

Invariability H o w e v e r , P h i l o reports that A e n e s i d e m u s first m o d e p r o v i d e s a clear 1

w a r r a n t that t h i n g s are i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e {Dc Ebr. 175). A n d s i m i l a r l y , D i o g e n e s f o r m u l a t e s the c o n c l u s i o n s to s o m e o l the m o d e s i n t e r m s that suggest not m e r e l y o u r i n a b i l i t y to d e c i d e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s but t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d o i n g so ( D L 9.81, 85, 8 6 , 8 8 ) . E v e n it A e n e s i d e m u s is n o t a relativist, he w o u l d n e e d a strategy other t h a n u n d e c i d a b i l i t y to a r r i v e at s u c h c o n c l u s i o n s . T h e m o s t p l a u s i b l e c a n d i d a t e for s u c h a strategy r e q u i r e s t h e use of an i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to S e x t u s :

A e n e s i d e m u s s a y s that t h e r e is a difference a m o n g a p p a r e n t t h i n g s , a n d that s o m e of these a p p e a r i n c o m m o n to e v e r y o n e , w h i l e o t h e r s a p p e a r p r i v a t e l y to s o m e o n e , a n d that the o n e s that a p p e a r i n c o m m o n to e v e r y o n e are t r u e , w h i l e the o n e s not like this are false,

{M

8.8)

T h e c o n t r a s t suggests that w h a t a p p e a r s i n c o m m o n a p p e a r s the s a m e to e v e r y o n e . T h u s w e m a y articulate a n i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n this w a y :

[C]

A p p e a r a n c e s that a p p e a r in common

to e v e r y o n e [ i n v a r i -

a b l y ] are true, w h i l e t h o s e n o t like this are false.

HI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

S i m i l a r l y , P h i l o states, i n h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n to the m o d e s : if it w e r e the case that the s a m e u n v a r y i n g a p p e a r a n c e s w e r e p r o d u c e d f r o m the same things, then no doubt we should of n e c e s s i t y a d m i r e as u n e r r i n g a n d i n c o r r u p t i b l e t h o s e t w o s t a n d a r d s , p e r c e p t i o n a n d t h o u g h t . . . a n d w e s h o u l d not be in two minds and suspend judgment ...

( D e Ei>r: 169)

Sextus a l s o m a k e s u s e o f s o m e t h i n g v e r y m u c h l i k e t h i s i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n i n h i s a t t a c k o n e t h i c s , w h i c h is a p p a r e n t l y d e r i v e d f r o m Aenesidemus; I f there is a n y t h i n g by n a t u r e g o o d , a n d there is a n y t h i n g b y n a t u r e b a d , this t h i n g o u g h t to be c o m m o n to a l l a n d to be g o o d o r b a d for e v e r y o n e . F o r j u s t as fire, b e i n g by nature w a r m i n g , w a r m s e v e r y o n e a n d d o e s not w a r m s o m e but chill o t h e r s , a n d i n the s a m e w a y a s s n o w , w h i c h c h i l l s , does not c h i l l s o m e people but w a r m o t h e r s , but c h i l l s e v e r y o n e equally, s o that w h i c h is by n a t u r e g o o d o u g h t to b e g o o d for e v e r y o n e , a n d not g o o d for s o m e but b a d for o t h e r s . ( A i 11.69; see PH 3.179; D L 9 . 1 0 1 ) "

1

Lf w e u n d e r s t a n d t h e " a p p e a r i n g i n c o m m o n " i n [ C ] a n d at the b e g i n n i n g o f this passage as "affecting e v e r y o n e t h e s a m e way", w e get: [A]

I f A" is by n a t u r e F , t h e n x affects e v e r y o n e as F .

W e m a y o b s e r v e b y m e a n s o f the o b s e r v a t i o n s a s s e m b l e d i n o n e o f the m o d e s that: x d o e s n o t affect e v e r y o n e as F . A n d w e m a y t h e n c o n c l u d e by matins ioilens that x is n o t b y nature F . S i n c e this a r g u m e n t c a n be a p p l i e d to a n y t h i n g for w h i c h w e c a n a s s e m b l e variable a p p e a r a n c e s , w e m a y c o n c l u d e quite g e n e r a l l y that k n o w l e d g e o f the n a t u r e s o l t h i n g s is i m p o s s i b l e . B u t i n o r d e r to

112

AES'ESIDE.WUS

get the negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that x is not by n a t u r e F , we have to r e a d [ A ] as a s t a t e m e n t not m e r e l y about h o w t h i n g s appear, but r a t h e r h o w they really are. T o c l a r i f y [ A ] ; it x is [and not appears]

b y n a t u r e F , t h e n x affects [and not merely appears

merely

to affect]

e v e r y o n e as F . A l t h o u g h neither [A] n o r [ C ] are explicitly m e n t i o n e d i n reports of the m o d e s , all of t h e m c a n easily be u n d e r s t o o d as l o l l o w i n g this patt e r n . T h e v a r i a b i l i t y o f the c o l l e c t e d a p p e a r a n c e s o f JC w i l l not present us w i t h a n u n d e c i d a b l e conflict, but rather d i r e c t e v i d e n c e that we c a n n o t reveal the n a t u r e of x o n the basis o f those a p p e a r a n c e s , for that w o u l d r e q u i r e that x affect e v e r y o n e in the s a m e way. But i n t e r p r e t i n g the m o d e s in t h i s w a y y i e l d s s t r i k i n g l y feeble a r g u m e n t s . T h e s e v e n t h m o d e , for e x a m p l e , d r a w s o u r attention to the difficulty of d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t q u a n t i t y o f stuff reveals its t r u e n a t u r e . A m o d e r a t e a m o u n t of w i n e benefits, but a large a m o u n t stupefies; b a r s of s i l v e r a p p e a r w h i t e , s h a v i n g s a p p e a r b l a c k ; a n d i n the c o r r e c t p r o p o r t i o n s , d r u g s are b e n e f i c i a l , but m i x e d i m p r o p e r l y they c a n be lethal. H i e m o t i v a t i n g a s s u m p t i o n is that the true nature o f s o m e t h i n g w i l l be e x p r e s s e d i n v a r i a b l y i n a n y q u a n t i t y of it, a n d i n a n y c o m p o u n d . It a d r u g is by n a t u r e b e n e f i c i a l , t h e n it w i l l affect e v e r y o n e b e n e f i c i a l l y regardless o f the q u a n t i t y a n d the p r o p o r t i o n s i n w h i c h it is m i x e d w i t h o t h e r s u b s t a n c e s . S u c h a s i m p l i s t i c v i e w o f c a u s a l p r o p e r t i e s w o u l d not be likely to c o n v i n c e a n y o n e ; it d o e s not r e q u i r e a s o p h i s t i c a t e d c a u s a l t h e o r y to o b s e r v e h o w easily the p o t e n c y of d r u g s m a y b e v a r i e d . T h i s line of t h i n k i n g w o u l d be effective at p r o m o t i n g the v i e w that d r u g s really have c e r t a i n p o w e r s o n l y relative to t h e i r c o m p o u n d s a n d quantities. But by the s a m e token it w o u l d a l s o p r o m o t e the idea that this is all there is to b e k n o w n a b o u t the p o t e n c y o f d r u g s . I n other w o r d s , it s i m p l y s e r v e s to reveal the i m p l a u s i b i l i t y ot the i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n i n t h i s context, A p p l y i n g the i n v a r i a b i l i t y strategy to the m o d e s generally p r o d u c e s feeble results. R a t h e r t h a n c o n c l u d e that the t r u t h is b e y o n d o u r g r a s p , w e w i l l p r o b a b l y t h i n k , tor e x a m p l e , that s n a k e v e n o m really is h a r m f u l to o n e p e r s o n , but not to a n o t h e r , a n d p l a y i n g w i t h h o o p s really is s e r i o u s b u s i n e s s for c h i l d r e n , but not for o l d p e o p l e ,

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

and metals really are v a l u a b l e w h e n s c a r c e , b u t not w h e n a b u n d a n t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the fact that n o t h i n g s e e m s to meet the i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n m i g h t be t a k e n a s g r o u n d s to reject that c o n d i t i o n a n d e m b r a c e s o m e sort o f r e l a t i v i s m . T h e t e n t h m o d e , h o w e v e r , is a m o r e plausible c a n d i d a t e for the i n v a r i a b i l i t y strategy. T h i s m o d e c o u l d be r e a d as r e v e a l i n g the c o n tingent a n d v a r i a b l e n a t u r e ot v a l u e b y p o i n t i n g out the differences a m o n g lifestyles, c u s t o m s , l a w s , beliefs In m y t h s a n d d o g m a t i c s u p p o s i t i o n s . I n g e n e r a l , t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f w h a t w e f i n d v a l u a b l e is i n d i c a t e d by the c o r r e l a t i o n of b e l i e f a n d the t i m e a n d p l a c e o f o n e s b i r t h . I n s o m e c u l t u r e s it is a p p r o p r i a t e to tattoo babies: i n others it is not. I f y o u g r e w u p i n a n c i e n t E t h i o p i a y o u w o u l d p r o b a b l y believe it is g o o d to tattoo y o u r c h i l d . B u t il y o u g r e w u p In V i c t o r i a n E n g l a n d y o u w o u l d p r o b a b l y believe it is b a d . H o m o s e x u a l i t y is c u s t o m a r y i n s o m e places, illegal i n o t h e r s . E g y p t i a n s e m b a l m the d e a d a n d R o m a n s c r e m a t e the b o d i e s ( D L 9.83), But if a n y of these practices w e r e g o o d b y nature, they w o u l d affect all of us as g o o d , that is, they w o u l d s e e m g o o d to e v e r y o n e j u s t as fire s e e m s w a r m i n g to e v e r y o n e . H e n c e w e m a y c o n c l u d e that n o t h i n g is g o o d o r b a d by nature. A l l a n c i e n t e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s offer s o m e a c c o u n t o f w h a t is g o o d by nature, a n d they all c o n t e n d that w h a t e v e r it i s , it is b e n e f i c i a l . T h e s e are s u p p o s e d to be o b j e c t i v e l y t r u e a c c o u n t s o f w h a t is g o o d , and b e n e f i c i a l , tor all h u m a n b e i n g s . So, the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n a l w o u l d be c o m m o n l y h e l d b y a n c i e n t e t h i c a l theorists: if x is g o o d by n a t u r e t h e n it is b e n e f i c i a l for e v e r y o n e . I f w e s u p p o s e that i n o r d e r for x to be b e n e f i c i a l for s o m e o n e , it m u s t a c t u a l l y benefit h i m , w e m a y restate t h e r e q u i r e m e n t this w a y :

[B]

I f x is g o o d by nature t h e n e v e r y o n e affected by it w i l l be benefited.

A d m i t t e d l y , t h i s is quite d i s t i n c t I r o m t h e f u r t h e r c l a i m : [R]

I f x is g o o d b y nature, t h e n e v e r y o n e affected by it w i l l recognize

1:1

it as b e n e f i c i a l .

AES'ESIDE.WUS

It c e r t a i n l y s e e m s p o s s i b l e that o n e m i g h t be benefited w i t h o u t r e c o g n i z i n g it. I n d e e d , it often h a p p e n s that w h a t s e e m e d initially like a p r o b l e m t u r n s out to be a b l e s s i n g . A n d m o r e generally, it s e e m s o n e does not have to have a n y p a r t i c u l a r beliefs about w h a t is g o o d or b a d to b e b e n e f i t e d . H o w e v e r , t h i s is not t h e case tor Stoic e t h i c s , a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h , o n e m u s t k n o w w h a t is g o o d b y nature to be v i r t u o u s . Y o u m i g h t receive all s o r t s of a p p a r e n t l y g o o d t h i n g s a n d d e v e l o p t h e d i s p o s i tions v a l u e d b y y o u r c u l t u r e , but u n t i l a n d u n l e s s y o u g r a s p the d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e b e t w e e n w h a t is b y nature g o o d a n d w h a t is not, y o u w i l l n o t b e v i r t u o u s a n d n o n e of these a p p a r ently g o o d t h i n g s c a n t r u l y benefit y o u . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the v i r t u o u s Stoic c a n n o t tail to be a w a r e , at least o n r e f l e c t i o n , ot the fact that he is v i r t u o u s a n d that h i s v i r t u e is b e n e f i c i a l for h i m . So, g i v e n the Stoic v i e w o f w h a t it m e a n s l o r x to be g o o d by nature, Stoics w o u l d accept b o t h [ B ] a n d [ R ] . I n that case, if the a r g u m e n t w e r e d i r e c t e d at a Stoic o r a n y o n e else w h o a c c e p t e d these p r o p o s i t i o n s [ A , B , R ] , there w o u l d b e no n e e d for A e n e s i d e m u s h i m s e l f to believe t h e m . H e m a y a r g u e that as a r e s u l t of his i n t e r l o c u t o r s ' c o n v i c t i o n s , n o t h i n g is by n a t u r e g o o d or b a d . T h e c o n f i d e n t a s s e r t i o n o f any o f these r e q u i r e m e n t s takes us w e l l b e y o n d s c e p t i c i s m a n d e v e n a m e r e l y negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e d i a l e c t i c a l strategy, o n the o t h e r h a n d , a l s o a n t i c i p a t e s a n d p r o b a b l y informs Sextus' dialectical use o f ( A ) . It is c l e a r that S e x t u s d o e s not h i m s e l f believe that fire heats byn a t u r e (PH

1.82; see M 9 , 2 4 2 - 4 3 ) , But In t h e c o n t e x t of a r g u i n g

against d o g m a t i c e t h i c a l t h e o r i e s , he finds it u s e f u l to c l a i m that it does; " F i r e , w h i c h heats by nature, a p p e a r s h e a t i n g to e v e r y o n e ; a n d s n o w , w h i c h c h i l l s by nature, a p p e a r s c h i l l i n g to e v e r y o n e " [PH 3.179; see M 8 . 1 8 9 , 1 9 7 - 9 9 ) . T h i s m a k e s it s e e m quite r e a s o n a b l e to expect that the n a t u r a l p r o p e r t y o f g o o d n e s s s h o u l d a l s o affect e v e r y o n e the s a m e w a y . B u t in a n o t h e r passage, S e x t u s otters a n i m p o r t a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n to [ A ] , a p p a r e n t l y i n o r d e r to b l o c k t h e o b j e c t i o n that fire does not w a r m everyone:

115

ANCIENT

[A']

SCEPTICISM

I f x is b y n a t u r e F , t h e n A" affects e v e r y o n e who is in what they cal! a natural

state as F ( P H 3 . 1 7 9 ) .

[ A ' ] m a k e s the n a t u r a l w a r m i n g p o w e r o f fire m o r e plausible. B u t by the s a m e t o k e n it o p e n s the d o o r for the d o g m a t i s t to a r g u e that h i s a c c o u n t o f the g o o d is the r i g h t o n e . T h o s e w h o d i s a g r e e , he m i g h t say, are s i m p l y not i n a n a t u r a l state; so the fact that the g o o d does not s e e m g o o d to t h e m , or affect t h e m beneficially, is e x a c t l y w h a t we s h o u l d expect. A s Sextus c o n c l u d e s the a r g u m e n t h e d r o p s the m o d i f i c a t i o n i n [ A ' ] w i t h o u t c o m m e n t , r e v e r t i n g to [ A ] : "it t h i n g s w h i c h affect u s by n a t u r e affect e v e r y o n e In the s a m e way, w h i l e we are not a l l affected i n the s a m e w a y in the c a s e o f s o - c a l l e d g o o d s , t h e n n o t h i n g is by n a t u r e g o o d " ( P H 3 . 1 8 2 ) . T h e o n l y c o n v i n c i n g e x p l a n a t i o n of h i s flexibility i n this regard is that he uses [ A ] a n d [ A ] d i a l e c t i c a l l y to J

u n d e r m i n e h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s c o n f i d e n c e , a n d not to establish any negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s o f h i s o w n . T h e s a m e is p r o b a b l y true for A e n e s i d e m u s as w e l l . I n d e e d , the dialectical use o f [ C ] is the key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s p u z z l i n g c o n n e c t i o n w i t h H e r a c l i t u s . B e f o r e t u r n i n g to t h i s i s s u e , we s h a l l c o n s i d e r w h y r e l a t i v i s m a n d i n v a r i a b i l i t y c a m e to be s o c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s , a n d h o w they c a n be u n d e r s t o o d to be c o n s i s t ent w i t h s c e p t i c i s m .

I n c o r p o r a t i n g relativity a n d invariability w i t h i n s c e p t i c i s m It is p o s s i b l e that u n d e c i d a b i l i t y is a later strategy i n s p i r e d b y d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the i n v a r i a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n , or w h a t e v e r p r i n c i p l e is r e q u i r e d to d e r i v e negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n s . L a t e r S c e p t i c s m a y have f o u n d A e n e s i d e m u s ' c o l l e c t i o n s of v a r i a b l e a p p e a r a n c e s a u s e f u l r e s o u r c e . B u t rather t h a n a p p e a l to [ C ] or [ A ] , t h e y m a y h a v e a r g u e d that w e are not i n a p o s i t i o n to d e c i d e a m o n g the v a r i able, a n d c r u c i a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e , a p p e a r a n c e s . S u c h a d e v e l o p m e n t is suggested by c o m m e n t s we f i n d i n two o f o u r s o u r c e s for P y r r h o n i s m that predate its s c e p t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n i n Sextus. A c c o r d i n g to the

116

ABNESIDEMU1

a n o n y m o u s c o m m e n t a t o r o n Plato's Theaetetus ( p r o b a b l y f r o m the first c e n t u r y B C E ) :

The

P y r r h o n i s t s say that e v e r y t h i n g is relative, i n a s m u c h

as n o t h i n g exists in its o w n r i g h t but e v e r y t h i n g relative to o t h e r t h i n g s . N e i t h e r s h a p e s n o r s o u n d s n o r o b j e c t s o f taste o r s m e l l or t o u c h n o r a n y other object o f p e r c e p t i o n h a s a c h a r a c t e r o f its o w n . F o r o t h e r w i s e t h i n g s that are the s a m e w o u l d not affect us differently d e p e n d i n g o n t h e i r i n t e r v a l s a n d the t h i n g s o b s e r v e d together w i t h t h e m . . . (in Tht C o l . 63 [ A n n a s & B a r n e s 1985:

97])

S i m i l a r l y , t h e R o m a n a u t h o r A u l u s G e l l i u s r e m a r k s that:

A b s o l u t e l y e v e r y t h i n g that affects the h u m a n s e n s e s is r e l a tive. T h a t m e a n s that there is n o t h i n g at a l l w h i c h exists i n its o w n right or w h i c h h a s its o w n p o w e r a n d n a t u r e : e v e r y t h i n g is r e f e r r e d to s o m e t h i n g else a n d a p p e a r s s u c h as its a p p e a r a n c e is w h i l e it is a p p e a r i n g , i.e. s u c h a s it is m a d e i n o u r s e n s e s to w h i c h it has a r r i v e d a n d not s u c h as it is i n Itself f r o m w h i c h it h a s set out. (iVA 1 1 . 5 . 7 - 8 , p r o b a b l y m i d - s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E [ A n n a s & B a r n e s 1985: 9 6 - 7 ] ) T h e s e r e m a r k s m a y be i n t e r p r e t e d in s u p p o r t of a m e t a p h y s i c a l relat i v i s m . H o w e v e r , w e m a y a l s o r e a s o n a b l y s u p p o s e that their a u t h o r s m i s t a k e n l y attribute s o m e p r i n c i p l e to A e n e s i d e m u s that w a r r a n t s the i n f e r e n c e f r o m the relativity of a p p e a r a n c e s to the relativity of t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s . T h i s w o u l d be a n easy m i s t a k e to m a k e i f A e n e s i d e m u s i n fact a r g u e d d i a l e c t i c a l l y for s u c h negatively d o g m a t i c conclusions. F u r t h e r m o r e , w e c a n a c c o u n t for the p r o m i n e n t role o f relativity b y c o n s i d e r i n g S e x t u s ' d i s c u s s i o n o f the relativity m o d e , w h i c h he takes to be the g e n e r i c f o r m for a l l o f the m o d e s (PH

1.135-40,

1 , 3 9 ) . " S e x t u s a p p a r e n t l y s a w relativity a s the c o m m o n feature b i n d i n g this set o f a r g u m e n t s together. A l l of the m o d e s c a n be s e e n as

117

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r e l y i n g o n t w o t y p e s of relativity - v a r i a b l e a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e appearances ot ,v are p r o d u c e d either relative to the s u b j e c t j u d g i n g (e.g. x a p p e a r s F to h u m a n b e i n g s , n o t - F to d o g s ) or relative to the t h i n g s o b s e r v e d a l o n g w i t h x (e.g. x a p p e a r s F w h e n m i x e d w i t h y, n o t F w h e n m i x e d w i t h z). T h e g e n e r a l , a n d m u n d a n e , o b s e r v a t i o n is that t h i n g s a p p e a r a s t h e y d o o n l y relative to c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A n d the sort o f r e l a t i v i s m at stake is the m o d e s t , s e m a n t i c variety r e f e r r e d to above: w h e n e v e r 1 say A" a p p e a r s F , it m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d that I m e a n x a p p e a r s F in certain

circumstances.

1 cannot meaning-

fully talk about a n a p p e a r a n c e o l x absent a l l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . H a v i n g s y s t e m a t i c a l l y generated a w e a l t h of i n c o m p a t i b l e a p p e a r a n c e s , the s c e p t i c a l w o r k is d o n e b y the a r g u m e n t that w e are u n a b l e to d e c i d e a m o n g t h e m , that is, that w e h a v e n o r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s o n w h i c h to h o l d one set of c i r c u m s t a n c e s as e p i s t e m i c a l l y p r i v i l e g e d . I f this w e r e A e n e s i d e m u s ' v i e w it w o u l d e x p l a i n w h y he is c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h r e l a t i v i s m , a n d w h y it is a m i s t a k e to s e e this a s a m e t a p h y s i c a l position. I f A e n e s i d e m u s p r o m o t e s the s u s p e n s i o n o l j u d g e m e n t i n the b r o a d s e n s e , r e g a r d i n g a n y c l a i m a b o u t the w a y the w o r l d really is, as o p p o s e d to h o w it a p p e a r s , t h e n it is c o n s i s t e n t for h i m to u s e b o t h the u n d e c i d a b i l i t y a n d i n v a r i a b i l i t y strategies, p r o v i d e d he e m p l o y s s u c h p r i n c i p l e s as [ A ] dialectically.

Aenesidemus and Heraclitus O n e o l the v i r t u e s o f this a c c o u n t is that it l e n d s itself to a v e r y p l a u sible e x p l a n a t i o n of A e n e s i d e m u s ' p u z z l i n g relation to H e r a c l i t e a n ism.

1 1

A e n e s i d e m u s took a n active interest i n H e r a c l i t u s , d e v e l o p i n g

his o w n distinctive interpretations o f the n o t o r i o u s l y o b s c u r e sayings of the P r e s o c r a t i c . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of these, for o u r p u r p o s e s , are h i s s t a t e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g H e r a c l i t u s " v i e w o f t r u t h a n d the d o c t r i n e of the u n i t y o f opposites, W e have a l r e a d y e n c o u n t e r e d A e n e s i d e m u s ' statement ( [ C ] ) that a p p e a r a n c e s that a p p e a r i n c o m m o n to e v e r y o n e [invariably]

are

t r u e , w h i l e t h o s e not like t h i s are false ( A i 8.8; cf. A f 7 . 1 2 6 - 3 4 ) . J u d g -

118

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i n g f r o m the context a n d o t h e r related passages, [ C ] appears to be one of A e n e s i d e m u s ' interpretations of Heraclitus. - In another pas1

1

sage, we f i n d a n i m p o r t a n t a p p l i c a t i o n o l [ C ] : A e n e s i d e m u s a n d h i s followers u s e d to say that the Sceptical p e r s u a s i o n is a p a t h to the p h i l o s o p h y of H e r a c l i t u s , because the idea that c o n t r a r i e s a p p e a r to h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g leads to the i d e a that c o n t r a r i e s a c t u a l l y d o h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g ; a n d w h i l e the S c e p t i c s say that c o n t r a r i e s appear to h o l d o f the s a m e t h i n g , the H e r a c l i t e a n s go o n f r o m there to the idea that they a c t u a l l y do h o l d .

(PH

1.210)

T h i s is a reference to H e r a c l i t u s ' f a m o u s , a n d c o n t r o v e r s i a l , u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s d o c t r i n e , illustrated by s u c h c l a i m s a s "sea water is b o t h p u r e a n d p o l l u t e d , b r i n g i n g life to fish a n d death to h u m a n b e i n g s " A n d it is easy to see how, g i v e n [ C ) , o n e c a n r e a s o n f r o m the c o m m o n a p p e a r a n c e that c o n t r a r i e s h o l d o f the s a m e t h i n g to the c l a i m that they a c t u a l l y d o . H o w e v e r , Sextus d o e s not attribute t h i s i n f e r e n c e to A e n e s i d e m u s . It w o u l d be unacceptable

1

d o g m a t i c for a s c e p t i c to e n d o r s e

the u n i t y of o p p o s i t e s d o c t r i n e a s l o n g as w e u n d e r s t a n d it to be a n a s s e r t i o n about the w a y t h i n g s really are. F o r the sceptic, e v e n if it is a c o m m o n a p p e a r a n c e that c o n t r a r i e s h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g , this r e m a i n s a n a p p e a r a n c e . H e is not w i l l i n g to a p p l y [ C ] i n o r d e r to a r r i v e at the b o l d m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c l u s i o n that c o n t r a r i e s

actually

d o h o l d o l the s a m e t h i n g b e c a u s e he d o e s not s u b s c r i b e to [ C ] i n the first place. T h i s m u c h Sextus a n d A e n e s i d e m u s agree o n . But Sextus disagrees w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s ' c l a i m that P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is a p a t h to the p h i l o s o p h y of H e r a c l i t u s . First, Sextus p o i n t s out that the a p p e a r a n c e that c o n t r a r i e s h o l d of the s a m e t h i n g (e.g. h o n e y tastes sweet to h e a l t h y people, bitter to s i c k o n e s ) is n o t i n the least p e c u l i a r to S c e p t i c s or d i s t i n c t i v e o f S c e p t i c i s m . G i v e n the t r u l y

common

nature of this a p p e a r a n c e , it m a k e s n o s e n s e to single P y r r h o n i s m out, r a t h e r t h a n s o m e o t h e r p h i l o s o p h y o r e v e n o r d i n a r y lite, as a path to H e r a c l i t e a n i s m .

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

F u r t h e r m o r e , the t w o v i e w s c o n f l i c t . C l e a r l y o n e c a n n o t b e l o n g to b o t h c a m p s s i n c e that w o u l d r e q u i r e b e l i e v i n g i n the u n i t y o f o p p o sites as well as s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t about it. S e x t u s t h e n c l a i m s "it is a b s u r d to c a l l a c o n i l i c t i n g p e r s u a s i o n a p a t h to the s c h o o l it c o n f l i c t s w i t h " (Phi 1.212). A n d this is the case i l w e take t h e p a t h m e t a p h o r i n either o f the f o l l o w i n g w a y s . I n l o g i c a l t e r m s ; I f A is a path to B, t h e n A entails B. O r m o r e broadly, in r h e t o r i c a l t e r m s : I f A is a p at h to B , t h e n o n e w h o f i n d s A c o n v i n c i n g w i l l f i n d B c o n v i n c i n g also, I n n e i t h e r o f t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the m e t a p h o r is it reasonable to say that P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is a path to H e r a c l i t e a n i s m , S c e p t i c i s m c e r t a i n l y d o e s not e n t a i l H e r a c l i t e a n i s m . A n d if a S c e p t i c w e r e to f i n d Heraclitus" v i e w c o n v i n c i n g , it w o u l d not be b e c a u s e ot h i s s c e p t i c a l p e r s u a s i o n ; just as i f a n a g n o s t i c b e c a m e a theist it w o u l d not b e because of his agnosticism. A m o r e p l a u s i b l e l e a d i n g o f A e n e s i d e m u s " m e t a p h o r is e v i d e n t f r o m PH 1.210, even it Sextus d i d not see it, O n e c a n a r r i v e at a p o s i t i v e v i e w o f the nature o l t h i n g s , the H e r a c l i t e a n u n i t y o f o p p o sites, by a p p l y i n g the p r i n c i p l e [ C ] , w h i c h P y r r h o n i s t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i cally u s e o n l y for the s a k e of u n d e r m i n i n g c l a i m s about the nature of t h i n g s . Sextus m i s t a k e n l y takes A e n e s i d e m u s " m e t a p h o r

i n an

a p p r o v i n g sense, a s it to s a y o n e w o u l d d o w e l l to travel t h i s s c e p t i c a l r o a d to H e r a c l i t e a n i s m , w h e r e a s A e n e s i d e m u s m e a n t it w i t h o u t any s u c h a p p r o v a l ; o n e can get to H e r a c l i t u s ' v i e w by w a y ot a p r i n c i p l e the S c e p t i c s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y u s e .

Conclusion I n c o n c l u s i o n w e s h a l l briefly c o n s i d e r A e n e s i d e m u s " p o s i t i o n i n the h i s t o r y o f S c e p t i c i s m . P y r r h o n i s m , i n w h a t e v e r l o r m it m i g h t

AENESIDEMUS

have t a k e n after T i m o n ' s death i n 2 3 0 B C E , w a s utterly neglected u n t i l A e n e s i d e m u s b r o u g h t it b a c k to p u b l i c a t t e n t i o n (Ptaep.

Ev.

14.18.29). W h a t h e b r o u g h t b a c k w a s not p r e c i s e l y P y r r h o ' s v i e w , but a S c e p t i c i s m c l e a r l y i n s p i r e d b y it. T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f i n s p i r a t i o n s e e m s to h a v e b e e n P y r r h o s n o v e l a s s o c i a t i o n o i epoche w i t h tranquillity. A e n e s i d e m u s also a p p r o p r i a t e s T i n i o n s v i e w ( e c h o e d in the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y ) that a p p e a r a n c e s are a d e q u a t e guides t o life. W e [ P y r r h o n i s t s ] a f f i r m the a p p e a r a n c e , w i t h o u t also a f f i r m i n g that it is of s u c h a k i n d . W e too [i.e. like d o g m a t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s ] perceive that fire b u r n s ; b u t w e s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t a b o u t w h e t h e r it is its nature to b u r n . W e see that a m a n m o v e s a n d that h e d i e s ; h o w it h a p p e n s w e d o n t k n o w . W e o n l y object to the n o n - e v i d e n t s u b s t a n c e u n d e r l y i n g appearances.

( D L 9 . 1 0 4 - 5 [ L S 1 H ] ; see 9.106)

W e d o not n e e d a n y s p e c i a l insight into t h e nature of t h i n g s i n o r d e r to live, a n d e v e n to live w e l l . H o w e v e r , d r a w i n g o n the d i a l e c t i c a l t r a d i t i o n o f the early s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y , " A e n e s i d e m u s develops a n o p p o s i t i o n a l m e t h o d d e s i g n e d 4

to u n d e r m i n e anyone's c o n f i d e n c e that h e has r a t i o n a l l y d e t e r m i n e d h o w t h i n g s a r e . S o h i s P y r r h o n i s t r e v i v a l is a c t u a l l y a s y n t h e s i s o f two earlier t r a d i t i o n s , c o m b i n i n g t h e a r g u m e n t s a n d m e t h o d s o f the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y i n the s e r v i c e o f a t t a i n i n g the k i n d o l lite exemplified by Pyrrho. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n also a l l o w s u s t o see t h e later P y r r h o n i s m , as o u t l i n e d b y S e x t u s , a s a m o r e potent v e r s i o n of A e n e s i d e m u s ' v e r s i o n . B y c o n t r a s t , it w e read A e n e s i d e m u s as a relativist, w e are forced to c o n c l u d e that S e x t u s either w i l f u l l y m i s r e p r e s e n t s o r b a d l y misunderstands h i m . B u t , a s w e shall see, S e x t u s ' v e r s i o n o f S c e p t i c i s m h a s m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h A e n e s i d e m u s ' T h i s is especially i m p o r t a n t w i t h regard to the issue o l the c o n s i s t e n c y o f S c e p t i c i s m . S i n c e A e n e s i d e m u s a c c u s e s h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y A c a d e m i c s of r a s h l y c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e m selves, it is n o s u r p r i s e that h e is c o n c e r n e d t o p r e s e r v e h i s o w n

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c o n s i s t e n c y : " T h e P y r r h o n i s t d e t e r m i n e s a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g , not even t h i s v e r y c l a i m that n o t h i n g is d e t e r m i n e d . . . by e n t e r t a i n i n g d o u b t s a b o u t e v e r y t h e s i s , they m a i n t a i n c o n s i s t e n c y "

(Bib.

I 6 9 b 2 7 - 2 S , 3 9 - 4 0 ) . I n o t h e r w o r d s , A e n e s i d e m u s ' r e f u s a l to believe a n y p r o p o s i t i o n of the f o r m "JC is b y n a t u r e F" s h o u l d not itself be c o n g e a l e d into a d o c t r i n e . H e b e l i e v e s that it is n e i t h e r possible n o r i m p o s s i b l e to d e t e r m i n e that x is b y n a t u r e F. D e t e r m i n i n g n o t h i n g is n o t therefore a statement o f a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n that o n e m i g h t d e f e n d or attack, but r a t h e r a report of the S c e p t i c s g e n e r a l attitude t o w a r d s i n v e s t i g a t i o n . T h e n a t u r e o f t h i s attitude is c a p t u r e d i n a m e t a p h o r : s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s are like purgatives that e l i m i n a t e t h e m s e l v e s a l o n g w i t h the o f f e n d i n g s u b s t a n c e ( D L 9.76). T h e self-defeating, o r purgative, nature of s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t s , a s w e l l as the nature o l "the o f f e n d i n g s u b s t a n c e " are topics to be e x p l o r e d in C h a p t e r 7 as w e e x a m i n e the later d e v e l o p m e n t o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m ,

122

SEVEN

Sextus Empiricus: the consistency of Pyrrhonian Scepticism

W h a t e v e r b e c a m e ot P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m i n the w a k e of A e n e s i d e m u s , it d i d not m a k e m u c h of an i m p r e s s i o n o n S e n e c a , w h o r e m a r k s in the e a r l y 6 0 s C E that there is n o o n e to h a n d o n the teachings o f P y r r h o (Natural

Questions

732).

O n the o t h e r h a n d ,

l o o k i n g b a c k f r o m the t h i r d c e n t u r y C E , D i o g e n e s d r a w s a lineage of P y r r h o n i a n teachers a n d s t u d e n t s f r o m P y r r h o all the w a y u p to Sextus E m p i r i c u s a n d h i s s t u d e n t S a t u r n i n u s ( D L 9 . 1 1 5 - 1 6 ) . T h e list p r o b a b l y exhibits D i o g e n e s ' p a s s i o n for genealogy m o r e t h a n h i s t o r i cal t r u t h . B u t it is likely that there w a s s o m e c o n t i n u i t y o f s c e p t i c a l practice f r o m the t i m e of A e n e s i d e m u s s i n c e , m o r e t h a n 200 years later, Sextus d r a w s o n a r i c h t r a d i t i o n of s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t that c l e a r l y w a s not the w o r k o f just o n e S c e p t i c .

1

I n d e e d , Sextus h i m s e l t s o m e t i m e s s e e m s not to be j u s t o n e S c e p t i c either. T h e r e are a n u m b e r of s t r a n d s i n h i s w o r k s , not all o f w h i c h fit c o m f o r t a b l y together. T h e m o s t l i k e l y e x p l a n a t i o n is that there were earlier, i n c o m p a t i b l e v e r s i o n s of P y r r h o n i s m r e c o r d e d i n h i s s o u r c e s , a n d that Sextus d r e w f r o m t h e m w i t h little c o n c e r n for c o n s i s t e n c y . W h e t h e r he s h o u l d h a v e b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h c o n s i s t e n c y is a topic to be e x p l o r e d later. D e s p i t e these a p p a r e n t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t s c e p t i c a l s t r a n d s in S e x t u s ' texts, we c a n d i s c e r n a d i s t i n c t i v e v o i c e at w o r k , a n d w e c a n extract a c o h e r e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n , or rather p r a c tice. T h i s w i l l be o u r task i n t h i s a n d the l o l l o w i n g two chapters.

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The works of Sextus E m p i r i c u s Sextus w a s a p r a c t i s i n g p h y s i c i a n , p r o b a b l y at w o r k i n the late s e c o n d c e n t u r y C E , p o s s i b l y in A l e x a n d r i a o r R o m e , or b o t h .

2

H i s books

reveal m u c h p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d p s y c h o l o g i c a l detail about the p r a c tice of S c e p t i c i s m , but they tell u s v i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g about its h i s t o r i cal d e v e l o p m e n t , the i n f l u e n c e a n d s i z e o f the S c e p t i c a l m o v e m e n t or the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n S c e p t i c a l teachers a n d s t u d e n t s . A l s o , s i n c e h i s s o u r c e s are n o w lost w e c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e the extent to w h i c h Sextus is a n o r i g i n a l t h i n k e r a n d the extent to w h i c h he m e r e l y c o m p i l e s a n d a r r a n g e s the a r g u m e n t s o f h i s p r e d e c e s s o r s . W h a t e v e r the case m a y be, h i s b o o k s represent the c u l m i n a t i o n o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m a n d , a l o n g w i t h C i c e r o ' s w o r k , are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s o f t r a n s m i s s i o n for the entire t r a d i t i o n o f a n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m . A n d g i v e n h i s interest i n setting out the a r g u m e n t s o f past p h i l o s o p h e r s o n v a r i o u s topics, h e is o n e of o u r m o s t i m p o r t a n t s o u r c e s for G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y in g e n e r a l . S e x t u s ' s u r v i v i n g w o r k s c o n s i s t of the Outlines

of Pyrrhonism,

a n d Against

Commentaries

I n the Outlines

the Professors

of Pyrrhonism

w i t h its G r e e k title, Pyrrhoneioi

five b o o k s ot the

Sceptical

(see F i g u r e 3 ) .

( a b b r e v i a t e d as PH in a c c o r d a n c e Hypotyposeis),

S e x t u s sets o u t a

g e n e r a l a c c o u n t a n d a specific a c c o u n t of h i s s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e . T h e g e n e r a l a c c o u n t e x p l a i n s the d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r of S c e p t i c i s m , its p r i n c i p l e s , m e t h o d s a n d a i m s , a n d h o w it differs f r o m o t h e r p h i l o s o p h i e s w i t h s c e p t i c a l e l e m e n t s . T h e s p e c i f i c a c c o u n t , by contrast, sets out a n a r r a y o f a r g u m e n t s targeting c l a i m s m a d e w i t h i n e a c h of the three t r a d i t i o n a l s u b d i v i s i o n s o f H e l l e n i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y : logic, p h y s ics a n d e t h i c s . H e r e the focus is o n specific a p p l i c a t i o n s ot the g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t f o r m s a n d s c e p t i c a l strategies o u t l i n e d in the g e n e r a l part. Outlines

of Pyrrhonism

is d i v i d e d i n t o t h r e e b o o k s . T h e first c o n -

tains the g e n e r a l a c c o u n t , a n d the s e c o n d a n d t h i r d c o n t a i n the s p e cific a c c o u n t . Sextus c o v e r s the s a m e g r o u n d , w i t h the s a m e p l a n , i n h i s Sceptical

Commentaries.

The general account w a s probably

p r e s e n t e d i n m u c h greater d e t a i l i n the first five b o o k s , w h i c h have not s u r v i v e d . H e then f o l l o w e d t h r o u g h w i t h the specific a r g u m e n t s against logic, p h y s i c s a n d e t h i c s i n the r e m a i n i n g b o o k s , w h i c h have

124

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125

ANCIENT

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s u r v i v e d . T h e s e w e r e m i s t a k e n l y thought to c o n t i n u e the six b o o k s titled Against

the Professors

(Pros Mathematikons',

M 1 - 6 ) , in w h i c h

he r e c o r d s S c e p t i c a l a n d E p i c u r e a n a r g u m e n t s a i m e d at s h o w i n g c e r t a i n k i n d s o f t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t i s e to be a s h a m . S o the s u r v i v i n g b o o k s of the Sceptical

Commentaries

are m i s l e a d i n g ] } n a m e d M

7 - 1 1 . M 7 a n d 8 are a l s o k n o w n as Against 10 Against

the Physicists a n d M 11 Against

-

the Logicians,

M 9 and

M a n y of the

the Ethicists.

s a m e t o p i c s a n d a r g u m e n t s t r o m PH 2 - 3 appear, often in greater length a n d d e t a i l , i n the s u r v i v i n g b o o k s o l the Sceptical taries, M

7-ll.

Commen-

3

The means a n d ends of Scepticism: normative versus causal accounts Sextus c h a r a c t e r i z e s S c e p t i c i s m a s a w a y of life (agoge), a n d defines it as a n ability (dynamis)

to b a l a n c e the p e r s u a s i v e force o f a r g u m e n t s

as w e l l as a p p e a r a n c e s for a n d against any d i s p u t e d c l a i m . T h i s b a l ance, or e q u i p o l l e n c e , leads to s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t w h i c h i n t u r n leads to t r a n q u i l l i t y (ataraxia;

(epochs),

PH 1.8). W e shall start

by c o n s i d e r i n g the relation b e t w e e n these three elements in the S c e p tic's p r a c t i c e : e q u i p o l l e n c e , s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t a n d tranquillity. W h a t d o e s it m e a n to say that the first leads to the s e c o n d , a n d the s e c o n d to the third'? I n o r d i n a r y c i r c u m s t a n c e s , o n e d o e s not start out as a s c e p t i c in a state of epochs

but rather e n d s u p there. Sextus s a y s the c a u s a l p r i n -

ciple, or o r i g i n , o f s c e p t i c i s m is the h o p e of b e c o m i n g t r a n q u i l : M e n o f talent, t r o u b l e d by the a n o m a l y i n t h i n g s a n d p u z z l e d as to w h i c h o f t h e m they s h o u l d r a t h e r assent to, c a m e to investigate w h a t in t h i n g s is t r u e a n d w h a t false, t h i n k i n g that b y d e c i d i n g these i s s u e s they w o u l d b e c o m e t r a n q u i l . (PH

1.12}

O n e m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , w o r r y a b o u t w h e t h e r or not a b e n e v o l e n t G o d exists. It is e a s y to i m a g i n e h o w c o n f l i c t i n g a c c o u n t s o n this

126

S E X T U S £ hi PI h EC US

m a t t e r m i g h t be d i s t u r b i n g ( a l t h o u g h we shall l o o k m o r e closely at the nature of the p r o t o - s c e p t i c s d i s t u r b a n c e later i n this c h a p t e r ) . It is also easy to s u p p o s e that the w a y to relieve s u c h a d i s t u r b a n c e is by d e t e r m i n i n g the t r u t h . O n c e I c o m e to k n o w that G o d exists ( o r does n o t exist ) I c a n stop w o r r y i n g about it. So the p r o t o - s c e p t i c sets a b o u t e x a m i n i n g all the relevant a r g u m e n t s a n d e v i d e n c e they c a n f i n d . I n s t e a d o f d i s c o v e r i n g the t r u t h , however, "they c a m e u p o n e q u i p o l l e n t dispute, a n d b e i n g u n a b l e to decide this t h e y s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t . A n d w h e n they s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t , t r a n q u i l i t y i n matters o l o p i n i o n f o l l o w e d f o r t u i t o u s l y " {PH

1.26). T h e fortuitous a p p e a r a n c e of t r a n q u i l l i t y is a l s o related

i n the f o l l o w i n g story;

T h e y say that [ A p e l l e s ] w a s p a i n t i n g a h o r s e a n d w a n t e d to represent in h i s p i c t u r e the lather o n the h o r s e s m o u t h ; but h e w a s s o u n s u c c e s s f u l that he gave up, t o o k the s p o n g e o n w h i c h he h a d b e e n w i p i n g off the c o l o r s f r o m h i s b r u s h , a n d flung it at the picture. A n d w h e n it hit the picture, it p r o d u c e d a representation of the h o r s e s lather. N o w the Sceptics w e r e h o p i n g to a c q u i r e t r a n q u i l i t y by d e c i d i n g the a n o m a lies i n w h a t a p p e a r s a n d is t h o u g h t of, a n d b e i n g u n a b l e to d o this t h e y s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t . B u t w h e n they s u s p e n d e d j u d g m e n t , t r a n q u i l i t y f o l l o w e d a s it w e r e fortuitously, as a s h a d o w f o l l o w s a body.

(PH

1.28-29)

Sextus is c l e a r l y not a d v o c a t i n g s p o n g e - t h r o w i n g as a p a i n t i n g t e c h nique, I m a g i n e h o w f r u s t r a t i n g that w o u l d be. T h e c h a n c e s ot hitting the c a n v a s at p r e c i s e l y the right spot w i t h a p r o p e r l y saturated s p o n g e t r a v e l l i n g at j u s t the right s p e e d are v e r y s l i m . It j u s t is not a reliable way ot getting the d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . B y analogy, Sextus is not s u g g e s t i n g that w e j u m p straight epochs

to

a n d give u p o n the e n q u i r y b e l o r e e v e n s t a r t i n g . A p e l l e s '

trustration, just like the proto-sceptic's d i s a p p o i n t m e n t at not f i n d i n g the t r u t h , is a n e c e s s a r y prelude to their u n f o r e s e e n s u c c e s s e s . T h e p o i n t o f the s t o r y is to illustrate the s u r p r i s i n g nature o f the sceptic s i n i t i a l d i s c o v e r y : t r a n q u i l l i t y a r i s e s not i n the w a y she o r i g i n a l l y

127

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

s u p p o s e d it w o u l d , but rather as the u n f o r e s e e n o u t c o m e of b r i n g i n g her intellect to a standstill, H o w then does the s c e p t i c b r i n g h e r intellect to a standstill? W e c a n n o t force the s c a l e s o f j u d g e m e n t to b a l a n c e , i n so tar as we c a n not m a k e o u r s e l v e s feel that b o t h sides have e q u a l r a t i o n a l force i f they d o n o t s e e m to. O f c o u r s e o n e c a n p r e t e n d to f i n d s o m e t h i n g c o n v i n c i n g j u s t as o n e c a n force the scales to b a l a n c e b y p u s h i n g d o w n o n one side; but this d o e s not m e a n the objects w e i g h the s a m e , a n d the p e r s o n w i t h h e r finger o n the s c a l e m u s t k n o w this. S o epochs is b r o u g h t a b o u t in the s c e p t i c a s the effect ot her a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a c t i c e . Sextus indicates this c a u s a l relation b y m e a n s of a v a r i e t y of p a s s i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n s : b e c a u s e o f e q u i p o l l e n c e , the sceptic is brought to, e n d s u p i n , or is f o r c e d to a r r i v e at epochs. b e c a u s e o f e q u i p o l l e n c e , epochs

4

Similarly:

is brought about, is i n t r o d u c e d , or

follows l o r the s c e p t i c / O n the o t h e r h a n d , Sextus s o m e t i m e s indicates the necessity o i s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t w i t h a n active c o n s t r u c t i o n : b e c a u s e ot the s c e p t i c s i n a b i l i t y to d e c i d e a m o n g c o m p e t i n g a p p e a r a n c e s , o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c c o u n t s , it is n e c e s s a r y to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . * S o m e o f these a s s e r t i o n s are clearly n o r m a t i v e : o n e m u s t , or s h o u l d s u s p e n d judgement. S o w h i c h is it? A f t e r b e c o m i n g a w a r e of the e q u i p o l l e n c e o l o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s , does the s c e p t i c t h e n d e c i d e that the r e a s o n able t h i n g to d o is s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ? O r does b e c o m i n g a w a r e o f e q u i p o l l e n c e s i m p l y e l i m i n a t e all i n c l i n a t i o n to believe o n e w a y or the other, a n d h e n c e b r i n g about epochs w i t h o u t the s c e p t i c d o i n g a n y t h i n g (else) to h e l p it a l o n g ? W e c a n n o t opt for b o t h s i n c e they are i n c o m p a t i b l e , at least in the f o l l o w i n g s e n s e . E i t h e r the s c e p t i c first m a k e s the n o r m a t i v e j u d g e m e n t that s h e s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t before a r r i v i n g at

epochs,

or not. S i m i l a r l y , either s u s p e n s i o n o f j u d g e m e n t a r i s e s i m m e d i a t e l y t r o m h e r p r o d u c t i o n ot e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g , o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s or it r e q u i r e s a l s o a n o r m a t i v e j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h a t o n e s h o u l d d o i n s u c h a case. I f the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t is c o r r e c t , the sceptic s u s p e n d s j u d g e ment i n accordance with a general principle:

128

5 E X T U S £ hi PI h EC US

[I]

It is irrational

or i r r e s p o n s i b l e to believe e i t h e r of t w o

contradictory

p r o p o s i t i o n s that o n e f i n d s e q u a l l y c o n -

vincing.

W h e n c o n f r o n t i n g e q u i p o l l e n c e , it is still p o s s i b l e to opt l o r o n e or the o t h e r s i d e . P e r h a p s a s W i l l i a m James ( [ 1 8 9 7 ] 1979)

suggests

i n " T h e W i l l to Believe", w e m a y assent i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s o m e n o n - r a t i o n a l i n c l i n a t i o n w h e n r e a s o n c a n n o t settle the matter. A n d m o r e p r o s a i c a l l y , m a n y p e o p l e believe in t h i n g s s u c h as a n after!ile o w i n g to n o n - r a t i o n a l factors s u c h a s w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g , e v e n w h e n the a r g u m e n t s o n e i t h e r s i d e o i the m a t t e r are i n c o n c l u s i v e . B u t b e c a u s e she e n d o r s e s [ I ] , a n d b e c a u s e s h e t h i n k s o n e s h o u l d not d o w h a t is i r r a t i o n a l o r i r r e s p o n s i b l e , the s c e p t i c w i l l t h i n k that she s h o u l d not opt for e i t h e r s i d e . W h e t h e r or not she c o n s c i o u s l y s

decides to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h [I], e a c h t i m e she does so is g o v e r n e d by h e r a c c e p t a nee o f this g e n e r a l policy. She m a y still, o n o c c a s i o n , violate the p o l i c y , j u s t as w e a l l s e e m able to act c o n t r a r y to o u r c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n s . B u t o n r e f l e c t i o n she w i l l t h i n k that s h e s h o u l d not believe either o f two c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n s that she finds e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g . O n the other h a n d , it the c a s u a l a c c o u n t is correct, epochs is s i m p l y w h a t h a p p e n s to the s c e p t i c w h e n she e n c o u n t e r s e q u i p o l l e n t a r g u ments. I n that case, the sceptic has n o n e e d o f [ I ] , just as I have n o n e e d of n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s to digest m y l u n c h ; getting f o o d into m y s t o m ach is sufficient ( a s s u m i n g e v e r y t h i n g is w o r k i n g p r o p e r l y ) . I n place of [I] the causa] a c c o u n t offers a d e s c r i p t i o n of the sceptical d i s p o s i t i o n :

[D]

T h e sceptic s disposition

inclines her away from believing

e i t h e r of t w o c o n t r a d i c t o r y

p r o p o s i t i o n s that she finds

equally c o n v i n c i n g .

W h e r e [1] c o n t a i n s a g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e , [ D ] is a n o n - n o r m a t i v e d e s c r i p t i o n of a v e r y s p e c i f i c sort of p e r s o n ; [ D ] says n o t h i n g about w h a t y o u or I s h o u l d d o , o r e v e n about w h a t the sceptic s h o u l d d o . L a c k i n g a n y i n c l i n a t i o n to b e l i e v e , she s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t ; there is n o t h i n g to tip the s c a l e s o n e w a y o r the other.

129

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

C h o o s i n g b e t w e e n these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s is c r u c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t tor t h e o v e r a l l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of S e x t u s P y r r h o n i s m , for they i n v o l v e 1

d r a m a t i c a l l y different attitudes t o w a r d s r e a s o n . O n the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t , the s c e p t i c s h a r e s w i t h the d o g m a t i s t a c o m m i t m e n t to [ I ] . T h e y are i n v o l v e d i n the s a m e project of s e e k i n g the truth by e x a m i n ing a n d assessing arguments a n d evidence. T h e y will also agree on the c l o s e l y related p r i n c i p l e : [R]

It is rational

a n d r e s p o n s i b l e to believe a p r o p o s i t i o n that

o n e f i n d s c o n v i n c i n g ( i f it is s u f f i c i e n t l y s u p p o r t e d by reason a n d evidence). T h e y o n l y d i s a g r e e a b o u t w h e t h e r a n y c a n d i d a t e s are sufficiently s u p p o r t e d by r e a s o n a n d e v i d e n c e . O n t h e c a u s a l a c c o u n t , t h e s c e p t i c starts o u t c o m m i t t e d to b o t h [I] a n d [ R ] , b u t i n h e r c o n v e r s i o n to s c e p t i c i s m s h e leaves these b e h i n d a l o n g w i t h all the o t h e r d o g m a t i c beliets she m a y h a v e h e l d . After d e v e l o p i n g the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n , she n o longer has any belief a b o u t w h a t r e a s o n d e m a n d s , o r w h a t she s h o u l d d o i n v i r tue ot b e i n g a r a t i o n a l agent. T h i s s c e p t i c is n o l o n g e r e n g a g e d i n the s a m e project that s h e s t a r t e d out w i t h ; s h e is agnostic not o n l y w i t h respect to t h e positive c l a i m s m a d e by d o g m a t i s t s but also w i t h respect to w h e t h e r there are a n y n o r m a t i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s i m p l i c i t i n the use of r e a s o n .

Sceptical e n q u i r y T h e m a i n p o i n t i n f a v o u r o f the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t is that it s u p p o r t s t h e v i e w o f t h e s c e p t i c as a n o p e n - m i n d e d e n q u i r e r . I n o r d e r tor a n y o n e to s i n c e r e l y h o p e to find the t r u t h , s h e m u s t be w i l l i n g , at least i n p r i n c i p l e , to b e l i e v e w h a t r e a s o n establishes. I f s h e is not w i l l i n g to act in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h [ R ] , t h e n it s e e m s s h e is not w i l l i n g to follow w h e r e r e a s o n l e a d s , a n d h a s f o r e c l o s e d o n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s u c c e s s f u l e n d to t h e p u r s u i t o f t r u t h . I n that case, h e r s c e p t i c i s m a p p e a r s to c o l l a p s e i n t o negative d o g m a t i s m .

130

S E X T U S £ hi P l h t e n s

I i so, the c a u s a l a c c o u n t is m i s t a k e n , s i n c e S e x t u s i n s i s t s o n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s c e p t i c i s m a n d d o g m a t i s m , w h e t h e r p o s i t i v e or negative. H e o p e n s the Outlines

of Pyrrhonism

b y r e m a r k i n g that an

i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l e n d in o n e o f t w o w a y s : a d i s c o v e r y o f the t r u t h or a d e n i a l that t h e t r u t h c a n be f o u n d . O t h e r w i s e , the i n v e s t i g a t i o n w i l l c o n t i n u e (PH

1 . 1 - 4 ) , A r i s t o t l e , E p i c u r u s a n d the Stoics

are d o g m a t i s t s s i n c e they t h i n k they have d i s c o v e r e d the t r u t h . F o r e x a m p l e , h a v i n g d e t e r m i n e d that t h e r e is n o t h i n g but a t o m s a n d the v o i d , E p i c u r u s n o l o n g e r n e e d s to investigate that p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t : he w o u l d not go l o o k i n g for w h a t he h a s a l r e a d y f o u n d . H e m a y go o n to investigate o t h e r matters, but this w i l l not m a k e h i m partsceptic s i n c e he w i l l rely o n the t r u t h s a l r e a d y d i s c o v e r e d i n s e e k i n g to e x p a n d h i s k n o w l e d g e . O n the o t h e r h a n d , all e n q u i r y m u s t a p p e a r futile to t h o s e w h o have d e t e r m i n e d that the t r u t h c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d ; y o u w o u l d not go l o o k i n g tor w h a t y o u have d e c i d e d c a n n o t be l o u n d . T h e negatively d o g m a t i c A c a d e m i c s , for e x a m p l e , have d e t e r m i n e d that k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e . A l t h o u g h this is not a fair d e s c r i p t i o n o l C a r n e a d e s (as we h a v e s e e n in C h a p t e r 4 ), it does c l a r i f y Sextus* view. I n c o n t r a s t to b o t h t y p e s of d o g m a t i s m , t h e s c e p t i c has n e i t h e r d i s c o v e r e d the t r u t h n o r f o u n d that it c a n n o t be d i s c o v e r e d , so she c o n t i n u e s to investigate (PH

1.2). A n d i n fact, Sextus leans o n the e t y m o l o g y of the G r e e k

t e r m skeptike,

p o i n t i n g out that s c e p t i c i s m is so n a m e d f r o m its a c t i v -

ity i n i n v e s t i g a t i n g a n d e n q u i r i n g (skeptesthai;

PH

1.7).

It we u n d e r s t a n d this i n v e s t i g a t i o n as a c o n t i n u a t i o n of h e r o r i g i n a l , p r e - s c e p t i c a l project o f t r y i n g to b e c o m e t r a n q u i l b y m e a n s of d i s c o v e r i n g the t r u t h , t h e n she w i l l c o n t i n u e to a c c e p t [I] a n d [ R ] . But there is n o c o m p e l l i n g reason to s u p p o s e that h e r project r e m a i n s the s a m e after h e r s c e p t i c a l c o n v e r s i o n . O n the c o n t r a r y , there are b o t h p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n d textual r e a s o n s to s u p p o s e that it u n d e r g o e s a r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , like the s c e p t i c h e r s e l i . I n that case, we w i l l n e e d to see h o w S e x t u s c a n p r e s e r v e the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s c e p t i c i s m a n d negative d o g m a t i s m , a n d we w i l l n e e d to c l a r i f y the k i n d of i n v e s t i g a t i o n the m a t u r e s c e p t i c is e n g a g e d i n . H i e first t i m e she s t u m b l e s o n t r a n q u i l l i t y b y b r i n g i n g h e r intellect to a s t a n d s t i l l m u s t be quite a s u r p r i s e . B u t as she repeats the

1.11

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

e x p e r i e n c e it w i l l c o m e to s e e m quite o r d i n a r y . She w i l l c o m e to expect that t r a n q u i l l i t y f o l l o w s epocfie,

a n d to e x p e c t that

epocfie

follows e q u i p o l l e n c e . E a c h r e p e t i t i o n of the cycle o f e q u i p o l l e n c e epoc/ie-tranquillity will reinforce her sceptical disposition [ D ] , At s o m e p o i n t i n this p r o c e s s she w i l l realize that she has n o g o o d r e a s o n to m a i n t a i n h e r o r i g i n a l e x p e c t a t i o n that t r a n q u i l l i t y a r i s e s f r o m rationally r e s o l v i n g the d i s p u t e d issue, s o she w i l l n o longer have the s a m e m o t i v a t i o n to accept ( I ] o r [ R ] , F o r all she k n o w s , d i s c o v e r i n g the truth m i g h t p r o d u c e tranquillity, or it m i g h t p r o d u c e greater d i s t u r b a n c e . N e v e r h a v i n g d i s c o v e r e d the t r u t h , she is u n a b l e to predict or e x p e c t a n y p a r t i c u l a r o u t c o m e , T h e m o r e expert s h e b e c o m e s at b a l a n c i n g c o m p e t i n g a c c o u n t s the m o r e u n l i k e l y it is that she w i l l e v e r d i s c o v e r t h e t r u t h . I n fact, Sextus e v e n envisages t h e possibility' ot a d o g m a t i s t p r e s e n t i n g a n a r g u m e n t that the s c e p t i c c a n n o t refute. H i s a d v i c e is to r e s p o n d i n the f o l l o w i n g w a y : B e f o r e t h e f o u n d e r of t h e s c h o o l to w h i c h y o u a d h e r e w a s b o r n , the a r g u m e n t o f the s c h o o l , w h i c h is n o d o u b t s o u n d , was n o t yet apparent, a l t h o u g h it w a s really there i n nature. I n the s a m e way, it is p o s s i b l e that the a r g u m e n t o p p o s i n g the one y o u have j u s t p r o p o u n d e d is really there i n nature but is n o t yet a p p a r e n t to u s ; so w e s h o u l d not yet assent to w h a t is n o w t h o u g h t to be a p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t .

[PH

1.34J

S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , s o m e o n e presents y o u w i t h a c o m p e l l i n g v e r s i o n of the p r o b l e m o f e v i l . A s a result, y o u are s t r o n g l y i n c l i n e d to 5

t h i n k that a G o d m e e t i n g the J u d e o - C h r i s t i a n d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s not, and i n fact c a n n o t , exist, A fallible A c a d e m i c w h o is c o m m i t t e d to f o l l o w i n g the n o r m a t i v e r u l e s [I] a n d [R] w i l l tentatively e n d o r s e a t h e i s m w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g that s o m e t h e i s t i c a r g u m e n t s m a y e v e n tually p r e v a i l . E v e n if it is d i s t u r b i n g to t h i n k that he could b e w r o n g , there is n o i n c e n t i v e tor the fallibilist to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . I n fact, it w o u l d be d o w n r i g h t d i s h o n e s t to d o so. T h i s s i t u a t i o n is q u i t e different for the s c e p t i c . H e r i n a b i l i t y to articulate a n effective c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t right n o w d o e s not o v e r r i d e

132

5 E X T U S £ ht PI h EC US

her s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h S e x t u s a d v i c e , she w i l l 1

say that for all w e k n o w there is s o m e p o w e r f u l t h e o d i c y that c o u l d n e u t r a l i z e the force ot the p r o b l e m of e v i l , or that s u c h a n a r g u m e n t is a w a i t i n g " d i s c o v e r y " T h e m a t u r e s c e p t i c has a l w a y s , or n e a r l y a l w a y s , f o u n d the a r g u m e n t s n e c e s s a r y to a c h i e v e e q u i p o l l e n c e o n the issues she has e x a m i n e d so tar. S o it w o u l d be r a s h a n d precipitous to e n d o r s e s o m e v i e w j u s t b e c a u s e it has not yet b e e n refuted. I n this s i t u a t i o n , t h e s c e p t i c is not i n p o s s e s s i o n o l the c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g a r g u m e n t , a n d yet she s o m e h o w p r e v e n t s the s c a l e s of j u d g e m e n t f r o m t i p p i n g . W h a t , t h e n , is d o i n g the w o r k o l the m i s s i n g a r g u m e n t ? II t h e s c e p t i c a c t u a l l y finds the v i e w in q u e s t i o n c o n v i n c i n g a n d still does n o t assent, the n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t c o u l d e x p l a i n the situation t h i s w a y : the sceptic m u s t d e c i d e w h e t h e r o r not to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t ; a n d w h e n there is n o c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g a r g u m e n t , s h e w i l l still believe that she s h o u l d not assent. T h i s a m o u n t s to a n i m p o r t a n t e x p a n s i o n o f the n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e :

[I*]

It is i r r a t i o n a l a n d i r r e s p o n s i b l e to believe a n y p r o p o s i t i o n as l o n g as it is p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a n e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t against it,

S i n c e it has, s o far, a l w a y s b e e n p o s s i b l e for the s c e p t i c to c o n s t r u c t an e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t

for a n y v i e w , [I*"] s h o u l d

lead h e r to t h i n k that it w i l l a l w a y s be i r r a t i o n a l a n d i r r e s p o n s i b l e to believe a n y p r o p o s i t i o n . I f so, her c o m m i t m e n t to [I*], a l o n g w i t h a w e l l - h o n e d s c e p t i c a l talent for p r o d u c i n g e q u i p o l l e n c e , m a k e it e x c e e d i n g l y u n l i k e l y that any v i e w w i l l ever be sufficiently s u p p o r t e d by r e a s o n a n d e v i d e n c e . I n that case, t h e n o r m a t i v e a c c o u n t ot S e x tus' p r o m i s s o r y note (PH

1.34) leaves t h e s c e p t i c u n a b l e to s i n c e r e l y

e x p e c t that she w i l l ever d i s c o v e r the t r u t h . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , the c a u s a l a c c o u n t c a n e x p l a i n S e x t u s ' p r o m i s s o r y note by m a k i n g a p a r a l l e l m o d i f i c a t i o n : [D*]

T h e s c e p t i c s d i s p o s i t i o n i n c l i n e s her a w a y h o r n b e l i e v i n g any p r o p o s i t i o n as l o n g as it is p o s s i b l e to c o n s t r u c t a n e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t against it.

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O n t h i s v i e w , not o n l y h a s she b e c o m e h a b i t u a t e d to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t w h e n the a r g u m e n t s are equally b a l a n c e d , s h e is n o t e v e n i n c l i n e d to a c c e p t v i e w s that are c u r r e n t l y u n o p p o s e d . B e c a u s e of her e x p e r i e n c e , the m e r e p o s s i b i l i t y ot a c o n v i n c i n g c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t is e n o u g h to b a l a n c e the scales of j u d g e m e n t . A n d ( a g a i n ) s i n c e she has so far a l w a y s b e e n able to c o n s t r u c t a n equally c o n v i n c i n g c o u n ter- a r g u m e n t for a n y v i e w , the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n has the effect o l l e a v i n g her u n m o v e d by a n y r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . She h a s d e v e l o p e d a n attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n that is r a d i c a l l y different f r o m the one she s t a r t e d out w i t h . A m a j o r advantage of the c a u s a l , o r d i s p o s i t i o n a l , a c c o u n t is that it p r o v i d e s a m u c h better d e f e n c e against the c h a r g e of negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e [ I * ] c o m m i t s the s c e p t i c to a n e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y h i g h s t a n d a r d o i j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t given the s c e p t i c s p a s s i o n for a r g u i n g against any a n d e v e r y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theory, s u c h a c o m m i t m e n t is s u s p i c i o u s at best, s e l l - r e f u t i n g at w o r s t . If, i n a p p l y i n g her s c e p t i c a l skill, she c o n s t r u c t s e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s for a n d against [ I * ] , a d h e r i n g to this p r i n c i p l e w o u l d r e q u i r e h e r to reject it. B y contrast, a t t r i b u t i n g the d i s p o s i t i o n [ D * ] to the sceptic involves a t t r i b u t i n g n o beliefs, a n d h e n c e p r e s e r v e s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s c e p t i c i s m a n d negative d o g m a t i s m . T h e c a u s a l a c c o u n t a l s o fits n i c e l y w i t h the d i s t i n c t i o n Sextus d r a w s b e t w e e n the P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c a n d A r c e s i l a u s , I n o t h e r regards their s c e p t i c a l v i e w s are v i r t u a l l y the s a m e but A r c e s i l a u s says that p a r t i c u l a r s u s p e n s i o n s ot j u d g e m e n t are g o o d a n d p a r t i c u l a r assents b a d (PH 1.232). I n o t h e r w o r d s , A r c e s i l a u s t h i n k s we s h o u l d s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a n d w e s h o u l d not a s s e n t . T h e P y r r h o n ist, b y c o n t r a s t , m a k e s n o s u c h e v a l u a t i v e or n o r m a t i v e j u d g e m e n t about s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t (see PH 1.196 a n d C h a p t e r 3), F u r t h e r m o r e , i n s o m e passages Sextus indicates that the s c e p tic d o e s i n fact a i m at a c q u i r i n g a n d p r e s e r v i n g t r a n q u i l l i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , he says that the s c e p t i c w i l l s t u d y n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , n o t for the sake of m a k i n g f i r m a s s e r t i o n s a b o u t s c i e n t i f i c matters, but " i n o r d e r to be able to o p p o s e to e v e r y a c c o u n t a n e q u a l a c c o u n t , a n d tor the s a k e ot t r a n q u i l i t y " (PH

1.18). So the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f s c i -

entific issues is a matter ot c o l l e c t i n g m a t e r i a l a n d d e v e l o p i n g t h e

13-1

S E X T I T S £ hi P l h t C H S

sceptical ability to p r o d u c e e q u i p o l l e n c e . Similarly, w h e n e x p l a i n i n g the a i m (telos) of s c e p t i c i s m , he r e m a r k s : " U p to n o w w e s a y the a i m of t h e S c e p t i c is t r a n q u i l i t y i n matters of o p i n i o n a n d m o d e r a t i o n of feeling in matters f o r c e d u p o n u s " (PH

1.25; s e e a l s o 1.30). W e

s h o u l d not t a k e this s c e p t i c a l teios to be the s o r t o f n o r m a t i v e goal e s t a b l i s h e d by a d o g m a t i c ethical theory. It is rather a d e s c r i p t i o n of the o u t c o m e o f t h e s c e p t i c s p r a c t i c e ; at least so far, s u c h p r a c t i c e , i n Sextus' e x p e r i e n c e , has e n d e d i n epochs a n d t r a n q u i l l i t y ( H a n k i n s o n 1997b). A n d finally, t h e s c e p t i c s i n a b i l i t y to e v e r d i s c o v e r the t r u t h is o n l y a p r o b l e m if w e s u p p o s e that the m a t u r e s c e p t i c s e n q u i r y is a i m e d at t r u t h . S e x t u s never e x p l i c i t l y says that it is despite the fact that a n u m b e r o f passages c a n be r e a d that w a y (see e s p e c i a l l y PH 1 . 3 , 2 . 1 1 ; P a l m e r 2 0 0 0 ) . W h e n w e f i n d , for e x a m p l e , that the sceptic has not up to now d i s c o v e r e d a c r i t e r i o n o f t r u t h (PH 3.70; see 2 . 5 3 ) , w e d o not n e e d to s u p p o s e that s h e s i n c e r e l y e x p e c t s to s o m e d a y f i n d it. W i t h regard to the d i s c o v e r y of t r u t h , she n o longer has a n y e x p e c t a t i o n o n e w a y o r the other. G r a n t e d , e n q u i r y i n t h e o r d i n a r y s e n s e , is n a t u r a l l y a i m e d at r e v e a l i n g the t r u t h . B u t the s c e p t i c is not e n g a g e d i n an o r d i n a r y e n q u i r y after h e r c o n v e r s i o n . W h a t the s c e p t i c investigates:

is not what is apparent, b u t w h a t is s a i d a b o u t w h a t is a p p a r ent - a n d this is different f r o m investigating what is a p p a r e n t itself. F o r e x a m p l e , it a p p e a r s to us that h o n e y sweetens ( w e c o n c e d e this i n a s m u c h a s w e are s w e e t e n e d i n a p e r c e p t u a l w a y ) ; b u t w h e t h e r (as far as the a r g u m e n t goes)-" ! it j a c t u 1

s

ally s w e e t is s o m e t h i n g w e investigate - a n d this is not w h a t is a p p a r e n t but s o m e t h i n g s a i d a b o u t w h a t is apparent. (PH

1.19-20)

Before her s u r p r i s i n g d i s c o v e r y about h o w to a c h i e v e tranquillity, the sceptic is engaged in t h e p u r s u i t of t r u t h [PH 1.12, 1.26). She w a n t s to f i n d out about the t h i n g s t h e m s e l v e s , n o t w h a t is s a i d a b o u t t h o s e t h i n g s . S h e w a n t s to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r or not a b e n e v o l e n t G o d exists, not m e r e l y w h a t c a n be s a i d about the e x i s t e n c e o f G o d .

135

ANCIENT

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T h e s e m a y s e e m to be i n s e p a r a b l e . W h y , after a l l , w o u l d one investigate w h a t is s a i d about the existence of G o d if not for the s a k e o l d e t e r m i n i n g the truth about w h e t h e r G o d exists? C i c e r o , for e x a m p l e , s e e k s out a r g u m e n t s p r o a n d c o n for the s a k e of m a k i n g the m o s t i n f o r m e d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h e r e the t r u t h lies. S i m i l a r l y , w h e n S o c r a t e s e x a m i n e s the beliefs of h i s i n t e r l o c u t o r s , he w a n t s to d i s c o v e r the truth by means of d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r they k n o w the t r u t h . I n S o c r a t e s ' case, h i s s e c o n d - o r d e r e n q u i r y into w h a t people say a n d believe about v i r t u e is still a i m e d at r e v e a l i n g the first-order t r u t h about v i r t u e . W h a t the m a t u r e s c e p t i c w a n t s to d i s c o v e r , h o w e v e r , is n o t the truth about x

t

but rather w h a t t h e o r i e s a n d a r g u m e n t s h a v e b e e n

p r o p o s e d r e g a r d i n g x, a n d h o w they are s u p p o s e d to e s t a b l i s h their c o n c l u s i o n s . Before h e r c o n v e r s i o n , h e r e n q u i r y w a s a i m e d at d i s c o v e r i n g the t r u t h a n d w a s g u i d e d by s u c h n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s as [I] a n d [ R ] , A f t e r h e r c o n v e r s i o n , h e r e n q u i r y takes o n this s e c o n d o r d e r nature a n d is n o longer g o v e r n e d b y a n y n o r m a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; as a matter of h a b i t a n d d i s p o s i t i o n , she c o n t i n u e s to s e e k out w h a t is s a i d o n all s i d e s o f d i s p u t e d issues. A n d a s a matter o f h a b i t a n d d i s p o s i t i o n , her e n q u i r y leaves h e r i n a t r a n q u i l state o l epoche. T h e m a t u r e sceptic's i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f a r g u m e n t s p r o a n d c o n v a r i o u s i s s u e s w i l l a p p e a r i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m the investigation o f s o m e o n e w h o a c c e p t s n o r m a t i v e rules g o v e r n i n g e n q u i r y . T h e single, c r u c i a l difference is i n their attitudes towards these rules. ( I n C h a p t e r 9 we w i l l f i n d a s i m i l a r difference b e t w e e n the sceptical a n d d o g m a t i c attitudes t o w a r d s c u l t u r a l , e t h i c a l a n d religious p r a c t i c e s . )

Therapeutic scepticism a n d Sextus' diagnosis T h e s c e p t i c s d i s t i n c t i v e attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n is illustrated b y the s e l f - r e f u t i n g nature o f the attempt to r a t i o n a l l y establish that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s

(see B u r n y e a t 1976J. D o g m a t i s t s s e i z e o n

this p e c u l i a r feature i n the f o l l o w i n g a n t i - s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t 2.185):

136

(PH

S E X T U S £ ht PI h EC US

(1)

I f a n a r g u m e n t establishes its c o n c l u s i o n , then (at least o n e ) d e m o n s t r a t i o n exists.

(2}

T h e s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t e i t h e r e s t a b l i s h e s that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s or it d o e s not.

(3)

II it d o e s not, t h e n the a r g u m e n t h a s not s h o w n there are no demonstrations,

(4)

I f it d o e s e s t a b l i s h its c o n c l u s i o n , t h e n b y ( 1 ), d e m o n s t r a t i o n exists.

So it is s e l l - r e f u t i n g to r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h that t h e r e are n o d e m o n strations. II w e f u r t h e r s u p p o s e that o n e c a n n o t i n fact a c c o m p l i s h s u c h a task, the sceptic w i l l n e c e s s a r i l y fail i n h e r attempt. S i m i l a r l y , one c a n n o t coherently

say in a l o u d a n d clear v o i c e , " I ' m not s p e a k i n g

right now". T h e fact that w e c a n utter these w o r d s d o e s n o t e s t a b l i s h that w e c a n c o m m u n i c a t e a n y t h i n g m e a n i n g f u l , or at least c o h e r e n t , by m a k i n g these n o i s e s . Sextus r e s p o n d s by c l a i m i n g that the s c e p t i c finds n o a r g u m e n t s probative, not e v e n the o n e that is s u p p o s e d to e s t a b l i s h that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . S o the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o h e r e n t l y e s t a b l i s h i n g that t h e r e are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s is not a p r o b l e m . B y a c h i e v i n g e q u i p o l l e n c e o n the issue, the s c e p t i c w i l l not be i n c l i n e d to a c c e p t either side. B u t this is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h , a n d i n d e e d r e q u i r e s , that e a c h s i d e a p p e a r e q u a l l y c o n v i n c i n g or p l a u s i b l e . T h e s c e p t i c a l project w i l l o n l y be s e l l - r e f u t i n g i f t h e s c e p t i c s e e k s to p r o v e that there are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . B u t she d o e s not; she does not s e e k to r a t i o n a l l y e s t a b l i s h a n y t h i n g , a n d n o r is she b o u n d by a n y n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l p u r s u i t of t r u t h . H e r u s e o f r e a s o n has, so far, o n l y led to e q u i p o l l e n c e ,

epochs

a n d t r a n q u i l i t y . T h e s c e p t i c s e e k s to p u r g e b y m e a n s o f r e a s o n the d o g m a t i c a s s u m p t i o n that the p r o p e r use o l r e a s o n reveals the t r u t h (see PH 1 . 2 0 ) . T h i s is s u g g e s t e d by S e x t u s ' e v o c a t i v e m e t a p h o r s :

. . . there are m a n y t h i n g s that put t h e m s e l v e s i n t h e s a m e c o n d i t i o n as they put o t h e r t h i n g s . F o r e x a m p l e , j u s t as fire after c o n s u m i n g the w o o d d e s t r o y s itself a s w e l l , a n d j u s t as purgatives after d r i v i n g the fluids o u t ot b o d i e s e l i m i n a t e

137

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

t h e m s e l v e s a s w e l l , so t o o the a r g u m e n t against d e m o n s t r a t i o n , after d o i n g a w a y w i t h all d e m o n s t r a t i o n , c a n c a n c e l itself as w e l l . A n d a g a i n , just as it is not i m p o s s i b l e l o r the p e r s o n w h o has c l i m b e d t o a h i g h place by a l a d d e r to k n o c k o v e r the l a d d e r w i t h h i s foot after h i s c l i m b , s o too it is not u n l i k e l y that the sceptic, h a v i n g got to the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o l h i s task b y a sort o f s t e p - l a d d e r - the a r g u m e n t s h o w i n g that there is n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n - s h o u l d d o a w a y w i t h this a r g u m e n t . {M 8 . 4 8 0 - 8 1 ; see a l s o PH 2.188,1.206;

D L 9.76;

PraepEv.

14.18.21)

Sextus is h a p p y to a p p l y h i s negative c o n c l u s i o n s to t h e m s e l v e s , j u s t as h e is w i l l i n g to say that the p h r a s e " n o t h i n g is t r u e " applies to itself as w e l l (PH 2 . 1 8 8 ) . B u t i n that case, w h a t is S e x t u s s a y i n g ? A r e we left w i t h a s c e p t i c a l idiot a b s u r d l y p r o c l a i m i n g that he i s not s p e a k i n g right n o w ? T h i s d e p r e s s i n g a s s e s s m e n t is e a s i l y a v o i d e d . O n m a n y

occa-

s i o n s , Sextus a r g u e s dialectically, r e l y i n g not o n l y o n h i s d o g m a t i c opponents

1

beliefs as p r e m i s e s , but a l s o o n their c o m m i t m e n t

to

n o r m a t i v e , r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . L i k e A r c e s i l a u s a n d C a r n e a d e s , the P y r r h o n i s t s i m p l y h o l d s h i s o p p o n e n t s to their o w n r a t i o n a l s t a n d ards in o r d e r to s h o w h o w far s h o r t their beliefs fall. S u c h d i a l e c t i cal a r g u m e n t s , i n t h e i r p u r e f o r m , r e q u i r e n o s u b s t a n t i v e or l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s o n the part of the sceptic. O n o t h e r o c c a s i o n s , Sextus s e e m s to insert h i s o w n p r e m i s e s a n d to s p e a k i n h i s o w n voice. But all of these p r o p o s i t i o n s m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d w i t h the c r u c i a l q u a l i f y i n g d i s c l a i m e r set out at the b e g i n n i n g of the Outlines:

" B y w a y of preface let u s say that o n n o n e

of the matters to be d i s c u s s e d d o we a f f i r m that t h i n g s c e r t a i n l y are j u s t as w e say they are: rather, we report d e s c r i p t i v e l y o n e a c h item a c c o r d i n g to h o w it a p p e a r s to us at the t i m e " ( P f f 1.4). S i m i l a r l y , Sextus e x p l a i n s that w e m u s t u n d e r s t a n d the s c e p t i c s u s e of s u c h characteristic p h r a s e s as " s o m e object or state of affairs is no more this than that" as a r e p o r t o n the w a y he is affected, that is, as a n e x p r e s s i o n of h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r to h i m at that m o m e n t {PH see also PH

138

1.15,

1.187-191;

1.135, 1,193, 1 . 1 9 7 - 1 9 3 , 1.200). T h i s applies to

S E X T U S £ hi P l h t C H S

the sceptic's a w a r e n e s s ot t h e e q u i p o l l e n c e o i o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s . " W h e t h e r they are e q u a l , w e d o not a f f i r m : w e s a y w h a t a p p e a r s to us about t h e m , w h e n t h e y m a k e a n i m p r e s s i o n o n u s " (PH 1.196). T h e sceptic w i l l o n l y report d e s c r i p t i v e l y o n h o w the a r g u m e n t s affect her. She w i l l say n o t h i n g about h o w t h e y s h o u l d affect her, or h o w they s h o u l d affect others. I n this way, reason is s t r i p p e d of the i m p e r s o n a l , n o r m a t i v e force that w e t y p i c a l l y attribute to it (see C h a p t e r 9 for m o r e o n t h e s c e p t i c s r e l i a n c e o n a p p e a r a n c e s ) , F o r e x a m p l e , i f it s e e m s to a d o g m a t i s t that t h e p r o b l e m of evil is a g o o d r e a s o n to be a n atheist, he w i l l h o l d that it is a g o o d r e a s o n for a n y o n e to be a n atheist. R e g a r d l e s s o l w h e t h e r or not a n y o n e finds t h e a r g u m e n t r a t i o n a l l y c o m p e l l i n g , he w i l l h o l d that e v e r y o n e should. By c o n t r a s t , w h e n i n t r o d u c i n g t h e s c e p t i c a l m o d e s , Sextus insists that he is a f f i r m i n g n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e i r n u m b e r or about t h e i r force: they m a y b e u n s o u n d , a n d there m a y be m o r e than t h e o n e s he d e s c r i b e s (PH

1.35), T h e c o n t e x t m a k e s it clear that he d o e s not

i n t e n d a s p e c i f i c a l l y l o g i c a l s e n s e o f s o u n d n e s s . H e is not s u g g e s t i n g that the m o d e s m a y be i n v a l i d , or that t h e i r p r e m i s e s m a y be false, but r a t h e r that they m a y be i m p o t e n t , they m a y a p p e a r to s o m e to be u n s o u n d . A s to w h e t h e r they are u n s o u n d i n s o m e o b j e c t i v e s e n s e he w i l l have n o o p i n i o n . H e is s i m p l y a c k n o w l e d g i n g that different a r g u m e n t s affect p e o p l e differently, S e x t u s ' c o n c e r n for s u c h v a r i a b i l i t y is best e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s of his t h e r a p e u t i c a n d p h i l a n t h r o p i c a g e n d a . I n the c o n c l u s i o n to the Outlines,

he w r i t e s :

S c e p t i c s are p h i l a n t h r o p i c a n d w i s h to c u r e b y a r g u m e n t , as far a s t h e y c a n , the c o n c e i t a n d r a s h n e s s of the D o g m a t i s t s , lust a s d o c t o r s for b o d i l y afflictions have r e m e d i e s w h i c h differ i n potency, a n d apply severe r e m e d i e s to patients w h o are severely afflicted a n d m i l d e r r e m e d i e s to those m i l d l y afflicted, so S c e p t i c s p r o p o u n d a r g u m e n t s w h i c h differ i n strength - they e m p l o y w e i g h t y a r g u m e n t s , capable o f v i g o r o u s l y r e b u t t i n g t h e d o g m a t i c affliction ot conceit, against those w h o are d i s t r e s s e d b y a s e v e r e r a s h n e s s , a n d they

L39

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

e m p l o y m i l d e r a r g u m e n t s against those w h o are afflicted by a c o n c e i t w h i c h is s u p e r f i c i a l a n d e a s i l y c u r e d a n d w h i c h c a n be rebutted by a m i l d e r degree o f plausibility. T h i s is w h y those w i t h a S c e p t i c a l i m p u l s e d o not hesitate s o m e t i m e s to p r o p o u n d a r g u m e n t s w h i c h are s o m e t i m e s w e i g h t y i n their plausibility, a n d s o m e t i m e s a p p a r e n t l y r a t h e r w e a k . T h e y d o this deliberately, s i n c e often a w e a k e r a r g u m e n t is sufficient for t h e m to a c h i e v e their p u r p o s e .

(PH 3 . 2 8 0 - 8 1 )

H e r e the s c e p t i c s p u r p o s e is c l e a r l y not the d i s c o v e r y of t r u t h , but r a t h e r the a l l e v i a t i o n o f d i s t u r b a n c e b r o u g h t a b o u t b y d o g m a t i c inclinations.

11

B u t i f a b a l a n c e d diet of o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s is the

p r e s c r i p t i o n that leads u s to t r a n q u i l l i t y , w h a t is the d i a g n o s i s ? W h a t is the c a u s e o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e ? Sextus t h i n k s that s o m e d i s t u r b a n c e s are avoidable a n d others are u n a v o i d a b l e . A s a n i m a l s w e are subject to the u n a v o i d a b l e k i n d : h u n g e r , thirst, s e x u a l urges a n d so o n (PH 3 . 1 8 3 ) . S e n s a t i o n s are not all pleasant. B u t a s a n i m a l s w e h a v e a n a t u r a l i n c l i n a t i o n to r e m o v e d i s t u r b a n c e s w h e n e v e r a n d w h e r e v e r they a r i s e . I n c o m b a t i n g a lofty Stoic c o n c e p t i o n of r e a s o n , S e x t u s a p p e a l s to the abilities o l the h u m b l e d o g . H e points o u t that dogs not o n l y r e m o v e

thorns

f r o m their p a w s but a l s o clean their w o u n d s , favour i n j u r e d legs i n k e e p i n g w i t h g o o d H i p p o c r a t i c practice a n d , b y e a t i n g grass a n d v o m i t i n g , relieve a n upset s t o m a c h . T h u s the d o g attains w h a t the Stoic C h r y s i p p u s w o u l d (allegedly} have to a d m i t a s the p e r f e c t i o n of r e a s o n i n c h o o s i n g w h a t is appropriate a n d a v o i d i n g w h a t is d i s t u r b i n g (PH 1 . 7 0 - 7 1 , 1.238). I n this regard, w e are n o different f r o m the o t h e r a n i m a l s : w e too n a t u r a l l y seek to e l i m i n a t e d i s t u r b a n c e s . U n l i k e t h e o t h e r a n i m a l s , h o w e v e r , w e are s u b j e c t t o a h o s t o f u n n e c e s s a r y d i s t u r b a n c e s . T h e s e arise f r o m b e l i e v i n g that s o m e t h i n g is by nature g o o d or b a d , a p p r o priate o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e (PH 1 . 2 9 - 3 0 , 3 . 2 3 6 - 8 ; M 1 1 . 1 1 8 , 1 4 5 - 6 , 1 5 8 ) . F o r s o m e t h i n g to be by nature g o o d m e a n s , a s w e s a w i n C h a p t e r 6, that it is i n v a r i a b l y a n d really so, despite the w a y it m a y appear. I I s o m e t h i n g is g o o d b y nature, d o g m a t i s t s believe, t h e n it is g o o d for e v e r y o n e , at a n y t i m e a n d i n a n y c i r c u m s t a n c e .

140

S E X T I T S £ hi P l h t C H S

H a v i n g j u d g e d that m o n e y is b y n a t u r e g o o d , I will teel a s t r o n g i m p u l s e t o w a r d s a c q u i r i n g it. I w i l l teel j u s t as s t r o n g l y about a v o i d i n g p o v e r t y i n so far as I j u d g e it to be b y nature b a d . If I a m poor, I w i l l be d i s t u r b e d by m y poverty. S e e k i n g to e l i m i n a t e this d i s t u r b a n c e 1 w i l l i n t e n s e l y p u r s u e m o n e y . I f I fail to get it, I w i l l be e v e n m o r e d i s t u r b e d by m y poverty. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if I d o get it, I w i l l t h e n live i n fear ot l o s i n g it. S o b e c o m i n g r i c h does not put a n e n d to the d i s t u r b a n c e : it m e r e l y shifts the f o c u s . By s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t about w h a t is really g o o d a n d b a d , the sceptic n e i t h e r p u r s u e s n o r a v o i d s a n y t h i n g intensely. N e v e r t h e l e s s , he is n o t c o m p l e t e l y free t r o m d i s t u r b a n c e . T h e s c e p t i c s

method

is o n l y effective against the " d i s t o r t i o n s o f r e a s o n " a n d " w o r t h l e s s opinion", that is, against v o l u n t a r y m o t i o n s of the m i n d (Af 11.148). T h e a i m o l the s c e p t i c is to be t r a n q u i l in matters o f o p i n i o n a n d to be o n l y m o d e r a t e l y affected b y matters that are forced u p o n h i m (PH 1.30). So he w i l l still suffer f r o m h u n g e r , thirst a n d c o l d , but he w i l l not believe these are b a d . T o d o so m e r e l y m a k e s the d i s t u r b a n c e m o r e severe. W e n a t u r a l l y strive to r i d o u r s e l v e s o f i n v o l u n t a r y d i s t u r b a n c e s , j u s t as a d o g r e m o v e s a t h o r n f r o m its paw. T h e belief that s u c h d i s t u r b a n c e is b a d a d d s n o t h i n g to the effort to be r i d ot it but o n l y m a k e s matters w o r s e (Af 11.158).

Stoic d i s t u r b a n c e s So far the d i a g n o s i s o n l y s e e m s to i m p l i c a t e a s m a l l c a t e g o r y of beliefs: t h o s e that l e a d to i n t e n s e p u r s u i t or a v o i d a n c e . T h e Stoics w o u l d agree, p o i n t i n g out that the r e a s o n s u c h beliefs are d i s t u r b i n g is that the g o o d a n d h a d t h i n g s p u r s u e d a n d a v o i d e d are not w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l , a n d are not i n fact g e n u i n e l y g o o d or b a d . D e s p i t e o u r best efforts, we m a y suffer t r o m hunger, thirst, c o l d , p o v e r t y a n d so o n . T h e t r a n q u i l l i t y of the Stoic sage, h o w e v e r , is as f i r m a n d i n v i o lable as p o s s i b l e . H e is i m m u n e f r o m the w h i m s o f fortune. But t h i s t r a n q u i l l i t y is not the result of s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . Q u i t e the c o n t r a r y , it is ( i n p a r t ) the result of a n irrefutable c o n v i c t i o n that v i r t u e is the o n l y g e n u i n e g o o d , a n d that u n l i k e the

1U

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

apparent g o o d s of f o r t u n e , it is entirely w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l . T h e Stoic sage c a l m l y a n d c o n f i d e n t l y p u r s u e s a p p a r e n t l y g o o d t h i n g s s u c h as w e a l t h a n d health a n d a v o i d s the a p p a r e n t l y b a d o n e s s u c h a s p a i n and poverty, but a l w a y s w i t h the full r e a l i z a t i o n that they are not g e n u i n e l y g o o d or b a d ; the sages p u r s u i t a n d a v o i d a n c e is n e v e r i n t e n s e . H i s k n o w l e d g e that virtue lies e n t i r e l y w i t h h i m s e l f a n d is the o n l y g e n u i n e g o o d p r o d u c e s a state ot p e r m a n e n t t r a n q u i l l i t y . " Yet Sextus t h i n k s that the S t o i c , like a n y o n e else w h o believes s o m e t h i n g is g o o d or b a d b y nature, w i l l suffer u n n e c e s s a r y d i s t u r b a n c e s . T o substitute v i r t u e for the g o o d s o f fortune d o e s not r e m o v e d i s t u r b a n c e , but rather rearranges it: . . . the p h i l o s o p h e r s r e a s o n i n g p r o d u c e s o n e disease i n place of a n o t h e r , s i n c e i n t u r n i n g a w a y the p e r s o n w h o is s t r i v i n g for w e a l t h or g l o r y or h e a l t h as s o m e t h i n g g o o d

towards

p u r s u i n g . . . v i r t u e , he does not free h i m f r o m p u r s u i t , but transfers h i m to a n o t h e r p u r s u i t .

(Af 11.135 [Bett 1 9 9 7 ] )

T h i s is a i m e d not at the i d e a l Stoic sage, but rather at the flesh a n d b l o o d Stoic w h o has not yet attained v i r t u e . L a c k i n g v i r t u e , he w i l l feel c o m p e l l e d to intensely p u r s u e it. A n d he s h o u l d c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f m i s e r a b l e as l o n g as he l a c k s it. T h e c l a i m that v i r t u e is entirely w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l w i l l n o t , or at least s h o u l d not, alleviate h i s d i s t u r b a n c e as l o n g a s he l a c k s this g o o d . T h e Stoics a r g u e that the p r o p e r r e s p o n s e to the r e c o g n i t i o n o f vice is not to b e c o m e d i s t u r b e d a n d d e s p o n d e n t , but rather to r e d o u ble o n e s efforts to attain v i r t u e . B e s i d e s , the Stoics m a i n t a i n that m e n t a l d i s t u r b a n c e c a n o n l y a r i s e w i t h o u r p e r m i s s i o n . S o we m a y a d m i t that we lack the o n l y t h i n g w o r t h h a v i n g a n d set a b o u t t r y i n g to get it w h i l e r e m a i n i n g t r a n q u i l ( W h i t e 1995). But the Stoics a l s o m a i n t a i n that t h e i r p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s are r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d a n d not m e r e l y a r b i t r a r y preferences. A n d this p r o v i d e s a n o p e n i n g for the sceptic. Sextus r e m a r k s , " A s for those w h o say that g o o d t h i n g s c a n n o t be lost, w e shall b r i n g t h e m to s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g m e n t as a result of the i m p a s s e a r i s i n g f r o m d i s p u t e " (PH

112

3 . 2 3 8 ) . T h e sceptic a c c o m p l i s h e s this b y p r o d u c i n g

SEXTUS

EMPIRtCUS

o p p o s i n g a r g u m e n t s that a p p e a r equally c o n v i n c i n g . T h e Stoic w i l l then be at a loss as to w h a t to believe. H i s f o r m e r p r e f e r e n c e for S t o i c i s m w i l l a p p e a r a r b i t r a r y , a n d h i s i n a b i l i t y to r a t i o n a l l y resolve the p u z z l e as to w h e t h e r g o o d t h i n g s c a n be lost w i l l result in d i s t u r bance. H e m u s t e i t h e r t r y to o v e r c o m e the d i s t u r b a n c e b y f i n d i n g a n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , n o n - a r b i t r a r y j u s t i f i c a t i o n for h i s S t o i c i s m , or j o i n the s c e p t i c i n s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t . T h e o n l y route to c o n t i n u o u s t r a n q u i l l i t y is to s u s p e n d j u d g e ment

not

merely about

all e v a l u a t i v e matters,

but also

about

w h e t h e r reason is capable of p r o d u c i n g a g o o d life b y s t o c k i n g o u r m i n d s w i t h t r u e b e l i e f s . If, h o w e v e r , the real life Stoic n e v e r d i s covers that h i s preference is m e r e l y a r b i t r a r y ( a s s u m i n g it i s ) , he w i l l n e v e r leel d i s t r e s s e d at v i o l a t i n g h i s o w n c o m m i t m e n t to r e a s o n . T h i s u n d e t e c t e d d e l u s i o n , it s e e m s , w i l l s e r v e j u s t as well a s the s c e p t i c a l s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t i n p r o d u c i n g tranquillity. N e v ertheless, d e l u s i o n a l t r a n q u i l l i t y is a fragile a n d c o n t i n g e n t affair. A n d i n a n y case, there is n o t h i n g a d m i r a b l e about r e f u s i n g to put o n e s beliefs to the test, w h i l e s u p p o s i n g n o n e t h e l e s s that they are rationally justified.

The disturbance of non-evaluative beliefs Not all o f o u r beliefs s e e m to i n s p i r e p u r s u i t or a v o i d a n c e : for e x a m ple, that s e v e n t e e n i s a p r i m e n u m b e r , or that m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y of m y p e r c e p t i o n . I m a g i n e a m o d e s t l y fallihle A c a d e m i c w h o e x a m i n e s the a r g u m e n t s tor a n d against the existence of m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e . L e t us s u p p o s e he d e c i d e s to tentatively a c c e p t the m o r e c o n v i n c i n g c o n c l u s i o n w h i l e c o n t i n u i n g h i s investigations. B e l i e v i n g in the e x i s t e n c e ( o r n o n - e x i s t e n c e ) ot m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y not affect the w a y the w o r l d a p p e a r s . P r e s u m a b l y m y d e s k w i l l a p p e a r as s o l i d to o n e c o n v i n c e d by B e r k e l e y ' s idealist v i e w of s u b s t a n c e as to o n e c o n v i n c e d b y Locke's realist view. B o t h o f t h e m w i l l use the d e s k i n the s a m e way. T a k e n i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r beliefs a n d attitudes, b e l i e l s about m a t e r i a l s u b s t a n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y have n o p r a c t i c a l effect at a l l . So if s u c h beliefs have n o i m p a c t o n

1 13

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

w h a t we p u r s u e a n d a v o i d , w h y s h o u l d we t h i n k a c c e p t i n g t h e m w i l l produce any disturbance? 1

1

W e m u s t note first that s u c h beliefs are the p r o d u c t of the p u r s u i t of t r u t h . A n d e v e n i f w e d o not t h i n k there is a n y p r a c t i c a l v a l u e i n d e t e r m i n i n g the t r u t h of s o m e matters, we m u s t a l s o s u p p o s e that the t r u t h - s e e k e r sees some v a l u e in it. H e w i l l p r o b a b l y see truth as i n t r i n s i c a l l y v a l u a b l e , a n d thus w o r t h a c q u i r i n g regardless of the c o n s e q u e n c e s . I n that case, the d o g m a t i c t r u t h - s e e k e r is s u b j e c t to d i s t u r b a n c e w h e n e v e r he a c k n o w l e d g e s that h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n falls s h o r t . F o r t h i s w i l l a m o u n t to a n a d m i s s i o n that w h i l e he m i g h t be i n p o s s e s s i o n of an i n t r i n s i c g o o d , he m i g h t not be, W h a t , t h e n , about the dogmatist w h o a c k n o w l e d g e s the i m p e r f e c t i o n s in h i s j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f s o m e belief but r e m a i n s t r a n q u i l ? W e m a y e v e n i m a g i n e that h i s greatest j o y lies i n debate w i t h o t h e r d o g m a tists, a n d that he o c c a s i o n a l l y c h a n g e s his v i e w s o n t h i n g s , a p p r o v i n g first o n e v i e w as m o r e t r u t h - l i k e , t h e n another. L a c k i n g w h a t he sees as i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d is s u p p o s e d to be d i s t u r b i n g , a n d yet it is quite easy to i m a g i n e cases i n w h i c h it is not. T o take this as a n o b j e c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that S e x t u s

1

diagnosis

is m e a n t to reveal s o m e p s y c h o l o g i c a l t r u t h s about h u m a n n a t u r e . T h i s is c l e a r l y not the spirit i n w h i c h he offers h i s therapy. I n s t e a d , we s h o u l d take h i s d i a g n o s i s as a descriptive report of his past e x p e r i e n c e . It s e e m s to h i m that s o m e h a v e suffered f r o m the intense p u r s u i t s a n d a v o i d a n c e s i n s p i r e d by d o g m a t i c c o m m i t m e n t s a n d e v e n b y the v e r y p u r s u i t of t r u t h . W h e t h e r this p u r s u i t m a n i f e s t s itself i n evaluative or n o n - e v a l u a t i v e beliefs, the g o o d that is s o u g h t , k n o w l e d g e , is e l u s i v e . S i n c e the satisfaction of this d e s i r e d o e s not s e e m to be w i t h i n o u r c o n t r o l , it s e e m s to l e a d to f r u s t r a t i o n a n d d i s t u r b a n c e , A p r i m e e x a m p l e of this is S e x t u s ' r e m a r k that " G e o m e t e r s are b u r d e n e d w i t h n o s m a l l d i s t u r b a n c e w i t h regard to the existence or c o n c e i v a b i l i t y of a line h a v i n g length w i t h o u t b r e a d t h " ( A i 3.57; see A i 8 . 1 3 0 ) . I f t h i s is the object they w i s h to i n s t r u c t u s a b o u t , a n d i f t h e y h a v e n o clear c o n c e p t i o n o f it, t h e n t h e y w i l l n o t be able to t e a c h u s a n y t h i n g about it. Sextus' o b j e c t i o n is s i m p l y that we c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of l e n g t h w i t h out b r e a d t h . H i s p o i n t is that the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of a line, w h e t h e r

1H

S E X T I T S £ hi P l h t C H S

o n a c h a l k b o a r d o r i n someone's t h o u g h t s , p r e s u p p o s e s b r e a d t h . Sextus believes n e i t h e r this n o r the geometer's c o n t r a d i c t o r y c l a i m ; n o r does he believe it is i n t r i n s i c a l l y g o o d to resolve the issue. S o he w i l l n o t be t r o u b l e d . T h e g e o m e t e r , by c o n t r a s t , w i l l feel c o m p e l l e d to p u r s u e a r e s o l u t i o n ; i n a d d i t i o n to the i n t r i n s i c g o o d at s t a k e , he m a y a l s o sutler f r o m the m o r e m u n d a n e w o r r y that h e is a f r a u d , or that h i s l i v e l i h o o d is at stake. L a c k i n g s u c h beliefs, the sceptic has no worries. T o s u m u p S e x t u s ' d i a g n o s i s : the s o u r c e of p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s t u r b a n c e is ( s e e m s to be) the e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c b e l i e ! that the p r o p e r use of r e a s o n w i l l l e a d to the t r u t h , a n d that the r e s u l t i n g i m p r o v e m e n t i n o u r beliefs is s o m e h o w i n s t r u m e n t a l to o u r w e l l b e i n g . T h u s w h e n c o n f r o n t e d w i t h c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s that we feel we m u s t resolve, w e are d r i v e n to a t r o u b l i n g a n d intense p u r s u i t . E v e n those w h o are m o t i v a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y by d i s i n t e r e s t e d curiosityare v u l n e r a b l e to d i s t u r b a n c e in so far as they d e e m the o b j e c t of their e n q u i r y to be g e n u i n e l y good. F o r as they e n q u i r e they m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e that they l a c k w h a t they believe to be g o o d , a n d after they c o n v i n c e t h e m s e l v e s that they have o b t a i n e d it, t h e y m u s t a d m i t that t h e i r a r g u m e n t a n d e v i d e n c e m a y e v e n t u a l l y be o v e r t u r n e d .

C o n c l u s i o n : the c o n s i s t e n c y o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m Sextus d e s c r i b e s the P y r r h o n i s t not a s o n e w h o a d h e r e s to c e r t a i n d i s t i n c t i v e beliefs, as a Stoic o r E p i c u r e a n w o u l d , but rather one w h o lives i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the g e n e r a l a c c o u n t o f S c e p t i c i s m ( P H 1 . 1 6 - 1 7 J - I h a v e a r g u e d that t h i s a c c o u n t is p u r e l y d e s c r i p t i v e , a n d r e q u i r e s us to u n d e r s t a n d the c o n v e r s i o n to S c e p t i c i s m as i n v o l v i n g the a d o p t i o n o l a v e r y different project a l o n g w i t h a r a d i c a l l y different attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n . T h e m a t u r e s c e p t i c s h e d s her o r i g i n a l b e l i e f that the w a y to t r a n q u i l l i t y i s to r a t i o n a l l y resolve the t r o u b l i n g issues. A f t e r d e v e l o p i n g the s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n , she n o l o n g e r has a n y e x p e c t a t i o n s or b e l i e l s a b o u t the potential benefits o f t r u t h o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a i n i n g it b y m e a n s o f r e a s o n . A n d w i t h the r a d i c a l r e v i s i o n of h e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n , s h e n o longer leels that h e r

1 i?

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

use of r e a s o n is g o v e r n e d b y the n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s s h e o r i g i n a l l y a d h e r e d to, a l t h o u g h h e r b e h a v i o u r m a y still a p p e a r to be i n c o n f o r m i t y to t h e m . I f w e u n d e r s t a n d s c e p t i c i s m as a n activity or set o l practices a i m e d at r e l i e v i n g d o g m a t i c d i s t u r b a n c e , t h e n we c a n see h o w m i s p l a c e d the c h a r g e o f i n c o n s i s t e n c y is. It is s i m p l y a c a t e g o r y m i s t a k e to a c c u s e a practice o l i n c o n s i s t e n c y . Just a s it is n e i t h e r

consistent

n o r i n c o n s i s t e n t to r i d e a b i c y c l e , the p r a c t i c e o f s c e p t i c i s m , i n so tar as it is s o m e t h i n g the s c e p t i c does, c a n be n e i t h e r c o n s i s t e n t n o r i n c o n s i s t e n t , a l t h o u g h it c a n be either effective or ineffective, s k i l f u l or c l u m s y . T h e charge o f s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n is m o r e difficult. I have briefly i n d i cated h o w S e x t u s deals w i t h t h i s i n a r g u i n g that t h e r e are n o d e m o n s t r a t i o n s . W e shall r e t u r n to the i s s u e o f w h e t h e r he c a n s u s t a i n h i s p e c u l i a r attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n . B u t first, i n C h a p t e r 8, we shall c o n s i d e r the s c e p t i c s a r g u m e n t s i n o r d e r to better u n d e r s t a n d the tools w i t h w h i c h Sextus w o u l d p h i l a n t h r o p i c a l l y relieve us of o u r beliefs. I f we s u p p o s e that these a r g u m e n t s are effective, we m a y t h e n c o n s i d e r two final q u e s t i o n s about P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m . I n C h a p t e r 9, we shall e x a m i n e h o w the sceptic is able to p r a c t i s e sceptic i s m w i t h o u t beliefs, a n d h o w s h e is able to engage i n the o r d i n a r y b u s i n e s s of life w i t h o u t beliefs.

146

EIGHT

Pyrrhonian arguments

I n this c h a p t e r I h o p e to s h o w that e v e n i f w e are u n i n t e r e s t e d i n the p r o s p e c t s o f t r a n q u i l l i t y , P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m c o n t i n u e s to provide a n important, a n d perhaps insurmountable, challenge. For 1

this c h a l l e n g e to take effect, o n e m u s t s i m p l y accept that a n a r b i t r a r y preference is not a r a t i o n a l b a s i s l o r belief, a n d that w e have s o m e s o r t o f o b l i g a t i o n as r a t i o n a l agents to j u s t i f y o u r beliefs. I f the sceptic c a n s y s t e m a t i c a l l y b l o c k all o f o u r attempts at j u s t i f i c a t i o n , we w i l l be left in the t r o u b l i n g p o s i t i o n o l b e l i e v i n g that w e o u g h t to d o w h a t w e c a n n o t ?

T h e five m o d e s A s w e s a w i n C h a p t e r 6, the m o d e s are t h e S c e p t i c s tools; they are a r g u m e n t f o r m s that m a y b e e m p l o y e d against a w i d e v a r i e t y of c l a i m s . A f t e r p r e s e n t i n g A e n e s i d e m u s ' ten m o d e s , S e x t u s t u r n s to a n o t h e r set of five that he d e s c r i b e s as the p r o p e r t y of " m o r e recent S c e p t i c s " (PH

1.164; see 1 . 3 6 ) .

W h a t all routes to epochs o n e t h i n g to a n o t h e r {PH

3

h a v e i n c o m m o n is that they o p p o s e

1.31): for e x a m p l e , t h e a p p e a r a n c e that

the tower a p p e a r s r o u n d w i t h the a p p e a r a n c e that t h e t o w e r a p p e a r s s q u a r e , or the a r g u m e n t that p r o v i d e n c e exists w i t h the a r g u m e n t

117

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

that p r o v i d e n c e d o e s not exist, T h e o n l y l o g i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t is that the o p p o s e d p r o p o s i t i o n s m u s t be c o n t r a r i e s : they c a n n o t b o t h be true, but they m a y b o t h be false. A s l o n g as they are c o n t r a r i e s , there w i l l be a p r o b l e m l o r the p r o p o n e n t of either s i d e : he c a n n o t a c c e p t that b o t h are true, s o he m u s t e x p l a i n o r j u s t i f y h i s preference. T h e sceptic w i l l t h e n a p p l y a m o d e o r c o m b i n a t i o n o l m o d e s to s h o w this preference is u l t i m a t e l y a r b i t r a r y a n d thus not r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i fied.

D i s p u t e , r e l a t i v i t y a n d t h e sceptic's d i a l e c t i c a l s t r a t e g y T h e first ot the five m o d e s p r o c e e d s by c i t i n g a d i s p u t e o r d i s a g r e e m e n t that has not b e e n d e c i d e d (PH typically uses, aisepikritos,

1,165), T h e adjective Sextus

is a m b i g u o u s : it c o u l d m e a n either u n d e -

c i d e d o r u n d e c i d a b l e . T o d e c i d e a d i s p u t e m e a n s to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h side is r i g h t , o r at least m o r e j u s t i f i e d a n d h e n c e m o r e likely to be right. But S e x t u s does n o t m e a n that c e r t a i n disputes are i m p o s s i b l e to resolve. I f that w e r e the case, it w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e to settle the matter, a n d Sextus w o u l d b e a negative d o g m a t i s t . W h a t he m e a n s is that t h e issue h a s not i n fact b e e n r e s o l v e d to the satisfaction of all interested parties; o t h e r w i s e there w o u l d be n o d i s a g r e e m e n t to s p e a k o l . S o the s c e p t i c w i l l s a y that s u c h d i s p u t e s have p r o v e d u n d e c i d a b l e u n t i l n o w - they are c u r r e n t l y u n d e c i d e d - b u t he w i l l not s a y that t h e y a r e i n p r i n c i p l e u n d e c i d a b l e . H i s s c e p t i c a l ability to a c h i e v e e q u i p o l l e n c e w i l l prevent h i m f r o m e v e r j u d g i n g a n issue, even t h e i s s u e about w h e t h e r s o m e d i s p u t e m i g h t be r e s o l v e d i n the future, T h e t h i r d o f the five m o d e s is relativity (PH 1.167). A l t h o u g h it plays a c e n t r a l role a m o n g A e n e s i d e m u s ' ten m o d e s , p r o v i d i n g the general f o r m for the rest, h e r e it a p p e a r s to be m o r e of a n a d j u n c t to the m o d e d e r i v i n g f r o m d i s p u t e , T h e n o t i o n that e v e r y t h i n g is relative (i.e. a p p e a r s relative) p r o v i d e s a n e a s y f o r m u l a for o p p o s i n g one t h i n g to a n o t h e r t h e r e b y g e n e r a t i n g a d i s a g r e e m e n t . I n a n a l o g y w i t h the first m o d e , w e s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d this as a n u n d e c i d e d relativity.

i

a

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

But w h y s h o u l d I w o r r y i f I have not b e e n able to p e r s u a d e t h o s e w h o disagree w i t h m e ? I f 1 h a d g r a n t e d that the d i s p u t e has n o t yet b e e n r e s o l v e d , I w o u l d have to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , B u t I d o not n e e d to grant this. I m i g h t insist that I have r e s o l v e d the d i s p u t e to m y o w n s a t i s f a c t i o n , a n d that adequate r e s o l u t i o n d o e s not require u n i v e r s a l agreement, M y v i e w m a y still be t h e right o n e e v e n ii it is d i s p u t e d . N o t e v e r y o n e is e q u a l l y w i l i n g or able to f o l l o w c o m p l i cated a r g u m e n t s . S o it is n o s u r p r i s e that not e v e r y o n e s h a r e s m y correct v i e w o l t h i n g s , T h i s r e s p o n s e w i l l s e e m c o n s i d e r a b l y less a r r o g a n t o n c e I present m y d e f e n c e . F o r t h e n it w i l l n o longer s e e m to be a matter of preferr i n g m y beliefs just b e c a u s e they are m i n e . But the sceptic is p r e p a r e d to rebut any p o s s i b l e defence, S u p p o s e I believe that p r o v i d e n c e exists, that is, that t h e w o r l d is g o v e r n e d b y the w i s d o m o f the gods (see ND 2,76). S u p p o s e also that I a m a w a r e that s o m e p e o p l e d i s a gree w i t h m e . W h a t e v e r I a d v a n c e i n s u p p o r t of m y b e l i e ! will be the subject o f a n u n d e c i d e d d i s p u t e , I f I s a y that the u n i v e r s e e x h i b i t s a h i g h degree of o r d e r l i n e s s , I w i l l also have to a d m i t that s o m e believe the o r d e r l i n e s s w e see is the e x c e p t i o n a n d not the r u l e , or that this o r d e r l i n e s s n e e d not be the p r o d u c t of d i v i n e p r o v i d e n c e . A n d if I cite the a u t h o r i t y of s c r i p t u r e as e v i d e n c e I w i l l have to a d m i t that s o m e believe s c r i p t u r e is not a u t h o r i t a t i v e . W h a t e v e r r e a s o n I give for m y b e l i e f w i l l itself be s u b j e c t to d i s p u t e . A n d I w i l l h a v e to p r o v i d e yet a n o t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n this w a y the sceptic w i l l d r i v e m e to a n infinite regress, c l a i m i n g that I have failed to j u s t i f y m y view. W e s h a l l c o n s i d e r t h i s s e c o n d m o d e in greater d e t a i l i n t h e next s e c t i o n . F o r n o w , note that the regress is g e n e r a t e d b y m y d e s i r e to s h o w that m y b e l i e f is n e i t h e r arrogant n o r arbitrary. T h e s c e p t i c is n o t r e s p o n s i b l e for the regress. U n l i k e t h e persistent c h i l d w h o keeps a s k i n g w h y , the sceptic s c h a l lenge a r i s e s f r o m the dogmatist's o w n c o n c e p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d r a t i o n a l a g e n c y : the s c e p t i c o n l y reflects the dogmatist's e p i s t e m i c ambitions, A s l o n g as I c o n t i n u e to see myself as this sort o f r a t i o n a l agent, I w i l l have to t r y to put a n e n d to the regress. B u t t h e r e a p p e a r to be o n l y t w o o p t i o n s . F i r s t , I m a y assert that s o m e belief is s e l f - e v i d e n t l y

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

true a n d needs n o o t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h e s c e p t i c w i l l t h e n a p p l y the fourth m o d e f r o m h y p o t h e s i s a n d argue that this is n o better t h a n a n a r b i t r a r y a s s e r t i o n . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , I m a y c l a i m that the r e a s o n s I have cited m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t o n e another. S o e v e r y r e a s o n I have a d v a n c e d is j u s t i f i e d by s o m e other r e a s o n 1 h a v e a d v a n c e d . T h e s c e p t i c w i l l c o u n t e r t h i s w i t h the fifth, r e c i p r o c a l m o d e , a n d argue that c i r c u l a r reasoning provides n o justification. S o we have a b r i e l s k e t c h of the g e n e r a l s c e p t i c a l strategy. T h e d o g m a t i s t asserts h i s b e l i e f P. T h e sceptic p o i n t s out that

others

e n d o r s e s o m e l o g i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e c l a i m P* or they assert that it t

o n l y a p p e a r s P i n s i t u a t i o n S, but P" in s o m e o t h e r s i t u a t i o n S". F o r e x a m p l e , I m i g h t assert m y belief that w e a l t h is the greatest g o o d . S o m e o n e else m i g h t assert that the greatest g o o d is h e a l t h o r that it o n l y a p p e a r s to b e w e a l t h w h e n o n e is healthy, w h i l e it a p p e a r s to be h e a l t h w h e n one is i l l . A s a r a t i o n a l agent, the d o g m a t i s t is c o m p e l l e d to e x p l a i n w h y he h a s d e c i d e d i n favour o l P, that is, he m u s t j u s t i f y h i s belief. T h i s l e a d s to a t r i l e m m a : h i s belief is h e l d o n the b a s i s o f a n infinite s e r i e s ot r e a s o n s , a n a r b i t r a r y h y p o t h e s i s or c i r c u l a r r e a s o n i n g (PH

1 . 1 6 6 - 9 ) . A c c o r d i n g to Sextus, each o f

these three l e a d to s u s p e n s i o n of j u d g e m e n t (see F i g u r e 4 ) . W e shall consider them in turn.

Infinite regress T h e r e is n o t h i n g n e c e s s a r i l y p r o b l e m a t i c about the n o t i o n of a p o t e n tial infinity. W e c a n a l w a y s i m a g i n e m a k i n g a f u r t h e r d i v i s i o n o f s o m e t h i n g or a f u r t h e r a d d i t i o n to it, T h e p r o b l e m arises w h e n , as in the c a s e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , we n e e d to c o m p l e t e the task. S e x t u s p r e s e n t s a n o n - e p i s t e m i c v e r s i o n o f this p r o b l e m in r e p o r t i n g a n a r g u m e n t against the reality o f m o t i o n : I f a n y t h i n g is m o v e d , it is m o v e d e i t h e r by itself or b y s o m e t h i n g else. I f b y s o m e t h i n g else, t h e n s i n c e w h a t p r o d u c e s m o t i o n acts a n d w h a t a c t s is m o v e d , that item too w i l l n e e d s o m e t h i n g e l s e to m o v e it, a n d the s e c o n d a t h i r d , a n d so ad

I?'i

PiRRHONlAN

DISPUTE

RELATIVITY

Some assert P,

[1 appears P in situation S,

others assert P*

ARGUMENTS

It appears P* in situation S* —^

Undecided -

f —'

Decided: There is some reason (Q) to prct'er P to P*

' 1 DISPUTE Some assert Q, others assert Q"

INFINITE

HYPOTHESIS

RECIPROCITY

REGRESS

(MERE ASSERTION)

(CIRCULARITY)

Figure 4. T h e five m o d e i : a general sceptical stralegy [PH 1.164-77,2.19-20).

LSI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

infinitum,

s o that the m o t i o n c o m e s to have n o b e g i n n i n g

- w h i c h is a b s u r d . N o t e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h is m o v e d , t h e r e fore, is m o v e d by s o m e t h i n g else. N o r b y i t s e l f . . . (PH

3.67; s e e A f 10.76)

T h e a b s u r d i t y is the n o t i o n that the effects of s o m e p r o c e s s o c c u r w i t h o u t the relevant c a u s e h a v i n g o c c u r r e d to get t h i n g s g o i n g . II there is not a first step i n the p r o c e s s , it has not s t a r t e d . A n d if it has not started it c a n n o t be c o m p l e t e d , But p e r h a p s there d o e s not really h a v e to be a first c a u s e . I f the u n i verse is e t e r n a l , m o t i o n w i l l j u s t be a brute fact, a feature of the w a y t h i n g s are. T h e r e w i l l be n o first c a u s e of m o t i o n b e c a u s e objects i n the u n i v e r s e h a v e a l w a y s b e e n i n m o t i o n . So a n y i n s t a n c e o f m o t i o n that y o u care to n a m e w i l l have a p r e c e d i n g c a u s e . N o i n s t a n c e o f m o t i o n l a c k s a n i m m e d i a t e l y p r e c e d i n g c a u s e , a n d yet there is n o first c a u s e . It w i l l be futile to seek a first c a u s e of m o t i o n b e c a u s e it does not exist. B u t c l e a r l y t h i n g s are, a n d a l w a y s h a v e b e e n , i n m o t i o n , W h a t e v e r Sextus m i g h t say about this c o s m o l o g i c a l possibility, he w o u l d not accept it i n the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t . H e typically s u m s up h i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s m o d e b y r e m a r k i n g that it is impossible

to

p r o v e infinitely m a n y p r o p o s i t i o n s , to g r a s p a n infinite n u m b e r o l d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , to m a k e infinitely m a n y d e c i s i o n s o r j u d g e m e n t s a n d so o n . We s i m p l y d o not have the t i m e . T h e c o s m o l o g i c a l p r o m i s s o r y note is u n a c c e p t a b l e w h e n s e e k i n g a j u s t i f i c a t i o n . E v e n if I a m able to p r o v i d e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n for any r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d b e l i e f in the i n f i n i t e regress, l a m not able to p r o v i d e every j u s t i f i c a t i o n . So, w h i l e we c a n a d m i t that the infinite series is p o t e n t i a l l y j u s t i f i e d , it d o e s not follow that it is a c t u a l l y j u s t i f i e d . F o r e x a m p l e , i n o r d e r to a c t u a l l y d e c i d e b e t w e e n c o n t r a r y appearances, one:

w i l l n e e d a n o t h e r a p p e a r a n c e i n t u r n to j u d g e this s e c o n d a p p e a r a n c e , a n d a n o t h e r to j u d g e that, a n d so ad

infini-

tum. B u t it is i m p o s s i b l e to m a k e infinitely m a n y d e c i s i o n s . T h e r e f o r e it is i m p o s s i b l e to d i s c o v e r w h i c h a p p e a r a n c e s one m u s t use as s t a n d a r d s a n d w h i c h not.

152

(PH

2.78)

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

T h e c r u c i a l p o i n t is that before m y b e l i e f P e a n be j u s t i f i e d , all of the p r e c e d i n g beliefs o n w h i c h it d e p e n d s m u s t t h e m s e l v e s be j u s t i f i e d . T h e defender of the p r o m i s s o r y n o t e s m i s t a k e n l y a s s u m e s that the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f s o m e r a n d o m l y s e l e c t e d b e l i e ! d e p e n d s o n l y o n its predecessor. A s l o n g a s there is e v e n o n e a c t u a l l y u n j u s t i f i e d belief i n the series, we c a n n o t c o u n t the final b e l i e f j u s t i f i e d . So i n o r d e r tor a series o f b e l i e t s to p r o d u c e a j u s t i f i c a t i o n , it m u s t b e finite, that is, t h e r e m u s t be a first, a s s u m i n g the s e r i e s is not c i r c u l a r . H o w , t h e n , d o e s the m o d e d e r i v i n g f r o m infinite r e g r e s s i o n l e a d to the s u s p e n s i o n ot j u d g e m e n t ? S i n c e f e w w o u l d rest their j u s t i fication o n a n i n f i n i t e regress i n the first p l a c e , this m o d e is m o s t c o m m o n l y u s e d i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the h y p o t h e t i c a l a n d r e c i p r o cal m o d e s . S o for the m o s t part, r e v e a l i n g the u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a n J

infinite regress b l o c k s a l o g i c a l l y p o s s i b l e r o u t e to j u s t i f i c a t i o n . L i k e e v e r y o t h e r s c e p t i c a l a r g u m e n t , it a i m s to u n d e r m i n e the d o g m a t i s t s c o n f i d e n c e by b a l a n c i n g o p p o s i n g r e a s o n s i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e equipollence.

Hypothesis O n e t e m p t i n g w a y to put a n e n d to the regress is to set s o m e t h i n g d o w n as true, c l a i m i n g it needs n o f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . C o n t e m p o r a r y e p i s t e m o l o g i s t s call s u c h beliefs f o u n d a t i o n a l or basic, a n d s o m e d e s c r i b e t h e m as s e l f - e v i d e n t . A h y p o t h e s i s is, a n d s h o u l d be, a c c e p t e d as t r u e w i t h o u t a n y d e m o n s t r a t i o n ot its t r u t h . S e x t u s ' o b j e c t i o n is o b v i o u s ; " i f they c a n be t r u s t e d o n the basis o f a bare a s s e r t i o n , the p e o p l e viho

say the o p p o s i t e c a n a l s o be

t r u s t w o r t h y w h e n they b r i n g f o r w a r d their e q u a l l y s t r o n g a s s e r t i o n " (Af 8 . 4 3 6 ) . T h e e q u a l s t r e n g t h is a m a t t e r o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the p r o p o n e n t s of h y p o t h e s i s H are j u s t as c o n v i n c e d as p r o p o n e n t s o f a l o g i c a l l y i n c o m p a t i b l e h y p o t h e s i s H*. T h e s c e p t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d w i l l a c k n o w l e d g e the i n t u i t i v e force o f b o t h H a n d F P ; he w i l l see w h y s o m e o n e m i g h t f i n d either h y p o t h e s i s c o m p e l l i n g . T h i s w i l l lead h i m to e q u i p o l l e n c e a n d the s u s p e n s i o n of judgement,

153

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

T h e p r o p o n e n t o f H, h o w e v e r , w i l l not c o n c e d e that H* is e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g . H e m a y i n s i s t that in o r d e r l o r s o m e t h i n g to be selfevident ly true it d o e s n o t h a v e to be s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t r u e for e v e r y o n e . A g a i n , the d o g m a t i s t w i l l not be i m p r e s s e d b y d i s a g r e e m e n t .

He

m i g h t i n v o k e Aristotle's d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is better k n o w n to us a n d w h a t is better k n o w n b y nature, o r w i t h o u t q u a l i f i c a t i o n (Met,

1.1, l S 4 a l 6 - 2 l ) .

5

T h e idea is that the w o r l d is intelligible to

us b e c a u s e of the k i n d s of a n i m a l s w e are. H o w e v e r , it is not i m m e diately intelligible. It d o e s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y reveal its order, p a t t e r n or s t r u c t u r e , or g e n e r a l l y w h y it is the w a y it i s . B u t it d o e s reveal itself to t h o s e w h o are p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d a n d i n the right p h y s i c a l a n d intellectual c o n d i t i o n ( c o m p a r e [ A ' ] I r o m C h a p t e r 6 ) . A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s the t h i n g s better k n o w n b y nature are p r i m a r y features of the w o r l d . T h e y e x p l a i n w h y t h i n g s are the w a y they are, but they a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s e x p l a i n e d in t u r n . So e v e n t h o u g h we c a n o n l y a r r i v e at k n o w l e d g e o f these first p r i n c i p l e s by s t a r t i n g w i t h w h a t is m o r e f a m i l i a r o r better k n o w n to u s , they are not j u s t i f i e d or e x p l a i n e d by a p p e a l i n g to a n y t h i n g else. C r u c i a l l y , they are not f r i v o l o u s or a r b i t r a r y a s s e r t i o n s . In this s e n s e the d o g m a t i s t

does

h a v e a r e a s o n to p r e f e r h i s first p r i n c i p l e s to w h a t others m i g h t set d o w n h y p o t h e t i c a l l y . B u t he is still u n a b l e to p r o v i d e a n y e x t e r n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the t r u t h of h i s h y p o t h e s e s . S u c h p r i n c i p l e s w i l l o n l y a p p e a r c o m p e l l i n g to those w h o h a v e b e e n p r o p e r l y t r a i n e d . A Platonist c o u l d tell a s i m i l a r story, e x p l a i n i n g w h y o n l y s o m e people are able to g r a s p c e r t a i n basic t r u t h s that n e e d n o f u r t h e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H e w i l l c l a i m that s t a t e m e n t s about F o r m s o n l y s e e m a r b i t r a r y to those w h o have not a c q u i r e d the P l a t o n i c d i s c i p l i n e . A g a i n , the p o i n t is that d i s a g r e e m e n t about s e l l - e v i d e n t l y true p r o p o s i t i o n s n e e d not cause one to a b a n d o n what a p p e a r s s e l f - e v i d e n t l y true. Sextus d o e s not e x p l i c i t l y a d d r e s s this type o l reply, but it is easy e n o u g h to see w h a t he c o u l d say. F i r s t , the n o t i o n o l what is better k n o w n by nature, like the n o t i o n of P l a t o n i c F o r m s , is deeply e m b e d d e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory. I f we b a l a n c e e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t s for a n d against Aristotle's teleology we w i l l have n o i n c l i n a t i o n to believe that there is a n a t u r a l fît b e t w e e n h u m a n c o g n i t i v e e q u i p -

154

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

merit a n d the m e t a p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e of the w o r l d . T h i s i n t u r n w i l l lead us to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about the intelligibility o l the w o r l d a n d the v e r y existence ot t h i n g s that are better k n o w n b y nature. F u r t h e r m o r e , there is d i s a g r e e m e n t r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p e r t r a i n i n g a n d the p r o p e r c o n d i t i o n n e c e s s a r y to g r a s p s e l l - e v i d e n t truths, A n d there r e m a i n d i s a g r e e m e n t s r e g a r d i n g the content of those s u p p o s edly s e l f - e v i d e n t truths. So we f i n d o u r s e l v e s b a c k o n c e a g a i n at the m o d e of d i s p u t e . But p e r h a p s w e c a n differentiate a m o n g c o m p e t i n g h y p o t h e s e s o n the basis o f t h e i r p r e d i c t i v e o r e x p l a n a t o r y s u c c e s s . T h e d o g m a t i s t m i g h t c l a i m that; . . . a n a s s u r a n c e o f the h y p o t h e s i s b e i n g s t r o n g is the fact that the c o n s e q u e n c e that is d r a w n t r o m the t h i n g s a s s u m e d b y h y p o t h e s i s is f o u n d to be t r u e ; for if w h a t f o l l o w s f r o m these is s o u n d , the t h i n g s f r o m w h i c h it follows are a l s o t r u e and u n q u e s t i o n a b l e .

( M 8.375)

So s o m e h y p o t h e s e s are r a t i o n a l l y preferable to o t h e r s b e c a u s e they i m p r o v e o u r p r e d i c t i v e s u c c e s s : the c o n s e q u e n c e s ot the h y p o t h e s i s are true. N o w the p r o b l e m is to e x p l a i n h o w we are able to d e t e r m i n e that the c o n s e q u e n c e s are true. T h e y w i l l not c o n f i r m t h e m s e l v e s ; if that w e r e the c a s e it w o u l d not b e n e c e s s a r y to d e r i v e t h e m f r o m the p r e m i s e or h y p o t h e s i s . B u t they w i l l not be c o n f i r m e d by the p r e m i s e either, b e c a u s e this h a s not b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d as t r u e a n d is itself the p o i n t u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , o n e m i g h t h y p o t h e s i z e that s c r i p t u r e is the literal w o r d o f G o d , a n d then i n f e r that s o m e specific s c r i p t u r a l c l a i m is true. S i n c e there is a d i s p u t e about the h y p o t h e s i s , it is a s u n c o n v i n c i n g as the c o n t r a r y h y p o t h e s i s that s c r i p t u r e is not the literal w o r d o f G o d . S o it c a n n o t w a r r a n t the c o n s e q u e n c e . S i n c e l o r e v e r y h y p o t h e s i s H there is at least o n e c o n t r a r y h y p o t h esis H", the s c e p t i c finds the v e r y act o f h y p o t h e s i z i n g s u s p i c i o u s . N o o n e feels the n e e d to h y p o t h e s i z e w h a t is so e v i d e n t a s to be u n d i s p u t e d . Sextus r e t u r n s to this t h e m e i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n of the hypothetical mode;

L55

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

. . . s i n c e a p p a r e n t t h i n g s d i s p l a y j u s t that - that t h e y a p p e a r - a n d h a v e n o f u r t h e r p o w e r to teach us that they a l s o exist, let it be s u p p o s e d b o t h that t h e p r e m i s e s o l the d e m o n s t r a t i o n a p p e a r a n d s i m i l a r l y that the c o n s e q u e n c e d o e s . B u t i n this w a y the c o n c l u s i o n b e i n g sought w i l l not be d r a w n a n d the truth w i l l not be b r o u g h t f o r w a r d , s i n c e w e are l i m i t e d to bare a s s e r t i o n a n d o u r o w n affection. A n d w a n t i n g to s h o w that they not o n l y appear, b u t also exist, is the m a r k of m e n w h o are not content w i t h w h a t is n e c e s s a r y for n o r m a l use, but are eager a l s o to h e l p t h e m s e l v e s to w h a t e v e r p o s s i b l e . (MS

368)

I f w e a c k n o w l e d g e that reports a b o u t h o w t h i n g s a p p e a r or h o w I a m affected are m e r e a s s e r t i o n s , there is n o p r o b l e m , B u t a h y p o t h e s i s goes further. T o h y p o t h e s i z e is to p r e t e n d that one's m e r e a s s e r t i o n is i n fact true a n d to request that others treat it that w a y as w e l l , w h e t h e r it a p p e a r s t r u e to t h e m or not. I n so far as w e are c o m m i t t e d to a v o i d i n g beliefs that are m e r e l y a r b i t r a r y preferences, w e m u s t not accept any a r g u m e n t that p r o ceeds f r o m h y p o t h e s e s . W h e n e v e r the issue in q u e s t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by h y p o t h e s e s o n b o t h (or a l l ) s i d e s , w e m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t .

Reciprocity (circularity) T h e final route to j u s t i f i c a t i o n is to try to c l a i m that one's beliefs are m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e of e a c h other. S o n o n e of m y beliefs p r o v i d e the f o u n d a t i o n for the rest, but e a c h is s u p p o r t e d by the o t h e r s . W h e n the sceptic p o i n t s out that there is a d i s p u t e about m y c l a i m P, I m a y r e s p o n d that P is t r u e b e c a u s e o f Q, A n d w h e n t h e s c e p t i c p o i n t s out that there is a d i s p u t e about Q, I r e s p o n d that Q is t r u e b e c a u s e of P . S e x t u s w i l l then i n v o k e the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e , ""The r e c i p r o c a l m o d e o c c u r s w h e n what ought to be c o n f i r m a t o r y of the object u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n n e e d s to be m a d e c o n v i n c i n g b y the object u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n " ( P f f 1.169). I f I w i s h to establish that ( P ) s c r i p t u r e is the literal w o r d o f G o d , I c a n n o t rely o n ( Q ) s c r i p t u r a l

156

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

passages. Before I c a n rely o n the a u t h o r i t y of the passages I have to e s t a b l i s h the o r i g i n a l p o i n t u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n : that s c r i p t u r e is the literal w o r d o l G o d . I f the o n l y w a y I c a n d o that is b y a p p e a l i n g to s c r i p t u r a l passages, I c a n n o t s u c c e e d . I c a n n e v e r be instilled i n b e l i e v i n g P as l o n g as t h i s p r e s u p p o s e s that Q h a s b e e n j u s t i f i e d , b e c a u s e Q c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d u n t i l P is, T h i s applies also to d e f i n i t i o n s . C o n s i d e r the m a d d e n i n g e x p e r i e n c e of l o o k i n g u p the w o r d " p r o f l i g a c y " i n t h e d i c t i o n a r y a n d d i s c o v e r i n g that it m e a n s " d i s s o l u t e n e s s " N a t u r a l l y y o u t u r n to the d e f i n i t i o n o f " d i s s o l u t e n e s s " a n d f i n d that it m e a n s "profligacy". I f these are the o n l y entries, y o u w i l l be f r u s t r a t e d , b e c a u s e y o u n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d o n e i n o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the other, a n d vice v e r s a . Sextus p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f this w i t h " c a u s e " a n d "effect";

I f i n o r d e r to c o n c e i v e o f a c a u s e , w e m u s t a l r e a d y have r e c o g n i z e d its effect, a n d i n o r d e r to k n o w its effect . . . we m u s t a l r e a d y k n o w t h e c a u s e , the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e o l p u z z l e m e n t s h o w s that b o t h are i n c o n c e i v a b l e : the cause c a n n o t b e c o n c e i v e d o f as a c a u s e n o r t h e effect a s a n effect; for e a c h o f t h e m needs to be m a d e c o n v i n c i n g by t h e other, a n d we s h a l l n o t k n o w f r o m w h i c h to b e g i n to f o r m t h e c o n c e p t . H e n c e w e s h a l l not be able to assert that a n y t h i n g is a cause of anything.

(PR 3 . 2 1 - 2 )

W e m a y n o n e t h e l e s s f i n d o u r s e l v e s i n p o s s e s s i o n o f the c o n c e p t s o f cause a n d effect, or at least, as H u m e w o u l d put it, w e w i l l c o n t i n u e to e x p e c t that a c e r t a i n type o f event w i l l be f o l l o w e d b y a n o t h e r type o f event. S e x t u s a l l o w s that the s c e p t i c w i l l expect to f i n d fire w h e n h e sees s m o k e (PH 2.100; see the d i s c u s s i o n o f recollective s i g n s b e l o w ) . W h a t t h e r e c i p r o c a l m o d e b l o c k s i n this case is the attempt to argue that a n y t h i n g is a c a u s e i n t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l s e n s e , that i s , s o m e t h i n g that p r o d u c e s its effect n e c e s s a r i l y . T h e s c e p t i c s e x p e c t a t i o n s are n o t the sort o f t h i n g h e w i l l argue tor; h e m e r e l y finds h i m s e l f e x p e c t i n g that s m o k e w i l l follow fire. T h e dogmatist's a s s e r t i o n that P is the c a u s e o f Q , h o w e v e r , w i l l be d i s p u t e d a n d t h u s i n n e e d o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t i n o r d e r t o j u s t i f y h i s a c c o u n t o f cause

]?7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a n d effect he first n e e d s to p r o v i d e i n f o r m a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of the k e y t e r m s . T h e r e c i p r o c a l m o d e s h o w s t h i s to be i m p o s s i b l e , a s s u m i n g the o n l y w a y to d e f i n e the t e r m s is reciprocally, a n d this b l o c k s the dogmatist's attempt at j u s t i f i c a t i o n . R e c i p r o c a l d e f i n i t i o n s are not a r g u m e n t s . B u t they suffer f r o m the s a m e s h o r t c o m i n g a s r e c i p r o c a l a r g u m e n t s (for m o r e o n d e f i n i t i o n , see PH

2 . 2 0 5 - 1 2 ) . Just as the d e f i n i t i o n s are not i n f o r m a t i v e , the

a r g u m e n t s are not p r o b a t i v e . T h e y d o not p r o v i d e i n d e p e n d e n t reas o n s for a c c e p t i n g the c o n c l u s i o n as true. If I w e r e to collect a n u m b e r of e x a m p l e s of c o u r a g e o u s a c t i o n i n o r d e r to see w h a t they all have i n c o m m o n , it s e e m s that I first n e e d s o m e c r i t e r i o n or d e f i n i t i o n so that I d o not m i s t a k e n l y i n c l u d e a c o w a r d l y act a m o n g m y e x a m p l e s . S o I c a n n o t collect m y e x a m p l e s i n o r d e r to r e a s o n i n d u c t i v e l y to the nature of c o u r a g e s i n c e I m u s t first k n o w w h a t c o u r a g e is i n o r d e r to c o r r e c t l y c h o o s e m y e x a m p l e s (cf. PH 2 . 1 9 7 ) . O f c o u r s e , there m a y a l w a y s be other, n o n - r e c i p r o c a l g r o u n d s o n w h i c h to j u s t i f y one's c l a i m s or define one's t e r m s . T h e charge o f c i r c u l a r i t y d o e s not necess a r i l y lead by itself to epoche. S e x t u s uses it effectively in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h the h y p o t h e t i c a l m o d e i n the f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e . I f a n y o n e c l a i m s to h a v e a p p r e h e n d e d s o m e t h i n g that is d i s p u t e d , he w i l l c l a i m either that it is s e l f - e v i d e n t l y t r u e o r that he has e s t a b l i s h e d its t r u t h after h a v i n g investigated it. II h e opts for the former, the s c e p t i c w i l l a p p l y the h y p o t h e t i c a l m o d e . I f h e opts for the latter, the s c e p t i c w i l l a p p l y the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e , a r g u i n g that o n e c a n o n l y a p p r e h e n d w h a t has b e e n investigated, but that o n e c a n o n l y investigate w h a t has a l r e a d y b e e n a p p r e h e n d e d

(PH

2 . 6 - 9 ) . Sextus' a r g u m e n t is s t r o n g l y r e m i n i s c e n t o f Plato's p a r a d o x of e n q u i r y (Meno

8 0 d - e ; cf. P H 3 . 1 7 4 ) . O n e c a n n o t search for w h a t

o n e a l r e a d y k n o w s or for w h a t o n e d o e s n o t k n o w . I n the first case, there's n o n e e d to s e a r c h for w h a t y o u a l r e a d y k n o w . I n the s e c o n d case, y o u c a n n o t s e a r c h for w h a t y o u d o not k n o w b e c a u s e y o u d o not k n o w w h a t to l o o k for, so w i l l not k n o w if y o u h a p p e n b y a c c i dent to find it. F o r e x a m p l e , to investigate the s o u l I m u s t a l r e a d y k n o w e n o u g h to differentiate a s o u l f r o m o t h e r t h i n g s . E i t h e r I w i l l c l a i m that this k n o w l e d g e i s s e l f - e v i d e n t or that I h a v e a c q u i r e d it o n the b a s i s o l

158

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

e n q u i r y . T h e f o r m e r c l a i m invites the h y p o t h e t i c a l m o d e , a n d the latter invites the r e c i p r o c a l : I c a n n o t a p p r e h e n d the s o u l , o r a n y t h i n g about it, u n t i l 1 have investigated what a s o u l is, but 1 c a n n o t i n v e s tigate w h a t a s o u l is u n t i l I h a v e a p p r e h e n d e d e n o u g h to be able to isolate m y object o f study. R e s p o n s e s to this p u z z l e t y p i c a l l y attempt to b r e a k out of the c i r cularity, i m p l i c i t l y a c k n o w l e d g i n g the effectiveness of the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e . F o r e x a m p l e , a c c o r d i n g to the s o l u t i o n that Plato e x p e r i m e n t s w i t h i n the Me no, w e a l r e a d y k n o w ( i n s o m e s e n s e ) w h a t w e w i s h to d i s c o v e r b y i n v e s t i g a t i o n . L e a r n i n g t u r n s out to be a k i n d o f r e c o l l e c t i o n a n d , c o n t r a r y to a p p e a r a n c e s , we d o in fact s e a r c h tor w h a t we a l r e a d y " k n o w " . O f c o u r s e , a n y s u c h s o l u t i o n w i l l c o m m i t the 0

d o g m a t i s t to other c o n t r o v e r s i a l , a n d d i s p u t e d , c l a i m s . S o the sceptic w i l l still have a m p l e o p p o r t u n i t y to c h a l l e n g e h i s o p p o n e n t . B u t , we s h o u l d note that Sextus p r e s e n t s this a r g u m e n t initially as a p r o b l e m for the sceptic. I f e n q u i r y is i m p o s s i b l e , it is i m p o s s i b l e l o r e v e r y o n e , a n d the sceptic c a n n o t investigate the d o g m a t i s t s c l a i m s . F o r either he a p p r e h e n d s the t h i n g s the d o g m a t i s t s talk about or not. I f the sceptic a p p r e h e n d s w h a t the d o g m a t i s t s m e a n b y "soul", then he c a n n o t be g e n u i n e l y p u z z l e d by it. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if he d o e s not a p p r e h e n d "soul", t h e n he c a n n o t refute d o g m a t i c c l a i m s a b o u t it. Sextus disputes b o t h h o r n s o f t h i s d i l e m m a b y m a k i n g a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o senses o f " a p p r e h e n s i o n " . I n one sense it m e a n s s i m p l y to t h i n k o f s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t a f f i r m i n g its reality, a n d in a s t r o n g e r sense it m e a n s to g r a s p as true. So the s c e p t i c a p p r e h e n d s " s o u l " i n the w e a k e r sense, but is still p u z z l e d by w h e t h e r s u c h a t h i n g actually exists. H e u n d e r s t a n d s the w a y h i s o p p o n e n t s use their t e r m s , he u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t they t h i n k these w o r d s m e a n . B u t he d o e s not t h e r e b y take h i m s e l f to have g r a s p e d t h e m as t r u e ( P H 2.4-6, M8.334a-336a).

7

Sextus c l a i m s that t h i s d i l e m m a is i n tact e v e n m o r e p r o b l e m a t i c for the dogmatist. W h e n , for e x a m p l e , the Stoic disputes the E p i c u r e a n c l a i m that p l e a s u r e is the o n l y g o o d , he e i t h e r a p p r e h e n d s the t r u t h of this c l a i m o r not. I f h e a p p r e h e n d s it, t h e n h e m u s t reject h i s S t o i c i s m . A n d i f he does not a p p r e h e n d it, he c a n n o t d i s p u t e it,

159

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tor h e does not e v e n k n o w w h a t they are t a l k i n g a b o u t O f c o u r s e , the Stoic c a n appeal to the s a m e d i s t i n c t i o n the s c e p t i c does, c l a i m i n g that he grasps w h a t the E p i c u r e a n m e a n s , a n d not that w h a t the E p i c u r e a n m e a n s is true. S o this d i s t i n c t i o n a l l o w s b o t h d o g m a t i s t s and sceptics to c a r r y o n t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . But it also e m p h a s i z e s the p o i n t that we o n l y investigate w h a t we d o not c o m p r e h e n d I n so far a s d o g m a t i s t s believe they h a v e a r r i v e d at the t r u t h , they have put a n e n d to e n q u i r y {PH 2 . 1 1 ) ,

The specific account of Scepticism I n h i s specific a c c o u n t , S e x t u s investigates a n a r r a y ot p a r t i c u l a r d o g m a t i c d o c t r i n e s . R a t h e r t h a n take these a r g u m e n t s p i e c e m e a l , he a p p r o a c h e s t h e m i n a s y s t e m a t i c f a s h i o n , first g r o u p i n g the t o p i c s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h s t a n d a r d d o g m a t i c d i v i s i o n s , a n d s e c o n d l y targeti n g the m o s t b a s i c , f o u n d a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s or c o n c l u s i o n s w i t h i n each division. I n the o p e n i n g passages of M 7 (the first b o o k of Against cians),

the Logi-

Sextus sets out the three s t a n d a r d d i v i s i o n s o f p h i l o s o p h y

i n the H e l l e n i s t i c p e r i o d : l o g i c , p h y s i c s a n d e t h i c s . T h i s p r o v i d e s 3

a u s e f u l , a l t h o u g h c r u d e , f r a m e w o r k for o r g a n i z i n g the h i s t o r y o l G r e e k p h i l o s o p h y a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , for a r r a n g i n g h i s s c e p t i c a l targets i n a s y s t e m a t i c way. A s the s t o r y goes, m o s t o f the P r e s o c r a t ics c a r e d o n l y for the p h y s i c a l part, w h e r e a s Socrates c a r e d o n l y for the e t h i c a l , a n d Plato, A r i s t o t l e , E p i c u r u s a n d the Stoics t u r n e d their attention to all three. T h e Stoics w e r e p a r t i c u l a r l y f o n d o i e x p l a i n i n g the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n these three p a r t s m e t a p h o r i c a l l y ; for e x a m p l e , e t h i c s is the yolk, p h y s i c s the w h i t e a n d logic the shell ot a n egg ( A i 7 . 1 7 - 1 9 ) . O t h e r s c o m p a r e d p h i l o s o p h y to a l i v i n g b e i n g , c o m p a r i n g logic to the b o n e s a n d s i n e w s , e t h i c s to the flesh a n d p h y s i c s to t h e s o u l , a l t h o u g h s o m e p r e f e r r e d to see e t h i c s as the s o u l a n d p h y s i c s as the flesh. N e v e r t h e l e s s , l o g i c p l a y s either a s t r u c t u r a l or d e f e n s i v e role i n all the m e t a p h o r s . It s h o w s u s h o w we m a y w i n t r u t h tor o u r s e l v e s a n d t h e n h o w w e m a y d e f e n d the g r o u n d .

I in l

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

Sextus d e c i d e s to start w i t h logic s i n c e e v e r y part of p h i l o s o p h y , w h e t h e r Stoic or not, is d e d i c a t e d to the d i s c o v e r y o f t r u t h , a n d this i n t u r n r e q u i r e s reliable m e t h o d s o f differentiating the t r u e f r o m the false (PH 2.17; M 7.24). L o g i c p r o v i d e s the b a s i c tools for all three p a r t s o f p h i l o s o p h y (PH 2 . 1 3 ) . So, il the s c e p t i c s a r g u m e n t s are s u c c e s s f u l , the d o g m a t i s t s w o u l d be u n a b l e to differentiate the true t r o m the false, a n d a fortiori

u n a b l e to d e f e n d their c l a i m s i n

physics a n d ethics. Sextus follows this s t a n d a r d d i v i s i o n not b e c a u s e he e n d o r s e s it, but rather " l o r the s a k e o f a n o r d e r l y a n d m e t h o d i c a l s e a r c h " ( M 7.2). H i s f o c u s o n the m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m s w i t h i n e a c h s u b d i s c i p l i n e is s i m i l a r l y m o t i v a t e d . A p p e a l i n g to a h u n t i n g m e t a p h o r , he notes that just as it is m o r e s k i l f u l to be able to c a t c h m a n y p r e y all at o n c e w i t h a net t h a n to p u r s u e t h e m o n e at a t i m e w i t h a l i n e , so too it is m o r e a c c o m p l i s h e d to b r i n g d o w n m a n y c l a i m s i n c o m m o n w i t h a s i n g l e refutation (M 9.3). A p p e a l i n g to a different m e t a p h o r , he suggests the w a y to d o t h i s is b y u n d e r m i n i n g the f o u n d a t i o n o f the s t r u c t u r e we w i s h to b r i n g d o w n ( A i 9.2; PH 3.1, 2.84). So, for e x a m p l e , he b e g i n s h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f p h y s i c s w i t h a r g u m e n t s against the intelligibility of the active p r i n c i p l e , G o d . I n s o far as d o g m a t i c e x p l a n a t i o n s o f p h y s i c a l p h e n o m e n a rely o n the intelligibility of the active p r i n c i p l e , Sextus w i l l h a v e effectively b r o u g h t t h e m all d o w n b y m e a n s of h i s a r g u m e n t s against the d o g m a t i c

conception

of G o d . W e s h o u l d be c a u t i o u s about the i m p o r t o f all t h e s e m e t a p h o r s , h o w e v e r . W h e n Sextus " u n d e r m i n e s " o r " b r i n g s d o w n " s o m e d o g m a t i c a s s e r t i o n s , he does not take h i m s e l f to have p r o v e n t h e m false. T h e goal is o n c e a g a i n to b a l a n c e the r a t i o n a l force of a r g u m e n t s o n e a c h s i d e of a n issue, thereby l e a d i n g the reader to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . Sextus h i m s e l f has n o v i e w o n w h e t h e r the d o g m a t i s t s f o u n d a t i o n a l c l a i m s entail other p r o p o s i t i o n s . It is e n o u g h that the dogmatist t h i n k s so, It the v i e w I h a v e d e f e n d e d in C h a p t e r 7 is c o r r e c t , Sextus is not s e a r c h i n g tor the t r u t h a b o u t these d i s p u t e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l i s s u e s , but rather tor w h a t c a n be s a i d about t h e m i n o r d e r to a r t i c u l a t e equally c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t s o n b o t h s i d e s . G i v e n the t h e r a p e u t i c

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

a n d p h i l a n t h r o p i c nature o l the S c e p t i c a l project a n d the v a r i a b i l i t y i n w h a t people rind p e r s u a s i v e , Sextus w i s h e s to f i n d a variety of ways of b r i n g i n g about e q u i p o l l e n c e . T h i s e x p l a i n s the c o n c e s s i v e nature of m a n y ot h i s a r g u m e n t s ; in p a r t i c u l a r , it e x p l a i n s w h y , after pres e n t i n g the g e n e r a l l y a p p l i c a b l e strategy of the five m o d e s , a n d t h e n u n d e r m i n i n g d o g m a t i c logic, he n o n e t h e l e s s presses o n to attack their s p e c i f i c a r g u m e n t s i n p h y s i c s a n d e t h i c s . E v e n it h i s "patients" are n o t sufficiently i m p r e s s e d by the S c e p t i c a l assault o n the roots ot their d o g m a t i c p o s i t i o n s , he w i l l attempt to c u t off the larger l i m b s or at least the b r a n c h e s . I n the r e m a i n d e r o f t h i s chapter, w e shall f o l l o w h i m o n l y as far as l o g i c .

Logic: criteria, signs and proofs A s Sextus presents it, the m a i n task ot l o g i c is to e x p l a i n the nature of t r u t h , a n d to e x p l a i n h o w w e m a y reliably d i s t i n g u i s h it f r o m w h a t is false. T h e latter, e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! topic, is by far the prominent in both M 7 - 8

( Against

the Logicians)

most

a n d the parallel

text, PH 2. S o i n b o t h , texts, c r i t e r i a , s i g n s a n d proofs are c e n t r a l topics." Before t u r n i n g to s o m e characteristic a r g u m e n t s against e a c h of these, we m u s t note that Sextus d i s t i n g u i s h e s c r i t e r i a a n d s i g n s that are s c e p t i c a l l y a c c e p t a b l e f r o m t h o s e that are not (see F i g u r e 5 ) . N o k i n d ot proof is s c e p t i c a l l y acceptable s i n c e p r o o f is a r a t i o n a l m e a n s ot e s t a b l i s h i n g the t r u t h o l s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n . H o w e v e r , this does n o t p r e c l u d e the s c e p t i c f r o m u s i n g p r o o f s i n h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i cally t h e r a p e u t i c m a n n e r , that is, w i t h o u t p e r s o n a l l y a p p r o v i n g o f the n o r m a t i v e torce o f logical i n f e r e n c e .

Criteria

of action

versus

criteria

of

truth

T h e i n i t i a l d i s t i n c t i o n i s b e t w e e n a c r i t e r i o n of a c t i o n a n d a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h . A c r i t e r i o n o f a c t i o n is m e r e l y a n a p p e a r a n c e , a l t h o u g h it n e e d not be l i m i t e d to s e n s o r y a p p e a r a n c e s . F o r e x a m p l e , the h o n e y m i g h t a p p e a r g o o d to eat. T h i s a p p e a r a n c e , a l o n g w i t h the s c e p t i c s h u n g e r , w i l l e x p l a i n w h y he ate the h o n e y r a t h e r than a n a p k i n . U n l i k e a c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , s u c h a p p e a r a n c e s p r o v i d e n o j u s t i f i c a t i o n

162

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

CRITERIA

Clear

•

1

I : I . i

I ••

States of alTairs Figure 3. Criteria, iigns arid p r o o t i P H 2; M 7—8)

163

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

or d e f e n c e . T h e s e g u i d i n g a p p e a r a n c e s tell us n o t h i n g about w h e t h e r the agent s h o u l d have p e r f o r m e d the a c t i o n , i n either the

moral

or p r u d e n t i a l sense o f " s h o u l d " . A n d they are s u p p o s e d to g u i d e the sceptic w i t h o u t c o m p r o m i s i n g h i s epochs

(we shall consider in

C h a p t e r 9 w h e t h e r a n d h o w this m i g h t be s o ) . A c r i t e r i o n of t r u t h , o n the other h a n d , is the m e a s u r e or s t a n d a r d o n e a p p l i e s i n m o v i n g b e y o n d the a p p e a r a n c e to the u n d e r l y i n g reality, h o w e v e r that m a y be u n d e r s t o o d . T h e r e are t h r e e different types: g e n e r a l , s p e c i a l i z e d a n d v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d . T h e g e n e r a l i n c l u d e sight, h e a r i n g a n d taste, a m o n g the others. T h e s p e c i a l i z e d i n c l u d e t e c h n i c a l m e a n s o l m e a s u r e s u c h as s c a l e s , r u l e r a n d c o m p a s s . T h i s g r o u p a p p e a r s to be a subset o f the g e n e r a l In s o far as s u c h c r i t e r i a are extensions o f o u r senses. F u r t h e r m o r e , if we c a n n o t rely o n s e n s a tions, the g e n e r a l c r i t e r i a , t h e n w e c a n n o t rely o n the m e a s u r e m e n t s we r e a d f r o m o u r t e c h n i c a l i n s t r u m e n t s , the s p e c i a l i z e d c r i t e r i a . Sextus has n o c o m p l a i n t against e i t h e r o f these as l o n g as t h e y are e m p l o y e d i n the s c e p t i c a l f a s h i o n , that is, tor the s a k e of a c t i n g and not tor the s a k e of a s s e n t i n g to t r u t h . H e c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e m as o r d i n a r y or e v e r y d a y s t a n d a r d s i n c o n t r a s t w i t h the v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d type (PH 2.15). T h i s set a l s o a p p e a r s to be a s u b s e t of the s p e c i a l i z e d in s o far as the c r i t e r i a are t e c h n i c a l . T h e c r u c i a l differentiating feature is that v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d c r i t e r i a are m e a n t to reveal u n c l e a r or n o n - e v i d e n t matters. S e x t u s p r o p o s e s to deal p r i n c i p a l l y w i t h these s i n c e , u n l i k e the o t h e r two, they are the tools o l d o g m a t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s . ( W e shall r e t u r n to the sceptic's reliance o n a p p e a r a n c e s i n C h a p t e r 9.) H e f u r t h e r d i v i d e s the v e r y s p e c i a l i z e d c r i t e r i a into three k i n d s (PH

2.16; M 7 . 3 5 - 3 7 ; not i n d i c a t e d in F i g u r e 5) in o r d e r to s y s t e m -

atically refute the m o s t f a m o u s a n d p l a u s i b l e a c c o u n t s available (PH 2 . 2 2 - 7 9 ; Af 7 - 8 9 - 4 3 8 ) . H e r e again h e illustrates h i s p o i n t by w a y of a metaphor:

. . . the h u m a n b e i n g , " b y w h o m " the j u d g m e n t o c c u r s , is like the w e i g h e r or c a r p e n t e r ; sense-percept ion a n d thought, " t h r o u g h w h i c h " the j u d g m e n t o c c u r s , are l i k e the scales a n d r u l e r ; a n d the i m p a c t of the a p p e a r a n c e , in virtue o f w h i c h

li-.-l

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

the h u m a n b e i n g u n d e r t a k e s to j u d g e , is l i k e the state of the a f o r e m e n t i o n e d tools.

( A i 7.37)

I n t e r m s of the m e t a p h o r , these three a s p e c t s are i n e x t r i c a b l y c o n n e c t e d . I f a c a r p e n t e r is u n r e l i a b l e or u n s k i l l e d , it d o e s not m a t t e r h o w a c c u r a t e h i s s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n s m a y be a n d h o w finely t u n e d his tools are s i n c e he w i l l not be able to r e l i a b l y use t h e m to get the d e s i r e d o u t c o m e . S i m i l a r l y , e v e n it the c a r p e n t e r is s k i l l e d he w i l l be h a m p e r e d b y e i t h e r u n r e l i a b l e p e r c e p t i o n s or faulty tools. T h e m e t a p h o r is l i m i t e d , h o w e v e r , s i n c e there is n o c o n t r o v e r s y r e g a r d i n g w h a t a c a r p e n t e r is. I n the a n a l o g o u s case there is n o e n d to the p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s p u t e s r e g a r d i n g h u m a n nature. S e x t u s c l a i m s that if we c a n n o t resolve these d i s p u t e s a n d m a k e h u m a n nature intelligible, we c a n n o t a p p e a l to it as the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to b e true, But e v e n it we w e r e able to m a k e h u m a n nature intelligible, w e m u s t n o t i c e that the j u d g e m e n t that h u m a n b e i n g s are the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be true is m a d e by a h u m a n b e i n g . So, in a m a n n e r r e m i n i s c e n t o f A e n e s i d e m u s ten m o d e s , the j u d g e h

is p a r t y to the d i s p u t e . F u r t h e r m o r e , to grant t h i s j u d g e m e n t pres u p p o s e s that h u m a n beings are the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be t r u e , w h i c h is the v e r y issue at q u e s t i o n . A n d e v e n if we grant that h u m a n b e i n g s are the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be true, we m u s t t h e n d e t e r m i n e which ones

to trust,

to d i s a g r e e m e n t .

10

tor

h u m a n beings are p a r t i c u l a r l y

prone

N o w the p r o b l e m w i l l be that if o n e l a c k s the

expertise to q u a l i f y as the c r i t e r i o n by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be t r u e , he w i l l be u n q u a l i f i e d to settle the d i s p u t e s about w h i c h h u m a n b e i n g is the c r i t e r i o n . A s C i c e r o p u t s the p o i n t , it w i l l be the j o b ot a sage to d e t e r m i n e w h o is a sage ( A c . 2.9). O n the o t h e r h a n d , if he c l a i m s to be a sage h i m s e l f , either he m e r e l y asserts t h i s or he b a c k s it u p w i t h s o m e proof. T h e s c e p t i c w i l l not be s w a y e d by m e r e a s s e r t i o n , b u t w i l l h o l d the d o g m a t i s t to h i s o w n s t a n d a r d a n d d e m a n d s o m e r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s i n t u r n w i l l l e a d to a d e m a n d tor a c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h , t h r o u g h w h i c h or i n v i r t u e of w h i c h he m a y assess the proof. B u t in s e e k i n g to j u s t i f y h i m s e l f as

L65

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the c r i t e r i o n b y w h i c h t r u t h is r e v e a l e d , the d o g m a t i s t is p a r t y to the d i s p u t e . M o v i n g to the c r i t e r i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be t r u e , S e x t u s n o t e s that o n l y t w o faculties have b e e n p r o p o s e d : the senses a n d the intellect. T h i s p r o d u c e s t h r e e p o s s i b l e a c c o u n t s : w e d i s c e r n the t r u t h t h r o u g h the s e n s e s a l o n e , t h r o u g h the intellect a l o n e o r t h r o u g h b o t h . I f w e s u p p o s e it is t h r o u g h the senses a l o n e , h o w shall w e d e c i d e the d i s p u t e a m o n g t h o s e w h o say the s e n s e s are a l w a y s reliable, n e v e r reliable or o n l y s o m e t i m e s reliable? W e c a n n o t settle the matter b y a p p e a l to the s e n s e s s i n c e this w o u l d b e g the q u e s t i o n at issue. A n d i l it m u s t be d e c i d e d by a p p e a l i n g to s o m e t h i n g else, we w i l l h a v e to reject the a s s u m p t i o n that w e d i s c e r n the truth t h r o u g h the s e n s e s a l o n e . S i m i l a r l y , if we s u p p o s e it is t h r o u g h the intellect a l o n e , h o w s h a l l we d e c i d e the d i s p u t e a m o n g those w h o a r r i v e at i n c o m p a t i b l e v i e w s by the a p p l i c a t i o n of the intellect? We c a n n o t settle the matter by appeal to the intellect since this w o u l d b e g the q u e s t i o n at issue. A n d a g a i n , if it m u s t be d e c i d e d b y a p p e a l i n g to s o m e t h i n g else, w e w i l l h a v e to reject the a s s u m p t i o n that we d i s c e r n the t r u t h t h r o u g h the intellect a l o n e . Sextus next rejects the p o s s i b i l i t y that it is t h r o u g h b o t h o n the g r o u n d s that it w i l l still be t h r o u g h one or the o t h e r i n e a c h case ( a s s u m i n g the t w o d o not b l e n d into s o m e t h i r d , d i s t i n c t type o f faculty ). S o the p r e v i o u s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w i l l still apply. A n d we w i l l h a v e to c e r t i f y the reliability o f b o t h the s e n s e s a n d the intellect either t h r o u g h the s e n s e s or t h r o u g h the intellect. T h i s w i l l c a l l for the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e s i n c e e i t h e r the senses or the intellect m u s t first be certified before it c a n c e r t i f y the other. F i n a l l y , S e x t u s c o n s i d e r s a p p e a r a n c e s as the c r i t e r i o n i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h t r u t h is d i s c e r n e d . S i n c e a n a p p e a r a n c e is o n l y the affection of o u r sense organs, it is g e n e r a l l y t h o u g h t to be different f r o m the external object that gives rise to it. A s Sextus puts it, " h o n e y is not the s a m e t h i n g as m y b e i n g affected s w e e t l y " (PH 2.72); n o r is a picture o f Socrates the s a m e as Socrates h i m s e l f . T h i s leads to S e x t u s ' v e r s i o n o f w h a t we n o w t y p i c a l l y call the " v e i l of p e r c e p t i o n " It o u r o n l y a c c e s s to the true nature of e x t e r n a l objects o r s t a t e s of affairs is t h r o u g h the

166

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

way they affect u s , we m a y n e v e r c o n f i r m w h e t h e r the a p p e a r a n c e s are a c c u r a t e ; we w i l l n e v e r k n o w w h e t h e r the p i c t u r e of S o c r a t e s is a c c u r a t e s i n c e we c a n never meet S o c r a t e s h i m s e l f (PH

2.74-75),

A n d e v e n if we grant that we c a n g r a s p the u n d e r l y i n g n a t u r e o f t h i n g s i n v i r t u e o i the w a y t h e y appear, we w i l l h a v e to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n , or o n l y s o m e a p p e a r a n c e s . H i e first o p t i o n l e a d s d i r e c t l y to s e l f - r e f u t a t i o n s i n c e it a p p e a r s to s o m e that not e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n . S o I r o m the c l a i m that e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n it w o u l d i o l l o w that not e v e r y a p p e a r a n c e is the c r i t e r i o n . T h e s e c o n d o p t i o n r e q u i r e s us to e x p l a i n the b a s i s o n w h i c h we c a n m a k e s u c h a j u d g e m e n t . I f we m u s t rely o n s o m e other appearance, t h e n the s c e p t i c w i l l set u s off o n a n i n f i n i t e regress a n d we w i l l n e v e r finish j u s t i f y i n g the i n i t i a l a p p e a r a n c e s . It is m o r e p r o m i s i n g to c l a i m , as the Stoics do, that c e r t a i n a p p e a r a n c e s are s e l f - e v i d e n t l y true, at least to those w h o h a v e a c q u i r e d the p r o p e r m e n t a l d i s p o sitions. A f t e r s e t t i n g out the Stoic a r g u m e n t s in s u p p o r t of these kataleptic i m p r e s s i o n s ( A i 7 . 2 2 7 - 6 0 ) , Sextus tries to l e a d h i s readers to e q u i p o l l e n c e by r e p o r t i n g the A c a d e m i c a r g u m e n t s against t h e m (Af 7 . 4 0 2 - 3 5 ; see C h a p t e r 4 ) . It r e m a i n s p o s s i b l e that s o m e o n e m a y d i s c o v e r a n o v e l a c c o u n t of the c r i t e r i o n . W h a t S e x t u s t h i n k s he h a s s h o w n is that for the m o s t p r o m i s i n g c o n t e n d e r s available the a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t are as c o n v i n c i n g as the a r g u m e n t s o p p o s e d , Signs and

proofs

L o o s e l y s p e a k i n g , s i g n s a n d p r o o f s are j u s t different varieties o f c r i teria s i n c e they are all s u p p o s e d to e x p l a i n h o w w e are able to m o v e f r o m i g n o r a n c e to k n o w l e d g e . T h e Stoic a c c o u n t of s i g n s a n d proofs, w h i c h is Sextus p r i n c i p a l target, is m o r e n a r r o w l y l o g i c a l ( i n o u r 1

sense o f the w o r d ) . Stoics define a s i g n as the a n t e c e d e n t p r o p o s i t i o n i n a s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l that is capable of u n c o v e r i n g the c o n s e q u e n t (a s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l b e i n g o n e i n w h i c h it the a n t e c e d e n t is true, the c o n s e q u e n t is true; A i 8 , 2 4 4 - 5 6 ; PH 2 . 1 0 4 ) . T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s articulate the content ot a r a t i o n a l i m p r e s s i o n ( A i 8,70). P r o o f s , as w e s h a l l see, are a k i n d of s i g n s i n c e the c o n j u n c t i o n o f the p r e m i s e s

167

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

c a n be u n d e r s t o o d as a s i g n of the t r u t h of t h e c o n c l u s i o n (JVÍ 8.277, 299; PR 2 , 1 3 4 ) . T h e r e q u i r e m e n t that a sign ( o r p r o o f ) is c a p a b l e of u n c o v e r i n g or r e v e a l i n g t h e t r u t h ot the c o n s e q u e n t ( o r c o n c l u s i o n ) is c r u c i a l s i n c e not e v e r y antecedent of a s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l u n c o v e r s the truth of the c o n s e q u e n t . A s a n e x a m p l e , S e x t u s offers this: i f it is day, it is light. I n t h i s c o n d i t i o n a l , if they are t r u e , b o t h a n t e c e d e n t a n d c o n s e q u e n t are g r a s p e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o l o n e a n o t h e r , b y m e a n s ot t h e i r o w n m a n i f e s t character. T h i s is not a t e r r i b l y h e l p f u l e x a m p l e , h o w e v e r , s i n c e S e x t u s does not tell us w h a t w e w o u l d a t t e n d to ( o t h e r t h a n the tact that it is l i g h t ) i n g r a s p i n g that it is day. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e p o i n t is that i n s o m e s o u n d c o n d i t i o n a l s , the t r u t h o f the antecedent is not causally or e v e n c o n c e p t u a l l y related to the t r u t h ot t h e c o n s e q u e n t a n d h e n c e does not r e v e a l that t r u t h . C o n s i d e r this c o n d i t i o n a l by c o n t r a s t : i f a w o m a n is l a c t a t i n g , she has c o n c e i v e d . H e r e the antecedent s h o w s that t h e c o n s e q u e n t is true. It is s u p p o s e d l y becmtse w e a p p r e h e n d that a w o m a n is lactating that w e a p p r e h e n d s h e has c o n c e i v e d . S i n c e s i g n s a n d proofs are n e c e s s a r i l y revelatory, the c o n s e q u e n t s or c o n c l u s i o n s m u s t be initially u n c l e a r . B e t o r e c o n s i d e r i n g t w o o f S e x t u s ' b a s i c strategies tor retuting s i g n s a n d proofs, w e m u s t c o n s i d e r s o m e i m p o r t a n t d o g m a t i c d i s t i n c t i o n s S e x t u s reports b e t w e e n clear a n d u n c l e a r objects:

O f the u n c l e a r , s o m e are u n c l e a r o n c e a n d for a l l [ a b s o l u t e l y ] , s o m e are u n c l e a r for the m o m e n t [ t e m p o r a r i l y ] , a n d s o m e are u n c l e a r by n a t u r e [ n a t u r a l l y ] . W h a t c o m e s of itselt to o u r k n o w l e d g e , they say, is clear (e.g. that it is d a y ) ; w h a t does not h a v e a n a t u r e s u c h as to fall u n d e r o u r a p p r e h e n s i o n is u n c l e a r o n c e a n d for all (e.g. that the stars are e v e n i n n u m b e r ) ; w h a t has a n evident n a t u r e b u t is m a d e u n c l e a r for us for t h e m o m e n t by c e r t a i n e x t e r n a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s is u n c l e a r for t h e m o m e n t (e.g. for m e now, the city o f the A t h e n i a n s ) ; a n d w h a t d o e s not have a n a t u r e s u c h a s to fall u n d e r o u r evident g r a s p is u n c l e a r by n a t u r e (e.g. i m p e r ceptible p o r e s - for these are never a p p a r e n t ot t h e m s e l v e s

168

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ARGUMENTS

but w o u l d b e d e e m e d to be a p p r e h e n d e d , I f at a l l , by w a y of s o m e t h i n g else, e.g. b y s w e a t i n g . . . ) . (PH

2 . 9 7 - 9 9 ; see M 8 . 1 4 5 - 50)

T i l i n g s that are clear n e e d n o s i g n . A s l o n g as these are r e s t r i c t e d to a p p e a r a n c e s , Sextus w i l l n o t object, for i n that case there w i l l be n o d i s p u t e about t h e m . S i m i l a r l y , n o o n e b o t h e r s to a r g u e that the n u m b e r o l stars is o d d (or e v e n ) s i n c e this is absolutely a n d p e r m a nently unclear;

But t h i n g s u n c l e a r for t h e m o m e n t a n d t h i n g s u n c l e a r bynature are a p p r e h e n d e d t h r o u g h s i g n s - b u t not t h r o u g h the s a m e s i g n s : t h i n g s u n c l e a r for t h e m o m e n t a r e a p p r e h e n d e d t h r o u g h recollective s i g n s , t h i n g s u n c l e a r by nature t h r o u g h i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s . . . . T h e y c a l l a s i g n recollective if, h a v i n g b e e n o b s e r v e d e v i d e n t l y together w i t h the t h i n g it signifies, at the s a m e t i m e as it m a k e s a n i m p r e s s i o n o n us - a n d w h i l e the o t h e r t h i n g r e m a i n s u n c l e a r - it leads us to recall the t h i n g w h i c h h a s b e e n o b s e r v e d together w i t h it a n d is not n o w m a k i n g a n evident i m p r e s s i o n o n us (as i n the case o f s m o k e a n d f i r e ) . A s i g n is i n d i c a t i v e they say, i f it s i g n i f i e s that of w h i c h it is a s i g n n o t b y h a v i n g b e e n o b s e r v e d e v i d e n t l y together w i t h t h e t h i n g it s i g n i fies but f r o m its p r o p e r n a t u r e a n d c o n s t i t u t i o n (as bodilym o v e m e n t s are s i g n s ot t h e s o u l ) . (PH

2 . 9 9 - 1 0 1 ; see A i 8 . 1 5 1 - 5 5 )

T h e c r u c i a l difference is that i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s r e v e a l s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y g r a s p e d . T h e t w o objects o r events l i n k e d byrecollect ive s i g n s are b o t h potentially o b s e r v a b l e . S i n c e I c a n never e x p e r i e n c e the s o u l directly, it c a n o n l y be r e v e a l e d b y w a y of a n indicative sign. Sextus h a s n o p r o b l e m w i t h recollective signs. T h e y are part a n d p a r c e l o f o u r e v e r y d a y activity, i n s p i r e d b y w h a t H u m e later refers to a s o u r i n e s c a p a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n that t h e future w i l l r e s e m b l e the p a s t . " Sextus sees h i m s e l f as the c h a m p i o n ot c o m m o n s e n s e i n

169

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

m o u n t i n g h i s attack o n the d o g m a t i s t s ' private f i c t i o n of i n d i c a t i v e signs. O n e o f h i s c e n t r a l strategies for a r g u i n g against both i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s a n d p r o o f s is to d e r i v e a c o n t r a d i c t i o n f r o m two features that the d o g m a t i s t s c l a i m are e s s e n t i a l to b o t h . S i g n s a n d proof s are b o t h ( i ) relative to s o m e t h i n g . S i g n s are relative to the t h i n g s i g n i f i e d , a n d proofs are relative to the c o n c l u s i o n p r o v e d . But, s i g n s a n d proofs are also b o t h ( i i ) revelatory. N o w s u p p o s e A is a sign of B. O n the Stoics' o w n a c c o u n t of t h i n g s that are relative, A a n d B m u s t be a p p r e h e n d e d together. F o r : just as w h a t is to the right c a n n o t be a p p r e h e n d e d as b e i n g to the right of w h a t is to the left before w h a t is to the left has b e e n a p p r e h e n d e d . . . so s i g n s c a n n o t be a p p r e h e n d e d as s i g n s o f w h a t is s i g n i f i e d before w h a t is s i g n i f i e d has b e e n apprehended.

(PH

2,117)

Sextus' point is that we c a n n o t g r a s p that A is true a n d that it is a sign of B w i t h o u t h a v i n g a l r e a d y g r a s p e d that B is t r u e . O n e m i g h t grasp that A is true w i t h o u t thereby g r a s p i n g that it is a s i g n of B , but that is b e s i d e the p o i n t . C o n s i d e r a red traffic light. I n o r d e r for m e to g r a s p it as a sign to stop, I m u s t see it at o n e a n d the s a m e t i m e as a p h y s i c a l sign a n d as the c o m m a n d to stop. H o w e v e r , if A a n d B m u s t be a p p r e h e n d e d simultaneously, A c a n n o t be revelatory of B , b e c a u s e that w o u l d r e q u i r e that A be a p p r e h e n d e d before B, O t h e r w i s e we c a n n o t say that w e w e r e l e d to a p p r e h e n d B b e c a u s e of A . I n o t h e r w o r d s , for A to reveal the t r u t h o f B , there m u s t be a m o m e n t i n w h i c h w e a p p r e h e n d the t r u t h of A f o l l o w e d b y a m o m e n t i n w h i c h we a p p r e h e n d w h a t w a s p r e v i o u s l y u n c l e a r , n a m e l y the truth of B. B u t a g a i n , this c a n n o t h a p p e n if w e m u s t grasp the t r u t h o f w h a t is s i g n i f i e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h the s i g n . The

second, more

f a m i l i a r s c e p t i c a l strategy is to i n v o k e the

m o d e s . S o m e say that i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s exist a n d others d e n y it: N o w a n y o n e w h o says that there are i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s w i l l s p e a k either s i m p l y a n d w i t h o u t proof,

170

making a

mere

PiRRHONlAN

ARGUMENTS

a s s e r t i o n , or else w i t h proof. B u t i f he m a k e s a m e r e a s s e r t i o n he w i l l be u n c o n v i n c i n g , a n d i f he w a n t s to give a p r o o f he will take for g r a n t e d the matter u n d e r investigation. F o r s i n c e p r o o f is s a i d to be a s p e c i e s o f s i g n , t h e n as it is c o n t r o v e r s i a l w h e t h e r t h e r e are a n y signs or n o t , t h e r e w i l l be c o n t r o v e r s y too a s to w h e t h e r there are a n y p r o o f s or n o t - j u s t a s , it y o u are i n v e s t i g a t i n g , say, w h e t h e r there are a n y a n i m a l s , y o u are a l s o i n v e s t i g a t i n g w h e t h e r there are a n y h u m a n s . . . it is a b s u r d to try to p r o v e w h a t is u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h r o u g h what is e q u a l l y u n d e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n o r t h r o u g h i t s e l f . . . . (PH

2.121-2)

A n y p r o p o s e d a c c o u n t o l c r i t e r i a , signs or p r o o f s w i l l be d i s p u t e d . But t h e r e a p p e a r s to be n o w a y to p r o v i d e a n o n - a r b i t r a r y , or n o n q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g , r e s o l u t i o n ot s u c h d i s p u t e s , a n d w e c a n n o t p r o v i d e an infinite s e r i e s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n s . S e x t u s s u m m a r i z e s the a p p l i c a t i o n of the t r i l e m m a a s f o l l o w s :

I n o r d e r for the d i s p u t e that h a s a r i s e n about c r i t e r i a to be d e c i d e d , w e m u s t p o s s e s s a n agreed c r i t e r i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h w e c a n j u d g e it; a n d i n o r d e r for u s to p o s s e s s a n a g r e e d c r i t e r i o n , t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t c r i t e r i a m u s t a l r e a d y have b e e n d e c i d e d . T h u s the a r g u m e n t falls into the r e c i p r o c a l m o d e a n d the d i s c o v e r y of a c r i t e r i o n is b l o c k e d - for w e d o not a l l o w t h e m to a s s u m e a c r i t e r i o n by h y p o t h e s i s , a n d it t h e y want to j u d g e the c r i t e r i o n b y a c r i t e r i o n w e t h r o w t h e m i n t o a n infinite regress.

(PH

2.20)

So it s e e m s w e c u r r e n t l y p o s s e s s n o m e a n s by w h i c h to reveal w h a t is not a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t o r c a n n o t b e c o m e a p p a r e n t t h r o u g h everydaysorts o f p r a c t i c e a n d o b s e r v a t i o n . T h u s d o g m a t i c e p i s t e m o l o g y is s t y m i e d . A l l o f the a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t o f c r i t e r i a , s i g n s or p r o o f s are m e t w i t h e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l a r g u m e n t s i n o p p o s i t i o n .

171

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Conclusion P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is o n l y a c h a l l e n g e to t h o s e w h o b e l i e v e it is i m p o r t a n t to resolve t h e s e p e r s i s t e n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s w i t h s o m e n o n - q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g a r g u m e n t s that s h o w w h y o n e s i d e is r a t i o n a l l y preferable. It y o u d o not t h i n k this is i m p o r t a n t , t h e n y o u w i l l have n o m o t i v a t i o n to a d o p t a n d d e f e n d a p o s i t i o n . I n o r d e r for the P y r r h o n i s t ' s s c e p t i c a l c h a l l e n g e to be effective, he m u s t s h o w that y o u h a v e failed to a b i d e by y o u r o w n e p i s t e m i c p r i n c i p l e s . I f y o u are not c o m m i t t e d to these p r i n c i p l e s , y o u w i l l not be c o n c e r n e d w i t h any failure to a b i d e by t h e m , B u t it we accept the c h a l l e n g e , there a p p e a r s to be little h o p e of m e e t i n g it, T h e sceptic's a r s e n a l is impressive.

NINE

The (ordinary) life of a Pyrrhonist

T h e m o s t persistent o b j e c t i o n to P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m is that lite is n o t p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t beliefs. T h i s m a y be a p p l i e d to the practice of s c e p t i c i s m as well as o r d i n a r y , d a y - t o - d a y activities. So w h i l e the s c e p tic goes s h o p p i n g , m a k e s breakfast or a r g u e s against d o g m a t i s t s , she is d e l u d e d if she t h i n k s she has n o beliefs, A c c o r d i n g to the o b j e c t i o n , all i n t e n t i o n a l , p u r p o s e f u l a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s s o m e sort of belief. T h e r e are t w o different types of r e s p o n s e the s c e p t i c m i g h t m a k e , or that we m i g h t m a k e o n her behalf. F i r s t , we c a n d e n y that a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s belief. I f so, the s c e p t i c is able to act w i t h o u t h o l d i n g any beliefs, a n d the s c o p e of epochs

m a y be u n r e s t r i c t e d . S e c o n d l y ,

we c a n agree that a c t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s belief a n d c l a i m that this is not a p r o b l e m b e c a u s e the s c e p t i c has the sort o f b e l i e f n e c e s s a r y for the relevant a c t i o n . I n this case, the s c o p e of epoche is l i m i t e d : the sceptic does not s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about everything.

1

I shall follow G a i l

F i n e ( 1 9 9 6 ) in r e f e r r i n g to t h e s e o p t i o n s as the " n o - b e l i e f v i e w " a n d the " s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w " r e s p e c t i v e l y

2

W h e t h e r Sextus offers a n o - b e l i e f v i e w or a s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w r e m a i n s c o n t r o v e r s i a l , T h e versatility o l the c o n c e p t o l b e l i e f c o m plicates the i s s u e f u r t h e r b y a l l o w i n g for v a r i a t i o n s w i t h i n

each

c a m p . O n e attractive h y p o t h e s i s is that v e r s i o n s o f b o t h v i e w s a p p e a r i n S e x t u s ' w o r k , reflecting c o m p e t i n g s t r a n d s i n the h i s t o r y of P y r r h o n i s m . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , this w o u l d s a d d l e Sextus w i t h t w o

17.1

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

i n c o m p a t i b l e s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e s : one c a n n o t , in p r a c t i c e , believe n o t h i n g a n d s o m e t h i n g . W h i l e 1 t h i n k it is n o n e t h e l e s s likely that b o t h v i e w s s h o w u p in S e x t u s ' w o r k , I also t h i n k the n o - b e l i e f v i e w m a k e s the s t r o n g e r a p p e a r a n c e . I n t h i s c h a p t e r 1 s h a l l a r g u e that the P y r r h o n i s t s reliance on appearances i n h e r sceptical practice as well as i n o r d i n a r y a n d s k i l f u l a c t i v i t i e s c o m m i t s h e r to n o beliefs.

To b e l i e v e or n o t to b e l i e v e T h e e q u a l l y c o m p e l l i n g force o f o p p o s e d a r g u m e n t s or a p p e a r a n c e s l e a d s the s c e p t i c to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . I n o r d e r to o p p o s e a r g u m e n t s o r a p p e a r a n c e s , t h e y m u s t refer to the s a m e t h i n g . If it is not the s a m e tower that a p p e a r s n o w r o u n d a n d n o w s q u a r e , the a p p e a r a n c e s are not really o p p o s e d . S i m i l a r l y , i f t w o people use a key t e r m , s u c h as j u s t i c e , to m e a n different t h i n g s , they m a y have n o real d i s a g r e e m e n t . T o g e n u i n e l y disagree w i t h o n e a n o t h e r w e have to be t a l k i n g a b o u t the s a m e t h i n g s . A p p e a r a n c e s a n d a r g u m e n t s are e a s i l y o p p o s e d l o r the d o g m a tists i n so tar as he takes t h e m to refer to, a n d ideally to reveal, s o m e objective state of affairs. D o g m a t i s t s investigate w h a t e v e r a p p e a r s to be the case i n o r d e r to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r it really is the case. T h e s c e p t i c , h o w e v e r , d o e s not investigate w h a t is a p p a r e n t , but rather w h a t is s a i d about w h a t is a p p a r e n t (PH 1 . 1 9 - 2 0 ) . W h a t the d o g m a tist t y p i c a l l y says is that s o m e a p p e a r a n c e is t r u e for s u c h a n d s u c h r e a s o n s . H e is not content to m e r e l y say that this is h o w it s e e m s . T h u s t h e object o l s c e p t i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n is not the a p p e a r a n c e "that p\ but the a p p e a r a n c e "that p is t r u e " (PH 1.22) a n d , m o r e precisely, w h a t is s a i d a b o u t , a n d i n s u p p o r t of, the a p p e a r a n c e that p is true. Sextus r e m a r k s that t h e sceptic w i l l m e r e l y take the a p p e a r a n c e "that p " for g r a n t e d (PH

1.9).

T h e p r o b l e m is to d e t e r m i n e p r e c i s e l y w h a t the sceptic is d o i n g w h e n she takes a n a p p e a r a n c e for g r a n t e d . I n p a r t i c u l a r , d o e s she believe w h a t s h e t a k e s for g r a n t e d or not? I n w h a t f o l l o w s I w i l l a s s u m e t h e s t a n d a r d a n a l y s i s o f belief; it S b e l i e v e s p , t h e n S assents to t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that p is t r u e .

|-|

THE

(ORDINARY)

L I E E OP A

PYRRHONIST

I i w h a t the s c e p t i c finds o b j e c t i o n a b l e about d o g m a t i s m is its i n s i s t e n c e that t h i n g s are as they a p p e a r i n s o m e cases, t h e n the n o belief v i e w is c o r r e c t . F o r i n that case, the sceptic w i l l n e v e r c l a i m that t h i n g s are as they appear. I n o t h e r w o r d s , she w i l l never assent to any a p p e a r a n c e " t h a t p is true". C o n s e q u e n t l y , given the s t a n d a r d a n a l y s i s of belief, she w i l l never b e l i e v e that p .

The s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w a n d j u d g e m e n t a l appearances. O n the o t h e r h a n d , if w h a t the s c e p t i c f i n d s o b j e c t i o n a b l e about d o g m a t i s m is its i n s i s t e n c e that t h i n g s are a s they a p p e a r far the reasons

advanced,

t h e n the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w w i l l be c o r r e c t . F o r i n

that case, the s c e p t i c d o e s not object to a s s e n t i n g to the a p p e a r a n c e "that p is true"; she objects o n l y to a s s e n t i n g o n the basis of s o m e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . S o she m a y b e l i e v e that p is t r u e as l o n g as this b e l i e f is not b a s e d o n r e a s o n s ; for it it is b a s e d o n r e a s o n s , she w i l l be i n c l i n e d by h e r s c e p t i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n to a r g u e against it i n o r d e r to a c h i e v e e q u i p o l l e n c e a n d be r i d of the belief. A c c o r d i n g l y , the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w e m p h a s i z e s the lact that S e x tus e x p l i c i t l y offers h i s P y r r h o n i a n therapy to d o g m a t i s t s (e.g.

PH

3 . 2 8 0 ) . T h e d i s t u r b a n c e s that s c e p t i c i s m c a n c u r e are all b r e d of d o g m a t i c a m b i t i o n s to reveal the h i d d e n nature o f things. I f w e leave s u c h matters a l o n e , we w i l l not b e d i s t u r b e d , a n d we m a y c o n t i n u e to b e l i e v e in the m a n n e r o r d i n a r y people d o r e g a r d i n g o r d i n a r y t h i n g s , e x c l u s i v e l y o n the b a s i s of h o w they s e e m w i t h o u t a n y r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n . O r d i n a r i l y , p e o p l e d o not i n v o k e m e t a p h y s i cal, e p i s t e n i o l o g i c a l or s c i e n t i f i c t h e o r i e s to s u p p o r t the belief that the cat is o n the mat. A n d they w o u l d p r o b a b l y b e at a c o m p l e t e loss i f one w e r e to c h a l l e n g e t h e m to p r o v i d e s u c h w e i g h t y s u p port for w h a t they find perfectly e v i d e n t . S i n c e t h e r e a p p e a r s to be n o i m m e d i a t e p r a c t i c a l benefit in f i n d i n g r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t for w h a t a l r e a d y w o r k s a n d is a l r e a d y clear, m o s t p e o p l e have n o interest i n d o i n g so. It is o n l y w h e n t h i n g s b r e a k d o w n , c o n t r a d i c t i o n s arise or i n c o h e r e n c e c r e e p s i n that p e o p l e b e g i n to c a l l Into q u e s t i o n w h a t is e v i d e n t l y the case. T h u s b e g i n s the p u r s u i t o f t r u t h , l e a d i n g to

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the d i s t u r b i n g d o g m a t i c beliefs that S e x t u s ' s c e p t i c a l t h e r a p y is s u p p o s e d to e l i m i n a t e . S c e p t i c a l l y acceptable beliefs, o n the o t h e r h a n d , are u n a v o i d a b l e , and i n e l i m i n a b l e . I d o n o t c h o o s e t o b e l i e v e , for e x a m p l e , that the b o o k is g r e e n , that h o n e y tastes sweet o r that I a m b e i n g affected i n w h a t e v e r w a y I a m b e i n g affected. S u c h a d v e n t i t i o u s beliefs m a y be w h a t S e x t u s h a s i n m i n d w h e n he r e m a r k s that sceptics "assent to the teelings forced u p o n t h e m b y a p p e a r a n c e s - for e x a m p l e , they w o u l d not say, w h e n heated o r c h i l l e d , ' I t h i n k 1 a m n o t heated ( o r : c h i l l e d ) " ' l . l 3J. W h a t they resist is a s s e n t i n g to any u n c l e a r object o f s c i -

{PH

entific investigation. S i n c e w h a t is d i s p u t e d i s w h e t h e r o r n o t s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n is true, a n d s p e c i f i c a l l y w h e t h e r the r e a s o n s a d v a n c e d i n s u p p o r t establish this t r u t h , the sceptic o n l y needs to a v o i d a c c e p t i n g that s o m e t h i n g i s t r u e based on rational

considerations.

I f Sextus is u s i n g the t e r m " a s s e n t " i n s o m e t h i n g like the Stoic sense, there m u s t be s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n c l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h t h e feeli n g s forced o n t h e s c e p t i c . O t h e r w i s e , t h e feeling o r a p p e a r a n c e s h e receives w i l l not be " s a y i n g " a n y t h i n g w i t h w h i c h s h e m i g h t agree. A n d i n o r d e r to c a p t u r e the i m m e d i a t e a n d i n v o l u n t a r y nature o f the assent, w e m a y t h i n k o f the a p p e a r a n c e s h e receives as judgemental: it w i l l c o n t a i n o r i m p l y the j u d g e m e n t that s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n a r t i c u l a t i n g the content o f the a p p e a r a n c e is true. B u t w h a t i s the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of s u c h a p p e a r a n c e s ? T h e a p p e a r a n c e that the b o o k is green m a y be a r t i c u l a t e d b y t w o distinct propositions: T h e b o o k is g r e e n . H i e a p p e a r a n c e o f the b o o k is g r e e n . T h e s u b j e c t of the first p r o p o s i t i o n is an object in the w o r l d : the b o o k . T h e s u b j e c t o f the s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n i s a m e n t a l state; the a p p e a r a n c e o l t h e b o o k . T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n refers to the w a y o n e is affected, w h i l e the first relers to w h a t i s c a u s i n g the affection. W e s h o u l d note t h e difference b e t w e e n w h a t w o u l d have to be the case i n o r d e r for e a c h o l these p r o p o s i t i o n s to b e true. H i e first one w o u l d be true, o n a s t a n d a r d , c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y o f t r u t h ,

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just i n case t h e b o o k i s g r e e n . T h e s e c o n d o n e w o u l d be true, a g a i n o n a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e theory, just i n case t h e b o o k a p p e a r s g r e e n . T h e first p r o p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h a fact about t h e w o r l d that i s e x t e r n a l to the agent w h i l e the s e c o n d p r o p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d s w i t h the m e n t a l state o n e h a s w h e n the b o o k a p p e a r s g r e e n . Let u s c o n s i d e r each o f these i n t u r n . F i r s t , d o e s t h e sceptic believe that t h e b o o k is green i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the a p p e a r a n c e ? O n at least o n e o c c a s i o n , S e x t u s s e e m s to say that h e j u d g e s h o w p e r c e p t i b l e t h i n g s are o n t h e basis o f h o w they a p p e a r : N o t h i n g is o f a n a t u r e to be g r a s p e d b y m e a n s o f itself; ever y t h i n g is g r a s p e d b y m e a n s o f a n effect, w h i c h is o t h e r t h a n w h a t p r o d u c e s it, the t h i n g that appears. F o r w h e n h o n e y has b e e n brought to m e a n d 1 h a v e b e e n s w e e t e n e d , I guess that the e x t e r n a l l y e x i s t i n g h o n e y i s s w e e t , a n d w h e n fire h a s b e e n b r o u g h t to m e a n d I have b e e n w a r m e d , I take the c o n d i t i o n in m e as a sign that the e x t e r n a l l y e x i s t i n g fire is w a r m , a n d the s a m e a r g u m e n t applies i n the case o f o t h e r perceptible things.

( M 7.365, e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

By " g u e s s i n g " that h o n e y is sweet a n d by " t a k i n g " the fire to be w a r m , S e x t u s s e e m s to be s a y i n g that t h e sceptic b e l i e v e s these t h i n g s . I f s o , t h i s c o u l d h e l p u s u n d e r s t a n d the sense i n w h i c h Sextus c h a m p i o n s o r d i n a r y life {bios; e.g. PH 2 . 2 4 4 - 6 , 2.254, 2 . 2 5 8 , 3 . 2 3 5 ) . II w e o r d i n a r i l y take the w a y t h i n g s a p p e a r t o i n d i c a t e t h e w a y they are, the b u s i n e s s o f o r d i n a r y life w i l l be c o n d u c t e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h j u d g e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e s . T h i s applies not o n l y to s i m p l e s e n sations, but also to e v a l u a t i v e j u d g e m e n t s a n d p r e d i c t i o n s : it s e e m s , a n d w e believe, that h u r t i n g i n n o c e n t p e o p l e is w r o n g , that r u n n i n g red lights i s d a n g e r o u s a n d that a w i n d o w w i l l shatter w h e n h i t by a rock. Our

ability to m a k e a c c u r a t e p r e d i c t i o n s is a c r u c i a l e l e m e n t

of e v e r y d a y life. A s w e h a v e seen, S e x t u s d e s c r i b e s t h i s i n t e r m s of recollective s i g n s , w h i c h " l e a d us to recall t h e t h i n g w h i c h h a s b e e n o b s e r v e d together w i t h it a n d is n o t n o w m a k i n g a n e v i d e n t i m p r e s s i o n o n u s (as i n the c a s e o f s m o k e a n d fire)" {PH 2 . 1 0 0 ) . A

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recollective sign m a y be u n d e r s t o o d as a j u d g e m e n t a l a p p e a r a n c e : w h e n 1 see s m o k e , I also receive the a p p e a r a n c e that there is s o m e fire there. T h e s c e p t i c w i l l register h e r tentative b e l i e f by s a y i n g , "there appears to b e a fire". O b v i o u s l y t h i s is not a matter of a c t u a l l y s e e i n g the fire, b u t r a t h e r it s e e m i n g to her that there is s o m e fire c a u s i n g the s m o k e . O f c o u r s e it r e m a i n s possible that things are not what they appear to be. T h e sceptic c a n easily a c k n o w l e d g e this by h o l d i n g h e r beliefs w i t h the a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e s t y . S h e o n l y tentatively b e l i e v e s the a p p e a r a n c e s f o r c e d o n h e r a n d s h e is entirely o p e n to the p o s s i b i l i t y that things m a y not be as they s e e m , I n any case, she is j u s t as r e a d y as a n y o t h e r P y r r h o n i s t to d i s p u t e d o g m a t i c c l a i m s about n o n - e v i d e n t matters. W h i l e there is m o r e that c a n be s a i d i n s u p p o r t of this view, there are p o w e r f u l o b j e c t i o n s to be r a i s e d . F i r s t , o n at least two o c c a s i o n s Sextus says that sceptics affirm n o t h i n g about e x t e r n a l objects, w h i c h he explicitly contrasts w i t h what is apparent a n d w i t h the w a y the sceptic feels (PH 1.15,

1.208). I n r e p o r t i n g h o w she feels t h e n she is

not s a y i n g a n y t h i n g about the e x t e r n a l objects. A n d , m o r e generally, S e x t u s i n s i s t s that w h e n e v e r he talks about things he s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d as t a l k i n g about h o w they a p p e a r (see e s p e c i a l l y Sextus i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k at PH

1

1.4).

S e c o n d l y , the p e r s i s t e n c e o f the apmxhi

objection strongly s u g -

gests that the S c e p t i c s o p p o n e n t s d u g i n their heals o n p r e c i s e l y 1

this p o i n t : a c t i o n is i m p o s s i b l e l o r o n e w h o h a s n o beliefs. If the S c e p t i c s a c t u a l l y c l a i m e d to assent to the t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about the externa] w o r l d i m p l i c i t in a p p e a r a n c e s , they w o u l d have h a d a s i m p l e a n d c o n c l u s i v e r e s p o n s e : a c t i o n is possible tor us b e c a u s e we have all the o r d i n a r y beliefs that e v e r y o n e else h a s . B u t we have n o e v i d e n c e that a n y P y r r h o n i s t offered this response, S o it s e e m s that at least s o m e P y r r h o n i s t s w e r e r e c o m m e n d i n g a lite w i t h o u t b e l i e f i n the o r d i n a r y sense. Let us t u r n to the s e c o n d k i n d o l p r o p o s i t i o n to w h i c h the s c e p t i c m i g h t assent. D o e s the s c e p t i c believe that the a p p e a r a n c e of the b o o k is g r e e n ? If so, her belief is solely about the m e n t a l state she is i n at that m o m e n t a n d not about the e x t e r n a l object that is s u p -

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p o s e d l y the c a u s e o f h e r e x p e r i e n c e , T h i s m a y be w h a t Sextus has i n m i n d w h e n he identifies p a s s i v e a n d u n w i l l e d feelings a s the s t a n d a r d a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the sceptic g u i d e s her a c t i o n s {PH

1.22,1.13).

A s w i t h the first v e r s i o n o f t h i s v i e w , the a p p e a r a n c e that the b o o k is g r e e n c a r r i e s w i t h it a j u d g e m e n t - but in t h i s case, it is the j u d g e m e n t that the b o o k a p p e a r s g r e e n , or that o n e is affected greenly. We m a y apply this interpretation to the sceptic's reliance o n recol¬ lective s i g n s as w e l l . H a v i n g o b s e r v e d a scar, s h e says that a w o u n d w a s i n f l i c t e d , or "there appears to h a v e b e e n a w o u n d here". S h e m i g h t m e a n that s h e c a n n o t h e l p but to t h i n k o f w o u n d s w h e n she sees s c a r s . I f so, s h e is s i m p l y r e p o r t i n g h o w the o b s e r v a t i o n affects her. S i m i l a r l y , we m a y say that s m o k e serves as a sign o n l y i n d r a w i n g the m i n d o n to expect a n o t h e r sort of a p p e a r a n c e . A n advantage of this v e r s i o n o f the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w is that it a l l o w s us to e x p l a i n w h y the Sceptics' o p p o n e n t s c o n t i n u e d to raise the s p e c t r e of apraxia.

I f the o b j e c t i o n is that a c t i o n r e q u i r e s belief

about e x t e r n a l objects, it w i l l c o n t i n u e to apply to those w h o c l a i m not to h a v e s u c h beliefs, T h i s v i e w also a l l o w s us to u n d e r s t a n d h o w the sceptical reply m i g h t go. S e x t u s w o u l d be c l a i m i n g that a l t h o u g h the s c e p t i c l a c k s beliefs about e x t e r n a l objects, she n o n e t h e l e s s has beliefs (about her o w n m e n t a l states) that are sufficient for a c t i o n , A n o t h e r a d v a n t a g e is that it reveals just h o w strange a c h a r a c t e r the s c e p t i c i s . T h i s is fitting, s i n c e S e x t u s s o m e t i m e s presents h i m s e l f as the c h a m p i o n o f s c e p t i c i s m i n o p p o s i t i o n to o r d i n a r y life a s w e l l as d o g m a t i s m . S c e p t i c s are indifferent to the o p i n i o n ot the m a n y ( A i 1,5); i n d e e d , P y r r h o is a m o d e l o f sceptical eccentricity. M o r e i m p o r tantly, o r d i n a r y people are o n l y m a r g i n a l l y less likely to be d i s t u r b e d than p h i l o s o p h e r s (e.g. PH

1.30), I n t e r m i n a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y is not

the exclusive d o m a i n ot intellectuals [PH

1,165). O r d i n a r y people

disagree about; w h i c h g o d s exist; w h e t h e r h e a l t h , w e a l t h or w i s d o m is the greatest g o o d ( A i 11.49), u n l e s s it is sex, gluttony, d r u n k e n ness or g a m b l i n g ( P H 3 , 1 8 0 ) ; a n d even w h e t h e r apparent t h i n g s are intelligible o r p e r c e p t i b l e ( A i 8 , 3 5 5 ) . T h e p o i n t is that the d i v i d e b e t w e e n o r d i n a r y p e o p l e a n d d o g m a t i s t s is not n e a r l y a s w i d e as the o n e b e t w e e n t h e m a n d the S c e p t i c s . T h e Sceptic's r e f u s a l to believe a n y t h i n g about e x t e r n a l o b j e c t s h e l p s to e x p l a i n t h i s d i v i d e .

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T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m w i t h this v i e w . W h e n Sextus d i s c u s s e s the q u e s t i o n ot w h e t h e r s c e p t i c s h o l d beliefs, he r e m a r k s that " i f y o u h o l d beliefs, then y o u posit a s real the t h i n g s y o u are s a i d to h o l d beliefs a b o u t " (PH 1.14). It f o l l o w s i m m e d i a t e l y that if the sceptic h o l d s beliefs a b o u t her m e n t a l states, she posits m e n t a l states as real. B u t c l e a r l y the s c e p t i c s h o u l d a v o i d s u c h d o g matic commitments. M e n t a l states are theoretical entities that are hotly d i s p u t e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s . U n d e r s t o o d as objective features o f the w o r l d , about w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s m a y b e true o r false, they are not i d e n t i c a l to p e r c e p t u a l a w a r e n e s s , u n d e r s t o o d f r o m the f i r s t - p e r s o n p e r s p e c tive. W h i l e s o m e d e n y the v e r y existence of m e n t a l states, n o one s i n c e r e l y d e n i e s that she feels a s she d o e s . So if the b e l i e f that she is b e i n g p e r c e p t u a l l y s w e e t e n e d c o m m i t s the s c e p t i c to the existence of m e n t a l states ( o r s o m e o t h e r s u p p o s e d l y real entity c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the p r o p o s i t i o n a l content o l her b e l i e f ) t h e n she s h o u l d not h a v e s u c h beliefs. A s i m i l a r p r o b l e m arises if we a s k the s o m e - b e l i e l s c e p t i c w h y she b e l i e v e s she is p e r c e p t u a l l y s w e e t e n e d w h e n she tastes h o n e y . T h e r e are two k i n d s of r e s p o n s e she c a n m a k e , n e i t h e r of w h i c h are sceptically suitable. C l e a r l y s h e w i l l not r e s p o n d w i t h a n a c c o u n t o l the r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s i n s u p p o r t o f h e r belief; a s w e h a v e s e e n , she w o u l d o n l y d o that i n o r d e r to b a l a n c e the p s y c h o l o g i c a l force o f the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n s u p p o r t o f the o p p o s i n g view. B u t n e i t h e r s h o u l d she offer a p u r e l y c a u s a l a c c o u n t s h o w i n g h o w she c o u l d not h e l p b e l i e v i n g as she d o e s . I f she a p p e a l s to the s u p p o s e d fact that she c o u l d not resist b e l i e v i n g that the h o n e y a p p e a r s sweet, she w i l l o n c e again m o v e b e y o n d w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y apparent a n d stray i n t o the d o g m a t i c territory ot u n c l e a r a n d d i s p u t e d matters.

The no-belief v i e w and phenomenological appearances O n the o t h e r h a n d , if the s c e p t i c h a s n o beliefs she w i l l not have to a n s w e r a n y q u e s t i o n s about w h y s h e believes as she d o e s . I n o r d e r to s e e h o w this is p o s s i b l e we w i l l n e e d to a r t i c u l a t e a n o n - c o g n i t i v e ,

THE

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v i e w of a p p e a r a n c e s . A c c o r d i n g to t h i s v i e w ,

a p p e a r a n c e s c o n t a i n or i m p l y n o p r o p o s i t i o n s e i t h e r a b o u t e x t e r n a l objects o r e v e n about m e n t a l states. W h e n the s c e p t i c r e p o r t s o n the a p p a r e n t s w e e t n e s s o f h o n e y , she is o n l y telling us a b o u t t h e w a y t h i n g s are c u r r e n t l y affecting her. She w i l l be u s i n g l a n g u a g e not to express s o m e fact but rather s i m p l y to c o n v e y h o w she is feeling. It w i l l still be p o s s i b l e to a r t i c u l a t e s o m e p r o p o s i t i o n to c o r r e s p o n d to t h e c o n t e n t o f h e r feeling. B u t il the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i a c c o u n t is c o r r e c t , it is n o t n e c e s s a r y for h e r to d o so. S u c h a r t i c u l a t i o n is a c o g n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n that is d i s t i n c t f r o m b e i n g p a s s i v e l y affected by the w a y t h i n g s appear. It she a r t i c u l a t e s the p r o p o s i t i o n a n d assents to it she w i l l h a v e m o v e d b e y o n d w h a t is e v i d e n t a n d t a k e n a s t a n d o n w h a t is really t h e case, regardless o f w h e t h e r she h a s a n y r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s for that s t a n d . B u t again, s u c h a step is not n e c e s s a r y ; s i m p l e o r g a n i s m s , for e x a m p l e , are affected b y the w o r l d w i t h o u t a r t i c u l a t ing any propositional content. It the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i v i e w o f a p p e a r a n c e s is c o r r e c t , n o beliefs are u n a v o i d a b l e a n d i n e l i m e n a b l e , a n d n o b e l i e ! is i m m u n e f r o m s c e p t i c a l c h a l l e n g e s . It w i l l still be the case that I c a n n o t help feeli n g p a i n w h e n I d o or tasting s w e e t n e s s w h e n I do, but I a m never c o m p e l l e d to believe anythingijfcouf these feelings. O n the p h e n o m enologicai v i e w , a p p e a r a n c e s d o not c o m e b u n d l e d w i t h j u d g e m e n t s . O n c e I take the c o g n i t i v e attitude that s o m e part of the w o r l d is d e t e r m i n a t e l y o n e w a y rather t h a n a n o t h e r , that is, that p is t r u e , I m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e the p o s s i b i l i t y that t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y c l a i m n o t - p is true. A n d o n c e these p r o p o s i t i o n s have b e e n o p p o s e d , I w i l l be led b y the s c e p t i c to see, regardless of w h e t h e r I c u r r e n t l y have any r a t i o n a l g r o u n d s for m y b e l i e ! that p, that there is as m u c h to b e s a i d i n s u p p o r t of the o n e as for the other. T o a v o i d s u c h p r o b l e m s , the P y r r h o n i s t s h o u l d h o l d n o beliefs. T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a i a c c o u n t of a p p e a r a n c e s h o w s h o w she m a y a v o i d d o i n g so w h i l e n o n e t h e l e s s p a s s i v e l y a c q u i e s c i n g , that is, not resisting, t h e n a t u r a l p u s h a n d p u l l o l a p p e a r a n c e s , T h i s v i e w e n j o y s the advantages I have attributed to the last, s o m e belief, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n : it s h o w s j u s t h o w strange a c h a r a c t e r the P y r r h o n i s t is; it e x p l a i n s the p e r s i s t e n c e of the aprnxia

objection; a n d

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it p r e s e r v e s the r a d i c a l n a t u r e o f P y r r h o n i s m . It a l s o p r e s e r v e s the a p p a r e n t l y u n i v e r s a l r e a c h ot the P y r r h o n i s t s a r g u m e n t s , a n d a l l o w s us to take S e x t u s at h i s w o r d w h e n he repeatedly insists that the sceptic s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t about e v e r y t h i n g .

External world scepticism To c o n s i s t e n t l y m a i n t a i n this v i e w , we w i l l have to a d m i t that r a d i c a l s c e p t i c i s m challenges beliefs about the v e r y e x i s t e n c e of the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , a l o n g w i t h t h i n g s s u c h as m e n t a l states a n d c a u s a l l a w s . A t M 7.366, Sextus argues that aIIexternal

t h i n g s are u n c l e a r a n d u n k n o w n

to u s . I f w e interpret this quite b r o a d l y it w i l l i n c l u d e not o n l y the p r o p e r t i e s o f t h i n g s , but also their v e r y e x i s t e n c e .

3

I f the e x t e r n a l

w o r l d is p e r m a n e n t l y a n d i r r e v o c a b l y u n c l e a r , w h a t entitles u s to t h i n k that it exists i n the first place? Sextus attributes to the C y r e n a i c s the v i e w that e v e r y o n e is i n f a l lible w i t h respect to the w a y t h i n g s affect t h e m . O n e c a n n o t b e m i s t a k e n that she is affected greenly, or sweetly, but it is i m p o s s i b l e to ever k n o w w h e t h e r the c a u s e of the affection is g r e e n or s w e e t * " F o r the effect that h a p p e n s i n us r e v e a l s to u s n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n itself. H e n c e . . . o n l y the effect is apparent to u s ; the e x t e r n a l t h i n g p r o d u c t i v e of the effect is p e r h a p s a b e i n g , but it is not a p p a r e n t to u s " ( M 7.194). S e x t u s differentiates the s c e p t i c f r o m the C y r e n a i c o n p r e c i s e l y this k e y p o i n t : " W e s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t (as far as the a r g u m e n t g o e s ) a b o u t e x t e r n a l e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , w h i l e the C y r e n a i c s assert that they have a n i n a p p r e h e n s i b l e n a t u r e " (PH 1.215). A s F i n e ( 1 9 9 6 : 2 8 1 ) p o i n t s out, w e m a y take the s c e p t i c h e r e to be s u s p e n d i n g j u d g e m e n t o n l y a b o u t the e s s e n t i a l p r o p e r t i e s of t h i n g s , or m o r e b r o a d l y about w h e t h e r they e v e n exist. T h e s c e p t i c s epochs r e g a r d i n g t h e external w o r l d poses n o p a r t i c u lar p r o b l e m p r o v i d e d we r e m e m b e r that it is not the s a m e as C a r t e s i a n doubt. T h e P y r r h o n i s t does not hypothetically entertain, o r w o r r y about, the p o s s i b i l i t y that n o t h i n g exists except her m e n t a l states. N o r d o e s she i n v o k e the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality i n o r d e r to c l a i m that a p p e a r a n c e s reveal o n l y themselves, as the C y r e n a -

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ics d o . It m a y be the case that f r o m the t h i r d - p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , we n e e d s o m e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e to m a k e sense of the v e r y i d e a o f p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l , or e v e n j u d g e m e n t a l , appearances. But the sceptic d o e s not need to m a k e sense out ot the ontological status of the p s y c h o l o g i c a l entity s h e is a s s e n t i n g to. She d o e s not, a n d n e e d not, take a p o s i t i o n o n w h e t h e r the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l or j u d g e m e n t a l v i e w o l a p p e a r a n c e is the right one. B e i n g m o v e d b y the way t h i n g s a p p e a r r e q u i r e s n o c o m m i t m e n t to the n a t u r e of m e n t a l states, or the m e c h a n i c s o l h u m a n p e r c e p t i o n a n d b e h a v i o u r , as long as she d o e s not take it to be true that she is s o affected. So, o n o n e h a n d , the P y r r h o n i s t w i l l not be s c e p t i c a l about the existence ot the e x t e r n a l w o r l d in so far as that p r e s u p p o s e s a n o n t o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p p e a r a n c e a n d reality. E x t e r n a l w o r l d s c e p t i c i s m , u n d e r s t o o d as s o l i p s i s m , d e n i e s that c e r t a i n k i n d s of entities exist: m i n d - i n d e p e n d e n t objects a n d agents. It is a k i n d of negative d o g m a t i s m . B y contrast, the P y r r h o n i s t will s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r s o m e object really exists in s o far as real existe n c e is s u p p o s e d to be s o m e t h i n g b e y o n d w h a t is apparent. B u t e v e n if we grant that the s c e p t i c c a n navigate t h r o u g h the w o r l d b y r e l y i n g o n p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p e a r a n c e s , it is n o t so e a s y to see h o w s h e c a n c o n d u c t h e r a r g u m e n t a t i v e practice w i t h o u t h o l d i n g a n y beliefs. A n d e v e n if we c a n s h o w that the s c e p t i c is i n d e e d able to d o e v e r y t h i n g s h e c l a i m s to be able to d o w i t h o u t any beliefs, we s h o u l d still w o n d e r w h e t h e r s u c h a life is e v e n remotely d e s i r a b l e . H o w , for e x a m p l e , c a n the sceptic ever a c q u i r e a n y m o r a l v i r t u e s w i t h o u t evaluative c o m m i t m e n t s ? H o w c a n she d e v e l o p any p r a c t i c a l skills? A n d h o w c a n she l e a r n a n y t h i n g i f she refuses to believe?

The fourfold observances I n o r d e r to a n s w e r these q u e s t i o n s , a n d f u r t h e r d e v e l o p the n o - b e l i e f view, w e shall e x a m i n e Sextus' fourfold observances: A t t e n d i n g to w h a t is apparent, w e live i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h e v e r y d a y o b s e r v a n c e s , w i t h o u t h o l d i n g o p i n i o n s - for we

LS3

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

are not able to be utterly i n a c t i v e . T h e s e e v e r y d a y o b s e r v ances s e e m to be f o u r f o l d , a n d to c o n s i s t i n (ij g u i d a n c e by nature, [ii] n e c e s s i t a t i o n by feelings, [iii] h a n d i n g d o w n o l l a w s a n d c u s t o m s , a n d [iv] t e a c h i n g o f k i n d s o l expertise. B y n a t u r e s g u i d a n c e we are naturally capable of p e r c e i v i n g a n d t h i n k i n g . B y the n e c e s s i t a t i o n of feelings, h u n g e r c o n d u c t s us to l o o d a n d thirst to d r i n k . B y the h a n d i n g d o w n o l c u s t o m s a n d l a w s , we accept, f r o m a n e v e r y d a y p o i n t o f v i e w , that piety is g o o d a n d i m p i e t y b a d . B y t e a c h i n g o f k i n d s o l e x p e r t i s e w e are not inactive i n t h o s e w h i c h w e accept, (PH

1.23-4}

It is p o s s i b l e to interpret these o b s e r v a n c e s as a c t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the tentative, s o r t s of beliefs c o u n t e n a n c e d o n the s o m e - b e l i e l v i e w s . W e c o u l d say that s o m e o n e s e e k s f o o d b e c a u s e h e feels, a n d t h u s b e l i e v e s , he is h u n g r y . A n d we c o u l d say that s o m e o n e obeys the laws b e c a u s e it s e e m s to h i m , a n d thus he believes, it is right or at least p r u d e n t i a l to d o so. O n the o t h e r h a n d , it is a l s o possible to interpret these o b s e r v ances

as a c t i o n

in a c c o r d a n c e

with

the

sceptics

dispositions,

w i t h o u t a p p e a l i n g to a n y beliefs. T h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f s u c h i n t e r p r e tations, to be d e v e l o p e d b e l o w , a l o n g w i t h the o b j e c t i o n s to the s o m e - b e l i e f v i e w o u t l i n e d above, s h o u l d w e i g h in favour o l the n o belief view.

Sceptical

assent and pathological

(i) nature's

guidance

and

detachment:

(ii) the necessitation

of

feelings

T h e feeling of t h i r s t leads u s to seek s o m e t h i n g to d r i n k a n d h u n g e r to f o o d , j u s t as p a i n leads a d o g to r e m o v e the t h o r n f r o m its p a w {PH

1.238). T h e n e c e s s i t y is j u s t a matter of n a t u r a l reflex. C l e a r l y a

d o g d o e s not n e e d beliefs about t h o r n s a n d p a i n to b e h a v e t h i s way. A n d s i m i l a r l y , o n e does not n e e d beliefs about f o o d a n d d r i n k to seek t h e m o u t . Sextus e x a m p l e s of the necessitation of feeling all deal w i t h a c t i o n s 1

we have i n c o m m o n w i t h n o n - r a t i o n a l a n i m a l s . S u c h a c t i o n s are r o o t e d i n o u r natures: a d o g d o e s not n e e d to be t r a i n e d to favour a n

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i n j u r e d leg, n o r d o h u m a n b e i n g s n e e d to b e taught to seek f o o d a n d shelter. S i m i l a r l y , w e d o not n e e d to be taught to p e r c e i v e s e n s i b l e qualities; b y o u r n a t u r e we are able to see the c o l o u r w h i t e , to taste sweet or to feel heat ( A i 8 . 2 0 3 ) . O b v i o u s l y w e are far m o r e c o m p l e x t h a n this. I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the first o b s e r v a n c e , o u r n a t u r e g u i d e s us not o n l y to perceive, but also to t h i n k . A n d here we c o n f r o n t a p r o b l e m : h o w c a n we c o n t i n u e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t w h i l e nature guides us to t h i n k ? Belief appears to be a n essential part o f t h i n k i n g , b o t h as c a u s e a n d as effect. T h i n k i n g leads us to b e l i e v e s o m e t h i n g s a n d reject others. A n d beliefs i n t u r n i n s p i r e t h o u g h t . T o sever the c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g a n d b e l i e v i n g s e e m s to u n d e r m i n e b o t h . T h e s c e p t i c d o e s not n e e d to sever t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , h o w e v e r , s i n c e it is n o t n e c e s s a r y to t h i n k a b o u t o n e s own beliefs to b e t h i n k i n g . O n e m a y have all sorts of thoughts about w h a t o t h e r s believe. I m i g h t reflect o n the beliefs o f C h a l d e a n astrologers w i t h o u t a c c e p t i n g a n y o f t h o s e o d d c l a i m s myself. M e r e l y t h i n k i n g about these t h i n g s d o e s not n e c e s s a r i l y entail b e l i e f - a g a i n o n the s t a n d a r d v i e w of belief - as l o n g a s I d o not have the a d d i t i o n a l t h o u g h t that the a s t r o l o g i cal c l a i m s are true o r false. F u r t h e r m o r e , the s c e p t i c w i l l not a c c e p t that the p u r p o s e of t h i n k i n g is to i m p r o v e one's s t o c k o f beliefs. S h e w i l l have n o beliefs a b o u t w h y we t h i n k , or w h y w e s h o u l d t h i n k ; s h e m e r e l y f i n d s h e r s e l f c a p a b l e of thought, j u s t a s she finds h e r s e l f c a p a b l e o f p e r c e p t i o n . B u t b e i n g a w a r e o f the f l o w ot t h o u g h t s d o e s not require h e r to c o m m i t to the truth or talsity o f a n y of t h e m ; h e n c e sceptical t h i n k i n g occurs without believing. E v e n g r a n t i n g this r e s p o n s e , there is still o n e p r o b l e m a t i c difference b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g a n d p e r c e i v i n g . It m a k e s s e n s e to say, " I t s e e m s to m e that there is a p u d d l e of w a t e r o n the r o a d , but I s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as to w h e t h e r it is really there". I n t h i s a n d o t h e r f a m i l i a r s c e n a r i o s , w e suffer n o c o g n i t i v e d i s s o n a n c e in e n t e r t a i n i n g a p e r c e p t i o n w i t h o u t a s s e n t i n g to it. B u t the s a m e a n a l y s i s does not s e e m to h o l d tor t h i n k i n g , or tor s t a t e m e n t s o f h o w t h i n g s s e e m to us intellectually/ Sextus insists that s u c h intellectual s e e m i n g s s h o u l d be u n d e r stood m e r e l y as feelings rather t h a n p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n s . O n c e a g a i n

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he is o n l y r e p o r t i n g h o w he is c u r r e n t l y affected, this t i m e b y the arguments: W h e n S c e p t i c s say "I d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g " w h a t they say is this: "I n o w feel i n s u c h a w a y a s n e i t h e r to posit d o g m a t i cally n o r to reject a n y of the t h i n g s t a i l i n g u n d e r this i n v e s t i g a t i o n " W h e n they say this they are s a y i n g w h a t is apparent to t h e m about the subject p r o p o s e d - not d o g m a t i c a l l y m a k i n g a c o n f i d e n t a s s e r t i o n , but d e s c r i b i n g a n d r e p o r t i n g h o w they feel.

(PH

1.197; see a l s o 1.7, 15, 193, 198,

200)

T h e s e passages all reterto a specifically intellectual feeling, w h i c h leads the sceptic to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t , o r rather prevents her f r o m m a k i n g a j u d g e m e n t . C o n s i d e r the P y r r h o n i s t s r e m a r k that it s e e m s to m e that o p p o s e d to e v e r y a c c o u n t is an e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l o n e , b u t I s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as to w h e t h e r this is really the case {PH

1.202-5).

H o w c a n that b e ? H o w c a n it s e e m to the s c e p t i c that, for e x a m p l e , h o n e s t y is the best p o l i c y w h i l e she n o n e t h e l e s s s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t about w h e t h e r it is the best p o l i c y ? W h a t c a n the s e e m i n g a m o u n t to i n s u c h cases if n o t b e l i e v i n g ? M o r e to the point, h o w c a n s u c h a s s e r t i o n s as " I d e t e r m i n e n o t h i n g " a n d " o p p o s e d to e v e r y c l a i m is an e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l o n e " g u i d e the s c e p t i c s a r g u m e n t a t i v e practice unless she believes them? A c c o r d i n g to this o b j e c t i o n , in o r d e r for m e to t r u t h f u l l y d e n y that 1 believe w h a t s e e m s to be the case, I w o u l d have to be s c h i z o p h r e n i c . 1 w o u l d literally have to be o f two m i n d s : it c o u l d t h e n s e e m to o n e o l m y m i n d s that h o n e s t y is the best policy, a n d to a n o t h e r ot m y m i n d s that I have n o beliel o n the m a t t e r s i n c e the a r g u m e n t s f o r a n d against are equally b a l a n c e d . I f s o the s c e p t i c c a n c o n t i n u e to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t a b o u t w h a t s e e m s , intellectually, to be the case o n l y at the cost of a p a t h o l o g i c a l d e t a c h m e n t f r o m h e r o w n m e n t a l states, T r a n q u i l lity w o u l d c o m e at the c o s t o f s e r i o u s m e n t a l illness. S o w h i l e it m i g h t be p o s s i b l e to c a r r y o n that way, n o o n e i n h i s right m i n d w o u l d . W e m a y t r y to meet this o b j e c t i o n , o n b e h a l f o f the s c e p t i c , by a p p e a l i n g o n c e a g a i n to p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p e a r a n c e s a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , T h e o b j e c t i o n a r i s e s f r o m the a s s u m p t i o n that

186

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w h e n it s e e m s ( i n t e l l e c t u a l l y ) to m e that p, I represent this as my appearance.

S o w h e n it a p p e a r s to m e that h o n e s t y is t h e best p o l i c y

I a m not m e r e l y d i s p o s e d to h o n e s t b e h a v i o u r , I a m a l s o c o n s c i o u s l y a w a r e of t h e fact that I a m so d i s p o s e d , p e r h a p s b y a r t i c u l a t i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the a p p e a r a n c e . I f so, t h e j u d g e m e n tal v i e w o f a p p e a r a n c e s has crept i n t o t h e a c c o u n t . F o r n o w , w h e n the s c e p t i c a c k n o w l e d g e s the i n t e l l e c t u a l a p p e a r a n c e that honestyis the best policy, she a l s o assents to the fact that she is c o g n i t i v e l y d i s p o s e d in this way. B u t the s c e p t i c m a y be caught u p i n t h e f l o w o f t h o u g h t s to s u c h a n extent that she does not b e c o m e a w a r e o f a n y o f t h e s e i n t e l l e c tual a p p e a r a n c e s as h e r o w n . T h i s is a f a m i l i a r e x p e r i e n c e : w h e n w e are totally e n g a g e d i n s o m e project, all w e are a w a r e of are the thoughts t h e m s e l v e s , a n d n o t o u r r a t i o n a l o r c o n s c i o u s r e l a t i o n to those t h o u g h t s . T h e c o n s c i o u s agent b e c o m e s w h o l l y e n g r o s s e d i n the activity. W e c a n f i n d this line of thought in the s t o r y about t h e p a i n t e r A p e l l e s (PH

1.23; see C h a p t e r 7). A s l o n g a s he struggles to get the

d e s i r e d effect of f o a m o n the h o r s e s m o u t h , he is f r u s t r a t e d . T h e d o g m a t i c u s e of reason s i m i l a r l y l e a d s to f r u s t r a t i o n , w h i l e the s c e p tical p r a c t i c e y i e l d s tranquillity. W h a t A p e l l e s a n d the s c e p t i c have i n c o m m o n is that they get t h e i r d e s i r e d results in u n e x p e c t e d w a y s ; s u c c e s s c o m e s o n its o w n , i n d i r e c t l y . T h i s suggests a s i m i l a r i t y w i t h Z e n m e d i t a t i o n . C o n s c i o u s l y s t r u g g l i n g to c l e a r t h e m i n d is c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e . S u c c e s s o n l y c o m e s b y w a y of a different s o r t of effort. R a t h e r than actively s t r i v i n g , w e m u s t s i m p l y a l l o w the d e s i r e d result to o c c u r . T h i s is not a matter of c o m p l e t e l y g i v i n g up, but rather p u t t i n g o n e s e l f in t h e right c o n d i t i o n to a l l o w t h e d e s i r e d result to o c c u r . A n d that i n t u r n r e q u i r e s first d e v e l o p i n g the r i g h t s o r t s of dispositions through practice. It the P y r r h o n i s t s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t i n r e s p o n s e to a n a r g u m e n t that s h e has not yet m a n a g e d to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e , she n e e d not c o n s c i o u s l y i n v o k e the p r i n c i p l e that o p p o s e d to e v e r y a c c o u n t is a n e q u a l l y p o w e r f u l o n e . T h e a c c o m p l i s h e d s c e p t i c w i l l have n o n e e d to refer to s u c h p r i n c i p l e s , j u s t a s a g r a n d m a s t e r w o u l d n e v e r i n t e r r u p t h i s g a m e to c o n s u l t a r u l e b o o k . W h e n S e x t u s d i s c u s s e s the s c e p t i c a l

187

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SCEPTICISM

p h r a s e s , h e offers t h e m a s descriptions

of s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i c e f r o m the

o u t s i d e , as it w e r e . T h i s s o l u t i o n s h o w s h o w it c a n s e e m to the s c e p t i c that p , w i t h out h e r b e l i e v i n g that p. R a t h e r t h a n r a d i c a l l y d i s s o c i a t i n g h e r s e l f t r o m h e r o w n m e n t a l states, she w i l l be totally e n g r o s s e d in t h e m . I n d e e d , the v e r y n o t i o n of d i s s o c i a t i o n p r e s u p p o s e s that the agent d i s t a n c e s h e r s e l f u n d e r o n e d e s c r i p t i o n f r o m her sell u n d e r a d i f ferent d e s c r i p t i o n ; a n d that In t u r n r e q u i r e s at least i m p l i c i t l y that she i d e n t i f y the relevant m e n t a l state as h e r o w n . It this is c o r r e c t , it e m p h a s i z e s again j u s t h o w e x t r a o r d i n a r y the s c e p t i c s m e n t a l life w i l l be w h i l e still a l l o w i n g for w h a t l o o k s like o r d i n a r y b e h a v i o u r .

Sceptical

virtue:

(Hi) laws and

customs

A n o t h e r s e r i o u s o b j e c t i o n to the n o - b e l i e f v i e w targets the s c e p t i c s m o r a l character. M a n y p e o p l e f i n d a l a c k o f m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n to be h i g h l y s u s p e c t ; it suggests a f r i g h t e n i n g d e g r e e o f flexibility. A r i s t o cles r a i s e s this spectre w h e n he a s k s u s to c o n s i d e r ; W h a t sort o f c i t i z e n or j u d g e or a d v i s e r or f r i e n d w o u l d he [the sceptic] be? W h a t sort o f p e r s o n i n g e n e r a l w o u l d he be? W h a t evil t h i n g w o u l d he not d a r e to do, t h i n k i n g that n o t h i n g is really e v i l or s h a m e f u l , j u s t or u n j u s t ? O n e can't e v e n say that the s c e p t i c s are a f r a i d of l a w s a n d p e n a l t i e s . H o w c o u l d t h e y be w h e n they are, a s they c l a i m , unaffected and tranquil?

(Praep.

Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 8 }

A c c o r d i n g to t h i s o b j e c t i o n , w h i c h w e have a l r e a d y

encountered

m a n y t i m e s , the sceptic is not o n l y incapable ot v i r t u o u s a c t i o n , she is m o r e likely to b e h a v e in v i c i o u s w a y s . She will h a v e n o m o r a l beliefs to guide her. She w i l l be u n a b l e a n d u n w i l l i n g to j u s t i f y a n y of h e r a c t i o n s , or even h e r m o t i v a t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s . She m i g h t still t r y to prevent i n n o c e n t s u f f e r i n g , but not b e c a u s e s h e believes it is b a d . T h e n a g a i n , s h e m i g h t j u s t as w e l l inflict i n n o c e n t s u f f e r i n g s i n c e she d o e s not believe it is b a d . But Sextus c l a i m s that the s c e p t i c is not o n l y able to live, but to live correctly, " w h e r e c o r r e c t l y is u n d e r s t o o d not o n l y w i t h regard

188

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(ORDINARY)

to v i r t u e but m o r e g e n e r a l l y " (PH

1.17).

LIEE

OP A

PYRRHONIST

It is c r u c i a l to p o i n t out

that Sextus says o n l y that the sceptic is able to live correctly,

not

that she will. I n r e s p o n s e to the o b j e c t i o n , t h e n , I w i l l e x p l a i n h o w it is p o s s i b l e for the s c e p t i c to live v i r t u o u s l y ; i n o t h e r w o r d s , I w i l l e x p l a i n the k i n d o l v i r t u e that is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the s c e p t i c s lack of moral conviction. T o this e n d , w e shall c o n s i d e r the s c e p t i c s b r a n d ot piety. Sextus r e m a r k s that f r o m a n e v e r y d a y p o i n t o f v i e w the s c e p t i c d e e m s piety to be good a n d i m p i e t y b a d (PH 1.24, q u o t e d a b o v e ) . A n d , " f o l l o w i n g o r d i n a r y life w i t h o u t o p i n i o n s , w e say that t h e r e are gods a n d w e are p i o u s t o w a r d s the gods a n d say that they are p r o v i d e n t " [PH

3.2J.

T h e s c e p t i c even engages i n religious c e r e m o n y , p e r f o r m i n g acts that c o n t r i b u t e to the reverence a n d w o r s h i p o f the gods ( A i 9.49). E v e n so, Sextus is k e e n l y a w a r e o f the r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g religious r i t u a l s : s o m e t h r o w the d e a d for the fishes o r dogs or v u l tures to eat, others pelt the b o d y w i t h stones u n t i l it is completelyc o v e r e d , a n d s o m e e v e n sacrifice people over s i x t y a n d eat

them

t h e m s e l v e s . T h e s c e p t i c s a w a r e n e s s of t h e s e a p p a r e n t l y u n d e c i d a b l e d i s p u t e s does n o t h i n g to prevent h e r f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i n g in h e r r e l i g i o n s rituals. H a v i n g n o belief as to w h e t h e r they are a n y better or w o r s e , m o r e or less p l e a s i n g to the gods, s h e s i m p l y c a r r i e s o n . Piety, like the o t h e r v i r t u e s , s e e m s to r e q u i r e the p r o p e r i n t e n tional state. II the s c e p t i c has n o b e l i e f about w h e t h e r G o d exists or not, it is h a r d to see w h a t s i g n i f i c a n c e there c o u l d be i n h e r reverence. She m i g h t just as w e l l be p r e p a r i n g a m e a l , or s p i n n i n g a i m l e s s l y i n c i r c l e s . H e r c o n f o r m i t y to l o c a l religious c u s t o m a p p e a r s to be a c a r i c a t u r e o i piety. T h e charge that the s c e p t i c s piety is h y p o c r i t i c a l or i n s i n c e r e , h o w e v e r , is not fair. I n e n g a g i n g i n religious rituals, the s c e p t i c is not t r y i n g to a d v a n c e h e r o w n self-interest, o r deceive a n y o n e about her i n t e n t i o n s . N o r is s h e t r y i n g to belittle h e r fellow w o r s h i p p e r s . S u c h i n s i n c e r i t y or d u p l i c i t y w o u l d r e q u i r e h e r to c o n c e a l h e r real m o t i v e s a n d beliefs; but she h a s n o t h i n g to c o n c e a l . N e v e r t h e l e s s , s c e p t i c a l piety m a y still s e e m to be a n u n i n t e n t i o n a l p a r o d y ot the g e n u i n e article. T h i s i m p r e s s i o n is u n a v o i d a b l e f r o m the d o g m a t i c b e l i e v e r s s t a n d p o i n t - I f g e n u i n e piety r e q u i r e s h a v i n g

189

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

the right t h e o l o g i c a l beliefs, t h e n the s c e p t i c c a n n o t be p i o u s . B u t t r o m the s c e p t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e t h e r e is r e a l l y v e r y little s e p a r a t i n g h e r religious o b s e r v a n c e s f r o m the d o g m a t i c b e l i e v e r s . T h e d o g m a t i s t w i l l ha% e to agree that h i s s i n c e r e piety is b a s e d n o t just o n a n y o l d r

belief, but rather o n j u s t i f i e d belief. I f true piety w e r e s i m p l y a m a t t e r o f b e l i e v i n g some th ing a b o u t g o d , w e w o u l d have to c o n t e n d w i t h a n embarrassing wealth ol incompatible pieties* But it s e e m s to the s c e p t i c that n o o n e is able to j u s t i f y the beliefs that m i g h t be s u p p o s e d to be e s s e n t i a l to g e n u i n e piety. If so, all that really differentiates the p i o u s s c e p t i c f r o m the pious d o g m a t i s t is that the o n e a c t s o n the b a s i s o f u n j u s t i f i e d beliefs ( w h i c h he takes to be j u s t i f i e d ) , w h i l e the o t h e r acts i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the f o u r f o l d o b s e r v a n c e s a n d h a b i t u a l d i s p o s i t i o n s . A l l piety is t h u s r e d u c e d to c e r t a i n k i n d s o f c o n v e n t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r a l o n g w i t h the relevant d i s p o s i t i o n s . B e l i e f o r l a c k of b e l i e f is n o l o n g e r essential, Moral

and political

conformistn

M o r a l i t y often requires us to go against c o n v e n t i o n a l n o r m s . N e a r l y all of us w o u l d like to t h i n k that we w o u l d not have c o n d o n e d s l a v e r y i n the early n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , or the b u r n i n g of " w i t c h e s " i n the s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . S u c h s p e c u l a t i o n s are p r a c t i c a l l y w o r t h l e s s i n so far as w e w o u l d not be the s a m e p e o p l e u n d e r s u c h r a d i c a l l y d i f ferent c o n d i t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is w o r t h t r y i n g to u n d e r s t a n d w h a t m o t i v a t e s p e o p l e to d o s u c h t h i n g s , A large part o f t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , or at least e x p l a n a t i o n , w o u l d p r o b a b l y have b e e n i n t e r m s o l a c c e p t e d c u s t o m s a n d c o n v e n t i o n s , O u r w i l l i n g n e s s to o b e y a u t h o r ity, w h e t h e r i n the p e r s o n of w h i t e - c o a t e d s c i e n t i s t s , c h a r i s m a t i c leaders or a c c e p t e d c o n v e n t i o n s , is the d a r k s i d e o f o u r s o c i a l n a t u r e . S u c h c o n f o r m i s m is the b r e e d i n g g r o u n d for w h a t H a n n a h A r e n d t has a p t l y n a m e d the b a n a l i t y of eviL V i c i o u s n e s s c a n c o m e to s e e m quite o r d i n a r y a n d a c c e p t a b l e g i v e n the r i g h t c o n d i t i o n s . A n i m p o r t a n t part of the d o g m a t i c attitude t o w a r d s r e a s o n is the n o t i o n that the a u t o n o m o u s a p p l i c a t i o n o f c r i t i c a l r e a s o n is the m o s t potent antidote to t h i s u n f o r t u n a t e t e n d e n c y . T h e p r o p e r use of r e a s o n c a n i m p r o v e not o n l y o u r c h a r a c t e r s as i n d i v i d u a l s , but also the c h a r a c t e r o f a people o r society. T h e f e w brave i n d i v i d u a l s

190

THE

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LIEE

OP A

PYRRHONIST

w h o first s t o o d u p to past i n j u s t i c e s w e r e able to see h o w u n f a i r a n d u l t i m a t e l y i r r a t i o n a l these a c c e p t e d p r a c t i c e s are. A n initial step i n r i g h t i n g these w r o n g s is to e x p o s e the flaws in the a r g u m e n t s that are s u p p o s e d to w a r r a n t u n j u s t a c t i o n s . W h i l e the sceptic w o u l d b e h a p p y to d e c o n s t r u c t s u c h a r g u m e n t s , s h e w o u l d n o t d o s o for the s a k e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g the c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n c l u s i o n . I n fact, it s e e m s s h e w o u l d be w i l l i n g to a r g u e b o t h l o r a n d against the injustice of slavery, for e x a m p l e . A s a result she n e i ther believes n o r d i s b e l i e v e s that s l a v e r y is u n j u s t , that it is w r o n g to cause i n n o c e n t suffering, that all h u m a n beings d e s e r v e to be treated the s a m e u n d e r the law, o r a n y o t h e r m o r a l p r o p o s i t i o n that m o s t of us f i n d i n d i s p u t a b l y t r u e . F u r t h e r m o r e , she n e i t h e r b e l i e v e s n o r d i s b e l i e v e s that c a r e f u l rational scrutiny of our social a n d political institutions will produce a n y i m p r o v e m e n t s . I n d e e d , i n so far as the f u n d a m e n t a l issue o f w h a t c o u n t s as a n i m p r o v e m e n t is itself d i s p u t e d , the sceptic s u s p e n d s j u d g e m e n t o n t h i s p o i n t a s w e l l . L a c k i n g a n y belief a b o u t h o w to m a k e the w o r l d a better place is h a r d l y a recipe for s o c i a l a c t i v i s m , o r e v e n for s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t . T h e s c e p t i c s i n a b i l i t y to d e n o u n c e e v e n s u c h o b v i o u s l y u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n s a s s l a v e r y i s o b j e c t i o n a b l e . B u t it d o e s not follow f r o m this either that she w o u l d or w o u l d not c o n d o n e s l a v e r y in p r a c t i c e . W h e n it c o m e s to c o m b a t i n g s o c i a l i n j u s t i c e , p u b l i c p r o c l a m a t i o n s a r e u s u a l l y far less effective t h a n a c t i o n . T h e sceptic m i g h t w o r k just as h a r d as a d o g m a t i s t in s e e k i n g a n e n d to slavery, a l t h o u g h she w i l l be far less likely to d o s o if she h a p p e n s to be b o m into a f a m i l y of slave-traders in the e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . O n the o t h e r h a n d , it is also u n l i k e l y that a d o g m a t i s t b o r n i n t o a f a m i l y o f s l a v e - t r a d e r s w o u l d be a n abolitionist. I n either case, the d e c i s i v e factor w o u l d be an u n u s u a l event, or series of e v e n t s , that gives rise to the m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n that slavery is u n j u s t (for the d o g m a t i s t ) or to the d i s p o s i t i o n to treat e n s l a v e d people w i t h the s a m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n a n d respect that e v e r y other h u m a n b e i n g d e s e r v e s (for the s c e p t i c ) . I n general, the best r e s p o n s e to the c o m p l a c e n c y o b j e c t i o n is to s h o w that the sceptic is not in fact m o r e easily c o r r u p t e d or m o r e w i l l ing to c o m m i t m o r a l atrocities t h a n those w h o have f i r m c o n v i c t i o n s .

H I

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

S u p p o s e , for e x a m p l e , a tyrant has d e m a n d e d , that y o u m u s t either h e l p seize a n d k i l l a n i n n o c e n t p e r s o n or be k i l l e d y o u r s e l f . Sextus m e n t i o n s this e x a m p l e i n o r d e r to c o m b a t the o b j e c t i o n that the s c e p t i c s c h o i c e w i l l re% eal h e r true m o r a l c o m m i t m e n t s ( M 1 1 . 1 6 4 - 6 ; see r

D L 9 . 1 0 8 ) . H i s r e s p o n s e is s i m p l y that the s c e p t i c acts i n a c c o r d a n c e with ancestral laws a n d customs without taking a stand o n whether the action is really, i n its nature, m o r a l l y g o o d o r b a d . A l t h o u g h Sextus does not d r a w this point f r o m the tyrant e x a m p l e , we s h o u l d note that there is n o o b v i o u s l y correct s o l u t i o n available to a n y o n e . W e c a n find a r g u m e n t s to s u p p o r t e i t h e r c o u r s e of a c t i o n , but i n the e n d there m a y s i m p l y be n o g o o d c h o i c e , there m i g h t not e v e n be a lesser of t w o e v i l s . If there are s u c h g e n u i n e m o r a l d i l e m m a s , r e a s o n w i l l not h e l p us out. W e m u s t s i m p l y c h o o s e a n d t h e n deal w i t h the c o n s e q u e n c e s , S e x t u s c l a i m s the s c e p t i c w i l l be able to b e a r these h a r s h realities m o r e e a s i l y t h a n the d o g m a t i s t w h o feels that he m u s t rationally d e t e r m i n e the p r o p e r c o u r s e . E v e n if the d o g matist c o n v i n c e s h i m s e l f that he has m a d e the m o r a l l y better c h o i c e , he w i l l p r o b a b l y sutler p a i n f u l d o u b t s o n future reflection. F r o m the s c e p t i c s p e r s p e c t i v e , d i l e m m a s are not e x c e p t i o n a l ; a n y s i t u a t i o n r e q u i r i n g a m o r a l j u d g e m e n t p r e s e n t s us w i t h a r a t i o n a l l y i r r e s o l v a b l e p r o b l e m , or at least t h i s has a l w a y s b e e n the s c e p t i c s e x p e r i e n c e , R e a s o n fails us not o n l y w h e n tyrants m a k e u n a c c e p t able d e m a n d s but w h e n e v e r we have to c h o o s e a c o u r s e of a c t i o n w i t h s i g n i f i c a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s . I f Sextus is right about o u r i n a b i l i t y ( s o tar) to r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f y e v e n the m o s t s e e m i n g l y o b v i o u s m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e n t h o s e w i t h m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s are really n o better off t h a n the sceptic, T h e s a m e is t r u e w i t h respect to o u r a b i l i t y to r e v i s e o u r p r i o r i t i e s or m a k e progress t o w a r d s b e c o m i n g v i r t u o u s . If m o r a l progress p r e s u p p o s e s the efficacy of r e a s o n i n d e t e r m i n i n g the p r o p e r e n d s , a n d i f the s c e p t i c s attack o n r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n is s u c c e s s f u l , we c a n n e v e r be c o n f i d e n t that w e are m o v i n g i n the right d i r e c t i o n .

Teaching

and learning:

(iv) technical

expertise

Sextus d o e s , h o w e v e r , rely o n a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is b e n e f i c i a l a n d h a r m f u l in e v e r y d a y life. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a r i s e s f r o m o u r

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o r d i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e of the w o r l d . E v e r y o n e agrees that w h a t is g o o d is b e n e f i c i a l . A n d e v e n t h o u g h we d i s a g r e e v e h e m e n t l y about the n a t u r e o f the g o o d , there is a great d e a l o f c o n s e n s u s that c e r t a i n arts or k i n d s of e x p e r t i s e (techne)

are b e n e f i c i a l . T h e c o b b l e r s art p r o -

v i d e s u s w i t h s h o e s (Af 1.294), n a v i g a t i o n m a k e s i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m e r c e p o s s i b l e ( A i 1.51), h e r d s m e n k e e p o u r f l o c k s safe (Af 2 . 2 0 ) , a s t r o n o m y p r e d i c t s the w e a t h e r ( A i 5.2; at least, its m e t e o r o l o g i c a l s u c c e s s o r d o e s ) , m u s i c is able to distract u s f r o m u n p l e a s a n t tasks a n d m a k e t h e m easier to p e r f o r m ( A i 6 . 2 1 ) , a n d Sextus o w n t e c h n i h

cal e x p e r t i s e , m e d i c i n e , h e a l s the s i c k ( A i 2 . 4 9 ) . I n so far a s there are n o d i s p u t e s about the utility o l g o o d s h o e s , w e m a y take the b e n e f i c i a l n a t u r e o f the c o b b l e r s art a s e v i d e n t . F o r the m o s t part, e v e r y o n e w o u l d r a t h e r h a v e g o o d s h o e s , sate t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , a c c u r a t e w e a t h e r p r e d i c t i o n s , pleasantly d i s t r a c t i n g m u s i c a n d g o o d h e a l t h than t h e i r o p p o s i t e s . It is o n l y w h e n we see these benefits a s p r o p e r l y m o d e s t that we f i n d c o n s e n s u s . E v e r y o n e agrees that w e l l - m a d e s h o e s are g o o d for w a l k i n g a n d p r o t e c t i n g the teet, n a v i g a t i o n is g o o d tor getting s o m e w h e r e safely a n d k n o w i n g w h a t the w e a t h e r is likely to be is g o o d for p l a n n i n g o n e s day, a n d s o o n . S o w h a t is h a r m f u l a n d b e n e f i c i a l i n e v e r y d a y life is a matter o f w h a t we all i m m e d i a t e l y r e c o g n i z e as instrumciitaily

g o o d or b a d . E x p e r i e n c e

is e n o u g h to s h o w u s that w e l l - m a d e p r o d u c t s a n d e x p e r t s e r v i c e s are g o o d for a c c o m p l i s h i n g o u r f u r t h e r e n d s . Plato c a p t u r e s this m o d e s t s p i r i t i n h i s reflections o n the s k i l f u l navigator s attitude t o w a r d s h i s art (Gorg.

51 i d - 5 1 2 a ) . H a v i n g safely-

t r a n s p o r t e d h i s p a s s e n g e r s , a l o n g w i t h t h e i r p o s s e s s i o n s , it is not clear to the navigator w h e t h e r he has really benefited t h e m , that is, w h e t h e r they are better off as a result o f h a v i n g b e e n t r a n s p o r t e d safely. A f t e r a l l , the passengers are n o different w i t h respect to b o d y o r s o u l t h a n w h e n the j o u r n e y b e g a n . T h e n a v i g a t o r has d o n e t h e m a v a l u a b l e s e r v i c e , but he refuses to speculate as to w h e t h e r the c h a n g e o f l o c a t i o n is b e n e f i c i a l in s o m e deep, or n o n - e v i d e n t , m a n n e r . F o r all the m o d e s t navigator k n o w s , s o m e p a s s e n g e r s m a y h a v e b e e n better off i f t h e i r s h i p h a d not c o m e i n , B y c o n t r a s t , the m a s t e r s of the liberal arts that Sextus targets for refutation i n Af 1 - 6 , e x h i b i t a n a r r o g a n c e p r o p o r t i o n a l to the

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

disutility of their "art" C h a l d e a n astrologers,

for e x a m p l e , a d o r n

t h e m s e l v e s w i t h i m p o r t a n t titles a n d try to s u p p o r t their p r e d i c tions o n the b a s i s of elaborate t h e o r i e s l i n k i n g the m o t i o n o f the stars to w h a t h a p p e n s o n earth ( A i 5 ) . S o m e m u s i c i a n s c l a i m their art is n e c e s s a r y for h a p p i n e s s s i n c e it h a r m o n i z e s the s o u l a n d p r o d u c e s the p r o p e r d i s p o s i t i o n s ( A i 6 ) . G r a m m a r i a n s also c l a i m their art is n e c e s s a r y for h a p p i n e s s s i n c e o n l y they c a n p r o v i d e the c o r r e c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f the w i s e s a y i n g s of the p o e t s ( A i 1 . 2 7 0 - 7 1 ) . A n d the c l a i m s o f P y t h a g o r e a n a r i t h m e t i c i a n s are i n h e r e n t l y i m m o d e s t , if not o u t r a g e o u s : the n u m b e r ten, b e i n g the result of a d d i n g one, two, three a n d four, is the m o s t perfect n u m b e r a n d the s o u r c e o f the e t e r n a l roots of nature s i n c e the a c c o u n t of the s t r u c t u r e o f all t h i n g s lies w i t h i n it ( A i 4.3), T h e p a r a d i g m for all o f these is the e x p e r t i s e i n l i v i n g , p r o m o t e d m o s t e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y b y the S t o i c s . T h e g o o d , the b a d a n d indifferent are the basic c o n c e p t s a p p l i e d b y p r a c t i t i o n e r s o f t h i s art. B u t s i n c e , Sextus c l a i m s , he has s h o w n that these c o n c e p t s are i n c o h e r e n t , a n d t h u s c o r r e s p o n d to n o t h i n g real, the art of l i v i n g is u n r e a l as w e l l (PH 3 . 2 3 9 ; A I 1 1 . 1 6 8 - 8 0 ) , B u t w e m u s t r e m e m b e r that these refutations are offered to c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the S t o i c a r g u m e n t s i n s u p p o r t . T h e p r o p e r s c e p t i c a l attitude is to n e i t h e r believe n o r d i s b e l i e v e that there is a n art o f l i v i n g . W e f i n d the s a m e a p p r o a c h i n h i s a r g u m e n t s against the liberal arts, For e x a m p l e , S e x t u s a r g u e s that points, l i n e s a n d p l a n e s d o not exist s i n c e we c a n n o t c o n c e i v e of the g e o m e t e r s ' d e f i n i t i o n s (e.g. Af 3 . 2 9 - 3 0 ) . A p o i n t is s u p p o s e d to be a sign %vithout d i m e n s i o n s , a n d line is length w i t h o u t b r e a d t h . B u t w e really h a v e n o i d e a w h a t we are t a l k i n g about w h e n we utter these w o r d s ; the p o i n t I c a n c o n c e i v e has d i m e n s i o n s a n d the line I c a n c o n c e i v e h a s b r e a d t h ; I f the g e o m eters' d e f i n i t i o n s fail to identify a n y t h i n g that really exists, t h e n their e x p e r t i s e is u n r e a l as w e l l . C o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g s u c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n s against the g e o m e t e r s ' r e a s o n s i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r e x p e r t i s e s h o u l d l e a d us to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t . T h e sceptic's basic a r g u m e n t against all f o r m s o i i m m o d e s t e x p e r tise is that they l a c k the e p i s t e m i c f o u n d a t i o n s they c l a i m to have; note that the m o d e s t f o r m s d o not c l a i m a n y s u c h f o u n d a t i o n s . S o

THE

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LIEE

OP A

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we c a n see S e x t u s ' attack o n the l i b e r a l arts a s a n e x t e n s i o n of his g e n e r a l s c e p t i c a l a g e n d a , I n fact, i n h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y r e m a r k s , he c l a i m s that the sceptic initially u n d e r t a k e s the study of the l i b e r a l arts j u s t as he d i d p h i l o s o p h y w i t h the d e s i r e to d i s c o v e r the t r u t h (AÍ 1.6). B u t he is s i m i l a r l y f r u s t r a t e d a n d d i s c o v e r s o n l y e q u i p o l l e n t conflict a n d d i s p u t e . H i s study o f the l i b e r a l arts t h u s e n d s like his s t u d y o f p h i l o s o p h y , at least for the time b e i n g , in

epoche.

G i v e n this c o n t e x t , w e s h o u l d interpret all o f h i s s e e m i n g l y d o g m a t i c c l a i m s that s u c h - a n d - s u c h a n art d o e s not exist as o n e side of the e q u i p o l l e n t conflict. T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , h o w e v e r , is c o m p l i c a t e d b y S e x t u s ' a p p r o p r i a t i o n of a r g u m e n t s f r o m E p i c u r u s , w h o "took the p o s i t i o n that the l i b e r a l arts are n o help i n p e r f e c t i n g w i s d o m " ( M 1.1). W h a t motivates E p i c u r u s ' a r g u m e n t s is h i s o w n p o s i t i v e c o n c e p t i o n o f w i s d o m . Not s h a r i n g t h i s c o n c e p t i o n , Sextus c a n onlyretail these a r g u m e n t s to c o m b a t the professors' c l a i m that their arts are b e n e f i c i a l it n o t essential for a t t a i n i n g v i r t u e a n d h a p p i n e s s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , Sextus' r e l i a n c e o n b o t h E p i c u r u s a n d p r e v i o u s S c e p t i c s gives the i m p r e s s i o n of two d i s c o r d a n t v o i c e s i n M

1-6

( B a r n e s 1 9 8 3 ) . A c c o r d i n g to the first, m o d e r a t e , E p i c u r e a n v o i c e , s o m e arts are u s e l e s s a n d o t h e r s are u s e f u l . T h e u s e f u l studies are b a s e d o n e v e r y d a y o b s e r v a t i o n a n d m a k e n o pretence o f u n c o v e r i n g the h i d d e n n a t u r e of t h i n g s . A c c o r d i n g to the s e c o n d , r a d i c a l l y s c e p tical, v o i c e , there are n o arts at a l l ; rather, we m u s t s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t r e g a r d i n g the e x i s t e n c e of the arts, w h e t h e r u s e f u l or useless. B u t as l o n g as the s c e p t i c a l p r a c t i t i o n e r of u s e f u l arts refuses to justify h i s p r a c t i c e by a p p e a l i n g to s o m e theory, n o t h i n g p r e v e n t s h i m f r o m a c k n o w l e d g i n g a n d a d v e r t i s i n g h i s expertise, H e d o e s not n e e d to believe a n y t h i n g about the objects a n d p r i n c i p l e s of h i s art. W e d o not n e e d a t h e o r y o f n u m b e r s i n o r d e r to c o u n t t h e m , o r of lines a n d s h a p e s i n o r d e r to d e s i g n a n d b u i l d t h i n g s , or o f m u s i c a l notes a n d t e m p o r a l i n t e r v a l s i n o r d e r to play a n i n s t r u m e n t . T h e s c e p t i c m a y l e a r n a n d p r a c t i s e a n y art in s o far as it i s m e r e l y a c o l l e c t i o n a n d a r r a n g e m e n t o f o b s e r v e d regularities, that is, r e c ollect i ve r a t h e r t h a n i n d i c a t i v e s i g n s (PH

2.102; M 8 . 1 5 6 - 5 8 ) . I n

d o i n g so, he w i l l m a k e use of the two s o r t s of c r i t e r i a of a c t i o n that Sextus a p p r o v e s of: the s e n s e s , a n d t e c h n i c a l d e v i c e s s u c h as r u l e r

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

and c o m p a s s (PH

2 . 1 4 - 1 5 ) . A l l o l this c a n be b r o u g h t u n d e r the

h e a d i n g o f the f o u r t h type ot o b s e r v a n c e ; the t e a c h i n g ( a n d l e a r n i n g ) o f k i n d s of expertise. T h e sort o f t e a c h i n g a n d l e a r n i n g a v a i l a b l e to the sceptic c a n n o t be a matter o f t r a n s f e r r i n g true beliefs I r o m t e a c h e r to student. It is a matter ot l e a r n i n g h o w to d o s o m e t h i n g rather t h a n l e a r n i n g that s o m e t h i n g is t r u e , l i k e a n a p p r e n t i c e i m i t a t i n g the master.* The

scepticpftysician

T h e s c e p t i c w h o s t u d i e s m e d i c i n e , for e x a m p l e , w i l l not e n d u p w i t h m e d i c a l k n o w l e d g e , but r a t h e r a m e d i c a l d i s p o s i t i o n (see M 11.188, 255). A l t h o u g h S e x t u s grants that b o t h the c o m m o n p e r s o n a n d the s k i l l e d p h y s i c i a n p e r f o r m a c t i o n s that restore h e a l t h , the p h y s i c i a n does so in a n o b s e r v a b l y m e d i c a l f a s h i o n : quickly, p a i n l e s s l y a n d i n an o r d e r l y m a n n e r ( A i 11.204). T h e d i s p o s i t i o n f r o m w h i c h these a c t i o n s arise is not itself o b s e r v a b l e , but the features that differentiate his a c t i o n s f r o m the o r d i n a r y p e r s o n s are. S o we m a y d i s t i n g u i s h the expert f r o m the n o n - e x p e r t i n the s a m e way that o r d i n a r y people d o : o n the basis o f their a c t i o n s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the s c e p t i c p h y s i c i a n p e r f o r m s these s k i l f u l a c t i o n s w i t h o u t a n y reference to u n o b s e r v a b l e , theoretical features ot h u m a n physiology. I n tact, he w i l l not p r o v i d e a n y sort ot c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n tor the p a t i e n t s c o n d i t i o n . I n s t e a d , he w i l l be g u i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by the p h e n o m e n a , that is, h i s o b s e r v a t i o n of events a n d c o n d i t i o n s , T h i s is the a p p r o a c h t a k e n by m e d i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s . E m p i r i c i s m arose i n r e s p o n s e to the apparent failure of rationalist t h e o r i e s about p h y s i o l o g y a n d the h i d d e n c a u s e s ot illness, N o n e ot the t h e o r i e s p r o d u c e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y better results a n d , like the S c e p t i c s ,

the

e m p i r i c i s t s d o u b t e d that these theoretical disputes c o u l d be r e s o l v e d . A c c o r d i n g to this v i e w , m e d i c a l theories p r o v i d e n o better g u i d a n c e than e x p e r i e n c e : they are p r a c t i c a l l y useless. T h e rationalists c o u n t e r e d , a r g u i n g that e x p e r i e n c e by itself c a n not a c c o u n t for o b s e r v e d regularities. W e h a v e to rely o n reason to d i s c e r n the u n d e r l y i n g p r i n c i p l e s a n d s t r u c t u r e s that regulate the body, S o r e a s o n is n e c e s s a r y to establish a n d e x p a n d m e d i c a l k n o w l edge. B u t a c c o r d i n g to G a l e n , the d i s p u t e g r a d u a l l y b e c a m e i r r e l -

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evant, at least f r o m a p r a c t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , s i n c e b o t h rationalist a n d e m p i r i c i s t p h y s i c i a n s t e n d e d to agree o n the a p p r o p r i a t e t r e a t m e n t . I n the e n d they m e r e l y d i s a g r e e d a b o u t h o w the c o r r e c t d i a g n o s e s a n d p r e s c r i p t i o n s are a r r i v e d at ( W a l z e r & F r e d e 1985). S e x t u s ' n a m e i n d i c a t e s that he w a s a m e m b e r o f the e m p i r i c i s t s c h o o l . A n d a l t h o u g h t h e r e is a s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y w i t h P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m , S e x t u s insists that they are not the s a m e in s o far as e m p i r i c i s t s m a k e a f f i r m a t i o n s about the i n a p p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f u n c l e a r matters (PH 1.236). I n o t h e r w o r d s , they are negatively d o g m a t i c i n i n s i s t i n g that the r a t i o n a l i s t s c o u l d not p o s s i b l y get the k n o w l e d g e they a i m e d at. T h e proper sceptical attitude is to s u s p e n d j u d g e m e n t as to w h e t h e r the b o d y is c o m p o s e d of theoretical entities s u c h as a t o m s a n d invisible p o r e s a n d as to w h e t h e r w e c o u l d e v e r k n o w t h i s . R a t h e r t h a n r e a d i n g this as a c o m p l e t e a b a n d o n m e n t o f e m p i r i c i s m , it is m o r e l i k e l y that Sextus is o n l y c r i t i c i z i n g o n e v e r s i o n of e m p i r i c i s m . I n r e s p o n d i n g to the rationalists, s o m e e m p i r i c i s t s p r o b ably p r e s e n t e d their side as a n alternative e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l theory, one that relies d o g m a t i c a l l y o n e x p e r i e n c e as a k i n d of j u s t i f i c a t i o n . B u t s i n c e Sextus a r g u e s against all f o r m s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , e x p e r i e n c e is n o m o r e acceptable t h a n r e a s o n . T h e o b j e c t i o n a b l e k i n d o f e m p i r i c i s m w o u l d be b o t h negatively d o g m a t i c i n d e n y i n g the rationalists' c l a i m s , a n d positively d o g m a t i c i n s u p p o r t i n g their o w n . W h a t the sceptic n e e d s i s not a t h e o r y to u n d e r w r i t e h i s expertise, but rather a n e x p l a n a t i o n o l h o w he is able to l e a r n a n d p r a c t i c e it w i t h o u t u n w i t t i n g l y a c q u i r i n g d o g m a t i c beliefs. W e c a n see this i n Sextus' praise f o r a t h i r d s c h o o l , m e t h o d i s m (PH 1.236,238J. I n agreem e n t w i t h e m p i r i c i s m , the m e t h o d i s t s rejected the d o g m a t i c viewthat we m u s t r e l y o n u n o b s e r v a b l e , theoretical entities i n s e a r c h i n g for a n d j u s t i f y i n g m e d i c a l k n o w l e d g e . H o w e v e r , t h e y disagree w i t h e m p i r i c i s m i n s o far as it leads to the negatively d o g m a t i c c o n c l u s i o n that w e c a n never u n c o v e r the h i d d e n c a u s e s a n d u n d e r l y i n g natures of t h i n g s r e l a t i n g to h e a l t h a n d d i s e a s e . I n c o n t r a s t to b o t h , m e t h o d ists c o n s i d e r e d i r r e l e v a n t the c a u s a l h i s t o r y o f the d i s e a s e a l o n g w i t h tacts about the patient's age, habits a n d p r e v i o u s c o n d i t i o n . D i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n of the patient's c u r r e n t c o n d i t i o n is sufficient to indicate the p r o p e r t r e a t m e n t ( E d e l s t e i n 1 9 6 7 ) .

H7

ANCIENT

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Sextus c o m p a r e s the m e t h o d i s e s practice to the s e c o n d o b s e r v a n c e : n e c e s s i t a t i o n o i feelings. B e i n g c h i l l e d , we feel c o m p e l l e d to seek w a r m t h ; so too w h e n the s c e p t i c p h y s i c i a n o b s e r v e s that part of the b o d y is c o n s t r i c t e d , he w i l l try to l o o s e n or e x p a n d it

(PH

1.238). I n s o tar a s s u c h t r e a t m e n t s restore a n d p r e s e r v e h e a l t h , he w i l l c o n t i n u e to use t h e m . T h e i d e a is that expertise is a d i s p o s i t i o n to r e s p o n d i n a p p r o p r i a t e a n d effective w a y s . Just as nature gives us the d i s p o s i t i o n to seek w a r m t h w h e n c o l d , e x p e r i e n c e that is p r o p e r l y i n f o r m e d b y a d e s i r e to h e a l gives u s m e d i c a l e x p e r t i s e . One

last p o i n t i n t a v o u r of m e t h o d i s m is that it r e d u c e d the

extensive a n d c o s t l y c o u r s e ot m e d i c a l t r a i n i n g to six m o n t h s . T h i s effectively o p e n e d up the field o f m e d i c i n e to a m u c h w i d e r s t r a t u m of society w h i l e u n d e r m i n i n g the n o t i o n that m e d i c i n e is a n e x t r e m e l y difficult a n d abstruse art. I n h i s role as c h a m p i o n of o r d i n a r y life, Sextus m a y w e l l have b e e n attracted b y this attempt to reveal the p r e t e n s i o n s o l m e d i c a l t h e o r i e s . B u t despite h i s s y m p a thy for m e t h o d i s m , Sextus w o u l d not have a d o p t e d it as the right theory, b e c a u s e , a g a i n , the s c e p t i c has n o n e e d for theories, a n d i n fact rejects t h e m all.

T h e sceptic's p h i l a n t h r o p y T h e r e is n o d i f f e r e n c e i n k i n d b e t w e e n s c e p t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y a n d s c e p t i c a l m e d i c i n e . T h e y are b o t h t h e r a p e u t i c p r a c t i c e s d e v e l o p e d over t i m e o n the basis o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e y are b o t h a i m e d at r e l i e v i n g the patient ot p h y s i c a l d i s e a s e or m e n t a l d i s t u r b a n c e o n the b a s i s o f o b s e r v a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of the b o d y or m i n d . T h e f o r m e r are revealed to the p h y s i c i a n by d i r e c t o b s e r v a t i o n a n d the latter are revealed to the s c e p t i c by m e a n s ot the patient's statement o f h i s beliefs a n d the k i n d s ot r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s he f i n d s p e r s u a s i v e . B o t h of these practices p r o c e e d f r o m d e v e l o p e d d i s p o s i t i o n s but w i t h o u t any refere n c e to g u i d i n g beliefs, p r i n c i p l e s o r r a t i o n a l j u d g e m e n t s . S o S e x t u s ' p h i l a n t h r o p y m a y be r e v e a l e d either t h r o u g h h i s attempt to c u r e the conceit a n d r a s h n e s s ot the d o g m a t i s t s (PH 3 . 2 8 0 ) , or t h r o u g h h i s attempt to alleviate the p h y s i c a l s u f f e r i n g o f h i s patients.

198

THE

(ORDINARY)

LIEE OP A

PYRRHONIST

But there is at least o n e i m p o r t a n t d i s a n a l o g y that c a n s e r v e as an o b j e c t i o n to the sceptic's d i a l e c t i c a l p r a c t i c e . T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l dogmatist i s , typically, not like a m e d i c a l patient s e e k i n g h e l p f r o m a p h y s i c i a n . T h e patient is often quite s u r e he has a p r o b l e m a n d he trusts that h i s p h y s i c i a n c a n h e l p . T h e s e two b e c o m e e n g a g e d i n the s a m e project, a n d w o r k together to a c c o m p l i s h their s h a r e d goal. T h e d o g m a t i s t , by c o n t r a s t , w i l l p r o b a b l y see t h e sceptic as the one w i t h t h e p r o b l e m . A t the v e r y least, he w i l l be reluctant to c o n c e d e to the sceptic's a r g u m e n t s . So, f r o m a p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a n d p o i n t , the sceptic's b e n e v o l e n c e w i l l p r o b a b l y be m e t w i t h r e s i s t a n c e , if not hostility. T h i s w i l l be e x a c e r b a t e d it the d o g m a t i s t u n d e r s t a n d s that they are engaged in two quite different p r o j e c t s . T h e sceptic a i m s at e l i m i n a t i n g beliefs, the d o g m a t i s t at a c q u i r i n g or i m p r o v i n g t h e m , A l t e r n a t i v e l y , w e m i g h t s a y that I r o m t h e s c e p t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e the d o g m a t i s t is l i k e a m e n t a l patient w h o is not a w a r e that he needs therapy, T h i s p r e s e r v e s the m e d i c a l analogy, b u t it a l s o reveals j u s t h o w i n s u l t i n g the sceptic s v i e w is f r o m the d o g m a t i s t s p e r s p e c t i v e . It also e m p h a s i z e s the fact that they are engaged i n v e r y different projects, a r i s i n g f r o m v e r y different attitudes t o w a r d s r e a s o n . A l t h o u g h the P y r r h o n i s t sees h i m s e l f as a p h i l a n t h r o p i s t , the d o g m a t i s t , if a w a r e o f what the sceptic is u p to, w i l l see h i m as a d u p l i c i t o u s s n e a k . T h e d o g m a t i s t is e n g a g e d i n a project that the sceptic is t r y i n g to get h i m to give u p . T h i s m a k e s for a n o d d r e l a t i o n s h i p ; the d o g m a t i s t m i g h t m i s t a k e n l y t h i n k he is a r g u i n g against his o p p o n e n t , a n d t r y i n g to get her to see t h e r a t i o n a l s u p e r i o r i t y of his p o s i t i o n , but h i s s c e p t i c a l o p p o n e n t h a s n o p o s i t i o n to d e f e n d , a n d does n o t feel b o u n d b y t h e s a m e r a t i o n a l , n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s . I c a n t h i n k of n o r e s p o n s e that w o u l d satisfy t h e d o g m a t i s t o n this p o i n t . A s l o n g a s he is engaged i n the project ot s e e k i n g the m o s t r a t i o n a l l y d e f e n s i b l e v i e w , he w i l l f i n d the s c e p t i c s offer of t h e r a p y i n s u l t i n g ; i n d e e d , he s h o u l d . B u t i r o m the sceptic's p e r s p e c t i v e , t h i s is j u s t w h a t w e w o u l d expect i r o m " m a d " d o g m a t i s t s w h o have b e e n c a p t i v a t e d b y the a l l u r i n g p r o m i s e o f r e a s o n . But e v e n if the d o g m a t i s t rejects the offer of therapy, he w i l l h a v e a s t r o n g i n c e n t i v e to engage the sceptic i n a r g u m e n t . H e d o e s not n e e d to see the p r o c e e d i n g s as t h e r a p e u t i c . H e s h o u l d see it, i n a c c o r d a n c e

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

w i t h h i s a c c e p t a n c e of the obligations of r a t i o n a l agency, as a n o p p o r t u n i t y to put h i s p o s i t i o n to the test. R e f u s i n g to debate the s c e p t i c , the d o g m a t i s t a b a n d o n s h i s o w n r a t i o n a l standards.

Conclusion U n l i k e o r d i n a r y people, the s c e p t i c h a s n o beliets. It is h a r d to i m a g ine w h a t s u c h a life w o u l d b e like i r o m the i n s i d e . H o w e v e r , I have a r g u e d that it c a n be c o h e r e n t l y d e s c r i b e d a n d d e f e n d e d f r o m the outside. I f S e x t u s s e l f - p u r g i n g attack o n rationality is s u c c e s s f u l , we m u s t 1

c o n c l u d e that n o n e o f the t h i n g s we typically t h i n k of as c o n s t i t u t i n g progress are the fruit of r e a s o n . E v e r y v i r t u o u s a c t i o n , e v e r y t e c h nically skilful action, a n d every socially beneficial action

proceeds

f r o m c e r t a i n sorts o f d i s p o s i t i o n s . A n d we have n o g o o d g r o u n d s o n w h i c h to t h i n k r e a s o n , as e m p l o y e d by e p i s t e m i c a l l y o p t i m i s t i c d o g m a t i s t s , is better a b l e to p r o d u c e these d i s p o s i t i o n s t h a n e n v i r o n m e n t a l or o t h e r n o n - r a t i o n a l forces. C o n s e q u e n t l y , w e are n o better off t h a n the s c e p t i c w i t h regard to o u r ability to live happy, fulfilling a n d e v e n v i r t u o u s lives. A n d as l o n g as we are u n a b l e to meet the s c e p t i c a l challenge, we are far m o r e p r o n e to suffer u n n e c essary disturbances.

Notes

1 . Introduction 1. i h e d i s t i n c t i o n between ancient a n d m o d e r n forms of scepticism is a very controversial topic. M . P. Burnyeat, " ' I h e Sceptic in his Place a n d t i m e * in Philosophy

in History:

Essays on ihe Historiography

of Philosophy,

R . Korly,

J. B. S c h n e e w i n d St Q . S k i n n e r (cds), 2 2 5 - 5 4 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r sity Press, 19841 introduces a n d explores the metaphor o f insulation to describe the practice of separating philosophical arguments a n d their conclusions from the activity o f o r d i n a r y life. See also ). A n n a s , " D o i n g W i t h o u t Objective V a l ues: A n c i e n t a n d M o d e r n Strategies" in the Norms of Nature:

Studies in Hel-

lenistic Ethics, M . Schoheld & G . Striker (eds), 3 - 2 9 { C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19 86) a n d "'iceplici sra, O l d a n d New", in Rationality

in Greek

thought. M . Prede & G . Striker (eds), 23<)-54 ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 1996), and H_ Kelt, "Scepticism a n d Everyday Attitudes in A n c i e n t a n d M o d e r n P h i l o s o p h y " Mclaphilosophy

1A (1993), 3 6 3 - 3 1 , especially for d i s c u s s i o n of

the practice of insulation with regard to ethical issues. 2. C o m p a r e D L 1.16, 9.6"} a n d PH 1.7, a n d see L . Ploridi, Sexlus hmpiricus: Transmission

and Rediscovery

ofPyrrlronism

'Ihe

( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press,

2002), 103-4. 3.

I h e term translated as " a p p r e h e n d " camprehendi, the technical Stoic term katalepton

is the Latin translation of

{Ac. 2.18). 'Ihis is not s u r p r i s i n g as both

the A c a d e m i c a n d P y r r h o n i a n views develop i n close dialectical contact with Stoicism, a n d especially their account of h o w we are able to grasp the truth with certainly. See C h a p t e r 3 for more detail o n Stoic epistemology. 4.

Translations o f Sextus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism

[PH\ throughout this book are

taken from J. A nnas Sr J. Barnes, Outlines of Scepticism

(Cambridge: Cambridge

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , with slight modifications.

2-JI

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

5. Unless otherwise indicated, ill subsequent translations of Cicero's Academica [Ac.\ are from C . Briltain, C/crno, On Academic Scepticism (Indianapolis, I N : HacketL, 2006), with slight modifications. 6. The view I attribute to Cicero in Chapter 5 is perhaps the most controversial of all the interpretations I offer in this book. However, it is very similar to the view that Charles Briltain attributes to Fhilo ofLarissain bis supposedly middle period, that is, between his initial endorsement of the scepticism of Clilomachus and Carneades and his later dogmatic view in his Roman books (Piij'o of Larisia: ike Last of the Academic Sceptics | Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 j). '[hose who are unconvinced by my account of Cicero may thus prefer to read it as an exposition of Philos middle period. However, see the extensive and critical review of Briltain in J. Glucker, ""lhe Philonian/Metrodorians: Problems of Method in Ancient Philosophy", Elenclws 2 5 (2004), 9 9 - 1 5 2 . 7. See H. Spinelli, "Sextus Empiricus, the Neighbouring Philosophies and the Sceptical Tradition (Again on Pyr. [ 220-225J", in Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition, J. Sihvola (ed.), Acier Philosoplnca hennica 66, 36-61 (Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland. 2000) for discussion of how Sextus differentiate5 his Pyrrhonism from '"neighbouring" philosophies, with which it appears to have something in common (PH 1.210-241). I discuss Aenesidemus' p u l l i n g relationship with Heraclilus in Chapter 6. 8. O n the dangers and pitfalls of working with the fragmentary evidence for ancient Scepticism and Hellenistic philosophy, see R. Sharpies, "The Problem of Sources", in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, M . L . Gill fit P. Pellegrin (eds), 4 3 0 - 4 7 (Oxford: Black well, 2006), and }. Mansfeld, "Sources", in lhe Cambridge

History of Hellenistic

Philosophy,

K. Algra, J. Barnes, |. Mansfeld fit

M . Schofield (eds), 3 - 3 0 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Por illuminating discussions on the nature and purpose of historical approaches to philosophy in genera], see Rorty cl al., Philosophy in History, and M . Frede, assays in Ancient Philosophy (Minneapolis, M N : University of Minnesota Press, I 9 S 7 ) , ix-xivii.

2. P y r r h o a n d T i m o n : the o r i g i n o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m 1. |. Brunschwig, "Introduction: lhe Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology", in Algra fin/., lhe Cambridge

History of Hellenistic Philosopfty, 241 n.36, provides

a list of eight different types of interpretation of Pyrrho with bibliographic details for examples of each. 2. The "since" in this translation is the result of an emendation to the text that requires only a very slight change and makes excellent grammatical sense. Consequently, it is widely agreed that the issue can only be resolved on the basis of what 1 imon means. R. Kelt, Pyrrho, his A ntecedents, and his Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 25-7, summarizes the issue, and argues against the emendation. The insertion of the adverb "consistently" is a

2:H

NOTES

plausible, though disputed, interpretation of (he sense o f ] imon's statement, but there is no corresponding Greek adverb in the text. In defence of the insertion, see M . R. Stopper, "Schizzi Pirroniani" Phronesis 29 (1983), 265-97 and'F. Brennan, "Pyrrho on the Criterion", Ancient Philosopljy 18(2) (1998), 417-34, and opposed, Bett, Pyrrlro, his Antecedents,

and his Legacy, 22- 3,60-62.

3. Anaxarchus may have derived his mora] conventionalism from an interpretation of the atomism of his teacher Democritus; see J. Warren, Epicurus Oeinocritean

Ethics: An Archaeology

and

of Ataraxia (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-

versity Press, 2O02). 4. In Airl. 4.4-5, Aristotle deals with those who maintain that it is possible for a thing to have both of a pair of contradictory properties (see Met. 4.3, 10O5bl9-2O). One consequence of this is that everything would be indefinite, or indeterminate (Met. 4.4, 10O7b27). And when we examine what the defender of this view means, we find there is nothing to examine, since he neither says something is so, or not so, but both so and not so, and then again he even denies these very assertions so as to say nothing definite at all (jVfff. AA, 1008b30-35). While this view has same similarities with Pyrrho's, there is no good reason to suppose that Aristotle was arguing against him. In fact, there is no evidence that Aristotle even knew of Pyrrho. For more detail, see Bett, Pyrrho,

his Antecedents,

and his Legacy, 179-82.

5. There are in all of this some striking similarities to the attitude promoted in Zen Buddhism. I he notions that we must escape from desire and opinion and that the things people generally care about have no real value are common to both. There are also some similarities between the types of utterances forbidden on both views. These observations, along with the tantalizing remark about Pyrrho's journeys (DL 9.61), have encouraged the speculation that his view was in some way influenced by the Indian "gymnosophists". It appears, however, that what are supposed to be distinctively Buddhist elements are discernible in earlier Ci reek philosophers as well. So although the hypothesis of Buddhist influence cannot be ruled out, it is not required by the evidence we have. See E. Plintoff, "Pyrrho and India", Phronesis 25 (1980), 88-108, and S "Later Pyrrhonism and Indian philosophy" in the Guide to Further Reading.

3. A r c e s i l a u s : t h e o r i g i n o f A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m 1. For a detailed exploration of the evidence for the development of the early Academy, see H . Cherniss, the Riddle ofthe Early Academy (Berkeley, C A : University of California Press, 1945); J. Ddlon, the Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy

(347-274 AC) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and E. Watts,

"Creating the Academy: Historical Discourse and the Shape of the Community in the Old Academy", journal of Hellenic Studies 127 (2007), 106-22. 2 Characterizing the dialogues as dialectical simply means that the investigalion proceeds by articulating views and developing objections and replies.

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3. A l l hough we n o r m a l l y think of propositions o r positions as the only sorts o f things that can be refuted, in the S o c r a t i c sense a p e r s o n is refuted w h e n he contradicts h i m s e l f or gives a n incoherent account of what he believes. See T. B r i c k h o u s e Si N . S m i t h , Plato's Socrates (New York: O x f o r d University Press, 1394), esp. 12-14. 4. G i v e n the diverse variety of h i s intellectual influences, w f cannot be sure that this is the actual origin of Arcesilaus' s c e p t i c i s m . It is at least possible that he discovered his scepticism in Plato's dialogues after his c o n v e r s i o n . 5. It is not clear exactly what Arcesilaus w o u l d have said about the m a n y apparently dogmatic passages i n Plato's dialogues, especially those deemed m i d dle a n d late h y many commentators. F o r the m o s t influential chronological arrangement ot Plato's dialogues, see G . Vlastos, Socrates, Philosopher

Ironist and

Moral

(Ithaca, N Y : C o r n e l l University Press, 1991). J. A n n a s , "Plato the

Sceptic", in the Socratic

Movement,

P. V a n d e r Waerdt (ed.), 309—U) (Ithaca,

N Y : C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994) argues that the sceptical r e a d i n g o f Plato's Socrates requires severing his positive, dogmatic convictions from his negative argumentative practice. I n this way, A r c e s i l a u s could c l a i m that Socrates' arguments never proceed from his o w n convictions, but rather exclusively f r o m those o f his interlocutors. C Shields, "Socrates A m o n g ihe Sceptics", in Vander Wae rdl, ihe Socratic Movement,

341 - 66, argues that although we do

not find A r c e s i l a u s ' scepticism practised even by the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues, his c l a i m to c a r r y i n g on the Socratic mantle is at least as defensible as that o f the Stoics. 6. L i k e Socrates, A r c e s i l a u s left no writings. A c c o r d i n g to one account, he wrote n o t h i n g because of his universal cpachc ( D L 4.32). But it is reasonable to s u p pose that both A r c e s d a u s a n d Socrates were so intent a n r e l u t i n g live interlocutors that literary endeavours paled bv c o m p a r i s o n (see Ap. 38a). R e a d i n g arguments against one's a w n view is simply not as effective as h a v i n g to defend those views against a live Socrates. 7. T h e r e is scant evidence far the view that Arcesilaus was secretly dogmatic, testing his students with sceptical dialectic before deciding to reveal Platonic d o c t r i n e to them in private [PH 1.234). But even N u m e n i u s , w h o is generally quite hostile to the sceptical A c a d e m y , rejects the idea that Arcesilaus' cpochi is merely a facade (Praep.

Ev. 14.6.6).

S. C i c e r o i n c l u d e s D e m o c r i t u s , A n a x a g o r a s , E m p e d o c l e s a n d nearly all the old philosophers a m o n g those w h o c l a i m that truth i s b e y o n d our c o m p r e h e n s i o n o w i n g to the limits o f our senses, the feebleness of o u r m i n d s a n d the brevity o f life (Ac. 1.44). Protagoras similarly attributes h i s agnosticism to the obscurity of the question a n d the shortness o f life ( D L 9.51). 9. 'Ihe merely h u m a n w i s d o m that Socrates allows h i m s e l f [Ap.

2 0 d - e , 21d,

2 3 a - b ) - the awareness of his o w n ignorance - is not the w i s d o m he seeks. B e i n g h u m a n l y wise is a matter o f not having any m i s p l a c e d confidence about the status o f one's beliefs. S o it is consistent with saying that Socrates, like the rest o f the A t h e n i a n s , lacks virtue.

204

NOTES

10. I he influence of Fyrrho is also evident in the description of Arcesilaus by a contemporary Stoic, Aristón, as a philosophical chimera composed of Plato in front. Fyrrho behind and the dialectician Diodorus Cronus in the middle ( D L 4.33). It is not clear exactly what Aristón meant to convey about the relative importance or relation of these "parts"; however, D. N. Sedley, " Ihe Protagonists" in Doubt and Dogmatism, M. Schofield, M. Burnyeat Si |. Barnes (eds) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 11, offers a plausible account. 11. For more on the relation between Stoic ethics and other parts of the Stoic system, see the dispute between J. Cooper, "Eudaimonism and the Appeal to Nature in the Morality of Happiness: Comments on |ulia Annas, The Morality of Happiness", and J. Annas, "Reply to Cooper" Philosopliy and Phenomenological Research 55(3) (1995), 587-93, 599-610. 12. See B. Reed, " I h e Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression" Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosopliy 23 (2002), 147-80, for a different assessment. 13. Diogenes (7.177, L S 40F) records an amusing anecdote about a Stoic being deceived by a bowl of wax pomegranates. His response was that he had not assented to the false impression that I hey were real pomegranates; rather, he had assented to the true impression that it ivas reasonable that they were pomegranates - tor discussion, see T. Breunan, "Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism" Phronesis 41 (1996), 318-34. 14. For more detail on the Stoic psychology of human action, see LS 57 and B. Jnwood, Ethics and Human

Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 1985). According to the Stoics,both human and non-human animalsare born with a natural impulse towards self-preservation (a sort of proprietary affection towards themselves). But only human beings are capable Df moral action, in accordance with our distinctively rational capacity for self-governance. 15. Plato sometimes has Socrates refute characteristically Socratic theses as defended by his interlocutors. For example, in the Laches (19+d-199e), Nicias unsuccessfully defends the Socratic claim that courage is a kind of knowledge, and in the Charmides ( l 6 4 d - 172a), Critias unsuccessfully defends the Socratic claim that temperance is a kind of knowledge.

4. C a r n e a d l e s 1. For more on the sorites see '1. Williamson, Vagueness (London: Routledge, 1994). 2. For more on the Stoic response see |. Barnes, "Medicine, Experience and Logic", in Scicncf and Speculation:

Studies in Hellenistic

iheory and Practice,

J. Barnes,

J. Brunschwig, M . Burnyeat S: M. Schofield (eds), 24-63 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932); M. Mignucci,"lhe Stoic Analysis of the Sorites", Proceedings

of the Aristotelian

Society 93 (1993), 231-45.

3. Cirneades' division is somewhat clumsy with regard to Epicurean ethics since Epicurus argues that it is not possible to live pleasantly (i.e. to consistently

205

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

attain pleasure) without living virtuously and vice versa (F'rfr. 1.57). [f he is right, t h e d i s t i n c l i o n s b e t w e e n ( I ) and (4), and similarly between (2) a n d ( 5 ) , would vanish. 4. T h i s a n d all subsequent translations o f Scxtus' Against 7-8| are I r o m R. B e t l , Scxtus

Empiricus,

Against

the Logicians

the Logicians

|= A i

(Cambridge:

C a m b r i d g e University Press, 20O5). 5. C i c e r o does not explicitly credit this argument t o C a r n e a d c s , a n d Scxtus'report of a very s i m i l a r argument seems to have already w orried C h r y s i p p u s , so it is probably not C a r n e a d e s ' invention. Nevertheless, given his attachment to the sorites (see above, a n d A c . 2.91-4) it is likely that he employed it against the Stoics. 6. M o r e sophisticated developments of this line of thought c a n be f o u n d in externalist epistcmological theories, [he defining feature of such theories is the denial o f the so called K K thesis: in order to have knowledge, one m u s t k n o w that he has knowledge. A c c o r d i n g to the K K thesis, in order to k n o w that one's belief p is true, one must be aware of the reasons that establish, reveal, entail o r justify t h a t p is true. Externalists, by contrast, often provide causal accounts o f justification that do not require the agent to be aware of the justifying grounds, [f my belief is formed in the right way then 1 c a n be said to k n o w it. I need not be aware o f how my belief w a s formed: the justification is a matter o f the external relationship between m y belief and the world, i h e internalist, h o w ever, w o u l d object that this relationship determines w h e t h e r or not the belief is true, but not whether it is justified. See W . A l s t o n , Epislemic Essays in the theory of Knowledge H . K o m b l i t h , Epistemology:

justification:

{[thaca, N Y: C o r n e l ] University Press, 1989);

Intcrnalism

and Externalism

(Cambridge, M A :

M I T Press, 2001). F o r problems with the notion that the Stoics eventually develop an externalist epislemology, see Keed, '"[he Stoics' A c c o u n t o f the Cognitive Impression". 7. A n influential defence o f the purely sceptical or dialectical C a r n e a d e s is M . Burnyeat, " C a r n e a d e s was n o Probabilist," ( u n p u b l i s h e d ) . See also: |. A l l e n , "Academic Probabilism and Stoic Epistemology", Classical Quarterly 44 (19941, 8 5 - 1 1 3 , and " C a r n e a d e a n A r g u m e n t in Cicero's Academic and Argument: Symposium

Studies in Cicero's Academic

Hcllenisticuin,

Books", in Assent

Books, Proceedings

of the

Seventh

B. I n w o o d St J. M a n s f e l d (cds), 2 1 1 7 - 5 6 ( L e i d e n :

Brill, 1997); R . Kelt, "Carneades' Pif'ranofr: A Reappraisal of its Role and Status" OxfordSludies

in Ancient Philosophy 7 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , 59-94, a n d "Carneades' D i s t i n c -

tion between Assent and A p p r o v a l " Sionist 7 3 (1990), 3-20; M . Frede, " T h e Sceptic's T w o K i n d s of Assent and the Q u e s t i o n o f the Possibility o f K n o w l edge" in R o r t y et al., Philosophy

in History, 2 5 5 - 7 8 ; and G. Striker, "Sceptical

Strategies", in Schofield et al.. Doubt and Dogmatism,

5 4 - 8 3 , and " U b e r den

Unterschied z w i s c h c u den F y r r h o n e e r n u n d d e n A k a d e m i k e m " , Phronesis

26

(1981), 153-71 [reprinted in E n g l i s h as " O n the Difference Between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics", in her Essays on Hellenistic Ethics,

206

Epistemology

and

1 3 5 - 4 9 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, I996)|. Suzanne

NOTES

O b d r z a l e k , " L i v i n g i n D o u b t : C a r n e a d e s ' Pilhanon Studios in Ancient

Reconsidered"

Oxford

Philosophy ii (2006), 2 4 3 - 3 0 , provides a c o n v i n c i n g defence

o f ihe . >ll. • . - interpretation of C a r n e a d e s criterion, but without t a k i n g a position o n whether C a m e a J e s h i m s e l f endorses it. 8. A s we shall see in C h a p t e r 5, after C a r n e a d e s ' death there was- some disagreement in the A c a d e m y about how to u n d e r s t a n d the great Sceptic. So it is possible that Sextus takes this r e m a r k from a later, controversial account of C a r n e a d e s . O n the other hand, it is also the k i n d o f softening of an originally u n c o m p r o m i s i n g sceptical stance that we may expect to result from m a n y years o f intense dialectical battle w i t h the Stoics.

5. C i c e r o : the e n d of the s c e p t i c a l A c a d e m y 1. I n contemporary epistemology we l e n d to talk more of knowledge than w i s d o m . So the analogous question in contemporary discussions is whether it is possible to k n o w p a n d yet not have conclusive g r o u n d s for believing p; see, for example. M . Steup, A n /rrfrotiuciion to Contemporary

Epistemology

Saddle River, N J : Prentice H a l l , 1996). Most contemporary

(Upper

epistemologistsare

not sceptics since they defend some account ol I allible knowledge, t h a t is, they w i s h to s h o w that one c a n be fully justified in believing p. a n d hence k n o w that p, while still having good rational g r o u n d s to doubt t h a t p is true; see B. Reed, " H o w to I h i n k A b o u t Fallibdism", Philosophical

Studies

107 (2002),

U3-57.

By contrast, the view u n d e r examination in this chapter is a form o f scepticism since it is an attempt to show h o w w i s d o m , not knowledge, is compatible with fallibility. A c c o r d i n g to the mitigated scepticism described here, knowledge has been s h o w n to be neither possible n o r impossible. 2.

I h e only possible, although crucial, exception to this is that by a r g u i n g d i a l e c l i cally for a n d against the existence o f kalaleptic impressions, C a r n e a d e s may have judged that it is probable that n o t h i n g c a n he grasped w i t h certainty (Ac. 2 . 1 0 9 - 1 0 ) . If C a r n e a d e s h a d made this judgement it w o u l d have s e r v e d as an important precedent for the Later development of A c a d e m i c fallibilism, but it is by no means necessary to think C a r n e a d e s was the first to make this move.

3. For other interpretations o f Fhilo's R o m a n books, see especially Brittain, Philo of Larissa,

1 2 9 - 6 3 ; |. Cilucker, Antiochus

and the Late Academy

(Gottingen:

V a n d e n h o e c k fir Ruprecht, 1978); a n d H . 'liarranl, "Agreement a n d the SelfE v i d e n t in P h i l o o f L a r i s s a " Dionysius

5 {19a 11, 6 6 - 9 7 .

4. H i s earliest published w o r k , w h i c h dales back to 81 B C E , also expresses this same A c a d e m i c outlook. I n fact, W . G o r i e r , "Cicero's P h i l o s o p h i c a l Stance in the L U C J J "'us ' ' in In w o o d & Mansfeld, Assent and Argument,

3 6 - 5 7 , argues that

Cicero's phdosophical allegiance r e m a i n e d constant throughout h i s life. Ihe apparently dogmatic lone o f h i s dialogues dealing with political philosophy (written between 55 a n d c.51 B C E ) simply expresses his m o r e epislemically optimistic side.

207

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

5. Briltain, Philo of Larissa,

has argued that Fhilo's movement away from C l i l o -

machus' view occurred in two stages. P h i l o supposedly e n d o r s e d three distinct positions throughout h i s career: hrst, a radical C l i l o m a c h e a n scepticism that holds f i r m l y to epoche; secondly, a mitigated scepticism that preserves the rejection o f Stoic epistemology but allows tor fallible beliefs ( i n c l u d i n g philosophical judgements); and thirdly, the novel dogmatic view o f the R o m a n books. For reasons that w o u l d take us too far from the m a i n themes o f the introductory account offered here, J reject the thesis that P h i l o defended the second o f these three positions. A l t h o u g h he m a y have made some modifications to C l i t o m a c h u s ' view - augmenting o r adding to them - 1 believe his one d r a m a t i c shift is from scepticism to the d o g m a t i s m of h i s R o m a n books. In his extensive review of B r i t l a i n , C l u c k e r , " I h e P h i l o n i a n i M e l r o d o r i a n s " , offers a n u m b e r o f serious, a n d I think c o n v i n c i n g , objections. See also my " R a d i c a l a n d Mitigated Scepticism in Cicero's Academico", Piulosophy,

in Cicero!r

Practica!

YV. Nicgorski (ed.) (Notre D a m e , I L : U n i v e r s i t y of Notre D a m e

Press, forthcoming). 6. For a defence o f the view that C i c e r o i s the first to apply the A c a d e m i c m e t h o d for these positive aims see W. G o r i e r , "Altere F y r r h o n i s m u s , Jüngere A k a d e m i e , Ant iochos aus Askalon", in Orundriss

der Ceschichte

losophie der Antike, B d . 4. Die hellenistische

Philosphie

der Philosophie,

Die

Phi-

(Basel: Schwabe, 1994).

7. C i c e r o frequently singles out this freedom as the m o s t definitive a n d attractive feature o f the A c a d e m i c s ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l practice; see, for example, Inv. 2 . 9 - 1 0 : Drv. 2.150; fuse. 5.83; Off

3.20.

8. C i c e r o often berates others for their obstinacy (pertinacia;

e.g. Ac. 2 . 7 , 6 5 ; Pin.

1.27). Interestingly he also acknowledges the difficulty in clearly differentiating pertinacia

I r o m perse wrantia

{Top. 87; see also luv. 2.165, where he notes that

the latter borders o n the f o r m e r ) .

6. A e r t e s i d e i n u s : the P y r r h o n i a n r e v i v a l 1. A l t h o u g h we have no certain evidence in support of A e n e s i d e m u s ' m e m b e r s h i p in Philos sceptical Academy, this is the most plausible interpretation o f Pholius' report that A e n e s i d e m u s dedicates his books t o a c e r t a i n f e l l o w - m e m b e r oft he Academy, L u c i u s Tubero; see J.Mansfeld, "Aenesidemus and the Academics", in Ihe Passionate

intellect,

L. Ayres (ed.), 2 3 5 - 4 8 ( N e w B r u n s w i c k , N J : T r a n s a c -

tion, 1995) in opposition to the view set forth by P. D e c l e v a C a i z z i , "Aenesidem u s a n d the Academy", Classical Quarterly 2. Praep.

42( I ) ( 1 9 9 2 ) , 176-89.

Ev. 14.18.29. It is p u z z l i n g that C i c e r o never mentions A e n e t i d a m i E ,

especially since the Pyrrhonist

Discourses

are dedicated to Cicero's lifelong

f r i e n d , L u c i u s I'ubero. C i c e r o and l u b e r o had grown u p together, were connected by marriage a n d h a d devoted themselves to the same studies ( C i c e r o , Pro Ligario 21). G i v e n his devotion to the Academy, it is unlikely that C i c e r o was unaware o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' radical faction, especially i f h i s close friend

208

NOTES

h a d been a member. J he most reasonable hypothesis is that Cicero's neglect is an intentional snub, consistent with h i s generally dismissive attitude to the historical F y r r h o ; see C-lucker, Anfrocrrus and the late 3. O t h e r references to A e n e s i d e m u s ' Pyrrhonist

Academy. arc found at D L 9.73,

Discourses

106-7, 1 1 6 ¡ jVf 3.215. Sextus is probably d r a w i n g extensively from this work also in his presentation o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' T e n Modes (PH 1 . 3 c - 1 6 3 , o n w h i c h see below), hut it is not clear h o w strictly he keeps to this text. Diogenes refers to two other w o r k s . Against

Wisdom a n d On inquiry,

about wh ich we k n o w

only that they repeat Aenesidemus' contention that F y r r h o determines nothing dogmatically but guides h i m s e l f b y what is apparent ( D L 9.107). 4. i h e reference to "self-evident cognition" in this passage suggests that h i s pri m a r y target is F h i l o s K o m a n view. N u m e n i u s r e m a r k s that Philo a b a n d o n e d epoche because o f the clarity a n d consistency o f his experience (Praep 14.9.2); see T a r r a n t , "Agreement a n d the Self-Evident", 7 2 ¡ Cilucker, and the Late Academy,

1 - 8 3 ; a n d Krittain, Philo o/Larissa,

EV.

Antiochus

133 n.b.

3. i h e r e are plausible externalist replies one might m a k e . O f course I c a n be m i s taken i n c l a i m i n g to k n o w something. But it need not follow from this that the idea o f fallible knowledge is untenable. T h e externalist can argue that we arc fal lible about what we k n o w and do not know. O u r knowledge is secured by being in the right causal relationship with the world whether or not we are a ware o f this fact. More generally, one might simply d i s c a r d the a s s u m p t i o n that only c o n clusive justification is genuine justification, [his is the approach taken by most contemporary epistemologists (Keed, " H o w to T h i n k About FalLibilism"). 6. F h o l i u s reports that the a i m o f the Pyrrhonist firmly

Discourses

" i s to establish

[&efcr'psaj| that there is n o t h i n g firm [1'efcnron] to be g r a s p e d "

(Bib.

1 6 9 b I 8 - 1 9 ) . It is not clear whether this formulation is actually A e n e s i d e m u s ' or w h e t h e r it is F h o t i u s ' o w n ironic jab. I n either case, it pointedly recalls the ambiguity between e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ] a n d metaphysical readings of F y r r h o . 7. i h e a u t h o r of On Drunkenness

[De Lbr. ) is P h i l o o f A l e x a n d r i a , a Jewish phi

losopher a n d political leader w h o flourished around the first c e n t u r y C E . 1 refer to h i m below simply as FhiİD, but he s h o u l d not be confused with the Academic, Philo of Larissa. 8. F o r a detailed defence, see Bett, Pyrrho,

his Antecedents,

and his Legacy;

S.

tiaukroger, " T h e T e n Modes of A e n e s i d e m u s a n d the M y t h of A n c i e n t Scep ticism", tirrfiirr journal

for

the History

of Plıilosopfıy

P. Woodruff, "Aporetic P y r r h o n i s m " Oxford

Studies

3 (1995), 3 7 1 - 8 7 ; a n d in Ancient

Philosophy

6

(1983), 139-63. Although Wood ruff argues f o r a negatively dogmatic interpre tation of A e n e s i d e m u s , he attributes only a semantic, rather than a n l o l o g i c a l , relativism to h i m . I n other words, the restrictions on w h a t the P y r r h o n i s t m a y say a n d believe do not entail any c l a i m s about how things are, but only about the appropriate use of language: to say, f a r example, that honey is sweet means that honey is sweet relative to certain conditions. I h i s sort of relativ ism leaves it entirely open as to w h e t h e r h o n e y is or is not sweet by nature; M . Schofield, " A e n e s i d e m u s : P y r r h o n i s t a n d H e r a c l i l e a n " in Pynhonists,

Patri-

209

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

c inns, Platonizers: of the lenth

Hellenistic

Symposium

Philosophy

Heilcnisticum,

in the Period 155-56 BC.

Proceedings

A . M . [oppolo fit D. N . Scdley (cds),

2 6 9 - 3 3 8 ( N a p l t s : Bibliopolis, 2007). 9. I follow Sextus' e n u m e r a t i o n of tht m o d e s in what follows. D i o g e n e s n u m b e r s Lhe Len m o d e s differently, a n d Philo, w h o includes only eight in h i s account, does not n u m b e r them at all. 10.

l h e interpretation o f these passages, a n d the general issue o f ethical relativism w i t h i n P y r r h o n i a n scepticism, is explored in Schofield, "Aenesidemus: P J T rhonist a n d H e r a c l i l e a n " ; H_ J. H a n k i n s o n , " V a l u e s , Objectivity a n d Dialectic; The Sceptical Attack on E t h i c s : Its Methods, A i m s , a n d Success", 39(1}

(1994), 4 5 - 6 8 ; Belt, Pyrrho,

his Antecedents,

and his Legacy,

Pfironesis Annas,

" D o i n g Without Objective Values". 11. [. A n n a s 8t J. Barnes, Vijf Modes of Scepticism

(Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-

sity Press, 19S5), 1 4 3 - 5 , hypothesize that S e x l u s imports the later A g r i p p a n relativity m o d e (PH (PH

1.167) into h i s account o f A e n e s i d e m u s ' relativity m o d e

1.135-40). I n both discussions, he says that objects appear relative to the

judging subject a n d to the things observed together. 'I his explains a n u m b e r o f otherwise very p u z z l i n g aspects o f Sextus' text: for example, unlike the other n i n e m o d e s , there are no examples d r a w i n g o n traditional observations, a n d instead we find a series o f highly abstract arguments m u c h more characteristic of Agrippa's modes. 12. [n the following account J rely o n Schofjeld's resolution (in "Aenesidemus: P J T rhonist a n d H e r a c l i l e a n ' ) of this long-standing "scholarly headache". A m o n g the many details I leave out of consideration, it is important to note Schofield 5 contention that A e n e s i d e m u s is motivated, at least in part, by a desire to underm i n e the Stoic appropriation o f H e r a c l i l u s as an authoritative precursor. See also the detailed study in R . Polito, ihe Sceptical Road: Aenesidemus priation

of Heraclilus

Appro-

( L e i d e n : Brill, 2004), a n d f. Rist, " T h e H e r a d i l e a n i s m o f

Aenesidemus", Phoenix

24(4)

(1970), 3 0 9 - 1 9 .

13. See Schofield, "Aenesidemus: Pyrrhonist a n d H e r a c l i l e a n " for d i s c u s s i o n o f the a w k w a r d expression S e x l u s frequently uses to introduce these interpretations: "Aenesidemus' followers' interpretation of H e r a c l i l u s " or " H e r a d i t u s according to A e n e s i d e m u s " i h e views expressed are regarding the nature o f the intellect (JW 7.350), the relation o f part to whole (At 9.337), time ( A i 1 0 . 2 1 6 , 2 3 3 ; P H 3.] 38) a n d m o t i o n ( A i 10.83). I n his translation o f the text, Betl, Sextus i'rfn?irrcns, Against the Logicians, 14. See Bett, Pyrrho, his Antecedents,

deletes the w o r d s "and H e r a c l i l u s " at AJ 8.8. and his Legacy,

1 1 4 - 2 3 , for a m o r e positive

view about the role o f opposing appearances i n Pyrrho's view.

7. S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s : t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m 1. D i o g e n e s ' genealogical List also contains a n u m b e r o f p r o m i n e n t empiricist physicians. T h i s close connection with medical e m p i r i c i s m indicates that the

210

NOTES

development o f P y r r h o n i s m is tied up with emerging debates o n the methodology a n d epislemology o f medicine; see M . F r e d e , " i h c M e t h o d of the S o - C a l l e d M e t h o d i c a l School of Medicine", in K a r n e s et al.. Science and Speculation, J. A l l e n , " P y r r h o n i s m and M e d i c a l E m p i r i c i s m " , Aufsticg Riimischen

1-23;

und Niedergang

der

Well, II 37(1) (1993), 6 4 6 - 9 0 .

2. Jonathan B a r n e s succinctly lays out the relevant evidence in the introduction to A n n a s SrBarnes, 'HieModesofScepticism. eus" Classical Quarterly

D . H o u s e , '"Ihe Life o f Sextus E m p i r i -

30 (1980), 2 2 7 - 3 3 , goes into greater detail, but see also

F l o r i d i , S e x t u s E m p i r i e u s , w h o suggests that House is overly cautious about the possibility o f reaching f i r m e r conclusions regarding the l i f e o f S e x t u s . 3.

I here is a g o o d deal o f controversy regarding the chronology of these texts. Some m a i n t a i n thai

i is a n earlier version o f the material that Sextus later

r e w o r k e d as the Sceptical Sextus Empirieus

notably K . Janacek, Prolegomena

Commentaries:

to

"Acta Universitatis Palackianae O l o m u c e n s i s " N o . 4 ( O l o m o u e :

N a k l a d e m Palackeho University, 1943 ). O t h e r s argue that PH is a more sophisticated abridgement that strengthens the earlier version o f the Sceptical mentaries:

most notably R. Belt, Sextus Empirieus,

C l a r e n d o n Press, 1997} a n d SV.vius Empirieus,

Com-

Against the Elhicists (Oxford;

Against Ore Logicians.

Vet others

argue that if Sextus' purpose is therapeutic, then what m a y b e effective for one reader (or patient) may not be effective for another. T h u s one Sceptical text may be better suited to treat one person a n d another text better suited to treat another person. I n that case, we c a n sensibly talk about better or worse Sceptical texts only relative to the particular needs o f the Sceptic's dogmatic patients. 4.

I h e following references are not exhaustive: PH 1.8, 1.73, 1.121, 1.128, 1.129, 1.134, 1.163, 2.95, 3.65; A i 9.436, 10.168.

5. PH 1.3], 1.35, 1.36,1.79. 1.87, 1.99, 1.117, ].123; Af 3 . 2 , 8 . 1 6 0 , 9 . 1 9 1 , 10.6. Ihe notion that cpochi

follows {akolouthci)

equipollence ( P H 1.167; A i 9.194; cf.

D L 9 . 7 9 ) is particularly significant since Sextus uses the same

ve?b{akoiouthei)

to describe the fortuitous attendance of iTrnravjiT o n epoche {PH 1.26, 29, 31). 6. P H 1 . 6 1 , 1 . 1 4 0 , 1 . 1 6 3 , 1 . 1 7 0 , 1 . 1 7 5 , 2 . 1 9 2 , 3 . 6 , 3 . 2 9 ; A f 7 . 3 8 0 , 8 . 1 7 7 , 8 . 2 5 9 , 8 . 3 8 0 , 8,401. 7. A i 8.346, 3.428; cf. A i 8 . 3 8 0 , 8 . 4 7 7 , 11.168, w h i c h also suggest that epoche is the result o f a conscious, deliberate decision. 8. Note how s i m i l a r [[[ is to W. K.. Clifford's famous assertion that "It is w r o n g always, e v e r y w h e r e , a n d for anyone, to believe a n y t h i n g u p o n insufficient evidence" {'Ihe Ethics of Belief and Other Essays [ A m h e r s t , N Y : Prometheus, [1877] 1999). 9. i h e p r o b l e m is that the existence o f m o r a l a n d natural evils seems incompatible with the existence o f a G o d w h o is b o l h a n d able a n d willing to prevent innocent suffering. 10. See J. B r u n s c h w i g , " O n c e A g a i n o n t u s e b i u s o n A r i s t o d e s o n T i m o n o n Pyrr h o " in h i s Papers in Hellenistic

Piiilosophy,

190-211 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994) for a detailed analysis o f the expression "as far as the argument goes".

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

11. C o n t r a r y to J. B a r n e s , " I n t r o d u c t i o n " in A n n a s 8; B a m e s , The Modes of Scepticism, x x v i i - x x i x , ] think we must admit that the sceptic as therapist might k n o wi ngly apply invalid o r incoherent arguments. B u t a l l t h a t t h i s c a n m e a n i s that s u c h arguments appear weak to h i m . It c a n n o t be construed as an attempt to deceive or m i s l e a d the "patient", "the thought that a therapeutically effective, but invalid, argument is deceptive or m i s l e a d i n g presupposes that one

should

not argue this way. But the p h i l a n t h r o p i c sceptic w i l l have no s u c h scruples. F u r t h e r m o r e , the o n l y time it would make sense to k n o w i n g l y offer an invalid argument w o u l d be w h e n a valid argument with the same c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d not be as c o n v i n c i n g . W h i l e it is true that . II

•

• r e a s o n i n g c a n be quite

c o n v i n c i n g to those u n f a m i l i a r with logic, those in need of sceptical therapy will probably be better served with coherent, valid arguments. Hut again, the therapeutic sceptic's preference for valid arguments can not be due to a n y epistemic advantage such arguments are supposed to offer. 12. However, the Stoics insist that tranquillity itself is not ihe summum

iiojrrrru but

rather a welcome bv-product (sec Ac. 2.138). 13. A n o t h e r explanation is that the physiology o f belief accounts for its disturbance. M . M c P h e r r a n , "Ataraxia

a n d Eudaimonia

Is the Sceptic Really H a p p y ? " Proceedings Ancient

Philosophy

in A n c i e n t P y r r h o n i s m :

of the Boston Area Colloquium

in

5 (1983), 1 3 5 - 7 1 , esp. 15a, notes that both the Stoics a n d

S e x l u s describe reason as an active faculty that is itself in m o t i o n w h e n it assents, a n d that s u c h a goal-directed motion is just what it is to experience the disturbance of belief. S u s p e n s i o n o f judgement eliminates the disturbing p s y c h i c m o t i o n a n d leaves a relatively untroubled, s m o o t h m o t i o n .

8. P y r r h o n i a n a r g u m e n t s 1. For the persistence o f the challenge p r o v i d e d by P y r r h o n i a n Scepticism, see R. Fogelin, R . Pyrrhonian

Reflections

on Knowledge

and Justification

(Hew

York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1934). 2. M y d i s c u s s i o n o f the sceptical modes in this chapter is heavdy indebted to J. Barnes, The 'toils of Scepticism

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press,

1390). 3. D i o g e n e s attributes these same m o d e s to Agrippa a n d h i s s c h o o l ( D L 9.88). T u l a is virtually all we k n o w about A g r i p p a . 4. See P. D . K l e i n , " H u m a n Knowledge a n d the Infinite Regress o f Reasons", Philosophical

Perspectives

13 (1939), 2 9 7 - 3 2 5 , for a defence of infinitism.

5. Aristotle frequently makes this distinction: for example, NE 1.3, I 0 3 5 a 2 - 4 ; i > f A ruma 2 . 1 , 4 1 3 a 1 1 - 1 2 ; Are/. 7.3, 1 0 2 9 b 3 - l 2 . 6. A more plausible response to the charge o f circularity is to embrace it. C o n temporary epislemolDgists have developed a variety of coherence theories that do just that. Perhaps the most difficult p r o b l e m with coherence theories is to explain w h y the coherence a m o n g a set of propositions m a k e s t h e m more

212

NOTES

likely to be true than an equally coherent set of incompatible propositions; see L . Bonjour, She Structure

of Empirical

Knowledge

(Cambridge, M A : Harvard

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 19*5). 7. Sextus offers a different, a n d incompatible solution i n AÍ 8.333a. We cannot decide w h i c h a m o n g c o m p e t i n g conception 5 of soul (lor example) is the right one to begin with; but we cannot really enquire into the nature of the soul until we settle this issue, so e n q u i r y cannot even get started. See J. B r u n s c h w i g , "Sextus t ' m p i r i c u s on the K r i t e r i o n : the Sceptic as C o n c e p t u a l Legatee", in IhcQuestion

of "Eclecticism":

Studies in LaterCreek

Philosophy,

J. M . U i l l o n St

A . A . L o n g (eds), 1 4 5 - 7 5 (Berkeley, C A : U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1988). 8. We c a n begin to get a sense of the b o u n d a r i e s of these sub-fields b y consideri n g the C r e e k w o r d s from w h i c h their n a m e s are derived: ethos, physis

and

logos. E t h i c s deals with normative a n d evaluative concepts, applied to h u m a n beings individually a n d collectively, so it includes m o r a l a n d political philosophy; physics deals with nature, i n c l u d i n g metaphysical as well as scientific questions, both about h u m a n beings as well as the earth a n d the universe; a n d logic deals w i t h the many uses o f language a n d reason, i n c l u d i n g formal m e t h o d s of inference along with rhetorical a n d e p i s t e m o l ó g i c a ! topics. 9. At A Í 7 . 2 5 Sextus says that a criterion is the m a r k o f an immediately observable, or self-evident, t r u t h , w h i l e signs a n d proofs provide us with a way of discerni n g the truth of things that are not immediately evident. G i v e n the variety of ways Sextus' dogmatic opponents used s u c h epistemológica! notions, however, it is not s u r p r i s i n g that he does not keep strictly to this distinction; see C . Striker, "Krilérion zit Gottingen

tes aietheias", Nachrichten

der Akademie

der

Wissenschajien

I. Phil.-hist. K l a s s c 2 (1974), 4 8 - 1 1 0 .

10. Sextus does not at this point consider Protagoras' view that every h u m a n being is the criterion by w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is j u d g e d to be true, because he counts h i m a m o n g those w h o do away w i t h the criterion. I f we a l l o w that whatever appears to be the case is the case for m e at this m o m e n t , then we effectively do away w i t h truth as typically conceived, a n d thus have no need of a criterion. Sextus also briefly refers to Plato's "exquisite a r g u m e n t " [Tkt. 1 7 l a ) : " i f every appearance is true, then even rroi every appearances being true, since it lakes the form of an appearance, will be true" (Af 7.390). 11. T h e nature o f the sceptic's reliance o n recollect ive signs, a n d especially whether it presupposes some form of belief, is discussed in C h a p t e r 9.

9. T h e ( o r d i n a r y ) l i f e o f a P y r r h o n i s t 1. i h e s e options arc e x a m i n e d a n d developed in an influential set of essays in M . H. Burnyeat St M . Frede ( e d s ) . The Original

Sceptics: A Controversy

(Indiana-

polis, I N : Hackett, 1997). 2. i he terms more frequently u s e d , adopted from Barnes, w h o takes them from C a l e n , are " r u s t i c " a n d " u r b a n e " Fine points out that these terms, as usually

2:3

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

applied, do not exhaust the relevant logical space, whereas her terms do. In particular, it is possible to reject more k i n d s of belief t h a n the urbane sceptic does ( a s urbanity is variously interpreted), a n d yet to stop short of a complete ban o n belief. G. F i n e , S c e p t i c i s m , Existence, a n d B e l i e f " Oxford Ancient Philosophy

Studies

in

14 (1996), 286 n.25, refers to this excluded m i d d l e , neither

urbane n o r rustic, as " s u b u r b a n s c e p t i c i s m " 3. S e e G . F i n e , "Sextus a n d E x t e r n a l W o r l d S c e p t i c i s m " Oxford Studies in Piiilosophy

Ancient

24 (2003 ), 3 4 1 - 8 5 , for d i s c u s s i o n o f w h e t h e r Sextus' P y r r h o n i s m

includes some form o f external world scepticism. 4. See V. T s o u n a , the Hpistcmoiogy of the Cyrenaic School ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1993) for a detailed examination of C y r e n a i c epistemology. 5. I take the lol lowing objection from M . F. Hurnyeal, " C a n the Sceptic Live H i s S c e p t i c i s m ? " in Schofield et ai., Doubt

and Dogmatism,

2 0 - 5 3 . I h e response

is further elaborated in my " I s the E x a m i n e d Life W o r t h Living? A P y r r h o n i a n Alternative" Apeiron

3 6 ( 3 ) ( 2 0 0 3 ) , 2 2 9 - 4 9 ; see also B. C . Johnsen, " O n

the C o h e r e nee of P y r r h o n i a n Scepticism", Philosophical

Review 110(4) (2001),

5 2 1 - 6 1 , for a different response. 6. D e f e n d e r s o f fideism w o u l d argue that unjustified belief c a n be, a n d perhaps must be, the foundation for religious observances. See X P e n e l h u m , God Scepticism

and

(Boston, M A : Keidel, 1983) for more o n the relation between varie-

ties o f scepticism a n d fideism. 7. Sextus m e n t i o n s Aristotles suggestion for m a k i n g sense o f the notion that a line is length without breadth. Ihe dispute turns o n what it means l a conceive a line. If we must represent it visually then there c a n be n o conception of line without breadth. But if conception o c c u r s in some n o n - v i s u a l form o f representation, the concept o f line is perfectly coherent. But o f course Sextus' argument need not be conclusive since he i s o n l y seeking to balance the c o m p e t i n g c l a i m s . For more detail see 1. Mueller, ' G e o m e t r y a n d Scepticism", in Barnes et ai.. Science and Speculation,

69-95.

8. J. Barnes, "Scepticism a n d the Arts", in Method, Studies

in the Philosophy

of Ancient

Science,

Medicine

and

Metaphysics:

R . ). H a n k i n s o n (ed.),

Apeiron

12(2} (1988), 5 3 - 7 7 , esp. 61, m a r k s this d i s t i n c t i o n in terms o f formal a n d i n f o r m a l l e a c h i n g . A l t h o u g h Sextus never d r a w s this distinction himself, it is at the very least suggested by the distinction between a criterion o f action and a criterion o f truth, along with the sceptic's reliance o n teaching o f forms of expertise. There is no o t h e r way to make sense of h o w the sceptic could l e a m a n y form of expertise except by imitation. See also U. L . B l a n k , Sextos tmpiricus,

21-1

Against the Grammarians

( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1998), xxxiv.

Guide to further reading

1 . Introduction Translations

and collections

of texts and

fragments

The relevant ancient texts are widely scattered. A good place to start is A. A. Long & D. N . Sedley (eds), Tire Hellenistic Philosophers, 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) [= LS]. Volume 1 contains selections of texts translated into English followed by commentary. Volume 2 contains the original Greek and Latin texts along with critical notes arid bibliography. Another good point of entry is B. In wood & L. P. Gerson, Hellenistic Philosophy:

introductory

Readings, 2nd edn (Indianapolis, I N : Hackett, 1997) [= I G ] , In many cases I have taken the translations of ancient texts from these volumes. More detailed information on primary texts can be found below in the relevant sections of this guide. A very efficient way to become familiar with what scholars consider most interesting, noteworthy or controversial is to read book reviews. Each of the following sections of this guide will include references in square brackets after some entries. Additionally, reliable and informative online reviews can be found at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (http:nndpr.nd.edu/) and at Bryn Mawr Classical Review (http^.'ccat.sas.upenn.edii'hjncr/), Secondary

literature

An excellent overview of the epistemological issues at the heart of ancient Scepticism is J. Brunschwig, "Introduction: The Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology", in Vie Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, K. Algra, I. Barnes, J. Mansfeld & M . Schotield (eds), 229-59 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). There are also very instructive chapters on Pyrrhonian 21?

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

and Academic Scepticism in M . L . Gill & P. Pellegrin (eds), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Oxford; Blackwell, 20Ö6): C . Levy, "The New Academy and its Rivals", 448-64, and J. Brunschwig, "Pyrrhonism" 465-85. See also: D. N. Sedley, "The Motivation of Greek Scepticism", in The Sceptical Tradition, M . Buniyeat (ed.), 9-29 (Berkeley, C A ; University of California Press, 1983); A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy, 2nd edn (Berkeley, C A : University of California Press, 1986), 75-106; and R. \V. Sharpies, Sforrj, Epicureans and Sceptics (London: Routledge, 1996). The most comprehensive study is R. I. Hankinson, Hie Sceptics (London: Routledge, 1998) [ R E V I E W S : C . Brittain in Philosophical Review 106(4) (1997), 635-8; G . Fine, "Scepticism, Existence, and Belief, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 14 (1996), 273-90; D. W. Hamlyn i n Philosophical Investigations 19(3) (1996), 270-74; C . Osborne in Mind 107 (1998), 478-82; R K . Sakezles in Ancient Philosophy 18(1) {1998), 202-6]; an engaging study mostly aimed at defending Pyrrhonism is A. Bailey, Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean

Scep-

ticism (Oxford: Oxford L'niversity Press, 2002) [ R E V I E W S : ). Barnes in Mind 112 (2003), 496-9; R. Bett in Philosophical Review 112(1) (2003), 100-102; M . McPherran in Philosophical Quarterly 5 4 (2004), 319-21]; a controversial interpretation linking ancient Scepticism with anti-realism is L. Groarke, Greek Scepticism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990) [ R E V I E W S : C. Hookway in Mind 101 (1992), 145-8; R, Pierson in Dialogue;

Canadian

Philosophical Review 35 (1996), 133-5; A. Silverman in Phoenix 48(2) (1994), 165-70]; still valuable is the pioneering work of C . L. Stough, Greek Scepticism (Berkeley, C A : University of California Press, 1969) [ R E V I E W S : M . Frede in Journal of Philosophy 7 0 (1973), 805-10; A. A . Long in Philosophy 46 (1971), 77-8]- Also worth consulting is M . M . Patrick, The Greek Sceptics (New York; Columbia University Press, 1929), More book-length studies dealing with Pyrrhonian Scepticism are listed below in the section on Septus Empiricus. For readers of French, German or Italian; V. Brochard, I f s Sceptiaues Grecs, 2nd edn (Paris: W i n , 1923); M . Dal Pea, Loscetticismo Greco, 3rd edn (Bari: Lateral, 1989); L. Robin, Pyrrhon etleScepticisme

Grec (New York: Garland, 1980);

A. Goedeckemeyer, Die Geschichte des Griechischen Skeptizismus (New York; Garland, 1987); R. Ricken, Antike Skeptiker (Munich: C . H . Beck, 1994). Sceptical

antecedents

(See also § " O n the origins of the sceptical Academy", below,) Belt, R. " O n the F i e - h i s t o r y of P y r r h o n i s m " , Proceedings of the Boslon Area loquium in Aprrit-rii Philosophy

B r u n s e n wig, J. " L e fragment* U K 70 B l de Metrodore de C h i c " in Polylristor: in the History and Historiography

of Ancient

der Horst Si D . T R u n i a ( e d s ) , 11-38

216

Col-

15 (1999), 1 3 7 - 6 6 . Pliilosophy,

Studies

K . A . A l g r a , P. W. van

( L e i d e n : Brill, 1996).

GUIDE

Let,

M . - K. Epistemology and

Dcmocrilus

After Protagoras:

TO

FURTHER

Responses to Relativism

READING

in Plato,

Aristotle

( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 2005) [ H E V L E W S ; D . T. J. Bailey in

M i n d 115 (2006), 1151-3; L . C a s t a g n o l i i n Ancient

Philosophy

27(2) (2007),

4 0 5 - 1 8 ; |. W a r r e n i n Classical Review 56 (200b), 5 9 - 6 1 ) . Warren, J . Epicurus ami Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology o/Alaraxia (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press 2002) [ K E V I E W S : V . T s o u n a i n Classical (2004), 1 7 4 - 8 2 ; W . E n g j e r l i n Ancient Philosophy

Philology99

24 (2004), 496-500|.

2. P y r r h o Translations

and collections

of texts and

fragments

Although Pyrrho wrote nothing, much has been written about him, starting with his student Timon. These testimonies are gathered in F. Decleva Caizzi, Pirrone: Tesiimonianze (Naples; Bibliopolis, 1981

), which also contains transla-

tions and extensive commentary in Italian [REVIEWS: W. Görler in Archiv/fir

Geschichte der Philosophie 67 (1985), 320-25; A . A . Long in Classical Review 34(2) (1984), 219-21]. LS 1-3 is a more selective collection of tests translated into English and followed by insightful commentary,

Eusebius, a bishop of Caesarea, records the Aristotelian philosopher Aristodes'

polemical account of Pyrrho and his followers in Praeparatio Evangélica,

Book 14, Chapter 18. Die

only complete English translation is E . H. Gilford

(trans.), Preparation for the Gospels,

4 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903).

A thorough, scholarly treatment of the work of Aristocles can be found in M .

L. Chiesara, Aristocles of Messene, Testimonia and Fragments (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001)

[REVIEW; G . Karamanolis in Classical Review

(2004), 57-9],

Diogenes Laertius Lives of Pyrrho and Timon ( D L 1

9.61-116)

54(1)

is a com-

pressed account of the entire history of Pyrrhonian Scepticism containing many dubious yet entertaining anecdotes about the historical Pyrrho: R, Hicks (trans,), Diogenes Laertius, Lh'es of Eminent Philosophers (Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press, Secondary

1972), This text is excerpted

in IG

111-22,23.

literature

Ausland, H . " O n the M o r a l O r i g i n of the P y r r h o n i a n P h i l o s o p h y " Eienchos

10

(1985), 3 5 9 - 4 3 4 . Barnes, ). " D i o g e n e s Laertius DC 6 1 - 1 1 6 : T h e Philosophy of Pyrrhonism", Aufstieg und

Niedergang der römischen

Weit U 36.6 ( 1992), 4 2 4 1 - 3 0 1 .

Bett, R. Pyrrrro, fus Antecedents, and his Legacy ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 2000) I R E V I E W S : ). Karnes i n jVirnrf 110 (2001), 1 0 4 3 - 6 ; L . C a s l a g n o l i in Philosophy

22(2) (2002), 4 4 3 - 5 8 ; R . Perwerda i n Mnemosyne

7 4 3 - 6 ; A . M . loppolo i n Gnomon Metaphysics

76 (2004) 114-19;

Ancient

54{6) (2001),

P. W o o d r u f f i n Review of

55(2) (2001), 3 7 9 - 8 0 ] .

217

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Belt, K_ "Arislocles o n ' ] i m o n o n Pyrrho: T h e ' l e x l , its Logic a n d Lis Credibility", Oxford Studies in Afrcj'eni Philosophy

12 (1994), 1 3 7 - B L

Beit, R. " W h a t d i d P y r r h o think about ' T h e Nature o f the D i v i n t a n d the G o o d ? ' " Phronesis

34{3) (1994), 3 0 3 - 3 7 .

B r e n n a n , T . " P y r r h o o n the C r i t e r i o n ' ; Ancient

Philosophy

18(2) (1998), 4 1 7 - 3 4 .

B r u n s c h w i g , J. " O n c e A g a i n o n E u s e b i u s o n A r i s l o c l e s on 1'imon o n P y r r h o " i n his Papers in Hellenistic

Philosophy,

190-211 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y

Press, 1994). B r u n s c h w i g , J. " L e litre d e s T n d a l m o i ' de 'I'imon: d'Ulysse a Pyrrhon", sur la philosophic

title of T i m o n ' s tndalmoi: Philosophy,

Recherchcs

ct le langage 12 (1990), 8 3 - 9 9 . | R e p r i n t e d i n E n g l i s h as " T h e from O d y s s e u s to P y r r h o " i n his Papers in

Hellenistic

212-23.|

Bu rnyeat, M . P. " i ' r a n q u i l i t y W i t h o u t a Slop: T'imon fr. 6 8 " Classical

Quarterly

30

(1980), 8 6 - 9 3 . D e L a c y , P. "Ou mallon

a n d the Antecedents o f A n c i e n t Scepticism" Phronesis

3

(1953), 5 9 - 7 1 . Lesses, G . " P y r r h o the Dogmatist". Apcrron 35(3) (2002), 2 5 5 - 7 1 . L o n g , A . A . " T l m o n of Phlius: P y r r h o n i s t a n d Satirist", Proceedings of the Philological

Cambridge

Society 24 (1978), 6 8 - 9 1 .

Powers, N . " F o u r t h C e n t u r y F l u x T h e o r y a n d the O r i g i n of P y r r h o n i s m " Ape iron 34(1) (2001), 3 7 - 5 0 . Sakezles, P. " P y r r h o n i a n i n d e t e r m i n a c y : A Pragmatic Interpretation" Apeiron

26(2)

(1993), 7 7 - 9 5 . Stopper, M . R . " S c h i z i i P i r r o n i a n i " Phronesis

28 (1983), 2 6 5 - 9 7 .

Svavarsson, S. H . "Pyrrho's Undecidable Nature", Oxford Studies in Ancient

Philoso-

phy 27 (2004), 2 4 9 - 9 5 . Svavarsson, S. H . "Pyrrho's Dogmatic Nature" Classical

Quarterly

52 (2002), 248¬

56. Warren, J. "Aristocies' Refutations of P y r r h o n i s m " Proceedings Philological

Pyrrho,

of the

Cambridge

Society 46 (2000), 140-64.

later Pyrrhonism

and Indian

philosophy

Chalterjee, D . " S c e p t i c i s m a n d I n d i a n P h i l o s o p h y " Philosophy

East and West 27(2)

(1977), 195-209. Plintoff, E . " P y r r h o a n d India", Phronesis

2 5 (1980), 8 8 - 1 0 8 .

P r e u k i a n , A . M . "Sextus E m p i r i c u s a n d I n d i a n L o g i c " Philosophical (india)SQ

( W57),

MeEviiley, T . 1982. " P y r r h o n i s m a n d Madhyamika", Philosophy (1982), 3 - 3 5 .

218

Quarterly

115-26. East and West 32(1)

GUIDE

T OFURTHER

READING

3-5. Arcesilaus, Carneades, Cicero, (Philo and Antiochus) Translations

and collections

of texts and

fragments

The relevant texts for the study of the sceptical Academics are collected in H . f. Mette, "Zwei Akademiker heute: Krantor von Soloi und Arkesilaos von Pitane" Lustrum 26 (1984), 7-94; "Weitere Akademiker heute Von Lakydes bis zu Kleitomachos", Lustrum 27 (1985), 39-148; and "Philon von Larisa und Antiochos von Askalon *,Lustrum 28-9 ( 1986-7), 9-63. Also, C . Brittain, Phih 1

of Larissa:

T7IL?

Last of the Academic Sceptics (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2001 ) has, in an appendix, collected and translated into English the testimonia on Philo of Larissa. Cicero, Sevtus and Diogenes Laertius are our richest sources of information on the sceptical Academy. Also important is the fragmentary Index Academicorum {History of the Academy) written by the Epicurean Philodemus: T. Dorandi (ed.), Fj/oifertio, Storia dei jilosoji; Platone e I'Academia (Naples: Bibliopolis 1991) [Greek text with Italian translation]. References to Sextus texts are in § "7-9. Sextus Empiricus", below. In Book 4 of Lives of Eminent Philosophers, Diogenes presents brief biographies of the Academics from Plato's successor Speusippus up to Carneades successor Clitomachus. 1

O f Cicero's philosophical dialogues, the Academica is by far the most important, but Dejinibus, De natura deorum. De fato and Dedivmatione also contain a great deal of Academic argumentation, and the Tusculanarum Disputationes and De officiis are essentia] for understanding Ciceros own views. For the Aca¬ demica, there are excellent notes on the text along with commentary in J. S. Reid (ed.), Af. Tulli Ciceronis, Academica (London; Macmillati, 1885). Cicero's dialogues are all available in Loeb Classical Library editions, with English translations facing Latin text (Cambridge, M A : Harvard University Press). Here are some more recent and readable translations with useful introductions and notes: C i c e r o , On Academic

C. Krittain (trans.) ( I n d i a n a p o l i s , I N : Hackett,

Scepticism,

2006). C i c e r o , Orr Duties,

M . T . G r i f f i n fit E . M . A t k i n s (trans.) ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

University Kress, 1991). C i c e r o , O n the Emotions,

i'usculan

Disputations

3 and 4, M . G r a v e r (trans, a n d

c o m m . ) ( C h i c a g o , [L: University o f C h i c a g o Press, 2002). Cicero, On the Ideal Orator, J. M . M a y Sr |. Wisse (trans.) ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University

Press, 2001). C i c e r o , O n Moral Ends, \. A n n a s (intra.), R. W o o l f ( t r a n s . ) ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press 2 0 0 1 ) . C i c e r o , 'the Nature of the Gods,

P. G . Walsh (trans.) ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press,

1997).

219

A N C I E N T

S C E P T I C I S M

Secondary

literature

on the sceptical

Academy

(from

Arcesilaus

to

Cicero) Since so much Academic argument is aimed specifically at the Stoics, a good place to start is M , Frede, "Stoic Epistejnology", followed by M . Schofield, "Academic Epistemology" both in Algra, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 295-322 and 323-354. An excellent collection of essays dealing with the sceptical Academy is B. Inwood & J. Mansfeld (eds), Assent and Argument (Leiden: Brill, 1997). A l l e n , p. " A c a d e m i c Probabilism a n d Stoic Epistemology" Classical Quarterly

A4

(1994), « 5 - 1 1 3 . Barnes, J. " A n l i o c h u s of Ascalon", i n Phitosopliia Roman

Togala: Essays on Philosophy

and

Society, M . Griffin Bt f. B a r n e s (eds), 5 1 - 9 6 ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y

Press, 1989). Belt, R . "Carneades" Pilhanon:

A Reappraisal of its Role a n d Status" Oxford

Studies

Philosopiry 7 (1989), 5 9 - 9 4 .

in Ancient

Belt, R . " C a r n e a d e s ' D i s t i n c t i o n between Assent a n d Approval", Manist 7 3 (1990), 3-20. B r e n n a n , T'. " R e a s o n a b l e Impressions i n Stoicism", Phrcnesis Briltain, C . Philo of Larissa:

The Last of the Academic

41 (1996), 3 1 8 - 3 4 .

Sceptics

(Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2001) [ K E V I E W S : J. G l u c k e r , " ' I h e P h d o n i a n / M e t r o d o r i a n s : Problems o f M e t h o d i n A n c i e n t Philosophy", fc'lcriciios 25 (2004), 9 9 - 1 5 2 ; |. C . L a t t n e n i n journal

of the History

of Philosophy

40(1) (2002), 116-18, i n A . A .

L o n g , Classical Review 53(2) (2003), 314-16|. Burnyeat, M . " G o d s a n d H e a p s " i n Language and Logos: Studies Philosopity

presented

to C. E. L. Owen,

in Ancient

Creek

M. Schofield Si M . N u s s b a u m (eds),

3 1 5 - 3 8 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1982). C o o p e r , J. "Arcesilaus: S o c r a l i c a n d Sceptic" i n his Knowledge, Essays on Ancient Philosophy,Sl-103

Nature, and the Good,

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,

2004). C o u i s s i n . P " L e Stoicisme de la nouvelle A c a d e m i c " Revue hsopliie

d'historie

de la phi-

3 (1929), 2 4 1 - 7 6 . [Reprinted i n English as " I h e S t o i c i s m of the New

A c a d e m y " i n Burnyeat, Ike Sceptical

Tradition,

31-63.|

De Lacy, P. "Plutarch a n d the A c a d e m i c Sceptics", Classical Journal 4 9 ( 2 ) (1953), 79-85. Prede, D . " H o w Sceptical were the A c a d e m i c Sceptics?" i n Scepticism of Philosophy,

in the History

R . H . Popkin (ed.), 1 - 2 6 ( D o r d r e c h t : Kluwer, 1996).

Prede, M . " T h e Sceptic's T w o K i n d s o f A s s e n t a n d the Q u e s t i o n o f the Possibility o f K n o w l e d g e " i n Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography

of Philosophy,

R. Rorty, |. B. S c h n e e w i n d St Q. S k i n n e r ( e d s ) , 2 5 5 - 7 8 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1984). [Reprinted i n his Essays in Ancient

Philosophy,

201-24

( M i n n e a p o l i s , M N : University of M i n n e s o t a Press. 1987).] Prede, M . "Stoics a n d Sceptics o n C l e a r a n d Distinct I m p r e s s i o n s " in Burnyeat, The Sceptical

220

Tradition,

65-94.

GUIDE

C l u c k e r , |. Antiochus

TO FURTHER

READING

and the Late Academy ( G o t t i n g e n : V a n d e n h o e e k Bt Ruprecht,

1978) [ R E V I E W S : J. D i l l o n i n Classical Review " A c a d e m i c s a n d Platon ics" Prudenlia

31 ( I ) (1981 ), 6 0 - 6 2 ; H . Tarrant,

12(2} (1980), 1 0 9 - 1 8 ] .

H a n k i n s o n , R . ). "A Purely Verbal Dispute? G a l e n un Stoic a n d A c a d e m i c tpistemolo g y " Revue Internationale

de Philosophie45

(1991), 2 6 7 - 3 0 0 .

H a n k i n s o n . R. J. 1997. "Natural C r i t e r i a a n d the T r a n s p a r e n c y o f |udgment: A n t i o c h u s , P h i l o a n d G a l e n o n E p i s l e m o l o g i c a l Fust i licit ion". In In w o o d Sr Mansfeld, Assent

and Argument,

In w o o d , B. "Rhetorica

161-216. 1 he strategy o f D e Einibus

Dipulatio:

Therapy, M . N u s s b a u m (ed.), Apeiron

I I " i n The Poetics of

23(4) (1990), 143-64.

Johnson, O . "Mitigated Scepticism", Ratio 18 (1976), 7 3 - 8 4 . Long, A . A . "Diogenes Laertius, the Life of A r c e s i l a u s " Llenchos

7 (1986) 4 2 9 - 4 9 .

Long, A . A . "Sloa a n d Sceptical A c a d e m y : O r i g i n s a n d G r o w t h o f a T r a d i t i o n " Liverpool

Classical Monthly

5 (1980), 161-74.

Long, A . A . " C a m e a d e s a n d the Stoic telos", Phranesis M a c K e n d r i c k , P. The Philosophical

12 (1967), 5 9 - 9 0 .

Rooks of Cicero ( L o n d o n : D u c k w o r t h , 1989).

M a c o n i , H . " N o v a N o n P h i l o s o p h a n d i Philosophia", Oxford Studies

in Ancient

Phi¬

losophy 6 (1988), 2 3 1 - 5 3 . Meador, P. A . "Sceptic T h e o r y o f Perception: A Philosophical Antecedent to C i c e r o nian Probability". Quarterly

journal

of Speech 54 (1968), 3 4 0 - 5 1 .

Niiniluoto, I. " S c e p t i c i s m , Pallibilism, a n d V e r i s i m i l i t u d e " i n Ancient and the Sceptical

'i'radil ion, J. S i h vola ( éd.), A c ta Philosophica

Scepticism 66 (2000),

Eennica

145-69. O b d r z a l e k , S. " L i v i n g i n D o u b t : C a r n e a d e s ' Fithanon in Ancient

Philosophy

Reconsidered". Oxford

Perin, C . "Academic A r g u m e n t s for I he I n d i s c e r n i b i l i t y ' I h e s i s " Pacific Quarterly

Studies

31 (2006), 2 4 3 - 3 0 . Philosophical

8 6 ( 4 ) (2005), 4 9 3 - 5 1 7 .

Powell, J. G . P. (ed.) Cicero the Philosoplter:

Twelve Papers ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r -

sity Press, 1995). Reed, B. "The Stoics' Account of the Cognitive Impression", Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

23 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 147-80.

Reinhardt, Ï . "Rhetoric i n the F o u r t h A c a d e m y " Classical Quarterly

5 0 ( 2 ) (2000),

531-47. Striker, G . "Sceptical Strategies" in Doubt and Dogmatism,

M. Schofield, M . B u r n y c a l

Sr I Barnes (eds), 5 4 - 8 3 ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1980). [Reprinted in her Essays on Hellenistic

Epistemology

and Ethics, 9 2 - 1 1 5 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m -

bridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1996).] Striker, G . " U b e r d e n Unterschied z w i s c h e n d e n P y r r h o n e e r n u n d d e n A k a d e m i k ¬ e r n " Phronesis

2 6 (1931), 153-71. [Reprinted i n E n g l i s h as " O n the Difference

Between the P j T r h o n i s l s a n d the Academics", i n h e r Essays on Hellenistic temology and Ethics,

Epis-

135-49.]

Striker, G . " C i c e r o a n d G r e e k Philosophy", Harvard

Studies

in Classical

Philology

97(1995), 53-61.

321

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Tarrant, H . Scepticism

or Plalonism?

The Philosophy

of the Fourth Academy ( C a m -

bridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1935) [ R E V I E W S : J. A n n a s i n Canadian osophical

Phil-

Reviews 6 ( 1 ) (1936), 3 3 - 5 ; J. Rist i n Phoenix 4 0 ( 4 ) (1936), 4 6 7 - 5 ] .

Tarrant, H . "Agreement a n d the S e l f - E v i d e n t i n Philo o f Larissa", Dionysius

5(1531),

66-57. W i l k e r s o n , K . t . " C a r n e a d e s at R o m e : a P r o b l e m o f Sceptical R h e t o r i c "

On

Philosophy

21 ( 1983), 1 3 1 - 4 4 .

and Rhetoric the origins

of the sceptical

Academy

A n n a s , J. "Plato the S c e p t i c " i n Ihe Socratic

Movement,

P. V a n d e r Wacrdt (ed.),

3 0 5 - 4 0 (Ithaca, N Y : C o r n e l l University Press, 1994). A n n a s , J. " T h e Heirs o f Socrates", Phroncsis

23(1 ) (1983), 100-12.

Rri ttain, C . Si J. Palmer, "1 he N e w Academy's Appeals to the Presocratics",

Pluonesis

4 6 ( 1 ) (2001), 3 8 - 7 2 . D i l l o n , |. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347-274

flCJ

(Oxford:

O x l o r d University Press, 20D3) [ R E V I E W S : G . Boys-Stone i n American of Philology

Journal

125 (2004), 4 5 9 - 6 2 ; L . P G e r s o n i n Airmi 113 (2004), 168-71;

Steel in Journal of the History of Philosophy

C

43(2) (2005), 2 0 4 - 5 [ .

L o n g , A . A . "Socrates i n Hellenistic P h i l o s o p h y " Classical Quarterly

33(1) (1938),

150-71. Sedley, D . " I h e E n d o f the Academy", Phronesis

26 ( 1981), 6 7 - 7 5 .

Shields, C . "Socrates A m o n g the Sceptics" i n V a n d e r Waerdl, the Socratic

Move-

ment, 3 4 1 - 6 6 . Tarrant, H . "Socratic Synousia: Philosophy

A Post-Platonic M y t h ? " Journal

of the History

of

4 3 ( 2 ) (2005), 1 3 1 - 5 5 .

Warren, |. "Socratic Scepticism i n Plutarch's Advtrsus

Colotem",

Elendios

23(2)

(2002), 3 3 3 - 5 6 . Woodruff, P. " I h e Sceptical Side o f Plato's Method", Revue losophies

6.

Internationale

de Phi-

(1986), 2 2 - 3 7

Aenesidemus

Translations

and

collections

of texts and

fragments

In addition to Sextus, the main sources lor the views of Aenesidemus are Diogenes Laertius, Philo of Alexandria and Photius. Many of the relevant texts are assembled in L S 7 1 - 2 , I G 111-25,35. Texts bearing specifically on the ten modes are assembled, along with illuminating commentary in J. Armas & J. Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). The Greek text of Photius summary of Aenesidemus with facing French 1

translation can be found in R. Henry (eà.), Photius, Eiliothèque,

Tome ///(Paris;

Société d edition " L e s Belles Lettres", 1962). For more on Photius and an English translation of the summary see N. G . Wilson, Hie (London; Duckworth, 1994).

222

Bibliotheca: A

Selection,

GUIDE

Secondary

T O FURTHER

READING

literature

D e c l e v a C a i z i L n , K "Aenesidemus a n d the A c a d e m y " Classical

Quarterly

42(L)

(1992), 1 7 6 - 8 9 . Gaukroger, 5. " T h e T e n Modes of A e n e s i d e m u s a n d the M y t h o f A n c i e n t Scepticism" British journal for the History of Philosophy

3 (L995), 3 7 1 - 8 7 .

Mansfeld, J. "Aenesidemus a n d the A c a d e m i c s " i n 7 h i Passionate

Intellect, L . Ayres

(ed.), 2 3 5 - 4 3 ( N e w B r u n s w i c k NJ: T r a n s a c t i o n , 1995). Folilo, R. ihe Sceptical Road: Aenesidemus*Appropriation

of Heraclitus

( L e i d e n : Brill,

20O4) [ R E V I E W S : P . M a c h u c a in Britisfi Journal for the History of Philosophy (2006), 1 6 0 - 6 4 ; M . Schofield in Journal of Hellenic

Studies

14( 1)

126 (2006), 2 1 5 - 1 6 ;

A . T i g a n i i n Rhizai 2 ( 2 } (2005}, 2 9 3 - 3 0 0 ] . Rist, J. M . " T h e H e r a c l i t c a n i s m o f Aenesidemus", Phoenix

2 4 ( 4 ) (1970), 3 0 9 - 1 9 .

R o m a n a l c a l a , R. "Aenesidemus: I h e Recuperation o f G r e e k Sceptic T r a d i t i o n " Pensa?niento

52 (1996) 3 3 3 - 4 0 2 .

Woodruff, P. "Aporetic Pyrrhonism", Oxford Studies in Ancient

Philosophy

6 (1983),

139-63. Schofield, M . "Aenesidemus: Pyrrhonist a n d Heraclilean". In Pyrrhonists, Ptatonizcrs,

Patricians,

A . M . [oppolo & D . N . Sedley (eds), 2 6 9 - 3 3 8 (Naples: B i b l i o p o l i s ,

20O7). Striker, G . " T he T e n Tropes o f A e n e s i d e m u s " i n Bumyeat, The Sceptical Tradition, 95¬ 115. [ Reprinted in her Essays on Hellenistic

7-9.

Epistemology

and Ethics, 116-34.]

Sextus E m p i r i c u s

Translations

and

texts

Sextus extant texts are available in four volumes of the Loeb series, all translated 1

by R. G . Bury: vol. 1, Outlines ofPyrrhcm ism\ = PH]; vol. 2, Against the Logicians |=Af 7 - 8 ] , vol. 3, Against the Physicists, Against the Elhicists [= M 9-11]; vol. 4, Against the Professors \ = M 1-6]; (Cambridge, M A ; Harvard University Press, 1933-49). Tie

Greek text alone is available in H , Mutschmann 8t). Mau (eds),

Sexti Empiric/ Opera, 3 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1954-58). Large portions of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism

are

excerpted in I G III 26-51

along with other relevant texts. Also, many passages from Sextus' works are translated in LS, but only as evidence for the views of other philosophers. Translations of selected texts can also be found in S, G . Etheridge, Sextus

Empiricus,

Selections from the Major Wrrfjn^i on Scepticism Man and God (Indianapolis, I N : Hackett, 1985). The following are recent and reliable translations, many of which include helpful introductions, notes and commentaries; Sextus E m p i r i c u s , Outlines

of Scepticism,

2 n d e d n . J. A n n a s 5; J. B a m e s (trans.)

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 2000).

223

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

Sexlus E m p i r i c u s , Against

R. Belt ( I r a n i . ) ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

the Logicians,

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2005). Sexlus E m p i r i c u s , Against

the Hthicists, R. Bett (trans.) ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press,

1997). Sexlus E m p i r i c u s , The Sceptic

Way, Sexlus

Empiricus'

Outlines

B.

of Pyrrhonism,,

Mates (trans.) ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 1996). Sexlus E m p i r i c u s , Against

the Grammarians

] ] , D . L . B l a n k (trans.) ( O x f o r d :

[=M

C l a r e n d o n Press, 1998). Sexlus E m p i r i c u s , Against

|= A i 6 ] , D . D . Greaves (trans.) ( L i n c o l n ,

the Musicians

N E : University o f N e b r a s k a Press, 1986).

Secondary

literature

A n n a s , ( . " S e x l u s E m p i r i c u s a n d the Peripatetics", Elenchos Barnes, J. the Toils of Scepticism [ R E V I E W S :

13 (1992), 2 0 1 - 3 1 .

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1990)

R. Bett in Journal of Hellenic Studies

"Symbolic Scepticism'", Phroncsis

113 (1993), 199-200; N . Denver,

36(3) (1991), 313-1 S; C . Hookway i n Mind 101

(1992), 1 4 5 - 8 ; A . S i l v e r m a n i n Phoenix4*1(2)

(1994), 1 6 8 - 7 0 ] .

Barnes, ]. " S c e p t i c i s m a n d Relativity" Philosophical

Studies 32 ( 1 9 8 8 - 9 0 ) , 1 - 3 1 .

Karnes, |. " P y r r h o n i s m , Belief a n d C a u s a t i o n : O b s e r v a t i o n s o n the Scepticism o f Sexlus E m p i r i c u s " , A ufslieg und Niedergang der Römischen

Welt II 36(4) (1990),

2608-95. Karnes, |. " A n c i e n l Scepticism a n d C a u s a t i o n " i n Burnyeat, Vfir Sceptical

'Tradition,

149-204. Barnes, ]. " P r o o f Destroyed", i n S c h o n e i d et al.. Doubl

161-81.

ami Dogmatism,

Bett, R . "Sextus' A y n i m i the Hthicists: S c e p t i c i s m , Relativism or Both?", Aperron 27 (1994), 1 2 3 - 6 1 . K r e n n a n , X Ethics and Episiemoiogy [ R E V I E W :

in Sextus Empiricus

M . Matthen in Philosophy

( L o n d o n : Routledge, 1999)

in Review 2\ (2001), 2 3 7 - 9 ] .

K r u n s c h w i g , J . " P r o o f Defi n e d " i n Schofield et ai. Doubt and Dogmatism,

125-60.

K r u n s c h w i g , J. " L a F o r m ü l e Jroso« epi tö logo chez Sextus E m p i r i c u s " , i n i f ticistne antique,

Cahiers

de la Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie,

Scep-

A . J. Voelke

(ed.), 107-21 ( G e n e v a : Revue de Theologie et de Philosophie, 1990). [Reprinted as " I he hoson epi tö logo F o r m u l a i n S e x l u s E m p i r i c u s " i n his Papers lenistic Philosopliy,

E b e r l , T'. " T h e O r i g i n of the Stoic I h e o r y of Signs i n Sexlus E m p i r i c u s " Studies

in Ancient

in Hel-

244-58.] Philosophy

Oxford

5 (1987), 8 3 - 1 2 6 .

E v e r s o n , S. " T h e Objective Appearances of Pyrrhonism", i n Pyschology,

S. E v e r s e n

(ed.), 1 2 1 - 4 7 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1991). Fine, G . "Sexlus a n d E x t e r n a l W o r l d Sceplici sm", Oxford Studies in Ancienl

Philoso-

pliy 24 (2003), 3 4 1 - 8 5 . Fine, G . "Sceptical D o g m a t a , Outlines

of Pyrrhonism

1.13" Aieirrexis 13 (2000),

31-105. G l i d d c n , D . "Sceptic Semiotics" Phronesis

22-\

2S (1933), 2 1 3 - 5 3 .

GUIDE

TO FURTHER

READING

H a n k i n s o n , R. f. " V a l u e s , Objectivity a n d Dialectic; T h e Sceptical Attack on E t h i c s : Its M e t h o d s , A i m s , a n d Success"; Phropirsrs 39(1) (1994), 4 5 - 6 8 . H a r l e , V. 8c M . L a n e , " P y r r h o n i s m a n d F r o t a g o r e a n i s m : C a t c h i n g Sextus O u t ? " Logical Analysis

and History of Philosophy

2 (1999), 157-72.

House, D . " T h e Life o f Sextus E m p i r i c u s " , Classical Quarterly Janacek, K . Prolegomena

to Sextus Empiricus

30 (1930), 2 2 7 - 3 3 .

"Acta U n i v e r s i l a t i s Palackianae G l o -

m u c e n s i s " N o . 4 ( O l o m o u e : N a k l a d e m Palackeho University, 1948). Janacek, K . Sort us Empiricus'

Sceptical

L a Sala, R. Die Ziige des Skeptikers:

(Praha: Universita K a r l o v a , 1972).

Methods

Die dialektischc

Ciiarakler

von Sextus

Empiricus'

YVerk ( G o l i n g e n : V a n d e n h o e c k Si K u p r e c h l , 2005). L i m m e n r a n t a , M . " i h c P y r r h o n i a n Problematic" i n The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism. J. G r e c o (ed.), 9 - 3 3 ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2 0 0 3 ) . Long, A . A . "Sextus E m p i r i c u s o n the C r i t e r i o n o f truth" Bulletin of the Institute of 25 ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 3 5 - 4 9 .

Classical Studies of the University of London

M c P h e r r a n , M . " P y r r h o n i s m ' s A r g u m e n t s Against Value", Philosopfucal

Studies60

(1990), 1 2 7 - 4 2 . Palmer, J. A . "Sceptical Investigation" Ancient

Philosophy

20 (2000), 3 5 1 - 7 5 .

Perin, C " P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m a n d the Search for T r u t h , " Oxford Ancient

Philosophy

Studies

in

30 (2006), 337-60.

Sedley, D . N . "Sextus E m p i r i c u s a n d the A l o m i s t C r i t e r i a of T r u t h " Elenchos

13

(1992), 19-56. Shields, C . " T h e T r u t h bvaluability of Stoic Phantasiai: 7 . 2 4 2 - 4 6 " journal

of the History of Philosophy

Spinelli, E . "Sceptics a n d Language: Phonaiand

Adivrsus

Mathematicos

3 1 ( 3 ) (1993), 3 2 5 - 4 7 .

Logai i n Sextus E m p i r i c u s " Histaire,

Langage 13(2) (1991), 5 7 - 7 0 .

Epislcmologie.

Stough, C . "Sextus E m p i r i c u s o n \ o n - a s s e r t i o n " Phronesis W l o d a r c z y k , M . A . Pyrrhonian

2 9 (1984), 137-64.

inquiry ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e Phdological Soci-

ety, 2000).

Pyrrhonism

and

self-refutation

Bailey, A . " P y r r h o n e a n S c e p t i c i s m a n d the Self-Refutation A r g u m e n t " Quarterly

PlulosopTucal

4 0 (1990), 2 7 - 4 4 .

B r u n s c h w i g , J. "Sextus E m p i r i c u s o n the K r i t e r i o n : 'I he Sceptic as C o n c e p t u a l Legatee," i n The Question

of "Eclecticism':

Studies

in Later Creek Philosophy,

J.

M . L.lillon 8c A . A . L o n g (eds), 1 4 5 - 7 5 (Berkeley, C A : University o f C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1938). B u r n y e a l , M . P. "Protagoras a n d Self-Refutation i n Later G r e e k Phdosophy", sopliical Review

Phih-

135 (1976), 4 4 - 6 9 .

Castagnoli, L . "Self-bracketing P y r r h o n i s m " Oxford Studies

in Aricr'eni

Philosophy

18(2000), 263-328. H a n k i n s o n , R. J. " I h e E n d o f Scepticism" Kriterion

33 (1997), 7 - 3 2 .

fohjuerj, R. C . " O n the C o h e r e n c e of P y r r h o n i a n S c e p t i c i s m " Philosophical

Review

110(2001), 521-61.

225

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

M c P h e r r a n , M "Sceptical H o m e o p a t h y a n d Self-refutation" Phronesis

32 (1587),

290-328.

Pyrrhonism

as a way of life, tranquillity

and the sceptic's

beliefs

Five w r y influential papers dealing with these topics are collected in M, Burnyeat & M . Frede (eds), The Original Sceptics; A Controversy (Indianapolis, I N ; Hackett, 1997). Barney, R . "Appearances a n d Impressions" Phronesis

37(3) (1992), 2 8 3 - 3 1 3 .

Rett, R. " S c e p t i c i s m as a Way o f Life and Scepticism as 'Pure I h e o r y ' " i n Viator

Classical

Homo

M . Whitby & P. Hardie (eds), 4 9 - 5 7

Essays for john Bramble,

( O a k Park, 1L: Bristol C l a s s i c a l Press, 1987). C o h e n , A . "Sextus E m p i r i c u s : S c e p t i c i s m as a I h e r a p y " Philosophical

15(4)

Porum

(1984), 4 0 5 - 2 4 . Erede, M . " D e s S k e p t i k e r s M e i n u n g e n " Nate Hefte fiir Philosophic, Antike

Aktualitdt

der

15/16 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 1 0 2 - 2 9 . [Reprinted as " T h e Sceptic's Beliefs" W. M a n n

(trans.), i n his Essays in Ancient

Philosophy,

179-200.J

C a r n e r , D . " S c e p t i c i s m . O r d i n a r y Language, a n d Z e n Buddhism", Philosophy

East

and rtfcsf 27(2) (1977), 1 6 5 - 4 1 . M a c h u c a , V. " T h e Pyrrhonisms Ataraxia

a n d Fhilanthropia",

Ancient

Philosophy

26

(2006), 1 1 1 - 3 9 . M c P h e r r a n , M . "Ataraxia

a n d Eutfajprroprr'fl i n A n c i e n t P y r r h o n i s m : Is the Sceptic

Really H a p p y ? " Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium

in Ancienl

Philosophy

5 ( 1 9 8 9 ) , 135-71. Moller, D . " T h e P y r r h o n i a n Sceptic's Trios", Ancient

Philosophy

24 (2004), 4 2 5 - 4 1 .

M o r r i s o n , D . " T h e A n c i e n t Sceptic's Way o f Life", Metaphilosophy

21(3) (1990),

204-22. N u s s b a u m , M . "Sceptic Purgatives: i h e r a p e u l i c A r g u m e n t s i n A n c i e n t Scepticism", Journal of the History of Philosophy

19 (1991), 1 - 3 3 .

Riberio, B. " I s P y r r h o n i s m Psychologically Possible?" Ancicpri Philosophy

22(2)

(2002), 3 1 9 - 3 1 . Striker, G - ' A r a r u A r u : Happiness as Tranquility"; Monisi 73 (1990), 9 7 - 1 0 0 [Reprinted in h e r Essays on Hellen istic Epistcmoiogy

and Ethics,

183-95.

I h o r s r u d , H . " I s the E x a m i n e d Life W o r t h L i v i n g ? A P y r r h o n i a n Alternative" Apeiron 3 6 ( 3 ) (2003), 2 2 9 - 4 9 . Trowbridge, J. " S c e p t i c i s m as a W a y of L i v i n g : Sextus E m p i r i c u s a n d Zhuangzi", Journal of Chinese Philosophy

33(2) (20O6), 2 4 9 - 6 5 .

T s o u n a - M c K i r a h a n , V. " C o n s e r v a t i s m and P y r r h o n i a n Scepticism'; Syllccta

Classica

6(1995), 69-86. W i e n l r a u b , R . " T h e Sceptical L i f e " Dialectica

Pyrrhonism

and technical

50(3) (1996), 2 2 5 - 3 3 .

expertise

A l l e n , J. " P y r r h o n i s m a n d M e d i c a l E m p i r i c i s m " Aufstieg Hbmischen

226

Welt, It 37( I ) (1993), 6 4 6 - 9 0 .

und

Niedergang

der

GUIDE

A lien, |. inference from Signs: Ancient

TO FURTHER

READING

Debates about the Nature ofEvidence

(Oxford:

C l a r e n d o n Press, 2001), 8 7 - 1 4 6 . Barnes, J. " S c e p t i c i s m a n d the A r t s " in Method, ies in the Philosophy

of Ancient

Science,

and Metaphysics:

Stud-

ft_ |. H a n k i n s o n (ed.}, Apeiron

Medicine

12(2)

(1988), 5 3 - 7 7 . Barnes, ]. " M e d i c i n e , E x p e r i e n c e a n d L o g i c " in Science in Hellenistic

and Speculation:

Studies

J. Karnes, J. B r u n s c h w i g , M . B u m y e a t & M .

theory and Practice,

Schofield (eds), 2 4 - 6 8 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 19*2). Blank, D . L . " I n t r o d u c t i o n " in Sextus Empiricus,

xiii-lv.

Against the Grammarians,

Edelstein, I_ " E m p i r i c i s m a n d Scepticism in the ' l e a c h i n g of the G r e e k E m p i r i c i s t School", in h i s Ancient

Medicine,

1 9 5 - 2 0 4 (Baltimore, M D : Johns H o p k i n s U n i -

versity Press, 1967). Edelstein, L . " I h e M e t h o d i s t s " in his Ancient

Medicine,

173-91.

Erede, M . "The M e t h o d of the S o - C a l l e d M e t h o d i c a l S c h o o l o f Medicine", in Barnes etal., Science and Speculation,

1 - 2 3 . |Keprinled in his Essays in Ancient

Philoso-

phy, 2 6 1 - 7 8 . ] H a n k i n s o n , R . J. Cause and Explanation

in Ancient

(Oxford: Claren-

Greek thought

don Kress, 1998}, 2 6 8 - 3 2 2 . K r e n t z , E . " P h i l o s o p h i c C o n c e r n s in Sextos E m p i r i c u s , Advcrsus

1"

Malhcrnaticos

Plironesis 7 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 152-60. W a l l e r , R. Bt M . Erede (eds), Galen,

Three Treatises on the Nature

(Indi-

of Science

anapolis, I N : H a c k e t l , 1985).

The legacy of undent

Scepticism

A great d e a l has b e e n written o n this topic, T h e f o l l o w i n g is o n l y a s m a l l s a m p l e : Ainslie, D . C . "Hume's Scepticism a n d A n c i e n t S c e p t i c i s m s " in Hellenistic Modem

and

Early

|. M i l l e r St B. I n w o o d (eds), 2 5 1 - 7 3 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e

Philosophy,

University Press, 2003). A n n a s , ). " H u m e a n d A n c i e n t Scepticism", in S i h v o l a , Ancient Sceptical

Scepticism

and

the

271-85.

Tradition,

A n n a s , J. " D o i n g Without Objective Values: A n c i e n t a n d M o d e r n Strategies" i n The Norms

of Nature:

Studies in Hellenistic

Ethics, M . Schofield St G . Striker (eds),

3 - 2 9 ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1986). A n n a s , J. " S c e p t i c i s m , O l d a n d New", in Rationality

in Greek Thought,

M . Prede &

G . Striker (eds), 2 3 9 - 5 4 ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1996). Eett, R. "Scepticism a n d E v e r y d a y Altitudes in A n c i e n t a n d M o d e m Philosophy", Metaphilosophy

24 (1993}, 3 6 3 - 8 1 .

B u r n y e a l , M . P. " T h e Sceptic i n h i s Place a n d T i m e , " in R o r t y ei ai., Piiilosophy History,

in

225-54.

B u r n y e a l , M P. " I d e a l i s m in C r e e k P h i l o s o p h y : W h a t Descartes Saw a n d Berkeley Missed", Philosophical Curley, A . J. Augustine's

Review 91(1) (1982), 3 - 4 0 . Critique

of Scepticism:

A Study of C o n t r a A c a d e m i c o s ( N e w

York: Peler L a n g , 1996).

227

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

D i l l o n , |. Ihc Middle

SO HC to AD 20t) ( L o n d o n :

Platonists: A Study of Piatomsm

D u c k w o r t h , 1377). Doty, R . " C a m e a d e s , a F o r e r u n n e r o f W i l l i a m James's Pragmatism", Journal of the History of Ideas 4 7 (1986), 133-8. pine, G . "Subjectivity A n c i e n t a n d M o d e r n : T h e C y r e n a i c s , Sextus, a n d Descartes," i n M d l e r fit I n w o o d , Hellenistic Florid i. L . Sextus

Empiricus:

and Early Modern

Ihe

Transmission

Philosophy,

192-231.

and Rediscovery

of

Pyrrhonism

( O x f o r d : O x f o r d University Press, 2002). Florid i, L . "Cupiditas

Veri Videndi:

Pierre de V d l e m a n d y ' s D o g m a t i c vs. Cicero's

Sceptical Interpretation of'Man's Desire to K n o w " Britisli journal for the History of Pi\ ilosophy 3( 1) (1995). 2 9 - 5 6 . H i ley, D . R . Philosophy

in Question:

University o f C h i c a g o Press, 1988) ics 45({)

iheme (Chicago, I L :

Essays on a Pyrrhonian [ R E V I E W :

C . C u i g n o n i n Review of Metaphys-

(1989), 168J.

Hookivay, C . Scepticism

( L o n d o n : Routledge, 1990) [REVIEWS! R. Fogelin i n Phiioso-

pliy and Phenomenological

53(1) (1993), 2 1 5 - 2 0 ; J. ' l h o m a s i n Philo-

Research

42(1992).499-50lJ.

sopliical Quarterly

L a u r s e n , J. C . the Politics of Scepticism

in tire Ancients,

Montaigne,

Hume and Kant

( L e i d e n : Brill, 1992). Loeb, L . "Sextus, Descartes, H u m e , a n d Peirce: O n S e c u r i n g Settled Doxasu'c States", Moris 32 (1998), 205-34). Lorn, P. Ihe Limits of Doubt:

the Moral

and Political Implications

of

Scepticism

(Albany, N Y : S U N Y Press, 2001). Luper, S. (ed.) Ihe Sceptics:

Essays (Aldershot: Ashgale, 20O3).

Contemporary

M a i a Neto, J. R. " A c a d e m i c S c e p t i c i s m i n E a r l y M o d e r n P h i l o s o p h y " journal

of the

History of Ideas 58(2) (1997), 199-220. Musgrave, A . C o m m o n Sense, Science and Scepticism: the Iheory

of Knowledge

Naess, A . Scepticism Philosoplucal

A Historical Introduction

to

( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e University Press 1993).

( N e w York: H u m a n i t i e s Press, 1969)

[ R E V I E W :

PL Stroud i n

Review 80(2) (1971), 235-56|.

O p s o m e r , J. in Search

of the Truth:

Academic

Tendencies

in Middle

Platonism

(Brussels: Verhandelingen v a n de K o n i n k l i j k e A c a d e m i c v o o r Welenschappen, 1998). Pcr.clhurn, T . Cod and Scepticism

(Boston, M A : Reidel, 1983).

P o p k i n , R. H . Ihc History of Scepticism from Erasmus

to Spinoza,

2 n d edition (Ber-

keley, C A : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1979). P o p k i n , R . H . Ihe High Road to Pyrrhonism,

R . A . Watson 5: |. P. Force (eds) ( I n d i -

anapolis, I N : Hackett, 1993). Price, J. V. "Sceptics i n C i c e r o a n d Hume", journal

of the History of ideas

25(1)

(1964), 9 7 - 1 0 6 . Schmitt, C . B. Cicero Scepticus: Renaissance

A Study of the Influence

S i n n o t l - A r m s t r o n g , W. (ed.) Pyrrhonian Press, 2004).

228

of the A c a d e m i c a i n fhe

(The H a g u e : M a r t i n u s NijhofT, 1972). Scepticism

( N e w York: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y

GUIDE

Contemporary

TO F U R T H E R

READING

Pyrrhonism

Although I do not discuss Robert Fogelihs contemporary version of Pytrhoniati Scepticism in this book, a few bibliographical notes are ivorth making: see first, his Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification {New York Oxford University Press, 1994) ( R E V I E W S : L. Floridi in Philosophical

Quarterly

47 {1997), 406-8; J. Greco in international Philosophical Quarterly 37(1) (1997), 115-19; C . Hookway in European journal of Philosophy 5(1) (1997), 93-7; B. Stroud in Journal of Philosophy 92 (1995), 662-5]. He develops this further in Walking the Tightrope of Reason (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). For a summary of the work see his "Precis of Pyrrhonian

Rejlections on

Knowledge and Justification", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(2) (1997), 395-400. The precis opens a Book Symposium, which includes: P. K. Moser, "The Relativity of Scepticism", 401-6; F. Dretske, "So D o We Know or Don't We?" 407-9; B. Stroud, "Unpurged Pyrrhonism" 410-16; and R. Fogelin, ''What Does a Pyrrhonist Know?" 417-25.

229

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237

Index of passages

Ac. 2 . 2 3 - 2 5 ( = I G 11-5)

Anonymous In iht. C o l . 63

117

76

Ac. 2.32 (= L S 6 3 R )

75,76

Ac. 2.34

Aristotle NU 1.2, 1 0 9 4 a 2 3 - 2 5 i\'£ 1,3, I 0 9 5 a 9 - I 2

67

104

Ac. 2.37-38 ( = L S 4 0 O )

67

Ac. 2.39

52

i\'£ 1.6, 1096a L 2 - 1 7

37

Ac. 2.43

87

Aiff 1 . 1 , 1 8 4 a 16-21

154

Ac. 2.44

96

Met 1.9 Rh. 1.1

Ac. 2 . 4 7 - 4 9

36

52

Ac. 2.31 (= L 5 4 0 N )

50,74

72

Ac. 2.59 (= L S 6 9 F = I G 111-8)

3

Rh. 1 . 1 , 1 3 5 5 a

Ac. 2.60 (= L S 6 8 Q = [ G I1I-8)

99

topic* 1.1-2, 1 0 1 a 3 4 - 3 6

65, 91 88

Ac. 2 . 6 6 - 6 7 ( = L S 6 9 G = I G 111-9)

3

47,

38,91 Aulus Gellins

Ac. 2 . 7 2 - 7 4

NA 1 I J . 4

Ac. 2.76 (= L S 6 8 0 = I G 111-10)

29

NA 1 I J . 6 - 8

12 46

Ac. 2.77 (= L S 4 0 D , 6 3 0 = I G [[1-10)

7 , 8 , 117

47 Cicero

Ac. 2.78 (= L S 6 9 H , 4 0 D = I G 111-10)

Ac. 1.16 41 Ac. 1 . 1 7 - 1 8

9L 87

Ac. 1 . 4 4 - 4 6 ( = L S 6 8 A = I G 111-19)

90,165 87

Ac. 2 . 1 5 - 1 6 ( = L S 6 8 C ) Ac. 2 . 1 3 - 3 1

87

48

Ac. 2 . 9 1 - 2 ( = L S 3 7 H )

73,97

Ac. 2.99 (= L S 421)

1 2 , 4 1 , 44, 56 Ac. 2 . 7 - 9 ( = L S 6 8 S = I G 111-21} Ac. 2 . 1 1 - 1 2

Ac. 2 . 8 4 - 9 1 ( = L S 4 0 ) )

46

88,

Ac. 2.100 (= L S 421)

78 80

Ac. 2.103 ( = L S 691)

78

Ac. 2.104 ( = L S 691)

75

Ac. 2.105

73

Ac. 2.109

80

239

ANCIE.VT

İCEPT1C1SM

Ac. 2 . 1 1 ü Ac. 2.111

10,80,83,97 96

Tusc. 5.11

13,39

"İKSC. 5.15 67

Ac. 2.128-31

67

Tusc. 5.17 94

Ac. 2.130 ( = L S 2 F )

27

iitsc. 5.83 69

Ac. 2.131 Sİ

T usc. 5 . 3 4 - 3 5 (= L S 1|) 67

Ac. 2.134

"İKSC. 5.120 68

95

Ac. 2.139 ( = L S 6 9 L = I G 111-14) 80, 81

L>iogenes L ı e r t i u s

Ac. 2.146 96 Amic. Alt.

DL3J7

19 92

12.52 89

DL4.13

De O T . 2.155

60

De OT. 3.142

93

Fin. 3.11-12 Fin.

41

DL4J7

60

DL4.40

60

D L 4 . 6 7 ( = I G 111-5)

70

85

D L 7.46 ( = L S 4 0 C , 3 1 B = I G 11-3) 9 7

3 . 6 2 - 6 3 (= L S 57K) 93 27

D L 7 . 7 6 ( = L S 3 6 A = 1G I I - 3 ) 55 D L 7.121 ( = L S 6 7 M = I G 11-94)

Fin. 4.49

27

D L 7.162 ( = I G 11-1}

Fin. 4.60

27

D L 7.201

5 . 1 5 - 2 3 (= L S 641;} 67

DL9.51

2

Fin.

5.16 6 5

DL9.54

32

4

46

46

46

Fin.

LegAA6

39,

40,50

27,30

Fin.4.43(=LS2H)

Fat. 4

49

D L 4 J 2 (= LS68F. = I G l l l - l )

2.61 92

Fin. 2.2 (= L S 6 a j ) Fin. 3.41

33

D L 4 - 2 8 (= L S 6 8 D )

A H . 13.21 60

Div.

2

D L 3.5 36

D L 9 . 6 1 - 6 2 ( = L S İ A = [ G 111-22) 93

Leg. 1.23

93

D L 9.64 ( = L S I B , 2 G = [ G II1-22)

Leg.t.32

93

D L 9.65 ( = L S 2 D = I G 111-22) 21

rfflîl.ll

13,41,88

N D 1.11-12 61

N D 3.38

62

ND 3 . 4 3 - 4 4

31

D L 9.66-68 ( = L S 1 C = I G 111-22) 28,

39

ND 2.76 ( = LS 54J) .VD3.34

17,

24,25,31,34

31,32 149

D L 9.72 ( = I G 111-22)

20

D L 9.76 ( = L S 1 G = I G 111-22)

29,33,

122, 138 61,64

D L 9.78 ( = L S 7 I B = I G 111-22)

110

Og. 1.6 27

D L 9 . 8 1 , 8 5 , 8 6 1= 1 0 111-22}

Of

3.16 92

D L 9.83 ( = I G 111-22)

114

Of

3.31

95

D L 9.88 ( = I G 111-22)

104,110,111

O r a i . 51

35

D L 9.101 ( = I G 111-22) 1L2

Rep. 1.39 93 İÎÎÎC. 1.8 38 Tusc. 1.7 100 Tusc. 2.9 88

D L 9.104-5 (= L S 1 H = I G 111-22) 25, 34,121 D L 9.106 ( = L S 7 1 A = I G 111-22) 21, 2 4 , 3 4 , 121

inse. 4.5 6 0

D L 9.108 ( = I G 111-22)

Tusc 5 . 3 - 4 95

D L 9 . 1 1 5 - 1 6 ( = I G 111-23)

240

111

192 123

INDEX

D L 1 0 . 1 2 1 - 3 5 <= L S 2 1 K = 1 G 1-4)

63

Ap. 2 0 e - 2 2 e Ap. 2 l b

Eusebius Prafp. Ev 14.4.8

46

Prafp. Ev, 14.6.4-6 Prafp. Ev. 14.7

Prafp. Ev. 1 4 . 8 . 2 , 9 - 1 0 Prafp. E K 14.9.1-2

Ap. 2 3 c - d

60

Crr(£f46b

100

473b

Gorg

15B

107a

100

20

Phacdo

23

Proi.319a

Prafp. Ev. 14.13.4 ( = L S I f )

2

Prot. 3 5 1 b - 3 5 S d

24

Prafp. E K 14.13.16

20

i?fp. 5 0 5 a - b

Prafp. Ev. 14.13.18

188

i!fp. 5 3 6 e - f

Prafp. Ev. 14.13.19 (= L S I E ) 31 13B

Prafp. Ev. 14.18.26

32

Prafp. Ev. 14.18.29

121

193

M r no 8 0 d - e

Ev. 14.18.1-4 ( = L S 1K)

Prafp. Ev. 14.13.21

5

42

Gory.5lld-5l2a

59

86

Prafp. Ev. 1 4 . 1 8 . 1 - 2 ( = L S I F )

Fracp.

41

42

Euthypli ro 7 a - 8 a

44

65,76

O F PASSAGES

42

33 37

Tht. 1 4 8 e - l 4 9 a iht. 1 5 2 d - e

5

22

Plutarch Adv. Col. 1120c

Homer

50

Adv. Coi I l 2 1 e - 1 1 2 2 a (= I G 111-12) 40

Hliad 6.146 31

ACTV. Col. 1 1 2 2 b - d (= L S 6 9 A = I G 111-12)

Lactanlius

51

Adv. Col. 1 1 2 2 e ( = L 5 6 9 A = I G 1-131)

Div. fast 5.15-3-5 ( = L S 6 8 M ) Epitome- 55.8 ( = L S 63 M )

60

60

Philo of Alexandria DcEbr.

169

112

DcEbr.

175

104, 111

DcEbr.

187

104

50 Prof. Virt. 32f

33

Vit. Aiex. 5 0 - 5 2

26

Vit. Cat. Mai. 2 2 - 2 3

60

Seneca Natural Questions

7.32 (= L S 1 K )

123

Philodemus index Ac. C o l , 18

39

Sextus E m p i r i c us

Photirli

Ml.]

195

M 1.5

179

Bib. ] 6 9 b 2 7 - 2 9 ( = L S 7 1 C )

122

M 1.51

Bib. 1 6 9 b 3 8 - 4 0 ( = L S 7 I C )

104,122

M ] .53

Bib. 170a 1 - 3

(=LS71C)

105

Biff. 170a 1 4 - 1 7 , 2 8 - 3 3 (= L S 7 1 C )

Plato 42

M 1.61 M 1.282

102

Bib. 1 7 0 b 3 - 3 5 ( = L S 7 2 L )

Ap. 2 0 c

35 195 125

M 1.270-71

11,103 Bib. 1 7 0 b 3 9 - 4 0

M 1.6

193

104

M 1.294

194

31 193

M 2.20

193

M 2.49

193

M 3.29-30

194

241

ANCIENT

AI3.57

SCEPTICISM

144

Af 8.368

156

i l l 4.3

194

Af 8.375

155

Af5.2

193

Af 8.436

153

Af6.2l

193

AT 8.430-81 ( = I G 111-29)

M635

125

A i 9 , 2 - 3 ( = I G 111-34)

Af6.5S

125

Af 9.49 (= I G 111-43)

Af6.6l

125

AI 9 . 1 4 6 - 4 7 ( = I G 111-43) 61

AJ7.2

161

Af 7 . 1 7 - 1 9 A17.24

189

Af 9 . 1 5 2 - 7 7 ( = I G 111-43) 62 160

Af 9 . 1 3 2 - 8 4 ( = I G 111-43) 6 1 , 6 4

It.]

A i 10.76

152

Af 7 . 3 5 - 3 7

164

AI 10.234

Af 7 . 8 7 - 8 8

26

Af 11.20 ( = L S 7 0 B )

Af 7 . 1 2 6 - 3 4 Af 7.135

133

161

118

A l l 1.49

20

125

A l l 1.63-95

Af 7 . 1 5 5 - 7 ( = I G 111-18}

46,50,91

Af 7.158 ( = L S 69 B = I G 111-18) 52,

104.112

A i 11.118

140

Af 11.135

140

Af 11.140 ( = L S 2 E )

53 Af 7.159 ( = L 5 7 0 A = 1G 111-18}

71

Af 7.168 ( = L S 69t? = I G 111-18) 72 Af 7.175 ( = L S 6 9 D = I G 111-18)

76

Af 7 . 1 7 6 - 7 8 ( = L S 6 9 E = I G 111-18) 80 Af 7.184 ( = L S 6 9 L = I G 111-13) Af 7.185 ( = 1 G 111-18)

76

79

Af 7 . 1 8 6 - 8 7 ( = I G 111-18) 80

A l l 1.145-6 Af 11.148

141

Af 11.158

140,141

Af 1 1 . 1 6 4 - 6 ( = L S 2 ] , 5 8 F = I G 111-51) 34,192 Af 1 1 . 1 6 8 - 8 0 ( = L S 2 5 K ) Af 1 1 . 1 8 «

196

182

A i l 1.204

196

Af 7.202

125

Af 11.255

196

P H 1.1-4 ( = I G 111-26}

194

9, 131, 135,

178

Af 7.252 ( = L S 4 0 E ) 48 Af 7 . 2 5 3 - 5 7 ( = L S 4 0 K )

25

140

Af 7.194

Af 7.248 ( = L S 4 0 B ) 44

27

179

P H 1.7 ( = I G 111-26)

131,186

Af 7.365

177

74

P H 1.8 (= I G 111-26)

126

Af 7.366

182

P H 1.9 (= I G 111-26)

174

Af 7 . 4 0 2 - 3 5 ( = L S 4 0 H , 37P, 4 0 L ) 167

P H 1.12 ( = I G 111-26)

Af 7.416-21 ( = L S 3 7 F )

P H 1.13 ( = I G 111-26)

176, 177

111,113

P H 1.14 { = I G 111-26)

179

144

P H 1.15 ( = I G 111-26)

138, 1 7 3 , 1 8 6

Af8.8 Af 8.130

73

126, 1 2 7 , 1 3 5

Af 8 . 1 4 5 - 5 5

169

P H 1.16-7 (= I G 111-26)

Af 8 . 1 5 6 - 5 8

195

P H 1.18 ( = I G 111-26)

Af 8.189

P H 1.19-20 ( = I G 111-26)

115

Af 8 . 1 9 7 - 9 9

145,189

134 135,136,

174

115

Af 8.203

135

P H 1.22 { = I G 111-26)

Af 8.227

168

P H 1.23-4 ( = I G 111-26)

184, 189

Af 8 . 2 4 4 - 5 6 ( = L S 5 1 H ) 167

P H 1.25-6 (= I G 111-26)

135

Af 8 . 3 3 4 a - 3 3 6 a

P H 1.28-30 ( = I G 111-26)

Af 8.355

242

179

159

140, 141, 179, 137

174,179

127, 135,

INDEX O F PASSAGES

PH 2 . 6 - 9 (= I G 111-31)

P H 1 . 3 1 - 3 { = L S 7 2 A = I G 111-26)

P H 2 . 1 1 (= 1G 111-31)

110, 147 P H 1 3 4 (= L S 7 2 A = 1G 111-26)

132,

133

PH2.13

L58 135, 160

161

PH 2 . 1 4 - 1 7 (= I G 111-32)

PH

1.35 (= L S 7 2 A = 1G 111-35)

PH

1.36 (= L S 7 2 A = 1G 111-35)

147

PH 2 . 1 9 - 2 0 (= I G 111-32)

P H I J 9 (= L S 7 2 A = 1G 111-35)

117

PH 232-73

P H 1.59 (= L S 7 2 B = 1G 111-35)

109

PH2.35

1.60 (= L S 7 2 B = 1G 111-35)

110

PH 2.72 (= 1G 111-38)

PH

P H 1.64 (= 1G 111-35)

110

P H 1.70-1 ( = I G 111-35)

140

135

115 33

P H 1.100 (= L S 7 2 E ) = I G 111-35)

109

P H 1 . 1 3 5 - 4 0 ( = L S 721 = I G 111-35) 117, 138

PH 2.84

161

PH 2 . 9 7 - 1 0 1 PH 2.102

157,169,177

195

PH 2.104 ( = L S 3 5 C )

PH 2.121 ( = I G 111-40)

143,179

PH 2.134 ( = [ G 111-41)

150

PH 2.135

136

P H 1.167 ( = I G 111-36)

143

P H 2.188

138

P H 1.169 ( = I G 111-36)

156

PH 2.197

158

P H 1 . 1 3 0 - 6 (= L S 7 2 M = I G 111-37) 106 P H 1.137-91

138

138, 186

P H 1.196 ( = I G 111-33)

134,139

P H 1 . 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 (= I G 111-37) P H 1.200

138, 136

P H 2.205-12

15B

PH2JZ44-46

177

PH 2.254

177

P H 2.258

177

PH3.1

186

171 168

189

3-21—2 ( = I G 111-44)

157

P H 3 . 6 7 ( = I G 111-46)

152

3.70 (= I G 111-46)

135

P H 1.206 138

PH

P H 1.208

P H 3 . 1 7 4 ( = I G 111-48)

178

170

161

P H 3.2 (= I G 111-42) PH

138,186

P H 1.202-5

167

147

P H 1.166-9 (= I G 111-36)

167

152

P H 2 . 1 1 7 ( = I G 111-40)

P H 1.165 ( = I G 111-36)

P H 1.193

166

PH 2.73 (= 1G 111-38)

P H 1 . 9 2 - 3 (= L S 7 2 D = I G 111-35)

1.164 ( = I G 111-36)

151,171

164

PH 2 . 7 4 - 7 5 (= I G 111-38)

P H 1JÍ2 (= L S 7 2 C = I G 111-35)

PH

161.164,

196

139

158

P H 1.210 ( = I G 111-27)

119,120

P H 3 . 1 7 9 ( = I G 111-48)

112,115,116

P H 1.212 ( = I G 111-27)

120

P H 3.130 ( = t G 111-48)

179

P H 1.215 ( = I G 111-27)

182

P H 1 . 2 2 7 - 3 0 ( = I G 111-27)

65

PH

3.132 ( = I G 111-48)

116

PH

3.133 ( = I G 111-48)

140

P H 1.220 ( = I G 111-27)

9,86

P H 3.235

P H 1.230 ( = I G I H - 2 7 )

82

PH

3.236-3

PH

3.239 ( = I G 111-49)

PH

3 J 3 0 - 8 1 (= I G 111-28)

P H 1 . 2 3 2 - 3 4 (= L S 681 = I G 111-27) 10,44, 50, 134 P H 1.235 ( = I G 111-27) S é P H 1.236 ( = I G 111-27)

197

P H 1.238 ( = I G 111-27)

140, 184. 197,

198 P H 2 . 4 - 6 ( = I G 111-31)

177 140, 142 194

Ihiiivdidcs History of the Petopvtmcsian

L59

140, 175,

198

1.22-23

War

2

243

Index

A c a d e m i c s differentiated from Pyrrhonisls

7-14

Antigonus o f C a r y s t u s

17,34

A n t i o c h u s of A s c a l o n

11,14,87,89,

Anliochus

9

Arcesilaus

10,44,134

Antiphon

Carneades

S-10

appearance (impression)

Philo

96,103-4

9,86, i04

a n d belief

Academy

57, 1 7 5 - 3 4

as guide to ac lion

12-13, B 5 - 7

indistinguishable

early, non-sceptical Aenesidemus

36-40

10-11

and Heraelilus

tll-13

Discourses

104-7

102

rejection of d o g m a t i c Academics

1 0 3 - 7 , 110—11,

variable a n d conflicting

108-11

views o f F y r r h o

Arcesilaus

9; see a!si> criteria o f

action, A r c e s i l a u s

24,34,105,

Plato's influence Pyrrho's influence

Anaxarchus

12,40-44 44-5

Zcno's (Stoic) influence

14

Aristocles

110,147-50

A l e x a n d e r the G reat

40-44,

55-3,60

121 five m o d e s

2,24,103,

1 1 0 - 1 3 , 116, 118. 126, 123, 147.

emulation of Socrates

116-18 ten m o d e s

2 , 2 4 , 2 5 , 2 9 , 34, 7 1 - 2 ,

106, 108, 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 , 164, 1 6 6 - 7 ,

152, 174

8 4 , 1 0 2 - 4 , 121

and relativism

48-9, 72-3

6,30,185-88

174-5

and negative d o g m a t i s m Pyrrhtmisl

intellectual a n d reality

116,113-20

and invariability

sec criteria of

action

continuity of the sceptical

Agrippa

2

26, 3 1 , 4 7

2 - 3 , 18, 1 9 , 2 3 , 3 6 - 7 , 39,

154-5

2 5 - 6 , 31

A n o n y m u s i n Theaetetum

Aristotle

45-50

13,20,23,27,28,188

117

AulusCellius

7-8,117

2i?

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

belief

criteria of truth

disturbance o f fallible

31,34,141-5

13, 75, 78, 79, 82, 85, S i ,

9 1 - 2 , 9 4 , 9 5 , 103-4

C y n i c , Diogenes' detachment Cyrenaics

Stoic altitude towards

sec kataleplic

impressions; truth

4 7 , 7 4 ; see

also s u s p e n s i o n of judgement

Democrilus

11-12,20-21,29

and tranquillity Carncades

Descartes

9

against E p i c u r e a n ethics against Stoic ethics

68-9

against Stoic cpistcmology

71-5

difference from A r c e s d a u s

59-60,

65,82-3, 84-5

53-4,57

Carneade s a n d

81-2,85,91

in Plato's dialogues

4 - 5 , 37, 4 0 - 4 2

115-16,138

60

sorites arguments C a t o , scandalized by C a r n c a d e s Cicero

argument 115-16,117-18,

Arcesdaus and

Sextus a n d

ethical d i v i s i o n s 6 5 - 8 ; see also

Chrysippus

Aenesidemus and 121

6 0 - 6 5 ; sec

also criteria o f action, C a r n c a d e s

embassy to K o m e

182

dialectical, ad homincm,

91

against Stoic theology

32

7

C a r t e s i a n doubt

69-70

against the Stoic sage

32

2 3 , 1 0 6 , 182

60

73, 140

Epicurus

3 9 , 6 8 , 90, 131, 195

Eusebius

18

Evandrus

59

external w o r l d scepticism

182-3

1 1 - 1 3 ; sec also criteria o f

action, C i c e r o

üalen

mitigated scepticism, fallibilism

196-7

geometry

194

Hegisinus

59

87-90, 95-100 onPynrho

27-8,30

social a n d political obligation of philosophy

93-4

Heraclitus, doctrine of flux

view o f Socrates

100-101

Homer

on the Stoic sage

91-2

Hume, D

virtue a n d happiness circularity

92, 9 4 - 5

31-2 1 3 , 6 2 , 157,169

hypothesis

148, 1 5 3 - 6 , 1 5 9

150, 1 5 6 - 6 0

Clilomachus

9,14,81,85,86

i m m o r a l i t y of scepticism

criteria of action 34-5,

121

inactivity (aptaxia)

objections

6-7,

1 4 , 5 0 - 5 3 , 55, 7 5 - 8 , 30, 31, 33,

Arcesilaus' lo culogon

52-3, 55-6,

57-8,88

8 3 , 9 1 , 1 7 3 - 4 , 1 7 8 , 1 7 9 , 181 inconsistency of scepticism

C a r n e a d e s' to pitharwn

75-81,88

Cicero's probabilitas

88-9

Sextus' appearances

162—4

a n d belief

59-60,

188-92

A e n e s i d e m u s ' appearances

174-82 183-96

34-5

4-5,

11, 1 4 , 2 8 , 3 0 - 3 3 , 54, 55, 5 6 - 8 , 80,83,96,105,107,116,113, 1 2 1 - 2 , 1 2 3 , 1 4 5 - 6 ; see also selfrefutation

fourfold observances l i m o n s appearances

246

22; sec

also A e n e s i d e m u s

infinite regress invariability

110, 1 5 0 - 5 3

see truth

INDEX

insulation

Me no's paradox

6-7

o n rhetoric James, W .

129

158-9

38-9

o n virtue, knowledge, happiness 37-3

kataleptic impressions

PoJemo

4 5 - 5 0 , 53,

7 1 - 4 , 7 5 - 6 , 78, SO, 86, 103, 167

38-9,45

PoJystratus

106

Popper, ft. Lacydes

100

Presocratics

59

Protagoras Fyrrho

medical expertise: rationalism, empiricism, and methodism

11-12 2,23,29,38

6,10,17,39

indeterminate, indeterminable

196-8

19-24 a n d m o r a l conventionalism

modes

sec A g r i p p a ; A e n e s i d c m u s

and non-assertion recklessness of

Xausiphanes

31

25-3

33-4

34; see also T ' i m o n ;

tranquillity

negative d o g m a t i s m

3-4,5,9-11,

12,25, 104-7. I l l - i 3 ,

travels with A l e x a n d e r the Great

L16-17,

1 3 0 - 3 1 , 1 3 4 - 5 , 148, 1 6 1 , 1 8 3 , 197 "no m o r e one way than another"

123

19,

20-21, 28-30,33,105, i38 opposing arguments

26, 31 P y r r h o n i s t s , genealogy ot recollective signs

2 - 3 , 4 9 , 56,

157,177-8,179

as oppos e d to indicative signs

8 8 - 9 , 1 0 7 , 1 1 0 , 121, 1 2 3 , 1 3 2 - 4 ,

195

1 3 9 - 4 0 , 1 4 2 - 3 , 1 4 7 - 8 , 1 5 3 , 167,

relativity

169,

see A e n e s i d c m u s

171, 174, 181,186, 187 ordinary life, customs, practices

2,

34-5,43,52,76,79,80-81,82, 8 3 , 9 7 , 146, 164, 1 7 3 - 5 , 1 7 7 , 1 7 8 ,

self-refutation

123

Sextus b m p i r i c u s Parmenides

12,23

F h i l o o f Larissa

F h i l o Judaeus Fhotius piety

therapy

111,112

126

Antiochus" interpretation of

87

A r c e s d a u s ' sceptical interpretation

Forms

works

124-6

Socrates a n d argument ad homit\em

12,40-13,45 89-90

4-5,

5 3 , 5 6 - 8 , 136; see also A r c e s i l a u s , e m u l a t i o n of; C i c e r o , view o f

9, 3 6 - 7 , 154

founding of the A c a d e m y

1 3 9 - 4 1 , 1 4 4 - 5 , 161-2,

scepticism as a way of life, practice

2,4-5

of

103, 1 1 7 - I S

175-6, 198-200

102

Cicero's interpretation of

108-10, 119-21 112

scepticism as philanthropy a n d

86-7,88

4-5, 184,189-90

Plato

a n d invariability a n d relativity

103-4 R o m a n books

9, 1 4 , 1 2 3

andAenesidemus

9, 11, 14, 3 5 , 8 9 ,

3 3 , 122,

137-8 Seneca

179, 188, 189,196, 198

136-7,146

as therapeutic purgation

36

confession of ignorance

11-12

2i7

ANCIENT

SCEPTICISM

philosophical m i s s i o n and Stoic sage Sophists

41-2

Hpicurus, absence o f pain

45-6

P y r r h o (and T i m o n )

2,38-9

27,30-35

sorites arguments

Sextus Hmpiricus

against Stoic theology

63-5

against Stoic epislemology Speusippus

126-7, 1 3 1 - 2 ,

1 3 4 - 5 , 1 4 1 - 3 , 145, 1 8 6 - 7 72-3

36-8

Stoic sage

68

17-18,25,

truth as a i m o f enquiry

3. 3 7 - 9 , 45,

4 6 , 9 2 , 141-2

5 3 , 5 6 , 8 1 , 8 9 , 1 0 3 - 4 , 111, 127,

Stoic systematic view ol philosophy

1 3 0 - 3 7 , 1 4 0 , 144, 160-61, 175,

160-61

195

suspension o f judgement

{cpochc)

2 - 4 , 5 , 6, 1 4 , 2 8 , 3 1 , 4 7 , 50, 5 6 - 8 ,

6; sec also kalaleptic i m p r e s s i o n

7 8 - 9 , 107, 126-30, 1 4 5 - 6 , 153,

and expertise

156, 173-82, 199, 200

as intrinsically g o o d

and morality

188-92

feeling

133-8

I heophraslus ïimDn Pytho

see hypothesis 167- 71

192-6

39

undecidability

2

19, 2 3 - 4 , 108-11, 113,

116-18,148-9, 151,189

17-18,20,24-5,27,35 veil o f perception

31,33

O n the Senses Aenesidemus Arcesdaus

7,14

Xenocractes

36-8

121

44-5

94-5

166-7

34

tranquillity (alaraxia)

Cicero

self-evidence

144-5

21-2,105,111-13

signs a n d proofs

and technical expertise 'Ihucydides

95-7

as invariabdity

and perception, thought, and

248

criterion of 27, 77, 86, 8 3 , 9 9 , 162¬

Z e n meditation

187

Zeno of C i l i u m

39,45-50