Agreeable Agreement: An Examination of the Quest for Consensus in Ecumenical Dialogue (Ecclesiological Investigations)

Ecclesiological Investigations Series Editor Gerard Mannion

Volume 8 Agreeable Agreement

Other titles in the series: Receiving ‘The Nature and Mission of the Church’ Christian Community Now Comparative Ecclesiology: Critical Investigations Church and Religious ‘Other’ Ecumenical Ecclesiology Globalization and the Mission of the Church Friendship: Exploring its Implications for the Church in Postmodernity

Agreeable Agreement An Examination of the Quest for Consensus in Ecumenical Dialogue ECCLESIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Minna Hietamäki

Published by T&T Clark A Continuum imprint The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 80 Maiden Lane, Suite 704, New York, NY 10038 www.continuumbooks.com All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Copyright # Minna Hietamäki, 2010 Minna Hietamäki has asserted her right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the Author of this work. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Typeset by Data Standards Limited, Frome, Somerset, UK Printed and bound in Great Britain by the MPG Books Group ISBN: 978–0–567–60718–8 (hardback)

Series Editor Gerard Mannion, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Series Editorial Committee Michael Attridge, St Michael’s College, University of Toronto Paul Avis, Church House, Westminster, Editor of Ecclesiology Mark Chapman, Ripon Theological College, Cuddesdon, Oxfordshire Paul Collins, University of Chichester Peter De Mey Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Michael Fahey, Boston College, USA Fr K M George, Old St Joseph’s Seminary, Kottayam, India

Bradford Hinze, Fordham University, New York Paul Lakeland, Fairfield University, Connecticut, USA Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Duke University, USA Paul Murray, Durham University Gareth Powell, Cardiff University Anthony Reddie, Queen’s Foundation, Birmingham, UK Gemma Simmonds, Heythrop College, University of London Kenneth Wilson, University of Chichester

Series Editorial Advisory Board Michael Attridge, St Michael’s College, University of Toronto Paul Avis, Church House, Westminster Mark Chapman, Ripon Theological College, Cuddesdon, Oxfordshire Julie Clague, Glasgow University Paul Collins University of Chichester Peter De Mey Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Michael Fahey, Boston College, USA Fr K M George, Old St Joseph’s Seminary, Kottayam, India Janette Gray, Jesuit Theological College, Parkville, Victoria, Australia Roger Haight, Union Theological Seminary, New York Nicholas Healy, San Diego University, California Bradford Hinze, Fordham University, New York Paul Lakeland, Fairfield University, Connecticut, USA Mohan Larbeer, Tamilnadu Theological Seminary (TTS), Madurai, India Richard Lennan, Western Jesuit Theological Institute, Boston MA, USA Gerard Mannion, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Mary McClintock Fulkerson, Duke University, USA

Mark Mason, University of Chichester Michael Montgomery, Chicago Theological Seminary Paul Murray, Durham University Timothy Muldoon, Boston College, USA John O’Brien, Lahore, Pakistan Neil Ormerod, Australian Catholic University, Sydney Peter Phan, Georgetown University Gareth Powell, Cardiff University Paul Pulikkan, University of Calicut Henk de Roest, University of Leiden Anthony Reddie, Queen’s Foundation, Birmingham, UK Gemma Simmonds, Heythrop College, University of London Jutta Sperber, Church of Peace, Bayreuth and the University of Rostock, Germany Gesa Thiessen, Milltown Institute, Dublin Ola Tjørhom, Stavanger, Norway Steven Shakespeare, Liverpool Hope University, UK Steve Summers, University of Chichester Michael Walsh, Heythrop College, London, UK Kenneth Wilson, University of Chichester Henk Witte, University of Tilburg

CONTENTS Note on Sources

ix

PART I INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 CONSENSUS AS AN ECUMENICAL CHALLENGE Historical and ecumenical background Ecumenical agreement: main approaches

3 3 8

PART II LUTHERAN–ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE Chapter 2 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE The First Official Report (L-RC 1966) Far-reaching consensus in understanding the gospel and the church (L-RC 1972) The liturgical and ecclesiological contexts of growing agreement All under One Christ (L-RC 1980 All ): Recapitulating the first decade of Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue Facing Unity (L-RC 1984) Church and Justification (L-RC 1993): Understanding the church in light of the doctrine of justification Basic methodological features Chapter 3 NATIONAL DIALOGUES: SELECTED EXAMPLES Dialogue in North America Dialogue in Germany: Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? (L-RC 1985 ger) Basic methodological features Chapter 4 CONSENSUS WITH DIFFERENCE The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999) Communio sanctorum (L-RC 2000 ger) The Church as Koinonia of Salvation (L-RC 2004 usa): structures and ministries

21 21 22 28 31 32 34 35 43 43 47 49 54 54 69 73

Contents PART III ANGLICAN–ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE Chapter 5 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE: ANGLICAN–ROMAN CATHOLIC INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION (ARCIC) A Vision for Unity (The Malta Report) (A-RC 1968) ARCIC I: The Final Report (A-RC 1982) ARCIC II: general remarks on method Salvation and the Church (A-RC 1986) The Church as Communion (A-RC 1990) The Gift of Authority: Authority in the Church III (A-RC 1997) PART IV ANGLICAN–LUTHERAN DIALOGUE Chapter 6 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE Functional understanding of doctrine Furthering the method: The Report of the Anglican–Lutheran European Regional Commission (A-L 1982 eur) Describing the goal and the nature of agreement: Report of the Anglican–Lutheran Joint Working Group (A-L 1983) A breakthrough in understanding episcopacy: The Niagara Report: Report of the Anglican–Lutheran Consultation on Episcope (A-L 1987)

vii

91 91 92 97 99 101 103 123 123 127 128 130

Chapter 7 EPISCOPAL–LUTHERAN DIALOGUE IN THE UNITED STATES Emerging method: Progress Report (LED I) (A-L 1972 usa) Sufficient consensus: Lutheran–Episcopal Dialogue: Report and Recommendations (LED II) (A-L 1981 usa) and The Lutheran–Episcopal Agreement (A-L 1982 usa) Lutheran–Episcopal dialogue (LED III) Evangelical and historic episcopacy: Called to Common Mission (A-L 1999 usa)

137 137

Chapter 8 REGIONAL DIALOGUES: SELECTED EXAMPLES On the Way to Visible Unity (A-Ev 1988 Meissen) Together in Mission and Ministry (A-L 1992 Porvoo)

149 149 156

138 141 143

PART V THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSENSUS: A SYNTHESIS 173 Chapter 9 CONSENSUS IN BILATERAL DIALOGUES Methodological focus 173 Consensus as commonality 177 Consensus as compatibility 185 Chapter 10 CONSENSUS: THE CONTINUING DEBATE Fundamental questions in the debate Consensus debate in an ecumenical context

194 194 198

viii

Contents Proposal for a wider understanding of ecumenical consensus

Chapter 11 Bibliography Index

CONCLUSION

203 216 223 259

NOTE ON SOURCES The source material is referred to by a signum, which consists of abbreviations indicating the dialoguing churches, the year of publication of the document and, where necessary, an additional indication for regional documents. Many of these documents are available in various publications. Reference is made here to publications in which the documents are most easily attainable in their entirety. For documents originally published in a language other than English, I have given reference to both the original text and the authoritative English translation. Additional church documents have been signified in a similar manner.

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PART I

INTRODUCTION

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Chapter 1 CONSENSUS AS AN ECUMENICAL CHALLENGE Historical and ecumenical background The question of the meaning of consensus for the true unity of the Church has been the object of intensive ecumenical theological and ecclesiological reflection in recent years. Yet, essentially, it is as old as the ecumenical movement itself. To ask about the unity of the church is inevitably to raise the question of the kind of consensus necessary for unity.1 Lukas Vischer’s introduction to the concept of consensus in the Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement is perhaps the clearest and most succinct description available of consensus in an ecumenical context. It is also a good example of the various challenges relating to this concept. Vischer defends the view that consensus is an essential feature of the church. He notes that the question of the meaning of consensus is essentially as old as the ecumenical movement itself. At the same time consensus as an ecumenical concept remains tremendously challenging. Its use in philosophical discourse exceeds even its long history as a central and frequently used theological concept. Yet as Christoph Schwöbel observes, there is no consensus on the essential elements, function or importance of the concept of consensus, either in the history of philosophy or in fundamental theology.2 Vischer’s enumeration on the ‘implications of the word ‘‘consensus’’ ’ elegantly describes the various aspects of this multifaceted concept. Consensus has to do with the agreement of a community. It deals with the fundamental convictions, attitudes and behaviour shared by the members of a community. Sometimes consensus also refers to an agreement in the form of a specific accord or joint statement. The ecumenical challenges of ‘consensus’ become more and more evident with each of its implications. What does it mean to agree? If we agree, does it mean we have reached the truth? How does one come to an agreement? What does one need to agree on? How do we define what is fundamental? What is the relationship among convictions, attitudes and behaviour? Who has the authority to say that an agreement has been reached? What are the implications of an agreement? These are only some of the questions that arise from the conviction that consensus in fact is needed for the unity of the church. Vischer does not mention that also the assumption that the church needs consensus has been contested in ecumenical theology. Also contemporary philosophical discourse challenges the need for and desirability of consensus. As

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Schwöbel pointed out, there is no general agreement even on the importance of consensus. The philosophical debates of recent decades have resulted in an especially convincing body of literature against the idea of consensus. One need only look at the title of Nicholas Rescher’s Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus to anticipate his dismissal of the ‘sanctification of consensus’. According to Rescher the observable richness of plurality is too vibrant to be confined by the constraints of social and cognitive agreement. The proponents of consensus place so many expectations on it that consensus becomes an utterly idealized concept. In Rescher’s words, ‘the burden that consensus is asked to bear is more than can justifiably be placed on it’.3 In recent years a number of ecumenically minded theologians have raised questions about the relevance of consensus as a goal of the ecumenical movement. Prominent theologians such as Ingolf Dalferth, Ulrich Körtner, Dorothea Wendebourg and Christoph Schwöbel have voiced concerns over the particular forms of consensus being sought and even about the overall validity of consensus as a goal of the ecumenical movement. The central but contested role of consensus as an ecumenical goal forms the larger background of this research. Contemporary discussion of the ecumenical relevance of consensus is challenged by the elusiveness of the concept itself. At times it becomes evident that opponents and proponents represent not only differing opinions but also very different discourses. This collision of discourses is not only a challenge, but also an opportunity for a fuller perception of the shared reality. For academic purposes one should be aware of the context of differing arguments. The current debate over ecumenical consensus draws from two different sources. One of these focuses on ecclesially committed theology, while the other focuses on more academically oriented philosophy. These two categories are in the best case heuristic and descriptive since the philosophical and theological discourses have always drawn from each other and have become mixed and intertwined. The categories should nevertheless be helpful in outlining the main dynamics underlying the ecumenical discourse. In general terms individuals active in the philosophically oriented discourse place more emphasis on epistemic questions and consequently questions of rationality and its universality or particularity. This discourse follows the tradition that descends from Plato and Aristotle and perceives the relationship between the individuals consenting and the community created by the consensus in terms of rational agreement on beliefs. The Latin word consensus can be variously translated into English as ‘consent’, ‘conformity’ or ‘congruence’, ‘approval’, ‘assent’ or ‘accordance’, ‘unanimity’, ‘unity’ or ‘harmony’, ‘agreement in opinion or sentiment’, ‘combined action, custom or general practice’, ‘harmony in sensation and sympathy’. It denotes consensus of opinion by general consent and agreement to a proposal. Consensus can also be used in a negative sense to mean plot or conspiracy. A close parallel to consensus is consensio, which can likewise be translated as ‘an agreement in opinion or sentiment’, ‘consent or unanimity’, ‘likeness of purpose or action’, ‘harmony and agreement, especially with a statement of the opposing party’. The corresponding verb consentio can accordingly be translated as ‘joining or sharing in sensation or feeling’, ‘being in agreement’,

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‘unison of opinion’, ‘being in harmony or of the same mind’, ‘acting together’, ‘combining’, ‘coinciding’, ‘agreeing’ or ‘agreeing deliberately on a particular point’, ‘consenting’, ‘fitting or being consistent or in sympathy with’, ‘being in unison’, ‘favouring’ and ‘assenting (the process of) reaching an agreement’, ‘planning or joining in mutual action’ and ‘being consistent with’. Synonymous with consensus is concordia, or concorditas, which also refers to ‘mutual agreement’, ‘concurrence of feeling’, ‘union’, ‘friendship and harmony between things in conjunction’ or to a state of peace and amity between opposing parties.4 The main questions arising from this discourse are the following. What is the relationship between truth and agreement? Does agreement imply truth?5 What is the relationship between agreement and community? Is a fully functioning community necessarily an agreeing community?6 What does agreement mean in terms of individually held beliefs? What does agreement mean in terms of communally held beliefs? The early development of the church’s self-understanding as a distinct community was accompanied by a gradual development of authoritative teaching. The concept of consensus played a significant role in this development. The early church followed the traditional use of ‘consensus’ in Greek philosophy and therefore referred to consensus as an instance in discerning truth. Thanks to this early development, the general idea of consensus is embedded in some of the earliest forms of ecclesial authority, both institutional and non-institutional. Because of the connection between the church’s understanding of its own nature and consensus, the times when the church’s self-understanding has been threatened have brought consensus to the fore. The three major concepts used to defend the truth of orthodox teaching were the consensus patrum, consensus theologorum and consensus fidelium.7 As an ecclesiological reality, consensus raises questions that exceed the classical philosophical discussion. These questions relate to the nature and function of doctrine in the church. This opens a vast discussion, which has special relevance for ecumenical consensus. There is general agreement that understanding the nature and function of doctrine has gone through significant changes during the church’s history. This history has had direct consequences for the perception of the form and relevance of doctrinal consensus. From very early on the church’s teaching began to exercise a critical function of identifying a truly Christian community. Identification did not take place only through discerning the orthodox beliefs but more widely through discerning an orthodox way of being a Christian.8 Accordingly, ‘consensus’ was not primarily a question of abiding or consenting to true beliefs. Two of the earliest normative principles of identifying a truly Christian community were the lex orandi/supplicandi, lex credendi principle and the interpretative principle, regula fidei. Both of these early principles point to a wide understanding of the church’s orthodoxy and of church consensus. Most importantly, both principles show how the church’s consensus encompasses not only cognitive–intellectual elements but elements pertaining to the community’s practical life as communion.9 This becomes increasingly clear if one looks at the Reformation period and the struggle over authority. Although the idea of consensus was central to sixteenth-century Reformation theology, in many ways the

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understanding of the content and relevance of consensus changed radically. Reformation theology challenged the idea of common agreement as a criterion of authentic teaching. Reformers asserted that consensus in the church could only be constituted by the church consenting to God’s work, which would bring about the communion of the faithful.10 Doctrinal consensus in Reformation understanding refers both to the agreement among present-day Christian communities and to the agreement in current teaching with the early church. The consensus was more explicitly subordinate to the gospel.11 This short historical introduction to the idea of consensus had the general purpose of describing briefly the most common discourses with which consensus has been associated. Both philosophical and ecclesiological discourses have various uses for the concept of consensus. These can be roughly divided into two basic approaches. One can be called a cognitive consensus and the other a socio–communal consensus. Cognitive consensus is concerned with the individual’s right or wrong apprehension of propositional knowledge and the role of communal agreement or consensus in that apprehension. Whether the consensus is perceived as factual consensus, as consensus in the ultimate future or as hypothetical ideal, the crucial question is whether the consensus is an implication or a criterion or an acquired truth. The second use of consensus emphasizes its social dimensions, that is, it explicates the implications of consensus for communities. The theological and in particular the ecclesiological discourses reflect these two emphases. There are also various reasons to argue that the two categories are not the best ones to be used in an ecumenical context. Firstly, in the epistemic discourse on consensus and truth, truth is understood to refer to true propositions. The same cannot be said of the truth of the Christian faith. The issue is more complicated since there are various perceptions of the nature of Christian doctrine. Secondly, the ecclesial notion of consensus is diffuse. Although it seems justified to say that consensus is an integral element of the church as communion, there is no common theological definition of consensus in reference to the church. Nevertheless, consensus of the church cannot, in light of the church’s history, be reduced to an agreement on propositional truths. This diffuse nature of consensus makes it challenging to define what consensus is, ecumenically speaking. Ecumenical encounters are holistic, they include cognitive and intellectual and also social and spiritual aspects of being a Christian. Ecumenical encounters take place under various circumstances with a variety of different goals. The researched material of this study is the written, agreed documents of bilateral dialogue commissions. Bilateral encounters were the privileged method of overcoming or avoiding church division from the sixteenth century to the early twentieth century. While the World Council of Churches (WCC) can especially be credited for facilitating multilateral dialogues, the strong preference of the Roman Catholic Church for bilateral encounters has, since the 1960s, made bilateral dialogues the main form of official ecumenical dialogue.12 The general term ‘consensus ecumenism’ has come to refer to dialogue documents and to the agreement on subject matters within them.

Consensus as an Ecumenical Challenge

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It is one of the claims of this thesis that the picture painted of ‘consensus ecumenism’ is overly simplified. Although the dialogue text as the end product is a goal of the dialogue, the dialogue process itself is an important, even necessary element of the consensus reached. An ‘ecumenical agreement’ is a document sui generis. It does not have precedents in the church’s history. A second claim of this thesis is that even though ecumenical consensus cannot be separated either from ecclesiological or from philosophical use, it does possess qualities specific to the anomalous ecclesial situation (of division) in which it was created. Ecumenical documents are characterized by two features, which at first seem selfevident but on closer investigation prove worthy of further consideration. The documents are, firstly, dialogue documents. This means that they are a result of a process where two parties engage in exchange. Secondly, the documents are texts. As textual material, they are subject to the limits and possibilities of language. To describe an ecumenical text as dialogue rather than a monologue implies that the text itself has certain characteristics. These include an attitude of openness, reciprocity, exchange and acceptance of the other. Dialogue can be understood either in an anthropological sense of belonging to what it is to be a human being or in an instrumental sense of defining a means of communication.13 An instrumental understanding of dialogue allows an evaluation of the success of the dialogue. Both Tobias Brandner and Johannes Brosseder emphasize the hermeneutical aspect of a successful dialogue. In their view, a successful ecumenical dialogue is founded on a relational or dialogic anthropology in which the individual ‘I’ is formed through an encounter with the ‘other’. At the same time, it is a process of communication that assumes an ecumenical attitude and commitment, a sense of historicity and contextuality of doctrine, analysis of the relationship between verbal expressions in relation to their meaning, a clearing of misunderstandings, an analysis of the extremity of historically developed positions and the possible complementarity of differing doctrines.14 Monological and dialogical attitudes go together with two essentially different perceptions of the purpose of discourse. Monologue assumes that a clear enough exposition of truth as understood and conceptualized by a church will result in others recognizing the truth and returning to it. Dialogue, as described above, recognizes the possibility that truth is perspective. A perspectival understanding of truth has implications for ecumenical method and for understanding consensus. For the monological approach, ecumenical method consists of discerning the true view among a multitude of falsehoods, and consensus means identity and uniformity of beliefs. To use a dialogical approach with a perspectival understanding of truth is to understand truth as something transcending individual understandings. As will be shown in the analysis, this basic ‘perspectival principle’ is applied and understood differently in different discourses.15 The truth question points to another significant element of doctrinal dialogues, namely, the understanding of doctrine. Neither the documents nor the literature have come to a common understanding of how to perceive doctrine. One of the few commonly held convictions distances itself from a propositional understanding of doctrine, which identifies doctrinal expressions with truth clauses. Propositional understanding of doctrine does not correspond with the growing understanding of

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relational or communicative perception of revelation. Propositional understanding of doctrine collapses dialogue into a monologue in the manner presented above and makes ecumenical encounters nonsensical. One’s understanding of doctrine is essential to the question of consensus. It has been suggested that the perception of the relations among revelation, faith and doctrine would be the quintessential question of contemporary ecumenism.16 As textual material, the dialogue documents are subject both to the constraints of language and to the plurality of understandings and interpretations of readers. These questions are not specific to ecumenical theology but simply to theology as a linguistic endeavour. Contemporary ecumenical theology is dominated by hermeneutical theories and the impact of philosophy of language is significantly less. There is a slight hesitation in reading too much philosophy of language into normative ecclesial teaching.17 The purpose of this research is not to offer an exhaustive answer to questions of language in an ecumenical context. Questions relating to theology and language are treated in relation to the understanding of doctrine and as they relate to doctrinal consensus. Ecumenical agreement: main approaches The ecumenical use of ‘consensus’ has distinctive characteristics. In contrast to classical theological consensus, the ecumenical sense of the word does not primarily designate a particular group with a shared identity but transcends ecclesial identities. In contrast to the philosophical use of consensus, ecumenical consensus has less epistemic emphasis. Ecumenical consensus is more functional in the sense that one of its purposes is also to enable the churches to be one.18 At the same time, the concept continues to resonate with its other meanings.19 The ecumenical use of consensus reflects and connects to a variety of interests arising from the other discourses. This variety of interests can be grouped into two clusters. The first group consists of methodological and fundamental theological questions. These concern primarily the nature of doctrine and theology, the relation of revelation and faith and the perennial questions of knowledge, rationality and agreement. The second group is concerned more with the content of doctrine, especially ecclesiology. Here the focus is on how individual doctrinal questions are formulated in confessional theologies. The relationship of these two groupings as well as the questions attributed to each of them are important for the discussion of ecumenical consensus. In the research literature support is found in favour of the primacy of both groupings. Some argue that ecumenical questions are primarily questions of ecclesiology.20 Jósef Fuisz, for instance, has demonstrated how confessional ecclesiological self-understanding influences ecumenical method.21 This emphasis on the formative role of ecclesiology is to a certain extent justified. Consensus has to do with how the church identifies itself as a faith community. It relates not only to truth as an a-temporal proposition but also to how the community at different times and in different places lives the truth. At the same time, some essential characteristics of consensus relate it to issues that transcend points of doctrine. The

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idea of consensus was a central, critical instance in the history of the development of doctrine. It had an influence both on the content of orthodox teaching and the understanding of what ‘doctrine’ is, why there should be agreement on doctrine and who should agree on it. I need only refer briefly to the notions of consensus patrum, consensus fidelium and consensus ecclesiae mentioned earlier. The distinction between the two groupings is for heuristic reasons. Its purpose is not to create unhelpful dichotomies. On the contrary, such distinctions can be helpful in identifying cases in which the churches seem to be discussing the same issue but end up talking past each other because the question is located in different discourses. Because methodological and fundamental theological questions penetrate all individual doctrinal questions, I have given relative priority to this group of questions as a generic category. Bilateral dialogues employ a set of common but loosely defined terms to describe the reached agreement.22 Some concepts, such as consensus and convergence, are clearly technical terms. Others, such as agreement, common understanding, being at one and the like are more general. Also these have begun to develop more specific meanings. The radical increase in the number of doctrinal agreements has resulted in a plurality of unity-related technical terms and their interpretations. Discussion of the validity of doctrinal agreements and the consensus they express focuses on two areas. One concerns the subject matter of the consensus and whether the explanation is faithful to one’s own and/or to the Christian tradition. Beyond this, there is a second level of discussion on the nature and form of the acquired consensus. Questions within this discourse address such issues as the validity of the theological method of acquiring consensus, including questions relating to language and hermeneutics, the perception of doctrine, its structure and relevance; and also the overall need for a doctrinal consensus. These two areas correspond to the two groupings of substantive ecumenical and methodological or fundamental questions mentioned earlier. The emphasis in my analysis of the bilateral dialogue documents has been on the methodological or fundamental questions of theology and consequently on the forms, methods and goals of ecumenical consensus. This choice has been made with the understanding that the methodological and substantial aspects cannot be totally separated and that the two categories are somewhat diffuse. An ecumenical agreement is never purely formal. The form of the agreement also draws on the subject matter discussed. This makes it harder to transfer the reached agreements from one context to another. In this respect one can ask, for example, whether it is possible to have the kind of consensus with difference found in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999) on something other than the doctrine of justification? Or does the form of agreement draw on the subject matter of justification in a way which does not allow them to be separated? A second feature of the forms, methods and goals of ecumenical agreements is that the meaning of even technical terms is not strictly fixed. Their meaning can be best grasped through a description of their use. In the following I will give general descriptions of the main approaches to ecumenical agreement. The presentation will attempt to demonstrate the diffuse character of unity-related concepts and approaches and to describe the conceptual field of ecumenical consensus discourse.

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Convergence Originating from the Latin word convergere, ‘to incline together’, convergence has in ecumenical dialogues been understood in both a positive and a negative sense. In a positive sense, ‘convergence’ refers to a rapprochement or growing understanding between churches.23 Convergence has to do with the differing expressions that refer to common faith. The expressions might be converging while complete agreement is lacking. Emphasis is more on the ecumenical process than the resulting agreement. A positive understanding of ‘convergence’ is best seen in the multilateral Faith and Order document Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry (F&O BEM 1982). In Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry, convergence means the discovery of shared convictions and viewpoints, which is enabled by ‘leaving behind the hostilities of the past’. The discovery of theological convergences is possible because of a growth in mutual trust. By developing mutual trust, the churches are able to develop doctrinal convergences towards consensus. Consensus includes the element of doctrinal agreement but it is primarily rooted in the experience of living together in one community.24 In the most negative sense, convergence has been understood as an agreement born out of compromise or as betrayal of one’s standpoint.25 Such convergence is not a way to consensus but a false consensus. If not the opposite of consensus, convergence often denotes an agreement lacking in fullness. Viewpoints converge but a mutual understanding or agreement has not been reached. Convergence is an ‘insufficient consensus’.26 In its positive interpretation convergence does not have the connotation of being an ‘incomplete agreement’. Quite the contrary, it emphasizes the necessary and fruitful process of growing together. It avoids the connotations of static, ahistorical understanding of truth sometimes associated with the idea of consensus.27 The intention of finding a middle way is inherent in ‘convergence’. Convergence has therefore been suggested as an especially suitable concept for describing a plurality of viewpoints and their complementarity as witness to the same reality. Jósef Fuisz defends the positive interpretations of convergence by reference to testimonials, viewpoints and perspectives, which taken together contribute to a fuller and more complete knowledge.28 In their ecumenical use, the concepts of consensus and convergence are partly overlapping. This becomes clear in analysing the structure of epistemic convergence as Fuisz understands it. Fuisz locates the focal point of convergence in the experience of those whose testimonials or views are converging.29 This is the weakest point of Fuisz’s model of epistemic convergence. Fuisz argues that the convergence of the New Testament is a hidden reality that underlies all plurality. It can only be reached when observed through a ‘fundamental experience’ (Grunderfahrung). This fundamental experience is something opposite to and overcome by fixed ecclesial traditions and especially fixed expressions of faith. The forms of expression chosen by the evangelists are secondary in relation to the common ‘Jesus experience’.30 This kind of epistemic interpretation of convergence is problematic, but it is not the only way to support a form of ‘convergence ecumenism’. Another possibility is

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to give more emphasis to the convergence as a social or communal process. Here emphasis is not on knowledge but on metanoia or change of mind. Metanoia describes the individual and communal processes of change without the loss of what is essential to one’s own identity. In the process of conversion individuals and communions converge or draw nearer to God and to each other.31 This approach has perhaps best been manifested in the work of the Groupe des Dombes and can be observed in Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry as well. In the texts of the Groupe des Dombes, convergence is linked to the continual conversion of Christians and the church, which is an essential part of Christian identity.32 Based on the above, it is clear that some of the central descriptions of both consensus and convergence are shared. Some descriptions of one concept apply to the other as well whereas other descriptions seem to contradict each other. Convergence can be understood as the exact opposite of consensus, as partial or insufficient consensus or as a stage on the way to consensus. Convergence is like consensus in that it too is a consensual event, though it puts more emphasis on the process itself than on the agreement reached.33 Consensus Wolfgang Beinert has identified three different uses of ‘consensus’ in ecumenical dialogues. 1

2

3

Consensus meaning being in agreement or conformity (Übereinstimmung). This is a comprehensive understanding of the concept originating from the use of consensus in Greek antiquity. It emphasizes the temporal and transcendental qualities of consensus as conformity. In this interpretation conformity is perceived as a sign of transcendental reality being manifest on the horizontal level of the congregation, on the vertical level of conformity with the will of God, on the diachronic level of agreement with past generations and on the synchronic level of agreement with Christians in all places. This kind of agreement pre-supposes the unity of the agreeing community and common modes of arguing.34 Consensus meaning acceptance, consent or compliance (Zustimmung). This interpretation emphasizes consensus as a process of arriving at a common resolution. The focus is on individuals consenting to a common decision. Here reaching a consensus assumes that members of the community have true freedom to formulate, accept or reject the proposed consensus. In this interpretation consensus includes an aspect of reception.35 Consensus meaning agreeing by understanding or being in accord (Übereinkunft). This understanding focuses on the process of reaching agreement by way of dialogue. ‘Understanding’ here has the function of mediating knowledge. The emphasis is on the process of argumentation and dialogue, but more weight is given to dialogue between communities than to dialogue within a community. Consensus in this sense has a twofold meaning. It makes the dialogue possible (‘basic consensus’) but it is also the resulting agreement of the dialogue after a period of argument. Consensus in

12

Agreeable Agreement the latter meaning implies consent to the argument. It is, however, the preexistent ‘basic consensus’ that allows for the differing parties to come to an agreement. Beinert points out the hermeneutical aspect of reaching agreement and tries to identify means of building bridges between the different communions (e.g. a common language or a common hermeneutical system).36

In Beinert’s view, the third form of consensus is ecumenically primary. Christianity is divided into ‘Christianities’ with dissenting practices, doctrinal content and doctrinal expressions. Consensus means any consonance recognized by the divided communities. The way to recognition is through ‘discursive comparison’, which allows the communities to identify either partial agreement on individual questions, a total agreement on all problematic questions or an agreement on fundamental elements of doctrine, that have not been fixed by common practices or doctrinal traditions. Beinert focuses on the cognitive aspect of discursive reflection and agreement at the end of the argumentative process. The separated communions reach agreement when either party assents to the arguments of the other. Beinert is largely occupied with the possibility of an existing basic consensus, that is, an agreement underlying differences on the surface.37 Further developments in ecumenical methodology suggest changes in this approach and even alternative paradigms. Often ‘consensus’ appears with additional qualifications, which illustrate the depth, scope or field of the agreement by posing either qualitative or quantitative limits to the agreement. Qualitative predicates limiting or focusing the consensus refer either to the essential, basic or fundamental 38 contents of a doctrine or to consensus on a larger doctrinal structure and the position of an individual doctrine within it. The choice of concepts follows from one’s understanding of the structure of Christian teaching, that is, a the general understanding of theological language, larger structures or hierarchies within the body of doctrine and the understanding of appropriate methods of ecumenical dialogue. For example, the broad idea that the desired consensus need not exceed ‘the essentials’ assumes that individual doctrines or the body of doctrine are structured in a way that allows distinguishing ‘the essentials’.39 A qualitatively essential/basic/fundamental consensus is full as an agreement but is restricted in its scope. This limitedness in scope does not hinder the fullness of the agreement because what is agreed on is itself something ‘essential’. Quantitative predicates describe the depth or width of the agreement. The agreement is described quantitatively as substantial, extensive, wider, sufficient or growing. Quantitative predicates are in part implications of the qualitative prerequisites determined by the method and understanding of the doctrine. For example, an agreement on the church’s (qualitatively) central teaching is considered necessary and by some, (quantitatively) sufficient.40 Another distinction, rarely encountered in the documents, but found in the secondary literature, is that between total consensus and partial consensus. The first of these refers either to an agreement encompassing the totality of the problem (quantitative) or to the absolute agreement on any particular issue (qualitative). Accordingly, the latter

Consensus as an Ecumenical Challenge

13

definition refers to agreement on individual questions (quantitative) or to an incomplete agreement (qualitative).41 Yet another qualification distinguishes between negative and positive consensus. Negative consensus refers to identifying certain points of doctrine as non-divisive, whereas positive consensus refers to a substantial statement on issues at hand.42 A qualitatively interpreted consensus can also mean agreement that is more or less true.43 The distinction, though important, between qualitative and quantitative definitions is not clear either in the documents or in the research literature. For example, ‘basic consensus’ appears in a very different light depending on whether it is seen as qualitatively or quantitatively ‘basic’. A quantitatively basic agreement is something elementary and simple whereas qualitatively ‘basic’ can refer to something foundational. Accordingly, the concept of full consensus can be used to denote either complete agreement on a particular issue or agreement on all points.44 One of the causes behind disagreements over ecumenical consensus is precisely the mixing of qualitative and quantitative interpretations of consensus. A (quantitative) basic consensus may be deemed insufficient while the (qualitative) basic consensus would be seen as sufficient. The challenge is that at the outset both qualitative and quantitative interpretations apply, and both could under certain circumstances have a positive ecumenical effect. Each of the theological traditions investigated (Anglican, Lutheran and Roman Catholic) manifests both interpretations in their ecumenical endeavours. The Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral is a good example of a limitation to a set of four points of teaching that can be (for ecumenical purposes) distinguished by their quality from other doctrines. At the same time the Anglican churches have quite effectively used a quantitative interpretation of consensus to allow ecumenical processes to advance, even when agreement is not yet total in the qualitative sense.45 The quantitative sufficiency of an ecumenical agreement appears to depend on the understanding of the relation between ecclesial unity and consensus. In addition to convergence and consensus, ecumenical agreements are at times described as compromises. Unlike both convergence and consensus, compromise has very few positive ecumenical connotations. The Latin word compromissum originally referred to a joint promise guaranteed by a deposit of money. The corresponding verb compromitto translates as ‘entering into an agreement’.46 As convergence, so too compromise can and has been perceived either as an alternative of or as a stage towards consensus. Compromises are made, for example, in selecting relevant concepts to be used in a dialogue. In this case, compromise is an early stage of consensus. Making a compromise implies a positive understanding of conceptual diversity and an open attitude towards the dialogue partner.47 In juridical language ‘compromise’ denotes finding a middle way through a conflict by altering one’s own position. According to this view, compromise is an alternative to consensus. This interpretation also assumes an existing agreement on a common goal. In order to reach a compromise, both parties are required to recognize the rights of the other to hold an opinion and to understand one’s own view as contingent and relative. Both parties need to be ready to respect the complexity of plural interpretations of reality. Compromise is present when the complexity of reality is respected and common processes of conflict resolution are

14

Agreeable Agreement

enabled. Compromise cannot take place if opinions are perceived as absolute and if there is no tolerance of ambiguity.48 Fuisz takes a very positive stand on compromise and its possibilities in facilitating the coming together of people in times of conflict. For Fuisz, compromise is a nobler form of letting go of one’s perceived self-sufficiency. Fuisz’s positive evaluation of compromise as ecumenical means is nevertheless in the minority. In general, compromise is perceived as false agreement or a giving up of what is important to one’s own identity.49 Fuisz justifies his positive take on compromise by emphasizing the positive preconditions of making a compromise. These preconditions include perceiving one’s own viewpoint as relative and recognizing the rights of the other to hold a different opinion. The limits of compromising become evident rather quickly. One can compromise on questions of opinion of equal importance or grade but not on factual issues or when speaking the ‘laboratory speech of mathematicians and chemists’. By this Fuisz refers to a formal language that yields exact descriptions. Fuisz does not venture into a longer discussion of language and its relevance to understanding compromise. In speaking about doctrine, Fuisz associates compromise with features that in the later ecumenical discussion have come to describe consensus. It is important that in compromising, one grant the other the possibility of an opinion and by such granting one moves in a way beyond one’s own position. At the same time, it is important that neither party needs to abandon their view totally.50 In Fuisz’s discussion, compromise is more involved with the criteria for discerning what is right than with the agreement itself. Fuisz concludes that, for example, the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification can best be understood as a ‘compromise’, or as ‘leading to convergence with the help of a theory of differentiated compromise and consensus’.51 Fuisz’s associating compromise with an agreement, that is not sheer identity is a good example of the diffuse character of concepts in ecumenical theology. Many of the positive characteristics Fuisz associates with ‘compromise’ have also been associated with those forms of consensus that endeavour to accommodate differences.52

Notes 1. Lukas Vischer, ‘Consensus’, in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Nicholas Lossky et al. (Geneva: WCC, 2 edn, 2002), p. 246. 2. Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Konsens’, in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2001), 4:1610. 3. Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 3. 4. Oxford Latin Dictionary. Cf. Gerhard Sauter, ‘Consensus’, in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, ed. Gerhard Krause and Gerhard L. Müller (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1981), 8:1981–2; Jósef Fuisz, Konsens, Kompromiss, Konvergenz in der ökumenischen Diskussion (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2000), p. 22. 5. For a discussion in classical and mediaeval thought, cf. Rescher, Pluralism, pp. 6–7, 11–15, 21; Michael Becht, Pium consensum tueri: Studien zum Begriff consensus im Werk von Erasmus von Rotterdam, Philipp Melanchthon und Johannes Calvin (Münster: Aschendorff, 2000), p. 6; David Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (New Haven and London: Yale

Consensus as an Ecumenical Challenge

6.

7.

8.

9.

15

University Press, 1987), p. 19; Klaus Oehler, Antike Philosophie und byzantinisches Mittelalter: Aufsätze zur Geschichte des griechischen Denkens (Munich: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1969), pp. 234– 7, 242; Herbert Scheit, Wahrheit, Diskurs, Demokratie: Studien zur Konsensustheorie der Wahrheit (Freiburg, Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1987), p. 33. For postmodern discussion, see Arie Brand, The Force of Reason: An Introduction to Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990), p. 31; Ingram, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason, pp. 19–22, 31; Rescher, Pluralism; Nicholas Rescher, Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Cf. Kurt Bayertz, The Concept of Moral Consensus: Philosophical Reflections. Philosophy and Medicine 47 (Dordrecht, Boston and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), pp. 42– 3; Percy Herbert Partridge, Consent and Consensus: Key Concepts in Political Science (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971), pp. 10, 15, 19. The literature discussing the formation of doctrine, authority and related questions in terms of consensus patrum, consensus theologorum and especially consensus fidelium is vast. The following studies are a sample representing various aspects of the question: Wolfgang Beinert, ‘Bedeutung und Begründung des Glaubenssinnes (Sensus fidei ) als eines dogmatischen Erkenntniskriterium’, Catholica 24 (1971): 271–303; Boris Bobrinskoy, ‘How Does the Church Remain in the Truth? An Orthodox Response’, in Who Has the Say in the Church?, ed. Jürgen Moltmann and Hans Küng. Concilium 148/8 (New York, Edinburgh: Seabury Press, T&T Clark, 1981), pp. 18–22; Hubert Filser, Dogma, Dogmen, Dogmatik: Eine Untersuchung zur Begründung und zur Entstehungsgeschichte einer theologische Diziplin von der Reformation bis zur Spätaufklärung (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2001); Georges Florovsky, ‘The Function of Tradition in the Ancient Church’, in Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View. Collected Works 1 (Belmont, Mass.: Nordland, 1972), pp. 73–92; Heinrich Fries, ‘Is there a Magisterium of the Faithful?’, in The Teaching Authority of the Believers, ed. J. B. Metz and E. Schillebeeckx. Concilium 180/4 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), pp. 82–91; Peter Scharr, Consensus fidelium: Zur Unfehlbarkeit der Kirche aus der Perspektive einer Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit (Würzburg: Echter, 1992); Brian Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory: The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from Gratian to the Great Schism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955); Herbert Vorgimler, ‘From Sensus Fidei to Consensus Fidelium’, in The Teaching Authority of the Believers, ed. J. B. Metz and E. Schillebeeckx. Concilium 180/4 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), pp. 3–11. Paul M. Blowers, ‘The Regula Fidei and the Narrative Character of Early Christian Faith’, Pro Ecclesia 6/2 (1997): 199; Robert A. Markus, ‘The Problem of Self-Definition: From Sect to Church’, in Jewish and Christian Self-Definition, ed. E. P. Sanders. The Shaping of Christianity in the Second and Third Centuries 1 (London: SCM Press, 1980), pp. 13–15; Alister McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1990), pp. 40, 75; Rowan Williams, ‘Does It Make Sense to Speak of Pre-Nicene Orthodoxy?’, in The Making of Orthodoxy, ed. Rowan Williams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 8. For discussion of the lex orandi/supplicandi, lex credendi principle and the relationship between liturgy and doctrine, cf. e.g. Paul De Clerck, ‘ ‘‘Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi’’: The Original Sense and Historical Avatars of an Equivocal Adage’, Studia Liturgica 24 (1994): 185–6; Karl Federer, Liturgie und Glaube: Eine Theologiegeschichtliche Untersuchung (Freiburg: Paulusverlag, 1950), p. 14; Filser, Dogma, Dogmen, Dogmatik, pp. 46–7; Florovsky, ‘The Function of Tradition in the Ancient Church’; Karl Lehmann, ‘Gottesdienst als Ausdruck des Glaubens. Plädoyer für ein neues Gespräch zwischen Liturgiewissenschaft und dogmatischer theologie’, Liturgisches Jahrbuch 30 (1980): 197–214; Paul V. Marshall, ‘Reconsidering ‘‘Liturgical Theology’’: Is there a Lex Orandi for All Christians?’, Studia Liturgica 25 (1995): 142; Edmund Schlink, ‘Die Struktur der dogmatischen Aussage als ökumenisches Problem’, Kerygma und Dogma 3 (1957): 260. On regula fidei in the early church, see Blowers, ‘Regula Fidei’, pp. 210–11; Richard Hanson, Tradition in the Early Church (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 124–5; Albert C. Outler, ‘Origen and the Regulae Fidei’, The Second Century 4/3 (1984): 134; Williams, ‘Does It Make Sense?’, pp. 15–16.

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10. Sauter, ‘Consensus’, p. 185. 11. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 1:23–4. 12. Harding Meyer, ‘Dialogue, Bilateral’, in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Nicholas Lossky et al. (Geneva: WCC, 2 edn, 2002), pp. 310–11. 13. Meyer and Evans speak of the characters of dialogue mostly in the anthropological sense, whereas Brandner makes a distinction between the two: Tobias Brandner, Einheit gegeben – verloren – erstrebt: Denkbewegungen von Glauben und Kirchenverfassung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), pp. 213, 225–6; Gillian R. Evans, Method in Ecumenical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 50; Harding Meyer, Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie (Frankurt am Main and Paderborn: Verlag Otto Lembeck and Bonifatius, 1998), 1:38–43. 14. Brandner, Einheit, pp. 217–18, 228; Johannes Brosseder, ‘Dialogfähige Theologie’, in Dialogfähige Theologie, ed. Johannes Brosseder (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchen Verlag, 1998), pp. 18–19. 15. Methodologically this means that ‘truth’ or even ‘the church’ is not identified with the dialogue (see Brandner, Einheit, pp. 219–21). The identification would make the dialogue nonsensical (see David Mills, ‘Necessary Doctrines: Why Dogma is Needed and Why Substitutes Fail’, in Ancient and Postmodern Christianity: Essays in Honor of Thomas C. Oden, ed. C. A. Hall and K. Tanner (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2002), p. 113. Mills’s propositional understanding of doctrine does not allow any differentiation either on the level of language or on the level of reality. Doctrine is the ultimate reality; Cf. Mills, ‘Necessary Doctrines’, pp. 108–14. It is thus clear that dialogue and the understanding of the nature of doctrine are intrinsically connected. 16. Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene: Über das Verhältnis von Kirchengemeinschaft und Gottesverständnis’, in Befreiende Wahrheit: FS Eilert Herms, ed. Wilfried Härle, Matthias Heesch and Reiner Preul (Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 2000), p. 452. 17. Cf. Wolfgang Thönissen, ‘Die Problematik von Grund und Gestalt: Eine Skizze zur ökumenischen Hermeneutik’, Catholica 56/2 (2002): 111–27. 18. Fuisz, Konsens, pp. 56–7. 19. Wolfgang Beinert, ‘Möglichkeit und Umfang ökumenischer Konsense: Eine historischtheologische Studie zur ‘‘Grundkonsens’’-Problematik’, in Grundkonsens – Grunddifferenz, ed. André Birmelé and Harding Meyer (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 1992), pp. 60– 61. 20. Reinhard Frieling, Der Weg des ökumenischen Gedankens (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), p. 257. 21. Fuisz, Konsens, p. 14. 22. ‘Agreement’ is used here in a non-juridical sense to refer to the state of affairs concerning the subject matter under discussion. Thus, ‘a reached agreement’ does not imply that the results of the dialogue have been officially received or affirmed. 23. Harding Meyer, ‘Die Prägung einer Formel: Ursprung und Intention’, in Einheit – aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom ‘differenzierten Konsens’, ed. Harald Wagner. Quaestiones disputatae 184 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000), p. 48; Reinhard Slenczka, ‘ ‘‘Magnus Consensus’’: Die Einheit der Kirche in der Wahrheit und der gesellschaftliche Pluralismus’, Kerygma und Dogma 43 (1997): 22–3. 24. F&O BEM 1982: Preface. 25. James A. Nestingen perceives both ‘consensus’ and ‘convergence’ as identically negative concepts implying compromising one’s own views. Cf. James A. Nestingen, ‘Dialogue in Dialog: The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification: Anti-JDDJ Visions and Realities’, Dialog 39/2 (2000): 140–41. Cf. also Evans, Method, pp. 81–2. 26. Johannes Brosseder, ‘Dialogfähige Theologie’, p. 19; Peter Lüning, Ökumene an der Schwelle zum dritten Jahrtausend (Kevelaer: Topos, 2000), p. 23; Jean-Marie R. Tillard, ‘Reflections and Suggestions Concerning Ecumenical Dialogue’, One in Christ 7/1 (1971): 100. Some responses to Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry interpreted the reached agreement from this negative

Consensus as an Ecumenical Challenge

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

41.

42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

17

viewpoint as ‘insufficient’. Responses are quoted in Evans, Method, p. 188. See also the report of the WCC Assembly in Vancouver 1983 in Gathered for Life (WCC 1983), p. 72; Brandner, Einheit. In Brandner’s view consensus in fact does have a similar dynamic character, which is oriented towards transcending isolated perceptions of truth (Einheit, p. 234). Fuisz, Konsens, pp. 170–71. Ibid., pp. 171–6. Fuisz draws directly from Heribert Mühlen’s article in Heribert Mühlen, ‘Konvergenz als Strukturprinzip’, Ökumenische Rundschau 21 (1972): 290–315. Mühlen, ‘Konvergenz als Strukturprinzip’, pp. 303, 310. Cf. George A. Lindbeck, ‘The Unity We Seek: Setting the Agenda for Ecumenism’, Christian Century (9 August 2005): 28. Groupe des Dombes 1991: 64. Brinkman and Fleinert-Jensen point to the challenge of transferring the notion of conversion from an individual metanoia to inter-church relations; see Maarten E. Brinkman, ‘Conversion and Identity: An Exploration of the Theme’, in Bekehrung und Identität: Ökumene als Spannung zwischen Fremden und Vertrautem, ed. Dagmar Heller. Beiheft zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 73 (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 2003), p. 14; Flemming Fleinert-Jensen, ‘Die Notwendigkeit zur Umkehr für die Kirche und ihre Bedeutung für den ökumenische Prozess’, in Bekehrung und Identität, Ökumene als Spannung zwischen Fremden und Vertrautem, ed. Dagmar Heller. Beiheft zur Ökumenischen Rundschau 73 (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 2003), pp. 73–5. Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry speaks of convergence as the process by which churches ‘reach the point of living and acting together in unity’ (F&O BEM 1982: Preface). Brandner, Einheit, p. 229. Fuisz seems to have this understanding as well although it is not clearly explained. Beinert, ‘Möglichkeit und Umfang’, p. 60. Ibid. Ibid., p. 61. Ibid. See Karl Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ein ökumenischer Fortschritt? Einführung in die Methodik und Hermeneutik der Untersuchungen’, in Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend?, ed. Karl Lehmann (Freiburg: Herder, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 2:34. See Karl Lehmann, ‘Grundlegend einig’, in Ökumene vor neuen Zeiten: FS Theodor Schneider, ed. Konrad Raiser and Dorothea Sattler (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000), p. 178. See Harding Meyer’s two articles ‘Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft. Bericht und Reflexionen über eine Konsultation und ihr Thema’ and ‘Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft. Eine lutherische Perspektive’, in Grundkonsens – Grunddifferenz. Studien des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung, Ergebnisse und Dokumente, ed. André Birmelé and Harding Meyer (Frankfurt am Main, Paderborn: Otto LembeckBonifatius, 1992), pp. 17–19 and 125–8. See also A-L 1983; A-L 1987; A-Ev 1988 Meissen; Harding Meyer, ‘Ecumenical Consensus: Our Quest for and the Emerging Structures of Consensus’, Gregorianum 77/2 (1996): 220–21. Beinert, ‘Möglichkeit und Umfang’, p. 61. According to Lehmann, the notions of ‘total’ and ‘partial’ should not be read as qualitative definitions because this would lead into unrealistic claims of absolute identity in language and concepts of two traditions. The reading of these definitions is rather ambiguous; see Lehmann, ‘Grundlegend einig’, p. 10. R. R. Reno, ‘The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification: An Outsider’s View’, Pro Ecclesia 7/4 (1998): 428. Jean-Marie R. Tillard, ‘How Do We Express Unity in Faith?’, One in Christ 14/4 (1978): 319. There are many examples of both qualitative and quantitative readings of ecumenical documents. Cf. e.g. Imgard Kindt-Siegwalt, ‘Believing in Unity and Accepting Difference’, Ecumenical Review 51/2 (1999): 194 and Lehmann, ‘Grundlegend einig’, p. 179. For a longer discussion see Chapter 4 below, pp. 54–80. Oxford Latin-English Dictionary, s.v. compromitto.

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47. Brandner, Einheit, pp. 235–6. 48. Fuisz, Konsens, p. 113. Fuisz discusses political decision-making, sociology and the peaceful life of a community; cf. Fuisz, Konsens, pp. 114–19. In light of the work of WCC’s Special Commission these comparisons seem surprising; cf. The Final Report of the Special Commission on Orthodox Participation (WCC Special 2002). 49. See Tillard, ‘Reflections and Suggestions’, p. 99. 50. Fuisz, Konsens, p. 123. 51. Ibid., p. 158. 52. Meyer, ‘Die Prägung’. The phrase ‘differentiated consensus’ has become a standard way of referring to a consensus that exists with difference, not despite of it. Although primarily connected to the model of consensus in the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, it is becoming the normative way of speaking about consensus, which is not uniformity. This development is not only positive. The phrase ‘differentiated consensus’ is, at least implicitly, connected with a particular understanding of unity (‘reconciled unity’). Some problems arise from the concept itself. To avoid the idea that the Joint Declaration’s form of consensus is the only possible way of describing a consensus with difference and also to make room for alternative interpretations of how consensus can exist with differences, I have opted for a very general, descriptive concept of ‘consensus with difference’.

PART II

LUTHERAN–ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE

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Chapter 2 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE The First Official Report (L-RC 1966) The First Official Report of the Joint Working Group between the Roman Catholic Church and the Lutheran World Federation described the starting points and basic principles for the coming Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. The dialogue was motivated by the history and origins Lutherans and Roman Catholics share and the emergence of the modern world, which makes the existing traditional theological differences ‘now appear in different perspective’. The challenges of the modern world include, for example, the development of the natural sciences, the expanded knowledge of the universe, secularization and difficulties in faith in God and the new perspective on the past provided by historical science. In addition, the modern biblical scholarship has provided a new approach to the traditional formulations of the respective positions and to confessional differences.1 The dialogue was intended to eliminate misunderstandings and causes of irritation. Ecumenical progress was foreseen to take place through growth in accurate knowledge about the positions of the other church.2 The official dialogue was hoped to be a ‘striving for the truth carried on in mutual respect, where both partners meet as equals’.3 The fact of different approaches should be approached with an attitude of charity. The goal was to acquire ‘new Christian insights’, which ‘are opened up for future development’.4 The apparent differences between Lutherans and Roman Catholics are perceived as ‘real’ but also a consequence of misunderstandings and the particular perspectives from which one community observes the other. The new insights could be received ‘in repentance and faith . . . by the divine grace in (our) fraternal relationships’.5 As a starting point, the churches thus have both positive and negative challenges. The negative challenges come from outside the churches and require a common response from the churches. New developments in historical and biblical scholarship are a positive thrust towards reviewing past events and traditional confessional positions. The document echoes Unitatis redintegratio in placing emphasis on the correct understanding of the teaching of the other church. It also forecasts the possibility of advancing beyond comparing individual points of doctrine and seeking their justification in specific historical contexts. These basic principles become clearer in the first report of the Joint Lutheran–Roman Catholic Study Commission The Gospel and Church (commonly known as the Malta Report, L-RC 1972). The Malta Report can in retrospect be described more as a survey of

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current theological positions than as an attempt to produce common, substantial theological statements.6 It emphasizes the historicity of the church and its doctrine. Consequently, the document also emphasizes the historicity of particular linguistic forms used to communicate the gospel and the possibility of looking for the most adequate conceptualization. If the basic orientation of the first Lutheran–Roman Catholic document echoes the ‘Catholic principles of ecumenism’ of Unitatis redintegratio, then some of the central methodological emphases in the Malta Report reflect theological developments in the Lutheran or in the wider Protestant world.7 Far-reaching consensus in understanding the gospel and the church (L-RC 1972) Commonality and conformity In the Malta Report ecumenical rapprochement is based on deeper understanding of the historicity of the church and the possibility of finding new mutually understandable contextualizations of the common gospel.8 This is the key to understanding the beginnings of Lutheran–Catholic ecumenical methodology. Any contextualization or ‘understanding’ of the gospel is affected by three interrelated factors: the historical context (in this case, both Reformation and contemporary contexts), ecclesiology and the theological method applied. Concepts referring to divinity are considered analogical in nature. Moreover, their essence can be reached only through particular historical forms. Particular historical forms of expression do not ‘contaminate’ the divine reality but allow access to this reality. Their existence is itself the work of the Spirit.9 The emerging theological method draws on theological hermeneutics and biblical scholarship to discover possible new interpretations appropriate for contemporary times and to serve a common mission. Differences are attributed to the differing understandings of the gospel. The main goal of new, common contextualizations has two parts: firstly to find a theological agreement on the ‘gospel’ and secondly to find criteria for adequate interpretation/proclamation. The method makes a basic distinction between Jesus’ proclamation and the primitive kerygma on the one hand and the continuing proclamation of God’s salvific work on the other. This distinction is the main content of the acquired ‘far-reaching consensus’. Consequently, it becomes necessary to agree on the criteria for distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate ‘later developments’.10 The primary criterion of ‘legitimate developments’ is the Holy Spirit who makes the Christ-event into a saving action.11 This is called the viva vox evangelii, the gospel expressed in ever-changing circumstances.12 Since every feature of the church is historically transmitted, ‘what the world is and how we understand it, inevitably influences the formulation of the Gospel and the life and structures of the church’.13 ‘Tradition’ as an instance of authority is not so much a static constancy as a spirit-guided, dynamic and hermeneutic process of continuously testifying to the gospel in new historical situations. The criterion for adequate interpretation is

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23

thus included in the tradition, which is the hermeneutical process of correct interpretation. The criterion allows for developing a variety of time-bound traditions and also ensures that these traditions communicate what is essential in the gospel. The centre and foundation of the gospel is explicitly not defined as a particular theological formulation or doctrine, but rather something constituted by the eschatological saving act of God.14 Continuity and faithfulness of tradition relates to apostolicity, which is understood primarily as a general continuity in the apostolic teaching and secondly, as the succession of the uninterrupted line of the transmission of office.15 The three key criteria of legitimate interpretation are contemporaneity, the Spirit-guided viva vox evangelii and continuity as apostolicity. These criteria are not to be separated but they should appear together. The reached agreement rests on two statements or aspirations of commonality and conformity. The continuous Spirit-guided interpretative process of proclamation refers to a common ground, that is, the centre or the foundation of the gospel. Thus, the interpretative process is anchored not in doctrine (or a doctrine) but in God’s eschatological saving act. The churches pursue this common interpretative process in changing historical situations. The agreement based on commonality is accompanied by another based on conformity. The Malta Report proposes conformity in the theological perception of interpretative structure, more specifically in the theological formulation of the critical principle of interpretation. These theological thought-structures are on the Lutheran side ‘the centre of the Gospel’16 and on the Roman Catholic side, the hierarchy of truths (hierarchia veritatum), which allow for differentiation between the various truths of faith according to their contents and proximity to the centre. The Malta Report has no discussion of the compatibility of the hierarchy of truths and the centre of the gospel. Also, the document itself does not incorporate this proposed structural affinity in its method.17 The Malta Report’s consensus was facilitated by an agreement on the ‘centre of the gospel’. In the end the discussion of the compatibility of differing doctrinal or thought structures received far less attention than the principle of differing doctrinal expressions that are dependent on contingent historical contexts.18 The document does take a position on perceiving doctrinal statements as historically mediated explications of the gospel and thus something secondary. The primary focus of unity is on fulfilling the common mission of preaching the gospel; this is the context in which the possibility of intercommunion, for example, is considered.19

The Malta Report and the ‘centre of the gospel ’ The theological method in the Malta Report reflected the theological trends of the time. Its argumentation drew on modern hermeneutics in maintaining that the key to resolving classical Lutheran–Roman Catholic differences is in reinterpreting them in a contemporary context.20 The frame of reference of the document is historical. Truth is intrinsically bound up with the historical context of the time. The common response to the challenges of the present time becomes a question of

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Agreeable Agreement

extreme importance; the truth of the gospel is reachable only through a reinterpretation appropriate to contemporary time and place. The hermeneutical method used in the Malta Report to arrive at a joint reinterpretation of the gospel reflected discussion of similar themes within the Lutheran World Federation (LWF) at the time. The idea of ‘reformulating’ the doctrine of justification for the sake of better communication with ‘modern men’ was prominent in the Lutheran World Federation in the 1960s. The LWF Helsinki Assembly in 1963 made a notorious attempt to formulate a common statement on justification. Although the attempt failed, the discussion had ecumenical consequences. The Helsinki Assembly coincided with the Second Vatican Council. Consequently, the assembly’s theological developments were integrated into the agenda of the new Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, which started immediately after the close of Vatican II.21 The Helsinki Assembly met under the motto ‘Christ Today’. This theme exemplified the Lutheran churches’ concern for fostering the proclamation of the message of justification to the people of today and to make proclamation useful to the way the church expresses its faith and life. ‘Christ Today’ was perceived as a call to actualize the message of justification. The contemporary time and the contemporary questions were taken as critical instances of expressing the message of justification. A meaningful presentation of the message of justification answers the questions raised by contemporary time.22 Methodological parallels with the Malta Report are evident. The method of the Malta Report is historically oriented in a way that both relativizes doctrinal and theological statements and justifies looking for contemporary answers to contemporary questions rather than dwelling on sixteenth-century questions.23 In the Malta Report, ‘history’ or the ‘present’ becomes almost a theological axiom. A change in time creates a gap between the present and what was before. Time does not allow for going back in history. The world as it is today offers the context in which to find and understand the gospel.24 Together the churches face the challenges of ‘modern times’ and of theological development (in biblical theology and, for example, in developments in Catholic theology after Vatican II). Essential for the churches is the faithfulness of proclamation or authenticity of Christian kerygma. Doctrinal disagreements have emerged as a response to contingent historical situations and thus they also can disappear as a consequence of an interpretative process that starts from a common ground.25 How far the doctrinal differences are expected to disappear is not certain. The document leaves open the possibility for non-divisive doctrinal differences. Two arguments in the Malta Report’s model for consensus raise special questions. The first has to do with the notion of ‘the centre of the gospel’ and how it is used in the search for consensus. The second concerns the conformity of the ‘centre of the gospel’ and the ‘hierarchy of truths’. The concept of ‘the centre of the gospel’ is central to the developing Lutheran–Roman Catholic ecumenical method. The Malta Report describes the concept as a classically Lutheran concept, a Christological, hermeneutical principle normative to the interpretation of the scriptures. This interpretation is not universally accepted. For example, Gottfried Martens argues that ‘the centre of the gospel’, though referring back to the classical Lutheran idea of the ‘centre of the scriptures’ was formulated only in the mid-

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twentieth century. Both Martens and Eeva Martikainen refer to the ‘centre of the gospel’ as an idea created in an ecumenical context for ecumenical purposes.26 ’The centre of the gospel’ was perceived as the essence of a new, revolutionary method of the ecumenical movement. This method was explicitly used in the Leuenberg Agreement (CPCE 1973), which is contemporary with the Malta Report. These two documents differed in their immediate goals and consequently, also in their final method. Some observations on the use of the ‘centre of the gospel’ in the Leuenberg Agreement will serve to shed light on its possibilities and challenges as an ecumenical method.27 As in the Malta Report, so also in the Leuenberg Agreement the criteria of correct interpretation have a central role. In the Leuenberg Agreement the criteria are related to the ‘centre of the scriptures’, which is Jesus Christ. This is also the ground and reference point of the confessions: they unfold the centre in obedience to the witness of the scriptures.28 The notion of ‘the centre of the gospel’ relates to a foreseeable church fellowship. It has to do with the criteria for describing a common understanding of the gospel. Eventually, the defined criteria, the right proclamation of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments all belong to the ‘centre’. In this way the ‘centre’ limits the required scope of the agreement and guides the agreement to concentrate on the fundamentals. This limitation to the ‘centre’ or the fundamentals opens up two interrelated discussions. One concerns the form of consensus in the Leuenberg Agreement (a proleptic consensus), while the other concerns the ecclesiological discussion of whether church fellowship is founded on justifying faith alone or whether common doctrine should be included as well.29 The ambiguity remaining in this question can be demonstrated by the use of the phrase ‘understanding of the gospel’. The fundamental rationale of the Leuenberg Agreement is that church fellowship is established by an agreement on what establishes or founds the church. This implies a distinction between the foundation (Grund ) and its expression (Ausdruck).30 The church’s foundation is the ‘centre’, which supports, affects and is the condition of individual doctrinal expressions. These expressions are historically conditioned ‘thought-forms’ (Denkformen) and are manifested in particular doctrines. Difficulties arise from different interpretations of the assertion that a church fellowship is initiated by recognizing a ‘common understanding of the gospel’. Martens interprets ‘understanding’ to refer to historically conditioned thought-forms.31 According to this quantitative interpretation, the precondition of church fellowship would be an agreement on a doctrine, in this case, the doctrine of justification. The above mentioned distinction would then be a distinction between a ‘fundamental article’ and other articles of the doctrine. It is also possible to interpret the ‘understanding’ in a qualitative way that distinguishes between the primary understanding of the gospel and all historically conditioned, secondary, doctrinal formulations. In this regard the Leuenberg Agreement itself remains ambiguous.32 Regardless of how the limitation is understood, it is clear that in the Leuenberg Agreement, consensus covers only an agreement on the ‘centre’. The agreement takes the form of a confession (Bekenntnis) in the sense of witness.33 This consensus should also find contemporary doctrinal expressions. The contemporary expressions

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Agreeable Agreement

are not the agreement as such but an implication of it. Consequently, ‘agreement on doctrine’ is not a prerequisite but a consequence of consensus on the ‘centre’. Consensus in the fundamentals of doctrina evangelii is ‘the prolepsis of the settling of doctrinal differences’.34 The Malta Report shares the general temporal orientation of the Leuenberg Agreement. Both documents were shaped by their time and its challenges and were oriented towards the future with respect to the eventual agreement. In the Leuenberg Agreement ‘the centre of the gospel’ was essentially related to the common understanding of the gospel, which, in turn, justified the declaration of a church fellowship. Consensus de doctrina was taken in the sense of Confession Augustana 7. The signatory churches agreed both on the presentation and on perception of this presentation as necessary and sufficient for ecclesial communion. The agreement was formulated as a common confession.35 One can ask to what extent the methodological use of the ‘centre of the gospel’ implies an ecclesiological understanding similar to that of the Leuenberg Agreement, and how much of this ecclesiological understanding exists implicitly in the Lutheran aspirations of the Malta Report.36 As in the Leuenberg Agreement, so also in the Malta Report the emphasis is on common witness. In the Malta Report, witness is not interpreted as a confession of faith (Bekenntnis), but more as the churches’ common responsibility for witnessing to the gospel in the contemporary world. In the Malta Report ‘the centre of the gospel’ is offered as a focused centre of diverse ways of witnessing. It resembles the idea of a focused centre of the scriptures (Mitte der Schrift ) but extends to encompass the whole of Christian tradition (der Mitte christlicher Überlieferung). The Malta Report has a wide understanding of ‘the gospel’, which is equated with the sum of all diverse historical developed forms of the message of salvation.37 The centre of the gospel is considered as the transcendent, eschatological saving act of God, which is the criterion of proclamation but itself cannot be reduced to a particular theological formula.38 As has been shown, the Malta Report’s idea of ‘the centre of the gospel’ remains somewhat ambiguous and in its strong resemblance to the Leuenberg Agreement is also potentially controversial. There is also a significant difference between the Leuenberg Agreement and the Malta Report. In the Leuenberg Agreement all the churches share a common understanding of the ‘centre of the gospel’ as an interpretative centre, but the Malta Report can only point to ‘a certain convergence’ between the ‘the centre of the gospel’ and ‘the hierarchy of truths’.39 The Malta Report’s form of consensus depends not only on the interpretation of ‘the centre of the gospel’, but also on the proposed conformity with the ‘hierarchy of truths’. The hierarchy of truths, as the ‘centre of the gospel’, is relatively new as a concept but refers to a number of earlier theological ideas. The concept itself emerged for the first time in the Second Vatican Council document Unitatis redintegratio,40 though similar concepts can be found even earlier in writers such as Yves Congar. The hierarchy of truths has been enthusiastically received in the ecumenical world but sparingly used, it seems, as a method. A wider discussion with a focus on the compatibility of the hierarchy of truths with the critical function of the doctrine of justification emerged in the context of The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of

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Justification (L-RC 1999). In the Malta Report, the focus is not on the critical function of the doctrine but on ‘the Lutheran understanding of the Gospel in terms of the central events to which it witnesses’.42 In its original context, Unitatis redintegratio, the hierarchy of truths was presented first and foremost as a tool of ecumenical dialogue. The purpose of this tool was to help clarify definitive doctrines, that is, to facilitate their interpretation. The hierarchy of truths, as presented in Unitatis redintegratio differs from an earlier, epistemic principle of ‘hierarchy of certitude’. The two hierarchies are not identical, for a precisely defined doctrine high in the hierarchy of certitude might be placed lower on the hierarchy of truths.43 According to Thönissen, the hierarchy of truths should be considered a corrective to the earlier hierarchy of epistemic certitude. It is a systematic exposition of doctrines according to their content, not according to how binding they are.44 Essential to the question of convergence between the hierarchy of truths and the ‘Lutheran understanding of gospel’ is not only the principle that there is an organized structure, but more importantly, the critical principle of distinguishing between the truths and the implications of an agreement on this question for the churches. This principle has been described further in postconciliar Roman Catholic theology.45 With regards to the critical principle in identifying and distinguishing between the ‘fundament’ and the truths of faith, there exists a general agreement among various authors. The ‘fundament’ is identified not as a doctrine but as the person of Jesus Christ. The idea of a hierarchy of truths assumes therefore a distinction between revelation or mysterium on the one hand and the truths of faith (i.e., truths about God and about revelation) or mysterien on the other.46 This distinction is based on the understanding of revelation proposed in Dei verbum, which conceives Jesus Christ to be complete, perfect and to confirm the divine revelation with divine guarantees.47 In Dei verbum, revelation is not to be perceived as ‘an undifferentiated body of propositions about many different realities’ but as a whole that ‘has a quite distinct and determinate focus, the person of Jesus Christ’.48 Although there is a general agreement on identifying the person of Jesus Christ as the ‘fundament’ of Christian faith, there are various opinions about the ecumenical implications of this agreement. William Henn argues that in Unitatis redintegratio the hierarchy of truths was not perceived as a direct means towards achieving the unity of the church but as an indirect means of facilitating discussion. Therefore in Henn’s opinion one cannot interpret Unitatis redintegratio as proposing that an agreement on ‘the fundament of Christian faith’ would be sufficient for ecclesial unity.49 Returning to the context of the Malta Report, one has to note that the proposal of ‘a certain convergence’ between the Lutheran and the Catholic organizing principles is relatively modest. In addition, it does not have an essential role in the actual agreement spelled out in the report. The hierarchy of truth functions more, as proposed in Unitatis redintegratio 11, as a medium to facilitate discussion. The ecclesial consequences of ‘the centre of the gospel’ and the hierarchy of truths are not necessarily identical because they are dependent on additional theological convictions external to the principle itself. As was shown with the example of the Leuenberg Agreement, the ‘centre of the gospel’ is perceived (by the signatory churches) as both the necessary and sufficient foundation of the

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Agreeable Agreement

church. Consequently, the church’s unity can and should be based solely on an agreement on this centre. In Henn’s view, in the hierarchy of truths the organization is considered but not the binding character of the individual truths of faith. A claim that ecclesial unity can be declared on the basis of an agreement on the founding principle of the hierarchy would thus be an unwarranted reduction.50 Another difficulty is that the concept of ‘the centre of the gospel’ yields both qualitative and quantitative interpretations. The possible compatibility of the hierarchy of truths and the centre of the gospel depends also on which of these two interpretations is followed. On the one hand, a qualitative interpretation (such as Loff ’s) would converge with the idea that ‘the foundation of Christian faith’ is not a doctrine but the person of Jesus Christ. In this interpretation, however, doctrinal expressions are considered inferior to the centre in a way that does not agree with the hierarchy of truths. On the other hand, a more quantitative interpretation comes close to the idea of an agreement on the ‘fundamental article’ which, as shown by Henn, does not agree with the hierarchy of truths either. The question of how far the centre of the gospel and the hierarchy of truths do converge is important in view of the later Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue but does not concern the Malta Report directly. The Malta Report’s emphasis on the common witness to the contemporary world directs the method towards a direction that works more on the form–content distinction and is motivated by the introduction of historical-critical biblical methods. The Malta Report’s method is distinctively ‘modern’ in assuming that the ‘biblical message’ is to be found somewhere behind a variety of textual expressions.51 It is easy to agree with Inge Lønning’s critical call for a renewed investigation into basic methodological questions and a clearer distinction between questions of systematic theology and biblical studies. Lønning does not criticize so much the methodological but the unreflected use of the ‘centre of the gospel’. The first round of the international Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue made partial use of several different methods. Some of them were carried over into regional dialogues or emerged later in different contexts. Two notable methodological proposals were the proposal to discover structural convergences (here the centre of the gospel and the hierarchia veritatum) and the talk of agreement as a common understanding. Both of them emerged as focal points of intensive discussion and debate at later points in the dialogue. The liturgical and ecclesiological contexts of growing agreement The Eucharist (L-RC 1978 eng) The Final Report of the Joint Roman Catholic–Lutheran Commission, The Eucharist, shares some methodological features of the Malta Report. The document’s focus is on the churches’ witness, and theological traditions are perceived as historically bound conceptualizations (or interpretations). The document addresses ‘misunderstandings’ that have developed over the course of time and need to be cleared up. The goal of the document is twofold: to describe

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the Lutheran and Catholic ways of witnessing through celebrating the Eucharist and to describe and clear up misunderstandings of theological positions. Accordingly, the document has two methodological foci, one concerned with the liturgical context of joint doxological witness and another concerned with theological conceptualizations. Methodologically, the movement is from common witness to common theological understanding. According to The Eucharist, the purpose of ecumenical work is to clarify and identify converted positions and set them in a new interpretative framework.52 In The Eucharist the interpretative framework is not contemporary time in the first place but a particular theological context, that is, the eucharistic doxology. The words of the doxology, ‘through him, with him, in him, in the unity of the Holy Spirit, all honour and glory is yours, almighty Father, now and forever’, are taken as a theological crux through which Lutherans and Roman Catholics could together testify to the mystery of the Lord’s Supper. The liturgical action of celebrating the Eucharist is perceived as witness to what in the Malta Report was referred to as the ‘eschatological saving act of God’.53 In the context of The Eucharist this witness is given through common praise of God’s salvific presence.54 Although the document refrains from making proposals for intercommunion55 the text does assume that even when not receiving the Eucharist from the same altar, the separated communions could give common witness to the gift given in the Eucharist. This gift is described as living in communion through, in and with Christ as a community renewed, sanctified and strengthened by the power of the Holy Spirit and by being united to the death and resurrection of Christ,56 proclaiming and giving thanks and praise to God the Father and praying for the world.57 The Eucharist is also the way to transfigure the world, to begin a new unity of human kind and to anticipate God’s coming kingdom.58 Paradoxically, Christians in both Roman Catholic and Lutheran communions are assumed to be nourished by the sacrament and to join in the doxology without de facto sharing the Eucharist.59 Regarding the second task of explaining particular theological perceptions, the document differs slightly from the two earlier Lutheran–Roman Catholic documents. There is no longer talk of misunderstandings between the communions, and the hermeneutical focus is slightly different. While the Malta Report asserted that the reality of God can only be reached through our particular and historical understandings of it,60 The Eucharist focuses on the common interpretative framework within which traditionally controverted positions can be reworked. Although the relation between the common doxological celebration of the Eucharist and its theological explication is explained as the Lutheran or Roman Catholic understanding (cf. the Malta Report), the understanding is of a different kind. In the Malta Report ‘understanding’ referred to making the gospel understandable in a particular age but in The Eucharist the different understandings derive from differing emphases in understanding or they are a consequence of conceptualizing the subject matter with the help of different wordings and/or with the help of different metaphysics.61 Although both the Malta Report and The Eucharist have a similar and methodologically significant focus on witness, the two documents also have significant differences. In The Eucharist the witness is not primarily oriented

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Agreeable Agreement

towards the contemporary context and the need to provide an appropriate reinterpretation of some central truths. Rather the focus is more on making particular theological traditions understandable to the other tradition. This is done by making reference to basic intentions, that is, what this particular theological tradition wants to emphasize or avoid.

Ministry in the Church (L-RC 1981) The theological agreements of Ministry in the Church can be presented from three structural viewpoints: commonality, compatibility and difference. Commonalities function as interpretative viewpoints that give shape to the agreed upon text. The text identifies two interpretative viewpoints, an agreement on justification and the ministry of all believers.62 These common starting points imply an agreement on the level of basic, common convictions. Although the churches share basic convictions, they diverge in ways of implementing them. Not all of these differences are a hindrance to church unity. Differences arise, for example, due to differing missionary needs.63 Some of the differences are due to lack of coherence within theological traditions64 and to the churches missing a common interpretative viewpoint.65 These are the negative sources of diversity, which, it is hoped, will disappear by finding common interpretative viewpoints and regaining coherence in theological traditions. Changes in theological understanding take place through changes in interpretative viewpoints. Finding common interpretative viewpoints will, it was hoped, create common theological understanding. ‘Understanding’ is used in the document in various connections. It refers to a particular theological ‘understanding’, that is, a theological interpretation of a specific time or confessional tradition. It is in this sense that the document speaks of ‘the medieval understanding of the ministry’66 and ‘Catholic and Lutheran understanding’.67 ‘Understanding’ is used synonymously with the notion of theological or ecclesial tradition.68 ‘Understanding’ is also used in a technical sense to refer to a particular intentional viewpoint. Intentional here means that the viewpoint is a result of a wish to emphasize or avoid a particular interpretation. A ‘common understanding’ consequently refers to a joint viewpoint that does not deny or harmonize with the intended emphases. Instead the particular emphases are understood to be able to coexist if seen from the common viewpoint. Common understanding also denotes the ability to make common statements or to speak together on an issue. Common understanding is not purely abstract or theoretical but an instrument that facilitates joint theological elaboration. Striving for a common understanding is explicitly seen as an interpretative process. The churches perceive the concrete forms of ministry as taking shape according to existing historical structures and missionary needs of the church.69 How theology conceptualizes the ministry will differ at different times. In this way Ministry in the Church followed the Malta Report in emphasizing ‘contemporary time’. The contemporary historical situation is a relevant factor in formulating an understanding of ministry.70 The reached common understanding was presented as a

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challenge to the churches, thus implying that the interpretative process has or should have concrete consequences for the life of the churches.71 All under One Christ (L-RC 1980 All ): Recapitulating the first decade of Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue The goal of All under One Christ (L-RC 1980 All ) was to reflect on the new relationships between Lutherans and Roman Catholics by discussing the Augsburg Confession. The document was important in two ways. It offered an evaluation of the ecclesial significance of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic doctrinal dialogues, and, it introduced new concepts to describe the reached agreements. I shall focus briefly on these new concepts. In general the doctrinal dialogues were viewed as having brought about a significant change in Lutheran–Roman Catholic relations. In the Reformation period, the churches, despite differences in thought, perceived themselves as one community. After the Reformation, the Lutherans and Roman Catholics went through a period of estrangement. Ecumenical endeavours have brought the two communions to the current situation where Lutherans and Catholics can again confess being ‘all under one Christ’. The ecumenical struggle is therefore in principle not a struggle between communions but a struggle for truth within one communion.72 This change is reflected, that is, in the proposal that the Augsburg Confession can jointly be perceived as a valid expression of faith.73 The perceived change in relations follows from theological agreements, such as ‘a broad consensus emerging on the doctrine of justification’ and ‘a basic, if still incomplete accord on the understanding of the church’. These agreements are jointly described as a ‘basic consensus’, that is, that the churches have ‘a common mind on basic doctrinal truths which points to Jesus Christ, the living centre of our faith’.74 These descriptions raise two kinds of questions. One can ask how the additional predicates (‘broad’ or ‘basic’) define the agreement. Especially the term ‘basic consensus’ has raised questions. Therefore the use of the word ‘basic’ needs special attention. The document uses the word ‘basic’ in two different meanings. Paragraph 16 refers to ‘basic’ as a quantitatively lesser or incomplete agreement, that is, an agreement that is of the right kind but is missing the needed intensity, breadth or depth. It refers only to the nature of agreement without making a judgement of the importance of the particular issues agreed upon. In contrast, paragraph 18 speaks of ‘basic doctrinal truths’ with the word ‘basic’ referring to something fundamental or elementary but not (in the first case) incomplete.75 In this use the agreement is adequate but restricted in scope; it covers only what is basic and essential. Therefore, the ‘basic consensus’ in paragraph 18 is not partial or incomplete but an adequate consensus on a restricted set of fundamental doctrines. Some ambiguity remains because the agreement on the particular doctrinal truths (which is ‘basic’) is itself ‘basic’ in the sense of ‘not complete’. The ‘basic consensus’ in paragraph 18 refers to an agreement on doctrines that are considered basic (the doctrine of justification and understanding of the church). Having a common mind on this

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would be the common witness of Christ. The basic consensus could also be interpreted as an incomplete consensus on the contents of the basic truths. In this interpretation the incompleteness of the accord does not hinder having ‘a common mind on basic doctrinal truths’ or having a basic consensus. The context in which the notion of ‘basic consensus’ appears suggests a qualitative interpretation, that is, that reference is made to a set of more ‘basic’ doctrines. The content of ‘basic doctrines’ is analogous to the first part of the Augsburg Confession (arts 1–22).76

Facing Unity (L-RC 1984) The goal of Facing Unity was to elaborate on the realizable ecclesial forms of the already existing understanding of unity as expressed in the earlier Ways to Community (L-RC 1980 Ways). The document pursued to describe a balanced coexistence of unity and diversity within one communion. According to Facing Unity, a common perception of the church is the proper context in which differences can lose their church-divisive character and where the legitimacy of remaining differences can be judged.77 In this section I will first discuss the various understandings of consensus presented in the document. This will be followed by discussion of the nature of church-dividing differences and the process of differences losing their church-divisive character. Facing Unity uses the concept of consensus in reference to something basic or essential78 or to an agreement concerning a certain individual subject matter such as ‘consensus on the reality (of the eucharistic presence)’.79 Notions such as ‘substantial consensus’ and ‘deepened consensus’ are also employed.80 ‘Basic consensus’ is used to refer to an incomplete or fragmentary agreement, as in ‘[the process] has led to a basic, though not yet complete, consensus in the understanding of church’.81 The fullest form of agreement is described as ‘consensus regarding apostolic faith’. Consensus regarding the apostolic faith is yet to be reached although the churches have ‘a full accord on fundamental and central truths’. Consensus in apostolic faith is an agreement that also includes an official judgement about theological consensus pronounced by an instance of authoritative teaching.82 A full theological consensus can exist separately of ‘consensus regarding apostolic faith’ if the theological consensus lacks authoritative recognition. ‘Consensus’ does not refer to a theoretical agreement on the interpretation of theological statements. Faith, sacramental praxis and service are inseparably connected in consensus. Consensus gains visibility through the link between understanding and praxis. This way consensus begins to have increasingly visible forms and structures of continuity and common decision-making.83 The concept of ‘fundamental consensus’ is used to refer to a consensus on faith, sacramental life and ordained ministry and is considered to be necessary for lifting mutual condemnations. This fundamental consensus is a key element in the process of making the remaining differences lose their church-divisive character.84 The process has two aspects of reconciliation-recognition and reception-reconciliation, which characterize different sides of the process.

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Facing Unity introduces into the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue a distinction between ‘church-divisive’ and ‘non-church-divisive’ differences. Under certain circumstances divergences can be brought to converge sufficiently that manifest differences are no longer church-divisive. This process has two phases, a phase of convergence and a phase of critical reception. Both phases take place in an ecclesiological or ecclesial context, that is, in the soteriological–eschatological framework described in Ways to Community. This framework connects the ecumenical goal of the unity of the church with that of the ultimate soteriological goal of ‘unity of all in Christ’. The soteriological–eschatological framework is especially noticeable in the process of convergence. Convergence is a consequence of becoming reconciled in God through Christ. This reconciliation enables separated Christians to be reconciled with each other. Through reconciliation separated Christians can let go of false perceptions and the perceptions of illusory differences that derive from such perceptions. Remaining differences can begin to be perceived as mutually enriching correctives to one-sided teaching by any particular church and legitimate conceptualizations of the same faith. Consensus is a consequence of a process of reconciliation wherein all converge, that is, all are reconciled with God and with each other.85 Convergence enables one to see the other in a new way. It implies a change in attitude and perception, not in beliefs. The change in perception is made possible by dialogue and constant communication.86 Unity in faith is nonetheless not a question of mere ‘ability to see the other’ in an uncontroversial way. Legitimate differences can be accepted as such because they ‘are based on a fundamental consensus in understanding the apostolic faith’.87 Here Facing Unity distinguishes between the substance of faith and ‘the way it is articulated’. Differences in articulation or contextualized expressions of the one faith are legitimate when they are centred around and related to ‘the central message of salvation and Christian faith’ and do not endanger this centre.88 An expression is ‘related’ to the central message when it does not ‘endanger it’. This implies that a fundamental consensus also has a critical dimension. Recognizing that an expression is related to and does not endanger the central message of salvation opens up a shared critical space in which critical questions can be safely brought up.89 The nature and function of fundamental consensus is therefore one thing and the judgement on the scope of agreement, that is, what doctrines need to be agreed on, is another.90 The second phase of reception follows when past condemnations have been judged groundless. This is described as reconciliation through recognition (of the ecumenical process) and reception (of the results). At this point reconciliation refers more to practical ecclesial processes than, for example, to the reconciliation of doctrinal expressions of faith. In the processes of reconciliation repentance and renewal are prior to the working through of the doctrinal divergences. This way the document binds together the spiritual and the academic aspects of ecumenical processes.91

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Church and Justification (L-RC 1993): Understanding the church in light of the doctrine of justification The central goal of Church and Justification was to clarify the ecclesiological implications of the ‘far-reaching consensus on the doctrine of justification’ expressed in the Malta Report. This was the third document of the Lutheran– Roman Catholic dialogue after Ways to Community and Facing Unity to address ecclesiological questions. Church and Justification contributed to the discussion by explicating both the theological foundation of the common ecclesiological vision and the specific place of justification in it. The document was intended to be an ecclesiological contribution to the discussion of the existence of ‘fundamental consensus’ or ‘fundamental difference’ between Lutherans and Roman Catholics.92 The document does not arrive at affirming a ‘basic consensus’ but postulates its existence as a basis of the theological work.93 The document has two parts. The first part explains the Lutheran and Roman Catholic positions and provides a new interpretation of their relationship. In the second part, an agreement is structured on the basis of the redefined relationship. The argumentation as a whole is shaped by two theologically motivated reservations the Lutheran position has towards the Catholic position and vice versa. The Catholic reservations ask whether the Lutheran understanding of justification does not diminish the reality of the church. The Lutheran reservations ask whether the Catholic understanding of the church does not obscure the gospel as the doctrine of justification explicates it.94 These theological reservations have been distilled into a series of questions, which either contradict or challenge the outright classical theological thinking of the other communion. In the first part of the inquiry an argument is built for the positive existence of distinctively Lutheran and Roman Catholic confessional positions. This positive understanding of confessional positions exists within the framework of a fundamental consensus. The theological reservations and the subsequent questions exist within a consensus that is more fundamental than the differences. The questions and hesitations are not destructive but make it possible for one confessional viewpoint to understand how the viewpoint of the other has developed and what it intends to communicate.95 A basic or potential compatibility is then argued through three ‘basic convictions’.96 These basic convictions reveal an implicit assumption underlying both the Lutheran and the Roman Catholic concerns. According to this assumption there is a (potentially fundamental) contradiction between the church and the gospel. Yet the basic convictions show that this contradiction cannot be justified. Differences in theological approach are not a consequence of a fundamental contradiction. The differing Lutheran and Roman Catholic approaches point to differing aspects of the issue at hand. Perceiving theological differences as differing aspects of the same thing is called ‘original consensus’. Theological differences are attributed to differences in theological emphasiz,97 understanding,98 interpretation99 or viewpoint,100 as linguistic forms101 or as differing theological starting points.102 In light of the basic convictions the differences can ‘lose their sharpness’. The differences can also be

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103

made to surface with a specific way of posing the questions. In addition to differences for which the document already proposes a common viewpoint, differences that were considered to be more serious and requiring further studies were also identified. Even these significant differences are not a result of a fundamental difference.104 Church and Justification firmly insisted that there is no principle ‘fundamental difference’ that would make it impossible to reconcile differing theological approaches. Church and Justification’s agreement is based on an argument of compatibility between Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching and tradition. In this document ‘compatibility’ means ‘not conflicting’ or ‘not incompatible’. The text is based on two differing forms of ‘negative compatibility’. The first form of compatibility is conditional. It states that there is no fundamental difference between Lutheran and Roman Catholic forms of thought and therefore they are potentially compatible. The second form of compatibility concerns the relation between individual theological positions and the critical instance of the doctrine of justification. Theological positions are compatible if they do not contradict the doctrine of justification. In the context of Church and Justification this ‘negative compatibility’ with the doctrine of justification is taken to imply that the Lutheran and Roman Catholic positions are not contradictory and therefore are compatible. A negative compatibility is a weak argument and it fails logically. Showing that two arguments are not contradictory does not imply their compatibility. Church and Justification’s strength is not in the argument for compatibility but in its ecclesiological implementation of a consensus in justification. By this I mean the use of the doctrine of justification as a critical principle. The problem with this implementation is that Church and Justification could not claim that there is in fact a consensus on the doctrine of justification.105 Therefore the document deals only with the critical function of justification, not with ‘how the saving event can be rightly described and how God communicates his righteousness to the sinner’.106 Because a positive consensus on the doctrine of justification was missing, the accomplishments of the document remained conditional. The conclusions were pending a consensus on the doctrine of justification. The proposed use of the doctrine of justification as a critical instance is an important characteristic of Lutheran–Roman Catholic consensus, especially in a form that exists with and not despite differences. Basic methodological features The first basic feature of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue is the emphasis on the historicity of church teaching. During the course of the dialogue, both Lutherans and Roman Catholics come to recognize that the teaching of each of the communions is not ‘bare revelation’ but clothed in historical forms. This emphasis was central at the beginning of the dialogue. It gained momentum from contemporary developments in the LWF, the Roman Catholic Church and the consequent theological currents of the time. A great influx of historical biblical scholarship into systematic theology oriented the dialogue towards a striving for

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common contemporary interpretation of the gospel message. One of the main questions in the dialogue became how to discern truthful doctrinal interpretation from false. This question is important, both as a question to the church in its mission to proclaim the gospel and to the separated Christian communions in their desire to be united. A second basic characteristic of the dialogue follows from the first. There is a conviction that at times the interpretative framework rooted in the word of God, the witness of the apostles and the challenges of contemporary times can and will produce differing responses in the forms of teaching and doctrine. Therefore, the churches have come to ask what the reference point of the church’s unity is. The dialogue suggests, that the reference point is the church’s fundament, and by reference to this fundament the church can discern the truthfulness of the various aspects of its life. Agreement on the ‘fundament’ and the principles of how this fundament relates to the various aspects of the church’s life is called a ‘fundamental consensus’. A third basic feature has to do with the method of coming to an agreement. The methodology has developed through the dialogue and has therefore undergone various changes. It is characterized by an intention to clear up misunderstandings and to strive for truth. It is executed through comparison and explanation. The central focus of the method is to expose the intended meaning of particular doctrines, to evaluate what is meant by their correspondence with the ‘fundament’ and by their compatibility with the teaching of the other communion. The exact character of this ‘fundament’, which is basic to the reached agreement, is not clear. This is because some of the documents use ambiguous language to describe the ‘basic agreement’. For example, the description of ‘basic agreement’ in All under One Christ yields two very different interpretations, arising from the use of the word ‘basic’ in both qualitative and quantitative senses. According to the qualitative interpretation, a ‘basic consensus’ is something incomplete.107 At the same time ‘basic consensus’ is used in reference to Lutherans and Roman Catholics having ‘a common mind on basic doctrinal truths which points to Jesus Christ’.108 This is a quantitative interpretation of consensus, that concentrates on a particular number of ‘truths’. Agreement on the second kind, according to an official statement from the LWF is an agreement that goes beyond individual agreements and provides a common foundation. A Roman Catholic statement perceives it as an agreement on the central truths of faith.109 The reactions from the LWF and the Roman Catholic Church would support understanding the ‘basic consensus’ to refer to consensus on basic truths of faith, that is, to be a fundamental consensus. Even if one should choose the quantitative interpretation of ‘consensus in basic doctrinal truths’, the question of how to identify what is fundamental remains. This anticipates the discussion of ‘the centre of the gospel’ and ‘the hierarchy of truths’ in Chapter 4. The description of ‘basic consensus’, that is, consensus ‘on basic doctrinal truths which points to Jesus Christ, the living centre of our faith’, is reminiscent of the hierarchy of truths, that, hierarchical ordering of doctrinal truths according to their relationship to the fundament of Christian faith, the person of Jesus Christ. A basic consensus on central doctrinal truths appears to be an attempt to combine both the main ideas of the ‘centre of the gospel’ and the hierarchy of

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truths. This is to say that a basic consensus is restricted to the essential, the centre of the gospel. At the same time, basic consensus is an agreement on basic doctrinal truths. The combination of these two aspects is not completely convincing. As shown before, the idea of the centre of the gospel functions mainly with a distinction between a transcendental fundament and its historically bound expressions (or by a distinction between the fundamental article and the rest of the doctrine). The hierarchy of truths starts with a set of defined truths and their ordering is considered in reference to the fundament of Christian faith. An important question regarding ‘basic consensus’ is whether it includes the aspect of narrowing down the area of agreement to a specific set of issues or whether the basic consensus refers more to an underlying element that is distinct from the individual questions, yet at the same time supports or brings them together.110 The discussion of basic consensus should also note the distinction that Facing Unity makes between a basic consensus and a ‘fundamental consensus in apostolic faith’. This fundamental consensus in apostolic faith is perceived as something fuller or going further than a basic consensus. While Facing Unity proposes that a basic consensus already exists, a fundamental consensus in apostolic faith is still to be reached. This advanced form of fundamental consensus also takes into account how the churches exercise authoritative teaching and how, for example, they discern the results of doctrinal dialogues. The two concepts of ‘basic consensus’ and a ‘fundamental consensus in apostolic faith’ express specific but implicit Lutheran and Roman Catholic ecclesiological aspirations. While the Lutheran theological point of view, as it appears in the documents, would favour an idea of the necessary but also sufficient basic consensus reminiscent of the Leuenberg Agreement, the Roman Catholic perception envisions a consensus not restricted to a particular area of doctrine. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue has proposed various ways to argue for the compatibility of confessional forms of thought. In the Malta Report (1972) it was proposed that compatibility could be found through conformity in structuring the body of doctrines, that is, in the conformity of the hierarchy of truths with the principle of the centre of the gospel. In Ways to Community (1980) the compatibility was approached from the viewpoint of the essential meanings. The document proposes that structural differences can be judged non-divisive if the differing thought structures point to essentially the same meaning. In a similar vain in Facing Unity (1984) it was proposed that differences should be observed from the viewpoint of a fundamental consensus that relativizes them and makes them lose their church-divisive character. Church and Justification (1993) spoke of ‘basic convictions’, which, when held in common, create a space within which diversity is an enrichment, not a danger. Within this diversity-tolerant space differing approaches are perceived to create balance and help to bring out a fuller presentation of reality.

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1. L-RC 1966: 2, 5. 2. This action is clearly foreseen in Unitatis redintegratio 4, 9. Evans describes the evident shortcomings of remaining with this kind of a ‘method of truth’ as they were observed in the Orthodox–Roman Catholic dialogue, which started in the late 1970s (see Evans, Method, pp. 73–5). 3. On the question of equality in ecumenical dialogue, see Evans, Method, p. 76. Cf. RC-WCC 1975: 42. 4. L-RC 1966: 5, 7b. 5. Ibid., 8. 6. See L-RC 1972: 7. 7. Lindbeck describes the general approach of the Malta Report as ‘appealing directly to modernism’ in trying to explain its basic methodological approach, that is, limiting to a basic or fundamental consensus without discussion of ‘an indefinite number of ways of describing or picturing salvation’; see George A. Lindbeck, ‘Justification and Atonement: An Ecumenical Trajectory’, in By Faith Alone: Essays on Justification in Honor of Gerhard O. Forde, ed. Joseph A. Burgess and Mark Kolden (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 2004), p. 198. 8. L-RC 1972: 14, 47. 9. Ibid. 15, and esp. 31. Regarding the ministry, see ibid. 54–6, 59. 10. Ibid. 18. 11. Ibid. 18. 12. Ibid. 43. Secondary criteria include, from the Lutheran side, the living Word of preaching and the Confessions of the church as the authoritative interpretation of the gospel, and, from the Catholic side, a reciprocal interaction of official and unofficial charisma and the living faith experiences of Christians; cf. ibid. 20–21. 13. Ibid. 35. 14. Ibid. 24, 39. 15. Ibid. 57–8. 16. Ibid. 24–5. In Martens’ view, ‘the centre of the gospel’ is used in the same sense as the Lutheran principle ‘the centre of the scriptures’; cf. Gottfried Martens, Die Rechtfertigung des Sünders – Rettungshandeln Gottes oder historisches Interpretament? (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), pp. 195–9. 17. L-RC 1972: 25. 18. The document refers to church teaching mainly as doctrine but also uses notions of dogma and confession (Bekenntnis) in reference to the temporal explications of the gospel. The document also refers to ‘the confession of justification’ (ibid. 29). 19. Ibid. 69. 20. Lindbeck, ‘Justification’, pp. 197–202. 21. Ibid., p. 196; Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, p. 122. 22. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, pp. 126–7, 141, 144. Cf. Jens Holge Sjørring (ed.), From Federation to Communion (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1997), p. 377. 23. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, pp. 183–5. 24. ‘Es wird damit nichts weniger behauptet, als dass wir dem Evangelium nicht nur dadurch begegnen, dass wir auf die Schrift, die Tradition und die kirchliche Verkündigung hören, sondern dass dazu auch ein Hören die Welt notwendig ist. Damit würde auch die Methode des oekumenischen Gesprächs auf eine neue Grundlage gestellt’ (Walter Kasper, ‘Die Welt, der Ort des Evangeliums’, in Evangelium–Welt–Kirche, Schlussbericht und Referate der römischkatholish/evangelisch-lutherischen Studienkommission ‘Das evangelium und die Kirche’, 1967– 1971, ed. Harding Meyer (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 1975), pp. 133–4. 25. L-RC 1972: 36, 43.

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26. Martens claims that the idea first appeared at the 1961 Una Sancta, where Franz Mussner used the words ‘centre of the gospel’ in the title of his presentation; see Franz Mussner, ‘ ‘‘Evangelium’’ und ‘‘Mittes des Evangeliums’’: Ein Beitrag zur Kontroverstheologie’, in Gott in Welt: Festgabe für Karl Rahner, ed. Herbert Vorgimler and Karl Rahner (Freiburg: Herder, 1964), pp. 492–514. Martikainen maintains that a method of referring to the ‘centre of the gospel’ appears in the proceedings of the 1937 synod of Halle (of the Evangelical Church of the Prussian Union [EKU]) and in the subsequent discussion between the EKU and the United Evangelical Lutheran Church of Germany (VELKD) in the 1950s; cf. Eeva Martikainen, Evankeliumin keskus; Hans Joachim Iwandin ekumeeninen metodi. STKS 120 (Helsinki: STKS, 1980), pp. 8–13. See also Lønning, ‘Om reformasjonens teologiske prinsipp’, Svensk teologisk kvartalskrift 49 (1973): 153–61. 27. Wenzel Loff, a drafter of the Leuenberg Agreement, was also a member of the commission preparing the Malta Report. The other drafter, Mark Lienhard, has also already been quoted on the question of the ‘centre of the gospel’. Cf. Elisabeth Schieffer, Von Schauenburg nach Leuenberg: Entstehung und Bedeutung der Konkordie reformatorischer Kirchen in Europa, Konfessionskundliche und Kontroverstheologische Studien 48 (Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1983), p. 587. 28. Schieffer, Von Schauenburg nach Leuenberg, pp. 20–21, 23. 29. Ibid, 449–538. 30. CPCE 1973: 5. The Leuenberg Agreement also distinguishes between declaring a church fellowship and realizing it. Assenting to the reached agreement means ‘having a common understanding’. The process of realization refers to the reception, that is, translating the declaration to the lives of the churches. See André Birmelé, ‘The Leuenberg Agreement from 1973 to 1988’, in The Leuenberg Agreement and Lutheran Reformed Relationships. Evaluations by North-American and European Theologians, ed. William G. Rusch and Daniel F. Martensen (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), pp. 35–51. 31. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, p. 225. This view is associated with Wenzel Loff but also supported, for example, by Eilert Herms, Mark Lienhard and Christoph Schwöbel. Cf. Eilert Herms, ‘Einigkeit im Fundamentalen: Probleme einer ökumenischen Programmformel’, Ökumenische Rundschau 37/1 (1988): 60; Wenzel Loff, ‘Grund und Grenze der Kirche’, Evangelische Kommentare 5 (1970): 13–17; Mark Lienhard, ‘The Leuenberg Agreement: Origins and Aims’, in The Leuenberg Agreement and Lutheran Reformed Relationships. Evaluations by North-American and European Theologians, ed. William G. Rusch and Daniel F. Martensen (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), pp. 13–34; Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene’, pp. 462–3. Cf. also Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, pp. 228–30. 32. See the critique by Tuomo Mannermaa in Von Preussen nach Leuenberg: Hintergrund und Entwicklung der theologischen Methode der Leuenberger Konkordie (Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1981). 33. CPCE 1973: 1. Meyer calls this form of consensus, which is at the same time ‘not complete’ but sufficient, a ‘basic consensus’ (Harding Meyer, ‘Critique of the Leuenberg Agreement as an Ecumenical Model’, in The Leuenberg Agreement and Lutheran Reformed Relationships. Evaluations by North-American and European Theologians, ed. William G. Rusch and Daniel F. Martensen [Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Fortress, 1989], p. 60). 34. Loff, ‘Grund und Grenze der Kirche’, p. 16; Schieffer, Von Schauenburg nach Leuenberg, pp. 587–8. Tuomo Mannermaa and Simo Kiviranta, especially, criticize the method of proleptic consensus. Cf. Tuomo Mannermaa and Simo Kiviranta, ‘Genesis und Struktur: Das Problem der Einheitlichkeit des Leuenberger Konkordienentwurfs’, in Von der Wahren Einheit der Kirche: Lutherische Stimmen zum Leuenberger Konkordienentwurf, ed. U. Asendorf and F.W. Künneth (Berlin: Die Spur, 1973), pp. 79–87. For critique see Schieffer, Von Schauenburg nach Leuenberg, pp. 586–91. 35. CPCE 1973: 2; Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, 218. 36. A strong connection between the form of agreement and ecclesiology can make it difficult to apply the agreement outside the ecclesiological context; see Robert W. Jenson, ‘The Leuenberg Agreement in the North American Context’, in The Leuenberg Agreement and

40

37.

38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60.

Agreeable Agreement Lutheran Reformed Relationships: Evaluations by North-American and European Theologians, ed. William G. Rusch and Daniel F. Martensen (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), p. 102. Some of the tensions in the Malta Report might be a result of conflicting unspoken ecclesiological expectations. Similar challenges were noted later in L-RC 1985 ger: 14, 25, 27–8. Martens argues with Lønning (‘Om reformasjonens teologiske prinsipp’) and Iris Wikström (Fundamentalkonsensus i dialogen mellan romersk-katoliker och lutheraner? [Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1982], p. 208) that such an equation is more appropriate to Roman Catholic theology than to Lutheran theology. According to Martens, the idea of a ‘centre of the gospel’ is not traditionally Lutheran theology (Die Rechtfertigung, pp. 195–7). Cf. also Lønning, ‘Om reformasjonens teologiske prinsipp’, p. 159. The equation of ‘gospel’ with ‘scripture’ in this context can be observed, for example, in Mussner, ‘Evangelium’, p. 511. Mussner is critical of the method but lauds Rahner of identifying Jesus’ basic testimony of himself as the ‘actual’ (eigentlich) gospel, which precedes and underlies all of its ‘objectifications’ (Mussner, ‘Evangelium’, pp. 513–14). L-RC 1972: 24. Ibid. 25. Unitatis redintegratio 11. Earlier responses are recorded in Ulrich Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum. Theologiegeschichtliche Hintergründe und mögliche Konsequenzen eines Hinweises im Ökumenismusdekret des II. Vatikanischen Konzils zum zwischenkirchlichen Gespräch (München: Claudius Verlag, 1968) and later in Wolfgang Thönissen, ‘Hierarchia Veritatum: Eine systematische Erläuterung’, Catholica 3 (2000): 180–81. L-RC 1972: 25. William Henn, ‘The Hierarchy of Truths and Christian Unity’, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis 66/1 (1990): 117. Thönissen gives the Assumption of Mary as an example. This dogma is highly detailed and thus high on the hierarchy of certitude. Its position in the hierarchy of truths is considerably lower; cf. Thönissen, ‘Hierarchia Veritatum’, p. 185. Valeske’s exposition is enlightening in demonstrating the development and use of the epistemically oriented formal and juridical interpretation of a hierarchy of truths of faith; Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum, pp. 84–105. Thönissen, ‘Hierarchia Veritatum’, p. 186. See also Valeske, Hierarchia Veritatum, p. 104. Henn, ‘The Hierarchy of Truths’, pp. 117–18. Thönissen, ‘Hierarchia Veritatum’, p. 186. Thönissen quotes Heribert Mühlen, ‘Die Lehre des Vaticanum II über die ‘‘hierarchia veritatum’’ und ihre Bedeutung für den ökumenischen Dialog’, Theologie und Glaube 57 (1966): 303–35. See also Henn, ‘The Hierarchy of Truths’, p. 119. Dei verbum 4. Henn, ‘The Hierarchy of Truths’, p. 121. Ibid., pp. 113–14, 116, 118–19. Ibid., p. 132. For critique, see Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context (Louisville, Ky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), pp. 60–78. L-RC 1978 eng: 47. Ibid. 6. Cf. L-RC 1972: 24, 39. L-RC 1978 eng: 12. For the differing Lutheran and Roman Catholic perceptions, see ibid. 72–3. Ibid. 13–20, 22–4, 25–8, 34–7. Ibid. 30–33. Ibid. 39, 44–5. The only reference to Eucharistic fellowship is a direct quote from the Malta Report (L-RC 1972: 72). The Malta Report approaches questions of intercommunion more from the viewpoint of baptism. Cf. ibid. 68–75. See ibid. 16–17, 35–6.

Lutheran–Roman Catholic: International Dialogue 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81.

82. 83.

84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

91.

41

Ibid. 49, 50–51, 57–60. Cf. L-RC 1981: 10–15, esp. 15. Ibid. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 36. See ibid. 38, for parallel expressions of the Lutheran tradition, the Lutheran view and the Lutheran understanding. Ibid. 18. E.g., ibid. 44. See ibid., esp. 84, see also 34, 56. L-RC 1980 All : 6. Ibid. 10–11. Ibid. 14–18. The reading ‘incomplete doctrinal truths’ cannot be logically excluded. This would have to assume both that there are grades in doctrinal truths, that the churches have a common mind on a partial truth and that this points to the living centre of faith, that is, Jesus Christ. Even though doctrines can be organized in various ways both in Roman Catholic and Lutheran theology, neither would use the degree of truthfulness as a criterion. For the Roman Catholic view, see Richard Gaillardez, Teaching with Authority: A Theology of the Magisterium in the Church (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1997), p. 116. L-RC 1980 All : 17. Two paragraphs later the document refers to the second part of the Augsburg Confession which reviews ‘abuses which have been corrected’. L-RC 1984: 47. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 46. Ibid. 78, 83. Ibid. 57. Already the Malta Report applied the notion of (partial) basic consensus. Also the Executive Committee of the LWF used a distinction between partial consensus and full accord on central and fundamental truths; cf. LWF Augsburg 1982: 76. L-RC 1984: 60. For criticism of Facing Unity’s shortcomings, see Peder Nørgaard-Højen (ed.), Catholic– Lutheran Relations Three Decades after Vatican II. Studia ecumenica Farfensia (Vatican City: Liberia editrice vaticana, 1997), pp. 33–4. For alternative solutions to the defectus-question, see Ulrich Kühn, ‘Das geistliche Amt und Kirche: Zum gleichnamigen Dokument der Gemeinsamen römischkatholischen/evangelisch-lutherischen Kommission’, Una Sancta 37 (1982): 324. L-RC 1984: 123. Ecclesiologically, this means perceiving the church as an instrument of God’s salvific work. According to Birmelé, this decision was not reflected clearly enough and thus not that well received. The problem for Birmelé is ultimately not the functional understanding of the church but not reflecting on the specific character of the functionality; see André Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft: Ökumenische Fortschritte und methodologische Konsequenzen, trans. Uwe Hecht (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003), p. 9 and n. 11. L-RC 1984: 48. Ibid. 47. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 83. Cf. George A. Lindbeck, ‘Episcopacy and the Unification of the Churches: Two Approaches’, in Promoting Unity: Themes in Lutheran–Catholic Dialogue, ed. H. George Anderson and J. R. Crumley Jr (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), pp. 54–5. L-RC 1984: 48.

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92. In the 1970s general opinion was that there are basically no relevant doctrinal differences between the Lutheran and Roman Catholic churches. See Peter Lengsfeld, ‘Sind heute die traditionellen Konfessionsdifferenzen noch von Bedeutung?’, Una Sancta 26/1 (1971): 28; Jürgen Moltman, ‘Welche Einheit’, Ökumenische Rundschau 26 (1977): 287; Karl Rahner, ‘Scheinprobleme in der ökumenischen Diskussion’, in Gott und Offenbarung, ed. Paul Imhof, Schriften zur Theologie 13 (Zürich: Benzinger, 1978), p. 66. In the 1980s it was thought that the consensus agreements already reached were ‘only dealing with the symptoms but not healing the sickness’. Under the apparent consensus, there was a basic divergence of fundamental dissent. The dissent was observed either in the general mentality and theological tradition of the churches (e.g., Platonic–Augustinian–Lutheran vs. Aristotelian–Scholastic– Catholic in O.H. Pesch) or in specific areas of theology (e.g., understanding the revelation in Eilert Herms, Christology in Jörg Baur or ecclesiology in H. M. Müller); see Harding Meyer, ‘Problemskizze zu einem Studienprojekt’, in Grundkonsens–Grunddifferenz: Studien des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung, Ergebnisse und Dokumente, ed. André Birmelé and Harding Meyer (Frankfurt am Main and Paderborn: Otto Lembeck-Bonifatius, 1992), pp. 171–7. 93. The achieved agreement is not described as ‘convergence’ and the remaining differences are not referred to as ‘divergences’, although Birmelé uses this concept in reference to them; see Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, pp. 70, 73, 75. 94. L-RC 1993: 166, 173. 95. For the principle, see L-RC 1984: 83; and the previous section on Facing Unity. 96. L-RC 1993: 169–72. 97. Ibid. 105, 108. 98. E.g., ibid. 133, 142, 151. 99. Ibid. 204. 100. Ibid. See also the discussion of the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification in Ch. 4. 101. L-RC 1993: 77. 102. Ibid. 241. 103. Ibid. 204, 208. 104. E.g. ibid., 105. For Birmelé the central question is whether the remaining differences in fact are church-dividing or not. Differentiating between what is necessary for the church and what is necessary for salvation does not offer viable solutions but on the contrary only sharpens the differences; see Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, p. 77. Harding Meyer believes that a fundamental consensus has been achieved and the ecclesiological implications have lost their church-dividing character; see ‘Ekklesiologie im ökumenischen Gespräch und der lutherisch-katholische Dialog über Kirche und Rechfertigung’, KNA-ÖKI 1–2 (1994): 5–16. 105. This is the view of, for example, Dorothea Wendebourg. Harding Meyer finds that enough agreement exists. Meyer, ‘Ekklesiologie im ökumenischen Gespräch’, p. 13; Dorothea Wendebourg, ‘Kirche und Rechtfertigung: Ein Erlebnisbericht zu einem neueren ökumenischen Dokument’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 93/1 (1994): 89. 106. L-RC 1993: 167. 107. L-RC 1980 All: 16; L-RC 1984: 57. 108. L-RC 1980 All: 17–18. Meyer, ‘Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft‘, p. 16. 109. LWF Augsburg 1982: 70–71. 110. Distinction between individual ‘basic consensuses’ and an all-encompassing ‘basic consensus’ is discussed by Meyer in ‘Grundkonsens und Kirchengemeinschaft’, p. 117. Meyer supposes that a basic/fundamental consensus would satisfy the criteria for church unity, although he asserts that such a consensus does not yet exist between Lutherans and Roman Catholics. This is different from the vision in Facing Unity, for which the desired state of consensus is ‘a consensus in apostolic faith’ (L-RC 1984: 60).

Chapter 3 NATIONAL DIALOGUES: SELECTED EXAMPLES Dialogue in North America Nuanced consensus: Justification by Faith (L-RC 1983 usa) The goal of Justification by Faith was to investigate the nature of justification in light of the ‘far-reaching consensus’ of the Malta Report. The document is considered by some authors the highpoint of the US dialogue.1 The text reveals the various intentions that motivated the development of conceptual distinctions and particular thought-forms.2 The objectives of the document are not primarily to clear up misunderstandings but rather to demonstrate the diversity of viewpoints inherent in individual theological questions and the variety of interpretations, that have emerged in the course of history. The document addressed two main questions: how do differences in theological thought evolve and can differences in theological thought be perceived as non-contradictory? The responses to these questions gave rise to a new, hermeneutical theological method. Justification by Faith argues that an assessment of the theological relationship between Lutherans and Roman Catholics depends upon a prior understanding of what is typically ‘Lutheran’ or ‘Catholic’ as well as the character of theological traditions. ‘Theological tradition’ is not a uniform entity but consists of a relatively coherent set of ways of formulating theological statements. The characteristics that are included in a description of typically ‘Lutheran’ or ‘Catholic’ are therefore also partly a question of choice. Justification by Faith uses this choice to emphasize the reconciling potential of the Lutheran and Catholic theological traditions. As an example, Justification by Faith emphasizes a hermeneutical interpretation of the doctrine of justification, an interpretation suggested by Luther’s early writings. The interpretation has reconciling potential since it converges with recent trends in Catholic sacramental and kerygmatic theology. At the same time it disagrees with the Scholastic approaches in both Catholic and Lutheran theologies.3 In Justification by Faith, theological traditions themselves were considered internally diverse and at times even in conflict. Although this raised questions about the idea of ‘theological tradition’, it also opened up new possibilities with regards to ecumenical method. Confessional theological traditions include a variety of differently nuanced interpretations. A common theological perception must therefore be equally nuanced. This emphasis was fundamental to the later development of an idea of consensus with difference. A possible danger of the

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method used in Justification by Faith lies in the underlying assumption that an ecumenical dialogue concerns primarily different theological traditions and schools. One can ask what the connection between the dialogue and the truth-claims made by the doctrines is.4 Yet the arguments for a diverse understanding of theological traditions are very convincing. In Justification by Faith it is argued that the diversity of theological traditions is an implication of the diversity in the earliest New Testament sources.5 This original plurality is partially responsible for the differing interpretations, which then develop into traditions in a dynamic process in which new doctrinal formulations are reactions against views perceived to threaten correct teaching.6 Threats give rise to concerns that then direct the interpretative process. The doctrinal formulations are further shaped by the application of particular philosophical or metaphysical concepts. These both provide solutions for the concerns and orient the consequent theological argumentation.7 To summarize: according to Justification by Faith the development of a theological tradition is a dynamic process. The process feeds on the original theological plurality of early Christianity. Its development is a hermeneutical process in the sense that the theological tradition reflects those questions relevant to particular times. Both of the churches have, in their encounters with challenges pertaining to particular times and places developed their theological understanding in a way that can be perceived as ‘a pattern of thought’. Theological traditions are not determined only by external stimuli. Patterns of thought also have a particular orientation. This orientation is influenced by concerns regarding false teaching or misuses of piety and by the philosophical framework within which the thought patterns developed. The root cause of differing doctrinal developments is in contrasting concerns. The logical consequence of contrasting concerns is not a conflict. Rather conflict is a consequence of how these differing concerns and consequent thought patterns are evaluated.8 Recognizing that the theological developments have been guided by certain concerns leads the churches to revisit the biblical data on salvation.9 In Justification by Faith this leads to two major findings, an agreement on a Christological centre of the scriptures ‘for purposes of theological interpretation’ and a conviction that the Lutheran and Roman Catholic approaches to justification are not by themselves sufficient to represent all of the rich and varied biblical witness of God’s saving works. Therefore ‘both sides need to treat each other’s concerns and ways of interpreting Scripture with greater respect and willingness to learn than has been done in the past’.10 ‘Differing concerns’ are directly related to differences in language.11 Emphasis on the plural nature of theological traditions and the diversity of hermeneutical processes behind them raises the question of how to discern legitimate and illegitimate differences and developments. In Justification by Faith, this discernment is possible through one church’s ability to recognize and relate to the ‘concerns’ of the other. If the churches are able to share in each other’s concerns, then they can acknowledge the legitimacy even of contrasting theological perspectives and structures of thought.12 Sharing in each other’s concerns is possible by reference to the above-mentioned common Christological focus. The ability to recognize and share in the concerns of the other is a formal prerequisite of

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an agreement. Reference to a common Christological focus is the agreement’s material ground. It expresses the fundamental meaning of what the differing theological traditions intend to affirm. At the same time its formulation is not identical to either classical Lutheran or Catholic theological formulations. Committing oneself to this common affirmation does not necessitate adopting any particular way of conceptualizing or picturing God’s saving work. Acceptance of this affirmation implies that the other church shares a commitment to the same gospel.13 Justification by Faith affirmed that Lutheran and Catholic doctrines of justification are derivatives of this common ground (Christological centre) and as such are legitimate interpretations of it.14 Different theological elaborations are not subsumed by the common conviction, but the common viewpoint makes it possible to perceive them as complementary and not mutually exclusive.15 In combining the formal hermeneutical understanding of the development of theological traditions with the material Christological focus, Justification by Faith includes potential elements of a ‘consensus with difference’. The document’s methodological choices lead in a direction that allows the recognition of positive diversity within a fundamental, material agreement. Justification by Faith’s use of these methodological elements is restricted to the critical function of the doctrine of justification. The document is able to conclude that if the common affirmation is valid, then the doctrine of justification can be used as a criterion. Other aspects of the doctrine are dealt with using other methods, such as differentiating between the linguistic form and the content of the affirmation and using historical research in the development of the doctrine.

Emerging understanding of consensus with difference In Justification by Faith, ‘agreement’ refers to a theoretical theological understanding.16 An agreement is something opposite to controversy and something that is building up to be a convergence. Convergences result from Lutherans and Catholics drawing closer because of ‘modern scriptural studies and intellectual developments in the humanities, social studies, and the natural sciences’.17 The concept of convergence refers to a rapprochement, which is facilitated by individual theological agreements. A convergence is not an ‘all or nothing’ proposition but can have degrees. The document differentiates between a ‘convergence, which is however not a uniformity’ and a ‘lesser but significant convergence’.18 The lesser nature of the otherwise significant convergences is due to serious differences in thoughtstructures.19 Despite the gravity of disagreements the churches can recognize the legitimacy of the concerns behind the theological thought-structures.20 Serious differences in thought-structures have a negative effect on the convergence. At the same time theological agreement does not imply identity of thought-structures or adoption of the theological explication of the other. In this sense the agreement is conditional; it communicates a ‘yes’ followed by a cautious ‘however’.21 The hesitations and reservations are directed at the possible (although not necessary) reductions and misuses of a particular theological thought-form. An agreement of this kind implies an absence of controversy. Controversies are based

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on differences in theological terminology. Differences in theological concepts and terminology can be overcome by common theological research.22 Reaching an agreement means that differences are understood not to contradict each other. This understanding of the non-contradictory character of differences is based on common essential intentions behind the differing theological explications. Even after recognizing that the differing theological traditions are compatible, the churches are still challenged by the need for common language.23 The legitimacy of the differences is guaranteed by a ‘fuller material convergence’. It is based on fundamental common convictions, some of which are of older origin and some which have appeared more recently. These common convictions are manifested in different interpretations and formulations in each tradition, but seen as a whole, ‘they constitute a very significant agreement’.24 The fuller material convergence is also called an agreement. At the core of the material convergence is the common Christological affirmation, which is used as the reference point for a variety of statements coalescing into the agreement. The only difference between the material and lesser convergences is that the material convergence includes a hermeneutical principle to test the legitimacy of the fundamental theological convictions. Lesser convergences are secondary derivatives of this substantial agreement. In Justification by Faith, consensus refers to a common confession of basic fundamental intentions of the two churches. These are expressed in the various theological responses of the two churches to the biblical message of justification.25 The relationship between the agreements, convergences and the final consensus is not completely clear. Convergence does not refer to a ‘lesser agreement’ than the final consensus: the notion of consensus is used merely to conclude what has been said and it does not introduce any additional theological points to support the agreement. Convergence refers more to a process of clarifying the positions and changing attitudes or to a change in the way in which the dialogue partners are oriented towards each other, whereas consensus denotes the ecclesial implications of the convergence. Convergence denotes a common conviction that a particular issue can be discussed and that an agreement might be reached. In Justification by Faith consensus is not the sum total of convergences.26 The changes, that is, the convergences, are rooted in the common Christological affirmation. The changes, however, cannot themselves be built into the agreement, but facilitate reaching a full agreement. ‘Consensus’ implies that a certain stage has been reached in the process of convergences. In the end, no recommendations on the basis of this reached consensus were made in the document.27 The methodological outline presented above is significant, since it points to a nuanced or differentiated perception of consensus. In this form of consensus, differences prevail but lose their divisive force. The assumption is that differences have developed not only through error or necessity but also because of a choice of theological arguments that could have been replaced by others without betraying the essence. One can see the emergence of the principle of a consensus with difference in the document’s final declaration.28 The strength of Justification by Faith, its explication of a nuanced consensus, is also its weakness. The acceptance of this form of consensus requires an acceptance

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of the normative hermeneutical use of the doctrine of justification. Justification by Faith makes two proposals for how the normative character of justification could be agreed upon. In the first approach, differences in perceiving the normative character of justification were understood as a manifestation of the differing Lutheran and Catholic thought-structures. A partial solution to the difference is the acceptance of the differing concerns of the differing thought-structures. The churches share a common affirmation that the structures, practices and theologies of the churches need to be tested to see that they do not hinder the proclamation of the gospel. There is, however, no agreement on the concrete application of this affirmation, that is, which of the structures, practices and theologies pass the test.30 This task is more complicated than the mere judging of individual doctrines by their compatibility with the doctrine of justification separate from larger questions such as the relationships between scripture and tradition or revelation and doctrine.31 The second proposed solution is perhaps more successful. This proposal consists of differentiating between the doctrine of justification and the event of justification. According to this distinction, the criterion is not a particular doctrine of justification but rather God’s saving act.32 Still Justification by Faith is one of the most substantial contributions to the ecumenical discussion of justification and consequently perhaps the greatest resource for the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999). Dialogue in Germany: Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? (L-RC 1985 ger)33 The main aim of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? was to investigate the current applicability of the sixteenth-century condemnations.34 The study was motivated by the discrepancy between official condemnations on the one hand and the ecumenically recognized ‘basic consensus’ on the other. The study finds that condemnation and basic consensus are mutually exclusive and therefore one or the other must cease to be effective. The main question is not whether the condemnations are applicable, but how, in light of the ‘basic consensus’ the churches should perceive the condemnations. The non-applicability of the sixteenth-century condemnations was not the result, but the motivating force of the dialogue.35 A further goal of the study was to justify theologically the initial claim that the sixteenth-century condemnations are no longer applicable. A consensus in the Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? sense does not mean eliminating all doctrinal differences, even on those issues, which are crucial for church unity.36 There is no necessary relationship between consensus and the condemnations. Condemnations can be lifted if they are no longer relevant or applicable to Lutheran–Roman Catholic relations even if there is no factual consensus on all questions necessary for the unity of the church. The relevancy of the condemnations depends only on whether the current teaching of the other church falls into what the condemnation denies.37 The validity of the condemnations is weakened by their suspected inaccuracy: some condemned issues were not perceived in their proper context.

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Finding a proper context may show that the differing viewpoints have a positive, complementary (komplementär) character. This would allow them to be seen as not mutually exclusive.38 Because there is no necessary relationship between consensus and the condemnations, the act of lifting the condemnations depends primarily on the applicability of the condemnations, not on the complementarity of viewpoints. Re-evaluation of the condemnations takes place in two phases, which can be called the ‘clearing up of the past’ and ‘the clearing up of the present’. The goal of the first phase is to grasp more clearly the Lutheran and Roman Catholic positions in the sixteenth century, while in the second the concentration is on the reception of recent ecumenical convergences and grasping more fully what the churches teach today.39 The commission proceeded by asking four questions: (1) What are the concrete instances that the doctrinal condemnations condemn? (2) Are the positions of these instances correctly described? (3) Are these descriptions still valid when it comes to the contemporary positions of the dialogue partner? (4) If they are valid, what is the status and meaning of the still existing differences?40 Answering these questions would assist in the main goal of evaluating the applicability of the condemnations. The task was made more challenging by ‘a lack of comprehensive hermeneutics’. Some of the condemnations of the sixteenth century were the results of misunderstandings and others were directed at extreme positions that did not have a binding character.41 Some of the condemned teachings are not taught in contemporary churches. Some issues today are understood from a different perspective, and this understanding has brought about new agreements. On some issues there is still no consensus. The study gives an honest picture of the complexities of grasping the ecumenical realities of the churches. Because Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? emphasizes the question of applicability of the condemnations, no attempt is made to formulate common theological affirmations. The objective is merely to describe the current situation of theological plurality from a non-controversial viewpoint. The non-controversial theological outlook includes an option for a possibility of commonality beyond diversity. This does not mean denying the reality of differences, either in the sixteenth century or in the contemporary churches. The key question is how the churches should relate to these differences. The Reformation times were polemical, while the contemporary time attempts to be more non-controversial.42 A provision for a commonality beyond diversity does not imply a future disappearance of diversities. Even if differences in teaching remain, whether it is on the level of linguistic formulations or in the particular historical interpretations of the realities of faith,43 they need not be church-dividing but can be mutually enriching.44 The document strongly emphasizes the right of both traditions to uphold their identities when it comes to theological explanations, institutional structure and forms of piety.45 One of the main arguments of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? was that doctrinal plurality is not necessarily church-dividing. Both the biblical witness and subsequent diverse developments in tradition exemplify ‘original plurality’. The original biblical witness is ‘differentiated’ in that it consists of various layers. In addition, no theological tradition is identical with this differentiated biblical witness. ‘Quite frequently’, the document asserts, ‘the same thing can be expressed with differing words’.46 Theological traditions are interpretative in that they adapt

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to differing contextual situations. Traditions develop through a process of interpretation and reinterpretation that allows a renewed understanding of the doctrinal positions of other churches.47 Methodologically, Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? comes very close to its earlier contemporary, the North-American document Justification by Faith whose method had two elements, a formal, hermeneutical element and material, Christological one. It is evident in both documents that the development of doctrinal traditions is Christologically oriented. This is clearest in the case of the doctrine of justification. In both documents Christ is believed to be the subject and content of justification.48 The development of theological traditions is perceived to be a process of interpretation and reinterpretation, with differences in theological formulation perceived as implications of specific ‘concerns’. Differences are consequences of acting in a coherent way in accordance with these concerns. From this it follows that doctrinal statements can be understood correctly only in their proper context. This ‘setting of doctrines in their proper contexts’ is also an interpretative process. It is guided by hermeneutical principles that help to focus attention on the proper elements in the life and praxis of the church and on the ‘concerns’ that have influenced the development of the particular theological traditions.49 Because theological traditions are continuously in a state of interpretation and reinterpretation, they are also never safe from possible misunderstandings. The churches also continue to have opportunities for correct understanding. To avoid misunderstandings the churches must look beyond complex conceptual formulations to the subject matter.

Basic methodological features The North American and the German national dialogues share some methodological features. One of these is the understanding of theological differences as a consequence of differing ‘concerns’. These ‘concerns’ are key elements in the interpretive process, which takes place between the content of an expression and the expression itself. Both the German and the North American studies assume that consensus tolerates a significant amount of diversity on the level of doctrinal expressions. Both place emphasis not only on the diversities but also on the perception of diversities. The differing doctrinal expressions become understandable if one can identify the interpretative ‘concerns’ that gave rise to the differences in the first place. Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? especially emphasizes the compatibility of the ‘concerns’. Differences do not need to be harmonized but neither do they need to be perceived as mutually exclusive.50 Facing Unity addressed the complementarity of viewpoints, that is, that the doctrines do not contradict each other in view of their common Christological focus. In both the German and the North American dialogues, the above-mentioned concerns were seen as the central cause for differences in doctrinal expressions. This method, which placed emphasis on ‘concerns’, has been criticized on the grounds that a de facto historical plurality cannot justify a normative appeal for plurality.51

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One of the essential critical questions is whether the idea of ‘differing concerns’ in fact masks real, untreated differences. The Göttingen Opinion sharply criticized Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? for making the methodological distinction between ‘concerns’ and theological statements. The Opinion holds that the method is essentially flawed, since it concentrates on ‘concerns’ and not on the centre or basis on which the differing statements are formed. In addition, the Göttingen theologians asserted that Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? in fact only assumed but did not demonstrate a ‘complementarity of the concerns’.52 While the Göttingen Opinion grants that Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? was right in pointing to a common Christological basis upon which the dialogue partners could stand, it also claimed that the common Christological basis could only be understood correctly in connection with a correct, that is, Reformation, understanding of justification.53 The Göttingen Opinion points to a significant methodological question. The Opinion’s main argument is that the common Christological foundation becomes functional only within a discourse structured by the doctrine of justification as set forth in Reformation theology. Detached from the discourse, the common basis can be interpreted in ways that contradict the principles of Reformation theology. George Lindbeck, from the North American context, refers to the same question of detaching individual concepts or arguments from their contexts but draws different conclusions. Lindbeck would agree with the Göttingen theologians that the Lutheran and Roman Catholic frameworks yield different kinds of meanings from the same theological principles. Lindbeck also agrees with Gottfried Martens and consequently with the Göttingen theologians that the lifting of condemnations does not imply rapprochement between incommensurable frameworks. Lindbeck would, however, disagree with the statement that the Reformation doctrine of justification provides the only legitimate interpretative framework for the common Christological basis. In Lindbeck’s opinion a common Christological–soteriological confession does make it possible to have an agreement on ‘justification as a rule’ despite the fact that there are irreconcilable differences in the descriptive doctrines. The agreement is unfounded only if, in Lindbeck’s words, ‘the diverse outlooks on justification are reduced to anthropology by abstracting from their common reference to God’s saving works in Christ’.54

Notes 1. Paul O’Callaghan, Fides Christi: The Justification Debate (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1997), p. 119. Commentaries on the document include R. J. Groeser, ‘Reflections on Dialogue and Justification’, Ecumenical Trends 13 (1984): 81–5; J. F. Hotchkin, ‘Commentary on U.S. Roman Catholic–Lutheran Statement on Justification’, Ecumenical Trends 13 (1984): 62–4; J. Reuman, ‘ ‘‘Justification by Faith’’ in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue and Beyond: Reflections over a Decade’, Lutheran Forum 23 (1989): 21–4. 2. E.g., L-RC 1983 usa: 9, 18. 3. Ibid. 93. Cf. Robert K. Welsh, ‘Justification by Faith: The ‘‘Critical Principle’’ for an Ecumenical Theology’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 23/3 (1986): 504–6, 511–12; Joseph A.

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4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

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Burgess, In Search of Christian Unity (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1991); George Tavard, ‘Justification in Dialogue’, One in Christ 25 (1989): 301–5. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, p. 245; Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, p. 15. Cf. Anthony N. S. Lane, Justification by Faith in Catholic–Protestant Dialogue: An Evangelical Assessment (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2002). Martens sharply criticises Justification by Faith for an ‘inadequately reflected use of the historical-critical method’. Martens opposes the conclusion that justification is perceived only as one, although important, way of speaking about God’s salvific work. This, in Martens’s view, leads to the scriptures losing their normative function in distinguishing between correct and incorrect teaching of justification; cf. Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, p. 247. E.g., L-RC 1983 usa: 9, 12, 24. Consider, e.g., ibid. 96, 107. Cf. ibid. 10, 14, 53, 65. Ibid. 94. Cf. Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, p. 13. L-RC 1983 usa: 149. Cf. ibid. 100, 101, 103, 106, 110, 112, 117–20. Ibid. 121. Ibid. 158, 159. Birmelé highlights the relevance of L-RC 1983 usa: 156–60 for justifying legitimate diversity (Kirchengemeinschaft, p. 14). Cf. O’Callaghan, Fides Christi, p. 120. L-RC 1983 usa: 49. Cf. ELCA’s response (L ELCA 1994: 345–6). O’Callaghan is suspicious of whether the material consensus can be regarded as reliable; see O’Callaghan, Fides Christi, p. 121. Birmelé translates Justification by Faith’s ‘agreement’ as ‘Konsens’ although the document itself differentiates between consensus and agreement; see Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, p. 14. L-RC 1983 usa: 151. Ibid. 152. Ibid. 154. Ibid. E.g., ibid. 99. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 155. Ibid. 164. Karl Lehmann later described convergence as a process in which the dialogue moves from dissent to towards a consensus that is not yet reached (Karl Lehmann, ‘Was für ein Konsens wurde erreicht?’, Stimmen der Zeit 217 [1999]: 740). ELCA’s response to Justification by Faith distinguishes convergence from consensus by the area of application. Convergence is applied to theological statements whereas consensus refers to an agreement in doctrine. Consensus and convergence are interrelated in the sense that consensus sets the limits for legitimate beliefs and practices in the church; it leaves room for, but at the same time sets limits to, theological diversity. Consensus should not be confused with the material convergence, although the danger of confusion can be observed already in the document. The future challenge is not only to agree on the specification but also on the application of the critical consensus achieved (L ELCA 1994: 344, 347–9). Cf. also the criticism of the Lutheran Church – Missouri Synod (L Missouri 1994: 350). L-RC 1983 usa: 164; Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, p. 16. The use of justification as a criterion was singled out in the response of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops as possibly pointing ‘to a profound ecclesiological difference’ between the churches (RC Bishops 1994 usa: 338). The hermeneutical use of the doctrine of justification was found especially difficult (ibid. 341). L-RC 1983 usa: 153. Ibid. 154. The document discusses this in relation to the idea of a community of separated churches, not as a question of the unity of the church as such (L-RC 1990 usa: 153).

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32. L-RC 1983 usa: 156. 33. Publications of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? consist of four volumes. The first includes eight documents produced by various working groups consisting of 50 theologians altogether. The first volume is treated as source material and references are indicated by L-RC 1985 ger. The paragraphs in this document are not numbered. Reference is therefore made to page numbers. Direct quotations are taken from the English translation in Condemnations of the Reformation Era: Do They Still Divide?, ed. K. Lehmann and W. Pannenberg, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press, 1990). Volumes 2 and 3 make public additional material regarding issues addressed during the process, while the final volume presents responses from various churches to the documents in the first volume. Volumes 2 and 3 will be treated as literature and cited as literary sources. Volume 4 is considered an additional source and referred to as L-RC 1994 ger. Due to the fragmentary nature of the preparation process one must be careful not to read it as a more coherent document than it really is. A description of the preparation process can be found in the Preface to the first volume, pp. 9–17. 34. See Daphne Hampson, Christian Contradictions: The Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 197–200. The main purpose is similar to that of the Leuenberg Agreement. A similar approach was also used in, for example, the Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue, which took as its starting point Pope Leo XIII’s letter Apostolicae curae announcing Anglican orders to be ‘null and void’. The Leuenberg Agreement is an explicit inspiration of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend?, but the method is not considered directly applicable to Lutheran–Roman Catholic relations; cf. L-RC 1985 ger: pp.14, 25, 27–8; and also Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, pp. 25–8; Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ’, pp. 46–8. A serious discussion has taken place about whether there are in fact equal condemnations on the Lutheran and Roman Catholic sides to be lifted, that is, if the anathemas of the Council of Trent and the statements in the Lutheran and other Protestant writings are analogous. The Göttingen Opinion maintains that the condemnations of Trent and those of the confessional writings are in no way comparable; cf. Dietz Lange (ed.), Überholte Verurteilungen? Stellungnahme gegenüber ‘Lehrverurteilungen–Kirchentrennend?’ Die Gegensätze in der Lehre von Rechtfertigung, Abendmahl und Amt zwischen dem Konzil von Trient und der Reformation – damals und Heute (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991). Birmelé believes that the Heidelberg Catechism refers to the mass as idolatry and interprets this as a condemnation on the Protestant side. He also notes that unlike on the Catholic side, the Lutheran condemnations were aimed at specific teachings, not at individual persons; cf. Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, pp. 22–3. The question of the nature and status of the condemnations was raised again in the discussion of the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. 35. Fundamental agreement or basic consensus is understood here as partial, not ‘full’ consensus. ‘Full consensus’ would imply ecclesial and eucharistic communion; ‘basic consensus’ is a common reference point for renewed understanding (L-RC 1985 ger: p. 13). Cf. Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ’, pp. 42–3; Martens, Die Rechtfertigung, p. 284. 36. L-RC 1985 ger: p. 13. 37. Ibid., p. 32; cf. also Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ’, p. 43. The document also proposes using new uncontroversial concepts instead of the traditional ones, which are based on metaphysical assumptions that are not held exclusively. See L-RC 1985 ger: pp. 106–7. Some of the proposals are made in a conditional form implying that as long as certain preconditions of understanding certain theological explications are met, the former controversial issues can be said to have been resolved (ibid., pp. 122–3). 38. Ibid., p. 16; Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ’, p. 49. 39. The study explicitly recognizes the central role of doctrinal differences in the process that drove the churches apart in the Reformation period but also emphasizes the so-called nontheological political, cultural, social, economical, institutional and personal factors. The current ecumenical situation cannot be resolved on a purely practical level, but it must include a re-evaluation of the sixteenth-century condemnations (L-RC 1985 ger: pp. 9–11). The style

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40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

53

of the documents is more academic in nature and the results do not specifically lean on previous convergences or agreements. Birmelé observes that despite the explicit academic nature of the document, already in the introductory part, it commits itself to principles that are identical with Justification by Faith. One of these is that variation in the doctrinal formulations does not necessarily lead to condemnations and the disunity of the church (Birmelé, Kirchengemeinschaft, pp. 20–21; cf. also Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ’, p. 54). Reactions of churches revealed that the distinction between rereading the old positions and evaluating the applicability of the condemnations in the present situation and making common statements was not communicated clearly enough. See L-RC 1985 ger: pp. 18, 19 23, 16–17, 28. L-RC 1985 ger: p. 15. On the Eucharist, see ibid., pp. 83, 89; and, on ordination, see ibid., p. 160. Cf. also Lehmann, ‘Ist der ‘‘Schritt zurück’’ ’, pp. 50–51. L-RC 1985 ger: pp. 19, 24. Ibid., pp. 22–4. Cf. ibid., pp. 19–20 for an example of reciprocal learning with regards to liturgical celebrations. Ibid., p. 27. Cf. ibid., pp. 20–21. Baur is generally critical of any hermeneutical method but especially attacks any relativization of the historical difference between the biblical origins and the theological developments (Jörg Baur, Einig in Sachen Rechtfertigung? Zur Prüfung des Rechtfertigungskapitels der Studie des Ökumenischen Arbeitskreises evangelischer und katholischer Theologen ‘Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend?’ [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, Paul Siebeck, 1989], p. 17). L-RC 1985 ger: p. 23. Similarly, see Otto Herman Pesch, ‘Rechtfertigung und Kirche’, Ökumenische Rundschau 37/1 (1988): 35. L-RC 1985 ger: p. 43. E.g., a proper interpretation of the justification decree of Trent takes its orientation from Augustine (L-RC 1985 ger: pp. 47–8; cf. also O’Callaghan, Fides Christi, p. 134; Simo Peura, ‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode der Gemeinsame Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Unitas visibilis: studia oecumenica in honorem Eero Huovinen, episcopi Helsingiensis, ed. Jari Jolkkonen et al. Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft 57 [Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft, 2004], pp. 182–3). On the methodological side the sharpest critique has been aimed at building agreement on the compatibility of the particular ‘concerns’, for example, a response from the Göttingen theologians asserted that the conclusions were reached through an inadequate application of the critical function of the doctrine of justification and that in fact the formal agreement (on the critical function) and the material agreement (justification as a doctrine) in the study are not reconcilable. According to O’Callaghan the official response of EKD followed the same lines as the Göttingen critique (O’Callaghan, Fides Christi, pp. 137–8). L-RC 1985 ger: p. 59; see also ibid., p. 75. Lange (ed.), Überholte Verurteilungen?, pp. 13–15. Ibid., pp. 26–7. Ibid., pp. 29–30. Lindbeck, ‘Justification’, p. 202.

Chapter 4 CONSENSUS WITH DIFFERENCE The preceding analysis of some of the major documents in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue on international and national levels demonstrates a gradual coming about of a specific form of ecumenical consensus with difference. In the scholarly discussion around The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999), this form of consensus has been called a ‘differentiated consensus’. This concept is challenging on various accounts, not least because of the strong feelings both for or against it raises. It is often used retroactively to refer to a number of earlier forms of agreement or agreements outside the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. Yet one might argue that the form of consensus that the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue has discovered is unique to this dialogue. It applies to other dialogues only if taken not merely as a label for a general category but also with a relatively large set of philosophical and fundamental theological assumptions. For example, the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue operates with a methodology that is explicitly more hermeneutical than many other dialogues. This hermeneutical understanding is an integral part of Lutheran–Roman Catholic agreement. Therefore, the form of agreement cannot be applied retroactively to dialogues that do not subscribe, for example, to the hermeneutical understandings that make the form of consensus possible in the first place. Another challenge with the discussion over the Joint Declaration’s form of consensus is that the reached consensus and the method of pursuing consensus are often confused. Consequently, ‘differentiated consensus’ often becomes ‘the method of differentiated consensus’. To avoid at least some of these problems I will use a more generic concept of ‘consensus with difference’ to refer to a general category of an agreement that does not require uniformity of expression or beliefs. ‘Differentiated consensus’ is used to refer to the form of consensus in the Joint Declaration.1 The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999)2 The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification is a summary document. It draws on a variety of documents from the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, combining results and developing the arguments further. It is safe to say that the document made a new contribution to ecumenical theology, one that went beyond a combination of what previously existed. Methodologically speaking, the Joint Declaration undertook the challenging task of summarizing a number of documents that used a variety of methods in pursuit of agreement. Although the

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methods are not irreconcilably different, they do differ in the understanding of what kind of an agreement or declaration is needed for overcoming the Reformation breach.3 Partly because of the diversity of its sources, the aims and objectives in the Joint Declaration were not exactly identical with the aims and objectives of the previous documents. The goal of the Joint Declaration was, first, to investigate the differences in how theological formulations of justification are perceived and, secondly, to examine those official condemnations that have a church-dividing effect. The diverse influences from the North American and German dialogues on the results are clearly evident. The North American dialogue emphasized the relation between agreement and compatibility of differing theological traditions, while the German dialogue put more emphasis on the applicability of the sixteenth-century condemnations.4 A basic assumption carried over to the Joint Declaration from the German dialogue was that differences in doctrine are not in themselves churchdividing, whereas doctrinal condemnations are. Differences in doctrine can create an occasion for condemnations, but there is no necessary link between differences in doctrine and the church-dividing character of these differences.5 Doctrinal condemnations follow the evaluation of these differences. The contemporary applicability or non-applicability of the condemnations is based on a re-evaluation of the doctrinal positions.6

Hermeneutical method and consensus with difference One of the main objectives of the Joint Declaration was to bring together a variety of earlier attempts to describe a unity, which exists in and not in spite of difference. The concept of ‘differentiated consensus’ does not appear in the document but later came to be associated with the its form of consensus with difference. I will therefore use the notion of ‘differentiated consensus’ in reference to the model of consensus with difference presented in the Joint Declaration. Before going into the precise structure of this form of consensus, two preliminary remarks are in order. In speaking of ‘differentiated consensus’, it is important to distinguish between the model of consensus and the method of pursuing it. In the Joint Declaration, agreement was pursued through various hermeneutical methods. Epistemologically it argues on the idea of ‘situatedness’. This means that all knowledge is situated in historical and linguistic contexts. The context functions as a way to knowledge. All intellectual encounters are encounters between situated, holistic ‘forms of thought’ (Denkformen7). Thought-forms are independent and distinctive, that is, they are not interchangeable. A positive relationship between thought-forms is called either complementarity or compatibility.8 Contextuality in the Joint Declaration is not extreme and determinative but moderate and mediatory. These general methodological principles do not define a particular ‘method of differentiated consensus’. Confusing the method and the outcome creates a somewhat suspicious concept of a ‘method of differentiated consensus’, in which a method is made to serve the outcome in a way that contradicts freedom of interpretation, however laudable the desired outcome.9

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A second source of unease follows from ambiguous interpretations of the epistemic implications of a ‘differentiated consensus’. Especially in its philosophical use, the idea of consensus has strong epistemic connotations. In its ecumenical use ‘consensus’ has less epistemic weight. It is related to truth because ecumenical consensus is essentially truth-driven. At the same time it has been recognized that ‘an agreement of all’ is not a sufficient epistemological criterion. Magnus Striet has appropriately described the Joint Declaration type of ‘differentiated consensus’ as a heuristic concept.10 This does not mean that other elements of the Joint Declaration’s method would not have epistemic meaning. For example, Lothar Ullrich argues that the notion of complementarity as used in the Joint Declaration should be perceived as an epistemic concept. The concept of consensus as such would best be understood in Striet’s sense of a heuristic aide. A ‘differentiated consensus’ type of agreement has a specific structure, which consists of two parts. The first part is a consensus statement on what the dialogue partners mutually hold to be essential or fundamental to a particular doctrinal question. The second part is a consensus statement on the legitimacy of remaining differences in doctrinal expressions. Differences are legitimate when they do not endanger the initial consensus on the essentials or fundamentals.11 In the text the relationship between the remaining differences remains unspecified. Lutheran and Roman Catholic explications of justification are ‘in their difference open to one another and do not destroy the consensus regarding the basic truths’.12 The nature of this ‘openness’ is highly significant for the ‘differentiated consensus’ as is the relationship between the differences and the basic truths. The second consensus statement on legitimate differences is supported by a common identification of what is church-dividing in general and what divides Lutherans and Roman Catholics in particular. Following the argumentation of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? the Joint Declaration asserts that differences in doctrinal explications are not in themselves church-dividing. What divides the churches are the doctrinal condemnations of the sixteenth century. The condemnations follow from judgements regarding the teaching of the other church. The aim of the consensus is not to change the doctrinal condemnations but to review the judgement of the current teaching in the churches. The logic of the document starts from a review of the condemnations and proceeds to reviewing the current teaching. The text draws on both Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? and the North American document Justification by Faith in its description of the development of theological traditions. The agreement takes for granted the distinction between doctrinal content and doctrinal expression. Ultimately, the text distinguishes between the transcendental reality of God’s promise (the gospel) and its historically contextualized instantiations (biblical witness, doctrinal explications). Theological traditions and doctrinal explications are intentional. The way the theological traditions and the doctrinal expressions have developed has been motivated by intentions to either affirm desirable interpretations or reject unwanted interpretations. This has led to a diversity of theological expressions that were formed in particular, historical and intellectual contexts. Consequently, to ‘understand correctly’ a theological expression it is necessary to place it in its

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proper context. This proper context consists of a variety of historical, philosophical and theological preconditions, all of which manifest themselves in intentions, concerns and affirmations. A question on the limits of legitimate diversity still remain. As in both of the national documents, so too in the Joint Declaration, the legitimate diversity of theological interpretations is described by reference to a common Christological affirmation. Based on the investigation of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic (theological) understanding of justification, the churches conclude the following: (1) The condemnations of the sixteenth century do not apply to the teaching of the contemporary churches. (2) The particular and differing Lutheran and Roman Catholic understandings of justification are compatible with the consensus on the basic truths (of justification) and therefore the remaining differences are tolerable. The agreement is ‘differentiated’ since it exists in a variety of descriptions, a fact that does not endanger the agreement itself.

Clarification of methodologically central concepts The Joint Declaration’s method is hermeneutical and based on distinctions among three aspects of language: content, form and expression. The text reflects these distinctions through a variety of technical terms. They were used to demonstrate the way in which the agreements and the remaining differences are, in the agreement, located on different hermeneutically significant linguistic levels. Some of these concepts are overlapping and thus represent a potential source of confusion. In a general sense the above-mentioned methodologically central concepts can be divided into three groups as follows. The left-hand column describes the methodological approach and the right-hand column gives examples from the text. I will discuss each category separately. Methodological Approach

Examples from the Joint Declaration

Differentiated content

Biblical message of justification13 Message of justification14

Differentiated explication

Understanding of justification15 Understanding of the doctrine of justification16 Common understanding of justification17 Shared understanding of justification18

Description of the agreement

Convergence concerning justification19 Consensus in basic truths of the doctrine of justification20 Consensus on basic truths concerning the doctrine of justification21 A consensus in basic truths22

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Differentiated content of the message of justification The Joint Declaration’s primary distinction is between the gospel (understood as God’s promise) and the variety of ways in which it is set forth in the scripture. ‘The biblical message of justification’ and ‘the message of justification’ both refer to the variety of biblical images, concepts and metaphors found in the scriptures. The (biblical) message of justification is not uniform but differentiated. ‘The biblical message’ is not an intangible and transcendental ‘message’. It is God’s promise in the tangible ‘Pauline’, ‘Johannine’ or ‘Synoptic’ form. The church has received this message, itself already differentiated, through different conceptualizations and has applied the original plurality of ‘the biblical message’ in a variety of ways. The Joint Declaration is very clear on the absolute mediatedness of the gospel as God’s promise. The historical forms are epistemically necessary: God’s promise cannot be encountered as a transcendental phenomenon an sich.23 For this reason the document does not identify God’s promise of salvation with the message of justification. The message of justification refers to this promised salvation and orients towards the heart of the New Testament witness of God’s saving act in Christ. As pointed out above, even this message of justification is ‘differentiated’. The New Testament itself encompasses various treatments of justification. These different treatments are all capable of functioning as referents of salvation or orientation towards it. Differentiated explication of justification In general, the text refers to any explication of justification as ‘understanding’. The difference between various ‘understandings’ of justification and the doctrine of justification is not very clear. The concepts are used almost synonymously. The Joint Declaration speaks both of a ‘common understanding of justification’ and a ‘shared understanding of justification’, but also of ‘the understanding of the doctrine of justification’. The specific meaning and function of ‘understanding’ in the document has received various interpretations. Some make a distinction between a theological ‘understanding’ and doctrine as an ecclesially binding statement. In the Joint Declaration the distinction is not this clear. The text states that the doctrine of justification ‘takes up this message (of justification) and explicates it’. Biblical ‘understandings’, ecclesial applications, theological understandings and doctrinal explications appear to create seemingly endless hermeneutical circles. That the document yields this kind of interpretation is no doubt one of its weaker points. Description and content of the agreement In describing the reached agreement the Joint Declaration uses concepts of both convergence and consensus. The word ‘convergence’ is used in the text only once (par. 13), in the context of moving from the opposing interpretations and applications in the sixteenth century to a common understanding of justification. Convergence refers to converging (theological) viewpoints or interpretations. This coming together of differing viewpoints is the ‘common understanding’, which is needed to overcome the divisions caused by the condemnations of the Reformation era. The concept of consensus appears in paragraphs 5, 13, 14, 40 and 43, where it is consistently associated with ‘basic

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truths of/concerning the doctrine of justification’. Consensus is a consequence of converging viewpoints. It refers to an agreement on certain basic elements or features of doctrine. The distinction between convergence in theological viewpoints and consensus in doctrine and especially the interaction between the two levels remains ambiguous. On the one hand, consensus needs and is facilitated by convergence. On the other hand, the reached consensus is ultimately the context where the validity of the convergences can be evaluated. It is the consensus that in the end determines the nature of the ‘understanding’, according to the Joint Declaration. The text also refers to the content of the agreement as either ‘justification’ or ‘the doctrine of justification’. Paragraph 13 states that insights from recent biblical studies and modern investigations of the history of theology and dogma and ecumenical dialogues have led to a notable convergence concerning ‘justification’. Paragraph 14 continues with discussion of ‘a shared understanding of justification, which encompasses a consensus on the basic truths’. Both ‘understanding of justification’ and ‘doctrine of justification’ refer to theological elaborations on the biblical message of justification. ‘The understanding of justification’ appears to imply a more general or wider perception of both the contents and the relevance of justification, whereas the doctrine of justification refers more specifically to the content of the doctrine. This interpretation is supported by paragraph 3, which describes a common conviction regarding the content of what the churches teach about justification and the shared conviction on the position of the doctrine of justification within the truths of faith. The description leaves open the question of the interrelationships among understanding, convergence and consensus, and most importantly, the question of ‘basic truths’.

From basic consensus to consensus in basic truths The general idea of differentiating between more and less central issues is recognizable all through the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. The exact phrase ‘consensus in basic truths’ appeared for the first time in the Joint Declaration. This formulation recapitulates a number of earlier attempts to describe what is at the heart of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic agreement. The earlier terminology expressed two differing aspirations for emphasizing the existing consensus as either qualitatively or quantitatively partial. In the qualitative interpretation, ‘basic agreement’ is incomplete and requires completion. In the quantitative understanding, the agreement is considered to be full but encompassing a limited set of doctrines. This qualitative/quantitative distinction has implications for understanding the Joint Declaration’s form of consensus. The two main questions are how to identify what is ‘basic’ and whether this agreement is a complete agreement or still in need of becoming fuller or more complete. The Joint Declaration’s form of consensus grew out of the discussions over basic/ fundamental consensus. It became a separate, independent concept only late in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue.24 Harding Meyer demonstrates the emergence of the Joint Declaration’s form of consensus by referring to a shift in the

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understanding of ‘basic consensus’. In the traditional ecumenical use of basic consensus, the word ‘basic’ refers to a continuous and basic depository of common and central doctrines and assertions of faith, a common root not affected by the divisions. The traditional ‘basic consensus’ exists despite differences and concentrates on the common content or central substance of doctrine. Meyer offers a qualitative interpretation of this traditional basic consensus and refers to it as a set of doctrines not affected by divisions and basic to the Christian faith.25 This classical view of ‘basic consensus’ developed during the dialogue process into a more complex understanding of consensus, which exists in or with difference. This form of basic consensus focuses more on the structure of the agreement than on the content. This structural interpretation of basic consensus as an ‘agreement in basic truths’ distinguishes consensus as a whole from the agreement in basic truths. Agreement on basic truths creates a new context, which changes the relationships among traditional doctrinal positions. According to Meyer, the secondary literature often labels this new relation a ‘differentiated consensus’ because it does not dismiss the differences but allows for their legitimate existence. The agreement on basic truths sets the differences in a new relationship.26 The change from classical consensus (despite differences) to consensus with differences followed from a change in understanding of revelation and faith. The classical consensus (despite differences) reflected a propositional understanding of revelation. According to this view, revelation is a set of revealed truth clauses and faith means the acceptance of these propositions. The purpose of dialogue is to show the truths that must be consented. Diverging views are dismissed. Any divergence from revealed truth is a heresy. Doctrinal expressions are identical with the propositions they convey. There is no possibility for anything less than uniformity on the level of expressions. An agreement is nothing less than uniformity. A ‘consensus on basic truths’ besides the whole set of revealed truths would be heresy.27 In contrast to this ahistorical understanding of revelation, ecumenical dialogues have drawn on a communicative understanding of revelation, which is both historical and particular. In this approach the church is viewed as a communicative community, and propositional truth clauses are replaced by a more holistic and personal (though not individual) truth of salvation. According to this communicative understanding of revelation, the ‘basic’ in basic consensus is the revealed truth itself and consent to this truth creates conformity and consensus in the community.28 Within this framework, an agreement is not a question of arriving at the true proposition by dismissing falsehoods. Truth is attainable only in a historically and contextually mediated form and the dialogue needs to work through a variety of historical mediations. In the Joint Declaration these mediated forms are referred to as ‘understanding’. Accordingly, the document associates basic consensus with ‘common understanding’, a phrase with two meanings. In line with the classical sense of ‘basic consensus’, it refers to an agreement on the basic substance of Christian teaching.29 In addition, the text uses ‘common understanding’ to refer to an agreement on how the doctrine is structured and how it functions. In having a ‘common understanding’, the churches agree that the New Testament witness to God’s saving action has a centre or ‘heart’ and that the message of justification, that

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is, conceptualizing salvation as justification, directs in a special way towards that centre.30 The Joint Declaration exemplifies a gradual shift in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue from partial (basic) agreement to an agreement on the basics. A basic consensus as an agreement on the basic truths is not ‘basic’ in the sense of ‘elementary’ or ‘rudimentary’. It is ‘basic’ in the sense of ‘fundamental’. Questions about the completeness of the document’s agreement have arisen due to the use of both definite and indefinite articles in the German text, and have been fuelled by the differing qualitative and quantitative interpretations of what is agreed on. For example, Karl Lehmann understands the document’s consensus as an incomplete agreement in the most important doctrines. The use of the indefinite article denotes for him the existence of still other basic truths that have to be agreed on.31 Wendebourg on the other hand argues that though there is no definite article, the context implies that consensus has been reached on the basic truths, that is, those truths so central to the teaching of justification that agreement on them surpasses all remaining differences.32 For Jüngel already the mixing of the definite and indefinite forms implies a deficiency in the reached agreement.33 The Joint Declaration’s ‘basic’ can be interpreted as something that fundamentally affects other truths. Such a consensus on the basic truths would affect the remaining differences and justify their existence.34 An agreement on the basic truths functions as a foundation for the rest of the agreement. Here ‘foundation’ does not refer to an epistemic foundation, which supports a chain of logical inference. This interpretation is theoretically possible, but there are various reasons to support a different interpretation. One of the main reasons is that neither of the churches commits itself to a propositional understanding of revelation. It is therefore not necessary to understand ‘foundations’ as epistemic foundations. Discussion of the legitimacy or necessity of differentiation provides more evidence to support alternative interpretations. The change from partial (basic) agreement (despite differences) to an agreement with difference implies a significant change in the churches’ attitudes towards differences. In the earlier paradigm differences were perceived as failures and defects. The newer paradigm allows either a moderate possibility of differences or a more radical necessity of differences. In the moderate view of a ‘possibility of differences’ the differences as such are neither necessary nor should their possibility be a priori denied. For example, Hans Jörg Urban argues that historical circumstances and historically conditioned concerns and fears have an effect on any given doctrinal expression. Both appropriateness to the contemporary situation and a desire to remain in orthodox teaching influence doctrinal expression. Ultimately, it is the church’s desire to remain orthodox that puts limits on legitimate diversity. An ‘absolute heresy’ means the total refutation of Christ’s truth. Therefore, the church cannot tolerate differences born out of absolute heresy. Along with absolute heresy, Urban identifies ‘relative heresy’, by which he means an ‘unreasonable privileging’ of one part of the truth at the expense of the other parts. In Urban’s view doctrinal constructs born out of concerns and fears could be perceived as ‘relative heresies’, which, though giving unreasonable emphasis to particular parts of the truth, in their concentration on particular issues also contribute to the deepening of

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understanding in regards to a particular truth. For Urban, differentiation is not in the first place a positive thing, since in any case it falls into the category of heresy. At the same time, differences do not imply an absolute heresy. A consensus with difference is perhaps not desirable but it is possible.35 Wolfgang Thönissen agrees with Urban but gives diversity an even more positive connotation. Thönissen’s argument calls for a proper distinction, though not a separation of the form and content of theological statements. The essence and truth of Christian faith is not atemporal. It points to the actuality of the history of Jesus Christ. This is the determining ground of cognition, which should be distinguished from the understanding itself.36 For Thönissen, this distinction is epistemic and considers both the basis of knowledge and the cognition itself. He argues against any idea of immediate or unmediated cognition based on the linguistically mediated character of all cognition. Speech always has a perspective and the perspective itself is a medium of cognition. In a theological context, this implies that the truth of faith is bound to the truth and history of the effects of God’s revelation in Jesus Christ, including the tradition history. A consensus with difference, understood from this point of view, is an attempt to pay attention both to the fact that the concepts of the binding ecclesial tradition are not easily exchangeable and also to the point that the concepts cannot be bluntly identified with their contents. The context of a concept, the ‘internal logic of the imprinted theological language’ and the rules for reflection all determine the validity of a concept. Thönissen argues for a symbolic–typological understanding of theological language. He supports not only the possibility or even the necessity of differing theological forms of speech but also the possibility of translating or making intelligible the theological language of different traditions. This requires an explication of the logic of the language system and the rules that govern the relationship among its different parts.37 A more radical interpretation holds that differentiation is not only possible but in some way necessary. Striet argues, for example, that the development of tradition includes a necessary historical development of a diversity of thought forms. Striet maintains that historically communicated truths of faith necessarily have a particular ‘perspective’. The history of dogma manifests the historical realization or adoption of the salvation event. This is essentially an interpretative process in which understanding has a central role. Understanding creates identity between faith claims and the event of God’s self-revelation in the history of Jesus Christ. Striet places an understanding of a consensus with difference in the framework of the historically transmitted tradition. Because tradition is historically transmitted, it is impossible to step outside one’s own historically bound expressions of that tradition. There is no requirement of identity, even on the level of thought forms. The only thing needed is the recognition of the validity of differing expressions in relation to the historical event of salvation.38 The identity creating understanding binds together the founding event and the faith claims but not the differing faith claims in and of themselves. The dynamics of understanding itself justifies and to a certain degree necessitates the existence of differing expressions of faith.

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Compatibility of doctrinal expressions The Joint Declaration argues for the legitimacy of differentiation based on the compatibility of the differing statements with the consensus in basic truths. This ‘compatibility argument’ has been challenged on two accounts. Both Harding Meyer and Eberhard Jüngel have noted that manner of argument for consensus in difference in the Joint Declaration seems to ‘challenge’ (Meyer) or ‘run counter to’ ( Jüngel) what they call a ‘general understanding’ of consensus.39 With ‘general understanding of consensus’, both Meyer and Jüngel refer to consensus based on identity and uniformity. The document’s consensus encompasses differences and therefore appears incompatible with the very definition of consensus. The compatibility argument is also challenged by some uncertainty about what should be compatible and what it ultimately means for two things to be compatible. The different candidates for what can legitimately differ without the loss of ‘compatibility’ are many. They include intentions, meanings, ‘implicit axioms’,40 theological languages, forms of thought, theological structures and so on. In addition, compatibility can refer to the practical consequences of the doctrinal language (the performative aspect of doctrine) or it can denote the comprehensibility of differing formulations.41 There are also several proposals for what ‘compatibility’ means. The research literature offers three different proposals of what it means to be ‘compatible’. These three are ‘complementarity’, ‘conformity’ and ‘referential compatibility’. I have further divided the arguments under ‘complementarity’ into two, based on whether the complementarity considers doctrinal expressions or thought-structures. The ‘complementarity of linguistic expressions’ argument is based on the general idea of an epistemic viewpoint. According to this view, truth is in itself a complex reality. Therefore, a single linguistic description cannot give an exhaustive description of truth. Individual expressions remain approximations of a complex truth. A plurality of approximations communicates a fuller presentation of the complex truth. The complex nature of truth itself necessitates integrating differing images, conceptual systems or languages. Not all of the complementary expressions have the same weight in the final descriptions; some aspects can dominate over others.42 Because of this, complementarity does not simply mean expressions completing each other like pieces in a puzzle. To detect complementarity one needs to observe the doctrinal expressions as part of a theological language or form of thought and compare them as part of this language or thought form.43 The complementarity of doctrinal expressions concerns the compatibility of the underlying thought forms rather than the expressions themselves. The Joint Declaration does not explicitly address the conformity of thoughtstructures. This is, nevertheless, one possible interpretation of the document’s ‘compatibility’. The idea of structural conformity is not foreign to the Lutheran– Roman Catholic dialogue. A proposal for a certain convergence between ‘the hierarchy of truths’ and ‘the centre of the gospel’ was noted at the very beginning of the dialogue.44 The Joint Declaration discusses questions of thought-forms in relation to the critical function of the doctrine of justification. The question is

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interesting since it shows how interrelated, in the context of the document, the methodological and substantial questions are. Whether one accepts the argument of conformity in thought-structures depends on one’s understanding of their content and form. The document’s claim to agreement on this question is one of the most controversial of its parts. Parts of the critical discussion around this theme also touch upon the more methodological question of doctrinal compatibility. Eberhard Jüngel strongly disagrees with the claim that the Joint Declaration demonstrates an agreement on the critical function of the doctrine of justification. Jüngel’s criticism relates directly to the ‘compatibility’ question. He discusses the validity of the proposed agreement in the context of ‘criteria of discernment’. According to Jüngel, Lutheran and Roman Catholic structures of thought differ significantly in the number of criteria for discernment. For Jüngel, the doctrine of justification is an identification criterion for discerning what true Christian teaching is. Consequently, the doctrine of justification is a truth criterion for discerning the truth of the gospel proclamation and ecclesial praxis and a criterion for right/correct theology. In addition, it is a hermeneutic category directing all thinking, speaking and action.45 The doctrine of justification is a singular critical standard. Jüngel believes it is nonsensical to attempt to demonstrate any gradation between abdicable and non-abdicable criteria.46 The notion of criterion by definition implies a definitive status. Jüngel is also not convinced that the plurality of biblical terminology or imagery for salvation should relativize the doctrine of justification as the only valid conceptualization for salvation: the essence of the scripture is identical with the article on justification. The variety in biblical imagery is a variety in expressing the doctrine of justification. Nothing can add to or expand the doctrine of justification itself. Because there is no consensus on the critical function of the doctrine of justification, there is consequently no consensus on the basic truths regarding the doctrine of justification.47 These few remarks from Jüngel point to two additional ecumenical challenges. Jüngel’s criticism shows firstly, how threatening it is to deviate from traditional forms of argumentation. In Jüngel’s view, ‘the essence of the scripture’ is identical with the doctrine of justification. Any deviation from this way of conceptualizing ‘the essence’ is fundamentally a deviation from scripture itself. The doctrine of justification is not something that orients towards the centre, it is the centre. Secondly, Jüngel’s remarks show quite convincingly the interconnectedness of method and the substance of doctrine. At least in the context of the Joint Declaration, what is attributed to the doctrine of justification has implications for the perceived agreement. This somewhat weakens the structural argument since the emphasis is not on the structures themselves but on the principles of organizing the structure.48 The third form of compatibility argument goes beyond the immediate forms of expression or thought structures. It argues for compatibility of thought structures in reference to something held in common. Here the thought forms or doctrinal structures are not compared with each other, but analysed in relation to a common point of reference. Walter Kasper’s description of the Joint Declaration’s Christocentric method serves as a good example. According to Kasper, both the Roman Catholic ‘hierarchy of truths’ and the Reformation emphasis on the actual

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event of proclamation are fundamentally oriented towards Christ. Compatibility of the hierarchy of truths and the critical function of the doctrine of justification is based on this common Christological orientation point. Kasper’s main emphasis is not on how the doctrine is structured but that it is structured in reference to Christ. Thönissen supports Kasper’s Christocentric argument. He observes that in the Second Vatican Council’s description, ‘the foundation of faith’ is a criterion of all doctrine. Each individual doctrine finds its place in relation to other doctrines by reference to this foundation. Therefore, says Thönissen, Catholic theology too embraces a critical Christological fundament of faith.49 To follow Thönissen’s and Kasper’s interpretation of the common Christological reference point is to arrive at a point of theological convergence in one of the most contested fragments of the Joint Declaration, the critical function of the doctrine of justification.50 But is this interpretation justified? In light of the larger Lutheran– Roman Catholic dialogue, a Christocentric interpretation of the document’s method emerges as the most plausible one. Especially important here is the Christological argument found in the North American document Justification by Faith. In Justification by Faith, the Christological principle was more explicitly a hermeneutical principle. It was accompanied by a non-restrictive attitude towards the variety of legitimate explications of the principle. The Joint Declaration goes a step further in seeking commonly agreed limits of the justified diversity. This change reflects the idea that the limits of justified differences cannot be left open. Doctrinal definitions also function as limits of the orthodox teaching community. With the emphasis on a common foundation defined, not by a particular form, but by a substance of doctrine, there is ample space for responding to the need for changing interpretations to make the gospel message intelligible in particular times and places. This is evident from the repeated use of the formula: ‘We confess together . . .’, where confessing means confessing to something, it also takes place in a particular time. The same time–place continuum can be concluded from the combination of the reached consensus with the proclamation of the gospel message. Meyer argues that in the Joint Declaration proclaiming the gospel message is the actual kerygmatic form of the consensus and not a consequence of it.51 Thönissen gives further support for a referential interpretation of the Joint Declaration’s agreement by analysing the language of the document. He suggests that this language reflects the presence of the two elements of common reference and different, though compatible theological structures. The first common phrase asserts consensus in basic truths using what Thönissen calls ‘the classic method of convergence and consensus’. Here language is common and expressions, uniform.52 Paragraphs stating the common view of the churches start with: ‘In faith we together hold the conviction . . .’53 or ‘We confess together . . .’.54 The opening formulas imply that the common statements are ‘binding, scripture-oriented confessional statements’.55 The second phrase brings in the traditionally conflicting doctrinal statements and examines whether they, in light of the common agreement, are still in conflict or whether they could be seen as complementary. The expressions are not uniform in language. Because of the remaining differences, the expressions of one denominational language must be translated into the

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language of the other. Thönissen calls the language of the differentiated statements ‘denominationally imprinted’.56 In Thönissen’s view the justification for differing ‘denominationally imprinted’ expressions relates to their translatability. The main question here is to what extent are the differentiated expressions within the consensus merely different linguistic formulations that ultimately speak of the same thing. In other words, what kind of understanding of the linguistic mediatedness of revelation does the Joint Declaration exemplify? The document itself declares that an agreement exists on Christian truth or the substance of the Christian proclamation. The common sentences express this agreement.57 How is the relationship between the truth or the substance of the proclamation and the expressions to be understood and how does this understanding reflect on the criteria/possibility of compatibility between the denominationally imprinted theological languages? The question of legitimate diversity is still under discussion in ecumenical theology and thus the issue cannot be avoided. Thönissen’s remark on the permanent need for translation from one theological language to another would mean that Christian speech would remain in a continuous state of discerning the meaning of doctrinal expressions. Another question is how much diversity a consensus can endure. In summary: there is considerable evidence to argue that the consensus in the Joint Declaration can be described as compatibility between different confessional statements.58 Compatibility does not mean direct conformity: this becomes clear in the difficulties faced in the discussion of critical principles. It is more suitable to describe compatibility as a mediated or referential compatibility. It is not because of the plain conformity of structures that Lutheran and Roman Catholic teaching are compatible but by a reference to a Christological fundament and centre. Linguistic expressions, which refer to a common centre, mediate the compatibility of differing statements. Some questions remain. One of the most important regards the relationship between the differing expressions. Does compatibility require that the expressions are translatable from one ‘confessionally imprinted language’ to another? How does one discern that a ‘confessionally imprinted’ expression in fact has a particular referent?

Identity and difference The last point I want to raise regarding the Joint Declaration’s form of consensus with difference considers questions of identity. Some have asked whether the document’s use of the phrase ‘common understanding’ implies a hermeneutically invalid claim for identical understanding. For example, Ingolf Dalferth and Ulrich Körtner accuse the Joint Declaration of implying identity where identity cannot exist. Others have expressed quite the opposite concerns of the document’s allowing diversity which would be detrimental to the church’s quest for unity. A consensus with difference cannot sustain a substantial agreement. The third identity-related challenge concerns the identity of the confessional forms of thought. Some fear that the document distorts the theological identity of both Lutherans and Roman Catholics by using a new common context to evaluate doctrinal statements.

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Ingolf U. Dalferth’s main argument against the Joint Declaration’s method focuses on the validity of its hermeneutical method. Dalferth argues that publishing texts is not productive for the ecumenical endeavour as such. It cannot be expected that these texts will be read and understood according to only one interpretation.59 Understanding is always personal and individual; the verb ‘to understand’ means to perceive or to apprehend a meaning within the horizon of life praxis. This results in a unique ‘understanding’ as a noun, which a person uses for orienting action and behaviour. The ‘horizons of life praxis’ and language are shared. This gives understanding its communal character. A ‘common understanding’, as a noun, is possible only via personal ‘understanding’, as a verb. Understanding for Dalferth has a distinctively provisional character. Properly speaking, it is merely the changeover from ‘understanding’ to ‘understanding more’ or ‘in a different way’. Due to the provisional and fundamentally individual nature of understanding there can be neither identical synchronic nor diachronic understanding.60 Dalferth concludes that there is no identity in understanding, as a noun, but only the individuality of understanding individuals. Consensus between individuals denotes neither a common understanding because of an identical understanding nor an identical understanding of a common understanding. Consensus can only mean an accord or harmony of separate understandings in light of something that at present seems sufficiently similar to both. Dalferth is very definite on the provisional character of any particular understanding. He condemns any attempt to regulate a particular understanding by fixing it as a consensus and deems it ‘hermeneutical naivety’. In Dalferth’s view dialogue texts can merely open a ‘space for misunderstanding’ (ein Spielraum des Mißverständnisses), that is, to define a certain frame within which there can be differences in understanding. This is, however, neither consensus nor ‘common understanding’.61 Giovanni Sala agrees with Dalferth on the legitimacy of differing understandings and with his critical assessment of the document as a whole. Unlike Dalferth, Sala sees that differences on the level of understanding should not make it impossible to express what is held in common with a common language. Sala bases his argument on differentiation between the language of faith and the language of theology. Sala calls ‘understanding’ on the level of faith ‘common-sense-understanding’. This understanding is immediate rather than reflective. As a theological endeavour, ‘understanding’ refers to a reflective process, the goal of which is discernment. Theological understanding is assessed by its adequacy, not by its truthfulness. Adequacy as a criterion justifies temporal and cultural differences in theological language. Justification of differences does not necessitate differences. The plurality of theological languages is not a means of preserving the unity of faith needed for the unity of the church. On the contrary, Sala emphasizes the necessity of a common language of faith. A common language of faith uses a common confession or creed, which, according to Sala, cannot be constructed by means of a differentiated consensus.62 According to Daphne Hampson the Joint Declaration’s greatest fault is in detaching confessionally determined theological statements from their proper context. Concepts can be correctly understood only in their original context. When detached from their original context, they become vague or capable of being

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interpreted in numerous ways. According to Hampson, Lutheran and Catholic theologies are fundamentally different. Any move from the fundamental theological assumptions betrays the confessional identity of both Lutherans and Catholics. Lutheran and Catholic forms of thought are, according to Hampson, different to the degree of being incommensurable. This makes them fundamentally incompatible, because they do not speak of the same thing.63 The document’s fundamental problem is that it attempts to position Lutheran and Catholic theological formulations within a greater framework and then claims that these formulations are commensurable. Hampson treats its common statements as ‘foundational’ statements, which set forth what ‘each side then expresses in diverse ways’ yet holds in common. Hampson’s claim is that unless the diverse explications turn out to be identical, the foundational statement fails to be meaningful.64 Hampson’s arguments are at various points backed by a reference to identity, which is understood as sameness. In Hampson’s view no ecumenical agreement can exist outside the context of a particular theological context. Particular theological contexts allow identifying theological statements correctly. Different explications are possible as far as they can be identified as elements of the same theological framework and therefore can be understood to ‘mean the same thing’. Consequently, ‘consensus’ can only mean ‘identity’. Besides ‘sameness’, Hampson’s understanding of identity also denotes at least relative stability or unchangeability. Confessional identity has a definitive description and any change to this is a deviation from the proper identity. Catherine Clifford promotes an alternative and more dynamic understanding of confessional identity. She argues that to demand that an ecumenical agreement be ‘properly Lutheran’ or ‘properly Catholic’ is a sign of an inadequate appreciation of ecumenical consensus and theological method in general. For Clifford, the common confession of faith in the Joint Declaration serves as a hermeneutical focus for theological reflective work, interpretation and history, all of which are functions of common listening to the word of God. The common confession of faith has a transformative function that emphasizes conversion beyond contradictory positions and misunderstandings. The common consensus functions as a new theological context and affects the preaching and catechesis of the churches. Clifford argues that there should be no separation of denominational and ecumenical hermeneutics. Through common theological hermeneutical processes, the churches can receive the results of ecumenical dialogues as a part of their theological identities. Clifford’s underlying argument is that even the denominational identities of the churches are not static. The church’s diachronic identity is dynamic. For this reason, ecumenical processes cannot assume the continuity of particular ecclesial identities as static or unchanged identities.65 The themes discussed above appeared in the Joint Declaration, but they are not specific to this document alone. They exemplify challenges faced by claims of ecumenical consensus, which are not based on uniformity, sameness or identity of beliefs. I will offer a wider discussion of these themes, drawing on a greater number of ecumenical dialogues, in the last part of this study (Part V: ‘The Possibility of Consensus’).

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Communio sanctorum (L-RC 2000 ger) Methodological distinctions: basic contents and basic form Communio sanctorum (L-RC 2000 ger) follows the ‘new principles of ecumenical hermeneutics’, that recognizes the legitimate existence of non-church-dividing differences within the unity of faith, which they are striving. The goal is to reach a ‘differentiated consensus’ by a method analogous to that of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? Communio sanctorum distinguishes between differentiated consensus as a goal and the method of acquiring it. Both the goal and the method consist of two elements, represented by two statements, one declaring agreement in the basic and essential content of previously controversial teaching and the other clarifying why the remaining differences can be considered legitimate and not in conflict with the agreement in essentials. Accordingly, the method of reaching this consensus has two elements. These are evaluating whether the doctrines of the two churches are mutually exclusive and whether those points of doctrine emphasized and held important by one church are preserved in the teaching of the other church ‘so clearly that they cannot be overlooked or misunderstood’.66 Communio sanctorum’s hermeneutical method depends on a basic distinction between form and content. The faith of those who are the communio sanctorum has a fundamental content (Grundgehalt) and fundamental form (Grundgestalt).67 The fundamental content of faith is God’s saving act in Jesus Christ and Christ’s presence among the communion of the faithful. The witness of the early church is the basic form of faith. As noted before, the word ‘fundamental’ is methodologically significant. In Communio sanctorum ‘fundamental’ appears as a limitation of plurality. The fundamental ‘form of faith’ is analogous to apostolicity or a paradigmatic means of expression. Apostolicity and the ‘fundamental form of faith’ are, however, not identical. The text in fact refers only to the practice of confessing Christ and to the awakening of faith as the consequence of this confessing.68 Apostolicity also has a content (‘apostolic message’ or ‘content of faith’), which can be expressed in various ways. The content is binding but ‘the various developments of this message in the life expressions of the church and of individual Christians’ are not universally obligatory.69 The text makes a similar distinction in reference to the ‘faith sense of the faithful’, sensus fidelium. Although sensus fidelium is an authentic instance of transmitting faith, this ‘faith sense’ can be healthy or manifest ‘timebound trends, false developments, and abridgements of Christian faith and life’.70 The purpose of the content–form distinction is, on the one hand, to preserve the integrity of faith and, on the other hand, to facilitate critical discussion about the forms this faith has taken. The ‘fundamental form’ of witness is a paradigm of a correct form. To apply it in developing a common Christian response to the challenges of contemporary life requires the use of other instances of discernment.71 The fundamental form of Christian witness includes authoritative criteria for assessing proclamation. Communio sanctorum defines five ‘recognition and witnessing authorities’, which, in a diverse but still authoritative form, facilitate the receiving, witnessing and sharing of God’s truth.72 These instances are the

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scriptures, the handing down of the faith (tradition), the witness of the whole people of God (sensus fidei ), the ministry and theology. The elaboration of these authoritative instances of recognition and witness belong to the area in which Communio sanctorum broke new ground in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue.73

Focus on communio Communion ecclesiology is often mentioned as the ecumenically most plausible approach to ecclesiology.74 It has a more central and explicit function in Communio sanctorum than in previous Lutheran–Roman Catholic documents. ‘Communion’ is the main starting point for a majority of theological elaborations in the document. For example, questions relating to revelation and thus to the relationship between scripture and tradition are treated as a sub-division of the ‘Communion of Saints through Word and Sacrament’. The discussion follows a detailed analysis of the idea of communio and its applicability to the church.75 This setting increases significantly the hermeneutical value of the concept of communio. Dividing differences are sublimated in the concrete communion mediated, by word and the sacraments.76 Communio sanctorum’s treatment of the Eucharist gives an example the methodological use of communio. The communion character of the church is a gift of God. It is based on participation or communion with the holy gifts and the inner life of the Trinity.77 Receiving the gift of the Eucharist is the foundation to becoming a ‘saint’. Participating in the holy gifts is therefore fundamental to the communio sanctorum.78 Participating in the communion of saints is also part of what it means to be ‘just’.79 Here the participatory element of communion functions as a point of contact between the Roman Catholic and Lutheran discourses, which emphasize either the Eucharist or justification as the foundation of the church. The document shows quite convincingly that the main ecumenical challenge for Lutherans and Catholics is not so much in ecclesiology but in exploring the concrete implications of their common understanding of the church.80 The differing explications of this question are the beginnings of differing ecclesiological emphases in the Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches. While communio has a methodologically central role, it is not Communio sanctorum’s only technical term with methodological implications. The document uses a large variety of hermeneutical and other methods to demonstrate the reached agreement. Some commentators have therefore suggested that the document is in fact less hermeneutical in method than other Lutheran–Roman Catholic documents.81 For example, chapter 4 portrays communio as the context in which scripture is read in faithfulness towards the content of faith. At the same time communio is not used as an argument in the theological elaboration of the document in this part.82 Similarly, passages dealing with sacraments start by recognizing the communion of saints as the context for the theological work but does not explicitly implement this supposition in the subsequent argumentation.83 The document does not mention the concept of communion in chapters 4 and 5.

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Chapter 6 on the ministry uses the concept of communion only in the discussion of the universal ministry. In chapter 7 regarding the saints, the communio idea is apparent, but the already reached consensus in the doctrine on justification is methodologically more important.84 This variety in methods is mirrored by variety in the strength of the reached agreement. In the following section, I will give examples of four kinds of agreements of different strength illustrated in Communio sanctorum. The Agreement(s) Example 1: (very weak) far-reaching commonalities with differing uses of similar concepts: sacraments The explanation of sacraments starts with a description of their areas of common understanding. Lutherans and Catholics agree on the church’s role as the receiver and God’s role as the giver of the gifts of sacrament.85 Questions relating to the concept of sacrament, and the number of sacraments are discussed. The document offers an answer to the question of the number of sacraments by providing a description of the concept of sacrament that is acceptable for both churches. The churches are able to agree that the concept of ‘sacrament’, as described in the document, can be applied to baptism and Eucharist. Beyond that, the churches can recognize similar liturgical actions, which Roman Catholics call sacrament but Lutherans do not. Communio sanctorum offers a solution by combining the Roman Catholic division to major and minor sacraments with the Lutheran understanding of two sacraments plus additional liturgical practices. Yet ultimately, the document has to conclude that this combination is not successful enough to function as a basis for consensus; the differences in the concepts of sacrament and (Lutheran) ‘acts of blessing’ do not fit into one differentiated concept of sacrament, and hence there is no common ground for reaching consensus. The method used is primarily historical and intends to show the ambiguities in current definitions of sacrament and the historical situations that led to the controversial contemporary definitions.86 Example 2: (weak) basic agreements with unresolved differences: ministerial office The basic agreements (grundsätzlichen Übereinstimmungen) on ministerial office exemplify an agreement that remains too weak to facilitate resolving the remaining differences. The churches share recognition of the binding character of Christian doctrine and, as a consequence, of the responsibility of the ministerial office for teaching. Similarly, the churches recognize that the ministerial office is not exercised independently of the faith witness of the whole church and that the ministerial office is to remain under the norm of the gospel.87 Furthermore, there is an agreement that as a whole, the church always remains in truth.88 Even after avoiding misunderstandings and reservations there still remains ‘an unresolved controversy’ about who bears the responsibility for teaching office. These differences are associated with Catholic ‘theology and practice’ (Theologie und Praxis) and ‘conviction’ (Überzeugung) and ‘Lutheran understanding’ (Lutherische Auffassung) or the ‘Lutheran side’ (Lutherischerseits). They ‘touch on

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deeply rooted fundamental convictions’ and ‘neither of the two partners in this dialogue can expect that the other give up its faith position’.89 Instead of giving up the convictions of either church, the document suggests ‘defusing the contradictions’ (entschärfung der Gegensätze) by testing their compatibility with the conviction that scripture itself has the power to present the truth of God and interpret itself. In the case of the ministerial office, the basic agreements (in plural) refer to a general or formal agreement but without having the ability to facilitate common understanding or come to a common viewpoint that would ‘defuse’ the contradictions.90 Example 3: (strong but conditional) material agreement: the church The agreement on the church concentrates on the question of the church’s nature as both sign and instrument of salvation. The method of explication is similar to the discussion of sacraments. It starts with a common affirmation followed by a description of the Roman Catholic point of view and the Lutheran objections.91 Contrary to the discussion of the sacraments, the passage on the church does not attempt to adjust the differing views. Instead, the text endeavours to describe the common understanding of the two churches in a language that avoids those theological concepts not shared by both (e.g., calling church a sacrament). The agreement is strong, but remains conditional: ‘Where this is together taught, there is a material agreement, even if different judgements exist about the analogous use of the term ‘‘sacrament’’ in relationship to the church.’92 The dialogue partners are able to perceive the differing theological conceptualizations and theological concerns as ‘salutary warnings’93 or ‘correctives’ of a commonly recognized fundamental teaching. The agreement on church consists of both a positive and a negative affirmation. This implies that although or because there is a material agreement on the issue, neither church needs to adopt or, strictly speaking, even to agree on the formulations of the other church.94 Example 4: (strong) basic/fundamental agreement: justification Discussion of the doctrine and message of justification does not break new theological ground. Still, the description of the already existing agreement is worth noting. The text recognizes that there exists a basic consensus on the doctrine of justification. This fundamental consensus is evident in the shared understanding of the biblical message about justification.95 Yet the distinction in Communio sanctorum between the biblical message of justification and the doctrine of justification is ambiguous. For example, the text refers to Paul’s presentation of the message of justification as the ‘doctrine of justification’. At a later point, the message of justification is simply called ‘the gospel’. The text is clear on the existing variety of biblical descriptions of justification.96 It, therefore, appears to identify the doctrine of justification with the Pauline presentation of the gospel message. It does not consider the ‘doctrine of justification’ as a general category of teaching about justification. It remains difficult to determine if the ‘common agreement in the understanding of the biblical message of justification’ refers to a particular doctrinal formulation or more generally to recognition of the variety of biblical conceptualizations of the gospel message. Agreement is also described as ‘agreement in the understanding of the

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gospel as the message of justification of the sinner by God’s grace’. The vagueness continues in such assertions as ‘this doctrine (of justification) . . . is a critical standard for the church’98 and ‘the message of justification has a central significance for the total doctrine, life, and ordering of the churches’.99 During the Reformation the reformers and the Catholics differed in their concerns and experiences. This led to differences in emphasis in understanding justification. Communio sanctorum describes the Joint Declaration as a solution to these differences. At the same time, it does not follow its example in describing the ‘common understanding’, which embraces the ‘existing differences’.100 Communio sanctorum’s consensus appears to be a ‘consensus despite differences’ rather than a consensus with differences. The reached consensus is nevertheless central to the whole agreement. Paragraph 117 states that it is exactly the basic agreement in the doctrine of justification that results in understanding the church as the communio sanctorum and through this the basic understanding in justification must also result in a ‘corresponding communion between our two churches’.101 With respect to the doctrine of justification, ‘basic consensus’ thus denotes a common starting point or common foundation that in a mediated way also functions as a hermeneutical criterion for other areas of the church’s teaching and practice.102

The Church as Koinonia of Salvation (L-RC 2004 usa): structures and ministries The Church as Koinonia of Salvation is intended to be not only a continuation of the longstanding North American dialogue process but also an instance in the reception of the Joint Declaration. Although the methodological and material continuities cannot be strictly separated, it appears that, method-wise, Church as Koinonia represents a form of consensus that allows differences (as in the Joint Declaration), whereas content-wise, the document depends on the previous rounds of the North American dialogue (especially rounds III, IV and VI) and Facing Unity from the international dialogue. Focus on koinonia In Church as Koinonia, a deliberate choice is made for the New Testament Greek concept of koinonia over its Latin translation communio. By so doing, the document’s authors avoid some of the controversial theological connotations linked with the Latin communio. Among these are the close connection between communio and the Eucharist, for example, and the sacramental character of the church or the ministry.103 This distinction between the Greek and the Latin uses is specific to this document.104 Church as Koinonia uses koinonia as a tool to implement a type of consensus with difference in ecclesiology similar to that of the Joint Declaration. This seems appropriate for various reasons. In principle both koinonia and consensus in the Joint Declaration reflect an understanding of ecclesial unity not based on a merger into a structurally unified whole but a consensus that admits

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degrees. As opposed to the frequently used images of the church as the people of God, the body of Christ and the temple of the Spirit, the concept of koinonia is not, in the biblical context, associated with church or ekklesia but with all the faithful.106 In the New Testament, koinonia can be translated as ‘common’ or ‘communal’, ‘to have a share’ or ‘have a part’. Some scholars have also proposed such translations as ‘participation’, ‘fellowship’, ’association’ or ‘community’ although it has been noted that there is no particular translation that would capture the manifold connotations of the word. As Church as Koinonia puts it: ‘koinonia is a multivalent term’.107 In Church as Koinonia, communio is perceived as a theological ‘rendering’ of the Greek word koinonia. Since koinonia has not had a prominent place in the systematic theological elaborations of either of the two Christian communions in question, it has not lost its rather undefined biblical character. The document presents this lack of uniform definition as an asset and an opportunity for new, non-controversial theological developments. Over the past few decades, the concept of koinonia has gained prominence as an ecclesiological concept in ecumenical dialogues and ecumenically oriented theology. Yet despite its frequent ecumenical use, the concept of koinonia has remained a loosely defined concept. Its variety of meanings has some common characteristics. For example, according to Susan K. Wood, koinonia implies that: (1) the Trinity is perceived as the interior principle of ecclesial communion, whose (2) source is the Holy Spirit. (3) The Christian community is the result of union (koinonia) with God and can thus be called koinonia. In addition (4) koinonia refers to the church’s nature as the body of Christ, the people of God and the temple of the Holy Spirit and (5) this koinonia is entered through baptism and nourished and expressed in the celebration of the Eucharist. Wood summarizes the fundamental meaning of koinonia as ‘participation in Christ’s death and resurrection through baptism, participation in the body of Christ through Eucharist, participation in the life of the Trinity through union with Christ’.108 Apart from the first three characteristics, this five-point list is not immediately applicable to Church as Koinonia. In comparison to Wood’s summary, Church as Koinonia gives more emphasis to participation in the life of the Trinity through union with Christ and less to baptism or even the Eucharist as the means of this participation. The text mentions baptism as the initiation into the people of God only once.109 Baptism is perceived as a consequence of God’s calling and election,110 which in turn is the primary source of justification. Similarly, the eucharistic dimension appears as one, but not the privileged event in or consummation of koinonia.111 At some points the proclamation of the gospel is given a more definite role in the formation of koinonia than is the Eucharist.112 The Church as Koinonia appears to give koinonia a new interpretation. This new emphasis follows from the agreement on justification and the new recognition of the reality of salvation in both Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches. It is also one implication of a strictly biblical reading of koinonia. The primacy given to the idea that ‘we, the justified’113 are members of the people of God leads to perceiving the structures and ministries of the communion ‘as instruments of koinonia, serv[ing] God’s people’.114 This reading of koinonia gives the document a practical, phenomenological or even instrumental flavour in the perception of ecclesial structures or ministries. The practical feel

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nevertheless masks a number of significant and substantial theological claims, which form the document’s particular understanding of koinonia. I will demonstrate the theological implications of the notion of koinonia in Church as Koinonia with two short examples. The first comes from George Vandervelde. He points out that the ecumenical use of koinonia allows for two very different interpretations of the metaphysical nature of ‘having a share’.115 In one interpretation koinonia is viewed ontologically as participation in divine being, while in the other, koinonia is perceived as the reconciliation of the creaturely life or partnership with the trinitarian life, that is, in a relational way. The two interpretations essentially differ but are, according to Vandervelde, reconcilable alternatives. They thus resemble the differing views in the Joint Declaration, which are reconciled on forensic and effective justification, and the ontological and relational uses of koinonia in Church as Koinonia. The second example concerns what George Hunsinger calls ‘koinonia relations’. Hunsinger sketches a ‘chalcedonian’ relation of koinonia, characterized by a mutual indwelling and resulting in a coexistence ‘in a unity-in-distinction’ and ‘distinctionin-unity’. In this relation of ‘differentiated unity’, neither part loses its identity, but gains it instead. Koinonia relations are not interchangeable, that is, they posses characteristics that cannot be transferred beyond a particular category or context. In addition, koinonia relations quite often follow a principle of asymmetry that allows functional, logical or ontological priority or priority-in-status to one of the instances in the relation without destroying their mutual indwelling. Finally, by nature all the differing koinonia relations converge in various ways in Christ. The paradigm of koinonia relations is thus essentially Christocentric.116 Vandervelde’s and Hunsinger’s examples help us to grasp more fully the theological implications of the notion of koinonia, especially in the ecumenical context.

Two methodological pairings: material and formal The Church as Koinonia’s agreement was modelled after the Joint Declaration’s. The text endeavours to acknowledge the validity of differences, that exist within a consensus. The model for this comes from the Joint Declaration, which Church as Koinonia does not discuss further. Instead, the document widens the area of consensus in the doctrine of justification and explore its ecclesiological consequences. The text uses two kinds of pairings to achieve this aim. The first is essentially the theological or material pairing of the idea of justification with koinonia. This pairing results in koinonia becoming the central hermeneutical principle of the document’s ecclesiological investigation.117 I call this pairing ‘material’ because it is based on the material substance of the two doctrines. As opposed to this, the second pairing is based more on the formal, functional or structural features of doctrine. The material pairing consists essentially of coupling the ideas of koinonia and justification. Koinonia functions as a medium for moving from the realm of justification to the area of ecclesiology. Church as Koinonia describes this transition as moving ‘from Christ and the gospel of salvation to koinonia. We understand this

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gospel particularly as the message of justification by grace through faith, and treat koinonia as a lens through which to view ecclesiology and ministries of those ordained, within the whole people of God.’118 The transition consists of two parts. It begins by moving from Christ and the gospel of salvation to koinonia and continues with reviewing ecclesiology through the notion of koinonia. Theologically, the document establishes a connection between justification and koinonia by linking the event of justification with the community of those justified. Because Church as Koinonia can take the Joint Declaration’s consensus on justification as a given, it can start directly by stating: ‘We, the justified, share in salvation . . .’119 Justification is identified as the primary link between an individual and the justified as a community. The document puts more emphasis on justification than on baptism as the way of entering into koinonia, because in a biblical context koinonia is not related to baptism. God’s calling and the human response to this calling through faith establish the link between justified individuals and the community. Justified individuals are in union with Christ and thus participate in the triune life. This participation is a fundamental element to the church’s being koinonia.120 Relations between the triune God, the individual Christian and the church shape the church’s nature as ‘the koinonia of salvation’.121 The primary emphasis is on the underlying reality of participating in the trinitarian life, not on specific structures and ministries, which serve or manifest this saving participation.122 Participation consists in a horizontal and a vertical element in which the fellowship with the triune God and fellowship with other believers coincide and intertwine.123 With this intertwining of the vertical and horizontal fellowship, Church as Koinonia brings together the individual and communal aspects of salvation. This also brings justification into a wider and more communal context.124 By making salvation the main precondition of ecclesial community, the document in fact implicitly brings in justification as a criterion of ecclesial structures and ministries (see par. 19). This move is in line with the conviction expressed in the Joint Declaration about the centrality of the doctrine of justification as an indispensable criterion. While the first part of the Church as Koinonia’s argument is based on accommodating justification in the framework of a participatory communion, the second part rests on pairing ecclesial and ministerial structures. This second pairing makes koinonia a common point of reference for both the ecclesial structures and the ministries. The text uses koinonia to bring together theologically and structurally asymmetrical elements of ecclesial structure and ministry. A formal or functional pairing of the corresponding theological elements mirrors this structural pairing. The second, formal pairing takes place in the framework of a legitimate plurality of biblical and early church imagery and praxis. As do the Joint Declaration, Justification by Faith and Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? so too Church as Koinonia argues for the legitimacy of contemporary theological differences. As an example, Church as Koinonia discusses the existing plurality in the understanding of ‘local church’, a problem in the heart of the discussion over ecclesial structures and ministries. Starting with the ‘complex history . . . with the variety of community structures and ministries within first-century Christianity’,125 the document shows

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how the Catholic and Lutheran theological traditions have followed one or another ‘aspect’ of the early church.126 These different aspects, however, that is, giving priority either to the diocese overseen by the bishop or to the congregation where the gospel is preached as the basic ecclesial unit, mask a ‘deep structural similarity’. This similarity is based on the incompleteness of either approach to express fully what is meant by the basic ecclesial unit, namely, the local church, and leads to a legitimate pairing of the two viewpoints. In fact the pairing is not merely legitimate, but ecclesiologically normative and facilitated by the hermeneutical use of the concept of koinonia. This implies that as a standard the two aspects presented by the Lutheran and Catholic ecclesiologies need to be brought together. ‘Normative complementarity’ is a conceptual novelty, which Church as Koinonia introduces to describe the relationship between the differing theological expressions or even categories of differing theological weight. Normative complementarity denotes an interdependent polarity, which neither disregards differences nor separates them from each other.127 It is an attempt to conceptualize the ‘openness’ of Lutheran and Catholic differences in theological explication towards each other claimed in the Joint Declaration.128 In the following section, I will give two examples of the method of normative complementarity as it is demonstrated in the discussion of ecclesial and ministerial structure. The two levels do not have equal weight in Church as Koinonia: they are paired through the notion of koinonia by an understanding both of the structures and of the ministries as a service to the koinonia. In addition, the ministries are paired with the particular structure in which the service takes place. The ministries serve not only the koinonia but also the structures manifesting the koinonia. Thus, on a practical and institutional level the ministries are dependent on the ecclesial structures while on a theological level the ministries have priority over ecclesial structures.129

Application of the method: discussion of ecclesial and ministerial structure In Church as Koinonia, the concept of ‘local church’ forms a starting point for discussion of the complementarity of Lutheran and Roman Catholic ecclesial structures. The argument proceeds as follows. Both churches agree on the description of the local church but differ in the application and in the theological understanding of its realizations. In other words, both Lutherans and Catholics agree that the local church means a church, that ‘has everything it needs to be church in its own situation’. For Lutherans this describes a congregation; for Catholics, a diocese.130 In reality, churches recognize the necessity of the immediate face-to-face community where the word is preached and the sacraments administered and a larger regional community. Therefore, the document concludes that both churches ‘have each grasped an essential dimension of the church’.131 Church as Koinonia asserts that, although Lutherans and Catholics differ on the theological definition of ‘local church’, the institutional reality of both churches includes both a face-to-face aspect and a wider, regional aspect. For this reason, the churches can consider the differing theological explications a positive challenge to

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develop further their theological understanding of the aspect currently having less emphasiz.132 This is enough, according to Church as Koinonia, to suggest that the pairing of these two levels could be normative and thus ‘express an institutional truth about how the koinonia of salvation is rightly realized’.133 Paragraph 88 reaffirms this view by stating that, ‘the exclusive prioritizing of either the regional or the geographically local is a false alternative’. To be complete, the realizations should include both the aspect of immediate physical gathering of people around the pulpit and the altar and the expression of catholicity and diversity of the koinonia of these gatherings.134 Both of these realizations have a synchronic and a diachronic element, making the experience of koinonia stretch across both space (a koinonia of particular churches in communion with each other) and time (continuity in the apostolic faith).135 The argument is supported with discussion of manifestations of koinonia on local, regional, national and universal levels. On each level Lutherans and Catholics can make a common affirmation,136 accompanied by specific Lutheran and Catholic statements. The common affirmations elaborate the formal principle of recognizing realizations of koinonia on each level. The particular statements explicate the differing theological interpretations and their specific Lutheran and Catholic emphases. Church as Koinonia makes it clear that the Lutheran and Catholic theological interpretations of ecclesial structures are not symmetrical. Lutheran theology is most refined on the level of the local community. It is the starting point of discussion of other, wider structures.137 Roman Catholic theology is stronger than Lutheran theology on the synodical/diocesan level.138 At the same time both emphasize the specific function of this level as a manifestation of the communion between particular churches and of the apostolic continuity. The national realizations of koinonia lack theological content on both sides,139 whereas the theological descriptions of the worldwide level are considerably different. The Roman Catholic Church approaches the question from the viewpoint of the universal church while the Lutherans elaborate on the nature of the Lutheran World Federation as a communion of churches.140 Despite these differences in theological evaluation both Lutherans and Catholics agree that the various structural levels exist in an interdependent relationship. Interdependence here means that neither the immediate face-to-face community nor the regional communities can exist without the other. It is true to say that the basic unit of the church, that is, the place where the church is ‘essentially realized’, is the face-to-face community where the gospel is proclaimed in word and sacrament. But at the same time it is true to say that catholicity, which is essential to the ecclesial nature of the church, is realized only in koinonia with other communities. Therefore Church as Koinonia concludes: ‘the complementarity of face-to-face eucharistic assembly and primary regional community is thus theologically normative’.141 Differing theological elaborations do not deny or break the intrinsic interdependence of the structures. In the consequent analysis of the ministries paralleling the ecclesial structures, it becomes clear that at this stage the fundamental question is the relationship and the theological definitions of the parish/congregation and synod/diocese. This question is paralleled by the question on the relationship between the presbyter and the bishop.

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From the theologically normative pairing of the primary and regional communities follows a normative complementarity of the ministries serving these communities.142 All the three theologically elaborated levels (local, regional, universal) of ecclesial structure have a parallel ministry to serve the koinonia of the church. Church as Koinonia’s discussion of ministry concentrates mainly on two themes, the necessity of differing ministries and the differing theological understandings of the relationship between presbyter/priest and the bishop. Koinonia as mutual, reciprocal sharing gives a fresh outlook on considering the relationship between ministry and ecclesial community. The key argument in paragraphs 60, 63 and 70 is that of a ministry in the service of the koinonia or community.143 The ministry is dependent on and serves the ecclesial structures. On the other hand, any form of koinonia is founded in sharing the word and the sacrament, which presumes the existence of ministry. The ministry is thus the central, even the essential element of koinonia.144 Through the lens of koinonia, the ministerial and ecclesial structures appear to be mutually dependent. Neither can stand without the other and the question of theological primacy turns into theological mutuality. On closer analysis, the Lutheran and Catholic views diverge on which of the particular ministries are or should be essential. Both churches can affirm that the ministry of the ordained pastor/priest is a ‘constitutive element of the koinonia of salvation’. At the same time, there is no similar agreement on the ministry of the bishop or on the Petrine ministry. With regards to regional communities, the churches are able to agree upon a ministry of oversight exercised by an ordained minister called the bishop. The ministry of the bishop is essentially the same ministry of word and sacrament as the pastor’s/priest’s ministry with a special emphasis on pastoral leadership and the function of serving the unity both of the local community and ‘the church of all times and places’.145 In regards to the universal ministry, the wording is very cautious. The text affirms only that ‘all ministry, to the degree that it serves the koinonia of salvation, also serves the unity of the worldwide church’ and that a specific ministry to serve the worldwide church is affirmed by the Catholics and not excluded by the Lutherans.146 The relationship between presbyter/priest and bishop reflects the necessary but complementary difference between the two forms of face-to-face and regional community. Particular theological views are complementary, since both claims on the primacy of either the presbyter or the bishop can be justified without being mutually exclusive. The episcopal ministry can be perceived as ‘fuller’ in the sense that episcopal ministry as a ministry to the communion of communities expresses unity in a fuller way than could be manifested by any of the communities alone. On the other hand, the ministry of the presbyter/priest can be understood as a more fundamental ministry since it serves the actual face-to-face community where the gospel is proclaimed in word and sacrament.147 Both ministries of bishop and presbyter/priest essentially exist to serve the koinonia. This is the foundation of their complementarity as ministries. Church as Koinonia follows the principles of ‘consensus with difference’ as formulated in the Joint Declaration and applied in Communio sanctorum but implements the principle in what at first looks like a more praxis oriented way. The document has almost totally abandoned the language of common understanding

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prominent in the Joint Declaration and central to Communio sanctorum. The only common understandings claimed in the document refers to the achieved consensus in understanding justification, to the mutual agreement that koinonia can be a useful tool in bringing the differing theological understandings into a positive and non-contradictory relationship148 and to the claim of interdependence of ecclesial and ministerial structures.149 Of these three, the last is methodologically fundamental. The text pairs differing structures according to their functional or structural affinity. Essential to the pairing is how the ministries serve the koinonia of salvation. Structuring the agreement by pairing structural or functional complementarities rather than around common understanding gives more emphasis and independence to the differing statements. Neither approach in describing a consensus with difference excludes the other. For both, the crucial factor is the renewed status of the differences and their compatibility. The changed status can be described as a change from plurality to pluriformity, that is, legitimate plurality.150 Notes 1. The origin of the concept of ‘differentiated consensus’ is most likely in the writings of Harding Meyer and the preparatory work of the international Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. Meyer expresses his indebtedness to Karl Rahner’s notion of ‘differentiated unity of faith’ (differenzierter Glaubenseinheit) and gives examples of introducing the specific term ‘differentiated consensus’ in various presentations starting in the early 1980s (Meyer, ‘Die Prägung’, pp. 54–8). 2. A detailed analysis of the genesis of the Joint Declaration with informative appendices can be found in Dorothea Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der ‘‘Gemeinsame Erklärung’’ ’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 95 (1998): 140–206. Cf. Eugene L. Brand, ‘Der Prozess im LWB hinsichtlich der Gemeinsamen Lutherisch/RömischKatholischen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, in Zu einer Gemeinschaft zusammenwachsen. LWB Dokumentation 40 (Geneva: LWF, 1996); Hans Martensen, ‘The Joint Declaration on Justification: A Nordic Catholic Perspective’, Ecumenical Review 52/2 (2000): 204–10. The responses of the LWF (LWF Response 1998) and the Roman Catholic Church (RC PCPCU Response 1998) have been published in PCPCU Information Service 99/3 (1998): 90–101. 3. E.g., Peura has demonstrated the methodological interdependence along with the differences between the Joint Declaration, Justification by Faith and Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? (‘Leuenberg und die ökumenische Methode’, pp. 174–5). 4. There are different views on whether the original plan of the LWF was to reach a consensus on the applicability of the sixteenth-century condemnations or if the agreement was also to include a consensus statement on the doctrine of justification (see Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte’, p. 150). Brandt shows that the initiative for a collaborative statement on justification came from North America in 1993 and was not well received by the German theologians who would have preferred to continue along the lines of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend?; cf. Brand, ‘Der Prozess im LWB’, pp. 57–9. The North American process reports the move from substantial agreement to a declaration on the sixteenth-century condemnations in the beginning of 1993 (L-RC 1995 usa: 14). 5. The influence of Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? and Justification by Faith is evident; see L-RC 1985 ger: pp. 13, 22–4; L-RC 1983 usa: 94. 6. L-RC 1999: 13. 7. Magnus Striet, ‘Denkformengenese und -analyse in der Überlieferungsgeschichte des Glaubens: Theologisch-hermeneutische Überlegungen zum Begriff des differenzierten

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8.

9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

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Konsens’, in Einheit – aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom ‘differenzierten Konsens’, ed. Harald Wagner. Quaestiones disputatae 148 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000), pp. 74–80. Lothar Ullrich, ‘Differenzierter Konsens und Komplementarität’, in Einheit – aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom ‘differenzierten Konsens’, ed. Harald Wagner. Quaestiones disputatae 184 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000), p. 114. Such a biased ‘hermeneutics for unity’ is criticized, for example, by Körtner and Dalferth; see Ingolf Dalferth, Auf dem Weg der Ökumene: Die Gemeinschaft evangelischer und anglikanischer Kirchen nach der Meissener Erklärung (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2002), pp. 261–6; Ulrich Körtner, ‘Offene Fragen einer ökumenischen Hermeneutik der Verschiedenheit: Zur Diskussion über eine Hermeneutik der Symbole, Riten und Brauche’, Kerygma und Dogma 51/4 (2005): 233. Striet, ‘Denkformengenese’, pp. 74–5. Harding Meyer, ‘Die Struktur ökumenischer Konsense’, in Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie, ed. Harding Meyer (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 1998), 1:72–3. L-RC 1999: 40. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 17. Ibid. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 13, 43. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 40, 43. Ibid. 13. Ibid. C. Böttingheimer, ‘ ‘‘Differenzierter Konsens’’ und ‘‘Versöhnte Verschiedenheit’’: Über die Tradition der Konzentration christlicher Glaubensaussagen’, Catholica 59 (2005): 54. This radical distinction is according to Harald Wagner possible in the Roman Catholic context due to a transition from a propositional to a communicative understanding of revelation which took place officially in the decrees of the Second Vatican Council; cf., Harald Wagner, ‘Ekklesiologisch-theologische Strukturprinzipien als Grundlage des ‘‘differenzierten Konsens’’ ’, in Einheit – aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom ‘differenzierten Konsens’, ed. Harald Wagner. Quaestiones disputatae 184 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000), pp. 14–15, 21–3. A change was made in paragraphs 13 (12 in the 1995 draft) and 40 (42) and new wording was added to paragraphs 14 and 43. The concept appears in the document both in the indefinite (5, 13, 40, 43) and definite (14, 40) forms. For a detailed genesis of ‘consensus in basic truths’ in the Joint Declaration, see Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte’, pp. 161–2. Harding Meyer, ‘Consensus on the Doctrine of Justification’, Ecumenical Trends 26/11 (1997): 5; Meyer, ‘Die Prägung’, pp. 52–4. The traditional use of ‘basic consensus’ leads, according to Meyer, to indifference towards differences and thus does not facilitate their reconciliation. See Heinrich Fries and Karl Rahner, Unity of the Church, an Actual Possibility, trans. Ruth C. L. Gritsch and Eric W. Gritsch (Philadelphia and New York: Fortress Press and Paulist Press, 1985); and Meyer’s critique in Harding Meyer, ‘Die Thesen von Fries und Rahner – Versuch einer Weiterfuhrüng: eine lutherische Stellungnahme zu These II und IV’, Theologische Quartalschrift 166/4 (1986): 290–2; also Meyer, ‘Die Prägung’, pp. 52–3. Both of the uses are recognizable in the LWF study, André Birmelé and Harding Meyer (eds), Grundkonsens – Grunddifferenz: Studien des Strassburger Instituts für Ökumenische Forschung, Ergebnisse und Dokumente (Frankfurt am Main and Paderborn: Otto Lembeck and Bonifatius, 1992). Beinert, ‘Möglichkeit und Umfang’, p. 63.

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28. Beinert’s proposal is that, within the communicative model of revelation, faith is understood more as ‘the faith that believes/trusts’. The basic consensus is already given in the faith that believes. The measure of what is known to be true is not the knowing subject but a personal reality, which is created in the act of trusting. The consensus is total in a qualitative sense. Questions arise only in the derivative sense of articulating the faith. Basic consensus is a fundamental consensus, that is, a fundament upon which diverging theological schools or strains of thought can exist without falling into heresy (see ‘Möglichkeit und Umfang’, p. 69). 29. L-RC 1999: 15–16. 30. Ibid. 17–18 explains the common understanding of both the special position of the message of justification within the church’s teaching and the relationship between the message and the doctrine of justification; cf., Ullrich, ‘Differenzierter Konsens’, p. 106. 31. Lehmann, ‘Was für ein Konsens wurde erreicht?’, Stimmen der Zeit 217 (1999): 741–2. 32. Wendebourg, ‘Zur Entstehungsgeschichte’, pp. 161–2. 33. Eberhard Jüngel, ‘Amica Exegesis einer römischen Note’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 95 (1998): 275. 34. For criticisim, see Peder Nørgaard-Højen, ‘A Point of No Return? The Joint Declaration and the Future of Lutheran-Catholic Dialogue’, Ecumenical Review 52/2 (2000): 219. 35. Hans Jörg Urban, ‘Jenseits von Häresie und Schisma, oder: Differenziertes voneinander Lernen als Prinzip der Ökumene’, in Einheit – aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Formel vom ‘differenzierten Konsens’, ed. Harald Wagner. Quaestiones disputatae 184 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000), pp. 87–8, 90. 36. Thönissen, ‘Die Problematik von Grund und Gestalt’, p. 222. 37. Ibid., pp. 123–7. 38. Striet, ‘Denkformengenese’, pp. 74–80; cf. Urban, ‘Jenseits von Häresie und Schisma’, p. 90. 39. See Jüngel, ‘Amica Exegesis’, pp. 257–8 n. 15; Meyer, ‘Die Prägung’, pp. 42–3; Heinz-Albert Raem, ‘Dialog ohne Ende? Hermeneutisch Überlegungen zur ‘‘Gemeinsame Erklärung des Lutherischen Weltbundes und der römisch-katholischen Kirche zur Rechtfertigungslehre’’ ’, Catholica 50 (1996): 236. 40. Cf. Dietrich Ritschl, ‘Die Erfahrung der Wahrheit: Die Steuerung des Denkens in Handelns durch implizite Axiome’, in Konzepte, Ökumene, Medizin, Ethik: Gesammelte Aufsätze, ed. Dietrich Ritschl (Munich: Kaiser, 1986), p. 165. 41. George Tavard, ‘The Bi-Lateral Dialogues: Searching for Language’, One in Christ 16/1–2 (1980): 27. 42. Raem, ‘Dialog ohne Ende?’, pp. 237–9. Raem quotes Lothar Ulrich’s, ‘Rechtfertigung’ in Lothar Ulrich, Die Lehrverurteilungen des 16. Jahrhunderts in ökumenischen Gespräch (Leipzig: Benno-Verlag, 1992), pp. 75–91. For discussion on the application of the method in other contexts, see David Coffey, ‘The Roman ‘‘Clarification’’ of the Doctrine of Filioque’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 5/1 (2003): 9. 43. The recognition of differing thought-structures does not necessarily lead to perceiving them as complementary; see Hampson, Christian Contradictions, pp. 97–142, 176–80; Christopher J. Malloy, Engrafted into Christ: A Critique of the Joint Declaration. American University Studies Series 7: Theology and Religion 233 (New York: Lang, 2005), p. 373. 44. L-RC 1972: 24–5. 45. Cf. Gerhard Gloege, Gnade für die Welt: Kritik und Krise des Luthertums (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964). 46. Cf. Walter Kasper, ‘In allem Christus bekennen: Einig in der Rechfertigungslehre als Mitte und Kriterium des christlichen Glaubens?’, KNA-ÖKI 32 (1997): 5–7. 47. Eberhard Jüngel, ‘Um Gottes willen – Klarheit! Kritische Bemerkungen zur Verharmlosung der kriteriologischen Funktion des Rechtfertigungsartikles – aus Anlass einer ökumenischen, Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechtfertigungslehre’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 94 (1997): 379–405; cf. Roland Fritsch, ‘Konsens in der Wahrheit oder Dissens für die Wahrheit?’, MD 48/6 (1997): 116. For a description of the debate as a whole, see Hampson, Christian Contradictions, pp. 213–22. Positive evaluations of the method in the Joint Declaration can be found in, for example, Horst Georg Pöhlmann, ‘Hermeneutik des

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48.

49.

50.

51.

52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57. 58. 59.

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Verdachts: Die Bunkermentalität evangelischer Theologien’, Evangelische Kommentare 31/1 (1998): 40–41. The commentators on the Joint Declaration were more satisfied by a later attempt to argue on the compatibility of criteria, that is, the doctrine of justification and what the Roman Catholic Church identified as ‘the fundamental criterion of the regula fidei ’; see RC PCPCU Response 1998. Though agreeing with the final conclusion, Jüngel maintains the call for clarification on this point is an error, since what is clarified is exactly the central supposition of Lutheran theology (‘Amica Exegesis’, pp. 265–7). Bertram Stubenrauch also perceives a Christologically focused ecclesiology as a point of contact between the differentiated Lutheran and Roman Catholic perceptions on issues such as sola fide versus a sacramental understanding of the church; see Bertram Stubenrauch, ‘Konsens ohne Einigkeit? Versöhnungshilfen in neuentbrannten Streit um die Rechfertigung’, Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift 107/3 (1998): 238. Thönissen’s remark, that the full recognition and adoption of a structural principle, though described in the documents of the Second Vatican Council, continues to challenge Catholic theology since such an idea is not inherent in it, is interesting; see Wolfgang Thönissen, ‘Dialog auf neuer Basis: Was kommt nach der Gemeinsamen Erklärung zur Rechfertingungslehre?’, Theologie und Glaube 90 (2000): 568–70. Also promoted by LWF Commentary 1997. Unlike its predecessors (such as Justification by Faith) the Joint Declaration does not present the Lutheran understanding of justification as purely forensic. The more ontological understanding of justification, which does not separate justification from creation, emphasized in the contemporary Finnish Luther studies, might be helpful in communicating between Lutheran and Roman Catholic ontologies; see Nicholas Sagovsky, ‘Christian Contradictions? Hampson, Jüngel and Lane on Justification and the Structures of Lutheran and Catholic Thought’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 4/1 (2004): 93–5; cf. William T. Cavanaugh, ‘A Joint Declaration? Justification and Theosis in Aquinas and Luther’, Heythrop Journal 41/3 (2000): 265–80. Variation in the Lutheran explication of justification can be observed in L-RC 1983 usa: 103 and L-RC 1999: 22–7, which emphasize the transforming nature of faith. Harding Meyer, Versöhnte Verschiedenheit: Aufsätze zur ökumenischen Theologie II. Der katholisch/lutherische Dialog (Frankfurt am Main and Paderborn: Otto Lembeck and Bonifatius, 2000), pp. 157–9. L-RC 1999: 14–19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37. Ibid. 15, 17. Ibid. 19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 34, 37. At other points Thönissen also emphasizes the specific nature of the Joint Declaration, where consensus ‘finds its expression in the form of a confession’ (Thönissen, ‘Dialog auf neuer Basis’, p. 561). Similarly, Frieling speaks of a twofold process of translation that starts with translating the (controversial) sixteenth-century concepts and continues with a ‘Lutheran (evangelisch)– Catholic translation’ which enables communication despite the differing uses of theological structures and concepts (Reinhard Frieling, ‘Ökumenischer Grundkonsens in der Rechtfertigungslehre’, MD 48/2 [1997]: 28; see also Wolfgang Thönissen, ‘Can the Roman Catholic Church Adopt a Differentiated Consensus as Ecumenical Method?’, in Unity in Faith: The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification in a Wider Ecumenical Context. Presentations and relevant documents from a consultation held in Columbus, Ohio, 27–30 Nov. 2001 [Geneva: LWF Office for Ecumenical Affairs, 2002], pp. 1–2; Thönissen, ‘Dialog auf neuer Basis’, p. 563). Thönissen, ‘Die Problematik von Grund und Gestalt’, pp. 111–13. Nørgaard-Højen, ‘A Point of No Return?’, pp. 211–22. Dalferth’s often quoted article was published under the title ‘Ökumene am Scheideweg’, in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (26 Sept. 1997) and again in Ingolf Dalferth, ‘Kairos der Ökumene? Die Gemeinsame Erklärung führt zu neuem Nachdenken über reformatorische Theologie’, epd-dokumentation 46 (1997): 52–8.

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60. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, pp. 245–6. 61. Ibid., pp. 249–50. See also Josef Ratzinger, ‘Pluralismus als Frage an Kirche und Theologie’, Forum katholische Theologie 2 (1986): 81–6. Annemarie C. Mayer speaks of a sumfwni/a, a consonance of viewpoints over a ‘monophony’ of expressions (Annemarie C. Mayer, Sprache der Einheit im Ephesenbrief und in der Ökumene [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002], pp. 236– 7). Unlike Dalfeth, Mayer does not identify consensus with ‘monophony’. Her ecumenical vision includes a ‘harmonious choir’ as opposed to the ‘cacophony of differences’. Brandner insists that consensus is a combination of identities and non-identities on different levels. While there is a legitimate diversity of incongruities on the level of expressions, there is an agreement over the fundamentals, intentions or behaviour regarding faith; cf. Brandner, Einheit, pp. 229–30. 62. Giovanni B. Sala, ‘Die ökumenische Einheit in christlichen Glauben – ein ‘‘differenzierter Konsens’’?’, Forum katholische Theologie 13/1 (1997): 17. 63. Hampson, Christian Contradictions, pp. 185–96, 204. 64. Ibid., pp. 206–7, 208–9. 65. The majority of ecumenical documents emphasize the right and need for communities to cherish their confessional identities. Some of the statements exemplify a static understanding of ‘identity’, although there are also those who emphasize a more dynamic understanding of ‘identity’. For an example of a more dynamic view, see the French Groupe des Dombes (Groupe des Dombes 1991). See also Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (eds), In One Body Through the Cross: The Princeton Proposal for Christian Unity: A Call to the Churches from an Ecumenical Study Group (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003); Catherine E. Clifford, ‘The Joint Declaration, Method, and the Hermeneutics of Ecumenical Consensus’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 38/1 (2001): 79–91; Catherine E. Clifford, ‘Lonergan’s Contribution to Ecumenism’, Theological Studies 63/3 (2002): 521–38. 66. The preface identifies the method of differentiated consensus with Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? The identification is misplaced since Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? explicitly avoids making claims of substantial consensus. Communio sanctorum’s description of the ‘differentiated consensus’ misses the very essence of this form of consensus, that is, the common affirmation of faith (L-RC 2000 ger: 12). For a critical discussion of the document, see Wolfgang Klausnitzer, ‘Eine römisch-katholische Stellungnahme zu den Aussagen über den ‘‘Petrusdienst’’ in ‘‘Communio Sanctorum’’ ’, Ökumenische Rundschau 51/2 (2002): 225–34; Walter Sparn, ‘Vielen Kirchen – eine Petrusdienst? Eine evangelische Stellungnahme zu ‘‘Communio Sanctorum’’ ’, Ökumenische Rundschau 51/2 (2002): 235–57. See also Albrecht Beutel, ‘Versöhnte Vielfalt? Hermeneutisch-methodologische Bemerkungen zu Bedeutung und Funktion der ‘‘Bezeugungsinstanzen’’ in ‘‘Communio Sanctorum’’ ’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 98/2 (2001): 247–64; Gunther Wentz, ‘Die Kirche als Gemeinschaft der Heiligen: Zum jüngsten Text der Bilateralen Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Kirchenleitung der VELKD’, Kerygma und Dogma 47/1 (2001): 42–66. 67. L-RC 2000 ger: 41. 68. Ibid. 41. 69. Ibid. 52. 70. Ibid. 59. 71. E.g., L-RC 1972. 72. L-RC 2000 ger: 45. 73. Klausnitzer, ‘Eine römisch-katholische Stellungnahme’, p. 227. Both Klausnitzer, from a Roman Catholic, and Sparn, from a Protestant, viewpoint hold that the presentation of these ‘instances’ is Roman Catholic in origin and nature. Both interpret the ‘instances’ though Dei verbum. Klausnitzer sees that in Communio sanctorum the instances are perceived in an additive sense. This interpretation differs from Dei verbum 9. An additive interpretation is also not compatible with the Protestant tradition, which does not know these instances and in which their positioning would be very different; see Klausnitzer, ‘Eine römisch-katholische Stellungnahme’, p. 228. Sparn does not interpret Communio sanctorum’s description as

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74.

75.

76.

77. 78. 79.

80. 81.

82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90.

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additive. Still he claims that even if it were not problematic to recognize the instances of knowledge, it would be problematic to agree on how they cooperate and if at this point Communio sanctorum is in line with the sola scriptura principle; see Sparn, ‘Vielen Kirchen’, p. 238. Similar critique can be found in the response of EKD (EKD Stellungnahme 2002: 5– 6). The topic has been discussed previously, e.g., L-RC 1995 usa: 31 and later in ‘ ‘‘Communio Sanctorum – Die Kirche als Gemeinschaft der Heiligen’’: Kommentar zu dem neuesten Dokument der Bilateralen Arbeitsgruppe der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz und der Kirchenleitung der Vereinigten Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirchen Deutschlands’, Una Sancta 57/1 (2002): 68–70. See Lorelei A. Fuchs, ‘Communio Terminology in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic International Dialogue in the Light of the Koinonia Language of the Canberra Statement’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 39/3 (2002): 248–75. Church and Justification arrived at the concept of communio sanctorum through elaboration of the church’s foundation in the Christ event (L-RC 1993: 10–17), the church’s proclamation of this event (ibid. 18–33) and the church’s being created by this proclamation (ibid. 34–47). The biblical material and theological conclusions thereupon are analogous to those in Communio sanctorum, their position in the document gives them a totally different weight. Church and Justification is more persistent in having the justification aspect as a constant part of the theological elaboration. Communio sanctorum on the other hand introduces the doctrine of justification only at the midpoint of the document before the traditionally problematic questions of universal ministry, the saints and Mary. L-RC 2000 ger: 143. The German word Gemeinschaft can be translated as ‘communion’, ‘community’ or ‘fellowship’. I will follow the Communio sanctorum by using the translation ‘communion’, which highlights the theological emphasis of communion in and with Christ in the Spirit; cf. L-RC 2000 eng: 1 n 1. L-RC 2000 ger: 23. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Communio sanctorum refers to Nicetas of Remesiana, the earliest recorded writer to use the notion of communio sanctorum; see Nicetas of Remesiana, Explanatio symboli 23 (PL 52, 871B). Communio sanctorum does not quote further the following passage of Explanation symboli, which elaborates on the differences between the real church and the ‘pseudoecclesiae’, whose doctrine has been deceived by the devil. These communities do not believe in the remission of sins, ‘which is the grace we believe in’. The key article for Nicetas was the resurrection of Christ, because ‘all we believe in we believe because of the resurrection of Christ’ (PL 52, 871C–872A). L-RC 2000 ger: 7. Ullrich Winkler sees Communio sanctorum as placing more emphasis on what he calls ‘semiotic competences’ than on hermeneutics; see Ulrich Winkler, ‘Ökumenische Leben: Neuerscheinungen für die Praxis’, Salzburger theologische Zeitschrift 7 (2003): 74. L-RC 2000 ger: 50–51. Ibid. 74–85. Ibid. 226. Ibid. 75–8. Ibid. 79–83, 85. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 61–2, 66–8. Beutel misses a reference to scriptural evidence as an instance of evaluation (Beutel, ‘Versöhnte Vielfalt?’, p. 259). L-RC 2000 ger: 123–42, esp. 130. Cf. the commentary of the bilateral working group between the German Bishops’ Conference and the EKD, ‘ ‘‘Communio Sanctorum – Die Kirche als Gemeinschaft der Heiligen’’ ’, pp. 65–7, 72–4. The discussion of Petrine ministry in L-RC 2000 ger: 153–200 follows the same line of though without being able to declare any kind of ‘basic agreement’ (ibid. 199). To facilitate reconciliation the document suggests a methodological distinction between form and contents (ibid. 200).

86 91. 92. 93. 94.

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L-RC 2000 ger: 87–8. Ibid. 89. Cf. L-RC 1999: 42. A similar conditional agreement is presented on the invocation of saints (L-RC 2000 ger: 244). It is clearly stated that no church needs to adopt the practices of the other (ibid. 245). 95. Ibid. 90, 93. 96. Ibid. 102–9. 97. Ibid. 120. 98. Ibid. 90. 99. Ibid. 117. 100. Ibid. 110–16. 101. Ibid. 117. 102. This criterion is only applied to purgatory and prayer for the dead in ibid. 226. 103. L-RC 2004 usa: 10, 129. 104. E.g., in L-RC 1984 (5–7, 55–145, 146–9) the terms koinonia and communio are used almost synonymously. Church as Koinonia 129 points out the sacramental connotations in using communio as a translation for koinonia. Communio sanctorum 4 uses the Latin translation of communio and thus gives the sacramental character of the horizontal and vertical fellowship a more central role. 105. George Vandervelde, ‘Koinonia Ecclesiology – Ecumenical Breakthrough?’, One in Christ 29/2 (1993): 133. 106. L-RC 2004 usa: 19. 107. Ibid. 126–30. See George Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace: Studies in the Theology of Karl Barth (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 200), p. 257. 108. Susan K. Wood, ‘Ecclesial Koinonia in Ecumenical Dialogues’, One in Christ 30/2 (1994): 128. Cf. F&O Canberra Statement 1993: 2.1. 109. L-RC 2004 usa: 122. 110. Ibid. 11 n. 10. 111. Ibid. 11. 112. Ibid. 19. The reduced emphasis on the Eucharist is an exception. Susan Moore starts her discussion on the biblical use of koinonia by referring to 1 Cor. 10.16 (Susan Moore, ‘Towards Koinonia in Faith, Life and Witness’, Ecumenical Review 47/1 [1995]: 5). David Power uses the concepts of koinonia and communion synonymously with reference to participation in the life of the Trinity through the Eucharist (David Power, ‘Roman Catholic Theologies of Eucharistic Communion: A Contribution to Ecumenical Conversation’, Theological Studies 57/4 [1996]: 587). Similar identification of koinonia and communio is common in ecumenical dialogues. Though the lesser emphasis on the Eucharist might at first glance decrease the value of the sacramental character of communion, Wood has pointed out that also mediation through the Word can be understood in a highly sacramental way and thus ‘essentially similar to the kind of mediation represented by the sacraments’ (Wood, ‘Ecclesial Koinonia in Ecumenical Dialogues’, p. 135). Döring finds using the concept of communio as a desired move towards a differentiated consensus in ecclesiology (Heinrich Döring, ‘Die Ekklesiale Dimension der Schriftinspiration’, Catholica 56/1 [2002]: 27). 113. L-RC 2004 usa: 11. 114. Ibid. 19. 115. Vandervelde, ‘Koinonia Ecclesiology’, pp. 126–42. 116. Cf. George Hunsinger, ‘Baptism and the Soteriology of Forgiveness’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 2/3 (2000): 249; Hunsinger, Disruptive Grace, pp. 258–61. Hunsinger makes an ecumenically interesting proposal to apply the above-mentioned koinonia relations to sacramental theology by assuming a mutual indwelling of the signum and res, for example, in the Eucharist. In doing this he refers to 1 Cor. 10.16, a passage often used to support the centrality of the Eucharist in the church’s koinonia; see Disruptive Grace, p. 276.

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117. Both ecclesiological documents following the Joint Declaration have taken koinonia/ communio as the main theological concept to describe the ecclesial reality. Theological elaboration of the subject is quite similar in both the Joint Declaration and Communio sanctorum, the point of entry is quite different. Communio sanctorum starts with a communion of those who have faith (e.g. L-RC 2000 ger: 35–6) but Church as Koinonia describes koinonia as the communion of those justified and thus sharing in the salvation from God. 118. L-RC 2004 usa: 7. 119. Ibid. 11. 120. This emphasis on the element of union in justification is prominent in the contemporary Finnish Luther studies. It found its way into the Joint Declaration where the Lutheran explication of justification is not as purely forensic as, for example, in Justification by Faith (L-RC 1983 usa: 98). For an introduction to Finnish Luther studies, see Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (eds), Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation of Luther (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998). Critical discussion of the relationship between the Finnish school of Luther studies and the Joint Declaration can be found in Malloy, Engrafted into Christ, pp. 145–67. Christopher Butler interprets koinonia similarly within ARCIC. In Butler’s presentation baptism is considered ‘a tangible and obligatory expression of koinonia’ (Christopher S. Butler, ‘The Church as Communion’, in Towards Unity in Truth: A Series of Lectures Given During Lent 1981 in Westminister Abbey, ed. Christopher S. Butler, Alan Clark and Henry Chadwick [Leominster: The Church Literature Association, 1981], pp. 14–15). 121. L-RC 2004 usa: 11–13. 122. Cf. ibid. 138–9. 123. This intertwining was demonstrated differently in Church and Justification, which used the threefold description of the church as the people of God, body of Christ and the temple of the Spirit to describe participation in the triune life. The participation is realized in the proclamation of the gospel and the celebration of the baptism and the Eucharist (L-RC 1993: 64–71). The same imagery is referred to in the WCC study documents The Nature and Purpose of the Church and The Nature and Mission of the Church but with a different emphasiz; see F&O Nature 1998: 14–25; F&O Nature 2005. 124. The communal aspects of justification can also be observed in the Joint Declaration , e.g., in par. 16. Also the document’s reading of Lutheran teaching of justification opens up further possibilities into the direction of participation as understood in Church as Koinonia; cf. L-RC 1999: 22–4. 125. L-RC 2004 usa: 23. 126. See ibid. 24–5, for Catholic developments, and ibid. 26, for Lutheran developments. 127. The idea of complementarity appeared already in Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? (LRC 1985 ger: p. 16), where it was perceived as the reason behind finding the doctrinal condemnations of the sixteenth century non-applicable. According to Yves Congar, koinonia can sometimes be employed too easily, owing to its vagueness. The fact that the same reality can be seen from two different angles does not imply that the viewpoints are complementary. Congar does subscribe to the general epistemological claim that human intellectual constructions are limited and thus there is always a need for multiple viewpoints (Yves Congar, Diversity and Communion [London: SCM Press, 1984], pp. 73–6). Both Congar and Ullrich perceive complementarity as an epistemic category; see Ullrich, ‘Differenzierter Konsens’, pp. 114–15. Brander identifies complementarity with radical difference: complementarity means letting two or more mutually exclusive theological positions remain unreconciled without their difference breaking the community. Complementary aspects can be positioned with the help of a third external point of reference, but do not necessarily need to. For Brandner complementarity is a part of consensus-building process (Einheit, p. 239). 128. L-RC 2004 usa: 40. Cf. Ullrich, ‘Differenzierter Konsens und Komplementarität’, p. 113. 129. L-RC 2004 usa: 54, 96.

88 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143.

144. 145.

146.

147. 148. 149. 150.

Agreeable Agreement Ibid. 21–2, 34. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 87. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 28, 33. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 36, 41, 47, 51. Ibid. 37–8. Ibid. 45–6 (Roman Catholic), 42–4 (Lutheran). Ibid. 48–50. Ibid. 52–3. Ibid. 91. Ibid. 92. Here Church as Koinonia diverges from the classical ecumenical way of approaching ministry as service to the word of God. Ministry is defined as ministry to the koinonia of salvation, which offers new interpretations of the relationship between the ministry of all believers and the ordained ministry (L-RC 2004 usa: 19). Eucharist and Ministry (L-RC 1970 usa) approaches ministry from the viewpoint of the church’s mission to proclaim the gospel. Consequently, ‘ministry’ is defined as a task or service of the whole church to the word. The document distinguishes between ‘ministry’ as the general calling of all people and ‘Ministry’ as a function, calling or gift within the church’s general mission to the world; see L-RC 1970 usa: 9. L-RC 2004 usa: 82. Ibid. 63. The unresolved issues deal with the definition of ‘necessary’. Lutheran theology has traditionally made a distinction between what is necessary for the church and what is necessary for salvation; only the latter necessity has been regarded as a necessity in a strict sense (cf. ibid. 67, 80). The same problem is described in relation to the universal ministry (ibid. 119). The concepts of practically necessary and theologically necessary are used analogously to ‘necessary for the church’ and ‘necessary to salvation’ (ibid. 92). Ibid. 70. Even the conditional acceptance of papacy has in Lutheran thought been imaginable as something de iure humano; the relationship between the divine and human law is mentioned as a question needing further elaboration; cf. ibid. 73–4. Ibid. 93. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 96. Harding Meyer, ‘Unity in Faith: Beyond Bilateralism’, in Unity in Faith: The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification in a Wider Ecumenical Context (Geneva: LWF Office for Ecumenical Affairs, 2002), p. 245.

PART III

ANGLICAN–ROMAN CATHOLIC DIALOGUE

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Chapter 5 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE: ANGLICAN–ROMAN CATHOLIC INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION (ARCIC) A Vision for Unity (The Malta Report) (A-RC 1968) A Vision for Unity (The Malta Report) is a short document written for the purpose of drafting guidelines for future Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue. It outlines the main methodological starting points of the dialogue and the theological questions on the agenda. The document opens with an affirmation of the common substance of faith in the triune God. It affirms the sharing of common baptism, the Holy scriptures, the Apostle’s and Nicene creeds and the Chalcedonian definition, the teaching of the Fathers and a common heritance in liturgy, theology, spirituality, church order and mission.1 Methodologically the document makes two important distinctions. The first is a distinction between ‘revealed Truth’ and the expressions of truth. Like Lutheran– Catholic documents from the same period, A Vision for Unity recognizes that historically conditioned thought-forms affect doctrinal expressions. Legitimate diversity of expressions is not unlimited, but has value ‘when used creatively rather than destructively’.2 The second methodological distinction differentiates between ‘basic truths’ and ‘devotional practices’. Basic truths are truths of the one faith set forth in creeds and the common tradition of the ancient church. Individual beliefs and devotional practices belong to the individual traditions of the two churches.3 Neither church is obliged to accept everything that belongs to the individual traditions. Both distinctions argue for a legitimate diversity, but on different grounds and in a different form. The first distinction recognizes difference between content and a variety of expressions. The second refers to the variety in forms of spiritual life and of ‘beliefs’ as opposed to unchanging basic truths. The latter distinction imposes limitations regarding areas of ecclesial life that need to be agreed upon (qualitative definition), whereas the former considers the legitimate diversities in individual doctrines that belong to the area where divergences cannot exist.4 This appears to be a form of ‘basic consensus’ in which the creeds and the common tradition of the ancient church are the necessary basis for the full communion of the two churches. These two methodological distinctions lead to the argument, that divergences, that have developed since the sixteenth century do not involve the substance of faith, but ‘our separate ways of receiving it’. Differences in the thought-forms that help to formulate doctrinal expressions and the language used facilitated the

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development of differences. The way to overcome divergences is to look both to the past towards the common fundament and to the future as the means of growing towards communion.6 To facilitate the growth towards communion, the document highlights already existing convergences in thought-forms.7 As points of convergence, it mentions the Anglican distinction between internal and external communion and the differentiation between fundamental and non-fundamental elements in doctrine. These correspond to the Roman Catholic distinction between full and partial communion and the various ways of differentiating between doctrine and its expressions (the hierarchy of truths, the distinction between ‘the deposit of faith’ or ‘the truths’ and ‘the manner in which they are enunciated in the same meaning and understanding’ and perceiving differences in theological tradition as complementary, respectively).8 ARCIC I: The Final Report (A-RC 1982) General remarks on method Interpretation of the ARCIC I Final Report is complicated by the fact that both the nature of the preparatory commission’s mandate and the question of whether ARCIC fulfilled this mandate have been debated. Adrian Hastings claims that the actual mandate of ARCIC was to supervise Anglican–Roman Catholic relations on various levels of pastoral care. The supervision would have included both the planning and the implementation of various stages towards full communion. The stages would have included investigation into the possibility of intercommunion and a study of Apostolicae curae (RC Leo XIII 1896), which includes the negative evaluation of Anglican ministries.9 This more praxis-oriented mandate was, according to Hastings, modified when ARCIC chose a more ecclesiological starting point. George Tavard agrees that there was a change in the agenda but suggests that it was due to the dialogue commission’s hesitance to commit themselves to the ecumenically sensitive concept of intercommunion. The commission opted for an approach that emphasizes the Eucharist as the centre of the church and thus agreement on the Eucharist as the way of recognizing a community as a church.10 The Final Report’s use of A Vision for Unity’s variety of methodological proposals is very modest.11 Its point of departure is strikingly non-historical with explicit emphasis on ‘faith as it is today’. While trying to avoid traditional, polemical language, the document adopts a method to ‘pursue together that restatement of doctrine which new times and conditions are . . . calling for’.12 This hermeneutically suggestive statement would have required a more profound investigation into the historically developed forms and expressions of doctrine than the commission was able to provide. The introductory paragraphs make reference to the distinction between differing linguistic forms of doctrines and their actual content. The document does not follow up this distinction in the main text.13 Peter Lüning has appropriately called the hermeneutical method of ARCIC I a ‘hermeneutics of forgetting’ (Hermeneutik des Vergessens).14 The limits of the method of uniform language are apparent in the responses of the churches to The

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Final Report. The churches were asked to assess whether the document is ‘consonant in substance’ with the faith of Anglicans and Roman Catholics respectively. The hermeneutical work needed to bridge the common language of The Final Report and the theological languages of the two churches was left up to the churches themselves.15 Where language is concerned, the goal of The Final Report was to increase the area of agreement and decrease the area of differences.16 As a result, the main body of the text unfolds in common, undifferentiated statements, a direct consequence of the commission’s focus on the commonalities the churches share despite their differences and an attempt to formulate these commonalities in a uniform language.17 The uniform style of presentation makes the actual theological method used somewhat elusive: one cannot easily follow how the commission reached its conclusion. This ambiguity also caused problems for the churches who were invited to evaluate the appropriateness of the descriptions and the consonance of what had been said with the teachings of the Anglican churches and the Roman Catholic Church respectively.18

Two hermeneutical foci: koinonia and obedience ARCIC I has two methodologically central concepts: (1) koinonia (communio) and (2) obedience or faithfulness to the lordship of Christ. Koinonia is ARCIC I’s main concept for the church. The text uses koinonia as an overarching concept, that transcends and embraces the original plurality of New Testament images. Consequently, in ARCIC I koinonia is considered as the proper context for understanding New Testament imagery. Koinonia’s special advantage is its internally relational character. It creates a space that is defined, on the one hand, by the relationship between individual believers and Christ and on the other, by the relations between the believers.19 The document links each of the three larger themes of the Eucharist, episcope and universal primacy to koinonia. The Eucharist is the effectual sign of koinonia, episcope serves the koinonia and universal primacy is the visible link and focus of koinonia.20 The context of koinonia is more explicit in the case of the two statements on authority in the church whereas in the cases of the Eucharist and ministry, the connection to koinonia remains vague. In the case of ministry, the document asserts only that the purpose of all ministry is to build up the communion (koinonia). In discussing ministry, the document uses the idea of reconciliation as the dynamic event of bringing the faithful in relationship with Christ and with each other.21 Formally, this corresponds to the twofold relationship of koinonia mentioned above. The Final Report’s understanding of koinonia even has sacramental connotations. Koinonia depicts the visible reality of God’s saving work. It both manifests God’s will (as a sign) and facilitates its realization (as an instrument). The visible form of koinonia is ‘organic unity’.22 This is the ultimate goal of ARCIC.23 The second theme in The Final Report is that of Christ’s lordship and the obligation to obedience. The whole process of striving towards visible unity is an act of obedience towards Christ’s will.24 The church is defined as the community that

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consciously seeks to submit to Jesus Christ.25 The Spirit, who maintains the faithful in obedience to the Father’s will and keeps them in faithfulness to the revelation of Jesus Christ, guides the life of the church. Christian community exists to fulfil the Father’s purpose, and thus all Christians are called to serve this purpose by surrender to the divine grace and by offering themselves to God. Ordained ministry is a ministry to the people of God that gives itself up to God26 and a means by which the Holy Spirit keeps the church faithful and obedient to the lordship of Christ.27 Obedience to Christ is also connected to the authoritative decisionmaking in the church. Faithfulness to God implies seeking the common mind in the church.28 Forms of agreement Substantial consensus/agreement In The Final Report the concepts of agreement and consensus are used synonymously. The first statement on ‘Eucharistic Doctrine’ attaches to ‘agreement’ an additional predicate ‘substantial’.29 In later parts of the document, the concept of consensus appears without additional predicates.30 Substantial consensus or agreement is viewed as an important stage in moving towards organic unity. A ‘substantial consensus’ means ‘unanimous agreement on essential matters where . . . doctrine admits no divergence’. According to the ‘Elucidations on Eucharist Doctrine’, a mere agreement means ‘judgement’ by the members of the dialogue commission but the qualification ‘substantial’ adds to it a normative dimension ‘where doctrine admits no divergence’. Substantial thus refers to qualitatively distinguishable matters of essence in which doctrinal differences cannot be accepted.31 The preface to ‘Eucharistic Doctrine’ expresses a similar idea, stating that an agreement has been reached on ‘essential points of eucharistic doctrine’ and that ‘nothing essential has been omitted’ in the process. Other paragraphs contain similar remarks.32 The understanding of substantial agreement can be further elaborated by reading the documents in The Final Report against the claims made in A Vision for Unity (A-RC 1968). Paragraphs 5 and 7 of A Vision for Unity imply that substantial agreement means, first, a qualitative limitation on the essentials of faith and further a quantitative limitation within a particular article of faith.33 A substantial consensus or agreement on ‘Eucharistic Doctrine’ (A-RC 1982 ED) is analogous to the basic agreement in ‘Ministry and Ordination’ (A-RC 1982 MO). In this context, the predicate ‘basic’ emphasizes the partial nature of the agreement. It is not exhaustive but deals with questions, that have previously been a source of controversy.34 ‘Substantial agreement’ and ‘basic agreement’ appear to be interchangeable concepts. The description of consensus in areas where doctrine does not allow divergences and which are indispensable to unity has been taken from ‘Ministry and Ordination’ 17, to shed light on the substantial consensus in ‘Eucharistic Doctrine’ and is again quoted in the ‘Elucidations on Eucharistic Doctrine’ (A-RC 1982 EDE). A ‘substantial agreement’ is a real consensus, which is not endangered by ‘divergences in matters of practise and in theological judgements relating to them’.35 A real, substantial consensus ultimately refers to a

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consensus in faith. ‘Substantial’ or ‘essential’ also refer to the profound nature of the agreement. Consensus exists on the level of faith. Both communions can therefore recognize the Christian faith in the texts of the statements.36 In the end, the full meaning of ‘substantial consensus’ remains ambiguous. J. Robert Wright notes that the word ‘substantial’ can mean ‘real’, ‘genuine’ or ‘a truly essential point’. Wright asks whether the agreement refers to some of the questions that have been agreed on or to all essential questions.37 There is also some ambiguity on the content of the agreement; it is referred to both as an agreement on doctrine and as agreement in faith.38 The ambiguity stems from an optimistic attempt to surpass and leave aside particular denominational formulations for the sake of common language and a certain lack of hermeneutics of the language of doctrine.39 Especially in the ‘elucidation’ parts, the authors were forced to explicate in more detail the reasons behind divergences in matters of practise and their theological judgements and ‘the real consensus on the essentials of . . . faith’.40 The ‘Elucidations on Eucharistic Doctrine’ also make a clear distinction between agreement on the nature or content of a particular doctrine and its application.41 An agreement on a description of the content or nature of a particular issue is not dependent and does not imply an agreement on how to apply this description. For example, with regard to women’s ordination, the document differentiates between the principles of the achieved doctrinal agreement and the question of whether the principles can be applied to women.42 The agreement does, however, change the overall context of the divisive questions that still remain.43 Towards the end of The Final Report the concepts of consensus and agreement are used without the qualifications of either substantive or basic. Although the wording becomes simpler, the text begins to contain more reflections on the nature of the agreement. ‘Elucidations on Ministry and Ordination’ makes a distinction between the essential functions of the ministry and their theological interpretations.44 The preface to ‘Authority in the Church I’ (A-RC 1982 AC I) differentiates between ‘a large measure of agreement in faith’ and ‘areas of doctrinal disagreement’, implying that the agreement and disagreement in fact exist on different levels, namely, that of faith and its doctrinal explication. The preface also describes the wide area of consensus and refers to the extent to which it covers various topics and to the degree of consensus that would seem to refer both to the width and to the depth of the consensus. In addition, the document reflects on the function of the reached consensus. It provides a ‘solid basis’ for confronting the remaining differences.45 Convergence The concept of convergence appears twice in the whole of The Final Report, both times in the section dealing with authority in the church. Paragraphs 24 and 25 of ‘Authority in the Church I’ employ both concepts of consensus and convergence. ‘Authority in the Church II’ (A-RC 1982 AC II: 15) also mentions ‘consensus’, but without the additional predicates of ‘substantial’ or ‘essential’.46 Here ‘consensus’ denotes an agreement on basic principles, which function as a basis for solving the remaining problems. The remaining questions relate to ‘particular claims of papal primacy and its exercise’. The new consensus on basic principles of papal primacy is accompanied by ‘a significant convergence with far-

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reaching consequences’. Convergence denotes a theological convergence, which has been accomplished by theological work on common issues and shared methods.47 The change is a change in interpretative horizons. Convergence refers here to something partial or ‘less than consensus’. At the same time, it refers to a theological rapprochement.48 Convergence follows from common theological work that has already reached consensus on some significant areas. Consensus and convergence are therefore not quantitatively different forms of agreement but they have qualitative differences. In addition, neither one seems to be a consequence of the other in a linear sense, that is, one cannot say that consensus follows from convergence. Instead, consensus and convergence appear as two distinct and recurring moments in the ongoing process of reconciliation. They take place on slightly different levels but still have an affect on each other.49 Complementarity and consonance Complementarity and consonance are the two prominent technical terms used in The Final Report to describe, in a normative way, a variety of theological relations. ‘Complementarity’ describes the dynamic relation between two theological aspects of a particular event. Within Eucharist, for example, two complementary movements were identified ‘within an indissoluble unity’. These two movements are, on the one hand, Christ’s giving himself in the Eucharistic elements and, on the other hand, the communicant’s partaking of these elements in faith. A similar complementary relation exists between primacy and conciliarity as instances of the church’s authority.50 Particular traditions have emphasized one side or the other of this twofold movement. This one-sided emphasis has been a source of difficulties, which have been increased by the separation of the churches.51 The second use of ‘complementarity’ is closely related to the first. The text asserts that, providing the emphasis of the other church is not denied, neither emphasis should be judged incompatible with (eucharistic) faith. Consequently, theological differences are reconciled through recognizing a dynamic and complementary pattern within the doctrinal issue itself. The idea is further elaborated in the context of possible future reunion with description of the particular features of the Anglican Communion and the Roman Catholic Church that would contribute to the wholeness of the reunited communion.52 The concept of consonance describes the truthful relationship between contemporary theological understanding on the one hand and biblical teaching and ecclesial tradition on the other.53 ‘Consonance’ is used as a hermeneutical concept in the document in connection with ‘apostolicity’. The church’s selfunderstanding is defined by three elements: its historical origins, its subsequent experience and ‘its endeavour to make the relevance of the Gospel plain to every generation’.54 Part of the church’s self-understanding is the restatement of the good news of salvation in consonance with the apostolic witness recorded in the scriptures. Consonance does not mean ‘identity’ as uniformity. The church’s teaching is often expressed in words different from the original text of scripture ‘without being alien to its meaning’.55 In addition, consonance is described as the condition under which the church can make authoritative decisions. Any authoritative decision must be consonant

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with the community’s faith as grounded in the scriptures and interpreted by the mind of the church. Finally, all decisions must be measured against the scriptures, the ultimate authority.56 Consonance is a technical term, which in content corresponds to the theme of Christ’s lordship and obedience to the guidance of the Spirit. It is important to note the significance of this hermeneutical understanding to the reception of the document. The word ‘consonant’ was also used as a technical term in assessing the compatibility of The Final Report with the faith of the two churches.57 It is evident that the official responses of the two churches diverged significantly already on the methodological level. While the Roman Catholic response rendered consonance to mean ‘identity with the faith of the church’, the Anglican response spoke of the statements as ‘consonant in substance with the faith of Anglicans’.58 The Roman Catholic response lacks differentiation between the substance of faith and the expressions of this faith. Christopher Hill argues that in reality the response evaluated the report’s identity with the Roman Catholic teaching more than its consonance with Roman Catholic faith.59 Liam Walsh points out that the Roman Catholic understanding of the role of language owes more to philosophical realizm that to nominalism or other forms of philosophy of language. Thus, the identity that the official response is calling for is precisely identity in the reality.60

ARCIC II: general remarks on method The second and ongoing phase of ARCIC was given the task to ‘to continue the work already begun’, that is, to examine the remaining doctrinal differences and to recommend practical steps toward full communion.61 The common declaration calls for two remarks. Firstly, it anchored the work of ARCIC II to the ‘respective judgements on The Final Report ’ of the two communions. This demand continues to raise some methodological questions since the two official reactions to the ARCIC I Final Report were considerably different. The Anglican Communion considered ‘consonance in substance’ as a sufficient grounds for accepting ARCIC I’s proposal of substantial consensus. The Roman Catholic response did not recognize a substantial agreement due to the lack of identity of the proposed statement with Roman Catholic teaching.62 The approach of the official response of the Roman Catholic Church was criticized in various responses of individual (Roman Catholic) episcopal conferences. A response from the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops addressed especially the issue of ‘identity in faith’. The episcopal conference found it impossible to assess the identity of faith, even within one faith community. At the same time, it pointed out the dangers of completely separating the essence of the depositum fidei from its expressions. The response gave two proposals for discerning the substance of faith beneath the expressions, one appealing to orthopraxy as a test of orthodoxy and the other making reference to common experience or intent. Due to the very different readings of the ARCIC Final Report, the second commission not only had to

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express the common faith in a common language, but also had to deal with the question of interpreting the already existing agreement. A second observation concerns the goal of full communion. ARCIC II’s goal centres on the mutual recognition of sacraments and ministries. Addressing this issue was already on the agenda of ARCIC I. In the first phase the commission was able to treat the ministry as a principle and an individual question, but it was not able to place the ministry into an ecclesiological context, the vision endorsed by the preparatory commission.63 Eucharist, ministry and authority were discussed in separate documents in the first phase. Documents in the second round explain the wider ecclesiological context(s) through which the churches read and assess the agreements of ARCIC I. The three themes were not completely isolated even in the first phase: the preface of The Final Report places them in the framework of koinonia/communio ecclesiology. This ecclesiological context is significantly clearer in the second phase where the commission set out to investigate how the church and salvation are related, whether the Reformation question of justification separates Anglicans and Roman Catholics and to elaborate further on the nature of church as koinonia/communio.64 ARCIC II’s choice of subjects was determined by the list of the still remaining questions on the relationships among scripture, tradition and the exercise of teaching authority, the position of lay people in the decision-making process and the Petrine ministry in relation to scripture and tradition.65 ARCIC’s goal of full communion focuses on the recognition of ministries. Therefore the statements of ARCIC II need to be read against the challenges posed by Leo XIII’s Apostolicae curae, even if they do not explicitly discuss the ministry. Edward Yarnold proposes that taking up koinonia/communio ecclesiology was an attempt to address the issue by providing a solid base from which to reassess it.66 The possibility of a reassessment of the validity of Anglican orders was already foreseen by ARCIC I: none of the official ARCIC documents, however, explicitly discuss it.67 The concept of koinonia/communio, the main starting point of the two ecclesiological statements, serves a twofold purpose in bringing together two concerns expressed by the common statement of 1982. Koinonia’s centrality is based on both the concept’s theological substance and the possibility of using it as a criterion of discernment. Nicholas Sagovsky describes this critical use of koinonia as a kind of ‘rule of communion’. 68 This use reflects the Anglican Communion’s selfunderstanding as a ‘communion of communions’. Sagovsky argues that ARCIC II translates the Anglican Communion’s experience of managing a communion of independent and interdependent communions into an ecumenical principle. Compared with ARCIC I, the three ARCIC II documents were clearly more influenced by other ecumenical dialogues. ARCIC II paid special attention to the Lutheran–Roman Catholic document Justification by Faith (L-RC 1983 usa), which made a significant impact on the development of methodology in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. In contrast to the explicit tendency of ARCIC I to use common or shared language to describe the contemporary common faith, Salvation and the Church (A-RC 1986), the first document of ARCIC II, uses more differentiated language in describing the common faith. The two later documents, The Church as Communion (A-RC 1990) and The Gift of Authority (A-RC 1997) are

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clearer examples of the older paradigm used in ARCIC I. There is also a significant change on the level of language: in documents of ARCIC II the technical terms of ‘consensus’, ‘consonance’, ‘coherence’ and ‘convergence’ are either absent or very rare. The statements work mainly with the simpler distinction of agree–disagree. At the same time, there is a significant increase in wording relating to differing viewpoints, concerns, emphasiz, understandings, meanings and so on, especially in The Church as Communion and The Gift of Authority. All the agreed statements in ARCIC II are more sensitive to the particular historical developments in doctrine than the Final Report of ARCIC I.

Salvation and the Church (A-RC 1986) The first document of ARCIC II, Salvation and the Church, deals with the doctrine of salvation and especially the question of justification in an ecclesiological context.69 The document has three specific emphases. It places salvation in the context of communio ecclesiology, it deals with questions of the doctrine of justification in the larger framework of ‘the doctrine of salvation’ and it adopted some methodological distinctions used by the Lutheran–Roman Catholic document Justification by Faith. Hermeneutical (material) focus: koinonia According to Salvation and the Church, the main reason for differences in understanding salvation is due to lack of a properly communal setting for salvation in both communions.70 To remedy this, the document discusses salvation in the communal framework of koinonia. Salvation is perceived as a communal event of reconciliation in the life of the triune God.71 The Spirit brings all believers into this union through Christ. This koinonia/communio has two elements, a horizontal and a vertical one. The Spirit unites all believers with Christ and in Christ with each other. The unity-creating action of the Spirit takes place through baptism, which makes all the faithful into one fellowship in the body of Christ. This new communal framework especially affects the discussion of the church’s role in salvation. The text describes the church as a fellowship of those justified by faith who, because of justification, ‘may learn to do justice to one another’. The church’s purpose is to be the sign, steward and instrument of God’s design, that is, God’s saving will towards all humanity.72 The focus on koinonia draws out the relational aspects of each topic discussed. For example, in discussing justifying faith, the text focuses on the balance between the gift of faith and the human response in love. It emphasizes the inseparability of the relationships towards God and towards other human beings. The vertical relation towards God has primacy. It is through this relation that ‘we are conformed to the image of Christ’.73 In discussing the relation between justification and salvation, the document again focuses on the interrelation between the individual and communal aspects. Both aspects, the gift of faith to which the response is love

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and the interconnectedness between justification and sanctification, are used to argue for the legitimacy of good works as the ‘fruit of the freedom God has given us’.74 Again the text attempts to give full justice to the communal nature of faith and the full participation in God-willed new humanity and the freedom. This new humanity is not a merely social-ethical reality. It is participation in a community of all the faithful, living and departed, who are bound together in a communion of prayer.

Balance and coherence of doctrine According to Salvation and the Church, the principle formal reason behind disunity are the imbalances and incoherencies in teaching the common faith. The ecumenical goal is to regain the ‘partially obscured’ balance and coherence of the doctrine of salvation. Here the influence of Justification by Faith (L-RC 1983 usa) is clear. Salvation and the Church works with a distinction between the ‘constitutive elements’ or ‘essential aspects’ of the doctrine on the one hand of salvation and the historically conditioned explications and the issues themselves on the other hand.75 The line of argumentation follows that of Justification by Faith, although it is not as elaborate. Methodological commonalities between the documents are especially evident in paragraphs 8 and 13–18 that discuss general ecumenical hermeneutics and the relationship between justification and salvation.76 Similarly, the language of different fears, concerns, emphases and understandings in paragraphs 4–7 parallel that of Justification by Faith in paragraphs 100, 101, 103, 106, 110, 117–19. The purpose is to show the multifaceted nature of both the biblical witness and confessional theologies. In the course of history and controversy, ‘the balance and coherence of the constitutive elements of the Christian doctrine of salvation had become partially obscured’.77 Recognizing the variety of theological interpretations and ecclesial emphasis that are not necessarily mutually exclusive creates a new context that allows for a more balanced and coherent common expression of the doctrine of salvation.78 A new context arises from the repositioning of traditional confessional viewpoints with the help of the doctrine of justification in the larger framework of the doctrine of salvation. Traces of the more extensive historical elaboration of Justification by Faith are visible in the text. A good example is the discussion of justification and sanctification in paragraphs 14–17, which in Church and Salvation becomes a focus of the new balance and coherence of the doctrine of salvation. The document concludes that justification and sanctification are two differing aspects of salvation, which reflect, on the one hand, God’s sovereign act (justification) and, on the other hand, the effects of that act in the believer (sanctification). The two communions agree on the essential aspects of the doctrine of salvation and have therefore regained an understanding of the relevance of the message of justification and sanctification within the whole doctrine of salvation.79 Justification and sanctification have become two poles in the one divine act of salvation. This positioning brings new coherence to the doctrine of salvation.

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As a whole, Salvation and the Church moves away from expressing the contemporary faith with one voice and includes short presentations both on the specific viewpoints of the two churches and on the individual questions being addressed. It is evident that the question of justification was chosen due to its centrality in the Reformation disputes.80 The centrality is nevertheless of far less importance than in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue.81 Thus, it seems that the contribution towards reconciling the Anglican and Roman Catholic communions did not benefit as much from an agreement on justification as did those dialogues in which historically the issue had had a more prominent place. Neither the question of ministry nor the understanding of the compatibility of common ecumenical documents and confessional theological formulations are clarified in this document.82 Both issues receive some clarity in the second ecclesiological document, The Church as Communion (A-RC 1990).

The Church as Communion (A-RC 1990) With regard to method, the main contribution of The Church as Communion is the further elaboration of a common ecclesiological vision for ARCIC II. The document returns to the koinonia/communio ecclesiology envisaged in the preface to the ARCIC I Final Report. The text is not a contribution to a specific ecclesiological question but an attempt to position the already acquired agreements within a common ecclesial context. The document thus contributes to a developing hermeneutics of authoritative teaching. In the words of Nicholas Sagovsky, I have earlier described this as the ‘rule of communion’. The hermeneutical value of the koinonia/communio received explicit attention in the intra-Anglican discussions.83 I will refer to the intra-Anglican discussion for clues with which to understand the hermeneutical use of koinonia in Salvation and the Church. Rule of communion as a hermeneutical method Intra-Anglican discussion has often referred to koinonia/communio as a critical norm of ecclesial and theological decision-making. The Lambeth Conference in 1988 adopted a resolution on the consecration of women to the episcopate that called ‘the highest degree of communion with the Provinces which differ’.84 The Eames Commission described this state of communion with differences as the church ‘while still preserving unity’ being ‘obliged to live with the fact of disagreement’.85 In the case of the Anglican Communion, the question has been how to maintain communion despite differing developments. ARCIC II’s agenda was the opposite: it endeavoured to regain a communion already broken. There are nevertheless notable ecclesiological commonalities which justify asking how koinonia/communio ecclesiology could serve as a hermeneutical principle in striving for (ecumenical) doctrinal consensus. Moving from individual doctrinal issues to ecclesiology implies widening the horizon on doctrinal consensus. The discussion does not stop at referential relations

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between expressions and content or meanings and understandings. It is oriented more towards the ecclesial prerequisites and consequences of the agreements. What is the relevance of communion in the search for consensus? Is it at all possible to ‘reach’ consensus without an already existing communion? A negative answer would be a normative statement on the necessity of ecclesial communion prior to consensus on doctrine. The Church as Communion recognizes the hermeneutical value of common ecclesiology in reaching agreement on unresolved matters. Ecclesial communion is intrinsically connected to the authenticity of apostolic faith. The text clearly implies that true apostolic teaching is possible only within one ecclesial communion. Life in communion creates a proper hermeneutical context in which legitimate diversities can exist and can serve the church’s mission to be truly catholic. The church as a communion is the location or context in which the authentic remembrance of apostolic teaching takes place. Communion is therefore the hermeneutical point of contact between depositum fidei and the differing ages and cultures where the contents of faith are authentically expressed.86 Due to this hermeneutic character of the church’s communication, differing expressions of faith arise even within a single community.87 These differences might cause tensions within the community, but even some tensions ‘are creative of healthy development’.88 Koinonia serves as a hermeneutical point of reference to bring coherence, compatibility and justification to the diverse doctrinal expressions. Something happens when the diversities become differences and break the ecclesial communion. The breaking of ecclesial communion reverses this hermeneutical process of keeping the diversities in a positive complementarity. The one faith is no longer passed on in one communion. This leads to an impoverishment of the church and a growing apart of Christians.89 Breaking up the communion is the exact opposite of the church’s catholicity, which is described as the church’s mission ‘to teach universally and without omission all that has been revealed by God’ and ‘to unite in one eucharistic fellowship men and women of every race, culture and social condition in every generation’.90 Distorting or denying apostolic faith threatens this catholicity. Catholicity becomes obscured by attitudes and behaviour not in accordance with the church’s calling to be the holy people of God. ‘Just as the church has to distinguish between tolerable and intolerable diversity in the expression of the apostolic faith, so in the area of life and practice the church has to discover what is constructive and what is disruptive of its own communion.’91 The ‘rule of communion’ is not merely a sociological principle. It calls for seriously taking into account all the different marks or bonds, that hold the ecclesial communion together. Since communion is not monolithic but a many faceted reality, it can survive even if there is no complete agreement on all aspects that uphold the communion.92 One might here refer to the Anglican principle of ‘doctrinal comprehensiveness’. It corresponds on a doctrinal level to understanding communion as unity in diversity.93 A ‘comprehensive’ approach implies that no one particular facet of communion but the communion as a whole is the critical principle of unity in truth and love. This also implies that the different facets of communion are not identical with the constitutive and essential elements of ecclesial communion. Here The Church as Communion takes a stricter stance, firstly by asserting that ‘it is required that all the essential constitutive elements of ecclesial

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communion are present and mutually recognized’ for the local churches to be in communion and then enumerating various interrelated elements and facets of visible communion.94 The statement gives two lists of ‘constitutive elements’. In so doing it differentiates between essential constitutive elements of the ecclesial life and ‘ ‘‘what constitutes an ecclesial communion’.95 An ecumenically normative understanding of koinonia has both positive and negative implications. On the positive side, this approach fosters a wider understanding of consensus, extending beyond its cognitive-propositional elements. At the same time, the commission is forced to postulate an unbroken communion where this communion in fact does not exist. The text does not discuss the implications of the factually imperfect state of communion.96 A functioning ‘rule of communion’ as a hermeneutical tool requires a recognition of an already existing effective communion. An attempt at such recognition is made in paragraphs 49–56. The argument ends in paragraph 57 with the statement that the remaining unresolved matters have to be faced together and the solutions will be ‘shaped by the agreed understanding of communion’ elaborated in the statement. Two of the unresolved areas relate to the ministry, that is, the general reconciliation of ministries and the question of women’s ordination; a third one to moral issues. The discrepancy between postulated unbroken communion and factual disunity could well create problems, for example, in the reception of the dialogue documents. This potential problem in reception raises questions of the appropriateness of the ecumenical method. The loss of communion has devastating consequences both for authentic teaching and for a proper Christian life. A fundamental dilemma arises: should one consent to saying that the communion (between Anglicans and Roman Catholics) has been broken and commit to the hermeneutically devastating consequences? Or, for the sake of functioning hermeneutics, should one postulate the existence of a communion that is factually missing? The Gift of Authority: Authority in the Church III (A-RC 1997) Dialogical koinonia In The Gift of Authority: Authority in the Church III, the idea of koinonia has two methodological functions. Its first function is to manifest the temporal dynamics between an already existing ‘real but imperfect communion’ and the goal of full, visible unity. The second function is hermeneutical and facilitates the application of the above-mentioned tension between ‘already’ and ‘not yet’ to three individual theological questions, namely, the relation between the individual and the corporate, the nature of tradition and biblical hermeneutics.97 These three elements together with the relation between individual and corporate, the process of handing on the apostolic witness and, as a special case, the formation of the biblical canon come together in the ideas of reception and ‘re-reception’ to include aspects of catholicity and various forms of authority. The purpose of the document is to show how the churches can move towards fuller or ‘more perfect’ communion through the process of re-reception.98

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The dialectical pairing of God’s ‘Yes’ and the believers ‘Amen’ creates a dialogical context for koinonia.99 Because the ‘Yes’–‘Amen’ principle is included in the hermeneutic function of koinonia, it permeates the entire document. The dialectics is made into a basic feature underlying the koinonia in and through Christ and with each other. A dynamic koinonia is the true koinonia because Christ is the true ‘Amen’.100 By the Spirit and through the faithful obedience to the Father, the individual believer’s ‘Amen’ is ‘incorporated in the ‘‘Amen’’ of Christ, through whom, with whom and in whom we worship the Father’.101 Because this dialogical form defines the internal dialectic of koinonia, the emphasis is on the receiving and accepting of gospel and Christ and the faithful response in the individual and corporate ‘Amen’ to them.102 Both baptism and the Eucharist are described from this point of view, baptism as the event where the dialogue becomes visible103 and the Eucharist as the centre of life in the local church ‘in which all believers hear and receive God’s ‘‘Yes’’ in Christ to them’. The believers are incorporated, that is, united into one body, through their individual response, which is embedded in the faithful answer of the entire Christian community. Being incorporated into the response of the whole community is an inseparable element of the dynamics of ‘Yes’–‘Amen’. Through the relationship with the community, ‘the believer is incorporated into an ‘‘Amen’’ of faith, older, deeper, broader, richer than the individual’s ‘‘Amen’’ to the Gospel’.104 The ‘Yes’–‘Amen’ dialectic is not merely a formal principle. An individual’s response to God’s ‘Yes’ in the communal context of the church becomes more complete as the believer, in the corporate ‘Amen’ receives what the church considers as the ‘authentic content of divine revelation’. This receiving is not a singular event of consenting to the (propositional content of the) divine revelation but a continuous process of receiving anew all essential elements of the ecclesial communion that communicate the original, apostolic witness to the revealed Word. Receiving revelation is a constant dynamic and hermeneutical process of rereceiving or remembering God’s ‘Yes’ in particular situations. Very subtly, The Gift of Authority differentiates between the content of the divine revelation or the authentic revelation, which is what the church receives, from the ‘true expressions’ of tradition (manifesting the divine content of revelation).105 Tradition in The Gift of Authority has a double meaning. It is associated both with the divine content of revelation and the constant reception of it is changing situations. Though the tradition has already been delivered in its wholeness it still needs to be remembered in ever new situations. This remembering again is a dynamic dialogical event between the individuals of particular community and the circumstances the community lives in.106 Remembering is a central element of the on-going hermeneutical process. The use of authority is motivated by and embedded into this process of remembering or re-reception The underlying dialogical nature of koinonia and the corresponding dialogical– hermeneutic understanding of tradition have two implications for how consensus is perceived in the church and consequently for the agreement of this particular document. Firstly, The Gift of Authority presumes a sort of complementary relationship between the individual and the corporate in the re-receiving or

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remembering of the divine content of revelation. Secondly, the ecclesial consensus is perceived in the dynamic context of reception and re-reception.

‘Amen’ as reception and re-reception The Gift of Authority uses concepts of reception and re-reception in two meanings to describe both the continuous process of receiving the apostolic tradition anew and the ecumenical process of re-introducing elements of the tradition ‘forgotten’ by a church.107 Particularly in the first meaning the connection to the dialogical nature of koinonia, that is, the dynamic relation between God’s address and the response of the faithful is evident.108 As noted in the previous section, the document runs into difficulties when it attempts to apply the same dialogical dynamics in the relationship between the authority of those exercising the ministry of oversight and the body of the faithful as a whole. Similar difficulties are visible in the document’s argumentation on the ecumenical reception. The paradigmatic model of reception is that of the Christian community as a whole responding to God’s ‘Yes’. The whole process of handing on and communicating the gospel is understood as tradition (paradosis) in this document; the church’s ‘Amen’ is directed towards the whole of this tradition.109 In addition to this processual understanding of tradition The Gift of Authority uses two other more substantial definitions; firstly, tradition includes theologically substantial instances of handing on the gospel such as baptism, confession of the apostolic faith, celebration of the Eucharist and leadership by an apostolic ministry.110 Secondly, what is received also includes ‘true expressions of the tradition which has been once for all delivered to the apostles’.111 While the first description inclines towards perceiving tradition as continuous faithfulness towards the gospel, that is, as a process, the latter emphasizes the deposit of faith as received by the apostles and handed on by the church through the ages. Tradition is the primary means of koinonia: ‘through it, from one generation to another, and from one place to another, humanity shares communion in the Holy Trinity’.112 Sensus fidei, the intuitive recognition of the truths of faith in the life of the Christian community, is an essential element in the ‘Amen’ of the church: the recognition of truth in the apostolic tradition is a fruit of the Spirit. The constant reception of the apostolic tradition is a hermeneutic process of making present the apostolic witness. As such, the plain notion of reception already includes an aspect of ‘re-receiving’.113 Reception is thus described as the working of a corporate memory through which the Word of God is communicated in ‘many varied circumstances and continually changing times’.114 ‘Selective memory’ is the human aspect of tradition. It keeps alive and reproduces especially those elements of the gospel, that are important to particular communities at a given time.115 The process of reception is thus at the same time a process of faithfulness and freedom. It is faithfulness towards being the community that Christ founded. It is freedom in being this in the new and changing situations in which the community lives.116 Re-reception is a parallel concept to the continuous process of reception. This concept has two meanings. Firstly, it is synonymous with ‘reinterpretation’: the

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tradition or the apostolic witness needs to be re-received, that is, reinterpreted in new situations. In this sense re-reception is a critical concept requiring ‘the use of Scripture, Tradition and reason’.117 Secondly, re-reception refers to recalling or remembering aspects of tradition that have been neglected or forgotten. This process of reclaiming the ‘full vision of the kingdom of God’ results in the renewal of the church’s ‘Amen’.118 This remembering belongs to the fundamental nature of ecumenical progress.119 The Gift of Authority does not present a positive view of particular ecclesial traditions. Such traditions are not so much responses to specific historical questions that have risen in particular contexts as they are the results of ‘forgetting’. A particular tradition is incomplete, not because it has gained something in witnessing in a specific historical context but because over the course of time a part of the apostolic witness has been forgotten. The process of mutual ecumenical learning120 refers more to balancing the lack than to enriching the already existing tradition; learning can be mutual only if one church has what the other is lacking. The final recommendations suggest what the churches should regain: for the Anglicans, openness and desire for ‘a recovery and re-reception’; and, for the Roman Catholics, an openness and desire for a re-reception of the exercise of primacy by the bishop of Rome.121 The Anglicans are lacking the universal primacy exercised by the bishop of Rome and should balance this lack by re-receiving it. It is not clear, however, what the Roman Catholics are being encouraged to re-receive and especially how the re-reception would be facilitated by their relationship with the Anglican Communion.122 The faithfulness of the ‘Amen’, that is, the faithfulness of the process and reception of tradition, is guarded and manifested by a ‘ministry of memory’. The exercise of this ministry vis-à-vis the body of all the faithful is at the heart of both the main theme of the document, authority and the question of consensus. Corresponding to the definition of tradition as the faithful re-receiving or remembering is authority perceived as being exercised in the church as the ministry of memory.123 The exercising of this ministry of memory is associated with serving the essential elements of the church, that is, the sacraments, the proclamation of the Word and administering discipline.124 The ministry of memory is not the bearer of the memory: this is the responsibility of the whole people of God.125 The text makes a fine distinction between the ordained ministries exercising authority in the church and the responsibility of the whole people of God for the recalling, remembering or re-reception of the authentic apostolic tradition. Sensus fidei/fidelium, its exercise and its relationship to the ministerial authority is essential to this distinction.126 Sensus fidei is an active capacity for spiritual discernment. It is the possession of every Christian ‘fully incorporated into the life of the Church’ and seeking to be faithful to Christ. The sensus fidei of individuals, exercised in concert by the whole body of the faithful is called sensus fidelium ‘through which the whole church remains faithful to Christ’. The exercise of episcope, ‘watching over the living memory of the church’ must take place in ‘symphony’ with the whole people of God.127 The Gift of Authority describes the relations among those with sensus fidei in terms of ‘symphony’ and ‘concert’. Though both terms can be interpreted simply to mean ‘together’, they also have connotations that imply a form of agreement along the lines of consensus fidelium.128

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In questions of authority, the symphony of sensus fidelium and the episcope of the ministry of memory are not symmetrical but asymmetrical. For the sake of koinonia, the bishop has a responsibility to make and implement decisions, that the believers have a duty to receive and accept.129 As a teaching authority, the ministry of memory also has the authority to discern and accept new expressions of faith.130 In relation to the discernment of the teaching authority, sensus fidelium is not consensus in the sense of agreement. It refers more to consenting to the authoritative decision made by the bishop: ‘By their sensus fidei the faithful are able in conscience both to recognize God at work in the bishop’s exercise of authority, and also to respond to it as believers.’131 Though the way in which authority is exercised in the communion is called ‘synodality’ (syn-hodos, ‘common way’),132 the role of the believers is more that of passive recipients whereas the bishops are to be actively attentive to the needs of the community.133 The college of bishops has the task of exercising the ministry of memory in order to keep the teaching of the church faithful to apostolic tradition. Though consulting the faithful is an aspect of episcopal oversight, it is still within the authority of the bishops not only to discern but also to articulate the sensus fidelium.134 In The Gift of Authority’s description, the specific ministry of memory and the activity of the body of faithful are reciprocal instances in a shared sensus fidelium. Ecclesiologically, the document tends towards a distinction between ecclesia discens and ecclesia docens135 with negative epistemic connotations. Though the distinction itself does not imply subordination of the body of the church to the ministry exercising episcope, this remains one possible interpretation.136 The Gift of Authority’s shortcoming at this point is a lack of clarity in distinguishing among authority, power, ministry and jurisdiction and even within these concepts between their theological and juridical use. The differentiation between ministers exercising episcope and the body of faithful is made by reference to authority.137 This implies differentiation according to the power or jurisdiction attached to the ministry of episcope.138 Though paragraph 43 asserts that ‘especially in situations of challenge’ the whole body of believers participates ‘in their distinctive ways’ in the exercise of teaching authority, there is no clarity as to what this participation means. Sensus fidelium is at work in this participation and reception is integral to this process. The power to exercise authority is bound through the apostolic succession to the apostles ‘who were the body authorised and sent by Christ to preach the Gospel to all the nations’.139 The Gift of Authority does not paint a harmonious picture of the interaction between the episcope and the body of the faithful because of its juridical emphasiz. It does not come clear what, if any role the faithful play vis-à-vis the ministry of oversight beyond recognizing their role in discerning, guiding and formulating the sensus fidelium.140 The inability to show clearly what role reception plays as a manifestation of the active role of the whole body of believers (sensus fidelium) and as part of the ministry of the whole people of God leaves an imbalance in the reciprocal interaction of the faithful and those exercising episcope. On the other hand, the choice of koinonia as a central hermeneutical tool could suggest a more positive interpretation on the role of sensus fidelium.141 The Gift of Authority’s agreement is based on a dialectical understanding of being church. The focus on the dialogical relation between ‘yes’ and ‘Amen’ has an affect

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on the basic setting of the dialogue. The dialogue partners are not primarily the two ecclesial communions, but rather God and humanity. This means that the reconciliation of theological traditions or demonstrating the compatibility of existing doctrinal expressions with biblical witness is not the first priority. The reached agreement is an implication of the two communions’ willingness to rereceive together elements of the tradition, that have been forgotten or disregarded.142 Among other effects is that The Gift of Authority’s agreement does not recognize differences in explication or theological emphasiz. The document considers these to be incoherencies in the shared ‘Amen’ of the whole church. In the understanding of The Gift of Authority, internal differences are not considered as a value.143 There is in fact only one response of faithfulness and this is the obedient ‘Amen’. One can ask how this uniform ‘Amen’ relates, for example, to the description in Virginia Report of ‘a willingness to contain difference and live with tension, even conflict, as the church seeks a common mind on controversial issues’ that is one of the key features of the Anglican Communion.144 Regarding the subject matter, perhaps The Gift of Authority’s greatest advance is binding together of scripture, tradition and the exercise of ordained ministry. This is achieved by emphasizing tradition as the process of receiving, communicating and making present the word of God in the life of the whole Christian community and the ordained ministry as a ministry of anamnetic memory, that is, making present the word of God.145 The remaining questions in this area are due to the unreconciled perceptions of the actual location of authority understood as power (or jurisdiction) and differing understandings on the participation of the laity in discerning the truth.146 The Response of the Anglican-Roman Catholic Dialogue of Canada (A-RC Response 2004 can) points out that describing the ordained ministry as a ministry of memory recalls the prophetic function of the bishop who calls the people to renew their fidelity to God’s covenant.147 On the other hand, there seems to be no possibility for a prophetic voice for individual Christians whose dissenting concerns would seem to fall out of the obedient ‘Amen’ response.148 Another issue in The Gift of Authority’s perception of tradition is that it presumes distortions to be the result of lack. As noted before, the document does not explicitly give any positive appraisal of the additional developments of particular traditions. Nor does the text recognize the possibility that the tradition itself, through the forms it has developed, could be the source of problems and in need of correction.149

Notes 1. A-RC 1968: 3. There appears to be no discussion on the ecclesial consequences of the affirmation of common faith in Christ through baptism; cf. Peter Lüning, ‘Anglikanisch/ römisch-katholische Beziehungen aus der sicht der Kirche von England’, Catholica 51 (1997): 41. 2. A-RC 1968: 5. ‘Doctrinal comprehensiveness’ is a particularly Anglican idea. It refers to a dynamic existence of agreement on essentials and tolerated diversity. The Lambeth Conference of 1968 described the diversity even as ‘tolerating disagreement on matters in which Christians may differ without feeling the necessity of breaking communion’ (A Lambeth 1968: 140). Doctrinal comprehensiveness can be understood as (1) the ‘via media’,

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5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17.

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the middle way, (2) as complementary integration of differing viewpoints or (3) as the simultaneous, non-reconciled existence of differing views. Lüning is not convinced of the theological validity of any of these models to bring about coherence in Anglican theology; see Lüning, ‘Anglikanisch/römisch-katholische Beziehungen’, p. 121–3. Stephen Sykes is equally doubtful of doctrinal comprehensiveness to provide with the criteria for distinguishing between destructive and non-destructive forms of diversity but does not see this as a problem for a ‘continuity in fundamentals’; see Stephen W. Sykes, ‘The Fundamentals of Christianity’, in The Study of Anglicanism, ed. S. Sykes and J. Booty (London: SPCK, 1988), pp. 242–3; cf. A Virginia 1997: 3.1–54. A-RC 1968: 7. Lüning perceives the qualitative distinction between the person of Christ and the doctrine referring to the person of Christ to exclude the possibility of a quantitative distinction between a doctrinal centre and related doctrines referring to the centre. A qualitative distinction would also be a move away from the Anglican distinction of fundamentals and non-fundamentals in doctrine. Lüning proposes to differentiate within individual doctrines by a Christological–soteriological ordering of the hierarchy of truths; see Peter Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung: Eine Studie zu ihrer Verhältnisbestimmungen anhand des anglikanisch/römisch-katholishen Dialogs (Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1999), pp. 67–9. Sykes interprets ARCIC as using the classic fundamentals–non-fundamentals distinction (‘The Fundamentals of Christianity’, p. 232). Unlike Lüning, Beinert sees it as possible to combine qualitative and quantitative reductions (Beinert, ‘Möglichkeit und Umfang’, p. 66). Sykes’s interpretation of, for example, the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral, suggests that qualitative and quantitative interpretations might not be irreconcilable; see Sykes, ‘The Fundamentals of Christianity’, p. 243. A-RC 1968: 4–6. Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, pp. 44, 47. Cf. George Tavard, ‘ARCIC on Authority’, in Communion et Réunion, ed. G. R. Evans and M. Gourgues (Leuven: Leuven University Press and Peeters, 1995), p. 186. Gaudium et spes 62; A-RC 1968: 6. Adrian Hastings, ‘Malta Ten Years Later’, One in Christ 14 (1978): 20–29. The logic follows various Vatican II documents (Sacrosanctum concilium 2; Lumen gentium 19; Unitatis redintegratio 11). This change in implementation does not, according to Tavard justify Hastings’s claim that ARCIC abandoned the mandate given to it by the preparatory commission; see George Tavard, ‘The Anglican-Roman Catholic Statements and their Reception’, Theological Studies 41/1 (1980): 70–75. Tavard agrees with Lüning’s analysis of the method of The Final Report and the position the Eucharist is given in the whole process of the report; see Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, pp. 69–70. Cf. Lüning’s criticism in Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, p. 262. A-RC 1982: Preface and Introduction, 3. Cf. Evans’s critique in Gillian R. Evans, ‘The Genesis of the ARCIC Methodology’, in Communion et Réunion: FS J.-M. R. Tillard, ed. G. M. Evans and M. Gourgues (Leuven: Leuven University Press, Peeters, 1995), p. 136. In the preparatory phase the commission attempted to make a distinction between truth and the varying importance of truths, but in the end this method did not find its way into The Final Report; see Christopher Hill, ‘The Decree on Ecumenism: An Anglican View’, One in Christ 26 (1990): 28. Similarly, although the distinction between the deposit of faith and the way in which it is formulated had been recognized, for example, in Unitatis redintegratio, its practical application was not accomplished; cf. Evans, ‘The Genesis of the ARCIC Methodology’, pp. 134–5. Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, p. 61. Mary Tanner, ‘In Defence of Dialogue’, in Communion et Réunion, ed. G. M. Evans and M. Gourgues (Leuven: Leuven University Press and Peeters, 1995), p. 180. Paul Avis, Ecumenical Theology and the Elusiveness of Doctrine (London: SPCK, 1986), p. 44. The method is clearly outlined in a fragment of Tillard’s intervention in the commission meeting. The intervention is quoted in Evans, ‘The Genesis of the ARCIC Methodology’,

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19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.

32.

33.

34. 35.

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p. 135. Tillard also offers the possibility of moving in the direction of investigating the differentiated expressions ‘masking’ what is shared in common. The commission nevertheless decided to move along the lines of seeking commonalities under common language. Lüning for his part appreciates the ARCIC approach and perceives it to be more advanced than, for example, the method used in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue; see Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, p. 59. Howard Root, ‘Some Remarks on the Response to ARCIC I’, in Communion et Réunion, ed. G. R. Evans and M. Gourgues (Leuven: Leuven University Press, Peeters, 1995), p. 166. The use of uniform language with new, not confessionally specific language was one of the points criticized already in the course of ARCIC I’s work; cf. A-RC 1982 EDE: 4. The Observations of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith refers to the question of language as a problem of a ‘possibility of a twofold interpretation of the texts’, which is a consequence of the insufficiently explicit formulations of the text (RC Congregation 1982: 2.iii). The French Episcopal Conference, on the other hand, remarks that though the language of The Final Report is at some points ambiguous, language by nature cannot escape being ambiguous before it becomes the object of a common interpretation of social groups and milieus (RC Episcopal Conference France 1985: 331). A-RC 1982: Preface, 4–5. A-RC 1982: Preface, 6. A-RC 1982 MO: 3. The Anglican Communion understands organic unity through the image of the church as to body of Christ, which emphasizes the corporate nature of the church and the interdependence of its different parts. It attempts to give room to the diversity of the different parts of the body in obedience to Christ. According to the Anglican interpretation, organic unity is to be distinguished from organizational uniformity but also from a loose federation. Organic unity is not a concept used only in ecumenical connections but is also used to describe the Anglican Communion; see A Lambeth 1988: 140. A-RC 1982 ED: 1; A-RC 1982 AC II: Conclusion. A-RC 1982: Preface, 9. A-RC 1982 AC I: 4. A-RC 1982 MO: 7; A-RC 1982 AC I: 11. A-RC 1982 AC I: 7. Ibid. 9. A-RC 1982 ED: 1, 12; A-RC 1982 EDE: 2, 9, 10. A-RC 1982 MO: 17; A-RC 1982 MOE: 6; A-RC 1982 AC I: Preface, 24; A-RC 1982 AC II: 1, 15. A-RC 1982 EDE: 2; A-RC 1982 MO: 17. The first reactions from the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith pointed to a serious ambiguity in the use of the word ‘substantial’. Though in English ‘substantial’ can be taken to mean ‘real’ or ‘genuine’, it has different and more profound connotations when translated into Latin or languages of Latin origin. These connotations would make the concept imply ‘a fundamental agreement about points which are truly essential’. Because it is impossible to know whether issues not mentioned in the agreement are of secondary nature or whether they are not mentioned because there is no consensus on them, consensus remains elusive; see RC Congregation 1982: A 2.ii. A-RC 1982 MOE: 6; A-RC 1982 AC I: 24. The report also implies that agreement on the essentials is a mark of the universal communion, but does not take a stand on whether it is a necessary or sufficient mark (A-RC 1982 ACE I: 8). Sykes argues that from the viewpoint of Anglican theology it is not possible to arrive at a coherent conclusion on the criteria for distinguishing the essentials. According to Sykes, this is due to the lack of common ecclesiology; see Stephen W. Sykes, ‘Authority in Anglicanism, Again’, in The Future of Anglican Theology, ed. M. D. Bryant. Toronto Studies in Theology 17 (New York and Toronto: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1984), p. 189. A-RC 1982 MO: 1. A-RC 1982 EDE: 9.

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36. A-RC 1982 MO: Preface. Robert Wright sees that ‘substantial consensus’ and ‘substantial agreement’, as used in The Final Report, are equivalent to what elsewhere is called a ‘basic consensus’; see J. Robert Wright, ‘Grundkonsens – eine anglikanische Perspektive’, in Grundkonsens – Grunddifferenz, ed. André Birmelé and Harding Meyer (Frankfurt am Main and Paderborn: Otto Lembeck and Bonifatius, 1992), p. 149. 37. Wright, ‘Grundkonsens’, p. 151. 38. Agreement on doctrine: A-RC 1982 ED: 12; A-RC 1982 MOE: 5; A-RC 1982 AC I: Preface. Agreement on faith: A-RC 1982 EDE: 2; A-RC 1982 MOE: 6. 39. The lack of common hermeneutics of doctrinal language was addressed in the North American dialogue, which emphasized the permanent approximate nature of doctrinal formulations in expressing faith. A clear distinction between the linguistic forms and the thoughts and experience is not possible. Neither common liturgy, the lex orandi nor orthopraxis provides sufficient criteria for discerning the nature of faith because also they exist in plurality; see A-RC Statement 1992 usa: 26. 40. A-RC 1982 EDE: 9. 41. A-RC 1982 MO: 17; A-RC 1982 MOE: 5; A-RC 1982 AC I: 24; A-RC 1982 AC II: 22. 42. A-RC 1982 MO: 5. 43. A-RC 1982 MOE: 6; A-RC 1982 AC I: Preface. 44. A-RC 1982 MOE: 4. 45. A-RC 1982 AC I: Preface, 24. 46. Wright, ‘Grundkonsens’, p. 150. 47. A-RC 1982 AC I: 25. 48. For Wright, convergence is a qualitatively lesser agreement (‘Grundkonsens’, p. 150). 49. The Response to the Final Report of ARCIC by the Roman Catholic Bishops’ Conference of England and Wales also understands convergence to refer to the level of theological formulations (RC Episcopal Conference England and Wales 1985: 6–9). The Official Roman Catholic Response to the Final Report of ARCIC I on the other hand perceives convergence as ‘a first step along the path that seeks consensus as a prelude to unity’ (RC Congregation 1991: 9). 50. A-RC 1982 AC I: 22. 51. A-RC 1982 EDE: 7; A-RC 1982 AC I: 23. 52. A-RC 1982 AC I: Preface. 53. A-RC 1982 ED: 1; A-RC 1982 MO: 1. 54. A-RC 1982 AC I: 14. 55. A-RC 1982 ACE: 2, 15. 56. A-RC 1982 AC II: 23; A-RC 1982 ACE: 2. 57. ‘In considering the Final Report, the Conference bore two questions in mind: (i) are the Agreed Statements consonant with Anglican faith, and if so (ii) do they enable us to take further steps forward?’ (A Lambeth 1988: 211). Similarly, the Roman Catholic response was to answer to the question of whether the ‘agreements contained in [the] Report [are] consonant with the faith of the Catholic Church’ (RC Congregation 1991: 166). 58. Cf. the Roman Catholic response: ‘What was asked for was not a simple evaluation of an ecumenical study, but an official response as to the identity of the various statements with the faith of the Church’ (RC Congregation 1991: 166). The resolutions of the Lambeth conference in turn assert that the statements are ‘consonant in substance with the faith of Anglicans’ and, for example, that ‘the Agreed Statement in the Eucharist sufficiently expresses Anglican understanding’ (A Lambeth 1988: Resolution 8; cf. A Canterbury 1991: 169). While the official response of the Catholic Church presented an undifferentiated interpretation of ‘consonant’, this was not the case with all the individual responses from the Catholic Bishops’ Conferences; see RC Episcopal Conference France 1985: 329. The agreed statement on the Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue in the US differentiates between understanding of consonance as ‘compatibility’, and as full and complete identity (A-RC Statement 1992 usa: 12–15).

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59. Also the response does not recognize ARCIC’s method of pursuing a new, non-controversial language in formulating the common views. To Hill, this implies a reading of Lumen gentium 8, which takes subsistit in to mean that the one sole subsistence of the true church exists in the Roman Catholic Church; see Christopher Hill, ‘The Fundamental Question of Ecumenical Method’, in Anglicans and Roman Catholics: In Search for Unity, ed. Christopher Hill and Edward Yarnold (London: SPCK, 1994), pp. 224–6. 60. Liam G. Walsh, ‘Purification and Illumination on the Way to Union: The ARCIC Experience’, in Ökumene: Das eine Ziel – die vielen Wege. Festschrift zu 30jährigen Bestehen des Institutum Studiorum Oecumenicorum der Universität Freiburg (Schweitz), ed. I. Baumer and G. Vergauwen. Ökumenische Beihefte 28 (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag Freiburg, 1995), p. 110. 61. A-RC Common 1982: 46–7. 62. Cf. A Lambeth 1988; Edward Yarnold, ‘A New Context: ARCIC and Afterwards’, Anglican Theological Review 78/1 (1996): 67–8. 63. A-RC 1968: 19. 64. In addition, the commission produced a statement on moral issues (Life in Christ, A-RC 1983), a (conclusive) report on authority (The Gift of Authority, A-RC 1997) and a statement of Mary (Mary: Grace and Hope in Christ, A-RC 2005); cf. Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, p. 263. 65. Cormac M. O’Connor, ‘The Work of ARCIC 1968–2000’, One in Christ 39 (2004): 29. 66. Yarnold, ‘A New Context’, pp. 65–6. 67. The claim was made in A-RC 1982 MO: 17. The possibility of re-evaluation was expressed by Cardinal Willebrands in his letter to the co-chairmen of ARCIC II (Johannes Willebrands, ‘Anglicans and Roman Catholics: Progress Towards Closer Unity’, One in Christ 22/2 [1986]: 662–3); cf. John A. Gurrieri, ‘Sacramental Validity, Ecumenical Questions’, Ecumenical Trends 15/5 (1986): 69–73; William R. Franklin, ‘Apostolicae Curae of 1896 Reconsidered: Cardinal Willebrands’ Letter to ARCIC II’, Ecumenical Trends 15/5 (1986): 80–82; Thomas Ryan, ‘Reflections on ‘‘A New Context for Discussing Anglican Orders’’ ’, One in Christ 22/3 (1986): 228–33. The English ARC, at the request of ARCIC II, set up a sub-commission to investigate the Book of Common Prayer, the Alternative Service Book and the Roman Catholic Rites of Ordination. It concluded that, with the exception of the rite for the ordination of a deacon in the Book of Common Prayer, the ordinals correspond with the understanding of the Eucharist and priesthood presented in the ARCIC I Final Report. Still the commission did not give any suggestions for solving the problem of apostolic succession; cf. Yarnold, ‘A New Context’, p. 65. Documents from the original debate in 1896–97 are published in Christopher Hill and Edward Yarnold (eds), Anglican Orders: The Documents in the Debate (Norwich: Canterbury Press, 1997). 68. Nicholas Sagovsky, ‘The Gift of Authority and the Renewal of the Church’s Catholicity’, Louvain Studies 22 (2000): 232–59. 69. The theme was requested by the Anglican Consultative council; see A-RC 1986: Preface; A ACC-5: Resolution 4. 70. A-RC 1986: 3, 7; cf. Lüning, Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, pp. 272–4. 71. Lüning distinguishes this as a systematic-soteriological approach from a controversialhistorical approach, with the aim of clarifying and overcoming historical disputes between the two communions (Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, pp. 271–2). 72. A-RC 1986: 25–31. Lüning criticizes the ambiguous use of the pronoun ‘we’. It is not clear if the text refers to the church or to individuals (Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, pp. 274–5; cf. 280, 332–6). 73. A-RC 1986: 9. 74. Ibid. 19. 75. Ibid. 32. This two-dimensional differentiation encompasses five different methodological moves: (1) concentration on essential points, (2) observing differences on the level of theological traditions, (3) critical distancing from past controversies, (4) description of the new context through which new interpretations are possible and (5) recognition of the

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79.

80.

81. 82.

83.

84. 85.

86. 87. 88.

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theological value of language. The approach is more deductive than before and more concerned with logical coherence and synthetic quality (Donato Valentini, ‘ARCIC II: Salvation and the Church: A Contribution to the Reading of the ARCIC II Statement Salvation and the Church’, PCPCU Information Service 63/1 (1987): 46–8. Cf. L-RC 1984: 94. A-RC 1986: 32. David A. Scott criticizes a ‘therapeutic approach’ to describing Reformation debates, that is, concentrating on decoding processes in communication at the cost of semantics or the references to external truths. The ‘therapeutic approach’ disregards the truth-claims of the doctrines and does not allow for a real distinction between misunderstandings and actual disagreements (David A. Scott, ‘Salvation and the Church and Theological Truth-Claims’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 25/3 (1988): 430–32. Robert Wright shows that Scott’s search for a more propositional theology is bound to fail because no church can produce propositional claims that would be accepted even within the individual churches (J. Robert Wright, ‘Salvation and the Church: A Response to David Scott’, Journal of Ecumenical Studies 25/3 (1988): 437–44. A-RC 1986: 32. Here Salvation and the Church differs from Justification by Faith. In Justification by Faith forensic justification is presented as the Lutheran understanding of justification and sanctification has a secondary place. In Salvation and the Church justification is always accompanied by sanctification and justification has become a sub-category of salvation (L-RC 1984: 98–101). Lüning finds this kind of argumentation ambivalent (Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, pp. 296–7). Lüning also refers to a specific request from the evangelical Anglicans (Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, p. 266). Cf. R. G. England, Justification Today: The Roman Catholic and Anglican Debate. Latimer Studies 4 (Oxford: Latimer House, 1979). Lüning notes that unlike the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, ARCIC II does not consider justification to be a criterion (Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung, p. 271). The Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith judged that the document ‘can be interpreted in a way that conforms with Catholic faith’. The language of the document is seen as ‘symbolic’ and therefore difficult to interpret univocally. A univocal interpretation is nevertheless necessary ‘given that the purpose is to reach a definitive declaration of agreement’ (RC Congregation 1988: 429–34). Discussions within the Anglican Communion on the issue of women’s ordination offers an interesting parallel to the ARCIC texts. The decision of some of the Anglican provinces to ordain women to the priesthood caused widespread discussion of the nature of the ordained ministry and the nature of ecclesial communion. The same themes are currently under debate in regards to the ordination of openly homosexual clergy; cf. Stephen W. Sykes, Unashamed Anglicanism (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1995), pp. 137–8. For the question of women’s ordination see the documents from the Eames Commission (1988–94) and the subsequent Eames Monitoring Group (1995–98) (A Eames 1994; A Eames 1997). Cf. also the Virginia Report (A Virginia 1997) and the Windsor Report (A Windsor 2004). Both reports were created in preparation for and at the request of the Lambeth Conference in 1998. A Lambeth 1988: Resolution 1. Quoted in Nicholas Sagovsky, Ecumenism, Christian Origins and the Practice of Communion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 22. Avis argues that both the basic theistic axiom of Trinity and the variety of biblical theologies point to a plurality of founding nature within Christianity. Avis gives as an example of this pluralism the incoherence of biblical theology, for example, the difference between Paul and James on faith and works (Ecumenical Theology, p. 113). A-RC 1990: 16–27, 57. Ibid. 29. The text differentiates between the ‘communio’ and ‘community’. The nature of differences within a community is interpreted both in a positive and a negative way. On the one hand, the koinonia of the church is perceived as a communio of culturally varied communities (A-RC

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1990: 15, 29, 36, 43). On the other hand, in par. 30 differing communions are viewed quite negatively: they are embodiments of differences that hinder Christians from receiving and passing on truth in one community of faith. Paragraph 37 refers to communities in the plural, but it is difficult to say whether the connotation is positive or negative. Sullivan notes this ambiguity and asks whether the present imperfect communion can be called ‘church’. He also notes that ‘the church’ is perceived both as an ideal or an eschatological reality and the actually existing church; see Francis A. Sullivan, ‘Comment on the Church as Communion’, PCPCU Information Service 77/2 (1991): 100. 89. A-RC 1990: 30. 90. Ibid. 34. 91. Ibid. 40. 92. Sagovsky, Ecumenism, p. 23. 93. Comprehensiveness and contract affect Anglican theology on the meta-level of conceptual symbols. The symbols are comparable to Aquinas’ method of developing a theological position by refuting all the opposing views or to the Lutheran concentration on sola fide. They differ in the sense that they are not a method in the proper sense but elements of what Stevenson calls ‘Anglican ethos’; see Taylor W. Stevenson, ‘Is There a Characteristic Anglican Theology’, in The Future of Anglican Theology, ed. M. D. Bryant. Toronto Studies in Theology 17 (New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984), p. 18. Nicholas Lossky notes that ‘doctrinal comprehensiveness’ can be understood in two ways: falsely as a ‘practically unlimited’ plurality of theological opinions and indifference regarding truth or as ‘comprehending’ the very fullness of truth, which is Jesus Christ himself. The latter meaning comes close to catholicity, in the etymological sense of ‘according to the whole’ (Nicholas Lossky, ‘The Anglican Contribution to the Ecumenical Age: A Non-Anglican View’, Anglican Theological Review 80/2 [1998]: 250–55). Similarly, Frank A. Peake describes the ‘search for consensus’, that is, ‘prayerful consideration of both the Bible and tradition’, which leads neither to ignoring the foundations of faith by radical approbation of the contemporary nor to being confound by the Bible, as a method in Anglicanism; see Frank A. Peake, ‘The Anglican Ethos’, in The Future of Anglican Theology, ed. M. D. Bryant. Toronto Studies in Theology 17 (New York and Toronto: Edwin Mellen Press, 1984), p. 36. Avis too associates consensus with catholicity (Ecumenical Theology, p. 73). 94. A-RC 1990: 43. 95. Ibid. 45. 96. For the theological implication see The Gift of Authority (A-RC 1997). 97. Ibid. 11–13, 14–18, 19–23. 98. Ibid. 24–31. The concept of ‘re-reception’ refers to a process where a church reactivates parts of the church’s tradition that have once been received but were later ‘forgotten’ or abandoned. 99. Ibid., Preface. Cf. Wolfgang Klausnitzer, Der Primat des Bischofs von Rom. Entwicklung – Dogma – Ökumenische Zukunft (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2004), p. 500. The perspective is emphasized in A-RC 1997: 14. The Gift of Authority accomplishes what Avis considered the greatest shortcoming of The Final Report, that is, the development of a common approach to basic or fundamental theological assumptions; see Avis, Ecumenical Theology, p. 6. Lüning demonstrates in Offenbarung und Rechtfertigung how differences in perceiving revelation affect the understanding of unity and diversity. Theories of revelation deal with the relation between reality and its manifestations and thus have an important place in the discussion on the legitimate diversity within unity. 100. A-RC 1997: 8. 101. Ibid. 10. An important aspect of authority is its relation to the life of the Trinity. The references are scarce but significant; see Sagovsky, ‘The Gift of Authority’, p. 234. 102. Sagovsky notes that the main emphasis is now on the experience of the individual believer. Therefore the exercise of authority is a personal encounter; see ‘The Gift of Authority’, pp. 234–5. 103. A-RC 1997: 10.

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104. Ibid. 12–13. Paragraph 23 speaks about believers being the people of faith ‘because they are incorporated by baptism into a community’. Paragraphs 12 and 23 diverge on their perception of the relationship between the individual and the corporate. Whereas paragraph 12 merely links together the ‘Amen’ of the individual and of the community, paragraph 23 asserts, that ‘the faith of the community precedes the faith of the individual’. Paragraph 13 does not make a judgement on the logical or temporal order of the individual’s response contra the community’s response but does imply that the individual response, if not incorporated into the response of the community remains impartial. 105. Ibid. 12, 19. Paragraph 17 gives criteria for recognizing the apostolicity of the tradition; the description echoes Confessio Augustana 7. 106. This dynamics is demonstrated by a reference to biblical hermeneutics (A-RC 1997: 21). 107. Steward has described a three-dimensional understanding of reception, which resembles The Gift of Authority. Reception means (1) the ways of responding to the Word of God, (2) receiving the tradition as formulated by the church, including discernment of any novelties and their inclusion into authentic tradition, and (3) receiving the results of the ecumenical dialogues; see Richard M. Steward, ‘ ‘‘Reception’’: What Do the Churches Do with the Ecumenical Agreements?’, One in Christ 21/3 (1985): 194–5; cf. Guido Vergauwen, ‘Sensus fidei – consensus fidelium im ökumenischen Dialog heute’, in Ökumene, Das eine Ziel – die vielen Wege: Festschrift zu 30jährigen Bestehen des Institutum Studiorum Oecumenicorum der Universität Freiburg, ed. I. Baumer and G. Vergauwen (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag Freiburg, 1995), pp. 27–8. John Zizioulas widens the scope of re-reception to mean also the need of every church to receive anew their ecclesial tradition ‘and readjust themselves to the original apostolic community’. For Zizioulas ‘reception’ in an ecumenical context is more complex than in its classical meaning because the receiving community is not one but divided. The churches no longer merely receive the tradition but they also need to receive one another, see John Zizioulas, ‘The Theological Problem of Reception’, One in Christ 21 (1985): 188–9, 193. The Gift of Authority tries to integrate the three meanings of reception in a holistic model where the continuous receiving of tradition becomes an ecumenical rereceiving of elements with lesser emphasiz. 108. Zizioulas explains reception as a Spirit-facilitated event of communion where the received truth becomes authoritative by ‘springing from an event of communion’ (‘The Theological Problem of Reception’, p. 191). 109. A-RC 1997: 14, 16. 110. Ibid. 14. 111. Ibid. 24. Sagovsky, ‘The Gift of Authority’, p. 238. 112. A-RC 1997: 15. 113. Cf. Wolfgang Beinert, ‘Die Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung für Leben und Lehre der Kirche’, in Glaube als Zustimmung: Zur Interpretation kirchlicher Rezeptionsvorgänge, ed. W. Beinert. Quaestiones Disputatae 131 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 1991), p. 18. 114. A-RC 1997: 16. 115. Ibid. 21. Sagovsky emphasizes the link between ‘tradition’ as remembering and ‘sacramental reality’ as anamnesis in The Final Report of ARCIC I. In The Gift of Authority, corporate memory makes effective through the Holy Spirit the ‘once and for all’ event of salvation; see Sagovsky, ‘The Gift of Authority’, p. 238. 116. A-RC 1997: 24. 117. Examples of the receiving and reinterpreting of the ‘First Testament’ are given in the New Testament (A-RC 1997: 20). Hill perceives re-reception as a capacity of reform from abuse and error; see Christopher Hill, ‘An Ecumenical Hermeneutic of Trust’, in Unpacking the Gift: Anglican Resources for Theological Reflection on The Gift of Authority, ed. Peter Fisher (London: Church House Publishing, 2002), p. 66. Sagovsky argues that the Reformation breach was facilitated by a re-reception in light of renewed biblical and patristic understanding (‘The Gift of Authority’, p. 240–41). Beinert perceives the Reformation as non-reception but in a positive sense (‘Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung’, p. 19).

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118. A-RC 1997: 25. Whereas the continuous memory of the church is guided by ‘a ministry of memory’, associated with the exercise of episcope (A-RC 1997: 30), the re-reception is assisted by biblical scholars and theologians ‘and the wisdom of holy persons’ (A-RC 1997: 25). This implies that the re-reception process is more concerned with questions of theological interpretation than the fundamental faith lived in the everyday life of the church. 119. Cf. Beinert, ‘Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung’, p. 46. 120. Cf. Klausnitzer, Primat des Bischofs, p. 502. 121. A-RC 1997: 62. 122. Klausnitzer refers to Gift of Authority 56, which discusses the implementation of Vatican II but does not speak of mutuality in learning (Klausnitzer, Primat des Bischofs, p. 506). The reciprocity of the ecumenical process described in The Gift of Authority has been contested by Martin Percy, ‘The Gift of Authority in the Church of England: Sketching a Contextual Theology’, in Unpacking the Gift: Anglican Resources for Theological Reflection on The Gift of Authority, ed. Peter Fisher (London Church House Publishing, 2002), pp. 92–3. 123. A-RC 1997: 30. 124. Ibid. 30, cf. 14. 125. Ibid. 28. 126. The Gift of Authority associates authority with the ministerial authority (A-RC 1997: 32), pastoral authority (ibid. 36) and teaching authority (ibid. 38). 127. A-RC 1997: 29–30. The text echoes Cardinal Newman’s On Consulting the Faithful in Matters of Doctrine (1871), which speaks of ‘pastorum et fidelium conspiratio, which is not in the pastors alone’; quoted in Gerard Mannion, Richard R. Gaillardetz and Jan Kerkhofs (eds), Readings in Church Authority: Gifts and Challenges of Contemporary Catholicism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 293–4. 128. Jan Kerkhofs perceives sensus fidei, sensus fidelium and the consensus fidelium as spontaneous acts of the faith instinct of the faithful. The acts are distinguished by their scope: sensus fidei refers to the spontaneous way of living in accordance with the tradition of the church and sensus fidelium to the conviction of most of the faithful that a doctrine or behaviour is inspired by God despite the fact that new situations require new answers. Consensus fidelium is more restricted in its scope and refers to ‘most’ or ‘all’ agreeing on those truths belonging to the core of faith. Reception is an aspect of sensus fidelium that reflects the degree of agreement with what is pronounced by the hierarchy. It does not need to be a temporal consequence of the pronouncement but can also precede it; see Jan Kerkhofs, ‘The Sensus Fidelium and Reception of Teaching’, in Readings in Church Authority: Gifts and Challenges for Contemporary Catholicism, ed. Gerard Mannion, Richard R. Gaillardetz and Jan Kerkhofs (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003), p. 292. For Burkhard, sensus fidei is more the Christian’s possession of the truths of faith or the underlying truth of the Christian belief system. Sensus fidelium is the activity of the believer abiding in, defending or elaborating on the truth of Christianity; see John Burkhard, ‘Sensus Fidei: Meaning, Role and Future of a Teaching of Vatican II’, Louvain Studies 17 (1992): 19. Guido Vergauwen emphasizes the connection between sensus fidelium and sensus ecclesiae, which precedes any hierarchical differentiation in the church; Congar speaks of sensus fidei as a quality inherent in the subject, as a faculty of perceiving the truth while sensus fidelium is an objective manifestation of what the faithful believe and profess. Sensus fidelium tends towards consensus, which is essentially similar to public opinion; see Yves Congar, ‘Towards a Catholic Synthesis’, in Who Has the Say in the Church?, ed. Jürgen Moltman and Hans Küng. Concilium 148/8 (New York and Edinburgh: Seabury Press and T&T Clark, 1981). By contrast the apostolic exhortation Familiaris consortio (RC John Paul II 1981) emphsizes the distinction between a majority opinion and that of consensus fidelium, which does not consist solely or necessarily in the consensus of the faithful (RC John Paul II 1981: 5). It is the responsibility of pastors to discern the genuineness of the expressions of sensus fidei and promote it in all the faithful. 129. A-RC 1997: 36. 130. Ibid. 41.

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131. Ibid. 36, 29. For a discussion on the distinction between reception and obedience, see Hermann Josef Pottmeyer, ‘Rezeption und Gehorsam: aktuelle Aspekte der wiederentdeckten Realität ‘‘Rezeption’’ ’, in Glaube als Zustimmung (Freiburg: Herder, 1991), pp. 51–91. 132. A-RC 1997: 34. 133. Ibid. 30. Opinions about the actual role of the laity diverge among scholars. Some opinions, like Newman’s, appreciate the faithful’s instinct in living according to and recognizing what is right also when ‘there was a temporary suspense of the functions of the ‘‘ecclesia docens’’ ’, if only in a passive sense. Even this passive functioning of the faith of the laity should be informed faith, not mere fides implicita; quoted in Mannion, Gaillardetz and Kerkhofs (eds), Readings in Church Authority, pp. 293–4. A post-Vatican II perception emphasizes the constitutive nature of the experiences of the faithful to the church’s witness to the faith. This view is a consequence of (among other things) a perception of truth not exhausted by a set of propositions or concepts to be consented to; see Walter Kasper, ‘Zum Problem der Rechtgläubigkeit in der Kirche von Morgen’, in Kirchliche Lehre – Skepsis der Gläubigen, ed. F. Haarsma, Walter Kasper and F. X. Kaufman (Freiburg: Herder, 1970), pp. 44–5. If Kasper is correct, then Newman’s call for informed assent would lead all individuals via the use of reason to the same true propositions. Vorgrimler makes a further distinction between theoretical or speculative theories and more praxis-oriented issues based on the fundamentals of faith. He argues that a consensus (of the faithful) is more easily recognized in issues with practical relevance in particular situations than highly speculative theological formulations; see Vorgimler, ‘From Sensus Fidei to Consensus Fidelium’, pp. 8–9. These views open new perspectives but do not resolve the fundamental problem of the relationship between freedom and obedience on the part of the faithful. Beinert argues that reception by definition can only be an act of freedom and should thus be distinguished from obedience. Not every instruction from the teaching authority falls into the category of obedience even if the recognition of ministerial authority is part of the contents of faith (Beinert, ‘Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung’, p. 31). 134. A-RC 1997: 38, 42. 135. The ecclesia docens–ecclesia discens distinction has often been associated with the polarization between the teaching magisterium and the body of the faithful in the period between the First and Second Vatican Councils. During this time the church was seen as a society of unequals (societas inaequalitas); see, e.g., Leonardo Boff, ‘Is the Distinction between Ecclesia Docens and Ecclesia Discens Justified?’, in Who Has a Say in the Church?, ed. Jürgen Moltman and Hans Küng. Concilium 148/8 (New York and Edinburgh: Seabury Press and T&T Clark, 1981), p. 50. 136. Both Boff and Hanvey apply the distinction without this understanding of inequality by placing the whole church (including the hierarchy) in the ecclesia discens. Perceived in this way the distinction loses its epistemic justification and becomes merely functional; see James Hanvey, ‘Tradition as Subversion’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 6/1 (2004): 66. Boff asserts that the listening and the speaking are not ‘fractions’ but ‘functions’ of the church (Boff, ‘Ecclesia Docens and Ecclesia Discens’, p. 48. In Hill’s view The Gift of Authority can be understood correctly only if read to surpass this dichotomy of clergy/bishops and laity; see Hill, ‘An Ecumenical Hermeneutic of Trust’, p. 64. 137. The response of the Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue in the US interprets Gift of Authority as presenting both sensus fidei and the episcope of the bishops as ‘authority’. Even with this more positive interpretation the response criticizes both the depth of the presentation and its accuracy; cf. A-RC Response 2003 usa: 5, 11. 138. Steven Sykes disagrees with The Gift of Authority’s description of authority; see Stephen W. Sykes, ‘How Does the Church Remain in the Truth: An Anglican Response’, in Who Has the Say in the Church?, ed. Jürgen Moltman and Hans Küng. Concilium 148/8 (New York and Edinburgh: Seabury Press and T&T Clark, 1981), pp. 32–3. Sykes does emphasize that there are grades in the authority and various forms of exercising it, but in Sykes’s words even the ordained apostolic ministry ‘is set in a context which expresses, both in liturgical practice and in Church government, the authority of the whole people of God’; cf. Mary Tanner,

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139. 140.

141.

142.

143.

144.

Agreeable Agreement ‘Authority: Gift or Threat?’, in Unpacking the Gift: Anglican Resources for Theological Reflection on The Gift of Authority, ed. Peter Fisher (London: Church House Publishing, 2002), pp. 23–5. A-RC 1997: 43. This is in fact one of the areas where differences of expression still remain; cf. ibid. 39–40. Perhaps a more fruitful approach would have been similar to that offered by Waldenfels who elaborates on the epistemic consequences of sensus fidelium. Waldenfels agrees with Vorgrimler in his assertion that consensus fidelium cannot be judged on the level of propositions as much as on ‘the concrete performance of faith in terms of human life’ (Vorgimler, ‘From Sensus Fidei to Consensus Fidelium’, p. 8). Waldenfels proposes that the sensus or consensus fidelium is not so much a consequence of conceptual working as an actual and spontaneous experience. The insights and judgements are therefore subjective or emotional. The sensus fidei is nevertheless a function of discovering and bearing witness to the truth with certainty emerging when the knowledge is spread among the sense of faith of the many. For Waldenfels the consensus fidei does not follow from the efforts of the teaching authority nor does it describe the listening church in contrast to the teaching church. The reciprocal function of the teaching office is more that of post factum critical discernment; see Hans Waldenfels, ‘Authority and Knowledge’, International Journal for Theology 180/4 (1985): 40–41. Beinert has described the relationship as that of a complementary ‘priorities’. On the one hand, the hierarchical magisterium has a priority since it interprets the truth critically and includes a higher degree of reflection. On the other hand, the sensus fidei has the privilege of being more complete in its function of witnessing to the truths of faith. Truth is not only what is rationally and logically expressed, but also encompasses the whole person’s existence; cf. John Burkhard, ‘Sensus Fidei: Theological Reflections since Vatican II: I, 1965–1984’, Heythrop Journal 34 (1993): 46–7. See Bernd Sixtus, ‘Of Keys and Gifts: How to Read The Gift of Authority’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 4/2 (2004): 172. Bertolino (quoted in Burkhard, ‘Sensus fidei’, pp. 127–8) and Beinert (‘Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung’, p. 39) assert that communio ecclesiology is the only proper context for understanding sensus fidei. The response of the Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue of Canada understood the sensus fidelium to imply a participation of the body of faithful in the authoritative processes of the church (A-RC Response 2003 usa: 2.3.3.1). Beinert has pointed out how an analogous asymmetry between a theological and a juridical understanding of sensus fidei came out of the First Vatican Council and ‘reception in juridical sense was ruled out’ (‘Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung’, p. 30). For Mary Tanner ‘re-reception’ implies a positive appraisal of the differing traditions and their reconciliation into a common ‘Amen’; see Mary Tanner, ‘A Commentary on the Gift of Authority’; http://www.aco.org/ecumenical/dialogues/rc/authority/commtannerenglish. html. Klausnitzer sees re-reception as a reciprocal learning process; see Klausnitzer, Primat des Bischofs, p. 502. William Henn has noted that The Gift of Authority does not allow for a differentiation between more- or less-central doctrines. Henn finds this to correspond well with the Catholic idea of the authority of God underlying the whole of revelation. Henn rejects those interpretations of hierarchia veritatum that would suggest such differentiation. Henn refers especially to Mortalium animos (RC Pius XI 1928) 9. He accepts the hierarchy of truths when it is used to refer to the organic interrelations of the various truths and their common foundation in the Trinity; see William Henn, ‘A Commentary on The Gift of Authority of the Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission’, PCPCU Information Service 100/ 1 (1999): 30–42. A Virginia 1997: 3.4. The response of the Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue of Canada (ARC) points to this uniformity of response as one of the weaker points of the document. ARC pointed to two interrelated difficulties arising from the use of the ‘Yes’–‘Amen’ dialectics. While the trinitarian setting is seen as something positive, ARC misses an explicit exploration of the communion of the Trinity as the source of the communion of the church. This lack results in the perception of the relation between the body of the faithful and

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persons in authority as a dyad, not in the framework of one’s personal relationship with the triune God and the wider ecclesial and human community (A-RC Response 2004 can: 3.2). ARC also misses discussion on the dissenting voices within the community. Dissonant voices are not always signs of discord and discontinuity but prophetic voices (ibid. 3.4.2.). Beiner has pointed to the coexistence of ministry and ‘free charisms’ among which the charism of prophesy plays a key role. The ministerial office and the charisms do not fall into one but exist in a reciprocal relationship where the ministerial office also has a duty at times to listen and receive from the prophetic charism working in the church; see Beinert, ‘Rezeption und ihre Bedeutung’, p. 41. Cf. the criticism of Martin Davie, ‘ ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘No’’ – A Response to The Gift of Authority’, in Unpacking the Gift: Anglican Resources for Theological Reflection on The Gift of Authority, ed. Peter Fisher (London: Church House Publishing, 2002), pp. 43–4, 59. Cf. A-RC Response 2004 can: 2.1, 2.2.1. Cf. e.g. A CofE 2004: 469. A-RC Response 2004 can: 2.2.1. Ibid. 3.4.2. Davie, ‘ ‘‘Yes’’ and ‘‘No’’ ’, p. 38.

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PART IV

ANGLICAN–LUTHERAN DIALOGUE

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Chapter 6 INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE Functional understanding of doctrine The initial proposal for an Anglican–Lutheran dialogue, presented in a Memorandum of the Anglican/Lutheran Committee (A-L 1967) foresaw the dialogue to deal with questions of faith and of practice1 and to be firmly rooted in the common pre-Reformation history. It is this common history and the ‘strong sense of . . . continuity’ the churches share, that encourages and even obliges the churches to work for greater closeness of the two communions.2 According to the initial plan, the dialogue should be rooted in the common past, but motivated by the need to ‘proclaim the unity of the Christian church in a secular world’.3 A sense of urgency for the two communions to testify together to the gospel in the modern secularized world leads the commission to suggest that the dialogue should start with questions such as the church in the modern world, ‘the nature of man’, the significance of the church in history and the meaning of secularization. More traditional doctrinal questions, such as the role of theology, the concept of orthodoxy, scripture and tradition, the authority of creeds, councils and confessional documents, the limits of comprehensiveness and diversity in patterns of spirituality were to follow later.4 The short Memorandum does not yield many conclusions on the nature of the sought-for unity. By referring to the local and regional dialogues, that had already begun, the Memorandum identifies the most important doctrinal questions on the agenda. The Memorandum offers no hypotheses for why the churches had grown apart and no scheme for the restoration of unity between Anglicans and Lutherans. In relation to the inner-Anglican or inner-Lutheran documents that describe the foreseen ecumenical processes, the Memorandum remains vague.5 In drawing on the experience of urgency to give a common testimony to the world, the tone of the Memorandum prefigures the later Malta Report (L-RC 1972) from the Lutheran– Roman Catholic dialogue. The first full report resulting from this dialogue, The Report of the Anglican– Lutheran International Conversations 1970–1972 (A-L 1972, The Pullach Report), summarizes convictions and practices common to Anglicans and Lutherans and makes recommendations for developing their relations further. The discussion covers only ‘fundamental doctrinal points’, that is, the sources of authority (scripture, creeds, confessional formularies, tradition and theology) and teaching on the church, the sacraments, ministry and worship.6 The report uses ‘fundamental’

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as a qualitative predicate to narrow the discussion down to the essentials of individual theological questions. The understanding of agreement in the Pullach Report follows from its perception of doctrine. It presents doctrinal statements as one of the means the church uses to guard proclamation and interpretation from error.7 For the church to be obedient to the apostolic witness, this witness has to be reinterpreted in particular historical situations.8 This dynamic, interpretative understanding of apostolicity includes essentially the aspects of gospel (not in form but in content) and the authentic interpretation of the gospel. Both are crucial in the discussion of episcopacy/episcope or the ministry of oversight, that has the responsibility for the authentic interpretation of the gospel. Doctrinal statements are one of the means, used by the ministry of oversight to safeguard authentic interpretation. ‘Apostolicity’ does not relate to particular form but to authentic content. The church’s action of guiding, admonishing and making doctrinal statements regulates the manifestations of this authentic content.9 The primary function of doctrine is not to contain truth, but to guide authentic and therefore truthful interpretation.10 All these instruments are under the authority of the scriptures. Differences in doctrinal statements can be due to consistent differences in theological style. To overcome these differences, the document proposes, for example, developing a better understanding of the theological language used in Anglican and Lutheran theology respectively.11 Such a functional understanding of doctrine has significant methodological implications. I will demonstrate these with three examples: (1) sources of authority, (2) the church and (3) Word, the sacraments and episcopacy.

Example 1: differences in theological thinking: sources of authority The section on the sources of authority discusses questions of scripture, creeds, tradition and confessional formularies. The document asserts that the two communions have a common teaching, that they agree, believe or are at one.12 On questions of confessional formularies and perception of theology, the two communions have factual differences. The implied agreement is self-evident in the case of scripture and the creeds, whereas the other points also include elaboration on why and how differences in views could be justified. In the case of confessional formularies, there is an agreement on the nature and function of these formularies: both churches perceive them as faithful expositions of scripture and the means of safeguarding and witnessing to ‘the faith of the church at all times’. Differences are rather in the official and actual positions of the confessional formularies in the theological thinking of the respective churches. This is not viewed as an obstacle to church unity for two reasons: the confessional formularies are not a mark of the church and they are secondary to living, faithful witness. The use of distinct confessional formulae is not a mark of the church. Therefore, no particular formula needs to be present in every communion. Here the dialogue uses ‘the marks of the church’ as a critical tool in limiting the area of required agreement. This is also a recurring theme at later stages in the dialogue. In addition

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to the argument of ‘the marks of the church’, the shared living confession as a confession of God’s living word has primacy over particular forms of confession as manifested in the Thirty-Nine Articles and Lutheran confessional writings.13 Confessional formularies are secondary, time-bound, theological formulations. They need not be abandoned, but neither should their acceptance be required of another church. Confessional formularies are a special case of a particular way of doing theology. Varieties in theological thinking, whether because of differing philosophical backgrounds or differences in theological training in general, are welcomed by both communions as ‘an expression and sign of a legitimate variety within the one people of God’.14 Differences in perceiving ‘tradition’ ultimately fall into the category of legitimate theological differences, which are due to differing historical developments, ways of thinking and life itself.15 The discussion of the sources of authority supports the idea of justified diversity on two grounds. In the first place, the goal of ecclesial unity is focused on the ‘marks of the church’. Other areas of ecclesial existence allow diversity. The ‘marks of the church’ argument is a qualitative limitation on the area of agreement. The second argument prioritizes living witness over linguistic formulations and, in general, content over form. This argument paves the way for a substantial interpretation of ‘the marks of the church’, for example, and especially episcopacy.

Example 2: differences in confessional theological traditions: the church The Pullach Report emphasizes those ecclesial convictions shared by both communions. Both communions affirm the authority of the Nicene Creed and confess the church to be ‘one, holy, catholic and apostolic’. The communions share ‘ecclesiological attitudes’ and their ecclesiological thinking has areas of agreement. New currents in biblical theology and ecclesiology have also given rise to new convergences.16 At the same time the report reveals differences between Anglican and Lutheran understandings of church and, consequently, in the understandings of the goal of ecumenical dialogue. One indication of differences in ecclesiological understanding is the uneasy identification of the Lutheran idea of ‘altar and pulpit fellowship’ with the Anglican concept of ‘full communion’.17 These confessional theological descriptions have rather different institutional implications and this makes the identification less convincing. ‘Altar and pulpit fellowship’ denotes full fellowship in the exercise of ministry (preaching and administering sacraments), but does not refer to any particular legally constructed organization. The language of ‘altar and pulpit fellowship’ generally assumes, that church order in its entirety belongs to the category of human traditions as mentioned in Confession Augustana 7.18 ‘Altar and pulpit fellowship’ can be used to describe both the reality between churches of the same confession (e.g., LWF) and the reality between churches of different confession who share a similar ecclesiological vision (e.g., CPCE19).20 The Anglican understanding of ‘full communion’ refers primarily to relations between churches within the historical Anglican Communion and subsequently to churches in communion with the Anglican Communion. Fullness of communion includes the

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recognition of the members and of the ministry of the respective churches. Recognition of ministries involves, for example, the bishops participating in the consecration of a bishop in another church and taking corporate decisions. Full communion in the Anglican understanding requires satisfying the criteria laid down in the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral.21 Churches in full communion become interdependent while remaining autonomous.22 Identification of these two principles, ‘altar and pulpit fellowship’ and ‘full communion’ can at best be understood to affirm that both communions are willing to establish with the other the most intimate relationship theologically imaginable, although the nature of this relationship is at this time loosely defined. Part of the later challenges of the dialogue relate to this vagueness in common ecclesiological vision. The later dialogue does not discuss the compatibility of the Anglican full communion and the Lutheran altar and pulpit fellowship. Instead, the notion of ‘altar and pulpit fellowship’ fades away and full communion in the form of ‘full, visible unity’ becomes the standard concept of the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue.23 This notion has been widely adopted but also heavily debated in the Anglican– Lutheran context.

Example 3: bearable and unbearable differences: Word, sacraments and ministry Agreement on the sacraments exemplifies a case in which the two communions share a significant agreement in theology and existing differences cut across denominational lines. Differences in interpretation, present in both communions are not an obstacle to unity. This goes both for the theology and praxis of confirmation24 and for the sacrificial character of the Eucharist.25 The section on the Word and the sacraments is very short, but it gives a good example of a certain tolerance for theological ambiguity, even in connection with very fundamental questions. Essential here is the ecclesiological relevance of doctrine and theology and their implications for the sought-for consensus. The question of ministry, especially that of the ministry of oversight, presents the greatest challenge for Anglican–Lutheran relations. The Anglican emphasis on the historic episcopate should be understood in the context of the apostolicity of the whole church. In this context, historical continuity is approached on the one hand through the church’s continuing obedience to the original apostolic witness and on the other hand, through the multiplicity of means used to guard the apostolicity of the church over the course of time.26 Within this multiplicity, the ministry of word and sacrament holds, especially when exercising oversight, a special place. The Pullach Report does not find a solution to the obvious challenge of the diversity of possible forms of exercising oversight. An agreement exists on a principle level regarding the basic function and the need for expressing the ministry of oversight in a way appropriate to particular situations and times.27 The Pullach Report is left with the theological dilemma that faces both Anglicans and Lutherans. The Anglicans wonder how it is possible to give priority to the historic episcopate and at the same time recognize the character of the proclaimed Word

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and the administration of sacraments in the Lutheran churches. Similarly, the Lutherans are left to ask how the proclamation of the gospel and the due administration of the sacraments can be given absolute priority if there are no specific considerations of the existence or non-existence of episcopacy in a particular church.28 Furthering the method: The Report of the Anglican–Lutheran European Regional Commission (A-L 1982 eur) The goal of The Report of the Anglican–Lutheran European Regional Commission (the Helsinki Report) is to explore the practical and pastoral implications of the Pullach Report and to advance discussions on eucharistic theology and ministry. The Helsinki Report gives additional depth to the Pullach Report’s emerging method by investigating further the roots of apparent differences and the possibilities of agreement in doctrine.29 The Pullach Report provided the basic outlines for the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue. Central to the Pullach Report’s method were (1) limiting the area of required agreement on what belongs to the ‘marks of the church’, (2) subordinating doctrinal and confessional expressions to the living witness of faith, (3) distinguishing between legitimate varieties in theological and ecclesial traditions and in subject matters and (4) describing doctrine as a means of regulating the authentic proclamation and interpretation. The Helsinki Report takes up the Pullach Report’s understanding that Anglicans and Lutherans in general share a great deal of common history as well as similar contemporary challenges. In addition, the Helsinki Report indicates differences in theological method, which contribute to differences in theological thinking. A central difference in theological method is the difference between the Lutheran sola scriptura principle versus the Anglican understanding in which the scriptures, tradition and reason each play a part. Additional differences are attributed to the role of liturgy and confessional writings.30 The Helsinki Report’s main goal is to investigate further whether ‘the agreement and convergence in faith and practise is of such weight that remaining differences should no longer be regarded as a barrier to closer fellowship’.31 The report gives both faith and practice a central role in the search for closer fellowship. Special consideration of liturgical practices, mentioned earlier as a typical feature of Anglican theological method, is used to highlight areas of agreement.32 The Helsinki Report reaffirms the Pullach Report’s suggestion about the relationship between agreement in doctrinal issues and the relationship of the two communions. In the area of doctrine, there are both agreements and convergences. The convergences denote a rapprochement in theological understanding of a particular doctrine or in the more general perception of the church, its structures and its mission in the contemporary world.33 What Anglicans and Lutherans have in common is referred to as ‘an agreement’,34 ‘a common affirmation’35 or ‘a shared common understanding’.36 The text moves between more basic convictions (e.g., those regarding baptism set forth in par. 22), which the two communions can easily subscribe to and those ecumenically more complex issues (e.g., the ministry, pars

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40–42) in which there is ‘wide agreement in the understanding (of the ordained ministry)’ but also differences. The remaining differences are relative to the expected full communion of the two churches and to the wider ecumenical context.37 The Helsinki Report recommends that the remaining differences not be considered a hindrance to closer fellowship between Anglicans and Lutherans. This closer fellowship would include receiving Holy Communion in the other church in the case of pastoral need and when perceived to be ecumenically appropriate, the possibility of inter-celebration, mutual participation in episcopal and presbyterial ordinations and increase of pastoral and theological exchanges.38 The idea of apostolicity, prominent already in the Pullach Report has a central role in the Helsinki Report, where it is described as ‘continued faithfulness to the apostles’ teaching, which found normative expression in Holy Scripture and, under Scripture, in the ecumenical creeds’.39 According to the Helsinki Report, apostolicity includes two elements of faithfulness as adherence to the authority of the scriptures and as continuity. Apostolic succession serves apostolicity. A variety of ecclesial elements and activities express and maintain apostolicity and apostolic succession.40 The Helsinki Report’s description of apostolicity comes very close to the classical, ecclesial understanding of consensus. The description of apostolicity in the Helsinki Report and the classical understanding of consensus both make reference to synchronic and diachronic conformity of various aspects of ecclesial life. For the Helsinki Report, recognizing the apostolicity of the other church implies certain consensus, which penetrates through faith and practices of the past and present church in various places. The Helsinki Report breaks new ground in moving from identifying apostolicity with apostolic succession to understanding both apostolicity and succession to consist of a variety of elements. This multifaceted understanding of apostolicity has been tremendously important for those regional Anglican–Lutheran agreements that have reached full communion. Describing the goal and the nature of agreement: Report of the Anglican– Lutheran Joint Working Group (A-L 1983) The purpose of the Report of the Anglican–Lutheran Joint Working Group (the Cold Ash Report) was to summarize and elaborate on the findings of locally conducted dialogues after the Pullach Report. It contributes especially to clarifying the goals of the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue and specifying what the dialogue means by notions of consensus and convergence. In the Cold Ash Report, the concept of full communion refers to a relationship of mutual recognition of apostolicity and catholicity between the two communions. The two communions recognize that they share ‘a common identity in all essentials of the Christian faith’. In practice, this means that members of one communion are allowed to receive the Eucharist in a church of the other communion. In addition, it makes possible for bishops to participate in the consecration of a bishop, although it does not oblige them to, and to exercise liturgical functions in a church of the other communion. With regard to ecclesial structures, a full communion includes the existence of recognized organs of regular consultation and communication.41

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The report is clear but subtle on the need for common decision-making. It does not call for an institutional merger, but speaks of the churches becoming ‘interdependent while remaining autonomous’. Churches in full communion recognize that they are in harmony and express their agreement both in statements and in life.42 The movement towards full communion is to take place in stages. These stages include elements of full communion even before the churches arrive at that goal. The Anglican–Lutheran ecumenical vision allows for a ‘limited eucharistic sharing’ before the establishment of full communion. Limited eucharistic sharing is conditional and assumes a commitment to working together to solve the remaining questions. The possibility for a limited eucharistic sharing is open because the two communions are of the opinion that some questions can only be resolved within a relationship that includes eucharistic sharing.43 A gradual rapprochement in all spheres of ecclesial life contributes to the development of a common modus vivendi. This is a precondition for acquiring the goal of full communion.44 The provision for eucharistic sharing before full communion is peculiar to the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue. While the Eucharist is primarily understood to manifest the already existing unity, the dialogue recognizes that within a communion, the Eucharist also creates and upholds unity. Unity in faith and unity in sharing the Eucharist are two complementary elements on the way to full communion. On the one hand, agreement in faith precedes full communion. On the other hand, it is also perceived as a stage on the way to achieving full communion and a ‘vehicle of consensus’.45 Agreement in faith is also the basis for a provisional eucharistic sharing. The provision for eucharistic sharing depends both on the agreement in faith and on commitment to the goal. Ecumenical progress as outlined in the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue is a multifaceted reality. It consists of factual elements, such as factual agreement if faith and increase in factual cooperation. These factual elements are complemented by intended realities. The factual agreements, for example, allow provisional sharing of the Eucharist in a context in which the churches intend to move towards full communion and are committed to this goal. The factual agreements and intended realities create a ‘proleptic space’ where the two communions can anticipate the existence of full communion even if its existence is not an immediately recognizable reality. In this document, convergence refers to rapprochement in both theological understanding and practical cooperation. It appears in two different meanings. In its primary meaning convergence is a prerequisite of consensus, not a lesser or incomplete consensus. Drawing closer together provides opportunities for rediscovering affinities and the positive, enriching power of diversity.46 In a general sense, convergence denotes a greater affinity of the two communions in theological thinking, a result of agreements on faith. Most of the time the words ‘agreement’ and ‘convergence’ appear together.47 In addition to this primary meaning, the report uses ‘convergence’ in reference to an incomplete agreement. For example, in the first paragraph of recommendations it is noted that in the area of ministerial expression of apostolicity, a complete agreement is missing and, further, that the existing agreement is a ‘convergence rather than consensus’.

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The concept of consensus appears to be almost a synonym for full communion. For example, in paragraph 32 the document describes the state of full communion as sharing ‘a common identity in all essentials of the Christian faith, recognizing that they are in harmony and expressing their agreement in statements as well as in life’. Full communion includes full agreement in faith.48 At the same time the document describes consensus as something preceding full communion. In this interpretation consensus belongs to the area of ‘agreement in faith’, which precedes full communion.49 Consensus means full agreement on a theological level. Its fullness relates to the fact that the agreement itself includes proposals for implementing what is agreed upon.50 In the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue consensus has both a theological and a more practical orientation. It includes a modus vivendi, that is, common prayer, study, witness and evangelism. It is a necessary but intermediary goal of the dialogue. It is necessary, since it is an agreement of faith and order that itself generates and facilitates agreement of life and work. At the same time consensus does not equal full communion but implies it. In the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue there is no sharp distinction between a theoretical agreement and its practical implementation. On the contrary, the practical life in worship and mission and the dialogue overlap, permeate and constantly feed off each other.

A breakthrough in understanding episcopacy: The Niagara Report: Report of the Anglican–Lutheran Consultation on Episcope (A-L 1987) The Niagara Report is a key document in the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue over episcope/episcopacy. Its breakthrough agreement was made possible by a new focus on three issues within the larger framework of apostolicity and oversight, namely, positioning episcope in the context of the church’s mission; speaking of faithfulness as God’s faithfulness, not as the church’s faithfulness; and moving attention from the formal to the substantial elements of episcopacy. At each point the text identifies the dangers of mutually exclusive extreme interpretations. At the same time the report attempts to show the benefits of affirming the simultaneous existence of differently oriented interpretations. I will discuss these foci under the following topics: (1) theology of coherence, (2) theology of continuity and (3) substantial episcope. Theology of coherence God’s gift and the church’s call to communicate this gift are the two defining features of a mission-oriented ecclesiology. The normative aspects of a missionoriented ecclesiology fall under a concept of ‘theology of coherence’. This concept describes the theological requirements for the church to function according to its nature. The church’s fundamental nature is God’s gift, that is, it is God’s choice in Christ to accept humanity as God’s heirs and to take part in God’s plan to bring all

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to unity. God’s primary gift is the gift of forgiveness. This primary gift is accompanied by a gift of spiritual insight. This is needed to recognize the magnitude of the primary gift of forgiveness and to conceive ‘resources of power open to those who trust in Christ’.51 Equipped with these gifts, the whole church is sent on its mission to embody in all that it is and says God’s promise that the unity of all is realizable.52 God’s gift is accompanied by a call for the church to communicate God’s promise in everything it is. The church’s nature is to be communicative. Successful communication needs certain qualities. These qualities are effectiveness and comprehensiveness (‘no part . . . is strictly irrelevant to the conveying of coherent meaning’53) and clarity (’when human beings communicate with one another it is important, if one is to avoid confusion, that words, gestures, facial expressions, and symbolic gifts should not contradict each other’54). These three qualities – effectiveness, comprehensiveness and clarity – serve the coherence of the church’s communication. Theologically, the church fulfils its mission to be a communicative community when its communication is coherent in the sense of being effective, comprehensive and clear. Every gift of every member of the community contributes to the comprehensiveness of communication. Misunderstandings, personal rivalries and disputes break the coherence of the communication.55 Coherence implies complementarity of various gifts present in the community and a positive call for diversity. A lack of coherence or using individual gifts in a competitive manner is detrimental both to the church as communion and to the church’s mission.56 This is the basic context in which authority is exercised. The church’s nature of being effective and coherent in its communication calls for a responsibility of oversight.57

Theology of continuity The dynamic relationship between God and the human community gives rise to a ‘theology of continuity’. The concepts of faithfulness/gift (on God’s side) and continuity/faithfulness (on the church’s side) define this ‘theology of continuity’. Gift/faithfulness is an attribute of God and continuity/faithfulness, an attribute of the church. The church’s attributes depend on God’s attributes. The church is apostolic in being sent on a mission by God. Each of God’s gifts corresponds to a calling in the church. God calls the church to ‘be sent’, that is, to be apostolic and to be unifying and sanctifying.58 Because of the faithfulness of God’s gifts, there is continuity in the life and mission of the church. Continuity in the church depends on God’s gift of fidelity. By fidelity, the document refers to continuity in Christ’s word, abiding in koinonia/communio with Christ and each other and faithfulness in teaching and confession.59 The understanding of the ministry of oversight in The Niagara Report is based on the assertion of God’s continuous faithfulness. The text enumerates seven requirements of the mission (doxology, continuity, disciplined life together, nurture, direction and goal, and the development of structure), which all connect to the faithfulness as continuity. Doxology is praise evoked by God’s unsearchable and

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inscrutable faithfulness. The development of structures and the disciplined life and nurture needed to maintain church as a community manifest continuity. The ministry of oversight relates to the requirements of the church’s continuing mission. To remain oriented towards its eschatological goal, the church needs a ministry of oversight.60 The community of disciples may succumb to the temptation of individualism and anarchy or to oppressive collectivism and therefore needs discipline in its corporate life. Nurturing the community’s life also requires making judgements and responding to various demands.61 Because the church is an eschatological community and its consummation is still to come, it will need to be constantly reoriented towards the goal given in Christ. To carry out its mission properly the church needs episcope.62 The report does not mention a particular kind of episcope as a requirement of the church’s mission. Instead, the report emphasizes ‘the basic intention’ to which different roles gave an expression63 and especially the spatial and temporal dimension of the role of the bishop.64 These emphases result in a substantial interpretation of episcopacy.

Substantial interpretation of apostolicity and episcopacy As shown above, both the ‘theology of coherence’ and ‘theology of continuity’ point towards the need for a ministry of oversight. In developing a common description of the ministry of oversight The Niagara Report tries to find a balance between the necessity of visible manifestations and structures of this ministry and recognizing the frailty and potential misuse of any form of ministry.65 It is the presence of the apostolic faith in the community that guarantees and exemplifies apostolicity, not the mere existence of episcopacy.66 God’s gift is not the ministry of oversight, but rather apostolicity itself, understood in a broad sense. This broader notion of substantial apostolicity has direct consequences for the perception of episcopacy. Being in apostolic succession does not denote a continuous chain of particular kinds of ordinations. Both apostolicity and apostolic succession are characters of the whole church. One criterion is not enough to discern the apostolicity of the whole church.67 In substantial interpretation of apostolicity, the focus of attention moves from the de facto ‘historic continuity’ of the ministries of bishop, presbyter and deacon to the intention to preserve continuity ‘with traditional church structures’.68 The Niagara Report makes a clear choice in favour of ‘apostolic faith’ implied by doctrinal agreements. In this way, the document outlines means to resolving such questions as the ‘historicity’ of episcopacy.69 The Niagara Report has been especially influential on regional Anglican– Lutheran agreements, some of which have reached full communion. Its impact on regional agreements is a prime example of the dynamic relations between local and global dialogues, that characterise Anglican–Lutheran relations. This dynamic is not only a technical element of the dialogue but reflect an understanding of the local and universal character of the church. Despite its success, The Niagara Report’s breakthrough was not complete. As Gillian Evans points out, The Niagara Report addresses the question of oversight and affirms its necessity in the church. It does

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not, however, discuss the fourth criterion of the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral, that is, the historic episcopate.70 The lack of episcopacy or the lack of historical continuity in a particular church remained an open question, even after The Niagara Report. This was not perceived as a problem in the report, which quotes from the Helsinki Report the view that there are not ‘any serious obstacles on the way towards the establishment of full communion between our two churches’.71 In the commission’s view there is enough faithfulness to recognize the apostolicity of the other and therefore to recognize each other as sister churches. Although The Niagara Report described agreement in episcopacy, it did not have a significant effect on Anglican–Lutheran relations at the international level. Rather, the influence was felt in the regional dialogues. The Porvoo Common Statement (A-L 1992 Porvoo), the Concordat of Agreement (A-L 1991 usa CoA) (approved with amendments as Called to Common Mission [A-L 1999 usa]) and the Waterloo Declaration (A-L 2001 can) established new relations between Anglicans and Lutherans in parts of Europe, US and Canada.72 The dialogues leading to Meissen (Germany) and Reuilly (France) were not able to adopt The Niagara Report but proceeded along different paths.73

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

A-L 1967: 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 9–10. The proposals of the Memorandum were affirmed by the Lambeth Conference 1968; see ‘Renewal of the Church in Unity’ (A Lambeth 1968: 111–49, 143). A-L 1972: 8. Ibid. 22. Ibid. 73. Ibid. 22. Similar views can be found in John Webster, ‘The Goals of Ecumenism’, in Paths to Unity: Explorations in Ecumenical Method, ed. P. Avis (London: Church House Publishing, 2004), p. 6. Cf. A-L 1972: 13. For common teaching, see ibid. 17–19, 22; for being in agreement, see ibid. 21, 34; for believing, see ibid. 24; and for being at one, see ibid. 23, 32. Ibid. 26–31. Ibid. 45–50. This resembles but is not identical with the list of ‘recognition and witnessing authorities’ enumerated in Communio sanctorum, the ecclesiological document of the German Catholic– Lutheran dialogue; see L-RC 2000 ger: 45. A-L 1972: 52, 57. Ibid. 53. Vilmos Vatja (ed.), Church in Fellowship: Pulpit and Altar Fellowship among Lutherans (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Publishing House, 1966), p. 226; Eugene L. Brand, Toward a Lutheran Communion: Pulpit and Altar Fellowship. LWF Report 26 (Geneva: LWF, 1988), p. 12. A prominent ecumenical example is the Community of Protestant Churches in Europe (CPCE); see CPCE 1973: 30–34.

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19. The general tendency in ecclesiology within this community, especially in The Church of Jesus Christ (CPCE 1994), which contains the summary of their ecclesiological thinking, distinguishes between the church as an object of faith and the church as a visible community. The visible community as an institution witnesses to but is not ordained by God’s will. It is a social reality, which can be experienced in diverse historical forms and shapes. The distinction manifests itself in the exposition of the notae ecclesiae. The Church of Jesus Christ adds to the classical marks of the church the true proclamation of the gospel and the administration of the sacraments in accordance with their institution. These are considered the actual marks of the church whereas others mentioned in the various confessional writings (e.g., the office of keys, the order of the ministry of the word, prayer, suffering for the sake of the gospel and obedience to the second table of the commandments according to Luther) are described as secondary, more ambiguous and belonging not to the visible shape of the church, but to the life of its members (CPCE 1994: 2.2, 2.4.2). Similar emphasis can be found in the Pullach Report (A-L 1972: 61). 20. There are significant differences within the Lutheran communion in perceiving the meaning and ecclesiological consequences of communio. Harding Meyer held that historically Lutherans have used the idea of church fellowship as a synonym for communion. Church fellowship includes ‘altar fellowship’, ‘pulpit fellowship’ and ‘confessional fellowship’, but also in the words of Peter Brunner ‘a common acknowledgement of the doctrinal decisions made concerning the content of the apostolic Gospel’. In the ecumenical usage, ‘confessional fellowship’ is replaced with ‘theological consensus’. Perceiving the relations between all the above-mentioned concepts have varied even between LWF assemblies and different committees within LWF; see Harding Meyer, ‘ ‘‘Koinonia/Communio’’ and the Notion of ‘‘Kirchengemeinschaft/Church Fellowship’’ in Lutheranism, Particularly in the LWF: Historical and Theological Observations’, in The Church as Communion: Lutheran Contributions to Ecclesiology, ed. H. Holze. LWF Documentation 42 (Geneva: LWF, 1997), pp. 342–7. 21. E.g. A Lambeth 1958: 14; cf. also A Intercommunion 1968: 28–30, 40. 22. Mary Tanner, ‘The Ecumenical Future’, in The Study of Anglicanism, ed. Stephen Sykes and J. Booty (London: SPCK, 1988), p. 74; cf. A-L 1983: 26. 23. See Webster, ‘The Goals of Ecumenism’, p. 3; cf. esp. the discussion on pp. 8–12. Webster contrasts the concept of full visible unity with ‘reconciled diversity’ and certain interpretations of ‘conciliar fellowship’, which have been the more favoured models of unity for confessional world bodies such as the LWF; cf. Michael Root, ‘The Ecumenical Identity of the Lutheran World Federation’, Ecumenical Review 46/4 (1994): 421–2. Both Webster and Tanner express concerns about diversity in structural forms and the continuing existence of distinct confessional bodies envisaged in these models. Tanner, however, attempts to see ‘conciliar fellowship’ as elaborating on one implication of ‘visible unity’, that is, what Tanner calls the three marks of conciliar fellowship: consensus in apostolic faith; mutual recognition of baptism, the Eucharist, the ministry and members; and conciliar gatherings for common decision-making. Root perceives ‘reconciled diversity’ or forms of fellowship/communion (here used as synonyms) as an alternative for church union in the sense of organizational union. In this sense both CPCE and the Porvoo Communion are ‘church fellowships’, although their perception of the theological criteria for ecclesial communion differs; see Root, ‘The Ecumenical Identity of the Lutheran World Federation’, pp. 423–4. It is vital to distinguish between organizational models and ecclesiological models. These cannot be separated because a particular ecclesiological understanding yields only to certain organizational manifestations. They should not be confused either. Perceptions of the goal of the dialogue are especially pressing in agreed statements and declarations such as the Meissen, Porvoo, Reuilly and Waterloo statements and Called to Common Mission. 24. A-L 1972: 66. 25. Ibid. 69. 26. Ibid. 73. 27. Ibid. 81.

Anglican–Lutheran: International Dialogue 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

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Ibid. 85, 90. A-L 1982 eur: Preface, Introduction. Ibid. 11, 33. Ibid. 15. E.g., ibid. 33. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 21, 33, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 51. Ibid. 20, 28. Ibid. 20, 25, 31, 32, 43, 44. Ibid. 15, 43. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 38. Ibid. A-L 1983: 25, 32. Ibid. 26, 27, 32. This was, according to Root, the most significant content of the report; see Michael Root, ‘Porvoo in the Context of the World-Wide Anglican–Lutheran Dialogue’, in Apostolicity and Unity: Essays on the Porvoo Common Statement, ed. Ola Tjørhom (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Geneva: Eerdmans and WCC, 2002), p. 23. A-L 1983: 31. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 28–34; cf. A-L 1987: 21. A-L 1983: 1. Ibid. 16, 17. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 17, 32. A-L 1987: 11. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17–18. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 20. The formulations of The Niagara Report resemble those of Groupe des Dombes 1975: Introduction, 4, 9, 12, 18. A-L 1987: 24. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 25–59. Ibid. 31, 33. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 52. The perception of ministry reflected in The Niagara Report is very close to that presented in the report of the (Anglican) Commission on Intercommunion; see A Intercommunion 1968: 100–101. Evans mentions the loss of balance between status and authority, which in the Middle Ages led to authoritarianism and consequently to discarding episcopacy altogether by many Protestant churches; see Gillian R. Evans, ‘Episcope and Episcopacy: The Niagara Report’, One in Christ 25/3 (1989): 283. A-L 1987: 48, 53–4. A substantial interpretation of apostolicity can also be observed in the US Episcopal–Lutheran dialogue; see A-L 1972 usa: 2 D 1–4. A-L 1987: 20. Cf. Evans, ‘Episcope and Episcopacy’, p. 281. A-L 1987: 55. Some remaining problems on the Anglican side are noted in A Episcopal 1990: 619–21. Evans, ‘Episcope and Episcopacy’, p. 284. A-L 1987: 71; cf. A-L 1982 eur: 62–3.

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72. The influence was, according to Root, partly transmitted by overlapping personnel. The major influence came from similar conclusions drawn from the results of The Niagara Report; see Root, ‘Porvoo in the Context of the World-Wide Anglican–Lutheran Dialogue’, p. 24. 73. Root, ‘Porvoo in the Context of the World-Wide Anglican-Lutheran Dialogue’, p. 25.

Chapter 7 EPISCOPAL–LUTHERAN DIALOGUE IN THE UNITED STATES Emerging method: Progress Report (LED I) (A-L 1972 usa) The first progress report of the Lutheran–Episcopal dialogue contributes to the discussion of the nature of ecumenical consensus in two ways. Some of the document’s nascent methodological principles later became important characteristics of Anglican–Lutheran relations. The most important of these are (1) the understanding of communion as a methodological imperative, (2) the substantive understanding of apostolicity and (3) the recognition of ‘differentiated’ forms of apostolicity as ‘particular apostolicites’. In addition, the document describes a vision for ecclesial unity, which later became widely accepted. The first nascent methodological principle concerns the understanding and function of ‘communion’. Communion is both the goal and the means to the goal. As a goal, communion is an ecclesial communio in sacris. All ecumenical intentions are directed towards this ultimate goal. Commitment to life in communion and confidence in the transformative power of communion also make ‘communion’ a medium of moving towards ecclesial unity. The document believes that the renewal of the church is ‘more likely to come in communion with one another than out of communion with another’.1 The fundamental question of Lutheran–Episcopal relations is, according to the report, not how much unity is needed for eucharistic sharing, but: how far can a dialogue progress without sharing the Eucharist. The second methodological principle, a substantial understanding of apostolicity, follows from the merger of two criteria for intercommunion. These are the (Lutheran) criterion of the presence of the gospel and the (Episcopalian) criterion of apostolicity.2 The two criteria merge in a Christological interpretation of apostolicity. According to this interpretation, the identity of ‘our gospel’ and ‘the apostles’ gospel’ is in the personal identity of the risen Christ.3 A substantial interpretation of apostolicity is perhaps the central factor in the success of Anglican–Lutheran relations. The third methodological principle, the idea of ‘particular apostolicity’ reflects an emerging understanding of legitimate diversity. The argument for ‘particular apostolicity’ runs as follows: Both communions agree on a basic affirmation. This basic affirmation contradicts neither the variety of interpretations within communion nor the variety between two communions. The different emphases manifested in the differing interpretations are justified through their appropriateness within a particular context. ‘Particular apostolicity’ has adequately preserved the church in

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truth in a given context. The communions, having lived in differing contexts, have developed differing forms of ‘particular apostolicities’. Particular elements in manifesting apostolicity are something that can be enriching when shared.4 Differences are compatible or coherent if they arise from differing particular apostolicities. With the help of these three nascent methodological principles LED I sketches a vision of the way to ecclesial unity between two different ecclesial communions. This sketch includes the following basic elements, which recur in later dialogue documents: 1 2 3 4

5

Agreement on the fundamentals of ecclesial life and doctrine enables the churches to enter into a relationship of mutual giving and receiving.5 Common life in faith is made possible by a mutual recognition of the apostolicity of the other church.6 Common life in faith is a prerequisite for moving towards unity.7 Based on the mutual recognition of apostolicity, local Episcopal and Lutheran communions may exercise intercommunion where they ‘by reason of proximity, joint community concerns, and/or activities, have developed such a degree of understanding and trust as would make intercommunion an appropriate response to the Gospel’.8 The church is under constant demand for reform to be able to serve better the proclamation of the gospel. Any changes resulting from ecumenical dialogues are part of this ongoing reform.9

Sufficient consensus: Lutheran–Episcopal Dialogue: Report and Recommendations (LED II) (A-L 1981 usa) and The Lutheran–Episcopal Agreement (A-L 1982 usa) The report from the second round of Lutheran–Episcopal dialogues includes a set of five agreed-upon statements on justification, the gospel, the eucharistic presence, the authority of the scripture and apostolicity. The elaborated arguments follow the vision towards ecclesial unity outlined in LED I. The comparative method is still predominant but there is also significant development in the direction of a more synthesising approach. This is especially clear regarding the agreement on the fundamentals of church life and doctrine. This ‘consensus achieved in the discussions’, facilitates a change in official relations between the two communions.10 The Lutheran–Episcopal Agreement is a good source on ecumenical method. The text discusses a double criterion of consonance with the gospel on the one hand and sufficient compatibility with the teaching of the other church on the other.11 LED II does not explicitly mention this dual criterion, but its use is evident. The Introduction gives more insight into the method.12 According to the Introduction, the agreed-upon statements are not complete confessions of faith. Their function is rather to assure the participating communions of existing dogmatic agreement sufficient for continuing work towards closer fellowship. Agreed-upon statements touch points of larger doctrinal contexts. Their purpose is to include fundamental

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assertions that communicate to the communion that sets a high regard on this particular doctrine that a sufficient agreement has been reached.13 A sufficient compatibility is not only a compatibility of linguistic doctrinal formulations but also includes various aspects of liturgical praxis. This makes it methodologically possible to pair, for example, doctrinal statements on the real presence with liturgical reverence of the consecrated elements.14 The introduction uses a diagram to explain the relationship between the agreed, overlapping areas and other areas characterized by legitimate pluralism. The method is perceived to be compatible with the idea of ‘reconciled diversity’ (see figure below).15

The idea of a ‘sufficient consensus’ is methodologically interesting. It offers a preliminary explanation of the form and a description of the function of the agreedupon doctrinal statements. Formally, the ‘sufficient consensus’ compares to forms of consensus with difference that appeared especially in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. In comparison with the ‘differentiated consensus’ of the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999), the Lutheran–Episcopal ‘sufficient consensus’ has a greater sense of instrumentality. The purpose of a ‘sufficient consensus’ is to enable the two communions to progress towards their final goal. A ‘sufficient consensus’ does not lead to a discussion of the theological weight of particular points of doctrine, in this case justification and apostolic succession. In the framework of a ‘sufficient consensus’ these two are perceived as a pair, each having greater emphasis in one communion than in the other. A change in relations can occur in the two communions on different bases. With Lutherans, the change is brought about by an agreement on justification; with Episcopalians, by agreement on apostolic succession. The ‘sufficient consensus’ and the ‘differentiated consensus’ also share important features. Both assert that there is a difference between more fundamental issues, which need to be agreed on, and important issues where legitimate diversity prevails. The confessional differences in both models are understood as offering something to the other communion such as

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a corrective or a reminder of an area of theology, which in the other communion has received less attention. The discussion of apostolicity in this document is a good example of a ‘sufficient consensus’. It appreciates apostolicity as a multifaceted reality. ‘Apostolicity’ concerns three areas of ecclesial life: doctrine, worship and order. The document considers apostolicity as a multifaceted reality and is therefore able to assert that both Episcopal and Lutheran communions stand in apostolic succession. Three arguments support this assertion. It is argued that apostolicity is a quality of the whole church and that the ‘churches may exhibit most aspects of apostolicity while being weak or deficient in some’ without losing their ecclesial character.16 Apostolic succession does not concentrate solely on historic episcopate. It is properly understood in the context of the ‘succession of the whole Church in faith and life’.17 The greatest weakness of the Lutheran–Episcopal Agreement is that it presents these arguments as presuppositions but lacks a constructive part that would lead from the presuppositions to conclusions. The conclusion that both communions are not just apostolic but also in apostolic succession appears premature in the context of this document. A declaration of apostolicity is better justified in the wider framework of the dialogue. A ‘sufficient consensus’ on apostolicity denotes enough agreement for continuing and deepening the dialogue. The divergences are tolerated ‘for now’, although they are later expected to disappear. Declaring that both the Lutheran and Episcopal churches are in apostolic succession does not imply that the churches are now in communion but that they can and should keep on working towards communion. This can be observed in the final recommendations, which start by recommending a mutual recognition of Lutheran and Episcopal churches as true churches, continues with recommendations regarding forms of common life now made possible and ends with a recommendation to continue the dialogue.18 A mutual recognition of apostolicity makes possible an interim sharing of the Eucharist. The document justifies an interim sharing of the Eucharist on two grounds. Eucharistic sharing is possible when the two communions have achieved consensus ‘on the chief doctrines of the Christian faith’.19 A provisional sharing of the Eucharist is possible because of the eschatological, anticipatory character of the Eucharist. Interim sharing of the Eucharist does not indicate an unconditional recognition of each other’s Eucharist or ministries. The agreement is nevertheless sufficient for provisional eucharistic sharing to take place.20 Both the recognition of the apostolicity of the other and the consequent possibility of an interim sharing of the Eucharist are implications of the understanding that the common life in faith facilitates theological agreement. Examples can be found in the joint statements on justification, eucharistic presence and the authority of the scriptures.21 In the case of justification the document recognizes, on the one hand, the common Reformation tradition, which both communions share and, on the other hand, the different emphases in the theological understanding of ‘salvation’. The way forward is in continuing to listen to each other so that in this listening the ‘justification by grace and the new life in the Spirit (would) abound’.22 The Eucharist is perceived as both the manifestation of the church’s unity and also as the anticipation of the eschatological oneness of all

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under the reign of Christ. Hence, depending on whether a sufficient agreement on word and sacraments has been reached, the document maintains that ‘communion among separated Christians’ is possible.23 Lutheran–Episcopal dialogue (LED III) Indications of growing consensus in Implications of the Gospel (A-L 1988 usa) Implications of the Gospel starts a new phase in the Lutheran–Episcopal dialogue. It explores further the possibilities of the existing comparative method and at the same time creates new, common biblical theology. This elaboration of common biblical theology is offered ‘as an indication of our growing consensus’.24 It uses converging theological scholarship to articulate a common vision.25 The document sets the dialogue firmly in an ecclesiological framework. The method of Implications of the Gospel is less descriptive and more explanatory than before. More than in previous documents, the text endeavours to explain the theological challenges the churches were attempting to respond to by formulating certain doctrines. The document addresses the ‘intentions’ and ‘hesitations’ experienced by the communions in the theology and doctrine of the other communion.26 The text expresses sensitivity towards differences in understanding the nature of doctrine. Lutherans are associated with more prescriptive understanding and Episcopalians with more descriptive understanding of doctrine. Both communions agree that the fundamental function of doctrine is to guard and evaluate the authenticity of the church’s proclamation. In speaking of the differences in Lutheran and Episcopal teaching, the document implements the earlier-mentioned principle of ‘particular apostolicity’. Lutherans and Episcopalians have developed different ways of being authentic in their proclamation. In dialogue with the other, they can challenge each other’s ways of being authentic.27 The eschatological reality of the coming of God’s kingdom functions as a common framework for exploring the implications of the gospel.28 The document describes all encounters with the risen Christ as eschatological events. The eschatological events bring the future outcome of history into the midst of history. The apostles’ proleptic or anticipatory experiences are paradigmatic for the church. The church exists in between an ‘already’ and ‘not yet’. Both baptism and the Eucharist exemplify this proleptic character of the church.29 The church is oriented towards a future, which is already present now in concrete events. This emphasis on the anticipatory character of the church strengthens the understanding of apostolicity as a multifaceted reality.30 Implications of the Gospel gives an ecclesiological interpretation of the various aspects of apostolicity described in the report of the second dialogue round. Doctrine, worship and church order are ‘dimensions of the community’s life’.31 The text explores the various ‘necessities’ required of a church by elaborating on the relationship between the gospel and the church. Its approach is narrative, missiological and eschatological. The gospel as a shared narrative is the first necessity of the church as community. Shared narratives or stories shape the

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community. They shape the whole life (liturgy, polity, doctrine) of the church through witness. The content of the witness is the breaking through of the coming kingdom. This is what identifies a Christian community The principal consequence of this to the ecclesial order is evident. If the gospel as a story identifies a Christian community then the shape of the community is an implication of the gospel.32 Two things follow from this. Firstly, the ‘visibility’ of unity has to do with identity and ‘being able to be identified’. Second, it follows that the questions of unity and diversity or continuity of form and reform become, if possible, even harder. Implications of the Gospel ’s preliminary answer is interesting. While valuing the gospel narratives as fundamental to Christian identity, the document at the same time refuses to idealize the ordering or even the factual diversity of orders in the early church. Instead, the document states that the refusal to undertake evident and necessary reform can be an indication that a community has hardened itself against the gospel.33

Episcopacy as a Symbolic Function: Toward Full Communion (A-L 1991 usa TFC) The starting point of Toward Full Communion is the inherited impasse of conflicting Lutheran and Episcopal views of the relationship between the substance (res) of apostolicity and the sign (signum) of episcopal succession. While Lutherans would agree that the sign can exist without the substance and vice versa, the Episcopalians would tend to disagree.34 Instead of directly addressing the concerns of either the Lutheran or the Episcopal view, the document orients towards episcopacy as a ‘practical necessity’.35 This combines a reworked understanding of the sign and a proposal for undoing the dichotomy of ontological versus functional understanding of the ministry. Toward Full Communion focuses on the relationship between the sign of episcopal succession and the substance of apostolicity. According to the document, neither the Lutheran nor the Episcopal description of this relationship is fully adequate. The document makes a case for historic episcopate, yet does not refute the Lutheran claims for apostolicity without the necessity of episcopacy. The following statements form the core of the argument: 1 2 3 4

5

The church as witness to the reign of God in its worship, doctrine and polity is the primary implication of the gospel. Therefore, ecclesial order is an implication of the gospel and is of significance.36 No single institution is of the esse of the church; only the gospel is that.37 Apostolic succession is distinct from the institution of historic episcopate.38 Ministerial institutions have a symbolic function. ‘Symbolic’ here means that the ministerial institutions are ways to communicate the community’s identity both to the community itself and to other communities. Ordination is ‘gestural language’, which is used to communicate the selfunderstanding of a community.39 Presbyteral and episcopal successions do not have identical symbolic functions. Their symbolic functions are nevertheless not antithetical. ‘Since

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we believe that the Spirit has given utterance to both, the challenge is ‘‘to find ways of sharing and preserving both messages’’.’40 The text intends to cultivate common forms that will facilitate the maximum reciprocity and interchangeability of the ordained ministry.41

Toward Full Communion’s emphasis on the symbolic function of ministerial institutions reflects the ‘theology of coherence’ in The Niagara Report (A-L 1987), while at the same time developing an original approach to episcopacy as a sign. The asymmetrical relation between presbyteral and episcopal successions is especially significant. The document does not condemn either form of ordination. In principle, both presbyteral and episcopal ordinations can contribute to the apostolicity of a church. Both forms of ordination are implications of different emphasis within the Lutheran and Anglican communions.42 As signs, the forms of ordination are not interchangeable. Therefore, in a community that uses signs to communicate its identity, one cannot be substituted for the other. The document affirms that both forms of succession are in principle capable of serving the apostolicity of the church. Similarly, it affirms that Lutherans and Episcopalians have discovered a common confession of the gospel and a sufficient common understanding of episcopal ministry.43 Therefore, both can recognize one another’s ministries to be apostolic. A life in communion requires coherent communication and the common use of communicative signs. Although in principle both forms of ordination are valid, they cannot exists at the same time in one communion. Episcopal ordination is, according to Toward Full Communion, a sign par excellence and thus all the future ordinations should be episcopal.44 The document speaks of ‘receiving the gift of comparable, compatible and interchangeable forms of episcope’.45 Although the agreement results in suggesting that all ordinations be episcopal, it is quite clear that ‘episcopal’ does not mean ‘Episcopalian’. Both dialogue partners recognize the partiality and lack of faithfulness of their praxis as it stands.46 Entering into a new relationship is a new commitment to changes, not towards the expectations of the other but towards fuller faithfulness to the gospel.47 Still it is important to recognize how the document presents the ‘necessity’ of episcopacy. Adopting the historical episcopate is not ‘necessary’ in the sense of being either a necessary practical condition or doctrinal condition of full communion. The bringing about of a coherent ministry of oversight is a consequence of the full communion and in this sense is necessary.48

Evangelical and historic episcopacy: Called to Common Mission (A-L 1999 usa) Evangelical and historic succession and the theology of the sign Called to Common Mission’s greatest contribution to the dialogue process is the description of the episcopal succession as both evangelical and historic.49 This description follows from placing episcopacy in the context of witness and common

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mission: ‘The one ordained ministry’ is sought ‘for the sake of common mission’.50 Historic episcopate is witness to apostolicity. Called to Common Mission’s dual description of ‘historic’ and ‘evangelical’ is an implication of the substantial interpretation of apostolicity and the consequent mutual recognition of apostolicity made in Toward Full Communion. In the document’s substantial interpretation of apostolicity, succession is attributed to a number of elements, which taken together manifest the church’s apostolicity. ‘Evangelical and historic’ applies primarily to a variety of continuous practices in the church, the continuous use of the apostolic scriptures, the confession of the ancient creeds, the celebration of the sacraments and episcopacy.51 The ministry of oversight is one of the ways to express visibly and symbolize personally the church’s apostolic succession.52 Episcopacy as one of these continuous practices of the church is therefore ‘historic’ and ‘evangelical’. It is relative both to other ‘expressions and symbols’ and more importantly, to the gospel. This has consequences for the document’s perception of episcopacy as sign. Called to Common Mission describes episcopacy as a ‘sign, but not guarantee’ of apostolicity.53 The concept of ‘sign’ appears in three contexts: the church is described as ‘a sign, instrument and foretaste of the Kingdom of God’, the episcopal ordination is ‘a sign, though not guarantee of the unity and apostolic continuity of the whole church’ and episcopal succession as a sign shared by bishops.54 In elaborating on these various uses of ‘sign’, Called to Common Mission begins to develop a distinct ‘theology of the sign’, characterized by the two attributes of apostolicity, ‘evangelical’ and ‘historic’. The historic episcopate, understood as a sign, is an image pointing to a reality beyond itself. The sign is not self-sufficient but is continuously reconstructed by reference to the gospel. This is the ‘evangelical’ side of episcopacy as sign. The bishop’s role as a visible expression and symbolic presence of episcope relates to this evangelical side of the sign. Bishops fulfil their figurative role in their authentic action, in teaching, preaching and celebrating the sacraments. The sign is ‘historic’ when it is continuously present in the church. Neither the evangelical nor the historic aspect of episcopacy should be overemphasized. Focusing solely on the historic and symbolic sign over-emphasizes the formal presence of the symbol. Concentrating only on the exercise of the ministry produces an evangelical over-emphasis that makes the sign dependent on the bishop’s ability to fulfil episcopal functions. The ‘historic’ (figurative) and the ‘evangelical’ (functional) are necessary correctives to one-sided interpretations.55

Justified diversity? Called to Common Mission’s agreement has methodological similarities with the Lutheran–Roman Catholic form of consensus with difference. Neither agreement requires either of the churches to renounce their theological understanding. Confessional emphases are taken as gifts of the one tradition to the other.56 More than that, the differing emphases serve as correctives or ‘salutary warnings’57 against one-sided interpretations. The differing emphases do not contradict each other. Joseph Britton exemplifies this in the context of Called to Common Mission by showing how the concept of evangelical and historic episcopate brings out the

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evangelical undertones of Anglican understanding of episcopacy. Evangelity of the episcopate shields the church from hierarchism and historicity from schism by contextualizing the circumstances that give rise to them. Called to Common Mission was able to reach an agreement over episcopacy by describing the signifying function of the bishop and episcopal ordinations. Situating episcopacy in the context of the church’s mission to communicate its message with appropriate and effective signs helped to bridge the gap between the seemingly different intentions of the claims to ‘historicity’ and to ‘evangelity’. Called to Common Mission’s approach is innovative and laudable, but it raises questions about the possibility of justified diversity within the Lutheran–Episcopal community. In principle, the text embraces diversity. It situates the ordained ministry within the common ministry of all believers, exercised ‘in a diversity of forms, in fidelity to the teaching and mission of the apostles’. Both Lutherans and Episcopalians recognize that diverse forms of the ordained ministry can fulfil the criterion of being ‘apostolic’. For the sake of witness to the faith, the churches are nevertheless called to share ‘one ordained ministry’. This call for oneness appears to overcome at least part of the positive attitude towards diversity in ministry. The document makes a distinction between ‘the one ministry’ and the ‘function of the ministry (of oversight)’, exercised in various forms. This distinction intends to allow room for diversity in exercising one shared ministry. As an example, the document refers to diaconate, where the churches can share some diversified functions. In the discussion of the ministry of oversight, the distinction between ministry and the functions of the ministry is not equally clear. The text does not speak of ‘the ministry of oversight’ but of a shared episcopate. Is ‘a shared exercise of the ministry of oversight’ compatible with diversity of forms or does ‘shared’ mean sharing a form of exercising the ministry as well? In principle, the ministry can be exercised in diverse forms ‘in fidelity to the teaching and mission of the apostles’. This has been the case in the Lutheran and Episcopal communions while they lived in separation. It remains uncertain whether the diversity can exist within one community or whether it is perceived to be detrimental to the symbolic value of episcopacy.59 Called to Common Mission remains ambiguous on what in the ministry the churches already share, what they are aspiring to share and what they do not, for the sake of unity, need to share. Called to Common Mission does not unambiguously pursue the goal of ‘reconciled diversity’. It recognizes the shortcomings of both Lutheran and Episcopal ecclesiological principles and the practise of those principles. It recognizes that differing viewpoints are enriching and that sharing them is for the good of the churches.60 A fuller realization of what the churches have is possible through repentance, change and trying again together.61 In describing the new communion between Lutherans and Episcopalians, the document makes a methodological distinction between the beginning of a relationship of full communion and realizing it. The full communion will remain partially unrealized until ‘both churches determine that in the context of a common life and mission there is a shared ministry of bishops in the historic episcopate’. It was believed that the proposed practical changes would facilitate the realization of a full communion.62 These changes also reduce diversity in requiring, for example, certain uniformity in the

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exercise of ordinations. This call for similarity does not fit with the goal of ‘reconciled diversity’. At the same time a continuous existence of differences should not be idealized either. Called to Common Mission especially raised discussion about what changes can be implemented without losing a sense of ecclesial identity. Meg H. Madson has used the metaphor of ‘ecclesial DNA’ in describing the nature of acceptable changes. An unacceptable change is one that changes the ‘ecclesial DNA’ of a communion.63 Madson might be right in stating that some changes facilitated by ecumenical dialogues do facilitate changes in confessional identities. On the other hand, none of the ecclesial traditions has remained unchanged during their existence.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

A-L 1972 usa: pt. 1. Ibid. pt. 1. Ibid. pt. 2 D 4. Ibid. pt. 2 D 5. Ibid. pt. 2 D 2. Ibid. pt. 3. Ibid. pt. 1. Ibid. pt. 3 III. Ibid. pt. 1; pt. 3 IV 3. A-L 1981 usa: ‘Recommendations’ A II. A-L 1982 usa: 4 A-L 1981 usa: 81. This introduction, though offering important information on the methodology of the agreement, is not commonly reprinted. It can be found, for example, in Lutheran–Episcopal Dialogue: Report and Recommendations (Cincinnati, Ohio: Forward Movement Publications, 1981). A-L 1981 usa: 18–19. Ibid. 16–17. Ibid. 20. The diagram refers to the areas of pluralism as ‘areas of unexplored pluralism’ while the text speaks of ‘legitimate pluralism’. These descriptions have very different implications. Ibid. ‘Joint Statement on Apostolicity’ pt 1. Ibid. pts 3; 5. Ibid. ‘Recommendations’ A. Ibid. ‘Recommendations’ A 2. A-L 1982 usa: 4a; A-L 1981 usa: ‘Joint Statement on Eucharistic Presence’ 6. Cf. A-L 1981 usa: 13. Ibid., ‘Joint Statement on Justification’ D. Ibid., ‘Joint Statement on Eucharistic Presence’ 6. That a sufficient agreement has in fact been achieved is stated in A-L 1982 usa: 4. A-L 1988 usa: 5. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 47–8, 51. For ‘authority in the church’, see A-L 1991 usa TFC. A-L 1988 usa: 64–9. Criticism of Implications of the Gospel’s interpretation of ‘the gospel message’ can be found in Kenneth Appold, ‘On the Efficacy of the Gospel: Thoughts on the Gospel’s Implications’, in Inhabiting Unity: Theological Perspectives on the Proposed Lutheran–Episcopal Concordat, ed. E. Radner and R. R. Reno (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 199–205. A-L 1988 usa: 8–15, 44–50.

Episcopal–Lutheran Dialogue in the USA 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52. 53.

54. 55. 56.

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Ibid. 34. Ibid. 43. Cf. A-L 1981 usa: ‘Joint Statement on Apostolicity’ pt. 2. A-L 1988 usa: 43–50, 52. Ibid. 57. John Webster develops a similar approach with ‘the self-organizing power of the Gospel of Christ’ though without reference to this text. John Webster, ‘The Self-Organizing Power of the Gospel of Christ: Episcopacy and Community Formation’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 3/1 (2001): 69–82. A-L 1991 usa TFC: 10. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 75. Ibid. 70. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 87. Ibid. 89. Ibid. 90–91. Bruce D. Marshall, ‘The Lutheran–Episcopal Concordat: What Does It Say and Why Does it Matter?’, in Inhabiting Unity: Theological Perspectives on the Proposed Lutheran–Episcopal Concordat, ed. E. Radner and R. R. Reno (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 32– 51. The Concordat of Agreement was not adopted. The reasons are varied, some of which do not relate directly to the content of the document. Toward Full Communion and the Concordat of Agreement are not completely congruent in their argumentation, and this probably made it more difficult for the agreement to be adopted. Toward Full Communion argues in favour of ‘reintroducing’ the historic episcopate to the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ECLA) on two grounds: the common agreement on the gospel and the Lutheran confessional writings not condemning episcopacy as long as it serves the gospel. The Concordat of Agreement adds to this a third condition regarding the future threefold pattern of ministry (A-L 1991 usa CoA: 2, 8). This condition had not been discussed in Toward Full Communion and certainly contributed to the defeat of the Concordat of Agreement; cf. A-L 1991 usa CoA: 4. Though heavily debated, this condition is supported also by some Lutheran commentators, for example, Michael Root, ‘Conditions of Communion: Bishops, the Concordat and the Augsburg Confession’, in Inhabiting Unity: Theological Perspectives on the Proposed Lutheran–Episcopal Concordat, ed. E. Radner and R. R. Reno (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1995), pp. 53–4. The later Called to Common Mission extends and amends the argumentation in the Concordat of Agreement at this point. A-L 1999 usa: 8, 12. Ibid. 8. Called to Common Mission does not elaborate the argument but refers to ‘previous dialogues’. Presumably this means Toward Full Communion and The Niagara Report. A-L 1999 usa: 8. Ibid. 5, 6, 12. This description originates with Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry and is used even more extensively in other Anglican–Lutheran documents, such as Together in Mission and Ministry; see F&O BEM 1982: M38; A-L 1992 Porvoo: 51. A-L 1999: 5, 12, 19. Joseph Britton, ‘The Evangelity of the Episcopate’, Anglican Theological Review 85/4 (2003): 614–18. A-L 1999 usa: 13, 17. At this point, the text is lacking symmetry. The Episcopal Church ‘acknowledges and seeks to receive the gifts of the Lutheran tradition’ but similar acknowledgement is not made by the Lutherans. The Lutherans are to ‘receive the historic

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57. 58. 59.

60. 61.

62.

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episcopate’, but the text avoids stating that it is received from the Episcopal Church. The historic episcopate is received through participation in ordinations of bishops already sharing in the historical episcopate. Participating bishops come from both the Lutheran communion and the Episcopal Church. The participation of Episcopalian bishops is said to take place ‘in addition (to the Lutheran bishops) . . . as a symbol of the full communion now shared’ (ibid. 18–19). The intention is that the historic episcopate is received from participating Lutheran bishops and not from the participating Episcopalian bishop whose participation is a symbol of the full communion. The text is not completely clear and has been interpreted in various ways; see, e.g., Bruce D. Marshall, ‘Lutherans, Bishops and the Divided Church’, Ecclesiology 1/2 (2005): 25; J. Robert Wright, ‘Called to Common Mission: Our Best Opportunity’, Word and World 19/2 (1999): 180–81. L-RC 1999: 42. Britton, ‘The Evangelity of the Episcopate’, pp. 618–19. A-L 1999 usa: 7–8. A point of discussion is the ‘exception clause’ passed by the 2001 ELCA Assembly, which makes it possible for a person to be ordained by a pastor under restricted circumstances; see John S. Enslin, ‘Called to Common Mission, Is It Worth the Tribulation?’, in Discovering Common Mission: Lutherans and Episcopalians Together, ed. Robert B. Slocum and D. S. Armentrout (New York, NY: Church Publishing Incorporated, 2003), p. 61; Reginald H. Fuller, ‘Called to Common Mission: Some Marginal Questions’, in Discovering Common Mission: Lutherans and Episcopalians Together, ed. Robert B. Slocum and D. S. Armentrout (New York: Church Publishing Incorporated, 2003), pp. 135–6. A-L 1999 usa: 6. Ibid. 15–17, for Episcopalians; ibid. 18–21, for Lutherans. Discussion for and against the proposals has been lively. The supporting arguments generally tried to show that the satis est clause of Confession Augustana 7 does not exclude the possibility of re-establishing episcopacy. On the contrary, the supporters say, other references to the Schmalcald Articles (A SA: 10.1–3) show that the reformers were, under certain conditions, willing to put themselves under the jurisdiction of the Catholic bishops. The conditions refer to the bishops’ not refusing the proclamation of the pure gospel, that is, the evangelical teaching. For supporting arguments, see Carl E. Braaten, ‘Episcopacy and the ELCA’, Dialog 39/3 (2000): 214–21; Marshall, ‘Lutherans, Bishops and the Divided Church’; Wright, ‘Called to Common Mission’, pp. 180, 182–3. For arguments for and against, see ‘Dialogue in Dialog: Called to Common Mission’, Dialog 39/1 (2000): 145–51. Opposing arguments can also be found in Brian Lesemann and Erik Rottman, ‘Toward an Assessment of Called to Common Mission’, Concordia Theological Quarterly 65/4 (2001): 345–60; Meg H. Madson, ‘The Episcopal ‘‘No Spin Zone’’ ’, Dialog 39/4 (2000): 293–5; Meg H. Madson, ‘The Lutheran-Episcopal Concordat and Porvoo’, Lutheran Quarterly 13 (1999): 21–33; Meg H. Madson, ‘On Adopting Episcopal DNA’, Dialog 39/1 (2000): 68–9; Viktor Westhelle, ‘Augsburg Confession VII and the Historic Episcopate’, Dialog 39/3 (2000): 222–7. See also the material from the Word Alone network at www.wordalone.org. A-L 1999 usa: 14, 16. Cf. Paul Avis, ‘The Significance of Regional Agreements for International Dialogues: An Anglican Perspective’, in Eighth Forum on Bilateral Dialogues: The Implications of Regional Bilateral Agreements for the International Dialogues of Christian World Communions, ed. Alan D. Falconer (Geneva: WCC, 2002), p. 26. Madson, ‘On Adopting Episcopal DNA’, pp. 68–70.

Chapter 8 REGIONAL DIALOGUES: SELECTED EXAMPLES On the Way to Visible Unity (A-Ev 1988 Meissen) The conversations leading directly to On the Way to Visible Unity, usually referred to as the Meissen Common Statement, took place between the Church of England, the Federation of the Evangelical Churches in the German Democratic Republic and the Evangelical Church in Germany in 1985–88. The Meissen Common Statement describes the relationship of the participating churches and makes proposals for further development in their relations. The statement relies on the theological work done in the international Anglican–Lutheran and Anglican– Reformed dialogues and the multilateral Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry. The Meissen Common Statement places these agreements in a particular context defined, on the one hand, by the split between peoples caused by the Second World War and, on the other hand, a deep desire for reconciliation. It uses existing experiences of shared life in common faith as its momentum and expresses these experiences in theological language.1 The text signified one stage in a process which started before the Meissen process and continues after it.

From recognition to reconciliation The Meissen Common Statement perceives ecumenical progress as a gradual and intentional growth towards ‘full, visible unity’. This growth progresses in stages. ‘Stages’ refer to commonly recognized and authorized joint actions or practices and to stages in the ecumenical dialogue process. Issues in the first category include descriptions of the joint practices now made possible.2 The second category refers to progress made in the ecumenical process. The document presents ecumenical process as one of mutual learning and advancement of the church’s mission in a secular world.3 The goal of full, visible unity includes ‘a common confession of apostolic faith in word and in life’. The churches already ‘acknowledge an existing fidelity to the apostolic faith’ but look forward to making a common confession of this faith. Agreements in faith are part of this ecumenical process.4 They consist of agreement on the common confession of the basic trinitarian and Christological dogmas to which the Nicene–Constantinopolitan and Apostles’ Creeds testify.5 The text does not refer to the concept of ‘basic consensus’ but in practice focuses the area of agreement to the basics. ‘Basic’ in this context means those fundamental or primal

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doctrinal statements manifested in the ecumenical creeds. Full, visible unity implies a ‘common confession of apostolic faith in word and life’ and an agreement in faith as a basis for recommendations for further rapprochement. In the view of the Meissen Common Statement, the full, visible unity requires a consensus in faith and teaching.6 The Meissen Common Statement is a good example of how the churches’ understanding of ecclesial communion affects their ecumenical engagements. This close relationship between the theological understanding of the church and perceptions of the ecumenical process may also create confusion. This is especially the case with documents such as the Meissen Common Statement, which is concerned both with the church and with the ecumenical process. The document is a concise presentation of ecclesiology with the purpose of providing a basis for the ecumenical process of the participating churches. At the same time, the document itself represents a stage in the ecumenical process.7 The Meissen Common Statement’s primary function is to describe one ecumenical process of reconciliation. The document binds reconciliation as ‘ecumenical rapprochement’ with reconciliation as becoming reconciled with God and with other human beings. God’s will towards all of creation is to reconcile all in Christ (Versöhnung der Menschheit).8 The church, a ‘sign, instrument and foretaste’ of the eschatological reality where God’s will is fully realized, is a provisional embodiment of God’s will. The church is described as koinonia, a community of those reconciled with God and with each other (mit Gott und miteinander versöhnt). Growing ‘in faith into the fullness of Christ’ also means growth in unity.9 Reconciliation is a key concept both in the ecclesial understanding of the Meissen Common Statement and in its ecumenical method. Methodologically, the statement proceeds from recognition (anerkennen) to reconciliation (zum volle Einklang zu bringen).10 ‘Recognition’ refers to discerning matters of faith and consequently, recognizing authentic faith in the life and teaching of the other church. Recognition is a logical prerequisite of ecclesial reconciliation and the content of what is recognized is enumerated in the ‘points of agreement’. A lack of theological agreement, for example, on the question of historic episcopate, leaves the recognition (Anerkennung) of the ministries defective. In the case of ministry, the churches can recognize the ministries of the other church as ‘given by God and instruments of his grace’.11 Due to the remaining theological difference, the mutual recognition does not result in the full interchangeability of the ministries. It does, however, move the process forward so that the ordained ministers can share in the celebration of the Eucharist in a way that ‘advances beyond mutual eucharistic hospitality’. The text is not clear on how, for example, the ministries can be recognized as God-given instruments of God’s grace but how this recognition in itself does not imply the interchangeability of the ministries.12 The understanding of ecumenical process in the Meissen Common Statement is similar to that in the Lutheran–Episcopal dialogue. Both encourage various forms of cooperation and sharing of the Eucharist before full communion/full visible unity has been acquired. The documents differ in their perception of the timeframe of the reconciliatory process. The Lutheran–Episcopal Eucharistic sharing is ‘interim’, that is, it takes place between the present and the moment when full

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communion is reached. In the Meissen Common Statement, the understanding of the process of growing together is more open, almost eschatological. This is due to some uncertainty in describing the goal of the dialogue.13

Full visible unity? The Meissen Common Statement describes the church in relational terms as koinonia. Ecclesial community described as koinonia consists of two basic and interconnected relationships, the horizontal human–God relations and the vertical relationships between humans. The interconnectedness of these horizontal and vertical relations means that ‘as our churches grow in faith into the fullness of Christ, so they will themselves grow together in unity’.14 The Meissen Common Statement uses koinonia ecclesiology to bind the ecumenical process of the reconciliation of the churches to the reconciliation of all in Christ. This interconnectedness of ecumenical and ‘ecclesial’ reconciliation is elegant, but also a potential source of confusion. The Meissen Common Statement describes the ultimate form of unity, ‘perfect unity’ as an eschatological reality. A ‘perfect unity’ is realized in the coming of God’s kingdom. In this world the churches are to strive for a ‘full, visible unity’ (quotation marks in the original), but the relationship between this unity and the eschatological ‘perfect unity’ is not clear. The text differentiates between the ‘full, visible unity’ aspired to, ‘descriptions of unity’ and ‘the experiences of unity’. In addition, the churches already share a ‘real communion’, but again the relationship among this communion, the ‘full, visible unity’ and the ‘perfect unity’ is unclear.15 The document does not give a definitive description of ‘full, visible unity’ and the text implies that the participating churches in fact do not share a common understanding of the unity they pursue. They have entered an ecumenical process in which the churches ‘grow together’ and ‘the understanding of the characteristics of full, visible unity become clearer’. The already existing common understanding includes three characteristics: (1) a common confession of the apostolic faith in word and life, (2) the sharing of one baptism, the celebrating of one Eucharist and the serving of a reconciled, common ministry and (3) bonds of communion to ‘guard and interpret the apostolic faith, to take decisions, to teach authoritatively, to share goods and to bear effective witness in the world’. These bonds of communion possess personal, collegial and communal aspects and function as outward and visible signs of the communion.16 The text remains, however, unclear on what the churches are still missing from a ‘full, visible unity’. It also does not discuss further the theological understandings of ‘full, visible unity’.17 It does mention that in the Anglican view, ‘full, visible unity’ includes both a ‘historic episcopate’ and full interchangeability of ministries.18 From the document text alone it is not clear whether the ‘remaining difference’ in paragraph 16 refer to episcopal succession, the form of episcope exercised in the Anglican Communion, the notion of ‘historic episcopate’ or the idea of the full interchangeability of ministers. Ingolf Dalferth suspects that the question is not only about both the historic episcopate and the episcopal succession but also about the threefold ministry as such.19 In order to

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grasp the question more fully it will be necessary to look into the notion of full, visible unity more in detail. The contested notion in this phrase is ‘visible’ and therefore the presentation will focus on that. Visibility and the marks of the church Full, visible unity has become a standard way of describing Anglican understanding of the goal of ecumenical dialogue.20 Concepts in ecumenical theology are typically provisional or in the process of being defined. Accordingly, the concept of full, visible unity is by no means definitive, even in its Anglican use. Mary Tanner shows how, despite varieties in language, the basic idea of ‘full, visible unity’ can be found in all ecumenical dialogues Anglicans have participated in.21 The description of full, visible unity arises from the ‘marks’ (quotation marks Tanner’s) or characteristics of the ‘united church of the future’. These characteristics include: a common confession of the apostolic faith witnessed to in word and in life, being united in the life of the Trinity through a single baptism, the sharing of one eucharistic celebration, a common mission and shared evangelism, a single united ministry and ‘the need for structures or ‘‘bonds of affection’’ that enable the all in each place to know and to live out their underlying communion and unity which they share with all in every place’.22 It is significant, that Tanner does not refer here either to the four classical marks of the church (one, holy, catholic and apostolic)23 or to the four criteria of the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral for the reunion of the churches.24 How do these characterizations relate to each other and to the unity of the church? The Lambeth Conference of 1968 described the four elements of the Chicago– Lambeth Quadrilateral as an ‘indication of those gifts of God to the Anglican Communion which it has received as a part of the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church and also in part as an indication of what God is calling the whole church in history more fully to become’.25 This description relates the Quadrilateral with the four classical marks of the church, but does not identify it with them. It describes what has been given as gifts of God to the church, which is one, holy, catholic and apostolic and what the church in history is obliged to strive towards. In addition, the dynamics of God’s gift – our calling associated with the Quadrilateral – is in itself an ecumenical principle. According to this principle, God has already given the whole gift of God’s self-disclosure (scripture), common and authoritative answers to some questions implicit in scripture (creeds), union created in baptism (the sacraments) and ministry in a variety of forms (the ministry). Although God’s gift is complete, the church in history is not making use of the gift in a proper manner; God’s gift is calling the church in history to ‘fully become’ something that it not yet is. Christians are lacking in understanding of the scriptures, the creeds need a common reinterpretation, the churches need a deeper understanding of baptism and its significance to overcome separation in the Eucharist and the churches have various experiences of the one ministry given by God. The Chicago– Lambeth Quadrilateral is, in the words of the Lambeth Conference of 1968, ‘not a static formulation of positions in which Anglicans are entrenched’.26 These four features are necessary in that they have to be present in the church, but they are not sufficient in the sense that their mere existence does not guarantee their proper use. They are indicators of the gift given to the ‘one, holy, catholic and apostolic church’

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but not the oneness, holiness, catholicity or apostolicity as such. They are not marks of the church in an essential or ontological sense but conditional epistemic signs whose efficacy is dependent on the essential marks, for example, ‘oneness’.27 The distinction between two kinds of marks of the church is helpful in describing differences that the churches participating in the Meissen Common Statement potentially have on the goal of ‘full, visible unity’. Ingolf Dalferth takes advantage of these differences in a commentary on the Meissen Common Statement and relates them to a difference in the church’s being at the same time coram deo and coram mundo. The church coram deo refers to the church as a hidden reality, a truth that is believed and known. As opposed to this, the church coram mundo refers to the perceptible reality of the church as experienced in history. This distinction as made by Dalferth relates directly to the discussion about the marks of the church. The perceptible and experienced church needs to show that it is a real church. This cannot be done by referring to the four classical marks of oneness, holiness, catholicity and apostolicity, because they are marks of the church as it is believed coram deo. None of the churches in history (or coram mundo) manifests these marks unambiguously. The perceptible church (coram mundo) is a true church in so far as it is able to signal that the four marks are present and the presence of these signals in fact makes the churches perceptible in history. These perceptible marks that signal the essential marks of the church are the things needed for the administration of the congregatio sanctorum, that is, the proclamation of the word and administering the sacraments. Dalferth differentiates between essential marks (notae ecclesiae) and epistemic criteria (signa ecclesiae) of the church.28 Dalferth’s reasoning converges in essentials with the reformers in continental Europe, although the distinction between notae and signa ecclesiae in these words does not exist. Paul Avis, for example, asserts that for Luther the marks of the church were indicative, not constitutive, meaning that the marks function as signs to indicate the existence of the true church.29 What is at stake in regards to the Meissen Common Statement and the notion of ‘full, visible unity’ in general is at the same time how ‘visibility’ relates to the marks and the nature of the visible–invisible church distinction. The focal point of this discussion is the question of historical episcopacy. Visible versus invisible/hidden church The question of the visibility of the church is complicated by its prominence in classical Reformation theology. Part of the complexity arises from an inherent ambiguity in the distinction; the opposite of ‘visibility’ can be interpreted as either ‘invisibility’ or ‘hiddenness’. Invisibility and hiddenness relate to visibility in very different ways. While invisibility is the absence of visibility, hiddenness in fact requires visibility. The church as hidden is not ‘imperceptible’ but perceptible in the very thing that hides it. The church is hidden because true Christians are known only to God, and on earth the church remains a mixed company (corpus permixtum). The church as a community of those justified remains invisible. It can be recognized only through faith. The signalling marks of the church – preaching of the word, the administering of the sacraments and, in a secondary way, the ministry of word and sacrament – have a dual function. They are both constitutive and indicative. As the means by which God creates the

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community of the justified, they are constitutive to the church. At the same time, they have an indicative function in the sense that through them one can recognize church in its visible form.30 The invisibility of the hidden church refers, on the one hand, to an idea based on an Augustinian doctrine of double predestination where the company of the elect form a community only known to God and therefore remains invisible to humans in the church as we perceive it.31 On the other hand, it reflects the conviction of the reformers that the true nature of the church cannot be judged by any exterior greatness or manifest piety.32 In this sense, the church is not perceptible. The church’s hiddenness and the marks of the church belong essentially together. Dalferth emphasizes an essential difference between God’s word as a visible mark (both as the preached word and as the visible word of the sacraments) and the other marks by which the church can be recognized. God’s word constitutes the church as communio sanctorum. The other marks belong to the description of the church but do not constitute it.33 The ministry as such and especially the ministry of oversight would seem to constitute a special borderline case. Critics of the Meissen Common Statement have expressed concerns over the document’s perception of ministry as a mark of the church. For example, Dalferth holds quite firmly that in a strict sense the ministry is not constitutive of the church. Questions of ministry are therefore theologically subordinate to questions which relate to the fullest possible fellowship among Christians.34 This does not take away the assertion that a ministry of oversight is ‘necessary to witness to and safeguard the unity and apostolicity of the church’.35 The complex of problems and different sorts of challenges focus not on the ‘visibility’ of the unity, that is, if there can or should be visible, perceptible elements, which communicate the existence of one, true church. The focus is more on the specific kind of visible unity. For example, Dalferth asserts that the ‘visibility’ of unity refers to an unwarranted theological and structural uniformity. Dalferth argues against ‘unity as uniformity’ on various grounds. Most applicable to the Meissen Common Statement is his antipathy towards communio or koinonia ecclesiology, which, according to him, in its ecumenical use confuses a critical difference between community/communio (Gemeinschaft ) and commonality (Gemeinsamkeit). Dalferth’s claim is that especially in the Anglican ecumenical use, communio ecclesiology brings into the dialogue ‘sacramental, episcopal and papalist interests’ of a particular Anglo-Catholic kind. In Dalferth’s view, ‘visible unity’, applied in the context of koinonia ecclesiology, confuses community and commonality and consequently focuses falsely on the ministry in the service of the sacramental focus (i.e., the Eucharist) of koinonia.36 Dalferth’s linking of ‘visibility’ with organizational uniformity points to another discussion of ecumenical goals. In this discussion the focus is on the relationship between ‘full, visible unity’ and the classical model of ‘organic unity’ or ‘organic union’. Leslie Newbigin associates ‘organic union’ closely with early Anglican ecumenical endeavours and especially with the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral.37 In this Anglican context, organic union means ecclesial unity beyond practical cooperation in the mission field. Organic union is perceived as an association of churches and as ‘an outward, visible and united society, holding one faith, having

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its own recognized officers, using God-given means of grace, and inspiring all its members to the worldwide service of the kingdom of God’.38 Though the general idea of organic union encompasses an element of unity on an organizational level, the concepts of ‘organic’ and ‘organizational’ are not identical. Newbigin’s short description ends on a positive note with the idea of organic union, thanks to a biblical reference to the communion of Christians as the body of Christ.39 This stress on the living, organic character of Christian unity is emphasized also by Thomas Best in his description of organic unity as a goal of the Faith and Order movement.40 The notion of full, visible unity is aligned historically with the two above-mentioned models of unity and has been, at least implicitly, associated with an organizational interpretation of ‘organic unity’. Given the New Testament image of the church as the body of Christ one can assert that the unity of the church is (by definition) organic regardless of the visibility or invisibility of the unity. To summarize: the understanding of ‘full, visible unity’ is connected with ecclesiological questions that are highly relevant for the discussion of episcope. The Meissen Common Statement left open some of these questions, especially those relating to the constitutive or necessary function of the ministry.41 These questions were developed further in the Porvoo Common Statement, Together in Mission and Ministry. The Meissen Common Statement’s contribution to the question of episcopacy was to identify it as one of the ‘bonds of ecclesial communion’.

Bonds of ecclesial communion and episcopal succession In the Meissen Common Statement ‘bonds of communion’ are an essential element of the church as koinonia. Baptism establishes the church as koinonia. God’s grace through the word and sacrament sustains and nurtures the church as koinonia and the ordained ministry serves it. In addition, the church is ‘also held together by other bonds of communion’.42 The purpose of these bonds is to ‘enable the church at every level to guard and interpret the apostolic faith, to take decisions, to teach authoritatively, to share goods and to bear effective witness in the world’. The document describes these bonds as visible signs, that possess ‘personal, collegial and communal aspects’.43 Beyond that, the description of these ‘visible signs’ remains imprecise. Because the bonds are ‘visible’, they are not mere theological constructs, but rather address the life of the churches. The Lambeth Conference of 1988 associates ‘bonds of communion’ with the ideas of organic unity and the image of the church as the body of Christ.44 Many, though not all, functions of the ‘bonds of communion’ relate clearly to episcope or the ministry of oversight. This also suggests that in the context of the Meissen Common Statement, the ‘bonds’ should be interpreted as referring to episcope.45 Approaching the question of episcope through the bonds of communion allows a certain ‘limited openness’ towards differing ways of exercising the ministry.46 While the Meissen Common Statement does not reach any definitive conclusion on the ministry of oversight, the formulation is a step towards reaching an agreement on the large complex of questions relating to it. The main remaining questions are: (1) whether there should be a particular form of episcope, (2) whether a particular form of episcope should be

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understood as a necessary condition for full, visible unity and (3) how to understand the concepts of historicity and succession in relation to episcope. The questions will be discussed in reference to the Porvoo Common Statement, which advances beyond the Meissen Common Statement on this issue.

Together in Mission and Ministry (A-L 1992 Porvoo) The theological background to the Porvoo Common Statement, Together in Mission and Ministry, can be traced back to a series of theological conversations and to Anglo-Scandinavian theological and pastoral conferences that started in the early twentieth century.47 From the very beginning of the Anglican–Lutheran negotiations, it was evident that the questions relating to episcopacy were the source of greatest divergence.48 The Meissen Common Statement (A-Ev 1988 Meissen) and The Niagara Report (A-L 1987) were especially significant for the final text. The Porvoo Common Statement is explicitly indebted to the Meissen Common Statement. While the Porvoo Common Statement’s argumentation is very similar to that of the Meissen Common Statement, it exceeds it in its agreement on episcopacy.49 The dialogue is conscious of harvesting ‘the fruits of previous ecumenical agreements’ in order to ‘express a greater measure of common understanding, and to resolve the longstanding difficulties between us about episcopacy and succession’.50 Agreement as ‘having in common’ The Porvoo Common Statement describes both substantial and recognized theological points of consensus and formal ecumenical documents as ‘agreement’. ‘Agreement’ is a consequence of theological convergence, while convergence refers to a process of moving beyond particular ways of thought and clearing misunderstandings. Clearing up misunderstandings leads to a growing common understanding. Confessional theological perspectives do not hinder this common understanding, at least to the same extent as before.51 An increase in common understanding also denotes increase in how much diversity the relationship can bear. One of the most often repeated words in the Porvoo Common Statement is ‘common’. Anglicans and Lutherans face a common challenge to engage in mission, they have found that their churches have common ground and they describe the nature of church as koinonia, as ‘having in common’.52 The ‘having in common’ and the sharing of a common life are characterized by diverse and complementary gifts of the Spirit, which are ‘for the common good of the whole people’. The koinonia of life, action and mind, even in the manifest form of ‘visible unity’, is characteristically unity in the diversity of the gifts of the Spirit.53 The emphasis given to koinonia as legitimate diversity within the church has two consequences for the agreement. Koinonia encompasses diversity, which reflects the diversity of the gifts of the Spirit. The theological context is manifestly pneumatological and results in an emergent understanding of consensus with

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difference. The Porvoo Common Statement’s proposed consensus with difference is made possible by a distinction between ‘faith’ and ‘expressions of faith’. The purpose of a doctrinal dialogue is to focus on the different principles that have guided and do still guide the development of different expressions of faith. Fundamental unity in faith exists despite differences in expressions and differences in the theological emphases or principles, which give rise to the differences.54 Agreement in the Porvoo Common Statement is defined by the idea of ‘having in common’. It is rooted in koinonia ecclesiology and can be characterised as consensus, that is, having a common mind. This ‘having in common’ does not require taking up any particular doctrinal formulation of the distinctive traditions but it does require the churches to move towards in living in closer communion.55

Main elements and structure of the argument The vision of the church in the Porvoo Common Statement is characterized by instrumentality and a strong missiological vision. This understanding of the church grows out of koinonia ecclesiology. Central to this is the understanding of sharing life with each other and with the triune God. The church is the instrument through which God realizes God’s ultimate purpose.56 The church thus is constituted by the word and the sacraments.57 The proclaimed gospel summons the koinonia, baptism unites members with Christ and the Eucharist sustains the koinonia as the body of Christ. The ministry exists to serve this community, which is constituted by the word and the sacraments. In the Porvoo Common Statement, both the visible and the audible word and the ministry are necessary but their relation to the community is different. The word constitutes and ministry serves.58 The Porvoo Common Statement’s argumentation relies on the concepts of witness and service to bridge various areas of discussion. Witness and service are the means by which the churches participate in God’s mission and the reason why the fellowship that the church represents, is assembled.59 The churches also enhance the unity they already enjoy by witness and service. The connections among concepts of witness, service and apostolicity on the one hand and of witness, service and succession on the other are especially important. These connections can be arranged into two categories according to the kind of questions they answer, that is, the ‘whys’ and the ‘hows’ of the church’s witness. The ‘whys’ address the constitutive elements of the church’s being while the ‘hows’ refer to the ways in which the church actualizes its mission. The proclamation of the gospel constitutes the church. It is the fellowship of those brought together by God through the gospel proclamation.60 This is the source of ecclesial koinonia. Without it, the church does not exist: ‘The church and the Gospel are thus necessarily related to each other. Faith in Jesus, the Christ, as the foundation of the reign of God arises out of the visible and audible proclamation of the Gospel in word and sacraments.’61 The ‘why’ of apostolicity is found in living ‘in continuity with the apostles and their proclamation’.62 Apostolicity is a predicate of the whole church and realized through various means. The church has the responsibility to proclaim the gospel to all nations. This work, constitutive of the church, is to be conducted

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in ‘faithfulness to the normative apostolic witness to the life, death, resurrection and exaltation of its [the church’s] Lord’.63 Apostolicity is firstly continuity in the proclaimed message and in the fact of proclaiming the gospel. Since proclaiming the gospel and administering the sacraments requires a ministry, this means also continuity in ministry. The ordained ministry is nevertheless relative to both Word and sacrament and to the mission of the whole church.64 Ministry does not constitute the church. Its existence is necessary for the constitutive elements, the Word and the sacraments to be present and therefore also for the church to be apostolic. The Porvoo Common Statement uses a multitude of partially overlapping concepts to characterize the apostolic ministry and to describe how the church remains in faithfulness to the apostolic message. The most important of these concepts are the following: Apostolic succession (pars 39, 40, 46, 47, 56) Episcopal succession (pars 34, 50, 51, 52, 57) Apostolic continuity (pars 34, 52, 57) Apostolic ministry (pars 20, 25, 35, 41, 49, 55, 56) Ministry of oversight (pars 42, 44, 46) Episcopal ministry (pars 34, 49, 52, 54, 56) Apostolic succession of the ministry (par. 40) Apostolic succession in the episcopal office (par. 47) Historic episcopal succession (pars 50, 51, 52, 57) Historic succession of bishops (pars 34, 50) The apostolic ministry has the chief responsibility of preaching the word and administering the sacraments in the church.65 The argument used in the Porvoo Common Statement invoked concepts that allowed three methodologically important distinctions to be made. These are the distinctions between ministry and office, between succession and continuity, and between apostolic and episcopal succession. The document is especially challenging at the points where the argument moves from one concept in a pair to another (e.g., from ministry to office). Apostolicity is primarily a character of the whole church. It denotes faithful continuity in the proclamation and witness of the apostles and in the permanent characters of the church of the apostles. These include witness to the apostolic faith, proclamation and fresh interpretation of the gospel, celebration of baptism and the Eucharist, the transmission of ministerial responsibilities, communion in prayer, love, joy and suffering, service to the sick and needy, unity among the local churches and sharing the gifts which the Lord has given to each.66 Apostolic ministry is a ministry of service to the common life of the church. It is given by God and transmitted through the apostles. The apostolicity of ministry is constituted by its continuous service within the apostolicity of the whole church.67 The church intends to exercise apostolic ministry in fidelity

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to God’s gift of the apostolic ministry to nourish the church. Two signs, ordination in the historic episcopal succession (in intended continuity with the apostles) and prayer and the laying on of hands in ordination, signify this intention to exercise apostolic ministry and to remain faithful to God’s gift.69 The episcopal ministry or the ministry of oversight is for the coordination of God’s gifts both across the ages and in unity with Christians in other places. The ministry of oversight is exercised personally, collegially and communally.70 The bishop has the particular responsibility of oversight within the church. In this (episcopal) office bishops are representative pastoral ministers of oversight, continuity and unity.71 The apostolic succession in the episcopal office is a visible way of focusing the apostolicity of the whole church. Apostolic succession is signified in the ordination/consecration of a bishop in which in the laying on of hands the whole church calls upon God’s promise to pour out the Holy Spirit on the covenant people.72 The historic succession of bishops denotes successive ordinations of bishops (intended to go back to the apostles). It is maintained by episcopal ordination. The historic succession of bishops is not interrupted by an ordination of a bishop by priests. Bishops in historic succession by episcopal ordination are in episcopal succession.73

Points of discussion The understanding of apostolic succession represented in the Porvoo Common Statement is a continuation and implementation of The Niagara Report’s broad interpretation of apostolicity, whereby apostolic succession is not identical with episcopal succession. The former’s emphasis is primarily on the continuity of apostolic proclamation in the church’s witness and service, which is then signified by an apostolic succession in the episcopal office. The issue is nevertheless not as easy as distinguishing between the res of succession in apostolic witness and service from the signum of succession in ministry or episcopacy. This is because apostolicity is signified by a multitude of signa, none of which individually constitutes apostolicity. Within this multitude of signa, succession in the ministry has specific relevance because it is the specific responsibility of the ordained ministry to safeguard and express the church’s apostolicity. The Porvoo Common Statement makes a basic methodological distinction between ministry and ministers and a parallel distinction between continuity and succession. These basic distinctions are intended to clarify the variety of concepts used in reference to episcopacy. At the same time, they are a potential source of confusion. Dalferth has addressed a methodological problem arising from this distinction and especially from the use of both theological and functional or pragmatic justification of arguments. The Porvoo Common Statement justifies the existence of ordained ministry theologically and its organization as a threefold ministry pragmatically. When applied to episcopal ministry, the argumentation is

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reversed. The existence of episcope, an episcopal ministry, has a practical justification, while the specific form of episcope, the episcopal office is justified theologically. Dalferth finds this mixing of practical and theological justifications unacceptable since it leads to a confusion in what is required of the episcopal ministry and in the exercise of the office.74 In the Porvoo Common Statement the ministry is understood as existing to serve and function as a focus for the continuity of the church.75 Tjørhom raises the question of the necessity of particular individual signs. In Tjørhom’s view, individual signs cannot be seen as necessary requirements of ‘being apostolic’ in a valid way. Instead, churches should open up to as many ‘appropriate apostolic signs’ as possible in order to emphasize the importance of giving visible signals of the church’s intention to remain apostolic.76 Tjørhom’s proposal goes beyond the Porvoo Common Statement in stressing the visibility aspect of ministry in the service of apostolicity but is in line with, for example, the Meissen Common Statement and its stronger insistence on the visibility of unity. Tjørhom places the various ‘signs of apostolicity’ within a context of koinonia and calls for the churches to share in each other’s ‘signs of apostolicity’ and not insist one-sidedly on the existence of individual signs.77 Tjørhom’s interpretation comes close to Mary Tanner’s, which emphasizes the relational character of the understanding of apostolicity in the Porvoo Common Statement. Apostolicity comes out of the community’s relationship or participation in the Trinity, in its relation to the apostles and in social relations of the past, present and future.78 Tjørhom’s observation that the Porvoo Common Statement does not attempt to make explicit juridical claims on the validity or non-validity of the apostolic succession of a particular church is partly convincing. Although not explicit, the statement does make at least implicit or negative assertions on validity. It insists that neither the mere de facto continuity of the (episcopal) ministry nor the recognition of the existence of apostolic teaching is alone definitive for evaluating the apostolicity of ministry. The argument focuses more on the intentions that have guided the development of a variety of forms of ordination. The document argues that both episcopal and presbyterial ordination can be signs of intention to continue the apostolic character of the church.79 This assertion is the first step in what has been called the Porvoo Common Statement’s ecumenical breakthrough, which helps to re-evaluate different understandings of the relevance of episcopacy and succession.80 Points of discussion nevertheless remain. One of the most difficult is the transition from what Tjørhom calls ‘signs of apostolicity’ (in the plural) to episcopacy as a privileged sign (singular) of apostolicity. Tjørhom asserts that the sharing of signs of apostolicity is reciprocal, that is, that the Lutheran side is not a mere passive recipient of the sign of episcopacy.81 The idea of exchanging elements of apostolicity does not seem helpful here. It merely raises the question of what is the Lutheran contribution to this reciprocal sharing. Tanner’s description of apostolicity as ‘a rope of several strands of continuity’ has more explanatory power. In Tanner’s ‘rope’, the succession of bishops and the ordered succession in the historic episcopal sees are equally capable of maintaining the apostolic succession.82

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Tanner’s interpretation connects episcopacy and episcopal succession to the community, which the episcopal ministry serves through the historical sees of the church catholic. She does not, however, address any of the other signs of apostolicity. The connection between the episcopacy/episcopal succession and the community is intended to introduce the idea of the ‘historicity’ of succession without losing the context of the church’s koinonia, which is an essential element of the Porvoo Common Statement’s argument. Tanner avoids the problematic idea of reciprocal giving and receiving by describing apostolicity as a reality that becomes stronger when exemplified by several signs. Even in Tanner’s explanation the difficult transition from a plurality of signs to the one sign of episcopacy remains partial. Kristen Busch Nielsen, noting this problem, speaks of two ‘apostolicities’, a broader apostolicity, which characterizes the church as a whole, and a narrower apostolicity, which insists on linking apostolicity with episcopacy. As the argument proceeds, the wider apostolicity characteristic of the whole church and thus the ‘apostolic ministry’ is transformed to a narrower apostolicity of ministry and finally of episcopal ministry.83 This ‘evaporation’ of the idea of apostolic ministry and its substitution by episcopal ministry serves as a good example of the Porvoo Common Statement’s weaker attempts to move from the more comprehensive apostolicity to the specific sign of episcopacy. The document does make a substantial contribution in developing a ‘theology of sign’ to describe the episcopacy’s significance.84 The Porvoo Common Statement uses extensively a theological explication of ‘sign’ in striving towards agreement on episcopacy. The text uses the concept of sign frequently and not only in relation to episcopacy. With the theology of the sign the document attempts to describe what the sign is, and how and what it signifies. As to what ‘the sign’ is, the text gives several answers. The church is ‘a sign, instrument and foretaste of the Kingdom of God’.85 Historic succession86 or episcopal succession,87 the episcopal office,88 the ordination of a bishop in historic episcopal succession89 and the laying on of hands in episcopal ordination90 are all signs. Various signs related to ministry are partially overlapping while still signifying different things. The Porvoo Common Statement’s ecumenical breakthrough is found in what the sign signifies. The general purpose of ‘the sign’, common to all uses, is a bridge between the continuity of ‘the apostolic life and mission of the whole church’ and the ministry of oversight. In addition, the sign gives a visible and personal focus to these features of the church. The key word is continuity; it is what the sign signifies. The ordination/consecration of a bishop signifies continuity in the apostolic succession and the act of laying on of hands is ‘to do what the apostles did, and the church through the ages’, that is, to act in continuity with the apostles and the church.91 To ordain in historic succession is to ordain in an intended continuity from the apostles. Here the sign signifies the church’s continuous intention to care for its life and mission.92 This focus on the continuous intention, not the factual historical continuity is a result of a substantial interpretation of apostolicity as applied to episcopal ordination. To the question of how the sign signifies, the text does not contain many answers. The sign of the laying on of hands is called ‘effective’, that is, under certain circumstances it affects what it signifies.93 It is a

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conditional sign since it remains ambiguous without an accompanying prayer or declaration of its meaning. This means that the form of the rite of ordination is integral to the sign being operative. Discussion of the ‘theology of the sign’ has concentrated on the question of how the sign signifies. On the positive side both Michael Root and Henry Roelvik understand the sign as an intermediatory category bridging between a functional and an ontological understanding of episcopacy. As an intermediatory or an instrumental category, a sign can be necessary without being essential. Root finds that this way the concept of sign helps Lutherans to acknowledge a category between the essential and the non-essential (adiaphoron).94 Roelvik agrees with Root on the intention to use ‘the sign’ as an instrumental category to avoid either extremely functional or extremely ontological interpretations of episcopacy. In Roelvik’s opinion an instrumental sign as presented in the Porvoo Common Statement comes close to what the Roman Catholic Church ‘prefers to call a sacrament’.95 The Porvoo Common Statement uses the notion of sign to express the necessity of something, which is not in a strict sense essential and to overcome difficulties in perceiving episcopal succession as necessary in the sense of guaranteeing the apostolicity of a church. It clearly states that the sign is not a guarantee of the fidelity of a church to every aspect of apostolic faith, life and mission or of a particular bishop’s fidelity.96 Despite the Porvoo Common Statement’s best efforts, the nature of an efficacious sign, which does not guarantee the presence of what it signifies, remains unclear. Dalferth criticizes the documents theology of the sign especially because of this remaining ambiguity in the description of an effective sign.97 A church not using an effective sign or not using it correctly remains even in the best case in an irregular situation. For Dalferth, speaking of an effective sign carries unwanted and unclarified sacramental connotations. It ends up promoting a sacramental understanding of ordination to the ministry and to the episcopal office.98 Dalferth’s concerns are at least partly justified. It is clear that some commentators do perceive the Porvoo Common Statement’s explanation of sign in a sacramental way. For example, Tjørhom describes the document’s perception of the episcopal office ‘as a sign of continuity with the apostolic witness to Christ that is abidingly constitutive of the church – and, thus, as an effective bond of unity’.99 Tjørhom’s comment mentions the sign of episcopal office. However, the document does not speak only of the episcopal office (which all the signatory churches have) but makes claims about the nature and manner of ordinations as well. Tjørhom is in danger of failing to make the distinction between ministry and office. A failure to make this distinction is at the centre of Dalferth’s criticism. It is therefore difficult to see whether Tjørhom considers the specific instance of apostolic ministry or the more general apostolic witness to be constitutive of the church. Either way, Tjørhom seems to put more emphasis on the sign (of episcopal ministry) than does the Porvoo Common Statement itself. Eventually, the document considers ‘the promise of the Lord’ as the ‘ultimate ground of the fidelity of the church’.100 A final methodological note on theology of the sign would support Dalferth’s claim of the Porvoo Common Statement’s implicit sacramental undertone. One can agree with Roelvik that the document’s first concern was not to judge the

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canonical validity of ordinations. Some arguments in the document nevertheless bear a resemblance to classical Scholastic sacramental theology, in which the three elements determining a valid sacrament are the materia, forma and intentio of the sacrament. In Augustine, forma referred to the perceptible form of the sacrament. From the mid-twelfth century onwards, forma came to refer to the sacramental words, that is, the basic structure of the rite and especially the prayers used. During this time, the concept of materia started to be used in reference to the material elements of the sacrament. The third element, intentio, was used in Scholastic theology to safeguard the validity of a sacrament against doubts regarding the proper character of the person distributing the sacraments. Thus, for a sacrament to be valid it needs to be celebrated with the appropriate words or rite (forma), the appropriate material elements (materia) and with the intention of ‘doing what the church does’ (intentio faciendi, quod facit Ecclesia).101 These three classical principles have also been used by official Roman Catholic documents in ecumenical contexts to asses the validity of ordinations (sacred orders). An early example is from Leo XIII’s encyclical Apostolicae curae (RC Leo XIII 1896), which addressed the possible validity of Anglican orders. Leo XIII’s denial of the validity of Anglican orders was justified by three observations: (1) the Church of England introduced a new rite for conferring Holy Orders under Edward VI,102 (2) a change in the ordination rite denotes deviation from ‘the accustomed form of the church’ and (3) changing the wording of ordination prayers, that is, what in the ordination rite constitutes the priestly ordination, changes the materia of the ordination and expresses a lack of intentio since every reference to sacrifice ‘was deliberately removed and struck out’.103 Retaining the imposition of hands in the ordination is irrelevant since the materia (of the imposition of hands) receives its proper signification from the forma.104 Therefore, all three required elements are lacking and the Anglican orders cannot be held valid.105 In the Porvoo Common Statement all three arguments of intentio, forma and materia are used. The consecration of a bishop through prayer and the laying on of hands is an effective sign. The sign is effective in four ways. Firstly, it bears witness to the church’s trust in God’s presence by calling upon God to pour out the Holy Spirit. Second, it expresses the church’s intention to be faithful, ‘to do what the apostles did, and the church through the ages’. Thirdly, the presence of other bishops signifies the other church’s acceptance of the ordination, and fourthly, the consecration transmits ministerial office and its authority. Therefore, in the prayer and laying on of hands, form and matter are present. The intention of doing what the apostles did and what the church through the ages has intended to do completes the three aspects. With the requirement of episcopal ordinations, the Porvoo Common Statement conforms in essentials to the requirements of the sacrament of orders in the Roman Catholic Church.106 The substantial understanding of apostolicity and predicating apostolicity to various signa also allows Lutherans and Anglicans to recognize apostolicity where the factual succession of episcopal ministers has been discontinued. Even here, the main argument for asserting that apostolicity is not lost is the intention to stay in apostolic continuity and to manifest it with appropriate visible signs. This observation does not undermine the Porvoo Common Statement’s ‘ecumenical breakthrough’ in describing the relations

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between apostolicity and episcopacy. It does make it harder to apply this theological breakthrough beyond Lutheran churches that already have bishops in either factual or intended succession. Notes 1. The connectedness of human and Christian unity presented in the introductory parts of the Meissen Common Statement is also clearly visible in the texts of the 1988 Lambeth Conference; see A Lambeth 1988: ‘Ecumenical Relations’. 2. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: I.6–8; These kinds of declarations have implications for the legislation of the signatory churches. Cf. canons B43 and B44 and the paragraph on ‘Churches designated pursuant to the Church of England’, Ecumenical Relations Measure 1988 in A Canons. 3. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: Introduction 7, I.4–5, VI.9. The perception of ‘unity in stages’ as described in the Meissen Common Statement has become a model for various later agreements between the Church of England and other Lutheran/Reformed churches; see Avis, ‘Significance of Regional Agreements’, pp. 23–8. 4. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 8, 12, 14. 5. Ibid. 15(ii). 6. Dalferth agrees that agreement or consensus in faith is needed for the full, visible unity of the church but identifies ‘agreement in faith’ with confession (Bekenntnis). Dalferth thus identifies consensus in faith and teaching with the confession of faith but at the same time differentiates between the church constituting a unity of faith (opus Dei ) and the teaching/ doctrine and confession (opus hominum). The existence of a doctrinal consensus implies for Dalferth that the churches in question share a regula fidei, that is, a confession by which the orthodoxy of the churches is judged; see Ingolf Dalferth and Paul Oppenheim (eds), Einheit bezeugen: Zehn Jahre nach der Meissener Erklärung/Witnessing to Unity: Ten Years after the Meissen Declaration (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 2002), p. 107. This interpretation of agreement in faith being a basic presupposition of church fellowship is supported by Hill and Tjørhom in A-L 1992/19892. It is possible to agree with the claim that agreement in faith is a basic assumptions of church fellowship without interpreting ‘agreement in faith’ as common confession (Bekenntnis) in the way Dalferth does. 7. Cf. Mary Tanner, ‘The Meissen Common Statement: Provenance and Content’, in Leuenberg, Meissen and Porvoo: Consultation between the Churches of the Leuenberg Church Fellowship and the Churches involved in the Meissen Agreement and the Porvoo Agreement, ed. W. Hüffmeier and Colin Podmore. Leuenberger Texte 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 1996), pp. 70–74. The Meissen Common Statement has two originals, one in English and the other in German. Both texts ‘are equally authentic’. One should exercise caution because the linguistic division also marks a division between Anglican and German ‘evangelical’ theology. Potential problems arise, for example, in the use of such central ecclesiological concepts as communion/community/fellowship and the equivalent German Gemeinschaft. An EKD document on the Protestant Understanding of Ecclesial Communion points out ambiguities in translation and proposes the use of ‘communion’ as a translation for Gemeinschaft; see EKD Protestant 2001: f 5. Clarifying footnotes have been added in the English translation. The document also observes a need for further clarifications of the nature of the ecclesial communion envisaged in recent ecumenical dialogues, also in the Meissen Common Statement; see EKD Protestant 2001: Introduction. Characterizing the church as ‘a divine reality’ in the English translation and ‘von göttlicher Wirklichkeit’ in the German text is another cause for concern (A-Ev 1988 Meissen: I.3). To demonstrate some possible instances of confusion I have added the German phrases in brackets alongside the direct quotations in English. 8. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 3. 9. Ibid. 5–6.

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10. Ibid. 19. 11. Ibid. 16. In the case of the ministry, there is some ambiguity about what in fact needs to happen before the full interchangeability of the ministries can be realized. Paragraph 16 refers to the differing attitudes towards historic episcopate, that is, the Anglican perception of both the historic episcopate and full interchangeability as parts of full, visible unity. Because of differences in understanding a particular form of episcope as a necessary condition for full, visible unity, there is no interchangeability of ministries. In par. 17 the text refers to the ‘reconciliation of our churches’, which ‘makes possible the full interchangeability of our ministries’ (wenn sich unsere Kirchen in vollem Einklang befinden). 12. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 17A(iii)–17B(vi). Paolo Ricca, for example, argues that the recognition of ministries implies their interchangeability. Ministry is God’s gift to the whole church not to one of the churches; consequently, if two churches can recognize the existence of this ministry in another church, then the ministries are interchangeable; see Paolo Ricca, ‘Kritische Anfragen an Meissen aus der Sicht einer Kirche der Leuenberger Kirchengemeinschaft’, in Leuenberg, Meissen und Porvoo: Konsultation zwischen den Kirchen der Leuenberger Kirchengemeinschaft und den an der Meissener Erklärung und der Porvoo-Erklärung beteiligten Kirchen: Liebfrauenberg, Elsass 6. bis 10. September 1995, ed. W. Hüffmeier and Colin Podmore. Leuenberger Texte 4 (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 1996), pp. 83–6. 13. Dalferth has argued that from ‘a Protestant point of view’ the Meissen Common Statement demonstrates an agreement already sufficient for entering ‘a full church fellowship’; see Ingolf Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop according to Meissen and Porvoo: Protestant Remarks about Several Unclarified Questions’, in Visible Unity and the Ministry of Oversight, ed. Rupert Hoare and Ingolf U. Dalferth. The Second Theological Conference Held under the Meissen Agreement between the Church of England and the Evangelical Church in Germany (London: Church House Publishing, 1997), p. 27. 14. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 6. 15. Ibid. 7, 9. 16. Ibid. 8. 17. The second theological conference held in accordance with the Meissen Common Statement, entitled ‘Episcope in History, Theology and Praxis and the Future We Share’ noted the need to clarify the meaning of ‘full, visible unity’ and discussed this theme in the third consultation under the title ‘The Unity We Seek’. For papers from the consultation, see Rupert Hoare and Ingolf Dalferth (eds), Visible Unity and the Ministry of Oversight. The Second Theological Conference held under the Meissen Agreement between the Church of England and the Evangelical Church in Germany, West Wickham, March 1996 (London: Church House, 1997). Documents from the fourth and fifth conferences can be found in Dalferth and Oppenheim (eds), Einheit bezeugen. For a description of the dialogue process, see A-Ev 2002. Cf. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, p. 10. 18. The historic episcopate and the full interchangeability of ministries each relate differently to the Anglican understanding of full, visible unity. The historic episcopate is one of the four conditions mentioned in the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral, and it can thus be perceived as a necessary condition for full, visible unity. Full interchangeability of ministries is a feature of the full, visible unity but more as a consequence than as a condition. This is also implied later in A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 16. 19. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, p. 18. Dalferth in general associates the goal of visible unity with a ‘clericalization’ of ecumenism; see Auf dem Weg, pp. 257–363. At times Dalferth seems to imply that not only the particular question of episcopacy but the whole idea of ‘visibility’ goes against a Protestant understanding of the church. The argument is elaborated in Auf dem Weg, pp. 14–17, 22–4, 36–44 and in a longer chapter on pp. 195–244. Ulrich Kühn suggests that a Protestant understanding need not rule out the possibility of a threefold ministry; cf. Ulrich Kühn, ‘The Office of Bishop in the Liturgical Formularies of the Churches of the EKD’, in Visible Unity and the Ministry of the Oversight. The Second Theological Conference held under the Meissen Agreement between the Church of England and the Evangelical Church in Germany, West Wickham, March 1996 (London: Church

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20.

21.

22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30.

31.

Agreeable Agreement

House Publishing, 1997). Cf. Risto Saarinen, ‘Sichtbare Einheit und Extrinzesimus’, in Unitas visbilis: studia oecumenica in honorem Eero Huovinen, episcopi Helsingiensis, ed. Jari Jolkkonen, Kari Kopperi et al. Schriften der Luther-Agricola Gesellschaft 57 (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola Gesellschaft, 2004), p. 222. For Dorothea Wendebourg part of the problem is that if Anglican bishops were invited to participate in ordinations then the EKD churches could be interpreted to have ‘slip[ped] into historical continuity’; see Dorothea Wendebourg, ‘The One Ministry of the One Church’, in Witnessing to Unity: Ten Years after the Meissen Declaration, ed. Ingolf Dalferth and Paul Oppenheim (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 2003), pp. 332. Cf. David Carter, ‘Recent Anglican-Protestant Dialogue within the Meissen Agreement’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church 4/1 (2004): 84, 88. The ‘visibility’ of unity was also emphasized in the work of the Faith and Order movement and became attached to the WCC’s perception of the goal of the ecumenical movement in the WCC Assemblies in New Delhi (1961) and Nairobi (1975); see WCC 1961: I.2; WCC 1975: II.2. The occurrences are by no means independent as can be seen, for example, in Mary Tanner’s presentation on Anglicanism and the ecumenical movement: Tanner, ‘The Ecumenical Future’, p. 380. Mary Tanner, ‘The Goal of Unity in the Theological Dialogues Involving Anglicans’, in Einheit der Kirche: Neue Entwicklungen und Perspektiven, ed. Gunther Gassmann and Peder Nørgaard-Højen (Frankfurt am Main: Otto Lembeck, 1988), p. 76. Tanner, ‘Goal of Unity’, pp. 76–7. There is a variety of lists of ‘the marks of the church’. Calvin explicitly spoke of two or three marks (Word, sacraments and discipline); see PRE 2004 can. Luther spoke of the seven marks of the church (the Word of God, the sacrament of baptism, the sacrament of the altar, the office of the keys, consecrating or calling of ministers, prayer, the possession of the sacred cross or suffering); see Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (eds), Marks on the Body of Christ (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1999). An interesting parallel can be found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church. The unity of the church, which is of the essence of the church, is marked by diversity. Still Christians are to maintain ‘the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace’ (Eph. 4.3) (RC Catechism: 814). Changing from the singular ‘bond of peace’, the text continues to speak about the ‘bonds of unity’, which are both of the invisible and the visible kind. The visible bonds of communion are the profession of one faith received from the apostles, the common celebration of divine worship, especially of the sacraments, and the apostolic succession through the sacrament of Holy Orders (RC Catechism: 815). A Lambeth 1968: 123. Ibid. 124–5. Stanley J. Grenz is of the opinion that in the classical interpretation the four marks of the church belong to the essence of the church. Grenz argues that the basic difference between what he calls a ‘high church’ tradition and the Protestant tradition is in the understanding of how to guarantee the trueness of the church. The ‘high church’ opinion identifies the church with apostolicity interpreted as the continuity of the episcopal ministry, whereas the Protestant view emphasizes the relationship with Christ created by the proclamation of the word and the administration of the sacraments; see Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Vancouver: Eerdmans and Regent College Publishing, 1994), p. 468. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, p. 41. Paul Avis, The Church in the Theology of the Reformers (London: Marshall, Morgan & Scott, 1981), p. 16. Hans Friedrich Geissen, ‘Über die Schwierigkeiten evangelischer Theologie mit der Sichtbarkeit ihrer Kirche, unter Berücksichtigung ökumenische Reflexe’, in Unsichtbare oder sichtbare Kirche? Beiträge zur Ekklesiologie, ed. M. Hauser. Ökumenische Beihefte 20 (Freiburg: Universitätsverlag Freiburg, 1992), pp. 50–51. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematische Theologie (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993), 3:126.

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32. Avis, The Church in the Theology of the Reformers, p. 19. 33. See Luther’s explanation of the seven marks of the church in Von den Konziliis und Kirchen (WA 50:629; Eng. trans: On the Councils and the Church [LW 41:148–68]). 34. Cf. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, pp. 10–11; EKD Protestant 2001: I 1. 35. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 15(ix); A-L 1992 Porvoo: 32 k. The wording is similar to Luther’s (WA 50:633; LW 41:148–68). 36. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, 15 n. 7. Dalferth quotes Mary Tanner’s description of koinonia as it is appears in the (early) ARCIC. It is uncertain how ‘anglican’ the view is when it appears in a dialogue document. It can be said (1) that a formulation of an ecclesiological vision in an ecumenical context has its own value despite the fact that the formulations are necessarily provisional and (2) that the Anglican self-understanding of episcopacy is also in the process of change and the changed perception has been influenced by the ecumenical dialogues in which the Anglican Communion is engaged; see Tanner, ‘The Ecumenical Future’, pp. 387–9. Dalferth’s criticism is adequate from the viewpoint of Lutheran/Protestant theology, but its applicability to Anglican theology at this point is not clear. Dalferth and Tanner converge in seeing the ecumenical process fundamentally as a creative process; see Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, p. 11; Tanner, ‘The Ecumenical Future’, p. 387. 37. Leslie Newbigin, ‘Union, Organic’, in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Nicholas Lossky (Geneva: WCC, 2nd edn, 2002), pp. 1160–61. 38. A Lambeth 1920: Resolution 9 ‘Appeal to all Christian People’ I. The appeal does not quote the Chicago–Lambeth Quadrilateral directly when describing what is included in the visible unity of the church. Paragraph VI lists the Holy scriptures, the creeds, the two sacraments of baptism and Eucharist and ‘a ministry acknowledged by every part of the church as possessing not only the inward call of the Spirit, but also the commission of Christ and the authority of the whole body’. The episcopate is mentioned as ‘the one means of providing such a ministry’ (par. VII). The acceptance of this means is assumed to precede union but its position as ‘means’ should be noted. 39. Newbigin, ‘Union, Organic’. 40. Thomas Best, ‘Unity, Models of ’, in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Nicholas Lossky (Geneva: WCC, 2nd edn, 2002), pp. 1173–5. 41. Cf. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, p. 15. 42. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: II.4. 43. Ibid. II.8. 44. E.g., A Lambeth 1988: 140. 45. A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 15(ix). Similarly Bernard Sesboüé, ‘Authority’, in Dictionary of the Ecumenical Movement, ed. Nicholas Lossky (Geneva: WCC, 2002), p. 82; F&O BEM 1982: M26–27; A-Ref 1984: 6; A Lambeth 1988; A Episcopal 1990: 136–54; A Virginia 1990: 5.2. 46. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, p. 105. The Virginia Report of the Anglican Consultative Council speaks of ‘structures of interdependence’, which include features of both Reformation and Catholic tradition. These are the threefold ministry and a structure of decision-making ensuring the participation of both lay and ordained, the independent synodical provinces under the bishops’ authority (in locally adjusted forms), the interdependence of provinces maintained by the archbishop of Canterbury, the Lambeth Conference, the Anglican Consultative Council and the Meeting of the primates; see A Virginia 1990: 3.V. 47. The theological conversations resulted in agreements on interim eucharistic hospitality by the Church of England and the Church of Sweden (1909), the Evangelical–Lutheran Church of Finland (1934) and the Lutheran churches of Estonia and Latvia (1938). The AngloScandinavian Theological Conferences began in 1929 and the Anglo-Scandinavian Pastoral Conferences in 1978. 48. See A-L 1910; cf. Root, ‘The Ecumenical Identity of the Lutheran World Federation’, p. 23. 49. Cf. A-L 1992/19891 and the two preparatory texts by Christopher Hill and Ola Tjørhom (February 1989) (A-L 1992/19892) and Stephen Sykes and Ola Tjørhom (October 1989) (AL 1992/19893). 50. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 6.

168 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83.

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Ibid. 4–5. Ibid. 7–9, 15–16. Ibid. 4, 15–16, 19, 23, 58 i, 59. The difference rise out of differences in emphasizing either the importance of liturgy (lex orandi) or doctrinal confessio (lex credendi ). Anglicans and Lutherans have different emphases but they both perceive lex orandi and lex credendi as being closely related. The Anglican and Lutheran confessional writings differ by origin and purpose but both of them are seen to ‘retain a common understanding of the nature and purpose of the Church and a fundamental agreement in faith’ (ibid. 29; emphasis added). Ibid. 33. Ibid. 15, 18; cf. Ola Tjørhom, ‘The Porvoo Statement: A Possible Ecumenical Breakthrough?’, Ecumenical Review 46/1 (1994): 99. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 17. Here the Porvoo Common Statement’s ecclesiology seems more coherent than Meissen’s, though they consist of very similar elements. Emphasizing the constitutive character of the word and the sacraments clarifies the relationship between the different marks of the church; cf. Dalfert’s criticism in ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, p. 15. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 5, 26. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 17. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 32 j. Ibid. 41. Ibid. 36. In the Porvoo Common Statement succession is primary associated with apostolicity, which gives (substantial) continuity primacy over (formal) traditions; see Henry Roelvik, ‘Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Statement’, One in Christ 30/4 (1994): 346, 348. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 25, 35. Ibid. 41, 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 42–4. Ibid. 43. Ibid. 46–7. Ibid 34, 50. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, pp. 31–2. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 40. Ola Tjørhom, ‘Apostolic Continuity and Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Common Statement: A Challenge to the Nordic Lutheran Churches’, Louvain Studies 21 (1996): 128; Ola Tjørhom, ‘Apostolicity and Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Common Statement – Necessary or a Mere ‘‘Optional Extra’’ in Church’s Life?’, in Apostolicity and Unity. Essays on the Porvoo Common Statement, ed. Ola Tjørhom (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Cambridge: Eerdmans and WCC, 2002), pp. 162–81. Tjørhom, ‘The Porvoo Statement’, p. 100. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 34; cf. Mary Tanner, ‘The Anglican Position on Apostolic Continuity and Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Common Statement’, Louvain Studies 21 (1996): 120. Cf. Tanner, ‘The Anglican Position’, p. 124. E.g., Roelvik, ‘Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Statement’, p. 348. Tjørhom, ‘Apostolicity and Apostolic Succession’, p. 177. Tanner, ‘The Anglican Position’, p. 123. Kristen Busch Nielsen, ‘Apostolicity and Succession in the Porvoo Common Statement: Without Confusion, Without Separation’, in Apostolicity and Unity: Essays on the Porvoo Common Statement, ed. Ola Tjørhom (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Geneva: Eerdmans and WCC, 2002), pp. 188, 192–3.

Anglican–Lutheran: Regional Dialogues 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92.

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So labelled by Dalferth in ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, p. 33. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 18, 22, 32 f. Ibid., Foreword 9, 35, 51. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 32 k. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 47–8. Ibid. 46–7. Ibid. 48, 50. The ‘sign of ordaining a bishop’ is distinguished from the ‘sign of ordaining a bishop to intended historic continuity’. 93. Ibid. 48. 94. Michael Root, ‘Anglican–Lutheran Relations: Their Broader Significance’, One in Christ 30/1 (1994): 23–4. 95. Roelvik, ‘Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Statement’, p. 347. Cf. Root, ‘Anglican– Lutheran Relations’, p. 23. Roelvik sees that ‘apostolicity’ in the Porvoo Common Statement is compatible with the Roman Catholic understanding where ‘signs’ are perceived as guarantees; see Roelvik, ‘Apostolic Succession in the Porvoo Statement’, p. 348. 96. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 51. 97. Ibid. 48. 98. Dalferth, ‘Ministry and the Office of Bishop’, pp. 33–4. 99. Tjørhom, ‘The Porvoo Statement’, p. 100. 100. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 46. John Hind has a sacramental understanding of the Porvoo Common Statement’s ‘sign’. He attempts to broaden the understanding of ‘sacramental’ in the direction of the word of God and its authority in the church; see Hind, ‘Sign But Not Guarantee’: Reflections on the Place of the Historic Succession of Bishops within the Apostolic Continuity of the Church in Some Current Ecumenical Texts’, in Apostolicity and Unity: Essays on the Porvoo Common Statement, ed. Ola Tjørhom (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002), pp. 146–62. 101. Gunther Wentz, ‘Sakrament, I Kirchengeschichtlich’, in Theologische Realenzyklopädie, ed. Gerhard Krause and Gerhard L. Müller (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), 29: 667, 669–760. 102. RC Leo XIII 1896: 3. 103. Ibid. 24, 31. 104. Ibid. 24. 105. Ibid. 33, 36. Cf. Yarnold, ‘A New Context’, p. 64–75. The same three elements are mentioned in Pope Pius XII’s Sacramentum Ordinis (RC Pius XII 1947: 4). 106. A-L 1992 Porvoo: 47–8. Cf. RC Catechism: 1573.

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PART V

THE POSSIBILITY OF CONSENSUS: A SYNTHESIS

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Chapter 9 CONSENSUS IN BILATERAL DIALOGUES Methodological focus Doctrinal dialogues have become prolific in terms of the number of documents published. Despite the success of bilateral dialogues, the whole idea of ‘consensus ecumenism’ has become contested. Criticism of consensus ecumenism derives from various outlooks on the relationship between church and consensus. Does the church need consensus? What is the ecclesial relevance of ecumenical consensus? Differences in perceiving the ecclesial status of consensus lead to disagreements regarding the goal of ecumenism: does it include agreement on doctrine? This often latent disagreement is fuelled by a general frustration over the implications or implementation of ecumenical dialogues.1 In addition to these ecclesiologically motivated disagreements, there are also disagreements regarding the metatheological or philosophical assumptions underlying the ecumenical discourse. Contemporary ecumenical debate oscillates between two opposite poles: a ‘consensus ecumenism’ and an ‘ecumenism of difference’. ‘Consensus ecumenism’ understood in a pejorative sense refers to a quest for agreement as uniformity of beliefs. As opposed to this, the ‘ecumenism of difference’ asserts that to incorporate differences into consensus is ‘semantically ambiguous’2 or produces a ‘deformed concept’.3 Neither approach produces a plausible notion of ecumenical consensus. Ecumenical consensus appears either as a call for unwarranted uniformity or as a confused concept. Therefore, it is claimed, ecumenical efforts should abandon consensus in favour of a model that starts from differences, not from a goal of consensus. Criticism of ecumenical consensus originates from two different discourses, a theological–ecclesiological discourse and a meta-theological–methodological discourse. Accordingly, the understanding of what essentially is doctrinal consensus and how it can be defended draws on both discourses. These two discourses are partially overlapping and diffuse. In the following section, I will give a certain priority to the meta-theological–methodological discourse. This priority is based on the strong influence of intellectual or conceptual frameworks in explicating theological and ecclesiological beliefs. This meta-theological discourse concerns fundamental questions, that cause uncertainty about the viability of ecumenical consensus. Perhaps the most crucial of these is if, and on what grounds, it can be argued that diversity and consensus can coincide. In moving towards a consensus that encompasses diversity, ecumenical theology and ecumenical method are

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challenging and challenged by conventional theological and philosophical arguments. There appears to be a theological imperative suggesting that it must be possible for the church to have consensus on beliefs without the loss of diversity. At the same time, there are weighty philosophical arguments suggesting that one cannot sustain a serious argument for justified diversity and simultaneously speak of consensus or vice versa. If this is so, it would seem that the theological acceptance of a consensus in diversity would also depend partly on the kind of theological approach that is chosen. My proposal is as follows: combining unity and diversity under one concept of ‘consensus with difference’ becomes possible through developments not only in the willingness of churches to engage in dialogue but also in consequent developments in the understanding of theology and doctrine. More attention should be paid to the nature of ecumenical theology in relation to theological and intellectual trends such as modernity and postmodernity. Ecumenical theology, knowingly or not, facilitates changes in theological paradigms by challenging conventional ways of thinking, arguing and conceptualizing thoughts. The short history of ecumenical theology bears witness to the great extent to which ecumenical dialogues draw from their surrounding intellectual contexts. In the remaining chapters, my goal is to demonstrate the gradual development of various understandings of how consensus could be pursued in ecumenical dialogues and assess the viability of these proposals. Central to the discussion is how the churches believe that a consensus could exist with differences and not merely in spite of difference. I will first return to the results of my analysis of the three bilateral dialogue processes among Anglicans, Lutherans and Roman Catholics. For the most part in the preceding section I have concentrated on individual dialogue processes treating each separately. This has been due to a growing realization of the particular nature of some ecumenical questions. Confessional theological assumptions show strong influence of the emerging ecumenical consensus. Still, dialogue processes do not proceed in isolation. Conceptual and methodological findings are taken up from local dialogues and received and are implemented on the international level. Theological approaches are taken up and implemented in various dialogues regardless of their place of origin. Similarities and differences in approach between and within dialogue processes have given rise to the question of the compatibility of the agreements.4 In the following section I will describe the main types of methodological attempts to discover ecumenical consensus as they appear in the material studied for this thesis. The emphasis is not on individual doctrinal questions but on ecumenical method. I will therefore focus on how the bilateral doctrinal agreements and documents reflect the idea of consensus in terms of structure and temporal location. I will address this perception of consensus with two questions: (1) What arguments arising from the churches’ understanding of doctrine are used to support consensus and (2) how does diversity relate to consensus? I will then proceed to reflect on these proposals in light of some suggestions arising from contemporary discussion on the nature of theology, doctrine and theological rationality. It seems evident that ecumenical theology has certain similarities to postmodern thinking. At the same time, postmodern thinking can be used to argue against some forms of proposed

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ecumenical consensus. In the final part of my thesis I shall try to point out some meta-theological preconditions underlying the possibility of speaking of valid consensus with difference. Although undoubtedly theological endeavours are always lacking in perfection I will try to show that even within a range of imperfect perceptions of theology, some perceptions are more ecumenically plausible than others. Ecumenical theology generally asserts that (ecclesial) unity does not mean (doctrinal or formal) uniformity.5 In an ecclesial sense, diversity is an aspect of ecclesial unity. Ecumenical methodology endeavours to find a proper balance of diversity in unity (or unity in diversity).6 One way of identifying justified areas of unity and diversity is by looking into the structure of doctrine. Are there areas of doctrine where diversity cannot be tolerated? How are these areas to be distinguished from the rest? What is their relationship? If an area of doctrine does tolerate diversity, does it mean these doctrines do not need to be believed or acted upon like the others? The assertion that unity does not mean uniformity can have at least two very different kinds of implications. I have called these the ‘unity-in-essentials approach’ and the ‘legitimate-diversity-in-essentials approach’. The unity in essentials approach differentiates between more and less essential elements of doctrine. It then argues that diversity can exist on the less essential areas, whereas the essentials do not tolerate diversities. The unity-in-essentials approach is plausible if one agrees with a distinction between essentials and nonessentials in doctrine. This approach allows for legitimate diversity but its tolerance of differences only reaches halfway. The factual agreement covers only the essentials where uniformity is required and no diversity is tolerated. The ecumenical application of the unity in essentials approach differentiates between doctrines, on the one hand, and rites, customs, church discipline and so on, on the other. An agreement should exist on issues of doctrine, while rites and customs may vary.7 This simple doctrine-versus-rites application has proved to be of limited ecumenical value. The mere recognition that these two categories exist does not take ecumenical dialogues very far. The distinction raises immediate questions on what actually belongs to either of the categories.8 One obvious challenging area concerns those ecclesial rites that have sacramental value. In sacramental rites the rite itself is intimately connected with the grace it conveys.9 Ecumenical dialogues also have shown the value of shared symbolic, but non-sacramental acts. One can here refer to the Anglican–Lutheran dialogues on ministry and ordination and the question of the laying-on of hands in ordination.10 Due to the ecumenical difficulty of agreeing on which issues should in fact be addressed as ‘pure doctrine’ and what belongs to ‘customs and rites’, the distinction as such cannot be taken for granted.11 In addition, a strict opposition between doctrine and praxis is not ecumenically helpful. This has been already noted in the discussion of contradicting consensus with ‘Konvivenz’. Many writers emphasize the interconnectedness of Christian praxis and teaching. For example, Jean-Marie Tillard argues from the twofold nature of the word of God, marked not only by its noetic content but also by its life-giving dynamism, and concludes that ‘in the Christian context orthopraxis can never do without orthodoxy. Orthopraxis and orthodoxy are woven together precisely

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because of the nature of the Biblical Word, the source of faith’.12 Separation of (theoretical) doctrine and practice becomes a highly relevant issue in ecumenical consensus especially when taken to the extreme. Based on a radicalized version of this distinction one could argue that all doctrinal expressions belong to the category of ‘customs and rites’ and therefore to the area where diversity is automatically legitimate. This argument ends where discussion on the nature of doctrine begins. In the second approach of diversity in essentials, the diversities reach to the area of doctrine itself. This application differentiates either between or within individual doctrines. Differentiation between doctrines asserts that some doctrines are more fundamental for unity than others. A potential for this kind of structural interpretation is present in all three theological traditions under investigation here, though all also yield other interpretations. The Lutheran theological tradition can differentiate between a fundamental article, that is, the article of justification and other articles of faith: the Roman Catholic tradition knows a hierarchy of truths (hierarchia veritatum) and the Anglican tradition can speak of the essential or fundamental and non-essential or non-fundamental doctrines.13 As will be shown later, the questions of what is fundamental and for what emerge as important for the possibility of consensus with difference. Differentiation within individual doctrines is a more radical form of the diversity-in-essentials approach. In this variant, the required agreement in doctrine comes close to ceasing to be uniformity and the agreement itself becomes nuanced, diverse or exists ‘with difference’. This approach raises questions about the relationship between sameness and diversity. This is the path, for example, that the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue has taken and which challenges in a serious way the more common perception of ‘consensus’ where sameness and diversity do not easily coincide. Much of the discussion around ecumenical consensus has been fuelled by discord in localizing legitimate diversity; by arguing for diversity at the very core of consensus, the discussion challenges the concept as a whole.14 The diversity-in-essentials approach leads to a new discourse that involves how to accommodate unity and diversity in one valid concept of consensus. The researched material suggests two main ways of doing this. In the argument on commonality, consensus is perceived as being in possession of common features or attributes. In the argument on commonality, diversities do not have a positive function. In the researched material, the argument on commonality appears in two variants. The first variant is concerned with the structures or organization of doctrine and the second focuses on the understanding or meaning of doctrines. The second approach is based on compatibility of differences. In contrast to the first argument based on commonality, the argument based on compatibility assumes a positive or possible existence of differences. The possible positive relation can be either conformity, that is, correspondence in form, manner or character; or complementarity, that is, something that completes or mutually supplies each other’s lack. The second argument for compatibility is more complex than the argument on commonality. It supports an idea of consensus, which encompasses compatible, justified differences. The argument based on compatibility seeks to avoid assimilating or annihilating differences but rather to distinguish between enriching differences that are desirable and destructive differences that should be avoided.

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The argument based on compatibility also appears in two variants, depending on how the compatibility of differences is observed. The researched material suggests that differences are compatible either through conformity or complementarity. Conformity here means some sort of correspondence in form, manner or character. Complementarity refers to differences that complete or mutually supply each other’s lack. The main intention of the compatibility argument is to allow the recognition of legitimate diversity. One of the argument’s problems is that it is capable of frustrating its own intentions and fail because of its way of argumentation. The comparative method assumed by the compatibility argument is in danger of betraying the intention to allow for real differences. This is because compatibility of differences can also be achieved by assimilating differences into a larger conceptual framework, which embraces all differences. As part of an allembracing framework, the differences become irrelevant pseudo-differences. In reality, this strategy denies differences and collapses the argument of compatibility into an argument of commonality. A true compatibility can exist only between really different instances. A compatibility that transforms differences into pseudodifferences in fact argues for consensus on the basis of commonality or sameness. This is not to say that both of these arguments could not exist at the same time. This, in fact, seems to be the case. In the researched material the compatibility argument is not independent from the arguments of commonality. Indeed, there is an especially close connection between ‘common understanding’ and compatibility.

Consensus as commonality Common theological structure: a question of identity, uniformity and commonality Dialogue documents rarely claim that the participating churches already have common theological structures in the sense of ‘sameness of theological structure’. By theological structures I do not mean the possession of particular doctrines, for example, classical trinitarian or Christological doctrines. ‘Theological structures’ refer here to the organization of the church’s teaching in the sense of particular emphases, viewpoints or organizing principles that make confessional theology distinctively ‘Anglican’, ‘Lutheran’ or ‘Roman Catholic’. The approach emphasizing common theological structures assumes that affinities in theological thought structures imply affinity in doctrine.15 There are a number of views on what it in fact means to be ‘in possession of common features or attributes’. There is at least an implicit understanding whereby ‘having in common’ denotes absolute sameness or identity. In the same way, convergence is easily interpreted as becoming more alike despite the common ecumenical understanding that unity does not mean uniformity. Relations among ‘having in common’, identity and uniformity are of importance here. The issue of sharing in a theological or doctrinal structure breaks down into two partially overlapping questions. One can first ask what kind of structures there are

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in doctrine and, secondly, what is the relationship between these structures? And on what basis can the churches claim that they have them in common? By ‘theological structure of doctrine’, the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue means the way in which individual doctrines are constructed and relate to each other. In its early phase the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue proposed that ‘there is a certain convergence’ when observing the ‘Catholic idea of the hierarchy of truths’ and ‘the Lutheran understanding of the Gospel in terms of the central events to which it witnesses’.16 This ‘convergence’ has two interpretations. It can refer to the two theological ecclesial traditions in possession of doctrinal structures, which are characterized by the same features or attributes. In the case of Lutherans and Roman Catholics, this would mean that ‘hierarchy’ equals a structure that has a centre and that the same things are attributed to the top of the hierarchy as are attributed to the centre, and so forth. The second interpretation maintains that similarities are not about ‘sameness’ but about ‘compatibility’. Compatibility of forms and structures is argued based on the meaning conveyed by the structures or how they are understood. The argument based on compatibility shifts attention from the forms and structures either to an objective ‘meaning’ or to more or less subjective ‘meaning for us’/‘understanding’. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic conformity of theological structures is on referents, which transcend the factual theological structures. Convergence of the hierarchy of truths and the ‘centre of the gospel’ is based on a reference to an external referent, in this case the person of Jesus Christ.17 This interpretation changes the question of structures significantly. Hierarchy is not in the first place a hierarchy of doctrinal structure but implies a distinction between the linguistically formed doctrinal statements on the one hand and being confronted with the person of God on the other.18 What at first seemed to be a discussion of the commonality of theological structures has turned into a discussion of revelation and its mediatedness.

Common understanding: four approaches to mediation and reception The argument based on common understanding appears in all three of the dialogues investigated here, though in different forms. This argument assumes that doctrine is an indirect or mediated way of expressing revelation. There is therefore a distinction between the substance of doctrine and its expression.19 Both the Malta Report (L-RC 1972) and A Vision for Unity (A-RC 1968) expressed a conviction that the apparent divergences in doctrine are not due to differences in substance but in ‘separate ways of receiving it’.20 Convergence in receiving the ‘substance’ is a way forward: ‘Through the appearance of the modern world’ the differences ‘now appear in a different light’.21 The Anglican–Lutheran dialogue also developed similar reasoning. The principle reason for estrangement between these two communions is in the particular historical situations in which they lived and the particular theological frameworks they used to respond to the situations.22 All three dialogues agree on the power of shared experiences or missionary challenges to facilitate positive ecumenical development.

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Questions of historical mediation, reception and understanding are essentially questions relating to hermeneutical methodological approaches. The trouble with the ‘hermeneutical method’ is that it is not a single method but a variety of approaches that share some basic characteristics. Anton Houtepen has shown that ecumenical dialogues apply at least four different ‘hermeneutical methods’. Their methods differ considerably in their philosophical backgrounds and therefore yield rather different results. Houtepen’s four hermeneutical approaches can be called the ‘overcoming history by history’ approach, the ‘no way out of the hermeneutical circle’ approach, the ‘eschatologically open process’ approach and the ‘radical deconstruction’ approach. The main difference between the first approach and all the others is that the ‘overcoming of history by history’ approach assumes the possibility of an objective, referential truth. Ecumenical dialogue applying this method is intended to clear up misunderstandings and formulate propositions that would be acceptable to all, while avoiding using the terminology that previously led to division.23 By contrast, the three other approaches do not assume that the hermeneutical process will lead to common interpretations. The ‘no way out of the hermeneutical circle’ approach emphasizes the permanent perspective of differing viewpoints. Interpretative traditions are caught up in a continuous interpretative process between the text and the reader or the tradition and the contexts. The ‘eschatologically open process’ approach assumes the existence of collective, narrative prefigurations of reality that allow for interpretations which surpass subjectivity. In this sense it is possible to assess individual interpretations. The ‘radical deconstruction’ approach denies the possibility of any meta-narratives. It favours a highly pluralistic approach and wants to refrain from definitive texts and consensuses.24 Ecumenical dialogue documents very rarely commit themselves strongly to one hermeneutical approach. An ecumenical ‘hermeneutical method’ would be better described as an eclectic combination of different approaches. In this eclectic ecumenical approach, the notion of ‘understanding’ refers in a broad sense to the process of historical reception, mediation and construction. Even if the dialogue texts do not always refer directly to ‘understanding’, the emphasis on interpretative processes of reception is explicitly preset. It is safe to say that ecumenical dialogues employ a hermeneutical method. Due to the eclectic nature of this method, this assertion is purely formal without reference to the particular ways of appropriating ‘the method’.25 The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the variety of ecumenical hermeneutical understandings through four different hermeneutically oriented approaches. Approach 1: authenticity The argument based on common understanding has a central place in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic Dialogue. The first two documents, the Malta Report (L-RC 1972) and The Eucharist (L-RC 1978 eng) exemplify two different ways of perceiving ‘understanding’. The first ‘understanding’ concerns the relationship between the church and the world, while the second one focuses on the relationship between churches. These two movements towards the world and towards the other are two interrelated elements of the hermeneutical method as it appears in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue.

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The first movement concerns the relationship between the church and the world. Within this relationship, ‘understanding’ refers to a conceptualization that communicates the gospel message adequately to the contemporary world. Understanding means authentic witness. ‘Understanding’ is anchored both in the ‘gospel message’, that is, the unchanging content of the proclamation, and in the ‘contemporary world’. The contemporary world is a crucial factor in this scheme, since the contemporary world is the way to reach the gospel. There is a certain Bultmannian overtone in the desire to sort out the ‘eschatological saving act of God’ behind and beyond theological formulae or any other conceptual expressions and to emphasize the experience of being confronted with the present as the authentic way of reaching it.26 Here the interpretative tradition is not a bridge between contemporary churches and early Christianity. On the contrary, temporal distance creates a gap between then and now. Proclamation only becomes the viva vox evangelii when expressed in reference to ‘ever new questions raised by men of today’.27 The approach corresponds to Houtepen’s ‘no way out of the hermeneutical circle’ type of hermeneutics. The second hermeneutical movement is oriented towards the other ecclesial tradition. It is aimed at a wider and more authentic theological understanding. There is a distinction between what the churches ‘confess together’ and how they explain or conceptualize this confession theologically. These conceptualizations are called ‘understandings’. It is rhetorically difficult that the documents also speak of ‘understanding’ when describing the growing awareness of why a particular theological conceptualization has developed. It is important to note that it is especially this latter form of ‘understanding’, that is, growing awareness of the intentions of particular theological formulations, that has been perceived as facilitating agreement. At the same time, there is no immediate link between ‘understanding why’ and agreement between the dialogue partners, at least not in the sense of adopting the argument of the other or identifying one’s own argument with it. ‘Understanding why’ does have a positive impact, but only in the sense of making it possible to see the other theological conceptualization as potentially valid and allowing critical discussion on the theological understandings and therefore facilitating exchange and dialogue. Perhaps the two hermeneutical moves can more easily be grasped in reference to some conceptualizations of ‘understanding’ in hermeneutical theories. For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s perception of ‘understanding’ draws on at least three different sources. For Gadamer, ‘to understand’ is in a very general sense also to have an intellectual grasp on something, although this is not the main meaning of the word. Understanding is also a cognitive or epistemological process whereby something is perceived in its appropriate framework. More importantly, with Gadamer, understanding always refers to application. It is not a mere intellectual grasp of something but perception of oneself in the actualization of what is understood. Gadamer writes: ‘Where there is understanding, there is not translation but speech.’28 That is, there is not a mere objective grasp of meaning but engagement and participation in an event in which both the subject and the object of understanding are sustained by their being situated in an historical continuity. Finally, by understanding, Gadamer refers to a form of ‘agreement’ between the

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reader and the text. It is exactly this basic agreement, that makes it possible for a reader not merely to record the intentions of the other but also to grasp the essential meaning of the text, which is somewhat separate from the intentions of the writer. Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogues allow two observations about the shape of ecumenical hermeneutics in this context. Firstly, there is a difference between the two above-mentioned hermeneutical movements with regards to the object of what is understood. In the first, that is, ‘understanding as authentic witness’, what is understood is the gospel. This understanding is a cognitive–intellectual and epistemic process in that it aims at grasping the object of understanding in a correct way. Understanding is not merely a question of a correct method of reproduction; much in the same way as Gadamer contrasts translation with speech, the documents speak of proclamation as the ‘living voice of the Gospel’. Understanding thus implies engagement in the contemporary historical situation through which the basic message of the gospel can be ‘made real’ or ‘true’ in the present. The second form of understanding, that is ‘understanding why’, has as its object the cognitive conceptualizations of the other. Here too, the goal of ‘understanding’ is to grasp the object of what is understood in a correct way. This approach reverses the perception of historicity: unlike the first case in which the churches share the challenges of the contemporary world, here it is argued that Lutherans and Roman Catholics do not share or have not shared a historical framework that would enable understanding. Taken together, these two hermeneutical aspects of understanding as authentic witness and ‘understanding why’ describe the function ‘understanding’ has in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. Understanding as authentic witness describes the relationship of theological or linguistic expressions to what is expressed. This authentic viewpoint is to be intentional. The authentic witness itself is a result of an interpretative process. Ecumenical consensus is in this way anchored in two distinct directions. First, it is anchored in the direction of meaning, which is taken to be something objective and unchanging. At the same time, it is anchored to the ‘meaning for us’. This second meaning is not subjective in the sense of individual subjectivity. Nevertheless, this understanding has to do with the individual subjects being immersed and interacting with their cultural, social and linguistic surroundings. Much of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue has been dedicated to investigating the second form of understanding, that is, perceiving how differing theological understandings have developed, how they relate to their meaning and to each other. Both instances of ‘understanding’ are referred to as ‘common understanding’. These two instances are not in all respects equal. What I have called ‘understanding as authentic witness’ has clear priority. The emphasis is on the gospel, which is the object of understanding and, in a theological sense, also the foundation of understanding. The principal referent of a ‘common understanding’ is the subject matter of the theological question at hand, not the theological conceptualization of the other church. Justification by Faith (L-RC 1983 usa) is a good example of this. It provides a common description of the fundamental meaning of both the Catholic and Reformation’s teaching of justification. The description is not identical with either church’s teaching, but shows what they

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attempt to communicate in different ways.29 The argument based on common understanding asserts that if the churches in a sense reverse the hermeneutical process, which has led to the proliferation of theological understandings, and instead look at these theological understandings from the viewpoint of what they refer to, their existence too could be justified. Even with this approach, questions remain. While the above-mentioned scheme does accomplish the possibility of a variety of doctrinal and theological expressions, it automatically determines which expressions are authentic and which are not. Approach 2: interpretative frameworks Another similar argument pursues common understanding by finding common or appropriate interpretative frameworks. This can mean either positioning a theological claim in its original context or positioning two different theological claims in a new or common interpretative framework. If one fails to grasp a theological claim in its original context, then the claim is misunderstood. Having a correct understanding in this sense is necessary, but not ecumenically sufficient. ‘Authenticity’ has two reference points, the original context and the contemporary context. These were described as the ‘meaning’ and ‘the meaning for us’. The importance of observing the historically bound ‘meaning for us’ is especially emphasized by the German Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. It constructs ecumenical dialogue as a complex hermeneutical process of rereading and reinterpreting linguistic forms and their contexts.30 The North American dialogue moves along the same lines. It notes that one can make interpretative choices in ecumenical relations. The Church as Koinonia of Salvation (L-RC 2004 usa) makes an explicit interpretative choice that enables positioning theological approaches within a common theological framework. The document uses the notion of koinonia as a theological framework for explicating and bringing Lutheran and Roman Catholic theological convictions and emphases into a fruitful relationship.31 The single most important question for consensus ecumenism is whether consensus and difference can exist simultaneously. The argument from common understanding has a central place in this discussion. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue specifically uses the argument of common understanding in constructing a consensus with difference. At the same time, the Lutheran–Roman Catholic ‘consensus with difference’ should not be reduced to an argument of common understanding. The dialogue documents reflect a desire towards moving from ‘understanding why’ the conceptualizations are different to being able to evaluate them and to see how they are related. To reach a fuller description of a consensus with difference one has to take into account not only the argument of commonality but also arguments of compatibility, both of which emerge as instances in the methodology. Approach 3: koinonia, correct understanding and the fullness of tradition ARCIC shares some elements with the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue but also has significant differences. ARCIC involves two rather different methodological approaches. The first, exemplified by The Final Report of ARCIC I (A-RC 1982) and to some extent The Church as Communion (A-RC 1990) and The Gift of

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Authority (A-RC 1997), emphasizes the common doctrinal and ecclesial history and the churches’ sharing of the basic teaching of the Trinity, the scriptures, creeds and important doctrinal definitions. Here hermeneutic movement is in some ways opposite to that of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. Whereas Lutherans and Roman Catholics look to the past to see how the current doctrinal interpretations have developed, ARCIC looks to current and future times to explain the meaning of commonly held beliefs. This means that the ‘understanding why’ aspect is significantly weaker in ARCIC. In ARCIC’s approach the question of truth has a central role. The dialogue was an attempt to deepen the churches’ understanding of the truth. ARCIC’s second methodological approach comes closer to the one used in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. This approach recognizes a distinction between the ‘constitutive elements’ or ‘essential aspects’ of a doctrine and its historically conditioned explanations. Both are used to investigate the various existing theological approaches and come to an understanding of how to relate to this existing variety. This methodological approach is more visible in Salvation and the Church (A-RC 1986) and Mary: Grace and Hope in Christ (A-RC 2005). Both use communio or koinonia as a central interpretative concept. All the subjects discussed relate to the true nature of the church and hence, to the concept of koinonia. Therefore, the experience of koinonia is the proper context for understanding the true nature of the church.32 The consequences of placing the discussion in the context of koinonia are different in the two above-mentioned methodological approaches used in ARCIC. The intention of ARCIC was to recreate a proper theological context for koinonia in order to facilitate the emergence of true/correct understanding. The authentic context for correct interpretation was intrinsically connected with ‘substantial agreement’ as ‘consensus . . . on essential matters where it considers that doctrine admits no divergence’.33 ARCIC’s method is marked by the pursuit of correctness by reproducing the authentic meaning on the one hand, and unanimity as obedience and assent on the other. A clearer understanding is likely to result in resolving differences. This focus on correctness and unanimity leads to ask how the document understands the mediatedness of theology. On the one hand, there is an intention to differentiate between a ‘consensus’, which here means unanimity, and ‘matters of practice and [in] theological judgements relating to them’. Divergences in the latter do not endanger the existing consensus.34 On the other hand, the documents show, that the agreement had been reached both ‘regarding doctrine’ and ‘in faith’.35 ARCIC’s way of making room for differences is to make a distinction between doctrine on the one hand and faith on the other. The distinction remains somewhat ambiguous. For example, in the discussion about authority in the church, the authority to assess the correct interpretation of and obedience to the gospel is with the ‘common mind’ of the church. A shared commitment and belief create this common mind.36 This implies that that the truthfulness of faith equals truthfulness of theological interpretation and this truthfulness can be assessed by obedience to the common mind, which is created through shared belief. The hermeneutical circle does not open up to the world outside dogmatic definitions. The truth of faith is measured by the ‘common mind’

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of the church. This ‘common mind’ is at the same time founded on what is recorded in the Holy scriptures but also functions as the authoritative instance in interpreting them. Therefore, there is, in this approach no differentiation between differing but legitimate theological conceptualizations or understandings when it comes to discussing specifically Anglican or Roman Catholic traditions. The Church as Communion attempts to open up the hermeneutical circle by discussing apostolicity as a dynamic and living tradition of the living memory of Christ. The document recognizes that diversity can develop in the expression of the one gospel and in fact, the development of new expressions of the faith is an integral part of the church’s faithfulness.37 The discussion exemplifies the use of koinonia as a normative framework for interpretation. According to the ‘rule of communion’, diversities may exist until they cause frictions in the communion.38 The argument from common understanding is most clearly visible at this point. It is this common understanding of the church as koinonia/communio as presented in The Church as Communion that should function as the common framework for ARCIC.39 The ‘common understanding’ as such does not allow for differentiation. This is because the ‘common understanding’ refers to common expressions, not to common meanings. Similarly, in The Gift of Authority ‘having in common’ ultimately means ‘having the same’. For The Gift of Authority, agreement is a consequence of the workings of a corporate memory. Memory is by nature interpretative, that is, it preserves things relevant to particular times and contexts. From the church’s point of view, this ‘selectivity’ is ultimately counterproductive. ‘Selection’ indicates that part of the fullness of tradition has been forgotten. Forgetting leads to the impoverishment of the tradition.40 The church’s memory should not be selective but conservative. Its task at any given moment is to preserve and to hand on everything it has received. Within this framework, any diversity can easily be understood as a lack of the fullness of tradition. Accordingly, coming to consensus means a reciprocal receiving of the missing elements of the tradition so that both churches have all the authentic elements. Approach 4: regulative understanding The Anglican–Lutheran dialogue presents yet another way of conceptualizing mediation and reception and consequently, of the question of common understanding as an element of consensus. The Anglican– Lutheran dialogue has a functional or regulative perception of doctrine. Doctrine exists as one of the church’s means of guarding proclamation and interpretation from error.41 In the first place, doctrines do not contain truth or even refer to the truth, but rather enable truthful interpretation. There is more emphasis on how these two communions can function truthfully as a communion than on the truthfulness of individual doctrinal statements. ‘Common understanding’ in doctrine is ultimately referential. The dialogue distinguishes between differences in theological tradition and fundamental trinitarian and Christological teaching. Full ecclesial unity does require unity in faith. This is referred to as sharing ‘a common identity in all essentials of the Christian faith, recognizing that they are in harmony expressing their agreement in statements as well as in life’.42 This shared identity does not imply identity of doctrine but rather the ability to recognize the identity of the other communion as ‘the same’ as one’s own. This is what is meant by

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recognizing the apostolicity of the other church. The functional or regulative understanding of doctrine is accompanied by a focus on the intentions of particular doctrinal statements. Within this general approach, there are distinct differences between the North American and European regional dialogues. Both regional dialogues frame their theological work within the church’s mission. The North American dialogue speaks of the church’s linguistic, gestural and other expressions as communication or signs. Whatever requirements they foresee for ‘commonalities’ arise from this communicative understanding of doctrine, church order and liturgical gestures. Shared understanding refers in this context to a shared symbolic universe in which the symbols are understood when they can be used to communicate the identity of the community to itself and to others.43 This creates an interesting dilemma with regard to uniformity and diversity. On the one hand, it can readily be admitted that very different linguistic expressions, liturgical gestures or institutional organizations can be directed by intentions meant to preserve the same truth in the respective communities. On the other hand, there are limits to how much symbolic diversity can exist in a community that perceives itself as one community, not a communion of communities. A good example is the Episcopal Church’s recognition of nonepiscopal Lutheran ordinations as valid on the one hand, while on the other hand requiring that all ordinations following the establishment of full communion be episcopal (the case of Called to Common Mission [A-L 1999 usa]). The European documents also proceed within the framework of the church’s mission but the argumentation is closer to the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogues. The main line of difference runs between the church and the secularized or modern society, not between the two communions. The emphasis is more on the similarities in understanding that already exist than on the differences that have developed in response to differing historical situations. It is not only the contemporary challenges both the churches face that urge and enable them to express their faith together but also similarities in understanding their theological heritage. Also the challenge of contemporary times is perceived differently. In the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, and partly also in ARCIC, contemporary times are perceived to challenge the way in which the gospel message is truly understood and communicated or points of doctrine are expressed in an adequate way. The Anglican–Lutheran dialogue on the other hand feels challenged to reinterpret their confessional traditions to rediscover their identity in relation to society.44 Here the ‘understanding’ emphasizes the self-understanding of the communions in light of their faith on the one hand and the changing historical and societal situation in which they exist.45 Consensus as compatibility Referential compatibility In the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, the arguments based on commonality and complementarity are closely connected. The argument based on complemen-

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tarity appears in the variants of ‘conforming thought-structures’ and ‘complementarity of viewpoints’. The argument based on complementarity builds on the argument of commonality, which appears in the form of common understanding. This forms the compatibility argument into a ‘referential compatibility’. I have described this model of consensus that appeals to a ‘shared fundament’ and justifiably different confessional theological explications as a consensus with difference. A ‘consensus with difference’ breaks down into two separate and consecutive arguments; the first argues for a common understanding of something ‘basic’ or ‘fundamental’, while the second speaks of the relations between things in which the churches differ. The compatibility of a ‘consensus with difference’ (as presented in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue) is referential compatibility. A referential compatibility is not only based on a comparison of structures, forms or intentions but also on references to the common understanding of justification. This dual, referential structure makes this form of consensus innovative. It also makes it vulnerable to criticism. It is vulnerable to both theological and philosophical criticisms. Compatibility through common understanding The two-layered structure of commonality–compatibility can be further divided into finer sub-arguments. The commonality part of the argument has two aspects. The first involves common understanding or consensus on justification (foreseen in the Malta Report [L-RC 1972], and established in The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification [L-RC 1999]). It is accompanied by common understanding of the ‘essence’ or ‘reality’ of other individual points of doctrine.46 The consensus on justification functions as ‘fundamental consensus’. This fundamental consensus is an agreement between Lutherans and Roman Catholics on what the doctrine of justification affirms in the most fundamental sense.47 This aspect of common understanding always accompanies an understanding of the ‘essence’ or ‘reality’ of individual doctrinal questions.48 If there is an agreement on any given doctrinal question between Lutherans and Roman Catholics, it is partly because there is agreement on ‘what the doctrine of justification in the most fundamental sense affirms’. Based on this, I will argue that there is a difference between a ‘consensus with difference’ in the doctrine of justification and a ‘consensus with difference’ in other doctrines. The latter case of consensus assumes an agreement on justification. Agreement on justification is what makes differentiation possible. Agreement on justification is a necessary element of ‘differentiated consensus’. Without agreement on justification, the agreement lacks criteria for discerning legitimate differentiation. On the question of how legitimate differences relate to each other, the Lutheran– Roman Catholic dialogue proposes a number of answers. One way is to start from negative arguments. These do not say anything about what the differences are but focus on what they are not. Particularly Lutheran or particularly Catholic emphases are ‘losing divisive character’49 and ‘no longer appear as church dividing’.50 In its weakest and most elementary variant, the argument does not even address the differences as such but appeals to how the dialogue partners perceive each other. It focuses on the judgement or ‘how things appear’ without clarifying the basis of this judgement. A more elaborated form of the argument describes Catholic and

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Lutheran views as compatible when what is rejected by one does not stand in opposition to what the other asserts.51 Here the negative argument starts to turn into a positive one. Church and Justification (L-RC 1993) serves as a good example of how what at first appears to be a negative argument on compatibility ‘being noncontradictory’ turns into an argument about compatibility by complementarity. Church and Justification establishes complementarity by reference to shared ‘basic convictions’. These basic convictions appear in the form of affirmations and their commonly agreed-upon implications.52 Compatibility means affirming the basic affirmations from which theological implications are inferred. These both refer to and do not contradict the common affirmations. The inferences are justified because they relate to and are supported by the same basic convictions. The interrelatedness of the commonality and compatibility arguments gives rise to the following questions. For consensus to exist, do the differing views have to be compatible with each other or is it enough for them to be compatible with the ‘fundament’? How do expressions relate to the fundament and is it at all possible to deduce or infer different theological claims from the same fundament? Is there a real difference in the differentiated consensus or are ‘differences’ flaws of argumentation (a pseudo-consensus) or merely differences in appearances (pseudo-differences)? Depending on whether the proposed compatibility also includes compatibility of thought structures the model of referential compatibility can appear in two variants. In the first, the mediated referential compatibility, there is no claim of structural compatibility or it appears in a mediated form. The second variant also includes structural compatibility. Mediated referential compatibility In the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue compatibility is justified in two different ways. The first approach is well exemplified by the German national dialogue. It stresses that any given linguistic expression is limited and not able to encompass everything that the truth of faith includes. The expressions are still truthful in their specific contexts. It is the duty of theological interpretation to make sure that expressions communicate what is most important to the situation where the gospel is proclaimed. In the mediated referential compatibility a requirement of compatibility of expression is not relevant. What is required is that ‘the truth contained in . . . assertions [can] be appreciated and recognized by both sides’ while recognizing the limitations of their formulation.53 Compatibility includes two significant relationships, one between the gospel and the expression and another between the expression and its context. There is only a weak or secondary requirement on the relationship between the doctrinal expressions. The requirement is that the other also holds ‘concerns’ and interpretative stresses that are of primary importance in the doctrine of the one partner, even if not with equal importance. By reference to these ‘concerns’ and interpretative emphases that the two theological approaches share the differing doctrinal forms can be perceived as complementary.54 The North American national dialogue comes close to the German one in ‘shared concerns’. Both of them point to the fact that contrasting theological perspectives and thought structures have consequences that seem irreconcilable.55 The US dialogue too

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attempts to go around the question of contrasting thought structures by distinguishing between church-dividing and non-church-dividing issues. Disagreement between thought structures is not, in the US dialogue, a churchdividing issue.56 Compatibility is not direct but mediated through reference to some form of ‘foundation’ and to ‘concerns’ or intentions that guide interpretation. The mediated compatibility variant puts emphasis on the compatibility of differing doctrines with their fundament and with their current context. Following the factual variation of historical and intellectual context the emergence of differing forms of expression is possible and even desirable. Structural referential compatibility A second approach, also visible in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, proposes some form of compatibility of thought-structures as an argument for consensus. A good example of this is the North American ecclesiological document, The Church as Koinonia of Salvation. Both theological traditions are perceived to emphasize one legitimate aspect of the original theological teaching. Each is understood to lack the emphasis of the other. Pairing the two thought-structures with differing emphases results in a more complete expression of the original teaching. To present the fullness of the original teaching, both emphases should be present. Therefore, the pairing is theologically normative.57 This pairing, though structural, does not concern plain structures. It is theologically mediated by the concept of koinonia. The complementary relationship is a ‘koinonia relationship’, which does not require the structures to be completely commensurable. This means that the paired instances are not necessarily completely translatable nor are they interchangeable, that is, they ‘work best’ in their particular context. The Church as Koinonia of Salvation shows a possible way forward in exploring the implications of a consensus with difference. The document constructs a structural compatibility by referring to the notion of koinonia as a privileged interpretative theological framework. The relations between structures are not direct or immediate but mediated by reference to this theological context. The reference enables comparison between structures that would not be comparable without the mediating concept. The lens of koinonia changes the quality of the perceived relations. A koinonia relation requires less in the traditional sense of sameness and enables going around the issues of ‘identical thinking’, which continues to haunt the consensus discourse. A truly solid consensus with difference must be able to recognize real differences in a real consensus. In The Church as Koinonia of Salvation, ‘koinonia relations’ is proposed as a technical term to describe relations between different but referentially comparable instances. The notion of koinonia links the comparison to a Christological–soteriological framework. This reference is invoked to allow for an agreement that refers to salvation and one that allows for the existence of differences.58 A consensus with difference yields a variety of interpretations. How the concept is interpreted is strongly influenced by the interpreter’s understanding of what doctrine is and the interpreter’s understanding of what the unity of the church is. In the latter question the key element is the location of desired consensus, first on the scale of ideal consensus versus realiztically reachable consensus and secondly on a

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temporal scale reaching from the present to an eschatological future either at the end of time or beyond temporal time.59

Compatibility within a theological dialectic/multiplicity ARCIC presents an example of a proposed compatibility based on a theological dialectic inherent in the subject matter. For example, ‘Elucidations on Eucharistic Doctrine’ (A-RC 1982 EDE) describes the Eucharist as including ‘two complementary movements within an indissoluble unity’.60 These movements are internal to the theological meaning of the Eucharist. In a way, the subject matter of eucharistic doctrine itself offers the possibility of developing one-sided emphases and discord. At the same time, this dialectic nature makes it possible to see differences in emphasis as consonant with one or another authentic element of the theological meaning of the Eucharist. The fault is not so much in holding a particular view as it is in denying the other end of the dialectic.61 Compatibility means first a recognition that there is a theological dialectic within a particular doctrinal question and second, a recognition that what either church teaches is in consonance with one or another end of the earlier recognized dialectic. ARCIC requires only a negative relation between the particular confessional viewpoints: one should not affirm what the other denies.62 ARCIC’s Final Report exemplifies a simpler variant of this argument and recognizes basically two different aspects of a given doctrinal point. Another variant of the argument points to an even greater multiplicity of theological meanings. For example, in Salvation and the Church, the New Testament description of salvation is comprised of a variety of complementary theological descriptions. Out of this multiplicity of descriptions of one doctrinal question the document extracts two, justification and sanctification, perceived as ‘two aspects of the same divine act’.63 As in the cases of the Eucharist and authority, so too in regard to justification, the greatest problem is not the existence of differing theological views but their imbalance and incoherence. Consequently, reaching a consensus denotes a rediscovery of the balance and coherence and also expressing it together.64 This variant of compatibility highlights the complementary nature of differing emphases based on the diverse nature of the subject matter itself. The approach differs from the views that argue for complementarity because of differences in viewpoints appropriate in different times and places. In this second approach that focuses on the differences in viewpoints, the particular interpretations can themselves have a monolithic character. Differences are justified in reference to the human conditions or interpretative needs. As opposed to this, ARCIC’s approach does not refer primarily to interpretation but to the dynamic character of the truth itself. The main difference between these approaches is that in the hermeneutically oriented approach differences have a positive value because they serve the authenticity of the interpretation. In the ARCIC approach, differences are due to lack of completeness and are thus undesirable.

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Compatibility as particular appropriateness The Anglican–Lutheran dialogue exemplifies yet a third variant of the compatibility argument. This argument resembles the Lutheran–Roman Catholic referential compatibility in that it is based on a positive recognition of differences. Diversity is not a consequence of ‘forgetting’ part of the tradition as in ARCIC. Unlike the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue, here diversity is not perceived to be an implication of human limitations in perceiving the whole truth, but is in fact an implication of the gospel. The church recognizes that it does not yet represent the full power of the gospel. At the same time and exactly because of this power of the gospel, the church is called to continuous change and reform. This change and reform are not primarily about adapting to the needs of the world but about proleptic anticipation of eschatological fullness.65 The positive recognition of differences, associated with the notion of comprehensiveness, is accompanied by a call for both continuity and coherence in the church’s communication. The stress on comprehensiveness opens the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue to a recognition of the positive diversity of the various gifts found in the communities. Coherence sets limits on the diversity. Even in positive differences, what the church communicates must be intelligible. Too many or too radical differences blur the communication and make the church’s communication difficult or impossible. Continuity supports the church’s need to function continuously as a communio in different times and places.66 The particularity of Anglican–Lutheran consensus is in the distinction between authentic symbolic manifestations and interchangeable symbolic manifestations. Both concepts exist in the aforementioned context of communication. An authentic symbolic manifestation fulfils two criteria. It is authentic in the sense of being founded in the gospel and appropriate in the contemporary context. These authentic symbolic manifestations are appropriate and efficiently communicate the communion’s identity within a particular context. This form of apostolicity or forms of ‘apostolicities’ can be called particular apostolicity.67 Particular apostolicities are complete in the sense that they have preserved truth in a particular context. At the same time, they are not fully interchangeable. Episcopal and presbyterial ordinations are compatible, because both have been able to preserve, in particular situations, the authenticity of the church.68 They are however neither conforming nor complementary ways of communicating. They are not conforming because they do not have the same form, even though to a considerable degree, they fulfil the same function. They are not complementary, since the particular manifestations are not something that one communion has and the other lacks. The claim of compatibility rests on the recognition that the accomplishments of the particular symbolic manifestations are compatible, that is, that they have been able to preserve the truth. The ‘particular appropriateness’ approach of the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue resembles the ‘referential compatibility’ model of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. Both give priority to the relationship between doctrinal formulation and its ‘foundation’ or ‘source’ in the gospel. The approaches differ in the perceptions of

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existing differences. The Anglican–Lutheran dialogue recognizes the legitimacy of very different implications of the gospel if these interpretations are appropriate both in reference to the gospel and in their particular contexts. When the churches move towards closer communion, the range of legitimate diversities is limited by the requirement of coherent communication. Therefore, it is possible that what was tolerable difference in a time of greater separation is not tolerable in a time of closer communion. More radical differences can be tolerated if they do not exist at the same time within the same community. Notes 1. E.g., Evans, Method, pp. 1–9. Cf. LWF Crisis 1994; Harding Meyer, That All May Be One: Perceptions and Models of Ecumenicity, trans. William G. Rusch (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 151. 2. Ulrich Körtner, Einführung in die theologische Hermeneutik (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), p. 165. 3. Jüngel, ‘Amica Exegesis’, p. 258. 4. E.g. A-L 2002 Growth. 5. See Ola Tjørhom, Visible Church – Visible Unity: Ecumenical Ecclesiology and ‘The Great Tradition of the Church’ (Collegeville, Minn.: Unitas, 2004); Harald Wagner (ed.), Einheit – aber wie? Zur Tragfähigkeit der ökumenischen Form von ‘differenzierten Konsens’. Quaestiones disputatae 184 (Freiburg, Basel and Vienna: Herder, 2000). 6. Tjørhom, Visible Church – Visible Unity, p. 85. Cf. Bilateral 1991: 47–8. 7. E.g. Luther’s distinction in the preface to Confessio fidei ac religionis baronum ac nobilium regni Bohemiae between doctrina fidei et morum that must everywhere and always be the same and customs and usages which are rightly subjected to the varietates hominum (WA 50:380); cf. Meyer, ‘Versöhnte Verschiedenheit’, p. 63. Similar affirmation is to found in A Articles: 34. 8. Meyer, ‘Ecumenical Consensus’, pp. 216–17. 9. Tillard, ‘Reflections and Suggestions’, p. 96. 10. E.g., in A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 17. 11. See the Special Commission on the Orthodox Participation in the WCC (2002). The documents point to difficulties, for example, in the fields of ethical and social ethical questions and the exercise of spiritual life (WCC Special 2002: Section B IV 25, V 43). The conclusions deal with WCC only but are nevertheless symptomatic. 12. Tillard points to the common witness of contemporary martyrs and their common confession of faith (‘How Do We Express Unity in Faith?’, pp. 318–19). 13. For Anglicanism, see Sykes, ‘The Fundamentals of Christianity’, p. 232. 14. See Harding Meyer, ‘Evangelische Teilhabe am historischen Episkopat?’, Stimmen der Zeit (2005): 245, 247. Previously the concept of consensus tended to denote uniformity, full equality and congruence of beliefs and statements. This form of consensus proved inadequate for the ecumenical endeavours that insisted on diversity, whereas the old consensus paradigm was based on uniformity. 15. Stobbe and May have called an agreement based on the form and content of doctrine a ‘structural consensus in meaning’. The structural definition entails interchangeability of particular elements of doctrine or claims made in the doctrine; Heinz-Günther Stobbe and John May, ‘Übereinstimmung und Handlungsfähigkeit. Zur Grundlage ökumenischer Konsensbildung und Wahrheitsfindung’, in Ökumenische Theologie: Ein Arbeitsbuch, ed. Peter Lengsfeld (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1981), p. 318. The requirement of interchangeability is stricter than what is meant by convergence in structure in the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue. It is not clear how far the two structures have to be identical in order for two items to be interchangeable. For example, Lindbeck argues that a requirement of interchangeability

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16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48.

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assumes a wrong kind of decontextualized and idealized understanding; see ‘Justification’, p. 201. L-RC 1972: 25. Thönissen, ‘Dialog auf neuer Basis’, p. 186. Cf. pp. 24–8 above for more detailed discussion. One of the challenges of this proposal is that ‘the centre of the gospel’ can be interpreted either as a particular doctrine (of justification) or as the content of the gospel (the person of Jesus Christ). This emphasis was supported by the theological climate of the 1960s and 1970s. See Pope John XXIII’s opening speech of the Second Vatican Council (Gaudet mater ecclesiae) and other Roman Catholic documents (Mysterium ecclesiae [1973] and Ut unum sint [1995] esp. 36–9.) A-RC 1968: 4. L-RC 1972: 2. E.g., A-L 1982 eur: 9, 12. Anton Houtepen, ‘According to the scriptures: The Ecumenical Movement and Its Methods Tomorrow’, Louvain Studies 22 (1997): 113. Ibid. 113–19. Körtner finds the lack of a clear ‘ecumenical hermeneutics’ a significant obstacle to ecumenical progress; see Körtner, ‘Offene Fragen’, p. 234; Stobbe, ‘Konsensfindung als hermeneutisches Problem’, p. 31. L-RC 1972: 24. See Charles M. Wood, Theory and Religious Understanding: A Critique of the Hermeneutics of Joachim Wach (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1975), p. 2. E.g., L-RC 1972: 43. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (London: Sheed and Wand, 1975), p. 386; Wood, Theory and Religious Understanding, p. 3. L-RC 1983 usa: 157. Cf., e.g., L-RC 1985 ger: 19, 24. L-RC 2004 usa: 10, 15–20. A-RC 1982: Introduction, 4. A-RC 1982 MO: 17; A-RC 1982 EDE: 2. A-RC 1982 EDE: 9. A-RC 1982 ED: 12; A-RC 1982 MOE: 5; A-RC 1982 AC I: Preface; A-RC 1982 EDE: 2; ARC 1982 MOE: 6. A-RC 1982 AC I: 2. A-RC 1990: 27–8. A-RC 1990: 30, 40. Ibid. 57. A-RC 1997: 24. A-L 1972: 22. A-L 1983: 32. E.g., A-L 1991 usa: 27. A-L 1983 eur: 56. E.g., the Meissen Common Statement associated ‘growing together’ with advancing in ‘understanding’ (A-Ev 1988 Meissen: 8). This duality can be observed, for example, in Ministry in the Church (L-RC 1981: 9). The subsequent discussion refers to essential and specific function (ibid. 30) or to consensus on the reality (ibid. 38). See. L-RC 1983 usa: 157. Similarly in the German dialogue, see L-RC 1985 ger: p. 36. See L-RC 1980: 9–13 (unity as an implication of God’s salvific act in Christ through the Spirit); L-RC 1981: 10–14, 19 (ministry as witness to the gospel, manifested by a plurality of Spirit-given charismata; similarly also in L-RC 1970 usa: 6–9); L-RC 1984: 7 (the church has its foundation in God’s salvific act in Christ): L-RC 1995 usa: 47, 64, 66 (questions of solus Christus and sola scriptura in the discussion of scripture and tradition); L-RC 1990 usa: 70 (solus Chrisus and sola scriptura in the discussion of Mary and the saints).

Consensus in Bilateral Dialogues 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

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L-RC 1982: Preface. L-RC 1984: 123. As in L-RC 1993: 197. L-RC 1993: 170–72. L-RC 1985 ger: Introduction, p. 21. Ibid., p. 46. L-RC 1983 usa: 121. Ibid. 154. Cf. L-RC 2004 usa: 28, 88, 91, 92, 106, 123. Lindbeck demonstrates this argument in the context of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic Malta Report; see George A. Lindbeck, ‘Atonement and the Hermeneutics of Social Embodiment’, in The Nature of Confession. Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1996), p. 202. To be complete, this section should include a discussion of how the different churches perceive eschatological hope or the consummation of God’s promise. A-RC 1982 EDE: 7. Ibid. The argumentation on authority in the church follows the same pattern; episcope consists of two complementary elements, primacy and conciliarity. Excessive emphasis on either results in an imbalance and the koinonia of the church requires a balance between them; see A-RC 1982 AC I: 22. A-RC 1987: 15. Ibid. 32. A-L 1988 usa: 57. A-L 1987: 16. A-L 1972 usa: 2 D 5. E.g., A-L 1972 usa: 2 D 4–5; A-L 1987: 55–9; A-L 1992 Porvoo: 52; A-L 1999 usa: 8.

Chapter 10 CONSENSUS: THE CONTINUING DEBATE The bilateral dialogue documents suggest that it is appropriate to speak of a variety of ecumenical methods and forms of ecumenical consensus rather than of a singular ecumenical consensus. Without implying that this variety of methods and forms of consensus could be reduced to a single approach I will discuss some questions generic to ‘ecumenical consensus’ in the following section. The background of these generic questions is the fundamental dilemma of unity and diversity. A valid concept of ‘consensus with difference’ is theologically and philosophically challenging. Challenges come about when the ecumenical imperative of ecclesial unity confronts real life diversities. In the struggle to embrace real differences without succumbing to absolute pluralism, ecumenical theology resembles some forms of postmodern theology. As an example, the mere idea of ‘consensus with difference’ challenges the basic assumption that differences equal plurality and consequently, that consensus implies unity as uniformity. A proposal for ‘consensus with difference’ is possible only as a consequence of a re-evaluation or reformulation of three fundamental concepts or ideas that are involved in consensus building. These are the re-evaluation of rationality, (religious) beliefs and the concept of consensus itself. Deconstructing concepts and questioning the very foundations of reason and knowing give ecumenical theology a distinctively postmodern feel. Venturing into the area of postmodern thinking is no threat to ecumenical theology. On the contrary, some ecumenical goals might ultimately be attainable only if ecumenical theology is able to draw on postmodern discourse. Fundamental questions in the debate Plurality–consensus dichotomy In Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus, Nicholas Rescher states that ‘the diversity of persons, cultures, and experiences makes the goal of actually realizing consensus in cognitive or evaluative practical matters effectively impracticable and unrealiztic. Only by abstracting from the physical and social realities – by shifting to the level of idealization – can we require or expect a valid consensus.’1 Rescher argues that consensus can only be supported as an idealized state of affairs. To reach it requires affirming an idealized form of uniform rationality, used by an idealized group of people in an idealized situation and acquired in an idealized future. Rescher does not consider such idealized claims to be valid. He joins the

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postmodern discussion in dismissing the ideas of unity, identity, sameness and consensus as parts of a modern paradigm. Instead, the postmodern discourse promotes such concepts as pluralism, multiplicity, diversity, incommensurability and dissensus.2 Rescher’s arguments exemplify the dichotomy that exists between consensus and pluralism. This dichotomy seriously challenges the ecumenical claim for a valid consensus with difference. The challenge is all the more serious because of the strength of the arguments, such as Rescher’s, against (cognitive) consensus. I have therefore indicated this issue as one of the main questions in the consensus debate. My question is not only whether (an ecumenical) consensus with difference is possible but also whether such an argument can be supported without denying the critique of ‘cognitive consensus’ exemplified by Rescher. I will try to demonstrate, first, that ecumenical theology, as seen in the ecumenical bilateral documents, in fact shares some central features of postmodern thinking in the way of argumentation.3 I intend to show that ecumenical theology need not endorse this dichotomy of consensus and plurality. The coexistence of plurality and consensus can be supported, provided that neither reason nor consensus is taken as an epistemic method. What kind of plurality does postmodern thinking promote and what are the commonalities with ecumenical theology? Nancey Murphy describes the characteristics of postmodernity with the help of a heuristic model as having three critical axes. These axes involve epistemology, perception of language and the relationship between individualism and community. Described along these thematic axes, postmodernism emphasizes holism in epistemology, meaning as used in the philosophy of language, and tradition and community in ethics.4 Schrag describes decentring the subject as the epistemological foundation as a characteristic of postmodernity along with recognizing the social and contextual resources of rationality, certain undecidability of meaning, perceiving power as embedded within the claims of reason, and celebrating radical historicism and pluralism.5 Van Huyssteen asserts that postmodernity, understood as having the above-mentioned characteristics, makes it impossible to discuss central theological terms like religious experience, revelation and tradition with a generalized terminology that ignores socio-historical locations and the role of the theologian as interpreter.6 Postmodernism and ecumenical theology share an affirmation of socio-historical situatedness but implement this affirmation in different ways. Ecumenical theology recognizes the power of socio-historical situatedness to create plurality. At the same time, it holds to the ecumenical imperative that an agreement between churches cannot be a priori excluded. Ecumenical theology also shares with postmodernism what Murphy calls ‘holism in epistemology’.7 There is a conviction that the reality to which the doctrinal statements refer is not a set of foundational propositions. The understanding of revelation reflected in the ecumenical dialogue documents is not atomistic and cognitivist but holistic and relational. This is not immediately evident because the atomistic and holistic approaches are not either/or options. There is still no common theological view as to how far the historical and sociolinguistic contexts condition the Christian understanding of truth. In any case, the givenness of truth remains axiomatic to (ecumenical) theology. Ecumenical

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theologians are careful not to go too far in the constructivist direction and claim that the only referent of truth is the particular community, which creates and judges meanings. A move away from strictly foundationalistic epistemology is evident, although the ‘rational integrity’ of an argument is not solely dependent on the community.8 Epistemically speaking, ecumenical theology should perhaps be described neither as foundationalist nor as non-foundationalist. No extreme position (that there are absolute foundations for knowledge or that truth is relative, that there is universal reason or that each community has a rationality of its own) accurately reflects the developing understanding of theological hermeneutics and theological rationality.9 This uncertainty holds a possibility for ecumenical theology to find a way to address both the cognitive and the socio–communal aspects of consensus and thereby escape the above-described plurality versus consensus dichotomy.

Knowledge and understanding with or without consensus? I have identified the epistemic value of consensus as the second central question in the consensus debate. It is generally accepted that communal consensus has a role in rational inquiry. At the same time, there are convincing arguments both against the kind of uniform rationality this idea assumes and in support of an idea that dissensus and diversity play a central role in the life of communities.10 For example, Rescher argues that rational reasoning can very well lead to different conclusions depending on which premises are used. Because of this, says Rescher, one cannot justify a demand for consensus. Rational reasoning neither brings nor should bring us to a single, common conclusion.11 Is it possible at all to defend an argument for consensus from an epistemic point of view? Rescher’s uncompromising criticism of the pursuit of consensus offers tools to overcome some unresolved questions in ecumenical theology. His criticism is severe, but in the case of ecumenical consensus, it slightly misses the mark. In an ecumenical context consensus is, strictly speaking, not a method. Nor is consensus a procedure, which, when followed in detail, leads to a foreseeable result, in this case the truth.12 In the first place, ecumenical consensus is not an answer to an epistemic question. Here Rescher’s observation might be helpful. Rescher maintains that the link between consensus and truth is relatively weak and can be argued for only as an idealized state of affairs. This means that all rational people will have all the relevant information available and will draw the same conclusions from it under idealized circumstances.13 The only relatively plausible connection Rescher sees between consensus and truth is something created by agreement on meanings. The epistemic usefulness of ‘consensuality of meaning’ is highly restricted. It is one thing to agree on what a linguistic construct means, that is, what claim it asserts, and another thing to claim that what has been asserted is true.14 From the viewpoint of ecumenical theology, one can join Rescher in saying that the epistemic relevance of consensus is highly restricted, the reason being that rational argumentation can justifiably lead to differing conclusions.

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It is ecumenically relevant that understanding does not equal agreement. For Rescher, ‘to understand’ means to have knowledge of the beliefs of the other and the ability to communicate with the other. ‘Understanding’ does not include endorsement of the argument. Even considering a conception radically different from the conception another holds does not prevent one from thinking that both parties are speaking about the same thing. Rescher speaks here of ‘objectivity’ and ‘referential commonality of focus’. The existence of an objective referent outside particular viewpoints does not itself restrict the number of correct descriptive conceptualizations.15 For Rescher, the existence of a referential commonality of focus does not qualify as an element of consensus. This is because of his perception that ‘consensus’ in the end refers to identity of beliefs.16 Rescher denies that different cognitive positions could be combined into a consensual agreement: ‘different bases do not combine, they make mutually incompatible demands, and in conjoining them we will not get something more comprehensive and complete – we will get a mess’.17 To summarize: there are two elements in Rescher’s criticism that are relevant to the debate about ecumenical consensus. Rescher demonstrates the existence of three modes of consensus, which extend from a ‘de facto consensus’ through ‘ultimate consensus’ to an ‘idealized consensus’. He argues that a plausible argument for consensus can only be made either in the form of an ultimate consensus, that is, as an agreement that presumably will come to exist in the community in the eventual future, or as an idealized consensus, that is, a hypothetical state that could be attained under ideal, though probably not realizable, conditions.18 These models of consensus have parallels in the ecumenical discussion of doctrinal consensus and church unity. Is doctrinal consensus something attainable or is it an eschatological reality in the sense that it is realized only ‘in the end of time’? Rescher’s second ecumenically important criticism considers the implausibility of arguing for consensus based on conjoining a variety of differing beliefs. The dialogue documents analysed here show that there has been no convincing argument for consensus based on combining differing beliefs as instances of a larger, overarching structure. No attempt simply to accept the existence of differing beliefs and to declare them equally justified seems plausible. However justified Rescher’s argument against consensus is, it is not necessarily detrimental to an ecumenical pursuit of consensus. Rescher’s argument is based on the belief that consensus is not a valid epistemic category. Communities should endeavour to make it safe to disagree, not to require a change of beliefs in a bid to attain consensus. Ecumenical consensus does not carry heavy epistemic connotations. It seems content with the restricted epistemic use of consensus as ‘referential commonality of focus’. Further on, the ecumenical dialogues consensus is not conceived of as referring to ‘uniformity of beliefs’. It is clear that whether or not one can see that a consensus can exist with difference depends on one’s understanding of beliefs or, in the case of ecumenical consensus, on doctrine.

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Agreeable Agreement Consensus debate in an ecumenical context

At the beginning of this chapter I noted that recent critical discussion of the notion of consensus has contrasted ‘consensus ecumenism’ with an ‘ecumenism of difference’. I would suggest that the struggle between these two options (consensus ecumenism and the ecumenism of difference) can be led in new directions if understood as a part of larger discourse of theological rationality.19 The debate over ‘consensus ecumenism’ and, ultimately, over ecumenical consensus as such is a point in the discourse concerning a plausible way of making religious claims and conceptualizing beliefs. I have already proposed that ecumenical theology in general has intentions similar to particular kinds of postmodernism with the reservation that ecumenical theology is not primarily driven by epistemic concerns but by questions of truth. It is crucial for an ecumenical theory of ‘consensus with difference’ to be able to accommodate both real unity in truth and a real difference in explication and experience. Where do the real differences come from? What is the foundation of theological plurality? These questions are part of the philosophical debate between the foundations of knowledge (whether conceptual or sensual) versus the web of experience. The foundationalism versus non-foundationalism debate has a parallel in the debate on the nature of theology as either a discipline of explanation or of understanding. In a foundationalist paradigm, theology (like any science) has an explanatory function. The purpose of theology is to offer absolute explanations, which are necessarily derived by following specific rules, clear and true regardless of tradition or context. In the non-foundationalist paradigm, theology is considered as an interpretative effort. Understanding is rooted in and conditioned by particular historical traditions.20 Differences in understanding the function of theology reflect on the understanding of theological consensus. If the task of theology is primarily interpretative, then ecumenical consensus too considers primarily interpretations. If the task of theology is to explain objective truths, then also consensus concerns truths. Some of the disagreements on the possibility of consensus and on whether a consensus has been reached derive from this difference in perception of the task of theology. Theological discussion of the viability of ecumenical consensus is constantly being balanced between the church’s communal character and its pluriform manifestations. Views of the possibility or the desirability of reaching a justifiable ecumenical consensus vary from very pessimistic to moderate and limited optimism. In the following sections I will present three differing lines of criticism on consensus as an ecumenical goal. This will be followed by a proposal for a wider understanding of ecumenical consensus. Consensus with difference: a contradiction in terms Ulrich Körtner serves as an example of significant pessimism regarding both the possibility and the desirability of consensus as an ecumenical goal.21 Körtner contrasts ‘consensus ecumenism’ with ‘hermeneutics of difference’ and maintains

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that consensus with difference is incompatible with the concept of consensus as such. Taking as an example a formulation from the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999), he asserts that a ‘consensus’ in the conventional sense of the word cannot coincide with a postmodern plurality of ‘basic truths’.22 In addition, the pursuit of a consensus, not to mention consensus with difference, is for Körtner not a valid ecumenical goal. Consensus with difference fails both a priori as a concept and a posteriori when applied in the ecumenical dialogues. Again the Joint Declaration serves for Körtner as an example. He asserts that by explicating a differentiated, that is, not full consensus, the document shows that the goal of ‘consensus ecumenism’ (i.e., the identical understanding of doctrine) cannot be attained. To continue to pursue the road of consensus ecumenism in fact unnecessarily prolongs ecumenical dialogue. Instead of the false goal of consensus, the ecumenical movement should work on a ‘difference paradigm’. This would have several positive consequences for ecumenical dialogues, including a renewed respect for differing confessional identities and through this a realization of dialogue among equals.23 In Körtner’s hermeneutical ‘difference paradigm’ the differences do not reach to the heart of the subject matter. The differences exist on the level of expressions (linguistic, etc.). Since the expressions and the subject cannot be totally separated (the subject matter can only be attained through the expressions), the common subject matter will eventually result in new common expressions. These will not be discerned through their identity but through their ‘coherence of non-abolishable [unaufhebbar] differences’. Körtner reinterprets the consentire of the Augsburg Confession to mean this coherence of non-abolishable differences. These differences can function as a means of mutual correction, but need not function so forever. The churches can also grow towards lesser diversity.24 Körtner perceives different confessions to function as more or less independent semiotic systems with their own theological logic or grammar. He argues against the goal of ‘visible unity’ and opts for an ecumenical goal resembling a Wittgensteinian ‘family resemblance’.25 Körtner emphasizes the development of meaning through the use of words and signs. He binds concepts and practice together through the perception of concepts as signs whose meaning is formed in their use. The purpose of ecumenical hermeneutics is to enable the development of common forms of speech that bind or surpass confessional language.26 Körtner’s response to the question ‘What kind of ecumenical consensus can accommodate differences?’ would be ‘None’. A consensus in Körtner’s view stands firmly on the idea of identity and uniformity and in direct opposition to differences. To allow for differences, one must dismiss consensus.

Possible but not necessary ‘sufficient consensus’ Ingolf Dalferth has argued against consensus ecumenism and especially against conceptualizing ‘agreement’ as ‘common understanding’ from a hermeneutical viewpoint. Dalferth shows quite convincingly that (1) understanding the other can only take place through one’s own horizon of understanding and this cannot be

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called ‘common understanding’ and (2) to come to a common understanding denotes negotiation and convincing argumentation, but not consensus.27 Dalferth presses the hermeneutical agenda quite far, stating that God’s revelation cannot be distinguished from its interpretation. This is to say that for Dalferth there is in principle no place outside interpretations where the interpreters could meet.28 In Dalferth’s view, to come to an understanding requires only a sufficient understanding of the presented arguments and their relevance to the debate. This sufficient understanding is neither common understanding in the sense of agreement nor in the sense of identical understanding. Common understanding is not agreement because one can comprehend the debate and the arguments without agreeing with them.29 Nor is it identical understanding because one does not have to understand the arguments in an identical way to be convinced by them or to reject them. This follows from the distinction Dalferth makes between rationality and reasonableness. Rationality is a quality of the content of the belief and reasonableness is a quality of the ‘believer’s believing’. With this distinction it is not necessary to deny the reasonableness of holding a belief, even if one does not accept the grounds used to justify the belief. Dalferth gives priority to the reasonableness of a belief to the degree that he calls ‘rational’ any belief that can be reasonably held.30 Consensus is not impossible, but it does not consist of one shared meaning. For Dalferth consensus is not univocal but perspectival. Dalferth opposes identifying ‘understanding’ with consensus and ‘having a common understanding’ with being in agreement. Annemarie C. Mayer formulates clearly what is also Dalferth’s concern, namely, that a doctrinal consensus reduces the plurality of confessional differences to an unwanted uniformity. Mayer argues, along the same lines as Dalferth, that human understanding is always fragmented. Truth is always an interpretation. We do not receive a ‘pure’ truth, rather truth is always interpreted from our own perspective. According to Mayer’s interpretation, this pluriformity serves to bring out the wholeness of the truth that is represented by complementary and differing understandings.31 Although Mayer draws on Dalferth, her conclusions emphasize more than Dalferth’s the complementarity of viewpoints. Dalferth argues that ‘the sense of a whole’ is a myth that in reality does not exist. Commonalities are never neutral in the sense of being free from interests and accessible to all in the same way. Instead they are bound up with particular perspectives. The particularity of perspectives is not detrimental to the community since commonality of beliefs is not, in Dalferth’s view, even desirable. What is needed is an agreement on public procedures of debate, defence, contest and decision-making that enables people who hold different beliefs to live peacefully together.32 Unity for Dalferth is not unity in the understanding of faith, but unity in faith. The consensus as ‘understanding’ can never be more than a ‘sufficient consensus’ that holds until challenged the next time. Even this sufficient consensus cannot be attained merely on the level of a text. It is the common action or lived life that shows whether a sufficient consensus exists.33 In Mayer’s interpretation, Dalferth would strongly opt for a Konvivenz over a consensus, that is, a commonly lived life over common cognitive agreement.34 Even without going that far one can say that Dalferth has a distaste for consensus for two reasons; firstly because consensus

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implies identity of understanding which, from his hermeneutical perspective in its strictest sense cannot be attained, and second because he does not agree with what he takes to be a fundamental presupposition of consensus ecumenism, namely that the unity of the church is brought about through an agreement in doctrine.35 Dalfeth’s answer to the question of ecumenical consensus with difference would be moderately negative. He does not deny the possibility of consensus, but he does deny its probability and desirability. It is his philosophical conviction that human existence is always bound to perspectives. This perspectival understanding does not from the outset exclude the possibility that two or more people could hold similar beliefs. Dalferth also has other convictions regarding the functioning of societies and the church as communion, which render it impossible for him to consider consensus a positive normative goal. The goal of society is to become a safe place for disagreement and debate. Within the church Dalferth argues for peaceful coexistence and tolerance. But this coexistence and tolerance can be called consensus only in a very restricted and provisional sense.

Embedded reasoning and referential consensus Christoph Schwöbel shares with Dalferth a strong positive understanding of pluriformity and diversity. Like Dalferth, Schwöbel too would agree to some form of consensus, though with some restrictions. Schwöbel’s views of the possible coexistence of consensus and plurality can be understood from the viewpoint of plurality. Plurality is a constitutive feature of Christianity; a ‘symptom’ of what makes Christianity what it is essentially.36 Reducing Christianity’s plurality to uniformity inhibits access to Christianity’s true identity. The church’s true identity depends on the church’s relation to the trinitarian God. This has profound ecclesiological and epistemological consequences for Schwöbel’s ecumenical thinking. On the ecclesiological side, Schwöbel asserts that the only legitimate goal of ecumenism is ‘a communion of many’. In this communion, theologically modelled after a trinitarian paradigm, differences are not subsumed under oneness but become constitutive elements of the communion.37 Plurality does not come about because of a fixed ‘fundament’ in a philosophical, foundationalist sense. Plurality is based on the gospel as God’s trinitarian work. It is the gospel as God’s work, reached through the human action of proclamation and made certain in concrete life situations, that grounds the plurality of faith.38 Schwöbel speaks of foundation, which is not reachable by following formal procedures and with the help of universal, decontextualised reason. For Schwöbel, reasoning is always embedded in particular contexts. At the same time, Schwöbel wants to avoid falling into diversity, which is characterized by parallel cultures, separated from each other.39 These two convictions have important implications for Schwöbel’s understanding of the desirability and valid expression of ecumenical consensus. Because Schwöbel associates consensus with the ‘common ground’ approach of universal, decontextualized reason, he does not favour consensus as an ecumenical goal. The foundation of the church is in God’s trinitarian, salvific action, which through

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faith, creates a relationship, on the one hand, between God and individual churches and, on the other hand, among individual churches.40 In Schwöbel’s view, a pursuit of consensus in doctrine is futile because it fails to identify properly the foundation of the church. A superficial ‘consensus in doctrine’ can appear to exist without proper clarification of the foundation of doctrine. Instead of the doctrinal surfaces, ecumenical theology should focus on how God acts in the world, and on clarifying the relations between revelation, faith and doctrine.41 A consensus in doctrine has as such no power to create unity. The foundation of doctrine, that is, God’s salvific action in the world, does have this power. Consensus can exist only in a referential sense, that is, in reference to the foundation of the church. Because Schwöbel’s ‘foundation’ is not a fixed set of truths, his referential consensus is not a method. Schwöbel contrasts his referential approach with the ‘differentiated consensus’ specifically on these grounds. In Schwöbel’s view, ‘differentiated consensus’ claims to be a method. It is an attempt to present in detail the doctrinal statements on which both Lutherans and Catholics can agree and show the compatibility of differing emphases.42 He wonders how to perceive the relationship between the common and the differentiated statements in a ‘differentiated consensus’. Schwöbel suspects that the statements are made to function as propositional foundations in the sense presented earlier. Understood thus, the common statement would be the basic truth from which other truths are deduced. Schwöbel rightly points out that one cannot deduce divergent truths from true premises and wonders whether a ‘differentiated consensus’ endangers the truthfulness of doctrine for both churches.43 For Schwöbel, a ‘differentiated consensus’ is an example of a positivistic understanding of doctrine. A positivistic or propositional understanding of doctrine is incompatible with the idea that the church’s foundation is an act of God and as such cannot be fixed as a set of propositions. Schwöbel’s critique of current attempts to accommodate consensus and differences are theologically motivated. His main difficulty with consensus (as reflected in the Joint Declaration) is that such consensus is based on doctrine and is meant to have ecclesial consequences. His objection becomes clear in his contrasting the doctrinal consensus in the Joint Declaration with that in the Leuenberg Agreement (CPCE 1973). In Schwöbel’s reading, the Leuenberg Agreement is explicitly not a consensus document but an agreement between churches with differences in doctrine. The Leuenberg Agreement is primarily an agreement on ‘common understanding of the gospel’, that is, an agreement on what constitutes the church. This ‘common understanding of the gospel’ is not a doctrine but refers to God’s salvific action which is the foundation of doctrine. Schwöbel’s proposed referential consensus reflects an agreement like that of Leuenberg that focuses on the foundation and allows plurality in all the rest. A referential consensus does not consist of claims regarding doctrinal statements or attempts to formulate new doctrinal statements. Rather it refers back to what is the foundation (Grund ) and subject matter (Gegenstand ) of doctrine, God’s salvific action in Christ through the Holy Spirit.44

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Proposal for a wider understanding of ecumenical consensus The two main problems pointed out by the criticisms of ‘consensus ecumenism’ described above are that a pursuit of consensus implies that the unity of the church is primarily about cognitive agreement on propositional beliefs and that this approach fails to recognize the real pluriformity, which is essential to the nature of the church. Based on the above discussion of how postmodern thinking has challenged our understanding of rationality and beliefs and on the analysis of bilateral ecumenical dialogue documents, I propose some principles for a wider understanding of consensus in an ecumenical context. A solid ecumenical consensus should be able to accommodate differences within unity and in a way that does not reduce consensus to a cognitive agreement on beliefs. An ecumenical consensus must therefore incorporate both the cognitive aspect of agreement on beliefs and the socio-communal aspect of the community of those consenting to the beliefs. In addition, the viability of an ecumenical consensus with difference (or enriching differences) rests on what one perceives to be the foundation/subject matter and the function of consensus. This is true in both the philosophical and the theological discourses. All these questions will be approached with the assumption that the preferred theoretical approach will need to accommodate some tendencies that at first seem mutually contradictory. Great difficulties are encountered in arguing for a coexistence of consensus and differences if only simple propositions are used or if expressions are simply identified with their content. At the same time, objective truth-claims cannot be avoided in the preferred approach.45 There is also ample evidence to argue against epistemically normative interpretations of consensus. The preferred theoretical approach should show that consensus matters for the community of those consenting. An idealized and decontextualized approach survives neither the criticism of Rescher from the philosophical side nor that of Körtner, Dalferth or Schwöbel from the theological side. The ecumenical use of the concept of consensus can avoid both the criticisms of idealization and of decontextualization. A step towards this is to observe that consensus has two interconnected aspects, a cognitive and a socio-communal aspect. Of these two aspects, the cognitive relates more strongly to questions of truth and rationality. The socio-communal aspect focuses on the functioning of the community and its significance to consensus.46 These two aspects can be theoretically distinguished but not separated. A solid consensus with difference must be viable in regard to both of these aspects. These two aspects also reflect parallel discourses on the nature of solid ecumenical consensus with difference. A more cognitively oriented discourse inquires about the truth that a doctrine describes, refers to, or manifests. The more socio-communal-oriented discourse discusses the relation between doctrine or consensus and the ecclesial community.47 The cognitive aspect of ecumenical consensus Discussion of the cognitive aspect is distinguished from the socio-communal aspect by its presentation. The diffuse character of these aspects makes even a practical

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distinction difficult. It is my goal in this section to draw on the analysis of the dialogue documents and to describe, with the help of Christoph Schwöbel, on the one hand, and George Lindbeck, on the other, some of the ways in which it is possible to accommodate consensus and differences under the same heading. Despite differences, both Schwöbel and Lindbeck share a conviction that in speaking of truth, doctrine is best described as referential. This rather modest observation simply means that there is a difference between the content of the doctrine (or what the doctrine refers to) and the doctrine itself.48 Schwöbel is very clear in describing the trinitarian and dynamic nature of the source and referent of consensus. Schwöbel’s discussion is partly motivated by his ecclesiological convictions, that is, that doctrine should not be perceived as the foundation of ecclesial unity.49 It should be possible to set aside for a moment this ecclesiological conviction and focus on Schwöbel’s description of the source and referent of doctrine. At the same time, I find Lindbeck’s description of the different approaches to understanding the character of the referential relation quite appealing. Lindbeck proposes that this relation should be reduced neither to the objectivity of an ahistorical propositional truth nor to the subjective and individual experiences of it. Rather there should be a third way out, which accounts both for the objectivity of truth and for the subjectivity of knowledge.50 To add to Lindbeck’s understanding of the cultural–linguistic nature of doctrine, I will make use of Nancey Murphy’s remarks on judging the truth-claims of differing traditions. Schwöbel’s solution for the coexistence of consensus and difference lies in what he calls ‘referential hermeneutics’. In referential hermeneutics, agreement does not exist primarily between doctrinal formulations but in reference to the foundation (Grund ) and the subject matter (Gegenstand ) of the doctrine.51 In this approach, identifying the ‘foundation and the subject matter’ is of primary concern.52 Failing to make a distinction between the ‘foundation and subject-matter’ and ‘what belongs to the surfaces’ distorts the relations among revelation, faith and doctrine. Schwöbel speaks of a ‘displacement of foundations’, which can appear, for example, in the form of biblical fundamentalism. In an ecumenical context, a displaced foundation could be anything that is falsely assigned to what founds the unity of faith and consequently the church. Schwöbel mentions two examples of displaced foundations, the above-mentioned case of biblical fundamentalism and what could be called ‘doctrinal maximalism’.53 Doctrinal maximalism identifies doctrinal statements with revelation. As a consequence, doctrinal statements can be falsely perceived as the foundation of the church. In referential hermeneutics, truth is mediated by reference and manifested as both correspondence and coherence. Correspondence between doctrine and God’s self-realization is primary. In reference to and in agreement with this foundation, the doctrines can also cohere. In Schwöbel’s view, a hermeneutics of reference encompasses both consensus and difference. It encompasses difference by recognizing that differing doctrinal statements from two differing churches are based on the same foundation. Consequently, hermeneutics of reference recognizes a consensus in reference to the common ground. Doctrinal statements are signs,

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which in one context communicate what a different sign might communicate in another.54 Schwöbel describes the relation between the foundation and expression as ‘correspondence’, but the more specific nature of this correspondence remains unclear. Presumably, Schwöbel does not commit to a correspondence theory of truth in the strict sense. This would require speaking of revelation in terms of propositions and facts and assuming more precise linguistic expressions than theological understanding of language would allow.55 The above-mentioned idea of ‘embedded rationality’ suggests that there the pursuit of the foundation itself is mediated by the ‘embeddedness’. How the reference to the foundation, which is the dynamic work of the trinitarian God, implies coherence among differing doctrinal statements and what the purpose of this coherence is remains unclear. Schwöbel’s referential hermeneutics seem therefore vulnerable to Rescher’s criticism on consensus as ‘referential commonality of focus’. Rescher’s objection was that a referential focus does not itself restrict the number of correct descriptive conceptualizations.56 The question remains whether consensus has, in the framework of ‘referential hermeneutics’ any kind of normative function. In order to answer some of these challenges, an approach that incorporates the cognitive or truth aspect of consensus must be expanded beyond the idea of a decontextualized cognition. Social contexts must not serve only as the surroundings in which the correspondence or coherence of ‘the foundation’ and ‘the expression’ takes place. The contexts are an integral part of the correspondence and coherence. Nancey Murphy’s description of the constraints of Christian truth-seeking exemplify such an approach. According to Murphy, Christian truth-seeking is constrained by three kinds of preconditions: clues, fit and language. ‘Clues’ refer to the variety of experiences that both stimulate and constrain the development of theories. The clue aspect of Murphy’s description refers to the correspondence theory of truth. It recognizes that knowledge relates to and is partially determined by something outside of itself. At the same time it escapes one of the problems of the correspondence theory, namely, that knowledge must somehow imitate or mirror the thing it corresponds to. The second constraint of ‘fit’ also functions both as a stimulus and a constraint. In truth-seeking, one is at times compelled to seek affirmation beyond individual clues in the consistency of existing theories. The fit aspect owes its origins to the coherence theory of truth. The third constraint, ‘language’, refers to the conceptual schemes that scholars of every age have had at their disposal. Murphy associates with ‘conceptual scheme’ a variety of functions of language, such as being a resource for naming things, organizing experience, enabling communication and providing rules about what can and cannot be said with particular words.57 Murphy’s description helps to show how the truth question expands beyond the simple relation between a sentence (or expression) and a fact (the content of the expression). It demands more of coherence than, for example, Schwöbel, for whom coherence is something that can be postulated from correspondence. By speaking of the constraints of language, Murphy also expands the theory towards questions of the use of language and ultimately, the community of those using the language.

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Murphy also proposes a redefinition of truth in the Christian context. Murphy’s proposal is ecumenically interesting and provides yet another conceptual tool for describing what a consensus with difference would look like. Murphy distinguishes between the self-commissive and evaluative uses of ‘true’. She proposes to use the word ‘true’ to communicate that a person is committed to believe that Christianity is true. This is the self-commissive use of the word ‘true’. According to this selfcommissive use of ‘true’, a person can, for example, commit to upholding as true the trinitarian formula ‘God is three persons in one substance’, while at the same time having doubts about the adequacy of the philosophical terms ‘person’ and ‘substance’. Murphy distinguishes this self-commissive use of ‘true’ from epistemological assessment. For this evaluative use, Murphy proposes to use different terms such as levels of acceptability. By distinguishing between a selfcommissive and an evaluative use of ‘true’, one can be fully committed to what one holds to be true without ceasing to be able to converse with those who are committed to different ‘truths’.58 Murphy is not content with a purely ‘intrasystematic truth’ (in a Lindbeckian sense). She stresses the need to engage in epistemic evaluation of the whole religious tradition.59

The socio-communal aspect of ecumenical consensus Lindbeck’s account of the nature of doctrine is enlightening on the nature of the referential relation between the ‘expression’ and ‘foundation’ of doctrine. It is not my intention to give an exhaustive presentation of Lindbeck’s cultural–linguistic theory of doctrine.60 I will only refer to some aspects of it in order to show how a cultural–linguistic understanding of doctrine could allow for the coexistence of consensus and difference. Lindbeck’s proposal for understanding doctrine as regulative rules of language has several advantages for ecumenical use. He endeavours to keep together the cognitive and performative aspects of doctrine, that is, not to allow the separation of a belief or proposition from the context in which the belief is formed, uttered or performed.61 Differences in doctrinal formulations are not determined solely by the differing historical contexts in which the Christian community lives out its experience of faith. Experiences-in-context and the conceptual frameworks in which the experience is conceptualized are in a dialectical relationship. For Lindbeck, ‘doctrine’ is a specific category in the religion genre. ‘Religion’ includes a variety of different forms of discursive and non-discursive symbols. In general, Lindbeck speaks more of religion or religious language than of doctrine. This is true also in relation to truth. Truth is a characteristic of the ordinary religious language when it is used in a regulative manner to ‘mold lives through prayer, praise, preaching, and exhortation. It is only on this level that human beings linguistically exhibit their truth or falsity, their correspondence or lack of correspondence to the Ultimate Mystery.’62 ‘Doctrine’ refers to those symbols that have a regulative function in a religion.63 Religious knowledge is not primarily about religion or that the religion teaches such and such but about how to be religious.64 ‘How to be religious’ is not only

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about praxis but about the entirety of cognitive and performative symbols which are aroused and formed by the dialectical interplay between linguistic frameworks and the experiences that are, in particular contexts, conceptualized through them. The mere fact that there is a reference or even a common point of reference does not allow for comparison between different sets of rules.65 The referential relation is complicated by its mediatedness through both experiental and cognitive–conceptual schemes, which may or may not be shared by the two groups compared. Related to this, Lindbeck suggests that the power of any religious utterance is not in the descriptive but in their performative use. ‘What is decisive’, says Lindbeck, ‘is use, not content.’66 Here Lindbeck approaches hermeneutically oriented theologies where application or meaning ‘for me’ in a particular situation is of primary importance. Siding with J. L. Austin’s speech act theory allows Lindbeck to explain why the particular ‘for me’ is doctrine in the first place, that is, part of the discourse that has a regulative function in the community. Doctrine does not have a regulative function because of its accuracy in describing its content or compelling truth value. The regulative function is based on the nature of utterances that are always an act of saying, are that in a particular manner and induce action.67 Lindbeck maintains that doctrines do not guarantee their truthfulness but make possible propositional, practical and symbolic truth.68 Like Schwöbel, Lindbeck too in speaking of the truthfulness of religion distinguishes between two aspects of coherence and correspondence. For Lindbeck, the correspondence aspect relates to the ontological aspect of truthfulness, that is, the relation between the religious utterance and reality. What is noteworthy is that, according to Lindbeck, correspondence is not an attribute of the utterances as such but is only a function of their role in constituting a form of life. An utterance can have propositional truth in the sense of ontological correspondence in so far as the utterance is performance, that is, an act or deed which helps to create the correspondence.69 The performative aspect is, in Lindbeck’s view, internal to language itself. It is therefore necessary for the propositional truth. This does not mean that a proposition is made true or false by performance. The performative aspect of language provides the context in which the ontological correspondence can be evaluated.70 From Lindbeck’s account of the nature of doctrine it follows that the existence or non-existence of consensus is not restricted to either end of the cognitivist versus experiential–expressivist dichotomy. True knowledge is not merely a referential relation (of any kind) between a foundation and an expression. The constant element in religion is neither on the level of objective descriptions or on that of inner experience.71 Truthfulness is embedded in a wide variety of symbolic actions (including linguistic assertions). Symbolic actions are always shared and have a communicative function. With these arguments, Lindbeck endeavours to shift the epistemic focus from the individual subject and recognize the social and contextual elements of rationality. Lindbeck uses the term ‘hermeneutics of intratextual social embodiment’ to describe these contextual elements.72 In regard to consensus and diversity Lindbeck would maintain that the inevitable variety on the experiential level does not jeopardize the continuity or identity of doctrine. This also extends to the linguistic forms, which both the first-order and second-order propositions (the regulative doctrines) take.73 For Lindbeck, ‘identity’

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does not mean here ‘unchanged sameness’. It refers primarily to ‘identifiability across time and space’.74 The identity (in the sense of identifiability) of doctrine is not lost, even if the grammatical rules of how to make doctrinal utterances are profoundly different. Lindbeck’s conviction that there is no third framework that would encompass two differing confessional frameworks and thus allow for their comparison enhances the profundity of difference. In the absence of a third framework, talk of compatibility or incompatibility becomes impossible.75 For Lindbeck, the different Christian traditions are different in a way which makes complete translation at times impossible.76 The incompleteness of translation implies that differences in descriptive doctrines will remain. This does not exclude the possibility of ecumenical consensus. The identity of doctrine is not dependent on the sameness (or translatability) of descriptive doctrines but (in the case of the doctrine of justification) on the common Christological–soteriological confession. Although the descriptions remain different in the sense of being incommensurable, they are commensurable on the meta-level of their reference. Commensurability on a meta-level means that the different descriptive doctrines are intelligible in a referential sense and can be judged on the basis of how well they allow access to what they refer.77 To summarize, one can say that in Lindbeck’s work ‘doctrine’ refers to a specific form of religious language, namely language that has a regulative function in the community. The form of doctrine is mediated through conceptual frameworks and socio-cultural settings. The ecumenically central question is not whether doctrines agree in the sense that they describe the same object. ‘Doctrine’ as such refers to an utterance whose primary purpose is not descriptive but regulative. Rather the main ecumenical question becomes, does the doctrine inform life through various actions (including mental actions) so that the form of life is truly Christian? Both the appearance of the rule and what the rule encourages or forbids can vary while still guiding the communities towards truly Christian form of life. For an ecumenical consensus this would mean that ‘agreement’ is not a relationship between propositions or statements as descriptions of propositions. Consensus refers more to the relation between the differing traditions.78 Following Lindbeck’s proposal of the regulative nature of doctrine, a consensus would be a predicate of the discourse that guides the Christian communions to act (in a holistic sense) in a truthful way.

Consensus with difference: possibilities and possible consequences Most of what has been said in the previous pages confirms the view that, ultimately, differences among churches will remain rather than be annihilated. It has been my purpose to show that consensus and differences need not be mutually exclusive. This does not necessarily mean that consensus should be on the ecumenical agenda. Nevertheless, there are sufficient grounds for preferring at least a modest but still normative conception of consensus. For this I would like to return to the idea of identity. The question of identity is one of the church’s perennial questions. From very early on, the church’s unity was challenged by disputes over how to judge what is

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truly Christian. Accordingly, the ecumenical dialogues frequently speak of faithfulness when referring to the continuity of the church’s identity through the ages. Disagreements in judging whether a practice or an action belongs to the identity of what it is to be Christian have grown into church-dividing differences. A church-dividing difference is thus a difference that hinders members of one communion from identifying members of another communion as having a Christian identity. This inability of identification makes it impossible for the two communions to function as one.79 It is important to make a distinction between ‘identity’ and ‘the ability to identify’. A consensus with difference is not a call for a common or ‘identical identity’. The idea of a consensus with difference is in line with the kind of ecumenism that emphasizes the positive contribution of a variety of confessional identities. Eilert Herms has argued that the notion of ‘confessional identity’ should be understood to denote a particular class of social identity, that is, the class of organized churches. In Herms’s view, a valid or operative doctrine is something that defines the identity of a church in that it has a regulative value. Thus, it helps to identify context invariant goals, guides in identifying potential problems in the community and assists in solving these problems. Herms therefore concludes that the existence of confessional identities in fact demands the formulation of an ecumenical consensus. Consensus is essentially connected to the functioning of the communion.80 Even if the need for consensus as regulative to the functioning of the community can be justified, the question still remains of how this consensus looks when it is a consensus with difference. William G. Rusch and Harding Meyer have both proposed ‘differentiated participation’, in an effort to elaborate on this question.81 Meyer focuses on the question of episcopacy and asks how Lutherans and Catholics could participate in the same historical episcopate. He describes ‘common participation’, which follows the pattern of ‘differentiated consensus’. ‘Common participation’ thus becomes ‘differentiated participation’. In ‘differentiated participation’, all share the same episcopate but are free to differ in their interpretation, emphasis and evaluation of it.82 Rusch discusses the idea of differentiated participation as it can be observed in the Lutheran–Episcopal Called to Common Mission (A-L 1999 usa).83 Both proposals give some indication of future models of common ecclesial life. A major shortcoming of both is that each considers the model of differentiated participation to be something that advances beyond a consensus with difference. This raises the question of what kind of understanding of doctrine lies behind these proposals. It seems that they fall back into a more cognitivist understanding in which what is theologically agreed upon is separated from how the communion acts. In light of what has been presented in the previous sections, this separation does not seem ecumenically helpful. Some form of differentiated participation inevitably follows from a consensus with difference. Perhaps a more plausible proposal will arise from a discourse such as the one outlined above. I have in mind Herms’s remarks on the necessity of consensus for the identity and functioning of the church, Lindbeck’s proposal for a regulative understanding of doctrines as rules for governing ‘how to act truthfully’ as a Christian communion and perhaps also Nancey Murphy’s distinction between the self-commissive and evaluative aspects of truth.

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1. Rescher, Pluralism, p. 43. 2. J. Wenzel van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), p. 24. 3. A definition of what ‘postmodernity’ actually is is notoriously missing. For a recent introduction to the question from a theological point of view, see Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, pp. 18–27. The necessity of discussing ecumenism in the postmodern context has been pointed out, for example, by Dietrich Ritschl in Theorie und Konkretion in der Ökumenischen Theologie: Kann es eine Hermeneutik des Vertrauens inmitten differierender semitischer Systemen geben? (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2003), p. 43. 4. Nancey Murphy and James William McClendon Jr, ‘Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies’, Modern Theology 5/3 (1989): 192–9; van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, p. 24. 5. Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, p. 30. 6. Ibid. pp. 59–60. 7. Murphy and McClendon, ‘Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies’, p. 191. 8. ‘Foundationalism’ is here understood in a general sense to refer to an epistemic attitude in which all non-basic beliefs must be accepted on the basis of universally compelling beliefs or realities that themselves are in no need of support. Van Huyssteen describes the current dialogue between theology and contemporary culture as a challenge to move ‘beyond the insular comfort of theological foundationalism’ ( J. Wenzel van Huyssteen, ‘Is the Postmodern Always a Postfoundationalist?’ Theology Today 50/3 [1993]: 374). The same could be said about ecumenical encounters. On the pitfalls of radical non-foundationalism, see van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, pp. 74–9. 9. F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality (Grand Rapids, Mich. and Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1999), pp. 25–42. 10. Van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality, p. 99. 11. Rescher, Pluralism, p. 7. 12. This is also noted by Michael Root (‘Identity and Difference’, in Theology and Dialogue. Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce D. Marshall [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990], p. 179). It is important to emphasize that consensus is not a method, especially in light of how often it is referred to as such in ecumenical discourse. Referring to consensus as a method makes consensus vulnerable to both epistemically oriented and hermeneutically oriented criticism. The epistemically oriented criticism will dismiss consensus as a method referring to such arguments as Rescher’s. The hermeneutically oriented reader will consider consensus as a method hermeneutically biased. Körtner demonstrates the problems clearly with reference to combining a ‘hermeneutics of unity’ (F&O Treasure 1998) with ‘differentiated consensus’ (Einführung in die theologische Hermeneutik, p. 165). 13. Rescher, Pluralism, p. 56. 14. Ibid. p. 36. 15. Ibid. p. 41. 16. The introduction to the book starts with the following statement: ‘For much of the history of Western philosophy, consensus – uniformity of belief and evaluation – has been viewed as a desideratum whose ultimate realization can be taken as assured’ (ibid., p. 1). Rescher continues: ‘The ‘‘consensus’’ that prevails among all rational people in such matters simply reflects the inevitable uniformity that we ourselves predetermine by using our standards to determine who the rational people are’ (ibid., p. 10). 17. Ibid., p. 102. 18. Ibid., p. 28. 19. Another option would be to link the discussion to the larger framework of ecclesiological discourse. Although ecclesiological beliefs surely have an affect on the conceptualization of other doctrinal loci, I find making reference to the more general style of theological

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20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45.

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argumentation to have more explanatory power. Christoph Schwöbel points to the same question in asserting that agreements on the church or the ministry remain superficial if they are merely a cover for more fundamental differences in the theological rationale of doctrinal statements. These more fundamental differences are merely manifested in the questions of church and ministry; see Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene’, p. 452. Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, pp. 68–70. Körtner, Einführung in die theologische Hermeneutik. L-RC 1999: 5. Cf. Körtner, Einführung in die theologische Hermeneutik, p. 165; Jüngel, ‘Amica Exegesis’, p. 258 n. 15. Körtner, Einführung in die theologische Hermeneutik, p. 167. Ibid., p. 168. Körtner refers here both to Wittgenstein and to Lindbeck; see ibid., p. 170. Ibid., p. 170. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, p. 273. See also Rescher’s argument that ‘rational cogency’ cannot be identified with consensus because of the following realities: (1) the diversity in people’s experiences and epistemic situations, (2) the variation of available data, (3) an underdetermination of facts by data, (4) the variability of people’s cognitive values and (5) the variation of cognitive methodology and the epistemic ‘state of the art’; Rescher, Pluralism, p. 11. Rescher’s view corresponds to Dalferth’s understanding of the limiting factors of one’s individual perspective. Ingolf Dalferth, ‘Representing God’s Presence’, International Journal of Systematic Theology 3/ 3 (2001): 240. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, pp. 272–5. Ingolf Dalferth, Becoming Present: An Inquiry into the Christian Sense of the Presence of God (Leuven, Paris and Dudley, Mass: Peeters, 2006), pp.12–13. Mayer, Sprache der Einheit, pp. 232–7, 245. Dalferth, Becoming Present, pp. 22–3, 264–6. Similarly, Joachim Track, ‘Überlegungen zur Ökumenischen Hermeneutik’, in Ökumene, ed. Wilfried Härle and R. Preul. Marburger Jahrbuch Theologie 12 (Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 2000), pp. 45–6. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, 273–5; Mayer, Sprache der Einheit, p. 261. Mayer, Sprache der Einheit, p. 270. Dalferth, Auf dem Weg, p. 23. Here Schwöbel is drawing on Gerhard Ebeling’s proposal that Christianity’s plurality is a ‘symptom of the constitutive’, a kind of manifestation of the plurality that constitutes the church; see Christoph Schwöbel, Christliche Glaube im Pluralismus: Studien zu einer Theologie der Kultur (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), pp. 34–5. Schwöbel, Christliche Glaube im Pluralismus, p. 96. Ibid., pp. 34–7. Writing in the context of interreligious dialogue Schwöbel emphasizes the move from the ‘common ground’ approach to an approach that works from differences without reductive aims. In his presentation Schwöbel identifies consensus with the ‘common ground’ that he associates with de-contextualized universal reason; Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Talking over the Fence: From Toleration to Dialogue’, Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 45/1 (2003): 123. Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene’, p. 457. Ibid., p. 452. Ibid., p. 460. Christoph Schwöbel, ‘Konsens – Differenz – Referenz. Perspektiven ökumenischer Hermeneutik’ (paper presented at the Fourteenth Consultation of Societas Oecumenica, Prague, 17–22 August 2006). Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene’, p. 463. See Scheffczyk’s critique of the Joint Declaration’s consensus with difference. Scheffczyk asserts that a differentiation between ‘basic truths’ and ‘how they unfold’ is not possible. The descriptions of the basic truths are not consensus since they yield different interpretations.

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47.

48.

49. 50.

51. 52. 53.

54. 55.

56. 57. 58.

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Any differentiation in the ‘unfolding’ of what is held true is considered by Scheffczyk to be ambiguous. Ambiguity is a sign that ‘formal agreement’ (förmliche Übereinstimmung) has not been reached; see Leo Scheffczyk, Ökumene: Der steile Weg der Wahrheit. Quaestiones non disputatae 7 (Siegburg: Verlag Franz Schmitt, 2004), p. 270. Herms makes a similar distinction: Eilert Herms, ‘Konsensustexte und Konfessionelle Identität’, in Von der Glaubenseinheit zur Kirchengemeinschaft. Plädoyer für eine realiztische Ökumene, ed. Eilert Herms (Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1989), p. 137. The implications of a ‘socio-communal’ discourse are not self-evident and depend largely on the context where the concept of ‘communion’ is used. Here ‘communion’ is used in relation to the communitarian discourse, not as in the liberal–individualistic tradition, which emphasizes social interaction as a consequence of a social contract. In ecclesiological terms the church is not primarily a voluntary association of individuals whose Christian identity precedes their presence in the community. Although I want to put more emphasis to the priority of the community as part of theological method and the primacy of relationships for personal existence and meaningful action, I join Grenz and Franke in applauding the relative benefits of the contractual approach in advancing the theological idea of the priesthood of all believers; cf. Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, pp. 204–5, 208, 224–5. The modesty of the observation lies in that while the distinction itself is important, it does not by itself say anything about the nature of this referential relation. As Barrett shows, a purely cognitivist account working with propositions and truth and meaning as functions of individual sentences also speaks of a referential relation; see Lee C. Barrett, ‘Theology as Grammar: Regulative Principles or Paradigms and Practices’, Modern Theology 4/2 (1988): 156. Schwöbel, Christliche Glaube im Pluralismus, p. 126. George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (London: SPCK, 1984), p. 35. For characteristics of postfoundational theological rationality, see Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, p. 43. Schwöbel, ‘Gottes Ökumene’, p. 463. E.g., ibid., p. 451. Schwöbel, Christliche Glaube im Pluralismus, p. 122. Schwöbel’s description is based on his preference for the ecumenical ecclesiological model proposed by the Leuenberg Agreement. Nevertheless, it should be possible to take his proposal of ‘displaced foundations’ without his ecclesiological motivation. This seems plausible, for example, on the basis of Ormond Rush’s discussion of revelation in Roman Catholic theology. Rush argues that ‘revelation’, interpreted through the Second Vatican Council’s dogmatic constitution on the divine revelation Dei verbum, points to the Word of God as the foundation of Christian faith and as the ultimate criterion of discernment. Rush contrasts this interpretation among other things, with dogmatic maximalism. Accompanied by a propositional understanding of revelation, dogmatic maximalism identifies revelation with the dogmatic statements of the church, much in the same way as biblical fundamentalism identifies revelation with biblical verses; see Ormond Rush, ‘Determining Catholic Orthodoxy: Monologue or Dialogue?’, Pacifica 12 (1990): 124–7. Dogmatic maximalism would thus qualify for a ‘displacement of foundations’ in Schwöbel’s sense. Schwöbel, ‘Konsens – Differenz – Referenz’, pars. 8–10. Schwöbel, for example, finds it hard to accept a ‘differentiated consensus’ as presented in the Joint Declaration if this would mean that the differentiated descriptions are deduced from the common one. If the common description is true one cannot infer different true statements from it (see ‘Konsens – Differenz – Referenz’). Rescher, Pluralism, pp. 40–41, 141. Nancey Murphy, ‘Christianity and Theories of Truth’, Dialog 34 (1995): 101–2. Ibid., p. 105. In the ecumenical context one could refer to the self-commissive mode as ‘consent’ in that a person consents to a particular formula because of what it communicates (i.e., the doctrine) without having to maintain that the particular formula is the only possible, or even the best one.

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59. In Murphy’s view, Lindbeck does not offer any adequate ways for such an evaluation. She proposes using Alasdair MacIntyre’s description of ‘traditions’ to fill in this lack; see ibid., pp. 102–3. 60. Lindbeck’s seminal work, The Nature of Doctrine, itself provides a short but dense description of the theory. The collection of Lindbeck’s essays, The Church in a Postliberal Age, ed. James J. Buckley (London: SCM Press, 2002), enlightens readers on the wider theological context of his thought. The foreword to the German edition of The Nature of Doctrine (published in The Church in a Postliberal Age) gives a rare account of Lindbeck’s reactions to the discussion of his work. The following essays by Lindbeck are especially interesting from an ecumenical point of view: ‘Justification and Atonement’; ‘A Question of Compatibility: A Lutheran Reflects on Trent’, in Justification By Faith: Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII, ed. H. George Anderson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), pp. 230–40. A noteworthy publication in secondary literature on Lindbeck is Bruce D. Marshall (ed.), Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). 61. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 33. Barrett argues that Lindbeck uses two different ways to discuss the nature of doctrine . One approach is the one mentioned above, where meaning is connected to use. This approach does not distinguish between formal intelligibility and application to experience as strictly as the second approach. The second approach, which emphasizes doctrine’s likeness to language, distinguishes between syntax and semantics, that is, between internal operational rules and their application. Barrett finds any distinction between syntax and semantics misleading but asserts that the value of Lindbeck’s proposal can be retained without making the abstract rules the sole bearers of continuity; see Barrett, ‘Theology as Grammar’, pp. 160–61. Barrett’s criticism is ecumenically relevant in addressing the problem of ecumenical agreements ‘remaining on paper’. An agreement might ‘remain on paper’ because it failed to address the matter in a way that would allow its application. Barrett argues that the meaning of a rule is always dependent on ‘the technique of its application’ and that ‘the formal meaning of any rule is not prior to its paradigms’ but that ‘the paradigmatic use . . . gives significance to the rule’. In view of ecumenical consensus, it is relevant to emphasize this interconnectedness of rule and application in Lindbeck’s proposal. The interconnectedness is crucial for the argument but not self-evident, as can be observed, for example, in Geoffrey Wainwright’s critique on Lindbeck; see Geoffrey Wainwright, ‘Ecumenical Dimensions of George Lindbeck’s Nature of Doctrine’, Modern Theology 4/2 (1988): 127. 62. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 69. 63. Lindbeck’s observation that even the same utterances may or may not function as doctrine in different contexts at first seems confusing. Still, many involved in ecumenical dialogues have come to a similar conclusion, although without explicitly employing Lindbeck’s understanding of doctrine. For example, in the German Lutheran–Roman Catholic document Communio sanctorum, doctrines are distinguished by their function: ‘As far as Marian theology is concerned, it should be kept in mind that the dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption of Mary into Heaven, problematic for Reformation theology, differ from older Marian dogmas in that they are first of all not meant to defend the faith, but rather are meant to serve the praise of God. . . . It may thus be asked whether it is necessary for the unity of the faith that Reformation theology makes these Marian dogmas its own if it is prepared to recognize that these statements are fundamentally in harmony with revelation’ (L-RC 2000 ger: 265; emphasis in the original). 64. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 35. 65. Here Lindbeck sides with MacIntyre on the confrontation of rival intellectual traditions. MacIntyre writes: ‘When two rival large-scale intellectual traditions confront one another, a central feature of the problem of deciding between their claims is characteristically that there is no neutral way of characterizing either the subject matter about which they give rival accounts or the standards by which their claims are to be evaluated. Each standpoint has its own account of truth and knowledge, its own mode of characterizing the relevant subject matter’

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68. 69.

70.

71. 72. 73. 74.

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(Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality? [Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988], p. 166). Lindbeck, ‘Justification’, p. 188. Disagreement exists among Lindbeck’s commentators on whether he is justified in his view of doctrine’s regulative function. For example, Lindbeck’s claim that the classical Nicene Creed does not primarily consider propositional truth has been disputed. For criticism, see Wainwright, ‘Ecumenical Dimensions’, p. 124; Stephen Williams, ‘Lindbeck’s Regulative christology’, Modern Theology 4/2 (1988): 173–86. For Lindbeck’s own view, see The Nature of Doctrine, p. 94. As the criticism shows, Lindbeck’s distinction between first-order descriptive and second-order regulative uses of doctrinal utterances is at times ambiguous. It is possible that this ambiguity is carried over from J. L. Austin’s speech-act theory. Lindbeck’s distinction is analogous to Austin’s distinction between performative and constative utterances. Performative utterances (such as: ‘I promise’) do not, strictly speaking, describe a state of affairs and therefore cannot be said to be ‘true’ or ‘false’. Constative utterances also describe a state of affairs (such as: ‘That dog is dangerous’) and thus can be judged true or false. As Alice Crary shows, Austin denied that individual statements could be distinguished as belonging to either category when separated from their usage; see Alice Crary, ‘The Happy Truth: J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things With Words’, Inquiry 45 (2002): 66. If Lindbeck proposes the regulative understanding of doctrine in line with Austin’s speech-act theories, this would from the outset frustrate any attempt to locate an individual statement as either first- or second-order speech without reference to the wider situation in which the statement is uttered. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 48. Ibid., p. 65. Cf. Bruce D. Marshall, ‘Absorbing the World: Christianity and the Universe of Truths’, in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce D. Marshall (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 73–4. The influence of Austin’s speech-act theory is notable here. According to Austin, there are cases in which performatives (but at times also constatives, i.e., statements) fail in the sense that they are uttered in a context in which they do not communicate anything, or they are uttered without the intention of communicating what they could communicate. In the former case, Austin speaks of the performative ‘misfiring’; a correct verbal formula is uttered but the verbal formula is not performed. In the latter case the verbal formula is performed in an imperfect manner, that is, it is ‘abused’; see J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1976), pp. 18–24; Crary, ‘The Happy Truth: J. L. Austin’s How to Do Things With Words’, pp. 63–4. Lindbeck speaks mostly of cases in which the performative misfires. Lindbeck writes: ‘religious sentences . . . acquire enough referential specificity to have firstorder or ontological truth or falsity only in determinate settings’ (The Nature of Doctrine, p. 68). Ibid., p. 84. Lindbeck, ‘Atonement’, p. 226. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, p. 92. As Michael Root points out the philosophical discussion on identity and change is far more complicated, but a simpler description might suffice at this point; see Root, ‘Identity and Difference’, p. 166. Lindbeck’s argument against an overarching third framework is connected to his desire for a ‘neutral’ understanding of doctrine. This ‘neutrality’ has been contested on several accounts. Van Huyssteen has claimed that Lindbeck’s proposal is ‘crypto-foundationalist’ because he has, without realizing it, fallen back into fideism. Shults asserts that a claim of ‘neutrality’ can be nothing but foundationalist, since the demand for neutrality is itself the ‘common framework’; see Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, pp. 53–4. Richard Heyduck too attacks Lindbeck for both fideism and for misreading Austin and Wittgenstein; see Richard Heyduck, The Recovery of Doctrine in the Contemporary Church: An Essay in Philosophical Ecclesiology (Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2002), pp. 81–4. Scott

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77.

78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

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Holland points out that Lindbeck’s claim for ‘neutrality’ is motivated by his adherence to Hans Frei’s narrative hermeneutics. In Frei’s view, the central biblical narrative of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is not a philosophical account or explanation of a universal, foundational or even an authentically ‘religious’ way of life; see Scott Holland, How Do Stories Save Us? An Essay on the Question with the Theological Hermeneutics of David Tracy in View. Louvain Theological and Pastoral Monographs 35 (Louvain, Paris and Dudley, Mass: Peeters, 2006). This raises questions about the religious neutrality of Lindbeck’s proposal but at least it partially answers philosophical challenges. One could argue that the Christological–soteriological motivation makes Lindbeck’s proposal less qualified as a ‘neutral’ theory of religion. Such motivation should not hinder its use in the ecumenical context. Ecumenically more troubling is Holland’s observation that Lindbeck’s proposal is potentially sectarian and protectionist in allowing one to remain within one’s own, unchanged narratives. At the same time Amy Plantinga Pauw, for instance, holds that Lindbeck’s proposal does not advocate ‘conformity to established practices’; cf. Holland, How Do Stories Save Us?, pp. 100– 101; Amy Plantinga Pauw, ‘The Word is Near You: A Feminist Conversation with Lindbeck’, Theology Today 50/1 (1993): 46. Lindbeck, ‘Justification and Atonement’, p. 201. Lindbeck has quite explicitly used different ways of conceptualizing the nature of ‘difference’. Lindbeck notes that ‘it now seems to me more helpful’ to draw on Alasdair MacIntyre’s ‘traditions of inquiry’ (‘Justification’, p. 201 n. 39). The concepts of commensurability–incommensurability and translatability–untranslatability are from MacIntyre. In an enlightening manner MacIntyre describes the preconditions of adherents of differing traditions to engage with each other. The preconditions include the use of conceptual imagination to place oneself imaginatively within the scheme of belief of the others, the acquisition of a ‘second-first-language’ type of understanding and the use of the other tradition and the ability to engage both in the ongoing debates within one’s own tradition and in the debates and argumentation between traditions; see MacIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality?, pp. 370–71, 394. Lindbeck here follows, knowingly or not, Nancey Murphy’s earlier proposal, according to which MacIntyre’s elaboration on the truth of traditions accomplishes more than the ‘categorical adequacy’ Lindbeck proposes in The Nature of Doctrine; see Murphy, ‘Christianity and Theories of Truth’, pp. 103–4. Lindbeck, ‘Justification’, p. 203. Lindbeck himself is not consistent in arguing whether it should be possible to show that Lutheran and Roman Catholic approaches are compatible. For example, Lindbeck does not exclude the possibility of assessing the compatibility or incompatibility of differing confessional theologies. At the same time he is of the opinion that this is not ecumenically the most central question; see George A. Lindbeck, ‘A Question of Compatibility: A Lutheran Reflects on Trent’, in Justification By Faith, Lutherans and Catholics in Dialogue VII, ed. H. George Anderson (Minneapolis, Minn.: Augsburg Publishing House, 1985), p. 240. William G. Rusch, ‘Structures of Unity: The Next Ecumenical Challenge – A Possible Way Forward’, Ecclesiology 2/1 (2005): 118. Root points out an important element in the identification process when he says that of all the available rules governing the identity of a group, some might be more crucial at times than others; see ‘Identity and Difference’, p. 175. Herms, ‘Konsensustexte und Konfessionelle Identität’, pp. 136–9. Rusch acknowledges his debt to Meyer’s terminology; see Meyer, ‘Evangelische Teilhabe am historischen Episkopat?’; Rusch, ‘Structures of Unity’. Meyer, ‘Evangelische Teilhabe am historischen Episkopat?’, p. 253. Rusch, ‘Structures of Unity’, pp. 119–21.

Chapter 11 CONCLUSION The main purpose of this study has been to analyse the development and understanding of the idea of consensus in bilateral dialogues among Anglicans, Lutherans and Roman Catholics and to investigate some characteristics of a theoretical context in which an ecumenically viable and theologically and philosophically acceptable consensus would be possible. This aim has been pursued through five objectives: (1) to describe the methods of reaching agreement separately in each of three dialogue processes, (2) to analyse these methods and give a systematic description of them across the dialogues, (3) to investigate the relationship among consensus, unity, uniformity, diversity and divergence vis-à-vis ecclesial unity, (4) to investigate the same relationships vis-à-vis agreement in doctrine and finally (5) to explore the possible positive contributions of postmodern thought to ecumenical dialogue. The major part of the research has been dedicated to the description and analysis of various ways of reaching agreement in the above-mentioned dialogues. The results of the individually analysed material are presented in Parts II, III and IV, which discuss the forms of agreement in Lutheran–Roman Catholic, Anglican– Roman Catholic and Anglican–Lutheran dialogues. Each of the three dialogues has its specific character and agreement is pursued in ways peculiar to each dialogue. In general, the dialogue documents have argued for agreement or consensus based on commonality or compatibility. In the argument on commonality, consensus means ‘being in possession of common features or attributes’. In this argument, diversities in general do not have a positive function. The argument on commonality appears in two variants; one focuses on the structures or organization of doctrine and the other, on the understanding or meaning of doctrines. The second approach is based on compatibility of differences. In this argument, differences have neutral or positive weight. The agreement is formed either as conformity, that is, correspondence in form, manner, or as character or complementarity, that is, something that completes or mutually supplies on other’s lack. The Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue has a particular interest in hermeneutical questions. This is clear from the Malta Report (L-RC 1972). I have described the Malta Report’s method as distinctively ‘modern’, because of its strong emphasis on finding new, common interpretations to allow access to the ‘centre of the gospel’ for ‘the modern man’. In the Malta Report, doctrinal agreement as such is not of primary concern. More important is the church’s proclamation of the living gospel in the current situation. The Malta Report argues for greater unity between Lutherans and Catholics based on ‘commonality’. This commonality does not

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involve doctrine but the common centre or foundation of the gospel and its proclaimed ‘meaning for us’. Already in The Eucharist (L-RC 1978 eng) the Malta Report’s argumentation was modified. From the churches together providing meaningful interpretations to the world the focus shifts to the ecclesial traditions needing to be explained to each other. Both documents emphasize correct understanding as authenticity. Methodologically it is important to observe, that there are two kinds of ‘understandings’ in the Lutheran–Catholic dialogue with essentially different relationship to the idea of agreement. The first ‘understanding’ involves the gospel; I have called this ‘understanding as authentic witness’. This form of understanding implies personal engagement and experience of the authentic meaning in a contemporary situation. It is more connected to agreement than the second form of ‘understanding’, which I have called ‘understanding why’. This form of understanding is directed at grasping the particulars of theological traditions, but does not entail agreement. Ministry in the Church (L-RC 1981) began to use the language of ‘intentions’ to explain why the two ecclesial traditions differ. The approach in Ministry in the Church identified common interpretative foci, which enable specific viewpoints in the differing traditions to be explained to the other. Agreement as a ‘common interpretative focus’ is rather weak, since it does not imply that the churches would implement the theological understanding in the same way. Common interpretative viewpoints do in any case create commonality among the churches and thus contribute to a collective growing together. The ability to formulate common interpretative viewpoints is taken to imply a ‘basic agreement’ between Lutherans and Catholics. The idea of ‘basic consensus’ became one of the central concepts in Lutheran– Roman Catholic relations in the 1980s. This idea has been interpreted in two very different ways. In a quantitative interpretation of ‘basic consensus’, the agreement is viewed as lacking in fullness, whereas in a quantitative interpretation the agreement is seen to be full, but restricted in scope. Differences in interpreting ‘basic consensus’ have significant implications for judging the validity of Lutheran–Catholic doctrinal agreement in general. The discussion on ‘basic consensus’ reveals quite clearly the close connectedness between doctrinal agreement and understanding of the church. It is possible to argue that the church as such is constituted by a fundament, and an agreement on this fundament (‘basic agreement’) establishes the unity of the church. The interconnectedness between doctrinal agreement and the nature of the church has raised additional, ecumenically relevant questions. Among these are how do we identify the fundament? Is it a doctrine or a kind of transcendental referent? What if the churches have different criteria for ‘the unity of the church’? What is the significance of ‘agreement’ in the unity of the church? The national Lutheran–Catholic dialogues in both North America and Germany took the existing diversity of churches and theological traditions as their points of departure. The North American document Justification by Faith (L-RC 1983 usa), especially, combined the two hermeneutical foci, ‘understanding as authentic witness’ and ‘understanding why’, within its agreement. Justification by Faith speaks of a ‘nuanced consensus’. A nuanced consensus is based on the common ‘understanding as authentic witness’ and includes diversity in theological understandings. Theological diversity is justified by reference to an ‘original

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plurality’ of theological traditions in the earliest New Testament sources. Theological diversities are consequences of differing ‘concerns’, which have guided the churches’ authentic witness. Agreement among differing traditions becomes possible through sharing in each other’s concerns and sharing fundamental convictions. Chief among these is a Christological affirmation, which concerns the authenticity of the different theological ‘understandings’. Methodologically the German document Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? (L-RC 1985 ger) comes very close to Justification by Faith. It puts more emphasis on the question of the sixteenth-century condemnations and elaborates more on the function of particular interpretative frameworks that guide the development of theological traditions. The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification (L-RC 1999) has a special place in Lutheran–Catholic relations. Its form of agreement, described as a ‘differentiated consensus’ in the research literature, has been greeted both with joy and serious concern. The document’s agreement is based on the hermeneutical convictions that developed through the Lutheran–Catholic dialogue. The agreement assumes that doctrines are necessarily bound to their context, that is, that they are ‘perspectival’. These ‘perspectival differences’ are legitimate in so far as they do not endanger what both of the churches hold in common to be essential or fundamental to the issue. In connection with the agreed upon essentials, the different ‘perspectival’ explications ‘remain open to each other’ and do not break the agreement. In the two ecclesiological documents, Communio sanctorum (L-RC 2000 ger; L-RC 2000 eng) and The Church as Koinonia of Salvation (L-RC 2004 usa) the ecclesiological implications of the Joint Declaration’s agreement are explored. The two documents differ slightly in their interpretation of the Joint Declaration’s form of agreement. ARCIC’s hermeneutical approach emphasized correctness of interpretation instead of authenticity. This approach focused on truth and was less positive about differences in interpretation. In ARCIC the ‘understanding why’ aspect receives less attention: their authors consciously looked towards a ‘common future’, not to the separated past. As for ARCIC’s methodology, the concentration was on finding common theological contexts that would allow for correct theological interpretations. Due to its concentration on doctrinal formulations expressed in common language, understanding of agreement in ARCIC at points remains ambiguous. Distinctions between doctrine and faith and between the content and application of doctrine are not always clear. ARCIC developed towards more hermeneutically sensitive explications already within The Final Report (A-RC 1982), which was a collection of documents prepared over several years. In ARCIC II koinonia was the single most important focus of interpretation. Salvation and the Church (A-RC 1986) mentioned ‘the lack of communal setting for salvation’ as the primary reason for differences in theological interpretation. Consequently, the Anglican–Roman Catholic agreement rests on the assumption that regaining this common ‘communal setting’ will facilitate agreement. ARCIC II’s common ecclesiological vision found its clearest expression in Church as Communion (A-RC 1990). It proposed a ‘communal setting’ in which Anglicans and Roman Catholics would find doctrinal consensus. In so doing, the document presented a hermeneutics of authoritative teaching, which I have called the ‘rule of communion’.

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The ‘rule of communion’ describes a state that allows for the maximum number of differences within a communion without breaking it. It also widens the area of consensus from considering ‘expressions’ and ‘meanings’ of doctrinal clauses to the actual life of the communions. In Church as Communion, ‘communion’ is understood as a prerequisite or an elementary part of consensus, not its consequence. Life in communion creates the proper hermeneutical context in which legitimate diversities can exist. Conversely, the breaking of communion reverses the hermeneutical process that creates coherence and complementarity among diversities and allows for the development of differences that inhibit common life. ARCIC II’s ‘rule of communion’ has both positive and negative ecumenical implications. On the positive side, the ‘rule of communion’ enables a wider understanding of consensus, which extends beyond its cognitive-propositional elements. The value of this should not be underestimated. On the other hand, this hermeneutical principle requires a methodological postulating of an unbroken communion, which factually does not exist. This creates a discrepancy between the theological method and the actual state of affairs. Due to its hermeneutical focus on community, ARCIC’s understanding of agreement is positively wider than a consensus perceived as a strictly cognitive– intellectual agreement. The Gift of Authority (A-RC 1997), especially, presents another aspect in ARCIC’s widening of ‘consensus’. This is the inclusion of ‘reception’ in the agreement. The Gift of Authority presents both ecumenical processes and the church’s being in the world as continuous reception and rereception of God’s gifts. In the ecumenical sense, churches are called to receive and re-receive elements that have been ‘forgotten’ by one tradition and preserved by the other. True ‘consensus’ coincides with fullness and truthfulness where forgotten elements have been brought into the attention of both churches. The danger of this approach is that it is both conservative and additive. Change is easily perceived as ‘forgetting’ and to avoid this, tradition must conserve as much as possible of what has belonged to the tradition of the church. Much like the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue and ARCIC, the early Anglican–Lutheran international dialogue was characterized by a shared urgency to proclaim together the gospel in the world. An instrumental understanding of doctrine characterized the dialogue from early on. The purpose of doctrine is to guard the church’s proclamation from error. The Anglican–Lutheran international dialogue represents a type of ‘form–content’ distinction but in a way that differs from the two previous dialogues. While the emphasis of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue and ARCIC has been mainly on the meanings of expressions, the Anglican–Lutheran dialogue asked whether this doctrine allows the church to proclaim and therefore exist in an authentic, that is, apostolic way. This instrumental understanding of doctrine goes together with an emphasis on the instances of authority. The Niagara Report (A-L 1987) is rightfully mentioned as a breakthrough in Anglican–Lutheran understanding of episcopacy. The Niagara Report’s agreement was based on three theological imperatives: coherence, continuity and substantial interpretation of doctrine. According to the two first principles, the church’s proclamatory communication must be coherent and continuous. Coherences of communication imply avoiding misunderstandings and

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rivalries. Continuity refers to God’s continuous faithfulness as a giver of gifts. Consequently, the emphasis is not on the formal continuity of bishops, but on the continuity of the gift of apostolicity, which the bishops serve. The Lutheran–Episcopal dialogue in the USA exemplifies beautifully the interconnectedness between doctrinal agreement and lived communion. I have called this a ‘methodological understanding of communion’, because the form of agreement is affected by the connection to the communion. The agreement has a processual character. It begins with an agreement on the fundamentals of ecclesial life and doctrine, which enables the church to enter a relationship of mutual giving and receiving. This relation includes a mutual recognition of the apostolicity of the other church. Recognition of the apostolicity of the other church enables the churches to share a common life in faith, which is a prerequisite for moving towards unity. The agreement that allows the churches to enter into a new relation is not an exhaustive but a ‘sufficient consensus’. Its purpose is to assure both communions of a sufficient amount of agreement on essentials for the churches to progress towards greater communion. I have stated that the Lutheran–Episcopal ‘sufficient consensus’ is comparable to the ‘differentiated consensus’ of the Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue in that it is based on a ‘sufficient compatibility’ of doctrine. The major difference between ‘differentiated consensus’ and ‘sufficient consensus’ is that whereas ‘differentiated consensus’ concerns divergences in the interpretation or explication of one point of doctrine, ‘sufficient consensus’ considers a wider set of doctrinal statements and liturgical practices belonging to ecclesial life. The general intention behind both the Meissen (A-Ev 1988 Meissen) and the Porvoo Common Statements (A-L 1992 Porvoo) follows the idea of the wider understanding of consensus in the church described above. Both texts concentrate on reaching a common understanding of what it is to be church. The Porvoo Common Statement’s consensus is effective in the context of church understood as koinonia. The church’s diversity is rooted in the diversity of the gifts of the Spirit. At the same time doctrinal consensus with difference is made possible by a distinction between ‘faith’ and ‘expressions of faith’ or more generally what is signified and the plurality of signs that signify. In the Porvoo Common Statement’s understanding, as in Called to Common Mission (A-L 1999 usa), the churches can agree that different signs have at times preserved church’s apostolicity. Having said this they choose to use a common set of signifying signs to strengthen the communion’s witness of the unity of the church. Based on the analysis of the dialogue documents, I have claimed that the nature of ecumenical theology has undergone significant changes in the course of the past decades. These changes can be observed in the dialogue documents, since the results of ecumenical dialogues are partly dependent on or significantly influenced by meta-theological and methodological assumptions underlying the dialogues. Some of these meta-theological and methodological presuppositions can support an ecumenical agreement as ‘consensus with differences’. Those approaches that do support a ‘consensus with difference’ manifest features generally associated with postmodernity. At the same time, the idea of ecumenical consensus is seriously challenged by the pluralistic imperatives of postmodernity.

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What are the challenges of postmodernity to ecumenical theology and how would identifying postmodern tendencies in ecumenical theology contribute to the goals of the ecumenical movement? Under what conditions is it possible to speak of a consensus with difference? The main challenge of ecumenical consensus derives from a dichotomizing of consensus and plurality and of perceiving consensus as an idealized uniformity of cognitive beliefs (cognitive consensus). Some forms of postmodern thinking retain this dichotomy and end up dismissing consensus. The postmodern emphasis given to socio-historical situatedness, decentring the subject as epistemological foundation and the consequent holistic approaches to epistemology, certain undecidability of meaning, and questioning the uniformity of rationality do not necessarily lead to abandoning consensus. It does make it difficult to discuss central theological terms such as religious experience, revelation and tradition with a generalized terminology that ignores socio-historical locations and the role of the theologian as an interpreter. Postmodernity’s consensus criticism has challenged the ecumenical debate on at least three accounts. It asks in which way ecumenical consensus concerns cognitive agreement on beliefs. This question is a double challenge. It challenges both the way the relation between the cognitive and the socio-communal aspects of agreement are considered in ecumenical theology and the understanding of doctrine as the thing agreed on. Finally, this criticism has challenged the epistemic relevance of ecumenical consensus. An ecumenically solid consensus must come to meet these challenges. Ecumenical consensus is also challenged by arguments arising from theological and ecumenical discourse itself. The two main arguments against consensus are that the pursuit of consensus implies the unity of the church to be primarily about cognitive agreement on propositional beliefs and that this approach fails to recognize the real pluriformity, which is essential to the nature of the church. Consensus fails as an ecumenical goal because in its classical form it cannot accommodate the kind of diversity that is the essence of the church, because an ecumenical consensus is at best ‘only’ differentiated and not full consensus, because human existence is bound to perspectives and therefore there is no universal rationality that would lead all to a common conclusion and finally, because the pursuit of consensus fails to identify correctly the church’s foundation as the work of the trinitarian God. I propose that to respond to the ecumenical consensus criticism one must be able to speak of a consensus that combines both the cognitive–intellectual and the sociocommunal aspects of consensus. The cognitive aspect concerns more questions of truth and rationality whereas the socio-communal aspects involve the realities of the lived community. As a possible way of combining these two aspects, I have discussed George Lindbeck’s proposal for cultural–linguistic understanding of doctrine. I am not implying that Lindbeck’s proposal is without its weaknesses. I am suggesting that the ecumenical implications of his proposal have not yet been explored to the full. A further investigation into the ecumenical possibilities of Lindbeck’s proposal, with the help of such writers as Nancey Murphy and Alasdair MacIntyre, has the potential to further ecumenical endeavours to reach a consensus that embraces differences without losing cognitive credibility.

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INDEX Anglican–Lutheran Dialogue international The Niagara Report 130–3 Pullach Report 123–8 Report of the Anglican–Lutheran Joint Working Group (ColdAsh) 128– 30 in North-America Called to Common Mission 133, 143–6, 185, 209, 220 Concordat of Agreement 133 Implications of the Gospel 140–2 Lutheran–Episcopal Agreement 138–9 Lutheran–Episcopal Dialogue. A Progress Report (LED I) 137–8 Report of the Lutheran–Episcopal Dialogue Second Series 1976–1980 (LED II) 138–41 Toward Full Communion 142–4 regional On the Way to Visible Unity (Meissen Agreement) 133, 149–56, 160, 220 The Report of the Anglican–Lutheran European Regional Commission (Helsinki Report) 127–8, 133 Together in Mission and Ministry (Porvoo Agreement) 133, 155– 63, 220 Anglican–Reformed dialogue Called to Witness and Service (Reuilly Agreement) 133 Anglican–Roman Catholic dialogue Authority in the Church II 95 The Church as Communion 98–9, 101–2, 182, 184, 218 The Final Report 92–7, 99, 101, 182, 189, 218 The Gift of Authority 98–9, 103–8, 184, 219 Salvation and the Church 98–101, 112, 183, 189, 218 A Vision for Unity (Malta Report) 91–2

agreement as commonality 22–3, 30, 48, 154, 176–8, 182, 185–7, 197, 200, 205, 216–17 as compatibility 23, 26, 28, 30, 34–7, 47, 49, 55, 63–6, 72, 80, 102, 108, 126, 138–9, 176–8, 182, 185–91, 202, 208, 216, 220 as conformity 4, 11, 22–4, 26, 37, 60, 63–4, 66, 128, 176–8, 216 apostolic succession 107, 128, 132, 139– 40, 142 apostolicity 23, 69, 96, 124, 126–30, 132–3, 137–44, 153–4, 157–64, 184–5, 190, 220 Austin, J.L. 207 authority in the church 5, 183 instances of 22–3, 96, 219 and ministry 106–7, 163 of scripture 97, 124, 128, 138, 140, 144, 158–61 sources of 123–5 teaching authority 98, 107 Beinert, Wolfgang 11–12 bonds of communion 151–2, 155–6 centre of the Gospel 23–8, 36–7, 63, 178, 216–17 common understanding 7, 9, 25–6, 28, 30–1, 57–8, 60, 66–7, 70–3, 79–80, 127, 143, 151, 156, 177–86, 199–202, 230 commonality 22–3, 30, 48, 154 176–8, 182, 185–7, 197, 200–5, 216–17 communio 70–3, 98–103, 154–5 Community of Protestant Churches in Europe The Leuenberg Agreement 25–8, 37, 203 compromise 10, 13–14 consensus basic 11–13, 31–4, 36–7, 47, 59–62, 72–3, 91, 149, 217

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cognitive 4–6, 12, 103, 180–1, 194–7, 200, 203–7, 219, 221 concept of 3–9, 11–14 with difference 9, 43–7, 54–80, 139, 144–6, 157, 174–7, 182, 186, 188, 194–5, 198–209, 220–1 differentiated 14, 45, 54–7, 58, 60, 67, 69, 139, 186–7, 199, 202, 209, 218, 220–1 on the essentials 56 full 12–13, 32, 37, 46, 59, 199, 217, 221 fundamental 12, 25–6, 28, 31–7, 45, 56, 59, 61, 72, 176, 186 on the fundamentals 25–6, 56, 138, 220 nuanced 43–5, 176, 217–18, 59, 61, 96 partial 11–12, 31 proleptic 25 socio-communal 6, 196, 203, 206–8, 221 substantial 12, 32, 46, 66, 94–5, 97, 183–4 sufficient 11–13, 27–8, 37, 97–8, 138– 41, 199–201, 220 and truth 3, 5–6, 8, 10, 56, 63–4, 67, 196–8, 202–9 as uniformity 7, 45, 60, 63, 154, 173– 5, 194, 197, 199–201, 221 consensus ecumenism 6–7, 173, 182, 198–203 see also ecumenism of difference critique of 173, 186, 196–205 convergence concept of 9–11, 13–14 convergence ecumenism 10 ecumenical 26–8, 33, 45–8, 57–60, 63–5, 92, 95–6, 99, 125–9, 156, 176, 178 Dalferth, Ingolf 4, 66–7, 151–4, 159–60, 163, 199–203 differences church-dividing 32, 48, 55–6, 69–70, 186, 188, 209 enriching 33, 48, 138, 176–7, 203 real 21, 50, 177, 187–8, 194, 198–9, 221 doctrine propositional understanding 6–8, 60– 1, 202–7 regulative understanding 184–5, 206–9 structure of see hierarchia veritatum see the centre of the Gospel

ecumenical method 6–9, 12, 22–3 ecumenism of difference 173, 198 episcopacy 124–7, 131–3, 142–5, 153–6, 159–64, 209, 219–20 episcope 93, 106–7, 124, 130–2, 143–4, 151–6, 160 Faith and Order Baptism, Eucharist, Ministry (BEM) 10–11, 149 Groupe des Dombes

11

hermeneutical approach 7–8, 12, 23–30, 43–7, 49, 55–8, 65–73, 75–7, 92–3, 96– 7, 99–107, 179–84, 189, 199–202, 207, 217–19 Herms, Eilert 209 hierarchia veritatum 23–4, 26–8, 36–7, 63– 5, 92, 176–8 Hill, Christopher 97 Hunsinger, George 75 Ju¨ngel, Eberhard 61–4 Justification doctrine of 24–6, 31–2, 34–5, 43, 45– 7, 49–50, 54, 58–9, 63–5, 72–3, 75– 6, 99–100, 186, 208 message of 24, 46, 58–60, 72–3, 76, 100–1 Kasper, Walter 64–5 koinonia 73–80, 93, 98–107, 131–2, 150–1, 154–7, 160–1, 182–4, 188–9, 218, 220 Konvivenz 175, 200 Lambeth Conference 101, 152, 155 lex credendi 5, 15 lex supplicandi 5 Lindbeck, George A. 50, 204–9, 221 Lutheran–Roman Catholic dialogue in Germany Communio Sactorum 69–73, 79, 218 Lehrverurteilungen – Kirchentrennend? 47–50, 56, 69, 76, 218 in North America The Church as koinonia of Salvation 73–80, 182, 188, 218 The Eucharist 28–30, 179, 217 international All Under One Christ 31–3 Church and Justification 34–7, 187 Facing Unity 32–3, 37, 49, 7

Index The Gospel and the Church (Malta Report) 34, 37, 43, 178–9, 186, 216–17 The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification 9, 14, 18, 27, 47, 54–68, 73, 75, 80, 139, 186, 199, 202, 218 Justification by Faith 43–7, 49, 56, 65, 76, 98–100, 181, 217–18 Ministry in the Church 30–1, 217 Ways to Community 32–4, 37 Lutheran World Federation 24, 35–6, 78, 125 MacIntyre, Alasdair 221 marks of the church 124–5, 127, 152–4 Meyer, Harding 59–60, 63, 65, 209 Murphy, Nancey 195, 204–6, 210, 221 orthodox 5–6, 9, 62–5, 65, 97–8, 123, 175–6 orthopraxy 97, 175–6 plurality 4, 8–10, 44, 48, 50, 58, 63–4, 67, 69, 76, 80, 93, 161, 194–6, 198– 202, 218, 220–1 pluriformity 80, 200–1, 203, 221

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reception 11, 32–3, 48, 73, 97, 103–4, 178–85 reconciliation 32–3, 75, 93, 96, 99, 103, 108, 149–51 re-reception 103–4 Rescher, Nicholas 4, 194–7, 203, 205 revelation 8, 27, 35–6, 47, 60–2, 66, 70, 94, 104, 178, 195–6, 200, 202, 204–5, 221 Root, Michael 162 Schwo¨bel, Christoph 3–4, 201–7 Second Vatican Council 24, 26, 65 sensus fidelium 69, 106–7 Tanner, Mary 152, 160–1 Tho¨nissen, Wolfgang 27, 62, 66–7 Tjørhom, Ola 160, 162 Ullrich, Lothar 56 uniformity 7, 45, 54, 60, 63, 68, 96, 146, 154, 173, 173, 175–6, 185, 194, 196, 199–200, 216, 221 Unitatis redintegratio 21–2, 26–7 World Council of Churches (WCC)

6