Altopascio: A Study in Tuscan Rural Society, 1587-1784 (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History)

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY Editors J. H. ELLIOTT AND H. G. KOENIGSBERGER

Altopascio A study in Tuscan rural society, 1587-1784

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY Edited by J. H. Elliott and H. G. Koenigsberger

The idea of an 'early modern' period of European history from the fifteenth to the late eighteenth century is now widely accepted among historians. The purpose of the Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History is to publish monographs and studies which will illuminate the character of the period as a whole, and in particular focus attention on a dominant theme within it, the interplay of continuity and change as they are represented by the continuity of medieval ideas, political and social organisation, and by the impact of new ideas, new methods and new demands on the traditional structures. The Old World and the New, 1492-1650 /. H. Elliott French Finances, 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy / . F. Bosher

The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: the logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries Wars Geoffrey Parker

Chronicle into History: an essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth Century Chronicles Louis Green

France and the Estates General of 1614 / . Michael Hayden

Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century John Francis Guilmartin

Reform and Revolution in Mainz 1743-1803 T. C. W. Blanning The State, War and Peace / . A. Fernandez-Santamaria

Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands, 1544-1569 Phyllis Mack Crew

Altopascio A STUDY IN TUSCAN RURAL SOCIETY, 1587-1784

FRANK McARDLE

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE LONDON NEW YORK MELBOURNE

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521216197 © Cambridge University Press 1978 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1978 This digitally printed first paperback version 2005 A catalogue recordfor this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data McArdle, Frank, 1946Altopascio. (Cambridge studies in early modern history) A revision of the author's thesis, University of Virginia, 1974. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Altopascio, Italy- Social conditions. 2. Altopascio, Italy - Economic conditions. 3. Altopascio, Italy - History. I. Title. HN488.A47M23 1977 309.1'45'53 76-53261 ISBN-13 978-0-521-21619-7 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-21619-2 hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-02307-8 paperback ISBN-10 0-521-02307-6 paperback

Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

List of illustrations List of tables Acknowledgments Origins The estate of Altopascio: village and villagers Population The economic organization The economic performance, part I The economic performance, part II Familial organization Class divisions The local authority The expression of grievance Conclusion Bibliography Index

vi vii ix 1 16 41 66 83 109 130 156 182 195 214 218 223

Illustrations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

The location of Altopascio x Northern wall of the castello of Altopascio 17 Eastern wall of the castello 18 Ramp leading to the western gate 18 The Castello of Altopascio in the eighteenth century 20 Piazza Ospitalieri 22 The site of the wine cellar of the estate 22 Approach to the Florentine gate 23 The Plain 24 Architectural plan of a peasant house designed in the eighteenth century 26 Boats in a canal 28 The Oratory of San Rocco 34 Births and deaths reported in the parish of Altopascio (Altopascians only): annual average of five-year periods, 1625-1784 46 Annual births, marriages and deaths reported in the parish of Altopascio (Altopascians only): 1625-1784 51 The River Ralla 67 The Argine 68 View of the Church of le Spianate 69 The peasant farm 70 Indices of average annual price of wheat, net money income, and income adjusted for wheat prices of the estate of Altopascio, 1577-1780 88 Indices of average annual production of the Estate of Altopascio, 1600-1784 90 Indices of average annual leaseholder indebtedness, wheat prices at Montecarlo, and the yield of wheat per unit of seed for the Estate of Altopascio, 1630-1778 100 Abandoned farmhouse in the cerbaia 149

Tables

1 Distribution of population by the six classes of the Macinato tax of 1679 2 Burials in the parish of Altopascio, 1648-50 3 Age distribution of plague victims in Altopascio, 1648-50 4 Short-term demographic crises, 1625-1784 5 Average size of families of Altopascio by duration of marriage 6 Average interval between births (in months): mothers and daughters 7 Average family size of all reconstituted families of Altopascio 8 Respective marriage ages of women remaining versus those exiting 9 Distribution of land of the estate of Altopascio 10 Average price of wheat at Montecarlo 11 Relative prices of wheat, rye and millet in the market of Udine, 1500-1700 12 Gross return of wheat and segalato for each unit of seed planted on the estate of Altopascio, 1600-1783 13 Annual average leaseholder indebtedness, indices of the average annual price of wheat at Montecarlo and the yield of wheat per unit of seed for the estate, 1630-1778 14 Leaseholder rent payments, 1704-10 15 Annual net debt of average peasant household (in scudi and hundredths of scudi), indices of price of wheat at Montecarlo and of the gross return per unit of seed for the entire estate of Altopascio, 1624-1783 16 Average family size of the six macinato classes: 1679 17 Typology of families by profession: 1767 18 Household size of grand-ducal mezzadri, 1767 19 Household structure of the village of Altopascio, 1618-1767: percentage of total households for that year

36 48 49 52 57 59 61 63 80 84 86 95 99 102

114 131 132 133 134

Acknowledgments

This book is a thoroughly revised version of a doctoral dissertation presented to the graduate faculty of the University of Virginia in May 1974. My research was greatly facilitated by a Woodrow Wilson Dissertation Fellowship and a Fulbright Fellowship, which allowed me to return to Florence for a full year in 1972-3 after a summer of archival work there in 1971. Many people have given me valuable assistance. I mention in particular my readers at the University of Virginia, Professors Samuel Berner and Michael Moohr, and Professor Carlo Corsini and his associates of the Dipartimento StatisticoMatematico dell'Universita degli Studi di Firenze, who processed the demographic data with the computer programs devised specifically for their ongoing research in the demographic history of Tuscany. Professor Simon Pepper of the University of Liverpool, Sergio Nelli of Altopascio, Phyllis Eastman of the Naval Research and Development Center at Carderock, Maryland, and Lucy A. McArdle, all contributed their skills at important formative stages of this study. The manuscript also benefited from the detailed criticism and recommendations of Professor David Herlihy of Harvard University, and from the helpful suggestions of the editors of the series, Professors J. H. Elliott and H. G. Koenigsberger. A special acknowledgement is due to my wife, Jennifer, who photographed the parish registers and the district of Altopascio, worked alongside me on some pressured research projects, and carefully read all my drafts of the dissertation and the book. To all these people, I extend my deepest thanks.

Peseta,

Fig. 1. The location of Altopascio.

Origins

In the Middle Ages, a heavily traveled highway called the Via Francigena served as a major thoroughfare that carried knights, clerics, and commoners from southern France and northern Italy to the center of Christian civilization in Rome. Sometime around 1060, an unidentified group of men founded a hospice on this highway at a place in Italy called Altopascio, whose name derived from an adjacent river. Altopascio is located in Tuscany, approximately 14 kilometers southeast of Lucca, 32 kilometers northeast of Pisa, and 64 kilometers northwest of Florence. The hospice fell under the jurisdiction of the state of Lucca from the time of its establishment until 1339, when it passed by treaty to the Florentine state. The site bordered on a difficult stretch of the road notorious for a multitude of hazards that threatened the safe journey of travelers. It was situated at the edge of the Cerbaia, a name that refers to a vast zone of woodland that originally occupied the area between the Lake of Bientina on the west and the Fucecchio swamp on the east, and was bordered by the crest of hills of Poggio-Adorno, Monte Falcone, and Pozzo.1 An eighteenth-century source makes the medieval Cerbaia sound a frightening region: 1

Emanuele Repetti, Dizionario geografico fisico storico della Toscana contenente la descrizione di tutti i luoghi del Granducato, Ducato di Lucca, Garfagna, e Lunigiana

(6 vols.; Florence, 1833), i, 652. [Abbreviations for footnotes: AC, Archivio Capponi; ACM, Archivio del Comune di Montecarlo; APA, Archivio della Parrocchia di Altopascio; APM, Archivio della Parrocchia di Montecarlo; ASF, Archivio di Stato di Firenze; AVP, Archivio Vescovile di Pescia; AVSM, Archivio Vesovile di San Miniato; CR, Consulta Regia; CSSM, Compagnie Soppresse di San Miniato; RP, Regie Possessioni; SF, Segreteria di Finanze.]

1

Altopascio

[In this] vast forest called Cerbaia. . . the tall thick trees made it dark even at midday, and the narrow winding roads within it became a labyrinth in which many travelers often lost their way while returning from the fairs and ended up dead, and often too they were robbed and murdered by thieves.2 Legend recalls that the Countess Matilda, the eleventhcentury Margrave who represented imperial authority in Tuscany,3 herself became lost in the forest. The terror she experienced prompted her to sponsor a hospice to aid pilgrims, 'a hospital in which poor people could be sure to find haven and spend the night with tranquility, safe from assassins and creatures of the wild.. . .' Alongside the hospital, a bell called La Smarrita (the Lost One) rang for one hour between one and two a.m. 'so that those who were lost in the forest could save themselves by following the sound of the bell/4 Such were the motives behind the founding of this pious institution. And although the obscurity surrounding the establishment of the hospice precludes any absolute judgment, it is generally believed that the church and hospice of Altopascio did enjoy the patronage of the Countess Matilda,5 who was herself Lucchese, had a castle in nearby Vivinaia, and who is celebrated for her numerous acts of piety and for her patronage of many religious institutions. The best identification of the first residents of Altopascio is still rather vague: in 1056 the Porcari family made a donation of lands to three priests in the adjacent community of Pozzevoli who, several years later, now grown to twelve in number, transferred themselves to Altopascio and opened the hospice around 1061-2.6 These men were united in their commitment to aid the poor 2 3 4 5 6

ASF, RP, 3767, no. 7: 'Alcune Memorie della Mansione dello Spedale dell'Altopascio.' Ferdinand Schevill, Medieval and Renaissance Florence (2 vols.; New York, 1963), i, 32 and 54. ASF, RP, 3767, no. 7. For the legend of the Countess Matilda, see Salvatore Andreucci and Guglielmo Lera, Altopascio (Lucca, 1970), pp. 113-14. Andreucci and Lera, op. cit., p. 80. Ugo Mori, Storia di Montecarlo, ed. Mario Seghieri and Giorgio Tori (Lucca, 1971), p. 161. Temistocle Lorenzi, Vospizio e il paese di Altopascio (Prato, 1904), pp. 61-2.

Origins

3

and the pilgrims. They organized themselves as a community for the purposes of maintaining roads, building bridges, and providing food and lodging to pilgrims bound for holy places. Some military activity was also required in defending the locality from the bandits of the Cerbaia; and the military aspect developed as the men of Altopascio became active participants in support of the crusading movement that gained momentum shortly after the foundation of Altopascio. By the early thirteenth century, the followers of the initial founders included knights, clerics, and laymen. In 1239 Pope Gregory IX conferred upon them the Rule of the Hospital of San Jacopo of Altopascio, which was inspired by the rule of St Augustine and similar to the rule of the Knights of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem. The Grand Master of the Order came under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See. Thus the men of Altopascio, with the tau cross as their symbol, came to be known as the Friars and the Knights of the Order of the Hospital of San Jacopo of Altopascio; they were a product of the fervent religious atmosphere that characterized the late eleventh century. In the course of the twelfth century, the Order expanded its influence throughout Western Europe and 'dependent houses' subordinate to the Grand Master of Altopascio sprang up in Istria, Sicily, Sardinia, Piedmont, Spain, Flanders, Germany, and England. The charities of food and lodging dispensed by the hospital gradually became famous enough that Boccaccio could use the image of ' Altopascio's caldron' in The Decameron and expect his readers to understand the reference to the food prepared in great quantities to feed pilgrims.7 Along with fame, there came bequests of land that accumulated in time to form a 'fat' benefice not only in Tuscany but also around the various dependent houses. No wonder that the hospital of Altopascio came to attract the interest of the Florentine patriciate. Economic conditions eventually made patrician control of the benefice not only desirable but feasible. The warfare 7

Giovanni Boccaccio, Decameron, ed. Vittore Branca (Florence, 1965), Sixth Day, Tenth Story, p. 751.

4

Altopascio

endemic in the fourteenth century among the Florentine, Pisan, and Lucchese city-states, joined with the recurrent demographic checks through pestilence, brought serious disaster to Altopascio as it did to the rest of the towns in this contested frontier region. At one point, retreating Pisan soldiers actually set fire to the walled village castello.8 Direct jurisdiction of the Holy See also drew Altopascio within the partisan policies of the Great Schism that divided Catholic Europe in allegiance to the rival claimants to the chair of St Peter. An impressive list of lands alienated ' during the war of the Church and then recovered '9 indicates that the institution's revenues had been sacrificed for short-term considerations. By 1419 there is evidence that not only had disaster befallen Altopascio but that the Order could not draw the income from its lands. On 24 March, 1419, the Master General Bartolomeo de' Bonittis of Orvieto wrote a circulating letter declaring his need for charitable donations to restore the now deteriorated hospice to its former splendor.10 The catasto tax records of 1427 yield an equally gloomy commentary upon the fate of the institution. The tax records document a serious economic crisis: the castello was 'falling apart', formerly cultivated farms were abandoned to pasture, pastureland was unused because the lessee was without livestock, and many rents owed to the hospice went unpaid.11 All this stress prepared the way for successful patrician intervention. The Grand Mastership of the Order first passed to Giuliano Capponi in 1445, which initiated that family's legal control of Altopascio, finally consummated in 1472. In that year, Pope Sixtus IV awarded the ius patronatus of the benefice to Niccolo and Bartolomeo, brothers of Giovanni di Piero Capponi, with the proviso that some members of the family 8

9 10

11

Lorenzi, op. cit., pp. 165-77. The castello was put to the torch in 1363 and the following year, on 20 August 1364, a treaty was signed by which Pisa surrendered Altopascio to the Florentine republic. ASF, RP, 3767, no. 53. Biblioteca Moreniana, 230, 'Memorie Storiche,' in, no. 1. The actual text of the letter is provided by Giuseppe Dal Canto, Altopascio Medicea (Lucca, 1974), Appendix I, pp. 175-80, which the author graciously allowed me to consult in manuscript form. ASF, Catasto 1427, 198, ff. 750-71; there is a copy of the catasto for Altopascio in AC, xin, no. 65.

Origins

5

reside in Altopascio and spend three thousand florins in eight years to restore the institution.12 For all practical purposes the Order was fundamentally transformed once the institution fell into the grips of the patrician class. Elections of the Grand Master ceased, control of that office became centralized in the Capponi family and passed through hereditary succession. The benefice never left the Capponi until it fell permanently within the grasp of still stronger patricians - the Medici themselves. In 1537 Duke Cosimo de' Medici acceded to an uncertain regime which came into existence after Imperial armies and their Florentine allies dealt the final blow to the Florentine republic. The new duke had to reassert the sovereignty of the Florentine state in relation to the Papacy and the Empire, and at the same time to impress upon the notoriously independent patrician class the fact that he intended to rule by himself.13 In this context Duke Cosimo's effort to obtain Altopascio from the Capponi was more than a selfish struggle to secure a valuable benefice. A revived and militant papacy also gazed longingly at these lands, and the ensuing contest was not only a battle over revenue: it was a symbolic confrontation that challenged the sensitive issue of Cosimo's sovereign rule. The Holy See historically had controlled the ius patronatus of Altopascio. Were not the Capponi rights to the benefice solemnized by a papal bull? When the Capponi heir agreed to name a trusted agent of Duke Cosimo as Grand Master of Altopascio in 1537, Pope Paul III quickly retaliated by naming his own Grand Master, his nephew Cardinal Alessandro Farnese. Duke Cosimo could hardly break with one of the most sacrosanct traditions of the Florentine republic independence from papal * domination.' Quite openly and bluntly the duke supported his candidate, Ugolino Grifoni, and a battle between the duchy and the Papacy lasted for three years, during which time Grifoni was twice excommunicated by the Holy Father.14 The outcome was predictable and once 12 13 14

Biblioteca Moreniana, 230. On this whole problem see Eric Cochrane, Florence in the Forgotten Centuries, 1527-1800 (Chicago, 1973), pp. 19-21, 29-35. ASF, Archivio Grifoni, 216:' Estratti o Spogli attenenti allo Spedale di San Jacopo di Altopascio dal 1409-1604.'

6

Altopascio

again in line with the history of the Florentine republic. Cosimo won, even though the compromise accepting Grifoni temporarily kept Altopascio out of the direct possession of the Medici. But only temporarily. In 1552 Grifoni ceded the title of Grand Master to Cardinal Giovanni de' Medici, and in 1565 Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici received the title while the revenues and the administration remained in Grifoni's hands until his death in 1576.15 A trial at that date indicates that the remarkable fortune of the Grifoni family owed not a little to the revenues of Altopascio to which Ugolino had generously helped himself.16 Still, the Grand Mastership as it existed was not fully satisfactory for two reasons. The Papacy retained the power of granting its apostolic approval to changes in lands, in spending and in investment; and the Capponi, after three quarters of a century and a papal investiture, certainly held some legal claim to Altopascio. Grand Duke Francesco I satisfied Capponi claims by a settlement in 1584 by which the family gave up its rights to Altopascio in exchange for three commende (benefices) created from public revenues. Some shrewd members of the Capponi family perceived an element of unfairness in the fact that the estimated revenues from these commende did not equal the revenues from Altopascio.17 Other documents from the early eighteenth century indicate that the Capponi did not always receive even those revenues promised. The family members in favor of cession nonetheless prevailed. Exactly why the recalcitrant ones yielded is not certain. The most plausible explanation is that they realized the futility of resisting Francesco I. The final settlement also returned to the Capponi the lands confiscated because of Antonio di Niccolo Capponi's participation in the Pucci conspiracy of 1575, a plot against Grand Duke Francesco de' Medici in which four of the twenty-two participants were members of the Capponi family.18 15 16 17 18

A copy of the document of 1565 can be found in ASF, Miscellanea Medicea, 25, no. 4. Dal Canto, Altopascio Medicea, pp. 20, 82-3. The discussion of the issue among members of the family is preserved in AC, xin, nos. 68, 73, 74, 75, 76. Samuel J. Berner,' Florentine Society in the Late Sixteenth and Early Seventeenth Centuries,' Studies in the Renaissance, xvm (1971), 238-9.

Origins

7

With the Capponi out of the picture, only the problem of His Holiness the Pope remained. Grand Duke Ferdinando I handled this satisfactorily by arranging for Sixtus V to issue an apostolic bull suppressing the Order of San Jacopo of Altopascio and creating in its place a Commenda Precettoria of the Order of Santo Stefano which Ferdinando, as Grand Master of the Order, could control and grant as a benefice to any member of the Order of Santo Stefano. The avowed intention was to endow the religious undertakings of the new order. In fact, Altopascio became for all practical purposes the personal property of the grand duke and was administered as such, reserving to the Order of Santo Stefano the ceremonial tasks of approving alienations of land decided by the grand duke's agents, and of making occasional inspections of the church. In return the duke agreed to pay 3,362 Roman scudi and 75 baiocchi to the Papacy every fifteen years, the 'quindennio.'19 A legacy of the suppressed Order of San Jacopo was the obligation of the grand dukes to sustain the charities traditionally offered by the hospice. Another legacy was the retention of the privileges of exemption from taxes and immunity from the legal jurisdiction of communal authorities, the so-called * Privileges of Altopascio/20 The old regime was nonetheless transformed. Papal control was removed: the apostolic approval required for alienations of lands of the benefice was actually only rarely obtained and for only a small portion of the vast lands alienated in the 1640s. The legal extinction of the Order of San Jacopo eliminated the clerical status of the Grand Master, a condition that would have excluded the Grand Master as a cleric from the ducal throne. By suppressing the old regime, Ferdinando cleverly managed to assert his control over the benefice while maintaining the customary public image of Altopascio as a haven for pilgrims. The requirement to maintain the traditional charities complicated the economic organization of the estate. The obligation to fund such undertakings often conflicted with the capitalistic drive of the grand duke and his 19 20

Biblioteca Moreniana, 230. For the privileges, see Andreucci and Lera, Altopascio, p. 47, and ASF, Carte Strozziane, Serie prima, cccv: 'Nota di Scritture e privilegi dello Spedale dell' Altopascio,' codice 211.

8

Altopascio

agents to maximize profits and minimize costs. But in any event, the lands were now securely in the Medici grip. Thereafter, the community of Altopascio bore the imprint of the Medici regime. The basic political and managerial assumptions of that regime remained relatively constant from the reign of Duke Cosimo I (1537-74) right through to that of Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo (1765-90). Professor Eric Cochrane has described the regime at the accession of the latter grand duke in the following terms: 'The principle laid down by Cosimo I in the mid-sixteenth century was still accepted as axiomatic: government was a function inseparable from the person of a prince, and a bureaucracy existed only to carry out his orders.'21 Actually, both the traditions of the bureaucrats and the personality of the prince together influenced the administration of the grand-ducal lands. The chief posts in the bureaucracy were held by patricians. These men were often themselves landholders, descendants of families with long experience in commercial and agricultural undertakings. Their management of the grand-ducal lands was influenced by their practical training in efficient management of their own estates.22 They brought an acute statistical consciousness to the management of the grand-ducal lands, along with a shrewd sense of busines and a watchful eye towards fraud. The bureaucracy of the Medici regime, therefore, naturally reflected the values of the landlord class. The small size of the Tuscan bureaucracy, however, always allowed the personality of the prince to influence public administration even on the very lowest levels. The members of the bureaucracy numbered about a thousand in the sixteenth century, and 1,335 in 1765.23 And the documents 21 22

23

Cochrane, Florence, 1527-1800, p. 428.

The Marquis Francesco Feroni, for example, who held the post of InspectorGeneral of the Royal Possessions for many years, had vast landholdings of his own. Professor Antonio Anzilotti described the Feroni as 'a representative family of gentlemen, who know how to dedicate themselves to the reclamation of their lands and to their studies, excellent administrators, and at the same time openminded towards advances in the physical sciences and their practical applications' ('Le riforme in Toscana nella seconda meta del secolo XVIII. II nuovo ceto dirigente e la sua preparazione intelletuale,' in Movementi e contrasti per Vunita italiana (Bari, 1930), p. 97). Samuel Berner, 'Florentine Political Thought in the Late Cinquecento,' Ilpensiero politico, Anno III, no. 2 (Aug. 1970), p. 193, hereafter cited as 'Florentine Political Thought'; Cochrane, Florence, 1527-1800, p. 401.

Origins

9

pertaining to the affairs of the estate of Altopascio support the observation that Professor Samuel Berner has made for the sixteenth century: 'The dimensions of the Tuscan state were such that the Duke and a few trusted secretaries could realistically manage important as well as relatively minor affairs.'24 The grand dukes did exert considerable interest in the performance of their lands, and the letters of the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions frequently stated that the ruler of the state did take the time to examine personally the final accounts of the estate. Consequently, in the history of Altopascio, the tone of any given administration reflected the personality of the reigning grand duke. To cite examples, under Grand Duke Ferdinando I, known as an energetic duke with strong entrepreneurial leanings, the estate of Altopascio underwent its most dramatic physical expansion. Under Grand Duke Ferdinando II, who was plagued by financial problems, the war of the Barberini, and a serious commercial depression, all of the member estates of the original benefice of Altopascio were sold, except Altopascio itself. During the regency period (1737-65) that followed the end of Medici rule, there was a break in the historical tie between the Medici grand dukes and their properties; and the new regime leased the former lands of the Medici to a tax farm in 1740 in order to meet the financial needs of the reigning Grand Duke Francesco Stefano of Lorraine. Finally, under Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo, the enlightened ruler, famous as a reformer and a modernizer, Altopascio experienced heavy capital investments in housing and land reclamation, and ultimately the alienation of the estate in 1784 as part of a planned program of agrarian reform. Notwithstanding the different personalities of the grand dukes, the ideology of the regime and the tenor of its representatives remained unchanged throughout the period under consideration. This was a monarchical regime steeped in the ideology of divine right absolutism. The concept of the ruler was paternalistic, and the grand duke, whether of the Medici or Lorraine dynasty, was still 'ruler of the household.' 24

Berner, 'Florentine Political Thought,' p. 193.

10

Altopascio

The paternalistic ideology did penetrate to the level of the everyday administration of the lands of Altopascio. Within limits, of course, the administrators would often mention their desire to act with 'Christian charity' in pardoning the offenses of the subject peasantry. Another feature of the Medici regime was its fidelity to custom, and here too the ideology of conservatism found expression in numerous reprimands to individual estate managers not 'to innovate' in the contractual relations with labor or in other customary practices of the community. To sum up, the fate of the inhabitants of Altopascio was inextricably bound to the inclinations of the Medici and their administrators. The historical significance of the community of Altopascio in the early modern period stems from this close identification with the Medici family. On the one hand, the economic performance of the estate serves as an indicator of the resources available to the rulers of the state. On the other hand, the thorough management of these lands by the Medici agents has bequeathed to posterity an exceptional source of primary material for reconstructing a rural society in the past. Inasmuch as the field of early European agrarian social and economic history all too often suffers from a lack of the direct testimony of the participants, this Tuscan source material deserves recognition for its outstanding character, the historical potential of which is virtually unlimited. In fact, one of the most renowned students of Italian economic history, Professor Luigi Dal Pane, has made the historical significance of the archive of the grand-ducal possessions a recurrent subject in his work. After stressing the unusual abundance of its valuable quantitative material, Dal Pane proceeds to describe the historical potential in the following terms: But the importance of this department [of the Royal Possessions] is not conferred solely by numbers: owing to the vast extent of the landed property, the methods of tenancy and of administration, the various works of agricultural improvement, and the commercial affairs of different sorts, the monographic study of the Medici business and of the grand-ducal possessions would not only constitute an indispensable premise for the economic and financial history of Tuscany during the Medici principate, but would also

Origins

11

advance the research into political events and the subsequent development of the economy and politics under the House of Lorraine.25 Unfortunately the sheer volume of archival material makes an exhaustive study of all the grand-ducal lands impossible for a single person to complete. What follows is a brief attempt to introduce the reader to the type of documentation available for the study of Altopascio, with the understanding that data of a comparable quality, though only rarely for so long a time span, exist for virtually all of the grand-ducal possessions. In the Archivio di Stato of Florence, Italy, where the grand-ducal archives are now located, two very thorough inventories catalogue the holdings and permit one to determine beforehand the extent of the documentation for any particular estate and the chronological span of the data. The inventory of the Piante delle R. Possessioni is a catalogue of all maps, drawings, architectural plans, and the like, that were used in the administration of the properties. Among the plans surviving for Altopascio, for example, is a detailed map of the estate dating from the late seventeenth century, showing the roads, houses, fields, granaries, swampland, etc. Here too can be found the architectural plan of peasant houses designed for an area of newly reclaimed land. Maps which depict the leasehold tenements and bear the signature of the leaseholder in witness have also survived. Basically, then, the piante provide the indispensable information to situate the properties and to reconstruct them visually. This historical information can then be supplemented by the excellent modern maps available for purchase through the Istituto Geografico Militare, which illustrate the topography, the vegetation, and even the location of old dirt roads. Aerial photographs of the region are also available from the Institute; and good geological maps can be purchased through the Servizio Geologico d'ltalia. The second inventory of the Possessioni catalogues practically all the rest of the narrative and quantitative data, out25

Luigi Dal Pane, La ftnanza toscana dagli inizi del secolo XVIII

Granducato (Milan, 1965), p. 13.

alia caduta del

12

Altopascio

standingly rich because the agency entrusted with the administration of the grand-ducal lands demanded complete information from the localities on the performance of the estate, thus generating a profusion of administrative sources. The primary yardstick of the estate's performance lay in the accounts. Generally the accounts for all the grand-ducal estates were entered in the thick and weighty master account book, the Libro Maestro, a series which is complete from the early seventeenth century onward. In addition to these volumes, there are individual account books for the estate which served as the sources for the Libro Maestro, organized according to subject matter. In both these series of accounts the transactions of the estate were recorded; from them, it is possible to obtain yearly quantitative data on agricultural production, livestock, market transactions, peasant indebtedness, rent collections - in short, data on the entire gamut of the estate's activities. The numbers themselves, and the comments entered alongside them, together allow the researcher to reconstruct the anatomy of the rural economy and to trace its movement over a long period of time. Certain gaps occur for individual estates, however, during periods when the estate was leased to someone else, but even then, some records of the lessee or of visiting agents of the grandducal possessions can frequently help to fill the void. The narrative accounts of the estate's history are also unusually abundant. To begin with, correspondence between the local estate management and the central administration in Florence was both frequent and regular; on average, about two letters per week were exchanged. All of the outgoing correspondence from Florence has been preserved from the mid-seventeenth century onward in the Copialettere of the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions. The letters actually originating at the estate are not complete for Altopascio, but, allowing for variations from estate to estate, significant numbers of these letters have survived. Furthermore, the format of the letters written in Florence generally summarized the original letter point by point, which usually allows the reader to comprehend the events that had transpired. These letters were extremely valuable because of the range

Origins

13

of the subject matter - the business transactions of the estate, incidents of violence, crime, illegitimate pregnancies, family disputes - in sum, the whole range of activities within the rural community. In addition to the letters, the Deputies of the Royal Possessions convened regularly and preserved their discussions in their Deliberazione and their more important dispositions in the Negozi, another two series of administrative sources which are virtually complete for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. If the deputies required more technical information, they might order a visit by one of their agents, who then filed a report at the end of the commission, preserved today in the series of Relazione. Many of the specific inquiries by specialists addressed the problems of hydrology, and it is quite possible that these data could be used effectively to link known climatic fluctuations to the level of agricultural productivity. Still another extremely rich source is the petitions, the bulk of which for Altopascio are catalogued under the Segreteria di Finanze for the period from 1740 to 1784. (Earlier petitions are referenced mostly in the Copialettere.) Though every petition must be understood in its context, there is perhaps no other source that describes so vividly the human dimensions of the society as these demonstrations of the individual and collective mentalities in their dialogue with the royal landlord. Another intriguing series of documents dates from 1740, the ' Description' of each individual property included in the lease of all the grand-ducal possessions to the tax farm known as the Appalto Generate. These 'Descriptions' are detailed inventories of each estate, describing the houses, the number of residents in the household, the fields sown, the trees planted, an exhaustive inventory to insure that at the expiration of the lease the lessee would pay the difference for any deterioration in the estate. Here is another source that defies estimation of its full historical potential in reconstructing rural domestic systems and their relationship to the agricultural economy. It would be misleading, though, to suggest that this short discussion of the sources on Altopascio could summarize completely the historical possibilities of the archive of the

14

Altopascio

grand-ducal possessions. For one thing, a category of documents catalogued as 'Miscellaneous' could contain virtually anything. For example, there was no reason to expect to find, as I did, the extremely valuable census of the village executed in 1618 as a control on the amount of charities dispensed. For another thing, the documentation pertaining to Altopascio is such a small part of the entire archive that it is impossible to predict what an exhaustive study of the remaining documentation would yield. This brief discussion should suggest that a historian of whatever specialism, whose interests fall within the broad dimensions of rural society, could expect to turn to this archive in order to uncover practically as much information about the grand-ducal possessions as was available to the administrators themselves. As if all this were not enough, however, this study was also able to utilize the communal archive, the parish archive, and a private family archive to discover even more about the conditions of life in Altopascio. The town archive of neighbouring Montecarlo held the records for the macinato (flour) and polline (fertilizer) taxes, a long price series on grain sold in the communal marketplace, and the deliberations of the local town government.26 It is also on this level that the best efforts of local historians were encountered in men like Dr Mario Seghieri and Dr Giorgio Tori: in their careful maintenance of the archive itself, in the detailed published inventory of the town archives, in their own publications, and in their personal generosity and cordiality in making all resources readily available to outside investigators. Certainly, this study could not overlook the work of these dedicated local historians, of whom Tuscany can boast an abundance. Parish records were also available, and their riches have now become so well established that they need hardly be elaborated upon here.27 For Altopascio, a complete series of 26 27

See the published inventory by Mario Seghieri, Inventario dell'Archivio del Comune di Montecarlo (1480-1900) (Lucca, 1967). For descriptions of these sources in Italian parish archives, see Carlo M. Cipolla, 'I libri dei morti,' Carlo A. Corsini, 'Nascite e matrimoni,' and Athos Bellettini, 'Gli "Status Animarum": caratteristiche e problemi di utilizzazione nelle ricerche di demografia storica,' published by the Comitato italiano per lo studio dei

Origins

15

births, marriages, and deaths exists from 1625 onward, with only marriage and birth records extending back to 1596 and 1600 respectively. The many status animarum that have survived in the parish archive were of great value in studying the population. These are nominative lists of parish residents grouped under the head of the household, which can be used to determine household size, population size, the types of households, the developmental cycles of stable families, an age stratification of the population over time, population mobility, the professional structure of the community, and still more. Finally, the private archive of the Capponi family, graciously made available by Count Neri Capponi, contains valuable records of the administration of Altopascio in the late sixteeenth century by Senator Giovanbattista Capponi. In conclusion, this historical reconstruction of the village and grand-ducal estate of Altopascio is doubly important for its identification with the Medici and for the data that allow us to penetrate the obscurity surrounding the lives of ordinary people in a rural community from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries, years that have largely come to be known as 'the general crisis of the seventeenth century.' An underlying historical problem is the degree to which that general crisis affected these rather ordinary lives. problemi della popolazione, Le fonti della demografia storica in Italia, Atti del seminario di demografia storica, 1971-72 (Rome, 1974). More information on the

status animarum can be found in S. Chifini, 'Caratteristiche delle rilevazioni numeriche della popolazione nei secoli XVII e XVIII: gli stati d'anime,' Societa italiana di statistica, Atti della XXVI riunione scientifica, vol. n (1969) and the same

author's 'Exploitation des listes nominatives de population a Fiesole' in Population, 3 (1971).

1 The Estate of Altopascio: village and villagers

The property of Altopascio that passed to the Medici grand dukes was indeed worthy of a prince. In 1597 the entire benefice was valued at 240,000 scudi,1 although we must remember that in the interval between 1576 and that date, Ferdinando de' Medici's will to improve the land and the able administration of Senator Giovanbattista Capponi had already increased the value of the member estates. The benefice was composed of several member units, which became fattorie under the Medici reorganization. The mid-sixteenth century benefice included the 'members' of the Cerbaia, Lucca, Fucecchio, Pescia and Gello. The Cerbaia member corresponds to the estate of Altopascio, which is the subject of this study. The estate itself was vast. It consisted of the village of Altopascio, which served as the administrative center for the roughly 3,000 acres of land that sprawled over five different communal jurisdictions.2 Where possible, photographs of the 1 2

ASF, Miscellanea Medicea, 322, no. 33: 'Stato Patrimoniale della Religione di S. Stefano 1561-1600.' In 1697 the area cultivated for the grand duke amounted to about 1,856 acres, with an additional 958 acres leased for rents, bringing the total to 2,814 acres. In 1784 the estate had grown to about 3,182 acres. The size of the estate has been calculated from the figures in coltre for 1697 in ASF, Miscellanea Medicea, 359, no. 20. The estimate for 1784 is based on the stiore of the land in ASF, RP, 2555. Using the values of these respective measurements in Ildebrando Imberciadori, Campagna toscana nel '700. Dalla reggenza alia restaurazione (Florence, 1953), p. 419, of 1 coltra equal to about 7.5 stiore, and 19 stiore equal to 1 hectare, the measurements were then converted to acres. The estimate for the total size of the estate in 1784 assumes that the area of leased land was the same as it was in 1697, which is not exactly correct because the area of leasehold land may have changed, but this assumption is adequate to give an idea of the overall dimensions of the property in question. The estate fell under several communal jurisdictions: 7 pieces of land along

16

The Estate of Altopascio

17

Fig. 2. Northern wall of the castello capped by its bell tower.

historical features of present-day Altopascio have been utilized to aid in depicting the physical environment of the community of Altopascio in the past. The administrative head of the estate, the fattore or estate manager, resided in the castello, the walled village of Altopascio, a small urban nucleus constructed on the original site founded by the good men of the eleventh century (Figs. 2-4). Legally the entire village was the property of the grand duke. Within the urban walls there numbered about forty houses. This area contained the parish church, San Jacopo of Altopascio, famous beyond its dispensation of charities for its relic of St James. Each year on 25 July, the feast day of the patron saint was celebrated as a festa, while throngs of hungry people from all over the district congregated to obtain the free bread that was distributed. Over a dozen priests were invited to the ceremony, and because these clerics were paid 10 lire above what they could eat, the invitation was always an object of jealous contention among the local clerics of this area. The the Bientina lake in the Podesteria of Castel Franco di Sotto, 13 farms and woodland under the Vicariato of Fucecchio, 2 more farms under the Vicariato of Pescia, 16 under the Podesteria of Buggiano, and another 16 under the Podesteria of Montecarlo (ASF, RP, 2555).

Altopascio

18

•

•

'

•

,

Fig. 3. Eastern wall of the castello bordered by the vegetable garden.

Fig. 4. Ramp leading to the western gate.

The Estate of Altopascio

19

priests of the neighboring parishes of the Badia, Spianate, and Montecarlo were generally invited, and whomever else the curate of Altopascio considered worthy. Ultimate approval of the clerical participants always remained with the grand duke. Separate from the church was the spedale, which by the seventeenth century had ceased to be a 'hospital' in the modern sense. There were technically two hospitals, one for men and one for women, although visitors frequently complained that the distinction had broken down. Pilgrims or travelers passing through Altopascio could obtain food and lodging according to their social station. A coin called a pistacchia was issued by the parish priest and could be redeemed by the traveler at the dispensary at its designated value. A white coin entitled the bearer to a one-pound loaf of white bread and a half flask of wine. This type of coin was granted for eight consecutive days to pregnant women either of the parish or the wives of workers of the estate as well as to those who received the viaticum - the Eucharist as dispensed to dying persons. A black pistacchia was given to the poor pilgrims who passed through Altopascio. If they passed by day, they received a one-pound loaf of white bread and a quarter flask of wine, if by night, double quantities of bread and wine. Poor pilgrims also received firewood to keep themselves warm and a bed to sleep on. The pistacchie given as payment to the peasants and workers of the estate brought a loaf of brown bread and a quarter flask of wine. The pistacchie dispensed to the priests, brothers, and laymen of better status surpassed by far the distinction between white and brown bread. The more refined palates of these notables earned them 9 soldi's worth of food in addition to the loaf of white bread, the half flask of wine, firewood, and a bed. On normal days their menu included a half libbra of meat, with a good soup of broth with greens and a slice of dried meat, or instead lasagne, rice, or some other pasta, with cheese or fruit for dessert according to the season. On fast days the meal consisted of a soup of legumes or rice or vegetables, a salad, a pair of eggs cooked in a pan, or half an omelet cooked home style (alia casalinga), or some other equivalent, plus cheese or

Altopascio

20 Fliglit erfstairs (from the time of the C&pponi) shared by all Apartments

5? 3rd courtyard J< (today Ttizza. OsfiuUeri) •'

Castello of Altopascio in the middle of die I8tk century R&rtJii ona-plandrawviby Qiuseppe Val Canto and Sergio Nelll uponan erda/qemer& of the, tax map of \8Z4(Community of MonUcarlO; section Fof Altopascio ^adabiiTli4)

7A Ihe, apartment of the •^ administrator of the estate H | Tlu apartment of the Capvichin fathers Ej| UU otherapartmenfr 'Altogether noble' Z!

ADMINISTRATIVE AHEA

AREA OF THE COMMUNITY

Fig. 5. The Castello of Altopascio in the eighteenth century.

fruit. During Lent, fish and walnuts were substituted.3 Even charity, then, discriminated between rich and poor: in the sphere of donations, the poor deserved less. 3

On the pistacchie, ASF, RP, 2555: 'Notizie diverse relative alia Commenda Magistrate di Altopascio.' The menu was taken from ASF, RP, 3767, no. 19; and Giuseppe Dal Canto (' II piaggione di Altopascio - cenni di urbanistica,' La Provincia di Lucca, Anno XI, no. 2 (1971), p. 51, hereafter cited as 'II piaggione'), has published photographs of the coins.

The Estate of Altopascio

21

Those travelers who could afford better lodging stayed at the inn (osteria) run by families that had leased it on a short-term basis from the grand duke. The rest of the houses, by the end of the eighteenth century, were filled with shopkeepers and artisans who used the ground floor for their shop and the second story as a residence. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the urban nucleus had instead housed a large number of farmers, especially leaseholders but also a few peasants, who resided within the walls and walked to their fields. Gradually, by the end of the seventeenth century the settlement pattern stabilized with peasants and leaseholders living directly on isolated farmsteads. This left within the village walls the estate manager, the clergy, hospital staff, artisans, shopkeepers, and the very poor who rented a house or a room or two and worked for wages on all types of odd jobs. Widows and other solitaries also resided within the walls, where they might weave cloth for a living. The architectural profile of Altopascio (Fig. 5) drawn from the detailed narrative 'Description of 1740'4 illustrates the anatomy of this modest village capped by its lovely bell tower. One particular feature of the social organization of the community is embodied within this physical layout and deserves emphasis. This small village population, which oscillated in number between 600 and 700 over the period 1615-1784, was very much a divided society. Dominant was the palazzo (palace) of the fattore, which had originally housed the brothers of Altopascio and was then taken over and improved by the Capponi (Fig. 6). The physical dominance of the palace reflected the dominance of the padrone directly represented by his agent, the estate manager. This administrative zone was also physically separate and closed off from the rest of the village (Fig. 7), thereby setting the padrone above and away from the rest of the society. The fattore was even reminded by his superiors to extend this physical separateness into the social sphere: a good estate manager should discourage friendships with the villagers in the interest of efficient management. Often, however, that advice was unrealistic in the close quarters of this rural society. The impression of a divided society also applies to the houses outside 4

Dal Canto, 'II piaggione,' no. 3, p. 57.

22

Altopascio

Fig. 6. Proceeding to the center of the village from the western gate, there is the square today called Piazza Ospitalieri, with the old public well and the loggia of the palace of the estate manager. The room in the center of the loggia was the office, scrittoio, of the fattore.

Fig. 7. Through the passageway underneath the loggia, one arrives in another large square in the administrative section of the village. On the left is the site of the old wine cellar of the estate. On the far right a gateway closed off the administrative area from the rest of the village.

The Estate of Altopascio

23

Fig. 8. The site where the houses of the better families of the village lived, just adjacent to the Florentine gate. By a right turn here, one would complete the circle by passing the hospital, the bell tower, the church and ending up back at the palazzo of the estate manager.

the area of the fattore's palace. The rural bourgeoisie, the local notables, occupied the section along the wall of the Via Romana (Fig. 8); the artisans and shopkeepers occupied houses along the eastern wall, while the poor were crowded into dismal rooms in the tower. Within these village walls, from the pilgrims passing through to the permanent residents, all shadings of social status were sensitively registered and respected. The fields began directly outside the walls. The quality of the land was not uniform throughout the estate. The medieval community of Altopascio cultivated the lands of the forest called the Cerbaia, and these same lands formed the older nucleus of the Medici estate, several of which include ' cerbaia' in the toponyms of the member farms. One part of the estate, therefore, existed on an area of low hills or knolls that sloped southeast of the village from 24 meters above sea level until it reached 50 meters in the forest called the Bosco della Serezara. The quality of this soil was relatively poor, composed of hard yellow earth intermingled with gravelly

24

Altopascio

Fig. 9. The Plain.

pebbles. Even today the residents of the district use the word 'cerbaia' to describe a piece of land that is difficult to work and yields little. Local proverb echoes the stark historical reality of this land in the saying: 'In the Cerbaia there is hunger.'5 The other segment of the estate lay in the area called the Plain (Fig. 9), situated north and east of the River Ralla and the Sibolla Canal. Today this whole area is still very flat, at the low altitude of 17 meters above sea level. That altitude had probably been somewhat lower in the seventeenth century, since it was consistent Medici policy to raise the elevation of this lowland through reclamation that rendered it profitable. The geological map confirms that this was a fertile zone formed of rich alluvial deposits. Drainage posed a critical 5

The best maps of the region, which include altitude above sea level, vegetation, and even the old dirt roads, are those of the Istituto Geografico Militare of which foglio 105 covers Altopascio. My comments on the soil are based upon foglio 105 of the Carta Geologica d'ltalia, which clearly reveals the two faces of the estate in terms of soil composition, and also upon personal visits to the area, discussions with local residents, and the remarks of Lorenzi (Uospizio, p. 16), who described the cerbaia as 'composto d'un cemento di sassi e ghiaie.' For the proverb 'In Cerbaia dalla fame ci si abbia,' see Galli Nori Andreini, La grande Valdinievole (Florence, 1970), p. 105.

The Estate of Altopascio

25

problem for the cultivation of these lands since they were low, flat and situated in a rainy belt of Tuscany at the extremity of the Valdinievole.6 As long as these lands could be drained effectively, they yielded twice as much as the farms in the cerbaia. When drainage was deficient, so were the crops. The utilization of the Plain was a major factor in the economy of the estate. The lands were also divided into two jurisdictional areas, the lands given out on long-term lease (livello) and the portion directly worked for the grand duke and managed by the estate manager. The leaseholders who colonized this wood and swampland gradually built their own houses right on their plots. The area farmed for the grand duke was also divided into plots, which created another permanent paradox in the economy of the fattoria: one large unit of ownership was apportioned into numerous (38 in 1784) units of operation, called poderi, small farms complete unto themselves and worked by families. On these isolated farms, by the end of the seventeenth century, all the peasants, mezzadri, resided. Many of these houses were nothing more than large huts; others were carefully designed according to established principles of agricultural economics. Figure 10 shows a plan which has survived for one of the latter type houses. Here there is a real aesthetic concern to create a symmetrical, lovely edifice, quintessentially rational and therefore functional. A feature distinguishing this house from twentieth century equivalents in the same region is the unity of men and women and their animals under the same roof. Equally striking is the fact that this construction was not only a house, it was a small farm with a wine cellar, an oven for treating flax, a room with a loom for spinning, and its own threshing floor. Architecturally and economically this peasant house was a separate unit. The constant attempt of the estate manager to embrace and control these distinct entities is one dominant theme in the organization of this society. For the time being it suffices to 6

Ferdinando Milone, L'ltalia neU'economia delle sue regioni (Turin, 1955), p. 497. Altopascio is at the edge of a zone of 1200-1400 millimeters (47.2-55.1 inches) precipitation annually, or the second highest area of rainfall in all of Tuscany.

26

Altopascio Plan of tKc houses to be built oa the five farms of the of tke Pescia di Pescia river on the Estate of Altopascio.

Bedroom, and cellar below

Hall, and v&t-roovn below

Stable

bedroom, and place for IOOYYL below

I

Loggia., and portico bdow

Oven with a ken-house above and a, pigsty below

Fig. 10. Architectural plan of a peasant house designed in the eighteenth century. The original of this undated plan can be found in ASF, Piante delle Regie Possessioni. Although this plan is clearly the work of an Engineer of the Royal Possessions in the eighteenth century, the precise date is problematic, but it probably is the work of the engineer Pierantonio Tosi referred to in ASF, RP, 3534, no. 34 and in 3103, ff. 135, 154, 200, and designed between 1706 and 1709. The important point is that these houses were the planned product of professionals employed by the Royal Possessions, and not spontaneous peasant creations. In fact the instructions sent from Florence carefully controlled all specifications like the thickness of the wooden beam.

recall that the peasants slept in the same building with their oxen, horses, pigs, and pet cats.7 At the mill, also leased by the estate to private individuals, the peasants and foreigners came to grind their grain into flour. Over the entire period under consideration, the peasants were regularly instructed to frequent the estate's mill, although the instructions emanate from the fact that the peasants took the grain elsewhere whenever possible, prob7

That is, in houses of this design. The wide variety of peasant living arrangements means that in places there could be a separate hut for the animals, while in other huts of the estate of Altopascio, and in the Valdinievole generally, peasants and livestock were intermingled. The plan nevertheless reflects the ideal peasant house as conceived in this era, and the architects saw a clear advantage in centralizing peasants and livestock under one roof. For more discussion of Tuscan rural housing, see Guido Biffoli and Guido Gerrara, La casa colonica in Toscana (Florence, 1966).

The Estate of Altopascio

27

ably to avoid the monopoly prices charged by the estate's miller. The kiln, the fornace, provided the fattoria internally with all the bricks, lime and mortar that it needed. The forest was another unit of the fattoria, the two wooded areas called the Bosco della Serezara and the Bosco del Grifoglieto. From the woods fuel, building supplies, acorns for pigs, chestnuts for humans, and leaves and underbrush for the animals, all these were derived; and more was available from the swamps. A vast extension of water, called the Lake of Bientina, bounded Altopascio on the northwest. On the east, another large body of water, the Padule di Fucecchio, enclosed the estate. In the northeastern corner a smaller swamp area remained, the residue of the greater body of water that once covered the whole area. This marsh, called the Sibolla, was used to process flax, and the water of the swamp, the chiaro, was leased for its fishing rights, as were the mill pond and the Fossa Navareccia, the long canal that connected the port of Altopascio to the Lake of Bientina. Through this port and out across the lake one could reach the Lucchese region, or head south to the Arno river and proceed directly to Pisa and Leghorn. Through the 'ports' that lined the Fucecchio swamp, which were appropriated by the aristocratic landowners around the padule, one could also proceed to Ponte a Cappiano and from there down the Usciana Canal into the Arno. More important still, the Padule of Fucecchio was the drainage basin for the whole low-lying area called the Valdinievole, whose waters were then drained by the Usciana into the Arno. The efficiency of this drainage line effectively controlled the fertility of the lands of the estate. If the flow of water in the Arno or the Usciana or the padule became restricted and the water level rose, then the intricate network of drainage ditches that ended in the padule would become blocked, causing sterility to the undrained lands on which freshly planted crops would languish before reaching maturity. There were four major drainage systems: the Sibolla Canal ran west to east and drained the Sibolla swamp and the bordering farms into the padule; the Fosso alle Parti, a canal with two smaller ante fosso ditches on either side, also drained

28

Altopascio

Fig. 11. In boats much like these, the peasants journeyed into the swamp to transport wood, leaves, and underbrush to their farms and to catch fish without paying the high cost of the fishing permit.

into the padule; the River Pescia di Collodi and the other Pescia di Pescia river served similar drainage functions. Other ditches bordered all the fields of the farms and drained into the major canals. Also along this drainage network, the peasants could use their small boats, barche, to go into the swamp to fetch firewood, decayed vegetation, and leaves for fertilizer (Fig. 11). The Poderi del Cerro, the farms closest to the padule, even shipped their wine through the swamp. The peasants could fish in these waters and canals to supplement their diets, though we shall see that a major theme over this period is the exclusion of the peasantry from the formerly public sources of food in favour of individual lessees. The waterways and the port of Altopascio were not the only links with distant urban markets. The Via Francigena (also called the Via Romana), a principal thoroughfare that reached Italy from southern France, passed through Lucca and right by Altopascio from which it continued on to Fucecchio and Siena, until it finally reached Rome. Roads also

The Estate of Altopascio

29

connected Altopascio to the important urban markets of Pescia, Borgo a Buggiano, and Fucecchio. Between these roads and the Via Romana, one could get almost anywhere. Internally the estate was interlaced by roads which ran through it from the east towards Fucecchio, intersecting with roads crossing north and south, and ending in a network of viottole, narrow dirt roads that ultimately connected the peasant farms to the administrative center in the village. Clearly this was not a closed society but one open to travel and commerce with such important centers as Pisa, Leghorn, Lucca, Pescia, and Florence. This communications network was, at one and the same time, a consequence and a lubricant of a highly commercialized zone of Tuscany. Widespread water connections also meant relatively cheaper transport costs. In 1766 a governmental inquiry into manufacturing and commerce revealed that merchandise shipped from Pescia to Leghorn paid as much in transport costs for the short land trip to Altopascio as for the long water route from Altopascio to Leghorn.8 There were, in addition, links to outside the Florentine state. Directly north over the Apennine range lay Modena and Parma, whose inhabitants often crossed the mountains to pasture their animals or to steal. Altopascio was, moreover, the boundary between the Florentine state and Lucca. As a frontier zone, it reaped the suffering of mutual hostilities, immigrants and exiles from the Lucchese, and served as a permanent attraction for contraband traffic. This then is a description of the village and the estate of Altopascio. Around 1650, the Deputies of the Royal Possessions described it as ' an important estate both for the income it yields and for the charities distributed there daily.' No wonder it was so described: of the twenty-four entries that year, 1650, in the compilation entitled 'Summary for His Royal Highness of all the Net Income from all the estates and other [sources] of the Department of the Royal Possessions,' 8

The six or seven miglia overland journey from Pescia to Altopascio cost roughly the same as the 39 miglia water route from Altopascio to Leghorn (Luigi Dal Pane,

Industria e commercio nel Granducato di Toscana nelVeta del Risorgimento. Vol. I: II

Settecento (Bologna, 1971), p. 134, hereafter cited as Industria).

30

Altopascio

Altopascio's net income of 3,559 scudi ranked third largest and accounted for 13 % of the total revenue received from all the grand duke's lands.9 Again in 1784, Altopascio's lands ranked third most valuable of the forty estates listed.10 By that date, however, the verdict upon these lands had changed somewhat. Luigi Bartolini, the Superintendent General of the Royal Possessions who handled the alienation of the estate, felt obliged to point out that 'the Royal Estate of Altopascio, although vast in size, is physically a confusing mixture of excellent, mediocre, and terrible lands, of difficult cultivation and scarce return.' 11 Heterogeneous lands, then, some of which were difficult to work and yielded little, lands which largely determined the fortunes of those who leased and worked them. And this society, almost to a member, depended for its sustenance and its professional identity upon the land. Unfortunately the earliest complete description of the professions of all the villagers dates from 1767. The source of the descriptions of that year, the stato d'anime prepared by the parish priest, is unsurpassed for its detail. It divides the parish population of 631 into 116 households.12 To sketch an occupational profile of the villagers, I have taken the profession of the head of each household and classified these within the four broad categories that emerge from the descriptions given by the priest. The first category, those who worked the land, accounted for 84 households and embraced 72% (453) of the village population. The second category, the artisans and shopkeepers, consisted of 21 households and 19% (120) of the population; the third category, the notables who sublet land or acted as merchants, 4 households and 4% (24) of total population; the fourth category, the administrative staff of the estate, formed another 4 households and 4% (24) of 9 10 11 12

ASF, RP, 3758, no. 19. Pietro Leopoldo d'Asburgo Lorena, Relazioni sul governo della Toscana, ed. Arnaldo Salvestrini (2 vols.; Florence, 1969 and 1970), I, 400-1. ASF, RP, 2555: Final Report of Luigi Bartolini, 31 Dec. 1783. APA, Stato d'anime, 1767. Because of 2 households and 21 persons (mostly under age 1) who were listed in the stato d'anime but not reflected in the final sum, this total differs from the 114 households and 610 persons given by the priest.

The Estate of Altopascio

31

total population. The remaining percentage came from miscellaneous solitaries and beggars who lived from alms. The distinction of agricultural versus artisan occupations breaks down once we observe that about a third of the artisans in this small community either leased land and farmed it out, or worked the land directly themselves and exercised a trade in addition and were described by the parish priest as a 'leaseholder and shoemaker' (livellaro e calzolaio) or 'leaseholder and smith' (livellaro e fabbro). The notables, too, depended on the land even though they did not farm it themselves, since they lived for the most part on the income from land leased from the grand duke and worked for them by peasants on short-term arrangements. Within the first occupational category, that of persons employed directly on the land, those who worked lands held by others ranked at the bottom of the social pyramid. At the very base stood the apprenticed farm laborers (garzoni) and day-workers (pigionali) who did not farm land with any tenurial regularity but rather on hire, as the need arose. When they were not attached to a specific household, these people rented houses and worked as needed for different people, hence their designation as pigionale deriving from the shortterm house rent, pigione, that they paid. The garzoni, which translates as 'apprentices' in English, were frequently bastards whom peasant families took from the foundling home to work their plot and supplement the family's labor. Most garzoni were therefore unmarried and attached to households with regular tenurial access to land. Of the fifteen men each designated as a 'garzone' in the Stato d'anime of 1767, only one was a head of a household. In all, roughly 7% of the village population lived under garzoni and pigionali households. The sharecroppers, mezzadri, who worked the lands of the grand duke numbered 12 households and constituted 18 % of the population of the parish of Altopascio, while another 16 % of the villagers lived in 19 households that worked land conceded to them a mezzo (sharecropping) or in affitto (on rent) by leaseholders who lived outside the village. These con-

32

Altopascio

ceding leaseholders were most often designated as 'gentlemen', i.e., they belonged to the class of rural notables. The category of agricultural workers also included leaseholders who farmed their own land. This group consisted of 41 households and 31 % of the population of the parish. All told, then, there were four different types of agricultural workers who together constituted about three quarters of the total population. The twenty-one shopkeeper and artisan heads of households practiced the following trades: five shoemakers (calzolaio), two blacksmiths (fabbro), two delicatessen dealers (pizzicagnolo), a general storekeeper (bottegaio di pannine, spiano de pane, pizzicagnolo ed altro), a vegetable gardener (ortolano), a carpenter (legnaiolo), a plate dealer (bottegaio di piatti), and two weavers - one of wool (tesse efilala land) and one of linen cloth (tesse la tela di lino). The actual number of individual artisans was higher because of the frequency of several members of the same family exercising the same trade as that of the head of the household. There were four resident households in the category of notables, conceding leaseholders, entitled 'gentlemen' and each described as 'living from his income.' These were the two Baldaccini households, the Lenzi, and the Vettori. By farming out lands leased from the grand duke, the notables expanded their influence in the community as rentiers. But leasing land was not the only item in their portfolio. The Lenzi family also had members in the medical profession (chirurgo), while Jacopo di Vettorio Vettori was described in 1767 as 'a silk trader, cattle merchant, and dealer in other things' (negoziante di seta, mercante di bestiami ed altro). Within the

Vettori household there resided Silvestro Lorenzini, manager

of the grocery store (ministro del negozio di pane came ed altro),

Stefano Bernardini, baker (fornaio), and Antonio di Giovanni Vetturini, a carter (vetturino e barrociante).

The administrative staff of the estate that year 1767 included the estate manager (fattore), two assistant managers (sotto fattore), a clerk (scrivano), and a housekeeper (serva).

There were in addition the security guard of the estate (guardia), the steward of the dispensary (dispensiere), the bell-

The Estate of Altopascio

33

ringer (campanara) and an assistant (assistente alia campanara),

the parish priest and his servant. Only a small minority of the women of Altopascio ever became heads of households. In 1767 only 9 (7.8%) of the 116 households were headed by women. Most of the rural women were described as * assisting in the tasks of the farm' and/or 'taking care of the house/ One woman made shoes, another sold fruit and vegetables, several women performed odd farm chores, and another seven were servants. The women of Altopascio also suckled children either from private families or from the foundling homes of Lucca and Pisa to bring in supplemental income. The parish registers prove that this job often reduced the amount of time a woman lived at home with her own family, in addition to retarding her natural fertility.13 The Stato d'anime of 1746, for example, contains a notation alongside the name of Maria Camilla, wife of the peasant Giuseppe Cecchi, that she was out of the parish serving as a wet nurse (fuori per balia).14 The range of tasks that fell to women is still not exhausted. The Stato d'anime of 1767 lists eight women who spun flax and another seven women who wove linen cloth, and one spinner and weaver of wool. 'Putting out' characterized a principal part of the textile industry in eighteenth-century Tuscany, so signs of its existence at Altopascio are not surprising, especially since a major linen cloth industry operated nearby in the town of Fucecchio. And since the 'putting-out system' was an important stage in the economic history of industrial development, its personnel are of interest. The women who spun flax could be celibate or married or widowed, but every single one came from the pigionale category of landless dayworkers at the bottom of the social hierarchy. The spinners were also located outside the village walls, whereas the women weavers all resided within the castello. But the weavers were all wives or daughters of artisans: one was the wife of a boatsman, another four came from a carpenter's family, one from a blacksmith's 13

14

For the reduced fertility among Tuscan wet nurses, see Carlo A. Corsini,' Ricerche di demografia storica nel territorio di Firenze,' Quaderni storici, 17 (1971), 396-7, and also the same author's forthcoming elaboration of this theme in ' La fecondite naturelle de la femme mariee. Le cas des nourrices.' APA, Stato d'anime, 1746,

34

Altopascio

Fig. 12. Just a short distance outside the walls there remains the Oratory of San Rocco erected by the religious confraternity of that name in 1645.

household, and the last was the wife of a grocer. There was only one male weaver in Altopascio in 1767. So the labor for this primitive textile industry came almost exclusively from the women of the parish, from families of the rural poor for spinning, and from the lower artisan class for weaving. There was no inclination toward this preindustrial activity shown either by the peasants or the notables. The peasant women preferred to work the land, the bourgeois women looked after the house. The very poor women spun flax because the supplementary income was valued and necessary for subsistence. Not only the inhabitants themselves, but even the agents of the grand duke joined together in describing Altopascio as a poor parish. In an undated letter, written probably around 1631, the people of Altopascio asked Grand Duke Ferdinando II for a special favor. The dreaded plague had penetrated the surrounding area on two occasions, they wrote, yet, by the mercy of God, Altopascio had been spared both times. To preserve the memory of this miraculous protection, the villagers agreed to erect a chapel in honor of God

The Estate of Altopascio

35

and San Rocco (Fig. 12). 'To accomplish that, they did their best to get together as much money as they could, which amounts to 200 scudi.' The estimated cost of the proposed chapel, however, exceeded 300 scudi. Their only recourse was to solicit the aid of the grand duke: Now because they are poor and not able to obtain [the money], they appear once again at the feet of Your Highness, and out of their innermost feelings for the Lord they entreat him to grant that the estate [of Altopascio] will also contribute towards this project so that something may be done in honor of God and for the beautification and the reputation of this place. Andrea Cioli, the estate manager in that year, offered the following comments on the above request in his letter to Grand Duke Ferdinando II: 'By way of information we cannot report otherwise to Your Highness than that, these being poor men, it appears to us that they have done a great deal to put together as much as the sum of 200 scudi. ' 15 Thirty years later, in 1662, the estate manager Matteo Berti opposed an attempt by the community of Montecarlo to levy a tax on the people of Altopascio, which he described as 'disproportionate to persons who do not have the cash value of four pennies, so to speak.'16 The surviving documents of the estate abound with statements to the same effect. One reason why Altopascio was a poor village was that its residents owned no real estate. In one form or another all the villagers were tenants of the grand duke. In this rural society the possession of land was the yardstick that measured one's position in society and divided rich from poor. This consideration probably explains the low social status of the village population. The macinato tax is a useful indicator. It was first levied in 1678 as a head tax with rates proportionate to the economic condition of the assessed person. The results of the tax stratification of the parish of Altopascio are presented in Table 1, the first category being the most affluent. The people of Altopascio were more heavily distributed in the lower orders of society. Only 6 % fell in the top third of 15 16

ASF, RP, 1308, no. 51. * Sproportionate a persone che non hanno il valsente di quattro soldi per cosi dire' (ASF, RP, 3770, 13 May 1662).

36

Altopascio Table 1. Distribution of population by the six classes of the macinato tax of 1679 Total population

Families Class First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Total

Number

Percentage

Number

Percentage

6 1 11 19 59 25 121

5 1 9 16 49 21 101

31 4 56 157

5 1 9 26 45 15 101

277 91 616

ACM, 420: 'Libro di Tasse, Decreti e Ragioni di Camarlinghi per la Tassa e Reparto del Macinato.' society, 35 % in the middle third, and 60 % in the bottom third. In other terms, 15 % of the population ranked in the top half, 86 % in the bottom half. The families within the walls of the neighboring village of Montecarlo were distributed differently. That community of small landholders and artisans had relatively more families in the top third of society and correspondingly fewer families in the bottom third, while the middle category in Montecarlo was only slightly smaller.17 The tenants of the grand duke were relatively poorer than their neighbors. The influence of the grand duke over the lives of the villagers did not end with the monopoly of land ownership. Rather, the power of the grand duke cast a veil over the villagers' relationship with the outside world, because the historical and legal identity of the estate community was so clearly bound to the titular holder of the benefice. Legally, Altopascio existed virtually as an island within the greater community of Tuscan villages and towns, like a fief, 17

Of the 77 families listed within the castello of Montecarlo in the macinato tax of 1679, 31 % fell in the top third, 16% in the middle third, and 53% in the bottom third (ACM, 420).

The Estate of Altopascio

37

except that the grand duke did not wield judicial power over the residents. But the distinction between private and public jurisdiction was not very real as far as grand-ducal peasants were concerned. The ducal landlord was literally the source of law in the community and throughout the estate: the ordinances (handi) of the castello were issued and enforced by the estate management, the economic regulations on retail trade emanated from the landlord's power of control over his property and, most important, the estate management held the power to choose when to utilize and when to ignore the police and judicial resources of the state. Consequently the legal relationship of the community to the outside world was largely a partisan one. The estate management could and did rely on the Tribunal of Montecarlo, for example, to imprison debtors, and thus used the courts as a lever to apply pressure on the leaseholders. On the other hand, * privileges' exempted the community from the law of Montecarlo with respect to taxes and other matters. The inhabitants of the village did not enjoy the benefits of regular police protection, because the police were only allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of the estate when prior authorization had been secured from the representative of the grand duke. Likewise, a leaseholder might become embroiled in civil litigation in the courts of one of the neighboring communes, but since ownership of the leaseholder's property lay with the grand duke, the Department of the Royal Possessions could negate any claims to real property, and itself demanded first claim upon any personal property in the settlement of a suit against a debtor. Inasmuch as the landlord of the community was the ruler of the state, there was no clear distinction between the will of the former and the law of the latter. It follows that the residents had rather fractured links with the Comune of Montecarlo within whose physical jurisdiction it lay. Because it enjoyed certain tax privileges right up to 1770, the community of Altopascio did not enjoy the social services of a public doctor or school teacher, services that the other taxpayers of the commune did enjoy. This ambiguous relationship to the wider community gradually came to an end in the late eighteenth century when Grand Duke Pietro

38

Altopascio

Leopoldo abruptly finalized the transition by abolishing the privileges of Altopascio and fully integrating the village within the Comune of Montecarlo just prior to the alienation of the estate in 1784. Even this change, however, owed itself to the personal inclinations of the grand duke. The local society, in fact, existed as a 'community' because of its connection to the seigneur rather than through an autonomous set of common understandings. The landlord was the chief element of commonality, his legal immunities were the privileges that his subjects enjoyed, his economic policies were the chief concerns that stimulated the residents, his regulations were the laws under which they lived. It is not surprising, then, that aside from the identity of religious beliefs among the residents and their religious confraternities, the first communal ties forged among the villagers came as political reactions to the administration of the landlord and these political associations in turn helped to create communal ties. But it was not until the economic role of the landlord diminished in the period after the alienation of the estate in 1784 that this autonomous communal expression gained momentum and ultimately resulted in the incorporation of Altopascio as a separate commune in the nineteenth century. The interpersonal links to the outside world had always been more firmly established than the legal ones. Trade, for example, brought merchants from Leghorn and Lucca to buy agricultural produce to feed the urban population.18 Price fluctuations in these cities had an impact on local price levels.19 Trade, too, stimulated Altopascians to travel to such urban markets as Leghorn, Pescia, and Borgo a Buggiano to sell their produce. Butchers from the urban centers around the Valdinievole and Leghorn would also come to the village to purchase animals locally. A similar mechanism linking members of the community 18 19

For one of the many examples of the presence of Leghorn merchants at Altopascio, see ASF, RP, 3053, f. 208. The point is an important one, in view of the tendency to regard the port of Leghorn as an enclave without any real impact on the Tuscan economy. For evidence of this linkage between supply and demand conditions at Leghorn and the local market at Altopascio, see ASF, RP, 3100, f. 634; 3127, ff. 276ff.; 3121, ff. 161, 168; 3126, f. 316.

The Estate of Altopascio

39

to the values of the greater world operated through professional mobility. Some members of families at Altopascio became soldiers20 stationed in places like Leghorn or Portoferraio. The boatsmen traveled the whole network of waterways in Tuscany and the Lucchese, as their counterparts on land, the carters, covered the district by road. More evidence of professional mobility can be found in the provenance of the artisans and shopkeepers of Altopascio, some coming from as far away as Bologna, Parma, Milan, and Modena, and many more from surrounding towns such as Montecarlo, Castelfranco, Fucecchio, Santa Croce, Lucca, Buti, Bientina, Calcinaia, and Pescia.21 There were also scores of pilgrims that passed through Altopascio on their journey to and from Rome, as Montaigne did in the sixteenth century.22 And several of the parish priests of Altopascio themselves made trips to Rome.23 Other links lay in the wholesale movement of people, like the uprooted families who hopped from parish to parish, perpetually in movement, and the masses of rural poor regularly set in motion by crop failure and economic crisis. There were the times of celebration when crowds gathered to celebrate the feast of San Jacopo, or the more sober times such as that in 1637 when 'about two thousand persons' came to witness the Bishop of San Miniato say mass at the chapel of the Madonna della Quercia, famous that year because of a hermit who had begun to pray at the site of an ancient church buried amidst the swamp and the forest. The hermit's efforts had been rewarded with miracles and other blessings for those who worshipped there, and the reports caused 'many people' to converge there month after month.24 The Capu20 21

22

23 24

See ASF, RP, 1317,' 102,'and the various statid'anime of the parish archive which list family members as soldiers in Portoferraio and Leghorn. The provenance was derived from the series of rental accounts 'Debitori e Creditori di Pigioni di Case, e Botteghe, e Proventi della Commenda Magistrate' (ASF, RP, 6693-9). Michel De Montaigne, The Diary of Montaigne's Journey to Italy in 1580 and 1581, trans. E. J. Trechmann (London, 1929), p. 275: 'Altopascio, sixteen miles. I stayed there for an hour to give the horses a feed of oats. . . We met a number of peasants on the road who were picking the vine leaves, which they keep as fodder for their catde in the winter; others were collecting ferns for litter.' ASF, RP, 3083, ff. 362, 389; 3144, f. 79. ASF, RP, 1310, '43.'

40

Altopascio

chin friars who came to Altopascio to preach the Lenten sermons each year, like the Jesuits and other religious orders who conducted missions at Altopascio and the surrounding area, also furnished another connection to the ideas of the outside world. Finally one cannot underestimate the important cultural link accomplished through the institution of marriage, the selection of a partner from outside the parish, and the tendency for women to settle in the land of their husband. Of the 748 marriages performed in the parish of Altopascio between 1625 and 1784, 333 (44.5%) involved two members of the parish, whereas in 378 (50.5 %) the husband came from outside the parish, in 29 (3.9 %) a wife from outside the parish married a man from Altopascio, and in 8 (1.1 %) neither one came from Altopascio. In 55.5 % of the total marriages, then, one or both persons came from outside the parish, and the data indicate that the tendency to select a partner from outside the parish grew stronger from the seventeenth century through the eighteenth century.25 In conclusion, the economic and cultural integration of the community within the wider world was always far more advanced than the dominance of the seigneur and the politicallegal isolation would suggest, until, at the very end of the estate's existence, legal assimilation was hastened by the reforms of Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo. All this discussion, however, should not mislead us into thinking that cultural integration proceeded at equal rates among all members of this society. Cultural integration was always more advanced among the leaseholders and artisans than among the peasants, because of differences in their relationships to the market place, the unequal levels of occupational skills, and the overall freedom of professional mobility. Owing to all these factors, the leaseholders, artisans, and notables lived in relatively less economic isolation and commanded a wider range of personal contacts than the peasants, who traveled off the estate more as messengers on errands for the landlord than as independent agents in pursuit of their own interests. 25

See below, Chapter 2, Table 8.

2 Population

When Professor E. J. Hobsbawm set forth his theory of the ' general crisis' of the seventeenth century, he reached almost at the outset for one of the most telling indices of a society's vitality, namely, the size of its population and its capacity to sustain population growth. He found that 'the scattered figures for European population suggest, at worst an actual decline, at best a level or slightly rising plateau between the mounting slopes of the population curve in the later sixteenth and eighteenth centuries.'1 Even within the small world of the village of Altopascio, population was a dynamic element that changed its course in response to both economic and natural forces, and in turn imposed alterations within the fabric of the community as a whole. Fortunately a good many records have survived that enable us to calculate the village population, along with its short-term fluctuations in size and long-term modifications of demographic behavior.2 The picture that emerges from all these data is consistent with the demographic trends outlined by Professor Hobsbawm as evidence for a general European crisis. At Altopascio, over the entire period from 1551 to 1784, the secular trend in absolute size of population divides into a long period of growth through 1647, then an abrupt decline, followed by more than a century of cyclical fluctuations around a static level. 1 2

E. J. Hobsbawm, 'The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,' in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660, ed. Trevor Aston (New York, 1967), p. 7. Unless otherwise indicated, all calculations relative to population are based on the totals in the stati d'anime, on the aggregative method of counting births, marriages and deaths in the parish registers, or on the family reconstitution project.

41

42

Altopascio

In 1551 there were 222 inhabitants of the village grouped within 38 households (fuochi). Population grew rapidly in the second half of the sixteenth and the early part of the seventeenth centuries. Two episcopal visits of 1564 and 1588 document a 60% growth in population during those years, from the 250 heads reported in the first visit to the 400 reported in the latter. More rapid growth ensued between 1588 and 1615 when episcopal records stated that the population of Altopascio had now reached 'over 600.'3 The growth curve flattened out between 1615 and 1678 when the total inhabitants of Altopascio numbered 629.4 Actually within those terminal points population continued to grow from 1615 to 1647 when it underwent a severe reduction during the three years of the plague/famine of 1648-50. The village recuperated much of its losses, perhaps as much as 60%, in the years following the plague, but the peak in the second half of the seventeenth century probably never equaled the peak in the first half of that century. Population decline reappeared between 1665 and 1684 when total numbers had now fallen to 602, but some growth was registered through 1697 in the new total of 630. The next surviving estimate in 1717 registers a 13 % loss relative to 1697 in the 546 inhabitants then recorded, but population grew at roughly 1 % per annum to reach 690 in 1741. After that date population persistently declined until it reached 595 in 1777. The last years of the estate witnessed a recovery of population to 658 in 1783, even though population still remained below the 1741 level. Two comments are in order. First of all, the population of the village increased dramatically after the estate passed to Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici in 1565. The rapid rate of growth after that date indicates a sizeable inflow of population through immigration. Secondly, the Medici administrators, and especially Senator Giovanbattista Capponi, deliberately 3

4

The 1551 population was taken from the census ordered by Duke Cosimo (Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze, Magliabechiana, 11, i, 120, f. xxxxv). The Episcopal visits stored in the Archivio Vescovile di Lucca have been reproduced by Dal Canto, Altopascio Medicea, Appendix VII, pp. 200-6. The population in 1678 was derived from the macinato tax records for that year (ACM, 420).

Population

43

encouraged settlers.5 The demographic inflow was part of a process in the calculated development of Altopascio from a largely wooded and uncultivated region to a flourishing Medici estate. To appreciate the dimensions of population mobility at this stage of the estate's history, we might refer to the partial census of 1618 that applied only to the residents within the village walls.6 Only 46% of the 37 families listed were native to Altopascio. Another 46% were recent immigrants, while an additional 8 % were the sons of immigrant fathers. Of these immigrants, 76% came from the neighboring state of Lucca, 12% from Montecarlo, 6% each from the towns of Lamporecchio and Castelfranco. The estate manager commented in this same report that the immigrant families had been in Altopascio for 10, 15 and 20 years, proof that the strong attraction of immigrants endured right into the first decade of the seventeenth century. Later on, as population stabilized and declined, the pattern of population mobility changed to a net outflow of persons. There is indisputable evidence that the last three decades of the seventeenth century witnessed an exodus of population from Altopascio. On 20 November 1684, the Vicarioof Montecarlo wrote a letter to the Deputies of the Salt Tax to protest against an increase in that levy. Besides the official's legal argument about local privileges, the letter contains important information describing why the new tax burden was unbearable for these rural inhabitants. First because this commune and its people are so wretched, being situated either on the largely unproductive hillside or on the plain which yields little fruit because of thefloodsthat occur nearly every year and which is treacherous because of the infections of the air as in Alto Pascio. This leads entire families to profit from the legal exemptions in Pisan territory, or to abandon their homes and flee into the state of Lucca so as not to be constrained to die miserably from hunger, for even their houses are in deplorable poverty and 5

6

AC, iv, no. 20: 'Lettera del Senatore Giovanbattista Capponi scritta al Signore Usimbardi' which specifically described the efforts to attract colonists:' Dite a S.S. I. che s'e disegnato et dato tre possessione per 3 famiglie lucchese. . .et li fo carezzare et servire accio che gli altri piglino animo a venire. . . et questi huomini promettano condurne dell'altre famiglie.' ASF, RP, 2991, no 63: 'Nota di tutte le famiglie che di presente si trovano nel Castello dell'Altopascio.'

44

Altopascio

laden with mortgages, as one can readily see from the reports of the executors and the distraints they make daily.7 A critical historian would ordinarily be skeptical of a similar plea as an exaggerated statement worded to gain a reduction in taxes. Other sources indicate, however, that every element in the argument corresponded to the actual situation in Altopascio. In 1677, 1678 and 1680 poor harvests and flooding crippled the rural economy. And the account books that record rent payments owed to the Medici underline a novel development. In 1683 five leasehold properties were described as abandoned lands. Alongside the entry for one of those abandoned leases there is a note that directly echoes the statement of the Vicario of Montecarlo: 'The abovesaid lands have been given to Jacopo Gennai to work on a sharecropping basis this present year, 1684, because the lessees have withdrawn to the Pisan district and have abandoned the leasehold.'8 The problem grew worse as the century drew to a close. By 1718 the account books recorded no less than 25 abandoned livello farms.9 A parallel exodus occurred within the village walls. Towards 1683, along with a trend towards declining rents, the account books registered 6 houses that had not been rented and 12 former lessees. By 1692 there were 12 entries for unleased houses and rooms, while the number of former tenants had risen to 19. The last category leaped to 45 between 1692 and 1704, and the entries alongside their names clearly attribute the reason for their departure to their wretched poverty.10 More quantitative proof of the net outflow can be obtained by summing the births and deaths from 1698 to 1716 and comparing their difference to the change in population recorded in the Stato d'anime of 1697 and 1717. Between those dates population declined by 84 members, but only 38 had died in excess of births. In other words, a net 46 villagers had left Altopascio between those dates. 7 8 9 10

ACM, 126: 'Registro di lettere al Magistrato dei Nove.' ASF, RP, 6684, f. 145. ASF, RP, 6686. ASF, RP, 6697 (1683-92), 6698 (1692-1704), 6699 (1704-18).

Population

45

All the data lead to the same conclusion. Between 1680 and 1720 an outflow of persons from Altopascio accompanied a trend of declining population by a surplus of deaths over births. The tendency of migrations in the early and late seventeenth century was to reinforce trends in natural increase and decrease. Let us now examine the movement of marriages, births and deaths. The first condition of population growth is the formation of families through matrimony. The number of marriages reported between 1596 and 1784 corresponds in its development to that of total population. Marriages remained relatively numerous through 1655, then turned downwards steadily and persistently for the remainder of the time period. The annual average number of marriages between 1596 and 1655 was 5-8, as compared to 4-5 between 1656 and 1784. The decline in marriages did not always proceed at the same rhythm: the annual average was higher in the periods of 1655-89, 1720-39, and 1770-84, and lower in the periods 1690-1719 and 1740-69.11 In other words fewer people married as population ceased to grow and during cycles of population decline.12 Natural trends in population size that exclude the element of migration can be determined by plotting total births against deaths over the period. The image can be examined in the appended curve (Fig. 13) that divides into a time of relatively strong surplus of births over deaths through 1660-4. After that date a clear negative period is in evidence from 1665 to 11 12

Here is the average annual number of marriages in the following periods: 1655-89, 4-6; 1690-1719, 4-0; 1720-39, 4-7; 1740-69, 3-6; 1770-84, 5-2. The proportions of those who married may also have changed, as a crude marriage rate of 10 per thousand in 1615 declined to 5 and 7 per thousand between 1656 and 1784. But the rate calculated for 1615 is not reliable, depending as it does on the highly approximate figure of 600 (when the Episcopal documents said 'over 600') and dividing that by the annual average of marriages between 1615 and 1620. Another population approximation is in the Episcopal visit of 1624 in AVSM, Visite Pastorali, which lists 300 anime of communion age, and using the very crude approximation, which was employed in the Episcopal visits of the sixteenth century, of doubling the number of people of communion age to arrive at total population, then the resulting estimate of 600, when divided by the average annual number of marriages between 1625 and 1629, yields 9 per thousand, which is still higher than the more reliable rates derived for specific moments in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when population counts are provided by the stati a" anime.

Births Deaths 50

40

30 1

20

—TH ... 1

10 J

I

1

1

1

I

I

1

I

J

1

1

1625- 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 < 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84 89 94 99 '

1

1

05 10 09 14

J

I

I

I

I

1

I

I

I

1

20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 24 29 34 39 44 49 54 59 64 69 74 79 84

Fig. 13. Births and deaths reported in the parish of Altopascio (Altopascians only): annual average of five-year periods, 1625-1784. The parish registers of Altopascio throughout the period, and especially in the early seventeenth century, also recorded some acts of those who lived outside the parish but who were serviced by the curate of Altopascio for convenience. To deal with this problem I used here only the acts of parishioners and of those for whom no other domicile was specified. The acts of parents who were specified as being domiciled outside the parish were counted separately and not included in our discussion of population trends, even though some of the people in this category may have been recent immigrants to Altopascio.

Population

47

1714: in the 10 five-year periods between those terminal dates, the average annual number of deaths exceeded births for 6 of those 10, as opposed to only 3 periods when births exceeded deaths, with the last period being roughly equal 11.8 births as against 11.2 deaths. The last seventy-year period after 1714 represents a long trough in the curves of both births and deaths. Although deaths exceeded births in only 6 of the 14 five-year annual averages, there was little difference between births and deaths in the final seventy years, hardly a surplus large enough to allow much real growth, except in the period 1770—9 when conditions improved. Natural population trends, then, divide into a long positive period through 1660-4, followed by a predominantly negative period through 1720, some recovery in 1720-40, with renewed decline between 1740 and 1770 and more growth after that last date. The tendency of this population to maintain a surplus of births over deaths in the seventeenth century right until 1660—4 seems relatively late in terms of a turning point generally established around the 1620s.13 Altopascio's data indicate a rapid rate of growth through 1634, with a slowdown between 1635 and 1644 because of a rise in mortality, then the demographic reversal during the plague/famine of 1648-50, followed by renewed increase through 1664. The relatively high rate of natural increase after 1650 was a response to the demographic reversal of 1648-50. Otherwise a clear slowdown was already underway around 1635, even though the famous plague of 1630 miraculously spared the village.14 Perhaps that same miracle made the next plague/famine conjuncture all the more devastating. From July through September 1648, 74 people were buried at Altopascio as compared to 27 buried in the entire preceding year. Mortality 13

14

For the city of Florence, see Julius Beloch, 'La popolazione d'ltalia nei secoli sedicesimo, diciasettimo e diciottesimo,' in Storia delVeconomia italiana. Saggi di storia economica, ed. Carlo Cipolla (Turin, 1959), i, 475; for Venice, Daniele Beltrami, Storia della popolazione di Venezia dalla fine del secolo XVI alia caduta della Repubblica (Padua, 1954), p. 59; for Pavia, Giuseppi Aleati. La popolazione di Pavia durante il dominio spagnolo (Milan, 1957), p. 21. Mario Seghieri, Montecarlo e la Madonna del Soccorso (Lucca, 1961).

48

Altopascio Table 2. Burials in the parish of Altopascio, 1648-50

July-September 1648 October-December 1648 January-March 1649 April-June 1649 July-September 1649

74 43 24 19 29

October-December 1649 January-March 1650 April-June 1650 July-September 1650 October-December 1650

29 15 23 14 12

abated in absolute numbers after September, but abnormally high mortality rates endured right through 1650. Not all of the persons buried were Altopascians. About 15% were outsiders, bringing the total number of inhabitants who died between January 1648 and 1650 to 256. The age distribution of those who died clearly points to higher death tolls among the very young and the elderly. The bias towards young children is even more evident if we realize that of the 115 who died between 0 and 9 years, 99 were age 5 or under. The age distribution of mortalities affected this society in specific ways. On the one hand the age composition would immediately shift towards an older population, followed by a relative shortage of young adults until a new wave of post-plague births passed through the age spectrum. Age distribution is especially important in an agricultural labor force that depends so heavily upon physical exertion. A second implication of the age distribution of plague mortalities derives from the relatively smaller number of deaths among the 20-39 age group, which meant that the recuperative possibilities of this society were very good. The average number of births between 1651 and 1661 was only 10% smaller than the average for 1635-47, a fact that explains an estimated recovery of 60 % of losses by the 1660-4 period. Even in the demographic sphere this society displayed resilience in readjusting to shock and disequilibrium. The parish priest of Altopascio unfortunately left behind no account of this demographic disaster. For a narrative of the plague/famine we must rely upon the comments of the

Population

49

Table 3. Age distribution of plague victims in Altopascio, 1648-50 Age group

Percentage

0-9

41

10-19 20-9 30-9 40-9 50-9 60-9 70 + Not specified Total

7

8 8 9 8 11 4 4 100

priest of the neighboring parish of Montecarlo. 15 Here is his entry for the year 1648: July. I remember how Montecarlo and its district enjoyed universal good health thanks to God's compassion, even though Lucca, Pescia, Pistoia and all the surrounding areas suffered incredible mortality, not only among the poor, but even among the rich, and more among the young than the elderly. The illness began at Leghorn, Pisa, Lucca, Pistoia, Prato, and Florence, and then spread out into the towns, villages and countryside in the greatest slaughter, killing entire families... As in the state of Lucca and even in several parts of the Florentine state, Pescia has been very badly afflicted, particularly the parishes of Castellare. The sickness consisted of malignant fevers which caused death within a few days. The sick started out showing few signs of being ill, soon fell into a delirium, and inexorably they died, without the sickness being understood by doctors even though in Florence, Lucca and elsewhere many corpses were examined. They found many worms in these corpses, which would not die in oil. . .or in lemon juice, but instead in wine, so it was deemed useful to allow the sick to have wine. The most famous doctors were the least successful and they, as well as the novice physicians, have made fortunes, particularly in 15

My thanks to Sergio Nelli for directing me to this narrative account in APM, Libro de Morti, 1648.

50

Altopascio

Florence, where doctors and druggists of every sort became rich. The sickness showed signs of being contagious because wherever it struck it did not end with one person, and very few persons were cured. Those who improved had very great difficulty recovering despite the aid of all possible recuperatives, as were experimented on many rich people; therefore the slaughter occurred, and continues to occur, among the rich as well as among the poor, and it continues throughout all of Italy, and particularly in poor Tuscany, from which it follows that God is disdainful of the sins of all, because it is believed that such great mortality is joined with a famine and penury never before experienced in our time, wheat being priced at 34 and 35 lire a sack, and minor grains at 8 and 9 lire a staio, and still they are not to be found. Meanwhile, due to such a long and strange famine, an infinite number of persons died of hunger in the cities and in the countryside, and if these deaths did not occur among the rich, one could say that the illness and such frequent deaths stem from the extreme suffering among entire families for so many months, but because even the families of rich people were seen suffering from the sickness, one must believe that everything arises from the mercy of God, that sweetly visits us for our own good, and because all men permit themselves to offend Him. The famine is not only in wheat and minor grains, but also in the meats, hides, eggs, and similar goods, there being a great penury of everything, and all things being sold at a steep price, as are the wines; because a great quantity was spoiled in every district, all wine has sold for a giulio a flask. In Bologna wheat has risen in price to two scudi for a staio of our measure. Such was the attempt of this country priest to render intelligible a terrible plague and famine. He was a shrewd cleric at that: sensitive to the fact that sickness had a different meaning for rich and for poor; analytic in distinguishing a generalized famine from a shortage of wheat; aware of the market prices for goods not only in his own district but in distant Bologna; cynical of doctors who made fortunes without being able to cure; and sensitive, after all was said and done, to his own inability to explain the disaster except by reference to God's wrath. He was probably relieved to note on 29 November that the number of deaths in that month had dropped to less than half of the October level. On 21 December 1648 the curate made his summation:

Population

51

Births Marriages Deaths

1625 35

Fig. 14. Annual births, marriages, and deaths reported in the parish of Altopascio (Altopascians only): 1625-1784. A good summary discussion of short-term demographic crises can be found in E. A. Wrigley, Population and History (New York, 1969), pp. 62-76.

Here we are (praise God) at the end of the year 1648, a most cruel year because of the misery of a very great famine throughout all Italy, but more terrifying still because of the recurrent illness and death in all of poor Tuscany; may it please heaven through its infinite mercy to look not at our sins, but to take pity on our afflictions.16 The priest's testimony proves that even though plague and famine were active simultaneously, famine conditions had preceded the plague; the food shortage was not the result of the plague removing labor from the fields. But the plague fatalities also reinforced the subsistence crisis: the reduced labor force further contributed to poor harvests again in 1649 and 1650, which were responsible for continued high mortality. The reference to a subsistence crisis in the period 1648-50 leads to an inquiry about other short-term negative fluctuations in population size and specifically those due to changes in the price of wheat. The curve of births, marriages, and 16

APM, Libro de Morti.

52

Altopascio Table 4. Short-term demographic crises, 1625-1784

(Altopascians only)

Year 1636 1639, 40, 41 1648, 49, 50 1659, 60 1663 1667, 68, 69 1677, 78, 79, 80 1683, 84 1693, 94 1697, 98, 99, 1700 1705, 06 1708, 09, 10, 11, 12 1715, 16 1720 1731, 32, 33, 34 1747 1752 1757, 58, 59 1763, 65 1773,75 1782, 83

Births

Deaths

26 89 85 60 28

35 115 256 95 32 112 146 66

72 80

37

31 69 35 53 32 16 61 14 14 48 36 36 32

72

92 56 92 35 34 89 17 23 71 62 54 52

Population change -9 -26 -171 -35 -4 -40 -66 -29 -41 -23 -21 -39 -3 -18 -28 -3 -9 -23 -26 -18 -20

deaths plotted annually (Fig. 14) reveals the incidents of short-run demographic crises, when the number of deaths rose beyond the number of births and marriages fell. In all, nearly one-third of the period 1625-1784 can be labeled as years of short-run crises that occurred in the following sequence: 13 in the 50 years between 1626 and 1675, 22 in the years 1676-1725, 13 in 1726-75, and 2 in the 9 years between 1776 and 1784. Table 4 summarizes these crises. A list of years between 1661 and 1761 in which the price of wheat reached or exceeded 5 lire a staio has survived in the State Archives of Florence.17 These were years of dearth, and a sum total 17

ASF, Segreteria di Gabinetto, 98, f. 115: 'Spoglio degl'Anni nei quali a Firenze e a Pisa il Grano e arrivato ed ha passato il prezzo di L. 5 lo staio nel corso d'anni 100-coiedal 1661 al 1761.'

Population

53

of 16 occasions was uncovered for the years 1663, 1671, 1678, 1679, 1680, 1693, 1696, 1708, 1709, 1710, 1712, 1715, 1747, 1749, 1751, and 1759. When we compare the years of food shortage in Florence with the years of high mortality in Altopascio, there are 12 identities, 2 non-identities, and 2 occasions on which the mortality in Altopascio was recorded in the calendar year after the year of the high price. In other words for approximately 75 % of the years of high prices there was a demographic crisis in Altopascio, and the coincidence may be as high as 88 % if prices are considered to affect the mortalities of the following year. The size of these demographic crises can also be crudely estimated for certain years. Excepting the plague/famine of 1648-50, the worst setbacks came in 1667-9,1677-80,1693-4, and 1708-12. The losses in those years ranged between 5 and 10% of estimated population, while those in the remainder of the eighteenth century were much smaller in magnitude, the very largest ones ranging between 3 and 5 %.18 Along with a decline in births and deaths, the data on subsistence crises again point to a deterioration between 1667 and the 1720s in the form of negative population changes, and if we except the plague/famine of 1648-50, the second half of the seventeenth century appears far worse than the first half. Not all the short-term fluctuations were caused solely or primarily by a failure of the means of subsistence because of an increase in the price of grain. Illness, to be sure, could raise its head in epidemic proportions. The parish priests of Altopascio were silent on these matters, but for certain years our history can draw on the supplementary information 18

The apparent relaxation of pressures on subsistence may reflect the introduction of maize production in 1710 and its steady expansion during the remaining years of the estate's history, see below, Chapter 4. The 1677-80 crisis accounted for a net population loss equal to 10-5% of the 1678 head count, and if we add on net 22 heads lost in 1677 to the population of 1678 to derive an estimated population in 1676, the percentage is then 10-1 %. The loss in 1683-4 equaled 4-8 % of the population of 1684, that of 1693-4 6-1 % of the population of 1692, that of 1708-12 equaled 7-1 % of the population of 1717. The losses of 1715-16 were 0-5% of the population of 1717, and equally small were the losses of 1747 and 1752; but those of 1757-9 equaled 3-6% of the population of 1756, and the losses after that date were similar: the toll of 1763 and 1765 being 4.2% of the population of 1762; 1773-5 losses equaled 3-3% of the population of 1771, and the numbers lost in 1782-3 amounted to 3-1 % of the population of 1781.

54

Altopascio

contained in the registers of Montecarlo. 19 The priest there reported a tertian fever epidemic in 1641. For 1659, another year of high mortality in Altopascio, the parish priest of Montecarlo reported that many were suffering from a ' high fever' illness which, he wrote in August 1659, was aggravated by the 'excessive heat' that was felt night and day and by the extreme drought, it * not having rained for three months, and there is no memory of such extreme heat, nor of such unaccustomed drought.' T h e death of Lieutenant Pellegrino di Bianco di Andrea Bianci in September 1659 provided the occasion for a longer discourse by the priest. He contracted the illness that is going around while at his country estate where he had spent over a month caring night and day for one of his daughters afflicted with the same thing. And in effect it is seen that whoever returned to the city after spending the past summer in the country has died of this current epidemic of high fevers (febbri ardenti). And this has been the general experience. It is believed that the illness developed the same way at Lucca, Pisa, Pistoia, and other nearby places, and at Florence and other cities. The reason is thought to be that rural areas were more exposed to the sun and the night air because the extreme drought and excessive heat forced people to stay outside more, or stay by an open window. Others say that just as the eclipse that occurred last May caused great damage to the harvest which had promised to be excellent but then ended up meager, so has it ruined physical constitutions, almost every house having become a hospital. Though it is true that a great number of sick have appeared in my parish, very few died. The philosophers and the mathematicians whom Our Most Serene Lord asked to study this matter have said that the sun has been three degrees hotter than usual, and that for the last 22 years it has not been so hot as in this year, as everyone knows from the continuous perspiring nignt and day. And in this last quarter of the August moon the illnesses have become more frequent, and so have the deaths; and all the Almanacs threaten that the entire autumn will be bad. Therefore we must deliver ourselves unto God's compassion and mercy. Add to these menaces the smallpox reported in 1646 of which 'only the young [died], but none of the adults.' From October 19

All the following quotations of the parish priest were taken from the APM, Libro de Morti, under the entry for the year in question.

Population

55

1645 to January 1646 the health of these rural people faced the test of * very great and unaccustomed rains and damaging floods everywhere such as cannot be recalled.' The letters of the Medici administrators furnish more reports of illness; for example, the epidemics of 1667, 1708 and 171520 produced more years of high mortality in Altopascio. Short-run fluctuations in population were thus not always pure subsistence crises. Many demographic checks were due to fatal illnesses, and very often the same climatic process that brought poor harvests and undernourished rural populations might bring illness that could thrive in conditions of abundant moisture or excessive dry heat. A glance back at the curve of annual births, marriages, and deaths is enough to convince us, however, that the change realized in the second half of the seventeenth century was more than the simple result of an episodic, short-term fluctuation in population. This rural society had transformed itself. The population of Altopascio fell considerably after its peak in the midseventeenth century and remained perhaps as much as 20% to 30 % smaller right through to 1784. Changes in the pattern of migration transformed Altopascio from a village that attracted large numbers of immigrants to a society that exported its members largely through the * push' exerted by adverse economic conditions at the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Equally important changes governed the schedule of births and deaths. Between 1625 and 1665, the mean number of births per annum was 32, the mean number of deaths 26. Births declined to 23 per annum in 1665-84 and were more than matched by the annual number 20

In August 1667, the central administration in Florence sent a carton of medicines to the fattore of Altopascio to help cure the peasants' illnesses (ASF, RP, 3059, f. 309). According to Harold Acton (The Last Medici (New York, 1958), p. 101), there was an influenza epidemic in the city of Florence in July-August 1667. The epidemic of 1708 is discussed in ASF, RP, 3102, ff., 173, 200, 220. The administrators made a connection between this epidemic and the severe drought that ruined harvests in that year and they were pleased to learn that the September rains brought relief to the countryside and also to those who had been ill (ibid., f. 220). In December 1715, there was another report of epidemic illness at Altopascio (ASF, RP, 3109, f. 408). An epizootic of influenza had broken out in the Lucchese in October, and Florentine troops were sent to the border to prevent commerce in Lucchese livestock and the introduction of the disease to Florentine territory (ibid., ff. 244, 258).

56

Altopascio

of 26 deaths. From 1685 to 1784 the means dropped to 16-9 births and 16-6 deaths. The society had undergone a transition from one that was rapidly growing in the early seventeenth century to a population that was just barely successful in replacing its yearly numbers lost in death. That change involved a significant alteration in the demographic behavior of these people - a process that clearly emerges under close analysis of the population by the method of family reconstitution. This method was applied to the baptismal, matrimonial, and death registers of the single parish of San Jacopo of Altopascio throughout the period from 1625 (the first year for which all three series of baptisms, marriages, and deaths were recorded) until 1784. During those years 748 marriages were performed at Altopascio. Of this group, 385 couples produced 1,555 children whose baptisms were recorded in the parish. Family reconstitution is a laborious method that involves recopying all the individual births, marriages, and deaths recorded in the parish registers on to individual cards, and then collating all the births and deaths for the married couples and their offspring. The population reconstituted is not a statistical sample taken randomly but rather a complete analysis of that group of families whose members married and reproduced in Altopascio. The relationship between those families and the others that escaped reconstitution is still problematic.21 At the present stage of our knowledge we must proceed with the hypothesis that the families who escaped reconstitution share the same demographic comportment as their less mobile counterparts. Mobility also means that the population reconstituted is not homogeneous, but divided into two groups - the completed cases of stable families who married, reproduced, and ended their marriage at Altopascio, and the incomplete cases of families that married at Altopascio, reproduced for a variable number of years, but either left the parish before the marriage ended or were 21

Carlo A. Corsini, 'Recherches de demographie historique menees au Departement de Mathematiques et de Statistiques de l'Universite de Florence,' Annales de Demographie Historique (1972), pp. 62-4.

Population

57

Table 5. Average size of families of Altopascio by duration of marriage

Number

Average

Average number of

f\ IIT*!} t"lOTl

Period

Women

(children)

(in years)

per family

1625-49 1650-99 1700-49 Total (1625-1749)

23 49 43 115

(147) (284) (224) (655)

21-83 21-04 24-65 22-55

6-39 5-80 5-21 5-70

native of another parish and their date of birth is unknown, or both. T h e distinction between the two groups is an important one because their different qualities caused them to influence the demographic history of the village in diverse ways. T h e number of stable families in Altopascio was relatively small: at the maximum they ranged between 18% and 25 % of the total number of new families formed and about a third of the families reconstituted, the remainder of the reconstituted families being incomplete cases. One factor in particular was responsible for the negative population trends. T h e number of families who married and had children in Altopascio declined dramatically after 1650 and again from 121 in 1650-99 to 99 in 1700-49. T h e data from the family reconstitution fully support the conclusions already reached from the aggregative analysis of all births and deaths recorded. In other words, the number of families reconstituted declined and then stabilized just as the aggregate trends, the eighteenth-century level being roughly 20 % lower than the level of 1650-99. Other factors curbed the rate of growth among the reduced number of families. T h e most striking long-run modification was a trend towards later age at marriage. T h e age of the brides has been computed in 434 cases.22 Before 1700, the women of Alto22

The age of the groom at marriage was not generated by the computer analysis.

58

Altopascio

pascio married at the average age of 21 -50. The average age leaped forward to 24-17 between 1700 and 1749, until it finally reached 26-12 after 1750. All things being equal, one might expect a reduction in the average family size because of the later formation of the marriage and the reduction of the fertile period. Ultimate family size in past societies not efficiently controlling births was a function of both the woman's fertility and the duration of the marriage. The women of Altopascio between 1625 and 1784 generally had one child for every two and a half years of married life. The final size of the family was controlled by the length of the union.23 The group of completed cases demonstrates a persistent reduction in the average number of children per family over the entire period. There was a significant decline in family size by the first half of the eighteenth century especially considering the longer duration of the unions. This reduction was undoubtedly caused by the later age at marriage. Together with a fewer number of families, the decline in the average number of children per stable family is enough to explain the sharp fall in population size after 1650. Still other factors intervened, however, to insure that once a new level of population was reached at the end of the seventeenth century, a new phase of stabilization would replace a declining trend. The interval between births was among those variables. Changes in the timing of births somewhat mitigated the effect 23

Years of marriage 0-4 5-9

10-14 15-19 20-4 25 plus

Table 1 Average age at last birth

Average number of children

29-00 30-00 31-37 36-12 38-11 38-38

1-50 3-07 4-35 5-61 7-00 6-77

Population

59

Table 6. Average interval between births (in months): mothers and daughters Time period Before 1700 1700-49 1625-1784

Interval Marriage - first birth Average of all births Marriage - first births Average of all births Marriage - first births Average of all births

Mothers

Daughters

23-3 30-0 18-8 29-3 20-7 29-1

22-0 29-1 19-0 28-4 20-2 28-5

of the later age at marriage by reducing the interval especially among the earlier births. As the age of marriage increased after 1700 the families between 1700 and 1749 had their first child much sooner and their second and third children at shorter intervals than in the seventeenth century. After 1750 the range of the shorter intervals now extended as far as the sixth and seventh births, though the overall effect of subsequent births in the eighteenth century produced only a slightly smaller interval for total births. T o understand this better a study of generations has been made by comparing the mothers and daughters of Altopascio. Differences between mothers and daughters were insignificant in comparison to changes over time. T h e passage from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century produced a reduction in the interval between marriage and the first birth, while the average total interval remained roughly one month shorter for all births. T h e data indicate a social adjustment to the increase in age at marriage. Eighteenth-century families that married later inclined to have their first child sooner after marriage. 24 If 24

The shorter interval between marriage and the first birth may also have been biologically related to the later age of marriage of eighteenth-century women, given that the mean age of menstruation, from the little we know of it, was much older in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and that the trend has been towards an earlier puberty over time. When we consider that the women of Altopascio between 1625 and 1649 married at the tender average age of 18-56, and that girls in Norway in 1850 began to menstruate at 17*1 years of age, it is possible that irregular ovulation among the young brides of Altopascio produced the longer interval between marriage and the first birth, as compared to subse-

60

Altopascio

the emphasis upon option is correct, did seventeenth-century families deliberately delay the timing of their first child? If so, did that same interference affect the intervals between subsequent births? Whatever the answers to those difficult questions, the interval between marriage and the early births seems to have been an important variable that underwent modification in the demographic evolution of Altopascio. The shift was in the direction of the behavior of families of the town of Fiesole outside the city of Florence. Professor Carlo Corsini and his associates, who studied those families between 1650 and 1700, have described as more * modern' the shorter interval between marriage and the first birth relative to the longer interval between subsequent births.25 Trends in Altopascio developed perhaps with a lag in timing in comparison with that district on the edge of the large urban agglomerate - the city of Florence. The interval between births was still only one variable that changed. Increases in the average life of married women and in their age at the birth of their last child tended to mitigate the effect of later age at marriage to reduce the average number of children per family. The average age at death of women who married between 1650 and 1699 was five years less than those who married between 1700 and 1749. This tendency of married women to live longer was reflected in later disruption of conjugal units and consequently a prolongation of the average fertile period among all the families of Altopascio, both incomplete and completed cases. Drawing on all the indices discussed, we are now in a position to analyze the forces behind the complex demographic history of Altopascio. In the early part of the seventeenth century the high growth rate was produced by a population largely formed by recent arrivals who married at an early age. The age composition of the inhabitants of 1618 was also very 25

quent generations who married later. The statistic from Norway and trends in the mean age of puberty were taken from Peter Laslett, The World We Have Lost (New York, 1965), p. 83. Between 1630 and 1680, the women of Fiesole married at an average age of 23-2, had their first child after an average interval of 13*9 months, and their second child at an average interval of 27-0 months after the first-born. Carlo A. Corsini, M. Livi Bacci, A. Santini, 'Spoglio dei registri parrocchiali e ricostruzione delle famiglie in Italia. Problemi delle ricerche di demografia storica,' in C. A. Corsini et al., Saggi di demografia storica (Florence, 1969), p. 13.

Population

61

Table 7. Average family size of all reconstituted families of Altopascio (n = 385)

Average Average age at age at marriage last birth

Period 1625-49 1650-99 1700-49 1750-84

(n = 94) (n= 121) (n=99) (w=7l)

18-56 20-41 21-87 25-51

29-06 31-15 34-31 34-27

Average fertile Average period number of in years children 10-50 10-74 12-44 8-76

3-85 4-17 4-38 3-59

young, 19-9 as compared to the 23-8 average age in 1684. 26 In their exuberance the young settlers of Altopascio in 1618 produced a population of 38-7% between the ages of 0 and 9, as compared to the more modest 22-5% in that category in 1684. T h e 1618 population eventually sent a wave through the society in the form of a sudden arrival at marriage age of an unprecedented number of young adults. This large generation forced down the age at marriage and kept the number of matrimonies high, two factors that explain the sustained population growth through 1660. T h e years between 1665 and 1685, and again between 1697 26

Age composition of the inhabitants of Altopascio, taken from the census of 1618 and the Stato d'anime of 1684: Table 2 Percentage of total population Age group

1618

1684

0-9 10-19 20-9 30-9 40-9 50-9 60-9 70 plus Total Average age of total group

38-7 12-3 19-6 17-2

22-5 25-0 17-7 12-7 11-7

4-9 5-5 1-8 0

100-0 19-9

7-0 3-0 0-7

100-3 23-8

62

Altopascio

and 1717, witnessed on the contrary a decline in population both in terms of the excess of deaths over births and in the form of an outflow of population that eventually produced abandoned lands and empty houses. Economic conditions deteriorated during this same period. The depression of incomes that paralleled the fall in the price of wheat and pauperized those who worked the land, actively discouraged any renewed population growth. The fall in population along with the economic malaise restricted the opportunities for marriage in Altopascio, a restriction that produced fewer marriages and a later age at marriage. The later age at marriage choked down population growth in two ways. First of all it reduced the average number of children produced by the stable families of Altopascio. At the same time it counterbalanced the tendency of married women to live longer and produce their last child at a later average age. The new and later ages at marriage thereby stabilized population by producing an average family size for all the families of Altopascio that remained relatively constant over a century and a half, allowing the population slowly to recoup its numbers lost in 1697-1720 without launching any new period of growth. In other words the trend had now shifted from accelerated growth to stabilization without producing any significant decline in the average number of children for all the families of Altopascio. There were limits to its possibilities for adjustment. After 1750 the upper limit on age at the birth of the last child had been reached, and the new increase in age at marriage reduced the average fertile period and the average number of children per family from 4-38 to 3-59. This last reduction explains the downward march of the population of Altopascio in the second half of the eighteenth century. In conclusion, the youthful settlement of Altopascio that passed to maturity in the course of the eighteenth century, and then experienced a mortality schedule that favored a longer fertile period, would have disastrously exceeded the means of subsistence had marriage age not increased. The family reconstitution programs also indicate how the decision to marry later was enforced. As the population of

Population

63

Table 8. Respective marriage ages of women remaining versus those exiting Marry and remain Time 1625-49 1650-99 1700-49 1750-84 Total

Marry and leave

Total marriages

No.

Marriage age

No.

Marriage age

137 241 216 154 748

94 121 99 71 385

18-56 20-41 21-87 25-51 21-75

43 120 117 83 363

21-00 22-49 24-21 26-90 24-16

Altopascio stopped growing, declined, and then stabilized, there was a corresponding change in the marriage patterns. T h e family reconstitution programs give the number of women who married at Altopascio but had no children there, i.e., for the most part women who had left the village after marriage to reside probably in the parish of their husbands. T h e implications of the marriage pattern upon age at marriage emerge from Table 8. T h e women of Altopascio who married and left changed from a minority of cases in the first period to near parity in the second half of the seventeenth century to a strong majority position in the eighteenth century. T h e results also indicate that even though the group who married and stayed within the village tended to marry later, that same group nonetheless married substantially earlier than those who married and settled outside the parish. As population declined there was less opportunity to find suitable husbands within the village, thereby forcing up age at marriage and dictating more frequent selection of partners from outside the parish. T h e substantially later age at marriage for that second group presumably reflects the longer time required to locate a partner and to arrange a mutually satisfactory union with a family not of the village. T h e changing marriage pattern, then, was the mechanism that enforced the later age of marriage as economic crisis and

64

Altopascio

declining absolute numbers restricted opportunities within the village. Interestingly enough, as the age at marriage increased to a level around that of the women of Fiesole, the women of Altopascio likewise followed in having their first child sooner, a reflex action that helped to soften the human adjustment to the later age at marriage. That human reaction was not always morally sanctioned. The parish registers enable us to gauge the number of illegitimate births and abandoned children. Over the entire period between 1625 and 1784 illegitimate births equaled only 1-1% of the total baptismal acts registered. The distribution is nevertheless instructive. After 1650 the actual number of illegitimate and abandoned children doubled as a proportion of total births registered. The conclusion appears warranted that the declining population and the number of postponed marriages generated new pressures evident in the doubling of the rate of illegitimacy. Perhaps this was the empirical basis for the edicts of Cosimo III in 1691 ordering peasants to desist from allowing their children to bring their girl friends into the house for sexual purposes. 27 Grand Duke Cosimo's fears were later substantiated by the number of pre-marital conceptions among married couples. Before 1700 only 1 in 20 of the married women of Altopascio gave birth to their first child within 8 months of marriage. By the first half of the eighteenth century the proportion rose to 1 in 9, and after 1750 to 1 out of every 6-7 women. The data also indicate that the pressure for pre-marital conception was greater among those who married later. Only 8*9% of those who married under 25 had conceived before marriage, as opposed to 13-7% of those who married over age 25. This last correlation adds strength to the hypothesis that as marriage age increased so did the tendency towards illegitimate and pre-marital conceptions. By the end of the eighteenth century 15-5% of the women had conceived before marriage, a change of manners that poses the question of internalized religious values in rather different terms. More and more couples in the eighteenth century turned to 27

ASF, RP, 3085, 21 July 1691, f. 29. According to Acton (The Last Medici, p. 184), laws against lovers were also promulgated in Florence in October 1691.

Population

65

personal rather than religious convictions about sex before marriage, as a confluence of secular factors delayed their age at marriage. Among those factors there looms especially large an economic system that underwent a severe depression of wages, prices, and income. To pursue our investigation into the fortunes of Altopascio and its people, we must now venture into the complicated world of its economy.

3 The economic organization

A network of economic relations linked the glorious house of the Medici princes to the humble peasants who worked their lands, the leaseholders who rented them, and the artisans and shopkeepers who serviced both the estate and the village population. The economic changes of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not affect the landowner, his tenants, and his laborers in precisely the same way. At times the interests of these different groups placed them in stark opposition. This and the two subsequent chapters will dissect the village economy, study its movement, and assess the welfare of its constituent parts. But the economic organization of the Medici lands will first be described before the performance of the economy over roughly two centuries is assessed. Our description might well begin by discussing the building blocks of any economic system - the factors of production: land, labor and capital. It will be recalled that the estate sprawled over two different types of soil and terrain. The area of low hills or knolls, which was known as 'cerbaia' and characterized by tight yellow clay mixed with gravelly pebbles, contrasted with the expanse of low, flat land that lay in the Plain, rich in alluvial deposits but always threatened by the proximity of the rivers and the poor drainage that could ruin the crops. Whenever the water level in the Fucecchio lake or the Arno river changed the slope of the waters flowing off the Plain, the backlog impeded drainage, the crops suffered, and the land rendered little. The Medici dealt with this problem through the technique of colmate, i.e., raising the elevation of this low-lying land by 66

The economic organization

'A

67

•

&*

Fig. 15. The River Ralla, or Pescia di Collodi, low and tranquil in this late July photograph. As late as the 1950s this very destructive river during high-water seasons necessitated the construction of high embankments to hold back the waters.

building an earthen dam around the fields to be raised and then flooding the whole area by introducing waters from the river through a canal. The deposits from the river would collect in the basin until the desired elevation was reached, when the river would be detoured to the next area to be raised.1 The process was especially beneficial in the short run for the reason that it improved the drainage of the area reclaimed while simultaneously introducing a layer of rich topsoil. This technique was costly, however, and not always successful over the long term. First of all, the river must originate in the hills where it could accumulate rich deposits; otherwise it might introduce sand instead of fertile soil. Secondly the colmate sometimes backfired because by raising the elevation of the area reclaimed, the technique simultaneously lowered the slope of the farms farther upstream, thereby inhibiting the drainage of those lands and rendering them 1

Some detailed discussion of the colmate can be found in Imberciadori, Campagna toscana, who reproduces in Appendix XI, pp. 367-9, a document pertaining to the Colmate del Cerro of the estate of Altopascio.

68

Altopascio

•, Fig. 16. Argine of this type were used in the early modern period to contain rivers and encircle areas destined to be reclaimed through colmate. The river and the embankment were photographed from the Ponte a Pini.

sterile.2 That lesson took nearly a century for the Medici administrators to learn, and the implications deserve elaboration with regard to productivity. For the moment, it is sufficient to summarize the impact of the land on the subsequent history of the estate. The convenient supply of rivers furnished the possibility of reclaiming uncultivated land, but the rivers were a mixed blessing. With frequency, unpredictability and savagery, the rainy seasons would swell the rivers, flood the farms, and overnight leave the relentless efforts of the peasant family buried beneath a layer of water (Figs. 15-16). The important point is nevertheless that the large area of wood and swampland meant that the supply of land over this period was relatively elastic - a key consideration in the expansion of the estate but a condition that hinged on the ability to provide gargantuan labor inputs to colonize this land. The labor requisite for the project became relatively more 2

For other examples where colmate backfired in this way, see M. Biffi Tolomei,

Saggio d'agricoltura pratica toscana e specialmente del contado fiorentino (Florence,

1804), pp. 74 ff.

The economic organization

69

Fig. 17. View of the Church of le Spianate from a farm in the Belvedere district.

abundant as the sixteenth century drew to a close. The timing of the Medici acquisition coincided with the peak in a long period of population growth that had increased the demand for land and attracted large numbers of immigrants to the cultivation of these formerly marginal lands that had been neglected during the demographic reversal of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The landlord did not engage labor on a wage basis but guaranteed its supply through two different types of tenurial relations: direct peasant farming for a share of the crop and long-term leasing of land not directly farmed for the landlord. Peasants worked the lands of the Medici according to the terms embodied in the mezzadria contract by which lord and peasant shared the harvest and the returns from the livestock. In its ideal form the arrangement also provided housing for the peasant on the landlord's farm (Figs. 17-18). In fact housing was not provided by the landlord everywhere in Tuscany or even throughout the same estate. 'Housing' also included a wide variety of structures from solid masonry houses to miserable straw huts. The provision of housing definitely served the landlord's interests. By having a peasant

70

Altopascio

Fig. 18. The peasant farm with its fields bordered by grapevines.

resident upon the farm the landlord was assured of greater labor inputs and less time lost in traveling to and fro. Resident peasants also performed the necessary function of supervising the animals and the farm, protecting both against thieves, poachers, or sudden natural disasters. The documents of the Medici administration consistently stress the fact that a farm with a resident peasant family yielded a higher return than a farm on which peasants simply worked by day. The specific terms of the mezzadria contract varied according to the particular region of Tuscany. Where the land was especially fertile, or in other localities where housing was provided, the landlord could require the peasant to supply all of the seed.3 At Altopascio the Medici gave one-half of the seed except on reclaimed land, where the peasant was obliged to furnish full seed for the first year of cultivation.4 And then 3

4

The recommendations of a visitor to the lands of the commenda, in AC, xni, no. 48, proposed that on the estate of Fucecchio the peasants who formerly advanced only one-half the seed for lack of housing could be forced to provide full seed now that housing had been furnished. The tendency of landlords to exact full seed from peasants on fertile land emerges from Biffi Tolomei's discussion of the mezzadria and also from documents pertaining to the colmate of Altopascio cited below in n. 4. ASF, RP, 3121, ff. 19, 95; 3122, f. 92.

The economic organization

71

the landlord only gave half the seed for certain crops: wheat, vetched wheat, rye, oats, beans, and barley, but not millet, sorghum, flax, or panicum - crops for which the peasants provided all the seed. The peasants also maintained the mulberry trees used to nourish silkworms. Every three years the value of the leaves was appraised and the sum debited to the peasant, who was expected to make up the difference at the end of the three years if the trees had suffered damage. The same technique applied to the livestock, which the landlord purchased and then assigned to the peasants for raising. Here, too, the peasant was debited for the appraised value of the animals, their manure, and the carts. Thereafter lord and peasant divided the profits and losses from the rearing and sale of livestock. Above and beyond the labor provided intending the land and the animals, the peasants also pledged to perform certain labor services, like carting, or planting vines, that earned a fixed remuneration. There were other vantaggi (dues) that the peasants paid as a rent on the chicken house, the pigsty, and the pigeon loft connected to their houses. All these obligations together constituted the 'compacts' of the peasant's contractual relationship to the landlord, obligations that for Altopascio have been reconstructed from the account books, because in this region the terms of the mezzadria were not recorded in formal, written contracts.5 In Tuscany generally the peasants' duties were determined by a body of customary practice. Variations in the specific terms of the contract should not obscure the fundamental anatomy of this market relationship in which the landlord exchanged his principal outlay in the form of land for the labor supplied by the peasant family. Besides the labor pledged in the terms of the contract, the actual operation of the mezzadria generated even more labor. 5

Some written compacts have been published by Elio Conti (La formazione delta struttura agraria moderna nel contado fiorentino (vols. i and m part 2A; Rome, 1965),

i, Appendix, pp. 358-9). The terms of the compacts studied by Conti were more burdensome in the seventeenth century than at any other time, but the mezzadri of the seventeenth century had relatively more autonomy in the sphere of agricultural production than they had in subsequent centuries, which indicates to me that in the Florentine contado, just as at Altopascio, the landlord's control over the peasants and over work discipline tended to augment in the early modern period.

72

Altopascio

Ideally the peasant worked a holding and earned a share of the crop adequate to feed his family. The division of the harvest, however, rarely left the cultivators with enough to subsist, thereby forcing them to borrow from their employer. The consequence was a tie of indebtedness between peasant and landlord. Economically the landlord retaliated by extracting as much labor as possible to reduce the size of bad debts, labor that was paid on a wage basis and directed towards large reclamation projects on which indebted peasants were compelled to work. The history of peasant indebtedness and its crucial role in the social and economic transformations of the early modern period will be discussed at much greater length. The point here is to describe an economic system that assured an abundant source of labor from within the estate at a minimal cost. Other tenurial arrangements guaranteed still more labor for the development of the estate and the accumulation of capital in the form of colonized and reclaimed land. The most important of these was the leasehold contract. The livello was a long-term agreement in which the leaseholder paid an initial entry fee (laudemio) and a regular annual rent thereafter. The duration of the leaseholds granted at Altopascio varied over time as a function of the demand for land and the availability of labor. In the sixteenth century there is evidence of leaseholds awarded in perpetuity, while in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the leases were granted for the term of four lives. After c. 1630 the leases fell to three lives in duration, except in specific periods when downward pressure on rents apparently prompted a return to the longer term of four lives. The * lives' were reckoned along the male line of the initial leaseholder. Women were excluded from inheriting livelli except in unusual cases where the grand duke condescended to allow a female petitioner to accede to the land transmitted by her male relations.6 The leasehold contract allowed a certain degree of flexibility to the landlord's needs while insuring a stable rental income over the long term. Changes in the duration of the lease have already been noted as a mechanism adjusting their 6

ASF, RP, 772.

The economic organization

73

attractiveness to conditions in the market for land and labor. The type of rent payment could also be modified. At Altopascio the overwhelming majority of the leases specified rent payments in kind: mostly in rye, with some combinations of wheat, eggs, chickens, or wax from religious corporations. Still other contracts charged a fixed money rent. In any given year the leaseholder could also pay a fixed monetary equivalent for the portions of rent owed in kind. Finally, towards the end of the eighteenth century, all rent payments at Altopascio were converted to money payments. In short the landlord could adjust the terms of the contract according to the specific situation. Stability of rents derived from the long duration of the lease and the method of payments in kind. At any given point in time the society of leaseholders included tenants at different junctures in the ultimate duration of their particular lease. Rents in kind were determined as a fixed quantity of produce per acre of land leased - 2 staia of rye for every coltra of land. Whenever a piece of land became available the policy of the estate management was to lease the property for the same rent per unit of land as was already being charged the large body of leaseholders. The Medici administrators argued that if they lowered the rent on a piece of land newly granted on lease, they would have to adjust the rents of all active leaseholders.7 This inflexibility favored the Medici in three ways. First of all, the long agricultural depression of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created pressures for a lower rent in the marketplace. So the estate's administrative policy of charging a fixed rent protected the Medici during these centuries because it arbitrarily kept rents higher for a longer period of time, when a free play of market forces would otherwise have caused rents to fall farther and sooner. Second, the amount of the fixed rent had been determined in the late sixteenth century, when the growing demand for land and the high price of agricultural commodities enabled the Medici to charge a stiff rent. In other words, the leaseholds preserved rents at relatively high levels. And third, the fact that most rents were in kind insured more stability. The depression of 7

ASF, RP, 3767, Letter of N. Gaetano Torelli, 3 Aug. 1718.

74

Altopascio

grain prices certainly reduced the market value of rents in kind, and the long duration of the lease prohibited the Medici from making any short-run conversion to money payments that would have evoked the protest of the leaseholders during the agricultural depression. On the other hand, the real value of the rent probably registered little change, since all commodity prices were depressed during this period and the lower market value of rents in kind probably rendered comparable purchasing power. All these features explain the attractiveness of the livelli as a system of guaranteed income. In addition to the rental income, the leases provided the landlord with an abundant supply of labor. In the second half of the sixteenth century, when the region was still underdeveloped and covered with large areas of wood and swampland, the Medici administrators used the livello to attract colonists.8 The uncultivated land was given out for four generations with the condition that the lessee reduce the plot to cultivation. Whether specified or not, colonists and cultivation meant an equal expansion of housing. Since the leaseholders were tenants, all improvements to the property accrued to the landowner by law. Even after the initial colonization had ceased, the livello could be used to require a tenant to build a house or to make improvements on an already existing one. The livello thus provided labor for capital improvements of the lands of the estate without any cost to the landlord. The process of capital accumulation was further reinforced by the large debts generated by the livello through unpaid rents; the landlord compelled the leaseholders, like the peasants, to pay off their debts by laboring on different projects ordered by the estate management.9 The economic system thus relied upon the labor force to expand its stock of capital goods used in agricultural production. For the landlord there was a high initial investment in financial capital in laying the infrastructure of the estate. Animals had to be purchased, houses constructed, and indispensable agricultural implements like wine barrels provided. Once the newly acquired holding had been placed on 8 9

See Chapter 2, n. 5. ASF, RP, 3060, f. 1,147.

The economic organization

75

a working basis, the rate of net financial investment fell close to zero, that is, to replacement and maintenance. Livestock acquisitions and maintenance were financed largely from receipts from the livestock account. Implements were durable and secondary to the labor input in the agricultural process. The plow used in this region produced only a shallow upheaval of the soil. The real soil preparation came from the vangatura, when the peasant took his shovel and penetrated the earth by twelve to sixteen inches and overturned the earth with his muscles.10 Housing, stables and the like, could be a costly initial investment, but in the overall management and expansion of the estate, the greatest factor input was the labor furnished by the peasants. Whenever the landlord provided the supplies for stables and huts, the peasants provided the labor, free of cost, to build them.11 The only possible exception to the model of low net investment lies in the large-scale reclamation projects that cover the history of the estate. These are problematic to assess as capital investment. These projects resemble to a large extent the high initial outlay of capital, because many of the reclamation projects were executed upon newly acquired but infertile lands. Where the technique was used to replenish older plots, the investment again takes the form of renewing the infrastructure of unproductive soils, a long-run replacement cost. Almost all the waterworks were conceived defensively, as operations to maintain land rendered unproductive by soil depletion, lack of drainage, or repeated flooding. The administrators certainly realized that the investment would increase the yields of the land. The precise circumstances out of which the colmate emerged made those decisions in almost every case a necessary defensive measure 10

11

Carlo Pazzagli has a good and accessible discussion of this key agricultural operation in his book, Uagricoltura toscana nella prima meta delU800. Tecniche di produzione e rapporti mezzadrili (Florence, 1973), pp. 165-78. AC, iv, 'Lettera di Giovanbattista Capponi al Cardinale de' Medici in Roma, Firenze 24-1V-1581.' In this letter Capponi justified his plan to build a large new stable on the grounds that it would actually cost very little: the lumber had already been cut from the forest. And in the housing restorations that were underway at this same time, the estate only furnished bricks, mortar, and hired the bricklayers; all the unskilled labor was provided free of charge by the peasants, who also hauled the material at no cost to the estate.

76

Altopascio

to preserve lands that were threatened with declining productivity.12 Even where reclamation projects were executed on the estate, the normal productive process was not altered. The agricultural system remained labor intensive, a feature that applied to the reclamation projects themselves. The beams and the earth to make the dams were readily available to the estate. The crucial requirement was the labor to build dams, dig new trenches, move rivers, and after the project was completed, to work the reclaimed land into a condition suitable for cultivation. The labor-intensive element stands out in marked contrast to our modern capital-intensive methods of performing the same operations. A change in the disposition of labor also made the reclamation projects less costly and therefore economically advantageous to undertake. The large accumulation of peasant and leaseholder debt in the seventeenth century meant a reduction in the costs of the undertaking that could be financed out of bad debt. In other words, the colmate made productive use of excess labor generated by debt.13 The use of the land, the organization of labor, and the production and accumulation of fixed capital by laborintensive methods, all situate the economy of the estate and the mezzadria system in a hybrid mode of production, one with marked advances of a capitalistic nature over the seigneurial regime, but an organization which inherited a legacy that prevented those capitalist elements from blossoming into the dominant economic system. This intermediary economic 12

13

The report of Giuseppe Salvetti dated 9 Sept. 1772 (ASF, RP, 3563, no. 135) illustrates this point, along with the fact that colmate necessitated more colmate by lowering the relative elevation of contiguous lands. The same defensive reaction lay behind the Colmate del Cerro. This tract had been described in 1674 (i.e. before reclamation) in the following terms: 'Parte di codesti poderi sono tanto sottoposti all'Innondazione del Padule che se ne cava poco frutto et i lavoratori non vi possono campare' (ASF, RP, 3065, f. 24). More on the defensive necessity of the colmate and waterworks of Altopascio can be found in ASF, RP, 3531, nos. 26 and 71; 3551, no. 17; 3534, nos. 2, 5, 8, 9, 10. It is impossible to calculate exactly what portion of the labor was financed out of peasant debts. Whenever a project was decided, the instructions from Florence would order the estate manager to use all the debt labor he could in order to minimize expenses, and to imprison those debtors who refused to work (ASF, RP, 3060, f. 1,147).

The economic organization

77

organization gives rise to a number of contradictions and ambiguities in the economic history of the estate. The first ambiguity derives from the landlord himself. The Medici were by 1587 an old mercantile family with a long history of dealings in land, banking, and commerce. But in the sixteenth century, because of a change in the political system realized in the 1530s, the Medici became the dukes of Tuscany and the first nobles of the duchy. As a result the Medici's political interest in 'good rule' influenced the economic administration of these lands. Such interests, for example, explain why the estate retained most of the historic charities of Altopascio intact without systematically evading the obligations. The charitable institutions of Altopascio accord very well with the other paternalistic elements of Medici rule, like the image of the Medici personally distributing grain to the hungry citizens of Florence or hiring unemployed wool workers to ease their suffering during the industrial crisis of the seventeenth century.14 This basic compatibility of the charities of Altopascio with Medici rule probably explains their retention. Similarly the leasing of the estate of Altopascio in 1784 was a calculated act of political economy designed to promote agrarian reform. The reorganization of the estate also represented an administrative improvement from the landlord's point of view; but the motive for the * reform' was nevertheless political in inspiration. To 14

For an account of Grand Duke Ferdinando I distributing grain and an observer's impression, see Berner, 'Florentine Society,' p. 210. A later example can be taken from the reign of Grand Duke Ferdinando II: on 10 October and again on 15 November 1663 he ordered the Scrittoio of the Royal Possessions to administer 200 staia of wheat to 'S. Francesco del Pugliese Provveditore del Arte della Lana, dovendo servire per distribuirsi a diverse povere tessitore di lana, che di presenze non anno da tessere' (ASF, RP, 1320, nos. 126, 127). It would be a fascinating study to reconstruct all of this activity of the Medici family throughout Tuscany, in an attempt to understand political quiescence and the transition from republic to principate. It is known, for example, that Ferdinando II played a personal role in combating the plague of 1630 which earned him the love of his subjects, and in 1632, by order of the same grand duke, a commandite was given to a firm of the Arte della Lana to provide employment for the vagabonds and unemployed housed in the Pia Casa de' Mendicanti (Maurice Carmona, 'Aspects du capitalisme toscan au XVIe et XVIIe siecles. Les societes en commandite a Florence et a Lucques,' Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, xi (1964), p. 85). For another example of this type of government, see n. 2 of the Conclusion and the way Grand Duke Cosimo III used paternalistic political economy in response to the urban riots of 1694.

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Altopascio

sum up, the estate's managerial objectives did not always focus strictly on profit and loss: as the private property of the grand duke, Medici lands financed, and were enmeshed in, the public interests of state. More serious contradictions in the degree of capitalist development governed the organization of labor. First of all there is the enduring ambiguity of a huge tract of property divided and worked by peasants on family farms, thereby creating a contradiction between the legal and the operational unit. The estate was simultaneously a vast Medici property and a loose federation of small holdings. In a sense this organization displays the fundamental capitalist division between the owners of the means of production and the producers. The Medici employed their capital and their land to engage labor. Over the period under consideration, the performance of the economy and the distribution of the costs of production increasingly deprived the peasants of any independent property. This proletarianization process steadily increased the dependence of the peasant on the estate manager, augmenting the latter's powers of control. The estate manager controlled the timing of all agricultural operations, and severely reprimanded the peasants if they ever acted individually on these matters.15 The control of timing constituted a primitive form of work discipline: the peasants must seed, harvest, prune, etc. at the designated times. The control extended to items of joint ownership. The livestock was marketed at the prices and the times decided by the estate management. Here, too, the peasant was a passive agent who could consult and sometimes advise, but never decide. As peasants became more and more indebted, they worked for the landlord in greater proportions on a wage basis. By the end of the eighteenth century the mezzadri had been so effectively stripped of any surplus that they were unable to meet small cash obligations, like the purchase of clothing, for which they were forced to borrow from the estate manager.16 15

16

ASF, RP, 3059, f. 201. Although this control served agricultural purposes by regulating the timing of operations, it was also enforced to prevent the peasants from defrauding the landlord by withholding part of the harvest, which was normally divided under the supervision of the estate manager and the guard. 'Contanti Rogati a Pietro Lazzeri per comprare roba per rivestirsi' (ASF, RP,

The economic organization

79

The social and economic relationship between lord and peasant resembled that of capitalist and proletariat. On the other hand some of the indispensable technical accompaniments of capitalism never manifested themselves on the estate. Despite the growing importance of debt labor, peasants were not remunerated primarily by a wage but by a share of the crop. That method of engaging labor itself influenced production decisions in important ways. By dividing labor according to family units, it was impossible to derive the benefits of an optimum use of labor on a large estate. At the very same moment in time, the organization of labor would tolerate a shortage of manpower on one farm and an inefficient surplus on another. Duplication of efforts meant that the estate never reaped the benefits of specialization of labor as a way of increasing output. The mezzadria itself actively discouraged specialization. By minimizing labor costs to the degree that it did, there was no advantage for the landlord to shift to the wage system. In providing subsistence by a share of the crop instead of through a wage, the production decisions of the estate were biased by the need to provide subsistence to each family working the farms. This prerequisite of agricultural production lies behind the 'coltura promiscua' that characterized Tuscany, the multiple-crop farming on a labor-intensive system. Because a family needed to subsist, the primary requirement of the farm was to provide cereals. All other production decisions were built around this essential requirement.17 So the vines were planted along the sides of fields, thereby inhibiting the extension of specialized vineyards that so advanced Tuscan agriculture after the Second World War. Fruit and olive trees were also planted at the edge of cultivated strips, on river banks, or alone in the middle of a field of wheat. The need to provide subsistence also

17

6737A: 'Quaderno di Conti dei Lavoratori dal 1768 al 1778,' second division, f. 114). The same accounts (f. 113) list the cash advanced to Francesco Picchi 'per sua meta di sugo comprato da Andrea Natale.' Similar cash advances under the general rubric of 'per occorrenze' are already in evidence in the accounts of 1735-50 (ASF, RP, 6730). This is a theme of the book by Pazzagli, L'agricoltura toscana, which was elaborated in discussion by Professors Imberciadori, Giorgetti, Romani, and Sereni during a conference held in Florence in June 1973, sponsored by the Unione regionale delle provincie toscane, to present this volume to the public.

80

Altopascio Table 9. Distribution of land of the estate of Altopascio

Year

% sterile

% arable

1697* 1784

N.S. 1-8

42-9 50-8

% under recla% mation pasture 5-8 6-7

14-7 14-8

% woods

Total

36-6 25-9

100-0 100-0

* The figures for 1697 were converted from coltre to stiore on the basis of 7-5 stiore per coltra in order to make comparisons with the data for 1784. restricted the production of forage crops, and placed an upper limit upon profitable expansion of livestock. The restricted development of livestock in turn restricted the quantity of available fertilizer. The net result of these restrictions was the inability of the estate to specialize according to comparative advantage. T h e estate could not be organized along lines that would devote one portion to wine cultivation, another to grain, another to orchards, as long as each independent family unit required a harvest of cereals that would allow it to subsist. T h e estate became locked into an organization of land use that resisted modernization along the lines of any agricultural revolution. Particular elements in the whole production equation could be modified or rationalized, while the system itself remained inflexible. Table 9 provides a concrete illustration of the stable pattern of land distribution. Between the two dates, the total area under direct estate management had increased by roughly 20%. T h e significant change in the distribution of land is the marked relative increase in the area of arable land and a corresponding decrease in the area of woodland over the century. Without minimizing the expansion of arable land, it is nonetheless clear that the new area had been carved from woodland without altering the agrarian balance or upsetting the interrelationships within it. The newly cultivated land was absorbed according to the same priorities. The system had been

The economic organization

81

rationalized to yield a higher level of aggregate output without ever revolutionizing the use of the land.18 This was an economy dominated by the most powerful merchant/landlord in Tuscany, an economy that depended on the labor of the peasants, on the rents provided by the leaseholders, and on the market that regulated the sale of its commodities. The two chapters that follow are a study in the performance of this economy and an analysis of the crisis that struck that system in the second half of the seventeenth century. For the sake of focus, the guiding themes in the analysis might here be summarized. The grand dukes of Tuscany enjoyed a secular expansion of the lands and the income of Altopascio from 1587 to 1784. After 1650, however, there began a depression of wheat prices that produced a decline in Medici income until the early decades of the eighteenth century. The effect of the economic crisis was to alter the relationship between lord and tenant. Important structural factors made the landlord by far the most resilient member of the economy. The crisis affected the peasants through an accelerated deterioration in their status as producers, symbolized by higher levels of indebtedness correlative to the expansion of Medici output and income. The net effect of the crisis was to transform the peasants of the estate from independent farmers to semiproletarians. For the class of leaseholders the crisis produced 18

Using the 1697 data as the base period equal to 100, the total area under direct cultivation in 1784 had increased to 121-2, arable land jumped to 143-6, pasture to 122-5, and reclaimed land to 122-5, while the woodland declined to 85-6. Note that the proportion of pasture, which is relatively high in comparison to the rest of Tuscany, was not the product of the internal organization of the estate but rather the external economy that the estate enjoyed by virtue of its location bordering the Padule di Fucecchio. The map of the estate in ASF, Piante delle Regie Possessioni, Scaffale D, Palchetto 3, Piante nos. 17, 18, proves conclusively that almost all of the pastureland of the estate was situated along the borders of the swamp, in the area called the Gremignaio, i.e., lands that were not suitable for regular cereal cultivation because they would seasonally be flooded by the waters of the padule, but nevertheless a bonus for livestock cultivation. This external economy that the Lago di Bientina and the Padule di Fucecchio constituted is responsible for the higher number of livestock found at Altopascio and in the Valdinievole generally, because the swamp also generated abundant sources of fodder crops that were otherwise neglected in the regular farming of the estate. It is, therefore, especially interesting to note that the estate nevertheless failed to increase productivity, despite this relatively more abundant supply of livestock and natural fertilizer.

82

Altopascio

more differentiation by ruining many small farmers and simultaneously releasing their lands at a cheap rate for the acquisition by the notables of their class who did not work the land themselves. Two separate lines of development moved the entire system in a capitalistic direction: merchant financial capital directly engaged labor in the production of farm commodities for profit; and a rural bourgeoisie quietly emerged out of the ranks of independent producers who gradually substituted hired labor on their farms and steadily extended their economic activities into small-scale commerce. At the end of both lines of development stood the pure agricultural laborers, among whose womenfolk local capitalists found an ideal medium for the culture of the domestic industry of spinning flax. These capitalistic tendencies never became predominant because of a basic inflexibility of the economic organization that was reflected in static levels of productivity. What follows is the paradoxical story of those who labored within a system that became increasingly capitalistic without ever adopting the classic pattern of capitalism wherein labor earns its subsistence through wage payments and is wholly reorganized to serve the production goals of the employer.

4 The economic performance, part I

The price of wheat in this period has long intrigued economic historians because of the ' price revolution' of the sixteenth century and the subsequent collapse of prices in the seventeenth. In the economy of Altopascio, since production costs and productivity did not vary much over time, the price of wheat and other farm commodities was crucial to the wellbeing of the estate members. Prices also altered the absolute and relative distribution of costs and benefits; the depression of commodity prices penalized those who owed debts, fixed money rents or other obligations, to the advantage of those who collected those items.1 A study of wheat prices for the Tuscan city of Siena permits us to situate the most rapid rise in prices in the second half of the sixteenth century, with the greatest gains coming after 1575 and reaching a high point around 1595.2 After that date there are more relevant price data for Altopascio collected from the communal archive of Montecarlo.3 1 2 3

For the specific effect of the price depression on the leaseholders of Altopascio, see below, Fig. 21, and the discussion in the pages that follow. Giuseppe Parenti, Prezzi e mercato del grano a Siena (1546-1765) (Florence, 1942), Table of Prices, pp. 27-8, and graph following p. 32. This, like every series, has its own history. It deals with the price of grain sold by quasi-public institutions in the months of April, May and June. The prices for the years from 1600 to 1636 are the average price of a staio of wheat for the total amount of wheat sold in the months of April, May, and June by the Opera Maggiore, that is, the corporation that looked after the maintenance of the church, which used as income the wheat grown on its lands and sold in the comune; after 1636 the prices are those of wheat sold under the 'Pio Legato Billo,' that is, the wheat from the lands left by Arrigo Barsanti called Billo to fund the dowries of 30 lire each that Billo established for the poor girls of the parish. Whereas in the period from 1600 to 1655 the price of wheat fluctuated from month to month, after 1672 (gap between 1656 and 1671) the monthly price became constant, which suggests that the price of wheat was now determined and maintained each year, with fluctuations from year to year but no fluctuations from month to month. Nothing specific has resulted about the method of determining

84

Altopascio Table 10. Average price of wheat at Montecarlo (per staio)

Time

Raw price (in soldi and hundredths of soldi)

Index (base period: 1601-55= 100)

1601-55 1672-1770 1771-1800

112-11 78-11 103-65

100-00 69-67 92-45

T h e movement of prices at Montecarlo yields the following observations. From 1601 to 1655 wheat prices stabilized at a relatively high level. From 1656 to 1671 there is a gap in the registers of Montecarlo, but when the data resume in 1672, a sharp fall in prices is recorded. In the course of the entire century through 1770, the price levels of 1651-5 were never reached again. Table 10 summarizes the changes in wheat price. Data from neighboring towns enable us to establish that the turning point in prices was around 1660.4 Within that long period of low prices there were of course distinct subperiods: between 1672 and 1690, and again between 1716 and 1730,

4

the price by communal authorities, nor of the reason it was decided to prevent fluctuations. Despite this policy, the prices at Montecarlo accurately reflect market trends, as proven by the fact that when values at Montecarlo and Siena are set at parity for a given base period, thereafter there is almost a perfect correlation between changes in price at Siena and at Montecarlo, which permits interpolations of missing years at Montecarlo on the basis of coefficients derived from the Siena series. The sources for the entire price series are ACM, 677: 'Saldi dell'Opera Maggiore dal 1600 al 1636'; 692: 'Saldi di Billo dal 1610 al 1655,' and volumes pertaining to the Billo accounts 693 (1671-1726), 694 (1727-74), and 695 (1776-1802). My thanks, once again, to Mario Seghieri for copying this price data for me, thereby allowing me to use my limited time in the communal archive to investigate other sources. The precise turning point was probably after 1655, Parenti, op. cit., p. 235. I am well aware that several economic historians, including Parenti, have noted the first break in the trend around 1600 or 1630, when the trend passed from accelerated growth to stability or decline. Even though prices did fall between 1634 and 1642 at Montecarlo, they rose again between 1643 and 1655, reaching the seventeenthcentury peak at Montecarlo between 1648-9. The data presented by Parenti (p. 229) on the annual average price for ten-year periods in 14 urban markets besides Siena also illustrate that generally the annual price in 1651-60 was higher than in 1641-50. In view of absolute levels of price, along with other indices of welfare analysis that emphasize a clear break after 1650,1 have opted for the later turning point.

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85

prices were at their lowest; in 1691-1715 and 1733-70 average prices were roughly 20 % higher. The definitive Medici acquisition of Altopascio in 1587 coincided with a trend of rising wheat prices that leveled off in the first half of the seventeenth century. The first shock was registered from 1660 to 1690. Some mild improvement followed until another cycle of low prices materialized between 1716 and 1730. After that point the economy steadily recovered from the depression of wheat prices. The fall in wheat prices undoubtedly stimulated adjustments in the demand for agricultural commodities. So it is unfortunate that no price series exists for commodities other than wheat at Altopascio, especially because changes such as the 'price revolution' and a 'price depression' most likely produced significant substitution effects, as occurred elsewhere. Professor Tagliaferi has collected prices for wheat, rye, millet, and wine for the market of Udine in the state of Venice from 1500 to 1700.5 Several interesting changes in price relationships are documented in that series. The most striking change is that wine, which Tagliaferi set at rough parity at the beginning of the time series, increased in price during the price revolution at approximately the same rate as wheat. After 1600 wine prices continued to rise through 1620, while wheat prices dipped. For the entire seventeenth century wine now had a greater value than wheat. There were also subtle substitution effects among grain crops. Table 11 takes the five-year average price for wheat, rye and millet at five different times; the wheat price was set at 100 and divided into the rye and millet prices to derive relatives. During the first half of the sixteenth century, as wheat prices rose slowly, the price relationships among these three crops remained roughly equivalent. In the sharp price rise between 1555 and 1605, the increases in all prices nevertheless produced a proportionate decline in the price of rye, thereby indicating a stronger demand for wheat.6 The 5

6

Amelio Tagliaferi, Struttura e politica sociale in una communita veneta del '500 (Udine)

(Milan, 1969), pp. 70-5. Of course, in theory, the decrease in the relative price of rye during the period of high prices, and an increase in its price during a time of low prices, could have been produced by an increase of rye production during the price revolution and a decline of rye production during the price depression. Actually that theoretical

86

Altopascio Table 11. Relative prices of wheat, rye and millet in the market of Udine, 1500-1700 (per staro Udinese) Wheat

Time 1501-5 1551-5 1601-5 1651-5 1691-5

Rye

Millet

Raw price Raw price Raw price (in denari) Index (in denari) Index (in denari) Index 1274 1786 3564 3374 3408

100 100 100 100 100

934 1330 2306 2155 2484

73-3 74-5 64-7 63-9 72-9

610 865 1759 1512 1939

47-9 48-4 49-4 44-8 56-9

Data for this table are taken from Tagliaferi's Tables 2 and 3. I have converted the figures to denari to facilitate calculation of relatives. relationship then stayed unchanged during the trend of stable prices through 1655, but in the second half of the seventeenth century the price of the minor grains, rye and millet, rose significantly in relation to that of wheat. These data support the hypothesis that over the early modern period there was a shift in consumption patterns from wheat to minor grains. This shift apparently did not come about during the price revolution, but rather during the depression, which suggests that the depression increased the relative cost of wheat for lower income groups and prompted a substitution of cheaper grains. Changes in prices also created more difficulties in the marketing of commodities, but the distribution of those difficulties hurt small farmers more than the ducal landlord because of structural advantages that the Medici enjoyed. Whereas small producers were more or less confined to local markets, the Medici estates readily received the license to export. When prices in the Florentine state were too low to suit the Medici agents, they could export their commodities to the nearby possibility is nullified by the fact that during the agricultural depression more rye was produced than wheat, thereby making a change in demand the independent variable that altered the price relationships in Table 11.

The economic performance, part I

87

state of Lucca using these export permits. The Medici lands also enjoyed a certain economy of scale in their marketing. At times the grains of Altopascio would be combined with those of other grand-ducal estates in the Valdinievole and sold in one huge transaction. At other times the estate negotiated its own sales and either sent its crops to the local markets of Pescia and Borgo a Buggiano, or instead sold them in small lots right at the estate. That decision was rationally made on the basis of prices in those respective markets, and the determination of whether the difference in urban prices would compensate for transport costs. Those decisions were facilitated by the centralization of information in Florence, where the Department of the Royal Possessions functioned as a clearing house of information on current market conditions. That information enabled the estate to execute the constant administrative injunction to sell at the highest possible price and buy at the cheapest. If the administrators decided that the market price was inadequate, they could also store the crops in their underground granaries until a suitable deal arose.7 For all these reasons the landlord showed considerably more resilience throughout the agricultural depression in comparison to the leasehold producers with their small surplus. Despite that resilience price trends exerted a depressive influence on the net money income derived from Altopascio. Much like prices, trends in net income divide into three distinct periods: a phase of marked expansion between 1587 and 1647, followed by an abrupt decline in money income that prevailed until 1734 when a new period of growth began that lasted through 1780. The graph of the indices of the price of wheat, money income and income in relation to wheat prices (Fig. 19) illustrates that the depression of money income was partially a function of prices. Income adjusted for the fall in wheat prices therefore showed far more resilience: while such income definitely ceased to expand after 7

There were, however, technical limitations upon these features. The Medici lands of Altopascio never had all the storage facilities that were desired, until the new granary was built under Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo; there were also limitations upon the efficiency of storage in the underground buche; inevitably some moisture entered the storage area, and crops would be damaged during times of storage, some crops storing better than others.

88

Altopascio Semi-logarithmic 2 cycles Base Period: 1602-16=100 Price of wheat • Net money income

1577- 1587- 1602- 1617- 1632- 1647- 1662- 1676- 1692- 1707- 1722- 1741- 1759- 176982 1601 16 31 46 51 75 91 1706 21 40 49 65 80

Fig. 19. Indices of average annual price of wheat, net money income, and income adjusted for wheat prices of the Estate of Altopascio, 1577-1780. Net income equals the total receipts from harvests, livestock, and other entries, minus operating costs, seed, maintenance, and other. Net income does not include the costs of peasant debt, nor of the land reclamation projects and improvements which are recorded under a separate entry either as Spese di Colmate, or Muramente e Coltivazione. Net income also does not take into account the costs of operating the church or the hospital. 'Income adjusted for wheat prices' is the index of money income from the estate divided by the index of the price of wheat at Montecarlo, the result being the index of the amount of wheat purchaseable at Montecarlo with the money income of the estate. The sources for all income figures are the grand-ducal account books cited below, n. 8, with the additional financial accounts of AC, xin, no. 47, and ASF, SF, 307, Incanti, 'Affitto Pagni.' Note that wheat prices in this graph are those of Montecarlo, which required interpolations for the years prior to 1600 and for 1662-71 by the method of coefficients derived from the Siena series as discussed below, Table 15n.

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89

1646, it stabilized rather effectively until the period from 1692 to 1721 when it then declined along with money income. The overall levels of both money income and price-adjusted income nevertheless declined proportionately less than wheat prices relative to the early seventeenth century. Medici income still underwent a remarkable 200% increase from the late sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century. That trend of expanding income was mostly a function of the expansion of agricultural output. Production trends for the estate are complicated by the existence of the multiple-crop system and the trade-offs among crops over the long run. To deal with this complication, all grains produced by the estate have been combined in a single index of aggregate output of cereals weighted by the price relationships among grains in a typical year.8 This 8

The formula for the index is

where n designates a given year, Po designates the price weight of a crop in a typical year, and Qo the quantity of that commodity produced in the base year. Included in the index with base production values of 1720-4 =100 for each crop, are wheat, segalato, beans mixed with vetch, barley mixed with vetch, maize, millet and panicum, oats and saggina. The weights used were those for a typical year derived from the values of an eighteenth-century agronomist found in Imberciadori, Campagna toscana, Appendix IV, 'Calcoli analitici dell'autore della "Selva di Agricoltura e di dimostrazione di zienda" in appoggio alia tesi dell'opportunita di estendere i Maggesi, 1774,' pp. 320-1, Capitolo VIII, no 10: ' Parimente per i prezzi proporzionali di Marcatura si valutano Staia 3 di Grano quante 4 di Segalato, tre di Segalato quante 4 di Fave e Vecciati, tre di Fave e Vecciati quante Staia 4 di granturco, Miglio e Panico, staia tre di granturco, miglio e panico quante staia tre di Vena e di Saggina.' I assigned to veccie orzato the same value as fave e vecciati.

The weights were necessary because a simple summation of wheat and, say, millet might disguise a change in the more important of the two crops. If any particular weight is off in size, then this would affect the absolute height of the curve, but not its shape. The more serious objection concerns the possibility of a changing price relationship among these crops over the long run. We have seen that the possibility did occur in the market of Udine in the relationships of rye and millet to wheat. Even there, however, over the long run rye's price relationship to wheat returned at the end of the seventeenth century to its level in the early sixteenth century. At Altopascio it is likely that any changing relationship would have increased the value of crops like segalato and the rest relative to wheat, and if that were the case, then the index of aggregate output would have increased at a greater rate than it does here, but the general conclusions would be the same. The sources for all production data are the Libri Maestri account books of the grand-ducal possessions in ASF, RP, 6649, 6650, 6651, 6652, 6653, 6654, 6655, 6656, 6657, 6658, 6659, 6660, 4131, 4132, 4133, 4134, 4135, 6708, 6716.

90

Altopascio Semi-logarithmic 4 cycles Base period: 1720-24= 100

100 90 80 70I ^J 60 50 40

'—

I

I i

Aggregate output of cereals

i I i i i i

i i i i i i i i I i i I I i i

i i I I i

i I I

I

i I i i

300 200

100 90 80 70 60 50

'

i

l

l

Flax production

40

30 25 200

l

I I I I I I I I I I

I I I I I I

I I l l l I I i I I I I

Wine production I II I III II II II II I I II I1 1 II I IIII I II I I I I I «-SN«m^*inlniS!oNi::-ooco5aoO--(N(NenMTt-Thininio u") Cb iO ^^ tO ^J tO CD *-O
Fig. 20. Indices of the average annual production of the estate of Altopascio, 1600-1784.

particular solution serves a dual function: it allows us to measure the size of output at any given moment and to appreciate its direction over time; and when compared with the output of any single crop, the index allows us to observe relative changes in proportion and therefore changes in the composition of output. Figure 20, a graph of the production of the estate of Altopascio, charts the index of cereal output and the indices of wine and flax production. The first observation is the secular trend of increasing output over the long run. That overall increase nevertheless divides into three distinct periods. The first stage was one of rapid increase through the mid-seventeenth century. When the data resume after 1666,

The economic performance, part I

91

a second stage is in evidence: production underwent a serious disruption. Wine production fell after 1675 and remained below the level of 1670-4 for the next half century. Flax production also fell between 1666 and 1695. Cereals fell in the 1670s, leaped forward in the 1680s probably due to reduced production of wine and flax, but settled into a long trough between 1690 and 1725. In the third stage, from 1725 onward, production steadily expanded until 1745, after which a downward trend is in evidence in the last decade of the estate's existence. Production trends conform rather well with trends in prices, except that the relative fall in wheat prices was proportionately greater than the increase in supply, which suggests a reduction in consumer demand in the second half of the seventeenth century - the result of some population decline from the mid-century peak and a decline in monetary emissions.9 The composition of output also changed in the second half of the seventeenth century. After 1605 the estate stopped producing 1,665 staia of rice and converted the rice fields into wheat-producing farms. Then, in the second half of the seventeenth century there began a permanent shift away from wheat to a crop called segalato, which was a mixture of two parts rye to one part wheat and a little vetch.10 Although wheat production expanded relatively faster than rye in the first half of the seventeenth century, thereafter wheat production steadily diminished while segalato production continued to expand. As wheat production declined, minor grains like millet, saggina, and beans increased in output in the second half of the seventeenth century, until the phenomenal increase in maize production in the eighteenth century gradually absorbed a greater portion of the cultivated area. 9

10

I am referring here to the drop in international monetary emissions associated with the decline in Spanish silver, and to similar declines in Italian monetary emissions, the best studied being the classic work by Carlo Cipolla, Mouvements monetaires dans V£tat de Milan (Paris, 1952), where the ten-year summaries on p. 42 clearly demonstrate a reduction in monetary emissions between 1621 and 1700. These declining emissions affected Tuscany through international exchanges and also because of monetary outflows of Tuscan currency that continued despite repeated legislation to the contrary. Imberciadori, Campagna toscana, p. 237.

92

Altopascio

Maize made its first appearance on the estate in 1710, when it was introduced as an experiment by order of Grand Duke Cosimo III. 11 The timing is significant, because it followed the disastrous cold spell and poor harvests of 1709, which may have served as an incentive to innovate. The experiment was a success. The average harvest of maize in 1720-4 had increased by almost twelve times by 1745-9 and thirty-five fold by the end of the time series. Maize also responded favorably to an experiment in 1771 in which it was sown with medicated seed, whereas wheat seed, in the same experiment, was destroyed by the medication.12 The changing composition of output may also indicate a change in the pattern of rotations as well as in production decisions. No official statement of rotations was found in the documents. At the end of the eighteenth century, Jean Charles Simonde De Sismondi, an eye-witness on the plain of neighboring Pescia, reported that the land was overturned every third year with the vanga, shovel. There was no fallow system practiced. Instead, after a wheat crop was planted in the fall, a second crop of wheat or segalato would follow in the second year, then the same plot would be overturned with the vanga, and a legume crop like mixed beans and vetch would be planted to replenish the soil, a new wheat crop being sown in the fourth year. There is nothing universal about this rotational system, as the same eye-witness pointed out. In hilly areas, for example, he reported that many farmers used the 11

12

ASF, RP, 3103, Letter of 31 March 1710 to the Estates of Terzo, Stabbia, Castel Martini, Altopascio, Bientina, Pianora: 'Alligato alia presente riceverete un Involto di Saggina bianca, quale vi si manda d'ordine di S[ua] A[ltezza] R[eal]e per seminare in codesta fattoria, e nel pervenirvi questa vi dovra anco esser consegnata una porzione di Gran Turco, che pure d'ordine della medesima A[ltezza] Sua si deve costi seminare. Usate per tanto ogn' attenzione possibile perche segua la Sementa di dette robe in terreno a proposito, e fatele di poi ben custodire con renderci a suo tempo avvisati del frutto che ne averete ritratto per poterlo rappresentare a S.A.R.' On f.494 of the same volume, it turns out that each of the above fattorie received 6 staia of granturco for seed. The harvest of maize at Altopascio for 1710 was 56 staia (ASF, RP, 4133, Libro Maestro 1704-18). For the letter ordering the experimentation with medicated seed to increase productivity, see ASF, RP, 6752, f. 6, Letter of 28 Feb. 1771; on f. 28 of this same volume, the letter of 18 Sept. 1771 reports that 1 staio of medicated maize seed produced 117 staia of maize on the farm of Francesco Cortesi, which was located on the rich Colmate del Cerro! On f. 32, the poor outcome of the same experiment with regard to wheat seed was reported in the letter of 2 Nov. 1771.

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93

same system but overturned the soil only every fourth year.13 The rotational pattern at Altopascio then may have varied between three.and four years, depending on the farms of the cerbaia versus those of the plain. The area of land seeded by wheat and rye seems to have declined as a percentage of arable in the second half of the eighteenth century, from roughly 71% of total arable in 1740 to 56% of arable in 1783.14 The estate may have shifted from a four to a threeyear system during that time. Whether rotations changed or not, there was a redistribution of the costs of production in the second half of the eighteenth century. By expanding crops like maize and flax for which the peasants provided full seed, and by de-emphasizing those for which the landlord supplied one-half of the seed, the relative costs of planting the total crop were smaller for the landlord and his net return augmented because of the portion of the seed burden displaced on to the peasantry. To refer back to the graph of total estate production (Fig. 20), a similar displacement of costs could explain why flax and maize production continued to expand after 1745, whereas cereals and wine production had declined. The motives for that redistribution might also be found in the leasing of the entire estate to managing capitalists between 1741 and 1767, since the lessees naturally had a rational incentive to minimize the costs of production and enjoy an immediately greater return for the duration of their nine-year lease. For that same reason the lessees aggravated the terms of the * compacts' under which the peasants labored.15 Two factors account for the route taken by the lessees. First of all, their contract forbade any reorganization 13 14

15

Jean Charles Simonde De Sismondi, Tableau de I'agricolture toscane(Geneva, 1801), pp. 59 ff. Of the 817 coltre of arable in 1697, which is equal to 1,634 staiaaseme, 529-7 staia of total seed (landlord and peasants' share) or 32-42 % of arable was planted with wheat, 38-41% with segalato, bringing the total area under wheat and segalato to 70-83%. In the Descrizione of 1740 (ASF, RP, 3553), there is a listing of the number of fields (campi) devoted to each crop: 16-1 % of the total fields were planted with wheat, 46-5% with segalato, and the total of wheat and segalato was 62-6%. The 8,799 stiore of arable in 1783, when converted to coltre, equalled 2,346-4 staia of seme and the annual average of seed planted between 1780 and 1784 was 17-48% wheat, 38-11 % segalato, bringing the total area of wheat and segalato under cultivation to approximately 55-59% of arable. For more on this, see the discussion of the peasantry in Chapter 7.

94

Altopascio

of the estate. The lessees could make improvements, but the estate had to be returned in the same condition in which it had been leased.16 Secondly, minimizing costs was especially necessary because there was no way of exacting a higher return by increases in productivity. Over the long run a constant fund of technology kept the productivity of the land within bounds largely determined by weather conditions. The marked expansion of agricultural output was not mirrored by comparable changes in productivity. On the contrary, the yield of both wheat and rye over the period from 1600 to 1783 remained relatively static and bound within certain precise limits. These remarks are not intended to suggest that the yield at any given moment was equal to the yield of the rest of the period. There were marked cyclical fluctuations in yield, times when the indices soared and others when the indices dropped to famine levels. These fluctuations were of crucial significance for the lives of those working the land. The point of our analysis at this stage is to examine trends in the economic history of the estate over the long term. Once all the cyclical fluctuations are averaged out, the trend of productivity is remarkably stable. Within each of the subperiods in Table 12 there is a direction to changes in productivity: the yield per unit of seed increased between 1600 and 1647, declined between 1666 and 1679, and dropped again between 1696 and 1729, followed by a new rise from 1731 to 1749, while the average annual yield in 1768-83 fell below the level of the mid-eighteenth century. Despite these important upward and downward movements, the average yield was nevertheless remarkably stable over the two centuries in question. Even if segalato is chosen because of its higher yield during 1730-49, the data produce the same results: between 1600 and 1695 the average yield of segalato was 6-67; the average yield during the subsequent century from 1696 to 1783 was 6-79. No technological change introduced any real discontinuities in the form of rising productivity. No agricultural revolution overturned the Medici system of agriculture. 16

A copy of the contract for Altopascio in 1740 is bound with the Description of that year (ASF, RP, 3553).

The economic performance, part I

95

Table 12. Gross return of wheat and segalato for each unit of seed planted on the estate of Altopascio, 1600-1783 Yield of wheat seed

Yield of segalato seed

Period

Raw figure

Index 1600-50= 100

Raw figure

Index 1600-50= 100

1600-50 1666-94 1695-1729 1730-49 1768-83

6-55 6-75 5.73 6-85 6-92

100-0 103-1 87-5 104-6 105-7

6-58 6-54 6-03 8-08 7-02

100-0 99-4 91-6 122-8 106-7

Computed from production data cited above, n. 8.

The secular increase in output, then, could only have been accomplished by an expansion of the area under cultivation, i.e., a model of extensive as opposed to intensive development. For the most part the Medici expanded onto uncultivated or partially cultivated wood and swampland. In 1576 the estate of Altopascio was composed of only 8 farms. In 1597 a visitor sent by the Medici reported that the number of farms had now substantially increased: 'There are, and there were visited, 22 farms in the cerbaia that are very well cultivated, in part new farms, and even though they are cerbaia one sees there rather good crops, and the grapevines, fruits and mulberry trees are in good condition. . . and there are another seven farms in the plain and two more are being acquired which are partially cultivated and require more cultivation, and these are, and will be, all good farms.'17 Even though reports on the size of the estate only exist for 1697 and 1783, there are methods of approximating the area of land under cultivation. One method consists of measuring the quantity of seed furnished by the landlord, since most of these crops were seeded according to established ratios. A second method is considerably simpler: since productivity was constant over the long term, the output data alone give a measure of the increase in the area under cultivation. Tax records for 17

Dal Canto, Altopascio Medicea, Appendix VI, p. 198.

96

Altopascio

the estimo of the Commune of Montecarlo are still another index. On the basis of any or all of these methods there is no doubt about the chronology of development. Medici lands underwent a phenomenal expansion in the period between 1576 and 1650 on the order of 300%, as opposed to the modest expansion of 20% between 1697 and 1783. The timing provides insights into the forces behind this agricultural expansion and its implications for the whole of society. The difference in the rate of growth between the two centuries reflects a change in the motives behind the expansion. During the first stage the extension of land showed a remarkable sensitivity to wheat prices: the amount of land under cultivation increased as prices rose, peaked, and then stabilized. The smaller rates of profitability during the long depression of wheat prices discouraged land acquisition by diminishing the rate of return for newly cultivated land and by depressing the money income required to finance that expansion. The slower expansion of Medici land after 1650 was a function of the declining real and money income from the estate in the second half of the seventeenth century. The policy of colmate reclamations during those years was an attempt to increase output as a way of compensating for the fall in income. Both sets of circumstances produced an expansion of land, but the change in the independent variable providing the incentive to expand altered both the rates and the type of expansion. The fact that most of the acquisitions of land derived from formerly uncultivated or undercultivated land meant a progressive contribution to aggregate output for all of Tuscany; but the narrow bounds of productivity increase meant that the fortunes of the Medici were predicated upon this ability to extend their land even during the agricultural depression. Whenever a tenant or a small holder faced inelastic land boundaries or, worse still, partible fragmentation of the family holding, his fate would be quite different from that of the Medici. Instead of a steady expansion of income, the leaseholders of the estate of Altopascio constantly accumulated debt for the annual rents that went unpaid. Agents of the grand-ducal

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97

possessions themselves admitted in the eighteenth century that the size of the rent of 2 staia of rye for every coltra of land was high relative to the productivity of the land.18 These rents had been established at the end of the sixteenth century when prices were high and the lessee obtained virgin woodland to cultivate. As prices fell so did the value of the leaseholder's produce and the burden of the fixed rent increased relative to declining money income. This land was mostly cerbaia that had remained uncultivated because of its low productivity. With ample fertilizer and great physical exertion the cerbaia land could and did yield a surplus for the cultivator. Before long, however, this soil became exhausted by the repeated planting of wheat and rye without fallow periods.19 The decline in money income also decreased the possibilities of purchasing fertilizer, and the registers of the Commune of Montecarlo document a sharp fall in the number of entries of fertilizer imported after 1700.20 As a result the productivity of the land declined relative to the late sixteenth century, which made high rents all the more difficult to meet. The decline in income and in productivity relative to the fixed rent also provided the incentive for leaseholders 18

19

20

In 1581 Senator Capponi reported that it was becoming easier to obtain a good rent at Altopascio because the municipality of Montecarlo had by then leased most of its lands, thereby creating a greater demand for the lands of the estate, AC, iv, no. 20: 'Lettera di Giovanbattista Capponi al Cardinale de' Medici in Roma, 24-1V-1581.' In 1772, Giovanni Federighi, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, referred to the 'heavy rent' of two staia of rye per coltra that was paid by the leaseholders of Altopascio (ASF, RP, 3563, no. 170). The relatively high level of these rents had been known to the administration for some time, as they had been so indicated by the local rent collector Niccolo Gaetano Torelli (ASF, RP, 3767, Letters of 3 Aug. 1718 and 28 Sept. 1722). There is evidence that productivity declined in the cerbaia but was partially offset by increased yields from reclaimed lands on the plain. Spianate wine production declined in the course of the eighteenth century, while the total wine production of the estate increased due to expanded viticulture on the plain. The administrators also complained in the eighteenth century that the Spianate wine deteriorated in quality rather quickly, whereas in the past it had been valuable because it could be stored through the summer months without losing its strength. See ACM, 390-4, where the number of entries of imported pollina declined sharply after 1700 until they reached a mere trickle by the second half of the eighteenth century. N. Gaetano Torelli's letter of 28 Sept. 1722 points out another lost source of fertilizer. When the dairy farm of Altopascio was dissolved in 1642, the leaseholders lost access to the manure generated in the operation; and the colmate, by eliminating sources of pali stakes for vine cultivation, also raised the relative costs of wine production for the leaseholders, which may explain the decline of wine production on their lands (ASF, RP, 3767).

98

Altopascio

to withhold rents deliberately.21 This overall process made the indebtedness of leaseholders a familiar and important theme in the management of the estate. Leasehold contracts issued in the 1620s already refer to the debts that had accumulated among prior leases.22 Population, however, continued to grow and so did the demand for land, leaving the trends in rent unchanged. The complete accounts of leasehold rent payments have survived for the estate of Altopascio beginning in 1630. On the basis of those accounts, the total debt of all leaseholders in August 1629 amounted to 5,032-3 staia of rye, 214-5 staia of wheat, 6,371 eggs, 12 chickens and 2 pounds of wax.23 As time progressed leaseholders ceased to make payments in the chickens and eggs required by the early contracts, and the rents paid in wheat were a distinct minority. So the remarks about the trends in indebtedness are hereafter confined to the rent owed in rye, i.e., the rent paid by the majority of the hundredodd leaseholders over the time series. Table 13 presents the annual indebtedness of the average leaseholder in staia of rye, as well as the indices of the yield and the price of wheat for those same years. After 1718 a change in the account books prevents a determination of the average leaseholder's annual debt in rye. It appears probable that leasehold indebtedness may have declined between 1718 and 1740 for both economic and institutional reasons. The record of amounts paid shows relatively larger payments in the years between 1719-24 and 1735-40, rather than declining payments.24 The last years of this period are also those that witnessed a short-run increase in the yields of wheat and rye. An institutional change effected in 1717 also helped to exact greater payments from leaseholders. In that year the Medici assigned Niccolo Torelli to the specific task of collecting rent payments owed by the leaseholders. Since Torelli was remunerated at the rate of 5 % of the amount he collected, the institutional change produced a more thorough exaction 21 22 23 24

See Chapter 9. ASF, RP, 1307; 'Negozi dei Deputati,' no. 47. Calculated from entries in ASF, RP, 6674: 'Quaderno di Debitori e Creditori di Livelli della Fattoria d'Altopascio di Cerbaia dal 1630 al 1636.' ASF, RP, 6706 (1718-40).

The economic performance, part I

99

Table 13. Annual average leaseholder indebtedness, indices of the average annual price of wheat at Montecarlo and the yield of wheat per unit of seed for the estate, 1630-1778

Annual average

Base period, 1630-6= 100

indebtedness

Period

of rye)

Index

Index of average wheat price*

1630-6 1637-50 1651-9 1660-5 1666-79 1683-91 1692-1703 1704-18 1768-78

1-21 2-75 2.06 1-80 5-09 4-24 1-52 3-02 2-82

100-0 227-3 170-2 148-8 420-7 350-4 125-6 249-6 233-1

100-0 93-2 [79-8] [61-8] [64-5] 51-6 70-3 68-7 85-2

Raw (in staia

Index of average annual yield of wheat 100-0 101-9 N.A. N.A. 85-7 118-5 93-6 85-9 106-5

* Figures enclosed in brackets denote values interpolated for the missing years at Montecarlo (1656-71) using coefficients derived from price ratios in the Siena series, as explained in Table 15n. Sources for the data in this table: ASF, RP, 6674 (1630-6), 6675 (1637-50), 6676 (1651-9), 6679 (1660-5), 6682 (1666-79), 6684 (1683-91), 6685 (1692-1703), 6686 (1704-18), 6689 (1768-78); see n. 3 and n. 8 above for sources of price and production data.

of rents. By the late 1730s Torelli reported that he was having an easier time of collecting rents. 25 The data in Table 13 depicted in Figure 21 illustrate the phenomenon of leasehold indebtedness. The inevitable conclusion is that over the long run leaseholders were unable 25

For the date and terms of the appointment, see ASF, RP, 4135, f. 154. Comments on the collections were made by Torelli in ASF, RP, 3767, no. 4, Letter of 17 Aug. 1735, and no. 38, Letter of 2 Oct. 1736.

Altopascio

100

Semi-logarithmic 2 cycles Base period: 1630-36= 100 600 -

Leaseholder indebtedness

500 -

- _ -

1

400 -

-

Yield of wheat Wheat prices

1 *—1

300 -

H

200

"*

i

!

1 i

100 90 80 70

i L

1 1

L-_.J

60 50

-

40

-

30

i

- — T

i i

i

r--*•—-1

j

I j

i

!

1630- 1637- 1651- 1660-1666- 1683-1692- 1704- 176836 50 59 65 79 91 1703 17 78

Fig. 21. Indices of average annual leaseholder indebtedness, wheat prices at Montecarlo, and the yield of wheat per unit of seed for the estate of Altopascio, 1630-1778.

to meet their full rent payments regardless of the particular cycle in the economy. Despite repeated collective efforts by leaseholders, they could not achieve a general lowering of rents because the Medici administrators calculated that a universal reduction of rents would mean a loss of income to the landlord, even allowing for the unpaid rents and bad debts.26 The Deputies of the Royal Possessions tried to keep rents inflexible, but in the second half of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there were strong market pressures that forced rent downwards. During these years the contracts were issued for lower rents than in the first half of the seventeenth century in response to the problem of abandoned lands that developed in the late seventeenth and early 26

ASF, RP, 3767, no. 38.

The economic performance, part I

101

eighteenth centuries.27 As the rise in average indebtedness plainly indicates, these lands were abandoned because of a decreased ability of the leaseholders to stay afloat. Two factors in particular produced that effect: years of low return per unit of seed and the general depression of wheat prices. The link between years of food shortage and higher indebtedness hardly needs much emphasis. The 15 % decline in the annual average yield of wheat during 1666-79 and again in 1704-17 both forced the leaseholders to make reduced payments towards their rents. The leaseholds were mostly small, fragmented family farms with a narrow margin of surplus over subsistence: modest cyclical changes of productivity could produce more than proportionate changes in indebtedness by altering the size of the surplus which furnished the portion allotted for rents. Over the long run, the solvency of the leasehold class was also a function of agricultural prices. The graph of the indices of average leaseholder indebtedness, wheat prices, and wheat yields (Fig. 21) clearly depicts an inverse correlation between the price of wheat and the trend in leasehold indebtedness. Over the long run leaseholders became more indebted as the price of wheat declined. The structural relationship between leaseholder and landlord explains that tendency. The leaseholder was not an associate of the Medici but an independent unit, and it was a market relationship that linked him to the landlord. This becomes clear when the actual payments made by leaseholders are examined. Even though the land contracts fixed rent payments in kind, and mainly in rye, the leaseholders always attempted to pay their rent by substituting other types of crops or money. In 1618 the Committee of the Royal Possessions voted to restrict payments to only those rents specified in the contract; in other words, the estate manager should only accept payments in rye for rents reckoned in rye. This decision was most unpractical in this multiple-crop economy, especially since a landlord who refused any type of rent payment might go without payment altogether. So other crops and money were both accepted. 27

See the discussion of emigration in Chapter 2: Population.

102

Altopascio Table 14. Leaseholder rent payments, 1704-10 Paid in money Fiscal year

Paid in staia of rye

Paid in barrels of wine

1704-5 1705-6 1706-7 1707-8 1708-9 1709-10

385-13 821-25 313-13 973-75

103 68 110 97 237 49

—

9-13

(scudi, lire, soldi, denari)

360. 202. 332. 273. 213. 445.

6. 11. 6. 4. 1. 13. 8 5. 9. 8 -. 11. 5. 3. 4

Source: ASF, RP, 6686. A method was devised of assigning a fixed money equivalent for rents owed in kind: rye, for example, was valued at 3 lire per staio.2S The excerpt of rent payments made by leaseholders in Table 14 illustrates rather well how this policy allowed the leaseholders to trade-off between payments in rye, wine, or money. The obvious fluctuations in the type of annual rent payments reflect a very rational market behavior. Whenever the price of rye rose above 3 lire per staio, the leaseholders would market their rye and pay their rent in money. When the price of rye fell below 3 lire, the market favored payments in kind. Leaseholders might also decide to pay in kind if the crop was of a poor quality. The landlord's agents complained that under this system the grand duke lost either way, because the leaseholders made payments in grain of the very worst quality and of a lower market value, which the landlord was nevertheless forced to accept. There is even a possibility that leaseholders bartered or purchased inferior quality rye to pay their rents and benefit from the differential between poor and good quality rye in the market place. Finally, in 1779, the leaseholders had all rents owed in kind converted to money payments at a time when prices were 28

See ASF, RP, 6686 (1704-18), f. 179, where rye is valued at 'Lire tre lo staio second l'uso.' The same principle of fixed valuations applied to payments of eggs and wine.

The economic performance, part I

103

rising.29 The administrators accepted the offer to eliminate the loss from poor quality grains, and the leaseholders thereafter benefited from the rising wheat prices that decreased the relative cost of their fixed money rent. Rent payments establish the relationship to the market of the leaseholders who were, in the anthropological sense, farmers as opposed to peasants, i.e., the distinction between those who produce for a market and those who simply produce their own subsistence. Since they were linked to the market, the fall in agricultural prices contributed to leaseholder indebtedness by reducing their money income, and the relative burden of fixed payments in kind became all the more acute because the decline in the price of rye made trade-offs with payments in money all the more difficult to realize. The mounting rate of indebtedness in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in turn served to alter the shape of this rural society. During periods of high indebtedness, non-hereditary transfers of land increased sharply as new leaseholders replaced those who were evicted, fled, or died off. At first the contracts issued to the new leaseholder often obliged him to assume the debt owed by the former tenant, a policy that endured into the second half of the seventeenth century.30 Gradually, however, declining population and the diminished profitability of the leasehold reduced the demand for land. Around 1720, when population had fallen to its lowest level since the plague of 1648, the Medici suddenly confronted a situation in which there was less demand for land and a large number of abandoned leaseholds. The administrators had no choice but to accept lower rents for these deserted farms, and they justified the lower rent to the rank and file of the leaseholders on the grounds that these farms had deteriorated during their abandonment. This particular time represented the very worst point in the economic crisis. Prices were woefully de29

30

ASF, RP, 3564, no. 130. In this report by Siminetti there is an innuendo that the inferior crops paid in kind may not actually have been harvested from the lands for which the rent was paid. For one of the last examples of this provision, see ASF, RP, 6684, f. 163. This stipulation, which was common in the first half of the seventeenth century, disappeared from the contracts issued after this date, reflecting the reduced demand for land during the period of depression and emigration.

104

Altopascio

pressed, there had been a string of bad harvests in 1704, 1708, 1709, 1710, 1713, 1715, when the gross return per unit of seed fell below 5-1, and more years when the yield hovered close to that mark. Significant numbers of leaseholders were fleeing their debts. Only the notables had enough capital to take on a new holding during this generally sorry decade. The result of the economic duress of the late seventeenth century was a pattern of concentration that transferred land from indebted farmers to the notable class. At one point a grandducal administrator complained of this concentration; two or three families, he said, were getting all the land.31 He recommended that the administration adopt a more tolerant policy towards debtors as a way of maintaining population in the district by eliminating the displacement of people due to land concentration. His suggestion was rejected and the degree of concentration increased. To get some idea of the dimensions of this transfer, one need only note that between 1651 and 1659 there were 149 leaseholders who paid their rent in rye; by 1704-18 the number had fallen to 118, and by 1768-78 the number reached 104. This same period sees a consolidation of the notable class and its further differentiation from the rank and file of the leaseholders. The notables did not work the land themselves, but instead farmed it out to sharecroppers or short-term tenants who promised to pay the rent and then a certain proportion of the harvest to the conceding leaseholder. The signatures on a petition for tax reduction confirm the status of the expanding lease31

Giovanni Sansedoni, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, in commenting on a petition by leaseholders for lower rent, agreed that the rent of 2 staia per coltra was 'excessive' in relation to the yield of the land, and he attested to the 'miseria' of the petitioners, whose houses he found in terrible condition. Sansedoni therefore recommended reducing rents to 1 staio per coltra and allowing the leaseholders to pay their debts in installments of half a staio per year, with the proviso that they restore their houses in six months or lose their leasehold for past debts. He argued that if his proposal were adopted, 'si conservera una quantita di Famiglie, che altrimenti miserabili anderebbero disperdendosi. . . Ho notato, che da pochi anni tutti li livelli, li quali si commetono alia subasta restano aggiudicati a due, 6 tre Famiglie.' His recommendation was rejected (ASF, SF, 309, P. Collettive, 1748). This important episode, I feel, obliges us to assign full responsibility for the sorry condition of the Altopascians in the late eighteenth century to the Lorraine dynasty. After rejecting Sansedoni's suggestion for a solution of the problem of indebted leaseholders, the agrarian regime was no longer a legacy, but an order that was actively preserved.

The economic performance, part I

105

holders: most of those who obtained new leases between 1720 and 1740 were literate, they were not scrub farmers.32 Once the notables successfully acquired these abandoned lands, a cyclical fluctuation blessed their fortunes. Around 1730 yields began to increase (Table 12); and around the same time wheat prices began a steady upward movement. The notables who had obtained lands at low rents subsequently enjoyed a period of high returns. The interesting fact is that the units that consolidated long-term leases were not aggressive individuals but family members acting cooperatively. The leases, for example, might be issued in the name of five different brothers of the Vettori family who were associated in the same contract. The role of the family was vital for the accumulation of capital in this period. Within the village walls there was contemporaneously a process of impoverishment, indebtedness, and concentration of capital similar to that witnessed on the land. The chronology of leasehold indebtedness corresponds to the decline in urban rents that were tied to market conditions. These rents were principally those of the inn, the fisheries, and the mill, all of which were bid upon at public auctions, so the rent received accurately reflects market trends. The inn and fisheries drew declining rents in the second half of the seventeenth century until they reached particularly low levels between 1680 and 1720. Significantly the inn closed after 1720 right through 1740 because the administrators could not find a bidder that made it profitable to keep it open. When the inn was finally rented in 1740, the term was a long livello lease and not the usual three-year term that the past contracts had stipulated. The bids on the fisheries show some recovery in the second half of the eighteenth century but the absolute level of rent was still low. Assessment of rent from the mill is more difficult, because payments were reckoned in kind which naturally depreciated along with prices. Mill rents apparently managed to maintain the level of the early seventeenth century for a much longer time, probably because the expanding production of the estate provided more 32

ASF, RP, 3563, no. 114. Of the 33 petitioners, 11 could sign their name and all 11 were of families that had acquired their leases after 1700.

106

Altopascio

work for the miller. Mill rents, too, declined between 1715 and 1740, and in 1768 the mill, like the inn, was given on a long-term lease with some farm land included. As compensation for the longer term the lessee pledged to spend 800 scudi in improvements - another case where the landlord used the relatively advantageous long-term lease to deflect costs of repair and maintenance.33 Housing rents behaved somewhat differently in that they manifested greater inflexibility than commercial rents.34 The rent for house number 3, for example, started out at 3 scudi a year in 1637 and remained at that level right through the turn of the century when the rent fell to 1.1. - -(scudi, lire, soldi, denari). This behavior is especially interesting because of the lack of any short-run adjustment in rent to the reduced demand caused by the fall in population after the plague of 1648. The trend in house rents nevertheless did decline over the long run, as more houses were vacated; and the occurrence of many vacant houses became more common in the village at the end of the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. The implications of housing trends fall into three categories. The situation of vacated houses parallel to theflightof leaseholders implies a contraction in the local economy for the small shopkeepers and artisans within the village walls; by this linkage the crisis on the land likewise affected those who serviced its laborers, and the depression of the late seventeenth century extended its grip. Secondly, given the resultant fall in income of the village inhabitants, the short-run inflexibility of house rents penalized them to a greater degree, as rent now assumed a relatively larger portion of diminished receipts. The combined pressure of at least sixty years of inflexible house rents and declining market conditions produced the impoverishment that dispersed large numbers of the village population. The first signs of houses going unrented are recorded in the account book that registered rent payments between 1667 and 1680. The problem grew 33 34

ASF, RP, 6690 (1778-84). ASF, RP, 6691 (1637-41), 6692 (1642-5), 6693 (1645-50), 6694 (1651-9), 6695 (1660-6), 6696 (1666-83), 6697 (1683-92), 6698 (1692-1704), 6699 (1704-18), 6706 (1718-40), 6688 (1740-9), 6689 (1768-78), 6690 (1778-84).

The economic performance, part I

107

over the next two decades. At the end of the account books there is a reference to the inactive debts owed by former tenants, and the number of indebted former tenants jumped from 19 to 45 between 1692 and 1704. The account books also record comments about the fate of these former tenants: It is said, and affirmed, that not a single one of the heirs of the said Agostino and Giovanni di Martino can be found, all having scattered and died in a wretched state. No one of the line of the said Pellegrino can be found, all having died as miserable wretches. The said Stefano Stefani died in a wretched state, and he left no heirs other than two young girls, who are wretched and go around begging without finding anything at all.35 Of the 45 former tenants listed in 1704, 11 were specifically described as 'wretches' (miserabili) who died without leaving a trace, i.e., without heirs, except in two cases where young children survived and became beggars for their daily bread. This condition produced the final implication in housing trends, a redistribution of house leases in the first half of the eighteenth century. The concentration of houses in the village was quite dramatic. Between 1692 and 1704 very few families held a lease for more than one house: 5 families held 11 houses, 3 families held 4 extra rooms irl addition to their houses, and 20 families held one house apiece. Between 1704 and 1718 there was even less concentration of houses, probably because the immediate effects of declining population and emigration left large numbers of unrented houses: only 4 families during this period held more than one house each (9 in all). From this void a new social pattern emerged: the consolidation of houses among the * better families' of the village. In 1740, 9 families held 21 houses.36 The notables confirmed their position in the 1770s when they obtained these houses from the grand duke on a long-term lease for three lives, as opposed to the former system of paying an annual pigione. The 35 36

ASF, RP, 6699, ff. 16-19. ASF, RP, 6698, 6699, 6688. The process continued after 1740 and by 1772 9 families held 28 houses (RP, 6689)

108

Altopascio

notables obtained these favorable leases in return for a pledge to make specified capital investments in the houses in the form of improvements. No sooner had these new contracts been awarded than the administrators of the Royal Possessions heard reports of pressure by the new leaseholders upon their tenants, pressure that took the form of higher rents or eviction. The agents of the grand duke alleviated that pressure somewhat by converting the hospital, whose functions had been transferred to Pescia in 1773, into rooms that could house poor evicted tenants.37 Despite that attempt, the new housing pattern that had emerged from the crisis in the village was very evident in the tightening grip of the rural bourgeoisie. Impoverishment was the vehicle that prepared the way for the concentration of capital. 37

Giovan Domenico Poggetti, for example, was put out of the quarters he rented after the house where he had been living was awarded on long-term lease (ASF, RP, 3564, no. 42). The new leaseholders, who had obtained the contracts for several houses, put pressure on the old tenants either by charging much higher rents or by evicting them on some pretext (ibid., no. 20).

5 The economic performance, part n

Every segment of the working population of Altopascio - the leaseholders, the village artisans and laborers, and the peasant sharecroppers - was indebted and unable to meet its obligations to the landlord. Accounts exist for the years between 1759 and 1765 that allow us to quantify the debt actually formed during those years by the average debtor in each group. The average of 103 leaseholders became indebted to the landlord for 14 scudi, the average of 10 artisan/laborers for 5 scudi, while 39 peasant households formed an average debt of 82 scudi, nearly six times the indebtedness of the average small farmer.1 The mezzadri of the grand duke were the most indebted of a poor and debt-ridden society. On a purely individual basis a number of variables determined the amount of peasant indebtedness. The farms that composed the estate were not of equal size or quality. A larger and more fertile farm was naturally better suited to sustain a given peasant family than one that was small and less fertile. In line with this observation, those few peasant families of Altopascio who were not indebted at the end of the eighteenth century resided on the larger and more fertile farms carved out of land that had been reclaimed not long before.2 Size and quality were still not the only determinants because even peasants on good plots could and did become indebted. The demographic composition of the family was another factor that influenced indebtedness. The more adult, working males, the better the productive powers of the family. The 1 2

ASF, SF, 307, Incanti,' Affitto Pagni.' In calculating debt I dropped lire, soldi and denari from the total debt in order to facilitate calculations. The range of values of member farms of the estate leased in 1784 was between 1,195 and 8,457 scudi; the range of those peasant families who obtained farms

110

Altopascio

more children and elderly, the more food the family required from relatively less manpower. Families short of labor could hire outsiders, but that arrangement only added more claims upon an already meager food allowance. If someone had to be hired to substitute for an ill member of the family, the additional cost could actually overturn the equilibrium of the family economy. There were, in short, many reasons why an individual family could become indebted. When, however, that indebtedness is the generalized and persistent condition of the peasantry, as it was at Altopascio, then there is but one conclusion: the contractual relationship between lord and peasant did not furnish the family with enough to subsist without regular supplementary advances by the landlord for which the peasants were indebted. The peasant's share of the harvest generally ran out by the end of winter. The landlord then lent him grain valued at a market price for the maintenance of his family.3 The cultivator also did not derive enough from his share of the harvest to allow for his obligation to furnish one-half of the total seed; so the peasant borrowed seed from the landlord and paid interest on that loan in the form of a larger amount of seed that he was required to repay. There were also debts on lease worked farms that ranged in value between 4,559 and 8,457 scudi. Table 3 uses the values of the farms assessed in ASF, RP, 3555. Table 3

Value range of farms

Percentage of workers of the estate

0-4999 5000-7999 8000 plus

66

(in scudi)

3

26 8

Percentage of workers in each category who obtained land on lease 4 40 100

The more valuable farms were those of the Colmate del Cerro which besides being more fertile, were all around 40 coltre in size, nearly twice that of the farms formed in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. For the market valuation, which was assessed by the landlord, examine the prices for grains advanced and returned in the conti correnti of the mezzadri, as in ASF, RP, 6722, 6725.

The economic performance, part II

111

stemming from the mulberry leaves or from the annual dues owed to the landlord. The administrators of the grand-ducal lands intended of course that all these advances of food and seed be repaid at the next harvest. In fact debts were never fully repaid because the peasant's share of the crop, inadequate to begin with, could hardly yield in the following year a surplus large enough to provide subsistence for the family and to repay the grain advanced to them. So the peasants of Altopascio steadily accumulated debt over time, especially in times of shortage. At those times the peasant borrowed relatively more at prices that were pitched high because of the short supply at the end of the harvest year and in famine years. He could only repay the grain in times of abundance and then, by the law of supply and demand, the grain he repaid was worth less. The past became a living burden: not only did a peasant family reap a debt of past years, they inherited the debts of their ancestors. Peasant debt passed from one generation to the next and fell to all male heirs. Once a family had become heavily indebted there was no way out, especially because by the terms of the mezzadria alternative sources of employment were closed to the peasant as long as he worked the grand duke's lands. The terms of the agricultural contract stipulated that the peasant could not farm a plot of his own in addition to the one he worked for the grand duke. And the landlord also forbade him to keep any animals of his own on the estate as a precaution against defrauding the landlord of implements or supplies or animals used to the exclusive advantage of the peasant. The landlord reasoned that the peasant might steal manure for his own farm, or keep the best farm animals for himself. Nor could the cultivator take employment off the estate, because that endangered the landlord with peasant non-residence, smaller labor inputs, and minimal supervision of the farm due to the time allotted for outside employment.4 The net effect of these restrictions was to deprive the peasant families of Altopascio of any cushion between hard times and the family's assets. The approved outlet for repaying debts was through the labor services required by the 4

All these remarks are the conclusions formed by examining the documents of the estate, not by any theoretical treatise or polemical tract on the mezzadria.

112

Altopascio

landlord. By the wage of one lira per day's work the peasant could work off part of his debt, but it was humanly impossible to satisfy the full amount owed in addition to the labor supplied for the normal operation of the farm. The fact that indebtedness always loomed over one's head also meant that no family member would again enjoy a licit surplus as long as he worked the lands of Altopascio. There were economic forces that encouraged the peasant to remain on the estate despite the unfavorable contract. For one thing, the peasant was assured of annual subsistence even at the high human price, while an industrial depression in the cities and severe guild restrictions limited alternatives off the estate.5 At best the peasant could expect to earn his subsistence as an unskilled laborer, a transition replete with uncertainty and without real material advantage. These economic forces locked the peasants into the inertia of accepting their daily bread in exchange for steadily augmenting debts. The task before us is to examine how economic trends over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries affected the tenurial imbalance embodied in the mezzadria contract. Economic trends caused a reduction in the wages that peasants received for labor performed for the landlord above the normal operations of the farm. On the whole, in the early seventeenth century there was far less peasant debt labor available to the landlord than in the second half of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries when major waterworks projects were undertaken. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the peasants received higher wages for the relatively fewer days' labor supplied. The account of one peasant for 1637 credited him with 35 lire for having worked 5

For the generalized industrial depression, see Ruggiero Romano, 'A Florence au XVIP siecle: industries textiles et conjoncture,' Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations (1952), as well as the same author's fine article 'L'ltalia nella crisi del secolo XVII,' in Studi storici, ix (1968), now reprinted in Tra due crisi: Vltalia del Rinascimento (Torino, 1971). Though the silk industry probably compensated for a good deal of the dislocation of the woolen industry, its market requirements were very different and by the eighteenth century the silk industry too was in deep crisis. Guild organization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is one more unstudied problem in Tuscany, but Carlo Cipolla long ago pointed to the recrudescence of severe guild regulations, and every other thing I have read about Italian guilds, and guilds in general, has underscored the tendency to enforce and multiply restrictions during periods of recession and depression.

The economic performance, part II

113

'at 1 lira a day in repairing the Sibolla Canal.'6 By the end of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the peasants were getting only 16 soldi 8 denari per day to 'raise the banks of the River Ralla.'7 Whether for technical differences in assessment or not, the effective income earned from a peasant's day of work declined sometime after the midseventeenth century, probably as a function of the increased supply of labor generated by peasant indebtedness. In other words, the same economic forces that caused an increase in indebtedness also made it ultimately more difficult for peasants to repay their debts by increasing the supply and thereby reducing the remuneration of debt labor. Whereas the performance of the Medici estate of Altopascio brought a secular increase in real income to the landlord, the same period witnessed a trend of rising peasant indebtedness. The figures speak for themselves: in 1589, 15 peasants were indebted to the landlord for the sum of 312 scudi.8 Between 1772 and 1784 alone, 38 peasant families incurred a net debt of 11,123 scudi,9 a total which does not include the actual level of accumulated peasant debts which would double that figure. Peasant indebtedness had remained at low absolute levels through the early 1620s, but net peasant debts increased by over 16 times between 1624 and 1718. Table 15 presents the rate of peasant indebtedness actually formed during the periods specified. The table illustrates a number of significant points. Regardless of the period or the particular economic cycle, the peasants displayed a tendency to become indebted, a tendency that derived from the terms of their tenurial relationship with the landlord. Secondly, the table indicates that the rate of peasant indebtedness was 6 7

8 9

ASF, RP, 6701, f. 107. ASF, RP, 6729, f. 139. There was some reason in technical assessment that a peasant in 1744-5 received 1 lira per day's work 'in serving as a manual laborer at the kiln.' Even this 'manovale' category, however, had declined by the 1770s when the carpenters who worked on the houses being built for the estate were paid, as masters, 1. 16. 8 instead of 2 lire, and as 4manovali' were paid 18. 4 (soldi and denari) instead of the traditional payment of 1 lira for this category: ASF, RP, 3574, * Altopascio: Spese di Nuove Fabbriche, Opere fatte di Legnaiuolo da Me Carlo di Pacifico Rabai; 24 May 1773'; other manovali around this same time were paid 16 soldi 8 denari per day's work: ibid., 'Altopascio: Spese di Acconcimi.' AC, iv, no. 21: 'Bilancio del Libro Grande... Addi 30 di giugno 1589.' ASF, RP, 2555, 'F': 'Dimostrazione dell'Entrate e delle Spese della Reale Fattoria di Altopascio.'

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Table 15. Annual net debt of average peasant household (in scudi and hundredths of scudi), indices of price of wheat at Montecarlo and of the gross return per unit of seed for the entire estate of Altopascio, 1624-1783

Period

Annual net debt of average peasant household

Index of average wheat price, 1624-9= 100*

Index of average yield of wheat, 1625-9= 100

1624-9 1634-7 1642-4 1645-8 1651-66 1667-82 1683-91 1704-17 1718-35 1736-40 1741-9 1759-65 1772-83

4-90 1-82 1-06 19-51 2-87 6-95 1-33 11-12 2-10 10-17 1-61 11-66 26-61

100-00 80-03 82-73 116-49 N.A. [60-67] 50-18 65-00 54-32 66-36 69-55 75-53 88-45

100-00 139-27 115-99 110-16 N.A. 109-50 146-35 106-14 114-93 129-13 119-78 N.A. 115-78

* Brackets denote interpolations of missing values using price ratios from the Siena series. The active accounts of peasants were totaled from each of the following books, lire, soldi and denari were dropped from the final totals, which were then divided by the number of account years and total number of households: ASF, RP 6725 (1624-9), 6701 (1634-7), 6719 (1642-5), 6720 (1645-9), 6727 (1651-83), 6722 (1683-92), 6728 (1704-18), 6729 (1718-35), 6730 (1735-40), 6731 (1740-9); SF, 307, 'Incanti' (1759-65); RP, 2555, 'F' (1772-1783). Price and production data cited above, Chapter 4, n. 3 and n. 8. In this table the yields of wheat for the corresponding period of 1667-82 are actually based on the yields for 1667-81; those of 1736-40 actually on 1736-9. The price index for 1667-82 was interpolated by determining the ratio of prices in 1667-82 to prices in 1672-82 at Siena, and then applying that coefficient to the prices available between 1672 and 1682 at Montecarlo. The operation

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inversely related to low productivity and positively correlative to changes in price. In other words, during years of low productivity peasants borrowed more for higher prices and were able to repay less. A fall in productivity need not have been sustained in order to increase peasant indebtedness drastically: short-run fluctuations were enough to accomplish that. By 1649 the plague/famine had caused the rate of indebtedness to soar and it more than doubled total indebtedness in the course of three short years. Thirdly, the table displays a tendency for an increasing rate of indebtedness after 1667 that endured right through to 1783, a fact that suggests that the dependence of the peasants upon the landlord's advances of food and seed had increased during those same years. The formation and the accumulation of peasant indebtedness brought about a profound transformation in the relations between lord and peasant. The debt incurred by peasants in meeting their subsistence needs was a cost of production that would have been met by the employer under a system of wage payments. At Altopascio the terms of the mezzadria shifted that cost onto the peasants, who were forced to meet it out of their share of the harvest: if the share of the harvest were adequate, the peasants would have received their subsistence; if the harvest were abundant, they would have enjoyed a surplus over the costs of producing the crops; but if the peasant's share was inadequate, the costs of production had to be financed by borrowing. The fact that the peasants continually borrowed indicates that their half of Table 15 Continued

produced little change in the raw price at Montecarlo from 76-80 soldi to 74-96 soldi, and a change in the index from 62-00 to 60-67 using the same base values. In some cases fluctuations in annual yield were so dramatic as to disguise the years of shortage that promoted the formation of debt: for example, in the period 1645-8 the accelerated debt formation looks puzzling in view of the tolerable index of wheat yield; yet that tolerable index is the simple mean of the abnormally high yield of 1645 (9-91) and the terrible yields of 1647 (4-35) and 1648 (3-21); the same factors influenced the results of 1736-9, when the debt was formed primarily by the yield of 4-63 in 1735 and 5-63 in 1736, against very good returns in 1737 and 1738.

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the harvest did not suffice to compensate for the full costs of production. The bias contained in the mezzadria pushed these costs onto the peasants during times when productivity was relatively low and the costs of production were higher relative to total output; and the costs of production embodied in providing subsistence to labor were naturally higher in times of food shortage. This method of distributing costs insured the landlord of a higher return as long as the peasants could actually repay their debts. The obligation to repay those debts produced a transformation in the social and economic status of the peasants of Altopascio. Two inspectors of the Agency of the Royal Possessions visited the estate in 1626 and again in 1633. On both occasions they reported that the peasants of Altopascio were relatively comfortable because almost all of them held land beyond that which they worked for the Medici. It is true that almost all the peasants of that place own land or lease it, and some have others to work it for them, and some do not because they have a small farm; and it could be that these fellows use the oxen and the manure that belong to His Highness. I have rebuked the guards for it, and one I removed because he did not serve well, but it is necessary to tolerate some things of the peasants who serve well, all the more because they live in huts or in the swamp. And as for them having their own lands, the same happens on the estates of Pescia and Fucecchio, and I believe that it is good that they have something of their own.10 At this early stage of the estate's history the peasants were not fully differentiated as pure laborers. They worked the lands of the estate, they owned property in their own right, and they held property on long-term leases. Some of them employed labor as well as being laborers themselves. As farmer-peasants, they could also benefit from the use of the animals provided by the grand duke to work and fertilize their personal lands. The administration tolerated these 'abuses' because of the miserable housing conditions that existed on the estate. By 1668 the peasants had accumulated a formidable debt, and this condition allowed a tough Superintendent of the Royal Possessions a rather free reign. The Superintendent Ippolito Borromei inaugurated a new era of rigorous policy 10

ASF, RP, 3531, no. 90 (1626).

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towards debtors, and he proceeded in two ways. He exacted large inputs of coerced labor as a way of reducing the size of bad debts, and he required the peasants to sell their personal property in order to pay a portion at least of the debt they owed the grand duke.11 The large total debt also eliminated the earlier incentive to tolerate 'abuses', and the same Superintendent required peasants of the estate to dispose of the lands and the animals that they held in their own right in order to obviate the possibilities of fraud and neglect on the Medici farms.12 The peasants of Altopascio complied, and the sharp rises in indebtedness during 1667-83 and 1704-18 completed their transition from undifferentiated peasant-farmers to semi-proletarians. In 1783 the peasants of Altopascio were, in the grand majority, without any assets whatsoever.13 11

12 13

In August 1668 the peasants were told that they would have to pay their debts, and that the Superintendent would make them sell their lands at public auction and withhold any further loans of food until the debt was satisfied (ASF, RP, 3060, f. 105). The Superintendent rejected the peasants' proposal that the debt be repaid in annual installments (ibid., f. 128). A letter from Florence on 20 September 1668 acknowledged that the peasants were selling their lands to pay their debts (ibid., f. 145). There is an example of how far the administration went to collect these debts. By 28 June 1670 Caporale Giovanni Banti had sold most of his property and very little remained which he could use towards his debt with the estate (ibid., f. 1,227). The estate manager was ordered to sequester the harvest from all Banti's lands and even from those which he had sold, because his first obligation was to the Royal Possessions. In ASF, RP, 3061, f. 15, it turns out that Banti had sold his lands to Signore Lorenzini, who appeared before the Royal Possessions to settle the lean on the harvest of his newly acquired lands. The reverberations were still not finished. Some leasehold land in the district of Fucecchio that Banti had transferred to a relative was also discovered, and the harvest sequestered, probably along with any other saleable property that remained on the leasehold (ibid., f. 30). ASF, RP, 3072, f. 170, 11 Nov. 1684. The same restrictions applied to the ownership of farm animals (ASF, RP, 3058, f. 133). This is the conclusion reached from studying the whole body of documents dealing with the alienation of the estate in 1784 that is discussed below. The exceptions to the rule were those on the lands of the colmate, who owned larger poderi, and were probably better off to begin with, because the administration practiced a selective policy of admitting families to work the colmate. Thus Ascanio Lippi filed a report several pages in length on the new colmate of 1727 in which he discussed the qualifications of the different families and their demographic composition. It is not surprising that the three families Lippi recommended first were those of Ansano Cortesi, Jacopo Giuntoli and Antonio Matteoni, all of whom came from the biggest families (29, 16 and 27 persons, respectively) who worked the largest farms (between 42 and 43 coltre) and who could divide on to the new farms. All three families ran a profitable livestock account because their larger farms permitted them more animals, and their location contiguous to the padule provided the most ready access to the natural fodder in the swamp. Not surprising, either, is the fact that these three meritorious

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This transformation of peasant status produced corresponding changes in the peasant's relationship to the landlord and the land. In the early seventeenth century the peasants could use the yield from their own lands to supplement their portion of the mezzadria account with the landlord. Without that supplement they became fully dependent on the landlord for advances of food and cash requirements. From independent farmers with their own marketable surplus, they had descended to the ranks of semi-proletarians who were personally dependent on the landlord for basic cash requirements like tax payments or clothing purchases.14 The net effect of this transformation was to increase the rate of indebtedness to the landlord, because the costs of production could no longer be financed from the peasants' personal assets. During this second stage, however, once peasant assets had been fully depleted, the costs of production that had initially been forced onto the peasantry now fell to the landlord to meet. Certainly, peasant indebtedness formed gigantic paper assets, and the labor derived from peasant indebtedness was useful and productive, but once peasants could no longer repay the greater portion of their debts, the costs of production were now met exclusively out of the income of the landlord that was forgone in the advance of food to the peasants. In the eighteenth century, then, the higher rate of indebtedness consumed a greater portion of net income. The landlord's agents responded by showing more intransigence over advances of food, and by dismissing peasants who had accumulated large debts. Even these retaliations were unable to turn back the tide of increasing peasant debt. The consequence was a great deal of discussion of the condition of the peasantry among members of the landlord class, and in this reaction lies the economic background to the political reforms under Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo. One element in the discussion of the peasant condition was 14

families were all creditors in their current account with the landlord. By similar logic, the peasants considered eligible for land in 1784 were generally those who had worked the largest and best farms. Apparently, by the end of the eighteenth century, this condition was generalized on the estates of Tuscany, judging from the 'Calcoli analitici' of the agronomist who wrote in 1774:' Per alimonia e Vestito d'un solo colono... Scudi dodici a testa,' in calculating the costs of an azienda (Imberciadori, Campagna toscana, Appendix iv, pp. 320-1, Capitolo vm, no. 1).

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the question of incentives. T h e Medici administrators realized quite correctly that peasant indebtedness encouraged peasant laxity in the operations of the farm. Naturally, peasants who owed huge debts were less inclined to exert themselves when all the surplus would be taken as payment towards debt, especially since the landlord would in any event be forced to advance food in order to have the farm worked. The psychological depression caused by the relentless weight of indebtedness can be felt in the collective reaction to the news that the debt for the fiscal year 1772-3 had been pardoned. T h e report came from Benedetto Sconditi, the Superintendent General of the Estate of Altopascio, in a letter of 29 September 1773 to the central administration in Florence. Sconditi began by acknowledging receipt of the list of the debts of each peasant that had been remitted by the grand duke for that year. On this topic I must report how on the 27th of this month I ordered the convening of all the heads of peasant families on this estate who had obtained a gracious pardon for all the debts incurred over the last year. The sum total is given in the enclosed note. After a long speech in which I made them understand their responsibilities to the landlord, who has favored them by the cancellation of last year's debts, I went on to enjoin them to take good care of the farm, the animals, and anything else entrusted to them. The said workers were stunned by the news of this act of generosity, and some of them cried from happiness, others thanked Our Lord, and others shouted jubilantly 'Long live the Royal Landlord.' That evening they made large fires and said a Holy Rosary in thanks, asking that Our Lord and the Madonna shower blessings upon the Royal Infant and upon the author of this signal favor. Finally each of them took out some pennies and during this week they want to display the Holy Sacrament in this church and have as many masses said as they can, to demonstrate their devotion and entreat the Lord to grant prosperity to our Royal Landlord, to all the Royal Family, and to anyone who played a part in the decision to grant them this gift. This is what I can report on the subject. And as a result of this pardon, I will not fail to post the respective sums to their current accounts.15 Jubilation, gratitude and tears, this was the reaction to the partial alleviation of such a heavy burden. In 1779 Grand 15

ASF, RP, 3566, no. 92.

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Duke Pietro Leopoldo, sensitive to the peasants' condition, actually ordered that the entire peasant debt be remitted. Generosity, unfortunately, was no cure for the real problems contained in the agrarian regime. Only four years after the remission of their total debt, the peasants of Altopascio had built up another new debt of over 4,350 scudi. The mounting rate of peasant indebtedness brought the administrators' attention to the proportion of net income consumed by bad debts. From 1773 to 1783, net peasant debts consumed no less than 17-5% of net income. The loss of income during those years created all the more concern because another 18% of net income had been claimed by improvements on the estate: Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo had spent 10,411 scudi beyond normal expenses in order to correct deplorable housing conditions on the estate and to execute reclamation projects that had long been requested by former administrators but had never been undertaken.16 All these factors pointed to an important contradiction within the estate system. In point of fact the landlord could not improve the welfare of his workers without suffering a sizeable loss of income. Even if the costs of housing and reclamation projects were repaid by the increased return from the land, there was the enduring disorder of a system in which peasant indebtedness escalated regardless of the intentions of individual grand dukes. Low yields in 1779 and 1782 were responsible for most of the new peasant debt, but its reappearance immediately after the remission of debts was compelling evidence that the agrarian regime was not working properly. Of course there were different interpretations of the cause of the malfunction. One interpretation that was sustained by the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, Luigi Bartolini, assigned exclusive responsibility for the failure of the system to the peasants. In a letter of 15 June 1783 to the estate manager of Altopascio, Bartolini imputed the cause of the new peasant debt after 1779 to the adverse effect of the grand duke's generosity. 16

ASF, RP, 2 5 5 5 , ' F ' .

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What gave me the greatest surprise of all was the enormous debt which the workers of this Royal Estate of Altopascio have incurred during the past year due to the most generous and apparently lavish provisions which you have granted them this year. In the face of such a recent remission of debt, ordered by the magnanimous heart of His Royal Highness, it is incredible that the matter should again arise of the subjects' indiscretions in the face of Sovereign Benevolence. But perhaps the benevolence has furnished an illegitimate incentive to commit indiscretions, and has caused an unforeseen evil to which it is my duty to apply every opportune remedy, and one which would be similar in efficaciousness to that which I am proud to have used against the ill will of the leaseholders, and perhaps also against your ill-considered and excessive condescension in not compelling them with the necessary efficaciousness to meet their obligations. Without further speculation about the outcome, it is necessary that I think about a just remedy that protects the interests of our employer, so that we do our full duty; and while I am deciding, I must regretfully remind you that as far as your duty is concerned, you must be careful at the next harvest not to abandon these workers to their own inclinations, but to plan to collect produce from them towards payment of their debt, as well as to consider, with regard to you yourself, how proper it would be to revive the income of this estate, and to return sums that show clearly that the possession of these lands is advantageous to their owner, rather than an article of insignificance or of loss, which the result of last year's administration comes close to being.17 Bartolini's interpretation of the large debt created in 1782-3 makes no reference whatsoever to the poor harvest of 1782. This interpretation instead focused upon the * lavish' advances of food to peasants who had been spoiled by the generosity of the grand duke. T h e cause of peasant indebtedness was the * ill will' that animated them. Within this grand-ducal administration a second interpretation of the condition of the peasantry coexisted with that of Bartolini. This interpretation assigned the failure of the grand-ducal lands to the system of labor itself. T h e most famous proponent of this opinion was the statesman Francesco Maria Gianni who served as the principal adviser to 17

ASF, RP, 3178, no. 1168, Letter of 15 June 1783 to Agostino Carraresi.

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Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo at this same time.18 It was Gianni who was probably responsible for the specific paragraph that blamed the 'agricultural contract,' that is, the mezzadria, for the sorry condition of the peasants of the grand-ducal estates: 'The system of agricultural contracts in Tuscany has made the peasants a class of pure laborers who serve to realize a profit for someone else's capital, and receive annual subsistence as their pay, so that they cannot feel the passion of their self-interest except on that low, narrow, and feeble plane that restricts their aspirations to the attainment of their daily bread.'19 This interpretation focused upon the issue of incentives, and it attributed the lack of peasant incentive to a system that divorced him from the fruits of his labor. The statement of Gianni formed part of the announcement of a reform intended to end the servile dependence of the peasantry by offering the lands of the grand duke for sale or lease to small holders; the reformers hoped to favor the actual peasants who worked the land over all other bidders. The estate of Altopascio was among those included in this plan. In 1783 bids were taken both for the individual farms of the estate, which were offered on perpetual lease, and for the sale of farm buildings no longer required by the defunct system of direct estate management. The reorganization of the estate even obtained the support of those of Bartolini's persuasion, because the new organization obviated the irritating consumption of royal income through peasant indebtedness. On the matter of the alienation of the estate, then, proponents of both interpretations could agree. The problem was that Bartolini executed the reform according to his own bias. This fact explains how the estate came to be apportioned among many different small holders, while at the same time the peasants of Altopascio were deprived of the lands that the reformers had hoped to give them. 18 19

An excellent biography of Gianni exists in the work of Furio Diaz, Francesco Maria Gianni dalla burocrazia alia politica sotto Pietro Leopoldo di Toscana (Milan, 1966). ASF, CR, 345: 'Filza di Motupropri e Ordini,' no. 3, 'Memoria istruttiva.' This document was issued in 1784, the year that the alienation of Altopascio had been completed, and it provided instructions for future alienations. An interesting problem is the degree to which the experience of the operation and alienation of the estate of Altopascio specifically influenced the remarks in the general instructions of 1784.

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Since Bartolini had been preoccupied with the loss of grand-ducal income resulting from peasant indebtedness, he tried to avoid any financial loss to the state in carrying out the reform. In his final report Bartolini boasted that the transition of the estate of Altopascio from direct farming to many small leaseholds produced more annual revenue for the state, rather than less.20 Any reform that was so rigidly controlled by financial considerations had to focus upon 'good risk' candidates. The peasants of Altopascio, for the most part indebted and without assets, could hardly qualify for land awarded on terms that required one year's annual rent in advance as surety, payments for the cattle on the farm at the time of the alienation, and sufficient operating capital to convince the deputies that the tenant would not default in his rent payments. Financial qualifications for the new leases automatically excluded the majority of the peasants by dictating narrow terms of eligibility. Bartolini's personal interpretation of the failures of the estate system also worked against the interests of the peasantry. Although his instructions advised him to favor the peasants who actually worked the estate, Bartolini excluded them because they lacked capital and because, to his mind, peasant indebtedness derived not from an unfavorable tenurial balance but instead from negligence, laziness, and unwillingness to sustain the burdens of an industrious farmer. Of the 38 peasant families who worked the lands of Altopascio, only 7 were awarded the lands of the estate on lease.21 Investigation into the background of these 7 families reveals that generally they held the largest and the best farms on recently reclaimed lands with high yields per unit of seed. These 7 families were, as a result, not indebted to the grand duke, and some even held assets outside the estate. These peasants whom Bartolini considered qualified for the land were exceptional among the workers of Altopascio. Bartolini, himself, was conscious of having deviated from his original instructions: 20 21

ASF, RP, 2555, Final Report of Luigi Bartolini, 31 Dec. 1783. Ibid.

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In this humble report of mine, I have with as much daring proposed and begged your Royal Highness not to make leaseholders of the bad peasants of the estate of Altopascio, but to favor only the good ones among them, who have, in my opinion, been accurately determined by me.22 Bartolini's criterion for distinguishing the 'bad' from the 'good' peasants is a measure of his deep prejudices that penalized the peasantry. In terms of labor performance, it is unlikely that 80 % of the peasants could be considered 'bad'. The only complete evaluation of the peasants' performance dates from 1767. An outside estate manager brought in to investigate the question determined that 24 out of 37 peasant families maintained their farms reasonably or well; the remaining 13 maintained their farms not too well or very badly.23 Instead of finding roughly 65 % of the peasants adequate, Bartolini found that 80% of the peasants of Altopascio were 'bad.' But the criterion he used was peasant indebtedness - the condition of almost all peasants. Bartolini gives no sign of recognizing that the landlord's policy towards these peasants over the last two centuries had prevented them from holding the assets which he demanded as qualification for the new leases. It never occurred to him that the grand-ducal estate system had fostered indebtedness. With vicious circularity, Bartolini blamed the peasants for the pauperism produced by years of working the lands of the grand duke; he implemented the reform for his own purposes without appreciating that the peasants' condition was the product of the mezzadria. Bartolini chose instead to favor the independent yeoman farmers, 11 of whom obtained lands on lease. The remaining 20 farms he awarded to small property owners of the Valdinievole. By 'small property owners' he meant that the patrician landholding class was not permitted to obtain any land. But these 'small' property owners were all men of comfortable means, the notables of the district. Take, for example, 22 23

Ibid. Calculations are mine, based upon the findings of the fattore who rated them qualitatively in ASF, RP, 3553: 'Relazione del 1767 della Fattoria d'Altopascio di S.A.R.'

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Valentino and Pellegrino Fantozzi who obtained two farms on lease. The Vicario of Pescia reported to the Superintendent Bartolini that Valentino was a priest and Pellegrino possessed several farms valued at 10,000 scudi, that Pellegrino also worked as an estate manager for the Count Bardi, and that he was regarded as a man of substance. Bartolini added in his comments that * the selection of Fantozzi is also desired by the peasant currently working the land,' another valid motive for accepting Fantozzi's offer.24 The land, in other words, was awarded for the most part to men of property. A good many of these property owners, and perhaps some of the independent farmers, would not even work the land themselves, but would farm it out probably on mezzadria. The reform left the structure of society untouched. The lands of Altopascio, although granted on perpetual lease, were still the property of the grand duke; and the annual rent would always consume a sizeable portion of the farm surplus. Economically the old units of the estate remained intact: there was no modernization in the distribution of land and crops. The farms may even have become less profitable as they shrank under partible division over subsequent years. The alienation of the estate did not even completely reform the system of working the land, because many of those who obtained the land farmed it out again. For a few select peasant families, there was a transformation from mezzadro to leaseholder status. For the majority of the workers of Altopascio, the gap between them and the notables widened as the propertied gained access to more property and the propertyless remained without. On this note the story of the estate must end, because the reorganization of 1784 changed the relationship between landlord and tenant, and with that changed relationship the rich documents of grand-ducal administration ceased to exist. The conclusion of this long episode of direct estate management has a bearing upon our understanding of the agrarian system and of those who labored within it. This rural society 24

For the number of awards to small property owners, see the final report of Luigi Bartolini, ASF, RP, 2555, 31 Dec. 1783.

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underwent an economic crisis during which the estate members confronted the drama of economic ruin. The crisis took the form of declining prices, income and wages, and its severity was reinforced by cyclical falls in the yield of wheat in the 1670s and again between 1695 and 1729 when the yield of wheat fell to an average that was nearly 13 % lower than the average for 1600-50. A loose chronology of the crisis would situate it from around 1650 to around 1730. But the rhythm was not continuous between those terminal points. The worst phase occurred in the period from 1695 to 1725; surely this was the worst of times. The actual effects of the crisis, however, vary according to the agents involved. The crisis led to a decisive deterioration in the status of the peasants as producers and to their transformation from independent peasant farmers to semi-proletarians. Consequently it aggravated a structurally inadequate tenurial balance which shifted high costs of production onto the cultivators during times of low productivity and food shortage. The continued deterioration of the peasants' status was facilitated by the legal system, which enforced hereditary indebtedness. Once the peasantry had been stripped of the surplus it enjoyed from its independent holdings, there ceased to be any partnership of fortunes between landlord and sharecropper. In fact since the peasants had been reduced to subsistence producers, all price increases in the course of the eighteenth century accrued to the exclusive benefit of the landlord, while the same prices actually penalized the peasantry because they increased the valuation of the food they borrowed and therefore the size of their debt to the landlord. Among the leaseholders of this society the crisis produced a similar process of impoverishment, but the timing and the specific conditions that produced that deterioration were different from those variables which affected the peasantry. A depressed market aggravated the rate of indebtedness among leaseholders, whereas for the peasants the principal factor was the precise mark on the yield index. Certainly very low yields also hurt the leaseholders, as low prices affected the peasants in the early stages of the estate's history when

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they still had a surplus to market. And over the long run, both classes became indebted. The principal independent variable was nevertheless different in each case, and this affected the timing of the effects of the crisis. It is significant, for example, that the leaseholders experienced a high rate of indebtedness in the 1680s, whereas this period of low prices marked a pause in the escalation of peasant indebtedness. The different timing of their respective reactions derived from their different structural relationship to the economy at large. And that same structural relationship allowed some relative recovery for leaseholders after 1730, and no improvement in status for the sharecroppers of the estate. For the landlord, in turn, the outcome of the story was different. The crisis meant for him a break in the trend, an interruption of a long period of expansion that produced some decline in real and money income between 1650 and 1730. After that date, however, the crisis ended for the landlord, and the interrupted process renewed itself as the initial trend reappeared. The crisis was an important interlude during which this particular landholder showed himself to be no idle, feeble aristocrat, but the master of a team of shrewd, imaginative, and ingenious administrators who never relaxed their efforts to maximize profits. The landlord's agents became preoccupied by a legacy of the crisis: increased rates of peasant indebtedness that gradually consumed a larger portion of net income. The final reorganization of the estate in 1784 eliminated that particular problem for the grand-ducal administration because the lands were no longer farmed directly for the grand duke. Between the giant landowner, who prospered over the long run and was remarkably resilient in times of duress, between him and the wretched lower class of peasants and day workers, a rural bourgeoisie timidly raised its head. Amidst this process of impoverishment in a time of acute stress, the notables consolidated their position, and this critical change made eighteenth-century Altopascio a very different place. Our final task is to speculate on the relationship between these distinct but related changes and that elusive entity - the general good. The employment of Medici capital in direct

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farming for a profit has many features that resemble capitalist development, and specifically the formation of semiproletarians yoked by ties of economic dependence to the landlord. On the other hand the Medici never altered the system of production that relied upon independent farm units. The formation of semi-proletarians took place, then, without any corresponding increase in the productivity of labor. In fact the mezzadria had reduced labor costs to a degree that discouraged a shift to the hiring of labor on the open market. The inertia of the estate was caused by its system of scattered, family units which, while requiring less financial capital than wage labor, at the same time prevented increases in productivity through job specialization. Any transition along those lines was also replete with uncertainty. The crisis of the seventeenth century produced a stronger differentiation within the group of leaseholders into those who labored for others, those who farmed for themselves, and those who employed others. The crisis also created a climate favorable to the concentration of capital in the hands of the rural notables, who developed only on the fringe of the huge patrician holding. Nor is it clear that these notables employed their capital in any organization of labor that was substantially different from that of the Medici. The qualitative shift in the distribution of capital was not of the quantitative magnitude to produce a wholesale transformation of society. The grand dukes of Tuscany remained at the helm. The persistence of grand-ducal control had implications for the long-term condition of society as a whole. The grand dukes and their agents directed agricultural planning and the pace of agrarian development in the community; the economic decisions of the community were centralized in the administrators of the estate and not dispersed among the many peasant households that actually performed the work. Control over peasant households also furnished the administrators with the means to coerce individuals to labor on the reclamation projects designed by the Department of the Royal Possessions. One of the results, we have seen, was an expansion of the area under cultivation and an increase in agricultural production. The institutionalized duress of peasant indebtedness generated through the mezzadria con-

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129

tract functioned as a powerful lever that the landlord applied to compel peasants to invest their labor as directed by the estate manager in order to satisfy their financial obligations to the estate. The model of agricultural change was, therefore, one of increased aggregate output within a productive system that concentrated benefits in the hands of the landlord, while the impoverishment of the peasant producers restricted direct peasant investment in agriculture as well as the effective demand for manufactures among the families of rural cultivators. The agrarian regime deprived urban markets of the consumers needed to stimulate a more generalized economic * take-off.' Trends in the countryside, as they are represented at Altopascio, reinforced the industrial failure of the woolen and silk industries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively. The regime on the land internalized and aggravated the failure of demand resulting from the changes in external markets.25 In other words the same features that retarded the degree of capitalist development in the countryside may have simultaneously halted the growth of capitalism in the entire economy. The * fallacy of composition' means that 'in the field of economics, it turns out that what seems to be true for individuals is not always true for society as a whole.'26 Applying this principle to the foregoing analysis, what was good for the grand-ducal landlord may conceivably have retarded the agricultural and industrial development of the economy as a whole. 25

26

There were short and long-run forces behind the failure of foreign markets. The former include dislocations in Northern and Central Europe during the Thirty Years' War, and with a remarkable coincidence of timing, the decline of Spain and the decline of the Ottoman Empire coincided with the economic decline of Italy, cf. Aspetti e cause della decadenza economica veneziana nel secolo XVII (Venice, 1961). Long-run factors include the reorganizations in the economies of Northern Europe that made them competitive with the Italian economy, while a reduction in home demand for manufactures further crippled early Italian industrialization and partially accounts for the failed transition to early economic modernization (Carlo Cipolla, 'The Economic Decline of Italy: The Case of a Fully Matured Economy,' in Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy during the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries, ed. Brian Pullan (London, 1968)). In this context, the social transformations of the members of the estate of Altopascio are a concrete demonstration of the reduction in the home market for manufactures in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or a case study in demand contraction. Paul A. Samuelson, Economics: An Introductory Analysis (New York, 1967), p. 13.

6 Familial organization

In rural Altopascio, an individual's economic and social status, if not his specific occupation, devolved primarily from that of his family. This is not the * family' of family reconstitution, which concentrates upon the vital events and the size of the conjugal unit. The economic and social significance of the familial organization extends beyond the conjugal unit to embrace the network of ties binding those within the household. These pages are concerned with the household and the relations among its members. The household structure of this community supports conclusions already derived for the neighboring Pisan countryside in the fifteenth century, namely the survival of significant numbers of extended and multiple family households.1 Between 1684 and 1767 over one-third of the families of Altopascio and almost one-half of the entire population lived with members outside the nuclear family. Even within this small village, however, economic and professional differentials created diverse realities for varied social groups. To illustrate the income factor, let us first consider family size in relation to the six-fold division of the macinato tax of 16792 which enables us to stratify families according to their assets, the most affluent falling in the first category. The poorest families were smaller than those in the top half of the tax group, but the more prosperous families were substantially smaller than the large households in the fourth 1

2

Christine Klapish and Michel Demonet, ' " A uno pane e uno vino", la famille rurale toscane au debut du XV e siecle,' Annales: Economies, Societes, Civilisations,

Numero Special: Famille et Societe (1972), pp. 873-901. ACM, 420.

130

Familial organization

131

Table 16. Average family size of the six macinato classes: 1679 First (n = 6) Second (n = 1) Third (n = 11)

5-2 4-0 5-1 Total (n= 121)

Fourth (n = 19) Fifth (n = 59) Sixth (n = 25) 5-1

8-3 4-7 3-6

category. At this point professional and occupational differentials add another dimension. T h e Stato d'anime of 1684 3 reveals that the landless day laborers and hired hands together averaged a family size of 3-4, whereas the mezzadri sharecroppers who worked the lands of the grand duke lived, on average, in families of 9-3 members. T h e landless had the smallest families, and the peasants who worked the lands of the grand duke stand out as having larger families, as they did in the fourth class of the macinato. But these data from the stato d'anime add still another differential - the land itself on which the peasant families resided. Those who worked the lands of the grand duke lived in conspicuously large families, while their counterparts who worked the livelli of others lived in more nuclear families. T h e farms of the grand duke were much larger than the average livello, which shrank under the impulse of partible division. Certainly, even within the same professional groups, an investigation of the household structure illustrates a spectrum of families ranging from solitary individuals to combinations of two and three conjugal units. Table 17 provides the percentages of family types according to professions in the parish of Altopascio. 4 A significant distinction belongs to the mezzadri 3 4

APA, Stato d'anime, 1684. APA, Stato d'anime, 1767. Note that the parish of San Jacopo of Altopascio was, albeit the primary parish, nevertheless only one of several parishes in whose jurisdiction the lands of the estate fell, and data designated as being 'of the parish' are distinct from those of 'the entire estate.' I have followed throughout the methods and terminology of Peter Laslett ('Introduction: The History of the Family,' in Household and Family in Past Time, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 1-89), including his definition of the multiple-family household which differs in one instance from that of Professor Louis Henry, p. 33, n. 48.

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Altopascio

Table 17. Typology of families by profession: 1767 ( n = 115 (excluding parish priest)) Mezzadri or

Artisans/ otherwise Mezzadri of Livellari who sublet shop- work livelli Daygrand duke farmers and fattore keepers of others laborers Family type (n=12) (n = 41) (n = 6) (n=22) (n=19) (n=15) Livellari

Solitaries Co-residents (unmarried) Simple nuclear Extended Multiple Total

0 0

25-0 16-7 58-3 100-0

4-9 9-8

46-3 24-4 14-6 100-0

0

17-4

16-7

0

50-0 33-3

52-2 21-7

0

100-0

8-7

100-0

0 5-5

61-1 16-7 16-7 100-0

0 0

80-0 20-0 0

100-0

of the grand duke, the majority of whom lived in households of two and three conjugal families and only a minority of whom lived in nuclear family arrangements. And we know that the mean household size of these grand-ducal mezzadri resident within the parish of Altopascio actually underrepresents the average household size of all the grand-ducal mezzadri of the entire estate (Table 18). Among families in other professions property also seems to have been an important factor. The livellari and the artisan/shopkeeper class could sustain higher percentages of solitary individuals and unmarried co-residents, and relatively more extended combinations; the mobile landless group who worked the livelli of others and the day laborers tended to favor nuclear family combinations. Given the existence of these extended and multiple family households, a key question concerns the timing and the evolution of the development. Table 19 summarizes the results of the inquiry made at four junctures.5 The head count 5

APA, Stati d'anime, 1684, 1741, 1767, and the head count of 1618 in ASF, RP, 2991, no. 63. All statistical references to family and population for those years are based on these sources. Note that the census of 1618 differs from the stati d'anime in that it does not specify the exact blood relationship among members of the household, as the stati d'anime do. The 1618 census lists the head of the household, and then beneath him the number of males and females and their

Familial organization

133

Table 18. Household size of grand-ducal mezzadri, 1767* Parish of Altopascio

members

Number

1-4 5-8

1 6 3 1 1

9-12 13-16 17-20

Total Mean household size

Percentage 8-3

50-0 25-0 8-3 8-3

99-9

12 9 •3

Entire estate Number

Percentage

2

5-3

8 15 9 4 38

21-1 39-5 23-7 10-5 100-1 11- 3

* APA, Stato d'anime, 1767; ASF, RP, 3553. for 1618, however, is different from the other three because it refers to the population within the walls of the castello. Consequently the comparison with total population estimates for the other years is not perfect. To compensate for the differences, a further comparison between the castello population of 1618 and 1767 can be made, but once again the comparison is not perfect because of the different settlement pattern between those two points in time. In 1618 the grand majority of the inhabitants of the castello were livellari who worked lands outside the village walls. By 1767, primarily artisans, shopkeepers, and solitary individuals lived within the village walls, along with the administrators of the estate and the rural gentlemen. In other words, the comparison of castello population is weaker because of the transformations of the professional structure of the society. Both comparisons, as would a third comparing livellari alone, nonetheless point to the same development. Over the long run the families who lived in Altopascio passed from a settlement dominated by ages. On the basis of this information, the family type was presumed, with the assumption that the children listed under the adult male and female were indeed the offspring of the couple and not outsiders.

Altopascio

134

Table 19. Household structure of the village of Altopascio, 1618-1767: percentage of total households for that year Type of household Solitaries Unmarried residents Simple conjugal families Extended families Multiple families Type 1, 2, 3 Type 4, 5

1684 1741 1767 Classifi- 1618 cation (n=37) (n= 105) (n= 122) (n= 116) 2

2-7 2-7

2-9 2-9

11-5 6-6

6-0 5-2

3

78-4

58-1

49-2

52-6

4 5

13-5 2-7 83-8 16-2

20-9 15-2 63-9 36-1

17-2 15-6 67-3 32-8

20-7 15-5 63-8 36-2

1

Household structures, castello 1618 1741 1767 Type (n=37) (n=26) (n=26) 1

2 3 4 5

1,2,3 4, 5

2-7 2-7 78-4 13-5 2-7 83-8 16-2

26-9 7-7 42-3 15-4 7-7 76-9 23-1

19-2 3-9

53-9 11-5 11-5 77-0 23-0

nuclear families to a society with proportionately fewer nuclear families, more households without conjugal families, and more extended and multiple households. The predominantly nuclear combinations of 1618 undoubtedly stem from the particular phase in the development of the region. The people of 1618 were young, on average 19 years of age, recent immigrants to new land that had shortly before been made available to people crowded by the population growth of the sixteenth century. The transformation of the household structure reflects the passage of the settlement from youthful colonization to mature operation and, along with that de-

Familial organization

135

velopment, the disappearance of available land. This evolution contradicts the theory of the progressive nuclearization of the family.6 Equally noteworthy is the relativity of family size and household organization within the same community. The overall development implies that the family underwent significant sociological adjustments to specific phases in the evolution of the village. Undoubtedly this transformation left its mark upon the transmission of authority and interfamilial relations within larger and more extended families. Unfortunately our data on these matters date from 1667, when the direct management of the estate returned to the deputies of the grand duke after an interval under the management of Cardinal Carlo de' Medici. From that date there is a complete record of the letters from the deputies of the grand duke in Florence to the agents in Altopascio. Thus the following remarks apply to the period after the initial settlement of the frontier had been completed. The patriarchal organization of the household was embodied in the 'capo di casa,' a social and legal designation of the official head of the household. The 'capo di casa' was almost always male, women acceding to the position only as widows with young children or as unattached isolees. The actual blood relationship of the head to its members varied according to the type and the domestic cycle of the family in question. In an extended or multiple family household, for example, a new family formed by the father might in the next generation pass to an organization around one or more married brothers, or in the next generation around an uncle. At any moment this society contained families at different points in their domestic cycle, but the concept of' capo di casa' still applied. The age breakdown of the heads of households in the year 1767 indicates that persons arrived at the position of 'capo di casa' rather late in life - most commonly between the ages of 38 and 52. Little over a quarter of them became heads of household before age 38, and another third ruled their 6

For a summary and criticism of this theory, see David Herlihy, 'Family Solidarity

in Medieval Italian History,' in Economy, Society and Government in Medieval Italy. Essays in Memory of Robert L. Reynolds, ed. David Herlihy, Robert S. Lopez and

Vsevolod Slessarev (Kent, 1969), pp. 173-84.

136

Altopascio

families at the respectable age of 58 and above. In 1618, however, over three-quarters of the heads of households were under age 42. The families in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries not only lived in less nuclear combinations; their members were governed by considerably older men. The individual was born and died a member of the household, that is, a member of dependent status. Unlike the modern system where persons arrive at independent status through age, in this rural society in the past one always remained dependent unless by a legal act one 'separated' himself from the family and formed, along with his share of the family assets, a separate entity. The only other alternative to auto-determination was, of course, to succeed to the position of the head of the household, a position not available to most of the people involved. Socially, then, anyone who was not an independent head of a household was a dependent figlio di famiglia, child of the family. This dependent status extended into the economic world because the dependent member could not, unless an exception was pointedly made, contract for land or bind himself to any other form of contractual relationship. The case of Giuseppe di Domenico Lenzi serves as a useful illustration. In January 1773, he bid at a public auction for a lease on a piece of land. The grand duke's agents refused to enter into this contract with Lenzi unless he provided a mallevadore, or co-signer, who would be bound along with Giuseppe. Here are the words of the Deputy of the Royal Possessions: 'For another thing, I must warn you that I shall not be able to execute the agreement with him [Lenzi] as long as he is not emancipated, that is, freed from his father's authority, because contracts made with dependent sons have no binding power.'7 Interestingly enough, at the time this contract was refused, Giuseppe Lenzi was 36 years old and still celibate. He was the third boy in the family, and the last born of seven children. His two older brothers were both dead at this time: Jacopo, the oldest, had been married; Lorenzo had been a cleric. Giuseppe was described as the community 7

ASF, RP, 6753, f. 3.

Familial organization

137

physician of Montecarlo by the parish priest who recorded the death of Giuseppe's father on 1 October 1775. Neither the Stato d'anime of 1767 nor that of 1774 shows him to be resident in Altopascio. By 1780 he was back in the family house, under the same roof as his mother and his four nieces and nephews, one of whom was married. At the time, then, that Giuseppe was denied a lease for land as a legal dependent he was living outside the family house and practicing a profession. He was nevertheless dependent in the legal sense because he had not emancipated himself legally. When we recall that his father was described in the Stato d'anime of 1767 as a 'signore' who lived from his incomes, this behavior again becomes meaningful. The family's wealth was bound up in lands, and legal separation would have been economically disadvantageous for Giuseppe. Not only were assets in leased land difficult to divide; by his father's death Giuseppe's position within the family was stronger, which probably dictated his return to the family home. There only remained his nephews with whom to contend, a contention that was frequent among the livellari class of this society. The fact, however, that Giuseppe had not emancipated himself probably also spared the family considerable turmoil. Some of the most bitter conflicts among these rural families stemmed directly from the problem of division and emancipation. These disputes were bitter because beyond the sentimental and physical association of the family under the same household, these families were generally united in a single economic enterprise. Many were the economic ties that bound the family together. The inheritance pattern automatically joined those who owned or had regular tenurial access to land because all male heirs acceded to their portion of the estate, there being no primogeniture. The sons of Giovanni, say, were linked in the same enterprise by birth, even though other elements would determine thereafter whether the heirs remained united. A combination of factors promoted the family enterprise, especially the relative shortage of land and capital and the correspondingly greater emphasis on the labor input. As the development of the region progressed and land grew

138

Altopascio

relatively less available, subsequent generations were more impelled to remain together because of the lack of alternative possibilities on the land. The generalized industrial slump of this era, combined with de-urbanization between 1630 and 1720, also meant that opportunities in the cities were not abundant for an heir who attempted to leave the household and strike off on his own. Practically all of the modest leaseholder's family capital was, moreover, tied up in the land. The plots were very small, and disintegration and fragmentation of the family patrimony became economically disadvantageous once division reduced portions beyond the ability to support a family. In the other direction any family member of this social stratum would be unlikely to have enough liquid capital to expand his holdings. Expansion of leaseholding by the notables, consequently, came about through association of family members in the lease, thereby using the family as a vehicle for capital accumulation. Members of the same household, or otherwise related, would also serve as mallevadore, or surety; they would co-sign for the activity of the contracting party enabling him to secure the lease of the mill or the inn or the fisheries. Over and beyond the institution of mallevadore, the corporate responsibility of the family extended into the economic sphere. All heirs to an estate inherited not only the assets but also the debts of the departed soul. A livello contract obliged all the descendants of the contracting party in solidum, and the grand duke's administrators often justified their exactions against particular family members for payment of back rent in terms of this corporate legal responsibility. For all these reasons, people occupied on the land were associated in a single enterprise. The family enterprise extended, interestingly enough, even into the artisan and professional spheres. The fattore often came from fattore families. The management of the estate of Altopascio passed between members of the Berti family for most of the seventeenth and the early part of the eighteenth centuries. On numerous occasions members of the same family of an estate manager of Altopascio served as a fattore or some other type of agent for another Medici estate. The artisan and lower skilled craftsman illustrate the same

Familial organization

139

pattern of father-son occupations. The Stato d'animeoi 1767 provides numerous examples of two brothers within the same household engaged in the identical occupation. Take the case of Giuseppe di Giovanni Pieretti, a shoemaker who was married and head of a household of ten members. His brother Antonio, also married, and his brother Jacopo, celibate, were both shoemakers, and lived with their brother Giuseppe. Their father, Giovanni Pieretti, had been a shoemaker.8 The examples could be extended indefinitely and all add up to the same conclusion: one learned by watching. The family was a repository of skills that were transmitted from one generation to the next and which could only be acquired outside the family by apprenticeship. The economic depression restricted employment opportunities. Without a high level of demand to serve as the primary stimulus for the movement from unskilled to skilled labor status, this role of the family probably increased in importance in inverse relationship to trends in the economy. Corporate responsibility, or rather, the responsibility of the head of the household for his members extended into the moral and social spheres. The documents abound with cases where fathers were held responsible for sons who misbehaved or acted criminally; families were warned to curb the ways of their loose women or face eviction; and fathers could be held legally responsible for violations of the law by members of their household.9 In short a confluence of factors made extended families and joint family responsibility a primary, if not dominant, social arrangement. These factors include the professional relationship to the l^nd and the need for unpaid labor. The supply and quality of the land also shaped the household, as did the inheritance pattern and the absence of economic alternatives through demand pressure or urbanization. High mortality rates also helped to extend the family enterprise because low life expectancy and a high level of mortality often provoked additions to the nuclear family of parents, aunts, cousins, 8 9

APA, Stato d'anime, 1767. The father's profession is specified in the Stato d'anime of 1756. ASF, RP, 3089, ff. 141, 151.

140

Altopascio

nephews, and grandchildren who had been left abandoned by the reckless hand of death. Not only were extended family ties important, they seem to have become more important as time passed, especially in the economic sphere. The land contracts issued in the early seventeenth century were generally issued to single family heads, whereas in direct relationship to the disappearance of uncultivated land and the deterioration of the economy, the dominant pattern of leases by the early eighteenth century had become one of association of family members, mostly brothers, but cousins too. By the 1730s, for example, 'Biagio di Giuseppe and Giovan Francesco di Lorenzo, and their respective brothers,' all Baldaccini, contracted for a single livello.10 This association of family members for the acquisition of land was especially frequent among the notable class of the village. Perhaps a stronger degree of cooperation characterized the economic relations of families in that social category rather than among the other classes of the village population. Once again the solidity of the family's position probably dictated levels of behavior that tended to reinforce the conventions of marriage abstinence and family cooperation that are said to characterize the solid families of the rural bourgeoisie. But the very factors that promoted family extension could also generate tensions that would wreck the enterprise. High levels of mortality often forced combinations within the same household. On occasion the initial family annexed new members in order to survive, and the new combination was dictated by economic necessity, not by emotion.11 Even so, the ravages of mortality must have made the family sentimentally quite different from the contemporary one. Mortality rates meant the disruption of many conjugal units at every level. Normally a person would never have known several of his siblings who preceded or followed him, their lives cut short at the infant stage. The same person would probably marry at an age when at least one of his parents was deceased; and the duration of his union would last, on average, about twenty years. He 10 11

ASF, RP, 3767, no. 41. A letter of 1733 referred to a peasant family that kept a nephew in the household as a 'garzone' (ASF, RP, 3127, f. 156).

Familial organization

141

himself would lose several children; and remarriage only a short time after the loss of a partner was a common and well-accepted practice. The same person would not live to see all his children married, and he probably would never know his grandchildren. 12 Here, then, are important sentimental moments in the history of the modern family that were rarely enjoyed in the past. The human impact of high mortality might be measured by studying child mortality. Children born in Altopascio who died as children often had their names given to the next child of the same sex born to the family. This policy of renaming children after their departed brothers and sisters certainly suggests an emotional loss on the part of the parents as well as an attempt to fill the void created by the child's death. This practice, however, is equally alien to the modern family for whom a child, whatever his life span, is an individual. In an age when so many children died at an early age, the individuality of these children was not an accepted concept. In fact, many head counts exclude from the totals children who were listed as being under one year. High mortality, then, may have dulled sensitivities. It also meant that the children who survived were not likely to know their parents as adults, another important dimension of the modern family. High mortality and a relatively short life span made the family's real moments of union hardly comparable to those of our own day. Under these circumstances there was a considerable lack of continuity along family lines. Lineage was a hazy concept in this society and the parish registers attest to generations forgotten because the memory of the couple did not always extend beyond their own parents. Last names for these rural people moved from the exception to the rule in the course 12

All these comments are impressions derived from close work with the parish registers, but which actually merit a quantitative study in their own right, in particular, the question of the duration of family contacts. Many marriages performed at Altopascio indicate that the father of one or both of the partners was already deceased. To gauge the average survival of parents to the time of their children's marriage, the average marriage age of all the women of Altopascio between 1625 and 1784 was 23-4, and the average duration of the unions was 22-6. So the average family, who had their first child at an interval of 20-7 months after marriage, would have at least one of the parents deceased before the first-born child reached age 21.

142

Altopascio

of the seventeenth century; perhaps surnames filled the void of missing ancestors by providing identification for these non-literate families. Population mobility was another obstacle to the consolidation of extended families. Movement tended to disrupt a consolidated family line extended laterally or vertically. Network systems undoubtedly evolved to help control this last disruption. Many immigrants to Altopascio retained important links with their original parish. One such link consisted of finding partners for an immigrant's children from the native parish. A family might also establish a pattern of marriage alliance between the family of the bride leaving Altopascio and the new family into which she married. One more surprising and perhaps exceptional connection occurred when a baptism was reported of a child whose mother had married and left the parish but for some reason returned to her father's house and had her child.13 Still another method of consolidating a family line among families without last names lay in the practice of naming the first child after his grandparents. A cycle of Luca di Andrea di Luca developed and imposed a nominal continuity vertically that did not exist contemporaneously. By renaming children after those stricken by death, the family could advance the line by blotting out the memory of those lost members. Last names gradually gave more clarity and identification to families. The most interesting fact, however, is the multiplicity of the obstacles to the creation of a sentimental family line for these rural people who were not blessed with the ricordi written and conserved by the Florentine patricians.14 Still other cracks in the edifice of the family derived from the very importance of the functions it served. The issue of inheritance, for example, could severely divide the family instead of unifying it. Conflicts among male heirs are visible at numerous junctures. One livellaro heir would accuse the others of default in their rent payments, and he would petition to the deputies of the grand duke to exact from the 13 14

APA, Libro de Morti, 16 Oct. 1712. For a discussion of the more advanced consolidation of a vertical family line among patrician families, see Richard Goldthwaite's Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence. A Study of Four Families (Princeton, 1968), especially pp. 234-75.

Familial organization

143

recalcitrant relatives the portions of the rent due from them, or to turn over the entire livello to the petitioner. The corporate responsibility of the family before creditors was another source of division for the same reason, namely dispute among members over the degree to which individuals fulfilled their share of the debt payments owed. The variety of combinations within the household produced just as many modes of conflict: conflict between brothers or cousins, conflict between the uncle and nephew, objections of a brother to the entry of his sister-in-law into the household, objections of the brother to the payment of his sister's dowry. All of these stemmed from disputes between those who considered themselves closest to the interests and the management of the family and those more distant, like the brother of the household versus the entering sister-in-law. The domestic harmony of the extended family depended, in the last analysis, upon the successful arbitration and management by the capo di casa. His power by law and by custom seems awesome, yet at times his control could be fragile indeed. In 1767 Giuseppe di Salvestro Lorenzini, mezzadro of the fattoria, petitioned for a daily food allowance because he was 86 years old, blind, with a family of twelve, and unable to work. Ignazio Pagni, who at that time held the lease of Altopascio, provided the following information when requested by the deputies of the grand duke. It is true that the petitioner is old and deprived of eyesight; he is therefore unable to work and to manage the family. He is not the father, but an uncle to the family under his authority, which, finding him to be incompetent and burdensome, does not treat him very humanely, concerning food especially, as I have learned from the very mouth of the same man, and from information gathered from other sources. On 19 May 1767, Giovanni Federighi, then Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, recommended granting the above petitioner a loaf of bread a day because he was 'mistreated by his family.' On 29 May 1767, it became necessary to order that the subsidy be dispensed in a way that would prevent the

144

Altopascio

family from eating the old man's subsidy.15 Santi Teglia, another mezzadro at Altopascio and head of his household, petitioned in May 1773 to be allowed to take a wife as a remedy for the labor shortage within the family. His family was small, he explained, and suffered the expense of hiring day laborers to work the podere. Santi's brother, already married, was unhappy with the new prospect. Nor would the father of the prospective bride agree to give his daughter away as long as this disagreement reigned among the members of the receiving household. When the deputy of the grand duke learned subsequently that Santi was not good at managing the family enterprise, he wrote to the fattore: ' It surprises me very much that though he [Santi] is no good as a manager, they continue to entrust the affairs of the household to him, instead of to the other brother Pietro, whom you praise so much in your letter.'16 The issue here was whether the brother should be allowed to marry. Although head of the household, Santi could not impose his will. A family ruled by a father was apparently stronger than this frereche family ruled by a man with his married brother in the household. Real power within the family could be challenged on important matters. In this case, as well as in that of Giuseppe Lorenzini, inefficient management of the podere by the head of the household contributed to undermining his authority. These two cases illustrate occasions in which the authority of the head of the household was contested or rejected. In both instances the head of the household's relationship to its members was not that of a father to his children. Both cases involve extended families and in both the ability of the capo di casa was objectively in doubt. The frereche household that was common among the mezzadri families of two and three married brothers indicates that the first characteristic was met with regularity. And the outcome of challenged authority within the mezzadri households is verified by the frequency of occasions on which the deputies were called upon to arbitrate family conflict. Over the long run the documents reveal a persistent ten15 16

ASF, SF, 308, ' L \ ASF, RP, 6753, ff. 17-18.

Familial organization

145

dency of multiple families to divide, and the rupture was most often accompanied by serious conflict. The issue of legal separation meant the delicate task of dividing up family assets that were all too small. Angry words were almost always the result. Other families might divide because of a disagreement that was irreconcilable, the most common case involving the household's refusal to allow a marriage by one of its members. Families who disagreed on this issue could appeal to the Deputies of the Royal Possessions, who generally supported the decision of the father as head of the household. The member wishing to marry was then confronted with the alternative of staying within the household and remaining celibate, or marrying and heading off on his own. A letter of December 1780 demonstrates how inflexible the family could be in this matter. I am sorry to hear of the disturbances following from the misdeeds committed by Luigi Poggetti, and by Giuseppe Pagni, workers of that estate, that were subsequently put right by marriage. And since he did not inform his relatives of this marriage, it does not seem to me that one can oblige the family of thefirst-namedto keep him within the household, because to so oblige them would be the same as throwing this family into disorder, and it is proper that he suffer this punishment too, so that it may serve as an example to the others, wherefore similar scandalous disturbances may not arise so frequently.17 There are, of course, those cases where the marriages were blessed by the family. But for those who desired to shape their own life and to marry against the ruling of the head of the household, the only outcome was separation. Other divisions of the multiple family came about voluntarily as one of the two branches living together decided to split off and work a podere on its own. In that case mezzadri families outgrew their farm and divided willingly.18 The division could forecast ruin, however, if the family were not large enough to sustain the loss of some members and still work the plot. This is precisely what happened in 1728 when 17 18

ASF, RP, 3171,ff.476-7, 2 Dec. 1780. As the family of Antonio Matteoni requested in 1727 (ASF, RP, 3536, no. 55).

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Francesco di Giovanni Giuntoli, who, along with his cousin Jacopo Giuntoli, works a farm in the cerbaia of this estate, in a place called the Meadow, appeared before our committee and complained that his above-mentioned cousin does not wish to live with him, wherefore he finds himself reduced to the condition of having to leave the house, and consequently be deprived of a farm. Advise us what kind of man this Francesco is, and the reasons why the cousin does not wish to live with him.19 Very often the fragment of the extended family that separated became an outcast vis a vis the original household. In the late eighteenth century a case arose when the deputies considered a petition for a daily food subsidy by a man who described himself as a former mezzadro of Altopascio, a father of eight small children unable to supply the needs of his family. T h e inquiry revealed that after having abandoned the paternal household, and consequently having separated from his brothers, who remained as workers of the estate of Altopascio, the petitioner went away with his family into the state of Lucca, where he is at present. Then under these circumstances it does not seem to me that the demeanor of the petitioner is the sort that merits the charitable subsidy requested. This segment which broke off from the multiple family could not earn its living, and it was outcast not only from the father's house but also from the charities of the grand duke, whose deputies looked upon such behavior with a jaundiced eye. T h e separated conjugal unit e n d e d ' in a wretched state,' 20 and its fate probably points to economic considerations that discouraged family division. T h e landlord could be another force disrupting the extended family by enforcing the division of households which had outgrown the capacity of their farm to sustain them. A portion of the family could be sent off the estate, or the divided segment could be resettled on another plot if one were available. Families might welcome this division, but if they resisted they could be forced off the land. The Committee of the Deputies of the Royal Possessions in 1734 19

ASF, RP, 3122, f. 152, 2 Oct. 1728.

20

ASF, RP, 3564, no. 199.

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ordered two families to be released from service because their families were too large and they had accumulated a large debt. On 8 August these families were offered an alternative. If they will agree to divide their families, leaving on each farm only that number of men and women that may be needed, and no more, and send all those persons who are unnecessary off the estate, then our committee will readily agree to let the family remain.21 Looking ahead in the letters, only one of the families in question was actually expelled. Apparently only one of the two families agreed to divide. Involuntary division also occurred when the agents of the grand duke decided to release a mezzadro from service for poor work, insolence, theft or debt. The deputies, depending on the case, could dismiss the entire household, or the individual, or simply the conjugal unit, allowing another conjugal unit within the household to accede to the management of the podere. Expelled individuals would usually try to make their way back into the household once tempers had cooled. The administrators would often allow this if they considered that the individual had mellowed and learned from his expulsion. On other occasions, the Committee of the Royal Possessions would adamantly refuse such accommodation and threaten the entire household with eviction if they continued to harbor a member of their family who had been dismissed. Whatever the charge and whomever the tenant, the deputies could threaten expulsion of the entire family for any recalcitrant or troublesome individual. This in turn probably induced the family to exert pressure on its wayward member. The law and the landlord bound the livellari families for the payment of rent and debt. The history of different livello contracts indicates a strong tendency for subdivision both of land and of houses. The estimo tax on land for 173822 gives numerous examples of individuals assessed for 'part of a house,' that is, his legal share. Inheritance patterns and the grand-ducal documents both confirm a high degree of frag21 22

ASF, RP, 3128, ff. 36, 77, 124, Letters of 3 July 1734, 7 Aug. 1734, 11 Sept. 1734. ASF, Decima Granducale, Montecarlo, 7158.

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mentation among livellari families; and the aerial photos visually depict the degree of subdivision of these lands which Temistocle Lorenzi, who lived in the village of the Spianate in the early twentieth century, described as little more than garden-sized plots.23 Among the livellari class there appears to have been a stronger tendency towards family fragmentation, facilitated by the regular access to property guaranteed to each male heir and by the inability of subdivided plots to support households as large as those of the mezzadri of the grand duke, i.e., anywhere from nine to twelve in average size. This fragmentation, however, requires careful definition. The livellari lived more in nuclear combinations than the mezzadri of the grand duke, and much less in multiple-family households, even though they show a greater percentage of households with additions of unmarried persons to the conjugal unit. In other words the families of the livellari were fragmented to the extent that they favored nuclear combinations and spurned the multiple-family households that prevailed among the mezzadri of the grand duke. One more nuance completes the picture, and that requires a study of the houseful, i.e., all the households under the same roof.24 No less than one-third of the families of Altopascio of 1767 shared houses with at least one other family. Two-thirds of those combinations were shared among different members and lines of the same family, and by 1767 shared mostly among cousins, but also among brothers and sisters. Most of the families who shared were of the livellaro class.25 The new problem is to understand the relations among different families that were considered independent but who lived along with other conjugal units of their line. A grandducal agent described one such livello of the Raugi family in 1780 as being divided among Eugenio, Vincenti and Antonio 'and other' Raugis, and the livello had, he wrote, 'three separate houses.'26 Now the designation of' separate' in reference to rural housing in these documents could mean two things: it could mean three houses physically separated, or 23 24 25 26

Lorenzi, L'ospizio, passim. Laslett, Household and Family. APA, Stato d'anime, 1767. ASF, SF, 309, 'R'.

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Fig. 22. Abandoned farmhouse in the cerbaia.

it could mean one house with three separate attachments. Cross checking the Raugi livello against the Stato d'anime of 1780, the Raugi did indeed have three physically separated houses, and in one of these, three independent households were lodged, all these Raugis!27 This cross checking, then, proves that the families mentioned above did indeed share the same house, otherwise the parish priest would have listed them individually, as he did for those of the Raugi who had separate houses. It is not known, however, whether the independent households under one roof apportioned sections of the house to allow themselves a minimum of privacy in their quarters; nor is it known in how many instances the opposite occurred and all the people under one roof lived as a single unit. The parish priest considered these households under the same roof as independent, and the photographs of old houses in this district (Fig. 22) show how families could live separately under the same roof. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that these modest families had the space or the luxury of multiple kitchens. Did these families, listed independently but under the same roof, share their meals? As yet we simply do not know. In any event, the livellari householders demonstrate this significant trait of being able to live closely on the podere or even under the same roof, and yet preserving simultaneously an important degree of differ27

APA, Stato d'anime, 1780.

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entiation and independence of each household, a dimension of the family that mirrors a second ambiguity between the legal and the de facto possession of land. The Raugi example is enough to illustrate how a single family group bound in solidum for debt and rent payments actually refers to no less than five independent families among whom the livello was divided. The conjugal unit, then, was apparently stronger than the extended and multiple household units in the minds, at least, of the married couple. After all, it was for the sake of forming a new conjugal unit that so often members of extended households angrily broke away from their relatives. Whenever families did split, they could be expected to break generally along the lines of the conjugal unity. Even here, however, the union was not immune to discord. Many marriages were arranged for ostensibly practical motives, namely to satisfy the need for additional manpower among the mezzadri families. Other reports about betrothals of young peasants clearly use the word 'love'; 28 and all unions were by no means utilitarian or even predominantly so. Most probably we are confronted here with still another demonstration of human motivation in the early modern period which is paradoxical to us and combines mundane practical considerations with lofty flights of romantic passion. Along with the reports of love, alas, there is also evidence of cruelty. The parish registers, generally reticent about cause of death, report for the burial of a woman on 16 March 1760 that her husband told no one that she was dying and he abandoned her alone and sick in the house. Only days after her death, the children followed her to the grave.29 The documents also yield a very small number of cases where husband and wife were separated. The head count of 1618, for example, lists * Lorenza di Laureo - her husband is Lucchese and he does not stay with her, and she lives here at Altopascio.'30 The registers of livello rents record for the following leasehold in 1780: * N.B. that on this place Maria Ortenzia, wife of Antonio 28 29 30

ASF, RP, 3567, no. 411, Letter of Agostino Carraresi to Niccolo Siminetti. APA, Libro de Morti, 1760. ASF, RP, 2991, no. 63.

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di Giovanni di Antonio, pays [separately] 8 level bushels of segalato a year because she is separated from her husband.'31 By that date Maria had Bartolomeo di Francesco Serafini working her land. No method exists for determining how many marriages were marred by discord and cruelty. All the same the existence of these cases should at least warrant caution in any popular discussion that eulogizes the solidity of the pre-industrial family. The source for all the preceding comments about domestic relations is the body of letters and petitions preserved by the administrators of the grand duke's lands in Florence. Conflicts must have run deep, especially in large peasant families, where it was so often necessary to appeal to the estate manager, and the committee in Florence, to settle the dispute. The need for this appeal to the authority of the landlord reinforces the idea that the authoritarian paterfamilias organization was on many occasions unable to resolve real difficulties within the household. The numerous instances of separation and of youthful resistance to the head of the household's attempt to control marriages also proves that the members of the peasant household were not stooped in any submissive posture towards the institution of the capo di casa. These disputes were in part the product of eighteenth-century conditions, when demographic data indicate a decline in the number of marriages and an increasing age at marriage. The tension within these households may be directly linked to the postponed formation of new families; and those very tendencies that favored extended and multiple households over the long run may correlate with the tension and fragmentation along conjugal lines of former members of large households. Given this flexible demographic structure over time, one can only wonder about the domestic relations among the nuclear family units that colonized Altopascio in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The importance of these domestic relations lay not only in the personal and social sphere; they extend to the economic domain. As the grand duke's administrators were always 31

ASF, RP, 6690: 'Debitori e Creditori di Livelli, Affitti, Pigioni e Proventi "B" dal 1778 al 1784,'f. 3.

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quick to note, an efficient family enterprise depended upon concord and harmony within the family and the ability of the head of the household to direct and to manage. In fact, at the end of the eighteenth century, the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions enjoined the fattore to include * domestic tranquility' among the factors that determined which peasants deserved the lands made available by the alienation of the estate.32 Implicit in this request are two important features: the control exerted by the landlord over peasant families, and a concept of 'bad' and 'good' family behavior that differentiated a worthless peasantry from an independent yeoman-type farming family. The grand duke as a landlord of Altopascio directly encouraged family combinations in a system that differentiated the peasants on his lands from the livellari households and even from their counterparts working the land of livellari.33 Here, then, is a tool for inter-class comparison. The Raugi livello of 24 coltre was no smaller than a good many of the farms worked by the mezzadri of the grand duke. The Raugi, however, divided themselves into five separate units whereas mezzadri on plots of similar size were bound under a large multiple family household. This and the preceding discussion indicate that, all things being equal, nuclear families probably retained the preference and the primary sentimental attachment of individuals; but that the ravages of mortality, the unavailability of land, and the family-based enterprise system were the independent variables that encouraged family combinations. The most important single variable was nevertheless the terms of access to property. By the mezzadria system on his 32 33

ASF, RP, 2555, Bartolini's letter of 16 Dec. 1783 and the reply by the Fattore Carraresi of 19 Dec. 1783. The landlord's control over domestic architecture on the estate, the need for multiple-family households to execute the laborious vangatura required by the landlord, and the landlord's direct intervention in controlling marriages, expelling or relocating families, and dividing others, all this constituted clear deterministic influence outside the peasant household's control. The lack of autonomy of peasant households vis a vis the economic power of the landlord is remarkably similar to that experienced by peasant families in the Baltic province of Kurland who labored under conditions of serfdom (Frank McArdle, 'Another Look at "Peasant Families East and West",' Peasant Studies Newsletter, in, no. 3 (July 1974), pp. 11-14).

Familial organization

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lands, the landlord encouraged a unitary family operation as opposed to the several families that farmed livelli. Through the legal system all heirs of a family bore a corporate responsibility for debt and rent payments. Often this legal responsibility of a unitary family conceals livellaro families that were separate in fact. The question then becomes why the landlord and the law imposed corporate responsibility upon fragmented units. The answer appears to lie in the riskminimizing function of multiple responsibility. To repeat, leases of mills or any position which entrusted the agent with the property of the grand duke required a mallevadore, a co-signer in responsibility. If the man defaulted, his mallevadore could be held responsible for the share of the responsibility that he had pledged. The risk of not being paid is minimized by associating someone else who can be held liable. The same principles apply to family responsibility for debt, either of rent or of the debts incurred by the mezzadri for food lent them. The legal system that encouraged joint family responsibility worked to the protection of creditors, those who lent, leased, or sold. The system protected, in other words, the interests of the merchant/landowning oligarchy that one encounters at every stage in the history of early modern Tuscany. The system worked to the disadvantage of debtors, and to the disadvantage of the peasants who were born into the world as the heirs of debts they played no part whatsoever in creating. Here, too, then, the fortunes of the family were ultimately linked to the exercise of sovereignty in the state. The second implication of Bartolini's inquiry into the internal relations of the family was that good leasehold families had solid, peaceful families, whereas 'bad' peasants had disordered and conflict-ridden families. Bartolini implied a different quality of family behavior according to economic class and profession. His implication may have been correct. The families of Altopascio support in many ways a hypothesis to the effect that families working the land experienced a different family culture largely governed by the influence of property. For one thing, both family size and household structure differentiated the mezzadri of the grand duke from the livellari farmers. It is quite logical that these mezzadri

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Altopascio

families that were nearly twice the size on the average of the livellari families experienced different problems and different levels of domestic relationships. Property also differentiated the sharecropping mezzadri because by 1767 sharecropping tenants on livelli worked land that had undergone nearly two centuries of partible division and simply could not sustain large multiple-family households; but sharecroppers on the grand duke's land had to maintain larger farms that had never been divided because they were never subject to hereditary property rights of those working the land. The mezzadri were large propertyless family units held together by their occupation, working the lands of the grand duke; the livellari were small farmers with access to property in a regular hereditary fashion. The mezzadri families of the grand duke demonstrate a high degree of tension and dispute in the course of the eighteenth century, while the livellari families lived closely but independently, autonomous but cooperative. Apportionment of respective plots and sections of the house may have controlled tensions. The livello contracts issued in the eighteenth century reveal many families, a good many of these notable, expanding and/or renewing their holdings, i.e., more cases of voluntary association of brothers and cousins to achieve an objective. The hypothesis states that the economic position of the family shaped its domestic organization. Jean Charles Simonde De Sismondi, the famous historian who lived for a while in the neighboring district of Pescia, reported a discussion he had with a livellaro family at the very end of the eighteenth century. From this discussion he learned that livellaro families favored a system that allowed the marriage of the oldest boy while the younger males remained celibate as a method of consolidating the family patrimony.34 At best such behavior was a convention and not a rule. Yet simplistic though that model may seem in allowing for the wide variety of marriage patterns within families, households in Altopascio seem to lend some support to this model. Of the 16 livellari families who lived with members other than the conjugal unit, no less than 8 were extended to include unmarried collateral 34

Simonde De Sismondi, VAgricolture toscane, p. 100.

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members. Among the mezzadri families of the grand duke, the most popular household pattern was the frereche with 2 or more married brothers, while only 1 of the 16 livellaro families lived within that type of household. A more detailed study of marriage patterns is certainly necessary. But prima faciethe household structure indicates that greater marriage control was practiced among the livellari brothers than among the mezzadri of the grand duke. Heads of mezzadri households undoubtedly attempted to control marriages within their families; yet here the frequent tension and discord that ensued may derive from the fact that the overriding norm of the family patrimony was absent. The propertyless mezzadri lacked the solidity and the direction of family management that the livellari families derived from their property interests on the land. Property is also the specific issue upon which livellaro families cooperated for the acquisition of livelli. Possibly the pattern may emerge of a weaker family structure among the poor families as opposed to the more substantial families of the middle class. At the same time that the rural bourgeoisie consolidated its position in economy and society, notable families showed a higher degree of cooperation in the acquisition of land; and this occurred while internal discord dramatized many of the mezzadri families. Different family behavior has already been noted in the registration of births and marriages, in the formation of last names, and between rich and poor generally;35 these differences may even extend to domestic relations. Different family cultures at Altopascio only reinforce what other indicators already underline: the real differences in the villagers' lifestyles according to class and social structure. It is to a description of these groups and their differences that we now turn. 35

'It is almost certainly true that the history of the rich family was not also that of the poor (Joan Thirsk, 'The Family,' Past and Present, 27 (1964), 121); and Carlo Corsini ('Nascite e Matrimoni,' passim) has pointed out the differences in the formation of last names, and in the registration of acts of birth, marriage and death according to social class, the upper classes being those who first demonstrated these features presumably as a method of differentiating limits between classes.

7 Class divisions

The members of the community of Altopascio fell within three classes, the peasantry, the leaseholders, and the notables. The term * class' will not be used to identify groups of comparable income, but rather persons who share the same general relationship to the productive process. That relationship not only constitutes a common interest among members of the group but it also serves to differentiate the group from other ' classes' of the society with their own particular role in the system of production.1 The peasants were the primary producers of the estate's revenues, so it is only fitting that a discussion of social classes and social structure should begin with them. What, though, do we mean by 'peasantry'? It is a start, but surely not enough, to describe peasants as rural cultivators. The anthropologist Professor Eric Wolf has made a distinction between peasants and other rural cultivators. Peasants are not farmers, i.e., entrepreneurs engaged in the business of commercial agriculture. The peasant is instead primarily occupied in satisfying the subsistence needs of his household. Professor Wolf also makes a helpful distinction between peasants and primitives: In primitive society, producers control the means of production, including their own labor, and exchange their own labor and its products for the culturally defined equivalent goods and services of others. In the course of cultural evolution, however, such simple systems have been superseded by others in which control of the means of production, including the disposition of human labor, passes from the hands of the primary producers into the hands of 1

Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capitalism (New York, 1947),pp. 14-15.

156

Class divisions

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groups that do not carry on the productive process themselves, but assume instead special executive and administrative functions, backed by the use of force.... Peasants... are rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn.2 When these observations are applied to the class structure at Altopascio, it becomes necessary to distinguish between the mezzadri, who fit best the definition of peasantry, and the leaseholders. The latter were much closer to the category of farmer, and, unlike the mezzadri, as independent farmers they retained more control over the means of production and thus controlled the disposition of their own labor and their agricultural surplus. Earlier discussions of population, the economy, and the family have already provided some key insights into the way of life of the mezzadri. These people lived in large, extended households which farmed the land on a sharecropping basis as a family enterprise. Over the course of the seventeenth century economic crisis and rising levels of indebtedness precipitated a transformation of the peasants of Altopascio from mezzadri with additional lands outside the purview of the Medici administration to propertyless laborers almost totally dependent upon the estate for their livelihood.3 Contemporaries, in fact, never used the term 'mezzadro' to refer to members of this group, but rather the word 'lavoratore,' worker. History and current accounts blended under the impulse of corporate responsibility to create an unending burden of peasant indebtedness, a burden that so depressed the spirits of these people that its remission in 1773 released tears, gratitude and prayers of thankfulness to the Lord. Our task here is to explore other elements in the human experience of the peasantry. Insecurity of tenure was a cardinal feature of the peasant's existence. Since the compacts under which the peasant labored were customary and conventional rather than written 2 3

Eric R. Wolf, Peasants (Englewood Cliffs, 1969), pp. 3-4. See the observations of Francesco de' Medici cited above in Chapter 5, p. 116.

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contracts, and since the landlord enforced the terms of the compacts, peasants had no guarantee against violations by the landlord. One protection that the peasants did have derived from a law that allowed expulsions of mezzadri only during a specified time of the year and required the landlord to serve prior notice. The law was intended to provide the peasant with adequate time to find a new farm and also to insure that the mezzadro would not be dismissed at a time of the year that would effectively rob him of all the labor and seed he had earlier supplied.4 As for the specific terms of tenure, the Medici administrators generally adhered to the canons of customary practice. Indeed they would be the first to rebuke any estate manager for 'innovations' that violated the customary arrangements between lord and peasant. During the period from 1740 to 1767, when the estate was leased to managing capitalists, the respect for customary compacts disappeared as the new management sought to maximize every possible item of income. They introduced, for example, one compact that required the peasants to pay an annual' tax' on wood, a practice that was declared an unjust 'aggravio' when Altopascio again passed to the direct management by the grand duke in 1767. In other words, the terms of the traditional compacts had been aggravated. The grand duke's administrators also discovered that the particular compact governing the wood was alone responsible for a good portion of the large debt the mezzadri had created in recent years.5 Around the same time that the administrators abolished the 'tax' on wood, they reintroduced a sharecropping arrangement for the cocoons of silk worms. Earlier the mezzadri simply contracted for the care and the harvest of the mulberry leaves; but when it was correctly perceived that climatic fluctuations unduly burdened the peasants by indebting them when weather damaged the harvest of leaves, the administrators changed the system in the second decade of the eighteenth century to one where 4

5

The landlords lobbied successfully for the removal of this constraint at the end of the eighteenth century (Mario Mirri, 'Proprietari e contadini toscani nelle riforme leopoldine,' Movimento operaio, vn (1955), pp. 203-4). ASF, RP, 3563, no. 18; 6752, f. 50, Letter to Senatore Federighi, 8 July 1772.

Class divisions

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the mezzadri would tend and harvest the leaves, nourish the cocoons, and then share the final product with the landlord.6 The fact that this arrangement had to be reintroduced in 1768 indicates that it, too, had been transformed by the capitalists who leased the estate. The insecurity of tenure is best dramatized, however, by the way mezzadri were summarily released from service for debt, disobedience, fraud, or inattention to the interests of the landlord. These occasions were frequent and regular. Between 1740 and 1749 at least eight families disappeared from the rolls of the grand duke's workers, and another four were relocated, which amounts to a turnover of the agricultural labor force equal to about 20%.7 The turnover rates increase the farther back our calculation begins. Clearly the idea that mezzadri worked the lands uninterruptedly for hundreds of years is nothing less than pure myth. Certainly some families might remain on the estate for a century, but the reality that daily confronted the peasant was expulsion or the threat of expulsion whenever he performed badly. Besides permanent expulsion there was always dislocation caused when lands of the estates were under colmate reclamation and the peasants who worked those lands were either dismissed or relocated on another podere or given lands to work temporarily. Generally the administration respected the integrity of the farm over that of the peasant family. Whenever an imbalance developed in the man/land ratio of any unit, the administration preferred to disrupt the family rather than redraw the lines of the podere.8 When families outgrew or shrank below the number considered adequate to work the unit, the family would be relocated or expelled or divided. Sometimes the actual podere that the peasants worked could be modestly adjusted by adding or deleting fields according to the requirements of the family. Peasant tenure illustrates once again that the reality of this rural 6 7 8

ASF, RP, 3111, Letter of 26 March 1718 to the estates of Altopascio, Stabbia, and Ponte. For the reintroduction of this policy in 1768, see ASF, RP, 3563, no. 18. Calculated from peasant accounts in ASF, RP, 6737 A: 'Debitori e Creditori per Conto di Stime e per Corrente, 1740-1749.' 'Non ci pare bene scemare i Poderi, ma piu tosto scemare le Famiglie de' medesimi quando sono superflue' (ASF, RP, 3086, 26 July 1692, f. 31).

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society was not static immobility but a dynamic equilibrium. The hallowed institutions had to be flexible and resilient enough to absorb the shocks created by a world of demographic and economic flux. The peasant's position within that world was subordinate in the production process and servile in the sphere of human relations. Though the peasant shared the crops and the animals produced on the estate, he could only begin the harvest or sell livestock at the time approved by the fattore; and he could only use farm animals on the lands of the estate. The peasant relied on the landlord for provisions of seed; and he paid interest on the loan in the form of a greater portion of seed returned. 9 If a peasant owned lands or held any on lease, he was forbidden to farm those lands in addition to those he worked on the estate. In some cases peasants petitioned for the right to cultivate a leasehold because their lands on the fattoria yielded little. But to secure that permission, the peasant would sometimes have to pledge half of the crop from his own lands as payment towards his debt with the grand duke.10 Debt required the peasants to perform labor operations they disliked but could not refuse; or their labor could simply be commandeered outright.11 The mezzadro could not take any job outside the fattoria, a prohibition that made him totally dependent on the estate manager for work. As his position deteriorated in the course of the economic depression, the peasant increasingly lacked cash assets; and the account books record that peasants depended on the estate manager for cash advances to pay their taxes, to pay their vantaggi, or to buy a suit of clothes.12 At times, when a cow died the meat was forcibly distributed among the peasants and debited to them; on one occasion the meat forced upon them came from a sick ox.13 Their reliance on 9

10 11

12 13

The peasants borrowed seed 'a misura rasa' and repaid it 'a misura colma' which amounts to an interest rate just over 4 % of every staio of seed lent, or 1/8 staio per sacco (ASF, RP, 6742, 'Raccolta di Parte Domenicale'). ASF, RP, 3087, 31 Oct. 1693, f. 117. AC, iv, no. 21. It became easier to commandeer labor because of peasant and leaseholder indebtedness, which allowed the landlord to order these debtors to either work on large-scale reclamation projects or suffer imprisonment for debt. See above, Chapter 3, n. 16. ASF, RP, 3095. In this case, it is true, the central administration rebuked the estate

Class divisions

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the landlord for food provisions meant that the peasants ate what they considered distasteful food, because they were given the most inferior grains which earned the lowest prices - a policy adopted by the administration to keep debts smaller. Sometimes the peasants angrily refused these distasteful provisions;14 over the long run they ate them. Information from the late eighteenth century proves that these peasants never ate bread made of wheat, but rather of part segalato, sorghum, millet, and maize.15 One event in the year symbolized the peasant's dependence, the day of the bilancio, the final reckoning of accounts, the summary of what the peasant had earned and what he owed. The accounting took place in the palace of the estate manager, in May or June, depending on the epoch. One can readily imagine the awesomeness of the moment and the apprehension of illiterate peasants about their accounts and their powerlessness to alter them. No wonder they feared the fattore who held over them the control of work, the control of food, and the control of family. The documents record this fear. Senator Giovanbattista Capponi, as agent for Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici, the future grand duke, reported his investigation of fraud in the accounts of an estate manager of Altopascio in 1581. Distrustful of the fattore's record of the harvest, Capponi went directly to the peasants themselves. Then I sent for each worker one by one to come before me and repeat what he had harvested year by year, and this was accomplished with considerable effort on my part and a struggle because

14

15

manager for coercing the peasants into buying the meat on the grounds that it was infected and also that it violated the butchers' interests. The letter goes on to explain that meat from dead cows should be sold first to the butchers if they held the local monopoly (appalto), and if they did not, then the meat could be sold wherever advantageous but without coercing those who could not afford, or did not desire, to buy. Despite this stated policy, peasant accounts still register regular purchases of meat from the estate; and when an animal died it was apportioned among peasant families in order to minimize the financial loss to the landlord. For an example, see ASF, RP, 3310, f. 406, where a dead ox was apportioned among the peasants for a price that was to be paid in so many days' work. ASF, RP, 3059, ff. 110, 692, for evidence of the distaste for saggina which was nevertheless administered to the peasants in large quantities for their food provisions. ASF, RP, 3564, no. 94, Report of Niccolo Siminetti, 20 July 1778, on the petition of Maria Maddalena widow of Giuseppe Lorenzini.

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they were resolved not to say, being fearful and intimidated by the fattore.16

Again at the end of the eighteenth century, the under-fattore argued that the estate manager could make the peasants write anything he wished,17 an argument that is plausible because both the fattore and the under-fattore produced written attestations supporting their position in the dispute. Over and beyond the subordination in the production process, servility in human relations governed peasant lives. The primary duty of a peasant was obedience to the landlord and to his representatives. The statement was made explicitly after Barzante Bulleri had been pardoned for cutting chestnut stakes from the woods: But make Bulleri as well as the other workers understand that they may not commit transgressions or I shall dismiss them from their holdings, desiring that they be more obedient than other people.18 Obedience, moreover, was behavior that was repeatedly ordered and sanctioned by expulsions threatened or real. Often the correspondence contains suggestions of ' making an example' of a peasant to serve as warning for the others. Servility was also the posture required for obtaining food provisions as the supplies from the previous harvest wore thin. As indebtedness mounted, the administration decided on a hard line holding the peasants to the bare minimum they required to survive. Many times mezzadri would journey to Florence and plead before the Superintendent that they were not receiving adequate provisions and that without any advance of food they would be unable to sow or harvest or perform some other important agricultural task.19 When this happened, the deputies in Florence generally ordered the estate manager to advance the supplies that were needed. The very fact, however, that the peasant could be driven to such 16 17

18 19

AC, iv, no. 21: Letter of Giovanbattista Capponi to Ferdinando de' Medici, 8 Nov. 1581. ' II Sopra Intendente e fattore ai contadini gli fanno dire quello piu gli piace' (ASF, SF, 'M-R,' Antonio Morelli). In 1772 Pietro Baldaccini signed an affidavit retracting his former testimony about Morelli on the grounds that he had been duped by the new assistant manager into making damaging statements unknowingly (ASF, RP, 3563, no. 150: Memoria of Niccolo Siminetti). ASF, RP, 3059, f. 134. See, for example, ASF, RP, 3090, f. 270, 19 Jan. 1696 (stilo fiorentino).

Class divisions

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limits, coupled with the perennial wrangling with the fattore over annual provisions, illustrates an important servile dimension of his life. The instructions given to the agent Benedetto Sconditi in 1767 told him to enter as 'master of the house' and teach peasants how to live when they seemed not to be making the most of their provisions.20 The enforcement of edicts displayed a similar indifference to peasant privacy. In 1667 a law prohibiting private fishing in the Fucecchio lake was republished to serve the interests of those who had leased the fishing rights; the guards of the estate and the rural police were ordered to search at will any of the peasant homes and seize the fishing nets banned by the new law.21 Not only were houses arbitrarily searched without notice, the peasant was not free to order his life within his home as he saw fit. In 1695 the deputies had a peasant dismissed from service when they learned that a fight had broken out at a dance he had given. The desperate mezzadro traveled to Florence to appeal his case. Giovanni Bachechi has been here stating that he did not give a dance as was supposed, but that it was a small entertainment for two or three young girls, so for this occasion you will reinstate him on the holding, but warn all the peasants not to give dances or they will be dismissed.22 Another edict of the late seventeenth century ordered heads of peasant households not to allow their children to entertain women in the house because of alleged sexual acts that were performed during these visits.23 These houses, it could be argued, were the property of the grand duke; but this fact only reinforces the image of subordination and the dependent status that characterized the peasants of Altopascio. Even family matters fell within the pale of grand-ducal authority. The following case, so humiliating for a contemporary, was a structural feature of the mezzadro's human relations. 20 21 22

ASF, RP, 3563, no. 17: 'Istruzione per il Signore Benedetto Sconditi,' 24 Sept. 1768. ASF, RP, 3059, 2 June 1667. 23 ASF, RP, 3089, f. 6, 4 June 1695. See above, Chapter 2, n. 27.

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There appeared before this agency Biagio Bulleri and Giuseppe del Teglia, workers of this estate, the first of whom petitions us to remove his cousin Giuseppe Bulleri from the household, since there is little harmony between them, and the second petitions us to allow his brother to marry, stating that they do not have a sufficient number of women in the household to meet the necessary duties of the farm. The motives of each fellow persuade us to support them, not wanting to compel Bulleri to keep his cousin in the house and provoke a scandal, and not being able to prevent Teglia from marrying, even when the need of the farm is the lesser consideration that forces him to marry her. They were both clearly told that they should not be surprised that if Bulleri is left with too small a family and Teglia increases his in excess, it will become necessary to dismiss them both, and because it appertains to us to take cognizance of this, we give you full authority to retain or to dismiss them, as you will deem most opportune for the good service of the interests of His Royal Highness.24 T h e need to secure prior permission for marriage was no joking matter. A letter from Florence in February 1707 ordered the estate manager to dismiss Andrea di Barzante Bulleri * because he has chosen to marry against your will and overcrowd his father's house.' 25 T h e estate's ability to control marriage and the entry or exit of different members of the household offers clear illustration of the way legally free peasants were personally subject to the will of the landlord for the decisions of their family. This power, apparently, derived from no seigneurial right, but rather from the control exercised by the landlord over the number of people per farm unit. Legally free peasants who decided to marry against the landlord's interests could, therefore, find themselves without land and employment. Political and economic subordination prevailed over legal freedom. Dependence was not, however, always disadvantageous for the peasantry, because as subjects of the grand duke they were entitled to his protection. T h e mezzadri of Altopascio were spared on occasion some of the more distasteful features of life that afflicted peasants on private estates. In the midseventeenth century, for example, the peasants of Altopascio 24 25

ASF, RP, 3100, f. 176, 23 Aug. 1706. Ibid., f. 5 3 7 , 12 Feb. 1706 (stilo fiorentino).

Class divisions

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were not forcibly conscripted into military service as were the other inhabitants of this rural society.26 Protection could also be useful against the police, who preyed on the peasants to supplement their income through fines or through outright extortion. Documents preserved in the communal archive of Montecarlo certainly contain many examples of the way the policemen of Pescia 'leaned' on the peasants of their jurisdiction.27 The protection of the grand duke, even if belated, could be mustered for the peasants who worked his land. A letter of 1702, for example, discussed the 'arrogant acts' of the policemen of Pescia at the house of Giovanni Lemmi, mezzadro.28 The steps taken by the deputies were probably not always effective in this regard, because they lacked power to enforce their will upon these constables. In the very same month that the offenses were committed against Lemmi, a letter to the estate manager documents this limited effectiveness. We consider it useless to write to the constable of San Miniato that he order his police to patrol the forest because the said policemen will not do it, and all the more so if required to do it at night, the time when the damage is done.29 Even so, no protection was to be rejected in a society organized around ' protectors' who officially represented the interests of the local communal government at Florence,30 or 26

27 28 29 30

' Ho pregato il Signore Marchese Bufalini che si trova in codeste parti a far le rassegnie soliti a non volere forzare i lavoratori di S.A.S. a entrar Soldati' (ASF, RP, 3058, f. 91,25 Aug. 1666). Dal Canto, Altopascio Medicea, p. 102, citing ACM, Partiti e Deliberazioni, passim. ASF, RP, 3095, f. 357, 26 Feb. 1701 (stilo fiorentino). Ibid., f. 3 2 1 , 4 F e b . 1 7 0 1 (stilo fiorentino). Mori, Storia di Montecarlo, pp. 85-90, relates the interesting story of the struggle over the benefice of S. Silvestro in the 1570s when the Comune of Montecarlo awarded the benefice, as was its right, to Dott. Matteo di Morto Tonietti, Knight of the Order of Santo Stefano, this to the irritation of the Marquis Capponi, who responded bitterly to the comune's refusal to accept his nominee and angrily resigned his title of 'Protector of the Commune.' This dispute first arose in 1572 and in 1579 Tonietti was suddenly assassinated at Montecarlo, it not being known whether his murder was linked to the dispute over the benefice. Interestingly enough, the comune found its solution out of the battle by conceding to Grand Duke Francesco de' Medici the faculty of naming, for one time only, the Rector of the benefice; however, that faculty remained in sovereign hands until 1640, when Ferdinando II awarded the benefice to the daughter of Matteo Tonietti, Donna Giovanna. After the extinction of the Tonietti line in 1705 the benefice passed, against the will of the comune, to the Counts Rucellai from 1705 to 1780. The

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Altopascio

around the other protectors, the landlords who defended their peasants in order to shield themselves against labor shortages or unseeded land. The grand duke often protected the peasant from outside creditors, especially from the vile breed that made a profession of prosecuting peasants for fabricated debts.31 No creditor, in fact, could proceed against a peasant of the grand duke without the express permission of the Deputies of the Royal Possessions. The deputies could also protect the peasants from other state agencies. They could intervene to secure the release of peasants who had been hastily seized by the police agents of the Abbondanza for presumed violation of the laws against hoarding or exporting, when the peasants had simply been transporting their harvest to the village.32 Protection, then, was partial compensation for the subordinate status of the peasant. Subordination, however, was never complete. Whatever the punishment peasants would disobey; they would attempt

31

32

story illustrates several points: first of all, the naming of the protector, who just as in the 'embassies' to Florence, was a nominee from the largest and wealthiest families to represent the interests of the comune within the central administration; and second, the story possibly points to one of the reasons that the towns of the 'dominio' acceded to the Principato: in this case the grand duke arbitrated in favor of the comune's safety from the ire of the Marquis Capponi. The fact also that throughout this period the comune was unable to execute its legal right of giuspatronato demonstrates once again the power of nobility on this rural scene. In a case in 1769 involving the mezzadro Domenico Tongiorgi, the estate manager reported that the alleged creditor, Jacopo Galessi, was well known for bringing legal action against peasants for false debts, and the fattore wrote that he was including several attestations that proved' che il Galessi e uomo di cattivo carattere, e debito a defatigare or questo or quello colle sue false invenzioni' (ASF, RP, 3565, no. 106). In the response from the central administration (ASF, RP, 6751, Letter of 11 Feb. 1769), the General Administration agreed to protect Tongiorgi by denying Galessi the permission to proceed against a peasant of the grand duke. The leaseholders were frightened to bring their crops to Altopascio in payment of rent because of these regulations (ASF, RP, 3085, f. 28, 21 Sept. 1691). A similar incident was recorded in 1671 when two youngsters were carried off and imprisoned by the police of Pescia for allegedly attempting to take their oxen out of the grand duchy, when in fact the animals were simply being taken to pasture at the peasants' house. The Superintendent of the Royal Possessions sent a letter which he ordered the fattore to deliver in person to the Vicario of Pescia, a letter justifying the actions of the peasant children and demanding their prompt release (ASF, RP, 3061, f. 473). During years of food shortage, the Abbondanza laws forbade people to take their crops within three miles of the border, a regulation designed to stop contraband but one which caused much distress to the inhabitants of border districts, like the Altopascians, whose miller, for example, complained in 1678 that the prohibition caused him to lose much business (ASF, RP, 3068, f. 467).

Class divisions

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to withhold crops; they would illicitly perform odd jobs; and worst of all, they would use the animals of the podere for hauling jobs. In 1694 the guards discovered the mezzadro Jacopo Gennai's farm horse * loaded with cheese, lemons and fish.' Gennai had rented the horse to Pasquale Zoppo of Pescia who was arrested on his return from Leghorn.33 At times peasants acted disrespectfully to the estate manager, to the parish priest, and especially to the guard. On these occasions the peasant could be rebuked, expelled, or jailed for his 'insolence.' Mezzadri who were summarily released from service would very likely speak angry, threatening words. It took repeated efforts over the years to impose discipline and obedience upon the peasants, a policy that could never be fully effective as long as the tenurial relationship encouraged acts of fraud and disobedience on the peasant's part. The grand duke's agents often accused mezzadri of actually selling food provisions that had been lent to them for subsistence; or the peasant might sell some of the manure; or he might withhold a portion of the harvest, especially the wine harvest where pilferage was more difficult to detect.34 Many of these accusations were undoubtedly justified; in a number of cases the peasants caught in the act actually admitted guilt. By these acts of fraud and theft the peasant increased his share of the mezzadria; as such fraud represents an instinctive act of retaliation, an attempt to obtain a more favorable tenurial balance. This behavior was perfectly rational even though it was disobedient and criminal according to the prevailing assumptions. Nor were peasants completely helpless before the estate manager. Even in the earlier case of fraud investigated by Senator Capponi, he learned that some shrewd peasants had secretly arranged for a third party to record the size of their harvest.35 There was, in addition, the alternative of traveling to Florence to plead a case before the deputies themselves. Very often the peasant could obtain a reversal of unjust decisions or obtain mercy and forgiveness of their disobedi33 34 35

ASF, RP, 3088, f. 4. For an example, see ASF, RP, 6753, f. 36, 6 Nov. 1773, and RP, 3563, no. 183. See above, n. 16.

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ence. Finally, a distinctly political form of collective peasant action developed among the mezzadri in the second half of the eighteenth century.36 In conclusion, the life of the peasantry dictated subordination and servility; but that same experience could ignite angry feelings or outright resistance. Years passed before the dozens of peasant violations of the fishing law of 1667 finally subsided. Most of this form of individual resistance was powerless to alter the trend of things, and no better illustration can be found than the question of fishing rights. From the time prior to the Medici acquisition of Altopascio through the early seventeenth century, the inhabitants of the district enjoyed the right to fish in two large inland bodies of water, the Lakes of Bientina and Fucecchio. The lakes supported a large number of professional fishermen, and the eels and fish provided an important supplement to the peasant's diet. Fishing rights to both areas gradually became appropriated as the seventeenth century advanced. The Lake of Fucecchio fell entirely into the hands of the individual who leased the grand duke's estate called the Fattoria delle Calle, except for a strip along the swamp purchased by the Marquis Ferroni who earned a monopoly of fishing rights along that strip. Anyone who wished to fish in the lake now had to secure a permit from the Calle or the Marquis Ferroni. These permits were priced according to the quality and the extension of the area assigned; their price soared between 4 lire before 1740 to 10 lire in 1767; the price for a fishing place doubled from 2 to 4 scudi in the same time period. Higher prices were charged for inferior fishing spots because the better ones were reserved for the renter of the lake so much so that very many of the poor fishermen struggle to make a living because of this policy, and in addition to all this [there is] the greater severity shown towards the peasants, who could in the past, in an atmosphere of leniency and tolerance, go with impunity into the swamp to catch a small quantity of fish to sustain their families in their time of greatest need, and especially during the summer months; and considering further that the fish (practically all of which are in the hands of the leaseholder) are now sold either 36

See the discussion below in Chapter 9.

Class divisions

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in Florence or in other distant places, the result is that under the present circumstances, a product which belongs to the district and should serve primarily to make it prosper, not only renders it no benefit, but is reduced to a positive burden for those residents from all sides.37 The history of the Lake of Fucecchio illustrates, once again, the powerlessness of the peasantry before the rights of property and the sovereignty exercised by the grand duke and the noble landowners. Property rights reigned over the persons of the peasants just as the house provided by the landlord overshadowed the personal lives of those who resided within it. These houses, at their best, were hardly models of comfort. In 1626 Francesco de' Medici indirectly described the unenviable living conditions when he said that the peasants of Altopascio lived 'in huts or in the swamp.'38 The grand dukes gradually produced better housing on some of their farms; but in 1727 the Administrators of the Royal Possessions decided not to erect any more costly masonry houses on lands acquired from the colmate. This was decided after masonry houses had been provided for only two of the seven farms that were eventually carved out of this area. Thereafter the administration of the grand-ducal lands cut spending on these houses, building simple huts (capanne) instead. The administrators did not intend these huts to be just temporary living quarters which would satisfy the peasants' immediate need during the first seedings of the colmate. Rather the masonry houses initially planned were deliberately abandoned in favor of capanne because of the financial crisis that faced the administration in the early decades of the eighteenth century. In another attempt to economize on housing costs, one house was actually built onto another.39 37

38 39

ASF, RP, 6750, f. 46: 'A. Memoria relativa alia decadenza del Bestiame in Valdinievole, e alle Tasse abusive delle Fide per il Padule di Fucecchio, e Fossi Adiacenti al Medesimo.' ASF, RP, 3531, no. 90. The idea of combining two families in a single house was first approved in a letter from Florence dated 11 Oct. 1710 (ASF, RP, 3104). The following year the financial crisis had its impact and building stopped altogether (ibid., f. 433, 18

170

Altopascio

Testimony has survived concerning the quality of life in these huts of the colmate. In 1756 Francesco Cortesi informed the administration how he and his family of fourteen members worked the Fourth Podere del Cerro in the parish of Ponte Buggianese, on which holding there serves as lodging for the family a small hut in which the entire family and the farm hands must sleep, and inasmuch as this family is composed of two married brothers, unmarried girls, and small children, all of whom must sleep and take their rest in this hut, it does not seem to be a thing that suits a Christian way of life, nor is this approved by the parish priest who, for his conscience's sake, continually admonishes the petitioner as head of the household. Cortesi petitioned that another room be built or some other adjustment made 'in order to be able to shelter his family without causing scandal, and to free himself of the gossip, all the more so because the farm worked by the petitioner cannot stand a smaller family, being about 40 coltre in size.' A grandducal agent named Torelli, as well as Lucrezia Mei Landi who leased the estate at that time, both agreed on the absolute necessity of enlarging the h u t ' for the decency of the numerous persons composing this large family/ Landi estimated the cost of a decent masonry house at 400 scudi, and Torelli added that similar housing improvements would be requested by the families who worked the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Poderi of the colmate' because they suffer the same discomfort and impropriety.' The Superintendent of the Possessions, Giovanni Sansedoni, acted directly counter to the advice provided by Torelli and Landi. He reported that it was not necessary to build a blueprint house 'at such expense' and especially 'when the petitioner only asks for a simple room, or other adjustment.' Sansedoni ordered that another hut be April 1711). In his report of 10 November 1717, the Visitor General AscanioLippi authorized combining two families in a house on the colmate by adding a second staircase and a stable (ASF, RP, 3535, no. 96). The first house built on the colmate had cost over 3,000 ducats, and the second one about 1,400 ducats. But Lippi noted that in the past, the peasants along the swamp lived in huts, for the construction of which the estate furnished the lumber, the swamp yielded the straw for the roof, and the peasants provided the labor. Lippi proposed therefore that huts be built instead of houses (ASF, RP, 3536, no. 55) and expenditures of 160 scudi were approved for each hut (ASF, RP, 3123, f. 12, 11 June 1729), an obvious saving to the estate.

Class divisions

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built, or the existing one extended, ' with the roof and pillars of masonry, of a size appropriate to the need, the cost of which would amount in all to about fifty scudi, it being possible to obtain the greater part of the necessary materials from the estate itself/ This sum of money, the Superintendent continued, was not so substantial, even in the event that the operation be performed to the other three farms, 'for which it is appropriate to await the petition, and then verify the need at that time, as has now been done with respect to the attached request.'40 The above case is an important example of peasant resignation, because the families of the colmate tolerated this housing arrangement for over twenty years before sustained pressure from the parish priest drove one of them to petition for more space. The Agency of the Royal Possessions reneged on its duty to provide a decent house and offered a makeshift substitute. The worst example of this mentality lay in Sansedoni's readiness to leave the other three peasant families in crowded, miserable conditions until they actually petitioned for improvements. Here was a neglect of duty that was blatant and unthinkable - a vivid demonstration of the House of Lorraine's unsalutary neglect of the former lands and tenants of the Medici. All the former Medici estates were leased in 1740, and all genuine concern disappeared along with the lease. Fortunately there is one bright spot in this whole dreary affair. Torelli reported to Sansedoni on 22 March 1756 that he had heard that the other three heads of the peasant households in question were going to request enlargement of their huts 'and that they had all united to make such a petition.' More information about housing conditions derives from a letter in 1769 of Giovanni Federighi, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, to His Royal Highness, the Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo: It is certain that the workers of that estate [Altopascio], like the greater part of those on the plain of the Valdinievole, reside in huts, made ordinarily of straw, and they suffer all those inconveniences injurious to their health. 40

ASF, SF, 308, ' C \

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Altopascio

Federighi relied on the information provided by the General Administrators, who had represented the situation at Altopascio in a report based on a recent inspection of each individual house. The visit uncovered that several of these houses only required maintenance work to bring them to a suitable standard. Then others of these houses, improperly so called, are in reality huts standing right on some farms on the plain, that is to say on the sites with the worst air. These absolutely must be built to a design, because those poor and rather large families sleep amidst the farm animals, men and women intermingled, and are exposed to all foul weather, and consequently to serious illnesses and to every sort of suffering given the stench of the nearby stables, and the great humidity to which they are subjected especially in the wintertime.41 In all, six entirely new house constructions were required and two large extensions to existing houses. These conditions were not generalized throughout the estate, but they described the situation of a good many of its workers. The worst housing, moreover, existed on the areas of the colmate, that is, the farms that yielded the most per unit of seed, the highest return from the livestock, and the greatest income. On these most fertile of lands the administrators had been content to allow the most disgraceful living conditions for their laborers; and it was because the area was so fertile that the old administration probably never felt any need to provide better housing, a situation that epitomizes the mezzadria system wherein the landlord supplied the least capital on the most fertile lands.42 The new concern for the living conditions of the peasants, manifest in 1769, already characterized the nascent sentiments of agrarian reform. The General Administrators, Siminetti and Gavard, seem to have been important agents in this movement; their position on the matter of fishing rights found a parallel in their position on housing. Their attitude contrasted sharply with that which Sansedoni had expressed in 1756. They reported that the housing repairs and extensions should be undertaken care41 42

ASF, 3563, no. 38. See the discussion of the mezzadria by Biffi Tolomei, Saggio d'agricoltura practica toscana.

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fully and promptly because they pertained to the farms located on the plain - lands from which the estate reaped the highest return and a good profit from the livestock. 'Unquestionably,' they added one of the methods most apt to promote good agriculture is to allow the workers of the land to enjoy comfortable quarters, which besides rendering them more fond of their farms and more industrious, by relieving them of the suffering and the danger of illness, also puts them in a position to work the land better and to extract a greater profit from it as a result.43 Far from considering masonry houses to be an unnecessary expense, Siminetti and Gavard conceived of housing as a key factor in promoting the economic development of the estate. Finally, then, the abuses of half a century were corrected over a few short years under Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo. Even here, however, the solution to the peasant's dilemma lay by definition outside of his grasp. The cost of awaiting reform from above enhanced the suffering, illness, discomfort, and emotional stress resulting from crowded conditions. To these discomforts must be added the perennial and regular occurrence of fire that so easily ignited straw huts, but also had time to spread within the wooden and masonry walls of isolated homesteads. On 14 September 1720, the parish priest recorded the death of a twenty-year-old woman who was trapped in a house enveloped by flames. The priest gave her absolution while he stood outside the flaming structure and listened to the woman's screams of 'Gesu.'44 In 1715 a child was burned to death.45 Humans presented more danger to peasant families. As custodian of the lands of the grand duke, the peasant and his crops were a target for the needy eyes of the rural poor. A letter from Florence told of the following incident: We hear that Michele Gennai's son came across a certain Bonicolino Bonicolini who had cut a quantity of his millet and was carrying it off with a cart, and after he took it away from him, this Bonicolini got together his brothers armed with weapons and clubs to give it 43

ASF, SF, 308, *C\

44

APA, Libro de Morti.

45

Ibid.

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Altopascio

to Gennai as he was returning home, but little harm resulted thanks to the people who ran to the defense of Gennai. You have done well to order the arrest of these persons and have them also charged for the damage done to the millet.46 Nature, too, created violent troubles. The tramontana north wind that gains momentum along this flat area as it blows down from the Apennine range hits the Altopascio district very hard, as its present-day residents are always quick to report. Strong winds and storms regularly damaged the houses, especially the roofs blown off by gusts of wind that slipped beneath the tiles. Wind and storm also disturbed the rivers against which the peasants defended the lands of the grand duke and their own labor. These floods posed real danger to life, in particular to those who lived on farms contiguous to the rivers and the lakes. Among items that warranted expenditure in 1637 there is the following: Item. Build a house on high ground for the worker of the holding at the end of the River Ralla. He is tending cattle there and the danger is that all the animals and the family will perish in a flood some day. This year alone they have had tofleethat danger on two occasions in the middle of the night.47 Floods, then, constituted still another danger in the service of the lands of the grand duke. Occupational hazards also existed in this pre-industrial society. Several of the reported fires started from operations in the processing of flax. Falling from trees while pruning or gathering leaves was another common occupational hazard, one that caused fatalities recorded in the parish registers. The tools of the peasant's work could also be dangerous, especially in the hands of the inexperienced: in April 1725 a four year old fell on a sickle and died.48 Drownings were another occupational hazard for those who went by boat into the swamp in search of underbrush and fertilizer or to transport goods. A whole body of dangers were part and parcel of peasant living. The peasants represented their sufferings in their petitions 46 47 48

ASF, RP, 3090, f. 112, 8 Oct. 1696. ASF, RP, 1310, no. 46.

APA, Libro de Morti.

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to the grand duke. Most of these sufferings relate to work, because physical labor was the dominant feature of the peasant's life. Labor began at a very early age: young children around four or five could be given the task of tending livestock; at seven years of age one child was considered old enough to be given out as a garzone apprentice.49 Work began early in life and lasted until death or paralysis brought it to an end. In this context afflictions of the human body were dreaded as disabling. The proper performance of arms, legs, and hands was crucial because their impairment could leave one without a function in society. Many petitions50 came from the elderly who were physically unable to work but could not survive economically without it. Take the case of the sixtyyear-old man who begged for charity because paralysis in fingers on both hands left him 'disabled and unfit to earn a whole day's food by his labor.' Or the case of Pietro di Gaetano Poggetti who furnished a doctor's attestation that he had suffered for seven years from an intestinal hernia on the right side, along with a thyroid disturbance; or the case of a sixty-year-old woman without children who had become incapacitated by a crippled leg. Michele Gonfiantini needed a food subsidy because for two months sharp pains in the arm left him unable to work. No understanding of this rural society can be reached until the drama of illness is placed within terms of labor and subsistence. Bartolomeo, a bastard from the foundling home at Pisa, told how he had lived with a peasant family as a farm laborer (garzone) 'but never drew a salary of any sort beyond food and clothing.' Now the mezzadro family could not even afford to provide him with that, and so Bartolomeo petitioned for a food subsidy 'because he is no longer in a condition to turn elsewhere with profit as a farm laborer on account of a hernia that renders him unfit for the laborious farm chores, finding himself at the age of fifty-four.' Growing old in this society could be painful indeed. So could pregnancy. Maria Antonia, wife of Pier Giuseppe 49 50

ASF, RP, 3129, f. 259, 18 Feb. 1735/36. All the quotations that follow are from petitions in ASF, RP, 2556, appended to the Report of Luigi Bartolini, 31 Dec. 1783.

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Sevieri, mezzadro, submitted a doctor's affidavit that her last pregnancy had left her suffering with retention of urine. Even an expectant mother might not be spared the relentless physical labor that existence demanded of her - a plight that formed the substance of the following petition: Maria Domenica, wife of Domenico Raugi, of the Commune of Monte Carlo and the people of Altopascio, most humble servant and subject of Your Royal Highness, bravely represents to him how she finds herself obliged on account of her destitute circumstances to toil away her life in laborious work even during the time of her pregnancy. From which it has happened that, as you may believe, for four times she has given birth to four dead creatures. Two parish priests, one of Altopascio and the other of the Querce, attested to the miscarriages. The story of Angelo di Leonardo Poggetti can serve as a gauge for measuring the gravity of these afflictions. Forty-nine years old and bedridden, Poggetti often had to hire labor to work his podere on account of which * he suffers expenses that do him no small harm, because for the man who has little, it takes only a small loss to cause serious trouble/ All these petitions were considered genuine both by the estate manager and the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions. They recreate in vivid terms the anguish borne by rural societies. For peasants and small farmers alike, illness and paralysis and labor were the facts of life. For everyone in this society illness was disabling. Only for the rural poor, however, did each short interruption in the ability to work threaten one's survival. Only the rural poor understood the full meaning of what life meant 'for the man who has little'; and the mezzadri formed the backbone of the laboring poor. The irony is, for these people who slaved and suffered from early childhood through their last years, the formula recording burials in the parish registers may have been correct when it introduced each death with the words: 'there passed to a better life.' The leaseholder segment of this society, being a tenurial standard and not one of wealth or profession, naturally encompassed people at both extremes - the prosperous as

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well as the impoverished. This class, too, faced mounting indebtedness and a narrow margin of surplus to allocate towards their rent payments. In absolute levels their debts were much smaller than those of mezzadri; but most likely the livellari also owed money to creditors other than the grand duke. The grand-ducal documents offer very little information about private livellari accounts; but actions by creditors against livellari which affected the grand-ducal administration revealed that these people were indebted to third parties. Dowries, for example, were regular items that could place a family in debt, along with the rather widespread diffusion of the censo mortgage by which a party received a specified sum of money from the lender and then promised in return a fixed annual payment in perpetuity. Livellari might also owe tax payments to the local government. Indebtedness, in short, was a definite problem for this group and it affected all echelons: even the cream of this class could, and did, become indebted. The very bottom of the leaseholding category could clearly merge with the mezzadri class with respect to wealth, income and welfare. There was, nonetheless, important economic and social differentiation. The livellari remained farmers throughout the period, that is, they had an active relationship to the market and they were not merely subsistence producers, even though a large portion of their crops probably went towards their subsistence. The social differentiation was even more pronounced. For one thing, livelli contracts, which generally ran from three to four lives in duration, allowed a security of tenure that was unknown to the mezzadri. Certainly, the contracts provided for eviction under specified terms, and mainly if the tenant accumulated a debt in excess of three years' annual rent. Even then, however, the permission to pay debts on composition, that is, in annual installments, usually allowed the family to remain. Some families even stayed on their leasehold in excess of four lives simply because the initial registration of the contract had disappeared. Livelli that expired could, moreover, be renewed for another three or four lives. Around this relative security of land the livellari family could unite, divide, and transmit from

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one generation to the next; and this association of property accounts for the different household structure and the types of association of households among livellari families, even as they definitely had substantially smaller households than the mezzadri of the grand duke. This greater degree of independence from the landlord brought the livellari less of the grand duke's protection and more of his rigorous prosecution. But their personal freedom exceeded by far that of the grand-ducal sharecropper. Depending on the size and the quality of the holding, the livellari group had, all things being equal, more of an opportunity to rise or fall on the social scale. Their horizons were not as rigidly fixed as the mezzadro's because through clever combinations, adequate farming, and good luck, they could extract a greater share from the crop; they could also develop a second occupation: carting, or masonry, or carpentry. At this point, therefore, the livellari and the artisans tend to merge, because livellari practiced skilled trades and artisans held land on lease. A double occupation improved the possibilities of the family because the land, in this case, more easily yielded subsistence while artisan work provided useful additional income. The reader should not, however, form an impression of the overall prosperity of this class, because these people were rarely prosperous. The artisan-livellari families nevertheless distinguished themselves from the rest of peasant society and constituted the lower layer of the rural bourgeoisie. At the top of the social pyramid there were the notables of the village. These notable families were described by the end of the eighteenth century as gentlemen living on their rents. In fact they obtained livelli and then farmed them out to laborers on a short-term basis. Over this period these families came to display considerably more aggressive economic behavior. In the seventeenth century, for example, the Lenzi dealt in bread and grain, the Baldaccini sold wine, or operated the inn or the mill. In other words, the notables originated as small merchants, even as the Vettori, also gentlemen, were engaged in 1767 as merchants of silk and cattle 'and other things.' These families had diversified portfolios, like the

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Lenzi family, who combined the medical profession with their rentier status. If these families moved from aggressiveness to timidity in their economic affairs in the course of the eighteenth century, they did so as a function of the evolution of their particular family and not as a characteristic of the notable class as a whole. To repeat, the Vettori, like many of those who applied for the lands of the estate when it was offered on lease, were active and aggressive merchants who also held land. The notables were humble in comparison with the Florentine patricians, and they were by no means aristocrats. In the city of Florence they probably would have ranked as little more than petty-bourgeois. Yet here, within the village world, they were powerful, impressive characters. They, unlike the rest of society, were styled ' gentlemen' and titles came into use in the parish registers in the course of the eighteenth century to describe these notable families. In the seventeenth century the title had always been reserved for important men like the estate manager, and in that period it was never applied to these notable families, whereas it was being used for them around the early decades of the eighteenth century. These families thus earned the recognition of the title within the local society in the eighteenth century, a development that corroborates other important indicators about the consolidation of this rural bourgeoisie. Notable families also exhibited a well-developed sense of identity.51 The sons and daughters of the Baldaccini, the Lenzi, and the Vettori generally married outside the parish, except on occasions when a prospective spouse could be taken from their peers within the village. These people displayed, then, an important element of middle-class consciousness concern over mesalliance. The provenance of their marriage partners also reflects this development, because they came from farther away than the spouses of the lower orders of society. The practice of naming children also differentiated notables from the rank and file of society. Pietro Panattoni, an influential leader in the village around the 1770s and 51

These remarks stem from the intimate view of the families of Altopascio obtained in the course of the family reconstitution project.

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1780s, named his first son Giovan Gaspero Eusebio, his third son Luigi Leonardo Baldassare, and his seventh son Leone Maria Melchior. These fantastic multiple names would be surpassed by those used in the contemporary Vettori family, exemplifying the way these notable families distinguished themselves from the lower classes by their choice of names. Another expression of the notable family's identity was its pew in the parish church. In January 1765, when a priest not native to the parish rearranged the pews, he provoked a furor. The grand-ducal administration pacified the people by ordering that the priest return the pews to their customary place. Later on, the administrators decided to correct the * abuse' of these families appropriating the church through their benches. In 1781 the Deputies of the Royal Possessions ordered the family pews to be removed and new ones to be installed.52 The important point, once again, was the symbolic representation of the family within the church, and the fierce sensitivity to status. The priest had not simply moved a pew, he had disturbed the delicate hierarchy within the community. The social control of notable families extended to the religious sphere. More often than not, the parish priest came from their class since these families were more influential and more literate. Baldaccini, Lenzi, Panattoni are the names of the notable families and also of the parish clergy. Leadership in the religious confraternities fell to the rural bourgeoisie. For one of these confraternities, the Company of the Purification, accounts have survived from the late seventeenth through the late eighteenth century.53 These accounts give the name of the treasurer of the confraternity, a one-year term. For eighty-one years, the office was filled by 28 different families. The distribution among those 28 families is even more interesting. Four families, the Baldaccini, the Lenzi, the Manzuoli and the Vettori, held office 40 % of the time. In all the distribution proves that 14 individuals 52

53

ASF, RP, 3152, f. 18, 12 Jan. 1765. The final decision to remove the family pews altogether is in ASF, RP, 3173, f. 227, and a second letter to the estate manager lists the families owning pews and refers to their resistance to the order of the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions (ibid., ff. 304-5). ASF, CSSM, P XLVI Compagnia della Purificazione, Entrata e Uscita.

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held office for only one year, and he might be the fattore or a new steward of the hospice; but only 14 families over an entire century managed to hold office 83 % of the time. Even though these religious confraternities attracted a large percentage of the population, perhaps as much as 50 %,54 the notables controlled the institution by virtue of their status in the society. The concentration of authority among these families is manifest. At the very top of their rank stood two personalities, one clerical and one secular, the village priest and the estate manager. 54

According to the Episcopal visit of 1685, the Confraternity of San Rocco had 40 members, while that of the Purificazione had 120 members. In a visit two years earlier, the membership of San Rocco in 1683 was reported as being 70 with 240 members in the Company of the Purificazione (AVSM, Visite Pastorali). The population of the village in 1684 was 602. The discrepancy between the two sets of membership estimates may be due to the presence of members from outside the parish in 1683, or to the presence of male members only in 1685.

8 The local authority

The grand-ducal local representatives, as administrators of his property, had the right to exercise authority over the villagers of Altopascio. The grand duke delegated to the parish priest the duty of maintaining the moral welfare of his subjects and controlling the distribution of alms in the name of the church. The temporal authority to govern the village and to preserve order devolved upon the estate manager. The parish priest and the fattore were the two most important men in the village. Perhaps no other role in this society is less suitable for generalization than that of the village priest, because the way in which he performed his duties was determined by intimate personal convictions which are unlikely to be recorded. Our task here is to situate the parish priest within the village community and to underline some of his characteristic functions. The parish of Altopascio imposed its own particular requirements. On the one hand, its considerable charities required a capable and intelligent administrator; on the other hand, this rural parish had little to offer a sophisticated cleric. In an undated letter from the end of the sixteenth century, Senator Giovanbattista Capponi described the task of finding a parish priest in his letter to Signor Piero Usimbardi, the Secretary of Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici, the future grand duke. As for Altopascio, I have several priests to choose from, but careful deliberation is necessary because one has to weigh both the spiritual and temporal considerations. And the priest of Santa Maria named Ughi has recommended a priest who for many years has served well 182

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the spiritual needs of a certain group of nuns; but he also has a reputation of liking material comforts, and the village requires a plain sort of man who is willing to work long and hard.1 The qualifications demanded by the agents of the grand duke resulted in the selection of competent priests. Unsatisfactory clerics were promptly dismissed. The efficiency of the parish registers is one indication. Another can be found in the reports of the Episcopal visits that regularly describe the inhabitants of Altopascio as well educated in Christian doctrine.2 Religious ignorance was dangerous and could even be heretical. In the late sixteenth century a guard of the estate of Altopascio was accused before the Inquisition at Pisa of allegedly denying Christ's presence in the Eucharist.3 The guard readily retracted this statement and the whole episode resembles more a case of religious ignorance than formal heresy. But the example proves that the magnitude of errors could be grand indeed. As late as 1684, the parish priest wrote alongside the names of four men, aged between 30 and 35, that they did not know the articles of the faith.4 The clergy reacted to this problem and their response was a program of apparently successful religious education. Most of the parish priests came from native families, notable families - Baldaccini, Lenzi, Panattoni. Sometimes a priest was chosen from outside the parish, but this type of nomination generally created more difficulties than advantages. For one thing, priests from notable families could employ all the influence of their family within the social hierarchy; their legal authority was reinforced by their social power. Outsiders were more likely to inspire opposition and less able to fend off attacks. Nominees were also disappointed 1 2 3

4

AC, iv, no. 20: 'Lettera del Senatore Giovanbattista Capponi scritta al Signore Usimbardi Segretario del Cardinale de' Medici.' AVSM, Visite Pastorali, 1624. ' Io prete Luca Seghieri rettore di S. Jacopo di Cafaggioreggio di Pisa e cappellano alle Spianate di Montecarlo denuntio a voi Padre Reverendo Inquisitor di Pisa et questo per scarico della conscienzia mia come nel comune del Altopascio vi si trova Giuliano detto Cacine da Sorana guardia del gran duca il quale. . . disse che i sacerdoti non hanno autorita di far venir Xr'to nel Hostia et che non credeva che scendesse di cielo nel Hostia perche Dio stava in paradiso et essendo ripreso prontamente da tutti non fece frutto alcuno.' My thanks to Sergio Nelli for his transcription of the document. APA, Stato d'anime, 1684.

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by the situation of the parish, and notably its 'bad air' that derived from close proximity to the Lakes of Bientina and Fucecchio and all the illnesses associated with stagnant water. The country rudeness familiar to those of the parish might horrify the newcomer. Most important of all, the outsider was ignorant of the factions within the village. Simple acts like moving the pews in church could mushroom into severe blunders. Even natives, however, fell victims to factionalism. The parish priest shared the pinnacle of influence in this local society with the fattore. At times, though, these two men did not share power agreeably. Their rivalry stemmed in part from the fact that both the estate manager and the parish priest dispensed the pistacchie, the charitable coins that entitled the bearer to a specified quantity of food. The fattore dispensed them as payment for the services performed by the peasants outside the scope of the mezzadria; the parish priest dispensed them to the pilgrims and others who merited the traditional charities associated with the hospital of Altopascio. On occasion each could find fault with the administration of the other; either man was liable to report to the deputies unwarranted dispensations of pistacchie, which of course irritated the other by that act of interference. A case in the mid-eighteenth century involved a parish priest who conspired against the fattore and used his influence among the village population to bolster his attack of the estate manager with their accusations.5 Beyond these structural considerations, the tensions between fattore and village priest mirror the age old struggle between secular and religious authorities, especially since the priest played such an important role in temporal matters. As dispenser of the charities granted by the grand duke, the priest was simultaneously an agent of God entrusted with the care of souls and an agent of the grand duke with rules to enforce. Because of a still imperfect distinction between the grand duke and the state, the parish priest was, then, both a civil and a religious servant. This fundamental ambiguity constituted the axis around which revolved the priest's relations with the community; the particular pole which exercised the most attraction would determine to what degree the priest 5

ASF, RP, 3153, ff. 169, 180, 198.

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enjoyed harmonious relations with the parishioners and/or the grand duke. The parish priest was central to the life of the village. The villagers were not subservient before his authority, but readily protested against misallocations of charity or misspending of donations. In fact as a civil servant the priest was liable to incur popular hostility for actions ordered at a higher level. In 1776, for example, certain villagers accused Father Lorenzo Panattoni of having responsibility for transferring the hospital from Altopascio to Pescia.6 Actually that decision emanated from the grand-ducal administration in Florence and applied to several institutions, not just to Altopascio; but as a civil servant the priest suffered the angry village reaction to the policies of the grand duke. Sometimes the dual orientation of the priest's task split into open contradiction, thereby forcing conflict either with his parishioners or with the Deputies of the Royal Possessions. The classic instances derived from occasions when the priest, in the interests of the service of the grand duke, had denied an important charitable subsidy to a family. The priest, for instance, had to exclude a girl from eligibility for the dowry provided by the grand duke if she was not a native of the village. A more delicate case involved a parish priest who refused to visit a dying member of a parishioner's family. A charitable food subsidy was traditionally given to pregnant women of the village and to the dying. This time the parish priest maintained that the parishioner's child had feigned illness in order to obtain the subsidy; and the parishioner violently objected to this charge. The Deputies of the Royal Possessions advised the priest to do his duty but to be careful not to commit the horrendous omission of denying the Last Rites to a dying person.7 Tensions over charitable allowances naturally multiplied in 6 7

See Chapter 9 for the precise quotation. ASF, RP, 3093, f. 63, Letter to the Curate of Altopascio, l7Oct. 1699. Interestingly enough, the parish registers around this same time record a significant number of instances when the parish priest was not called to the aid of dying persons. Because of the existence of this charitable subsidy, this behavior was not to the economic advantage of the family, and it could mean one of several things: a reluctance or an inability to diagnose fatal illness, reluctance to summon the priest to avoid frightening the ailing person, or simply a lack of recognition of the sacramental necessity of the Last Rites.

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Altopascio

years of dearth. The famine that regularly visited the Tuscan countryside set loose a whole segment of society that roamed in search of food. Many of these people headed for the hospice of Altopascio, but the parish priest was frequently reminded by the Deputies of the Royal Possessions that the charities were intended exclusively for pilgrims and travelers, not for the local residents.8 Hungry people did not always see the justice in that distinction. In 1702, at the hospital of the Commenda of Altopascio at Pescia, a hungry pregnant woman struck the priest as he dispensed the alms.9 Similar incidents probably occurred at Altopascio and lay behind the charges of 'insolence' to the priest recorded in the correspondence of the grand duke's agents. At the same time priests tended, under pressure from the populace, to ignore the advice of the deputies of the grand duke in Florence. The number of occasions during years of dearth in which the deputies reminded the priest of the regulations proves that, more often than not, priests closed their eyes to official restrictions and opened their hearts to the procession of wretched people who marched through Altopascio. The priests often displayed an unusual sense of accommodation. At the end of the eighteenth century, the parish registers record the death of a man who regularly slept in the hospital of Altopascio because he had no home.10 Strictly speaking these accommodations were only for pilgrims and travelers. In actual fact the priest had been moved by the condition of this poor man. Documentary proof of similar behavior dates from a letter of 31 January 1741 from the deputies to the Curate Guidi: It has been reported to me from an unusual source that people stay on in that hospice more than the customary time, and that lodging is not furnished exclusively to pilgrims but also to others who are perhaps people from the village, or from the surrounding area who return several times; therefore I ask you to watch that alms are distributed according to the established practice only to pilgrims, 8 9 10

For some statements of this policy in 1676, see ASF, RP, 3066,ff.490, 515, 597. The incident (/'attentato) is discussed in ASF, RP, 3096, f. 388, and on f. 433 it is revealed that the woman was pregnant. APA, Libro de Morti, 1 Jan. 1717: Carlo di Mariano di Luca 'morto nello spedale dove si ritirava il piu delle notte per non avere ne casa ne letto.'

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and not to those who beg for excuses to stay on there beyond what is just.11 A letter from the parish priest Giovan Antonio Baldaccini dated 13 May 1750 shows him a model of sensitivity. The compassion that I feel for the hardship and distress of the majority of my parishioners compels me to inform Your Most Illustrious how all my predecessors have made a practice of helping needy families with the alms of this hospice. I report this in the hope of obtaining permission to succor the poor of my parish during this truly calamitous year. I can assure him that already in traveling about the parish I have witnessed these poor creatures eat raw grass out of hunger, and others come to church less often on account of their starvation. Therefore, for my conscience's sake, I implore the sum of his goodness to allow me too to fulfill my duty and distribute the goods of the church, which are the patrimony of the poor, and not appear cruel by refusing so many needy persons who beg for bread to relieve their hunger. Awaiting a prompt and benign order, I declare myself full of homage and true esteem.12 T h e research conducted by the Deputies of the Royal Possessions uncovered no direct aid of the type to which Father Baldaccini alluded, except in 1707 when doctors had been sent throughout the Valdinievole to treat the many people stricken during an epidemic. T h e priest's allusion probably reflects an illicit, yet equally ready ability of the village priests to meet the needs of the hungry out of the charities of Altopascio. T h e deputies forwarded this petition to the Abbondanza, the state agency which regulated grain supplies; that agency, and not the Royal Possessions, promptly furnished aid. Here, then, was one parish priest who preferred to use the revenue from the estate to serve the needs of his parishioners rather than the financial interests of the grand duke: the property of the church, he argued, was the property of the poor. Legally of course the church was, and remained, the property of the grand duke. Village society and grand-ducal administration placed the career of the parish priests within the terms of a specified social equation. T h e relations between priest and parishioner 11 12

ASF, RP, 3134, f. 237, 31 Jan. 1740/41. ASF, SF, 307, 'Anni Precedenti,' 1750.

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at any given time depended upon the values assigned to the variables in the equation by the priest himself. Harmonious careers hinged upon the reaction of the villagers and the deputies of the grand duke towards the behavior of the priest; a tranquil parish depended, too, upon that other minister of authority, the estate manager. Situated as he was at the top of the village hierarchy, the estate manager was a man whose favor the notables and artisans were anxious to court. After all he controlled patronage in the form of livello contracts and work assignments, and he administered the grand duke's property, which was nothing less than the entire village. For these very reasons the central administrators of the grand-ducal lands advised the fattore to remain aloof from personal ties and local rivalries. It was practically impossible, however, to avoid those who besides being neighbors were also so solicitous of favors from the estate manager. As a corrective the fattore was always an outsider. Even the Berti family, who ran Altopascio as fattore for over half a century, came originally from a district north of Florence.13 The need for an efficient administration independent of the local population is embodied architecturally in the physical separation of the fattore who was housed in the 'palace' set apart from the rest of the village. The fattore's was a demanding job. In addition to the requisite agricultural knowledge, he had to be highly literate and capable of keeping refined financial accounts. The estate manager also filed reports on any particular problem on which the deputies requested information. He needed the ability to interpret legal contracts, the judgment to negotiate big marketing deals, and the skills to manage a naturally shrewd and recalcitrant peasantry. His technical advice helped in selecting the sites for, and in actually executing, landreclamation projects. The fattore supervised the alms dispensed by the clergy, maintained order, and policed the village when required. Besides being a difficult position, it was a vulnerable one. Vulnerability derived from the very power of the fattore. Although he could inspire fear in the peasantry, their slightest 13

ASF, RP, 3770, 13 May 1662.

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ridicule or defiance could embarrass him in society and undermine his authority.14 Power could draw out the worst and most egotistical in a man, and the Medici administrators were the first to rebuke a heady fattore. In the late sixteenth century there were several reputed cases of fraud and embezzlement by estate managers. A reform in 1618 centralized all decisions about spending and other important matters in the hands of the Committee of the Royal Possessions in Florence, from which the fattore had to secure advance approval.15 The estate manager was personally responsible for any money missing from his accounts; and his mallevadore and pledge against his own property could always be held over his head for mismanagement. The Committee severely limited his power. On one occasion when the fattore dismissed a peasant from service without the permission of the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, the fattore was crisply reminded that he, too, was dispensable; he was only the agent, wrote the deputy, the Superintendent was the minister!16 All these factors establish the context for the case of Benedetto Sconditi, a man for whom the abundant information available allows us to penetrate the personality of the individual and his mentality. Strictly speaking, Sconditi was not a fattore. In 1768 he was appointed Superintendent of the estate of Altopascio and Customs Agent of the new customs house there. Formerly the customs agent at Bientina, Sconditi's dual position was created to combine efficient administration of the estate with control of the brisk contraband traffic in the district. He ranked above the fattore in the hierarchy of the estate management. This was the first time such an appointment had been made and for most of his activities he behaved as the man in charge, as the fattore traditionally had been. For his combined jobs, Benedetto Sconditi earned a salary of 1,400 lire annually and free lodging in the palace of the estate. Sconditi's instructions began with the advice that the administration of this estate was a complicated affair and that he should be persistent both in his own efforts and in use of the 14 15

ASF, RP, 3770, 8 Oct. 1663. ASF, RP, 2334, no. 2, f. 1.

16

ASF, RP, 3058, f. 102.

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courts to keep livellari up to date on their rent payments. Similar diligence was required in the purchase and sale of livestock, and his supervision of the work of digging the canals and repairing the houses should be executed in a way that would produce durable results at the least possible cost; he must be conservative in lending food provisions to the peasants, teaching them domestic economy when necessary as * experience demonstrates that a comfortable peasant maintains his farm well, and a poor one is most negligent.' The estate manager should also see that the amount of land assigned a peasant family is proportionate to its size. Finally we recommend unity, without which an estate can never produce those good results that are desired by the proprietor. Certainly one who supervises an administration must not form intimate friendships with persons from the village, and particularly with the turbulent inhabitants of Altopascio, who are wont to vex their superiors with petitions.17 A year later, on 23 September 1769, it was recommended that Sconditi should be granted an increase in salary and a share of the emoluments of the fattore, this for his 'excellent service.'18 Subsequent behavior revealed, however, that Sconditi never absorbed the lesson about 'unity' contained in the instructions. Before long the administration of the estate of Altopascio was badly divided. After nine months in office, Benedetto Sconditi had already begun a campaign against the fattore Betti who had been described in the Instructions of 1768 as 'very capable.' In July 1769 Sconditi informed the General Administrators that Betti was lazy about collecting debts owed to the estate and showed 'little diligence' in his management of the peasants and of the countryside. Sconditi wrote by the end of August that both his reputation and his finances required the removal of the incompetent Betti who never left the village walls either to go to market or to visit the farms. ' He does not behave like an estate manager of Altopascio, but rather like a gentleman spending the whole day in the center of this [village] amusing himself with the female sex and other 17

ASF, RP, 3563, no. 18.

18

ASF, SF, 307, 'Ruolo.'

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things, as is well known throughout the village, and it falls to the others to fill in for his duties.'19 These were only part of the total charges Sconditi made against Betti: others included disobeying orders about executing repairs and acting on his own with inferior results; of selling eighty sacks of sorghum below the market prices because the buyers were his friends; of negligence that allowed the leaseholders to be lax in paying their rents and made scoundrels of the peasants, because he failed to use the courts against the leaseholders, and the peasants 'turn his head with gifts.' If the administrators would not fire Betti, Sconditi begged to be transferred because no one could manage Altopascio efficiently with the likes of Betti as fattore. The only way to manage the estate efficiently, he argued, was by 'changing the system, the method, and the personnel.' Sconditi promised that he could then apply his full personal attention towards achieving a sound administration of the estate; and he offered to furnish collateral, as required of a fattore, in the form of his own patrimony 'altogether unencumbered and of some magnitude.'20 The words of Sconditi reveal a strong, aggressive personality, bent on remodeling an easy-going administration by overturning the old system and method. Himself a man of property, Sconditi demanded efficient management in every sphere of the fattoria. In a Report of 1769 he severely criticized the peasants for keeping their farms badly and for raising livestock on their own account.21 He moved against the leaseholders in the next few years by quantifying the area of land they had usurped through encroachment and charging them additional rent.22 He brought more injury in 1772 by noting the houses of the livellari in the countryside that were in terrible condition and by ordering the families to repair them.23 In 1773 Sconditi worked against the man who 19 20 21 22

23

ASF, RP, 3563, Report of Benedetto Sconditi, 31 Aug. 1769.

Ibid. Ibid., n o . 144: 'Relazione sopra diversi Articoli della Fattoria dell'Altopascio di

S.A.R;

Ibid., no. 146: * Nota di diversi terreni r i t r o v a t i . . . usurpati alia fattoria,' dealt with 11 leaseholders w h o h a d usurped 13 coltre of land a n d o w e d a total additional rent of 3 4 staia of segalato. Ibid., n o . 155, listed 2 9 such houses.

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replaced Betti, fattore Agostino Parlanti, but the investigation of Parlanti uncovered negligence and not fraud on his part when he advanced food to laborers who were unable to repay the loans.24 Parlanti was personally debited for these advances and all dealings involving collection and payment were taken out of the fattore9s hands and placed within the willing grasp of Benedetto Sconditi. By that date, however, it was apparent that his 'shake up' of the administration of Altopascio had earned Sconditi many dangerous enemies. Already in November 1772, after Sconditi had released the under-fattore Morelli, Morelli requested an open trial to clear himself of the charges leveled by Sconditi. Sconditi also wanted a trial to acquit himself of Morelli's counter accusations. The General Administrators had to weave through these charges and counter charges and they decided that neither party's accusations merited a trial: Morelli had been fired for insolence, laziness, and 'connivance with some family of the village' to the point of setting aside for them some small amount of the estate's supplies. And as for Sconditi, if Morelli is to be believed, [the charges] boil down to a rather too haughty and intolerant demeanor, of which I have warned him on various occasions, and to familiarity with some family of the village, of which apparently not even Morelli is exempt, the difference being that the latter made the estate suffer the cost of it.25 The rest of the charges against Sconditi, so the administrators reported, amounted to poor managerial decisions rather than deliberate fraud. But Morelli's accusations included various acts of violence committed by Sconditi against individual peasants, one of whom he reportedly beat with a club for having relieved himself over by the stable of the estate on a festival day.26 And when the administrator Niccolo Siminetti judged Sconditi innocent of the charges made by Morelli, his decision rested on the investigation conducted by the manager of the grand-ducal estate of Pratolino, whose report exonerated Sconditi of any fraud or mismanagement but 24 25 26

Ibid., Report of Francesco Nefetti, 17 July 1773. ASF, SF, 307, 'M-R,' Antonio Morelli. ASF, RP, 3563, no. 150: Memoria of Niccolo Siminetti, 9 Jan. 1773.

The local authority

193

which, interestingly enough, never addressed the accusations of violence.27 The sigh of relief breathed by Sconditi when he received Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo's letter of 18 January 1773 dropping the charges made against him, undoubtedly gave him a false sense of security. The 'turbulent inhabitants' of Altopascio could not be expected to lie down before a proud, aggressive, and violent minister. On 28 February 1770, Sconditi reported that the fattoressa Francesca Melosi' let the former estate manager Lorenzo Betti into the fattoria when we were all out and was divulging to him all that has happened not so much in domestic matters as in political ones.' Upon discovering Betti within the palace of the estate, Sconditi rebuked the two conspirators and he warned the former fattore that if he caught him again in the rooms of the fattoria: 'I would make him jump out the window.'28 The image of influential people within the village conspiring against Sconditi is reinforced from other letters. Giuseppe Lenzi, son of a notable family, accused Sconditi of denying his livello application because of Sconditi's favoritism towards the Pieretti family. On 8 August 1770, Sconditi referred to an earlier letter of his which described the threat to his life made openly by Lorenzo Baldaccini who had, in fact, lain in wait for Sconditi on two occasions but had been thwarted both times because the minister had been accompanied by the guard of the estate. Sconditi was frightened of his avowed enemy: 'This man, beyond the perpetration of so many villainous acts, has essayed the death of his father with an harquebus in his h a n d . . . in short he is a person capable of keeping his word.'29 At one point an unknown assailant nearly achieved his objective. On 24 April 1776, Sconditi reported the incident: For the last few days I have been suffering a great deal and further obliged to remain in bed on account of having taken poison, in what I do not know, and upon passing into the blood stream it deprived me of my senses, and made me very weak, with a strong headache, which gave me much to fear, but finally, thanks to the good care 27 29

28 Ibid. ASF, RP, 3565, no. 197, 28 Feb. 1770. Ibid., no. 102, 8 Aug. 1770.

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of Doctor Pagnini, I have recovered somewhat, being left with some inflammation and disturbance in the stomach.30 The reply from Florence did nothing more than acknowledge the report, but we know from a letter written just a few days before that Sconditi was also disturbed by the bad talk spreading about him. The deputies in Florence advised him to ignore the rumors, because 'one who is innocent must always live in tranquility.'31 Sconditi, however, was justifiably worried. Criminal prosecution began against him in little over a year, charging mismanagement of the estate and tyrannical treatment of the peasantry. A protocol of 13 January 1778 ordered Sconditi to be removed from service awaiting the results of his trial for bad management and his 'over impetuous and violent character.'32 So ended the episode of Benedetto Sconditi. Having disregarded the many early signs that portended disaster, he proceeded without being able to reconcile his enemies within the village; and he probably never even tried. The eventful trial against him gained greater momentum because of additional charges of sexual abuse. Sconditi, a married man, had an affair with a young girl of the village whose parents were deceased.33 The preconditions for his downfall had already been established by his regime which divided the administration and favored certain families in a polarized community. By his act of sexual indulgence, this powerful man in authority demeaned his station and made himself vulnerable to the most common attack, precisely where an earlier one had failed some four years before. Now the assault was a complete success and Sconditi was removed. This story, besides the insights it provides into the mind and manners of an estate manager, also illustrates the dogged local resistance of the 'turbulent inhabitants' of Altopascio. 30 31 32 33

ASF, RP, 3567, no. 38, 24 April 1776. ASF, RP, 6754, f. 12. ASF, SF, 307, 'R-Z,' Benedetto Sconditi. Ibid.

9 The expression of grievance

The bond between the villagers and the grand-ducal estate of Altopascio was comparable to that which might exist in a small industrial town where a single corporation dominates the lives of the residents. An idea of the community's identity can be drawn from its expression of grievance because therein lay the autonomous feelings of the community - independent reactions of groups and individuals which even this most powerful of landlords and the ruler of the state was unable to repress. During these centuries of grand-ducal administration, three broad categories of expression most clearly articulated the grievances of the community: crime, violence, and outright resistance. Practically all the crime in this society was directly linked to the material condition of the criminal. The correspondence between Florence and Altopascio was very specific on this point. On 20 June 1716, for example, the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions in Florence wrote to the estate manager of Altopascio: * It does not surprise us that theft is continually on the rise in that part of the countryside, because the same is happening elsewhere, and the cause of it is the common misery.'1 The prevalent crime was theft, which was difficult to prevent on the vast expanse of this estate, especially when the thieves were impoverished individuals acting out of desperation. In February 1695 the Royal Possessions reluctantly ordered the incarceration of Domenico Baccetti, who could not otherwise be stopped from stealing sticks and timber from 1

ASF, RP, 3110, f. 31, 20 June 1716.

195

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Altopascio

the forest. This man did not fear any possible fines because he owned no personal property that could be seized. Baccetti enjoyed the dubious freedom of having nothing to lose. Several months later he was again arrested for stealing wood; and in September 1695 his wife was apprehended for the same type of crime. A year later, in August 1696, Domenico Baccetti was caught stealing sorghum from one of the farms of the estate, and by now he earned the label of' a professional thief.'2 Most of the thefts represented an outgrowth of the distributive system in this society - an attempt to recover losses or correct inadequacies. Other types of crime share the same origin. The rural poor repeatedly violated the ban on fishing so as to supplement their diet with their illicit catch. The numerous offenders who trespassed on the estate to pasture their animals, or to gather animal or vegetable fertilizer, fit the same category. There was the contraband traffic, wherein peasants and small farmers disregarded prohibitions on buying or selling in the Lucchese, this when the Medici and other large producers were usually able to circumvent the same restrictions by securing tratte permits. There were the abundant cases of fraud in which grand-ducal peasants withheld a portion of the crop, or put aside some fertilizer for their private benefit and thus increased their return from the mezzadria. And there was the insolence expressed by individuals angry over grand-ducal policy, like that of Pietro d'Antonio Tongiorgi, who was imprisoned for his insolence on a work project ordered by the estate along the Pescia river.3 Of course all crimes committed in the locality did not originate solely from economic need: there were two cases of sexual attack reported, and other offenses which were motivated by different circumstances. Without any doubt, however, the great bulk of the reported crime emanated from the social and economic deprivation of the offender. The distribution of criminal incidents supports this interpretation. As one might expect, crime tended to 2 3

ASF, RP, 3088,ff.274, 309; 3089, f. 109; 3090, f. 79. ASF, RP, 3089,ff.335, 342.

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proliferate during the economic depression of the seventeenth century. Of the 213 crimes reported at Altopascio between 1665 and 1784, no less than 89% (189) took place in the years between 1665 and 1724, while in the subsequent sixty-year period the number dwindled to 24 (11 %).4 Violence spread along with crime: 28 assaults and 14 homicides between 1665 and 1784, with 27 of the assaults and 13 of the homicides occurring between 1665 and 1724.5 Like crime in general, violence tended to be accentuated during the worst years of the depression. Violence was a form of resistance closely related to other types of crime. In 1703, the police of the Commune of San Miniato were summoned to aid in apprehending the numerous violators who pillaged the forest 'with the intent of giving armed resistance to the guard' of the estate.6 The same dynamic that spurred the rural poor to steal likewise led them to commit acts of violence to evade apprehension. This was probably the motive behind the murder of a guard of Altopascio. The guard reaped the hostility of the local residents. In the first place, he enforced the laws of the grand duke which excluded the sprawling area of the estate from the general benefit of the public for fishing, grazing, etc. Secondly, the guard received a portion of his remuneration from in-kind contributions assessed from the grand-ducal peasantry and from fines exacted from offenders, which created the impression that he prospered from the punishment of poor transgressors. The documents record a barrage of insults and assaults upon the guard of the estate by grand-ducal peasants and outsiders. But violence to escape arrest was not confined in its application to the guards; it was also directed against the peasants of the grand duke. In June 1708, for example, the Royal Possessions ordered the imprisonment of Giovan Lorenzo del 4

5 6

I have compiled these and the following statistics on crime and violence from the total body of grand-ducal records examined in my research, and principally from the ongoing correspondence between the estate manager of Altopascio and the central administration in Florence in ASF, RP, Copialettere. ASF, RP, 3097, f. 262. ASF, RP, 3060, f. 1,147, 10 May 1670; 3062, f. 502, 16 April 1672.

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Altopascio

Grasso and Pelligrino di Giovanni Cecchi. When some grandducal peasants had come upon them in the act of damaging the farm, these offenders turned upon their accusers and wounded them with a sickle.7 At times the tension between impoverished criminals and the wretched mezzadri erupted in brutality far exceeding any legitimate defense, as in January 1708 when a grand-ducal peasant named Gennai discovered that Giovanni Bianucci had taken two turnips from his garden and killed him for it.8 Some of the violence represented a specific behavioral reaction to resist, or retaliate for, eviction from the lands of the estate. On 6 June 1639, the Royal Possessions had to ask the Mayor of Pescia to imprison Rinaldo di Matteo di Vincentio and his son Matteo, to confiscate their harvest, and to remove all the belongings from their home. These were leaseholders of the estate who also rented a house within the village walls. When their lease had been declared nullified for non-payment of rent, they tried * to remain there by the use of force and threats.'9 More of this kind of violence occurred in 1702. Two men named Baldaccini and Pieretti fell into disagreement over some money due from a farm that Baldaccini had leased from Pieretti. When Pieretti appeared on the scene and tried to remove some wine forcibly, the peasant went after him with an iron tool used for pruning grapevines.10 In October 1733 another lease expired for unpaid rent, but the leaseholder, Simone di Quirico Barbini, was deemed a 'man bold enough to commit homicide if evicted from his leasehold lands.' The administration feared that if Barbini were imprisoned straightaway, he might be even more dangerous as a result of his incarceration when finally released. The Deputies of the Royal Possessions were pleasantly surprised when Barbini agreed to leave his land peacefully.11 The administration was not so fortunate in 1748 when a leasehold was transferred to Giovanbattista Sevieri. Michele Cervelli, the peasant who 7 8 9 10 11

ASF, RP, 3102, 16 June 1708. ASF, RP, 3101, f. 394. ASF, RP, 3320, 21 June 1639. ASF, RP, 3096,ff.266, 277. ASF, RP, 3127,ff.141, 164.

The expression of grievance

199

cultivated the land before it passed to Sevieri, made off with all the straw from the farm, and he did serious damage to the land and the buildings in retaliation for eviction. The central administration finally ordered the guard of Altopascio to intervene and prevent any further devastation of the property.12 The atmosphere of crime and violence that permeated this small community can be gauged by the number of licenses issued to bear arms. The Tuscan grand dukes had a policy of controlling who had the right to carry arms by requiring a permit. Altopascians requested licenses for defense, not merely ostentation. In September 1639, Lorenzo di Matteo Gatti and his five sons petitioned for the right to carry an harquebus. They were long-time leaseholders of the estate, who made a living by fishing in the Lake of Bientina; but they suffered the animosity of Nardo di Matteo and his two sons, who made armed threats against the Gatti men as they passed along the Lucchese border in order to reach the Lake of Bientina. Background information described Nardo di Matteo and his sons as 'troublesome ruffians' who had been evicted from their houses at Altopascio and had taken refuge in the Lucchese from which' they continuously threaten Piero Berti estate manager of Your Highness.' It was recommended that the arms permit be granted so the Gatti could live calmly and go about their business with security.13 Because the estate manager faced dangerous situations like the one detailed above, he too had a permit to be armed while traveling about the estate. The surprising fact is that he was not nearly alone in this need. The parish priest had a license to bear arms, as did the storekeeper (canovaio), the clerk (scrivano), the steward (dispensiere), the dairyman (caciaio), the farmhands at the dairy (garzoni della cascina), and the work foreman (caporale de' lavori). The guards of the estate were armed.14 So were those who leased the Sibolla lake; and generally the permission to bear arms was included in any commercial negotiation that obligated the contracting party to transport goods 12 13 14

ASF, RP, 3137, 26 June 1748 and 23 July 1748. ASF, RP, 1311, '25,' 22 Sept. 1639. ASF, RP, 1311, '41/ 10 Dec. 1639; 3060, f. 678; 3059, f. 201.

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Altopascio

from Altopascio across some portion of the Tuscan state. The contract awarded in 1663 to transport firewood to the Royal Household in Pisa, for example, included the right of the carrier to bear offensive and defensive weapons throughout the cities and districts of the grand duchy and to carry an harquebus beyond 20 miles of the city of Florence.15 In all of the above instances, weapons were used for protection in a world where violence was expected. At one point the peasants of Altopascio were afraid to carry money to Florence for fear of assassins.16 Religious sentiment was mobilized in an attempt to help control individual acts of violence. In 1680 a priest of Altopascio complained that his parishioners were not being educated in Christian doctrine. Grand Duke Cosimo III ordered that such instruction be undertaken, and in harmony with Cosimo's personal religious commitment, missions became a regular feature of the rural scene. These were dramatic affairs, judging from the account left by Father Segneri of his mission at the city of Pescia. Besides the flagellation as a symbol of piety and the overt fundamentalist tone of men and women publicly confessing their sins, the missionaries also tallied the number of existing conflicts that were successfully resolved. Father Segneri noted that on his mission to Montecarlo 202 disputes were settled, 8 compromises negotiated, and 4 planned homicides were renounced.17 Other missions held throughout the Valdinievole fulfilled similar pacifying functions. A letter concerning Altopascio vividly juxtaposed the missionary movement alongside abackground of rural violence: the same letter that commented on the religious instruction performed by the missionaries told in the next paragraph of a recent murder.18 The frequency of violence at the end of the seventeenth century evoked a moral solution to help curb it. But religious sentiment was surely not enough. 15 16

17

ASF, RP, 3056, f. 239. ASF, RP, 3074, 30 June 1685.

For the complaint that religious instruction was lacking, see ASF, RP, 3081, f. 185; for the story of the missions, see Dante Biagiotti, 'II Padre Segneri in

Valdinievole,' Bollettino di ricerche e di studi per la storia di Pescia e di Valdinievole,

18

Anno II, Fascicolo II (1928), pp. 51-8. ASF, RP, 3101, f. 394, 7 Jan. 1707 (stilo fiorentino).

The expression of grievance

201

In 1736 the administration had to break with tradition and allow the police of the Pescia district to patrol the area around Altopascio. Bandits were using the village as a haven because of its jurisdictional immunities from communal authorities. The parish priest had written to Florence in that year that the same criminals who were terrorizing the countryside and frightening his parishioners actually took refuge in the hospice of Altopascio and beneath the arcade of the Church of San Jacopo. The police of Pescia were asked to enter the territory and do everything to keep the village 'clean' of thieves.19 This new policy was probably a significant factor in the drop in reported crime in the eighteenth century. All this discussion has a bearing on an interesting historical problem, namely, the complete absence of any peasant uprisings in Tuscany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries until the ' Viva Maria' uprising of Tuscan peasants against the French occupation.20 During the same years of the general crisis of the seventeenth century that witnessed annual peasant tumults in France, and important rebellions in Catalonia, Naples, and elsewhere, the Tuscan peasantry never rebelled against the state or the landlord. Precisely because of the abundant evidence of rural violence at Altopascio, this failure to revolt cannot be explained in terms of any inherently peaceful nature of these Tuscan peasants. Local grievances ran deep at Altopascio but resistance followed a rather different course. The lack of a communal government in Altopascio deprived the villagers of a political forum until the elimination of their tax-exempt status brought them under the jurisdiction of the Commune of Montecarlo near the end of our history. The inhabitants had never accumulated the experience of regular political activity, and their expression of grievance was consequently devoid of any broad intellectual or constitutional framework. Village politics still floated on the backwater fostered by the seigneurial dominance of the landlord. But the atmosphere at Altopascio was nonetheless charged with live issues. 19 20

ASF, RP, 3129, f. 259, 18 Feb. 1735/36. Gabriele Turi, 'Viva Maria: La reazione alle riforme leopoldine (1790-1799) (Florence, 1969).

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Altopascio

In the course of the eighteenth century, local resistance became both more vigorous and more political - not in an ideological, institutional or constitutional sense, but political in a fundamental form: the group representation of class interests. Local resistance changed from primarily isolated acts of individual 'insolence' or violence to concerted opposition to the estate management along group lines. Remember, too, that these activities were directed against the landlord who was also the ruler of the state, and this behavior was considered seditious and troublesome by the agents of the grand duke. Two factors in particular lay behind the eighteenth-century developments. First of all, there was the emergence of clearly defined local leaders. These 'agitators' were all members of the rural bourgeoisie, notables who had consolidated their position through extensions of land under lease, through occupation of the houses leased within the village, and through recognition of their 'gentle' status within rural society - changes realized through the economic transformations of the seventeenth-century crisis. Leadership came to be exercised by these men in the eighteenth century as a consequence of their material consolidation and as they became conscious of their place in the local community. Family and kinship ties were the vehicles they used to spread their influence, and their control over the religious confraternity allowed them to form 'parties.' As the notables stepped in to fill the void created by the abandoned lands and the impoverishment of the seventeenth century, the same process elevated their social position within the village. A second factor was the change in the regime that confronted the estate community in the eighteenth century. In 1740 the lands of the grand duke were included with the Appalto Generate, a tax farm composed of a number of different sources of state revenue that were leased to a company of capitalist entrepreneurs. Between 1740 and 1767 the community of Altopascio underwent three different lessees. A new group of watchful administrators now focused their attention upon every article of income. The immediate result was increased pressure on peasants and leaseholders because the

The expression of grievance

203

Deputies of the Royal Possessions, as the old administrators, wanted to resolve all the outstanding debts owed to them. The debtors soon complained of excessively rough treatment by Niccolo Gaetano Torelli, the collector.21 For their own part, the new lessees quickly attacked the leaseholders for encroachments and applied pressure to collect rents. Many peasants were dismissed during these years, and the terms of the compacts of the remaining peasants were aggravated. To complicate matters, a deterioration in output and a more frequent incidence of 'bad' years between 1750 and 1770 made these new aggravations all the more difficult to bear. The final blow came when Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo legislated away the privileged status of the Altopascians and required them to pay the land (estimo) and head (testatico) taxes. All these changes inspired economic grievances among the local population, and the representatives of the estate who enforced the changes, like Benedetto Sconditi, earned special rancor. In the seventeenth century a man traditionally put forward his case by traveling to Florence and pleading before the Deputies of the Royal Possessions. Under the old regime an individual usually believed it advantageous to pursue his claim personally. In the eighteenth century, however, even as the cultivators became more dependent on the landlord, both the Royal Possessions and the Appalto Generate grew less receptive to visits by individual peasants and leaseholders. With greater frequency, therefore, the members of the community resorted to collective action. The most important expression of this behavior was the collective petition. This was an old technique in Tuscany for seeking redress of grievances. But even though this method was adopted by the villagers of Altopascio in the seventeenth century, its use was generally rare and confined to occasions of exceptional need or tension. They would profit, for example, from a visit of the grand duke to petition collectively for a rent reduction;22 or when under legal prosecution groups of leaseholders would unite to economize on court 21 22

ASF, RP, 3134, ff. 225, 291. ASF, RP, 3767, no. 4, Letter of N. Gaetano Torelli, 28 Sept. 1722.

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costs and to present a more effective case. There was a lesson to be gained in such collective action - its power. In 1667 the Tribunal of San Miniato asked the fattore Giuseppe Berti to cooperate in having those under inquisition in Altopascio appear before the court. Berti responded that it was impossible for him to 'impose obedience on such a large group of men' nor would the mezzadri of the estate appear before the Tribunal because they suspected imprisonment and were * obstinate.'23 This effective form of group action gained favor by the third and fourth decades of the eighteenth century, and by the 1770s the use of the collective petition was frequent and directed towards specific grievances among the livellari class. They would petition for lower rent, postponement of annual rent payments because of a bad harvest, conversion of their rents from in-kind to money payments, and most important of all they petitioned for the respect of their traditional rights and privileges. Many petitions addressed the issue of tax exemptions that had traditionally been the privilege of the Altopascians but which Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo had eliminated in the interest of administrative reform. The livellari repeatedly petitioned to be exempt from the estimo and testatico taxes and they even succeeded in preserving their exemption from the estimo for those whose contracts had been issued prior to 1700.24 The livellari also protested against the corporate responsibility of their family debt and they argued that the 'old debt' prior to 1740 was an undeserved burden that should be lifted.25 The deputies of the grand duke were the last to be intimidated by popular will. Lower rents were steadfastly denied. At best, the administration would consent to a ' composition' whereby annual installment payments would be accepted towards accumulated debts, or the date would be postponed for rent due that year. A favorite tactic of the administration was to refuse to acknowledge the generalized condition represented by the petitioners.26 The deputies preferred instead 23 24 25 26

ASF, RP, 3770, Letter of Giuseppe Berti, 24 Aug. 1667. ASF, RP, 3563, no. 114. ASF, SF, 309, P. Collettive, 7 Feb. 1767. See, for instance, the response of Niccolo Siminetti of the central administration to a petition in 1774 by 28 leaseholders for a postponement of their annual rent payment in ASF, RP, 3563, no. 192.

The expression of grievance

205

to deal with individuals, tolerating the debt of those whom they considered least able to pay and rigorously prosecuting those who were better off. T h e official response to collective petitions attempted to divide and isolate the interests of the petitioners. T h e ultimate success of group action can nonetheless be seen in the decision of Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo to remit all leaseholder debts in 1781. 27 T h e petition was not the only tool for the expression of grievance. Leaseholders also conspired to withhold rents on a scale that resembled a primitive form of rent strike. T h e first specific reference to similar behavior dates from 1734 when Andrea Guidi was described as a person of bad reputation, a delinquent payer who goes around suborning the others not to pay, and he is always the leader in formulating the appeals. It would not serve any purpose to take him to court because no one can be found who will testify against him. It would be of great advantage for the rent collections if he could be removed from the vicinity.28 More evidence came to light in 1783 when the Superintendent of the Royal Possessions requested information from the Mayor of Montecarlo about a prospective leaseholder, Pietro Panattoni. Here is what the mayor responded: He has some property of his own and some he leases from the royal estate and from the municipality of Montecarlo. He and his sons are intriguers and cavilers. They are quick to undertake litigation. It is said that they have always conspired against the Sovereign interest, and they still instigate the indebted leaseholders of the royal estate not to pay their rents. They behave like bullies and like persons who want to be in authority.29 This property owner and local notable was clearly a leader in convincing leaseholders to withhold their rent payments, and the Superintendent's final report itself suggested that leaseholders had been deliberately holding back all along. Still another instrument for expressing discontent was the cartello, a piece of heavy paper on which the anonymous protestor communicated his message by means of pasted 27 28 29

ASF, RP, 6690, records the debts of leaseholders remitted as of 28 July 1781. ASF, RP, 3767, 8 July 1734. See also Torelli's letter of 1717, in this same volume, which refers to the conventicola, or secret group of those who withheld rents. ASF, RP, 2555, under the responses of the Vicario of Montecarlo.

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Altopascio

letters taken from printed matter. The first reported case of the cartello in Altopascio occurred in the early eighteenth century.30 Later, at the time of Sconditi, a political placard appeared which has survived relatively intact. Some brave soul had prepared a cartello that read: 'The Corporal of the spies has gone to Florence with all his men to draw his pay as a barone fottuto. '31 On both occasions the deputies reacted energetically to these placards which had been strategically placed on the column of the fattoria which held all important public notices. The deputies considered this behavior scandalous, willful opposition. The link between this method of expression and political protest has also been established in other cities in Tuscany. In 1796 a local radical in the nearby town of Buggiano used the same cartello with pasted letters to warn the 'rich Buggianese' not to be afraid of the invading French armies but to fear instead the natives of the town.32 The cartello was a strong, dramatic form of protest. The history of the religious confraternity in Altopascio, the only institution of communal nature in the village, offers still another indication of the growing political awareness of the village population in the eighteenth century. By April 1776 the members of the Company of the Purification were divided into 'two parties.' Bitter feelings were still harbored over the election of the chaplain the year before, and over some litigation concerning matters of the confraternity that was pending before the Tribunal of Montecarlo. On the election day of 8 April 1776, the sacristan counted the votes and announced that Cosimo Manzuoli, a member of the sacristan's party, was elected head of the confraternity. The opposing faction immediately suspected fraud: they surrounded Manzuoli and a tumult ensued in which the newly elected officer was strung up outside the confraternity. Some others chased Cosimo's father, Francesco Manzuoli, who had fled from the meeting after sustaining a blow from a stick that drew blood from his cheek; but his opponents nonetheless continued to 30 31 32

ASF, RP, 3117, ff. 257-8, 1 Jan. 1723/24. ASF, SF, 307, 'R-Z\ Carlo Magnani, 'Giornale di Vincenzio Fredianelli - 1796,' Bollettino di ricerche e di studi per la storia di Peseta e di Valdinievole, Anno II, Fascicolo I (1928), p. 8, n. 2.

The expression of grievance

207

shower him with punches and clubs. The parish priest rushed out to calm the tumult 'that seemed like a war,' but the opponents continued the fight outside the church and ' many people feared great harm' as women, too, rushed to join the fray. Benedetto Sconditi finally carried off the leaders of the fight, and the riot ended.33 The Bishop of San Miniato ordered the Company closed, but the enemies of Manzuoli conspired against him by forming a conventicle. The Constable of Pescia came to Altopascio and brought seven or eight of the villagers before the Tribunal to hear their explanations of the disturbance. Sconditi also reported that he had learned that Pietro Panattoni had gone to Florence to deliver a complaint against Sconditi and the parish priest.34 That letter connects the same man who had encouraged rent withholding and other forms of resistance to the party that opposed Manzuoli and the estate manager - a link that suggests that the dispute within the Company of the Purification tied in with a broader political division within the village. Neither the intervention of Sconditi nor that of the Constable of Pescia was enough to quiet the population. Two months later the parish priest suffered more trouble. Some years before he had closed a passageway leading behind the main altar into the church because of the ' irreverent and scandalous noise' of the people entering church after mass had begun. He had finally closed the door permanently because the populace 'refused to obey' his injunction and persisted in their irreverence. Now, in June 1776, the Bishop of San Miniato visited Altopascio to bring peace to the confraternity. He failed. Instead of being reconciled, the factions 'split more than ever' as they did not wish to abide by his arbitration; they even extended their attack to include the parish priest: Three or four men rose up against me, saying that I was the cause of their disagreements because I kept the doorway closed and because I caused the pistacchie to be taken away. These are the men who transported, in their boats via the lake, the Capuchins and the nuns who came to this hospice, and then they earned between twelve 33 34

ASF, RP, 3567, no. 30, Letter of Lorenzo Panattoni, Curate, 10 April 1776. Ibid., no. 31, Letter of Benedetto Sconditi, 17 April 1776.

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Altopascio

and eighteen pistacchie for the trip. All these fellows are the creatures of Pietro Panattoni.35 The conflict within the confraternity takes on still another dimension as the tumultuous members criticized the parish priest for the loss of income they suffered from the transfer of the hospice to Pescia in 1773. These grievances also bore the political stamp of the notorious Pietro Panattoni, known for his conspiracy against the administration of the estate. The bishop had no more success than the parish priest in calming the situation. At first the brothers of the confraternity feigned unity for a specific objective: the bishop reblessed the chapel of the confraternity, purified it after the desecrating acts of violence, and then celebrated holy mass there. After the ceremony the bishop exhorted the members to come before him and make peace. Having already secured the benediction of the chapel, wrote Sconditi, the members no longer intended to adhere to the bishop's arbitration. When they assembled in the salon of the fattoria to hear the terms of the arbitration, the bishop learned 'to his surprise* that the two parties would not accept his decision. His Eminence replied that as bishop he had the authority to order their compliance. 'Despite that,' the members continued to protest and 'to raise their voices disrespectfully,' and an altercation developed between the factions. Sconditi quickly spoke out: I reminded them to be respectful and that they were in a place belonging to the Sovereign and would have to render an account afterwards. Despite that, they persisted in their disorder and they turned against the parish priest, speaking disrespectfully of him and making false accusations to the point where, in view of the renewed hostility between the two parties, the expedient was taken of removing the bishop and canons from their company and locking them in a room so that even worse things would not take place in their presence. The brothers were put outside the salon of the fattoria and the whole affair ended even worse than before. The incident put the bishop in 'great agitation' and he ended 'by knowing the character of these people'; he sent his complaints to Senator Rucellai. Several of the brothers of the confraternity, 35

Ibid., no. 51, Letter of Lorenzo Panattoni, Curate, 19 June 1776.

The expression of grievance

209

for their part, let it be understood that they would appeal against the bishop, and every day one could see notaries passing by to inform or verify petitions.36 Not long after the incident, the Company of the Purification was among the confraternities first suppressed by Grand Duke Pietro Leopoldo. This divided community was clearly not * under the thumb' of the parish priest, nor even under the more imposing thumb of the Bishop of San Miniato who had been forced to flee their turbulent behavior. Anticlericalism survived in face to face confrontations with high clerical authorities. The confraternity, as an institution, was a focal point for tensions within the village. Disputes crystallized around minor points, like the entrance to the church, but they were infused with economic discontent over the loss of charitable dispensations and instigated by the political leadership of Pietro Panattoni. The abolition of the confraternity robbed this tension of one focal point, but another institution soon attracted its share of these political tensions. The reform of communal government enacted by Pietro Leopoldo required that local landowners be drawn by lot to serve on the various judicial and legislative agencies of the town government. Often the lot drawn was the grand duke's property, in which case an alternate was generally named to represent the grand duke in the particular post because the fattore was far too busy to serve. In June 1779 the central administration in Florence asked the fattore Carraresi to select an alternate, but the instructions prescribed a special qualification beyond the need for a capable personality. The letter warned Carraresi not to choose anyone who had kinship to, or compatibility with, the Vettori, Panattoni, Lenzi or the Bianucci families, in an effort to eliminate the possibility of any * management' by the same subjects, 'some of whom, according to the information given me confidentially by the Mayor [of Montecarlo], have caused much trouble and apprehension in the aforementioned magistracy.'37 The whole process of social change and political leadership 36 37

Ibid., no. 53, Letter of Benedetto Sconditi, 18 June 1776. ASF, RP, 6754, f. 150, 5 June 1779.

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Altopascio

comes to the fore in this secret information supplied by the Mayor of Montecarlo. The families causing trouble in the local governments were the notables of the district, the same men who instigated the collective petitions, the same people who controlled the confraternity. The rural bourgeoisie had clearly emerged as a local leadership that took advantage of the old forums and the new one provided by the communal reform. These families had a following and effective kinship ties that might allow them * to manage' a communal government in which they did not hold office. To offset this development, the mayor and the grand-ducal administrators and the fattore all collaborated. Carraresi announced on 19 June 1779 that he had selected Signore Francesco Maria Chiti of Pescia to represent the estate. Two months later, on 28 August, the same Chiti purchased a piece of land from the estate; his presence in the government of Montecarlo could hardly have been disinterested or impartial.38 On the contrary, the grand duke's administrators could command a wider network of allies, and at least on this occasion frustrate the plans of the local notables. Unfortunately the documents offer no specific discussions of the precise political positions of these families. Silence on these critical issues might have even provided necessary protection for individuals. We do know that the resistance to the grand duke that originated on the level of basic economic interests had now escalated to resistance within established organs of communal government. In 1780 the fattore Carraresi described the people of Altopascio, and especially the leaseholders, as 'the worst subjects in this realm.'39 He went on to narrate how these men had maintained a consistent assault upon him as he executed his duty as an agent of the grand duke. At no point, though, did the expression of grievance explode into a mass uprising against the grand duke. The peasants of the estate partook in the same evolution as the other classes in this society. Among them, as well, the collective 38

39

Ibid., f. 153, has the nomination of Francesco Maria Chiti of Pescia, and on f. 165 there is mention of the land transaction between Chiti and the estate of Altopascio. ASF, RP, 2556, Letter of Agostino Carraresi to the Superintendent General of the Royal Possessions, 5 Sept. 1781.

The expression of grievance

211

petition became a frequently used tool in the eighteenth century. In 1740 disastrous floods prompted them to make a joint request for a reduction in debt. By mid-century the mezzadri had shown a further inclination to unite on critical issues: a deplorable housing condition allegedly drew forth a united petition from mezzadri families in 1756. In the 1760s and 1770s the mezzadri petitioned for remission of debts incurred for seed lost in floods, and to complain often about other comparable matters of cardinal economic importance. Their last collective petition would protest against the denial of their bids for the land made available by the agrarian reform.40 So the grand-ducal peasants came to develop a very distinct consciousness of their class interest in relationship to the landlord, and they realized that their betterment depended on their willingness to articulate needs and to struggle for concessions from the grand duke. But there was a point beyond which they dared not venture. Peasants depended upon the landlord so completely that to rise in armed revolt would sever the hand that fed them. In the last analysis the peasants owed their existence to the landlord for the land they worked and for the food they borrowed at an enormous debt. The mezzadria helped preserve peace in the countryside not by assuring prosperity but by establishing the irrevocable control of the large landholder over the scores of independent producers. The mezzadria system and the political economy of Tuscany combined to thwart large-scale uprisings. While there were subsistence crises in the parish of Altopascio, the toll was relatively small and far less severe than those crises which ravaged French rural populations in the same period.41 Be40

41

See the notation on the folder in ASF, SF, 309, P. Collettive, 1780-8: 'Risultato dei Ricorsi avanzati alia Segreteria intima da Vari Lavoratori della Reale Fattoria d'Altopascio per essere stati esclusi dall'acquisto dei terreni da essi respettivamente coltivati. Visto.' A cross reference then follows V.P.A. [Vedi Protocollo A?] but I failed to locate the petition or the deliberation of the Segreteria intima. In the Beauvaisis district of France, of three parishes that have been compared, the parish of Auneuil suffered the least impact of the demographic crisis of 1693-4 because it was a zone of mixed agriculture with significant pastoral activity. 'Whereas the burial surplus in 1693-4 in Auneuil was about 12 per cent of the total population, in Breteuil it was about twice as great' (Wrigley, Population and History, p. 68). At Altopascio, the demographic crisis of 1693-4 accounted for a loss of about 6-1 % of the total population, see above, Chapter 2, n. 18.

212

Altopascio

cause of both the mezzadria and the Abbondanza emergency provisions in famine years, the people of Altopascio as a group never faced the stark alternative of starving or rebelling to obtain bread. The classic multiple-crop system of the mezzadria almost always yielded some form of food; and they could always turn to the landlord. In the long run the peasants of Altopascio were indebted and exploited, but they could generally rely on the landlord for advances of food in times of scarcity. In exchange for this short-run assurance of subsistence the peasants experienced economic misery, social backwardness, and a lifetime of indebtedness. The terms of this bargain offer a plausible explanation not only of the reason peasants failed to rebel but also why the mezzadria displayed such a remarkable vitality in spite of the glaring ruination of the peasant class. After all, assurance of life was no small benefit. Certainly, there were other factors that contributed in preventing rebellion. The aristocratic leadership that generally directed peasant uprisings was absent from this Tuscan countryside. At Altopascio there were no disappointed princes of the state to profit from peasant discontent and direct it against the government. The Medici and later the Lorraine dynasties were also not tyrants on their lands. Within the assumptions of this society that was of course shaped by the merchant/landlord oligarchy, the Medici acted fairly and not arbitrarily. All these factors, then, explain the non-violence of the peasants of Altopascio relative to their European and Italian counterparts. Peace in the countryside had its price. If Tuscan rural society was non-violent, it was equally wretched, plagued by indebtedness, racked by debt labor, and scarred by flight from the land to evade debt. The local expression of grievance was of limited effectiveness. For the peasants of Altopascio, there was no night of 4 August, no forced expropriation of royal and aristocratic lands. The fate of the cultivator combined a naturally oppressive work cycle with an inability to rise beyond a miserable social status. This condition ultimately inspired the indictment of the mezzadria contained in the Instructions of 1784 which offered the grand-ducal lands for

The expression of grievance

213

sale or lease to small holders, with the avowed intention of favoring the peasants who actually worked the land over all others.42 The edict announcing the alienation of the estate had specified that bids would be taken at public auctions. Most of the peasants of Altopascio attended these auctions and made bids for land that were accepted 'on condition of sovereign approval.' The Superintendent of the Royal Possessions had always been opposed to the system of public auction and he simply dismissed the peasants' bids as desperate, frivolous offers that deserved no consideration whatsoever because they drastically exceeded the peasants' real financial capabilities.43 The peasants of Altopascio expressed their disappointment. A number of them petitioned collectively in protest of the fact that they had been denied the lands of the estate.44 Their petition, however, lacked the power to alter the results of the alienation. The segment of society that genuinely needed the reform went unheard. 'For those who had little,' nothing was gained from the reform. 42 43 44

ASF, CR, Filza di Motupropri e Ordini, 345, no. 3: Memoria istruttiva. ASF, RP, 2555, Final Report of Luigi Bartolini, 31 Dec. 1783. See above, n. 40.

Conclusion

With the panorama of life in Altopascio before us, I shall now address the specific problem of the * general crisis of the seventeenth century' and its impact upon the lives of the villagers. The 'crisis' that struck this society was not a general one. There was certainly a severe economic crisis that accelerated the ruin of peasant producers and widened the gap between landlord, tenant, and small producer. This economic crisis provoked correlative changes in the concentration of wealth and power in the hands of the landlord along with a consolidation of a rural middle class. The economic changes did not, however, give rise to a political crisis either on the estate or in Tuscany as a whole. The peasants and the leaseholders of Altopascio developed techniques of expressing their economic grievances, but these instinctive forms of organization did not create any crisis of * society in its relations with the state,'1 or any constitutional crisis on the order of the more famous examples of early modern European history. It is true that the worst phase of the crisis in the early decades of the eighteenth century did help to stimulate serious disaffection in Florence with the long rule of Grand Duke Cosimo III. 2 1 2

H. Trevor-Roper, 'The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century,' in Crisis in Europe, 1560-1660, ed. Trevor Aston (New York, 1967), pp. 63-102. Acton, The Last Medici, p. 202, talks about the growing disaffection under Cosimo III, and gives an account of some urban riots after a new sumptuary law was established in 1694: 'The restrictive laws drove many artisans out of work; the unemployed surged before the Pitti and called out with threatening fury for bread and work. There is no jesting with a hungry mob; and Cosimo, in sudden panic, "assumed upon himself the subsistence of the artisans and retail of their manufactures by obliging the chief merchants of Leghorn to receive them." One of the chief causes of the people's rage was the extravagance of the Court.' On pp. 221, 251, there are described placards written in Florence in opposition to

214

Conclusion

215

But the political and social changes both within and beyond the village were never of the intellectual force or the quantitative magnitude to challenge the rule of the grand duke in Tuscany. The exception of this small state and others to the general political cataclysms of the seventeenth century probably means that not only was the crisis not general within each state, but also that the * general crisis' was not general throughout Europe. All of the member states of the European community did not partake of the crisis to the same degree, and it seems to me that this is a crucial consideration. The implication is that the generalized economic dislocations symptomized by low wheat prices, industrial failures, declining interest rates and contracted monetary emissions did not everywhere produce identical results. These trends must be viewed as international developments that were in part external to regional economies, whose particular reactions would be influenced by specific factors in their organization, such as the supply and the utilization of labor, the political power of the landlord class, and the ability of the state to conquer foreign markets as internal demand languished. Now that the important but once neglected element of the generalized economic crisis has been adequately documented,3 it seems to me that we have returned full-swing to the conclusions of that pioneer historian who noted the coincidence of six contemporaneous revolutions. Professor Merriman's well-known but little-consulted work emphasized the variety of those six contemporaneous revolutions.4 The task of contemporary historiography is to reassess the variety of historical responses to the generalized economic and demographic trends of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and to study the particular way those general trends were transmitted and transformed by local institutions and mores. 3 4

the grand duke, and gatherings of the 'popolo' outside the Pitti in 1710-11 who cried out for 'Bread and Work' and sang menacing songs. Ruggiero Romano, 'Tra XVI e XVII secolo. Una crisi economica: 1619-1622,' Rivista storica italiana, LXXIV (1962), 480-531. Comparing the revolutions of 1648 with those of 1848, Roger Bigelow Merriman wrote in conclusion: 'The two sets of revolutions are also alike in that the varieties in each are, on the whole, more remarkable than the similarities' (Six Contemporaneous Revolutions (Oxford, 1938), p. 211).

216

Altopascio

In the region of Altopascio, for example, the economic crisis of the seventeenth century was nothing like the crisis of the fourteenth century. There are a number of reasons why that is so. Primarily there was a political change that transformed this frontier region from a pawn in the struggle of belligerent city-states to a relatively peaceful community that had exchanged the blight of invading armies for the more civilized border disputes between the Florentine and Lucchese states. By the seventeenth century, moreover, a complete agrarian system had been placed in operation - one that put uncultivated soil to the plough in a way that provided a number of reserves against total disaster. For one thing, the family-farm system altered the settlement pattern and rural depopulation never progressed as far as it apparently had in the fourteenth century, because, as long as new families could be attracted, the population of the village only oscillated between relatively narrow limits. The mixed farming system in this district also helped to protect the local population from starvation: fields of wheat that had been ruined in the winter could be reseeded with beans or corn in the spring, crops which tempered the harvest crisis and furnished some food, at least, to its cultivators. The mezzadria and mixed farming systems together limited the toll of subsistence crises in this village through peasant subsidies and multiple crops, while institutions like the Abbondanza furnished emergency provisions to starving districts. This entire discussion is not intended to serve as an apology for the exploitation, the expropriation and the impoverishment that accompanied these developments. These remarks are intended to differentiate the village over time and to point to the diverse quality of its response to a very similar economic trend. The village of Altopascio, like local histories of southern France, also demonstrates a relatively late occurrence of the economic crisis.5 In this rural society the crisis did not begin 5

Rene Baehrel, Une Croissance: la Basse-Provence rurale (fin du XVIe siecle -1789)

(Paris, 1961); Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Les Paysans de Languedoc (2 vols.; Paris, 1966); and on the basis of these studies, Ferdinand Braudel also suggests in his second edition of La Mediterranee et le Monde Mediterraneen a Vepoque de Philippe II (Paris, 1966), that 'if we wished to reconstruct the new global panorama of the Mediterranean, after the great break which marked the end of its primacy, we ought to choose a rather late date, 1650 or even 1680,' quoted by E. J. Hobsbawm, 'Notes,' Past and Present, 39 (1968), 174.

Conclusion

217

in the 1620s and then disappear in the 1680s. Society underwent an economic crisis after 1647,6 and its worst phase came between 1695 and 1725. In view of the timing of the crisis on the land, it seems reasonable that trends in the countryside reflected and perhaps aggravated a crisis of commerce and industry that had begun much earlier. The final verdict should stress that, for social history, terms like 'depression,' 'recovery,' and 'crisis' are relatively useless as research tools unless they are anchored in a concrete reference to classes and income groups. In the district of Altopascio there was a trend towards increasing output and income for the grand-ducal landlords from the late sixteenth to the late eighteenth centuries. In this zone, at least, the crisis of the seventeenth century could not correspond to declining agricultural production either logically or historically. Since there is a negative correlation between price and supply, it is illogical to expect declining agricultural production during a time of declining prices. Some historians of Tuscany have traditionally interpreted the failure of the agrarian regime as a failure on the aggregate supply side of the equation. Professor Dal Pane has recently shown, however, that in the second half of the eighteenth century, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany was a net exporter of grain.7 The crisis of the seventeenth century was principally one of market and contractual relations rather than the product of famine years and climatic fluctuations. The crisis at Altopascio only aggravated traditional inequalities between landlord and tenant, so the community emerged from it with no radically new organization of society but with the roles of lord and peasant more firmly entrenched than ever before. The real tragedy was not rooted in the soil but in the terms of men's relations with other men. 6

7

Oscar Di Simplicio has reached the same conclusion studying production trends on an estate in the neighboring district of Siena (' Due secoli di produzione agraria in una fattoria del Senese, 1550-1751,' Quaderni storici, 21 (1972), 781-826). Dal Pane, Industria, p. 33, discusses how, in 1762, the grand duchy's grain exports exceeded imports, and that the recognition of this fact probably oriented the Leopoldine reformers towards economic liberalism. This interpretation contradicts the widespread generalization, repeated in the very good book by Turi, ' Viva Maria,' passim, that even though agricultural output expanded in the eighteenth century, Tuscany was unable to feed itself.

Bibliography

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Schevill, Ferdinand. Medieval and Renaissance Florence. 2 Vols. New York, 1963. Seghieri, Mario. Inventario delVArchivio del Comune di Montecarlo. (1480-1900). Lucca, 1967. Montecarlo e la Madonna del Soccorso. Lucca, 1961. Simonde De Sismondi, Jean Charles. Tableau de Vagricolture toscane. Geneva, 1801. Slicher van Bath, B. H. The Agrarian History of Western Europe, A.D. 500-1850. London, 1963. Tagliaferi, Amelio. Struttura e politica sociale in una comunita veneta del '500 (Udine). Milan, 1969. Thirsk, Joan. 'The Family,' Past and Present, 27 (1964), 116-22. Turi, Gabriele.' Viva Maria.' La reazione alle riforme leopoldine (1790-1799). Florence, 1969. Wandruszka, Adam. Pietro Leopoldo, un grande riformatore. Translated by Giuseppe Cosmelli. Florence, 1968. Wolf, Eric R. Peasants. Englewood Cliffs, 1966. Wrigley, E. A. Population and History. New York, 1969.

Index

agricultural production, 89-92 expansion of land, 68, 95-6 land use, 79-80, 92-3 peasant indebtedness and, 113, 115 productivity, 94-5, 97 soil preparation, 75, 92-3 Altopascio benefice, 16 charities, 3, 7, 19-20, 29, 77, 184, 185-7 church of San Jacopo, 17 estate of, 16, 17, 29-30, 32-3 founding, 2-3 hospital, 1, 2, 3, 19 legal and political jurisdiction, 1, 7, 36-7 location, x, 1 name, 1 parish archive, 14-15, 13In. settlement pattern, 21 village, 4, 17-23 anticlericalism, 209 Anzilotti, Antonio, 8n. Appalto Generate, 13, 202, 203

artisans, 31, 32

Baccetti, Domenico, 195-6 Bachechi, Giovanni, 163 Baldaccini family, 32, 140, 178, 179, 180, 183, 198 Baldaccini, Father Giovan Antonio, 187 Baldaccini, Lorenzo, 193 Baldaccini, Pietro, 162n. Band, Caporale Giovanni, H7n. Barbini, Simone di Quirico, 198 Bardi, Count, 125 Bartolini, Luigi, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, 30, 120-1, 1225, 152, 153 Berner, Samuel, 9

Berti family, 138 Berti, Matteo, estate manager, 35 Berti, Giuseppe, estate manager, 204 Berti, Piero, estate manager, 199 Betti, Lorenzo, estate manager, 190-1, 193 Bianci, Lieutenant Pellegrino di Bianco di Andrea, 54 Bianucci family, 209 Bianucci, Giovanni, 198 Bientina, Lake of, x, 1, 27, 81n., 168 births illegitimate, 64 interval between, 58-60 number of, 45-8, 51, 55-6 premarital conceptions, 64-5 boats, 28 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 3 Bonicolini, Bonicolino, I73n. Bonittis, Bartolomeo de', 4 Borgo a Buggiano, 206 Borromei, Ipolito, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, 116-17 Bosco del Grifoglieto, 27 Bosco della Serezara, 23, 27 Bulleri, Andrea di Barzante, 164 Bulled, Barzante, 162 Capponi family, 4, 5, 6, 7, 21 archive, 15 Capponi, Antonio di Niccolo, 6 Capponi, Bartolomeo, 4 Capponi, Senator Giovanbattista, 97n., 161, 167, 182 Capponi, Giovanni di Piero, 4 Capponi, Giuliano, 4 Capponi, Marquis, 165n., 166n. Capponi, Niccolo, 4 cartello, 205-6

Carraresi, Agostino, estate manager, 209-10

223

224 Castello of Altopascio, see Altopascio, village catasto 1427, 4

Cecchi, Giuseppe, 33 Cecchi, Pelligrino di Giovanni, 198 Cerbaia, 1-2, 3, 16, 23-4, 66, 93, 95, 97, 149 (Fig. 22) Cervelli, Michele, 198 children, 141 names of, 180 Cioli, Andrea, estate manager, 35 Chiti, Francesco Maria, 210 class, definition of, 156 Cochrane, Eric, 8 colmate, 66-8, 75-6, 96, 110n., 159, 169, 170, 171 contraband, 29 Corsini, Carlo, 60 Cortesi, Ansano, Il7n. crime (see also violence), 195-7 crisis economic, 81-2, 126-7, 128 general, 15,41, 201, 214-17 Dal Pane, Luigi, 10, 217 deaths, 141 number of, 45-8, 51, 55-6 domestic relations, 151 epidemic (see also illness) plague, 4, 34, 47-51, 77n. estate manager, 188-94 family enterprise and corporate responsibility, 138-40, 143, 152, 153 names, 141-2 reconstitution, 56-7 size, 58, 60, 61 Fantozzi, Valentino and Pellegrino, 125 farmer, definition of, 103, 157 Farnese, Cardinal Alessandro, 5 fattore, see estate manager Federighi, Giovanni, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, 97n., 143,171-2 Feroni family, 8n., 168 Fiesole, 60, 64 firearms, permits, 199-200 fishing rights, 168-9 floods, 174 Fossa Navareccia, 27 Fosso alle Parti, 27

Index Francesco Stefano, Grand Duke of Tuscany (1737-65), Holy Roman Emperor as Francis I (1745-65), 9 Fucecchio, 33 estate of, 70n., 116 Fucecchio, Padule di (or Lake of), x, 1, 27, 81n., 168-9 Galessi, Jacopo, 166n. garzoni, 31

Gatti, Lorenzo di Matteo, 199 Gavard, General Administrator, 172-3 Gello, 16 Gennai family, 198 Gennai, Jacopo, 167 Gennai, Michele, 173-4 Gianni, Francesco Maria, 121-2 Giuliano da Sorana, 183n. Giuntoli, Francesco di Giovanni, 146 Giuntoli, Jacopo, Il7n., 146 Grasso, Giovan Lorenzo del, 197-8 Gregory IX, Pope, 3 Grifoni, Ugolino, 5, 6 Guidi, Father, 186 Hobsbawm, E. J., 41 household dependents, 136-7 division, 145-8 head of, 135-6, 139, 143, 144, 145, 151 professions, 132-3 size and structure, 130-1, 133-5, 139-40, 142, 144, 148-50, 152, 153-5 houses, 23, 148-9 concentration, 107-8 number of, 17 peasant, 25-6, 69-70, 169-73 vacant, 106 illness (see also epidemic), 43, 54-5, 175-6 income, 87-9 indebtedness artisan, 109 land concentration and, 103 leaseholder, 76, 96, 98-103, 177 peasant, 72, 76, 109-21, 157, 158 inheritance, 137-8, 142, 147 instruction, religious, 183, 200 investment, 74, 75 Istituto Geografico Militare, 11 James, St, feast of, 17

Index labor debt labor, 112-13 organization, 78-9 supply, 68-9, 71-2, 74, 75, 76 wages, 112 Landi, Lucrezia Mei, 170 leasehold, 25, 72-4, 177-8 leaseholders (see also household size and structure; see also indebtedness), 31, 32, 157 Leghorn, 38 Lemmi, Giovanni, 165 Lenzi family, 32, 178, 179, 180, 183, 209 Lenzi, Guiseppe di Domenico, 136-7, 193 lineage, 141-2 Lippi, Ascanio, Inspector of the Royal Possessions, Il7n., 170 livello, see leasehold

Lorenzi, Temistocle, 148 Lorenzini, Giuseppe di Salvestro, 143 144

Lorenzini, Signore, Il7n. Lorraine, House of, 171, 212 Manzuoli family, 180 Manzuoli, Cosimo, 206 Manzuoli, Francesco, 206 marriage, 145, 150-1, 154-5 age at, 57-8, 59, 61, 62-4, 140-1 duration, 57 (Table 5), 58, 140-1 number performed, 45, 51, 56, 57, 61, 63

marketing, 86-7 Matilda, Countess of Tuscany, 1 Matteoni, Antonio, Il7n. Medici, Cardinal Carlo de\ 135 Medici, Cosimo I de', Duke of Florence (1537-69), Grand Duke of Tuscany (1569-74), 5, 6, 8 Medici, Cosimo III de', Grand Duke of Tuscany (1670-1723), 64, 92, 200 Medici, Ferdinando I de', Grand Duke of Tuscany (1587-1609), 6, 7, 9, 161 Medici, Ferdinando II de', Grand Duke of Tuscany (1620-70), 9, 34, 35, 165n. Medici, Francesco de', Grand Duke of Tuscany (1574-87), 6, 165n. Medici, Francesco de', 157n., 169 Medici, Cardinal Giovanni de', 6 Medici regime, 8-10, 77-8, 127-9

225

Melosi, Francesca, 193 Merriman, Roger Bigelow, 215 mezzadri, 31, 157, 159 mezzadria

capitalism and, 76-7, 78-9, 128-9 compacts, 69-72, 93, 110-12, 115-16, 128-9, 157-9, 161, 196, 211,212 mill, 26-7 missions, religious, 200 Montecarlo, 35, 36, 37, 38, 43, 201, 209-10 archive, 14 plague and illness at, 49-51, 54-5 wheat prices, 83-4, 114n-15n. Morrelli, Antonio, 162n., 192 notables, 31, 32, 138, 178-81, 202, 210 occupations, 31-4 family and, 138-9 hazards, 174 women, 33 Order of the Hospital of San Jacopo of Altopascio, 3, 4, 5, 7 Order of Santo Stefano, 7 Pagni, Giuseppe, 145 Pagni, Ignazio, 143 Panattoni family, 180, 183, 209 Panattoni, Father Lorenzo, 185 Panattoni, Pietro, 179-80, 205, 207, 208, 209 Papacy, 5, 6, 7 Parlanti, Agostino, 192 Paul III, Pope, 5 peasant condition, 116-20, 121-2 definition, 156 subordination, 160-7 Pescia, estate of, 116 Pescia di Collodi, River, see Ralla, River Pescia di Pescia, River, 28 petitions, 13, 143, 144, 146, 173-6 collective, 203-5, 210-11 pews, family, 180 Pietro Leopoldo, Grand Duke of Tuscany as Leopold I (1765-90), Holy Roman Emperor as Leopold II (1790-2), 8, 9, 37-8, 118, 120, 122, 171, 173, 193,203, 204, 205, 209 Pieretti family, 139, 198

pigionali, 31

226

Index

Pisa, 130 plague, see epidemic Plain, 24-5, 43, 66, 93, 95 Poderi del Cerro, 28 Poggetti, Angelo di Leonardo, 176 Poggetti, Luigi, 145 Poggetti, Pietro di Gaetano, 175 police, 163, 165, 197, 201 population age distribution, 48, 49, 60-1 demographic and subsistence crises, 51-5,211 migrations, 38-9, 42-5, 55, 142 size, 21, 30, 42 tax distribution, 35-6 (Table 1) trends, 41, 42, 57, 60-2 Porcari family, 2 ports, 27, 28 (see also Leghorn) Possessions, Royal, archives of, 10-14 prices, 82-5 income and, 87-9 land expansion and, 96 leaseholder indebtedness and, 101-3 peasant indebtedness and, 110-11, 113-14 substitution effects, 85-6 priest, parish, 182-8, 207, 208 Pucci conspiracy, 6 Purification, Company of the, 180-1, 206-8 Ralla, River (or Pescia di Collodi), 24, 29,67 (Fig. 15), 112, 174 Raugi family, 148-9, 150, 152 Raugi, Maria Domenica, 176 reform, 118 agrarian, 122-5, 213 rents fisheries, 105 house, 106 inn, 105 land, 72-4, 97, 100, 101-3, 104, 105 mill, 105-6 withholding of, 205 resistance, 167-8, 195, 197, 201-13 Rinaldo di Matteo, 198, 199 roads (see also Via Francigena), 28-9 Rucellai family, 165n., 208 Salvetti, Giuseppe, 76n. San Miniato, Bishop of, 39, 207, 208, 209 San Rocco confraternity, 181n. Oratory of, 34 (Fig. 12), 35

Sansedoni, Giovanni, Superintendent of the Royal Possessions, 104n., 170-1 Sconditi, Benedetto, Superintendent of the estate of Altopascio, 119, 189-94, 203, 206, 207, 208 Seghieri, Father Luca, 183n. Seghieri, Mario, 14, 84n. Segneri, Father, 200 Segreteria di Finanze, 13

Servizio Geologico d'ltalia, 11 Sevieri, Giovanbattista, 198-9 Sevieri, Maria Antonia, 175-6 shopkeepers, 32 Sibolla Canal, 27 Siena, wheat prices at, 83, 84n., 114n. Siminetti, Niccolo, General Administrator, 103n., 172-3 Simonde De Sismondi, Jean Charles, 92, 154 Sixtus IV, Pope, 4 Sixtus V, Pope, 7 Tagliaferi, Amelio, 85, 86 Teglia, Giuseppe del, 164 Teglia, Santi, 144 Tongiorgi, Domenico, 166n. Tongiorgi, Jacopo, 166n. Tongiorgi, Pietro d'Antonio, 196 Tonietti, Matteo di Morto, 165n. Torelli, Niccolo Gaetano, 97n., 98-9, 170, 171, 203 Tori, Giorgio, 14 trade, and markets, 38 transport costs, 29 Udine, prices at, 86 Usciana Canal, x, 27 Usimbardi, Signor Piero, Secretary of Cardinal Ferdinando de' Medici, 182 Vettori family, 32, 105, 178, 179, 180, 209 Via Francigena (or Via Romana), 1, 23, 28, 29 Via Romana, see Via Francigena violence, 172-3, 197-9, 200, 201, 206-7 'Viva Maria' uprisings, 201 Wolf, Eric, 156-7 Zoppo, Pasquale, 167