America Embattled
What causes anti-Americanism and where are its historical roots? What is the impact of September 11 ...
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America Embattled
What causes anti-Americanism and where are its historical roots? What is the impact of September 11 on America’s sense of itself and its role in the world? Is America, paradoxically, a victim of its own political and economic power? This book seeks to understand the terrible attacks of September 11 within a broader historical, political and ideological context. Rather than drawing on simple “clash of civilizations” oppositions, the author argues that it is important to have an awareness of the complex historical processes that influence: • • •
America’s sense of itself and its changing view of the world How the world, especially the Muslim world, views America The changing nature of international politics and the global system since the end of the Cold War
Drawing on a wide variety of contemporary and historical sources, Richard Crockatt has written a balanced, subtle, and highly readable book which provides genuine insight into American foreign policy, anti-Americanism, and Islamic fundamentalism. It will be important reading for all those seeking to understand the background to the “war on terror.” Richard Crockatt is Reader in American History at the University of East Anglia. His award-winning The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991 is also published by Routledge.
America Embattled September 11, anti-Americanism, and the global order
Richard Crockatt
First published 2003 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2003. © 2003 Richard Crockatt All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-30449-7 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-34559-2 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0–415–28341–8 (hbk) ISBN 0–415–28342–6 (pbk)
This book is for Julia
Contents
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Contents
Preface Acknowledgments
ix xv
September 11, 2001
1
1 How America sees the world: historical perspectives America and the world: the perceptual gap 7 Patterns in the past 9 The question of isolationism 13 Expansion and growth 17 An American empire? 21 A democratic republic? 24 Government and the people or government versus the people? 34 2 How the world sees America: the causes and consequences of anti-Americanism A very British story 39 The meanings of anti-Americanism 43 Americanism and the nature of American nationalism 46 Americanization and anti-Americanism 51 Varieties of anti-Americanism and September 11 57 Conclusion 69 3 The roots of terror: Islam, the Middle East, and the United States The rise of political Islam 75 Palestinian–Israeli conflict 88
7
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viii Contents The Middle East and the American connection 93 The crucible of terrorism: the Afghan War of 1979–88 and its aftermath 98 Conclusions 106 4 The limits of governance: globalization, terrorism, and the transformation of international politics since 1989 The shock of the new 108 The end of the Cold War and its consequences: ideas of order and disorder 109 Globalization and its limits 115 Elements of instability 119 Governance and its limits 130 5 Responding to terror: George W. Bush and American foreign policy The office and the man 137 Bush in relation to his predecessors 141 September 11 and the war on terrorism 146 The politics of the coalition against terrorism 148 Complications in the war against terrorism 151 The war on terrorism and the nature of American foreign policy 160
108
136
Conclusion
162
Notes Bibliography Index
167 186 195
Preface
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Preface
There can be no doubting the enormity of the terrorist attacks of September 11, whether one is referring to their costs to human individuals or to their impact on the larger fabric of American life. America has been shaken to its core. Moreover, because the United States lies at the center of world politics and the global economic system, because the nations of the world are increasingly interdependent, and because the full horror of the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC was played out on television around the world, the impact of these events was inescapably global. People around the world have as much at stake in what happens now as do the people of the United States. No single analysis can hope to encompass all the ramifications of September 11. What follows focuses firstly on what these events reveal about the United States, its history, and present foreign policies, including American and overseas perceptions of the United States’ international role. Despite the vast volume of the information about the United States that daily floods our media, or perhaps in part because of it, America remains a baffling presence to many observers. In this book, I look behind some of the cruder stereotypes of the United States with the aim of understanding the country from the inside. The second area of concern is the global political system, the environment in which American foreign policy is pursued. The relationship between these two fields constitutes the subject of the book. The main claim of the book is that September 11 must be understood in the light of the interaction between America’s dominant international position since the end of the Cold War, the rise of political Islam, and the complex set of phenomena that comes under the heading of globalization. These are themselves admittedly large questions involving a range of themes, each of which merits book-length study. These include, besides the politics and history of the United States, globalization,
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terrorism, conflict in the Middle East, the nature of Islam, and the role of the United Nations and other international organizations. Each of these is discussed in the book, though no claim is made to definitive treatment. The justification for the ambitious approach adopted here is that the interplay between America and the world is of the essence in understanding September 11. Such an approach means crossing boundaries between fields that are often kept distinct. The first boundary is between study of the United States and study of the wider world. American studies often means study only of America and largely of its domestic history and culture. Even American foreign policy history, by the admission of some of its practitioners, is often characterized by parochialism.1 On the other hand, international relations frequently means study of the international system in isolation from the internal histories of the nations that make up the international community or with only perfunctory reference to them. Of course, nations, as we are repeatedly reminded, are a threatened species in the era of globalization, but they still constitute the primary loyalty of most people, and there is no avoiding the attempt to understand their workings; globalization does not mean that we can abandon this effort but rather that we need to develop more complex approaches to match the growing complexities of our world. In the following chapters, I draw on national, international, and global perspectives. If September 11 has taught us anything, it is that the internal histories of nations and the international environment are deeply implicated in each other. The second boundary is between study of the present and study of the past or, in terms of academic fields, between political science and history. For many, history is regarded as at best “useful background” to the present; for others, it is primarily an ideological battleground fought over by political groups who seek to exploit the past for their own ideological purposes. From this point of view, as one scholar has put it, “The past provides a reserve of reference and symbol for the present; it does not explain it.”2 Both these approaches have their place. It certainly is the case that a knowledge of the historical background to current events can be highly useful; among other things, it can prevent us from making gross misjudgments about the present. Concerning the view that history is ideology, there is undoubtedly also a sense in which parties in conflict continually invent and reinvent pasts for themselves to suit whatever political or cultural ends they have in view and, to that extent, they are not in dispute about what actually happened, only about what they would like to have happened. However, history plays a more organic role in the life of the present than either of these perspectives implies. The past is present not only as background or as ideology but as experience that has become embodied
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in assumptions, habits of mind and institutions, and ultimately in what we call culture. That is why it is so difficult to shift. I make no apology for delving deep into America’s past for clues to present dilemmas or for taking the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the First World War as the starting point for my discussion of the rise of political Islam. These are the methodological considerations that have guided the writing of this book. Before going on to outline the organization and themes, it is as well to acknowledge the dangers of attempting to draw conclusions too quickly while events are still in motion. Historians of all people know the risks of trying to second-guess the outcomes of current events. History teaches that unpredictability is the only real certainty. This book was written in the knowledge that a year from now (this is being written in June 2002) the world could be a very different place. While making judgments about policies and events on the basis of the materials to hand, I indulge neither in prediction nor policy recommendations. This book is rather a provisional map of the territory that will be filled in in greater detail as time goes on. There is the further risk in writing so soon after the event of intellectualizing a subject about which emotions are unavoidably deeply engaged. A British journalist resident in Washington, DC wrote shortly after the attacks, “On the campus where I am writing this, there are a few students and professors willing to venture points about US foreign policy. But they do so very guardedly and it would be profane apologetics if transmitted live. So the analytical moment, if there is to be one, has been indefinitely postponed.”3 Of course, the analytical moment cannot be postponed forever, nor has it been, though in the United States it has been approached much more cautiously than elsewhere, for obvious reasons. Some have argued that the controversy that arose in mid-May 2002 over whether or how much the White House knew about the risk of terrorist attacks prior to September 11 represented the return of politics as usual in the United States. From this point of view, the United States had now reached the point, which other countries had reached much earlier, at which September 11 could be examined and discussed almost like any other political event. Judgments about this will vary, but the evidence would suggest a complex picture. On the one hand, questions began to be asked in Congress and the media in the early summer of 2002 that could only with difficulty have been raised earlier, and to that extent September 11 had become “history.” On the other hand, there were few indications that the majority of Americans were prepared to declare open season on this issue. There was too much at stake, too many open wounds, and unresolved questions. Significantly, after initial attacks on President Bush himself by prominent Democrats, attention was
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quickly redirected toward the failings of the FBI and its director. President Bush’s reorganization of internal security, which involved the establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security, indicated an effort to draw a line under the issue. It may, as some suggested, have been politically motivated— an exercise in political self-defense on the president’s part with an eye on upcoming Congressional elections—but there was considerable caution among the American public about pushing this issue in ways that could have compromised the effectiveness of the war against terrorism.4 The sense of shock remained in America and continued to determine policy. The present book is that of an outsider but one concerned above all to understand rather than to judge or condemn. It is a continual source of surprise to me that so many commentators are willing to write off entire nations and cultures with the stroke of a pen on the basis of a very simple tool kit of moral ideas.5 This applies as much to judgments about conflict in the Middle East as to America and September 11 and, indeed, all conflicts in which deep questions of political identity and justice are involved. It should be possible to discuss these questions without becoming absorbed by the passions and viewpoints of one or another of the parties to conflict, important as it is to seek an understanding of these passions. Despite the temptation to let feelings rule, I want to advocate the virtues of a complex response to the events of September 11. By the same token, however, excessive detachment is probably as futile as an excess of passion, if less dangerous. Judgments are unavoidable. In this regard, I should make it plain that my motivation for writing this book came in part from an awareness of the hugely oversimplified images of the United States with which many media commentators were operating. There may be something in the way Americans present themselves to the outside world that gives rise to such caricatures and distortions, an issue dealt with in the second chapter of this book, but it is important to look beyond the stereotypes. There are many who insist, rightly in my view, on the need to acknowledge the complexity and diversity of the Muslim world but who are happy to traffic in the crudest images of the United States and its people. Those who have visited the United States know that it is a large and diverse country that tolerates ranges of lifestyles and social behavior that would be inconceivable in many other countries. They know that many of the images of the United States presented in the media are unrepresentative, that, for example, big-city America is only one facet of America and that a large proportion of Americans live in small and medium-sized towns. Those who have studied the United States know that for every supposedly typical image of America, one can find its opposite. Americans, we are told, are inveterate individualists, but they are
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also the most community-minded of peoples, a nation of “joiners.” America is the home of futuristic urbanism par excellence, but its heart—the “real” America, middle America—is in its small towns and farms. America is said to be an intolerant country full of bigots, but it has the strongest free-speech laws in the world. With its legacy of slavery and racial discrimination, America has been a byword for racial conflict, yet it has gone farther than any other nation to promote multiculturalism and racial and ethnic tolerance. Americans are devoted to materialist values and the cult of consumerism, yet America has a deep and abiding Puritan tradition. Few countries have insisted so rigidly on the separation of church and state, yet religious observance is higher than in any other advanced industrial society, and America’s public life is saturated with the language of religion. One could go on. Even these polarities scarcely meet the case; they are the beginning of analysis, not the end of it. The point should be clear. Simplified images are dangerous tools of analysis and are certainly dangerous politically. A number of questions have guided me in writing this book, each having a chapter devoted to it. First, what did the American response to September 11 reveal about America’s view of the outside world and why is there such an apparent gap between the scale of America’s influence in the world and Americans’ habitual perception of it? (chapter 1). Second, what are the sources of the radical alienation from the United States manifested in the terrorist attacks and among those who actively or passively endorsed them? More generally, how is the phenomenon of anti-Americanism to be explained? (chapter 2). Third, what are the reasons for the rise of political Islam and what are the connections between September 11, conflict in the Middle East (including the Palestinian–Israeli crisis), and American involvement in the region? (chapter 3). Fourth, what possible links exist between September 11 and changes in the international political and economic environment in recent years? More specifically, are there new elements of instability that help to explain September 11? (chapter 4). Fifth, did the Bush administration’s response to September 11 represent a shift from unilateralism to multilateralism? Was the war on terrorism effective both as a response to September 11 and as the basis for foreign policy as a whole? (chapter 5). The conclusion addresses the issue of whether the necessary political and other resources exist in the United States and the international community to make the world a safer rather than a more dangerous place. Among the questions raised here, which is adumbrated in individual chapters, is whether the sheer size and power of the United States creates an imbalance in international politics.
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The book begins with an account of the events of September 11 and its immediate aftermath, as much to remind myself as to remind the reader that what provoked all this talk about international politics was the brute fact of the destruction of human lives and buildings. As experience, the two things— the physical carnage and high politics—are incommensurable, but they are also irrevocably connected. I have sought to do justice to both.
Acknowledgments
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Acknowledgments
I sat down at my desk on September 10, 2001, to begin a year’s sabbatical leave with a brief to write a history of American foreign policy. The changes that the following day brought to my life were minute compared with those experienced by numerous others inside and outside the United States. This book, nevertheless, is the result both of that shock and of reflection upon it. The UK Government Department of Education and Skills, in the form of the Arts and Humanities Research Board, and the University of East Anglia not only provided the funds that enabled me to take a sabbatical year but responded quickly and positively to my request to change the focus of my research and writing. Warm thanks are due to both institutions. Over the years, furthermore, the University of East Anglia has provided me with an opportunity to teach both American history and international relations, without which a venture such as the present one would not have been possible. I am grateful also to Craig Fowlie at Routledge who helped to push me in the direction I wanted to go. His advice and support have been of great help throughout. Three anonymous referees of the original proposal gave encouragement and useful advice. At an early stage, conversations with a number of individuals were instrumental in helping me to get started. These include Chris Bigsby, Mike Bowker, Mick Cox, Adam Fairclough, and John Thompson. Vivien Hart, David Corker, Jacqueline Fear-Segal, Adam Fairclough, and Eric Homberger passed on references or provided answers to questions. Several conversations with Tim Lang helped to clarify my ideas. Joe Illick, Roger Thompson, and Jim Sumberg each read one or more chapters, and their responses were of enormous help. Regular conversations with Jim Sumberg and Roger Thompson were invaluable supplements to their reading of various chapters. I am extremely grateful to Fred Halliday and Avi Shlaim for reading and commenting on the Middle
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Eastern chapter with such care and saving me from some errors. Needless to say, neither they nor any of the other readers can be held responsible for the final result, which is mine alone. My deepest debt is to my wife Julia, whose love and support have been, quite simply, essential.
September 11, 2001
1
September 11, 2001
On September 11, 2001, at around eight o’clock in the morning eastern daylight time, four passenger planes took off from various East Coast cities in the United States bound for destinations on the West Coast. Within an hour, all four had been taken over by hijackers and transformed into flying bombs, targeted at seats of American financial and governmental power. United Airlines flight 175, a Boeing 767 with 56 passengers and 9 crew, departed Boston’s Logan Airport at 7.58 AM; one minute later, American Airlines flight 11, also a Boeing 767, carrying 81 passengers and 11 crew, left the same airport. Both planes were bound for Los Angeles. At 8.45 AM, American Airlines flight 11 crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center in lower Manhattan, to be followed 21 minutes later by United Airlines flight 175, which flew into the south tower. A third plane, American Airlines flight 77, a Boeing 757 carrying 58 passengers and 6 crew, departed Washington’s Dulles airport at 8:10 AM, flew some distance toward its destination of Los Angeles, reversed course, and at 9.40 AM crashed into the Pentagon building in Washington, DC, headquarters of the United States Defense Department. A fourth plane, United Airlines 93, another Boeing 757 with 38 passengers and 7 crew aboard, left Newark, New Jersey, at 8:01 AM bound for San Francisco. After flying westward as far as Cleveland, it turned eastward and, at 10:37 AM, crashed into open ground in rural Pennsylvania some 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh. It is assumed that this plane’s intended target was another prominent building in Washington, possibly the White House or the Capitol building. It quickly emerged that passengers on some of the flights had been in contact by mobile phone with relatives in the minutes before impact, giving some insight into the methods, if not as yet the motives, of the hijackers. In some cases, passengers were told by the hijackers to contact relatives; in other cases, passengers locked themselves in toilet compartments and made frantic calls to
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September 11, 2001
loved ones to say goodbye. Each plane contained four or five hijackers who overpowered crews and resisting passengers with small knives, box-cutters (or Stanley knives in the United Kingdom), or razor blades embedded in plastic. Some crew members and some passengers were killed or wounded with these weapons. Threats that they had bombs were also used by the hijackers to take control of the crews and passengers. Among the hijackers, one or more on each plane, it later emerged, had received training in flying large jets and evidently directed the planes to their chosen targets. Aviation experts say that it is close to inconceivable that airline pilots would have flown the planes into the buildings in New York and Washington. While there is no definitive clue as to when the hijackers took over, expert opinion concludes that it was earlier rather than later, suggesting a high degree of piloting skill and training on the part of the hijackers. Conclusions such as these, in conjunction with the rapidly emerging information about the movements of the hijackers prior to the flights, suggested a high degree of planning and organization. Devastating as the attacks on New York and Washington were, it soon became apparent, in the light of names of analysis of passenger manifests, that at least two other planes may have been part of the overall plan. A plane due out of Boston around the same time as the two that hit the World Trade Center and also bound for the West Coast was grounded because of technical problems, while another flight from Newark to San Antonio was diverted to St Louis after news of the attacks on New York. The impacts of the planes on the twin towers of the World Trade Center did not initially, at least to the uninitiated, appear to threaten their collapse, but that is what happened within approximately an hour of the impacts. The south tower fell at 10.00 AM, trapping hundreds of rescuers in addition to unknown numbers of workers in the building. The north tower followed at 10.29 AM, raining more debris and rubble on rescuers and crushing several lower buildings in the immediate vicinity. Some hours later, at 5.25 PM, the adjacent forty-stor y World Trade Building collapsed. Meanwhile, in Washington, the Pentagon building had sustained serious damage to its west side containing the offices of many senior members of the American military. In the immediate aftermath, counting the cost in terms of human lives lost was a matter of pure speculation as desperate efforts were made to account for the whereabouts of employees of the numerous offices in the World Trade Center. A total of 50,000 was given as the possible maximum number of occupants of the towers, but this did not take account of the actual comings and goings of employees on that particular morning nor of the numbers who had managed to escape from the buildings between the impact of the first and
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second planes and prior to the collapse of the towers. Nor could precise numbers be established of rescue workers who had died in the attempt to save lives. Two weeks after the attacks, the number of dead and missing was given as in the region of 6,400, a figure that was based on matching of the names of the missing with those known to have been working in or visiting the towers.1 Few bodies were found, and it soon became apparent that few would be. Two weeks after the attacks, the New York Coroner’s Office announced that it was prepared to issue death certificates for those believed to have died in the towers, allowing relatives to end doubts about the fate of their loved ones and to make necessary financial and other arrangements. The losses at the Pentagon amounted to approximately 250, as against the 800 initially feared. On a day of the most extreme disorientation, government was as fully stretched as those involved directly in the rescue efforts. President Bush was visiting an elementary school in Florida when he was told of the attacks on the World Trade Center. He had been told of the crash on the first tower before entering a classroom to hear children read but, at this time, it was still thought possibly to have been an accident. News of the second plane reached the president when he was in the classroom in full view of television cameras and was clearly registered in his facial expression. After making a brief statement, he left Florida on the presidential airplane, Air Force One, bound, on the insistence of Vice-President Dick Cheney, for Offutt Air Force base in Nebraska, home of the United States Strategic Air Command. The advice reaching Bush from his closest advisors was that the White House and Air Force One were likely targets of terrorist attack. On Bush’s insistence that he issue a public statement, his plane touched down en route to Nebraska at Barksdale Airforce base in Louisiana, where he gave a brief statement before resuming his flight to Nebraska. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Colin Powell cut short a visit to Latin America, and members of both houses of Congress gathered on Capitol Hill, some expressing misgivings about the absence of the president from public view. In the early evening, President Bush finally returned to the White House and made a televised speech from the Oval Office. Nothing prepared viewers around the world for television images of the attacks except perhaps the wildest cartoon fantasies. From an early stage, discussion took place about whether these attacks represented a wholly new level of inhumanity, some insisting that populations in less favored nations than America had experienced greater catastrophes. Reports of air crashes in which hundreds die, natural disasters in which the dead are counted in thousands, mindnumbing acts of cruelty and destruction by individuals in all parts of the world, including vicious acts of terrorism: these have been a staple of news reports
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from all over the world in the last thirty years. Hijackings and attacks on passenger planes have been frequent enough to produce resigned shrugs rather than visceral shock. We have become partially anesthetized to disaster. After all, irrespective of threats to civilian order, war and the inversion of normal morality that so often goes with it are always going on somewhere in the world. In short, violence, destruction, cruelty, and death are givens in the modern world. Why should these acts have been regarded differently? The terrorists’ choice of targets was part of the answer. Within minutes of the attacks, television commentators were offering instant and somewhat crude and sensationalist cultural analysis of the symbolism of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the attack on the Pentagon. It is not necessary to indulge in such tasteless abstraction of the meaning of these acts from their human costs to be aware that the attackers chose their targets for maximum effect. These were attacks at America’s vitals with instruments of America’s own making, civilian airliners, which seemingly had nothing in common with weaponry. Some basic taboo was broken. Why would one seek to create defenses against a threat that could hardly be conceived to exist? The World Trade Center was designed to withstand all manner of likely threats from earthquakes to hurricanes, and it contained the full panoply of safety features associated with high-rise buildings, albeit over thirty years old. However, this was not a fortress. It was in the fullest sense defenseless against such concentrated human malice. The Pentagon, by contrast, had a military function and was secure against a greater range of threats than was the World Trade Center, though not evidently a determined attack using unexpected means from an unexpected quarter. Questions were quickly asked about the ease with which Washington, DC’s airspace was so easily penetrated; in the case of the Pentagon attack, it is more plausible to speak of a security lapse. There is enough evidence from the United States and other countries to demonstrate the vulnerability of government buildings to all kinds of attacks. Nevertheless, in conjunction with the destruction of the World Trade Center, the attack on the Pentagon was an act of the highest possible provocation, producing a corresponding level of shock. Nothing was more numbing that the recognition that a few well-organized individuals deploying surprise, targeted fanaticism, and relatively simple weapons could wreak such havoc on the world’s most powerful nation. There was also a sense that other boundaries had been crossed. One was between the serene normality of a working day and the utter chaos which resulted. The bonds between one day and the next, one moment and the next, had been broken. Moral boundaries had been crossed, too. The terrorists chose their own deaths, but the passengers were forced to participate not only
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in their own deaths but those of countless others, many of them their own countrymen and women. This was hardly war. Even war has rules of a sort. These acts went beyond war in that they exploited to the full the most vulnerable elements of civilian society in an atmosphere of total surprise. The immediacy of the television images breached another boundary—between reality and fantasy. In a disaster movie, viewers can enjoy letting the most graphic images lead the imagination on or they can look away if they are too much. On September 11, both options only reinforced the sense of actuality. There was the added horror of uncertainty about whether there was more to come and what form it might take. The human costs, or some of them, were visible at an early stage in the interviews with those who had been able to escape and with distraught family members and friends of those missing, in the sickening sight of human beings falling from the buildings or pitifully waving from high windows above the points of impact, from which there was no possibility of escape. The endless replays of the impact of the second plane, followed later by the broadcast of an amateur video of the first plane striking, and subsequently newly discovered footage of the impacts from a range of angles, all contributed to a sense of the enormity, the effrontery, of the events. The collapse of the towers was hardly credible to those without a knowledge of skyscraper construction; the fires seemed restricted to the upper stories. And then they were gone. Smoke and dust billowed out along the streets and avenues of New York while crowds of people struggled to outrun the cloud or find shelter in doorways or under vehicles, only to emerge like moving statues of dried clay. As if these sights were not enough, heart-rending messages left on phoneanswering machines by passengers on the high-jacked planes were soon broadcast, leaving listeners to imagine what the last minutes of those stricken passengers must have been like. No disaster can have been documented so fully or so painfully as this. And then came the questions. Who were the terrorists? Why did they do it? Who lay behind them? Why did the authorities fail to anticipate the attacks? How should America respond? In the following days and weeks, the answers given to these questions would reshape the agenda of American and global politics. At the root of these consequences was America’s visceral sense of being embattled. The weekly magazine US News and World Report’s main story in its first post-September 11 issue carried the headline “Under Siege.” The New York Times issued a separate section under the heading “A Nation Challenged,” which was discontinued only at the end of December 2001. Numerous other publications issued comparable sections and reports. Countless speeches and articles by American leaders and opinionmakers
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conveyed the same message. Into whatever rarified heights post-September 11 national and international politics might flow, they come down to the brute realities of September 11 and America’s sense of being embattled.
How America sees the world
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7
How America sees the world Historical perspectives
No insularity in the West, not even the English, has been so acute as the American: no international involvement, again not even the English, has been so deep. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America1
America and the world: the perceptual gap It takes little imagination to see that the events of September 11 delivered a profound shock to America’s sense of its relationship with the outside world. Commentators inside and outside the United States strove to find words to express their sense of the enormity of the attacks. The attacks were a “wakeup call for Americans.” They constituted the “end of American innocence,” a final blow to America’s privileged position of detachment from the messy and violent conflicts that blighted less favored countries. America had now once and for all entered the “real world” of international politics, its “illusion of invulnerability” finally shattered. An important assumption behind these reactions was that America’s stance toward the outside world could and must change as a result of these events. American isolationism (in so far as it still existed), its tendency to act unilaterally, indeed its famed “exceptionalism” itself must inevitably give way to an acknowledgment that the United States was just like any other power. What precise policy implications might flow from such a recognition were as yet unclear; it was enough that the events of September 11 constituted a turning point in American foreign relations. The world, it was said repeatedly, would never be the same again, and neither would America.2 It is not surprising that a shock of this scale and immediacy should incline people to reach for the most charged language. It seems intuitively right that
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How America sees the world
there must be some correlation between the human cost of the tragedy and the wider historical and political significance of the event. It is surely too early to come to final conclusions about these larger issues, but American reactions to September 11 exposed, if nothing else, certain deeply held assumptions about America’s role in the world. Besides the obvious sense of horror at the scale of the human tragedy, which was shared by many non-Americans, most poignant of all was the sense of shock and bafflement expressed by Americans at the intense hatred of the United States that these attacks displayed. The sources of such hatred are the subject of future chapters. Here, we are concerned with the shock and bafflement and what they reveal about how America sees the world beyond its shores. Let us be clear at the outset that the claim is not that Americans should have expected or anticipated the attacks of September 11, far less that they should have shrugged them off as the price to be paid for world leadership.3 The point is rather the gap that these events exposed between America’s actual role in the world and America’s habitual perception of that role. Even those in other countries favorably disposed to the United States—and there were and are many—tended to comprehend the terrorist attacks within a framework in which American power was perceived to be a dominant—perhaps the dominant—force in world politics. By and large (and this is a generalization to be developed and refined in the course of this chapter), American reactions to September 11 betrayed a world view in which American global power, though a fact of life, was incidental to America’s foreign relations. Americans rarely see American power at work, with the consequence that foreign relations are perceived to be something that happens to America as a result of the actions of others rather than arising from the actions of the United States on others. To the extent that America is a world unto itself, by virtue of its size, geographical location, social diversity, and economic dynamism, it is often insulated from the reactions that its activity in the world arouses. From this point of view, September 11 was undoubtedly a profound shock to America at all levels but, to the extent that the attacks were perceived to have come “out of the blue,” arguably they reinforced rather than displaced the perceptual gap described earlier regarding America’s relations with the outside world. Where did these assumptions come from and how did they grow? They are evidently rooted in America’s past, and it is to history that we must turn to comprehend both the American reactions to September 11 and the significance of the attacks for American foreign relations. One preliminary point must be made. For much of this chapter, no distinction is made between the people of the United States and their government,
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as the concern here in the first instance is with broad attitudes. However, it is clearly wrong to assume a simple identity between the two when it comes to particular policies and decisions. How policy is made, what role public opinion and its political representatives have in the formation of policy, whether policymakers lead or are led by public opinion are all critical issues that are discussed later in the chapter. Patterns in the past In the struggle to understand the full dimensions of the blow to America’s sense of security in the wake of September 11, a number of possible historical analogies lie to hand, the most commonly invoked being the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. The element of surprise was common to both attacks, and the sudden resolve of the United States in both instances to respond immediately and massively was in part a function of the absence of warning. The sense of America’s having been violated, resentment at the enemy for failing to play “by the rules,” the underhanded nature of the attacks, and the naked exploitation of America’s openness (its “innocence”) unified the country and all but silenced doubts about the need to respond vigorously. However, the differences between December 7, 1941, and September 11, 2001, are all too clear. Though on United States soil, the naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii was remote from the continental United States and the main centers of population. Furthermore, the attack on Pearl Harbor was unambiguously an act of war by one state against another, the targets at Pearl Harbor were warships, not civilians, and there were fewer casualties than in New York and Washington. Finally, there was no doubt about the identity of the enemy or what needed to be done to defeat him. Having said that, there is one important similarity between the two cases to which I shall return. Both instances encouraged the view that once and for all American isolationism was finished. The Cuban missile crisis is another possible analogy, in the sense that the missiles in Cuba represented a direct threat to the American mainland and their use would have created the potential for catastrophic war with the Soviet Union.4 For thirteen days in October 1962, the world held its breath in horrified anticipation of possible destruction on a scale that would have dwarfed the attacks of September 11, 2001. However, once again, this was a state-tostate standoff, and the tension was generated by potential rather than actual destruction. Moreover, horrific as war would have been in the event of a breakdown between the United States and the Soviet Union, this crisis took
10 How America sees the world place in the framework of the Cold War, which was a familiar and, in a sense, rule-bound conflict, however oppressive and threatening. By contrast, September 11 seemed outside any known parameters. There have been other attacks on the United States. In 1942, a Japanese submarine shelled an oil refinery near Santa Barbara on the coast of California, one of the few cases in recent history of a direct attack on the American mainland. But this was a sideshow to the main theaters of war. If it had any direct effect, it was to confirm American opinion about the justification of interning Japanese Americans for the duration of the war. Looking further back into history, some commentators noted that the last (and only) time there had been, on a single day on American soil, casualties comparable to those of September 11 was the Civil War battle of Antietam (1862), in which an estimated four and a half thousand individuals died.5 This battle proved decisive in the Civil War, putting an end to the Confederacy’s ambitions of taking Union territory, but it also was a case of American killing American in the course of a long and bloody conflict, not a bolt from the blue from outside. The efforts of one newspaper columnist to draw lessons from Antietam about how the United States (the Union) might defeat terrorism (the Confederacy) strains credulity and illustrates the limits rather than the usefulness of supposed historical parallels.6 In some ways, a more apt reference point might be the razing of Washington, DC, by the British in the war of 1812, if only because it involved the destruction of American property by an outside force. But once again, this action took place during an already declared war, and besides which Washington at the time was an overgrown village rather than a major city, the government had already departed, and the action was not decisive militarily. The search for direct parallels, in short, appeared to lead to the conclusion that there were no meaningful precedents for September 11. It was apparently outside the framework of America’s historical experience. However, this is to look at the issue too narrowly. To say that there are no clear historical parallels is merely to confirm the familiar truth that history never repeats itself exactly. Patterns, however, do exist and it is these that we must examine. If a sense of vulnerability was the most damaging repercussion of September 11, then it must be pointed out that expressions of vulnerability to outside influence, whether in the form of ideas or physical attack, are discernible from the beginnings of American nationhood. America was born in war, and its first president was a general. America’s early diplomatic history, including the treaty with France in 1778, which was formed in order to achieve independence, and the treaty with Britain in 1794, formed in order to sustain independence, evidenced America’s relative weakness and vulnerability to the superior power
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of the “Great Powers.” America won the war and the peace in part by taking sober cognizance of its real and potential weaknesses. The Constitution of 1787, which replaced the original instrument of American government (the Articles of Confederation), was devised in part to remedy the frailty of American statehood and its consequent vulnerability to external pressures in a world of scheming nations.7 Moreover, a sense of vulnerability remained pervasive in American history, with peaks of intensity at moments of international crisis, suggesting that there has been no great transition as a result of September 11 from a secure America to an insecure and vulnerable America. Out of many possible examples, we can take the repercussions of the French Revolution, which caused political turmoil in America during the 1790s and led to the passage of Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798; a foretaste of similar efforts to insulate America from foreign radicalism in the Red Scare of 1919–20; and the anticommunist drive in the 1940s and 1950s. Anxieties about the spread of “alien” religious beliefs, not least Roman Catholicism in this predominantly Protestant country, colored American history throughout the nineteenth century. Vestiges of these fears were visible in questions posed to presidential candidate John F. Kennedy in 1960 about where his loyalty would lie in a case where his allegiances to America and Rome were in conflict with each other. In the field of foreign economic policy, efforts to stay neutral in global wars and to maintain America’s flow of overseas trade consistently failed, leading to more or less drastic measures to try to cut the United States off from the sources of conflict. During the Napoleonic Wars, American trading vessels fell prey to the depredations of Britain and France as each tried to deny goods to the other. However, American neutrality proved unsustainable, and the result was war with Britain in 1812, in this case a foretaste of comparable American efforts to remain neutral in 1914–17 and 1939–41. As the technology of war developed, so did the possible range of threats. Militarily, the advent of the airplane and later the intercontinental ballistic missile canceled America’s apparently supreme advantage of distance from potential enemies. American reaction to the launch of Sputnik by the Soviet Union in 1957 was only the most visible evidence of a more general anxiety during the Cold War about the Soviet threat. Sputnik quickened the pace of civil defense measures, including a crash program to build fallout shelters, and deeply affected other areas of American life, such as education, as the Federal government pumped new funds into the teaching of mathematics and science. In short, the sense of vulnerability, if anything, intensified with the growth of American power; indeed, it became a staple feature of foreign policy debates and was not confined to a few high-profile cases of obvious threat. Furthermore,
12 How America sees the world the problem of vulnerability typically provoked a quest for invulnerability, not least in the burgeoning defense budgets of the Cold War years. More specifically, this impulse drove the argument for a missile defense shield, from Reagan’s “Star Wars” scheme to the more recent proposals for NMD (National Missile Defense).8 On their own, these historical instances are not decisive. Historians make a habit of piling up historical precedents with the aim of proving that there is nothing new under the sun. What makes these instances significant is that they coexisted from an early stage in America’s history with an equally powerful sense of national confidence, or what one historian has called a “quest for national greatness.”9 Indeed, the coexistence of these two powerful and contradictory motions constitutes one of the chief paradoxes of American history. Both impulses coalesced in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, which was both a piece of supreme bravado (given that the United States lacked the means to enforce it on their own) and an expression of concern about the threat of a reassertion of European power in the Western hemisphere. Seeking to preempt a possible attempt by Spain, with the help of France, to crush the newly established independent states of Latin America and also to challenge Russian power on the northwest coast of the continent, President Monroe declared that “the American continents, by the free and independent condition that they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European power.”10 As suggested above, the paradox deepened in the twentieth century when, despite the fact that American economic and military power began to dwarf that of rival powers, a sense of vulnerability persisted. Over the two hundred years and more of America’s national history, the interaction of these contrary impulses has manifested itself in the repetition of a particular—indeed, peculiarly American—response to external events: namely, the sense that each major venture in foreign policy, and particularly participation in war, represents a radically new step for America; that, however necessary such interventions might be for pragmatic reasons, they constitute deviations from America’s true destiny, which is to perfect its own society; and that, other things being equal (i.e., if the requisite international conditions exist), the correct path for America, once the crisis is over, is to resume its preferred position of detachment. The exposure to vulnerability invited a response to deal with the conditions that produced the threat, to be followed by a restoration of what an all-but-forgotten president in the wake of the great crusade of the First World War called normalcy.11
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It is as if with each new foreign policy crisis, the United States starts from a clean slate. America has thus “lost its innocence” on numerous occasions, not least in the First and Second World Wars and the Vietnam War, each case seemingly a renewed loss.12 A sense of vulnerability is regularly re-experienced as something radically new, particularly as the United States assumed a world role in the twentieth century. Above all, isolationism has been buried several times, most notably in the First and Second World Wars but most obviously in the Cold War, from which it appeared for several decades there could be no “return to normalcy.” Hence, despite past experience, America’s innocence is still there to be lost, and despite repeated experiences of vulnerability and measures taken to protect against it, the wound of vulnerability remains open. By the same token, isolationism is still there to be countered or promoted, depending on one’s political point of view. This old debate, which many had thought was long over, revived after the end of the Cold War and informed discussion about possible American interventions during the 1990s. It is still a factor in the responses to September 11 in ways that will become clear later. In short, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on September 11 were in crucial respects unprecedented, but they struck at old fears in American society and triggered responses that go to the heart of America’s sense of its role in the world. The search for the roots of a “gap” between America and the world leads logically to the question of isolationism. Is this the key to understanding America’s relationship with the world? The question of isolationism There are huge difficulties with the term isolationism, not least because it was employed initially as a politically loaded term of abuse and it still retains some of its political freight.13 Few Americans, even if they held ideas that others would call isolationist, have been happy to accept the label; it smacks too much of a mindless ostrich-like attitude to the outside world. America’s isolationists of the 1930s, for example, preferred to march under the banner of “America First.” Historians have found it no easier to give a stable meaning to the term, though most accept that in common parlance, in the words of the leading historian of isolationism, it “coupled a determination to stay out of foreign wars with an unwavering refusal to enter into alliances.”14 If that can be taken as a working definition, considerable clarification is required if it is to be applicable to the realities of American foreign relations. The policy if not the term is said to have originated in George Washington’s
14 How America sees the world Farewell Address (1796) in which he stated that “the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign relations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible.”15 This was followed up five years later by Thomas Jefferson in his first inaugural address, when he urged “equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”16 Certain qualifications to our initial definition of isolationism suggest themselves immediately. Evidently neither of these statements implied total isolation of the United States from the world community. Each envisaged maximum possible economic intercourse with other nations and, in the field of politics and diplomacy, the injunction was not against any or all contact but against commitments that would tie the United States’ hands. Even political isolation was heavily qualified. Thus, it has been argued that unilateralism may be a more appropriate term for what is commonly called isolationism.17 Furthermore, it seems clear that, even if the United States adopted a politically isolationist stance toward Europe for much of its history, toward Latin America, and the Pacific, activism and intervention have been features from an early stage. To that extent, if isolationism has existed, it has been applied differentially according to region and according to the United States’ capacity to exert power and influence. Further qualifications to the original definition can be made. The distinction between diplomacy and trade in the statements by Washington and Jefferson is surely significant. Indeed, revisionist historians of the United States have denied that isolationism has ever characterized American foreign relations, given the dynamism of American overseas trade and expansion and the activities of government to foster them. In that apparently most isolationist of decades, the 1920s, the American economy expanded on a global basis, and the policies of the Republican-led governments were expressly designed to promote it. Political isolationism, as represented in American nonmembership of the League of Nations, resulting from the Senate’s refusal to entertain Woodrow Wilson’s internationalist dreams in the wake of the First World War, was merely incidental. Of the essence was the United States’ consistent push for an “open door” for American goods around the world. Isolationism was merely a “legend.”18 It may be wondered whether the term isolationism has any utility left, particularly in the light of America’s apparently comprehensive burial of the Founding Fathers’ injunction against entering “entangling alliances” with the formation of NATO in 1949, to be followed by further treaties on the NATO
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model, including the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Arguably it has, not least because the term and the attitudes associated with it refuse to die. Isolationism apparently will not go away. A leading historian of isolationism, writing in the late 1950s, concluded that “authentic isolationism was all but gone” but added that “any number of possible foreign calamities could once more render isolationism a feasible and even an attractive policy.”19 History has proved him right. The issue of isolationism returned to the forefront of political debate in the Clinton years.20 Even if Clinton himself could not be described in these terms, in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, many Americans assumed that America could yet again return to normalcy. However, there are other reasons for wanting to retain the concept of isolationism if not the term itself. Most importantly, isolationism can be regarded as a frame of mind rather than a policy, a cultural as much as a political expression of American attitudes toward the outside world, which exists to some extent independently of government policies. Reference has already been made to the sense in which the United States is a world unto itself—a consequence in part of the cushion of distance and time offered for much of its history by its geographical location and in part also of the possession of vast areas of land and natural resources, which allowed the United States to be virtually self-sufficient in vital goods. To these must be added the paradoxical impact of the vast flow of immigrants into the United States: namely, the pressures placed on immigrants to shed their “hyphenate” identities and become 100 percent Americans. Such pressures ebbed and flowed in American history; they were perhaps most intense during and after the First World War, which happened to be the time at which the proportion of foreign born in the American population was at a new high.21 America has always been by its natural composition a multicultural society, but that very diversity has placed a premium on adherence to symbols of national unity and national distinctiveness. These issues are discussed at greater length in the following chapter. For the moment, we must emphasize the extent to which these conditions and pressures fostered attitudes, not of exclusion from the world but of necessary and desirable insulation from many of its influences, especially those that might harm the United States. Isolationism is by no means uniformly distributed in the United States; it is correlated with certain regions— particularly the Midwest heartland of America—and with class and educational levels. Knowledge of and interest in foreign affairs similarly are distributed variously and tend to be the subject of continuous public attention only when American interests are directly involved. This in itself is not surprising. The
16 How America sees the world same conclusions could be drawn about the populations of many nations in the world. The significance of the American case is its association with a society that, at least since entry into the Second World War, has been continuously engaged as a major player in the affairs of other nations. American insulation may be put down in part to the presentation of news in the broadcast media in the United States. A British BBC journalist, admittedly displaying professional and possibly national bias, observed that “Americans settled for second best in their news broadcasting, which is why millions were so shocked by the terrible mass murder of September 11. Their journalists hadn’t prepared them to understand the great swings of history that are going on, the rage and frustration that exists in some parts of the world when people see an Israeli pilot in an American F-16.”22 This brings us back to the apparent contradiction noted by Louis Hartz in the quotation that heads this chapter: America has been at once the most insular and involved of nations. Isolation or insulation is evidently a matter not simply of attitudes but of experience and remained so even after the narrowing of physical gap between the United States and the rest of the world through air travel and global communications. To take only one measure, until September 11 the United States was effectively insulated, at least by comparison with most other nations, from the worst effects of war, as is apparent from a glance at comparative casualty figures for the most destructive of twentieth century conflicts: the Second World War. American battle deaths in the Second World War were 407,316, with around the same number of additional deaths in the armed forces from disease and other causes. The Soviet Union is estimated to have sustained 8 million battle deaths and at least the same number of civilian deaths resulting from the German occupation. Some estimates put the total Soviet war dead as high as 27 million.23 Whichever figure one chooses, at least one-tenth of the Soviet population died in the Second World War. Germany lost approximately 4 million in battle and a substantial number of civilians. Needless to say, the experience of invasion and occupation, which affected many societies in Europe and Asia, brought the war home in a peculiarly direct way. This is to leave aside the economic impact of war, which was devastating in all belligerent nations except the United States, whose economy boomed in wartime. To American families and individuals who lost relatives, the costs of war were high; to American society as a whole, the costs of American intervention in the Second World War and other conflicts were relatively limited. (It remains the case that no overseas conflict in which the United States has been engaged approaches the Civil War of 1861–65 in its impact on American society, whether the criterion is absolute numbers of casualties or the number
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of casualties in relation to population. ) The most costly of all post-Second World War interventions, the Vietnam War, resulted in a determination not to repeat the experience, not least because the costs were relatively high across the board—politically, economically, socially, and culturally. The “Vietnam syndrome” is testimony to the political risks for American governments of engaging in conflicts that might result in large numbers of casualties or that have no calculable time limit. One consequence, in the event that intervention is deemed unavoidable, is the use of overwhelming force with the aim of achieving goals in the minimum possible time, as in the Gulf War of 1990–91. Another is the resort to alternative forms of intervention—whether through covert means, support of proxy organizations, or air power—that do not incur the risks either of large numbers of casualties or politically damaging openended commitments. However, such means carry a cost to the extent that their full implications may be hidden from the American public. Americans may simply not know what is being carried out in their name, and reactions to such policies by groups or countries affected by American actions may seem to Americans to be both unreasonable and unjustified.25 Once again, it has to be said that these conclusions apply to some degree to all countries. Since foreign policy is closely allied with considerations of national security, all governments engage to a greater or lesser degree in secrecy, whether for genuine reasons of national security or for political reasons. Crucially, governments claim the right to decide where the line falls between these two. The American case is singular, however, because of the disproportionately large impact of United States policies on other nations. Thus far, we have emphasized America’s sense of vulnerability and isolationism, but these concepts evidently cannot encompass the full measure of America’s relations with the outside world. We turn now to the other side of the story, namely, the United States’ manifestly enormous influence on the world beyond its shores. After establishing the facts of America’s rise to world power, we shall examine different ways in which this story has been interpreted. In the end, the stories that people tell themselves about their past dictate the ways in which they interpret the present. Expansion and growth The indisputable reality of American history is the swift physical, demographic, and economic growth of the country. From its beginnings as a string of thirteen colonies along the eastern seaboard of North America in the late eighteenth century, peripheral to the politics of the Great Powers of Europe, the United
18 How America sees the world States expanded across the continent during the course of the nineteenth century and displaced the Great Powers of Europe by the middle of the twentieth century to become the chief global power of the twenty-first century. It is necessary to remind ourselves of the dimensions of this growth because it is so often taken for granted. One suspects that Americans are too familiar with it to give it a second thought, while non-Americans either do not know the story or consider that history irrelevant to the present. The current boundaries of the United States seem natural but they are the result of a series of conscious decisions, negotiations, wars, and annexations. The first boon was British willingness in the Treaty of Paris (1783), which ended the War of Independence, to concede to the United States territory up to the Mississippi River, trebling at a stroke the area of the original thirteen colonies. This did not include the mouth of the Mississippi River or Florida, which were still in the hands of Spain, and indeed this was one reason the British were not too unhappy to make concessions on this scale. The territory between the Mississippi River and the Appalachian Mountains was held to be of limited value so long as the mouth of the river was controlled by another power.26 The British might have taken a different view if they could have foreseen the speed with which the Americans would acquire control both of the Mississippi and of Florida. The former came in 1803 with the purchase from France (Spain having been forced to concede it shortly before this date) of the territory known as Louisiana. Though now simply one of the fifty states and of moderate size relative to the others, at the time Louisiana referred to a vast area bounded on the east and west by the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains and on the south and north by the current northern state line of Texas and the current border with Canada. The Americans paid Napoleon approximately $1 an acre for this land, which doubled the size of the United States. Sixteen years later, following settlement of Americans in Florida and considerable American military pressure, the Spanish conceded Florida to the United States by treaty. Simultaneously, the United States made its first claim to a position on the West Coast when, in this so-called Continental Treaty with Spain, the boundary between American and Spanish territory was drawn right out to the Pacific Ocean. A generation later, the modern boundaries of the continental United States were effectively established by a mixture of annexation, war, and treaty. The annexation in question was Texas, which until its declaration of independence in 1835 had been the northern province of Mexico. Once again, as in Florida, American settlers had created a critical mass in a Hispanic territory, provoking initially a demand for independence and subsequently annexation to the United
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States. The United States’ annexation of Texas in 1846 brought the inevitable war with Mexico and, following Mexico’s defeat, the equally inevitable concessions of territory to the United States. The United States gained not only Texas itself but the whole of the Mexican southwest, the area covered now by the states of California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, and parts of New Mexico and Colorado. Indeed, some historians argue that the real American goal in the war with Mexico was California and, even more precisely, the huge natural harbors of San Francisco and San Diego, the inducement being the prospect of trade with the Far East.27 The United States’ ambition to be a Pacific power was reinforced by its 1846 agreement with Britain for the absorption of the “Oregon country” (the modern states of Washington, Oregon, and Idaho) into the United States. The process was completed, as far as the American continent is concerned, in 1867 with the purchase of Alaska from Russia. Territorial growth was only part of the story. By itself, land did not guarantee economic growth or political power. If the United States was a world power by the end of the nineteenth century, at least in economic terms, it was because immigration and industrialization (including the mechanization of agriculture) had combined to make maximum use of the land and its resources. The figures are indeed startling. Between 1890 and 1920, the United States more than quadrupled its steel output from 9.3 to 42.3 million tons, while Britain, Germany, and France showed only modest rises from roughly the same levels as the United States in 1890. On a broader index of total industrial potential, the United States’ increased tenfold between 1880 and 1928, while Britain’s only doubled. According to this composite index, by 1928 American economic power was equal to that of Britain, Germany, France, Russia, Italy, and Japan combined. Finally, America’s share of world manufacturing output increased from 14.7 percent in 1880 to 39.3 percent in 1928, while during the same period Britain’s fell from 22.9 percent to 9.9 percent.28 Perhaps it is no surprise that as the internal frontiers of the United States were pushed back, the land settled, cities burgeoned, and the nation knitted by railroads and communications networks, there should be a push outward to new frontiers beyond America’s existing boundaries. The 1890 United States census declared the frontier “closed” and, three years later, the frontier had its historian in the form of Frederick Jackson Turner, whose essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” was both an innovative theory purporting to explain the essence of America’s historical development and an elegy for a lost past. Within a few years, the nation became an empire when, as a result of its war with Spain in 1898 over Cuba, the United States
20 How America sees the world acquired overseas territories, not least the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific Island of Guam. Indeed, the United States had begun occupying small islands in the middle of the Pacific in the years immediately preceding the Civil War and subsequently acquired more in the following decades, including the Midway Islands (1867) and parts of Samoa (1889). The annexation of Hawaii in 1898, the most substantial of these chains of islands, and the acquisitions from Spain in 1898 left little doubt about the United States’ claims to be a Pacific power.29 There is no need to spell out the details of the United States’ emergence as a global power during the twentieth century, since they are familiar enough. American economic power and, in the last few months of the war, her military power too were enough to tip the balance in favor of the Allies in the First World War. In the Second World War, the United States’ role was so decisive as to encourage a prominent American publisher to announce that this was “the American century,” and even America’s enemies or those who doubted her right or capacity to take this kind of lead could not but be impressed by the fact that the Second World War ended with the United States in possession of half the world’s industrial productive capacity, to say nothing of its possession of the atomic bomb, its vast conventional military machine, and its virtually intact economic and social infrastructures. Even given that these relative advantages were temporary, these were precisely the years when the postwar global order was established, and the international institutions that resulted (the United Nations Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank) were to a substantial degree the creation of the United States and their headquarters located within its borders.30 In the following decades, the United States assumed the responsibility of containing communism globally, oversaw the readmission of Japan and West Germany into the international community, contributed to the economic recovery of Europe, and intervened on numerous occasions in numerous countries to safeguard what were perceived to be America’s interests and those of its allies. It even, for the first time in its history, entered into “entangling alliances,” the most significant being NATO, thus apparently denying a cardinal tenet of American foreign policy. There were between states few issues that could be described any more as being of purely local or regional significance; indeed, it was one of the defining characteristics of the Cold War that it transformed the local and regional into the global, such were the universalizing impulses behind the competing Cold War ideologies and the almost infinitely expandable definitions of American and Soviet “national” interests associated with them.
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It is hard to imagine what George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, or John Quincy Adams would have made of Harry Truman’s speech to Congress in March 1947 announcing his policy of containment of communism or of John F. Kennedy’s inaugural address or any number of comparable speeches by later presidents. In calling for military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey in March 1947, Truman said that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” Kennedy, if anything, raised the stakes in his exhortation that the United States must “pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and success of liberty.” John Quincy Adams, by contrast, had declared in the 1820s, in turning down a request for aid from Greek insurgents fighting for independence from Turkey, that “America goes not in search of monsters to destroy.”31 The difference between Adams’ statement and those of Truman and Kennedy is a measure of the distance America had traveled in its first century and a half. The basic outline of American growth is not in dispute. Interpreting these events, however, has enlisted the attentions of scholars on an industrial scale. We are concerned here only with two broad orientations toward America’s growth. The first, which is a minority view inside the United States, regards America in imperial terms and emphasizes the self-interested exertion of American power; the second prefers the words republic or democracy and emphasizes limits to American power and consistency in the exertion of that power with America’s core values. Needless to say, this broad distinction cannot take account of many variations and complexities in the ways Americans regard their history. It is intended rather to illustrate a broad polarization of views that has long existed but has been intensified by the events of September 11. An American empire? As far as many historians are concerned, the United States has become an empire, no different in essentials from the great empires of the past—the Greek, the Roman, the British, and others. Indeed, for some historians, the United States had always contained within itself the aspiration to imperial status. According to Richard Van Alstyne, “The United States is by its very essence an imperial power. It is a creature of the classical Romano-British tradition. It was conceived as an empire; and its evolution from a weak state, strung out on a long exposed coastline in 1789, to a world state, with commitments which are truly Roman in their universality, has been a characteristically imperial type of growth.”32 A contemporary of Van Alstyne’s, William Appleman
22 How America sees the world Williams, gave this interpretation a sharper political edge in his hugely influential Tragedy of American Diplomacy (1959), which was to exert a profound effect on the generation that protested against the Vietnam War. “The philosophy and practice of secular empire” expressed in the policies of presidents McKinley and Roosevelt at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,” Williams wrote, “became the central feature of American foreign policy in the twentieth century.”33 Ronald Steel, another influential critic on the left during the 1960s, regarded the postwar international order as a “Pax Americana,” in direct refutation of President Kennedy’s claim that the kind of world the United States sought was “not a Pax Americana enforced on the world by American weapons of war.”34 Such arguments did not necessarily entail the conclusion that American imperialism was designed to oppress. Some of the harshest critics of American foreign policy, including those quoted above, conceded that America might be acting from the best of intentions. “Nobody planned our empire,” wrote Steel, and it “has been maintained from a sense of benevolence.”35 Williams argued that one of the guiding conceptions of American foreign policy was “the warm, generous, humanitarian impulse to help other people.”36 Furthermore, most critics have noted that the United States sought economic influence rather than political control—the fruits of empire without the burdens associated with it. America’s was an informal rather than a formal empire.37 Nevertheless, the result, according to America’s severest critics, irrespective of America’s best intentions, was indiscriminate and excessive exertion of American power. The writings of Noam Chomsky have for a generation represented the most unadulterated version of the imperial interpretation of American foreign policy history.38 Nor has the language of empire been restricted to historians and commentators whose interpretations carried an explicit political message. It was present in a book referred to earlier, Empire on the Pacific (1955) by Norman Graebner, which argued that in the 1840s, the United States sought expansion to the West Coast with a view to using its harbors for trade and expansion in the Pacific. Taking a much longer historical perspective, Paul Kennedy’s Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1988), though read in the United States primarily with reference to specific contemporary problems (the issue of America’s supposed decline), was in fact a large-scale historical work that placed the United States in a modern tradition of empires from the Spanish in the sixteenth century up to the present. Its significance from the point of view of the present theme is precisely that it speaks of the United States in the same breath as other empires of the past. By implication, the United States had no
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special destiny, no exemption from the material and moral dilemmas common to all imperial powers. The point needs emphasizing because of the powerful claim in American history to an exceptional status, conferred on it by its republican tradition, which is ostensibly wholly at odds with the idea of empire. The model for this contrast comes from Roman history in which the republic gives way to, indeed is effectively destroyed by, the advent of the empire. We shall be returning to the republican tradition but, for the moment, it is worth pointing out that many of those who have thought the term empire an appropriate description of America’s foreign relations also recognize that there is a need to reconcile this with the centrality of republicanism in American history. A recent survey of America’s early diplomatic history is entitled The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865, a formulation that neatly captures this central tension in American history: the coexistence of an ambition for power and growth with an aspiration to exemplary status as an ideal republic. Perkins chooses not to explore the tensions between the two terms in his title, while others have seen these two impulses as more obviously in confrontation with each other. Thus, James Petras and Morris Morley entitle their book Empire or Republic? (1995), and they answer their own question unambiguously, with direct reference to the presidency of Bill Clinton, in the assertion that “as the empire expands the republic declines.”39 There is no shortage of evidence in the documentary record of the language of empire. The phrase manifest destiny, which was first invoked in the 1840s, reflected assumptions about the inevitability and rightness (indeed righteousness) of American expansion. Secretary of State William Seward, described by one historian as “the central figure of nineteenth century American imperialism,” remarked on the completion in 1869 of the Union Pacific railroad linking the east and west coasts of the United States that “The world contains no seat of empire so magnificent as this which … offers supplies on the Atlantic shores to the over-crowded nations of Europe, while on the Pacific coast it intercepts the commerce of the Indies. The nation thus situated … must command the empire of the seas, which alone is real empire.” The jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes declared that “we are the Romans of the modern world, the great assimilating people.” The rhetoric of Theodore Roosevelt and many of his contemporaries was saturated with imperialism. It is no coincidence that it was at the turn of the century, as the United States occupied the Philippines and other former Spanish possessions, that an anti-imperialist movement grew in protest against what were taken to be new and damaging departures from America’s republican tradition.40
24 How America sees the world The developments and ideas described above demonstrate the centrality in American history of a dynamic, expansionist, and outward-thrusting drive that, however it is regarded, aligns the United States with any number of nations in the past that have grown from small beginnings to positions of power and even dominance. However, while the main physical facts of these developments are indisputable, interpretation of them is a matter of deep controversy. Nor are differences of opinion on these issues simply matters of academic importance; they go to the heart of the ways in which Americans understand their relations with the outside world. We need now to examine the other side of the history recounted above, because it is this other version which by and large is believed by the American people. A democratic republic? The United States may bear similarity to former empires, it may be perceived by other nations as having “hegemonic” power, there may be American academics and intellectuals who share the most damning criticisms by foreign observers of the record of American foreign policy, and yet most Americans scarcely recognize themselves in such portrayals. Most Americans tell themselves a very different story of their past. We can start with terminology. Few would dispute the applicability of the word expansionism to America’s growth but the term empire is a different matter. Indeed, the term was commonly used until the mid-nineteenth century as virtually a synonym for nation or sovereign state, which accounts for the prevalence of the term in writings of the Founding Fathers and political leaders up to the Civil War.41 Early uses of the term empire thus may not have implied what we now call imperialism. The more loaded, politically negative meaning now associated with the term grew in the late nineteenth century as the leading European powers embarked on a rash of colonial land grabbing, and simultaneously political theorists, particularly of the left, subjected these developments to scrutiny and theoretical analysis.42 Empire (or more commonly imperialism) now firmly denoted domination over newly absorbed territories, the economic exploitation of colonies for the benefit of the mother country, the treatment of conquered peoples as colonial subjects rather than citizens, and an emphasis on personal rule and blind loyalty on the part of the people to such rulers. It came to be associated with oppression rather than freedom, centralization rather than devolution or distribution of power. None of these features, the official history of the United States tells us, characterizes the main lines of growth of the United States. The obvious exceptions are the existence
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of slavery from the early colonial period and the fate of the Native American peoples. However, in the version of America’s past we are outlining, the treatment accorded to these peoples represents regrettable deviations from the central thrust of American development. They are exceptions that prove the rule. In any case, they are regarded as “internal” matters and not of direct relevance to foreign relations. As for the territorial growth of the United States, this was far from being a record of unchecked land grabbing. At various points during the nineteenth century, several ambitious proposals for expansion were checked by either internal opposition, governmental prudence, or fears of war. Among the aspirations of some Americans that were not realized were the call to take “all Mexico” in 1848, to annex Cuba in 1848 and again in 1854, and the desire to annex Canada, which went back to the invasion of Canada during the Revolutionary War and surfaced at regular intervals during the nineteenth century. American territorial growth certainly displayed a powerful dynamic but was also characterized by a sense of the limits to American power. The primary positive piece of evidence supporting the official version of the history of America’s foreign relations was the American Revolution itself and the establishment of the Federal Constitution in 1787. The United States was born in opposition to colonial subjection, its sense of nationhood was determined by that act of rebellion, and its founding institutions reflected the conditions and principles that gave birth to the “first new nation.” The instrument of American government, the Federal Constitution of 1787, embodies the idea of limits to power, whether exercised by government or the people; the mechanisms contained in the Constitution are designed to check the exercise of arbitrary or concerted power by any one branch. These provisions apply particularly in the field of foreign policy, not least the requirements that only Congress can declare war (the president may request such a declaration but not order it) and that treaties require the advice and consent of the Senate. These and other similar injunctions do not guarantee that actual policy will follow the word of the Constitution, but they can be and have been invoked to check the power of presidents on particular occasions. Above all, they reflect aspirations to constitutionally sanctioned ways of doing things. Given the profound significance ascribed by Americans to their founding documents, it would be rash to assume that, simply because practicalities (or politics) often prevented their literal enactment, they are therefore to be considered of no account. A second important piece of evidence for the official version is the mechanism for the admission of new states to the Union as new territories
26 How America sees the world were acquired. This procedure, which is set out in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, established rules for the governance of as-yet-unorganized territories and also ensured that once a certain population level had been reached, states would be formed that would enjoy the same political and civil rights as those of the original states. Far from being a recipe for empire, it was a recipe for the expansion of the republic on a democratic basis. Admittedly, new issues were raised by the acquisition of noncontiguous territories, as the United States joined other nations in the rush for empire in the late nineteenth century. However, it could be shown that in most cases, the United States applied its republican and democratic principles in the future disposition of these territories. Alaska and Hawaii became the forty-ninth and fiftieth states of the Union, albeit with some delay. The Philippines achieved independence in 1946, though again postponed from the originally projected date by the Second World War. That the United States continued to regard itself as an anti-imperial, anticolonial nation as it assumed global power is evident in a number of ways. The delivery to the major European powers of the “open door” notes of 1899 and 1900 illustrated the United States’ desire to dissociate itself, at least at the level of rhetoric, from the exploitive policies of the European powers and Japan toward China. Few historians now regard these professions of good intentions as being innocent of the same grasping and material motives as those of the Europeans and the Japanese.43 Nevertheless, it remains true that American policy makers and the public at large developed the legend or perhaps the myth that the United States had a special relationship with China based on America’s uniquely benign treatment of China.44 The continuing vitality of the anticolonial, anti-imperial idea is evident in the speeches and policies of Franklin Roosevelt during the Second World War. High on the list of problems in his otherwise positive and fruitful wartime relations with Churchill was Roosevelt’s wish not to be associated with Britain’s more nakedly imperial ambitions. Roosevelt’s position is indicated in the draft of a letter to Churchill: “There is no question in my mind that the old relationship [between the Europeans and Americans on the one side and the ‘variety of races’ in eastern and southern Asia on the other] ceased to exist ten or twenty years ago and that no substitute has yet been worked out except the American policy of eventual freedom … .”45 By the same token, Roosevelt, ever the pragmatist, was always ready to acknowledge practical limitations to his principles. While during the war he expressed the firm intention of resisting the desire of the French to resume colonial control over Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia), which had fallen to the Japanese during the war, as
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victory came within sight, he conceded that temporary French control, preferably in the form of a trusteeship, might be necessary. There is nevertheless little reason to doubt Roosevelt’s continued devotion to the principle of anticolonialism itself.46 Following Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, the French did return to Indochina—with the practical help of the British and the effective endorsement of the United States. As the Cold War took root, the principle of anticolonialism was forced to run the gauntlet of anticommunism, with consequences with which we are familiar. When war broke out in 1946 between the returning French and the Vietnamese nationalist movement led by Ho Chi Minh, the United States could not afford to put pressure on the French to give up its colonial ambitions, since solidarity with the French in the emerging Cold War in Europe was the overriding priority. As the French became ever more deeply embroiled in Indochina and Europe became divided ever more deeply and dangerously along the line of the iron curtain, United States’ aid to France grew correspondingly. The Communist takeover in China in 1949 and the beginning of the Korean War in June 1950 cemented the United States’ commitment to “containment” of communism in Asia in general and Indochina in particular. By the early 1950s, the United States was paying the lion’s share of the cost of the French war in Indochina. Roosevelt’s principles seemed firmly to have been overtaken by events. How is it possible to sustain the official picture of the United States in the face of the record not only of American experience in Indochina but of American policy as a whole in the post-Second World War period, which is one of active involvement at all levels of policy—economic, military, diplomatic, cultural—in practically all geographical regions? How can the realities of the exercise of global power and the massive apparatus associated with it, including nuclear weapons, substantial conventional arms, a network of overseas military bases, military and diplomatic interventions in numerous locations, aid programs, membership of international organizations, to say nothing of the power inherent in the global reach of the American economy—how can all this be rendered consistent with the self-image of the United States as a peaceloving beacon of democracy and a benign distributor of goods to a grateful world? The answer lies in the conviction that American principles as applied in the era of global leadership are consistent with those of its earlier history. Indeed, according to this view, the United States never sought global power; global power was thrust upon it, as a further glance at history tells. In purely economic terms, as we have seen, the United States was a world power by
28 How America sees the world the beginning of the twentieth century, but it chose not to exercise that power politically or militarily except where American interests were felt to be directly at stake. Until the First World War, this meant predominantly Latin America and the Pacific, including China, the European balance of power being largely a European matter. This policy was directly in line with the long-standing precepts of the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which insisted that Europe’s affairs were Europe’s, and America’s were America’s. The Monroe Doctrine was both a “keep out” sign to the Great Powers of the old world and an undertaking that the United States would not interfere with their spheres of interest. The “political system of the allied powers [the Holy Alliance],” Monroe declared, “is essentially different … from that of America.”47 In this respect, Monroe was echoing sentiments that had been common currency for more than a generation. In his famous pamphlet, “Common Sense” (1776), Tom Paine had declared that “it is evident that they [England and America] belong to different systems. England to Europe: America to itself.”48 The United States became directly involved in the European, and hence global, balance of power in 1917 and 1941 only because the Europeans proved incapable of maintaining it on their own, an incapacity that posed a direct threat to American security. America did not seek war in 1917; war sought America out in the form of the German submarine campaign that violated America’s chosen position of neutrality. “The status of belligerent has been thrust upon [the United States],” announced President Woodrow Wilson in his speech of April 1917 requesting from Congress a declaration of war.49 America did not seek war in 1941 and entered only under the extreme provocation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. America was, in the words of one historian of America’s entry into the Second World War, a “reluctant belligerent.”50 The story of the Cold War is essentially comparable, according to this version of events. The Soviet domination of Eastern Europe and its threat to the political stability of Western Europe forced the United States into the role of counterweight to Soviet communist power and, by extension, other regions of the world as communism took hold in China, and Soviet or Chinese communism became a model for newly independent nations or for insurgent movements within them. America’s Cold War posture was a defensive reaction to communist aggression. Not to have responded to this threat would have been to submit to a siegelike existence. Old style political isolationism was not an option, but this did not imply an abandonment of cherished principles. According to this interpretation of American foreign relations, Americans could say in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries what John Quincy Adams had
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said in the nineteenth and with as much conviction: “America goes not in search of monsters to destroy.” Just as the United States did not rush to war in 1917 and 1941, it did not rush to take up a Cold War role, however committed it became (as in the cases of the two World Wars) once involved. The American Congress, listening hard to the people who voted them in in 1946 (a conservative Republican Congress as against a Democratic president), were slow to vote, for example, in favor of the Marshall Plan, debating the issue for long months and approving the bill only under the pressure of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. A year earlier, Congressional agreement to aid for Greece and Turkey, arguably the turning point in the United States’ commitment to waging Cold War, was achieved only under the pressure of the famous Truman Doctrine speech in which the president painted the global situation in unprecedentedly apocalyptic terms. Truman had been told by an adviser that if he wanted to get those appropriations through he would have to “scare the hell out of the American people,” which he proceeded to do. In short, consent to the United States’ new global political and military role, as in previous instances, was given reluctantly and only under the pressure of circumstances. The requirements of defense, in the Cold War as in earlier times, justified such interventions and international involvement as the United States undertook. It was simply that the conditions of the Cold War required the United States to engage in continuous and apparently open-ended international commitments. The end of the Cold War, if anything, served to reinforce an older preSecond World War approach to American foreign relations. With the removal of the historic communist enemy and apparently of the need for the intense vigilance of the previous forty years, the United States, it was believed, could now scale down its military forces and be more selective about where and when it chose to intervene. The prospect of a “peace dividend” opened out to many the possibility of something like a return to normalcy in American foreign relations. In practice, the conditions of the post-Cold War world created numerous new pressures for interventions—the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the collapse of Yugoslavia being the most obvious cases in point—and old conflicts persisted, if in novel forms, in which an American role was scarcely avoidable. Here the Arab–Israeli conflict, to be considered at length in a later chapter, loomed largest. Nevertheless, the resurgence of isolationist sentiment in public discussion during the 1990s and the lengths to which officials in the Clinton administration felt they had to go to rebut it reflected the desire of many Americans, including some influential individuals, to redirect America’s priorities to its own domestic well-being. If this desire was based on an illusion,
30 How America sees the world it was nevertheless a powerful one, perhaps no less so than the opposite assumption that the new “unipolar moment” offered the United States a unique opportunity to remake the world in its own image or at least to ensure that global conditions could be rendered peculiarly favorable to the United States.51 Doubtless, all states regard their own foreign policies as springing from defensive motives. In the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a virtually unanimous move among the world’s nations to rename departments of war as departments of defense. After two horrendously destructive world wars, war could no longer be accepted as a legitimate means of advancing the national interest or, as early nineteenth century Prussian General Clausewitz famously put it, “merely the continuation of political activity by other means.”52 In signing the United Nations Charter, all nations committed themselves to seeking peaceful means of resolving international disputes. The United States is, therefore, not unique in regarding all its foreign policy activity, including resorting to arms, as defensive in nature. It is, however, unique in its capacity to influence other nations’ destinies simply by virtue of its size and the dynamism of its economy and culture. Anyone holding the position that has been outlined above is forced to acknowledge that American engagement (a favorite word in the Clinton presidency, perhaps because of its benign connotations as compared with intervention) since the Second World War has been both continuous and extensive and on a scale that makes it hard to sustain the picture of the United States as simply a victim of circumstances or the malign intent of other nations.53 Given that the United States manifestly has and does determine the destinies of many other nations, how is this fact of American and international life explained and justified by those who maintain the view of American “innocence”? One approach lies in the distinction established by Washington and Jefferson between political and economic contact with other nations. Implicit in their statements is the common assumption of Enlightenment thinkers, notably the economic philosopher Adam Smith, that trade and commerce were inherently peaceful activities while political and diplomatic relations, especially when formalized in alliances, led to war. To the extent that this assumption was sustained through later periods of American history, Americans continued to resist the notion that their overseas economic activity might pose a threat to other nations or might have political implications. The idea that economic activity is politically neutral is visible in the history of American attempts to stay out of three global conflicts: the Napoleonic wars and the First and Second World Wars. In the first two cases, the United States would accept little or no compromise to its rights as a neutral to trade with any other nations, including
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the belligerents. In the 1930s, as war loomed in Europe, recognizing that trade in arms with the belligerents in the First World War had compromised its political neutrality, Congress passed a series of neutrality laws forbidding the selling of arms to nations at war. They were designed to insulate the United States from growing conflict in Europe as Hitler’s Germany pushed ever harder against its neighbors. One of the latter in this series of acts, however, contained the key provision that trade in military goods with nations at war was permissible if belligerents collected the goods in their own ships and paid “cash on the barrel head.” This provision reflected, as one historian has put it, “the contradictory desire of the American people to remain economically in the world and politically out of it.”54 All three attempts to maintain neutrality broke down; in each case, the United States went to war, suggesting that the tactic of separating out economic from political realities was unsustainable. The evidence suggests, however, that the assumption of separate spheres for economics and politics dies hard. To the extent that America’s power and influence has rested on the dynamism of its economy and the reach of its trade and investment around the world, Americans themselves could hardly regard this as in anything but a positive light. The appetite for American invention, American products, and American investment exists all around the world and appears to suggest universality in what the United States has to offer. Critics of the United States, and Marxists in particular, have seen things otherwise, and a school of political economists and theorists of development both in the West and in developing countries have rejected this benign vision of capitalism. It is no accident that Marxism and socialism more generally have exerted such little influence in the United States outside fairly rarefied academic and intellectual circles. The United States’ core value system does not admit the possibility that the economic structure itself—the capitalist system—may exert a malign influence, that it may exploit what it appears to benefit. Individual malefactors may and do exist; evil is a fact of life. Indeed, Americans, with their adherence to religious belief and public morality on a scale that is unusual in Western industrialized countries, are perhaps more alert to corruption in high places than are the populations of other Western countries. The American political system and press laws encourage more openness than most other Western nations. However, to see the motor of the American productive system as inherently dangerous to the lives and liberties of other nations hardly enters into the consciousness of those who see its benefits in the form of high standards of living and consumption as self-evidently good and of benefit to all.
32 How America sees the world This conclusion leads directly to a further reason why most Americans find it difficult to regard their influence abroad as being anything but benign— namely, that America’s fundamental political, social, and moral values are regarded as being self-evidently true and right. “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, and among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Thus the American Declaration of Independence, authored by Thomas Jefferson. The issue is not simply the content of these truths but their presumed selfevident nature. When tied to a sense of mission, which is to be found from the beginnings of American nationhood and gathers pace with the territorial expansion of the nation, this stance carries all before it. “We have it in our power to begin the world over again,” Tom Paine had written in his famous pamphlet of January 1776, “Common Sense.”55 Two generations later, that aspiration had been translated into certainty. “Our country,” wrote a journalist in 1839, “is destined to be the great nation of futurity. It is so destined, because the principle upon which a nation is organized fixes its destiny, and that of equality is perfect, is universal. It presides in all the operations of the physical world, and it is also the conscious law of the soul—the self-evident dictates of morality, which accurately defines the duty of man to man, and consequently man’s rights as man.”56 It is easy to see how such sentiments, growing originally out of a sense of America’s welcome detachment from the world, could be converted into a sense of duty to bring these same benefits to others. Once the United States had arrived at world power, national self-interest and devotion to principle combined to place the assertion of American values high on the list of foreign policy priorities. “The world must be made safe for democracy,” declared Woodrow Wilson in 1917.57 Implicitly, contrary or different sets of values lacked legitimacy. Given a free choice, most people would opt for liberal democracy. “We’re going to turn the Mekong into a Tennessee valley,” said Lyndon Johnson.58 In the wake of the Vietnam War itself and in the light of the growing sensitivity to issues of racial and ethnic diversity, such naked expressions of ethnocentrism became less acceptable, at least in the public domain. Nevertheless, it has remained the policy of the United States to promote the spread of its values. Among the most explicit expressions of this stance toward the outside world was a comprehensive policy statement of September 1993 by Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s national security adviser. Cold War and containment were things of the past; the collapse of the Soviet Union required the United States “to think anew because the world is new.” The chosen instrument was a policy of “enlargement” which had four components.
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The United States must “strengthen the community of major market democracies … which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding; foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible; counter aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy; help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.” Crucially, in this new world, the United States was compelled “not only to be engaged but to lead.” It is significant also that Lake should point up the continuity between this policy and that of Woodrow Wilson. “These dynamics [of enlargement],” said Lake, “lay at the heart of Woodrow Wilson’s most profound insights. Although his moralism sometimes weakened his argument, he understood that our own security is shaped by the character of foreign regimes.” Furthermore, Lake adds, virtual consensus has reigned on this issue throughout the twentieth century: “Most presidents who followed, Republicans and Democrats alike, understood we must promote democracy and market economics in the world—because it protects our interests and security; and because it reflects values that are both American and universal.”59 Opponents of these values are hence not merely enemies of the United States but of universal values. It is easy to see how an encounter between such a stance and similarly universal claims by nations or cultures that hold to different principles could develop into confrontation. It did so with communism; the potential is there with Islam. The clash of ideologies gives way, in the eyes of some, to the clash of civilizations.60 This issue will be taken up later. For the moment, it is important to stress the process by which a set of principles originally devised to bolster separation and a sense of difference can be transformed, under different conditions, into powerful tools of expansion or even exploitation. The potentially exploitative nature of these principles, however, is obscured for many Americans themselves because of their association with the founding principles of the United States. A sense of continuity underscores assumptions about the benign character of the American presence on the international scene. The view outlined above, which is a composite of popular attitudes and more or less sophisticated justifications of America’s record in foreign policy, does not deny the facts of American expansion or American influence in the world. On the contrary, it celebrates them but does so in a way that assumes continuities with the period when the United States was a relatively small power on the periphery of international politics. America, the twenty-first century superpower, the empire, the so-called world policeman, understands itself and its relations with the world in terms of assumptions formed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
34 How America sees the world Government and the people or government versus the people? What has been said so far assumes an identity between government and the people. Even in a democratic system, however, it is rash to assume that policy and government actions are simply the expression of the will of the people. When possible gaps between policy makers and public opinion are taken into account, the dilemma outlined above—of the gap between America’s world role and the people’s perception of it—is deepened. Generally, popular opinion has been markedly more “isolationist” in all possible senses of the term than has government and the foreign policy elite. Indeed, governments have often had to work hard to make the case for intervention. While the record suggests that the American public will rally around strongly in cases of obvious national emergency—and no more so than when the United States has been directly attacked—it is also clear that given the choice, the American people would prefer not to be involved. The evidence from the history of electoral politics in the twentieth century is overwhelming. In 1916, Woodrow Wilson fought for presidential election on the slogan “He kept us out of the war”; in 1940, Roosevelt was forced to declare, in response to a question from a journalist, that he would not send “our boys” to fight overseas; in 1964, Lyndon Johnson presented himself as the peace candidate on the question of Vietnam (made easier for him because of the belligerent stance of his Republican opponent, Barry Goldwater); in 1992, Bill Clinton announced his determination to refocus the energies of government on domestic affairs. In each case, within more or less brief periods of time, these presidents had committed American troops overseas. The United States entered the First World War in April 1917 and the Second World War in December 1941. Within a few months of the 1964 election, Johnson had begun the “Rolling Thunder” bombing campaign and sent combat troops to Vietnam. Clinton’s interventions were much more modest, but the cases of Bosnia in 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 were significant, not least because, like the others mentioned, they were undertaken in the consciousness of isolationist sentiment among the American people. Generally speaking, presidential candidates cannot expect to win votes by promising high-profile interventions. Neither Wilson nor Roosevelt were comfortable with the stands they took and adopted them because they felt forced to do so for political reasons. The two postwar presidents who came into power with the most ambitious foreign policy agendas, including promises of substantial buildups in American military power—Kennedy in 1960 and Reagan in 1980—were noticeably cautious about actually
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intervening. Furthermore, it is evident that there have been votes to be won by candidates promising to end wars already under way. Eisenhower in 1952 and Nixon in 1968, both Republicans fighting Democrats encumbered by association with unpopular wars, promised to bring peace. Eisenhower did, as promised, “go to Korea,” and the war was over within six months of his coming into office. Nixon, via long and damaging detours into Cambodia and Laos, did eventually pull American troops out of Vietnam. Further examples of the American public’s reluctance to entertain the active foreign policies undertaken by the United States in the twentieth century could be added, but the point is surely clear: American presidents undertaking active foreign policies, as all have since the Second World War, must engage in extensive public relations exercises to make their policies acceptable to the public. This conclusion raises a number of important issues. In the first place, it would appear to bear out the conclusion of British historian John Thompson that emphasis on vulnerability stems primarily from government’s need to exaggerate it in order to get backing from the American people for policies it knows will be unpopular. The sense of vulnerability is, then, in part manufactured.61 Second, it might suggest that the high-sounding ideals invoked by presidents and other senior officials to gain support for their policies may be simply a matter of rhetoric designed to rationalize and justify policies that they believe are important on pragmatic grounds. Officials make the unacceptable acceptable by dressing it up in language sanctioned by American tradition. What I have called the official version of America’s history is thus, according to this line of argument, once again largely manufactured; it hides (not least from the American people) the real end of American power, which is one of pursuit of naked self-interest. Third, the well-known reluctance of the American public to be drawn into large-scale, open-ended overseas commitments may help to explain the resort by the executive branch of the government to various semiconstitutional and even, on occasions, unconstitutional means of conducting foreign policy. To take only one example, a formal declaration of war can be made only by Congress, though the president may request one. In fact, such declarations have been made on only five occasions in American history: 1812 (against Britain), 1846 (against Mexico), 1898 (against Spain), 1917 (against Germany and Austria-Hungary), and 1941 (against Japan and Germany). Such declarations involve extensive debate of the full range of issues involved, followed by votes in both houses. In the many other instances of American military action, the risks of seeking formal prior approval from Congress, with its attendant
36 How America sees the world full-dress debate and inevitable challenges to executive power, have evidently been regarded by American administrations as excessive. Most of the other wars or interventions in American history, including Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, have been carried out on the basis of Congressional resolutions or executive orders, the latter stemming from the president’s constitutional role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The case of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964, which sanctioned the escalation of the American commitment to Vietnam, illustrates very clearly the political significance of the procedural difference between a formal declaration of war and a Congressional resolution. Coming to Congress in August 1964 with information suggesting unprovoked attacks by North Vietnam on US war vessels, Lyndon Johnson received close to unanimous support from both Houses (two Senators opposed it) for a capacious enabling resolution.62 Only later did it emerge that the information was less than conclusive, by which time the key decisions on expansion of the war had long been taken. Congressional checks on executive power, especially in the field of foreign policy, are generally after the fact. Even the War Powers Act of 1973, which was designed to limit the power of the executive to commit troops, has turned out to set few real constraints on executive power and has even, according to some, given presidents new scope because of ambiguities and loopholes in the act. In a word, full democracy has rarely applied in the field of foreign policy. As for unconstitutional means, the executive branch has employed various methods of circumventing normal procedures, as was evident, for example, in President Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia in the spring of 1969 and the Iran-Contra imbroglio of the mid1980s, to give only two of many possible examples. That both of these ventures failed to achieve their ends and proved politically damaging to their promoters is less important in the context of the present discussion than the fact that they illustrate the lengths to which some presidents felt they had to go in order to bridge the gap between what they wanted and what they felt the American people were prepared to accept. The much discussed growth of the “imperial presidency” in the post-Second World War years was only partly a matter of a wilful aggrandizement of power by the executive branch; it was in part also a response to a structural problem: the gap between America’s growing role as a superpower and Americans’ disinclination to perceive themselves in this light.63 Do these conclusions imply that the American people are simply the dupes of their governments and that governments cynically exploit the symbols and traditions of the nation? The case is hardly that straightforward. It is true that governments sometimes manipulate public opinion in order to achieve support
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for their policies and that rhetoric drawn from tradition is often employed to disguise or soften the edges of policies that owe at least as much to Realpolitik as to Enlightenment idealism. However, it is not always or only a matter of governments pulling the wool over the eyes of the people, if only because there is plenty of evidence that it is not a one-way process. Governments are aware of their own political vulnerability and couch policies in language that speaks to nationally sanctioned values and symbols. Nor is it simply a matter of language. The American Constitution itself, though no guarantee of full governmental accountability at every step of the way, ultimately does set boundaries to policy making. Democracy does in the end exert some constraints on governments, try as governments on occasions will to circumvent them. The evidence suggests that American decision makers are vitally affected by what they think public opinion will stand. Contrary to the “imperial” interpretation of American foreign policy history and the views of some of America’s most strident critics abroad, it is not the case that the United States has rushed indiscriminately to intervene anywhere and everywhere it could in recent decades. Indeed, there are those both inside the United States and outside it who believe that the problem is that the United States is not imperial enough. If only the United States would conceive of itself as a true Great Power and assume the corresponding responsibilities, then its own policies would be the more consistent and more likely to promote international stability. “There is no excuse for the relative weakness of the US as a quasi-imperial power,” wrote a British professor at Oxford in the aftermath of September 11. America must make the transition from “informal to formal empire.” However, “it does not come naturally to the US … to act as a self-confident imperial power. The US has the resources but does it have the guts to act as a global hegemon and make the world a more stable place?” Another observer, writing in the influential American periodical Foreign Affairs, concluded that America’s “antiimperialist restraint is becoming harder to sustain … as the disorder in poorer countries grows more threatening.” He advocated the establishment of a new international body under United States leadership devoted to “nationbuilding.”64 Ultimately, the American government and the American people meet on common ground that is defined broadly by what I have termed the official version of America’s foreign policy history. Clearly, there is no total consensus. An American antiwar movement exists against the post-September 11 war in Afghanistan, as has been the case to a greater or lesser degree in all conflicts in which the United States has engaged. There are many shades of opinion. What is not in doubt is the allegiance of a majority of Americans to certain profoundly
38 How America sees the world unifying symbols, attitudes, and values that can collectively be called Americanism. There is no more eloquent expression of this sentiment, which is sufficiently potent and historically grounded to qualify as an ideology, than the unity displayed by the American people’s reaction to September 11. Equally clear is the curious mixture of attraction and repulsion that this ideology arouses in peoples around the world. This is the subject of the following chapter.
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How the world sees America The causes and consequences of anti-Americanism
America is solidly organized egoism, it is evil made systematic and regular. Pierre Buchez1
I have always believed that this anointed land was set apart in an uncommon way, that a divine plan placed this great continent here between the oceans to be founded by people from every corner of the earth who have a special love of faith and freedom. Ronald Reagan2
A very British story On October 4, 2001, the London Review of Books (LRB) published a collection of reactions to the events of September 11 by some of its leading contributors. One in particular, by a Cambridge academic, provoked an angry response from an American professor, setting off a debate that continued through several subsequent issues. It spread out to at least one daily newspaper, the Guardian, when one of its columnists reported on the furor. To that extent, this controversy became news and not simply a piece of academic infighting.3 The comments in the LRB on October 4 that provoked the most heated response were contained in a single sentence. Once the initial shock of the September 11 attacks had passed, wrote Mary Beard, a “more hard-headed reaction set in,” which included the feeling that “however tactfully you dress it up, the United States had it coming (emphasis added).” Beard’s phrasing allowed for the possibility that she was merely reporting what others believed, but the general tenor of her remarks suggested endorsement of this view. So, at any rate, it was taken by some readers. Many of the statements by other contributors, while expressing condemnation of the attacks and sympathy for the victims, were critical either directly or indirectly of the United States government’s
40 How the world sees America response. Most important, the tone adopted by a significant number of the contributors was one of deep skepticism about the United States’ ability to do the right thing. One contributor, in this case an American, wrote: “I’m not sure which is more frightening: the horror that engulfed New York City or the apocalyptic rhetoric emanating daily from the White House.”4 It was perhaps inevitable that the attention subsequently focused on some of the more provocative statements should have overshadowed the manifest variety of perspectives among the other contributions.5 The next issue carried an angry response by Marjorie Perloff, a professor at Stanford University in California. Expressing outrage at the seeming insensitivity of many contributors to the carnage at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, she rejected the assumption she took to be at the heart of the LRB statements: that what happened in New York and Washington could be blamed directly on the policies of the United States from the 1960s to the present. While conceding that “the US has committed some atrocities in the Middle East,” she asked, “Does it therefore follow that ‘the US had it coming’? And which of us in the US are included?” She concluded by saying that she planned to cancel her long-standing subscription to the LRB and would urge her students and colleagues to do likewise.6 In the usual way of such correspondences, participants and their supporters rushed to offer qualifications, clarifications, stouter defenses, and outflanking maneuvers. While Perloff ’s stance was warmly endorsed on November 1 by one letter-writer, the follow-up letters in the next two issues of the LRB suggest that Perloff was in a minority among readers of the LRB. Beard, whose words had originally kindled the debate, riposted that Perloff had distorted her views, and others rushed to Beard’s defense. Most bizarre of all was a short email from Minneapolis in response to the original statements: “When I visit England sometime I’m going to stop by your offices and shove your loony left faces into some dogshit.” The same correspondent offered in the next issue a somewhat cringing apology. “My e-mail was sent in a fit of passion,” he wrote. “This doesn’t help excuse my comment, just helps explain it,” to which he added that “you published it partly ironically, I’m sure, and partly to reconfirm your readers’ views of Americans as idiots. Well, I was idiotic with sadness and anger.” He concluded that, although he didn’t usually agree with publications such as the LRB, “I am glad they are around.”7 The passage of time evidently drove other readers in the opposite direction toward a defense of the United States and of Perloff ’s angry response to the September 11 issue. By the end of November, the majority of readers’ letters, several (though by no means all) from Americans, were deeply critical of the
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views expressed in the LRB’s September 11 issue, and the charge of “antiAmericanism” was raised more sharply than in earlier issues. One correspondent talked of the “fatuous, self-righteousness” and “reflexive anti-Americanism” of the LRB contributors, while another spoke of the “knee-jerk antiAmericanism posing as thought in your letter pages.”8 The LRB hardly commands a mass readership. Like the New York Review of Books (NYRB) on which it is modeled, the LRB services a small though influential class of intellectuals and academics toward the liberal end of the political spectrum. It publishes lengthy and thoughtful book reviews and also commentary on political, literary, and cultural issues of the day. Contributors to the LRB and the NYRB, like their readerships, are conspicuously transatlantic. Reviewers from Harvard, Yale, and Columbia rub shoulders with their counterparts from Oxford, Cambridge, and London. If there is such a thing as a “special relationship” of the intellect, it is to be found in the pages of these periodicals. It is partly for this reason that the LRB’s responses to September 11 are of particular interest. They raise the question of whether this special relationship of the intellect is at odds with the special relationship in politics. Is there some sort of elective affinity between liberal intellectuals and antiAmericanism? There is also the question of the relationship between critical opinion and outright prejudice. Where does one stop and the other begin? In short, in what sense is anti-Americanism an issue in the exchanges described above? First, there is the issue of timing. What provoked the reaction from Perloff and the e-mailer to the original statements was not merely the views themselves but the apparent detachment of some of the authors from the immediate human and emotional impact of the attacks in New York and Washington. Hence the distinctiveness of the e-mail from Minneapolis. Its rawness was out of keeping with the usual tenor of writing in the LRB, yet it was probably closer to the emotional response of most Americans to the attacks. The e-mailer sensed that he had broken the rules of a code and sought in the second letter to realign himself with the accepted discourse of the LRB. In doing so, he felt (or at least appeared to be) bound to adopt the prejudices that he assumed the LRB held toward America and Americans. The price of suppressing his original gut reaction was self-contempt. Here, rationality is associated with criticism of the United States or at least of being grown up intellectually; emotion with sympathy for it. However, this very rationality so soon after the events smacked of insensitivity to the human tragedy, to say nothing of a fundamental lack of sympathy with the United States.
42 How the world sees America The second sense in which the issue of anti-Americanism is raised lies in the political dimension in the LRB debate. The Left in Britain has never been unanimous in its condemnation of the United States. Indeed, until at least the end of the nineteenth century, the United States was regarded as a political model for many British progressives and liberals. Furthermore, the American dissenting tradition, including the civil rights and feminist movements, continues to attract the attention of British radicals. Nevertheless, with the United States’ rise to global power, not least in the period of Cold War, the association between a liberal or Left-wing stance and anti-Americanism grew strongly. The issue was not merely of criticism of American foreign policy but of a broader predisposition to doubt whether American power ever could be exerted for good overseas. The view that the United States had it coming, certainly in the context in which it was uttered, encapsulates views that have been current on the Left for a generation or more, both inside and outside the United States. They are represented in the more strident forms of the argument outlined in chapter 2, that America is an imperial power seeking hegemonic control globally, in the course of which it has generated numerous enemies whose opposition is both understandable and justified. The third level at which this debate can be discussed is cultural. Irrespective of political position, there exists a pervasive attitude of superiority among many in Britain toward the United States, perhaps best expressed by reference to the e-mailer’s assumption that LRB readers regard Americans as “idiots.” This question will be addressed at greater length later in this chapter, but it is worth stressing that despite the manifest reversal of power between the United States and Britain since the Second World War, vestiges of condescension toward the United States, which transcend party political lines, continue to exist in Britain and more generally in Europe. It is based in part on judgments on American popular culture and its influence, partly on its supposed naiveté and lack of statesmanship in international politics, and partly on a more encompassing suspicion of the exertion of American power, whether economic, political, or cultural. The above expressions of anti-Americanism, if they can be called such, did not cost lives or topple buildings, nor doubtless would the contributors to the LRB in question necessarily admit to the charge of anti-Americanism. What this debate illustrates very clearly, however, is the intensity of attitudes toward the United States. September 11 brought to the fore with peculiar force opinions about the United States that have long existed in one form or another. The debate in the LRB represents in microcosm a debate about America that
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has taken place on a global scale. What are the sources of such emotions and attitudes? What exactly is anti-Americanism? The meanings of anti-Americanism The attacks of September 11 expressed nothing if not hatred of America. In the aftermath of the atrocities, commentators and ordinary individuals both in the United States and outside it pondered the sources of a hatred so pure and so deadly that it would induce young men to spend years preparing to sacrifice their lives in the most spectacular possible manner. Bin Laden, wrote the French newspaper Le Monde, represented “un antiaméricanisme absolu,” while the American journal of opinion, the New Republic, had no doubt that “we are living in a new era of anti-Americanism.”9 As the debate in the LRB illustrates, almost as sobering for Americans was the realization, as reactions to the attacks were reported from around the world, that many groups and individuals who said they deplored the attacks and the loss of life nevertheless professed to understand the reasons why the United States was a target of such hatred. In between the extremes of the terrorist acts themselves and a detached understanding of them—which to many Americans amounted to apologetics for the attacks—was a full array of positions expressing a greater or lesser degree of alienation from the policies and, in some cases, the values of the United States. Anti-Americanism was both a cause and a consequence of the terrorism of September 11 and, as such, it is central to an understanding of these events. It is necessar y to put quotation marks around the term “antiAmericanism” because, like all essentially political terms, it proves difficult to define once you start peeling back the layers of meaning. One can take it that it implies something more sweeping and absolute than simply criticism of American policies, yet anti-Americanism may often begin in this way, hardening to an idée fixe only when such policies become routine or when a pattern of perceived exploitation and dependence becomes a permanent condition, as is arguably the case in American relations with Latin America. Anti-Americanism seems to imply also an element of irrationalism and resistance to facts that may run counter to prejudices. The French historian Theodore Zeldin writes that “to hate a whole nation, to love a whole nation, is a clear symptom of hysteria.”10 A leading American analyst of antiAmericanism, Paul Hollander, similarly puts irrationalism at the center of his definition. Anti-Americanism, he writes, is “an unfocused and largely irrational, often visceral aversion toward the United States, its government,
44 How the world sees America domestic institutions, foreign policies, prevailing values, culture, and people.”11 These definitions raise a number of issues. In their very comprehensiveness, they risk failing to account for the highly specific nature of many forms of alienation from the United States. Even Osama bin Laden’s apparently blind and extreme rejectionism, according to one of the few journalists who has met him, focused on specifics. Following an interview with bin Laden, the Pakistani journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai wrote that “There was … one significant element missing from his list of grievances: he did not say anything about the idea of America—its rights, its freedoms, its prosperity. It was in American foreign policy that he saw the greatest threat to Islam.”12 It is hard to know how much credence to give to this particular report. Judging by statements made before and after September 11, Osama bin Laden regarded all Americans as legitimate targets and made no distinction between government and people. The founding statement of Al Qaeda, dated February 1998, was effectively a fatwa against the United States and declared that “the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it … ”13 Nevertheless, the distinction between government policy and the wider American society is a familiar one among critics of the United States. Evidence from other parts of the Middle East and South Asia since September 11 supports the view that the most vitriolic criticisms of United States policies can be combined with goodwill toward individual citizens. A report from Islamabad on October 19 noted that “there is no personal animosity toward any American or Westerner from people they have met, only a strident political critique and resentment of American foreign policy, which is where the roots of antiAmericanism lie.”14 The British radical politician Tony Benn can stand for many on the Left in Europe who insist that to reject American foreign policy is not to hate America or its people and culture. There is little doubt, nevertheless, that Benn’s stance of firm opposition to the war in Afghanistan would be regarded by most Americans as anti-American, since his rejection of American policies seems unqualified and uncompromising. It is possible, however, to find the opposite case of distaste for American culture being combined with an insistence that American power is necessary as a counterweight to the threat of communism or Islam or terrorism.15 As we shall see in the course of this chapter, anti-Americanism assumes many forms and has many different roots. It is more useful to think of it as a family of related attitudes rather than as a single entity.
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The question of the unfocused and irrational character of anti-Americanism raises other important issues. The ascription of rationality or irrationality to the motives behind a certain act is partly a matter of point of view. The definition quoted above by American scholar Paul Hollander comes close to claiming that to be opposed to American core values is by definition to be irrational. Certainly, such types of anti-Americanism are to be found, notably the extreme conspiratorialism that sees the hand of the United States in every ill that befalls particular countries. However, Hollander’s approach risks blurring the already problematic distinction between anti-Americanism and a critical stance toward particular aspects of American policy or culture. Indeed, in Hollander’s book, anti-Americanism is associated with the entire range of critiques of American society in the 1960s, at home as well as abroad. Hollander employs the term anti-Americanism as a synonym for 1960s radicalism, which he regards as having undermined America’s traditional culture and values. Here, discussion of antiAmericanism has as much to do with internal American political debate as with foreign attitudes toward the United States. The political character of his conception is even clearer in comments he has made on this theme since September 11, 2001. “Intellectuals and quasi-intellectuals, college professors, ministers, and those nostalgic for the 1960s and their youthful ideals,” he writes, [the list includes “the usual suspects” Noam Chomsky, Paul Kennedy, Norman Mailer, Robin Morgan, Harold Pinter, Edward Said, Susan Sontag, and others] have come forth to affirm once again what they have always believed: that this country is a unique incarnation of injustice and hypocrisy.”16 There are, however, costs in employing such a sweeping definition of anti-Americanism. The phenomenon is more varied and complex than this usage suggests. Needless to say, some, and perhaps all, of the individuals named above would reject the view that they are anti-American. Hollander’s approach has at least this merit, however: it brings out important affinities between critiques of the United States among Leftists abroad and those by America’s own Left wing. A British journalist on a visit to a book fair in America some months after September 11 noted that among book-loving American intellectuals on the Left, “it is chic to disapprove of America, not only of its rulers or those who elected them, but of the idea of America itself.”17 American anti-Americanism does exist but, even here, there is a danger of oversimplification. If Left-wing criticism of the United States is to be considered virtually by definition anti-American, what of the views of the extreme Right, whose rejection of the American establishment is as least as sweeping as that of the Left? The confusions multiply when one considers that radicals of various stripes, whether on the Left or the Right, trace their lineage to the period of
46 How the world sees America the American Revolution, albeit in both cases selectively. All claim to be quintessentially in the American tradition.18 To follow through on these and other problems associated with antiAmericanism is to be aware that the term itself is a contested concept whose range of reference is wide and shifting. Though at the extreme there may be little ambiguity about what constitutes anti-Americanism, in the muddier middle ground, its meaning is a matter of perception and point of view. On occasions, the term is used as a political weapon to discredit an opponent rather than anything approaching a neutral term of analysis. Arguably, Hollander has taken this route. The way forward is not to deny the existence of antiAmericanism but to accept that it assumes many different forms, depending on historical contexts and political agendas. There are, furthermore, important practical reasons for insisting on a careful treatment of the term and of the phenomenon itself. In the absence of close attention to variations in attitudes, there is the danger of dismissing all criticism of the United States as the product of a mindless and homogenous anti-Americanism and thus of failing to address the issues that give rise to criticism of the United States. However, there is also the opposite danger of making too much of anti-Americanism. No nation or government can be expected to agree with, far less respond to, all negative judgments on its actions and policies, not least because many such judgments will inevitably be poorly grounded, at best partial, or just plain wrong. If there are perceptual gaps in the United States’ view of the world, the same holds true in reverse. What we are concerned with here is the other side of the material that we examined in the last chapter. There we looked at American foreign relations from the inside out; here we look from the outside in. Americanism and the nature of American nationalism The sources of anti-Americanism may be diverse, but it is important to account for the fact that, however defined and whatever form it takes, it should be so prevalent. Why America? The obvious answer is that as the leading world power, the United States inevitably attracts opposition. Anti-Americanism has grown in step with the rise of the United States to world power. Like imperial nations of the past, the United States wields disproportionate power that is an object both of attraction and resentment. Moreover, America exerts power at all levels. Its “soft power,” or cultural influence, is as potent as the “hard power” it wields through its military and economic might.19 Such power has often been an object of suspicion by America’s friends as well as by its enemies. Nations that rely on the United States for protection struggle also to assert a
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measure of autonomy. The story of America’s relations with Western Europe in the post-Second World War period can be told in terms of this tension between dependence and independence. European anti-Americanism has many other roots, but it lies in part in the field of power relations. In other parts of the world, American power has been exerted in a more naked and dominant fashion, and resentment is correspondingly more intense. More generally, relations with the United States are such a central element of the foreign policies of so many countries that anti-Americanism can become a factor in domestic politics.20 To the extent that it is exploited for domestic reasons, it may become virtually detached from the realities of relations with the United States and take on a life of its own. We shall be exploring these and other related issues in greater detail later. For the moment, it is enough to note that the United States is a target in part because it is there, because its influence is felt everywhere and can thus be blamed, whether justifiably or not, for any number of ills. Anti-Americanism is part of the language of international politics. There is more than politics at stake here. English poet Stephen Spender noted that “the Americans are the people other nationals feel they know most about.” People from all over the world feel free to venture opinions about the United States and its people “with an assurance which they would not have if talking about Russia and Russians, Frenchmen and France, or even English and England.”21 America appears transparent and knowable to people who may have had little contact with the United States beyond images culled from films, television, magazines, and books. Indeed, the image of America arguably is the reality for many people. What is the source of the peculiar power of the image of America? There is attached to opinion about the United States a special intensity that long predates the United States’ rise to world power. Anti-Americanism is inconceivable without “Americanism,” an expression of nationalism that is a product both of the United States itself and of others’ expectations of it.22 The quotations at the head of this chapter are expressions from opposite points of view of the familiar notion that America has always been an idea—an invention—as much as a place or a country. Before the United States existed, indeed before colonies were established in North America, America was already a place of myth, a screen onto which Europeans projected their imaginings. Fantasy blended with fact as the first explorers reported their findings of natural abundance and untold riches in the ground. Settlement of the New World was in part stimulated by such stories, and they were so effective because they fed an already existing appetite for Arcadian images. The discovery of America
48 How the world sees America coalesced with the Renaissance dream of Utopia and, in one of those examples of life imitating art, it has been said that the first English settlers in North America were powerfully influenced by Thomas More’s Utopia.23 By the time the first English colonies were established in the early seventeenth century, it was clear that the word America had entered everyday language; witness John Donne’s exclamation on going to bed with his mistress and exulting in her nakedness: “O my America! My new-found-land.” Later in the century, for John Locke to say that “in the beginning all the world was America” was to identify America with the state of nature before political societies were established. This America of the mind represented all that was new, abundant, fertile, free. Actual settlement brought the inevitable confrontation with reality, but the evidence suggests that hardship did not destroy the sense of mission that had brought the settlers to the New World. Rather the reverse. John Winthrop, about to land at Massachusetts Bay in 1630 and confront the reality of life on the outer reaches of the known world, contributed hugely to the idealizing drive behind the settlement of the New World when he counseled his fellow settlers to consider that “wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies of all people are uppon us.” America as Jerusalem placed a heavy burden of expectation on Americans. The seventeenth century Puritan sense of mission was the progenitor of nineteenth century ideas of manifest destiny no less than of Ronald Reagan’s notion that America had been placed between the oceans according to a “divine plan.”24 The American Revolution and the creation of the United States itself generated new sorts of perfectionist and universal claims, not least among foreign observers. Thomas Pownall, a British official who served as governor of Massachusetts and tried in vain to reconcile the colonies with the mother country, wrote of America in 1783 in elevated terms: “The genuine Liberty on which America is founded is totally and entirely a new System of Things and Men, which treats all as what they actually are, esteeming nothing the True End and perfect Good of Policy but that Effect which produces, as equality of Rights, so equal Liberty, universal Peace, and unobstructed intercommunion of happiness in human society.”25 Inflated as these sentiments appear, they were not untypical of the period. A French contemporary of Pownall, J. Hector St John de Crèvecoeur, famously asked in 1782, “What then is the American, this new man?” to which he gave the answer: “The American is a new man, who acts upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, and form new opinions. From involuntary idleness, servile dependence, penury and useless labor, he has passed to toils of a very different nature, rewarded by ample subsistence.—This is an American.”26 A generation later, Goethe spoke
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for many who felt the old world had had its day and envied America its new beginning: “Amerika, du hast es besser/Als unser Kontinent, das alte, / hast keine verfallene Schlösser … ” [America, you have it better than our continent, the old one; you have no ruined castles … ]27 The crowning expression of the American national mission, however, was contained in the founding documents themselves. As G.K. Chesterton observed, following a visit to the United States shortly after the First World War, “America is the only nation in the world which is founded on a creed. That creed is set forth with dogmatic and even theological lucidity in the Declaration of Independence.”28 As noted in the last chapter, it is the presumed self-evident nature of the truths asserted in the Declaration that is so striking and gives them their quasi-theological status in the development of American nationalism. The somewhat grandiose introductory phrases of the Declaration of Independence express a sense that, as an embodiment of new and enlightened values, the United States has a special destiny among nations. Foreign observers and Americans themselves have typically been preoccupied with identifying what makes America different from other nations and cultures. For many analysts, that difference is contained in everything implied by the “American dream” (opportunity, upward mobility, freedom). Even to utter the term is to be aware of something distinctive about America and “Americanness.” Who talks of the British dream or the French dream? Consequently, the distinctiveness of the United States, or American “exceptionalism,” has been the subject, possibly the only real subject, of many of the attempts to understand the basis of America’s cultural identity, whether by such foreign observers as Alexis de Tocqueville and James Bryce in the nineteenth century or by several later generations of American analysts of American culture.29 American nationalism has not always expressed itself so generously. Around the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the national mission came to be identified by some as Americanism. The term (including the expression “100 percent Americanism”) appears to have originated with Theodore Roosevelt, president of the United States in the first decade of the twentieth century. “Americanism,” he declared, signified “the virtues of courage, honor, justice, truth, sincerity and strength—virtues that made America.”30 At various times in America’s history, especially when there was perceived to be a foreign threat, Americanism has taken narrower, more exclusive, and even repressive forms. Sometimes—as in the 100 percent Americanism of the Ku Klux Klan— an extreme form of nationalism, or nativism, was the preserve of a group or party rather than of the nation as a whole. In other cases, as in the determination to root out “un-American” activity in the early Cold War, an intense
50 How the world sees America Americanism —here taking the form of anti-communism—became something like a national ideology. The concept of un-American activity itself suggests the quasi-theological character of American nationalism referred to by Chesterton. To be un-American is to deviate from some accepted notion of Americanism; it is a form of heresy. There is a close relationship between unAmericanism and anti-Americanism, the distinction between them being that the former is generally applied to Americans while the latter generally, though not exclusively, refers to non-Americans. What ties them is the peculiarly intense expression of nationalism known as Americanism. Americanism, however, is by no means only a matter of high politics or ideology. It expresses itself on a more homely level in, for example, devotion to the flag and celebrations of national events and heroes. Americans celebrate their nationhood with an openness and a fervor that embarrasses or even repels the citizens of many other nations. Flying the flag, even in normal times, is for many Americans an everyday patriotic duty. In times of crisis or national emergency, such as the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979–80, the Gulf War, or the terrorist attacks of September 11, the flag is invested with correspondingly greater significance. Americans “rally round the flag” as few other nations do, perhaps because in a nation composed of such diverse elements, the flag is a necessary unifying symbol. It is noteworthy that flag manufacturing was among the few businesses to flourish in the wake of September 11.31 In these and other ways, the United States presents a face of national cohesiveness that often obscures deep divisions along the lines of race, religion, politics, and social attitudes. To what extent the “American consensus” is genuine has long been disputed by historians. One tradition of interpretation has it that American society has always been characterized more by divisions than consensus, the elements of consensus being largely ideological and manufactured. By contrast, consensus historians do not deny that divisions exist in American society, but they regard them as taking place within a framework of common values and assumptions that determine the ways in which social conflicts are expressed. Without attempting to resolve this dispute here, it can be said that the balance between these two aspects of American society swings hugely toward consensus whenever a threat is perceived from outside. Generally speaking, furthermore, it is the consensual aspects of American society to which foreigners respond when they regard the United States from a distance. There are, of course, revealing exceptions. The themes in modern American history that attract most attention from overseas students of the United States are the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War, both of which exposed fundamental divisions in American society. It would appear, though, that the
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attention paid to these and other dissenting traditions in American history often reinforces the sense of a powerful establishment that seeks to impose consensus. One conclusion to be drawn from this brief discussion is that projections of Americanism tend to invite all-or-nothing responses. Just as America—or rather the idea of America—has been the focus of utopian dreams and inflated expectations, it has been regarded as the stuff of nightmares too. The remark by Pierre Buchez at the head of this chapter, in its sweeping and abstract character, is a simple inversion of commonly encountered idealized images of America. In Kafka’s dystopian vision, “Amerika” is a hell of impersonal bureaucracy, the creation of an author who significantly never visited the United States.32 Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World takes place in the era A.F.—After Ford—indicating that Huxley’s chilling vision of the future takes its cue from the system of mass industrial production. In the 1960s, counter-cultural radicals in the United States and elsewhere used the German spelling—Amerika—on banners and posters, suggesting an equation between the United States and Nazi Germany. And so it goes on. These nightmare versions of America are mirror images of the idealizations already discussed and can be accounted for in terms of the same impulses that are, however, in these instances inverted. They may have little to do with flesh-and-blood America and everything to do with the aspirations and frustrations of the groups and individuals who promote them. Anti-Americanism does not attach only to the idea of America. It is a reaction also to the realities of the United States’ emergence as a major power and to the dynamism of its economy and culture. In this regard, an important target of anti-Americanism is “Americanization.” Americanization and anti-Americanism Anti-Americanism is in part a byproduct of the huge success of the United States as an economic, cultural, and political system. That dynamism generated a continuing flow of immigrants from generations of the discontented, the poor, and the persecuted all over the world. Between 1840 and 1920, the United States absorbed close to 35 million immigrants. Restrictive immigration laws were passed in the 1920s, designed to safeguard the European basis of the population, but these were relaxed in the 1960s, since which time the bulk of new immigrants have come from the Caribbean, Latin America, and the Far East. The American population increasingly reflects the ethnic diversity of the global population. There is no sign of the United States declining as the
52 How the world sees America first choice destination for would-be migrants. The figures for the period since 1970 show a rising curve across the board but especially for Asia and the Americas.33 In short, however intense the hatred of America in some quarters, it remains supremely attractive to many. Americanization began at home and was designed in the first instance to turn immigrants into American citizens, the instruments for which were work, education, and more diffuse forms of social pressure. On occasions, Americanization became a full-fledged program rather than simply a term for various social processes. During the First World War, anxiety about the loyalty of certain national origin groups—particularly German or Austrian—led to a national campaign to ensure conformity to American values. The superintendent of New York schools stated in 1918 that “we mean [by Americanization] an appreciation of the institutions of this country, absolute forgetfulness of all obligations or connections with other countries because of descent or birth.” Woodrow Wilson provided presidential imprimatur to the movement when he asserted that “America does not consist of groups … A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American.”34 Such a deliberate and potentially oppressive model of assimilation to American society was not the only one on offer. More generous and liberal methods also existed.35 However, at times of national emergency and social tension, the mechanisms of conformity tended to predominate. A similar duality between liberal and illiberal impulses was apparent when American influence was projected abroad. Americanization went international when the American economy went international, and that was a good deal earlier than is commonly thought. Early signs of Americanization were detected by foreign observers in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, during which time more than twenty American companies were established in Europe alone; American overseas investment was swiftly becoming global, as such companies as Standard Oil, Singer, General Electric, the United Fruit Company, Duke Tobacco Company, and many others grew into multinational giants.36 W.T. Stead’s The Americanization of the World was published in 1901, indicating that the theme was already current. The pace of Americanization was sharply stepped up in the new century. In the twentieth century, the United States became a major exporter not only of economic goods but of culture and political ideas. The value of American exports increased from $800 million in 1895 to $2.3 billion in 1914, the largest area of growth being in manufactured goods.37 The establishment in Europe in the 1920s of such giant companies as Ford, Proctor and Gamble,
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and many other household names represented a new chapter in the story of the American-owned multinational company. Furthermore, international economic conditions in the 1920s were highly favorable to American producers and traders. In the words of one historian of this movement, “The war weakened competitors yet stimulated America’s own industrial plant and enlarged its supply of investment capital.” 38 If the depression years forced a pause in the rate of the internationalization of American business, in the post-Second World War period, the process was resumed with new vigor. Emerging from the war far stronger economically than when she had begun it, in sharp contrast to virtually all other nations, the United States was presented with an international climate at least as favorable to its needs as after the First World War. With the further expansion of American multinationals, investment, consumer goods, advertising, and management styles, few parts of the world escaped the imprint of American capitalism. Those that did—or tried to—such as the Soviet bloc, had to resort to erecting walls, metaphorical and real, against American influence. Hollywood, Tin Pan Alley, Detroit, Nashville, the New York and Los Angeles TV studios and, perhaps above all, Disney brought the techniques of mass production and distribution into the field of popular culture and found eager customers in Europe and other parts of the world. Products from Coca Cola, McDonald’s, Levi, and countless others filled the world markets. Even American beers made inroads into consumption patterns in a sector where most countries had strong local products. There was no more astonishing symbol of the reach of American capitalism and popular culture than the elevation to global iconic status, courtesy of Nike, of basketball star Michael Jordan in the 1990s. As compared with other sports, basketball scarcely featured outside the United States, but Jordan’s image was everywhere.39 Equally important as the sheer growth of American influence and power was the fact that it was the subject of deliberate promotion by both private and public organizations in the United States. Successive American governments sought to promote optimum international conditions for American private enterprise, whether through tariff and taxation policies, incentives for overseas investment or, in the post-Second World War period, the establishment of international financial and economic agencies the functioning and resourcing of which relied heavily on the United States.40 The same principle applied to the cultural sphere, especially after the Second World War. A recent study of postwar American–Austrian relations talks of the “coca-colonization” of Austria, a theme that could be applied to several European countries during the Cold War. Indeed, the promotion of American culture and democratic values was integral to the Cold War political goal of rebuilding Western societies
54 How the world sees America in the face of the challenge from communism. Not least among these efforts was the promotion of American studies programs at universities in Europe and elsewhere and the establishment of Fulbright programs that brought overseas scholars and students to America and took American scholars abroad. Cultural diplomacy was an important tool of American influence.41 Government and private organizations often worked along parallel lines. Large philanthropic bodies, such as the Ford Foundation, the senior personnel of which had close links with government, became active in the promotion of American cultural values through funding of publications, educational ventures, conferences, and organizations of intellectuals. Americanization, as a recent historian of American cultural diplomacy in Germany has convincingly argued, is not to be summed up as an inexorable process associated with “modernization” but was subject to a “degree of conscious and pragmatic management.”42 In the field of political values, American influence, if not full Americanization, was manifest in the immediate postwar years through, for example, its role as the leading occupying power in Germany and Japan and as prime mover behind the United Nations.43 The German and Japanese constitutions reflect inputs from the United States during the periods of occupation, while the UN Charter bears the strong imprint of American constitutionalism, mediated through a combination of Wilsonian idealism and Franklin Roosevelt’s pragmatism. The Indian constitution of 1950 adopted virtually the whole of the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution. More generally, as a recent analyst of American foreign policy has pointed out, while Woodrow Wilson aimed to “make the world safe for democracy,” America’s postwar leaders aimed “to make the world democratic.”44 If democracy is now a term that all but a few nations claim for themselves, whatever the actual character of their politics, this is owed to a considerable extent to the influence of the United States. It is significant also that some Third World leaders believed that, in the light of its anticolonial heritage, America might support new states struggling to shed their colonial pasts. Tom Mboya, general secretary of the Kenya Federation of Labor, wrote in the mid-1950s that “through her history the United States is an inspiration to the African people in their struggle against colonialism.”45 Ho Chi Minh celebrated the liberation of Vietnam from the Japanese in 1945 by quoting from the American Declaration of Independence, an American army colonel at his side. Fidel Castro is reported to have thought that America would welcome his revolution carried out in the name of the people. In each case, these leaders were disappointed, but their expectations indicate the potential for a radical reading of America’s traditions with applications to the present.
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Exporting democracy was evidently not as straightforward as exporting consumer goods or popular culture but, if intentions and efforts count for anything, the goal of spreading democracy can be counted as one aspect of Americanization in the second half of the twentieth century. Above all, American leaders did not separate politics from culture and the economy when it came to spreading the word about the American way. When Richard Nixon visited the Soviet Union in 1959 as Eisenhower’s vice president, he stressed the connection between America’s uniquely high standard of living and its democratic system. The statistics for the American economy demonstrate, he suggested, that “the United States, the world’s largest capitalist country, has from the standpoint of the distribution of wealth come closer to the ideal of prosperity for all in a classless society.”46 However, if these aspects of American culture were loved, or at least copied, by many, they were also hated, resented, and resisted by some. From an early stage, many European observers of America adopted a superior attitude toward American culture, doubting whether anything substantial and rich could ever be produced by such an egalitarian and materialistic society. Those features of American society that Goethe and others found attractive—its escape from history, the practical bent of its people, the dynamic, future-oriented character of the nation—left others cold. After a visit to America in the 1790s, Chateaubriand remarked that “letters are unknown in America; the American has replaced intellectual preoccupation with practical activities.”47 Alexis de Tocqueville, whose Democracy in America (1835) has remained the most influential analysis of the United States by a foreign observer, was both fascinated and repelled by the leveling effect of American democracy. For all its vital energies, American democracy bred a dangerous uniformity of opinion and an impoverished culture.48 Baudelaire’s vision two decades later was more apocalyptic. He associated Americanization with the end of civilization. “Mechanization” he wrote, will “Americanize” us; progress will “atrophy the spiritual side of our natures.”49 No less damning in its own very different way was Henry James’ listing of the things that America lacked, the absence of which denied to America any real culture: “No State, in the European sense of the word, and indeed barely a national name. No sovereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy, no church, no clergy, no army, no diplomatic service, no country gentlemen, no palaces, no castles, nor manors, nor old country-houses, nor parsonages, nor thatched cottages, no ivied ruins, no cathedrals, nor abbeys, nor little Norman churches; no great Universities nor public schools—no Oxford, nor Eton, nor Harrow; no literature, no novels, no museums, no pictures, no political
56 How the world sees America society, no sporting class—no Epsom, nor Ascot!” Without these things, little remained, and that was precisely James’ point.50 The above observations were all made before America had made a substantial impact on the world economically, culturally, or politically. Early warnings of Americanization were sounded at the close of the nineteenth century, but the alarm bells really began to sound in the 1920s. Anxieties focused, as in the nineteenth-century comments above, particularly on the presumed uniformity and vulgarity of American culture, but the accents now were characterized more by resentment than by a sense of superiority. The threat was now real and immediate. At a time when the ordinary people of Europe were flocking to see American films and listen to American jazz and dance music, the elites were up in arms. In 1928, British philosopher C.E.M. Joad asked, “Does England Dislike America?” and was in no doubt about the answer. After listing the reasons for his dislike under various headings—“American quixotism,” “so many sheep,” “rich but bored,” and “the new vandals”—he concluded that “in three hundred years, when England is an appanage of America, the English country will have ceased to exist; it will have been transferred into a gigantic pleasure resort for the solace and amusement of American businessmen on holiday.”51 Similar sentiments were expressed in France. In a book titled The American Cancer, published in 1930, the authors presented the United States’ “colonization” of France as destructive of French traditions. America’s mechanistic drive for efficiency and “its cult of blind reason and rational construction” were at odds with France’s revolutionary principles of individuality and human rights.52 The same lines of argument were reproduced after the Second World War with ever greater frequency from around the world. French anxieties about American cultural influence were particularly intense and inspired efforts to protect the French language, to put up barriers to Hollywood’s domination of the film industry, and to resist the “McDonaldization” of the French eating habits. French resistance to Americanization, however, was only a local variation on a global theme. The complaint of a Venezuelan journalist in the 1970s is representative of a wide body of opinion: “Americans have a mania for uniformity … Everywhere are the same gas stations, the same supermarkets, the same food, the same churches, the same press, the same people … Little by little all the nations of the world … are becoming more like one another in their Americanization.”53 The broad critique is clear: Americanization threatened to destroy the individuality of the world’s many cultures and to impose a homogenized and spiritually vacuous Americanism over them all. Nor is it perhaps surprising to find some
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Americans echoing these critiques. The song “Little Boxes,” popularized in the late 1950s by Pete Seeger, mirrored the concerns of a generation of sociologists who saw in America’s postwar suburban consumer culture the advent of a stupefying conformity.54 Americanization was as unpopular at home in some quarters as abroad. The above examples of anti-Americanism relate to rather broad critiques of American culture and society. To some extent, anti-Americanism in these contexts is a reaction to modernity rather than to America itself; indeed, it could be said to be a reaction to globalization, since the growth of American power and the spread of its influence coincided with the expansion of capitalism on a global scale. Separating anti-Americanism from a concern with these other aspects of modernity is thus not easy simply because, of all nations, the United States embodies modernity most completely.55 There is a sense in which the United States is a target for a host of anxieties the sources of which lie elsewhere. If, as was suggested in the last chapter, the peculiar blindness of Americans is to regard themselves as acted upon by the world rather than acting, the peculiar blindness of non-Americans is to regard America as the source of all the things they dislike in the contemporary world. We must now look beyond these broad expressions of anti-Americanism and examine its various forms in more detail. Varieties of anti-Americanism and September 11 Europe
When we turn from broad to more local and specific expressions of antiAmericanism, we find that it is inflected according to histories and traditions of individual nations. Nations express their identities through their attitudes toward the United States. No attempt is made in what follows to be comprehensive. What is offered is a selection of references to a number of countries that suggest the range of attitudes that exist. One common theme that emerges is that expressions of anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism can exist in the same culture, indeed in the same individual. The same Baudelaire who lamented the coming Americanization of the world in the 1850s was also a great admirer of American literature. Comparable splits are in evidence in many different countries, bearing out the point that anti-Americanism is no simple unitary phenomenon.56 Nor is it necessarily consistently held. Attitudes toward the United States can be extremely volatile, depending often upon the outcomes of particular political situations. One striking example comes from Italy in the wake of the
58 How the world sees America First World War. Italy had entered the war in 1915 on the side of the Allies but had experienced a crushing military defeat in 1917 at Caporetto at the hands of Austria-Hungary and Germany. Aspirations were thus high at the end of the war for the restoration of Italian honor. Prominent among Italy’s demands for territory was a questionable claim to Fiume, a strip of territory on the Croatian coast that had belonged to the now defunct Austro-Hungarian empire. Much confidence was placed in Woodrow Wilson’s ability to deliver what Italy regarded as its due in the peace conference that was to take place at Versailles in 1919. Prior to the conference, Wilson toured Italy, where he was received as a savior. Men and women knelt and crossed themselves as he passed. In the event at Versailles, Wilson refused to deliver Fiume to the Italians, and adulation turned to despairing contempt.57 In this case, as in others, opinions of the United States were determined as much by particular political situations or economic conditions as by broader attitudes or prejudices. Though less extreme, similar dynamics can be observed in the case of France since the Second World War. There is no doubt that French anti-Americanism was at its height in the 1950s and 1960s, fueled by conditions that angered all parts of the French political spectrum. The Gaullists, preoccupied by the need to reassert the greatness of France after the disaster of the German wartime occupation, resented both America’s lukewarm attitude to France’s desire to restore its colonial empire and its attempt to dictate France’s (and Western Europe’s) stance toward the Soviet Union. The Suez crisis caused a radical breach between France and the United States, which was followed up by France’s pursuit of an independent nuclear status and its partial withdrawal from NATO. De Gaulle’s personal dislike of America, stemming in part from what he regarded as slights from Roosevelt during the war, was legendary; his famous “Non” to the British application to join the Common Market was determined in part by his feeling that Britain was too much in the hands of the Americans. The French Left, meanwhile, whether in the form of the large and influential Communist party, fellow-traveling intellectuals, or Socialists, was stridently critical of the United States from the early phase of the Cold War through the years of the Vietnam War, when French anti-Americanism reached its height. However, as a comprehensive recent study of French anti-Americanism has shown, some of the animus behind political anti-Americanism evaporated when the issues to which it had given rise slipped back into history. By the mid-1980s, with the Vietnam War over, the colonial issue long past, and De Gaulle’s struggles with NATO mostly forgotten, the old battle lines of the Cold War were less clear. Above all, a new generation of intellectuals turned
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away from the engagement of Sartre and his contemporaries and embraced more esoteric and inward-looking philosophies. Perhaps surprisingly, Reagan’s America enlisted the enthusiasm of French people across the political spectrum, in large part because of the economic boom of the mid1980s and the evidence that, whatever one’s view of Reagan the man, the American way of enterprise apparently worked. America was now definitely chic.58 Broadly speaking, this situation remained true through the 1990s and into the new millennium, though the Gulf War of 1991 exposed deep divisions in French society, deeper, it has been said, than in most other countries in Europe.59 An assessment of French views of America published in early 2001 showed few traces of the strident anti-Americanism of the early postwar years. The United States continued to attract the French in some respects; Bill Clinton was immensely popular, and there were some regrets that Bush took the election of 2000. However, the old French suspicion of American consumer culture, distaste for the relative lack of commitment to social welfare, and concern about the death penalty confirmed that culturally the French were happy to affirm their “singularity.” France was the home, furthermore, of the most determined attack on globalization in the form of the movement led by French farmer José Bové, a movement which began with protests against McDonald’s restaurants in France. Ambivalence was and is the story of French relations with the United States.60 Reactions to the terrorism of September 11 amply demonstrate this. At one end of the spectrum of attitudes towards the United States lay Le Monde, which declared on September 13, echoing John F. Kennedy’s words at the Berlin wall in 1962, that “nous sommes tous Américains.” At the other end of this spectrum lay some members of the far Right. “One cannot conduct a policy of power which is arrogant and sometimes criminal,” said Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front, “without incurring inexpiable hatred.” This response was matched by voices on the Left, showing as ever that political extremes often meet. The author of an article published on September 18 observed that “without doubt anti-American sentiment … is alive and well in France,” and went on to quote a member of the Green party to the effect that “the reality is that American foreign policy and its military policy was bound to provoke the kinds of terrorism which we have just witnessed.” Inevitably too, Le Monde’s identification with the United States was taken as a challenge by some. “Personally,” wrote one journalist, “today I do not feel in the least American. On the contrary, I am confirmed in all my reasons for condemning a world which aligns itself with a catastrophic president.”61
60 How the world sees America Such expressions of opinion confirm the view that September 11 had the effect of bringing back to the surface attitudes that had remained dormant or marginal for some time. September 11, while generating broad sympathy and solidarity with the victims of the terrorist attacks, also polarized opinion about the United States. A similar pattern is apparent in Germany. There too, a legacy of anti-Americanism existed, stemming in part from a sense of cultural superiority going back to the nineteenth century and in part also from the special conditions of the early Cold War years. One analyst of German antiAmericanism suggests that “anti-American hostility lies deeper in the political mentality in Germany than elsewhere in Europe,” which he puts down to Germany’s defeat in two world wars.62 Certainly, the hiatus in German history produced by the catastrophe of the Nazi period followed by the Allied occupation placed Germany for a period of time in a position of nearly total dependence on the United States. That debt was productive of deeply ambivalent feelings, one of which was a sense that in being forced to submit to an alien power, Germany became alienated from its true self. According to this view, “Germans lost their authenticity and self-esteem through reeducation and imposed democracy.” As in France, Left and Right had reasons for resenting America: the Right because the German nation was politically humiliated and its culture devalued; the Left because, as the Cold War progressed, America seemed the epitome of imperialism and, in the most extreme versions of this view, had simply taken over the Nazi ambition to dominate the world.63 As compared with France, the nuclear issue in the 1980s and, in particular, the proposed deployment of cruise missiles in Germany, provoked widespread demonstrations against the United States. In response to September 11, Die Zeit expressed the same sentiments as Le Monde—“Now we are all Americans”—which, in the light of President Kennedy’s words at the Berlin wall in 1962, carried even more symbolic freight in Germany than it did in France. Many of Die Zeit’s contributors were convinced that once and for all Germany’s—indeed Europe’s—relations with America would never be the same again. The attacks, as one contributor put it, showed how indissolubly linked were the American and European democratic societies. And yet, proving that there were still some determined to resist this insight, there appeared “the familiar anti-American reflex” in some quarters. Another contributor, impressed by the way in which President Bush had recovered from his initial fumbling response on September 11 to produce an “astonishingly” powerful speech before Congress a week later, noted that this turnaround would never be acknowledged by those “European athletes of the beloved intellectual sport of America-bashing.”64
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Thus, in Germany, as in other countries, the attacks of September 11 exposed a deep-lying vein of anti-Americanism that may have served to influence the character of governments’ willingness to commit themselves to the American-led cause of fighting the war against terrorism. Certainly, as Le Monde reported a few days after the attacks, all the political parties in France wished to retain an element of distance from the policies of the United States, not least because of the memory of the divisions caused in public opinion by the Gulf War. These divisions, which were “larger than in most other European countries,” had “left their trace.”65 The British case shows its own distinctive characteristics while sharing common features with others. Historically, British anti-Americanism had some of the same roots as in other European countries and was visible across the political spectrum. It was expressed variously as an assumption of cultural superiority, a belief, stemming from resentment at Britain’s demotion to the status of a second-rate power after the Second World War, that the United States was a neophyte in international politics and needed guidance from surer hands, and the familiar critique from the Left that, in America, the interests of capital and property have always been placed before those of the people and that America has been the arch-imperialist power. Anti-Americanism was also rife in the higher echelons of the British army during the period of close collaboration with the Americans in the Second World War.66 The particular interest of British anti-Americanism lies in the fact that, whatever the strength of such sentiments, they have taken place in the context of a “special relationship” in diplomacy and arguably also the sphere of culture. This is not the place to explore that relationship and the many debates among historians and commentators about whether it really exists and, if so, what kind of relationship it is.67 Suffice it to say that it is a continuous subject of public debate and historical analysis. The record of British foreign policy in the postwar period shows a fairly consistent pattern of British alignment with American goals and numerous cases of close diplomatic and military cooperation. Of all countries, Britain, or at least its government, stood closest to the United States after September 11, giving close to unqualified support to the Bush administration. Yet, the record also shows, as is evident in the exchanges discussed at the opening of this chapter, that anti-Americanism was as alive and well among sections of public opinion in Britain as in other nations of Europe. Whatever the views of America in the corridors of power, on the street, according to New York-based novelist Salman Rushdie, many Brits showed little sympathy or solidarity with the Americans. “Night after night,” he reported in February 2002, “I have found myself listening to Londoners’ diatribes against the sheer
62 How the world sees America weirdness of the American citizenry. The attacks on America are routinely discounted (‘Americans care only about their own dead’). American patriotism, obesity, emotionality, self-centeredness: these are the crucial issues.” Furthermore, these sentiments stood in sharp contrast to the types of anti-Americanism in the Muslim world: “Western anti-Americanism is an altogether more petulant phenomenon than its Islamic counterpart and far more personalized. Muslim countries don’t like America’s power, its ‘arrogance,’ its success; but in the non-American West, the main objection seems to be to the American people.”68 It may be that affinities between British and American culture, based on common heritages and language, are more apparent than real or only selectively real. Closeness in some areas exposes differences in others. As Stephen Spender noted, Anglo-American relations were “love–hate relations.” Latin America
The reasons for Latin American resentment of the United States seem so familiar and so well-documented that it is important to acknowledge that there is also evidence for more positive relations. The example of the American War of Independence was an important source of inspiration for independence movements in Latin America as they struggled to break free from Spain in the wake of the Napoleonic wars. Subsequently, for some leaders of the newly independent states, American democracy was a model for their own futures. This was the case with Domingo Sarmiento, president of Argentina in the 1830s and an admirer in particular of the American education system. The United States, he wrote in 1847 during a period of political exile from his own country, “have made the most progress of any nation on earth today along the road to the unknown political solution toward which Christian peoples are groping, stumbling over the monarchy as in Europe, or overwhelmed by brutal despotism as in our own poor country.”69 A very different view, however, and one which became more common as the century wore on, was expressed around the same time by an author whose country—Mexico—had just experienced defeat in war with the United States. The cause of the war, wrote Ramon Alcaraz was “the insatiable ambition of the United States, favored by our weakness.”70 The disparity in power and wealth between the countries of Latin America and the colossus to the north grew substantially in the course of the nineteenth century. In Cuba, as the movement for independence from Spain gathered force in the 1890s, the Cuban leader Jose Marti warned of the need to “prevent the United States from spreading through the Antilles as Cuba gains its independence and from overpowering with that additional strength our lands of America. … I have lived
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in the monster [the United States],” he declared, “and I know its entrails; my sling is David’s.”71 The challenge presented to Latin America only grew with the new century, as the United States intervened on numerous occasions between 1900 and 1930 to assert American interests in, for example, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Haiti; and this is to say nothing of the economic and political power exerted by the United Fruit Company and comparable corporate giants.72 “Never in all human history,” wrote Argentinean author Manuel Ugarte in 1923, “has such an irresistible or marvelously concerted force been developed as that which the United States are bringing to bear upon the peoples which are geographically or politically within its reach in the south of the Continent or on the shores of the sea … North American imperialism is the most perfect instrument of domination which has been known throughout the ages.”73 A more moderately expressed view by a Spanish economist in the 1960s is nevertheless at least as devastating in its implications. “The power of the North is so huge compared to that of the South,” wrote Salvador de Madariaga, “ that, like a machine or a monster, it paralyses and devours the nearly defenseless South, so that all that remains free and independent there might be said to owe its freedom and independence less to its own exertions than to the moderation and wisdom of the North.”74 To be sure, a brief anthology of such statements as this cannot stand for an analysis of American–Latin American relations, nor is it intended to. Not only have the relations of individual nations of Latin America with the United States varied according to geography, economic conditions, and national traditions but relationships have been characterized by complexity even where domination seems to have been the reality.75 It is also the case that, whatever the depth of anti-Americanism in public opinion in Latin America, governments have had to work with the United States. The above statements serve to indicate merely that a continuous feature of US–Latin American relations has been the existence of a basic condition that has fueled resentment of the United States, that condition being the disproportionate size and power of the United States relative to the countries of Latin America. “Dependency Theory,” which in the 1960s and 1970s was a hugely influential Marxist model for relations between the First and Third Worlds, was developed in the first instance in relation to Latin America.76 Even if this theory is now less prominent, dependence on the United States or on American-led international institutions, such as the IMF, remains a fact of life for several Latin American countries. American military interventions in the 1980s and 1990s in Grenada, Panama, and Haiti demonstrate, furthermore, the continued willingness of the United States to assert its interests in the most direct fashion.
64 How the world sees America In the light of this legacy, reactions to September 11 were perhaps predictable. In early October 2001, Newsweek reported on a survey of opinion in Latin America under the headline “Take That, Gringos.” While Latin American governments, at the prompting of Brazilian president Fernando Enrique Cardoso, collectively backed the United States’ war on terrorism, on the streets the message was very different. “I’m not against the American people,” said a Brazilian student, “but the United States got what it deserved.” At a peace rally in Rio de Janeiro, banners read, “A MINUTE OF SILENCE FOR AMERICA’S DEAD. 59 MINUTES FOR THE VICTIMS OF AMERICAN POLICY.” “Maybe not since the 1970s,” concluded the Newsweek reporter, “when military men ruled the continent—often with Washington’s blessing— has Latin America seen such an explicit outburst of anti-Gringo sentiment.” The Economist (London) confirmed this judgment in a report that noted that “rather to the surprise of American officials, the attacks have laid bare the continuing strength of anti-American opinion in the region.”77 As in many other countries and regions of the world, September 11 intensified opinion about the United States, whether for or against. India
The case of India would seem to be far removed from that of the nations of Latin America. Population alone makes India something of a special case, giving it great potential for growth and independent action. It currently possesses 20 percent of the world’s population. To be sure, experts dispute whether India should be regarded as a “developing country.” On the one hand, as a recent study of Indian–American relations observed, “India is a backward, impoverished country, racked by political instability.” However, “it is also a rich and powerful country (especially when viewed from the perspective of its smaller neighbours) that has shown surprising political resilience over the past fifty years.”78 Furthermore, as compared with Latin America, India’s physical distance from the United States, even in the age of air travel and instant communications, has made the maintenance of political distance somewhat easier. In short, India possesses greater means than Latin America of resisting American pressure, and one would expect manifestations of anti-Americanism to take different forms. Such proves to be the case, but there is one feature they share, which is an interest in America’s revolutionary heritage as a model for the achievement of independence. An Indian academic visiting the United States in the 1950s suggested that Indians and others had underestimated the influence of the United States on the movement for independence in the subcontinent. “The
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example of America’s struggle for independence was a great source of inspiration,” he wrote. “Every contemporary of mine in school knew the main facts of America’s War of Independence and it was his ardent desire that his history examination would bear a question or two on this subject.” This same author went on to note that Indian–American relations were in a poor state, which he put down in the first place to the fact that America was not well-versed “in the arts of diplomacy” necessary for dealing with its new global interests. The key problem was America and India’s different perceptions of communism: “To the Indian mind Communism is more an internal threat in many east Asia countries than a threat from outside.” America, by contrast, saw communism solely “in terms of power.” The generous impulses that had given rise to the Marshall Plan and the Point IV aid program had seemingly disappeared. Now “only one thing seems to matter and that is American Security.”79 This author was writing at a period of high tension in the Cold War, during which President Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, famously opposed any attempts by such countries as India to maintain neutrality with respect to the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neutrality, Dulles believed, was not possible in the Cold War. If this particular bone of contention became less urgent in the following decades, India nevertheless fell foul of America’s later Cold War strategies, not least the policies that led in the 1970s to America’s “opening to China,” a historic rival of India. America’s close relations with Pakistan, not least its tilt toward Pakistan in the Indo–Pakistan war of 1971, similarly exacerbated Indo–American relations. The disastrous chemical spill at Union Carbide’s plant at Bhopal in 1984 cost thousands of lives and gave rise to focused protests against the company and some wider anti-American feeling which continues today. However, it had little impact on political relations between India and the United States. American concerns about India’s nuclear weapons, matched by its concerns about Pakistan’s, have been a serious irritant in recent years, above all following the nuclear tests by both powers in May 1998. “American and Indian perceptions of India’s ‘rightful’ place in the world,” a recent analysis concludes, “have not been congruent for most of the past fifty years, and the end of the Cold War did not improve the situation.”80 Until, that is, September 11, 2001. In early November 2001, an Indian journalist reported the results of a poll that showed that 83 percent of Pakistanis were on the Taliban side and that only three percent supported America in its war with Afghanistan. “The opposite is true in India,” it was noted. “Except among Muslims of a radical bent and a small group of Left-liberal intellectuals there is general consensus that after September 11 the Americans had no
66 How the world sees America choice but to bomb Afghanistan.” Indeed, to the extent that anti-Americanism was an issue in India after September 11, it was so because of its obvious marginality. “Anti-Americanism, rejected by civil society, lives only in the mind of the civilisationally challenged,” wrote a columnist in the generally proestablishment weekly, India Today. A lecture tour in India in early November by dissident American scholar Noam Chomsky was dismissed by the same publication as a matter of “lecturing the trendy left in India.” The passage that followed this remark revealed much about India’s response to September 11. Chomsky was quoted as having called India “a terrorist state” because “I don’t think the Kashmir movement is terrorist. It is a resistance movement.”81 Such a statement could hardly have been more provocative in the circumstances. The Indian response to September 11, and its assessment of relations with the United States, were indissolubly linked to relations with Pakistan and the Kashmir issue. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee committed India to “waging peace” along with the United States in its announced war against terrorism. Much was made in the Indian media of the fact that comparable acts of terrorism were familiar to Indians. “This moment of charred truth,” India Today editorialized, “is not America’s alone. We have been there before.”82 Solidarity with the United States was, therefore, conceived as being a logical extension of its own struggle against Islamic militancy. A huge complication, however, lay in relation to Pakistan. In the emerging American-led coalition against terrorism, Pakistan was a key player. To the extent that Pakistan was under enormous pressure to follow American priorities—not least in reversing its previous support for the Taliban in Afghanistan and resisting the demands of its own domestic Islamic militants—India could see only advantages to the closest possible alignment with the United States. To the extent, however, that Pakistan was able to reap benefits from its new relationship with the United States—in enhanced international credibility and, above all, in relation to Kashmir—there were dangers for India. India’s desire was that the United States and others should see the fight against bin Laden and Al Qaeda and the fight against Pakistanbacked terrorism in Kashmir as India saw it: namely, as one and the same.83 With these competing pressure at play, it is not surprising that Indian opinion should have been delicately balanced. On the one hand, moves toward closer relations were welcomed. The Times of India declared in late October that the United States and India had an “identity of interests” and that ties “can only deepen.” India Today pursued the same line but, if anything, wanted closer relations than were on offer and worried that, in spending so much time wooing
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Pakistan, America failed to see “who its true friend is” in the subcontinent. The visit of American Secretary of State Colin Powell to India in early November and his proposal of a military alliance with India focused these issues more sharply. In any event, the Indian government turned the offer down, but the Times of India’s verdict reflected a strong body of opinion: “Alliance or no alliance, India and the United States have a congruity of strategic interests, also shared with Russia in steering Pakistan toward moderate Islam.”84 In the other scale of that delicate balance, however, many Indians were aware of the fragility of relations with the United States and of the dangers of getting in too deep. “India is in an extremely vulnerable situation, both politically and economically,” wrote a columnist in the Times of India. “Our society too is not immune from social tensions which could arise out of India’s active participation in what many see as America’s war.” In these circumstances, while India must show solidarity with the international coalition against terrorism, “India’s immediate and most direct short-term national interest at this time may not in every significant detail or aspect coincide with America’s.” Even the generally strongly pro-American India Today was aware of the contingency of its new relationship with America. “India began the Bush era,” it was noted, “as an incidental blip on the margins of the radar screen—an unfamiliar place that could possibly serve as a counterweight to China. After September 11, it has re-emerged—at the center of a resurgent Pax Americana dream.”85 The violent and bloody attack on the Indian parliament building in December 2001 reinforced both strands of India’s policy, inclining it both to greater solidarity with the United States’ war against terrorism and also to an increased preoccupation with its own problems with Pakistan and Kashmir. As the Kashmir crisis worsened in the early months of 2002 and reached crisis point in May, the United States had every reason to cultivate closer relations with India, as with Pakistan, as the nightmare of a possible nuclear exchange loomed. Influential voices in the press in the United States and India welcomed signs of what one American commentator called “a nascent Indo–American alliance.”86 The Muslim world
American relations with the Middle East are dealt with at length in the following chapter. Here we need simply to indicate the broad outlines of opinion in order to allow a means of comparison with attitudes toward the United States described above. In 1968, one year after the disastrous Arab defeat in the Six-Day War with Israel, President Nasser of Egypt declared that “no one other than an obvious
68 How the world sees America agent can openly declare friendship for the United States.”87 Thirty years on, things were not quite so simple. Egypt made its peace with Israel within a decade of Nasser’s speech, and Egypt became an ally of the United States. However, peace and ally are relative terms in that conflict-ridden region, and successive Egyptian governments were faced with growing disquiet among the population. The phenomenon of “’anti-Americanism’ has become increasingly visible in the Arab world since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada on 28 September,” reported the leading Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram in the autumn of 2000. Opinion hardened further during the following year as the Israeli– Palestinian conflict became more intractable and the Oslo peace process ground effectively to a halt.88 The attacks of September 11, 2001, only reinforced such sentiments. In a speech made a month after September 11, President Bush asked why there was such “vitriolic hatred for America in some Islamic countries,” adding, “Like most Americans, I just cannot believe it because I know how good we are.” On the streets of Cairo, any number of answers were given. A student at Cairo University said, “People don’t like the Americans; the reasons for that are everywhere,” above all in America’s pro-Israeli and anti-Arab policies. Another gave the opinion that “only the Americans think they are intelligent. They have money. They have culture, they have the movies … and now they are looking for a new enemy, a scapegoat in addition to Iraq.” Some even doubted that bin Laden was the culprit. “Show us the proof,” said one; the attacks were “too well prepared not to involve internal elements of the [US] government.” Such anger and skepticism was clearly not confined to Egypt. A Turkish reporter, walking the streets of Istanbul after the attacks on September 11, was asked by one of his neighbors, “Sir, have you seen, they have bombed America,” adding “they did the right thing.”89 Doubtless, one should be cautious about ascribing too much significance to individual remarks. Widespread demonstrations are another thing. The day after Bush’s speech, anti-American protests took place in a variety of countries with large Muslim populations, including Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia, Egypt, and the Palestinian territories. Furthermore, as a September 14 survey carried out by Le Monde of newspapers around the Muslim world showed, there was a common theme, even if not complete unanimity, in their responses to September 11. “The arrogance of America punished by an enemy without a name” (Beirut); “the American cowboy reaps the fruit of its crimes against humanity” (this one, perhaps predictably, from Baghdad); “Washington understands nothing” (Karachi); “The United States pays for twenty years of liaisons dangereuses (Oran, Algeria).90
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However, for all the manifest anger and frustration in these responses, there is little evidence that it is hatred of American culture or American people per se that is the main issue, though there are some indications of it. A common thread among virtually all responses from the Middle East and the Muslim world in general is the profound conviction that the United States has consistently pursued policies that were against Arab and Muslim interests and in favor of those of Israel. Even this, however, does not account for the full depth of feeling. According to a close observer of the Muslim world, “It is neither Islam nor even poverty itself that directly engenders support for terrorists whose ferocity and ingenuity are unprecedented in human history; it is, rather, the crushing humiliation that has infected the third-world countries.” The gulf between rich and poor globally is not only huge but is visible through television and films.91 Moreover, the voices of “the wretched of the earth” are scarcely heard and especially not in the United States. An African professor resident in the United States gave the view nearly twenty years ago that “the United States has perfected a special censorship to prevent itself from hearing distressing world voices,” the messages it was least prepared to hear being those of Marxism and Islam.92 Marxism, of course, is now largely a thing of the past, but Islam and the wider issues of deprivation and humiliation in many countries of the Third World remain. In short, anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is a special case of the general anti-Americanism in much of the Third World. Conclusion In one sense, anti-Americanism is nothing more nor less than the expression of an awareness of cultural difference and, to that extent, many of the sentiments expressed above are not peculiar to attitudes toward the United States. Crossing the boundaries between any cultures means being conscious of differences that may range from radical clashes of customs and behavior to milder and often picturesque variations on what one is used to. Such differences may be attractive or irritating or even repellent, depending on context and the attitudes one brings to them. Anti-Americanism represents a heightened version of such attitudes, expanded and intensified by the disparity in size, power, and cultural influence bewteen the United States and other nations. As has been observed in this chapter, anti-Americanism is the other side of the coin of the powerful attraction exerted by aspects of American culture on most other cultures. It is not a uniform phenomenon, however. On the one hand, cultural attraction can
70 How the world sees America coexist with profound antipathy arising from political relations while, on the other hand, it is not uncommon for countries to find it in their interest to align themselves politically with the United States but to maintain cultural distance, a good example being Saudi Arabia. What is clear is that changes in political contexts can effect swift changes in attitudes, which suggests that attitudes are not necessarily irrevocably fixed; they may even be to a certain extent “managed.” To some extent, therefore, the solutions to the problem of anti-Americanism lie in America’s own hands. However, the dangers of mismanagement, arising from misreading a situation, may make such a strategy risky. It is evident, for example, that dropping aid packages in Afghanistan at an early stage in the war was a public relations disaster; an apparent gesture of good will rebounded because of its manifest inappropriateness and inadequacy. On a larger scale, such failures and reversals may have large consequences. Looking at the question from the other side, it is clear that a reservoir of good will exists, or at least existed, in a number of countries based on America’s experience of overthrowing its colonial legacy. It was a point of identification by some former colonial nations with the United States; as we have seen, America’s founding documents and revolutionary heritage were taken by some leaders of independence movements in the Third World as being directly relevant to their own situations. That reservoir of good will has to a large extent been drained in the last half century because of the perception that the United States has failed to act in accordance with the principles on which it was founded. Indeed, the perception is not only that the United States has failed to act on those principles but that it has on occasions acted contrary to them, even betrayed them. In a word, power seems to have mattered more than principle. The empire has subsumed the democratic republic. If such criticisms seem overly harsh and based on unrealistic expectations about how any nation can be expected to act—surely all nations act on behalf of their own national interests—it must be said that the United States has itself continually raised such expectations. Few nations have ever set themselves such high standards. Few nations have ever aspired to so much or been in a position to aspire to so much. Few nations have ever been so successful or claimed so much for their own greatness, whether in the sphere of the economy, of cultural, or of social values. In few nations, inevitably, has the gap between the claims and the actuality been so visible and so politically consequent. A major source of anti-Americanism is the feeling, whether justified or not, that America wields power without principle but in the name of principle. In the end, we come back to a gap in cultural and political perceptions, based on history and experience. America has a long national tradition the
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history of which is known only sketchily by most non-Americans. What is generally known about America is based on the projection of American power overseas in the last fifty years and on powerfully promoted images of American popular culture. Small wonder that most Americans should wonder why antiAmericanism is so prevalent, since their own America is not the one most outsiders see. Small wonder, too, that outsiders should find so much to criticize in the projection of American power, since that is generally all they see.
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The roots of terror Islam, the Middle East, and the United States
The Middle Eastern sources of the terrorist attacks of September 11 have been firmly established. The evidence suggests that the attacks were carried out by terrorists from a number of Middle Eastern countries acting, if not under the direct orders of Osama bin Laden, then according to his publicly stated goals. Bin Laden’s primary aim, as announced in a statement issued by the Al Qaeda organization in 1998, was “to kill the Americans and their allies— civilian and military” as a matter of “individual duty for every Muslim,” this aim in turn being supposedly in line with the Quranic injunction to “fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together” and “fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in God.”1 Among the frequently stated grievances of bin Laden was the presence on Saudi Arabian soil of American troops, defiling the holy land of the Prophet; American support for Israel and, in particular, its policy toward the Palestinians; and finally, American policy toward Iraq. Bin Laden’s was at least nominally a pan-Islamic vision that linked the oppression of any one group of Muslims with the West’s oppression of Islam itself. Whatever doubts were expressed initially about the responsibility of bin Laden and Al Qaeda for the attacks of September 11 disappeared in most observers’ eyes with the release of a videotape in mid-December 2001, in which bin Laden was seen to exult in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and to show knowledge of the planning of the attacks.2 Investigations by the FBI and other organizations in a number of countries produced an evidence trail linking the perpetrators of the attacks with cells of Islamic militants in several European countries. Clear connections were established between these militants and Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan, where bin Laden was based after the Taliban took power there in 1996. Bin Laden’s own actions and statements showed a consistent pattern of extreme rejection of the West and also of Arab governments, above all
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that of Saudi Arabia, which he regarded as having cravenly yielded to the infidel West, thus betraying true Islam. The attacks on New York and Washington, moreover, were in line with a series of terrorist incidents in the 1990s, the sources of which in the Middle East were established beyond any reasonable doubt. These included the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, of a military base in Saudi Arabia in 1996, of the United States Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, and of the USS Cole in Aden in October 2000. While the above facts show clear connections between the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the Middle East, the question of what to make of them is not so straightforward. What, for example, of the relationship between the Palestinian issue and September 11? In the aftermath of September 11, many came to the conclusion that there was a direct causal link between the attacks and the failure to resolve this conflict. In the absence of full implementation of the Oslo Accords, movement toward Palestinian statehood, and a resolution of the issue of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, there should be no surprise, many argued, that Islamic militants should vent their anger and frustration. The new intifada beginning in September 2000 was the inevitable response to deadlock, according to this line of argument, and the Israeli gover nment’s violent and disproportionate response only exacerbated an already inflamed situation. The election of Ariel Sharon, whose lack of sympathy with the Oslo peace process was well known, put the last nail in the coffin of reasonable relations between Israel and the Palestinians. In all these moves, the United States did little or nothing to restrain the Israelis and, in taking this passive line, much to provoke the Palestinians. Above all, it was said, whatever had happened in the past, there could be little hope of dealing with the causes of terrorism in the future without addressing the Palestinian issue. In response to these arguments, it was pointed out that Al Qaeda terrorism had flourished in the 1990s when hopes for a positive outcome of the Oslo process were at their height. The terrorists might use the Palestinian issue as a rallying cry for political purposes, but their primary agenda lay elsewhere. Nor was there any sign that bin Laden and his supporters would be satisfied with anything less than the destruction of Israel; Islamic militants had no time for the peace process. Besides, as one commentator pointed out, “the Palestinian–Israeli conflict affects Palestinians and Israelis profoundly, but it does not begin to explain the dire state of today’s Arab and Muslim world, nor why it has spent decades languishing in economic stagnation and political suffocation.”3 In short, there were many reasons to be convinced that, while
74 The roots of terror connections might exist between September 11 and the Palestinian issue, they were complex and indirect. A second set of questions is raised by the role of Islam in the terrorism of September 11. Again the connection seems obvious: members of a particular militant Islamic sect, regarding itself as representing the true faith, carried out the attacks in God’s name and with the expectation that their sacrifice would in the end help to destroy the world of the infidel. For many observers in the West and the Middle East, these acts were a new twist in the emerging “clash of civilizations” consequent on the ending of the ideological conflict between East and West in the Cold War. With the collapse of communism, older lines of conflict, which were cultural rather than national in character and long predated the battle between communism and capitalism, reemerged. In the words of the most prominent advocate of the clash-ofcivilizations view, Samuel Huntington, “the revitalization of religion throughout much of the world is reinforcing these cultural differences,” opening out the prospect that “the local conflicts most likely to escalate into broader wars are those between groups and states from different civilizations.”4 Objections to this interpretation of September 11 and the wider issue of relations between the West and Islam were widely voiced, not least by Muslims who saw in the thoughts and actions of the terrorists of September 11 a perversion of Islam rather than an expression of it. No one, it has to be said, was more patently an advocate of the idea of a clash of civilizations than Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, to identify Islam and the Muslim world in general with the terrorism carried out in its name was to put ordinary Muslims at risk in many countries where they are in a minority, to say nothing of the larger danger of self-fulfilling prophecy. To speak of a clash of civilizations may be to produce one. An understanding of Islam must surely play a part in explaining the events of September 11 but, once again, the precise nature of its role needs careful examination. A third set of issues revolves around the relationship between the United States and conflict in the Middle East. This question clearly enters into both topics discussed above but also deserves separate treatment. The Palestinian question and the emergence of Islamic militancy are the products in the first instance of local and regional conditions, and close attention will be given to these conditions in what follows. It is equally plain that the American connection is central to a consideration of both topics. What we should not do is collapse the one into the other and assume either, on the one hand, that the terrorist attacks are to be regarded entirely as a reaction to American policies or, on the other hand, that they can be explained in isolation from any actions by the
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United States. There are political reasons in various quarters for adopting either one of these positions. Disentangling these strands from each other is important not only in order to get the history right but because the success or otherwise of policies designed to deal with these problems depends on establishing what their sources are. With this in mind, we shall examine the following issues: first, the rise of political Islam; second, Arab–Israeli conflict, with particular reference to the Palestinian issue; third, the record of American involvement in the Middle East; and fourth, the issue of terrorism and its relation to conflict in the Middle East. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of the “first” Afghan war of the twentieth century, prompted by the Soviet invasion of 1979, since, as will become clear, Afghanistan was a crucible into which all the other elements in the tangled conflict leading to September 11 were poured. Needless to say, each of these topics is worthy of much more extended coverage than can be offered in this chapter. The aim here, however, is not comprehensiveness but the establishment of a number of contexts in which the attacks of September 11 may be understood. The rise of political Islam In 1925, the American philosopher John Dewey visited Turkey at the request of the ministry of education. As a leading proponent of “progressive education,” he had been asked to advise the government on establishing a new education system. Turkey was in the throes of revolution. In the wake of the First World War, the Allies had imposed the punitive Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman Empire, and Greece sought to take advantage of the moribund Empire by invading and seizing parts of Western Anatolia. Under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Kemal Atatürk), a Turkish resistance movement pushed back the Greeks and repudiated the harsh terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. In 1923, the triumphant Kemal abolished the Sultanate, which had been the ruling institution of the Ottoman Empire for close to a millennium, and declared a republic. A year later, he abolished the Caliphate, the office of the successor to the prophet Mohammed that, in name at least, embodied the unity and universality of the world of Islam. Kemal then embarked on a path of secularization and modernization with the aim of taking Turkey by forced march into the modern world. By the mid-1930s, he had brought religious leaders under government control, introduced the Gregorian calendar, abolished the fez and replaced it with modern Western headwear, established a new civil code based on the laws of Switzerland, abolished polygamy, replaced Arabic script with the Latin
76 The roots of terror alphabet, and introduced many other Western practices and institutions. John Dewey’s visit was one small part of that project. In the event, Dewey received a less than warm welcome. The minister who had invited him was no longer in office, and the new one did not seem very interested. However, Dewey wrote for the Turkish government a report that is still occasionally referred to by modern Turkish educationists. He also wrote reports on his visit to Turkey for publication in the United States, and these are of considerable significance in understanding the course of history in the Muslim world since then, and also Western perceptions of it.5 The most notable feature of Dewey’s reports is an absence of curiosity about Islam, coupled with an assumption that the modernization of Turkey was a virtual fait accompli. “The whole modern political movement in Turkey,” he declared, “strikes one as just a belated offspring of the principles of ’89 [i.e., 1789].” Moreover, in Turkey’s radical break with what he described as its dynastic and theocratic past, he sensed “a feeling of something familiar,” which was “akin to the work of the pioneer and the frontier in America.” The decision to move the capital from the ancient metropolis of Istanbul to the remote city of Ankara symbolized for Dewey the struggle and the promise of the new Turkey. In short, Turkey was setting out on the road on which other countries, not least the quintessentially modern United States, had started two centuries before.6 Left to itself, it was assumed, Turkey would develop broadly along Western or modern secular lines, and in this Dewey was at one with what would later be called modernization theory. According to this theory, progress toward modernity—industrialism, urbanism, secularism, and so on— was an inexorable process that some might attempt to resist but that could not ultimately be denied. Religion, in the view of modernization theorists, was essentially a regressive force, however valuable it might be as a source of moral values and individual consolation. In any event, as far as Dewey was concerned, the steps taken by the Turkish leader seemed to confirm his own assumptions. Turkey was in the process of remaking itself as a modern secular state and had put history firmly behind it. Among Near and Middle Eastern countries, Turkey was doubtless a special case. No other Muslim country made such strenuous efforts to shed the past and, in part, this reflected Turkey’s geographical and geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire had long straddled that divide and, although during the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the “sick man of Europe” had lost most of its European territories, the modern state of Turkey hung on to a piece of Europe on the western bank of the Bosphorus and the Sea of Marmara. The history of Turkey
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since the foundation of the republic partly confirms but partly refutes the dreams of the modernizers. Atatürk’s revolution was to all appearances highly successful. It was effected from the top on the basis of authoritarian one-party rule and, following Atatürk’s death in 1938, his successor, Inönü, initially employed the same methods. In the wake of the Second World War, however, Inönü announced that opposition parties would be permitted. In conjunction with the establishment of multiparty democracy, Turkey’s Western orientation seemed assured when it was admitted to NATO in 1952. Since the 1950s, Turkey has oscillated between periods of democracy and military rule, but geopolitically Turkey has remained firmly a part of the West.7 Despite the European or “Western” dimension of Turkish history, however, the “Eastern” dimension was never far from the surface. Turkey was and is largely a Muslim country. Islam did not atrophy as a cultural force, however firmly it was marginalized politically. The first signs of a return were visible as early as the 1950s, but only toward the end of the 1960s did Islam appear fully resurgent in Turkey, as in other Muslim nations. In 1970, the Party for National Order was founded with the aim of promoting sharia law as the basis of Turkish political life, and soon the government felt the pressure to acknowledge the force of religious groups. In 1972, Turkey joined an international body known as the Organization of the Islamic Conference. A decade later, the ruling Motherland Party “introduced mandatory religious instruction in primary and secondary schools” and permitted the growth of Islamic schools and colleges, thus reversing the trend toward secularization of education to which John Dewey had contributed in the 1920s.8 Admittedly, Islamic parties still remained clearly in a minority. In local elections held in 1989, Islamic parties won only 10 percent of the vote, and this percentage appeared to represent the support for an Islamic political agenda in the nation as a whole.9 However, since the 1970s, political Islam has emerged with sufficient force as to require successive governments to respond. The authorities have swung between attempts to placate the Islamists and attempts to repress them. In the late 1980s, a member of the Islamic Welfare Party was prosecuted for declaring that he was neither a lay person nor an Kemalist but a Muslim.10 This brief account of the Turkish case will have served its purpose if it has indicated the transformation that the Muslim world has undergone in the last generation in the direction of a revival of Islam as both a social and a political force. Clearly, there are factors specific to Turkey that explain the particular form that the Islamic revival has taken there. However, the overall pattern is too obvious to be denied. If it has manifested itself in the most secular of Muslim countries, how much more significant a part has it played in countries
78 The roots of terror that never sought to go as far as Turkey toward secularization, to say nothing of those, such as Saudi Arabia, that always placed Islam at the center of national life. What are the sources of this profound historical transformation? First, some preliminary points must be made. Terminology in this area can be notoriously deceptive. The most commonly used word to describe the general phenomenon of Islamic resurgence is fundamentalism, but some scholars have voiced serious objections. Not only does this term fail to register the mixture of a return to roots and the embrace of modern technology and social practices characteristic of many groups, but the word is laden with associations with Christian movements and generally carries negative connotations. To that extent, it presupposes a judgement about the phenomena under consideration. Furthermore, it has been pointed out, many Muslims can be described as fundamentalist in the sense that they “accept the Quran as the literal word of God and the Sunnah (example) of the Prophet Muhammad as a normative model for living.” The term fails, therefore, to make necessary distinctions between different religious and politico-religious groupings. Here lies the critical point: To the extent that the term is used as a general label for broad changes in the world of Islam, it belies the diversity of groups involved and the different political consequences of Islamic revivalism in different countries.11 There is no simple solution to the problem of terminology. Some prefer the term Islamism as a label for Islamic political movements as distinct from the Islamic system of belief. Some use the term political Islam, while another makes the same distinction simply by use of quote marks: “Islam” as opposed to Islam. Finally, one leading scholar adopts the terms Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism to denote the emerging political significance of Islam.12 There can be no perfectly neutral or uncontentious terminology. The most important requirement is that the language we use should be able to support the distinctions we want to make. In what follows, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, the broad revival of Islam, as measured by increasing levels of religious observance, adoption of traditional dress, and number of publications and radio progams devoted to the Islamic faith and, on the other hand, the political expression of Islam that ranges from, at one extreme, conventional party political activity to, at the other end of the scale, extreme forms of terrorism and violence.13 Evidently, the social and the political are intimately related. Indeed, the ultimate goal of Islamist movements is to create the political conditions for the social practice of Islamic faith. However, because this goal for a variety of reasons is rarely achievable in its fullest sense, there exists large scope for frustration on the part of those for whom partial Islamization—or Islamization that is not on their own terms—is unacceptable. One of the
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sources of political Islam is this frustration. Islamic revivalism, however, may not or need not issue in political activism. There are many Muslims for whom the “private” realm of the family and other social networks suffice. From some of the commentaries in the media, one would think that the Muslim world in general had a predisposition to political extremism. In order to forestall such assumptions, I believe that it is important to maintain the distinction between specifically political efforts to promote Islam and efforts to promote Islamic faith. I adopt the terms political Islam and Islamic revivalism to describe these two tendencies. Even then, it must be acknowledged, as suggested above, that political Islam covers a wide spectrum of attitudes and activities. One further clarification is in order. Such formulations as the clash of civilizations foster the view that the Muslim world speaks with one voice and, indeed, advocates of this view could point to the aspiration of Islam from its beginnings to unity among all Muslims. That this has been no more than an aspiration is clear, however, from the history of Islam. Islam contains many tendencies and sects, the chief division being between the Sunni and Shi’ite branches of the faith, the sources of which lie in events in the generation following the death of Muhammad in AD 632. There are, however, many other branches of Islam.14 Nor have aspirations to Arab unity come to fruition, in part because of splits within Islam but even more because of tensions common to all secular state systems. Since the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 and the rise of Arab nationalism over the following decades, even nominal unity in the so-called Arab nation has been absent, though attempts have been made to realize it. A United Arab Republic centered on Egypt and Syria was proposed in the late 1950s and another in the early 1970s, which included Libya and Sudan. Neither of these efforts came to fruition. The advent of the nation state has been at least as important in framing conflict in the Middle East and the Muslim world in general as have Islamic beliefs. Nor should this be a cause for surprise to Europeans whose own history showed comparable aspirations to spiritual unity and splits along national lines. Indeed, nationalism was a “Western” import into the Middle East; it is one of the modernizing forces that has been a source both of development and conflict. As previously suggested, Turkey represented a special case in a broad pattern of development in the Muslim world, as independence movements achieved their goals in the wake of the First and Second World Wars. Whether the former colonial power was the Ottoman Empire or one of the West European powers (or in some instances both in succession, given the colonial mandate system established after the First World War), colonial rule had introduced modern methods of administration and had created small but politically
80 The roots of terror powerful educated elites whose experience and skills were to be crucial in the coming of independence. It was natural that, for the most part, the newly independent nations should borrow institutions and practices from the West, including the continued use of Western languages for some purposes, especially English or French; legal and educational systems; and, not least, trading and commercial institutions.15 After all, the new nations were faced at the outset with the need to survive and compete in a world in which they played important economic and strategic roles. External pressures as much as internal needs, therefore, dictated “modernization.” Among the factors linking many Middle Eastern countries—most notably Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf States—into the global political economy was oil. The interests of large British and American oil companies were never far from the attentions of the British and American governments, both for economic and political reasons. As has often been pointed out, the first major clash of the Cold War took place over Iran in 1946, arising in part from American anxieties that the Soviet Union sought to annex the oil-rich northern Iranian province of Azerbaijan.16 The Middle East remained an important theater of Cold War conflict for the next forty years. Though oil was not distributed evenly throughout the Middle East, the geopolitical significance of the region ensured that the political alignments of all nations were matters of extreme sensitivity from the points of view both of the superpowers and of governments in the region. The Suez Canal made Egypt a pivotal state and, with the establishment of Israel in 1948, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt once again were on the front line of international conflict. In sum, oil, the Cold War, and the establishment of Israel ensured that the states of the Middle East would be subject to powerful external influences, all of which created pressure for the development of modern methods and institutions. There was no uniform political model for the states of the Middle East. John Esposito usefully distinguishes three types of state: Islamic, secular, and Muslim. Saudi Arabia represented the Islamic model in the sense that “the monarchy of the house of Saud based its legitimacy on Islam, claiming to govern and be governed by the Quran and Islamic law.” Turkey, as we have seen, lay at the other end of the spectrum, with the effective disestablishment of Islam and its restriction to personal life. Thus the secular model. In between lay the “Muslim states, in that the majority of its population and its heritage are Muslim, yet they have pursued a moderated secular path of development.”17 The most dynamic political ideology among this middle group of states in the Middle East was an amalgam of Arab nationalism, socialism, and charismatic leadership. All three elements were united in the figure of Gamal Abdel Nasser,
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leader of the military officers who overthrew King Farouk in 1952 and, from 1956 until his death in 1970, president of Egypt. Nasser’s revolution became the model for development in Iraq, Syria, and Libya, though each showed distinctive national features. Monarchies remained in Jordan and (until 1979) in Iran, though each in its own way embraced modern institutions. What can be said about this middle group of states is that each arrived at a more or less effective accommodation between secular rule and acknowledgement of the centrality of Islam in national life. In contrast to Turkey, most of these states’ constitutions contained clauses that required that the head of state be a Muslim or “that Islamic law be recognized as a source of law (even if this was not the case in reality).”18 In practice, this meant that leaders were free to exploit religion politically when necessary, for example to mobilize the people against an internal or external threat or to keep it firmly in the background at other times. From the point of view of the present discussion, the key point is that the terms of such calculations began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Political Islam became a factor that Middle Eastern governments across the board could no longer ignore. Control of the religious factor in national politics became less secure. Above all, the assumption that had been made about the relationship between religion and modernization—namely, that as modernization proceeded, religion would decrease in political significance, however important it remained to individuals—proved to have been unfounded. Islam was resurgent not merely among the poor and dispossessed but among those educated in the fields of science and engineering. Furthermore, their commitments were explicitly political. What gave rise to the renewal of Islamic belief as a political force? In the first place, radical forms of Islam had never been far from the surface. Like all the world’s religions, throughout the centuries Islam had been subject to revisionary movements. Some, such as the eighteenth-century Wahhabi sect, were deeply conservative while others, such as the mystical form of Islam known as Sufism, had radical implications. The movements that had the most direct influence over the Islamic revival after the Second World War were the Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-I-Islami (or Islamic Society). The former was founded in Egypt in the late 1920s and the latter in the Indian subcontinent in the same period. Both movements rejected the modernizing trends in Muslim countries and were at once theologically and political radical. While beginning as a reform movement under its founder, Hasan al-Banna, in the hands of its leading theorist, Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), the message of the Muslim Brotherhood soon spread far beyond the borders of Egypt. His goal was to reinvigorate
82 The roots of terror Islam by refocusing attention on the Quran and those hadith (or sayings of the Prophet), the sources of which could be unequivocally identified as the words of the Prophet. Only those should form the basis of the sharia, and only the sharia should form the basis of social and political life. Muslims had no need of either Western capitalist ideas of “Eastern” communism. All that was necessary was contained within Islam.19 Jamaat-I-Islami propounded a comparable message in the Indian subcontinent. These movements were conceived in the era of colonial rule in explicit opposition to Western imperialism and played an important role in the struggles for independence. Once independence was achieved, however, these radical messages ran against the political grain, and the organizations that promoted these views were brutally suppressed by the authorities in the two decades after the Second World War. Qutb himself was imprisoned and tortured and was executed in 1966. Ironically, at this very moment, conditions were changing in ways that would give Qutb’s revolutionary views new relevance. During the 1960s, internal and external problems surfaced, suggesting that the hopes of the 1940s and 1950s for political stability and economic growth were not being achieved. Internally, the demographic landscape was changing rapidly. Population increases and large-scale migrations of rural populations to the cities put enormous strains on urban infrastructures. Modernization was taking place at a dizzying rate, bringing in its train the decay of traditional social structures. At the same time, notes Olivier Roy, “the development of education, combined with budgetary restrictions, and thus a relative decrease in jobs offered by the state increased the number of intellectuals forced into the lower classes.” The consequence was a cohort of discontented and highly educated young people predisposed “to participate in various forms of protest.”20 It is worth pointing out that a comparable explosion in higher education in developed countries had comparable destabilizing effects. In the Middle Eastern context, however, the scale of the gap between classes, the relative absence of safety nets for the poor, and growing economic problems in the 1970s and 1980s put severe strains on societies and hence also on governments that often resorted to extreme measures to quell internal dissent. Attempts to placate Islamic radicals, such as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s adoption of the sobriquet “Believer President” and his toleration of radical Islamic activity, proved no more effective than suppression. Indeed, his efforts at toleration were greeted with suspicion and cynicism, and he resorted increasingly to suppression.21 As far as Islamic radicals were concerned, Westernized models had failed in the Middle East, including Arab socialism. “Re-Islamization” was the only answer for many,
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not so much from a desire to return to ancient roots but because of the conviction that Islam contained within it the solution to modern problems. The most visible and extreme manifestation of these pressures and frustrations was the Iranian Revolution of 1978–79, which overthrew the pro-Western Shah and installed an Islamic government under the spiritualcum-political leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini. This is not the place for a full account of these events. Suffice it to say that beyond the factors mentioned above that affected all Muslim societies, there were circumstances highly specific to Iran that account for the upheavals in that country. These include the detachment of the Shah and his government from the currents of Iranian society, the overt luxury and Western orientation of the Shah and his entourage, and his close connection with the United States. For our purposes, the significance of the revolution lies not only in the fact that, as Fred Halliday has suggested, “for the first time in modern history … a revolution took place in which the dominant ideology, forms of organization, leading personnel and proclaimed goal were all religious in appearance and inspiration,” but because the revolution in Iran became an important “external” influence over events in other Muslim countries.22 The demonstration effect of the Iranian revolution was of paramount significance, but its impact was not straightforward. On the one hand, the revolution was an inspiration to all Muslims who wished for radical change and for whom American influence in the Middle East was a satanic force. On the other hand, Shi’ism, which is the dominant form of Islam in Iran, is a minority branch within Islam as a whole and, to that extent, the Iranian revolution was a divisive force in the Islamic world. It posed particular threats to governments of Sunni Muslim countries that contained Shi’ite populations, an important example being Iraq, whose population is 60 percent Shi’ite but whose leadership is Sunni. While there were certainly other important political and economic causes of the Iran–Iraq war (1980–88), religion was one facet of the conflict between the two nations. Even Saudi Arabia, whose population is only 8 percent Shi’ite overall, experienced riots by Shia Muslims in areas where they were in larger concentrations.23 Perhaps even more significantly, in the wake of the Iranian revolution, Saudi Arabia embarked on a program of funding and support for Sunni Islamic networks in both the Arab and non-Arab worlds, the Muslim Brotherhood being among the most important beneficiaries of this policy. “The Iranian revolution of 1979,” observed Olivier Roy, “immediately contested the very legitimacy of the Saudi dynasty,” and its goal was to combat and isolate the “Shi’ite heresy.”24 In short, many Arab governments had little reason to welcome the triumph of political Islam in Iran.
84 The roots of terror In accounting for the rise of political Islam, a central role must be ascribed to the fallout from the Arab–Israeli conflict, in particular the shattering Arab defeat in the Six-Day War of 1967. The war radicalized Arab opinion as no other single event did. Military defeat was humiliating enough; if anything, more damaging was the evidence that Arab unity, such as it was, was ineffective.25 Two further developments ensured that the consequences of this catastrophe would be long-lasting. The first was American backing for Israel that had existed before 1967 but was markedly stepped up in the wake of the war. The second was the exacerbation of the Palestinian problem resulting from Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem. Both these topics are discussed later in this chapter. For the moment, it is enough to affirm that, combined with the military impact of the war, they provided additional targets for the frustration and anger of Islamic radicals for whom Israel was now unequivocally an agent of Western imperialism. Subsequent events confirmed the worst fears of Islamic radicals. In the aftermath of the next war with Israel—the October or Yom Kippur War of 1973—Egypt embarked on negotiations with Israel, brokered by the Carter administration, which led to the Camp David agreement of 1978. In addition to a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, the agreement provided nominally for movement toward a comprehensive Middle East peace settlement and for self-government of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including recognition of the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.” In practice, only the bilateral peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was realized. Neither Carter nor Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had wished for a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, not least because it would alienate the rest of the Arab world, but that is in effect what they got. “Once Egypt and Israel were at peace,” wrote William Quandt, who was both a participant in the Camp David process and one of its leading historians, “[Menachem] Begin had few remaining incentives to deal constructively with the Palestinian question.”26 In short, the Camp David agreement split the Arab world and left the Palestinian question not only unresolved but further inflamed. In breaking ranks with the Arab world and negotiating with the enemy Israel under the aegis of the United States, President Sadat paid with his life. He was assassinated in 1981 by an extremist splinter group of the Muslim Brotherhood. The assassination dramatically illustrated the pressure to which the leaderships of all Arab nations were potentially subject from the late 1970s onward. Islamic insurgency erupted throughout the Arab world and, indeed, beyond it in the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia in countries with substantial Muslim populations. Even apparently solid and dictatorial
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governments, such as the Assad regime in Syria, experienced Islamic opposition in the 1980s that was brutally suppressed by government forces. Similar pressures existed in Qadaffi’s Libya, where Islamic militancy was put down with comparable ruthlessness.27 The most destructive conflicts took place in Algeria where, in 1991, the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) were poised to achieve victory in the first multiparty elections in the country since independence. The FIS had received the highest number of votes in the first round of voting but not sufficient for a clear majority. The second round was to be held in 1992, but the government declared the elections void and took steps to crush the FIS. Effective civil war ensued, with brutal atrocities, reprisals, and counterreprisals on both sides. Though the conflict moderated after 1999 with the election of more conciliatory leadership, the conflict has not to date been resolved.28 Several conclusions suggest themselves in the light of this brief overview of the resurgence of Islam and Islamism. Islam has undoubtedly undergone a period of profound revivalism on both the social and political levels in the last generation. If there is no such thing as a unified Islamic “threat” to the West, Islamic revivalism certainly posed challenges to Western societies both in the intensity and the geographical range of its effects.29 Furthermore, in the rush to counter the more questionable parts of Samuel Huntington’s clash-ofcivilization thesis, there is a danger of ignoring the very real cultural differences between Islamic and Western societies. This is not only or even primarily, however, a matter of international relations but one of internal relations. Significant numbers of Muslims living in Western societies feel alienated from the values of those societies and seek to insulate themselves from secular and permissive influences. There may be a long-term challenge to the West in the apparent dynamism of Islam as compared with Christianity, irrespective of whether Islamists wield actual political power. However, these conclusions must be qualified in several ways. First, as cannot be insisted too often, the world of Islam is no single entity but contains diverse theological and political tendencies. “There isn’t a single Islam,” writes Edward Said, “but ‘Islams’.”30 This does not mean that we should deny the existence of important unifying elements in Islamic cultures, nor does it mean that we should deny the existence of differences in culture, social practices, and attitudes among societies with Islamic and Christian heritages. It is clear, however, that political Islam is as divisive within the world of Islam as between Islam and the West. There is not and never has been an “Islamic International” along the lines of the Communist Internationals, though numerous transnational associations and networks exist at levels below that of the nation state.31 Many of the
86 The roots of terror conflicts inside the Islamic world or between Islamic countries and the West do not have their sources in religion per se. They are the result of states pursuing their national interests in the time-honored fashion of nation-states. Consequently, it must be affirmed that such differences as do exist between Islam and the West do not entail the conclusion that Islam is inherently incompatible with Western or Christian societies, even if it does involve the careful cultivation of toleration. Second, if one accepts the argument of the French Islamic scholar, Olivier Roy, the salient fact about political Islam is its failure to achieve its goals. Except for the short-lived Taliban regime, Iran and Sudan remain the only examples of the full takeover of a state by Islamists. “Political Islam is no longer a geostrategic factor,” he writes; “it is at most a societal phenomenon.” While “North–South tensions will long remain vital, fuelling a resentment that can easily take on the colors of Islam, the Islamic revolution is behind us.”32 In short, conflict between Islam and the West may be regarded as an aspect of the relations between the Third and First Worlds, not a Manichean struggle over theological principles. The point can be extended by observing that terrorism, devastating and indiscriminate as its effects can be, is generally the weapon of the weak and the politically dispossessed. It is typically the weapon of last resort by those who are unable or unwilling to work through legitimate channels of political expression. Nor, it hardly needs to be pointed out, is terrorism the reserve of extremist Islamic groups, as history attests (see below). Terrorism knows no international boundaries, even if its targets are individual national governments. Third, we return to the theme of modernization with which this section began. One implicit assumption of John Dewey, and no doubt of his modernist heirs, is that the West has successfully mastered the transition to modernity that others are still struggling to negotiate. Arguably, this is a rash assumption. While the manifestations of the strains of modernization may be different from those in developing nations, the prevalence of drug use, social violence, and cynicism about public life suggests that they do exist. Furthermore, in the United States if not in other Western countries, there is a correlation between, on the one hand, periods of rapid social and economic change and, on the other, levels of religious observance and the emergence of religious and political fundamentalism. Ironically, at the very time John Dewey was in Turkey, the economic and social explosion of the roaring twenties witnessed a revived Ku Klux Klan, a highly successful if short-lived organization (as far as achievement of political power is concerned) that promoted a combination of Protestant fundamentalism, racism, and profoundly conservative values. It is often
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interpreted as a revolt of Protestant rural America against the deracinated urban culture of modern industrial society. Upsurges in religious observance, if taking less extreme forms, were visible in the 1950s and 1970s and 1980s, in the latter case having considerable impact on the election of Ronald Reagan in the form of the Moral Majority’s support for his candidacy. Though Reagan by no means enacted the full Moral Majority agenda, the existence of such pressure groups can be taken as a sign of protest against modernity. Other manifestations in the United States of revolts against modernity are the militia movements that have emerged since the 1980s, advocating a return to the true American value of individual freedom that they regard as having been corrupted by big government. Some have used terrorism to make their point: witness Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma bombing; others have simply made a show of violence by stockpiling weapons and survival supplies in anticipation of the great showdown with the forces of evil.33 America’s fundamentalist movements, whether religious or political, have at least this in common with comparable Islamic movements: that they make sophisticated use of the most modern technology to convey their reactionary messages. In sum, modernization is an uncompleted and conflict-ridden process that affects all societies, not least the United States, where modernization has been embraced perhaps more fully than anywhere else. There are even those who characterize American culture as a whole as fundamentalist and would argue that the conflict between America and Islam is not between modernity and fundamentalism but between two forms of fundamentalism.34 Finally, there is the question of the relationship between the rise of political Islam and terrorism. The subject of terrorism is treated later in the chapter. Here, we need simply note that if one were to judge from the self-confessed motivations of bin Laden and his supporters, there then is an intimate connection between their acts of terror and their religious faith, as is evident from the frequency with which quotations from the Quran are used to justify their actions; witness bin Laden’s invocation (already quoted at the beginning of this chapter) of the Quranic injunction “to fight them [the pagans] until there is no more tumult or oppression and there prevail justice and faith in God.” That it is possible to quote other passages from the Quran enjoining moderation in war and limiting “just wars”—as in the Christian faith—to wars of defense would seem to undermine arguments that it is religious belief itself that lies at the root of terrorism. The invocation of the Quran seems to be merely instrumental on all sides. There are good grounds for arguing, as one analyst has put it, that the real causes of terrorism and the real motivations of terrorists have little to do with the religious legitimations that are provided for them.35
88 The roots of terror Unfortunately, the legitimations given by bin Laden and his supporters have had the effect of tarring Islam as a whole with the terrorist brush. The writings of the same Islamists who led the Islamic revival, notably Qutb and the Muslim Brotherhood, laid the groundwork for a reinterpretation of the concept jihad that, in the hands of such figures as bin Laden, would permit violence against the state (including states that were nominally Muslim but were held to have departed in practice from the faith) and even against innocent civilians.36 Such a reading of jihad is a minority one and is hotly disputed in the Muslim world. According to Olivier Roy, bin Laden “is not a theologian or a jihadist in the traditional sense of the term”; he has simply “Islamized the traditional discourse of Western anti-imperialism.” More pointedly, some prominent Muslim spiritual leaders with long histories of support for terrorist activity (including the Hizbollah leader Sheik Muhammad Hussain Fadlallah) reject bin Laden’s innovative use of the Quran to justify the September 11 attacks as being “incompatible with Sharia law” and a product merely of bin Laden’s “personal psychological needs.”37 To those in the Muslim world, however, seeking reasons to express their frustrations with the West or with their own leaders, bin Laden’s innovation offers itself as a persuasive and convenient weapon; to those in the West and elsewhere seeking explanations for their own justified anxieties about terrorism, it is easier to take the terrorists at their word and regard the deed simply as the product of the word. Palestinian–Israeli conflict Our question is: what bearing does the Palestinian issue have on the terrorist attacks of September 11? The evidence suggests that Osama bin Laden turned his anger toward the United States initially because of the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia during and after the Gulf conflict of 1990–91. “That was a provocation to the entire Muslim world,” bin Laden is reported to have said in an interview conducted in December 1998. The same report goes on: “But once those early encounters in his homeland had stoked his feelings, he came to concentrate more on America’s involvement in the Middle East. He declared a jihad against America and Israel jointly, he said, because he believed Israel was killing and punishing Palestinians with American money and American arms.”38 In most statements issued