African Yearbook of International Law Annuaire Africain de droit international
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
Printed on acid-free paper.
ISBN 90-04-13872-2 © 2004 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Brill Academic Publishers incorporates the imprint Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. http://www.brill.nl All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming , recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill Academic Publishers provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.
Printed and bound in The Netherlands
AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAIRE AFRICAIN DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Volume 10 2002 Published under the auspices of the African Foundation for International Law Publié sous les auspices de la Fondation Africaine pour le Droit International
Edited by / Sous la direction de Abdulqawi A. YUSUF
MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN / BOSTON
AFRICAN FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW FONDATION AFRICAINE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL Governing Board Conseil d’administration Georges ABI-SAAB (Egypt) Edward KWAKWA (Ghana) Tiyanjana MALUWA (Malawi) Fatsah OUGUERGOUZ (Algeria) Mpazi SINJELA (Zambia) Abdulqawi A. YUSUF (Somalia)
AFRICAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ANNUAIRE AFRICAIN DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL GENERAL EDITOR – DIRECTEUR Abdulqawi A. YUSUF (Somalia)
ASSOCIATE EDITORS – DIRECTEURS ADJOINTS Mpazi SINJELA (Zambia)
Fatsah OUGUERGOUZ (Algeria)
EDITORIAL ASSISTANT – ASSISTANT DE REDACTION Roland ADJOVI (Benin)
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD – COMITÉ CONSULTATIF DE RÉDACTION Georges ABI-SAAB (Egypt) Andronico O. ADEDE (Kenya) Mohammed BEDJAOUI (Algeria) Sayeman BULA-BULA (Democratic Republic of Congo) Christof HEYNS (South Africa) Maurice KAMTO (Cameroon) Edward KWAKWA (Ghana) Tiyanjana MALUWA (Malawi) Muna NDULO (Zambia) Chris Maina PETER (Tanzania)
The General Editor and the African Foundation for International Law are not in any way responsible for the views expressed by contributors, whether the contributions are signed or unsigned. Les opinions émises dans les contributions au présent annuaire, que ces dernières soient signées ou non, ne sauraient en aucune façon engager la responsabilité du Directeur de l’Annuaire ni de la Fondation Africaine pour le Droit International.
All communications and contributions to the Yearbook should be addressed to: Prière d’adresser toute communication ou contribution destinée à l’Annuaire à : General Editor, African Yearbook of International Law E-Mail: <
[email protected]> Website:
or / ou General Editor, African Yearbook of International Law c/o BRILL, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers P.O. Box 9000, 2300 PA Leiden The Netherlands Website:
TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE DES MATIÈRES EDITORIAL Looking Forward: The Tenth Anniversary of the Yearbook Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
3
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute Between Cameroon and Nigeria Nsongurua J. Udombana
13
The Interplay Between Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights in International Law Federico Lenzerini
63
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law Mohamed S. Amr
109
The Interplay Between the Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment: Patterns and Instruments to Achieve Sustainable Development in Practice Massimiliano Montini
181
The Protection of Copyrights and Related Rights in Africa: Challenges to Protection in the Internet Age Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
225
Etude sur l’occupation et sur l’Article 47 de la IVème Convention de Genève du 12 août 1949 relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre : le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé Robert Kolb
267
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée Léopold Donfack Sokeng
323
La Déclaration de l’Organisation internationale du Travail du 18 juin 1998 relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail : une technique juridique singulière de relance des conventions fondamentales Mouloud Boumghar
365
viii
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: Developing the Frontiers of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction Edward Kwakwa
407
Quelques réflexions sur la communauté internationale Robert Kolb
431
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 2001 Ludivine Tamiotti
453
Chronique de la jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (1995-2002) Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
493
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE Recueil juridique des droits de l’homme en Afrique – 1996-2000 recensé par Mouloud Boumghar
595
The World Court Reference Guide – Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Court of Justice (1922-2000) reviewed by Fatsah Ouguergouz
605
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU: Declarations and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government AU: Declarations and Decisions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Government Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union The Statute of the African Foundation for International Law
663 695
ANALYTICAL INDEX
701
INDEX ANALYTIQUE
723
INDEX OF VOLUMES 1 (1993) TO 10 (2002)
749
AUTHORS INDEX FOR VOLUMES 1 (1993) TO 10 (2002)
769
611 645
EDITORIAL
This page intentionally left blank
LOOKING FORWARD: THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE YEARBOOK Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
With the publication of this volume, the African Yearbook completes its first decade of existence. This calls for celebration and retrospection, but also for a look forward into the future. We have therefore decided to devote the first few pages of Volume 10, to retrospection and celebration, information on the ongoing transformation of the Yearbook, and a consideration of the future.
CELEBRATION AND RETROSPECTION There is much to celebrate in the publication of Volume 10 of the Yearbook. When we embarked on this project, scepticism was expressed in some quarters on the sustainability of an African annual publication in the field of international law. We ourselves were not very sure of how far we could take it. Lacking both institutional and financial support, we had almost everything riding solely on our personal determination to succeed, and to establish this intellectual forum for the promotion and development of international law in Africa. This determination has paid off. The African Yearbook has not only survived, it has become a widely-read and a highly-respected publication known to reflect the highest standards of scholarship. Most importantly, it has helped numerous young African international lawyers to publish their first scholarly work and to find a hospitable forum for their ideas. When the African Association of International Law (AAIL) was created in Lusaka (Zambia) in March 1986, it declared as one of its A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 3-9. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
4
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
main objectives: “to foster the development and dissemination of African perspectives and practices of international law, in particular through the publication of an African Yearbook of International Law”. The reference to a Yearbook, rather than a Journal or a Review, was due to historical reasons. In 1969, Mohammed Bedjaoui, the then Minister of Justice of Algeria, submitted a plan to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) for the publication of an African Yearbook of International Law.1 Although the plan was accepted, it was never implemented by the OAU. The African Association wanted to pick up the thread where it was left in 1969, and turn into reality the original plan presented to the OAU. It, therefore, appointed Mohammed Bedjaoui, who had in the meantime become a Judge at the International Court of Justice, as Editor-in-Chief of the new Yearbook, and elected an Editorial Advisory Board to assist him. On 9 January 1991, after having made significant progress in the preparation for the publication of the first volume, and signed a contract for the publication of the Yearbook with Kluwer Academic Publishers B.V. in The Hague (Netherlands), Judge Bedjaoui decided to abandon the project. In a letter to the Secretary-General of the African Association, Mr. Tunguru Huaraka, he wrote: “[c]’est avec une grande tristesse que je renonce, cette fois-ci définitivement, à lancer l’Annuaire africain de droit international, faute de moyens matériels, de locaux, de secrétariat et de temps. J’abandonne ainsi un vieux rêve que je caressais depuis longtemps.”
In August 1991, having consulted the other members of the Editorial Board elected in Lusaka (Zambia), Mr. Huaraka asked me if I could take over the responsibility of launching the Yearbook. I decided to accept the challenge. I was hopeful that other African international lawyers would soon come to my help, or that an African university would accept to host the Yearbook and take over the task of continuing its publication after the first volume. The latter hope has not yet materialized, although we continue working on its realization. As stated in the foreword to Volume 1, it is still “our ardent desire to 1
See Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (OUA), Treizième Session Ordinaire des Conseil des Ministres, Projet de création de l’Annuaire Africain de Droit International, Doc. CM/290, Addis-Abeba, Ethiopie, août – septembre 1969.
Looking Forward: The Tenth Anniversary of the Yearbook
5
find a permanent home for the Yearbook in Africa and to repatriate it.” On the other hand, with regard to the hope for assistance from other lawyers, I was lucky to receive, immediately after having launched the first volume (which took me about a year to assemble and edit), the support of two colleagues, Dr. Mpazi Sinjela and Dr. Fatsah Ouguergouz. They were both working, at the time, at the office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations in New York (U.S.A.) and were willing to participate in the adventure of not only keeping such a publication alive, but also of turning it into a viable and respectable scholarly forum despite the lack of financial or institutional support. It was an adventure worth taking for the promotion of legal scholarship and the rule of law in Africa. Together we were able to keep the flame burning and to ensure not only continuity, but also quality, in the publication of the African Yearbook of International Law. In reflecting over the past ten years, it is a pleasure to note that accompanying us also in that adventure were some of the most eminent international lawyers of our time, be they from Africa or from outside our continent, who decided to contribute articles, notes and comments to the Yearbook, sometimes on several occasions.2 We also had to refuse, at the same time, many contributions offered by wellmeaning authors, to whom we are always thankful, but which did not meet the high scholarly standards we are committed to maintain. In the foreword to Volume 1, I said that: “It is with great joy and pride that we announce ourselves to Africa, and the rest of the world, with this first and inaugural volume of the AYIL”. That joy and pride is even greater today as we celebrate the publication of Volume 10 of the Yearbook, but continues to be tempered by the immensity of the challenges that lie ahead and of the ever-present need of securing a more solid and sustainable basis for the Yearbook.
2
See index of authors in this volume.
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
6
CONTINUING THE IMPROVEMENT AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE YEARBOOK As the publication of Volume 10 approached, our thoughts turned naturally, as often happens on such important anniversaries, to the future of the Yearbook and the need to provide it with a better institutional auspices. For, although we officially continued to publish the Yearbook under the auspices of the AAIL, the Association had neither provided institutional support nor financial sponsorship over all these years. Indeed, after its inaugural conference in Lusaka (Zambia) in 1986, the AAIL has been unable to meet or to exercise the functions foreseen in its Statutes. We have therefore decided, on the occasion of the publication of Volume 10, to shed off this institutional affiliation, and to create an African Foundation for International Law, under whose auspices the Yearbook would henceforth be published. We consulted again Dr. Huaraka, who, as Secretary-General of the African Association, continued to strive for its resuscitation. He had in the meantime returned to Namibia, after serving his country as Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York (U.S.A.). Dr. Huaraka enthusiastically supported this new initiative. The creation of the African Foundation for International Law (AFIL) was also prompted by other considerations related to the teaching, dissemination and development of international law in Africa. As provided in its Statutes which are published in this volume, the aims and purposes of the Foundation are inter alia: “(i)
to promote study, research and analysis on international legal matters of particular interest and relevance to African countries and to foster the teaching and dissemination of international law in Africa;
(ii)
to encourage and promote intellectual debate and exchanges on international legal issues of particular interest to Africa and its peoples and to foment the establishment of networks among African international lawyers as well as between the latter and scholars of other continents;
(iii)
to contribute actively to the promotion and building of the rule of law in Africa, in general.”
Looking Forward: The Tenth Anniversary of the Yearbook
7
The Foundation shall pursue those aims and purposes through inter alia: “(i)
(ii) (iii)
(iv)
(v)
the publication of the ‘African Yearbook of International Law’, the ‘African e-Journal of International Law’ and such other periodicals, journals, and monographs as may be decided upon by its Governing Board; the establishment of research centres, or other academic institutions; the launching of initiatives aimed at building networks or at promoting collaboration and coordination among African legal scholars and practitioners; the organization of conferences, symposia, seminars, and other academic forums for exchange and dissemination of ideas, or for training purposes; the provision, upon request, of advice to African institutions or governments on international legal matters.”
With the creation of the African Foundation, we have thus embarked on a wider enterprise in the service of our continent and its peoples, for we believe that the advancement and promotion of international law, and of the rule of law, are integral to the development of Africa. We also believe that Africa has much to contribute to the development of international law and to the values underlying it for a better understanding and peace among nations. As stated by Chinua Achebe: “Africa is not only a geographical expression; it is also a metaphysical landscape – it is in fact a view of the world and of the whole cosmos perceived from a particular position”.3
A clear articulation of that view with respect to international law will not only be to the benefit of Africa, but of the entire world. It is therefore our hope that through the establishment of the African Foundation, we will have both a strategy and a mechanism for pursuing the above objectives.
3
See: “Thoughts on the African Novel”, in C. ACHEBE, Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays, Anchor Books, October 1990, p. 92.
8
Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
Another important feature of the facelift given to the Yearbook on the occasion of this Tenth anniversary is the reconstitution and renewal of the Editorial Advisory Board. This task is not yet fully completed. It is however our hope that it will result in a more closely-knit cooperative effort, and coordination among all concerned, for the successes of the Yearbook. In trying to keep up with the times, and in an effort to reach a much wider audience, through modern technological tools, we have also recently established a website for the African Yearbook. The address of the website, which is still under construction, is (http://www.ayil.org). We hope that through this website, we will also be able to establish better communication with legal scholars in Africa and to build networks and promote cooperation amongst them. A further objective of the website, once properly developed, is to lay the groundwork for an African e-Journal of International Law through which African scholars can establish effective dialogue and exchange of views on international legal issues of particular interest and relevance to Africa. These developments have coincided with a change of publishers following the takeover of Kluwer Law International by Brill Academic Publishers in the Netherlands. The Yearbook will be continued under the imprint of Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
LOOKING FORWARD At present, the African Yearbook is the only scholarly publication devoted exclusively to the study, development, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law in Africa as a whole. Through the ten volumes of scholarly works so far published, the Yearbook has clearly demonstrated the vital role that international law can play in ensuring the spread of human freedom, the greater protection of human rights and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in Africa. By persistently and earnestly spreading this message and promoting it as part of the legal culture in Africa, the Yearbook is slowly but clearly contributing to enhance the respect for the rule of law in Africa. In the foreword to Volume 1, it was observed that:
Looking Forward: The Tenth Anniversary of the Yearbook
9
“The peoples and States of Africa are currently going through a difficult period of their existence and development. The hopes and expectations raised by the emergence into independent nationhood during the past three decades have encountered the hard realities and demands of nation-building, consolidation of statehood and promotion of economic and social development. In some instances, fragile economic and social structures and state institutions have buckled under burdensome pressures.”
Unfortunately, the situation has not changed much. In certain cases, it has actually worsened. Suffice it to mention the genocide in Rwanda, the massacres and mass killings in Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo and the recent conflicts in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire. Civil wars, the collapse of state institutions, and the rise of warlords and tin-pot tyrants continue to undermine human rights, the rule of law and the prospects for economic development in certain parts of the continent. It is not however all doom and gloom in Africa, as some may argue. In many African countries, the rule of law is slowly taking root. Continent-wide institutions and initiatives, such as the African Union and NEPAD are also showing a new commitment to the promotion of democratic change, peaceful resolution of conflicts and economic development. The African Yearbook will try to contribute to these positive trends in the continent. Through the study and analysis of emerging legal issues of particular relevance to Africa, such as the creation of viable continental institutions capable of promoting unity and security for the peoples of the continent, the effective protection of human rights, the end of impunity for mass killings and massive violations of the rule of law, the promotion of a rule-based democratic culture, the role of African countries in a globalizing world economy, and in international trade relations, the Yearbook will strive to be responsive to the intellectual needs of African countries in the area of international law, and to the continuing struggle for creating an environment conducive to the rule of law throughout the continent. These challenges will hopefully keep the Yearbook a vital and vibrant forum for the years to come.
This page intentionally left blank
GENERAL ARTICLES ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX
This page intentionally left blank
THE GHOST OF BERLIN STILL HAUNTS AFRICA! THE ICJ JUDGMENT ON THE LAND AND MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE BETWEEN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA Nsongurua J. Udombana*
“We reject the desperate attempts to fossilize Africa into the wounds inflicted upon it by the vultures of colonialism. Consequently, African leaders must address the problem of colonial boundaries through mutual understanding on fundamental issues. It is no use smothering this problem with the verbiage of uti possidetis juris, since it will always come back to haunt the continent, as it has done in the past.”1
THE CONTEXT On 10 October 2002, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – the principal judicial arm of the United Nations (UN) – sitting at *
Senior Lecturer & Acting Head, Department of Jurisprudence and International Law, University of Lagos, Nigeria; ([email protected]). This paper was first presented at a staff seminar at the Faculty of Law, University of Lagos, in November 2002. It was later presented at a Workshop on Boundaries, Borderlands and Regional Integration Processes: State of Knowledge and Research Agenda for Africa, organised by the Centre for African Regional Integration and Border Studies (CARIBS), Lagos, in December 2002. The paper has enjoyed generous comments from the author’s colleagues and other scholars, notably Prof. Anthony Asiwaju, Director of CARIBS. While the author is personally liable for any remaining error, he expresses his thanks for the valuable comments and observations. The paper is dedicated to the indigenes of Bakassi.
1
N.J. UDOMBANA, “The Unfinished Business: Conflicts, the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development”, George Washington International Law Review (2002) 5, p. 31 (on file with the author) (calling on African leaders to seize the opportunity of the new regional political arrangement and economic development blueprint to also address the root causes of conflicts).
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 13-61. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
14
Nsongurua J. Udombana
The Hague, delivered its final judgment on the land and maritime boundary dispute brought by Cameroon against Nigeria over, inter alia, the Bakassi Peninsula.2 The case, which Cameroon filed on 29 March 1994, lasted for eight years, with several preliminary rulings on interim measures, jurisdiction and admissibility, and the intervention of Equatorial Guinea on maritime delimitation. It is singularly significant because it involves several claims rolled into one. It involves a claim on State responsibility as well as land and maritime issues, which, according to the ICJ, “are two distinct areas of the law, to which different factors and considerations apply”.3 These unique features particularly attracted a special comment from Judge ad hoc Ajibola, in his dissenting opinion.4 The ICJ determined the boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, inter alia, from Lake Chad to the sea and requested each party to withdraw all administrative and military or police forces present on the territories falling under the sovereignty of the other party.5 The final judgment of the Court is a source both of joy and sadness, for by it some people’s lives are enriched while others are endangered. 2
3
4
5
See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening), ICJ General List, No. 94, 10 October 2002, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010.PDF) [hereinafter Cameroon case]. Id. para. 238 (rejecting Cameroon’s contention that the reasoning of the ICJ in the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 1986 ICJ Rep., p. 554 (hereinafter “Burkina Faso v. Mali case”) and the Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) case, 1994 ICJ Rep., p. 6 in regard to land boundaries should be transposed to those concerning maritime boundaries, id.). Judge ad hoc Ajibola, in his dissenting opinion, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_ajibola.PDF) [hereinafter Ajibola, Diss. Op.], para. 174: “I am aware of exclusive land boundary claims by States; and I am also aware of exclusive maritime delimitation claims by States. Cases of maritime boundary cum land boundary claims are very few. However, I have not heard of an application involving a land boundary claim, a maritime delimitation claim, and a State responsibility claim, all presented at the same time. Little wonder that the case took a marathon hearing time of five weeks”. See ICJ Press Release 2002/26 of 10 October 2002, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/iprescom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-26_cn_20021010.htm) (giving a summary report of the judgment of the ICJ on the Cameroon case) [hereinafter Press Release 2002/26].
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
15
This explains the emotional outbursts from all segments of the Nigerian population, including public officials.6 For example, an influential Nigerian daily has, in an editorial, described the judgment as – a travesty and a cunning if brutal re-enactment of colonial injustices [and] a sad reminder that the case arose in the first instance as a direct consequence of the buccaneer activities of the imperial powers of Europe who, having earlier traded in African virile peoples, sought at the close of the 19th Century to balkanise the continent in the infamous scramble for Africa that was capped by the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885.7
This paper attempts a post-mortem analysis of the ICJ’s landmark decision in the Cameroon case. What did the Court decide and how did it decide it? To what extent will the decision resolve the boundary dispute between the parties? At the macro-level, what contribution will the ICJ decision make to the resolution of boundary disputes in Africa, in particular, and to the development of international law in general? Will the parties comply with the decision? Assuming, without prejudice to latter conclusions, that Nigeria fails or refuses to comply with the judgment and the consequential orders of the ICJ, what will be the likely implication vis-à-vis Africa’s renewed efforts at conflict prevention, management and resolution? What are the challenges that this frontier problem between Cameroon and Nigeria and, indeed, between several other African countries have on the refurbished African inter-governmental organization, the 8 African Union (AU) – formerly known as the Organization of African 6
7 8
See, e.g., The Guardian (Nigeria), Friday 11 October 2002, at pp. 1 & 4 (reporting on the reaction of Nigerians to the decision of the ICJ); and “Nigerians Uneasy Over Loss of Oil-Rich Land”, Washington Post, 11 October 2002, available at (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A150852002Oct11.html). “World Court Verdict on Bakassi”, The Guardian (Nigeria), 22 October 2002, at p. 22. See OAU, Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted 11 July 2000, entry into force 26 May 2001, CAB/LEG/23.15, African Yearbook of International Law 8 (2000), p. 479 [hereinafter AU Act]. The AU Act replaces the Charter of the OAU, id. Art. 33. The AU was officially launched on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, with the convening of the inaugural session of the Assembly of the Union. For an analysis of the institutional structure of the AU,
16
Nsongurua J. Udombana
Unity (OAU).9 Considering where Africa is today, and where it should have been but for conflicts, is the uti possidetis principle – that disastrous sword of Damocles that enshrines the inviolability of the frontiers inherited from colonialism10 – still relevant in contemporary Africa? These are just some of the questions arising from the ICJ decision in the Cameroon case. In attempting to answer some of these questions, this paper will give greater attention to the land boundary aspect of the judgment, though the maritime boundary will be equally highlighted. The reason is because the fulcrum of the dispute between the parties is the Bakassi Peninsula; other matters are incidental or additional to it.
THE CASE This part examines the various aspects of the Cameroon case, starting with some factual statements about the countries in conflict and moving on to examine the contentions of the parties as presented to the ICJ and the consensus or decision of the Court.
9
10
see N.J. UDOMBANA, “The Institutional Structure of the African Union: A Legal Analysis”, California Western International Law Journal 33 (2002), p. 69. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 25 May 1963; it , entered into force 13 September 1963, United Nations Treaties Series (UNTS) 479, p. 39, reprinted in International Legal Materials (ILM) 2 (1963), p. 766 [hereinafter OAU Charter]. The uti possidetis concept is borrowed from Latin America and is expressed as follows: “When the common sovereign power was withdrawn, it became indispensably necessary to agree on a general principle of demarcation, since there was a universal desire to avoid resort to force, and the principle adopted was a colonial uti possidetis; that is, the principle involving the preservation of the demarcations under the colonial regimes corresponding to each of the colonial entities that was constituted as a State.” HYDE, cited in I. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, 1998, p. 132. See generally S.R. RATNER, “Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New States”, American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 90 (1996), p. 590 (examining the propriety of uti possidetis to contemporary challenges related to state unity).
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
17
A. Countries in Conflict Cameroon (French: Cameroun; German: Kamerun) is a relatively small country – slightly larger than California11 – on the West African coast. It has a total area of 475,440 square kilometres – made up of 6,000 square kilometres of water and 469,440 square kilometres of land12 –, a population of 16,184,748 million people,13 and a total land boundary of 4,591 kilometres.14 It has diverse terrain, with coastal plain in the southwest, dissected plateau in the centre, mountains in the west, and plains in the north.15 It has oil resources and favourable agricultural conditions. This makes it one of the best-endowed primary commodity economies in sub-Saharan Africa, though it has failed to properly utilize these resources for the benefit of its citizens, for the simple reason that Cameroon is in the vanguard of the corrupt of the world.16 Nigeria is a relatively big country – slightly more than twice the size of California17 – on the West African coast. It has a total area of 923,768 square kilometres – made up of 13,000 square kilometres of water and 910,768 square kilometres of land18 –, a population of 129,934,911 million people,19 and a total land boundary of 4,047 kilometres.20 Its terrain is made up of southern lowlands merging into central hills and plateaus, mountains in the southeast and
11
12 13 14 15 16 17
18 19 20
See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook 2002, available at (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cm.htm) [hereinafter CIA Factbook 2002/CAM] (providing facts about Cameroon as of 1 January 2002; last visited 5 November 2002). Id. Id. Id. Id. See generally J. TAKONGANG and M. KRIEGER, African State and Society in the 1990s: Cameroon’s Political Crossroads (1998). See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook 2002, available at (http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ni.html) [hereinafter CIA Factbook 2002/NIG] (providing facts about Nigeria as of 1 January 2002; last visited 5 November 2002). Id. Id. Id.
18
Nsongurua J. Udombana
plains in the north.21 Nigeria is rich in oil, though political instability, corruption,22 and poor macroeconomic management have long hobbled it. Nigeria’s position in global poverty rankings has improved only marginally over the years.23 Each of the two countries – Cameroon and Nigeria – has land boundaries extending from Lake Chad24 in the north to the Bakassi Peninsula in the south. Their coastlines are adjacent and are washed by the waters of the Gulf of Guinea.25 In the northern part, the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria passes through hot dry plains around Lake Chad, at an altitude of about 300 meters. It then passes through mountains, cultivated high ground or pastures, watered by various rivers and streams and descending in stages to areas of savannah and forest until it reaches the sea.26 Similarly, the Southern part, known as the Bakassi Peninsula, is situated in the hollow of the Gulf of Guinea. The River Akwayafe bound it to the west while the Rio del Rey bound it to the east. An amphibious environment, the Peninsula is characterized by an abundance of water, fish stock and mangrove vegetation.27 Meanwhile, [t]he Gulf of Guinea, which is concave in character at the level of the Cameroonian and Nigerian coastlines, is bounded by other States, in particular by Equatorial Guinea, whose Bioko Island lies opposite the Parties’ coastlines.28 21 22
23
24 25 26 27 28
Id. For a third year running, Nigeria has been classified as the second most corrupt nation in the world; see Transparency International, Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2002, 2002, available at (http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2002/cpi2002.en.html) (relating to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts, and ranging between 10 (highly clean) and 10 (highly corrupt). In a survey of 102 countries, Nigeria is ranked as the second most highly corrupt, trailing marginally behind Bangladesh). Economic Commission for Africa, Economic Report on Africa 2002: Tracking Performance and Progress, 2002, p. 153 [hereinafter ECA Report 2002] (laying out an agenda for Africa based on systematic benchmarking of economic performance). Four States border Lake Chad: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. See Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 30. Id. Id. Id.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
19
Now, how did two well-endowed and hitherto friendly African countries become hostile neighbours? The story is that, by a 1913 Agreement, Great Britain ceded Bakassi to Germany. Following the defeat of Germany in World War I, Cameroon became a Mandate Territory under the League of Nations and, by the end of World War II, a Trust Territory under the UN Charter. Britain and France jointly administered the territory at various times. However, whereas the French Cameroon was retained as a distinct colony, British Cameroon was divided into two – the Northern Cameroon, which was administered as part of Northern Nigeria, and the Southern Cameroon as part of Southern Nigeria. When, however, the Francophone Cameroon became independent in January 1960, the Anglophone South voted in a Plebiscite – one year after (1961) – to join the Francophone region. The Northern part of Cameroon opted for unification with Nigeria. Cameroon was not happy with the outcome of that plebiscite; it took the matter to the ICJ, which, held that it could not entertain the suit.29 That was how the present-day Cameroon came to being. By then, however, Bakassi had become effectively part of Nigeria, with indigenes and residents of the Peninsula regarding themselves as Nigerians and being treated as such. Cameroon, however, continued to believe that the Bakassi Peninsula was part of its territory, a claim that had resulted in periodic military skirmishes between the two countries over the oil-rich Peninsula. In fact, incidents involving serious clashes and hostilities have also occurred in recent times. It is, however, obvious that Cameroon had always nursed the ambition of reclaiming part of what it believes was wrongfully taken away from her in 1961.
29
See Northern Cameroon case, 1963 ICJ Rep., p. 15.
20
Nsongurua J. Udombana
B. Contentions of the Parties On 29 March 1994, Cameroon, relying on Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute,30 filed an application before the ICJ against Nigeria in a dispute “rela[ting] essentially to the question of sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula”,31 which it claimed was in part under military occupation by Nigeria. It requested the Court to determine the course of the maritime frontier between the two States in so far as the Maroua Declaration, signed by the Cameroonian and Nigerian Heads of State in 1975, had not already established that frontier and “up to the limit of the maritime zones which international law places under their respective jurisdictions”.32 On 6 June 1994, Cameroon brought an additional application which had the effect of extending the case to a further dispute with Nigeria over “a part of the territory of Cameroon in the area of Lake Chad”,33 which it claimed was also occupied by Nigeria. Cameroon asked the Court “to specify definitively” the frontier between itself and Nigeria from Lake Chad to the sea, to order the withdrawal of Nigerian troops from Cameroonian territory and to
30
31
32 33
See Statute of the ICJ, Art. 36(2), signed at the UN Conference on International Organization, San Francisco, California, 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945; [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (providing that “[t]he states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes …”). See also id. Art. 36(5). Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 1. Note that a State may challenge territorial allocation for a variety of reason. It could be historical, where there is a claim to ancient sovereignty; it could be geographical, where it is claimed that the boundary should follow a natural feature; it could be ethnic or cultural, where it is claimed that a people or cultural group is split into two by a frontier; it could be economic, where territory on one side of a boundary is felt to be essential to, or a concomitant of, occupation of territory on the other side; or it could be military of strategic, where it is sought to rectify the boundary so as to make it more easily defensible in time of crisis or war. See M.A. AJOMO, “Legal Perspective on Border Issues”, in A.I. ASIWAJU and P.O. ADENIYI (eds.), Bordelands in Africa, 1989, p. 39. Id. at para. 25(f). Id. at para. 3.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
21
determine reparation for the material and non-material damage inflicted by Nigeria.34 Cameroon duly filed its Memorial on the merits.35 However, on 13 December 1995, Nigeria filed a preliminary objection challenging the jurisdiction of the ICJ and the admissibility of Cameroon’s claims. The proceedings on preliminary objections had the effect of suspending the proceedings on the merit.36 As the Court later recalled, in its judgment on the preliminary objections, “it has always acknowledged as one of the fundamental principles of its Statute that no dispute between States can be decided without their consent to its jurisdiction”.37 Meanwhile, On 12 February 1996, Cameroon requested the Court to indicate provisional measures after “serious armed incidents” had taken place between Cameroonian and Nigerian forces in the Bakassi Peninsula.38 The ICJ Statute gives the Court the power “to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the requisite rights of either party.”39 Once the matter has been brought before the Court, it may indicate measures not only at the request of one of the parties but also on its own initiative.40 Thus, on 15 March 1996, the ICJ found Cameroon’s request for provisional measure meritorious and, 34
35 36 37
38 39
40
See ICJ Press Communiqué 99/37 of 2 July 1999, available at (http://www.pictpcti.org/news/archive/July/ICJ.07.02.Cameroon.html) [hereinafter Press Communiqué 99/37]. Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 8. See Rules of Procedure of the ICJ, AJIL 73 (1979), p. 748 [hereinafter ICJ Rules], Art. 75(3). Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 ICJ Rep., p. 312, para. 79; see also Monetary Gold Removal from Rome 1943, Judgment, 1954 ICJ Rep., p. 32. See ICJ Press Communiqué 99/37, supra note 34. See ICJ Statute, supra note 30, Art. 41(1). Cf. ICJ Rules, supra note 36, Art. 74(1) (providing that “[a] request for the indication of provisional measures shall have priority over all other cases”). On interim measures, see K. OELLERS-FRAHM, “Interim Measures of Protection”, in R. BERNHARDT (ed.), Encyclopadia of Public International Law, 2000, II, p. 1027; and generally R. BERNHARDT (ed.), Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts, 1994, p. 69. See H.-J. SCHLOCHAUER, “International Court of Justice”, in R. BERNHARDT (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, id., pp. 1084-1095.
22
Nsongurua J. Udombana
consequently, made an Order directing both Parties to ensure that no action of any kind, and particularly no action by their armed forces, is taken that might prejudice the rights of the other in respect of whatever judgment the Court may render in the case, or that might aggravate or extend the dispute before it.41 Meanwhile, the Court, on 11 June 1998, delivered its judgment on the preliminary objection by Nigeria, with five separate42 and three dissenting43 opinions. It declared that it had jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the dispute and found that Cameroon’s claims were admissible. A further request by Nigeria, on 28 October 1998, for the interpretation of the Court’s judgment on preliminary objections was also declared inadmissible.44 The Court fixed 31 March 1999 as the time limit for the filing of the Counter-Memorial of Nigeria in the case,45 which time was, again at the request of Nigeria, extended to 31 May 1999, by an Order of 3 March 1999.46 Nigeria, in its CounterMemorial,47 claimed against Cameroon,48 contending that Cameroon, in its written pleadings, “cited [a]... variety of ‘incidents’ along the border and... with respect to some of these... brought in issue the international responsibility of Nigeria”. Nigeria pointed out that, “there are [however] many cases in which incursions are occurring along the border from the Cameroon side and for which Cameroon is internationally responsible”. Nigeria accordingly asked the Court to declare that the incidents referred to engaged the international 41 42 43 44 45 46 47
48
See Cameroon v. Nigeria Land and Maritime Boundary (Provisional Measures) Order, 1996 ICJ Rep., p. 13. Judges Oda, Vereschchetin, Higgins, Parra-Aranguren, and Kooijmans. Vice-President Weeramantry, Judge Koroma, and Judge ad hoc Ajibola. Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 14. See ICJ Press Communiqué, 98/25 of 1 July 1998 (reporting on the Order of the ICJ directing Nigeria to file its Counter-Memorial by 31 March 1999). See ICJ Press Communiqué 99/37, supra note 34. The contentious proceedings before the ICJ consist of two parts: written and oral. During the first phase, written pleadings are exchanged. Under the Rules of Procedure of the ICJ, pleadings are reduced to two – Memorial and CounterMemorial – with provision for a Reply and a Rejoinder “if the parties are so agreed, or if the Court decides proprio motu or at the request of one of the parties, that these pleadings are necessary”, ICJ Rules, supra note 36, Art. 45. The ICJ Rules allows a State Party to present a counter-claim provided that it is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other party and that it comes within the jurisdiction of the Court; see id. Art. 80, para. 1.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
23
responsibility of Cameroon. It asked for compensation in the form of damages, if not agreed between the Parties, then, to be awarded by the Court in a subsequent phase of the case. On 2 July 1999, the ICJ ruled, by an Order of 30 June 1999, that Nigeria’s counter-claims were “admissible as such and form part of the current proceedings”.49 According to the Court, the counter-claims came within its jurisdiction and were “directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim[s] of the other [P]arty”. They “rest on facts of the same nature as the corresponding claims of Cameroon”, and those facts “are alleged to have occurred along the frontier between the two States.” Besides, the claims of both States “pursue the same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility and the determination of the reparation due on this account.”50 In sum, Cameroon claimed, inter alia, that by attempting to modify unilaterally and by force the courses of the boundary, Nigeria had violated and is violating the fundamental principle of respect for frontiers inherited from colonization – uti possidetis juris – as well as its legal obligations concerning the land and maritime delimitation. It requested the ICJ to adjudge that sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula is Cameroonian. In both its Memorial and pleadings before the Court, Cameroon relied mainly for its title on the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 and on various effectivités. Nigeria, for its part, requested the Court to adjudge and declare that sovereignty over the Bakassi is vested in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, basing its claim on original title, as confirmed by the Treaty of Protection which the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar signed with Great Britain on 10 September 1884. The maxim is prior est tempore, prior est jure. Nigeria also relied on historical consolidation, contending that parts of the Anglo-German Agreement of 11 March 1913 were invalid as Great Britain was not entitled to cede the territory pursuant to the 1884 Treaty. The said Treaty of 1884 was a treaty of protection and in no way transferred sovereignty to 49
50
See Press Communiqué 99/37, supra note 34 (“The Court’s ruling on the admissibility of Nigeria’s counter-claims means that those claims will be examined by the Court simultaneously with Cameroon’s claims during the proceedings on the merits”, id.) Id.
24
Nsongurua J. Udombana
Great Britain over the territories of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar. Nigeria further argued that the 1913 Agreement was invalid on grounds of inconsistency with the principle nemo dat quod non habet,51 which places a restrictive effect on titles dependent on bilateral agreements. As regards to the maritime claim, Nigeria argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Cameroon’s maritime claim from the point at which its claim line enters waters claimed against Cameroon by Equatorial Guinea, or alternatively that Cameroon’s claim is inadmissible to that extent. On 30 June 1999, the Government of Equatorial Guinea submitted an Application to the ICJ to be permitted to intervene, pursuant to the Statute of the Court.52 It asserted that it “d[id] not seek to become a party to the case”;53 rather, it sought to “protect the legal rights of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea in the Gulf of Guinea by all legal means available” and to inform the Court of the nature of the legal rights and interests of Equatorial Guinea that could be affected by the Court’s decision in the light of the maritime boundary claims advanced by the parties to the case before the Court.54
It asks that the boundary to be fixed by the Court should not encroach upon the median line between its own coasts and those of Cameroon and Nigeria, which it regards as “a reasonable expression of its legal rights and interests that must not be transgressed in proceedings to which Equatorial Guinea is not a party”.55 According to Equatorial Guinea, if the Court’s decision in the present case were to involve 51 52
53 54 55
Or, nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet: no donor can give a greater interest than that which he himself has. See ICJ Statute, supra note 30, Art. 62(1) (providing that “[s]hould a State consider that it has an interest of a legal nature which may be affected by the decision in the case, it may submit a request to the Court to be permitted to intervene”). Note also that if the construction or a multilateral treaty is at issue in contentious proceedings, the Registrar of the Court is mandated to inform all States which are parties to the treaty in addition to those that are directly concerned in the case in question. If they exercise this right, the construction contained in the judgment will be equally binding on them, see id. Art. 63. Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 18. Id. Id. at para. 284.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
25
such an encroachment, this would cause it “irreparable harm” and would “lead to a great deal of confusion”,56 notwithstanding the protection afforded by Article 59 of the Court’s Statute.57 Generally, what is an interest of a legal nature is a matter of law and fact58 that has to be decided after the abduction of proof that the alleged legal interest is truly involved.59 Equatorial Guinea was said to pass that test; thus, on 21 October 1999, the Court, having considered that – Equatorial Guinea had sufficiently established that it had an interest of a legal nature which could be affected by any judgment which the Court might hand down for the purpose of determining the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, authorized it to intervene in the case to the extent, in the manner and for the purposes set out in its Application.60
The Court fixed time limits for the subsequent intervention proceedings, pursuant to its Rules.61 An important question in international law is whether an intervenor must have any jurisdictional link with either or all of the parties to the dispute? In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ answered in the negative and held that the absence of a jurisdictional link is “no bar to permission being given for intervention”.62 The Court maintained that an intervening State could make observations to the Court about its interests of a judicial nature it believed to be affected by the case. However, such a State could not become a party to the case, and “does 56 57
58
59
60 61 62
Id. See ICJ Statute, supra note 30, Art. 59 (providing that “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case”). For an explanation of the phrase “an interest of a legal nature”, see the separate opinion of Judge Oda in the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras), Application to Intervene, Judgment, 1990 ICJ Rep., p. 137 (13 September), – the first time that an intervention under Article 62 of the ICJ Statute was permitted. See, e.g., Libya-Malta Continental Shelf case, 1985 ICJ Rep., p. 33 (in which the ICJ, in 1984, refused the request by Italy to intervene in the maritime dispute because, according to the Court, Italy did not show any interest of a legal nature that should enable it to intervene in the dispute). Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 18. See ICJ Rules, supra note 36, Art. 85, para. 1. Judgment of the Chambers, 1990 ICJ Rep., p. 135, para. 101.
26
Nsongurua J. Udombana
not acquire the rights, or become subject to the obligations, which attach to the status of a party, under the Statute and Rules of Court, or the general principles of procedural law”.63 This means that the intervenor is not permitted, for example, to put in the full written pleadings that a party has a right to do, though it could make “observations” that are limited to the affected interests that are the subject of the intervention. Furthermore, its agent and counsel are seated at the side of the Court in the place normally used by the press; in short, the scope of the intervention “necessarily involves limitations of the right of the intervener to be heard”.64 Besides, the intervenor is, in spite of an express undertaking made in its request, not bound by the judgment as a “party” in the sense of Article 59 of the ICJ Statute.65 C. Decision of the Court For the purposes of this case, the ICJ was composed of fourteen permanent judges – including the President and Vice-President – and two ad hoc judges.66 It delivered its judgment on the merit on 10 October 2002, a judgment of 151 pages,67 plus three declarations,68 four separate opinions,69 and two dissenting opinions.70 In its complex 63 64 65 66
67 68
69
Id., p. 136, para. 102. Id. at para. 103. See R. JENNINGS, “The International Court of Justice After Fifty Years”, AJIL 89 (1995), p. 500. I.e., Judges Keba Mbaye and Bola Ajibola. The ad hoc judges were chosen by the parties to the dispute pursuant to the ICJ Statute, supra note 30, Art. 31(3) (providing that “[i]f the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of the parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge…”). See Cameroon case, supra note 2. Judges Oda, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_oda.PDF); Herczegh, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_herczegh_french.P DF); and Rezek, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_rezek_french.PDF). Judges Ranjeva, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_ranjeva_french.PDF); .Parra-Aranguren, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_parra.pdf);
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
27
and long judgment,71 the ICJ determines the course of the boundary, from north to south, between Cameroon and Nigeria.72 It decided that treaties entered into during the colonial period had fixed the land boundary between the two countries, and upheld the validity of those treaties. It moreover rejected the theory of historical consolidation put forward by Nigeria and accordingly refused to take into account the effectivités relied upon by Nigeria. It ruled that, in the absence of
70
71
72
Al-Khasawneh, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_al-khasawneh.PDF); and Judge ad hoc Mbaye, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_mbaye_french.PDF). Judge Koroma, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn_ijudgment_20021010_koroma.PDF) [hereinafter Koroma, Diss. Op.] and Judge ad hoc Ajibola; see Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4. It may be instructive to observe that both judges also dissented in the earlier judgment of the Court on Preliminary Objections (supra). When compared to such cases as the South West Africa case of 1966 – a “sterile Judgment” yielding 501 pages of Judgment and Opinions, the Cameroon case may be a welcome development in terms of the economy of drafting. Indeed, judge Ajibola, in his dissenting opinion, has commended the Court for “comprehensively deal[ing] with all the submission presented to it by the Parties”, “notwithstanding the unusually large request of Cameroon’s Applications”, Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 1. Another relevant point is that the method of declarations, separate and dissenting opinions has come to represent the style of the ICJ judgments; the practice has been to let Judges decide how to head their opinions. Jennings offers some factors that a Judge of the Court considers in deciding how to title his opinion. One of such factors “will be the fact that the media will, if he calls it dissent, report it, probably without mentioning any points on which he agreed with the Court; but if he calls it a separate opinion the media will most probably ignore it entirely”, R. JENNINGS, supra note 65, at p. 498. It has, however, been observed that the overestimation of separate (especially dissenting) opinions seems to underestimate the basic rule of collegiality by which the ICJ functions; cf. S. ROSENNE, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1997, pp. 15791585. But it may be asserted with equal force that, in some instances, the separate or even dissenting opinions of judges may be very useful in a proper appreciation of the essential points underlying the reasoning of the majority and/or in elaborating or refining various concepts; see B. KWIATKOWSKA, “The Peaceful Settlement of Maritime Disputes by the International Court of Justice and other Courts and Tribunals”, 1999, available at (http://www.cdupuyusenghor.org/word/confe.pdf). For a summary of the long judgment, see ICJ, Summary of the Judgment of 10 October 2002, available at (http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-26bis_cn_20021010.htm).
28
Nsongurua J. Udombana
acquiescence by Cameroon, these effectivités could not prevail over Cameroon’s conventional titles. In the Lake Chad area, the Court decided that the boundary is delimited by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930, as incorporated in the Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931 (between Great Britain and France). It also found that the boundary starts in the lake from the Cameroon-Nigeria-Chad tripoint (whose coordinates it defines) and follows a straight line to the mouth of the River Ebeji as it was in 1931 (whose co-ordinates it also defines) and thence runs in a straight line to the point where the river today divides into two branches.73 Between Lake Chad and the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court confirmed that the following instruments delimit the boundary – i) from the point where the River Ebeji bifurcates, as far as Tamnyar Peak, by the Thomson-Marchand Declaration of 1929-1930 (paras. 2-60), as incorporated in the HendersonFleuriau Exchange of Notes of 1931; ii) from Tamnyar Peak to pillar 64 referred to in Article XII of the Anglo-German Agreement of 12 April 1913, by the British Order in Council of 2 August 1946; iii) from pillar 64 to the Bakassi Peninsula, by the AngloGerman Agreements of 11 March and 12 April 1913.74 With respect to Bakassi Peninsula, in particular, the Court reached the conclusion that, under the applicable law at the time, Great Britain was in a position to determine its boundary with Germany, based on the 1913 Agreement.75 It found that Nigeria, at independence76 and subsequently,77 had accepted that Articles XVIII to XXII of the Anglo73 74 75 76
77
See ICJ Press Release 2002/26, supra note 5. Id. See Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 209. The Court recalled, with approval, Cameroon’s claim that Nigeria did not protest the proposed boundary line by the UN during the independent process and, in fact, that Nigeria voted in favor of the General Assembly Resolution 1608 (XV) by which the British trusteeship was formally terminated; see id. at paras. 210 & 213. The Court relied on such other documents as the Yaounde Declaration of 14 August 1970; the Kano Agreement of September 1974; the Maroua
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
29
German Agreement of 1913 were valid and in effect, and that it recognized Cameroonian sovereignty over the Bakassi Peninsula.78 The Court rejected Nigeria’s arguments with respect to the Maroua Declaration of June 1975, which Cameroon relied on as one of the three international legal instruments that delimit the course of the first sector of the maritime boundary between the two countries.79 The ICJ held that the Declaration constituted an international agreement concluded between States in written form and tracing a boundary and that it was governed by international law.80 It held that the said Declaration constituted a treaty in the sense of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969,81 providing, in particular, that: A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.82
The Court also rejected Nigeria’s claim to title based on “historical consolidation”83 – a concept it regarded as “over-generalized” –
78 79
80 81
82
83
Declaration of June 1975; and the Yaounde II Declaration of 4 April 1987, id. at para. 214. Id. Nigeria had argued that the Declaration lacked legal validity because, under the 1963 Constitution of Nigeria – in force at the time – General Gowon did not have the power to commit his Government without the approval of the Supreme Military Council, which constituted the executive authority and Government of Nigeria, id. at para. 258. Id., at para. 263. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969, in force 27 January 1980; UNTS 331, p. 1155; ILM 8 (1969), p. 679; AJIL 63 (1969), p. 875 [hereinafter Vienna Conv.]. Nigeria and Cameroon ratified the Convention in 1969 and 1991 respectively. Id. Art. 46(1). In approving this provision during its drafting process, the International Law Commission stated that “the decision of international tribunals and State practice, if they are not conclusive, appear to support” this type of solution, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2 (1966), pp. 240-242. Historical consolidation caters, inter alia, for a situation where there has been a clear loss or absence of title through abandonment or inactivity on the one side, and an effective exercise of jurisdiction and control, continuously maintained, on the other; see G. FITZMAURICE, “General Principles of International Law”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (R.C.A.D.I.) 2 (1957),
30
Nsongurua J. Udombana
insisting that “the established modes of acquisition of title… take into account many other important variables of fact and law”.84 According to the Court, besides the Fisheries case,85 the notion of historical consolidation “has never been used as a basis of title in other territorial disputes, whether in its own or in other case law”.86 It insisted that nothing in the Fisheries case suggests that “historical consolidation” allows land occupation to prevail over an established title.87 Similarly, [t]he legal question of whether effectivités suggest that title lies with one country rather than another is not the same legal question as whether such effectivités can serve to displace an established treaty titles.88
With respect to the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon, the Court held that the mere presence of Equatorial Guinea
84 85
86
87 88
p. 148. The factors that a court will consider in resting title on historical consolidation include peaceful holding and acquiescence or toleration by other states. A court that is faced with rather equivocal facts will also take into consideration other special factors, including economic interests, see I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at 163. In the instant case, Nigeria presented the following as evidence of historical consolidation and effectivités: the toponomy of Bakassi, the administration of Bakassi as part of Nigeria in the period 1913-1960, exercise of authority by traditional rulers, acts of administration by Nigeria after independence in 1960 involving effectivités and peaceful administration, maintenance of public order and investigation of crimes, granting of oil exploration rights, public health, public education, participation in parliamentary elections, collection of custom duties, use of Nigerian passports by residents of the Bakassi Peninsula, etc., see e.g., Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 222. Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 65. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 1951 ICJ Rep., p. 137 (18 December) [hereinafter Fisheries case] (in which the Court referred to certain maritime delimitation decrees promulgated by Norway almost a century earlier which had been adopted and applied for decades without any opposition. The Court said of these decrees that they represented “a well-defined and uniform system… which would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an historical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against all States”, id. at p. 137). Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 65; cf. R. JENNINGS, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, 1963, pp. 23-28 (in which the author is critical of “historical consolidation”, maintaining that the concept “is based upon the merest hint in the case reports”). Id. Id. at para. 223.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
31
and Sao Tome and Principe in Gulf of Guinea does not, in itself, preclude its jurisdiction over maritime delimitation between the Parties.89 It, however, rejected Cameroon’s claims in so far as they may affect rights of Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe.90 According to the Court: The jurisdiction of the Court is founded on the consent of the parties. The Court cannot therefore decide upon legal rights of third States not parties to the proceedings. In the present case there are States other than the parties to these proceedings whose rights might be affected, namely Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe. Those rights cannot be determined by decision of the Court unless Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe have become parties to the proceedings. Equatorial Guinea has indeed requested – and has been granted – permission to intervene, but as a nonparty intervener only. Sao Tome and Principe has chosen not to intervene on any basis.91
A CRITIQUE OF THE ICJ JUDGEMENT This part attempts a critique of the Cameroon case, pointing out, for example, areas in which the Court failed to reflect existing principles of international law, particularly in the light of the evidence presented by the parties. There is no doubt that many aspects of the ICJ judgment in the Cameroon case raise concerns. Undoubtedly, if the material sources of international law, as listed in the Statute of the ICJ,92 are read literally as implying a hierarchy – as some scholars 89 90 91 92
See id. at para. 238. See id. Id. See ICJ Statute, supra note 30, Art. 38 (listing the sources of that the ICJ should apply in discharging its functions). These sources are listed, successively, to include (a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59 [stating that decisions of the Court have no binding force except between the parties to the case], judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.
32
Nsongurua J. Udombana
do93 – then the Court might be legally justified in giving priority to the 1913 Anglo-German Agreement and other subsequent agreements, such as Maroua Declaration of June 1975. Critics of the judgement argue that, by relying on a 1913 Agreement between Great Britain and Germany to vest title on Cameroon, the ICJ ignored the basic principle of nemo dat quod non habet and that the much trumpeted Maroua Declaration of 1975 was not opposable and, therefore, not enforceable against Nigeria.94 These argue that the declaration clearly was in violation of Nigeria’s internal law, as the highest decision making organ of the state at the time did not ratify it – and Cameroon knew or ought to have known that General Gowon was constitutionally limited. As Nigeria argued, States are normally expected to follow legislative and constitutional developments in neighbouring States which have an impact upon the interState relations of those States, and… few limits can be more important than those affecting the treaty-making power.95
It is further argued that the failure of the ICJ to take the principle of the right to self-determination into consideration means that the judgment is fatally flawed and that it makes compliance and implementation practically impossible.96 This essay takes up these issues in turn. The Vienna Convention, which reflects customary international law, provides an objective test as to what constitutes a violation of a State’s internal law. A violation, according to the Convention, “is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal practice and in good faith.”97 Nigeria’s position, therefore, is weakened by the fact that it ignores several other agreements that the Nigerian Government 93
94 95 96 97
See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at p. 3 (stating that the Court may, in practice, be expected to observe the order in which the sources appear and that “the priority of (a) is explicable by the fact that this refers to a source of mutual obligations of the parties”, id.). See e.g., I.E. SAGAY, “Bakassi: The Critical Issues”, Thisday (Nigeria), 2 November 2002, p. 36. Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 258. I.E. SAGAY, supra note 94, at p. 36. Vienna Conv., supra note 81, Art. 46(2).
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
33
executed with Cameroon – such as the Yaounde Declaration of 14 August 1970; the Kano Agreement of September 1974; and the Yaounde II Declaration of 4 April 1987. It must be mentioned that there is no substantive requirement as to the form of treaties. Even agreements “not in written form” may have legal force.98 Thus, “[t]he manner in which treaties are negotiated and brought into force is governed by the intention and consent of the parties”.99 Besides, may it not be said that these series of agreements indirectly created a customary law between the two parties? After all: Customary international law develops from the practice of states. To international lawyers, ‘the practice of states’ means official governmental conduct reflected in a variety of acts, including official statements at international conferences and in diplomatic exchanges, formal instructions to diplomatic agents, national court decisions, legislative measures or other actions taken by governments to deal with matters of international concern.100
The rejection of the claim to title by Nigeria, based on historical consolidation, however, raises some questions. The Court relied heavily on the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali) case,101 where the Court held that [w]here the act corresponds exactly to law, where effective administration is additional to the uti possidetis juris, the only role of effectivité is to confirm the exercise of the right derived from a legal title.102
It has also been argued, in support of the Court’s position, although possession may be ninety percent of ownership in the municipal legal system, a different view tends to hold under general international law. This probably explains why territorial acquisition achieved by any form of unilateral occupation is no longer permissible.103 That may be so; but the impression that the ICJ gives, in the Cameroon case, is that 98 99 100 101 102 103
See id. Art. 3. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at p. 610. T. BUERGENTHAL and H.G. MAIER, Public International Law in a Nutshell, 1990, pp. 22-23. See Burkina Faso v. Mali case, supra note 3. Id. at pp. 586-587 para. 63. See M. IKHARIALE, “Why We Lost Bakassi”, The Guardian, 20 October 2002, at p. 20.
34
Nsongurua J. Udombana
the categories of acquisition of title to territory, unlike the common law tort of negligence, are closed. This runs counter to the dynamic character of international law.104 International law, like its municipal counterpart, is a product of its environment and changes in response to the conditions and cultural traditions of the society within which it operates.105 Changes in international relations must necessarily bring about what Zelim Skurbaty calls “instant paradigm shifts.”106 Therefore, to insist that there are fixed “modes” of acquisition of legal title107 – as the decision of the ICJ suggests – is to rob international law of that needed capacity for growth. As Judge Koroma argued, “[j]ust as the Court has recognized prescriptive rights to territory, so there is a basis for historical consolidation as a means of establishing a territorial claim”.108 Even in its Advisory Opinion in the Western Sahara case, the ICJ recognized the local rulers’ possession and title as superior to other forms of title.109 The raison d’être of international law is to provide a legal underpinning to the international political system.110 A tribunal should 104
105 106
107
108 109
110
See, e.g., J. TACSAN, The Dynamics of International Law in Conflict Resolution, 1992 (evaluating the effectiveness of international law in conflict resolution processes and the ways international actors affirm, change or disregard it in their efforts to solve disputes). See M. SHAW, International Law, 1997, p. 36 (arguing that for international law to survive, “it must be in harmony with the realities of the age”, id.). Z. SKURBATY, “Instant Paradigm Shifts: Globalising Human Rights?”, in K. HASTRUP (ed.), Human Rights on Common Grounds: The Quest for Universality, 2001, p. 102 (stating that in order to keep up with current developments, international law paradigm shifts should occur rapidly). According to Brownlie, “the whole concept of modes of acquisition is unsound in principle and makes the task of understanding the true position much more difficult. Labels are never a substitute for analysis,” I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at p. 129. Koroma, Diss. Op., supra note 70, at para. 26. See Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) case, 1975 ICJ Rep., p. 12 (where the ICJ could not countenance the claims of Mauritania and Morocco to the Western Sahara. The question was asked as to whether the territory in question had been terra nullius at the time of colonization. The ICJ found evidence of allegiance of some tribes to the Sultan of Morocco and others to Mauritania, although they had no ties with a territorial sovereign for neither Morocco nor Mauritania was a State in international law at the time that Spain occupied the territory). M. SHAW, supra note 105, at p. 37.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
35
concern itself with proof of the exercise of sovereignty at the critical date or dates, and should place less emphasis on the orthodox analysis used to describe its process of decision. The reason is because “[t]he issue of territorial sovereignty, or title, is often complex, and involves the application of various principles of the law to the material facts.”111 Wine can vary with every valley and every vineyard. It has actually been observed, with respect to the “modes” of acquisition of title, that – [t]here seems to be no real basis for any suggestion that the scope of considerations which judicial, as opposed to arbitral, tribunals may take account of is narrower: a wide range of social, economic and geographical criteria were explicitly taken account of in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries and North Sea Continental Shelf cases, and historical and cultural considerations were not of themselves described as irrelevant in the Temple case. In the Jaworzina case, the Permanent Court explicitly invoked the notion of the historic boundaries of the States in dispute, and the ethnographical factors presuming in their favour.112
It appears, therefore, that the ICJ willingly ignored some of these factors in its conclusion, for there is no doubt that historical consolidation, coupled with effectivités113 and supported by the requisite evidence, can be a sound and valid means of establishing title.114 111 112
113
114
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at p. 129. A.L.W. MUNKMAN, “Adjudication and Adjustment – International Judicial Decision and the Settlement of Territorial and Boundary Disputes”, British Yearbook of International Law (1972-1973), p. 113, cited with approval by Judge ad hoc Ajibola in his dissenting opinion, see Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 7. Judge ad hoc Ajibola, in his dissenting opinion, discussed the functions of effectivité thus: “Short of invalidating a legal title that bears no relation to the situation on the ground, effectivité comes in to play the role of sustaining complementarily the boundary based on the practice and conduct of the parties over the years which, in effect, is similar to the principle of uti possidetis juris (de facto). Consequently, effectivité comes in to adjust, vary or amend such boundary as may be structurally established by the legal title”; Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 52. See Koroma, Diss. Op., supra note 70, at para. 8. See also Minquiers and Ecrehos (United Kingdom v. France), 1953 ICJ Rep., p. 53 (where the parties contended that they retained an ancient title. The Court considered that “[w]hat is
36
Nsongurua J. Udombana
It is also surprising that the ICJ failed to take into consideration the human elements in Bakassi. It is well known that the Efiks of Calabar, Nigeria, live in Bakassi, using the place largely as fishing grounds. The same goes for their counterparts in Lake Chad.115 As Judge ad hoc Ajibola puts it, in his dissenting opinion, the Court ought to take cognisance of the fact that Nigerians have settled in Bakassi from time immemorial, that they owe allegiance to their Kings and Chiefs, and that they have settled administration and other civil activities as Nigerians there.116
By upholding the Anglo-German Treaty of 1913 to vest title on Cameroon, the ICJ ignored or disregarded the inalienable rights of the Kings, Chiefs and people of Old Calabar to their land and ancestral homes as well as of their rights to self-determination, a right that is not only recognized by the UN Charter117 but also has enjoyed primacy in international law.118 Even before the development of the current norm of selfdetermination by the UN, international law had, for example, recognized that the object of cession was sovereignty over territory.
115
116 117
118
of decisive importance… is… the evidence which relates directly to the possession of the Ecrehos and Minquiers groups”, id. at p. 57). Cf. Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 49: “A clear picture of the situation in Lake Chad is that the inhabitants have been living at large regardless of where the boundary lies, and some of them have been there for many years. It is precisely a situation like this that calls for justice in favour of these inhabitants, more of whom owe allegiance to Ngala local government in Nigeria and their Nigerian Bulamas (chiefs).” Id. at p. 153. See UN Charter, Art. 1(2); cf. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 19 December 1966, entry into force 23 March 1976, UNTS 999, p. 171, ILM 6, p. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR], Art. 1(1) (providing that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”). Almost all international lawyers agree that self-determination is a jus cogens, that is, a peremptory norm of international law from which no derogation is permitted. On peremptory norms, see Vienna Conv., supra note 81, Art. 53. Note, however, that while some jurists ground jus cogens in either convention or custom, other publicists would only accept custom and general principles of law as possible sources. For an excellent review of these arguments, see R. KOLB, “The Formal Source of Ius Cogens in Public International Law”, Australian Journal of Public International Law 53 (1998), p. 69.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
37
Consequently, international law required that the population domiciled in the affected territory and who were citizens of the ceding state should be given the opportunity of deciding if they wanted to retain their citizenship of the ceding state or consented to their citizenship being transferred to a new sovereign. Indeed, the requirement of consent of the affected population in cases of cession or transfer of peoples and territories from one sovereign to another was accelerated after the establishment of the UN.119 It has also been asserted that several treaties of cession concluded during the nineteenth century stipulated that a cession should only be valid if the inhabitants consented to it through a plebiscite.120 The ICJ refused Cameroon’s request for the delimitation of the maritime boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon; yet, the Court agreed with the basic premise that such delimitation must be done in such a manner as to “achieve an equitable solution”.121 Cameroon had strenuously argued, and the Court agreed, that in the delimitation of maritime areas lying beyond the outer limit of the respective territorial seas of the two States, the applicable criteria, principles and rules of delimitation are when a line covering several zones of coincident jurisdictions is to be determined. They are expressed in the so-called equitable principles/relevant circumstances method. This method, which is very similar to the equidistance/special circumstances method applicable in delimitation of the territorial sea, involves first drawing an equidistance line, then considering whether there
119
120 121
See, e.g., Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514(XV) (1960); and Declaration of the Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations Among States 1970, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Oct. 24, 1970. See L. OPPENHEIM, “International Law”, in R. JENNINGS and A. WATTS (eds.), 1992, p. 864. For an exposition of the doctrine of equity, see Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Diss. Op. of Judge Hudson, 1937, Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) Series A/B, No.70, pp. 76-77, stating that “under Article 38 of the Statute, if not independently of that article, the Court has some freedom to consider principles of equity as part of the international law which it must apply”; cf. M.O. HUDSON, The Permanent Court of International Justice 19201942 – A Treatise, 1943, p. 618; Nicaragua v. USA (Provisional Measures) and (Merits), Diss. Ops. of Judge Schwebel, 1984 ICJ Rep., pp. 198-199 and 1986 ICJ Rep., pp. 392-393.
38
Nsongurua J. Udombana are factors calling for the adjustment or shifting of that line in order to achieve an “equitable result”.122
The Court was re-echoing cases such as the North Sea Continental Shelf cases123 and the Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf case,124 in which the Court’s decisions “involved detailed judicial examinations of special non-legal factors, e.g. geographical features, in reaching equitable solutions to the delimitation problems”.125 Similarly, in the Fisheries case,126 the ICJ asserted that, certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial sea, bring to light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse facts in question.127
Equity also played a major role in allowing for a fair and just allocation and delimitation of the maritime boundary in Maritime Delimitation in the Area Between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway).128 These cases have been applauded for their careful balancing of the interests of the parties.129 The pertinent question is, why did the Court not invoke principles of equity in dealing with the land delimitation over Bakassi? At least, there is no rule of international law known to this author that says 122
123 124 125 126 127 128 129
Cameroon case, supra note 2, para. 288, citing, inter alia, the Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 1993 ICJ Rep., p. 62 para. 55: “General international law, as it has developed through the case-law of the Court and arbitral jurisprudence, and through the work of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, has employed the concept of ‘relevant circumstances’. This concept can be described as a fact necessary to be taken into account in the delimitation process.” 1969 ICJ Rep., p. 53 (holding that “delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles”). 1982 ICJ Rep., p. 60. See also Gulf of Maine case, 1984 ICJ Rep., pp. 313-314 and 325-330. M.W. JANIS, “Equity in International Law”, in R. BERNHARDT (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 1995, II, p. 111. See Fisheries case, supra note 85. Id. at p. 133. 1993 ICJ Rep. M.W. JANIS, supra note 125, at p. 111.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
39
equity should only be considered in maritime, as opposed to land, delimitation cases? Thus, in the 1998 Eritrea/Yemen Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute Award (Phase I),130 the Arbitrator rejected the proposition that “the international law governing land territory and the international law governing maritime boundaries are not only different but also discrete, and bear no juridical relevance to each other”.131 Why, then, did the Court focus mainly on law, to the neglect of equity? This essay believes that all aspects of the Cameroon case involve a degree of subjective certitude that goes beyond the logical certainty of the arguments employed. As Judge Koroma observed, in his dissent, “[t]he main purpose of applying the law is to do justice and where the law is not correctly applied it could lead to an injustice”.132 The ICJ ought to have invoked equitable principles in the land delimitation to mitigate inequities. Bakassi and the Lake Chad are not just pieces of real estate where ownership is determined solely by references to documents. They are home to human beings who have been living there for a long time, mostly before independence and some after. “To pluck them out of this national homeland by reference to colonial documents that have been rendered obsolete by the ‘wind of change’, independence reality since October 1st 1960 is”, according to Charles Njoku, “absurd”.133 It is like clinging to the ancient worldview that the earth is flat after Copernicus had established that it is spherical.134 The Cameroon case involves neighbouring States. Geography and history compel their eternal co-existence; and the Court ought not to have lent its support to any decision that would create eternal acrimony.135 That will be out of harmony with the aims of the UN, as expressed in its Charter.136 As Judge ad hoc Ajibola reasoned: 130 131 132 133 134 135 136
ILR 1999, p. 114. Id. at paras. 108-113. Koroma, Diss. Op., supra note 70, at para. 3. C. NJOKU, “The Bakassi Case”, The Guardian (Nigeria), 22 October 2002, at p. 75. Cited in id. See Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 175. See, e.g., UN Charter, Art. 2(3) (providing that “[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”, emphasis added).
40
Nsongurua J. Udombana The paramount and fundamental objective of the Court, over and above all other considerations, is to ensure that litigants or disputants are satisfied at the end of the day that justice has been done, that the Court has been fair and impartial, and that parties can still live together in peace and security.137
In sum, the ICJ decision is singularly flaccid and unconvincing. On the contrary, the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma makes inordinately good sense. According to Koroma, the conclusions of the ICJ “are totally at variance with the express provisions of the 1884 Treaty and in violation of the principle of pacta sunt servanda”.138 In construing the 1884 Treaty of Protection between Great Britain and the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, Koroma argues that Great Britain’s authority did not include the power to conclude on their behalf, treaties which entitled the protecting State to alienate the territory of the protected State. Thus, the relevant parts of the 1913 Anglo-German Agreement, by which Great Britain purportedly ceded the territory of the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar to Germany, lay outside the treaty-making competence of Great Britain, and were not binding on the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar nor ultimately on Nigeria as the successor State. There is, therefore, no legal basis on which to hold, as the Court has done in this case, that the protector State was entitled to cede territory without the consent and in breach of the protective agreement…139
This is a convincing argument; for history lends credence to the fact that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar have been exercising territorial rights over the Bakassi Peninsula since the seventeenth century. The issues here are not only questions about principles but principally about matters of fact; and for such, cuiquam in sua arte credendum.140
137 138 139 140
Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 175. Koroma, Diss. Op., supra note 70, at para. 15. Id. “We must believe the expert in his own field”.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
41
In his dissenting opinion, Judge ad hoc Ajibola made the following scathing remarks: This is an artificial decision that fails blatantly to take into consideration, contrary to all the accepted principles of international law and practice, that effectivités must invariably be given consideration in a matter of this nature. Furthermore, the Court fails to take into account the submission of Nigeria based on historical consolidation, which the Court now refers to as mere theory. It is my view that, if the principle of historical consolidation is a theory, it is one that the court, over the years in its judgment… has given its approval and support. The decision of the Court, in my view, is rather a political than a legal one.141
The issue of “the infamous scramble for Africa” is examined later in the paper; before then, the next part will discuss the question of compliance with the extant judgment of the Court.
COMPLIANCE OR CONTEMPT? The preceding paragraphs attempted a critique of the ICJ judgment in the Cameroon case, with a conclusion that it is faulty in most material aspects. It is a judgment that adds very little to the corpus of general international law; rather, it creates confusion in existing principles. This is not surprising; since “[t]here are, after all, remedies that breed new diseases, regardless of whether they cure those to which they are applied”.142 Notwithstanding its manifest weaknesses, the judgment is valid and the rule of law demands that every valid judgment of the Court, whether at the international or municipal level, and whether the parties like the decision or not, should be obeyed. 141
142
Ajibola, Diss. Op., supra note 4, at para. 64. Cf. J. TACSAN supra note 104, at p. xiii (acknowledging that “non-legal, that is, various economic, political, sociological, or psychological, factors, also substantially affect the outcomes of disputes”). N.J. UDOMBANA, “Can the Leopard Change Its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human Rights”, American University International Law Review 17 (2002) 6, p. 1183 (a pessimistic assessment of the AU Treaty’s prospect of bringing about a paradigm shift in the poor human rights practice in African states).
42
Nsongurua J. Udombana
The crucial question that arises is whether the State Parties to the present case will sheath their swords and comply with the judgment or whether they will treat it with contempt and damn the consequences? Already, the international media is awash with news of tensions in the two countries following the judgment.143 This part looks at the various options open to the parties. It, however, counsels them – Nigeria, in particular – to comply with the judgment in the interest of international peace and security. A. The Attitude of the Parties Towards Compliance Although the author is not yet aware of Cameroon’s official reaction to the ICJ judgment, it is natural to expect that it will pledge to implement it, since the judgment was largely in its favour. However, the story is different with respect to Nigeria. In its first official pronouncement following the decision, the Obasanjo Government has rejected the judgment and declared that it will not abide by the orders of the Court. In a position paper issued on 24 October 2002, Nigeria declares that the judgment did not consider “fundamental facts” about the Nigerian inhabitants of the territory, whose “ancestral homes” the ICJ has now adjudged to be in Cameroonian territory. Nigeria also cites grave and extensive errors of judgment as well as apparent bias on the part of the judges.144 Some prominent Nigerian scholars have supported the response of the Federal Government, saying that it is “understandable and
143
144
See, e.g., “Tension High After Ruling on Nigeria-Cameroon Row”, CNN World Online, 10 October 2002, available at (http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/10/10/nigeria.cameroon.reut/) (reporting that Nigerian troops went on high alert before the ruling in the southeastern garrison town of Ikang, on the Cameroon border to the north of the peninsula and that Obasanjo convened an extraordinary meeting of local state governors and former heads of state in the capital Abuja on 10 October 2002, to discuss the security implications of the ruling). See “Dismay at Nigeria’s Bakassi Stand”, BBC News Online, 24 October 2002, 09.28 GMT, available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2356373.stm) (reporting on how Cameroonians and diplomats have expressed dismay and disappointment over Nigeria’s announcement that it is refusing to hand over the disputed oil-rich Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon as directed by the ICJ).
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
43
inevitable”.145 Other groups have advised the Government on steps to take following the judgment, saying, for example, that Nigeria should regard itself as a successor to colonial French Government and should, consequently, take steps to regain the land of the indigenous Efik that was annexed by the British colonial government and handed over to the French by a treaty.146 India is cited as an example, which adopted this solution when it annexed Goa Island off the Indian Peninsula.147 There is also a call on the people of Bakassi, the direct bearers of whatever consequences that arise from the judgment, to move against Cameroon by formally declaring their right to self-determination and declining that they are subject to the authority of Cameroon. Nigeria could then canvass their case before the UN and turn the tide against Cameroon. Still, others suggest that as the fundamental issue of the Bakassi crisis is the oil deposits, Nigeria should make some attractive financial offers to Cameroon in return for the territory. These suggestions, with due respect, are sounds of demolition than of new construction; they are like trying to put a bandage to a joint that is totally dislocated. Advocates of self-determination, for example, fail to realize that the proliferation of states, each smaller and more ethnically based than that from which it emerged, is no longer fashionable nor, indeed, desirable. “A presumption in favor of such states accentuates arbitrary distinctions about human beings and undermines the cosmopolitan tenets on which all human rights law is based”.148 The notion that self-determination is coterminous with independence is unwarranted. The fundamental purpose of selfdetermination is the democratisation of government; it demands that people should be ruled by their own consent and that they should play commensurate roles in government.149 145 146
147 148
149
I.E. SAGAY, supra note 94, at p. 36. See The Guardian (Nigeria), 14 October 2002, pp. 1 & 4 (reporting on how Nigerians are offering alternative solutions to the ICJ verdict on the Cameroon case). Id. S.R. RATNER, supra note 10, at p. 592; see also L. SOHN, “The Rights of Minorities”, in L. HENKIN (ed.), The International Bill of Human Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1981, pp. 270-276 (purpose of minority rights). See N.J. UDOMBANA, “The ‘Niger-Delta’ Question: Self-determination or Right to Development?” ASUU-UNILAG Journal of Contemporary Issues
44
Nsongurua J. Udombana
More importantly, the above suggestions ignore the fact that Cameroon has a deep interest in Bakassi and will not stand idly by and allow Nigeria to dictate the tune of the music. Cameroon presently has international public opinion in its favour and will certainly utilize that goodwill to its maximum. B. Counsel for Caution This paper counsels both countries, Nigeria in particular, to honour the judgment of the ICJ, in line with their commitments under the UN Charter and similar undertakings. They should demonstrate the kind of maturity that the parties in the Libya/Chad case demonstrated.150 There, the parties began implementing the ICJ decision within two months by signing a treaty and; in another two months, they began withdrawing their troops from the disputed area. Nigeria, should, at least, reluctantly accept the ICJ judgment, even if it does not embrace it willingly. Leniter ex merito quicquid patiare ferendum est.151 Like Wagner’s music, the judgment is not all as bad as it sounds. There are aspects of the delimitation that actually favour Nigeria, particularly in the Lake Chad region. Cameroon did not get all it wanted. For example, it invoked state responsibility against Nigeria and asked for reparation “on account of the material and non-material damage inflicted upon the Republic of Cameroon”.152 The Court refused.153 Besides, the ICJ did not rule on the limits of the Continental Shelf between the two countries. This presumably means that Nigeria still retains most of the oil-bearing positions as they lie inside the shelf. The military option should certainly be out of the question. Such an option runs counter to Nigeria’s posturing as a peacemaker and peacebroker in Africa. Nigeria must demonstrate leadership in keeping with its exalted position as one of the pillars of the AU and its commitment
150 151 152 153
1 (2000) 2, p. 177 (looking at the dialectics in the Niger-Delta crisis and calling for a deliberate and programmatic developmental programmes by the Nigerian Government as well as giving the people a greater participation in political, economic and social issues affecting the Niger-Delta). See Libya/Chad case, supra note 3. “Let pain deserved be borne without complaint”, OVID, Heroides, v. 7. Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 25. Id. at para. 325.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
45
to a larger policy of trans-border cooperation and wider regional integration. Meanwhile, Cameroon must recover from the euphoria of the verdict and act sensibly. There is no doubt that both countries are keenly aware of the perils of military escalation; which probably explains why they opted for a peaceful means of settling this frontier problem.154 Indeed, it is to the credit of both parties that they had sought peaceful means of settling this frontier problem in the past.155 Any forceful annexation of Bakassi could engender separatist activities and even a civil war that will make a Kashmir out of Bakassi! So, let both parties act sensibly and give peace a chance, considering the human and material resources that have already been wasted in this conflict. As Wole Soyinka wrote, “[w]e hold the view that no piece of mere territorial holding, including its natural
154
155
See, e.g., “Annan Pledges UN Support to Nigeria, Cameroon in Bakassi Peninsula Ruling”, UN News Service, 10 October 2002, available at (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=5000&Cr=nigeria&Cr1=cameroon) (commending the two countries for resorting to the ICJ for a peaceful settlement of their territorial dispute, “and for the steps they have recently taken to restore the fraternal and neighbourly relations that have traditionally existed between them”. He also called on the two countries to respect and implement the decision by the ICJ). Cf. “Interim Chairperson of the African Union Commission Welcomes the Decision of the International Court of Justice on the Dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon”, AU News Service 11 October 2002, available at (http://www.africa-union.org/en/detail.asp?id=203) (welcoming the decision of the ICJ and encouraging both Parties to move swiftly to implement the decision). The Chairperson expresses the hope that the decision will lead to a full restoration and promotion of the historical and fraternal bonds that bind the peoples of the two countries, in the interest of peace and stability in the region and the continent as a whole, id. See A. ASIWAJU, “The Bakassi Peninsula Crisis: An Alternative to War and Litigation”, in G.H. BLAKE et al. (eds.), Boundaries and Energy: Problems and Prospects, 1998, p. 251 (arguing for a peaceful means towards resolving the conflict). The paper notes that the Bakassi dispute was one of the matters that was raised and placed on the priority agenda of the Nigeria-Cameroon Joint Committee of Experts on Border Issues set up during the visit of Nigeria’s Minister of External Affairs to Cameroon in August 1991; see id. at p. 267. It further asserts that peaceful settlement had remained Nigeria’s option up till late 1991 when the government decided to publish a new national map indicating Nigeria’s claim line in respect of the Bakassi Peninsula; see id.
46
Nsongurua J. Udombana
resources, is worth the life of one of our fellow men, women or children”.156 Any armed confrontation over Bakassi will open the floodgate to the ruthless economic exploitation that goes with international politics, an experience that neither country can afford. Nigeria, for example, is a country in transition, after the military rule that made the country a pariah in the comity of nations. It is, consequently, faced with those institutional and other obstacles to which every society in transition is inevitably subject – provision of amenities, maintenance of law and order, and so on. With 45 per cent Nigerians living below the poverty line,157 the Nigerian Government, no less its Cameroonian counterpart, has better things to contend with. These two countries should focus on ameliorating the humiliating poverty of their peoples, including those in Bakassi. Baba Oluwide’s thoughtful observation is apposite: I hope we would not suddenly be rich enough to go to war when we cannot even feed most of our people, engage most of our youth, house all our families and start off an industrial revolution from the vast mineral resources of Nigeria meanwhile being looted by the accomplices of the war mongers and arms merchants.158
It is also politically unwise for Nigeria to turn its back against the judgment of the ICJ and give the impression that it does not respect the international rule of law. Bad leadership has so weakened the Nigerian state that it is no longer, or not yet, in a position to pick and choose when to obey the international legal order. Regrettably, it is the strong that determines the rules for the weak in contemporary international relations: “For you know as well as we do”, says Thucydides, “that right, as the world goes, is in question only between
156
157 158
W. SOYINKA, Towards What Manner of Union?, Address at the Third African Development Forum (3-8 March 2002), available at (http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Speeches/2002_speeches/030802wole.htm). See CIA Factbook 2002/NIG., supra note 17 (2000 estimate). B. OLUWIDE, “Bakassi and the War Mongers”, The Guardian (Nigeria), 16 October 2002, at p. 57.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
47
equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.159 It may be, a priori, that Nigeria committed a tactical blunder in surrendering to the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, thereby undertaking to abide by the judgment and consequential orders of the Court.160 It needs not to have done so. It could have pursued diplomatic and political options. At any rate, Nigeria has been exercising effective occupation over Bakassi, a point it strenuously canvassed before the ICJ but which was rejected. Having submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, Nigeria must keep faith with its undertakings. The rule is pacta sunt servanda.161 It will be foolhardy for Nigeria to repudiate such undertakings and to dare the international community. The poignant observation of Cecil Hurst – former Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office – in 1929, on the eve of Britain’s acceptance of the obligatory jurisdiction of the PCIJ, still rings with much relevance today. It is worth quoting in extenso: [T]he obligatory jurisdiction of an international tribunal means that within that field the Country imposes upon itself an authority to which we all must bow. It means the voluntary renunciation by the State of that nonsubordination to any other authority which is the distinguishing feature of sovereignty… The day will come when the Court will give some decision which will be very unpopular. We shall not always be the victorious litigant in the disputes submitted to the Court. If the decision goes against us in some case which has evoked wide spread interest, and which is felt to touch the interests of the people at a vital spot, there may well be popular clamour, clamour which will become dangerous unless well-informed opinion knows enough about the Court to steady the opinion of the crowd, and to keep it from thinking that the Court was necessarily in the wrong because it decided against us.162 159 160
161 162
THUCYDIDES, The Peloponnesian War, Book V, Section 89 (Crawley trans. 1982). See, e.g., UN Charter, Art. 94 (providing that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party”). See Vienna Conv., supra note 81, Art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith”). C. HURST, “Preface” to J.W. WHEELER-BENNETT and M. FANSHAWE, Information on the World Court 1918-1928, 1929, p. 5.
48
Nsongurua J. Udombana
Interestingly, Nigeria and Cameroon have had long-standing bilateral relationships, strong enough to withstand the shocks of Bakassi. In 1963, for example, the two countries entered into a bilateral trade agreement, through which they granted most favourednation treatment to each other in matters of trade.163 The challenge is to strengthen the solidarity between the Southern Cameroonians and Eastern Nigerians “to ensure co-operation and better understanding so essential to the promotion of good neighbourliness”.164 Indeed, the different nationalities caught among state borders in the South should preserve their uniqueness and promote growth by acting together for common interests, despite the reality of the artificial geo-political demarcations.165 In view of the obvious shortcomings of the judgment, the international community, in particular the Security Council, should find ways of doing what justice and equity demands in this conflict. It must fashion out a diplomatic solution that will bring about an agreement between the affected parties without undermining the authority and integrity of the ICJ. This requires great tact, bearing in mind that sovereignty issues are notoriously difficult to resolve. It is always hard, but not impossible, to get a country to relinquish territory. Maritime boundaries, in particular, are fiendishly difficult to agree on. Often, these long running, claim-jumping disputes – like the current one – are not about the land, but about what is beneath it: fish, minerals and oil.166 The prospect of offshore oil drilling also has driven many of the contemporary conflicts, including China, Japan 163
164
165 166
See T.O. ELIAS, “The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration of the Organization of African Unity”, British Yearbook of International Law 40 (1964), p. 337. M.A. AJOMO, “Legal Perspective”, supra note 31, at p. 42; see also generally M.A. AJOMO, “The Nigerian/Cameroun Border Dispute: Implications at International Law”, California Law Review (1982), p. 144 (calling for meaningful rapport between Nigeria and her neighbours). See B. OLUWIDE, supra note 158, at p. 57. See, e.g., A. ASIWAJU, “The Bakassi Peninsula Crisis…”, supra note 155, at p. 254 (arguing that “[w]hile the dominance of the state has tended to politicise problems of territory and boundary, the quintessence in virtually all cases of dispute and conflict is economic considerations, especially resource development and exploitation”).
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
49
and Taiwan over the Senkaku Islands off the eastern edge of China.167 The same nations – along with Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines – contest control of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, another area rich in fish and gold.168 Of utmost importance is what to do with the estimated 150,000 Nigerians that have lived in Bakassi for years. Will they be resettled? If so, what happens to their human and material investments in Bakassi, not to mention their emotional attachments to the land of their ancestors? These are sensitive but pressing questions that the judgment of the ICJ has thrown up before the two countries and, indeed, the international community. Now that the World Court has made its decision, the international community must step in and mediate to ensure that the indigenous populations in Bakassi do not suffer but should continue to enjoy residency and pursue their fishing and other occupations. They must never be made to permanently wander in the wilderness of double citizenship. It is terrible to forever live in-between. The parties could be encouraged to enter into an agreement similar to the “Maud Line” between Great Britain and Ethiopia in 1907, which permitted local inhabitants on either side of the frontier free gazing rights and access to the wells on common basis.169 Meanwhile, this author, salva reverantia,170 commends the UN Secretary-General for his willingness to make his good office available to the two countries in the implementation of the ICJ judgment.171 Considering its determination to play a central role in 167
168 169
170 171
See M. DONNELLY, “Marking Territory”, ABCNEWS.COM, 24 July 2002, available at (http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/territory020724disputes.html) (reporting that the Spain-Morocco rift is just one of many quarrels over tiny bits of land). Id. See Whiteman Digest 3, pp. 662-668, cited in A. AJOMO, “Legal Perspective…”, supra note 31, at p. 42 (noting that though the Agreement was abrogated on Sept. 29, 1947 and a new borderland drawn up with subsequent amendments later, the border inhabitants still retained the privileges provided for in the original Accord of 1907, id.). “Without outraging reverence.” See “Annan Invites Leaders of Nigeria and Cameroon to Further Talks on Bakassi”, UN News Service, 1 November 2002, available at (http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=5238&Cr=Bakassi&Cr1) (reporting that the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has invited the Presidents
50
Nsongurua J. Udombana
bringing about peace, security and stability in Africa,172 the AU should also work to compliment the efforts of the UN in settling this delicate problem. And it must act fast, because combatants always tend to imagine that the war is further on than it really is. According to Judge Koroma, nowhere is the category of the peaceful settlement of disputes more imperative than in territorial and boundary disputes between neighbouring States, given the potential for such disputes to escalate with destructive consequences for the States concerned.173
THE ROOT OF THE CONFLICT It must be stressed that this conflict over, inter alia, the Bakassi Peninsula is an atomistic manifestation of the larger ailment that has long afflicted Africa – the problem of colonial boundaries. That is the crux or root of the frontier crisis in Africa. It all started with the scramble for Africa by imperialist European Powers, which climaxed in the Berlin Congress of 1884-1885 that led to the slicing of Africa into different spheres of influence,174 what Dennis Austin calls “[w]olves agreeing on the spoils”.175 As the ICJ itself reflected, referring to the scramble, [t]he dispute between [Cameroon and Nigeria] as regards their land boundary falls within an historical framework marked initially, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, by the actions of the European Powers with a view
172
173 174
175
of Nigeria and Cameroon to meet him in the near future in a bid to assist the two countries in the follow-up to the judgment of the ICJ the Bakassi dispute). See Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, AU Assembly, 1st Ordinary Session, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002, available at (http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/summit_council/secprot.htm) [hereinafter PSC Prot.], Preamble, para. 15. Koroma, Diss. Op., supra note 70, at para. 1. On the origin of the scramble for Africa, see N. BENNETT, Africa and Europe, 1975, pp. 84 et seq.; and J.D. HARGREAVES, Prelude to the Partition of West Africa, 1966, pp. 196 et seq. For more on the proceedings of the Congress, see generally R.J. GAVIN and J.A. BETLEY, The Sramble for Africa, 1973. D. AUSTIN, “Goodbye to Berlin? The Partition of Africa Reconsidered”, in A. SESAY (ed.), Africa and Europe: From Partition to Independence or Dependence?, 1986, p. 34.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
51
to the partitioning of Africa, followed by changes in the status of the relevant territories under the League of Nations mandate system, then the United Nations trusteeship, and finally by the territories’ accession to independence.176
The notion of frontiers was alien to Africa prior to the arrival of the Europeans. At best, such frontiers were zones through which one clan or tribe passed from one region to another; and any borders depended solely on who would be paid tribute.177 However, “[b]y the time the Berlin Conference took off in November 1884, most of the participating countries had already showed interest in acquiring various parts of Africa”.178 The continent became an irresistible attraction for occupation and acquisition by the European adventurers, “each with a sharpened appetite, each fearful of losing what might be gained.”179 However, since they European powers could not consider Africa as territorium nullius at the time of the scramble – “in view of the array of kingdoms and empires, some dating back to antiquity”180 – they resorted to the more fanciful form of treaties of cession and the colonial protectorate. The reason for this approach was that international law rules on acquisition of territory had already crystallized by the nineteenth century, although it has been said that these rules were not intended to justify acquisition against the original inhabitants. As Umozurike puts it, neither morality nor legitimacy was relevant in dealing with non-Europeans. The rules were rather intended to be used vis-à-vis Europeans. The issue was simply – which of the European claimants has a better title?181
176 177
178
179 180 181
Cameroon case, supra note 2, at para. 31. See S.R. RATNER, supra note 10, at p. 595; and R. YAKEMTCHOUK, “Les Frontières Africaines”, Revue générale de droit international public (RGDIP) 74 (1970), pp. 32-35. S. AKINRINADE and T. FALOLA, “Berlin and Afro-European Relations”, in A. SESAY (ed.), Africa and Europe…, supra note 175, p. 21 (exploring the factors that led to the Berlin Conference and the subsequent developments). D. AUSTIN, supra note 175, at p. 34. A. OYEBODE, “The Legal Regime of African Frontiers Re-considered”, J.P.P.L. 10 & 11 (1988), p. 25. U.O. UMOZURIKE, Introduction to International Law, 1993, p. 72.
52
Nsongurua J. Udombana
It has even been asserted that the fact of the Partition was not even made known to Africans, their states and governments “until the European powers began the process of conquest… of the African territories that had been assigned to the respective European nation-states”.182 The point really is that, in establishing the boundaries, the imperialist overlords ignored the historical precedent of Africa and the cultural characteristics of the people in the region, making territorial allocations only to reduce armed conflicts among themselves rather than any regard for local inhabitants or geography.183 The European imperialists adopted such convenient but bogus theories as “spheres of influence,” “hinterland,” among others.184 Arbitrary lines, thus, were drawn on maps, and these maps have left countries with meaningless boundaries with no rhyme or reason in the geographical, topographical or ethnic character of particular regions. In some cases, the agreed boundaries never existed in fact. An example was the proclamation of the Oil Rivers Protectorate made by Britain on 8 June 1885 and acknowledged by Germany “apparently in exchange for recognition by the former of German dominance in an adjoining territory.”185 Unknown to the two European contracting parties, the agreed boundary – the Rio del Rey – did not actually exist!186 It was a geographical exploration of the area that later revealed that the socalled Rio del Rey was an estuary receiving several steams.187 Until 182
183
184 185
186 187
I.A. ASIWAJU, “The Conceptual Framework”, in A. ASIWAJU, Partitioned Africans: Ethnic Relations Across Africa’s International Boundaries 1884-1984, 1984, p. 1. See J. HERBST, “The Creation and Maintenance of National Boundaries in Africa”, International Organizations 43 (1989), pp. 678-685; S. TOUVAL, The Politics of Independent Africa, 1972, pp. 3-17; and generally T. PAKENHAM, The Scramble for Africa: White Man’s Conquest of the Dark Continent From 1876 to 1912, 1991. See A. AJALA, “The Origin of African Boundaries”, Nigerian Forum (1981), p. 245. A. OYEBODE, supra note 180, at pp. 25-26. See also Arrangement between Great Britain and Germany relative to their Respective Spheres of Action in portions of Africa, 29 April – 16 June 1885, in III HERTSLET, Map of Africa by Treaty, 1909, p. 866. See A. ALLOTT, “Boundaries in Africa: A Legal and Historical Survey”, in M. BROWN (ed.), African International Legal History, 1975, p. 75. See A. OYEBODE, supra note 180, at p. 26.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
53
then, and, in fact, until the Agreement between Great Britain and Germany respecting the Rio del Rey,188 “the boundary between British colonial possessions and the German Colony of Cameroon remained a matter of conjecture.”189 For Africa, the whole episode was a break upon progress. More frequently, several ethnic groups have found themselves in one and the same country. In many others, groups found themselves living on either side of the administrative frontier.190 The Yorubas, for example, were previously united under the Oyo Empire; but they found themselves divided into the colonies of Dahomey, Nigeria and the Protectorate of Lagos. The Ewes were divided between Gold Coast and Togo, Efiks and Ibibios between Nigeria and Cameroon and the Somali between Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti.191 The Asante of the Asante Empire found themselves in Ivory Coast (now Côte d’Ivoire) and Ghana. The Mossi were divided into Ghana and Burkina Faso (then called Upper Volta) while the Kanuri of Kanem-Bornu Empire became colonial subjects in Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad.192 In southern Africa, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Zimbabwe became countries that developed out of not only the actions of Shaka, the Zulu warrior, but also the intrigues of British settlers led by Cecil Rhodes.193 These artificial boundaries were the genesis of the boundary disputes that surfaced after political independence;194 indeed, the 188
189 190
191 192 193 194
See Agreement between Great Britain and Germany respecting the Rio del Rey, 14 April and 15 November 1893, in III HERTSLET, supra note 185, pp. 910, 913. See also Agreement between Great Britain and Germany, 19 March 1906, in id. at pp. 937, 941. A. OYEBODE, supra note 180, at p. 26. See M. PALMBERG, National Identity and Democracy in Africa, 1999, p. 11. See also generally A. ASIWAJU and P. NUGENTS (eds.), African Boundaries: Barriers, Conduits and Opportunities, 1996. See id. See id. See D. OLOWU and J.S. WUNSCH (eds.), The Future of the Centralized State Institution and Self-Governance in Africa, 1990, p. 35. Cf. T.O. ELIAS, “The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration…”, supra note 163, at p. 336 (asserting that some inter-state disputes in Africa were inherited, in the sense that they emanated from the complex of rights and obligations that devolved upon the new States in consequence of the application of the doctrine of State succession. Among those falling under this
54
Nsongurua J. Udombana
former colonial rulers bequeathed 103 border disputes to Africa.195 As Kwame Nkrumah observed, in his address on the eve of the founding of the OAU – an observation that still poignantly holds true today –, “[t]here is hardly any African state without a frontier problem with its adjacent neighbours”.196 To illustrate, Benin and Niger are in conflict over the Lete Island, on the River Niger, and the Mekrou region.197 Algeria is in dispute with Libya because the later is claiming part of the southeastern region.198 In the Comoros, the islands of Anjouan (Nzwani) and Moheli (Mwali) have moved to secede from the French-administered Mayotte.199 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been embroiled in a civil war that has drawn in military forces from neighbouring states,200 in what has become
195
196
197
198 199 200
category, according to Elias, “none are more intractable and pressing than boundary disputes or frontier incidents resulting from the partitioning of Africa among the Great Powers during the nineteenth century”, id. at p. 336). See K. SOMERVILLE, “Border Dispute an African Legacy”, BBC News Online, 10 October 2002, 13.19 GMT, available at (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2316645.stm) (commenting on the Cameroon and Nigeria border conflict in the context of boundaries problems in Africa). K. NKRUMAH, Africa Must Unite, cited in New African (January 2000), p. 21; cf. A. ASIWAJU, “The Conceptual Framework”, supra note 182, at p. 1 (“Since the attainment of political independence, there is hardly one of these states which has not had cause to worry about the position of its boundaries vis-à-vis its neighbours”). See also generally C.G. WIDSTRAND (ed.), African Boundary Problems, 1964. See Benin, Niger Take Land Dispute to The Hague, IRIN News Online, 24 June 2001, available at (http://www.africaonline.com/site/Articles/1,10,3634.jsp) (reporting that Benin and Niger have signed an agreement to submit their border dispute to the ICJ for resolution and giving a summary of current disputes being negotiated between African countries). Id. Id. The countries that are involved in the fray include Burundi, Rwanda, and Uganda – backing the rebels – and Angola, Chad, Namibia, and Zimbabwe – supporting the government. See E. BLUNT, “DR Congo War: Who is Involved and Why”, BBC News Online, 25 January 2001, 13:55 GMT, available at (http://www.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid_1136000/1136470.stm). Meanwhile, on 23 June 1999 the DR Congo filed an action at the ICJ against Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) for “acts of armed aggression perpetrated in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the OAU”. In its Applications, the DRC is contending that “such armed aggression... ha[d] involved inter alia violation of the sovereignty and territorial
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
55
Africa’s First World War. Most of the Congo River boundary with the Republic of the Congo is indefinite, as no agreement has been reached on the division of the river or its islands, except in the Pool Malebo/Stanley Pool area.201 Meanwhile, Egypt is asserting its claim to the “Hala’ib Triangle”, a barren area of 20,580 square kilometres under partial Sudanese administration that is defined by an administrative boundary that supersedes the treaty boundary of 1899.202 Besides its maritime disputes with Cameroon and Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea is also in dispute with Gabon over islands in Corisco Bay.203 In Ethiopia, most of the southern half of the boundary with Somalia is a Provisional Administrative Line, besides its dispute over the Ogaden. Ethiopia is also in dispute with Eritrea over alignment of boundary, a dispute that led to armed conflict in 1998, which is still unresolved despite arbitration efforts.204 The list, indeed, is long and dismal.205
201 202 203 204 205
integrity of the [DRC], violations of international humanitarian law and massive human rights violations”. The DRC is seeking “to secure the cessation of the acts of aggression directed against it, which constitute a serious threat to peace and security in central Africa in general and in the Great Lakes region in particular”. It is also seeking reparation for acts of intentional destruction and looting, and the restitution of national property and resources appropriated for the benefit of the respective respondent States. For further details, see (http://www.icj-cij.org). See IRIN News Online, supra note 197. Id. Id. Id. There are also disputes between The Gambia and Senegal, because their short section of boundary indefinite. Libya has maritime boundary dispute with Tunisia; Libya claims about 19,400 sq km in northern Niger and part of southeastern Algeria. In Madagascar, there are claims over Bassas da India, Europa Island, Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova Island, and Tromelin Island (all administered by France). Malawi is in dispute with Tanzania over the boundary in Lake Nyasa (Lake Malawi). Morocco claims and administers Western Sahara, though sovereignty is unresolved and the UN is attempting to hold a referendum on the issue. Spain controls five places of sovereignty (plazas de soberania) on and off the coast of Morocco—the coastal enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which Morocco contests, as well as the islands of Penon de Alhucemas, Penon de Velez de la Gomera, and Islas Chafarinas. Namibia is not left out, as it has dispute with Botswana over uninhabited Kasikili (Sidudu) Island in Linyanti (Chobe) River. Although the ICJ resolved in favour of Botswana on 13 December 1999, at least one other island in Linyanti River is contested. Seychelles is claiming Chagos Archipelago in British Indian Ocean Territory. Meanwhile, Swaziland has asked South Africa to open negotiations on
56
Nsongurua J. Udombana
What all this illustrates is that the ghost of Berlin has refused to rest; it still haunts Africa forty years after independence. The independence political elites and leaders are to blame for this messy situation. They ignored the advice of pan-Africanists, who had denounced “artificial frontiers drawn by imperialist Powers to divide the people of Africa, particularly those which cut across ethnic groups and divide people of the same stock” and called for “the abolition or adjustment of such frontiers at an early date.”206 Thus, instead of a wholesale restructuring of colonial borders to rectify past injustices, the post-independent African leaders, backed by their European colonial overlords, opted for the maintenance of the extant lines “as the most feasible method for speedy decolonization”.207 They, thus, accorded recognition to the rickety States created by colonialism and, thereby, dashed whatever hope there was “that independence would allow for true self-determination through a re-adjustment and realignment of Africa’s fragmented culture areas.”208 Since then, both the UN and the OAU – now AU – flatly reject any ex ante right to secession, insisting on the cosmopolitan, multi-ethnic solution under all circumstances.209 At its Summit in Cairo, Egypt in 1964, African leaders pledged “to respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence.”210 The ICJ lent credence to this principle of uti possidetis ita possideatis,211 in the Burkina Faso v. Mali case. There,212 the ICJ emphasised that the uti possidetis formula constituted a general principle, whose purpose was to prevent the independence and stability of new states from being endangered by
206
207 208 209 210 211
212
reincorporating some nearby South African territories that are populated by ethnic Swazis or that were long ago part of the Swazi Kingdom. See id. See Resolutions Adopted by the All-African People’s Conference, Accra, 5-13 December 1958, in C. LEGUM, Pan-Africanism: A Short Political Guide, 1962, p. 231. S.R. RATNER, supra note 10, at p. 595. A. OYEBODE, supra note 180, at p. 21. See, e.g., UN G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV) 1970. OAU Res. 16(1) 1964, in I. BROWNLIE (ed.), Basic Documents on African Affairs, 1971, p. 361. Meaning, literally, “as you possess, so you may possess.” It has been observed that uti possidetis was, at first, much less legal than political in its implications. See D. P. O’CONNEL, International Law, 1965, I, p. 491. See Burkina Faso v. Mali case, supra note 3.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
57
fratricidal struggles provoked by the challenging of frontiers.213 The Court, however, acknowledged that the uti possidetis principle conflicted with the principle of self-determination;214 but it, nevertheless, insisted that the maintenance of the territorial status quo in Africa is… the wisest course, to preserve what has been achieved by peoples who have struggled for their independence, and to avoid a disruption which would deprive the continent of the gains achieved by much sacrifice.215
This and other similar cases216 illustrates, in the words of Schwebel, that “[s]tability and certainty of boundaries, and the need for clear principles, fairly applied, have been matters of particular importance to African States emerging from the colonial era.”217 This policy was not surprising though, given the OAU’s earlier emphasis on “respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state…” and “peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration.”218 These phrases are not harmful in themselves. It has, however, been argued that African rulers found the reason for their right to rule in the maintenance of these colonial borders:
213
214 215 216
217
218
Id. at pp. 566-567. Brownlie is of the view that the principle “is in accordance with good policy”, I. BROWNLIE, supra note 10, at p. 133. Steven Ratner has argued that the policy was intended to serve an external and internal purpose: “externally, it would seek to prevent irredentist tendencies by neighbors from turning into territorial claims and the possible use of force. Internally, it would give clear notice to ethnic minorities that secession or adjustment of borders was not an option”, S.R. RATNER, supra note 10, at p. 595; see also S. TOUVAL, supra note 183, at p. 90. See Burkina Faso v. Mali case, supra note 3, at p. 17. Id. See also Award of the Tribunal in the Guinea / Guinea (Bissau) Maritime Declaration case, I.L.R. 77 (1985), p. 657 para. 40; Award of the Tribunal in Guinea (Bissau) / Senegal Delimitation case, I.L.R. 83 (1989), p. 22; and the Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Ajibola in Libya / Chad, supra note 3, at pp. 83-92. .S.M. SCHWEBEL, “The Impact of the International Court of Justice,” in Boutros Boutros-Ghali Amicorum Discipulorumque Liber – Paix, Développement, Démocratie, 1998, pp. 668-669. See OAU Charter, supra note 9, Art. III(3) & (4). The AU Act has re-iterated the uti possidetis principle. See AU Act, supra note 8, Art. 4(b) (enshrining the principle of “respect of borders existing on achievement of independence”).
58
Nsongurua J. Udombana These boundaries defined and legitimated the particular kind of power structure which grew up within post-colonial African states, and provided the framework for the politics of patronage... through which those who controlled these states sought to survive.219
This essay submits that, whatever may have been the policy behind the adoption of uti possidetis juris, it was based on a destructive African solidarity. Uti possidetis, indeed, “represents a line of least resistance and deliberate attempt by the African governments to run away from the problem created by the arbitrary frontiers clamped on Africa by colonialism.”220 The fact remains that these frontiers militate against the economic, political, or social viability and coherence of the African states thus artificially created. Uti possidetis has been a recipe for confusion and chaos, as border wars and secessionist bids have proved to be the rule, despite several resolutions rejecting such actions in the continent.221 The confusion was further exacerbated by the complacence of the defunct OAU, which failed to see the dangers and work to avoid them. It is regrettable that many years after independence, the central concern of many African states still has to do with sovereignty assertions and related territorial claims and counter-claims, “when what is perhaps needed is more integration and less formality in transborder relations.”222 Undoubtedly, these concerns detract the attention of these states from the more critical issues of development.223 The ghost of Berlin will not rest until the AU 219 220
221
222
223
C. CLAPHAM, “Boundaries & States in the New African Order,” in D. BACH (ed.), Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration, 1999, p. 55. A. OYEBODE, supra note 180, at p. 28 (noting also that “the attempt to sweep under the carpet problems associated with boundaries in Africa has not been altogether successful.” Id.). See, e.g., GA Res. 1474 (ES-IV), UN GAOR, 4th Emer. Epec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at p. 1, UN Doc. A/4510 (1960) (resolution originating in Afro-Asia draft on Katanga and Congo); OAU Resolution on the Situation in Nigeria, 1967, in Basic Documents on African Affairs, supra note 210, at p. 364 (Biafra). A. OYEBODE, supra note 180, at p. 21 (noting also that “[n]ot only has the uti possidetis formula proven a failure as a modus vivendi in the prevention and resolution of boundary disputes and border conflicts, it has, in fact, become counter-productive and inimical to the historic cause of the African people for continental unity.” Id.). See A. ASIWAJU, “The Bakassi Peninsula Crisis”, supra note 155, at p. 251.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
59
demonstrates a willingness and readiness, inter alia, to cast it out of Africa by re-visiting the uti possidetis principle. As an eminent authority on boundary problems in Africa observed: African States appear to be haunted by the spectre of “the skeleton in every cupboard complex” over the issue of Africa’s colonial boundaries. But they cannot all continue to pretend indefinitely that the problems are unassailable. They have to be resolved somehow someday. And unless they are settled with finality these disputes will continue to rear their ugly heads at the expense of good neighbourliness among independent African States.224 This essay believes that the time for flogging dead paradigms is long past. A new international law on boundaries and borderlands is urgently needed in Africa. African states should make a last leap in desperation to address and redress the arbitrary boundary lines drawn by the former colonial overlords at Berlin. This is the only sure route to the resolution of boundary disputes and the establishment of a lasting peace in this conflict infested and torn continent. The problems encountered in practice are not avoided simply by hoisting the conceptual flag of uti possidetis. This paper, of course, admits that not all claims will be solved simply by drawing or redrawing of maps or the making or remaking of boundaries “in order to separate and divide the inherently inseparable and indivisible.”225 Thus, disputes over resource-based, trans-border locations might require a different solution; probably what Asiwaju calls “principles of ‘unitisation’, active collaboration and joint-utilisation arrangements.”226 But these should be seen as exceptions, not the rule. A call of this sort is likely to meet with the objection that it would be against the continental integration that the AU is trying to pursue.227 224
225 226 227
A.O. CHUKWURAH, “The Organisation of African Unity and Territorial and Boundary Problems, 1963-1973,” Indian Journal of International Law 13 (1973), p. 185. Id. Id. See, e.g., AU Act, supra note 8, Art. 3(c) (having as one of the objectives of the Union, the acceleration of the political and socio-economic integration of the continent). See also generally N.J. UDOMBANA, “A Harmony or a Cacophony? The Music of Integration in the African Union Treaty and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development,” Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 13 (2002) 1, p. 185 (examining the reasons for failures of past efforts at
60
Nsongurua J. Udombana
That is to say that boundaries should not even be an issue in a globalising world such as ours. Is it not illogical, one may ask, to be talking of political and economic integration, on the one hand, and revisiting the uti possidetis, on the other? The answer is that if the ultimate goal of the AU is to create some form of rational – as opposed to mere sentimental – political union, then the present boundaries that were imposed on the continent by imperial powers must be designated as negotiable – “wherever they remain costly sources of friction.”228 At any rate, if regionalism will take Africa to the promised land of peace and security, it is well and good. It does not matter much to a man dying in the desert by which route he may find the only well in the area.
CONCLUSION This paper submits that the ICJ judgment in the Cameroon case, though valid, flies in the face of good sense and logic. However, the case reminds Africa of its colonial heritage and on how the complacency, if not acquiescence, of Africa’s independence political elites have contributed to the maintenance of the statu quo and the resulting sources of conflict. It is the failure of Africa’s leaders to face and pragmatically deal with the frontier problems that has, over the years, led to the recurrence of conflicts everywhere, like a snake that has not been slain. Africa will truly not be free until an atmosphere of lasting peace and stability prevails and Africans can live in harmony with each other. This requires that the frontier problems be confronted, in an attitude of mutual understanding and compromise on fundamental issues. As Chukwurah wisely advised, There is no alternative (except violence) to a willingness on the part of the states concerned to make reciprocal concessions if these outstanding boundary and territorial problems are to be permanently solved.229
228 229
economic and political integration in Africa and suggesting ways towards making the current efforts succeed). See W. SOYINKA, supra note 156. A.O. CHUKWURAH, supra note 224, at p. 182.
Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute (Cameroon and Nigeria)
61
Individuals are usually encouraged, and sometimes obliged, to give up a degree of personal autonomy to achieve a greater public good. The same philosophy should hold true for African States. Such statesmanlike compromises have been made before in the continent – between Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire;230 they could be done again. Life, actually, is about making compromises, since the human situation is not a condition but a conjuncture. The AU should treat the extant judgment of the ICJ as a beginning, not an end, of the search for a lasting solution to the intractable problem of colonial boundaries. Ignoring a possibility does not make it to go away. On the contrary, the AU should try to derive some good out of this colonial-imposed situation. Perhaps, from a decision that so clearly evokes their colonial past, African countries may find a call for a new action on boundaries and continental conflicts.
230
See, e.g., T.O. ELIAS, “The Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration…”, supra note 163, at p. 336 (noting that, in 1961, the President of Liberia reached agreements with Guinea, on the one hand, and Côte d’Ivoire on the other, for the purposes of redrawing boundaries. Such boundaries were redrawn, in the one case, along the natural division constituted by a river and, in the other case, along a division constituted by an intervening mountain range. In the process of these adjustments which enabled previously separated ethnic and cultural groups to reunite, Liberia generously gave up areas of territory which she possessed under existing agreements with France, id.).
This page intentionally left blank
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW Federico Lenzerini*
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HUMANKIND AND THE ENVIRONMENT According to Hans Kelsen’s immanent approach, developed in the “theory of degrees” (Stufentheorie) – a variant of his celebrated pure theory of law – law is a dynamic system of norms whose specific compulsory force depends, irrespective of their content, upon the manner in which they have been created and in which they are linked to a unique and harmonised legal system.1 Until the end of World War II, such a description was apt for international law, whose main rules had been constantly imposed by the dominant forces of the international society. After World War II, in addition to traditional norms based on reciprocal State interests, new principles emerged in the international legal system, founded upon universal values. These values were not corresponding directly to interests belonging to the State as a political entity, but were aimed at furthering the well-being of humanity as a whole. With regard to these new international norms, the view of law evolved largely from the idea illustrated in Kelsen’s Stufentheorie, in the sense that the degree of the compulsory force of a given norm came to be evaluated in terms of the moral relevance of the value protected by the norm itself rather than the manner in which *
Ph.D. International Law, Department of Public Law, University of Siena, Italy.
1
See Z. JELIû, “An Observation on the Theory of Law of Hans Kelsen”, Law and Politics (2001) 1, p. 560.
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 63-108. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
64
Frederico Lenzerini
it had been created. Nevertheless, the aspect of the unity of norms in a unique and harmonised legal system, which was also part of the theory of degrees, remained unchanged. This interconnection among legal provisions has in fact become more evident in recent times, with the development of a number of principles in various fields of global interest, for example human rights, social development and environmental protection. The interaction between these interests is so intense that a possible conflict could result between the values at stake with respect to their concrete implementation. In particular, growing awareness of the importance of preserving the global environment, traditionally exploited by humans in an infinite variety of ways, has raised questions about the relationship between man and environment, especially with regard to the environmental sustainability of certain human activities and, at the same time, to the degree of interference that environmental values may play in regulating such activities. The genesis and development of international environmental law lay in two main principles corresponding to different historical phases; the first stage, the protection of the environment at the international level, mainly coincided with the prevention of transboundary harm, as ruled in 1941 by the United States/Canada Arbitral Tribunal in the leading Trail Smelter case.2 However the environment was not perceived, per se, as a value worthy of protection; its relevance was mainly instrumental to the safeguarding of the economically tangible interests of States. In the second phase, whose starting point may be traced to 1972,3 the international community became conscious of the crucial role of the environment in the survival and preservation of the human being. Several international agreements relating to key topics of environmental protection (e.g. climate change,4 prevention of 2 3
4
See Trail Smelter case, 1941, RIAA 3 (1905). The ideal reference to such a date is due to the fact that the starting point of this phase may be traced back to the adoption of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, available at (http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503). See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, available at (http://unfccc.int/resource/conv/conv.html), and Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1997, available at (http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.html).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
65
pollution,5 preservation of water resources,6 institution of internationally special protected areas,7 protection of biodiversity,8 or endangered species,9) have been stipulated, and the concept of the environment as a “common concern of mankind”,10 whose protection constitutes the object of an erga omnes obligation,11 has emerged in the framework of the international legal system. At this stage, the prevailing vision of the environment lies in the vital role it plays in guaranteeing, both in the present and the future, good living conditions for humankind.
5
See, e.g., the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, available at (http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/marine.pollution.dumping.of.wastes.1972.html), and the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, available at (http://www.unece.org/env/Irtrap/Irtrap_h1.htm). 6 See, inter alia, the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and Coastal Area of the South-East Pacific, adopted in Lima in 1981, available at (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/pidb/texts/marine.environment.coastal.south.ea st.pacific.1981.html). 7 See the 1959 Antarctic Treaty and its complex system (all relevant instruments are available at (http://www.polarlaw.org/Treaty.htm)), and the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, available at (http://www.ramsar.org/key_conv_e.htm). 8 See Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, available at (http://www.biodiv.org); Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2000, ILM 39 (2000), p. 1027. 9 See the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), available at (http://www.cites.org). 10 This principle is expressed, in particular, by the preambles of the Convention on climate change (supra, note 3) and of the biodiversity Convention (supra, note 7). K. BASLAR, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind in International Law, The Hague, 1998. 11 The concept of erga omnes obligations has been proclaimed by the International Court of Justice in the renowned Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. case (ICJ Rep., 1970, p. 3); according to the Court, “an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligation of a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest to their protection; they are obligations erga omnes. Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning basic rights of the human person including protection from slavery and racial discrimination” (p. 33.).
66
Frederico Lenzerini
According to a distinguished group of scholars that support a nonanthropocentric view of international environmental law, a further stage of the evolution of the concept of environmental protection is emerging in present times, in the sense that the international legal context is developing towards the recognition of the intrinsic value of the environment. According to this idea, the environment has its own legal relevance irrespective of the impact this may have on human interests.12 Nevertheless, this intellectual movement, based on principles such as the inherent value of the rights of animal and natural species, basically remains in the realm of conjecture. Leaving aside purely philosophical and theoretical approaches, the relevant practice clearly demonstrates that international law continues to clearly distinguish between human beings and other living species, accordingly (and in the view of this author, correctly), recognising the predominance of human dignity and well-being over environmental values. Environmental protection is thus mainly perceived as instrumental to the improvement of human living conditions (this latter concept is however to be conceived in a broad sense, so as to include not only the mere physical survival of human beings, but also the complex of human feelings related to the environment triggered by reasons of an emotional and aesthetic nature). This anthropocentric approach is confirmed by the renowned statement proclaimed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the advisory opinion on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons: “environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn”.13
12
13
This view is comprehensively explained by C. REDGWELL, “Life, The Universe And Everything: A Critique of Anthropocentric Rights”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, Oxford, 1996, pp. 71 et seq. See also the discussion on anthropocentricity by A. BOYLE, “The Role of International Human Rights Law in the Protection of the Environment”, ibid., p. 51. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep., 1996, p. 225, para. 29. The same statement is recalled in the Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, judgment of 25 September 1997, ICJ Rep., 1997, p. 7, para. 53.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
67
An even more explicit statement expressing the same view can be found in Principle 1 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which stresses the principle according to which “[h]uman beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature”.14 Ten years later, the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development was based on an identical standpoint, offering a deeply anthropocentric vision of the environment as devoted to the commitment to “build a humane, equitable and caring global society cognizant of the need for human dignity for all”.15 Consistently, most of the principles developed by now in the field of environmental protection – such as the principle of sustainable development16 and the principle of intergenerational equity17 – are founded on a solid human-based raison d’être. The predominant State practice confirms this view; virtually all governments manage their national environment by basing their actions on the purpose of guaranteeing a stable preservation of the environment as a whole, without contemplating any right inherent to any single animal or vegetal species. The preservation of biodiversity is often carried out 14
15 16
17
See U.N. doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) of 12 August 1992, Annex I. The same principle was later reaffirmed by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in paragraph 1 of its Resolution 1994/65 of 9 March 1994 (available in the “Documents of Charter-Based Bodies” page of the U.N. Website, at (http://193.194.138.190/huridocda/huridocda.nsf/Documents?OpenFrameset)). See U.N. doc. A/CONF.199/L.6/Rev.2 of 4 September 2002, para. 2. The anthropocentric nature of the principle of sustainable development is demonstrated by a comparative evaluation of the 1992 Rio Declaration (see supra, note 14) and the Plan of Implementation adopted in 2002 by the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. According to the first of these instruments, the elements that compose the concept of “sustainable development” are first of all the right to development (see Principles 2 and 3) and then environmental protection (see Principles 3 and 4). Paragraph 3 of the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation states that “the three components of sustainable development [are] economic development, social development and environmental protection”; in the more recent instruments the element of “environmental protection” is located at the third place, after economic and social development. See the judgement of the Supreme Court of Philippines in Minors Oposa, et al. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al., infra, note 73 and corresponding text.
68
Frederico Lenzerini
by annihilating or drastically reducing the diffusion of nonautochthonous species, and virtually all States control the growth of any animal species by killing the exceeding members in order to limit their number according to the rate sustainable by the land. Certainly the same course of action would be absolutely inconceivable and ludicrous with regard to human beings, due to the basic rights recognised to them by international law. The common perception in the international community of the relationship between the human being and nature clearly demonstrates the non-existence of presumed rights inherent to an animal or vegetal identity. In addition, many of the conventional instruments usually mentioned to support the non-anthropocentric theory of international environmental law are actually implemented in a manner supportive of the opposite view. For example, in 1997 the Conference of the States Parties to the CITES Convention18 allowed the export from Pakistan of a small number of hunting trophies of the markhor capra falconeri, in spite of the inclusion of such species in Appendix I of the Convention,19 for the benefits this may bring to local people (including, of course, incentives to protect local habitat).20 Similarly, in October 2002, maintaining a well-established practice, the International Whaling Commission,21 at a special meeting, approved by consensus a proposal allowing selected indigenous peoples (Alaskan Eskimos and native peoples of Chukotka) to hunt a limited number of whales for their cultural, nutritional and subsistence needs.22 18 19
20
21
22
See article XI of the CITES Convention, supra, note 9. Pursuant to article II paragraph 1 of the CITES, Appendix I lists all species that are “threatened with extinction which are or may be affected by trade”. CITES generally prohibits commercial international trade in specimens of these species. See Resolution Conf. 10.15 (Rev.), available at (http://www.cites.org/eng/rtesols/10/10_15/shtml); see also M.F. BIANCHET, “Getting your goat: trophy hunting for mountain ungulates”, World Conservation 33 (2002) 3, p. 20. The International Whaling Commission was set up under Article III of the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the full text of the Convention is available at (http://www.iwcoffice.org/Convention.htm)). See International Whaling Commission’s Special Meeting 2002, Oxford, 14 October 2002, Final Press Release, available at (http://www.iwcoffice.org/Final%20Press%20Release%202002SM.htm).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
69
In sum, in this writer’s opinion, a realistic assessment of contemporary international law does not allow a different conclusion than that the nature of international environmental law is anthropocentric.23 Moreover, as pointed out by a scholar, even if humans agreed to recognise the inherent rights of environmental entities, these rights would be created and implemented by humans, and would exist only insofar as humans continue to recognise and implement them. This inescapably means that there exists a “deep structural anthropocentrism which inevitably accompanies a humanmade legal system”.24 This intrinsic anthropocentrism shapes any legal regime that is informed by and instrumental to human needs with regard to the material field it regulates. Legal regimes are thus instrumental, and subordinate, to human priorities. International environmental law does not escape this rule.
THE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: DO HUMANS HAVE A “RIGHTS TO A SAFE ENVIRONMENT”? One of the main consequences of the anthropocentric character of international environmental law is the predominance of basic human rights over environmental protection. Once it is ascertained that the reason for the existence of environmental protection arises from a need to secure the well-being of humankind, then, in any case where a violation of fundamental human rights would result from the implementation of environmental law, in principle such law should not be applied. This view is confirmed by the jus cogens status reached by a number of provisions relating to fundamental human 23
24
In equivalent terms see, e.g., P. TAYLOR, “From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in International Law”, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 10 (1998), p. 352; L.A. MOWERY, “Earth Rights, Human Rights: Can International Environmental Human Rights Affect Corporate Accountability?”, Fordham Environmental Law Journal 13 (2002), p. 348. See M.R. ANDERSON, “Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), op. cit., note 12, pp. 14 et seq.
70
Frederico Lenzerini
rights in the contemporary international law context.25 Such status determines the imperative character of these provisions, which can never be derogated from; this is true also for the implementation of an international rule belonging to the category of jus dispositivum.26 Despite the ongoing development of the principle of the “common heritage of mankind” in the field of environmental protection,27 international legal provisions related to this field are mainly of a conventional character or, if customary, belong to the field of jus dispositivum. Only by emphasising the anthropocentric character
25
26
27
On human rights as jus cogens see, inter alia, I. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, 1998, p. 515; B. CONFORTI, Diritto internazionale, Napoli, 2002, p. 185; J.A. FROWEIN, “Jus cogens”, Encyclopedia of public international law, vol. III, 1997, p. 65; R.B. LILLICH, “Civil Rights”, in T. MERON (ed.), Human Rights in International Law. Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford, 1984, p. 117; M. Mc DOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, L. CHEN, Human Rights and World Public Order, New Haven/London, 1980, p. 274; O. SCHACHTER, “International Law in Theory and Practice”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye (1982) 178, p. 339; M.M. WHITEMAN, “Jus cogens in International Law, With a Projected List”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 7 (1977), p. 625. See also the International Law Commission’s Commentaries to the draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted in November 2001, in Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), also available at (http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/State_responsibility), p. 208 (“[the] peremptory norms that are clearly accepted and recognized include the prohibition of aggression, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination, crimes against humanity and torture and the right to self-determination”). See, finally, American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United Nations, 1987, para. 702. On the “dualism” between jus cogens and jus dispositivum see A. VERDROSS, “‘Jus Dispositivum’ and ‘Jus Cogens’ in International Law”, AJIL 66 (1966), p. 55; P.A. FERRER SANCHIS, “Los conceptos de ‘jus cogens’ y ‘jus dispositivum’ y la labor de la Comisión de Derecho Internacional”, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 21 (1968), p. 763; T. MERON, “On a Hierarchy of International Human Rights”, AJIL 80 (1986), p. 1; L. HANNIKAINEN, Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present Status, Helsinki, 1988; G. M. DANILENKO, “International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making”, EJIL 2 (1991), p. 42. See, in particular the Preamble of the Convention on climate change (supra, note 4) and the Preamble of the biodiversity Convention (supra, note 8).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
71
of some basic environmental principles is it possible to perceive their potential to evolve towards jus cogens status.28 Once it is accepted that fundamental human rights have predominance over environmental values, it may be useful to further evaluate the implications of environmental principles in the context of their relationship with the practical operation of human rights. In this sense it is evident that the above predominance is diminished by the fact that the preservation of the environment is essential to human survival and, a fortiori, to the preservation of the same basic human rights (e.g. the right to life or right to health). This is clearly expressed by ICJ Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion attached to the judgment pronounced by the Court in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project case:
28
See E.M. KOMICKER UHLMANN, “State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteria for Peremptory Norms”, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 11 (1998), p. 101. The author identifies three jus cogens candidates: “(1) The prohibition of wilful serious damage to environment during armed conflicts; (2) The general prohibition of causing or not preventing environmental damage that threatens the international community as a whole; and (3) The human right to a sound environment” (emphasis added). She concludes that only principles n. (1) and (3) fulfil the conditions required by international law for the existence of a jus cogens norm. As for n. (1), she focuses on the practice developed during and after the 1990 Gulf War, and, inter alia, on article 20 (g) of the International Law Commission’s 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (available at (http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/dcodefra.htm)), which includes among war crimes the use of “methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the intent to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely prejudice the health or survival of the population” (emphasis added); with regard to n. (3), she points out that the jus cogens character of the principle in point does not exist in itself, but constitutes the consequence of the fact that its violation may factually coincide with the infringement of the right to life, whose cogent status is in no way doubtable (see p. 118). In any event, it appears clear that, as pointed out in the text corresponding to this note, these environmental law rules may eventually be considered as jus cogens in character insofar as they are conducive to safeguarding fundamental human rights. Accordingly, such laws would not conflict with the protection of fundamental human rights.
72
Frederico Lenzerini [t]he protection of the environment is likewise a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights instruments.29
Although at present an individual right to a safe environment seems to be enforceable under international law, this is only insofar as it is instrumental to the implementation of other rights that are recognised as fundamental. However, a philosophical idea of an autonomous human right to a safe environment, in and of itself, is emerging in the contemporary international legal system.30 This idea could be linked not only to the role of the environment in preserving some basic features of humankind, but also to the feelings triggered by the grace and beauty of environment on human sensibilities. The recent Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union includes a specific provision which associates “[a] high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the quality of the environment […] in accordance with the principle of sustainable development”31 with the principle of solidarity dealt with by Chapter IV of the Charter. The innovative character of this norm, which is nevertheless of a non29
30
31
See the separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the Case Concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (supra, note 13, p. 91); Judge Weeramantry also adds that “[t]he people of both Hungary and Slovakia are […] entitled to the preservation of their human right to the protection of their environment” (ibid., p. 90). See, e.g., D. SHELTON, “Human Rights, Environmental Rights and the Rights to Environment”, Stanford Journal of International Law 28 (1991), p. 103; M.A. THORME, “Establishing Environment as a Human Right”, Denver Journal of International Law & Policy 19 (1991), p. 301; P. CULLET, “Definition of an Environmental Right in a Human Rights Context”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 13 (1995), p. 25; D. SHELTON, “Environmental Rights”, in P. ALSTON, Peoples’ Rights, Oxford, 2001, p. 185. See Official Journal of the European Communities n. C/364 of 18 December 2000, p. 1, article 37. Generally of environmental rights in the European Union before the enactment of the Charter of Fundamental Rights see Douglas-Scott S., “Environmental Rights In The European Union – Participatory Democracy Or Democratic Deficit?”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), op. cit., note 12, p. 109.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
73
binding character for Member States, is demonstrated by the fact that no international human rights convention in force provides for an enforceable right to a safe environment. Consistently, a pragmatic assessment of relevant international law shows that, only by emphasising the decisive (instrumental) role played by environmental protection in preserving universally recognised basic rights, is it possible to sustain the enforceability of the right to a safe environment.32 A safe environment is strictly linked to the preservation of the right to life.33 Under this right States are undoubtedly obliged to guarantee a minimum level of environmental safety, including information about imminent environmental risk,34 control of emissions of dangerous substances and prevention of environmental harm.35 Further, the protection of the right to health, expressly mentioned by Judge Weeramantry in the statement reproduced above, may be relevant in the present context. This right is, to a certain extent, absorbed by the right to life, but it may assume its autonomous relevance since dreadful health conditions may be inconsistent with human dignity even if they do not lead to death. In addition, the right to physical integrity may be in principle conceived as part of the broader right to be free from inhuman or degrading treatment. For example, in Lopez Ostra v. Spain the applicant sought to invoke article 3 of the
32 33
34 35
See E.M. KOMICKER UHLMANN, op. cit., note 28, p. 128. In the words of the Human Rights Committee, “[the right to life] is the supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”; see General Comment n. 6(16) (article 6), 1982, UN Doc. A/37/40 del 1982, Annex V, para. 1. See also Guerrero v. Colombia, 1982, Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee 1 (1982), p. 112, para. 13.1 (“[t]he right [to life] […] is the supreme right of the human being”). The right to life is considered as one of the most important human rights by the main pertinent international instruments (see, e.g., article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNTS 999, p. 171; article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, ETS No. 5; article 4 of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series n. 36; article 4 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ILM 21 (1982), p. 58, and may be reasonably considered as having attained the jus cogens status. See infra, text following note 41. See E.M. KOMICKER UHLMANN, op. cit., note 28, p. 129.
74
Frederico Lenzerini
European Convention on human rights,36 stressing the occurrence of degrading treatment on account of pollution (fumes, noise and smells) produced by a plant for the treatment of wastes located in close proximity to her home.37 Neither the Commission nor the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of article 3;38 nevertheless, the Court found a violation of article 8 of the Convention39 on account of the fact that severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.40
This finding was later reiterated in Guerra and others v. Italy,41 in which the Court, dealing with severe environmental pollution, was also called upon to examine the question of whether the failure by a State to provide information about existing environmental risk may infringe an individual’s right to life. Due to the conclusion that there had been a violation of Article 8 the Court found it unnecessary to
36
37 38
39
40 41
Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (supra, note 33) states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, available at (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/defaultasp?Language=en&Advanced=1). Id., para. 59; the Court found that “[t]he conditions in which the applicant and her family lived for a number of years were certainly very difficult, but did not amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3”. Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights (see supra, note 33) states that “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. See Lopez Ostra v. Spain, op. cit., note 37, para. 51. Guerra and others v. Italy, judgment of 19 February 1998, available at (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp?Language=en&Advanced.=1), para. 60. See also Hatton and others v. The United Kingdom, judgement of 2 October 2001, available at (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/defaultasp?Language=en&Advanced=1), para. 97.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
75
consider the case under Article 2,42 however Judge Jambrek, in his concurring opinion, indicated that [t]he protection of health and physical integrity is […] as closely associated with the “right to life” as with the “respect for private and family life” […] If information is withheld by a government about circumstances which foreseeably, and on substantial grounds, present a real risk of danger to health and physical integrity, then such a situation may also be protected by Article 2 of the Convention: “No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally”.43
According to Judge Jambrek, the right to be informed in the event of imminent environmental hazard is thus instrumental to the right to life; this view had been implicitly shared by the Commission (which had recognised that information to the public is “one of the essential means of protecting the well-being and health of the population in situations in which the environment [is] at risk”)44 and also by the Court, although in the instant case no violation of article 10 of the Convention was found.45
42
43 44 45
According to article 2 paragraph 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (see supra, note 33), “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law”. See Guerra and others v. Italy, op. cit., note 41, Concurring opinion of Judge Jambrek. Id., para. 52. Id., para. 55. Article 10 of the Convention (supra, note 33) states that “1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”.
76
Frederico Lenzerini
In five 2001 cases the Strasbourg Court found no violation of article 8 with regard to applications brought by applicants, all belonging to gypsy families, who had been precluded by the British authorities, on different grounds (e.g. impact on visual amenity, safety of highways, detriment to landscape), to live in their caravans, preventing them from enjoying a prerogative that was invoked as being an integral part of their ethnic identity as gypsies.46 Although recognising that the enforcement measures and planning decisions in each case interfered with the applicants’ rights to respect for their private and family life,47 the Court (correctly or not) found that such measures were consistent with the law and “pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding “the rights of others” through preservation of the environment”,48 and were thus consistent with paragraph 2 of article 8.49
46
47 48 49
See Chapman v. United Kingdom, Beard v. United Kingdom, Coster v. United Kingdom, Lee v. United Kingdom, Jane Smith v. United Kingdom, all delivered on 18 January 2001 and available at (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp?Language=en&Advanced=1). See, for example, Chapman v. United Kingdom, op. cit., note 46, para. 78. Id., para. 82 (emphasis added). According to article 8 of the Convention (see supra, note 33), “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others”. Also, in a 1993 judgment the Court found that the denial of a judicial remedy for threatened environmental harm may fall within the scope of article 6 of the Convention, which deals with the right to a fair trial; see Zender v. Sweden, judgment of 25 November 1993, available at (http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.asp?Language=en&Advanced=1). Generally on the Strasbourg practice related to environmental law see R. DESGAGNE, “Integrating Environmental Values Into the European Convention on Human Rights”, AJIL 89 (1995), p. 263; K. COOK, “Environmental Rights as Human Rights”, European Human Rights Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 196.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
77
The central view ensuing from the case-law of the European Court of human rights is generally shared by the whole international community, as shown by relevant practice.50 This is confirmed by the jurisprudence of other international human rights bodies. The Human Rights Committee, in an early case,51 although declaring the application inadmissible due to the failure to exhaust local remedies, found that the storage of radioactive wastes in close proximity to the applicants’ houses raised “serious issues with regard to the obligation of States parties to protect human life”52 under article 6(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.53 In a number of cases the Committee also found that activities which may cause a threat to the environmental integrity of lands traditionally belonging to minorities or indigenous peoples may amount to a violation of article 27 of the Covenant,54 which protects the right to enjoy one’s own culture.55 In its 1991 general comment on the right to adequate 50
51 52 53
54
55
For a detailed analysis of such practice see M. CASTELLANETA, “L’individuo e la protezione dell’ambiente nel diritto internazionale”, Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 80 (2000), p. 913. See E.H.P. v. Canada, Communication No. 67/1980, 27 October 1982, available at (http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/114_canada67_1980.pdf). Id., para. 8. Article 6 paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (supra, note 33), states that “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life”. Article 27 of the Covenant (supra, note 33) states that “[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”. See, inter alia, Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, 26 March 1990, available at (http://heiwww.unige.ch/humanrts/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm); Ilmari Länsam et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, 14 October 1993, UN Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 of 8 November 1994. The same finding was also reached by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 31 August 2001, available at (http://www.indianlaw.org/IACHR_Judgement_Official_English.pdf) (on this case see J.A. AMIOTT, “Environment, Equality and Indigenous Peoples’ Land Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System: Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua”, Environmental Law 32 (2002), pp. 873 et seq.; S. ANAYA and C. GROSSMAN, “The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New Step in the International Law of Indigenous
78
Frederico Lenzerini
housing the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stated that, in pursuance of article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,56 “housing should not be built on polluted sites nor in immediate proximity to pollution sources that threaten the right to health of the inhabitants”.57 In Yanomami v. Brazil the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that, by constructing a highway through Yanomami indigenous community’s territory and authorising the exploitation of the territory’s resources, the Government of Brazil ha producido una situación que ha dado como resultado la violación, en perjuicio [de los indios Yanomami] de los seguientes derechos reconocidos en la Declaration Americana de los Deberes y Derechos del Hombre: Derecho a la vida, a la libertad y a la seguridad (artículo 1); Derecho de residencia y tránsito (artículo 8); y Derecho a la preservación de la salud y bienestar (artículo 9).58
The ratio of the decision rested on the fact that the Government’s activities led to a mass influx of non-indigenous persons to this area, who brought contagious diseases to the Yanomami community, which
56
57
58
Peoples”, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 19 (2002), pp. 1 et seq.). See 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, available at (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/b2esc.htm). Article 11 paragraph 1 states that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent”. See General Comment 4 on the right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991, available at (http://www.unchs.org/campaigns/tenure/legal_sources.asp), para. 8(f). “[The Government of Brazil] has produced a situation giving rise to the violation, to the prejudice [of the Yanomami Indians], of the following rights recognized by the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man [adopted in 1948 by the Ninth International Conference of American States, available at (http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/basic2.htm)]: Right to life, liberty and personal security (Article 1); Right of residence and movement [Article 8]; and Right to the preservation of health and well-being” (translated by the author). See Case n. 7615, Resolution n. 12/85 of 5 March 1985, available in the OAS Website, at (http://www.oas.org), paragraph 1 of the findings.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
79
remained untreated due to lack of medical care. Consistently, in its 1997 Report on Ecuador, the Commission also pointed out that [t]he realization of the right to life, and to physical security and integrity is necessarily related to and in some ways dependent upon one’s physical environment. Accordingly, where environmental contamination and degradation pose a persistent threat to human life and health, the foregoing rights are implicated […] the Government [has the responsibility] to implement the measures necessary to remedy the current situation and prevent future […] contamination which threaten the lives and health of [the concerned] peoples.59
Apart from the practice of international adjudicatory or supervisory bodies, the principle in point is regularly restated at the United Nations level. For example, General Assembly Resolution 45/94 emphasises “that all individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health and well-being”,60 connecting this right with the right to an adequate standard of living, good health and well-being affirmed by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.61 The 1994 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment, drafted by a group of experts convened at the United Nations in Geneva, recognises the right of all persons “to a secure, healthy and ecologically sound environment […] interdependent and indivisible” with other human rights.62 More recently, the U.N. 59
60
61 62
See Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 of 24 April 1997, available at (http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ecuador-eng/index%20-%20ecuador.htm), chapter VIII. See UN Doc. A/RES/45/94 of 14 December 1990, available in the United Nations Website, at (http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r094.htm), para. 1. Id., Preamble. See article 2. The text of the Draft Declaration is available at (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1994-dec.htm). The declaration also recognises, inter alia, “the right to freedom from pollution, environmental degradation and activities that adversely affect the environment, threaten life, health, livelihood, well-being or sustainable development within, across or outside national boundaries” (article 5), “the right to protection and preservation of the air, soil, water, sea-ice, flora and fauna, and the essential processes and areas necessary to maintain biological diversity and ecosystems” (article 6), “the
80
Frederico Lenzerini
Commission on Human Rights, following its well-established practice, reaffirmed that “illicit traffic in and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes constitute a serious threat to the human rights to life, health and a sound environment for every individual”.63 In the field of environmental law, one may firstly refer to the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment,64 Principle 1 of which states that [m]an has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and wellbeing, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.
The same idea is reaffirmed by, inter alia, the 2002 Johannesburg Declaration on sustainable development,65 as well as by a number of relevant multilateral treaties of universal character.66
63
64 65
66
right to benefit equitably from the conservation and sustainable use of nature and natural resources for cultural, ecological, educational, health, livelihood, recreational, spiritual and other purposes” (article 13) and “the right to information concerning the environment” (article 15). Res. 2001/35 of 23 April 2001, available in the “Documents of Charter-Based Bodies” page of the U.N. Website, at (http://193.194.138.190/huridocda/huridocda.nsf/Documents?OpenFrameset), para. 4; see also Res. 2000/72 of 26 April 2000, ibid., para. 4. See supra, note 3. See supra, note 15. The Declaration does not contain a statement which affirms the principle in point by using particularly solemn words, but it is entirely permeated by the idea of the right to a safe and fair environment belonging to all human beings. Most of the relevant international treaties include in particular specific provisions relating to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration (cf. supra, note 14), which deals with the participation and access to information of all concerned citizens in the management of environmental issues (see, e.g., article 4(1)(i) of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra, note 4, or articles 13 and 14 of the Biodiversity Convention, supra, note 8). As for human rights treaties, see, e.g., article 24(2)(c) of the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (available at (http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm)), which calls upon States Parties to take appropriate measures to “combat disease and malnutrition, including within the framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of readily applicable technology and through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of environmental pollution” or the ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (available at (http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp2.htm)), also adopted in 1989. For a
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
81
At the regional level, besides article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, cited above,67 a relevant provision can be found in paragraph 1 of the part on “Entitlements and responsibilities” of the 1989 European Charter on Environment and Health, which states that “[e]very individual is entitled to an environment conducive to the highest attainable level of health and wellbeing [and] information and consultation on the state of the environment”.68 Similarly, article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights Relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognises the individual right “to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services”, and a corresponding obligation for States Parties to “promote the protection, preservation and improvement of the environment”.69 Finally, article 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights proclaims the right belonging to all peoples “to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their development”.70 With regard to this provision, in 2001 the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights stressed that
67 68
69
70
comprehensive survey on the multilateral treaties dealing with the connection between environment and human rights see Shelton D., “Human Rights and Environmental Issues in Multilateral Treaties Adopted between 1991 and 2001”, Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, Geneva, 14-16 January 2002, Background Paper No. 1, available at (http://193.194.138.190/environment/bp1.html); see also R.R. CHURCHILL, “Environmental Rights in Existing Human Rights Treaties”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), op. cit., note 12, p. 89. See supra, note 31 and corresponding text. The text of the Charter is available in the World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe Website, at (http://www.who.dk/AboutWHO/Policy/20010827_3). Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador), 1988, available at (http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-52.html). See supra, note 33, article 24.
82
Frederico Lenzerini [t]he right to a general satisfactory environment, as guaranteed under article 24 of the African Charter or the right to a healthy environment, as it is widely known, therefore imposes clear obligations upon a government. It requires the State to take reasonable and other measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, to promote conservation, and to secure an ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources.71
As for the national level, the existence of a human right to a healthy environment has been proclaimed, inter alia,72 by a number of domestic courts. For example, in 1987 the Italian Constitutional Court recognised the right to a safe environment as included among the basic rights of the individual.73 Also, the Supreme Court of India in 1991 stated that the right to life is fundamental under article 21 of the Constitution and it includes right of enjoyment of pollution free water or air for full enjoyment of life. If anything endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of laws, a citizen has the right to [legally act] for removing the pollution of water or air which may be detrimental to the quality of life.74
71
72
73
74
See Communication 155/96, The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, decided in October 2001, OAU doc. ACHPR/COMM/A044/1 of 27 May 2002, para. 52. For a more comprehensive survey of relevant domestic practice, with particular attention to constitutional provisions, see M. CASTELLANETA, op. cit., note 50, p. 951. See judgment n. 210 of 22 May 1987, in Foro Italiano 111 (1988), I, p. 329; see also judgment n. 365 of 30 July 1993, in Rivista Giuridica dell’Ambiente 9 (1994), p. 252. See Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, Judgment of 1 September 1991, All India Reporter, 1991, S.C. 420; comprehensively on environmental rights in India see M.R. ANDERSON, “Individual Rights to Environmental Protection in India”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), op. cit., note 12, p. 199. The fact that the right to life includes the right to live in a safe environment has been also recognised in 1994 by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, in Shela Zia v. WAPDA PLD, comprehensively described by M. LAU, “Islam and Judicial Activism: Public Interest Litigation And Environmental Protection In The Islamic Republic of Pakistan”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), op. cit., note 12, p. 296.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
83
The most renowned relevant domestic judgment is however the one proclaimed by the Supreme Court of Philippines in Minors Oposa, et al. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, et al.,75 in which the Court gave legal recognition to the principle of intergenerational equity, recognising the right of a person to represent future generations in preserving the right to a balanced and healthful environment. The Court also stated, inter alia, that “[t]he complaint focuses on one specific fundamental right – the right to a balanced and healthful ecology […]”.76 Two years later, the Court of Appeal of Nigeria expressly recognised that environmental degradation may give rise to a violation of human rights.77 The same principle is constantly reiterated by Latin American courts.78 For example, in 1991, the Court of First Instance of Colombia affirmed that [e]veryone has the right to enjoy and live in a healthy environment. This should be regarded as a fundamental human right, which is a prerequisite and basis for the exercise of other human, economic and political rights. It should be recognised that a healthy environment is a sine qua non condition for life itself and that no right could be exercised in a deeply altered environment.79
The principle in point was later confirmed by the Constitutional Court.80 Similarly, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Costa Rica affirmed the right to a healthy environment as “a right that all citizens posses to 75 76 77 78
79
80
See supra, note 17. Id., p. 187. See Kokoro-Owo v. Lagos State Government, 1995, Nigerian Weekly Law Reports 6 (1995), p. 765. For a comprehensive survey of the Latin American case-law in the field of the interaction between human rights and environmental protection see A. FABRA and E. AMAL, “Review of Jurisprudence on Human Rights and the Environment in Latin America”, Joint UNEP-OHCHR Expert Seminar on Human Rights and the Environment, Geneva, 14-16 January 2002, Background Paper No. 6, available at (http://193.194.138.190/environment/bp6.html). See Fundepúblico v. Mayor of Bugalagrande and others (Juzgado Primero Superior, Interlocutorio No. 032, Tuluá), 19 December 1991, quoted by A. FABRA and E. AMAL, op. cit., note 78, pp. 2 et seq., and by A. FABRA, “Indigenous Peoples, Environmental Degradation, and Human Rights: a Case Study”, in A. BOYLE and M.R. ANDERSON (eds.), op. cit., note 12, pp. 262 et seq. (footnotes 96 e 98). Id. (the decision of the Constitutional Court was enacted in June 1992).
84
Frederico Lenzerini
live in an environment free from contamination”.81 In the same year, an Argentinean Court stated that [t]he right to live in healthy and balanced environment is a fundamental attribute of people. Any aggression to the environment ends up to becoming a threat to life itself and to the psychological and physical integrity of the person – which is based on ecological balance.82
Finally, Latin American courts have also conceived the right to a safe environment as a right belonging not only to present generations but, lying on the same ratio expressed by the Supreme Court of the Philippines in Minors Oposa,83 also to future ones. This principle was already stated by the Supreme Court of Chile in 1988: [p]resent claims are particularly relevant because they relate to the right to live in an environment free from pollution […] [They regard] not only the well being of man but also his own life, and actually not only [present generations]: future generations would claim the lack of prevision of their predecessors if the environment would be polluted and nature destroyed.84
In conclusion, the above analysis demonstrates that, leaving aside the (predominantly theoretical) problem concerning the relevance of the right to a safe environment as an autonomous value or as a condition for the enjoyment of other rights, the existence of such a right may be considered as part of customary international human rights law. Consequently, when the implementation of a significant environmental value enters into conflict with the preservation of a human right, it is necessary to balance the different values at stake, trying to find a point of convergence between them or, if this is not possible, to prioritise the more important right. Although this question is for the most part merely academic (because environmental protection is not generally suitable to enter into conflict with the implementation of basic human rights), it may assume practical 81 82 83 84
See case Carlos Roberto García Chacón, 1993, quoted by A. FABRA and E. AMAL, op. cit., note 78, p. 3. See Irazu Margarita v. Coperto S.A., 1993, ibid., p. 2. See supra, note 17. See Comunidad de Chañaral v. Copeco División el Saldor, 1988, quoted by A. FABRA and E. AMAL, op. cit., note 78, p. 4 (see also the other judgments cited therein).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
85
relevance in particular circumstances, among which two main situations emerge: a) the high concentration of persons in environmentally significant places and, b) clashes between “environmental” interests and the protection of groups’ and peoples’ rights. The following paragraphs will deal with the analysis of these two situations.
FLOWS OF REFUGEES AND EVIRONMENTAL HARM Speaking of the relationship between environmental protection and basic human rights, a particularly intense concentration of people in a given location may cause environmental harm that cannot be settled by recourse to ordinary means of environmental management, in the event of large flows of refugees fleeing from situations of massviolation of fundamental rights. Refugee camps have a potentially high propensity for triggering serious harm to nearby protected areas. The most pertinent example of this harmful influence can be traced back to 1994 when, as a result of crude ethnic conflict that obliterated any thought for human dignity, Rwanda and its peoples were destroyed, resulting in a mass exodus of Rwandese refugees to Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This latter State took very seriously its obligations arising under the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees,85 granting asylum to the largest number of such refugees, over 700,000, that were resettled in the area of North and South Kivu near Parc National des Virungas. This national park is Africa’s oldest one, and features an outstanding diversity of habitats and is particularly famous for its population of mountain gorillas.86 The park was inscribed in the UNESCO World
85
86
See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, UNTS 189, p. 137, and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, UNTS 606, p. 267; Democratic Republic of Congo acceded to the Convention in 1965 and to the Protocol in 1975 (see the list of ratifications available in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Website, at (http://www.unhcr.ch)). There are about 650 mountain gorillas in the world, half of which live in the Parc National des Virungas.
86
Frederico Lenzerini
Heritage List in 197987 and was included in the List of World Heritage in Danger in 1994.88 The presence of such a high concentration of refugees led to an environmental devastation. Although the mountain gorillas were not seriously impacted,89 the park was placed under particular threat mainly due to the search for firewood and building materials; more than 150 square kilometres of the forest cover of the park was thus destroyed.90 Also, wildlife was seriously jeopardised as many animals were killed for meat, both by refugees and by local people, due to the decrease of livestock in North Kivu caused by the need to share existing resources with the refugees. This led to a decline in the availability of animal proteins for the human population. The tourist activities in the area dramatically dropped, depriving the park of its main means of subsistence and conservation.91 The settlement of refugee camps in the Virungas area was carried out in contravention of the UNHCR policy against the establishment of such camps on the border of protected areas, according to which the minimum distance should not be less than 150 kilometres away from
87
88
89 90
91
See Report of the 3rd Session of the World Heritage Committee, Cairo and Luxor, 22-26 October 1979, doc. CC-79/CONF.003/13 of 30 November 1979, para. XII.45. See Report of the 18th Session of the World Heritage Committee, Phuket, Thailand, 12-17 December 1994, doc. WHC-94/CONF.003/16 of 31 January 1995, para. IX.22; the Committee points out, inter alia, that “[s]ince July 1994, the threats to the park have exacerbated several fold by the influx of almost 1 million refugees, fleeing the war in Rwanda, adjacent to the southern parts of the Park […] the Mountain Gorilla and its habitat at higher elevations, fortunately, have not been impacted so far”. See note 87. See S.E.W. WERIKHE, N. MUSHENZI, J. BIZIMANA, “The Impact of War on Protected Areas in Central Africa. Case Study of the Virunga Volcanoes Region”, in Parks for Peace, International Conference on Trasboundary Areas as a Vehicle for International Co-operation, Somerset West, South Africa, 1618 September 1997, Conference Proceedings, p. 156. When the flow of tourists is stable, up to 8 persons go each day to see the gorilla, paying the price of U.S. $120 per capita. The drop in tourism may thus lead to an economic loss close to U.S. $1,000 a day and U.S. $365,000 a year, with serious consequences with regard to the environmental conservation of this area. See “Mountain Gorillas in Peril”, (http://www.kilimanjaro.com/gorilla/marcel.htm) (last visited on 14 February 2003).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
87
the nearest protected area boundary.92 Generally speaking, the UNHCR is very sensitive with regard to problems related to environmental protection in the management of refugee operations. Of course, refugees, due to the particularly difficult living conditions in which they are forced to abide, cannot be expected to put environmental considerations ahead of their own safety and welfare, but the adoption of specifically tailored environmental precautions in the settlement and management of refugee camps may drastically reduce the adverse impact that they can have on the local environment. Thus in recent years environmental management has become a policy priority of the UNHCR, and is a primary consideration in all relevant phases of refugee operations. In June 1996 the UNHCR Environmental Guidelines were adopted;93 these deal with refugee-related environmental problems during the whole length of refugee operations, and can be divided into three phases: (a) the emergency phase; (b) the care-and-maintenance phase; (c) the durable-solutions phase. This final phase includes the environmental rehabilitation of the asylum country’s territory after the repatriation of refugees, environmental concerns related to the integration of refugees in the host country, and environmental concerns related to the re-integration of refugees that return to their home country.94 The approach followed for rendering refugee operations environmentally sustainable is an integrated one, in the sense that, keeping in mind the peculiar needs of any different refugee situation, it tries to “incorporate environmental elements into the interventions made right from the beginning or to modify refugee assistance operations to make them environmentally more benign”.95 In practical terms, the main means used to pursue such an outcome reside in an “environmentally sound site selection” (outside areas of high environmental values), local participation, financial integration, effective coordination of the role of different actors involved 92 93 94 95
See S.E.W. WERIKHE, N. MUSHENZI, J. BIZIMANA, op. cit., note 90, p. 156. UNHCR Environmental Guidelines, Geneva, June 1996, available in the UNHCR Website, at (http://www.unhcr.ch). Id., p. 6. Id., p. 7.
88
Frederico Lenzerini
(e.g. UNHCR, local government, NGOs), environmental planning, environmental training and rehabilitation. Since harvesting of firewood is generally the most damaging refugee activity in the medium to long term, particular attention is devoted to the promotion of alternative energy sources.96 The adoption of this policy should achieve, in general, the goal of minimising the adverse impact of refugee operations to the detriment of environmental values. It is nonetheless possible that in extreme situations it may not successfully work. In the case of the Parc National des Virungas, for example, the UNHCR acted against its own policy because the situation with the refugees was exceptionally desolate and many were perishing on a daily basis. Thus, no other solution was practicable, as too high a price would be paid in terms of human lives. In similar circumstances one may correctly assert that there exists an obligation on all relevant actors to take all available measures to minimise adverse environmental effects of refugee operations. This duty descends from the fact that the preservation of a safe environment, as we have seen, matches a vital interest of humankind. In addition, it is also essential under the perspective of the right of asylum, both for the fact that environmental degradation may undermine the safety and welfare of the refugees themselves, and for the negative influence it may have with regard to future decisions of governments to offer asylum to refugees. Apart from this duty, environmental threats cannot prevent relevant actors from performing refugee operations in situations, like that of the Virungas park, where serious humanitarian emergencies require the immediate implementation of assistance measures with the view of avoiding grave breaches of basic human rights to the detriment of refugees. In this author’s opinion, although highly valuable, environmental protection remains secondary with respect to the basic rights involved in refugee operations, except where environmental harm is so grave in nature that it would imply a concrete and 96
See UNHCR, “Refugee Operations and Environmental Management: Selected Lessons Learned”, available in the UNHCR Website, at (http://www.unhcr.ch), p. 62; for further details about the UNHCR strategy in the field of environmental protection see also UNHCR, “Refugee Operations and Environmental Management: Key Principles for Decision-Making”, ibid.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
89
immediate risk for the same rights. As a consequence, the rights that are at stake in the above situations (the “supreme” right to life being at immediate risk) are of such a fundamental character that they cannot be sacrificed to prevent a harm that, although inherent to a highly relevant value, is of a partially uncertain and non-immediate nature and whose effects, contrary to those deriving from the denial of assistance in favour of refugees, may be prevented, or at least minimised, if appropriate measures are taken as soon as adequate responses to the humanitarian emergency are completed.
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: HUNTING AND FISHING RIGHTS The key role of indigenous peoples in the preservation and management of environmental values is widely recognised at the international level. Article 8(j) of the biodiversity Convention97 states that any contracting party, as far as possible and appropriate, will “respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity […]”. Similarly, the Preamble of the U.N. Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples recognises “that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment”.98 More solemnly, Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration stresses that 97
98
See supra, note 7. See also Indigenous People’s Biodiversity Network (IPBN), “Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous Knowledge and Innovations and the Convention on Biological Diversity”, available at (http://www.ecouncil.ac.cr/rio/focus/report/english/ipbn.htm). See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/2/Add.1, adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities with Resolution 1994/45 of 26 August 1994, reprinted in ILM 34 (1995), p. 541 (hereinafter “Draft Declaration”). On the Draft Declaration see, inter alia, R.T. COULTER, “The Draft UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: What is it? What does it mean?”, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 13 (1995), p. 123.
90
Frederico Lenzerini [i]ndigenous peoples and their communities, and other local communities, have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable development.99
The holistic view of nature inherent in the indigenous vision of life implies a deeply ecocentric approach with respect to environmental management, based on spontaneously selective uses of natural resources that are respectful of the principle of sustainable development. This concept, just like that of “intergenerational equity”, represents a moral idea that is genetically intrinsic in the way of life of indigenous peoples (whose activities related to nature are consequently environmentally sound). They have developed these principles as philosophical features of their ideological and anthropological identity and not, like the “civilized” Western society, as indispensable instruments for slowing down incumbent environmental devastation caused by senseless and massive exploitation of natural resources. For most indigenous peoples the land, including all its natural elements, is the mother of life and coincides with God, and their own existence as peoples is thus inextricably linked with their being part of their motherland. In other words, while according to the Western view of the world the environment is something to be changed and subjugated according to human interests, for indigenous peoples it is the entity that shapes life and fixes the immutable rules of existence. Their traditional environmental activities are thus part of their own culture and, a fortiori, of their own identity. Among these activities, hunting and fishing represent two of their basic features and constitute an essential part of their identity as peoples. Although hunting and fishing constitute activities that are part of the culture of virtually every people in the world, and are thus to be generally safeguarded as part of the human right to culture, they assume a special relevance for indigenous peoples, since they are perceived as part of their identity as 99
See supra, note 14. The “vital role of the indigenous peoples in sustainable development” is also reaffirmed by paragraph 25 of the Johannesburg Declaration (see supra, note 15).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
91
“peoples”. As a consequence, these activities become relevant at the level of collective rights, that are essential not only from an individual perspective, but especially as features that adhere to a people and are vital for the preservation of its own identity. In the framework of the indigenous vision of life, the notion of a group identity has a vital role in safeguarding the individual rights of each member of the concerned group. This is because individual identity, and thus all individual rights attached to the personal heritage of any human being (especially cultural rights), can be enjoyed only in the context of the group, and disappear when the group as such ceases to exist. The crucial interconnection between collective and individual rights in the indigenous way of life is also recognised by the main international legal instrument in force concerning indigenous peoples, the 1989 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,100 which includes a specific part dealing with land rights. Article 13 stresses that States parties shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.101
By referring to “collective aspects”, this provision implicitly recognises that the relevance of any indigenous traditional activity does not reside in the activity per se, but in the place it occupies in the global “circle of life”.102 Thus, this idea of collective rights does not 100
101 102
See supra, note 66; the Convention has been ratified by only 17 States, all Latin American countries except Denmark, Fiji, The Netherlands and Norway (see the list of ratifications attached to the Convention text, ibid., last checked 18 February 2003). See Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, note 66, article 13 para. 1 (emphasis added). The concept of the “circle of life” is a basic element of the culture of indigenous peoples in general and Native Americans in particular. The “circle of life” circles the Earth, waters, the air and all other elements of nature; all human relations are included therein. The human being is thus incorporated into a deep relationship with the environment. The 1997 Heart of the Peoples Declaration (available at (http://www.ipcb.org/resolutions/htmls/dec_heartopeoples.html)), adopted during the North American Indigenous Peoples Summit on Biological Diversity and Biological Ethics identifies the “Indigenous Circle of Life” with “biological diversity”; the 2002 Indigenous Peoples Political Declaration (available at
92
Frederico Lenzerini
simply mean that a given right must be necessarily exercised as a group activity, but that it is to be put into effect according to its social role in the global context it belongs to, characterised by precise cultural elements such as the land where it takes place and the rites to be followed in the different phases of its implementation. As a consequence, the exercise of a given right is inextricably linked to a precise land, and cannot be enjoyed in a different place. For this reason, the 1989 ILO Convention also states that “[t]he rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized”,103 adding that measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the rights of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities.104
Finally, article 15 stresses that [t]he rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the rights of these peoples to participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources.105
Similar rights are also recognised by the 1994 Draft Declaration,106 especially by articles 12, 13, 24, 25, 26 and 28. Article 26, in particular, emphasises the right of indigenous peoples to use their environment according to their traditional way of life, by stating that they have the right to own, develop, control and use the lands and territories, including the total environment of the lands, air, waters, coastal seas, sea-ice,
103 104 105 106
(http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/wssd/poldec.html)), adopted in Bali (Indonesia) by the Indigenous Peoples of the Americas, Asia, Pacific, Africa, Europe and the Arctic region, stresses that “[w]e cannot be removed from our lands. We, the indigenous peoples are connected by the circle of life to our lands and the environment”. See Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, note 66, article 14 para. 1, first sentence. Id., article 14 para. 1, second sentence. Id., article 15 para. 1. See supra, note 98.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
93
flora and fauna and other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used.
From a global perspective, the above rights are far from being recognised by the international community. The 1989 ILO Convention has been ratified only by 17 countries,107 not including the main States on the territory of which the question of indigenous rights is an important issue, such as Australia, Canada and the United States. Moreover, the fact that the Draft Declaration still remains a “draft” after its adoption in 1994 hardly requires a comment with regard to the difficulty of reaching a communis opinion on the matter. In any case, this does not mean that concern for the right of indigenous peoples to perform their traditional activities is extraneous to the international community. The scarce adherence of States to the above instruments is in fact mainly due to the fear that indigenous communities may claim the “inherent rights” that, under general international law, are attached to the term “peoples”, used by both the 1989 ILO Convention and the Draft Declaration (although article 1 para 3 of the Convention expressly excludes that the term may “be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law”).108 The right to the traditional use of the environment, and particularly the right of perpetuating traditional practices of hunting and fishing in the motherland, is instead increasingly recognised, as shown by relevant international practice, as a prerogative actually belonging to indigenous peoples. One example of this practice that has already been referred to is given by the exemption of aboriginal subsistence whaling from the strict prohibition on whaling imposed by the International Whaling Commission.109 Such exemption, as already stressed,110 is constantly granted not only for nutritional needs, but even for cultural reasons.111 107 108 109 110 111
See supra, note 100. See Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, note 66, article 1 para. 3. See supra, text subsequent to note 21. See supra, text corresponding to note 22. The International Whaling Commission has incessantly recognised the relevance of culture in the debate relating to aboriginal subsistence whaling. In 1982, for example, the Commission stated that “[w]haling and associated activities [are]
94
Frederico Lenzerini
Similarly, article III(1)(d) of the Polar Bears Agreement allows hunting such bears when it is carried out “by local peoples using traditional methods in the exercise of their traditional rights…”,112 and article III(5)(c) of the 1979 Convention on Migratory Species states that the general prohibition to the taking of endangered migratory species may be derogated from, inter alia, when it is carried out to “accommodate the needs of traditional subsistence users of such species”.113 Such exemptions have clearly been granted for safeguarding the cultural value of traditional hunting customs, irrespective of whether they were developed by indigenous or other peoples.114 In a different way, article VII of the 1957 Convention on
112 113 114
perhaps the most important single element in the culture and society of north Alaskan whale hunting communities. It provides a focus for the ordering of social integration, political leadership, ceremonial activity, traditional education, personality, values, and Eskimo identity […] the position of whaling as a pivotal, cultural activity and the extremely high valuation placed on bowhead whale products as food makes such replacement impossible” (emphasis added) (see Report of the International Whaling Commission, 1982, Special Issue, No. 4, p. 35); ten years later the Commission recognised that “the cessation of minke whaling in [Japanese] communities has affected individuals economically, socially, spiritually and culturally, in a manner that threatens the vitality and viabilities of the communities” (see Report of the Forty-Four Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, 1992, p. 31); for a more comprehensive survey see A. GILLESPIE, “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: A Critique to the Inter-Relationship Between International Law and the International Whaling Commission”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 12 (2001), p. 114. On aboriginal whaling see also W.C. DOUBLEDAY, “Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling: The Right of Inuit to Hunt Whales and Implications for International Environmental Law”, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 17 (1983), p. 373; A. SOONGI BECK, “The Makah’s Decision to Reinstate Whaling: When Conservationists Clash With Native Americans Over an Ancient Hunting Tradition”, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 11 (1996), p. 359; L. WATTERS and C. DUGGER, “The Hunt for Gray Whales: The Dilemma of Native American Treaty Rights and the International Moratorium on Whaling”, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 22 (1997), p. 319; R.J. MILLER, “Exercising Cultural Self-Determination: The Makah Indian Tribe Goes to Whaling”, American Indian Law Review 25 (2000/2001), p. 165. See 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears, available at (http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/polar.bears.1973.html), article III(1)(d). See 1979 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, available at (http://www.wcmc.org.uk/cms/cms_conv.htm), article III(5)(c). See A. GILLESPIE, op. cit., note 111, p. 95, note 89. With a similar approach see also article 9 para. 1 of the 1979 Berne Convention on the Conservation of
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
95
North Pacific Fur Seals expressly relates to aboriginal peoples, by stating that [t]he provisions of this Convention shall not apply to Indians, Ainos, Aleuts or Eskimos dwelling on the coast […] who carry on pelagic sealing in canoes not transported by or used in connection with other vessels, and propelled entirely by oars, paddles or sails, and manned by not more than five persons each, in the way hitherto practiced and without the use of firearms; provided that such hunters are not in the employment of other persons or under contract to deliver the skins to any person.115
The central element of the above referred provisions is culture, which, as emphasised by the 1982 Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies,116 is to be conceived as the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group [including] modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs.
Any different manifestation of culture is part of the concept of the “common heritage of mankind” that has eventually emerged in the contemporary international legal system. This concept, proclaimed by a conspicuous number of international instruments,117 is remarkably
115 116 117
European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, European Treaty Series No. 104 (also available at (http://www.ecnc.nl/doc/europe/legislat/bernconv.html)), which allows, “on a selective basis and to a limited extent, the taking, keeping or other judicious exploitation of certain [endangered] wild animals and plants in small numbers”. See 1957 Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, U.N.T.S. 314, p. 105, article VII. The text of the Declaration is available at (http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/mexico/html_eng/page1.shtml). See, for example, the Preamble of the 1954 Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, available at (http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws), which states that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world”, and that “the preservation of the cultural heritage is of great importance for all peoples of the world and […] it is important that this heritage should receive international protection. For a more comprehensive analysis see F. FRANCIONI, “Principi e criteri ispiratori per la protezione internazionale del
96
Frederico Lenzerini
epitomised in the Preamble of the 1972 World Heritage Convention, which states that “deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural […] heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world”.118 The complex of all different cultural expressions shapes the realm of cultural diversity, which is embodied in the uniqueness and plurality of the identities of the groups and societies making up humankind. As a source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. In this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of present and future generations.119
The growing concern for traditional cultural values, with particular consideration for indigenous practices, is also demonstrated by the international negotiations that, at the time of writing, are carried out at the UNESCO level in view of the adoption of an international convention for the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage.120 The preliminary Draft text, after having stressed “the general interest in and common concern for the safeguarding of intangible cultural heritage of humanity”,121 defines intangible heritage as including “social practices, rituals, festive events”.122 This locution is later explained by an Annex to article 2, which includes, among the
118 119
120
121 122
patrimonio culturale”, in F. FRANCIONI, A. DEL VECCHIO and P. DE CATERINI (eds.), Protezione internazionale del patrimonio culturale: interessi nazionali e difesa del patrimonio comune della cultura, Milano, p. 14. See Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 1972, available at (http://whc.unesco.org/world_he.htm), Preamble. See UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2 November 2001, available at (http://www.unesco.org/confgen/press_rel/021101_clt_diversity.shtml), article 1. On the value of cultural diversity in contemporary international law see F. LENZERINI, “Riflessioni sul valore della diversità culturale nel diritto internazionale”, in Comunità Internazionale, 2001, p. 671. See Second Session of the Intergovernmental Meeting of Experts on the Preliminary Draft Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, UNESCO Headquarters, Paris, 24 February – 1 March 2002, “Compilation of Amendments from Member States concerning the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage”, doc. CLT/2002/CONF.203/3°Rev. of 12 February 2003 (document on file with the author, member of the Italian delegation at the above Meeting). Id., see the Preamble of the Draft Convention, third sentence. Id., see article 2(2)(c) of the Draft Convention, as modified and approved in plenary on 28 February 2003.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
97
examples related to such concept, “practices relating to hunting, fishing and gathering”.123 The strongest argument for supporting the view sustained in the present article, according to which general international law recognises the right of indigenous peoples to perform traditional cultural practices, especially hunting and fishing activities, surely resides in the deep interaction that exists between culture and human rights. Firstly, article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that [i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.124
With regard to the exercise of cultural rights protected under this article, the Human Rights Committee has stated that culture manifests itself in many forms, including a particular way of life associated with the use of land resources, especially in the case of indigenous peoples. That right may include such traditional activities as fishing or hunting and the right to live in reserves protected by law. The enjoyment of these rights may require positive legal measures to ensure the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect them […] The protection of these rights is directed towards ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social
123 124
Id., see Annex to article 2 of the Draft Convention. See supra, note 33, article 27. This provision was reaffirmed by the World Conference of Human Rights of 1993. The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (U.N. doc. A/CONF.157/23 of 12 July 1993, available at (http://www.unhcr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A/CONF.157/23.En?OpenDocument)) states that “[t]he persons belonging to minorities have the right to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion and to use their own language in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination” (para. 19 of part I), and recognises “the inherent dignity and the unique contribution of indigenous people to the development and plurality of society […] States should, in accordance with international law, take concerted positive steps to ensure respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, on the basis of equality and non-discrimination, and recognize the value and diversity of their distinct identities, cultures and social organization” (para. 20 of part I).
98
Frederico Lenzerini identity of the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole.125
In 2000, pronouncing on the case Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, the Human Rights Committee found that “the use and control of fisheries is an essential element of [Maori] culture”,126 and that a State’s “freedom to [encourage development or allow economic activities by enterprises] is […] to be assessed […] by reference to the obligations it has undertaken in article 27”.127 Since “[a]rticle 27 requires that a member of a minority shall not be denied his right to enjoy his own culture [,] measures whose impact amount to a denial of the right will not be compatible with the obligations under article 27”.128
In any case, in its observations, the government of New Zealand itself had recognised that “the enjoyment of Maori culture encompasses the right to engage in fishing activities and it [had] accept[ed] that it has positive obligations to ensure that these rights are recognized”.129 125
126
127 128 129
See Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 23 of 6 April 1994, “The rights of minorities (Art. 27)”, available at (http://193.194.138.190/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CCPR+General+comment+23.En? OpenDocument), para. 7 (emphasis added). See also Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, Communication No. 197/1985, 27 July 1988, available at (http://www.law.monash.edu.au/humanrts/undocs/197-1985.html) (in this case the Committee found no violation of article 27 because the appellant was “permitted, albeit not as of right, to graze and farm his reindeer, to hunt and to fish”; see para. 9.8); Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, op. cit., note 55, especially para. 32.2; Lansmann et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, 26 October 1994, available at (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/vws511.htm) para. 9.5; Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, Communication No. 760/1997, 6 September 2000, available at (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session69/view760.htm), para. 10.6. Communication No. 547/1993, 27 October 2000, available at (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/547-1993.html), para. 9.3. On this case see S. DAVIDSON, “Fishing for Rights? Mahuika v. New Zealand in the Human Rights Committee”, International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 16 (2001), p. 679. Id., para. 9.4 (the Committee recalls its statement pronounced in Lansmann et al. v. Finland, op. cit., note 125, para. 9.4). Id., para. 9.4. Id., para. 7.1.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
99
The right to the preservation and enjoyment of one’s own culture, with special reference to indigenous peoples, is also recognised, in addition to international instruments specifically dealing with such peoples,130 by article 30 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, which states that [i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.131
The special relevance of this provision is given by the fact that, referring to children, it specifically recognises the vital importance of transmitting the cultural identity of each people from generation to generation, as this is the best way for preserving it. It is important to 130
131
These instruments are the 1989 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (see supra, note 66 and corresponding text; in addition to articles 13, 14 and 15 (cited supra, notes 102-105 and corresponding text) see article 5 (“[i]n applying the provisions of this Convention: (a) the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values and practices of these peoples shall be recognised and protected, and due account shall be taken of the nature of the problems which face them both as groups and as individuals; (b) the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these peoples shall be respected […]”) and article 8 para. 2 (“[t]hese peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally recognised human rights […]”), and the 1994 Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (see supra, note 98, in particular articles 7 (right not to be subjected to ethnocide and cultural genocide), 8 (right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics), 12 (right to practise and revitalise their cultural traditions and customs), 13 (right to manifest, practise, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies), 14 (right to revitalise, use, develop and transmit to future generations, inter alia, their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies) and 16 (right to have the dignity and diversity of their culture, traditions, histories and aspirations). See supra, note 66, article 30. See also article 20 para. 3 (“[in case of alternative care ensured by the State for a child deprived of his or her family environment] due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuing in a child’s upbringing and to the child’s ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic background”) and article 29 para. 1(c) (“[the education of the child shall be directed to the] development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own cultural identity, language and values […]”).
100
Frederico Lenzerini
keep in mind that, to date, the Convention on the Rights of the Child has been ratified by all countries of the world with the sole exceptions of Somalia and the United States (both States have nonetheless signed it),132 and that only a very limited number of reservations and declarations have been pronounced with regard to article 30.133 This is a strong symptom of the general opinio juris which supports the actual existence of a right of individuals belonging to minorities and indigenous communities to enjoy and practice their own culture and, a fortiori, the traditional practices that are essential to it (including, of course, hunting and fishing activities) as part of their own identity. Signs of this opinio juris can also be found in domestic practice regarding most of the main State actors on the indigenous issue.134 In 1976, for example, the U.S. Federal Court of Idaho found that 132 133
134
See the ratification list at (http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf) (last checked on 21 February 2003). Article 30 has been subjected to the following reservations and declarations: a) France declared that, “in the light of article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic, article 30 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned”; b) Oman declared that “[t]he Sultanate does not consider itself to be bound by those provisions of article 14 of the Convention that accord a child the right to choose his or her religion or those of its article 30 that allow a child belonging to a religious minority to profess his or her own religion”; c) Turkey reserved the “right to interpret and apply the provisions of articles 17, 29 and 30 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child according to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey and those of the Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923”; d) Venezuela took “the position that this article must be interpreted as a case in which article 2 of the Convention applies”. As for Canada, it reserved, “[w]ith a view to ensuring full respect for the purposes and intent of article 20 (3) and article 30 of the Convention […] the right not to apply the provisions of article 21 [which deals with adoption] to the extent that they may be inconsistent with customary forms of care among aboriginal peoples in Canada”; also, it expressed a statement of understanding which states that “[i]t is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in matters relating to aboriginal peoples of Canada, the fulfilment of its responsibilities under article 4 of the Convention must take into account the provisions of article 30. In particular, in assessing what measures are appropriate to implement the rights recognized in the Convention for aboriginal children, due regard must be paid to not denying their right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion and to use their own language”. See (http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty15_asp.htm) (last checked on 21 February 2003). For a comparative analysis see M.A. BURNETT, “The Dilemma of Commercial Fishing Rights of Indigenous Peoples: A Comparative Study of the Common
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
101
[w]here established by historical use, aboriginal title includes the right to hunt and fish and where those rights have not been passed to the United States, by treaty or otherwise, the rights continue to adhere to the current members of the tribe which held them aboriginally.135
Native hunting and fishing rights are also recognised by the U.S. Supreme Court.136 In 1999, the High Court of Australia 137 confirmed the reasons used by the local magistrate in dismissing a charge against the appellant, a
135
136
137
Law Nations”, Suffolk Transnational Law Review 19 (1996), p. 389; S.J. ANAYA and R.A. WILLIAMS, Jr., “The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System”, Harvard Human Rights Journal 14 (2001), p. 33. See State v. Coffee, Federal Court of Idaho, 1976, 556 P.2d 1185, p. 1189, quoted by M. ICHIKAWA, “Understanding the Fishing Rights of the Ainu of Japan: Lessons Learned from American Indian Law, the Japanese Constitution, and International Law”, Colorado Journal of International Law and Policy, 12 (2001), p. 255. According to U.S. case-law, Native Americans retain offreservation fishing rights “at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations” (see United States v. Washington, District Court of Tacoma, WA, 1974, 384 F. Supp. 312, p. 332). See, inter alia, United States v. Winans, 1905, 198 U.S. 371; Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 1918, 39 S. Ct. 40; Tulee v. Washington, 1942, 62 S. Ct. 862; Menominee Tribe v. United States, 1968, 88 S. Ct. 1705; Antoine v. Washington, 1975, 95 S. Ct. 944; Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 1979, 99 S. Ct. 3055; Montana v. United States, 1981, 101 S. Ct. 1245; Nevada v. Hicks, 2001, 121 S. Ct. 2304). See also the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp. (In re Exxon Valdez), 1997, 104 F.3d 1196, in which the Court recognises “the Alaska Natives’ right to recover economic damage flowing from loss of fishing resources” (p. 1197). For a more comprehensive survey on indigenous hunting and fishing rights in the United States see S.D. TURNER, “The Native American’s Right to Hunt and Fish: An Overview of the Aboriginal Spiritual and Mystical Belief System, the Effect of European Contact and the Continuing Fight to Observe a Way of Life”, New Mexico Law Review 19 (1989), p. 377; G.D. MEYERS, “Different Sides of the Same Coin: A Comparative View of Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights in the United States and Canada”, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 10 (1991), p. 94; E. GOODMAN, “Protecting Habitat for Off-reservation Tribal Hunting and Fishing Rights: Tribal Co-management as a Reserved Right”, Environmental Law 30 (2000), p. 286. Yanner v. Eaton, Australian Law Reports 166 (1999), p 258 (High Court of Australia, 7 October 1999). The recognition of the native title to land was first recognised by the High Court of Australia in an earlier judgment, the leading
102
Frederico Lenzerini
member of the Gunnamulla clan of the Gangalidda tribe of Aboriginal Australians, who had caught two juvenile estuarine crocodiles in Queensland using a traditional type of harpoon. The appellant had been charged with the offence of taking and keeping fauna without the necessary permit required by the Fauna Conservation Act of 1974. The magistrate based his decision on the fact that the appellant’s clan had a direct link with the land from which the crocodiles were taken, a link that had existed “before the common law came into being in the colony of Queensland in 1823 and... thereafter continued”. It was a traditional custom of the clan to hunt juvenile crocodiles for food, and the evidence suggested that the taking of juvenile rather than adult crocodiles had “tribal totemic significance and [was based on] spiritual belief”.138 These findings were fully confirmed by the High Court. In New Zealand Maori fishing rights have been recognised, since 1840, by article II of the Treaty of Waitangi.139 This notwithstanding, at the judicial level these rights were considered for long time to be nonexistent, due to the perception by the national courts that the Waitangi Treaty was a legal nullity. This perception was based on the presumption that the Maori peoples lacked the political organisation necessary to give them sovereignty under international law.140 Nevertheless, after the institution of the
138 139
140
Mabo II case (Mabo and Others v. Queensland (No. 2), High Court, 1992, 175 Commonwealth Law Reports, 1992, p. 1). The new doctrine of native title replaced the 17th Century doctrine of terra nullius, on which British claims to possession of Australia’s lands were based, and recognised that aboriginal “people are entitled as against the whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of [their ancestral] lands” (see conclusion n. (3) of the Mabo II decision). See Yanner v. Eaton, op. cit., note 137, findings. The second article of the Treaty of Waitangi states that “Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession” (modern English translation of the Maori version, available at (http://aotearoa.wellington.net.nz/back/treat.htm#E2)). See M.A. BURNETT, op. cit., note 134, p. 413.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
103
Waitangi Tribunal,141 fishing rights have been resurrected also by State courts, beginning with the leading Te Weehi case, in which the Court held that a Maori prosecuted for the illegal harvesting of shellfish was exercising a customary right which had not been extinguished by law.142 In Canada, traditional aboriginal rights have been recognised for many years by treaty law and domestic legislation,143 and are constantly affirmed by the judiciary. In R. v. Sparrow the Supreme Court, in recognising the close nexus between such rights and the cultural identity of indigenous peoples, held that [t]he anthropological evidence relied on to establish the existence of the right suggests that, for the Musqueam, the salmon fishery has always constituted an integral part of their distinctive culture. Its significant role involved not only consumption for subsistence purposes, but also consumption of salmon on ceremonial and social occasions. The Musqueam have always fished for reasons connected to their cultural and physical survival. […] [T]he right to do so may be exercised in a contemporary manner.144
More recently, the same Court explained more carefully the doctrine of aboriginal rights, stating that it refers to a broader notion of aboriginal rights arising out of the historic occupation and use of native ancestral lands, which relate not only to aboriginal title, but also to the component elements of this larger right – such as aboriginal rights to hunt, fish or trap, and their accompanying practices, traditions and customs – as well as to other matters, not related to land, that form part of a distinctive aboriginal culture.145
141 142
143 144 145
See Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, at (http://rangi.knowledgebasket.co.nz/gpacts/reprint/text/1975/an/114.html). See Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer, High Court of Christchurch, 1986, New Zealand Law Reports 1 (1986), p. 680. See also, more recently, McRitchie v. Taranaki Fish and Game Council, Court of Appeal of Wellington, 1998, New Zealand Law Reports 2 (1999), p. 139. See M.A. BURNETT, op. cit., note 134, p. 407. See R. v. Sparrow, 1990, Supreme Court Reports 1 (1990), 1075, p. 1099. See R. v. Van der Peet, 1996, Canadian Criminal Cases 109 (3d) 1, p. 44 (emphasis added). See also R. v. Meshake, Ontario Court of Justice, 2003, O.C.J. Lexis 9 (2003). For a more comprehensive survey on aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in Canada see MEYERS, op. cit., note 136, especially p. 102;
104
Frederico Lenzerini
In addition, specific rights such as the right to hunt may also exist, apart from any other kind of title on the land, as a unique element of the relationship between a people and the land itself, in the sense that hunting on a specific tract of land is an integral part of the people’s distinctive culture. Thus the aboriginal right to hunt is defined in this way and the right of such people over the land is limited to the right to hunt in that specific tract.146 When this right exists, governmental provisions which may have an impact on uses of the land by indigenous peoples and which are essential to their culture require “the full consent of an aboriginal nation, particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands”.147 The rights in point are also generally recognised by the Scandinavian countries, although with a non-uniform degree of “exclusivity”,148 and by Latin-American States, most of which have ratified the 1989 ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention.149 In 1993 the Constitutional Court of Colombia expressly recognised that [l]a explotación de recursos naturales en territorios indígenas plantea un problema constitucional que involucra la integridad étnica, cultural, social y económica de las comunidades que sobre ellas se asientan.150
146 147 148
149 150
S. IMAI, “Treaty Lands and Crown Obligations: The ‘Tracts Taken Up’ Provision”, Queen’s Law Journal 27 (2001), p. 1. See Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, Supreme Court of Canada, 1997, Supreme Court Reports 3 (1997), p. 1010, para. 138. Id., para. 168. In Sweden, for example, in 1993 the hunting and fishing exclusivity on lands previously reserved to the Sámi people was removed in the name of equality; see, generally, L. HANNIKAINEN, “The Status of Minorities, Indigenous Peoples and Immigrant and Refugee Groups in Four Nordic States”, Nordic Journal of International Law 65 (1996), p. 33. See supra, note 100. See Sentencia No. T-380/93, 1993, para. 7 (“the exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territory gives rise to a constitutional problem which involves ethnic, cultural, social and economic integrity of the communities that live therein” (translated by the author)). The full text of the judgment is available at (http://bib.minjusticia.gov.co/jurisprudencia/CorteConstitucional/1993/Tutela/T380-93.htm).
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
105
Malaysian Courts have also enacted decisions which recognise the rights in point as actually belonging to aboriginal peoples. After the leading Adong case, in which it was acknowledged that “the aboriginal peoples’ rights over the land include[d] the right […] to live from the produce of the land itself”,151 in 2001 the High Court of Kuching expressly recognised native customary hunting and fishing rights in favour of the Borneo Iban tribe.152 Later, in 2002, the High Court of Shah Alam held that aboriginal people live from the hunting of animals in the jungle and the collection of jungle produce. Those are the only source of their livelihood and income. Can these rights be taken away by the government without compensation? […] [A]dequate compensation for the loss of livelihood and hunting ground ought to be made when the land where the plaintiffs normally went to look for food and produce was acquired by the government.153
Although the above rights seem prima facie to be connected to a “mere” need for subsistence, the judge further added that “as the land was continuously occupied and maintained by [aboriginal people] to the exclusion of others in pursuance of their culture and inherited by them from generation to generation in accordance with their customs, it falls within the ambit of ‘land occupied under customary right’”.154
The indigenous right of ownership of ancestral land, and the consequent right to use it in accordance with traditional way of life, are thus also based on a cultural foundation, although, according to the Court, the government retains the power to acquire such land by simply paying adequate compensation.155 Finally, even in Japan, where the Ainu people had been denied the opportunity of enjoying their traditional hunting and fishing rights 151
152 153 154 155
See Adong Bin Kuwanu & Ors. v. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor, High Court of Johor Bahru, 1996, Malayan Law Journal 1 (1997), p. 418, 1996 MLJ Lexis 1154. See Nor Anak Nyawai & Ors. v. Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd & Ors., 2001, Malayan Law Journal 6 (2001), p. 241, 2001 MLJ Lexis 647. See Sagong bin Tasi & Ors. v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Ors., 2002, Malayan Law Journal 2 (2002), p. 591, 2002 MLJ Lexis 143, p. 64. Id., p. 69 (emphasis added only to the word “culture”). See id., p. 69.
106
Frederico Lenzerini
from the end of the nineteenth century, and although salmon fishing in their traditional land is at present still prohibited, the members of such community are today allowed to take a limited supply of salmon for the promotion of their fishing traditions and ceremonial use.156 The analysis developed in the present paragraph shows an increasingly deep concern for the international community for traditional aboriginal rights. In this regard, the general communis opinio recognises the moral compunction of allowing indigenous communities to perform and transmit to future generations their ancestral traditions; this approach seems to have evolved towards an opinio juris that has legal significance. Consistent State practice supplies the second element for shaping a legal obligation under general international law. Such practice demonstrates that, in principle, traditional aboriginal activities like hunting and fishing should never be hindered, not even when they involve relevant environmental concerns (e.g. the protection of endangered species), although the said activities, due to their intrinsically ecological nature, are not generally likely to play a detrimental role to the prejudice of such environmental values.157 Consequently, as a matter of human rights and cultural integrity, the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy, inter alia, their hunting and fishing prerogatives can not be impaired, in principle, for environmental reasons, in the sense that environmental management has to be achieved in a way that allows the actual and reasonable exercise of such rights.
156 157
See M. ICHIKAWA, op. cit., note 135, p. 276. Generally on this problem see G. HANDL, “Indigenous Peoples’ Subsistence Lifestyle as an Environmental Evaluation Problem”, in A. BOYLE & M. BOWMAN (eds.), Environmental Damage in International and Comparative Law. Problems of Definition and Valuation, Oxford, 2002, p. 85.
Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights
107
CONCLUSION During the last decades international legal norms have developed in a number of fields that were previously reserved to the domestic jurisdiction of States. The growing complexity of the diverse international legal regimes has led to the concrete possibility that their implementation may actually affect the achievement of other values that are not less important for the international community. The necessity to find a point of convergence in the event of conflicts between different legal rules has thus emerged in the framework of the international legal system. In the course of the present work it has been possible to ascertain that this kind of interaction may actually arise in the context of the relationship between human and peoples’ rights and the environment, and that the implementation of any of the legal regimes pertaining to these two values may detrimentally affect the integrity of the other. In general terms, when this kind of situation comes into being in the real world, States should try to balance the diverse legal values at stake in a way that allows to preserve the integrity of all of them. When this is not concretely possible, priority should be accorded to the implementation of the legal regime which protects the entity that, in a scale of values, is perceived by the international community as being of higher significance. Thus, in case of conflict between environmental protection and human and peoples’ rights, priority is in principle to be recognized to the accomplishment of the latter, due to the higher hierarchical position of the (jus cogens) norms which protects them in the system of sources of international law and to the very nature of environmental law as instrumental to the achievement of basic human rights. As a consequence, the implementation of environmental provisions is to be carried out in a way that does not affect the full enjoyment of fundamental human and peoples’ rights, and in extreme cases, when this is not possible, such implementation should not be executed at all. Having said this, it is necessary to stress that, as for the rights to be considered fundamental to this extent, relevant practice demonstrates that contemporary international human rights law is at present conceived, from a universal perspective, as more extensive than the mere sum of the sole rights to be free from immediate threats to one’s
108
Frederico Lenzerini
own life, slavery, torture and similar extreme treatment. Both the right to a safe environment and the right to enjoy and transmit to future generation one’s own culture are generally recognised by the international community, and, consistently with the general principle expressed above, in the case that these rights may collide, the operation of each of them has to be implemented giving due consideration to the duty of respecting the other, trying to find a point of equilibrium that allows the contextual achievement of both the rights at stake. In any case, it may be necessary to recognise the precedence of some rights over others according to the concrete contexts in which they operate. In the case of indigenous peoples, the right to perform their traditional cultural activities is of so fundamental character for their very survival that, in principle, it has to be considered to supersede the environmental concerns that may abstractly collide with its operation. As for the other topic dealt with in the present work, when a severe refugee crisis arises, environmental concerns cannot interfere with the necessity of granting immediate relief in favour of the refugees concerned, due to the basic character of the individual rights that are under threat in such context.
DIVERSION OF INTERNATIONAL UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
WATERCOURSES
Mohamed Sameh Amr*
INTRODUCTION International watercourses and their uses have created many international conflicts throughout the history of humankind. These conflicts reflect the different points of view of the riparian States when they are confronted with the utilization of a watercourse flow in their territories. The question of diversion of international watercourses is often at the heart of inherited conflicts.1 The number *
Lecturer of Public International Law, Faculty of Law, Cairo University. Deputy Permanent Delegate of Egypt to UNESCO.
1
Many international watercourse disputes in different regions of the world since the end of 19th and up to the end of the 20th century were due to diversion of watercourses. For instance, the diversion of the Allegash River in Maine between 1860-1870, (USA and Canada); the diversion of the Rio Grand River 1895, (USA and Mexico); the diversion of water by Belgium as a consequence of constructing the Albert Canal 1930, (Netherlands and Belgium); Indian diversion of water from the Indus River 1948, (India and Pakistan); the Canadian proposal to divert water from the Columbia River 1955, (USA and Canada); the French diversion of water from Lake Lanoux 1955, (Spain and France); the Turkish plan to divert water from the Kariek River in the 1950s; the Indian diversion of water from the Ganges River in the early 1970s, (Bangladesh and India); the North Korean diversion of water from the Han river 1985, (North Korea and Republic of Korea); the Slovakian diversion of water from the Danube River 1992, (Hungary and Slovakia); the on-going dispute between Syria and Turkey regarding the Turkish projects to divert water from the Euphrates River; the Syrian plan to divert water of the Yarmouk into its irrigation system, which threatens the water supply to Jordan; the on-going dispute between Syria, Lebanon, Palestinian in West Bank and Jordan on one hand and Israel on the other hand since 1958, regarding Israel’s diversion of water from Tiberias Lake
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 109-179. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
110
Mohamed S. Amr
of disputes involving diversion of international watercourses are many and increase every day due to some common factors such as the shortage of water supplies,2 increase of demand for water, change of climate, increase in arid and semi-arid zones, rapid increase in population and the competition over water resources for development strategies. The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of the diversion of international watercourses in the light of States’ practice and the present rules of international water law. Before addressing these issues, it seems imperative to clarify the meaning of both terms: “diversion” and “international watercourses”. “Diversion” has been defined as “a turning aside or altering the natural course or route of a thing. The term is chiefly applied to the unauthorized change or alteration of a watercourse to the prejudice of a lower riparian...”3 “International watercourse” as defined by Article 2 of the United Nations Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses 1997 (hereinafter the UN Convention 1997), means a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus, parts of which are situated in different States.4
2
3 4
to El-Nakeb (National Water Carrier Project), and Israeli’s diversion of water in the Golan Heights; and the Namibian plan to divert waters from the Okavango River, which could affect the flow of water to Botswana. Recently, Croatia announced its plan to divert water from the Drava River in order to build a power plant on the River near the border with Hungary and Slovakia. It has been observed that by the year 2025 the number of people living in countries with water shortage or water problems of all kinds will have increased from 300 million in 1990 to over 3,000 million. See: M. FITZMAURICE, “Water Management in the 21st Century”, in A. ANGHIE and G. STURGESS (eds.), Legal Visions of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Judge Christopher Weeramantry, 1998, p. 425. Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th edition, 1991, p. 477. The Final Act of the Congress of Vienna 1815 defined international rivers as “those which separate or traverse the territory of two or more States.” In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles was the first treaty in which rivers were described as “international”. See: S. YU, “International Rivers and Lakes”, in M. BEDJAOUI (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991, p. 989. It is worth mentioning that the diversion of water from internal rivers is beyond the scope of this study.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
111
In the light of the above, one can define “diversion of international watercourses” as an act taken by a riparian State and resulting in a change of the flow regime and which might affect the flow of the surface water and/or the ground waters located in another riparian State(s).5 In most cases, diversion is undertaken by the upper-riparian State and affects the flow of water and discharge of ground water in the lower riparian State(s).
5
The term “diversion” as defined may differ linguistically from other terms related to some acts which affect the flow of watercourses, such as extracting water and holding the flow of water. “Withdrawal” or “extracting” of water means that a State withdraws or extracts water from a watercourse flow in another State, usually a neighbouring country, and without the consent of the latter State. The best example of such an act is Israel‘s extraction of water from the Litani River in South Lebanon. The other term “holding or stopping the flow of water” means any act taken by a riparian State in order to fill reservoirs behind dams. The best example for such an act is the Turkish act which stopped the flow of the Euphrates River to fill the reservoir behind the Ataturk Dam. See: T. NAFF and R. MATSON, Water in the Middle East: Conflict or Cooperation, 1984, p. 73; S. LIBISZEWSKI, Water Disputes in the Jordan Basin Region and their Role in the Resolution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1995, pp. 44-45; J. COHEN, “International Law and the Water Politics of the Euphrates”, International Law and Politics 24 (1991), pp. 512-513; M. SHOKRI and M. MALNADY, “The International Legal System for Utilizing the Water of Euphrates River”, in S. AMER (ed.), The New International Watercourses Law and the Arab Interests, 2001, p. 190. However, and despite the difference in the linguistic meaning of the terms reflecting such acts which affect the flow of water, it is our opinion that such acts can be subject to the same rules which apply to the diversion of international watercourses since they have the same effects and impacts of diversion on the down stream States. Finally, it should be noted that “diversion of water” is a different concept from “inter-basin transfer”. The latter concept refers to transfer of water beyond the geographical limits of the drainage basin. viz., taking the water outside the basin. This matter was extensively discussed by the drafters of the Helsinki Rules, 1966 but no agreement was reached. See: C. BOURNE, The International Law Association‘s contribution to the International Water Resources Law, 1999, pp. 26-27; K. TAKEUCHI, “Inter-basin Water Transfer and Reservoir, Water Use presentation”, Inter-basin Water Transfer at the 2nd World Water Forum, 17-22 March 2000, The Hague.
112
Mohamed S. Amr
IMPACT OF WATERCOURSES
DIVERSION
OF
INTERNATIONAL
Diversion of international watercourses as a unilateral act can be undertaken by any co-riparian State for one or more reasons, such as providing sufficient quantities of water for irrigation,6 navigation,7 fishing, flood protection, developing some areas, constructing dams,8 generating hydroelectric power,9 or even for political purposes by harassing the other co-riparian States. Whatever the reason behind the decision taken by the upstream State to divert water from the international watercourse passing through its territory, diversion generally diminishes the normal flow of water to the other co-riparian States, especially the downstream States. The latter object to such an act on the basis that the diversion may have a harmful effect on the people or territory of such States. In most cases, the diversion of water has one or more of the following results. A. Shortage in water supply It is a well-established principle of international law that each riparian State is entitled, within its territory, to an equitable share of 6
7
8
9
For instance, Chile announced its intention to divert the Lauca River, which flows from Chile to Bolivia, for agricultural purposes. See: J. LIPPER, “Equitable Utilization”, in A. GARRETSON et al. (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, p. 27. One of the main reasons of the dispute on sharing of the water of the River Ganges was the construction of the Farakka barrage project by India in order to supply sufficient water in the Hooghly River, so as to maintain its navigability for toeing ships from the Calcutta port to the sea. See: S. GARG, International and Interstate River Water Disputes, 1999, p. 90. This is a common case of diversion. In October 1986, North Korea announced the commencement of construction of a hydropower dam at the site of Mt. Kumgang in the North Han River, which involved a diversion of water flow from the North Han River to its tributaries in the southern part of the river located in the Republic of Korea. For more details, see: C. CHEE, “The Diversion of the North Han River by North Korea in International Law”, The Korean Journal of International Law 16 (1988), p. 28. The dispute between France and Spain regarding Lake Lanoux was based on the French diversion of water from Lake Lanoux towards the River Ariège to generate electricity. See: International Law Reports (ILR), 1957, p. 101.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
113
the water from an international watercourse. The principle of equitability has been recognized by international doctrine and several bilateral and multilateral treaties, including the UN Convention 1997.10 Diversion might affect the river water supply and consequently the livelihood of people in the areas beyond the point of diversion. Consequently, it might cause displacement of population residing in the proximity of the river and directly affects irrigation, destroying agricultural lands, fishery production, forestry, navigation and industry. Therefore, in many cases, downstream States argue that diversion of a watercourse by an upstream State affects people’s livelihood and causes economic losses and political insecurity. This argument was raised by Mexico when protesting against the United States diversion of water from the Rio Grande on the basis that such an act had affected agricultural operation in some areas in Mexico, which were dependent on irrigation from the Rio Grande.11 The United States also objected to Canada‘s announcement to divert water of the Columbia River. It has been argued that the Canadian diversion would cause a reduction of twenty-five per cent of the river’s flow into the United States which would affect in turn the irrigation and reclamation of over one million arid acres of rich farm land in the Columbia basin project in central Washington, the navigation in the lower reaches from Pasco to the sea, and the fishing industry.12 Spain objected to the French diversion of water from Lake Lanoux on the basis that this diversion affected the whole of the water system and the flow of the waters coming from Lake Lanoux and passing through the Carol which constituted a modification of physical features of the hydrographic basin of the Carol and this implicitly meant that the water would no longer flow naturally in its own course. Syria and Iraq asserted that the diversion of water undertaken by Turkey for the Southeastern Anatolian Project (known as the GAP) could reduce the 10 11 12
With regard to the principle of equitable utilization of water, see pp. 121 et seq. below. J. SIMSARIAN, The Diversion of International Waters, 1939, p. 43. E. HUTCHESON, “The United States Position – Diversion of Columbia River Waters”, in Proceedings, Regional Meeting American Society of International Law, The Diversion of Columbia River Water, 1956, p. 19.
114
Mohamed S. Amr
flow of water by forty per cent to Syria and up to eighty percent to Iraq.13 A similar argument was also raised by Bangladesh when India decided to build a barrage across the Ganges at Farakka in order to divert water into the Hooghly River to improve the navigability of the port of Calcutta in the Indian state of West Bengal.14 Bangladesh claimed that this act of diversion would negatively affect the irrigation, water supply, fishery production15 and river navigation.16 Similarly, the Republic of Korea objected to North Korea‘s announced plan to divert the North Han River in order to construct a hydropower dam, arguing that this river provided water for a population of 13
14
15
16
W. SCHEUMANN, “Conflicts on the Euphrates: An Analysis of Water and Non-water Issues”, in W. SCHEUMANN and M. SCHIFFLER (eds.), Water in the Middle East: Potential for Conflicts and Prospects for Cooperation, 1998, p. 113; R. LIEN, “Still Thirsting: Prospects for as Multilateral Treaty on the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers Following the Adoption of the United Nations Convention on International Watercourses”, Boston University International Law Journal 16 (1998), p. 282. For the background of the dispute over the Ganges and its development, see: A. SWAIN, “Conflict over Water: the Ganges Water Dispute”, Security Dialogue 24 (1993), p. 429; B. CROW et al., Sharing the Ganges: The Politics and Technology of River Development, 1995, p. 26; S. SALMAN, “Sharing the Ganges Waters between India and Bangladesh: An Analysis of the 1996 Treaty”, in S. SALMAN and L. BOISSON DE CHARZOURNES (eds.), International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and Management Conflict, Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar, World Bank Technical Paper 414 (1998), p. 132; T. KHAN, “Management and Sharing of the Ganges”, Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996), p. 460; N. ISLAM, “The Regime of International Watercourses: the case of the Ganges from an Asian Perspective”, in G. BLAKE et al. (eds.), International Boundaries and Environmental Security, 1997, p. 330. It has been noted that the diversion of the Ganges affected fishery production since the stagnated water has throttled aquatic organisms, and the increased water temperatures have resulted in a shortage of oxygen, creating conditions where the river fishery is on the verge of extinction. According to the statistics taken at the very first year of the diversion of Ganges, the three landing points – Khulna, Goalunda and Chandpur – the reduction of fish from February to June 1976 compared to the corresponding period in previous years was 75%, 34% and 46% respectively. These statistics are cited in A. SWAIN, supra note 15, p. 433. The reduced flow of river caused by Indian diversion of water of Ganges has also caused unprecedented crisis of inland water navigation system for public and goods transportation. It has been recorded that the inland waterway transportation in south-west Bangladesh was reduced by 11 million tons and the total number of waterways available for mechanically propelled vessels has shrunk from 25,000 kilometres to 5,000 kilometres. See: A. SWAIN, supra note 15, p. 433.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
115
15 million in the Republic of Korea’s capital, Seoul, and its surrounding areas. It has been estimated that if the usual inflow of water to the River is intercepted by a large-scale dam under construction by North Korea and diverted to the East Coast, the downstream basin areas will lose about 1.8 billion cubic meters of water supply annually, which will cause a shortage of service water.17
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case (hereinafter the Gabcikovo case), Hungary argued that the diversion of water of the Danube undertaken by Slovakia had dramatically decreased the water supply thus jeopardizing the supply of drinking water to a large part of the Hungarian population.18 B. Causing damage to the environment Water is the most active component in the natural environment. Protection of the environment is the main subject of many international declarations and treaties which all prohibit any act, especially transboundary, which might cause pollution or damage to the environment of international rivers or lakes.19 This was reflected in the Helsinki Rules 1966,20 the Declaration of the United Nations
17
18 19
20
Korea National Committee on large Dam, South North Joint Water Resources Utilization of Shared River, 1987, Seoul, Korea, p. 16, cited in C. CHEE, supra note 8, p. 29. ICJ Pleadings 1 (1994), Memorial of Hungary, p. 232. Some lawyers consider that this obligation stems from the principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. In their view, this principle may be regarded as a principle of law recognized by civilized nations and could be qualified as a source of international law under Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Statute of International Court of Justice. See: C. CHEE, supra note 9, p. 53. Article 10 of the rules provides that: “(1) Consistent with the principle of equitable utilization of the waters of an international drainage basin, a State: (a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water pollution in an international drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State.” This principle was restated on the International Law Association (ILA)’s Draft Article on the Rule on Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin. See: Article 1 of the ILA Report, 60th Conference, 1982, p. 353.
116
Mohamed S. Amr
Conference on Human Environment 1972,21 the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992,22 the Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development 1992,23 and finally the UN Convention 1997.24 Protection of the environment was also confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion in the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The Court clearly stated that:
21
22
23
24
Principle 21 of this Declaration stipulates that “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” Article 2 provides that: “1. The Parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent control and reduce any trans-boundary impact. 2. The Parties shall, in particular, take all appropriate measures: (a) To prevent, control and reduce pollution of waters causing or likely to cause trans-boundary impact; (b) To ensure that trans-boundary waters are used with the aim of ecologically sound and rational water management, conservation of water resources and environmental protection; (c) To ensure that trans-boundary waters are used in a reasonable and equitable way, taking into particular account their trans-boundary character in the case of activities which cause or are likely to cause trans-boundary impact; (d) To ensure conservation and, where necessary, restoration of ecosystems.” Principle 2 provides that: “States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and development policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. Article 21 paragraph 2 of the Convention stipulates that: “[w]atercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment, including harm to human health or safety, to the use of the waters for any beneficial purpose or to the living resources of watercourse. Watercourse States shall take steps to harmonize their policies in this connection.” Article 23 paragraph 2 of the ILC draft 1984 required a riparian State to take “reasonable measures to prevent pollution” or “to minimize the pollution.”
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
117
“the existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or areas beyond national control is now a part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.”25
Diversion of a watercourse might cause changes in the environment at the point of diversion in the river and in any of the other lower areas. The impact of the diversion of water on the environment is related directly to the scale of the diversion. In most of the cases of diversion of watercourses by the upper-riparian State, the lower riparian States usually argue that such acts cause damage to the environment and therefore affect the purity of the water. For instance, Bangladesh challenged the diversion of water from the Ganges River on the basis that it affected the environment. It argued that the decrease in the water supply resulting from diversion changed the figures of salt water used to entrench from 300 kilometres inland to 460 kilometres and had caused an unprecedented rise in river-water salinity, which affected soil and plant nutrients and resulted in the death of a large number of trees. It has also been claimed that “Sundarbans”, the largest natural mangrove forest in the region, is estimated to be losing about US $ 20 million worth of timber every year.26 Syria, Jordan and Palestine have also claimed that the diversion of water from the Jordan River by Israel caused an increase both in the salinity of the land surrounding the lake of Tabaria as well as the water in the Jordan River which affected agriculture production.27 In addition, it has been claimed that the diversion of water by Turkey to implement the GAP project could affect the salinity of the water in the Arabian Gulf. It was noted that the naturally high salinity of the Arabian Gulf is modified by the entry of fresh water from Shatt AlArab, which also provides nutrients essential to the marine biota. 25 26
27
ICJ Report, 1996, para. 53. M. RAHMAN, “Reducing the flow of the Ganges: the consequences for Agriculture in Bangladesh”, in E. GOLDSMITH and N. HILDYARD (eds.), The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams, 1984, p. 270; A. SWAIN, supra note 15, p. 433. T. NAFF and R. MATSON, supra note 6, p. 28; M. ALWAN, “Jordan River: A Legal Study”, in S. AMER (ed.), The New International Watercourses Law and Arab Interests, 2001, pp. 286-287.
118
Mohamed S. Amr
If the flow of the Shatt is reduced as much as fifty percent in the future, the water which reaches the Arabian Gulf would become considerably saltier and the ecology of the Gulf could be seriously affected.28 Finally, the Republic of Korea objected to the diversion of water from the North Han River by North Korea since this act would cause change in the environment on the southern tributaries of the Han River in the Republic of Korea and would also cause pollution in the same tributaries.29 C. Reduction in the Level and Quality of the Groundwater Groundwater is found primarily in aquifers, which are replenished mainly from atmospheric precipitation infiltrating through the soil. As water tends to flow with gravity, aquifers are often replenished from surface water sources.30 Since groundwater is linked to surface water, diversion of surface water by any co-riparian State could detrimentally affect interconnected aquifers by decreasing the quantity of the groundwater level in the neighbouring State.31 This depends on the contribution of the flow of surface water on the groundwater. Diversion might also cause pollution to the groundwater, since the recharge of aquifers with surface water of poor quality resulting from diversion might also affect the quality of the groundwater.32
28
29 30
31
32
J. KOLARS, “Problems of International River Management: the case of Euphrates”, in A. BISWAS, International Waters of the Middle East From Euphrates-Tigris to the Nile, 1994, p. 78. C. CHEE, supra note 9, p. 30. G. ECKSTEIN, “Application of International Water Law to Trans-boundary Groundwater Resources, and the Slovak-Hungarian Dispute over GabcikovoNagymaros”, Suffolk Transnational Law Review 19 (1995), pp. 84-85. J. BARBERIS, “The Development of International Law of Transboundary Groundwater”, Natural Resources Journal 31 (1991), p. 169 ; E. EL-ZANATY, “The Legal Regime of the Transboundary Groundwater in the light of the Arab Interests”, in S. AMER (ed.), The New International Watercourses Law and the Arab Interests, 2001, p. 106. L. TECLAFF and E. TECLAFF, “Trans-boundary Ground Water Pollution: Survey and Trends in Treaty Law”, in L. TECLAFF et al. (eds.), International Groundwater Law, 1981, p. 79; L. TECLAFF, “Legal and Institutional Responses to Growing Water Demand”, FAO Legislative Study 14 (1977), pp. 36-37.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
119
In practice, Bangladesh opposed the Indian diversion of the Ganges River on the basis that it negatively affected the groundwater tables. It based its opposition on the fact that a decrease in the surface flow had led to increased use of groundwater resulting in a decrease in water quantity as well as causing a rise in water salinity and an increase in the level of soil salinity.33 As a result of the diversion of water from the Danube by Czechoslovakia, Hungary argued that due to almost ninety percent of the reduction of the water discharge into the Danube, the Szigetkoz (wetland in Hungary) would suffer a drop in groundwater and damage to the underground water, which was an essential element of the hydraulic system of the whole system.34 D. Shortage in Hydroelectric Power Water can be utilized to generate power. Hydropower provides a cheap source of electricity as a source of energy production and many States nowadays construct hydropower stations on rivers to generate power. The effect of diversion on the generation of power was raised by the United States following a proposal by Canada to divert water from the Columbia River. It has been noted that such diversion would severely damage the hydroelectric facilities on the United States side of the border.35 The Republic of Korea also objected to the 33
34 35
In its white paper, Bangladesh claimed that: “the hydraulic cycle of surface and ground-water are interdependent. In 1976 the ground-water level in the highly affected area went down by 5 feet on average with a range of 3 to 8 feet below normal”. Cited in B. CROW, supra note 15, p. 135. See also S. SALMAN, supra note 15, p. 132; N. ISLAM, supra note 15, p. 329. ICJ Pleadings 1 (1994), Memorial of Hungary, pp. 157-158, 223. In this regard it has been noted by Mr. Jordan of the International Joint Commission, and General E. C. Itschner, Deputy Chief of Army Engineers that: “if Canada makes this diversion, the Columbia River resources in the United States can never be fully developed Libby Dam on Kootenai, a Columbia tributary, already authorized by the Congress and a key project for power and flood control, would no longer be feasible, and the diversion would have a seriously harmful effect on other proposed downstream projects.” He also stated that: “we have substantial investments in existing power plants in the Columbia basin amounting to about one and one-half billion dollars; power plants under construction, another billion dollars; plus another estimated two billion dollars for power plants that will be built in the next ten years … All of these projects
120
Mohamed S. Amr
announcement by North Korea of its intention to divert the North Han River on the basis that this act would cause a great loss to the hydropower capacity of the Republic of Korea, which was estimated at that time to be forty per cent of its total hydropower.36 E. Other Impacts The above-mentioned impacts are the most common results of water diversion. However, diversion of water may cause other effects, which differ from one situation to the other. It might lead to alteration of the water flow. In the Lake Lanoux case, Spain argued that diversion undertaken by France affected the whole of the water system and the flow of waters coming from Lake Lanoux and this act produced a modification of the physical feature of the hydrographic basin of the Carol.37 It also argued that the diversion had an effect on the political equilibrium between France and Spain, in term of sovereignty, as governed by the Treaties of Delimitation.38 Diversion might affect the boundaries between neighbouring States, In the Gabcikovo case, Hungary claimed that the diversion of water from the Danube River by Slovakia affected the agreed boundaries of these States.39 Diversion may also affect the main stream of the river. In the Gabcikovo case, Hungary claimed that, following diversion, the main stream was divided into three distinct sections which led to a disconnection of the main stream from the floodplain, whose diversity was important for the survival of many main-stream species.40 Diversion might also affect the morphology of the river. After the diversion of water from the River Ganges, Bangladesh claimed that
36 37 38
39 40
were planned and all of the funds are committed in anticipation that the waters of these international rivers would not be utilized by Canada in such a way as to jeopardize downstream interests.” Cited in E. HUTCHESON, supra note 13, p. 20. C. CHEE, supra note 9, pp. 29, 53. ILR 1957, pp. 112-113. Ibid. p. 117. It should be noted that at the time of this dispute the France-Spanish frontier was fixed by successive treaties in 1856, 1862 and 1866. See: ILR 1957, p. 102. ICJ Pleading 1 (1994), Memorial of Hungary, pp. 216-217. Ibid. p. 378.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
121
such an act would lead to the interception of a large proportion of the sediment carried by that river.41 Finally, diversion might damage tourist sites of the lower riparian States. The latter argument was raised by Botswana as a consequence of the Namibian announcement of its proposal to divert water from the Okavango River. Botswana argued that such an act might result in the destruction of the Okavango Delta, a vibrant tourist resort of international value.42
SOVEREIGNTY OF WATERCOURSES
STATES
OVER
INTERNATIONAL
Diversion of international watercourses raises in all cases the question of the sovereignty and rights to the use of water in international watercourses by the concerned (co-riparian) States. There are a number of theories regarding the rights and responsibilities of States and utilization and management of common watercourses. A brief analysis of the theories concerning utilization of international watercourses under international law is relevant. A. Absolute Territorial Sovereignty (Harmon Doctrine) The absolute territorial sovereignty theory provides that a riparian State has complete control over all waters lying within its territory, and may utilize those waters without regard to its effect on the other co-riparian States, especially the downstream States. This theory was introduced in international law in 1895, by the then US Attorney General Judson Harmon. At the time, the United States decided to divert the upper Rio Grande, which resulted in reducing the water flow in the downstream of that river used by people living in
41 42
B. CROW et al., supra note 15, p. 137. K. LEBOTSE, “Southern African Development Community Protocol on Shared Watercourses: Challenges of Implementation”, Leiden Journal of International Law 12 (1999), pp. 174-175.
122
Mohamed S. Amr
Mexico.43 Mexico objected to this act by the United States and argued that while this diversion was entirely within the United States territory, it had, as an effect, the reduction of the quantity of water available to Mexico. In Mexico’s view, this act of diversion was illegal. In replying to the above argument, Mr. Harmon stated that: “the rules, principles and precedents of international law impose no liability or obligations on the United States.”44 The International Waterway Commission in its report of 15 November 1906 upheld this theory.45 The Commission concluded its report by noting that: it can hardly be disputed that, in the absence of treaty stipulation, a country through which streams have their course or in which lakes exist can in the exercise of its sovereign power, rightfully divert or otherwise appropriate the waters within its territory for purposes of irrigation, the improvement of navigation, or for any other purpose which the government may deem proper… it would seem, therefore, to be settled international law… that the exercise of sovereign power over waters within the jurisdiction of a country, cannot be questioned, and that, notwithstanding such exercise, may take such form that will be injurious to another country through which the waters of the
43
44
45
This river starts in the US, flows south to the border, then flows along the border for about 60% of the distance that the USA and Mexico are joined. See: R. JOHNSON, “The Columbia Basin”, in A. GARRETSON et al. (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, p. 184; D. LEMARQUAND, International Rivers: The Politics of Cooperation, 1977, p. 12; S. McCAFFREY, “The Harmon Doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised”, Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996), p. 725. Once Mexico announced the illegality of the US’s act, the US Secretary of State referred the matter to Attorney General, Mr. Judson Harmon, for an opinion to clarify whether the diversion was a permitted act by the rules of international law or not, and if not whether Mexico was in a position to claim damages or any other relief. See: R. JOHNSON, supra note 45, p. 184; J. BAINS, “The Diversion of International Rivers”, Indian Journal of International Law 1 (1960-1961), p. 39; A. LESTER, “Pollution”, in A. GARRETSON et al. (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, p. 95. This commission, which was embraced by an equal number of Americans and Canadians as members, issued its joint report on the application of the Minnesota Canal and Power Company of Duluth, Minnesota, for permission to divert certain waters in the State of Minnesota from the boundary waters between the United States and Canada. See: J. BAINS, supra note 46, p. 39.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
123
same streams or lakes pass, it cannot be rightfully regarded as furnishing a cause of war…46
Again the United States as an up-stream State, upheld the Harmon doctrine in its dispute with Canada regarding the legality of diversion of water undertaken by the United States as a consequence of the opening of the Chicago Drainage Canal as a result of which the flow of the Chicago Lake and the St. Lawrence River were reversed, and the level of water in the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence were lowered.47 Despite its earlier practice upholding the Harmon doctrine which was supported by the International Waterway Commission and by some international lawyers,48 the United States rejected the application of this doctrine as a downstream State objected the announced intention of Canada to divert the Columbia River waters in 1955. Canada argued that its decision to divert water was based on Article II of the 1909 Treaty concluded with the United States on the basis of the Harmon doctrine.49 Some Canadian lawyers upheld this theory in defending Canada’s position stating that:
46
47 48
49
Compiled Reports of the International Waterway Commission 1905-1913, Sessional Papers No. 19a, Canada, Sessional Papers, vol. XLVII, 1913, pp. 363365: cited in C. HYDE, International Law, as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, vol. 1, 1945, p. 567, Note 5. DEALEY, “The Chicago Drainage Canal and St. Lawrence Development”, American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 22 (1929), p. 327. The Harmon Doctrine was supported by some lawyers, for instance: R. MACKAY, “The International Joint Commission between the United States and Canada”, AJIL 22 (1928), p. 292; E. HYDE, supra note 48, p. 565; H. BRIGGS, The Law of Nations, 1952, p. 274. Article II of the Boundary Water Treaty, 1909 concluded between USA and Great Britain on behalf of Canada, provided that each party reserved to itself the “exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters”. For more details regarding Canadian right to divert, see: C. MARTIN, “The Diversion of Columbia River Waters”, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 25-27 April 1957, p. 5; J. LIPPER, supra note 7, pp. 25-26.
124
Mohamed S. Amr
A State may do as it pleases with the waters in its territories without concern for downstream interests… this was the theory that supported the diversion of the Allegash River in Maine and was raised in the discussions about the Milk and St. Mary Rivers and also about the Rio Grande.50
It has been concluded that: “Canada‘s legal right to divert the waters of any river in Canada is absolute.”51 The United States rejected the Canadian position and argued that Article II was merely a restatement of customary international law, which rejected the theory of absolute sovereignty and embraced limited sovereignty.52 In its Legal Memorandum 1958, the United States argued that: 1.
2.
A riparian has the sovereign right to make maximum use of the part of a system of international water within its jurisdiction, consistent with the corresponding right of each co-riparian … Riparian are entitled to share in the use and benefits of a system of international waters on a just reasonable basis.53
The United States concluded its Memorandum by stating that: [a] riparian which propose to make, or to allow, a change in the existing regime of a system of international waters which could interfere with the realization by a co-riparian of its own right to share on a just and reasonable basis in the use and benefits of the system is under a duty to give the coriparian an opportunity to object.54
The above paragraph clearly affirms the position of the United States in repudiating the Harmon doctrine. Nowadays, the Harmon doctrine does not receive the support of the majority of international lawyers who find that it gives unlimited rights to one riparian State without regard to the interest of other States. In their view, this doctrine is inconsistent with international legal principles and hinders international cooperation in the exploitation of natural resources. 50 51 52 53 54
C. BOURNE, in Proceedings Regional Meeting American Society of International Law, “The Diversion of Columbia River Water”, 1956, p. 27. Ibid., p. 32. J. LIPPER, supra note 7, p. 26. Legal Aspects of the Use of Systems of International Waters, S. Doc. No. 118, 85th Cong., 2nd Session 1958, pp. 89-90, cited in J. LIPPER, supra note 7, p. 26. Ibid., pp. 90-91.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
125
It has also been stated that this doctrine infringes upon the sovereignty of a lower riparian State while international law, regardless of the nature of asserted claims, is based upon the equality of States.55 B. Absolute Territorial Integrity The absolute territorial integrity theory constitutes the opposite extreme of the Harmon doctrine.56 According to this theory, a State is entitled to expect that the same volume of water, uninterrupted in quantity and unimpaired in quality, flows into its territory. Therefore, it demands the maintenance of the natural regime of the river, and consequently no interruption, diminution or augmentation of the flow caused by the use of waters located in a riparian State is permitted. The upper-stream State has the right to exploit the waters of a river so long as such utilization does not affect the interests of the lower riparian. On the other hand, downstream States have the right to object any upstream water utilization that is likely to disrupt the natural flow.57 This theory received little support by international lawyers to the extent that it has been noted that this theory was never accepted in international law and practice, since it was considered to be unworkable.58
55
56
57 58
A. LESTER, supra note 46, p. 96; ULLMAN, Une question de droit international sur les cours d’eau, 1911, pp. 10-11. It should be noted that this theory was upheld and supported by other international lawyers, see: J. BAINS, supra note 46, p. 46; G. RAJU, “Principles of Law Governing the Diversion of International Rivers”, Indian Journal of International Law 2 (1962), p. 370. For more details about this theory see : V. BON, “L’exploitation industrielle de cours d’eaux internationaux”, Revue générale de droit international public (RGDIP), vol. 17, pp. 281; L. OPPENHEIM, International Law, 8th ed., vol. 1, ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1955, pp. 475, 290; H. REID, “Servitudes Internationales”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International (R.C.A.D.I.) (1933) III, p. 18. S. YU, supra note 5, p. 990. D. CAPONERA, Principles of Water Law and Administration, National and International, 1992, p. 213.
126
Mohamed S. Amr
C. The Theory of Community of Interest59 According to the community of interest theory, a State’s sovereignty is limited by similar rights of other States sharing the same basin.60 This theory emphasizes the maximum utilization and optimum economic development of an entire river basin. It reinstates the community of interest approach and attributes a positive duty to render active cooperation in the rational development and utilization of the shared water resources.61 In other words, this theory considers the water of an international drainage basin to be managed as a unit without regard to national territorial boundaries. Therefore, the various co-riparian States should manage and develop the drainage basin jointly and share the benefits derived therefrom. This theory has never been widely applied, especially with regard to the nonnavigational uses of international watercourses, since it considers only the economic aspect of development and maximum utilization of resources without considering the other aspects such as protecting the environment or even the different levels of development of the States dependent on those resources.62 This theory was upheld by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Territorial Competence of the River Oder Commission case (hereinafter River Oder case), where the Court concluded that: the community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege of any one riparian State in relation to the others.63
In the Lake Lanoux case, the Arbitral Tribunal dismissed this theory. It was argued by Spain that France had not based the development scheme for the waters of Lake Lanoux on a foundation 59 60 61 62 63
It is known also as the theory of “Optimum Utilization”. For more details regarding this theory, see: H. FARNHAM, The Law of Waters and Water Rights, 1904. S. GARG, supra note 8, p. 20. N. ISLAM, supra note 15, p. 334. PCIJ Ser. A, No. 23, 1929, p. 27.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
127
of absolute equality and had imposed the scheme unilaterally without associating Spain with it in a common search for an acceptable solution. The Tribunal rejected Spain’s argument and concluded that: “the upstream State… is not obliged to associate the downstream State in the elaboration of its schemes”.64 Consequently, as a result of this award one can conclude that an upper-stream State has no obligation to involve a lower riparian State in its development and planning of projects for the exploitation of the transboundary resources. D. Limited Territorial Sovereignty and Integrity According to this limited territorial sovereignty theory, States have a sovereign right to use a water resource in international watercourses lying within its own territory to the extent that such use does not cause any injury or harm to other States.65 Accordingly, if the use of water resources in international watercourses by a State affects the interest of the co-riparian State, then the sovereign right of the State to the use of water in the international watercourses is limited or restricted. This theory is based on the rule of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which leads one to note that sovereignty over shared water is relative and qualified. This theory finds its basis in a letter of the Dutch government to the Dutch Ministries in Paris and London regarding the use of the River Meuse by Belgium and the Netherlands, in 1862. The letter stated that: The Meuse being a river common both to Holland and to Belgium it goes without saying that both parties are entitled to make the natural use of the stream, but at the same time, following general principles of law, each is bound to abstain from any action which might cause damage to the other. In other words, they can not be allowed to make themselves masters of the
64 65
ILR 1957, pp. 139-140. For more details see: B. WINIARSKI, “Principes généraux du droit fluvial”, R.C.A.D.I. 45 (1933) III, p. 81; F. BERBER, Rivers in International Law, 1959, p. 25; D. CAPONERA, Principles of Water Law and Administration, National and International, 1992, p. 213.
128
Mohamed S. Amr
water by diverting it to serve their own needs, whether for purposes of navigation or of irrigation.66
This theory received wide support by international lawyers and is considered as a general principle of international law.67 For instance, Brierly concluded that: “each State has in principle an equal right to make the maximum use of the water within its territory, but in exercising this right must respect the corresponding rights of other States.”68 In addition, Article II of the Salzburg Resolution on the use of International Non-Maritime Waters, adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1961, stated that: Every State has the right to utilize waters which traverse or border its territory, subject to the limits imposed by international law and, in particular, those resulting from provisions which follow. This right is limited by the right of utilization of other States interested in the same watercourse or hydrographic basin.69
This theory was upheld by the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Diversion of Water from the Meuse case (hereinafter the Meuse case). The Court in reply to the challenge raised by the Netherlands regarding the implemented projects undertaken by Belgium to feed the Hasselt Canal with water from the Meuse held that: [a]s regards such canals, each of the two States is at liberty, in its own territory, to modify them, to enlarge them, to transform them, to fill them and even to increase the volume of water in them from new sources, provided that the diversion of water at the treaty feeder and the volume of water to be
66 67
68 69
H. SMITH, The Economic Uses of International Rivers, 1931, p. 217. Ibid., p. 151; F. BERBER, Rivers in International Law, 1959, p. 25; C. BOURNE, “The Right to Utilize the Waters of International Rivers”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law 13 (1965), p. 203; A. GARRETSON et al. (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, pp. 26-27; G. ECKSTEIN, supra note 32, p. 75. J. BRIERLY, The Law of Nations, ed. by Sir Humphary Waldock, 6th ed, 1963, p. 231. Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at its session in Salzburg, 3-12 September 1961, AJIL 56 (1962), pp. 737-738.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
129
discharged therefrom to maintain the normal level and flow… is not affected.70
According to the above, it seems clear that the Court has granted States freedom to act with regard to the water passing throughout their territories with one limitation that such act will not affect the level of water of other States.
STATE PRACTICE IN REGULATING INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
DIVERSION
OF
International practice has witnessed the conclusion of several international treaties which specifically regulate diversion of international rivers as well as other international treaties regulating the utilization and management of international rivers generally and which also address the issue of diversion of watercourses. The provisions related to diversion included in these treaties may permit the act of diversion without any limit, or regulate it by requesting that some procedures should be exhausted or that certain conditions are fulfilled by the willing State, or prohibit the unilateral act of diversion altogether. A. Treaties concluded specifically to address diversion of international watercourses States may agree to conclude international treaties to regulate the diversion of the flow of water of some specific international watercourses. Despite the limited number of such kind of treaties, they set the rules for undertaking the unilateral acts of diversion by one of the State parties. For instance the treaty between Finland and Norway 1951, regulates the diversion of the flow of water from lakes Garsjoen, Kjerringvatn and Forstevannene to the waterway of Gandvik instead of that of the River Naatamo (Neiden). By virtue of this treaty, the Finnish Government undertakes not to raise any 70
PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70, 1937, p. 26.
130
Mohamed S. Amr
objection to the closing off of the natural outlets from Garsjoen, Kjerringvatn and Forstevannene, by means of dams or by other means, or the diversion of the flow of water from these lakes to Fuglevatn, or its affluents through tunnels.71 Netherlands and Belgium also concluded a treaty in 1961, to regulate the diversion of water from the river Meuse. According to this treaty, Netherlands is authorized to dismantle lock 19 of the Zuid-Willernsvaart waterway, referred to in the treaty of 1863 to regulate the regime of the diversion of water from the Meuse, and to fill in the part of the Zuid-Willernsvaart waterway laying to the south of the junction of the connecting canal with the lift lock in the Bosscheveld.72 Finally such a provision has also been included in the treaty between the United States and Canada 1969, for the temporary diversion for power purposes of the water normally flowing over the American Falls at Niagara.73 B. Treaties regulating the utilization of international watercourses and referring to the issue of diversion 1. Absolute permission of unilateral diversion of international watercourses Some international treaties permit its parties to undertake a unilateral act of diversion of the international river. For instance, the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909 between the United States and Great Britain, grants to each party an exclusive jurisdiction and control over the use and diversion, whether temporary or permanent, of all waters on its own side of the line which in their natural channels would flow across the boundary or into boundary waters.74 Similar provisions are 71 72 73
74
Article 1 See UNTS 1981, pp. 70-71. Article 1 See UNTS 1963, p. 163. According to Article 1 the minimum flows over the Falls stipulated in Article IV of the Niagara River Treaty of 1950 shall be reduced from 100,000 c.f.s. and 50,000 c.f.s., respectively, to 92,000 c.f.s. and 41,000 c.f.s., respectively, during the hours designated in that Article. Any water in excess of these new temporary minimums may be diverted for power purposes. See UNTS 1970, p. 255. Article 2. For more details, see: I. REINUMAGI, “Diverting Water from the Great Lakes: Pulling the Plug on Canada”, Valparaiso University Law Review 20 (1986), pp. 328-329. However, the interpretation of this article was subject to different views expressed by both United States and Canada as a consequence of
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
131
included in the temporary agreement between Bangladesh and India regarding the Farakka project of 1975 by which India was allowed to divert, during the dry season (21 April to 31 May 1975) 11,000 cubes of flow into the feeder canal in April and 16,000 cusecs in May.75 2. Unilateral diversion subject to some conditions and qualifications Some international treaties dealt in general with international watercourses, included provisions permitting diversion of water subject to the fulfillment of certain procedures. For instance, the 1960 declaration issued by the co-riparian States of the Uruguay River (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay) requires the authorization of the Permanent Mixed Technical Commission, established with equal representation of all parties, in connection with all matters pertaining to the utilization, impounding and diversion of the water of this river or its tributaries. If no agreement is reached, “diplomatic procedures” are to be used, and if no solution is reached, dispute must be submitted to arbitration.76 Accordingly, if any of these States act unilaterally
75
76
the announcement of Canada to divert water from the Columbia River. Canada defended its position on the basis of Article 2 of the Boundary Water Treaty 1909, signed by the two parties, which permits any of them to liberally divert water. Some United States lawyers opposed the Canadian position on the basis that Canada misinterpreted Article 2 and the treaty did not support its position at all. In their view, the purpose and effect of Article 2 “was merely that each party reserved exclusive jurisdiction and control of the river within its own territory as to uses by private citizens, but nowhere therein did the United States consent that Canada could make unlimited or any substantial diversions to another river system… such a diversion would be of course unthinkable.” This argument was rejected by other Canadian lawyers, such as Bourne, who claimed that according to Article 2, the only limitation on the right of Canada to divert the water of a river is non-interference with navigation. In addition, they argued that the language of the article made it unmistakably clear that it embodied the wellknown “Harmon doctrine”, which the United States Government had invoked in its disputes with Mexico and also had relied on in its dealing with the Allegash River flowing across the boundary into Canada. See: E. HUTCHESON, supra note 13, p. 21; C. BOURNE, supra note 52, p. 26. This treaty was valid for only forty-one days and was not renewed by the two parties. See: S. SUBEDL, “Hydro-Diplomacy in South Asia: The conclusion of the Mahakali and Ganges River treaties”, AJIL 93 (1999), p. 958. R. HAYTON, “The Plata Basin”, in A. GARRETSON et al. (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, pp. 381-382.
132
Mohamed S. Amr
without respecting the mechanism for the management of the Uruguay River, as agreed by the co-riparian States, such State would be in breach of its international obligations. Another example of such treaties can be found in the Mekong Treaty concluded by Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam to regulate cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong River and which permits diversion subject to detailed conditions. Article 5 of the said Treaty adopted the principle of reasonable and equitable utilization and sets out the procedures to be followed in case any of the riparian States wish to divert water from the inter-basin. It requires the State to notify the Joint Committee in case of inter-basin diversion on tributaries of the Mekong River, including Tonle Sap. If the diversion occurs on the mainstream of the Mekong River, the treaty makes a distinction between two cases. If the diversion occurs during the wet season, then the inter-basin diversion shall be subject to prior consultation, which aims at arriving at an agreement by the Joint Committee. Secondly, if the diversion is undertaken during the dry season, then such diversion must be agreed upon by the Joint Committee through a specific agreement for each project prior to any proposed diversion. However, should there be a surplus quantity of water available in excess of the proposed uses of all parties in any dry season, verified and unanimously confirmed as such by the Joint Committee, an inter-basin diversion of the surplus could be made subject to prior consultation.77 Article 26 of the said Treaty entrusted the Joint Committee to prepare and propose for approval of the Council, inter alia, Rules for Water Utilization and Inter-Basin Diversion, including the setting up of a mechanism to monitor inter-basin diversion from the mainstream.78
77
78
Regarding the position of the State Parties in adopting this Article, see: G. BROWDER and L. ORTOLANO, “The Evolution of an International Water Resources Management Regime in the Mekong River Basin”, Natural Resources Journal 40 (2000), pp. 520-521. It should be noted that according to the Mekong River Treaty, the Mekong River Committee is a single organization with three bodies: the Council, the Joint Committee, and the Secretariat. For the composition and function of each of these organs, see: Article 12, 15, 21-24 and 28-30 of the Mekong River Treaty 1995.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
133
3. Absolute prohibition of unilateral diversion of international watercourses Some international treaties prevent the co-riparian States to take any unilateral action, including diversion of water, related to a specific international watercourse. For instance the Treaty concluded between Argentina and Uruguay concerning the Utilization of the Rapids of the Uruguay River in the Salto Grande area 1946, provides that the diversion, whether temporarily or permanently, of the waters of the Uruguay River and its tributaries upstream of the dam shall be granted by the Governments solely within their respective jurisdiction.79 In the same manner, the Mahakali River treaty concluded between India and Nepal states that each party undertakes not to use or obstruct or divert the waters of the Mahakali River adversely affecting its natural flow and level except by an agreement between the two States.80 C. Evaluation In the light of the foregoing, one may conclude that the act of diversion of water from any international watercourses can have one of the following scenarios: (a) if diversion is absolutely permitted by a specific or general treaty without specifying any requirements or conditions, then any co-riparian State party to this treaty has the right to divert the waters and such act shall be considered as a lawful act; (b) if diversion is permitted subject to the fulfillment of some requirements and conditions, then any State party has the right to divert water, provided that it respects these conditions or requirements; (c) if diversion is prohibited and the State acted to the contrary, such an act shall be considered unlawful; and (d) if there is no rule governing diversion of a specific watercourse then the general principles stipulated in 79 80
Article 5, UNTS 1969, p. 30. Article 7.
134
Mohamed S. Amr
international law and more specifically international water law shall be applicable in order to determine the legality of such an act. The determination of the legality of the act of diversion under (d) should be subject to the principles of “equitable utilization” and “noharm” as well as other principles of international law in addition to some procedural requirements as stipulated by some international treaties and other rules of customary international law. These principles and rules will be examined under the following points.
THE PRINCIPLES OF “EQUITABLE UTILIZATION” AND “NOHARM” Diversion of international watercourses touches both the principle of “equitable utilization” and the concept of “no-harm”. As both issues are considered to be the corner stones of the subject matter of this study, a careful analysis of both principles under international law and more specifically international water law, is needed. A. The “Equitable utilization” of watercourses81 The principle of “equitable utilization” governs any use of shared natural resources by two or more States. Therefore, its treatment is essential to any comprehensive study on international watercourses and more specifically to any act related to it such as diversion. It has been noted that: this principle originated as a middle position of reasonableness between the two extreme principles of the absolute territorial sovereignty assertion of upstream States and absolute territorial integrity claims of downstream States.82
81 82
Many terms have been used for this principle, such as: “equitable apportionment” or “equitable participation.” A. UTTON, “Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That of Reasonableness or that of No Harm?”, Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996), p. 638.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
135
This principle means that a State has a right equal to that of another State in sharing the utilization of the shared international watercourses. Since each riparian State cannot satisfy its needs concerning international watercourses to their full extent, some adjustment or accommodation is necessary.83 Therefore, in the absence of specific conventional rules, such adjustment is made on the basis of equity.84 This established principle of equitable utilization of international watercourses has been reflected in the resolutions of international bodies and the 1997 UN Convention and was considered by international tribunals.85 1. Equitable utilization in the light of the work of international bodies and 1997 UN Convention In 1958, the International Law Association adopted in 1958 a resolution on the “Use of the Waters in International Rivers.” This resolution stated that: [e]xcept as otherwise provided by treaty or other instruments or customs binding upon the parties, each co-riparian State is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of a drainage basin. What amounts to a reasonable and equitable share is a question to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.86
83 84
85
86
D. CAPONERA, “The Legal Status of the Shatt-al-Arab (Tigris and Euphrates) River Basin”, Austrian Journal of Public International Law 45 (1993), p. 156. Judge Hudson in the Meuse case noted that: “[w]hat are widely known as principles of equity have long been considered to constitute a part of international law, and as such they have often been applied by international tribunals… A sharp division between law and equity… should find no place in international jurisprudence … Whether the reference in an arbitration treaty is to the application of “law and equity” or to justifiability dependent on the possibility of applying “law or equity”, it would seem to envisage equity as a part of law.” PCIJ, Ser. A/B, No. 70, 1937, p. 76. Similarly, Article 2 of the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992, stated that the State Parties to Convention shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the transboundary waters are used in a “reasonable and equitable” way. The ILA Report of the 48th Conference, New York, 1958, pp. viii-x.
136
Mohamed S. Amr
The principle of “equitable utilization” was further included with great elaboration in the Helsinki Rules adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) at its fifty-second conference, held at Helsinki in 1966. Article IV of these rules states that: “Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.” Article V of the said Rules provides a list of factors to be considered in identifying and determining the “reasonable and equitable share” of water such as: climate, geography and hydrology of the basin, past and existing uses of the waters, the economic and social needs of each State, the population dependent on the waters of the basin, the availability and cost of alternatives, the practicability of resolving the conflict through compensation, and the degree to which waste and unnecessary injury can be avoided.87 In evaluating the equitability of use, all the above relevant factors are to be considered together and a conclusion must be reached on the basis of the whole. Accordingly, it seems that determination of the most equitable use in the light of Helsinki Rules is not a static matter but it may vary from
87
Paragraph 2 of this Article states: “Relevant factors which are to be considered, include, but are not limited to: (a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage area in the territory of each basin State; (b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by each basin State; (c) the climate affecting the basin; (d) the past utilization of the water of the basin, including in particular existing utilization; (e) the economic and social needs for each State; (f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State; (g) the comparable costs of alternative means of satisfying the economic and social need of each basin State; (h) the availability of other resources; (i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of the waters of the basin; (j) the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of adjusting conflicts among uses; and, (k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.”
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
137
one river system to another and may change in one river system over a period of time.88 This principle was also supported by the International Law Commission (ILC) Reports issued on the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses. In its third Report, the Commission concluded that aside from the rule that no State may cause appreciable harm to another State, there may be a: more widely accepted principle in the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses that each system State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share of the beneficial uses of waters.89 (Emphasis added).
In addition, McCaffrey has noted that: The waters of an international watercourse shall be developed, used and shared by watercourse States in a reasonable and equitable manner on the basis of good faith and good-neighbourly relations with a view to attaining optimum utilization thereof consistent with adequate protection of an international watercourse and its components.90
The principle of equitable and reasonable utilization was embodied in the UN Convention 1997. Article 5 provides that States shall utilize watercourses in their territories in an “equitable and reasonable manner”. It also confirms that the use and development of any international watercourse by a watercourse State shall be taken with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefit therefrom, taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, and consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse. In addition, the above-mentioned article provides that watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.
88
89 90
Lipper noted that: “nor is the determination of an equitable utilization final for all times. Changing circumstances may require revaluation and a new determination.” See: J. LIPPER, supra note 7, p. 66. Yearbook of the International Law Commission (YBILC) (1982) II, (part1), p. 75. YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 111.
138
Mohamed S. Amr
Article 6 of the 1997 UN Convention contains a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining what is equitable and reasonable.91 These relevant factors are to be considered together and conclusion reached in this regard on the basis of the whole. These factors, among others, are related to geographic, hydrological, prior use, climate, ecological, economic and social needs and the population dependent on the waters of the basin.92
91
92
“(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural character; (b) The social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned; (c) The population dependent on that watercourse in each watercourse State; (d) The effect of the use or uses for the watercourses in one watercourse State on other watercourse States; (e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse; (f) Conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect; (g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable value, to a particular planned or existing use.” Despite the fact that the UN Convention 1997 has followed the Helsinki Rules by providing a non-exhaustive list of the factors to be considered in determining equitable and reasonable use, some lawyers have noted that there is some difference between the two mentioned instruments. For instance, while the Helsinki Rules specify that the extent of a basin contained in each of the riparian States and the water contribution of each State are factors which should be considered in determining an equitable allocation, the UN Convention 1997 does not specifically state that these must be considered. The Helsinki Rules state that the past and present utilization of the basin waters should be considered, whereas the UN Convention 1997 refers only to the existing and potential uses. The Helsinki Rules regard historical patterns of use to be an important consideration in determining equitable use, while the 1997 UN Convention does not. The Helsinki Rules state that the availability of other resources, presumably including non-hydrological resources, should be considered while the 1997 UN Convention makes no direct reference to other resources when considering equitable allocations. See: J. CHENOWETH, “International River Basin Management: Data and Information Exchange under International Law and the Vase of Mekong River”, Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 18 (2000), p. 145; S. AMER, “Legal Regime of International Rivers”, in S. AMER (ed.), The New International Watercourses Law and Arab Interests, 2001, pp. 71-73.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
139
2. The Principle of “equitable utilization” in the dictum of International Adjudication The principle of equitable utilization of watercourses was addressed by international courts and arbitral tribunals in a number of cases. In the River Oder case, the Permanent Court of International Justice held that: the community of interests in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian States in the use of the whole course of the river…93
The International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo case also addressed this principle.94 This case concerned a dispute related to the implementation and termination of a treaty concluded by the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Czechoslovak People’s Republic in 1977. According to this treaty, the two countries had agreed to build two barrages which would then be jointly operated. The treaty also envisaged diversion of water from the Danube onto Czechoslovak territory. The treaty included some provisions related to the construction and operation of a System of Locks by the parties as a “joint investment”.95 After concluding the treaty, construction began but in May 1989, Hungary decided to suspend the works at Nagymaros pending the completion of various studies related to the environmental aspects of the barrages. The Hungarian authorities finally decided to abandon the works at Nagymaros and to maintain the statu quo at Dunakiliti.96 The above position led Czechoslovakia to decide to proceed unilaterally with a provisional solution known as “Variant C”. Czechoslovakia unilaterally diverted water from the Danube to its territory some 10 kilometres upstream of Dunakiliti. In 1992 when Czechoslovakia split into two countries, it was agreed that Slovakia would succeed to the ownership of the Czechoslovak 93 94
95 96
PCIJ Series A, No. 23, 1929, p. 27. For the background of the case and the positions of the disputant parties in detail, see: G. BERRISCH, “The Danube Dam Dispute under International Law”, Austrian Journal of International Law 46 (1994), p. 231. ICJ Rep. 1997, para. 15. Ibid. para. 22.
140
Mohamed S. Amr
part of the project. Later on, about eighty percent of the water of the Danube was diverted into a bypass canal on Slovak territory. Hungary claimed that the diversion undertaken by Slovakia was an illegal act in the light of the 1977 Treaty and the related Agreement of 6 May 1976 as well as the Boundary Waters Convention of 31 of May 1976.97 Hungary further claimed that the 1977 Treaty did not allow for unilateral operation of the Barrage System by either party.98 After a lengthy negotiation, the parties agreed to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Czechoslovakia rejected the Hungarian claim and argued that: Variant C was essentially no more than what Hungary had already agreed to and that the only modifications made were those which had become necessary by virtue of Hungary’s decision not to implement its treaty obligations.99 The Court examined a wide range of international legal issues, inter alia, international watercourses law. In this regard the Court stated that: the suspension and withdrawal of that consent constituted a violation of Hungary‘s legal obligations, demonstrating, as it did, the refusal by Hungary of joint operation; but that cannot mean that Hungary forfeited its basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse100 (emphasis added).
The Court addressed the legality of the unilateral act of diversion taken by Czechoslovakia in the light of the provisions of 1977 Treaty. The Court noted that: It is true that Hungary, in concluding the 1977 Treaty, had agreed to the damming of the Danube and the diversion of its waters into the bypass canal. But it was only in the context of a joint operation and a sharing of its benefits that Hungary had given its consent. The suspension and withdrawal of that consent constituted a violation of Hungary’s legal obligations, demonstrating, as it did, the refusal by Hungary of joint operation; but that cannot mean that 97 98 99 100
ICJ Pleadings 1 (1994), Memorial of Hungary, p. 210. Ibid. p. 211. ICJ Rep. 1997. para. 78. Ibid.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
141
Hungary forfeited its basic right to an equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.101
It was further held by the Court that … Czechoslovakia by unilaterally assuming control of the shared resources, and thereby depriving Hungary of its right to an equitable and reasonable share of natural resources of the Danube – with the continuing effects of the diversion of these waters on the ecology of the riparian area of the Szigetkoz failed to respect the proportionality which is required by international law.102 (Emphasis added).
It seems clear that the Court supported the principle of equitable utilization as a basic rule governing the use and allocation of international watercourses. It considered the Czech/Slovakia‘s act of unilateral diversion could be qualified as a failure to respect proportionality, which is required by international law. Having considered the principle of equitable utilization in the light of international practice and jurisprudence as well as the 1997 UN Convention, it can be concluded that granting equitable utilization entitles all riparian States to a reasonable share of the uses and benefits of the waters of international watercourses. Applying this principle to the issue of diversion, it seems clear that States, when undertaking a unilateral act to divert water, should consider this principle as imposing limits upon it when taking such an act. Therefore, diversion will not be justified if it is not based on the principle of equitable utilization. However, it is not the only principle to be considered by the concerned State before taking such action which should also take into account that such action will not cause harm to the other riparian States.
101 102
Ibid. ICJ Rep. 1997, para. 85. See also, P. SANDS, “Watercourses, Environment and the International Court of Justice: the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Case,” in S. SALMAN and L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (eds.), International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and Management Conflict, Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar, World Bank Technical Paper 414 (1998), pp. 103-105.
142
Mohamed S. Amr
B. The Principle of “No-Harm” 1. The Principle of “No-Harm” in the work of international bodies and the 1997 UN Convention This principle originally found its basis in international law with regard to the prevention of extraterritorial environmental pollution. The direct result of this concept is that a State may not use or allow its territory to be used in such a manner that harm is caused to the territory or interests of another State.103 The application of this concept was extended to international watercourses. Accordingly, riparian States are required to take due care or due diligence to prevent or abate transfrontier water pollution which causes harm in other riparian States.104 The 1966 Helsinki Rules make no mention of this principle, which would enjoin riparian States from causing harm to their co-riparian State. Article V, which enumerates the elements to determine the equitable and reasonable share, refers to “the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State”.105 The Rules also address specifically the issue of transboundary pollution. Article X prohibits any new form of water pollution or any increase in the degree of existing water pollution in international drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in the territory of a co-basin State.
Article XI provides that a polluting State must cease the polluting activity and compensate the injured State. The World Charter for Nature adopted in 1983 by the United Nations General Assembly provides that
103 104 105
D. CAPONERA, supra note 83, p. 156. J. LAMMERS, Pollution of International Watercourses, 1984, p. 632. Article 5 paragraph 2/k. See: L. CAFLISCH, “Regulation of the Uses of International Watercourses”, in S. SALMAN and L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (eds.), International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and Management Conflict, Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar, World Bank Technical Paper 414 (1998), p. 8.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
143
States… shall… [e]nsure that activities within their jurisdictions or control do not cause damage to the natural systems located within other States or in the areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.106
In his third report of the ILC, Schwebel stated that: 1.
2.
The right of a system State to use the water resources of an international watercourse system is limited by the duty not to cause appreciable harm to the interests of another system State, except as may be allowable under a determination for equitable participation for the international watercourse system involved. Each system State is under a duty to refrain from, and restrain all persons under its jurisdiction or control from engaging in, any activity that may cause appreciable harm to the interests of another system State, except as may be allowable under paragraph 1 of this article.107
The 1997 UN Convention stipulates that States when using the international watercourses are required to refrain from “causing of significant harm to other watercourses States”.108 The term “significant”, as a standard of harm, was used for the first time in the 1994 ILC Draft Article.109 Other terms were proposed to be used, such 106 107
108
109
G.A. Res. 37/7 (Annex) UN GAOR, 37th Sess. No. 51, at 17, UN Doc. A/37/51 (1983). Third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report by Stephen Schwebel, UN GAOR, ILC 34th sess. UN Doc A/CN.4/348 (1982), pp. 104-105. Article 7 of the UN Convention states that: “1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States. 2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the State whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in conclusion with affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.” It should be noted that term “significant” has never been used by any earlier international treaty related to the international watercourses. Many previous international treaties used the term “harm” without any qualifications, such as the Convention between Great Britain and United States 1909, the Convention between Ecuador and Peru 1971, the Exchange of memoranda between Egypt and United Kingdom regarding the River Nile, July 1952 and July 1953. Other treaties used different standards such as: “important damage” (United Kingdom
144
Mohamed S. Amr
as “appreciable”, “substantial”.110 The difference among all these terms is related to the degree of “harm” which might be caused by the act of any riparian State, specially the upstream States, to other riparian States. The standard of “significant” as used by the 1997 UN Convention, means that there must be actual harm of a certain amount caused to riparian States by the act undertaken by other riparian States.111 Therefore, each State has to prove that it is not only harmed but also there is a serious or real dilution of its rights and it has a harmful effect. Therefore, the evaluation of harm might differ from one country to another. Accordingly, if diversion is undertaken by any upper-riparian State, the other lower-riparian States claim that such diversion caused harm to health, property, industry, wealth, agriculture and/or the environment. The principle of “significant harm” was also mentioned in Article 21 of the 1997 UN Convention.112 This article focuses on the
110
111
112
and Belgium 1934); “notable harm” (the Boundaries Agreement between Netherlands and Germany 1960), “substantial harm” (The Act of Santiago dated 26 June 1971 between Chili and Argentina). During the negotiation prior to the adoption of the Convention, Egypt had proposed not to use any qualifications in this regard and just use the term “harm”. See: A. EL-MOUFTI, “An Analytical Study foe the Convention of NonNavigational Use of International Watercourses”, in S. AMER (ed.), The New International Watercourses Law and the Arab Interests, 2001, p. 75. Pakistan also objected the use of the term “significant” while Ethiopia supported the term “significant”. See: A. SCHWABACH, “The United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Customary International Law, and the Interests of Developing Upper Riparian”, Texas International Law Journal 33 (1998), pp. 272-273. The 1991 ILC draft used the term “substantial harm”. During the negotiation it has been noted that the term “substantial” might have a variety of meanings and this ambiguity caused it ultimately to be considered undesirable for use in the ILC drafts. It has been noted also that the term “appreciable” harm was to be that which is not significant or barely detectable, but, was, nonetheless, not necessarily “serious”. The 1994 ILC draft has replaced “appreciable” with “significant”. For more details, see: M. FITZMAURICE, supra note 2, p. 438. The Second Report to the ILC presented by Evensen stated that: “1. No watercourse State may pollute or permit the pollution of the water of an international watercourse which causes or may cause appreciable harm to the rights or interests of other watercourse States in regard to their equitable use of such watercourses or to other harmful effects within their territories.” See: YBILC (1984) II, (part 2), p. 120.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
145
protection of watercourses from pollution caused by any co-riparian State. It imposes an obligation on the co-riparian States to prevent, reduce and control the pollution of watercourses that may cause significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment, including harm to human health or safety. This Article also applies in the case of diversion. It should not be interpreted restrictively to protection of the environment from pollution caused by other States but also to any act such as diversion of watercourses which might affect the level of water in the basin and consequently its quality. 2. The principle of “Harm” in the dictum of International Adjudication Since the concept of harm is not restricted only to international watercourses but applies to any act of States which has a transboundary effect, this concept was addressed by many international tribunals in several cases. The International Court of Justice considered the concept of harm in the Corfu Channel case. The Court established in its jurisprudence the principle of non-harm by declaring that every State has the obligation “not to allow knowingly its territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States”.113 The concept of “harm” was examined also by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Trial Smelter Arbitration between the United States and Canada in 1941. This case dealt with transboundary air pollution between the United States and Canada. The United States was seeking compensation from Canada for damages caused to United States farmers by emissions from zinc and lead smelter on the Canadian territory close to the United States border. The Arbitral Tribunal qualified the injury of “serious consequence”.114 The Tribunal stated that States do not have the right to permit significant injury to the territory of other States through the use of their own territory. It concluded that under the principles of international law
113 114
ICJ Rep. 1949, p. 4. UNRIAA 3, (1941).
146
Mohamed S. Amr
no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or properties or person therein, when the case is of a serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.115
Despite the fact that the Tribunal was dealing with a case related to air pollution, the principle adopted by the Tribunal can be extended to any case in which transboundary injuries caused by one State can affect any other State such as on contamination of water of any international watercourse or any act of diversion which might affect the flow of water to the lower riparian States.116 The Arbitral Tribunal in the Lake Lanoux case also addressed the concept of harm. Spain argued that the diversion of water undertaken by France would cause harm to it since such an act would affect the quantity and quality of water which it would receive. France defended its position of diverting waters of the Carol, which flows across the border into Spain, in order to generate electricity on the basis that it would not cause any harm to Spain. It argued that: “on the Spanish territory neither the course nor the flow of the Carol will suffer the slightest change.”117 It further argued that the diverted water was returned to the River Carol before it reached the Spanish border without loss in quantity or change in quality, and that, since the diversion involved no change in the regime in Spain, the matter was wholly within French competence, so that Spanish consent was unnecessary under the treaty.118 The Tribunal dismissed the Spanish claim and found that in undertaking diversion, France had granted the restitution of water to the Carol. In the Court’s opinion, no harm would be caused to Spain as long as the same quantity of water would not be affected by the French project.119 However, the Court envisaged that harm could be caused as a consequence of diversion. It noted that:
115 116 117 118 119
Ibid. G. ECKSTEIN, supra note 32, p. 77. ILR 1957, p. 117 For more details regarding the different claims and counter claims of the disputant parties, See: Ibid. pp. 112-119. Ibid. pp. 119, 121-125.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
147
it could have been argued that the works would bring about an ultimate pollution of the waters of the Carol or that the returned waters would have a chemical composition or a temperature or some other characteristics which could injure Spanish interests. Spain could then have claimed that her rights had been impaired.
The Court did not deal with this issue since it was not presented by Spain either in its written or oral pleadings.120 Having considered both the rules of international law and the jurisprudence, it can be concluded that the principle of harm stands side by side with the principle of equitable utilization in regulating the conduct of States when they decide to divert water from any international watercourse. This raises a question regarding the relationship between those two principles. C. “Equitable utilization” versus “Significant Harm” The removal of the concept of harm from the list of factors in Article 6 of the 1997 UN Convention to determine what is equitable and reasonable utilization and the reference to the concept of harm (significant) under a separate article (Article 7) raises an important question related to the relationship between “equitable utilization” and “significant harm”. Which rule should prevail in international water disputes: that of “equitable utilization” or “significant harm”? The 1997 UN Convention does not determine the primacy of one norm over the other.121
120 121
Ibid. p. 123. It has been noted that the 1991 ILC draft accorded unconditional primacy to the no-appreciable (significant) harm principle. The 1994 ILC draft retained the primacy of the no-significant harm principle. The ILC attempted to clarify the relationship between the principles of no-significant harm and equitable utilization by adding new words to Article 7 paragraph 2, to read as follows: “where, despite the exercise of due diligence, significant harm is caused…” The additional words “due diligence” were introduced in order to clarify the relationship between the two principles. Nevertheless, the final draft of Article 7 of the Convention does not include these proposed words and left the determination of the relationship unclear. For more details, see: M. FITZMAURICE, supra note 2, p. 439.
148
Mohamed S. Amr
The above question is well connected to the subject of diversion of international watercourses. This can be clarified by giving the following hypothetical example: where a river passes through two States namely X (upper-stream State) and Y (down-stream State) can State X undertakes a unilateral act to divert water from the river on the basis of equitable utilization, or should it be prevented from diverting water from the river on the basis that such diversion is likely to cause significant harm to State Y, and, if diversion were allowed, would State X be required to compensate State Y? The silence of the 1997 UN Convention to provide a clear answer in this regard led some international lawyers to consider the issue as controversial, and found that there is a direct clash between the principle of “equitable utilization” and the concept of “significant harm”.122 Some lawyers give priority to the principle of “equitable utilization” over the concept of “significant harm”. In their view, if a State’s use of a watercourse is equitable it should be allowed to continue, even if it causes significant harm to another State. The harming State, in such a case, would be obliged to minimize that harm to the extent possible and to compensate the other State for any unavoidable harm.123 On the contrary, other lawyers considered that the concept of “no significant harm” is the governing norm of watercourse law.124 The above different interpretation regarding the relationship between the two norms is a significant one since the 122
123
124
A. UTTON, supra note 86, p. 635; M. FITZMAURICE, “Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses”, Leiden Journal of International Law 10 (1997), p. 506. For the discussion which took place in the International Law Commission, see: L. CAFLISCH, “Regulation of the Uses of International Waterways: The Contribution of the United Nations”, in M. GLASSNER (ed.), The United Nations at Work, 1998, pp. 19-23. S. McCAFFREY, “An Assessment of the Work of the International Law Commission”, Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996), p. 309; S. McCAFFREY, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls”, in S. SALMAN and L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (eds.), International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and Management Conflict, Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar, World Bank Technical Paper 414 (1998), p. 22. P. WOUTERS, “An Assessment of Recent Developmenst in International Watercourse Law Through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing Use Allocation”, Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996), p. 424; M. FITZMAURICE, supra note 122, p. 506.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
149
adoption of any one of these different views would lead to a different result in determining the legality of any act taken unilaterally, such as diversion, by the upstream States. Therefore, other international lawyers have tried to find a compromise in this regard. It has been rightly noted that the two norms could be employed and be considered simultaneously in each case on an equal footing.125 This opinion is based on Article 10 of the 1997 UN Convention which provides that: “In the event of a conflict between uses of international watercourse, it shall be resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7…” Back to our hypothetical example, if State X would like to divert water from the river passing through its territory on the basis of the principle of “equitable utilization”, it has to consider at the same time the possible significant harm which can be caused to State Y as a result of such an act. Therefore, State X cannot defend its position by claiming that it gave due regard solely to the notion of equitable and reasonable utilization since its act can cause significant harm to State Y. In such a case, State X must take all appropriate measures and consult State Y in order to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the issue of compensation.126 In the light of above, one may conclude that the assessment of equitable use and the significant harm has to be decided on a case-bycase basis through balancing all relevant factors stipulated in Article 6 of the 1997 UN Convention together with the principle of “significant harm” as provided by Article 7 of the said Convention. This was also noted by McCaffrey, after considering Articles 5-7 and 10 of the UN Convention 1997, who concluded that: [t]his would presumably mean that if State A’s hydroelectric use conflict with State B’s agricultural use, the conflict is not to be resolved solely by applying the ‘no harm’ rule of Article 7, but rather through reference to the “package” of articles setting forth the principles of both equitable utilization and no harm.127 125
126 127
S. AMER, “Legal Regime of International Rivers”, in S. AMER (ed.), The New International Watercourses Law and Arab Interests, 2001, p. 34; A. EL-MOUFTI, supra note 113, p. 68. J. CHENOWETH, supra note 96, p. 146. S. McCAFFREY, “The UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Prospects and Pitfalls”, in S. SALMAN and L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (eds.), International Watercourses,
150
Mohamed S. Amr
APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON DIVERSION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: SUPPLEMENTARY RULES International law, through international instruments and custom, provides a number of principles, which can be considered as landmarks of the relationship among the member States of the international community. Some of these principles also govern the relations among riparian States, and can be recalled by them when dealing with the utilization, regulation and management of any international watercourse. In addition to the principle of equitable utilization and no-significant harm, these principles should be taken into account by riparian States when they decide to undertake any unilateral act related to the international watercourses. The 1997 UN Convention recognized these principles some of which are to be found throughout the text. A. International Cooperation The principle of cooperation is considered as one of the recognized principles of international law.128 This principle implies an obligation on States to co-operate with one another irrespective of differences in their political, economic and social systems, in all spheres of international relations, in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention.129 The duty to cooperate becomes more imperative in the economic sphere and particularly in the sphere of development, the utilization of shared natural resources and in resolving international problems. This principle was included in the
128
129
Enhancing Cooperation and Management Conflict, Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar, World Bank Technical Paper 414 (1998), p. 22. Article 1 of the UN Charter enumerates the purposes of the Organization, among which: “to achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character…” R. DAOUDI, “Promotion of Friendly Relations by International Organizations”, in M. BEDJAOUI (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991, p. 492.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
151
UN Charter as one of the Organization’s primary principles and was linked to the principle of friendly relations among States.130 It has also been mentioned in several resolutions of the General Assembly.131 The application of the principle of international cooperation to the issue of international watercourses and more specifically to the diversion of water from international watercourses was considered by many international lawyers. Early in 1930, Smith noted that: The first principle is that every river system is naturally an indivisible unit, and that as such it should be so developed as to tender the greatest possible service to the whole human community which it serves, whether or not that community is divided into two or more political considerations. It is the positive duty of every government concerned to cooperate to the extent of its power in promoting this development, though it cannot be called upon to imperil any vital interest or to sacrifice without full compensation and provision for security and other particular interest of its own, whether political, strategic, or economic, which the law of nations recognize as legitimate.132
Other international lawyers noted that: a use of water by a riparian State in an international watercourse which may affect the interest of a co-riparian State requires cooperation, without which a use of water by a riparian State in an international watercourse would create an unfair or injurious consequence to the co-riparian State.133
130
131
132 133
Article 1 paragraph 3 establishes as one of the purposes of the UN “to achieve international cooperation in solving international problems…” Article 55 and 56 of the Charter recite a pledge of all UN member States to cooperate with the Organization in the pursuit of “peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples. E.g. the Resolution 2625 (XXV), 1970, containing the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; Resolution 3281 (XXIX) 1974, views the principle of co-operation as a right to cooperate in economic fields as well as the right to participate on sub-regional and regional levels. H. SMITH, supra note 69, pp. 150-151. C. CHEE, supra note 9, p. 42.
152
Mohamed S. Amr
The application of the principle of cooperation in the utilization of international watercourses was also confirmed by several international instruments. Article 3 of the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States provides that: In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must cooperate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultation in order to achieve optimum use of such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interests of others.134
In addition, the UN Water Conference held in Mar del Plata in March 1977 issued two recommendations for cooperative action between the riparian States, one of them relating to regional and the other to international cooperation. In the case of sharing watercourses on a regional level, the conference recommended that: [i]n the case of shared water resources, cooperative action should be taken to generate appropriate data on which future management can be based and to devise appropriate institutions and understanding for 135 coordinated development.
With regard to international cooperation among the riparian States in international watercourses, it recommended that: It is necessary for States to cooperate in the case of shared water resources in recognition of the growing economic, environmental and physical interdependence across international frontiers. Such cooperation, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and principles of international law, must be exercised on the basis of equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States, and take due account of the principle expressed, inter alia, in Principle 21 of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.136
134 135 136
GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974. UN Report of the UN Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977, UN Doc. E/Conf. 70/29, p. 51. UN Report of the UN Water Conference, Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 1977, UN Doc. E/Conf. 70/29, p. 52.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
153
The 1997 UN Convention recognized the importance of the principle of international cooperation in using the international watercourses both in its preamble and in some other articles.137 Article 8 of the Convention refers to the obligation of cooperation as a general obligation.138 Article 11 also implies the principle of cooperation by imposing on State Parties to the Convention an obligation to inform and consult amongst themselves regarding any use of international watercourses.139 Therefore, States in using, managing or diverting international rivers passing through their territories must consider these principles all together as recognized principles of international law in order to make all possible joint efforts to maintain and improve all aspects of utilization of international watercourses. B. Good-neighbourliness The principle of good-neighbourliness was introduced as a principle of international law in the post Second World War era. It requires States to coexist peacefully while using transboundary natural resources within national boundaries. Accordingly, States, in general, are prohibited from taking any act which has a transboundary 137
138
139
In his Second Report to the ILC, Evensen accepted the application of the principle of cooperation by States in the use of water resources. Paragraph 1 of Article 10 entitled General Principles of Cooperation and Management, stipulates that: “[w]atercourse States sharing an international watercourse shall to the extent practicable, establish cooperation with regard to the uses projects, programs, planning and development related to such a watercourse in order to obtain optimum utilization, protection and control of the watercourse. Such cooperation shall be exercised on the basis of equality, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the watercourse States concerned.” See: YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 113. Article 8 entitled “General obligation to cooperate” provides that: “1. Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse. 2. In determining the manner of such cooperation, watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various regions”. See supra, p. 135.
154
Mohamed S. Amr
harmful effect upon the neighbouring State. It also imposes a duty on each State to tolerate, to a reasonable extent, the harmful effects caused by lawful activities undertaken in neighbouring States.140 This principle has been embodied in many international instruments. For instance, Article 74 of the UN Charter addressed the principle of good neighbourliness and provides that: members of the United Nations also agree that their policy… must be based on the general principle of good neighbourliness, due account to be taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic and commercial matters. (emphasis added).
This principle enables States to coexist peacefully while using transboundary natural resources within national boundaries. This principle was confirmed by the UN Economic Commission which stated: [a] State has the right to develop unilaterally the section of the waterway which traverses or border its territory, in so far as such development is liable to cause in the territory of another State only slight injury or minor inconvenience compatible with good neighbourly relations.141 (Emphasis added).
The International Court of Justice applied this principle in the Corfu Channel case where it noted that it is illegal for States to use or permit the use of their territory for acts that would contribute harm to persons or to the environment in other countries. It concluded that it was: “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the right of the other States”.142 This principle was used by Spain in its dispute with France regarding diversion of water by the latter State from Lake Lanoux. Spain argued that: 140
141 142
N. ISLAM, “The Regime of International Watercourses: the case of the Ganges from an Asian Perspective, in International Boundaries and Environmental Security”, G. BLAKE et al., 1997, p. 333. 1952 Memorandum of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, Cited in F. BERBER, supra note 70, pp. 39-40. ICJ Rep. 1949, p. 4.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
155
[a] State has the right to utilize unilaterally that part of a river which runs through it so far as such utilization is of a nature which will effect on the territory of another State only a limited amount of damage, a minimum of inconvenience, such as falls within what is implied by good neighborliness.143
In its 1972 New York Session, the International Law Association adopted Articles on Flood Control, Article 2 of which provides that: “Basin States shall cooperate in measures of flood control in a spirit of good neighbourliness, having due regard to their interests as wellbeing as co-basin States.”144 In his Second Report of the ILC on the draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Evensen, concluded that: A watercourse State shall refrain from and prevent (within its jurisdiction) uses or activities with regard to an international watercourse that may cause harm to the rights or interests of the other watercourse States, unless otherwise provided for in a watercourse agreement or other agreement or arrangement.145
McCaffrey also noted that: The waters of an international watercourse shall be developed, used and shared by watercourse States in a reasonable and equitable manner on the basis of… and good-neighbourly relations.146 (Emphasis added).
Some international lawyers are of the view that applying the principle of good neighbourliness to diversion may lead to the conclusion that sovereignty of an upstream State over its river is limited to the extent that its acts do not affect the interest of the neighbouring States.147 In addition, Caponera has seen this principle as 143
144 145 146 147
ILR 1957, p. 124. France had defended its position by upholding that: “the correlative duty not to injure the interests of a neighboring state.” See: ILR 1957, pp. 111-112. ILA Report, 55th Conference, 1972, New York, pp. 16-17. YBILC (1984), (part 1), p. 112. YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 111. SAUSER-HALL, “L’utilisation industrielle de fleuves internationaux”, R.C.A.D.I. (1953), pp. 554-555.
156
Mohamed S. Amr
calling for cooperation between neighbouring riparian States in the utilization of water resources in an international watercourse, as “the territorial propinquity is, of course, a spur to greater collaboration.”148 Lauterpacht also concluded that: it is a rule of international law that no State is allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighbouring State. For this reason a State is not only forbidden to stop or divert the flow of the river which runs from its own to a neighbouring State, but likewise to make such use of the water of the river as either causes danger to the neighbouring State or prevents it from making proper use of the flow of the river or its parts..149 (Emphasis added).
The 1997 UN Convention recognized this principle. The preamble has affirmed the importance of the principle of good neighbourliness in using the international watercourses.150 C. Good faith This principle of good faith is a well established principle in municipal law and was transferred to international law. It was included in the UN Charter, which stipulates that members of the Organization “shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them”.151 The principle applies not only to the obligations derived from the Charter but also to any international obligation and imposes upon the State the duty to conform to its intention and to abide by unilateral acts, though the act remains its own creation.152 It also provides that a State which committed itself in good faith to a course of conduct or to recognition of a legal situation would be stopped from
148 149 150 151 152
D. CAPONERA, “The Law of International Water Courses”, FAO Legislative Study 23 (1980), p. 16. Oppenheim’s International Law, 8th ed., vol. 1, ed. by H. Lauterpacht, 1955, pp. 474-475. It provides that: “[a]ffirming the importance of international cooperation and good-neighborliness in this field.” Article 2 of the Charter. K. SKUBISZEWSKI, “Unilateral Acts of States”, in M. BEDJAOUI (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991, p. 232.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
157
acting inconsistently with its commitment or position when other States have reasonably relied on it.153 The General Assembly Declaration annexed to Resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 entitled Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations enshrines this principle and states that: “every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its obligations under international agreements valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law”.154 The principle of good faith applies, ipso facto, if a State intends to divert the watercourse unilaterally, then it has to inform and consult in good faith with co-riparian States concerning such proposed act. In his report of the ILC on the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, McCaffrey has noted that: “The waters of an international watercourse shall be developed, used and shared by watercourse States in a reasonable and equitable manner on the basis of good faith…”155 (Emphasis added). It is our view that this principle should not be applied restrictively only to prevent States from acting unilaterally in such a way as to cause harm to other States but also to suspend execution of any work pending settlement by the concerned parties.156 D. Non-abuse of rights The principle of non abuse of rights is based on the Roman principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas and has been adopted by most national legal systems. In municipal law, this principle stipulates that an act will not be considered legal and valid if such act was carried out without legitimate motive or the resulting benefit to 153 154 155 156
O. SCHACHTER, “Non-Conventional Concerted Acts”, in M. BEDJAOUI (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991, pp. 267-268. GA Res. 2625 (XXV) of 24/10/1970. YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 111. Article 17 of the UN Convention 1997 can be interpreted in the light of this principle. It states that: “[d]uring the course of the consultation and negotiations, the notifying State shall, if so requested by the notified State at the time it makes the communication refrain from implementing or permitting the implementation of the planned measures for a period of six months unless otherwise agreed”.
158
Mohamed S. Amr
one party does not sufficiently outweigh the damage inflicted upon the other party. This principle was developed in international law in the inter-war period and is considered as an exception to the classical concept that States, on the basis of their sovereignty, are free to act in whatever manner they wish except in so far as their conduct might be expressly prohibited under existing international law doctrine.157 This principle was discussed and examined by many international lawyers. For instance, Oppenheim considers that there is an abuse of rights when “a State uses its right in an arbitrary fashion, with a result that another State suffers harm, when not justifiable through a legitimate consideration of the needs of the former State.”158 Lauterpacht also defines this principle as “a very wide legal principle of justice and social solidarity, conceived to render invalid the unscrupulous appeals to formal rights which menace peace and community.”159 This principle may also be applied to the case of diversion of watercourses. No State can divert water from any international watercourse on the basis that it is using its absolute right over the water passing through its territory. The injured State can challenge such use of right if it can prove that such act was undertaken solely on the basis of the needs of the State which diverted the water without considering the other rights of the other co-riparian States. The above-mentioned inter-related principles constitute part of international law, at least of customary international law and can be applied in regulating the use of international watercourses in general and the issue of diversion of international watercourses in particular. Therefore, any State which feels injured from any act of diversion of watercourses may rely on these principles in addition to the two substantial principles, “equitable utilization” and “significant harm”, in order to challenge such an act.
157 158 159
E. McWHINNEY, “The Concept of Co-operation”, in M. BEDJAOUI (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, 1991, p. 428. Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 153, p. 345. H. LAUTERPACHT, “The absence of an International Legislature and the Compulsory Jurisdiction of International Tribunals”, British Yearbook of International Law (BYIL) 1930, p. 134.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
159
These principles should not be interpreted restrictively. Accordingly, any co-riparian State can base its claim challenging any act of diversion undertaken by other States sharing the same riparian on the basis of the principle of good neighbourly relations, even if they do not have adjoining territories.
DIVERSION OF WATER AND THE STATE’S OBLIGATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCEDURAL RULES A. Information and Notification The obligation of the co-riparian States to inform and notify each other prior to implementing or taking any action by any one of them has become a recognized rule of the customary international law.160 This rule finds its roots in the principle of the duty to cooperate in international law. It has been noted that international river basins demand the cooperation of the States which comprise them. Such States need to work together if the full benefits of the sustainable development and use of water courses are to be realized by the whole basin community. The Helsinki Rules 1966 recommended that river basin States, regardless of their location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish to any other basin State, the interest of which may be substantially affected, notice of any proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the basin in a way which might give rise to a dispute… The notice should include such essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an assessment of the probable effects of the proposed alteration.161 160
161
This principle was considered by many international treaties such as: the Lawrence Seaway Agreement between USA and Canada 1954; the Danube Basin Agreement, 1987; the Rhine Convention Against Pollution, 1976; the Helsinki Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes 1992. Article 29 of the Helsinki Rules. This position was reiterated by the International Law Association, in its comments to the Draft Articles on the Relationship of International Water Resources with Other Natural Resources and Environmental Elements, where it observed that: “(A) Basin State shall: (a) regularly inform the other States concerned of all relevant and reasonably available data, both qualitative and quantitative, on the pollution of waters of the
160
Mohamed S. Amr
The obligation of the riparian State to inform co-riparian States as a customary rule was confirmed by some international lawyers, who stated that the riparian State has a “duty to give co-riparian State an opportunity to object” to the proposed work in an international watercourse.162 In addition, Judge Arechaga, when discussing the obligations of riparian States under international law, concluded that: the first of these duties is that any State which proposed the execution of works requiring water from a river basin has a duty to give notice of its intention to other riparian States. This duty exists even though the State proposing to undertake works considers that they will not cause any injury to other co-riparian.163
Similarly, but looking from the perspective of the rights of the other co-riparian States, Laylin and Blanchi concluded that: the right to receive appropriate and correct information on the existing regime and probable changes to be effected in a common river is coterminous with the fundamental duty to respect a riparian’s legitimate interests. No co-riparian can evaluate the full extent of its rights without such information.164
162
163 164
basin, its causes, its nature, the damage resulting from it, and the preventive procedure; (b) notify the other States concerned in due time of any activities envisaged in their own territories that may involve a significant threat that may cause or increase water pollution in the territories of those other States; and (c) promptly inform States that might be affected of any sudden change of circumstances that may cause or increase water pollution in the territories of those other States.” See: ILA Report of the 59th Conference, Belgrade, 1980, pp. 388-389 and ILA Report of the 60th Conference, Montreal, 1982, pp. 540-541. H. SMITH, supra note 69, p. 152; W. GRIFFIN, “The Use of Waters of International Drainage Basins under Customary International Law”, AJIL 53 (1959), p. 79; C. BOURNE, “Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins: Notice and Exchange of Information”, University of Toronto Law Journal 22 (1972), p. 178; D. CAPONERA, supra note 152, p. 8. E. DE ARECHAGA, “International Legal Rules Governing Use of Waters from International Watercourses”, Inter-American Bar Review 2 (1960) 2, p. 336. J. LAYLIN and R. BLANCHI, “The Role of Adjudicating in International River Disputes: The Lake Lanoux Case”, AJIL 53 (1959), p. 48.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
161
The State’s obligation to inform and notify other riparian States concerning its proposed use of the water in the international watercourse finds support in the judgments of international tribunals. In the Lake Lanoux case, the Arbitral Tribunal held that an obligation to consult arises out of customary international law. It concluded that: A State which is liable to suffer repercussions from the work undertaken by a neighboring State is the sole judge of its interest; and if the neighbouring State has not taken the initiative, the other State cannot be denied the right to insist on notification of works or concessions which are the object of a scheme.165
The 1997 UN Convention codified the rule of customary international law, as supported by international lawyers and the dictum of international tribunals. It provides clearly that states are required to exchange data and information relating to shared watercourses.166 Therefore, the riparian State is under an obligation to inform and notify other co-riparian States about any proposed work it intends to undertake in an international watercourse that is going to affect the interest of the co-riparian State.167 The 1997 UN Convention, also fixed a time frame for such notification as well as a time frame for the reply of the co-riparian States to such notification.168 Accordingly, one may conclude that the present rules of international law impose on the co-riparian State an obligation to 165 166
167
168
ILR 1957, p. 138. Article 11 provides that: “Watercourse States shall exchange information and consult each other and, if necessary, negotiate on the possible effects of planned measures on the condition of international watercourse”. In his First Report to the International Law Commission on the UN Convention on Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, the Rapporteur, Mr. Evensen stated that: “the principle of adequate notification laid down in Article 11 is, in the view of the Special Rapporteur, an expression of a prevailing principle of international law.” See: YBILC (1983) II, (part 1), p. 174. In his Second Report, Mr. Evensen stated that: “[w]atercourse States should engage in consultation (negotiations) and the exchange of information and data on a regular basis concerning the administration, management and uses of such watercourse and other aspects of regional interest with regard to relevant watercourses.” See: YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 113. In 1972, Bourne concluded that such obligation should be undertaken within a reasonable time, so that the co-riparian State could not delay a project indefinitely by refusing to agree to it. See: C. BOURNE, supra note 166, p. 233.
162
Mohamed S. Amr
inform and notify other co-riparian States of any proposed work or utilization of waters, such as diversion, which might affect the flow of water and consequently cause them harm. Conversely, every coriparian State has the right to request notification regarding any work or project undertaken by any neighbouring State. Therefore, failure of the co-riparian State to notify and consult with other co-riparian States constitutes a breach of the obligation under the international law governing the non-navigational use of an international watercourse to notify the other co-riparian State of the future use of water in an international watercourse. Should such notification be in writing or can it be announced verbally? Articles 11 and 12 of the 1997 UN Convention do not explicitly require such notification to be in writing but this can be inferred from Article 12 which implicitly requires such notification to be in writing when it states: “[s]uch notification shall be accompanied by available technical data and information, including the results of any environmental impact assessment…” Therefore, for the sake of effectiveness and as a better means of evidence, one may share the opinion of Professor Bourne that the duty of a riparian State to give notice to the co-riparian States must be in writing. In his view, this means that it must give those States entitled to receive it such information as would enlighten them as to the nature of the proposed work and its repercussions on them: it must give them the “essential facts”.169 B. Consultation and Negotiation In case the notified State considers that the intended diversion to be undertaken by the notifying State is not in conformity with the principles of international water law, can the former request thereafter to enter into consultation or negotiation? This raises the question of the obligation of the concerned States to enter into consultation and/or negotiation to discuss the intended activity by one of them.
169
C. BOURNE, supra note 166, p. 178.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
163
Consultation as a method to enable the concerned riparian States to reach a solution has been recognized since the adoption of the 1956 Resolution of Dubrovnik. Article 6 of this Resolution provides that: A State, which proposes new works (construction or diversion etc.) or change of previously existing use of water, which may affect the utilization of water by another State, must first consult with the other State. It has to consult with other riparian States once this project or act can affect those other States. In case agreement is not reached through such consultation, the States concerned should seek the advice of a technical commission; and if this does not lead to agreement, resort should be had to arbitration.170
Consultation was justified by some international lawyers on the ground that it ensures that a State will not utilize the waters of an international drainage basin without examining all the factors involved. By consulting other States, a nation may discover another course of action, which is more beneficial to all the parties affected, or, at the very least, ascertain the legal ramifications of its proposed actions.171 The 1997 UN Convention provides that if the notified State finds that the implementation of “planned measures” by the other State is inconsistent with the principles of equitable utilization or non-harm, both States shall enter into consultation. It has also affirmed that such consultation should be conducted in good faith. However, the obligation to enter into negotiation depends on whether there is an obligation derived from an international treaty in this regard or not. It has been noted that about fifty percent of all the treaties related to the non-navigational uses of international waters and deposited at the UN’s Secretariat have included a provision for negotiation or agreement between or among the riparian States parties to these treaties before the development of the basin is undertaken.172 Therefore, if such treaty does not exist or it does not impose on its parties the obligation to enter into negotiation, such obligation to 170 171
172
ILA Report of 47th Conference, Dubrovnik, 1956, pp. 241-243. C. BOURNE, “Procedures in the Development of International Drainage Basins: The Duty to Consult and Negotiate”, Canadian Yearbook of International Law 10 (1972), p. 230; I. REINUMAGI, supra note 78, p. 321. I. REINUMAGI, supra note 78, p. 322.
164
Mohamed S. Amr
negotiate is not provided by international law. The 1997 UN Convention does not impose upon the co-riparian States any obligation to negotiate.173 According to Article 17 paragraph 1, if the notified State replied to the notifying State in a way that it declares that the intended acts are inconsistent with Article 5 (equitable utilization) or Article 7 (significant harm) the concerned States may agree to enter into negotiation. Therefore, it may be concluded that entering into negotiation by the concerned States should be agreed upon by the concerned States. However, if they agree to enter into negotiation, then such negotiation must be genuine and comply with the rule of good faith. Negotiation in good faith is considered as a general principle of international law and was confirmed by the International Tribunals on several occasions. The Arbitral Tribunal in the Lake Lanoux case noted that: Consultation and negotiations between the two States must be genuine, must comply with the rules of good faith and must not be mere formalities. The rules of reason and good faith are applicable to procedural rights and duties relative to the sharing of the use of international rivers.174
This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo case, where it held: The parties are under an obligation so to conduct themselves that the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be the case when either of them insists upon its own position without contemplating any modification of it.175
A question may arise in this context regarding the possibility of continuing implementation of a planned act during the term of consultation and negotiation. Article 7 of the Salzburg Resolution adopted by Institut de Droit International in 1961, provides that co-riparian States should refrain from proceeding with works or utilization which are the object of the dispute or from doing anything that might aggravate the dispute 173
174 175
The ILA Report of 1964 on the “use of international rivers”, did not refer to any obligation to enter into negotiations but it considered it sufficient to state that: “parties should seek a solution by negotiation”. ILR 1957, p. 119. ICJ Rep. 1997, para. 141.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
165
during their negotiation. Similarly, Article 17 of the 1997 UN Convention has provided the possibility of suspending the implementation of the planned act subject to two conditions: (i) it is so requested by the notified State in its reply to the notifying State and (ii) such suspension remain for six month, unless agreed otherwise. C. Prior agreement Is the State intending to divert water under any obligation to receive the prior agreement of other co-riparian States before undertaking such act? Two possibilities can be envisaged. The case where there is an express obligation on the co-riparian States to obtain the consent of the other riparian States, then any State intending to undertake any act such as diversion must do so before taking any step in this regard. This was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo case, where the Court observed that: the fact that Hungary had agreed in the context of the original Project to the diversion of the Danube (and, in the Joint Contractual Plan, to a provisional measure of withdrawal of water from the Danube) cannot be understood as having authorized Czechoslovakia to proceed with a unilateral diversion of this magnitude without Hungary’s consent.176
However, in the absence of such obligation imposed on riparian States, it is the opinion of the majority of international lawyers that such prior agreement is not required.177 In the Lake Lanoux case, Spain argued that the diversion undertaken by France required the agreement of the two governments prior to its execution, failing which this would be considered as a 176 177
Ibid. para. 86. C. BOURNE, supra note 175, pp. 231-233; I. REINUMAGI, supra note 78, p. 321. However, The 1952 Memorandum of the UN Economic Commission for Europe stated that “[a] State has the right to develop unilaterally the section of the waterway which traverses or border its territory, in so far as such development is liable to cause in the territory of another State only slight injury or minor inconvenience compatible with good neighborly relations. On the other hand, when the injury liable to be caused is serious and lasting, development works may only be undertaken under a prior agreement…” Cited in F. BERBER, supra note 70, pp. 25-40.
166
Mohamed S. Amr
breach of the 1866 treaty concluded between the disputant parties. The Arbitral Tribunal rejected this claim and stated that there is no rule either in customary international law or in the general principles of law that require a State to obtain the prior approval of another riparian State of any project or act it intends to undertake regarding the rivers passing through its territory.178 The 1997 UN Convention does not impose any obligation on the co-riparian State to obtain a prior approval from other co-riparian States before implementing such act.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES ON INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES
DIVERSION
OF
Any unauthorized or unlawful act taken by a co-riparian State, including diversion, may lead to a conflict or dispute with other coriparian States. In the absence of an applicable agreement between the parties to settle such dispute,179 they may seek a settlement by peaceful means in accordance with Article 33 paragraph 1, of the UN Charter which provides that: the parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.180 178 179
180
ILR 1957, p. 127. In 1997, it has been noted that 36% of the international treaties dealing with water issues have decided that settling the dispute can be provided by an advisory council or conflict-addressing body within the parties’ government. 10% refer disputes to a third party or the United Nations. 22% make no provisions for dispute resolution. 32 % of the treaties are either incomplete or ambiguous as to the creation of dispute resolution mechanism. See: J. HAMNER and A. WOLF, “Patterns in International Water Resource Treaties: the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database”, Colorado Journal of International and Environmental Law and Policy 7 (1997), p. 166. In Evensen’s Second Report on the non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, it has been stated that: “watercourse States as well as other States parties shall settle disputes between them concerning the interpretation or application of the present Convention by peaceful means in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations and, to this end, shall seek
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
167
These methods were recommended also by the 1966 Helsinki Rules and 1997 UN Convention.181 A. Settlement through non-judicial means State parties to any dispute related to international watercourses should seek to settle their disputes by one of the peaceful means, as mentioned above, otherwise they will be infringing the UN Charter. State practice regarding international water disputes shows that a large number of these disputes have been settled through diplomatic channels or through an international joint commission established by the concerned States. The success of this means to settle international water disputes is based on the fact that these disputes require various elements such as technical, economic and other factors to be taken into account. Realizing these factors and the special nature of such disputes, in most cases, States seek to settle them through one or more of the diplomatic channels or through an international joint commission and in most cases, they do not only settle the dispute but also conclude agreements by which they regulate the use and management of the international watercourse amongst themselves. Therefore, disputant States may seek to settle their disputes by negotiation,182 mediation183 or conciliation.184
181 182
solutions by the means indicated in Article 33, Paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter.” See: YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 124. Chapter (6) of the Helsinki Rules (Articles 30 to 34) and Article 33 of the UN Convention 1997. It is the most basic approach toward peaceful dispute settlement since it is controlled by the respective parties to the dispute. Most international lawyers have noted that negotiation is one of the best methods to settle international water disputes. This is based on the fact that the co-riparian States share the same watercourse and therefore the mutually and voluntarily accepted solution is likely to be more enduring and satisfactory. In addition, each international river has its own distinctive characteristics and peculiar problems, and a solution dealing with one may not necessarily be applicable to another. For the advantage of this method to settle international water disputes, see: M. ISLAM, “The Ganges Water Dispute, An Appraisal of a Third Party Settlement”, Asian Survey 27 (1987) 8, p. 930; E. BENVENISTI, “Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater: The Challenges of International Water Resources Law”, AJIL 90 (1996), pp. 400-401.
168
Mohamed S. Amr
Disputes involving international watercourses can also be resolved through international joint commissions. These commissions can be established by the co-riparian States prior to or at the time when the dispute arises. A number of international treaties related to watercourses refer to this method of dispute settlement. Article 11 of the Mahakali River Treaty between India and Nepal provides that any dispute between the parties will be referred to the joint commission established by the treaty for settlement. The Treaty also provides that the Commission will examine the differences and may submit recommendations on resolving them to the parties. If the Commission fails to deliver an opinion within three months or if either party disagrees with the Commission’s recommendation, a dispute shall be deemed to have arisen and then will be submitted to arbitration for decision. Similarly, the Ganges River Treaty between India and Bangladesh 1996 states that any dispute between the parties arising out of the interpretation or implementation of the treaty will in the first place be referred to a joint committee established by the treaty. In practice, States have tried to settle their disputes through joint committees; some of them were successfully settled.185 For instance, in the dispute between Canada and United States over the Columbia River basin, the two countries decided to settle the dispute through the 183
184
185
Mediation and good offices allow a third party to act as intermediary and may play a role to soften the tension between sovereign States. In the dispute between Hungary and the Czech Republic, some attempts were made to settle this dispute by mediation. These attempts did not succeed. See; J. FITZMAURICE, Damming the Danube, Gabcikovo and Post-Communist Politics in Europe, 1996, p. 112. In the ILC‘s Second Report on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, Evensen’s referred to the compulsory conciliation procedure in settling international water disputes. In his commentary, he noted that: “the establishment of a conciliation commission has in practice proved to be useful in the search for peaceful in the search for peaceful solutions to international disputes. See: YBILC (1984) II, (part 1), p. 125. Some co-riparian States tried to solve their disputes through this method but they failed to reach an agreement. For instance, the commission established by Spain and France to settle the dispute arose as a consequence of French project to divert water from Lake Lanoux, see: ILR 1957. In addition, the dispute between Afghanistan and Iran regarding the Helmand River Delta. See: C. BOURNE, “Mediation, Conciliation and Adjudication in the Settlement of International Drainage Basin Disputes”, The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 9 (1971), p. 192.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
169
international joint commission created pursuant to the Boundary Water Treaty of 1909 and led eventually to the signing of the Columbia River Treaty 1961.186 In addition, Article 33 of the 1997 UN Convention referred to fact finding as a method of settling international water disputes. Paragraph 3 of the above article provides that if the concerned parties are not able to settle their dispute through negotiation as requested by one of them within six months, the dispute can be settled by a fact finding commission. The commission is entitled to consider the dispute and shall submit its report to the concerned parties, setting forth its findings and the reasons, which should be considered by the parties in good faith. B. The Role of International Organizations International organizations such as the UN through its various organs can play a significant role in settling international watercourses disputes. Many co-riparian States depend on the flow of water in their territories, which derive from international watercourses in most cases. Unilateral acts, including diversion, taken by any co-riparian State which has no legal basis, may touch upon the interest of any other co-riparian States and lead to an international conflict which might threaten or endanger international peace and security. The UN Charter empowers both the General Assembly and the Security Council, as political organs of the Organization, to maintain international peace and security. The Security Council, pursuant to Chapter VI of the Charter, deals with matters that only potentially could disturb the peace and with regard to a dispute or situation “which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.” It also acts pursuant to Chapter VII when an international crisis constitutes a “threat to the peace, a breach of the peace, or act of aggression.” Similarly, the General Assembly may discuss any question of a general nature regarding the maintenance of
186
I. REINUMAGI, supra note 78, p. 305.
170
Mohamed S. Amr
international peace and security. It exercises the same peaceful settlement function on the basis of Chapter VI of the Charter.187 Since the establishment of the UN, some cases relating to international watercourses were referred by States to both the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council as early as 1950s dealt with water disputes when Syria referred the unilateral act of Israel to divert water from the Jordan River to the arid southern portion of Israel for irrigation purposes.188 The dispute between Bangladesh and India regarding the Indian unilateral act of diversion in the Ganges River was referred to the General Assembly. As a consequence of the seriousness of the situation, Bangladesh succeeded to include the matter on the agenda of the 31st Session of the General Assembly pursuant to Article 14 of the UN Charter. Bangladesh justified its request on the basis that the diversion of water by India threatened the economic welfare of Bangladesh, adversely affected the friendly relations between the two countries, and the failure to resolve the issue expeditiously and satisfactory carried with it the potential threat of conflict affecting peace and security in the region.189 The matter was never brought before the General Assembly but was assigned to the Special Political Committee of the Assembly. The Committee adopted a consensus resolution stating that both parties agreed to negotiate with a view to arriving at a fair and expeditious settlement and invited either party to report to the General Assembly at its 32nd session on the progress achieved in the settlement of the problem.190 The negotiation between 187
188
189
190
For more details, see: N. WHITE, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 1990, p. 60. (for the powers of the Security Council), and p. 95. (for the powers of the General Assembly); I. SHEARER, Starke’s International Law, 1994, p. 572. A. SALIBA, The Jordan River Dispute, 1968, pp. 26-28; K. SCANLAN, “The International Law Commission‘s First Ten Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses: Do they Adequately Address all the Major Issues of Water Usage in the Middle East”, Fordham International Law Journal 19 (1996), p. 2195. The inclusion of the matter on the Agenda of the General Assembly was strongly challenged by India and former Soviet Union on the basis that it was merely a bilateral dispute to be resolved between the parties. See: M. ISLAM, supra note 186, p. 928. UN Doc. A/SPC/31/7 (1976).
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
171
the two States was held and resulted in an interim agreement of 1977, to regulate the use of the Ganges River between them. Other international specialized organizations can play a similar role to that of the UN in settling such disputes. For instance, the World Bank has played a leading role in resolving one of the most intricate international watercourses disputes related to the Indus basin between India and Pakistan. The Bank offered its services to India and Pakistan in 1951, which was accepted by both parties. Due to the strained relations between the two States at that time, it took the Bank about ten years to reach an agreement on this matter and in September 1960, the two parties signed the Indus Waters Treaty.191 In another dispute, the Bank expressed its willingness to negotiate and cooperate with India and Bangladesh for a permanent solution of the Ganges dispute, should the parties seek its assistance jointly.192 In addition, the World Bank put pressure on Turkey by withholding financing of water projects until it entered into negotiations with Syria and Iraq to solve their pending disputes arising from these projects.193 The above role undertaken by the World Bank can also be played by other international specialized organizations which are concerned with the issue of international watercourses such as: the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Development Program.
191
192
193
L. TECLAFF, The River Basin in History and Law, 1967, pp. 163-165; G. PITMAN, “The Role of the World Bank in enhancing cooperation and resolving conflict on international watercourses: the case of Indus basin, in international watercourses: enhancing cooperation and managing conflict”, in S. SALMAN and L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES (eds.), International Watercourses, Enhancing Cooperation and Management Conflict, Proceedings of a World Bank Seminar, World Bank Technical Paper 414 (1998), p. 155; B. CONCANNON, “The Indus Waters Treaty: Three Decades of Success, Yet, Will it Endure?”, The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 2 (1989), pp. 63-64. A statement to this effect was made by the Vice-President of the World Bank on November 25, 1967, over Radio Pakistan, cited in M. ISLAM, supra note 15, p. 933. R. HAGER, “The Euphrates Basin : In Search of a Legal Regime”, The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 3 (1990), p. 225.
172
Mohamed S. Amr
C. Judicial Settlement If the disputant parties fail to settle their dispute through any of the mentioned methods above, such dispute can be submitted to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice for settlement. This method of settling international water disputes is recognized by many international treaties as well as by the jurisprudence of international tribunals. For instance, the Mahakali River Treaty between India and Nepal provides that where the two parties can not settle their disputes through the joint commission the dispute will be settled by arbitration.194 The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Meuse case noted that third party adjudication could be used successfully to settle river disputes, despite the complexity of the conflicting uses of the riparian States.195 Judicial settlement of international water disputes was considered by some international lawyers. In their view, such disputes may lead to various causes of action which include: (1) breach of certain obligations under international law; (2) breach of an obligation arising by virtue of an international agreement; and (3) introducing a request for a declaration as to the existence of certain legal rights and duties.196 In practice, and despite the large number of international disputes which have arisen as a result of diversion of international watercourses, few of them were referred to international arbitration and international tribunals. Only three disputes related to diversion of international watercourses were referred to international courts and tribunals. Regarding arbitration, the dispute between France and Spain known as the Lake Lanoux case, was referred by the concerned parties to an arbitral tribunal for settlement. This dispute arose as a consequence of the French decision to divert water from Lake Lanoux towards the River Ariège. The Tribunal restricted itself to an
194 195 196
Article 11. PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 70, 1937. D. ALHERITIERE, “Settlement of Public International Disputes on Shared Resources: Elements of a Comparative Study of International Instruments”, Natural Resources Journal 25 (1985), p. 709.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
173
examination of the French act of diversion in the light of the Treaty of Bayonne 1866 as requested by the parties in the Compromis.197 Regarding international tribunals, only two cases were so referred. The first is the Meuse River case between Netherlands and Belgium. This case was referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice as a consequence of complex multi-purpose projects undertaken by Belgium, which required large water diversions from the Meuse River leading to a substantial alteration of the water flow. Netherlands claimed that the Belgian act constituted an infringement of the Treaty of 1863 concluded between the two States.198 The Court examined the above dispute in the light of the Treaty provisions.199 The Gabcikovo case was referred to the International Court of Justice by Hungary and Czechoslovakia.200 The dispute arose as a consequence of the unilateral act undertaken by Czechoslovakia to divert water from the Danube River to its territory some 10 kilometres upstream of Dunakiliti.201 Before the Court, Hungary claimed that diversion made by Slovakia was illegal in the light of the 1977 Treaty and the related Agreement of 6 May 1976 as well as the Boundary Waters Convention of 31 of May 1976.202 Hungary further claimed that the 1977 Treaty did not allow for unilateral operation of the Barrage System by either party.203 The Court restricted its examination to the legality of the Slovak act of diversion in the light of the provisions of the above-mentioned treaties. Despite the fact that arbitral tribunals and international courts have tried, upon the request of the disputant parties when they refer their disputes related to diversion for settlement, to restrict themselves to the interpretation and application of the particular international treaties concluded by the parties, some of the statements in the awards and
197 198 199 200 201 202 203
ILR 1957, pp. 120-121. PCIJ Rep. Series A/B, No. 70, 1937, pp. 5-9. Ibid. p. 26. In 1992 when Czechoslovakia became two countries, it was agreed that Slovakia would succeeded to ownership of the Czechoslovak part of the project. See pp. 124-126 above. ICJ Pleadings 1 (1994), Memorial of Hungary, p. 210. Ibid. p. 211.
174
Mohamed S. Amr
judgments go beyond treaty interpretation and propound, or at least suggest, principles of general application.204 However, some remarks can be made regarding the role of judicial settlement to settle disputes related to diversion of watercourses: First, despite the great number of disputes, States practice show that States still believe that referring such kind of disputes to international adjudication undesirable. For instance, in the dispute which arose between India and Pakistan regarding the Indus River, although Pakistan proposed to submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice, India rejected this request.205 The Prime Minister of India, at that time Nehru, declared that allocation of the Indus waters was not a juridical problem, but a humanitarian one.206 The second remark is related to the burden of proof before international tribunals. As a general principle, the burden of proof lies upon the plaintiff State which must prove the causes and consequences of harm as well as its limits. The International Court of Justice has recognized this problem in the Corfu Channel case, where it stated: The other State… is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal recourse to inference of fact and circumstantial evidence… the proof may be drawn from inference of fact, provided that they leave no room for reasonable doubt.207
The above remarks raise the question of whether judicial settlement is the appropriate mechanism to resolve international water disputes. Before answering this question, one must admit that circumstances surrounding the act of diversion of international watercourses are, in general, highly technical. For instance, in establishing whether or not diversion took place and if in the affirmative, the methodology to be applied to evaluate its impact and to measure significant harm left by 204
205 206
207
Some of these statements relate to the principle of “equitable utilization”, see pp. 124 et seq. above and to the principle of “non-harm”, see: pp. 126 et seq. above. R. BAXTER, “The Indus Basin”, in A. GARRETSON et al. (eds.), The Law of International Drainage Basins, 1967, p. 454. B. CONCANNON, “The Indus Waters Treaty: Three Decades of Success, Yet, Will it Endure?”, The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 2 (1989), pp. 62-63. ICJ Rep. 1949, p. 18.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
175
such diversion. Therefore, some international lawyers have noted that: “water disputes are generally agreed to constitute a classical example of disputes which cannot be satisfactorily solved by judicial decision.”208 Other lawyers are of the view that: a legal tribunal may decide that apportionment should be ‘equitable’ but it is beyond the competence of legal learning to decide what should be the fair share of two independent States in the same waters. In so far as the determination of such a question is a matter for experts at all, the experts, or some of them chosen must possess qualifications, such as engineering and hydrological knowledge, not usually to be found among lawyers.209
These opinions invite us to consider the desirability and appropriateness of establishing a specialized international tribunal for international watercourses which would be capable of dealing with such disputes which contain highly technical aspects. Precedents of such specialized international tribunals can be found in the field of settling international trade disputes by the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization, international disputes related to investment by the ICSID and finally international disputes related the law of the sea by the Tribunal of the Law of the Sea. Despite all the above qualifications, it is our opinion that international adjudication will remain the safeguard and the last resort for States to settle their disputes related to international watercourses. As noted by Bourne, third party assistance in resolving differences between co-basin States is highly commendable and should be encouraged.210 The role of international courts or arbitral tribunals should not be restricted only to settling international water disputes but should also result in the finding of State responsibility for any illegal act taken by a co-riparian State and a decision on the appropriate remedies to be adopted in accordance with international law.
208 209 210
F. BERBER, supra note 70, p. 263. H. SMITH, “The Water of the Jordan: Problem of International Control”, International Affairs 25 (1949), pp. 423-424. C. BOURNE, supra note 189, p. 158.
176
Mohamed S. Amr
CONCLUDING REMARKS Disputes concerning diversion of international watercourses are on the increase and there is a pressing need to establish applicable international law rules to determine the legality or otherwise of an act of diversion, and the consequences of such determination on the disputant States and the means available to settle such disputes. The absence of specific rules governing diversion of international watercourses and the differences of opinion expressed by upper and downstream States in interpreting and applying general theories of management and utilization of shared natural resources as tools to determine the legality of a particular act of diversion is a matter of international concern. The importance of this issue should be seen from the perspective of the negative effects which might result from any unilateral decision by a co-riparian State to divert water from an international watercourse. In most cases, the negative impacts of diversion far exceed those resulting from any improper utilization or mismanagement of shared natural resources. Thus, diversion of watercourses by upper riparian States may cause several negative impacts on lower riparian States which might seriously affect peoples’ livelihood, economy and the environment. I. Whether a particular act of diversion of a watercourse is legal or not depends on a primary question: whether there is an agreement between the concerned States permitting such an act and, if so, whether there is a limit to the exercise of such an act. If such an agreement exists, the diversion of water by any co- riparian State will be seen as a lawful act as long as such State respects the limits imposed on it according to the agreement. Similarly, the position is clear where there is an agreement between the co-riparian States which prohibits diversion. A unilateral act of diversion contrary to such an agreement will be considered an unlawful act. Difficulties arise where there is no agreement whatsoever or where an agreement permits diversion subject to the fulfillment of certain procedures and conditions and the State undertaking the diversion does not respect such procedures or conditions. A determination of the legality of an
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
177
act in this regard depends on the application of several rules of international law as reflected in some international instruments as well as customary international law. II. A State which intends to undertake diversion of watercourses is bound by a set of rules and principles. It should consider that the prevailing theory for utilizing shared natural resources is that of limited sovereignty. Therefore when managing or utilizing a watercourse passing through its territory, a State should recognize that it has no absolute sovereignty over the watercourse but that its sovereignty is limited by the rights of other co-riparian. State sovereignty is qualified by the principle of “equitable utilization” and the principle of “Non-Harm” as well as by other related principles of international law. Regarding the principle of “equitable utilization”, any diversion of water by an upper riparian State should not deprive a lower riparian State of its rightful part of the shared water resources, and of its right to exploit these resources essentially for its own benefit. The criteria introduced by the 1966 Helsinki Rules and confirmed by the 1997 UN Convention could be used to determine the meaning of equitable utilization. If the concerned State undertakes diversion of a watercourse and justifies its act on the basis of achieving and realizing equitable utilization, then it must also consider that it must not cause harm to other co-riparian States. The obligation not to cause harm in the utilization of watercourses finds its roots in the 1997 UN Convention. Contrary to the principle of equitable utilization, the determination of harm is a subjective one. Article 7 fixes a criterion by providing a standard by which the diversion undertaken by any co-riparian State should not cause significant harm to another riparian State. III. Generally recognized principles of international law such as the principle of international cooperation, good faith, non-abuse of rights and most importantly that of good neighbourliness also play a significant role in the determination of the legality of diversion of watercourses. The principle of good neighbourliness should not be interpreted in a narrow sense, limited to physical interdependence of contiguous States, but broadly from the perspective of interest.
178
Mohamed S. Amr
Any co-riparian State which breaches the above principles and rules should be considered as violating the territorial integrity of the other co-riparian State. In such case the breaching State becomes liable to pay compensation, particularly when its act of diversion causes significant harm to another co-riparian State. IV. The State which has suffered harm may be awarded damages for harm of a physical nature, including consequential damage as well as direct loss.211 For example, damages can be awarded as a remedy against electric power loss resulting from halting the water flow as a consequence of the diversion. If diversion causes pollution in the downstream State the upper stream State may opt to pay for a treatment plant. Compensation can also be awarded to cover irrigation, agricultural, fisheries and navigation losses.212 V. A State intending to undertake diversion is obliged to inform and notify other co-riparian States of its intention to do so. Such notification should be accompanied by adequate technical data about the intended work before implementation. If the notified State disagrees with the notifying State, they shall enter into consultation. However, it is a well established principle of international law that, unless an agreement exists to the contrary, no obligation is imposed on States to enter into such negotiation. Where the concerned States fail to agree, they must seek to resolve their dispute through one of the peaceful means provided in the UN Charter, namely, negotiation, mediation, or conciliation. They can also opt to resolve the dispute by resorting to a technical mechanism such as a joint commission or a fact-finding commission. States may also choose to resolve their dispute by referring it to one of the political organs of the UN or to a specialized international 211
212
The International Court of Justice in Gabcikovo case noted that: “[i]t is a wellestablished rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it.” See: ICJ Rep. 1997, para. 152. A. LESTER, supra note 46, p. 113. In this regard, it has been noted by some lawyers that: “the common remedy of response in monetary compensation following a breach of an international obligation is rarely adequate in the case of a substantial change in the regime of a river system on which nations depend for their live hood. A man dying of thirst cannot be revived with monetary compensation for his water, even when tendered in advance.” See: J. LAYLIN and R. BLANCHI, supra note 168, p. 31.
Diversion of International Watercourses Under International Law
179
organization. Judicial settlement through international courts or tribunals will nonetheless remain the ultimate safeguard or last resort for the concerned States. Referring diversion of watercourse disputes to international courts and tribunals will also assist in the development of a body of principles and rules of international law specifically applicable to diversion of watercourses.
This page intentionally left blank
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: PATTERNS AND INSTRUMENTS TO ACHIEVE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE Massimiliano Montini*
THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT: BASIC FEATURES The right to development started to emerge during the 1960s and the 1970s as a demand coming mainly from the most developed States coming out from the decolonization process, which wished to affirm their partial distrust on the international economic institutions, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the GATT, and to promote a greater recognition of their economic, social, cultural and political rights within the comprehensive framework of the human rights protection.1 The origins of the right to development are doubtful. For some scholars it is a legal concept already enshrined in the UN Charter, in *
University of Siena, Italy.
1
On the right to development see ABI-SAAB, “The legal formulation of a right to development”, in DUPUY (ed.), The Right to Development at the International Level, The Hague, Academy of International Law, 1980, p. 168; TÜRK, “The Human Right to Development”, in VAN DIJK, VAN HOOF, KOERS & MORTELMANS (eds.), Restructuring the International Economic Order: the Role of Law and Lawyers, Kluwer Law, Deventer, 1987, p. 85; DE WAART, PETERS & DENTERS (eds.), International Law and Development, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1988; BEDJAOUI, “The Right to Development”, in BEDJAOUI (ed.), International Law: Achievements and Prospects, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1991, p. 1177; CHOWDHURY, DENTERS & DE WAART (eds.), The Right to Development in International Law, Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1992; ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, in ALSTON, People’s Rights, OUP, Oxford, 2001, p. 127.
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 181-223. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
182
Massimiliano Montini
particular in article 55. According to another well established view, reported by Bedjaoui, the right to development is to be seen as an “inherent” and “built-in” right forming an inseparable part of the right to development. Building on this, Bedjaoui however proposes to anchor the right to development to the jus cogens, as recognised by article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, through the duty of “international solidarity” that is placed on the whole international community because of the essential interdependence of States caused by the global nature of the world economy.2 After some vague reference to it contained in various human rights instruments, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the right to development was finally enshrined in the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by the UN General Assembly. In the 1986 Declaration, the right to development is considered in all its peculiar elements and its basic features are clearly outlined.3 Dealing briefly with the right to development, the first issue to be addressed is the following one: Which is the content of the right to development? According to article 1(1) of the 1986 Declaration, [t]he right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized.
This shows the substantial and fundamental link between the right to development, intended not merely as a right to economic development but also to social, cultural and political development, and the protection and promotion of all human rights. In addition, article 1(2) establishes an interesting link between the right to development and the right of peoples to self-determination, which is meant to include “the exercise of their inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources”. 2 3
See BEDJAOUI, “The Right to Development”, supra note 1, pp. 1184-1185. See Declaration on the Right to Development, adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
183
Moreover, the right to development, as it is formulated in article 1(1) of the 1986 Declaration, puts an important stress on the right of every human person to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development. The right to development should in fact be promoted in a way which ensures to all human beings an “equality of opportunity […] in their access to basic resources, education, health services, food, housing, employment and the fair distribution of income” (article 8(1)). The right to development should therefore be considered as a “participatory right”, which allows people to exercise some influence over the development process, rather than being simply consulted about pre-determined results and decisions, and which enables people to enjoy an equitable and fair share of the benefits brought by the development process.4 Another important issue regarding the right to development which needs to be addressed is the question of who is the holder of the right. Such an issue has been the subject of much discussion among legal scholars.5 To this respect, a noteworthy approach to the present issue seems to be the one proposed by Bedjaoui, who stated that, although it is not a matter of indifference whether the holder of the right is the State or the individual, the ultimate answer to the question raised above must be that “its beneficiaries can only be both at the same time”. In other words, there cannot be any true exercise of the right to development by any individual if the State to which he/she belongs is not able to assert and protect such a right in concrete terms. Therefore, it seems that the holder of the right to development may be also the individual, but essentially only in connection and co-operation with the State.6
4 5
6
See ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, supra note 1, pp. 138-139. See CHOWDHURY & DE WAART, “Significance of the right to development”, in CHOWDHURY, DENTERS & DE WAART (eds.), The Right to Development in International Law, supra note 1, p. 7; BEDJAOUI, “The Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 1179; ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 138. See BEDJAOUI, “The Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 1179.
184
Massimiliano Montini
The solution endorsed by the 1986 Declaration seems to point at a similar direction. To this respect, in fact the Declaration states at article 2(1) that: “The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development”. However, the Declaration does not completely deny the role of the State, by affirming at article 3(1) that “States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable to the realization of the right to development”. In my view, such an approach seems to be rather too simplistic. In fact, the right to development, in concrete terms, is essentially a collective right more than an individual right. Therefore, as it generally happens for “collective rights”, even if the holder is the individual in practical terms is normally the State which can exercise such a right on behalf of the people under its jurisdiction. This unfortunately may lead in some circumstances to cases in which the State exercises such a right formally “on behalf of the people”, but substantially not “in the interest of the people”. In other words, the State may sometimes exercise the right to development by giving priority to economic development, irrespective of the overall welfare of its people, thus causing a violation of other human rights and fundamental freedoms.7 However, the exercise of the right to development by the State does not seem to be avoidable. In fact, as it has been correctly argued by a commentator, “in the case of a right held by a people, or a society, as a whole, the most plausible ‘person’ to exercise the right is, unfortunately, the state”.8 At this point, a further issue needs to be addressed: against whom may the right to development be exercised? Although not all legal scholars agree on that approach,9 if the right to development is 7 8
9
See ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 137. See DONNELLY, “In Search of the Unicorn: the Jurisprudence and Politics of the Right to Development”, California Western International Law Journal 15 (1985), p. 473, cited in ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 136, note 32. See TÜRK, “The Human Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 88; CHOWDHURY & DE WAART, “Significance of the right to development”, supra note 1, p. 15; ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”,
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
185
conceived essentially as a human right accruing to all human beings, it follows from this that it is meant to be exercisable primarily against the State, which is traditionally responsible for constraining the rights and freedoms of the individuals placed under its jurisdiction. Drawing on this understanding, the 1986 Declaration imposes upon States a double duty towards their citizens, both at national and at international level. In fact, on the one side, they have “the duty to formulate appropriate national development policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population” (article 2(3)) and on the other side they have “the duty to co-operate with each other in ensuring development and eliminating obstacles to development” (article 3(3)). Moreover, according to the 1986 Declaration, States not only have the right and the duty to promote the effective exercise of the right to development on behalf of their citizens, but also have the duty to protect the human beings placed under their jurisdiction against undue interference from outside actors, by promoting “international development policies with a view to facilitating the full realisation of the right to development” (article 4(1)). In addition to that, however, the Declaration also places on all human beings who ultimately hold the right to development a duty to promote the effective exercise of the right to development, by stating that all human beings have a responsibility for development, individually and collectively, taking into account the need for full respect for their human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as their duties toward the community, […] and they should therefore promote and protect an appropriate political, social and economic order for development (article 2(2)).
What does this mean in practical terms? This reference to a duty placed upon all human beings, but intended as to be placed on all nonState actors can be interpreted in two ways. In a first sense, in fact, it can be seen as a positive reference in so far it reminds that not all supra note 1, p. 138. For an opposite view, which in practical terms reports the exercise of the right to development essentially to the State, see BEDJAOUI, “The Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 1188.
186
Massimiliano Montini
threats to human rights nowadays come from States and therefore it is essential that appropriate instruments are devised to ensure that the right to development is respected also by non-State actors. In a second and opposite sense, it can be seen instead as a negative reference which may enable States to avoid their responsibility by referring to the responsibility of “external forces”, mainly non-State actors upon which they exercise no control, when the right to development, similarly to other human rights, is violated.10 Once briefly described who are the holders and against whom the right to development may be exercised, let us now address a further issue: provided that the right to development is considered as a human right, may such a right have sometimes priority over other human rights? The answer to such a question can only be negative, since the concept of the “indivisibility of human rights” ought to apply here. This means, in the present context, that the realisation of the right to development cannot be separated from the realisation of all other human rights. Such an approach is substantially endorsed also by the provisions of the 1986 Declaration, such as article 6(2), which affirms that: All human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and interdependent; equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to the implementation, promotion and protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.
Moreover, the indivisible link between the right to development and all other human rights is further recalled by article 9(2) of the Declaration, according to which: Nothing in the present Declaration shall be construed as being contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, or as implying that any State, group or person has a right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the violation of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the International Covenants on Human Rights.
10
See ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, supra note 1, p. 143.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
187
The indivisibility established by the 1986 Declaration between the right to development and the other human rights seems to me to be particularly important in the present globalised world. This is essentially because it underlines the fact that the promotion of the right to development should in no circumstance become a means to justify the violation of other human rights, such as for instance the freedom of association, the freedom of expression or the right to political participation, sometimes denied by States and multinational corporations in the name of economic development goals.11
THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: BASIC FEATURES It was only in recent times that man took conscience of the fact that the right to development should not be exercised at the detriment of the protection of the environment, if it is true that, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion and again in the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, “the environment is not an abstraction, but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn”.12 In fact, the record of the international practice shows that some early cases with “environmental protection” features had been decided long time ago, mainly by some International Arbitral Tribunals, such as the well known 1941 Trail Smelter case, which dealt with an issue of transboundary air pollution. Moreover, it is not impossible to find some early “green” international conventions concluded long before man realised that the world was facing an “environmental crisis”, mostly caused by his arrogant and irreverent behaviour towards the environment. 11 12
See ORFORD, “Globalization and the Right to Development”, supra note 13, pp. 140-141. See Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, pp. 66 and 226, reprinted in International Legal Materials (ILM) 35 (1997), p. 809, para. 29; and Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, ICJ Reports, 1997, p. 7, reprinted in ILM 37 (1998), p. 162, para. 53.
188
Massimiliano Montini
However, it is not until the beginning of the 1970s that the international community started to approach the environmental challenge within a legal framework.13 The starting date of what has been then called international environmental law is commonly reported back to 1972, when the first world conference for the protection of the environment was held in Stockholm, under the auspices of the United Nations. The 1972 Stockholm Conference, officially named UN Conference on the Human Environment adopted a Declaration which crystallises some of the most important “common principles [which ought] to inspire the peoples of the world in the preservation and enhancement of the human conditions”. The Principles listed in the Stockholm Declaration represent the first concrete effort of the international community to establish some guidelines which can be applied in order to try and find an adequate and successful balance between the need to foster economic and social development and the opposite necessity to promote and improve the environment, to maintain or restore a quality of the environment at a level which permits a life of dignity and well-being for man, both for present and future generations. In particular, among the twenty-six Principles listed in the Stockholm Declaration, it is Principle 21 which deserves a special attention for the focus of the present contribution. In fact, such a Principle, which has been commonly considered since its first formulation one of the cornerstones upon which international environmental law is based, provides that States have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources according to their national policies and the correspondent responsibility to ensure that activities carried out within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
13
On international environmental law see in general KISS, Droit international de l’environnement, Paris, 1989; SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, Manchester, 1995; NANDA, International Environmental Law and Policy, New York, 1995; BIRNIE & BOYLE, International Law and the Environment, Oxford, 2002.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
189
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration probably represents the first attempt to find instruments and patterns to achieve a balance between the right to economic development and the protection of the environment. In this case, the right of development is enshrined in the right for each State to exploit its own natural resources according to its own needs and policies and States have a sovereign right to pursue it, while at the same time they must ensure that economic development does not damage the environment, particularly the environment beyond the borders of the State within whose jurisdiction the potentially damaging activities are performed. In fact, in Principle 21, this attempt to strike a balance between the right to development and the duty to protect the environment is still framed in the very traditional terms of limiting transboundary pollution which may give raise to international controversies among sovereign States. However, it cannot be denied that in concrete terms the establishment of Principle 21 probably paved the way for the appearance on the international scene of the concept of sustainable development, which was firstly launched in the 1980s and now represents the basis upon which most of international environmental law stands. The genesis of the concept of sustainable development is commonly reported to the 1987 Brundtland Report, in which is contained the well-known definition of “sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. We will analyse in greater detail in the next paragraph of the present contribution the constitutive elements and the main features of the principle of sustainable development. For the moment it is sufficient to recall that the principle of sustainable development, since its first formulation in the Brundtland Report, has immediately become the common keyword for the promotion of all national and international efforts aimed at finding a reasonable balance between the needs of the economic development and the conflicting needs related to the protection of the environment. It is certainly not a coincidence that the 1992 Rio Conference promoted by the UN General Assembly to assess the state of the art regarding such a world-wide effort towards a sustainable and environmentally sound development, while at the same time
190
Massimiliano Montini
elaborating strategies and adopting measures to halt and reverse the adverse effects of environmental degradation on the planet, was named UN Conference on Environment and Development. The name chosen for the 1992 Rio Conference stressed in fact once again the importance of the overarching objective of the balance between the right to pursue economic development for all peoples on the earth with the competing common interest of mankind to promote sustainable patterns of development and discontinue activities and behaviours too dangerous for the environment. The Rio Declaration adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference contains twenty-seven Principles, which although are per se generally non binding, certainly represent the main framework upon which most of the global efforts to affirm, both at international and at national level, an increased recourse to the principle of sustainable development are based since then. In the Rio Declaration, a particular stress is placed on the need that States co-operate in good faith to fulfil their right to development without endangering the environment and to further develop in more general terms international law in the field of sustainable development. Several Principles listed in the Rio Declaration deserve a special attention: first of all Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration needs to be recalled here. It substantially reproduces Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration that we just examined above with a small, but not irrelevant, modification. In fact, while in the text of Principle 21 it is stated that “States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies”, twenty years later, probably under the influence of the principle of sustainable development, it is asserted that States have the right to exploit their own resources pursuant not only to their environmental policies, but also to their “developmental policies”. Everybody can see that this is certainly not a sign of advancement in the promotion of environmental protection goals, since in the integration and balancing between environmental and developmental policies, are generally the former ones which prevail. However, this modification in the text of the Principle reflects the fact that a new era, dominated by the concept of sustainable development, has now come and reaffirms the necessity to develop instruments and promote
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
191
patterns of development which can achieve the right balance between the right to development and conflicting environmental interests on a case by case basis. The importance of the right to development in the framework of the Rio Declaration is even better demonstrated by Principle 3, which seems to consider the fulfilment of the right to development as a prerequisite to meet the developmental and environmental needs of the peoples around the world, even if considered in an inter-generational perspective. Principle 3 in fact plainly states: “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations”. The reach of Principle 3 is probably somehow limited and tempered by the following provision of the Rio Declaration, namely Principle 4, which affirms the importance of environmental considerations for the planning of patterns of economic development which point at the achievement of sustainable development. Principle 4 in fact provides that: “In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. There are some other important provisions of the Rio Declaration which deserve a special mention, insofar they introduce some noteworthy instruments to be used in order to try and achieve in concrete terms the objective of sustainable development by balancing on a case by case basis the competing environmental and developmental interests at stake. Such instruments are for instance the precautionary principle, enshrined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration, which will not be further examined in the present context, and the environmental impact assessment principle, recalled in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration, which will be analysed in greater detail below in Section 4 of the present contribution. Our attention in the next paragraph will be instead devoted to a brief analysis of the origins, features and evolution of the principle of sustainable development. In fact, during the 1990s, building up on the results of the 1992 Rio Conference, the principle of sustainable development has become the leading concept used in the framework of international treaties and judicial interpretations in order to find a balance between right to development and protection of the
192
Massimiliano Montini
environment. To this effect, the principle of sustainable development, during the last decade, has been enshrined in several international legal treaties and has been applied before national and international courts. Therefore, it is probably not surprising that UN Conference convened in Johannesburg in 2002 in order to assess the progress made by the international community in the process for the creation and consolidation of an “international law in the field of sustainable development” was named UN Conference on Sustainable Development. In concrete terms, however, the 2002 Johannesburg Conference did not produce the same interesting results of the previous two 1972 and 1992 Conferences, as far as the adoption of declarations of principles and international treaties is concerned. At the Johannesburg Conference, in fact, just a Political Declaration and a corresponding Plan of Action were adopted. These documents did not represent any advancement in the progressive development of international law in the field of sustainable development, but merely recalled the concepts already elaborated in the previous Stockholm and Rio Conferences. In the Political Declaration, in fact, all States and peoples of the world gathered in Johannesburg merely reaffirmed their general commitment to the principle of sustainable development, as the key-word to pursue the objective of a better future for all mankind, and in the Plan of Action they launched a very broad working agenda for the next years. With this in mind, let us go on with a most careful analysis of the origins, main features and evolutionary trends of the principle of sustainable development.
THE PRINCIPLE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ORIGINS, FEATURES AND EVOLUTION We have mentioned in the previous paragraph that the first and commonly accepted basic definition of sustainable development is the one contained in the 1987 Brundtland Report, where “sustainable development” is defined as “development that meets the needs of the
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
193
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.14 As anyone can see, such a definition is based on the two opposed concepts of “needs” and of “limits”.15 On the one side, in fact, the objective of sustainable development can be reached only if the “needs” of the present and future generations are satisfied in a fair and equitable way. On the other side, however, no kind of development can be considered to be “sustainable” if no “limits” are placed on the exploitation of the environmental resources in the name of economic development. In other words, development can be sustainable only if some “limits” are posed upon it and if it does not pose an excessive burden on the capacity of the environment to sustain the human pressure, so as to permit a fair and equitable satisfaction of the needs of the present and future generations. Before analysing the basic elements which compose the concept of sustainable development, it should be recalled here that although the concept of sustainable development only emerged as such in the last fifteen years, the idea of the “sustainability” of certain human activities potentially dangerous for the natural environment can be traced back to the XIX century. An early example of a claim based on the idea of sustainability can be found, for instance, in the Fur Seals case (1983), which opposed the United States and Great Britain. In such a case, the attempt of the United States to act unilaterally so as to prevent an excessive and unregulated fishing of fur seals located in the Behring Sea, operated mainly by British fishermen, was considered to be not acceptable by the Arbitral Tribunal called upon to judge on the question. The Tribunal, in fact, held that the United States in principle had no right to regulate fishing outside their territorial sea. However, responding to the quest of sustainability of the US, the Tribunal partially endorsed the US position and promoted the conclusion of a fishing agreement between the two States, which could prevent an
14 15
See Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, OUP, Oxford, 1987. See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 198.
194
Massimiliano Montini
excessive fishing of fur seals and therefore avoid the risk of an extinction of the said species.16 The elements which characterise the concept of sustainable development in the framework of the basic and traditional definition contained in the Brundtland Report are essentially four. The first constitutive element is represented by the concept of the “prudent and rational use of natural resources”. Such a concept ought to represent a guideline to be applied first of all by each State of the international community, when it is determining and implementing its national policies on economic development and environmental protection. Moreover, the aim of the prudent and rational use of natural resources must be taken into account by States also when they co-operate for the conclusion of international agreements in the field of economic development and environmental protection, so as to promote sustainable patterns of development.17 The second constitutive element of the concept of sustainable development is represented by the principle of inter-generational equity. Such a principle imposes upon States the duty to take into account not only the needs of the present generation, but also the plausible needs and the overall benefit of future generations. To better explain the reach of the concept of inter-generational equity, some commentator has recalled the concept of the “trust”. In fact, if we keep in mind that as “members of the present generation, we hold the earth in trust for future generations”,18 it follows that we are compelled to make a prudent and rational use of the natural resources available, so as not to deplete excessively the stock of natural resources left to us by the previous generation and leave to the next generations the same possibilities we have to meet their own needs.19 16 17 18
19
See Fur Seals case, 1983, in MOORE, International Arbitral Awards, Vol. I, p. 755. See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 201. See BROWN WEISS, “Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the Environment”, American Journal of International Law (AJIL) 84 (1990), p. 1999; FRANCIONI, “Per un governo mondiale dell’ambiente: quali norme? quali istituzioni?”, in SCAMUZZI, Costituzioni, Razionalità, Ambiente, Torino, 1993, pp. 443 et ss. See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 199.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
195
The third constitutive element of the concept of sustainable development is represented by the principle of intra-generational equity. According to such a principle, each State in the definition of its developmental and environmental policies must take into account the benefit of the other peoples and States around the world. The principle of intra-generational equity is closely related to the principle of intergenerational equity. Both principles have in common a fundamental “social dimension”. However, while the inter-generational perspective adopts a dynamic and inter-temporal approach, the intra-generational perspective tries to promote a fair and equitable share of the world resources with reference to a static approach, which considers the present historical situation. Moreover, the principle of intragenerational equity is closely linked also to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, enshrined in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, which affirms that all States have a duty to co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to tackle the most serious global environmental problems. However, not all States have the same duties and responsibilities to act for the benefit of the Earth’s ecosystem, but in order to define their respective responsibilities, due account must be taken of their different contributions to the occurrence of the present situation of environmental degradation. The fourth constitutive element of the concept of sustainable development is represented by the principle of integration. Pursuant to such a principle, environmental considerations must be integrated into economic development projects, plans and programmes, so as to promote an environmentally friendly approach to economic development. The principle of integration is defined in the following terms in Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration: “In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. It should be underlined that, in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, the principle of integration is meant to drive both the national and international policies of States towards a more sustainable approach, and in fact in recent years it has been incorporated in several national and international legal instruments to this effect. Moreover, the principle of integration ought to play a decisive role if the concept of the “sustainable development” is really
196
Massimiliano Montini
destined to be a privileged instrument to be used in order to find a balance, on a case by case basis, between the right to development and the protection of the environment.20 The basic and traditional definition of the principle of sustainable development just described above, based on four constitutive elements, was partially reviewed and updated at the Johannesburg Conference. In fact, the Johannesburg Political Declaration underlines that the principle of sustainable development is based on three “interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars”, namely “economic development, social development and environmental protection”, which must be collectively promoted and advanced “at local, national, regional and global levels”.21 In more general terms, it can be noticed that while the Stockholm and Rio Conferences had mainly focused on environmental issues, at the Johannesburg Summit the attention gradually shifted from environmental to economic and social issues. Therefore, in the Johannesburg Declaration the Parties recognise that poverty eradication, changing consumption and production patterns, and protecting and managing the natural resource base for economic and social development are overarching objectives of, and essential requirements for sustainable development.
In such a context, as one can see, the traditional objective of the protection of the environment seems in fact to be destined to be gradually replaced by the more dynamic objective of the protection and management of the natural resources intended as pre-requisites for economic and social development.22 In the era of the economic globalisation, the traditional environmental and social challenges seem to have gained a new dimension which must be taken into account. Pursuant to the Johannesburg Declaration, in fact,
20 21 22
See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 205. See Johannesburg Political Declaration, para. 5. See Johannesburg Political Declaration, para. 11.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
197
the rapid integration of markets, mobility of capital and significant increases in investment flows around the world have opened new challenges and opportunities for the pursuit of sustainable development23
and therefore the priority for the international community must be “the fight against the world-wide conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development” of all the people.24 In sum, the wording of the Johannesburg Declaration seems to build up on the previous Stockholm and Rio Declarations, but with two important differences. The first one is that the present Declaration does not contain legal principles, but merely political statements. The second one is that in the present Declaration, differently than in the previous ones, the main focus is placed on the economic and social development themes, whereas the protection of environment seems to be left aside, as it was the less important pillar on which the concept of sustainable development is based. Once described the four constitutive elements, which compose the principle of sustainable development, as deriving from the evolution of international environmental law marked by the Rio and the Johannesburg Conferences, it is now time to analyse briefly how the principle of sustainable development has been incorporated in international treaties and has been relied upon in the decisions of international courts and tribunals. If one exempts the broad reference to the concept of sustainability contained in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, with specific reference to the issue of the sound management of international fisheries,25 the first two international treaties which made an explicit reference to the concept of sustainable development, as one of the 23 24
25
See Johannesburg Political Declaration, para. 14. According to the Johannesburg Declaration, among the conditions that pose severe threats to the sustainable development of the people are: “chronic hunger; malnutrition; foreign occupation; armed conflicts; illicit drug problems; organized crime; corruption; natural disasters; illicit arms trafficking; trafficking in persons; terrorism; intolerance and incitement to racial, ethnic, religious and other hatreds; xenophobia; and endemic, communicable and chronic diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis” (see Johannesburg Declaration, para. 19). See preamble of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), reprinted in ILM 21 (1982), p. 1261.
198
Massimiliano Montini
guiding principles to which such treaties are based, are the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, both signed during the Rio Conference on Environment and Development. In particular, as regards the Climate Change Convention, the principle is enshrined in article 3, which reads as follows: The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable development. Policies and measures to protect the climate system against human-induced change should be appropriate for the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated with national development programmes, taking into account that economic development is essential for adopting measures to address climate change.26
Correspondingly, in the Biodiversity Convention, “sustainability” is one of the key-words which ought to regulate the sound management of biological resources and although the term “sustainable development” is not explicitly used in the text of the Convention, certain relevance is given to the concept of the “sustainable use” of biological diversity. For instance, article 1 of the Biodiversity Convention states that: The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources.
As to the concept of sustainable use, in particular, this is defined as such by article 2 of the Convention: Sustainable use means the use of components of biological diversity in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity, thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future generations.27
26 27
See article 3(4) of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, reprinted in ILM 31 (1992), p. 849. See articles 1 and 2 of the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, reprinted in ILM 31 (1992), p. 82.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
199
Even more interestingly, the concept of sustainable development during the 1990’s has been incorporated in a series of treaties not expressly dealing with the protection of the environment, such as the 1994 Treaty Establishing the World Trade Organization, whose preamble contains an explicit reference to the principle of sustainable development, when it affirms that the Parties recognise that: their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.28
As regards then the reference to the principle of sustainable development contained in the decisions of international courts and tribunals, two cases in particular need to be mentioned. Such cases are the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, decided by the International Court of Justice, and the 1998 Shrimps-Turtles case, decided by the WTO dispute settlement authorities. Both cases will better analysed in the following sections of the present paper and therefore they will be dealt here only to the extent that appears strictly necessary for addressing the limited issue of the evolution and progressive reference to the principle of sustainable development contained in contemporary international practice. For instance, in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, which regarded a project of dams to be built on the Danube for hydro-electric purposes, whose construction opposed Hungary to Slovakia mainly on environmental protection grounds, the concept of sustainable development was referred to by the ICJ as the key concept which aptly expresses in a single framework the need to balance and reconcile the
28
See preamble to the 1994 Treaty Establishing the World Trade Organization, reprinted in ILM 33 (1994), p. 13.
200
Massimiliano Montini
two conflicting interests of economic development and environmental protection. The Court, in particular held that: Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.29
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, then, the importance of the concept of sustainable development was further stressed by Judge Weeramantry, which provided for a thorough examination of the principle in its Dissenting Opinion.30 In particular, as to the role of the principle of sustainable development in general, he held that: The Court must hold the balance even between the environmental considerations and the developmental considerations raised by the respective Parties. The principle that enables the Court to do so is the principle of sustainable development.
Moreover, as to the applicability of the principle in the case at stake as a balancing tool between the conflicting interests related to the right to development on the one side and the right to environmental protection on the other side, he stated that: When a major scheme, such as that under consideration in the present case, is planned and implemented, there is always the need to weigh considerations of development against environmental considerations, as their underlying juristic bases – the right to development and the right to environmental protection – are important principles of current international law. 29 30
See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, 1997, cited above, para. 140. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, cited above, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
201
Judge Weeramantry then observed that in the case under scrutiny both Parties, namely Hungary and Slovakia, agreed on the existence and applicability of the principle of sustainable development to the case and their disagreement was merely as the way in which the principle was to be concretely applied.31 As mentioned above, another recent case which bears a particular relevance for the issue of the progressive incorporation of the principle of sustainable development in the recent international practice is the Shrimps-Turtles case, decided in the framework of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.32 The Shrimps-Turtles case concerned a US regulation which unilaterally imposed to fishing activities occurring outside the jurisdiction of the United States certain fishing technologies to prevent accidental take of sea turtles. The US regulation was opposed by several GATT Parties and was ultimately judged on the basis of the exception contained in article XX(g) GATT, as it will be described below in section 5 of the present article. For what concerns the present section, in particular, it should be recalled that the AB, when analysing the term “exhaustible natural resources”, contained in article XX(g) GATT, affirmed that since: The words of Article XX(g), ‘exhaustible natural resources’, were actually crafted more than 50 years ago. They must be read by a treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment.33
The AB then held that, in order to achieve such an “evolutive interpretation” of the existing norms of the GATT Treaty,34 a particular importance had to be recognised to the principle of
31 32 33 34
See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, cited above, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry, section A. See Shrimps-Turtles case, Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/R and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R. See Shrimps-Turtles case, Report of the Appellate Body, para. 129. On the principle of “evolutive interpretation” of existing treaty provisions see FRANCIONI, “Environment, Human Rights and the Limits of Free Trade”, in FRANCIONI (ed.), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, Hart, Oxford, 2001, p. 23.
202
Massimiliano Montini
sustainable development, whose importance is explicitly acknowledged by the WTO Agreement in its preamble.35 Having said that, once described the theoretical foundations of the concept of sustainable development and briefly dealt with its progressive incorporation in the international practice, the next two sections will be devoted to the analysis of two different practical modalities of application of the principle of sustainable development, namely the case of the application of the instrument of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for development project and plans and the case of the necessity principle as the balancing tool used to address the so-called the “trade and environment” issue in international trade law.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF EIA FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND PLANS Development projects and plans can be very risky for environmental protection and preservation of natural ecosystems. For this reason, before putting into practice a proposed development project or plan it is certainly advisable to make a previous evaluation of its possible impact on the environment, so as to prevent or significantly reduce any environmental damage it may cause. To respond to this basic need, the instrument of the “environmental impact assessment” (EIA) was devised.36 Under the name of EIA is normally intended a procedure, foreseen by national and international legal acts, with calls for certain technical authorities to conduct a previous evaluation of the foreseeable impact of a certain development project or plan on the environment, in order to provide decision-makers with a better knowledge of the pros and cons of the activity under scrutiny so as to allow them to take the best
35 36
See preamble to the 1994 Treaty Establishing the World Trade Organization, cited above. See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 579; BIRNIE & BOYLE, International Law and the Environment, supra note 13, p. 130.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
203
decision in the view of the promotion of the overall objective of sustainable development. In practice, the EIA procedure should permit an integration of environmental protection considerations in the framework of the planning and approval of development projects and plans, so as to prevent the pursuit of unsustainable patterns of development. According to Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration: Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.
Such a definition of EIA presents some distinct features which need to be assessed. Firstly, it seems to limit the scope of application of the EIA procedure, by imposing it only for those activities which are likely to have a “significant adverse impact” on the environment. In other words, it seems that EIA is mandatory only for those activities which exceed a certain magnitude of negative impact on the environment. It is in fact a sort of a “de minimis” approach which is endorsed here by the present EIA definition, which is ought not to apply to activities likely to have only a minor or transitory negative impact on the environment. Secondly, the EIA definition contained in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration seems to limit the duty to conduct an EIA procedure only to those circumstances in which a significant adverse impact on the environment is “likely”. In other word, it seems that, according to such a definition, the EIA procedure becomes mandatory only when a certain negative impact is not simply “possible” or “foreseeable”, but when is rather “probable” or “likely”. Before the EIA procedure is performed, therefore, an initial evaluation on the likeliness of a given project or plan to cause adverse effects on the environment should be carried out by the competent authorities, so as to avoid making all proposed projects and plans subject to a “full” EIA procedure when it is not necessary. Thirdly, the EIA definition contained in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration seems to render the performance of an EIA procedure obligatory simply with regard to projects, plans and programmes
204
Massimiliano Montini
falling into the category of “activity”, without, however, providing any definition of such a term. A question arises in this respect. Are all the projects and plans which would deserve the performance of an EIA, in consideration of their likely adverse impact on the environment, to be considered “activities” in the sense of Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration? Unfortunately, no clear answer to the present question has been yet provided by national and international practice on the topic, although in most of the legislation on EIA the terms “projects and plans” are preferred to the ambiguous term “activity” included in Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration.37 At international level, several treaties and various other acts contain provision requiring the performance of an EIA in certain cases. A sort of EIA, for instance, is mandated by article 206 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which calls States to conduct, as far as practicable, a previous assessment of the potential effects of a certain planned activity on the environment, when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the planned activity under its jurisdiction or control may cause substantial pollution to the marine environment.38 As anyone can see, this is still a very embryonic form of EIA, insofar the duty to conduct the assessment is not really a mandatory one, but can be avoided if it is not “practicable”. Moreover, the State which decides to carry out such an assessment on the one side has the duty to communicate the results to the “competent international organisations”, but on the other side it is not compelled to base its decision regarding the planned activity on the results of the assessment. Finally, in more general terms, it can be observed that here the EIA is still framed as an instrument to prevent transboundary environmental damage, rather than as a tool to achieve a satisfactory balance between the developmental and the conflicting environmental interests at stake.39
37 38 39
See BIRNIE & BOYLE, International Law and the Environment, supra note 13, p. 134. See article 206 of UNCLOS, cited above. See BIRNIE & BOYLE, International Law and the Environment, supra note 13, p. 134.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
205
As far as non-binding acts are concerned, a very important international instrument on EIA is represented by the 1987 UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact Assessment.40 The UNEP document contains guidelines to be followed by States in order to assess when an EIA is necessary and how should it be carried out, so as to achieve an “environmentally sound and sustainable development”. The UNEP Goals and Principles are based on three related objectives: firstly, they require that a previous assessment is performed before decisions on a planned projects are taken by the competent authorities and that such decisions are based on the results of the assessment conducted; secondly, it mandates for the adoption and application of national EIA procedures; thirdly, it calls for the establishment of national procedures, based on reciprocity, for notification, information, exchange and consultation on activities likely to have significant transboundary effects.41 A sophisticated and comprehensive EIA system is envisaged by the 1991 Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty.42 Article 8 of the Protocol, in fact, requires States to conduct a prior assessment of the possible negative impacts of the planned activities to be undertaken in the Antarctic environment or in dependent or associated ecosystems. The assessment procedure is different depending on the degree of impact the planned activity is likely to have on the Antarctic environment. The expected degree of impact can fall into the following three categories: (a) less than a minor transitory impact, (b) a minor transitory impact; (c) more than a minor transitory impact. Under the EIA regime provided by article 8 of the Protocol, each planned activity which may have negative effects on the Antarctic environment is firstly assessed under national EIA procedures. If it is found to have “less than a minor transitory impact”, it may be carried out without any further examination. If instead, it is found likely to exceed the degree of a “less than a minor transitory 40 41 42
See UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact Assessment, UNEP/GC7DEC714725 (1987). See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 581. See Environmental Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991, reprinted in ILM 30 (1991), p. 1461.
206
Massimiliano Montini
impact”, the activity must be subject to an Initial Environmental Evaluation, with the aim of establishing whether the said activity is likely to have a “minor transitory impact” or more. Finally, if such an Initial Evaluation shows that the activity is likely to have “more than a minor transitory impact”, the activity must undergo a Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation, which must be then circulated to the other Parties to the Protocol, before a final decision is taken.43 The most comprehensive agreement on EIA is probably represented by the 1991 Espoo Convention.44 The Convention, which is a regional European agreement, concluded under the auspices of the UN ECE, deals with EIA in a transboundary context. In fact, it requires each “party of origin”, that is each party under whose jurisdiction a certain proposed activity which is likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary environmental impact is planned, to ensure that an EIA procedure is undertaken, pursuant to the provision of the Convention, prior to any decision on whether to authorise or undertake the proposed activity. The party of origin is also compelled to notify any “affected party”, that is any party likely to be negatively affected by the transboundary impact of a proposed activity, of the proposed activity and to seek co-operation with the affected party or parties, so as to minimise the risk of any adverse transboundary environmental impact. Moreover, article 7 of the Espoo Convention foresees the possibility for the concerned parties to supplement the prior EIA procedure with a post-project monitoring and analysis of the possible transboundary impact of the proposed activity.45 During the last decade, the EIA procedure found its way also in two cases decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), namely the 1995 Nuclear Tests II case and the 1997 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case. In the former case, New Zealand sought to prevent France from resuming underground nuclear tests in the Pacific atolls of Mururoa and Fangatuafa, arguing inter alia that France had to carry out an EIA
43 44 45
See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 592. See Espoo Convention, 1991, reprinted in ILM 30 (1991), p. 802. See SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 588.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
207
on the proposed nuclear tests before starting the operations.46 In particular, New Zealand held that France had a duty, arising from several international treaties to which France was a Party and from many soft-law emerging provisions of international environmental law, to conduct an EIA, pursuant to the accepted international standards, in order to establish that the planned nuclear test were not likely to cause, directly or indirectly, a radioactive contamination of the environment in breach of the rights of New Zealand and other neighbouring Pacific States. The ICJ unfortunately dismissed the New Zealand claim on procedural reasons and did not address the merits of the arguments on the applicability of the EIA procedure in the present case. However, it should be noted that France did not deny this duty to apply the EIA procedure, but simply argued that internationally agreed standards do not exist and each State could refer to its own national regulations on EIA, as France had in fact done in the case a stake. Moreover, the importance of EIA in the framework of international environmental law was underlined by Judge Weeramantry in its Dissenting Opinion, in which he affirmed that EIA is an ancillary principle to the precautionary principle, which “is gathering strength and international acceptance, and reached a level of general recognition at which this Court should take notice of it”.47 Similarly, the EIA procedure was invoked in the 1997 GabcikovoNagymaros case, which opposed Hungary to Slovakia with regard to a project of dams to be built on the Danube for hydro-electric purposes. The project, which had previously planned together by two concerned States, was then considered by Hungary likely to cause an environmental degradation of the Danube’s ecosystem.48 Hungary therefore argued inter alia that Slovakia, which further to Hungary’s abandonment of the project, decided to go on with the construction of the so-called Variant C to the project, had started the construction works without conducting a prior EIA on the proposed project. The ICJ, unfortunately, did not specifically address the issue of 46 47 48
See Nuclear Tests II case, 1995, ICJ Report, 1995, p. 288. See Nuclear Tests II case, cited above, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry; see also MONTINI, in RECIEL 5 (1996), p. 67. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, cited above.
208
Massimiliano Montini
whether international environmental law required in such a case the prior performance of an EIA procedure, but simply affirmed in general terms that “the Parties together should look afresh at the effects on the environment of the operation of the Gabcíkovo power plant”.49 However, the Court in its decision made a very interesting reference to the link between the prior EIA evaluation and the postmonitoring activities, by stating that new environmental standards and new environmental law norms have to be taken into account and must be given proper weight “not only when States contemplate new activities but also when continuing activities begun in the past”.50 The position of the ICJ was then reinforced by the words of Judge Weeramantry, who expressly dealt with the issue of EIA in its Dissenting Opinion and stated that that environmental impact assessment means not merely an assessment prior to the commencement of the project, but a continuing assessment and evaluation as long as the project is in operation. This follows from the fact that EIA is a dynamic principle and is not confined to a pre-project evaluation of possible environmental consequences.51
In the context of the European Community, the EIA procedure is mandatory for certain well defined categories of public and private projects since the 1980s, under the 1985 EC Directive 85/337, as amended by the 1997 EC Directive 97/11.52 Article 2(1) of the EC Directive on EIA prescribes that: Member States shall adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue inter alia, of their nature, size or location are made subject to an assessment with regard to their effects.
49 50 51 52
See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, para. 140. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, para. 140. See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, Dissenting Opinion Judge Weeramantry. See EC Directive 85/337 of 27 June 1985, published in European Communities Official Journal (EC OJ), L 175 of 5 July 1985, p. 40, as amended by EC Directive 97/11 of 3 March 1997 published in EC OJ L 73 of 14 March 1997, p. 5. See also SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, supra note 13, p. 583; KRÄMER, EC Environmental Law, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2000; JANS, European Environmental Law, Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, II ed., 2000, p. 321.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
209
The EC Directive does not define or further explain how to assess which projects have to be considered likely to have “significant effects on the environment” for the purpose of the EIA procedure. However, article 4 of the EC Directive divides the projects which must be subject to EIA in two categories. The first category, which includes all projects listed in Annex I to the Directive, refers to projects which are presumed to have “significant effects on the environment” and for which the EIA procedure is always mandatory. The second category, which include all projects listed in Annex II to the Directive, refers instead to projects for which EIA is not mandatory, but is left to Member States the duty to determine, on a case by case basis or through general thresholds and criteria, whether such projects are to be subject to EIA, taking into account their characteristics. The EC Directive on EIA has been recently supplemented and completed by EC Directive 2001/42, which makes the EIA procedure mandatory not only for projects, but also for plans and programmes likely to have significant effects on the environment.53 It should be clear from the above analysis that the importance of the EIA lies not only, and not so much, in its nature of a technical tool to be used in order to assess and possibly prevent a negative impact on the environment caused by a planned development project, but it rather consists in its nature of balancing instrument between the right to development, as enshrined in development projects and plans, and the protection of the environment. In this sense, in fact, the EIA procedure represents a privileged instrument to be used both at national and at international level in order to find on a case by case basis the right balance between such conflicting legitimate interests. Moreover, the performance of an EIA can also contribute in concrete terms at the achievement of the overall objective of sustainable development, as incidentally stated by the ICJ in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case seen above.54
53
See EC Directive 2001/42 of 27 June 20001, published in EC OJ L 197 of 21 July 2001, p. 30. 54 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case, para. 140.
210
Massimiliano Montini
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF THE “TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT” ISSUE We have mentioned above the importance of the so called principle of integration, as one of the constitutive elements of the concept of sustainable development. We have also recalled that pursuant to the principle of integration, as enshrined in Principle 4 of the Rio Declaration: “In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. Now, it is time to address the following question: what is the exact content of the term “development” in this context? Which activities can be considered “part of the development process” in this sense? The answer to this question is not straightforward. However, it can be certainly said that “development” in the sense mentioned above is not intended to refer simply to “development projects and plans” in the traditional sense of “infrastructure works” or other “construction works”, which ought to be subject to an EIA procedure before their approval, as we have seen in the precedent paragraph. In the present context, instead, “development” is a much wider concept, which ought to include all activities, plans and project which somehow have as their ultimate aim the promotion of development as a “comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process”, in the sense of the 1986 Declaration of the Right to Development.55 Therefore, I am convinced that the promotion of international trade can certainly be considered “part of the development process” in the sense mentioned above. This is, in fact, also confirmed by the Preamble of the 1994 WTO Agreement, in which the Contracting Parties underline that their commercial and economic relations should be promoted with the ultimate objective of achieving a higher degree of economic development, while at the same time allowing for an optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development” and “seeking to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
55
See Declaration of the Right to Development, (1986), cited above.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
211
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development.56
Once ascertained that the concept of sustainable development and the conscience that there may be in some circumstances environmental concerns and interests which run counter to the promotion of free and undisturbed world trade is not completely extraneous from the WTO context, it is now time to proceed to the analysis of the further question of how to balance in concrete terms the possibly conflicting trade and environmental interests in the framework of the world trading rules.57 To this respect, it should be preliminarily recalled that the issue of the balance between conflicting trade end environmental interests has been addressed in recent times by the WTO dispute settlement authorities in several cases, under different treaty provisions, belonging to three different WTO multilateral agreements, namely the GATT, the SPS and the TBT. Let us firstly proceed to the analysis of the so-called “trade and environment ” dispute, as developed under the GATT Treaty. In this sense, it is well known that the ultimate goal of the GATT Treaty is the promotion of a freer and fairer trade among the Contracting Parties, which is to be achieved through the abolition of non-tariff barriers and the progressive elimination of tariff restrictions to trade in goods, with the ultimate goal of furthering economic development through the expansion of international trade. To this end, the main principle upon which the GATT is based is the principle of non-discrimination, which is enshrined in two clauses: (1) the “most-favoured nation” clause (MFN clause), according to which all tariff concessions accorded to one State must be automatically extended to all other GATT Contracting Parties (article I GATT); (2) the “national treatment clause” (NT clause), on the basis of which imported goods, once they have entered into the national market of a given State, must not be subject to a less favourable treatment than national products (article III GATT). 56 57
See Preamble of the WTO Agreement, 1994, cited above. See for instance FRANCIONI, Environment, Human Rights and the Limits of Free Trade, supra note 34, p. 1.
212
Massimiliano Montini
Moreover, the MFN and NT clauses are supplemented by a general provision which prohibits all restrictions on imported products other than tariffs (article XI GATT). On the basis of such provisions, obviously, an unrestricted freedom of trade is the main goal and the main concern of the GATT Treaty. However, this does not mean that international trade must remain unrestricted in all circumstances. The GATT Treaty itself in fact contemplates some circumstances in which trade can be legitimately restricted in order to afford an adequate protection to important interests of the Contracting Parties, provided that certain requirements are met. Such circumstances are listed in article XX GATT, which is named “general exceptions”.58 Pursuant to the provision of article XX GATT, in order for a Party to justify the adoption of some national measures giving priority to its national environmental interests over the general interest of the promotion of free and undisturbed international trade, two conditions must be fulfilled.59 Firstly, it must be demonstrated that the national measures in question fall under one of the two following exceptions: (1) article XX(b), which deals with national measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life of health”, (2) article XX(g), which refers to national measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible 58
59
The rational behind the “general exceptions” listed in article XX GATT as been aptly explained by Petersmann, which held that: “the ‘general exceptions’ in Article XX are designed to allow Contracting Parties to give priority to the “public policies” listed in Article XX over trade liberalisation by authorising trade restrictions necessary for the pursuit of overriding public policy goals, including protection of life, health and environmental resources”. See PETERSMANN, International and European Law after the Uruguay Round, London, 1995, p. 29. The correct method of application of the “general exceptions” contained in article XX GATT for the justification of national measures aiming at the protection of the environment has been summarised as follows by the Appellate Body (AB) in the 1996 Gasoline case: “In order that the justifying protection of Article XX may be extended to it, the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) – listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the requirements imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX. The analysis is, in other words, two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of characterisation of the measure under XX – paragraphs (a) to (j); second, further appraisal of the same measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.”
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
213
natural resources, if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restriction on domestic production or consumption”. Secondly, once ascertained that the national measures at stake fall under article XX(b) or XX(g) exceptions, they must be assessed in the light of the introductory clause of article XX, the so-called chapeau, which states that they can be held compatible with the GATT provided that: such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade. 60
On the basis of the above mentioned “general exceptions”, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement authorities have tried to find a balance between the conflicting environmental and trade interests at stake in a variety of cases. Before analysing some of the most important cases decided on the basis of the GATT’s provisions, it should be recalled here that in all the cases concerned the WTO dispute settlement authorities have settled the “trade and environment” issues by applying a balancing instrument which can be named “necessity principle”. Such a balancing instrument, as we will see in greater detail below, is essentially composed of two tests, namely the necessity and the proportionality tests, which have been almost constantly relied upon in order to determine whether the national measures of the Parties aiming at the protection of the environment can override by way of exception general free trade interests.61 As regards for instance the application of the exception contained in article XX(b) GATT, which refers to national measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”, the first case decided after the institution of the WTO which explicitly dealt with it was the 1996 Gasoline case.62 The Gasoline case arose from a US regulation which imposed on foreign gasoline refiners wishing to export their products into the US territory stricter environmental standards, as 60 61
62
See CHARNOVITZ, “Exploring the environmental exceptions in GATT article XX”, Journal of World Trade (1991), p. 5. See MONTINI, “The Necessity Principle as an Instrument to Balance Trade and the Protection of the Environment”, in FRANCIONI (ed.), Environment, Human Rights and International Trade, supra note 34, p. 135. See Gasoline case, Report of the Panel, ILM 35 (1996), p. 274.
214
Massimiliano Montini
compared to those imposed on US national refiners. The WTO Panel, when examining the national measure under article XX(b), focused in particular on the “necessity” of the US measure. In this sense, in fact, the Panel recalled the interpretation of the term “necessary” already given by some previous GATT Panels in the Section 337 case (1989) and in Thai Cigarettes case (1990) and stated that, with regard to the US measure under scrutiny: “If there were consistent or less inconsistent measures reasonably available to the United States, the requirement to demonstrate necessity would not have been met”.63 The Panel therefore found the US measure unjustifiable under article XX(b), since there were alternative measures less restrictive for international trade which could have been adopted by the US authorities. The case was then appealed before the WTO Appellate Body (AB).64 The AB did not explicitly deal with article XX(b) exception and with the interpretation of the term “necessary” contained thereto, but rather decided the case on the basis of article XX(g) only. However, from an obiter dictum of the decision, it seems that the AB substantially wished to endorse the line of reasoning proposed by the Panel, according to which a national measure can be considered “necessary” within the meaning of article XX(b) only if it can be demonstrated that there are no alternative measures reasonably available to the State, which could achieve the aim sought with less impact on international trade.65 In the subsequent case with “environmental” features decided under article XX GATT, namely the Shrimps-Turtles case (1998),66 dealing with a US regulation imposing certain fishing technologies to prevent accidental take of sea turtles also to fishing activities occurring outside the jurisdiction of the United States, the US authorities sought justification both under article XX(b) and XX(g), but the Panel and the Appellate Body only addressed the issues under the article XX(g) exception, and did not provide any further interpretative contribution to the interpretation and application of the 63 64 65 66
See Gasoline case, Report of the Panel, at para. 6.24. See Gasoline case, Report of the Appellate Body, ILM 35 (1996). See Gasoline case, Report of the Appellate Body, at p. 620. See Shrimps-Turtles case, Report of the Panel, WT/DS58/R and Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
215
article XX(b) exception. Therefore, the case will be dealt with below, with reference to article XX(g) exception. The application of article XX(b) exception was finally addressed again in the Asbestos case (2001). Such a case arose from a French national regulation which banned the manufacture, import, domestic marketing, exportation, possession for sale, offer, sale and transfer under any title whatsoever of all varieties of asbestos fibres or any product containing asbestos fibres
for the protection of workers and of consumers. The French regulation did, however, allow a limited exception to the general ban, in specific cases when no substitute for materials, products or devices containing chrysotile fibres was available. Canada, which prior to the adoption of the national measure at stake was a major exporter of asbestos fibres and products to France, challenged the French Decree before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), claiming that the Decree: (1) constituted a technical regulation covered by the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and it was incompatible with various provisions of the TBT Agreement; 2) amounted to a ban incompatible with Article III(4) GATT and was not justifiable under the exception contained in Article XX(b) GATT. As regards, in particular, the claim regarding the compatibility of the French measure with the GATT’s provisions, the issues under scrutiny were the following ones: firstly, it had to be determined whether “chrysotile asbestos fibres and products” and “PCG fibres and products” were “like products” within the meaning of GATT Article III(4)67 and secondly it had to be assessed whether the French measure could be justified under article XX(b) exception. For the purpose of the present paper we will deal here just with the latter issue. To this respect, the Panel firstly ascertained that, on the basis of the scientific evidence available, the asbestos fibres and 67
See Article III(4) of the GATT reads, in the relevant part: “The products of the territory of any Member imported into the territory of any other Member shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use”.
216
Massimiliano Montini
products constituted a risk for public health and therefore the French regulation fell within the range of policies designed to protect human life or health, within the meaning of GATT Article XX(b), and secondly concretely assessed the justifiability of the national measure by applying the “necessity principle”, as already developed by other Panels and the AB in previous cases.68 In doing so, the Panel analysed in particular whether other measures “consistent or less inconsistent” with the prescriptions of the GATT were “reasonably available” to France and found that, in light of the “high degree” health policy objectives sought by France, no measures existed which could be considered a “reasonably available” alternative to the general ban adopted. 69 Therefore, the Panel concluded that the French measure was justifiable under the exception of Article XX(b) GATT, after having verified that it also satisfied the requirements of the chapeau.70 The Panel’s decision was then reviewed by the AB. As to the issue of the justifiability of the French measure under Article XX(b) GATT, in particular, the AB substantially upheld the Panel’s finding that the French Decree could be justified under Article XX(b), by underlying that since “the chosen level of health protection by France was a halt to the spread of asbestos-related health risks”, the general ban on asbestos products was clearly designed to achieve the objective sought and there was no alternative measure “reasonably available” to France “that would achieve the same end and that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition”.71 The cases just analysed above show that the Panels and the AB, when judging on the possibility to justify a national measure under the article XX(b) have always applied the same sort of balancing instrument, which can be named “necessity principle”. On the basis of such an instrument, according to the AB view, “in order to determine whether a measure is necessary it is important to assess whether consistent or less inconsistent measures are reasonably available”. The rational behind such an instrument is therefore the following one: 68 69 70 71
See for instance United States – Gasoline, adopted 20 May 1996, Appellate Body Report, Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R, and the Shrimps-Turtles case, supra note 4. Ibidem, paras. 8.208-8.223. Ibidem, para. 8.241. Ibidem, paras. 164-175.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
217
the national measure must try to achieve the legitimate objective sought by posing the least possible restriction on international trade. If, however, there are no alternative measures “reasonably available” to achieve the same degree of environmental or public health protection, as for instance in the Asbestos case, even a quite burdensome restriction to trade, such as a general ban on certain goods, may be held justifiable under article XX(b). With reference to the application of the exception contained in article XX(g) GATT, there are two cases which need to be analysed. The first one is the Gasoline case, already scrutinised above, which is relevant also in this context. The second one is the Shrimps-Turtles case, mentioned above, which needs to be more closely examined here. In the Gasoline case (1996),72 the US national measure at stake, after being analysed under article XX(b), was examined also under article XX(g). To this respect, the Panel, in the application of article XX(g) exception, did not depart from the interpretation of the terms “relating to” the protection of an exhaustible natural resource as “primarily aimed at” such a protection, as well as from the interpretation of the term “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” as “primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions”, which had been constantly proposed by previous GATT Panels.73 The Panel’s decision was appealed before the AB, which on the one side confirmed that the interpretation of the term “relating to” as meaning “primarily aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource was correct, but on the other side when interpreting the term “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption” noted that it seems to require not so much that the national measures must be “primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions”, as it had been hold by the Panel, but rather that “the measures concerned impose restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline but also with respect to domestic gasoline”.74 Therefore, the AB concluded that the US national measure 72 73 74
See Gasoline case, cited above. See Gasoline case, Report of the Panel, paras. 6.35-6.42. See Gasoline case, Report of the AB, p. 22.
218
Massimiliano Montini
at stake was provisionally justifiable under article XX(g) exception. However, the AB finally found that the measure, as it was concretely applied, did not satisfy the requirements of the chapeau, in so far it constituted an “unjustified discrimination” and a “disguised restriction to international trade”, and therefore it could not be justified under article XX(g) GATT.75 In the Shrimps-Turtles case (1998),76 as mentioned above, the US regulation under scrutiny was examined only under article XX(g) exception, although both article XX(b) and XX(g) had been invoked by the defendant. In this case, the issue of the interpretation and application of article XX(g) exception was not explicitly addressed by the Panel, but the AB when examining the term “relating to” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, although formally did not depart from the “traditional” interpretation of the term as referring to measures “primarily aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, in practice gave some interesting suggestions on how to better address the “relationship between the general structure and design of the measure at stake and the policy goal it purports to serve”.77 The AB, in fact, found that the national measure at stake was justifiable under article XX(g) exception insofar it was “not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective of the protection and conservation of sea turtles species” and “the means [we]re in principle reasonably related to the ends”. 78 With the above mentioned statement, the Appellate Body proposed the adoption of a new interpretative test according to which the possibility to justify a national measure under article XX(g) ought to depend not so much from the assessment that the measure at stake is “primarily aimed” at the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, but rather from the evaluation that the measure is not “disproportionately wide in its scope and reach in relation to the policy objective” or in other words is “reasonably related to the ends”. The test proposed by the AB, in fact, seems to introduce a sort of necessity and proportionality dimension in the evaluation of a national 75 76 77 78
See Gasoline case, Report of the AB, p. 29. See Shrimps-Turtles case, cited above. See Shrimps-Turtles case, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R. See Shrimps-Turtles case, Report of the Appellate Body, at para. 141.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
219
measure under article XX(g) exception, which recalls the application of the balancing instrument of the “necessity principle” already seen above with reference to article XX(b). We have now analysed how the “trade and environment ” issue has been addressed and solved in various cases under the GATT. It is now time to spend some words on how the WTO dispute settlement authorities have approached the issue of the balance between conflicting trade end environmental interests in the framework of two other WTO multilateral agreements, namely the SPS and the TBT. The SPS Agreement (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) contains a series of rules and procedures for the definition and application of national sanitary and phytosanitary standards by its Members, which are all the WTO Parties. In this sense, in general terms, the SPS Agreement sets a preference for the use of internationally agreed standards, whenever possible. However, it also recognises the possibility for Members to adopt, in certain circumstances, national sanitary and phytosanitary measures based on more restrictive standards than those agreed at international level, provided that such standards are either based on a “scientific justification” or determined on the basis of a “risk assessment procedure” conducted pursuant to the provisions of article 5 of the SPS Agreement. To this respect, it is noteworthy that such a “risk assessment procedure” incorporates the proportionality principle (article 5.6) and the precautionary principle (article 5.7). The first circumstance in which the application of the SPS Agreement was invoked before the WTO dispute settlement authorities was the Hormones case (1998). 79 The case arose from a ban imposed by the European Community on the production, sale and importation of meat and meat products taken from cattle treated with hormones. The ban on import, in particular, blocked US and Canadian importation of meat in Europe and, after the failure to solve the dispute by means of negotiations among the Parties, the case ended up before the WTO dispute settlement authorities.
79
See Hormones case, Report of the Panel, WT/DS26/R/USA WT/DS26/R/CAN; Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26-DS48/AB/R.
and
220
Massimiliano Montini
For the purpose of the present paper, it is not the case to deal extensively with the outcome of the Hormones case,80 which finally focused on the issue of the correct application of the precautionary principle, as enshrined under article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, and ended up with the condemnation of the ban on hormones meat and meat products treated with hormones adopted by the European Community.81 It is important to stress, instead, that according to the procedure established under the SPS Agreement, when a Member wishes to adopt a national sanitary or phytosanitary measure based on more restrictive standards than those agreed at international level the following requirements must be fulfilled: (1) firstly, all national measures aiming at the protection of human, animal or plant health or life must be based on a “risk assessment” based on available scientific evidence; (2) secondly, when determining the appropriate level of SPS protection, Members should “take into account the objective of minimising negative trade effects”; (3) thirdly, the national measures chosen should not be “more trade-restrictive than required, to achieve their appropriate level of SPS protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility”; (4) fourthly, in case full scientific certainty does not exists, Members may provisionally adopt “precautionary measures” which must be temporary and should be reviewed as soon as possible. On the basis of the four requirements described above, it can be argued that in order to determine whether a national measure setting higher standards than those internationally agreed can be upheld under the SPS Agreement it must be previously assessed that: (1) the national measure is necessary to afford an adequate protection to human, animal or plant health or life and (2) the national measure is not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve the aim sought. This is, in fact, nothing but another application of the “necessity principle”, composed by the necessity and the proportionality tests, which we have already seen in the case-law under the GATT.
80
81
For a comment on the Beef Hormones case, see for instance DOUMA and JACOBS, “The Beef Hormones Dispute and the Use of National Standards under WTO Law”, European Environmental Law Review (1999), p. 137. See Hormones case, cited above.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
221
The TBT Agreement (Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade) deals with the application of technical measures by Members, which may negatively interfere with international trade. In general terms, the TBT Agreement encourages Members to adopt internationally agreed technical standards, whenever possible. However, Members are not totally prevented from taking national measures necessary to protect human, animal and plant life or health or the environment. Quite on contrary, in principle each Member has the right to determine the level of protection that it deems more appropriate, provided that “technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade”. Moreover, “technical regulations shall not be more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking into account the risk nonfulfilment would create”.82
As one can see, the TBT Agreement fully embodies the necessity principle, by imposing upon Members wishing to adopt their own national technical standards the burden to ensure that their measures satisfy both the necessity test, in the sense that they fulfil a legitimate objective, such as the protection of the environment, and the proportionality test, in the sense they are not “more trade restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective” nor adopted or applied “with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to trade”. Up to now, in the WTO case law, the TBT Agreement was invoked twice. In the first case, namely the Gasoline case (1996),83 the issue of the compatibility of the national measure at stake with the TBT Agreement was not analysed by the Panel and the AB. Conversely, in the second case, namely the Asbestos case (2001), the Panel and the AB partially addressed the Canadian claim regarding the alleged violation of some provisions of the TBT Agreement by the French ban, but unfortunately did not deal with the most interesting issue of the justifiability of the national provision under article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement. In fact, the Panel and the AB limited themselves to 82 83
See Article 2.2 TBT Agreement, reprinted in ILM 33 (1994), p. 28. See Gasoline case, cited above.
222
Massimiliano Montini
investigate whether the national measure under scrutiny was a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1(1) to the TBT Agreement.84 Since the national measure at stake in the Asbestos case was not examined under article 2(2) of the TBT Agreement, a basic question remained unanswered. The question is the following one: in the absence of any case-law on the topic, is its possible to envisage a further extension of the same acquis elaborated by the Panels and the AB, with regard to article XX(b) and XX (g) GATT and to article 5 SPS Agreement, to the realm of Article 2(2) TBT Agreement? Such an extension was in fact envisaged by Canada in its pleadings in the Asbestos case. However, neither the Panel, nor the AB specifically addressed the issue. This notwithstanding, the claimed extension seems perfectly possible, since the analysis conducted above has shown that the “purpose” of the four treaty provisions considered (namely article XX(b) and XX(g) GATT, article 5 SPS Agreement, article 2(2) TBT Agreement) is essentially the same one. Of course, this does not mean that the four provisions under scrutiny are identical ones, as each one clearly differs from the others with regard to its specific scope. However, the existence of a different specific scope, if counterbalanced by the presence of the same “purpose”, should not prevent the four provisions from being considered together as an expression of the “necessity principle”. Therefore, in more concrete terms, nothing should preclude the four provisions from having substantially the same role as a “balancing instrument” to be applied by the WTO dispute settlement authorities in order to find, on a case-by-case basis, the best solutions in “trade and environment” disputes.85
84 85
See Asbestos case, cited above. See MONTINI, La necessità ambientale nel diritto internazionale e comunitario, Cedam, Padova, 2001.
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment
223
CONCLUSION
We have analysed above the basic features of the right to development and of the protection of the environment, intended as possibly conflicting interests in contemporary international practice. We have then analysed the principle of sustainable development, the most important emerging principle in the field of international environmental law, which is based on the assumption that developmental and environmental interests must be mutually supportive and that environmental protection considerations must be integrated into the development process whenever possible. Notwithstanding the progressive emergence and gain of importance of the principle of sustainable development on the international scene, we have seen that in general terms it is still quite difficult to detect in the international practice some internationally agreed viable patterns and operative instruments which can be relied upon in order to effectively achieve sustainable development. However, we have then described and analysed two practical modalities of application of the principle of sustainable development, namely the case of the application of the instrument of the environmental impact assessment (EIA) for development project and plans and the case of the necessity principle as the balancing tool used to address the so-called the “trade and environment” issue in international trade law, which try to overcome this difficulty. These two examples in fact demonstrate that it is not impossible to devise in contemporary international practice some balancing instruments which can correctly accommodate on a case by case basis both the right to development and the interest to the environmental protection, thus trying to achieve the objective of sustainable development in practice.
This page intentionally left blank
THE PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHTS AND RELATED RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES TO PROTECTION IN THE INTERNET AGE Robin Ramcharan* Mpazi Sinjela
INTRODUCTION Why should African policy makers, legislators and diplomats pay attention to the protection of Copyright and Related Rights? In what ways can better copyright protection promote the economic and cultural development of African countries and how can such protection promote the growth of their economies? How can they ensure greater protection of their authors and artists and how is this related to economic growth of their countries? These questions are explored in this study, which aims to demonstrate the critical importance of the protection of Copyright for the development of Africa.
Copyrights and Related Rights constitute one of two major fields of intellectual property rights. It is a basic human desire to be rewarded for one’s endeavour. Copyright seeks to protect the expressions of ideas. For example, the author of a book, after spending much time, money and effort on researching and writing the book normally expects some reward for his or her endeavours. Similarly, a singer who devotes his or her time to recording a compact disc (CD) from which society gains a benefit, naturally expects to recover his investment in time and financial resources and to make a profit if he or she is to be encouraged to continue with his or her creative talent. *
Consultant in the Professional Training Program of the WIPO Academy: The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors alone.
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 225-265. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
226
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
Moreover, the singer may have used the lyrics of another songwriter, the music of a composer, the studio of a recording company, a designer for the cover of the CD, a technician to produce good quality sound and so on, all of which involves many people who also have to be recompensed for their work. Actors perform in front of cameras and on stage, classic tales, which we enjoy or present us with new stories for our consumption. They too, expect and must reap some reward. Television stations and cable operators, bring these performances directly into our homes and places of business. They also keep us in touch with the course of local and global history through news programs and documentaries. They cater, at great cost in the acquisition of television rights, to the consumer’s voracious appetite for major sporting events. They too must recover their costs and reap some financial benefit for their work. Copyright laws seek to ensure that the authors, singers, performers, television stations and cable operators obtain their just reward. At the same time it seeks to ensure that the public goods produced by these professions are capable of enjoyment and consumption by the public. There is no point producing a CD or television show, which the public cannot afford to watch due to costs. There is also no point producing a book, which the public cannot afford. At the same time, it is unfair to the author or singer to copy his or her book or CD without permission and without rewarding him or her. There are however, groups within every society who may enjoy some exceptions. For example, students, usually with meagre financial resources, or teachers; should these be permitted to copy parts of the book for educational purposes? If so, how much of the book can be copied for this purpose? Can another author use the ideas expressed in a book without indicating where he or she obtained that idea? Can another person interpret the subject matter of one book to suit his or her desire? Or should the author of the original story be able to protect the integrity of his or her story? In the same vein, how much artistic license can one afford to actors to interpret or re-interpret stories at their leisure? What are the rights of broadcasters who make these performances available to us in our homes?
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
227
The basic human desire for the enjoyment of some material and moral gains from the production of artistic and literary works and the competing need to ensure that the public can access these works at a reasonable cost have contributed to making Copyright-related industries a major source of economic growth for many of the world’s leading economies, which by itself is a major lesson for developing countries.
ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS The economic importance of copyright industries is well documented.1 The industries referred to are listed in Table 1 below. They are important contributors to national economies and create numerous jobs in every country. By the late 1980s, studies of European countries indicated that the copyright industries contributed 2.77 per cent to the gross national product (GNP) of the Netherlands, 2.06 per cent in Austria and 2.92 per cent in Finland. In the United Kingdom the value added to gross domestic product (GDP) of the UK in 1990 was 3.6 per cent. Those industries, which directly depended on copyright, employed about 800,000 people.2 The Commission of the European Communities has estimated more recently that the market for copyright goods and services in the Community ranges between 5 and 7 per cent of the gross national product (GNP) of the European Communities Member States.3 The music industry in European Union alone accounted for an estimated turnover of 18 million ECU and employed over 600,000 people in 1995.4 1
2 3
4
See H.C. JEHORAM, Critical Reflections on the Economic Importance of Copyright. VCH, Verlagsgesellshaft mbH, 4, Winheim, Germany, 1989; A. SILBERSTON, The Economic Importance of Copyright. Paper presented at a Conference on Creativity and Intellectual Property Rights: Evolving Scenarios and Perspectives, Vienna, 12-14 July 1998 and WIPO/ACAD/E/01. See: Table 1. International Bureau of the WIPO, “The Digital Agenda: Implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)”, PCIPD/3/9, July 2002, p. 3. D. LAING, “The Economic Importance of Music in the European Union,” reprint of article in Soundscapes, July 1999, (http://www.iccc.rug.nl).
228
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
Table 1. Copyright Industries Primary Copyright/Neighbouring Rights Industries
Some beneficiary Groups dependent Industries related Copyright
1
Printing/Publishing
Printing trade librarians
2
Music Industry
Composers, lyricists, musicians/performers, music publishing, recording companies, concerts or musical promotions
3
Computer/Games software
Computer hardware manufacturers
4
Arts, photography and related matters
Museums, galleries
5
Radio, television, cable (terrestrial/satellite)
Producers, directors, announcers, advertisers
6
Advertising
Most suppliers of goods and services
7
Films and videos
Producers, directors, actors
persons,
of to
library,
actors,
Source: WIPO Secretariat, “The Economic and Cultural Importance of Copyright and Related Rights Protection with Particular Reference to Collective Management,” WIPO/ACAD/E/01/11, March 2001.
In the United States, the Washington-based Intellectual Property Alliance estimated that the core copyright industries (publishing, broadcasting, sound recording and audiovisual) accounted for 5.24 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001. In dollar terms, this amounts to US$ 535.1 billion, an increase of over $75 billion since 1999. Copyright industries led the U.S. economy in their contributions to job growth, GDP and foreign sales/exports.5 Over the last 25 years the U.S. copyright industry’s share of the GDP grew more than twice as fast as the remainder of the U.S. economy. Employment in the U.S. copyright industries doubled to 4.7 million between 1997 and 2001.6
5 6
IIPA, Press Release, April 22, 2002 (http://www.iipa.com). Ibid.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
229
In Japan the copyright industry reached an estimated scale of 2.3 per cent of GDP in terms of value added in 1998.7 In the countries of the Southern Market (MERCOSUR) and Chile, a WIPO study estimates that the value added by the copyright industries to the GDP in Argentina was 6.6 per cent in 1993, 6.7 per cent in Brazil in 1998, 6 per cent in Uruguay in 1997 an average of 2 per cent for Chile between 1990-1998 and an average of 1 per cent for Paraguay between 1995-1999.8 In Australia, the copyright industries contributed $19.2 billion in industry gross product, which represented 3.3 of Australia’s GDP. This marks a steady growth from just over 2 per cent in 1980-1981. In June 2000 3.8 per cent (345,000 people) of Australia’s workforce were employed in copyright industries. Employment in these industries, have grown at an average of 2.7 per cent from 312,000 in 1995-1996.9 On the Asian continent, one may note the importance of the copyright industries in China and India. Alikhan notes that China, with one of the fastest growing economies since the late 1970s, has made intellectual property rights as a priority on its reform agenda. Indeed, it possesses a huge cultural industry which has continued to grow since. In 1994, the book publishing industry recorded 104,000 titles of which 61,000 were new. The number of printed copies stood at over 3 billion while some 150 films were produced with attendance in cinemas stood at around 14.5 billion. Sales of music were over $280 million in 1998. China was tipped to become one of the world’s largest internet markets. The number of Internet users in China increased more than fourfold from 2.1 million in December 1998 to 8.9 million in December 1999. As of 1998, the software industry alone had created some 60,000 jobs and generated over $220 million in tax
7 8
9
PCIPD/3/9, op. cit., supra footnote 3, p. 5. WIPO and State University of Campinas, Study on the Economic Importance of Industries and Activities Protected by Copyright and Related Rights in the MERCOSUR Countries and Chile, 2002. The Allen Consulting Group, The Economic Contribution of Australia’s Copyright Industries. Center for Copyright Studies, Australian Copyright Council, 2001. P.
230
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
payments in 1997.10 In India, Alikhan notes that as of 1997, the contribution of the cultural industry to the GNP of India was 5.06 per cent. It has a sophisticated book industry with an annual book title production of around 57,400 titles in 1997, producing a turnover of over $455 million. Its film industry is the largest in the world, producing some 800 films per year. Retail values of music in 1997 were around $334 million. The potential of the recording industry is enormous, especially given the size of its huge middle class which can boast between 200 and 300 million people. There are other areas of Asia with economically significant cultural industries such as South Korea and Singapore. The latter for example, with a population of around 4 million people, boasts over 100 publishing companies. The island city-state has made intellectual property one of its priority areas as it seeks to become and “intelligent island” which can serve as an information technology hub for the Southeast Asia region. It has invested massively in the software industry. Already in 1993 the contribution of the cultural industry to its GNP was 2.7 per cent. We have thus far established that copyright industries can and do play an important economic role in economies of Asia, Europe, North America, Latin America. What about the situation in Africa? Alikhan is optimistic and notes that Africa’s cultural industry, especially in book publishing and music, “is on a progressive path.”11 The most promising market he cited is South Africa, where the copyright industry “registered a sizable increase during the 1990s.” Book sales amounted to some $250 million in 1997 and the retail value of music was around $222.2 million in the same year. Sizebale book and music industries in Nigeria, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya were noted by Alikhan. Unfortunately, however, there are very few statistics, which one could use to provide an indication of the relative importance of copyright industries in Africa. This is one of the issues addressed in the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR), which convened at the WIPO from 4 to 8 November 2002. 10
11
S. ALIKHAN, Socio-Economic Benefits of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries (Geneva: World Intellectual Property Organization, 2000) pp. 64-65. Ibid., p. 70
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
231
Member States participating in the SCCR noted that “Although some countries have done survey work and shown the contribution of cultural and information industries to the national economy, that contribution is not sufficiently demonstrated, particularly in developing countries…” and in light of this WIPO and the Finnish government, following a meeting in July 2002, are cooperating on the preparation of a handbook on survey guidelines for assessing the economic volume of creative industries,” which will be published in early 2003.12 A rare study on their importance to Francophone Africa by Papa Toumané Ndiaye, reveals some of the issues and difficulties. Ndiaye, writing in 1996 about cultural industries, noted a shift away from cultural and ideological considerations “towards economic concerns… probably due to the fact that the main features of presentday culture are the importance of its industrial dimension, the force of its political and economic impact, and its means of dissemination, which through the information superhighways, are turning the world into a “global village”. The cultural industries, which exercise the greatest cultural influence, are “in order of importance music (radio, phonograms and television), the audiovisual media (cinema and television), the press (daily newspapers and magazines) and publishing (books).” Assessing their relative economic importance, however, is daunting task as “there are so few reliable indicators as to their economic and social importance.”13 Another challenge highlighted in this study is the differences in national legislation, which render any useful comparative study more difficult. Ndiaye notes the disparities in legislation on neighbouring rights as, by then, only Cameroon, Gabon and Guinea had specific laws on this area and Burkina Faso did not have a national law on its own.
12 13
Secretariat of WIPO, “Short Description of Possible Subjects for Future Review by the Standing Committee,”SCCR/8/2, August 28, 2002, paras. 28 and 29. P.T. NDIAYE, “The Economic Importance of Copyright and Neighbouring Rights in the Cultural Industries of African Countries Having French as a Common Language,” Copyright Bulletin XXX (1996) 1, p. 4.
232
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
A further challenge is the varying degrees of development of each type of cultural industry. Ndiaye notes: the cultural sectors where industrial processing and manufacturing occur…are book publishing, phonograms and the audiovisual media. All of the countries concerned have publishing houses with their own printing works for book production or contract out to similar printers. The manufacture of phonograms is less developed and concerns only Cameroon, the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea and Senegal. In the audiovisual sector, a distinction should be drawn between the production of content (television broadcasts, films, drama series, video clips, etc.) in which all of the countries are involved, and the production of the carrier medium (such as videograms in the case of Senegal). In the case of cinema…only the artistic aspect is taken into account. Outside radio and television broadcasting systems, which all have their own video-film editing studios, there is no film-editing processing laboratory anywhere in African countries having French as a common language.14
One is left with scraps of information gathered from disparate sources and the picture painted is equally sad. The indicators concern revenue lost rather than gained. While they paint a sad picture this serves to highlight usefully the nature of the problems faced and challenges ahead. Collective management revenues The International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC) notes that “Copyright awareness on the African continent moves from strength to strength” with new laws consistently being passed. New Copyright societies including the Sociedade Guineense de Autores have been admitted to CISAC. The WIPO is also promoting and assisting African countries with the setting up of collective management societies to collect Given the paucity of information Ndiaye relied on statistics from the publication l’Etat du Monde 199215 to produce the indicators in 14 15
Ibid., p. 5. A world economic and geopolitical survey, Editions La Découverte, Paris.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
233
Table 2 below. For the moment, regrettably, and distribute royalties due to authors and composers. In his 1996 study of Francophone Africa, Ndiaye noted that most of the countries surveyed, with the exception of Gabon, had an organization in the shape of a collective management agency responsible for its applications. Other countries not having such an agency by then were Burundi, Chad and Rwanda, then in the throes of civil war.16 CISAC notes that individual African societies have risen by as much as 170 per cent during the course of 2000, with the percentage increase in total collections during the same period reaching double digits. The biggest market remained South Africa, with over 20 million Euros being collected by South African societies in 2000. It cites the following economic indicators: Table 2 TV sets (per cent total population)
Books published (titles/year)
Benin
4.0
13/1978
Burking Faso
4.9
14/1985
Burundi
0.2
54/1986
Cameroon
12
22/1979
Central African Republic
2.5
-
Chad
-
-
Congo
3.4
-
Côte d’Ivoire
54
46/1984
Gabon
23
-
Guinea
2.5
-
Mali
3.7
6/1978
Niger
34
-
Rwanda
-
207/1987
Senegal
34
42/1984
Togo
5.5
-
Zaire
0.7
-
Source: Ndiaye, op.cit., p. 7.
16
P.T. NDIAYE, op. cit., footnote 13.
234
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
Table 3. Rights collection by African CISAC societies (1998-2000) (In Euros) 1998:
21,843,649
1999:
23,292,824
2000:
25,773,837
Source: CISAC, Authors Rights in Africa, (http://www.cisac.org).
Music piracy Music piracy as a global phenomenon has paralleled the globalization of the music industry. From a small market in the late 1950s, then dominated by the US with sales of $500 million, the industry registered over 4 billion records in 1998 sold worldwide and generating revenue of about $39 billion. While dominated by Europe and North America, Asia (largely the huge Japanese market) accounted for almost a quarter of the global sales and Africa’s share, which was expected to grow strongly, accounted for about $233 million in 1997.17 Anti-piracy investigators from over 40 countries met in Amsterdam in September 2002, to consider the problem of music piracy, one of the greatest problems facing the music industry according to the International Federation of Phonogram Industries (IFPI). The latter notes that piracy “hampers the ability of record companies to invest in music, particularly in signing and developing new artists.”18 IFPI’s Music Piracy Report (2002) notes that The economic losses due to piracy are enormous and are felt throughout the music value chain. The victims include the artists creativity gets no reward; governments who lost hundreds of millions of tax revenues; economies that are deprived of new investment; consumers who get less diversity and less choice; and record producers who are forced to reduce their artists rosters because it is impossible to compete against theft.19 17
18 19
B. ANDERSEN, Z. KOYUL-WRIGHT and R. KOZUL-WRIGHT, “Copyrights, Competition and Development: The Case of the Music Industry,” UNCTAD Discussion Paper (January 2000) 145, p. 7. IFPI Press release, “Global Recording Industry Anti-Piracy Investigators Meet in Amsterdam,” 25 September 2002, (http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20020925.html). IFPI, Music Piracy Report, June 2002, p. 1. Available on (http://www.ifpi.org).
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
235
Most of the piracy is performed by organized crime, which operates on a global scale, prompting IFPI to set up a worldwide antipiracy network. Interpol has also set up an intellectual property crimes unit to deal with this and other IP crimes. IFPI rates the global pirate market for music at US 4.3 billion in 2001, with pirate unites totaling 1.9 billion in that year. Almost 40 per cent of all CS and cassettes sold around the globe are pirated copies. Compact discs (CD R) make up the majority of pirate sales (51 per cent). The chief reason for the growth of CD-R piracy is the widespread availability of cheap CD-R replication equipment and high-speed “burners”.20 African countries do not feature on IFPI’s radar screen. This is perhaps due more to the availability of the technology to copy CD-s and cassettes on a massive scale, but does not necessarily mean that piracy is not a problem in Africa. Ndiaye noted in 1996, though without giving figures, that existing laws on the protection of activities of cultural industries “have not been able to prevent the piracy of literary and artistic works… from escalating to alarming proportions.” Sounding a positive note, however, “the scale of piracy is a pointer to the vitality of these sectors.”21 Of all of the sectors, he noted that music is the sector most affected due to “a massive increase in the number of cassette recorders in Africa in the 1980s.”22 Internet piracy, facilitated through providers like the now-banned NAPSTER and similar companies, also does not appear to be a problem on IFPI’s African radar screen as Internet connectivity remains low for the moment. Some indication of the economic importance of the music industry comes from South Africa. The Association of South African Music Industries (ASAMI) estimated in January 2000 that the total sales value of the South African Music Industry was R678 million in 1998 and R692 million in 1999. Total international Sales grossed R517 million in 1998 and R543 in 1999, while local sales totalled R161m in 1998 and R149 million in 1999. For the year 2001 sales totalled
20 21 22
IFPI, Music Piracy Report, June 2002, p. 4. Available on (http://www.ifpi.org). P.T. NDIAYE, op. cit., footnote 13. Ibid.
236
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
R608.7 million, with the international component comprising R452.5 million of this. A sign of the growing importance of the music and copyright industries in South African prompted the government to launch a Cultural Industries Growth Strategy in 1998. In 1999, a South African Music Week was launched. As the fourth Music Week from 24 to 31 August 2002 approached, the Deputy Minister of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology noted that in addition to is cultural value, “music plays an important economic role within the country generating significant copyright revenues.” He noted that the retail value of music sales in 2000 totalled over R1 billion and provided employment for 20,000 people. This figure excluded jobs created by live events. Software piracy The Business Software Alliance (BSA) representing the world’s leading software developers, notes that software piracy in South Africa remains “unacceptably high at 45 per cent.”23 Overall, however, while software piracy increased globally from 37 per cent in 2002 to 40 per cent in 2001, in the Middle East and Africa a decrease was recorded down from to 52 per cent in 2001.
COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS: THEIR RELEVANCE TO AFRICA It has been established above that copyright industries can have a significant role in the economic growth of countries. In addition to this, there are several other factors, which should inspire policymakers, legislators and diplomats in Africa and developing countries in general to pay particular attention to the importance protecting copyright and related rights.
23
BSA, “Companies Caught in BSA’s Pursuit against software piracy,” 24 May 2002, (http://www.bsa.co.za).
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
237
The emergence of the knowledge economy It is common knowledge by now that the nature of the world economy is changing. The very fact that copyright laws constitute issues for contention is an indication of the changing nature of the economies of the developed countries and increasingly the developing countries. Trade in knowledge-based products is occupying a larger percentage of world commerce and is made easier by dramatic changes in international communications technology. This new economy is defined in a Booz & Hamilton report on electronic commerce as, A knowledge-driven economy where e-commerce and the internet permeate all industrial, service and retail sectors, leading to new sources of competitive advantage based on the ability to create new products and exploit new markets. It is based on innovative business methods and highly skilled labour, but the support and participation of a forward-looking government and the presence of a knowledgeable population buying ever-evolving products and services.24
Jean-Louis Sarbib, Vice-president of the World Bank, notes that building knowledge based societies, with particular reference to the Arab world of the Middle East and North Africa, requires several pillars: 1. 2. 3.
4.
24 25
Economic incentive and institutional regime that encourage entrepreneurship; A skilled and flexible labour force in which people have opportunities for quality education and life-long learning; Creating a system in which regional firms, science and research centres, universities and other organizations can interact to promote innovation and create new products and services; and A dynamic information and telecommunications infrastructure that provides efficient services and tools to all sectors of society.25
BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON, “Foreign Legal and Regulatory Landscape: Its Effect Upon the Development and Growth of E-Commerce,” 14 July 2002. J.-L. SARBIB, “Building Knowledge Societies in the Middle East and North Africa,” paper presented at Knowledge for Development: A Forum for Middle East and North Africa, Palais du Pharo, Marseilles, France, 9 September 2002.
238
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
The nascent telecommunications revolution in Africa and the implications for electronic commerce The global telecommunications revolution refers to the explosion in the number of people who are connected through increased access to telephone lines, mobile telecommunication and through increasing numbers of computer networks, which communicate with each other to form what is called the Internet. While Africa is lagging behind in some areas comprising the revolution, the latter has not left Africa unaffected and the signs are that it is progressing steadily towards a state of full participation in the Internet Age. The implications of this for electronic commerce in Africa and its conduct by Africans are clear. In the lead-up to the International Telecommunications Union’s (ITU) fifth Telecom Africa conference in Johannesburg, South Africa (November 2001), the ITU noted that “Advanced telecommunications services – and notably mobile cellular and Internet – will bring enormous changes to Africa in the first decade of the new millennium, and there are clear signs that with increasing competition telecommunications development will accelerate even faster.”26 At the first ITU Telecom Africa in 1986, the theme of that event was “Bridging the Missing Link,” that is to bring the whole of mankind within easy reach of a telephone by the early part of the 21st century. While, this may not have happened by November 2001, ITU noted that “there is no reason to believe the goal cannot be achieved in Africa… if the political will of governments across Africa is in place and the private sector demonstrates its willingness to invest in the world’s most under-served market place.”27
In Africa’s vast market of some 800 million people a vast business opportunity awaits.
26 27
ITU, “Africa – A Regional Overview”, (http://www.itu.int/AFRICA2001 /press/presskit/backgrounders) (2001). ITU, “African Regional TELECOM Events – From 1986 – 2001”.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
239
Indeed African countries have collectively achieved great strides. ITU notes that in the decade prior to 2001 the number of main telephone lines in the region had doubled to reach over 20 million by early 2001. The year before, a “historic telecom milestone” in Africa had been reached as Sub-Saharan Africa achieved a telephone density of one subscriber per 100 inhabitants,28 a not unexpected result which is ascribed to the “noticeable upturn in African economies since the middle of the last decade,” with an average growth of 4 per cent a year and doubled export growth.29 Another of this is the growth of mobile subscribers in Africa. ITU Secretary-General Yoshio Utsumi beat a positive drum at the opening of the ITU Telecom Africa 2001 that since Africa Telecom 1998, “when there were barely two million mobile subscribers on the whole African continent,” by the end of 2001 this number would surpass 30 million subscribers in Africa.30 Putting to rest some “old myths” he noted, No longer are there more telephone lines in Tokyo than in Africa. In fact there are half as many fixed-lines – and significantly fewer cellular subscribers in Tokyo, than Across Africa. Sub-Saharan African teledensity is no longer trapped below one per cent – the base level considered essential to economic growth and development… And Africa is no longer a continent sadly lacking in fair regulation and free competition. Some 36 new operators launched mobile services in Africa and the year and a half to June [2001]. And well over half the countries in Africa have an independent regulator.
Nevertheless, there are significant strides, which remain to be accomplished. As impressive as the above is, there is still enormous 28
29 30
“Africa Reaches Historic Telecom Milestone”, ITU Telecommunications Indicators Update, July-August-September-October, 2001, p. 1. (http://www.itu.int). Telephone density is defined as “the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants in a particular country or territory.” It is a baseline figure which is considered essential to economic growth and development. On the pros and cons of teledensity indicators see the following paper “Methodological Note on the Choice of Teledensity Bands,” Note by the ITU Secretariat, September 30, 1998. (http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/intset/focus/bands.doc). Ibid. Y. UTSUMI, Opening Address to Telecom Africa, Johannesburg, South Africa, 11 November 2001. He also noted that since 1998 there were 350 million mobile subscribers worldwide, and by late 2001 that number had surpassed the billion mark.
240
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
opportunity to be harnessed. The teledensity remains well below global averages. The ITU notes that Africa still has only one in 50 of the world’s fixed line subscribers, one in 70 of the world’s personal computers and only one in 80 of the world’s Internet users. In the latter area in particular Africa has made significant strides but lags well behind. Whereas 5 years ago only a handful of countries had local Internet access, “now it is available in every capital city.”31 As of the end of 2001, only one of the continent’s nations – Eritrea – lacked direct Internet connection to the international Internet. Encouraging as this is, a comparison with the rest of the worlds sheds an unfavourable light. An independent study provides the following indicators for Africa’s 816 million people in 2001: 1 in 4 have a radio (205m), 1 in 13 have a TV (62 m), 1 in 35 have a mobile phone (24m), 1 in 40 have a fixed line (20m), 1 in 130 have a PC (5.9m), 1 in 160 use the Internet (5m), and 1 in 400 have pay-TV (2m).32 The distribution of connectivity within Africa is skewed, however. Wealthier nations have penetrated the international networks to a greater degree, such as Seychelles (7.4 per cent), Mauritius (7.3 per cent) and South Africa (5.5 per cent). Lower income countries like Burundi, Chad, Niger or Sudan “still hover around two or three users per 10,000 inhabitants.”33 The biggest obstacles to more rapid connection include lack of infrastructure and a prohibitive price structure (see Table 4 below). Currently the average cost of using a local dialup Internet account for 20 hours a month in Africa is about $60 per month. The total number of users of the Internet in Africa is estimated at 5 to 8 million, with about 1.5 to 2.5 million outside of North and South Africa and the vast majority coming from urban areas.34
31 32 33 34
“The African Internet – A Status Report”, (http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm). Ibid. ITU, “Africa – A Regional Overview”, op. cit. “The African Internet – A Status Report”, July 2002, op. cit.
July
2002
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
241
Table 4. Internet Monthly Access Charge in Africa (1999), US$
per cent of GDP per capita
Uganda
92
107
Guinea
65
45.3
Sierra Leone
50
118
Ethiopia
32
76.8
Mozambique
29
69.6
Senegal
24
17.6
Source: Roberto Blois, “ICC Africa Regional Meeting: Africa’s Role in the Global Economy,” 20-21 November 2000. (http://www.itu.int)
A number of other reasons explain the low level of penetration of telecommunications technology: irregular or non-existent electricity supplies, tax regimes which treat computers and cell phones as luxury items, brain drain and scarcity of skills and expertise, a business climate cluttered by heavy handed bureaucracy and lack of capital. The challenge of ensuring full and universal Internet access in Africa is daunting but it is an outcome, which must be achieved. A fully connected Africa would give access to the boom in global electronic commerce and open a range of new markets for African companies, small and large. However, Africa’s share, barring increased connectivity, is expected to remain quite small. A study by Booz-Allen & Hamilton in 2000 estimated that the global ITC (international communications technology) market surpassed US$2 trillion in 1999. While North America will continue to lead in Internet use, “growth will be significantly faster in other regions where ITC infrastructure is less developed. By the year 2005, North America will represent 30 percent of all Internet users, Western and Eastern Europe will account for about a third and Latin America and Africa/Middle East are estimated at 73 and 3.8 respectively.”35
35
BOOZ-ALLEN & HAMILTON, “Foreign Legal and Regulatory Landscape: Its Effect Upon the Development and Growth of E-Commerce”, 14 July 2002.
242
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
A few simple statistics from the United States will effectively demonstrate the potential economic rewards the Internet could facilitate. Nielsen//NetRatings reported on 21 November 2002 noted that Microsoft Corporation MSFT and AOL Time Warner AOL.N attracted more than 92.6 million visitors each during the month of October 2002.36 Dow Jones Newswires reported on 2 December 2002, that online shopping rose 20 per cent in the first few weeks of November. Nielsen//NetRatings reported that for the month of November 2002 holiday shoppers spent some $6.2 billion online, an increase of 22 per cent over the previous years.37 Books, music and video/DVD proved to be a hot category with companies like Amazon and eBay/Half.com taking 35.2 per cent and 10.6 per cent of the market for these products. With Africa’s rich cultural diversity in music and folklore the Internet bears great potential for economic gains. Perhaps as important as the economic gains, if not more, is the promotion and preservation of Africa’s cultural and musical traditions and the promotion of the identity of the diverse peoples from which this goldmine traditions emerge. After all music, like books, is a tool of communication and it communicates vital information about the identities of peoples, which can, with the help of the Internet, take their rightful place as equals. The Internet can help them to ‘stand up’ and be recognized as such. As popular artist Youssou N’Dour has said, “In African music there is room for everyone… We the creators of the hybrid forms, we the ‘Afro-pop’ stars, actually open many doors for traditional music by promoting awareness of Africa’s musical riches.” 38
Perhaps it can also help to prevent a ‘talent drain’ and encourage artists to stay in their native countries rather than having to export their talent literally. Unfortunately, as noted at a one-day workshop on the African music industry in June 2000, 36 37 38
Nielsen//NetRatings, netREPORTER, (http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/newsletter). Nielsen//NetRatings, “Holiday Shoppers Spend $6.2 billion online in November 2002,” (http://www.nielsen-netratings.com/pr/pr-021209.pdf). Youssou N’Dour, quoted by M. LIPP, “In African Music there is room for everyone”, (http://www.rootsworld.com/reviewsafrica2002.html).
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
243
“Africa has so far been unable to capitalize domestically on these natural resources.”39 Culture and Growth It is well recognized by now that culture and cultural products play a role in economic growth. We are concerned here with the tangible cultural products, which, if exploited strategically, lawfully and usefully, can contribute significantly to the economic health and vitality of a nation. In the same vein, Andersen et al., for example, note with respect to the music industries in developing countries, that many developing countries are better positioned to compete in audiovisual industries in many traditional industries… because the basic raw material, such as talent to create music, is readily available and entry costs… are not prohibitive as in many industries.40
Indeed, a category of so-called “world music” today “based on folk music heritage, originates with musicians from the developing world” is enjoying an increasing share of the world music market, which stood at 2 per cent in 1998. The “cross over potential”, derivatives from mixing with jazz, R&B, rock, rap and pop, is enormous. Africa is tremendously wealthy in musical traditions. Certain African instruments, which may give a particular cultural flavour to music, are traced back many centuries. Archaeological research has revealed rock paintings in the Sahara which show that as early as 700 B.C. “a six string harp was common in the entire region.”41 Similar finds in western Nigeria indicate that some types of drums and bells in use in modern Yoruba date back to the 11th century. Africa’s music has historically had a major impact on music around the world influencing the music of the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean. Besides this “cross-over potential,” the different musical 39
40 41
“Developing the Music Industry in Africa”, 23 June 2000, (http://lnweb18.worldbank.org). The conference was organized jointly by the World Bank and the Policy Sciences Center. B. ANDERSEN et al., op. cit., footnote 17. V. ERLMANN, “Music, African”, Africana.com, (http//wysiwyg://www.africana.com/Articles/tt_422.htm).
244
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
styles across the African continent perhaps can have an appeal entirely on their own. A cursory look at three fundamental aspects of musical performance – organization of movement, time and tone – whets the appetite sufficiently. With regard to the first, in most African societies music and dance form an indivisible whole. Taking the term of Bantu speaking peoples, ngoma (which means both song and dance) it appears sound production can never be considered in isolation from bodily movement. For Erlmann, “one of the most important stylistic traits of African music is the interaction between language-related patterns of movement and timbre (the distinctive tonality of a voice or musical instrument).”42 A second common stylistic trait, is the organization and experience of time (the length of notes and rests in music), in particular “the strikingly infallible ability of African musicians to keep musical time even when the most complex rhythmic patterns are being interwoven with each other.” Moreover, another feature common of African music, is the beat, which is not “a specific rhythmic pattern associated with certain kinds of dances or musical genres” but rather “an equally spaced series of reference points”. A third fundamental stylistic trait of African music is the organization of tones – the basic unit of musical organization, sounds with specific pitch and duration. Erlmann identifies several major stylistic regions of Africa: The Sahara and Sahel, The West African coast, the Central African, Ethiopia and Eastern Horn of Africa, East Africa, South Central Africa and Southern Africa.43 An examination of these regional styles will reveal centuries of absorption of music from Europe and Asia and their influence on American and Latin and Caribbean music. African musical styles that are known worldwide today include Afrobeat (which combines West African with black American music and popularized by artist Fela Anikulapo Kuti), Chimurenga (style of music form the Shona people of Zimbabwe and played by Thomas Mapfumo), Highlife (dance music from Ghana and Eastern Nigeria), Juju (from Nigeria relying on traditional Yoruba rhythms popularized by King Sunny Ade), Kwassa Kwassa (dance music from Zaire 42 43
Ibid. See V. ERLMANN for a description. Ibid.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
245
popularized by Kanda Bongo Man), Makossa (Cameroonian dance rhythm from the Douala region popularized by Manu Dibango), Mbala (Senegalese percussion music modernized by Youssou N’Dour), Mbaqaga (or “Township Jive” from South Africa popularized by Johnny Clegg), Rai (pop music from Algeria, popularized by artists like Khaled), Soukous (a musical style from Congo, mixing kwassa kwassa with Cuban rhumba44) and Zouk (a Creole slang word for “party” influenced by Antillean music). One only has to look at the richness and vitality of the music scene in Zaire, which has long been recognized as a musical epicentre in Africa. Congolese music has topped Central and Western African charts since the 1960s. Its richness is such that, as noted above, it has borrowed from foreign influences, African and non-African.45 A wealth of traditional knowledge and folklore for global consumption Beyond specific cultural products, the role of culture in general and its relation to overall growth and development of countries is gaining currency. Culture has gained currency in development thinking. Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen posits that the real question to ask is not “whether” culture matters, but “how” it matters. While cautioning against simplistic and formulaic generalizations tending towards cultural determinism, he singles out culture as one element of development, which contributes in the following ways:
44 45
See G. STEWART, Rumba on the River: A History of Popular Music in the Two Congos… See “The Music of Tanzania”, Africaonline.com (http://www.AfricaOnline.com/site/Articles/1.10.1885.jsp).
246
1.
2. 3. 4. 5.
6.
7.
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
Culture is a constitute part of development, for, after all, “the furtherance of well-being and freedoms that we seek in development cannot but include the enrichment of human lives through literature, music, fine arts, and other forms of cultural expression and practice, which we have reason to value.”46 Culture matters economically as cultural activities provide remuneration, tourism being an example. Cultural factors influence economic behaviour, which in turn can be vital for economic success. Culture influences political participation. Culture influences the operation of social solidarity and association. “The sense of closeness to others in the community can be a major asset for that community.”47 Cultural sites and recollection of the past can further “a clearer and broader understanding of a country’s or community’s past through systematic exploration of its cultural history.”48 Cultural influences have an impact on value formation and evolution.
Translating this into concrete policy framework, in a document entitled “Culture and Sustainable Development: A Framework for Action” (1998), James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank argued that we are at a “crossroads in our understanding of development” for “[W]e simply cannot conceive of development without cultural continuity. It must be acknowledged and must form the basis of the future.”49 Indeed sustainable development must be built on “local forms of social interchange, values, traditions, and knowledge” to reinforce the social fabric. The Bank defines culture as the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and 46 47 48 49
A. SEN, “How Does Culture Matter”, Presentation at Trinity College, Cambridge, March 2002, p. 3. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., p. 6. J. WOLFENSOHN, “Culture and Sustainable Development: A Framework for Action”, September 1998, p. iii.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
247
emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes creative expressions (e.g., oral traditions, language literature, performing arts, fine arts, and crafts), community practices (e.g., traditional healing methods, traditional natural resource management, celebrations, and patterns of social interaction that contribute to group and individual welfare and identity), and material or build forms such as sites, buildings historic centres, landscapes, art and objects.50 The World Bank seeks to target its programs to “help the poor communities identify their own strengths and open opportunities for them to revive, use, and adapt their own heritage and identity.”51 The use of local, traditional knowledge to foster sustainable development has also gained currency. At the Global Knowledge conference in Toronto in 1997, government leaders urged the World Bank and other donors to learn from local communities. In this vein, Nicolas Gorjestani of the World Bank’s Indigenous Knowledge (IK) for Development Program argues in an independent paper that IK is “a key element of the social capital of the poor and constitutes their main asset in their efforts to gain control over their lives. For these reasons, the potential contribution of IK to locally managed, sustainable and cost-effective survival strategies should be promoted in the development process.”52
Efforts are being made in the following areas: encouragement of countries to formulate national strategies traditional knowledge integration, enhancement of the capacity of national and regional TK networks, the promotion of local exchange and adaptation, and identification of innovative mechanisms to protect traditional knowledge in a way that fosters further development, promotion and validation and exchange of traditional knowledge.
50 51 52
Ibid., p. 12 Ibid, p. 13 N. GORJESTANI, “Indigenous Knowledged for Development”, paper presented to the UNCTAD Conference on Traditional Knowledge in Geneva, 1 November 2000.
248
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
Fulfillment of international obligations under the TRIPS Agreement and other international conventions Unfortunately, this rich cultural heritage is in many cases not supported by an effective legal, political and enforcement framework. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement) of 1994, seeks to make sure that at least the legal regulatory framework for a minimum level of protection across the globe provides a mechanism for enforcing this through its dispute settlement mechanism (DSU). The TRIPs Agreement was negotiated in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1986 and 1994, which led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).53 The inclusion of intellectual property on the agenda of the Uruguay Round was due to the increasing importance of copyright industries in some developed countries, the United States in particular, and the fact that these industries felt threatened by large-scale piracy in the then newly industrializing countries in East and Southeast Asia. In the area of copyright and related rights, the TRIPS Agreement has adopted the major substantive articles of pre-existing conventions, but has also added some new measures consistent with the latest technological advances, as we shall see below.
53
For a concise review of the results achieved by the Uruguay Round negotiations see JACKSON, The World Trade Organization: Constitution and Jurisprudence, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998. For critical assessments of the TRIPs Agreement see C. CORREA, Implementing the TRIPs Agreement: General Context and Implications for Developing Countries. Penang: Third World Network, 1998; B. DAS, The WTO Agreements: Deficiencies, Imbalances and Required Changes, Penang, Malaysia, TWN, 1998; and B. DEBROY, Beyond the Uruguay Round: The Indian Perspective on GATT, New Delhi, Response Books, 1996.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
249
INTERNATIONAL NORMS GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS We turn now to these substantive provisions. In this section we consider the rights granted in order strike a balance between the rights of the individuals and the rights of the consuming public. We then consider the key issues at stake in the field of copyright. Each country addresses these issues through national copyright laws, in conformity with minimum standards recognized in various international conventions governing copyright matters. These include the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886,54 the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations of 1961, The Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their Phonograms of 1971, the Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite of 1974, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) of 199655 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) of 1996.56 Both of the latter two came into force in 2002. Last but not least, as noted above the TRIPS Agreement of 1994, reiterated the basic principles and rights of the Berne Convention and added a needed enforcement dimension to the protection of intellectually in general.
54
55
56
Hereinafter Berne Convention. It was concluded in 1886, revised in Berlin in 1908, completed at Berne in 1914, revised at Rome in 1928, at Brussels in 1948, at Stockholm in 1967, at Paris in 1971 and amended in 1979. For a history of the evolution of The Berne Convention see The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works from 1886 to 1986. Geneva: WIPO, 1986. Contracting states numbered a total of 37 as of July 2002. For information on the the latest contracting members see the following (http://www.wipo.int/treaties/documents/english/pdf/s-wct.pdf). 37 contracting States. See (http://www.wipo.int/treaties/documents/english/pdf/s-wppt.pdf).
250
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
What is in need of protection? The Berne Convention, which created a Union of contracting states, is the ‘mother of all copyright treaties’, which seeks to protect the “literary and artistic works” of authors. The latter term is defined in Article 2 (1) as constituting: Every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode or form of its expression, such as books, pamphlets and other writings; lectures, addresses, sermons and other works of the same nature; dramatic or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works and entertainment in dumb show; musical compositions with or without words; cinematographic works which are assimilated works expressed by a process of analogous cinematography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving and lithography; photographic works to which are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; works of applied art; illustrations, maps, plans, sketches and three-dimensional works relative to geography, topography, architecture or science.
The element of fixation is provided for in Article 2(2) of the Convention which stipulates that it is a matter for each legislation “to prescribe that works in general or any specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material form.” The protection of the Convention applies also, as stipulated in Article 4, to (a) authors of cinematographic works the maker of which has his headquarters or habitual residence in one of the countries of the Union; (b) authors of works of architecture erected in a country of the Union or of other artistic works incorporated in a building or other structure located in a country of the Union. Unlike for patents and trademarks, the enjoyment and exercise of the rights granted is subject to no formality (Article 4 (1)). What are the rights granted by Copyright conventions? There are two categories of rights economic rights and moral rights. Economic rights refer to those, which are intended for the author of a work to obtain remuneration for his endeavour.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
251
Article 9 grants authors a right of reproduction. It stipulates that “authors of literary or artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form.” As a result of the development of new audio-visual technologies recent times, it also stipulates that “any sound or visual recording shall be considered as a reproduction.” A right of “making and authorizing translations of their works” (Article 8) and “authorizing adaptations, arrangements and other alternations” (Article 12) are granted to authors. Authors of dramatico-musical and musical works have the right of distribution. Article 11 gives them the right to authorize (i) the public performance of their works and (ii) any communication to the public of the performance of their works. They also enjoy the same rights for translations thereof (Article 11 (2)). Authors also enjoy the right to authorize the broadcasting (Article 11 bis) of their works or the communication thereof to the public by “any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or images” and, according to Article 14, the right to authorize (i) the cinematographic adaptation and reproduction of these works, and the distribution of the works thus adapted or reproduced, (ii) the public performance and communication to the public by wire of the works thus adapted or reproduced; and (iii) the adaptation into any other form of cinematographic production derived from literary or artistic works. In addition to these economic rights, the author enjoys moral rights, which seek to secure proper recognition of an author’s original work and to protect its integrity from mutilation. Article 6 in particular, stipulates that an author has the right to “claim authorship” and “to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor.” Indeed, the right to authorize translations and adaptations also serve this purpose. To enforce these rights the author is entitled to “institute infringement proceedings in the countries of the Union.” (Article 15) Infringing copies of the work are liable to seizure in any country of the Union according to the laws of each country (Article 16).
252
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
Who is eligible for protection? The beneficiary authors are those who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union and authors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union for (i) their works first published in one of those countries or (ii) simultaneously in a country outside the Union and in a country inside the Union. (Article 3 (1)) Authors who are not nationals of one of the countries of the Union but who have their habitual residence in one of them “shall… be assimilated to nationals of that country.” (Article 3 (2)) An important principle is that of national treatment. Article 5 (3) stipulates that authors will enjoy “in countries of the Union other than the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Convention” Where the author is not a national of the country of origin of the work for which he is protected “he shall enjoy in that country the same rights as national authors.” What is the term of protection? The term of the protection of the copyright is the duration of the life of the author from the moment of first publication and for fifty years after his/her death. (Article 7 (1)) In the case of cinematographic works, countries may provide that the term of protection shall expire fifty years after. The work has been made available to the public with the consent of the author, or… fifty years after the making. (Article 7 (2)) What are the limitations on protection of works? We have mentioned above, that an equitable balance must be sought between the author’s economic rights and the rights of the general public. Public interest limitations on the rights of authors are provided. For this reason, the Berne Convention leaves open to national legislations to determine, for example, whether political speeches and speeches delivered in the course of legal proceedings are excluded from the exclusive rights of the authors. (Article 2 bis) The
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
253
same applies to lectures, addresses and other works of a similar nature. It is permitted to make quotations from a work, provided that these are compatible with fair practice and that their extent is not excessive. (Article 10 (1)) It is permitted to use literary and artistic works for illustrations in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for teaching, provided such use is compatible with fair practice. (Article 10 (2)) The reproduction by the press, broadcasting or communication to the public by wire of articles published in newspapers or periodicals is permitted, subject to national legislation. However, “the source must always be clearly indicated.” (Article 10 bis (1)) Copyright and Technological Change: WCT and WPPT The rapid and dramatic changes in audio-visual and communications technology have led to a constant and on-going process of updating of the Berne Convention.57 The purpose of the WCT and the WPPT is to “update and supplement the major existing WIPO Treaties on copyright and related rights, namely the Berne Convention… and the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Procedures and Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations [Rome Convention].”58 These treaties seek to complement the provisions of the Berne Convention and to progressively adapt copyright laws to contemporary circumstances. The WCT – which deals with protection for authors of literary and artistic works – and the WPPT – which protects certain related rights – have sought better definition of international copyright norms and rules to suit contemporary technological changes, recognizing the “profound impact of the development and convergence of information and communication technologies on the creation and use of literary and artistic works,” in the case of the WCT and “on the production and use of performances and phonograms” in the case of the WPPT. The two are collectively referred to as the “Internet Treaties” as both 57 58
Footnote 1, supra. International Bureau of the WIPO, “The Digital Agenda: Implementation of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)”, PCIPD/3/9, July 2002.
254
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
seek to address the challenges posed by today’s digital technologies, “in particular the dissemination of protected material over digital networks such as the Internet.”59 Under the WCT, for example, computer programs, whatever may be the mode or form of their expression, are protected as literary works within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention (Article 5). A right of rental is granted to authors of computer programs (except where the program itself is not the essential object of the rental). Contracting Parties are obliged, under Article 11 of the WCT, to provide “adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of their rights…” The WPPT, pursuant to the Rome Convention of 1961, seeks to clarify the rights of artists in the digital era. Article 3 (b) of the WPPT amplifies the definition of phonograms in Article 2 (b) of the Rome Convention as follows: “‘phonogram’ means the fixation of the sounds of a performance or other sounds, or of a representation of sounds, other than in the form of a fixation incorporated in a cinematographic or other audiovisual work.”60
Article 2 (c) adds a definition of “fixation” to mean “the embodiment of sounds, or of the representations thereof, from which they can be perceived, reproduced or communicated through a device.” Article 2 (d) of the WPPT expands on the meaning of “producer of a phonogram” to mean “the person, or legal entity, who or which takes the first initiative and has the responsibility for the first fixation of the sounds of a performance or other sounds, or the representations of sounds.”61 Article 2 (e) amplifies the definition of “publication” of a fixed performance to mean “the offering of copies of the fixed performance or the phonogram to the public, with the consent of the right holder, and provided that copies are offered to the public in 59 60 61
Ibid. Article 3 (b) of the Rome Convention states that “phonogram” means “any exclusive aural fixation of sounds of a performance or other sounds.” Article 3 (c) defined “producer of phonograms” as meaning “the person who, or the legal entity which, first fixes the sounds of a performance or other sounds”.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
255
reasonable quantity.”62 Article 2 (f) expanded the definition of “broadcasting” to mean “the transmission by wireless means for public reception of sounds or of images and sounds or of the representations thereof; such transmission by satellite is also “broadcasting”; “transmission by encrypted signals is ‘broadcasting’ where the means of decrypting are provided to the public by the broadcasting organization or with its consent.”63 Article 2 (g) of the WPPT provides a definition of “communication to the public” meaning “the transmission to the public by any medium, otherwise than by broadcasting, of sounds of a performance or the sounds of the representations of sounds of a performance or the sounds or the representations of sounds fixed in a phonogram… [It] includes making the sounds or representations of fixed sounds audible to the public.”
The WCT and the WPPT were adopted by more than 100 countries the majority of whom were developing countries. The treaties should help to foster greater protection of rights holders, to promote the development of electronic commerce and to contribute to the national economy. Regarding the first of these, the WIPO notes that due to current Internet technology, the need for protection in the digital environment is greatest in the areas of recorded music, text, computer programs, photos and graphic art. Unauthorised use, however rapidly extending to other types of works and subject matter, for instance audiovisual works, as bandwidth and the quality of telecommunications systems improve. Unless legislators take action against it soon, the latter categories of copyright industries would face, in the near future, problems as serious as those already faced nowadays by the music and information industries.64 With regard to the second point, the trade in copyrighted works, performances and phonograms can become a major element of global commerce, which will grow and thrive along with the value of the 62 63 64
Article 2 (d) defined it as “the offering of copies of a phonogram to the public in a reasonable quantity.” Article 3 (f) of the Rome Convention defined it as “the transmission by wireless means for public reception of sounds or of images and sounds.” PCIPD/3/9, p. 3, op. cit., supra, footnote 3.
256
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
material that is traded. The transmission of text, sound images and computer programs over the Internet is already commonplace and will soon be true for transmission of audiovisual works (feature films). Protected copyright and related materials already constitute a great amount of the subject matter of electronic commerce. The latter will have a great impact on the system of copyright and related rights, which in turn will also exert a great influence on the evolution of how electronic commerce evolves.65 Ongoing debates While these two treaties provide basic norms clarifying and safeguarding the protection of copyright and related rights, there are still problems remaining at the international level. These include the liability of service providers’ liability, new subject matter and rights, as well as questions of private international law. The current issues that have been mainly discussed by the member States of WIPO at the Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR) are: Protection of Audiovisual Performances – Many national laws give protection to audiovisual performances, however, there is not a multilateral treaty that grants rights of performers in authorized audiovisual fixations of their performances. There is a need for the extension of international protection for performers to cover audiovisual performances since it will be used in an increasing measure on the Internet. Digital technologies permit more easily, the use of unauthorized manipulation and distortion of performers’ images and voices, so a solution of this issue is very important for an overall clarification of the rights involved in the digital environment. Protection of Broadcasting Organizations – Another issue that has been discussed by the Standing Committee is the protection of broadcasting organizations. What needs to be done is to update the 65
PCIPD/3/9, p.4, op. cit., supra, footnote 3. See also WIPO’s, Primer on Electronic Commerce, (http://www.wipo.int).
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
257
protection of broadcasting organizations in response to the digital and other new technologies and the growing use of the Internet. Some questions that come up when discussing this subject are what should be protected, and who should enjoy the protection. Following technological developments, new programs transmitting entities have emerged, and the question of whether every entity distributing signals and involved in the distribution of programs would qualify as a broadcasting organization and benefit from the protection has emerged. Protection of non-original databases – Another issue on the agenda of the Standing Committee is the protection of databases. Member States of WIPO have been discussing the possible introduction of international protection of non-original database, which presently do not qualify for protection under copyright law. How are these international norms and rules relevant to development in Africa? Are there not more pressing issues of basic survival to address, without having to deal with seemingly unimportant intellectual property rules? What is at stake for Africa?
KEY ISSUES FOR AFRICAN LAWMAKERS We have established thus far that the social, cultural, economic and political interconnections between peoples are increasing more rapidly today than at any time in history. This is due largely to the revolution in information and communications technology (ICT). We have established that the nature of the world economy, spurred on by technological breakthroughs in the developed world, is changing rapidly towards a knowledge-based economy in which knowledge is the prime commodity, but one, which is increasingly closely guarded. Developing and least developed countries, African countries comprising a great many of them, are seeking to harness the potential economic, social and cultural benefits, which might accrue therefrom by transforming themselves into “information societies”. We have
258
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
established that in such societies, copyright-related industries constitute an important part of the national economic wealth. The crucial importance of copyright-based industries in information societies was emphasized by the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) of the UK, which noted that copyright-related industries supply the intellectual raw material for science and innovation, as well as for educational and instruction in general, and they have helped bring about dramatic increases in productivity through aiding the creation of informationbased products like desk-top publishing software, electronic mail or sophisticated scientific computer databases.66
The CIPR concluded, We believe that copyright-related issues have become increasingly relevant and important for developing countries as they enter the information age and struggle to participate in the knowledge-based global economy.67
There are a number of key issues which African lawmakers will need to grapple with in the area of copyright and related rights. Striking a balance First, striking a balance, both domestically and internationally, between the protection of the author’s exclusive rights over his work and the need for access to information is now more difficult. Historically, each country adapted its laws to suit their vital concerns and levels of development. Prior to the Berne Convention there was no constraint on the ability of countries to do this. The US, for example, restricted copyright protection to US citizens until 1891. The Berne convention had left enough flexibility to countries to adapt their laws.
66
67
CIPR, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy. Report of the CIPR, London, September 2002, p. 95. (http://www.ipr.commission.org/graphic/documents/finalreport.htm). Ibid., p. 96.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
259
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention states “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interest of the author.”
Many countries adapted their laws, based on the concept of “fair use” (US) or “fair dealing” (UK) to provide exceptions based on criteria such as personal use, for educational purposes, research, archival copying, library use and news reporting. The advent of TRIPs, however, withdrew this flexibility, as Member States of the WTO must comply with all of the provisions. The CIPR notes that, the general lesson history shows us that countries have been able to adapt IPR regimes to facilitate technological learning and promote their own industrial policy objectives. Because policies in one country impinge on the interests of others, there has always been an international dimension to debates on IP. … [T]he Berne Convention recognized this dimension, and the desirability of reciprocity, but allowed considerable flexibility in the design of IP regimes. With the advent of TRIPS, a large part of this flexibility has been removed.68
Scope and term of protection A second and related issue is access to information vital to the transfer of technology. A majority of the world’s information carrying or knowledge-based products are produced in the developed world. It is common knowledge that the development of indigenous technological capacity has been a key determinant of economic growth and poverty reduction. Moreover, the CIPR notes that the “early emergence of an indigenous technology capacity” is of vital importance. Many of the factors conducive to effective transfer of technology, such as education, research and development, are underdeveloped in African countries. Access to scientific knowledge and knowledge of technological advances is therefore of vital importance. Africa is at a disadvantage given its lagging Internet 68
Ibid., p. 20.
260
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
connectivity. Nevertheless, while the Internet bears enormous and revolutionary potential to transfer this knowledge to those who need it the most, this may be rendered more difficult by developments in international copyright law and its extension to the digital environment. Copyright regulates the flow of ideas and knowledgebased products.69 Of particular concern are (1) the extension of the term of protection and (2) the extension of the scope of protection. The term of protection, traditionally set at up to 50 years beyond the death of the author of the work, is now up to 70 years in many developed countries. In the United States, the second session of the 105th Congress on 17 January 1998, decided to amend Section 302 of title 17 (dealing with the duration of copyright), United States Code, so that, “in subsection (a) by striking ‘fifty’ and inserting ‘70’ and (2) in subsection (b) by striking ‘fifty’ and inserting ‘70’.” The European Union, in its Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 stipulated that: (11) Whereas in order to establish a high level of protection which at the same time meets the requirements of the internal market and the need to establish a legal environment conducive to the harmonious development of literary and artistic creation in the Community, the term of protection for copyright should be harmonized at 70 years after the death of the author or 70 years after the work is lawfully made available to the public, and for related rights at 50 years after the event which sets the term running.70
Consequently, Article 1(1) of the Directive stipulated that The rights of an author of a literary or artistic work within the meaning of Article 2 of the Berne Convention shall run for the life of the author and for 70 years after his death, irrespective of the date when the work is lawfully made available to the public.
The CIPR notes that such extensions are in defiance of economic rationale as
69 70
Ibid., p. 95 Council Directive 93/98/EEC, of 29 October 1993, harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
261
“the rate of technical change has led in several industries to a shorter effective product life (for example, successive editions of software programs), which point to longer copyright protection being redundant.”71
The scope of protection has extended to computer software and to databases. On a continent that is lagging drastically behind in terms of Internet connectivity, the protection of badly needed software is an important issue. Databases are the subject of intense discussions at the international level. In the meantime, the European Union’s Directive on database protection in its member states… signals a restrictive attitude to the sharing of information… These two problems are compounded by a provision in the WCT and WPPT by clauses aimed at preventing the circumvention of technological protection measures, i.e., encryption technology. The point is not to belittle the international copyright system but rather to take stock of the vital issues. Indeed, if one were to relax the copyright rules in favour of developing countries, it may have a counterproductive effect. As John Caroll notes, in the knowledge economy, “software companies, among others, can be expected to rely on [strong encryption technology] to protect their copyrighted material. In such an environment, fair use would essentially be a dead issue, since it would be technologically possible to copy copyrighted material without paying for it.”72 Advocating lax approaches to copyright might result in less availability of information. Moreover, it may have an adverse effect on domestic producers of copyrighted material, as a lax approach would signal that it is acceptable not to have to pay for such works. Protection of Expressions folklore: Tapping the Cultural Diversity A third issue is tapping the indigenous or traditional knowledge of Africa and to channel it to growth. It is increasingly accepted that traditional knowledge “is essential to the food security and health of millions of people in the developing world.” Moreover, traditional 71 72
Ibid., p. 20 J. CAROLL, “Weak Copyrights Would (http://zdnet.com.com/2102-1107-963675.html).
Kill
Fair
Use”,
ZDNN,
262
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
medicines provide “the only affordable treatment available to poor people. In developing countries, up to 80 per cent of the population depend on traditional medicines to help meet their healthcare needs.”73 Expressions of folklore, beyond their monetary value, serve to preserve and promote the identity of groups in a globalizing world. Focus on the protection of traditional knowledge is a recent phenomenon. WIPO’s work on “expressions of folklore” began as early as 1978 in cooperation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). It has thus progressed to a more advanced stage than the work on traditional knowledge in general. A concrete outcome of this work was the adoption in 1982 of the “Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions” (the Model Provisions). Most recently, WIPO and UNESCO conducted four Regional Consultations on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore, each of which adopted resolutions or recommendations with proposals for future work. In addition, it is worth noting that the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) of 1996 already makes explicit reference to expressions of folklore. WIPO began its work on “traditional knowledge, innovations and creativity” (traditional knowledge) in the 1998-1999 biennium.74 More recently, the Intergovernmental 73 74
CIPR, p. 73. Two Roundtables were convened regarding the protection of traditional knowledge and a series of nine fact-finding missions on traditional knowledge, innovations and creativity (FFMs) were undertaken. The objective of the FFMs was “to identify and explore the intellectual property needs and expectations of new beneficiaries, including the holders of indigenous knowledge and innovations.” A draft Report on all the fact-finding missions was made available for public comment in paper form and on the WIPO website. 23 Comments received were taken into account in producing a revised Report on the Intellectual Property Needs and Expectations of Traditional Knowledge Holders (“the FFM Report”), which was published in 2001. From 9 to 11 November 2000, WIPO organized an Inter-Regional Meeting in Chiang Rai, Thailand, which addressed intellectual property issues within all the three themes of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore. 28 Member States attended the Meeting and adopted “A Policy and Action Agenda for the Future” which welcomed “the decision of the Member States of WIPO to establish … the Intergovernmental Committee” and recommended, among other things, that WIPO should “facilitate, support and contribute to the work of the Committee by
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
263
Committee was created by WIPO’s member states after a number of fact-finding studies undertaken by WIPO in 1998 and 1999.75 The question is whether the existing laws, national and international, governing intellectual property in African countries allow for the effective protection of traditional knowledge and folklore in particular. If the laws are not appropriate then is there need for a sui generis system. On the latter point, a sui generis system must be in function of the needs and demands of the TK holders. Any system of protection must recognize the customary laws under which the knowledge evolved. A crucial question in this regard is whether copyright offer the answers to effective protection of expressions folklore or whether other areas such as trademarks and geographical indications are better suited.76
75
76
continuing to conduct the exploratory activities and practical pilot projects and studies on these issues of the kind undertaken by WIPO thus far.” Following extensive discussions on intellectual property and genetic resources at WIPO between September 1999 and September 2000, the General Assembly of the WIPO approved a proposal for the establishment of the Intergovernmental Committee and for a basic substantive framework. At Twenty-Sixth (12th Extraordinary) Session of WIPO’s General Assembly, held from 25 September to 3 October 2000, Member States decided to establish a special body to discuss intellectual property issues related to genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore. The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore is a forum where governments discuss matters relevant to three primary themes. These themes concern intellectual property issues that arise in the context of: (i) access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing; (ii) the protection of traditional knowledge, innovations and creativity; and (iii) the protection of expressions of folklore. The Intergovernmental Committee was established by the WIPO General Assembly, at its Twenty-Sixth Session, held in Geneva from 26 September to 3 October 2000. The Intergovernmental Committee held its first session in Geneva, from 30 April to 3 May 2001. The Second Session of Intergovernmental Committee was held in Geneva, from 10 to 14 December 2001 and the Third Session in Geneva, 13 June to 21 June 2002. The WIPO International Forum on “Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: Our Identity, Our Future” was also organized in cooperation with the Government of the Sultanate of Oman on 20 and21 January 2002. See articles by E.S. NWAUCHE, “A Critical Evaluation of the Provisions of Nigerian Copyirght Law for Folklore”, International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 33 (2002) 5, pp. 599-605; J. ASEIN, “Nigerian Copyright Law – An Appraisal of Recent Innovation and Implications”, Calabar Law Journal 131 (1990) 3; T.A.T. IYAGBA, “Protection of Folklore in Nigerian
264
Robin Ramcharan & Mpazi Sinjela
CONCLUSION It has been established that copyright industries can contribute significantly to the wealth of countries. Their importance increases with the emergence of communications technology-driven knowledge economies in which information is the prized asset. The developed countries, which produce most of the world’s information carrying products and technologies, are eager to preserve their technological edge and this is reflected in calls for more stringent copyright laws. African countries, which are all developing countries, stand to benefit from the information emanating from the developed countries, though they are lagging behind in the infrastructure needed to take full advantage of this information. However, they are projected to catch up, especially as global multinational companies come to view Africa as a serious investment opportunity. Development, however, is not only a one way street. Africa has information, which is eagerly sought after by the developed countries. For example, Africa has much to offer by way of cultural products and must seek ways to exploit these efficiently. Viewed from this perspective, African governments need to pay particular attention to the establishment of sound national copyright laws and intellectual property systems in general to encourage local creativity and, crucially, to maintain that creativity at home. In seeking the right balance between protection of competing local interests and national and international interests, the legislators should take a closer look at the special provisions, found in Annex to the Berne Convention. The articles therein provide that “any country regarded as a developing country” in conformity with established practice of the General Assembly of the United Nations, “and which, having regard to its economic situation and its social or cultural needs, Copyright Law: Issues of Administration and Enforcement”, Modus International Law & Business Quarterly, Vol. 5, No.2, pp. 29-30; R. GANA, “Two Steps Forward: Reconciling Nigeria’s Accession to the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement”, IIC 476 (1996) 27; O. EZE, “Copyright Protection in Nigeria: Prospects for National Development”, Lawyers Journal 40 (1990) 1.
The Protection of Copyrights and the Related Rights in Africa
265
does not consider itself immediately in a position to make provision for the protection of all rights as provided for in this Act [Berne Convention]” (Article I), is allowed if it chooses to take advantage of these provisions, certain limitations to the right of translation (Article II) and to the right of reproduction (Article III).
This page intentionally left blank
ETUDE SUR L’OCCUPATION ET SUR L’ARTICLE 47 DE LA IVEME CONVENTION DE GENEVE DU 12 AOUT 1949 RELATIVE A LA PROTECTION DES PERSONNES CIVILES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE: LE DEGRE D’INTANGIBILITE DES DROITS EN TERRITOIRE OCCUPE Robert Kolb*
INTRODUCTION 1. L’objectif de la présente étude est de voir avec quelle intensité et selon quelles modalités le droit international de l’occupation de guerre s’applique aux situations d’occupation modernes. Contrairement au droit du XIXe siècle, confronté avec des phénomènes relativement simples et transitoires régis par un corps léger de normes sur l’occupatio bellica, les occupations postérieures à 1945 et surtout à 1967 sont marquées par leur caractère très controversé, par une multiplicité factuelle et juridique sans précédent, et par un prolongement de la présence étrangère inconnu jusque là. Toutes ces évolutions ont mené à des incertitudes sur l’applicabilité et sur l’ampleur d’application des normes du droit de l’occupation issues de textes relativement anciens, à savoir du Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, annexé à la Convention de La Haye (IV) de 1907, et la Convention de Genève (IV) de 1949 relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre1. A partir de ce qui précède, deux questions s’offrent à l’analyse *
Professeur de droit international aux Universités de Neuchâtel, Berne et Genève (Suisse).
1
Le texte de ces conventions peut être consulté D. SCHINDLER / J. TOMAN, Droit des conflits armés, Genève, 1996.
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 267-321. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
dans
268
Robert Kolb
critique. En premier lieu, il faut se demander si les situations d’occupation moderne tombent sous le coup des textes mentionnés2. C’est un problème de champ d’application de ces textes, notamment face à des situations nouvelles. On peut également s’interroger sur le fait de savoir si s’appliquent également d’autres sources du droit, comme par exemple le droit international des droits de l’homme, et si c’est le cas selon quelles modalités. En second lieu, il faut s’interroger si les textes dont il est question doivent s’appliquer en bloc (sans dérogations ou altérations possibles) aux situations nouvelles, ou si des modulations en fonction des spécificités des occupations modernes sont imaginables, et si oui comment. C’est un problème qui a trait au caractère des normes de l’occupation et au degré de flexibilité et d’intangibilité relatifs qu’ils véhiculent. L’article 47 de la Convention de Genève IV pose ici des exigences à première vue très claires et très rigides, qui devront être examinées de plus près. C’est à ces deux cercles de problèmes que sera dévolue cette brève étude. Avant de s’engager dans l’analyse y relative, il y peut être utile de synthétiser les contenus essentiels des deux textes mentionnés, le Règlement de La Haye et la Convention de Genève IV.
CARACTERE ET CONTENU DU REGLEMENT DE LA HAYE (1907) ET DE LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE (1949) EN RELATION AVEC L’OCCUPATION3 2
3
Le droit coutumier n’a en la matière pas d’autonomie par rapport à ces textes. C’est au contraire ceux-ci qui sont censés refléter le droit coutumier, soit en tout, soit en partie. Sur le régime de l’occupation (de guerre), cf. entre autres L. OPPENHEIM / H. LAUTERPACHT, International Law – A Treatise, vol. II, Londres / New York / Toronto, 1952, pp. 430 et ss. C. ROUSSEAU, Le droit des conflits armés, Paris, 1983, pp. 133 et ss. A. ROBERTS, “What Is A Military Occupation ?”, BYIL 55 (1984), pp. 249 et ss. E. BENVENISTI, The International Law of Occupation, Princeton, 1993. L.C. GREEN, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Manchester / New York, 1993, pp. 246 et ss. D. FLECK, Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, Oxford, 1995, pp. 234-279, §§ 519-581. M. BOTHE, “Occupation, Belligerent”, EPIL 3 (1997), pp. 763-766. N. RONZITTI, Diritto internazionale dei conflitti armati, Turin, 1998, pp. 166 et ss. E. DAVID, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 2ème éd., Bruxelles, 1999, pp. 452 et ss. I. DETTER, The Law of War, 2ème éd., Cambridge, 2000, pp. 181-182.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
269
2. Le Règlement de La Haye de 1907 diffère significativement de la Convention de Genève IV, tant dans sa perspective générale que, par conséquent, dans les garanties formulées4. Le Règlement est encore tourné vers le droit du XIXe siècle. Sa perspective est strictement inter-étatique. Il contient une série de droits (ou de compétences) en faveur de la Puissance occupante et établit par là un devoir corrélatif de la Puissance occupée ; et vice versa, il établit des devoirs de l’occupant, octroyant ainsi des droits à l’occupé. Les sujets de ces droits et devoirs corrélatifs sont les entités étatiques respectives. Le Règlement est fondé sur une autre idée du XIXe siècle, celle selon laquelle la guerre est une relation d’Etat à Etat qui ne crée pas d’inimitié entre les individus5. Dès lors, des garanties particulières pour la population occupée selon le modèle des droits de l’homme ne sont pas envisagées. Par hypothèse, la Puissance occupante n’est pas censée hostile à leur égard, et il ne peut s’agir que de protéger des droits patrimoniaux ou administratifs, liés à l’effort de guerre.
4 5
Voir aussi J. PICTET (éd), Commentaire de la Convention IV de Genève, Genève, 1956. Parmi les textes plus anciens, voir M. MARINONI, Della natura giuridica dell’occupazione bellica, Rome, 1911. G. TENEKIDES, Occupatio bellica : la nature juridique de l’occupation militaire, Athènes, 1945. A. MIGLIAZZA, L’occupazione bellica, Milan, 1949. F. CAPOTORTI, L’occupazione nel diritto di guerra, Naples, 1949. G. VON GLAHN, The Occupation of Enemy Territory, Minneapolis, 1957. M. GREENSPAN, The Modern Law of Land Warfare, Berkeley / Los Angeles, 1959, pp. 209 et ss. O. DEBBASCH, L’occupation militaire, Paris, 1962. Pour une bibliographie plus complète de la littérature jusqu’aux années 1980, cf. CICR / Institut Henry Dunant (éds.), Bibliography of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, 2ème éd., Genève, 1987, pp. 296 et ss. Pour ce qui est de la protection de la propriété, voir en particulier N. ANDO, Surrender, Occupation and Private Property in International Law, Oxford, pp. 29 et ss. Pour la protection de la population civile en territoire occupé, voir en particulier O.M. UHLER, Der völkerrechtliche Schutz der Bevölkerung eines besetzten Gebiets gegen Massnahmen der Okkupationsmacht, Nendeln / Liechtenstein, 1977. Cf. les remarques concises de BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 209 et ss. Voir les célèbres phrases de J.J. Rousseau : “La guerre n’est donc point une relation d’homme à homme, mais une relation d’Etat à Etat, dans laquelle les particuliers ne sont ennemis qu’accidentellement, non point comme hommes, ni comme citoyens, mais comme soldats…” (Du Contrat Social, I, IV). Cf. à ce propos R. DERATHÉ, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps, 2ème éd., Paris, 1974, pp. 192 et ss.
270
Robert Kolb
De surcroît, le Règlement s’inspire de l’idée que l’occupation ne dure qu’un laps de temps réduit, jusqu’à la conclusion du traité de paix. Il reflète ainsi les réalités du XIXe siècle. Dès lors, le Règlement ne cherche pas à organiser un véritable régime territorial de l’occupation. Le droit d’occupation n’est qu’un droit intérimaire, voire conservatoire. L’occupant n’est qu’un trustee des droits “administratifs” et “privés” de la Puissance occupée6, sur son territoire, pendant un temps bref. D’où un régime juridique fragmentaire, axé sur la “conservation”, sur le gel de la situation juridique, avant qu’une solution finale n’intervienne pour le territoire en question avec le traité de paix. Cette fragmentarité conservatrice est aussi sous-tendue par l’idée du libéralisme du XIXe siècle, envisageant en général un minimum d’intervention étatique dans la vie sociale. Cet idéal pouvait être appliqué avec plus de force encore à un occupant étranger. 3. Toute autre est l’optique de la Convention de Genève de 1949 qui est le fruit des expériences de la seconde guerre mondiale. Celle-ci avait généré des abus massifs envers les civils. L’édifice du Règlement de La Haye s’effondrait par pans entiers. Ses fondements mêmes ne tenaient plus. En premier lieu, la conception de “guerre totale” avait fait de tout ressortissant adverse un ennemi, voire un objectif militaire. Dès lors, l’occupant était devenu un “ennemi mortel” de la population occupée et vice versa. De plus, un régime juridique fragmentaire de l’occupation n’était plus de mise. Tout interstice laissé par le droit risquait de donner lieu à des abus de la part des autorités occupantes. C’est pourquoi il fallait non seulement capillariser le régime juridique de l’occupation, mais aussi garantir l’inviolabilité des droits en interdisant les dérogations et autres subterfuges du même genre (cf. l’article 47 de la Convention IV). Le seul point sur lequel la Convention de Genève IV devait rester fidèle à l’approche traditionnelle, c’est qu’elle continue d’envisager l’occupation comme un intermède relativement bref, qui se conclut par la conclusion du traité de paix (cf. l’article 6 de la Convention IV). Les conséquences de ce qui précède sont que la Convention de 6
Cf. l’article 55 du Règlement.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
271
Genève IV n’est pas fondée sur l’optique inter-étatique. En toute logique, elle s’oriente vers l’octroi de garanties individuelles selon le modèle d’un Bill of Rights. L’optique est individuelle. Ce n’est pas par hasard si l’on a très tôt rapproché la Convention IV du droit des droits de l’homme, estimant que les deux relevaient d’une souche commune, que la Convention IV relevait, en fait, d’une approche des droits de l’homme7. En un mot, à un Règlement basé sur une philosophie interétatique et de réglementation minimale succède une Convention fondée sur une philosophie de droits de la personne humaine et de réglementation maximale. Ces différences doivent être tenues présentes lorsqu’on parcourt les droits et obligations spécifiques de ces deux textes. 4. Le Règlement de La Haye de 1907 traite de l’occupation dans sa Section III, intitulée : “De l’autorité militaire sur le territoire de l’Etat ennemi” ; il s’agit des articles 42 à 56. Ces dispositions peuvent être classées en trois catégories : - les principes généraux : article 42 (définition de l’occupation et champ d’application) ; article 43 (devoirs fondamentaux de l’occupant, à savoir le devoir de rétablir et d’assurer l’ordre et la vie publics). - les garanties pour la population : article 44 (interdiction de forcer la population à donner des informations sur l’armée ou la défense de l’autre belligérant) ; article 45 (interdiction de contraindre la population à un serment) ; article 46 (respect de la propriété privée, de la famille, de la religion) ; articles 48-49, 51-52 (prélèvement de contributions ou d’impôts, réquisitions) ; article 47 (interdiction du pillage) ; article 50 (interdiction de peines collectives). - les garanties pour l’Etat évincé : article 55 (occupant en tant qu’administrateur et usufruitier des immeubles de l’Etat ennemi) ; article 53 (droits de saisie de certains biens meubles de l’Etat ennemi, par exemple les dépôts d’armes) ; article 56 (traitement de biens 7
Cf. par exemple J.A.C. GUTTERIDGE, “The Geneva Convention of 1949”, BYIL 26 (1949), p. 300. P. URNER, Die Menschenrechte der Zivilpersonen im Krieg gemäss der Genfer Zivilkonvention von 1949, thèse, Zurich, 1956. Voir en général, R. KOLB, “Aspects historiques de la relation entre le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme”, CYIL 37 (1999), pp. 73-74, 80 et ss.
272
Robert Kolb
communaux et des établissements consacrés aux cultes, à la charité et à l’instruction, aux arts et aux sciences, comme de la propriété privée) ; article 54 (principe du maintien des câbles sous-marins reliant un territoire occupé à un territoire neutre). Le caractère rudimentaire de ce régime apparaît très clairement. 5. La Convention de Genève de 1949 (IV) traite de l’occupation dans la Section I du Titre III (articles 27-34) et dans la Section III du Titre III (articles 47-78). Les dispositions de la Section IV du même Titre, relatives au traitement des internés, s’appliquent également aux territoires occupés, pour autant qu’il y ait des internements. La Section I susmentionnée contient les principes généraux relatifs au traitement des civils, ceux applicables partout, que ce soit aux territoires des parties au conflit, ou aux territoires occupés. La Section III susmentionnée traite des droits spécifiques de la population civile en territoire occupé; les questions traitées sont les suivantes: - Titre III, Section I : - Art. 27, Traitement. Généralités - Art. 28, Zones dangereuses - Art. 29, Responsabilités - Art. 30, Recours aux Puissances protectrices et organismes de secours - Art. 31, Interdiction de la contrainte - Art. 32, Interdiction de la torture et des sévices corporels - Art. 33, Responsabilité individuelle. Peines collectives. Pillage. Représailles - Art. 34, Otages8.
8
Cf. l’article 27(1), qui ouvre cette Section : “Les personnes protégées ont droit, en toutes circonstances, au respect de leur personne, de leur honneur, de leurs droits familiaux, de leurs convictions et pratiques religieuses, de leurs habitudes et de leurs coutumes. Elles seront traitées, en tout temps, avec humanité et protégées notamment contre tout acte de violence ou d’intimidation, contre les insultes et la curiosité publique.”
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
273
- Titre III, Section III : - Art. 47, Intangibilité des droits - Art. 48, Cas spéciaux de rapatriement - Art. 49, Déportations, transferts, évacuations - Art. 50, Enfants - Art. 51, Enrôlement. Travail - Art. 52, Protection des travailleurs - Art. 53, Destructions interdites - Art. 54, Magistrats et fonctionnaires - Art. 55, Ravitaillement de la population - Art. 56, Hygiène et santé publiques - Art. 57, Réquisition des hôpitaux - Art. 58, Assistance spirituelle - Art. 59, Secours - I. Secours collectifs - Art. 60, Obligations de la Puissance occupante - Art. 61, Distribution - Art. 62, Secours individuels - Art. 63, Croix-Rouges nationales et autres sociétés de secours - Art. 64, Législation pénale. - I. Généralités - Art. 65, Législation pénale. - II. Publication - Art. 66, Législation pénale. - III. Tribunaux compétents - Art. 67, Législation pénale. - IV. Dispositions applicables - Art. 68, Législation pénale. - V. Peines. Peine de mort - Art. 69, Législation pénale. - VI. Déduction de la détention préventive - Art. 70, Législation pénale. - VII. Infractions commises avant l’occupation - Art. 71, Procédure pénale. - I. Généralités - Art. 72, Procédure pénale. - II. Droit de défense - Art. 73, Procédure pénale. - III. Droit de recours - Art. 74, Procédure pénale. - IV. Assistance de la Puissance protectrice - Art. 75, Procédure pénale. - V. Condamnation à mort - Art. 76, Traitement des détenus - Art. 77, Remise des détenus à la fin de l’occupation - Art. 78, Mesures de sécurité. Internement et résidence forcée. Droit d’appel.
274
Robert Kolb
Comme on peut le constater, la Convention de Genève contient un régime beaucoup plus détaillé et contraignant en matière d’occupation. 6. Le Protocole additionnel I de 1977 aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 contient des dispositions relatives à la population civile dans son Titre IV (articles 48-79). L’optique est ici généraliste : c’est la protection des civils dont il s’agit, notamment contre les attaques militaires, non du contexte particulier de l’occupation. Certaines dispositions concernent toutefois aussi les territoires occupés, comme par exemple dans le contexte de la protection civile (cf. les articles 63, 66(3), 67(2), etc.). Eu égard au caractère marginal des dispositions pertinentes et au caractère plus controversé du Protocole I par rapport au droit coutumier, nous pouvons dans cette étude négliger l’apport de ce texte. 7. Il sied enfin de rappeler que d’autres sources juridiques peuvent s’appliquer pendant une occupation en venant compléter ou pénétrer le droit de l’occupation proprement dit. Certaines sources sont subjectives, c’est-à-dire volontaires ; il s’agit d’accords de tout genre, par exemple d’accords d’armistice ou même d’accords organisant une occupation pacifique9. D’autres sources sont objectives, c’est-à-dire indépendantes de la volonté ; il s’agit du droit des droits de l’homme, notamment coutumier et universellement applicable. Ce n’est pas le lieu ici de serrer de près la question du rapport entre le droit international humanitaire et les droits de l’homme. Il suffira d’observer que la pratique internationale et la grande majorité de la doctrine se sont orientés depuis la fin des années 1960 vers une complémentarité des deux sources, les droits de l’homme étant pour le moins un standard minimum supplétif10.
9 10
Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 276 et ss. Pour l’occupation, cf. A. ROBERTS, “Prolonged Military Occupation : The Israeli Occupied Territories Since 1967”, AJIL 84 (1990), pp. 70 et ss. En général, cf. R. KOLB (supra, note 7), pp. 83 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
275
LE CHAMP D’APPLICATION DU DROIT DE L’OCCUPATION (RATIONE MATERIAE, PERSONAE, TEMPORIS) A. Le champ d’application ratione materiae (article 2 de la Convention de Genève IV) 8. Dans le droit international d’avant 1945, les textes relatifs au droit de la guerre s’appliquaient à partir du moment où existait un état de guerre entre deux Etats. C’est le cas des Conventions de La Haye de 1899 et 1907, y compris le Règlement annexé à la Convention IV11. Cette manière de voir reflète la conception classique du droit international inter-étatique. Le fait de faire tourner l’applicabilité du droit de la guerre autour de l’état de guerre a montré ses insuffisances au cours du XXe siècle. La “guerre” n’est pas un état de fait. C’est une notion juridique complexe dans laquelle la volonté subjective de se considérer comme belligérant (animus belligerendi) joue un rôle essentiel. De plus, il est incertain si une déclaration ou intention unilatérale de guerre suffit, ou s’il faut un animus parallèle de l’autre partie12. Dès lors, nombre d’opérations utilisant la force armée eurent lieu dans les années 1930 du XXe siècle, qui ne s’analysaient pas comme guerre. Parfois les Etats avaient recours à des qualifications douteuses (représailles, opérations de police, intervention) précisément pour contourner l’état de guerre : le but était de ne pas déclencher l’application du droit de la guerre. C’est pourquoi, après 1945, le seuil d’applicabilité matériel du droit en question fut défini de manière purement factuelle, en écartant la notion de guerre. L’article 2 commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 reflète cette nouvelle orientation. Ces Conventions s’appliquent en cas de guerre déclarée, mais aussi et surtout en cas de conflit armé surgissant de fait entre deux ou plusieurs parties contractantes13. Un tel conflit armé existe à
11 12
13
Entre-temps, le terme “guerre” contenu dans ces textes est interprété à la lumière de l’évolution postérieure du droit pour signifier “conflit armé international”. Cf. R. KOLB, “Guerre”, dans : J. SALMON (éd), Dictionnaire de droit international public, Bruxelles, 2001, pp. 537-538. Voir aussi H.J. WOLFF, Kriegserklärung und Kriegszustand nach klassischem Völkerrecht, Berlin, 1990. Cf. J. PICTET (éd), Commentaire de la Convention de Genève IV, Genève, 1956, pp. 22 et ss.
276
Robert Kolb
chaque fois qu’il y a recours à la force armée entre Etats14 atteignant un minimum d’intensité et de continuité15. Il suffit donc qu’il y ait de facto des hostilités. C’est sur ce critère factuel qu’est basé toute l’applicabilité matérielle du “droit des conflits armés” d’aprèsguerre16. Ce changement, ayant pour objectif d’assurer l’application du droit des conflits armés, reflète une évolution profonde, car comme on l’a dit, le droit des conflits armés “vise avant tout à protéger des individus et non à servir les intérêts des Etats”17 ; aussi ne doit-il dépendre que des faits et non de qualifications sélectives. 9. Il faut noter que le cas de l’occupation est le seul à s’écarter de ce principe général du droit des conflits armés moderne selon lequel la porte d’entrée à ce droit passe par la notion de “conflit armé” ou de guerre déclarée. Pour l’occupation, le droit applicable prévoit un seuil plus bas, étendant considérablement le champ d’application des Conventions, notamment de la Convention de Genève IV. En effet, le paragraphe 2 de l’article 2 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève dispose que “la Convention s’appliquera également18 dans tous les cas d’occupation de tout ou partie du territoire d’une Haute Partie contractante, même si cette occupation ne rencontre aucune résistance militaire”.
A défaut de telle résistance, il n’y aura pas de conflit armé. Juridiquement, on peut donc dire que “l’occupation” est une troisième cause d’application des Conventions de Genève IV, à l’instar du “conflit armé” et de la guerre déclarée, avec ceci de particulier qu’elle donne lieu matériellement à la seule applicabilité de la Convention IV (sauf analogies possibles) ; les autres Conventions, par exemple la 14 15 16
17 18
Cf. le dictum du TPIY en l’affaire Tadic (1995), § 70. PICTET, op.cit., p. 26. Voir l’affaire Tadic (1997), § 562 (cf. ILR, vol. 112, p. 179). Sur cette évolution cf. R. KOLB, “Le droit international public et le concept de guerre civile depuis 1945”, Relations internationales, no. 105, 2001, pp. 14 et ss, et les renvois à la doctrine. Voir également D. SCHINDLER, “The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols”, R.C.A.D.I., vol. 163, 1979-II, pp. 128 et ss. CICR (éd), Commentaire des Protocoles additionnels du 8 juin 1977, Genève, 1986, p. 40. C’est-à-dire : en l’absence de conflit armé.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
277
Convention III relative aux prisonniers de guerre, suppose en effet l’existence d’un conflit armé. La raison de cet élargissement du champ d’application de la Convention de Genève IV tient aux expériences de la seconde guerre mondiale. Ainsi, la Tchécoslovaquie avait été envahie par l’armée allemande en 1938-1939 sans résistance, dans les circonstances que l’on sait. Le souci d’application effective et sans faille qui a animé les rédacteurs des Conventions de Genève se devait dès lors de fermer de telles échappatoires, car l’envahisseur aurait pu, dans de tels cas, écarter l’applicabilité du droit des conflits armés en invoquant l’absence d’un conflit armé quelconque19. Il faut souligner que le paragraphe 2 de l’article 2 ne consomme pas le paragraphe 1 selon l’argument que le cas spécial de l’occupation est réglé par le paragraphe 2 en dérogation (lex specialis) du paragraphe 1. S’il y a hostilités – et occupation – la Convention entre en vigueur selon le paragraphe 1 ; s’il y a occupation sans hostilités, la Convention entre en vigueur selon le paragraphe 220. Le point n’est pas sans importance, car le paragraphe 2 parle de “territoire d’une Haute Partie contractante”, ce qui a amené Israël à contester l’applicabilité de la Convention, le statut de certains territoires occupés n’étant pas clair et ne relevant pas, selon Israël, d’une Haute Partie contractante21. Mis à part que cette interprétation ne cadre guère avec l’objet et le but du paragraphe 2, qui était d’étendre à toute occupation de fait l’application du droit, et non de la restreindre, il faut dire que les occupations israéliennes sont le fruit d’un conflit armé (celui de 1967) et que par conséquent la Convention est rendue applicable par le paragraphe 1, qui ne contient pas la clause précitée relative au territoire des Hautes Parties contractantes22. Le paragraphe 2 n’est donc pas concurrent du paragraphe 1 mais cherche à le compléter, comblant une lacune, pour le seul cas d’une occupation sans hostilités, et visant à rendre la Convention applicable même dans ce cas.
19 20 21 22
Cf. PICTET (supra, note 13), pp. 25-27. Ibid., p. 27. Voir infra, §§ 19 et ss. Cf. également A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), pp. 62 et ss.
278
Robert Kolb
10. La Convention de Genève IV renvoie à l’occupation à son article 2(2), mais aussi dans des dispositions substantielles (articles 27 et ss., et 47 et ss.). L’application matérielle de la Convention dépend donc de la définition du terme “occupation” que la Convention ne nous fournit pas. Sur ce point, par son silence, la Convention renvoie au droit international général tel que reflété par la Convention de La Haye IV et son Règlement annexé. L’occupation (de guerre) désigne toute installation effective, mais de caractère provisoire, des forces armées d’un belligérant sur tout ou partie du territoire ennemi23. Selon les termes du Règlement de La Haye, à son article 42 : “Un territoire est considéré comme occupé lorsqu’il se trouve placé de fait sous l’autorité de l’armée ennemie. L’occupation ne s’étend qu’aux territoires où cette autorité est établie et en mesure de s’exercer”24. Comme on peut le voir, le droit international s’en remet en la matière à un critère d’effectivité qui cadre d’ailleurs avec l’approche factuelle relative à l’application du droit des conflits armés adopté après 194525. Tôt déjà, certains éléments de la définition précitée ont dû être élargis. Ainsi, une occupation par des forces armées peut avoir lieu ailleurs qu’en territoire ennemi, par exemple en territoire neutre. Dès lors, la définition de l’occupation doit couvrir tout territoire étranger (i.e. qui ne relève pas de la Puissance occupante), pas seulement le territoire ennemi. Ceci fut admis par le Tribunal militaire international de Nüremberg26. De surcroît, les temps modernes ont été le témoin d’une explosion des formes de présence (militaire) étrangère sur certains territoires. Aux occupations guerrières (occupatio bellica classique, occupation de territoire neutre ou allié, occupation d’après-guerre), sont venues s’ajouter diverses formes d’occupation mixtes ou pacifiques, souvent prolongées, concernant souvent des territoires au statut controversé27, opérant souvent avec un partage complexe des
23 24 25 26 27
Cf. J. SALMON (supra, note 12), p. 776. Pour un très bref commentaire, cf. H.S. LEVIE, The Code of International Armed Conflict, vol. II, Londres / Rome / New York, 1986, pp. 713-714. Voir supra, § 8. Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), p. 263. Par exemple les îles Kouriles, les Falklands / Malvinas, le Timor oriental, le Sahara occidental, la Cisjordanie et la bande de Gaza. Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 279 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
279
responsabilités avec des gouvernements ou autorités locaux28, enchevêtrées parfois avec la présence de forces envoyées par une organisation internationale29 ou entreprises par des entités nonétatiques tels que des mouvements de libération30. Cela a amené la doctrine à diversifier les critères d’une occupation, cherchant à définir les éléments qui en forment le noyau dur. A. Roberts en a retenu notamment trois31 : (1) il existe une force militaire d’un Etat (ou d’une entité quasi-étatique) en dehors des frontières internationalement acceptées d’un Etat, sans que leur présence sur un territoire étranger ne soit sanctionnée par un accord valide avec l’Etat territorial ; (2) il y a un remplacement ou une modification profonde de l’ordre public préalablement en vigueur sur ce territoire ; (3) il existe une différence de nationalité ou d’intérêts (allégeance) entre les indigènes et les forces étrangères. De ces trois éléments, le premier est le plus important, alors que les autres deux s’analysent en quelque sorte comme conséquences du premier. On peut donc estimer que les évolutions modernes ont donné à la notion d’occupation une nouvelle extension, au-delà du concept traditionnel d’occupation de guerre issu de la progression de l’armée victorieuse en territoire ennemi. A l’ancienne occupation de guerre est venu se joindre le concept plus large d’une occupation hostile, que ce soit en temps de conflit armé ou en temps de paix, et qui englobe l’ancienne notion sans s’épuiser en elle. Cette occupation hostile recouvre toutes les diverses situations dont il a été question, à l’exception probablement de la présence de forces d’organisations internationales telles que celles des Nations Unies32. Il s’agit de tous les cas où des forces militaires et administratives se situent en territoire étranger sans l’accord du souverain. Les Conventions pertinentes sont-elles applicables à cette occupation hostile ? Cela peut être douteux pour la Convention de La Haye IV et le Règlement. Le critère d’effectivité de l’article 42 du Règlement peut être considéré comme étant satisfait sans gymnastique 28 29 30 31 32
Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 284 et ss. Ibid., pp. 289 et ss. Ibid., pp. 292-293. Ibid., pp. 300-301. Voir infra, § 12.
280
Robert Kolb
interprétative excessive. Mais le champ d’application général de ces textes, l’existence d’une guerre (selon l’interprétation actuelle, d’un conflit armé) semble restreindre sa portée à l’occupation de guerre. C’est d’ailleurs clairement ce cas qu’on visait en 1907. Dès lors, à défaut de tentatives d’interprétation extrêmement dynamiques, il ne reste que la possibilité d’appliquer les dispositions du Règlement à titre d’analogie aux nouvelles situations. Alternativement, on peut estimer qu’en devenant coutumières33, ces dispositions se sont – au plan du droit international général – dévêtues des spécificités conventionnelles quant au champ d’application ; elles auraient suivi l’évolution du droit d’après-guerre, inauguré avec la Convention de Genève IV s’en remettant au seul fait d’une présence militaire sur territoire étranger ; et que dès lors leur champ d’application qua consuetudo se serait peu à peu élargi pour couvrir les situations nouvelles auxquelles la vie internationale a été confrontée. C’est une interprétation possible, mais on peut s’interroger si l’on y gagne beaucoup. En effet, le Règlement de La Haye représente sur bien des points du droit ancien qui ne correspond plus aux besoins actuels, par exemple en matière d’occupation prolongée34. La Convention de Genève IV de 1949 paraît pouvoir s’appliquer à ces situations nouvelles avec grande flexibilité, car en plus du critère d’effectivité, l’article 2 (2) de la Convention permet d’envisager son application en dehors du contexte d’un conflit armé en bonne et due forme. C’est donc à travers ce paragraphe 2 que la Convention peut s’étendre de l’occupation de guerre à l’occupation hostile. La Convention de Genève est, pour ce qui est de l’occupation, d’application “universelle”35, à partir du seul fait de la présence d’une armée sur un territoire étranger. Une autre question est ici encore de savoir si les contenus de la Convention suffisent aux besoins ressentis concrètement dans les situations récentes.
33 34 35
Ce qui a été confirmé par le T.M.I. de Nüremberg, cf. Trial of the Major War Criminals (1947), p. 65. Voir supra, § 1-3 ; infra, § 32. Les Conventions de Genève étant universellement obligatoires, la question de la “relativité” des traités ne se pose pas.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
281
11. La question la plus délicate dans l’élément-clé “présence d’une force armée sur un territoire étranger” est de savoir ce qui constitue, aux fins de l’occupation, un territoire étranger. Certains aspects semblent clairs. Ainsi, il ne peut en principe36 y avoir occupation sur du territoire propre, reconnu internationalement comme tel. La situation peut pratiquement se présenter lors de la reconquête d’un territoire pendant le conflit armé. Avant le retour des autorités civiles, l’armée y installe souvent un gouvernement militaire local, de nature temporaire. Mais il n’y a pas dans un tel cas occupation, car il n’y a pas de présence étrangère sur un territoire (ni d’ailleurs conflit d’allégeance entre la population et l’“occupant”). Un problème plus délicat est posé par des territoires au statut controversé. En considérant l’objet et le but de la Convention de Genève de 1949 et les critères factuels retenus à l’article 2 commun, il faut conclure que toute présence en dehors des frontières internationalement reconnues d’un Etat donne lieu à une occupation37, pour autant qu’elle ne soit pas couverte par un accord. Ce n’est donc pas le statut du territoire visé qui compte, c’est le fait que ce territoire ne relève pas internationalement de l’occupant, que ce dernier doit franchir une frontière internationale pour y pénétrer et l’occuper. Dès lors, ce territoire peut être réclamé par plusieurs Etats, y compris l’occupant, son statut peut être des plus confus ; ce qui compte n’est pas cela, mais uniquement s’il est situé au-dehors des frontières internationalement reconnues de l’Etat occupant. C’est la seule interprétation qui s’accorde avec la volonté des rédacteurs de la Convention de Genève de la rendre applicable partout où il y a de fait occupation. Dans le cas contraire, la population de tout territoire controversé – et c’est là que des situations d’occupation ont lieu pratiquement – ne pourrait jamais jouir de l’application du droit international humanitaire pertinent, sauf par gracieuse concession de l’occupant. Ce serait un résultat absurde. A la limite, il suffirait 36 37
Voir cependant certaines décisions en sens contraire dans : A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), p. 296. Comme l’utilisation de la force au-delà d’une telle frontière internationalement reconnue, même si elle est de facto (lignes d’armistice, etc.), donne lieu à une violation de l’article 2(4) de la Charte des Nations Unies. Cf. la Résolution 2625 de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies.
282
Robert Kolb
d’une revendication territoriale plus ou moins crédible pour écarter par la suite l’applicabilité du droit international humanitaire. Une telle interprétation s’inscrirait complètement en faux à l’évolution moderne du droit des conflits armés. Ce qui vient d’être dit a été confirmé par l’article 1 (4) du Protocole additionnel I de 1977 qui parle “d’occupation étrangère” en général sans aucun type de limitation38. L’approche factuelle des Conventions de Genève est ici menée à terme. 12. Il reste à cette place la question de savoir dans quelle mesure des forces d’une organisation internationale déployées dans un territoire génèrent une occupation propre à déclencher l’application du droit international y relatif39. La doctrine admet unanimement l’application du droit international humanitaire aux opérations entreprises par des forces d’une organisation internationale, quitte à exiger quelques modifications pour les cas où l’Organisation ne paraît pas capable, à défaut de base territoriale, d’exécuter certaines normes. Cependant, les réserves sont plus grandes à propos du volet “droit d’occupation”40. Formellement, il est difficile d’y voir une 38
39
40
Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), p. 254 : “As far as its specific reference to occupation is concerned, the paragraph does not concern itself directly with the definition or scope of ‘alien occupation’ ; and it adds little to the scope of application as spelt out in the 1949 Geneva Conventions themselves. All it really does is to close a tiny technical loophole in common Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, by making a little clearer what was already widely accepted - namely, that the law on occupations is applicable even in situations (like the West Bank and Gaza) where the occupied territory was not universally viewed as having been part of ‘the territory of a High Contracting Party’”. Sur l’article 1(4), cf. CICR, Commentaire… (supra, note 17), pp. 41 et ss., 54. M. BOTHE / K.J. PARTSCH / W.A. SOLF, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, La Haye / Boston / Londres, 1982, pp. 36 et ss., pp. 51-52. Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 289-291. Sur l’applicabilité du droit international humanitaire en général, cf. entre autres C. EMANUELLI, Les actions militaires de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire, Montréal, 1995. E. DAVID, Principes de droit des conflits armés, 2ème éd., Bruxelles, 1999, pp. 184 et ss. Cf. par exemple D. SHRAGA, “The United Nations as An Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law”, International Peacekeeping 5 (1998) 2, pp. 68-70. M. BOTHE, “Peacekeeping”, dans : B. SIMMA (éd), The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, Oxford, 1995, p. 600. N. RONZITTI,
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
283
occupation à l’instar des occupations de territoire inter-étatiques. En cas de peacekeeping traditionnel, la force internationale se déploie selon un accord avec les autorités locales et n’assume pas des tâches d’administration du territoire en concurrence, voire même en lieu et place des autorités locales. En cas de peace-enforcement fondé sur le Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies (voire sur le Chapitre VIII), les forces déployées agissent en vertu d’un mandat du Conseil de Sécurité (ou d’une Organisation régionale autorisée en vertu du Chapitre VIII) et donc pour le compte d’intérêts de la Communauté internationale. Ces forces sont souvent amenées à des tâches d’administration d’un territoire, mais il n’y a pas ici le conflit d’intérêts entre deux politiques nationales, ni de conflit d’allégeance entre la population locale et la force occupante, à l’instar de ce qui se passe dans l’occupation inter-étatique. Ce mandat international que la force a mission d’exécuter distingue ces situations des autres cas d’occupation à un point qu’il paraît difficile d’y voir une occupation au sens du droit international humanitaire. C’est d’autant plus vrai que dans ces cas il ne s’agit pas de conserver le statu quo pour une période transitoire, avant que le titulaire du territoire ne s’y réinstalle, mais au contraire d’y apporter de profondes réformes. Le “mandat” de la part de l’organisation internationale doit dès lors avoir au moins autant de force que l’“accord”, l’un et l’autre suffisant pour extraire une opération du champ de l’occupation au sens exigé par le droit des conflits armés. Ce qui précède ne signifie toutefois pas que des dispositions du droit de l’occupation, notamment de la Convention de Genève IV, ne seraient pas applicables. L’absence de règles spécifiques créées pour l’opération en question et la nature des choses appelleront souvent une mise en œuvre par analogie des règles conventionnelles, moyennant les modifications nécessaires41. La ratio legis de l’article 47 de la Convention de Genève IV l’indique également : les garanties individuelles contenues dans la Convention doivent s’appliquer en toute circonstance, indépendamment de la qualification juridique des situations. Certes, l’article 47 suppose une occupation ; s’il n’y en a
41
Diritto internazionale dei conflitti armati, Turin, 1998, p. 109. En sens contraire, cf. par exemple EMANUELLI, op.cit., pp. 40, 51 et ss. Cf. EMANUELLI, op.cit., pp. 51 et ss.
284
Robert Kolb
pas, il n’est pas applicable. Mais sa teneur suggère de donner au mot “occupation” une interprétation large, au besoin fonctionnelle (en favorisant donc l’analogie), car autrement ses garanties pourraient être facilement contournées. Simplement, à cause du mandat international, une certaine flexibilité supplémentaire doit être admise, ce que notre interprétation permet : le droit d’occupation s’applique par analogie, autant que possible, mais pas plus. Cette interprétation souple n’est d’ailleurs pas contraire au but de l’article 47, car l’inviolabilité “absolue” se comprend dans le cadre d’un occupant “intéressé”, celui du contexte inter-étatique, alors que des flexibilités supplémentaires peuvent être admises plus aisément dans le cadre d’un “occupant désintéressé”, celui auquel la Communauté internationale a délégué une mission de paix42. 13. Pour résumer, on peut dire que le droit international humanitaire postérieur à 1945, notamment les Conventions de Genève, s’applique selon un critère exclusivement factuel, celui de l’existence d’un conflit armé (hostilités effectives). En matière d’occupation, cette sphère d’applicabilité a été élargie : le droit d’occupation s’applique s’il y a occupation lors d’un conflit armé, mais aussi si des forces militaires d’un Etat s’installent dans un territoire hors des frontières internationalement reconnues d’un Etat sans rencontrer de résistance armée. Cette occupation sans résistance peut être interprétée de manière large afin de couvrir la multiplicité de situations rencontrées dans la pratique récente, qui ne tombent pas sous les prévisions de l’occupation de guerre classique. Ce sont des cas qu’on peut résumer sous le terme d’occupation hostile. Le statut controversé d’un territoire n’est pas pertinent. Le droit de l’occupation s’oriente, au niveau de son champ d’application, vers le seul critère de la présence effective de forces militaires dans des territoires situés audelà des frontières, de jure ou de facto, internationalement reconnues, de l’Etat dont elles relèvent. Lors du déploiement de forces d’une organisation internationale dans un territoire, il n’y a pas d’occupation au sens juridique. Cela ne préjuge pas du fait qu’il est utile de
42
Sur la question des flexibilités que permet l’article 47, cf. infra, §§ 29 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
285
considérer l’application par analogie, autant que faire se peut, des règles du droit d’occupation. B. Le champ d’application ratione personae (article 4 de la Convention de Genève IV) 14. Le champ d’application personnel du Règlement de La Haye (1907) ressort implicitement des articles 44 et suivants du texte : il s’agit de la “population d’un territoire occupé”, expression par laquelle on visait les ressortissants ennemis sous contrôle de l’armée étrangère. Pour ce qui est de la Convention de Genève IV, la question est explicitement réglée par l’article 4, qui dispose : “Sont protégées par la Convention les personnes qui, à un moment quelconque et de quelque manière que ce soit, se trouvent, en cas de conflit ou d’occupation, au pouvoir d’une Partie au conflit ou d’une Puissance occupante dont elles ne sont pas ressortissantes”43.
Ce sont des individus “en défaut d’allégeance” avec un belligérant ou un occupant qu’il s’agissait de protéger contre des actes arbitraires. D’où la focalisation, dès les travaux préparatoires, sur les personnes de nationalité ennemie se trouvant sur le territoire d’un Etat belligérant et, d’autre part, sur les habitants des territoires occupés. Sont également couvertes les personnes sans nationalité44. Les nationaux de la Puissance occupante sur le territoire occupé ne sont pas protégés : il manque précisément le défaut d’allégeance45. La pratique récente a pu préciser la portée de l’article 4. Elle a insisté sur une interprétation large, afin de garantir une protection ample, et téléologique, soulignant le critère de l’allégeance plutôt que celui de la 43
44 45
L’idée était de protéger les personnes qui sont en conflit d’allégeance avec un belligérant ou un occupant. Cela ressort a contrario du paragraphe 2 de l’article 4, qui se lit comme suit : “Les ressortissants d’un Etat qui n’est pas lié par la Convention ne sont pas protégés par elle. Les ressortissants d’un Etat neutre se trouvant sur le territoire d’un Etat belligérant et les ressortissants d’un Etat co-belligérant ne seront pas considérés comme des personnes protégées aussi longtemps que l’Etat dont ils sont ressortissants aura une représentation diplomatique normale auprès de l’Etat au pouvoir duquel ils se trouvent.” Sur l’article 4, cf. les explications de PICTET (supra, note 13), pp. 50 et ss. PICTET (supra, note 13), p. 51. Ibid., p. 52.
286
Robert Kolb
nationalité formelle. Les conditions des conflits modernes ont rendu nécessaire une telle lecture de l’article 4. 15. La pratique dont il faut faire état est celle du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie. Sa jurisprudence s’est orienté dans deux directions : l’une visait à donner une interprétation large aux termes “au pouvoir d’une partie au conflit” (anglais : “in the hands of a party to the conflict”) ; l’autre visait à donner une interprétation large aux termes “dont elles ne sont pas ressortissantes” (anglais : “of which they are not nationals”). Pour ce qui est du premier aspect, l’affaire Tadic (1997) précise “qu’au pouvoir d’une partie au conflit” ne recouvre pas que des personnes physiquement sous le contrôle de l’ennemi, mais toutes les personnes en territoire occupé par l’ennemi, pour autant qu’elles n’aient pas sa nationalité46. Le Tribunal insiste sur le fait que cette interprétation large correspond aux intentions législatives des rédacteurs de la Convention de Genève. Quant au deuxième aspect, celui de la nationalité, le cheminement de la jurisprudence a été plus tourmenté. Dans l’affaire Tadic précitée, la Chambre du Tribunal a donné une interprétation très restrictive. Elle a estimé que les exigences de l’article 4 de la Convention de Genève n’étaient pas satisfaites dans le conflit de Bosnie, car les bosniaques musulmans détenus par les bosniaques serbes avaient formellement la même nationalité que ces derniers, à savoir celle bosniaque. Dès lors, elles n’étaient pas au pouvoir d’une partie au conflit dont elles n’étaient pas ressortissantes47. En 1998, une autre Chambre du Tribunal adopta un raisonnement opposé. Dans l’affaire Delalic (1998), il est mis l’accent sur l’objet et le but de l’article 4 qui est de protéger autant que possible des individus dans des situations de combats réelles, sans se focaliser sur les aspects techniques de la nationalité selon le droit interne en jeu. Cette approche plus large correspond aussi mieux au droit des droits de l’homme qui a gagné en importance depuis 1945. Dès lors que les personnes en cause, en l’espèce, avaient été arrêtées parce qu’elles étaient serbes (de Bosnie), 46
47
Arrêt du 7 mai 1997, §§ 579 et ss. Voir aussi l’affaire Delalic (Celebici), arrêt du 16 novembre 1998, § 246. La clause de sauvegarde contenue dans l’article 4 (2) de la Convention n’était pas sous considération et demeure réservée. Cf. §§ 584 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
287
et qu’elles étaient arrêtées par des forces croates (de Bosnie), elles devaient être considérées des personnes protégées48. Cette lecture de l’article 4 fut confirmée par le jugement en appel de l’affaire Tadic (1999) qui cassa le jugement susmentionné sur le point qui nous intéresse. Ce jugement en appel présente de l’intérêt par le soin et la densité de son argumentation. Selon la Chambre d’appel, la nationalité au sens formel n’a jamais été décisive pour ce qui est de l’article 4. Cela ressort déjà du fait que les rédacteurs de la Convention entendaient couvrir des personnes sans nationalité et des réfugiés, c’est-à-dire toutes les personnes dépourvues de la protection diplomatique d’un Etat tiers. Une interprétation large et finaliste du critère de la “nationalité” contenu dans l’article 4 est commandée aussi par d’autres considérations. Dans les conflits armés modernes, c’est souvent des conflits internes qui deviennent internationaux par la mise en jeu de forces militaires étrangères (comme en Bosnie). Dans de tels cas, le critère de la nationalité formelle, axé sur la guerre interétatique, ne saurait suffire. En effet, lors de tels conflits, la lutte s’organise autour de clivages ethniques, non autour de la nationalité. L’objectif de protection de la Convention serait réduit à néant si on voulait retenir uniquement la nationalité formelle. Au contraire, la réalisation du but de la Convention suppose que l’on s’attache au critère de l’allégeance. De ce point de vue, il est clair que des bosniaques musulmans aux mains de bosniaques serbes (ou vice versa) sont des personnes protégées, car il y a cette opposition d’allégeance qui sous-tend les actes en violation de la Convention et rend urgente la protection49. Au vu des conditions des conflits armés 48 49
Delalic, § 247ss. Arrêt du 15 juillet 1999, §§ 164-166 : “[164.] Article 4(1) of Geneva Convention IV (protection of civilians), applicable to the case at issue, defines ‘protected persons’ - hence possible victims of grave breaches - as those ‘in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying Power of which they are not nationals’. In other words, subject to the provisions of Article 4(2), the Convention intends to protect civilians (in enemy territory, occupied territory or the combat zone) who do not have the nationality of the belligerent in whose hands they find themselves, or who are stateless persons. In addition, as is apparent from the preparatory work, the Convention also intends to protect those civilians in occupied territory who, while having the nationality of the Party to the conflict in whose hands they find themselves, are refugees and thus no longer owe allegiance to this Party and no longer enjoy its diplomatic protection
288
Robert Kolb
modernes, l’interprétation téléologique adoptée dans les affaires Delalic et Tadic (appel) se recommande, sous peine de vouer la protection conventionnelle très largement à l’ineffectivité50. 16. Cette interprétation large du champ d’application personnel de la Convention de Genève IV, désormais bien établie, a des conséquences diverses sur le droit de l’occupation. La plus importante de ces conséquences est que lors d’une invasion dans un territoire marqué par des rivalités ou des luttes ethniques, la nationalité identique des individus concernés ne fera pas obstacle à une protection selon les allégeances réelles. Si, par hypothèse, des forces chypriotes turques (sans la présence de forces turques) avaient occupé une partie du territoire chypriote contrairement au régime prévu par les textes internationaux, elles n’auraient pas pu arguer de la nationalité
50
(consider, for instance, a situation similar to that of German Jews who had fled to France before 1940, and thereafter found themselves in the hands of German forces occupying French territory). [165.] Thus already in 1949 the legal bond of nationality was not regarded as crucial and allowance was made for special cases. In the aforementioned case of refugees, the lack of both allegiance to a State and diplomatic protection by this State was regarded as more important than the formal link of nationality. In the cases provided for in Article 4(2), in addition to nationality, account was taken of the existence or non-existence of diplomatic protection: nationals of a neutral State or a co-belligerent State are not treated as ‘protected persons’ unless they are deprived of or do not enjoy diplomatic protection. In other words, those nationals are not ‘protected persons’ as long as they benefit from the normal diplomatic protection of their State; when they lose it or in any event do not enjoy it, the Convention automatically grants them the status of ‘protected persons’. [166.] This legal approach, hinging on substantial relations more than on formal bonds, becomes all the more important in present-day international armed conflicts. While previously wars were primarily between well-established States, in modern inter-ethnic armed conflicts such as that in the former Yugoslavia, new States are often created during the conflict and ethnicity rather than nationality may become the grounds for allegiance. Or, put another way, ethnicity may become determinative of national allegiance. Under these conditions, the requirement of nationality is even less adequate to define protected persons. In such conflicts, not only the text and the drafting history of the Convention but also, and more importantly, the Convention’s object and purpose suggest that allegiance to a Party to the conflict and, correspondingly, control by this Party over persons in a given territory, may be regarded as the crucial test.” Cf. R. KOLB, “The Jurisprudence of the Yugoslav and Rwandan Criminal Tribunals on their Jurisdiction and on International Crimes”, BYIL 71 (2000), pp. 278-280.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
289
commune pour échapper aux protections dues en vertu de la Convention de Genève. C. Le champ d’application ratione temporis (article 6 de la Convention de Genève IV) 17. Comme il a déjà été dit, le droit traditionnel envisageait l’occupation de guerre comme une phase transitoire et de courte durée, avant le règlement définitif issu du traité de paix. D’où la réglementation simple dans le Règlement de La Haye (article 42) : le droit de l’occupation commence à s’appliquer dès que les forces étrangères contrôlent de fait le territoire envahi, ou, selon les termes du Règlement, dès que ce territoire “se trouve placé de fait sous l’autorité de l’armée ennemie”. Le critère est ici simplement celui de l’effectivité. Quant à la fin de l’occupation, elle s’oriente au même critère : le droit d’occupation cesse d’être appliqué dès que les forces étrangères n’exercent plus leur autorité sur le territoire en question. La Convention de Genève IV continue à s’inspirer de l’idée d’une occupation brève, en attente du traité de paix. L’article 6(3) en témoigne. Il dispose comme suit : “En territoire occupé, l’application de la présente Convention cessera un an après la fin générale des opérations militaires…” L’article 6(3) continue pour dire que certaines dispositions devront être respectées même après, si l’occupation devait perdurer, revenant ainsi au critère de l’effectivité : “néanmoins, la Puissance occupante sera liée pour la durée de l’occupation – pour autant que cette Puissance exerce les fonctions de gouvernement dans le territoire en question – par les dispositions des articles suivants de la présente Convention : 1 à 12, 27, 29 à 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 à 77 et 143”51.
La raison d’être de cette disposition fut (outre la vision traditionnelle de l’occupation) le cas de l’Allemagne et du Japon. Après un an, il n’est pas possible de maintenir le gel de la situation territoriale qu’exige le droit de l’occupation. Une marge de manœuvre plus importante doit être concédée à l’occupant, forcé à assumer des tâches 51
Sur cette disposition, cf. PICTET (supra, note 13), pp. 69-70.
290
Robert Kolb
de gouvernement plus générales. S’y ajoute une vision optimiste, selon laquelle “en raison de l’arrêt des hostilités, les mesures de rigueur à l’égard de la population ne se justifieront plus”52 ; d’où un moindre besoin de protection. Restent réservées en tout cas les dispositions humanitaires, c’est-à-dire les principes de base du traitement des personnes contenues dans la Convention (voir les articles cités supra). On notera enfin que l’article 6 ne prévoit rien quant à la fin de l’application de la Convention dans le cas de l’occupation sans résistance militaire (cas envisagé par l’article 2(2) de la Convention). Le Commentaire en déduit à juste titre que le droit international général s’applique dans ce cas, si bien que la Convention sera applicable aussi longtemps que dure l’occupation (effectivité)53. Quand les cas spéciaux de l’Allemagne et du Japon, avec l’administration alliée ou américaine, appartinrent au passé, et que l’on fut confronté à de nouveaux cas d’occupation souvent prolongée54, l’orientation changea. C’est ainsi que le Protocole additionnel I de 1977, dans son article 3, tourne le dos à l’article 6(3) de la Convention de Genève IV. Il dispose que l’application des Conventions de Genève et du Protocole cesse, dans le cas de territoires occupés, à la fin de l’occupation55. Le Protocole revient ainsi à l’effectivité, sans faire d’exceptions. Pour les Etats ayant ratifié ou ayant adhéré au Protocole I, l’article 6(3) de 1949 a été abrogé. Il est plus délicat de dire si cette abrogation est de portée erga omnes au 52 53 54 55
Ibid., p. 70. Ibid., p. 70. Notamment les territoires occupés par Israël. Cf. CICR (éd), Commentaire… (supra, note 17), p. 68 : “L’extension de l’application jusqu’à la fin de l’occupation… reprend en fait le projet que la Conférence diplomatique de 1949 n’avait pas retenu”. M. BOTHE / PARTSCH / SOLF (supra, note 38), pp. 56 et ss., 59 : “The second rule in subpara. (b) refers to occupied territories and stipulates that the application of the Conventions and the Protocol shall cease on the termination of occupation. It has been mentioned that this rule abrogates Art. 6(3) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which provides for a term of one year after the general close of military operations and limits the obligations of the occupant to certain selected obligations. Article 6(3) of the Fourth Convention of 1949 was a special ad hoc provision for certain actual cases, namely the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. There is no reason to continue to keep in force such provisions designed for specific historic cases. In 1972 the majority of Government experts expressed a wish to abolish these time limits”.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
291
vu du fait qu’elle serait reprise par le droit coutumier56. La prudence commande plutôt de s’en tenir aux prévisions de l’article 6(3) entre Etats qui ne sont pas liés également par le Protocole I. Ceci nous donne le schéma d’application temporel du droit suivant : (a) Règlement de La Haye (1907) : pendant la laps de temps de contrôle effectif d’un territoire par les forces étrangères. (b) Pour les Etats liés par la Convention de Genève IV (1949) et non par le Protocole additionnel (1977) : applicabilité de la Convention dès le contrôle effectif d’un territoire par les forces étrangères et jusqu’à la fin de celui-ci en cas d’occupation sans résistance militaire, ou jusqu’à une année après la fin générale des opérations militaires (armistice), sauf pour une série de garanties fondamentales, en vigueur pour tout le temps du contrôle effectif du territoire étranger. (Alternativement : si la coutume subséquente a rendu désuet ou abrogé l’article 6(3), applicabilité de la Convention pendant le laps de temps du contrôle effectif par les forces étrangères). (c) Pour les Etats liés par le Protocole additionnel I de 1977 : applicabilité des Conventions de Genève et du Protocole pendant le laps de temps de contrôle effectif d’un territoire par les forces étrangères. Du point de vue juridique, tout milite en faveur d’un alignement de l’applicabilité du droit d’occupation à l’exercice de l’autorité effective sur un territoire par les forces étrangères (effectivité). L’article 6(3) visait une spécificité historique au sortir de la seconde guerre mondiale (situation de l’Allemagne et du Japon), en vue de laquelle on a dérogé aux principes bien reçus du droit coutumier, à savoir le seul critère de l’effectivité. Cette situation spéciale d’après-guerre appartient au passé. Il serait bon d’écarter cette lex specialis contingente et politique, pour revenir aux équilibres juridiques justifiés par des considérations générales. 18. Quant à l’applicabilité du droit d’occupation ratione temporis, il peut être utile d’ajouter ce qui suit. Ce droit peut (partiellement) 56
Probablement en ce sens A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 271-273.
292
Robert Kolb
s’appliquer même avant ou en dehors d’une invasion en bonne et due forme, établissant un contrôle effectif. Même en cas d’incursions limitées, les dispositions humanitaires essentielles de la Convention de Genève IV doivent s’appliquer : par exemple celles interdisant les déportations de civils. De même, l’occupation ne commence pas toujours par une invasion. Il y a des cas où des forces étrangères restent dans un territoire après disparition du titre qui les y autorisait : par exemple l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie, après le retrait du mandat international par l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies (1966). Quant à la fin de l’occupation, elle ne suppose pas toujours le retrait des forces étrangères. Leur permanence en vertu d’un accord crée un nouveau titre à leur présence et peut mettre fin à l’occupation (cf. les cas du Japon (1952) et de la République fédérale d’Allemagne (1955)). L’occupation peut aussi arriver à terme à cause du transfert du territoire occupé par voie de traité, ou à cause de l’émergence d’une résistance qui fait perdre au pouvoir occupant l’emprise effective sur le territoire57. D. Illustration : le cas des territoires occupés par Israël58 19. On sait les circonstances à travers lesquelles divers territoires – la Cisjordanie, la bande de Gaza, Jérusalem Est, le Golan, la péninsule du Sinaï – furent occupés par Israël suite au conflit armé de juin 1967. Le sort de ces territoires se distingua par la suite. Jérusalem Est fut en fait annexée par le biais de la loi “Jerusalem, Capital of Israel” (1980). Suite à un accord de 1974, Israël rendit une grande partie du Golan à la Syrie, mais garda les plateaux du Golan, auxquels il étendit son ordre juridique (“Golan Heights Law”, 1981). Enfin, la péninsule de Sinaï fut rendue à l’Egypte suite au Traité de paix de Camp David de 1979. Dès lors, les territoires occupés sont de deux catégories : 57 58
Sur touts ces cas, cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 255 et ss. Parmi la littérature très abondante, voir A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), pp. 58 et ss. ; BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 107 et ss., avec de nombreux renvois. Pour la situation après les Accords de 1994/5, cf. H.P. GASSER, “The Geneva Conventions and the Autonomous Territories in the Middle East”, dans : S. BOWEN (éd), Human Rights, Self-Determination and Political Change in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, La Haye / Boston / Londres, 1997, pp. 291 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
293
(1) ceux où s’appliquait un ordre juridique spécial, à travers un gouvernement militaire (Cisjordanie, bande de Gaza) ; (2) ceux où s’appliquait l’ordre juridique de l’Etat d’Israël (Jérusalem Est, plateaux du Golan). Comme il était naturel, Israël n’a envisagé l’application du droit d’occupation que pour la première catégorie de cas, alors que la Communauté internationale l’a postulée pour les deux catégories, considérant comme nulle et non avenue l’annexion. 20. La position d’Israël peut être résumée comme suit. Le Règlement de La Haye de 1907 est applicable de jure, car il reflète le droit international coutumier59. La Cour suprême d’Israël a accepté cette manière de voir60, malgré quelques hésitations initiales. D’un autre côté, Israël a refusé de reconnaître l’applicabilité de la Convention de Genève IV sur une base de jure. Il s’est borné à assurer une application de facto – donc gracieuse – des “dispositions humanitaires” de la Convention61. L’inapplicabilité formelle de la Convention de Genève IV a été motivée par le statut incertain de la Cisjordanie et de la bande de Gaza avant 1967. Israël a argué que ces territoires ne relevaient pas, internationalement, de la Jordanie et de l’Egypte, leur statut étant contesté. Ainsi, il ne s’agirait pas de territoires “d’une Haute Partie contractante” au sens de l’article 2(2) de la Convention IV. Dès lors, le droit d’occupation ne s’appliquerait pas formellement, l’une des conditions de son champ d’application faisant défaut. Cette construction n’a pas été acceptée par la Communauté internationale, notamment par les organes principaux des Nations Unies, l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil de Sécurité, qui ont constamment proclamé l’applicabilité pleine et entière de la Convention IV62. Il en va de même du CICR qui dans une série de démarches et dans chaque rapport d’activité annuel rappelle l’applicabilité de ladite Convention. 59 60
61 62
A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), p. 63. Cf. l’affaire Beth-El (1979), dans : M. SHAMGAR (éd), Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel : the Legal Aspects, vol. I, Jérusalem, 1982, pp. 371 et ss. Voir aussi pour un aperçu de la jurisprudence, A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), pp. 89 et ss. Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), p. 62. H.P. GASSER (supra, note 58), p. 292. Le Protocole I de 1977 ne lie pas Israël. Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), p. 69.
294
Robert Kolb
21. Diverses objections ont été opposées à l’argumentation israélienne relative à l’applicabilité de la Convention de Genève IV63. L’une des plus importantes a trait au rapport entre l’article 2(1) et l’article 2(2) de la Convention. Il a été dit que l’argument israélien se fonde sur l’article 2(2) alors que celui-ci n’est applicable qu’à des occupations sans résistance militaire. En l’espèce, c’est l’article 2(1) qui s’applique, puisque l’occupation a eu lieu lors d’un conflit armé. Or le paragraphe 1 ne contient aucune limitation similaire relative au territoire d’une “Haute Partie contractante”. Cet argument technique et presque lexical a certainement son poids. Mais l’essentiel paraît ailleurs. Les développements sur le champ d’application du droit d’occupation exposés ci-dessus64 permettent de répondre clairement à la question en affirmant l’applicabilité de la Convention de Genève IV. Comme il a été expliqué, le droit d’occupation moderne s’oriente vers le critère de la présence effective de forces militaires d’un Etat sur un territoire qui ne relève pas internationalement de sa souveraineté, sauf si cette présence est couverte par accord ou a lieu dans le cadre d’une opération sous commandement d’une organisation internationale, dûment autorisée. Le but de ce critère factuel régissant l’application des Conventions de Genève est précisément d’éviter des lacunes dans la protection des personnes protégées selon des qualifications juridiques formelles, comme l’existence d’une “guerre”, “l’appartenance d’un territoire”, etc. Dès lors, ce qui compte, c’est que des forces militaires s’installent dans un territoire en dehors des frontières internationalement reconnues de leur Etat sans titre bilatéral ou communautaire ; l’appartenance de ce territoire importe peu, du moment qu’il ne relève pas de l’Etat qui y envoie ses forces. En d’autres termes, est essentiel le statut du territoire par rapport à celui qui y pénètre militairement, non le statut de ce territoire par rapport à des tiers. Ce dernier aspect ne touche pas au droit de l’occupation mais au droit de l’attribution territoriale (droit de la paix) ; c’est en quelque sorte une res inter alios acta ou pour le moins un aspect distinct. En l’espèce, il ne peut pas faire de doute que les forces 63 64
Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), pp. 64-65. Supra, A-C, §§ 8 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
295
israéliennes ont franchi la frontière internationalement reconnue d’Israël. L’Etat hébreu l’admet d’ailleurs lui-même. Pour ce qui est de la population locale, tant la nationalité différente que le conflit d’allégeance existent. Les conditions de l’article 4 Convention de Genève (IV) sont donc satisfaites. Le seul aspect qui pourrait prêter à des doutes est l’applicabilité ratione temporis, à savoir la clause d’un an contenue dans l’article 6(3). Comme l’on sait, l’occupation israélienne commença en 1967 et dura dans une première phase jusqu’en 1994/1995, puis, de façon plus limitée, au-delà65. Ce fut donc une occupation qui se prolongea bien au-delà d’un an à partir de la cessation générale des hostilités. De surcroît, nous avons dit plus haut que c’est bien l’article 2(1) de la Convention de Genève IV qui s’applique (occupation suite à un conflit armé) et non l’article 2(2) (occupation sans résistance). Or l’article 6(3) s’applique précisément dans le contexte de l’article 2(1) et non dans celui de l’article 2(2). Le point décisif nous paraît être le suivant : l’article 6(3) était une clause exorbitante du droit commun, axée sur la situation particulière du Japon et de l’Allemagne d’après la seconde guerre mondiale. Depuis 1949, et notamment lors de la Conférence diplomatique ayant mené à l’adoption du Protocole additionnel I de 1977, la défaveur (voire la désuétude) de cette limitation a clairement été exprimée. Cette défaveur a abouti à l’abrogation de l’article 6(3) pour ce qui est des parties au Protocole I (article 3). Ce qui précède justifie une interprétation restrictive de l’article 6(3) qui est, très largement, un anachronisme juridique, de surcroît dérogatoire du droit commun. Cette interprétation restrictive justifie sans doute qu’on ne présume pas l’applicabilité de l’article 6(3) d’office. Or Israël ne s’est jamais prévalu de cette disposition66. On ne saurait dès lors le faire à sa place. Plus même, il semble qu’Israël a acquiescé à l’inapplicabilité de cet article. Peut-on voir une invocation indirecte de l’article 6(3) dans le fait qu’Israël reconnaît l’application des “dispositions humanitaires” de la
65 66
Voir H.P. GASSER (supra, note 58), pp. 295-296. Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), p. 55.
296
Robert Kolb
Convention67 ? La réponse doit être négative. Non seulement la présomption générale contre l’applicabilité de l’article 6(3) milite en défaveur d’une telle argumentation par implication. De plus, Israël n’a reconnu l’applicabilité de ces dispositions humanitaires que de facto, non de jure. Dès lors, toute conclusion juridique sur l’application de l’article 6(3) semble exclue d’emblée68. 22. La conclusion de ce qui précède est que la Convention de Genève IV s’applique de jure et entièrement aux territoires occupés par Israël suite aux hostilités de 1967. Elle continue à s’appliquer dans la mesure où Israël continue de fait à exercer des prérogatives qui relèvent de l’autorité de la Puissance occupante dans ces territoires.
LA PORTEE ET LES MODALITES D’APPLICATION DE L’ARTICLE 47 DE LA CONVENTION DE GENEVE IV : L’INTANGIBILITE DES DROITS CONVENTIONNELS A. Analyse de l’article 47 23. L’article 47 de la Convention de Genève IV est libellé comme suit : “Les personnes protégées qui se trouvent dans un territoire occupé ne seront privées, en aucun cas ni d’aucune manière, du bénéfice de la présente Convention, soit en vertu d’un changement quelconque intervenu du fait de l’occupation dans les institutions ou le gouvernement du territoire en question, soit par un accord passé entre les autorités du territoire occupé et la
67 68
Etant donné que l’article 6(3) exige l’application, même après l’écoulement d’un an, de certaines dispositions de la Convention fondamentalement humanitaires. Il a été dit également (cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), p. 55) qu’une autre condition de l’article 6(3) pourrait ne pas être remplie, savoir la ‘fin générale des opérations militaires’. La guerre de 1973 est mentionnée à l’appui. Cet argument est nettement subsidiaire à celui présenté, car il suppose l’applicabilité de l’article 6(3). Il est plus précaire aussi, car à un moment donné, après 1973, il aurait fallu conclure à une telle fin générale des hostilités.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
297
Puissance occupante, soit encore en raison de l’annexion par cette dernière de tout ou partie du territoire occupé.”69
Cette disposition a pour but d’assurer l’intangibilité des droits garantis par la Convention. Ces droits forment dès lors un standard minimum absolu ou indérogeable. Cet effort “garantiste” entrepris par la Convention de Genève ne se limite pas à l’article 47. En fait, celuici doit être lu en conjonction avec les articles 7 et 8 de la Convention70, avec lesquels il forme un triptyque. C’est notamment l’article 7 qu’il prolonge dans la section dévolue en particulier aux territoires occupés. L’article 7, situé dans le titre consacré aux dispositions générales, stipule qu’aucun accord spécial entre les Parties contractantes à la Convention ne pourra restreindre les droits que la Convention accorde aux civils ou porter préjudice aux personnes protégées71. Si l’article 7 concerne les accords interétatiques, l’article 8 complète l’inaliénabilité de ces droits en interdisant que les personnes protégées elles-mêmes renoncent, par accord ou unilatéralement, aux garanties conventionnelles (ou à celles d’un accord spécial consacrant des droits supplémentaires)72. D’où un système d’intangibilité des garanties conventionnelles. 69
70 71
72
Sur cette disposition, voir PICTET (supra, note 13), pp. 293-297. LEVIE (supra, note 24), pp. 716-717. UHLER (supra, note 3), pp. 206-208. BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 99-100. VON GLAHN (supra, note 3), p. 74. Pour des applications de l’article 47, cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 276-279, 285 ; pour l’application à Israël et à l’Autorité palestinienne, cf. J. QUIGLEY, “The PLO-Israeli Interim Agreements and the Geneva Civilians Convention”, dans : BOWEN (supra, note 58), pp. 25 et ss. Sur ces dispositions, voir PICTET (supra, note 13), pp. 71 et ss., 80 et ss. Cette alternative découle du fait qu’il n’est pas toujours possible de déterminer d’emblée si un accord spécial portera effectivement préjudice aux personnes protégées. Par exemple, leur situation peut être améliorée sur certains points, mais aggravée sur d’autres. D’où l’utilité de la clause qui interdit de restreindre les droits conventionnels, qui est à bien regarder plus générale. Cf. PICTET, op.cit., p. 77. Le texte de l’article 7 est le suivant : “En dehors des accords expressément prévus par les articles 11, 14, 15, 17, 36, 108, 109, 132, 133 et 149, les Hautes Parties contractantes pourront conclure d’autres accords spéciaux sur toute question qu’il leur paraîtrait opportun de régler particulièrement. Aucun accord spécial ne pourra porter préjudice à la situation des personnes protégées, telle qu’elle est réglée par la présente Convention, ni restreindre les droits que celle-ci leur accorde.
298
Robert Kolb
24. L’article 47 est le fruit des expériences de la seconde guerre mondiale. Des populations civiles entières furent soustraites au bénéfice de l’application du droit de l’occupation et livrées au pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’occupant. Plusieurs moyens servirent à ces fins, par exemple l’annexion anticipée (par exemple la Pologne), des accords entre l’occupant et des autorités locales mises sous pression (par exemple la Norvège ou la France) ou l’installation de nouvelles institutions, notamment de gouvernements fantoches (par exemple la Croatie). Par ces subterfuges, l’occupant pourrait toujours s’affranchir de l’application du droit de l’occupation. C’est ces manipulations que la Convention de Genève IV a entendu prévenir et interdire. D’où le contenu triparti de l’article 47 : - (1) interdiction de changements dans les institutions ou le gouvernement du territoire occupé. L’article 47 prohibe de telles opérations où les nouveaux organismes sont soumis à la volonté de la Puissance occupante. Il peut s’agir par exemple de changements de la forme gouvernementale, de la création de nouveaux organismes militaires ou politiques, de la transformation d’institutions constitutionnelles, de la dissolution d’un Etat, de la formation d’entités politiques nouvelles, etc. En revanche, l’article 47 n’interdit pas à la Puissance occupante d’apporter des modifications qui s’analysent en abrogation d’institutions (par exemple la Gestapo) ou de lois (par exemple celles de Nüremberg) oppressives. Il ne s’agit pas ici de priver des civils de leurs droits au regard de la Convention, mais au contraire de leur accorder à nouveau ces droits73.
73
Les personnes protégées resteront au bénéfice de ces accords aussi longtemps que la Convention leur est applicable, sauf stipulations contraires contenues expressément dans les susdits accords ou dans des accords ultérieurs, ou également sauf mesures plus favorables prises à leur égard par l’une ou l’autre des Parties au conflit”. Le texte de l’article 8 se lit comme suit : “Les personnes protégées ne pourront en aucun cas renoncer partiellement ou totalement aux droits que leur assure la présente Convention et, le cas échéant, les accords spéciaux visés à l’article précédent”. Cf. PICTET (supra, note 13), pp. 294-295.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
299
- (2) interdiction d’accords (dérogatoires) entre les Autorités du territoire occupé et la Puissance occupante. Ces accords sont déjà interdits par l’article 7. L’article 47 répète cette interdiction en matière d’occupation, car ici le danger de tels accords dérogatoires est particulièrement grand. Il en va de même pour des “renonciations” unilatérales qui toléreraient par exemple des déportations ou l’enrôlement de force. La clause s’applique aux Autorités légitimes du territoire occupé tout autant qu’à des autorités installées et maintenues par l’occupant74. - (3) interdiction de l’annexion. L’occupation est une possession de fait provisoire qui ne comporte pas le droit d’annexion. Pendant les hostilités, aucune annexion n’est licite, la matière devant être réglée par traité de paix, dans le respect du principe d’autodétermination des peuples. Des annexions anticipées et illégales ne sauraient dispenser de l’application des garanties de la Convention de Genève IV75. 25. L’article 47 interdit de se dispenser des garanties conventionnelles soit par des actes unilatéraux matériels (par exemple l’annexion), soit par des accords. Si dans les deux cas il s’agit d’“intangibilité” (ou de caractère “absolu”) des droits, les modalités juridiques sont différentes. Dans le cas des actes unilatéraux, la Convention se borne à dire qu’un certain acte n’aura pas un effet juridique donné. Les Etats sont liés à ce constat par leur ratification ou leur adhésion à la Convention. Dans le cas des accords, la Convention ne peut pas se borner d’interdire, elle doit de surcroît empêcher une dérogation par un accord subséquent (lex posterior derogat priori). C’est ici un problème de sources de droit. A cet égard, l’article 47 contient un volet de droit impératif (jus cogens). Il interdit toute dérogation à des droits conventionnels qui s’analyserait en une restriction des droits accordés par la Convention (dérogation négative) ; il n’a pas pour but d’interdire des accords qui octroient plus de droits que ceux contenus dans la Convention (dérogation
74 75
Ibid., pp. 295-296. Ibid., pp. 296-297.
300
Robert Kolb
positive)76. Cela se comprend par le but de protection (Schutzzweck) de la Convention. Comme dans le cas bien connu du droit public relatif à des salaires minima – qui sont du droit impératif seulement si on vise à les déroger pour les diminuer, non pour les augmenter –, l’article 47 organise ainsi un régime de standard minimum impératif, protégé contre tout accord visant ou ayant pour effet d’en abaisser le seuil. 26. L’article 47 prévoit trois modalités dont les Etats pourraient faire usage pour contourner les garanties que la Convention octroie aux civils en territoire occupé. Il stipule qu’elles n’auront pas cet effet. Il ne peut en revanche disposer de la question préliminaire de savoir si la Convention IV est applicable. Comme la pratique de ces dernières décennies l’a montré, c’est à ce niveau que surgit le problème capital. Aucun occupant – même pas Israël dans les territoires occupés – n’a reconnu l’applicabilité de la Convention de Genève IV. On peut citer les cas du Sahara occidental, de la Namibie, de l’Afghanistan (1979), du Timor oriental, du Kampuchéa, de Chypre, du Koweït (1990), etc. Or, si la Convention n’est pas tenue pour applicable, la question des garanties impératives de l’article 47 ne se pose en principe plus. En effet, logiquement, l’application de l’article 47 suppose l’applicabilité de la Convention. Peut-on lier les deux aspects ? Peut-on estimer que l’argument de nonapplicabilité de la Convention est une technique moderne de contournement des obligations assumées à l’instar des trois moyens nommés à l’article 47, et que dès lors l’article 47 devrait, par interprétation extensive (ejusdem generis), s’étendre à cette nouvelle technique pour l’interdire ou au moins la limiter ? Une construction du genre a été esquissée par A. Roberts qui estime que l’article 47 pourrait empêcher d’avancer l’argument selon lequel un conflit armé est non international, et que dès lors la Convention IV ne saurait s’appliquer77. On comprend aisément les raisons d’une telle 76
77
Sur ces termes, cf. R. KOLB, Théorie du jus cogens international, Paris, 2001, pp. 367 et ss. Sur les garanties du droit d’occupation comme relevant de l’ordre public international, voir déjà G. SCHWARZENBERGER, International Law – As Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, vol. II, Londres, 1968, p. 319. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 278-279 : “A central difficulty in applying the law on occupations to situations of this type [after foreign forces have been invited by a host government] is likely to be the argument to the effect that the
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
301
construction. Elle semble toutefois difficile à admettre. Le champ d’application de la Convention et son applicabilité sont une question préalable et distincte de l’application de l’un de ses contenus. L’article 47 ne peut être tout au plus qu’un aspect qui renforce le principe général du droit international humanitaire moderne selon lequel la finalité humanitaire des Conventions de Genève impose aux Etats un devoir d’interpréter avec une grande restriction les exceptions à l’applicabilité de ces Conventions. D’où aussi l’adoption de critères purement factuels en matière d’applicabilité des Conventions (existence de fait d’un conflit armé), ayant pour but d’étendre le plus possible la portée de celles-ci. Il ne faut en tout cas pas se cacher que le moyen essentiel pour échapper aux obligations conventionnelles ne se situe plus, désormais, dans les manipulations prévues par l’article 47, mais dans la négation pure et simple de l’applicabilité de la Convention. A cet égard, une action législative pourrait se recommander visant à mieux garantir l’application de la Convention en toutes circonstances78. On ne voit cependant pas très bien comment
78
conflict is basically internal, and that foreign forces, acting by invitation, are supposedly not occupants. So far as Geneva Convention IV is concerned, there are two possible answers to this problem. First, Articles 7 and 47 establish that any special agreements (for example, between the authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power) may not adversely affect the situation of protected persons. It appears that these articles can refer to agreements concluded before as well as during hostilities; and presumably, therefore, before an occupation also”. Sur l’obligation de faire respecter le droit international humanitaire, voir en particulier L. CONDORELLI / L. BOISSON DE CHAZOURNES, “Quelques remarques à propos de l’obligation des Etats ‘de respecter et faire respecter le droit international humanitaire en toutes circonstances”, Mélanges J. Pictet, Genève / La Haye, 1984, pp. 17 et ss. N. LEVRAT, “Les conséquences de l’engagement pris par les Hautes Parties contractantes de ‘faire respecter’ les Conventions humanitaires”, dans : Académie du droit international de La Haye, Centre de recherche F. KALSHOVEN / Y. SANDOZ (éds.), Mise en œuvre du droit international humanitaire, Dordrecht, 1989, pp. 263 et ss. P. BENVENUTI, “Ensuring Observance of International Humanitarian Law : Function, Extent and Limits of the Obligations of Third States to Ensure Respect of International Humanitarian Law”, Yearbook of the Institute of Humanitarian Law (San Remo), 1992, pp. 27 et ss. G. CASALTA, “L’obligation de respecter et de faire respecter le droit humanitaire lors des opérations militaires menées ou autorisées par l’ONU”, Droit et défense (1997) 3, pp. 13 et ss. F. KALSHOVEN, “The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances : From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
302
Robert Kolb
y aboutir, à défaut d’intervention d’un organe international doté de compétences contraignantes, apte à fournir une qualification objective de la situation juridique. Une telle solution, indiquée en soi, ne saurait avoir des perspectives d’être acceptée par les Etats. Certes, le fait que des organes internationaux comme l’Assemblée générale ou le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies opèrent une telle qualification – comme dans le cas d’Israël – y pallie jusqu’à un certain point. La Convention IV étant tenue pour applicable, l’article 47 s’applique aussi. Cependant, il s’agit là d’organes politiques, dont les qualifications sont d’ailleurs sélectives et ne couvrent de loin pas tous les cas. Dès lors, tant que le litige juridique sur l’applicabilité de la Convention demeure, l’article 47 est confiné par l’Etat occupant dans une espèce de limbes. B. Les diverses situations où l’article 47 pourrait s’appliquer 27. À l’époque moderne, il est une multitude de cas où l’article 47 pourrait s’appliquer. Le plus important d’entre eux concerne les territoires occupés par Israël79, mais il en est d’autres. - (1) Chypre80. On sait les circonstances qui menèrent à l’invasion des forces turques dans Chypre le 20 juillet 1974. Dès le lendemain de la
79 80
2 (1999), pp. 3 et ss. CICR (éd), Commentaire des Protocoles Additionnels, Genève, 1986, pp. 34 et ss. Infra, § 28. Cf. par exemple BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 177 et ss. Sur le conflit de Chypre et les activités des organes internationaux en général, voir V. COUSSIRAT-COUSTERE, “La crise chypriote de l’été 1974 et les Nations Unies”, AFDI, vol. 20, 1974, pp. 437 et ss. G. TORNATIRIS, The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus and Legal Problems Arising Therefrom, Nicosia, 1975. C. PAPALEKAS, Die Zypenfrage : Problematik und Perspektiven eines Dauerkonflikts, Frankfurt am Main /Berne, 1987. G. VON LAFFERT, Die völkerrechtliche Lage des geteilten Zypern und Fragen seiner staatlichen Reorganisation, Frankfurt am Main /Berne, 1995 (avec des renvois bibliographiques). Cf. aussi J. DUGARD, Recognition and the United Nations, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 108-111. M. EL KOUHENNE, Les garanties fondamentales de la personne en droit humanitaire et droits de l’homme, Dordecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1986, pp. 230 et ss. Pour la position turque, cf. Z.M. NECATIGIL, The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law, Oxford, 1989. Pour un résumé de l’activité devant les organes
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
303
date indiquée, la Turquie conteste l’applicabilité des Conventions de Genève avec un argument devenu classique. Pour elle, il ne s’agit que d’une “opération de police” à laquelle l’article 4(2) du Traité de garantie de 1959 l’autorisait. De même, la Turquie affirme qu’elle n’acceptera de reconnaître l’applicabilité des articles 47 à 78 de la Convention IV aux territoires occupés par elle qu’à condition qu’on n’y voie pas des “territoires occupés”, mais simplement des “territoires contrôlés par l’armée turque”. L’application desdites dispositions se serait alors faite à titre gracieux. La situation n’a pas évolué depuis. - (2) Timor oriental81. Sur invitation de forces pro-indonésiennes, l’Indonésie envahit ce territoire administré préalablement par le Portugal. Elle y installa un gouvernement provisoire, qui s’empressa de demander l’intégration du territoire dans l’Indonésie (annexion). Comme le CICR l’a reconnu, la Convention de Genève IV est applicable à l’occupation de Timor-Est par les forces indonésiennes (article 2(2) Convention IV). Le fait que la République d’Indonésie ait décidé d’incorporer Timor-Est comme sa 27ème province ne change rien à la situation juridique. En effet, l’article 47 assure la permanence des obligations en vertu de la Convention même dans ce cas. Le problème était une fois de plus que l’Indonésie ne reconnaissait pas l’applicabilité de la Convention IV au Timor oriental. - (3) Afghanistan (1979)82. Après l’invasion soviétique en Afghanistan, l’URSS installa à Kaboul un gouvernement fantoche présidé par B. Karmal. C’est là encore un cas qui tombe sous les prévisions de l’article 47 de la Convention IV. Une fois de plus, cependant, l’applicabilité de cette Convention était niée par l’URSS.
81 82
de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, voir G. COHENJONATHAN et J.P. JACQUE, “Activité de la Commission européenne des droits de l’homme”, AFDI, vol. 25, 1979, pp. 383 et ss. Cf. BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 153 et ss. Ibid., pp. 160 et ss.
304
Robert Kolb
- (4) Kampuchéa83. Le 5 décembre 1978, les forces vietnamiennes envahirent le Cambodge pour mettre fin au régime sanguinaire de Pol Pot, qui avait multiplié les hostilités avec le Vietnam. Le Vietnam installa au Cambodge un gouvernement sous son influence. Là encore, l’article 47 pourrait s’avérer pertinent. Le cas du Cambodge est cependant spécial. Un peu comme dans le cas de la “dénazification” en Europe, il fallut défaire les institutions et les lois d’un régime génocidaire, qui de surcroît avait mené son pays à la banqueroute. Le gouvernement pro-vietnamien ne respecta donc pas le volet conservateur du droit de l’occupation. Au contraire, il entreprit des réformes profondes. Il améliora les conditions de vie de la population et empêcha le retour de Pol Pot. A cet effet, il jouit d’un support populaire certain. Il a été suggéré que cet état des choses – abolition de mécanismes de répression, support populaire – puisse légitimer des changements qui aillent au-delà des limites imposées par les Conventions de La Haye (IV) et de Genève (IV)84. - (5) Koweït (1990)85. Comme il est notoire, l’Irak envahit le Koweït le 2 août 1990 en invoquant une invitation de quelques révolutionnaires koweïtiens. Il y installa un gouvernement fantoche, avant d’annexer le Koweït dès le 8 août, à la demande de ce gouvernement téléguidé. Là encore, il s’agit d’une hypothèse prévue par l’article 47. L’Irak ne reconnut pas l’applicabilité de la Convention de Genève IV. - (6) Sierra Leone (1997)86. Il s’agit d’un cas spécial. Suite à l’Accord de Conakry du 23 octobre 1997 appelé “Plan de Paix”, Accord conclu entre l’ECOMOG et l’AFRC (rebelles), des forces de l’Organisation régionale mentionnée s’installèrent en Sierra Leone. Selon l’Accord, ces forces devaient pourvoir à diverses tâches dont le désarmement, la démobilisation, la supervision des opérations d’assistance humanitaire, etc. L’Accord met-il fin à l’applicabilité de la Convention IV ? Il ne semble pas que cela ait été l’intention des parties à l’Accord, si bien que le CICR s’est orienté vers une 83 84 85 86
Ibid., pp. 164 et ss. Ibid., p. 167. Ibid., pp. 150-151. Cf. (http://www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html).
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
305
applicabilité conjointe du droit d’occupation et des dispositions de l’Accord. Quid en cas de conflit entre les deux sources ? A cet égard l’article 47 est invoqué, faisant prévaloir les dispositions de la Convention IV, qui ne peuvent être écartées par un “accord passé entre les autorités du territoire occupé et la Puissance occupante”. Il est remarquable que l’analogie des situations et l’importance du droit d’occupation commande ici une application de la Convention à des forces envoyées par une organisation internationale. La pratique dont il a été question confirme que le problème effectif se situe le plus souvent en amont de l’article 47, à savoir au niveau de l’applicabilité de la Convention et de l’admission de cette applicabilité par l’occupant. 28. Le cas des territoires occupés par Israël est évidemment l’exemple le plus important. La conclusion des Accords intérimaires entre l’OLP et Israël a mis en vive lumière la problématique de l’article 47. Par l’Accord du Caire de 1994 (relatif à la bande de Gaza et à Jéricho)87 et l’Accord d’Erez, dit intérimaire, de 1995 (relatif à la Cisjordanie)88, Israël a transféré à l’OLP certains pouvoirs relatifs aux territoires occupés. Les compétences sur ces territoires sont désormais partagées entre israéliens et palestiniens. L’Autorité palestinienne exerce l’administration civile, y inclus la police et la sécurité. Israël garde une présence militaire assurant la sécurité des colonies juives et la compétence des relations internationales des territoires. Israël jouit aussi d’un droit de veto à l’égard de la législation adoptée par l’Autorité palestinienne. De ce qui précède, on peut conclure que l’Autorité palestinienne n’est pas organisée sur les territoires en question comme Etat souverain. Dans la mesure où Israël a retenu des prérogatives propres à celle d’une Puissance occupante, les règles sur l’occupation demeurent applicables, en particulier celles de la Convention de Genève IV89. C’est d’autant plus urgent que l’Autorité palestinienne, dépourvue de souveraineté, ne peut pas protéger ses ressortissants civils comme pourrait le faire un Etat. La continuité de 87 88 89
ILM 33 (1994), pp. 622 et ss. ILM 34 (1995), pp. 455 et ss. Cf. H.P. GASSER (supra, note 58), pp. 295-297.
306
Robert Kolb
l’application des garanties conventionnelles se fait donc selon le critère d’effectivité : l’exercice de fait de pouvoirs publics en territoire étranger (hors des frontières internationalement reconnues) entraîne automatiquement, dans la même mesure, l’applicabilité du droit d’occupation. En relation avec ces territoires, l’application de l’article 47 devient actuelle dès qu’on prend en compte des possibilités d’écarts entre les Accords OLP / Israël et les exigences de la Convention de Genève IV. En effet, l’article 47 interdit des accords dérogatoires des garanties conventionnelles entre les autorités du territoire occupé et la Puissance occupante, ou pour le moins statue que de tels accords n’auront pas pour effet de dispenser de l’application des obligations prévues par la Convention IV. En doctrine, la question a été peu étudiée. Dans la seule étude qui a notre connaissance ait été consacrée à ce problème, celle de J. Quigley90 , l’auteur arrive aux conclusions suivantes. L’article 47 constitue une limite absolue et stricte. Dès lors, toute disposition dans les Accords OLP / Israël qui aurait pour effet de diminuer des obligations de la Puissance occupante prévues par la Convention IV est “invalide”. De telles incompatibilités existent à trois niveaux : - (1) les colonies juives91 : la Convention de Genève IV interdit des transferts de populations ayant la nationalité de l’occupant dans les territoires occupés (article 49). Les Accords OLP / Israël entérinent au contraire la permanence de telles colonies92. Israël a même continué une politique expansionniste quant à ces colonies après les Accords, octroyant de surcroît un statut d’extraterritorialité à ces colonies. Israël a utilisé son pouvoir prépondérant pour extorquer des concessions à l’Autorité palestinienne – ce que précisément l’article 47 veut interdire.
90 91 92
QUIGLEY (supra, note 69), pp. 26-28, 31 et ss. Ibid., pp. 32 et ss. Quaere s’il y a une différence entre le maintien d’un statu quo ante et l’envoi de nouvelles populations hypothétiquement prévu par l’Accord.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
307
- (2) le statut de Jérusalem93 : la Convention de Genève IV interdit toute annexion de l’ensemble ou d’une partie des territoires occupés, puisqu’elle vise un maintien maximal du statu quo tout en s’inspirant du droit international général (cf. par exemple l’article 64). Or Jérusalem-Est a été de fait annexé en 1980. Cette annexion demeure sans effet juridique, nonobstant un acquiescement au moins provisoire par l’OLP au contrôle israélien sur Jérusalem-Est contenue dans les Accords OLP / Israël. - (3) les ordonnances militaires israéliennes94 : pendant l’occupation, Israël a pris approximativement 2000 ordonnances militaires ayant une incidence profonde sur la vie dans les territoires occupés et modifiant significativement le droit qui y était applicable. Dans la déclaration de Principes de 199395 (article 9) et dans l’Accord du Caire de 1997 (article 7), l’approbation d’Israël est réservée pour toute modification de ces ordonnances. C’est contraire à la Convention IV (notamment à son article 64) et ne saurait dès lors prévaloir. J. Quigley conclut que l’OLP n’a pas le pouvoir de renoncer à des droits des civils palestiniens sous l’occupation, précisément parce que l’article 47 interdit toute dérogation (négative). Le texte de l’article 47 est clair : dans tout cas de conflit, la Convention IV l’emporte96. Il faut désormais se poser la question de la portée exacte de l’article 47. Celui-ci doit-il être lu comme gelant la situation juridique dans tous les cas ? S’oppose-t-il à des compromis parfois nécessaires dans une négociation sans laisser aucune flexibilité ? Régit-il également des situations d’occupation courtes et des situations d’occupation prolongées, où l’occupant doit assurer une gestion plus poussée du territoire, y compris l’adoption de réformes ? Quel rôle peut jouer l’approbation par la population du territoire occupé, exprimée en dehors de toute contrainte ? Faut-il distinguer entre un noyau fondamental de la Convention de Genève IV, toujours 93 94 95 96
Ibid., pp. 36 et ss. Ibid., pp. 40 et ss. ILM 32 (1993), pp. 1525 et ss. QUIGLEY (supra, note 69), pp. 42-43.
308
Robert Kolb
applicable, et des dispositions plus périphériques, pour lesquelles plus de flexibilité est permise ? Ces questions et d’autres encore doivent désormais être étudiées de plus près. C. La portée de l’article 47 a) Les exigences de rigidité et de flexibilité 29. L’interprétation de l’article 47 de la Convention IV pose un problème juridique général, celui des parts de rigidité et de flexibilité propres au droit de l’occupation militaire. On comprend que la Convention de Genève IV fasse la part plus belle à la rigidité. Truffée de dispositions protectrices de la personne dans une situation de vulnérabilité prononcée, elle établit un standard minimum d’ordre public (jus cogens). Mais ici comme ailleurs, une gestion efficace des réalités ne permet pas de s’en tenir uniquement à un ensemble de normes inflexibles, formulées pour répondre à certaines situations ou prévisions que le temps peut venir plus ou moins profondément altérer. A ce titre, on peut rappeler que le droit de l’occupation de la Convention de La Haye (1907) et encore celui de la Convention de Genève (1949) s’inspirent du modèle d’une occupation transitoire et de brève durée. La vie internationale de ces trente dernières années a en revanche montré que l’occupation moderne tend à se prolonger dans le temps pour durer parfois plusieurs décennies97. Il est facile de comprendre que dans un modèle d’occupation comme brève transition (comme une sorte de trust ou de negotiorum gestio), l’objectif doit être le plus possible de geler les droits et situations juridiques sur le territoire occupé. L’occupant ne doit posséder qu’un minimum de pouvoirs, ceux indispensables à l’exercice réglé de l’occupation. Les choses changent plus l’occupation se prolonge. La bonne gestion du territoire peut dans un tel cas requérir des mesures de réforme et de transformations sociales aptes à tenir le pas de l’évolution du monde. Ces réformes sont nécessaires pour le bien des populations locales. On s’imagine d’ailleurs que celles-ci puissent consentir à de telles 97
Sur l’occupation prolongée, voir A. ROBERTS (supra, note 10), pp. 44 et ss. BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 144 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
309
réformes, d’autant plus d’ailleurs que le statu quo ante était insatisfaisant (cf. l’exemple du Cambodge). La seule Puissance apte à entreprendre ou à permettre de tels développements est la Puissance occupante. De plus, pour sortir de la situation d’occupation, il peut être nécessaire de conclure des accords transitoires réalisant quelques compromis. C’est le propre de négociations – souvent très délicates en la matière – qu’elles ne peuvent avoir du succès qu’à condition que chaque partie obtienne quelques satisfactions. En cas contraire, l’accord ne sera pas approuvé au niveau interne de l’Etat occupant, voire même, si l’impression de “concessions traîtresses” est donnée, des troubles violents peuvent éclater au sein de cet Etat. Or ces concessions transitoires peuvent devoir s’écarter quelque peu de la lettre rigide du droit d’occupation, y compris de celle de la Convention IV. L’exemple-type qu’il est possible d’évoquer est celui du processus israélo-palestinien. Tout ce qui précède montre qu’aucune des solutions extrêmes, à savoir la rigidité intégrale (protection des personnes) ou la flexibilité excessive (libertés données à l’occupant ou aux compromis politiques), ne donne entière satisfaction dans les situations complexes d’occupations modernes, souvent prolongées. Pour s’approcher de solutions plus praticables, il convient de s’interroger sur la place précise que les exigences de protection (rigidité) et d’adéquation aux besoins nouveaux (flexibilité) doivent tenir dans le spectre du droit de l’occupation. Il n’est pas impossible de regrouper en quelques catégories topiques des situations qui appellent plus de flexibilité que de rigidité et vice versa, tout en traçant clairement une limite absolue aux besoins de protection. Au-dessus de cette limite incompressible, il pourrait y avoir une délimitation variable des deux exigences, selon les situations diverses où elles opèrent leur pesée. La tâche doit donc être double : (1) définir la limite minimale intransgressible ; (2) chercher à catégoriser les diverses situations typiques où un certain rapport entre rigidité et flexibilité peut se cristalliser. b) Catégories de flexibilité autour de l’article 47 30. Il est une première catégorie de cas où la flexibilité est inhérente aux normes du droit de l’occupation. C’est particulièrement
310
Robert Kolb
visible dans le Règlement de La Haye, calqué sur un modèle interétatique plus que sur la protection d’individus en tant qu’êtres humains. Ainsi, l’article 43 du Règlement (1907), qui est la disposition clé de la section traitant du droit de l’occupation, contient une série de clauses de sauvegarde : l’occupant prendra des mesures en vue de rétablir et d’assurer, autant qu’il est possible, l’ordre et la vie publics… ; il devra respecter, sauf empêchement absolu, les lois en vigueur dans le pays. Les dispositions spécifiques qui suivent ne contiennent pas de telles clauses de sauvegarde. La Convention de Genève IV n’est pas dépourvue de telles clauses. Ainsi, par exemple, l’article 64 prévoit que la législation pénale du territoire occupé demeurera en vigueur, sauf si cette législation constitue une menace pour la sécurité de la Puissance occupante, auquel cas cette dernière pourra l’abroger. Mis à part ces standards contenus dans des dispositions spécifiques, d’autres flexibilités générales sont organisées par la Convention. L’article 47 n’interdit que la dérogation négative, celle tendant à diminuer les droits et les garanties conventionnels, non les accords élargissant ces droits et garanties. De même, si l’on considère que la disposition en question n’est pas tombée en désuétude, l’article 6(3) de la Convention est un véhicule considérable de flexibilité. Une année après la fin générale des opérations militaires, la Convention ne s’applique plus intégralement ; ne demeurent contraignants qu’une série d’articles nommés à l’article 6(3), qui constituent en quelque sorte le noyau dur du standard minimum conventionnel98. Qu’il soit délicat d’argumenter avec l’article 6(3) a déjà été expliqué99. Mais ici il ne s’agit que de montrer que la Convention elle-même, en 1949, prévoyait une série de flexibilités. Et à ce titre, l’article 6(3) est un témoin précieux. 31. Une deuxième catégorie a trait à des cas de flexibilité liés au champ d’application de la Convention. La Convention de Genève n’interdit pas des accords qui mettent fin à l’occupation. Dans un tel cas, la Convention cesse de s’appliquer et la situation est régie par 98 99
Voir infra, § 33. Supra, §§ 17 et ss.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
311
l’accord conclu ainsi que par le droit international général de la paix. Si l’occupation perdure de fait, la situation est délicate, car il peut s’agir d’un contournement de l’article 47. Par exemple, des forces “d’occupation” peuvent rester sur un territoire après l’armistice ou la paix en vertu d’un traité relatif au stationnement de forces militaires étrangères. Un tel accord pourrait tomber sous l’esprit – sinon sous la lettre – de l’article 47. En même temps, si l’accord conclu n’a pas été obtenu par une coercition illicite, il pourra être argumenté que l’accord met fin à l’occupation, de manière à ce que la Convention IV n’est plus applicable ratione materiae100. S’il n’y a pas eu coercition, cet argument est correct. S’il y a eu coercition, l’article 47 pourrait être appelé à fonctionner, en mettant l’accent sur les mots “en aucun cas ni d’aucune manière”, contenus dans son texte. En tout cas, la pratique nous montre des situations où le droit de l’occupation et un accord spécial coexistent. Dans le passé, on a pu appréhender le droit d’occupation comme subsidiaire à l’accord spécial (cf. le cas de la rive gauche du Rhin de 1919)101. De nos jours, à cause des articles 7, 8 et 47 de la Convention de Genève, la solution juridique est celle opposée : l’accord est subsidiaire à la Convention IV. Ceci suppose cependant toujours que l’accord se mesure dans le cadre de la Convention. Si par hypothèse l’accord altère les conditions d’application ratione materiae de la Convention – par exemple en mettant fin à l’occupation – la Convention ne s’applique plus et l’article 47 est, en principe, hors de cause. Le choix juridique à opérer peut ici être délicat, comme en témoigne le traitement du cas du Sierra Leone102 au sein du CICR. En effet, il a fallu s’interroger si le ‘Plan de paix’ conclu par l’ECOMOG et les rebelles locaux organisait une descente de forces internationales selon des modalités du droit de la paix – auquel cas il n’y aurait pas d’occupation – ou s’il s’agissait d’un armistice visant à parvenir par la suite à une paix durable. C’est cette dernière solution qui paraissait s’imposer. Quoi qu’il en soit, ce jeu avec la question préalable de l’applicabilité de la Convention confère également, à sa façon, une
100 101 102
Cf. A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), p. 288. Ibid., pp. 277-278. Supra, § 27, no. (6).
312
Robert Kolb
certaine flexibilité praeter conventio.
aux
parties
concernées,
quasiment
32. Une troisième catégorie concerne notamment les cas d’occupation prolongée. Peut-on imaginer dans ce cas plus de flexibilité, eu égard à la nécessité d’adapter le droit local aux nouveaux besoins ? La conception traditionnelle est que le besoin de protection de la population locale est plus important au début de l’occupation, notamment en période de conflit armé et immédiatement après. Au fil du temps, l’antagonisme des intérêts s’émousserait, ce qui pourrait permettre une gestion plus flexible par la Puissance occupante103. Cette conception ne correspond pas nécessairement à la réalité moderne faite d’occupations prolongées de nature hautement politique plutôt que d’occupations de guerre transitoires, fondées sur la notion de gestion d’affaires. De plus, l’effort de transformer le droit et les structures locales peut rallumer très vivement les conflits d’intérêts entre la Puissance occupante et la population locale. Ce qui précède n’exclut pas une adaptation du droit d’occupation à ces circonstances nouvelles. Dès l’époque de l’adoption des Conventions de Genève, à une époque où prévalait l’approche rigide, le Commentaire à l’article 7 (Convention IV) qui interdit les accords dérogatoires, prévoit que si l’application d’une disposition conventionnelle entraînait, par suite d’un changement profond des circonstances, de graves inconvénients pour les personnes protégées, l’article 7 n’interdirait pas en tout cas un accord dérogatoire. Pour assurer l’intégrité de la Convention il est suggéré que des organismes neutres doivent alors se prononcer104. Sans doute faudra-t-il distinguer en ce cas, (1) entre des réformes servant les seuls intérêts de l’occupant et celles servant les intérêts de la population locale, et (2) entre les dispositions relatives à la “gestion” du territoire occupé et celles comportant des garanties humanitaires minima. Le premier aspect touche à des critères ou catégories de flexibilité et sera discuté ici ; le second touche à la limite minima intransgressible et sera traité sous c). 103 104
Cf. BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 146-148. PICTET (supra, note 13), p. 79.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
313
Comment juger si des réformes s’écartant de la lettre du droit d’occupation servent les intérêts de la population locale, ou du moins servent suffisamment ceux-ci ? La doctrine105 a proposé le seul critère praticable, tant qu’il n’existe pas d’organe international doté de pouvoirs en la matière106. La participation organisée de la population locale, à travers des organes librement élus par elle, serait cruciale pour apprécier la qualité des réformes. L’attitude de la population locale serait dès lors un indicateur essentiel pour juger du bien-fondé d’une flexibilité au regard du droit d’occupation. Cette participation serait par ailleurs un effet du droit d’autodétermination des peuples, reconnu désormais comme faisant partie du droit international général. Bien entendu, il importe que la participation et l’approbation populaire soient réelles et libres, non fictives et contraintes. Le degré de son indépendance réelle doit être mesuré au cas par cas à la lumière des informations disponibles. Un indicateur important est le fait qu’il n’y ait pas de contrôle de l’occupant sur les organes locaux, qu’il y ait opposition d’intérêts et non Gleichschaltung. C’est le cas, par exemple, entre l’Autorité palestinienne et Israël, la première pouvant difficilement être perçue comme à la botte de l’Etat hébreu : elle incarne bien des intérêts différents et en collision avec ceux d’Israël. Un autre aspect qui peut avoir une certaine pertinence est celui de la composition de la population du territoire occupé. S’il s’agit surtout de personnes ayant une solidarité d’intérêts avec l’occupant (mais non sa nationalité), non seulement la flexibilité peut être plus grande, mais le droit d’occupation pourrait ne plus s’appliquer à leur égard, ratione personae. Il faut rappeler à cet égard la jurisprudence du TPIY axée sur le critère de l’allégeance107. Cependant, le droit d’occupation s’appliquera envers les individus sur le territoire occupé qui ne relèvent pas de cette allégeance. Dans ce genre de situations, il y a évidemment souvent le problème supplémentaire que la prédominance très marquée de personnes ayant une solidarité avec l’occupant reposera sur une politique d’épuration ethnique, sur des expulsions, 105 106
107
BENVENISTI (supra, note 3), pp. 146-148, 182 et ss. Les indications de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies sont trop irrégulières et trop dictées par des contingences politiques pour servir de seul critère. Elles peuvent toutefois avoir une valeur indicative. Supra, § 15.
314
Robert Kolb
des transferts ou des massacres de populations. Alors se pose le problème distinct, de droit international général, de ne pas admettre que l’occupant profite de son propre tort. Mais c’est là un problème qui ne touche pas directement à notre question et qui peut être laissé de côté. Comme exemple d’un cas tombant sous les descriptions qui précèdent on peut mentionner Chypre. Enfin, la présence de forces d’une organisation internationale (ou envoyés sur mandat d’une organisation internationale) peut très similairement aboutir soit à flexibiliser l’application des garanties conventionnelles au regard du mandat de la force, soit à tenir la Convention pour formellement inapplicable, ratione materiae108. Dans cette dernière hypothèse, une application par analogie de garanties conventionnelles n’est pas exclue, mais qui dit analogie dit flexibilité. En appliquant ce qui précède aux Accords OLP / Israël, on peut dire que l’OLP est certainement représentative de la population locale (quoiqu’on puisse se demander jusqu’à quel point). Elle exprime la volonté locale de manière relativement autonome, sans Gleichschaltung. L’exprime-t-elle librement? Il est certain que des pressions ont été opérées, lors de négociations, pour trouver des compromis acceptables. Il est difficile de dire si ces pressions ont été excessives, mais il ne semble pas qu’elles aient dépassé la mesure usuelle lors de négociations difficiles et hautement politiques. Il faut cependant tenir compte de la position nette d’infériorité de l’Autorité palestinienne. Eu égard à ce qui précède, et aux nécessités de compromis pour faire avancer la situation, on peut estimer que, vu l’entité des concessions temporaires exigées par les Accords intérimaires, et au regard également qu’il ne s’agit pas d’abandons nouveaux de droits mais d’acceptation temporaire d’un statu quo contraire au droit d’occupation109, ces Accords ne paraissent pas incompatibles avec l’article 47. Il faut cependant insister sur le fait qu’il en serait autrement si ces acceptations cessent d’être temporaires, i.e. inscrites dans un processus de paix. La conclusion qui précède a certes des effets fâcheux en cela qu’elle relativise et brouille le seuil clair de l’article 47, livrant ses contenus à 108 109
Supra, § 12. Supra, § 28. L’aspect le plus problématique est celui des colonies juives.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
315
une géométrie variable. Mais d’un autre côté, la rigidité pure et simple ne répond pas non plus à des situations d’occupation prolongée insérées dans un processus de négociations de paix. c) Le standard minimum intransgressible 33. Les flexibilités dont il a été question ne sauraient évidemment être illimitées. Ce serait abroger de fait l’article 47. On peut noter en premier lieu qu’une flexibilité plus grande sur le volet “La Haye”, plus inter-étatique, que sur le volet “Genève”, plus humanitaire, est imaginable. Au sein du droit de Genève, renforcé par l’article 47, il faut définir les limites minima par rapport à la densité humanitaire des dispositions. Il convient dès lors de définir un noyau dur indérogeable et intransgressible en tout cas. Le point de référence de ce noyau dur pourrait être trouvé dans l’article 6(3) de la Convention IV. Les rédacteurs de la Convention ont eux-mêmes décidé quelles dispositions ils considéraient “plus fondamentales” que les autres. Quand ils insérèrent une disposition stipulant que la Convention cesserait de s’appliquer une année après la fin générale des hostilités alors que l’occupation continuerait de fait, il s’empressèrent d’ajouter que certains articles de la Convention continueraient à régir cette occupation. Par conséquent, ils estimèrent que ces dispositions constituent en quelque sorte le noyau dur d’ordre public de la Convention. Il s’agit des articles 1 à 12, 27, 29 à 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 à 77 et 143. Pour l’occupation, les dispositions pertinentes sont les articles 27, 29 à 34, 47, 49, 51, 52, 53, 59, 61 à 77. A bien regarder, il s’agit d’une sorte de Charte minimale des droits de l’homme : traitement des personnes protégées (art. 27), responsabilité pour ce traitement (art. 29), puissances protectrices (art. 30), interdiction de la contrainte (art. 31), interdiction de sévices corporels (art. 32), interdiction de peines collectives, etc. (art. 33), interdiction de la prise d’otages (art. 34), interdiction de déportations (art. 49), interdiction de l’enrôlement forcé (art. 51), etc. L’article 6(3) permet ainsi de jeter un pont vers le droit des droits de l’homme comme limite minimale. Il convient d’ajouter encore ceci : quand on parle de limite minimale, il ne faut pas conclure qu’il s’agit en tout cas de limites absolues,
316
Robert Kolb
quoiqu’on confonde de plus en plus les deux notions. La limite minimale peut valoir en général mais supporter des écarts ponctuels. Ainsi, l’article 49 de la Convention IV interdit à son paragraphe 1 les transferts forcés et les déportations, quel qu’en soit le motif. Au paragraphe 2, cependant, il est dit qu’une évacuation d’une région déterminée peut être permise, y compris pour d’impérieuses raisons militaires. Dès lors, les flexibilités prévues intra legem doivent toujours être prises en compte. Le caractère de limite minimale interdit d’en ajouter d’autres, praeter legem, et à plus forte raison contra legem. D. Le problème de la responsabilité partagée sur un territoire occupé 34. Eu égard à la situation dans les territoires occupés par Israël, il est utile de rappeler qu’en cas de deux autorités exerçant des pouvoirs sur le même territoire, la Puissance étrangère reste liée par le droit d’occupation dans la mesure où elle continue d’exercer en fait des prérogatives de puissance publique sur le territoire en question (effectivité)110. Divers problèmes supplémentaires peuvent se poser. Ainsi, bien que les autorités représentant la population locale ne soient pas liées par le droit d’occupation, il se pose la question dans quelle mesure la Puissance occupante doit intervenir sous le chef de ses propres responsabilités pour prévenir des violations de ce droit par ces autorités locales111. Le cas de diverses forces “locales” paramilitaires au Liban sous occupation israélienne en 1982 peut faire réfléchir. Il peut être trop de postuler un devoir de supervision générale, qui s’ouvrirait à son tour à des abus. Un tel devoir (ou pouvoir) serait d’ailleurs repoussé par les autorités locales comme une ingérence inadmissible dans les relations qu’elles peuvent avoir avec leurs propres ressortissants. Mais un certain devoir de diligence existe sans doute, d’autant plus grand qu’il s’agit de violations de dispositions humanitaires fondamentales. D’un autre côté, ce devoir est limité par
110 111
Dans le contexte de la situation des territoires occupés par Israël, cf. H.P. GASSER (supra, note 58), pp. 295 et ss. Voir aussi A. ROBERTS (supra, note 3), pp. 285-286.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
317
les possibilités matérielles d’intervention et le danger escompté d’escalades de violence : ad impossibile nemo tenetur.
SYNTHESE 35. Cette étude a tenté de fournir un effort préliminaire de réflexion sur le champ d’application et le degré précis d’applicabilité du droit d’occupation contenu dans les Conventions principales (La Haye, 1907 ; Genève, 1949) aux situations d’occupations modernes, singulières par leur complexité et leur caractère souvent prolongé. Les deux Conventions mentionnées sont différentes dans leur caractère. Le droit de 1907 est calqué sur un modèle libéral et inter-étatique ; il considère l’occupant comme un trustee de l’Etat évincé pendant une courte période de présence. Le droit de 1949 est calqué sur un modèle de droit public avec comme contenu des garanties pour l’individu proches d’un Bill of Rights ; il reconnaît pleinement le conflit aigu d’intérêts entre l’occupant et la population locale. Par leur schéma relativement simple à peine décrit, l’un et l’autre de ces textes ne répondent qu’incomplètement aux situations modernes. Le droit de 1907 est trop fragmentaire, trop flexible et trop inspiré d’un monde du XIXe siècle. Le droit de 1949 est trop rigide et trop axé sur des périodes d’occupation courtes pour répondre à la multiplicité des situations modernes échappant à un tel corset. 36. Le champ d’application du droit d’occupation s’est élargi et, dans le sillage du droit des conflits armés, orienté vers les effectivités plutôt que vers des concepts supposant une qualification juridique. Les conventions reflètent en cela une tendance affirmée dans les faits et qui s’est poursuivie après 1949. Aux termes de la Convention IV de 1949, il suffit qu’une force armée se trouve en territoire étranger sans être couverte par un accord à cet effet (peu importe si cette présence découle d’hostilités ou ne rencontre pas de résistance) pour que le droit d’occupation s’applique. L’occupation de guerre s’est ainsi transformée en occupation tout court. Le terme “à l’étranger” reçoit une interprétation large, ce qui compte étant que les forces militaires d’un Etat (ou d’une autre entité quasi-étatique) s’installent dans un
318
Robert Kolb
territoire hors des frontières internationalement reconnues de cet Etat sans être couvertes par un accord. L’élément de l’accord limite le champ d’application du droit d’occupation. Des accords de stationnement de forces à l’étranger modifient la nature juridique de leur présence, écartant ratione materiae une occupation au sens juridique. Comme la conclusion de certains accords diminuant la portée des garanties conventionnelles est interdite par l’article 47 de la Convention de Genève IV, il y a ici un conflit potentiel important entre l’accord à “l’intérieur du droit d’occupation” tombant sous le coup de l’article 47 et l’accord “à l’extérieur du droit d’occupation” décidant de l’applicabilité de celui-ci ou non. Or on peut glisser facilement d’un de ces types d’accord à l’autre. Le même mouvement d’élargissement du champ d’application du droit d’occupation se vérifie au niveau des personnes protégées, la nationalité formelle ayant été remplacée par un critère d’allégeance ethnique, religieuse, politique ou autre. Cela répond aux situations modernes où des conflits armés internes et internationaux s’interpénètrent. Quant au champ d’application ratione temporis, il couvre en principe l’ensemble de la période d’occupation effective. Mais la Convention de Genève IV contient à son article 6(3) une dérogation à ce principe d’effectivité afin de répondre à certains cas spéciaux d’après-guerre. Il faut désormais s’interroger sur la portée que peut encore avoir cette disposition en relation avec le champ d’application de la Convention. Enfin, les forces militaires d’une organisation internationale – ou les forces envoyées sous le mandat d’une organisation internationale – ne sont pas formellement couvertes par le droit d’occupation, ce qui ne préjuge pas d’une applicabilité par analogie de dispositions de la Convention IV ou du Règlement de 1907, surtout en matière de droits humanitaires. 37. Si l’on applique les critères qui précèdent à nombre de territoires marqués par la présence de forces étrangères, on s’aperçoit que le droit d’occupation est pratiquement toujours112 appelé à s’appliquer, malgré des dénégations de l’occupant. Le statut controversé du territoire ne joue justement aucun rôle. Ainsi, le droit 112
Sauf accord organisant la présence étrangère.
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
319
d’occupation s’applique de jure et non seulement à titre gracieux aux territoires occupés par Israël. Il continue à s’appliquer aussi longtemps que sont de fait exercées des prérogatives publiques sur le territoire étranger, même si le pouvoir est partagé avec des autorités locales. En cas de partage de pouvoirs, l’occupant reste responsable dans la mesure où il a gardé des pouvoirs. L’applicabilité de la Convention de Genève continue également dans le temps, du moins tant que l’article 6(3) n’est pas invoqué. S’il est invoqué, et s’il n’est pas désuet, ne continueront à s’appliquer que les dispositions qu’il mentionne, c’est-à-dire une espèce de noyau dur de droit humanitaire. 38. Suite aux abus commis lors de la seconde guerre mondiale, la Convention de Genève IV a tenté de prévenir toute manœuvre visant ou ayant pour effet de contourner ou de diminuer les garanties que la Convention offre aux civils. A ce but répond la triade des articles 7, 8 et 47. Il s’agit là de dispositions créant un droit impératif conventionnel, une sorte de standard minimum auquel on ne saurait déroger par accord pour soustraire des garanties et auquel on ne peut pas non plus échapper par des actes matériels, comme un changement de gouvernement ou une annexion. L’un des problèmes qui demeurent est que l’article 47 suppose l’applicabilité de la Convention. Or sur ce point, la pratique montre que les occupants cherchent à se soustraire à la Convention en niant son applicabilité. Du point de vue juridique, il n’y a là qu’une allégation qu’on peut réfuter. En pratique, la mise en œuvre des garanties en est profondément affectée, l’article 47 étant demeurant dans une espèce de limbes. 39. Le cas de territoires occupés par Israël met bien en exergue d’autres problèmes liés à l’article 47. Les divers accords intérimaires OLP / Israël ne mettent pas fin à l’occupation. La Convention IV étant applicable, on peut les apprécier à l’aune des exigences de l’article 47. Ces accords ne doivent pas déroger aux garanties que la Convention IV offre aux civils des territoires occupés. Sur trois points au moins, un conflit s’esquisse : (1) sur l’acceptation temporaire des colonies juives, (2) du statut de Jérusalem, (3) des ordonnances militaires israéliennes. Or il se pose la question de la portée exacte de l’article 47. Peut-il s’appliquer en toute rigidité à des situations
320
Robert Kolb
d’occupation prolongée, où les besoins peuvent être de gérer des réalités avec plus de souplesse ? Empêche-t-il toute marge de manœuvre, indispensable pour mener à bon port des négociations souvent extrêmement délicates ? 40. Les réponses à donner quant au spectre précis des exigences de rigidité (protections) et de flexibilité (adaptations) ne peuvent être que de premières approximations, quelque peu insatisfaisantes par leur caractère assez impondérable. C’est d’autant plus vrai que la pratique internationale ne nous livre guère d’enseignements, pas plus que la jurisprudence internationale n’a introduit quelques régularités ou quelques concrétisations sur une question qu’elle n’a simplement pas abordée. La doctrine elle non plus n’analyse pas le problème au-delà de quelques remarques remarquablement superficielles. Il a été suggéré que l’extraordinaire multiplicité des situations d’occupation modernes exige qu’on n’adopte ni une rigidité excessive d’un droit axé sur des prémisses parfois dépassées, ni une flexibilité trop grande susceptible de faire la part trop belle à l’occupant. L’approche doit être double : d’un côté définir des situations ou des catégories (Fallgruppen) où une flexibilisation du droit paraît indiquée ; de l’autre côté, définir une limite minimale au-delà de laquelle la rigiditéprotection prévaut. Pour ce qui est des catégories, ont été évoquées : (1) les flexibilités inhérentes aux normes du droit de l’occupation ; (2) les flexibilités liées au champ d’application de la Convention (accords de “stationnement”) ; (3) les flexibilités dans le cas d’une représentation et d’une acceptation réelles de réformes nécessaires par la population locale, réformes répondant du moins aussi à ses intérêts, et non seulement à ceux de l’occupant. Cela dépend y compris de la structure de la population et de ses allégeances, qui peuvent se présenter de manière très différente. Une certaine marge de manœuvre est à laisser aux représentants de la population locale dans le cadre de négociations visant à mettre fin à l’occupation, car l’expérience prouve que certains compromis seront nécessaires politiquement pour faire avancer la négociation, surtout après des occupations prolongées. Les Accords OLP / Israël ne dépassent probablement pas le tolérable, d’autant plus que les écarts par rapport à la Convention IV concernent des situations consolidées dans le temps et ne touchent qu’à une
Le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé
321
période transitoire. Le point de plus difficile est celui des colonies juives. L’extension de celles-ci est non seulement contraire à la Convention IV, mais également aux Accords intérimaires. Il ne s’agit pas de “dérogation”, mais de “violation” pure et simple. Les flexibilités mentionnées s’arrêtent à un standard minimum intransgressible. Celui-ci est formé par un noyau dur de garanties essentiellement humanitaires d’ordre public. La liste des articles mentionnés dans l’article 6(3) est une bonne indication de ce que les rédacteurs de la Convention considéraient eux-mêmes comme limite minimale intransgressible. Les flexibilités au sein des dispositions mentionnées demeurent toujours réservées. 41. A terme, une révision du droit de l’occupation paraîtrait utile, afin de clarifier plusieurs points de friction issus des situations d’occupation modernes. Certes, la faisabilité politique d’un tel projet peut prêter à des doutes dirimants.
This page intentionally left blank
LA LIBERTE D’ALLER ET VENIR DANS LA SOUS-REGION DU GOLFE DE GUINEE Léopold Donfack Sokeng*
INTRODUCTION Une réflexion sur la liberté d’aller et venir en Afrique, et particulièrement dans la sous-région du golfe de Guinée1 n’est certainement pas dénuée d’intérêt ; d’abord parce que l’analyse du régime de cette liberté apparaît comme un critère pertinent d’évaluation des libertés publiques dans un espace donné ; mais aussi parce qu’elle est révélatrice des logiques d’intégration politique et économique en cours dans cette région2. La libre circulation des *
Docteur en droit, Chargé de cours à l’Université de Douala (Cameroun), ([email protected]).
1
L’expression “sous-région du golfe de Guinée” pose quelques problèmes en raison de son indétermination. Elle ne correspond pas à une institution d’intégration régionale au sens où l’entend généralement la théorie juridique de l’intégration; d’où des difficultés de délimitation du champ géographique de l’étude. Aussi avons nous délibérément choisi d’en retenir une acception restrictive qui le limitera aux seuls Etats situés au fond dudit golfe. Il s’agit principalement du Cameroun, du Gabon, de la Guinée Equatoriale et du Nigeria, Etats directement ouverts sur l’océan Atlantique à partir de ce point. Seront également concernés d’autres États membres de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) et de la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) dont l’essentiel des échanges internationaux se font à partir du golfe de Guinée. Il s’agit notamment du Tchad, du Congo et de la République centrafricaine. Voir à ce sujet CDSR-AC, Rapport de la réunion sous-régionale préparatoire au 3e forum pour le développement de l’Afrique (ADF III), Yaoundé, 2002; également J. MOUANGUE KOBILA et L. DONFACK SOKENG, “La CEMAC: à la recherche d’une nouvelle dynamique de l’intégration en Afrique Centrale”, cet Annuaire 6 (1998), pp. 65-105.
2
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 323-363. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
324
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
personnes n’est-elle pas le nécessaire ferment de tout processus véritable d’intégration régionale ? Le choix de la sous-région du golfe de Guinée comme cadre géographique de la présente étude n’est certes pas innocent, mais il est principalement déterminé par trois facteurs d’une importance heuristique certaine: d’une part, nous sommes dans une zone de forte mobilité de populations culturellement très proches et entretenant des relations multiséculaires par delà les frontières naturelles, ethno-linguistiques, coloniales, et aujourd’hui étatiques, mobilité généralement perçue comme un facteur de tensions entre jeunes Etats en édification, très préoccupés par des questions de délimitation des frontières et de sécurisation de leurs espaces nationaux respectifs; d’autre part, les clivages entre Etats de la sous région – Etats à forte densité démographique contre Etats réceptacles, etc. – génèrent des attitudes divergentes : aux pulsions sécuritaires et à la forte affirmation des nationalismes de certains, s’opposent les logiques économique et expansionniste, voire hégémonique des autres; enfin les Etats concernés ne sont pas régis par les mêmes normes communautaires, d’où l’importance particulière d’une appréhension du régime de la liberté d’aller et venir dans cette sousrégion à travers un prisme kaléidoscopique mettant en relation à la fois le national et l’international, le local, le régional et l’universel. Ce qui n’est guère aisé. Ceci justifie-t-il pour autant le relatif désintérêt de la doctrine locale pour la question ?3 “Droit fondamental” s’il en est, parce que traduction au plan juridique du besoin fondamental, puisqu’instinctif, de mouvement qui habite l’être humain, la liberté d’aller et venir inclut nécessairement la liberté de déplacement, fréquemment appelée liberté de circulation. Pour naturelle qu’elle puisse paraître – la liberté d’aller et venir existerait même avant son appréhension par le droit4 – la 3
4
Nous n’avons répertorié qu’un article en cours de rédaction sur la question concernant la CEMAC, ce malgré des recherches approfondies dans ce sens. L’intérêt des peuples africains pour cette liberté ne fait pourtant pas de doute puisque “la liberté de mouvement et le droit d’asile en Afrique”, et “le problème des expulsions massives en Afrique” sont inscrits au programme des séminaires de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples. Telle est du moins la thèse soutenue par les théoriciens de l’école du droit naturel (l’on se réfèrera à ce propos aux rédacteurs de la Déclaration française des droits de l’homme et du citoyen de 1789, autant qu’à des auteurs tels que Hauriou,
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
325
reconnaissance de cette liberté n’exclut pas pour autant son aménagement par des textes positifs – n’est ce pas justement du fait de cette prise en charge de la liberté par la règle de droit positif que cellelà acquiert force de droit opposable à l’Etat autant qu’aux tiers ? – en vue de lui procurer la protection que confère la règle de droit, assortie des nécessaires restrictions qu’impose la vie en société. C’est que la liberté de l’un peut déranger l’autre, ou perturber l’équilibre d’un Etat, voire d’une région toute entière. Tel est souvent le cas lors des déplacements massifs de populations engendrés par des conflits armés, que ceux-ci soient internes ou inter-étatiques. Ainsi envisagée, la liberté d’aller et venir comporte deux versants concrètement distincts parce que très différents : l’intra-étatique et l’inter-étatique. La circulation intra-étatique est celle qui a pour cadre l’Etat. Elle se déploie à l’intérieur de celui-ci et peut s’étendre au point d’inclure la possibilité d’en sortir5. Son appréhension renvoie à l’étude des libertés publiques dans l’Etat, met en cause un faisceau de lois et réglementations, et ne retiendra notre attention que dans la mesure où elle est en corrélation avec l’international, ou, pour être plus conforme à notre champ d’étude, le régional. La circulation inter-étatique, quant à elle, concerne deux ou plusieurs Etats et soulève de fait des difficultés juridiques et politiques particulières, beaucoup plus ardues. Elle met en jeu les relations entre Etats6 – voisins ou non – ainsi que des échanges de populations, plus ou moins pacifiques, auxquels peuvent s’attacher des statuts divers
5
6
Geny, etc. ; ce que réfute évidemment les défenseurs de l’école positiviste (Kelsen, Carré de Malberg, Eisenmann, etc.) pour lesquels il ne saurait y avoir de droits antérieurs et en dehors de l’Etat. La controverse doctrinale demeure actuelle; elle oppose de nos jours les partisans de la supra-constitutionnalité de certains principes et droits fondamentaux à l’image de Stéphane Rials, au courant néo-positiviste dont l’un des plus fervents représentants est certainement Michel Troper. Lire à ce propos J. MOURGEON, Commentaire de l’article 2 du Protocole n°4, in L.-E. PETITTI, E. DECAUX, P.-H. IMBERT (dir.), La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Commentaire article par article, Economica, Paris, 1995, pp. 1045-1046. Les relations entre Etats de la sous région du golfe de Guinée nous intéresseront particulièrement. Cependant, nous entendons tirer partie des enseignements dégagés des décisions de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples sur la question, même si celles-ci ne visent pas directement ces Etats.
326
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
dans les pays d’accueil : touristes, travailleurs, réfugiés, apatrides, voyageurs en transit, étrangers étudiants, étrangers en situation irrégulière ou “sans papiers”, etc. On comprend dès lors que son régime juridique ait pu entrer dans le droit international. Demeure alors la question du caractère fondamental de la liberté d’aller et venir. S’agit-il d’un droit fondamental comme l’admet un peu trop rapidement la théorie dominante des droits de l’homme ?7 Si tel est bien le cas, comment justifier théoriquement et pratiquement ce caractère fondamental et partant, la suprématie de ce droit dans l’ordre juridique interne et international ? Sommes-nous en présence d’un droit fondamental absolu, intangible ? Sinon quelles en sont les limites ? Si oui, comment le concilier avec les exigences de sécurité nécessaires à préservation de tout Etat ?8 A l’évidence, la “sacrosainte” liberté individuelle se heurte ici à la non moins “sainte” souveraineté étatique. D’où les restrictions imposées par les Etats dans l’encadrement juridique de la liberté de circulation ; sécurité, ordre public et respect des droits d’autrui obligent ! Autant dire, à la lecture de la “charte internationale des droits de l’homme”9, que nous sommes en présence d’un droit certes fondamental de la personne humaine, mais d’une “fondamentalité” toute relative ou tangible, au regard de l’étendue des pouvoirs de l’Etat en matière de contrôle des frontières, de limitation des entrées sur son territoire et par voie de corollaire, des restrictions apportées au droit d’immigration et d’établissement des individus au-delà des frontières de l’Etat dont ils sont nationaux. Quid des fondements théoriques de cette liberté d’aller et venir ?
7
8
9
A. HEYMANN-DOAT, Libertés publiques et droits de l’homme, LGDJ, Collection Systèmes, 1994 ; J. RIVERO, Libertés publiques, tome 2, PUF, Paris, 1990 ; J. ROBERT et J. DUFFAR, Droits de l’homme et libertés fondamentales, Paris, Montchrestien, 1996. A. GARAPON, Commentaire de l’article 28 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme in “Les droits de l’homme. Une déclaration universelle à défendre”, Le Monde, Cahier spécial, 1998, p. 57. C. CHANET, “De la déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme à la charte universelle des droits de l’homme”, in La déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme. Avenir d’un idéal commun : 1948-1998, Colloque international de la Sorbonne des 12, 13 et 14 septembre 1998.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
327
Si en droit interne, l’on admet volontiers, sur la base des théories du contrat social, que l’homme est dans la société à la fondation de laquelle il participe en tant qu’élément du souverain et peut exiger des autorités déléguées au gouvernement de ladite société le respect de son droit fondamental en qualité de citoyen, de national, exigence quérable devant le juge10, la question se complexifie dans l’ordre international11. Comment en effet fonder le droit de libre circulation de l’individu en dehors de l’Etat dont il est national, et notamment dans la société internationale, domaine de prédilection de l’inter-étatisme12, autrement dit, de manifestation des souverainetés étatiques ?13 Ce droit peut-il trouver sa justification dans l’exigence nouvelle de mondialisation ?14 Bien que le phénomène lui soit antérieur, c’est bien en cette ère de mondialisation tous azimuts que la majorité des Etats, y compris ceux présentés comme “libéraux”, renforcent leur législation sur le contrôle de la circulation des personnes et la répression de l’immigration clandestine par des lois dites “anti-immigration” : aux Etats-Unis par exemple, les “réfugiés économiques” cubains, haïtiens, mexicains et autres sont parqués dans des zones dites de transit et refoulés par centaines. Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 ont quant à eux légitimé un renforcement du filtrage des entrées et un contrôle très restrictif de la libre circulation des étrangers dans ce pays. L’Europe de Schengen en fait autant : renforcement des contrôles et développement de la coopération en matière d’immigration y sont à
10
11
12 13
14
J. MOURGEON, Commentaire de l’article 2 du Protocole n°4, in L.-E. PETITTI, E. DECAUX, P.-H. IMBERT (dir.), La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Commentaire article par article, Economica, Paris, 1995, pp. 1043-1051 ; J. MORANGE, Les droits de l’homme, PUF, 1998 ; J. ROBERT et J. DUFFAR, op. cit. M. FLORY et R. HIGGINS (dir.), La liberté de circulation des personnes en droit international, Economica, Paris, 1988 ; C. LEBEN, “La liberté de circulation des personnes et le droit international”, Annales de la faculté de droit de Clermont-Ferrand, LGDJ, Paris, 1978. S. SUR, Relations internationales, Paris, Montchrestien, 1994 NGUYEN QUOC DINH et al., Droit International Public, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1999 ; P. REUTER et J. COMBACAU, Droit International Public, Montchrestien, Paris, 1985. Ph. MOREAU-DESFARGES, La Mondialisation, PUF, Que sais-je ?, 1998 ; M. DELMAS-MARTY, Trois défis pour un droit mondial, Paris, SEUIL, 1998.
328
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
l’ordre du jour, et il n’est pas jusqu’au droit d’asile qui ne soit menacé15. Le fondement recherché peut-il être d’ordre économique ? Auquel cas la liberté d’aller et venir serait le nécessaire pendant de la libre circulation des biens et services dont l’Organisation mondiale du commerce (OMC) se fait le chantre. L’on objectera de ce point de vue que les biens peuvent circuler sans les hommes et vice-versa16, et que les deux n’ont pas toujours été liés. Il n’est par conséquent pas question pour les pays développés, pourtant prompts à exiger l’élimination des barrières douanières ou tarifaires, de servir de terre d’asile à tous les “miséreux”17 malgré la prolifération des discours moralisateurs sur l’universalité des droits de l’homme et l’égale dignité de tous les êtres humains. Ce fondement ne pourrait-il résider dans l’institutionnalisation croissante de la société internationale ? Cette piste est à envisager avec sérieux, et la référence à Vitoria, Suarez et Grotius posant les bases d’une “communauté universelle du genre humain” ainsi que d’un jus gentium fondés sur le droit naturel et au service d’un citoyen libre de se mouvoir au-delà de la sphère étatique est extrêmement précieuse d’un point de vue théorique18. Nul mieux que Vitoria n’a en effet proposé meilleure justification du droit naturel de l’homme à la libre circulation, fondée sur la théorie de l’indivision : la terre appartient à tous les hommes et leur est 15
16 17
18
A ce propos, Danièle Lochak opine très justement “qu’en dépit de la valeur éminente qui lui est reconnue, le droit d’asile paraît aujourd’hui comme de plus en plus menacé. En effet, dans un contexte de “maîtrise des flux migratoires”, les Etats occidentaux multiplient les obstacles à l’accès des réfugiés à leur territoire et se montrent de plus en plus restrictifs dans la reconnaissance de la qualité de réfugiés” in Commentaire de l’article 14 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, Le Monde, Cahier spécial “Les droits de l’homme, une déclaration universelle à défendre”, 1998, p. 34. Cf. Commission Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, décision du 6 mai 1985, Requête 10653/83, DR, 42 : 224. Sur la question, lire entre autres J.-C. BARREAU, De l’immigration en général et de la de la nation française en particulier, Paris, Le pré aux clercs, 1992 ; également P. BERNARD, L’immigration, Paris, Le Monde éditions, 1993; DEWITTER (dir.), Immigration et Intégration, l’état des savoirs, Paris, La découverte, 1999. Pour une présentation de la pensée de ces auteurs, se rapporter à l’ouvrage de S. HUNTZINGER, Introduction aux relations internationales, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1987.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
329
commune ; puisqu’il y a indivision naturelle de la communauté humaine, il y a également indivision matérielle de la planète ; les Etats peuvent diviser la terre par les frontières et les conquêtes, ces divisions secondes et artificielles n’empêchent pas que la communauté primitive demeure. Vitoria en tire pour conséquence principale le jus communicationis, qui est le droit naturel des individus d’aller et venir partout où bon leur semble. Ce qui équivaut à fonder une conception du droit naturel de l’homme à aller et venir supérieure aux prérogatives des Etats : “jamais plus ce paradigme ne sera affirmé de façon aussi absolue”, souligne Huntzinger19. On opinera toutefois qu’en pratique et dans les faits, la société internationale est une société d’Etats et que chaque Etat dispose en principe du droit de légiférer souverainement sur ses titres de compétences, au premier chef desquels se trouvent la sécurisation des frontières et le contrôle des entrées et sorties du territoire. Toujours est-il que ce postulat du droit international classique est de plus en plus contesté, tant par la jurisprudence internationale20, que par les institutions et organisations de nature diverses21, suscitées par la société internationale. L’une des conséquences de ce phénomène nouveau est l’implication progressive, à la fois concurrentielle et complémentaire, d’un nouveau droit international beaucoup plus centré sur l’être humain, émanant pour l’essentiel de ces institutions et non d’une volonté étatique directe, dans la gestion de la liberté d’aller et venir jusqu’à lors considérée comme relevant du domaine réservé des Etats. Il demeure que l’on pourra toujours s’interroger sur les sanctions qu’encourt l’Etat qui enfreint la liberté d’aller et venir, et
19 20
21
S. HUNTZINGER, op. cit., pp. 29-30. Voir à titre d’exemple CIJ, arrêt du 27 août 1952, Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Maroc, C.I.J. Rec., 1952. Voir également la jurisprudence de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, sur laquelle nous reviendrons, infra. En effet, de nombreuses institutions internationales (à l’instar de l’ONU, de l’OIT, du HCR) et Organisations régionales ou sous-régionales telles que l’Union Européenne, la CEDEAO (Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest), la CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale), la CEEAC (Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale), etc. mettent en place des normes conventionnelles visant à régir cette dimension des relations internationales.
330
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
plus spécifiquement le “droit d’immigration”22. L’on peut tout autant se demander quelles sont les limites légitimes au pouvoir de l’Etat dans l’exercice de telles prérogatives23. De même pourrait-on, au regard de la précarité de la garantie des droits des populations immigrées dans certains Etats, contester la pertinence, au plan juridique, de l’idée de “droits inhérents à la nature humaine” et applicables indépendamment du lien de nationalité24. La thèse contraire ne peut être que prospective et spéculative: elle consisterait alors en un appel à l’encadrement juridique de la raison d’Etat sur la base des textes universels ou régionaux pertinents fondant l’existence de la “société démocratique” préfigurée dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme de 1948 ; autrement dit, dans le devoir qui incombe à la société internationale de “raisonner la raison d’Etat” en la confrontant à la “raison juridique et démocratique”25. Nolens volens, l’idée de soumettre la liberté d’aller et venir ou liberté de circulation des personnes à des règles n'émanant pas exclusivement de l’Etat a été exprimée il y a plus d’un demi-siècle, notamment dans la Déclaration universelle de 1948 en son article 13 consacrant le droit pour toute personne de circuler librement et de choisir sa résidence à l’intérieur d’un Etat d’une part, de quitter tout pays, y compris le sien, et de revenir dans son pays d’autre part. L’intérêt croissant du droit international pour cette liberté a du reste été manifesté dans plusieurs conventions à caractère universel ou régional, autant que dans plusieurs accords bilatéraux, comme le démontrera l’analyse des nombreuses dispositions pertinentes à cet effet ; l’enjeu majeur demeurant l’effectivité de ces normes. C’est donc par rapport à un ensemble de textes de nature et de portée très différentes qu’il convient de préciser les fondements normatifs, la signification, l’étendue et les limites, les modalités d’application et les 22
23 24 25
L’expression est utilisée par B. GENEVOIS dans un commentaire de l’article 13 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme paru dans Le Monde, “Les droits de l’homme, une déclaration universelle à défendre”, Cahier spécial, Décembre 1998, p. 31. Se reporter à ce propos à M. DELMAS-MARTY, in Le Monde, “Les droits de l’homme, une déclaration universelle à défendre”, Cahier spécial, op. cit., p. 60. Cf. X. VANDENDRIESSCHE, Le droit des étrangers, Paris, Dalloz, collection Connaissance du Droit, 2001, pp. 6-7. Cf. M. DELMAS-MARTY, op. cit., p. 60.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
331
implications de la liberté d’aller et venir dans le golfe de Guinée. Il importe en effet de circonscrire concrètement les termes de l’aménagement de la liberté de circulation entre les Etats de cet espace en tenant bon compte de la nécessité de concilier ce droit fondamental avec le besoin régalien de sécurisation des frontières et de la citoyenneté26, besoin particulièrement mis en exergue par certains Etats. C’est que ces derniers27 sont motivés par des préoccupations très différentes, et ont par rapport à la question de la libre circulation des personnes, des intérêts parfois antagonistes. Ce qui n’est pas sans conséquence quant à la définition d’une politique communautaire en la matière ; ce d’autant plus qu’ils n’appartiennent pas toujours aux mêmes institutions d’intégration sous-régionales28. Si en effet, comme on l’a si souvent souligné, tout Etat est d’abord rêve de stabilisation, de sédentarisation des populations dans un espace territorial contrôlé29, les mouvements transfrontaliers d’individus et de groupes ne peuvent qu’être une source potentielle de problèmes pour les gouvernements concernés. Une double interrogation interpelle dès lors le juriste : - comment concilier d’une part la liberté de circulation et le besoin régalien de sécurisation des frontières et de la citoyenneté ? - comment concilier d’autre part la logique d’intégration régionale en cours dans le golfe de Guinée et les velléités hégémoniques, sécuritaires et/ou autarciques des souverainetés orgueilleuses dans la région ? Il s’agit d’un double défi lancé à la théorie juridique de l’intégration régionale en Afrique – mais l’on pourrait en dire autant des autres régions du monde – l’une des questions sous-jacentes étant de dégager la signification concrète de la notion de frontière dans un
26 27 28
29
Voir sur la question les très intéressantes analyses de Bertrand BADIE dans son ouvrage La fin des territoires (Paris, Fayard, 1995). Il s’agit principalement du Cameroun, du Congo, du Gabon, de la Guinée Equatoriale et du Nigeria. Certains Etats sont membres de la CEMAC et de la CEEAC : c’est le cas du Cameroun, du Gabon, de la Guinée équatoriale, du Congo-Brazzaville, du Tchad et de la République centrafricaine; le Nigeria quant à lui appartient à la CEDEAO. Lire à ce propos B. BADIE, La fin des territoires, op. cit.
332
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
contexte d’intégration à la fois économique et politique30, ainsi que les implications de celle-ci en termes de redéfinition des droits fondamentaux des “étrangers”31. Le problème de fond que pose donc l’aménagement de la liberté d’aller et venir dans le golfe de Guinée est bien celui de la conciliation de la liberté de mouvement et de circulation, droit fondamental “tangible”, avec les exigences de souveraineté et de sécurité des Etats dans un contexte d’intégration régionale, mais également d’accélération des échanges et de libre circulation des capitaux, des biens et des services, de circulation croissante des populations, caractéristique du processus de mondialisation. La liberté est confrontée à l’ordre ; le droit en tant qu’instrument de régulation des rapports intra et inter étatiques, se doit de rendre compte de cette logique duale tout en négociant des compromis qui permettent l’exercice de l’une sans enfreindre l’autre. De l’analyse des textes pertinents relatifs à la liberté d’aller et venir dans le golfe de Guinée et de leur confrontation avec la pratique des différents acteurs de cet espace, il transparaît manifestement que le principe fondamental de libre circulation des personnes, bien que clairement affirmé dans sa double dimension intra- et inter-étatique, connaît des fortunes diverses d’un point à l’autre de la sous-région. Sa mise en œuvre n’en est rendue que plus difficile, parce que variant au gré des intérêts de chaque Etat. D’où l’ineffectivité de certains principes proclamés du fait des difficultés d’application des règles qui en découlent ; et corrélativement, le développement de stratégies plurielles de contournement des normes positives parfois trop rigides, mais également la fragilisation subséquente des droits fondamentaux personnes, et particulièrement des populations immigrées. C’est pourquoi il convient de souligner, en définitive, que si la liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du golfe de Guinée est un principe d’affirmation ferme parce que constante dans les textes juridiques, elle connaît toutefois une mise en œuvre variable et parfois contrastée, voire problématique. 30
31
Sur cette question, consulter l’ouvrage au titre évocateur de B. BADIE et M.-C. SMOUTS, L’international sans territoires, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1996 ; aussi B. BADIE, La fin des territoires, op. cit. H. JULIEN-LAFERRIERE, Droits des étrangers, Paris, PUF, collection Droits Fondamentaux, 2000.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
333
UN PRINCIPE FERMEMENT AFFIRME La liberté d’aller et venir, quoique participant du besoin fondamental de mouvement inhérent à la nature humaine32, ne peut être effective au plan juridique que si elle est consacrée par des normes opposables à tous, et notamment aux Etats. Cette assertion estelle vérifiée dans le contexte du golfe de Guinée ? Autrement dit, comment, très concrètement, est juridiquement garantie cette liberté dans cette région ? S’agit-il d’un droit consacré au niveau international – universel, régional ou bilatéral – ou essentiellement limité à l’échelle des Etats ? C’est la question des bases juridiques de la liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région qui est ainsi posée. La réponse n’est guère aisée; cependant, on peut relever que c’est en référence à une pluralité de textes de nature et de portée très différentes qu’il convient d’apprécier les bases juridiques de cette liberté. De cette consécration plurielle, transparaît la constance de l’affirmation de principe de la libre circulation des personnes dans le Golfe de Guinée (A). Demeure à clarifier dès lors la consistance du dit principe (B). A. La constance de l’affirmation La constance de l’affirmation de la liberté d’aller et venir est d’abord manifestée par l’attachement solennel de l’ensemble des Etats concernés à l’idéal universel de libre circulation des personnes. Elle est réitérée par l’adhésion à des textes et principes consacrés à l’échelle tant régionale que sous-régionale. On la retrouve encore dans des accords bilatéraux conclus entre Etats de la sous-région. Enfin, elle est très présente dans les différentes proclamations solennelles de droits et libertés contenues dans les constitutions de ces Etats 32
Lire à ce sujet, J. MOURGEON, Les droits de l’homme, PUF, Que sais-je ? n°1728, Paris, 1996 ; également du même auteur, “Commentaire de l’article 2 du Protocole n°4, in L.E. PETITTI, E. DECAUX, P.-H. IMBERT (dir.), La convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Commentaire article par article, Economica, Paris, 1995, pp. 1043-1051.
334
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
respectifs33, lieu de consécration par excellence des droits fondamentaux. Autant dire que l’universel (1), le régional (2) et le local (3) sont des lieux successifs de rappel de l’attachement des peuples et des Etats du golfe de Guinée au principe de la liberté d’aller et venir. 1. L’universel Au nombre des 30 articles constitutifs de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, figure l’article 13 relatif à la liberté d’aller et venir qui stipule que : “1. 2.
Toute personne a le droit de circuler librement et de choisir sa résidence à l’intérieur d’un Etat. Toute personne a le droit de quitter tout pays, y compris le sien, et de revenir dans son pays”.
On n’a souvent retenu de cet article 13 que la dimension intraétatique de la liberté d’aller et venir. Pourtant il constitue une traduction, certes imparfaite bien qu’audacieuse, de la liberté de circulation internationale34. En effet, l’expression “toute personne” figurant dans cet article est suffisamment générique pour inclure aussi bien les nationaux que les étrangers “légalement admis sur le territoire” et situe la protection internationale de cette liberté au-delà de la seule sphère intra-étatique. Mais en dépit de ce rattachement aux droits de la personne en général, la Déclaration universelle, comme en convenait avec regret René Cassin, “ne consacre pas totalement le principe de la libre circulation de pays à pays, puisqu’elle ne dit rien du droit d’immigration symétrique de celui d’émigration, ni du libre établissement en dehors du cercle d’un Etat déterminé”35. Tous les Etats du golfe de Guinée affirment leur adhésion à ce texte solennel, notamment à travers des références constitutionnelles explicites à la 33
34 35
Pour un aperçu des textes constitutionnels de ces Etats, voir J. DE GAUDUSSON, G. CONAC et C. DESOUCHES, Les constitutions africaines publiées en langue française, Bruxelles, Bruylant / La documentation française, 2 tomes, 1998. Lire B. GENEVOIS, commentaire de l’article 13 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, in Le Monde, Cahier spécial, op. cit., p. 31. Cité par B. GENEVOIS, op. cit., p. 31.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
335
Déclaration universelle de 1948 et aux dispositions pertinentes dans le système des Nations Unies en matière de droits de l’homme. L’intérêt du droit international et de la communauté universelle pour la liberté et plus particulièrement la liberté de circulation n’a cessé de croître depuis 194836. En témoignent les nombreuses conventions à caractère universel s’y référant à un titre ou à un autre. Il en va ainsi notamment : - des articles 12 et 13 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques complétant et positivant la Déclaration universelle, articles se rapportant respectivement à la liberté d’aller et venir à proprement parler et aux garanties relatives à l’expulsion des étrangers ; - de l’article 5 d) i) et ii) de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale du 22 Décembre 1965 ; - de la convention des Nations Unies de 1951 relative au statut des réfugiés et son protocole additionnel de 1967 ; - de la convention n°111 de l’O.I.T. concernant la discrimination en matière d’emploi et de profession ; - des conventions n°97 et n°143 de l’O.I.T. sur la protection des travailleurs immigrés ; - de la convention internationale de 1990 sur la protection des droits des travailleurs immigrés et des membres de leurs familles; - et, texte d’adoption beaucoup plus récente, de la convention n°169 de l’OIT sur les peuples indigènes et tribaux. Certes ces textes, notamment ceux de l’OIT, n’ont pas tous fait l’objet de ratification et d’engagement conventionnel de la part de l’ensemble des Etats de la région37. Mais ils constituent la référence juridique universelle censée orienter leurs politiques nationales, 36
37
Pour une évaluation des progrès réalisés en matière de conquête des libertés depuis l’adoption le 10 décembre 1948 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, se reporter à R. BADINTER, “L’horizon moral de notre temps”, Introduction au cahier spécial du Monde consacré au commentaire article par article de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme intitulé “Les droits de l’homme, une déclaration à défendre”, Le Monde, Cahier spécial, op.cit., pp. 3-4 ; également M. BETTATI, “Rapport général” du colloque international des 14, 15, et 16 décembre 1998 sur La Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme : avenir d’un idéal commun. 1948-1998, La Sorbonne, 1998. On sait par exemple que la convention n°169 sus-citée n’a encore été ratifiée par aucun des Etats concernés par notre étude.
336
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
communautaires ou régionales, en application des principes formulés dans les articles 1 et 2 de la Charte des Nations Unies et rappelés par la résolution 2625 (XXV) du 24 Octobre 1970 sur la “Déclaration relative aux principes du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les Etats”. Conscients de la nécessité de traduire en des termes encore plus concrets leur attachement à cet idéal de liberté et de fraternité, les Etats du golfe de Guinée ont tous adhéré à des conventions régionales consacrant la liberté d’aller et venir. 2. Le régional Les Etats de la région du golfe de Guinée sont parties à des conventions régionales et sous-régionales rappelant, entre autres matières, le principe de la liberté de circulation des personnes en général, ou certains aspects particuliers de cette liberté. A l’échelle du continent africain, on relève en premier lieu l’article 12 de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, texte adopté le 26 juin 1981 à Banjul (Gambie) et ratifié par l’ensemble des Etats du golfe de Guinée38. L’importance de cet article et l’originalité de la formulation méritent le détour d’une citation, eu égard à la pluralité des droits consacrés, en relation avec la liberté d’aller et venir : “1.
2.
38
Toute personne a le droit de circuler librement et de choisir sa résidence à l’intérieur d’un Etat, sous réserve de se conformer aux règles édictées par la loi. Toute personne a le droit de quitter tout pays, y compris le sien, et de revenir dans son pays. Ce droit ne peut faire l’objet de restrictions que si celles-ci sont prévues par la loi, nécessaires pour protéger la sécurité nationale, l’ordre public, la santé ou la moralité publiques
Pour une analyse profonde de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, lire F. OUGUERGOUZ, La Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, une approche juridique des droits de l’homme entre tradition et modernité, Paris, PUF, 1993 ; également K. MBAYE, Les droits de l’homme en Afrique, Paris, Pedone, 1992.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée 3.
4.
5.
337
Toute personne a le droit, en cas de persécution, de rechercher et recevoir asile en territoire étranger, conformément à la loi de chaque pays et aux conventions internationales. L’étranger légalement admis sur le territoire d’un Etat partie à la présente charte ne pourra en être expulsé qu’en vertu d’une décision conforme à la loi. L’expulsion collective d’étrangers est interdite. L’expulsion collective est celle qui vise globalement des groupes nationaux, raciaux, ethniques ou religieux”.
Sont ainsi condensés dans cet article 12 la liberté d’aller et venir à l’intérieur de l’Etat et le droit d’établissement, le droit d’émigration et le droit de chercher asile “conformément à la loi de chaque pays et aux conventions internationales”, ainsi que les garanties procédurales relatives à l’expulsion des étrangers. La proscription de l’expulsion collective des étrangers semble revêtir ici une force péremptoire – bien que sa définition ne soit pas un modèle de précision – dès lors qu’elle n’admet aucune restriction. Il s’agit là, non point d’une intention pieuse, mais d’une garantie essentielle des droits fondamentaux des populations immigrées dont on appréciera l’importance dans un contexte régional marqué par la montée des pulsions identitaires39 et des manifestations de xénophobie qui rythment le processus de démocratisation du continent. La “jurisprudence” de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples est à ce propos non équivoque, si l’on se réfère notamment aux affaires Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda40, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia41 et Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de 39
40
41
On consultera à ce propos, P. YENGO, Identité et Démocratie en Afrique et ailleurs, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997 ; également R. WERBNER, T. RANGER, Postcolonial identities in africa, 2nd ed. Books Limited, London and New Jersey, 1996. African Commission of Human & Peoples’ Rights, Communications n°27/89, 46/91, 49/91 and 99/93, 20th Ordinary Session, October 1996, Grand Bay (Mauritius). African Commission of Human & Peoples’ Rights, Communication n°71/92 (not dated), 20th Ordinary Session, October 1996, Grand Bay (Mauritius).
338
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
l’Homme, Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme au Sénégal and Association Malienne des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola42. Pour la Commission en effet, “the drafters of the Charter believed that mass expulsions presented a special threat to human rights”43 ; c’est que, argumente-t-elle en réponse à un Etat arguant son droit légitime à réprimer l’immigration clandestine, “The Commission does not wish to call into question nor is it calling into question the right of any State to take legal action against illegal immigrants and deport them to their country of origin, if the competent courts so decide. It is however of the view that it is unacceptable to deport individuals without giving them the possibility to plead their case before the competent national courts as this is contrary to the spirit and letter of the charter and international law.”44
Par cette proclamation de l’article 12 de la Charte de 1981, l’Afrique semble se hisser au niveau du droit régional commun en cette occurrence, puisque l’on retrouve des dispositions similaires respectivement aux articles 2 et 3 du Protocole n°4 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme45, et 22 de la Convention américaine relative aux droits de l’homme de 1969. L’on relèvera tout de même que le texte africain se singularise par la précision et l’exhaustivité de son énoncé. De même n’y retrouve-t-on pas la référence à la “société démocratique” qui limite les restrictions légales à cette liberté dans les textes européen et américain. Cette disposition protectrice de la liberté d’aller et venir reprend et conforte dans le 42 43 44 45
African Commission of Human & Peoples’ Rights, Communication n°159/96, Novembre 1997. Affaire Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, préc. Affaire Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, préc. Voir D. LOCHAK, Commentaire des articles 3 et 4 du Protocole n°4 in L.E. PETITTI, E. DECAUX, P.-H. IMBERT (dir.), op. cit., 1995, pp. 10531059 ; également G. COHEN-JONATHAN, Aspects européens des droits fondamentaux, Paris, Montchrestien, 1996 ; du même auteur, “Les rapports entre la convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le pacte des Nations Unies sur les droits civils et politiques” in Régionalisme et universalisme dans le droit international contemporain, Paris, Pedone, 1977.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
339
contexte africain la convention de l’OUA du 10 septembre 1969 régissant certains aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés dans ce continent. Ce qui souligne une fois de plus l’importance accordée à la question par les peuples africains, eu égard à la prolifération des conflits sur le continent. Au plan sous-régional, plusieurs conventions réaffirment de manière plus ou moins solennelle l’attachement des Etats de la sousrégion du golfe de Guinée au principe de la libre circulation des personnes. Référence peut ainsi être faite au traité constitutif de l’Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) signé à Brazzaville le 8 Décembre 1964, en son article 27 : “L’Union constitue un seul territoire douanier à l’intérieur duquel la circulation des personnes, marchandises, biens, services, et capitaux est libre”. En vue de la concrétisation de cette disposition, les Etats membres de l’UDEAC ont adopté le 22 Décembre 1972 à Brazzaville une convention commune sur la libre circulation des personnes et le droit d’établissement. À la suite du traité du 16 Mars 1994 instituant la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) en lieu et place de l’UDEAC, la convention du 5 juillet 1996 régissant l’Union Economique d’Afrique Centrale réaffirme le même principe. On le retrouve également inscrit à l’article 40 du traité constitutif de la Communauté Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) signé le 18 Octobre 1983 à Libreville, de même que dans les accords relatifs à la création de la Commission du Golfe de Guinée, auxquels est partie la République Fédérale du Nigeria, pays non membre des organisations sous-régionales d’Afrique centrale précédemment citées. 3. Le local Le caractère local46 de la proclamation de la liberté d’aller et venir se manifeste, soit par des accords bilatéraux conclus en principe par les Etats partageant des frontières communes, soit par la manifestation 46
Par local, on entend normalement le niveau national; cette acception n’est cependant pas retenue dans le cadre de cette étude, compte tenu de l’importance spécifique des mouvements de populations le long des frontières et de la vie communautaire transfrontalières.
340
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
d’une volonté unilatérale et souveraine, notamment dans le cadre des déclarations constitutionnelles des droits et des libertés de l’homme. En ce qui concerne la coopération bilatérale, on pourrait se référer à titre illustratif à l’accord conclu entre la République fédérale du Cameroun et la République fédérale du Nigeria, accord signé à Yaoundé le 6 février 1963 et dont l’article 7 dispose que : “les parties contractantes négocient des protocoles relatifs à des problèmes particuliers tels que : a) les affaires économiques, financières, douanières; b) les échanges frontaliers ; c) la libre circulation des personnes et des biens ; d) les affaires culturelles et techniques ; e) le droit d’établissement ; f) l’assistance et la convention en matière juridictionnelle”.
C’est en application de cet accord qu’un protocole a été négocié et conclu entre ces deux pays, qui permet à leurs populations respectives de circuler de part et d’autre des frontières sans formalité de visa d’entrée ou de sortie, nonobstant le différend frontalier qui oppose ces Etats et l’état de belligérance observé à certains points de leurs frontières47. La question de la libre circulation des personnes fait l’objet de protocoles d’accord dans le cadre des différentes commissions mixtes entre Etats de la sous-région du golfe de Guinée. Le caractère unilatéral de l’affirmation de la liberté d’aller et venir par les Etats du golfe de Guinée est symbolisé par la proclamation constitutionnelle de cette liberté dans la totalité des constitutions des Etats de la sous-région. Il en est ainsi notamment du préambule de la constitution camerounaise de 1996, de la constitution gabonaise de 1991, de la constitution congolaise de 2002, de la constitution nigériane de 1999, de la constitution centrafricaine de 1994 ou de celle du Tchad de 1996. Force est donc de constater la constance de la 47
Un important différend frontalier oppose en effet le Cameroun au Nigeria à propos de la presqu’île de Bakassi et plus généralement de la délimitation de leur frontière du Lac Tchad au large de l’océan Atlantique dans le golfe de Guinée. Le litige a été porté à la connaissance de la Cour Internationale de Justice en 1996, juridiction qui a rendu sur la question un arrêt définitif le 10 octobre 2002. (Voir http:// www.icj-cij.org).
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
341
proclamation de la liberté d’aller et venir par les Etats de la sousrégion du golfe de Guinée. Elle est adhésion à un idéal universel certes, mais également manifestation d’une volonté d’intégration des peuples et des Etats tant à l’échelle continentale que sous-régionale. Reste alors à dégager la consistance de cette affirmation. B. La consistance de la proclamation La multiplicité et l’enchevêtrement des sources juridiques fondant la liberté d’aller et venir, autant que la diversité des situations étatiques dans la sous-région du golfe de Guinée, suggèrent que soit précisée la signification réelle de l’engagement pris par les Etats en vue du respect de ce “droit personnel” que René Cassin distinguait des droits se rattachant aux “rapports entre l’homme et les hommes”, aux “libertés politiques” et aux “droits économiques, sociaux et culturels”48. Le décryptage des dispositions pertinentes conduit à constater que derrière la consécration de cette liberté fondamentale, se profile en réalité la reconnaissance de plusieurs droits de la personne humaine de portée variable dont les principaux sont, à n’en point douter, le droit à l’émigration (1), le droit à l’immigration (2) et le droit d’établissement (3). 1. Le droit à l’émigration Le droit à l’émigration est affirmé en des termes clairs et solennels dans les textes précédemment cités. Ainsi, le second alinéa de l’article 13 de la Déclaration Universelle de 1948 consacre pleinement le droit de tout homme à émigrer, en garantissant le droit “de quitter tout pays, y compris le sien”49, énonçant ainsi, souligne René Cassin, un droit “qu’aucune déclaration ou loi nationale n’a jamais eu qualité pour proclamer autrement que par référence à un pays déterminé”50. Le caractère coutumier de la consécration de ce droit n’engendre-t-elle pas de fait sa manifestation au bénéfice des ressortissants de la sousrégion du golfe de Guinée ? Il n’en demeure pas moins que ce droit est 48 49 50
Cité par B. GENEVOIS, op. cit., p. 31. Voir B. GENEVOIS, op.cit., p. 31. Cité par B. GENEVOIS, ibid., p. 31.
342
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
précisé, au plan régional, par la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples. En effet, l’affirmation du droit à l’émigration est reprise en des termes moins absolus, par l’alinéa 2 de la Charte africaine de 1981, qui admet qu’il puisse faire l’objet de restrictions ; à condition que celles-ci soient “prévues par la loi, nécessaires pour protéger la sécurité nationale, l’ordre public, la santé ou la moralité publiques”. La Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin a eu à rappeler le caractère fondamental de ce droit dans une affaire de rétention par la police du passeport d’un fonctionnaire pour obliger ce dernier à ne point quitter son pays avant de s’être présenté devant une commission parlementaire d’information, d’enquête et de contrôle désireuse de l’entendre. Le juge condamna cette rétention qui “est arbitraire et prive (la requérante) d’un droit fondamental, celui d’aller et de venir” proclamé aux articles 25 de la constitution béninoise et 12 alinéa 2 de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples dans la mesure où elle a lieu “sans intervention de l’autorité judiciaire”51. Le droit à l’émigration semble ainsi être le socle irréductible de la liberté de circulation de pays à pays, car, ainsi que l’affirmait le Conseil constitutionnel français, la “liberté fondamentale d’aller et de venir n’est pas limitée au territoire national, mais comporte également le droit de le quitter”52. Il vaut indistinctement pour les nationaux et pour les étrangers. Qu’en est-il du droit à l’immigration ? 2. Le droit à l’immigration L’immigration est communément définie comme l’action de venir dans un pays pour s’y fixer. Il convient de préciser que, suivant cette approche, le pays dont il s’agit est un pays autre que celui d’origine53.
51
52 53
Voir décision de la Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin enregistrée sous la référence DCC, n°96-060 du 26 septembre 1996, décision dans laquelle la Cour cite expressément la Charte africaine de 1981 en son article 12 alinéa 2. Cité par B. GENEVOIS, op. cit., p. 31. Pour en savoir plus, l’on consultera entre autres DEWITTER (dir.), Immigration et Intégration, l’état des savoirs, Paris, La découverte, 1999 ; P. BERNARD, L’immigration, Paris, Le Monde éditions, 1993 ; J.-C. BARREAU, De l’immigration en général et de la de la nation française en particulier, Paris,
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
343
Cette définition ne tient pas compte des mouvements des visiteurs dont l’objectif n’est pas forcément l’établissement définitif. Or il est loisible de constater que le plus important des mouvements transfrontaliers de personnes est celui des visiteurs temporaires : touristes, voyageurs en transit n’ont pas pour objectif l’établissement ; ils ne sont pas moins concernés par le durcissement de la réglementation de la circulation des personnes54. L’Etat d’accueil peut accepter, voire organiser la venue des immigrés en vue d’une installation plus ou moins durable et parfois définitive55. Auquel cas il s’agit d’une immigration régulière, par opposition à l’immigration clandestine qui s’opère en violation des conventions et de la législation en vigueur dans l’Etat d’accueil. Se pose dès lors le problème de la reconnaissance d’un droit à l’immigration en droit positif. En effet, si l’article 13 de la Déclaration Universelle de 1948 en son premier alinéa affirme la liberté d’aller et venir de l’individu à l’intérieur du territoire d’un Etat, elle ne va pas cependant jusqu’à reconnaître un droit d’entrée à une personne sur le territoire d’un Etat dont elle n’a pas la nationalité56. Il ressort par ailleurs des articles 12 du Pacte des Nations Unies sur les droits civils et politiques et de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples que le droit d’entrée sur le territoire d’un Etat est en principe réservé aux ressortissants de cet Etat. Le silence demeure toutefois quant à l’existence d’un droit à l’immigration; celui-ci ne semble connaître une consécration partielle – toute relative doit-on préciser – que par le détour du droit d’asile ; l’asile se définissant principalement comme la protection qu’un Etat accorde à un individu qui fuit des persécutions en l’autorisant à entrer et à séjourner sur son territoire57. La référence
54 55
56 57
Le pré aux clercs, 1992 ; D. LOCHAK, Etrangers, de quel droit ?, Paris , PUF, 1985. Cf. BARREAU, op. cit., pp. 10-12. Lire à ce sujet et à titre comparé, notamment en ce qui concerne la politique française de l’immigration et de l’intégration, Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, La connaissance de l’immigration et de l’intégration, Paris, La documentation française, 1992. Cf. B. GENEVOIS, op. cit., p. 31. Pour une définition exhaustive de la notion de réfugié dans le contexte africain, on se reportera à la convention de l’OUA du 10 septembre 1969 régissant certains aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés en Afrique.
344
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
aux persécutions explique l’exclusion des délinquants de droit commun d’une part, des auteurs de crimes contre le droit international58 d’autre part. Le droit de bénéficier de l’asile n’implique pas l’obligation pour un Etat d’accorder l’asile dès lors que la personne n’est pas ou n’est plus immédiatement en danger59. Quid des textes sous-régionaux précédemment évoqués ? Reconnaissent-ils un droit à l’immigration au profit de tous ? Aux termes de l’article 40 du traité de Libreville, les citoyens des Etats membres de la Communauté Economique des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) sont considérés comme des ressortissants de la communauté. Mais il appartient aux Etats de faciliter progressivement les formalités relatives à la libre circulation et à l’établissement à l’intérieur de ladite communauté60. Autrement dit, l’Etat d’accueil conserve bel et bien le pouvoir quasi discrétionnaire de réglementer les entrées dans son territoire, au besoin de les restreindre, et le scepticisme est réel quant à la reconnaissance d’un droit à l’immigration au profit des ressortissants de la CEEAC, qui consisterait en la liberté pour ceux-ci de s’établir dans tout Etat membre de cette communauté. Les textes relatifs à l’Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC) et à la Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC) précités semblent plus diserts dès lors qu’ils reconnaissent l’unité du territoire douanier de l’union à l’intérieur duquel les ressortissants des différents Etats membres doivent circuler librement. L’article 21 de la convention commune sur la libre circulation des personnes et le droit d’établissement dans l’UDEAC dispose notamment : “dans le cadre de la présente convention et un an après son entrée en vigueur, la libre circulation des personnes est effective à l’intérieur de l’Union et les restrictions à la liberté d’établissement sont supprimées”. 58 59
60
Il s’agit particulièrement des crimes contre la paix, des crimes de guerre et des crimes contre l’humanité. A ce propos, l’on se reportera à D. LOCHAK, Commentaire de l’article 14 de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme, in Le Monde, Cahier spécial, op. cit., p. 34 ; également X. VANDENDRIESSCHE, Le droit des étrangers, Dalloz, Paris, 2001, pp. 53-62. Cf. V. MBOUGUENG, Le droit de l’immigration au Cameroun, Mémoire de maîtrise en Droit public, Université de Yaoundé, 1989, pp. 33-34.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
345
Ne doit-on pas y voir l’affirmation d’un véritable droit à l’immigration, certes limité aux Etats de l’UDEAC et à leurs ressortissants ? Trente ans après la signature de ce texte, ce droit demeure pour l’essentiel ineffectif61. Pourrait-on en dire autant du droit d’établissement qui accompagne généralement la liberté d’aller et venir ? 3. Le droit d’établissement Le droit d’établissement pour tous est affirmé en même temps que le droit de circuler librement : “Toute personne a le droit de circuler librement et de choisir sa résidence à l’intérieur d’un Etat”, souligne l’alinéa 1er de l’article 13 de la Déclaration Universelle de 1948 ; “sous réserve de se conformer aux règles édictées par la loi”, précise l’alinéa 1er de l’article 12 de la Charte africaine de 1981 qui reprend mutatis mutandis la formule précitée. Le droit de s’établir dans un Etat apparaît donc comme la conséquence logique de la liberté de circulation tant à l’intérieur d’un Etat, que d’un Etat à l’autre pour celles des personnes qui y sont légalement admises. L’affirmation de ce droit pose dès lors un double problème : est-il réservé aux seuls citoyens de l’Etat ou alors est-il reconnu à toute personne, y compris les étrangers ? Et si tel est le cas, implique-t-il une égalité de traitement pour tous ? C’est donc dire que la portée de ce droit demeure à préciser.
61
Sur les entraves à la libre circulation des biens et des personnes dans cette zone, l’on consultera avec intérêt J. MOUANGUE KOBILA et L. DONFACK SOKENG, “La CEMAC: à la recherche d’une nouvelle dynamique de l’intégration en Afrique centrale”, op. cit., pp. 65-105; également Les enjeux de l’intégration régionale en Afrique centrale, tome I, Actes du séminaire organisé à Yaoundé les 25 et 26 juillet 1995 en collaboration avec le Secrétariat Général de l’UDEAC, Fondation Friedrich Ebert au Cameroun.
346
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
S’agissant de la première question, l’on soutiendra que le droit d’établissement concerne au premier chef le citoyen dans son Etat d’origine : “le droit de circuler et de résider librement sur le territoire d’un Etat n’est reconnu qu’aux nationaux et ne joue en faveur des étrangers que s’ils sont en situation régulière”62.
Dans le même ordre d’idées, René Cassin remarquait fort opportunément que la Déclaration universelle – qui est le texte international auquel on se réfère le plus souvent – “ne consacre pas totalement le principe de la libre circulation de pays à pays, puisqu’elle ne dit rien du droit d’immigration symétrique de celui d’émigration, ni du libre établissement en dehors du cercle d’un Etat déterminé”63.
Mais cette apparente simplicité ne résiste guère à une analyse approfondie dès lors que la pratique de certains Etats révèle qu’il peut exister des différenciations de droits ou de statut entre citoyens d’un même Etat en fonction de leur lieu d’établissement sur le territoire national. C’est notamment le cas au Cameroun où la loi constitutionnelle du 18 Janvier 1996 autorise une discrimination entre les “autochtones” et les autres composantes de la population en fonction de leur lieu d’établissement64. S’agissant de la garantie des droits des étrangers établis dans un territoire donné, le principe général – il est valable dans le cas du Golfe de Guinée – est celui de l’égal traitement entre nationaux et étrangers régulièrement établis65. Ce qui implique la proscription des mesures arbitraires d’internement, de reconduction à la frontière ou d’expulsion. Le même régime de protection ne concerne pas le cas des étrangers en situation irrégulière. 62 63 64
65
Cf. B. GENEVOIS, ibid., p. 31. Cité par B. GENEVOIS, ibid. p. 31. Sur cette question, se reporter à L. DONFACK SOKENG, Le droit des minorités et des peuples autochtones au Cameroun, Thèse de doctorat en droit public, Université de Nantes, 2001. Lire à ce sujet H. JULIEN-LAFERRIERE, Droits des étrangers, Paris, PUF, collection Droits Fondamentaux, 2000 ; également D. LOCHAK, Etrangers, de quel droit ?, précité.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
347
Force est donc de constater, à l’analyse des textes pertinents relatifs à la reconnaissance de la liberté d’aller et venir auxquels se réfèrent les Etats du Golfe de Guinée, qu’il s’agit d’un principe de proclamation constante, quoique inconsistante : solennellement reconnu par les différents Etats de la sous-région, leur mise en œuvre n’en est pas moins contrastée, voire problématique, variant au gré des intérêts et des stratégies de positionnement66 de chacun des Etats dans la sous-région.
UNE MISE EN ŒUVRE VARIEE ET PROBLEMATIQUE La mise en œuvre de la liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée résulte d’un compromis manifeste ; compromis entre le besoin régalien de contrôle de la population et de sécurisation des frontières transparaissant des politiques migratoires des Etats d’une part67, la logique d’intégration régionale et d’ouverture68 qui sous-tend le système des relations internationales en ce début de millénaire d’autre part. Les difficultés à surmonter sont d’autant plus nombreuses et les solutions complexes que l’intégration met en jeu des Etats aux intérêts fort contrastés : à l’affirmation forte des nationalismes au sein de la CEMAC, se greffe une logique de prépotence économique de la part de certains Etats69 qui ne peut qu’éveiller les pulsions sécuritaires des “petits Etats” à fort potentiel d’enrichissement70, les populations des pays voisins y étant inexorablement attirées par le mythe de l’Eldorado. 66 67 68 69
70
On lira à ce sujet A. MBEMBE, “A la lisière du monde : frontières, territorialité et souveraineté en Afrique”, Bulletin du CODESRIA (1999) 3 et 4, Dakar. Voir B. BADIE et M.-C. SMOUTS, L’international sans territoires, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1996. E.K. QUASHIGAH, “Les droits de l’homme et l’intégration”, dactyl., Université du Wisconsin, Madison, 1992. Il s’agit particulièrement du Nigeria et du Cameroun, Etats dont le tissu économique est suffisamment étoffé pour un développement des exportations vers les Etats voisins. Il s’agit principalement de la Guinée Equatoriale et du Gabon, Etats à faible densité et à dimension parfois réduite, mais qui offrent des perspectives intéressantes de développement, compte tenu notamment de l’importance de leurs ressources pétrolières.
348
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
La complexité de ces logiques ambiguës, inhérentes à la dialectique de l’ordre et du mouvement ici symbolisés par l’Etat et la population, explique, sans toutefois les justifier, les variations, voire les contrastes observés dans la mise en œuvre de la liberté d’aller et venir dans le golfe de Guinée (A). Ce qui n’est guère sans susciter de nombreux problèmes qui en relativisent la portée (B). A. Une mise en œuvre variée La libre circulation internationale des personnes est assurément le parent pauvre de l’entreprise d’intégration de la sous-région d’Afrique centrale71, laquelle abrite la plupart des Etats du golfe de Guinée. Le constat semble en effet unanime de l’échec, ou en tout cas des atermoiements des initiatives communes entreprises à cette fin (1), tant l’obstination des Etats à développer et à maintenir des réglementations restrictives et contraignantes semble l’emporter (3). Prenant la mesure des difficultés de la mise en œuvre d’une politique commune, ces Etats ont très tôt privilégié la voie bilatérale. D’où la variation du régime des entrées et sorties d’un Etat à l’autre (2) et parfois d’un point à l’autre d’une même frontière, contredisant ainsi la belle unanimité relevée dans la proclamation du principe de liberté préalablement affirmée. 1. Les atermoiements dans la mise en œuvre des normes communautaires Envisagée à plusieurs reprises par les instances dirigeantes des multiples organisations sous-régionales d’intégration auxquelles sont parties les Etats du golfe de Guinée, la mise en œuvre d’un droit communautaire fondé sur le principe de la libre circulation des personnes se heurte à de nombreuses difficultés. La Commission du Golfe de Guinée, cadre de concertation inter-étatique pour une gestion optimale de cette zone et des ressources qu’elle renferme, ne semble 71
Tel est du moins le constat récemment dressé par le Bureau Sous-régional Afrique Centrale de la Commission Economique des Nations Unies pour l’Afrique, CDSR-AC, Rapport de la réunion sous-régionale préparatoire au 3ème forum pour le développement de l’Afrique (ADF III), Yaoundé, 2002.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
349
présenter ni les structures, ni les compétences nécessaires à cet effet ; elle n’a du reste proposé aucun projet concret allant dans ce sens . La CEEAC quant à elle s’en est tenu au seul principe formulé dans l’article 40 de son traité constitutif, qui invite les Etats membres à faciliter progressivement la libre circulation et le droit d’établissement des personnes72. Seule l’UDEAC, devenue par la suite CEMAC, a envisagé quelques mesures concrètes propres à assurer une mise en œuvre proprement communautaire de la liberté d’aller et venir. La convention de Brazzaville du 22 décembre 1972, par une formulation pour le moins téméraire rendait “effective” la libre circulation des personnes et supprimait déjà les restrictions à la liberté d’établissement à l’intérieur de l’union “un an après son entrée en vigueur”. Celle-ci semble malheureusement avoir été différée ad eternam face aux réticences des Etats signataires de ce texte73. L’institution d’un passeport communautaire pour les ressortissants de la CEMAC est présentée comme la nouvelle initiative visant la concrétisation d’un principe de liberté objet d’une application à plusieurs vitesses et à géométrie variable par les États membres. En effet, aux termes de l’article 1er du Règlement n°1/00-CEMAC042-CM-04 portant institution et conditions d’attribution du passeport CEMAC, “il est institué au sein de la communauté un instrument de libre circulation des personnes, dénommé ‘passeport CEMAC’”. Si l’initiative semble heureuse, son application demeure pour une bonne part tributaire du bon vouloir des Etats dès lors que l’article 3 de ce règlement dispose que “l’impression, la gestion et la délivrance du passeport CEMAC sont de la compétence de chaque Etat membre”. Il n’est par ailleurs défini aucun mécanisme d’incitation ou de contrainte à cet effet. Les mêmes causes produisant les mêmes effets, nul doute que la concrétisation de cette mesure ne se fera que progressivement, compte tenu des velléités autarciques manifestées par certains Etats, à l’instar du Gabon ou de la Guinée équatoriale ; ce qui contribuerait au maintien des contrastes observés dans la mise en œuvre de la liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région. 72 73
V. MBOUGUENG, Le droit de l’immigration au Cameroun, op. cit., p. 37. Il s’agissait du Cameroun, du Congo-Brazzaville, du Gabon, de la République Centrafricaine et du Tchad.
350
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
2. Les variations du régime de la circulation inter-étatique L’observation des mouvements d’entrée et de sortie aux frontières des différents Etats du golfe de Guinée révèle la disparité des régimes de circulation des personnes, ceux-ci variant au gré des politiques migratoires de chaque Etat, en dépit des proclamations solennelles et des initiatives communautaires en faveur de l’effacement des frontières. Ici, réglementations unilatérales et accords bilatéraux s’imposent en l’absence d’une politique communautaire ferme. Ainsi, l’entrée des ressortissants des Etats de la région du golfe de Guinée au Gabon, y compris ceux des autres membres de la CEMAC, demeure soumise à l’obtention d’un visa, alors même que les ressortissants de certains pays occidentaux, comme la France par exemple, en sont dispensés. La même exigence de présentation d’un visa d’entrée – qui prend parfois la forme simplifiée d’un laissez-passer – est également requise par le Congo Brazzaville et la Guinée Equatoriale, tous deux membres de la CEMAC. Ces trois Etats n’appliquent donc pas les conventions et recommandations communautaires relatives à la libre circulation des personnes au sein de la CEMAC. Il en va différemment des autres Etats membres de la même organisation que sont la République Centrafricaine, le Tchad et le Cameroun, sous réserve, dans certains cas, de la clause de réciprocité. La République du Nigeria qui n’est guère membre des organisations d’intégration de l’Afrique centrale applique une réglementation plutôt souple en la même occurrence. Elle étend les bénéfices du régime de citoyenneté communautaire de la CEDEAO à ses voisins d’Afrique centrale à l’instar du Cameroun, du Tchad ou de la Guinée Equatoriale, y compris la dispense des formalités de visa d’entrée, ainsi que la liberté de circulation et d’établissement à l’intérieur de son territoire. Comment dès lors faire l’économie d’une réflexion sur l’effectivité d’une volonté intégrationniste en Afrique centrale lorsque l’on compare les régimes de la circulation des personnes dans la CEEAC et la CEMAC d’une part, et dans la CEDEAO d’autre part ?74 74
La liberté de circulation d’un Etat à l’autre de la CEDEAO est effective; ce qui est n’est pas le cas dans la CEEAC, ni même en zone CEMAC.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
351
En réalité, seuls les intérêts égoïstes et les stratégies de puissance semblent déterminer la politique migratoire des Etats dans le golfe de Guinée : le Nigeria, Etat à très forte pression démographique et à l’industrie manufacturière croissante est très favorable au bannissement des visas ; c’est que les Etats voisins d’Afrique centrale constituent un point privilégié de chute pour ses nationaux en même temps qu’un marché intéressant à conquérir75 ; marché que lui conteste le Cameroun qui, bien qu’ouvrant grandement ses frontières aux ressortissants nigérians, refuse d’étendre ce régime de liberté aux produits en provenance de ce pays. Le Gabon et la Guinée Equatoriale, pays largement sous-peuplés nantis d’importantes ressources naturelles, constituent des réceptacles privilégiés des migrations dans la sous-région, et développent par conséquent des réflexes d’auto-préservation au moyen de législations très restrictives, symbolisées par le maintien du visa d’entrée. Le Congo Brazzaville, déchiré par les guerres civiles engendrées les querelles politico-tribales, cultive la peur de “l’ennemi en provenance de l’extérieur”. D’où une surveillance étroite des entrées et des sorties du territoire national et une certaine tendance à l’autarcie. Etats particulièrement défavorisés et sans frontière maritime, la RCA et le Tchad ont fort à gagner dans le processus de libre circulation des personnes et des biens ; d’où la mise en place de législations particulièrement favorables à la libre circulation. C’est donc dire que la liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée est en dernière analyse tributaire des intérêts et des stratégies de positionnement sous-régional de chaque Etat, que reflète du reste sa législation en matière d’“émi-immigration”.
75
Cf. CEA-ADF III, Définir les priorités de l’intégration régionale, Addis-Abeba, 3-8 Mars 2002, pp. 5-10. B. NKENE, “Les immigrés nigérians à Douala. Problèmes et stratégies d’insertion sociale des étrangers en milieu urbain”, Polis 7 (1999-2000), Numéro spécial, Yaoundé, pp. 126-128.
352
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
3. La prégnance des législations nationales et des “conventions administratives” Disséminées dans des textes législatifs ou réglementaires, les normes relatives aux conditions d’entrée, de séjour et de sortie des territoires respectifs des Etats du Golfe de Guinée prolifèrent. Cette réglementation est marquée par le double souci de conciliation des intérêts des États et de la liberté des individus d’une part, et, ainsi que l’évoquait le Doyen Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch pour rendre compte de la situation de l’Etat dans l’ordre international, de limitation du pouvoir autonormateur de l’Etat par les principes du droit international76 d’autre part. Elle concerne en général les modalités du contrôle transfrontalier de police, les conditions de délivrance des passeports, des visas d’entrée ou de sortie, des laissezpasser, des cartes de séjour et autres cartes consulaires ou certificats de travail, ainsi que le régime de sanctions s’y rapportant. Elles concernent aussi les procédures autoritaires de sortie du territoire : maintien en zone d’attente des ports, aéroports et postes frontaliers, refoulements, reconduction aux frontières, expulsions et extraditions. Elles sont enfin relatives à l’organisation du droit d’asile : demande d’asile, conditions d’accueil, principe de non-refoulement, etc.77 Le légicentrisme de la régulation des entrées, séjours et sorties dans les Etats du golfe de Guinée est à souligner. S’agissant en effet d’aspects de la condition des personnes, leur régime relève généralement du domaine de la loi qui en détermine les principes, laissant aux autorités exécutives le soin de préciser leurs modalités d’application, en conciliation avec les nécessités du maintien de l’ordre public et de la préservation de la sécurité de l’Etat. Le classicisme de cette réglementation transparaît dès lors de la typologie du régime juridique des formalités requises, des mesures de police et du régime des sanctions applicables à la circulation des personnes par les Etats de la région. Elle se conforme pour l’essentiel aux analyses de la doctrine dominante pour laquelle : 76 77
B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH, Droit constitutionnel international, Sirey, Paris, 1933, p. 198. D. LOCHAK, Commentaire de l’article 14 de la Déclaration universelle…, op. cit., p. 34.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
353
- Tout Etat a le droit de recevoir sur son territoire les ressortissants des autres Etats. - L’usage tend à susciter un “devoir” pour l’Etat de recevoir sur son territoire des personnes désireuses d’y séjourner, dans le respect des conventions internationales et des lois en vigueur. - L’Etat ne devrait en principe se soustraire à ce “devoir” que si son droit de conservation l’exige. On distingue à ce propos trois systèmes de restriction qui peuvent être cumulatifs. D’abord les Etats peuvent exiger des personnes qui veulent franchir leurs frontières la possession d’un certificat délivré par leurs autorités et visé par celles du pays de destination ou viceversa : c’est le système des passeports, laisser-passer et visas. Ensuite, les Etats peuvent imposer le paiement d’une somme qui peut constituer une barrière : c’est le système des frais de visas, taxes d’entrée ou de sortie. Enfin, ils peuvent interdire l’accès à leur territoire aux personnes considérées comme indésirables : on parle alors de système de sélection ou d’exclusion78. On observera toutefois que ces principes varient dans leur mise en œuvre, suscitant des réglementations à l’application plus ou moins stricte, voire restrictive. Ce qui peut laisser place à des pratiques non codifiées, que nous appelons ici “conventions administratives”79 pouvant varier d’une frontière à l’autre au sein du même Etat, voire d’un poste à l’autre d’une même frontière80. Ces conventions administratives participent en général des stratégies de contournement visant à gommer les aspérités du formalisme des réglementations administratives du passage aux postes de contrôle des populations vivant de part et d’autre de la frontière. Elles doivent être interprétées
78 79
80
B. MIRKINE-GUETZEVITCH, Droit constitutionnel international, op. cit., pp. 198 et ss. Nous entendons par conventions administratives des pratiques qui naissent des arrangements entre agents des postes frontaliers de part et d’autre des frontières. Elles ont pour but soit de simplifier au mieux les procédures, soit de faciliter la circulation des personnes en apportant des réponses pragmatiques à certains cas non prévus par les textes pertinents, à l’exemple des marchés frontaliers ou des mouvements de populations frontalières. Rétention d’une pièce d’identité, consignation d’une somme d’argent, paiement d’un “droit de passage” non prévu par les textes, etc.
354
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
comme des solutions locales aux multiples écueils de la mise en œuvre de la liberté d’aller et venir dans les Etats du golfe de Guinée. B. Une mise en œuvre problématique Problématique, la mise en œuvre de la liberté de circulation dans le golfe de Guinée l’est certainement parce qu’elle n’apporte guère de réponses satisfaisantes à plusieurs questions. Au nombre de celles-ci figurent l’interrogation relative à l’effectivité de certaines normes (1), les problèmes liés à la garantie des droits fondamentaux des immigrés (2) ainsi que ceux rattachés à la circulation des populations frontalières et migrantes (3) 1. L’ineffectivité de certaines normes de référence L’ineffectivité des normes et principes relatifs à la libre circulation des personnes dans la sous-région ne peut que surprendre l’observateur qui s’en tient à la lecture des textes régionaux, communautaires ou bilatéraux précédemment cités : la pratique est toute autre et souligne les difficultés de la mise en application de la réglementation internationale et communautaire en particulier, notamment lorsqu’il s’agit de normes d’application directe comme c’est parfois le cas dans la CEMAC81. Auquel cas, réel est le problème de savoir si un ressortissant d’un Etat membre de la communauté est fondé à s’appuyer sur ces dispositions communautaires pour revendiquer son droit de circuler librement à l’intérieur du territoire communautaire. S’il peut paraître difficile de faire valoir un tel droit devant les juridictions internes, compte tenu de l’écran que pourrait alors constituer la législation étatique sur les conditions d’entrée, de séjour et de sortie du territoire national, et au regard de l’ineffectivité d’un éventuel contrôle interne de conformité des lois aux conventions communautaires, l’hypothèse d’une condamnation par le juge communautaire des Etats récalcitrants pourrait être envisagée avec sérieux cependant. En effet, nous en tenant au cas de la CEMAC, on 81
J. MOUANGUE KOBILA et L. DONFACK SOKENG, “La CEMAC: à la recherche d’une nouvelle dynamique de l’intégration en Afrique Centrale”, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
355
observera que le traité constitutif de cette communauté crée en son article 5 une Cour de justice communautaire dont la chambre judiciaire “assure le respect du droit dans l’interprétation et l’application du présent traité et des conventions subséquentes” et réalise “par ses décisions l’harmonisation des jurisprudences dans les matières relevant du domaine des traités”82. Nul doute que l’entrée en activité prochaine de cette cour augure des perspectives nouvelles dans la garantie de l’effectivité des normes communautaires. Un autre problème important est celui du texte applicable dès lors que plusieurs textes sont en concurrence tant au plan international que communautaire : Déclaration universelle et Pacte de 1966 précités, Charte africaine de 1981 et textes communautaires relatifs à la libre circulation, etc. La solution généralement admise, notamment en droit européen83 s’agissant de l’exercice d’une liberté fondamentale, est que la convention la plus favorable à la personne l’emporte ; l’objectif recherché étant la garantie la plus efficace des droits proclamés. On ne peut dès lors que déplorer le peu de recours à la jurisdiction de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, pourtant très favorable à un contrôle strict du respect par les Etats des engagements contenus dans la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, s’agissant notamment de la garantie des droits des immigrés84.
82 83
84
Article 2 de la convention de 1996 régissant la Cour de Justice de la CEMAC. J. MOURGEON, Commentaire de l’article 2 du protocole n°4, op. cit., pp. 10481049 ; G. COHEN-JONATHAN, “Les rapports entre la convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le pacte des Nations Unies sur les droits civils et politiques” in Régionalisme et universalisme dans le droit international contemporain, Paris, Pedone, 1977. Elle a une conception plutôt large de l’article 56 de la Charte de 1981 relative aux conditions de sa saisine dès lors qu’elle se considère compétente pour certaines causes alors même que les voies de recours internes n’ont guère été épuisées, ni même explorées: “In accordance with its earlier decisions on cases of serious and massive violations of human rights, and view of the vast and varied scope of the violations alleged and the large number of individuals involved, the Commission holds that remedies need not be exhausted and, as such, declares the communications admissible.” Cf. Affaire Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, préc.
356
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
2. La garantie des droits des populations immigrées Cette question est l’une des plus préoccupantes et des moins étudiées de la théorie des droits de l’homme. Pourtant, si l’on se réfère à l’OIT, environ 150 millions de personnes vivent temporairement ou en permanence en dehors de leur Etat d’origine. Plus de la majorité d’entre elles85 est constituée de travailleurs immigrés et des membres de leurs familles86. Mais l’on remarquera que dans la majorité des pays, y compris ceux du golfe de Guinée, le régime général de protection des droits de l’homme ne s’applique que de manière très partielle, voire partiale aux immigrés, généralement considérés comme des citoyens de seconde zone. Une question fondamentale devient donc de savoir si l’immigré – et plus généralement l’étranger – dispose des mêmes droits fondamentaux que les nationaux ; autrement dit, Ces droits présentés comme “inhérents à la nature humaine”87 peuvent-ils s’appliquer indépendamment de la nationalité ? A l’évidence, la réponse à cette question doit être nuancée. Il serait en effet raisonnable de soutenir qu’en droit comme dans les faits, il existe des droits de l’homme en général, c’est-à-dire rattachés à la nature humaine et par conséquent indépendants du critère de nationalité, tandis que d’autres seraient réservés aux seuls nationaux et, selon les cas, extensibles aux étrangers en situation régulière. Mais alors, quelle serait la ligne de démarcation des droits auxquels peuvent prétendre les uns et les autres ? Si le caractère fondamental ou non d’un droit semble constituer le critère pertinent de toute distinction en la matière, le problème demeure celui de l’établissement d’une liste consensuelle des droits fondamentaux valables urbi et orbi. L’instrumentation du principe d’égalité et de non discrimination permet d’apporter un éclairage précieux sur ce point, à la lumière du droit comparé notamment. La jurisprudence du Conseil constitutionnel français – qui recoupe sur bien de points celle de la Commission africaine précitée, du Comité des droits de l’homme des 85 86 87
Entre 80 et 97 millions selon les chiffres avancés par l’OIT pour l’année 2000. Cf. IOM/UN, “Human rights of migrants: challenges of the new decade, in International migration”, Quarterly Review 38 (2000) 6, Special issue. Telle est du moins la formule consacrée par les textes fondamentaux en matière de droits de l’homme.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
357
Nations Unies88, de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme89 autant que celle de plusieurs juridictions suprêmes – est significative en la matière, qui considère par exemple que “le législateur peut prendre à l’égard des étrangers des dispositions spécifiques à la condition de respecter […] les libertés et droits fondamentaux de valeur constitutionnelle reconnus à tous ceux qui résident sur le territoire de la République”90.
Dans une autre décision91, la même juridiction a réaffirmé le même principe de l’existence des libertés et des droits fondamentaux de valeur constitutionnelle qui sont reconnus à tous ceux qui résident sur le territoire de la république, “indépendamment donc de leur situation juridique, régulière ou non”92. Figurent parmi ces droits la liberté individuelle et la sûreté, la liberté d’aller et venir, la liberté du mariage et le droit de mener une vie familiale normale, le droit au regroupement familial93, le principe de la légalité des délits et des peines, du droit de la défense et notamment l’existence de voies de 88
89
90 91 92
93
Voir à ce propos la “jurisprudence” du Comité des droits de l’homme dont les rapports des différentes séances et comptes-rendus des communications examinées sont régulièrement publiés par le Centre de documentation des Nations Unies de Genève. Voir à ce sujet L.-E. PETITTI, E. DECAUX, P.-H. IMBERT (dir.), La convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Commentaire article par article, Economica, Paris, 1995 ; également les différentes chroniques de jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme ; G. COHENJONATHAN, “La protection internationale des droits de l’homme dans le cadre des Organisations régionales”, La documentation française, Documents d’études, Droit international public (n°305) ; C.-M. CERNA, “La Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, ses premières affaires”, AFDI, 1993, pp. 300 et ss. Cf. Décision n°89-269 DC du 22 janvier 1990. Décision n°93-325 DC du 13 Août 1993. Lire X. VANDENDRIESSCHE, Le droit des étrangers, op. cit., p. 10. L’on note par ailleurs une véritable détermination du Conseil d’Etat français à protéger les exilés contre des poursuites judiciaires et demandes d’extradition fondées sur des incriminations à caractère politique. La haute juridiction française fait en effet du refus d’extrader en raison d’une incrimination à caractère politique un “principe fondamental reconnu par les lois de la République” ayant valeur constitutionnelle (cf. C.E., Ass., 3 juillet 1996, Koné, D., 1996, p. 509 ; J.C.P., 1996, II, n°22720; A.J.D.A., 1996, p.722; R.F.D.A., 1996, p. 870). Cf. C.E., 8 Décembre 1978, GISTI.
358
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
recours, ainsi que le droit de quitter le territoire94. Ce qui implique l’inviolabilité de leur domicile, leur droit au travail, au libre exercice d’une activité professionnelle, à l’éducation, le droit de disposer librement de leurs bénéfices et de leurs biens, etc. L’existence de ces droits fondamentaux que l’on rattache volontiers à la nature humaine n’interdit pas cependant la faculté reconnue au législateur de mettre en œuvre ces dispositions de façon restrictive à l’égard des étrangers, éventuellement en faisant prévaloir les nécessités de l’ordre public95. La Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples a sur la question une position non équivoque : le bénéfice des droits fondamentaux de l’homme proclamés par la Charte africaine de 1981 s’étend aux nationaux et aux non nationaux : “Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognized and guaranted in the present Charter without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status.”96
Il s’en suit, poursuit la Commission, une obligation générale pour les Etats parties de garantir à tous, l’ensemble de ces droits : “This imposes an obligation on the contracting State to secure the rights protected in the Charter to all persons within their jurisdiction, nationals or non nationals”97.
Cette obligation s’étend également aux bénéficiaires du droit d’asile et à tous ceux qui, fuyant des persécutions dans leur Etat, sont demandeurs d’asile: non seulement ils ne peuvent être expulsés qu’en vertu d’une loi leur garantissant l’exercice effectif des voies de recours, mais également ils bénéficient d’une protection générale de la part de l’Etat hôte assurant la préservation de l’ensemble de leurs droits indifféremment de leur condition d’étrangers en situation 94 95 96 97
Lire à ce sujet B. STIRN, Les libertés en question, Montchrestien, Paris, 1996, Collection Clefs, pp. 138-141. Cf. Décision n°86-216 DC du 3 septembre 1986. Cf. affaire Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, préc. Ibid.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
359
irrégulière. La Commission en infère que l’expulsion massive de telles catégories de personnes engage la responsabilité de l’Etat pour violation d’un ensemble de droits fondamentaux reconnus à toute personne : “This type of deportations calls into a whole series of rights recognised and guaranted in the Charter ; such as the right to property (art. 14), the right to work (art. 15), the right to education (art. 17 paragraph 1) and results in the violation by the State of its obligations under article 18 paragraph 1 which stipulate that the family shall be the natural unit and basis of society. It shall be protected by the State which shall take care of its physical and moral health”98.
L’adoption à l’échelle des Nations Unies de la convention de 1990 sur la protection des droits des travailleurs immigrés et des membres de leurs familles, de même que la désignation d’un rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies pour les droits des populations immigrées, traduisent la prise de conscience à l’échelle universelle de la nécessité d’une protection renforcée de cette couche particulièrement vulnérable de la population. Ces mesures n’ont cependant qu’une portée très relative en ce qui concerne la sous-région du golfe de Guinée dès lors que la dite convention n’est pas encore entrée en vigueur et n’a guère fait l’objet de ratification de la part des Etats concernés. Les violations des droits des immigrés demeurent très élevées alors que les manifestations de xénophobie croissent avec la perpétuation de la crise économique. Les Etats se montrent de plus en plus réticents quant à l’octroi des permis de travail aux étrangers ou font jouer la clause de la “préférence nationale”, nonobstant l’existence des accords bilatéraux en matière de droit de travail. Ce qui condamne à l’illégalité de nombreux immigrés dont le travail semble souvent limité aux “three-D jobs” selon la formule anglo-saxonne consacrée : “dirty, dangerous and difficult”.
98
Cf. affaire Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme au Sénégal and Association Malienne des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola, préc.
360
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
Par ailleurs, l’assimilation des immigrés à la criminalité s’accentue : au Gabon ou en Guinée équatoriale, les “grands bandits” sont camerounais et nigérians ; au Cameroun, les “coupeurs de route” sont tchadiens ou centrafricains alors que les “trafiquants” sont nigérians, etc. D’où les multiples exactions et traitements dégradants infligés aux étrangers en provenance des Etats voisins, notamment lorsque ceux-ci sont “sans papiers” : rançons par les éléments des forces de l’ordre, confiscation des biens, violences et expulsions irrégulières, etc. Prenant acte de cette précarité des droits fondamentaux des populations immigrées, aiguisée en Afrique par une profonde crise économique, la Commission africaine a précisé dans l’affaire Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, Rencontre Africaine des Droits de l’Homme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme au Sénégal and Association Malienne des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola que : “The Commission concedes that african States in general and the Republic of Angola in particular are faced with many challenges, mainly measures aimed at protecting their nationals and their economies from non nationals. Whatever the circumstances may be, however, such measures should not be taken at the detriment of the enjoyment of human rights. Mass expulsions of any category of persons, whether on the basis of nationality, religion, ethnic, racial or other consideration ‘constitute a special violation of human rights’”.
Mais ces admonestations de la Commission99 suffisent-elles à exorciser une réalité fort peu reluisante ? Loin s’en faut. Autant le dire, la condition des populations immigrées n’est guère assimilable à celle des nationaux et se distingue également de la situation des populations frontalières.
99
La Commission, on le sait, émet des recommandations et non des décisions de justice (Voir chapitre 2 de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples, relatif aux compétences de la Commission, notamment son article 45).
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
361
3. La libre circulation des populations frontalières L’état de “frontalier” est principalement déterminé par la qualité d’habitant d’une zone frontalière. Les populations frontalières sont ainsi dans une situation juridique particulière : le régime du voisinage. Celui-ci induit la définition de conditions administratives et réglementaires libérales en vue de favoriser les déplacements quotidiens ou saisonniers desdites populations de part et d’autre de la frontière pour exercer leurs activités traditionnelles : agriculture, chasse, petit commerce, visites familiales, etc.100 En général, le régime de liberté applicable à ces populations frontalières fait l’objet d’un accord entre les Etats concernés garantissant entre autres, le droit de voisinage et le respect de leurs droits coutumiers101. On retrouve cette clause dans un certain nombre de traités remontant à la période coloniale102. Il en est ainsi notamment de la convention du 18 avril 1908 signée entre l’Allemagne et la France pour préciser la frontière entre le Cameroun et le Congo français (article 4). Il en est de même d’un arrangement convenu entre l’Allemagne et la Grande Bretagne le 13 mars 1913 pour délimiter la frontière entre le Nigeria et le Cameroun, et régler le régime de la navigation sur la Cross river (article 29). Ces droits se sont perpétués au-delà de la période coloniale, entérinés par les nouveaux États indépendants en vertu du principe de la succession d’États103 et confirmés par des accords bilatéraux postérieurs. Mais il peut également arriver que la législation et la réglementation nationales prenne en compte la situation particulière des frontaliers. C’est le cas notamment de la loi camerounaise du 19 décembre 1990 relative aux conditions d’entrée, de séjour et de sortie du territoire camerounais qui prévoit en son article 11 que “les mouvements traditionnels des frontaliers font l’objet de textes 100 101 102
103
R. YAKEMTCHOUK, L’Afrique en droit international, LGDJ, Paris, 1971, pp. 76-83. R. YAKEMTCHOUK, op. cit., p. 80. R. AKAMBA, Les frontières internationales du Cameroun de 1885 à nos jours. La frontière méridionale et la frontière orientale de l’Atlantique au lac Tchad, thèse de doctorat de 3ème cycle, Yaoundé, 1986, pp. 372 et ss. S. NGUIFFO TENE, Le droit de la succession d’Etat au Cameroun, thèse de 3ème cycle en relations internationales, IRIC, Yaoundé, 1993.
362
Léopold Donfack Sokeng
particuliers”. Cette situation n’est pas sans susciter des problèmes de relâchement du contrôle des Etats sur ces populations, situation propice à l’organisation des filières et réseaux d’immigration clandestine104 autant que de trafic de nationalité, voire de multiples nationalités au gré des intérêts de certaines personnes appartenant à ces populations. La difficulté de contrôle des entrées et sorties est d’autant plus réelle que les frontières sont étendues, poreuses, et le dispositif de contrôle étatique essentiellement limité : c’est la symbolique du Léviathan estropié qui s’impose ici.
CONCLUSION Proclamée et réitérée à maintes reprises dans les formes les plus solennelles par les Etats de la sous-région, la liberté d’aller et venir dans le golfe de Guinée demeure une véritable arlésienne. Par-delà les contrastes de sa mise en œuvre, le constat s’impose : son effectivité demeure à conquérir. De nombreux écueils restent à franchir pour ce faire : l’absence manifeste de volonté politique, l’exacerbation des micro-nationalismes, la montée de la xénophobie, l’insuffisance des infrastructures de communication, la pauvreté, etc.105 Les principes fondamentaux du droit international relatifs à la libre circulation et au droit d’établissement des personnes sont ici tenus en échec, nonobstant une “jurisprudence” particulièrement volontariste de la Commission Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples. Les compromis demeurent difficiles à négocier, engendrant de nombreux effets pervers. De fréquentes expulsions massives des ressortissants d’Etats voisins ont donné à ce constat la force d’une évidence, ramant à contre courant du mouvement d’intégration et d’unification du
104
105
Une illustration en est fournie par une étude réalisée dans la région transfrontalière de Kyé-Ossi (Cameroun, Gabon et Guinée Equatoriale); voir L. ELLA MEYE, “Les flux migratoires dans la région transfrontalière de KyeOssi : une menace de l’Etat ?”, communication aux Journées scientifiques du GRAPS, Yaoundé, septembre 2001, dactyl. CDSR-AC, Rapport de la réunion sous-régionale préparatoire au 3e forum pour le développement de l’Afrique (ADF III), Yaoundé, 2002, pp. 4-12.
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée
363
continent symbolisé par la constitution de l’Union Africaine106. En cela, les Etats du golfe de Guinée n’innovent guère tant il parait, assez paradoxalement, que les barrières frontalières, au Nord comme au Sud, n’ont jamais été aussi hermétiques à la circulation des personnes en cette ère de mondialisation. La vision anthropomorphique d’une communauté humaine régie par les principes de l’indivision et du jus communicationis jadis caressée par Francisco de Vitoria de Salamanque serait-elle à jamais chimérique ?
106
Commission Economique pour l’Afrique, L’architecture et la capacité de l’Union Africaine, CEA, Addis-Abeba, Mars 2002.
This page intentionally left blank
LA DECLARATION DE L’ORGANISATION INTERNATIONALE DU TRAVAIL DU 18 JUIN 1998 RELATIVE AUX PRINCIPES ET DROITS FONDAMENTAUX AU TRAVAIL : UNE TECHNIQUE JURIDIQUE SINGULIERE DE RELANCE DES CONVENTIONS FONDAMENTALES Mouloud Boumghar*
Créée en 1919 par le Traité de Versailles, l’Organisation internationale du Travail (O.I.T.) est intimement liée au règlement de la Paix. Après avoir massivement participé à l’effort de guerre, les travailleurs des Puissances alliées acquirent un poids suffisamment important pour faire pression sur leurs gouvernements respectifs afin que ceux-ci accèdent à leurs revendications au moment des négociations de paix. La peur de la contagion révolutionnaire aidant, le gouvernement du Royaume-Uni et celui de la France présentèrent des projets visant à inclure dans le Traité de Paix une réglementation internationale du travail1. L’examen de ces propositions par une Commission spéciale mandatée par la Conférence de la Paix eut pour résultat l’insertion d’une Partie XIII dans le Traité de Versailles prévoyant la création d’une Organisation permanente en charge des questions relatives au travail. Liée au règlement de la Paix d’un point de vue organique, l’Organisation internationale du Travail l’est aussi par ses fondements axiologiques et idéologiques. C’est ce que reflète le fameux passage *
Doctorant à l’Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II), Attaché Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche (ATER) à l’Université Paris-Nord (Paris XIII). Cet article a été publié une première fois (avril 2003) dans la revue électronique Droits Fondamentaux (http://www.droits-fondamentaux.org).
1
Sur ces projets, voir notamment N. VALTICOS, Droit international du travail, 2ème éd., Paris, Dalloz, 1970, n°46 et ss., pp. 36-41 (ci-après “DIT”).
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 365-404. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
366
Mouloud Boumghar
du Préambule de la Partie XIII du Traité de Versailles – c’est-à-dire la Charte constitutive de l’Organisation2 - qui dispose : “Attendu que la Société des Nations a pour but d’établir la paix universelle et qu’une telle paix ne peut être fondée que sur (…) la justice sociale (…), les Nations ont décidé de créer une organisation permanente du Travail”.
Par cette formulation, la nouvelle institution s’assignait pour objectif – ambitieux – la réalisation de la justice sociale. Le Français Albert Thomas, ami de Jean Jaurès et premier directeur du Bureau international du Travail (B.I.T.), expliquait cette imbrication intime des deux idées maîtresses en affirmant que “la démocratie politique, qui doit être (…) la sauvegarde des peuples contre les entraînements guerriers, n’est efficace [et] réelle que si elle est appuyée sur les pratiques de la démocratie sociale” et que “si la démocratie est la condition de la paix, la justice sociale est la condition de la démocratie”3. De la sorte, Thomas écartait la révolution comme moyen de réalisation de la justice sociale, lui préférant la voie du réformisme ; tout en rappelant le rôle de l’Etat en tant que cadre de sa réalisation. Bien que non définie par la Constitution de l’O.I.T., la justice sociale a été considérée dès les premières années de cette institution comme non “seulement un moyen d’établir la paix universelle [mais] aussi [comme] une fin propre”4. Cette valeur essentielle a permis l’extension progressive de la compétence de l’O.I.T. malgré l’opposition de certains gouvernements. Ces derniers, soutenus par les milieux patronaux, souhaitaient modérer les ambitions et tempérer les ardeurs de l’Organisation, handicapée par la définition large de ses objectifs. Suite à un avis consultatif de la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, l’“unité du travail” finît par être consacrée permettant ainsi une extension ratione personae de la compétence de l’O.I.T. non seulement à tous les travailleurs mais aussi à toutes les personnes 2 3 4
Celle-ci est traditionnellement appelée Constitution de l’OIT. C’est cette expression que nous retiendrons. A. THOMAS, “Justice sociale et paix universelle”, Revue de Paris, 15 mars 1924, in Politique sociale européenne, B.I.T., Genève, 1974, p. 137. A. FONTAINE, Dix ans d’OIT, 1931, pp. 13 et 15, cité in N. VALTICOS, Droit international du travail, op. cit., n°147, p. 113.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
367
susceptibles de travailler. Cette évolution dans le sens d’une prise en compte par l’Organisation de catégories de personnes autres que les travailleurs stricto sensu débuta en 1926 avec l’adoption de la Convention (n°21) sur l’inspection des émigrants, dans laquelle il n’est à aucun moment question de travailleur ni de travail. Cependant, la véritable consécration de cet élargissement vint avec la Déclaration de Philadelphie concernant les buts et objectifs de l’O.I.T. qui “ne s’adresse pas uniquement au monde du travail” mais au “genre humain dans son ensemble” à “tous les êtres humains, quels que soient leur race, leur croyance ou leur sexe”5. Adoptée en 1944 par la Conférence internationale du Travail à Philadelphie, cette Déclaration fut incorporée en 1946 à la Constitution de l’OIT en remplacement de l’article 41 du texte de 1919. Elle constitue depuis la Charte des buts et objectifs de l’Organisation et possède, formellement, la même valeur juridique que le reste de la Constitution. Ce texte est la réponse au défi historique posé par la Deuxième guerre mondiale qui “emporta corps et biens la SDN” à laquelle l’OIT était organiquement liée. Elle lui permit de survivre à celle-ci et de réussir son intégration au système des Nations Unies. Commentant la déclaration lors de sa présentation à la Conférence internationale du Travail en 1944, le Directeur général du B.I.T. expliquait que cette disposition essentielle était “destinée à montrer comment s’était élargie, au cours du dernier quart de siècle, la conception de justice sociale sur laquelle l’Organisation internationale du Travail s’appuie” et visait à “affirmer que tous les êtres humains ont certains droits en commun” désavouant ainsi “complètement les attitudes de discrimination qui ont apporté tant de misère au monde sous la loi de l’Axe, et qui devraient manifestement être éliminées des modes d’agir de tous les Etats démocratiques”6. En proclamant l’égalité de tous les êtres humains et “leur droit de poursuivre leur progrès matériel et leur développement spirituel dans la liberté et la dignité”, la Déclaration de Philadelphie intègre les droits de l’homme dans la problématique de ses objectifs. Ce mouvement est 5 6
Sur l’importance de cette Déclaration, voir notamment V.-Y. GHEBALI, L’Organisation internationale du Travail, Genève, Georg, 1987, pp. 40 et s. “Principes d’actions, programme et statut de l’Organisation internationale du travail”, C.I.T., 26ème session, Rapport I, Montréal, B.I.T., 1944, pp. 1-22.
368
Mouloud Boumghar
particulièrement perceptible dans sa Section I qui réitère l’attachement de l’O.I.T. à la liberté d’association – figurant déjà à l’article 41 de la Constitution de 1919 – en même temps qu’elle fait explicitement mention, ce qui était nouveau et moins évident, de la liberté d’expression. La mention de la liberté d’expression conjointement avec la liberté syndicale dans un seul et même énoncé témoigne, selon Wilfred Jenks, que cette dernière “has become the cornerstone of civil liberties and social and economic rights alike (…) [and] a necessary condition of economic and social freedom for the ordinary citizen”7. La Déclaration de Philadelphie consacre “la liberté d’expression et d’association” comme “condition indispensable d’un progrès soutenu” (Section I, b) et de “l’effort international continu et concerté dans lequel les représentants des travailleurs et des employeurs, coopérant sur un pied d’égalité avec ceux des gouvernements, participent à de libres discussions et à des décisions de caractère démocratique” (Section I, d).
Cet intérêt pour les droits de l’homme n’était pas sans précédent. Comme l’a souligné René Cassin8, s’il est vrai qu’au lendemain de la Grande Guerre, le Pacte de la Société des Nations (SdN) avait envisagé la protection de certaines catégories de personnes comme les minorités nationales, l’O.I.T. était l’organisation internationale dotée du mandat le plus large en la matière, à une époque où les individus n’étaient pas considérés comme des sujets du droit international. A l’inverse de ce qui s’est passé dans l’ordre interne, le droit international a d’abord garanti certains droits sociaux. Les Etats considérant en 1919 que le monde, déjà mûr pour la démocratie, était menacé de destruction par l’injustice sociale. Cependant, c’est la démarche globalisante de la Déclaration de Philadelphie qui a établi, pour la première fois, le principe de la protection internationale des droits de l’homme. 7 8
C.W. JENKS, Human Rights and International Labour Standards, Londres/New York, Stevens/Prager, 1960, p. 49. R. CASSIN, Nobel Lectures – Peace, 1951-1970, Amsterdam, Londres, New York, Elsevier Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 398-399, cité in C.W. JENKS, “Economic and Social Change and the Law of Nations”, R.C.A.D.I. 138 (1973) I, p. 470.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
369
L’apport de la Déclaration de Philadelphie ne s’arrête pas là. Ce texte a aussi permis l’extension ratione materiae de la compétence de l’O.I.T. du travail au social. Cette évolution avait été empêchée par la Cour permanente de Justice internationale qui avait estimé, dans son avis consultatif n°3, que “l’organisation et le développement des moyens de production [n’étaient] pas du domaine”9 de l’O.I.T. La Cour permanente enlevait ainsi à cette dernière “la possibilité de se prononcer sur les aspects de la politique économique susceptibles d’affecter en particulier la création d’emplois”10. En affirmant que “tous les programmes d’action et mesures prises sur le plan national et international, notamment dans le domaine économique et financier, doivent être appréciées d[u] point de vue [du progrès matériel et du développement spirituel de tous les êtres humains] et acceptées seulement dans la mesure où ils apparaissent de nature à favoriser et non à entraver, l’accomplissement de cet objectif fondamental” (Section II, c),
la Déclaration de Philadelphie introduit de manière solennelle les préoccupations sociales, au sens large, et le développement économique dans le mandat de l’O.I.T. Le social devient ainsi “la pierre de touche” de l’appréciation de la politique économique qui cesse d’être “un but en soi” pour n’être “qu’un moyen de réaliser des objectifs sociaux”11. Cet audacieux élargissement des buts et objectifs de l’O.I.T. a contribué à faire de la justice sociale le moteur le plus puissant de la réglementation internationale du travail. La diversité de cette œuvre normative se reflète dans le Code international du Travail. Cette compilation des instruments normatifs de l’O.I.T., qui fait partie du corpus juris de la justice sociale, embrasse l’ensemble des domaines de compétence de l’Organisation. A la suite de Jenks12, il est devenu classique de distinguer trois domaines dans la réglementation du travail. Le premier d’entre eux a trait aux droits fondamentaux (“certain basic human rights”), c’est celui qui nous occupe ; le second se rapporte aux “infrastructures 9 10 11 12
C.P.J.I., Série B, n°2 et 3, p. 49. F. MAUPAIN, “L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation”, R.C.A.D.I., 278 (1999), p. 325. “Principes d’action, programme et statut…”, op. cit., p. 7. C.W. JENKS, Law, Freedom and Welfare, Londres, Stevens, 1963, p. 103.
370
Mouloud Boumghar
essentielles à la protection des travailleurs et du progrès social” tandis que le dernier est composé des “normes de fond visant à assurer une protection ou une prestation spécifique aux travailleurs ou à certaines catégories spécifiées” de travailleurs. La Déclaration de l’O.I.T. relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail13 du 18 juin 1998 marque l’amorce d’une troisième grande étape dans l’activité normative de l’Organisation14. Cet instrument constitue une réponse au défi que représente la “mondialisation” contemporaine. Le 75ème anniversaire de l’O.I.T., célébré en 1994, année de la finalisation des négociations de l’Uruguay Round, avait été l’occasion de s’interroger sur les limites de l’action normative de l’Organisation telle qu’elle avait été menée jusque là. En effet, la justice sociale se trouvait, et elle le demeure, confrontée à la libéralisation des échanges commerciaux et la concurrence internationale, voire menacée par elles15. En réaffirmant le caractère fondamental de la liberté d’association et de la reconnaissance effective du droit à la négociation collective, de l’élimination de toute forme de travail forcé ou obligatoire, de l’abolition effective du travail des enfants et de l’élimination de la discrimination en matière d’emploi et de profession, la Déclaration identifie, par sa substance, le point nodal entre la justice sociale et la mondialisation économique. Selon le Directeur général du B.I.T., “la Déclaration ne vise pas en tant que tel à établir le caractère fondamental de certains droits. Leur prééminence résulte de l’objet sur lequel ils portent et du fait qu’ils ont déjà été reconnus comme fondamentaux à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur de l’OIT. En d’autres termes, les droits fondamentaux ne sont
13
14
15
Adoptée par 273 voix pour et 43 abstentions, Compte rendu des travaux, vol. I, Conférence internationale du Travail, 86ème session, Genève, 1998, CRP n°22, pp. 49-52. Pour un rappel historique détaillé de l’élaboration de la Déclaration de 1998, se reporter utilement à B.I.T., “Examen d’une éventuelle Déclaration de principes de l’Organisation internationale du Travail relative aux droits fondamentaux et de son mécanisme de suivi approprié”, Rapport VII (ci-après “Rapport VII”), Conférence internationale du Travail, 86ème session, 1998, Genève, pp. 3-10 Voir notamment B.I.T., “Des valeurs à défendre, des changements à entreprendre – La justice sociale dans une économie qui se mondialise : un projet pour l’OIT”, Rapport du Directeur général à la Conférence internationale du Travail, 81ème session, Genève, 1994 ; Rapport VII, pp. 11-17.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
371
pas fondamentaux parce que la Déclaration le dit, mais la Déclaration le dit parce qu’ils le sont”16.
D’une originalité certaine, la Déclaration ne ressortit pas, du point de vue formel, des moyens classiques de l’action normative de l’O.I.T. que sont les conventions et les recommandations. Les premières sont des instruments formellement contraignants tandis que les secondes ne le sont pas. Pour les deux, les Membres de l’Organisation ont l’obligation de soumettre l’instrument adopté à leurs autorités nationales compétentes dans un certain délai. Ceci à fin de ratification pour les conventions (article 19, § 5, b de la Constitution), et “en vue de l[es] transformer en loi ou de prendre des mesures d’un autre ordre” s’agissant des recommandations (article 19, § 6, b, de la Constitution). Malgré cette importante obligation, les raisons pour lesquelles l’O.I.T. n’a eu recours ni aux unes ni aux autres apparaissent simples. D’une part, une convention n’aurait pour le moins pas été adaptée à la promotion de “principes et droits qui ont été exprimés et développés (…) dans des conventions [de l’O.I.T.] reconnues comme fondamentales”. L’objectif final exprès de la Déclaration étant de favoriser chez les Etats Membres qui ne l’ont pas encore fait la ratification de l’ensemble des conventions fondamentales. Lors de l’adoption de la Déclaration, les conventions fondamentales étaient au nombre de sept : la convention (n°29) sur le travail forcé, 1930 ; la convention (n°87) sur la liberté syndicale et la protection du droit syndical, 1948 ; la convention (n°100) sur l’égalité de rémunération, 1951 ; la convention (n°105) sur l’abolition du travail forcé, 1957 ; la convention (n°111) concernant la discrimination (emploi et profession), 1958 et la convention (n°138) sur l’âge minimum, 1973. Depuis, s’est ajoutée la convention (n°182) sur les pires formes du travail des enfants, 1999, adoptée par la
16
Voir Rapport VII, p. 11. Le groupe des travailleurs a exprimé la même idée lors des discussions précédant l’adoption de la Déclaration, voir Compte rendu des travaux, vol. I, Conférence internationale du Travail, 86ème session, CRP n°20, p. 5, § 18.
372
Mouloud Boumghar
Conférence internationale du Travail à l’unanimité à sa 87ème session17. D’autre part, une simple recommandation n’aurait pas permis de souligner le caractère solennel de l’instrument18. La Conférence internationale du Travail a en effet recours à une recommandation “lorsque l’objet traité ou un de ses aspects ne se prête pas à l’adoption immédiate d’une convention” (Article 19, § 1, b, de la Constitution). Or les conventions fondamentales sont le développement de ce qui fait la substance de la Déclaration. Si originale qu’elle puisse paraître, l’utilisation d’une déclaration n’est pas sans précédent. Dans les organisations de la famille des Nations Unies, c’est en effet “un instrument formel et solennel, qui se justifie en de rares occasions, quand on énonce des principes ayant une grande importance et une valeur durable”. La re-formulation des buts et objectifs de l’O.I.T. avait été faite en 1944 par le biais de la Déclaration de Philadelphie, incorporée en 1946 à la Constitution. C’est encore une Déclaration qui a été adoptée par la C.I.T. en 1964 pour marquer solennellement la condamnation de l’apartheid par l’Organisation et ses Membres. Sorte de “recommandation génétiquement modifiée”19, l’originalité de la Déclaration de 1998 ne réside pas tant dans son appellation que dans la combinaison entre sa forme et son mécanisme de suivi (ci-après “le Suivi”). En effet, la Déclaration associe le caractère non contraignant ou promotionnel des recommandations au mécanisme de suivi (ou de contrôle) des conventions non ratifiées prévu à l’article 19, § 5, e, de la Constitution de l’O.I.T., alors même que cette Constitution prévoit expressément un mécanisme de contrôle en tout point identique pour les recommandations. 17
18
19
Déclaration de l’O.I.T. relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail, § 1, b. La convention n°182 est entrée en vigueur le 19 novembre 2000. Voir sur cet ajout, Examen des rapports annuels en vertu du suivi de la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail. Partie I. Introduction par les Experts-conseillers à la compilation des rapports annuels, Genève, B.I.T., mars 2001, p. 9. Mémorandum préparé par le Service juridique, secrétariat de l’ONU, 34 UNESCOR, sup. (n°8) 15, doc. ONU/E/CN.4/L.610 (1962), cité in Rapport VII, p. 19. Cf. E. DECAUX, “Droit déclaratoire et droit programmatoire” in La protection des droits de l’homme et l’évolution du droit international, Colloque S.F.D.I. de Strasbourg, Paris, Pedone, 1998. F. MAUPAIN, “L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation”, loc. cit., p. 243.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
373
En optant pour une telle combinaison, les concepteurs de la Déclaration ont mis l’accent sur le lien essentiel, du point de vue substantiel, entre les principes qu’elle énonce, les objectifs de la Constitution, dont les précédents sont l’expression, et les dispositions des conventions fondamentales qui en sont le développement. Par ailleurs, instrument formellement non contraignant, la Déclaration assure le lien entre des instruments conventionnels, et par conséquent contraignants, qui sont d’une part, la Constitution, et d’autre part, les conventions fondamentales de l’O.I.T. Du point de vue de la technique du droit international public, plus particulièrement en ce qui concerne les ordres juridiques internes des organisations internationales, tout l’intérêt de cette Déclaration réside dans le fait qu’en tant qu’instrument non contraignant accompagné d’un mécanisme de suivi, elle permet d’une part, d’avoir un effet sur la ratification des conventions fondamentales, et d’autre part, et par voie de conséquence, sur l’autorité normative des principes constitutionnels de l’Organisation. La Déclaration témoigne ainsi de la vigueur d’un texte non contraignant, qui relève du droit dérivé d’une organisation internationale, lorsqu’il s’insère dans un ensemble normatif préexistant dans lequel il n’introduit formellement aucun engagement nouveau à la charge des Etats Membres. Dans cette construction, le “Suivi Promotionnel” qui accompagne le texte de la Déclaration joue un rôle primordial en assurant l’effectivité des “principes et droits fondamentaux au travail” qui sont eux-mêmes l’expression des principes constitutionnels de l’O.I.T. auxquels est attachée une obligation de promotion à la charge des Etats Membres.
L’OBLIGATION DE PROMOTION CONSTITUTIONNELS DE L’O.I.T.
DES
PRINCIPES
Le sixième attendu de la Déclaration de l’O.I.T. de 1998 dispose que les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail sont “l’expression des principes constitutionnels” de l’Organisation. Pourtant, s’il est d’usage de désigner la charte constitutive de l’O.I.T. en utilisant le terme “constitution”, il ne s’agit guère d’un abus de langage. En effet,
374
Mouloud Boumghar
l’acte qui institue une organisation internationale est de nature mixte. “Traité international fondé, en tant que tel, sur la volonté” des parties, “il est par ailleurs destiné à devenir la constitution, c’est-à-dire l’acte de fondation de l’organisation, auquel celle-ci se rattache tout au long de son existence”. Conventionnel par sa forme, l’acte fondateur de toute organisation internationale possède “la substance de la constitution”20 en raison de son caractère institutionnel21. Si cette vision pouvait être mise en cause il y a quelques décennies, il ne fait plus guère de doute qu’il existe aujourd’hui un droit constitutionnel des organisations internationales22, qui ne se confond bien évidemment pas avec les droits constitutionnels nationaux23. Dotées d’une constitution, les organisations internationales ont une “finalité fonctionnelle”, c’est-à-dire “une valeur instrumentale qui marque nettement leur nature”. “Il en découle que ce qui vaut le plus, dans la structure d’une organisation internationale et même en ce qui concerne sa vocation, c’est la possibilité concrète de remplir ses fonctions, et, par conséquent, d’atteindre ses objectifs”.
C’est pour cette raison qu’on “trouve (…) dans l’acte institutif d’une organisation (…) des principes dont la portée dépasse très largement le résultat pratique en vue duquel l’organisation doit opérer”24. C’est précisément le cas au sein de l’O.I.T. Sa constitution a “établi certains principes généraux qui ont constitué des normes fondamentales dont on s’est souvent inspiré par la suite, non seulement
20 21 22
23
24
R. MONACO, “Les principes régissant la structure et le fonctionnement des organisations internationales”, R.C.A.D.I., 156 (1977) III, p. 101. CIJ, Avis consultatif du 8 juillet 1996, Licéité de l’utilisation des armes nucléaires par un Etat dans un conflit armé, Rec. 1996, § 19, p. 75. G. CAHIN, La coutume internationale et les organisations internationales. L’incidence de la dimension institutionnelle sur le processus coutumier, Paris, Pedone, 2001, p. 10. Contrairement à François GUERIN, La qualité de membre d’une organisation internationale, Thèse, Paris II, 1998, p. 17, l’expression “texte constitutif” ne nous paraît pas d’un usage systématique préférable à celui du terme “constitution”, auquel cet auteur reproche ses “connotations étatiques [et] paraétatiques”. Cette étude relevant du droit international public, toute possibilité de confusion avec les droits constitutionnels nationaux nous semble écartée. R. MONACO, “Les principes régissant…”, loc. cit., pp. 96-97. Italiques ajoutés.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
375
comme des directives adressées aux organes de l’O.I.T. en vue de l’élaboration de conventions et de recommandations mais aussi comme une source directe du droit international du travail”25.
Comme toute organisation internationale, l’O.I.T. s’est dotée de tels principes dans sa Constitution. A l’heure actuelle, ces principes sont ceux de la Déclaration de Philadelphie qui ont pris la suite des principes généraux de l’article 41 de la Constitution de 1919. Remplacé par la Déclaration de Philadelphie sur les buts et objectifs de l’O.I.T., l’ancien article 41 n’est plus en vigueur26. Cependant, son étude reste intéressante pour la compréhension de la Déclaration de 1998. D’une part, les principes de cette dernière coïncident partiellement avec les principes généraux de 1919. D’autre part, tout en étant une “nouvelle formulation des buts et objectifs” de l’Organisation, la première section de la Déclaration de Philadelphie ne fait qu’“affirme[r] à nouveau les principes fondamentaux sur lesquels l’Organisation (…) est fondée, tels qu’ils sont [étaient] fixés dans l’article 41 de la Constitution”27. Ces objectifs, dans leur nouvelle version, conservent donc la valeur et la portée que leur accorde le droit international public. Par conséquent, avant d’envisager la portée des principes de la Déclaration de 1998 (C), il convient de comprendre quelle est la portée des principes constitutionnels de l’OIT (A) y compris le principe relatif à la liberté syndicale dont l’effectivité est assurée par un mécanisme de plaintes (B), dont la Déclaration devait initialement s’inspirer. A. Des principes généraux aux principes fondamentaux. A l’instar de l’Organisation elle-même, les principes généraux de l’O.I.T. ont joui, dès le départ, du bénéfice de la vocation universelle. Ces principes généraux, dont fait mention l’article 41 de la Constitution de 1919, trouvent leur origine dans les clauses ouvrières qui avaient été promues par les mouvements qui militaient, bien avant 25 26 27
N. VALTICOS, DIT, op. cit., n°161, p. 128. Voir sur ce point le Code international du travail, éd. 1953, p. 25, note 23. “Principes d’action, programme et statut…”, op. cit., p. 5.
376
Mouloud Boumghar
la création de l’O.I.T., en faveur de l’élaboration d’un véritable code international du travail dont le respect devait être garanti par un mécanisme de contrôle28. Alors qu’il était bien entendu pour les représentants de la mouvance ouvrière que ces clauses avaient une valeur contraignante, cette position n’était pas partagée par tous les membres de la Commission de législation internationale. Pour d’autres en effet, il ne pouvait s’agir que de principes directeurs dépourvus de toute valeur contraignante. L’incertitude relative à la portée des clauses ouvrières apparut dès le stade des discussions du texte de la Constitution et l’intitulé “Principes généraux” de la section II de la Partie XIII du Traité de Versailles, sous lequel elles ont été désignées, apporte peu d’éclaircissement sur leur portée. Le paragraphe 2 de l’article 41 dispose en effet que “les Hautes Parties Contractantes (…) pensent qu’il y a des méthodes et des principes pour la réglementation des conditions du travail que toutes les communautés industrielles devraient s’efforcer d’appliquer”. Quant au paragraphe 3 de cet article, il contient une énumération des méthodes et principes qui paraissaient être à l’époque aux Hautes Parties Contractantes “d’une importance particulière et urgente”, ce qui laisse supposer que cette liste ne se voulait pas exhaustive. Dans l’ordre, ces principes généraux sont les suivants : “1. 2. 3.
4.
5.
28
Le principe dirigeant [selon lequel] le travail ne doit pas être considéré comme une marchandise ou article de commerce. Le droit d’association en vue de tous les objets non contraires aux lois, aussi bien pour les salariés que pour les employeurs. Le paiement aux travailleurs d’un salaire leur assurant un niveau de vie convenable tel qu’on le comprend dans leur temps et dans leur pays. L’adoption de la journée de huit heures ou de la semaine de quarante-huit heures comme but à atteindre partout où il n’a pas encore été obtenu. L’adoption d’un repos hebdomadaire de vingt-quatre heures au minimum qui devrait comprendre le dimanche toutes les fois que ce sera possible.
Sur ce point, voir notamment V.-Y. GHEBALI, op. cit., p. 23.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail 6.
7. 8.
9.
377
La suppression du travail des enfants et l’obligation d’apporter au travail des jeunes gens des deux sexes les limitations nécessaires pour leur permettre de continuer leur éducation et d’assurer leur développement physique. Le principe du salaire égal, sans distinction de sexe, pour un travail de valeur égale. Les règles édictées dans chaque pays au sujet des conditions du travail devront assurer un traitement économique équitable à tous les travailleurs étrangers résidant légalement dans le pays. Chaque Etat devra organiser un service d’inspection qui comprendra des femmes, afin d’assurer l’application des lois et règlements pour la protection des travailleurs.”
Quant à leur nature, ces principes généraux ne peuvent être assimilés aux “principes généraux de droit reconnus par les nations civilisées” que mentionnait à l’époque l’article 38 du Statut de la C.P.J.I. En effet, quelle que soit la position que l’on adopte à leur égard, les principes généraux de l’article 41 ne préexistaient pas dans la plupart ou au sein des principaux ordres juridiques nationaux puisque chaque Etat membre devait s’efforcer de les appliquer. Par ailleurs, l’utilisation de l’expression “principes et méthodes” n’est pas sans rappeler la distinction établie par la Cour internationale de Justice dans son arrêt du Golfe du Maine29. Dans cette décision, la Cour fait en effet la différence, valable aussi bien pour le droit international coutumier que le droit international conventionnel, entre les “principes juridiques de base qui énoncent des directives à suivre en vue d’un but essentiel” et les “méthodes pratiques et souvent techniques à utiliser pour atteindre le but en question, (…) méthodes qui restent tel[les] même qu’on les qualifie aussi, mais dans un autre sens, de ‘principes’”30.
29
30
Arrêt de la chambre de la CIJ sur l’affaire de la délimitation de la frontière maritime dans le Golfe du Maine (Canada/ Etats-Unis). Arrêt du 12 octobre 1984, Rec. 1984, § 81, p. 290. Pour un commentaire de cet arrêt, voir E. DECAUX, “Arrêt de la chambre de la CIJ sur l’affaire de la délimitation de la frontière maritime dans le Golfe du Maine (Canada/ Etats-Unis). Arrêt du 12 octobre 1984”, AFDI (1984), pp. 304-339. Arrêt précité, Rec. 1984, p. 290, §§ 80-81.
378
Mouloud Boumghar
A l’évidence, tous les principes généraux cités n’ont pas la même nature. Pour cette raison, il serait préférable de parler à leur égard d’“énoncés qualifiés de principes” généraux31. Sans établir une classification détaillée de ces principes, on peut remarquer que certains d’entre eux, comme le principe 1, sont des principes axiologiques exprimant une valeur et/ou représentant un axiome. D’autres principes généraux énoncent des mesures concrètes comme le principe 3, la première préposition du principe 6 ou encore le principe 4 qui renferme, de manière claire, un but à atteindre. Objectifs, les principes généraux prennent aussi la forme d’énoncés qui semblent revêtir une valeur contraignante (2ème partie du principe 6, principes 8 et 9). Mais la conclusion qui pourrait être tirée de cette apparence est fortement nuancée par le dernier paragraphe de l’article 41. En effet, même si les Etats parties considéraient les dispositions précitées comme étant d’une “importance particulière et urgente”, le texte de la Constitution de 1919 ne leur accordait comme valeur que celle de principes “propres à guider la politique de la Société des Nations” dans la réglementation internationale du travail. Analysés comme des principes normatifs structurels qui sont la traduction des “préoccupations et [d]es objectifs” du système juridique de l’O.I.T., on ne peut affirmer que les principes généraux ne s’imposent juridiquement ni à l’O.I.T. ni aux Etats membres. La conclusion sur la valeur juridique de ces principes tirée de leur qualification nous semble en effet quelque peu en contradiction avec la qualification elle-même32. A moins qu’il ne soit question ici que de normativité sociale. Il est vrai que la normativité, en droit international, de ce que le professeur Verhoeven appelle des principes structurels est mise en doute. Et il est aussi vrai que la définition même de ces principes pose problème. “Exigences résultant objectivement de la structure des rapports internationaux”, les principes structurels “reflètent une certaine idée que l’on se fait de la 31
32
Voir V. CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS, Les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République, préf. de M. Troper, Paris/Aix-en-Provence, Economica/Presses universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, 2001, p. 88. L. DUBIN, La protection des normes sociales dans les échanges internationaux, Thèse, Paris I, 2001, p. 200. A notre connaissance, cette thèse comporte l’étude la plus récente, et probablement la plus détaillée, sur les principes constitutionnels de l’O.I.T.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
379
société que l’on entend régir”33. Or, cette fonction des principes structurels fait apparaître leur détermination comme une opération empreinte d’une certaine part de subjectivité, qui nous semble peu conciliable avec leur caractère d’exigences résultant objectivement de la structure des rapports internationaux ou de celle d’un ordre juridique déterminé. Plus simplement, ces méthodes et principes correspondent, du point de vue du droit international public, aux traditionnels et classiques objectifs de l’Organisation34. Expression de la finalité fonctionnelle de l’organisation, ces objectifs, énoncés sous l’appellation de principes, sont en réalité l’expression d’une “finalité structurante” dotée d’une valeur et d’une portée normatives, dont la théorie des pouvoirs implicites est une illustration. Dénués de valeur contraignante en soi, ces principes, en tant qu’objectifs de l’Organisation dans lesquels les Etats membres “n’ont pas de peine à reconnaître la communauté de leurs intérêts”35, n’en emportent pas moins des conséquences juridiques. Cependant, il ne semble pas, en ce qui concerne les principes généraux de la Constitution de 1919, que ces conséquences aient été directement attachées dans le chef des Etats membres. “Principes généraux”36 dans la Constitution de 1919, les principes renouvelés sont qualifiés de fondamentaux dans la Déclaration de Philadelphie (Section I) qui les regroupent autour des quatre énoncés suivants : “a) b) c)
33 34
35
36
le travail n’est pas une marchandise ; la liberté d’expression et d’association est une condition indispensable d’un progrès soutenu ; la pauvreté, où qu’elle existe, constitue un danger pour la prospérité de tous ;
J. VERHOEVEN, Droit international public, Bruxelles, De Boeck & Larcier, 2000, pp. 352-353. Italiques ajoutés. Qui ne sont pas à confondre avec l’objet du traité qui institue l’organisation internationale. Sur cette distinction, voir notamment F. GUERIN, op. cit., pp. 388-389. M. VIRALLY, “La notion de fonction dans la théorie de l’organisation internationale” in Mélanges offerts à Charles Rousseau. La communauté internationale, Paris, Pedone, 1974, p. 291 et p. 283. Sur les différentes implications de ce critère, voir B. VITANYI, “La signification de la ‘généralité’ des principes de droit”, R.G.D.I.P. (1976) 2, pp. 536-545.
380 d)
Mouloud Boumghar la lutte contre le besoin doit être menée avec une inlassable énergie au sein de chaque nation, et par un effort international continu et concerté dans lequel les représentants des travailleurs et des employeurs, coopérant sur un pied d’égalité avec ceux des gouvernements, participent à de libres discussions et à des décisions de caractère démocratique en vue de promouvoir le bien commun”.
Moins nombreux, plus vagues et plus abstraits dans leur formulation que la plupart des principes généraux de 1919, les principes de la Déclaration de Philadelphie ressemblent davantage à des énoncés qualifiés de principes qu’à de véritables principes de droit. Cependant, si leur normativité peut paraître faible, voire nulle, ils n’en restent pas moins fondamentaux, comme il est devenu d’usage de les qualifier au sein de l’O.I.T. Ils le sont à plus d’un titre37. Tout d’abord, tous ces principes revêtent un caractère axiologique, qui indique autour de quelles valeurs les Etats membres se sont regroupés pour opérer la “relance” de l’Organisation à la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Ils sont aussi fondamentaux en raison de leur source, de leur appartenance au droit originel du système juridique de l’O.I.T., c’est-à-dire à la Constitution. Fondamentaux, les principes de Philadelphie le sont encore parce qu’ils assurent une fonction d’identité et de cohérence au sein du système juridique de l’Organisation. Ces deux dernières caractéristiques font de ces dispositions le socle sur lequel repose la réglementation internationale du travail. Toute la production normative de l’O.I.T. relative à la condition des travailleurs en est dérivée. Le choix du vocabulaire – utiliser principes fondamentaux au lieu de principes généraux – et le recours à une Déclaration sont les marques d’une solennisation du discours qui augurait, probablement, en 1944 de la reconnaissance de conséquences juridiques nouvelles aux objectifs de l’Organisation. Une telle évolution s’est lentement fait jour au sein de l’O.I.T. qui a permis de voir dans ces principes des dispositions “entraînant des conséquences juridiques tant pour l’Organisation que pour les Etats
37
Sur les significations possibles du caractère fondamental d’un droit ou d’un principe juridique, voir V. CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS, op. cit., pp. 83-85.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
381
membres”38. En réalité seul le principe relatif à la liberté syndicale permet d’illustrer, de manière éclatante, cette affirmation. B. L’autonomie de l’obligation attachée aux principes constitutionnels de l’O.I.T. malgré l’existence d’un mécanisme spécial fondé directement sur la Constitution Avec pour fondement la valeur de la justice sociale, l’O.I.T. s’inspire dans son action du réformisme social. Elle rejette donc dans sa démarche l’idée marxiste selon laquelle la société se trouve dans un état de lutte continue des classes. Aux politiques découlant de cette analyse, les fondateurs de l’O.I.T. ont préféré la voie de la collaboration du travail avec le capital39. Partant du présupposé que toute réforme réelle est impossible sans le concours de ces deux principaux pôles du monde économique, que ce soit sur le plan interne ou sur le plan international, ils pensaient que les travailleurs, mais aussi leurs employeurs, devaient nécessairement s’organiser en groupements capables d’être le moteur de l’amélioration des conditions du travail40. La structure tripartite de l’O.I.T. est la conséquence directe de cette idée. Cette caractéristique fait de l’O.I.T. une organisation internationale unique mêlant les classiques éléments intergouvernementaux à une participation active d’organismes privés, non-étatiques, à travers les représentants des employés et ceux des employeurs. En effet, chaque Etat membre est représenté par quatre délégués à la Conférence internationale du Travail, l’organe “légiférant” de l’Organisation. Deux délégués gouvernementaux d’une part, et deux autres non-gouvernementaux, syndicaux plus précisément, d’autre part. Parmi ces derniers, l’un est le représentant des employés et l’autre celui des employeurs. Cette répartition n’est pas simplement honorifique puisque chaque délégué vote
38 39
40
N. VALTICOS, “Les méthodes de la protection internationale de la liberté syndicale”, R.C.A.D.I., 144 (1975) I, pp. 87-88. Sur ce point, voir D.C. YIANNOPOULOS, La protection internationale de la liberté syndicale : la Commission d’investigation et de conciliation en matière de liberté syndicale de l’Organisation internationale du travail, préf. de M. Virally, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1973, pp. 7 et ss. A. THOMAS, op. cit., p. 30.
382
Mouloud Boumghar
individuellement à la Conférence41. Du point de vue du droit international public, l’originalité de cette répartition prend toute son importance lors du vote des conventions et des recommandations. Elles sont en effet adoptées par la Conférence à la majorité des deux tiers42, sur la base de l’égalité des voix gouvernementales et des voix syndicales. Révolutionnaire en 1919, cette participation directe et effective d’acteurs privés, dans une enceinte internationale, à l’adoption de normes contraignantes – les conventions –, à égalité avec les Etats, demeure, aujourd’hui encore, un élément d’une extrême originalité. D’autant plus que l’article 19 de la Constitution fait obligation à tout Etat membre de soumettre aux autorités nationales compétentes, les conventions et les recommandations adoptées par la Conférence, à fin de ratification s’agissant des premières (Article 19 § 5, b), et “en vue de l[es] transformer en loi[s] ou de prendre des mesures d’un autre ordre” (Article 19 § 6, c) pour ce qui est des secondes43. Le tripartisme constitue donc l’une des caractéristiques dominantes de l’O.I.T., sinon sa caractéristique première. Dès lors, le respect de la liberté syndicale, des employeurs et des employés, par chaque Etat membre, est une condition nécessaire, voire indispensable, au bon fonctionnement de l’Organisation elle-même. Et les textes n’ont pas manqué de le souligner. Les principes généraux de 1919 faisaient déjà mention du “droit d’association”, pour les employeurs et pour les employés. La Déclaration de Philadelphie, quant à elle, consacre “la liberté d’expression et d’association” comme “condition indispensable d’un progrès soutenu” (Section I, b) et de “l’effort international continu et 41
42
43
Le vote pour l’adoption de la Déclaration de 1998 illustre cette règle. Pour apprécier la répartition des votes en fonction de la nationalité des délégués, voir C.I.T., 86ème session, Compte rendu des travaux, vol. I, Compte rendu n°22, pp. 49-51. Il s’agit des deux tiers des délégués présents. Article 19, § 2 de la Constitution. Sur l’originalité de ce procédé en droit international public au début du XXème siècle et l’apport de l’OIT au droit international public commun, se reporter à N. VALTICOS, “Les conventions de l’Organisation internationale du Travail à la croisée des anniversaires”, R.G.D.I.P. (1996) 1, pp. 10-12, spécialement p. 10. De l’avis de certains auteurs, le droit des traités attacherait cette obligation à la qualité d’Etat signataire. Voir R. KOLB, La bonne foi en droit international public. Contribution à l’étude des principes généraux de droit, Genève/Paris, IUHEI/PUF, 2000, pp. 213 et 215.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
383
concerté dans lequel les représentants des travailleurs et des employeurs, coopérant sur un pied d’égalité avec ceux des gouvernements, participent à de libres discussions et à des décisions de caractère démocratique” (Section I, d).
La mention de la liberté d’expression conjointement avec la liberté syndicale dans un seul et même énoncé témoigne du fait que cette dernière “has become the cornerstone of civil liberties and social and economic rights alike (…) [and] a necessary condition of economic and social freedom for the ordinary citizen”44. Pourtant, malgré cette importance capitale pour l’Organisation, le principe relatif à la liberté syndicale est resté sans consécration dans l’entre-deux-guerres. En effet, ce principe n’ayant pas de valeur directement contraignante à l’égard des Etats membres, l’adoption d’une convention était le passage obligé de toute garantie effective de la liberté syndicale. Malgré les efforts de l’Organisation, aucune convention de portée générale ne fut adoptée en la matière. Il fallut attendre la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale pour que la C.I.T. vote en faveur de deux conventions – la Convention n°87 (1948) concernant la liberté syndicale et la protection du droit syndical et la Convention n°98 (1949) concernant l’application des principes du droit d’organisation et de négociation collective - traçant les grandes lignes de la protection de la liberté syndicale. Ces conventions dites fondamentales représentent le socle sur lequel repose la réglementation internationale des droits syndicaux. Cependant, cette avancée ne pouvait pas résoudre tous les problèmes liés au respect de la liberté syndicale, bien qu’elle ouvrît des perspectives très importantes. En effet, la Constitution de l’O.I.T. prévoit que les syndicats d’employeurs ou de travailleurs peuvent adresser au B.I.T. des réclamations s’ils considèrent qu’un Etat membre ne remplit pas de “manière satisfaisante” ses obligations en vertu d’une convention de l’O.I.T. L’Etat à l’encontre duquel une réclamation a été émise peut être invité par le Conseil d’administration (CA) à faire une déclaration sur ce sujet (Article 24). Une publicité de ces échanges, à la discrétion du CA, est alors possible (Article 25). Par ailleurs, tout Etat membre 44
C.W. JENKS, Human Rights and International Labour Standards, op. cit., p. 49.
384
Mouloud Boumghar
partie à une convention de l’O.I.T. peut déposer une plainte auprès du B.I.T. contre un autre Etat membre, engagé dans la même relation conventionnelle que lui, qui ne remplirait pas ses obligations de “manière satisfaisante” selon l’Etat plaignant (Article 26 § 1). Outre une procédure identique à celle prévue pour les réclamations syndicales (Article 26 § 2), le CA peut constituer une Commission d’enquête chargée d’étudier la question et de faire un rapport (Article 26 § 3) dont le Directeur Général du B.I.T. assure la publication (Article 29 § 1). Et si ce rapport est contesté, il est prévu que le différend pourra être soumis à la Cour internationale de Justice (Article 29 § 2). Mais encore faut-il que l’Etat en question ait ratifié la convention de l’O.I.T. en question. Or, bien que les Etats membres aient l’obligation de soumettre les conventions adoptées par la Conférence aux autorités nationales compétentes pour ratification, il ne s’agit bien évidemment pas d’une obligation de ratifier. Ainsi, l’O.I.T. se trouvait démunie face aux Etats membres non parties aux conventions et auteurs de violations répétées de la liberté syndicale. Pour faire face à ce handicap, l’Organisation créa en 1950 une Commission d’investigation et de conciliation en matière de liberté syndicale puis, l’année suivante, un Comité de la liberté syndicale comme organe de filtrage45. La procédure établie en ce qui concerne la Commission prévoit la possibilité d’enquêter et d’établir les faits, avec le consentement de l’Etat visé, suite à des plaintes relatives au nonrespect de la liberté syndicale émanant de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies ou de l’ECOSOC, d’Etats membres ou encore de syndicats d’employeurs ou de travailleurs. Original, le procédé l’est parce qu’il ne repose pas sur une convention de l’O.I.T. La question s’était donc posée de savoir si une telle procédure respectait la Constitution de l’Organisation, ce dont doutait l’Afrique du Sud qui contesta la constitutionnalité du nouveau mécanisme46. Pour ce qui concerne la portée des objectifs de l’Organisation, la discussion juridique la plus pertinente est celle relative à l’article 10 de la
45 46
Pour une étude détaillée de ces deux organes, voir D.C. YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit., pp. 96 et ss. Voir D.C. YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit., pp. 156-157.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
385
Constitution qui soulevait la compétence du Conseil d’administration pour établir une telle Commission47. Pour l’Afrique du Sud, l’article 10 n’accorde pas une telle compétence au CA. Selon cet Etat, cette disposition ne lui donnerait le pouvoir de prescrire des enquêtes spéciales que dans l’unique but d’être en mesure de proposer des conventions ou des recommandations, seuls moyens normatifs que la Constitution mettrait à la disposition de l’O.I.T. pour atteindre ses objectifs. Par ailleurs, l’Afrique du Sud ne voyait pas dans la condition du consentement à la procédure de l’Etat visé un gage de conformité à la Constitution en raison de l’exposition de l’Etat récalcitrant à la publication (ou toute mesure appropriée) de la plainte par le Conseil d’administration de l’O.I.T.48 Les juristes de l’Organisation répliquèrent à ces arguments en considérant simplement que la condition du consentement était suffisamment respectueuse des droits des Etats et que la promotion des buts et objectifs de l’Organisation pouvait être réalisée par d’autres moyens que l’adoption de conventions et de recommandations. Autrement dit, il s’agit de moyens non expressément prévus par la Constitution49. Cette pratique nouvelle (à l’époque) de l’Organisation constitue donc la consécration de la reconnaissance d’une obligation de promouvoir les objectifs de l’O.I.T. – en l’espèce, le principe constitutionnel relatif à la liberté syndicale – mise non seulement à la charge de l’Organisation ellemême mais aussi, de manière moins évidente, directement à celle des Etats membres50 puisqu’il s’agit de vérifier le respect par ces derniers de la liberté syndicale sur le seul fondement exprès de leur adhésion au texte de la Déclaration de Philadelphie. 47
48
49 50
Cette compétence est largement discutée par A. CASSESE, “Il controllo internazionale sull rispetto della libertà sindacale, nel quadro della tendenze in materia di protezione internazionale di diritto dell’uomo”, Communicazioni e Studi, vol. XII, pp. 334-340. On a parlé à ce sujet de “mobilisation de la honte”. Sur ce point voir notamment, B. STERN, “Conclusions” in H. RUIZ FABRI, L.-A. SICILIANOS & J.-M. SOREL, L’effectivité des organisations internationales : Mécanismes de suivi et de contrôle, Athènes/Paris, Sakkoulas/Pedone, 2000, p. 112. Sur ce point, voir A. CASSESE, loc. cit., p. 334. Sur les différentes interprétations possibles, voir A. CASSESE, loc. cit., pp. 336 et ss.
386
Mouloud Boumghar
Cette procédure audacieuse est une illustration éclatante de la portée, très poussée en l’espèce, de la finalité fonctionnelle des organisations internationales. Il faut bien reconnaître cependant qu’elle ressemble fort pour les Etats Membres à une “entorse à [leur] souveraineté”51. Malgré cet écart, l’obligation de promouvoir ne s’est pas transformée en obligation de protéger52. En d’autres termes, cette pratique interne de l’Organisation marquée par la contribution des travaux du Comité et de la Commission à l’émergence de normes coutumières53 n’a pas permis, au sein du système juridique de l’O.I.T., la transformation de l’objectif d’affirmation de la liberté syndicale en principe portant obligation pour tout Etat membre de protéger, en plus de la promouvoir, la liberté syndicale. Dès lors que cette conclusion vaut pour la liberté syndicale, elle s’applique, a fortiori, aux autres principes constitutionnels qui n’ont pas bénéficié d’une procédure aussi ambitieuse. Les principes de la Déclaration de 1998 en étant l’expression, la question se pose de savoir s’ils n’ont qu’une valeur d’objectifs ou si la Déclaration apporte des éléments nouveaux quant à leur portée juridique. C. Les principes de la Déclaration de 1998 : une valeur promotionnelle La Déclaration de 1998 énonce dans son paragraphe 2 “les principes concernant les droits fondamentaux” suivants : “a) b) c) d)
51 52
53
la liberté d’association et la reconnaissance effective du droit de négociation ; l’élimination de toute forme de travail forcé ou obligatoire ; l’abolition effective du travail des enfants ; l’élimination de la discrimination en matière d’emploi et de profession”.
D.C. YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit., p. 163. Une telle obligation serait inconcevable en ce qui concerne les principes fondamentaux de l’OIT en raison de leur caractère vague, A. CASSESE, loc. cit., p. 337. D.C. YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit., pp. 152-153.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
387
Le premier et les deux derniers principes précités correspondent sans conteste aux principes fondamentaux de l’O.I.T. Même si la reconnaissance de la négociation collective ne figure pas expressément dans la Section I de la Déclaration de Philadelphie qui contient les principes fondamentaux, elle figure parmi les objectifs énumérés à la Section III, au point e). Au demeurant, elle constitue le corollaire nécessaire de la liberté syndicale conformément au fondement idéologique de l’Organisation. Il n’en va pas de même du principe relatif à l’élimination de toute forme de travail forcé ou obligatoire (ci-après : principe relatif au travail forcé). Ce dernier ne semble pas avoir de fondement constitutionnel écrit. Cette constatation pose l’hypothèse de l’existence au sein de l’O.I.T. de principes constitutionnels non écrits ou plus exactement, l’hypothèse d’une coutume constitutionnelle de l’Organisation54. En effet, l’expression “travail forcé ou obligatoire” n’apparaissait pas dans l’article 41 de la Partie XIII du Traité de Versailles, pas plus qu’elle ne figure dans la Déclaration de Philadelphie. Paradoxalement, le travail forcé est l’objet d’une réglementation internationale de forme conventionnelle depuis l’entre-deux-guerres. Celle-ci commença tout d’abord par l’adoption d’une Convention n°29 sur le travail forcé, à la demande de la Société des Nations. Cette convention envisageait le travail forcé essentiellement comme un phénomène colonial. La constatation, après la seconde guerre mondiale, de l’existence d’un travail forcé utilisé comme moyen de coercition politique incita l’Organisation des Nations Unies à créer, conjointement avec l’O.I.T., un Comité spécial du travail forcé, doté de pouvoirs d’enquête dans ce domaine. Les investigations de cet organe ad hoc entre 1951 et 1953, puis celles menées par le Comité du travail forcé de l’O.I.T., aboutirent à l’adoption de la Convention n°105 sur l’abolition du travail forcé. Alors que ces deux conventions sont considérées comme fondamentales, il est significatif de relever que la première fut adoptée dans le prolongement de l’œuvre de la SdN en rapport avec l’administration des territoires sous 54
Sur ce point, voir notamment J. CHARPENTIER, “Tendances de l’élaboration du droit international public coutumier” in L’élaboration du droit international public, Colloque S.F.D.I. de Toulouse, Paris, Pedone, 1975, pp. 118-123 ; et plus récemment, G. CAHIN, op. cit., pp. 10 et ss.
388
Mouloud Boumghar
mandat et la suppression de l’esclavage. Par ailleurs, l’affirmation solennelle faite lors de la discussion du deuxième texte que “le travail forcé (…) ne représente pas seulement un aspect de la question générale des conditions de travail (…) [et que] son abolition est un principe fondamental, aussi essentiel et vital que la liberté d’association”55
n’a pas permis de proposer un fondement autre à l’interdiction du travail forcé que “les droits de l’homme tels qu’ils sont énoncés dans la Charte des Nations Unies”56. Même après l’adoption de la Déclaration de 1998 et l’affirmation de son caractère d’expression d’un principe constitutionnel, les organes de l’O.I.T. sont obligés de “reconnaître” que le principe relatif au travail forcé ne trouve que partiellement son fondement dans la Constitution de l’O.I.T. C’est ainsi que “le recours massif au travail forcé (…) entre pour une part dans ce qui est indiqué dans la Déclaration de Philadelphie (1944), à savoir que ‘tous les êtres humains… ont le droit de poursuivre leur progrès matériel et leur développement spirituel dans la liberté et la dignité, dans la sécurité économique et avec des chances égales’” [paragraphe II a) de la Déclaration].
Tandis que “la Déclaration [universelle] des droits de l’homme [qui] réaffirme que ‘nul ne sera tenu en esclavage ni en servitude’ et que ‘toute personne a droit… au libre choix de son travail’” [Articles 4 et 23 § 1] représente l’autre fondement57. Ainsi, ces éléments montrent que même lorsqu’un effort a été fait pour rattacher le principe relatif au travail forcé à la Constitution de l’O.I.T., ce rattachement au texte s’est toujours révélé insuffisant, en l’absence d’un principe ayant expressément pour objet le travail forcé. Plutôt qu’au texte, le caractère fondamental ou constitutionnel du principe sur le travail forcé est donc à attribuer à une “pratique générale de l’Organisation (…) généralement acceptée par [s]es
55 56 57
C.I.T., 46ème session, Rapport VI (1), Genève, B.I.T., 1956, pp. 14-15. C.I.T., 47ème session, (1957)), Rapport IV (1), Genève, B.I.T., 1957, p. 13. Halte au travail forcé, Rapport global en vertu du suivi de la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail, p. 10. Italiques ajoutés.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
389
membres”58 comme étant le droit. En effet, tant l’Organisation que ses membres considèrent l’abolition du travail forcé comme un principe constitutionnel depuis les années 1920. Il existe donc bien une coutume interne de l’Organisation en la matière. Ici, la coutume doit être entendue au sens de mode de formation de la norme juridique, cette dernière prescrivant l’obligation de promouvoir l’abolition du travail forcé et non l’obligation de l’abolir. La pratique et l’opinio juris attestent ici seulement de l’existence d’un principe constitutionnel sur le travail forcé, auquel sont attachées la valeur et la portée juridiques d’objectif de l’Organisation. En écho à la remarque du professeur Cassese59 relative au caractère vague des principes de Philadelphie qui les empêcherait de prescrire des obligations de protéger, on peut se demander si la rédaction de la Déclaration de 1998 ne permet pas de déceler un indice de la transformation de la nature de l’obligation. En effet, aux termes du deuxième paragraphe de la Déclaration “l’ensemble des Membres, même lorsqu’ils n’ont pas ratifié les conventions [fondamentales], ont l’obligation, du seul fait de leur appartenance à l’Organisation de respecter, promouvoir et réaliser [de bonne foi, et conformément à la Constitution, les principes”
en question. L’utilisation du verbe “respecter” laisse croire que l’obligation de promotion est complétée par une obligation ferme de protection de la liberté syndicale ou de l’interdiction du travail forcé. Il n’en est rien. Au contraire, tout indique que la Déclaration n’est conçue que comme un instrument promotionnel. Même si les “droits fondamentaux ne sont pas fondamentaux parce que la Déclaration le dit, mais [que] la Déclaration le dit parce qu’ils le sont”60, l’objet de la Déclaration reste, d’un point de vue normatif, de “promouvoir l’application universelle” de ces droits. Ni les délégués des 58
59 60
CIJ, Avis consultatif, Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la Résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de sécurité, Rec. 1971, § 22, p. 22. La reconnaissance du caractère fondamental des deux conventions précitées ainsi que, entre autres, l’adoption de la deuxième d’entre elles à l’unanimité moins une abstention, témoignent de l’ampleur de cette acceptation. Voir supra note 52. Rapport VII, p. 11.
390
Mouloud Boumghar
employeurs61 ni ceux des gouvernements des pays industrialisés62 n’envisageaient la Déclaration autrement. La position la plus explicite à ce sujet reste celle exprimée par le délégué gouvernemental japonais, au nom du groupe des pays d’Asie et du Pacifique, selon laquelle “la Déclaration doit porter sur des principes et non des droits”63, les principes étant envisagés comme dépourvus de valeur contraignante à l’égard des Etats. Il faut donc considérer la référence au respect comme étant une obligation de respecter les objectifs de l’Organisation, autrement dit, de respecter l’obligation de les promouvoir. Pas plus que le mécanisme de plaintes relatif à la liberté syndicale n’a fait passer le principe qui s’y rapporte d’un statut programmatoire pour les Membres à une valeur de norme portant obligation pour eux de protéger la liberté syndicale, la Déclaration de 1998 ne transforme pas non plus les principes constitutionnels en normes comportant des obligations de protéger. Quand bien même sa rédaction porterait à croire à l’amorce d’une telle évolution, la nature de l’instrument – résolution, au sens large, d’une organisation internationaleempêcherait une conclusion définitive en ce sens. Instrument promotionnel, la Déclaration, expression de la Constitution, n’impose donc pas aux Etats membres l’obligation de garantir la liberté syndicale, d’éliminer toute forme de travail forcé ou obligatoire, d’abolir immédiatement et effectivement le travail des enfants ou encore d’éliminer toute discrimination en matière d’emploi ou de profession. Par contre, elle les oblige à promouvoir les principes qui se rapportent à ces objectifs et aux droits fondamentaux correspondants. Il reste donc une obligation de promotion. Cependant, une telle obligation, comme l’ont montré les problèmes liés au respect de la liberté syndicale, a peu de chances d’aboutir à des résultats concrets si elle n’est pas assortie d’un mécanisme de contrôle. En l’espèce, ce mécanisme existe sous la forme du Suivi mis en place 61 62 63
Compte rendu des travaux, vol. I, C.I.T., 86ème session, B.I.T., Genève, 1998, CRP 20/3 § 10. Compte rendu des travaux, vol. I, C.I.T., 86ème session, B.I.T., Genève, 1998, CRP 20/6 § 22, point iii). Compte rendu des travaux, vol. I, C.I.T., 86ème session, B.I.T., Genève, 1998, CRP 20/6 § 21, point x).
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
391
par la Déclaration. Reposant sur le respect de bonne foi par les membres de leur obligation de promotion, ce Suivi a été difficile à faire accepter à de nombreux Etats membres, “instruits” par le précédent de la liberté syndicale dont il se distingue par l’absence d’un mécanisme de plaintes64.
L’EFFECTIVITE DANS CONSTITUTIONNELS
LE
SUIVI
DES
PRINCIPES
Le Suivi est servi par deux instruments. Le premier est le Rapport annuel. Il “se fait sur la base des rapports préparés par les gouvernements décrivant les efforts déployés pour respecter les principes et les droits contenus dans toutes les conventions fondamentales de l’O.I.T. qui n’ont pas été ratifiées, et des commentaires des organisations de travailleurs et d’employeurs”.
Le second est le Rapport global. “[S]oumis par le Directeur général du B.I.T. à la Conférence internationale du Travail, [il] donne une image globale dynamique centrée chaque année sur une catégorie de principes et de droits” et “sert de base pour déterminer les priorités à venir afin que l’Organisation, par le biais de ses activités de coopération technique, prête assistance à ses Membres dans la mise en œuvre des principes et droits fondamentaux”.
Qualifié par certains d’instrument témoin du passage dans l’activité normative de l’O.I.T. de la réglementation juridique au nouveau paradigme de la régulation, le Suivi de la Déclaration semble relever classiquement de la première catégorie (A). Ce Suivi qui s’effectue par référence aux dispositions des conventions fondamentales (B) peut être analysé, du point de vue du droit des traités, comme un rappel des obligations pré-conventionnelles des Etats membres qui ne sont pas parties à des conventions fondamentales (C). Enfin, la réussite du Suivi, matérialisé par l’augmentation des ratifications des conventions 64
Sur cette crainte des plaintes, voir notamment la réponse du Conseiller juridique du B.I.T., Compte rendu des travaux, C.I.T., 86ème session, Genève, B.I.T., CRP 20/43, § 133.
392
Mouloud Boumghar
fondamentales, autorise à émettre l’hypothèse que la Déclaration permet un renforcement de l’autorité normative des principes constitutionnels de l’O.I.T. (D). A. La signification du Suivi : l’absence de passage de la réglementation à la régulation En vertu de la Déclaration de 1998, chaque Etat membre est soumis à une obligation de promotion des principes qu’elle énonce. Il s’agit d’une “obligation de moyens inhérente à la qualité de Membre”65. L’obligation de moyens (ou de comportement) désigne l’obligation qui exige du débiteur qu’il prenne les mesures desquelles, dans la limite des probabilités raisonnables, on peut attendre un certain résultat. Elle se distingue de l’obligation de résultat qui, sous réserve des impossibilités matérielles, astreint le sujet à atteindre, en tout état de cause, le résultat requis. Ainsi, “tandis que les obligations de résultat sont des obligations de réussir, les obligations de moyens ne sont que des obligations de s’efforcer”66. Cette obligation de comportement – type d’obligation qui passe pour être le plus courant – révèlerait “l’apparition d’un nouveau paradigme dans la politique normative de l’O.I.T.”67. La Déclaration marquerait le passage de la traditionnelle réglementation internationale du travail qui “repose sur une conception classique de la norme qui la destine à définir un modèle de comportement ou un résultat qui devra être ensuite reproduit au niveau national”, et que souligneraient les mécanismes de contrôle, au modèle de la régulation juridique. Il est très peu question de cette dernière notion en droit international public. Nous savons cependant qu’elle reposerait “sur une fonction de la norme qui consiste à fixer des objectifs généraux, des principes auxquels les Etats doivent s’efforcer de parvenir par ajustements progressifs” et
65 66
67
F. MAUPAIN, “L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation”, loc. cit., p. 269. J. COMBACAU, “Obligations de résultat et obligations de comportement. Quelques questions et pas de réponses” in Mélanges Paul Reuter. Le droit international : unité et diversité, Paris, Pedone, 1981, p. 196. L. DUBIN, op. cit., pp. 9 et 205. A notre connaissance, l’idée a été avancée la première fois par la doctrine in F. MAUPAIN, “L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation”, loc. cit., p. 240.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
393
qu’elle serait différente de la soft law68. Par ailleurs, la régulation se distinguerait de la réglementation par la “plus grande marge de manœuvre [laissée aux Etats] quant aux choix des moyens de parvenir au but déterminé”69. Alors que celle-ci est associée au contrôle, cellelà s’accompagne d’un suivi défini comme “l’ensemble des suites qui peuvent être données à un acte juridique pour que celui-ci produise les effets qu’on attend de lui”70 qui serait en fin de compte “une évaluation des efforts”71. Le contrôle, quant à lui, est une “surveillance exercée en vue de vérifier la conformité d’un acte, d’une situation, de l’exercice d’un pouvoir à une règle, à un engagement ou aux exigences d’une bonne administration”72. Il est utile de rappeler qu’au sein de l’O.I.T., le contrôle exercé l’est en vertu des articles 19 § 6 d) en ce qui concerne les recommandations et 19 § 5 e) pour ce qui est des conventions non ratifiées73, qui est aussi le fondement constitutionnel du Suivi de la Déclaration. Il permet que les Etats membres soient “tenus de rendre compte des suites qu’ils donnent à des actes de l’Organisation qui, par nature, ne sont pas obligatoires”. Enfin, la réglementation serait “trop précise” alors que justement “les principes (…) [de la Déclaration] se distingue[raien]t des normes (…) contenues dans les conventions internationales [de l’O.I.T.] (…) [par le fait] que leur application n’implique pas la reproduction de 74 comportements précis” .
Bien que séduisante, cette explication théorique de la signification de la Déclaration et surtout de son Suivi n’emporte pas notre adhésion. 68 69 70
71 72
73 74
L. DUBIN, op. cit., pp 9 et 10, note 13. L’auteur ne précise pas ce qui caractérise la différence avec la soft law. F. MAUPAIN, “L’OIT, la justice sociale et la mondialisation”, loc. cit., p. 240. L. DUBIN, op. cit., p. 10. Cette définition est empruntée à P. JULLIARD, “Le suivi des instruments OCDE du 21 juin 1976” in H. RUIZ FABRI, L.-A. SICILIANOS & J.-M. SOREL, L’effectivité des organisations internationales : Mécanismes de suivi et de contrôle, Athènes/Paris, Sakkoulas/Pedone, 2000, p. 181. L. DUBIN, op. cit., p. 205. L. DUBIN, op. cit., p. 9 notamment note 6. Cette définition est empruntée à J. CHARPENTIER, “Le fondement du pouvoir de contrôle des organisations internationales” in Mélanges Burdeau, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1977, p. 1001 J. CHARPENTIER, “Le contrôle par les organisations internationales de l’exécution des obligations des Etats”, loc. cit., p. 167 L. DUBIN, op. cit., pp. 10 et 205.
394
Mouloud Boumghar
Il nous semble en effet que la Déclaration de 1998, toute “recommandation génétiquement modifiée” qu’elle est, pour reprendre l’expression de M. Maupain, n’en appartient pas moins, à l’instar des conventions et des recommandations, au domaine de la réglementation internationale du travail. Son effectivité est assurée par un mécanisme, somme toute classique, de contrôle international. Avant de s’engager plus avant dans la détermination du contrôle international, une première remarque s’impose, relative au degré de précision qui caractériserait les normes relevant de la réglementation et les distinguerait ainsi de celles relevant de la régulation. Il ne semble pas être un critère déterminant. La principale distinction entre la Déclaration et les conventions tient à leur forme. La Déclaration n’est pas un instrument contraignant, les conventions le sont. La Déclaration se réfère par ailleurs aux objectifs de l’Organisation auxquels est attachée, en ce qui concerne les Etats membres, une obligation de promotion. Les conventions fondamentales, pour s’en tenir à elles, transforment le plus souvent l’obligation de promouvoir en obligation de protéger les droits fondamentaux auxquels se rapportent les principes en question. Enfin, les conventions n’imposent pas davantage aux Etats parties un comportement précis qu’elles ne sont forcément précises dans leur rédaction. La convention fondamentale n°105 de 1957 sur l’abolition du travail forcé en est une illustration. Elle dispose dans son article 1er que “tout Membre de l’Organisation qui [la] ratifie s’engage à supprimer le travail forcé ou obligatoire et à n’y recourir sous aucune forme…” tandis que l’article suivant ajoute, pour toute précision, que “tout Etat partie s’engage à prendre des mesures efficaces en vue de l’abolition complète du travail forcé ou obligatoire”. Outre la difficulté de déterminer à quel moment l’Etat contrevient à ses obligations, la Convention – dont les huit autres articles ne traitent que de la naissance et de la fin de l’engagement – ne fait état d’aucun comportement précis. Par ailleurs, lorsque précision il y a dans la détermination du comportement requis, ce critère reste relatif. Ainsi, si le degré de précision de la norme devait être considéré comme caractérisant la réglementation internationale du travail, cette convention ne relèverait pas de cette catégorie juridique.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
395
L’autre argument qui incite à douter de la justesse de l’analyse précédemment évoquée tient à la définition même du contrôle international. Surveillance qui a généralement pour but une vérification75, l’opération de contrôle est caractérisée par la présence d’une série d’éléments76. Le premier d’entre eux est l’existence d’un couple composé d’un sujet de droit “astreint à un certain comportement” et d’une “autorité” chargée d’en vérifier la rectitude. Par ailleurs, cette autorité est informée sur la conduite du sujet contrôlé et enfin, elle apprécie le comportement de ce dernier par rapport à ce qui est requis de lui. Un aperçu rapide de la Déclaration et de son mécanisme de Suivi confirme à l’observateur la présence de ces éléments. Tout d’abord, les Etats membres sont soumis à une obligation de comportement. Chaque année, les gouvernements adressent à l’O.I.T. un rapport “décrivant les efforts déployés” par eux, en vue de “respecter” les principes de la Déclaration qui se rapportent aux conventions fondamentales qu’ils n’ont pas ratifiées (Paragraphe 1 du Texte du Suivi annexé à la Déclaration). Ces informations d’origine gouvernementale font l’objet de commentaires de la part des organisations syndicales, d’employeurs et de travailleurs. Ces rapports sont ensuite compilés dans un Rapport annuel dont la première partie est une introduction rédigée par un “groupe d’experts-conseillers indépendants” nommés par le Conseil d’administration et chargés d’attirer l’attention de l’Organisation sur certains aspects pour un examen plus approfondi. Cette introduction comporte notamment des recommandations adressées au Conseil d’administration, qui bien sûr sont un outil différent de l’instrument normatif du même nom. Par ailleurs, le Directeur général du B.I.T. soumet tous les ans un Rapport global à la Conférence internationale du Travail. Ce Rapport global, prévu au paragraphe 2 du Texte du Suivi, “sert de base pour déterminer les priorités à venir afin que l’Organisation, par le biais de ses activités de coopération technique, prête assistance à ses Membres dans la mise en œuvre des principes” (Paragraphe 3). Ce rapport permet de la sorte d’avoir une vision globale du respect de chaque 75 76
Cf. supra note 72. J. CHARPENTIER, “Le contrôle par les organisations internationales de l’exécution des obligations des Etats”, loc. cit., pp. 152-153.
396
Mouloud Boumghar
principe dans l’ensemble des Etats Membres et pas seulement chez ceux qui n’ont pas ratifié des conventions fondamentales. Tous les éléments du contrôle se retrouvent ici : le couple constitué de l’autorité de contrôle, le Conseil d’administration, et de l’Etat “suivi” ; une obligation de comportement requise de l’Etat suivi : la promotion des principes ; et une appréciation des efforts par le Conseil des efforts déployés en vue de permettre d’adapter la coopération technique à sa situation. Par ailleurs, selon le Bureau international du Travail, la Déclaration et son Suivi participent du mouvement de renforcement du système de contrôle des normes de l’O.I.T.77 Sans être un argument décisif, cette affirmation n’en reste pas moins révélatrice. Enfin, la définition du suivi avancé par les tenants d’un passage à la régulation pose problème. En effet, si le suivi est “l’ensemble des suites qui peuvent être données à un acte juridique pour que celui-ci produise les effets qu’on attend de lui”78, il peut alors correspondre à des situations extrêmement diverses79, dont le contrôle80. Le suivi englobe donc le contrôle. Il ne s’oppose pas à lui. L’opposition avancée est artificielle. Par conséquent, toute tentative de fonder un modèle juridique, la régulation, sur une définition aussi large du suivi, en l’opposant au modèle de la réglementation qui aurait le contrôle pour élément caractéristique, est vouée à l’échec. La constatation pratique de l’utilisation des dispositions des conventions fondamentales comme normes de référence du Suivi conforte cette conclusion. B. Les dispositions des conventions fondamentales : normes de référence du Suivi Selon L. Dubin, les principes de la Déclaration de 1998 sont des standards internes de l’O.I.T. Analysant très justement l’obligation incombant aux Etats membres comme une obligation de 77 78 79 80
Rapport VII, pp. 5-6. Voir supra note 70. Pour avoir un aperçu de cette diversité, se reporter utilement aux exemples étudiés in H. RUIZ FABRI, L.-A. SICILIANOS & J.-M. SOREL, op. cit. Voir supra note 72.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
397
comportement dans laquelle celui-ci reste indéterminé, cet auteur arrive, à partir de l’exigence de bonne foi requise par la Déclaration, à la conclusion que les principes et droits fondamentaux en question sont aussi des standards81. Le standard étant compris comme étant “une technique de formulation de la règle de droit qui a pour effet une certaine indétermination a priori de celle-ci” et qui permet “la mesure de comportements et de situations en termes de normalité”, selon une définition désormais classique chez les juristes français82. Deux observations, l’une de nature théorique et l’autre liée à la Déclaration et à son Suivi nous obligent à nuancer très fortement cette affirmation. La lecture de la Déclaration montre que les principes énoncés sont des normes primaires. Bien qu’il ne soit pas possible d’y attacher des conséquences juridiques plus fortes qu’une obligation de promotion des droits fondamentaux auxquels ils se rapportent, leur caractère de normes primaires subsiste. Pour ce qui est du standard, en tant qu’élément assurant la “mobilité” de la norme primaire – pour parler comme les économistes, c’est une variable d’ajustement dans l’appréciation du respect de la prescription – il est une rule of change, c’est-à-dire une norme secondaire83. En tant que rule of change, le standard “assure une fonction de changement du droit statique primaire au moyen de l’appréciation discrétionnaire et évolutive d’une notion par le juge”84, dans une perspective juridictionnelle, ou par l’autorité de contrôle dans la perspective qui est la nôtre. Ainsi, si la bonne foi peut-être envisagée, comme le fait L. Dubin, comme un standard85, cette qualification n’emporte pas l’inclusion automatique des principes de la Déclaration dans cette catégorie normative. Quand bien même l’argument théorique ne suffirait pas, la qualification de standard reste insuffisante car elle n’indique pas en fonction de quoi le 81 82 83
84
85
L. DUBIN, op. cit., p. 206. S. RIALS, Le juge administratif français et la technique du standard, Paris, LGDJ, 1980, p. XXI et n°70, pp. 72-73. Selon la distinction connue de H.L.A. HART, Le concept de droit, trad. de M. van de Kerchove, Bruxelles, Facultés universitaires de Saint-Louis, 1976, 314p. P. MORVAN, Le principe de droit privé, préf. de J.-L. Sourioux, n°66, p. 62. Pour une argumentation plus large sur la distinction entre les principes de droit et les standards, se reporter aux n°65-67, pp. 60-64. Voir R. KOLB , op. cit, pp. 111 et ss.
398
Mouloud Boumghar
contrôle est effectué. En d’autres termes, elle ne répond pas à la question : quelles sont les normes à l’aune desquelles le comportement des Etats membres est apprécié par l’autorité de contrôle ? Plus exactement, elle y répondrait en faisant des principes la référence de leur propre suivi. Le fondement textuel et la pratique du Suivi apportent une autre réponse à cette question. L’article 19 § 5 e), fondement constitutionnel du Suivi, établit à la charge des Etats membres l’obligation de faire rapport au Directeur général du B.I.T., “selon ce que décidera le CA”, sur l’état de leur droit positif et de leur pratique “concernant la question qui fait l’objet de la convention non ratifiée”. Les Etats membres doivent indiquer comment ils ont éventuellement donné ou comptent donner suite à certaines dispositions de la convention, formulation qui évoque la définition du suivi !86 En ce qui concerne les rapports annuels du Suivi, les formulaires de rapport sur les principes87 montrent bien que l’appréciation du comportement se fait, principalement mais non exclusivement, par rapport aux dispositions des conventions fondamentales. En effet, aux termes de la Déclaration, les principes sont l’“objet” de ces conventions. De la même manière que les conventions de l’O.I.T. sur la liberté syndicale sont la “source principale” de référence des organes de la procédure spéciale en matière de liberté syndicale (Commission d’investigation et d’enquête et Comité de la liberté syndicale), les conventions fondamentales sont le “standard de comparaison”88 principal en fonction duquel le comportement des Etats membres astreints, dans le cadre du Suivi, à faire rapport est apprécié par l’autorité de contrôle. Cette situation est une conséquence logique découlant aussi bien du texte de la Constitution que de la Déclaration. En effet, afin de 86 87
88
Cf. supra note 71. Ces formulaires sont disponibles sur le site Internet de l’OIT : (http://www.ilo.org/public/french/standards/decl/reports/forms.index.htm). Sur l’importance et le dynamisme introduit par le contenu des formulaires dans un mécanisme de contrôle, voir G. KOJANEC, “Article premier : Droit au travail. Article 16 : Droit de la famille à une protection sociale, juridique et économique. Article 17 : Droit de la mère et de l’enfant à une protection sociale et économique” in La Charte sociale européenne. Dix années d’application, éd. de l’Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1978, pp. 74-75. D.C. YIANNOPOULOS, op. cit, pp. 151-152. Ici, le terme “standard” n’est pas utilisé dans le sens précis de la définition du professeur Rials.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
399
formuler leurs recommandations, les experts-conseillers ont besoin d’apprécier les efforts déployés (ou leur absence) par les gouvernements pour promouvoir les objectifs de l’Organisation. Or, comment apprécier le comportement d’un Etat en ce qui concerne le travail forcé par exemple si ce n’est par référence à la définition de cette notion admise au sein de l’O.I.T. En l’espèce, cette définition se trouve dans la convention (n°29) de 1930. Il en va de même pour le statut de la liberté syndicale tout comme pour les autres principes89. Pour autant, les dispositions constitutionnelles qui sont “exprimé[e]s et développé[e]s” dans les conventions fondamentales qui s’y rapportent respectivement ne deviennent pas obligatoires en tant que telles. Les Etats membres qui n’ont pas ratifié une ou plusieurs conventions fondamentales restent libres de tout engagement, notamment en ce qui concerne le contenu des normes en question. Instruments de promotion des principes, qui sont l’expression de la Constitution et des objectifs de l’Organisation, et qui sont “exprimés et développés dans des sous forme de droits et d’obligations spécifiques dans des conventions reconnues comme fondamentales” (Paragraphe 1, b) de la Déclaration), la Déclaration et le Suivi ont notamment pour but, en matière normative, de promouvoir la ratification de ces conventions. La Déclaration pourrait donc aussi être vue sous l’angle du droit des traités. C. Le rappel des obligations pré-conventionnelles des Etats non parties aux conventions fondamentales La Déclaration qualifie les principes d’objets respectifs des conventions fondamentales et elle dispose que les Etats membres ont l’obligation de respecter, de bonne foi, cet objet. Il ne fait pas de doute, par exemple, que le premier principe cité dans la Déclaration constitue l’objet de la Convention n°57 relative à la liberté syndicale et au droit de négociation collective. Chaque principe est ainsi l’objet d’une ou plusieurs conventions fondamentales. En se plaçant sur le terrain du droit des traités, il est possible d’interpréter la Déclaration comme un rappel des obligations pré-conventionnelles des Etats 89
Sur ce point, voir entre autres Halte au travail forcé, pp. 10-11.
400
Mouloud Boumghar
membres qui n’ont pas ratifié une ou plusieurs conventions fondamentales. En effet, l’article 18 de la Convention de Vienne de 1969 sur le droit des traités dispose qu’ “un Etat doit s’abstenir d’actes qui priveraient un traité de son objet et de son but (…) lorsqu’il a signé le traité ou a échangé les instruments constituant le traité sous réserve de ratification (…), tant qu’il n’a pas manifesté son intention de ne pas devenir partie au traité”.
Cette règle du droit des traités est particulièrement intéressante en ce qui concerne la réglementation conventionnelle du travail car tout Etat membre de l’Organisation a l’obligation de soumettre à ses autorités nationales compétentes toute convention adoptée par la C.I.T., et cela quand bien même ses délégués auraient voté contre son adoption. Cette obligation, qui trouverait, de manière générale, son fondement juridique dans la bonne foi 90, si elle n’astreint pas les Etats signataires à des mesures positives91, leur impose tout de même une obligation d’abstention. Les Etats signataires ont “l’interdiction de mettre en échec la substance” de la convention92. Il est vrai que l’acte de signature par les Etats n’est pas prévu par la Constitution pour les conventions adoptées par la C.I.T. Mais, aux termes de l’article 19 § 4 de la Constitution, le texte des conventions adoptées est authentifié par la signature du Président de la C.I.T. et par celle du Directeur général du B.I.T. En l’absence d’authentification étatique, l’expression “Etat signataire” désigne ici, à défaut de terme plus approprié, l’Etat membre qui n’a pas ratifié une ou plusieurs conventions (fondamentales en l’occurrence). Cette situation correspond à celle de l’Etat signataire, dans le sens qui est donné à cette expression par le droit des traités. En l’espèce, cette obligation existe en ce qui concerne les conventions fondamentales parce qu’elles ont pour objet et pour but de mettre en œuvre les objectifs de l’Organisation que les Etats signataires – tout comme les autres membres – ont par ailleurs l’obligation de promouvoir en tant qu’Etats parties au traité constitutif. Cette obligation qui leur incombe en leur 90 91 92
Voir R. KOLB, op. cit., pp. 213 et ss. L’auteur envisage ici la bonne foi en tant que principe général de droit (p. 206). R. KOLB, op. cit., p. 211. Id.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
401
qualité de Membre de l’Organisation subsiste alors même que l’absence de ratification d’une ou plusieurs conventions fondamentales – toutes adoptées plusieurs années avant la Déclaration – ne saurait être interprétée autrement que comme un refus de l’engagement conventionnel. Alors que cette manifestation par l’Etat signataire de “son intention de ne pas devenir partie” à une convention fondamentale devrait normalement le délier de son obligation pré-conventionnelle, la conjonction de l’obligation de promouvoir les objectifs de l’Organisation et le rappel de la Déclaration la font (re)vivre. Ainsi, l’obligation de comportement à laquelle sont astreints les Etats signataires, comme le reste des Etats membres, est une obligation négative, d’abstention, en même temps qu’une obligation positive, celle de déployer des efforts pour tendre vers la réalisation des objectifs de l’O.I.T. ; et le tout est apprécié par référence au contenu des conventions fondamentales. Vus de la sorte, la Déclaration et son Suivi permettent un renforcement de l’autorité normative des principes constitutionnels de l’O.I.T., qui représente un élément essentiel de la portée de ce contrôle. D. La portée du Suivi : le renforcement de l’autorité normative des principes constitutionnels de l’O.I.T. Bien avant la Déclaration de 1998, l’article 19 § 5 e) de la Constitution, sur lequel repose le Suivi, était analysé comme établissant un mécanisme de contrôle international “audacieux”. Selon l’auteur de cette analyse, la portée de ce contrôle n’est pas “exactement d’apprécier si le comportement de l’Etat [contrôlé] est conforme à ce qu’il devrait être, mais plutôt de constater la distance qui sépare la situation interne de l’Etat de celle qui correspondrait à l’application correcte de la norme”.
Ce contrôle s’effectue selon “une double perspective : ou bien inciter l’Etat à accepter comme obligatoire la norme jusqu’alors écartée en lui montrant que son acceptation ne lui imposera aucun sacrifice puisqu’il répond déjà à ses exigences, ou bien faire
402
Mouloud Boumghar
apparaître les obstacles qui ont jusqu’ici [dissuadé] l’Etat de s’engager afin 93 (…) de l’aider à les surmonter” .
Comme le Suivi de la Déclaration repose précisément sur cette disposition de la Constitution, il n’est en rien étonnant de constater que cette analyse lui correspond, à une nuance près, parfaitement. Cette nuance qu’il faut éclairer d’emblée est la suivante : les deux termes de l’alternative, à savoir l’appréciation du comportement d’une part, et la double perspective décrite, d’autre part, ne sont pas exclusifs l’un de l’autre. Cette conclusion s’impose en l’espèce ne serait-ce que parce que les recommandations faites par le groupe d’experts-conseillers nécessitent au préalable une appréciation du comportement des Etats contrôlés. En effet, les renseignements fournis par les Etats dans leurs rapports sont commentés par les organisations syndicales et donc confrontés aux informations de ces dernières. Il n’y a certes pas de vérification directe par le groupe d’experts-conseillers, à ce stade, par une inspection sur le terrain par exemple. Le professeur Charpentier affirme même que la vérification en tant que telle n’existe pas dans la procédure de l’article 19 § 5 e). Mais il considère que le mécanisme reste un contrôle. En l’espèce, la confrontation de l’information étatique avec celle d’origine privée constitue en elle même une vérification de la réalité des efforts. Par ailleurs, les informations fournies par les Etats dans le cadre d’autres mécanismes de contrôle de l’Organisation permettent divers comparaisons et recoupements. Pour le reste, la Déclaration et son Suivi confirment l’analyse du professeur Charpentier. En effet, la Déclaration s’inscrit dans un processus interne de l’O.I.T. dont la Commission des questions juridiques et des normes internationales du travail est l’un des moteurs. Cette Commission s’est attachée d’une part, à promouvoir l’application universelle des droits fondamentaux en faisant la promotion des conventions fondamentales et en incitant les Etats qui ne l’ont pas encore fait à les ratifier et, d’autre part, elle s’est attelée à la tâche du renforcement du système de contrôle de l’O.I.T.94. 93 94
J. CHARPENTIER, “Le contrôle par les organisations internationales de l’exécution des obligations des Etats”, loc. cit., pp. 168-169. Rapport VII, p. 4.
Déclaration de l’OIT sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail
403
Cette campagne en faveur de la ratification des conventions fondamentales est, globalement, une réussite. Le Suivi de la Déclaration a pour “effet direct (…) d’accélérer le mouvement (…) de[s] ratifications”. Cette augmentation du nombre des ratifications des conventions fondamentales donne raison au professeur Charpentier et “illustre combien les rapports ayant trait à la Déclaration peuvent aider un pays lorsqu’il évalue ses possibilités en matière de ratification”95. Le Suivi permet d’identifier les obstacles, ou éventuellement leur absence, et de les surmonter grâce à la coopération technique “destinée à promouvoir l’application et la ratification des conventions fondamentales”, selon la Déclaration (Paragraphe 3, a)). Outre les recommandations des Experts-conseillers au Conseil d’administration pour qu’il demande des actions au B.I.T., celui-ci fixe les priorités de cette coopération en fonction “des besoins établis et exprimés” par les Etats eux-mêmes96 (Déclaration § 3). Ainsi, en plus d’un rappel de l’obligation pré-conventionnelle des Etats qui n’ont pas ratifié une ou plusieurs conventions fondamentales, la Déclaration, grâce à son Suivi qui est une véritable œuvre de promotion de la ratification de ces instruments, contribue fortement au renforcement de l’autorité de ses principes, et à travers eux, des principes constitutionnels. Il est en effet reconnu qu’il existe un lien entre l’adoption quasiuniverselle d’un traité et l’attribution d’une valeur coutumière à certaines de ses dispositions de fond. En l’espèce, les principes de la Déclaration sont l’expression des principes constitutionnels de l’Organisation que les Etats membres ont l’obligation de promouvoir. Le texte de la Déclaration établit un lien formel entre ses principes et les conventions fondamentales tandis que le suivi promotionnel des 95
96
Examen des rapports annuels en vertu du suivi de la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail. Partie I. Introduction par les Experts-conseillers à la compilation des rapports annuels, Genève, B.I.T., mars 2001, p. 13. Pour la répartition des ratifications par catégorie de principes, voir p. 14. Pour des exemples de priorités, voir Votre voix au travail. Rapport global en vertu du suivi de la Déclaration de l’OIT relative aux principes et droits fondamentaux au travail, B.I.T., Genève, 2000, pp. 61 et ss. Pour un éventail plus large d’exemples d’actions entreprises dans le cadre de la coopération technique, voir Rapport VI (1999) précité, op. cit., pp. 29 et ss., pp. 49 et ss., et sur la Déclaration et son Suivi, pp. 99 et ss.
404
Mouloud Boumghar
premiers favorise la ratification des secondes – l’objectif final étant que tous les Etats membres ratifient l’ensemble des conventions fondamentales. Au fur et à mesure que le Suivi rapprocherait l’Organisation de ce but, il s’effectuerait un renforcement de l’autorité normative des principes constitutionnels avec un glissement progressif de la teneur de l’obligation des Etats qui s’y rapporte de l’action de promotion à celle de protection. Cette transformation se ferait grâce à l’acquisition d’une valeur coutumière par les dispositions de fond des conventions. Par ailleurs, il nous semble difficile pour un Etat membre, après avoir ratifié une convention fondamentale, qu’il puisse se délier de cet engagement. Bien qu’il en ait par ailleurs la possibilité. L’objet de ces conventions correspondant aux principes fondamentaux sur lesquels repose l’édifice normatif de l’Organisation, la dénonciation d’une telle convention équivaudrait à renoncer aux objectifs de l’Organisation97.
97
Par ailleurs, la qualité d’Etat partie à une convention de l’O.I.T., fondamentale ou pas, survit à la perte de la qualité de Membre.
NOTES AND COMMENTS NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES
This page intentionally left blank
THE CAIRO-ARUSHA PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES: DEVELOPING THE FRONTIERS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION Edward Kwakwa*
INTRODUCTION The principle of universal jurisdiction refers to the exercise of criminal jurisdiction solely on the basis of the nature of the crime. The exercise of jurisdiction is irrespective of the place where the crime was committed and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim of the crime.1 It is, in modern day parlance, a reflection of the globalization of justice. The principle of universal jurisdiction has gained increased attention in recent years. For example, the International Law Association has prepared a very informative report on the subject.2 The non-governmental organization Amnesty International has *
LL.B., University of Ghana; LL.M., Queen’s University; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale Law School. Deputy Legal Counsel, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Geneva. This is a revised version of an article first published in the Africa Legal Aid Quarterly (2003). The views expressed here are my personal views and are not necessarily shared by WIPO or by the United Nations.
1
In general, the most frequently cited offences widely considered to be subject to universal jurisdiction include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, hijacking or the unlawful seizure of aircraft, and offences related to traffic in narcotics. See generally I. BROWNLIE, Principles of Public International Law, pp. 307-308 (5th ed. 1998). See M. KAMMINGA, “The Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences,” International Law Association, Report of the Sixty-Eighth Conference held at Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, 24-30 May 1998, (1998), pp. 563-583.
2
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 407-430. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
408
Edward Kwakwa
adopted 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction.3 Similarly, the Princeton Project adopted The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction.4 And the principle has been elaborated upon by commentators and in various international decisions, including recent ones by the International Court of Justice.5 The most recent attempt by a group of academics and practitioners to address the principle of universal jurisdiction is embodied in the Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: An African Perspective (“the CairoArusha Principles”). The Cairo-Arusha Principles are a final version of the Cairo Principles on Universal Jurisdiction that were cited in a dissenting opinion in the International Court of Justice’s Arrest Warrant Case.6 This Note briefly discusses the Cairo-Arusha Principles and assesses which aspects of those Principles break new ground in the area of universal jurisdiction. This Note is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of each of the Cairo-Arusha Principles. It simply focuses on the aspects of the Cairo-Arusha Principles that are not found in other attempts to codify or progressively develop the
3 4
5
6
See (http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/recent/ior530011999) (last visited 30 June 2003). The Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (Princeton University Program in Law and Public Affairs (2001), reprinted at (http:/www.princeton.edu/~lapa/principles.html) (last visited 30 June 2003). In the Arrest Warrant Case, the Court concluded that as Congo was not challenging Belgium’s attempt to exercise universal jurisdiction, the dispute between the parties was only about the immunity of a foreign minister. The Court therefore declined to decide whether Belgium’s issue of an arrest warrant, in a purported exercise of universal jurisdiction, was in accordance with the applicable rules. Nevertheless, three of the Justices discussed universal jurisdiction in detail in their joint separate opinion. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), I.C.J., 14 February 2002) (Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal). For a general review of the case, see N. BOISTER, “The ICJ in The Arrest Warrant Case: Arresting the Development of International Criminal Law,” Journal of Conflict and Security Law 7 (2002), pp. 293-314. See also Universal Jurisdiction in Theory and Practice (The Asser Institute), at (http://www.asser.nl/vr/query.htm) (last visited 30 June 2003). The Arrest Warrant Case (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), supra note 5 (dissenting opinion of Judge Van Den Wyngaert).
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
409
concept, or in existing case law or law review discussions on the subject. The starting point is to place the Cairo-Arusha Principles in the context in which they were adopted. The Cairo-Arusha Principles are the outcome of two experts’ meetings that were organized by Africa Legal Aid (AFLA) in Cairo from 30 to 31 July 2001, and in Arusha from 18 to 20 October 2002. Both meetings included leading experts from all across Africa and elsewhere who represented a variety of viewpoints and legal systems.7 Those meetings were, in turn, a result of an earlier meeting held in Maastricht on the theme of universal jurisdiction.8 At the Maastricht meeting, participants concluded that a discussion of universal jurisdiction gave rise to certain issues that were of particular significance to Africa. The Cairo and Arusha meetings were therefore convened with the express purpose of further exploring universal jurisdiction issues that were of particular relevance to Africa. The Cairo-Arusha Principles are an attempt to look at the concept of universal jurisdiction from an African perspective. They recognize that there are certain violations that may be of more direct and more immediate relevance in Africa by virtue of their impact. In finalizing the Cairo-Arusha Principles, the following questions featured prominently in the minds of the drafters and participants: What is the value underpinning universal jurisdiction? What types of crime affect Africa the most? Is the concept of universal jurisdiction necessarily universal in its application or implementation? Why are certain serious human rights offences excluded from the scope of universal jurisdiction? Why, for example, do high level perpetrators of the crime of apartheid continue to enjoy impunity? The Cairo-Arusha Principles contain elements of both lex lata and de lege ferenda. In recognition of the fact that universal jurisdiction is an evolving concept, the Principles have been drafted so as to take
7 8
The List of Participants at the said meetings is attached as an Annex to this Note. See Africa Legal Aid, Report of the Seminar on Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes against Humanity, 18 April 2000, Maastricht, available at (http://www.afla.unimaas.nl/en/act/Seminar%20on%20Universal%20Jurisdiction%20f or%20Crimes%20against%20Humanity.htm) (last visited 29 June 2003).
410
Edward Kwakwa
into account the further development, in law as well as in practice, of universal jurisdiction.
THE PREAMBLE9 The Preamble to the Cairo-Arusha Principles states at the outset that “[t]he African tradition has always been to abhor gross human rights offences.” This serves as an important introduction to the Principles by making clear the opprobrium with which certain serious offences have traditionally been regarded in Africa. This statement is of great import, given the history of gross human rights abuses in Africa and other parts of the world. As is well known, there are different grounds on which a State can exercise criminal jurisdiction under international law.10 The CairoArusha Principles state a clear preference for the principle of territorial jurisdiction, which is the exercise of jurisdiction by the State in which the gross human rights offences occurred. In the African context, however, a realistic assessment suggests that a strict adherence to the territorial principle would have the effect of excluding from trial several present and past leaders whose conduct arguably falls within the ambit of gross human rights offences. For example, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) is limited to the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda or violations committed by Rwandan citizens in neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994;11 that of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is limited to any of four clusters of offences committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia 9 10
11
The Cairo-Arusha Principles are attached as an Annex to this Note. These are the territorial principle, the nationality principle, the protective or security principle, the passive personality principle and the universality principle. See generally M. AKEHURST, A Modern Introduction to International Law (5th ed. 1984), pp. 102-104; I. BROWNLIE, supra note 2, pp. 303-309. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Legal Materials 33 (1994) 1602, available at (http://www.ictr.org) (last visited 30 June 2003).
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
411
since 1991;12 and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which may start trying cases in 2003, only has jurisdiction over crimes committed after July 2002, the date on which the Statute of the ICC entered into force. This jurisdiction is only exercisable in respect of crimes committed in a country or by nationals of a country that has ratified or acceded to the Statute of the Court.13 In light of this reality, the Cairo-Arusha Principles take the position that, for purposes of avoiding impunity in those cases that fall outside the ambit of national (or territorial) court jurisdiction, international tribunals or other national courts that are able and willing should exercise universal jurisdiction over violators.14
THE PRINCIPLES The first of the Cairo-Arusha Principles provides that universal jurisdiction should apply to gross human rights offences committed even in peacetime (and not only in wartime). This is indeed a unique feature of the Cairo-Arusha Principles. There is a tendency to assume that the principle of universal jurisdiction should only be invoked in the context of armed conflict. This may be due in part to the fact that 12
13
14
These are (i) grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, (ii) violations of the laws and customs of war, (iii) genocide, and (iv) crimes against humanity. See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, adopted 25 May 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution S/RES/827 (1993), as amended by UN Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1166 (1998), S/RES/1329 (2000) and S/RES/1411 (2002). Amended text available at (http://www.un.org/icty) (last visited 30 June 2003). See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 7 July 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9*, International Legal Materials 37 (1998) 999, corrected through July 1999 by UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/INF/3*, reprinted at (http://www/un.org/law/icc) (last visited 30 June 2003). See also J. DUGARD, “Universal Jurisdiction for Crimes against Humanity,” Africa Legal Aid Quarterly 7 (April-June 2000)(making clear that, due to the limited nature of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC’s jurisdiction, “if any of Africa’s tyrants are to be tried, it will be before a national court and not before an international court”). It is also noteworthy that the Statute of the ICC stresses in its Preamble that the ICC is “complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,” and provides in its Article 17 that the ICC should only step in when national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute a case.
412
Edward Kwakwa
the ICTY and the ICTR were both established in post-war situations. It is common knowledge, however, that serious offences such as pillage and genocide also take place on a daily basis, even in peacetime. Indeed, it is worth recalling the Corfu Channel Case, in which the International Court of Justice cautioned that elementary considerations of humanity are more exacting in peacetime than in wartime.15 The suggestion that universal jurisdiction should also apply to gross human rights offences committed in peacetime is meant to ensure that the international community does not underestimate the impact of gross human rights offences, irrespective of the circumstances under which they are committed. The Cairo-Arusha Principles also break new ground in proposing that the principle of universal jurisdiction should apply not only to natural persons, but also to other legal entities. It is recalled that other ad hoc tribunals, such as the ICTY, only have jurisdiction over natural persons, and not over corporations or other legal subjects. The CairoArusha Principle that universal jurisdiction should be extended to other legal entities is a natural corollary of Principle 4, where reference is made to certain other crimes that have major adverse economic, social or cultural consequences. It seems undeniable that some of the offences alluded to are committed not just by individuals, but in certain cases, also by transnational entities, corporations or other legal subjects. The application of universal jurisdiction to such entities would therefore require that other legal entities, and not just natural persons, also be subject to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In any event, the law, it would seem, is evolving in the direction of extending international criminal law, including universal jurisdiction, to legal persons and not just individuals. At present, universal jurisdiction is provided only for crimes affecting physical and psychological violation of the person. In terms of universal jurisdiction, international law does not recognize crimes of an economic, social and cultural nature, which are sometimes more devastating in their impact. The Cairo-Arusha Principles seek to reverse this trend.
15
Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), I.C.J. Rep. 1947, p. 4 (Merits).
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
413
In seeking to extend universal jurisdiction to other crimes having adverse economic, social or cultural consequences, Principle 4 is perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of the Cairo-Arusha Principles. Indeed, it engendered the most extensive debate and the most passionate discussion in both meetings of the experts. There are several reasons for the inclusion of Principle 4 in the Cairo-Arusha Principles. First, it was because of economic interests that the international crime of piracy came about. Indeed, the principle of universal jurisdiction was originally used to prosecute pirates.16 Secondly, there is hardly any country where it is not a crime for public officials to misappropriate public funds. Thirdly, it is arguable that even the Statute to the International Criminal Court indirectly addresses the issue of pillage.17 And fourth, it is instructive that the crime of slavery, whose economic consequences are well known, is a frequently cited example of a wrongful act that justifies an exercise of universal jurisdiction.18 Earlier drafts of the Cairo-Arusha Principles had expressly included certain specific crimes. One example is the crime of kleptocracy, which was subsequently removed because most participants concluded that the concept was captivating, but vague as a crime that could be subject to universal jurisdiction.19 Another example that was not retained in the final draft is “serious act of self-enrichment,” which, it was concluded, was not necessarily criminal.20 It is recalled that several of those opposed to the principle of universal jurisdiction do so on the ground that it infringes on the 16 17
18 19
20
See generally K.C. RANDALL, “Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,” Texas Law Review 66 (1988) 785, pp. 791-800. Article 77 of the ICC Statute provides that one of the penalties that may be imposed on a person convicted of a crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court is “a forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime.” See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 14. S. RATNER and J.S. ABRAMS, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond The Nuremberg Legacy 141 (1997). On the issue of kleptocracy and its relationship to universal jurisdiction, see generally C. EBOE-OSUJI, “Kleptocracy: A Desired Subject of International Criminal Law that is in Dire Need of Prosecution by Universal Jurisdiction,” Africa Legal Aid Quarterly 18-20 (July-September 2001). It is, however, noteworthy that the crime of “unjust enrichment” exists in certain common law countries.
414
Edward Kwakwa
sovereignty of States. Principle 6 addresses the issue of noninterference in the internal affairs of States by providing that the wellknown principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States should not be a bar to the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The Principle tries to strike a balance between proponents and opponents of humanitarian intervention, while keeping a focus on African reality, as enshrined, for example, in the new constitutive Act of the African Union.21 As is now well known, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union qualifies the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States.22 Taking into account Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act and the well-established and generally accepted principle that gross human rights offences are of legitimate concern to the international community, Cairo-Arusha Principle 6 concludes that gross human rights offences do in fact give rise to prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Principle 8 seeks to avoid the exercise of any form of universal jurisdiction that has an in-built selectivity or is used as a pretext to pursue politically motivated prosecutions. In essence, this Principle is restrictive, and is meant to provide a counterbalance to other principles, such as Principle 4, which are expansionist in scope. It will be noticed that the enumeration of grounds for bias, even though illustrative, provides quite an extensive list. The Principle provides that in exercising universal jurisdiction, authorities must avoid any selectivity “based on race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, colour, language, age, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status” of the suspect. Some opponents of universal jurisdiction argue that it risks being a one-sided instrument that can be more easily used by rich and 21
22
On the Constitutive Act in general, see T. MALUWA, “The Constitutive Act of the African Union and Institution-Building in Postcolonial Africa,” Leiden Journal of International Law 16 (2003), pp. 157-170; C.A.A. PACKER and D. RUKARE, “The New African Union and Its Constitutive Act,” American Journal of International Law 96 (2002), pp. 365-379. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act states the principle of “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.” See Constitutive Act of the African Union, 11 July 2000, at (http://www.africa-union.org/About_AU/Constitutive_Act.htm) (last visited 30 June 2003).
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
415
powerful countries in the North, than by those in the South. The concern is that certain States might use it as a pretext to pursue politically motivated prosecutions or that it might be applied against weak and vulnerable countries.23 The inclusion of Principle 8 in the Cairo-Arusha Principles is aimed at allaying that concern. Principle 9 is meant to address the deterrent effect of the cost of exercising universal jurisdiction. This is an issue with particular relevance to Africa, as 34 of the continent’s countries are classified by the United Nations as “least-developed countries.”24 The difficulty and expense of gathering sufficient evidence can potentially act as a bar to indigent States that would otherwise have exercised universal jurisdiction. Other similar obstacles include those of carrying out investigations in third countries and the costs related to locating and interviewing witnesses abroad or translation of documents.25 23
24
25
Others raise a question whether universal jurisdiction is a concept which will primarily be implemented on citizens of weaker nations by courts in the more powerful States. See, e.g., E. ANKUMAH, “Introduction,” Africa Legal Aid Quarterly 5 (April-June 2000)(quoting Shadrack Ghutto’s observation: “What would happen if an African State like Djibouti would prosecute let us say a national of the United States for crimes against humanity? The prosecuting State would either be bombed or will not receive aid from the World Bank.”). The 34 countries currently on the list of the 49 least-developed countries (“LDCs”) are: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. The list of LDCs is reviewed every three years by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (“ECOSOC”). In general, the criteria used to determine whether a country falls within the category of LDCs include: (i) the Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”) per capita, (ii) a composite index (the “Augmented Physical Quality of Life Index”) based on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita calorie intake, combined primary and secondary school enrollment, and adult literacy; and (iii) a composite index (the “Economic Diversification Index”) based on the share of manufacturing in GDP, the share of the labor force in industry, annual per capita commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD’s merchandise export concentration index. See generally (http://www.unctad.org/en/pub/ldcprofiles2001.en.htm) (last visited 30 June 2003). On the difficulty and expense, in general, of universal jurisdiction cases, see M. KAMMINGA, “Universal Jurisdiction in Practice,” Africa Legal Aid Quarterly 12-13 (July-September 2001).
416
Edward Kwakwa
The Cairo-Arusha Principles stress, however, that such financial constraints, while serving as an obstacle to prosecution, do not relieve States of their duties in respect of exercising universal jurisdiction. In this regard, the international community is invited to assist developing countries in need, as a means of reducing the burden on those developing countries exercising universal jurisdiction. This is consistent with the well-established principle of multilateral assistance or cooperation for development. Principle 14 has a hidden but uniquely African touch in its recognition that States have sought to ensure accountability and national reconciliation through the use of truth commissions, alternative forms of justice and other inquiries into national traumas and gross human rights offences. Examples of this are the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, and the Gacaca system of peer trial in Rwanda. As is well known, several African countries have given preference to peace, political stability or national security over justice by granting amnesty to persons who have committed gross human rights offences, such as crimes against humanity. The Cairo-Arusha Principles make clear that such alternative forms of justice and/or grants of amnesty do not relieve States of their duty to prosecute individuals or to extradite for trial individuals who are suspected or accused of gross human rights offences. This is in line with the generally accepted principle that international law does not allow or condone the granting of amnesty given at the national level for a crime under international law.26 The rationale behind prosecution and sentencing in cases of universal jurisdiction is discussed in Principle 16. Again, the Principles are cognizant of the particular African milieu when they stress that decisions relating to whether to prosecute, as well as the type of punishment meted out, should be guided not only by the need for deterrence, but also the equally important need to reconcile, rehabilitate and reconstruct the society where the offence 26
Thus, for example, in respect of the Sierra Leone Peace Agreement, the United Nations specified that the amnesty and pardon provisions in Article IX of the Agreement would not apply to the international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
417
was committed. Obvious situations in mind include Rwanda and Sierra Leone. The idea of reparations for the victims of gross human rights offences is a relatively new one. The Princeton Principles make no reference to the requirement of reparations to the victim(s) of the offences.27 And whereas the Amnesty Principles suggest that “courts must award appropriate redress to victims and their families,”28 CairoArusha Principle 17 specifically requests that appropriate reparation to the victim(s) should be provided by the offender, and, failing that, by “other available mechanism.” The last but one Principle seeks to address a very troubling but frequently occurring issue, the cross-section of refugee law, human rights law and international criminal law. Whereas international refugee law aims to protect victims, international criminal law aims to prosecute perpetrators or to achieve justice. There thus exists an inbuilt tension between the ultimate aims of international refugee law, on the one hand, and international criminal law, on the other. The Cairo-Arusha Principles preserve the time-honoured prohibition against non-refoulement in international refugee law, while providing that refugee status per se, or applications for such refugee status, do not relieve States of their obligation to prosecute or to extradite or transfer for trial persons accused or suspected of gross human rights offences.
27 28
See The Princeton Principles, supra note 5. See Principle 11 of the Amnesty Principles, supra note 4.
418
Edward Kwakwa
CONCLUSION The Cairo-Arusha Principles were drafted and adopted in the belief that the evolution of international criminal law requires the application of universal jurisdiction to a broader array of offences in international law. The Principles also recognize, however, that universality does not necessarily imply uniformity.29 This explains how issues relating to universal jurisdiction may be seen from an African angle, as done in the Cairo-Arusha Principles. As stated in the Preamble, the Cairo-Arusha Principles are meant to guide governments, in Africa and around the world, in exercising their powers and obligations. They are meant to assist human rights organisations and legal practitioners in their attempts to pursue international justice, and assist advocacy and lobbying initiatives. Most importantly, the Cairo-Arusha Principles are aimed at developing the frontiers of the principle of universal jurisdiction.
29
On obstacles to the harmonization of the application of universal jurisdiction, see generally S. SCHAIRER and C. EBOE-OSUJI, “The Jurisdiction to Prosecute Foreigners for Crimes Against Humanity Committed Abroad,” Africa Legal Aid Quarterly 12-19 (April-June 2000).
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
419
ANNEX 1 THE CAIRO-ARUSHA PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS OFFENCES: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE PREAMBLE The African tradition has always been to abhor gross human rights offences. The principle of universal jurisdiction concerns the international community as a whole; it should therefore have a truly universal scope in its content, implementation and effects. While it is generally preferable to try gross human rights offences in the State where they occurred, it is sometimes necessary, in order to avoid impunity, to make use of international tribunals or other national jurisdictions. Most African States have accepted the principle of universal jurisdiction by becoming parties to instruments which provide for universal jurisdiction over certain crimes under international law, including under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1973 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 1984 Convention against Torture. Many of those States, however, have not ensured that their courts can exercise jurisdiction in respect of gross human rights offences on the basis of universal jurisdiction. In recognition of this, AFRICA LEGAL AID (AFLA) convened a meeting in Cairo from 30 to 31 July 2001 and in Arusha from 18 to 21 October 2002. The meetings brought together a number of leading experts from all across Africa and elsewhere to discuss and devise principles on universal jurisdiction from an African perspective. The Principles are prompted, among others things, by a concern that certain offences which have particular resonance in Africa, such as the
420
Edward Kwakwa
crime of apartheid, have so far not attracted prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction. The Principles are aimed at assisting governments, in Africa and around the world, in exercising their powers and obligations, human rights organisations and legal practitioners in their attempts to pursue international justice, and advocacy and lobbying initiatives. They are also aimed at contributing to the progressive development of international law. The starting point for these Principles is an awareness of existing law, as enshrined, for example, in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In the particular context of the African Continent, however, there are additional considerations, including economic, social and cultural, that should be taken into account in trying to ensure the effective exercise of universal jurisdiction. PRINCIPLES 1. Universal jurisdiction applies to gross human rights offences committed even in peacetime. 2. The principle of universal jurisdiction should apply not only to natural persons, but also to other legal entities. 3. States shall adopt measures, including legislative and administrative, that will ensure that their national courts can exercise universal jurisdiction over gross human rights offences, including, but not limited to, those contained in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 4. In addition to the crimes that are currently recognised under international law as being subject to universal jurisdiction, certain other crimes that have major adverse economic, social or cultural consequences – such as acts of plunder and gross misappropriation of
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
public resources, trafficking in human beings and environmental crimes – should also be granted this status.
421
serious
5. The absence of specific enabling domestic legislation does not relieve any State of its international legal obligation to prosecute, extradite, surrender or transfer suspects to any State or international tribunal willing and able to prosecute such suspects. 6. The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States, as enshrined in Article 4(g) but qualified by Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, shall be interpreted in light of the well established and generally accepted principle that gross human rights offences are of legitimate concern to the international community, and give rise to prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction. 7. In dealing with gender crimes, such as rape and other forms of sexual violence that are recognised as crimes subject to universal jurisdiction, States shall make every effort to create conditions favourable to reporting such crimes, investigate them, bring the perpetrators to justice and provide support to the victims. 8. In applying universal jurisdiction, prosecuting authorities shall avoid bias and selectivity based on race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, colour, language, age, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status of the suspect. In particular, the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction shall not be used as a pretext to pursue politically motivated prosecutions. 9. Financial and other constraints do not relieve States of their duty to carry out investigations or to prosecute, extradite or transfer for trial persons suspected or accused of gross human rights offences under international law. However, the international community should assist developing countries in the latter’s efforts in prosecuting such offences.
422
Edward Kwakwa
10. States shall provide mutual legal assistance in order to facilitate the effective exercise of universal jurisdiction. 11. Proceedings, including but not limited to, the investigation, prosecution, incarceration and/or sentencing of gross human rights offenders, shall be undertaken in conformity with internationally recognized human rights standards. These rights include the right to consular assistance under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, and the right to counsel, which shall include, in the case of self-funding defendants, the right to choose counsel from outside the legal profession of the prosecuting jurisdiction. 12. In proceedings based on universal jurisdiction, States shall ensure that victims and witnesses receive adequate protection. 13. A person who has been tried and convicted or acquitted of a gross human rights offence under international law before a national court may not be tried again, except where the prior proceedings shielded the person from justice. 14. The use of alternative forms of justice, including truth and reconciliation commissions, does not relieve States of their responsibility and their duty to prosecute individuals or to extradite or transfer for trial individuals suspected or accused of gross human rights offences under international law. 15. While amnesties for gross human rights offences granted to individuals may, in certain cases, be politically expedient, such amnesties are generally incompatible with international law and do not have any effect outside the borders of the country in which they are granted; nor do they absolve other States of their responsibility and their duty to prosecute or to transfer for trial such individuals. 16. Prosecution and sentencing of gross human rights offenders shall be guided not only by the need for deterrence, but also by the need to reconcile, rehabilitate and reconstruct the society where the offence was committed.
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
423
17. Responses to gross human rights offences shall include a requirement for the offender or other available mechanism to make appropriate reparation to the victims of the offences, to the extent possible. 18. Refugee status or applications for refugee status shall not relieve States of their obligation to prosecute or to extradite or transfer for trial to any other State or international tribunal willing and able to prosecute persons accused or suspected of gross human rights offences. This is without prejudice to the prohibition of nonrefoulement. 19. A State in whose territory a gross human rights offence suspect is found shall prosecute him or her in good faith or extradite or surrender him or her to any other State or international tribunal willing and able to prosecute such suspect. The absence of an extradition treaty or other enabling legislation shall not bar the extradition, surrender or transfer of such a suspect to any State or international tribunal willing and able to prosecute the suspect.
424
Edward Kwakwa
ANNEX 2 EXPERTS’ MEETINGS, “AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES”, CAIRO, EGYPT, 30-31 JULY 2001 AND ARUSHA, TANZANIA, 18-20 OCTOBER 2002 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS Speakers & Chairs Prof. Nabil A. Hilmy Dean, Zagazig University Senior Partner, Hilmy Law Firm Cairo, Egypt Judge Navanethem Pillay President, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania Evelyn A. Ankumah Executive Director, Africa Legal Aid Honorable Dr. Ahmed Fathy Sorour Speaker of the National Parliament of Egypt Judge Yvonne Mokgoro Constitutional Court of South Africa Prof. Menno Kamminga Director, Centre for Human Rights Maastricht University, the Netherlands Maître Mouhamed El Habib Kébé Advocate of the High Court of Senegal Director, International Justice Programme, Organisation Nationale des Droits de l’Homme (O.N.D.H.) Dakar, Senegal Prof. Shadrack B.O. Gutto University of Witwatersrand, Faculty of Law South Africa Judge Unity Dow High Court of Botswana Lobatse, Botswana
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
Chile Eboe-Osuji Prosecution Counsel, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania Prof. Makau Wa Mutua Director, Human Rights Center University at Buffalo School of Law The State University of New York, U.S.A. Advocate Dumisa B. Ntsebeza Distinguished Visiting Prof. of Political Science and Law, University of Connecticut, USA Formerly Commissioner, South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission Prof. Cees Flinterman Director, Netherlands Institute for Human Rights (SIM) Utrecht University, the Netherlands Betty K. Murungi Advocate of the High Court of Kenya Nairobi, Kenya Christopher Hall Legal Adviser, International Justice Project, Amnesty International London, United Kingdom Guglielmo Verdirame Fellow, Merton College Oxford, United Kingdom Dr. Edward Kwakwa Deputy Legal Counsel World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Geneva, Switzerland Hon. Mr. Bakari J. Mwapachu Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Adama Dieng U.N. Assistant Secretary General Registrar, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania
425
426
Edward Kwakwa
Fiona McKay Director, International Justice Program Lawyers Committee for Human Rights New York, U.S.A. Kingsley Moghalu Special Assistant to the Registrar and Spokesperson International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania Isaac Flattau Implementation Advisor, NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court (CICC) New York, U.S.A. Amanda Reichman Prosecution Counsel, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania Nieves Molina Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania Dr. Bonaventure Rutinwa Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Ariana Pearlroth Project Director, Universal Jurisdiction Information Network London, United Kingdom Mbuthi Gathenji Legal Advisor, Kenya Human Rights Commission Advocate, Commissioner for Oaths & Notary Public Nairobi, Kenya Jennifer Miano Senior Program Officer, Kenya Human Rights Commission Nairobi, Kenya
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
Other Participants & Attendees Judge Winston C.M. Maqutu Judge, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Judge William H. Sekule Judge, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Judge Andrésia Vaz Judge, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Judge Lloyd G. Williams, Q.C. Judge, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Dr. John Ruhangisa Registrar, East African Court of Justice (EACJ) Arusha, Tanzania Dr. Anne Pieter van der Mei Maastricht University, Faculty of Law Maastricht, the Netherlands Roland Kouassi Géro Amoussouga Legal Adviser – Chief, Witnesses & Victims Support Section-Defence (WVSS-D) Registry (ICTR) Arusha, Tanzania Gwendolyn Chellam Assistant Legal Officer, Chambers, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Suzanne Chenault Legal Advisor and Jurist Linguist, Chambers, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Carmina Fernandes Intern President, Chambers, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Rachel Jensen Intern, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania
427
428
Edward Kwakwa
Michael Th. Johnson Deputy Prosecutor, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Mary Kaboggoza Coalition for the ICC, Coordinator for Eastern Africa Kampala, Uganda Elizabeth Nahamya Legal Officer Chambers, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Sugan Naidoo Special Assistant to the President, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania William Romans Associate Legal Officer, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Richard Shilamba SAHRiNGON-Tanzania Dar es Salaam, Tanzania Don Webster Senior Legal Advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTR Arusha, Tanzania Local Groups, Egypt Adel Abdel Baky President, Human Rights Supporters Amira Abdel Hakim Legal Advisor Farouk Abou Issa Secretary General, Cairo Centre for Human Rights Samih Ashour President, Arab Lawyers Union Prof. Abdel Hady Ashry Sherif Atlam Legal Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross Ambassador Siliman Awad Prof. Essam Bassim
The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction
429
Ambassador Abdallah El Ashaal Ambassador Naheed El Ashry Tahany El Guibally Arab Lawyers Union Prof. Nashaat El Hilaly Dr. Azza El Khamissy Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization Councellor Adel Fahmy Prof. Hazim Gomeeha Prof. Said Gouwily Dr. Jailon Hamza Prof. Barbara Harrell-Bond American University Bahiy El Din Hassan Cairo Centre for Human Rights Ambassador Essam Hawass Governor Adly Hussein Governor of Qalyubija Mahmoud Kabeel Actor Mohamed Maher Legal Advisor, International Committee of the Red Cross Mahmoud Mourad El Ahram Newspaper Prof. Abdel Rafia Moussa Prof. Ahmed Rifaat Counselor Nabil Sadek Adeeb Naguib Salamah Amir Salem Advocate Director, Legal Research and Resource Center for Human Rights Dr. Helmy Sha’rawi Head, Arab-African Research Centre Governor Abdel Azim Wazir Governor of Damietta
430
Edward Kwakwa
Local Groups, Tanzania Lilian Lyimo Lawyer, Legal and Human Rights Centre Alute S. L. Mughwai Chairperson, Arusha Chapter, Tanganyika Law Society John Umbulla Advocate, Imboru Chambers Drafting Committee Judge Unity Dow Chile Eboe-Osuji Prof. Shadrack B.O. Gutto Prof. Menno Kamminga Dr. Edward Kwakwa (Coordinator) Africa Legal Aid Secretariat Evelyn A. Ankumah Executive Director Mawuse Anyidoho Program Associate Marco van de Meugheuvel Program Associate Local Assistants Mimi Elwi Local Coordinator, Cairo Shermin Moledina Local Coordinator, Arusha Happyness Sindila Secretary, Arusha
QUELQUES REFLEXIONS INTERNATIONALE”
SUR
LA
“COMMUNAUTE
Robert Kolb*
POSITION DU PROBLEME Il est depuis quelques années de mode de parler de la communauté internationale1, surtout depuis la fin de la guerre froide et la chute des *
Professeur de droit international aux Universités de Neuchâtel, Berne et Genève (Suisse).
1
Sur le concept de Communauté internationale, voir notamment : M. GIULIANO, La comunità internazionale e il diritto, Padoue, 1950. G. VEDOVATO, La Comunità internazionale, Florence, 1950. G. MATURI, Il problema giuridico della Comunità internazionale, Milan, 1956. A. MIGLIAZZA, Il fenomeno dell’organizzazione e la Comunità internazionale, Milan, 1958. L. LEGAZ Y LACAMBRA, “Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Ideologie, Utopie und Wirklichkeit”, Mélanges C. Schmitt, Berlin, 1959 (réimprimé en 1989), pp. 123 et ss. Ch. DE VISSCHER, Théories et réalités en droit international public, 4ème éd., Paris, 1970, pp. 110 et ss. H. MOSLER, “The International Society as a Legal Community”, R.C.A.D.I. 140 (1974) IV, pp. 17 et ss. R.J. DUPUY, “Communauté internationale et disparités de développement, Cours général”, R.C.A.D.I. 165 (1979) IV, pp. 1 et ss. M. LACHS, “Quelques réflexions sur la communauté internationale”, Mélanges M. Virally, Paris, 1991, pp. 349 et ss. H. MOSLER, “International Legal Community”, EPIL 7 (1982), pp. 309 et ss. A. TRUYOL Y SERRA, “Cours général de droit international public”, R.C.A.D.I. 173 (1981) IV, pp. 53 et ss. R.J. DUPUY, La Communauté internationale entre le mythe et l’histoire, Paris, 1986. M. LACHS, “Quelques réflexions sur la Communauté internationale”, Mélanges M. Virally, Paris, 1991, pp. 349 et ss. P.M. DUPUY, “Humanité, Communauté et efficacité du droit”, Mélanges R.J. Dupuy, Paris, 1991, pp. 133 et ss. G. ABI-SAAB, “‘Humanité’ et ‘Communauté’ dans l’évolution de la doctrine et de la pratique du droit international”, Mélanges R.J. Dupuy, Paris, 1991, pp. 1 et ss. G. HERCZEGH, “The International Community of States”, Questions of International Law, (Budapest) 5 (1991), pp. 75 et ss. G.C. McGHEE, International Community : A Goal for a New World Order, Lanham, 1992. G. ABI-SAAB, “International
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 431-451. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
432
Robert Kolb
murs qui partageaient l’Europe. Les textes juridiques internationaux ne se sont pas fait faute de s’annexer également le concept : il se trouve dans des traités (voir par exemple l’article 53 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, 1969)2, dans des Résolutions d’organes internationaux (Résolution 2625 [1970] de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies relative aux relations amicales entre Etats, résolutions du Conseil de sécurité) ou dans des jugements de tribunaux internationaux (affaire de la Barcelona Traction, 19703 ; affaire du personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis d’Amérique en Iran, 19804). Encore plus fréquemment trouve-t-on des références à la notion dans le langage journalistique des médias et des décideurs politiques : d’où des appels à la mobilisation de la communauté internationale, des constats de passivité de la communauté internationale, des affirmations relatives à l’absence de la communauté internationale et ainsi de suite. Si l’on fait abstraction des acceptions les plus vaporeuses, la communauté internationale se réfère dans son sens générique à une unité plus élevée que l’Etat uti singuli, capable de posséder une dignité qui lui soit propre et par conséquent d’articuler et d’influencer l’action par l’idée d’un bien commun à l’ensemble des Etats (et donc à l’humanité), d’un intérêt général qui est plus que la somme des
2
3 4
Law and the International Community : the Long Road to Universality”, Mélanges W. Tieya, Dordrecht / Boston, 1994, pp. 31 et ss. C. TOMUSCHAT, “Die internationale Gemeinschaft”, Archiv des Völkerrechts 33 (1995), pp. 1 et ss. G. ABI-SAAB, “Wither the International Community?”, EJIL 9 (1998), pp. 248 et ss. B. SIMMA / A. PAULUS, “The International Community: Facing the Challenge of Globalization”, EJIL 9 (1998), pp. 266 et ss. P. MOREAU DEFARGES, La communauté internationale, Paris, 2000. D. KRITSIOTIS, “Imagining the International Community”, EJIL 13 (2001), pp. 961 et ss. A. PAULUS, Die internationale Gemeinschaft im Völkerrecht, Munich, 2001. Pour des renvois plus détaillés, on pourra consulter la bibliographie dans l’ouvrage précité de Andreas Paulus. Voici le texte de cet article, relatif au ius cogens international : “Est nul tout traité qui, au moment de sa conclusion, est en conflit avec une norme impérative du droit international général. Aux fins de la présente Convention, une norme impérative du droit international général est une norme acceptée et reconnue par la communauté internationale des Etats dans son ensemble en tant que norme à laquelle aucune dérogation n’est permise et qui ne peut être modifiée que par une nouvelle norme du droit international général ayant le même caractère”. CIJ., Rec. 1970, p. 32. CIJ., Rec. 1980, p. 43.
La Communauté internationale
433
intérêts particuliers. Dès lors, le concept est basé sur l’idée d’une solidarité internationale qui vient s’opposer à une simple juxtaposition d’entités ayant leur justification en elles-mêmes. Mais de quel type doit être cette solidarité ? Avant de tenter de répondre à cette question, il peut être de mise de brosser un rapide répertoire des moments saillants de l’évolution de l’idée de communauté internationale dans l’histoire. Peu d’autres concepts sont aussi liés à l’expérience et à la dimension historique.
LES REPERES HISTORIQUES COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE
DE
L’IDEE
D’UNE
Il ne saurait être question de serrer de manière approfondie les phases et les contextes dans lesquels l’idée de la communauté internationale a germé. On se bornera ici à mentionner les étapes. a) Les sociétés primitives. Nulle trace d’une communauté œcuménique chez les peuples dits primitifs. Leurs sociétés sont organisées selon l’autarcie et présentent ce qu’on appelle une morale close : l’éthique et le droit sont indissociablement liés au groupe ou à la tribu particuliers ; l’étranger n’est pas couvert par eux ; l’expérience du droit ne dépasse pas les frontières du groupe ; il est lié au sacral et ne présente pas cette contexture rationnelle qui seule permet de le généraliser. Le droit est donc vécu comme attribut d’appartenance au groupe ou à la tribu. L’étranger ne possède dès lors pas de droits au sein d’un groupe dont il ne relève pas ; pour en posséder, il doit être admis au sein de ce groupe par des procédés spéciaux, comme le fut par exemple la proxénie en Grèce antique. Cette tendance à la morale close de la tribu comme unité politique suprême se continue encore au Moyen Age sous l’aspect du principe de personnalité (plutôt que de territorialité) dans l’application du droit : jura ossibus inhaerent ; chacun emmène avec lui le droit personnel lié à son statut comme représentant d’un groupe social ou d’une population déterminée. Dans un tel cadre, l’idée d’une communauté œcuménique des hommes ne pouvait pas éclore ; l’étranger reste ennemi, hostis.
434
Robert Kolb
b) La Stoa. C’est dans la Grèce tardive, à l’époque hellénistique, que l’idée d’une seule humanité apparaît. On trouve cette conception chez les penseurs de la Stoa. La racine des enseignements de la Stoa – ce qui explique de surcroît leur orientation œcuménique – est la raison dont sont dotés tous les hommes ; la nature raisonnable de l’homme est posée comme étant la mesure de toute chose. L’individu est une petite unité dans un cosmos ordonné rationnellement. Cette conception d’une rationalité universelle traversant le monde de bout en bout amène à une conception de droit naturel universel : lex est ratio summa insita natura5. Cette conception universelle se traduit aussi dans la conception de la chose publique. Contrairement aux enseignements de la Politique d’Aristote6, la polis n’est plus l’unité la plus élevée de la vie publique. La raison universelle (politiquement soutenue par l’Empire universel d’Alexandre) emporte le postulat du cosmopolitisme. Nous sommes tous citoyens d’un seul monde, pour lequel nous avons la même et solidaire responsabilité éthique. Le local n’est plus que la circonscription du monde entier. On voit bien ici l’idée d’une communauté œcuménique fondée sur la raison commune. C’est des enseignements stoïques que les religions monothéiques comme le christianisme viendront par la suite emprunter l’idée universaliste. Notons de plus que toute doctrine qui cherche son ressort ultime dans la raison tend à l’universel et à la communauté internationale. Ce fut depuis toujours le cas d’un courant important des doctrines de droit naturel. Il en est ainsi parce que la raison est un attribut commun à tous les hommes, quels qu’ils soient et où qu’ils se trouvent. Il n’y a donc pas moyen d’échapper à la conclusion logique d’une unité morale universelle. L’origine ancienne de la communauté internationale est donc la Stoa. En droit, ces enseignements stoïques trouveront une première réalisation dans l’émergence du ius gentium romain. Quand l’Empire, à partir de l’époque des guerres puniques (IIème à IIIème siècle av. J.C.), s’étendit à de nombreux autres peuples, qui n’obtinrent pas la nationalité romaine, et que le commerce méditerranéen se 5 6
Cicéron, De legibus, I, 6, § 18 ; II, 4, § 8. Politique, liv. I, chap. I et II.
La Communauté internationale
435
développa fortement, la stricte limitation personnelle du droit selon les anciens principes de morale close devint intenable. Comment recevoir des commerçants étrangers à Rome afin d’y proposer leurs produits, si on le leur offrait pas de protection juridique du fait de leur nationalité étrangère ? Il devint évident que l’ancien droit sacral applicable seulement aux citoyens romains ne suffisait plus ; et qu’il fallait réformer le corps juridique afin d’inclure dans le monde du droit également les étrangers, les peregrini. La rénovation du droit fut confiée à des magistrats spéciaux dotés de pouvoirs considérables (praetor peregrinus) ; c’est donc par la jurisprudence que la réforme du droit eut lieu ; elle ne fut pas l’œuvre d’un législateur tel que nous l’entendons. Ces magistrats spéciaux donnèrent corps à des règles juridiques applicables à tous les hommes, quelle que fût leur nationalité: c’était le ius gentium7. Afin d’élaborer un droit valable pour tous les hommes dans leurs contacts réciproques, le préteur écarta les règles de l’ancien droit civil romain, imprégnées de trop de formalisme. Il forgea à leur place un corps de règles fondé sur la
7
Sur le jus gentium : M. VOIGT, Das jus naturale, aequum et bonum und ius gentium der Römer, 4.vols, Aalen, réimpression 1966 (première édition, Leipzig, 1856-1875, vol. I-IV). P. BONFANTE, Histoire du droit romain, t. I, Paris, 1928, pp. 261 et ss. G. MAY, Eléments de droit romain, 18 éd., Paris, 1935, pp. 39 et ss. J. BRYCE, “The Law of Nature”, dans : J. BRYCE, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, vol. II, Londres, 1910, pp. 586 et ss. G. GROSSO, Lezioni di storia del diritto romano, 5ème éd., Turin, 1965, pp. 272 et ss, 290 et ss. S. RICCOBONO, Lineamenti della storia delle fonti e del diritto romano, Milan, 1949, pp. 22 et ss. A. GUARINO, Diritto privato romano, 9ème éd. Naples, 1992, pp. 161 et ss. M. LAURIA, “Ius gentium”, Mélanges P. Koschaker, t. I, Weimar, 1939, pp. 258 et ss. P. FREZZA, “Ius gentium”, Revue internationale des droits de l’Antiquité, 1949 (2), pp. 259 et ss. G. LOMBARDI, Sul concetto di ius gentium, Milan, 1974. G. LOMBARDI, Ricerche in tema di ius gentium, Milan, 1946. KASER, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 2ème éd., Göttingen, 1982, pp. 134 et ss. M. KASER, Ius gentium, Cologne/Weimar, 1993. Sur la notion de ius gentium chez Grotius, cf. P. HAGGENMACHER, “Genèse et signification du concept de ‘ius gentium’ chez Grotius”, Grotiana 1981 (2), pp. 44 et ss. Cette conception n’est pas exclusivement occidentale. Ibn Khaldun, auteur arabe du XIVème siècle, dans son ouvrage “Muqaddimah” explique l’émergence et la consolidation des Etats sur la base d’un processus qu’il appelle “asabiyah”, c’est-à-dire de solidarité sociale ; cf. F. BAALI, Ibn Khaldun’s Sociological Thought, New York, 1988, particulièrement pp. 43 et ss.
436
Robert Kolb
raison commune à tous les hommes8, car à un tel droit purement rationnel, tous les hommes devaient pouvoir obéir sans limite de nationalité. Le préteur s’inspira des idées de justice naturelle, de la nature des choses, de l’utilité, de l’équité. Dépouillant les institutions juridiques de leurs accidents locaux et de leurs vêtements contingents, cherchant l’analogie des situations au-delà des limites nationales, le droit gagne en généralité, s’universalise. Pour cette raison le ius gentium se manifeste en une série de principes généraux communs aux peuples. La vocation du ius gentium à l’universalité, la place faite à la nature des choses ou à la raison, l’ont d’ailleurs depuis toujours rapproché du droit naturel. Comment ne pas voir que le ius gentium, prototype de droit universel, esquisse l’idée d’une communauté universelle des hommes ? c) La République chrétienne du Moyen Age. L’idée d’une “communauté internationale” trouve des réalisations locales dès le Moyen Age autour de doctrines religieuses : c’est la République chrétienne des pouvoirs universels en Occident, c’est la communauté de foi musulmane en Orient. En Occident, c’est l’Empire et le Pape qui deviennent les dépositaires de la communauté de foi. Ils fondent et gèrent un ordre constitutionnel particulier en Europe. Celui-ci est imprégné d’une caractéristique dualité : ici les pouvoirs universels avec leurs attributions politiques propres (notamment la défense extérieure), là les seigneurs locaux et les royaumes possédant une gamme de pouvoirs dérivés ou originaires. Cependant, mis à part cette structure duale du pouvoir, la pensée médiévale était toute pénétrée de l’idéal d’unité ; il y prédomine une constante reductio ad unum symbolisant la foi unique et le seul Dieu. Ainsi, par la foi en Dieu, tous les hommes sont unis les uns aux autres. Et la fraternité générale des hommes devient la fraternité générale des nations. De l’unitas divina découle l’unitas humana. Cette communauté de tous les enfants de Dieu est affirmée dans une lettre de Grégoire VII au Prince des Maures ; J. de Salisbury parle d’une res publica hominum ; 8
Voyez à la définition de Gaius, Dig. 1, 1, 9 : “Naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utuntur” (ce que la raison naturelle a établi entre tous les hommes et est observé également par tous ou presque tous les peuples).
La Communauté internationale
437
G. d’Occam d’une universitas mortalium9. L’idée de communauté politique se réalise concrètement par exemple dans la doctrine du pouvoir de destitution du Pape envers des rois qui manqueraient à leurs devoirs, doctrine formulée avec particulière clarté par E. Colonna et par le Pape Grégoire VII en 1080. De même se succèdent les projets de fédération des Etats chrétiens face au danger musulman. C’est le cas, par exemple, du projet de P. Dubois, De recuperatione terrae sanctae (1305) : selon lui, l’Occident forme una sit republica ; et il propose un concile général des Etats chrétiens sous l’égide du Pape. D’un autre côté, la revendication des rois à plus d’autonomie (rex imperator in regno suo) ne vise pas à contester l’idée de communauté chrétienne mais plutôt à se libérer de la gangue politique des pouvoirs universels. Par cela, cette revendication finira cependant à creuser la tombe de la république chrétienne médiévale, avec comme point d’orgue la guerre des trente ans. Que faut-il conclure de ce qui précède ? Ceci : le Moyen Age connaît l’idée d’une communauté des hommes et des peuples ; mais il s’agit de communautés restreintes ; elles ne couvrent que les peuples unis par la même foi. Il s’agit de la formulation d’un bien commun des personnes unies par la même foi (y compris contre les dangers extérieurs) et non pas de la formulation d’un bien commun de l’humanité. La communauté internationale existe et est vécue ; mais elle n’est que locale, partielle. d) De la scolastique espagnole au XIXème siècle. Au XVIème siècle, les penseurs de l’école de Salamanque (F. de Vitoria, G. Vasquez, F. Suarez, L. Molina) reprendront l’héritage universaliste de St. Thomas d’Aquin tout en lui donnant une nouvelle orientation. Il convient de rappeler que St. Thomas est le champion du courant intellectualiste dans la doctrine théologique. Qu’est-ce à dire ? Le Moyen Age avait en effet vu le partage entre deux doctrines : celle des auteurs donnant la primauté à la volonté (volontaristes) et ceux donnant la primauté à la raison (intellectualistes). Pour les premiers, seule la soumission à la volonté insondable de Dieu rend juste ; la 9
Sur ces prises de position, cf. F. A. VON DER HEYDTE, Die Geburtsstunde des souveränen Staates, Regensburg, 1952, pp. 223 et ss, 228-230.
438
Robert Kolb
raison humaine, corrompue par le péché originel, ne saurait proposer quoi que ce soit de certain ; dès lors, l’homme n’a en conséquence de salut que dans la soumission (aveugle) aux ordres de Dieu10. Dès lors : voluntas imperat intellectui. Il s’ensuit également que ce monde est radicalement séparé de celui de Dieu. La Cité terrestre est dans une opposition totale avec la Cité divine, car des règles différentes les régissent : ici la corruption humaine, là la splendeur de la sagesse divine11. Le volontarisme théologique a par ailleurs essaimé dans le domaine politique pour y fonder des doctrines d’absolutisme illimité du Prince. Pour les seconds, influencés davantage par la Stoa, l’ordre divin n’est pas qu’un diktat aveugle d’une volonté incommensurable. Rien n’est bon ou juste simplement parce que Dieu le veut ; Dieu veut les choses parce qu’elles sont justes et bonnes, non pas l’inverse ; or, l’homme, doté d’une raison, peut, bien qu’imparfaitement, participer à la connaissance de l’ordre divin, précisément parce que la raison lui indique ce qui est bon et ce qui est juste12. L’homme recouvre ainsi 10
11 12
L’origine de cette doctrine, défendue surtout par les Franciscains et des penseurs comme Duns Scot ou G. d’Occam, se trouve dès St. Paul : Epîtres aux Romains, 3, 23-24, 28. Elle est développée par St. Augustin dans la deuxième partie de sa vie et sera reprise par St. Cyprien, St. Anselme ou Hugues de St. Victor, plus tard par Luther et Calvin. Ce dualisme représente par ailleurs un platonisme. Cette éthique humaine fondée sur la raison atteint son apogée chez St. Thomas d’Aquin. Thomas reprend l’intellectualisme grec et en particulier l’idée que toute chose est ordonnée à une fin (aristotélisme). Il cherche à établir une solide doctrine temporelle pour une Eglise désormais fermement installée dans ce monde, contrairement au temps de Saint Augustin. Le finalisme renvoie à l’idée de la raison inhérente à tout mouvement de l’univers. C’est à travers la raison qui lui est innée que l’homme connaît et participe à l’ordre divin des choses. Dès lors, la loi est plus raison que volonté: on ne peut vouloir que le bien et le juste, et cela, la raison doit l’indiquer à la volonté (“lex indicans”). Même Dieu est lié par l’ordre rationnel qu’il a créé, parce que Dieu ne peut pas vouloir quelque chose qui ne serait pas fondée sur la sagesse et la raison divines. La fin de la loi est d’être ordonnée au bien commun. C’est cette direction rationnelle qui lui confère sa qualité intrinsèque, non la simple volonté. Thomas rejette donc la volonté comme principe premier de l’action et du droit. Seule la raison assure à la volonté une dignité qui, étant elle-même aveugle, pouvant être dirigée autant vers le mal que vers le bien, lui fait défaut. Thomas rejette donc la règle du “quod placuit principi”. En un mot : la raison est supérieure à la volonté. Il s’ensuit que Thomas réinsère entre la lex aeterna divine et la lex humana positive le droit naturel qui représente la participation de l’homme à l’ordre divin des choses à travers la raison. Dès lors s’ouvre la perspective d’un gigantesque
La Communauté internationale
439
une certaine autonomie, car sa raison lui permet de distinguer le bien du mal, le juste de l’injuste. De même l’insoutenable tension entre la civitas terrena et la civitas coelestis, entre la vie et la foi, se relâche ; les deux pôles sont unis par la passerelle de la raison qui permet d’atteindre des valeurs objectives valables pour ce monde. Dès lors, le bien et la justice deviennent possibles aussi ici-bas. Pour St. Thomas, l’humanité constitue une unité d’ordonnancement, car tous les hommes relèvent du créateur : c’est une communitas perfecta inter omnes communitates13. Cependant, St. Thomas n’a pas développé l’idée d’un Empire universel ou même d’une communauté universelle d’Etats. C’est cette idée que vient adjoindre aux doctrines thomistes l’Ecole de Salamanque. C’est l’époque des grandes découvertes : les Indes, les nouveaux continents. Les peuples découverts, qui n’ont pas la foi chrétienne, sont-ils hors du droit ? Ne possèdent-ils aucun droit, ce qui autoriserait à les traiter comme bon vous semble ? C’est à cette interrogation que l’Ecole de Salamanque répond par la négative. Pour ce faire, elle développe l’idée d’un bien commun de tous les peuples, d’un bonum commune humanitatis. Ainsi, depuis le temps d’Aristote, qui considérait la polis comme la plus haute unité politique, puis du christianisme, qui limitait l’idée de communauté internationale à ceux unis par sa foi, nous voici au maillon du dernier élargissement (ou du retour vers la Stoa), à travers le postulat d’un bien commun universel. Ainsi, Francisco de
13
système d’harmonie universelle fondée sur la raison : la lex aeterna est l’ordre de la création divine selon la sagesse et la raison divines; le droit naturel, la participation de l’homme à cet ordre qu’il peut (partiellement) connaître par sa raison; la loi positive la concrétisation des principes du droit naturel, soit par voie de conclusion, soit par voie d’adjonction là où subsistent des doutes et des lacunes. Ainsi s’ébauche aussi l’embryon d’une théorie de l’Etat de droit : la loi positive ouvertement contraire au droit divin ou naturel n’a de loi que le nom (“legis corruptio”). Si elle s’oppose au droit naturel elle peut être suivie – sans obliger en conscience – par souci de paix sociale et de sécurité juridique. Si elle s’oppose au droit divin elle est absolument nulle. Le système moniste de Thomas permet ainsi l’élaboration d’une doctrine de bien commun et de justice sociale, valables pour ici-bas, récupérant au sein d’un seul édifice la vie terrestre à côté de la vie éternelle de l’homme. Le primat de la raison assure dans cet édifice que la justice, et non l’arbitraire, soit le principe régulateur de la vie sociale. Voir sur cette question : A. VERDROSS, “Der klassische Begriff des ‘bonum commune’ und seine Entfaltung zum ‘bonum commune humanitatis’”, OZöR 2829 (1977-1978), pp. 143 et ss.
440
Robert Kolb
Vitoria (1499-1556) estime que les Etats sont unis par un ordre commun ; de plus, le bien de la communauté des Etats a la priorité sur le bien d’un membre particulier de ce corps social international14. Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) a développé ces idées. Dans des passages célèbres, il a évoqué un bonum commune generis humani fondé sur l’unité du genre humain15. Des réverbérations de ces termes se trouveront encore chez C. Wolff qui utilisera vers le milieu du XVIIIème siècle le concept de “civitas maxima”. Cette société suprême est fondée sur la nature des choses, mais trouve son fondement concret dans un consentement tacite des peuples. Elle recherche le bien commun des Etats par des règles qui émanent d’elle. Il s’agit chez Wolff d’une construction purement rationaliste, qui par ailleurs postule un nébuleux rector civitatis maximae capable de formuler la volonté générale16. Cette théorie n’a guère eu d’influence ; elle a été abandonnée par le plus fidèle disciple de Wolff, E. de Vattel. Cependant, en opposition à ce courant d’idées généreuses, d’autres forces, dans la réalité politique, travaillèrent pour en saper les bases. Avec la consolidation de l’Etat territorial souverain (consacré dans l’ordre des Traités de Westphalie au XVIIème siècle), l’on revient peu à peu à une conception atomiste des relations internationales. Il y prévaut l’intérêt des Etats (dotés de droits subjectifs inaliénables) pris individuellement. L’idée de communauté s’affaisse dès l’effondrement des structures universelles (Empire, Papauté) du monde médiéval. La politique se concentre sur le pouvoir ; et celui-ci est libéré des contraintes moralistes si propres au Moyen Age pour ne se concentrer que sur la mécanique toute causale de la conservation et de l’amplification du pouvoir. Certains chapitres du livre célèbre de Machiavel en sont emblématiques, comme l’est aussi la pensée de Hobbes, exposée dans les prolégomènes des ses ouvrages. L’affaiblissement de l’idée de communauté se voit tangiblement dans la disparition des anciennes doctrines interdisant le recours à la guerre 14 15 16
De potestate civili, no. 13. De legibus ac Deo legislatore, II. Cap. XIX, § 9. Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum (1749), Proleg., § 21. Sur la théorie de Wolff, voir par exemple W. G. GREWE, The Epochs of International Law, Berlin / New York, 2000, pp. 358-360.
La Communauté internationale
441
si ce n’est pour redresser un tort subi (doctrines de guerre juste). La souveraineté des Etats a érigé à leur place un droit illimité et incontrôlable de procéder à la guerre17, le jus ad bellum ; les causes justifiant le recours à la guerre sont désormais toutes politiques et se résument dans le vocable des intérêts (vitaux) des Etats. Mais quelle communauté a-t-on alors, si l’on concède à tout membre du corps social de se faire justice soi-même pour les causes les plus diverses ? Le monopole de la force est la première condition du progrès social18 et d’une société ordonnée au droit. L’émergence de l’Etat moderne ne s’explique au fond que par cela : exproprier le droit d’utiliser la force, qui avait semé tant d’anarchie tout au long du Moyen Age. Voilà donc le résultat : l’idée de communauté se rétracte autour des Etats uti singuli, de la communauté nationale ; il se perd au plan international. La communauté réelle, c’est l’Etat, la polis ; la communauté cosmopolite se perd dans les sables mouvants de la pensée de quelques philosophes (dont Kant). Ce fut un recul. Les progrès du positivisme, qui par son empirisme et sa déférence au pouvoir et aux phénomènes causals a toujours été hostile à toute pensée universaliste, ne devaient que renforcer ces tendances. e) Le XIXème siècle et le Concert Européen. Le XIXème siècle amène une nouvelle notion de communauté internationale, fort éloignée de celle de l’Ecole de Salamanque. C’est l’aboutissement de la phase d’atomisme et d’individualisme, inaugurée par les Traités de 17
18
Cf. N. POLITIS, Les nouvelles tendances du droit international, Paris, 1927, pp. 100-101 : “La souveraineté a tué la théorie du justum bellum. La prétention des Etats de n’avoir à rendre aucun compte de leurs actes les a portés à revendiquer le droit de faire de leur force l’usage que bon leur semblait”. “Nous touchons ici au cœur même du problème international. Devant cette question [le maintien de la paix], tout recule au second plan, parce que, en définitive, tout est conditionné par elle. La guerre n’est pas seulement une monstrueuse aberration. Elle est l’obstacle qui rend impossible toute organisation solide de la communauté internationale. Quand elle éclate, l’armature du droit se déchire; quand elle prend fin, les souvenirs et les appréhensions qu’elle laisse continuent d’empoisonner l’atmosphère. Aucun résultat décisif ne peut être acquis aussi longtemps que le monde reste ployé sous sa menace. Toute l’histoire de l’humanité l’atteste: guerres privées, guerres civiles, guerres internationales, peu importe; le refoulement de la guerre est la condition sine qua non du progrès social”. Cf. M. BOURQUIN, “Règles générales du droit de la paix”, R.C.A.D.I. 35 (1931) I, pp. 173-174.
442
Robert Kolb
Westphalie. La communauté est accaparée par un Concert de Puissances européennes, prétendant parler au nom de tous. Elles formèrent un club légiférant et agissant dans les affaires internationales ; leurs délibérations étaient censées par la meilleure doctrine avoir force de loi19. Les affaires internationales vivent alors au rythme des Congrès ; certains se présentent comme de véritables règlements internationaux de grande portée, notamment le Congrès de Berlin de 1878. De plus, seuls les Etats reconnus par les Puissances sont des titulaires pleins et entiers de droits internationaux et de devoirs correspondants. Cette situation de pouvoir est fidèlement reflétée (comme à son habitude) par la doctrine positiviste : pas d’obligation à la charge des Etats sans leur consentement, donc pas de nouveau membre de relations juridiques internationales sans la reconnaissance préalable des Puissances (car cela équivaudrait à les soumettre à des obligations juridiques envers le nouvel Etat sans leur consentement préalable). Comment est-on dès lors admis au club des relations internationales ? Par une décision d’admission aux avantages du “droit public de l’Europe” (le droit international de l’époque) par les Puissances. Ainsi, par le Traité de Paris de 1856 (article 7), il est déclaré que la Sublime Porte (Turquie) est admise à participer aux avantages du droit public et du concert européen. Seront ainsi également admis comme membres de la “communauté internationale” le Japon et le Siam (1894/1895), la Perse (1896), etc. f) Le XXème siècle et le retour de la Communauté internationale. Le cataclysme de la première guerre mondiale a bouleversé les esprits. L’anarchie de la société internationale et le droit généralisé de faire la guerre a cessé d’être la seule réalité politique du monde, comme le voulait le hégélianisme (si influent en Allemagne et en Italie). Une réaction se dessine : si l’on veut éviter le retour à de telles catastrophes, les Etats doivent être disciplinés et respecter un droit qui leur soit commun. Pour que celui-ci les contraigne, il doit leur être supérieur et représenter un corps de règles objectif (pas simplement une collection d’actes juridiques subjectifs, comme le voulait le 19
Voir par exemple J. C. BLUNTSCHLI, Le droit international codifié, Paris, 1870, p. 101, article 110.
La Communauté internationale
443
positivisme). On s’orienta donc vers l’idée d’une communauté (ou d’une solidarité nécessaire) entre les Etats, fondée sur l’existence d’un droit objectif commun20 et sanctionnée par des institutions internationales comme la Société des Nations. L’article 11 du Pacte de la Société des Nations reflète d’ailleurs à merveille cette nouvelle philosophie : la guerre est stigmatisée comme un mal social affectant tous les membres de la Société, même si elle a lieu entre Etats qui ne sont pas membres de l’Organisation. On n’imagine pas de formule plus révolutionnaire, tournant davantage le dos à la doctrine la plus solidement ancrée du XIXème siècle, à savoir le droit souverain de faire la guerre ou de rester neutre. La communauté internationale de ce début du XXème siècle se ramène au fond à l’affirmation de l’existence d’un lien commun entre les Etats représenté par un droit international auxquels ils sont également soumis. Dès 1945, la sensation de dangers communs (“s’unir ou périr”) donne une forte impulsion aux idées de communauté internationale. C’est l’époque des interdépendances, des droits de l’homme mis à mal 20
D’où la notion si typiquement évoquée à l’époque, celle de “Constitution internationale”. C’est tout naturellement vers l’idée d’une Constitution, telle qu’elle était connue en droit interne, que les esprits se tournèrent dans la recherche d’un pôle objectif dont procéderait le droit international. Postuler une constitution revenait à asseoir le droit international sur une base objective susceptible de mieux concilier, comme en droit interne, pouvoir et droit. Car la Constitution n’est autre chose que l’organisation des pouvoirs et compétences sociales essentielles. Il ne s’agissait désormais plus de juridiciser afin d’éviter le vide juridique, mais d’objectiviser les fonctions et disciplines sociales essentielles pour éviter l’archipélisation du droit promue par le positivisme. D’expédient pratique laissant de larges lacunes, le droit international devait devenir un système fondé sur l’ordonnancement des compétences. C’est des Ecoles allemande et italienne, les deux Etats où le positivisme avait le plus prévalu, qu’est partie cette réorientation de la pensée. L’école allemande, de facture normative, a lié la Constitution, outre qu’à l’idée de répartition des compétences, à des considérations matérielles susceptibles de traduire des exigences de justice et de bien commun propres à la société internationale (A. VERDROSS, Die Verfassung der Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft, Vienne / Berlin, 1926). L’école italienne, de facture sociologique, à cherché à fonder la Constitution dans les institutions sociales, le droit n’étant que l’expression d’une réalité sociale sous l’aspect d’ordre qui lui est inhérent. Le droit international prend dès lors corps dans les structures propres à cette réalité sociale qu’est la société des Etats (S. ROMANO, L’ordinamento giuridico, Pise, 1917). Dans les deux cas le droit international se présente comme système basé sur un fait objectif.
444
Robert Kolb
par les Puissances de l’Axe dans des proportions jusque là inconnues, des dangers communs par la bombe atomique puis par l’épuisement des ressources ou la pollution de l’environnement, etc. L’idée de communauté véhiculée à travers la sensation de dangers communs de l’humanité s’empare des esprits de plus en plus largement : G. Davis, un petit acteur américain, déchire dans les années 1950 son passeport et se déclare citoyen du monde ; en droit, l’idée d’intérêts communs à tous les Etats fait des progrès fulgurants et commande l’émergence de concepts tels que le jus cogens, les obligations erga omnes, les crimes internationaux des Etats et des individus, l’héritage commun de l’humanité, la reconstruction hiérarchique des obligations en droit international selon leur importance pour la “communauté internationale”, etc.21. Le droit international cesse de régir des intérêts purement bilatéralistes, fondés sur une logique de contrat, de propriété et de responsabilité civile (utilitas singulorum) pour venir embrasser des intérêts collectifs de l’humanité (utilitas publica) ; il cesse d’être un droit structurellement purement privé, agençant des intérêts particuliers, et s’enrichit d’aspects de droit public en définissant un intérêt général. Il y a dès lors une incontestable poussée vers la communautarisation du droit international, si bien que A. Carrillo Salcedo a pu constater en 1996 que le droit international de la fin du siècle se présentait sous une perspective nouvelle : “l’ordre juridique de la communauté internationale est venu […] s’ajouter aux dimensions traditionnelles de l’ordre juridique régulateur des relations interétatiques de coexistence et de coopération”22. Nous avons donc été témoins, au XXème siècle, de l’évolution d’une communauté de droit à l’époque de la Société des Nations vers une communauté de sort à l’époque des Nations Unies. Nous avons vu aussi les avatars historiques de la notion de communauté internationale, qui n’a guère progressé linéairement ; son cheminement a été marqué par des points d’arrêt et de rechute, tout comme par des phases d’avancée. De plus, les concepts de 21
22
Sur ces divers aspects, voir la présentation succincte chez C. TOMUSCHAT, “Die internationale Gemeinschaft”, Archiv des Völkerrechts 33 (1995), pp. 1 et ss. J. A. CARRILLO SALCEDO, “Droit international et souveraineté des Etats, Cour général de droit international public”, R.C.A.D.I. 257 (1996), p. 146.
La Communauté internationale
445
communauté internationale ont varié dans le temps. C’est le cas surtout pour leur point de référence : une communauté restreinte (quoique internationale) ou une communauté œcuménique.
LES CONCEPTS DE COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE Par le terme “communauté internationale” on peut exprimer des choses très différentes. Un examen attentif de la littérature permet de dégager au moins trois concepts différents de communauté internationale. Le troisième est une spécification du second, alors que le premier et le second diffèrent par degré. A bien regarder, les trois concepts se distinguent par le facteur de cohésion qui selon eux est constitutif de communauté : soit l’existence d’un ordre juridique, soit l’existence d’une conscience d’un bien commun dirigeant les actions concrètes, soit l’existence d’une institution publique. a) La Communauté internationale nécessaire. Selon cette conception, le simple fait d’être uni par le lien commun que créé l’existence d’un ordre juridique également contraignant pour tous est déjà un facteur suffisant de communauté. Le droit commun ordonne la société internationale : il y a dès lors plus qu’une juxtaposition anarchique. L’adjuvant du droit est créateur d’une communauté. Ici, la communauté est une simple déduction de l’existence d’un droit commun : s’il y a un ordre juridique objectif, il y a nécessairement une forme de communauté (fût-elle minimale), car le droit est créateur d’ordre. C’est sur la base de cette conception que M.K. Yasseen a pu répliquer au sein de la Société française pour le droit international que la communauté internationale existe, “car la coexistence n’est pas une juxtaposition ; il faut un lien pour assurer la coexistence”23. H. Mosler s’est inspiré de la même notion large de communauté par le droit24. Cette notion toute restreinte de communauté internationale par le droit 23
24
M.K. YASSEEN, “Réflexions sur la détermination du jus cogens”, dans : S.F.D.I., Colloque de Toulouse, L’élaboration du droit international public, Paris, 1975, p. 216. H. MOSLER, “The International Society as a Legal Community”, R.C.A.D.I. 140 (1974) IV, pp. 33 et ss.
446
Robert Kolb
n’est guère contestée, quand elle est bien comprise. La question qui se pose est si le terme “communauté” convient au lien minimal qu’assure le droit, ou s’il ne faut pas plutôt le réserver à des communautés présentant des éléments de solidarité plus poussés. b) La Communauté internationale spécifique. Pour les tenants de ce courant, le lien commun créé par le droit ne suffit pas pour constituer une communauté : société n’est pas communauté. Il faut dès lors chercher un élément de cohésion réelle supplémentaire. Pour une partie de la doctrine ce facteur supplémentaire dépend de la conscience des peuples. La pensée de Charles de Visscher est très illustrative à cet égard25. Pour lui, la communauté internationale dépend de “l’existence d’un esprit communautaire, la disposition chez les collectivités particulières à conformer leur action au bien supérieur d’une communauté universelle”26. C’est dire qu’il n’y a de communauté que si le pouvoir est ordonné au bien commun, s’il est lui-même facteur de société27. La réponse concrète à l’existence d’une communauté dépend des facteurs matériels d’interdépendance mais surtout des aspects moraux, à savoir la conscience d’un bien commun supérieur. Dans aucun ordre juridique cet idéal est plus lointain que dans celui de la société internationale28. L’Etat y absorbe les solidarités et se prépose à l’accroissement indéfini d’un pouvoir détourné des fins humaines. La communauté internationale n’est donc qu’une aspiration, non une réalité. Rien ne le souligne mieux que la conscience des masses et le sujet de leur loyauté politique : “Rien ne souligne mieux ce contraste que la comparaison des réactions que suscite dans les deux ordres en présence [l’ordre international et l’ordre national] la mise en jeu de leurs intérêts essentiels. Dans l’Etat, ce sont les intérêts vitaux, les plus hautement politiques, qui déclenchent les solidarités suprêmes. C’est l’inverse qui se produit pour la communauté internationale. On y relève des solidarités mineures, dans l’ordre économique ou technique par exemple ; mais plus on se rapproche des questions vitales, comme le 25 26 27 28
Ch. DE VISSCHER, Théories et réalités en droit international public, 4ème éd., Paris, 1970, pp. 111 et ss. Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., p. 111. Ibid., p. 111-116.
La Communauté internationale
447
maintien de la paix et de la guerre, moins la communauté exerce d’action sur ses membres ; les solidarités faiblissent à mesure que grandissent les périls qui la menacent ; celles qui s’affirment alors refluent vers leur foyer traditionnel, la nation. Les hommes ne contestent pas, en raison, l’existence de valeurs supranationales ; dans l’ordre de l’action, ils n’obéissent guère 29 qu’aux impératifs nationaux” .
En outre, dans la société internationale, l’action ne paraît presque jamais comme application impersonnelle du droit et dans ce sens dépolitisée. Elle est souvent ressentie comme une politique de puissance plus ou moins voilée, exposée par conséquent à être sans cesse détournée à des fins particulières. Les récentes guerres en exYougoslavie nous ont encore montré ces mécanismes dans une vivacité et plasticité saisissantes. Chacun des peuples concernés a fait corps autour de sa mythique nationaliste, repoussant toute critique internationale, si justifiée fût-elle. On le voit par exemple pour ce qui est de la répression pénale internationale. Chaque communauté tend à réagir avec violence dès que le tribunal international met en accusation des propres nationaux, car cela est vécu par un certain nombre de ces groupes comme une “salissure de la guerre héroïque contre l’ennemi de la patrie”. Ni les Serbes, ni les Croates, ni les Albanais ne se distinguent de ce point de vue. Cette attitude révèle un défaut de pénétration du sentiment international chez les masses. D’autres exemples sont plus vieux mais non moins évocateurs. Dans un procès devant la Cour suprême allemande à Leipzig, après la première guerre mondiale (affaire du Llandovery Castle, 1921)30, des militaires allemands furent accusés et, à l’administration de la preuve, reconnus coupables d’avoir tiré sur des naufragés britanniques en pleine mer, en les tuant. Le sous-marin allemand qui avait coulé leur navire avait fait surface, et les militaires allemands avaient ouvert le feu sur les quelques militaires britanniques qui, s’étant sauvés, flottaient à la dérive. Or, dès que les accusés furent condamnés, un grand nombre d’individus sortirent de la foule qui leur était tout acquise pour aller les féliciter de leur attitude en défense de la nation 29 30
Ibid., p. 112. Cf. dans AJIL 16 (1922), pp. 708 et ss.
448
Robert Kolb
allemande. Les quelques britanniques présents au procès en tant qu’observateurs durent sortir de la salle d’audience à la dérobée par une porte cachée, sous protection policière. Cette attitude n’est compréhensible qu’en raison du nationalisme de l’époque, exacerbé par la guerre, les souffrances et les privations subis par les Allemands pendant celle-ci, tout comme par le sentiment d’absence de réciprocité. Si chez C. de Visscher ces constats de l’égoïsme national sont faits avec regret et comme constat de grave et menaçante insuffisance de la société internationale, chez d’autres il y a des accents plus péremptoires et plus inspirés par la Realpolitik. D’où par exemple le constat sans appel d’un P. Weil : la communauté internationale n’est qu’une fiction qui voile le pouvoir des Etats individuels, seuls maîtres du jeu. C’est une vision irréaliste qui créé l’illusion sans la réalité du progrès31. Au fond, la notion doit donc être condamnée. Sans doute est-on à cet égard plus avancé dans les Communautés régionales, comme celle européennes. Mais là aussi des instants de crise tendent à produire des mouvements de repli sur soi, tandis que chez les peuples se lèvent çà et là des frémissements de retour vers plus de souveraineté nationale et donc plus d’anarchie. La crise de la “vache folle” ou la politique étrangère commune sont dans ces dernières années autant de signaux clairs à cet effet. c) La Communauté institutionnelle. Cette idée de Communauté est une variante de la Communauté spécifique : le facteur de cohésion est ici aperçu non pas simplement dans une conscience collective des peuples, mais dans un fait institutionnel. La Communauté internationale, c’est la communauté organisée. C’est donc les organisations internationales, foyers de coopération des Etats en vue d’intérêts communs, qui forment le cœur et le moteur de la communauté internationale. Par son universalité et ses fonctions politiques primordiales, l’Organisation des Nations Unies fait ici figure de proue, si bien que sa Charte a pu être comparée à une
31
P. WEIL, “Cours général de droit international public : le droit international en quête de son identité”, R.C.A.D.I. 237 (1992) VI, pp. 306 et ss, 311-312.
La Communauté internationale
449
Constitution internationale32. C’est vrai aussi des organisations régionales, comme notamment les Communautés européennes. Cette vision de communauté internationale a été véhiculée dans de nombreux écrits par C. Jenks ou encore par J. L’Huillier33. On peut ajouter que cette conception de la communauté internationale correspond au jargon journalistique qui identifie sans cesse la communauté internationale avec les Nations Unies, voire même avec le Conseil de sécurité (ce qui est particulièrement aberrant, vu la composition élitiste de cet organe).
CONCLUSION 1. Facteurs réels. A serrer les choses de bien près, l’existence d’une communauté internationale est une question de définition du terme “communauté”. Cela va de soi. Ce qui est plus important : c’est aussi une affaire d’inventaire, car des éléments communautaires et individualistes sont présents dans chaque société dans des combinaisons diverses. Quelle balance exacte entre eux faut-il exiger pour qu’il y ait une communauté ? Il ne peut y avoir à cela de réponse définitive et encore moins de réponse mathématique. Tout dépend des conceptions qui se nouent dans le temps. En ce sens, le concept de communauté internationale est un concept historique. Il est vrai, toutefois, que la communauté internationale a plus de mal à s’affirmer que des communautés plus restreintes. Il y a à cela diverses raisons, dont celle de l’alchimie sociologique est la plus évidente : il est plus facile d’intégrer des solidarités plus locales que 32
33
Voir par exemple B. CONFORTI, “Cours général de droit international public”, R.C.A.D.I., 212 (1988) V, pp. 129 et ss. B. FASSBENDER, UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto, La Haye / London / Boston, 1998, pp. 89 et ss. E. SUY, “The Constitutional Character of Constituent Treaties of International Organizations and the Hierarchy of Norms”, Mélanges R. Bernhardt, Berlin, 1995, pp. 267 et ss. K. SKUBISZEWSKI, “Remarks on the Interpretation of the United Nations Charter”, Mélanges H. Mosler, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York, 1983, pp. 891 et ss. G. RESS, “The Interpretation of the Charter”, dans : B. SIMMA (éd), The Charter of the United Nations – A Commentary, Oxford, 1995, pp. 26-29 (2. éd., 2002, pp. 15-18). Voir la formulation succincte dans : J. L’HUILLIER, Eléments de droit international public, Paris, 1950, pp. 180-181.
450
Robert Kolb
des solidarités plus globales. Or la communauté internationale est la communauté la plus large imaginable à l’heure actuelle. Elle reste dès lors plus un construit de la raison qu’une réalité sentie de près par les masses. Elle peut être pensée, mais elle est plus rarement vécue. De plus, la communauté se consolide le plus souvent vers l’extérieur : la solidarité se définit et se précise à l’endroit d’un ennemi commun, d’un danger extérieur, de la nécessité de se préserver envers autrui. La communauté internationale œcuménique n’a pas ce moteur d’intégration à sa disposition ; il n’y a par rapport à elle pas d’extérieur, pas d’ennemi en puissance (à moins d’une invasion par des extra-terrestres !). Il est d’ailleurs significatif que les progrès récents de la communauté internationale aient été le résultat de la perception plus aiguë de dangers communs, si bien que le moteur communautaire a été une fois de plus une menace. Il semblerait que l’humanité ne trouve de cohésion que face aux précipices qui s’ouvrent et qu’elle n’arrive pas à apprécier son intérêt œcuménique en dehors de ce cadre étroit et au sens étroit du mot “calamiteux”34. Il ne semble y avoir qu’une petite élite de l’humanité qui soit ouverte à l’appel direct de la raison. Nous tous payons le prix de cette défaillance. Et c’est ici que la jonction doit s’opérer avec le concept idéal de communauté internationale, celui qui devrait être et qui n’est pas, ou qui est trop peu. 2. Facteurs idéaux. Idéalement, la communauté internationale reste un concept philosophique, indiquant cette unité du genre humain et de ses intérêts pour laquelle il vaut sans doute la peine de se mobiliser et de lutter. Communauté internationale est ici synonyme de plus d’ordre et de plus de justice dans les relations internationales. Mais dans ce sens profond, la “communauté” reste aussi et toujours une vue de l’esprit, une idée régulatrice au sens kantien, car l’unité qui est à la base des choses reste toujours une idée transcendante. Sans doute, la 34
Selon une très belle image d’un philosophe du droit : “[A]ncor più che l’immagine del Dio, che, aureolato di gloria, si adora sugli altari, è la figura dolorosa di Cristo ..., fra gli strepi del Golgota..., quella che meglio esprime e più icasticamente rappresenta il tormento e l’anelito dell’uomo nella lotta per la ricerca della verità e per il trionfo della giustizia” : A. GROPPALI, Filosofia del diritto, Milan, 1944, p. 470.
La Communauté internationale
451
communauté parfaite n’est pas de ce monde. Il ne faut pas pour cela dédaigner les efforts accomplis pour faire régner plus d’ordre et de justice aussi dans cette société qu’on désigne désormais de plus en plus souvent et à cette fin même de communauté internationale. Et il ne faut pas ménager les efforts pour la servir, nous tous et chacun, selon nos moyens respectifs.
This page intentionally left blank
CHRONIQUE DES ACTIVITES DE INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE EN 2001
LA
COUR
Ludivine Tamiotti*
La Cour a connu en 2001 une année judiciaire chargée avec l’adoption de quatre décisions importantes (trois arrêts et une ordonnance), l’introduction de trois nouvelles instances et la révision de ses règles de procédure. Les quatre décisions rendues par la Cour en 2001 sont les suivantes: l’arrêt du 16 mars 2001 en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), l’arrêt du 27 juin 2001 en l’affaire LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), l’arrêt du 23 octobre 2001 sur la requête des Philippines à fin d’intervention en l’affaire relative à la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie c. Malaisie), et l’ordonnance du 29 novembre 2001 sur les demandes reconventionnelles en l’affaire relative aux Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (Ouganda c. République Démocratique du Congo). Cette chronique examine d’abord l’actualité non judiciaire de la Cour internationale de Justice, à savoir l’évolution de sa composition et de son rôle, le discours de son président à l’Assemblée générale, et les amendements portés aux règles de procédure, avant de s’attarder sur le fond des décisions rendues par la Cour cette année.
*
Juriste, Organisation mondiale du commerce, Genève. Les opinions exprimées dans cet article sont strictement personnelles à l’auteur et n’engagent pas l’Organisation mondiale du commerce.
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 453-492. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
454
Ludivine Tamiotti
ACTUALITE DE LA COUR Évolution de la composition de la Cour Jusqu’au 30 septembre 2001, la Cour internationale de Justice était composée de la manière suivante : M. Gilbert Guillaume (France), président; M. Shi Jiuyong (Chine), vice-président; MM. Shigeru Oda (Japon), Mohammed Bedjaoui (Algérie), Raymond Ranjeva (Madagascar), Géza Herczegh (Hongrie), Carl-August Fleischhauer (Allemagne), Abdul G. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Vladen S. Vereshchetin (Fédération de Russie), Mme Rosalyn Higgins (Grande-Bretagne), MM. Gonzalo Parra-Aranguren (Venezuela), Pieter H. Kooijmans (Pays-Bas), Francisco Rezek (Brésil), Awn Shawkat Al-Khasawneh (Jordanie) et Thomas Buergenthal (Etats-Unis d’Amérique), juges. M. Mohammed Bedjaoui, juge et ancien président de la Cour, souhaitant prendre une retraite anticipée, a démissionné de ses fonctions à compter du 30 septembre 20011. M. Bedjaoui était membre de la Cour depuis 1982. De ces deux décennies passées au service de la justice internationale, on se souviendra tout particulièrement de sa présidence de la chambre ad hoc constituée dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso/République du Mali) dont l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires avait permis de pacifier les relations entre ces deux pays. On se souviendra également de son rôle dans l’affaire de la Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires, au cours de laquelle M. Bedjaoui exerçait les fonctions de président. En tant que président de la Cour, M. Bedjaoui avait alors fait usage de sa voix prépondérante sur le vote du paragraphe 2, E du dispositif de cet avis consultatif. M. Nabil Elaraby (Egypte) a été élu le 12 octobre 2001 comme membre de la Cour par l’Assemblée générale et le Conseil de sécurité2. En tant que successeur de M. Bedjaoui et conformément à l’article 14 du Statut de la Cour, M. Elaraby achèvera le terme du mandat de M. Bedjaoui qui viendra à expiration le 5 février 2006. 1 2
Communiqué de presse n°2001/20, 6 juillet 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/25, 12 octobre 2001.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
455
M. Elaraby était membre de la Commission du droit international depuis 1994. Il a également été représentant permanent de l’Egypte auprès des Nations Unies à Genève puis à New York. Pour clore ce volet sur l’évolution de la composition de la Cour, il faut noter que, le 19 février 2001, la Cour a réélu M. Jean-Jacques Arnaldez (France) pour sept ans au poste de greffier adjoint3. Rappelons aussi que M. Philippe Couvreur (Belgique) est greffier de la Cour depuis février 2000. Évolution du rôle de la Cour Cette année, la Cour a été saisie de trois nouvelles affaires. Le 24 avril 2001, la République fédérale de Yougoslavie (RFY) a déposé une demande en révision de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 dans l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires4. La RFY invoque l’article 61 du Statut de la Cour pour fonder sa demande en révision. La RFY soutient qu’avant le 1er novembre 2000 (date de son admission à l’ONU), la RFY n’était pas la continuatrice de la personnalité internationale de la République socialiste fédérative de Yougoslavie. De plus, la RFY n’étant alors pas membre de l’ONU, elle ne pouvait pas non plus être partie à la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide qui est seulement ouverte aux membres des Nations Unies et aux non membres invités par l’Assemblée générale. Il faut rappeler que dans son arrêt de 1996 sur les exceptions préliminaires, la Cour avait fondé sa compétence sur l’article IX de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide. La RFY demande donc à la Cour de déclarer qu’il existe un fait nouveau de nature à rouvrir l’affaire aux fins de révision et demande aussi à la Cour de suspendre la procédure sur le fond de l’affaire jusqu’à ce qu’une décision sur la demande en révision soit rendue.
3 4
Communiqué de presse n° 2001/3, 20 février 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/12, 24 avril 2001.
456
Ludivine Tamiotti
La seconde nouvelle instance introduite en 2001 est l’affaire Certains biens déposée par le Liechtenstein contre l’Allemagne le 1er juin 20015. La requête du Liechtenstein concerne des “décisions prises par l’Allemagne, en 1998 et depuis lors, de traiter certains biens appartenant à des ressortissants du Liechtenstein comme des avoirs allemands saisis au titre des réparations ou des restitutions, ou en raison de la seconde guerre mondiale, sans prévoir d’indemnisation.” Comme base de compétence de la Cour, le Liechtenstein invoque l’article 1er de la convention européenne pour le règlement pacifique des différends (Strasbourg, 1957). La troisième nouvelle affaire, celle du Différend territorial et maritime, a été introduite le 6 décembre 2001 par le Nicaragua contre la Colombie au sujet de questions juridiques qui demeurent en suspens entre les deux Etats en matière de titres territoriaux et de délimitation maritime dans les Caraïbes occidentales6. Quatre affaires ont été rayées du rôle de la Cour: l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn) et l’affaire LaGrand (Allemagne c. EtatsUnis d’Amérique), suite à un arrêt sur le fond ; et les deux affaires des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Burundi) et (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda) suite à la demande de l’Etat requérant. Concernant ces deux dernières affaires, le 30 janvier 2001, la Cour a rendu simultanément, deux ordonnances prenant acte du désistement ((République démocratique du Congo c. Burundi) et (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda))7. Le Gouvernement du Congo a souhaité se désister de l’instance en précisant qu’il “se réserv[ait] la possibilité de faire valoir ultérieurement de nouveaux chefs de compétence de la Cour.” Le Burundi et le Rwanda ont informé la Cour qu’ils acceptaient ce désistement, respectivement les 19 et 22 janvier 2001. La Cour a rendu des ordonnances fixant ou reportant la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt des pièces de procédure dans les affaires suivantes: affaires de la Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Royaume-Uni), (Yougoslavie c. France), (Yougoslavie 5 6 7
Communiqué de presse n°2001/14, 1er juin 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/34, 6 décembre 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/2, 1er février 2001.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
457
c. Allemagne), (Yougoslavie c. Italie), (Yougoslavie c. Pays-Bas) (Yougoslavie c. Belgique), (Yougoslavie c. Canada) et (Yougoslavie c. Portugal)8; affaire relative au Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique)9; affaire relative à Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne)10; et affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda)11. La Cour a également rendu trois ordonnances relatives à la procédure des demandes reconventionnelles. Dans deux affaires, les ordonnances ont autorisé la partie répondant aux demandes reconventionnelles à s’exprimer une seconde fois par écrit sur lesdites demandes. Il s’agit d’abord de l’affaire de la Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria (Cameroun c. Nigeria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant))12, où la Cour a autorisé, par ordonnance du 20 février, le Cameroun à présenter une pièce additionnelle portant exclusivement sur les demandes reconventionnelles du Nigeria. Ensuite dans l’affaire des Platesformes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique)13 l’ordonnance du 28 août 2001 a autorisé l’Iran à présenter une pièce de procédure écrite additionnelle portant exclusivement sur la demande reconventionnelle des Etats-Unis. Il faut également noter l’ordonnance du 13 septembre 2001 par laquelle le président de la Cour a pris acte du retrait par la Yougoslavie des demandes reconventionnelles que cet Etat avaient présentées dans son contre-mémoire en 1997 en l’affaire relative à L’application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie)14. La Bosnie8 9 10 11
12 13 14
Ordonnances du 21 février 2001. Voir Communiqué de presse n°2001/5, 23 février 2001. Ordonnances du 14 mars 2001 et du 12 avril 2001. Voir Communiqués de presse n°2001/8, 16 mars 2001 et n°2001/11, 17 avril 2001. Ordonnance du 28 juin 2001. Voir Communiqué de presse n°2001/19, 29 juin 2001. La Cour a fixé les délais pour le dépôt de nouvelles pièces écrites dans son ordonnance du 29 novembre 2001 sur les demandes reconventionnelles. Voir Communiqué de presse n°2001/36, 13 décembre 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/4, 22 février 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/21, 30 août 2001. Communiqué de presse n°2001/22, 13 septembre 2001.
458
Ludivine Tamiotti
Herzégovine avait fait savoir qu’elle ne voyait aucune objection à ce retrait. Ces demandes reconventionnelles avaient été reconnues recevables par l’ordonnance de la Cour du 17 décembre 1997 et des pièces de procédure sur ces demandes avaient été d’ailleurs déposées par les deux parties. Toujours dans le domaine des ordonnances de procédure, la Cour a rejeté, par ordonnance du 27 juin 2001, une demande de la Belgique tendant à déroger à la procédure convenue en l’affaire du Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique) et à obtenir un délai additionnel pour le dépôt de son contremémoire15. La Belgique considérait que M. Yerodia Ndombasi n’occupant plus de fonction au sein du Gouvernement du Congo, il s’agissait d’un fait nouveau qui soulevait des questions de compétence et de recevabilité. En raison de ce fait nouveau, la Belgique souhaitait formuler des objections quant à la compétence et à la recevabilité. Cependant, le Congo s’est opposé à ce qu’il soit dérogé à l’ordonnance du 13 décembre 2000 fixant les dates d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt des pièces écrites du Congo et de la Belgique. La Cour ne voyant aucun motif impérieux de s’écarter de la procédure convenue a rejeté la demande de la Belgique de présenter des exceptions préliminaires entraînant la suspension de la procédure sur le fond. La Cour a néanmoins accepté de reporter la date d’expiration du délai pour le dépôt du contre-mémoire de la Belgique au 28 septembre 2001 au lieu du 31 mai 2001. Au 31 décembre 2001, la Cour comptait vingt-trois affaires inscrites à son rôle et aucune affaire consultative. Il s’agissait des affaires suivantes : affaires relatives aux Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Royaume-Uni) et (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) ; affaire des Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) ; affaire de L’application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie) ; affaire du Projet Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hongrie/Slovaquie) ; affaire de la Frontière 15
Communiqué de presse n°2001/17, 29 juin 2001.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
459
terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria (Cameroun c. Nigeria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)) ; affaire de la Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie/Malaisie) ; affaire Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo) ; affaires de la Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Royaume-Uni), (Yougoslavie c. France), (Yougoslavie c. Allemagne), (Yougoslavie c. Italie), (Yougoslavie c. Pays-Bas) (Yougoslavie c. Belgique), (Yougoslavie c. Canada) et (Yougoslavie c. Portugal) ; affaire des Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda) ; affaire de L’application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Yougoslavie) ; affaire de la Délimitation maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras) ; l’affaire du Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique) ; affaire de la Demande en révision de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires (Yougoslavie c. BosnieHerzégovine) ; affaire Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne) ; et l’affaire du Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie). Le discours du président de la Cour à l’Assemblée générale Le 31 octobre 2001, le président de la Cour internationale de Justice, M. Gilbert Guillaume, a présenté le rapport de la Cour pour la période allant du 1er août 2000 au 31 juillet 2001, devant la cinquantesixième session de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies16. Le président a d’abord présenté les activités de la Cour et le bilan des affaires qui ont été réglées pendant l’année. Il a également informé l’Assemblée générale des derniers efforts de la Cour pour améliorer ses procédures. Dans un autre registre, le président a plaidé en faveur de l’accès à la justice internationale des Etats disposant de ressources financières limitées. Il a rappelé à cet égard l’existence du Fonds d’affectation spécial crée par le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies 16
Communiqué de presse n°2001/31, 31 octobre 2001.
460
Ludivine Tamiotti
en 1989 afin d’aider les Etats en ayant besoin à faire face aux dépenses liées à la soumission d’un différend à la Cour. Le président a réitéré en conclusion son plaidoyer en faveur du maintien de l’unité du droit international face à la multiplication des juridictions internationales. Afin de maintenir cette unité, il a proposé de permettre aux diverses juridictions internationales de demander dans certaines affaires des avis consultatifs à la Cour, et ce par l’intermédiaire du Conseil de sécurité ou de l’Assemblée générale. A l’occasion de sa visite aux Nations Unies, le président a également prononcé un discours devant le Conseil de sécurité et devant la Sixième Commission de l’Assemblée générale17. Les amendements des Règles de Procédure C’est pour faire face tant à l’augmentation constante du nombre d’affaires dont la Cour est saisie qu’aux limitations budgétaires, que la Cour a amendé son Règlement. Dans un souci de rationalisation de son travail, la Cour a ainsi modifié les dispositions de son Règlement relatives aux exceptions préliminaires (article 79) et aux demandes reconventionnelles (article 80)18. Ces deux amendements ont été adoptés par la Cour le 5 décembre 2000 et sont entrés en vigueur le 1er février 2001. Cependant toute affaire soumise à la Cour avant cette date, ou toute phase d’une telle affaire, restera régie par le Règlement de 1978. La Cour a adopté son Règlement en 1946 et ne l’a modifié qu’à deux reprises: en 1972 et en 1978. Il faut savoir qu’il existe un Comité du Règlement, constitué par la Cour en 1979 comme organe permanent, qui se réunit régulièrement pour discuter des possibles améliorations des règles de procédure. Ce Comité est composé de M. Fleischhauer (président), MM. Herczegh, Koroma, Mme Higgins, MM. Buergenthal et Elaraby. L’objectif des amendements de l’article 79 est double: d’une part accélérer la procédure en matière de dépôt d’exceptions préliminaires et d’autre part codifier la pratique de la Cour d’isoler (modification du 17 18
Communiqué de presse n°2001/30, 30 octobre 2001. Pour connaître de l’ensemble des amendements des articles 79 et 80, voir Communiqué de presse n°2001/1, 12 janvier 2001.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
461
paragraphe 1), si elle en décide ainsi, les questions de compétence et de recevabilité des questions de fond (ajout des paragraphes 2 et 3, et renumérotations des paragraphes suivants). Désormais, le délai pour le dépôt d’une exception préliminaire par le défendeur est d’un maximum de trois mois après le dépôt du mémoire. En ce qui concerne la séparation des questions de compétence et de recevabilité des questions de fond (introduction du paragraphe 2), cette pratique de la Cour est née des affaires dans lesquelles l’Etat défendeur ne comparaissait pas. Dans ce type d’affaire, la Cour décidait de connaître d’abord des questions de compétence. Ensuite cette pratique s’est étendue à toutes les affaires où des questions de compétence se posaient. Enfin, l’ajout du paragraphe 3 permet à la Cour de conserver sa marge de manœuvre en ce qui concerne l’ordre dans lequel le demandeur et le défendeur déposent leurs pièces de procédure. En règle générale, la Cour a décidé que le demandeur devait soumettre en premier ses arguments sur la compétence. En ce qui concerne les amendements de l’article 80 sur les demandes reconventionnelles, ceux-ci codifient la pratique récente de la Cour en la matière. Elle avait eu à se prononcer sur l’étendue des obligations couvertes par cet article notamment dans les affaires Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique) et Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria (Cameroun c. Nigeria; Guinée équatoriale (intervenant)). La première modification de l’article 80 inverse simplement l’ordre des deux conditions requises pour que la Cour puisse connaître d’une demande reconventionnelle: maintenant la condition de compétence précède celle de la connexité directe avec l’objet de la demande. Ce changement de l’ordre reflète en fait la pratique de la Cour de toujours connaître des questions de compétence en priorité. Il est intéressant de remarquer que la Cour n’a pas jugé nécessaire de clarifier ce qu’elle entend par “connexité directe”. Cette absence de définition montre bien que la Cour souhaite conserver son pouvoir de discrétion afin d’établir, ou non, ce lien de connexité au cas par cas. Le paragraphe 2 de l’article 80 a été remanié et complété afin de préserver les droits de l’autre partie d’exprimer ses vues sur la demande reconventionnelle dans une pièce de procédure additionnelle. Enfin, la Cour a simplifié le paragraphe 3 qui prêtait à confusion.
462
Ludivine Tamiotti
En effet, la version précédente introduisait plus de questions qu’elle n’en résolvait. Désormais, la Cour est en mesure d’entendre les parties et de prendre une décision s’il y a une objection à l’application du paragraphe 1 de l’article 80 ou simplement si la Cour le juge nécessaire. Il faut également noter que la Cour a modifié la “Note portant recommandations destinées aux parties” qui avait été initialement adoptée le 6 avril 199819. Un nouvel alinéa E a été ajouté au paragraphe 3 de la note et la dernière phrase de l’ancien alinéa E du paragraphe 3 a été modifiée et renumérotée F. Plus tard, le 31 octobre 2001, la Cour a modifié à nouveau cette note et l’a renommée “Note contenant des informations importantes à l’usage des parties à de nouvelles affaires”20. A cette occasion, le nouvel alinéa E est devenu “Instruction de procédure V” et l’alinéa F a été modifié à nouveau et est maintenant contenu dans l’“Instruction de procédure VI”. L’Instruction de procédure V vise à accélérer la procédure sur les exceptions préliminaires en prescrivant que le délai de présentation par l’autre partie de son exposé écrit ne doit pas d’une façon générale excéder quatre mois. L’Instruction de procédure VI précise désormais, en rappelant l’article 60 paragraphe 1 du Règlement, que lors de l’examen des exceptions d’incompétence ou de recevabilité, la procédure orale doit se borner à un exposé sur les exceptions et conserver la brièveté requise. Lors de la modification d’octobre 2001, la Cour a également renforcé les termes utilisés afin d’encourager les parties à respecter ces instructions de procédure. Désormais, l’Instruction de procédure I décourage le dépôt simultané des pièces de procédure dans les affaires soumises par compromis, alors que dans la version précédente de la note, la Cour ne faisait que rappeler que la soumission simultanée n’était pas une règle absolue et que la Cour ne voyait que des avantages à la soumission alternée. Le langage de l’Instruction de procédure II est maintenant plus ferme: chaque partie “doit” faire figurer dans la conclusion de ses pièces de procédure un bref résumé de son argumentation. Auparavant, tout résumé de l’argumentation 19 20
Communiqué de presse n°1998/14, 6 avril 1998. Communiqué de presse n°2001/32, 31 octobre 2001.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
463
des parties au terme de la procédure écrite était seulement “le bienvenu”. Il en est de même pour les Instructions de procédure III et IV qui exigent respectivement une sélection “rigoureuse” des annexes et la mise à disposition automatique des traductions existantes des documents par les parties.
L’AFFAIRE DE LA DELIMITATION MARITIME ET QUESTIONS TERRITORIALES ENTRE QATAR ET BAHREÏN (QATAR C. BAHREÏN), ARRET DU 16 MARS 2001 Pour une chronique de l’arrêt de la Cour en l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), voir l’excellent article de Robert Kolb, in cet Annuaire 9 (2001), pp. 301-363.
L’AFFAIRE LAGRAND (ALLEMAGNE D’AMERIQUE), ARRET DU 27 JUIN 2001
C.
ETATS-UNIS
L’Allemagne a introduit une instance contre les Etats-Unis d’Amérique le 2 mars 1999, à 19h30 (heure de La Haye), en raison de violations de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires du 24 avril 1963. Le même jour, l’Allemagne a également déposé une demande en indication de mesures conservatoires, à laquelle, étant donné l’urgence de l’affaire, la Cour a répondu positivement dès le lendemain, en décidant, à l’unanimité que21:
21
Concernant l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires prise par la Cour le 3 mars 1999 en l’affaire LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), voir “Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (1999)”, cet Annuaire 8 (2000), pp. 388-392.
464 “a)
b)
Ludivine Tamiotti les Etats-Unis d’Amérique doivent prendre toutes les mesures dont ils disposent pour que M. Walter LaGrand ne soit pas exécuté tant que la décision définitive en la présente instance n’aura pas été rendue, et doivent porter à la connaissance de la Cour toutes les mesures qui auront été prises en application de la présente ordonnance; le Gouvernement des Etats-Unis d’Amérique doit transmettre la présente ordonnance au gouverneur de l’Etat de l’Arizona”22.
Cependant, et malgré la réaction rapide de la Cour, M. Walter LaGrand, âgé de 37 ans, a été exécuté, comme prévu, le 3 mars 1999. Il faut rappeler que MM. Karl et Walter LaGrand étaient deux ressortissants allemands, accusés et condamnés à mort en 1984 par une Cour de l’Arizona, pour leur participation à une tentative de vol à main armée dans une banque au cours de laquelle le directeur de la banque avait été tué et une autre employée grièvement blessée. Or, ces deux ressortissants allemands avaient été jugés et condamnés à la peine capitale sans avoir été informés par les autorités américaines, comme l’exige l’article 36.1 b) de la Convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, de leur droit de communiquer avec le Consulat d’Allemagne. Ce fait n’a pas été contesté par les Etats-Unis. Après avoir finalement été informés par d’autres sources de leur droits consulaires, les frères LaGrand ont engagé une procédure d’habeas corpus, au cours de laquelle un des moyens invoqués était fondé sur le fait que les autorités des Etats-Unis avaient manqué à leur obligation de notifier l’arrestation au consulat d’Allemagne, comme le prescrit la convention de Vienne. Cependant, ce moyen a été rejeté par application de la règle de la “carence procédurale” (procedural default) selon laquelle les intéressés auraient dû démontrer l’existence d’un élément extérieur objectif les ayant empêché de soulever plus tôt la question du défaut de notification consulaire. Tous les moyens de recours ayant été épuisés, la Cour suprême de l’Arizona a décidé que Karl LaGrand serait exécuté le 24 février 1999 et Walter le 3 mars 1999. Malgré plusieurs démarches de l’Allemagne, Karl LaGrand a été exécuté le 24 février. 22
LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 3 mars 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999, p. 16, para. 29.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
465
Sans pour autant soulever des exceptions préliminaires à proprement parler, les Etats-Unis ont fait valoir certaines objections à la compétence de la Cour et à la recevabilité des conclusions de l’Allemagne. Après avoir établi qu’elle était compétente et que les conclusions de l’Allemagne étaient recevables, la Cour s’est penchée sur le fond de l’affaire en examinant chacune des quatre conclusions de l’Allemagne. Questions préliminaires Questions de compétence L’Allemagne fonde la compétence de la Cour, pour connaître des quatre conclusions qu’elle a présenté, sur l’article premier du protocole de signature facultative concernant le règlement obligatoire des différends à la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires du 24 avril 1963, qui se lit comme suit : “Les différends relatifs à l’interprétation ou à l’application de la convention relèvent de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour internationale de Justice, qui, à ce titre, pourra être saisie par une requête de toute partie au différend qui sera elle-même partie au présent protocole”23.
Suivant les objections soulevées par les Etats-Unis, la Cour a examiné la question de sa compétence pour connaître de trois des conclusions de l’Allemagne. Concernant la première conclusion, les Etats-Unis reconnaissent avoir violé l’article 36.1 b) et que la Cour a compétence en vertu du protocole pour connaître de ce différend dans la mesure où ce dernier concerne les droits propres de l’Allemagne24. Cependant la première
23 24
LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt du 27 juin 2001, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, para. 36. L’article 36, paragraphe 1 se lit comme suit: “Afin que l’exercice des fonctions consulaires relatives aux ressortissants de l’Etat d’envoi soit facilité : a) les fonctionnaires consulaires doivent avoir la liberté de communiquer avec les ressortissants de l’Etat d’envoi et de se rendre auprès d’eux. Les ressortissants de l’Etat d’envoi doivent avoir la même liberté de communiquer avec les fonctionnaires consulaires et de se rendre auprès d’eux ;
466
Ludivine Tamiotti
conclusion de l’Allemagne comporte deux autres éléments que les Etats-Unis contestent. D’abord, l’Allemagne considère que du fait de la violation de l’alinéa b) de l’article 36.1, les Etats-Unis l’ont empêché d’exercer les droits que lui confèrent les alinéas a) et c) de la même disposition. Les Etats-Unis jugent cette prétention particulièrement mal fondée et refuse de distinguer la violation des alinéas a) et c) de l’alinéa b) au motif que le comportement critiqué est le même25. L’Allemagne prétend aussi qu’en sus de la violation de ses droits propres, les Etats-Unis ont violé les droits individuels que les alinéas a) et b) de l’article 36.1 confèrent aux personnes détenues26. Les Etats-Unis rejettent cet argument au motif que la prétention allemande est fondée sur le droit international coutumier de la protection diplomatique ce qui ne concerne pas l’interprétation de la convention de Vienne et ne relève donc pas de la compétence de la Cour27. La Cour ne retient pas ces objections, considérant que le différend qui oppose les Parties sur le point de savoir si les alinéas a) et c) de l’article 36.1 ont été violés du fait de la violation de l’alinéa b) a trait à
25 26 27
b) si l’intéressé en fait la demande, les autorités compétentes de l’Etat de résidence doivent avertir sans retard le poste consulaire de l’Etat d’envoi lorsque, dans sa circonscription consulaire, un ressortissant de cet Etat est arrêté, incarcéré ou mis en état de détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention. Toute communication adressée au poste consulaire par la personne arrêtée, incarcérée ou mise en état de détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention doit également être transmise sans retard par lesdites autorités. Celles-ci doivent sans retard informer l’intéressé de ses droits aux termes du présent alinéa; c) les fonctionnaires consulaires ont le droit de se rendre auprès d’un ressortissant de l’Etat d’envoi qui est incarcéré, en état de détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention, de s’entretenir et de correspondre avec lui et de pourvoir à sa représentation en justice. Ils ont également le droit de se rendre auprès d’un ressortissant de l’Etat d’envoi qui, dans leur circonscription, est incarcéré ou détenu en exécution d’un jugement. Néanmoins, les fonctionnaires consulaires doivent s’abstenir d’intervenir en faveur d’un ressortissant incarcéré ou mis en état de détention préventive ou toute autre forme de détention lorsque l’intéressé s’y oppose expressément.” LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt du 27 juin 2001, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, para. 40. Ibid., para. 41. Ibid., para. 40.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
467
l’interprétation et à l’application de la convention28. De même, le différend sur le point de savoir si l’alinéa b) crée des droits pour les particuliers et si l’Allemagne a qualité pour faire valoir ces droits au nom de ses ressortissants entre dans le champ de compétence de l’article premier du protocole de signature facultative. La Cour affirme clairement que le fait que la protection diplomatique serait une notion de droit international coutumier ne fait pas obstacle à ce qu’un Etat partie à un traité qui crée des droits pour les individus puisse prendre fait et cause pour l’un de ses ressortissants et mettre en mouvement l’action judiciaire internationale en faveur de ce ressortissant sur la base d’une clause attributive de compétence figurant dans un tel traité29. La Cour en conclut dès lors qu’elle a compétence pour connaître dans son ensemble de la première conclusion de l’Allemagne. Les Etats-Unis ne contestent pas la compétence de la Cour pour connaître de la deuxième conclusion de l’Allemagne relative à la théorie de la carence procédurale30. En ce qui concerne les objections soulevées par les Etats-Unis sur la compétence de la Cour pour connaître de la troisième conclusion de l’Allemagne relative à l’application de l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires du 3 mars 1999, la Cour réaffirme ce qu’elle a dit dans l’affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries. La Cour avait estimé dans cette affaire qu’afin de considérer le différend sous tous ses aspects, elle pouvait aussi connaître d’une conclusion qui “se fonde sur des faits postérieurs au dépôt de la requête mais découlant directement de la question qui fait l’objet de cette requête. A ce titre, elle relève de la compétence de la Cour...”31. La Cour en conclut que lorsqu’elle a compétence pour trancher un différend, elle a également compétence pour se prononcer sur des conclusions la priant de constater qu’une ordonnance en indication de mesures rendue aux fins de préserver les droits des parties à ce différend n’a pas été exécutée32. 28 29 30 31 32
Ibid., para. 42. Ibid. Ibid., para. 43. Compétence en matière de pêcheries (République fédérale d’Allemagne c. Islande), fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 203, para. 72 LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt du 27 juin 2001, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, para. 45.
468
Ludivine Tamiotti
Les Etats-Unis contestent aussi que la Cour soit compétente pour statuer sur la quatrième conclusion de l’Allemagne, dans la mesure où cette conclusion tend à l’obtention d’assurances et de garanties de non-répétition. Ils affirment que “la compétence qu’aurait la Cour d’ordonner la cessation d’une violation ou d’ordonner une réparation n’englobe pas la question des assurances et des garanties... [lesquelles] sont conceptuellement différentes de la réparation”.
Les Etats-Unis ne croient pas qu’il appartienne à la Cour d’imposer des obligations qui viennent s’ajouter à celles qu’ils ont acceptées lorsqu’ils ont ratifié la convention de Vienne. La Cour considère au contraire qu’elle a compétence pour connaître de la quatrième conclusion de l’Allemagne parce qu’un différend portant sur les voies de droit à mettre en œuvre au titre d’une violation de la convention est un différend concernant l’interprétation ou l’application de la convention et qui de ce fait relève de la compétence de la Cour. De plus, si la Cour a compétence pour connaître d’un différend portant sur une question déterminée, elle n’a pas besoin d’une base de compétence distincte pour examiner les remèdes demandés par une partie pour la violation en cause. La Cour se réfère à cet égard à son arrêt en l’affaire de l’Usine de Chorzów33. Questions de recevabilité Les Etats-Unis ont fait valoir quatre objections quand à la recevabilité des requêtes de l’Allemagne. La première objection est dirigée contre les deuxième, troisième et quatrième conclusions de l’Allemagne au motif de ce que l’Allemagne cherche à faire jouer à la Cour “le rôle d’une juridiction statuant en dernier degré d’appel sur des questions pénales soumises aux tribunaux internes”, rôle qu’elle n’est pas habilitée à jouer34. La Cour décide sur ce point que même si l’Allemagne s’est longuement étendue sur la pratique des tribunaux américains relative à l’application de la convention, ces trois conclusions visent exclusivement à prier la Cour d’appliquer les règles 33 34
C.P.J.I. série A n°9, p. 22. LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt du 27 juin 2001, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, para. 50.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
469
pertinentes de droit international aux questions litigieuses opposant les Parties à l’instance. La Cour rejette donc ce motif d’irrecevabilité. Les Etats-Unis soutiennent également que la troisième conclusion de l’Allemagne est irrecevable compte tenu de la requête tardive de l’Allemagne35. La Cour reconnaît que bien que l’Allemagne peut être critiquée pour la manière dont l’instance a été introduite, elle est en droit de se plaindre aujourd’hui de la non-application de ladite ordonnance par les Etats-Unis. En conséquence, la Cour conclut que la troisième conclusion de l’Allemagne est recevable. La troisième irrecevabilité soulevée par les Etats-Unis concerne la première conclusion de l’Allemagne au motif que les frères LaGrand n’auraient pas épuisé les voies de recours internes36. La Cour considère qu’il n’est pas contesté que la règle de la carence procédurale a fait que les LaGrand n’ont pu obtenir qu’il soit remédié à la violation de leurs droits résultant de la convention de Vienne. La Cour en conclut dès lors que les Etats-Unis ne sauraient se prévaloir aujourd’hui devant la Cour de cette circonstance pour faire obstacle à la recevabilité de la première conclusion de l’Allemagne, dès lors qu’ils avaient eux-mêmes failli à l’exécution de leur obligation, en vertu de la convention, d’informer les frères LaGrand. Finalement, les Etats-Unis soutiennent que les conclusions de l’Allemagne sont irrecevables au motif qu’elle cherche à faire appliquer par les Etats-Unis une norme différente de celle qui prévaut dans la pratique allemande37. La Cour rejette ce motif faute d’éléments suffisant pour prouver cette affirmation. Examen du fond Première conclusion de l’Allemagne : les Etats-Unis ont violé l’obligation juridique que leur imposait l’article 36.1 b) de la convention de Vienne La première conclusion de l’Allemagne affirme que les Etats-Unis ont violé l’obligation que leur imposait l’article 36.1 b) “d’avertir sans 35 36 37
Ibid., para. 53. Ibid., para. 58. Ibid., para. 61.
470
Ludivine Tamiotti
retard un ressortissant de l’Etat d’envoi de son droit d’informer le poste consulaire de son Etat d’origine de son arrestation ou de sa détention”. Ce faisant, les Etats-Unis auraient violé leurs obligations juridiques internationales “tant en ce qui concerne les droits propres de l’Allemagne que le droit de cette dernière d’exercer sa protection diplomatique à l’égard de ses ressortissants”38. La Cour se prononce tour à tour sur les droits propres de l’Allemagne et sur les droits tirés de la protection diplomatique. En ce qui concerne les droits propres de l’Allemagne, il faut d’abord noter que les Etats-Unis reconnaissent avoir violé cette obligation contenue dans l’article 36.1 b). Cependant, l’Allemagne prétend aussi que la violation de l’article 36.1 b) a entraîné par voie de conséquence celle des alinéas a) et c) de l’article 36.1. Selon l’Allemagne, dès lors que l’obligation d’informer sans retard la personne arrêtée de son droit de contacter le consulat n’est pas respectée, les autres droits qu’énonce l’article 36.1 perdent toute pertinence. La Cour se prononce en faveur de ce raisonnement de l’Allemagne en concluant que l’article 36.1 institue “un régime dont les divers éléments sont interdépendants”39. En ce qui concerne les droits tirés de l’exercice de la protection diplomatique, l’Allemagne prétend que la violation de l’article 36 par les Etats-Unis constitue également une violation des droits individuels des frères LaGrand. L’Allemagne aurait ainsi agit au titre de la protection diplomatique. D’après l’Allemagne, le droit d’être informé, tel que conféré par l’article 36.1 est un droit qui appartient à tout ressortissant d’Etat partie à la convention de Vienne. La Cour considère que, compte tenu du libellé de cette disposition (selon laquelle les autorités de l’Etat de résidence doivent informer sans retard l’intéressé de “ses droits”), l’article 36.1 crée des droits individuels qui peuvent être invoqués devant la Cour par l’Etat dont la personne détenue a la nationalité. La Cour conclut qu’en l’espèce ces droits ont été violés. L’Allemagne avait en plus demandé à la Cour de se prononcer sur le fait que le droit de l’intéressé d’être informé sans retard avait acquis 38 39
Ibid., para. 65. Ibid., para. 74.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
471
le caractère d’un droit de l’homme. La Cour n’a pas jugé nécessaire de se prononcer sur cette question puisqu’elle avait déjà décidé que les Etats-Unis avaient violé les droits que les frères LaGrand tiraient de l’article 36.1.
Deuxième conclusion de l’Allemagne : la théorie de la carence procédurale
Selon la deuxième conclusion de l’Allemagne, les Etats-Unis auraient violé l’obligation internationale qui leur incombait en vertu de l’article 36.2 de la convention de Vienne, en appliquant notamment la doctrine dite de la “carence procédurale”. En effet, selon l’Allemagne, les Etats-Unis devaient faire en sorte que leurs lois internes permettent la pleine réalisation des droits tirés de cette disposition. L’Allemagne soutient que la règle de la “carence procédurale” rend impossible l’invocation d’un moyen tiré de la violation du droit à la notification consulaire. Plus particulièrement, l’Allemagne fait clairement le point que ce n’est pas la règle de la “carence procédurale” en tant que telle qui est en question mais la manière dont elle a été appliquée en l’espèce en privant de facto les frères LaGrand de la possibilité de soulever, dans le cadre de procédures pénales devant les instances judiciaires des Etats-Unis, les moyens tirés de la violation de leur droit d’avertir leur consulat. Les Etats-Unis s’opposent à cette prétention de l’Allemagne considérant qu’elle va bien au-delà du texte de la convention de Vienne. La Cour a refusé l’argument américain selon lequel l’article 36.2 ne s’appliquait qu’aux droits de l’Etat d’envoi et non à ceux de la personne mise en détention. La Cour a ainsi réaffirmé que cette disposition créait des droits individuels. En ce qui concerne la règle de la carence procédurale, la Cour a aussi réalisé une distinction entre la règle en tant que telle et son application. Elle a conclut que la règle de la carence procédurale a empêché la pleine réalisation des droits tirés de l’article 36.2.
472
Ludivine Tamiotti
Troisième conclusion de l’Allemagne : le caractère obligatoire des mesures conservatoires Dans un troisième temps, l’Allemagne soutient que les Etats-Unis ont violé leur obligation juridique internationale de se conformer à l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour le 3 mars 1999. Plus précisément, l’Allemagne prétend que les Etats-Unis ont commis une triple violation de l’ordonnance de la Cour du 3 mars 199940 : (i) immédiatement après le rendu de l’ordonnance de la Cour, le bureau du Solicitor General, un service relevant du département de la justice des Etats-Unis, a avancé une nouvelle fois, dans une lettre adressée à la Cour suprême, qu’“une ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires émanant de la Cour internationale de Justice n’a pas force obligatoire et n’ouvre pas de recours susceptible d’être exercé en justice”; (ii) par la suite, la Cour suprême des Etats-Unis a refusé d’ordonner un sursis à l’exécution; (iii) enfin, le gouverneur de l’Arizona n’a pas ordonné le sursis à l’exécution de Walter LaGrand bien qu’il ait été en droit de le faire en vertu de la loi de l’Etat d’Arizona; d’autant plus que la commission des grâces de l’Arizona a, pour la première fois dans son histoire, recommandé le sursis à titre temporaire, en particulier au vu des questions de droit international soulevées en l’espèce. Les Etats-Unis quant à eux soutiennent avoir respecté l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires étant donné les circonstances exceptionnelles. Ils précisent deux éléments ayant cependant limité leur capacité d’agir : le délai extrêmement bref et la structure fédérale des Etats-Unis41. Ils contestent également le caractère contraignant de l’ordonnance rendue par la Cour en l’espèce et plus généralement le caractère obligatoire des mesures conservatoires de la Cour. Les Etats-Unis s’expriment en effet ainsi: l’Allemagne “semble affirmer qu’un requérant pourrait, par la simple saisine de la Cour, forcer un défendeur à s’abstenir dans le futur, de tout acte qui, selon le demandeur, serait susceptible d’affecter l’objet du différend. Si tel était l’état du droit, l’ensemble des règles et pratiques de la Cour relatives aux mesures
40 41
Ibid., para. 94. Ibid., para. 95.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
473
conservatoires seraient surabondantes. Telle n’est pas la règle de droit et telle n’est pas davantage l’attitude que les Etats ou la Cour ont adoptée en pratique”42.
La Cour a ainsi, pour la première fois de son histoire, été forcée à se prononcer sur l’existence ou non d’une obligation de se conformer à une ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires. Elle a ainsi procédé à l’interprétation de l’article 41 du Statut de la Cour selon les règles de l’art, à savoir en suivant le droit international coutumier tel que codifié dans l’article 31 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités. Au cours de cet exercice, la Cour a rencontré plusieurs difficultés qu’elle a simplement résolu en plaçant au dessus de tout principe d’interprétation, l’objet et le but du traité. Le premier obstacle rencontré concerne la différence de terminologie entre la version française et anglaise de l’article 41. Le texte français se lit comme suit: “1.
2.
La Cour a le pouvoir d’indiquer, si elle estime que les circonstances l’exigent, quelles mesures conservatoires du droit de chacun doivent être prises à titre provisoire. En attendant l’arrêt définitif, l’indication de ces mesures est immédiatement notifiée aux parties et au Conseil de sécurité”.
C’est sur l’interprétation textuelle de cette formulation “doivent être prises” que la Cour base le caractère impératif des mesures conservatoires. Cependant, la version anglaise ne reflète pas le caractère obligatoire du verbe “devoir” puisque “doivent être prises” a été traduit en 1920 par “ought to be taken”. Alors qu’il est clair que d’après l’article 111 de la Charte des Nations Unies les versions française et anglaise font également foi, la Cour fait tout de même valoir que la langue originelle en 1920 du Statut de la Cour était le français. La Cour se ressaisit cependant immédiatement en se référant au paragraphe 4 de l’article 33 de la convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités selon lequel, en l’absence d’accord entre les parties à cet égard, 42
Ibid., para. 96.
474
Ludivine Tamiotti
“lorsque la comparaison des textes authentiques fait apparaître une différence de sens que l’application des articles 31 et 32 ne permet pas d’éliminer, on adoptera le sens qui, compte tenu de l’objet et du but du traité, concilie le mieux ces textes”43.
La Cour a rappelé à cet égard sa fonction essentielle de règlement judiciaire international des différends44. L’article 41 de son Statut a pour but d’éviter que la Cour soit empêchée d’exercer ses fonctions du fait de l’atteinte portée aux droits respectifs des parties à un différend. La Cour affirme dès lors que “[p]rétendre que des mesures conservatoires indiquées en vertu de l’article 41 ne seraient pas obligatoires serait contraire à l’objet et au but de cette disposition”45. A cette interprétation liée à l’objet et au but du Statut, la Cour ajoute un autre motif justifiant le caractère obligatoire de ses mesures conservatoires, à savoir le “principe universellement admis devant les juridictions internationales (...) d’après lequel les parties en cause doivent s’abstenir de toute mesure susceptible d’avoir une répercussion préjudiciable à l’exécution de la décision à intervenir”46.
Ensuite, la Cour fait appel aux travaux préparatoires du texte de l’article 41 pour confirmer cette interprétation tout en indiquant a priori qu’elle n’estime pas nécessaire de faire appel aux travaux préparatoires pour déterminer le sens de cet article et en faisant observer que ces travaux ne s’opposent de toute façon pas à la conclusion que les ordonnances rendues en vertu de l’article 41 ont force obligatoire47. En faisant référence aux travaux préparatoires, la Cour parvient à expliquer la raison pour laquelle l’article 41 utilise le mot “indiquer” au lieu du mot “ordonner” par le fait que la Cour n’avait pas les moyens d’assurer l’exécution de ses décisions.
43 44 45 46 47
Ibid., para. 101. Ibid., para. 102. Ibid., para. 102. Compagnie d’électricité de Sofia et de Bulgarie, ordonnance du 5 décembre 1939, C.P.J.I. série A/B no79, p. 199. Cité in para. 103. LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt du 27 juin 2001, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, para. 104.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
475
Pour finir, la Cour s’interroge sur le libellé de l’article 94 de la Charte des Nations Unies et plus particulièrement sur la portée du terme “décision”: s’agit-il de toute décision rendue par la Cour ou seulement des arrêts? Choisissant de ne pas commencer une nouvelle interprétation, la Cour considère que quoi qu’il en soit l’article 94 n’est pas en mesure de faire obstacle au caractère obligatoire de l’article 41 de son Statut48. Après avoir décidé de la question générale du caractère obligatoire des ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires, la Cour s’interroge plus spécifiquement sur l’ordonnance en question et sur l’existence d’une obligation juridique à la charge des Etats-Unis. Il faut rappeler que la Cour avait indiqué deux mesures conservatoires: premièrement que les Etats-Unis prennent toutes les mesures dont ils disposent pour que M. Walter LaGrand ne soit pas exécuté tant que la décision définitive en la présente instance n’aura pas été rendue, et qu’ils portent à la connaissance de la Cour toutes les mesures qui auront été prises en application de la présente ordonnance; et deuxièmement que les Etats-Unis transmettent l’ordonnance au gouverneur de l’Etat de l’Arizona. Concernant cette deuxième mesure, les Etats-Unis ont en effet transmis le texte de l’ordonnance au gouverneur de l’Arizona. Cependant, en ce qui concerne la première mesure, et bien que la Cour rappelle à juste titre qu’elle ne créait pas une obligation de résultat, l’attitude des Etats-Unis a été considérée “très en deçà de ce que l’on aurait pu attendre des autorités des EtatsUnis”49. La Cour en conclut donc que les Etats-Unis n’ont pas pris toutes les mesures qu’ils auraient pu prendre pour donner effet à l’ordonnance que la Cour avait rendue le 3 mars 1999 et qu’ils n’ont ainsi pas respecté cette ordonnance. La Cour note par la suite que la conclusion de l’Allemagne demande uniquement à la Cour de dire et juger que les Etats-Unis ont violé leur obligation juridique internationale de se conformer à l’ordonnance du 3 mars 1999 et que l’Allemagne n’a pas lié d’indemnité à cette conclusion. Cependant, si tel avait été le cas, la Cour indique qu’elle aurait pris en considération certains facteurs tels 48 49
Ibid., para. 108. Ibid., para. 112.
476
Ludivine Tamiotti
que les fortes contraintes de temps et le fait qu’à l’époque où les autorités des Etats-Unis ont pris leur décision la question du caractère obligatoire des ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires avait été abondamment discutée dans la doctrine, mais n’avait pas été tranchée par la jurisprudence. Quatrième conclusion de l’Allemagne : les garanties de nonrépétition Dans sa dernière conclusion, l’Allemagne demande que les EtatsUnis leur fournissent “l’assurance qu’ils ne répéteront pas de tels actes illicites et que, dans tous les cas futurs de détention de ressortissants allemands ou d’actions pénales à l’encontre de tels ressortissants, les Etats-Unis veilleront à assurer en droit et en pratique l’exercice effectif des droits visés à l’article 36 de la convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires”50.
L’Allemagne demande donc deux types de garanties: une garantie générale de non-répétition et une garantie spécifique exigeant que dans le futur les Etats-Unis interviennent dans le procès si au cours de la procédure l’exercice des droits tirés de l’article 36 n’a pas été garanti. Pour l’Allemagne de telles garanties sont particulièrement importantes parce que l’exécution des frères LaGrand a rendu impossible toute réparation rétroactive sous la forme par exemple d’une restitutio in integrum. Sur la demande générale, les Etats-Unis soutiennent qu’une garantie absolue de non-répétition est impossible. De plus, quand bien même la Cour jugerait la demande de garantie de non-répétition fondée, les Etats-Unis indiquent qu’ils ont d’ores et déjà pris des mesures importantes (notamment la distribution d’une brochure d’information et l’organisation de programmes de formation des fonctionnaires) visant à empêcher qu’une violation de l’article 36.1 de la Convention de Vienne ne se reproduise51.
50 51
Ibid., para. 117. Ibid., para. 121.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
477
La Cour estime en effet que l’engagement pris par les Etats-Unis d’assurer la mise en œuvre des mesures spécifiques adoptées en exécution de leurs obligations au titre de l’article 36.1 b) doit être considéré comme satisfaisant à la demande de l’Allemagne visant à obtenir une assurance générale de non-répétition52. Mais la demande de l’Allemagne va plus loin en cherchant à obtenir que dans tous les cas futurs de détention de ressortissants allemands ou d’actions pénales à l’encontre de tels ressortissants, les Etats-Unis veillent à assurer l’exercice effectif des droits visés à l’article 36 de la convention de Vienne et qu’en particulier, dans les cas où un accusé est passible de la peine de mort, les Etats-Unis aient l’obligation de prévoir le réexamen effectif des condamnations pénales entachées d’une violation des droits énoncés à l’article 36. Pour répondre à cette demande, la Cour note premièrement que les Etats-Unis ont en l’espèce présenté leurs excuses à l’Allemagne. Cependant, elle indique clairement que dans le cas où les Etats-Unis manquent à leur obligation de notification consulaire au détriment de ressortissants allemands ayant fait l’objet d’une détention prolongée ou été condamnés à des peines sévères, des excuses ne suffisent pas53. En effet, dans un tel scénario, les Etats-Unis devront permettre le réexamen et la révision du verdict de culpabilité et de la peine en tenant compte de la violation des droits prévus par la convention. Il est intéressant de noter la précision que le président de la Cour a jugé utile d’ajouter à l’égard de cette partie de la décision de la Cour. Le président Guillaume indique ainsi que l’alinéa correspondant du dispositif ne se prononce pas “sur la situation des ressortissants d’autres pays ou sur celle de personnes condamnées à des peines n’ayant pas un caractère sévère”54. Mais afin d’éviter toute ambiguïté, le président Guillaume ajoute immédiatement “qu’il ne saurait faire l’objet d’une interprétation a contrario”55. La conclusion de la Cour sur cette quatrième demande de l’Allemagne est donc double: la Cour prend acte d’abord de l’engagement des Etats-Unis à assurer la mise en œuvre de ses 52 53 54 55
Ibid., para. 124. Ibid., para. 125. Ibid., Déclaration de M. Guillaume. Ibid.
478
Ludivine Tamiotti
obligations, et ensuite de l’obligation qu’ont les Etats-Unis de prendre les mesures qui s’imposent en cas de violation de cette convention, si de telles violations se produisaient en dépit des efforts déployés pour en assurer le respect56. La décision de la Cour sur cette demande de l’Allemagne a contribué à affirmer l’existence juridique des garanties de non-répétition. Ces développements ont ainsi été pris en compte par la Commission du droit international dans ses travaux de codification des garanties de non-répétition dans le cadre du projet d’articles sur la responsabilité des Etats. Conclusion La Cour a donc décidé qu’elle était compétente et que les quatre conclusions de l’Allemagne étaient recevables. Ensuite, la Cour a dit que les Etats-Unis ont violé les obligations dont ils étaient tenus envers l’Allemagne et envers les frères LaGrand en vertu de l’article 36.1 et 36.2. La Cour a également décidé que les Etats-Unis avaient violé l’obligation dont ils étaient tenus en vertu de l’ordonnance en indication de mesures conservatoires rendue par la Cour le 3 mars 1999. La Cour a ensuite pris acte de l’engagement pris par les Etats-Unis d’assurer la mise en œuvre des mesures spécifiques en exécution de leurs obligations au titre de l’article 36.1 b) de la convention, et dit que cet engagement doit être considéré comme satisfaisant à la demande de l’Allemagne visant à obtenir une assurance générale de non-répétition. Enfin, la Cour a décidé que si des ressortissants allemands devaient néanmoins être condamnés à une peine sévère sans que les droits qu’ils tiennent de l’article 36.1 b) aient été respectés, les Etats-Unis devront permettre le réexamen et la révision du verdict de culpabilité et de la peine en tenant compte de la violation des droits prévus par la convention57.
56 57
Ibid., para. 127. Ibid., para. 128.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
479
L’AFFAIRE RELATIVE A LA SOUVERAINETE SUR PULAU LIGITAN ET PULAU SIPADAN (INDONESIE C. MALAISIE), REQUETE DES PHILIPPINES A FIN D’INTERVENTION, ARRET DU 23 OCTOBRE 2001 La République d’Indonésie et de la Malaisie ont saisi la Cour en 1998 par compromis demandant à la Cour de déterminer auquel de ces deux pays appartenait la souveraineté sur deux îles de la mer des Célèbes, Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. Les Parties ont chacune choisi un juge ad hoc pour siéger en l’affaire: M. Christopher Gregory Weeramantry pour la Malaisie et pour l’Indonésie M. Mohamed Shahabuddeen qui a démissionné et a été remplacé en mai 2001 par M. Thomas Franck. Par lettre du 22 février 2001, les Philippines, invoquant l’article 53, paragraphe 1 du Règlement de la Cour, ont adressé à la Cour une demande tendant à ce que lui soient communiqués des exemplaires des pièces de procédure dans l’affaire opposant l’Indonésie à la Malaisie. Selon cette disposition, la Cour peut à tout moment décider, après s’être renseignée auprès des parties, que des exemplaires des pièces de procédure soient mis à disposition de tout Etat admis à ester devant elle et ayant formulé une telle demande. Cependant, après avoir consulté les Parties, la Cour a refusé cette demande et a communiqué cette décision par lettre du 15 mars 200158. Deux jours avant l’envoi de cette lettre, à savoir le 13 mars 2001, les Philippines ont déposé au Greffe de la Cour une requête à fin d’intervention dans l’affaire, en invoquant l’article 62 du Statut de la Cour. Dans cette requête, il était précisé que la demande de communication d’exemplaires des pièces de procédure était une démarche distincte de la requête à fin d’intervention. Selon cette dernière, l’intérêt d’ordre juridique en cause pour les Philippines dans la présente espèce
58
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie c. Malaisie), requête des Philippines à fin d’intervention, arrêt du 23 octobre 2001, para. 6.
480
Ludivine Tamiotti
“porte uniquement et exclusivement sur les traités, les accords et autres éléments de preuve fournis par les Parties et pris en compte par la Cour qui ont une incidence directe ou indirecte sur la question du statut juridique du Nord-Bornéo”.
Tant la Malaisie que l’Indonésie s’opposent à la demande d’intervention des Philippines. Les Philippines ayant fondé leur demande sur l’article 62 du Statut, la Cour doit examiner si la requête en question répond aux exigences de cet article et de l’article 81 de son Règlement. L’article 81 détermine spécifiquement les conditions de mise en œuvre d’une demande à fin d’intervention fondée sur l’article 62 du Statut de la Cour. Il existe un autre fondement pour une telle requête, à savoir l’article 63 du Statut lorsqu’il s’agit de l’interprétation d’une Convention à laquelle d’autres Etats, que les Etats parties au différend, sont parties. Il faut noter que la Cour est traditionnellement réticente à admettre l’intervention d’un Etat. Cela s’explique par un souci d’assurer que le recours à sa juridiction se fasse uniquement sur la base du principe du consentement préalable des Etats. Dans cet arrêt, la Cour s’emploie à définir ce “monstre presque indéfinissable”59 en examinant si les exigences de procédure sont respectées et si un intérêt d’ordre juridique est en cause pour les Philippines. “Le plus tôt possible avant la clôture de la procédure écrite” (article 81.1 du Règlement) La première exigence de procédure que la Cour examine concerne le dépôt de la requête qui doit se faire “le plus tôt possible avant la clôture de la procédure écrite” (article 81.1 du Règlement). Comme dans l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et militaire (El Salvador/Honduras)60, la Cour doit se prononcer sur une demande d’intervention à un stade tardif. L’article 81.1 du Règlement énonce 59
60
W. Farag, L’intervention devant la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale (Articles 62 et 63 du Statut de la Cour), Paris, 1927, cité in Opinion Individuelle du Juge ad hoc Weeramantry, para. 30. Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et militaire (El Salvador/Honduras), CIJ Recueil 1990, p. 98, para. 12.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
481
deux conditions: le dépôt doit se faire “le plus tôt possible” et “avant la clôture de la procédure écrite”. La Cour rappelle tout d’abord que le compromis conclu entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie a été enregistré auprès de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en juillet 1998, puis notifié à la Cour fin 1998 et enfin transmis à tous les Membres des Nations Unies. En conséquence, au moment du dépôt de la requête, les Philippines avaient connaissance, depuis plus de deux ans, de la saisie de la Cour concernant le différend sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. Dès lors, le moment choisi par les Philippines pour introduire leur requête ne remplit pas la condition d’un dépôt effectué “le plus tôt possible” comme le prévoit l’article 81.1 du Règlement. La Cour profite de ce point pour rappeler l’importance d’introduire “en temps utile” toute procédure incidente afin d’assurer une bonne administration de la justice61. Bien que la requête ait été déposée à un stade tardif de la procédure, la Cour constate que les Philippines n’ont pas contrevenu à l’autre condition énoncée dans l’article 81.1, qui établit un délai préfixé pour le dépôt d’une requête à fin d’intervention, à savoir “avant la clôture de la procédure écrite”. En effet, ce n’est que le 28 mars 2001 que les Parties, par une lettre conjointe, ont avisé la Cour de leur décision de ne pas échanger des dupliques. Dès lors, à la date à laquelle les Philippines ont déposé leur requête (le 13 mars 2001), ni la Cour ni les Etats tiers ne pouvaient savoir, si la procédure écrite était effectivement parvenue à son terme62. En conclusion, la Cour rejette l’objection de l’Indonésie et de la Malaisie, tirée du dépôt tardif allégué de la requête des Philippines. Il est intéressant de noter que des deux conditions tirées de l’article 81.1 du Règlement, la seconde, à savoir “avant la clôture de la procédure écrite”, est celle qui prévaut dans l’examen par la Cour de la réserve ratione temporis. En d’autres termes, même si la requête en question n’est pas déposée “le plus tôt possible”, ce qui compte c’est qu’elle le soit avant la clôture de la procédure écrite. La Cour semble donc vider de son sens la première condition.
61 62
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie c. Malaisie), requête des Philippines à fin d’intervention, arrêt du 23 octobre 2001, para. 21. Ibid., para. 24.
482
Ludivine Tamiotti
“La requête contient un bordereau des documents à l’appui, qui sont annexés” (article 81.3 du Règlement) Concernant l’objection tirée de l’article 81.3 du Règlement soulevée par l’Indonésie, la Cour observe que cette disposition n’exige pas que l’Etat qui demande à intervenir annexe nécessairement à sa requête des documents à l’appui et que ce n’est que dans le cas où de tels documents ont effectivement été annexés à la requête que celle-ci doit contenir ledit bordereau. La Cour considère que cet article a le même objet mutatis mutandis que le paragraphe 3 de l’article 50 de son Règlement qui prévoit que, “[a]u moment du dépôt d’une pièce de procédure, il est fourni un bordereau de tous les documents annexés à cette pièce”63. La Cour en conclut donc que la requête des Philippines ne comporte aucun vice de forme qui pourrait l’empêcher d’être admise. La question du lien juridictionnel La Malaisie considère que le lien juridictionnel fait défaut d’une part parce qu’il n’y a pas d’instrument conventionnel ou de déclaration unilatérale conférant à la Cour compétence pour connaître d’un litige territorial entre les Philippines et une des Parties en cause, et d’autre part parce que les deux Parties s’opposent à la demande d’intervention des Philippines. Afin de répondre à cet argument, la Cour cite un passage de l’affaire du Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et militaire (El Salvador/Honduras) dans laquelle une chambre de la Cour avait observé qu’“[un]e procédure incidente ne saurait être une procédure qui transforme [une] affaire en une affaire différente avec des parties différentes”64 et qu’il “découle… de la nature juridique et des buts de l’intervention que l’existence d’un lien juridictionnel entre l’Etat qui demande à intervenir et les parties en cause n’est pas une condition du succès de sa requête”65 (nous soulignons). 63 64 65
Ibid., para. 29. Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador/Honduras), requête à fin d’intervention, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1990, pp. 133-134, paras. 97-98. Ibid., p. 135, para. 100.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
483
Les Philippines ayant clairement indiqué qu’elles cherchent à intervenir en tant que non partie, la Cour en conclut que le défaut de lien juridictionnel entre les Philippines et les Parties à la procédure principale ne constitue pas un obstacle à l’intervention des Philippines66. La question de l’existence d’un “intérêt d’ordre juridique” Il s’agit ici de la question principale que le Cour a eu à examiner. En effet, selon l’article 62.1, “[l]orsqu’un Etat estime que dans un différend, un intérêt d’ordre juridique est pour lui en cause, il peut adresser à la Cour une requête, à fin d’intervention” (nous soulignons). Les Philippines soutiennent que “[l]’article 62 du Statut ne dit pas que l’Etat intervenant doit avoir un intérêt juridique”, et que “[l]e critère requis pour que l’article 62 puisse être invoqué est en conséquence un critère subjectif : l’Etat qui demande à intervenir doit “estimer” qu’il a un intérêt”67. Il ne s’agit donc pas de prouver l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique, mais de l’identifier et de montrer en quoi cet intérêt risque d’être mis en cause. Les Philippines insistent aussi sur le fait que le critère à suivre dans l’identification d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique n’est pas l’existence d’une connexité avec les conclusions, mais d’un lien de cause à effet68. Enfin, les Philippines avancent que leur revendication de souveraineté au NordBornéo pourrait être affectée par les raisonnements que la Cour pourrait adopter à propos de certains traités entre l’Indonésie et la Malaisie, et particulièrement concernant la concession par le sultan de Sulu de territoire sur l’île de Bornéo. L’Indonésie considère qu’il n’y a pas d’intérêt d’ordre juridique parce que les Philippines ont affirmé elles-mêmes qu’elles n’avaient aucun intérêt territorial relatif aux îles de Sipadan et de Ligitan. L’Indonésie insiste sur le fait qu’il n’est pas demandé à la Cour de se prononcer sur le statut juridique du Nord-Bornéo69. La Malaisie quant 66 67 68 69
Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie c. Malaisie), requête des Philippines à fin d’intervention, arrêt du 23 octobre 2001, para. 36. Ibid., para. 40. Ibid., para. 41. Ibid., para. 42.
484
Ludivine Tamiotti
à elle considère que l’intérêt d’ordre juridique doit être identifié avec précision, ce que les Philippines n’ont pas fait puisqu’elles n’ont pas indiqué en quoi la décision de la Cour concernant la souveraineté sur les îles de Ligitan et Sipadan pourrait affecter un intérêt d’ordre juridique spécifique70. De plus, selon la Malaisie l’intérêt d’ordre juridique en cause doit être affecté, le cas échéant, par la décision de la Cour et non pas par la seule motivation71. De manière préliminaire, la Cour détermine si les termes de l’article 62 du Statut excluent que l’intérêt d’ordre juridique de l’Etat cherchant à intervenir puisse porter sur une partie autre que le dispositif de l’arrêt que rendra la Cour. Etant donné que les versions anglaise et française de l’article 62 ne sont pas clairement compatibles, la Cour choisit la version offrant le sens le plus large, à savoir la française. Ainsi selon la Cour l’intérêt d’ordre juridique qu’un Etat doit manifester lorsqu’il souhaite intervenir sur la base de l’article 62 n’est pas limité au seul dispositif d’un arrêt mais peut également porter sur ses motifs72. Il est en effet possible qu’un arrêt contienne dans ses motifs des raisonnements, des interprétations ou des obiter dicta pouvant avoir une incidence sur la situation juridique d’un Etat tiers. Au contraire, les Juges Koroma et Parra-Aranguren considèrent que l’intérêt juridique protégé par l’article 62 du Statut de la Cour devrait être limité au dispositif de l’arrêt73. Ensuite, la Cour passe à l’examen de la question principale de cette demande d’intervention, à savoir la nature de l’intérêt d’ordre juridique en cause et sa capacité à justifier une intervention. La Cour note dans un premier temps que dans la majorité des requêtes à fin d’intervention dont elle a eu à connaître, le demandeur a soutenu qu’il avait un intérêt concernant l’objet même du différend ou le territoire devant faire l’objet d’une délimitation74. Ce qui n’est pas le cas en l’espèce. C’est pourquoi la Cour considère que “l’intérêt d’ordre juridique que les Philippines invoquent pour être admises à intervenir 70 71 72 73 74
Ibid., para. 43. Ibid., para. 43. Ibid., para. 47. Ibid., Opinion individuelle du Juge Koroma, para. 4 et déclaration du juge ParraAranguren. Ibid., para. 49.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
485
en l’espèce doit être établi avec d’autant plus de clarté qu’il ne porte pas sur l’objet même de l’affaire”75. La Cour examine donc si les droits invoqués par l’Etat qui demande à intervenir sont susceptibles d’être mis en cause et plus précisément si la revendication de souveraineté des Philippines au Nord-Bornéo pourrait ou non être affectée par le raisonnement de la Cour ou par l’interprétation qu’elle ferait des traités pertinents pour l’affaire relative à Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan76. La Cour rappelle que la charge de la preuve appartient à l’Etat désireux d’intervenir d’établir l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique susceptible d’être affecté par la décision. C’est donc aux Philippines de démontrer dans quelle mesure un raisonnement ou une interprétation de la Cour concernant certains traités pourrait affecter leurs prétentions de souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo77. Cette attribution de la charge de la preuve à l’Etat intervenant est contestée par le Juge Oda dans son opinion dissidente. Le juge Oda est d’avis que “(…) if a request for permission to intervene is to be rejected, the burden should be placed on the parties to the principal case to show that the interest of the third State will not be affected by the decision in the case”78.
Les Philippines font valoir qu’elles n’ont pas eu la possibilité d’avoir accès aux pièces pertinentes de l’affaire ce qui a constitué un obstacle considérable pour définir leur intérêt d’ordre juridique. A ceci, la Cour répond que les Philippines ne peuvent qu’avoir pleine connaissance des sources documentaires touchant à leur propre revendication de souveraineté au Nord-Bornéo79. Pour démontrer leur intérêt d’ordre juridique les Philippines ont tout de même mentionné plusieurs instruments. La Cour les a examinés tour à tour, sans pour autant parvenir à identifier un instrument dont l’interprétation pourrait nuire à la prétention de souveraineté des Philippines au Nord-Bornéo. La Cour en conclut donc que l’intérêt invoqué par les Philippines est trop éloigné de l’affaire en question pour justifier une intervention 75 76 77 78 79
Ibid., para. 78. Ibid., para. 56. Ibid., para. 60. Ibid., Opinion dissidente du Juge Oda, para. 11. Ibid., para. 62.
486
Ludivine Tamiotti
au titre de l’article 62. Il faut néanmoins noter ici qu’il y a un certain paradoxe de la part de la Cour à exiger des Philippines une grande précision dans l’identification de son intérêt d’ordre juridique en cause dans l’affaire sans leur avoir donné auparavant la possibilité de consulter les pièces de procédure pertinentes. L’objet précis de l’intervention (article 81.2 b) La dernière question que la Cour examine est celle du caractère approprié ou non de l’objet de l’intervention. Les Philippines énoncent trois objets dans leur requête80. Les deux premiers objets étant de nature très commune (préserver les droits des Philippines et informer la Cour de ces droits), la Cour a considéré qu’ils ne constituaient pas un obstacle à l’intervention81. Concernant le dernier objet portant sur le rôle de la Cour en matière de prévention des conflits, la Cour a noté que les Philippines n’ont pas développé cet aspect et n’ont pas non plus soutenu qu’il pourrait à lui seul suffire en tant qu’“objet” au sens de l’article 81 du Règlement. La Cour a donc simplement rejeté ce troisième objet comme étant dénué de pertinence au regard de son Statut et de son Règlement sans d’avantage de développements. Quoiqu’il en soit, cet examen des objets de la requête n’est pas d’une grande utilité puisque la Cour n’a pas reconnu l’existence d’un intérêt d’ordre juridique qui pourrait être mis en cause dans la présente 80
81
Ces trois objets se lisent comme suit: “a) Premièrement, de préserver et sauvegarder les droits d’ordre historique et juridique du Gouvernement de la République des Philippines qui découlent de la revendication de possession et de souveraineté que ce gouvernement forme sur le territoire du Bornéo septentrional dans la mesure où ces droits sont ou pourraient être mis en cause par une décision de la Cour relative à la question de la souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan. b) Deuxièmement, d’intervenir dans l’instance pour informer la Cour de la nature et de la portée des droits d’ordre historique et juridique de la République des Philippines qui pourraient être mis en cause par la décision de la Cour. c) Troisièmement, de prendre plus largement en compte le rôle indispensable que joue la Cour en matière de prévention généralisée des conflits et non pas simplement aux fins de la résolution des différends d’ordre juridique.” Ibid., para. 7. Ibid., paras. 87-88.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
487
espèce. C’est par quatorze voix contre une (celle du Juge Oda) que la Cour rejette la requête à fin d’intervention des Philippines82. La Cour a toutefois déclaré dans le cadre de ses motifs qu’elle “demeure informée des positions exposées devant elle dans la présente instance par l’Indonésie, la Malaisie et les Philippines”83. Ceci signifie qu’elle prendra d’avantage garde à l’interprétation des instruments juridiques qui pourraient comporter un lien avec la revendication de souveraineté des Philippines au Nord-Bornéo. Ainsi, bien que la demande des Philippines ait été refusée, les Philippines ont réussi à sensibiliser la Cour à leurs préoccupations.
L’AFFAIRE RELATIVE AUX ACTIVITES ARMEES SUR LE TERRITOIRE DU CONGO (OUGANDA C. REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO), DEMANDES RECONVENTIONNELLES, ORDONNANCE DU 29 NOVEMBRE 2001 En juin 1999, le Congo a déposé une requête introductive d’instance contre l’Ouganda au sujet d’un différend relatif à “des actes d’agression armée perpétrés par l’Ouganda sur le territoire de la République démocratique du Congo en violation flagrante de la Charte des Nations Unies et de la Charte de l’Organisation de l’unité africaine”84. Suite à la demande du Congo, et par ordonnance du 1er juillet 2000, la Cour a indiqué certaines mesures conservatoires85. Dans le chapitre XVIII de son contre-mémoire, l’Ouganda expose que pendant plus de sept ans, l’Ouganda a été victime des opérations militaires et d’autres activités de groupes armés hostiles visant à la déstabiliser, qui étaient soit parrainées, soit tolérées par les gouvernements congolais successifs. Dans ce même chapitre, on
82 83 84
85
Ibid., para. 95. Ibid., para. 94. Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (Ouganda c. République démocratique du Congo), Demandes reconventionnelles, Ordonnance du 29 novembre 2001, para. 1. Pour plus de details, voir “Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2000)”, cet Annuaire 9 (2001), pp. 283-290.
488
Ludivine Tamiotti
trouve une section intitulée “C. Les demandes reconventionnelles”, dans laquelle l’Ouganda introduit trois demandes reconventionnelles. La Cour examine d’abord si les demandes ougandaises constituent bien des “demandes reconventionnelles”. Elle rappelle pour cela sa jurisprudence dans l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide où elle avait indiqué “qu’une demande reconventionnelle présente… un double caractère ; qu’elle en est indépendante dans la mesure où elle constitue… un acte juridique autonome ayant pour objet de soumettre une prétention nouvelle au juge, et, qu’en même temps, elle s’y rattache, dans la mesure où, formulée à titre ‘reconventionnel’, elle riposte à la demande principale; que le propre d’une demande reconventionnelle est ainsi d’élargir l’objet initial du litige en poursuivant des avantages autres que le simple rejet de la prétention du demandeur à l’action”86.
En l’espèce, la Cour considère que les demandes ougandaises constituent des demandes reconventionnelles dans la mesure où elles “cherchent à obtenir, au-delà du rejet des demandes formulées par le Congo, l’établissement de la responsabilité de celui-ci et des réparations à ce titre”87. L’article 80 du Règlement inclut une condition de compétence que la Cour n’examine pas parce qu’elle n’est pas contestée par le Congo. Par contre, le Congo s’oppose à la recevabilité des demandes ougandaises au motif qu’elles ne remplissent pas les conditions de forme requises par l’article 80.2 selon lequel la “demande reconventionnelle est présentée dans le contre-mémoire de la partie dont elle émane et figure parmi ses conclusions”. Reconnaissant que les demandes ougandaises auraient certes pu être présentées de manière plus claire, la Cour rejette l’argument du Congo car le contremémoire de l’Ouganda contient bien un chapitre intitulé 86
87
Affaire relative à l’application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), ordonnance du 17 décembre 1997, Demandes reconventionnelles, C.I.J. Recueil 1997, p. 256, para. 27. Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (Ouganda c. République démocratique du Congo), Demandes reconventionnelles, Ordonnance du 29 novembre 2001, para. 30.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
489
“La responsabilité étatique de la République démocratique du Congo et les demandes reconventionnelles de la République de l’Ouganda” et les demandes reconventionnelles sont mentionnées dans les conclusions du contre-mémoire88. De manière subsidiaire, le Congo soutient que les demandes reconventionnelles ne satisfont pas la condition de “connexité directe” requise par l’article 80.1 du Règlement. La Cour étudie tour à tour les demandes reconventionnelles de l’Ouganda afin d’établir un lien de connexité directe avec l’objet de la demande. La Cour rappelle que ce lien de connexité doit être établi “aussi bien en fait qu’en droit”89. La première demande ougandaise concerne des actes d’agression que le Congo aurait commis à l’encontre de l’Ouganda. Le Congo n’admet l’existence d’un lien de connexité entre cette demande et l’affaire en cours que pour la période de mai à août 1998. Cependant, la Cour reconnaît que les demandes des deux parties portent sur des faits de même nature, à savoir l’emploi de la force et l’assistance qui aurait été apportée à des groupes armés. De plus, même si la demande de l’Ouganda porte sur une période plus étendue que la demande principale du Congo, “les deux demandes n’en ont pas moins trait à un conflit existant entre les deux Etats voisins sous des formes diverses et avec une intensité variable depuis 1994”90. La Cour en conclut que les demandes des deux parties non seulement “s’inscrivent dans le cadre d’un même ensemble factuel complexe” mais aussi poursuivent les mêmes buts juridiques, à savoir l’établissement de la responsabilité de l’autre en se fondant sur la violation du principe du non-recours à la force91. Dès lors, la première demande reconventionnelle de l’Ouganda est recevable et en connexité directe avec l’objet des demandes du Congo et ce pour l’ensemble de la période couverte par l’Ouganda. Cette demande porte de plus sur les mêmes objectifs juridiques à savoir l’établissement de violations des règles du jus ad bellum. La deuxième demande reconventionnelle de l’Ouganda concerne des attaques visant les locaux et le personnel diplomatique ougandais 88 89 90 91
Ibid., para. 33. Ibid., para. 36. Ibid., para. 38. Ibid., para. 38.
490
Ludivine Tamiotti
à Kinshasa ainsi que des ressortissants ougandais, dont le Congo se serait rendu responsable. Cette demande porte sur des faits qui se sont produits en août 1998, immédiatement après l’invasion alléguée par le Congo de son territoire. A nouveau la Cour estime qu’il s’agit là de faits de même nature et que les demandes des Parties s’inscrivent dans le cadre du même ensemble factuel complexe. De plus, chacune des Parties cherchant à établir la responsabilité de l’autre “en invoquant, en relation avec l’emploi illicite de la force allégué, certaines règles de droit international conventionnel ou coutumier relatives à la protection des personnes et des biens”, les Parties poursuivent les mêmes buts juridiques, à savoir l’établissement de violations des règles du jus in bello92. La Cour en conclut donc que cette deuxième demande est en connexité directe avec l’objet des demandes du Congo. Le Juge ad hoc Verhoeven a voté contre la recevabilité de cette deuxième demande reconventionnelle. Il considère que “l’attaque contre la mission diplomatique de l’Ouganda à Kinshasa (…) ne (…) paraît pas de nature à éclairer utilement la Cour sur l’agression armée et sur l’occupation illégale d’une partie de son territoire dont se prétend victime la République du Congo, qui sont au cœur de la demande principale”93.
A ceci, il faut cependant ajouter que la deuxième demande reconventionnelle porte aussi sur les règles du droit diplomatique et consulaire, introduisant donc des objectifs juridiques différents. La troisième demande porte sur des violations alléguées de l’accord de Lusaka par le Congo. La Cour note qu’il s’agit là de faits d’une nature toute particulière puisque la demande concerne l’examen de questions afférentes à des modes de solution du conflit. La Cour ne trouve donc pas de lien de connexité entre cette demande et l’objet des demandes congolaises parce qu’elle porte sur des faits différents et poursuit des objectifs juridiques autres94. La Cour ayant accepté comme recevable deux des demandes reconventionnelles présentées par l’Ouganda, elle examine une dernière allégation du Congo. Le Congo demande à la Cour de manière “très subsidiaire” de ne pas opérer de jonction au fond de 92 93 94
Ibid., para. 40. Ibid., Déclaration du Juge Verhoeven. Ibid., para. 42.
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice (2001)
491
l’ensemble des prétentions ougandaises afin d’assurer une bonne administration de la justice. Le Congo soutient qu’en l’espèce la “jonction amènerait la Cour comme les Parties à envisager sous un même ensemble des questions radicalement distinctes, mettant en jeu des règles juridiques très différentes, et renvo[yant] à des faits qui sont survenus durant des périodes parfois éloignées les unes des autres”95.
La Cour rejette cet argument indiquant que “bien au contraire, une bonne administration de la justice et un souci d’économie de procès appellent un examen simultané de ces demandes reconventionnelles et des demandes au principal”96. La Cour conclut son ordonnance par d’autres considérations de bonne administration de la justice en rappelant l’importance de statuer dans un délai raisonnable et d’assurer une stricte égalité des Parties. Pour cela, la Cour prescrit à l’unanimité la présentation d’une réplique du Congo et d’une duplique de l’Ouganda portant sur les demandes des deux Parties dans l’instance en cours97 et réserve le droit, pour le Congo, de s’exprimer une seconde fois par écrit sur les demandes reconventionnelles de l’Ouganda, dans une pièce additionnelle dont la présentation pourrait faire l’objet d’une ordonnance ultérieure98. La Cour a donc accepté à l’unanimité la recevabilité de la première demande reconventionnelle, par quinze voix contre une la deuxième demande et a rejeté à l’unanimité la troisième demande99.
CONCLUSION Force est de constater que la Cour a apporté une pierre essentielle à l’édifice de la jurisprudence internationale en matière de mesures conservatoires. Rappelons que la chronique des activités de la Cour de l’année dernière avait eu à examiner deux ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires sur trois décisions rendues en 2000, ce qui 95 96 97 98 99
Ibid., para. 15. Ibid., para. 44. Ibid., para. 51, B. Ibid., para. 50. Ibid., para. 51.
492
Ludivine Tamiotti
montrait bien l’importance croissante de ce type de décisions. Cependant, sur treize ordonnances, à ce jour, seule une a été respectée.100 En d’autres termes, après avoir consolidé pendant plusieurs décennies sa pratique quant aux conditions à remplir pour obtenir une décision en indication de mesures conservatoires (telles que les critères de compétence et d’urgence), il était temps pour la Cour de passer à une étape supérieure en examinant la valeur juridique de telles décisions. Comme cela a été vu plus haut, la Cour a en effet été forcée à se prononcer sur la question ancestrale du caractère obligatoire de ses ordonnances en indication de mesures conservatoires. Un des mystères de La Haye a donc été résolu et ce avec une “absolue netteté”101. Une décision d’un tel poids était bien nécessaire face à l’affront des Etats-Unis et vu l’importance de la question du caractère obligatoire des mesures conservatoires pour la préservation des droits des parties à une instance. En ce qui concerne l’évolution du rôle de la Cour, la juridiction internationale a gardé le rythme de l’année précédente en rendant quatre décisions dont deux arrêts majeurs pour la jurisprudence internationale (dans l’affaire de la Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn) et LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique)). Bien qu’à la fin 2001, pas moins de vingt-trois affaires étaient toujours inscrites au rôle de la Cour, il faut prendre en considération le fait qu’une moitié de ces affaires ne va probablement jamais arriver à l’étape d’un jugement sur le fond (particulièrement les affaires impliquant la République fédérative de Yougoslavie). La Cour a également été très active cette année en ce qui concerne l’amélioration de ces règles de procédure. Ces modifications ainsi que la détermination du président de la Cour de travailler à maintenir l’unité du droit international en proposant que diverses juridictions internationales puissent demander des avis consultatifs à la Cour témoignent véritablement du dynamisme renaissant de la Cour depuis quelques années.
100 101
Affaire du Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso c. République du Mali). Philippe Weckel, “Affaire LaGrand”, Revue générale de droit international public (2001) 3, p. 766.
CHRONIQUE DE LA JURISPRUDENCE DU TRIBUNAL PENAL INTERNATIONAL POUR LE RWANDA (1995-2002) Roland Adjovi Florent Mazeron
INTRODUCTION En avril 1994, les massacres perpétrés au Rwanda par la majorité au pouvoir et les Hutu en général, contre les Tutsi et d’autres Hutu dits modérés, n’ont suscité qu’une réaction tardive de la communauté internationale1. Aux Nations Unies, cette prise de conscience s’est traduite d’abord par l’envoi d’un rapporteur spécial, en la personne de René Degni-Ségui2. Son rapport, qui parut alors que les massacres se poursuivaient encore, a qualifié expressément les événements survenus de génocide au sens de la Convention y relative de 1948. En juillet 1994, la victoire militaire du Front patriotique rwandais
1
2
Doctorant à l’Université Paris II (Panthéon – Assas). Doctorant et Attaché Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche (A.T.E.R.) à l’Université d’Auvergne (Clermont I). F. OUGUERGOUZ, “La tragédie rwandaise du printemps 1994 – Quelques considérations sur les premières réactions de l’Organisation des Nations Unies”, Revue générale de droit international public 100 (1996) 1, pp. 149-177. Professeur de droit international, il est aussi un militant des droits de l’homme. Il fut écroué par le pouvoir en place en Côte d’Ivoire dans les années 1990, pour son opposition politique. Après l’avènement de Laurent Gbagbo au pouvoir en 2000, il est nommé conseiller juridique auprès de la présidence. Il est l’auteur de deux rapports sur le Rwanda : E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 juin 1994) et E/CN.4/1995/12 (12 août 1994). Ces deux rapports sont publiés également dans le Rapport du Secrétaire général à l’Assemblée générale et au Conseil de sécurité sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Rwanda (A/49/508 – S/1994/1157) du 13 octobre 1994.
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 493-591. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
494
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
(ci-après le “FPR”) contre l’Armée patriotique rwandaise, armée loyaliste, conduisit à la mise en place d’un nouveau gouvernement qui sollicita le soutien des Nations Unies par la création d’un tribunal pénal international pour juger les responsables du génocide3. Sur cette base, et après d’âpres négociations au sein du Conseil de sécurité, la Résolution 955 fut adoptée le 8 novembre 1994, sur le modèle de la Résolution 827 (1993) portant création du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (ci-après le “TPIY”). “Agissant en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies”, le Conseil de sécurité, dans le paragraphe premier du dispositif de la Résolution 955, “décide […] de créer un tribunal international chargé uniquement de juger les personnes présumées responsables d’actes de génocide ou d’autres violations graves du droit international humanitaire commis sur le territoire du Rwanda et les citoyens rwandais présumés responsables de tels actes ou violations commis sur le territoire d’Etats voisins, entre le 1er janvier et le 31 décembre 1994, et d’adopter à cette fin le Statut du Tribunal criminel international pour le Rwanda”.
La résolution fut votée avec une abstention (Chine) et un vote négatif, celui du Rwanda ! Le gouvernement rwandais reprochait essentiellement au texte adopté d’avoir exclu la peine capitale des peines applicables4, mais aussi d’avoir étendu la compétence ratione materiae du Tribunal aux crimes de guerre et aux crimes
3
4
Voir le document officiel (S/1994/1115). Le nouveau président rwandais, Pasteur Bizimungu, a aussi exprimé le vœu que les Nations Unies créent un tel Tribunal dans ses allocutions à l’Assemblée générale et au Conseil de sécurité en 1994. Cf. S/PV.3453, p. 14. Après le vote de la résolution 955 le 8 novembre 1994, le représentant du Rwanda a fait une déclaration pour exposer les raisons du vote négatif (cf. le procès verbal, S/PV.3453, pp. 14-17). Il en a avancé sept : 1) la compétence ratione temporis, 2) la composition et la structure, 3) la compétence ratione materiae, 4) la possibilité pour des pays ayant “pris une part très active à la guerre civile rwandaise” de proposer des candidats à l’élection des juges, 5) la possibilité d’exécution des peines hors du Rwanda et, surtout la possibilité pour l’Etat où la peine est exécutée de faire bénéficier de mesures de clémence (commutation de peine, grâce, etc.), 6) l’exclusion de la peine capitale pour les personnes “qui ont pensé, planifié et organisé le génocide” tandis que les exécutants jugés par la justice rwandaise seraient soumis à cette peine, et 7) la fixation du siège hors du Rwanda.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
495
contre l’humanité, ainsi que sa compétence ratione temporis au delà de la date d’arrivée du FPR au pouvoir5. La compétence du Tribunal ainsi créé, s’établit comme suit : - compétence ratione materiae : génocide (article 2 du Statut), crimes contre l’humanité (article 3 du Statut) et violations de l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève et du Protocole additionnel II de 1977 (article 4 du Statut) ; - compétences ratione personae, ratione loci et ratione temporis : crimes commis sur le territoire rwandais (ratione loci) par toute personne physique (ratione personae), crimes commis sur les territoires voisins (ratione loci) par les citoyens rwandais (ratione personae), entre le 1er janvier et le 31 décembre 1994 (ratione temporis) (articles 5 et 7 du Statut)6. 5
6
Ainsi, les cas de massacres de hutu par le Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR), à majorité tutsi, même s’ils ne sont pas constitutifs d’un génocide, pourraient sans doute être qualifiés de crimes de guerre, voire de crimes contre l’humanité. Ces actes sont notamment rapportés par Filip Reyntjens dans son ouvrage Rwanda : trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1995, p. 62, cité dans le rapport de Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda, Juillet 1997, notes 20 et 21.) ainsi que dans le rapport de l’International Crisis Group (Tribunal Pénal International pour le Rwanda : L’urgence de juger, Rapport Afrique n°30, Juin 2001, pp. 10-12). Pourrait aussi être qualifié de crime de guerre l’attentat contre l’avion du président Habyarimana le 6 avril 1994, pour lequel il semble que la responsabilité de l’actuel président du Rwanda, Paul Kagamé, pourrait être mise en cause : voir les enquêtes du juge français J.-L. Bruguière (Le Monde du 20 février 2003) et le rapport Hourigan selon Hirondelle et Diplomatie Judiciaire, des presses spécialisées sur le Tribunal (cf. Hirondelle, 28 mai 2002 [AT/GF/FH (ME0528B)] et Diplomatie Judiciaire, 9 mai 2000, (http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/Tpir/Parquet29.htm)). Sur la compétence ratione temporis du TPIR, le nouveau gouvernement rwandais avait suggéré que soit considérée “la période allant du 1er octobre 1990 – début de la guerre – au 17 juillet 1994 – fin de la guerre” (cf. S/PV.3453, p. 15). En effet, pour le pouvoir actuellement en place à Kigali, les crimes ont commencé en 1990 et ont quasiment pris fin avec son accession au pouvoir. La compétence du tribunal est donc fonction de la nationalité des personnes en cause. Pour les citoyens rwandais, le TPIR est compétent pour tous les crimes commis au Rwanda ou dans les Etats voisins ; pour les non rwandais, le TPIR n’est compétent que pour les crimes commis au Rwanda. Sur la compétence du TPIR en général, voir l’article de Fanny MARTIN, “Les compétences juridictionnelles du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda”, in E. FRONZA et S. MANACORDA (dir.), La justice pénale internationale dans
496
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Cette compétence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (ci-après le “TPIR”), s’exerce en concurrence avec toute compétence d’une juridiction nationale, mais avec primauté pour le TPIR dans la mesure où ses juges peuvent ordonner le dessaisissement de toute juridiction nationale (article 8). Cette relation hiérarchique est renforcée par la référence au Chapitre VII qui dote la Résolution 955 d’une force obligatoire incontestable dans les ordres juridiques internes des Etats membres en vertu de l’article 25 de la Charte, combiné aux articles 39 et 41. Ce Tribunal est composé de trois organes : les Chambres (trois Chambres de première instance et une Chambre d’appel), le Greffe et le Procureur. Tandis que certains organes lui sont propres, d’autres sont partagés avec le TPIY. Parmi les organes partagés, il y a le Procureur7 – le TPIR ayant un Procureur adjoint nommé par le Secrétaire général sur proposition du Procureur8 – et la Chambre d’appel. L’existence d’une Chambre d’appel commune aux deux Tribunaux pénaux internationaux (ci-après “TPI”) vise à assurer une certaine uniformité de la jurisprudence dans une matière nouvelle. Le Procureur joue un rôle particulier dans la procédure pénale devant le TPIR, tout comme devant le TPIY. C’est lui qui est à la fois le juge d’instruction et le ministère public. Cette inspiration de la common law fait qu’il dispose d’un pouvoir d’initiative important
7
8
les décisions des tribunaux ad hoc. Etude des Law Clinics en droit pénal international de Paris et Naples, Bruxelles, Bruylant, à paraître. Ont été successivement Procureur des deux Tribunaux pénaux internationaux : le sud-africain Richard Goldstone (1994-1996), la canadienne Louise Arbour (1996-2001) et la suissesse Carla del Ponte (depuis 2001). Le premier Procureur adjoint fut le malgache Honoré Rakotomanana nommé le 20 mars 1995 (Premier Rapport Annuel du TPIR, 8 novembre 1994 au 30 juin 1996, A/51/399 – S/1997/77B, § 10). Il démissionna et le camerounais Bernard Muna lui succéda le 20 mars 1997 (Second Rapport Annuel, 1er juillet 1996 au 30 juin 1997, A/52/582 – S/1997/868). Il faut signaler que dans ce second rapport annuel, il apparaît deux dates différentes pour la nomination du camerounais : dans le résumé (p. 2) il est indiqué qu’il est nommé le 20 mars 1997, tandis que, au paragraphe 6, il apparaît que cette nomination date du 29 avril 1997. A la date de clôture de cette chronique (31 décembre 2002), le poste de Procureur adjoint était vacant, faute peut-être pour le Procureur, d’avoir trouvé la personne idoine.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
497
dans l’exercice des poursuites9. Mais son pouvoir est soumis à un contrôle relatif des juges, notamment parce que tout acte d’accusation doit être confirmé par un juge. Même s’il n’est pas souvent arrivé qu’un acte d’accusation soit rejeté, la possibilité demeure. Le juge Khan en a par exemple fait usage lorsqu’il a rejeté l’acte d’accusation contre Bagosora et vingt-huit autres10. Relèvent du seul TPIR et à lui seul, ses Chambres de première instance et son Greffe. En 1995, les premiers juges du TPIR sont élus pour quatre ans et tiennent leur première session plénière du 26 au 30 juin de la même année. Ils adoptent alors le Règlement de procédure et de preuve (ci-après le “RPP”), et élisent le Président du Tribunal ainsi que son vice-président. Le 8 septembre 1995, le Greffier est nommé en la personne de Andronico O. Adede11. Le 28 novembre 1995, un premier acte d’accusation est confirmé : c’est l’affaire Kibuye12 ; mais les premières comparutions initiales n’ont lieu que six mois plus tard, soit en mai 1996, et le premier procès s’ouvre le 9 janvier 1997 avec l’affaire Akayesu. Le 2 septembre 1998, le TPIR rend son premier jugement en reconnaissant le bourgmestre Akayesu coupable de génocide et de crimes contre l’humanité : c’est la première fois que la Convention de 1948 relative au génocide est mise en œuvre par une juridiction pénale internationale. Jean-Paul Akayesu sera ensuite condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement à vie par un jugement du 2 octobre 1998. De même, le Tribunal révèle les originalités de la procédure pénale adoptée avec le plaidoyer de culpabilité de l’ancien premier ministre, 9
10
11
12
En fait, la procédure devant les deux TPI est un mélange de la civil law et de la common law, avec toutefois une prédominance de cette dernière qui tend relativement à s’atténuer à la suite des différentes modifications que les juges ont apporté aux règlements de procédure et de preuve. Le Procureur c. Bagosora et 28 autres (ICTR-98-37), Décision du 31 mars 1998. Dans une autre affaire, le juge n’a confirmé que partiellement l’acte d’accusation : Le Procureur c. Bernard Ntuyahaga (ICTR-98-40), Décision faisant suite à l’examen de l’acte d’accusation, 29 septembre 1998. A la suite du rapport du Bureau des services de contrôle interne des Nations Unies, le kenyan Andronico O. Adede démissionne. Lui succèdent : Agwu U. Okali nommé le 26 février 1997 (Second Rapport Annuel, § 7), puis Adama Dieng en mars 2001 (Septième Rapport Annuel, 1er juillet 2001 au 30 juin 2002, A/57/163 – S/2002/733, § 12). Premier Rapport Annuel § 44.
498
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Jean Kambanda, le 1er mai 1998 : il sera également condamné à une peine d’emprisonnement à vie par le jugement du 4 septembre 1998, premier jugement relatif à la peine. Depuis, l’activité du Tribunal n’a cessé de croître. Au 31 décembre 2002, il a clos dix affaires, rendu neuf jugements au fond, huit arrêts en appel sur le fond13, sur lesquels porte cette chronique14. Les décisions de procédure sont fort nombreuses même si nous ne disposons d’aucune statistique à cet égard15. Cette activité ne s’est pas faite sans accrocs que de 13
14
15
Dans la procédure des TPI, il y a différents types d’appel. L’appel au fond est celui interjeté contre le jugement au fond ou le jugement relatif aux peines (article 108). L’appel interlocutoire porte sur toute autre décision que celles au fond ou relative à la peine, et est spécialement prévu par le RPP, sous réserve, dans certains cas, d’une autorisation préalable. C’est le cas de l’appel contre le rejet d’une exception d’incompétence (article 72 D), mais aussi de celui contre l’ordonnance de mise en liberté provisoire (article 65 D) qui doivent être autorisés par un collège de trois juges. Il est aussi possible d’interjeter appel contre d’autres décisions du Tribunal qui sont incidentes : outrage au Tribunal (article 77) ou faux témoignage sous déclaration solennelle (article 91). Les affaires jugées au fond sont : Le Procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 2 septembre 1998 et Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 1er juin 2001 ; Le Procureur c. Clément Kayishema et Obed Ruzindana (affaires jointes) (ICTR-95-1), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement, 21 mai 1999 et Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 1er juin 2001 ; Le Procureur c. Jean Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 4 septembre 1998 et Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 19 octobre 2000 ; Le Procureur c. Georges Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 1er juin 2000 ; Le Procureur c. Alfred Musema (ICTR-96-13), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 27 janvier 2000 et Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 16 novembre 2001 ; Le Procureur c. Georges Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 6 décembre 1999 ; Le Procureur c. Omar Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 5 février 1999 et Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 6 avril 2000 ; Le Procureur c. Ignace Bagilishema (ICTR-95-1A), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 7 juin 2001 et Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 3 juillet 2002. Dans la suite de cette chronique, les nombreuses références faites à ces décisions se contenteront d’indiquer le nom de la personne accusée et la nature de la décision de fond (jugement ou arrêt). Vous trouverez en annexe une brève présentation de ces différentes affaires. Par ailleurs, le texte intégral de ces décisions est consultable en ligne sur le site officiel du Tribunal (http://www.ictr.org). Pour avoir un panorama plus large de la production judiciaire du TPIR, on peut utilement se reporter au Recueil des ordonnances, décisions et arrêts du TPIR que l’Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) tente de produire avec l’objectif de publier la totalité de cette production, et au cédérom que le Tribunal produit luimême. Le recueil de l’U.L.B. est devenu le Recueil officiel du Tribunal depuis l’accord tripartite intervenu le 15 mars 2002 entre le Tribunal, le Centre de droit
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
499
nombreuses voix n’ont pas manqué de relever, qu’il s’agisse d’organes internes aux Nations Unies comme le Bureau des services de contrôle interne (BSCI)16, dont le premier rapport du BSCI est à l’origine de la double démission du Greffier et du Procureur adjoint en 199717, ou d’organismes privés comme l’organisation civile de veille sur les crises politiques et humanitaires à travers le monde, International Crisis Group18. Ces critiques ne touchent toutefois pas seulement les organes du Tribunal ; d’autres personnes travaillant avec le Tribunal comme les avocats de la défense ont également été mises en cause : ainsi a été découverte une pratique de partage des honoraires entre certains avocats et les accusés dont ils assuraient la défense19. Nous ne nous attarderons pas ici sur ces critiques qui ne sont d’ailleurs pas spécifiques au TPIR, le TPIY étant en effet également la cible de détracteurs objectifs et de contestataires invétérés20. Notre propos sera plutôt d’examiner le fonctionnement et les activités du TPIR en passant successivement en revue les questions
16
17 18
19
20
international de l’ULB et les éditions Bruylant. La première édition dudit Recueil est paru en 2000 et porte sur la période 1995 à 1997 (E. DAVID, P. KLEIN et A.-M. LA ROSA (dir.), Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda. Recueil des ordonnances, décisions et arrêts, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2000, 964p.) tandis que les volumes correspondant aux autres années sont en cours d’édition. Quant au cédérom produit par le Tribunal, la première édition est paru en 2001 et porte sur la période 1995 à 2000, et une seconde édition devrait paraître au plus tard en 2004. Pour les rapports du BSCI, voir (http://www.un.org/Depts/oios/reports0.htm). Voir notamment le Rapport sur le Financement du TPIR, Rapport du Secrétaire général sur les activités du BSCI, A/51/789, 6 février 1997. A/51/789. Voir aussi le Deuxième Rapport Annuel (1997), § 57. L’ICG a produit deux rapports sur le TPIR : Rapport Afrique n°30 du 7 juin 2001 (cité supra) et Rapport Afrique n°50 du 1er août 2002. Voir le site Internet de l’ICG (http://www.crisisweb.org/). Voir aussi le Rapport n°343 sur les victimes devant le TPIR (octobre 2002) de la Fédération internationale des droits de l’homme (FIDH), sur son site Internet (http://www.fidh.org). Septième Rapport Annuel (2002), § 102. Cette pratique est à l’origine de l’amendement du Code de déontologie adopté par la session plénière sur proposition du Greffier (cf. article 5 bis). Le même service d’audit interne des Nations Unies a relevé une pratique de partage d’honoraires entre des conseils de la défense et des accusés devant le TPIY (A/56/836, §§ 28-33). Certains des détenus réussiraient ainsi à entretenir leur famille en ex-Yougoslavie (cf. D.R. SANDS, “White House wants trials kickbacks ended. U.N. attorneys share fees with clients”, The Washington Times, 30 mai 2002, version électronique).
500
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
suivantes : la coopération avec les Etats, le droit à un procès équitable, la responsabilité pénale individuelle, les crimes et les peines.
LA COOPERATION AVEC LES ETATS L’ordre juridique international, profondément marqué par la souveraineté des Etats, diffère fondamentalement de l’ordre juridique interne, et il reste encore difficile de fonder le caractère obligatoire d’une norme internationale autrement que sur la volonté des Etats de voir cette norme s’imposer à eux. Cette différence est particulièrement visible en droit international pénal. Tandis que le système pénal national peut s’appuyer sur le monopole de la contrainte organisée que confère, en interne, la souveraineté étatique le système pénal international ne dispose d’aucun mécanisme institutionnel propre pour lui donner effet : pas de police judiciaire, pas de personnel judiciaire spécialisé… C’est pourquoi les Etats, par la mise à disposition de leurs moyens de contrainte internes, jouent un rôle décisif dans l’effectivité des organes judiciaires internationaux21. Cette coopération, qui est obligatoire dans le cadre des TPI22 en raison de leur création par une résolution contraignante du Conseil de sécurité, s’effectue en trois temps : avant le procès (A), durant le procès (B) et après le procès (C). Toutefois, elle peut s’établir aussi sans rapport direct avec la mise en œuvre d’un procès puisque le système pénal international peut attribuer compétence au juge pénal interne et lui céder certaines affaires (D). A. La coopération avant le procès C’est la relation avec les Etats qui aura été la plus houleuse dans la mesure où, se situant en amont du procès, elle conditionne la mise en 21
22
C’est ainsi que Antonio Cassese, premier président du TPIY, affirmait à l’Assemblée générale, le 7 novembre 1995, que le Tribunal est comme un géant infirme n’ayant ni jambes ni mains. “To walk and to work, he needs artificial limbs. These artificial limbs are the state authorities; without their help the tribunal cannot operate.” Voir aussi le débat au sein de l’Assemblée générale, sur le premier rapport du TPIY, le 14 novembre 1994 (A/49/PV.56). Article 28 du Statut et Articles 55 à 61, 90 bis et 103 du RPP.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
501
œuvre du système pénal international. Selon que les Etats étaient ou non favorables à la poursuite des responsables des crimes commis au Rwanda en 1994, ils ont promptement coopéré ou traîné les pieds pour le faire. La coopération des Etats à ce stade implique d’une part qu’ils procèdent eux-mêmes à des enquêtes pour déterminer si des personnes poursuivies par le Tribunal se trouvent sur leur territoire et, d’autre part, qu’ils transfèrent ces personnes, lorsqu’ils les ont sous leur juridiction, à la prison du TPIR afin que le procès puisse se tenir23. C’est pourquoi les Etats n’ont pas tous le même rôle dans la coopération avec le Tribunal. Parmi les Etats qui jouent un rôle central, il y a d’abord le Rwanda. Ce positionnement se comprend aisément en raison du lieu principal des massacres. Les difficultés qui en résultent n’en sont que plus ardues, car le Rwanda détient un moyen de pression particulier sur le Tribunal, notamment au regard des enquêtes qui se déroulent pour leur grande majorité sur son territoire. Ainsi, et malgré les accords spéciaux signés entre le Rwanda et le Tribunal pour garantir et organiser cette coopération, il apparaît que le gouvernement de Kigali module sa coopération avec le TPIR selon que les résultats obtenus par le Tribunal coïncident avec sa politique intérieure ou non. Toutefois, pour la recherche des personnes présumées responsables, le Rwanda n’est pas au cœur du dispositif en raison des nombreux exodes qui sont survenus après les évènements de 1994. Les relations historiques font apparaître la Belgique et la France au premier plan, tandis que des raisons géographiques situent les Etats africains, notamment de la région des Grands Lacs africains, sur un même niveau. C’est ainsi que nombre de prévenus ont été retrouvés en Belgique, en France, en Zambie, au Kenya24, en Tanzanie et en République démocratique du Congo. D’autres encore ont été transférés depuis l’Afrique de l’Ouest (Bénin, Côte d’Ivoire et Mali principalement). Dans certains de ces Etats, des difficultés sont apparues en raison de lenteurs administratives (Etats africains spécialement) ou juridiques. Il faut souligner à ce dernier égard les cas 23 24
Car le procès devant les TPI ne peut se faire qu’en présence de l’accusé. Juillet 1997 : l’Opération NAKI (Nairobi – Kigali) a permis une série d’arrestations de suspects par la police kenyane (cf. Rapport 1997 Appendice V § 4).
502
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
particuliers de la Suisse et des Etats-Unis. La Suisse présentait une situation particulière parce qu’elle n’était pas membre des Nations Unies entre 1994 et 2002, de sorte que la Résolution 955 ne lui imposait aucune obligation25 même si cela ne l’a pas empêchée de coopérer avec les deux TPI26. Aux Etats-Unis, c’est la rigidité du système juridique et pénal américain qui a été mise à profit par les personnes accusées pour échapper à la justice pénale internationale. Cet Etat, en dépit de sa qualité de membre permanent du Conseil de sécurité et malgré l’adoption d’une législation organisant la coopération avec le TPIR27, ne montra que peu d’empressement à coopérer efficacement avec le Tribunal : il aura ainsi fallu plus de deux ans de procédure pour que le pasteur Ntakirutimana soit transféré, après avoir été libéré suite à une première arrestation28. De manière générale, les Etats récalcitrants ont tenté d’exciper, à tort29, de leur droit interne qui ne permet pas qu’une personne puisse être arrêtée sur simple mandat d’un Procureur30. 25
26 27
28
29 30
Une partie de la doctrine considère cependant que la Charte produit aussi des effets à l’égard des Etats tiers, en raison du caractère coutumier acquis par nombre de dispositions de la Charte de San Francisco : cf. Ph. CAHIER, “La Charte des Nations Unies et les Etats tiers”, in A. CASSESE (ed.), Current Problems in International Law, Giuffre, Milan, 1975, pp. 81-105. Une certaine lecture de l’article 2 § 6 de la Charte permet aussi de fonder une telle approche. Ainsi Alfred Musema a été transféré au Tribunal par la Suisse. Voir Jugement Musema, § 17. Cf. Agreement on Surrender of Persons, U.S. International Tribunal of Rwanda, National Defense Authorization Act Pub. L. n°104-106, s. 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (24 January 1995). Document cité par LCHR, Prosecuting Genocide in Rwanda, Juillet 1997, note 68. United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division, In the Matter of Surrender of Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, MISC. NO. L-96-5, Memorandum and Order, 17th December 1997 (Marcel C. Notzon, United States Magistrate Judge). En l’espèce, le juge avait ordonné la libération du Pasteur : “… it is hereby ORDERED that the Government’s request that ELIZAPHAN NTAKIRUTIMANA be surrendered to the International Tribunal […] is DENIED” (p. 13 dudit Jugement). L’article 58 du RPP stipule explicitement que les dispositions de l’article 28 relatif à la coopération des Etats, prévalent sur toute disposition de droit interne. L’article 40 A permettait au Procureur, par une simple demande écrite, de solliciter un Etat pour qu’il procède à l’arrestation de toute personne suspectée. Dans certains droits internes, une telle mesure ne peut être prise que sur ordonnance d’un juge ; ou c’est la garde à vue qui ne saurait être prolongée sans que la personne arrêtée ne soit présentée devant un juge. C’est peut-être pour
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
503
Un autre Etat qui joue un rôle important mais à un autre titre, est la Tanzanie. En effet, c’est sur le territoire de cet Etat que siège le Tribunal, plus précisément à Arusha, près de la frontière avec le Kenya. Cet éloignement se justifie par la volonté de la communauté internationale de faire échapper le Tribunal à la pression politique d’une société profondément meurtrie et d’un contexte intérieur peu favorable en raison de la position de vainqueur d’un mouvement à majorité tutsi, le FPR. Pour organiser cette coopération avec la Tanzanie, une convention a été signée entre les Nations Unies et la République Unie de Tanzanie, le 31 décembre 199431. Cet accord détermine les immunités et facilités de circulation au regard du droit tanzanien de l’immigration et du travail dont bénéficie globalement le Tribunal, c’est-à-dire les juges, les fonctionnaires internationaux, les accusés, les témoins et les avocats ainsi que leurs équipes de travail. Au niveau de la mise en œuvre de la Résolution 955, d’autres Etats ont joué un rôle tout aussi capital en fournissant au Tribunal ses premiers moyens d’action, notamment en ressources humaines32. Toutefois, ces contributions initiales ont aussi été sources de difficultés pratiques car certaines personnes détachées par leur Etat de nationalité n’étaient pas compétentes pour la situation. Ainsi nombre d’enquêteurs ne semblaient pas au fait de la procédure d’enquête en matière criminelle, encore moins en matière de génocide où le dolus specialis constitue un élément capital du crime. Pire, ils avaient une ignorance innocente du contexte social. Il apparaît ainsi une certaine discrimination dans les moyens mis à la disposition du TPIR lorsqu’on les compare à ceux alloués au TPIY. Cependant, qui doit-on blâmer ? Les Etats qui ont bien voulu soutenir la justice pénale internationale quelles que soient les raisons sous-jacentes à leur générosité intéressée, ou les Etats qui n’ont rien fait, notamment les Etats africains, qui n’ont même pas daigné répondre aux sollicitations officielles et officieuses du Tribunal ? L’Organisation de l’Unité
31 32
cette raison que l’article 40 bis a été adopté par la suite, pour assurer une place aux Juges du TPIR dans cette procédure préalable au procès, qui touche à la liberté physique des personnes. Cf. Appendice du Premier Rapport Annuel du TPIR, pp. 21-35. La contribution des Pays-Bas est sur ce point notable, voir Premier Rapport Annuel, § 13.
504
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Africaine (ci-après “O.U.A.”), qui regroupe tous les Etats africains à l’exception du Maroc, n’a apporté aucune contribution de son côté, alors même qu’en 1999, elle avait mis en place un panel d’experts pour enquêter sur les événements de 1994 ! A ce jour, aucun chef d’Etat africain n’a, par exemple, visité le Tribunal, ni aucun officiel de la défunte O.U.A. ou de la toute nouvelle Union Africaine. B. La coopération durant le procès Durant le procès, l’assistance que les Etats peuvent apporter à l’action du Tribunal se réduit à la facilitation des déplacements des personnes impliquées dans le procès, qu’il s’agisse du personnel même du Tribunal ou des témoins. Car pour ces derniers en particulier, la situation peut être critique dans la mesure où nombre d’entre eux ont fui les atrocités des massacres au Rwanda et sont parfois en situation irrégulière dans le pays où ils résident. Ce qui nécessite des mesures spéciales pour éviter que leur participation à la manifestation de la vérité ne leur porte préjudice dans leur quotidien. A ce titre, la France et la Belgique, mais aussi les Etats limitrophes du Rwanda ont pris des dispositions afin que les témoins retrouvent leur situation quo ante.33 Enfin, quand la sécurité physique des témoins l’exigeait, le Tribunal a su prendre d’autres dispositions pour limiter les risques, toujours avec la coopération des Etats. Dans cette phase de la procédure devant le Tribunal, le Rwanda a aussi su parfois insuffler une dynamique négative à l’action judiciaire pénale. En effet, sur son sol réside encore nombre de personnes susceptibles de témoigner aussi bien à charge qu’à décharge devant le Tribunal. En fonction de son appréciation de l’activité du Tribunal et surtout de ses résultats, le Rwanda a pu moduler, là aussi, sa stratégie, en refusant d’autoriser la sortie des personnes sollicitées par le Tribunal ou en créant des obstacles administratifs tels que la délivrance de passeport, et autres documents liés à l’émigration34. 33
34
Certains Etats (France, RCA, RDC et Tanzanie) ont signé un accord spécial avec le Tribunal pour faciliter la comparution des témoins qui, la plupart du temps, ne disposent pas de titre de séjour officiel dans ces pays, pouvant leur permettre de circuler librement. Cf. Quatrième Rapport Annuel (1999), § 113. Septième Rapport Annuel (2002), § 87.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
505
Dans l’affaire Butare, la Chambre de première instance II a même adopté une décision orale rappelant l’obligation pour les Etats membres des Nations Unies de coopérer avec le Tribunal, et invitant expressément le gouvernement rwandais à s’acquitter de cette obligation en facilitant l’activité judiciaire du Tribunal35. Une autre dimension de la coopération avec les Etats est la possibilité qui leur est donnée d’intervenir dans la procédure judiciaire, au titre de l’amicus curiae conformément à l’article 74 du RPP. C’est la Belgique qui, la première, en a fait usage en souhaitant intervenir dans l’affaire Bagosora,36 par une requête en date du 22 septembre 199737. Son objectif était de plaider son intérêt à juger ce militaire qui semblerait avoir à tout le moins cautionné voire ordonné le massacre des casques bleus belges. Il s’agissait pour la Belgique de plaider la qualité de son système judiciaire et l’intérêt pour la justice que cette personne soit jugée ailleurs que devant le TPIR. Par la suite, la Belgique est intervenue aussi dans l’affaire Ntuyahaga38 avec plus de succès puisque le Procureur a retiré son acte d’accusation39, ce qui a permis à la Belgique de demander son extradition à la RépubliqueUnie de Tanzanie. Actuellement, Bernard Ntuyahaga fait l’objet d’une double demande d’extradition, l’une provenant du Rwanda et l’autre de la Belgique. Il convient également de noter que dans la même affaire Bagosora, le Rwanda est intervenu, toujours au titre de l’amicus curiae40.
35 36 37 38 39
40
Cf. Bulletin du TPIR, Vol. 8, Décembre 2002, p. 4. Affaire n°ICTR-96-7-I. Troisième Rapport Annuel (1998), §§ 150-152. Quatrième Rapport Annuel (1999), § 116. Avant la douzième session plénière (juillet 2001) où l’article 11 bis du RPP a été adopté, le TPIR ne pouvait pas valablement opérer le transfert d’un accusé à un Etat membre. On peut imaginer que c’est pour cette raison que le Procureur a procédé de la sorte. Depuis ce nouvel article 11 bis, il est désormais possible au TPIR de transférer tout un dossier (l’accusé et les éléments de preuve résultant des enquêtes menées) à un Etat pour que la poursuite judiciaire s’y exerce. Cf. infra, pp. 503 et ss. sur la coopération en dehors du procès. Cf. Cinquième Rapport Annuel (2000), Annexe V, Chambre de première instance III, § 39, p. 40.
506
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
C. La coopération après le procès (exécution des peines) Une fois le procès terminé par la détermination de la peine en cas de condamnation ou par l’acquittement, la coopération des Etats reste nécessaire mais de façon différente. Dans le premier cas, il s’agit pour les Etats de faire exécuter la sentence en accueillant la personne condamnée dans leurs prisons pour qu’elle y purge sa peine, le TPIR ne disposant pas d’un lieu de détention permanent41. Mais ce transfert du condamné ne peut se faire que sur la base d’un accord entre le Tribunal et l’Etat d’accueil. Or peu d’Etats ont signé de tels accords. Seuls le Mali et le Bénin l’ont fait, et seul l’accord avec le Mali a été mis en œuvre avec le transfert de six (6) condamnés en décembre 200142. L’accord avec le Bénin ne sera mis en œuvre qu’une fois la prison de destination mise aux normes internationales de détention. D’autres Etats ont adopté des législations nationales permettant l’incarcération de personnes condamnées par les TPI ; il s’agit notamment de la Belgique, du Danemark, de la Norvège, de la Suède et de la Suisse. Les réticences éventuelles des pays occidentaux pourraient s’expliquer par les obligations qui découleraient de l’accueil d’un condamné, comme le droit de visite pour ses proches, étant données les conditions d’entrée et de séjour dans ces pays. Dans le second cas, l’acquittement, la coopération des Etats est encore nécessaire pour assurer la réinsertion sociale de la personne injustement mise en cause. Le principe ne bis in idem prend ici un sens tout particulier, puisque cet acquittement est définitif s’agissant des faits sur lesquels portait l’acte d’accusation devant le TPIR. Aucun Etat membre des Nations Unies – nous pensons notamment au Rwanda – ne pourrait donc entamer une procédure pénale contre la même personne pour les mêmes faits43. Cette coopération des Etats permettra à la personne acquittée de “refaire” sa vie sans subir les 41
42 43
Le TPIR possède un lieu de détention temporaire où sont tenues les personnes mises en cause devant le Tribunal, en attendant la fin des procédures entamées contre elles. En cas de condamnation, elles y attendent aussi d’être transférées à leur lieu de détention définitive, dans un Etat membre. Septième Rapport Annuel (2002), § 93. Ce principe vaut aussi en cas de condamnation : aucun Etat ne pourrait juger à nouveau le condamné pour les mêmes faits.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
507
conséquences négatives pouvant découler de sa mise en accusation. Ce fut le cas d’Ignace Bagilishema, le seul accusé à avoir été acquitté par le Tribunal au 31 décembre 2002. D. La coopération en dehors du procès Il est une coopération inédite qui s’inscrit en dehors du processus judiciaire devant la juridiction pénale internationale ad hoc, c’est celle qui donne lieu à l’exercice par les Etats de leur compétence universelle, un mécanisme prévu par la Résolution 955 dans le paragraphe 2 du dispositif où le Conseil décide que les Etats “prendront toutes mesures nécessaires en vertu de leur droit interne pour mettre en application les dispositions de la présente résolution et du Statut”, et complété par la récente adoption de l’article 11 bis du RPP. La compétence universelle en matière pénale se définit comme la situation dans laquelle se trouve un Etat qui exerce sa compétence juridictionnelle à l’égard de l’auteur d’une infraction sans que les liens classiques de rattachement – lieu de commission de l’infraction, nationalité de l’auteur ou de la victime – n’existent. En établissant une compétence concurrente entre le TPIR et les juridictions nationales, le Conseil de sécurité fait obligation à tous les Etats membres de poursuivre et de juger toute personne dont la responsabilité pénale pourrait être démontrée dans les crimes relevant de la compétence du TPIR, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de prouver l’existence d’un lien classique de rattachement. Cette disposition a été effectivement mise en œuvre dans de nombreuses lois nationales d’adaptation des résolutions créatrices des TPI44. En revanche, le chemin inverse, à savoir que le TPIR puisse transférer des affaires et des personnes aux Etats membres45, n’était 44
45
Ainsi en est-il avec la loi française du 22 mai 1996 par lequel le jugement par les tribunaux nationaux est possible sauf si le TPIR émet une ordonnance de dessaisissement en application du principe de primauté. Ainsi, dans l’affaire Bernard Ntuyahaga, le Procureur a fondé, entre autres, sa requête aux fins de retrait de l’acte d’accusation sur l’objectif de permettre à la Belgique de poursuivre l’accusé. La Chambre de première instance I a contesté cet argument en estimant que le Statut et le RPP, avant l’ajout de l’article 11 bis, s’y opposaient. Cf. Le Procureur c. Bernard Ntuyahaga (ICTR-98-40), Chambre
508
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
pas prévu. Face à l’urgence de mettre un terme à l’activité des deux tribunaux au plus tard en 2008, principalement sous la pression américaine, les juges de chacun des deux tribunaux, en assemblée plénière, ont procédé à la modification de leurs RPP. C’est ainsi que l’article 11 bis a été adopté46 pour permettre et faciliter le transfert des affaires et des personnes aux juridictions nationales aptes à en connaître en fonction des circonstances. Cet amendement n’a pas encore été mis en œuvre dans le cadre du TPIR, mais il devrait servir prochainement dans le contexte de la completion strategy47 du Tribunal. Déjà, dans le septième rapport annuel du Tribunal, il est indiqué que “le Procureur a identifié 40 suspects qu’il compte faire juger par des juridictions nationales”48, même si aucun accord avec des Etats ne semble encore être intervenu à ce titre. Hormis les Etats, d’autres personnes juridiques peuvent aussi coopérer avec le Tribunal pour lui permettre d’assurer sa mission dans de bonnes conditions, sans qu’il ne puisse y avoir d’obligations directes pour elles49. Au premier rang de ces personnes figurent les institutions intergouvernementales. C’est ainsi que le Secrétariat général des Nations Unies a été autorisé, dans l’affaire Akayesu, à intervenir au titre de l’amicus curiae afin d’éclairer le Tribunal sur les immunités dont bénéficiait le général Dallaire alors qu’il commandait la Mission des Nations Unies pour l’Assistance au Rwanda
46
47
48 49
de première instance I, Décision faisant suite à la requête du Procureur aux fins de retrait de l’acte d’accusation, 18 mars 1999. Cette adoption a eu lieu pour chacun des deux tribunaux pénaux internationaux. Pour le TPIR, l’amendement du RPP est intervenu le 6 juillet 2002, tandis que pour le TPIY il était intervenu dès le 12 novembre 1997. Il s’agit de “la stratégie envisagée pour la conclusion des travaux du Tribunal”. Elle est mise en place à la fois par le Greffe et par le Procureur, et certainement mais relativement par les Juges, pour permettre au Tribunal de mettre un terme à ses activités au 31 décembre 2008. On parle aussi de “exit strategy”. Cf. Septième Rapport Annuel (2002), §§ 21-23 ; Allocution de Carla Del Ponte au Conseil de sécurité le 27 novembre 2001 (GR/P.I.S./642-e), texte disponible sur le site du TPIY ; Allocution de Navanathem Pillay à la 57ème Session plénière de l’Assemblée générale (GA/10088, 28 Octobre 2002). Septième Rapport Annuel (2002), § 10. En effet l’obligation de coopérer pèse directement sur les Etats. Eventuellement les Etats pourraient ensuite, en fonction de leur droit interne mais aussi en application de leurs obligations internationales, obliger juridiquement les personnes sous leur juridiction à coopérer avec le Tribunal.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
509
(MINUAR) au moment des drames de 199450. Le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge est aussi intervenu à différentes reprises dans les affaires devant le TPIR, avec la limite que sa neutralité doit être respectée pour lui garantir des conditions propices à la poursuite de sa mission de service public international. Pareillement, le CICR a signé un accord avec le TPIR pour assurer un contrôle externe de son centre de détention à Arusha et garantir que les conditions de vie des détenus soient conformes aux normes internationales y relatives. A côté, la société civile joue aussi son rôle et participe à la procédure en apportant sa contribution aussi bien par le biais de l’amicus curiae51 que par les commentaires hors prétoire sur l’activité judiciaire. Toutefois, ce n’est qu’à l’égard des Etats membres des Nations Unies que le Tribunal dispose d’un moyen de pression avec l’article 7 bis du Règlement52 qui autorise le Président du Tribunal à en référer au Conseil de sécurité si les Chambres ou le Procureur constate qu’un Etat manque à ses obligations au titre de l’article 28 du Statut. Les Chambres peuvent aussi adopter “des ordonnances ou des requêtes contraignantes”53 pour les Etats, mais la Chambre d’appel du TPIY a nié que le Tribunal puisse adresser des injonctions à produire des documents (subpoena) comme la Chambre de première instance a pu le faire dans l’affaire Blaskic sur la requête du Procureur54. Toutefois, 50
51
52 53 54
Cf. Rapport 1999, § 116 ; Affaire Akayesu, Chambre de première instance I, Ordonnance autorisant une comparution en qualité d’amicus curiae du 12 février 1998. Voir aussi même affaire, Chambre de première instance I, Jugement du 2 septembre 1998, § 25. Au titre de l’amicus curiae, différentes ONG sont intervenues devant le TPIR, dont African Concern (Affaires Bagosora, Cyangugu et Musema, Rapport 1999, § 116) et l’Association pénale internationale des avocats de la défense (Affaire Akayesu, appel, Rapport 1999, § 116). Cet amendement du RPP n’a été adopté qu’en Juillet 1997. TPIY Rapport 1998, § 96. Affaire Blaskic (n°IT-95-14-PT), Ordonnance du 15 janvier 1997, du juge McDonald en tant que juge ayant confirmé l’acte d’accusation. Chambre de première instance II, Décision relative à l’injonction de produire, 18 juillet 1997. Chambre d’appel, Arrêt relatif à la requête de la République de la Croatie aux fins d’examen de la décision du 18 juillet 1997, 29 octobre 1997. La Chambre de première instance I s’est fondée sur cette décision de la Chambre d’appel pour rejeter une demande similaire d’assignation faite par Hassan Ngeze : Le Procureur c. Hassan Ngeze (ICTR-97-27), Décision relation à la requête de la Défense aux fins de la délivrance d’une assignation à produire les procès verbaux constatant les arrestations du Défendeur et copies d’archives judiciaires certifiées
510
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
ces moyens n’ont pas encore été utilisés, alors même que les occasions dans lesquelles le Tribunal aurait pu déployer toute sa puissance contre la souveraineté des Etats et le soutien parfois souterrain qu’ils apportent à l’inefficacité du Tribunal n’ont pas manqué.
LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DU DROIT A UN PROCES EQUITABLE Après avoir examiné dans la partie précédente les règles de procédure relatives à la coopération entre le TPIR et les Etats, nous allons maintenant nous pencher sur celles qui mettent en jeu les droits de l’accusé. Souvent perçus comme des droits fondamentaux de l’individu, ces derniers se heurtent néanmoins aux exigences d’une administration efficace de la justice et de la protection due aux témoins et victimes. Il convient donc de dépasser une vision exclusivement centrée sur les seuls droits subjectifs de l’accusé pour passer à une idée plus dynamique d’équilibre entre les différents acteurs du procès pénal, équilibre qui nous semble au cœur du désormais célèbre standard de “procès équitable”. Ce concept, qui trouve son origine dans les notions anglo-saxonnes de due process of law, fair hearing ou encore fair trial, et qui a été universalisé par le droit international des droits de l’homme, sert aujourd’hui couramment de référence pour encadrer les droits de la défense. Fort logiquement, on retrouve cette notion au cœur des statuts, des RPP et de la jurisprudence des deux tribunaux ad hoc55, qui avaient d’ailleurs dès leur création reçu pour consigne d’appliquer
55
conformes, 10 mai 2000. A propos de l’affaire Blaskic, voir P. MALANCZUK, “A Note on the Judgement of the Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia on the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum in the Blaskic Case”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 1 (1998), pp. 229-244; et J.A. CARRILLO-SALCEDO, “The Inherent Powers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to Issue ‘Subpoena Duces Tecum’ to a Sovereign State”, Mélanges en l’honneur de Nicolas Valticos: Droit et Justice, Paris, Pedone, 1999, pp. 269-280. Articles 19 et 20 du Statut du TPIR. L’article 20 reprend d’ailleurs l’article 14 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques de 1966. Se reporter également à l’article 89 du RPP.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
511
les standards les plus élevés en la matière56. Le TPIR a même contribué à consolider l’assise juridique du droit à un procès équitable en affirmant son caractère coutumier57. Afin de construire progressivement les fondations d’une procédure pénale internationale, les juges se sont donc largement appuyés sur cette notion de procès équitable et sur l’interprétation qui en avait été donnée par différents organes juridictionnels58, tant dans leurs décisions que dans les amendements successifs qu’ils ont apportés au RPP59. Il convient néanmoins de ne pas se méprendre sur ces références, qui ne signifient nullement que les juges des TPI ont importé à l’identique des recettes conçues dans et pour d’autres enceintes. Ils ont certes eu à cœur de façonner une procédure respectueuse des standards internationaux de protection des droits de l’homme, mais les règles qu’ils ont élaborées, et élaborent encore, n’en demeurent pas moins spécifiques aux tribunaux pénaux internationaux. Sur un plan strictement juridique, ils ne s’estiment d’ailleurs pas liés par l’interprétation que d’autres juridictions, même internationales, ont pu donner du droit de l’accusé à un procès 56
57 58
59
Voir A.-M. LA ROSA, “Réflexions sur l’apport du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie au droit à un procès équitable”, Revue générale de droit international public (RGDIP) (1997) 4, p. 946. Cette préoccupation a été plus récemment rappelée par le Président du TPIY et de la Chambre d’appel commune Claude Jorda in A. CASSESE et M. DELMAS-MARTY (dir), Crimes internationaux et juridictions internationales, Paris, PUF, 2002, p. 74. Arrêt Kayishema et Ruzindana, 1er juin 2001, § 51. Pour élaborer ce délicat édifice, ils ont été amenés à faire de fréquentes références aux instruments internationaux de protection des droits de l’homme et à la jurisprudence de leurs organes de contrôle. L’article 6 de la CEDH et la jurisprudence y relative arrivent largement en tête des citations, mais les juges effectuent aussi de fréquents renvois à la jurisprudence des tribunaux militaires internationaux de Nuremberg et de Tokyo, ainsi qu’à des décisions d’organes judiciaires nationaux et, dans une moindre mesure, à la jurisprudence de la CIJ (voir notamment sur ce point R. ADJOVI et G. DELLA MORTE, “la notion de procès équitable devant les Tribunaux Pénaux Internationaux”, in H. RUIZ FABRI (dir.), Procès équitable et enchevêtrement des espaces normatifs, Paris, Société française de législation comparée de Paris, à paraître en 2003). Ce sont les juges eux-mêmes qui, sur le fondement de l’article 14 du Statut du TPIR, procèdent à des amendements du RPP ; ils ont ainsi le pouvoir de déterminer eux-mêmes les règles de procédure auxquelles ils doivent se soumettre. Le RPP du TPIR a ainsi été amendé 11 fois entre son adoption en 1995 et Décembre 2002.
512
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
équitable60. Ils ont donc procédé à une interprétation autonome de cette notion générique, afin de l’adapter aux exigences du procès pénal international, où il faut tenir compte notamment du caractère particulièrement grave des crimes jugés, des difficultés liées à un cadre international dépourvu de police propre ou encore des nécessités d’une protection adéquate des témoins dans un contexte de paix précaire61. Ainsi les RPP, complétés par les précisions qu’apporte la très abondante jurisprudence des deux TPI en matière de procédure, peuvent désormais être analysés comme un véritable code de procédure pénale internationale, fruit de la combinaison des trois objectifs que sont la synthèse entre procédures accusatoire et inquisitoire, l’adaptation des règles de procédure au contexte particulier des TPI et enfin l’intégration des standards internationaux de protection des droits de l’homme62. Il convient de noter également l’absence de réelle spécificité des règles de procédure suivies devant le TPIR par rapport à celles appliquées par le TPIY. L’article 14 du Statut du TPIR prévoyait en effet que les juges adopteraient le RPP du TPIY “en y apportant les modifications qu’ils jugeront nécessaires”, et ils ont de fait repris intégralement sa structure lors de l’adoption du règlement le 5 juillet 1995. Les différences qui peuvent subsister entre les deux règlements sont pour l’essentiel mineures63, même si le règlement du 60
61
62
63
Voir par exemple, pour le TPIY, Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1-T), Décision relative à l’exception préjudicielle soulevée par le Procureur aux fins d’obtenir des mesures de protection pour les victimes et les témoins, 25 septembre 1995. Voir notamment, sur ce sujet, Antonio Cassese, ancien Président du TPIY, pour qui “devant les juridictions pénales internationales plus que devant toute autre juridiction, la notion de ‘procès équitable’, tout en étant essentiellement axée sur la protection des droits de l’accusé, doit être interprétée aussi dans le sens d’une protection des intérêts de la justice et de la communauté internationale, de même que des victimes et des témoins” (in M. DELMAS-MARTY, H. MUIR WATT, H. RUIZ FABRI (dir), Variations autour d’un droit commun – premières rencontres de l’UMR de droit comparé de Paris, Société de législation comparée de Paris, 2002, p. 244). Voir G. ABI-SAAB, “International Criminal Tribunals and the development of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law”, in Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, Kluwer, 1999, pp. 649-658. Certaines différences sont cependant loin d’être mineures. Ainsi de l’Article 65 B) du RPP du TPIR qui exige encore l’existence de “circonstances
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
513
TPIY est plus systématiquement modifié afin d’y inclure les apports des décisions les plus importantes64. La dernière modification du Règlement de procédure et de preuve du TPIR, en date du 6 juillet 2002, a néanmoins permis de combler une partie du retard, par l’inclusion de plusieurs dispositions qui, selon la version officielle, tendent “à garantir l’équité du procès, à accélérer le déroulement des procès en première instance et en appel et à faciliter l’exécution des poursuites par les juridictions nationales”65. En réalité, il n’y a rien de vraiment révolutionnaire. Sans prétendre nullement à l’exhaustivité, tant la matière est vaste et les décisions nombreuses, notre but sera ici de relever les principaux apports de la jurisprudence du TPIR sur plusieurs points essentiels du droit à un procès équitable, à savoir l’indépendance et l’impartialité du Tribunal et de ses agents (A), le droit à la présomption d’innocence (B), le principe de l’égalité des armes (C), la protection des témoins (D) et enfin le droit à être jugé dans un délai raisonnable (E).
64
65
exceptionnelles” pour que la Chambre de première instance puisse autoriser la mise en liberté provisoire, tandis que, dans le même alinéa de l’Article 65 du RPP du TPIY, cette exigence a été supprimée pour mieux faire coïncider la pratique du Tribunal ad hoc avec le droit international des droits de l’homme. La spécificité du TPIR à cet égard peut s’expliquer par le relatif manque de coopération dont il bénéficie de la part des Etats, et des accusés mêmes puisque aucun d’eux, à l’exception d’Omar Serushago, ne s’est rendu de son propre gré au Tribunal. Il faut préciser, s’agissant du cas Serushago, que celui-ci a largement coopéré avec le Tribunal, et a su ainsi bénéficier d’une certaine clémence à la fois du Procureur et de la Chambre de première instance. Toutefois, à notre connaissance, il n’a jamais demandé sa mise en liberté provisoire. Le fait que les textes du TPIR soient moins souvent amendés que ceux du TPIY, peut s’expliquer par la situation des juges : les sept juges de la Chambre d’appel résident à La Haye, tandis que les neuf des Chambres de première instance sont à Arusha, alors que l’Article 6 alinéa A exige, indirectement, un quorum de dix juges pour une session plénière. Toutefois, l’alinéa B du même article pourrait permettre aux juges de modifier le RPP sans se réunir en session plénière, mais il n’en a jamais été fait usage. Rapport 2002 § 16.
514
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
A. L’indépendance et l’impartialité du Tribunal et de ses agents Comme le rappelle la Chambre d’appel dans l’arrêt Kayishema et Ruzindana, il convient de ne pas confondre l’indépendance, que l’on apprécie objectivement et l’impartialité, fondée sur un critère subjectif. Ainsi, selon la Chambre, “en tant qu’organe judiciaire dont la compétence est définie par la Résolution 955 du Conseil de Sécurité, [le Tribunal] agit en toute indépendance par rapport aux organes des Nations Unies” (§ 55). Les arguments relatifs au défaut d’indépendance du TPIR ont été de toute façon très tôt rejetés, notamment dans l’affaire Kanyabashi66, qui constitue le pendant de l’arrêt Tadic de 1995 sur la question de la légalité de la création du TPIR. Cette jurisprudence constante ne décourage cependant pas les plaideurs, puisque l’argument de l’absence d’indépendance et d’impartialité du Tribunal a encore été présenté récemment par les conseils de Jean-Paul Akayesu devant la Chambre d’appel en 2001 (3ème motif d’appel). Les dispositions statutaires relatives aux juges, qu’ils soient permanents ou ad litem, sont énoncées aux articles 11 et 12 du Statut du TPIR : les juges doivent être “indépendants, ressortissants d’Etats différents” (art. 11) et être des “personnes de haute moralité, impartialité et intégrité possédant les qualifications requises, dans leurs pays respectifs, pour être nommés aux plus hautes fonctions judiciaires” (art. 12). Quant au Procureur, l’article 15 du Statut en fait un “organe distinct au sein du Tribunal international”, qui “agit en toute indépendance” et qui “ne sollicite ni ne reçoit d’instructions d’aucun gouvernement ni d’aucune autre source”.
66
Dans cette affaire, la défense avait plaidé l’absence d’impartialité et d’indépendance du TPIR en raison de sa création par le Conseil de sécurité. Elle avançait entre autres motifs que le tribunal n’avait pas été crée par la loi comme cela est exigé pour toute instance juridictionnelle et que l’obligation pour le Tribunal d’adresser un rapport annuel au Conseil de sécurité prouvait sa totale subordination à l’égard de son créateur. Tous ces motifs ont été rejetés par le TPIR dans la décision Kanyabashi du 18 juin 1997, qui s’est principalement référée à la décision Tadic de la chambre d’appel du TPIY de 1995. Cf. Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1-AR-72), arrêt relatif à l’appel de la défense concernant l’exception préjudicielle d’incompétence, 2 octobre 1995.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
515
Dans la droite ligne du TPIY, le TPIR considère que l’impartialité d’un juge ou d’une Chambre du Tribunal est présumée ; ce sera donc à l’accusé de démontrer sa partialité sur la base d’éléments de preuve solides et suffisants. Selon le Tribunal, d’un point de vue subjectif, le juge doit, pour remplir son obligation d’impartialité, être dépourvu de parti pris ou de préjugé et, d’un point de vue objectif, rien dans les circonstances ne doit être de nature à créer une apparence de partialité67. On retrouve la même appréciation de l’impartialité, selon un double critère objectif et subjectif, dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme68. B. Le droit à la présomption d’innocence Le droit à la présomption d’innocence est rappelé à l’article 20 du Statut, ce qui n’empêche pas le préambule de la résolution 955 d’affirmer que la mission du Tribunal est de juger des “personnes présumées responsables…” Néanmoins, dans l’arrêt Kayishema et Ruzindana (§§ 77-78), la Chambre d’appel a rejeté l’argument selon lequel cette expression était contraire au principe de la présomption d’innocence, sans toutefois véritablement argumenter sa décision. C’est surtout le régime de la détention provisoire devant le TPIR qui pose problème au regard du droit à la présomption d’innocence. Allant à l’encontre de la convergence de toutes les normes internationales et nationales en la matière, les Statuts et les RPP des 67
68
Sur cette base, la Chambre d’appel considère devoir s’inspirer des principes suivants pour interpréter et appliquer l’obligation d’impartialité énoncée dans le Statut : “A. Un juge n’est pas impartial si l’existence d’un parti pris réel est démontrée. B. Il existe une apparence de partialité inacceptable : i) si un juge est partie à l’affaire, s’il a un intérêt financier ou patrimonial dans son issue ou si sa décision peut promouvoir une cause dans laquelle il est engagé aux côtés de l’une des parties. Dans ces circonstances, le juge est automatiquement récusé de l’affaire ; ii) si les circonstances suscitent chez un observateur raisonnable et dûment informé une crainte légitime de partialité” : voir pour le TPIY Le Procureur c. Anto Furundzija (IT-95-17/1), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement, 10 décembre 1998, § 189 ; repris par le TPIR dans Arrêt Akayesu § 91 et Arrêt Kayishema et Ruzindana (§ 55). Voir J.-F. RENUCCI, Droit européen des droits de l’homme, 3ème éd., LGDJ, 2002, p 261.
516
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
deux Tribunaux ad hoc font de la détention la règle et de la liberté l’exception. Alors que la présomption d’innocence devrait faire peser la charge de la preuve de la nécessité de la détention sur le Procureur, c’est, dans le système des TPI, l’accusé qui doit prouver le bien fondé de sa liberté provisoire. Des raisons spécifiques aux TPI peuvent certes expliquer un tel régime dérogatoire : la crainte d’une noncomparution de l’accusé devant laquelle le Tribunal resterait impuissant en raison de l’absence de forces de police internationales, le risque d’agissements hostiles de l’accusé envers les témoins à charge… On peut néanmoins légitimement se poser la question du caractère proportionné de cette atteinte au droit à la présomption d’innocence. Les modes de preuve appliqués par les TPI sont également susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur le droit à la présomption d’innocence. Il semble néanmoins que la norme de preuve appliquée par le TPIR, celle de la preuve au-delà de tout doute raisonnable, permette un respect satisfaisant de ce principe.69 Enfin, la possibilité pour l’accusé de plaider coupable, élément caractéristique de la procédure pénale internationale issu de la common law, nous paraît présenter quelque relation indirecte avec le droit à la présomption d’innocence dans la mesure où il y met fin. Pour être valable, cette technique de justice négociée doit répondre à un certain nombre de critères que les juges d’Arusha ont puisé dans la jurisprudence du TPIY. Ils s’assurent que le plaidoyer de culpabilité est libre et volontaire, qu’il est fait en connaissance de cause, qu’il est sans équivoque et qu’il repose sur des faits propres à établir le crime et la participation de l’accusé à sa commission, compte tenu soit d’indices indépendants, soit de l’absence de tout désaccord fondamental entre les parties sur les faits de la cause70. Ces critères ont depuis lors été intégrés dans l’article 62 du RPP.
69 70
Arrêt Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 319. Voir arrêt Kambanda §§ 61, 75, 84, qui reprend l’arrêt Erdemovic du TPIY (Le Procureur c. Drazen Erdemovic (IT-96-22-A), Arrêt, Chambre d’appel, 7 octobre 1997).
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
517
C. L’équilibre entre l’accusation et la défense à travers le principe de l’égalité des armes Pour les deux TPI, le principe de l’égalité des armes entre accusation et défense fait partie intégrante des garanties du procès équitable71. Plutôt que de procéder à un tour d’horizon général, nous aborderons trois problèmes qui se sont posés avec une particulière acuité devant le TPIR : la commission d’office (1), l’inégalité matérielle des armes (2) et enfin la mise en œuvre du principe du contradictoire (3), qui constitue un sous-ensemble de la notion d’égalité des armes. 1. La commission d’office et les droits de la défense Devant le TPIR, la totalité des avocats sont commis d’office, les accusés ayant été considérés comme ne disposant pas des ressources nécessaires pour assurer leur défense. Cette commission d’office systématique implique une mise en œuvre spécifique des droits de la défense qui n’a pas manqué de soulever certaines difficultés. La question du choix du conseil commis d’office s’est notamment posée de façon cruciale dans les premiers temps de fonctionnement du Tribunal. Tandis que les accusés souhaitaient choisir des avocats canadiens, belges ou français, le Greffe mettait en avant un principe de répartition géographique censé s’opposer à la monopolisation de la Défense par un petit groupe d’avocats, principalement belges et canadiens72. Pourtant, l’article 45 du RPP relatif à la commission d’office ne prévoit aucun principe de répartition géographique. Mais le Greffe estimait pouvoir s’appuyer sur une décision de la Chambre de première instance I du 13 mars 1998 qui précisait que devaient être pris en compte les souhaits de l’accusé, ceux du Conseil, la compétence et l’expérience de ce dernier, les ressources du Tribunal, mais aussi la nécessité d’une répartition géographique et d’une
71
72
Le TPIY l’a notamment affirmé dans l’arrêt Tadic (Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1-A), Arrêt, 15 juillet 1999, § 44) en se référant à des décisions du Comité des droits de l’homme et de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Voir ICTR/INFO-9-004, 26 octobre 1998.
518
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
représentation des principaux systèmes juridiques mondiaux73. Il en résulta une grave crise, qui vit Jean-Paul Akayesu puis d’autres détenus mener une grève de la faim, au motif que le Greffe cherchait à leur imposer des avocats incompétents74. Bien qu’il s’agisse d’un principe inhérent au système onusien, le principe de répartition géographique nous apparaît manquer de pertinence pour l’attribution des avocats de la défense. A notre sens, il convient surtout de s’assurer que le Conseil puisse assurer valablement la défense de l’accusé avec le consentement et la coopération de celui-ci. Or, il se trouve que le français est la langue principalement utilisée par les élites rwandaises, ce qui plaide objectivement en faveur du choix d’avocats francophones. Néanmoins, comme l’a rappelé la Chambre d’appel dans l’arrêt Akayesu, “en principe, le droit à l’assistance gratuite d’un avocat ne confère pas le droit de choisir celui-ci”75. La commission d’un conseil à un accusé indigent est donc effectuée par le Greffier à partir d’une liste de conseils disponibles, qu’il considère qualifiés en fonction des critères officiels du Tribunal. Mais la Chambre d’appel ajoute aussi qu’“en pratique, l’accusé indigent a la possibilité de choisir parmi les avocats figurant sur la liste et le Greffier prend généralement en considération le choix de l’accusé”, même si “le Greffier n’est pas forcément lié par les voeux de l’accusé indigent et a un large pouvoir d’appréciation, qu’il exerce dans l’intérêt de la justice”76. Si sa liberté de choisir de son Conseil est limitée, l’accusé 73
74
75
76
The Prosecutor v. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko and Arsene Shalom Ntahobali (ICTR-97-21), 13 March 1998, Decision on a Preliminary Motion by the Defense for assignment of a co-counsel to Pauline Nyiramasuhuko. En fait, il apparaît, à l’analyse de la pratique des accusés en matière de choix d’avocats, que ce sont les avocats d’Afrique qu’ils écartent le plus souvent. Il y a comme une suspicion, peut-être pas d’incompétence, mais au moins de subjectivité politique dans l’appréhension de la crise rwandaise. En tout cas, il faut espérer qu’il n’y a pas d’autres raisons inavouables à une telle pratique qui ne saurait être comprise en l’absence de justification précise, dans la mesure où les accusés ont, relativement, la liberté de choisir trois avocats parmi lesquels le Greffier nomme ensuite celui qui les défendra. Arrêt Akayesu, § 61, la chambre d’appel renvoie à l’arrêt Kambanda, qui se fonde sur “une interprétation textuelle et systématique des dispositions du Statut et du règlement, lues en parallèle avec les décisions pertinentes du Comité des Droits de l’Homme et les organes de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme”. Arrêt Akayesu, § 62.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
519
indigent possède en revanche un droit à être représenté par un avocat compétent, qui trouve notamment sa source dans les articles 14 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et politiques, 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et 8 de la Convention inter-américaine. La compétence du conseil commis d’office est néanmoins présumée ; c’est donc à l’accusé de renverser cette présomption, en rapportant la preuve d’une faute professionnelle grave susceptible de faire naître un doute raisonnable quant à la possibilité d’une erreur judiciaire77. Enfin, dans le but de freiner les requêtes fantaisistes et les abus de procédure, les juges utilisent depuis peu la technique du non-paiement des honoraires dus aux conseils commis d’office par le Tribunal78. Ce moyen de pression, qui ne s’exerce par définition que sur les avocats commis d’office, nous apparaît susceptible, s’il n’est pas appliqué avec discernement, de porter atteinte aux droits de la défense. 2. L’inégalité matérielle des armes entre l’accusation et la défense Il est évident que les avocats de la Défense, surtout lorsqu’ils sont commis d’office, ne disposent pas des mêmes moyens matériels d’enquête que l’Accusation. De plus, dans le cas du TPIR, les conseils de la défense peuvent être confrontés à de réelles difficultés matérielles pour enquêter au Rwanda, d’abord parce qu’une situation d’insécurité générale règne toujours en dehors des grands centres urbains, ensuite parce qu’aux yeux des autorités rwandaises, l’implication des personnes jugées à Arusha dans le génocide ne fait pas l’ombre d’un doute. En conséquence, il est souvent difficile pour les avocats de la défense d’entrer au Rwanda, et encore plus de garantir leur sécurité ou d’obtenir la collaboration des autorités 77 78
Arrêt Akayesu, §§ 76 et 77. Il a été fait application de ce principe dans une décision rendue le 1er février 2002 : Barayagwiza c. Le Procureur (ICTR-99-52-A), Décision de la chambre d’appel du 1er février 2002 sur l’appel interlocutoire contre la décision orale de la chambre de première instance I rendue le 27 août 2001, ainsi que dans une décision rendue sur une requête similaire de la Défense déposée le 19 juillet 2002 et rejetée le 3 septembre 2002 : The Prosecutor v. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, Decision on the Defence’s motion for provisional release of JeanBosco Barayagwiza.
520
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
locales. Le problème se résout parfois par une collaboration de fait qui s’instaure entre les avocats et le bureau du Procureur à Kigali ; les conseils de Musema et de Bagilishema ont ainsi pu obtenir des autorisations pour entrer sur le territoire rwandais, être accompagnés sur place par les services du Procureur et bénéficier d’escortes militaires. Mais d’autres conseils hésitent à s’engager dans cette collaboration car ils ne souhaitent pas que leur stratégie de défense soit connue à l’avance par le Procureur79. Ce problème de l’inégalité matérielle des armes a notamment été soulevé par les conseils de Clément Kayishema et d’Obed Ruzindana devant la Chambre d’appel du TPIR. Ils ont demandé des informations sur les moyens matériels d’enquête dont disposait l’Accusation – nombre de juristes, d’enquêteurs, temps consacré à l’affaire – afin de pouvoir en exiger la limitation, au nom du principe de l’égalité des armes, au niveau de ceux de la Défense. Mais, pour les juges d’appel, “l’égalité des armes entre la Défense et l’Accusation ne signifie pas nécessairement l’égalité matérielle” et “le simple fait de ne pas pouvoir se rendre au Rwanda, n’est pas suffisant pour établir l’existence d’une inégalité des armes entre le Procureur et la Défense”80. Le principe d’égalité des armes consiste donc plutôt en une égalité de droits qu’en une égalité des méthodes et des ressources. 3. La communication des moyens de preuve et le respect du caractère contradictoire de la procédure. Le droit au caractère contradictoire de la procédure constitue sans conteste la clef de voûte du principe d’égalité des armes. Il implique, pour l’accusation comme pour la défense, la faculté de prendre connaissance des observations ou éléments de preuve produits par l’autre partie et de les discuter. Dans le système des TPI, le Procureur concentre entre ses mains les fonctions de poursuite et d’instruction, mais possède aussi certaines obligations à l’égard de la défense. Le Procureur doit ainsi, selon l’article 66 A) du RPP, communiquer de 79
80
Voir M.M. NIANG, “Les obligations du Procureur face à la défense devant le Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda”, Rev.sc.crim., avril-juin 2001, pp. 287 et 288. Arrêt Kayishema et Ruzindana, §§ 67-74.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
521
plein droit les pièces qui servent de support à la poursuite. L’article 66 B) lui impose également de communiquer des pièces spécifiques, dont la liste est fixée par ce même article, à condition que la Défense en fasse la demande. Par ailleurs, aux termes de l’article 68 du RPP, le Procureur ne doit pas instruire exclusivement à charge et doit informer la défense de l’existence d’éléments de preuve à décharge. Ces dispositions ont néanmoins posé plusieurs problèmes d’interprétation, et les réponses des juges sont parfois contradictoires. En particulier, pour l’article 66 B), le problème s’est posé de savoir comment la défense pouvait réclamer l’examen de ces pièces si elle n’avait pas été préalablement informée de leur existence. Dans une décision du 8 juin 200081, la requête de la défense a été rejetée au motif qu’elle n’avait pas prouvé que ces pièces étaient entre les mains du Procureur ou même existaient. Au contraire, dans une décision du 26 juin 200082, la Chambre a invité le Procureur à préciser ce qu’il avait et ce qu’il n’avait pas parmi les pièces réclamées, solution qui semble plus satisfaisante, même si elle ne résout pas l’hypothèse d’une rétention d’informations de la part du Procureur. De même, l’interprétation de l’article 68 s’est révélée délicate. Selon la lettre de cet article, le Procureur “informe” la défense de l’existence de moyens de preuve à décharge dont il “a connaissance”. Si l’on interprète restrictivement le texte, on peut donc estimer que le Procureur n’a aucune obligation de recherche active, et qu’il n’est pas non plus tenu de communiquer l’intégralité du contenu des pièces dont il a connaissance. Dans une décision du 8 juin 200083, la Chambre a donné au verbe “informer” le sens de “communiquer”, faisant ainsi obligation au Procureur de communiquer l’intégralité des preuve à décharge dont il dispose. En revanche, la Chambre interprète 81 82 83
Le Procureur c. Gratien Kabiligi et Aloys Ntabakuze (ICTR-97-34), décisions des 1er et 8 juin 2000. Le Procureur contre André Ntagerura (ICTR-96-10), décision du 26 juin 2000. Pour les décisions des Chambres de première instance, voir par exemple, dans l’affaire Bagilishema, la Décision relative à la requête de la Défense aux fins d’une ordonnance portant communication du mémorandum des Nations Unies préparé par Michael Hourigan, ancien enquêteur du TPIR, 8 juin 2000 (Chambre de première instance I). Pour la Chambre d’appel, voir : Clément Kayishema c. le Procureur, Arrêt (requête aux fins de communication du mémorandum des Nations Unies établi par M. Hourigan sur le génocide rwandais de 1994), 27 juillet 2000.
522
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
restrictivement l’expression “informations dont il a connaissance”, en la limitant aux seules informations que le Procureur possède effectivement. Par ailleurs, on peut souligner un certain idéalisme de l’article 68 : lorsque le Procureur est au courant d’informations de nature à disculper totalement l’accusé, il devrait en toute logique aider la Défense à obtenir l’acquittement. Mais, comme le montre l’affaire Rusatira84, il semble préférer retirer son acte d’accusation, ce qui a pour conséquence de laisser subsister un doute sur la culpabilité de l’accusé, et d’offrir une possibilité de reprise des poursuites devant le TPIR ou une autre juridiction. Enfin, il faut préciser les limitations auxquelles sont soumises toutes les communications de pièces au profit de la Défense. L’article 66 C) du RPP prévoit ainsi que la Chambre de première instance peut dispenser le Procureur des obligations de communication qui lui sont fixées par les articles 66 A) et B) s’il s’avère que cette communication risque de nuire à de nouvelles enquêtes ou à des enquêtes en cours. L’article 53 du RPP permet également à un juge d’ordonner la non-divulgation d’un acte d’accusation, mais aussi de tout document ou information “dans des circonstances exceptionnelles” et “dans l’intérêt de la justice”. De même, l’article 70 du RPP, qui dispose que “les rapports, mémoires ou autres documents internes établis par une partie, ses assistants ou ses représentants dans le cadre de l’enquête ou de la préparation du dossier n’ont pas à être communiqués ou échangés”,
permet de faire exception aux articles 66 et 67. La question se pose notamment de savoir si l’article 70, qui ne fait expressément exception qu’aux articles 66 et 67, peut aussi faire obstacle à la communication en vertu de l’article 68 d’éléments de preuve à décharge contenus dans un document interne.
84
Le Procureur c. Léonidas Rusatira (ICTR-2002-80), Décision du Président, 14 août 2002.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
523
D. L’équilibre entre les droits de la défense et la protection des témoins Les mesures de protection des témoins, dont le principe est prévu à l’article 21 du Statut du TPIR, ont nécessairement des répercussions sur les droits de l’accusé, et notamment sur son droit au contreinterrogatoire des témoins à charge. Elles se justifient certes par le contexte particulier dans lequel évoluent les TPI, mais ne doivent pas pour autant conduire à restreindre inconsidérément les droits de la Défense. Il convient donc de trouver un juste équilibre entre ces deux exigences. Le problème de la divulgation de l’identité des témoins à l’accusé fournit un exemple de la recherche de ce délicat équilibre. En principe, le droit de l’accusé à un procès équitable exige que soit levé en sa faveur le voile de l’anonymat. La Chambre de première instance pourra néanmoins ordonner la non-divulgation, mais dans les limites de l’article 69 C), qui prescrit que l’identité des victimes et des témoins soit communiquée à l’accusé avant le commencement du procès, dans des délais lui permettant une bonne préparation de sa défense. Ce délai est habituellement de 21 jours avant la déposition du témoin ou à partir de sa mise sous la protection du Tribunal85. La protection des droits de la défense passe aussi par la sanction du faux-témoignage, infraction prévue à l’article 91 du RPP. Le TPIR l’a défini dans une décision relative à l’affaire Akayesu du 9 mars 199886. Brièvement, on peut dire qu’il s’agit d’une infraction délibérée qui requiert de la part de son auteur une intention de tromper le juge, ce qui permet de la distinguer du témoignage souffrant d’un manque de crédibilité87. La charge de la preuve incombe à la partie qui l’invoque.
85 86
87
Voir Prosecutor v. Bagambiki and Imanishimwe (ICTR-97-36), Decision on motion for protective measures for witnesses, 7 septembre 2000. Le Procureur c. Jean-Paul Akayesu (ICTR-96-4), Décision faisant suite à la requête de la Défense aux fins de demandes au Procureur d’entreprendre une enquête pour faux-témoignage relative au témoin R. Des précisions ont également été apportées dans l’affaire Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), 8 juin 1998, Decision on Appeals against the Decisions by Trial Chamber I Rejecting the Defense Motions to Direct the Prosecutor to Investigate the Matter of False Testimony by Witnesses E and CC. Jugement Musema, §§ 98-99.
524
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
E. Le droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable Ce droit constitue un élément central du droit à un procès équitable. Or l’allongement des délais de procédure devant le TPIR prend aujourd’hui des dimensions inquiétantes, d’autant plus que, par un effet de ricochet, il entraîne parallèlement une prolongation de la détention provisoire, dont on a vu qu’elle constituait généralement la règle devant les TPI. Ce sont ainsi deux sources potentielles de violation des droits de l’accusé qui se combinent. Même si, paradoxalement, la durée excessive du procès découle pour une large part de la volonté des juges d’appliquer rigoureusement les autres normes qui régissent le droit à un procès équitable, il n’en demeure pas moins que des solutions efficaces doivent être trouvées pour assurer le respect de ce droit fondamental. Des réformes ont déjà été entreprises dans ce sens, comme le fait que chacune des trois Chambres de première instance conduise désormais trois procès distincts simultanément. Mais, comme le soulignait la Présidente du TPIR, la juge Pillay, dans le Septième Rapport Annuel88, des réformes de structure plus importantes s’imposent. La décision de créer, de la même manière qu’au TPIY, un pool de juges ad litem chargés de procéder à l’ouverture des procès des prisonniers en attente de jugement, constitue à cet égard un premier élément de réponse89. Cette question du délai excessif de la procédure trouve une illustration dans la tristement célèbre affaire Barayagwiza, qui a défrayé la chronique du TPIR. Arrêté et mis en détention au Cameroun à la demande du Procureur en avril 1996, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza n’est transféré à Arusha qu’en novembre 199790 et doit encore attendre près de trois mois avant sa première comparution. Le lendemain de cette première comparution, le 24 février 1998, il dépose une demande visant à faire annuler son arrestation et sa détention, qui ne sera rejetée que le
88 89 90
Rapport 2002 § 21. Résolution 1431, adoptée par le Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies le 14 août 2002. Entre temps, le Procureur avait renoncé aux poursuites avant de se raviser à la suite du rejet par le Cameroun de la demande d’extradition rwandaise.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
525
17 novembre 199891. L’accusé devra encore par la suite attendre un an la décision de la Chambre d’appel qui, le 3 novembre 199992, constatant une violation importante des droits de l’accusé, annule les charges retenues contre Barayagwiza, ordonne sa libération immédiate et interdit au Procureur d’exercer de nouvelles poursuites pour les mêmes faits. Si le constat de violation des droits de la défense n’est guère surprenant, les conséquences de la violation le sont davantage93. Toujours est-il que cette décision plonge le TPIR dans une crise sans précédent : le gouvernement rwandais décide de suspendre sa coopération avec le Tribunal ; le Cameroun, sollicité pour accueillir Barayagwiza, refuse. Quant à sa libération, la seule solution cohérente au regard de la décision du 3 novembre 1999, elle équivaudrait à une livraison de facto au Rwanda qui l’exposerait à la peine de mort94. La seule solution pour sortir de cette impasse sera le dépôt, par le Procureur, d’une requête en révision de l’arrêt de 1999, déposée le 3 décembre 1999, ce qui présente l’avantage d’offrir une justification au maintien en détention. Et, au prix d’une interprétation très souple des conditions de révision95, la Chambre d’appel décide, dans un arrêt
91
92 93
94 95
The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza (ICTR-97-19), Trial Chamber II, Decision on the extremely urgent motion by the Defence for order to review and/or nullify the arrest and provisional detention of the suspect, 17 novembre 1998. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza c. Le Procureur (ICTR-97-19-AR72), Chambre d’appel, Décision, 3 novembre 1999. La Chambre d’appel étant présidée à l’époque par le juge Mac Donald, et faute de dispositions pertinentes dans le RPP, Rafaëlle Maison et Hervé Ascencio y ont vu, à juste titre nous semble-t-il, l’influence directe des principes du procès pénal anglo-saxon. Voir A.F.D.I. (1999), p 479. Le principe non bis in idem ne pouvait en effet pas s’appliquer dans la mesure où Barayagwiza n’avait pas été jugé au fond. La Chambre d’appel s’appuie sur des faits nouveaux, inconnus lors de la première décision d’appel, et qui rendent la violation des droits fondamentaux de l’accusé sans commune mesure avec celle constatée dans le premier arrêt d’appel. Néanmoins, les faits en question ne sont pas à proprement parler “nouveaux” et il semble qu’ils auraient pu être connus et utilisés par le Procureur lors du premier arrêt d’appel. Or, l’article 120 du RPP du TPIY définit un fait nouveau comme un fait qui “n’était pas connu de la partie intéressée (…) ou dont la découverte n’avait pu intervenir malgré toutes les diligences effectuées”… On peut donc parler d’interprétation pour le moins souple des conditions de révision, ce qui n’est généralement pas le cas en matière pénale.
526
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
en date du 31 mars 200096, que la remise en liberté pure et simple et l’abandon des poursuites ne saurait être une conséquence de la violation du droit à un procès équitable, eu égard à la gravité des crimes reprochés à l’accusé et à l’intérêt des victimes. Après avoir failli s’arrêter définitivement, le procès de Barayagwiza reprend actuellement son cours devant le TPIR, dans le cadre plus large du procès des médias. Récemment, les conseils de l’accusé ont encore soumis des requêtes en libération de leur client, invoquant le fait qu’une détention de plus de 6 ans était en soi contraire au droit international des droits de l’homme, mais elles ont été rejetées97. Le principal enseignement juridique de l’arrêt en révision du 31 mars 2000 concerne d’ailleurs les conséquences d’une violation du droit à un procès équitable. La Chambre d’appel a substitué à la libération de l’accusé une réparation moins radicale, qui peut prendre la forme d’une compensation financière s’il est acquitté ou d’une réduction de la sentence s’il est jugé coupable98.
96 97
98
Le Procureur c. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza (ICTR-97-19-AR72), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt (demande du Procureur en révision ou réexamen), 31 mars 2000. Barayagwiza c. Le Procureur (ICTR-99-52-A), Décision de la Chambre d’appel du 1er février 2002 sur l’appel interlocutoire contre la décision orale de la chambre de première instance I rendue le 27 août 2001 ; The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Decision on the Defence’s motion for provisional release of JeanBosco Barayagwiza, 3 septembre 2002. La Chambre d’appel a suivi la même voie dans une décision relative à l’affaire Semanza (ICTR-97-20) du 31 mai 2000 où elle conclut à une violation du droit à être informé sans délai de la nature des accusations portées contre lui et du droit de contester la légalité de sa détention (§§ 127-128), et précise que la réparation consistera soit en une réparation financière, soit en une réduction de peine.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
527
LA RESPONSABILITE PENALE INDIVIDUELLE Le régime de responsabilité pénale individuelle est fixé à l’article 6 du Statut du TPIR99. Après avoir examiné la portée du deuxième paragraphe, selon lequel l’engagement de la responsabilité pénale individuelle ne dépend pas de la qualité officielle de l’accusé (A), nous envisagerons les différentes formes de participation criminelles prévues par les paragraphes 1 et 3 (B). A. Une responsabilité indépendante de la qualité officielle de l’auteur Selon l’article 6§2 du Statut, tout individu peut voir sa responsabilité pénale engagée devant le TPIR, quelle que soit sa qualité officielle. Le Tribunal est donc susceptible de juger les plus hauts responsables civils ou militaires comme les exécutants, même si la politique pénale du Procureur tend à se resserrer autour des premiers (1). Par ailleurs, un problème spécifique a été soulevé par les Chambres de première instance du TPIR, celui de la limitation de la responsabilité en matière de crimes de guerre aux seuls agents publics (2).
99
“1. Quiconque a planifié, incité à commettre, ordonné, commis ou de toute autre manière aidé et encouragé à planifier, préparer ou exécuter un crime visé aux articles 2 à 4 du présent statut est individuellement responsable dudit crime. 2. La qualité officielle d’un accusé, soit comme chef d’Etat ou de gouvernement, soit comme haut fonctionnaire, ne l’exonère pas de sa responsabilité pénale et n’est pas un motif de diminution de la peine. 3. Le fait que l’un quelconque des actes visés aux articles 2 à 4 du présent statut a été commis par un subordonné ne dégage pas son supérieur de sa responsabilité pénale s’il savait ou avait des raisons de savoir que le subordonné s’apprêtait à commettre cet acte ou l’avait fait et que le supérieur n’a pas pris les mesures nécessaires et raisonnables pour empêcher que ledit acte ne soit commis ou en punir les auteurs. 4. Le fait qu’un accusé a agi en exécution d’un ordre d’un gouvernement ou d’un supérieur ne l’exonère pas de sa responsabilité pénale mais peut être considéré comme un motif de diminution de la peine si le Tribunal international pour le Rwanda l’estime conforme à la justice”.
528
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
1. L’orientation de la politique pénale vers les plus hauts responsables Les Statuts des deux TPI se réfèrent de manière générale aux “personnes présumées responsables de violations graves du droit international humanitaire” et n’établissent pas de seuil de responsabilité, à la différence d’autres textes, tel l’Accord de Londres établissant le TMI qui visait les “grands criminels de guerre” ou encore le Statut du Tribunal pénal spécial pour la Sierra Leone qui restreint quant à lui sa compétence aux individus portant la responsabilité la plus lourde100. La limitation de la compétence des TPI aux plus hauts responsables relève donc exclusivement de la politique pénale déterminée par le seul Bureau du Procureur. L’objectif des TPI a toujours été de toucher les têtes de l’action criminelle. Néanmoins, dans les premières années de fonctionnement des tribunaux, le Procureur Richard Goldstone, constatant qu’il était difficile d’établir la responsabilité des plus hauts dirigeants, a déployé une stratégie qui consistait à remonter aux “gros poissons” par les “petits”, avec à la clef une multiplication des actes d’accusation, particulièrement devant le TPIY. Cette tendance a depuis fait long feu101, et la politique pénale a été revue, notamment en raison de la pression exercée par le Conseil de sécurité afin que le mandat des deux tribunaux soit achevé au plus tard en 2008. Cette volonté s’explique par des raisons financières, mais aussi par la difficulté croissante d’obtenir des témoignages crédibles avec le temps qui s’écoule et par l’impossibilité de justifier 100 101
S/RES/1315 (2000) du 14 août 2000. Voir le site officiel du Tribunal (http://www.sc-sl.org). On retrouve les traces de cette évolution de la politique criminelle dans la jurisprudence du TPIY. En 1996, la Chambre du TPIY considérait “[...] que la responsabilité à titre individuel de l’accusé se fonde sur les articles 1 et 7.1 du Statut, qui donnent pleinement compétence à ce Tribunal pour juger non seulement – ainsi que le soutien le conseil de l’accusé – de ‘grands criminels’ comme à Nuremberg, mais encore des exécutants” (Affaire Erdemovic (IT-96-22), Jugement portant condamnation, 29 novembre 1996, § 83). Deux ans plus tard, les juges du même Tribunal affichent une conscience explicite de “[...] la nouvelle politique, consistant à poursuivre les enquêtes et à maintenir l’acte d’accusation uniquement pour les personnes dont la fonction, militaire ou politique, leur confère une autorité” (Affaire Celebici (IT-96-21), Jugement, 16 novembre 1998, § 1280).
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
529
la mission de rétablissement de la paix de ces tribunaux s’ils rendent leurs décisions trop tardivement. Pour l’instant, les jugements rendus par le TPIR confirment cette stratégie du Procureur102. 2. La limitation de la responsabilité pour crimes de guerre aux seuls agents publics Les Chambres de première instance du TPIR ont en effet tenté d’élaborer une définition précise des auteurs qui pourraient être tenus responsables de violations graves de l’article 3 commun ou du Protocole II visées à l’article 4 du Statut. Selon elles, cet article ne s’appliquerait qu’ “aux individus de tous rangs qui appartiennent aux forces armées sous le commandement militaire de l’une ou l’autre partie belligérante, ou aux individus qui ont été dûment mandatés et qui sont censés soutenir ou mettre en œuvre les efforts de guerre du fait de leur qualité de responsables ou d’agents de l’Etat ou de personnes occupant un poste de responsabilité ou de représentants de facto du Gouvernement.”103
Autrement dit, les civils ne pourraient voir leur responsabilité engagée que s’ils étaient agents publics de facto ou de jure et s’il était démontré qu’à ce titre, ils soutenaient effectivement l’effort de guerre104.
102
103 104
Les personnes jugées occupaient en effet une position sociale élevée, qu’ils fussent industriels, commerçants ou hommes d’affaire (Musema et Ruzindana), chefs des interahamwe (Serushago et Rutaganda), bourgmestres (Akayesu et Bagilishema), préfet (Kayishema) ou Premier Ministre (Kambanda). En conséquence, les juges d’Arusha n’ont pas eu à se prononcer sur le problème du fait justificatif tiré de l’obéissance aux ordres d’un gouvernement ou d’un supérieur, envisagé par l’article 6§4 du statut. Jugement Akayesu, § 631, Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, §§ 175 et ss. ; Jugement Rutaganda, § 81 ; Jugement Musema, § 266. Ainsi, dans le cas d’Akayesu, qui était bourgmestre, la Chambre de première instance I estime (§ 642) que “La preuve relative au port d’un treillis militaire et d’un fusil n’est pas […] de nature suffisante pour démontrer qu’Akayesu a activement soutenu l’effort de guerre. Au surplus, la Chambre estime que l’assistance limitée que l’accusé a prêtée aux militaires en sa qualité de responsable de la commune ne suffit pas à établir qu’il a activement soutenu l’effort de guerre.” Pour Kayishema et Ruzindana, voir Jugement § 619.
530
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Cette approche a été censurée par la Chambre d’appel dans l’arrêt Akayesu. Selon elle, l’objet et le but de l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 commandent qu’on ne fasse pas du rapport particulier entre l’auteur des infractions et une partie au conflit une condition autonome de mise en œuvre de la responsabilité pénale pour une violation de l’article 4 du Statut105. Ainsi, “la Chambre de première instance a commis une erreur sur un point de droit en limitant l’application de l’article 3 commun à une certaine catégorie de personnes”106, ce qui ne l’empêche pas de rappeler que le lien étroit entre les violations commises et le conflit armé requis par l’article 3 commun “implique que, dans la plupart des cas, l’auteur du crime entretiendra probablement un rapport particulier avec une partie au conflit”107. La Chambre d’appel rejette donc le critère dit de l’agent public employé par les Chambres de première instance. Elle s’inscrit ainsi dans la droite ligne de la jurisprudence des différents tribunaux militaires nationaux qui avaient eu à connaître, parallèlement au TMI, des atrocités de la seconde guerre mondiale et qui avaient déjà rejeté la limitation de la responsabilité pénale pour crimes de guerre aux seuls membres des forces armées et agents publics108. Cette interprétation nous semble conforme au Statut du TPIR ; elle se situe d’autre part dans la droite ligne d’une tendance qui se dégage tant des jurisprudences nationales que de celle du TPIY, et selon laquelle quiconque, quelle que soit sa qualité ou fonction, est susceptible d’être condamné pour un crime de guerre109. 105 106 107 108
109
Arrêt Akayesu, § 444. Arrêt Akayesu, § 445. Arrêt Akayesu, § 444. Par exemple, dans l’affaire du lynchage d’Essen, trois civils ont été condamnés pour le meurtre de prisonniers de guerre non armés : Cour militaire britannique, Essen, Erich Heyer et six autres, L.R.T.W.C. vol. I, pp. 88-92. Une dizaine d’autres procès ont vu des personnes privées condamnées pour des faits de fourniture de poisons pour le meurtre de civils alliés, de réduction en esclavage et de déportation pour travail forcé, de prostitution forcée, de vol et de recel de biens volés, d’appartenance à une organisation criminelle ou encore de pillage et de spoliation de propriétés publiques et privées : pour la référence de ces affaires, voir H. ASCENCIO, E. DECAUX, A. PELLET (dir.), Droit international pénal, Paris, Pedone, 2000, p. 230. Voir Le Procureur c. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac et Zoran Vukovic (IT-96-23) et (IT-96-23/1), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement,
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
531
B. Les différentes formes de participation criminelle 1. Les formes de participation classiques (article 6§1) Outre la commission effective du crime, l’article 6§1 prévoit cinq formes de participation à l’infraction qui engagent la responsabilité pénale individuelle de leur auteur : la planification, l’incitation, l’ordre, l’aide et l’encouragement. Toutes ces formes de participation criminelle nécessitent, pour que leur auteur soit reconnu coupable, de prouver la commission effective du crime110, ainsi que l’intention criminelle ou mens rea de l’accusé. Ce dernier doit en effet avoir été pleinement conscient qu’il participait à la réalisation de l’infraction111. Le tableau se complique néanmoins en matière de génocide, crime pour lequel il convient de croiser les principes généraux de l’article 6§1 avec le régime particulier des infractions de l’article 2§3 du Statut112. Certaines de ces infractions peuvent en effet être qualifiées de “formelles” ou “autonomes” car elles peuvent être réprimées “indépendamment de la réalisation effective du crime envisagé”113. C’est le cas de l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide, de l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide et de la tentative de génocide114, mais pas de la complicité de génocide, que l’on pourrait qualifier d’infraction “conditionnelle” car elle n’existe qu’à partir de l’existence d’un fait punissable, auquel le complice est venu s’associer115. En revanche, contrairement aux autres infractions de l’article 2§3, la complicité de génocide ne nécessite pas de rapporter la preuve que l’accusé est animé du dol spécial du génocide. La superposition des dispositions des articles 6§1 et 2§3
110 111 112 113 114 115
22 février 2001, §§ 490-493 ; confirmé en appel : Chambre d’Appel, Arrêt, 12 Juin 2002, § 147-148. Jugement Musema, § 115 ; Jugement Akayesu, § 473. Jugement Akayesu, § 479. Voir infra la partie relative au crime de génocide. Jugement Musema, § 115 ; Jugement Akayesu, § 559. Cette dernière ne pourra d’ailleurs être constituée que si la réalisation du crime a échoué. Jugement Akayesu, § 526.
532
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
confère donc un caractère particulièrement complexe au régime de responsabilité pénale individuelle pour génocide devant le TPIR. On peut d’ailleurs douter de sa pertinence, et constater que le Statut de la CPI a pour sa part fait le choix d’appliquer au crime de génocide les principes généraux de responsabilité pénale prévus à l’article 25 du Traité de Rome. La question de la relation entre l’incitation à commettre un crime prévue à l’article 6§1 et l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide de l’article 2§3 s’est d’ailleurs posée devant la Chambre d’appel dans l’affaire Akayesu où la défense avait estimé, à l’instar de la Chambre de première instance I dans les jugements Akayesu et Musema116, que l’incitation à commettre le génocide ne pouvait être que directe et publique, conformément aux dispositions de l’article 2§3. La Chambre d’appel a rejeté cette interprétation et a clairement distingué les deux fondements, en affirmant que “l’‘incitation’, telle que visée à l’article 6 1) du Statut, ne doit pas nécessairement revêtir un caractère ‘direct et public’”117. Il convient donc de ne pas confondre “l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide”, crime spécifique prévu à l’article 2§3 et l’incitation à commettre le génocide, forme de participation criminelle visée à l’article 6§1 qui donnera lieu à une condamnation pour génocide si l’actus reus et la mens rea sont démontrés. Outre le caractère direct et public de l’incitation, un autre élément permet de différencier les deux incriminations : la preuve du rapport de causalité entre l’incitation et la perpétration effective du génocide n’est pas requise pour appliquer l’article 2§3c)118, tandis qu’elle l’est pour l’incitation de l’article 6§1119. Quant aux autres formes de participation de l’article 6§1, elles n’ont pas posé de problèmes d’interprétation particuliers aux juges d’Arusha, qui se sont souvent appuyés sur la jurisprudence du TPIY pour en dégager les éléments constitutifs : 116 117 118
119
Jugement Musema, § 120 ; Jugement Akayesu, § 481. Arrêt Akayesu, § 483. Ce qui, comme le soulignent H. Ascensio et R. Maison dans leur chronique parue (A.F.D.I. (1998), p. 408), facilitera la tâche du Procureur dans les nombreuses poursuites relatives aux médias rwandais qu’il a engagées. Jugement Bagilishema, § 30.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
533
- La planification “peut être définie comme supposant qu’une ou plusieurs personnes envisagent de programmer la commission d’un crime, aussi bien dans ses phases de préparation que d’exécution”120. - L’ordre donné de commettre un crime “suppose une relation de subordination entre le donneur d’ordre et l’exécutant”121. La participation par l’ordre donné constitue donc une première forme de responsabilité pour le supérieur hiérarchique, qui découle de la violation d’une interdiction de faire, et qui diffère de la responsabilité pour défaut d’action envisagée par l’article 6§3122. - L’aide et l’encouragement sont distingués par la jurisprudence du TPIR, de telle sorte qu’ils constituent deux types différents de participation criminelle. “L’aide signifie le soutien apporté à quelqu’un. L’encouragement, quant à lui, consisterait plutôt à favoriser le développement d’une action en lui exprimant sa sympathie”123. Ainsi, “la seule aide ou le seul encouragement peuvent suffire à engager la responsabilité individuelle d’un accusé”124. L’aide et l’encouragement couvrent tous les actes d’assistance, à condition qu’ils concourent substantiellement à la perpétration du crime. L’assistance peut être matérielle ou morale125 et la simple présence, lorsqu’elle s’ajoute à l’autorité, peut constituer une aide sous forme de soutien moral. Ce fut le cas d’Akayesu pour les violences sexuelles commises dans les locaux de la commune dont il était le maire. Comme pour l’incitation, il convient de ne pas assimiler l’aide et l’encouragement de l’article 6§1 à la complicité de génocide de l’article 2§3. Ainsi, selon la Chambre de première instance I dans l’affaire Akayesu, “bien qu’elles s’apparentent aux éléments matériels constitutifs de la complicité, [l’aide et l’encouragement] sont, de par elles-mêmes,
120 121 122 123 124 125
Jugement Musema, § 119 ; Jugement Akayesu, § 480. Jugement Musema, § 121 ; Jugement Akayesu, § 483. Cf. infra pp. 529 et ss. Jugement Akayesu, § 484. Jugement Musema, § 125. Jugement Bagilishema, § 33 : “la participation à la commission d’un crime ne nécessite ni la présence physique ni l’aide matérielle du participant. Pour ‘aider’ à telle commission, il peut suffire d’encourager ou de soutenir moralement l’auteur principal.”
534
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
constitutives d’un des crimes visés aux articles 2 à 4 du Statut, dont notamment le génocide”126.
Elle rappelle aussi dans le même paragraphe que la preuve du dol spécial de génocide n’est requise que pour l’aide ou l’encouragement de l’article 6§1, et non pour la complicité de l’article 2§3. 2. La responsabilité du supérieur hiérarchique pour défaut d’action (article 6§3) L’article 6§3 du Statut prévoit la possibilité d’engager la responsabilité des supérieurs hiérarchiques pour des actes matériels commis par leurs subordonnés mais qu’ils ont omis de prévenir ou de réprimer. Si les législations nationales font souvent le choix de réprimer ces omissions par le biais des mécanismes communs de complicité, les statuts des juridictions pénales internationales ont préféré les traiter dans le cadre d’une responsabilité spécifique prévue, pour le TPI, à l’article 6§3 de son statut. Cette forme de responsabilité est parfois qualifiée de responsabilité du supérieur hiérarchique stricto sensu afin de la distinguer de celle qu’ils peuvent également encourir sur le fondement de l’alinéa premier du même article. En effet, il n’est pas toujours aisé de faire la distinction entre action et omission. Par exemple, la responsabilité d’un supérieur encourue du fait de sa présence aux côtés de l’auteur d’un crime ne constitue pas une responsabilité pour omission reposant sur l’article 6§3 mais une responsabilité pour action reposant sur l’encouragement et le soutien accordé aux auteurs matériels des crimes127. Afin que la responsabilité pénale d’un accusé soit engagée sur la base de l’article 6§3, le Procureur doit démontrer : “1) qu’un des actes visés aux Articles 2 à 4 du Statut a bien été commis par un subordonné de l’accusé, 2) que l’accusé savait ou avait des raisons de savoir que le subordonné s’apprêtait à commettre cet acte ou l’avait fait et 3) que l’accusé n’a pas pris les mesures nécessaires et raisonnables pour
126 127
Jugement Akayesu, § 485. Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 202.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
535
empêcher que ledit acte ne soit commis par son subordonné ou pour le punir de l’avoir commis.”128
Nous examinerons successivement la mise en œuvre de ces trois éléments par les juges d’Arusha. a. Le lien de subordination exigé L’élément déterminant pour engager la responsabilité du supérieur sur le fondement de l’article 6§3 n’est pas la qualité officielle de l’accusé mais l’exercice concret de la fonction de supérieur hiérarchique. Cette forme de responsabilité n’est donc pas l’apanage des seuls militaires ; elle peut aussi concerner des individus qui se trouvent en position d’autorité civile ainsi que des individus qui exercent un pouvoir de fait129. Quelle que soit la qualité officielle de l’accusé, l’accusation devra démontrer que ce dernier exerçait un contrôle effectif sur les auteurs de violations du droit international humanitaire, qu’il s’agisse d’un contrôle exercé de jure ou de facto130. Le critère d’appréciation du lien de subordination reste donc identique que le supérieur soit un militaire ou un civil. Le jugement rendu dans l’affaire Musema contribue d’ailleurs à éclairer la notion de pouvoir ou d’autorité de facto, en précisant que celle-ci peut consister en un pouvoir indirect ou encore dériver d’un pouvoir d’influence exercé par une personne qui occupe une position sociale dominante (§ 144). Autant d’obiter dicta qui concernaient directement cette affaire où la question se posait de savoir dans quelle mesure Alfred Musema, directeur de l’usine à thé de Gisovu, avait un pouvoir de contrôle sur les personnes qui, a priori, ne relevaient pas de son autorité, comme les soldats, la police de la commune de Gisovu et surtout les milices Interahamwe. Mais les juges n’ont guère dépassé 128 129
130
Jugement Musema, § 892. Jugement Musema, § 135 ; Voir aussi, dans le même sens pour le TPIY : Affaire Celebici (IT-96-21-T), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement, 16 novembre 1998, § 370 ; Le Procureur c. Zlatko Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-T), Chambre de première instance I bis, Jugement, 25 juin 1999, §§ 90-111. Jugement Musema, §§ 141 et 148 ; Arrêt Bagilishema, §§ 50 et 56.
536
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
les positions de principe. Ils se sont en effet appuyés exclusivement, dans leurs conclusions, sur le fait qu’il y avait toujours lors des attaques, des employés de l’usine à thé, sur lesquels il ne fait aucun doute que Musema exerçait une autorité hiérarchique. b. Le degré de connaissance requis Selon l’article 6§3, la responsabilité du supérieur peut être engagée s’il “savait ou avait des raisons de savoir” que le subordonné s’apprêtait à commettre un acte criminel. C’est évidemment le second critère qui pose des problèmes d’interprétation. Les juges d’Arusha considèrent, en premier lieu, qu’il est rempli si la preuve est faite que le supérieur, en dépit de son absence de connaissance directe de l’acte criminel, disposait de certaines informations générales de nature à le mettre en garde contre d’éventuels agissements de ses subordonnés. Sa position de supérieur hiérarchique aurait dû alors le conduire à mener des enquêtes complémentaires131. C’est par exemple le cas si les crimes commis sont de notoriété publique. En second lieu, les juges de première instance ont également estimé, dans l’affaire Bagilishema, que ce critère pouvait être satisfait dans l’hypothèse d’une négligence criminelle, si “l’absence de connaissance résulte de la négligence du supérieur dans l’accomplissement de ses obligations de supérieur, c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il n’a pas mis en œuvre les moyens dont il disposait pour être tenu informé de l’infraction et que, dans les circonstances, il aurait dû savoir”132.
Cette position s’inscrit dans la ligne de la jurisprudence du TMI de Tokyo133, sur laquelle s’était à son tour appuyé le jugement Blaskic du TPIY134. Elle a pour conséquence de créer une responsabilité accrue, 131 132 133 134
Jugement Bagilishema, § 46 ; Arrêt Bagilishema, § 28. Jugement Bagilishema, § 46. Voir H.ASCENSIO et R. MAISON, A.F.D.I. (1998), p 406. “[S]i un commandant a exercé la diligence due dans l’accomplissement de ses devoirs mais ignore pourtant que des crimes sont sur le point d’être commis ou l’ont été, cette ignorance ne peut être retenue contre lui. Cependant, lorsque, compte tenu de sa position personnelle dans la hiérarchie et des circonstances du moment, l’ignorance résulte d’une négligence dans l’accomplissement de ses devoirs, elle ne saurait constituer un moyen de défense : ce commandant avait
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
537
presque automatique pour le supérieur militaire sur qui repose une obligation large de connaissance135. La Chambre d’appel a toutefois clairement rejeté cette évolution vers une responsabilité objective du supérieur hiérarchique en affirmant, dans l’arrêt Bagilishema, que la négligence criminelle du supérieur n’était pas une forme de responsabilité clairement définie en droit international pénal136. c. L’étendue de l’obligation d’agir du supérieur Les juges estiment que l’appréciation des mesures “nécessaires et raisonnables” devant être prises par le supérieur se fait au cas par cas, car toute tentative de formuler dans l’abstrait une norme générale n’aurait aucun sens137. En outre, il est important de souligner qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une obligation alternative d’empêcher la commission des crimes ou de les punir. “L’obligation faite au supérieur d’empêcher ou de punir le crime ne place pas l’accusé face à plusieurs options. Ainsi le supérieur qui savait ou avait des raisons de savoir que ses subordonnés étaient sur le point de commettre des crimes et qui ne les en a pas empêchés ne peut-il compenser ce manquement en punissant après coup lesdits subordonnés”138.
135
136 137
138
des raisons de savoir au sens du Statut” : Blaskic (IT-95-14-T), 3 mars 2000, § 332. Voir par exemple l’affaire List et autres (Tribunal militaire américain à Nuremberg, 19 février 1949, International Law Report, vol. 15, p 652, cité par Aurélie de Andrade in H. ASCENSIO, E. DECAUX et A. PELLET (dir.), Droit international pénal, Paris, Pedone, 2000, p. 209) : l’accusé principal était le commandant d’un territoire occupé qui invoquait son absence de connaissance des faits criminels. Le Tribunal lui a répondu qu’il ne pouvait utiliser comme moyen de défense le résultat d’un manquement à son obligation de se tenir informé. Arrêt Bagilishema, § 37 ; voir aussi dans le même sens pour le TPIY affaire Celebici (IT-96-21), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 20 février 2001, § 226. Jugement Musema, § 135 ; Jugement Bagilishema, § 48 ; voir aussi dans le même sens pour le TPIY : Affaire Celebici (IT-96-21-T), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement, 16 novembre 1998, § 394 ; Le Procureur c. Zlatko Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-T), Chambre de première instance I bis, Jugement, 25 juin 1999, §§ 112-119. Jugement Bagilishema, § 49.
538
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Pour conclure, il est intéressant d’aborder la question du cumul des deux types de responsabilité. Il est en effet très fréquent que les juges du TPIR condamnent pour les mêmes faits un accusé sur le fondement des paragraphes 1 et 3 de l’article 6. Par exemple, dans le jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, la Chambre de première instance a condamné Kayishema pour les ordres qu’il a donnés de commettre certains massacres, pour sa participation directe dans d’autres ainsi que pour l’ensemble des massacres en vertu de l’article 6§3. On peut se demander si cette pratique n’a pas pour conséquence de brouiller le tableau des responsabilités. Car, ainsi conçue, la responsabilité pour omission de l’article 6§3 nous semble, pour des crimes complexes comme le génocide qui impliquent nécessairement une pluralité d’acteurs, se déduire presque automatiquement de la reconnaissance de culpabilité d’une personne en position d’autorité sur le fondement de l’article 6§1. Il est en effet difficile d’imaginer qu’un supérieur hiérarchique, après avoir traduit son intention criminelle en ordonnant de commettre un crime, en le commettant lui-même ou en aidant à le commettre, remplisse son obligation d’agir en empêchant ses subordonnés de commettre lesdits actes criminels ! Peut-être serait-il donc opportun de distinguer plus clairement les deux formes de responsabilité, et de n’utiliser l’article 6§3 que subsidiairement, lorsqu’il est impossible de prouver la participation active du supérieur hiérarchique à la préparation ou à la commission du crime. Sinon, on peut se demander si la distinction entre les deux fondements de responsabilité est bien pertinente, et s’il n’aurait pas été préférable d’assimiler l’omission coupable à une forme de complicité.
LES CRIMES REPRIMES PAR LE TPIR La compétence ratione materiae du Tribunal est définie aux articles 2 à 4 du Statut (voir supra). Elle comprend le génocide dans ses différentes formes, les crimes contre l’humanité et les crimes de guerre, qui s’entendent des violations graves de l’article 3 commun aux quatre Conventions de Genève et du Protocole additionnel II de 1977 aux mêmes Conventions. Après avoir apprécié la mise en œuvre de ces trois crimes par le TPIR (A), nous appréhenderons la question
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
539
du concours d’infractions, sur laquelle sa jurisprudence offre aussi des développements originaux (B). A. Les trois crimes relevant de la compétence ratione materiae du TPIR 1. Le crime de génocide Le principe de l’inclusion du génocide dans le Statut du TPIR, tout comme la définition de ce crime, n’ont guère posé de problèmes, dans la mesure où les deux rapports de René Degni-Ségui qualifiaient comme tels les massacres en cours au Rwanda et où la Convention de 1948 offrait déjà une définition universellement reconnue de ce crime. Même si le crime est ancien139, le terme génocide est récent : le droit international contemporain le doit à Raphaël Lemkin. Dans la jurisprudence du TPIR, les juges, avant de s’intéresser au crime luimême, se sont attardés sur son fondement légal dans le cadre de leur compétence. a. Le fondement légal du génocide Le génocide est un crime de droit international, de sorte que son fondement est à rechercher à un niveau inter-étatique. Or l’article 38 du Statut de la Cour internationale de justice (ci-après “CIJ”) indique que les sources du droit international sont les conventions, la coutume, les principes généraux de droit et, auxiliairement, la jurisprudence et la doctrine. C’est donc naturellement dans ces différentes strates de la légalité internationale que les juges du TPIR vont rechercher le fondement légal du crime de génocide dans le cas rwandais. Cette recherche s’impose d’autant plus qu’il s’agit d’un procès pénal, qui implique le respect du principe de légalité des infractions et des peines140. A ce titre, la source première et la moins discutable141 de 139 140 141
Voir le site Internet de Genocide Watch (http://www.genocidewatch.org). Dans un cadre international, le terme loi doit être entendu dans un sens générique. L’article 2 §§ 2 et 3 reprend mot pour mot les Articles II et III de ladite convention.
540
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
cette incrimination est la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide du 9 décembre 1948, entrée en vigueur en 1951. C’est la première consécration du génocide comme crime spécifique dans un texte juridique à valeur obligatoire142. Le fondement est d’autant plus évident que le Rwanda a adhéré à cette convention le 16 avril 1975143, ce qui suffit amplement pour appliquer les dispositions conventionnelles à la situation survenue dans le pays en 1994, sans violer le principe de légalité. Toutefois, les juges ne s’en sont pas tenus à cet argument central, et ils ont par ailleurs affirmé la valeur coutumière de l’incrimination de génocide. Dès la première décision au fond (Akayesu, Jugement, 1998), ils sont convenus que “[l]a Convention sur le génocide est incontestablement considérée comme faisant partie du droit international coutumier comme en témoigne l’avis consultatif rendu en 1951 par la Cour internationale de Justice sur les réserves144 et comme l’a d’ailleurs rappelé le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies dans son rapport sur la création du Tribunal pénal international pour l’ex-Yougoslavie”145.
La mention dudit rapport nous apparaît superflue dans le raisonnement. Il n’a aucune valeur juridique en soi, sans compter qu’il ne fonde la valeur coutumière du crime de génocide que sur le seul avis consultatif de 1951. C’est donc exclusivement dans cette 142
143 144
145
Référence aux documents antérieurs de l’AGNU qui ont pu qualifier le génocide de crime, notamment la Résolution 96 (9) du 11 décembre 1946 qualifiant le génocide de “crime de droit des gens”… Le Rwanda a exprimé une réserve sur l’Article IX, excluant ainsi la compétence de la Cour internationale de justice quant aux différends entre les parties. Réserves à la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 15. C’est nous qui ajoutons cette note à la citation. Jugement Akayesu, § 495. Cet obiter dictum a été repris in extenso dans les décisions suivantes : Jugement Rutaganda, § 45 ; Jugement Musema, § 151 ; Jugement Bagilishema, § 54. Dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana (Jugement), les juges formulent autrement la même idée (§ 88) : “La Chambre relève que le crime de génocide est considéré comme faisant partie intégrante du droit international coutumier qui, de surcroît, est une norme impérative du droit.” Dans les deux autres affaires (Kambanda et Serushago), cette analyse n’a pas été rappelée parce que les accusés ont plaidé coupables, ce qui n’a pas donné l’occasion aux juges de discuter la source du caractère criminel du génocide.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
541
référence qu’il faut rechercher la consécration coutumière des dispositions conventionnelles. Or, dans cet avis, la CIJ s’est contentée d’affirmer que “les principes qui sont à sa base [de cette Convention] sont reconnus par les nations civilisées comme engageant même en dehors de tout lien conventionnel”146. Cette formule laconique, qui fonde depuis le caractère coutumier du crime de génocide, relève davantage de l’incantation morale que de la démonstration juridique. Car, à notre sens, celle-ci aurait exigé que soit rapportée la preuve d’une pratique concordante des États et d’une opinio juris, les deux éléments constitutifs de la coutume internationale ainsi qu’il découle de l’article 38-1b du Statut de la CIJ mais aussi de la jurisprudence internationale147. Cette démonstration, la CIJ ne l’a pas faite, et le TPIR n’a pas su pallier cette lacune. Pourtant, cinquante ans après l’avis sur les réserves, les juges disposaient de matériaux de fond pour asseoir une telle démonstration, en s’appuyant notamment sur les nombreuses résolutions des Nations Unies qui, à la suite de celle du 9 décembre 1948 (Rés. 260 A (III)), ont réaffirmé le caractère criminel du génocide, ainsi que sur un examen détaillé des droits nationaux148 146
147
148
Il aurait fallu une recherche méthodique des deux éléments constitutifs de la coutume. Ainsi dans l’affaire des Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. États-Unis), fond, arrêt (C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 14 §§ 183 et ss.), la Cour a procédé à une telle recherche minutieuse des règles coutumières s’agissant du recours à la force dans les relations entre les États. Dans les affaires liées au droit de la mer, la Cour a su aussi le faire. Voir à ce propos l’analyse de Barbara KWIATKOWSKA : “The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Development of the Law of the Sea”, 3 Mars 1998, mise à jour le 19 Juin 2002, Online Papers of NILOS (Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea), Faculté de Droit de l’Université d’Utrecht, Pays-Bas (http://www.law.uu.nl/english/isep/nilos/paper/trien.pdf). Ainsi José Antonio Pastor Ridruejo écrit dans son “Cours général de droit international public. Le droit international à la veille du vingt et unième siècle : Normes, faits et valeurs” (R.C.A.D.I. 274 (1998), p. 44) : “… la jurisprudence internationale, surtout celle de la Cour internationale de Justice, accepte la distinction [entre l’élément matériel et l’élément psychologique]… et en tire des conséquences importantes. […] A plusieurs reprises […] la Cour a refusé d’attribuer un caractère juridique à une pratique parce que l’élément subjectif faisait défaut. Les idées exprimées par la Cour dans l’arrêt rendu le 20 février 1969 dans les affaires du Plateau continental de la mer du Nord ne peuvent pas être plus éloquentes à ces propos.” Particulièrement de ceux (environ une soixantaine) qui ne sont pas parties à la Convention de 1948, car l’existence de ce crime dans ces droits et la relation entre la définition nationale et celle internationale permettrait de mieux fonder le
542
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
ainsi que de la jurisprudence internationale149 et nationale pertinente. Cette démonstration n’aurait pas changé le droit, mais aurait été, pour la consistance du raisonnement, d’un intérêt majeur. Qu’à cela ne tienne, la doctrine à la fois “des publicistes les plus qualifiés”, comme le stipule le même article 38 du Statut de la CIJ, et des États semble unanime sur ce point, et nul ne conteste l’universalité du caractère criminel du génocide. La contribution la plus riche de la jurisprudence du TPIR se situe donc, à ce jour, dans la détermination des éléments constitutifs de ce crime. b. Le génocide à travers ses éléments constitutifs Comme tout crime, le génocide dans ses différentes formes comprend deux éléments, l’un matériel et l’autre psychologique. Les précisions apportées par la jurisprudence du TPIR sont nombreuses, et ont trait essentiellement au dol spécial, au groupe et aux différentes formes de génocide. Ce sont d’ailleurs les seuls points sur lesquels nous avons choisi de faire une analyse plus approfondie, soit parce que les autres points ont déjà fait l’objet de critiques auxquelles nous adhérons150, soit parce qu’ils n’appellent pas de critique de notre part151.
149
150
151
caractère coutumier qui permet une application à tous les Etats, qu’ils soient parties ou non à la Convention de 1948. Voir notamment l’Ordonnance de la CIJ dans l’affaire relative à l’Application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (BosnieHerzégovine c. Yougoslavie), 1993. La CIJ n’a pas encore émis un arrêt au fond en cette affaire, et elle est saisie d’autres affaires relatives à la même convention : affaire relative à la Demande en révision de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie), exceptions préliminaires (Yougoslavie c. Bosnie-Herzégovine), 2001 ; et l’affaire relative à l’Application de la Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Yougoslavie), 1999. Cf. par exemple la critique de Hervé Ascensio et Rafaëlle Maison relative à la définition du meurtre comme l’homicide commis avec l’intention de donner la mort alors que le terme anglo-saxon de killing inclut le meurtre non intentionnel (Cf. AFDI XLIV (1998), p. 401, note 91). Cette analyse apparaît dans les jugements eux-mêmes. Voir par exemple Jugement Akayesu, § 500 et Jugement Rutaganda, § 50. Ainsi par exemple de la nécessité d’une politique génocidaire pour une effectivité du crime de génocide. Le TPIR a parfois recherché l’existence d’une
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
543
Dol spécial Le dol spécial constitue un élément propre au génocide. Les juges le définissent comme l’intention précise, chez le criminel, de provoquer le résultat incriminé, à savoir la destruction, en tout ou en partie, d’un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, comme tel152. Mais le problème principal est de savoir à quel niveau il convient de rechercher cette intention spécifique153. En fonction de l’autorité exercée par la personne inculpée, la preuve du dol sera plus ou moins difficile, les juges l’ayant recherchée tantôt au niveau de l’accusé, tantôt dans la politique génocidaire154. La politique génocidaire constitue le “contexte général de perpétration” du crime ; elle apparaît dans les prises de position des autorités de fait ou de droit, quel que soit leur rang. Et Dieu sait à quel point, au Rwanda, certaines autorités ont pris effectivement de telles positions parfois publiquement, ce qui en a facilité la démonstration. Participent aussi de la preuve de cette politique génocidaire, “l’échelle des atrocités commises, leur caractère général, dans une région ou un pays, ou encore le fait de délibérément et systématiquement choisir les victimes en raison de leur appartenance à un groupe particulier, tout en excluant les membres des autres groupes”155.
A ce propos, la difficulté, dans la procédure pénale, est de savoir si le juge, une fois que l’existence d’une telle politique a été prouvée dans telle politique sans en faire une condition pour l’incrimination. Cf. Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 94. 152 Voir Jugement Akayesu, § 498. Cette définition a été reprise et appliquée dans les autres jugements : Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, §§ 91-92 ; Jugement Rutaganda, §§ 59-63 ; Jugement Musema, §§ 164-167 et Jugement Bagilishema, §§ 60-65. 153 C’est l’interrogation à laquelle Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen tente de répondre en partie dans sa contribution au colloque du CREDHO de 1999. Cf. P. TAVERNIER et L. BURGORGUE-LARSEN (dir.), Un siècle de droit international humanitaire. Centenaire des Conventions de La Haye, Cinquantenaire des Conventions de Genève, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2001, Collection du CREDHO n°1, pp. 179-181. 154 Voir Jugement Akayesu, § 523. 155 Id., § 523.
544
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
une affaire, peut faire l’économie de sa démonstration dans les autres affaires et se contenter de déterminer dans quelle mesure l’acte spécifique d’une personne participe de cette politique. Dans la pratique actuelle des TPI, les juges ont choisi d’en faire la démonstration dans chaque affaire, mais, en réalité, ils reprennent la même analyse156. Cette difficulté s’accentue lorsque des instances internationales non juridictionnelles ont établi l’existence d’une telle politique, comme ce fut le cas avec le premier rapport de René DegniSégui, où il est dit explicitement que les événements survenus en avril 1994 revêtent la nature d’“un génocide résultant des massacres de Tutsi”157. De même, pour le Conseil de sécurité, il ne paraît pas y avoir de doute sur la qualification des faits, et la création du Tribunal a pour objectif de déterminer les responsabilités. Il faut craindre dès lors que cette qualification extrajudiciaire par le système ayant mis en place la juridiction pénale internationale n’influence les décisions judiciaires, risque qui n’est cependant pas spécifique aux tribunaux pénaux internationaux, même s’il est accentué par le caractère ad hoc de la juridiction. Quant à l’intention d’une personne en particulier de “détruire, en tout ou en partie un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”, la preuve en paraît bien plus difficile si la personne n’est pas dans une position d’autorité. Les juges ont alors recherché dans les “actes et propos” de l’accusé, l’existence d’une volonté bien déterminée en ce sens, même si le groupe visé n’a pas été totalement décimé158. 156 157
158
Voir par exemple : Jugement Akayesu § 523 ; Jugement Musema §§ 164-167 ; Jugement Rutaganda §§ 59-63 ; Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, §§ 93-94. A/49/508 – S/1994/1157 § 42. Les §§ 43-48 offrent une analyse plus détaillée où le Rapporteur Spécial essaie de déterminer les éléments constitutifs du crime de génocide. Le rapporteur spécial aurait même établi une liste de personnes devant être considérées comme particulièrement responsables dans la survenance des massacres (Cf. Rapport préliminaire de la Commission d’experts établie conformément à la Résolution 935 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, S/1994/1125 Annexe, § 29). Voir aussi dans le Rapport préliminaire sus-cité, les paragraphes 44, où les experts caractérisent la politique gouvernemental d’extermination, et 124, où en est faite la qualification juridique. Jugement Akayesu, § 497. Voir aussi Le Procureur c. Radovan Karadzic et Ratko Mladic (IT-95-5-R61) et (IT-95-18-R61), 11 Juillet 1996, § 92 : “l’effectivité de la destruction partielle ou totale n’est pas nécessaire pour conclure à l’existence du génocide”. Cité par H. Ascensio et R. Maison, AFDI XLIII (1997), p. 395, note 127.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
545
La politique génocidaire reste un critère essentiellement pour les accusés qui ont une fonction gouvernementale : elle sera déterminée par les actes et propos de l’accusé mais aussi par les actes des organes de l’État, et elle manifeste, associée au caractère systématique des meurtres de Tutsi et à l’ampleur des massacres, la volonté de détruire tout ou partie d’un groupe159. Il reste à savoir ce qu’on entend par groupe. Groupe La Convention de 1948 établit quatre types de groupes dont les critères distinctifs sont la nation, la race, l’ethnie et la religion. Ces critères sont tous, à des degrés différents, flous, du moins si l’on tente d’en donner une définition objective. En ce qui concerne le groupe national, la Chambre de première instance I du TPIR tente de le définir objectivement, en se fondant sur la jurisprudence Nottebohm de la CIJ160. Elle l’envisage comme “un ensemble de personnes considérées comme partageant un lien juridique basé sur une citoyenneté commune, jointe à une réciprocité de droits et de devoirs”161. Elle écarte ainsi une définition plus subjective de la Nation, fondée sur le sentiment d’appartenance, pour ne retenir que le lien objectif de nationalité. L’inconvénient d’une telle définition est son caractère restrictif. Dans le cas rwandais, elle exclut la qualification des groupes Tutsi ou Hutu de “national”, sans poser de difficulté particulière. C’est plutôt devant le TPIY que cette approche a pu révéler ses limites. Il faut en effet s’interroger sur la pertinence du caractère national du groupe Bosniaque musulman, puisque Bosniaques, Croates et Serbes faisaient partie d’une même entité étatique antérieure, la Yougoslavie. A ce titre, la simple qualification, par la Constitution yougoslave de 1963, du groupe Bosniaque musulman de Nation, suffit-elle à fonder l’analyse du juge ?162
159 160 161 162
Cf. Jugement Akayesu, § 118. Nottebohm, deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1955, p. 4. Jugement Akayesu, § 512. Cf. Le Procureur c. Radislav Krstic (IT-98-33), Chambre de première instance I, Jugement, 2 août 2001, § 559.
546
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Si les juges ont retenu une définition exclusivement étatique et objective du critère national, c’est peut-être aussi pour ne pas empiéter sur le critère ethnique, qu’ils ont également tenté de définir objectivement dans un premier temps, en affirmant que le “groupe ethnique qualifie généralement un groupe dont les membres partagent une langue ou une culture commune”163. Pour des observateurs peu au fait des caractéristiques de la société rwandaise, Hutu et Tutsi pourraient paraître se distinguer sur cette base. Mais n’y a-t-il pas là une certaine méconnaissance de l’environnement social rwandais, où les groupes ethniques qu’on tend à y distinguer, ont une langue et, pour l’essentiel, une culture communes ?164 Il faut donc rechercher un critère plus pertinent, que celui de la langue combiné avec l’élément culturel. Le critère racial n’est pas plus évident à définir objectivement. Même s’il est certaines différences physiques indéniables entre les humains – Blanc, Noir, Pygmées, Blond, Cheveux crépus, etc.165 – ces différences ne font pas pour autant des Hommes ayant les mêmes 163 164
165
Jugement Akayesu, § 513. Ainsi, dans leur chronique, H. ASCENSIO et R. MAISON (AFDI XLIV (1998), pp. 394-395) ont pu accepter la définition des groupes Hutu et Tutsi comme constituant des ethnies, alors même qu’il y avait une contradiction interne au raisonnement des juges, lesquels ont affirmé que les ethnies sont caractérisées par une langue et une culture communes. Or, les deux groupes Hutu et Tutsi ne peuvent pas être distingués avec ces critères. De plus, comment se justifie l’intégration des métis, c’est-à-dire de toute personne née d’un Hutu et d’une Tutsi (ou inversement), à l’un ou à l’autre groupe, sauf à considérer l’existence d’un troisième groupe ? Cette critique vaut d’ailleurs pour toutes les analyses tendant à trouver partout en Afrique des groupes ethniques. Souvent, la situation est bien plus complexe que l’œil de l’étranger ne la perçoit. Ainsi au Bénin par exemple, les Fon forment un groupe important dans lequel on distingue de nombreux autres sous-groupes, tandis que les Fon eux-mêmes participent d’un groupe encore plus grand, les Aja. Dans ces conditions, où doit-on situer l’ethnie ? Si c’est le groupe Aja qui est une ethnie, quid du groupe Fon et de ses subdivisions ? Si c’est le groupe Fon qui constitue une ethnie, quid du groupe Aja et des sous-groupes Fon ? Si, par contre, chacun de ces groupes constituent une ethnie, les critères déterminés par les juges et par les ethnologues en général, ne paraissent plus pertinents… Nous en faisons état parce que dans l’affaire Akayesu (Jugement, 1998), les juges ont proposé une définition basée sur ces critères physiques : “[l]a définition classique du groupe racial est fondée sur les traits physiques héréditaires, souvent identifiés à une région géographique, indépendamment des facteurs linguistiques, culturels, nationaux ou religieux” (§ 514).
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
547
caractéristiques une race à part. Les travaux d’experts réunis sous l’égide de l’UNESCO166 ont conduit à la Déclaration sur la race et les préjugés raciaux167 qui, dès son article premier (§ 1), affirme que “[t]ous les êtres humains appartiennent à la même espèce et proviennent de la même souche”. Dans son rapport préliminaire, la Commission d’experts mise en place par le Secrétaire général affirmait aussi qu’“il n’est pas nécessaire de prendre pour hypothèse ou postulat l’existence de la race ou de l’ethnie elle-même en tant que faits scientifiquement objectifs”168. Pourtant, de nombreux textes de droit international positif persistent à utiliser le critère racial pour désigner les persécutions ou les discriminations prohibées. D’où l’intérêt du critère subjectif dans la détermination du groupe protégé. Enfin, s’agissant du critère religieux169, la difficulté réside, s’agissant du contexte africain en particulier, dans l’hétérogénéité des croyances, avec toutes les combinaisons possibles, car le syncrétisme est au cœur même du système religieux africain. Ainsi, nombre de personnes, parallèlement à une pratique religieuse musulmane ou chrétienne, ont des pratiques traditionnelles qui relèvent de l’animisme, celui-ci étant entendu comme toute croyance en des forces de la nature qui sont élevées au rang de divinités ou de quasidivinités dans la mesure où les personnes leur accordent un certain pouvoir. Cette réalité est commune aux États de l’Afrique subsaharienne. En conséquence, le groupe chrétien sera facile à déterminer, mais celui des adorateurs de l’arc-en-ciel beaucoup moins… Ces difficultés nous conduisent donc à douter de l’opportunité d’une méthode strictement objective pour déterminer l’existence d’un groupe protégé. D’ailleurs, après avoir adopté une telle méthode, particulièrement dans l’affaire Akayesu, les juges d’Arusha vont progressivement se tourner vers une approche subjective à partir de 166 167 168 169
Cf. Four Statements on the Race Question, COM.69/II.27/A, 1969 (http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0012/001229/122962eb.pdf). Déclaration adoptée par acclamation le 27 novembre 1978 à Paris (http://www.unhchr.ch/french/html/menu3/b/d_prejud_fr.htm). Rapport préliminaire de la Commission d’experts établie conformément à la Résolution 935 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité, S/1994/1125 Annexe, § 159. Akayesu, Jugement § 514 : “[l]e groupe religieux est un groupe dont les membres partagent la même religion, confession ou pratique de culte”.
548
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana170, comme le fait bien apparaître Edouard Delaplace dans sa contribution au colloque organisé par la section rouennaise du CREDHO consacré à la répression du genocide rwandais171. Mais l’approche subjective présente aussi d’autres difficultés. En particulier, l’une des questions qui se posent est de savoir s’il faut retenir la perception de l’auteur du crime ou celle de sa victime et, dans ce dernier cas, s’il faut retenir la perception que la victime a, individuellement, d’elle-même ou celle que le groupe de victimes a de lui-même172. A l’instar du TPIR, il nous semble néanmoins que l’approche subjective centrée sur l’auteur devrait être privilégiée173. 170
171
172 173
Jugement, 1999, § 98. Cette analyse est confirmée dans d’autres affaires comme Musema (Jugement § 154) et Bagilishema (Jugement § 55). Toutefois dans le jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana (Jugement § 98), les juges font déjà apparaître l’approche subjective en indiquant que le groupe ethnique, c’est aussi ce que les “autres, y compris les auteurs des crimes” percevaient comme étant un groupe ethnique. Cette approche subjective est aussi retenue dans l’affaire Le Procureur c. Goran Jelisic (IT-95-10) (Jugement, 14 décembre 1999), dans un obiter dictum encore plus explicite : “Si la détermination objective d’un groupe religieux est encore possible, tenter aujourd’hui de définir un groupe national, ethnique ou racial à partir de critères objectifs et scientifiquement non contestables serait un exercice à la fois périlleux et dont le résultat ne correspondrait pas nécessairement à la perception des personnes concernées par cette catégorisation. Aussi est-il plus approprié d’apprécier la qualité de groupe national, ethnique ou racial du point de vue de la perception qu’en ont les personnes qui veulent distinguer ce groupe du reste de la collectivité.” (§ 70). Mais auparavant, dans les affaires Le Procureur c. Radovan Karadzic et Ratko Mladic ((IT-95-5-R61) et (IT-95-18-R61) 11 juillet 1996 § 94) d’une part, Le Procureur c. Dragan Nikolic alias “Jenki” ((IT-94-2) 20 octobre 1995 § 26) d’autre part, le TPIY, dans l’examen des actes d’accusation conformément à l’article 61 du RPP, paraissait déjà avoir adopté cette approche subjective (ces affaires sont citées par H. ASCENSIO et R. MAISON, AFDI XLIV (1998), p. 403, note 99). E. DELAPLACE, “La notion de groupe”, communication présentée au Colloque du CREDHO-Rouen (à paraître en 2003, dans la Collection du CREDHO chez Bruylant, Bruxelles). Edouard Delaplace a pu parler de subjectivité collective ou individuelle, op. cit., p. 9 de la version manuscrite. A une toute autre échelle, les méthodes objective et subjective peuvent être illustrées à l’aide d’un exemple, celui de la distinction entre un meurtre simple et un parricide. En utilisant la méthode objective, la qualification de parricide sera soumise à la détermination objective, chez la victime, de sa qualité de père de l’accusé. Mais quid si l’accusé n’a pas tué son vrai père ? Avec la méthode subjective, et selon la perspective utilisée, il faudra démontrer soit que l’accusé
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
549
Le but originel du crime de génocide n’est-il pas, en effet, de punir l’intention de détruire un groupe, quel qu’il soit, à partir du moment où le criminel se le représente comme tel ? Certes, il est vrai qu’une approche exclusivement subjective peut se heurter à un problème de preuve : comment déterminer avec certitude l’intention d’une personne ? qu’est-ce qui garantit que, même si la personne l’a avoué, nous détenons là sa vérité profonde ? Elle est également limitée par la liste établie dans la définition du génocide, qui exclut a priori les autres types de groupes, notamment politique ou culturel174. Il convient cependant de remarquer que, dans l’affaire Akayesu175, la Chambre de première instance I a estimé que l’énumération n’était pas limitative et qu’elle pouvait s’étendre à tout groupe stable et permanent, car telle était l’intention des rédacteurs de la Convention de 1948. Pourtant, la résolution 96 (I) de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies indiquait aussi les groupes linguistiques et politiques176 alors que le texte de la Convention ne comporte plus ces groupes : comment peut-on alors valablement affirmer que l’intention des rédacteurs était d’inclure tout groupe stable et permanent fut-il politique ou linguistique ? Dans l’affaire Musema,177 le TPIR fait apparaître un autre critère qui est celui de la relative stabilité ou permanence du groupe. Ce critère intervient comme pour compléter l’approche subjective, en évitant les groupes “mouvants” où l’adhésion résulte d’un “engagement volontaire individuel”. Au final, il nous semble donc que seule une combinaison des différentes approches permettra de déterminer, au cas par cas, si le groupe tel que se le figure subjectivement le criminel correspond effectivement à un groupe qui, de manière plus instinctive que
174
175 176 177
considérait sa victime comme étant son père, soit que la victime se considérait comme le père de l’accusé. La suprématie de la méthode subjective centrée sur l’auteur nous semble bien ressortir de cet exemple : l’essentiel n’est-il pas que l’auteur du crime ait eu l’intention de tuer quelqu’un qu’il considérait comme son père, qu’importent la réalité objective ou la perception de la victime ? Néanmoins, ces autres formes de destruction ou de tentative de destruction d’un groupe autre que national, racial, ethnique ou religieux peuvent entrer dans la catégorie des crimes contre l’humanité. Jugement, 1998, § 702 Cf. S/1994/1405, 9 décembre 1994, Annexe, §§ 157-159. Jugement, § 162.
550
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
rationnelle, est susceptible d’être objectivement identifiable par un observateur extérieur impartial. c. Les différentes formes de génocide Le paragraphe 3 de l’article 2 du Statut du TPIR énumère les cinq formes du génocide que le Tribunal est appelé à sanctionner. Il s’agit respectivement du génocide, de l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide, de l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide, de la tentative de génocide et de la complicité dans le génocide. Parmi ces formes, l’une ne semble pas avoir déjà été relevée devant le TPIR, qu’il s’agisse des chefs d’accusation ou des développements explicatifs et interprétatifs des juges, c’est la tentative de génocide178. Cela peut se comprendre dans la mesure où un tel crime ne peut avoir lieu que si le génocide n’a pas été commis ; or il est maintenant établi sans conteste qu’il y a eu génocide au Rwanda en 1994. Les quatre autres formes sont à distinguer en deux catégories : la première comprend le génocide, l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide et l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide, et exige de prouver l’existence du dol spécial du génocide chez l’accusé, tandis que la seconde ne comporte que la complicité de génocide et ne requiert pas la démonstration de l’intention spéciale. Le génocide, l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide et l’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide ont donc en commun pour le Procureur l’obligation de prouver que, au titre de l’élément mental ou mens rea, le but visé par l’accusé était de “détruire, en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux”. Mais il ne faut pas pour autant les confondre. Le génocide suppose que la personne mise en cause soit l’auteur direct d’une des infractions primaires visées à l’article 2§2 du statut. Et les juges fondent leur appréciation de la matérialité de l’acte sur le principe de la preuve au delà de tout doute raisonnable. L’entente en vue de commettre le génocide ou conspiracy est établie en l’absence même de conséquences physiques pour les 178
Devant le TPIY, il ne semble pas non plus que cette forme de génocide ait déjà été relevée.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
551
victimes : il suffit qu’au moins deux personnes aient été résolues à commettre un génocide, qu’elles se soient mises d’accord, et que leur but soit bien de “détruire, en tout ou en partie”, un groupe tel que prévu par la Convention de 1948179. C’est une infraction formelle puisque la matérialité de l’acte n’est pas un critère de l’incrimination ; il n’est même pas nécessaire que des actes préparatoires aient été posés180. Ainsi la Chambre définit-elle “l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide comme une résolution d’agir sur laquelle au moins deux personnes se sont accordées, en vue de commettre un génocide.”181 L’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide est semblable à la conspiracy, dans la mesure où elle est aussi une infraction formelle. Mais elle s’en distingue par le fait qu’elle consiste à avoir encouragé ou provoqué, dans un lieu public par nature et dans un discours clair et sans équivoque, la commission d’un génocide. Le Tribunal précise que la clarté du propos est fonction de la culture et de l’environnement social du criminel. Ainsi dans une société rwandaise où l’expression est très imagée, biaisée, une société de non-dits permanents, il n’est pas nécessaire que l’accusé ait tenu un discours plus clair que ne l’exigent les caractéristiques psychosociologiques du Rwanda. Toutefois les juges n’ont pas pu approfondir leur raisonnement à cet égard car, dans la seule affaire où ce crime a été déterminé, l’accusé (Ruggiu) a plaidé coupable. Dans le procès en cours des Médias, cette question devrait être aussi au cœur du dispositif des décisions au fond. Cette incrimination pose cependant un problème, que les juges n’ont résolu que de façon formelle : comment la distinguer de la complicité ? Pour le droit rwandais c’est une forme de complicité182 ; pour les juges du TPIR, il est indispensable comme nous l’avons déjà souligné, que le Procureur
179 180
181 182
Ces trois éléments sont posés dans le jugement Musema (§ 189). Ainsi les juges ont-ils affirmé que “[i]l ressort des Travaux Préparatoires de la Convention sur le génocide que l’intention ayant présidé à l’inclusion de cette infraction était, du fait même de la gravité du crime de génocide, de rendre punissable un accord en vue de commettre un génocide, même si aucun acte préparatoire n’a eu lieu” (Jugement Musema, § 185). Jugement Musema, § 191 Voir Akayesu, §§ 533 et ss.
552
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
prouve l’existence du dol spécial chez l’accusé183, ce qui n’est pas le cas pour la complicité. En effet, la complicité ne suppose nullement une volonté particulière de la part de l’accusé, il suffit qu’il ait parfaitement connaissance de l’objectif final auquel il s’associe soit par instigation, soit en apportant aide et assistance, soit en fournissant les moyens du crime184. Dans le premier cas, il y a une similitude relative avec l’incitation ; dans les deux autres cas il faut une action positive, une omission ne pouvant pas être sanctionnée185. Dans tous les cas, la 183
184
185
Cf. Jugement Akayesu, 560 : “L’élément moral du crime d’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide réside dans l’intention de directement amener ou provoquer autrui à commettre un génocide. Il suppose la volonté du coupable de créer, par ces agissements, chez la ou les personnes à qui il s’adresse, l’état d’esprit propre à susciter ce crime. C’est à dire que celui qui incite à commettre le génocide est lui-même forcément animé de l’intention spécifique au génocide: celle de détruire en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux comme tel.” Les juges aboutissent à cette conclusion tout en reconnaissant qu’elle ne résulte nullement des travaux préparatoires de la Convention de 1948 (cf. Jugement Akayesu, §§ 561-562). Il en est ainsi quelle que fût l’intention du complice. Ainsi les juges ont affirmé que même si seul un intérêt financier est à l’origine de la fourniture des moyens du crime, la complicité est établie. Cf. Jugement Akayesu, § 539. Dans cette affaire Akayesu, “La Chambre est d’avis, en conclusion, qu’un accusé est complice de génocide s’il a sciemment et volontairement aidé ou assisté ou provoqué une ou d’autres personnes à commettre le génocide, sachant que cette ou ces personnes commettaient le génocide, même si l’Accusé n’avait pas luimême l’intention spécifique de détruire en tout ou en partie le groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, visé comme tel.” Cette définition est reprise in extenso dans le jugement Musema (§ 183). Dans le jugement Akayesu (§ 547), les juges précisent que “[l]a conséquence [des formes de participation prévue à l’article 6 du Statut, soit la responsabilité pénale individuelle] en est que, lorsqu’on est en présence d’une personne accusée d’avoir aidé et encouragé à planifier, préparer ou exécuter un génocide, la preuve devra être apportée que cette personne était bien animée du dol spécial du génocide, à savoir qu’elle a agi dans l’intention de détruire en tout ou en partie un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, comme tel; tandis que, comme indiqué supra, la même exigence n’est pas requise dans le cas du complice dans le génocide.” Sur la complicité, voir aussi Jugement Musema, §§ 168-183. Mais s’agissant de l’encouragement ou de l’instigation, une omission est coupable. C’est ainsi que dans l’affaire Tadic (Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement, 7 mai 1997, § 689), les juges avaient déjà considéré que la seule présence pouvait constituer un acte d’encouragement. Dans l’affaire Akayesu, il aurait pu en être aussi ainsi n’eût été la condamnation pour génocide : parce que le génocide et la complicité dans le
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
553
complicité ne peut être sanctionnée que si l’infraction principale a été commise, en l’espèce le génocide, même s’il n’y a pas d’obligation d’en trouver le(s) coupable(s). Les juges fondent cette affirmation sur une formule classique des jugements des deux TPI : le droit rwandais ainsi que “l’ensemble” des systèmes pénaux du monde le permettent186. La complicité dans le génocide n’est donc pas une infraction autonome comme le génocide, l’incitation à commettre le génocide et l’entente en vue de commettre le génocide. L’existence de ces diverses formes de génocide pose par ailleurs la question du concours de qualifications criminelles. Il est en effet courant pour le Procureur d’inscrire tous ces chefs d’accusation contre les mêmes personnes, ce qui révèle un manque de sérieux de l’argumentaire accusatoire. Les jugements n’ont pas suivi cette pratique en affirmant qu’il y avait incompatibilité entre certaines formes, notamment la complicité et le génocide. Mais le problème demeure pour les plaidoyers de culpabilité : quelle est la validité d’un tel plaidoyer lorsque l’accusé accepte un acte d’accusation fourretout ? Le premier ministre Kambanda a ainsi admis être coupable de génocide, de complicité, d’entente en vue de commettre le génocide et d’incitation à commettre le génocide, et il a été condamné pour l’ensemble de ces chefs d’accusation !
186
génocide s’excluent mutuellement, reconnaître le bourgmestre de Taba coupable de génocide empêchait que sa complicité dans le génocide puisse être établie alors même que son silence était coupable. Cette conclusion résulte du fait que par ailleurs, s’agissant du viol comme crime contre l’humanité, les juges ont reconnu Akayesu coupable d’avoir “aidé et encouragé à commettre les actes de violence sexuelle ci-après en permettant qu’ils soient commis à l’intérieur ou près du bureau communal alors qu’il était présent dans les locaux dans le premier cas et en sa présence dans les deuxième et troisième cas, et en facilitant la commission de ces actes par les paroles d’encouragement qu’il a prononcées à l’occasion d’autres actes de violence sexuelle qui, vu son autorité, donnaient clairement à entendre que les actes de violence sexuelle étaient officiellement tolérés” (§ 693). Cf. Jugement Akayesu § 531.
554
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
2. Crimes contre l’humanité Tout comme le crime de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité, en tant que faits matériels, ne sont pas des phénomènes exclusivement contemporains. Même l’incrimination n’est pas nouvelle ; seul le contenu a varié dans le temps187. Les juges d’Arusha ont pu, à cet égard, apporter des précisions sur une définition qu’aucune convention n’avait consacrée avant celle portant création de la Cour pénale internationale, adoptée à Rome en juillet 1998. C’est ainsi que, dans l’affaire Akayesu, ils ont affirmé que “[d]e l’avis de la Chambre, l’article 3 du Statut confère au Tribunal compétence pour poursuivre des personnes du chef de divers actes inhumains constitutifs de crimes contre l’humanité. Cette catégorie de crime comporte grosso modo quatre éléments essentiels, à savoir : i) l’acte, inhumain par définition et de par sa nature, doit infliger des souffrances graves ou porter gravement atteinte à l’intégrité physique ou à la santé mentale ou physique ; ii) l’acte doit s’inscrire dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée ou systématique ; iii) l’acte doit être dirigé contre les membres d’une population civile ; iv) l’acte doit être commis pour un ou plusieurs motifs discriminatoires, notamment pour des motifs d’ordre national, politique, ethnique, racial ou religieux.”188
Cette définition offre une vue synthétique de ce crime dans le Statut du TPIR189, en quatre temps dont nous tenterons de clarifier successivement les termes. 187 188
189
Ainsi l’esclavage aujourd’hui est un crime contre l’humanité alors que, jusqu’au XIXème siècle, il n’était pas universellement considéré comme tel. Jugement Akayesu, § 578. Cette définition est reprise dans les autres affaires, dans la qualification détaillée des faits incriminés : Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, §§ 119-154 ; Jugement Rutaganda, §§ 64-84 ; Jugement Musema, §§ 199-233 ; Jugement Bagilishema, §§ 72-95. Cette précision s’impose dans la mesure où l’un des critères au moins du crime contre l’humanité dans le Statut du TPIR ne vaut pas devant le TPIY, c’est celui de la discrimination. D’ailleurs, dans le Statut de la Cour pénale internationale, tout comme dans les éléments des crimes, ce critère n’apparaît pas non plus. Le Statut du Tribunal pénal spécial pour la Sierra Leone s’inscrit aussi dans cette lignée, ne faisant pas état du critère discriminatoire.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
555
a. Acte inhumain par définition et par nature La substance du crime contre l’humanité réside dans l’inhumanité de l’acte190. Cela résulte du dernier point (i) de l’article 3 du Statut du TPIR où il est fait référence aux “autres actes inhumains”. Il faut en déduire d’une part que les actes précédemment énumérés par le même article sont considérés comme inhumains, et d’autre part que cette énumération n’est pas exhaustive. Une difficulté qui peut se présenter sur le plan pénal est le caractère insuffisamment précis de cette définition hormis les cas spécifiques de crimes contre l’humanité explicitement indiqués dans les points (a) à (h) de l’article 3. Car l’inhumanité est relative, tandis que la définition d’un crime ne saurait l’être ; il en va de la sécurité juridique. Mais, à l’opposé, il est difficile de croire qu’une définition parfaitement claire et circonscrite constitue un idéal dans la mesure où elle permettrait au criminel de trouver dans la précision les moyens de faire échapper son forfait à la qualification juridique… La relative imprécision du crime contre l’humanité permet ainsi d’élargir le champ répressif du droit international pénal, en offrant une qualification à des actes inhumains qui ne répondent pas aux critères spécifiques du génocide ou des crimes de guerre. b. Attaque généralisée ou systématique A la lecture de la seule version française du Statut du TPIR, on aurait pu croire que les deux formes d’attaque constituaient des critères cumulatifs, en raison de l’emploi de la conjonction de coordination “et”. Mais dès l’affaire Akayesu, les juges ont rétabli la concordance entre cette version et les autres versions linguistiques, en affirmant qu’il s’agissait là d’une erreur de traduction191. Ils en ont profité pour affirmer l’existence d’une définition coutumière dans 190
191
Si on se réfère aux définitions du crime contre l’humanité avant les deux TPI, ce critère de l’inhumanité apparaît aussi comme permanente. Ainsi dans le Statut du Tribunal de Nuremberg, l’article 6 c) utilise la même formule “et tout autre acte inhumain”. De même l’article 5 c) du Statut du Tribunal de Tokyo achève la définition des crimes contre l’humanité par cette formule “et autres actes inhumains”. Cf. Jugement, 1998 § 579, Note 143.
556
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
laquelle ces deux caractères de l’attaque sont alternatifs, ce que semble confirmer le Statut de Rome dans son Article 7 1), puisque cette disposition n’a pas fait l’objet de discussions particulières durant la Conférence de Rome. Pourtant le Statut du Tribunal pénal spécial pour la Sierra Leone, dans sa version française, reprend dans son article 2, cette même formule d’une “attaque généralisée et systématique” ! Il faut sans doute y voir une nouvelle erreur de traduction, à moins qu’il ne s’agisse d’une opposition à la règle dégagée par les juges d’Arusha. Quant à la définition même des deux caractères, la Chambre de première instance I a, toujours dans l’affaire Akayesu, affirmé que “[l]e caractère ‘généralisé’ résulte du fait que l’acte présente un caractère massif, fréquent, et que mené collectivement, il revêt une gravité considérable et est dirigé contre une multiplicité de victimes. Le caractère ‘systématique’ tient, quant à lui, au fait que l’acte est soigneusement organisé selon un modèle régulier en exécution d’une politique concertée mettant en œuvre des moyens publics ou privés considérables.”192
Quant à l’attaque, elle “peut se définir comme tout acte contraire à la loi du type énuméré aux alinéas a) à i) de l’article 3 du Statut (assassinat, extermination, réduction en esclavage, etc.)”193 De ces précisions, il résulte d’abord une insatisfaction liée à l’absence de seuil dans la gravité, le caractère massif, la fréquence… Mais nul n’ignore qu’un tel seuil est indéterminable, sauf à adopter une approche numérique de l’inhumanité : un millier de morts pourrait ainsi constituer un crime contre l’humanité, tandis que “mille moins un” morts n’en constituerait pas un194… Il faut donc sans doute accepter une part de subjectivité dans la définition des crimes de 192 193 194
Id., § 580. Voir aussi Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 123 ; Jugement Rutaganda, § 69 ; Jugement Musema, § 204 ; Jugement Bagilishema, §§ 77-78. Id., § 581. Voir aussi Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 122 ; Jugement Rutaganda, § 70 ; Jugement Musema, § 205. Certaines des analyses faites après les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 aux ÉtatsUnis sont de ce type, cf. F. L. KIRGIS, “Terrorists Attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon”, ASIL Insights 77 (September 2001) (http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm). L’auteur écrit, tout en se référant à l’article 7 du Statut de Rome : “The use of the hijacked aircraft as lethal weapons, resulting in the deaths of hundreds if not thousands of persons, may be a crime against humanity under international law.”
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
557
masse, tout en veillant à ce que le principe de sécurité juridique soit respecté, ce qui n’est pas chose aisée195. De plus, il découle de ces définitions qu’il n’est pas nécessaire que soit établie l’existence d’une politique d’État196. Le parallèle doit être établi ici avec le génocide pour lequel l’intention de détruire peut résulter d’une politique d’ensemble qui n’est pas forcément la politique d’un État déterminé. Mais il est nécessaire qu’il s’agisse de la politique d’un groupe humain donné. Enfin, et s’agissant des actes constitutifs de crimes contre l’humanité, il faut signaler le cas particulier du viol, pour lequel, en l’absence d’un consensus international197, la Chambre offre sa définition en s’inspirant en partie de jurisprudences nationales : le viol est “une invasion physique de nature sexuelle commise sur la personne d’autrui sous l’emprise de la contrainte”198. Cette méthode pose toujours problème dans la mesure où elle confère un large pouvoir d’interprétation à des juges qui n’ont qu’une vision parcellaire des droits nationaux, malgré l’utilisation de la formule rituelle “les grands systèmes juridiques”. Pourtant cette définition fera jurisprudence devant les TPI, puisque dans l’affaire Furundzija, la Chambre de première instance II du TPIY la reprend à son compte et l’approfondit199. Et elle répond à la spécificité des crimes sexuels, qui 195
196
197 198 199
Les deux objectifs sont difficiles à concilier. Comme nous l’avons déjà souligné précédemment, les définitions trop précises risquent d’ouvrir au criminel de nouvelles “fenêtres” pour commettre son forfait. Quant aux définitions trop vastes, elles se heurtent au principe de sécurité juridique, qui doit être entendu de manière stricte en droit pénal, et qui implique l’intelligibilité et la prévisibilité de la loi. Un équilibre doit donc être recherché, mais le “législateur” pénal doit se méfier d’une tendance qui consisterait à compenser l’interdiction qui lui est faite d’adapter rétroactivement les lois aux évolutions des comportements criminels par la rédaction d’incriminations excessivement larges conçues pour anticiper toutes les évolutions à venir. Jugement Akayesu, § 580. Dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana (Jugement), les juges reviennent plus longuement sur cet aspect (cf. §§ 124-126). Cf. aussi Jugement Rutaganda, § 69 ; Jugement Musema, § 204 ; Jugement Bagilishema, § 78. Jugement Akayesu, § 596. Id., § 598. Dans l’affaire Musema (Jugement), la Chambre de première instance reprend cette définition (§§ 220-229). Le Procureur c. Anto Furundzija (IT-95-17/1), Jugement du 10 décembre 1998, §§ 174-186. Au § 176, la Chambre cite expressément le jugement Akayesu.
558
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
ont justifié des dispositions propres quant à leur mode de preuve, comme en témoigne l’article 96 du RPP qui simplifie la procédure et tient compte du caractère psychologique particulier de ce type de crime en ménageant la victime ou la présumée victime. c. Population civile (contexte particulier d’un conflit interne) De manière générale, en droit international humanitaire, c’est l’une des questions qui divisent, en corrélation avec la qualification de combattants. Ainsi selon Mario Bettati, “[l]a définition de la population civile est négative en ce que l’on dit ce qu’elle n’est pas, et non ce qu’elle est. On en déduit donc, en résumé, qu’est personne civile tout non-combattant.”200 Or la difficulté de détermination du combattant, classique en droit des conflits armés, est accentuée par le caractère non international du conflit survenu au Rwanda en 1994. En effet, dans une guerre où des civils ont pris les armes contre d’autres civils, sans que les combattants caractérisés – groupes armés organises – ne soient hors du jeu, comment déterminer qui, de la population civile, participe au conflit ? Selon nous, cette incertitude ne peut qu’être relative dans la mesure où le caractère civil de certaines personnes doit être présumé de manière irréfragable. C’est le cas notamment des enfants201 et de toute personne inapte à combattre. Il demeure cependant une marge d’incertitude importante. La jurisprudence du TPIR n’est pas prolixe sur cette définition, et il faut rechercher, au cas par cas, la preuve que la victime est ou non un membre de la population civile202. De plus, il 200 201
202
M. BETTATI, Droit humanitaire. Textes introduits et commentés, Paris, Seuil, 2000, Collection Essais, p. 57. L’existence d’enfants-soldats induit une approche très restrictive de cette catégorie. La pratique du Tribunal pénal spécial pour la Sierra Leone permettra probablement de mieux appréhender cette logique, même si l’article 7 §1 de son Statut limite sa compétence ratione personae aux “personnes qui avaient atteint l’âge de quinze ans au moment de la commission du crime”. L’article 26 du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale élève quant à lui, la majorité pénale à dixhuit (18) ans. Ainsi, dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana (Jugement §§ 127-128), s’agissant plus particulièrement de la préfecture de Kibuye, les juges ont affirmé : “127. Les notions juridiques de ‘civils’ et de ‘population civile’ dans le contexte d’un conflit armé ont toujours fait couler beaucoup d’encre. Toutefois, le TPIR
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
559
ne suffit pas que l’attaque généralisée ou systématique ait eu pour objectif une population civile : encore faut-il que cette population civile ait été choisie “en raison de son appartenance nationale, politique, ethnique, raciale ou religieuse”. d. Motif discriminatoire La définition que le TPIR donne de la discrimination dans la qualification du crime contre l’humanité corrobore parfaitement notre affirmation selon laquelle les crimes commis à l’encontre d’autres groupes que ceux mentionnés dans la définition du génocide, entrent dans cette catégorie plus large. L’article 3 du Statut du TPIR inclut d’ailleurs expressément le groupe politique. S’agissant des quatre autres groupes – national, racial, ethnique ou religieux – qui sont communs aux crimes contre l’humanité et au génocide, la distinction se fera dans l’existence ou non de l’intention spéciale : la volonté de détruire, en tout ou en partie, le groupe en question. En l’absence de cette intention, l’accusé sera coupable d’un crime contre l’humanité et non d’un génocide. Il faut ajouter que ce motif discriminatoire constitue, conformément à la jurisprudence constante du TPIR, une limitation spéciale de sa compétence203, limitation dérogatoire au droit
203
considère, en vertu de son Statut, que les crimes contre l’humanité peuvent effectivement être commis soit dans le cadre soit en dehors d’un conflit armé. Par conséquent, le terme ‘civil’ doit être entendu comme s’appliquant tant à une situation de guerre qu’à un contexte de paix relative. La Chambre estime qu’il convient d’interpréter au sens large la notion de ‘civil’, ce qui signifie que toutes les personnes vivant à l’époque dans la préfecture de Kibuye, qui avait jusque là été épargnée par le conflit armé, étaient des civils, exception faite de celles chargées de maintenir l’ordre public et investies du pouvoir de faire usage de la force publique. A titre d’exemple, ne sont pas considérés comme des civils les éléments des FAR, du FPR, de la police et de la gendarmerie nationale. 128. Concernant le caractère civil de la population civile ciblée, la Chambre se rallie aux conclusions contenues dans le jugement Tadic où il est dit que la population visée doit essentiellement être civile, la présence de certains noncivils en son sein ne modifiant en rien son caractère civil.” Ainsi dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana (Jugement § 130), les juges ont affirmé : “Le Statut du TPIR prévoit un critère supplémentaire qu’on ne retrouve ni dans le Statut du Tribunal de Nuremberg ni dans celui du TPIY, à savoir que l’attaque soit commise pour des motifs d’ordre national, politique, ethnique, racial ou religieux.” La différence apparaît avec le TPIY où la Chambre d’appel dans l’affaire Tadic (Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic (IT-94-1-A), Arrêt,
560
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
international coutumier qui n’exige pas cet élément sauf pour la persécution. 3. Les crimes de guerre L’article 4 du Statut du TPIR incrimine de manière générale les “violations graves” de l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et de leur Protocole additionnel II de 1977 avant de dresser, dans ses alinéas a) à h), une liste non limitative d’infractions constitutives de ces violations graves. Au moins sur le papier, la compétence du TPIR en matière de crimes de guerre diffère donc 15 juillet 1999, § 305) a affirmé que : “The Prosecution was correct in submitting that the Trial Chamber erred in finding that all crimes against humanity require a discriminatory intent. Such an intent is an indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those crimes for which this is expressly required, that is, for Article 5 (h), concerning various types of persecution.” La Chambre d’appel du TPIR est revenue à la charge dans l’arrêt Akayesu (1er Juin 2001, §§ 462 et ss.), en affirmant : “462. La présente Chambre d’appel estime, toutefois, que cette jurisprudence [Tadic], ainsi que l’interprétation de l’article 5 du Statut du TPIY, sont d’une utilité limitée en l’espèce et pour l’examen, par la Chambre d’appel, de l’article 3 du Statut et, ce, du fait surtout que ces deux dispositions sont sensiblement différentes. En effet, l’article 5 du Statut du TPIY ne contient pas dans son chapeau la même condition, à savoir que les crimes contre l’humanité peuvent être poursuivis ‘lorsqu’ils ont été commis dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée et systématique dirigée contre une population civile quelle qu’elle soit, en raison de son appartenance nationale, politique, ethnique, raciale ou religieuse. […] 464. Pour la Chambre d’appel, sauf dans le cas de la persécution, le droit international humanitaire n’exige nullement que soit établie l’existence d’une intention discriminatoire comme élément constitutif de tous les crimes contre l’humanité. Dans cette mesure la Chambre d’appel reprend à son compte la conclusion et l’analyse générales figurant dans l’Arrêt Tadic, telles qu’elles sont exposées ci-dessus. Toutefois, bien qu’une telle condition ne s’attache pas au crime lui-même, des crimes contre l’humanité de toutes sortes peuvent, dans les faits, être commis dans le contexte d’une attaque discriminatoire dirigée contre une population civile. […] C’est dans ce contexte, et compte tenu de la nature des événements du Rwanda (où une population civile a effectivement été la cible d’une attaque discriminatoire), que le Conseil de sécurité a décidé de limiter la compétence du Tribunal à l’égard des crimes contre l’humanité aux seuls cas dans lesquels ils survenaient dans une situation caractérisée par la discrimination. Ce qui revient à dire que le Conseil de sécurité entendait par là que le Tribunal ne devait pas poursuivre les auteurs d’autres éventuels crimes contre l’humanité.”
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
561
substantiellement de celle du TPIY, qui est lui compétent pour connaître des “infractions graves aux Conventions de Genève” (article 2 de son Statut) et des “violations des lois ou coutumes de la guerre” (article 3 de son Statut). Parmi les affaires étudiées dans la présente chronique, des chefs d’accusation fondés sur des violations de l’article 3 commun et du Protocole II ont été émis contre Akayesu, Kayishema, Ruzindana, Rutaganda, Musema et Bagilishema. Tous ces chefs d’accusation étaient relatifs aux articles 4 a) ou 4 e) du Statut, et visaient essentiellement des meurtres, viols et autres traitements cruels ou dégradants. Pour l’instant, les jugements de première instance se sont toujours soldés par des verdicts de non culpabilité, les juges estimant que les conditions d’application de l’article 4 n’étaient pas toutes réunies. Pour sa part, la Chambre d’appel n’a eu à se prononcer qu’une seule fois sur ce fondement, dans l’affaire Akayesu. Bien que ne souscrivant pas au raisonnement de la Chambre de première instance sur la nécessité du lien entre l’auteur de l’infraction et une partie au conflit, elle n’est pas revenue sur la non-culpabilité de JeanPaul Akayesu pour ce chef d’accusation, car l’appel du Procureur ne portait que sur la réformation d’une erreur de droit. Dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana, l’appel du procureur a été rejeté car présenté hors délais. Dans l’affaire Musema, le procureur n’a pas interjeté appel. Enfin, dans l’affaire Rutaganda, l’acte d’appel du Procureur a été déposé le 6 janvier 2000, mais la décision d’appel est pour l’instant en délibéré. L’étude des jugements et arrêts précités ne nous apprend donc rien sur la définition des différentes “violations graves” incriminées à l’article 4 du Statut. En revanche, elle nous apporte de nombreux éléments sur leurs conditions d’application. Les juges ont tout d’abord logiquement examiné la valeur juridique des normes visées à l’article 4, et la possibilité d’engager une responsabilité pénale en raison de leur violation (a). Puis ils ont qualifié le contexte de commission des faits, et se sont interrogés sur l’existence d’un lien entre ce contexte et les actes reprochés aux accusés (b). Enfin, ils se sont penchés sur les conditions d’application ratione personae de l’article 4 c).
562
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
a. La démonstration imparfaite du caractère coutumier de l’incrimination Elaboré en 1994, le statut du TPIR est le premier texte de droit international à incriminer expressément des violations de dispositions du droit international humanitaire applicables dans les conflits armés internes. Dans son rapport de 1995, le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies a souligné le caractère novateur de l’article 4, qui vise “des instruments qui n’étaient pas nécessairement considérés comme faisant partie du droit international coutumier ou dont la violation n’était pas nécessairement généralement considérée comme engageant la responsabilité pénale individuelle de son auteur”204.
De fait, cet élargissement du champ d’application des crimes de guerres aux conflits non internationaux a été critiqué au motif qu’il relevait davantage de la lex ferenda que du droit positif. La question du fondement légal des incriminations de l’article 4 était donc particulièrement importante pour le Tribunal s’il ne voulait pas se voir reprocher une violation du principe cardinal nullum crimen sine lege. Or, en droit international pénal, c’est un double fondement légal qu’il convient de démontrer : il ne suffit pas d’établir l’existence de la règle violée en droit international, il faut aussi prouver qu’il s’agit d’une règle dont la violation engage la responsabilité pénale individuelle de son auteur205.
204 205
Voir S/1995/134, 13 février 1995, § 12. C’est le raisonnement qui a été suivi par le tribunal de Nuremberg. Il a estimé possible une incrimination d’actes individuels constituant des violations particulièrement graves du droit international par le mécanisme d’une norme coutumière d’incrimination venant se greffer sur celle qui régit le comportement en question (Jugement du Tribunal militaire international, in Procès des grands criminels de guerre devant le tribunal militaire international, tome I, Nuremberg, 1947, pp. 232-235 ou, en ligne et en anglais : (http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/v1menu.htm)). L’exigence de cette double démonstration est également affirmée dans le jugement Akayesu, § 611.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
563
Valeur juridique des normes visées à l’article 4 du Statut Le Rwanda ayant ratifié les Conventions de Genève de 1949 et le Protocole II au moment des faits, le fondement conventionnel des normes visées à l’article 4 est incontestable. Quant à leur caractère coutumier, il est, dans un premier temps, facilement démontré par la Chambre de première instance I dans l’affaire Akayesu206. Celle-ci rappelle d’abord que la valeur coutumière de l’article 3 commun a été établie par le TPIY207. Puis, pour démontrer le caractère coutumier des autres normes visées à l’article 4 du Statut, elle estime que ces règles sont extraites de l’article 4 § 2 du Protocole II, et que celui-ci ne fait que reprendre et compléter les dispositions de l’article 3 commun. Démonstration bien rapide, qui de plus laisse en suspens la question de la valeur des autres articles du Protocole II. Sur ce point, la Chambre de première instance I se contente en effet de reprendre à son compte l’affirmation du TPIY208 selon laquelle certaines dispositions seulement du Protocole II, qu’elle ne précise pas, possèdent un caractère coutumier. Il s’agit pourtant d’une question potentiellement intéressante pour le Tribunal, puisque la liste d’infractions jointe à l’article 4 du Statut ne présente qu’un caractère illustratif. D’autres articles du Protocole II pourraient donc faire l’objet de poursuites de la part du Procureur. L’hypothèse reste néanmoins peu vraisemblable, d’autant que les juges semblent vouloir dissuader l’accusation de se lancer sur ce chemin209. Il est vrai qu’il pourrait se révéler périlleux, particulièrement pour affirmer la valeur coutumière des dispositions invoquées. Et il suffit d’examiner le précédent fourni par l’article 4§2 du Protocole II pour s’en convaincre. On a vu que, dans Akayesu, les juges de la Chambre de première 206 207
208 209
Jugement, §§ 608-610. Dans son arrêt Tadic de 1995 (IT-94-1-AR-72, Le Procureur c. Dusko Tadic, arrêt relatif à l’appel de la défense concernant l’exception préjudicielle d’incompétence, 2 octobre 1995, §§ 99 et ss.), la Chambre d’appel du TPIY s’est livré à un examen détaillé de la pratique des États avant de dresser un exposé de l’évolution de la coutume internationale relative aux conflits armés non internationaux. Arrêt Tadic, 1995, § 117. Dans l’affaire Akayesu (Jugement §§ 609-610), la chambre I affirme que seuls les articles 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève et l’article 4§2 du Protocole II fondent la compétence ratione materiae définie à l’article 4 du Statut.
564
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
instance I ont démontré le caractère coutumier de cette disposition avec une facilité déconcertante. Mais la démonstration ne semble pas avoir totalement convaincu les juges de la Chambre de première instance II qui ont préféré se replier exclusivement sur un fondement conventionnel et se sont, au surplus, livrés à cette curieuse déclaration : “La Chambre est instruite du fait que la question de savoir si les instruments susmentionnés doivent être considérés comme des dispositions du droit international coutumier dont les violations graves engagent la responsabilité pénale des auteurs continue de faire l’objet de débats dans des cadres autres que celui du Tribunal”210.
Enfin, dans les affaires Musema et Rutaganda, jugées par la Chambre de première instance I, le caractère coutumier est affirmé du bout des lèvres, exclusivement par référence à Akayesu211. Dans tous les cas, que les faits concernent la liste de l’article 4 ou d’autres articles du Protocole II, l’auteur de l’infraction devra s’être rendu coupable d’une “violation grave” de cette disposition. Cette condition de gravité de la violation, qui semble aujourd’hui inhérente au crime de guerre en droit international, avait déjà été posée par le TPIY212 alors même que l’article 3 de son statut ne la mentionne pas expressément, contrairement à celui du TPIR. Logiquement, les juges d’Arusha213 ont repris la définition de leurs homologues de La Haye, aux termes de laquelle il faut entendre par violation grave une “infraction qui viole une règle protégeant des valeurs importantes et qui emporte de graves conséquences pour la victime”. Cette définition, qui n’en est pas vraiment une en raison de son caractère circulaire, a permis au TPIY d’écarter, dans l’affaire Celebici, le chef d’accusation de pillage au motif que les faits allégués, savoir la confiscation de bijoux ou d’argent appartenant à des détenus, ne présentaient pas ce critère de gravité214. 210 211 212 213 214
Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 156. Jugement Musema, §§ 240-241 ; Jugement Rutaganda, §§ 70-72. Tadic, Arrêt, 1995, § 94. Jugement Akayesu, § 616 ; Jugement Musema, § 286. Le Procureur c. Zejnil Delalic et al. (IT-96-21-T), Chambre de première instance II, Jugement, 16 novembre 1998, § 1154.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
565
Fondement légal de l’incrimination A la différence des quatre conventions de Genève relatives aux conflits armés internationaux, ni l’article 3 commun à ces conventions, ni le Protocole II ne prévoient de responsabilité pénale individuelle pour les auteurs d’infractions graves à leurs dispositions. La base conventionnelle est donc inopérante pour démontrer le fondement légal de l’incrimination, et il ne reste que le recours à la coutume. Pour démontrer le caractère coutumier de l’incrimination, la Chambre de première instance I s’est essentiellement appuyée, dans Akayesu215, sur les conclusions du TPIY dans l’arrêt Tadic de 1995, qui avait lui-même emprunté la démarche du Tribunal de Nuremberg216. Le TPIY s’était ainsi référé à la législation des États de l’ex-Yougoslavie et à d’autres législations nationales pour déduire le caractère coutumier de la criminalisation des violations graves des règles et principes coutumiers relatifs aux conflits internes. De nouveau, on peut donc reprocher aux juges d’Arusha d’avoir démontré le caractère coutumier de l’incrimination de l’article 4§2 du Protocole II exclusivement de manière médiane, en s’appuyant sur des précédents judiciaires, et uniquement par analogie avec la démonstration faite pour l’article 3 commun, ce qui ne nous semble pas pleinement satisfaisant. Il convient néanmoins de souligner aujourd’hui que la solution retenue par les juges d’Arusha pourrait se voir corroborer par la mention des articles 8 §2 c) et 8 §2 e) du Statut de la Cour pénale internationale et par un examen des positions des États lors des négociations de Rome, autant d’éléments qui fournissent des indices supplémentaires de la cristallisation de cette norme coutumière d’incrimination. Le principe de non rétroactivité en matière pénale interdit toutefois au TPIR d’en tenir compte pour des faits qui se sont déroulés en 1994. 215 216
Jugement, § 613. A l’instar du Protocole II et de l’article 3, la Convention de La Haye de 1907, sur laquelle les juges de Nuremberg se sont principalement appuyés, ne prévoyait aucune forme de responsabilité pénale individuelle.
566
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Enfin, dans le jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, la Chambre de première instance II qui, comme on l’a vu, avait préféré ne pas se prononcer sur le caractère coutumier des normes visées à l’article 4, reste très laconique sur la responsabilité individuelle, et ne fonde cette dernière que sur le droit pénal rwandais, qui, selon elle, incriminait toutes les infractions mentionnées à l’article 4 du Statut au moment des faits. Mais, curieusement, aucun renvoi précis au droit rwandais n’est effectué, et le TPIR ne précise pas si ces infractions étaient simplement codifiées comme crimes de droit commun ou si elles l’étaient aussi comme crimes de guerre commis à l’occasion d’un conflit armé non international, ce qui paraît toutefois peu probable217. Il est certes difficile de contester le raisonnement des juges tant la gravité des faits reprochés aux accusés (meurtres, viols commis contre des civils…) et l’universalité de leur répression rendent absurdes l’opposabilité du principe nullum crimen de même que la justification de ces infractions par le droit des conflits armés. Il n’en demeure pas moins que la référence au seul droit criminel rwandais nous semble insuffisante pour une juridiction internationale comme le TPIR dont la philosophie a toujours été de se placer sous l’empire du droit international général218.
217
218
Postérieurement au génocide, le Rwanda s’est doté d’une législation spécifique visant la poursuite et la répression du génocide et des crimes contre l’humanité commis entre le 1er Octobre 1990 et le 31 décembre 1994 : loi organique n°8/96 du 30 août 1996 sur l’organisation des poursuites des infractions constitutives du crime de génocide ou de crimes contre l’humanité, Journal Officiel de la République rwandaise, 30 août 1996 (document disponible en ligne : http://www.droit.fundp.ac.be/genocide/Index.htm). En revanche, rien ne semble avoir été fait concernant les crimes de guerre. Ainsi, pour Georges et Rosemary Abi-Saab, les statuts des TPI n’ont été conçus que comme des “supports institutionnels au droit international général, qui a gardé son autonomie et sa supériorité par rapport à eux” (G. et R. ABI-SAAB, “les crimes de guerre” in H. ASCENSIO, E. DECAUX, A. PELLET (dir.), Droit international pénal, Paris, Pédone, 2000, p. 284). De même, pour Laïty Kama, qui fut président du TPIR, la place des TPI est celle “d’organes judiciaires internationaux indépendants ayant le pouvoir d’appliquer le droit international coutumier”, ce qui est confirmé par “les rapports établis par le Secrétaire Général” qui “indiquent clairement que l’intention du CS n’est pas de créer de nouvelles normes juridiques” (L. KAMA, “le TPIR et la répression des crimes de guerre” in L. CONDORELLI, A.-M. LA ROSA, S. SCHERRER (dir.), Les Nations Unies et le droit international humanitaire, Paris, Pedone, 1996, p. 255)
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
567
b. Conditions d’application ratione contextus Pour que les textes visés à l’article 4 du Statut s’appliquent, il convient de démontrer l’existence d’un conflit armé de caractère non international. Mais la qualification de crime de guerre exige également que soit rapportée la preuve d’un lien entre l’infraction commise et le conflit armé. La qualification de conflit armé non international Selon le TPIR, c’est dans chaque affaire que l’accusation doit apporter la preuve qu’un conflit armé interne répondant à la définition requise pour l’application de l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et du Protocole II se déroulait sur le territoire rwandais au moment de la commission des faits incriminés219. Cette exigence, à condition qu’elle ne soit pas purement formelle, nous semble parfaitement justifiée. La qualification juridique de la situation ne sera en effet pas nécessairement uniforme sur l’ensemble de l’année 1994, champ de compétence ratione temporis du Tribunal. Sur la notion de conflit armé, les décisions étudiées reprennent la définition donnée par le TPIY dès l’arrêt Tadic de 1995 (§ 70) : un conflit armé se distingue des troubles et tensions internes par une différence d’intensité des hostilités et d’organisation des parties en présence ; il implique l’existence d’hostilités ouvertes entre les autorités gouvernementales et des groupes armés plus ou moins organisés ou entre de tels groupes au sein d’un Etat ; il commence dès l’ouverture des hostilités et se prolonge jusqu’à ce qu’un règlement pacifique soit atteint220. Concernant maintenant la notion de conflit armé non-international, les Chambres reconnaissent que l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève de 1949 et le Protocole II obéissent à des conditions d’application distinctes221. Pour l’article 3 commun, sont utilisés les critères proposés par le CICR dans son commentaire des Conventions
219
Jugement Akayesu, § 618. Jugement Akayesu, § 619 ; Jugement Musema, § 248. 221 Jugement Akayesu, § 607 ; Jugement Rutaganda, §§ 74-78. 220
568
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
de Genève222. Pour le Protocole II, les Chambres utilisent les critères précis énoncés à l’article 1 alinéa 1 de ce texte. Néanmoins, pour l’application de l’article 4 du Statut, qui fait référence aux deux textes, il semble que les juges d’Arusha exigent que soit démontrée la condition d’application la plus contraignante, à savoir celle du Protocole II. Ainsi, selon la Chambre de première instance I dans l’affaire Rutaganda, même si l’acte d’accusation ne comporte que des chefs d’accusation fondés sur l’article 3 commun, il convient pour l’accusation de prouver que les conditions d’application du Protocole II sont réunies, car “les conditions matérielles d’application de l’Article 4 du Statut sont indivisibles” et “il doit être satisfait aux conditions de l’Article 3 commun et du Protocole additionnel II pris ensemble pour qu’une infraction soit réputée tomber sous le coup de l’Article 4 du Statut”223. Dans Kayishema et Ruzindana, la Chambre de première instance II ne pose pas clairement cette condition de l’indivisibilité mais ne se penche que sur les conditions d’application du Protocole II, et non sur celles de l’article 3 commun224. Si cette condition d’indivisibilité de la qualification, qui semble se dessiner, est confirmée par la jurisprudence ultérieure du TPIR, il sera donc nécessaire de rapporter la preuve du contrôle d’une partie du territoire par les forces non-gouvernementales pour que des condamnations sur le fondement de l’article 4 du Statut puissent être prononcées225. Pour les crimes commis entre le 7 avril 1994 et le 18 juillet 1994, date de l’entrée victorieuse du FPR dans Kigali, la condition d’indivisibilité de la qualification posée par le TPIR ne suscitera pas de difficultés car il ne fait aucun doute qu’un conflit non international
222 223 224 225
Jugement Akayesu, § 619 ; Jugement Rutaganda, § 75. Jugement Rutaganda, § 424. Voir Jugement, §§ 170-172. On peut remarquer que cette condition de contrôle du territoire, propre au Protocole II, ne figure plus dans les définitions des conflits armés non internationaux des articles 8d et 8f du statut de la CPI, qui doivent servir respectivement de référence pour l’application des violations incriminées aux articles 8 c) et 8 e). Néanmoins, cette évolution n’est nullement opposable aux juges du TPIR, qui ne sont liés que par le Statut du tribunal.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
569
de type Protocole II se déroulait alors au Rwanda226. Tous les actes d’accusation émis jusqu’à présent concernent cette période. Néanmoins, la compétence ratione temporis du Tribunal s’étend du 1er janvier au 31 décembre 1994 et le Procureur pourrait prochainement décider de lancer des poursuites contre des membres du FPR pour des crimes commis après le 18 juillet227. Pourra-t-on encore considérer qu’il y a conflit armé et, surtout, que la condition du contrôle du territoire par les forces rebelles, nécessaire pour identifier un conflit armé de type Protocole II, est toujours remplie ? Le lien entre l’infraction et le conflit armé : la preuve impossible ? C’est l’établissement de ce lien qui fait la spécificité des crimes de guerre et qui permet de les distinguer des crimes de droit commun commis à l’occasion d’un conflit armé228. De manière générale, les juges des deux tribunaux pénaux internationaux estiment qu’il n’est pas nécessaire de démontrer que les infractions se déroulent à proximité immédiate du terrain des hostilités. Le droit international humanitaire s’applique en effet sur l’ensemble du territoire de la Haute Partie contractante et la connexité entre l’infraction et le conflit sera établie y compris dans le cas où les crimes sont liés à des hostilités se déroulant dans d’autres parties du territoire229. La notion de connexité avec le conflit n’en reste pas moins difficile à cerner. Dans les différentes affaires du TPIR étudiées, les juges 226
227
228
229
C’est d’ailleurs la conclusion à laquelle les chambres parviennent dans les affaires étudiées : voir Jugement Akayesu, § 627 ; Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 597 ; Jugement Musema, §§ 244-258. Après de longues tergiversations, les premières mises en accusation de membres du FPR devraient intervenir prochainement. Voir l’entretien que Diplomatie judiciaire a eu avec Carla del Ponte (4 décembre 2002), dans lequel elle fait expressément état d’enquêtes sur les crimes que le FPR aurait commis, et qui justifient la crise avec Kigali. Cf. Diplomatie Judiciaire (http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com/Tpir/Parquet47.htm). Cet élément a été rappelé par la Commission préparatoire de la Cour pénale internationale, qui a estimé lors de sa première session que ce lien de connexité était un élément constitutif fondamental de tout crime de guerre (Deuxième rapport de synthèse : PCNICC/1999/WGE/RT.2). Sur ce point, voir, pour le TPIR : Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, §§ 183185 ; Jugement Musema, §§ 259-262 et pour le TPIY : Arrêt Tadic, 1995, § 70 ; Jugement Delalic et consorts (Celebici), 16 novembre 1998, § 193.
570
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
refusent de définir in abstracto le lien de connexité, ce qui leur permet d’en apprécier souverainement l’existence au cas par cas, sur la base des faits présentés par le Procureur230. Dans l’affaire Musema231, les juges ont estimé, sans plus de précision, que le Procureur n’avait pas démontré, au delà de tout doute raisonnable, l’existence d’un tel lien entre les crimes reprochés à l’ancien directeur de l’usine à thé de Gisovu et le conflit armé. Dans l’affaire Rutaganda232, les juges reconnaissent que l’accusé était vice-Président des milices Interahamwe, qu’à ce titre il exerçait une autorité sur celles-ci, et qu’enfin ces milices ont effectivement participé à l’effort de guerre contre le FPR aux côtés des FAR ainsi qu’aux tueries de tutsi et d’opposants hutu. Néanmoins, ils estiment que ces éléments ne sauraient constituer ipso facto des preuves du lien de connexité entre les crimes et le conflit armé, et que le Procureur n’a pas en l’espèce établi au delà de tout doute raisonnable que les massacres visés dans l’accusation avaient été perpétrés à l’occasion du soutien des Interahamwe aux FAR dans le conflit contre le FPR. Dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana, les deux accusés étaient poursuivis pour les exactions commises entre avril et juin 1994 au stade de la ville de Kibuye, à l’église de Mubuga et dans la région de Bisesero. Dans son mémoire de clôture, le Procureur avait estimé que ces crimes étaient liés au conflit armé, au motif que les victimes avaient subi des attaques qui “ont eu lieu parce que des hostilités avaient éclaté entre le FPR et les FAR et que les Tutsis étaient recherchés sous le prétexte qu’ils étaient les complices du FPR, qu’ils étaient ‘l’ennemi’ et/ou qu’ils étaient responsables de la mort du Président”233.
Néanmoins, pour les juges de la Chambre de première instance II, le fait que les victimes aient été recherchées et massacrées sous le prétexte qu’elles étaient des complices du FPR ne constitue pas une preuve suffisante de l’existence d’un lien de connexité direct entre les 230 231 232 233
Voir aussi Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, (§ 189) et Jugement Musema, (§ 262) qui reprennent le Jugement dans l’affaire Rutaganda. Jugement § 974. Jugement, §§ 439-444. Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 165.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
571
crimes imputés et le conflit, et il aurait fallu établir que les victimes étaient réellement des complices du FPR234. Ce faisant, le TPIR s’écarte de la solution retenue par le TPIY pour qui, “s’il peut être établi (…) que l’auteur du crime a agi dans l’optique de servir un conflit armé ou sous le couvert de celui-ci, cela suffit pour conclure que ses actes étaient étroitement liés au conflit”235.
Or il est intéressant de remarquer que l’option choisie par les juges d’Arusha réduit considérablement la probabilité d’aboutir à une qualification de crime de guerre dans le contexte rwandais de 1994, où la plupart des victimes étaient des civils qui ne présentaient aucun lien avec les troupes du FPR. Si l’on ajoute à cette interprétation très restrictive de la connexité le fait que les juges de première instance ont également tenté de faire du lien entre l’auteur de l’infraction et l’une des parties au conflit une condition autonome d’application de l’article 4 du Statut236, on en viendrait presque à se demander s’il n’y a pas un “tabou” des crimes de guerre devant le TPIR… Il n’est pas exclu que des arguments de politique pénale, qui peuvent s’expliquer, sinon se justifier, par la particularité du contexte rwandais, aient ici davantage pesé que des considérations strictement juridiques. Deux catégories simultanées d’événements se sont en effet déroulés au Rwanda en 1994 : d’une part le conflit armé proprement dit entre l’armée régulière rwandaise (FAR) et le FPR, qui luttaient pour le pouvoir dans le pays ; d’autre part une chasse à l’homme systématique, orchestrée par les autorités civiles et militaires, et dont le but était de massacrer des civils sans armes, spécifiquement désignés. Or, comme les chefs d’accusation de crimes de guerre et de génocide visent le plus souvent les mêmes faits, nous nous demandons finalement si le TPIR n’est pas réticent à admettre la double
234 235 236
Id., § 603. Le Procureur c. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac et Zoran Vukovic (IT-96-23) et (IT-96-23/1-A), Chambre d’Appel, Arrêt, 12 Juin 2002, § 58. Cette condition supplémentaire posée par les juges de première instance pour la qualification de crime de guerre a néanmoins été censurée par la Chambre d’appel dans l’arrêt Akayesu : voir la partie de cette chronique relative à la responsabilité individuelle pour de plus longs développements sur cette question.
572
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
qualification, pourtant juridiquement possible237. Diverses raisons peuvent expliquer ces réticences, au premier rang desquelles figure sans doute la crainte que la double qualification ne vienne diminuer la portée de l’accusation de génocide et ne donne une prise à la stratégie de défense des génocidaires hutu, selon laquelle tous les civils tutsi étaient des complices de l’envahisseur FPR.238 De manière plus stratégique, il y a peut-être également la volonté de ne pas créer un motif de rupture entre le TPIR et l’actuel régime rwandais, pour qui l’évocation d’un lien entre les actes de génocide et le conflit armé est inadmissible. Néanmoins, il semble bien artificiel de dissocier complètement ces deux événements concomitants et donc nécessairement imbriqués. On peut d’ailleurs relever certaines contradictions troublantes dans la jurisprudence du TPIR. Ainsi, dans le Jugement Rutaganda, la Chambre de première instance I déclare que “le génocide des Tutsis est indéniablement lié au conflit entre les FAR et le FPR” (§ 482) avant de rejeter le chef d’accusation fondé sur l’article 4 faute pour le Procureur d’avoir démontré le lien entre l’infraction et le conflit. Pourtant, l’accusé a été reconnu coupable de génocide, pour les mêmes faits ! A l’inverse, dans le jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, les juges de la Chambre de première instance II estiment que les infractions qui fondent la qualification de génocide “ont été commises parallèlement au déroulement du conflit armé et non en conséquence de celui-ci”239. On est ainsi en droit de se demander si les crimes de guerre n’ont pas été éclipsés par la priorité donnée au génocide et si le verdict des juges eût été identique dans l’impossibilité de prouver la qualification de génocide. Cette intuition se trouve confortée par l’examen de deux 237 238
239
Voir infra les développements relatifs au concours d’infractions. Avant même les premiers procès, ce souci avait été exprimé par Frederik Harhoff in “Le tribunal international pour le Rwanda : présentation de certains aspects juridiques”, RICR n°828, décembre 1997, pp. 711-720 (http://www.cicr.org/fre/revue) : “les aspects juridiques du génocide risqueraient de devenir bien obscurs si les victimes étaient, d’une part, simplement considérées comme des victimes collatérales d’un conflit armé en cours et, d’autre part, considérées en même temps comme des victimes d’une tentative visant à détruire, en tout ou en partie, un groupe national, ethnique, racial ou religieux, comme tel.” Jugement, § 621.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
573
arrêts récents rendus par des tribunaux belges et suisses sur le drame rwandais, deux affaires dans lesquelles la condamnation pour génocide était exclue puisque ce crime n’était pas intégré à la législation pénale de ces deux pays au moment des faits… Le 27 avril 2001, le Tribunal militaire de cassation suisse condamnait définitivement, pour des faits similaires à ceux de l’affaire Akayesu, un ancien bourgmestre rwandais pour crimes de guerre en appliquant pourtant à la lettre les conditions définies par les Chambres de première instance du TPIR…240. Le 7 juin 2001, la Cour d’assises de Bruxelles condamnait pour sa part, par un jugement non motivé par écrit dont les médias se sont largement fait l’écho (procès des “quatre de Butare”241), un professeur d’université, un industriel et deux religieuses pour crimes de guerre sur le fondement de la loi belge de 1993 qui réprime les violations graves du droit international humanitaire242. Pour le TPIR, l’épreuve de vérité en matière de crimes de guerre viendra le jour où il devra juger des membres du FPR. Il sera vraisemblablement impossible d’établir la qualification de génocide pour ces actes, et celle de crime de guerre pourrait dès lors retrouver grâce aux yeux des juges d’Arusha. En attendant, l’appréciation très restrictive du lien de connexité ne nous semble guère satisfaisante sur le plan juridique. Et n’oublions pas qu’au delà des faits particuliers du contexte rwandais, l’argumentation juridique développée par le TPIR se doit aussi de constituer un modèle de référence pour l’avenir. c. Conditions d’application ratione personae tenant à la qualité de la victime Pour qu’une exaction tombe sous le coup de l’article 4 du Statut du TPIR, elle devra avoir pour cible une personne protégée par les textes visés par cet article. L’alinéa premier de l’article 3 commun aux 240 241 242
Cf. § 9 d) de l’arrêt. Texte intégral dans la base de données “national implementation” du CICR : (http://www.cicr.org/ihl-nat). Voir par exemple (http://www.fidh.org/afriq/dossiers/rwanda/rwanda.htm). Le gouvernement belge a d’ailleurs manifesté son désaccord avec l’appréciation de la connexité faite par le TPIR en déposant un avis d’amicus curiae dans l’affaire Semanza (ICTR-97-20), avis déposé le 16 octobre 2000).
574
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Conventions de Genève de 1949 confère une protection aux “personnes qui ne participent pas directement aux hostilités” et l’article 4 du Protocole II vise quant à lui “toutes les personnes qui ne participent pas directement ou ne participent plus aux hostilités”. Il s’agit de la définition classique de la personne civile243, notion charnière du droit international humanitaire. Les juges souscrivent à cette définition négative de la personne protégée244. Mais, au surplus, dans les Jugements Rutaganda et Musema, les juges ont avancé leur propre définition de la victime, qui faisait écho à la définition de l’auteur qu’ils avaient élaborée245. L’on sait en effet que les juges de première instance ont tenté de limiter la catégorie des auteurs de crimes de guerre aux agents publics de jure ou de facto de l’une ou l’autre des parties au conflit. Néanmoins, le rejet de cette définition de l’auteur par les juges d’appel dans l’affaire Akayesu a, par un effet de ricochet, rendu caduque celle de la victime, et il convient donc d’en revenir à la définition négative classique. Celle-ci autorise d’ailleurs plus de souplesse dans la reconnaissance de la qualité de victime, ce qui est conforme à l’esprit du droit humanitaire. L’affaire Rutaganda nous fournit un exemple de cette appréciation souple : les juges ont considéré que le fait pour des civils de porter des armes ne les excluait pas automatiquement du statut de personne protégée et qu’en l’occurrence “le port de ces armes était la preuve d’une tentative désespérée et vaine de leur part pour survivre face aux milliers d’assaillants”246. Enfin, dans un conflit interne comme celui du Rwanda, victimes et bourreaux partagent généralement la même nationalité. Il n’est donc absolument pas possible d’appliquer dans ce contexte la logique de la 4ème Convention de Genève, qui ne protège que les ressortissants civils de la partie adverse. Dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana247, la Chambre de première instance II ne semble pourtant pas avoir retenu 243 244 245
246 247
Bien qu’elle pose certains problèmes : voir supra les développements consacrés à la population civile dans la partie relative aux crimes contre l’humanité. Voir Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana §§ 177-181. “La chambre entendra par ‘personne civile’ toute personne n’appartenant pas à la catégorie des ‘auteurs’ définie supra”, Jugement Rutaganda, § 84. Voir aussi Jugement Musema §§ 276-281. Jugement, § 426. Jugement, §§ 621 et 622.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
575
cette position lorsqu’elle estime que les crimes commis au Rwanda, parce qu’ils l’ont été par les autorités rwandaises contre sa propre population civile, ne relèvent pas du droit international humanitaire mais des droits de l’homme. Cette analyse a pourtant été récemment rappelée par la Chambre d’appel du TPIY pour qui “[l]’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève vise à fournir des garanties minimales aux personnes qui, sans y participer activement, sont prises dans un conflit armé. Il s’applique à toute personne qui ne participe pas aux hostilités et par conséquent son champ d’application déborde celui envisagé par le IVème Convention de Genève incorporée dans l’article 2 du Statut […]”248.
B. Le concours d’infractions Dans le cas, fréquent, où un même fait revêt plusieurs qualifications juridiques sous des chefs d’accusation différents, les juges ne doivent-ils retenir qu’une seule desdites qualifications ou peuvent-ils reconnaître l’accusé coupable de toutes les infractions susceptibles de découler du même fait ? Telle est la question soulevée par le concours idéal d’infractions, et qui se résout différemment selon qu’il s’agit d’un concours interne au génocide249 ou d’un concours entre les trois grandes catégories de crimes prévues au statut. Le concours d’infractions interne au génocide a déjà été évoqué supra dans cette chronique. Les juges ont clairement rejeté la possibilité d’être condamné cumulativement, pour un même fait, comme auteur principal et complice de génocide250. En revanche, l’affaire Akayesu a montré que les incriminations de génocide et d’incitation publique et directe à commettre le génocide pouvaient se
248 249 250
Le Procureur c. Zejnil Delalic et al. (IT-96-21), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 20 février 2001, § 420. C’est à dire d’un concours entre les différentes infractions visées à l’article 2§3 du Statut. Jugement Akayesu, § 469 ; Jugement Musema, § 291 ; Jugement Bagilishema, § 67. Soulignons toutefois que la solution semble différente dans le cas d’un plaidoyer de culpabilité. En effet, dans le jugement du 4 septembre 1998 condamnant Jean Kambanda, les juges n’ont pas remis en cause le plaidoyer de culpabilité qu’il avait fait à la fois pour génocide et complicité de génocide.
576
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
cumuler, même si le cas n’est pas comparable puisque ces deux infractions s’appuient nécessairement sur des faits différents251. Le concours d’infractions entre deux crimes différents mérite une attention particulière car il a divisé la première et la deuxième Chambre de première instance du TPIR avant que la Chambre d’appel ne mette un terme au différend dans l’arrêt Musema. La Chambre de première instance II s’est en effet nettement écartée de la solution retenue par sa consœur la Chambre de première instance I, qui s’était alignée sur la position du TPIY, dans le jugement qu’elle a rendu en l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana. Dans cette affaire, l’acte d’accusation qualifie les mêmes faits à la fois de meurtre et d’extermination, et les incrimine tant sur le fondement du génocide que du crime contre l’humanité. La Chambre de première instance II n’a finalement retenu que le chef de génocide car, selon elle, “les chefs d’extermination et d’assassinat sont […] entièrement compris dans celui de génocide, et constituent, en l’occurrence, une seule et même infraction”252. A première vue, une telle solution paraît étonnante lorsque l’on sait que la Chambre de première instance II a défendu une position de principe similaire à celle adoptée dans l’affaire Akayesu253 par la Chambre de première instance I, selon laquelle un accusé ne peut être reconnu coupable de différentes infractions pour les mêmes faits que si les éléments constitutifs des infractions visées ou les intérêts que la société cherche à protéger à travers ces dispositions sont différents254. Or, dans les jugements Musema, Rutaganda, Akayesu, Kambanda et Serushago, la Chambre 251 252 253
254
Nous pensons de même que le cumul entre le génocide, ou la complicité de génocide, et les autres infractions formelles de l’article 2§3 sera possible. Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, 1999, § 648. Dans Akayesu (Jugement, § 468), la chambre juge “qu’il est acceptable de convaincre l’Accusé de deux infractions à raison des mêmes faits dans les circonstances ci-après: 1) les infractions comportent des éléments constitutifs différents; ou 2) les dispositions créant les infractions protègent des intérêts distincts, ou 3) il est nécessaire d’obtenir une condamnation pour les deux infractions pour rendre pleinement compte du comportement de l’Accusé. Toutefois, la Chambre juge qu’il n’est pas justifiable de convaincre un accusé de deux infractions à raison des mêmes faits si a) l’une des infractions est une infraction mineure constitutive de l’autre [...], ou si b) une infraction engage la responsabilité du chef de complicité et l’autre infraction la responsabilité en tant qu’auteur principal”. Jugement Kayishema et Ruzindana, § 627.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
577
de première instance II a prononcé des condamnations multiples pour génocide et crime contre l’humanité (extermination). En réalité, la divergence s’explique par le fait que les deux Chambres de première instance n’ont pas utilisé la même méthode de comparaison des éléments constitutifs des infractions. Curieusement, la Chambre de première instance II ne procède pas à cette comparaison de manière abstraite, en vérifiant que l’un au moins des éléments constitutifs d’une des infractions en concours se distingue, sur le papier, des éléments constitutifs de l’autre infraction, mais in concreto, en fonction des faits de l’espèce255. La Chambre de première instance II constate en effet que les actes incriminés correspondent aux éléments constitutifs des deux infractions pour en déduire que les éléments du crime d’extermination et d’assassinat sont, en l’espèce, inclus dans ceux du génocide. Ce raisonnement nous semble erroné. En effet, si le problème du concours de qualifications se pose, c’est justement parce que les définitions des crimes visés au Statut se recoupent partiellement. L’analyse concrète proposée par la Chambre de première instance II s’apparente en réalité à une simple opération de qualification. Elle ne permet de distinguer que la partie commune des éléments constitutifs, et non leur partie autonome. Cette solution a d’ailleurs été contestée par le juge Khan dans son opinion dissidente, ainsi que par le Procureur. Mais, l’appel de ce dernier ayant été rejeté dans l’affaire Kayishema et Ruzindana car présenté hors délais, il faudra attendre l’arrêt Musema pour connaître la position de la Chambre d’appel sur la question. Cette dernière retient, comme il fallait s’y attendre, la méthode abstraite de comparaison et reprend les conclusions rendues par la Chambre d’appel du TPIY dans l’affaire Celebici256. 255
256
Cf. § 636 : “le génocide et les crimes contre l’humanité peuvent coïncider dans certaines situations mais pas dans d’autres […] en conséquence, le concours des deux types d’infractions sera toujours fonction des faits propres à chaque cause et de la preuve particulière sur laquelle l’accusation choisit de faire fond pour établir les crimes allégués”. Le cumul est possible seulement “si chacune des dispositions comporte un élément constitutif matériellement distinct qui fait défaut dans l’autre. Un élément est matériellement distinct d’un autre s’il exige la preuve d’un fait que n’exige pas l’autre” (Le Procureur c. Zejnil Delalic et al. (IT-96-21), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 20 février 2001, § 412). “Lorsque ce critère n’est pas rempli, la Chambre doit décider de quelle infraction elle déclarera l’accusé coupable. Elle
578
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
Deux exemples issus de la jurisprudence du TPIY permettront de mieux comprendre cette comparaison des éléments constitutifs. Dans l’arrêt Kupreskic257, la Chambre d’appel du TPIY infirme la conclusion des juges de première instance qui ont déclaré impossible le cumul du meurtre comme violation des lois et coutumes de la guerre (article 3 du Statut) et de l’acte inhumain comme crime contre l’humanité (article 5 du Statut). Elle estime en effet que l’article 3 exige un lien étroit entre l’infraction et le conflit armé, élément qui n’est pas requis par l’article 5 tandis que, pour sa part, l’article 5 exige la preuve que l’acte incriminé soit commis dans le cadre d’une attaque généralisée et systématique contre la population civile, ce qui n’est pas le cas de l’article 3. En conséquence, le cumul des condamnations est possible pour les mêmes faits sur le fondement des articles 3 et 5 du Statut du TPIY. En revanche, dans l’arrêt Celebici258, la même Chambre d’appel estime que le cumul entre les qualifications d’homicide intentionnel et de meurtre fondées sur les articles 2 et 3 du Statut n’est pas envisageable. En effet, on ne peut relever qu’une seule différence dans les définitions respectives : l’article 2 exige que les actes criminels soient commis contre une personne protégée tandis que l’article 3 requiert que la victime soit une personne ne prenant pas une part active aux hostilités. Les personnes protégées étant nécessairement des individus qui ne prennent pas une part active aux hostilités, la définition de l’article 3 est certes plus large mais elle ne contient pas “d’élément matériellement distinct”, car elle n’exige pas la preuve d’un fait qui n’est pas requis par la définition de l’article 2. Il convient donc de retenir l’article 2 car sa définition est plus spécifique.
257
258
doit le faire en partant du principe qu’elle doit se fonder sur la disposition la plus spécifique. Ainsi, si un ensemble de faits est régi par deux dispositions dont l’une comporte un élément supplémentaire matériellement distinct, la Chambre se fondera uniquement sur cette dernière disposition pour déclarer l’accusé coupable” (id., § 413). Le Procureur c. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic et Vladimir Santic (IT-95-16-A), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 23 octobre 2001, § 386. Le Procureur c. Zejnil Delalic et al. (IT-96-21), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 20 février 2001, § 420.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
579
La jurisprudence des deux tribunaux pénaux est donc désormais claire en la matière. Le cumul des qualifications est autorisé de manière générale dans les actes d’accusation259 et les juges peuvent prononcer, si les conditions examinées ci-dessus sont remplies, des condamnations multiples, en appliquant ensuite la confusion des peines. Il convient néanmoins de remarquer que la comparaison des éléments constitutifs des différentes infractions ne fournira pas nécessairement la même réponse pour le Statut du TPIR et pour celui du TPIY. En effet, les définitions des crimes ne sont pas identiques dans les deux Statuts, notamment pour les crimes contre l’humanité. En définitive, l’admission, selon une doctrine assez libérale, du cumul des condamnations renforce le maillage de la répression internationale260 et évite aux juges d’avoir à établir une hiérarchie des infractions, comme ils auraient dû le faire s’ils avaient opté pour la solution de certaines législations pénales qui, en cas de concours idéal, ne retiennent que l’infraction la plus grave261. Néanmoins, au regard des difficultés soulevées par un éventuel cumul des qualifications de crime de guerre et de génocide dans le contexte rwandais, on peut se demander si le temps n’est pas venu pour un grand débat sur cette question, légitime, de la hiérarchisation.
LES PEINES Une fois la culpabilité déterminée, il est prévu que le TPIR puisse punir le coupable en adoptant une peine ou une sanction (article 22), celles-ci devant être motivées, adoptées à la majorité des juges et lues en audience publique. De la jurisprudence, il appert qu’il n’y a point de nuance entre peine et sanction, sauf à considérer les procès pénaux incidents tels que la mise en cause de la responsabilité d’un Conseil
259 260
261
Arrêt Musema, § 369. De manière plus cynique, les mauvaises langues diront que le cumul permet aussi de compenser le manque de préparation manifeste de certains actes d’accusation du Procureur… Voir la comparaison des législations nationales dans l’affaire Celebici (IT-96-21), Chambre d’appel, Arrêt, 20 février 2001, §§ 406 et ss.
580
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
pour violation du code de déontologie262 ou encore le faux témoignage. Le Statut ajoute que le Tribunal s’inspire, dans la détermination des peines, de la grille générale du système pénal rwandais, avec une double nuance : d’une part seules des peines d’emprisonnement peuvent être imposées, d’autre part le Tribunal devra tenir compte de la gravité des crimes (principe de proportionnalité) et de la situation personnelle de l’accusé (principe de l’individualisation) (article 23). La première nuance se justifie d’abord par l’existence de la peine capitale dans le droit pénal rwandais263. La seconde nuance offre une bien grande latitude aux juges dans la mesure où elle est vague et imprécise. C’est ainsi que malgré tous les arguments que la défense a pu avancer pour amoindrir les peines des accusés, les juges ont longtemps oscillé entre douze (12) ans d’emprisonnement et la perpétuité, tandis que le TPIY a même pu considérer qu’un condamné avait purgé sa peine, sa détention provisoire ayant duré plus longtemps que les trente (30) mois d’emprisonnement qui lui avaient été infligés264 : on aurait même pu l’imaginer demander à être indemnisé pour le surplus ! Le seul fait qu’il y ait eu génocide au Rwanda et que toutes les personnes condamnées à ce jour, l’aient été en partie sur la base de la Convention de 1948, ne saurait justifier cette discrimination résultant de la plus grande sévérité des peines appliquées au TPIR. Si la justice pénale a pour objectif soit la réparation soit la dissuasion, il convient de s’interroger sur l’impact des peines prises devant le TPIR, et de se demander si la volonté de dissuader ne l’emporte pas sur celle de réparer, et si la volonté de dissuader milite en faveur de la réconciliation que le Conseil de sécurité fait apparaître dans la Résolution 955 comme l’un des buts qui sous-tendent la création du Tribunal. Il convient aussi d’appréhender le paradoxe de la justice pénale internationale : il est entendu que le TPIR juge les “gros poissons” des événements de 1994 262
263 264
Il est exclu de corps des conseils du Tribunal, ou il se voit imposer une amende, ou encore ses honoraires ne lui sont pas payés. Ainsi constitue une violation dudit Code, le fait pour un Conseil de partager ses honoraires avec un accusé, ou même de ne pas signaler une proposition de l’accusé pour un tel partage, au cas où il n’accèderait pas au chantage. Cette limitation a fondé en partie l’opposition du gouvernement rwandais au Statut du TPIR. Le Procureur c. Zlatko Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1-T), Jugement, 25 juin 1999.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
581
au Rwanda, qui échappent ainsi à la peine de mort au Rwanda, tandis que les seconds couteaux, jugés au Rwanda, sont eux exécutés. Il ne s’agit pas de prôner une standardisation maximale en imposant la peine de mort au TPIR, mais de mettre le doigt sur une injustice majeure qui discrédite quelque peu la communauté internationale. Il nous semble que celle-ci gagnerait à militer pour une standardisation minimale qui ferait échapper ces criminels de second ordre à la peine capitale. Au delà de ce paradoxe, l’échelle des peines révèle une certaine hiérarchie entre les crimes du droit international pénal. Ainsi le génocide, “crime des crimes” et les crimes contre l’humanité sont au sommet, tandis que les crimes de guerre constituent les crimes les moins sanctionnés265. Ainsi qu’il est affirmé dans le jugement Kambanda (§ 14) : “Il ne semble pas douteux à la Chambre que les violations de l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève et du Protocole additionnel II, malgré leur gravité, soient considérés comme des crimes moindres que le génocide ou le crime contre l’humanité. Par contre, il lui paraît plus difficile d’établir une hiérarchie entre le génocide et le crime contre l’humanité quant à leur gravité respective”.
Pourtant dans une autre affaire, les juges diront que : “la Chambre ne considère pas qu’un acte quelconque de génocide, les crimes contre l’humanité et ou les violations de l’article 3 commun aux Conventions de Genève et du Protocole additionnel II constituent des formes mineures les uns des autres. Le Statut du Tribunal n’établit pas une hiérarchie des normes; il traite toutes les trois infractions sur un pied d’égalité.”266
Pourtant, ce second niveau de hiérarchie semble bel et bien exister en pratique. D’une part, il apparaît dans les stratégies du Procureur et de la Défense : les négociations sur le plaidoyer de culpabilité font apparaître que chacune des parties considère le génocide comme le plus grave des crimes pour lequel le condamné encourt une peine maximale. Ainsi Serushago a accepté de plaider coupable pour les 265 266
Akayesu, Décision relative à la condamnation, 2 octobre 1998, §§ 7-10. Jugement Akayesu, § 470.
582
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
crimes contre l’humanité, à condition que le Procureur retire les chefs d’accusation de génocide. De même dans la politique pénale des juges, il appert que le génocidaire encourt la peine maximale tandis que le criminel contre l’humanité encourt une peine moindre. Toutefois l’inhumanité demeure sans échelle de valeur. Enfin, dans l’exécution des peines, il peut apparaître aussi une discrimination qui ne dit pas son nom. L’article 26 du Statut prévoit que les peines seront exécutées au Rwanda, ou à défaut dans un Etat qui a signé un accord à cet égard avec le Tribunal. On peut douter que les peines puissent être convenablement exécutées dans un Rwanda où les seconds couteaux sont condamnés à mort… Il n’en demeure pas moins que selon le pays où la peine sera exécutée, le condamné pourra être soumis à un régime pénitentiaire différent et à un système de grâce et de commutation des peines plus ou moins avantageux. L’article 27 prévoit en effet que les détenus puissent bénéficier de tout régime de faveur que permettrait le régime carcéral sous lequel ils purgent leur peine, sous réserve de l’accord préalable du TPIR. Or tous les pays ne sont pas logés à la même enseigne à cet égard. La différence est plus flagrante entre les pays du Nord et ceux du Sud. Ainsi un détenu au Suède a de fortes chances de sortir plus tôt de prison qu’un détenu au Cameroun, où il n’est pas garanti qu’un système de commutation des peines soit effectif, même s’il existe dans les textes. Or en l’état actuel, c’est-à-dire en décembre 2002, seuls des pays africains ont formellement signé des accords avec le TPIR pour faire exécuter les peines sur leur territoire267. Autrement dit, le droit international pénal, même s’il bénéficie de la contribution, de la profusion de juridictions pénales internationales dans son processus d’autonomisation et d’uniformisation, est loin d’assurer une justice égale pour tous et partout.
267
Il s’agit du Mali et du Bénin ; cf. supra pp. 506 et ss.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
583
ANNEXES Note sur le référencement des affaires du TPIR. L’Article 23 § 4 de la Directive à l’intention du Greffe relative à la Division des Services Juridiques et Judiciaires régit la question. Il y est prévu que la référence soit Juridiction – Année – Numéro de dossier par ordre chronologique – Stade de la procédure. En conséquence la référence en français devrait commencer par TPIR, tandis que la référence en anglais par ICTR. Conformément à la pratique, et à une lecture au second degré de cette disposition, le mode de citation anglais prévaut. Article 23 § 4. Aux fins de l’attribution d’un numéro à un dossier, les symboles ci-après sont utilisés : (par exemple ICTR-95-14-R61) : TPIR
=
Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda
95
=
Année de l’acte d’accusation, c’est-à-dire 1995
14
=
Numéro du dossier suivant l’ordre chronologique, c’est-à-dire qu’il s’agit de la 14ème affaire portée devant le Tribunal
A
=
Appel (suivi de l’Article pertinent, s’il y a lieu, par exemple AR108 = Appel en vertu de l’Article 108)
T
=
Procès
P
=
Phase de mise en accusation
I
=
Acte d’accusation
R61
=
Débats au titre de l’Article 61
D
=
Débats relatifs au dessaisissement (Article 10)
DP
=
Procédure relative à l’Article 40 bis (détention provisoire)
584
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
ANNEXE 1 – AFFAIRES TERMINEES (AU 31 DECEMBRE 2002) AKAYESU Jean-Paul (ICTR-96-4) Né en 1953 à Taba, Bourgmestre de Taba, il est arrêté le 10 octobre 1995 en Zambie, transféré le 26 mai 1996, avec une comparution initiale le 30 mai 1996. Son procès devant la Chambre de première instance I, commence le 9 janvier 1997, et aboutit à un jugement (2 septembre 1998) qui le reconnaît coupable de crime de génocide, d’incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide, et de crimes contre l’humanité (extermination, assassinat, torture, viol et autres actes inhumains). Il est condamné à la prison à vie le 2 octobre 1998 (sentence). Il fait appel, mais la Chambre d’appel ne fait droit à aucun de ses moyens et confirme à la fois le jugement et la sentence (arrêt du 1er juin 2001). Dans cet arrêt, il est partiellement fait droit aux moyens du Procureur, sans pour autant modifier la condamnation ni la sentence. Le condamné purge sa peine au Mali depuis le 9 décembre 2001. BAGILISHEMA Ignace (ICTR-95-1) Né dans la commune de Mabanza, Préfecture de Kibuye, Bourgmestre de Mabanza, il est arrêté en Afrique du Sud le 20 février 1999, et transféré le 20 février 1999, avec une comparution initiale le 1er avril 1999. Son procès a débuté le 28 octobre 1999. Il a été acquitté le 7 juin 2001 sur les sept chefs d’accusation qui pesaient contre lui : génocide, complicité de génocide, crimes contre l’humanité (assassinat, extermination et autres actes inhumains), et de crimes de guerre (atteinte à la vie, à la santé, au bien-être physique et mental, et atteinte à la dignité de la personne). Cet acquittement a été confirmé en appel par un arrêt du 3 juillet 2002 dont les motifs ne sont rendus publics qu’en décembre 2002. KAMBANDA Jean (ICTR-97-23) Né le 19 octobre 1955 à Butare, il fut Premier Ministre du gouvernement intérimaire entre le 8 avril et le 17 juillet 1994. Il est arrêté au Kenya le 18 juillet 1997 et transféré le jour même. Sa comparution initiale a eu lieu le 1er mai 1998 et il a plaidé coupable pour tous les chefs d’accusation : génocide, entente en vue de
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
585
commettre le génocide, incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide, complicité de génocide, crimes contre l’humanité (assassinat et extermination). Il a été condamné à la prison à vie le 4 septembre 1998, décision confirmée en appel le 19 octobre 2000. Il purge sa peine au Mali depuis le 9 décembre 2001. KAYISHEMA Clément (ICTR-95-1) Né en 1954 à Kibuye, il en fut le Préfet. Il est arrêté le 2 mai 1996 en Zambie, transféré au TPIR le 26 mai 1996, sa comparution initiale ayant eu lieu le 31 mai 1996. Son procès joint à celui de Ruzindana a commencé le 9 avril 1997. Il a été reconnu coupable de quatre chefs d’accusation de génocide, et condamné à la prison à vie le 21 mai 1999. Dans son arrêt du 1er juin 2001, la Chambre d’appel le déboute de tous ses moyens d’appel et confirme le jugement et la sentence. Il purge sa peine au Mali depuis le 9 décembre 2001. MUSEMA Alfred (ICTR-96-13) Né le 22 avril 1949 à Byumba, il était directeur de l’Usine à thé de Gisovu. Il est arrêté le 11 février 1995 en Suisse et transféré au TPIR le 20 mai 1997. Sa comparution initiale a eu lieu le 18 novembre 1997, et le procès a commencé le 25 janvier 1999. Il est reconnu coupable de génocide et de crimes contre l’humanité (extermination et viol), et condamné à la prison à vie le 27 janvier 2000. Il interjette appel et est partiellement débouté par un arrêt du 16 novembre 2001 qui le déclare non coupable du chef d’accusation de viol comme crime contre l’humanité. Il purge sa peine au Mali depuis le 9 décembre 2001. RUGGIU Georges (ICTR-97-32) Né le 12 octobre 1957 en Belgique, il était journaliste à la RTLM en 1994. Il est arrêté le 23 juillet 1997 au Kenya et transféré le même jour. Lors de sa comparution initiale le 24 octobre 1997, il a d’abord plaidé non coupable des deux chefs d’accusation (incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide, et persécution comme crime contre l’humanité) qui pesaient contre lui. Mais en avril 2000, il a fait déposer par son conseil une requête pour changer son plaidoyer, en plaidant coupable des deux chefs d’accusation. Le 15 mai, les juges
586
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
accueillent favorablement son plaidoyer de culpabilité. er Le 1 juin 2000, il est condamné à douze (12) ans de prison. Il n’a pas encore été transféré ailleurs pour purger sa peine mais son lieu de détention reste secret pour des raisons de sécurité. C’est le seul qui n’ait pas fait appel de son jugement, ni de la sentence.
RUZINDANA Obed (ICTR-95-1) Né le 20 décembre 1962 à Kibuye, il est homme d’affaires à Kibuye. Il est arrêté à Nairobi le 20 septembre 1996, et transféré le 22 septembre 1996. Sa comparution a lieu le 29 octobre 1996, et son procès joint à celui de Kayishema débute le 9 avril 1997. Le 21 mai 1999, il est reconnu coupable de génocide, et condamné à 25 ans de prison, et son appel est rejeté le 1er juin 2001. Il est transféré au Mali le 9 décembre 2001.
SERUSHAGO Omar (ICTR-98-39) Né le 24 avril 1961 à Kibuye, il y est homme d’affaires. Il est arrêté le 20 septembre 1996 à Nairobi, puis transféré à Arusha le 22 du même mois. Sa comparution initiale a lieu le 14 décembre 1998, son procès ayant commencé le même jour puisqu’il a plaidé coupable. Dans l’accord de plaidoyer de culpabilité, le Procureur a retiré le chef d’accusation de viol au titre d’un crime contre l’humanité, il plaide donc coupable pour génocide et pour crimes contre l’humanité (assassinat, extermination et torture). Le Tribunal a autorisé le Procureur à retirer ce dernier chef d’accusation. Il est condamné à 15 ans de prison le 5 février 1999, son appel ayant été rejeté (Arrêt rendu public le 14 février 2000, Motifs de l’Arrêt publiés le 6 avril 2000). Il purge sa peine au Mali depuis le 9 décembre 2001.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
587
ANNEXE 2 – AFFAIRES EN COURS AU 31 DECEMBRE 2002 (EN APPEL, DEVANT UNE CHAMBRE DE PREMIERE D’INSTANCE OU SIMPLE ACTE D’ACCUSATION) Procès en cours devant la Chambre d’appel RUTAGANDA Georges (ICTR-96-3) Né en 1958 à Gitarama, il est homme d’affaires et second vice-président des Interahamwe. Il est arrêté en Zambie le 10 octobre 1995, et transféré le 26 mai 1996. Le 30 mai 1996, a lieu sa comparution initiale, et son procès commence le 18 mars 1997. Le 6 décembre 1999, il est condamné à la prison à vie pour génocide et crimes contre l’humanité (extermination et assassinat). Son appel était pendant au 31 décembre 2002, mais l’arrêt a été rendu le 26 mai 2003 et fera l’objet de notre prochaine chronique. Procès en cours devant une Chambre de première instance BAGAMBIKI Emmanuel (ICTR-97-36) BAGOSORA Théoneste (ICTR-96-7) BARAYAGWIZA Jean Bosco (ICTR-97-19) IMANISHIMWE Samuel (ICTR-97-36) KABILIGI Gratien (ICTR-97-34) KAJELIJELI Juvénal (ICTR-98-44) KAMUHANDA Jean de Dieu (ICTR-99-5) KANYABASHI Joseph (ICTR-96-15) NAHIMANA Ferdinand (ICTR-96-11) NDAYAMBAJE Elie (ICTR-96-8) NGEZE Hassan (ICTR-97-27) NIYITEGEKA Eliezer (ICTR-96-14)268 268
Eliezer Niyitegeka est né le 12 mars 1952. Il était journaliste de profession, et était présentateur à Radio Rwanda jusqu’en 1994. Puis, dans le gouvernement intérimaire, il est devenu ministre de l’information le 9 avril 1994. Par ailleurs, il était membre du Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), et premier responsable de ce parti dans sa préfecture (Kibuye) entre 1991 et 1994, et membre du bureau politique au niveau national de ce parti. Arrêté en février 1999 à Nairobi, la Chambre de première instance I a été saisie de son affaire, et a rendu son jugement le 16 mai. Il est condamné à l’emprisonnement à
588
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
NSABIMANA Sylvain (ICTR-97-29) NSENGIYUMVA Anatole (ICTR-96-12) NTABAKUZE Aloys (ICTR-97-30) NTAGERURA André (ICTR-96-10A) NTAHOBALI Arsène Shalom (ICTR-97-21) NTAKIRUTIMANA Elizaphan (ICTR-96-10 et ICTR-96-17)269 NTAKIRUTIMANA Gérard (ICTR-96-10 et ICTR-96-17)270 NTEZIRYAYO Alphonse (ICTR-97-29) NYIRAMASUHUKO Pauline (ICTR-97-21) NZABIRINDA Joseph (ICTR-2001-77) SEMANZA Laurent (ICTR-97-20)271 ZIGIRANYIRAZO Protais (ICTR-2001-73)
269
270
271
vie, pour génocide, entente en vue de commettre le génocide, incitation directe et publique à commettre le génocide et crimes contre l’humanité (assassinat, extermination, autres actes inhumains). Son jugement sera étudié dans notre prochaine chronique. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana est né en 1924, il est pasteur de l’église adventiste du 7ème jour à Kibuye. Il est arrêté une première fois, le 29 septembre 1996 au Texas (Etats-Unis). Il fut relâché puis arrêté à nouveau le 26 février 1998, puis transféré au TPIR le 24 mars 2000. Sa comparution initiale a eu lieu le 31 mars 2000, et son procès a commencé le 18 septembre 2001, en jonction avec le procès de son fils (Gérard). Le 19 février 2003, il a été condamné à 10 ans de prison, pour génocide. Ce jugement fera l’objet de notre prochaine chronique. Gérard Ntakirutimana est né le 12 août 1958 à Kibuye, il est médecin. Il est arrêté le 29 octobre 1996 en Côte d’Ivoire et transféré au TPIR le 30 novembre 1996. Sa comparution initiale a eu lieu le 2 décembre 1996, et son procès a commencé le 18 septembre 2001, en jonction avec celui de son père. Il est condamné le 19 février 2003 à 25 ans de prison. Il est reconnu coupable de génocide et de crime contre l’humanité (assasinat). Ce jugement sera étudié dans notre prochaine chronique. Laurent Semanza est né en 1944. Il a été bourgmestre de la Commune de Bicumbe pendant plus de vingt ans, et ce jusqu’en 1993. Il a toujours été membre du Mouvement républicain national et démocratique (MNRD) et, à ce titre, faisait partie de l’Assemblée nationale mise en place en 1993. Il a été arrêté au Cameroun en mars 1996. La Chambre de première instance III a rendu son jugement dans cette affaire, le condamnant à vingt-cinq ans de prison, pour complicité dans le génocide et crimes contre l’humanité (viol, torture, assassinat et extermination). Toutefois, la Chambre déduit six mois de cette peine en raison de la violation des droits de l’accusé. Nous y reviendrons de façon plus approfondie dans notre prochaine chronique.
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
589
Affaires en attente (simple acte d’accusation) BICAMUMPAKA Jérôme (ICTR-99-49 et ICTR-99-50) BIKINDI Simon (ICTR-2001-72) BISENGIMANA Paul (ICTR-2000-60) BIZIMUNGU Augustin (ICTR-2000-56) BIZIMUNGU Casimir (ICTR-99-45 et ICTR-99-50) GACUMBITSI Sylvestre (ICTR-2001-64) GATETE Jean-Baptiste (ICTR-2000-61) HATEGEKIMANA Idelphonse (ICTR-2000-55) KAREMERA Edouard (ICTR-98-44) KARERA François (ICTR-2001-74) MPAMBARA Jean (ICTR-2001-65) MUGENZI Justin (ICTR-99-47 et ICTR-99-50) MUGIRANEZA Prosper (ICTR-99-48 et ICTR-99-50) MUHIMANA Mikaeli (ICTR-95-1) MUSABYIMANA Samuel (ICTR-2001-62)272 MUVUNYI Tharcisse (ICTR-2000-55) NCHAMIHIGO Siméon (ICTR-2001-63) NDINDABAHIZI Emmanuel (ICTR-2001-71) NDINDILIYIMANA Augustin (ICTR-2000-56) NGIRUMPATSE Mathieu (ICTR-98-44) NSENGIMANA Hormisdas (ICTR-2001-69) NZIRORERA Joseph (ICTR-98-44) NZUWONEMEYE François-Xavier (ICTR-2000-56) RENZAHO Tharcisse (ICTR-97-31) RUKUNDO Emmanuel (ICTR-2001-70) RUTAGANIRA Vincent (ICTR-95-1) RWAMAKUBA André (ICTR-98-44) SAGAHUTU Innocent (ICTR-2000-56) SEROMBA Athanase (ICTR-2001-66) SIMBA Aloys (ICTR-2001-76) 272
Né le 6 juillet 1956, il est l’évêque de l’église anglicane de Shyogwe. Il a été arrêté au Kenya et transféré au TPIR, le 26 avril 2001. Sa comparution initiale a eu lieu le 2 mai 2001. Alors que l’affaire n’avait été attribuée à aucune Chambre de première instance, il est mort le 24 janvier 2003 à l’Hôpital de Moshi (Tanzanie).
590
Roland Adjovi & Florent Mazeron
ANNEXE 3 – AFFAIRES RETIREES DU ROLE DU TRIBUNAL NTUYAHAGA Bernard (ICTR-98-40) Par sa décision du 19 mars 1999, la Chambre de première instance I a accédé à la requête du Procureur aux fins de retrait de l’acte d’accusation. Il a été ordonné que le prévenu soit remis en liberté, le Greffier étant invité à “prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour exécuter la […] décision, au besoin en coopération avec les Autorités de l’Etat-Hôte”. Le Greffier a alors émis un sauf-conduit sollicitant la coopération de tous les Etats membres des Nations Unies pour assurer la liberté de circulation du prévenu, du 29 mars au 13 avril 1999, jusqu’à la destination finale de son choix ! Les juges n’ont pas fait preuve de moins d’originalité que le Greffier, en adoptant une déclaration déniant toute compétence au Greffier pour ce faire273. En fait le Procureur aurait convenu avec la Belgique de retirer son acte d’accusation pour permettre que le procès puisse se tenir ailleurs, en Belgique par exemple ; mais il n’est pas sûr que cette stratégie fonctionne car le Rwanda a demandé l’extradition de Bernard Ntuyahaga : la décision tanzanienne se fait encore attendre. RUSATIRA Léonidas (ICTR-2002-80) De l’avis d’un grand nombre d’observateurs et de militants des droits de l’homme274, il fut ce qu’on pourrait appeler un “juste” dans les événements de 1994 au Rwanda. Il était général des forces armées rwandaises, mais il demeura quelques temps dans l’armée patriotique rwandaise après la victoire du FPR en Juillet 1994, avant de s’exiler en Belgique en 1996. Pesaient contre lui, cinq chefs d’accusation 273
274
Cf. Déclaration sur un point de droit par la Chambre de première instance I composée des juges Laïty Kama (Président du Tribunal), Lennart Aspegren et Navanethem Pillay, 22 avril 1999. Les juges y affirment que “ni les dispositions de ladite Résolution du Conseil de sécurité, ni celles du Statut, ni celles du Règlement de procédure et de preuve n’habilitent le Greffier à délivrer un saufconduit, [et] constatent donc que le Greffier a, ce faisant, agi ultra vires.” cf. § 13 de la Déclaration. Il en résulte ainsi des notes d’information diffusées en ligne par Hirondelle (http://www.hirondelle.org) et Diplomatie Judiciaire, 17 mai et 11 juin 2002 (http://www.diplomatiejudiciaire.com).
Chronique de la jurisprudence du TPIR (1995-2002)
591
(génocide, complicité dans le génocide, extermination et meurtre comme crimes contre l’humanité, et crimes de guerre). Son acte d’accusation avait été confirmé par le juge Williams le 12 avril 2002. Il a été arrêté en Belgique en mai 2002. Mais, avant que son transfert ne soit effectué, le Procureur a souhaité retirer son acte d’accusation pour défaut de preuves suffisantes : la juge Pillay a accédé à cette requête le 14 août 2002, en rappelant qu’il reste possible pour le Procureur d’émettre un autre acte d’accusation contre lui.
ANNEXE 4 – LISTE DES RAPPORTS DES NATIONS UNIES RELATIFS AU RWANDA ET AU TPIR Rapport du SGNU (S/1995/134) – propositions pour la mise en œuvre de la Résolution 955 Rapport du SGNU (A/51/789) – audit et contrôle interne Premier Rapport annuel du Tribunal 1996 (A/51/399 – S/1996/778) Deuxième Rapport annuel 1997 (A/52/582 – S/1997/868) Troisième Rapport annuel 1998 (A/53/429 – S/1998/857) Quatrième Rapport annuel 1999 (A/54/315 – S/1999/943) Cinquième Rapport annuel 2000 (A/55/435 – S/2000/927) Sixième Rapport annuel 2001 (A/56/351 – S/2001/863) Septième Rapport annuel 2002 (A/57/163 – S/2002/733)
APPEL à CONTRIBUTION Les juristes du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda, sous la direction du Greffier, Adama Dieng, veulent honorer la mémoire de Laïty Kama, qui fut le premier président du Tribunal, et qui est décédé à Nairobi en 2001, en lui dédiant des Mélanges. Toute contribution intellectuelle à cet égard, est attendue par le secrétariat du projet à l’adresse du Tribunal (www.ictr.org), avant fin avril 2004. Contacts : Jean-Pelé Fomété ([email protected]) ou Roland Adjovi ([email protected]).
This page intentionally left blank
BOOK REVIEWS NOTES DE LECTURE
This page intentionally left blank
RECUEIL JURIDIQUE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME EN AFRIQUE – 1996-2000, SOUS LA DIRECTION DE PAUL TAVERNIER, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN AFRICA SERIES, CHRISTOF HEYNS AND PAUL TAVERNIER (EDS.), BRUXELLES, BRUYLANT, COLLECTION DU CREDHO, 2002, XXIII-1312P., ISBN 2-8027-1602-6. Recensé par Mouloud Boumghar*
Fruit de la coopération entre le CREDHO-Paris Sud et le Centre for Human Rights de l’Université de Pretoria, ce premier Recueil juridique des droits de l’homme en Afrique est d’une utilité incontestable. S’il est vrai que les ressources électroniques permettent, de nos jours, un accès rapide aux documents bruts de droit international des droits de l’homme (conventions, résolutions d’organisations internationales ou encore pratique des organes de promotion et de protection), cette documentation n’en restent pas moins fragmentée. Par ailleurs, les dispositions relatives aux droits de l’homme dans les droits nationaux africains ne sont pas toutes, loin s’en faut, d’un accès aisé. Avoir une vue d’ensemble de la réglementation des droits de l’homme en Afrique dans de telles conditions relève du parcours du combattant. La publication de ce premier Recueil périodique en langue française, sur le modèle des Human Rights Law Series in Africa qui paraissent depuis 1996 à l’initiative du professeur Christof Heyns, se révèle donc on ne peut plus opportune. Il en est d’autant plus ainsi qu’avec cet ouvrage, le professeur Tavernier et son équipe offrent aux *
Doctorant à l’Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris II) et Attaché Temporaire d’Enseignement et de Recherche (ATER) à l’Université Paris-Nord (Paris XIII).
A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 595-603. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
596
Recensé par Mouloud Boumghar
milieux politiques africains mais aussi aux universitaires et aux praticiens ou simplement aux citoyens un instrument de travail de haute qualité. Outil pratique, ce Recueil périodique ne se contente pas de reproduire des documents bruts. Son mérite est plus grand. Il regroupe l’essentiel des dispositions constitutionnelles applicables en matière de protection des droits de l’homme, les textes internationaux (régionaux et universels), ainsi que la jurisprudence nationale (constitutionnelle ou autre) et internationale, et les assortit d’une analyse pour certains pays et pour chaque organisation internationale, à l’exception de la Francophonie. Différentes bibliographies thématiques ainsi qu’une bibliographie générale sur le continent achèvent de donner à l’ouvrage son caractère d’outil de recherche universitaire. Trois parties constituent le corps du Recueil. La première est consacrée aux Nations Unies et aux droits de l’homme en Afrique ; la deuxième est relative à la protection régionale des droits de l’homme en Afrique ; et enfin, la troisième traite du droit national des droits de l’homme dans les pays du continent. La première partie établit d’abord un état des lieux (arrêté au 8 mai 2000) des signatures et ratifications par les Etats africains de 28 instruments conventionnels de protection des droits de l’homme à vocation universelle ainsi que de leurs déclarations et réserves, qui sont reproduites. La pratique des organes onusiens de promotion et de protection des droits de l’homme suit. Outre la liste des membres africains de la Commission des droits de l’homme, cette partie comprend une liste référencée des rapports et documents généraux indiquant d’une part, leur titre, et d’autre part, les Etats du continent concernés. A côté de ce tableau thématique, figure une liste, elle aussi référencée, des rapports et documents de la Commission spécifiquement consacrés à des pays africains. Un tableau recensant les décisions de cet organe qui concernent des Etats de la région s’ajoute à ces informations tandis qu’un autre est consacré aux résolutions par pays. Enfin, sont également recensées les deux déclarations (sur la période couverte) du Président de la Commission sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Libéria. S’agissant des six Comités (Comité des droits de l’homme ; Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels ; Comité des droits de
Book Reviews
597
l’enfant ; Comité contre la torture ; Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale et Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination à l’égard des femmes), les auteurs de l’ouvrage ont établi, pour chacun d’entre eux, la liste des membres africains ainsi que l’état des rapports devant être soumis par les Etats parties (africains). D’autres aspects de l’activité des Comités en rapport avec des Etats africains sont aussi mis en exergue notamment l’examen des plaintes individuelles reçues par le Comité des droits de l’homme et par le Comité contre la torture. S’agissant des textes bruts, seule la Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant est reproduite, aux côtés du Statut et du Règlement de Procédure et de Preuve du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda. Il est regrettable que les Pactes de 1966, conventions fondamentales du droit international des droits de l’homme à vocation universelle, n’aient pas été reproduits dans ce premier Recueil. Malgré cette absence, l’ampleur des informations disponibles dans cette première partie est tout à fait remarquable. Et le rapport portant sur “les Etats africains et les instruments des Nations Unies relatifs aux droits de l’homme”, qui clôt la première partie, apporte une grande valeur ajoutée à ces données. Les auteurs de cette analyse, le professeur Tavernier et Mademoiselle Capette, commencent par passer en revue les différents organes de l’ONU qui s’occupent de la promotion et de la protection des droits de l’homme, qu’il s’agisse des organes habilités, expressément ou non, par la Charte des Nations Unies, ou de ceux créés en vertu de conventions internationales conclues sous les auspices des Nations Unies. Après avoir exposé la façon dont chaque organe intervient, les auteurs passent à une revue thématique. Dix thèmes sont ainsi abordés allant des droits sociaux, économiques et culturels à la situation des travailleurs migrants en passant par la discrimination à l’égard des femmes et le génocide, les crimes de guerre et les crimes contre l’humanité ou les droits de l’enfant. A chaque fois, le droit conventionnel applicable est rappelé avant que ne soient évoqués les manquements des pays africains constatés soit par les organes conventionnels soit par des organes basés sur la Charte. Le lecteur peut ainsi avoir un plan serré de la situation des droits de l’homme sur chaque thème abordé et un aperçu des violations pour pratiquement chaque pays. Pour qui veut approfondir ses connaissances thématiques
598
Recensé par Mouloud Boumghar
et géographiques sur la période couverte, il suffit de se laisser guider par les très nombreuses références aux travaux des organes des Nations Unies. Enfin, les observations générales de ce rapport permettent d’élargir la vue grâce à des remarques transversales. Celles-ci offrent une grille de lecture des tableaux de la première partie de l’ouvrage. On peut ainsi savoir quelles sont les conventions ratifiées par le plus grand nombre d’Etats africains et quels sont parmi ces derniers ceux qui ont émis le plus de réserves. Les Etats du nord de l’Afrique sont les champions continentaux des réserves aux conventions de protection des droits de l’homme. Leurs réserves ont le plus souvent pour objet le respect des “principes de l’Islam”, la religion servant ici d’alibi idéal à ces régimes – qui ne brillent pas, par ailleurs, par leur libéralisme – pour refuser l’égalité juridique entre les hommes et les femmes. Pour un continent dont le leitmotiv est le développement et alors que les femmes représentent tout simplement la moitié de la société, cette situation de discrimination à leur encontre qui semble être commune à de trop nombreux Etats africains, quelque soit d’ailleurs la religion dominante, ne peut que soulever des inquiétudes. La méfiance des pays africains à l’égard de la compétence des organes conventionnels de contrôle pour recevoir des communications témoigne elle aussi de la longueur du chemin qu’il reste à parcourir.
Des organisations internationales autres que l’ONU sont là pour permettre aux Etats africains d’avancer sur la voie d’une meilleure protection des droits de l’homme. C’est ce qui ressort de la deuxième partie consacrée à la protection régionale des droits de l’homme en Afrique. Il y est bien évidemment question du système régional africain des droits de l’homme, celui de l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, devenue Union africaine depuis, mais aussi de la place des droits de l’homme dans les rapports entre l’Union européenne et les pays A.C.P. (Afrique, Pacifique, Caraïbes). L’action de la Francophonie en la matière figure aussi dans cette partie centrale de l’ouvrage, bien que l’aire couverte par cette organisation ne puisse être qualifiée de “région” au sens géographique du terme.
Book Reviews
599
L’étude du système africain des droits de l’homme s’ouvre par un état des lieux des signatures et ratifications (au 1er janvier 1999) de trois traités de l’O.U.A. relatifs aux droits de l’homme, qui y sont reproduits: la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, la Convention régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés en Afrique et la Charte africaine des droits et du bien-être de l’enfant. Outre le texte du Protocole à la Charte africaine des droits de l'homme et des peuples portant création d’une Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, cette partie accorde aussi une place à des instruments non-conventionnels de l’O.U.A., d’accès plus difficile, comme la Résolution sur la bioéthique. Le rapport du professeur Viljoen, de l’Université de Pretoria, offre, comme son intitulé l’indique, une véritable “vue d’ensemble du système régional africain des droits de l’homme”. La définition de ce système régional des droits de l’homme est d’ailleurs large. Elle inclut aussi les deux traités, peu connus, de l’O.U.A. relatifs à l’environnement auxquels de brefs développements sont consacrés : la Convention africaine sur la conservation de la nature et des ressources et la Convention de Bamako sur l’interdiction d’importer des déchets dangereux en Afrique, le contrôle de leurs mouvements transfrontaliers et leur gestion en Afrique. Par ailleurs, en rappelant que les droits de l’homme ne constituaient pas une préoccupation prioritaire de l’O.U.A. lors de sa création, l’auteur du rapport montre que, malgré les larges insuffisances actuelles, beaucoup de chemin a été parcouru depuis 1963, notamment avec l’adoption en 1969 de la Convention sur les aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés. Mais l’avancée décisive est venue avec l’adoption de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples en 1981. Malgré la référence à des notions très floues du point de vue juridique comme les vertus de la tradition historique ou encore la présence de “clauses de ‘récupération’”, la Charte reste l’instrument central du droit africain des droits de l’homme ce qui justifie que le rapport du professeur Viljoen lui soit presque entièrement consacré. Le droit de la Charte, que l’on pourrait qualifier de matériel, est étudié en premier. Ainsi la “jurisprudence émergente” de la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples est analysée pour chaque article de la Charte sur lequel elle a eu à se prononcer à l’occasion de communications.
600
Recensé par Mouloud Boumghar
L’étude de la pratique de la Commission englobe aussi la “clarification” apportée à certaines dispositions fondamentales de la Charte par les résolutions de la Commission comme l’introduction du concept des “élections” pourtant ignoré par le texte conventionnel. Par ailleurs, la politique “jurisprudentielle” exprimée par la Commission à l’occasion de l’examen des rapports ainsi que sa jurisprudence de fond qui transparaît dans les décisions sur la recevabilité font tour à tour l’objet d’une étude dans le rapport. Enfin, l’auteur n’oublie pas la question de la valeur juridique des réserves étatiques faites à la Charte. Après cette analyse essentiellement axée sur la portée des dispositions matérielles de la Charte telle qu’elle ressort de la pratique de la Commission, c’est cette dernière qui est à son tour étudiée. L’historique consacré à cet organe reprend certaines des critiques qui lui sont souvent adressées, dont l’absence de valeur obligatoire des décisions. C’est par ce biais que l’auteur est amené à évoquer la création de la Cour africaine censée compléter le mandat de protection de la Commission en permettant une application réelle des décisions. Le profil sociologique des commissaires constitue un autre objet de critique. En effet, il ressort du premier tableau du rapport – la structure est ici différente puisque contrairement au rapport de la première partie, les données présentées sous forme de tableaux et autres listes sont intégrées dans le texte – que ces commissaires sont encore trop souvent des diplomates. La vue d’ensemble du système régional se poursuit par l’étude du mandat et du fonctionnement de la Commission. Cette analyse est réalisée en deux temps. En premier lieu, les différents aspects du mandat et du fonctionnement sont présentés de manière empirique. Est ainsi abordée en premier la compétence de la Commission “à connaître des plaintes individuelles” et sa compétence “pour étudier les rapports des Etats”; l’auteur revient ensuite sur les “conditions de recevabilité” des communications avant de s’intéresser à l’“atténuation [de la] stricte obligation de secret” à laquelle est astreinte la Commission pour ce qui touche à ses activités de protection des droits de l’homme. Il ressort des développements consacrés à la pratique relative aux recours formés en cas de violation des dispositions de la Charte, à la nomination de Rapporteurs spéciaux, aux actions relatives à des violations graves et massives, aux missions dans les Etats parties ou encore touchant le rôle des O.N.G.
Book Reviews
601
que, comme tout organe juridictionnel ou quasi-juridictionnel, et malgré certains obstacles, la Commission tente de tirer le maximum de son mandat et l’élargit même parfois de son propre chef. Vient en second lieu une présentation détaillée des deux mandats de la Commission : le mandat de protection et le mandat de promotion. S’agissant du premier, toutes les questions relatives à l’examen des plaintes individuelles, de la recevabilité au suivi en passant par le fond, font l’objet d’une étude très fouillée. Ces développements représentent un outil de travail d’une utilité certaine pour les praticiens. Les “missions de protection dans les pays”, qui représentent l’autre aspect de ce mandat, semblent poser certains problèmes ; leur détail étant “toujours enveloppé dans un halo de secret”. S’agissant des rapports étatiques, qui représentent un aspect essentiel du mandat de promotion de la Commission, l’auteur brosse le tableau d’un mécanisme qui fonctionne très mal. D’une part, la Commission connaît des problèmes organisationnels et matériels et, d’autre part, les Etats parties, comme c’est le cas aux Nations Unies, ne respectent que rarement leur obligation conventionnelle de remettre un rapport à l’organe de contrôle. Enfin, le professeur Viljoen consacre quelques développements aux perspectives d’avenir de la Charte africaine des droits et du bien-être de l’enfant, de la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples et du projet de protocole sur les droits des femmes. La sous-partie relative à l’Union européenne et aux droits de l’homme en Afrique renferme des extraits de la Convention de Lomé ainsi que de l’Accord de Cotonou. Le rapport de M. Jean-François Akandji-Kombé, qui constitue l’essentiel de cette sous-partie, retrace clairement l’évolution du cadre général de la coopération entre les pays A.C.P. et ce qui allait devenir l’Union européenne. Il rappelle de même la façon dont la problématique des droits de l’homme a été intégrée dans les relations conventionnelles entre ces deux groupes d’Etats avant de s’attacher plus précisément à l’étude de la place de cette problématique dans l’Accord de Cotonou. La dernière partie du rapport consacrée à la “garantie des droits de l’homme dans le cadre des relations A.C.P.-U.E.” nous révèle un aspect intéressant. Il en ressort en effet qu’à côté des mécanismes de coopération inter-étatique qui conviennent à des accords de coopération au développement, il
602
Recensé par Mouloud Boumghar
existe des potentialités de protection juridictionnelle des dispositions conventionnelles relatives aux droits de l’homme, même si la jurisprudence reste “indigente” pour l’instant. Enfin, la partie centrale de l’ouvrage consacrée à la protection régionale se clôt par la reproduction des instruments nonconventionnels de la Francophonie (Déclaration et Plan d’action de Moncton, Déclaration de Luxembourg, Déclaration de Bamako et Plan d’action de Cotonou) qui abordent la question des droits de l’homme. L’intérêt de la Francophonie pour cette question étant récent, la période couverte par le Recueil ne pouvait faire l’objet d’un rapport d’analyse. La troisième et dernière partie consacrée au droit national des droits de l’homme couvre trente-six Etats sur la cinquantaine que compte le continent africain. D’un point de vue pratique, elle est d’une importance capitale. En effet, le juge national constitue, avant tout autre organe, régional ou universel, le premier recours en cas de violation d’un droit garanti, même si, pour bon nombre d’Etats, cette protection s’avère illusoire. L’accès à l’information juridique, qu’il s’agisse des textes ou de la jurisprudence, est donc primordial. C’est ce que permet ici le Recueil pour certains pays, en dépit de quelques insuffisances. Chacun des trente-six Etats fait l’objet d’une notice comprenant les repères essentiels, présentés à la manière des dictionnaires, éventuellement un rapport national, les dispositions constitutionnelles en matière de droits de l’homme ainsi qu’une bibliographie. Les rapports sont particulièrement intéressants. Ils présentent notamment la jurisprudence des plus hautes juridictions nationales en matière de protection des droits de l’homme et indiquent les coordonnées des principaux centres d’enseignement du droit ainsi que celles des institutions, gouvernementales ou privées, actives dans ce domaine. Les relations entre droit international et droit interne ne sont pas oubliées mais cet aspect n’est pas toujours généreusement développé. Par ailleurs, mais la faute n’en incombe certainement pas aux rédacteurs de l’ouvrage, seuls dix-neuf rapports nationaux sont disponibles dans ce premier Recueil. Il est regrettable à cet égard que les rapports sur des pays francophones comme le Maroc ou encore le Rwanda ne figurent pas ici. Ce Recueil étant appelé à être publié
Book Reviews
603
périodiquement, et par conséquent actualisé, l’insertion de dispositions législatives et réglementaires aux côtés des dispositions constitutionnelles ainsi que davantage de rapports nationaux se fera très probablement ultérieurement. Loin de porter une ombre sur le mérite des rédacteurs de l’ouvrage, ces insuffisances témoignent au contraire des difficultés à élaborer un tel Recueil et de l’importance considérable du travail accompli.
This page intentionally left blank
THE WORLD COURT REFERENCE GUIDE – JUDGMENTS, ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1922-2000), COMPILED AND EDITED BY BIMAL N. PATEL, WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY SHABTAI ROSENNE, KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, THE HAGUE / LONDON / NEW YORK, 2002, 928 P., ISBN 90-411-1907-8. Reviewed by Dr. Fatsah Ouguergouz
The essential purpose of this work is to give a comprehensive overview of all the contentious and advisory cases that have been dealt with by the International Court of Justice and its predecessor between 1922 and 2000. It provides basic information on various organisational, administrative, procedural and substantive aspects of 79 contentious cases and requests for advisory opinion dealt with by the Permanent Court of International Justice, as well as of 121 contentious cases and requests for advisory opinion dealt with by the International Court of Justice. For each contentious or advisory case, this guide provides general information about the claim or the original question submitted to the Court, the identity of the parties or the organ which requested the opinion, the means by which the case was instituted (application, special agreement) and the date thereof, the basis of jurisdiction invoked, the number of the case on the General List, the duration of the proceedings, including the public sittings, as well as the nature and dates of the orders adopted by the Court or its President in relation to those cases. This reference work also provides precious information about the decisions in each particular case, including headnotes, the composition A. A. YUSUF (ed.), African Yearbook of International Law, 597-599. © 2003 African Foundation for International Law, Printed in The Netherlands.
606
Reviewed by Fatsah Ouguergouz
of the Court, the text of the operative paragraphs of the judgment or final paragraphs of the advisory opinion (with details of how the judges voted), names of Members of the Court and judges ad hoc who appended opinions or declarations, and last but not least the case-law, legal instruments and other important documents referred to by the Court in its decision or opinion. Another interesting feature of the guide lies in the fact that, for each contentious or advisory case, it sets out the legal representation of the parties (names and positions of the agents, counsel, legal team, etc.). The work of Mr. Patel is therefore an important and valuable research tool on the World Court’s activities since its establishment. Each of the aspects dealt with by this guide is very useful and provides food for thought for any researcher interested in gaining a quick overview of any particular case in its entirety. It enables the reader to quickly gain a clear understanding of the initial legal questions submitted to the Court and what eventual solutions were found to them. By setting out (sometimes in summary form) the procedural orders issued by the Court or by its President, the guide offers a logical procedural history to each case charting developments from the date proceedings were instituted to the date of the final judicial pronouncement. Another useful part of the book is the coverage of the case-law and legal instruments which the Court has referred to in its judgments or advisory opinions. The author has indeed patiently gone through all of the pronouncements of the Court in order to comprehensively list the case-law found therein (PCIJ, ICJ, Arbitral awards) and the international legal instruments (treaties, declarations, etc.) referred to, and has specified the pages and paragraph numbers on which they appear. While the accuracy of the author’s work in this regard has still to be tested by the future users of his guide, this vade mecum will greatly enhance researchers’ efforts to locate these instruments in the judgments and opinions of the Court when they seek to understand why and how they have been referred to by the Court. The last part of the book is also important, consisting as it does of 14 indexes containing the provisions of various legal instruments (such as the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Statute of the PCIJ, the Charter of the United Nations, the Statute of the ICJ, and
Book Reviews
607
other treaties), of the Rules of Court (1922-1931, 1931-1936, 19361946, 1946-1972 and 1972 to date), and of the cases, advisory opinions and arbitral awards, referred to by the Court in its pronouncements. Needless to say, Mr. Patel has taken care to present the material in a simple, structured and user-friendly manner which further facilitates the task of any researcher interested in the work of the Court. The World Court Reference Guide meets all of the main criteria of a standard reference guide and will serve various actors in the international legal community – judges, lawyers, governmental authorities, academics and historians – for many years to come. In short, I would like to echo Judge Kooijmans's observations in his inaugural address at the launch of the book when he noted that this is “a book which may be called monumental in more than one respect”.
This page intentionally left blank
BASIC DOCUMENTS DOCUMENTS
This page intentionally left blank
DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS ADOPTED BY THE THIRTY-EIGHTH ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT OF THE OAU 8 July 2002 Durban, South Africa
TABLE OF CONTENTS References
Pages
Title Decision on the 15th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights
613
Decision on the Report of the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
614
AHG/Dec.173 (XXXVIII)
Decision on Lockerbie Case
615
AHG/Dec.174 (XXXVIII)
Decision on the Status Report on Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI)
616
Decision on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development Cooperation and (CSSDCA)
618
Decision on the Place of the African Population Commission (APC) in the African Union
619
Decision on the Place of the OAU Labour and Social Affairs Commission in the African Union
620
Decision on the World Solidarity and Poverty Reduction Fund
621
Decision on the Control Hypertension in Africa
622
AHG/Dec.171 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.172 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.175 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.176 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.177 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.178 (XXXVIII) AHG/Dec.179 (XXXVIII) AHG/Dec.180 (XXXVIII)
of
Arterial
Decision on Support for Mr Juan Somavia
625
612
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
AHG/Dec.181 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.182 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Dec.183 (XXXVIII) AHG/Dec.184 (XXXVIII)
AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVIII) AHG/Decl.2 (XXXVIII)
Decision on African Process For The Development And Protection of the Marine And Coastal Environment In Africa
625
Decision on the Implementation and Universality of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction
627
Decision on Development in the Middle East and Palestine
628
Resolution on the Return of the Pillaged African Monument the Obelisk of Axum
632
Declaration on the Principles governing Democratic Elections in Africa
634
Declaration on developments in Angola
642
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
613
AHG/DEC. 171 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE 15 TH ANNUAL ACTIVITY REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS The Assembly, 1. TAKES NOTE WITH SATISFACTION of the 15th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights and COMMENDS the African Commission for the excellent work accomplished in the past year in the area of promotion and protection of human rights; 2. CALLS ON the African Commission to propose ways and means of strengthening the African system for the promotion and protection of Human and People’s Rights within the African Union, and submit a report thereon at the next session of the Assembly; 3. CALLS UPON Member States, which have not yet done so, to expedite the process of ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and People’s Rights in order to have this important instrument in force before the next session (July 2003); 4. REQUESTS the Secretary General to take the necessary action in order to complete as soon as possible, the elaboration of the Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights relating to the Rights of Women in Africa and to make sure that all Member States are fully involved in the process; 5. AUTHORIZES the publication of the 15th Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, pursuant to Article 59 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.
614
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
AHG/Dec. 172 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE REPORT OF THE AFRICAN COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE CHILD The Assembly: 1. TAKES NOTE of the report and recommendations of the inaugural meeting of the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; 2. RECOGNIZES the important role of the African Committee in the improvement of the conditions of African children everywhere on the Continent; 3. CALLS UPON the Committee to ensure that the provisions on the rights and welfare of the African child, as enshrined in the African Charter are respected in all Member States; 4. URGES Member States which have not yet done so to urgently sign and/or ratify the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; 5. REQUESTS Member States to extend their full support and cooperation to the African Committee and submit their reports regularly to the Committee; 6. CALLS UPON the Secretary General to urgently appoint a Secretary to the Committee, as stipulated in Article 40 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, to enable the Committee to function effectively;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
615
AHG/Dec. 173 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE LOCKERBIE CASE The Assembly: 1. TAKES NOTE of the Report of the OAU Commission of Jurists on the Lockerbie Case which noted that the judgment of 31 January 2001 was based on evidence that was not in line with the vital elements of the accusation; 2. RECALLS Decision AHG/Dec.3 (V) adopted by the 5th Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government held in Sirte, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 2 March 2001 and Decision AHG/Dec. 168 (XXXVII) adopted on the issue by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held from 9 to 11 July 2001 in Lusaka, Zambia as well as all the other resolutions and decisions taken by the OAU on this matter; 3. REGRETS the fact that the United Nations Security Council has, up to now, not definitively lifted the unjust sanctions and embargo imposed on Libya and which no longer have legal or moral justification, given the positive attitude and full cooperation shown by Jamahiriya in handling this issue and URGENTLY REQUESTS the Security Council to take the necessary measures to immediately and definitively lift these sanctions and embargo which have already caused untold suffering to the Libyan people; 4. ALSO REGRETS that the Court of Appeal pronounced judgment on 14 March 2002 rejecting the appeal lodged by Mr. Al Megrahi; 5. FURTHER REGRETS the decision taken on 7 January 2002 by the United States of America to extend for a period of one year the measures to boycott the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya by virtue of the special law they promulgated since 1986 in the aftermath of the crisis;
616
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
6. COMMENDS the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for the spirit of cooperation it demonstrated throughout the judicial process and for the efforts it has invested to find a just and equitable solution to the Lockerbie Affair; 7. RECOMMENDS that the Current Chairman and the members of his Bureau use their good offices to make the necessary contacts with a view to ensuring a rapid and permanent settlement of the case.
AHG/Dec. 174 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE STATUS REPORT ON GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR VACCINES AND IMMUNIZATION (GAVI) The Assembly: 1. TAKES NOTE of the Report; 2. ACKNOWLEDGES that vaccines constitute one of the most effective means of improving health and reducing the suffering and mortality occasioned by infectious diseases; 3. ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES that the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) is a public-private partnership established in 1999 to reinforce the commitment to immunization; 4. URGES Member States to take all necessary measures to ensure that every child in Africa is fully immunized by widening, for all children, the range of basic vaccines (measles, poliomyelitis, BCG and DTC) to include Hepatitis-B Vaccines; 5. FURTHER URGES Member States to establish more effective linkages between immunization and health sector development in general, and create technical partnerships between low and medium income countries to promote experience and resource sharing so as to reduce the gap between children born in different environments;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
617
6. APPEALS to GAVI partners to support efforts aimed at combating measles which accounts for 50% of infant mortality each year in Africa; formulate strategies to ensure the sustainability of immunization services in the poorest countries, with over 80% coverage; and help low-income African countries to identify mechanisms which will enable them to increase their national immunization budgets; 7. URGES GAVI partners to undertake to increase the number of African governments on the Governing Body of GAVI in order to reflect the priority needs of the Continent, and to collaborate with the vaccine industry partners to guarantee adequate supply of essential vaccines 8. FURTHER URGES donors, international organizations and all institutions working in the health and development sector to provide adequate and sustained official development assistance for long-term funding, as well as other financial incentives related to poverty reduction strategies, such as debt cancellation and additional technical assistance; 9. FINALLY REQUESTS the Secretary General to take all the necessary measures to follow-up on the implementation of the present decision and report to subsequent sessions of Council.
618
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
AHG/Dec. 175 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY, STABILITY, DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION (CSSDCA) The Assembly: 1. WELCOMES the efforts deployed by the Secretary General in the implementation of the Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (CSSDCA) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000; 2. APPROVES the Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development, Cooperation as elaborated by the Experts’ meetings, enriched by the OAU-Civil Society Conference and recommended by the Council of Ministers; 3. REQUESTS the Member States to take steps required for the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding and to keep the Secretariat informed of the progress made in this direction in order to facilitate the monitoring and evaluation process of the CSSDCA, including through review conferences and meetings, as provided for in the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration adopted in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000; 4. WELCOMES the convening of the second OAU-Civil Society Conference on Developing Partnership between the OAU and African Civil Society Organizations, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 11 – 15 June 2002 and TAKES NOTE of the recommendations of the Conference, in particular, those relating to the African Union and the CSSDCA Process; 5. COMMENDS Nigeria and South Africa for their generous contribution of five hundred thousand dollars (US$500,000) each for the operationalization of the CSSDCA and CALLS upon OAU
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
619
Member States, the United Nations and all OAU Partners to provide financial support for the CSSDCA Process; 6. REAFFIRMS the centrality of the CSSDCA Process as a policy development forum, a framework for the advancement of common values, and as a monitoring and evaluation mechanism for the African Union; 7. REQUESTS the Secretary-General to pursue efforts aimed at strengthening the CSSDCA Unit to enable it to carry out its functions effectively and to take the necessary steps to ensure the follow-up of these recommendations.
AHG/Dec. 176 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE PLACE OF THE AFRICAN POPULATION COMMISSION (APC) IN THE AFRICAN UNION The Assembly: 1. RECOGNIZES the objectives, functions and achievements of the Commission, since its inception in 1994, under the Joint Secretariat of ADB, ECA and OAU; 2. COMMENDS the efforts of the African Population Commission (APC) in the implementation of the Dakar/Ngor Declaration and the International Conference on Population and Development and URGES for intensification of these efforts; 3. REQUESTS the OAU/AU to continue spearheading the realization of the APC Programmes; 4. CALLS UPON Member States to provide sustained and adequate support to National Population Councils, local focal points of the APC;
620
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
5. FURTHER CALLS UPON the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and other relevant partners to continue supporting and working with the APC; 6. REQUESTS the Secretary General to take the necessary measures to determine the position of this commission within the African Union, and make recommendations in this regard to the Assembly.
AHG/Dec. 177 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE PLACE OF THE OAU LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION IN THE AFRICAN UNION The Assembly 1. ACKNOWLEDGES the multifarious human, social and economic problems hindering sustainable development in the African continent; 2. RECOGNIZES that the Labour and Social Affairs Commission is one of the most dynamic and fruitful organs of the OAU; 3. RECOGNIZES ALSO the numerous achievements of the Commission in improving the social and economic conditions of the African peoples during its twenty-five years of existence; 4. COMMENDS the spirit of tripartism that exists in the Commission and the collaboration among Governments, Employers and Workers which is unique in the world, thus making the Labour and Social Affairs Commission a unique Regional Commission of this nature in the world; 5. AFFIRMS that with the promotion of tripartism as the bedrock of social dialogue and democracy, faster and sustainable development, social justice, peace, stability and good governance can be achieved;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
621
6. FURTHER RECOGNIZES that in the context of globalisation and the attendant challenges which Africa should take up in the economic and social fields, in particular employment, it is imperative to maintain the Commission in its present tripartite form and to strengthen it with a view to enhancing its effectiveness; 7. REQUESTS that the social dimension be adequately addressed in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme; 8. REQUESTS the Secretary General to take the necessary measures to determine the position of this Commission within the African Union and make recommendations in this regard to the Assembly.
AHG/Dec. 178 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE WORLD SOLIDARITY AND POVERTY REDUCTION FUND The Assembly: 1. RECALLS decision AHG/Dec. 4 (XXXV) by which the Heads of State and Government reiterated their support for the initiative launched by H.E. Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the President of the Republic of Tunisia aimed at the establishment of the World Solidarity Fund; 2. RECALLS Decision CM/Dec. 645 by which Council requested the Secretary General to seize the United Nations Secretary General of this Decision as the African Common Position, and seek his support to speed up the implementation of Resolution 56/207 on the mechanisms, operational modalities, powers and management modalities for the Fund, thereby making it operational; 3. REAFFIRMS its conviction that the Fund will contribute to the strengthening of international solidarity and cooperation with a view to eradicating poverty in the world, especially on the African
622
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
continent, pursuant to the objectives the poverty reduction programme adopted at the Millennium Summit held in September 2000; 4. FURTHER REAFFIRMS that this fund will constitute one of the instruments for the realization of the objectives of the African Union and NEPAD; 5. TAKES NOTE of the report of the Secretary General on consultations with the United Nations Secretary General to accelerate the process of establishing this Fund; 6. REQUESTS the Secretary General to continue his efforts as well as his consultations with the United Nations Secretary General and closely monitor negotiations on the implementation mechanisms to be conducted during the next session of the United Nations General Assembly. 7. FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretary General to report on progress made in the implementation of this decision to the next session of the Assembly of the African Union.
AHG/Dec. 179 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE CONTROL OF ARTERIAL HYPERTENSION IN AFRICA We, Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity meeting in Durban, South Africa on 8th July 2002, ANXIOUS to ensure the sustainable preservation and protection of health as a basic necessity of the individual, an inalienable right and an international public good, RECALLING the New African Initiative adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Lusaka,
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
623
Zambia, in July 2001 and later renamed NEPAD which recognizes that poverty eradication, necessary for placing our countries on the path of sustainable growth and development, requires the revitalization of teaching, technical training and health services, RECOGNIZING that the reduction and eventual elimination of poverty requires bold leadership, building an international partnership and the adoption of policies and strategies aimed at promoting development and strengthening dependable and efficient health systems, NOTING that the objectives set with regard to health promotion need not be solely limited to the control of major communicable diseases, and that non-communicable diseases equally record very high morbidity and mortality rates, STRESSING that the prevalence of cardiovascular diseases, especially arterial hypertension, has assumed alarming dimensions with the tendency towards early occurrence and increased severity, FURTHER STRESSING that these diseases which are becoming the major cause of morbidity and invalidity, with the attendant consequences of increased human suffering and health loss in Africa call for a preventative public health approach characterized by a determination to act and by resource mobilization, BEARING IN MIND, the Victoria (Canada) Declaration of 28 May 1992 on Cardiovascular Health, as well as the will to promote Cardiovascular Health awareness in the Third Millennium, which emphasizes prevention and calls for inter-sectoral and interdisciplinary collaboration, CONSIDERING the conclusions and recommendations of the “First Symposium on the Problem of Arterial Hypertension among Black People” organized in Brussels on 11 December 2000, which stressed the urgent need for concerted and collective action with
624
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
regard to the control of cardiovascular diseases, not only by way of testing and management, but through preventive measures, FURTHER CONSIDERING the conclusions and recommendations of the Libreville Declaration on the Control of Arterial Hypertension in Africa of 6 November 2001, REAFFIRM the importance of addressing the problem of NonCommunicable Diseases as one that requires a multi-sectoral approach involving all the sectors concerned, especially with regard to health and development policy, production and marketing of pharmaceutical products and research, DECIDE that the fight against Arterial Hypertension should feature prominently in the development policies of our respective countries; REQUEST the Secretary General to ensure that this matter is drawn to the attention of the relevant Specialized Technical Committees, upon the establishment of these committees, in order to ensure the promotion and coordination of research and control activities for arterial hypertension and other cardiovascular diseases. INVITE the International Community to respond positively to this Declaration by supporting financially and otherwise our efforts to fight against arterial hypertension in Africa. MANDATE COUNCIL to review each year, the progress made in the implementation of this Declaration with a view to ensuring better control of arterial hypertension in Africa.
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
625
AHG/Dec. 180 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON SUPPORT FOR MR JUAN SOMAVIA The Assembly: 1. TAKES NOTE of the Motion of Support for the candidature of Mr. JUAN SOMAVIA for a second term as ILO Director General, adopted by the 25th Ordinary Session of the OAU Labour and Social Affairs Commission held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from 16 to 21 April 2002; 2. ENDORSES this Motion and SUPPORTS the candidature of Mr. Juan Somavia for re-election for a second term as Director General of the ILO; 3. REQUESTS the Secretary General and the African Tripartite Representatives on the ILO Governing Body to ensure implementation of this Decision.
AHG/Dec. 181 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON AFRICAN PROCESS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROTECTION OF THE MARINE AND COASTAL ENVIRONMENT IN AFRICA The Assembly: 1. RECALLS Decision AHG/Dec. 163 (XXXVII) of its 37th Ordinary Session, held in Lusaka, Zambia in July 2001, which further endorsed the African Process for the Development and Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment in *[reservation by Libya] Sub-Saharan Africa and decided to hold its Partnership Conference at the level of Heads of State in conjunction with the World Summit on Sustainable Development;
626
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
2. AFFIRMS that the African Process is an important contribution of African countries to the World Summit in Sustainable Development and ACKNOWLEDGES the outstanding quality of the work carried out by African experts in the development of the Global Environment Facility (GEF MSP) for the Development and Protection of the Marine and Coastal Environment in Sub-Saharan Africa through which the African Process has been implemented to date; 3. ENDORSES the proposal made at the Second Meeting of the Steering Committee of the GEF MSP on the Environmental Component of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) to include the African Process as the component of its oceans segment, and to recommend the application of its methodology to other thematic areas; 4. INVITES all participating countries in the process to provide adequate financial resources, as well as institutional, administrative, policy and regulatory support, for the implementation of the African Process, and in particular for selected project proposals and URGES all Member States to support and actively participate in the implementation of the African Process; 5. APPEALS TO the G8 countries and other external partners, bilateral and multilateral, as well as international financial Institutions, to assist with financing projects which are to be presented at the Partnership Conference of the African Process; 6. REQUESTS the Global Environmental Facility and the World Bank to fund the second generation of the African Process project development cycle, with a view to enabling other Member States to participate and to assist in the development of viable “win-win” projects which address root causes of environmental degradation and promote sustainable development; 7. COMMENDS the innovative approach developed by the African Process, executed by a representative of civil society, the Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea (ACOPS) in partnership with
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
627
UNEP, the GPA Co-ordination Office and IOC, of UNESCO, and recommends that such multi-stakeholder partnerships be further promoted for addressing pressing environmental issues, and that such mechanism should also include the OAU/AU; 8. EXPRESSES ITS APPRECIATION to the Government of Nigeria, and in particular to His Excellency President Olusegun Obasanjo, for his vision and leadership in fulfilling the mandate given to his country as Presidency of AMCEN, and his decision to host the Super Prep-Com as well as in ensuring that the Partnership Conference be held at the level of Heads of State during WSSD Conference; 9. FURTHER REQUESTS the Secretary General to report on the conclusions of the Partnership Conference to the next Summit of the African Union.
AHG/Dec. 182 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION AND UNIVERSALITY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT, PRODUCTION, STOCKPILING AND USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON THEIR DESTRUCTION The Assembly: 1. TAKES NOTE of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (hereinafter “the Convention”) that aims to achieve the effective prohibition of the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and their destruction, 2. RECALLS United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/33 of 20 November 2000 which notes with appreciation the ongoing work to achieve the objective and purpose of the Convention, to ensure the full implementation of its provisions and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States parties,
628
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
3. ALSO RECALLS the steadfast position of Africa regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction and in particular to the Pelindaba Treaty, 4. ACKNOWLEDGES the conclusions and recommendations of the workshop devoted to Africa on the Chemical Weapons Convention held in Khartoum, the Sudan, from 9 to 11 March 2002, 5. WELCOMES the recommendation for an effective implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa through sustained technical assistance from the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 6. ENCOURAGES the call to achieve universality of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Africa, 7. REQUESTS the Secretary General to inform Council, at its regular sessions, of developments regarding the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the progress made on the issue of universality.
AHG/Dec. 183 (XXXVIII) DECISION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PALESTINE The Assembly 1. TAKES NOTE of the Report; 2. RECALLS UN General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East and Palestine, in particular resolutions 181 and 194 and Security Council Resolutions 242, 252, 338, 465, 478, 1397, 1402 and 1403 and CALLS for the implementation of these resolutions;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
629
3. FURTHER RECALLS all relevant resolutions of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on the Middle East, which affirm that the Question of Palestine is at the core of the Middle East conflict and that no comprehensive, just and lasting peace can be established unless Israel fully withdraws from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including East Jerusalem, the Syrian Golan Heights, the Lebanese territory to the borders of 4th June 1967; 4. REAFFIRMS its solidarity and support for the just and legitimate struggle of the Palestinian people, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative, to exercise their inalienable national rights, including their right to return to their homes, recover their property, self-determination and the establishment of an independent state on their national soil, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in accordance with the principles of international law and other pertinent resolutions of the UN; 5. EXPRESSES full solidarity with and support for the elected President of the Palestinian National Authority, the Leader of the Palestinian People, H.E. Yasser Arafat, and DEMANDS the immediate end of the Israeli brutal military siege imposed on President Arafat in Ramallah and CALLS for international efforts and assistance to rebuild the Palestinian institutions destroyed by the Israeli occupation army; 6. FURTHER CONDEMNS the repeated military incursions and reoccupation of areas under Palestinian control, the marginalization of the Palestinian National Authority, the wave of killings and assassinations, the policy of collective punishment and premeditated destruction of the Palestinian economy, infrastructures, official and public institutions, including the Presidential buildings in Gaza and Ramallah, and the suffocating blockage against the Palestinian people, all of which, will only jeopardize the prospects of peace in the region; also condemns the policy of Israel to desecrate Christian and Moslem places of worship in the occupied Palestinian territory and demands
630
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
that Israel respect the sanctity of these religious institutions and Israel’s commitment to the principles of international humanitarian law in the occupied Palestinian territory. 7. ALSO CONDEMNS the policy of destruction and demolition of homes carried out by the Israeli forces in the Palestinian refugee camps, villages and towns as well as the refusal of the Israeli Government to allow the UN Fact-Finding Mission charged with establishing the facts about alleged crimes and atrocities committed in the Jenin refugee camp, Nablus and other places. Also condemns the policy of Israel to forbid the entry and provision of medical and food supplies to the refugee camps, villages and towns in the occupied Palestinian territory; 8. TAKES NOTE WITH APPRECIATION of the initiative of the Saudi Crown Prince, adopted by the Arab League Summit in Beirut, Lebanon, which provides a historic opportunity and basis for a global, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, and CALLS UPON the parties and the International Community to support the initiative; 9. CALLS for the implementation of the Declaration adopted by the reconvened Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 5 December 2001 and CALLS for concrete action on the national, regional and international levels to ensure respect by the occupying power of the provisions of the Convention; 10. HAILS the efforts deployed by the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and URGES it to continue to pursue its initiatives with all the parties concerned; 11. WELCOMES the recent resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council on Development in the Middle East and Palestine, especially Resolution 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002 which inter alia reaffirms a vision of a region where two states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within secure and recognized borders;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
631
12. EXPRESSES CONCERN over the stalled peace process attributed to the lack of commitment of the Israeli Government in pursuing the negotiations that will ensure a just and comprehensive peace and guarantee security and stability for all the peoples of the region and REITERATES ITS CALL for the resumption of negotiations between Israel and Palestine on the one hand, and between Israel and Syria and Lebanon on the other, on the basis of Resolutions 242, 338, 425 and tenets of the peace process established at the Madrid Conference as well as the full implementation of all other agreements and commitments undertaken on all tracks of the peace process in the region; 13. ALSO EXPRESSES ITS SUPPORT for all peace initiatives aimed at achieving just, lasting and comprehensive peace, including the recommendations of the Mitchell Report and the Tenet Work Plan on security intended to ensure the stoppage of the cycle of violence and facilitate the resumption of the peace negotiations as well as the initiatives of the US Secretary of State, Mr. Colin Powell, and the “Quartet” amongst other things, the immediate cessation of hostilities and the establishment of a ceasefire regime and URGES the sponsors and the international community at large, to revive the peace process and guarantee its success and for the parties concerned, to honour their commitments in order to create the necessary conditions for the establishment of a ceasefire regime that will usher in lasting peace and security in the region; 14. WELCOMES the proposals of the Secretary General of the United Nations on the establishment of a robust and credible multinational force under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. CALLS on the members of the Security Council to quickly consider the proposal of the Secretary General and to take the necessary measures in this regard since the presence of such a Force in Palestine could make an important, positive contribution towards the rapid achievement of a final settlement between Palestine and Israel 15. AGREES to set up a Committee of 10 Members in order to activate the peace process in the Middle East.
632
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
AHG/Dec. 184 (XXXVIII) RESOLUTION ON THE RETURN OF THE PILLAGED AFRICAN MONUMENT THE OBELISK OF AXUM The Assembly of Heads of State and Government: RECALLING the Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property adopted on 14 November 1970, by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), RECALLING ALSO the Convention regarding the protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage adopted on 16 November 1972, by UNESCO, RECALLING FURTHER United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the return or restitution of cultural property to the countries of origin, adopted since 1972, and in particular resolutions 33/50 of 14 December 1978, 34/64 of 29 November 1979, 35/128 of 11 December 1980, 36/64 of 27 November 1981, 38/34 of 25 November 1983, 40/19 of 21 November 1985, 42/7 of 22 October 1987, 44/18 of 6 November 1989, 50/56 of 11 December 1995, 52/24 of 25 November 1997, 45/190 of 17 December 1999 and 56/97 of 14 December 2001, CONVINCED that cultural property constitutes a basic element of civilization and national culture, COGNIZANT of the singular importance attached by the countries of origin to the return of cultural property which is a fundamental spiritual and cultural value to them,
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
633
REITERATING the solemn appeal made on 7 June 1987, by the Director-General of UNESCO for the return of irreplaceable cultural heritage to the countries of origin, BEARING IN MIND the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/8 on the proclamation of 2002 as the United Nations Year for Cultural Heritage, 1. DECLARES that the return or restitution to a country of its cultural property contributes to the strengthening of international cooperation between developed and developing countries. 2. AFFIRMS the importance of the provisions of the convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. 3. DEPLORES the systematic delaying tactic deployed by the government of Italy regarding the pillaged African historical monument, namely the Obelisk of Axum. 4. CALLS upon the government of Italy to abide by its commitment entered into in 1947, 1956 and 1997 to return the Obelisk of Axum to its country of origin; 5. URGES UNESCO to put the necessary pressure on the government of Italy to return the Obelisk of Axum to Ethiopia without further delay. 6. APPEALS to the international community to pressure the Italian Government to return the Obelisk of Axum pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions.
634
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVIII) OAU/AU DECLARATION ON THE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS IN AFRICA
I. PREAMBLE We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in Durban, South Africa, at the 38th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the OAU, have considered the Report of the Secretary General on strengthening the role of the OAU in election observation and monitoring and the advancement of the democratization process. CONSIDERING the principles and objectives of the African Union enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union, particularly in its Articles 3 and 4; REAFFIRMING the Algiers Decision of July 1999 and the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the Framework for an OAU response to unconstitutional changes of government, which laid down a set of common values and principles for democratic governance; CONSIDERING the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Lomé, Togo, in July 2000, which underpins the OAU’s agenda of promoting democracy and democratic institutions in Africa; CONSIDERING the New African Initiative (NAI) now referred to as the New Partnership for the African’s Development (NEPAD) adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in Lusaka, Zambia, in July 2001, by which, through the Democracy and Political Governance Initiative, African Leaders undertook to promote and protect democracy and human rights in their respective countries and regions, by developing clear standards of accountability and participatory governance at the national and sub-regional levels;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
635
REAFFIRMING the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in December 1948, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted in December 1966, which recognized the will of the people expressed through free and fair elections as the basis of the authority of government; REAFFIRMING ALSO the significance of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in Nairobi, Kenya, in June 1981, which recognized the right of every citizen to participate freely in the government of his or her country whether directly or through democratically elected representatives; RECALLING the Declaration of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World, adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 1990 wherein OAU Member States undertook to continue with the democratization of African societies and the consolidation of the democratic institutions; RECALLING FURTHER the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in July 1990, which emphasized the need to involve the people of Africa in the spheres of economic and political governance; REFERRING to the Cairo Agenda for Action adopted in Cairo, Egypt, in 1995, which stressed the imperative of ensuring good governance through popular participation based on the respect for human rights and dignity, free and fair elections, as well as on the respect of the principles of freedom of the press, speech, association and conscience; COGNIZANT of the fact that each Member State has the sovereign right to choose its political system in accordance with the will of its people and in conformity with the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the universally accepted principles of democracy;
636
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
CONSIDERING the ever-growing role already played by the OAU in the observation/monitoring of elections and the need to strengthen the Organization’s efforts in advancing democracy in Africa; AGREE AND ENDORSE the following Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa:
II. PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS 1. Democratic elections are the basis of the authority of any representative government; 2. Regular elections constitute a key element of the democratization process and therefore, are essential ingredients for good governance, the rule of law, the maintenance and promotion of peace, security, stability and development; 3. The holding of democratic elections is an important dimension in conflict prevention, management and resolution; 4. Democratic elections should be conducted: a) freely and fairly; b) under democratic constitutions and in compliance with supportive legal instruments; c) under a system of separation of powers that ensures in particular, the independence of the judiciary; d) at regular intervals, as provided for in National Constitutions; e) by impartial, all-inclusive competent accountable electoral institutions staffed by well-trained personnel and equipped with adequate logistics;
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
637
III. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MEMBER STATES We commit our Governments to: a) take necessary measures to ensure the scrupulous implementation of the above principles, in accordance with the constitutional processes of our respective countries; b) establish where none exist, appropriate institutions where issues such as codes of conduct, citizenship, residency, age requirements for eligible voters, compilation of voters’ registers, etc. would be addressed; c) establish impartial, all-inclusive, competent and accountable national electoral bodies staffed by qualified personnel, as well as competent legal entities including effective constitutional courts to arbitrate in the event of disputes arising from the conduct of elections; d) safeguard the human and civil liberties of all citizens including the freedom of movement, assembly, association, expression, and campaigning as well as access to the media on the part of all stakeholders, during electoral processes; e) promote civic and voters’ education on the democratic principles and values in close cooperation with the civil society groups and other relevant stakeholders; f) take all necessary measures and precautions to prevent the perpetration of fraud, rigging or any other illegal practices throughout the whole electoral process, in order to maintain peace and security; g) ensure the availability of adequate logistics and resources for carrying out democratic elections, as well as ensure that adequate provision of funding for all registered political
638
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
parties to enable them organise their work, including participation in electoral process; h) ensure that adequate security is provided to all parties participating in elections; i) ensure the transparency and integrity of the entire electoral process by facilitating the deployment of representatives of political parties and individual candidates at polling and counting stations and by accrediting national and/other observers/monitors; j) encourage the participation of African women in all aspects of the electoral process in accordance with the national laws.
IV. ELECTIONS: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS We reaffirm the following rights and obligations under which democratic elections are conducted: 1. Every citizen shall have the right to participate freely in the government of his or her country, either directly or through freely elected representatives in accordance with the provisions of the law. 2. Every citizen has the right to fully participate in the electoral processes of the country, including the right to vote or be voted for, according to the laws of the country and as guaranteed by the Constitution, without any kind of discrimination. 3. Every citizen shall have the right to free association and assembly in accordance with the law. 4. Every citizen shall have the freedom to establish or to be a member of a political party or Organization in accordance with the law.
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
639
5. Individuals or political parties shall have the right to freedom of movement, to campaign and to express political opinions with full access to the media and information within the limits of the laws of the land. 6. Individual or political parties shall have the right to appeal and to obtain timely hearing against all proven electoral malpractices to the competent judicial authorities in accordance with the electoral laws of the country. 7. Candidates or political parties shall have the right to be represented at polling and counting stations by duly designated agents or representatives. 8. No individual or political party shall engage in any act that may lead to violence or deprive others of their constitutional rights and freedoms. Hence all stakeholders should refrain from, among others, using abusive language and/or incitement to hate or defamatory allegations and provocative language. These acts should be sanctioned by designated electoral authorities. 9. All stakeholders in electoral contests shall publicly renounce the practice of granting favours, to the voting public for the purpose of influencing the outcome of elections. 10. In covering the electoral process, the media should maintain impartiality and refrain from broadcasting and publishing abusive language, incitement to hate, and other forms of provocative language that may lead to violence. 11. Every candidate and political party shall respect the impartiality of the public media by undertaking to refrain from any act which might constrain or limit their electoral adversaries from using the facilities and resources of the public media to air their campaign messages. 12. Every individual and political party participating in elections shall recognize the authority of the Electoral Commission or any statutory
640
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
body empowered to oversee the electoral process and accordingly render full cooperation to such a Commission/Body in order to facilitate their duties. 13. Every citizen and political party shall accept the results of elections proclaimed to have been free and fair by the competent national bodies as provided for in the Constitution and the electoral laws and accordingly respect the final decision of the competent Electoral Authorities or, challenge the result appropriately according to the law.
V. ELECTION OBSERVATION AND MONITORING BY THE OAU We request the OAU to be fully engaged in the strengthening of the democratization process, particularly by observing and monitoring elections in our Member States, according to the following guidelines: 1. The observation and monitoring of elections shall be undertaken subject to a memorandum of understanding between the OAU General Secretariat and the host country in accordance with the principles enshrined in this Declaration and the laws of the host country. 2. In performing their obligations, the election observers or monitors shall be guided by detailed guidelines to be prepared by the General Secretariat drawing inspiration from the essential thrust of this declaration, the specific mandates and terms of reference determined by the particular case in question as well as the wider legal framework of the country staging elections. 3. Member States should ensure that invitations to the OAU to participate in election observation or monitoring are sent at least two months before the date of the election.
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
641
4. Member States should refrain from imposing any fees and/or charges on OAU observers i.e. registration/accreditation fees etc. and facilitate easy access of observers/monitors to locations of electoral events/activities and unhindered in the performance of their tasks. 5. The General Secretariat shall have the right to decline invitations to monitor elections which in its considered opinion, do not measure up to the normative standards enunciated in this Declaration.
VI. ROLE AND MANDATE OF THE GENERAL SECRETARIAT Further request the OAU Secretary General to take all necessary measures to ensure the implementation of this Declaration by undertaking, in particular, the following activities: a) Strengthen its role in the observation and monitoring of elections within the legal framework of the host country, in accordance with the memorandum of understanding reached with that country; b) Mobilize extra-budgetary funds to augment the General Secretariat resource base so as to facilitate the implementation of this Declaration; c) Undertake a feasibility study on the establishment of a Democratization and Electoral Assistance Fund, to facilitate a successful implementation of this Declaration. d) Undertake a feasibility study on the establishment within the OAU General Secretariat of a Democratization and Election Monitoring Unit that will also discharge issues on good governance; e) Compile and maintain a roster of African Experts in the filed of election observation and monitoring and democratization in general in order to deploy competent and professional
642
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
observers and to avails itself of their services whenever necessary. Member States on their part are requested to assist by making the names of their experts available to the General Secretariat; f) Work out better standards of procedures, preparations and treatment for personnel selected to serve on OAU observer missions. g) Promote cooperation and work in partnership with African Organizations and International Organizations, as well as national institutions, non-governmental Organizations and civil society groups involved in the elected monitoring and observation work. h) Publish and make the General Secretariat Reports on the observation/monitoring of elections and other related activities open to all Member States and the public at large, as a means of consolidating electoral and democratic processes on the continent.
AHG/Decl. 2 (XXXVIII) DECLARATION ON DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA We, the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of the African Unity, meeting at our Thirty-eighth Ordinary Session, in Durban, South Africa, on the 8 July 2002, HAVING TAKEN COGNISANCE of developments in the situation in Angola, as presented by H.E. the President of the Republic of Angola, HAVING BEEN SOLICITED by the Angolan Government to mobilize humanitarian assistance for the people recently affected by the war in the country,
Decisions and Declarations of the OAU (2002)
643
1. WELCOME the return of peace to Angola which, we are convinced, will bring about peace and tranquillity in the Southern and Central African regions as well as in the whole African Continent; 2. NOTE WITH SATISFACTION the exemplary implementation of commitments subscribed to within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding to the Lusaka Protocol between the Angolan Armed Forces and UNITA signed on 4 April 2002 in Luanda; 3. COMMEND the Government and the people of Angola, and in particular, H.E. President JOSE EDUARDO dos SANTOS for the spirit of national reconciliation and magnanimity they have demonstrated and encourage them to continue in this spirit; 4. EXPRESS our willingness to contribute to the ongoing efforts aimed at finding a solution for demobilized soldiers, orphans, internationally displaced persons and other war victims by ensuring their social reintegration and rehabilitation; 5. APPEAL to the African community in particular, and the international community in general, to continue to provide urgent humanitarian assistance towards the reconstruction and development of Angola.
This page intentionally left blank
DECISIONS AND DECLARATIONS ADOPTED BY THE FIRST ORDINARY SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE AFRICAN UNION 9-10 July 2002 Durban, South Africa
TABLE OF CONTENTS References ASS/AU/Dec.1(I) ASS/AU/Dec.2(I) ASS/AU/Dec.3(I) ASS/AU/Dec.4(I) ASS/AU/Dec.5(I)
ASS/AU/Dec.6(I) ASS/AU/Dec.7(I) ASS/AU/Dec.8(I)
ASS/AU/Decl.1(I) ASS/AU/Decl.2(I)
1
Title Decision on the Interim Period Decision on the Draft Rules of Procedure Decision on the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Resolution on the Establishment of the African Army1 Preliminary Resolution of the Proclamation by the African Union of a Capacity Building Decade in Africa Decision on the Proposed Amendments to Articles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union Decision on the Situation in Madagascar Decision on a Common African Defence and Security Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) The Durban Declaration in Tribute to the Organization of African Unity and on the Launching of the African Union
Pages 647 649 649
650 653 654 655
656
658
The Resolution on the Establishment of the African Army has not been adopted. Therefore it does not appear in this Yearbook. The Decision on a Common African Defence and Security (ASS/AU/Dec.8(I)) has been adopted to schedule a continuous reflection on the issue of an African Army.
This page intentionally left blank
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
647
ASS/AU/Dec. 1 (I) DECISION ON THE INTERIM PERIOD The Assembly of the African Union: 1. TAKES NOTE of the Report of the Secretary General; 2. DECIDES: i)
TO ADOPT the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly and the Statutes of the Commission;
ii)
THAT THE TRANSITION PERIOD shall come to an end with the convening of the Inaugural Session of the Assembly;
iii)
TO PROVIDE for an interim period with effect from 9 July 2002 for a duration of one (1) year after which the second ordinary session of the Assembly shall appoint the Chairperson, Deputy Chairperson as well as the Commissioners through the Executive Council.
iv)
TO DESIGNATE the Secretary General, the Assistant Secretaries General and the Staff of the General Secretariat of the OAU as the Interim Commission in accordance with Article 33(4) of the Constitutive Act;
v)
THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL shall be the Interim Chairperson of the Commission and the Assistant Secretaries General shall be acting Commissioners and AUTHORISES him to allocate the portfolios as appropriate;
vi)
TO AUTHORISE the Interim Commission to complete its proposals on structure of the Commission for submission to Member States and undertake all the necessary measures to facilitate the election and appointment of the Chairperson, the Deputy Chairperson and the Commissioners in July 2003;
648
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
vii) TO AUTHORISE the Interim Chairperson to prepare the financial implications of the structure of the Commission and undertake the necessary consultations with Member States prior to submitting them to the Executive Council and ultimately to the Assembly in July 2003; viii) TO AUTHORISE the Interim Chairperson to continue implementing the other activities identified in the Secretary General’s Report relating to the Lusaka Decision; ix)
TO AUTHORISE ALSO the Interim Commission to continue with the process of transferring the assets and liabilities of the OAU to the African Union;
x)
TO URGE those countries which have not yet ratified the Constitutive Act to do so expeditiously; and REITERATES its appeal to all Member States which have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Protocol on the PanAfrican Parliament; and
xi)
That the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Committee of Experts on Rights and Welfare of the Child shall henceforth operate within the framework of the African Union;
xii) TO CONGRATULATE and express its appreciation to the Secretary General, the Assistant Secretaries General and the Staff of the General Secretariat for the excellent work done and their dedication and commitment to the cause of the African Union which has made the launching of the African Union possible.
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
649
ASS/AU/Dec. 2 (I) DECISION ON THE DRAFT RULES OF PROCEDURE The Executive Council: TAKES NOTE of the Draft Rules of Procedure; DECIDES to adopt its own Rules of Procedure and those of the Permanent Representatives’ Committee.
ASS/AU/Dec. 3 (I) DECISION ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION The Assembly: RECALLS Decision AHG/Dec.160 (XXXVII), in which it decided to incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the African Union, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act and requested the Secretary General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ, including the possibility of changing its name; TAKES NOTE of Decision CM/Dec.31 (LXXVI) Rev.1 on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, adopted by the 76th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held in Durban, South Africa, from 28 June to 6 July 2002; ADOPTS the Protocol on the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and CALLS UPON all Member States to sign and ratify the Protocol so as to ensure its early entry into force; DECIDES in the interim that, pending the ratification and entry into force of the Protocol, the Cairo Declaration on the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution shall remain valid.
650
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
ASS/AU/Dec. 5 (I) PRELIMINARY RESOLUTION ON THE PROCLAMATION BY THE AFRICAN UNION OF A CAPACITY BUILDING DECADE IN AFRICA We, Heads of State and Government of Member States of the African Union meeting in Durban, South Africa, from 9 to 10 July 2002. RECOGNIZING the vital importance of Capacity Building for our countries and having taken and continuing to take measures to make Capacity Building a clear and intersectoral priority of our development policies, strategies and programmes, CONSCIOUS of the efforts deployed by the international community to promote the strengthening and/or consolidation of the capacities of various sectors in Africa, BEARING IN MIND the objectives and principles enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity of 25 May 1963, particularly its articles I, II and III, CONSIDERING the 3 June 1991 Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, and the various other decisions, declarations, resolutions and joint declarations aimed at promoting the economic, social and cultural integration of our continent, RECALLING the Sirte Declaration of 9 September 1999 adopted by the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, RECALLING ALSO the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the African Union by the Thirty sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Lomé, Togo from 10 to 12 July 2001, as subsequently ratified by two thirds of Member States,
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
651
ALSO BEARING IN MIND the New African Initiative adopted in July 2001 and MINDFUL of the determination of Africans to eradicate poverty and to commit their countries, individually and collectively, to sustainable growth and development, while taking an active part in the world economy and in decision making fora, COGNIZANT of the enormous capacity needs in the public and private sectors, as well as in the civil society of our respective countries, which constitutes a major impediment to participatory development, TAKING NOTE of the emergence of new actors on the political, social and economic scene of our respective countries, whose participation would be crucial in the reduction of poverty, promotion of sustainable development and strengthening of good governance, MINDFUL of the fact that Capacity Building constitutes a vital link that is missing in the implementation of effective development strategies in Africa, CONVINCED that capacity building in our respective countries and within the regional organizations will guarantee peace and security, and make it possible to attain high growth rates, ANXIOUS to preserve our attachment to the development and utilization of the continent’s human resources for the general wellҟ being of our peoples in all areas of human endeavour, ALSO COGNIZANT of the need for all African States and international organizations operating in Africa to strengthen coordination and harmonization of their activities and enhance development for the benefit of our Member States, NOTING that efforts so far made in the area of subregional and regional cooperation have produced encouraging results as far as the continent’s socioҟ economic development is concerned,
652
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
CONSIDERING the tremendous results already achieved by multilateral institutions, particularly African based institutions, notably the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in the area of socio economic policy analysis development and development management on the Continent, DESIROUS to pursue such efforts, as evidenced by the establishment of the African Development Forum which brings together all the stakeholders with a view to reaching a consensus on Africa’s development policies and priorities; the creation of the Joint African Institute whose role is to train officials from Member States in financial and economic matters, as well as in other development matters; and the implementation of the Capacity Building partnership in Africa (PACT) which offers a new framework for the provision by the international community for additional resources for Capacity Building on the continent, ALSO CONSIDERING that these efforts will be critical in the promotion of tripartite dialogue and national coordination between the public and private sectors, and the civil society; will help strengthen capacities for regional cooperation and integration; and facilitate integration of African countries in the world economy, RECOGNIZING FURTHER the need for African countries to take ownership of their development policies, strategies and programmes, and to pursue an effective partnership between Africa and the international community, HEREBY, DECIDE to proclaim 2002-2011 the “DECADE FOR CAPACITY BUILDING IN AFRICA” and solemnly:
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
653
AFFIRM our determination to ensure that local Capacity Building features prominently in the development policies of our respective countries; AGREE to demonstrate greater commitment to Capacity Building on the continent by pooling our resources and capacities, and allowing our people to take ownership of their development process; FURTHER AGREE to promote the multilateral organisations, particularly those based in Africa, namely the African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF) whose task is to strengthen and develop capacities on the Continent; CALL ON the international community to respond positively to this Resolution by supporting financially and otherwise our Capacity Building efforts; and MANDATE the Council of Ministers to review, each year, the progress made in the implementation of this Resolution with a view to ensuring the success of the DECADE FOR CAPACITY BUILDING in Africa.
ASS/AU/Dec. 6 (I) DECISION ON THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTIVE ACT OF THE AFRICAN UNION The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, meeting at its First Ordinary Session in Durban, 9 – 10 July 2002, HAVING CONSIDERED the proposal by the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on Amendments to Articles of the Constitutive Act of the African Union,
654
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
DECIDES as follows: 1. The interim Chairperson of the Commission will circulate the Libyan amendments to all Member States; 2. All the proposals for amendment will first be examined by the Executive Council (in accordance with Article 32 of the Act) and submitted for consideration by an Extraordinary Session of the Assembly to be held in 6 months’ time.
ASS/AU/Dec. 7 (I) DECISION ON THE SITUATION IN MADAGASCAR The Assembly: RECALLS Article 4 (p) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union on the condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of Government; REAFFIRMS its commitment to the Algiers Decision and the Lomé Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government during their ordinary sessions held in July 1999 and July 2000, respectively; COMMENDS President Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, the outgoing Chairman of the OAU, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal and the other Heads of State who facilitated the Dakar I Agreement of 18 April 2002, and who proposed the Dakar II Settlement Plan for Madagascar, as well as the Secretary General of the OAU and the Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General for their efforts; ENDORSES the Communiqué on the situation in Madagascar adopted by the Central Organ meeting held at Summit level in Addis Ababa on 21 June 2002;
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
655
ENCOURAGES Mr. Marc Ravalomanana and all the Malagasy parties to pursue efforts aimed at achieving national reconciliation and cohesion and promoting a peaceful solution to the crisis; ENCOURAGES further Mr. Marc Ravalomanana and other Malagasy parties concerned to organise, as soon as possible, elections* [Reservations expressed by Senegal, which proposes the organization of Legislative elections] as recommended in the Communiqué adopted by the Central Organ meeting at Summit level held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 21 June 2002. These elections must be transparent and free and organised with the assistance of the African Union and the United Nations; REQUESTS the current Chairman of the African Union and the Interim Chairman of the Commission to assist the Malagasy parties in seeking a peaceful and constitutional solution to the crisis in conformity with the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
ASS/AU/Dec. 8 (I) DECISION ON A COMMON AFRICAN DEFENCE AND SECURITY The Assembly: WELCOMING the initiative of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, Leader of the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahirya, on the establishment of one single African army, 1. STRESSES the need for a common African defence and security in the context of the Constitutive Act of the African Union. 2. REQUESTS the Chairman of the Assembly to establish a group of experts to examine all aspects related to the establishment of a common African defence and security and submit recommendations for the consideration of the next ordinary session of the Assembly.
656
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
ASS/AU/Decl. 1 (I) DECLARATION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT (NEPAD) WE, the Heads of State and Government of Member States of the Organisation of African Unity, meeting at the 38th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Durban, South Africa on 8th July 2002: RECALLING our decision regarding the then New African Initiative taken at the 37th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in Lusaka, Zambia from 9 to 11 July 2001 (AHG/Decl. 1 (XXXVII); NOTING WITH APPRECIATION the report provided to us by the Chairperson of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee, H.E. President O. Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, describing the developments in the NEPAD process over the course of the past year; FURTHER NOTING the document submitted to us by H.E. President Obasanjo entitled “Towards the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – Summary of Progress Report and Initial Action Plan” (hereinafter referred to as “Progress Report and Initial Action Plan”), elaborating the first phase for the implementation of NEPAD; FURTHER NOTING the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance submitted by H.E. President Obasanjo, which seeks to foster a strong statement of reaffirmation by African leaders of their commitment to the principles and core values of democracy and good political, economic and corporate governance; FURTHER NOTING the document submitted by H.E. President Obasanjo on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) which is
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
657
an instrument that will be voluntarily acceded to by Member States of the African Union for the purpose of self-monitoring, and which aims to foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional integration in the continent; EMPHASISING the long term nature of the NEPAD programme and our determination to use all available resources to ensure its successful implementation; ENDORSE the Progress Report and Initial Action Plan and RECOMMENDS that Member States wishing to do so, should submit written comments to the Chairman of HSIC; CALL for the detailed documents relating to each priority area of the Progress Report and Initial Action Plan to be distributed to all Member States of the African Union; URGE that the programmes in each priority area be urgently implemented and that each Member State provide assistance in the further development and implementation of these programmes and in the continued popularization of NEPAD amongst all sectors of society on the African continent; REAFFIRM our commitment to the principles and core values contained in the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance; ENCOURAGE all Member States of the African Union to adopt the Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance and accede to the African Peer Review Mechanism; MANDATE the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee of NEPAD and its Steering Committee to continue the vital task of further elaborating the NEPAD Framework and ensuring the implementation of NEPAD Initial Action Plan until reviewed at
658
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
the 2nd Assembly of Heads and Government of the African Union in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2003; DECIDE to increase the number of the members of the Implementation Committee by one per region of the African Union, thus bringing the total number of members of the Committee to twenty; CALL on the international community to provide continued and enhanced support for our efforts to regenerate the continent.
ASS/AU/Decl. 2 (I) THE DURBAN DECLARATION IN TRIBUTE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND ON THE LAUNCHING OF THE AFRICAN UNION We, the Heads of State and Government of the Assembly of the African Union, meeting in our inaugural session in Durban, South Africa, have adopted the following declaration in tribute to the Organisation of African Unity: 1. Thirty nine years ago, the Heads of State and Government of the then independent African Countries gathered in Addis Ababa Ethiopia to found the Organization of African Unity. 2. The main objectives for establishing the organisation were, inter alia, to rid the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonisation and apartheid; to promote unity and solidarity among African States; coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; for the defence of sovereignty, territorial integrity and consolidation of the independence of African States, as well as promoting international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations. 3. The common identity and unity of purpose engendered by the OAU, became a dynamic force at the service of the African people
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
659
in the pursuit of the struggle for the total emancipation of the African Continent in the political, economic and social fields. Nowhere has that dynamic force proved more decisive than in the African struggle for decolonisation. Through the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, the Continent worked and spoke as one with undivided determination in forging an international consensus in support of the liberation struggle. Today, we celebrate a fully decolonised Africa and Apartheid has been consigned to the ignominy of history. 4. Pursuant to one of the major objective of its Charter, the OAU has strived to address Africa’s problem of poverty and under development and adopted strategies in this regard, including the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos which continue to be the blue print for Africa’s integration and development. 5. In June 1991, the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community was signed and is now in force. The Treaty seeks to build the African Economic Community through a Common Market built on the Regional Economic Communities. Today, Regional Economic Communities are consolidating and proving to be engines for integration. ECCAS, SADC, COMESA, UMA, ECOWAS, IGAD and CENSAD are making great effort at economic development and integration as well as at promoting peace through conflict resolution in their region. We remain committed to continental and global cooperation including the strengthening of Afro-Arab cooperation. 6. In the political realm, the OAU Declaration on the Political and Socio-economic Situation in Africa and the Fundamental Changes taking place in the World of 1990, underscored Africa’s resolve to seize the initiative, to determine its destiny and to address the challenges to peace, democracy and security. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution that was established in 1993 was a practical expression of that determination to begin in earnest, the task of promoting peace and stability in Africa.
660
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
7. Through the Mechanism, the OAU has managed to address constructively many of the conflicts which have and continue to afflict our Continent. The Mechanism has made a fundamental difference, not only in its political significance of our determination to strive for peace, but more so in the practical framework it has provided for the continent to address conflicts and conflict situations. 8. The OAU has been on the vanguard in the promotion of the observance of human and people’s rights. The OAU Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the Grand Bay Declaration and Plan of Action on Human Rights are among the instruments adopted by the Organization to promote human rights. Underlying these instruments is a determination to ensure that Africa responds to the challenge of observing, promoting and protecting human rights and the rule of Law. 9. The OAU has also responded to the yearning of the African people for greater political freedoms inherent in democratic government. To this effect, it was at the forefront in galvanizing governments around a new determination to progressively place the people at the centre of decision making. The Charter on Popular Participation adopted in 1990 was a testimony to this new determination. 10. Today, Africa is firmly on the road to democratisation. In our Algiers decision on unconstitutional changes of Government and our Lomé Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes adopted in 1999 and 2000 respectively, we reiterated our determination to see Africa governed on the basis of democracy and by governments emanating from the will of the people expressed through transparent, free and fair elections. 11. Similarly, in our 2000 Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation, we agreed on fundamental principles to govern our cooperation in security, and development and in the promotion of Democracy and Good Governance in the Continent.
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
661
12. Through the OAU, Africa has been able to respond to the many other challenges it faces. Whether in the protection of the environment, in fighting international terrorism, in combating the scourge of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, malaria and tuberculosis or dealing with humanitarian issues such as refugees and displaced persons, landmines, small and light weapons among others, Africa has found collective action through the OAU. 13. We, the Heads of State and Government meeting in the inaugural session of the Assembly of our African Union, honour the founding leaders of the OAU and pay tribute to their tenacity, resilience and commitment to African Unity. They stood firm in the face of the divisive manipulations of the detractors of Africa and fought for the integrity of Africa and the human dignity of all the peoples of the continent. In the same vein, we pay tribute to all the Secretaries General and all the men and women who served the OAU with dedication and commitment. 14. As we hail the achievements of the OAU, we rededicate ourselves more resolutely to its principles and objectives and to the ideals of freedom, unity and development which the founding leaders sought to achieve in establishing the Organization thirty-nine years ago. As we bid farewell to the OAU, we rededicate ourselves to its memory as a pioneer, a liberator, a unifier, an organizer, and the soul of our continent. We pledge to strive more resolutely in pursuing the ultimate goals of the OAU and in furthering the cause of Africa and its people under the African Union. 15. We reiterate our continuing commitment to the objectives of the African Union which was initiated at the fourth extraordinary session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in the Great Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and as embodied in our 9.9.99 Sirte Declaration. We further rededicate ourselves to the objectives on the New Partnership of Africa’s Development (NEPAD), as a programme of the African Union for strengthening inter-African cooperation and integration in a globalising world and to
662
Decisions and Declarations of the AU (2002)
overcome the prevalence of poverty and strive for a better quality of life for all the peoples of Africa. 16. We commit ourselves to urgently establish all institutional structures to advance the agenda of the African Union and call on all Member States to honour their political and financial commitments and to take all the necessary actions to give unwavering support to all the Union’s initiatives aimed at promoting peace, security, stability, sustainable development, democracy and human rights in our continent. 17. In order to ensure the involvement of our peoples and their civil society organisations in the activities of the Union, we recommit ourselves to the early establishment of the Pan African Parliament and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) as envisaged in the Constitutive Act of our Union. 18. We welcome and recognise the important contribution of the youth, women, business community, parliamentary representatives and civil society and call upon these stakeholders to continue participating fully as partners in the regeneration of the African Continent through the programmes of the African Union. We reaffirm, in particular, the pivotal role of women in all levels of society and recognise that the objectives of the African Union cannot be achieved without the full involvement and participation of women at all levels and structures of the Union. 19. We note the importance of continuing to cooperate with Africa’s partners as well as regional and continental organisations in the furtherance of the objectives of the African Union. 20. As we enter a new era in the history of our continent, we commit ourselves to the principles and objectives that we set out in the Constitutive Act of our Union in order to ensure that our peoples live in peace and prosperity. We also rededicate ourselves to implementing all programmes, policies and decisions of the African Union.
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL OF THE AFRICAN UNION
WE, the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the African Union; CONSIDERING the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, as well as the Charter of the United Nations; RECALLING the Declaration on the establishment, within the Organization of African Unity (OAU), of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, adopted by the 29th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Cairo, Egypt, from 28 to 30 June 1993; RECALLING ALSO Decision AHG/Dec.160 (XXXVII) adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001, by which the Assembly decided to incorporate the Central Organ of the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution as one of the organs of the Union, in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, and, in the regard, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the structures, procedures and working methods of the Central Organ, including the possibility of changing its name; MINDFUL of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, conferring on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as the provisions of the Charter on the role of regional arrangements or agencies in the maintenance of international peace and security, and the need to forge closer cooperation and partnership between the United Nations, other international organizations and the
664
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
African Union, in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa; ACKNOWLEDGING the contribution of African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in the maintenance and promotion of peace, security and stability on the Continent and the need to develop formal coordination and cooperation arrangements between these Regional Mechanisms and the African Union; RECALLING Decisions AHG/Dec.141 (XXXV) and AHG/Dec.142 (XXXV) on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999, and Declaration AHG/Decl.5 (XXXVI) on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000; REAFFIRMING our commitment to Solemn Declaration AHG/Decl.4 (XXXVI) on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), adopted by the 36th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lomé, Togo, from 10 to 12 July 2000, as well as Declaration AHG/Decl.1 (XXXVII) on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which was adopted by the 37th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 9 to 11 July 2001; AFFIRMING our further commitment to Declaration AHG/Decl.2 (XXX) on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations, adopted by the 30th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Tunis, Tunisia, from 13 to 15 June 1994, as well as the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
665
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU held in Algiers, Algeria, from 12 to 14 July 1999; CONCERNED about the continued prevalence of armed conflicts in Africa and the fact that no single internal factor has contributed more to socio-economic decline on the Continent and the suffering of the civilian population than the scourge of conflicts within and between our States; CONCERNED ALSO by the fact that conflicts have forced millions of our people, including women and children, into a drifting life as refugees and internally displaced persons, deprived of their means of livelihood, human dignity and hope; CONCERNED FURTHER about the scourge of landmines in the Continent and RECALLING, in this respect, the Plan of Action on a Landmine Free Africa, adopted by the 1st Continental Conference of African Experts on Anti-Personnel Mines, held in Kempton Park, South Africa, from 17 to 19 May 1997, and endorsed by the 66th Ordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, held in Harare, Zimbabwe, from 26 to 30 May 1997, as well as subsequent decisions adopted by the OAU on this issue; CONCERNED ALSO about the impact of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons in threatening peace and security in Africa and undermining efforts to improve the living standards of African peoples and RECALLING, in this respect, the Declaration on the Common African Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted by the OAU Ministerial Conference held in Bamako, Mali, from 30 November to 1 December 2000, as well as all subsequent OAU decisions on this issue; AWARE that the problems caused by landmines and the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons constitute a serious impediment to Africa’s social and economic development, and that they can only be resolved
666
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
within the framework continental cooperation;
of
increased
and
well
coordinated
AWARE ALSO of the fact that the development of strong democratic institutions and culture, observance of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the implementation of post-conflict recovery programmes and sustainable development policies, are essential for the promotion of collective security, durable peace and stability, as well as for the prevention of conflicts; DETERMINED to enhance our capacity to address the scourge of conflicts on the Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing about peace, security and stability on the Continent; DESIROUS of establishing an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, in accordance with the authority conferred in that regard by Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union;
HEREBY AGREE ON THE FOLLOWING:
Article 1 Definitions For the purpose of this Protocol: a)
“Protocol” shall mean the present Protocol;
b)
“Cairo Declaration” shall mean the Declaration on the Establishment, within the OAU, of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
667
c)
“Lomé Declaration” shall mean the Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government;
d)
“Constitutive Act” shall mean the Constitutive Act of the African Union;
e)
“Union” shall mean the African Union;
f)
“Assembly” shall mean the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union;
g)
“Commission” shall African Union;
h)
“Regional Mechanisms” shall mean the African Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution;
i)
“Member States” shall mean Member States of the African Union.
mean
the
Commission
of
the
Article 2 Establishment, Nature and structure 1. There is hereby established, pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, a Peace and Security Council within the Union, as a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall be a collective security and early-warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. 2. The Peace and Security Council shall be supported by the Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force and a Special Fund.
668
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Article 3 Objectives The objectives for which the Peace and Security Council is established shall be to: a)
promote peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property, the well-being of the African people and their environment, as well as the creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development;
b)
anticipate and prevent conflicts. In circumstances where conflicts have occurred, the Peace and Security Council shall have the responsibility to undertake peace-making and peacebuilding functions for the resolution of these conflicts;
c)
promote and implement peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities to consolidate peace and prevent the resurgence of violence;
d)
co-ordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects;
e)
develop a common defence policy for the Union, in accordance with article 4(d) of the Constitutive Act;
f)
promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law, as part of efforts for preventing conflicts.
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
669
Article 4 Principles The Peace and Security Council shall be guided by the principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act, the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It shall, in particular, be guided by the following principles: a)
peaceful settlement of disputes and conflicts;
b)
early responses to contain crisis situations so as to prevent them from developing into full-blown conflicts;
c)
respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law;
d)
interdependence between socio-economic development and the security of peoples and States;
e)
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States;
f)
non interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another;
g)
sovereign equality and interdependence of Member States;
h)
inalienable right to independent existence;
i)
respect of borders inherited on achievement of independence;
j)
the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act;
670
k)
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act.
Article 5 Composition 1. The Peace and Security Council shall be composed of fifteen Members elected on the basis of equal rights, in the following manner: a)
ten Members elected for a term of two years; and
b)
five Members elected for a term of three years in order to ensure continuity.
2. In electing the Members of the Peace and Security Council, the Assembly shall apply the principle of equitable regional representation and rotation, and the following criteria with regard to each prospective Member State: a)
commitment to uphold the principles of the Union;
b)
contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa – in this respect, experience in peace support operations would be an added advantage;
c)
capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibilities entailed in membership;
d)
participation in conflict resolution, peace-making and peacebuilding at regional and continental levels;
e)
willingness and ability to take up responsibility for regional and continental conflict resolution initiatives;
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
671
f)
contribution to the Peace Fund and/or Special Fund created for specific purpose;
g)
respect for constitutional governance, in accordance with the Lomé Declaration, as well as the rule of law and human rights;
h)
having sufficiently staffed and equipped Permanent Missions at the Headquarters of the Union and the United Nations, to be able to shoulder the responsibilities which go with the membership; and
i)
commitment to honor financial obligations to the Union.
3. A retiring Member of the Peace and Security Council shall be eligible for immediate re-election. 4. There shall be a periodic review by the Assembly to assess the extent to which the Members of the Peace and Security Council continue to meet the requirements spelt out in article 5 (2) and to take action as appropriate.
Article 6 Functions The Peace and Security Council shall perform functions in the following areas: a)
promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa;
b)
early warning and preventive diplomacy;
c)
peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, conciliation and enquiry;
d)
peace support operations and intervention, pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
672
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
e)
peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction;
f)
humanitarian action and disaster management;
g)
any other function as may be decided by the Assembly.
Article 7 Powers 1. In conjunction with the Chairperson of the Commission, the Peace and Security Council shall: a)
anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity;
b)
undertake peace-making and peace-building functions to resolve conflicts where they have occurred;
c)
authorize the mounting support missions;
d)
lay down general guidelines for the conduct of such missions, including the mandate thereof, and undertake periodic reviews of these guidelines;
e)
recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, as defined in relevant international conventions and instruments;
f)
approve the modalities for intervention by the Union in a Member State, following a decision by the Assembly, pursuant to article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act;
and
deployment
of
peace
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
673
g)
institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes place in a Member State, as provided for in the Lomé Declaration;
h)
implement the common defense policy of the Union;
i)
ensure the implementation of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and other relevant international, continental and regional conventions and instruments and harmonize and coordinate efforts at regional and continental levels to combat international terrorism;
j)
promote close harmonization, co-ordination and co-operation between Regional Mechanisms and the Union in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa;
k)
promote and develop a strong “partnership for peace and security” between the Union and the United Nations and its agencies, as well as with other relevant international organizations;
l)
develop policies and action required to ensure that any external initiative in the field of peace and security on the continent takes place within the framework of the Union’s objectives and priorities;
m)
follow-up, within the framework of its conflict prevention responsibilities, the progress towards the promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law by Member States;
n)
promote and encourage the implementation of OAU/AU, UN and other relevant international Conventions and Treaties on arms control and disarmament;
674
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
o)
examine and take such appropriate action within its mandate in situations where the national independence and sovereignty of a Member State is threatened by acts of aggression, including by mercenaries;
p)
support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters;
q)
submit, through its Chairperson, regular reports to the Assembly on its activities and the state of peace and security in Africa; and
r)
decide on any other issue having implications for the maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent and exercise powers that may be delegated to it by the Assembly, in accordance with Article 9 (2) of the Constitutive Act.
2. The Member States agree that in carrying out its duties under the present Protocol, the Peace and Security Council acts on their behalf. 3. The Member States agree to accept and implement the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, in accordance with the Constitutive Act. 4. The Member States shall extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by the Peace and Security Council for the prevention, management and resolution of crises and conflicts, pursuant to the duties entrusted to it under the present Protocol.
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
675
Article 8 Procedure Organization and Meetings 1. The Peace and Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continuously. For this purpose, each Member of the Peace and Security Council shall, at all times, be represented at the Headquarters of the Union. 2. The Peace and Security Council shall meet at the level of Permanent Representatives, Ministers or Heads of State and Government. It shall convene as often as required at the level of Permanent Representatives, but at least twice a month. The Ministers and the Heads of State and Government shall meet at least once a year, respectively. 3. The meetings of the Peace and Security Council shall be held at the Headquarters of the Union. 4. In the event a Member State invites the Peace and Security Council to meet in its country, provided that two-thirds of the Peace and Security Council members agree, that Member State shall defray the additional expenses incurred by the Commission as a result of the meeting being held outside the Headquarters of the Union. Subsidiary Bodies and Sub-Committees 5. The Peace and Security Council may establish such subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions. Such subsidiary bodies may include ad hoc committees for mediation, conciliation or enquiry, consisting of an individual State or group of States. The Peace and Security Council shall also seek such military, legal and other forms of expertise as it may require for the performance of its functions.
676
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Chairmanship 6. The chair of the Peace and Security Council shall be held in turn by the Members of the Peace and Security Council in the alphabetical order of their names. Each Chairperson shall hold office for one calendar month. Agenda 7. The provisional agenda of the Peace and Security Council shall be determined by the Chairperson of the Peace and Security Council on the basis of proposals submitted by the Chairperson of the Commission and Member States. The inclusion of any item in the provisional agenda may not be opposed by a Member State. Quorum 8. The number of Members required to constitute a quorum shall be two-thirds of the total membership of the Peace and Security Council. Conduct of Business 9. The Peace and Security Council shall hold closed meetings. Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or in the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from the proceedings. 10. The Peace and Security Council may decide to hold open meetings. In this regard: a)
any Member State which is not a Member of the Peace and Security Council, if it is party to a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council, shall
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
677
be invited to present its case as appropriate and shall participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion; b)
any Member State which is not a Member of the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that Member State considers that its interests are especially affected;
c)
any Regional Mechanism, international organization or civil society organization involved and/or interested in a conflict or a situation under consideration by the Peace and Security Council may be invited to participate, without the right to vote, in the discussion relating to that conflict or situation.
11. The Peace and Security Council may hold informal consultations with parties concerned by or interested in a conflict or a situation under its consideration, as well as with Regional Mechanisms, international organizations and civil society organizations as may be needed for the discharge of its responsibilities. Voting 12. Each Member of the Peace and Security Council shall have one vote. 13. Decisions of the Peace and Security Council shall generally be guided by the principle of consensus. In cases where consensus cannot be reached, the Peace and Security Council shall adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters shall be made by a two-thirds majority vote of its Members voting.
678
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Rules of Procedure 14. The Peace and Security Council shall submit its own rules of procedure, including on the convening of its meetings, the conduct of business, the publicity and records of meetings and any other relevant aspect of its work, for consideration and approval by the Assembly.
Article 9 Entry points and modalities for actions 1. The Peace and Security Council shall take initiatives and action it deems appropriate with regard to situations of potential conflict, as well as to those that have already developed into full-blown conflicts. The Peace and Security Council shall also take all measures that are required in order to prevent a conflict for which a settlement has already been reached from escalating. 2. To that end, the Peace and Security Council shall use its discretion to effect entry, whether through the collective intervention of the Council itself, or through its Chairperson and/or the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise, and/or in collaboration with the Regional Mechanisms.
Article 10 The Role of the Chairperson of the Commission 1. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, under the authority of the Peace and Security Council, and in consultation with all parties involved in a conflict, deploy efforts and take all initiatives deemed appropriate to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts.
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
679
2. To this end, the Chairperson of the Commission: a)
shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any matter, which, in his/her opinion, may threaten peace, security and stability in the Continent;
b)
may bring to the attention of the Panel of the Wise any matter which, in his/her opinion, deserves their attention;
c)
may, at his/her own initiative or when so requested by the Peace and Security Council, use his/her good offices, either personally or through special envoys, special representatives, the Panel of the Wise or the Regional Mechanisms, to prevent potential conflicts, resolve actual conflicts and promote peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.
3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also: a)
ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions of the Peace and Security Council, including mounting and deploying peace support missions authorized by the Peace and Security Council. In this respect, the Chairperson of the Commission shall keep the Peace and Security Council informed of developments relating to the functioning of such missions. All problems likely to affect the continued and effective functioning of these missions shall be referred to the Peace and Security Council, for its consideration and appropriate action;
b)
ensure the implementation and follow-up of the decisions taken by the Assembly in conformity with Article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
c)
prepare comprehensive and periodic reports and documents, as required, to enable the Peace Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to perform their functions effectively.
680
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
4. In the exercise of his/her functions and powers, the Chairperson of the Commission shall be assisted by the Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security, who shall be responsible for the affairs of the Peace and Security Council. The Chairperson of the Commission shall rely on human and material resources available at the Commission, for servicing and providing support to the Peace and Security Council. In this regard, a Peace and Security Council Secretariat shall be established within the Directorate dealing with conflict prevention, management and resolution.
Article 11 Panel of the Wise 1. In order to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the area of conflict prevention, a Panel of the Wise shall be established. 2. The Panel of the Wise shall be composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent. They shall be selected by the Chairperson of the Commission after consultation with the Member States concerned, on the basis of regional representation and appointed by the Assembly to serve for a period of three years. 3. The Panel of the Wise shall advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion, and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. 4. At the request of the Peace and Security Council or the Chairperson of the Commission, or at its own initiative, the Panel of the Wise shall undertake such action deemed appropriate to support the efforts of the Peace and Security Council and those of the Chairperson of the Commission for the prevention of conflicts, and to pronounce itself on issues relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
681
5. The Panel of the Wise shall report to the Peace and Security Council and, through the Peace and Security Council, to the Assembly. 6. The Panel of the Wise shall meet as may be required for the performance of its mandate. The Panel of the Wise shall normally hold its meetings at the Headquarters of the Union. In consultation with the Chairperson of the Commission, the Panel of the Wise may hold meetings at such places other than the Headquarters of the Union. 7. The modalities for the functioning of the Panel of the Wise shall be worked out by the Chairperson of the Commission and approved by the Peace and Security Council. 8. The allowances of members of the Panel of the Wise shall be determined by the Chairperson of the Commission in accordance with the Financial Rules and Regulations of the Union.
Article 12 Continental Early Warning System 1. In order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established. 2. The Early Warning System shall consist of: a)
an observation and monitoring centre, to be known as “The Situation Room”, located at the Conflict Management Directorate of the Union, and responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an appropriate early warning indicators module; and
b)
observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be linked directly through appropriate means
682
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
of communications to the Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level and transmit the same to the Situation Room. 3. The Commission shall also collaborate with the United Nations, its agencies, other relevant international organizations, research centers, academic institutions and NGOs, to facilitate the effective functioning of the Early Warning System. 4. The Early Warning System shall develop an early warning module based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to recommend the best course of action. 5. The Chairperson of the Commission shall use the information gathered through the Early Warning System timeously to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and recommend the best course of action. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also use this information for the execution of the responsibilities and functions entrusted to him/her under the present Protocol. 6. The Member States shall commit themselves to facilitate early action by the Peace and Security Council and or the Chairperson of the Commission based on early warning information. 7. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, in consultation with Member States, the Regional Mechanisms, the United Nations and other relevant institutions, work out the practical details for the establishment of the Early Warning System and take all the steps required for its effective functioning.
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
683
Article 13 African Standby Force Composition 1. In order to enable the Peace and Security Council perform its responsibilities with respect to the deployment of peace support missions and intervention pursuant to article 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act, an African Standby Force shall be established. Such Force shall be composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice. 2. For that purpose, the Member States shall take steps to establish standby contingents for participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security Council or intervention authorized by the Assembly. The strength and types of such contingents, their degree of readiness and general location shall be determined in accordance with established African Union Peace Support Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and shall be subject to periodic reviews depending on prevailing crisis and conflict situations. Mandate 3. The African Standby Force shall, inter alia, perform functions in the following areas: a)
observation and monitoring missions;
b)
other types of peace support missions;
c)
intervention in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a Member State in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act;
684
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
d)
preventive deployment in order to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or States, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.;
e)
peace-building, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization;
f)
humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian population in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters; and
g)
any other functions as may be mandated by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly.
4. In undertaking these functions, the African Standby Force shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs. 5. The detailed tasks of the African Standby Force and its modus operandi for each authorized mission shall be considered and approved by the Peace and Security Council upon recommendation of the Commission. Chain of Command 6. For each operation undertaken by the African Standby Force, the Chairperson of the Commission shall appoint a Special Representative and a Force Commander, whose detailed roles and functions shall be spelt out in appropriate directives, in accordance with the Peace Support Standing Operating Procedures. 7. The Special Representative shall, through appropriate channels, report to the Chairperson of the Commission. The Force Commander shall report to the Special Representative. Contingent Commanders
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
685
shall report to the Force Commander, while the civilian components shall report to the Special Representative. Military Staff Committee 8. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Peace and Security Council in all questions relating to military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. 9. The Military Staff Committee shall be composed of Senior Military Officers of the Members of the Peace and Security Council. Any Member State not represented on the Military Staff Committee may be invited by the Committee to participate in its deliberations when it is so required for the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities. 10. The Military Staff Committee shall meet as often as required to deliberate on matters referred to it by the Peace and Security Council. 11. The Military Staff Committee may also meet at the level of the Chief of Defence Staff of the Members of the Peace and Security Council to discuss questions relating to the military and security requirements for the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The Chiefs of Defence Staff shall submit to the Chairperson of the Commission recommendations on how to enhance Africa’s peace support capacities. 12. The Chairperson of the Commission shall take all appropriate steps for the convening of and follow-up of the meetings of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of Members of the Peace and Security Council. Training 13. The Commission shall provide guidelines for the training of the civilian and military personnel of national standby contingents at both operational and tactical levels. Training on International Humanitarian
686
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Law and International Human Rights Law, with particular emphasis on the rights of women and children, shall be an integral part of the training of such personnel. 14. To that end, the Commission shall expedite the development and circulation of appropriate Standing Operating Procedures to inter alia: a)
support standardization of training doctrines, manuals and programmes for national and regional schools of excellence;
b)
co-ordinate the African Standby Force training courses, command and staff exercises, as well as field training exercises.
15. The Commission shall, in collaboration with the United Nations, undertake periodic assessment of African peace support capacities. 16. The Commission shall, in consultation with the United Nations Secretariat, assist in the co-ordination of external initiatives in support of the African Standby Force capacity-building in training, logistics, equipment, communications and funding. Role of Member States 17. In addition to their responsibilities as stipulated under the present Protocol: a)
troop contributing countries States shall immediately, upon request by the Commission, following an authorization by the Peace and Security Council or the Assembly, release the stand-by contingents with the necessary equipment for the operations envisaged under Article 9 (3) of the present Protocol;
b)
Member States shall commit themselves to make available to the Union all forms of assistance and support required for the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the Continent, including rights of passage through their territories.
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
687
Article 14 Peace-building Institutional Capacity for Peace-building 1. In post-conflict situations, the Peace and Security Council shall assist in the restoration of the rule of law, establishment and development of democratic institutions and the preparation, organization and supervision of elections in the concerned Member State. Peace-building during Hostilities 2. In areas of relative peace, priority shall be accorded to the implementation of policy designed to reduce degradation of social and economic conditions arising from conflicts. Peace-building at the End of Hostilities 3. To assist Member States that have been adversely affected by violent conflicts, the Peace and Security Council shall undertake the following activities: a)
consolidation of the peace agreements that have been negotiated;
b)
establishment of conditions of political, social and economic reconstruction of the society and Government institutions;
c)
implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, including those for child soldiers;
d)
resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons;
e)
assistance to vulnerable persons, including children, the elderly, women and other traumatized groups in the society.
688
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Article 15 Humanitarian action 1. The Peace and Security Council shall take active part in coordinating and conducting humanitarian action in order to restore life to normalcy in the event of conflicts or natural disasters. 2. In this regard, the Peace and Security Council shall develop its own capacity to efficiently undertake humanitarian action. 3. The African Standby Force shall be adequately equipped to undertake humanitarian activities in their mission areas under the control of the Chairperson of the Commission. 4. The African Standby Force shall facilitate the activities of the humanitarian agencies in the mission areas.
Article 16 Relationship with regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution 1. The Regional Mechanisms are part of the overall security architecture of the Union, which has the primary responsibility for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. In this respect, the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission, shall: a)
harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union;
b)
work closely with Regional Mechanisms, to ensure effective partnership between them and the Peace and Security Council
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
689
in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability. The modalities of such partnership shall be determined by the comparative advantage of each and the prevailing circumstances. 2. The Peace and Security Council shall, in consultation with Regional Mechanisms, promote initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, peacemaking and peace-building functions. 3. In undertaking these efforts, Regional Mechanisms concerned shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, keep the Peace and Security Council fully and continuously informed of their activities and ensure that these activities are closely harmonized and coordinated with the activities of Peace and Security Council. The Peace and Security Council shall, through the Chairperson of the Commission, also keep the Regional Mechanisms fully and continuously informed of its activities. 4. In order to ensure close harmonization and coordination and facilitate regular exchange of information, the Chairperson of the Commission shall convene periodic meetings, but at least once a year, with the Chief Executives and/or the officials in charge of peace and security within the Regional Mechanisms. 5. The Chairperson of the Commission shall take the necessary measures, where appropriate, to ensure the full involvement of Regional Mechanisms in the establishment and effective functioning of the Early Warning System and the African Standby Force. 6. Regional Mechanisms shall be invited to participate in the discussion of any question brought before the Peace and Security Council whenever that question is being addressed by a Regional Mechanism is of special interest to that Organization.
690
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
7. The Chairperson of the Commission shall be invited to participate in meetings and deliberations of Regional Mechanisms. 8. In order to strengthen coordination and cooperation, the Commission shall establish liaison offices to the Regional Mechanisms. The Regional Mechanisms shall be encouraged to establish liaison offices to the Commission. 9. On the basis of the above provisions, a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation shall be concluded between the Commission and the Regional Mechanisms.
Article 17 Relationship with the United Nations and other international Organizations 1. In the fulfillment of its mandate in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, the Peace and Security Council shall cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council, which has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant UN Agencies in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa. 2. Where necessary, recourse will be made to the United Nations to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the African Unions’ activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on the role of Regional Organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. 3. The Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission shall maintain close and continued interaction with the United Nations Security Council, its African members, as well as with the Secretary-General, including holding periodic meetings
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
691
and regular consultations on questions of peace, security and stability in Africa. 4. The Peace and Security Council shall also cooperate and work closely with other relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. Such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council on issues of common interest, if the latter considers that the efficient discharge of its responsibilities does so require.
Article 18 Relationship with the Pan African Parliament 1. The Mechanism shall maintain close working relations with the Pan-African Parliament in furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa. 2. The Peace and Security Council shall, whenever so requested by the Pan African Parliament, submit, through the Chairperson of the Commission, reports to the Pan-African Parliament, in order to facilitate the discharge by the latter of its responsibilities relating to the maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa. 3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall present to the Pan-African Parliament an annual report on the state of peace and security in the continent. The Chairperson of the Commission shall also take all steps required to facilitate the exercise by the Pan-African Parliament of its powers, as stipulated in Article 11 (5) of the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament, as well as in Article 11 (9) in so far as it relates to the objective of promoting peace, security and stability as spelt out in Article 3 (5) of the said Protocol.
692
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Article 19 Relationship with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ rights The Peace and Security Council shall seek close cooperation with the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in all matters relevant to its objectives and mandate. The Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights shall bring to the attention of the Peace and Security Council any information relevant to the objectives and mandate of the Peace and Security Council.
Article 20 Relations with Civil Society Organizations The Peace and Security Council shall encourage non-governmental organizations, community-based and other civil society organizations, particularly women’s organizations, to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required, such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council.
Article 21 Funding Peace Fund 1. In order to provide the necessary financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security, a Special Fund, to be known as the Peace Fund, shall be established. The operations of the Peace Fund shall be governed by the relevant Financial Rules and Regulations of the Union. 2. The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
693
within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund raising activities. 3. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the Union. 4. There shall also be established, within the Peace Fund, a revolving Trust Fund. The appropriate amount of the revolving Trust Fund shall be determined by the relevant Policy Organs of the Union upon recommendation by the Peace and Security Council. Assessment of Cost of Operations and Pre-financing 5. When required, and following a decision by the relevant Policy Organs of the Union, the cost of the operations envisaged under Article 13 (3) of the present Protocol shall be assessed to Member States based on the scale of their contributions to the regular budget of the Union. 6. The States contributing contingents may be invited to bear the cost of their participation during the first three (3) months. 7. The Union shall refund the expenses incurred by the concerned contributing States within a maximum period of six (6) months and then proceed to finance the operations.
Article 22 Final Provisions Status of the Protocol in relation to the Cairo Declaration 1. The present Protocol shall replace the Cairo Declaration. 2. The provisions of this Protocol shall supercede the resolutions and decisions of the OAU relating to the Mechanism for Conflict
694
Peace and Security Council of the African Union (Protocol)
Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa, which are in conflict with the present Protocol.
Signature, Ratification and Accession 3. The present Protocol shall be open for signature, ratification or accession by the Member States of the Union in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures. 4. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Chairperson Commission
Entry into Force 5. The present Protocol shall enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a simple majority of the Member States of the Union.
Amendments 6. Any amendment or revision of the present Protocol shall be in accordance with the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitutive Act. Depository Authority 7. This Protocol and all instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Chairperson of the Commission, who shall transmit certified true copies to all Member States and notify them of the dates of deposit of the instruments of ratification by the Member States and shall register it with the United Nations and any other Organization as may be decided by the Union.
AFRICAN FOUNDATION FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW The Statute
I. Name Article 1 1. The name of the foundation is the African Foundation for International Law (hereinafter the “Foundation”). 2. The Foundation is established for an indefinite period.
II. Aims and purposes Article 2 The aims and purposes of the Foundation are inter alia: (i) to promote study, research and analysis on international legal matters of particular interest and relevance to African countries, and to foster the teaching and dissemination of international law in Africa; (ii) to encourage and promote intellectual debate and exchanges on international legal issues of particular interest to Africa and its peoples, and to foment the establishment of networks among African international lawyers as well as between the latter and scholars of other continents; (iii) to contribute actively to the promotion and building of the rule of law in Africa, in general.
Article 3 1. The Foundation shall pursue its aims and purposes by legal means, either on its own or in cooperation with others. 2. The Foundation shall pursue those aims and purposes through inter alia: (i) the publication of the “African Yearbook of International Law”, the “African e-Journal of International Law” and
696
African Foundation for International Law (Statute)
such other periodicals, journals, and monographs as may be decided upon by its Governing Board; (ii)
the establishment of research centres, or other academic institutions; (iii) the launching of initiatives aimed at building networks or at promoting collaboration and coordination among African legal scholars and practitioners; (iv) the organization of conferences, symposia, seminars, and other academic forums for exchange and dissemination of ideas, or for training purposes; (v)
the provision, upon request, of advice to African institutions or governments on international legal matters.
III. Basic Principles Article 4 1. 2.
3.
4.
5.
The Foundation has no political or ideological affiliation or bias. It subscribes to freedom of speech and free exchange of views related to its aims and purposes, while making every effort to ensure that the highest standards of scholarship, and moral and ethical values prevalent in Africa, are maintained. The language of official communication by or under the auspices of the Foundation shall be English and French, and any African language where appropriate. The Foundation shall encourage participation in its activities by persons of recognized competence in international law, and the legal systems of African countries. There shall be no exclusion on grounds of nationality, ethnic origin, gender, religious or other belief, or ideological or political opinion. The organs of the Foundation shall adopt all decisions by consensus, before resorting to a vote.
African Foundation for International Law (Statute)
697
IV. Finances Article 5 1. The Foundation is a non-profit organization. 2. The Foundation may receive any legally permissible form of income including any grant, subsidy, donation, or legacy by testamentary disposition, and income resulting from its own activities. 3. No grants, subsidies, donations or legacies shall be received under conditions which would restrict the Foundation in its liberty of action in accordance with the basic principles set forth in Article 4. 4. Income received by the Foundation shall be spent or invested exclusively in pursuit of the aims and purposes of the Foundation. 5. At the end of each financial year, which shall coincide with the calendar year, the accounts of the Foundation shall be balanced. The Executive Committee shall thereupon draw up the annual accounts, which shall be accompanied by an audit report by a qualified accountant, and shall be submitted to the Governing Board for approval within six months of the end of the said financial year. 6. The Governing Board of the Foundation shall arrange for a final audit of the Foundation’s accounts in the event of winding up pursuant to Article 12.
V. Governing Board Article 6 1. The Governing Board of the Foundation (hereinafter the “Board”) shall consist of at least five (5) and not more than eleven (11) persons of recognized competence in international law. At least a simple majority of the members of the Board shall be nationals of African countries. 2. If one or more vacancies occur, the remaining members of the Board shall take the necessary decisions within two months in
698
3.
African Foundation for International Law (Statute)
order to fill these vacancies in accordance with Article 8 paragraph 2(iii). Membership in the Board shall terminate: (i) by death; (ii) by resignation; (iii) by expiration of a term of membership where such term has been established by the Board; (iv) by decision of the Board, determining that the member is no longer capable of carrying out his or her functions as such, or that he or she has acted in a manner inconsistent with this statute, or has acted negligently.
Article 7 1. The Board shall designate the Executive Committee, and oversee its activities; 2. It shall determine the main lines of actions of the Foundation, and approve its annual accounts; 3. It may take decisions on any matter related to the purposes of the Foundation. 4. If a difference of opinion should arise as to the meaning of any provision of this statute, the Board’s decision shall be authoritative.
Article 8 1. The Board shall take its decisions by consensus, failing which by a simple majority of all its members; 2. For the following matters, the Board shall, where it fails to reach a consensus, take its decisions by a majority of two-thirds of its members, including the votes of a majority of its African members: (i) modification of the statute of the Foundation; (ii) relocation of the seat of the Foundation; (iii) election of a new member of the Board pursuant to Article 6 paragraph 2; (iv) the determination referred to in Article 6 paragraph 3(iv);
African Foundation for International Law (Statute)
3.
4.
699
(v) winding up the Foundation pursuant to Article 12. The Board may adopt decisions without meeting, and shall for that purpose establish a procedure for voting by post or electronic mails, or any other means. The provisions of this Article shall apply mutatis mutandis to action by the Board concerning membership of any organ.
Article 9 1. The Board shall elect its President, who shall convene and preside at all meetings of the Board. 2. The Board shall also elect one or more Vice-Presidents, one of whom shall convene and preside at meetings of the Board if, for any reason, the President is temporarily unable to do so. 3. The Board shall appoint an Executive Committee and may assign to that Committee part or all of the functions of the Board, except those functions in connection with which a decision by a two-thirds majority is prescribed pursuant to Article 8.
VI. Executive Committee Article 10 The Executive Committee shall consist of three members designated by the Board who will choose a chairperson amongst themselves. Article 11 1. The Executive Committee shall have the exclusive competence to organize and conduct the activities of the Foundation. It shall act in accordance with the basic principles set forth in Article 4. 2. The Executive Committee is entitled to enter into transactions for the acquisition, conveyance, or mortgage of property. 3. The President of the Board shall represent the Foundation in any legal transaction and legal proceedings. He or she can temporarily transfer his or her powers to the Chairperson of the Executive Committee. If the chairperson is temporarily unable
700
African Foundation for International Law (Statute)
to act for any of the reasons listed in Article 6 paragraph 3, one of the two others members of the Executive Committee shall represent the Foundation for that purpose.
VIII. Winding up of the Foundation Article 12 1.
2.
The Board of the Foundation may decide to wind up the Foundation if it is determined that: (i)
the aims and purposes set forth in Article 2 can no longer be achieved or implemented by the Foundation; or
(ii)
it would be more likely that those aims and purposes would be best achieved or implemented if activities herein provided for or referred to, were to be carried out by an institution established in an African country, or by other means.
The Board shall, in the event of winding up, arrange for compliance with applicable legal and financial procedures, and shall ensure that any assets of the Foundation are transferred, in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1(i), to an institution with aims and purposes similar to those of the Foundation; and in the circumstance referred to in paragraph 1(ii), to the institution referred to therein.
ANALYTICAL INDEX
A Abuse Non Abuse of Rights (principle), 157, 177 Achebe (C.), 7 A.C.P. (African, Carribean and Pacific States), 598, 601 A.C.P.-U.E. (agreement between ACP States and European Union), 601 Cotonou Agreement, 601 Acquiescence, 28, 30, 60 Ade (King Sunny) See: King Sunny Ade Afghanistan, 300, 303 African Association of International Law, 3, 4, 6 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 73, 81, 336, 338, 342, 343, 345, 355, 358, 360, 599 Article 12, 336, 337, 338, 342, 345 Article 24, 81 Clawback Clauses, 599 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 81, 324, 325, 329, 337, 355, 356, 358, 360, 362, 599 Individual request, 597, 600 African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 599, 600, 601 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Child, 599, 601 Decisions Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 337, 355 Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, 337, 338, 358 Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, 601
African Foundation for International Law, 6, 7, 695-700 African Union, 15, 41, 44, 45, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 414, 421, 363, 504, 598 Constitutive Act, 414, 421 Agression (armed), 487, 490 Akandji-Kombé (J.-F.), 601 Algeria, 4, 54, 55, 454 Alikhan (S.), 229, 230 American Convention on Human Rights See: Inter-American Convention on Human Rights Amnesty, 416 Amnesty International (NGO), 407, 408, 425 14 Principles on the Effective Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction, 408 Andersen (B.), 243 Annexation, 45, 293, 297, 298, 299, 303, 307, 319 Antarctic Treaty See: Convention Apartheid, 409, 420 Aquin (St. Thomas), 437, 438, 439 Arbitral Awards See: Jurisprudence Arechaga (E. de), 160 Argentina, 131, 133, 144, 229 Aristote, 434, 439 Armed conflict, 267, 268, 276, 287, 318, 325, 411, 530, 558, 566, 567, 569, 570, 571, 572, 575, 578 Armistice, 274, 281, 291, 311 Asiwaju (A.), 13, 59 Association of South African Music Industries (ASAMI), 235 Asylum, 85, 87, 88, 324, 328, 337, 343, 352, 358 Austin (D.), 50 Australia, 93, 101, 229 Fauna Conservation Act of 1974, 102 High Court, 101 Austria, 227
702
Analytical Index
B Bangladesh, 109, 114, 117, 119, 120, 131, 168, 170, 171 Behring Sea, 193 Belgium, 109, 127, 128, 130, 144, 173, 455, 457, 458, 459, 501, 504, 505, 506, 507, 585, 590 Cour d’assises de Bruxelles, 573 Bénin, 54, 501, 506, 546, 582 Constitution Article 25, 342 Constitutional Court, 342 Berlin Conference (1884-1885), 15, 50, 51 Berlin Congress (1878), 442 Bill of Rights, 271, 317 Blanchi (R.), 160 Blue Helmets, 505 Bongo See: Kanda Bongo Man Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 237, 241 Bornéo, 480, 483, 485, 486, 487 Bosnie, 286 Botswana, 53, 55, 110, 121 Bourne (C.), 131, 161, 162, 175 Brazil, 78, 131, 229, 454 Brierly (J.), 128 Brundtland Report, 189, 192, 193, 194 Burkina Faso, 14, 33, 53, 56, 57, 231 Burundi, 233, 240 Business Software Alliance (BSA), 236 C Cambodia, 132, 304, 309 Cameroon, 231, 232, 233, 323, 331, 340, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 360, 361, 362, 524, 525, 582, 588 Constitution, 340 Constitutional Act (18 January 1996), 346 Act (19 December 1990), Article 11, 361
Canada, 64, 77, 93, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 113, 119, 122, 123, 124, 130, 145, 159, 168, 215, 222 Supreme Court, R. v. Sparrow (1990), 103 Capette (I.), 597 Caroll (J.), 261 Cassese (A.), 389 Cassin (R.), 334, 341, 346, 368 Centre for Human Rights (Pretoria), 595 Chad, 233, 240 Charpentier (J.), 402, 403 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union See: European Union Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States Article 3, 152 Chile, 229 China, 48, 229, 454, 494 Chukwurah (A.O.), 60 Clegg (J.), 245 Codification, 478 Collective and individual rights, 91 Collective rights, 91 Colombia, 456, 459 Constitutional Court, 83, 104 Court of First Instance of Colombia, 83 Colonna (E.), 437 Commission on International Regulations, 376 Commission of Guinea Gulf, 339, 348 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR) See: United Kingdom Committee against Torture, 597 Committee for the elimination of discrimination against women, 597 Committee for the elimination of discrimination, 597 Committe on Child Rights, 597 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 78, 596 Common heritage of mankind (concept / principle), 70, 95 Common law, 496, 497, 516
Analytical Index Community of interest (theory), 126 Comoros, 54 Complacency, 60 Congo, 323, 331, 349, 350, 351, 361 Constitution, 340 Congo (Democratic Republic), 9, 54, 85, 501 Convention Object and Purpose, 474 Reservation, 481, 491 1840, England and Chiefs of Tribes of New Zealand, Waitangi, 102, 103 Article II, 102 1856, 1862 and 1866, Delimitation (France and Spain), 120 1863, River Meuse (Netherlands and Belgium), 130 1884, Protection Treaty (Great Britain and Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar, Nigeria), 23, 40 1886, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literacy and Artistic Works, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259, 260, 264 Article 2, 250 Article 4, 250 Article 5, 254 Article 6, 251 Article 8, 251 Article 9, 251, 259 Article 10, 253 Article 11, 251, 254 Article 12, 251 Article 15, 251 Article 16, 251 1909, Treaty (Canada and United States of America), Watercourses, 123 Article II, 123, 124 1909, Boundary Water Treaty (United States of America and United Kingdom), 123, 130, 131, 169
703
1913, Agreement (Great Britain and Germany regarding Bakassi), 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 36, 40, 361 Article 29, 361 1931, Henderson-Fleuriau Exchange of Notes (United Kingdom and France), 28 1946, International Convention on the Regulation of the Whaling, 68 1946, Utilization of the Rapids of the Uruguay River (Argentina and Uruguay), 133 1951, Diversion of flow water from lakes Garsjoen, Kjerringvatn and Forstevannene to the waterway of Gandvik instead of that of the River Naatamo (Finland and Norway), 129 1951, United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees See: Refugee 1957, Convention on North Pacific Fur Seals, 95 1960, Indus Waters Treaty (India and Pakistan), 171, 174 1961 Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 249, 253, 254, 255 Article 2, 254 1961, Columbia River Treaty, 169 1963, Bilateral Trade Agreement (Cameroon and Nigeria), 48 1968, African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 599 1969, OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugees Problems in Africa, 599 1969, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29, 32, 182, 400, 432, 473 Article 18, 400 Article 53, 182 1969, United States of America and Canada, American Falls at Niagara, 130
704
Analytical Index
1971, Geneva Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of their Phonograms, 249 1972, Common Convention on Freedom of Movement for Persons and the Right of Settlement (Central Africa), 339, 344 1972, World Heritage Convention, 96 1973, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, 68 1973, Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, 94 1974, Brussels Convention Relating to the Distribution of ProgrammeCarrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, 249 1974, Kano Agreement between Cameroon and Nigeria, 28, 33 1975, Agreement between Bangladesh and India, 131 1975, Maroua Declaration (Nigeria and Cameroon), 20, 29, 32 1975, Brazzaville Convention (Economic Community of Central African States), 349 1975, Lomé Convention, 601 See also: A.C.P. 1976, Boundary Waters Convention, 140, 173 1976, Agreement (Hungary and Czechoslovakia), 140, 144, 159, 173 1977, Interim Agreement (Bangladesh and India), 171 1977, Treaty (Hungary and Czechoslovakia), 139, 140, 173 1979, Convention on Migratory Species, 94 1982, Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay Convention), 197, 204 Article 206, 204 1989, Convention on the Rights of the Child, 80, 100, 597 Article 30, 99, 100
1991, Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, 599 1991, Espoo Convention (European Convention on a transboundary environmental impact assessment) Article 7, 206 1992, Convention on Biological Diversity or Biodiversity, 65, 70, 89, 198 Article 1, 198 Article 2, 198 Article 8, 89 1992, Framework Convention on Climate Change, 198 Article 3, 198 1992, Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 116 1996, Ganges River Treaty between India and Bangladesh, 168 1996, Mekong River Treaty (Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) Article 5, 132 Article 26, 132 1997, Convention on the Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 110, 113, 116, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 177 Article 2, 110 Article 5, 137, 149, 164 Article 6, 149, 147 Article 7, 147, 149 Article 8, 153 Article 10, 149 Article 11, 153, 161, 162, 172 Article 12, 162 Article 17, 164 Article 21, 144
Analytical Index Administrative Conventions, 352, 353 Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol Article 8, 205 Internet Treaties See: WIPO Mahakali River Treaty (India and Nepal), 133, 168, 172 Article 11, 168 Article 12, 132 Cooperation Cooperation between States and ICTR, 500-510 Cooperation for development, 416 International cooperation, 124, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 177 CREDHO (Research Centre on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, France), 595 Crimes Actus reus, 532 Conspiracy, 531, 550, 551, 553, 584, 588 Gross Human Rights Offences, 410, 412, 414, 416, 417 Crimes against humanity, 407, 410, 411, 414, 415, 416, 495, 497, 538, 549, 554-560, 566, 574, 577, 579, 581, 582, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 591, 597 Genocide, 407, 410, 411, 412, 414, 416, 455, 457, 458, 488, 493, 494, 495, 497, 503, 519, 521, 531, 532, 533, 534, 538, 539-553, 554, 555, 557, 559, 566, 571, 572, 573, 575, 576, 577, 579, 580, 581, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 591, 597 Dolus Specialis, 503, 531, 534, 542, 543-545, 550, 552 Torture, 70, 74, 108 War crimes, 494, 495, 527, 529, 530, 538, 555, 560-575, 581, 584, 591, 597 Croatia, 298 Cuiquam in sua arte credendum, 40
705
Cyprus, 300, 302, 314 Czechoslovakia, 119, 139, 140, 141, 165, 173, 277 D Dallaire (R.), 508 Danemark, 506 David (Camp), 292 Davis (G.), 444 Death penalty, 477, 525, 581 Declaration Declaration (Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 1960), 131 Declaration on Cultural Policies (Mexico City, 1982), 95 Declaration on the Right to Development See: United Nations, General Assembly Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (1994), 79, 89, 92, 99 Article 26, 92 Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity Article 1, 96, Thomson-Marchand Declaration (1929-1930), 28 Yaounde Declaration (Cameroon and Nigeria, 14 August 1970), 28, 33 Yaounde II Declaration (Cameroon and Nigeria, 1987), 29, 33 Degni-Ségui (R.), 493, 539, 544 Delaplace (E.), 548 Dibango (M.), 245 Diplomatic Protection, 466, 467, 470 Dubin (L.), 396, 397 Dubois (P.), 437
706
Analytical Index
E Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 323, 329, 331, 339, 344, 349, 350 See also: Brazzaville Convention Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ECOMOG (Ecowas Monitoring Group), 304, 311 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (EMCCA), 323, 324, 329, 331, 339, 344, 345, 347, 349, 350, 354, 355 Regulation No. 1, Article 1, 349 Communitarian Court of Justice, 355 Egypt, 55, 56, 292, 293, 454 Environment, 63-108, 116, 134, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 163, 164, 174, 177, 178, 181-223 See also: Sustainable Development Adverse transboundary environmental impact, 206 Comprehensive Environmental Evaluation, 206 Draft Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the Environment (1994) See: Declaration Environmental damage (Harm, Degradation, Risk, Threat), 73, 74, 76, 79, 83, 85, 88, 190, 195, 202, 204, 207 Environmental Impact Assessment, 191, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 223 Environmental policies, 190, 195 First World Conference for the Protection of the Environment, 188 Imminent Environmental Hazard, 75 Initial Environmental Evaluation, 206 Intergenerational Equity, 67, 83, 90, 194, 195 International Environmental Law, 64, 66, 68, 69, 188, 189, 197, 207, 208, 223
Johannesburg (Conference, Declaration, Summit) (2002), 67, 80, 90, 192, 196, 197 Plan of Action (2002), 192 Political Declaration (2002), 192, 196, 197 Marine Environment, 204 Necessity and Proportionality tests, 213, 220 No-Harm (concept), 134, 145, 163, 174, 177 Precautionary (principle), 191, 207, 219, 220 Right of a person to represent future generations, 83 Right to the preservation and enjoyment of one’s own culture, 99 Right to the traditional use of the environment, 93 Rio Conference (1992), 189, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 198 Rio Declaration, 67, 80, 89, 116, 190, 191, 195, 197, 203, 210 Principle 1, 67, 80 Principle 2, 190 Principle 3, 191 Principle 4, 191, 195, 210 Principle 7, 195 Principle 15, 191 Principle 17, 191, 203 Principle 21, 188, 189, 190 Principle 22, 89 Risk Assessment, 219, 220 Significant harm, 116, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 164, 174, 177, 178 Stockholm Conference (1972), 188 Stockholm Declaration, 64, 80, 188, 197 Technical and economic feasibility, 220 Transboundary effects, 205 Transboundary harmful effect, 154 Transboundary pollution, 189 Trade and environment, 210, 211, 219, 222, 223 Trade and Environment Dispute, 213
Analytical Index United Nations Conference on Human Environment (1972), Declaration, 116 UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact Assessment (1987), 205 Equatorial Guinea, 18, 24, 30, 31, 55, 323, 331, 347, 349, 350, 351, 360, 362, 457, 459, 461 Equity, Intergenerational Equity See: Environment Eritrea, 39, 55, 240 Erlmann (V.), 244 Espoo Convention (1991) See: Convention Ethiopia, 16, 49, 53, 55 European Communities, 208, 219, 220, 227, 449 Directive on EIA Article 4, 209 Directive 2001/42 (27 June 2001), 209 Article 1, 260 Directive 97/11 (3 March 1997), 208, 209 Directive 93/98/EEC (29 October 1993), 260 Directive 85/337 (27 June 1985), 208, 209 European Convention on Human Rights, 73, 74, 75, 76, 325, 327 Article 2, 75 Article 3, 73 Article 6, 519 Article 8, 74, 76 Article 10, 75 Additional Protocol 4 Article 2, 338 Article 3, 338 European Commission on Human Rights, 74, 75 European Court of Human Rights, 74, 76, 357, 515, 517 Lopez Ostra v. Spain (1994), 73, 74 Guerra and others v. Italy (1998), 74, 75
707
Judges Jambrek, 75 European Union, 227, 260, 261, 598, 601 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000), 72, 81 Article 37, 81 Chapter IV, 72 European Charter on Environment and Health 1989, 81 Article 11, 81 Evensen, 144, 153, 155, 161, 166, 168 Extradite, 416, 417, 421, 422, 423 F Faith See: Good Faith Fair trial, 500, 510-526 Equality of arms, 513, 517, 520 Material inequality of arms, 517, 519, 520 Fangatuafa See: Mururoa Fela (A.K.), 244 Finland, 227 Food and Agriculture Organization, 171 France, 109, 112, 120, 126, 146, 154, 155, 165, 168, 172, 206, 207, 215, 216, 288, 298, 365, 454, 455, 456, 459, 501, 504 Constitutional Council, 342, 356 Franck (Th.), 479 Freedom of association, 187, 368, 370, 386, 388 Freedom of expression, 187, 368, 379, 382, 383 Freedom of movement, 323-363 French Society for International Law See: Société française pour le droit international Friendly Relations among States (principle) See: State
708
Analytical Index
G Geneva Conventions See: International Humanitarian Law GATT, 181, 201, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 248 Genocide See: Crimes Germany Supreme Court (Leipzig), Llandovery Castle (1921), 447 Gestapo, 298 Nüremberg, 278, 280, 298, 511, 528, 537, 555, 559, 562, 565 Ghana, 53, 230, 244 Globalisation, 327, 332, 363, 369, 370, 372, 392, 393 Gold Coast See: Ghana Golan, 292 Goldstone (R.), 496, 528 Good Faith (principle), 137, 153, 156, 157, 163, 164, 169, 177, 190, 382, 389, 391, 397, 399, 400 Good Neighbourliness (principle) See: State Gorjestani (N.), 247 Gowon, 29, 32 Great Britain, 76, 193, 454 See also: United Kingdom Grotius, 328 Guinea, 14, 18, 24, 25, 31, 57, 61, 231, 232, 233, 241 H Habeas corpus, 464 Harmon (J.), 121, 122, 123, 131 Doctrine (absolute territorial sovereignty), 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 See also: Sovereignty, especially Absolute territorial integrity (theory) Helsinki Rules See: International Law Association
Heyns (C.), 595 Hobbes (Th.), 440 Huaraka (T.), 4, 6 Human Rights, 8, 9, 63-108, 268, 269, 271, 274, 286, 302, 315, 325, 332, 334, 337, 338, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 373, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 394, 397, 402, 403, 409, 410, 411, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 443, 493, 499, 510, 511, 513, 515, 517, 526, 575, 590, 595-603 Cultural rights, 91, 97 Customary international human rights, 84 Economic, social, cultural and political rights, 181 Good Health (right), 79 Human Dignity, 66, 67, 73, 85 Individual Right, 72, 81, 184 Indivisibility of Human Rights, 186, 187 Participatory right, 183 Right to adequate housing, 78 Right to be informed, 75 Right to development (origins), 181 Right to economic development, 182, 189 Right to enjoy one’s own culture, 77 Right to hunt, 101, 104 Right to life, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 82, 89 Right to political participation, 187 Right to self-determination See: Self-determination Rights to respect for their private and family life, 76 Human Rights Committee, 73, 77, 97, 98, 356, 357, 596 Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zealand, 98 E.H.P. v. Canada, Communication No. 67/1980, 27 October 1987, 77 Ilmari Lansam et al. v. Finland, Communication No. 511/1992, 14 October 1993, 77
Analytical Index Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Ban v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984, 26 March 1990, 77 Hungary, 109, 115, 119, 120, 139, 140, 141, 165, 168, 173, 199, 201, 207, 454, 458 Huntzinger (S.), 329 I Impunity, 409, 411, 419 India, 109, 112, 114, 131, 133, 168, 170, 171, 172, 174, 229 Indigenous Peoples (Right of), 92, 93, 97, 106 Institute of International Law, 128, 164 Salzburg Resolution on the Use of International Non-Maritime Waters (1961), 128, 164 Article II, 128 Intergenerational Equity See: Environment Integration (principle), 195, 210 Continental integration, 59 Regional integration, 45, 58, 59, 60, 323, 324, 331, 345, 347, 351 Intellectual property, 225-265 Intellectual Property Alliance, 228 Intellectual Property Crimes, 235 Right of reproduction, 251, 265 Inter-American Convention on Human Rights, 338 Article 8, 519 Additional Protocol Relating to Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 78, 79 Yanomami v. Brazil, 78 Reports, Ecuador (1997), 79 Inter-American Court on Human Rights, 357 Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community v. Nicaragua, Judgement of 31 August 2001, 77
709
Additional Protocol on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 81 International Center for Settlement of International Dispute (ICSID), 175 International Committee of Red Cross, 269, 276, 282, 290, 293, 302, 303, 304, 311, 509, 567, 573 International Community, 431-451 International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers (CISAC), 232, 233, 234 International cooperation See: Cooperation International Court of Justice, 4, 65, 66, 71, 115, 116, 139, 141, 145, 154, 164, 165, 172, 173, 174, 178, 187, 199, 206, 207, 208, 209, 377, 384, 408, 412, 453-492, 511, 539, 540, 541, 542, 545, 605-607 Statute, 606 Article 14, 454 Article 59, 25 Advisory opinion, 34, 66, 605, 606 Critical Date, 35 Dissenting Opinion, 200, 201, 207, 208 Intervenor, 25, 480 Preliminary objection, 21, 22 Cases 2002, Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon c. Nigeria), 13-61, 457, 459, 461 2002, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 408, 457, 458, 459 2001, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), 453, 456, 463, 492 2001, Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia / Malaysia), 453, 459, 479, 481, 483
710
Analytical Index 2001, LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), 453, 456, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 475, 476, 478, 492 2001, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Burundi), 456 2001, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Rwanda), 456 1998, Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada), 30, 38, 467 1997, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), 66, 71, 72, 115, 120, 139, 164, 165, 173, 178, 187, 199, 200, 201, 206, 207, 208, 209, 458 1996, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion), 66, 116, 187 1993, Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), 38 1992, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador / Honduras, Nicaragua intervening), 480, 482 1986, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Republic of Mali), 14, 25, 33, 454 1984, Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States of America), 377 1982, Continental Shelf (Tunisia / Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 38 1975, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 34, 55 1970, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (second phase) (Belgium v. Spain), 432
1969, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), 35, 38 1949, Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), 145, 154, 174, 412 Pending Cases Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1998), 459 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro, 1993), 455, 457, 458, 459, 488 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia and Montenegro, 1999), 459 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda, 1999), 453, 457, 487, 488 Maritime Delimitation between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Caribbean Sea (Nicaragua c. Honduras, 1999), 459 Request for an examination of the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1975in the Nuclear Tests (New Zeland v. France) case (New Zeland v. France, 1995), 206, 207 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montréal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America, and Libyan Arab
Analytical Index Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom, 1992), 458 Judges Al-Khasawneh (A.S.), 454 Buergenthal (Th.), 454, 460 Bedjaoui (M.), 4, 182, 183, 454 Elaraby (N.), 454, 460 Fleischhauer (C.-A.), 454, 460 Guillaume (G.), 454, 459, 477 Herczegh (G.), 454, 460 Higgins (R.), 454, 460 Jiuyong (S.), 454 Kooijmans (P.H.), 454, 607 Koroma (A.G.), 22, 27, 34, 35, 39, 40, 50, 454, 460, 484 Oda (S.), 454, 485, 487 Parra-Aranguren (G.), 454, 484 Ranjeva (R.), 454 Rezek (F.), 454 Schwebel (S.M.), 37, 57, 143 Vereshchetin (V.S.), 454 Ad hoc Judges Ajibola (B.), 14, 22, 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 57 Shahabuddeen (M.), 479 Verhoeven (J.), 378, 490 Weeramantry (C.), 71, 72, 73, 200, 201, 207, 208, 479, 480 Registrar Couvreur (Ph.), 455 Deputy Registrar Arnaldez (J.-J.), 455 International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (1966), 73, 77, 97 Article 6, 77 Article 12, 335, 343 Article 13, 335 Article 14, 519 Article 27, 77, 97, 98 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 78, 79, 182 Article 11, 78 International Covenants on Human Rights, 186, 597 International Criminal Court, 411, 413, 420, 426, 428, 532, 554, 558, 565, 568, 569
711
Statute (Treaty or Roma Convention), 411, 532 Article 8, 565 International Criminal Law Contradictory (principle), 517, 520 Cumulative Charges / Sentences, 538, 539, 572, 575-579 Disclosure, 522, 523 Double qualification, 572 Due Delay, 513, 524 See also: Fair trial Individual Criminal Responsibility, 500, 527, 531, 532, 552, 562, 565 Ne bis in idem (principle), 506 Nullum crimen sine lege (principle), 562, 566 Official Capacity, 527, 535 Responsibility, 534, 538 Superior Criminal Responsibility, 534, 535, 536 Sentencing Individualisation, 580 Proportionality, 580 Guilty Plea, 497, 516, 575, 581, 586 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 410, 411, 412, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 493-591 Statute Article 4, 561 Article 6, 531 Article 7bis, 509 Article 11, 514 Article 11bis, 505, 507, 508 Article 12, 514 Article 66, 522 Article 67, 522 Amicus curiae, 505, 508, 509, 573 Completion strategy, 508 Defence, Assigned Counsel, 517 Judges, Khan, 497, 577 Prosecutor Goldstone (R.), 496, 528 Registrar, 497, 499, 518, 590, 591 Adede (A.O.), 497
712
Analytical Index
Cases Akayesu, 497-498, 508-509, 514515, 518-519, 523, 529-534, 540, 542-547, 549, 551-557, 560-565, 567-569, 571, 573576, 581 Bagilishema, 498, 507, 520, 521, 529, 532, 533, 535, 536, 537, 540, 543, 548, 554, 556, 557, 561, 575 Bagosora, 497, 505, 509 Barayagwiza, 519, 524, 525, 526 Kambanda, 498, 516, 518, 529, 540, 553, 575, 576, 581 Kanyabashi, 514 Kayishema, 498, 511, 514, 515, 516, 520, 521, 529, 534, 538, 540, 543, 544, 548, 554, 556, 557, 558, 559, 561, 564, 566, 568, 569, 570, 572, 574, 576, 586 Musema, 498, 502, 509, 520, 523, 529, 531, 532, 533, 535, 537, 540, 543, 544, 548, 549, 551, 552, 554, 556, 557, 561, 564, 567, 569, 570, 574, 575, 576, 579 Ntakirutimana, 502, 588 Ntuyahaga, 497, 505, 507, 590 Ruggiu, 498, 551 Rusatira, 522 Rutaganda, 498, 523, 529, 540, 542, 543, 544, 554, 556, 557, 561, 564, 567, 568, 570, 572, 574, 576 Ruzindana, 498, 511, 514, 515, 516, 520, 529, 534, 538, 540, 543, 544, 548, 554, 556, 557, 558, 559, 561, 564, 566, 568, 569, 570, 572, 574, 576, 585 International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, 276, 286, 313, 410, 411, 412, 447, 494, 496, 499, 500, 503, 508, 509, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 524, 525, 528, 530, 532, 535, 536, 537, 540, 545, 548, 550, 554, 557, 559, 560, 561,
563, 564, 565, 567, 569, 571, 575, 576, 578, 579, 580 Statut Article 3, 578 Article 5, 578 Cases Blaskic, 509, 536, 537 Celebici, 528, 535, 537, 564, 569, 577, 578, 579 Delalic, 286, 287 Furundzija, 515, 557 Tadic (1999), 276, 286, 287, 512, 514, 517, 552, 559, 560, 563, 564, 565, 567, 569 International Crisis Group (NGO), 499 International Environmental Law See: Environment International Federation of Phonogram Industries (IFPI), 234, 235 International Humanitarian Law, 268, 275, 276, 277, 278, 282, 283, 317, 494, 528, 535, 543, 558, 560, 562, 566, 569, 573, 574, 575 Combattants, 558 Geneva Conventions (1949) Common Article 2, 275, 276, 281 Common Article 3, 530, 563, 567, 568 (III) War Prisoners, 277 (IV) Protection of Civilians in War Time (12 août 1949) Article 2, 275 Article 4, 285 Article 6, 289 Article 27, 315 Article 29, 315 Article 30, 315 Article 31, 315 Article 32, 315 Article 33, 315 Article 34, 315 Article 47, 267-321 Article 49, 315 Article 51, 315 Protocol Additional I relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (1977), 274, 282, 290, 291, 295
Analytical Index Protocol Additional II relating to the Protection of Victims of Non International Armed Conflicts (1977) Article 1, 568 Article 4 § 2, 563 Law and Customs of War, 561, 578 Necessity (principle), 202, 213, 216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 Protected Persons, 272, 285, 287, 294, 296, 297, 298, 312, 315, 318, 573, 578 Civilian Population, 554, 558, 559, 560, 574, 575, 578 War Prisoners, 277 Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 267 Hague Regulations, 268, 269, 270, 271, 278, 280, 285, 289, 291, 293, 310 Article 47, 271 Reprisals, 275 Forced Transferts, 316 See also: Geneva Conventions International Labour Law, 365-404 International Labour Organization Constitution Article 10, 384, 385 Committee on Union Liberty, 384, 398 Special Committee on Slave Labour, 387 Commission for Investigation and Conciliation regarding Union Liberty, 381, 384 Commission of Legal Issues and Labour International Norms, 402 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989), 91, 92, 93, 99, 104 Article 1, 93 Article 13, 91 International Law Customary international law, 32, 33, 84, 93, 97, 106, 124, 134, 150, 158, 159, 161, 166, 177 Non-Binding Acts, 205
713
Non-Interference in the Internal Affairs (principle), 414, 421 Non-Intervention (principle), 150 Pacta sunt servanda, 40, 47 Private international law, 256 Progressive development of international law, 192 Soft law, 393 International Law Association (ILA), 111, 115, 135, 136, 155, 159, 160, 163, 164, 407 Helsinki Rules (1966), 111, 115, 136, 138, 142, 159, 167, 177 Article 10, 115 Resolution on Use of the Waters in International Rivers (1958), 135 Articles on Flood Control Article 2, 155 Resolution of Dubrovnik (1956) Article 6, 163 Report on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, 143, 148, 149, 155, 170 International Law Commission (ILC), 116, 137, 143, 144, 147, 148, 153, 155, 157, 161, 168, 170, 455, 478 International Monetary Fund, 181 International Telecommunication Union, 238, 239, 240 Telecom Africa, 238, 239 Telecom Africa conference (ITU), 238 International Military Tribunal, 278, 280, 511, 528, 530, 536, 537, 555, 559, 562, 565 International Waterway Commission See: Watercourses International Water Law See: Watercourses Internet Service providers’ liability, 256 Internet Treaties See: WIPO Interpol, 235 Intellectual Property Crimes Unit, 235
714
Analytical Index
Israel, 109, 111, 117, 170, 277, 290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 300, 302, 305, 306, 307, 313, 314, 316, 319, 320 Golan Heights Law, 292 “Jerusalem, Capital of Israel” Act, 292 Jérusalem Est, 292 Sinaï, 292 Supreme Court, 293 See also: Palestine Italia, 442 Constitutional Court, 82 Ius See: Jus J Japan, 48, 101, 105, 234, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295, 442, 454 Jaurès (J.), 366 Jenks (C.W.), 368, 369, 449 Johannesburg (Conference, Declaration, Plan of Action, Summit) See: Environment Jordan River, 117, 170 Jordan, 109, 111, 117, 119, 170, 175, 454 Jurisprudence Arbitral Awards 1998, Eritrea/Yemen Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute, 39 1955, Lake Lanoux (France – Spain), 109, 112, 113, 120, 126, 146, 154, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 168, 172 1941, Trail Smelter (United States of America – Canada), 64, 145, 146, 187 1893, Fur Seals (United States of America – Great Britain), 193, 194 National Courts Argentina, 84
Canada Ontario Court of Justice, R. v. Meshake (2003), 103 Supreme Court, Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 104 Supreme Court, R. v. Sparrow (1990), 103 Supreme Court, R. v. Van der Peet (1996), 103 Chile Supreme Court, 84 Costa Rica Supreme Court, 83 India Supreme Court, 82 Malaysia High Court of Johor Bahru, Adong Bin Kuwanu et al. V. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor (1996), 105 High Court of Shah Alam, Sagong Bin Tasi et al. v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor et al. (2002), 105 Nor Anak Nyawai et al. v. Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd et al. (2001), 105 Philippines Supreme Court, Minors Oposa et al. v. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources et al., 67, 83, 84 United States of America Federal Court of Idaho, 100 Supreme Court, 101 Jus ad bellum, 489 Jus cogens, 69, 70, 71, 73, 107, 182, 299, 300, 308, 444, 445 Jus communicationis, 329, 363 Jus gentium, 328 Jus gentium, 434, 435, 436 Jus in bello, 490
Analytical Index
715
K
M
Kampuchéa, 300, 304 See also: Cambodia Kanda Bongo Man, 245 Kant (E.), 441, 450 Karmal (B.), 303 Kelsen (H.), 63 Theory of degrees (pure theory of law), 63 Kenya, 53, 230, 501, 503, 584, 585, 589 Khaled, 245 King Sunny Ade, 244 Kleptocracy, 413 Kolb (R.), 463 Korea (North), 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 120 Korea (Republic of), 109, 112, 114, 118, 119, 230 Koweït, 300, 304 Kuti See: Fela
Machiavel (N.), 440 Madagascar, 454 Malawi, 53, 55 Malaysia, 49 High Court of Kuching, 105 High Court of Shah Alam, 105 Mali, 501, 506, 582, 584, 585, 586 Mapfumo (Th.), 244 Maupain, 394 Mauritius, 240 McCaffrey, 137, 149, 155, 157 Mexico, 109, 113, 122, 131 Mirkine-Guetzevitch (B.), 352 Molina (L.), 437 Morocco, 504, 602 Mosler (H.), 445, 449 Most Favoured Nation Clause / Treatment, 48, 211 Multilateral assistance (principle), 416 Multinational corporations, 187 Mururoa, Pacific atolls of Mururoa and Fangatuafa, 206
L N L’Huillier (J.), 449 Laos, 132 Lauterpacht (H.), 125, 156, 158 Laylin (J.), 160 League of Nations, 19, 51, 366, 367, 368, 378, 387, 443, 444 Pact, 606 Article 11, 443 Lemkin (R.), 539 Leniter ex merito quicquid patiare ferendum est, 44 Lesotho, 53 Lex (lege) ferenda, 409, 562 Lex (lege) lata, 409 Liberia, 9, 61 Libya, 14, 25, 38, 44, 54, 55, 57
N’Dour (Y.), 242, 245 Namibia, 6, 292, 300 NAPSTER, 235 See also: Piracy, and Music piracy National Treatment Clause, 211 Natural Resources Exploitation of natural resources, 124, 152 Negative Trade Effects, 220 Nehru, 174 Nemo dat quod non habet (principle), 24, 32 Nepal, 133, 168, 172 Netherlands, 109, 127, 128, 130, 144, 173, 227 Maastricht, 409, 424, 427 New Zealand, 98, 102, 103, 206, 207 Nicaragua, 456, 459 Nielsen//NetRatings, 242 Niger, 18, 43, 54, 55, 233, 240
716
Analytical Index
Nigeria, 230, 243, 244, 264, 323, 331, 339, 340, 347, 350, 351, 361 Court of Appeal of Nigeria, 83 Nkrumah (K.), 54 Nobel Prize See: Sen (A) Non-State Actors, 185 Nüremberg See: Germany ou International Military Tribunal O Obligation erga omnes, 65, 290, 444 Occam (G. d’), 437, 438 Office of Internal Oversight Services See: United Nations Organization of African Unity, 4, 15, 16, 48, 54, 56, 57, 58, 504, 598, 599 Ouguergouz (F.), 5 P Pacific States, 207 Pakistan, 68, 82, 109, 144, 171, 174 Palestine, 117 Jéricho, 305 Jérusalem Est, 292 Cairo Agreement between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel (1997), 307 Erez Agreement between Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel on Cisjordanie (1995), 305 Pan-Africanists, 56 Patel (B.N.), 606, 607 Peace and Security, 39, 40, 42, 55, 60 Peace-enforcement, 283 Peacekeeping, 283 Peaceful resolution / means, 8, 9, 39, 45, 166, 167, 178 Permanent Court of International Justice, 126, 128, 139, 172, 173, 366, 369, 377
Statute, 606 Article 38, 377 Cases 1937, Diversion of Water from the Meuse (Belgium / Netherlands), 128, 135, 172 1929, Territorial Competence of the River Oder Commission (Germany and others v. Poland), 126, 139 1928, Chorzów Factory (Germany v. Poland), 468 Piracy, 234, 235, 236, 248, 413 Internet Piracy, 235 Music piracy, 234 Pol Pot, 304 Poland, 298 Pollution, 187, 189, 204 See also: Environment Portugal, 303 Precautionary (principle) See: Environment Prior est tempore, prior est jure, 23 Procedural default, 464, 467, 469, 471 Proportionality (principle), 219 Provisional measures, 21, 22, 37, 165, 454, 463, 465, 467, 472-476, 478, 487, 491, 492 Q Quigley (J.), 306, 307 R Recording company, 226 Refugee, 85, 86, 87, 88, 104, 108, 326, 327, 328, 335, 339, 343, 417, 423 Hague Regulations See: International Humanitarian Law United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and Additional Protocol (1967), 85, 335
Analytical Index Regime Legal regimes, 69 Regionalism, 60 Reparation, 21, 23, 44, 55, 417, 468, 476 Responsibility International responsibility, 22 Right of well-being, 63, 66, 69, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80 Right to adequate housing General Comment on the right to adequate housing, 1991, 77 Right to an adequate standard of living, 78, 79 Rio Conference See: Environment Roberts (A.), 279, 300 Rule of law, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Rwanda, 9, 85, 86, 233, 410, 415, 416, 417, 597, 602 Bisesero, 570 Butare, 505, 573, 584 Gacaca, 416 Gisovu, 535, 570, 585 Interahamwe, 535, 570, 587 Kibuye, 497, 558, 559, 570, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588 Mubuga (Church of), 570 Rwandan Patriotic Army, 494 Rwandan Armed Forces, 559, 570, 571, 572 Rwandan Patriotic Front, 493, 494, 495, 503, 559, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 590 S Salisbury (J. de), 436 Salva reverantia, 49 Sao Tome and Principe, 31 Sarbib (J.-L.), 237 Schengen, 327 Self-determination (right), 32, 36, 43, 56, 57, 299, 313 Sen (A.), Nobel Prize, 245 Seychelles, 240 Shaka, 53
717
Siam, 442 Sierra Leone, 9, 304, 311, 415, 416, 417, 454, 528, 554, 556, 558 Agreement between ECOMOG and AFRC (Rebels) (Conakry, 23 octobre 1997), 304 Special Criminal Court, 528, 554, 556, 558 Singapore, 230 Sinjela (M.), 5 Skurbaty (Z.), 34 Slavery, 65, 70, 108 Slovakia, 109, 115, 120, 139, 141, 173, 199, 201, 207 Smith (H.), 151 Société française pour le droit international (French Society for International Law), 445 Solidarity (principle), 72 Somalia, 9, 53, 55, 100 South Africa, 15, 50, 53, 55, 230, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 245, 292, 384, 385, 389 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 416, 425 Sovereign, 188, 189, 190 Sovereign equality, 150, 153 Sovereignty, 14, 20, 23, 29, 35, 36, 47, 48, 54, 55, 57, 58, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 134, 152, 153, 155, 158, 177 Absolute territorial sovereignty (theory), 121, 124, 177 Absolute territorial integrity (theory), 125 Limited territorial sovereignty (theory), 124, 127 Soyinka, 45 Spain, 109, 112, 113, 120, 126, 146, 147, 154, 165, 168, 172 Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights See: WIPO State(s) Developed States, 181 Developing countries (States), 416, 421
718
Analytical Index
Friendly Relations among States (principle), 151 Good Neighbourliness (principle), 48, 59, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 177 Intervenor, 483, 485 Non State Entities, 279 State responsibility, 14, 444, 478, 489 State Dismemberment, 298 Stockholm, 188, 189, 190, 192, 196, 197 Stockholm Conference See: Environment Suarez (F.), 328, 437, 440 Subpoena, 509 Sudan, 240 Sustainability, 193, 197, 198 Sustainable development, 67, 72, 79, 80, 82, 90, 181-223 Definition, 192 Four elements of the concept, 194 Genesis of the concept, 189 Prudent and rational use of natural resources, 194 Right to a balanced and healthful environment, 83 Syria, 109, 113, 117, 170, 171 T Taïwan, 49 Tanzania, 501, 503, 504, 505, 589 Tavernier (P.), 595, 597 Territorium nullius, 51 Thailand, 132 Theory of degrees See: Kelsen Thomas (A.), 366 Thucydides, 46 Timor (eastern), 278, 300, 303 Togo, 53 Traditional knowledge, 245, 247, 261, 262, 263 Treaty (treaties) See: Convention
Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 175 TRIPs See: World Trade Organization Trust Territory, 19 Truth commissions, 416 Truth and Reconciliation Commission See: South Africa Turkey, 109, 113, 117, 171, 303, 442 U Uganda, 85 Umozurike (U.O.), 51 Unilateral act, 112, 129, 130, 140, 141, 148, 150, 156, 170, 173, 176, 299 United Kingdom (UK), 227, 258, 259, 365 Commission on Intellectual Property Rights (CIPR), 258, 259, 260, 262 United Nations Organization, 5, 6, 13, 19, 20, 28, 36, 39, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 55, 56, 58, 64, 70, 79, 80, 85, 100, 186, 188, 279, 281, 282, 283, 292, 293, 302, 313, 335, 336, 338, 348, 355, 357, 359, 367, 372, 384, 387, 407, 415, 416, 432, 444, 448, 597, 598 Charter, 19, 36, 39, 44, 47, 150, 151, 154, 156, 166, 167, 169, 170, 178, 181, 283, 388, 448, 473, 475, 487, 494, 502, 597, 606 Article 1, 336 Article 2, 336 Article 14, 170 Article 33, 166 Article 74, 154 Article 111, 473 Chapter VI, 169 Chapter VII, 169, 283, 494, 496 Chapter VIII, 283 Conference on Environment and Development (1992), 190 See also: Environment, Rio Conference
Analytical Index Conference on Sustainable Development (2002), 192 See also: Environment, Johannesburg Conference Conference on the Human Environment (1972), 188 See also: Stockholm Conference Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 154, 165, 384 General Assembly, 70, 79, 142, 151, 157, 169, 170, 182, 189 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), 157 Commission on Human Rights, 80, 596 Office of Internal Oversight Services, 497, 499 Resolution 2625, 151, 157, 336, 432 Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 1974 See: Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States Resolution 41/128, 4 December 1986, Declaration on the Right to Development, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 210 Article 1, 182, 183 Resolution 45/94, 79 Special Political Committee, 170 Water Conference (Mar del Plata, 1977), 152 World Charter for Nature (1983), 142 Secretariat General, 163 Security Council, 169, 170 Resolution 955, 494, 496, 502, 503, 507, 514, 515, 580, 591 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Draft Declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (1994), 89
719
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 171 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 85, 96, 171, 262, 547 Regional Consultations on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore, 262 World Heritage List, 86 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), 205 Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact Assessment, 205 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 85, 86, 87, 88 Environmental Guidelines (1996), 87 United States of America, 5, 6, 64, 93, 100, 101, 113, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 130, 143, 145, 168, 193, 201, 214, 216, 228, 242, 243, 248, 260, 327, 329, 453, 454, 456, 457, 458, 461, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 492, 502, 588 11 September 2001, 327 Arizona Court, 464 Solicitor General, 472 Supreme Court, 464, 472 See also: Jurisprudence Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity See: Declaration Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), 79, 182, 186, 326, 328, 330, 334, 335, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 352, 355, 388 Universal Jurisdiction Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 407-430 Principle 4, 412, 413, 414 Principle 6, 414 Principle 8, 414, 415 Principle 9, 415 Principle 14, 416
720
Analytical Index
Principle 16, 416 Principle 17, 417 Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, 408 Upper Volta See: Burkina Faso Uruguay, 131, 133 Uruguay Round, 248 See also: World Trade Organization Uti possidetis (principle), 13, 16, 23, 33, 35, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 V Vasquez (G.), 437 Vattel (E. de), 440 Venezuela, 454 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties See: Conventions Vietnam, 49, 132, 304 Viljoen (F.), 599, 601 Visscher (Ch. de), 446, 448 Vitoria (F. de), 328, 363, 437, 440 W Watercourses, 109-179 Diversion (obligation to consult and negotiate), 162 Diversion (obligation to inform and notify), 159 Equitability (principle), 113 Equitable share of the water, 113 Equitable utilization, 113, 115, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 163, 164, 174, 177 International Water Law, 110, 134, 162 International Waterway Commission, 122, 123
Whaling, International Whaling Commission, 68, 93 See also: International Law Commission, Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Weil (P.), 448 Western Sahara, 278, 300 Westphalia, 440, 442 Witness, 415, 422, 503, 504, 510, 512, 513, 516, 523 Wolfensohn (J.), 246 Wolff (C.), 440 World Bank, 114, 141, 142, 148, 150, 171, 181, 237, 243, 246, 247 World Health Organization, 171 World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), 225, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 249, 253, 255, 256, 257, 262, 263 Copyright Treaty or WCT (1996), 227, 249, 253, 254, 255, 261 Article 2, 254 Intergovernmental Committee, 262, 263 Internet Treaties (WCT and WPPT), 253 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions (1982), 262 Regional Consultations on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore, 262 Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights, 230, 231, 256 World Heritage List of world heritage in Danger, 86
Analytical Index World Trade Organization, 175, 199, 202, 248, 259 Treaty / Agreement (1994), 199, 202, 210, 211 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), 211, 219, 220, 222 Article 5, 219 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property or TRIPs (1994), 248, 259 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), 211, 215, 219, 221, 222 Article 2, 221 Appellate Board, 201, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222 Cases Asbestos case (2001), 215, 217, 221, 222 Gasoline case (1996), 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 221 Hormones case, 219, 220 Section 337 case, 214 Shrimps-Turtles case, 199, 201, 214, 216, 217, 218 Dispute settlement, 199, 201, 211, 213, 215, 219, 222, 248 Panel, 201, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222 Y Yasseen, 445 Yugoslavia, 455, 456, 457, 458, 488, 492 See also: International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia Z Zaire, 233, 244, 245 Zambia, 3, 4, 6, 53, 501, 584, 585, 587 Zimbabwe, 53, 54, 230, 244
721
This page intentionally left blank
INDEX ANALYTIQUE A Abus Non abus de droit (principe), 157, 177 Achebe (C.), 7 Accord Voir : Convention A.C.P. (Etats d’Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique), 598, 601 A.C.P.-U.E., 601 Accord de Cotonou, 601 Acquiescement, 28, 30, 60 Acte unilatéral, 112, 129, 130, 140, 141, 148, 150, 156, 170, 173, 176, 299 Ade (King Sunny) Voir : King Sunny Ade Adede (A.O.), 497 Afghanistan, 300, 303 Afrique du Sud, 15, 50, 53, 55, 230, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 240, 245, 292, 384, 385, 389 Commission Vérité et Réconciliation, 416, 425 Agression armée, 487, 490 Akandji-Kombé (J.-F.), 601 Algérie, 4, 54, 55, 454 Alikhan (S.), 229, 230 Allemagne, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295, 442, 453, 454, 456, 457, 459, 463478, 492 Cour suprême (Leipzig), Llandovery Castle (1921), 447 Gestapo, 298 Nüremberg, 298 Voir aussi : Tribunal Militaire International Amnistie, 416
Amnesty International (ONG), 407, 408, 425 14 Principes relatifs à l’exercice effectif de la compétence universelle, 408 Andersen (B.), 243 Annexion, 45, 293, 297, 298, 299, 303, 307, 319 Antarctique (Traité de) Protocole relatif à l’environnement, Article 8, 205 Apartheid, 409, 420 Aquin (St Thomas d’), 437, 438, 439 Arechaga (E. de), 160 Argentine, 131, 133, 144, 229 Aristote, 434, 439 Armistice, 274, 281, 291, 311 Asile, 85, 87, 88, 324, 328, 337, 343, 352, 358 Assistance multilatérale (principe), 416 Asiwaju (A.), 13, 59 Association africaine de droit international, 3, 4, 6 Association de Droit International (International Law Association, ILA), 111, 115, 135, 136, 155, 159, 160, 163, 164, 407 Projet d’articles sur la prévention des inondations Article 2, 155 Règles d’Helsinki (1966), 111, 115, 136, 138, 142, 159, 167, 177 Article 10, 115 Résolution sur l’utilisation des eaux des fleuves internationaux (1958), 135 Résolution de Dubrovnik (1956) Article 6, 163 Rapport sur la liberté de navigation sur des cours d’eau internationaux, 143, 148, 149, 155, 170 Association des Sociétés de Musique Sud-Africaine, 235
724
Index analytique
Attaque généralisée Voir : Crimes contre l’humanité Austin (D.), 50 Australie, 93, 101, 229 High Court, 101 Loi sur la conservation de la faune (1974), 102 Autodétermination des peuples, 299, 313 Voir aussi : Droits de l’homme, Droit à l’autodétermination Autorité effective, 291 Autriche, 227
Bosnie, 286 Botswana, 53, 55, 110, 121 Bourne (C.), 131, 161, 162, 175 Brésil, 78, 131, 229, 454 Brierly (J.), 128 Brundtland Report, 189, 192, 193, 194 Bureau des services de contrôle interne (BSCI), Voir : Organisations des Nations Unies Burkina Faso, 14, 33, 53, 56, 57, 231 Burundi, 233, 240 Business Software Alliance (BSA), 236
B C Bangladesh, 109, 114, 117, 119, 120, 131, 168, 170, 171 Banque mondiale, 114, 141, 142, 148, 150, 171, 181, 237, 243, 246, 247 Behring (Mer), 193 Belgique, 109, 127, 128, 130, 144, 173, 455, 457, 458, 459, 501, 504, 505, 506, 507, 585, 590 Cour d’assises de Bruxelles, 573 Bénin, 54, 501, 506, 546, 582 Constitution Article 25, 342 Cour constitutionnelle, 342 Berlin Voir : Conférence, Congrès Bien commun, 432, 437, 438, 439, 440, 443, 445, 446 Blanchi (R.), 160 Bongo Voir : Kanda Bongo Man Bon voisinage (principe) Voir : Etat Bonne administration de la justice, 481, 491 Bonne foi, 137, 153, 156, 157, 163, 164, 169, 177, 190, 382, 389, 391, 397, 399, 400 Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 237, 241 Bornéo, 480, 483, 485, 486, 487
Cambodge, 132, 304, 309 Cameroun, 231, 232, 233, 323, 331, 340, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 350, 351, 360, 361, 362, 524, 525, 582, 588 Constitution, 340 Loi du 19 décembre 1990, Article 11, 361 Loi constitutionnelle du 18 janvier 1996, 346 Canada, 64, 77, 93, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 113, 119, 122, 123, 124, 130, 145, 159, 168, 215, 222 Cour suprême, R. v. Sparrow (1990), 103 Capette (I.), 597 Caraïbes occidentales, 456 Carence procédurale, 464, 467, 469, 471 Carillo Salcedo (J.A.), 444 Caroll (J.), 261 Casques bleus, 505 Cassese (A.), 389 Cassin (R.), 334, 341, 346, 368 Centrafrique (RCA), 349, 350, 351 Constitution, 340 Centre for Human Rights (Prétoria), 595
Index analytique Centre international de règlement des différends internationaux (CIRDI), 175 Charpentier (J.), 402, 403 Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 73, 81, 336, 338, 342, 343, 345, 355, 358, 360, 599 Article 12, 336, 337, 338, 342, 345 Article 24, 81 Charte africaine des droits et du bien-être de l’enfant, 599, 601 Clauses de “récupération”, 599 Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 81, 324, 325, 329, 337, 355, 356, 358, 360, 362, 599 Plaintes individuelles, 597, 600 Décisions Organisation Mondiale contre la Torture v. Rwanda, 337, 355 Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme v. Zambia, 337, 338, 358 Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 599, 600, 601 Protocole relatif aux droits des femmes, 601 Charte des droits fondamentaux ou Bill of Rights, 271, 317 Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne Voir : Union européenne Charte des droits et devoirs économiques des Etats Article 3, 152 Charte internationale des droits de l’homme, 326 Charte mondiale pour la nature (1983), 142 Chili, 229 Chine, 48, 229, 454, 494 Chukwurah (A.O.), 60 Chypre, 300, 302, 314 Forces chypriotes turques, 288 Forces turques, 288, 302
725
Cisjordanie Voir : Palestine Clandestine Voir : Immigration Clauses ouvrières, 375 Clegg (J.), 245 Cleptocratie, 413 Codification, 478 Colombie, 456, 459 Cour constitutionnelle, 83, 104 Tribunal de première instance de Colombie, 83 Colonna (E.), 437 Combattants Voir : Droit international humanitaire Comité contre la torture, 597 Comité de la liberté syndicale, 384, 398 Comité des droits de l’enfant, 597 Comité des droits de l’homme, 73, 77, 97, 98, 356, 357, 596 Apirana Mahuika et consorts c. Nouvelle Zélande, 98 E.H.P. c. Canada, Communication n°67/1980, 27 octobre 1987, 77 Ilmari Lansam et consorts c. Finlande, Communication n°511/1992, 14 octobre 1993, 77 Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Ban c. Canada, Communication n°167/1984, 26 mars 1990, 77 Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, 78, 596 Comité international de la Croix Rouge et du Croissant Rouge, 269, 276, 282, 290, 293, 302, 303, 304, 311, 509, 567, 573 Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination à l’égard des femmes, 597 Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale, 597 Commission de législation internationale, 376 Commission des droits de l’homme, 80, 596
726
Index analytique
Commission des droits de la propriété intellectuelle (CIPR) Voir : Royaume-Uni Commission du droit international, 116, 137, 143, 144, 147, 148, 153, 155, 157, 161, 168, 170, 455, 478 Commission du Golfe de Guinée, 339, 348 Commission Vérité et Réconciliation Voir : Afrique du Sud Commissions Vérité, 416 Common law, 496, 497, 516 Communauté d’intérêt (théorie), 126 Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique centrale (CEEAC), 323, 329, 331, 339, 344, 349, 350 Communauté économique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) ECOMOG (Forces d’interposition de la CEDEAO), 304, 311 Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), 323, 324, 329, 331, 339, 344, 345, 347, 349, 350, 354, 355 Règlement n°1, Article 1er, 349 Cour de justice communautaire, 355 Communauté internationale, 431-451 Communautés européennes, 208, 219, 220, 227, 449 Directive sur l’évaluation de l’impact environnemental Article 4, 209 Directive 2001/42 (27 juin 2001), 209 Article 1, 260 Directive 97/11 (3 mars 1997), 208, 209 Directive 93/98/EEC (29 octobre 1993), 260 Directive 85/337 (27 juin 1985), 208, 209 Comores (îles), 54 Compétence universelle Principes du Caïre-Arusha sur la compétence universelle, 407-430 Principe 4, 412, 413, 414 Principe 6, 414
Principe 8, 414, 415 Principe 9, 415 Principe 14, 416 Principe 16, 416 Principe 17, 417 Principes de Princeton sur la compétence universelle, 408 Complicité Voir : Crimes Concession, 483 Conférence de Berlin (1884-1885), 15, 50, 51 Conférence de Rome, 556 Conflit armé, 267, 268, 276, 287, 318, 325, 411, 530, 558, 566, 567, 569, 570, 571, 572, 575, 578 Congo, 323, 331, 349, 350, 351, 361 Constitution, 340 Congo (République démocratique du), 9, 54, 85, 501 Congrès de Berlin (1878), 442 Connexité directe, 461, 489, 490 Consentement tacite, 440 Consentement, 440, 442 Contrat social, 327 Convention Objet et but, 474 Réserve, 481, 491 1840, Angleterre et Chefs des Tribus en Nouvelle Zélande, Waitangi, 102, 103 Article II, 102 1856, 1862 et 1866, Délimitation (France et Espagne), 120 1863, Convention relative à la Meuse (Pays-Bas et Belgique), 130 1884, Traité de protectorat (GrandeBretagne et Rois et Chefs du Old Calabar, Nigeria), 23, 40 1886, Convention de Berne pour la protection des œuvres artistiques et littéraires, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259, 260, 264 Article 2, 250 Article 4, 250 Article 5, 254 Article 6, 251 Article 8, 251
Index analytique Article 9, 251, 259 Article 10, 253 Article 11, 251, 254 Article 12, 251 Article 15, 251 Article 16, 251 1899 et 1907 Conventions de La Haye, 275 1907 Convention de La Haye (IV), 267, 278, 279, 308 1908, Allemagne et la France relative à la frontière entre le Cameroun et le Congo Article 4, 361 1909, Traité fluvial (Canada et EtatsUnis d’Amérique), 123 Article II, 123, 124 1909, Traité relatif aux eaux frontalières (Etats-Unis d’Amérique et Royaume-Uni), 123, 130, 131, 169 1913, Accord relatif à Bakassi (Allemagne et Grande-Bretagne), 19, 23, 24, 28, 29, 32, 36, 40, 361 Article 29, 361 1931, Echanges de lettres entre Henderson et Fleuriau (RoyaumeUni et France), 28 1945, Accord de Londres établissant le Tribunal Militaire International (Nuremberg), 528 1946, Convention internationale sur la réglementation de la pêche de la baleine, 68 1946, Utilisation des rapides du fleuve Uruguay (Argentine et Uruguay), 133 1948 Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide, 493, 497, 539, 541, 545, 549, 551, 552, 580 1949 Conventions de Genève Voir : Droit international humanitaire 1951 Convention des Nations Unies relative au statut des réfugiés, et son Protocole additionnel (1967), 335
727
1951, Dérivation du cours des lacs Garsjoen, Kjerringvatn et Forstevannene vers Gandvik au lieu du Naatamo (Finlande et Norvège), 129 1960, Traité relatif aux eaux de l’Indus (Inde et Pakistan), 171, 174 1961 Convention de Rome pour la protection des artistes ou exécutants, des producteurs de phonogrammes et des organismes de radiodiffusion, 249, 253, 254, 255 Article 2, 254 1961, Traité relatif au fleuve Columbia, 169 1963, Accord (Cameroun et Nigeria), 48 Article 7, 340 Protocole, 340 1963 Convention de Vienne sur les relations consulaires, Protocole de signature facultative concernant le règlement obligatoire des différends, 463, 464, 465, 466, 468, 469, 470, 471, 476, 477 et son Protocole de signature facultative concernant le règlement obligatoire des différends, 465 1965 Convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale, Article 5, 335 1969, Traité relatif aux Chutes du Niagara (Etats-Unis d’Amérique et Canada), 130 1969 Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, 29, 32, 182, 400, 432, 473 Article 18, 400 Article 53, 182 1969 Convention de l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine régissant les aspects propres aux problèmes de réfugiés en Afrique, 339, 343
728
Index analytique
1971, Convention de Genève sur la protection des producteurs de phonogrammes contre la copie illicite de leurs phonogrammes, 249 1972, Convention sur le patrimoine mondial, 96 1973, Convention sur le commerce international des espèces en voie de disparition, 68 1973, Accord sur la protection des ours polaires, 94 1974, Convention de Bruxelles concernant la distribution de signaux porteurs de programmes transmis par satellite, 249 1974, Accord entre Israël et la Syrie sur le Golan, 292 1974, Accord de Kano (Cameroun et Nigeria), 28, 33 1975, Accord (Bangladesh et Inde), 131 1975, Déclaration de Maroua (Nigeria et Cameroun), 20, 29, 32 1976, Convention sur les eaux frontalières, 140, 173 1976, Accord (Hongrie et Tchécoslovaquie), 140, 144, 159, 173 1977, Accord intérimaire (Bangladesh et Inde), 171 1977, Traité (Hongrie et Tchécoslovaquie), 139, 140, 173 1979, Convention sur les espèces migrantes, 94 1982, Convention relatif au droit de la mer (Convention de Montego Bay), 197, 204 Article 206, 204 1989, Convention sur les droits de l’enfant, 80, 100 Article 30, 99, 100 1990 Convention sur la protection des droits des travailleurs immigrés et des membres de leurs familles, 335, 359
1991, Convention d’Espoo sur l’évaluation de l’impact environnemental dans un contexte transfrontière Article 7, 206 1992, Convention sur la biodiversité (ou la diversité biologique), 65, 70, 89, 198 Article 1, 198 Article 2, 198 Article 8, 89 1992, Convention cadre sur les changements climatiques, 198 Article 3, 198 1992, Convention sur la protection et l’utilisation des eaux transfrontalières et des lacs internationaux, 116 1996, Traité relatif au fleuve Ganges (Inde et Bangladesh), 168 1996, Traité relatif au fleuve Mekong (Cambodge, Laos, Thaïlande et Vietnam) Article 5, 132 Article 26, 132 1997, Convention sur la non navigabilité des cours d’eau internationaux, 110, 113, 116, 135, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 156, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 177 Article 2, 110 Article 5, 137, 149, 164 Article 6, 149, 147 Article 7, 147, 149 Article 8, 153 Article 10, 149 Article 11, 153, 161, 162, 172 Article 12, 162 Article 17, 164 Article 21, 144 Convention africaine sur la conservation de la nature et des ressources, 599 Convention commune sur la libre circulation des personnes et le droit d’établissement, 339, 344
Index analytique Convention de Bamako sur l’interdiction d’importer des déchets dangereux en Afrique, 599 Convention de Brazzaville, 349 Convention de Lomé, 601 Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, 73, 74, 75, 76, 325, 327 Article 2, 75 Article 3, 73 Article 6, 519 Article 8, 74, 76 Article 10, 75 Protocole additionnel 4 Article 2, 338 Article 3, 338 Commission européenne des droits de l’homme, 74, 75 Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, 74, 76, 357, 515, 517 Lopez Ostra c. Espagne (1994), 73, 74 Guerra and others c. Italie (1998), 74, 75 Juges Jambrek, 75 Convention européenne pour le règlement pacifique des différends, 456 Convention interaméricaine des droits de l’homme (1968), 338 Article 8, 519 Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, 78, 79 Yanomami c. Brésil, 78 Rapports, Equateur (1997), 79 Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme, 357 Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community c. Nicaragua, Jugement du 31 août 2001, 77 Protocole additionnel relative aux droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, 81 Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant, 597
729
Convention de l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine sur les aspects propres aux problèmes des réfugiés, 599 Conventions administratives, 352, 353 Traité de l’Antarctique Protocole relatif à l’environnement Article 8, 205 Traité relatif au fleuve Mahakali (Inde et Népal), 133, 168, 172 Article 11, 168 Article 12, 132 Traités Internet Voir : OMPI Coopération Coopération entre les Etats et le TPIR, 500-510 Coopération internationale, 124, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 177 Coopération pour le développement, 416 Corée (République de), 109, 112, 114, 118, 119, 230 Corée du Nord, 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 120 Côte d’Ivoire, 9, 53, 61, 230, 232, 233, 493, 501, 588 Cour internationale de Justice, 4, 65, 66, 71, 115, 116, 139, 141, 145, 154, 164, 165, 172, 173, 174, 178, 187, 199, 206, 207, 208, 209, 377, 384, 408, 412, 453-492, 511, 539, 540, 541, 542, 545, 605-607 Statut, 606 Article 14, 454 Article 59, 25 Accès à la justice internationale des Etats disposant de ressources financières limitées, 459 Avis consultatif, 366, 369 Clause attributive de compétence, 467 Date critique, 35 Demande / Requête à fin d’intervention, 479, 480, 481, 482, 484, 487
730
Index analytique
Demandes reconventionnelles, 453, 457, 460, 461, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491 Exceptions préliminaires, 21, 22, 455, 457, 458, 488 Fonds d’affectation spécial, 459 Intervention d’un Etat, 25, 480 Mesures conservatoires, 454, 463, 464, 467, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 478, 487, 491 Note contenant des informations importantes à l’usage des parties à de nouvelles affaires, 462 Note portant recommandations destinées aux parties, 462 Opinion dissidente, 200, 201, 207, 208 Règlement, 460, 462, 479, 480, 481, 482, 486, 488, 489 Instruction de procédure I, 462 Instruction de procédure II, 462 Instruction de procédure III, 463 Instruction de procédure IV, 463 Instruction de procédure V, 462 Instruction de procédure VI, 462 Saisine Consentement préalable des Etats (principe), 480 Déclaration unilatérale, 482 Greffier Couvreur (Ph.), 455 Greffier adjoint Arnaldez (J.-J.), 455 Juges Al-Khasawneh (A.S.), 454 Buergenthal (Th.), 454, 460 Bedjaoui (M.), 4, 182, 183, 454 Elaraby (N.), 454, 460 Fleischhauer (C.-A.), 454, 460 Guillaume (G.), 454, 459, 477 Herczegh (G.), 454, 460 Higgins (R.), 454, 460 Jiuyong (S.), 454 Kooijmans (P.H.), 454, 607 Koroma (A.G.), 22, 27, 34, 35, 39, 40, 50, 454, 460, 484 Oda (S.), 454, 485, 487 Parra-Aranguren (G.), 454, 484
Ranjeva (R.), 454 Rezek (F.), 454 Schwebel (S.M.), 37, 57, 143 Vereshchetin (V.S.), 454 Juges ad hoc Ajibola (B.), 14, 22, 26, 27, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 57 Shahabuddeen (M.), 479 Verhoeven (J.), 378, 490 Weeramantry (C.), 71, 72, 73, 200, 201, 207, 208, 479, 480 Jurisprudence 2002, Mandat d’arrêt du 11 avril 2000 (République démocratique du Congo c. Belgique), 408, 457, 458, 459 2002, Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigeria (Cameroun c. Nigeria, Guinée équatoriale intervenant), 13-61, 457, 459, 461 2001, LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), 453, 456, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 475, 476, 478, 492 2001, Délimitation maritime et questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (Qatar c. Bahreïn), 453, 456, 463, 492 2001, Souveraineté sur Pulau Ligitan et Pulau Sipadan (Indonésie / Malaisie), 453, 459, 479, 481, 483 2001, Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Burundi, 1999-2001), 456 2001, Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), 456 1998, Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), 467
Index analytique 1996, Licéité de la menace ou de l’emploi d’armes nucléaires (avis consultatif), 454 1993, Délimitation maritime dans la région située entre le Groenland et Jan Mayen (Danemark c. Norvège), 38 1992, Différend frontalier terrestre, insulaire et maritime (El Salvador / Honduras, Nicaragua intervenant), 480, 482 1986, Différend frontalier (Burkina Faso / République du Mali), 33, 454, 492 1984, Délimitation de la frontière maritime dans la région du golfe du Maine (Canada / EtatsUnis d’Amérique), 377 1981, Personnel diplomatique et consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Iran), 432 1975, Sahara occidental (avis consultatif), 34, 55 1955, Nottebohm (Liechtenstein c. Guatemala), 545 Affaires pendantes Activités armées sur le territoire du Congo (République démocratique du Congo c. Ouganda, 1999), 457, 459 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (République de Guinée c. République démocratique du Congo, 1998), 459 Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (BosnieHerzégovine c. Yougoslavie, 1993), 455, 457, 459 Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Croatie c. Yougoslavie, 1999), 459 Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne, 2001), 456, 457, 459
731
Demande en révision de l’arrêt du 11 juillet 1996 en l’affaire relative à l’Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Yougoslavie, Yougoslavie c. Bosnie-Herzégovine, 2001), 459 Différend territorial et maritime (Nicaragua c. Colombie, 2001), 456, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Allemagne, 1999), 457, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Belgique, 1999), 457, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Canada, 1999), 457, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. France, 1999), 456, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Italie, 1999), 457, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Pays-Bas, 1999), 457, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Portugal, 1999), 457, 459 Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Royaume-Uni, 1999), 456, 459 Questions d’interprétation et d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique, et Jamahiriya arabe libyenne c. RoyaumeUni, 1992), 458
732
Index analytique
Plates-formes pétrolières (République islamique d’Iran c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 1992), 457, 458, 461 Cour pénale internationale, 411, 413, 420, 426, 428, 532, 554, 558, 565, 568, 569 Statut (Traité ou Convention de Rome), 411, 532 Article 8, 565 Cour permanente de Justice internationale, 126, 128, 139, 172, 173, 366, 369, 377 Statut, 606 Article 38, 377 Jurisprudence 1937, Prises d’eau à la Meuse (Belgique / Pays-Bas), 128, 135, 172 1929, Juridiction territoriale de la Commission internationale de l’Oder (Allemagne et associés / Pologne), 126, 139 1928, Usine de Chorzów (Allemagne c. Pologne), 468 Cours d’eau internationaux, 109-179 Commission fluviale internationale, 122, 123 Commission internationale pour la pêche de la baleine, 68, 93 Commission internationale de la navigation fluviale, 122, 123 Dérivation (obligation de consulter et de négocier), 162 Dérivation (obligation d’informer et de notifier), 159 Droit international des cours d’eau, 110, 134, 162 Equitable répartition de l’eau, 113 Equité (principe), 113 Utilisation équitable, 113, 115, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 141, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 163, 164, 174, 177 Voir aussi : Commission du droit international, Rapport sur le droit de la non navigation des cours d’eau internationaux
Coutume, 268, 274, 291, 293, 374, 387, 389, 403 CREDHO (Centre de Recherches sur les Droits de l’Homme et le Droit Humanitaire, France), 595 Crime Actus reus, 532 Aide au crime, 533 Complicité, 531, 533, 534, 538, 550, 551, 552, 553, 575, 576, 584, 585, 588, 591 Crimes contre l’humanité, 407, 410, 411, 414, 415, 416, 495, 497, 538, 549, 554-560, 566, 574, 577, 579, 581, 582, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 591, 597 Attaque généralisée, 554, 555, 556, 559, 560, 578 Autres actes inhumains, 555, 584, 588 Autres traitements cruels ou dégradants, 561 Extermination, 544, 556, 576, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 591 Meurtre, 545, 561, 566 Persécution, 560, 585 Formes de participation Encouragement, 531, 533, 534, 552 Incitation, 531, 532, 533, 550, 551, 552, 553, 575, 584, 585, 588 Ordre au crime, 531, 533 Planification, 531, 533 Génocide, 407, 410, 411, 412, 414, 416, 455, 457, 458, 488, 493, 494, 495, 497, 503, 519, 521, 531, 532, 533, 534, 538, 539-553, 554, 555, 557, 559, 566, 571, 572, 573, 575, 576, 577, 579, 580, 581, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 591, 597 Dol spécial (ou Dolus Specialis), 503, 531, 534, 542, 543-545, 550, 552 Entente en vue de commettre le génocide, 531, 550, 551, 553, 584, 588 Mens rea, 531, 532, 550
Index analytique Torture, 70, 74, 108 Viol, 553, 557, 561, 566, 584, 585, 586, 588 Violations massives des droits de l’homme, 410, 412, 414, 416, 417 Violences sexuelles, 533 Crimes de guerre, 494, 495, 527, 529, 530, 538, 555, 560-575, 581, 584, 591, 597 Connexité, 569, 570, 571, 573 Contrôle effectif, 291, 292, 535 Infractions graves, 561, 565 Violations de l’article 3 commun, 495, 561, 581 Violations graves, 494, 528, 529, 538, 560, 561, 564, 565, 573 Crimes internationaux, 444 Croatie, 298 Cuiquam in sua arte credendum, 40 D Dallaire (R.), 508 Danemark, 506 David (Camp), 292 Davis (G.), 444 Déclaration Déclaration (Argentine, Brésil et Uruguay, 1960), 131 Déclaration sur les politiques culturelles (Mexico, 1982), 95 Déclaration sur le droit au développement Voir : Organisation des Nations Unies, Assemblée générale Déclaration universelle sur la diversité culturelle Article 1, 96, Déclaration Thomson-Marchand (1929-1930), 28 Déclaration de Yaoundé (Cameroun et Nigeria, 14 août 1970), 28, 33 Déclaration de Yaoundé II (Cameroun et Nigeria, 1987), 29, 33
733
Déclaration de Philadelphie, 367, 368, 369, 372, 375, 379, 380, 382, 385, 387, 388 Déclaration sur la race et les préjugés raciaux, 547 Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (1948), 79, 182, 186, 326, 328, 330, 334, 335, 341, 343, 344, 345, 346, 352, 355, 388 Article 4, 388 Article 13, 330, 334, 341, 343, 345 Article 23, 388 Degni-Ségui (R.), 493, 539, 544 Delaplace (E.), 548 Déportations, 292, 299, 315, 316 Détention provisoire, 515, 524, 580, 583 Développement durable, 67, 72, 79, 80, 82, 90, 181-223 Définition, 192 Eléments du concept, 194 Genèse du concept, 189 Utilisation rationnelle et prudente des ressources naturelles, 194 Droit à un environnement équilibré et sain, 83 Dibango (M.), 245 Discrimination, 335, 346, 356, 367, 370, 371, 386, 390, 503, 554, 559, 560, 580, 582 Discrimination à l’égard des femmes, 597 Dol spécial ou Dolus specialis Voir : Génocide Droit à être représenté, 519 à la négociation collective, 370 à la notification consulaire, 471 au travail, 358 consulaire, 490 d’association, 376, 382 d’être informé, 470 d’immigration, 326, 330, 334, 346 de veto israélien sur la législation palestinienne, 305 de visite, 506 de voisinage, 361 Droit de la guerre
734
Index analytique
Droit des conflits armés Voir : Droit international humanitaire Droit des traités, 382, 391, 399, 400 Droit diplomatique, 490 Droit impératif, 299, 319 Droit international Conventionnel, 377 Coutume, Opinio Juris, 100, 106, 389, 541 Coutume, Pratique (élément matériel de la coutume), 389, 398 Coutumier, 32, 33, 84, 93, 97, 106, 124, 134, 150, 158, 159, 161, 166, 177, 377, 540, 560, 562, 564, 566 Développement progressif du droit international, 192 Hiérarchie des obligations en droit international, 444 Instruments internationaux non obligatoires, 205 Non ingérence dans les affaires intérieures de l’Etat (principe), 414, 421 Non intervention (principe), 150 Pacta sunt servanda, 40, 47 Principes généraux, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 382, 436, 531, 539 Privé, 256 Soft law, 393 Droit international des cours d’eau internationaux Voir : Cours d’eau Droit international de l’environnement Voir : Environnement Droit international du travail, 365-404 Droit international humanitaire, 268, 275, 276, 277, 278, 282, 283, 317, 494, 528, 535, 543, 558, 560, 562, 566, 569, 573, 574, 575 Combattants, 558 Conventions de Genève (1949) Article 2 commun, 275, 276, 281 Article 3 commun, 530, 563, 567, 568
(III) relative aux prisonniers de guerre, 277 (IV) relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre (12 août 1949) Article 4, 285 Article 6, 289 Article 27, 315 Article 29, 315 Article 30, 315 Article 31, 315 Article 32, 315 Article 33, 315 Article 34, 315 Article 47, 267-321 Article 49, 315 Article 51, 315 Protocole additionnel I relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés internationaux (1977), 274, 282, 290, 291, 295 Protocole additionnel II relatif à la protection des victimes des conflits armés non internationaux (1977) Article 1er, 568 Article 4 § 2, 563 Coutumes de la guerre, 561, 578 Nécessité (principe), 202, 213, 216, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 Personnes protégées, 272, 285, 287, 294, 296, 297, 298, 312, 315, 318, 573, 578 Population civile, 554, 558, 559, 560, 574, 575, 578 Prisonniers de guerre, 277 Règlement concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre, 267 Règlement de La Haye, 268, 269, 270, 271, 278, 280, 285, 289, 291, 293, 310 Article 47, 271 Représailles, 275 Transferts forcés, 316 Voir aussi : Conventions de Genève
Index analytique Droit international pénal Ne bis in idem (principe), 506 Nullum crimen sine lege (principe), 562, 566 Qualité officielle, 527, 535 Responsabilité pénale individuelle, 500, 527, 531, 532, 552, 562, 565 Responsabilité pour action, 534 Responsabilité pour omission, 534, 538 Supérieur (Responsabilité d’un), 534, 535, 536 Voir aussi : Procédure pénale internationale Droit naturel, 324, 328, 434, 436, 438 Droit positif, 325, 343, 398 Droit universel, 436 Droits à l’occupé, 269 Droits collectifs / individuels, 91 Droits coutumiers, 361 Droits de l’accusé, 510, 512, 523, 524, 525, 588 Droits de l’enfant, 597 Droits de l’homme, 8, 9, 63-108, 268, 269, 271, 274, 286, 302, 315, 325, 332, 334, 337, 338, 354, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 373, 386, 388, 389, 390, 391, 394, 397, 402, 403, 409, 410, 411, 414, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 443, 493, 499, 510, 511, 513, 515, 517, 526, 575, 590, 595603 Dignité humaine, 66, 67, 73, 85 Droit à l’autodétermination, 32, 36, 43, 56, 57 Droit à l’information, 75 Droit à la chasse, 101, 104 Droit à la santé, 79 Droit à la vie, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 79, 82, 89 Droit à un logement décent, 78 Commentaire général sur le droit à un logement décent (1991), 77 Droit à un niveau de vie adéquat, 78, 79 Droit au bien-être, 63, 66, 69, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80
735
Droit au développement (origines), 181 Droit au développement économique, 182, 189 Droit au respect de sa vie privée et familiale, 76 Droit de jouir de sa propre culture, 77 Droit de participer à la vie politique, 183, 187 Droit individuel, 72, 81, 184 Droit international coutumier des droits de l’homme, 84 Droits culturels, 91, 97 Droits de la défense, 357, 519, 523 Droits de la personne humaine Voir : Droits de l’homme Indivisibilité des droits de l’homme, 186, 187 Droits des étrangers, 346 Droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, 181, 341 Droits fondamentaux Voir : Droits de l’homme Dubin (L.), 396, 397 Dubois (P.), 437 E Effectivités, 23, 27, 30, 35, 41, 278, 279, 289, 290, 291, 306, 316, 318 Egalité (principe d’), 345, 356, 367, 368, 371, 380, 382, 383 Egypte, 55, 56, 292, 293, 454 Emigration Inspection des émigrants, 367 Non-refoulement, 352, 417, 423 Enfants (travail des), 370, 371, 377, 386, 390 Environnement, 63-108, 116, 134, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 158, 163, 164, 174, 177, 178, 181-223 Commerce et environnement, 210, 211, 219, 222, 223 Conférence de Rio (1992), 189, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 198
736
Index analytique
Déclaration de Rio, 67, 80, 89, 116, 190, 191, 195, 197, 203, 210 Principe 1, 67, 80 Principe 2, 190 Principe 3, 191 Principe 4, 191, 195, 210 Principe 7, 195 Principe 15, 191 Principe 17, 191, 203 Principe 21, 188, 189, 190 Principe 22, 89 Conférence de Stockholm (1972), 188 Déclaration de Stockholm, 64, 80, 188, 197 Conférence des Nations Unies sur le Développement Humain (1972), Déclaration, 116 Différends relatifs au commerce et à l’environnement, 213 Dommage environnemental, 73, 74, 76, 79, 83, 85, 88, 190, 195, 202, 204, 207 Droit à l’utilisation traditionnelle de l’environnement, 93 Droit à la préservation et à la jouissance de sa propre culture, 99 Droit d’une personne à représenter les générations futures, 83 Droit international de l’environnement, 64, 66, 68, 69, 188, 189, 197, 207, 208, 223 Environnement marin, 204 Equité intergénérationnelle, 67, 83, 90, 194, 195 Evaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement, 191, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 223 Evaluation du risque, 219, 220 Faisabilité technique et économique, 220 Impact transfrontalier, 205 Impact néfaste transfrontalier, 154 Johannesburg (Conférence, Déclaration, Sommet) (2002), 67, 80, 90, 192, 196, 197
Plan d’action (2002), 192 Déclaration politique (2002), 192, 196, 197 Nécessité et proportionnalité, 213, 220 PNUD, Objectifs et Principes de l’Evaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement (1987), 205 Politiques environnementales, 190, 195 Pollution transfrontalière, 189 Précaution (principe), 191, 207, 219, 220 Première Conférence mondiale sur la protection de l’environnement, 188 Projet de déclaration de principes relatifs aux droits de l’homme et à l’environnement (1994), 79, 89, 92, 99 Article 26, 92 Protocole relatif à l’environnement du Traité sur l’Antarctique, 205 Voir aussi : Développement durable Erlmann (V.), 244 Erythrée, 39, 55, 240 Esclavage, 65, 70, 108 Etat Acteurs non étatiques, 185 Bon voisinage (principe), 48, 59, 153, 154, 155, 156, 159, 177 Dissolution d’un Etat, 298 Entités non-étatiques, 279 Etats développés, 181 Etats en développement, 416, 421 Intervenant, 483, 485 Relations amicales entre les Etats, 151 Responsabilité, 14, 444, 478, 489 Etat de droit, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 Etats-Unis d’Amérique, 5, 6, 64, 93, 100, 101, 113, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 130, 143, 145, 168, 193, 201, 214, 216, 228, 242, 243, 248, 260, 327, 329, 453, 454, 456, 457, 458, 461, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 492, 502, 588
Index analytique 11 septembre 2001, 327 Cour de l’Arizona, 464 Cour suprême, 464, 472 Voir aussi : Jurisprudence Ethiopie, 16, 49, 53, 55 Expulsion, 335, 337, 346, 359 Extermination Voir : Crimes contre l’humanité Extrader, 416, 417, 421, 422, 423 Extraterritorialité, 306 Evensen, 144, 153, 155, 161, 166, 168 F Fangatuafa Voir : Mururoa Fédération internationale des sociétés de production de phonogrammes, 234, 235 Fela (A.K.), 244 Fleuves internationaux Voir : Cours d’eau internationaux Finlande, 227 Firmes multinationales, 187 Foi Voir : Bonne foi Fondation africaine pour le droit international, 6, 7, 695-700 Fonds monétaire international, 181 Force Emploi de la force, 489, 490 Non-recours à la force, 489 France, 109, 112, 120, 126, 146, 154, 155, 165, 168, 172, 206, 207, 215, 216, 288, 298, 365, 454, 455, 456, 459, 501, 504 Conseil constitutionnel, 342, 356 Franck (Th.), 479 Francophonie Voir : Organisation internationale de la Francophonie Frontière, 281, 295
737
G Gabon, 55, 231, 233, 323, 331, 347, 349, 350, 351, 360, 362 GATT, 181, 201, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 248 Ghana, 53, 230, 244 Génocide Voir : Crime Golan (Plateaux du), 292 Gorjestani (N.), 247 Gowon, 29, 32 Grande-Bretagne, 76, 193, 454 Voir aussi : Royaume-Uni Grands Lacs africains, 501 Grotius, 328 Guerre Etat de guerre, 275 Guerre déclarée, 275, 276 Guerre civile, 351 Guinée, 14, 18, 24, 25, 31, 57, 61, 231, 232, 233, 241 Guinée équatoriale, 18, 24, 30, 31, 55, 323, 331, 347, 349, 350, 351, 360, 362, 457, 459, 461 H Habeas corpus, 464 Harmon (J.), 121, 122, 123, 131 Doctrine (souveraineté territoriale absolue), 121, 122, 123, 124, 125 Voir : Souveraineté, particulièrement Intégrité territoriale absolue (théorie) Haute Volta Voir : Burkina Faso Helsinki (Règles) (1966) Voir : Association de Droit International Heyns (C.), 595 Hobbes (Th.), 440 Hongrie, 109, 115, 119, 120, 139, 140, 141, 165, 168, 173, 199, 201, 207, 454, 458 Huaraka (T.), 4, 6
738
Index analytique
Huntzinger (S.), 329 I Immigration Clandestine, 327, 338, 343, 362 Protection des travailleurs immigrés, 335 Regroupement familial, 357 Immunités, 503, 508 Impunité, 409, 411, 419 Indigène (Peuple), 335 Droit des peuples indigènes, 92, 93, 97, 106 Inde, 109, 112, 114, 131, 133, 168, 170, 171, 172, 174, 229 Indivision, 328, 363 Indonésie, 303 Injonctions Voir : Subpoena Institut de Droit International, 128, 164 Résolution de Salzburg sur l’Utilisation des Cours d’eau non maritime internationaux (1961), 128, 164 Article II, 128 Intégration (principe), 195, 210 Intégration continentale, 59 Intégration régionale, 45, 58, 59, 60, 323, 324, 331, 345, 347, 351 Intérêt général, 432, 444 International Crisis Group (ONG), 499 Internet Responsabilité des fournisseurs de services, 256 Traités Internet Voir : OMPI Interpol, 235 Unité chargée des crimes contre la propriété intellectuelle, 235 Interprétation, 458, 465, 466, 467, 468, 473, 474, 475, 477, 480, 485, 487 Inviolabilité de leur domicile, 358 Iraq, 113, 171 Islam, 598 Israël, 109, 111, 117, 170, 277, 290, 292, 293, 295, 296, 297, 300, 302,
305, 306, 307, 313, 314, 316, 319, 320 Cour suprême, 293 Jérusalem Est, 292 Loi “Jerusalem, Capital of Israel”, 292 Loi relative aux plateaux du Golan, 292 Sinaï / Péninsule du Sinaï, 292 Voir aussi : Palestine Italie, 442 Cour constitutionnelle, 82 J Japon, 48, 101, 105, 234, 289, 290, 291, 292, 295, 442, 454 Jaurès (J.), 366 Jenks (C.W.), 368, 369, 449 Johannesburg (Conférence, Déclaration, Plan d’action, Sommet) Voir : Environnement Jordanie, 109, 111, 117, 119, 170, 175, 454 Jourdain (fleuve), 117, 170 Jurisprudence Arbitrale 1998, Souveraineté territoriale et Champ du différend (Erythrée / Yémen), 39 1955, Lac Lanoux (France – Espagne), 109, 112, 113, 120, 126, 146, 154, 160, 161, 164, 165, 166, 168, 172 1941, Fonderies de Trail (EtatsUnis d’Amérique – Canada), 64, 145, 146, 187 1893, Phoques à fourrure de la mer de Behring (Etats-Unis d’Amérique –GrandeBretagne), 193, 194 Internationale Voir le nom de l’organe judiciaire (ex. Cour internationale de Justice) Nationale Argentine, 84
Index analytique Canada Cour de justice de l’Ontario, R. c. Meshake (2003), 103 Cour suprême, Delgamuukw c. British Columbia, 104 Cour suprême, R. c. Sparrow (1990), 103 Cour suprême, R. c. Van der Peet (1996), 103 Chili Cour suprême, 84 Costa Rica Cour suprême, 83 Etats-Unis d’Amérique Cour fédérale de Idaho, 100 Cour suprême, 101 Inde Cour suprême, 82 Malaisie Haute Cour de Johor Bahru, Adong Bin Kuwanu et al. c. Kerajaan Negeri Johor & Anor (1996), 105 Haute Cour de Shah Alam, Sagong Bin Tasi et al. c. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor et al. (2002), 105 Nor Anak Nyawai et al. c. Borneo Pulp Plantation Sdn Bhd et al. (2001), 105 Philippines Cour suprême, Minors Oposa et al. c. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources et al., 67, 83, 84 Suisse Tribunal militaire de cassation, 573 Voir aussi le nom du pays (ex. Bénin) Jus ad bellum, 489 Jus cogens, 69, 70, 71, 73, 107, 182, 299, 300, 308, 444, 445 Jus communicationis, 329, 363 Jus gentium, 328, 434, 435, 436 Jus in bello, 490
739
Justice sociale, 366, 367, 369, 370, 372, 381, 392, 393 K Kampuchéa, 300, 304 Voir aussi : Cambodge Kanda Bongo Man, 245 Kant (E.), 441, 450 Karmal (B.), 303 Kelsen (H.), 63 Théorie pure, 63 Kenya, 53, 230, 501, 503, 584, 585, 589 Khaled, 245 King Sunny Ade, 244 Kolb (R.), 463 Koweït, 300, 304 Kuti Voir : Fela L L’Huillier (J.), 449 Laos, 132 Lauterpacht (H.), 125, 156, 158 Laylin (J.), 160 Légalité (des infractions et des peines), 357, 526, 539 Lemkin (R.), 539 Leniter ex merito quicquid patiare ferendum est, 44 Lesotho, 53 Lex (lege) ferenda, 409, 562 Lex (lege) lata, 409 Liberia, 9, 61 Liberté d’association, 187, 368, 370, 386, 388 d’expression, 187, 368, 379, 382, 383 de circulation, 323-363 Liberté provisoire, 498, 513, 516 Liberté syndicale, 368, 371, 375, 381, 382, 383, 385, 386, 387, 389, 390, 398, 399
740
Index analytique
Libertés politiques, 341 Libertés publiques, 323, 325 Libre circulation Voir : Liberté de circulation Libye, 14, 25, 38, 44, 54, 55, 57 Liechtenstein, 456, 457, 459 M Machiavel (N.), 440 Madagascar, 454 Malaisie, 49 Haute Cour de Kuching, 105 Haute Cour de Shah Alam, 105 Malawi, 53, 55 Mali, 501, 506, 582, 584, 585, 586 Mandat, 283, 284, 292, 314, 318 Mapfumo (Th.), 244 Maroc, 504, 602 Marxiste, 381 Maupain, 394 Maurice (île), 240 McCaffrey, 137, 149, 155, 157 Mesures conservatoires, 21, 22, 37, 165, 454, 463, 465, 467, 472-476, 478, 487, 491, 492 Caractère obligatoire des ordonnances indication de mesures conservatoires, 472-476 Mexico, 109, 113, 122, 131 Mirkine-Guetzevitch (B.), 352 Molina (L.), 437 Mondialisation, 327, 332, 363, 369, 370, 372, 392, 393 Mort Voir : Peine de mort Mosler (H.), 445, 449 Mouvements de libération, 279 Multinationales (firmes), 187 Mururoa (atolls du Pacifique de Mururoa et Fangatuafa), 206 N N’Dour (Y.), 242, 245 Namibie, 6, 292, 300
NAPSTER, 235 Voir : Piratage Nation la plus favorisée (clause / traitement), 48, 211 Nationalité, 330, 343, 356, 362 Navigation (Régime de la), 361 Ndiaye (P.T.), 231, 232, 233, 235 Ndombasi (Y.), 458 Nehru, 174 Nemo dat quod non habet (principe), 24, 32 Népal, 133, 168, 172 Nicaragua, 456, 459 Nielsen//NetRatings, 242 Niger, 18, 43, 54, 55, 233, 240 Nigeria, 230, 243, 244, 264, 323, 331, 339, 340, 347, 350, 351, 361 Constitution, 340 Court of Appeal, 83 Nkrumah (K.), 54 Norvège, 298, 506 Nouvelle Zélande, 98, 102, 103, 206, 207 Nuremberg Voir : Allemagne ou Tribunal Militaire International O Obligation de notification consulaire, 477 pré-conventionnelle, 401, 403 erga omnes, 65, 290, 444 Occam (G. d’), 437, 438 Occupation, Devoirs de l’occupant, 269 OLP Voir : Palestine Oluwide (B.), 46 Opérations de police, 275, 303 Ordonnances militaires, 307, 319 Ordre juridique, 444, 445, 446 Ordre juridique objectif, 445 Ordre public, 326, 336, 342, 352, 358 Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, 4, 15, 16, 48, 54, 56, 57, 58, 504, 598, 599
Index analytique Organisation des Nations Unies, 5, 6, 13, 19, 20, 28, 36, 39, 43, 44, 45, 47, 49, 55, 56, 58, 64, 70, 79, 80, 85, 100, 186, 188, 279, 281, 282, 283, 292, 293, 302, 313, 335, 336, 338, 348, 355, 357, 359, 367, 372, 384, 387, 407, 415, 416, 432, 444, 448, 597, 598 Charte des Nations Unies, 19, 36, 39, 44, 47, 150, 151, 154, 156, 166, 167, 169, 170, 178, 181, 283, 388, 448, 473, 475, 487, 494, 502, 597, 606 Article 1er, 336 Article 2, 336 Article 14, 170 Article 33, 166 Article 74, 154 Article 111, 473 Chapitre VI, 169 Chapitre VII, 169, 283, 494, 496 Chapitre VIII, 283 Assemblée générale, 70, 79, 142, 151, 157, 169, 170, 182, 189, 281, 292, 293, 302, 313, 384, 453, 454, 455, 459, 460, 549 Résolution 96, 549 Résolution 260 A (III), 541 Résolution 2625, 151, 157, 336, 432 Résolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 décembre 1974 Voir : Chartre des droits et devoirs économiques des Etats Résolution 41/128, 4 décembre 1986, Déclaration sur le droit au développement, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 210 Article 1, 182, 183 Résolution 45/94, 79 Déclaration relative aux principes du droit international touchant les relations amicales et la coopération entre les Etats, 336 Déclaration sur les principes de droit international relatifs aux relations amicales et de
741
coopération entre les Etats en accord avec la Charte des Nations Unies (1970), 157 Bureau des services de contrôle interne (BSCI), 497, 499 Commission des droits de l’homme, 80 Sous-commission sur la prévention de la discrimination et la protection des minorités Projet de Déclaration sur les droits des peuples indigènes (1994), 89 Commission politique spéciale, 170 Conférence sur l’eau (Mar del Plata, 1977), 152 Conférence sur l’environnement et le développement (1992), 190 Voir aussi : Environnement, Conférence de Rio Conférence sur le développement durable (2002), 192 Voir aussi : Environnement, Conférence de Johannesburg Conférence sur l’environnement humain (1972), 188 Voir aussi : Conférence de Stockholm Conseil économique et social (ECOSOC), 154, 165, 384 Conseil de sécurité, 169, 170, 283, 293, 302, 432, 449, 454, 460, 473, 493, 494, 500, 502, 507, 508, 509, 514, 528, 544, 547, 560, 580, 590 Résolution 827, 494 Résolution 955, 494, 496, 502, 503, 507, 514, 515, 580, 591 Mission des Nations Unies pour l’Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), 509 Secrétariat général, 163 Haut Commissaire pour les Réfugiés (HCR), 85, 86, 87, 88 Principes directeurs relatifs à l’environnement (1996), 87
742
Index analytique
Organisation des Nations Unies pour l’Education, la Science et la Culture (UNESCO), 85, 96, 171, 262, 547 Consultations régionales sur la protection des expressions folkloriques, 262 Liste du patrimoine mondial, 86 Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (PNUD), 171 Programme des Nations Unies pour l’Environnement (PNUE), 205 Objectifs et principes de l’évaluation de l’impact sur l’environnement, 205 Organisation internationale de la Francophonie, 596, 598, 602 Déclaration de Bamako, 602 Déclaration de Luxembourg, 602 Déclaration et Plan d’action de Moncton, 602 Plan d’action de Cotonou, 602 Organisation internationale du Travail, 329, 335, 356 Constitution Article 10, 384, 385 Article 19, 393 Comité spécial du travail forcé, 387 Commission d’investigation et de conciliation en matière de liberté syndicale, 381, 384 Commission des questions juridiques et des normes internationales du travail, 402 Convention 21 (Inspection des émigrants), 367 Convention 29 (Travail forcé), 371, 387 Convention 57, 399 Convention 87 (Liberté syndicale), 371, 383 Convention 98, 383 Convention 97, 335 Convention 100 (Egalité de rémunération), 371 Convention 105 (Abolition du Travail forcé), 371, 387, 394
Convention 111 (Discrimination), 335, 371 Convention 138 (Age minimum de travail), 371 Convention 143, 335 Convention 169 (peuples indigènes et tribaux, 1989), 91, 92, 93, 99, 104, 335 Article 1, 93 Article 13, 91 Convention 182 (Pires formes du travail des enfants), 371 Mécanisme de plaintes / contrôle, 375, 390, 391, 392, 402 Principes de Philadelphie, 380, 389 Principes généraux, 375 Organisation mondiale du commerce, 175, 199, 202, 248, 259, 328 Traité de Marrakech (1994), 199, 202, 210, 211 Accord sur les aspects du commerce lies à la propriété intellectuelle (1994), 248, 259 Accord sur l’application de mesures phytosanitaires et sanitaires (SPS), 211, 219, 220, 222 Article 5, 219 Accord sur les barrières techniques au commerce (TBT), 211, 215, 219, 221, 222 Article 2, 221 Jurisprudence Asbestos (2001), 215, 217, 221, 222 Gasoline (1996), 212, 213, 214, 217, 218, 221 Hormones, 219, 220 Section 337, 214 Shrimps-Turtles, 199, 201, 214, 216, 217, 218 Organe d’appel, 201, 212, 214, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222 Panel, 201, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222 Règlement des différends, 199, 201, 211, 213, 215, 219, 222, 248 Organisation mondiale de la propriété intellectuelle (OMPI), 225, 227,
Index analytique 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 249, 253, 255, 256, 257, 262, 263 Comité intergouvernemental, 262, 263 Comité permanent sur les droits d’auteur et les droits connexes, 230, 231, 256 Consultations régionales sur la protection des expressions folkloriques, 262 Liste du patrimoine mondial en danger, 86 Modèle de dispositions législatives nationales sur la protection des expressions folkloriques contre l’exploitation illicite et d’autres actions préjudiciables (1982), 262 Traité relatif aux droits d’auteurs (WCT) (1996), 227, 249, 253, 254, 255, 261 Article 2, 254 Traités Internet (WCT et WPPT), 253 Organisation mondiale de la santé, 171 Organisation pour l’alimentation et l’agriculture, 171 Ouganda, 85 Ouguergouz (F.), 5 P Pacifique (Etats du), 207 Pactes de 1966 (Pacte international des droits civils et politiques, et Pacte international des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels), 186, 597 Pacte international des droits civils et politiques (1966), 73, 77, 97, 335, 343, 510, 519 Article 6, 77 Article 12, 335, 343 Article 13, 335 Article 14, 519 Article 27, 77, 97, 98
743
Pacte international des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels (1966), 78, 79, 182 Article 11, 78 Paix universelle, 366 Paix et sécurité, 39, 40, 42, 55, 60 Imposition de la paix, 283 Maintien de la paix, 283 Pakistan, 68, 82, 109, 144, 171, 174 Palestine, 117 Accord d’Erez entre l’Organisation de Libération de la Palestine et Israël sur la Cisjordanie (1995), 305 Accord du Caire entre Israël et l’Organisation de Libération de la Palestine (1997), 307 Autorité palestinienne, 297, 305, 306, 313, 314 Bande de Gaza, 278, 292, 293, 305 Cisjordanie, 278, 292, 293, 305 Colonies juives, 305, 306, 314, 319, 321 Déclaration de Principes (1993), 307 Jéricho, 305 Organisation pour la Libération de la Palestine (OLP), 305, 306, 307, 314, 319, 320 Voir aussi : Israël et Opération de police Panafricanistes, 56 Pape, Grégoire VII, 436 Papauté, Doctrine du pouvoir de destitution envers les rois, 437 Patel (B.N.), 606, 607 Patrimoine commun de l’humanité (concept / principe), 70, 95 Pays Bas, 109, 127, 128, 130, 144, 173, 227, 454, 457, 459 Maastricht, 409, 424, 427 Peine de mort, 477, 525, 581 Perse, 442 Personnes morales (Responsabilité pénale des), 412 Philippines, 49, 453, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487 Pillage, 412, 413 Piratage, 234, 235, 236, 248, 413
744
Index analytique
Piratage sur Internet, 235 Piratage d’œuvres musicales, 234 Pol Pot, 304 Pollution, 187, 189, 204 Voir aussi : Environnement Pologne, 298 Portugal, 303 Positivisme, 441, 442, 443 Pouvoirs implicites (théorie des), 379 Précaution (principe) Voir : Environnement Présomption d’innocence, 513, 515, 516 Prix Nobel Voir : Sen (A) Procédure pénale internationale Concours ou Cumul (d’infractions, de qualifications, de condamnations), 538, 575-579 Contradictoire (principe), 517, 520 Délai raisonnable, 513, 524 Voir aussi : Procès équitable Divulgation, 522, 523 Double qualification, 572 Injonctions Voir : Subpoena Peine Principe de l’individualisation, 580 Principe de proportionnalité, 580 Plaidoyer de culpabilité, 497, 516, 575, 581, 586 Prior est tempore, prior est jure, 23 Procès équitable, 500, 510-526 Egalité des armes, 513, 517, 520 Inégalité matérielle des armes, 517, 519, 520 Proportionnalité (principe), 219 Propriété intellectuelle, 225-265 Crimes contre la propriété intellectuelle, 235 Droit de reproduction, 251, 265 Intellectual Property Alliance, 228 Protection diplomatique, 466, 467, 470 Q Quigley (J.), 306, 307
R Race Voir : Déclaration sur la race et les préjugés raciaux Rationaliste, 440 Réfugié, 85, 86, 87, 88, 104, 108, 326, 327, 328, 335, 339, 343, 417, 423 Règlement de La Haye Voir : Droit international humanitaire Convention des Nations Unies relative au statut des réfugiés (1951), et Protocole additionnel (1967), 85, 335 Régime Régimes juridiques, 69 Régionalisme, 60 Règlement pacifique des différends, 8, 9, 39, 45, 166, 167, 178 Relations amicales entre les Etats (principe) Voir : Etat Réparation, 21, 23, 44, 55, 417, 468, 476 Non-répétition, 468, 476, 477, 478 Restitutio in integrum, 476 République Centrafricaine Voir : Centrafrique Responsabilité Responsabilité internationale, 22 Ressources naturelles Exploitation des ressources naturelles, 124, 152 Révision, 453, 455, 459, 477, 478, 525, 526, 542 Rhodes (C.), 53 Rio (Conférence de) Voir : Environnement Roberts (A.), 279, 300 Royaume-Uni, 227, 258, 259, 365 Commission des droits de la propriété intellectuelle, 258, 259, 260, 262 Russie, 454
Index analytique Rwanda, 9, 85, 86, 233, 410, 415, 416, 417, 597, 602 Armée patriotique rwandaise, 494 Bisesero, 570 Butare, 505, 573, 584 Forces Armées Rwandaises, 559, 570, 571, 572 Front Patriotique Rwandais, 493, 494, 495, 503, 559, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 590 Gacaca, 416 Gisovu, 535, 570, 585 Interahamwe, 535, 570, 587 Kibuye, 497, 558, 559, 570, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588 Mubuga (Eglise de), 570 S Sahara occidental, 278, 300 Salamanque, 437, 439, 441 Salisbury (J. de), 436 Salva reverantia, 49 Sao Tome and Principe, 31 Sarbib (J.-L.), 237 Savoir traditionnel, 245, 247, 261, 262, 263 Schengen, 327 Sécurité juridique, 555, 557 Sen (A.), Prix Nobel, 245 Sentence arbitrale Voir : Jurisprudence Seychelles, 240 Shaka, 53 Siam, 442 Sierra Leone, 9, 304, 311, 415, 416, 417, 454, 528, 554, 556, 558 Accord entre l’ECOMOG et l’AFRC (rebelles) (Conakry, 23 octobre 1997), 304 Tribunal pénal spécial, 528, 554, 556, 558 Sinaï Voir : Israël Singapour, 230 Sinjela (M.), 5 Skurbaty (Z.), 34
745
Slovaquie, 109, 115, 120, 139, 141, 173, 199, 201, 207 Smith (H.), 151 Société des Nations, 19, 51, 366, 367, 368, 378, 387, 443, 444 Pacte, 606 Article 11, 443 Société française pour le droit international, 445 Solidarité (principe), 72 Somalie, 9, 53, 55, 100 Soudan, 240 Souveraineté, 294, 305, 326, 327, 331, 332, 347 Intégrité territoriale absolue (théorie) Prétention de souveraineté, 485 Revendication de souveraineté, 483, 485, 487 Stockholm, 188, 189, 190, 192, 196, 197 Voir aussi : Environnement Suarez (F.), 328, 437, 440 Subpoena, 509 Sublime Porte, 442 Suède, 506, 582 Suisse, 502, 506, 585 Sulu (sultan de), 483 Syrie, 109, 113, 117, 170, 171 T Taïwan, 49 Tanzanie, 501, 503, 504, 505, 589 Tavernier (P.), 595, 597 Tchad, 233, 240, 323, 331, 340, 349, 350, 351, 361 Constitution, 340 Tchécoslovaquie, 119, 139, 140, 141, 165, 173, 277 Témoins, 415, 422, 503, 504, 510, 512, 513, 516, 523 Territoire occupé, 267-321 Voir aussi : Palestine Territorium nullius, 51 Thaïlande, 132 Thomas (A.), 366 Thucydides, 46
746
Index analytique
Timor oriental ou Timor-Est, 278, 300, 303 Togo, 53 Travail Voir : Droit international du travail Traité de Paix, 365 Traité de Paris (1856), 442 Traité de Versailles, 365, 366, 376, 387 Traité (traités) Voir aussi : Convention Traitement national (clause), 211 Transferts forcés Voir : Droit international humanitaire Travail Code international du Travail, 369, 376 Négociation collective, 383, 387, 399 Principe relatif au travail, 387, 388 Travail forcé, 370, 371, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 394, 399 Travaux préparatoires, 285, 474 Tribunal du droit de la mer, 175 Tribunal pénal international pour l’exYougoslavie, 276, 286, 313, 410, 411, 412, 447, 494, 496, 499, 500, 503, 508, 509, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 524, 525, 528, 530, 532, 535, 536, 537, 540, 545, 548, 550, 554, 557, 559, 560, 561, 563, 564, 565, 567, 569, 571, 575, 576, 578, 579, 580 Statut Article 3, 578 Article 5, 578 Jurisprudence Blaskic, 509, 536, 537 Celebici, 528, 535, 537, 564, 569, 577, 578, 579 Delalic, 286, 287 Furundzija, 515, 557 Tadic (1999), 276, 286, 287, 512, 514, 517, 552, 559, 560, 563, 564, 565, 567, 569
Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda, 410, 411, 412, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 493-591 Statut Article 4, 561 Article 6, 531 Article 7 bis, 509 Article 11, 514 Article 11 bis, 505, 507, 508 Article 12, 514 Article 66, 522 Article 67, 522 Amicus curiae, 505, 508, 509, 573 Défense (Commission d’office), 517 Greffier, 497, 499, 518, 590, 591 Adede (A.O.), 497 Juges Khan, 497, 577 Impartialité, 513, 514, 515 Indépendance, 513, 514 Procureur Goldstone (R.), 496, 528 Légalité de la création du Tribunal, 514 Règlement de procédure et de preuve, , 497, 498, 500, 502, 505, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 515, 516, 517, 520, 522, 523, 525, 548, 558, 590, 597 Stratégie de fin de mandat, 508 Jurisprudence Akayesu, 497-498, 508-509, 514515, 518-519, 523, 529-534, 540, 542-547, 549, 551-557, 560-565, 567-569, 571, 573576, 581 Bagilishema, 498, 507, 520, 521, 529, 532, 533, 535, 536, 537, 540, 543, 548, 554, 556, 557, 561, 575 Bagosora, 497, 505, 509 Barayagwiza, 519, 524, 525, 526 Kambanda, 498, 516, 518, 529, 540, 553, 575, 576, 581 Kanyabashi, 514
Index analytique Kayishema, 498, 511, 514, 515, 516, 520, 521, 529, 534, 538, 540, 543, 544, 548, 554, 556, 557, 558, 559, 561, 564, 566, 568, 569, 570, 572, 574, 576, 586 Musema, 498, 502, 509, 520, 523, 529, 531, 532, 533, 535, 537, 540, 543, 544, 548, 549, 551, 552, 554, 556, 557, 561, 564, 567, 569, 570, 574, 575, 576, 579 Ntakirutimana, 502, 588 Ntuyahaga, 497, 505, 507, 590 Ruggiu, 498, 551 Rusatira, 522 Rutaganda, 498, 523, 529, 540, 542, 543, 544, 554, 556, 557, 561, 564, 567, 568, 570, 572, 574, 576 Ruzindana, 498, 511, 514, 515, 516, 520, 529, 534, 538, 540, 543, 544, 548, 554, 556, 557, 558, 559, 561, 564, 566, 568, 569, 570, 572, 574, 576, 585 Tribunal Militaire International, 278, 280, 511, 528, 530, 536, 537, 555, 559, 562, 565 Turquie, 109, 113, 117, 171, 303, 442 U Umozurike (U.O.), 51 Unanimité, 463, 491 Union, 250, 251, 252, 259 Union Africaine, 15, 41, 44, 45, 50, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 414, 421, 363, 504, 598 Acte constitutif, 414, 421 Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques (URSS), 303 Union Douanière et Economique de l’Afrique Centrale (UDEAC), 27, 339, 344, 345, 349 Union européenne, 227, 260, 261, 598, 601
747
Charte des droits fondamentaux (2000), 72, 81 Article 37, 81 Chapitre IV, 72 Charte européenne relative à l’environnement et à la santé (1989), 81 Article 11, 81 Union internationale des télécommunications (UIT), 238, 239, 240 Telecom Africa, 238, 239 Telecom Africa Conference, 238 Urgence, 463, 492 Uruguay, 131, 133 Négociations d’Uruguay, 248 Voir aussi : GATT et Organisation mondiale du commerce Uti possidetis (principe), 13, 16, 23, 33, 35, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60 V Vasquez (G.), 437 Vattel (E. de), 440 Venezuela, 454 Vietnam, 49, 132, 304 Viljoen (F.), 599, 601 Viol Voir : Crimes Violations de l’article 3 commun Voir : Crimes Violations graves Voir : Crimes Visscher (Ch. de), 446, 448 Vitoria (F. de), 328, 363, 437, 440 Voies de recours, 355, 358 Voies de recours internes, 469 Volontarisme, 438 Volontarisme théologique, 438 Volontaristes, 437 Volonté générale, 440
748
Index analytique
W Weil (P.), 448 Westphalie, 440, 442 Wolfensohn (J.), 246 Wolff (C.), 440 Y Yasseen, 445 Yougoslavie, 455, 456, 457, 458, 488, 492 Voir aussi : Tribunal pénal international pour l’exYougoslavie Z Zaïre, 233, 244, 245 Zambie, 3, 4, 6, 53, 501, 584, 585, 587 Zimbabwe, 53, 54, 230, 244
VOLUMES INDEX 1 (1993) to 10 (2002) VOLUME 1 (1993) Foreword Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
xi
NAMIBIA: THE INDEPENDENCE PROCESS NAMIBIE: LE PROCESSUS D’INDEPENDANCE Namibia and International Law: An overview Georges Abi-Saab
3
The role of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in the independence process of Namibia Mpazi Sinjela
13
Namibia: The supervision and control of the electoral process by UNTAG Godwin Jituboh
35
Political amnesty and repatriation of refugees in Namibia Herman Ntchatcho
61
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX Towards new approaches to treaty-making in the field of environment Andronico O. Adede
81
Réflexions sur la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, dix ans après son ouverture à la signature: la question du régime d’exploitation des fonds marins Férid Belhaj
123
L’Afrique et le droit international de la mer Michel-Cyr Djiena Wembou
147
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community: An introductory essay Jeggan Senghor
183
750
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
The Bamako Convention on Hazardous Waste: A new step in the development of the African international environmental law Fatsah Ouguergouz
195
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE M.-C. Djiena Wembou, L’ONU et le développement du droit international M.C. Borloyannis
217
The International Law of Human Rights in Africa: Basic documents and annotated bibliography, compiled by M. Hamelengwa and others Fatsah Ouguergouz
221
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU: Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of Transboundary Movement and Management of hazardous wastes within Africa OAU: African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child OAU: Declarations and Resolutions adopted by the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government African Association of International Law: Statutes
227 269 295
ANALYTICAL INDEX
331
311 327
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
751
VOLUME 2 (1994) NATION-BUILDING, INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICA Reflections on the Fragility of State Institutions in Africa Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
3
Internal Conflicts in Africa: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Action? Edward Kwakwa
9
United Nations Peacekeeping Role: The Angolan Experience Mpazi Sinjela
47
Le Mécanisme de l’OUA pour la Prévention, la Gestion et le Règlement des Conflits Michel-Cyr Djiena Wembou
71
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX The African Debt Problem: Legal and Institutional Dimensions F.X. Njenga International Law and Sustainable Development: The Convention on Biological Diversity Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
95
109
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES L’Union du Maghreb Arabe A. El-Kadiri
141
The Indirect Effects of UN Sanctions on Third States: The Role of Article 50 of the UN Charter Gian Luca Burci
157
La Contribution des Etats Africains à la Renaissance de la Cour Internationale de Justice Mutoy Mubiala
173
The UN and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey Mpazi Sinjela, Fatsah Ouguergouz & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
181
752
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE Fatsah Ouguergouz, La Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples Danilo Türk
293
Andronico O. Adede, International Environmental Law Digest Mauro Politi
297
ANALYTICAL INDEX
301
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
753
VOLUME 3 (1995) HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA DROITS DE L’HOMME ET DEVELOPPEMENT EN AFRIQUE Droits de l’homme et développement: éléments de réflexion Georges Abi-Saab
3
The United Nations and Democratization Boutros Boutros-Ghali
11
Governance, Development and Population Displacement in Africa: A Call for Action Edward Kwakwa
17
The Role of International Law in the Protection of Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution of 1995 Tiyanjana Maluwa
53
Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: The Case of Tanzania Chris Maina Peter
81
International Human Rights Law: Lessons for Treaty-making and Implementation Andronico O. Adede
99
Le CICR et le respect du droit de la personne humaine: illustration de cas en Afrique Z. Meriboute
119
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX Fishing in the High Seas: From the 1982 UNCLOS to the 1995 Agreement on Stradding Stocks J. A. de Yturriaga
151
The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses K. Idris & M. Sinjela
183
The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping Muna Ndulo
205
754
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
The Framework for Capital Movements within the ECOWAS K. Oteng Kufuor
239
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: An Appraisal E. Nwogugu
257
L’Opération des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda Mutoy Mubiala
277
The UN and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey Mpazi Sinjela
285
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective Muna Ndulo
435
V. Morris and M. P. Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: A Documentary History and Analysis Mpazi Sinjela
441
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU, Resolutions and Declarations of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments 1994 and 1995
379
ANALYTICAL INDEX
447
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
755
VOLUME 4 (1996) CIVIL CONFLICTS IN AFRICA (Part I) LES CONFLITS INTERNES EN AFRIQUE (Partie I) Cooperation between the U.N. and Regional / Sub-Regional Organizations in Internal Conflicts B. G. Ramcharan
3
The Rwanda Conflict: with the Failure of Peacekeeping, Is Peacemaking Still Possible? Ike Minta
19
Mozambique: A Successful Conflict Resolution? Mpazi Sinjela
37
Civil Strife and Humanitarian Intervention in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment Edward Kannyo
51
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX The International Court of Justice and Absent Third States Bola Ajibola
85
A propos de l’effectivité de la Cour internationale de Justice dans le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux Philippe Couvreur
103
La Cour permanente d’arbitrage: rôle et avenir d’une institution à l’aube de son centenaire Hans Jonkman & Laurence de Blocq van Scheltinga
135
Le cadre juridique de la protection de l’environnement au Burkina Faso Amidou Garane
153
The Need for the Harmonisation of Trade Laws in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Muna Ndulo
195
The Treaty of Pelindaba: An African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone E. I. Nwogugu
227
756
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES L’Afrique et l’Asie face à la Cour internationale de Justice Mohammed Bedjaoui
251
Etude du mandat du Rapporteur spécial pour le Rwanda Mutoy Mubiala
257
Conflict Prevention by the OAU: The Relevance of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities John Packer
279
The United Nations and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey (Angola - Burundi - Liberia - Rwanda - Somalia) Mpazi Sinjela
293
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU, Resolutions adopted by the thirty-second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government OUA, Résolutions adoptées par la trente-deuxième session ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement OAU, Declarations and Decisions adopted by the thirty-second Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government OUA, Déclarations et décisions adoptées par la trente-deuxième session ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba) Traité sur une zone exempte d’armes nucléaires en Afrique (Traité de Pelindaba) ANALYTICAL INDEX INDEX ANALYTIQUE
469 481
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
757
VOLUME 5 (1997) CIVIL CONFLICTS IN AFRICA (Part II) LES CONFLITS INTERNES EN AFRIQUE (Partie II) Le processus de rétablissement et de maintien de la paix en Angola Alioune Blondin Beye
3
State Collapse and Prospects for Political Reconstruction and Democratic Governance in Somalia Alexandros Yannis
23
Civil Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: The Issue of Nationality of the Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo Angèle N. Makombo
49
The Rwandan Conflict and the Genocide Convention: Implications for Tanzania Khoti Kamanga
63
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX Le forum prorogatum devant la Cour internationale de Justice: les ressources d’une institution ou la face cachée du consensualisme Mohammed Bedjaoui & Fatsah Ouguergouz
91
A propos de l’ordonnance du 15 mars 1996: la contribution de la Cour internationale de Justice au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique Jean-Pierre Cot
115
The 1996 Zambian Constitution and the Search for a Durable Democratic Constitutional Order in Africa Muna Ndulo
137
The Process of Democratization in South Africa and the Protection of Human Rights under the New South African Constitution Mpazi Sinjela
175
Constitutionnalisme et légalité internationale François Rigaux
191
Recourse to the Law in the Settlement of International Disputes: Western Sahara B. G. Ramcharan
205
758
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Its Role for the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes Thomas Mensah
227
The 49th Session of the United Nations International Law Commission James L. Kateka
243
East African Co-operation: An Analysis of Recent Developments Wilbert T.K. Kaahwa
255
Vers l’institution d’une Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples Mutoy Mubiala
261
The United Nations and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey (Angola - Burundi - Congo, formerly Zaïre - Liberia - Sierra Leone - Somalia) Mpazi Sinjela
273
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE Evelyn A. Ankumah, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights – Practice and Procedures Karin Arts
329
Marcelo G. Kohen, Possession contestée et souveraineté territoriale Philippe Weckel
335
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU, Declarations and Decisions adopted by the thirty-third session of Ordinary of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government OUA, Déclarations et décisions adoptées par la trente-troisième session ordinaire des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement The Sudan Peace Agreement The Somali Peace Agreement Rules of Procedures of the National Salvation Council and the Executive Committee Agreement for the Establishment of a Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation between the Republic of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Uganda Protocol on the Establishment of a Secretariat of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for Cooperation between the Republic of Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania and the Republic of Uganda ANALYTICAL INDEX INDEX ANALYTIQUE
373 388 395 400 405 411 427
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
759
VOLUME 6 (1998) REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA (Part I) L’INTEGRATION REGIONALE ECONOMIQUE EN AFRIQUE (Partie I) From PTA to COMESA: The Quest for Sub-Regional Economic Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa Michael Gondwe
3
L’UEMOA: une nouvelle approche de l’intégration économique régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest Luc Marius Ibriga
23
La CEMAC: à la recherche d’une nouvelle dynamique de l’intégration en Afrique centrale James Mouangue Kobila & Léopold Donfack Sokeng
65
Les cours de justice des communautés et des organisations d’intégration économique africaines Maurice Kamto
107
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX Legal Aspects of a Nuclear Weapons Convention James Crawford & Philippe Sands
153
African Participation in the International Court of Justice – A Statistical Appraisal (1946-1998) Shiv R. S. Bedi
181
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The Originality of the Legal Status of the International University for African Development Ahmed S. El-Kosheri
225
The 50th Session of the United Nations International Law Commission James L. Kateka
229
Report on the Activities of the International Court of Justice during 1997 Eric N. Ward
245
The TICAD Process: An Appraisal of TICAD II Njunga M. Mulikita
261
760
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
Le deuxième concours panafricain de procès fictif des droits de l’homme (Oujda, Maroc, 28 septembre - 2 octobre 1996 Khadidja Elmadmad
277
The Fourth All-African Human Rights Moot Court Competition (Maputo, Mozambique, 28 September - 3 October 1998) Norman Taku
283
The United Nations and Internal / International Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey (Angola - Central African Republic Democratic Republic of the Congo - Ethiopia and Eritrea Rwanda - Sierra Leone - Somalia) Mpazi Sinjela
289
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE Georges Abi-Saab, “Cours général de droit international public”, Recueil des Cours de l’Académie de Droit International de La Haye Jean-Pierre Issele
367
Laurence Boisson de Charzournes, Richard Desgagne et Cesare Romano, Protection internationale de l’environnement – Recueil d’instruments juridiques Pierre Klein
371
Olivier Corten, L’utilisation du “raisonnable” par le juge international Discours juridique, raisons et contradictions Marcelo Kohen
373
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU, Declaration and Decisions adopted by the Thirty-Fourth Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Ouagadougou, June 1998) OUA, Déclaration et décisions adoptées par la trente-quatrième session ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement OAU, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights OUA, Protocole relatif à la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples portant création d’une Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples Somalia: the Cairo Declaration ANALYTICAL INDEX INDEX ANALYTIQUE
385 401 419 429 439 447 457
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
761
VOLUME 7 (1999) REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA (Part II) L’INTEGRATION REGIONALE ECONOMIQUE EN AFRIQUE (Partie II) African Integration Schemes: A case Study of the SADC Muna Ndulo
3
Trade Liberalization Under ECOWAS E.K. Kessie
31
The Treaty For the Establishment of the New East African Community: An Overview Wilbert T.K. Kaahwa
61
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX The Role of International Law in the Colonization of Africa: A Review in Light of Recent Calls for Re-colonization D.C.J. Dakas
85
La protection constitutionnelle des minorités en Afrique Vincent Zakane
119
La clause des droits de l’homme dans un Accord de Coopération économique: étude contextuelle de l’article 5 de la Convention de Lomé P.C. Ulimubenshi
167
The Realisation of Human Rights Through Sub-regional Institutions F. Viljoen
185
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The 51st Session of the UN International Law Commission James L. Kateka
217
Constitutionalism, Culture and Tradition: African Experiences in the incorporation of Treaties into Domestic Law Andronico O. Adede
239
The Trial of the Lockerbie Suspects in the Netherlands C. Morgan
255
762
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
Le Mécanisme de Règlement des différends dans le cadre de l’Organisation pour l’Interdiction des Armes Chimiques S. Pounjine
265
The United Nations and Internal / International Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey Mpazi Sinjela
283
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU, Declarations and Decisions adopted by the thirty-fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Algiers, July 1999), OUA, Déclarations et décisions adoptées par la trente-cinquième session ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement (Alger, Juillet 1999) OAU, Sirte Declaration adopted at the Fourth Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Sirte, Libya, September 1999) OUA, Déclaration de Syrte adoptée par la quatrième session extraordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement, Syrte, Libye, Septembre 1999) Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, signed in Arusha (Tanzania, 30 November 1999)
375 393 411 415
Traité instituant la Communauté de l’Afrique Orientale, signé à Arusha (Tanzanie, 30 novembre 1999) ANALYTICAL INDEX INDEX ANALYTIQUE
511 537
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
763
VOLUME 8 (2000) Foreword by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata
ix
REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS IN AFRICA LES REFUGIES ET LES PERSONNES DEPLACEES EN AFRIQUE Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention George Okoth-Obbo
3
The Admission and Expulsion of Refugees with Special Reference to Africa Georges Abi-Saab
71
Africa’s Refugees: Patterns, Problems and Policy Challenges Jeff Crisp
93
The African Refugee Crisis: Contemporary Challenges to the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa Robin Ramcharan
119
African Refugees in Europe: The Rights to Seek Asylum and the Authority of International Refugee Law: The Case of the United Kingdom Monica Feria Tinta
161
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX La compétence universelle des Etats dans le droit international contemporain Vincent Zakane
183
Les dispositions relatives aux conventions internationales dans les nouvelles constitutions des Etats d’Afrique francophone Narcisse Mouelle Kombi
223
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: a Critical Review Michelo Hansungule The African Contribution towards the Establishment of an International Criminal Court Sivuyile (Sivu) Maqungo Combating the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa through Proper Implementation of Treaty-law on Trade Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Andronico O. Adede
265 333
351
764
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 1999 Ludivine Tamiotti
381
The United Nations and Internal / International Conflicts in Africa: A brief Survey Mpazi Sinjela
419
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU, Decisions adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and Fourth Ordinary Session of the AEC (Lomé, July 2000) OUA, Décisions adoptées par la Trente-sixième Session Ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement et de la Communauté Economique pour l’Afrique (Lomé, Juillet 2000) OAU, Constitutive Act of the African Union (Lomé, July 2000) OUA, Acte Constitutif de l’Union Africaine (Lomé, Juillet 2000)
462 479 503
ANALYTICAL INDEX INDEX ANALYTIQUE
525 534
445
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
765
VOLUME 9 (2001) Special Theme: THE AFRICAN UNION Thème Spécial : L’UNION AFRICAINE Reimagining African Unity: Preliminary Reflections On the Constitutive Act of The African Union Tiyanjana Maluwa
3
Les fondements de l’Union Africaine Suleyman Bula-Bula
39
Cooperation versus Dissonance: the UN Security Council and the Evolving African Union (UA)? Njunga-Michael Mulikita
75
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX La sécurité juridique en droit international : aspects théoriques Robert Kolb
103
Les préoccupations environnementales dans les expériences d’intégration économique régionale en Afrique: la nécessité d’une politique communautaire Amidou Garane
143
WTO Doha Ministerial African Perspectives Tshimanga Kongolo
185
Declaration
and
Intellectual
Property:
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES The 53rd Session of the UN International Law Commission James Kateka
215
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 2000 Ludivine Tamiotti
267
Note commentée de l’affaire de la délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (fond) : Arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 16 mars 2001 Robert Kolb
301
766
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
Note sur la sentence arbitrale du 17 décembre 1999 relative à la délimitation des frontières maritimes entre l’Érythrée et le Yémen Djacoba Liva Tehindrazanarivelo
365
The United Nations and Internal/International Conflicts in Africa Mpazi Sinjela
391
BOOK REVIEWS / NOTES DE LECTURE Constitutional Comparison – Japan, Germany, Canada & South Africa as Constitutional States (François Venter), reviewed by Robert Dufresne
437
International Law in Post-Colonial Africa (Tiyanjana Maluwa), reviewed by James J. Busuttil
443
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU: Declarations and Decisions adopted by the Thirty-Seventh Assembly of Heads of State and Government OUA: Déclarations et décisions adoptées par la trente-septième session ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’État et de Gouvernement Eritrea – Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding Delimitation of the Border between the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 13 April 2002
451 473 497
ANALYTICAL INDEX
691
INDEX ANALYTIQUE
711
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
767
VOLUME 10 (2002) EDITORIAL Looking Forward: The Tenth Anniversary of the Yearbook Abdulqawi A. Yusuf
3
GENERAL ARTICLES / ARTICLES GÉNÉRAUX The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute Between Cameroon and Nigeria Nsongurua J. Udombana
13
The Interplay Between Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights in International Law Federico Lenzerini
63
Diversion of International Watercourse Under International Law Mohamed S. Amr
109
The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment: Patterns & Instruments to Achieve Sustainable Development Massimiliano Montini
181
The Protection of Copyrights & Related Rights in Africa: Challenges in the Internet Age Mpazi Sinjela & Robin Ramcharan
225
Etude sur l’occupation et sur l’Article 47 de la IVème Convention de Genève du 12 août 1949 relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre : le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé Robert Kolb
267
La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée Léopold Donfack Sokeng
323
La Déclaration de l’Organisation Internationale du Travail sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail : une technique juridique singulière de relance des conventions fondamentales Mouloud Boumghar
365
NOTES AND COMMENTS / NOTES ET COMMENTAIRES Universal Jurisdiction: An African Perspective Edward Kwakwa
407
768
Volumes Index (1993-2002) / Index des Volumes (1993-2002)
La Communauté Internationale Robert Kolb
431
Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 2001 Ludivine Tamiotti
453
Chronique de la jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (1995-2002) Roland Adjovi et Florent Mazeron
493
BOOK REVIEW / NOTES DE LECTURE Recueil juridique des droits de l’homme en Afrique, sous la direction de Paul Tavernier et de Christof Heyns recensé par Mouloud Boumghar
595
The World Court Reference Guide – Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders of the Permanent Court of International Justice (1992-2000), compiled by Bimal N. Patel reviewed by Fatsah Ouguergouz
605
BASIC DOCUMENTS / DOCUMENTS OAU: Declarations and Decisions Adopted by the Thirty-Eighth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government AU: Declarations and Decisions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of Assembly of Heads of State and Government Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union The Statute of the African Foundation for International Law
663 695
ANALYTICAL INDEX INDEX ANALYTIQUE
701 723
INDEX OF VOLUMES 1 (1993) TO 10 (2002) AUTHORS INDEX FOR VOLUMES 1 (1993) TO 10 (2002)
749 769
611 645
AUTHORS INDEX Volume 1 (1993) to 10 (2002) A Abi-Saab G., Droits de l’homme et développement: éléments de réflexion, AYIL 3 (1995), 3-10. Abi-Saab G., Namibia and International Law: An overview, AYIL 1 (1993), 3-12. Abi-Saab G., The Admission and Expulsion of Refugees with Special Reference to Africa, AYIL 8 (2000), 71-92. Adede A.O., Combating the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Africa through Proper Implementation of Treaty-law on Trade Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, AYIL 8 (2000), 351-380. Adede A.O., Constitutionalism, Culture and Tradition: African Experiences in the incorporation of Treaties into Domestic Law, AYIL 7 (1999), 239-254. Adede A.O., International Human Rights Law: Lessons for Treaty-making and Implementation, AYIL 3 (1995), 99-118. Adede A.O., Towards new approaches to treaty-making in the field of environment, AYIL 1 (1993), 81-122. Adjovi R. & Mazeron F., Chronique de la jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (1995-2002), AYIL 10 (2002), 493-592. Ajibola B., The International Court of Justice and Absent Third States, AYIL 4 (1996), 85-102. Amr M.S., Diversion of International Watercourse Under International Law, AYIL 10 (2002), 109-179. B Bedi S.R.S., African Participation in the International Court of Justice – A Statistical Appraisal (1946-1998), AYIL 6 (1998), 181-222. Bedjaoui M. & Ouguergouz F., Le forum prorogatum devant la Cour internationale de Justice: les ressources d’une institution ou la face cachée du consensualisme, AYIL 5 (1997), 91-114. Bedjaoui M., L’Afrique et l’Asie face à la Cour internationale de Justice, AYIL 4 (1996), 251-256. Belhaj F., Réflexions sur la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer, dix ans après son ouverture à la signature: la question du régime d’exploitation des fonds marins, AYIL 1 (1993), 123-146. Beye A.B., Le processus de rétablissement et de maintien de la paix en Angola, AYIL 5 (1997), 3-22. Blocq van Scheltinga L. & Jonkman H., La Cour permanente d’arbitrage: rôle et avenir d’une institution à l’aube de son centenaire, AYIL 4 (1996), 135-153. Boumghar M., La Déclaration de l’Organisation internationale du Travail sur les principes et droits fondamentaux au travail : une technique juridique singulière de relance des conventions fondamentales, AYIL 10 (2002), 365-404. Boutros-Ghali B., The United Nations and Democratization, AYIL 3 (1995), 11-16. Bula-Bula S., Les fondements de l’Union Africaine, AYIL 9 (2001), 39-74
770
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
Burci G.L., The Indirect Effects of UN Sanctions on Third States: The Role of Article 50 of the UN Charter, AYIL 2 (1994), 157-172. C Cot J.-P., A propos de l’ordonnance du 15 mars 1996: la contribution de la Cour internationale de Justice au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique, AYIL 5 (1997), 115-136. Couvreur Ph., A propos de l’effectivité de la Cour internationale de Justice dans le règlement pacifique des différends internationaux, AYIL 4 (1996), 103-134. Crawford J. & Sands Ph., Legal Aspects of a Nuclear Weapons Convention, AYIL 6 (1998), 153-179. Crisp J., Africa’s Refugees: Patterns, Problems and Policy Challenges, AYIL 8 (2000), 93-118. D Dakas D.C.J., The Role of International Law in the Colonization of Africa: A Review in Light of Recent Calls for Re-colonization, AYIL 7 (1999), 85-118. Djiena Wembou M.-C., L’Afrique et le droit international de la mer, AYIL 1 (1993), 147-182. Djiena Wembou M.-C., Le Mécanisme de l’OUA pour la Prévention, la Gestion et le Règlement des Conflits, AYIL 2 (1994), 71-94. E El-Kadiri A., L’Union du Maghreb Arabe, AYIL 2 (1994), 141-156. El-Kosheri A., The Originality of the Legal Status of the International University for African Development, AYIL 6 (1998), 225-228. Elmadmad Kh., Le deuxième concours panafricain de procès fictif des droits de l’homme (Oujda, Maroc, 28 septembre - 2 octobre 1996, AYIL 6 (1998), 277-282. G Garane A., Le cadre juridique de la protection de l’environnement au Burkina Faso, AYIL 4 (1996), 153-194. Garane A., Les préoccupations environnementales dans les expériences d’intégration économique régionale en Afrique: la nécessité d’une politique communautaire, AYIL 9 (2001), 143-184. Gondwe M., From PTA to COMESA: The Quest for Sub-Regional Economic Integration in Eastern and Southern Africa, AYIL 6 (1998), 3-22. H Hansungule M., The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: a Critical Review, AYIL 8 (2000), 265-332.
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
771
I Ibriga L.M., L’UEMOA: une nouvelle approche de l’intégration économique régionale en Afrique de l’Ouest, AYIL 6 (1998), 23-64. Idris K. & Sinjela M., The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, AYIL 3 (1995), 183-204. J Jituboh G., Namibia: The supervision and control of the electoral process by UNTAG, AYIL 1 (1993), 35-60. Jonkman H. & Blocq van Scheltinga L., La Cour permanente d’arbitrage: rôle et avenir d’une institution à l’aube de son centenaire, AYIL 4 (1996), 135-153. K Kaahwa W.T., The Treaty For the Establishment of the New East African Community: An Overview, AYIL 7 (1999), 61-84. Kaahwa W.T.K., East African Co-operation: An Analysis of Recent Developments, AYIL 5 (1997), 255-260. Kamanga Kh., The Rwandan Conflict and the Genocide Convention: Implications for Tanzania, AYIL 5 (1997), 63-88. Kamto M., Les cours de justice des communautés et des organisations d’intégration économique africaines, AYIL 6 (1998), 107-150. Kannyo E., Civil Strife and Humanitarian Intervention in Africa: A Preliminary Assessment, AYIL 4 (1996), 51-82. Kateka J.L., The 49th Session of the United Nations International Law Commission, AYIL 5 (1997), 243-254. Kateka J.L., The 50th Session of the United Nations International Law Commission, AYIL 6 (1998), 229-244. Kateka J.L., The 51st Session of the UN International Law Commission, AYIL 7 (1999), 217-238. Kateka J.L., The 53rd Session of the UN International Law Commission, AYIL 9 (2001), 215-266. Kessie E.K., Trade Liberalization Under ECOWAS, AYIL 7 (1999), 31-60. Kobila J.M. & Sokeng L.D., La CEMAC: à la recherche d’une nouvelle dynamique de l’intégration en Afrique centrale, AYIL 6 (1998), 65-105. Kolb R., Etude sur l’occupation et sur l’Article 47 de la IVème Convention de Genève du 12 août 1949 relative à la protection des personnes civiles en temps de guerre : le degré d’intangibilité des droits en territoire occupé, AYIL 10 (2002), 267-321. Kolb R., La Communauté internationale, AYIL 10 (2002), 431-451. Kolb R., La sécurité juridique en droit international : aspects théoriques, AYIL 9 (2001), 103-142. Kolb R., Note commentée de l’affaire de la délimitation maritime et des questions territoriales entre Qatar et Bahreïn (fond) : Arrêt de la Cour internationale de Justice du 16 mars 2001, AYIL 9 (2001), 301-363.
772
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
Kombi N.M., Les dispositions relatives aux conventions internationales dans les nouvelles constitutions des Etats d’Afrique francophone, AYIL 8 (2000), 223-264. Kongolo T., WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration and Intellectual Property: African Perspectives, AYIL 9 (2001), 185-211. Kwakwa E., Governance, Development and Population Displacement in Africa: A Call for Action, AYIL 3 (1995), 17-52. Kwakwa E., Internal Conflicts in Africa: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Action?, AYIL 2 (1994), 9-46. Kwakwa E., Universal Jurisdiction: An African Perspective, AYIL 10 (2002), 407-430. L Lenzerini F., The Interplay Between Environmental Protection and Human and Peoples’ Rights in International Law, AYIL 10 (2002), 63-108. M Maina Peter C., Enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms: The Case of Tanzania, AYIL 3 (1995), 81-98. Makombo A.N., Civil Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: The Issue of Nationality of the Banyarwanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo, AYIL 5 (1997), 49-62. Maluwa T., Reimagining African Unity: Preliminary Reflections On the Constitutive Act of The African Union, AYIL 9 (2001), 3-38. Maluwa T., The Role of International Law in the Protection of Human Rights under the Malawian Constitution of 1995, AYIL 3 (1995), 53-80. Maqungo S.(S.), The African Contribution towards the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, AYIL 8 (2000), 333-350. Mazeron F. & Adjovi R., Chronique de la jurisprudence du Tribunal pénal international pour le Rwanda (1995-2002), AYIL 10 (2002), 493-592. Mensah Th., The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea: Its Role for the Settlement of Law of the Sea Disputes, AYIL 5 (1997), 227-242. Meriboute Z., Le CICR et le respect du droit de la personne humaine: illustration de cas en Afrique, AYIL 3 (1995), 119-150. Minta I., The Rwanda Conflict: with the Failure of Peacekeeping, Is Peacemaking Still Possible?, AYIL 4 (1996), 19-36. Montini M., The Right to Development and the Protection of the Environment: Patterns & Instruments to Achieve Sustainable Development, AYIL 10 (2002), 181-223. Morgan C., The Trial of the Lockerbie Suspects in the Netherlands, AYIL 7 (1999), 255-264. Mubiala M., Etude du mandat du Rapporteur spécial pour le Rwanda, AYIL 4 (1996), 257-268. Mubiala M., L’Opération des Nations Unies pour les Droits de l’Homme au Rwanda, AYIL 3 (1995), 277-284.
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
773
Mubiala M., La Contribution des Etats Africains à la Renaissance de la Cour internationale de Justice, AYIL 2 (1994), 173-180. Mubiala M., Vers l’institution d’une Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, AYIL 5 (1997), 261-272. Mulikita N.M., Cooperation versus Dissonance: the UN Security Council and the Evolving African Union (UA)?, AYIL 9 (2001), 75-99. Mulikita N.M., The TICAD Process: An Appraisal of TICAD II, AYIL 6 (1998), 261-275. N Ndulo M., African Integration Schemes: A case Study of the SADC, AYIL 7 (1999), 3-30. Ndulo M., The 1996 Zambian Constitution and the Search for a Durable Democratic Constitutional Order in Africa, AYIL 5 (1997), 137-174. Ndulo M., The Need for the Harmonisation of Trade Laws in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), AYIL 4 (1996), 195-226. Ndulo M., The United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa: Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping, AYIL 3 (1995), 205-238. Njenga F.X., The African Debt Problem: Legal and Institutional Dimensions, AYIL 2 (1994), 95-108. Ntchatcho H., Political amnesty and repatriation of refugees in Namibia, AYIL 1 (1993), 61-80. Nwogugu E., The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference: An Appraisal , AYIL 3 (1995), 257-276. Nwogugu E.I., The Treaty of Pelindaba: An African Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, AYIL 4 (1996), 227-248. O Ogata S., Foreword by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, AYIL 8 (2000), ix-xi. Okoth-Obbo G., Thirty Years On: A Legal Review of the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention, AYIL 8 (2000), 3-70. Oteng Kufuor K., The Framework for Capital Movements within the ECOWAS, AYIL 3 (1995), 239-256. Ouguergouz F. & Bedjaoui M., Le forum prorogatum devant la Cour internationale de Justice: les ressources d’une institution ou la face cachée du consensualisme, AYIL 5 (1997), 91-114. Ouguergouz F., The Bamako Convention on Hazardous Waste: A new step in the development of the African international environmental law, AYIL 1 (1993), 195-216. Ouguergouz F., Yusuf A.A. & Sinjela M., The UN and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey, AYIL 2 (1994), 181-292.
774
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
P Packer J., Conflict Prevention by the OAU: The Relevance of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, AYIL 4 (1996), 279-292. Pounjine S., Le Mécanisme de Règlement des différends dans le cadre de l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des Armes Chimiques, AYIL 7 (1999), 265-282. R Ramcharan B.G., Cooperation between the U.N. and Regional / Sub-Regional Organizations in Internal Conflicts, AYIL 4 (1996), 3-18. Ramcharan B.G., Recourse to the Law in the Settlement of International Disputes: Western Sahara, AYIL 5 (1997), 205-224. Ramcharan R. & Sinjela M., The Protection of Copyrights & Related Rights in Africa: Challenges in the Internet Age, AYIL 10 (2002), 225-265. Ramcharan R., The African Refugee Crisis: Contemporary Challenges to the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in Africa, AYIL 8 (2000), 119-160. Rigaux F., Constitutionnalisme et légalité internationale, AYIL 5 (1997), 191-204. S Senghor J., The Treaty establishing the African Economic Community: An introductory essay, AYIL 1 (1993), 183-194. Sinjela M. & Idris K., The Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, AYIL 3 (1995), 183-204. Sinjela M. & Ramcharan R., The Protection of Copyrights & Related Rights in Africa: Challenges in the Internet Age, AYIL 10 (2002), 225-265. Sinjela M., Mozambique: A Successful Conflict Resolution?, AYIL 4 (1996), 37-50. Sinjela M., Ouguergouz F. & Yusuf A.A., The UN and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey, AYIL 2 (1994), 181-292. Sinjela M., The Process of Democratization in South Africa and the Protection of Human Rights under the New South African Constitution, AYIL 5 (1997), 175-190. Sinjela M., The role of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in the independence process of Namibia, AYIL 1 (1993), 13-34. Sinjela M., The UN and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey, AYIL 3 (1995), 285-378. Sinjela M., The United Nations and Internal / International Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey (Angola – Central African Republic – Democratic Republic of the Congo – Ethiopia and Eritrea – Rwanda – Sierra Leone – Somalia), AYIL 6 (1998), 289-363. Sinjela M., The United Nations and Internal / International Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey, AYIL 7 (1999), 283-374. Sinjela M., The United Nations and Internal / International Conflicts in Africa: A brief Survey, AYIL 8 (2000), 419-444.
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
775
Sinjela M., The United Nations and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey (Angola – Burundi – Liberia – Rwanda – Somalia), AYIL 4 (1996), 293362. Sinjela M., The United Nations and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey (Angola – Burundi – Congo, formerly Zaïre – Liberia – Sierra Leone – Somalia), AYIL 5 (1997), 273-326. Sinjela M., The United Nations and Internal/International Conflicts in Africa, AYIL 9 (2001), 391-433. Sinjela M., United Nations Peacekeeping Role: The Angolan Experience, AYIL 2 (1994), 47-70. Sokeng L.D. & Kobila J.M., La CEMAC: à la recherche d’une nouvelle dynamique de l’intégration en Afrique centrale, AYIL 6 (1998), 65-105. Sokeng L.D., La liberté d’aller et venir dans la sous-région du Golfe de Guinée, AYIL 10 (2002), 323-363. T Taku N., The Fourth All-African Human Rights Moot Court Competition (Maputo, Mozambique, 28 September – 3 October 1998), AYIL 6 (1998), 283-287. Tamiotti L., Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 1999, AYIL 8 (2000), 381-418. Tamiotti L., Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 2000, AYIL 9 (2001), 267-300. Tamiotti L., Chronique des activités de la Cour internationale de Justice en 2001, AYIL 10 (2002), 453-492. Tehindrazanarivelo D.L., Note sur la sentence arbitrale du 17 décembre 1999 relative à la délimitation des frontières maritimes entre l’Érythrée et le Yémen, AYIL 9 (2001), 365-390. Tinta M.F., African Refugees in Europe: The Rights to Seek Asylum and the Authority of International Refugee Law: The Case of the United Kingdom, AYIL 8 (2000), 161-182. U Udombana N.S., The Ghost of Berlin Still Haunts Africa! The ICJ Judgment on the Land and Maritime Boundary Dispute Between Cameroon and Nigeria, AYIL 10 (2002), 13-61. Ulimubenshi P.C., La clause des droits de l’homme dans un Accord de Coopération économique: étude contextuelle de l’article 5 de la Convention de Lomé, AYIL 7 (1999), 167-184. V Viljoen F., The Realisation of Human Rights Through Sub-regional Institutions, AYIL 7 (1999), 185-216.
776
Index of Authors (1993-2002) / Index des auteurs (1993-2002)
W Ward E.N., Report on the Activities of the International Court of Justice during 1997, AYIL 6 (1998), 245-259. Y Yannis A., State Collapse and Prospects for Political Reconstruction and Democratic Governance in Somalia, AYIL 5 (1997), 23-48. Yturriaga J.A. (de), Fishing in the High Seas: From the 1982 UNCLOS to the 1995 Agreement on Stradding Stocks, AYIL 3 (1995), 151-182. Yusuf A.A., & Ouguergouz F. & Sinjela M., The UN and Internal Conflicts in Africa: A Documentary Survey, AYIL 2 (1994), 181-292. Yusuf A.A., Foreword, AYIL 1 (1993), xi-xx. Yusuf A.A., International Law and Sustainable Development: The Convention on Biological Diversity, AYIL 2 (1994), 109-140. Yusuf A.A., Looking Forward: The Tenth Anniversary of the Yearbook, AYIL 10 (2002), 3-9. Yusuf A.A., Reflections on the Fragility of State Institutions in Africa, AYIL 2 (1994), 3-8. Z Zakane V., La compétence universelle des Etats dans le droit international contemporain, AYIL 8 (2000), 183-222. Zakane V., La protection constitutionnelle des minorités en Afrique, AYIL 7 (1999), 119-166.
