ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
TRENDS IN LOGIC Studia Logica Library
VOLUME 24 Managing Editor Ryszard Wójcicki, ...
31 downloads
1078 Views
1MB Size
Report
This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
TRENDS IN LOGIC Studia Logica Library
VOLUME 24 Managing Editor Ryszard Wójcicki, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland Editors Vincent F. Hendricks, Department of Philosophy and Science Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark Daniele Mundici, Department of Mathematics “Ulisse Dini”, University of Florence, Italy Ewa Or á owska, National Institute of Telecommunications, Warsaw, Poland Krister Segerberg, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Sweden Heinrich Wansing, Institute of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology, Germany
SCOPE OF THE SERIES
Trends in Logic is a bookseries covering essentially the same area as the journal Studia Logica – that is, contemporary formal logic and its applications and relations to other disciplines. These include artificial intelligence, informatics, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and the philosophy of language. However, this list is not exhaustive, moreover, the range of applications, comparisons and sources of inspiration is open and evolves over time.
Volume Editor Heinrich Wansing
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR by
GERHARD JÄGER University of Bielefeld, Germany
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 ISBN-13
1-4020-3904-2 (HB) 978-1-4020-3904-1 (HB) 1-4020-3905-0 (e-book) 978-1-4020-3905-8 (e-book)
Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. www.springeronline.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved © 2005 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Printed in the Netherlands.
Contents
List of Tables Preface Acknowledgments
vii ix xiii
1. TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR: THE FRAMEWORK
1
1
Basic Categorial Grammar
1
2
Combinators and Type Logical Grammar
17
3
Historical and Bibliographical Remarks
65
2. THE PROBLEM OF ANAPHORA
69
1
Anaphora and Semantic Resource Sensitivity
69
2
Variables in TLG
72
3
Previous Categorial Approaches to Anaphora
76
4
Summary
116
3. LAMBEK CALCULUS WITH LIMITED CONTRACTION
119
1
The Agenda
119
2
Contraction?
120
3
The Logic LLC
121
4
Relation to Jacobson’s System
153
4. PRONOUNS AND QUANTIFICATION
157
1
Basic Cases
157
2
Binding by wh -operators
158
3
Binding by Quantifiers
159
4
Weak Crossover
169
5
Precedence Versus c-command
169
v
vi
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
6
Backward Binding and Reconstruction
174
5. VERB PHRASE ELLIPSIS 1 Introduction 2 VPE: The Basic Idea 3 Interaction with Pronominal Anaphora 4 Interaction of VPE and Quantification 5 VPE and Polymorphism 6 Parallelism Versus Source Ambiguity
183 183 186 187 195 201 206
6. INDEFINITES 1 Introduction 2 Dekker’s Predicate Logic with Anaphora 3 Bringing PLA into TLG 4 Donkey sentences 5 Indefinites and Scope 6 Sluicing 7 Summary and Desiderata
213 213 215 220 228 245 258 269
References
273
Index
283
List of Tables
1.1 1.2 2.1
The structural hierarchy Substructural Curry-Howard correspondences Categorial approaches to anaphora
vii
30 39 118
Preface
This book discusses how Type Logical Grammar can be modified in such a way that a systematic treatment of anaphora phenomena becomes possible without giving up the general architecture of this framework. By Type Logical Grammar, I mean the version of Categorial Grammar that arose out of the work of Lambek, 1958 and Lambek, 1961. There Categorial types are analyzed as formulae of a logical calculus. In particular, the Categorial slashes are interpreted as forms of constructive implication in the sense of Intuitionistic Logic. Such a theory of grammar is per se attractive for a formal linguist who is interested in the interplay between formal logic and the structure of language. What makes Lambek style Categorial Grammar even more exciting is the fact that (as van Benthem, 1983 points out) the Curry-Howard correspondence—a central part of mathematical proof theory which establishes a deep connection between constructive logics and the λ-calculus—supplies the type logical syntax with an extremely elegant and independently motivated interface to model-theoretic semantics. Prima facie, anaphora does not fit very well into the Categorial picture of the syntax-semantics interface. The Curry-Howard based composition of meaning operates in a local way, and meaning assembly is linear, i.e., every piece of lexical meaning is used exactly once. Anaphora, on the other hand, is in principle unbounded, and it involves by definition the multiple use of certain semantic resources. The latter problem has been tackled by several Categorial grammarians by assuming sufficiently complex lexical meanings for anaphoric expressions, but the locality problem is not easy to solve in a purely lexical way. The main purpose of this book is to develop an extension of Lambek style Type Logical Grammar that overcomes these difficulties and handles anaphora in a systematic fashion. The linguistic applications of the theoretical framework that is developed here focus on three classes of
ix
x
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
anaphora that are well-studied and well-understood as far as the empirical generalizations go. First and foremost, I will discuss the grammar of anaphoric third person singular pronouns, as illustrated by the following example. (1)
a. Johni invented a problem that hei could not solve. b. [Every student]i invented a problem that hei could not solve.
The second empirical domain that we are going to look at is verb phrase ellipsis, i.e., constructions like (2). (2)
a. John revised his paper, and Bill did too. b. John is happy with his job, but Bill isn’t.
As is well-known, VP ellipsis interacts with pronominal anaphora and quantification in complex ways. The logic of anaphora resolution that I will propose lends itself readily to a simple theory of this kind of ellipsis which covers the basic facts in an empirically adequate way. Finally, I will discuss a third class of anaphora, a version of ellipsis that has been called “sluicing” in the literature. Thereby I mean constructions in which a bare wh-phrase is interpreted as a (direct or indirect) question, as illustrated in (3). (3)
a. She’s reading something, but I can’t imagine what. b. A: She’s reading something. B: What?
The main goal of this work is not so much to develop a novel descriptive theory of anaphora but rather to demonstrate that anaphora can be integrated into Type Logical Grammar without giving up the attractive design of this theory of grammar. Nonetheless, the empirical predictions that we end up with do not always coincide with those of competing analyses, and I (naturally) try to argue that my analysis also gets the facts right in these cases. So the discussion might be interesting for non-Categorial grammarians who are interested in the analysis of anaphora as well. Also, the type logical analysis of donkey anaphora led to a partially novel account of the grammar of indefinites that diverges from established theories in several respects, both theoretically and empirically. The book does not expect prior knowledge of Categorial Grammar or any acquaintance with proof theory that goes beyond the level of some introductory logics course. I do assume though a working knowledge of set theory, first order logic and the typed λ-calculus. The technical level of the book should be easily accessible to anybody who has mastered
Preface
xi
some standard textbook on formal linguistics like Dowty et al., 1981 or Gamut, 1991. The structure of the book is as follows. Chapter 1 gives a selfcontained introduction to the framework of Type Logical Grammar. It does not make any reference to the issue of anaphora whatsoever. It can be used as an introductory text on its own. Readers that are already familiar with TLG, on the other hand, can safely skip this chapter. Chapter 2 discusses previous Categorial approaches to (pronominal) anaphora. This chapter too can be read on its own (or in combination with Chapter 1). The remainder of the book does not build on it in any significant way, so this chaper is not essential for understanding of the subsequent material. Chapter 3 is the core of the book. There I develop the novel type logical machinery that enables us to analyze anaphora resolution. In this chapter I focus on the proof theoretic properties of the resulting type logical calculus, i.e., I present the calculus in different proof theoretic formats, establish their equivalence, and prove essential meta-logical properties like Cut elimination, decidability, finite reading property, strong normalization, and completeness. The remaining chapters apply these theoretical tools to the mentioned empirical areas. Chapter 4 focuses on anaphoric pronouns and their interaction with quantification. Chapter 5 discusses two options for a type logical treatment of verb phrase ellipsis. In Chapter 6 I propose another extension of the underlying formalism to accommodate certain peculiarities of indefinite NPs. This has an impact on the issue of anaphora for two reasons. First, I believe that the problem of donkey anaphora is mainly a problem of indefiniteness, less a problem of anaphora. So an adequate treatment of donkey pronouns requires a theory of indefiniteness. Furthermore, sluicing is a form of ellipsis that interacts closely with the grammar of indefinites. I discuss these anaphora related aspects of indefiniteness, and I also consider some empirical issues pertaining to the grammar of indefinites as such, namely their peculiar scope taking behavior. Now that I have explained what the book is intended to be, a few words about what it is not. The intended audience are mainly formally inclined linguists and computational linguists with an interest in logic. I try to illustrate how a logical grammar can contribute to a both formally precise and empirically comprehensive linguistic theory. It is not my goal to give an introduction into the Lambek calculus and related substructural calculi for logicians. Therefore, issues that are important to logicians but of lesser relevance to the linguistic applications are not covered in great depth. This concerns especially model theory and the
xii
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
relation of type logics to modal logic and Linear Logic. Likewise, extensions of the Lambek calculus that are interesting from a logical point of view but without obvious linguistic applications—like negation or additive connectives—are not discussed. Neither could I deal with all facets of Type Logical Grammar that emerged within the last decade. The focus of the book is on the treatment of anaphora. The introductory Chapter 1 gives an overview over the “classical” version of Type Logical Grammar, but various new developments that have no immediate connection to anaphora are left out. This concerns especially non-associative Categorial calculi, multimodal extions of TLG, and the calculus of proof nets.
Acknowledgments
Most ideas that I present in this book were developed while I was a postdoc at the Institute for Research in Cognitive Science of UPenn in Philadelphia 1997 and 1998. It is no exaggeration to say that at that time, the IRCS was one of the best institutes in the world to conduct research on formal grammar. Thanks to Aravind Joshi for making the place what it is! I profited immensely from the discussions with my colleagues there. Many people gave me inspiration and feedback, but I feel the contacts to Robin Clark, Seth Kulick, Jeff Lidz, Mark Steedman and Yael Sharvit were especially important. Last but not least, Dick Oehrle’s occasional visits to Philadelphia were very rewarding. Natasha Kurtonina deserves a special mention. Due to a lucky coincidence, we came to the IRCS at the same time and wound up being office mates. She has an extraordinary gift for explaining things, and most of what I know about the “Logic” in “Type Logical Grammar”, I learned from her. She never tired of pointing out the flaws in my proofs and digging out literature that might be relevant for my research. Last but not least, I thank her for always being a good friend. When I left Philadelphia, my work on anaphora in TLG consisted of a couple of half finished papers and a lot of loose ideas. My time as a visitor at the Utrecht Institute of Linguistics in 2000 and 2001 gave me the opportunity to finally write everything down in a coherent way. It is hard to find a place with a higher concentration of excellent categorial grammarians than the OTS, and this created the right atmosphere to finish this work. Thanks to my Utrecht colleagues, especially to Michael Moortgat, for making the time in Utrecht a pleasant and productive one. While I was finally writing down the manuscript, Cornelia Endriss got me interested into the issue of indefiniteness again. We had a vivid intellectual exchange on this over several months. The last chapter of the book would have taken a different shape without this, and perhaps it
xiii
xiv
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
would not exist at all. Even though we finally drew different conclusions on what a correct approach to specificity should look like, many of the ideas and observations from this chapter are due to Neli. I had the opportunity to present material from this book at various talks at Berlin, UPenn, the MIT, Utrecht, D¨ usseldorf, Amsterdam and Leiden, and I am grateful for the comments I received at these occasions. I am also indebted to the students of my Categorial Grammar classes in Potsdam and in Utrecht for the feedback they gave me. I owe a lot to Raffaella Bernardi, Christian Ebert, Bryan Jurish, Manfred Krifka, Glyn Morrill, and Willemijn Vermaat for reading previous versions of the manuscript or parts of it, and making numerous helpful suggestions for improvement. All remaining errors are of course mine. Special thanks go to Bryan for spending a lot of effort correcting my English. This book is a revised version of my habilitation thesis that I defended at the Humboldt-University at Berlin in 2002. I would like to thank the committe members Marcus Kracht, Manfred Krifka and Michael Moortgat for their encouragement and support. It was also Marcus who suggested that I submit the manuscript to the “Trends in Logic”. Last but not least I thank the series editor Heinrich Wansing for the very good cooperation during the final preparations for publication, and the two anonymous reviewers for their suggestions and comments.
Chapter 1 TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR: THE FRAMEWORK
1. 1.1
Basic Categorial Grammar Informal Introduction
All versions of Categorial Grammar that have been developed in the past 30 years can be traced back to the pioneering work of Bar-Hillel, 1953. His system, despite its obvious limitations, in nuce contains most of the features that make the Categorial approach attractive to the present day. It is thus a natural starting point for a presentation of its more sophisticated descendant, Type Logical Grammar. It rests on a fundamental intuition about the structure of languages (both natural and formal ones) which says that linguistic signs may be complete or incomplete. Under this perspective, grammatical composition can be described as the process of completing incomplete linguistic signs. Basic Categorial Grammar (BCG henceforth) is probably the grammatical framework that expresses this intuition in its purest form. Consider the sentence (1)
Walter snores.
The name Walter has a simple semantic function; it just refers to the individual called “Walter”. We may thus consider the expression Walter to be complete, since its linguistic function does not depend on its linguistic context. Similarly, the sentence Walter snores is complete insofar as its denotation is a proposition with a truth value that depends on the extralinguistic context only. The verb snores, however, is incomplete in a sense. It serves to constitute a proposition, but it needs a subject to do so. Semantically it serves as a function that turns an individual into a proposition.
1
2
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Following standard practice, I use the label np for names (and phrases that have a comparable distribution) and s for sentences. The verb snores is thus an incomplete expression that turns an np into an s. Using a notation from Linear Logic (Girard, 1987), this intuition could be expressed by snores : np−◦s In words this says that the expression snores has the category np−◦s. An important piece of information is missing here though. Consider the more complex sentence (2)
Walter knows Kevin.
Here the transitive verb knows is doubly incomplete; it requires two nps to turn it into an s. We may express this with knows : np−◦(np−◦s) However, for an adequate description of the linguistic facts we also need the information that one np occurs to the right and one to the left of the verb. Following Bar-Hillel, 1953, I therefore distinguish between two kinds of incomplete expressions: forward looking functors that have a category of the form A/B (pronounced: “A over B”) and expect the missing piece on their right, and backward looking functors that have a category of the form A\B (“A under B”) and expect the missing piece on their left. A more adequate description of the facts collected so far would thus be Walter, Kevin : np snores : np\s knows : (np\s)/np The derivation of the two example sentences can conveniently be expressed in tree format as s
s
np
np\s
Walter
snores
np\s
np Walter
(np\s)/np
np
knows
Kevin
3
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
In the sequel, I will refer to the A in the types A/B and B\A as the goal category and to the B as the argument category. The rules that are used in this derivation are (where ab is the concatenation of the strings a and b): 1 If a has category A/B and b has category B, then ab has category A. 2 If a has category A and b has category A\B, then ab has category B. These derivation schemes are sometimes called cancellation rules since they bear an obvious analogy to the arithmetic law1 x ×y =x y
Complex categories. It should be added that both the goal category and the argument category of a complex category may be complex themselves. The category of transitive verbs—(np\s)/np—already provides an example. Manner adverbs like faintly illustrate this point further; they combine with an intransitive verb phrase (category np\s) to yield an intransitive verb phrase. Both the argument category and the goal category are complex here. (3)
a. faintly : (np\s)\(np\s) b. Kevin snores faintly s c. np Kevin
np\s np\s
(np\s)\(np\s)
snores
faintly
Recursion. The category of adverbs also illustrates that the argument category and the goal category may be identical. If a BCG assigns such categories to an expression, the described language will display a recursive structure (but note that recursion may be realized in other ways as well). Adjectives are another case in point. They are attached to a common noun phrase (category n) to produce an expression of exactly this category. Figure 1.1 on the following page illustrates this. 1 Bar-Hillel’s system is based on the work of Ajdukiewicz, 1935 where the analogy is even more striking since it does not distinguish between forward looking and backward looking functors.
4
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR s
np
snores
n
np/n The
np\s
n
n/n old
n
n/n old
n/n old
Figure 1.1.
n n/n
n
old
man
Recursion
Semantic composition. Categories in Categorial Grammar represent two kinds of information. They encode how a sign combines with other signs both syntactically and semantically. Incomplete signs denote functions, and syntactic composition is accompanied by function application in semantics. The structure of the category of a sign is mirrored in the type of the function that it denotes. If the goal category of a sign is complex, its denotation is a curried function (i.e., a function whose values are functions themselves). Categories with complex argument categories correspond to higher order functions—functions that take other functions as arguments. If the semantic component of signs is represented by terms of the typed λ-calculus, syntactic and semantic composition can be displayed simultaneously in a tree structure, as illustrated in Figure 1.2.
1.2
The Formal System
1.2.1 Syntax After this rather informal description of BCG, let us make these intuitions precise. I begin with a formal specification of the notion of category. A BCG comprises finitely many basic categories (also atomic categories). Most linguistic applications make do with very few—the set {s, np, n, pp} is sufficient in many cases, but this is not essential. Complex categories are formed from basic ones by means of the connectives “/” (forward looking slash) and “ \ ” (backward looking slash).
5
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework s faintly’(λx.call’(x, kevin’))walter’
np\s faintly’(λx.call’(x, kevin’))
np walter’ Walter
np\s λx.call’(x, kevin’)
Figure 1.2.
(np\s)/np λyx.call’(x, y)
np kevin’
called
Kevin
(np\s)\(np\s) faintly’ faintly
Semantic composition of Walter called Kevin faintly
Definition 1 (Categories) Let a finite set B of basic categories be given. CAT(B) is the smallest set such that 1 B ⊆ CAT(B) 2 If A, B ∈ CAT(B), then A/B ∈ CAT(B) 3 If A, B ∈ CAT(B), then A\B ∈ CAT(B)
Bracketing convention:. I assume that the forward slash associates to the left, i.e., A/B/C is shorthand for (A/B)/C. The backward slash associates to the right, i.e., A\B\C stands for A\(B\C). Furthermore, forward slash takes precedence over the backward slash; A\B/C means A\(B/C). Like any formal grammar, a BCG consists of a lexical and a syntactic component. Ignoring semantics for a moment, the lexicon of a BCG is a mapping that assigns finitely many categories to each element of some finite set of strings. A lexical unit may have more than one category since linguistic units may be lexically ambiguous (as for instance walk in English, which is both a common noun and an intransitive verb). Definition 2 ((Uninterpreted) Lexicon) Let an alphabet Σ and a finite set B of basic categories be given. A BCG-lexicon LEX is a finite relation between Σ+ (the set of non-empty strings over Σ) and CAT(B).
6
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
The syntactic component is identical for all BCGs. It consists of a series of axiom schemes and rule schemes that jointly constitute a deductive system. I choose sequent presentation as a convenient format for a description of a deductive system. A sequent consists of a sequence of formulae A1 , . . . , An (of some formal language)—the antecedent, and a single formula B, the succedent. Antecedent and succedent are connected by the deduction symbol ⇒. A1 , . . . , An ⇒ B This sequent expresses that the succedent B can be derived from the antecedent A1 , . . . , An . Applied to BCG, the formulae in the sequents are elements of CAT(B). Trivially, every category A can be derived from itself. This is expressed by the identity axiom scheme id. Here and henceforth, I use letters A, B, C, . . ., possibly augmented with indices, as variables over categories.
A⇒A
id
Furthermore, it is possible to use lemmas in a derivation. In other words, a preliminary result of a derivation can be plugged into another derivation. This is expressed by the Cut rule. Letters X, Y, Z, . . . are variables over (possibly empty) sequences of categories.2 X⇒A
Y, A, Z ⇒ B
Y, X, Z ⇒ B
Cut
Finally, the fraction cancellation schemes informally given above represent valid deductions:
A/B, B ⇒ A
A>
B, B\A ⇒ A
A<
I will call these axioms “forward application” and “backward application” respectively. 2 The left hand side of a sequent will never be empty in BCG because all axioms have nonempty left hand sides, and applications of Cut never decrease the length of the left hand sides of sequents.
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
7
A sequent X ⇒ A is derivable iff it can be obtained from the axioms by finitely many applications of the Cut rule. This notion of deduction is summarized in the following definition. (I use the Kleene star in its usual meaning, i.e., Σ∗ is the set of (possibly empty) finite sequences of elements of Σ.)
Definition 3 (Derivability) Let a set B of basic categories be given. Then the relation B is the smallest set with the following properties (I write X ⇒ A instead of X ⇒ A ∈ B ): For arbitrary A, B, C ∈ CAT(B) and X, Y, Z ∈ CAT(B)∗ 1 A⇒A 2 A/B, B ⇒ A 3 B, B\A ⇒ A 4 If X ⇒ A and Y, A, Z ⇒ B, then Y, X, Z ⇒ B. Last but not least, a BCG grammar of a given language L specifies a finite set of designated categories, i.e., the categories of sentences of L. Usually, this set is tacitly assumed to be the singleton {s}. Lexicon, deductive rules and designated categories jointly determine a formal language L in the following way. Suppose a1 . . . an is a sequence of strings over the alphabet Σ such that the lexicon of a given BCG grammar assigns each ai at least one category. If we replace each ai by one of its lexically assigned categories, we obtain finitely many different sequences of categories. a1 . . . an is an element of L if and only if at least one designated category is derivable from at least one of these sequences. The following definition summarizes the notion of a BCG grammar:
Definition 4 (BCG Grammar) Let an alphabet Σ be given. A BCG grammar G is a triple B, LEX, S, where B is a finite set (the basic categories), LEX is a finite sub-relation of Σ+ × CAT(B), and S is a finite subset of CAT(B) (the designated categories). Such a grammar determines a language over Σ in the following way:
Definition 5 Let G = B, LEX, S be a BCG grammar over the alphabet Σ. Then α ∈ L(G) iff there are a1 , . . . , an ∈ Σ+ , A1 , . . . , An ∈ CAT(B), and S ∈ S such that 1 α = a1 . . . an ,
8
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
2 For all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n : ai , Ai ∈ LEX, and 3 A1 , . . . , An ⇒ S. Let me illustrate this notion of string recognition with an example. We consider the formal language that comprises the well-formed arithmetical equations without variables. So strings from this language are for instance 0 = 1 (3 ∗ 5999) = (72 − 16) + (17 : 77777777) (101 − (202 − 303)) = (0 − 1) .. . We use five basic categories: e (equation), t (term), lb (left bracket), rb (right bracket), and n (number). The lexicon assigns categories to atomic strings (I write “a ; A” rather than “a, A ∈ LEX”): {+, −, ∗, :} = ( ) {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
t\lb\t/rb/t t\e/t lb rb t/n n/n n t
The sample grammar contains exactly one designated category, namely e. In Figure 1.3 on the next page I give a sample derivation for the equation “12 = 1”. The interested reader is invited to test the adequacy of our grammar for more complex examples. One way to replace every lexical unit in the string in question by one of its lexical categories gives us the sequence t/n, n, t\e/t, t. The string in question is recognized by the sample grammar if we can derive the designated category e from this antecedent. This means that we have to prove the sequent t/n, n, t\e/t, t ⇒ e. This can be done by connecting three application axioms by means of three applications of the Cut rule.
Decision procedure. Derivability in the deductive component of a BCG is easily shown to be decidable. Observe that for each derivable
9
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
t/n, n ⇒ t
A>
t, t\e/t ⇒ e/t
e/t, t ⇒ e
t, t\e/t, t ⇒ e
t/n, n, t\e/t, t ⇒ e | | | | 1 2 = 1 Figure 1.3.
A<
A> Cut
Cut
Sequent derivation of “12 = 1”
sequent X ⇒ A, the succedent A is a subformula of some formula in X. (All axioms have this property, and it is preserved under Cut.) So we can do bottom up proof search by testing for a sequent in question whether (a) it is an instance of an axiom, or (b) it is the conclusion of some instance of Cut, and the two premises are derivable. The premises of a Cut rule always have a lower complexity (consist of fewer symbols) than its conclusion, so this procedure is bound to terminate after finitely many steps. If deduction is decidable, string recognition by a BCG grammar is decidable as well. Since both the lexicon and the set of designated categories is finite, recognition of a given string reduces to derivability of finitely many different sequents.
1.2.2 Relation to Context Free Grammars Basic Categorial Grammars are closely related to Context Free Grammars. These two grammar formats in fact (weakly) recognize the same class of languages. This equivalence was established in the seminal paper Bar-Hillel et al., 1960. I will sketch the basic idea of an equivalence proof. For an in-depth discussion of this and related issues the reader is referred to the excellent overview article Buszkowski, 1997. The notion of a derivation in BCG and CFG (Context Free Grammars) are highly similar to start with. Context free derivations can also be seen as deductions in a deductive system that contains the identity axiom and is closed under Cut. Instead of the two application schemes, however, CFGs have context free rules as additional axioms. To transform a BCG into an equivalent CFG, it is thus sufficient to demonstrate that only finitely many instances of the application schemes are used in actual derivations. These instances can then be reinterpreted as CFG rules. As was mentioned above, in every derivable BCG sequent, the succedent is a subformula of one element of the antecedent of this sequent (since this property holds of all axioms, and it is preserved under Cut).
10
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Given this, it is straightforward to see that all categories that occur in a premise of a Cut rule are subformulae of categories that occur in the conclusion of this Cut. This in turn entails that in the derivation of a sequent X ⇒ A, only subformulae of X or of A are used. In particular, all application axioms used in the derivation consist of subformulae of the sequent to be derived. In the derivation of grammatical strings, only subformulae of lexical categories are used in the antecedents and only subformulae of designated categories as succedents. Since there are only finitely many such categories for a given BCG, in fact finitely many instances of application are sufficient. It follows from these considerations that every language that is recognized by a BCG is also recognized by some CFG. The inclusion in the other direction is much harder to establish—the proof is the central point of Bar-Hillel et al., 1960. It is easy to demonstrate though if we use the Greibach Normal Form Theorem (Greibach, 1965):
Theorem 1 (Greibach Normal Form Theorem) Every context free language L is recognized by some CFG G that only contains rules of the form A → aα (where “A” ranges over non-terminals, “a” over terminals, and “α” over (possibly empty) sequences of non-terminals). Let L be some context free language that is recognized by some CFG G in Greibach Normal Form. An equivalent BCG can easily be constructed. We identify the set of non-terminals of G with the set of basic categories. The CFG rules of G are transformed into lexical assignments by going from A→a to a;A and from A → aB1 . . . Bn to a ; A/Bn / · · · /B1 Finally we identify the start symbol of G as the only designated category of the BCG.
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
11
1.2.3 Semantics Semantic types. Despite this strong similarity between BCG and CFG, the former has at least one conceptual advantage over the latter pertaining to its natural connection to semantic interpretation. As I alluded to in the beginning, the Categorial architecture is actually strongly motivated by semantic considerations. In phrase structure grammars and related formalisms, the syntactic category of a sign on the one hand and its semantic type on the other hand are independent semiotic dimensions that have to be specified separately. In Categorial Grammar, these components are closely linked. In other words, the category of a linguistic sign codes two kinds of information: it determines the (syntactic) combinatory potential of this sign, and it specifies which type of denotation the sign has. Let us make this precise. I assume that the reader is more or less familiar with type theoretic interpretation and summarize the basic notions very briefly. Analogously to basic syntactic categories, there is a finite set of basic semantic types. The set of semantic types is the closure of the basic types under function space formation: Definition 6 (Semantic types) Let BTYPE be a finite set (of basic semantic types). The set TYPE of semantic types is the smallest set such that 1 BTYPE ⊆ TYPE 2 If a, b ∈ TYPE, then a, b ∈ TYPE. In linguistic applications, the basic types usually contain at least the types e (for “entity”) and t (for “truth value), but this is not part of the general format. Semantic types correspond to ontological domains. The semantic type of a sign indicates what kind of object the denotation of this sign will be. The space of semantic domains has a recursive structure analogous to the set of semantic types; a complex type a, b always corresponds to the set of total functions from the domain of type a into the domain of type b.
Definition 7 (Domains) The function Dom is a semantic domain function iff 1 The domain of Dom is TYPE, 2 for all A ∈ TYPE, Dom(A) is a non-empty set, and 3 Dom(a, b) = Dom(b)Dom(a)
12
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
This definition does not restrict the assignment of domains to basic types (beyond the requirement that domains are non-empty). Following the lead of Montague, 1974, the conventional basic types e and t are usually mapped to some set E of individuals and the set {0, 1} of truth values respectively, but again, this is not part of the general architecture. Given a correspondence between basic categories and semantic types, the semantic type of a sign of an arbitrary category can be predicted from the internal structure of this category. More formally put, the semantic type of a linguistic sign is the homomorphic image of its syntactic category.
Definition 8 (Category to type correspondence) Let τ be a function from CAT(B) to TYPE. τ is a correspondence function iff τ (A\B) = τ (B/A) = τ (A), τ (B) Compositional Interpretation. Semantic types serve a double function. Primarily, they restrict the possible denotations of linguistic signs. If an expression has the syntactic category A, its denotation will be an element of Dom(τ (A)). Semantic types simply identify categories that differ only syntactically but not semantically (like np/np and np\np). For practical purposes, we are rarely concerned with actual meanings (i.e., model theoretic entities) but we deal with meaning representations that are formulated in the language of the typed λ-calculus. So we are mainly interested in a compositional translation from natural language into the semantic representation language. Since the denotation of λ-expressions is unambiguous and well-understood, such a translation indirectly determines a compositional interpretation of the object language. Semantic types not only determine the range of possible interpretations of a linguistic sign, they also determine the syntactic properties of its translation. The semantic types that we use are the syntactic categories of the semantic representation language. The category-to-type correspondence restricts possible translations from natural language to the λ-calculus. The translation—and thus indirectly the meaning—of a basic expression is determined in the lexicon. So a Categorial lexicon for an interpreted language is a three place relation, relating the form of an expression, its syntactic category, and its translation into the λ-calculus. I revise the definition of a lexicon accordingly. EXPa is the set of expressions of the typed λ-calculus that have type a. Definition 9 ((Interpreted) Lexicon) Let an alphabet Σ, a finite set B of basic categories and a correspondence
13
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
function τ be given. An interpreted BCG-lexicon LEX is a finite subrelation of (Σ+ × {A} × EXPτ (A) ) A∈CAT(B)
The lexically determined form-category-meaning relation can be extended to all constituents that are recognized by the corresponding BCG. To this end, the axioms and rules of BCG have to be supplied with operations on the meanings of their operands (or, more precisely, with operations on their semantic representations). These are conveniently represented by means of labeled deduction. Antecedent formulae of sequents are labeled with variables and succedents with possibly complex terms of the λ-calculus. The actual translation of a constituent is obtained by replacing the free variables in the succedent term with the corresponding lexical translations of the formulae in the antecedent. The labeled BCG rules are given below. I write l : C for category C carrying the label l. First some remarks on notation are in order. I use lower case letters x, y, z, . . . as metavariables over variables of the λ-calculus and upper case letters M, N, O, . . . as metavariables over λterms. “N [M/x]” is the result of replacing all free occurrences of x in N by M . Variables (free or bound) that occur in different sequents are tacitly assumed to be different, so no variable clashes can arise. Finally, I omit brackets for function application; so the term “M N ” is the result of applying the functor M to the argument N (which is sometimes also written as “M (N )”). x:A⇒x:A
X⇒M :A
id
x : A/B, y : B ⇒ xy : A
Y, x : A, Z ⇒ N : B
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [M/x] : B A>
x : B, y : B\A ⇒ yx : A
Cut
A<
For complex sequent derivations, I will use proof trees as typographic format. There the antecedent formulae of a sequent are written in appropriate order on top of a horizontal line, and the succedent appears below it. So a sequent like (4a) is displayed as (4b). (4)
a. A1 , . . . , An ⇒ B b. A1 , . . . , An
B The Cut rule is compiled into the proof tree format: Two derivations that meet the conditions for a Cut application can be merged into a complex
14
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
tree by unifying the succedent of one derivation with an element of the antecedent of the other one that has the same name. For instance, the Cut derivation in (5a) is represented as the proof tree in (5b). (5)
a. b.
A, B ⇒ C
C, D ⇒ E
A, B, D ⇒ E A
Cut
B C
D E
Lexical entries are considered as axiomatic premises and thus appear at the leafs of a proof tree. So in sum Categorial derivations in proof tree format resemble ordinary phrase structure trees very closely (apart from the fact that proof trees have the leafs at the top). The complete derivation in proof tree format for our example Walter knows Kevin on page 2 now comes out as: (6)
a. Lexicon Walter – walter’ : np knows – know’ : (np\s)/np Kevin – kevin’ : np b. knows W alter
walter’ : np
lex
know’ : (np\s)/np
lex
Kevin kevin’ : np
know’kevin’ : np\s
know’kevin’walter’ : s
lex A>
A<
Structural ambiguities as multiple proofs. Sometimes there is more than one way to prove that a given string is a sentence. An example is given in (7). The two possible proofs are given in Figure 1.4 on the facing page. (To simplify the derivation, I treat to talk as a single lexical entry, and I ignore the morphological distinction between finite and infinite VPs.) (7)
John asked Bill to talk faintly.
λ-labels have two functions. They supply a semantic representation of the constituent in question, and they record the history of a proof. If a sentence has two non-equivalent proofs, it receives two distinct labels
15
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework asked
lex
ask’ (np\s)/(np\s)/np John
lex
Bill b’ np
lex A>
to talk talk’ np\s
ask’b’ (np\s)/(np\s)
j’ np
f aintly
lex
faintly’ (np\s)\(np\s) faintly’talk’ np\s
ask’b’(faintly’talk’) np\s
lex A<
A>
A<
ask’b’(faintly’talk’)j’ s
asked
lex
ask’ (np\s)/(np\s)/np
Bill b’ np
lex A>
talk’ np\s
ask’b’ (np\s)/(np\s) John
lex
to talk
ask’b’talk’ np\s
j’ np
lex f aintly
A>
faintly’ (np\s)\(np\s)
faintly’(ask’b’talk’) np\s
lex A<
A<
faintly’(ask’b’talk’)j’ s Figure 1.4.
Derivations for (7)
and we thus predict two interpretations. For the example (7) this is borne out, it is an instance of a run-of-the-mill attachment ambiguity. Quite generally, structural ambiguities are treated as multiple proofs for the same sequent. Different proofs need not correspond to different meanings though. Proofs may differ in inessential aspects. Using an identity axiom as a premise for a Cut rule, for instance, is just redundant and has no impact on interpretation. So the two sub-proofs in Figure 1.5 on the next page are equivalent, and they derive the same λ-labels. In the literature, this phenomenon is called spurious ambiguity . Finally it should be added that the format of BCG (and all other Categorial systems) allows for the assignment of multiple meanings to the same form. So lexical ambiguity is another source of a multiplicity of meanings for the same form.
16
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR .. .
.. . X⇒M :A Figure 1.5.
1.3
X⇒M :A
x:A⇒x:A
X⇒M :A
id Cut
Two equivalent proofs
Conclusion
I close this section by pointing out three features of BCG that are shared by the more involved systems of Categorial Grammar to be introduced later in the book and that are characteristic for the Categorial approach in general. Surface orientation Categorial Grammar assumes a monostratal model of grammar. This means that there is only one level of syntactic representation, namely surface structure. Accordingly, CG does without empty categories like traces and empty pronominal elements. Since there are no different levels of representation, there is no room for transformations. Also, CG does not assume syntactic structures as independent objects of linguistic theory. Constituent structures show up as structures of proofs in a derivation, but they are part of our theorizing about language, not of language itself. It is therefore impossible to formulate constraints on syntactic objects that make reference to notions of dominance, c-command, m-command etc. Compositional interpretation Most theories of the syntax-semantics interface assume a level of syntactic representation that serves as input for a compositional semantic interpretation. This level may be a syntactic tree structure like “Logical Form” in generative approaches (see for instance Heim and Kratzer, 1998) or specifically semantic representations like “Discourse Representation Structures” in DRT (cf. Kamp and Reyle, 1993). This semantic representation is interpreted compositionally, i.e., the meaning of complex representations are determined by the meanings of their parts and the way they are combined. Since CG assumes surface structure to be the only level of syntactic representation, it is surface structure that is interpreted compositionally. The fact that we use the λ-calculus as semantic representation language is not
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
17
at odds with this overall approach: As long as the translation from surface structure to the semantic representation language is compositional it can in principle be dispensed with.3 Lexicalism CG does without syntactic structures as independent objects, and it assumes a highly impoverished syntactic component of grammar. In BCG, we only have the two application schemes as syntactic rules. (The identity axiom and the Cut rule are part of the very notion of a syntactic derivation.) This syntactic component is assumed to be universal across languages.4 The sole locus of non-trivial linguistic generalizations is the lexicon. Both paradigmatic regularities within a language (that would be covered by transformations in generative approaches) and parametric variation between languages have to be formulated as constraints over possible lexical entries.
2.
Combinators and Type Logical Grammar
Type Logical Grammar is an extension of Basic Categorial Grammar which reconstructs the deductive componenent of the grammar as the proof system of a logical calculus. In this sections I will give an introduction to the simplest version of TLG, which is based on the Lambek calculus from Lambek, 1958. The structure of the section is as follows. I first present some linguistically motivated proposals from the literature that BCG should be extended by additional inference rules, so-called “combinators”. In the next step, I discuss a family of logical calculi called the “structural hierarchy”, and I point out that one representative of this class of logics, the Lambek calculus, supplies us with an elegant meta-theory of combinatory extensions of BCG. In the main part of the section, I explore the logical and linguistic aspects of the system of Categorial Grammar that uses the Lambek calculus as its deductive component.
2.1
Combinators and Coordination
Over the years, empirical research on the syntax-semantics interface revealed that the view on grammatical composition inherent in Basic Categorial Grammar is too rigid for realistic linguistic analyses. Coordination phenomena can serve to illustrate this point very clearly. 3 Janssen,
1997 contains an in-depth discussion of these issues. assumption is not shared in full generality by proponents of Combinatory Categorial Grammar, cf. Steedman, 1996. 4 This
18
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Coordination particles like and or or are polymorphic, i.e., their arguments can be of different categories: (8)
a. John walked and Bill talked. b. John walked and talked. c. John loves and plays soccer.
Assigning the particle and a plethora of different categories would miss a crucial generalization, the fact that the two arguments of and are always of the same category, and that the constituent created by coordination has this very category. This can be expressed by means of an inference scheme for coordination which covers all category instances: (9)
X⇒A
Y ⇒A
X, and, Y ⇒ A
Conj
We restrict our attention to Boolean coordination, i.e., coordination where the two conjuncts denote functions into truth values.
Definition 10 (Boolean types and categories) 1 t is a Boolean type. 2 If a is a Boolean type, so is b, a. 3 If τ (A) is a Boolean type, A is a Boolean category. The coordination scheme given in (9) is restricted to instances where A is a Boolean category. The main motivation for assuming a coordination scheme rather than different lexical entries for and comes from the observation that the meaning of and is constant across its different category instances. It always denotes set intersection. So the polymorphic syntactic operation is accompanied by a polymorphic semantic operation.
Definition 11 (Boolean Conjunction) . 1 If ϕ and ψ have type t, ϕ ∩ ψ = ϕ ∧ ψ. . 2 If ϕ and ψ have the Boolean type a, b, then ϕ ∩ ψ = λxa .(ϕx) ∩ (ψx). Combining the syntactic and semantic aspects leads to the semantically labeled coordination scheme:
19
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
Definition 12 (Coordination scheme) X⇒M :A
Y ⇒N :A
Conj X, and, Y ⇒ M ∩ N : A This scheme is only applicable if the labels are defined, so it is implicitly restricted to Boolean categories. As the derivations in Figure 1.6 show, the coordination scheme enables us to derive the correct interpretations for the examples in (8) without resorting to ellipsis or other non-overt means. John
walked
lex
j’ : np
walk’ : np\s
walk’j’ : s
lex A<
Bill b’ : np
talked
lex
talk’ : np\s
talk’b’ : s
(walk’j’) ∧ (talk’b’) : s walked John j’ : np
walk’ : np\s
lex
lex
talked talk’ : np\s
λx.(walk’x) ∧ (talk’x) : np\s
(walk’j’) ∧ (talk’j’) : s loves love’ : (np\s)/np John j’ : np
lex
lex
plays play’ : (np\s)/np
λxy.(love’xy) ∧ (play’xy) : (np\s)/np
lex Conj
Figure 1.6.
A<
Conj
lex Conj A<
soccer soccer’ : np
λy.(love’soccer’y) ∧ (play’soccer’y) : np\s (love’soccer’j’) ∧ (play’soccer’j’) : s
lex
lex A>
A<
Derivations for (8)
However, there are several coordination patterns in English (as well as in other languages) that seem to involve Boolean coordination, but which are not derivable in BCG plus coordination scheme. We restrict our attention to three configurations.
2.1.1 Quantifiers At a first glance, quantifier phrases like every donkey, some man, most farmers etc. have the same distribution as names, so it is tempting to
20
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
assign them the category np as well. Simple semantic considerations show however that this would lead to incorrect predictions. Consider the following two deductions: (10)
a. John walked and John talked. John walked and talked. b. Some man walked and some man talked. Some man walked and talked.
Even though (10a) and (b) seem parallel, the inference scheme (10a) is valid and (10b) is not. According to the semantics of coordination predicted by the coordination scheme, this inference pattern is valid, however, if the subject expression has type e. So due to category-totype correspondence, quantifiers like some man cannot have category np. On the other hand, some man yields a sentence if it is combined with a VP to its right. So the only appropriate type assignment for some man will be s/(np\s), which corresponds to the quantifier type e, t, t. Under this category assignment, the inference in (10b) is not predicted to be generally valid. Nevertheless, names and quantifiers are conjoinable. (11)
John and somebody walked.
This entails that (a) names have a Boolean type as well (np is not Boolean), and (b) names and quantifiers have the same type. From these considerations, Montague, 1974 drew the conclusion that names have the syntactic category of quantifiers, namely s/(np\s). This in turn leads to an overly complicated meaning assignment to names. It has to be assumed that the denotation of John is the set of all properties that the individual John has, represented by λP.P j’. Several authors (like Partee and Rooth, 1983) noticed that this unsatisfactory state of affairs can be improved if we assume that the grammar admits an operation that lifts names to the category of generalized quantifiers. This Lifting Rule in its most general form can be formulated as (12)
X⇒M :A X ⇒ λx.xM : B/(A\B)
T>
Type lifting is conventionally labeled with T. Since there are two directional versions of it, I distinguish them with subscripts “>” and “<”. The inference from category np to category s/(np\s) is just one instance of this rule. The derivation in Figure 2.1.1 on the next page shows that this rule admits a correct derivation of example (11).
21
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
John j’ : np
lex
λQ.Qj’ : s/(np\s)
T>
somebody λP.∃xP x : s/(np\s)
λP.(P j’) ∧ ∃xP x : s/(np\s)
lex conj
(walk’j’) ∧ ∃xwalk’x : s Figure 1.7.
walked walk’ : np\s
lex A>
Derivations for (11)
2.1.2 Right Node Raising Even though phrase structures are not part of linguistic representations in BCG, the structure of lexical categories induces a constituent structure that determines what chunks are conjoinable. Under the customary category assignments, in a simple transitive clause such as (13)
John likes broccoli.
the substring likes broccoli can be assigned a category—np\s, but not the substring John likes. Nevertheless the complex “subject + transitive verb” is conjoinable: (14)
John likes and Bill detests broccoli.
This kind of construction requires the extension of the BCG core with yet another inference scheme called forward function composition. As the name indicates, the corresponding semantic operation is function composition, and the inference scheme operates with forward looking functors. (The label B> for this inference scheme is inspired by Curry and Feys’ (1958) function composition combinator.) (15)
X ⇒ M : A/B
Y ⇒ N : B/C
X, Y ⇒ λx.M (N x) : A/C
B>
The derivation of the Right Node Raising construction (14) requires lifting of the two subjects to the category of quantifiers, followed by function composition of the lifted subjects with the transitive verbs. It is given in Figure 1.8 on page 24.
2.1.3 Left Node Raising Coordination of chunks that a phrase structure grammar (or BCG) would not analyze as constituents is pervasive in natural language. Right Node Raising constructions can informally be described as involving
22
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
deletion of right peripheral material in the first conjunct. The mirror image pattern exists as well. The following example, where clusters of arguments are conjoined, is a case in point. (16)
John introduced Bill to Sue and Harry to Sally.
Here apparently the sequence John introduced is missing in the second conjunct. A surface compositional derivation is possible in an extended Categorial Grammar if we make use of mirror images of the rules introduced above. Both backward type lifting T< and backward function composition B< are necessary here. Their semantics is identical to their forward oriented twins, and they differ from them just by the directionality of the slashes. (17)
a.
b.
X⇒M :A X ⇒ λx.xM : (B/A)\B X ⇒ M : A\B
T<
Y ⇒ N : B\C
X, Y ⇒ λx.N (M x) : A\C
B<
To derive the construction in (16), some new notational conventions have to be introduced. Following standard practice, I assume the category label pp for prepositional phrases. A single preposition like to thus has category pp/np. An expression like introduced Bill selects a pp to its right and an np to its left to constitute a clause, it thus has category (np\s)/pp. I will abbreviate this category as “tvp”. Accordingly, a bitransitive verb like introduced has category tvp/np. I will furthermore abbreviate the category of VPs, np\s, as vp wherever it is convenient. The derivation of the construction in (16) involves three operations in each conjunct prior to coordination: 1. backward lifting of the direct object to the level of tvp, 2. backward lifting of the prepositional object to the level of vp, and 3. backward function composition of the two lifted objects. It is illustrated in Figure 1.8 on page 24. (I assume that the preposition to does not make a semantic contribution and thus denotes the identity function λx.x). Due to their relatedness to the combinators of combinatory logic (cf. Curry and Feys, 1958), inference rules like function composition and type lifting have been dubbed combinators. A whole branch of Categorial Grammar—Combinatory Categorial Grammar—treats combinators
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
23
as the main locus of linguistic generalizations both under a language particular and under a universal and typological perspective.5 Alternatively, one might consider the variety of different combinators (and of sub-combinators) that have been proposed in the literature as an indication that a more profound generalization has been missed. The work of Joachim Lambek from the late fifties and early sixties (Lambek, 1958 and Lambek, 1961) supplies such a meta-theory of combinators even though it antedates the idea of Combinatory Categorial Grammar. There, syntactic categories are conceived as propositions of a logical calculus, and combinators (alongside with all valid Categorial derivations) are theorems of this logic that are provable from more basic axioms and rules.
2.2
The Lambek Calculus L
The internal structure of a syntactic category in CG determines in which syntactic environment a sign of this category can occur. In BCG, this comes down to the following generalizations: If the category A/B is derivable from the antecedent X, then category A is derivable from X followed by a B. If the category B\A is derivable from the antecedent X, then category A is derivable from X preceded by a B. This is nothing more than a verbose formulation of the application axioms. They give necessary conditions for the assignment of slash categories to signs. The conditions are not sufficient though. If we turn the conditionals into biconditionals, we obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the usage of slash categories. This step brings us from Basic Categorial Grammar to the core system of Type Logical Grammar (TLG)6 in the version of Lambek, 1958. There the behavior of slash categories is governed by the regularities: The category A/B is derivable from the antecedent X if and only if the category A is derivable from X followed by a B. The category B\A is derivable from the antecedent X if and only if the category A is derivable from X preceded by a B. These rules can concisely be expressed in the format of sequent rules:
5 This research program is carried out mainly by Mark Steedman and several of his students and coworkers. Representative references are Steedman, 1996 and Steedman, 2000. 6 This terminology will be motivated below.
j’ : np
Bill
lex
λx.xj’ : s/(np\s)
T>
likes like’ : (np\s)/np
λy.like’yj’ : s/np
lex B>
b’ : np
24
John
lex
λx.xb’ : s/(np\s)
detests
T>
detest’ : (np\s)/np
λy.detest’yb’ : s/np
λz.(like’zj’) ∧ (detest’zb’) : s/np
lex B>
Conj
broccoli
lex
broccoli’ : np
A>
(like’broccoli’j’) ∧ (detest’broccoli’b’) : s
Bill
λy.yb’ (tvp/np)\tvp introduced John j’ np
lex
lex
λx.x pp/np
lex
b’ np
lex
T<
Sue sue’ np
sue’ pp λw.wsue’ (vp/pp)\vp
λu.(usue’b’) (tvp/np)\vp
lex to A>
Harry
B<
λv.(introduce’sue’b’v) ∧ (introduce’sa’h’v) vp (introduce’sue’b’j’) ∧ (introduce’sa’h’j’) s Figure 1.8.
lex
λy.yh’ : (tvp/np)\tvp
T<
sa’ : pp
A<
Derivations of (14) and (16)
A<
Sally sa’ np
lex A>
λw.wsa’ : (vp/pp)\vp
λu.(usa’h’) (tvp/np)\vp
λuv.(usue’b’v) ∧ (usa’h’v) (tvp/np)\vp
introduce’ tvp/np
λx.x pp/np
h’ np
T<
lex
Conj
T< B<
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
to
25
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework X ⇒ A/B
Y ⇒B
X, Y ⇒ A X⇒B
Y ⇒ B\A
X, Y ⇒ A
X, A ⇒ B /E
\E
X ⇒ B/A A, X ⇒ B X ⇒ A\B
/I
\I
As a side condition it is required that the antecedent of a sequent is never empty. The rules in the left column formalize the only-if direction of the informal formulation above. They are equivalent to the application axiom schemes of Basic Categorial Grammar. (We obtain the axiomatic formulation if we take identity axioms as premises of the rules given here. Conversely, the rule formulation is derivable from the application axioms via the Cut rule.) These two rules eliminate one slash occurrence, therefore they are called slash elimination rules, abbreviated as “/E” and “\E” respectively. Conversely, the rules in the right hand column represent the ifdirection of the biconditionals. They are examples of the method of hypothetical reasoning: To prove B/A from some antecedent X, provisionally add a hypothesis of category A to the right periphery of the antecedent and try to derive the succedent B. If you succeed, you can discharge the hypothesis and conclude B/A (and likewise for the backward looking slash). These rules create a new slash occurrence in a derivation. Therefore they are dubbed slash introduction rules, abbreviated as “/I” and “\I” respectively. Next to the two slashes, Lambek, 1958 assumes a third category forming connective, the product “•”. Intuitively, a linguistic resource has category A • B iff it consists of a component of category A, followed by a component of category B. So an argument cluster like Bill to Sue in (16) would (among others) have the category np • pp. Alternatively, the product operator can be considered the category-internal counterpart of the comma in the antecedent of sequents. These intuitions are captured by the elimination rule and the introduction rule for the product.. X ⇒A•B
Y, A, B, Z ⇒ C
Y, X, Z ⇒ C
•E
X⇒A
Y ⇒B
X, Y ⇒ A • B
•I
The usage of introduction rules and elimination rules, as well as the method of hypothetical reasoning, is reminiscent of systems of natural deduction for classical or Intuitionistic Logic. The Categorial slashes are
26
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
akin to directed implications (with the application rules corresponding to Modus Ponens), while the product is related to conjunction. This resemblance is not accidental; the Lambek calculus is in fact a (very lean) logical calculus. In the subsequent paragraphs, I will make this connection precise by pointing out how exactly the Lambek calculus can be obtained from ordinary classical propositional logic.
2.2.1 The Structural Hierarchy Consider a standard natural deduction formulation for the classical propositional calculus such as the one given in Figure 1.9. (I consider disjunction a defined operation and omit the corresponding rules.)
A⇒A
X⇒A
id
Y, X, Z ⇒ B
X⇒A X, B ⇒ A
X ⇒A∧B
M
X⇒A
X ⇒A∧B X⇒B
X⇒B X ⇒ ¬¬A
¬E
Figure 1.9.
X⇒B
X ⇒A∧B X⇒A
→E
X, A ⇒ B X⇒A→B X, A ⇒ B
Cut
∧E(1)
X⇒A
∧E(2)
X⇒A→B
X⇒A
Y, A, Z ⇒ B
∧I
→I X, A ⇒ ¬B
X ⇒ ¬A
¬I
Natural deduction calculus for classical propositional logic
Systems of natural deduction (“ND” henceforth) generally consist of three components. Like any deductive system, they contain the identity axiom scheme and the Cut rule. Second, there are optionally structural rules.7 These are inference rules that do not affect the internal structures of the formulae involved but only rearrange the formulae in the antecedent. In the present example, there is only one such rule, namely “Monotonicity” (abbreviated “M”). Intuitively, it says that not every antecedent formula has to be used in a valid deduction. Antecedent formulae may be redundant and can be ignored if necessary. Finally, the system contains logical rules, i.e., introduction rules and elimination rules for each logical connective. 7 The
notion of structural rules is due to Gentzen, 1935.
27
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
Antecedents in the ND system for classical logic are implicitly assumed to be sets of formulae. Neither linear order nor multiplicity of a single antecedent formula plays a role. In the Lambek calculus, on the other hand, antecedents are assumed to be sequences of formulae—as in BCG. We can bring classical logic into the sequence based format if we add two more structural rules, Permutation (P) and Contraction (C) (cf. Figure 1.10). They express explicitly that order and multiplicity of resources are irrelevant in this calculus. X, A, B, Y ⇒ C X, B, A, Y ⇒ C Figure 1.10.
X, A, A, Y ⇒ B
P
X, A, Y ⇒ B
C
Additional structural rules
In the presence of these structural rules, we may give different but equivalent logical rules for conjunction and implication (Figure 1.11). (The introduction rule for implication remains unchanged). X ⇒A∧B
Y, A, B, Z ⇒ C
Y, X, Z ⇒ C X⇒A→B
Y ⇒A
X, Y ⇒ B Figure 1.11.
→ E
∧E
X⇒A
Y ⇒B
X, Y ⇒ A ∧ B X, A ⇒ B X⇒A→B
∧I
→I
Alternative rules for ∧ and →
As the reader may verify, ∧E(1) and ∧E(2) can be derived from ∧E by using Monotonicity and Permutation, while ∧E can be derived from ∧E(1) and ∧E(2) with the help of Contraction and Cut. Conversely, ∧I is derivable from ∧I with Contraction and Permutation, while ∧I can be derived from ∧I with Permutation and Monotonicity. Likewise the two versions of the elimination rule for implication are interderivable by means of Permutation, Contraction and Monotonicity. If we omit the logical rules for the negation, we obtain the system of (positive implicational) Intuitionistic Logic. Here conjunction and implication are the only logical connectives (therefore the name “positive”). Note that this logic is weaker than just the positive fragment of classical propositional logic. For instance, Peirce’s Law ((A → B) → A) → A is a theorem that is derivable in classical but not in Intuitionistic Logic, even though it does not involve negation. This theorem is characteristic
28
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
of classical logic in the sense that adding it as an axiom to Intuitionistic Logic leads us to the positive fragment of classical logic. Intuitionistic Logic still admits all structural rules. Nevertheless the notion of deduction that underlies this calculus is different from classical logic. Classical logic is concerned with truth of propositions in a Platonic sense, and deduction is basically preservation of truth. Intuitionistic Logic is concerned with proofs. It is a constructive logic; a deduction is valid iff it is possible to construct a proof of the succedent from a proof of the antecedent. So the Intuitionistic notion of deduction is akin to the notion of a computation, and antecedents can be considered as computational resources. A further step in the direction of a logic that takes computational resources into account (i.e., a “resource conscious logic”, to use a fashionable term) is made by omitting the structural rule of Monotonicity. Without this rule, we require that all resources are consumed in a computation, i.e., valid deductions do not admit redundant antecedent formulae. The logic that we obtain in this way is a version of Relevant Logic (the canonical references are Anderson and Belnap, 1975 and Anderson et al., 1992, see Dunn, 1986 for an excellent overview). The characteristic formula which is a theorem in Intuitionistic but not in Relevant Logic is A → (B → A) In the absence of Monotonicity, the two ways to define conjunction in classical or Intuitionistic Logic are not equivalent anymore. In other words, Intuitionistic conjunction splits into two Relevant Logical connectives. To avoid confusion, I use two different symbols for the two Relevant conjunctions, and •. The corresponding logical rules are given in Figure 1.12. X ⇒AB X⇒A X ⇒AB X⇒B X ⇒A•B
E(1) X⇒A
E(2)
X ⇒AB
Y, A, B, Z ⇒ C
Y, X, Z ⇒ C Figure 1.12.
X⇒B
•E
X⇒A
Y ⇒B
X, Y ⇒ A • B
I
•I
Two Relevant conjunctions
In the sequel I reserve the term “conjunction” for and call • “product” (following the Lambek terminology; in the literature on Relevant Logic
29
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
this connective is usually called “fusion”). In Relevant Logic, it still holds that AB ⇒A•B but A•B ⇒AB is underivable. In Relevant Logic, all antecedent formulae in a deduction have to be consumed, but a given formula can be used arbitrarily many times. A more resource conscious perspective on deduction assumes that antecedent formulae are actually consumed in the process of deduction; so it makes a difference how many instances of a given proposition are available for a deduction. This amounts to dropping the structural rule of Contraction. The resulting system is (the additive-multiplicative fragment of Intuitionistic) Linear Logic (introduced in Girard, 1987). Again there is a characteristic law that is a Relevant, but not a Linear theorem: (A → A → B) → A → B Furthermore product and conjunction are logically independent in Linear Logic; A B ⇒ A • B is now underivable as well. The only structural rule that is left in Linear Logic is Permutation. If we remove it as well, implication splits into two variants (analogously to conjunction further above in the structural hierarchy). Alternatively to the logical rules for implication given in Figure 1.11 on page 27, we could use their mirror images: X⇒A
Y ⇒A→B X, Y ⇒ B
→ E
A, X ⇒ B X⇒A→B
→ I
In the presence of Permutation, the two versions are equivalent. If we do without this structural rule, we reach a logic with two directional versions of implication. Following Lambek’s notation, the first one is written as “/” and the second as “\”. The resulting logic is a version of the Lambek calculus. The characteristic law that is a theorem in Linear Logic but not in the Lambek calculus is (A → B → C) → B → A → C The original Lambek calculus is obtained if we ignore conjunction and add the requirement that the left hand side of sequents is never empty. To sum up so far, the logical calculi that we considered here form a hierarchy of systems with increasing strength, the Lambek calculus being
30
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
the weakest and classical logic the strongest of these systems. Between the Lambek calculus and Intuitionistic Logic, the difference between the calculi is determined by the presence or absence of structural rules. This motivates the name “structural hierarchy” for this pattern, and the cover term “substructural logics” for all calculi that have fewer structural rules than Intuitionistic Logic.8 This hierarchy is summarized in Table 1.1. Name
Characteristic Law
Structural rules
Classical Logic Intuitionistic Logic Relevant Logic Linear Logic Lambek calculus
((A → B) → A) → A A→B→A (A → A → B) → A → B (A → B → C) → B → A → C —
P, C, M P, C, M P, C P —
Table 1.1.
The structural hierarchy
Having thus a variety of resource conscious logics at our disposal, one might wonder which notion of deduction is appropriate for grammatical composition. The structural rule of Monotonicity admits the usage of redundant antecedent formulae. Natural language does not tolerate redundant lexical material though. Even pleonastic elements have a clear syntactic function and are not really redundant. So an appropriate logic of grammar will do without Monotonicity. Logics with Contraction admit multiple usage of resources. In its unrestricted form this would be much too powerful for natural language as well. It amounts to free deletion under identity (possibly restricted to adjacent constituents, depending on whether Permutation is available or not). If the grammar of English would admit such an operation, we could wrongly conclude from the grammaticality of (18a) that (18b) is grammatical as well. (18)
a. Anybody who laughed laughed about John. b. *Anybody who laughed about John.
(Anaphora phenomena show that natural language sometimes does reuse resources and that therefore a limited version of Contraction might be an appropriate grammatical deductive step. This will be the main point of the subsequent chapters.) 8 A good overview over the landscape of substructural logics, their history and motivations can be found in Restall, 2000.
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
31
Finally, unrestricted Permutation is not characteristic for the grammatical resource regime either. Even though languages differ with respect to their freedom of word order, no natural language is actually closed under permutation. So similarly to Contraction, Permutation is only available as a very restricted option in grammar. Hence we can conclude that the Lambek calculus is the obvious candidate for a grammatical general purpose logic since it embodies a resource management regime that we generally find in natural language.9
2.2.2 The Curry-Howard Correspondence Intuitionistic Logic as well as all substructural logics (including the Lambek calculus) are constructive logics. The intuitive meaning of a sequent X ⇒ A is “there is a construction transforming resources X into an A”. The different calculi discussed in the previous paragraph differ with respect to the methods of construction they admit but not with respect to this overall interpretation. So generally speaking, if a sequent X ⇒ A is derivable, there is a corresponding computable function leading from X to A. The appropriate formal language to talk about functions is the λ-calculus. The Curry-Howard correspondence establishes a profound correspondence between constructive logics on the one hand and the λ-calculus on the other hand. Loosely speaking, logic tells you what constructions are possible and λ-terms express how these constructions are to be performed. I start by recalling the syntax of the typed λ-calculus. Instead of the notation a, b for functional types used in linguistic semantics, I will write functional types as a → b. (The usage of an implication arrow for function spaces is no accident.) Also, I extend the simply typed λcalculus with conjunctive types that express Cartesian products. So the set of types coincides with the set of formulae of Positive Intuitionistic Logic. It is given by the definition Definition 13 (Types) Let a set BTYPE of basic types be given. TYPE is the smallest set such that 1 BTYPE ⊆ TYPE, 9 Arguably even the Lambek calculus is too permissive since it tacitly assumes that antecedents come as sequences rather than as trees. Therefore it is called the associative Lambek calculus. There is plenty of evidence that a notion of constituency is inevitable for adequate grammatical descriptions. A non-associative version of the Lambek calculus is presented in Lambek, 1961. However, I will ignore the issue of associativity/constituency in this book because it is orthogonal to the issues pursued here.
32
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
2 if A, B ∈ TYPE, then A → B ∈ TYPE, and 3 if A, B ∈ TYPE, then A ∧ B ∈ TYPE. Functional types figure in the syntactic operations of function application and λ-abstraction. The syntactic operations corresponding to conjunctive types are pair formation ·, · and the first and second projection, (·)0 and (·)1 . I assume that there are infinitely many variables of each type in TYPE. As in the previous section, I use letters x, y, z, . . . as metavariables over variables and M, N, O, . . . as metavariables over terms. Also I write M : A as shorthand for “term M has type A”.
Definition 14 (Syntax of the typed λ-calculus) 1 Every variable of type A is a term of type A. 2 If M : A → B and N : A, then (M N ) : B. 3 If M : A and x : B, then λxM : B → A. 4 If M : A and N : B, then M, N : A ∧ B. 5 If M : A ∧ B, then (M )0 : A and (M )1 : B. The notion of the domain of a type given in the previous section has to be extended appropriately to accommodate conjunctive types.
Definition 15 (Domains) The function Dom is a semantic domain function iff 1 The domain of Dom is TYPE, 2 for all A ∈ TYPE, Dom(A) is a non-empty set, 3 Dom(A → B) = Dom(B)Dom(A) , and 4 Dom(A ∧ B) = Dom(A) × Dom(B). Given a variable assignment function g that assigns each variable of type A an object from Dom(A), the interpretation function · extends g to all terms. I use the notation g[x → a] for the assignment function that is exactly like g except that it maps x to a.
Definition 16 (Interpretation function) xg = g(x) (M N )g = M g (N )g
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
λxM g M, N g (M )0 g (M )1 g
= = = =
33
{a, M g[x→a] |x has type A and a ∈ Dom(A)} M g , N g the unique a such that for some b : M g = a, b the unique a such that for some b : M g = b, a
So the operation ·, · of pair formation in the object language is interpreted as pair formation in the metalanguage. The projection functions (·)0 and (·)1 pick out the first and the second element of an ordered pair, respectively. This interpretation justifies the following reduction relations on λterms:
Definition 17 λxM N λx(M x) (M, N )0 (M, N )1 (M )0 , (M )1
;β ;η ;β ;β ;η
M [N/x] provided N is free for x in M M provided x is not free in M M N M
β-reduction for implicational types is well-known under the name of λconversion, and η-reduction for implicational types expresses extensionality of functions. The corresponding reductions for conjunctive types arise naturally from the semantics of pair formation. Furthermore there is the so-called α-equivalence over λ-terms: λyM [y/x] =α λzM [z/x] provided y, z are not free in M α-equivalence, β-reduction and η-reduction jointly constitute the notion of αβη-equivalence:
Definition 18 (αβη -equivalence) “=αβη ” is the smallest reflexive, transitive and symmetric relation such that 1 if M =α N , then M =αβη N , 2 if M ;β N , then M =αβη N , and 3 if M ;η N , then M =αβη N . It can easily be verified that this syntactically defined equivalence entails semantic equivalence under arbitrary assignment functions.
34
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
A comparison between the Intuitionistic part of the ND system in Figure 1.9 on page 26 on the one hand and the syntax of the typed λcalculus (as given in Definition 14 on page 32) on the other hand reveals a close similarity. The construction of typed λ-terms requires exactly the same reasoning steps as Intuitionistic deduction. The celebrated CurryHoward isomorphism for Intuitionistic Logic makes this correspondence precise. First some auxiliary notation:
Definition 19 Let Γ be a set of terms. Then |Γ| = {A ∈ TYPE | there is a term M ∈ Γ such that M : A} The syntax of the λ-calculus defines a consequence relation on types. Let M be some term of type A, and let Γ be the set of variables that occur free in M . Then M represents an operation that transforms arbitrary resources with the types |Γ| into an object of type A. According to the Intuitionistic resource management, not all resources have to be consumed in a derivation, so M also represents an operation from supersets of |Γ| to A. The following definition captures this notion of deduction.
Definition 20 X ⇒λ A iff for some term M with M : A, |F V (M )| ⊆ X Let us illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose the variable x has type e and the variable y has type e → t. Then the term λy.yx has type (e → t) → t. x is the only free variable occurring in this term. Therefore it holds that e ⇒λ (e → t) → t. To avoid notational confusion, I write X ⇒IL A if the sequent X ⇒ A is derivable in Intuitionistic Logic. The Curry-Howard correspondence says
Theorem 2 (Curry-Howard correspondence) X ⇒λ A iff X ⇒IL A Proof: As for the only-if direction, observe that each syntactic construction rule for λ-terms is matched by a rule of the ND calculus for Intuitionistic Logic. So this direction of the theorem can be established via induction over the complexity of terms. As for the if-direction, there is a simple constructive proof that assigns every Intuitionistic ND derivation a λ-term which embodies the derived sequent. This is done using labeled deduction; every ND step is labeled with a syntactic construction step over λ-terms. The labeled calculus is given in Figure 1.13. Here
35
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
letters X, Y, Z . . . range over sets of formulae that are labeled with variables. By convention, X, Y means X ∪ Y and X, x : A is shorthand for X ∪{x : A}. Variables are always assumed to be distinct unless otherwise stated. It is easy to see that every Intuitionistic proof has a labeled version which delivers the witness λ-term that is required by the theorem.
x:A⇒x:A
id
X⇒M :A
Y, x : A, Z ⇒ N : B
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [M/x] : B X⇒M :A X, x : B ⇒ M : A
Cut
M
X ⇒M :A∧B
Y, x : A, y : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [(M )0 /x][(M )1 /y] X⇒M :A
Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M, N : A ∧ B X⇒M :A→B
X, x : A ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A → B
Figure 1.13.
∧I
Y ⇒N :A
X, Y ⇒ M N : B
∧E
→E
→I
Labeled natural deduction for Intuitionistic Logic
Labeled deduction actually establishes a one-to-one correspondence between typed λ-terms and ND proofs. Therefore one can speak of a Curry-Howard isomorphism. This correspondence was first noted by Curry in Curry and Feys, 1958 for the purely implicational fragment of Intuitionistic Logic. In Howard, 1969 the correspondence is extended
36
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
to conjunction as well as to disjunction (the latter will be ignored in this book). From a more general perspective, the Curry-Howard correspondence provides a remarkable link between two apparently unrelated branches of mathematical logic, namely proof theory and function theory. This connection is frequently expressed by the programmatic slogan Propositions as types, proofs as programs. The terminology “type logic” is motivated by this connection; type logics are constructive logics that admit a functional interpretation. “Type Logical Grammar” is a theory of grammar that makes crucial use of type logics. The usage of the word type here is more or less synonymous to our earlier usage of category, and I will use these terms interchangeably henceforth. The connection between λ-calculus and Intuitionistic proof theory allows the transfer of results from one area to the other. In particular, the notion of normalization of terms (application of reduction steps to terms until a normal form is reached, i.e., a term that cannot be reduced any further) can be translated into a notion of proof normalization. Well-known properties of term reduction like the Church-Rosser property (confluence of different reduction strategies) and strong normalization (absence of infinite sequences of normalization steps) immediately carry over to ND proofs. A proof normalization step transforms an ND proof of a given sequent into a simpler proof of the same sequent. “Strong normalization” for proofs means that every sequence of normalization steps eventually terminates. To illustrate the concept of proof normalization, an example of a β-reduction and one of an η-reduction for implicational types are given in Figure 1.14, and in Figure 1.15 on the next page. X, x : A ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A → B
→I
Y ⇒N :A
X, Y ⇒ (λxM )N : B
→E
; Y ⇒N :A
X, x : A ⇒ M : B
X, Y ⇒ M [N/x]B Figure 1.14.
Cut
β-normalization
There are analogous relations between ND proofs and λ-terms for substructural logics. Limiting the deductive power of the proof theory by
37
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
X⇒M :A→B
x:A⇒x:A
X, x : A ⇒ M x : B X ⇒ λx.M x : A → B
id →E
→I
; X⇒M :A→B Figure 1.15.
η-normalization
omitting structural rules amounts to restricting the syntax of the λcalculus in certain respects. Relevant Logic requires that every deductive resource is actually used. This has two repercussions for the corresponding Curry-Howard terms. First, every variable on the left hand side of a sequent must in fact occur in the term on the right hand side. Furthermore, every λabstractor in a term must bind at least one free variable occurrence. To see why this is so, consider the term (λx.y)z Here the abstractor λx does not bind a free variable occurrence. z is free in this term, i.e., it represents an input slot for the corresponding computation. Normalizing this term leads to y Now z does not occur anymore; the resource z proved to be redundant. This is illicit in Relevant Logic, and the prohibition of empty abstraction excludes such configurations. Since Relevant Logic distinguishes conjunction and product, a complete correspondence would require two kinds of pair formation operations on the level of terms. To simplify matters, I ignore conjunction and assume that conjunctive types correspond to product formulae. So for Relevant Logic, the correspondence between terms and deductions has to be formulated as
Definition 21 X ⇒λR A iff for some term M without empty abstraction such that M : A, |F V (M )| = X. The relation ⇒λR represents the deduction relation determined by the fragment of the λ-calculus without empty abstraction and without re-
38
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
dundant antecedent formulae, and it coincides with derivability in the multiplicative fragment of Relevant Logic, i.e., Relevant Logic without conjunction (but with product). Linear Logic is still more restricted because it requires that every resource is used exactly once. On the level of λ-terms this amounts to the requirement that every free variable occurs exactly once, and every λ binds exactly one free variable occurrence. There is a minor complication involved here in connection with the projection functions that come with product elimination. For instance, the sequent x : A • B ⇒ (x)0 , (x)1 : A • B is Linearly derivable even though x apparently occurs twice in the succedent term. What we actually want is that the two occurrences of x count as one. To achieve this, the syntax of the fragment of the λ-calculus that corresponds to (the multiplicative fragment of) Linear Logic has to be defined in a way that sidesteps this problem. This alternative syntax is also closer to the ND calculus for product.
Definition 22 (Linear λ-calculus) Let VAR be the set of typed variables. The set of linear λ-terms ΛLL is the smallest set such that 1 VAR ⊆ ΛLL . F V (x) = {x} 2 If M : A → B, N : A, and F V (M ) ∩ F V (N ) = ∅, then M N ∈ ΛLL . F V (M N ) = F V (M ) ∪ F V (N ) 3 If M ∈ ΛLL and x ∈ F V (M ), then λxM ∈ ΛLL . F V (λxM ) = F V (M ) − {x} 4 If M, N ∈ ΛLL , and F V (M ) ∩ F V (N ) = ∅, then M, N ∈ ΛLL . F V (M, N ) = F V (M ) ∪ F V (N ) 5 If M, N ∈ ΛLL , x, y ∈ F V (M ), N : A ∧ B, x : A, y : B, and F V (M ) ∩ F V (N ) = ∅, then M [(N )0 /x][(N )1 /y] ∈ ΛLL . F V (M [(N )0 /x][(N )1 /y]) = F V (M ) ∪ F V (N ) − {x, y} This fragment of the λ-calculus corresponds to a fragment of Linear Logic10 in a way that is analogous to the Curry-Howard correspondence for Intuitionistic Logic. 10 The
positive multiplicative fragment of Intuitionistic Linear Logic, to be precise.
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
39
Up to this point, there is a neat correspondence between constructive logics (excluding classical logic, which is not constructive), structural rules, and constraints on λ-terms. This is summarized in table 1.2. Name
Structural rules
Constraints on λ-terms
Intuitionistic Logic Relevant Logic Linear Logic
P, C, M P, C P
— no empty abstraction no multiple abstraction/ no multiple occurrences of the same variable
Table 1.2.
Substructural Curry-Howard correspondences
To extend the Curry-Howard correspondence below Linear Logic, we would have to introduce a version of the λ-calculus that distinguishes between leftward and rightward abstraction and application. Such a system is developed in Wansing, 1993. I will not pursue this line here though but use Linear λ-terms as labels for derivations in the Lambek calculus as well. Since the Lambek calculus is a subsystem of Linear Logic, there is a corresponding Linear λ-term for every proof in the Lambek calculus, even though not every Linear term corresponds to a Lambek proof. The official labeled ND presentation of the Lambek calculus L is thus as given in Figure 1.16 on the following page.11 In the sequel I will use the notation LX⇒M :A to indicate that the labeled sequent X ⇒ M : A is derivable in the Lambek calculus L. Likewise I write LX⇒A if there is a Curry-Howard labeling for the unlabeled sequent X ⇒ A that makes it L-derivable. If no confusion is likely to arise, I will omit the “L” to the left of the turnstile. The tension between the directional base calculus and the non-directional Curry-Howard labeling has a sound linguistic motivation. The intended usage of the Lambek calculus is a description of grammatical 11 It
is based on the ND calculus for the Lambek calculus from Morrill et al., 1990. Lambek, 1958 only gives an axiomatic and a Gentzen style sequent presentation.
40
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
x:A⇒x:A
X⇒M :A
id
X⇒M :A
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [M/x] : B Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M, N : A • B X, x : A ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : B/A x : A, X ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A\B
Y, x : A, Z ⇒ N : B
/I
\I
Figure 1.16.
•I
X ⇒M :A•B
Cut
Y, x : A, y : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [(M )0 /x][(M )1 /y] : C X ⇒ M : A/B
Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M N : A X⇒M :A
Y ⇒ N : A\B
X, Y ⇒ N M : B
•E
/E
\E
Labeled natural deduction for the Lambek calculus L
composition. This process is multi-dimensional; it consists at least of the composition of forms and the composition of meanings. Composition of forms discriminates between left and right, so a general logic of grammatical composition must be non-commutative. On the other hand, meanings are not directed. Curry-Howard labels in general give recipes of how antecedent resources are composed into witnesses for the succedent. For the linguistic application of the Lambek calculus, we use them only to describe the composition of lexical meanings into sentence meanings. Since meanings are not directed, a term language that is less discriminating than the grammatical base logic is sufficient for this purpose. In the last section, I introduced the format of proof trees as a graphically more appealing notational alternative to the sequent format. I will make use of this format in the context of the Lambek calculus as well. There, ND rules are presented as transformations on graphs as given in Figure 1.17 on the next page. The resulting structures are a bit more complex than in the context of BCG. The identity axiom from the sequent presentation has no counterpart in the tree format since it comes down to the trivial claim that every single node that is labeled by a variable is a tree. Neither does the Cut rule occur explicitly. It corresponds to the general tree building operation of unifying the root node of one tree with a leaf of another tree to form a more complex tree. So we only have logical rules for the three Lambek connectives. The rule •I is a straightforward transposition of its sequent counterpart. •E is somewhat more complex since it introduces downward branching. So the resulting structures are strictly speaking not necessarily trees but only directed acyclic graphs. Down-
41
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework x:A
y:B
•I
x, y : A • B i x:A .. .
.. . .. .
M :B λxM : A\B .. . .. .
.. . .. .
.. . .. .
x:A•B (x)0 : A
(x)1 : B
x:A
y : A\B (yx) : B
•E
\E
\I, i i
x:A .. .
x : A/B
y:B /E
(xy) : A
M :B /I, i λxM : B/A Figure 1.17.
Natural deduction for the Lambek calculus in tree format
ward branching is only possible in the context of a proof graph with a unique root. The slash introduction rules \I and /I involve discharging of a hypothesis. In tree format, this amounts to a non-local transformation on trees. \I operates on a complete proof tree. It adds a new root at the root of its argument, and it marks the leftmost leaf of its argument as being discharged. This means that this leaf does not count as a premise12 of the deduction anymore. To keep track of the dependency between the discharged leaf and the position where it is discharged in case of multiple hypotheses, the discharged hypothesis and the root node are coindexed. (This mechanism is strictly speaking redundant if we use Curry-Howard labeling since the variable names of the hypothesis labels store this information too.) Rule /I works analogously except that it is the rightmost leaf of its argument proof tree that is discharged. The slash elimination rules are plain local tree admissibility conditions. They coincide with the two application schemes in BCG. The following theorem states the equivalence between the sequent format and the tree format of the ND presentation of L. (By σ(X) we refer to the result of replacing all commas in the sequent X by products, i.e. σ(A) = A and σ(X, A) = σ(X) • A.) 12 A note on terminology: The antecedents in the sequent style ND system correspond to premises in the tree format, and likewise for succedents vs. conclusions.
42
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Theorem 3 For any sequences X, Y it holds that L X ⇒ σ(Y ) iff there is a prooftree with X as its sequence of undischarged assumptions and Y as its sequence of conclusions. Proof: By induction over derivations.
2.2.3 Linguistic Application: Lambek Grammars Now the ground is paved to officially introduce the Lambek calculus as a logic of grammatical composition. Grammars based on the Lambek calculus L are very similar to Basic Categorial Grammars that were introduced in the previous section. The crucial difference is the fact that the deductive component of the grammar is now given by the logical calculus L rather than just by the application schemes. The formal definition of categories in Lambek grammars coincides with the corresponding definition for BCG and is repeated here for convenience. Definition 23 (Categories) Let a finite set B of basic categories be given. CAT(B) is the smallest set such that 1 B ⊆ CAT(B) 2 If A, B ∈ CAT, then A/B ∈ CAT(B) 3 If A, B ∈ CAT, then A\B ∈ CAT(B) The definition of a Lambek grammar also coincides with the corresponding BCG notion.
Definition 24 (Lambek Grammar) Let Σ be an alphabet. A Lambek grammar G is a triple B, LEX, S, where B is a finite set (the basic categories), LEX is a finite sub-relation of Σ+ × CAT(B), and S is a finite subset of CAT(B) (the designated categories). Due to the more inclusive notion of deduction based on L, the same grammar recognizes different languages depending on whether it is conceived as a BCG grammar or a Lambek grammar.
Definition 25 Let G = B, LEX, S be a Lambek grammar over the alphabet Σ. Then
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
43
α ∈ L(G) iff there are a1 , . . . , an ∈ Σ+ , A1 , . . . , An ∈ CAT(B), and S ∈ S such that 1 α = a1 . . . an , 2 for all i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n : ai , Ai ∈ LEX, and 3 L A1 , . . . , An ⇒ S. Note that all axioms and rules of BCG are derivable in L. Therefore every BCG derivation is also a Lambek derivation. As a consequence, the language that is recognized by a given grammar G conceived as a BCG grammar is always a sub-language of the language that is recognized by G as a Lambek grammar. Curry-Howard labels supply every derivation in L with a term of the λ-calculus. These terms play the same role as the labels in BCG derivations; they are interpreted as recipes for composing the meaning of a complex expression from the meanings of the lexical resources involved. Note also that term labeling of BCG derivations is preserved if they are interpreted as Lambek derivations. So switching from BCG to Lambek grammars does not only preserve string recognition but also meaning assignment. While Lambek grammars preserve the deductive means of BCG, they properly extend it. In pure Lambek grammars, the product connective (and its corresponding logical rules) plays no major role. The main difference with respect to BCG comes from the usage of hypothetical reasoning. There are at least two kinds of phenomena that find much more natural analyses if we have the slash introduction rules at our disposal, namely unbounded dependencies and coordination.
2.2.4 Unbounded Dependencies Consider a relative clause construction involving subject relativization, like (19)
the mathematician who wrote Principia
The relative clause who wrote Principia as a whole is a postnominal noun modifier, so its category should be n\n. If we assume the standard type assignments for determiners, transitive verbs and proper nouns, the simplest type assignment for the relative pronoun who is (n\n)/(np\s). Furthermore, to derive the desired interpretation ιx.mathematician’x∧ write’xprincipia’, we will have to assume the interpreted lexical entry (20)
who – λP Qx.Qx ∧ P x : (n\n)/(np\s)
1 np x who mathematician
lex
np/n λP ιx.P x
s write’principia’x
lex
np\s λxwrite’principia’x
n\n λQx.Qx ∧ write’principia’x n λx.math’x ∧ write’principia’x
np ιx.math’x ∧ write’principia’x
/E
wrote Russell
lex
book the np/n λP ιx.P x
lex
n book’
lex
lex
(n\n)/(s/np) λP Qx.Qx ∧ P x
s/np λxwrite’xrussell’
n λx.book’x ∧ write’xrussell’
\E
/E
np ιx.book’x ∧ write’xrussell’
Figure 1.18.
Derivations for (19) and (21)
1 np x
np\s write’x
s write’xrussell’
n\n λQx.Qx ∧ write’xrussell’
lex
(np\s)/np write’
np russell’ which
\E
/I, 1 /E
\E
/E
lex /E
\E
\I, 1 /E
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
the
lex
np principia’
np\s write’principia’
(n\n)/(np\s) λP Qx.Qx ∧ P x
n math’
principia
lex
44
wrote (np\s)/np write’
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
45
A ND derivation for (19) is given in Figure 1.18 on the facing page. This derivation is redundant in one respect: A \ E step is immediately followed by a \ I step. In this configuration, η-reduction is possible. However, it is important to notice that the hypothesis marked with 1 occurs in the subject position of the embedded clause, i.e., at the position where transformational theories would place a trace. This pattern can be extrapolated to other constructions. Quite generally, hypotheses in Type Logical Grammar play a role that is very similar to the role of traces in theories like GB (cf. Chomsky, 1981). Hypothetical reasoning is triggered by lexical entries with higher order categories like (n\n)/(np\s). (This type is called “higher order” because one of its argument categories is a complex category). Object relativization works analogously except for the linear position of the hypothesis, which in turn is triggered by the directionality of the higher order part of the category of the relative pronoun. So to derive the complex NP given in (21a), I assume the lexical entry (21b). (21)
a. the book which Russell wrote b. which – λP Qx.Qx ∧ P x : (n\n)/(s/np)
Note that subject and object relative pronouns have the same semantics, namely property intersection. The derivation of (21a) is given in figure 1.18. Again, a hypothesis occurs where transformationalists would put a trace. This time the hypothetical reasoning cannot be eliminated via η-reduction. It is easy to see that the distance between the discharged hypothesis and the triggering relative pronoun has no influence on the derivability of wh-dependency. This phenomenon is correctly predicted to be unbounded. Similar analyses can be formulated for other kinds of “A’-movement” like question formation or topicalization. The interested reader is referred to Morrill, 1994 and Carpenter, 1998 for a comprehensive discussion of these issues. Crucially, the natural ND according to these analyses starts by putting a hypothesis at the “base position” of the dislocated element that is later discharged. Note, however, that hypothetical reasoning is a proof technique, not an intrinsic part of our theory of grammar. There are proof theories for the Lambek calculus that are fully equivalent to ND without using anything that would resemble traces. Let me point out two problems that arise in connection with the Lambek treatment of A’-dependencies, both of which motivated further developments of Type Logical Grammar. First, L is too restrictive in a sense because it only admits extraction if the hypothesis to be discharged
46
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
(= the “base position” of the “moved” element) is peripheral in the scope of the binding operator. This held for the subject position and—in the previous example—for the object position, but it is straightforward to construct different kinds of counterexamples, as for instance (22)
the book that Russell wrote passionately the book that Russell gave to Whitehead the book that Russell gave to Whitehead intentionally the book that Russell thought Whitehead recommended to a student e. . . .
a. b. c. d.
While it might be possible to account for each of these examples individually by stipulating a new category for the relative pronoun, this strategy evidently misses a generalization: The linear position of the hypothesis is irrelevant for relativization. To cover this insight, we have to assume that the hypothesis has access to the structural rule of Permutation while the overt material hasn’t. So what is apparently needed is a hybrid logic of grammar that fine-tunes structural reasoning to certain linguistic domains. This can be done by extending the Lambek calculus with additional modes of composition to a multimodal type logic. Discussion of these techniques goes beyond the scope of this book though. The interested reader is referred to Morrill, 1994 and Moortgat, 1997. In some respects, the Lambek calculus is also too liberal to adequately formalize extraction phenomena. It treats these dependencies as unbounded in the literal sense, disregarding the fact that extraction is bounded by island constraints. It is for instance impossible to extract a relative pronoun out of a coordinate structure, cf. the following example from Moortgat, 1997: (23)
*the mathematician whom Gottlob admired Kazimierz and Jim detested
Nothing will prevent the derivation of this example in the Lambek calculus though, since the island constituent Gottlob admired Kazimierz and Jim detested has no special status that would prevent the discharging of hypotheses. Here the problem is that the Lambek calculus is too liberal, allowing unrestricted associativity. The solution is again an appropriate multimodal extension of L that blocks associativity wherever necessary.
2.2.5 Coordination and Combinators As was demonstrated above, Categorial Grammar lends itself to an elegant treatment of non-constituent coordination, provided BCG is ex-
47
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
tended with appropriate combinators. One major advantage of Type Logical Grammar based on the Lambek calculus is the fact that almost all combinators that have been proposed in an ad hoc fashion in the literature turn out to be theorems of L. Let us start with the two directional variants of type lifting, T> and T< . Their derivation is given in figure 1.19. 1 y : A\B
x:A
yx : B
1 y : B/A
\E
x:A /E yx : B
/I, 1 λy.yx : B/(A\B) Figure 1.19.
λy.yx : (B/A)\B
\I, 1
Natural deduction derivations of Type Rasing
The Curry-Howard labeling of the proof supplies the appropriate semantics for type lifting as a side effect. Function composition is derivable as well. It involves two slash elimination steps, followed by one slash introduction step (cf. Figure 1.20). y : B/C yz : B
x : A/B x(yz) : A λz.x(yz) : A/C
x:A
1
y : A\B yx : B
1 /E
/E
/I, 1
\E
z(yx) : C λx.z(yx) : A\C Figure 1.20.
z:C
z : B\C
\E
\I, 1
Natural deduction derivations of function composition
Other combinators from the literature like the Geach rules (cf. Geach, 1972) x : A/B ⇒ λyz.x(yz) : A/C/(B/C) x : B/C ⇒ λyz.y(xz) : (A/B)\(A/C)
48
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
and argument lowering (Partee and Rooth, 1983) x : A/((B/C)\B) ⇒ λy.x(λz.zy) : A/C are Lambek theorems as well. The Geach rules can immediately be derived from function composition by performing an additional step of slash introduction. Depending on whether the rightmost or the leftmost remaining premise of function composition is discharged, we end up with the harmonic or the disharmonic version of the Geach rule (I leave out the backward looking mirror images as these are essentially equivalent to their forward looking counterparts). 2
y : B/C yz : B
x : A/B x(yz) : A λz.x(yz) : A/C
2
/I, 2
1 /E
/E
/I, 1
λyz.y(xz) : (A/B)\(A/C) Figure 1.21.
z:C
xz : B
λz.y(xz) : A/C
/E
/E
x : B/C
y(xz) : A
1
/I, 1
λyz.x(yz) : A/C/(B/C)
y : A/B
z:C
\I, 2
Natural deduction derivations of the Geach rules
The ND derivation of argument lowering essentially involves type lifting of a hypothesis that is later discharged (cf. Figure 1.22 on the facing page). It goes without saying that the combinatory analyses of non-standard coordination phenomena sketched above carry over to Lambek grammars since the combinators involved are theorems here. So the Lambek calculus plus the Curry-Howard correspondence offers a principled explanation why these combinatory rules exist and why they have the semantics they have. I conclude this discussion with mentioning two combinators from the literature that are not derivable in L. To account for the cross-serial
49
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
z : B/C
2
y:C
zy : B x : A/((B/C)\B)
λz.zy : (B/C)\B
x(λz.zy) : A λy.x(λz.zy) : A/C Figure 1.22.
1 /E
\I, 2 /E
/I, 1
Natural deduction derivation of argument lowering
dependencies in Dutch, Steedman, 2000 proposes a disharmonic variant of function composition: x : A/B, y : C\B ⇒ λz.x(yz) : C\A To make this sequent a theorem, we would need access to the structural rule of Permutation. In other words, this combinator is a theorem of Linear Logic, and there it has the semantics Steedman assumes. In Moortgat, 1997 it is shown how Steedman’s analysis can be reproduced in a multimodal version of TLG. Furthermore Steedman (op. cit.) assumes a version of Curry and Feys’ combinator S to handle parasitic gap constructions: x : A/B, y : (A\C)/B ⇒ λz.yz(xz) : C/B The (Relevant) derivation of this sequent requires both Permutation and Contraction. Again, Moortgat, 1997 shows how this can be done multimodally while avoiding a collapse into full Relevant Logic.
2.2.6
Sequent Presentation, Cut Elimination and Decidability The decidability proof for BCG given above rests on the fact that in BCG-derivable sequents X ⇒ A, the succedent A is a subformula of one of the antecedent formulae in X. It is easy to see that neither the slash introduction rules nor the product introduction rule in the ND presentation of L necessarily preserve this property. In Lambek, 1958 another strategy for a decidability proof is pursued. Rather than using ND, Lambek formulates his calculus as a Gentzen style sequent system. Like the sequent presentation of ND, this proof format involves reasoning with sequents, and the two formats are very similar, but they also differ in crucial respects. Recall that the logical rules in the ND calculus either introduce or eliminate logical connectives on the succedent side of sequents. Sequent rules only introduce logical connectives,
50
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
but there are also rules that introduce them on the antecedent side of sequents. So in a sequent system, there is a left rule (also called “rule of use”) and a right rule (“rule of proof”) for every connective. Together with these logical rules, the sequent system for L comprises the identity axiom scheme and the Cut rule. Structurally stronger systems also employ structural rules (that are identical to the corresponding ND rules). Curry-Howard labeling can be applied to sequent proofs as well, even though the connection between the syntax of the labels and the structure of the proof is not as close as in the ND system. The labeled version of the sequent system for L from Lambek, 1958 is given in Figure 1.23.
x:A⇒x:A
X⇒M :A
id
X⇒M :A
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [M/x] : B Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M, N : A • B X, x : A ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A/B x : A, X ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A\B
Figure 1.23.
Y, x : A, Z ⇒ N : B
/R
\R
•R
Cut
X, x : A, y : B, Y ⇒ M : C X, z : A • B, Y ⇒ M [(z)0 /x][(z)1 /y] : C X⇒M :A
Y, x : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, y : B/A, X, Z ⇒ N [(yM )/x] : C X⇒M :A
Y, x : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, X, y : A\B, Z ⇒ N [(yM )/x] : C
•L
/L
\L
Labeled sequent presentation of the Lambek calculus L
The rules of proof in the sequent system coincide with the ND introduction rules. The rules of use differ from the corresponding elimination rules, but it is easy to see that the ND rules and the corresponding sequent rules are interderivable using the Cut rule. Hence both systems derive the same set of theorems. So in a sense the sequent system is a notational variant of ND. However, the former has an important feature that is crucial to establish decidability: the subformula property. Apart from the Cut rule, every formula in the premise of a sequent rule is a subformula of some formula in the conclusion. To be more precise, the premises of a sequent rule consist of exactly the same material except that they contain one connective less. So doing Cut free bottom up proof search for a given sequent will always reduce complexity and is thus guaranteed to terminate. So to establish decidability for L, it is sufficient to show that the Cut rule is admissible in the sequent system for L without Cut. (A rule is admissible if adding it does not increase the set of derivable theorems.)
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
51
The proof of this fact is the central part of Lambek, 1958. I give a sketch of Lambek’s proof here.
Theorem 4 (Cut Elimination) If L X ⇒ A, then there is a Cut-free sequent proof of X ⇒ A. Sketch of Proof: We define the complexity of a type or of a sequence of types as the number of symbols (i.e., atomic formulae and logical connectives) occurring in it. I notate the complexity of X as d(X). Now consider a schematic instance of the Cut rule: X⇒A Y, A, Z ⇒ B Cut Y, X, Z ⇒ B The degree of this instance of Cut is given by the definition d(X) + d(Y ) + d(Z) + d(A) + d(B) Lambek shows that every sequent proof that uses Cut exactly once can be transformed into a proof of the same sequent that is either Cut free or else uses one or two Cuts of a lower degree than the Cut in a given proof. In the latter case, this transformation can be applied to the one or two subproofs rooted by the new Cuts. Since the degree of a Cut is always finite and non-negative, repeated application of this transformation eventually eliminates all instances of Cut in the original proof. (I omit Curry-Howard labels in this proof. It can be shown that Cut elimination always leads to a proof term in β-normal form that is αβη-equivalent to the original proof term.) Some terminology: The formula in a Cut application that matches the A in the scheme above is called the Cut formula. All logical rules of the sequent presentation of L introduce exactly one new logical connective. In other words, each logical rule creates exactly one new formula, while all other formulae in the conclusion already occur in the premise. I will call this newly created formula the active formula of a logical rule. Now suppose we have a proof containing some Cut application. Then the proof contains at least one Cut that is not dominated by any other Cut. Now we may distinguish three cases. 1 At least one premise of the Cut is an identity axiom. 2 Both premises are results of logical rules, and the Cut formula is the active formula in both premises. 3 Both premises are results of logical rules, and the Cut formula is not the active formula in one premise.
52
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Consider the first case. Schematically, this looks like A⇒A
X, A, Y ⇒ B
X, A, Y ⇒ B
Cut
or X⇒A
A⇒A
Cut X⇒A In either case, the conclusion is identical to one of the premises, and the Cut as a whole can be removed from the proof. Now consider the second case. Suppose the Cut formula is AB, for some logical connective . If this formula is active in both premises, the two premises must be results of the logical rules R and L respectively. Therefore the two subformulae A and B of the Cut formula each occur once in an antecedent and once in a succedent of the premises of the Cut. I illustrate this for the case = /; the other two cases are analogous. X, B ⇒ A X ⇒ A/B
/R
Z⇒B
Y, A, W ⇒ C
Y, A/B, Z, W ⇒ C
Y, X, Z, W ⇒ C
/L
Cut
We may replace the original Cut by two Cuts which have A and B respectively as active formulae. In the example above, the result of this operation is X, B ⇒ A Z⇒B
Y, A, W ⇒ C
Y, X, B, W ⇒ C Y, X, Z, W ⇒ C
Cut
Cut
The final conclusion here is identical to the conclusion of the original Cut, and the original Cut is replaced by two Cuts of a lower degree. Now consider the third and final case, where the Cut formula is inactive in at least one premise. Then the Cut formula occurs in the antecedent of this premise as well, and we may permute the Cut rule with the logical rule. Again I illustrate just one subcase. The other five subcases are analogous. X, D, W ⇒ A U ⇒D
Y, B, Z ⇒ C
Y, B/A, X, D, W, Z ⇒ C Y, B/A, X, U, W, Z ⇒ C ;
Cut
/L
53
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
U ⇒D
X, D, W ⇒ A X, U, W ⇒ A
Cut
Y, B, Z ⇒ C
Y, B/A, X, U, W, Z ⇒ C
/L
Here a Cut is replaced by one Cut of a lower degree. So in each of the three cases to be considered, it is possible to replace a Cut by at most two Cuts of a lower degree without affecting the ultimate conclusion. Repeated application of this procedure will thus transform every proof into a Cut free proof. There is a simple decision procedure for the Cut free sequent calculus, which leads to the important
Theorem 5 (Decidability (Lambek, 1958)) Derivability in L is decidable. Proof: The conclusion sequent of each rule of the Cut free sequent calculus contains more symbols then its premises (since each formula in the premise occurs as a subformula in the conclusion and each logical rule introduces one logical connective). Furthermore there are only finitely many ways to match a given sequent with the conclusion of some sequent rule. Therefore there are always at most finitely many options to continue bottom up proof search, and every branch of the proof search tree is finite. This entails that the proof search space as a whole is finite. As an immediate corollary to this proof, we obtain the finite reading property of L:
Corollary 1 (Finite reading property) For a given unlabeled L-sequent, there are at most finitely many CurryHoward labelings. Linguistically speaking this means that we may derive at most finitely many different interpretations for a given string of lexical items (provided no infinite lexical ambiguities are involved). Given that different proofs of a given sequent correspond to structural ambiguities rather than vagueness etc., this is certainly a desired result. Especially this fact indicates that Lambek grammars do not suffer from the problem of infinite spurious ambiguities, despite appearance to the contrary. Consider a simple sequence of a subject followed by a VP, i.e., a sequence of categories x : np, y : np\s
54
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
A simple application of Modus Ponens will yield the goal type s (augmented with the semantic label (yx)). However, it is also possible to perform type lifting with the subject, yielding the sequence λz.zx : s/(np\s), y : np\s Now backward application leads to the succedent ((λz.zx)y) : s. Still, there are more options. Rather than performing application, we can type lift the VP, which gives us λz.zx : s/(np\s), λw.wy : (s/(np\s))\s From here we can derive (λw.wy)(λz.zx) : s/(np\s) via backward application. This iterated type lifting could be repeated arbitrarily many times, thus leading to infinitely many different derivations of the same sequent, np, ns\s ⇒ s. However, all these derivations except the first one use the Cut rule. Applying Cut elimination to any of these derivations returns the original Cut free derivation which just consists of one application step.
2.2.7 Axiomatic Presentation In Lambek, 1958 L is first introduced by means of an axiomatic system. I will briefly review this perspective here too. The theorems of this system are arrows rather than sequents, i.e., pairs of formulae of L. An arrow consisting of the source A and the target B is represented as A→B The axiomatic presentation of L consists of a set of axioms, i.e., arrows, and a set of rules, i.e., relations between arrows. Arrows represent deductions, so we assume that the relation expressed by arrows is reflexive and transitive (i.e., a pre-order). This is covered by the identity axiom scheme and the Cut rule A→A A→B
id
B→C A→C
Cut
We consider the product operator to be the primary connective. Working in the associative system L, we assume axiom schemes that guarantee that the product is associative:
55
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
A • (B • C) → (A • B) • C
(A • B) • C → A • (B • C)
α
α−1
To introduce the two implications, Lambek makes use of the notion of “residuated functions”. Suppose some set M is ordered by a pre-order ≤, and let f and g be functions in M . Then f and g are residuated functions iff the following holds for all x, y ∈ M : f x ≤ y iff x ≤ gy The product operator defines two unary functions for each type A, namely B → B •A and B → A•B. The two implications “\” and “/” define two unary functions for every type A as well, namely B → B/A and B → A\B. The axiomatics of L requires that these two implicational functions form residuated pairs with the two product functions (where the domain is identified with the set of types and the pre-order with the arrow). Lambek expresses this idea by means of two biconditionals: B → A\C iff A • B → C iff A → C/B This amounts to the following four inference rules (the labels are from Lambek, 1988): A•B →C A → C/B A•B →C B → A\C
β
A → C/B A•B →C
γ
B → A\C A•B →C
β −1
γ −1
The inference relation defined by the axiomatic system in fact coincides with the ND presentation and the sequent presentation of L. A sequent is L-derivable iff replacing all commas in the antecedent by products (and replacing ⇒ by →) yields a derivable arrow. To be more precise
Definition 26 (•-closure) 1 σ(A) = A 2 σ(X, A) = σ(X) • A
56
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Theorem 6 L X ⇒ A iff σ(X) → A It is easy to see that the axioms and inference rules of the axiomatic system are derivable in the ND calculus (β and γ correspond to slash introduction and β −1 , γ −1 to slash elimination). To see that the other direction holds as well, first observe that in the presence of Cut, the slash elimination rules are equivalent to the application axioms of BCG. These are easily derivable in the axiomatic system: A\B → A\B A • A\B → B
id
A/B → A/B
γ −1
A/B • B → A
id β −1
As mentioned above, α−1 , β −1 are notational variants of the slash introduction rules. The more general sequent formulation of Cut, as well as the two logical rules for the product come down to the requirement that the product is monotonic in both arguments. This follows from the logic of residuation in the following way: B•D →B•D D → B\(B • D)
C→D
C → B\(B • D) B•C →B•D A→B
B → (B • D)/C A → (B • D)/C A•C →B•D
id γ Cut
γ −1 β Cut
β −1
2.2.8 Model Theory The Lambek calculus and similar type logical calculi are used to reason about linguistic objects. A sequence like np, np\s ⇒ s for instance expresses the fact that a linguistic item of category np, followed by an item of category np\s, jointly constitute a complex object of category s. Model theory for the Lambek calculus studies the relation between syntactic categories and the set of objects they classify.13 13 There
is a source of confusion here: model theory is a branch of semantics. The semantics of syntactic categories is to be distinguished though from the semantics of linguistic signs.
57
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
A very general approach to the semantics of substructural logics is interpretation in ternary frames. This is inspired by the possible world semantics for standard modal logic, where unary modalities are interpreted relative to a binary accessibility relation between possible worlds. Likewise, the binary operators \, •, and / in L and related calculi can be interpreted relative to a ternary relation.
Definition 27 (Frames) A ternary frame F = W, R consists of a non-empty set of points W and a ternary relation R ⊆ W 3 on W . The associative Lambek calculus L is related to a special class of ternary frames, the associative frames.
Definition 28 (Associative frames) A frame F = W, R is associative iff for all x, y, z, u, v ∈ W : Rxyz ∧ Rzuv → ∃w ∈ W.Rwyu ∧ Rxwz and Rxyz ∧ Ryuv → ∃w ∈ W.Rwvz ∧ Rxyw The set W can be thought of as the set of linguistic signs, and Rxyz intuitively means: x can be decomposed into y and z (in that order). The two associativity postulates above thus express that linguistic composition is associative. Graphically this can be depicted as follows. Triples from R are displayed as elementary trees, with the first element as root and the other two as leaves:14 x
x
⇔
z
y u
v
w y
v u
A frame is turned into a model for L if an interpretation function for formulae is added.
Definition 29 (Model for L) M = W, R, f is a model for L iff W, R is an associative frame, and f is a function from the set of basic categories to subsets of W . The meaning / semantics / interpetation / denotation of a category like np is the set of signs of that category, while the meaning / semantics / interpretation / denotation of a particular np, say John, is an object in the world (here the person John). 14 I owe the graphical representation of ternary frames to Natasha Kurtonina (p.c.).
58
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
We can extend the function f to an interepretation function for all syntactic categories and strings of categories:
Definition 30 (Interpretation for L) Let B be a set of basic categories and M = W, R, f a model for L. pM A • BM A\BM A/BM X, Y M
= = = = =
f (p) iff p ∈ B {x|∃y ∈ AM ∃z ∈ BM .Rxyz} {x|∀y ∈ AM ∀z.Rzyx → z ∈ BM } {x|∀y ∈ BM ∀z.Rzxy → z ∈ AM } {x|∃y ∈ XM ∃z ∈ Y M .Rxyz}
We say that an object w verifies a formula or sequence X (relative to the model M) iff w is an element of the interepretation of X (relative to M). A sequent X ⇒ A is valid iff it always preserves truth, i.e., whenever an object w verifies the antecedent X in a model M, it also verifies the succedent A relative to M.
Definition 31 (Validity) |= X ⇒ A iff for each model M for L: XM ⊆ AM In Doˇsen, 1992 it is proved that L is sound and complete with respect to the class of ternary frames —the theorems of L are exactly the valid sequents. I only sketch the proof here.
Theorem 7 (Doˇ sen, 1992) L X ⇒ A iff |= X ⇒ A Sketch of proof: Soundness: We prove this via induction over the length of axiomatic derivations. It is obvious that each identity axiom is valid. Likewise, Cut obviously preserves validity. Consider the first associativity rule, α on page 55. Suppose x verifies the left hand side. Then there must be objects y and z such that y verifies A, z verifies B • C, and Rxyz. From the latter fact we infer that there are objects u and v with Rzuv, where u verifies B
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
59
and v verifies C. Since we are talking about associative frames, there must be an object w such that Rxwv and Rwyu. Therefore w verifies A • B, and x verifies (A • B) • C, i.e., x also verifies the right hand side of the axiom. The validity of α−1 is proved analogously. Now suppose the premise of the rule β is valid. This means that in each model: ∀x, y, z.y ∈ A ∧ z ∈ B ∧ Rxyz → x ∈ C Suppose furthermore that w verifies the antecedent of the conclusion, i.e., z ∈ B. It follows immediately from the interpretation of / that z also verifies C/B. By a similar argument it can be shown that γ is also validity preserving. Finally, suppose the premise of β −1 is valid. Then it holds in each model that ∀x ∈ A∀y ∈ B∀z.Rzxy → z ∈ C Simple first order reasoning transforms this into ∀z.∃x ∈ A∃y ∈ BRzxy → z ∈ C which means that the conclusion is also truth preserving in that model. Hence the conclusion is also valid. By a similar argument it can be shown that γ −1 is also validity preserving. These arguments prove that each arrow of the axiomatic system is valid. Since by definition, σ(X) = X, by Theorem 6 on page 55 every theorem of L is valid. Completeness: We start by constructing a canonical model. The set W is the set of types of L, and R is defined as RABC iff L A ⇒ B • C It follows directly from the associativity of the product in L that this is in fact an associative frame. The interpretation function f is defined as f (p) = {A|L A ⇒ p}
60
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Next we show that it holds for all types A and B that A ∈ B iff L A ⇒ B This is proved by induction over the complexity of B. For atomic B it follows directly from the construction of f . So suppose B = C • D. Assume that A ∈ C • D. By the semantics of the product, there are A1 and A2 with A1 ∈ C, A2 ∈ D, and RAA1 A2 . By induction hypthesis, L A1 ⇒ C and L A2 ⇒ D. From the way R is defined it follows that L A ⇒ A1 • A2 . Since the product is upward monotonic in both arguments, it follows that L A ⇒ C • D. Now suppose L A ⇒ C • D. Hence RACD. By induction hypothesis, C ∈ C and D ∈ D. Hence A ∈ C • D. Let B = C/D. Assume that A ∈ C/D. By the semantics of /, if d verifies D and ReAd, then e verifies C. By induction hypothesis, d verifies D. Thus for all e, if ReAD then L e ⇒ C. By the construction of R, it holds that R(A • D)AD. Hence L A • D ⇒ C. It follows directly that L A ⇒ C/D. Conversely, assume that L A ⇒ C/D. Also, assume that for some d and e that d verifies D, and ReAd. Then by induction hypothesis, L d ⇒ D, and by the construction of R, L e ⇒ A•d. Since the product is upward monotonic in both arguments, we infer that L e ⇒ (C/D) • D, and hence L e ⇒ D. From this we conclude that A verifies C/D. The argument for B = C\D is analogous. Finally, suppose that a sequent X ⇒ A is not derivable in L. Then σ(X) ⇒ A is not derivable either. By the above argument, σ(X) verifies X in the canonical model, but it does not verify A. Hence X ⇒ A is not valid. By contraposition it follows that every valid sequent is derivable. The method of interpretation in relational frames is very general, and the above result can be extended in various ways. Here we considered interpretation of a family of binary residuated operators in ternary frames. In general, any family of n-ary residuated operators can be interpreted relative to an n + 1-ary relation. There is a close correspondence between structural rules and frame conditions. The associativity of L corresponds to the associativity conditions on R. The non-associative Lambek calculus is sound and complete with respect to the class of all ternary frames. Requiring that
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
61
Rxyz ↔ Rxzy leads to the class of frames which is described by the nonassociative commutative Lambek calculus etc. Kurtonina, 1995 gives a general perspective on the correspondence between frame conditions and structural rules. L is also complete with respect to specialized sub-classes of the associative ternary frames. For instance, we can consider interpretation in ordered groupoids, where the set of objects is an algebra with a binary associative relation + and a pre-order ≤. Rxyz can then defined as y + z ≤ x. Doˇsen, 1992 also showed completeness of L for ordered groupoids. An even more concrete sub-class of ordered groupoids are language frames. There W is a set of strings, and Rxyz means that x = yz. Pentus, 1994 proved completeness of L in this class of frames. Another option is to identify W with the set of pairs of some set of states S. Types are then interpreted as sets of pairs, i.e., as binary relations. Our ternary relation R is definable as R(ab)(cd)(ef ) iff a = c, d = e, and f = b. This interpretation was proposed in van Benthem, 1991. Kurtonina, 1995 proves completeness of L1—the variant L where sequents with empty antecedents are permitted—in this class of frames (see also Pankrat’ev, 1994 and Andr´eka and Mikul´ as, 1994 for completeness results for L in a similar class of frames).
2.2.9 Generative Capacity and Complexity It was (correctly) conjectured by Chomsky, 1963 that Lambek grammars weakly recognize exactly the context free languages,15 but the problem remained open until the breakthrough of Pentus, 1993, where the Chomsky conjecture is proved. The inclusion of the context free languages in the Lambek recognizable languages can be established using basically the same argument that is used in the corresponding proof for Basic Categorial Grammars in Bar-Hillel et al., 1960 (sketched on page 10). This fact was noted in Cohen, 1967. Crucially, transforming a context free grammar in Greibach Normal Form into a Basic Categorial Grammar in the way described above creates a grammar where all lexical categories are first order formulae, where “first order” is defined as
15 On
p. 413, Chomsky writes “It is not known how Lambek’s system is related to bidirectional categorial systems or context-freee grammars, although one would expect to find that the relation is quite close, perhaps as close as weak equivalence.” Thanks to Makoto Kanazawa (p.c.) for pointing out this reference to me.
62
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Definition 32 1 Every atomic formula is first order. 2 If A is first order and p atomic, then A/p and p\A are first order as well. 3 Nothing else is first order. Furthermore, this construction yields only atomic designated categories. Thus the string recognition task for such a grammar always boils down to the question whether a sequent of the form A1 , . . . , An ⇒ s is derivable, where Ai is a first order formula and s is atomic. So we only have to consider a fragment of the full Categorial type language. It is easy to see that any application of a slash introduction rule in the ND presentation for L leads beyond this fragment, and the same holds for the product rules. Thus such a sequent can only be derived in L by means of the identity axiom scheme, Cut, and the slash elimination rules. These rules are also rules of BCG. So for the first order fragment, derivability in BCG and in L coincide, and it does not make a difference for the language recognized whether a first order grammar is conceived as a BCG or a Lambek grammar. Since every CFG can be transformed into a weakly equivalent BCG which is always first order, it can also be transformed into a weakly equivalent Lambek grammar. Pentus, 1993 showed that the inclusion holds in the other direction as well, i.e., every Lambek grammar can be transformed into a weakly equivalent CFG. Again I restrict myself to a sketch of the proof idea. For a very accessible discussion of the proof, the reader is referred to Buszkowski, 1997. Pentus’ proof crucially relies on the fact that a version of the interpolation theorem holds for L. This was proved in Roorda, 1991. Let us use the notation π(A) (π(X)) to refer to the multiset of atomic formulae occurring in the formula A (the sequence X). So it holds that
Definition 33 π(p) = {p} (p atomic) π(A/B) = π(A\B) = π(A • B) = π(A) ∪ π(B) π(A, X) = π(A) ∪ π(X) Note that ∪ means multiset union here (and ⊆ below multiset inclusion). The interpolation theorem runs as follows:
Theorem 8 (Interpolation Theorem) Let X, Y, Z ⇒ A be an L-derivable sequent. Then there is a formula B with the properties:
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
63
LY ⇒B L X, B, Z ⇒ A π(B) ⊆ π(Y ) ∩ (π(X) ∪ π(Z) ∪ π(A)) This theorem basically says that starting from a derivable sequent X, Y, Z ⇒ A and a subsequence Y of its antecedent, it is possible to represent this sequent as conclusion of a Cut application in such a way that the Cut formula is composed solely from the atoms that are shared between the two premises of the Cut rule. The proof of this theorem is a routine induction over sequent derivations and is omitted here. The interested reader is referred to Roorda, 1991. In the sequel, I will call a formula B with the properties given in the formulation of the interpolation theorem above an interpolant of Y. The crucial step in Pentus’ proof is the binary reduction lemma which strengthens Roorda’s theorem. (By |π(A)| I mean the cardinality of the multiset π(A), which is a measure of the length of A).
Lemma 1 Let A1 , . . . , An ⇒ B be an L-derivable sequent with n ≥ 2. Then there is a k with 1 ≤ k < n and a type C such that C is an interpolant of the sequence Ak , Ak+1 ∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ n → |π(C)| ≤ |π(Ai )|) |π(C)| ≤ |π(B)| In words, this lemma says that you can always pick out a pair of adjacent antecedent formulae in a derivable sequent such that one of their interpolants does not exceed any of the formulae in the initial sequent in length. This interpolant is constructed solely from the atomic formulae occurring in the initial sequent. This follows from the fact that it is an interpolant. Since its length is limited, there are only finitely many formulae which are candidates for interpolation. Now consider an L-derivable sequent X, A, B, Y ⇒ C where A, B are two adjacent antecedent formulae that have the property described in the lemma. This means that there is a formula D with
64
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
L A, B ⇒ D L X, D, Y ⇒ C such that only atoms from X, A, B, Y, C occur in D, and the length of D does not exceed the length of the longest formula in X, A, B, Y, C. Note that the original sequent can be derived from these two sequents by means of a single application of Cut. The new sequent L X, D, Y ⇒ C contains one antecedent formula less that the original sequent. Applying this procedure to this shorter sequent will produce a sequent with two formulae in the antecedent—a binary sequent for short—and a still shorter remaining sequent. After finitely many application of the binary reduction lemma, we thus end up with a number of binary sequents that (a) are L-derivable, (b) are composed solely from atoms that occur in the original sequent, (c) consist only of formulae that do not exceed the length of the longest formula in the original sequent. The original sequent can be derived from these binary sequents by means of the Cut rule only. There are only finitely many sequents with these properties. If we consider all sequents with these properties as axioms and Cut as the only inference rule, the original sequent will be a theorem of this deductive system. For a given Lambek grammar, recognition of a string depends on the L-derivability of sequents whose antecedent formulae are lexical categories and whose succedents are designated categories. There are only finitely many lexical or designated categories for a given Lambek grammar. Thus there is an upper bound for the length of formulae that matter for string recognition of this grammar, and only finitely many atoms are involved. Now let a Lambek Grammar G be given and consider the set of sequents of the form A⇒C A, B ⇒ C which have the following properties: 1 All atoms occurring in A, B, C also occur in G (either in a lexical or in a designated category). 2 The length of A, B, and C does not exceed the length of the longest formula occurring in G. Clearly there are only finitely many axioms with this property, and all sequents that matter for string recognition in G are L-derivable if and
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
65
only if they can be derived from these axioms via the Cut rule. This is an immediate consequence of the binary reduction lemma. (Sequents with just one formula in the antecedent have to be included into the set of axioms to cover cases when we have a lexical assignment a : A such that A ⇒ B for some designated category B.) Now a CFG is essentially a finite set of axioms closed under Cut. So to transform G into a CFG, we have to (a) conceive the above defined axioms as CFG rules, (b) create a novel start symbol S and add the CFG rules A ⇒ S for each designated category A, and (c) add the CFG rules a ⇒ A for each lexical assignment a : A. (Note that I consider A ⇒ B as a notational variant of the conventional CFG rule format B → A). The resulting CFG recognizes exactly the same language as G. The membership problem for context-free languages is known to be solvable in time that is cubic in the length of the string. However, Pentus, 2003 proved that the derivability problem for L is NP-complete in the size of the sequent. This means that the complexity of the parsing problem for Lambek grammars is cubic in the size of the string but NPcomplete in the size of the grammar.
3.
Historical and Bibliographical Remarks
Categorial Grammar was originally conceived in Ajdukiewicz, 1935. It incorporated the distinction between complete and incomplete expressions developed by Frege, Husserl’s concept of “meaning categories”, and Russell’s notion of types. Formally Ajdukiewicz’s system can be considered as the subsystem of Basic Categorial Grammar that only uses the forward slash. Ajdukiewicz’s calculus was extended to the classical bidirectional BCG by Bar-Hillel, 1953. Bar-Hillel et al., 1960 explore the formal properties of BCG. Most importantly, they establish the weak generative equivalence between BCG and context free grammars. Even though the inadequacy of context free grammars for the description of natural language was firmly established only in the 1980s (see Pullum, 1991 regarding the intricate history of this issue), Chomsky’s arguments for the context sensitivity of natural language (see Chomsky, 1957) were widely believed and formal linguists (including Bar-Hillel himself) lost interest in BCG. Joachim Lambek introduced his type logical version of Categorial Grammar in Lambek, 1958 and Lambek, 1961 (the former using an associative and the latter a non-associative logic). Since he presented it as a purely syntactic calculus and its generative capacity was correctly conjectured to be context free by Chomsky in 1963, Lambek style Categorial Grammar did not receive much attention at that time either.
66
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Montague, 1974 uses a Categorial core for his PTQ system. He makes explicit use of the category-to-type correspondence and the general parallelism between syntactic and semantic composition implicit in Categorial Grammar. The close connection between syntax and semantics inspired the work on combinatory extensions of BCG that was systematized in the program of Combinatory Categorial Grammar (started in Ades and Steedman, 1982, comprehensive accounts are Steedman, 1996 and Steedman, 2000). In van Benthem, 1983 it is pointed out that the Lambek calculus as a substructural logic displays a version of the Curry-Howard correspondence, and that this supplies the type logical version of Categorial Grammar with a very natural syntax-semantics interface. All subsequent work in the type logical tradition follows this lead. While van Benthem’s slogan “Curry-Howard terms as semantic recipes” established the general attractiveness of Type Logical Grammar for linguists interested in the syntax-semantics interface, the generative limitations of the Lambek calculus remained an obstacle to comprehensive empirical investigations. Moortgat, 1988 contains a first proposal to extend L with additional logical connectives that improve the linguistic coverage while sticking to Curry-Howard labeling. Morrill, 1990 is the earliest attempt to employ unary modal operators for this purpose. This program is carried through for substantial fragments of natural language in Hepple, 1990 and in Morrill, 1994. The latter is also a good introduction into Type Logical Grammar in general. The weak generative equivalence between Lambek grammars and context free grammars was finally established in Pentus, 1993. The context-freeness of Categorial Grammars based on the non-associative Lambek calculus was shown already in Kandulski, 1988. The usage of multimodality extends the generative capacity beyond the limits of context freeness—at a price. Carpenter, 1999 shows that unrestricted Multimodal Type Logical Grammar has the same generative power as a Turing machine. Tiede, 1999 shows that there are Lambek grammars that are not strongly equivalent to any CFG if we conceive ND proofs in tree format as tree structures. Girard, 1987 proposes proof nets as a novel method in proof theory, next to sequent derivations and natural deduction. In Roorda, 1991 this method is adapted to the Lambek calculus. There it is also shown that the assignment of Curry-Howard terms—and this is tantamount to meaning assembly in TLG—can be conceived as a side effect of checking correctness of proof nets. A good introduction to Categorial proof nets is Lamarche and Retor´e, 1996. De Groote and Retor´e, 1996 show that
Type Logical Grammar: The Framework
67
proof nets can themselves be conceived as semantic recipes, which makes Curry-Howard terms as semantic representations obsolete. Carpenter, 1998 presents an up-to-date application of a slightly extended Lambek style Type Logical Grammar to a vast variety of linguistic phenomena. Moortgat, 1997 summarizes recent developments in the area, with a focus on the usage of multimodal techniques.
Chapter 2 THE PROBLEM OF ANAPHORA
After the introduction into the general framework of TLG given in the previous chapter, I will now turn to the main topic of this book, the treatment of anaphora within this approach to grammar. In the first section I will point out why anaphora poses a problem for a strictly compositional theory of the syntax-semantics interface like Categorial Grammar in the first place. In Section 2.2, I discuss the fact that TLG is an essentially variable free theory. Therefore the standard treatment of anaphora using variables is not viable there. The third section gives an overview of existing Categorial approaches to anaphora from the literature.
1.
Anaphora and Semantic Resource Sensitivity
Anaphora is a challenge to any compositional theory of natural language interpretation. Let us explore this claim in some detail. Recall that the principle of compositionality requires the meaning of a complex expression to be determined by the meaning of its components and the way they are combined. The typed λ-calculus has proved to be a useful glue language to represent the operations on meanings that correspond to possible ways to combine signs. This can formally be stated as follows: For each sign S consisting of n lexemes, in each of its readings there is an expression M of the typed λ-calculus with x1 , . . . , xn occurring each exactly once such that M [N1 /x1 , . . . , Nn /xn ] = S where S represents the meaning of S and Ni the meaning of the i’th lexeme.
69
70
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
The term M can be said to represent the semantic structure of the sign. It is an obvious question to ask whether there are restrictions on the form of these structures in natural language semantics. It is uncontroversial to assume that every λ-operator should bind at least one variable occurrence. This disallows such unnatural meaning recipes like ((λy.x1 )x2 ), which would predict that the meaning of a sign can be completely independent of one of its lexical components. In terms of the hierarchy of resource sensitive logics introduced in the previous chapter, this amounts to the claim that semantic composition in natural language does not use the structural rule of Monotonicity. The Lambek calculus, being a subsystem of Linear Logic, imposes an even stronger constraint on semantic operations. It requires that each λ-operator in M binds at most one variable occurrence. This corresponds to the appealing intuition that each lexical resource is used exactly once. There are prima facie counterexamples to this view, but most of them can nevertheless be handled, as will be illustrated below. To do so, it is crucial to assume that the single-bind condition does not apply to lexical meanings. In the examples that I will discuss, (b) gives the meanings of the lexical items involved, (c) the desired sentence meaning after normalization, and (d) gives the term M in the sense of the definition above.
Reflexives. (1)
a. b. c. d.
John shaves himself. N1 = j, N2 = shave’, N3 =? S = shave’j j M = (λy.x2 yy)x1
At a first glance, the meaning of the subject is used twice here, while the meaning of the reflexive—whatever it may be—doesn’t make any contribution at all. This puzzling situation can be overcome by assigning the meaning λT λy.T yy to the reflexive. (Note that the single-bind constraint does not apply to lexical meanings.) Now the structure of the example gives rise to the meaning recipe M = x3 x2 x1 , which is perfect.1
Coordination Ellipsis. (2)
a. John walks and talks. b. N1 = j’, N2 = walk’, N3 = and’, N4 = talk’
1 This analysis of reflexivization was proposed at various places, see for instance Keenan and Faltz, 1985 and Szabolcsi, 1989.
71
The Problem of Anaphora
c. S = and’(talk’j’)(walk’j’) d. M = (λy.x3 (x4 y)(x2 y))x1 Here again the meaning of the subject occurs twice. As already discussed in the previous chapter, we can handle this by giving and the meaning λxλyλz.(xz) ∧ (yz) This is basically already proposed in Montague’s PTQ system and was probably first generalized to other types in Kayne, 1978.
Other kinds of anaphora and ellipsis. (3)
a. John claims that he will win. b. claim’(win’ j’)j’
Here the representation of the matrix subject occurs twice while the embedded subject completely disappears. Things are similar in the case of VP ellipsis: (4)
a. John walks, and Bill does, too. b. and’(walk’b’)(walk’j’)
Apparently the whole VP of the first conjunct gets recycled here. There are several ways to deal with these constructions. The burden of multiplying meanings could be transferred to the lexical semantics of the pronoun he in (3), and similarly to the auxiliary does in (4). In the case of bound anaphors, this has been proposed by Szabolcsi, 1989 and Dalrymple et al., 1997. However, these systems only capture pronouns that are syntactically bound. Since ellipsis phenomena are largely identical within one sentence and across sentence boundaries—as can be seen in (5)—syntactic binding is unlikely to extend to ellipsis. (5)
John walks. Bill does, too.
A more traditional alternative approach assumes that the output of meaning composition is an underspecified representation where each lexical resource is used exactly once. The final meaning is constructed by resolving the underspecification, thereby possibly identifying several subexpressions. Anaphoric expressions could be interpreted as free variables that get instantiated by means of a pragmatic resolution mechanism that takes place after meaning composition is completed. This is the folklore approach to the interpretation of coreferential pronouns. It has also been applied to ellipsis. A paradigmatic example of this idea is Dalrymple et al., 1991, where the compositional meaning of (4) is
72
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
supposed to be and’(P b’)(walk’j’), with P representing the meaning of does (,too). This parameter is, in a final step, pinned down to the meaning it is supposed to have by means of a system of term equations. This approach does not easily extend to bound pronouns though. Consider a variant of (3) where the antecedent is a quantifier rather than a name. (6)
a. Everybody claims that he will win. b. every’λx.claim’(win’x)x
If we assume that the pronoun him is translated as a free variable x, we are forced to assume that semantic composition uses a variable binding device since x is bound in the term representing the meaning of the whole sentence. Categorial grammars are essentially variable free theories of grammar though. This does not exclude the usage of variables as semantic parameters, but it does exclude variable binding as a licit semantic operation. This issue will be taken up in the next section. If variable binding is not an option, Categorial approaches to anaphora either have to locate the source of meaning multiplication in the lexicon as discussed above, or they have to assume that the semantic operations that are used in natural language go beyond the single-bind fragment of the λ-calculus, i.e., beyond the resource regime of Linear Logic. Both options have been proposed in the Categorial literature, and I will briefly review representatives of both strategies. In the subsequent chapters, I will present my own proposal that belongs to the second family of approaches.
2.
Variables in TLG
As alluded to above, Lambek grammars—as well as all other Categorial formalisms discussed here—are variable free theories of grammar. In this section I will discuss what this means and which consequences arise from this for the theory of meaning composition. Let us briefly review which role variables play in semantic theories based on transformational syntax, as for instance in Heim and Kratzer, 1998. Consider a relative clause construction like (7)
(book) which John liked
The Logical Form of this clause would come out as
73
The Problem of Anaphora CP
(8) which
λvi
C’ IP
C
I’
NP John
I
VP V
ti
liked
Ignoring tense, the IP John likes ti denotes the truth value 1 in a model M under an assignment function g iff John likes g(i) in M . So its denotation properly depends on the assignment function g. The sister constituent of the operator which, on the other hand, denotes the set of objects that are liked by John in M , i.e., it does not depend on g. In other words, while the index i is free in IP—the denotation of IP depends on the value of i under g, it is bound further up in the tree— the denotations of superconstituents of IP do not depend on i in this way. This means that meanings cannot be identified with plain denotations if the computation of meanings is supposed to be compositional. To see why, have a look at the semantic clause for λ-abstraction:
(9)
M λvi N M g = {a, N g[vi →a] |a ∈ E}
(Here I assume vi to be of type e and E to be the domain of individuals). The denotation of λvi N under g does not just depend on the denotation of N under g, but also on N ’s denotation under different assignment functions. So meaning composition is only compositional if we identify meanings with functions from assignment functions to denotations. Let us compare this to the composition of meanings in Type Logical Grammar. At a first glance, the picture seems to be similar. Apart from the different labels at the nodes and the absence of the phonetically empty functional categories “C” and “I”, the natural deduction derivation tree for this relative clause is virtually identical to the GB-style derivation.
74
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
(10) liked John john’ : np which λQλP λx.P x ∧ Qx (n\n)/(s/np)
lex
lex
like’ : (np\s)/np
lex
like’x : np\s
like’xjohn’ : s λxlike’xjohn’ : s/np
λP λx.P x ∧ like’xjohn’ : n\n
x : np
1 /E
\E
/I, 1 /E
However, the theoretical status of these two trees is entirely different. In GB and related formalisms, a syntax tree represents the internal syntactic structure of a sign, and meaning assignment is defined via recursion over such tree structures. In TLG, on the other hand, the corresponding tree depicts two kinds of facts: 1 The sequent x : (n\n)/(s/np), y : np, z : (np\s)/np ⇒ x(λw.zwy) : n\n is derivable in the Lambek calculus L, and 2 the lexicon relates the form “which” to the category (n\n)/(s/np) and the meaning λQλP λx.P x ∧ Qx, and likewise for the other lexical items involved. The tree thus represents the structure of a proof, not the structure of a sign. For Type Logical Grammar as a theory of grammar, it is inessential how we prove the derivability of sequents, so the proof theory is strictly speaking not part of our linguistic theory. To use a metaphor, the usage of free variables to mark hypotheses in natural deduction proofs has the same theoretical status as the subscripts that some people use when they do complicated additions on paper (illustrated in Figure 2.1 on the next page). These subscripts are artefacts of a certain algorithm to carry out an addition, and they are not part of number theory. Likewise, natural deduction proof trees, and especially variables marking hypotheses, are artefacts of a certain proof theory rather than ingredients of the underlying linguistic theory. The principle of compositionality requires that the meaning of a complex expression is determined from the meanings of its components and the way they are combined. In TLG, every derivable sequent represents a “syntactic rule”, i.e., a licit way to combine signs to form a possibly larger sign. Curry-Howard labeling supplies the corresponding
75
The Problem of Anaphora
9 + 5 +2 61 2 1
Figure 2.1.
8 5 51 9
7 5 4 6
Calculation using subscripts
semantic operation. So strictly speaking there are infinitely many syntactic operations in TLG. Proof theoretic rules like natural deduction rules or sequent rules are not rules to combine resources, but they have the status of GPSG’s meta-rules (cf. Gazdar et al., 1985): They transform syntactic rules into new syntactic rules.2 The set of the TLG rules is the closure of the identity map under the sequent rules (or, alternatively, the natural deduction rules) of the Lambek calculus. As a consequence, it is literally impossible to design a non-compositional meaning assignment to a Lambek grammar, provided Curry-Howard labels are interpreted as meaning recipes. Despite appearance to the contrary, meaning assignment via CurryHoward labeling is essentially variable free. To see why, observe that the only variables that occur free in a Curry-Howard term on the succedent side of a derivable sequent are those that are used as labels of the antecedent formulae. These variables are just place holders for lexical meanings. As a consequence, the meaning of a complex expression will never depend on the assignment function (provided the lexical meanings don’t). In terms of the syntax of λ-terms, this means that there are no semantic operations that turn a free variable occurrence into a bound one. Using the λ-calculus as a semantic glue language still requires the usage of assignment functions in intermediate steps that lead to the computation of complex meanings. However, due to compositionality, semantic representations are not essential for the theory and can in principle be dispensed with. We could augment the inference rules of L with
2 Pentus’ (1993) binary reduction lemma (which is discussed in the previous chapter in connection with the weak generative capacity of Lambek grammars) entails that for a given Lambek grammar, a finite number of unary and binary rules is sufficient. In practice a few instances of the standard combinators like type lifting, function composition and the Geach rule will do. Nonetheless, TLG in general comprises infinitely many syntactic rules.
76
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
direct operations on meanings, or we could use a variable free glue language like combinatory logic instead. There are two reasons why a variable free design of meaning assignment is ceteris paribus to be preferred. First, the meanings that such a theory assigns to linguistic expressions are simpler objects than their counterparts in an equivalent theory using variables. In the latter case, meanings are always functions from assignment functions into intuitive denotations, and this additional information is mostly redundant. Second, using variables means managing variable names. The standard way of doing this is to augment certain linguistic expressions with additional information like referential indices. This introduces a non-compositional aspect into the theory since the linguistic input simply does not contain this information. Even theories that do without such devices—like DRT (in the version of Kamp and Reyle, 1993)—assume that the linguistic input has to be disambiguated with respect to variable binding and coreference before interpretation is possible. It seems more natural to treat such ambiguities as structural ambiguities. In a variable free theory, this is the obvious route to take. The issue of variable freeness is discussed in great detail in Jacobson, 1996b, Jacobson, 1999, and Jacobson, 2000.
3.
Previous Categorial Approaches to Anaphora
As mentioned above, Lambek grammars display a Linear resource management regime for semantic composition: every lexical meaning can be used exactly once in the derivation of complex meanings. There are basically two strategies to cope with the fact that anaphora phenomena in natural language do involve a re-use of resources. We can locate the resource multiplicative force in the semantics of the lexical entries that trigger it—such as anaphoric pronouns, reflexives, or coordination particles. Alternatively, one might assume that resource multiplication is in fact part of the grammatical machinery of natural language. Choosing the latter option comes down to admitting a limited use of the structural rule of Contraction in syntax. Both options have been investigated in the literature, and in the remainder of this chapter, I will briefly discuss representatives of both paradigms.
3.1
Resource Multiplication in the Lexicon
3.1.1 Szabolcsi (1989) The first attempt to integrate anaphora resolution into the Categorial machinery is due to Anna Szabolcsi (Szabolcsi, 1989; see also Szabolcsi, 1992). Her proposal is mainly concerned with the behavior of reflexive pronouns, as in
77
The Problem of Anaphora
(11)
John likes himself.
Reflexive pronouns have three properties that an adequate theory should strive to cover: 1 They require a binder. 2 The binder must be syntactically more prominent than the reflexive itself. 3 The binder must be part of the same domain of locality. There is some dispute in the literature as to how the notions of “prominence” and “locality” should be exactly defined. I leave this open here.3 Szabolcsi assumes that the meaning of the reflexive pronoun is essentially an argument reducer, viz. it is a function that takes a binary relation as argument and returns the diagonal of this relation. Formally, the meaning of himself thus comes out as (12)
λRx.Rxx
Projected into syntax, this means that himself is a functor that consumes a transitive verb and produces a VP. Its syntactic category is therefore (13)
((np\s)/np)\np\s
It is noteworthy that this category is also the result of applying the combinator T< to the base category np. So Szabolcsi correctly predicts that there are no contexts where a reflexive can occur but a name can’t.4 Given this, the derivation of (11) is straightforward. It only involves function application: likes John john’ np
lex
lex
himself λRx.Rxx ((np\s)/np)\np\s
like’ (np\s)/np
λx.like’xx np\s
lex A<
A>
like’john’john’ s 3 In the Binding Theory of Chomsky, 1981, “prominence” would be identified with c-command and the locality domain with the smallest structure containing a subject. 4 As far as syntax is concerned; Binding Principle C rules out a certain reading of (i), not the sentence per se (i) John likes John.
78
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
It is obvious that this treatment of reflexives covers the first generalization given above. The reflexive is a higher order functor that can only be applied to an argument that has an open argument slot itself. So strictly speaking the reflexive is not directly bound by the subject in the derivation above but by the subject slot of the verb. This is a desired result, given that reflexives are also licit in constructions where there is no overt local binder: (14)
John tried to enjoy himself.
Here himself would be “bound” by the subject slot of enjoy, which in turn will be connected to the matrix subject John via the lexical semantics of the matrix verb. At first glance, nothing excludes the existence of a reflexive in nominative which occupies the subject position and is bound by the object. So it seems to be logically possible to assume a reflexive heself with the lexical entry (15a) which would render (15b) grammatical and assign it the meaning (15c). (15)
a. heself – λRx.Rxx : s/np/((np\s)/np) b. Heself loves everyone. c. ∀x(love’xx)
Szabolcsi excludes this possibility by the assumption that the category of a reflexive should always be obtainable from the category np via (possibly repeated) application of combinators. For accusative reflexives, this can be achieved by using backward type lifting. For the nominative reflexive, we would need forward type lifting and the Geach rule: np ⇒T> s/(np\s) ⇒Geach s/np/((np\s)/np) Szabolcsi assumes that the Geach rule is not part of the grammar of English. So her explanation of the prominence condition rests on assumptions on the inventory of combinators that are not easily reproduced in a type logical setting. Like any theory that handles the c-command constraint on reflexive binding correctly, Szabolcsi’s theory has problems coping with double object constructions as in (16), where the prominence hierarchy is apparently inverse to the intuitive c-command relation. (16)
a. *John introduced herself to Mary. b. John introduced Mary to herself.
This problem can be overcome if some notion of wrapping is invoked. Intuitively, the verb in (16) first combines with the prepositional object and forms a discontinuous constituent, which in turn is “wrapped”
79
The Problem of Anaphora
around the direct object to form a VP. Under this perspective, the direct object c-commands the prepositional object. There is no obvious way though to handle the locality constraint on reflexive binding correctly if the Categorial machinery comprises the combinator B (function composition, which roughly corresponds to associativity in a type logical system). So an example like (17) can get a derivation like Figure 2.2, which yields a reading where the matrix subject binds a reflexive in an embedded clause. (17)
Johni thinks Mary likes himselfi . M ary
lex
mary’ np thinks think’ (np\s)/s John
lex
lex
λx.xmary’ s/(np\s)
T>
likes like’ (np\s)/np
λy.like’ymary’ s/np
λy.think’(like’ymary’) (np\s)/np
lex B>
B>
λy.think’(like’ymary’)y np\s
john’ np
himself λRx.Rxx ((np\s)/np)\np\s
lex A<
A<
think’(like’john’mary’)john’ s
Figure 2.2.
Derivation of (17)
This need not be a disadvantage. Szabolcsi speculates that the locality constraint is not part of the grammar of anaphors but rather a processing effect. Grammar thus does not distinguish between reflexives and pronouns, and the above derivation represents the sentence (18)
Johni thinks Mary likes himi .
Quite generally, Szabolcsi proposes to treat bound pronouns in a manner similar to reflexives. Of course neither a uniform category assignment nor a uniform meaning will cover all instances of bound pronouns. For instance, she proposes to assign the pronoun he in (19a) the lexical entry (19b). (19)
a. Everybody thought he saw Mary. b. he – λxyz.y(xz)z : (((np\s)/s)\np\s)/(np\s)
80
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
In words, he is treated as a functor here that consumes a verb requiring a sentential object to its left and a VP to its right to produce a VP, thereby identifying the subject slots of the matrix verb and of the embedded VP. Analogously, the accusative pronoun him will receive the following lexical entry (which makes him synonymous with he): (20)
him – λxyz.y(xz)z : (s/np)\((np\s)/s)\(np\s)
The categories of bound pronouns may be considered pied-piped versions of ordinary NPs. Nominative NPs and accusative NPs are assigned the categories s/(np\s) and (s/np)\s respectively. The categories for pronouns are analogous, except for the fact that the goal category s is lifted to the category ((np\s)/s)\(np\s), i.e., the category of an object clause. Syntactically this guarantees that a clause containing a bound pronoun is always embedded into a matrix clause, while the semantics ensures binding by some superordinated subject. So while Chomsky’s Binding Principle A remains unaccounted for, Principle B is built into the lexical entry of pronouns. As the readers may convince themselves, this approach requires a considerable proliferation of lexical entries for pronouns if binding from non-subject positions should be taken into account. Szabolcsi assumes that they are all instances of a general combinatory scheme, in a way similar to the polymorphic treatment of coordination discussed in the previous chapter. All instances of this scheme obey the command constraint for similar reasons as the simple reflexive pronoun discussed above. This leads to an empirical and a conceptual disadvantage. First, the restriction of bound pronouns to configurations where they are c-commanded by their binder (proposed in Reinhart, 1983) is empirically inadequate in many cases. The following example (from Gawron and Peters, 1990) illustrates this. (21)
The soldiers turned some citizens in [each state]i over to itsi governor.
Other counterexamples to this generalization can be produced at will. This issue will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter 4. Furthermore, Szabolcsi follows Reinhart in assuming that pronoun binding is fundamentally different from anaphoric coreference. This is also empirically questionable. The following example (again taken from Gawron and Peters, 1990) indicates this. (22)
Every student read his paper before the teacher did.
The sentence has a reading where every student x read x’s paper before the teacher read x’s paper. In other words, the pronoun his is bound
The Problem of Anaphora
81
here but nevertheless gives rise to a strict reading under ellipsis. This is unexpected if bound pronouns are really nothing but argument reducers semantically. Quite independently from this fact, a Reinhart-Szabolcsi style approach considers the coreference in examples like (23) to be fundamentally different from instances of pronoun binding. (23)
The man who asked for John met him.
From the perspective of semantic resource management, there is no fundamental difference between binding and coreference. While binding involves binding of multiple variable occurrences by one λ-operator, coreference comes down to the multiple use of one lexical resource. Both phenomena are instances of a Relevant (as opposed to Linear) resource management regime, i.e., they require access to a (lexically controlled) application of Contraction. Given that these conceptually similar phenomena—binding and coreference—are not overtly distinguished in natural language, it seems somewhat artificial to separate them in linguistic theory.
3.1.2 Discontinuity Szabolcsi’s approach to pronoun binding leads to a proliferation of lexical entries since every different structural configuration in which the pronoun and its binder may occur require a separate lexical specification. It is thus desirable to somehow generalize this approach. The proposals of Moortgat, 1996a and Morrill, 2000 can be seen as attempts to do this. While Szabolcsi only mentions the usage of a “wrap” operation in passing, both Moortgat and Morrill treat discontinuity as an essential aspect of anaphora. A detailed discussion of the type logical implementation of discontinuity would go beyond the scope of this work, so I restrict myself to an illustration of the basic intuitions. Moortgat, 1996a. I start with the discussion of Moortgat’s proposal. While the Lambek calculus only allows reasoning over continuous strings, certain linguistic phenomena are best described as invoking operations that address a string and a non-peripheral substring of it. Quantifier scope is an obvious case in point. In a sentence like (24)
John introduced everyone to Mary.
the quantifier everyone occupies the structural position of an np, but its meaning operates over the whole sentence. Since syntactic and semantic composition cannot be divorced in TLG, the syntactic placement of
82
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR x : q(A, B, C) .. . .. .
i y:A .. .
.. . .. .
M :B
x:A qI λy.yx : q(A, B, B)
qE, i x(λyM ) : C Figure 2.3.
Natural Deduction rules for q
everyone thus has to involve the sentence as a whole as well. Intuitively, one might say that everyone is an operator that transforms the discontinuous string John introduced to Mary into the continuous string in (24). So the argument of everyone would be an s which contains an np gap. Arguably, the meaning of this object should be a function from np denotations to s denotations, so filling the np gap with an np in syntax amounts to function application in semantics. The meaning of everyone is thus a function from such functions to s denotations, i.e., a quantifier. Moortgat suggests a three place type constructor “q” to describe this behavior. Everyone is assigned the category q(np, s, s). This means that everyone can replace an np inside an s, and the result of this replacement will again be an s. Generally, a sign α has category q(A, B, C) iff replacing an item of category A inside a sign of category B by α results in a sign of category C. That the categories B and C need not be identical is illustrated by pied piping phenomena. A wh-NP like which man transforms an ordinary PP into a prepositional wh-phrase if it replaces a sub-NP: (25)
a. to a friend of John ; pp[−wh] b. to a friend of which man ; pp[+wh] c. which man ; q(np, pp[−wh], pp[+wh])
This intuitive content of the category q(A, B, C) is formally covered by the natural deduction rules in tree format in Figure 2.3 that extend the simple Lambek calculus L.5 The elimination rule roughly says the following: to use a premise of type q(A, B, C), replace it hypothetically by a premise of type A and use this together with the surrounding material to derive the conclusion B. 5 It
should be remarked that this formalization is incomplete. While the sequent q(np, s, s) ⇒ q(np, np\s, np\s)
is intuitively valid, it is not derivable.
The Problem of Anaphora
83
If you succeed, you can discharge the hypothesis and replace it by the original q(A, B, C), thereby changing the root node of the whole derivation from B to C. In terms of Curry-Howard labels, this rule amounts to λ-abstraction over the hypothetical A, followed by applying the label of q(A, B, C) to the resulting abstract.6 Since this deduction achieves nonlocal binding without involving movement, the q-constructor is dubbed “in situ binder”. The introduction rule is a generalization of the combinatory type lifting rule. It says that every A can (trivially) occupy an A-position inside a larger constituent of any arbitrary type B. The semantic type corresponding to the in situ binder is defined by the equation τ (q(A, B, C)) = τ (A), τ (B), τ (C) The proof theoretic properties as well as the linguistic applications of the in situ binder will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. For the time being, I restrict attention to Moortgat’s proposal to apply q to the analysis of bound pronouns. He focuses on subject oriented reflexives as in (26)
a. John likes himself. b. John introduced himself to Mary. c. John dedicated the book to himself.
Szabolci’s theory of reflexives is confined to cases where the reflexive is the direct object. As (26b) shows, such a treatment does not cover all cases of reflexivization since reflexive pronouns are not confined to the direct object position.7 The correct generalization of her proposal seems to be that a subject oriented reflexive always occupies an np position inside a VP and identifies the argument slot it occupies with the subject of this VP. This behavior is correctly covered by the lexical entry (27)
himself – λRx.Rxx : q(np, np\s, np\s)
Note that Moortgat assumes the same meaning for the reflexive as Szabolcsi. The in situ binder is not sensitive to its linear position inside its scope. So the derivations for (26a) and (b) are completely analogous. They are given in Figures 2.4 on the following page, and 2.5 on the next page, respectively. 6 So
the hypothesis A, together with its Curry-Howard label, plays a similar role here as the storage in Cooper’s 1983 theory of quantifier scope. 7 Szabolcsi handles such cases by invoking “simulated wrapping”. To this end, she utilizes the powerful combinator of crossed function composition.
84
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
himself likes
lex
y np
like’ (np\s)/np John
like’y np\s
lex
λx.like’xx np\s
john’ np
lex
λRx.Rxx q(np, np\s, np\s)
1
/E
qE, 1 \E
like’john’john’ s Figure 2.4.
Derivation for (26a)
himself introduced
lex
λRx.Rxx q(np, np\s, np\s) y np
introduce’ (np\s)/pp/np
lex to
1
/E
to’ pp/np
introduce’y (np\s)/pp John john’ np
M ary mary’ np
to’mary’ pp introduce’y(to’mary’) np\s
lex
lex
λx.introduce’x(to’mary’)x np\s
lex /E
/E
qE, 1 \E
introduce’john’(to’mary’)john’ s Figure 2.5.
Derivation for (26b)
Like Szabolcsi’s proposal, Moortgat’s type assignment to reflexives does not predict the locality constraint on binding. So we may apply the same treatment to bound pronouns like he or him to cover cases like (28)
a. Everyone believes that he has a solution. b. Everyone believes that John will talk to him.
Morrill 2000. While Moortgat’s account abstracts over irrelevant information pertaining to the linear position of the anaphoric element
The Problem of Anaphora
85
itself, it is still limited in scope. Binders or antecedents are restricted to c-commanding subjects, and there is no obvious way this problem could be overcome just by using the in situ binder. Morrill, 2000 therefore invokes powerful operations of “wrap” and “secondary wrap” that abstract both over the particular position of the anaphoric element and the position of its antecedent. While Moortgat’s in situ binder operates in a global fashion, wrapping decomposes discontinuity into more elementary operations. The product operator • of the Lambek calculus models string concatenation. Morrill (drawing on previous work of Bach, 1979, Versmissen, 1991, Solias, 1992, Morrill and Solias, 1993, Morrill, 1994, Morrill, 1995, and Morrill and Merenciano, 1996) extends L with a binary operator that models wrapping of a discontinuous string around a continuous string. Its first argument is to be thought of as a discontinuous string (i.e., a pair of strings) and its second argument as a simple string. Combining them via yields the result of infixing the second argument into the split point of the first argument, so we end up with a continuous string. The wrapping operator is a product operator like the concatenative product •, and thus left and right implications can be defined by means of left and right residuation analogously to the standard slashes \ and /. So the inventory of type forming connectives is extended with two more binary operators ↑ and ↓, which obey the residuation laws B ↓ A → C iff A → B C iff A ↑ C → B A sign a has category B ↓ A iff wrapping a discontinuous constituent of category B around a yields a continuous constituent of category A. Conversely, sign a has category A ↑ C iff it is a discontinuous constituent which yields a continuous constituent of category A if it is wrapped around a sign of category C. The category-to-type correspondence for the discontinuity operators is similar to that of the standard Lambek connectives. The discontinuous product corresponds to pair formation, while the implications ↑ and ↓ create function spaces. So we have
1 τ (A B) = τ (A) ∧ τ (B)
2 τ (A ↑ B) = τ (B ↓ A) = τ (B), τ (A)
86
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
These operators allow the definition of Moortgat’s q-operator as a combination of left residuation and right residuation of the wrapping operation:8 . q(A, B, C) = (B ↑ A) ↓ C So Moortgat’s analysis of subject oriented reflexives and pronouns can be reproduced in a wrapping analysis by assigning he and him(self ) the lexical entry (29)
λRx.Rxx : ((np\s) ↑ np) ↓ (np\s)
To generalize this analysis to binding from non-subject positions, Morrill proposes to generalize the notion of wrapping. Informally his idea runs a follows. Consider a sentence like (30)
Mary convinced everyonei that hei should participate.
Let us represent the meaning of Mary convinced x that y should participate as ϕ(y, x). The meaning of (30) is thus ∀xϕ(x, x). According to Morrill’s analysis, (30) is derived from a tripartite discontinuous constituent (31)
Mary convinced
that
should participate.
which contains two split points—to be occupied by NPs—and has the semantics λxyϕ(y, x). A pronoun like he still has the semantic value of an argument reducer (λRx.Rxx), but syntactically it is now infixed into the second split point of such a tripartite constituent, yielding a bipartite discontinuous constituent like (32). Note that a pronoun can only be infixed into the second split point of a tripartite constituent, thus Morrill’s system predicts that a pronoun always follows its antecedent. (32)
Mary convinced
that he should participate.
The semantic value of (32) is obtained by applying the meaning of the pronoun to the meaning of (31). This gives us λxϕ(x, x). The quantifier everyone is treated in a Moortgat style fashion, i.e., it has category (s ↑ np) ↓ s and meaning λP ∀xP x. Infixing it into (32) yields (30) and the desired meaning ∀xϕ(x, x). 8 As pointed out in Moortgat, 1996b, a decomposition of q in terms of wrapping only works if the default product is associative. Decomposition of q in a non-associative environment requires more powerful multimodal techniques.
The Problem of Anaphora
87
This intuitive idea is formalized by extending the Lambek calculus plus ordinary wrapping with a third product operator 2 . A 2 B is to be understood as combining a tripartite discontinuous constituent A with a continuous constituent B by infixing B into the second split point of A. The result is thus a bipartite discontinuous constituent. Like the concatenative product and the ordinary wrap product , this “secondary wrap” product comes with two implications ↓2 and ↑2 which are related to 2 via the residuation laws B ↓2 A → C iff A → B 2 C iff A ↑2 C → B So a sign has category B ↓2 A iff infixing it into the second split point of a tripartite constituent of category B yields a bipartite constituent of category A. Likewise, a sign has category A ↑2 C iff it is a tripartite constituent which yields a bipartite sign of category A if you infix a continuous sign of category C at its second split point. Semantic type assignment for secondary wrap categories is analogous to the other two families of type forming connectives. We have 1 τ (A 2 B) = τ (A) ∧ τ (B) 2 τ (A ↑2 B) = τ (B ↓2 A) = τ (B), τ (A) The communication between the three families of logical connectives is established by a natural deduction calculus that uses prosodic labeling (next to semantic Curry-Howard labeling). The units of the deductive system are triples consisting of a prosodic label, a semantic label and a category. I write them as p − s : c, where p and s are prosodic and semantic labels respectively, and c is a category. Intuitively, a prosodic term represents the form component of a sign, just as Curry-Howard labels represent the semantic component. Since we are dealing with three sorts of signs—continuous constituents, bipartite and tripartite discontinuous constituents—prosodic labels are categorized as belonging to the sorts T 1 , T 2 or T 3 . There are operations ( , ) and ( , , ) that form bipartite and tripartite discontinuous terms from continuous ones, and there is a term operation · representing concatenation. Furthermore I assume a term constant ε representing the empty string. So the set T of prosodic terms over a set of atomic prosodic terms is defined as in the following definition, where greek lower case letter α, β, γ are used as meta-variables over terms from the sort T 1 .
Definition 34 (Prosodic terms) Let a countably infinite set AT of atomic prosodic terms be given. The sets T 1 , T 2 , T 3 , T are the smallest sets such that
88
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
1 AT ∪ {ε} ⊆ T 1 2 If α, β ∈ T 1 , α · β ∈ T 1 3 If α, β ∈ T 1 , (α, β) ∈ T 2 4 If α, β, γ ∈ T 1 , (α, β, γ) ∈ T 3 5 T = T1 ∪ T2 ∪ T3 Furthermore there is an equivalence relation ≡ over terms which ensures that concatenation is associative and that the empty string is an identity element for concatenation.
Definition 35 ≡ is the smallest equivalence relation over T such that 1 (α · β) · γ ≡ α · (β · γ) 2 ε·α≡α≡α·ε 3 If α1 ≡ α2 , β1 ≡ β2 , and γ1 ≡ γ2 , then α1 · β1 ≡ α2 · β2 , (α1 , β1 ) ≡ (α2 , β2 ), and (α1 , β1 , γ1 ) ≡ (α2 , β2 , γ2 ) The natural deduction presentation of the extension of L with wrap and secondary wrap consists of inference rules over prosodically and semantically labeled formulae (see Figure 3.1.20 on the facing page). For simplicity I restrict myself to the implicational fragment, since the product rules are not used in the linguistic applications to follow. I will use lowercase Greek letters α, β, γ, ... as metavariables over terms from T 1 , and boldface lowercase Latin letters a1 , a2 , b, ... as metavariables for atomic terms. I start with the labeled versions of the rules for the Lambek slashes. The slash elimination rules correspond to simple concatenation on the level of prosodic terms. Slash introduction involves hypothetical reasoning. The hypothetical premise comes with an atomic prosodic label that is discharged with the introduction rule. The logical rules for ↓, ↑, ↓2 , and ↑2 are similar except for the fact that they perform a wrap operation on the prosodic labels rather than plain concatenation. In the prosodically and semantically labeled system, lexical entries can in fact be identified with labeled formulae. This suggests a modified notion of string recognition—a string is recognized iff it is the prosodic label of the conclusion of a derivation that only uses lexical entries as premises. Semantic labeling still supplies the semantic composition as a side effect.
89
The Problem of Anaphora a−x:A .. .
i
.. . .. .
.. . .. .
i
a−x:A .. .
a − x : A/B
i
.. . (α1 , α2 ) − x : A
↓ I, i
i a−x:A .. . γ1 · a · γ2 − M : B
.. . γ−y :A↓B
α1 · γ · α2 − (yx) : B
.. . (γ 1 , γ 2 ) − x : B ↑ A
(γ 1 , γ 2 ) − λxM : B ↑ A (a1 , a2 , a3 ) − x : A .. . (a1 , a2 · γ · a3 ) − M : B γ − λxM : A ↓2 B
↑ I, i i
(γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) − λxM : B ↑2 A
.. . γ − y : A ↓2 B
(α1 , α2 · γ · α3 ) − (yx) : B
.. . (γ 1 , γ 2 , γ 3 ) − x : B ↑2 A ↑2 I, i
.. . α−y :A
γ 1 · α · γ 2 − (xy) : B
.. . (α1 , α2 , α3 ) − x : A
↓2 I, i
i a−x:A .. . (γ 1 , γ 2 · a · γ 3 ) − M : B
Figure 2.6.
/E
/I, i
α − λxM : B/A
γ − λxM : A ↓ B
b−y :B
a · b − (xy) : A
α·a−M :B
(a1 , a2 ) − x : A .. . a1 · γ · a 2 − M : B
\E
\I, i
α − λxM : A\B .. . .. .
b − y : A\B
a · b − (yx) : B
a·α−M :B
.. . .. .
a−x:A
.. . α−y :A
(γ 1 , γ 2 · α · γ 3 ) − (xy) : B
↓E
↑E
↓2 E
↑2 E
Natural deduction rules with prosodic labels
Let us return to the issue of anaphora. As said before, Morrill basically treats a pronoun like he (as well as its accusative form him and the reflexive himself ) as an operator that infixes itself into the second split point of a tripartite discontinuous string. Thus it has a category of the form A ↓2 B. Its argument is a clause that contains two np gaps.
90
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
A clause with one np gap has category s ↑ np, thus a clause with two such gaps has category (s ↑ np) ↑2 np. The result of infixing he into the second gap yields a clause with one np gap. So the syntactic category comes out as ((s ↑ np) ↑2 np) ↓2 (s ↑ np). As in the Szabolcsi/Moortgat approach, the meaning of a pronoun is just the diagonalization operator, so the full (preliminary) lexical entry for he is (33)
he/him/himself − λRx.Rxx : ((s ↑ np) ↑2 np) ↓2 (s ↑ np)
This lexical entry still disregards locality constraints on the distribution of reflexive and personal pronouns. Simplifying somewhat, the antecedent of a personal pronoun must not be contained in the same local clause as the pronoun itself. Consider the example (34)
John thinks that Bill knows him.
Here only the matrix subject John is a licit antecedent of the pronoun him. The wrapping mechanism is fine grained enough to cover this generalization. We may consider him as an operator that replaces an np inside its local clause and turns this clause into a clause that needs an np antecedent. In analogy to the all-purpose pronoun category given above, a clause that needs an np antecedent (in the context of a matrix clause) has category ((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np). A VP which constitutes such an “anaphoric” clause then has category np\(((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np)). An accusative pronoun like him is an operator that infixes itself into an np gap of an ordinary VP and returns an anaphoric VP. So a more informed lexical entry for him is (35)
him − λxyzw.z(xwy)w : ((np\s) ↑ np) ↓ (np\((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np))
The nominative version he is restricted to subject positions. This means that it combines with an ordinary VP to form an anaphoric clause. This leads to the lexical entry (36)
he − λxyz.y(xz)z : (((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np))/(np\s)
Note that in both entries, one λ-operator binds two variable occurrences, so the job of meaning duplication is done by the lexical entries here, as in Szabolcsi’s and Moortgat’s approach. With these lexical entries in hand, we can derive bound readings for constructions where the binder does not c-command the pronoun, as in (37)
a. Mary convinced everyone that he should participate. b. Mary convinced everyone that the teacher likes him.
lex
M ary mary np
lex
that
1 a np
/E
convinced · a (np\s)/cp
(mary · convinced, that · b) s ↑ np (mary · convinced, that · b · ε) s ↑ np (mary · convinced, that, ε) (s ↑ np) ↑2 s
2 b s
that · b cp
convinced · a · that · b np\s
mary · convinced · a · that · b s
lex
that cp/s
The Problem of Anaphora
convinced convinced (np\s)/cp/np
/E
/E
\E
↑ I, 1 ≡ ↑2 I, 2
he
lex
should participate sh p np\s
he (((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np))/(np\s) he · sh p ((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np)
(mary · convinced, that · he · sh p · ε) s ↑ np (mary · convinced, that · he · sh p) s ↑ np
≡
everyone everyone (s ↑ np) ↓ s
lex ↓E
91
Derivation of (37a)
/E
↓2 E
mary · convinced · everyone · that · he · sh p s
Figure 2.7.
lex
92
convinced
lex
convinced (np\s)/cp/np
mary np
lex
/E
convinced · a (np\s)/cp
mary · convinced · a · that · b · ε s (mary · convinced, that · b · ε) s ↑ np (mary · convinced, that, ε) (s ↑ np) ↑2 s
≡ ↑ I, 1 ↑2 I, 2
knows
2 b s
that · b cp
convinced · a · that · b np\s
mary · convinced · a · that · b s
lex
that cp/s
lex
knows (np\s)/np
/E
knows · c np\s
/E
knows · c · ε np\s
/E the the np/n
lex
teacher teacher n
the · teacher np
(knows, ε) (np\s) ↑ np
lex
3 c np
/E
≡ him
↑ I, 3
knows · him · ε np\((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np)
/E
knows · him np\(((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np)) the · teacher · knows · him ((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np)
(mary · convinced, that · the · teacher · knows · him · ε) s ↑ np (mary · convinced, that · the · teacher · knows · him) s ↑ np
≡
Derivation of (37b)
↓E
≡ \E
↓2 E
mary · convinced · everyone · that · the · teacher · knows · him s
Figure 2.8.
lex
him ((np\s) ↑ np) ↓ (np\((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np))
everyone everyone (s ↑ np) ↓ s
lex ↓E
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
M ary
that
1 a np
The Problem of Anaphora
93
The derivations in the prosodically labeled natural deduction calculus are given in the Figures 2.7 on page 91 and 2.8 on the facing page. The derivation of bound readings that involve Principle B violations, as in (38), will fail because both for he and him, the anaphoric potential of a pronoun only becomes active after the local clause containing the pronoun is assembled, so the pronoun will never have access to local binders.9 (38)
Every mani shaves himi .
To sum up briefly, Morrill, 2000 assumes that anaphora involves two steps of a wrapping operation. The context of an anaphoric link is a discontinuous constituent containing two split points. It wraps first around the pronoun and then around the antecedent. In this way cases where the antecedent does not c-command the pronoun can be dealt with empirically adequately. Furthermore, Morrill proposes type assignments for personal pronouns that take the blocking effects into account that are standardly dubbed “Principle B effects”. Intuitively, he assumes that a pronoun like he as such is not anaphoric, but it constructs a clause that is anaphoric and requires an np antecedent. This proposal is certainly the most sophisticated approach to date to deal with anaphora exclusively in the lexicon in a Categorial setting, and it handles a considerable range of empirical data adequately. On the other hand, it has to use both a highly complex deductive system— secondary wrap and labeled deduction—and highly complex lexical types for pronouns. It also has to draw a fundamental distinction between bound and free pronouns which seems intuitively unmotivated. These shortcomings—which are inherent in the binding-in-lexicon approach— make it worthwhile to consider the other option, namely extending the logical apparatus of TLG with means to do anaphora resolution in syntax.
9 This approach to Principle B is of limited generality though since it wrongly predicts that a pronoun sitting inside a relative clause will have no access to an antecedent from the immediate matrix clause.
(i) Everybodyi sang a song that hei knew. It also wrongly excludes binding of a pronoun by a non-c-commanding quantifier within the same clause, as in (ii) Everybodyi ’s mother loves himi .
94
3.2
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Resource Multiplication in Syntax
All the approaches discussed up to now share the assumption that pronouns are complex higher order functors that scope over some other functor and identify two argument slots of its argument. In other words, binding is considered to be part of the meaning of the pronoun, while the overall resource management regime is sub-Linear, i.e., each lexical resource is used exactly once. However, it is an inevitable consequence of this kind of approach that the lexical entries become rather complex, and the syntactic mechanism has to be enriched with highly powerful operations like different kinds of wrapping. It is thus tempting to keep the lexical entries of anaphors simple and instead to introduce an operation of anaphora resolution—and thus of meaning multiplication—directly into the grammatical machinery. This idea was first proposed in Hepple, 1990 (see also Hepple, 1992) in a Type Logical setting. Pauline Jacobson develops a different implementation of the same idea within the framework of Combinatory Categorial Grammar (cf. Jacobson, 1992a, Jacobson, 1992b, Jacobson, 1994a, Jacobson, 1994b, Jacobson, 1996a, Jacobson, 1996b, Jacobson, 1999, Jacobson, 2000, Jacobson, 2001). In the remainder of this section I will discuss these two approaches before I develop my own proposal that incorporates important aspects of both.
3.2.1 Hepple 1990 In his thesis Hepple, 1990, Mark Hepple pursues the program—originally formulated in Morrill et al., 1990—to extend the Lambek calculus with controlled versions of structural rules from Intuitionistic Logic. To illustrate this point with an example, consider the structural rule of Permutation, which corresponds to the axiom A•B →B•A Adding this rule in its general form to the Lambek calculus leads to the multiplicative fragment of Linear Logic, a logic that is fully commutative. Accordingly, a Categorial Grammar based on this logic would only recognize languages that are closed under permutation. No natural language has this property. However, natural languages do admit a limited amount of permutation—depending both on structural and language particular triggers. It is thus desirable that Permutation be applicable in certain environments while being blocked as a general axiom. This can be achieved by means of modal operators. For instance, we may extend the inventory of type forming connectives by a unary operator “” (i.e., A is a type if A is), and extend the Lambek calculus with the following controlled form of Permutation:
95
The Problem of Anaphora
A • B → B • A The limitation of Permutation to modalized formulae enables us to fine tune the structural operations of the grammatical system by using modal operators in lexical assignments where appropriate. Hepple uses a similar strategy to model anaphoric binding. As mentioned above, doing anaphora resolution in syntax amounts to admitting a version of the structural rule of Contraction in the grammar logic. In an axiomatic form, Contraction can be formulated as A→A•A A modally controlled version of Contraction would thus be A → A • A (where “” is a unary modal operator). Hepple’s proposal can in fact be reduced to something that is very close to this axiom. Before we have a closer look at the logical aspects of his system, let me briefly discuss the repercussions of this strategy for the lexical meaning of the pronoun. In a simple sentence involving anaphora, like (39), the meaning of the antecedent is prima facie used twice, while there is no obvious counterpart to the anaphor in the semantic representation. (39)
a. John shaves himself. b. shave’john’john’
If the duplication of the meaning of the antecedent is performed in the course of semantic composition, the pronoun seems in fact to be semantically empty. This is exactly what Hepple proposes: the meaning of a pronoun is the identity function on individuals, i.e., λxe .x. At a first glance this might seem counterintuitive, but this assumption makes perfect sense if seen in the appropriate conceptual setting. Pronouns—and all other anaphoric expressions—are context dependent items. Their actual meaning in a particular context depends on some antecedent. So their context independent meaning can be identified with a function from the meaning of their antecedent to their meaning in an actual context. For a pronoun, this meaning is in fact the identity function. To employ another perspective, under the standard view the meaning of a pronoun is a function that maps assignment functions to one element of their range. Assignment functions can be identified with infinite sequences. To take an example, the meaning of the pronoun he21 is a function that takes a sequence of individuals and returns its 21st element.
96
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
The sequence contains much more information—all other values—which is wasted when interpreting the pronoun. A more economical system would identify a pronoun’s meaning with a function from partial assignment functions to values. The extreme borderline case would be a pronoun meaning that takes single-valued assignment functions as arguments. Identifying pronoun meanings with identity functions amounts exactly to this. Hepple implements binding by extending the Lambek calculus (a) with the unary modal operator and (b) with the Natural Deduction rule given in Figure 2.9, which he dubs the “Binding Interpretation Rule”. .. . .. .
x : A .. .
i
M :C λx.M x : C
.. . .. . BIR, i
where C is A\B or B/A Figure 2.9.
Binding Interpretation Rule
The intuitive content of this rule is best illustrated with an example. Reconsider sentence (39a). Hepple assigns the lexical entry in (40) to the reflexive pronoun. (40)
himself – λx.x : np/ np
So before himself can serve as argument of the transitive verb shave, it has to be combined with an argument of category np. The grammar does not assign this category to any constituent. So the argument of himself has to be a hypothesis that is to be discharged later. The only way to discharge it in such a way that the result does not contain an occurrence of the modal operator is via the Binding Interpretation Rule. Due to the side condition of this rule, this amounts to identifying the hypothetical argument of himself with the np argument of some functor category which contains himself. The only candidate in this example is the subject slot of the matrix VP. This leads to the bound reading of the example. The Natural Deduction derivation is given in Figure 2.10 on the facing page. While the overall architecture of Hepple’s system—extending the Lambek calculus with a modally controlled version of Contraction—is in-
97
The Problem of Anaphora
himself shaves
lex
shave’ (np\s)/np John john’ np
/E
/E
λy.shave’yy np\s shave’john’john’ Figure 2.10.
1 y np
y : np shave’y np\s
lex
lex
λx.x np/ np
BIR, 1 \E
Derivation of (39a)
tuitively appealing, it has a serious proof theoretic drawback, and the obvious way to remedy it leads to a system that is computationally inadequate. Therefore I will develop an alternative approach later on. Let us start to consider the proof theoretic properties of the Binding Interpretation rule (“BIR” henceforth). In a sequent formulation, it can be formulated by the following two rules: X, x : A, Y ⇒ M : A\B X, Y ⇒ λx.M x : A\B X, x : A, Y ⇒ M : B/A X, Y ⇒ λx.M x : B/A
BIR\
BIR/
These rules represent modalized versions of a combination of Contraction with Permutation. They cannot simply be incorporated as sequent rules into the Gentzen style sequent formulation of the Lambek calculus, because this system would not enjoy Cut elimination. Suppose the conclusion of the BIR is the left premise of a Cut application, and the Cut formula (i.e., B/A or A\B respectivly) is the active formula of the right premise of the Cut. Then permuting the BIR over the right premise is impossible. So to reach a system with Cut elimination, we have to reformulate the BIR.10 10 Hepple,
1990:160 discusses this problem. He presents a sequent formulation that is decidable (and has the finite reading property) provided all antecedent formulae are types from a “well-behaved” lexicon, even though the logic does not allow Cut elimination. I consider this state of affairs unsatisfactory.
98
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
It is easy to see that in the presence of the slash elimination rules and the slash introduction rules of the Lambek calculus, the two instances of the BIR given above are equivalent to the following formulations:11 y : A, X, x : A, Y ⇒ N : B y : A, X, Y ⇒ N [y/x] : B X, x : A, Y, y : A ⇒ N : B X, Y, y : A ⇒ N [y/x] : B
BIR\
BIR /
In these formulations, the BIR still blocks Lambek’s Cut elimination algorithm. Suppose the consequence of a BIR application is the right premise of a Cut, and A is the Cut formula. Then permutation of Cut with the BIR will fail. This problem can easily be overcome if we adopt slightly more involved but equivalent formulations of the BIRs: X⇒M :A
Y, y : A, Z, x : A, W ⇒ N : B
Y, X, Z, W ⇒ N [M/x][M/y] : B X⇒M :A
Y, x : A, Z, y : A, W ⇒ N : B
Y, Z, X, W ⇒ N [M/x][M/y] : B
BIR\
BIR /
Formulated this way, the BIRs can be incorporated into the Cut elimination procedure for L. However, these formulations point to two severe problems. First, they predict that any NP can antecede any pronoun, without any structural constraints. This would lead to wild overgeneration (and Hepple employed multimodal techniques to avoid this kind of collapse at the price of sacrificing Cut elimination). But even if appropriate constraints can be imposed, the system does not have the subformula property. Neither A nor A occur as subformulae in the conclusions of the rules. Thus Cut elimination is of little use here, since the Cut free system still does not lead to a finite proof search space. Cut elimination leads neither to decidability nor to the finite reading property.
3.2.2 Jacobson In a series of publications (Jacobson, 1992a, Jacobson, 1992b, Jacobson, 1994a, Jacobson, 1994b, Jacobson, 1996a, Jacobson, 1996b, Jacobson, 11 Hepple
distinguishes two families of slashes. The slashes that occur in his formulation of the BIR do not have introduction rules, so our reformulation is not entirely faithful to his system. Nevertheless it is instructive to explore the consequences that arise if we only consider Lambek’s slashes.
99
The Problem of Anaphora
1999, Jacobson, 2000, Jacobson, 2001), Pauline Jacobson has developed an alternative Categorial approach to pronominal anaphora resolution and applied it to a wide range of empirical phenomena. Her system is formulated in a version of the framework of Combinatory Categorial Grammar. This means that she does not assume the full power of the Lambek calculus but only certain theorems (combinators) like type lifting, function composition, Geach rule etc. As a novel contribution, she extends the inventory of category forming connectives with a third slash that expresses anaphoric dependencies, and she introduces a series of combinatory inference schemes that govern the combinatory potential of anaphoric expressions. The central intuition underlying her approach is the idea that the meaning of a constituent containing n unbound pronouns is a (Curryed) function from an n-tuple of referents to the contextualized meaning of this constituent. So the meaning of a sentence like (41)
Mary knows him.
is not a proposition but a function from individuals (i.e., potential referents of him) to propositions. Likewise, the meaning of the VP knows him is not a property but a relation. Consequently, the meaning of him itself is not an individual, but the identity function on individuals, as in Hepple’s system.12 So the semantic composition for (41) works as in Figure 3.2.2. S λx.know’xmary’ NP M ary mary’
VP λx.know’x V
NP
knows know’
him λx.x
Figure 2.11.
Since CCG—like all varieties of Categorial Grammar—assumes a strict category-to-type correspondence, the difference in type that is induced by unbound pronouns has to be mirrored in the syntactic categories. While Hepple formalizes the functional character of anaphoric 12 If
number and gender information is taken into account, the meaning of pronouns should actually be identified with partial identity functions. I ignore this point for simplicity.
100
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
expressions by means of the ordinary forward slash and distinguishes types of arguments by means of a modal operator, Jacobson introduces a third slash connective that is responsible for anaphoric dependencies. Instead of her notation AB for signs of category A that need an antecedent of category B, I will use the notation A|B to stress the similarity with the other slashes.13 Jacobson thus extends the Categorial machinery with the following definitions:
Definition 36 If A and B are categories, then A|B is a category. τ (A|B) = τ (B), τ (A) Accordingly, a pronoun receives category np|np. So the full lexical entry for him comes out as (42)
him – λx.x : np|np
A more appropriate derivation for the example above is hence s|np λxknow’xmary’
(43)
np M ary mary’
(np\s)|np λxknow’x (np\s)/np knows know’
np|np λx.x him
To make this a valid CCG derivation, the combinatory rules have to admit the inheritance of anaphora slots from subconstituents to superconstituents. This is achieved by means of the combinator G. The semantic operation accompanying it is the one of the Geach rule (which motivates its name). It comes in two directional variants given below: (44)
13 I
a.
X ⇒ M : A/B X ⇒ λxy.M (xy) : A|C/B|C
G>
assume that the vertical slash takes the highest precedence among all binary operators. So A|B/C abbreviates (A|B)/C, A/B|C abbreviates A/(B|C) etc. Furthermore, vertical slashes associate to the left, so A|B|C abbreviates (A|B)|C.
101
The Problem of Anaphora
b.
X ⇒ M : B\A X ⇒ λxy.M (xy) : B|C\A|C
G<
These combinators ensure that anaphora slots can be passed on from arguments to the result of applying a function to an argument. If a functor contains an anaphora slot itself, the argument has to be turned into the functor by means of type lifting. This is illustrated in the “official” derivation of (41) given in Figure 2.12. M ary
knows
lex
mary’ np λw.wmary’ s/(np\s) λuv.uvmary’ s|np/(np\s)|np
T> G>
lex
know’ (np\s)/np λyz.know’(yz) (np\s)|np/np|np
G>
λz.know’z (np\s)|np
λv.know’vmary’ s|np Figure 2.12.
him λx.x np|np
lex A>
A>
Derivation for (41)
Binding of pronouns is achieved by identifying the anaphora slot that originates from the lexical entry of the pronoun with some np argument slot of a superordinate functor. This is implemented by means of the combinator Z. Since it operates on two-place functors, it comes in four directional variants.14 (45)
a.
b.
c.
14 Jacobson
X ⇒ M : A/B/C X ⇒ λxy.M (xy)y : A/B/C|B
Z> >
X ⇒ M : (B\A)/C X ⇒ λxy.M (xy)y : (B\A)/C|B X ⇒ M : C\A/B X ⇒ λxy.M (xy)y : C|B\A/B
Z< >
Z> <
restricts the type variable B in the combinatory schemes in (45) to the value np.
102
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
d.
X ⇒ M : C\B\A X ⇒ λxy.M (xy)y : C|B\B\A
Z< <
A prototypical instance of Z takes a transitive verb (phrase) as input and returns a TVP which selects an object containing a pronoun (i.e., an object of category np|np). Semantically it binds the pronoun inside the object to its subject slot. This operation corresponds to the sequent x : (np\s)/np ⇒ λyz.x(yz)z : (np\s)/np|np If the subject slot of such a shifted transitive verb is in turn bound by a quantifier or a wh-operator, we indirectly achieve the effect of binding the pronoun to the operator. This is illustrated in the example (46). (I simplify matters a bit and pretend that the complex NP his mother receives the category np|np and the meaning mother’—the Skolem function15 mapping individuals to their mothers—in the lexicon, since the semantics of possessive constructions is of minor interest in the present context.) (46)
a. Every man loves his mother. b. loves
every
lex
every’ s/(np\s)/n
man man’ n
every’man’ s/(np\s)
lex A>
lex
love’ (np\s)/np λyz.love’(yz)z (np\s)/np|np
Z< >
his mother mother’ np|np
λz.love’(mother’z)z np\s
lex A>
A>
every’man’(λz.love’(mother’z)z) s
In Jacobson’s “official” theory the formulation of Z is somewhat more complicated, but I skip over this here for ease of exposition. The purpose of the G-combinators is to pass unbound anaphora slots from subconstituents to superconstituents. As I have presented G up to now, this will only work for one single slot, but of course a 15 A
remark on terminology: I use the term “Skolem function” as synonymous to “function of type e, e” throughout this book, regardless whether or not an operation of “Skolemization” is involved.
103
The Problem of Anaphora
constituent may contain more than one unbound pronoun. Therefore a generalization of G is required as well. Jacobson assumes that there are infinitely many instances of G that are defined recursively. The definition given above represents the base case. The recursive rule takes the form of the following monotonicity rule (Jacobson assumes that the input to this inference scheme has to be obtained by applications of G> , G< , and G∗ only. I ignore this aspect for simplicity.) (47)
x:A⇒M :B y : A|C ⇒ λz.M [(yz)/x] : B|C
G∗
Written in tree format, this rule amounts to a form of hypothetical reasoning. To derive a conclusion B|C from a premise A|C, assume some hypothesis of type A, try to derive B from it, and discharge the hypothesis. The general scheme is given in Figure 2.13. y : A|C
1
yz : A .. . M :B λzM : B|C Figure 2.13.
G∗ , 1
G∗ in tree format
I illustrate the application of G∗ in example (48) below. To summarize this mechanism, suppose the argument in a functorargument structure contains an anaphora slot. Then either of two options apply: 1 The functor undergoes some version of G and the anaphora slot is thus projected to the superconstituent (as illustrated in Figure 2.12 on page 101). 2 The functor undergoes Z prior to applying it to its argument. As net effect, the anaphora slot in the argument is bound by some superordinate syntactic argument place of the functor (cf. (46)). As a consequence, Jacobson’s system agrees with Szabolcsi’s in the prediction that in a binding configuration, the binder always c-commands the pronoun.16 A welcome consequence of this is that the system han16 To
apply this view on binding for double object constructions, Jacobson also employs a wrapping operation in these cases, following basically the suggestions from Bach, 1979.
104 (48)
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
a. His mother loves his dog. b.
loves
lex
love’ (np\s)/np λrs.love’(rs) (np\s)|np/np|np his mother
λs.love’(dog’s) (np\s)|np
lex
mother’ np|np λx.xmother’ s|np/(np|np\s|np)
G>
dog’ np|np
G>
λuv.love’(dog’s)(uv) np|np\s|np λsuv.love’(dog’s)(uv) (np|np\s|np)|np
λzv.love’(dog’z)(mother’v) s|np|np
lex A>
1
love’(dog’s) np\s
T>
λyz.yzmother’ s|np|np/(np|np\s|np)|np
his dog
G< G∗ , 1 A>
dles basic cases of Weak Crossover correctly. Consider the contrast in (49). (49)
a. Every Englishmani loves hisi mother. b. *Hisi mother loves every Englishmani .
The binding in (49a) is achieved by applying Z to the verb loves before it is combined with the object. To get a similar binding effect in (49b), we would need a mirror image of Z, something like x : (A\B)/C ⇒ λyz.xz(yz) : (A|C\B)/C Incidentally, this is a directional version of Curry and Feys’ (1958) combinator S. Since, according to Jacobson, the grammar of English does not contain this combinator, the subject-object asymmetry observed in connection with crossover violations is correctly accounted for. Jacobson presents a considerable list of empirical arguments to show that the view “pronouns as identity maps” is in fact superior to both to the standard view using variables and to the Categorial treatments that locate the binding in the lexical entry of the pronoun. I will briefly review the most important arguments.
The Problem of Anaphora
105
Functional questions. Consider a question like (50a): (50)
a. Who does no Englishman admire? b. Margaret Thatcher. c. His mother-in-law.
There is a general agreement in the literature (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984, Engdahl, 1986, Chierchia, 1993) that such questions are ambiguous between an individual reading (which elicits answers like (b)) and a functional reading (where we expect answers like (c)). The two readings can be paraphrased as (51)
a. Which individual x is such that every Englishman y admires x? b. Which Skolem function f is such that every Englishman y admires f y?
As a consequence of this observation, it is inevitable to assume that a wh-phrase like who is semantically ambiguous, binding either an individual gap or a Skolem function gap in its sister clause. The advantage of the Jacobsonian approach is that no further apparatus is needed to handle the ambiguity. The functional gap is bound by exactly the same means as an ordinary pronoun, namely by employing Z. (This is in clear contrast to the mentioned alternative approaches, where considerable extra apparatus like internally structured traces is needed.) In a Jacobsonian approach, the interrogative pronoun receives the two lexical entries below. Here Q is the syntactic category of questions, and the formula ?xϕ is to be interpreted as the question “Which x is such that ϕ”. (I remain neutral with regard to the correct semantics of questions since this has no bearing on the issue discussed here.) (52)
a. who – λP ?x.P x : Q/(s/np) b. who – λP ?f.P f : Q/(s/np|np)
The functional reading is now easily derived (see Figure 2.14 on the next page), using Z and the lexical entry for who in (52b). (I give a simplified treatment of auxiliary inversion since this issue is inessential here.) Since the binding of functional gaps is treated analogously to the binding of pronouns here, the approach predicts that functional gaps are subject to Weak Crossover effects. This is in fact the case (as for instance discussed at length in Chierchia, 1993). A functional reading is missing if subject and object are reversed: (53)
a. Which woman admires no Englishman?
106
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR no λQR¬∃x(Qx ∧ Rx) s/(np\s)/n does
who
lex
lex
lex
Englishman englishman’ n
λR¬∃x(englishman’x ∧ Rx) s/(np\s)
A>
λy.¬∃x(englishman’x ∧ admire’(yx)x) s/np|np ?y.¬∃x(englishman’x ∧ admire’(yx)x) q
Figure 2.14.
lex
(np\s)/np admire’ λyz.admire’(yz)z (np\s)/np|np
λy.¬∃x(englishman’x ∧ admire’(yx)x) s/np|np
λx.x s/s
λP ?f.P f q/(s/np|np)
admire
lex
Z< > B>
B>
A>
Derivation of the functional reading of (50a)
b. Margaret Thatcher. c. *His mother-in-law. The argument in favor of the Jacobsonian treatment can be further strengthened if the meaning of a constituent question is identified with the set of (denotations of) its correct constituent answers (as for instance proposed in Hausser and Zaefferer, 1978, Zaefferer, 1984 and, more recently, in Krifka, 1999). Then the answer his mother-in-law to the question Who does no Englishman admire has to be interpreted as the Skolem function mapping each individual to his mother-in-law. Jacobson’s system provides this as the basic meaning anyway, while a variable-based account would need an extra type shifting device that λ-abstracts over the variable corresponding to the pronoun.17
Sloppy inferences. Free relative clauses display a similar polymorphism. This can be observed most clearly in connection with so-called “sloppy” inferences as in (54) (taken from Jacobson, 2000 who attributes it to Tanya Reinhart): (54)
a. John will buy whatever Bill buys. b. Billi will buy hisi favorite car. c. Therefore Johnj will buy hisj favorite car.
In its most prominent reading, (54a) is to be interpreted as ∀xe (buy’xbill’ → buy’xjohn’) 17 Needless
to say this argument does not apply if the meaning of a question is identified with a set of propositions, as in Karttunen, 1977 or in Groenendijk and Stokhof, 1984.
The Problem of Anaphora
107
In this reading, the inference from (54a) and (b) to (c) is not valid. (54a) has another reading though that renders the argument valid. The critical reading can be represented as ∀fe,e (buy’(f bill’)bill’ → buy’(f john’)john’) A discussion of the semantics of free relatives would lead us too far afield here. The essential aspect of Jacobson’s analysis of the functional reading of free relatives is more or less parallel to her analysis of functional questions. In its basic meaning, a free relative pronoun like whatever binds an np gap inside the relative clause, and the free relative as a whole binds an np-position in the matrix clause. Jacobson assumes that whatever has a second reading where it binds an np|np-gap in the embedded clause and creates a free relative that binds such a position in the matrix clause. The meaning of whatever in this functional reading is basically a universal quantifier over Skolem functions. Again, binding is achieved by the same means as in the case of ordinary pronouns. In the example above, this means that the main verb both in the relative clause and in the matrix clause has to undergo Z. The same strategy can be applied if the object is sentential rather than nominal. So sentence (55a) is predicted to be ambiguous between the readings (b) and (c). (55)
a. Every Englishman believes whatever every Frenchman believes. b. ∀pt (∀x(french’x → bel’px) → ∀y(english’y → bel’py)) c. ∀Pe,t (∀x(french’x → bel’(P x)x) → ∀y(english’y → bel’(P x)y))
Under the second reading, the inference from (56a) and (b) to (c)— among others discussed by Chierchia, 1989 under the heading of “believe de se”—is correctly predicted to be valid. (56)
a. Every Englishman believes whatever every Frenchman believes. b. Every Frenchmani believes that hei should drink lots of red wine. c. Therefore, every Englishmanj believes that hej should drink lots of red wine.
Right Node Raising. In paragraph 2.1.2 (starting on page 21) I introduced a surface compositional Categorial treatment of Right Node Raising constructions like
108 (57)
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
John likes and Bill detests broccoli.
The analysis rests on the assumptions that the strings John likes and Bill detests form constituents that denote properties (the property to be liked by John and the property to be detested by Bill), and that the coordination particle and is polymorphic and denotes the join operation on properties (i.e., set intersection) in the construction above. Now consider a somewhat more complicated example where the object contains a bound pronoun: (58)
Every man loves but no man wants to marry his mother.
The sentence has a reading where the pronoun his is simultaneously bound by both quantifiers. It can be paraphrased by (59)
Every mani loves hisi mother but no manj wants to marry hisj mother.
If we analyze pronouns as variables and adopt the Categorial treatment of non-constituent coordination, this reading is underivable. The closest we can get at is the semantic representation (60)
λy(∀z(man’z → love’yz) ∧ ¬∃z(man’z ∧ wtm’yz))(mother’z)
Now λ-conversion would lead to the intended reading, but it is illicit without prior renaming of the quantified variables since y is not free for z here. With the renaming, we only obtain the reading where the pronoun is free. If one wants to maintain an analysis of pronouns as variables, one is forced to abandon the Categorial treatment of Right Node Raising. One has to adopt a reconstruction approach instead. So the input for the interpretation of (58) would be (61)
Every mani loves hisi mother but no mani wants to marry hisi mother.
This would give us the intended reading. However, a reconstruction approach without further constraints on the management of variable names leads to considerable overgeneration. For instance nothing prevents an interpretation of (62a) as (62b), where the pronoun is bound by the matrix subject in the first conjunct and by the local subject in the second one. Such a reading is impossible. (62)
a. Each boy believes that every man loves and no man marries his mother.
109
The Problem of Anaphora
b. Each boyi believes that every mank loves (hisi mother) and no mani marries hisi mother. A variable free analysis of pronouns is compatible with the general Categorial treatment of coordination, and the resulting analysis avoids both the undergeneration of the Categorial approach and the overgeneration of the reconstruction approach that comes with the variable analysis. The critical reading (59) is derived if the conjunction operates on the category s/np|np, i.e., the two conjuncts are interpreted as properties of Skolem functions. Besides, it is possible to do coordination in the category s/np and to pass the anaphora slot up to the entire coordinated structure. This admits binding from outside. The two derivations are given in Figure 2.15. There are no further options, so non-parallel binding patterns as in (62b) are excluded. loves every man λP ∀x(man’x → P x) s/(np\s)
lex
wants to marry
lex
love’ (np\s)/np λyzlove’(yz)z (np\s)/np|np
λy∀x(man’x → love’(yx)x) s/np|np
Z B>
no man λP ¬∃x(man’x ∧ P x) s/(np\s)
wtm’ (np\s)/np
lex
λyzwtm’(yz)z (np\s)/np|np
λy¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’(yx)x) s/np|np
λy.∀x(man’x → love’(yx)x) ∧ ¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’(yx)x) s/np|np
lex Z B> his mother
Conj
mother’ np|np
∀x(man’x → love’(mother’x)x) ∧ ¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’(mother’x)x) s
every man λP ∀x(man’x → P x) s/(np\s)
lex
loves love’ (np\s)/np
λy∀x(man’x → love’yx) s/np
lex B>
no man λP ¬∃x(man’x ∧ P x) s/(np\s)
lex
wants to marry wtm’ (np\s)/np
λy¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’yx) s/np
λy.∀x(man’x → love’yx) ∧ ¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’yx) s/np λzw.∀x(man’x → love’(zw)x) ∧ ¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’(zw)x) s|np/np|np
A>
lex
B>
Conj
G
his mother
λw.∀x(man’x → love’(mother’w)x) ∧ ¬∃x(man’x ∧ wtm’(mother’w)x) s|np
Figure 2.15.
lex
mother’ np|np
lex A>
Bound and free reading of (58)
i-within-i effects. In the literature, this is the common name for the observation that a pronoun inside a complex definite NP cannot be coreferential with the matrix NP. So the following coindexations lead to ungrammaticality:
110
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
(63)
a. *[The wife of heri childhood sweetheart]i left. b. *[The wife of heri sister’s childhood sweetheart]i left. c. *[The wife of the author of heri biography]i left.
(64)
a. *[Heri childhood sweetheart’s wife]i came to the party. b. *[The author of heri biography’s wife]i came to the party.
Neither is it possible that a quantificational determiner binds a pronoun inside its (complex) complement noun. So the following structures are excluded as well. (65)
a. *[Every wife of heri childhood sweetheart]i left. b. *[Every wife of heri sister’s childhood sweetheart]i left. c. *[Every wife of the author of heri biography]i left.
(66)
*[Every author of heri biography’s wife]i came to the party.
If indices are taken to be part of the theory, this suggests a simple generalization which Chomsky, 1981:212 formulates as follows: (67)
“*[γ . . . δ . . .], where γ and δ bear the same index.”
However, there are systematic exceptions to this generalization (which are accommodated by Chomsky in a complication of the above rule given in a footnote). The indicated indexation becomes possible if the pronoun sits inside a relative clause that modifies the head noun of the matrix NP: (68)
a. [The woman whoi married {heri sister’s / heri } childhood sweetheart]i left. b. [The woman whoi married the author of heri biography]i left.
(69)
a. [Every woman whoi married {heri sister’s / heri } childhood sweetheart]i left. b. [Every woman whoi married the author of heri biography]i left.
Under the Jacobsonian view on pronoun binding, this pattern is in fact expected. Let us start with a good example like (69b). The anaphora slot originating from the pronoun her is inherited by the NP the author of her biography by repeated application of G. So this NP will receive category np|np. The verb married undergoes Z before it is combined with its object. As a consequence, the VP married the author of her biography receives the interpretation “λx.marry’(author’(biography’x))x”.
The Problem of Anaphora
111
Starting from this VP meaning, the relative clause, the matrix NP and the matrix clause are assembled in the usual fashion, leading to the final meaning ∀x(woman’x ∧ marry’(author’(biography’x))x → leave’x) which corresponds to the coindexation in (69b). The same mechanism works ceteris paribus for all other good examples. So why is it impossible to assign the same meaning to (65c)? As far as the semantics goes, nothing prevents this. To get the reading in question, the 2-place predicate wife of has to undergo Z, just like married does in (69c). This is impossible though because the preconditions for the application of Z are defined in terms of syntactic categories rather than semantic types. While both married and wife of are semantically of type e, e, t, the former has category (np\s)/np and the latter category n/np. Only the former meets the preconditions for Z.
Paycheck pronouns. There is a class of pronoun occurrences that can neither be accommodated under “binding” nor under “coreference”. The name “paycheck pronouns” comes from the following example (from Karttunen, 1969). (70)
a. The man who gave his paycheck to his wife was wiser than the man who gave it to his mistress. b. The man whoi gave hisi paycheck to hisi wife was wiser than the man whoj gave hisj paycheck to hisj mistress.
Sentence (70a) has a reading which is synonymous with (70b). The example is problematic because the pronouns it does not have a coreferential/binding antecedent, even though it is evidently anaphorically related to the NP his paycheck in the first conjunct. There are two possible strategies to analyze this kind of anaphor in the literature. One may consider the critical pronoun as an E-type pronoun in the sense of Evans, 1977, i.e., as shorthand for a definite description. The paraphrase given in (70b) would thus be the main part of the analysis. This kind of analysis is incompatible with the program of surface compositionality since a certain syntactic copy mechanism has to be evoked before interpretation can proceed. Alternatively, one may assume that the paycheck pronoun it retrieves two meaning components from the context by means of anaphora resolution, namely a Skolem function and an individual, and it denotes the result of applying the function to this individual. In the above example, these components are the function f mapping individuals to their
112
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
paychecks, while the individual slot is bound by the relative pronoun who. Analyses along these lines were among others proposed in Cooper, 1979 and Engdahl, 1986. The latter kind of analysis has the advantage of being compositional. It is faced with three problems: 1 How can a pronoun take several antecedents simultaneously? 2 How can the NP his paycheck evoke a Skolem function as value of a subsequent paycheck pronoun? 3 How exactly does anaphora resolution of the two anaphoric components of paycheck pronouns proceed? Obviously, the second question receives an immediate answer if we assume Jacobson’s analysis—the meaning of his paycheck is the paycheckfunction. Let us turn attention to the first question. Syntactically, the paycheck pronoun in the example above takes his paycheck as one antecedent, and its second anaphoric slot is bound by a relative pronoun. The category of his paycheck is np|np, and the relative pronoun binds a gap of category np. The category of the paycheck pronoun should thus be (np|np)|(np|np)—an anaphor that takes first an np|np and second an np as antecedent and returns an np. This category is derivable from the basic pronoun category np|np by a variant of the well-established Geach rule: x : A|B ⇒G λyz.x(yz) : (A|C)|(B|C) | Applying this rule to the lexical entry of it gives us the derived sign (71)
it – λf.f : (np|np)|(np|np)
(Note that λf x.f x = λf.f due to the extensionality of functions.) So the first question is answered by assuming G| as a general type shifting rule. Given this, no extra apparatus is needed to answer the third question. The value for the Skolem function is retrieved by means of accidental coreference, while the individual component is bound by Z. A sample derivation for the critical clause in the simplified example in (72) is given in Figure 2.16 on the next page. The category of the clause is s|(np|np), i.e., it denotes a function from Skolem functions to propositions. The Skolem function slot is filled by the denotation of the antecedent phrase his paycheck. (72)
Every man spent his paycheck. Mary kept it.
113
The Problem of Anaphora kept M ary
lex
mary’ np λP.P mary’ s/(np\s)
lex
keep’ (np\s)/np λyz.keep’(yz)z (np\s)/np|np
T>
λuv.uvmary’ s|(np|np)/(np\s)|(np|np)
G>
λrsz.keep’(rsz)z (np\s)|(np|np)/(np|np)|(np|np)
G>
λsz.keep’(sz)z (np\s)|(np|np)
λv.keep’(vmary’)mary’ s|(np|np)
Figure 2.16.
it
Z< >
lex
λx.x np|np λf.f (np|np)|(np|np)
G| A>
A>
Derivation for (72)
Bach-Peters sentences. The above analysis of paycheck pronouns leads to a straightforward account of Bach-Peters sentences, i.e., sentences with two complex NPs each containing a pronoun that is coindexed with the other NP. A classical example is (73)
[The man who deserves iti ]k gets [the prize hek wants]i .
Even though this coindexation pattern leads us to expect a kind of circular reference (and thus pragmatic deviance), the construction is perfectly intelligible. The question is how the interpretation is to be derived in a compositional way. Let us first note some asymmetries in these constructions. To start with, the first NP is unrestricted with regard to the form of its determiner. It may be indefinite, definite (as above) or quantified: (74)
a. [A man who deserved iti ]k got [the prize hek wanted]i . b. [Men who deserved iti ]k got [the prizes theyk wanted]i . c. [Every man who deserved iti ]k got [the prize hek wanted]i .
On the other hand, the second matrix NP must be definite (or specific if indefinite). (75)
a. ??? [The man who deserves iti ]k gets [a prize hek wants]i . b. *[The man who deserves iti ]k gets [every prize hek wants]i .
This pattern is not really surprising; the attempted backward bindings in (75) are ruled out as mundane Weak Crossover violations. Definites and specific indefinites are known to be exempted from Weak Crossover.
114
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Furthermore, the first pronoun seems to be subject to Weak Crossover as well. Exchanging the pronoun and the gap corresponding to the relative pronoun in the first NP results in deviance. (76)
*[The man whom iti always evaded]k finally got [the prize hek wanted]i .
The second pronoun can occur both in subject position and in object position though. (77)
[The man who deserves iti ]k finally got [the prize that always evaded himk ]i .
The kind of subject-object asymmetry displayed by the first pronoun is also characteristic for paycheck pronouns: (78)
a. The man who sees [his brother]f regularly is better off than the man whoi never visits himf i . b. *The man who sees [his brother]f regularly is better off than the man whomi hef i is never visited by.
This asymmetry is predicted by Jacobson’s account; the relative pronoun binds the np slot of the paycheck pronoun just like an ordinary pronoun, and an object relative pronoun cannot bind an anaphora slot in the subject. Finally it should be observed that paycheck pronouns can precede their functional antecedent. This is not surprising either, given that accidental coreference does not involve binding and thus does not evoke Weak Crossover. (79)
The man whoi sees himf i regularly is better off than the man who never visits [his brother]f .
Putting these pieces together, we have evidence that the first pronoun in a Bach-Peters sentence is a paycheck pronoun, while the second one is an ordinary bound pronoun. This is exactly the analysis Jacobson proposes: In a sentence like (80), it is analyzed as a paycheck pronoun. Its Skolem function slot remains free on the level of sentence semantics— the category of the whole sentence is thus s|(np|np), while its np slot is bound by the relative pronoun (i.e., deserves undergoes Z). The pronoun him is treated as an ordinary pronoun that gets bound by the matrix subject (i.e., gets undergoes Z as well). The full derivation is given in Figure 2.17 on the facing page. (80)
Every man who deserves it gets the prize that pleases him.
lex who
man lex man’ n
every λP Q∀x.(P x → Qx) s/(np\s)/n
lex
n/(n\n) G>
(s/(np\s))|(np|np)/n|(np|np)
λP Qx.Qx ∧ P x (n\n)/(np\s)
T>
n|(np|np)/(n\n)|(np|np)
G>
lex
(np\s)/np|np G>
(n\n)|(np|np)/(np\s)|(np|np)
(np\s)|(np|np)/(np|np)|(np|np)
λf Q∀x(man’x ∧ deserve’(f x)x → Qx) (s/(np\s))|(np|np)
lex G>
(np\s)|(np|np)
(n\n)|(np|np) n|(np|np)
it Z< >
A>
A>
λx.x np|np (np|np)|(np|np) A>
G| A>
The Problem of Anaphora
deserves deserve’ (np\s)/np
pleases lex that
prize lex prize’ n
the lex gets lex get’ (np\s)/np (np\s)/np|np
Z< >
λP ιx.P x np/n np|np/n|np
G>
n/(n\n)
(s/np\s)\s
T>
λP Qx.Qx ∧ P x (n\n)/(np\s)
lex
(n\n)|np/(np\s)|np
n|np/(n\n)|np
(np\s)|np/np|np G> (n\n)|np
n|np np|np
np\s
please’ (np\s)/np
him G>
(np\s)|np
lex λx.x np|np
A>
A>
A>
A>
A>
T<
λrs.rs(λx.get’(ιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy)x) (s/np\s)|(np|np)\s|(np|np)
G<
...
...
λf Q∀x(man’x ∧ deserve’(f x)x → Qx) (s/(np\s))|(np|np)
λrs.rs(λx.get’(ιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy)x) (s/np\s)|(np|np)\s|(np|np)
Figure 2.17.
Derivation of (80)
A<
115
λf.∀x(man’x ∧ deserve’(f x)x → get’(ιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy)x) s|(np|np)
116
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
The syntax-semantics interface supplies the meaning (81)
λf.∀x(man’x ∧ deserve’(f x)x → get’(ιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy)x)
The paycheck pronoun it is still unresolved, so the meaning is a function from Skolem functions to propositions. In the Bach-Peters reading, it is accidentally coreferent with the prize that pleases him, which denotes the Skolem function (82)
λxιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy
So the final interpretation is obtained by applying (81) to (82), which yields the desired (83)
∀x(man’x ∧ deserve’(ιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy)x → get’(ιy.prize’y ∧ please’xy)x)
Let us briefly wrap up the discussion of Jacobson’s approach. Her crucial assumptions are that the meaning of pronouns is the identity map, and that the binding of pronouns is achieved by means of a syntactic operation, namely Z. The fact that these simple assumptions suffice to explain a considerable range of quite diverse data is strong evidence that her theory is on the right track. Still, some critical remarks can be made. From a theoretical point of view, the collection of combinators that are necessary to make the system work seems ad hoc. The instances of Z that were discussed here only deal with constructions where the binder is the subject. Other configurations require other versions of Z. An empirically adequate modeling of the inheritance of pronoun slots requires an even larger proliferation of combinators; we need infinitely many instances of G. So it seems that some generalization has been missed here. In the ideal case, all these combinators should be theorems of a more general deductive system. Besides, Jacobson’s system has certain empirical shortcomings. It assumes that c-command is a structural precondition for pronoun binding. As discussed above, this is inadequate in many cases. This problem becomes more severe if we strive for a unified treatment of pronominal anaphora and ellipsis. In ellipsis construction, c-command of the ellipsis site by the antecedent is the exception rather than the rule. In the next chapter, I will thus develop a type logical version of a Jacobson style treatment of anaphora that avoids these problems.
4.
Summary
Categorial grammars generally employ a version of the Curry-Howard correspondence for meaning assembly. This entails a variable-free con-
The Problem of Anaphora
117
ception of the syntax-semantics interface. In other words, under the Categorial perspective on meaning composition, the grammar does not include variable binding operations. Furthermore, both Lambek Categorial Grammars and most versions of Combinatory Categorial Grammar are in a sense subsystems of Linear Logic. This means that every meaning of a lexical item that occurs in a complex construction must be used exactly once in the composition of the complex meaning. This seems to be at odds with the empirical facts in connection with anaphora phenomena like pronominal anaphora and ellipsis. By definition, anaphora involves the re-use of semantic resources. If the overall variable-free design is to be maintained, there are two basic strategies to accommodate anaphora into the general picture: 1 Anaphora is triggered by certain lexical items, and the recycling of semantic resources is due to the interpretation of these lexical items. Accordingly, anaphoric lexical items have semantic representations where a λ-operator binds more than one variable occurrence. This strategy is pursued among others by Szabolcsi, 1989, Szabolcsi, 1992 in a Combinatory and by Moortgat, 1996a, and Morrill, 2000 in a Type Logical setting. 2 Anaphora resolution is handled in syntax. This means that the grammar contains operations specifically designed for this purpose. Lexical items typically have Linear meaning representations here, while the grammatical operations go beyond the resource management of Linear Logic. This approach was first explored by Mark Hepple (Hepple, 1990, Hepple, 1992), who uses a version of Type Logical Grammar. Drawing on his insights, Pauline Jacobson reformulated this idea within the framework of CCG (Jacobson, 1999, Jacobson, 2000). Mixed approaches are possible. Jacobson, for instance, follows the general Categorial consensus in treating coordination ellipsis in the lexicon while pronominal anaphora is dealt with in syntax. All mentioned approaches, including the second group, assume that anaphora is somehow lexically triggered. So they will not easily lend themselves to an analysis of ellipsis phenomena like stripping that are apparently not lexically triggered. (84)
Most people want to be millionaires, but not John.
The landscape of Categorial approaches to anaphora is schematically summarized in Table 2.1 on the next page.
118
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Author
Locus of resource multiplication
Szabolcsi
lexicon
Moortgat
lexicon
Morrill
lexicon
Hepple
syntax
Jacobson
syntax
Table 2.1.
Lexical entry of he
Non-standard operations
λxyz.y(xz)z (s/np)\((np\s)/s)\(np\s) λxy.xyy q(np, np\s, np\s) λxyz.y(xz)y (((s ↑ np) ↑2 s) ↓2 (s ↑ np))/(np\s) λx.x np/ np λx.x np|np
none none none BIR Z, G
Categorial approaches to anaphora
There is an obvious tradeoff between a fairly complex lexicon in the first three approaches and a complication of the grammatical machinery in the last two ones. Given that Jacobson gives empirical arguments a) that the meaning of a pronoun is in fact the identity function and b) something like her Z-operation is needed also in the absence of anaphora (for instance in functional questions), the second class of approaches seems to be superior. Furthermore they do without a lexical ambiguity between bound, coreferential and free pronouns, while this complication is virtually inevitable in the first group of theories. On the other hand, both Hepple and Jacobson assume some version of a c-command constraint on anaphora resolution. As argued above, this is empirically inadequate in certain cases of pronominal anaphora, and it practically blocks the extrapolation of their anaphora machinery to ellipsis. Furthermore, Hepple’s system displays certain unpleasant formal properties (like the failure of Cut elimination), and the (infinite!) collection of combinators needed to make Jacobson’s system work seems to be ad hoc. In the following chapter, I will develop a simple extension of the Lambek calculus which enables us to derive all relevant instances of Jacobson’s Combinatory approach as theorems. The system is proof theoretically well-behaved, and it is straightforwardly applicable to several kinds of ellipsis phenomena in natural language.
Chapter 3 LAMBEK CALCULUS WITH LIMITED CONTRACTION
1.
The Agenda
After having reviewed the main Categorial approaches to anaphora from the literature, in this chapter I will develop a new proposal. My aim is to extend the Lambek style core of Type Logical Grammar in such a way that a comprehensive treatment of anaphora phenomena becomes possible. The discussion from the previous chapter leads to the following agenda: Resource multiplication should be done in syntax (as in Hepple’s 1992 and Jacobson’s 1999, 2000 systems) rather than in the lexicon. There are three main reasons for taking this decision: 1. Doing resource multiplication in the lexicon means we have to stipulate ambiguity between bound and free pronouns, 2. binding-in-syntax lends itself more naturally to an extension to the discourse level than binding-in-lexicon, and 3. Jacobson supplies convincing empirical evidence that the meaning of a pronoun is in fact the identity function. This leads to the second desideratum: The meaning of a pronoun should come out as the identity function on individuals. The general topic of the present investigation is the analysis of anaphora in TLG, hence: The analysis should be formulated in an extension of the Lambek calculus.
119
120
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
I thus want to improve on Hepple’s proposal: The system should be proof-theoretically well-behaved, i.e., the logic should enjoy Cut elimination, decidability, the subformula property and the finite reading property. Furthermore there should be a natural Curry-Howard correspondence as syntaxsemantics interface. Finally, I want my analysis to incorporate the insights from Morrill’s (2000) system. Neither the structural positions of anaphors nor the positions of antecedents should be limited in an empirically unjustified way. The anaphora resolution mechanism should do without c-command restriction. The latter point is certainly controversial among linguists, and I will discuss the empirical aspects of this decision at length in the next chapter.
2.
Contraction?
Under a type logical perspective, doing resource multiplication in syntax means that the logic of grammatical composition derives Curry-Howard terms where one λ-operator binds more than one occurrence of a variable. According to the Curry-Howard correspondences of substructural logics, this amounts to the assumption that the structural rule of Contraction is part of the logic of grammar in one way or another. The canonical version of this rule is repeated here for convenience: X, x : A, y : A, Y ⇒ M : B X, x : A, Y ⇒ M [x/y] : B
C
Looking at this rule under a bottom-up proof search perspective, it says that antecedent formulae can be multiplied at will. It is easy to see that the proof search space becomes infinite as soon as we incorporate this rule, since we can apply Contraction to the premise of this rule again (still in the bottom-up direction) etc. and thus run into an infinite regress. While logics using Contraction might still be decidable (Intuitionistic Logic and some versions of Relevant Logic are), we nevertheless lose the finite reading property.1 Such a logic would thus be a priori too 1 The
simplest illustration of this point is the identity theorem x:A→A⇒M :A→A
where the Curry-Howard term M can be any λx.f n x for arbitrary n in Intuitionistic or Relevant Logic.
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
121
powerful as a logic of grammatical composition. Contraction thus has to be limited in a suitable way to avoid this collapse. One may try to do this by employing multimodal techniques along the lines of Hepple’s (1990) work. I will pursue another strategy though, which is inspired by Jacobson’s work. I will extend the Lambek calculus with a third version of implication, and I will compile a limited version of Contraction directly into the logical rules for this new connective. This will allow us to keep the power of Contraction under strict logical control.
3. 3.1
The Logic LLC Vocabulary
In this section I will introduce a conservative extension of L called Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction (abbreviated LLC), where a limited version of the structural rule of Contraction is compiled into the logical rules of a logical connective. Starting from the Lambek calculus L, I extend the inventory of category forming connectives by a third kind of implication (written as |). So the set of categories F over a collection of atomic categories A is given by
Definition 37 (Categories) F ::= A, F\F, F • F, F/F, F|F As in Jacobson’s system, the vertical slash creates categories of anaphoric items. A sign has category A|B iff it needs an antecedent of category B and, provided it finds one, behaves like an item of category A. Pronouns will thus come out as np|np. As in L, the product is interpreted as Cartesian product and the implications as function space formation. So the category-to-type correspondence for LLC is given by
Definition 38 (Category to type correspondence) τ (A • B) = τ (A) ∧ τ (B) τ (A\B) = τ (B/A) = τ (B|A) = τ (A), τ (B)
3.2
Sequent Presentation
The Gentzen style sequent formulation extends the corresponding presentation of L by a left rule and a right rule for the new implication slash. It is given in Figure 3.1 on the following page. Let us have a closer look at the two new rules. If the left premise of the rule of use |L is instantiated with an identity axiom, we obtain the
122
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
x:A⇒x:A
id
X⇒M :A
Y, x : A, Z ⇒ N : B
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [M/x] : B X⇒M :A
Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M, N : A • B
Cut
•R
X, x : A, y : B, Y ⇒ M : C X, z : A • B, Y ⇒ M [(z)0 /x][(z)1 /y] : C X, x : A ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : B/A X⇒M :A
/R Y, x : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, y : B/A, X, Z ⇒ N [(yM )/x] : C x : A, X ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A\B X⇒M :A
•L
/L
\R Y, x : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, X, y : A\B, Z ⇒ N [(yM )/x] : C
\L
X, x1 : A1 , Y1 , . . . , xn : An , Yn ⇒ M : B X, y1 : A1 |C, Y1 , . . . , yn : An |C, Yn ⇒ λz.M [(y1 z)/x1 ] · · · [(yn z)/xn ] : B|C
|R
n>0 Y ⇒M :B
X, x : B, Z, y : A, W ⇒ N : C
X, Y, Z, z : A|B, W ⇒ N [M/x][(zM )/y] : C Figure 3.1.
|L
Labeled sequent presentation of LLC
simplified formulation below (from which the original formulation can be recovered via Cut): X, x : B, Z, y : A, W ⇒ N : C X, x : B, Z, z : A|B, W ⇒ N [(zx)/y] : C Intuitively this rule says: If an anaphoric resource of category A|B is preceded by an antecedent of category B, it may be resolved and thus be replaced by a resource of category A. The meaning of the resolved anaphor is obtained by applying the meaning of the unresolved anaphor to the
123
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
meaning of its antecedent. (Typically, the meaning of the anaphor is just the identity function, so the resolved meaning of the anaphor winds up being identical to the meaning of the antecedent in these cases.) Note that the metavariable Z ranges over sequences of categories, including the empty sequence, so antecedent and anaphor may or may not be adjacent. The same intuition is possibly expressed more transparently by the two axioms below, which are jointly equivalent to the sequent rule above (i.e., extending L with the two axioms has the same effect as extending L with |L): x : A, y : B|A ⇒ x, yx : A • B x : A, y : B, z : C|A ⇒ x, y, zx : A • B • C The Curry-Howard labeling of |L reveals that this operation corresponds to three Intuitionistic operations: 1. Contraction (because M occurs twice in the proof term of the succedent), 2. the rule of Modus Ponens (corresponding to function application of z to one copy of M ), and Cut (corresponding to replacing x by M and y by zM ). In fact, if all three implications of LLC are mapped to the Intuitionistic implication and the product of LLC to Intuitionistic conjunction, |L becomes a derivable rule of Intuitionistic Logic, as can be seen from the natural deduction derivation in Figure 3.2. This translation into Intuitionistic Logic justifies the Curry-Howard labeling used here. z:B→A⇒z:B→A
id
w:B⇒w:B
z : B → A, w : B ⇒ zw : A
id →E
X, x : B, Z, y : A, W ⇒ N : C
X, x : B, Z, z : B → A, w : B, W ⇒ N [(zw)/y] : C .. . X, x : B, w : B, Z, z : B → A, W ⇒ N [(zw)/y] : C Y ⇒M :B
X, x : B, Z, z : B → A, W ⇒ N [(zx)/y] : C X, Y, Z, z : B → A, W ⇒ N [M/x][(zM )/y] : C
Figure 3.2.
Cut
P P C
Cut
Intuitionistic derivation of |L
The rule of proof |R expresses the insights that anaphora slots can percolate up inside larger constituents, and that they can be merged. The first fact is relevant for instance in answers to functional questions; we want to be able to assign the phrase (1b) the category pp|np: (1)
a. In which town is every Englishman happy?
124
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
b. In his hometown. This percolation mechanism can be covered by two axioms and one inference rule. An anaphora slot can percolate up to a superconstituent from either of its subconstituents. This corresponds to the two axioms x : A|C, y : B ⇒ λz.xz, y : (A • B)|C x : A, y : B|C ⇒ λz.x, yz : (A • B)|C Furthermore, anaphora slots are preserved under unary derivations. The corresponding inference rule is x:A⇒M :B y : A|C ⇒ λz.M [(yz)/x] : B|C Second, a syntagma may contain several anaphoric expressions that are understood as being co-anaphoric (i.e., depending on the same antecedent) even though no antecedent is present. A case in point is the adjective local which arguably has category (n/n)|np (i.e., it requires an np-antecedent to be an attributive adjective). In (2b) the two occurrences of local are preferably interpreted as co-anaphoric: (2)
a. What happened in three cities last year? b. The local press accused the local politicians of corruption.
The axiom covering this merge operation is x : A|C, y : B|C ⇒ λz.xz, yz : (A • B)|C These axioms and rules taken together are equivalent to the rule of proof |R given in fig 3.1 on page 122.2 As for the rule of use, the labeling is justified by the fact that the rule is Intuitionistically derivable (cf. Figure 3.3 on the next page).
3.3
Cut Elimination
Despite the fact that they incorporate Contraction, the two logical rules for the new implication have the subformula property, just as all logical rules of L. Hence the premise of any inference rule has a lower complexity 2 In J¨ ager, 2001 I used a rule of proof that is slightly stronger than the one given here. The present version is a generalization of a proposal from Glyn Morrill (p.c.). His rule is the special case of the one given here for n = 1.
125
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction y i : C → A i ⇒ y i : C → Ai
id
zi : C ⇒ z i : C
yi : C → Ai , zi : C ⇒ yi zi : Ai
id →E
X, x1 : A1 , Y1 , . . . , xn : An , Yn ⇒ M : B
X, y1 : C → A1 , z1 : C, Y1 , . . . , yn : C → An , zn : C, Yn ⇒ M [(yi zi )/xi ] : B .. .
P
X, y1 : C → A1 , Y1 , . . . , yn : C → An , Yn , z1 : C, . . . , zn : C ⇒ M [(yi zi )/xi ] : B X, y1 : C → A1 , Y1 , . . . , yn : C → An , Yn , z : C ⇒ M [(yi z)/xi ] : B X, y1 : C → A1 , Y1 , . . . , yn : C → An , Yn ⇒ λz.M [(yi z)/xi ] : C → B
Figure 3.3.
Cutn
P C n−1
→I
Intuitionistic derivation of |R
than its conclusion, and bottom-up proof search reduces complexity. Again this does not hold for the Cut rule. As in L, however, Cut is admissible in the Cut free sequent presentation of LLC.
Theorem 9 (Cut Elimination) If LLC X ⇒ A, then there is a Cut-free sequent proof of X ⇒ A. Sketch of proof: The proof is essentially identical to Lambek’s Cut elimination proof for L (as sketched from page 51 onwards in Chapter 1), except for the fact that we have two more cases to consider for principal Cut. These are the configurations where the Cut formula is the active formula in both premises. Since the rule |R also introduces anaphora-implications on the left hand side of the sequent, there are two new configurations for principal Cut: The left premise of the Cut is a conclusion of |L and the right premise is a conclusion of |R, or both premises are conclusions of |R. The Cut elimination steps for these configurations are schematically given in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 on the following page. (For the second configuration it is assumed that 1 ≤ i ≤ n.) In either case, the principal Cut is replaced by a Cut of lower degree. Lambek’s Cut elimination algorithm is thus guaranteed to terminate. Because every rule in the Cut free sequent presentation of LLC has the subformula property, the bottom-up proof search space is finite. As in L, this leads to the following consequences:
Theorem 10 (Decidability) Derivability in LLC is decidable. Proof: Identical to the corresponding proof for L.
126
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
U, D1 , V1 , . . . , Dn , Vn ⇒ A U, D1 |B, V1 , . . . , Dn |B, Vn ⇒ A|B
Y ⇒B
|R
X, B, Z, A, W ⇒ C
X, Y, Z, A|B, W ⇒ C
X, Y, Z, U, D1 , V1 , . . . , Dn |B, Vn , W ⇒ C
|L
Cut
;
B⇒B
U, D1 , V1 , . . . , Dn , Vn ⇒ A
id
X, B, Z, A, W ⇒ C
X, B, Z, U, D1 , V1 , . . . , Dn , Vn , W ⇒ C
X, B, Z, U, D1 |B, V1 , D2 , V2 , . . . , Dn , Vn , W ⇒ C .. . Y ⇒B
X, B, Z, U, D1 |B, . . . , Dn−1 |B, Vn−1 , Dn , Vn ⇒ C X, Y, Z, U, D1 , V1 , . . . , Dn |B, Vn , W ⇒ C
Cut
|L
|L |L |L
Principal Cut for |, first configuration
Figure 3.4.
X, A1 , Y1 , . . . , An , Yn ⇒ Bi X, A1 |C, Y1 , . . . , An |C, Yn ⇒ Bi |C
Z, B1 , W1 , . . . , Bm , Wm ⇒ D
|R
Z, B1 |C, W1 , . . . , Bm |C, Wm ⇒ D|C
Z, B1 |C, W1 , . . . , X, A1 |C, Y1 , . . . , An |C, Yn , Wi , . . . , Bm |C, Wm ⇒ D|C
|R Cut
; X, A1 , Y1 , . . . , An , Yn ⇒ Bi
Z, B1 , W1 , . . . , Bm , Wm ⇒ D
Z, B1 , W1 , . . . , X, A1 , Y1 , . . . , An , Yn , . . . , Bm , Wm ⇒ D
Cut
Z, B1 |C, W1 , . . . , X, A1 |C, Y1 , . . . , An |C, Yn , Wi , . . . , Bm |C, Wm ⇒ D|C Figure 3.5.
|R
Principal Cut for |, second configuration
Corollary 2 (Finite reading property) For a given unlabeled LLC-sequent, there are at most finitely many Curry-Howard labelings. Proof: Identical to the corresponding proof for L.
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
3.4
127
Natural Deduction Presentation
During the discussion of L we saw that the sequent system is indispensable since it guarantees decidability, but for practical purposes it is rather awkward. A presentation in natural deduction format is better suited for concrete derivations. Besides, it has an appealing allusion to the tree format linguists are used to. I start with a sequent style presentation of the natural deduction system (Figure 3.6 on the next page). Next to the identity rule and the Cut rule (which are identical to the corresponding rules in the sequent system), we have an introduction rule and an elimination rule for each connective. The rules for the Lambek connectives are identical to the corresponding rules in the natural deduction presentation of L. Additionally, we have an introduction rule and an elimination rule for the anaphora slash. The |-introduction rule is a combination of the rule of proof for | in the sequent system and Cut, and thus requires no further elaboration. The elimination rule is straightforwardly derivable from the rule of use from the sequent system (and vice versa). The derivations are given in Figure 3.7 on the following page and 3.8 on page 129.
Cut elimination for sequent style natural deduction. As in the sequent system, Cut is an admissible rule in the natural deduction system in tree format. Here Cut elimination does not even affect the CurryHoward term of the proof. Theorem 11 (Cut Elimination) If LLC X ⇒ M : A, then there is a Cut-free natural deduction proof of X ⇒ M : A. Proof: The proof follows the same strategy as the corresponding proof for the sequent system. There are two notable differences: The degree of a Cut application is measured by the complexity of the Curry-Howard term of the conclusion of the Cut. This guarantees that every Cut elimination step reduces the degree of the Cut, also if Cut is permuted with an elimination rule. Second, since there are no left rules in the natural deduction calculus, the configuration for principal Cut never arises. Since the elimination of a principal Cut is the only configuration where Cut elimination leads to a change in the Curry-Howard term, Cut elimination in the natural deduction calculus preserves Curry-Howard term assignment.
128
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
x:A⇒x:A
id
X⇒M :A
Y, x : A, Z ⇒ N : B
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [M/x] : B X⇒M :A
Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M, N : A • B X ⇒M :A•B
Cut
•I
Y, x : A, y : B, Z ⇒ N : C
Y, X, Z ⇒ N [(M )0 /x][(M )1 /y] : C X, x : A ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : B/A
/I
X ⇒ M : A/B
Y ⇒N :B
X, Y ⇒ M N : A x : A, X ⇒ M : B X ⇒ λxM : A\B X⇒M :A
/E
\I Y ⇒ N : A\B
X, Y ⇒ N M : B for 1 ≤ i ≤ n : Zi ⇒ Ni : Ai |C
•E
\E
X, x1 : A1 , Y1 , . . . , xn : An , Yn ⇒ M : B
X, Z1 , Y1 , . . . , Zn , Yn ⇒ λz.M [(Ni z)/xi ] : B|C X⇒M :A
Y ⇒ N : B|A
|I
Z, x : A, W, y : B, U ⇒ O : C
Z, X, W, Y, U ⇒ O[M/x][(N M )/y] : C Figure 3.6.
(Labeled) Natural Deduction presentation of LLC
X⇒A Y ⇒ B|A
Z, A, W, B, U ⇒ C
Z, X, W, B|A, U ⇒ C Z, X, W, Y, U ⇒ C Figure 3.7.
Derivation |L ; |E
Cut
|L
|E
129
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
A|B ⇒ A|B
id
Y ⇒B
X, B, Z, A, W ⇒ C
X, Y, Z, A|B, W ⇒ C Figure 3.8.
|E
Derivation |E ; |L
3.4.1 Natural Deduction in Tree Format Natural deduction proofs are more concisely presented in tree format. To give a natural representation for |-elimination, this format has to be extended somewhat in comparison to the tree format for L. Strictly speaking, a natural deduction proof tree is not necessarily a tree, but rather a sequence of finite directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) with labeled nodes. I will continue to use the term “proof tree” nevertheless. As in conventional syntax trees, the nodes in a proof tree are partially ordered by two relations, immediate dominance D and precedence <. In contradistinction to ordinary trees, one node may not only immediately dominate several nodes, but it may also be immediately dominated by several nodes. I call the transitive closure of the immediate dominance relation simply dominance. Due to the fact that a node can be dominated by several nodes, I will avoid the kinship terminology that is common when talking about trees (since this would entail that a node may have arbitrarily many parent nodes). Rather, if a immediately dominates b, I will say that a is a premise of b and b is a conclusion of a. If a and b are premises of the same conclusion, they are co-premises (and there is an analogous notion of co-conclusions). If a precedes b, a is a predecessor of b and b a successor of a. Finally, a sequence of proof trees is again a proof tree. So a proof tree need not be connected by the transitive and symmetric closure of the dominance relation. The class of graphs underlying proof trees obeys a series of axioms that are straightforward extensions of the corresponding axioms for trees. (As notational conventions, I write “D+ ” for the transitive closure and “D∗ ” for the reflexive and transitive closure of the relation “D”.) 1 Dominance is irreflexive. ¬∃x.xD+ x 2 Precedence is irreflexive and transitive. ¬∃x.x < x
130
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
∀xyz.x < y ∧ y < z → x < z 3 Both dominance and its inverse are disjoint from both precedence and its inverse. ¬∃xy.(xD+ y ∨ yD+ x) ∧ (x < y ∨ y < x) 4 Any two distinct nodes are either related by dominance or by precedence. ∀xy.x = y ∨ xD+ y ∨ yD+ x ∨ x < y ∨ y < x 5 Precedence is inherited from premises to conclusions and vice versa. ∀xyzw.xDy ∧ zDw ∧ x < z → (yD∗ w ∨ wD∗ y ∨ y < w) ∀xyzw.yDx ∧ wDz ∧ x < z → (yD∗ w ∨ wD∗ y ∨ y < w) The nodes in a proof tree are labeled with a rule name, a Curry-Howard term, and an LLC-category. (In the sequel, I will sometimes omit the rule name when referring to a label of a node.) Nodes may furthermore optionally be marked by indices and by an overline. Overlined nodes are called discharged. A node in a proof tree that is not dominated by any other node is called a premise of that proof tree. It follows from the above axioms that the undischarged premises of a proof tree are linearly ordered by the precedence relation. Likewise, a node that does not dominate any other node is called a conclusion of this proof tree, and the set of conclusions form a linear sequence as well. The set of proof trees is defined recursively by the subsequent rules. I tacitly assume that the sets of Curry-Howard variables used in distinct proof trees are mutually disjoint. 1 (id ) Every node labeled by x : A; id is a proof tree (where A is a category and x a variable with type τ (A)). 2 (Cut) If α is a proof tree with M1 : A1 , . . . , Mn An as its conclusions, and β1 , . . . , βk are proof trees with X, x1 : A1 ; id, . . . , xn : An ; id, Y as their undischarged premises, then α + β1 + · · · + βn is a proof tree as well, where α + β1 + · · · + βn is the result of replacing every occurrence of xi in βj (for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ k) by Mi , followed by a merging of the graphs by identifying nodes with identical labels.
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
131
3 (/I) If α is a proof tree with the single conclusion M : A and the sequence of undischarged premises X, x : B (where X is nonempty), then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of replacing x : B by x : B and extending the resulting graph by a node λxM : A/B; /I with M : A as its only premise. 4 (/E) If α is a proof tree with the conclusion sequence X, M : A/B, N : B, Y , then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of extending α with a new node M N : A; /E with M : A/B and N : B as its only premises. 5 (\I) If α is a proof tree with the single conclusion M : A and the sequence of undischarged premises x : B, X (where X is nonempty), then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of replacing x : B by x : B and extending the resulting graph by a node λxM : B\A; \I with M : A as its only premise. 6 (\E) If α is a proof tree with the conclusion sequence X, M : A, N : A\B, Y , then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of extending α with a new node N M : B; \E with M : A and N : A\B as its only premises. 7 (•I) If α is a proof tree with the conclusion sequence X, M : A, N : B, Y , then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of extending α with a new node M, N : A • B; •I with M : A and N : B as its only premises. 8 (•E) If α is a proof tree with the conclusion sequence X, M : A • B, Y , then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of extending α with a two nodes, (M )0 : A; •E and (M )1 : B; •E, each of which has M : A • B as its only premise, such that the first new node precedes the second one. 9 (|I) Let α be a proof tree with the conclusion sequence X, M1 : A1 |B, Y1 , . . . , Mn : An |B, Yn , and β a proof tree with X , x1 : A1 , Y1 , . . . , xn : An , Yn as sequence of undischarged premises (where X , Yi are like X, Yi except that all formulae are labeled with variables) and N : C as single conclusion. Then γ is a proof tree as well, where γ is the result of 1. replacing all occurrences of xi in β with Mi y, 2. replacing all occurrences of variables occuring in X , Yi by the corresponding terms from X, Yi , and 3. merging the two graphs by identifying all nodes with identical labels and having each Mi : Ai |B immediately dominate Mi y : Ai , and 4. extending the resulting graph by a new node λyN : C|B; |I with N : C as only premise.
132
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
10 (|E) If α is a proof tree with the conclusion sequence X, M : A, Y, N : B|A, Z, then α is a proof tree as well, where α is the result of replacing M : A by [M : A]i (i being a fresh index) and extending the resulting graph with a new node [N M : B]i ; |E with N : B|A as its only premise. 11 If α and β are proof trees, then the sequence α, β is a proof tree as well, where every node in α precedes every node in β. 12 Nothing else is a proof tree. A sequent X ⇒ M : A is derivable by natural deduction in tree format iff there is a proof tree α that has X as its sequence of undischarged assumptions and M : A as its sole conclusion. As in the other two proof formats discussed so far, Cut is redundant and can be eliminated:
Theorem 12 (Cut elimination for natural deduction) If LLC X ⇒ M : A, then there is Cut free natural deduction proof in tree format for X ⇒ M : A. Proof: The proof is essentially identical to the corresponding proof for sequent style natural deduction. If the second input to a Cut rule is an identity axiom, the output of Cut is identical to the first input, and the Cut can be eliminated. If the second input is itself the output of a rule R, we apply Cut to the input of this rule first and apply R to the output of Cut. Since no rule except Cut increases the set of undischarged premises, this permutation is always possible. Identifying the degree of a Cut with the complexity of the Curry-Howard term of its conclusion, every Cut elimination step reduces the degree of the Cut, and the algorithm is thus bound to terminate. Both natural deduction calculi derive the same set of sequents. The proof is somewhat blurred by the fact that intermediate steps in the tree format may have multiple conclusions. So we again need the notion of product closure from Definition 26 on page 55, this time applied to labeled formulae:
Definition 39 (Labeled product closure) 1 σ(M : A) = M : A 2 σ(X, M : A) = N, M : B • A, where σ(X) = N : B.
Theorem 13 (Equivalence of sequent and tree format) X ⇒ M : A is derivable in sequent style natural deduction iff there is
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
133
a proof tree with X as sequence of undischarged assumptions and Y as sequence of conclusions such that M : A is αβη-equivalent to σ(Y ). Proof: Both directions are proved by induction over derivations. I start with the only-if direction. The base case is the identity axiom, where the claim is obviously true. The rules for /I, /E, \I, \E and •I in the two formats are hardly more than notational variants from each other, and the induction steps for them are trivial. The result of a •E step in tree format can be obtained in sequent format by combining (sequent style counterparts of) the premise of the rule with the theorem x : A, y : B ⇒ x, y : A • B via •E. As for |I, suppose the induction hypothesis holds. This means that Γ ⇒ σ(X, M1 : A1 |B, Y1 , . . . , Mn , An |B, Yn ) (where Γ is the sequence of undischarged assumptions of α), and X , x1 : A1 , Y1 , . . . , xn , An , Yn ⇒ N : C. From the latter sequent we can derive X , z1 : A1 |B, Y1 , . . . , zn , An |B, Yn ⇒ λyN [zi y/xi ] : C via the sequent rule |I and n instances of the identity axiom. From this and the former sequent we can derive Γ ⇒ λyN : C via Cut and possibly several applications of •E, where N is a term from which N [Mi y/xi ] can be obtained via a sequence of β-reduction steps. Now consider |E. By induction hypothesis we assume that Γ ⇒ σ(X, M : A, Y, N : B|A, Z), and we have to show that then, Γ ⇒ O : C as well, where O : C is αβη-equivalent to σ(X, M : A, Y, N M : B, Z). Suppose the premise holds. It is easy to see that X , x : A, Y , y : B|A, Z ⇒ σ(X , x : A, Y , yx : B, Z ) is derivable, using one |E-step and a series of product introductions. From that and the other assumption, we derive the conclusion via Cut and possibly a sequence of product eliminations. Finally, the induction step for the sequencing rule corresponds to •I in the sequent format. Now we turn to the if-direction. Again, the induction base is obvious, and the induction steps for /I, /E, \I, \E and •I are trivial. Consider •E. By induction hypothesis, there is a proof tree leading from the undischarged premise sequence X to the conclusion M : A • B. (If the witness for an induction hypothesis has multiple conclusions, we can always turn it into a single-conclusion tree by applying •I.) Applying one •E step leads to a proof tree with the conclusions (M )0 : A and (M )1 : B. The second induction hypothesis states that there is a proof tree leading from the premises Y, x : A, y : B, Z to the conclusion N : C. These two proof trees can be combined to a new proof tree via Cut that leads from the premises Y, X, Z to the conclusion N : C. Now consider |I. By induction hypothesis, there are proof trees leading from the premises Zi to the conclusions Ni : Ai |C, and there is a proof tree leading from X, x1 : A1 , Y1 , . . . , xn : An , Yn to the con-
134
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
clusion M : B. The former set of proof trees can be combined with the sequences of identity axioms X , Yi (which are like X, Yi except that they only use variables as Curry-Howard labels) to a proof tree with the premises X , Z1 , Y1 , . . . , Zn , Yn and the conclusions X , Ni : Ai |C, Y1 , . . . , Nn : An |C, Yn via the sequencing rule. Combining this proof tree with the proof tree corresponding to the other premise of the sequent rule via |I, we obtain a proof tree leading from the premises X, Z1 , Y1 , . . . , Zn , Yn to the conclusion λzM [Ni z/xi ] : B|C. Finally we turn to rule |E. By induction hypothesis, there is a proof tree α leading from X to M : A, a proof tree β leading from Y to N : B|A, and a proof tree γ leading from Z, x : A, W, y : B, U to O : C. α and β can be combined with a series of identity axioms to a proof tree leading from Z, X, W, Y, U to Z, M : A, W, N : B|A, U via the sequencing rule. From there we obtain a proof tree with the same premises and the conclusion sequence Z, M : A, W, N M : B, U by applying |E once. This proof tree can be combined with γ via Cut, leading to a proof tree with the premises Z, X, W, Y, U and the conclusion O[M/x][N M/y] : C. The graphical representation of proof trees that I used in Chapter 2 is easier to work with (but possibly somewhat ambiguous; therefore I gave the precise definition above). The rules are schematically given in Figure 3.9 on the facing page. The rules for the Lambek connectives are identical to the rules in the natural deduction presentation of L from Chapter 2. Here we (again) coindex discharged assumptions with the point in the derivation where they are discharged. It should be noted that the graphical representation may be misleading sometimes since it might convey the impression that the inference rules are declarative graph admissibility conditions rather than procedural rules for graph constructions. The pseudo-proof tree in Figure 3.10 on page 136 may serve to illustrate this point. While the structure seems to conform to the rules from Figure 3.9 on the facing page, it is actually impossible to prove that this is a proof tree because the definition of \I requires that it operates on a single conclusion proof tree—therefore it can only be applied to a graph that excludes the node z : C|A—while the definition for |E requires that x : A and z : C|A are both conclusions of the same proof tree. These conditions cannot simultaneously be fulfilled, and the graph is thus not a proof tree. Accordingly, the ‘proven’ sequent y : B, z : C|A ⇒ λxx, y, zx : (A\(A • B)) • C is not derivable. In addition to better readability, the tree format for natural deduction has two advantages over the sequent format. First, proof trees are ambiguous with regard to the derivation history. It might occur that
135
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction i
.. . .. .
x:A .. .
λxM : A\B
.. . .. .
M :A
N : A\B
(N M ) : B
M :B
.. . .. .
.. . .. .
\E
\I, i
i x:A .. .
M : A/B
N :B /E
(M N ) : A
M :B /I, i λxM : B/A
M :A
N :B
M, N : A • B
M :A•B
•I
(M )0 : A
[M : A]i
(M )1 : B
···
N : B|A NM : B
M1 : A1 |B .. . .. .
M1 x : A1 .. .
i1
M2 : A2 |B .. . .. .
M2 x : A2 .. .
i2
N :C λxN : C|B Figure 3.9.
Mn : An |B .. . .. .
Mn x : An .. .
in
•E
|E, i
.. . .. .
|I, i1 , . . . , in
Natural deduction in tree format
several sequences of rule application lead to the same proof tree. A simple case in point is the following instance of the associativity law: A • B, C • D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D
136
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
[x : A]i
1
y:B
x, y : A • B λxx, y : A\(A • B)
•I
[z : C|A]i
\I, 1
zx : C
λxx, y, zx : (A\(A • B)) • C Figure 3.10.
|E
•I
An illicit Natural Deduction derivation
There are two natural deduction sequent proofs for this sequent, since there is a choice whether the first or the second product is eliminated first. They are given in Figure 3.11 and 3.12 respectively. However, this proof ambiguity is spurious since both proofs produce the same CurryHoward term, namely (x)0 , (x)1 , (y)0 , (y)1 . When working with natural deduction in tree format, both rule serializations lead to the same graph (given in Figure 3.13 on the next page).
A⇒A
A•B ⇒A•B
C •D ⇒C •D
id
id
id
B⇒B
id
C⇒C
B, C ⇒ B • C
A, B, C ⇒ A • (B • C)
id •I
•I
D⇒D
A, B, C, D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D
A, B, C • D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D A • B, C • D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D
id •I
•E
•E
Figure 3.11.
A⇒A
C •D ⇒C •D
id
A•B ⇒A•B
id
id
B⇒B
id
C⇒C
B, C ⇒ B • C
A, B, C ⇒ A • (B • C)
•I
•I
A, B, C, D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D
A • B, C, D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D
A • B, C • D ⇒ A • (B • C) • D
id
D⇒D
id •I
•E
•E
Figure 3.12.
Quite generally, proof trees do not represent serializations of subproofs that do not affect each other, i.e., that are essentially computed in parallel. This is reminiscent of the tree format for context free derivations
137
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
A•B A
B
•E
B•C A • (B • C)
C •D C
•I
D
•E
•I
A • (B • C) • D
•I
Figure 3.13.
which skips over inessential aspects of the serialization of derivation steps. The other advantage of the tree format lies in the fact that there is a tight correspondence between the structure of proofs and the syntactic structure of the accompanying Curry-Howard terms. An inspection of the inference rules reveals that, with one exception, the proof term M is a direct subterm of the proof term N if and only if the node labeled with M is either a premise of the node labeled with N , or M is coindexed with N due to an application of |E. There is just one exception to this generalization: if a proof term M x has been constructed by means of the upper part of |I, the variable x does not correspond to any node in the proof tree.
3.4.2 Proof Normalization Similarly to the natural deduction presentation of Intuitionistic Logic (≈ full typed λ-calculus), we can define a notion of proof normalization over proof trees in LLC. This is a procedure that removes redundant steps from proofs, i.e., sequences of proof steps where a connective is introduced and eliminated immediately afterwards or vice versa. Such detours can occur with any of the four connectives. I start with the Lambek implications. A proof where a / is introduced and eliminated in the next step leads to a Curry-Howard term that contains a β-redex. Such a proof can be replaced by a simpler proof of the same formula that avoids these two steps. On the level of proof terms, this transformation corresponds to one β-reduction step, and thus this operation is called β-normalization. It is schematically given in Figure 3.14. A similar redundancy arises if a / is eliminated and re-introduced in the next step. This leads to an η-redex in the term, and eliminating this detour is called η-normalization. It is given in Figure 3.15 on the following page.
138
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR .. . .. .
.. . .. .
1 .. .
x:A .. .
.. .
M :B
;
/I, 1
.. .
N :A
λxM : B/A
.. .
N :A .. .
M [N/x] : B
/E (λxM )N : B Figure 3.14.
β-normalization for /
.. . 1 x:B
M : A/B
/E
.. .
;
Mx : A
M : A/B /I, 1
λx.M x : A/B Figure 3.15.
η-normalization for /
Corresponding patterns arise for \ as well. They are the perfect mirror images of the ones given above and therefore omitted. An instance of •I immediately followed by •E leads to a β-normalization configuration too, and the inverse pattern to an η-redex. The reduction schemes are given in Figure 3.16 and 3.17 on the facing page. .. .
.. .
M :A
N :B
M, N : A • B (M, N )0 : A
;
•I
(M, N )1 : B Figure 3.16.
•E
.. .
.. .
M :A
N :B
β-normalization for •
The β-normalization pattern for | is somewhat more complex. Again, such a pattern can arise if an introduction step is immediately followed by an elimination step. However, since |I involves not just λ-abstraction but also n instances of application on the level of terms, the |E in the redex configuration is replaced by n instances of |E after reduction (cf. Figure 3.19 on page 140).
139
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction .. . M :A•B (M )0 : A
(M )1 : B
(M )0 , (M )1 : A • B Figure 3.17.
.. .
;
•E
M :A•B
•I
η-normalization for •
Due to the fact that |I involves application on the level of terms as well as λ-abstraction, a combination of two instances of |I may also lead to a β-redex. This is illustrated in Figure 3.20 on page 141. Finally, an η-normalization configuration for | can occur if the two components of |I are not separated by a real deduction (in other words, if the second input to |I is an identity axiom). The configuration is given in Figure 3.18. .. . M : A|B
;
i Mx : A λx.M x : A|B
|I, i
Figure 3.18.
.. . M : A|B
η-normalization for |
Due to the absence of Contraction as a structural rule in LLC, it is easy to establish that there are no infinite sequences of normalization steps starting from a given proof.
Theorem 14 (Strong normalization) Normalization always terminates after finitely many steps. Proof: Each normalization configuration given above reduces the number of instances of introduction rules in a proof (while it may increase the number of elimination rules). Since this parameter must be a nonnegative integer, there cannot be infinite normalization sequences. Furthermore, every proof tree has a unique normal form. To establish this, we have to modify the Curry-Howard labeling slightly. In the modified calculus, both participants in a |E-step are marked on the level of terms. The antecedent of the anaphora resolution becomes the argument of a fresh variable with an identity type. So if M in the rule below
140
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR M1 : A1 |B
.. .
···
.. . .. .
M1 x : A1 .. .
i1
Mn : An |B .. . .. .
Mn x : An .. .
N :C
[O : B]i
λxN : C|B (λxN )O : C
in
.. . .. .
|I, i1 , . . . , in |E, i
; M1 : A1 |B .. .
···
[· · · [O : B]i1 · · ·]in
.. . .. .
M1 O : A1 .. .
|E, i1
Mn : An |B .. . .. .
Mn O : An .. .
|E, in
.. . .. .
N [O/x] : C Figure 3.19.
β-normalization for |, first configuration
has type τ (A), x has type τ (A), τ (A). The modified rule is given in Figure 3.21 on the facing page. The reason for this move is the following: With the original labeling, it might occur that a proof contains a redex configuration but normalization cannot be applied because one of the intermediate steps that would disappear by normalization is used as antecedent for |E. Therefore according to the original labeling, there are proofs that are in normal form but that have Curry-Howard labels that are not in normal form. (Following standard terminology, I say that a proof is in normal form if no normalization step can be applied to it.) With the modified calculus, this possibility is excluded. This modified labeling simplifies the proof of the following lemma.
Lemma 2 If an LLC-proof tree is in normal form, all Curry-Howard terms occurring in it are in αβη-normal form. Proof: We prove this by contraposition. Suppose a proof tree contains a Curry-Howard term that contains a redex configuration M . M cannot be a variable, and all other subterms occurring in an LLC-proof are labels of some node in that proof. So M is the label of some node. M
141
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction M1 : A1 |B .. . .. .
M1 x : A1 .. .
Mn : An |B
i1
.. . .. .
Mn x : An .. .
N : Ck O1 : C1 |B .. . .. .
O1 y : C1 .. .
j1
λxN : Ck |B .. . .. .
(λxN )y : Ck .. .
in
.. . .. .
|I, i1 , . . . , in
Om : Cm |B
jk
P [(λxN )y/z] : D λyP [(λxN )y/z] : D|B
.. . .. .
Om y : Cm .. .
jm
.. . .. .
jm
.. . .. .
|I, j1 , . . . , jm
; M1 : A1 |B
O1 : C1 |B .. . .. .
O1 y : C1 .. .
j1
.. . .. .
.. . .. .
M1 y : A1 .. .
Mn : An |B
i1
.. . .. .
Mn y : An .. .
N [y/x] : Ck .. . P [N [y/x]/z] : D λyP [N [y/x]/z] : D|B
Figure 3.20.
in
.. . .. .
Om : Cm |B .. . .. .
Om y : Cm .. .
|I, j1 , . . . , jk−1 , i1 , . . . , in , jk+1 , . . . , jm
β-normalization for |, second configuration [M : A]i
···
xM : A Figure 3.21.
N : B|A NM : B
|E, i
Modified rule |E
may either be a β-redex or an η-redex. Suppose it is a β-redex. We have to distinguish several cases. 1 M = (λxN )O, and this term is the result of an application of /E. Then the premises of this node are λxN : A/B and O : B, and the former is in turn the conclusion of a node N : A; /I. This is thus a β-normalization configuration for /. 2 M = (λxN )O, and this term is the result of an application of \E. Here the same argument applies as above. 3 M = (λxN )O : A, and this term is the result of an application of |E. This entails that M is coindexed with a preceding node O : B, and that it is the sole conclusion of a node λxN : A|B.
142
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
This node in turn must be the sole conclusion of a term N : A due to |I. This is thus an instance of the first configuration for β-reduction for |. 4 M = (λxN )y : A, and it is coindexed with a |I-node λyO that it dominates. This is thus an instance of the second configuration of β-reduction for |. 5 M = (N, O)0 : A. Then M must be the left conclusion of a node N, O : A • B due to •E, the right conclusion of this node is (N, O)1 : B, and the premise itself is the conclusion of the two premises N : A and O : B due to •I. This is thus a β-normalization configuration for •. 6 M = (N, O)1 : A. Likewise. Now suppose M is an η-redex. Again we have to distinguish several cases. (I tacitly assume below that x does not occur in N .) 1 M = λx.N x : A/B. Then M must be the conclusion of N x : A due to /I, which in turn is the conclusion of N : A/B and x : B due to /I. This is an η-normalization configuration for /. 2 M = λx.N x : A\B. Likewise. 3 M = λx.N x : A|B. Then M is the conclusion of N x due to |I, i, and this in turn is the conclusion of N : A|B. Since |I can only be applied to proof trees with a single conclusion, N x : A neither precedes nor is preceded by any other node within this proof tree. Therefore it cannot be an operand of |E, and therefore the application of N to x is due to the upper part of |I. This is an η-normalization configuration for |I. 4 M = (N )0 , (N )1 . This means that M is the conclusion of the two nodes (N )0 and (N )1 via •I, which in turn are the coconclusions of N via •E. This is an η-normalization configuration for •. So whenever a proof tree contains a Curry-Howard label in non-normal form, it is not in normal form itself. By contraposition, normal form proofs only produce normal form labels. As with the original Curry-Howard labeling, there is a direct correspondence between the structure of a proof and the syntactic structure of its Curry-Howard term.
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
143
Lemma 3 If two proof trees Π1 and Π2 have the same sequence of undischarged premise types and the same sequence of conclusion types, and if the sequences of the Curry-Howard terms of their conclusions are identical up to uniform renaming of variables (free or bound), then Π1 and Π2 are isomorphic. Proof: By induction over the complexity of Curry-Howard terms.
From these lemmas we can immediately conclude that normal forms for LLC-proofs are unique.
Theorem 15 (Normal form theorem) Every LLC-proof has a unique normal form up to α-equivalence of Curry-Howard terms. Proof: An inspection of the normalization configurations given above shows that every proof normalization step is accompanied by at least one βη-reduction step in one of the Curry-Howard terms of one of its conclusions. So proof normalization preserves Curry-Howard labels up to αβη-equivalence. From this and lemma 2 we can conclude that for any LLC-proof Π and any normal form Π obtained from Π via proof normalization, the Curry-Howard terms of the conclusions of Π are the normal forms of the Curry-Howard terms of the conclusions of Π. Due to Lemma 3, any normal form Π of Π must thus be isomorphic to Π , and due to the normalization theorem for the typed λ-calculus, the CurryHoward terms of Π and Π are identical up to alphabetic variance. The Curry-Howard labeling of an LLC-proof according to the original calculus can be obtained from the modified labels by replacing subterms of the form (xA,A MA ) by MA . Since this operation is functional, normal forms for proofs according to the original calculus are unique as well (even though their Curry-Howard labels need not be in normal form). From this we can infer the corollary
Corollary 3 (Church-Rosser property) Proof normalization is confluent. Proof: Immediately from the normal form theorem.
Let us summarize so far and see how far we got with the agenda from the beginning of the chapter. LLC is an extension of the Lambek calculus, and it admits resource multiplication in syntax. This can be seen from the fact that both |E and |I can lead to Curry-Howard terms where one
144
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
λ-operator binds several variable occurrences, or where the label of an antecedent formula of a sequent occurs several times in the succedent. Thus far LLC is similar to Hepple’s system. However, LLC has several advantages at least from a proof theorist’s point of view. It has a sequent presentation and a natural deduction presentation that both admit Cut elimination. The sequent system enjoys the subformula property, and thence the system is decidable and has the finite-reading property. The natural deduction system has a natural connection to the structure of the accompanying Curry-Howard terms, and we can define a well-behaved notion of proof normalization that is strongly normalizing and confluent.
3.4.3 Model Theory The anaphora slash is a hyperintensional operator. Even if two categories A and B are interderivable, C|A and C|B need not be interderivable. For instance, it holds in LLC that A • (B • C) ⇔ (A • B) • C but nevertheless LLC C|(A • (B • C)) ⇒ C|((A • B) • C) and LLC C|((A • B) • C) ⇒ C|(A • (B • C)) This makes it difficult to develop a sound and complete model theory for LLC along the lines of the semantics for L that was described in Chapter 1. There, the intension of a category, i.e., the set of points that verify it, is compositionally derived from the intensions of their immediate components. If validity is defined as preservation of truth in all models and the interpretation is sound and complete, two interderivable categories are verified by exactly the same points. Therefore they have the same intension and should be interchangable in more complex categories salva veritate. Before I start to develop a hyperintensional semantics for LLC, I will briefly motivate this unusual feature. Conceptually A|B is a substructural version of the constructive implication B → A. Implications are downward monotonic in their first argument and upward monotonic in the second: A⇒B
A⇒B
B→C⇒A→C
C→A⇒C→B
The second inference scheme does hold for the anaphora slash:
145
Lambek Calculus with Limited Contraction
A⇒B A|C ⇒ B|C Suppose we would try to add the second scheme to LLC. With CurryHoward labeling, we would get x : A ⇒ M (x) : B y : C|B ⇒ λz.yM (z) : C|A Imagine there are two non-equivalent proofs for A ⇒ B: x : A ⇒ M1 (x) : B
x : A ⇒ M2 (x) : B
with M1 = M2 . With the rules of LLC plus the above monotonicity rule, we could derive x : A, y : C|B, z : C|B ⇒ x, λw.yM1 (w), λu.zM2 (u) : A • C|A • C|A Applying slash elimination twice gives us x : A, y : C|B, z : C|B ⇒ x, yM1 (x), zM2 (x) : A • C • C Linguistically speaking, this means that the resource x : A, which is structurally ambiguous between the readings M1 and M2 if conceived as a B, can be used as an antecedent for the first anaphor in one reading and as antecedent for the second anaphor in the second reading. Admitting Monotonicity thus predicts that a string like the boy who knows old men and women can simultaneously antecede an anaphoric pronoun referring to the boy who knows women and old men, and another pronoun that refers to the boy that knows old men and old women. Natural language anaphora does not work like this, so the second argument of the anaphora slash cannot be downward monotonic. It cannot be upward monotonic either because then we could not interpret it as a constructive implication. But why not admitting a rule like the following? (3)
x : A ⇒ M (x) : B
y : B ⇒ N (y) : A
z : C|A ⇒ λw.zN (M (N (w))) : C|B The same conceptual reasons that speak against downward monotonicity can also be used as arguments against this kind of intensional compositionality. Structural ambiguity can also arise in reversible sequents.
146
ANAPHORA AND TYPE LOGICAL GRAMMAR
Suppose we augment LLC with the conjunction , which has the same Curry-Howard labeling as the product but is interpreted as set intersection in relational models. The following two labeled sequents come out as theorems: x : A A ⇒ (x)0 , (x)0 : A A x : A A ⇒ (x)1 , (x)1 : A A Together with the rule (3), we can derive x : B|(A A) ⇒ λy.x(y)0 , (y)0 : B|(A A) x : B|(A A) ⇒ λy.x(y)1 , (y)1 : B|(A A) This in turn makes the following derivable: x : A A