Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy during the Great Game

Christopher M. Wyatt holds a PhD in History from the University of Leeds, and has taught both at the University of Leeds and the University of Reading. He now works for the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC).

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INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY Series ISBN: 978 1 84885 227 3 See www.ibtauris.com/ILTCH for a full list of titles 29. Britain and the Weimar Republic: The History of a Cultural Relationship Colin Storer

35. Constructing a Post-War Order: The Rise of US Hegemony and the Origins of the Cold War Andrew Baker

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30. Cyprus in World War II: Politics and Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean Anastasia Yiangou

36. The Rise of Women’s International Activism: Identity and Sisterhood Between the World Wars Marie Sandell

978 1 84885 436 9

978 1 84885 671 4

31. Britain and Cyprus: Key Themes and Documents since WWII William Mallinson

37. An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann and Fiona Mullen (Eds)

978 1 84885 456 7

32. Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire: Diplomacy and Strategy during the Great Game Christopher M. Wyatt

978 1 84885 678 3

38. Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build Up to the Russian-Japanese War Nicholas Papastratigkis

978 1 84885 610 3

33. Non-Alignment and its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet Challenge Rinna Kullaa

978 1 84885 691 2

39. Chelmno and the Holocaust: A History of Hitler’s First Death Camp Patrick Montague

978 1 84885 624 0

34. Internationalism Reconfigured: Transnational Ideas and Movements Between the World Wars Daniel Laqua (Ed)

978 1 84885 722 3

40. Frantz Fanon: The Militant Philosopher of Third World Liberation Leo Zeilig

978 1 84885 469 7

978 1 84885 724 7

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AFGHANISTAN AND THE DEFENCE OF EMPIRE Diplomacy and Strategy during the Great Game

Christopher M. Wyatt

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Published in 2011 by I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd 6 Salem Road, London W2 4BU 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 www.ibtauris.com Distributed in the United States and Canada Exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan 175 Fifth Avenue, New York NY 10010 Copyright © 2011 Christopher M. Wyatt The right of Christopher M. Wyatt to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patent Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. International Library of Twentieth Century History 32 ISBN: 978 1 84885 610 3 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record for this book is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress catalog card: available Typeset by Newgen Publishers, Chennai Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham

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CONTENTS

List of Maps

vii

Preface and Acknowledgements

viii

Note on Spelling

x

Introduction

1

1

The Problem of Herat The Vulnerability of Herat and Afghan Turkestan Russian Attempts to Secure Direct Relations: 1903 The Northern Afghan Frontier and the Dobbs Mission to Herat

25 26 30 46

2 Events in Russian Central Asia and their Relevance to Afghanistan Russian Railways and Rumours of Military Preparations Planning for War in Afghanistan

61 61 73

3 British Strategic Considerations and the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1903–05 Forward Defence and the Tribes Reform and Reinforcements Railways and Logistics

86 87 91 101

4 The Dane Mission to Kabul and the Treaty of the Mole A Renewal of Engagements

114 114

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vi

5

Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire Negotiating the Treaty The Reaction to the Treaty

119 137

Morley’s Sub-Committee and Strategic Planning 1906–07 Military Planning to 1907 The Morley Sub-Committee

140 140 147

6 A Diplomatic Defence of India Plans, Overtures and the Search for an Agreement The Entente Secured The Reception of the Anglo–Russian Convention: The Amir, the Convention and the Response of Parliament The Jamshedi Crisis The Problems of Turkey, Jihad and the Niedermayer-Hentig Mission

178 178 182 187 193 196

Conclusion

208

Notes

222

Appendix 1 The Lyall Agreement of July 1880 Appendix 2 Selected Parts of the Memorandum communicated by the Russian Embassy 6 February 1900 Appendix 3 The Kabul Treaty 21 March 1905 Appendix 4 The Anglo–Japanese Alliance 30 January 1902 Appendix 5 The Anglo–Japanese Alliance 12 August 1905 Appendix 6 The Anglo–Russian Convention Concerning Afghanistan 31 August 1907 Appendix 7 Proposed Treaty between the Amir of Afghanistan and German Mission 24 January 1916

269

280

Dramatis Personae

283

Sources and Bibliography

295

Index

315

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271 272 273 275 278

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LIST OF MAPS

1 2 3 4

Russian expansion into Central Asia Strategic railways in South and Central Asia Defending against a Russian attack on the Kabul–Kandahar Line The North-West Frontier Province

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xi xii xiii xiv

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book started life as part of my doctoral research. Like many of its kind, it was written as a doctoral thesis to be read as a doctoral thesis by a very small number of people. Looking back at it, it seemed quite hard to follow for anyone not well versed in the diplomacy of the time, the military challenges being faced or the complications of the region at the turn of the twentieth century. With that in mind, I have endeavoured to make this book more accessible. The notes are the least changed aspect of the work and are there chiefly to provide sufficient detail for the reader to be able to follow up items of particular interest. As is the case with research like this, the advice of others is invaluable and I had an excellent supervisor in Professor Keith Wilson, now retired. Keith’s knowledge of the subject, enthusiasm for learning and thinking about what we know, are infectious qualities which have stood many doctoral students in good stead. I also received much advice and encouragement from others, notably Professor Edward Spiers, Professor F.R. Bridge, Dr Geoffrey Waddington and Professor John Gooch. A well-known aspect of this type of research is the amount of time spent in archives. In all the places I visited, I had the most outstanding help and support from the people I dealt with, who were always professional and, in many cases, had an encyclopaedic knowledge of the papers in their charge. I would like to thank the staff of the following: The Public Record Office (now the National Archive); The India Office Library and

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Preface and Acknowledgements

ix

Records (now in the British Library); The British Library; The National Army Museum Archive; The Bodleian Library; St Anthony’s College Oxford Archive; Birmingham University Library; The Brotherton Library; Duke University Library. Thanks are also due to: The Syndics of Cambridge University Library; The Trustees of the National Library of Scotland; The Master, Fellows and Scholars of Churchill College in the University of Cambridge, as well as the staff working in them. Putting a book together can seem a surprisingly complex business for the uninitiated. I would particularly like to thank Maria Marsh at I.B.Tauris for making the process so easy and for all her help and support. I would also like to thank Allison McKechnie for her help on the copy-editing and proofreading side and Mike Blissett for his work on the maps. Last, but not least, I would like to thank my parents for their encouragement and support. One of the things I have particularly enjoyed about working on the book is that it rather forcefully reminded me of why I was so interested in its subject in the first place. I hope the book will stimulate such interest in others, too, as that will be its greatest reward. CMW

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NOTE ON SPELLING

Many of the words used here originate from the region and have, as a result, been transliterated differently over the years. A hundred years ago, words like ‘Amir’ were often spelt as ‘Ameer’, or ‘Kabul’ as ‘Cabul’. Others had had several spellings, like ‘Kandahar’, rendered variously as ‘Candahar’, or ‘Qandahar’. Names of people, too, were transliterated differently, so ‘Habibullah’ was spelt as ‘Habibulla’ at the time. Religious terms were also conceived differently at the time. The spelling of ‘jihad’ as ‘jehad’ is but one example. However, at the time the events in this book took place, Muslims were referred to as ‘Mahommedans’ and the term used by Muslims to describe nonMuslims was ‘kafir’. Today, most would use the term ‘kufr’. Often the terms we use are a combination of transliterations of Arabic, Persian, Turkic and Urdu words. Where these words and names occur, I have kept them in the form most widely used in the literature. Purist linguists might balk at this, but it does make the material more accessible. Where cited, such names and words remain as per the documentation.

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Russian expansion into Central Asia Map 1 Wayat_Prelim.indd xi

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Map 2

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Strategic railways in South and Central Asia

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Map 3

Defending against a Russian attack on the Kabul–Kandahar Line

Map 4

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The North-West Frontier Province

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INTRODUCTION

The army was in full flight. All semblance of order was lost, soldiers no longer followed their officers and discipline had completely broken down. Exposed to withering fire from the heights, it was every man for himself as stocks of food and ammunition were fast exhausted. A futile last stand ended in a massacre and just one man made it through to tell the tale. It was a disaster which imprinted itself on the collective consciousness of a nation, even today. When most people think of foreign intervention in Afghanistan, the retreat of 1842 is what comes to mind. There were other disasters, too, such as the Battle of Maiwand in the Second Afghan War, the problems of an Afghan invasion in the Third Afghan War and the Russian retreat in 1989 and all these continue to inform opinion on the perils of involvement in the affairs of Afghanistan today. Yet it was not always this way and British relations with Afghanistan were on the whole cordial in the period between the Second and Third Afghan Wars, that is from 1880 to 1919. This book is about the Great Game in the period from 1903 to 1915, and the picture it presents of Afghanistan in the defence of Empire is different in many respects from other books on the Great Game. The men on the spot are diplomats, the only wars fought are over plans and maps in London and the defence of India lies not in its army but in a treaty. The book also reveals some new dimensions which have not been covered before, most notably concerning the interplay of British and Indian diplomacy with defence planning, such as the British diplomatic presence in Kabul in 1904 and the Jamshedi Crisis of 1908–09.

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The period under consideration is also rarely covered in depth in histories of Afghanistan. There were no wars involving Afghanistan and only one significant tribal uprising. Men on the spot were not, like others before them, martyrs to a Victorian Great Game. The period was also not as formative for Afghanistan as the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan from 1880 to 1901. His reign had brought modern Afghanistan into being and, in many ways, his ultimate success in doing so was demonstrated by the peaceful accession of his son, Habibullah, whose period of rule from 1901 to 1919 has been in the shadows as a result. The other main aspect of the period is that it was the time of Great Power diplomacy in Europe before the First World War. When Habibullah ascended the throne of Afghanistan, the assumption in Britain was that the next war between European Great Powers would be with Russia and France, rather than with Germany. At that time, British concerns were more about Egypt and India than about Belgium and underlined her conclusion of the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907. Russia had conquered Central Asia to the Oxus, or Amu Darya, River, which both formed the limit of their advance and became part of Afghanistan’s northern border. The British in India, too, had arrived at their border with Afghanistan, or the Durand Line, named after the man who demarcated it. Between them lay Afghanistan, seen by each as a bulwark against the other. The strength of Afghanistan lay in its rugged terrain and resilient people, a fact not lost on Habibullah as he sought to maximise the advantages and opportunities open to him, especially as the Russo–Japanese War rolled on in the Far East.

The Politics and Dynamics of Afghanistan Although contemporary sources had the benefit of seeing events at first hand, in the case of Afghanistan they had to do so for the most part from a distance. As a result, the complexities and nuances of the internal political structure were not fully appreciated by the Government of India and, in Kabul, the Amir was subject to a variety

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3

of influences and constraints that exerted themselves both inside the government and from without. The Afghan Government was composed of a core group in the Afghan court, which was constituted of five elements. The first of these was the inner circle and it was here that the policy decisions affecting Afghanistan were made. In Habibullah’s day it was dominated by the Amir, his brother Nasrullah, and the Amir’s sons Inayatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan. It was up to the individual members of this inner circle to implement the Amir’s decisions. In practice this process was almost unworkable during Habibullah’s reign, and much of the Amir’s policy became compromised or diluted by other influences at court. As well as the Amir’s immediate family, there were others in the circle who carried influence, such as Sardar Abdul Quddus Khan, chamberlain from 1901 to 1916. Under the Amir’s control there were three main offices: defence, finance and the prime ministership. Political appointments in the government were maintained within the family or held by people who were loyal, in order to keep the position of the Amir reasonably secure. Nasrullah was Prime Minister and Inayatullah was head of the Defence Department. Mirza Muhammad Hussain Khan ran the Finance Department. It was from the inner circle, then, that the business of government was managed. The other sections of government were groups designed to implement the instructions of the inner circle. The second part of the government was the Musabihan, which acted as a council to coordinate the directions from the inner circle with the regions. The third and fourth groups were made up of senior members of two families: the Tarzis and the Charkhis. The former clan was headed by Mahmud Tarzi. Mahmud and his family had been exiled by Abdur Rahman and settled in Syria. There he came into contact with the twin influences of Jamal-ud-Din al-Afghani and the Young Turk movement and on his return from the Ottoman Empire he had become a proponent of reform. Later, in 1911, he was to publish the reformist Siraj-al-Akhbar Afghania (The Lamp [or torch] of the News of Afghanistan) journal. He was also to become a major influence on Amanullah Khan, both before and after his accession. The Charkhi clan represented much

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire

of the military establishment in the country. The family was headed by Ghulam Hayder Charkhi, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Army under Abdur Rahman. His sons Ghulam Nabi and Ghulam Siddiq were generals of influence among the tribes, especially the Ghilzai.1 There was also much rivalry between the Charkhis and the Musabihan, which was come to a head later, in 1929. The final group was composed of the Sirdars and Walis who governed the countryside. Many of these governed important towns and cities, such as Sirdar Muhammad Akbar Khan at Khost and Sirdar Muhammad Usman Khan at Kandahar. They would cooperate with the generals commanding local garrisons in the Afghan military districts in putting down rebellions or defending these regions against attacks. There were six military districts: Kabul, Kandahar, Farah, Herat, Turkestan and Badakhshan. The influences on the Amir at court varied between two extremes. The first came from the conservative right, which was opposed to modern innovations and ‘favoured absolute monarchy and opposed the Amir’s pro-British policy and [later] his neutrality in the First World War’. This faction was led by Nasrullah and Abdul Quddus Khan. The other extreme came from the reformists. Mahmud Tarzi and Amanullah Khan favoured constitutional government and the spread of education and were instrumental in persuading Habibullah to establish the Habibia College. Their position at court was to be much strengthened by events elsewhere, such as the constitutional movements in Russia and Persia, as well as by the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Although members of rival factions held these positions, they did cooperate from time to time and Inayatullah seems to have been able to move among each camp relatively freely.2 The Amir ruled by decree and was the personification of the executive, the legislature and the judiciary combined. The law took the form of the Amir’s Code. There was no representative democracy as conceived in the West, although representation came from the ancient and respected jirga system, which was a gathering of the elders of each tribe where they would sit together to debate tribal questions, eventually coming to a decision which, in theory, satisfied all parties. When the need arose a loya jirga would be held at national level. This

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5

sometimes contained the seeds of trouble for relations with the Amir as the tribes cherished their independence, and often decisions made in jirga might contravene the authority of the Amir.3 For the Afghans, the Amir’s authority was quite far down the list as far as loyalties were concerned. Other aspects, such as tribe, Qawm or sub-tribe, clan, custom and religion were both more important and more immediate. Identity formation, then, was a complex and multilayered process. Tribal dynamics were themselves complex, too. This became evident to the British through the dealings of political officers and the campaigns in Afghanistan and on the North-West Frontier. Outwardfacing aspects, too, were defined by conflict, broken down by Leon B. Poullada into five types: (1) interpersonal conflict within tribes; (2) intratribal group conflict, i.e. rivalry between subunits of the same tribe; (3) intertribal conflict between tribes of the same ethnic, religious, and linguistic backgrounds; (4) intertribal conflict between tribes of different ethnic, linguistic, or religious backgrounds; (5) conflict between a tribe or tribes in general and the central government authority.4 For Pashtuns, their relationship with the outside world and each other was defined by the Pashtunwali, their tribal code, the key tenets of which are honour (nang), hospitality (melmastia), revenge (badal), and asylum (nanawati).5 Islam was and is the other key factor in Afghanistan and, throughout the country, it has been a key part of identity formation. As an important regional hub, Afghanistan has seen many traditions and the effect has been an Islam as complex as its tribal identities and codes and, to a degree, there has been a symbiosis between them. This process has given the role of Islam considerable power as a galvanising force in Afghanistan, especially as jihad is welded to badal and other honour concepts. In addition, influences such as the Barelvi Movement and the Madrassah at Deoband have lent additional cohesive force to something historically more diffuse.6

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All these factors meant that Habibullah’s position required an ability to balance the contending forces at play at court and in society in general. Men on the spot like Sir Louis Dane saw this at first hand while negotiating a treaty with the Amir in 1905 and the way Habibullah was obliged to make concessions to anti-foreign factions at court and in the country.7 The need to balance these tensions nationally was also important, especially given the paucity of the apparatus of state. The Amir had little or no control over events outside Kabul, let alone places like Herat, Afghan Turkestan, or Badakhshan. The frontier tribes also lay outside his control. He could not control the activities of some of his people. There was almost nothing he could do about illicit trade or corruption, unless the culprits were caught red-handed. In addition, no ruler could trust his own Sirdars not to intrigue against him. The army, too, was unreliable. Although the army was a major prop of the regime, not all elements of it were totally loyal to the Amir and there were fears that he could be toppled by a Russian-sponsored rival claimant for the throne. The greatest fear was always what Russia would do next.

Russian Forward Policy in Central Asia and Afghanistan Russia’s foreign policy and her imperial ambitions were confined to the limits of her ability to expand in the Balkans and Turkey, the Far East and Central Asia. Russian policy, therefore, moved between these as opportunities for expansion arose. Her move into the Balkans and Turkey was part of an ongoing process which had been taking place for some time, and the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–78 was the most recent clash of arms between the two powers. Russian successes in both the war and the following peace of San Stefano were overturned by Bismarck and Disraeli, German Chancellor and British Prime Minister respectively, at the Congress of Berlin. It had become clear that Russian expansionism in the south, the west and the south-west would not be tolerated by Germany or Britain. For an expanding Russia, the next obvious power vacuum to be filled lay in Central Asia. This time, the Russian position was to an extent safeguarded by joining the German-led European alliance

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7

system. However, with the accession of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the dismissal of Bismarck, and the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty with Germany, Russia began to look elsewhere for an alliance, which she found in a previously isolated France, and the 1890s gave her an opportunity to consolidate her possessions in Central Asia, most notably with the Pamirs Agreement in 1895. The second half of the decade saw Russian aggression in the Far East. In April 1895 the Russians and the French forced Japan to abandon the Liaotung Peninsula; in March 1898 Russia leased Port Arthur from China; and in March 1902 the Russians signed an agreement with the French in the Far East in response to the Anglo–Japanese Alliance earlier the same year. With tensions growing with Japan in the Far East, the Russians signed the Murzsteg Agreement with Austria-Hungary, which was an entente designed to guarantee peace in the Balkans. Four months later the war with Japan broke out. With the disasters of Port Arthur, Mukden and Tsushima, as well as revolution breaking out all over Russia, it became clear that a new foreign policy direction was needed and in August 1907 Russia concluded her entente with Britain, ending decades of rivalry in Central Asia. The next year the Bosnian Crisis broke, followed by the Young Turk Revolution, the Tripoli War, and the two Balkan Wars, all of which went some way to illustrate the bankruptcy of Ottoman rule. This process opened up a dangerous power vacuum in the Ottoman Empire, which was to act as the catalyst for the outbreak of the First World War.8 Prior to this, Anglo–Russian rivalry in Central Asia had been something of a long-standing institution. British fears had begun in earnest with the penetration of Russian influence in Central Asia in the 1850s and 1860s after the end of the Crimean War in 1856 and the Treaty of Paris. Following the subjugation of the Kazakh horde in the hundred years to 1850, the Russians moved against the three Khanates of Khiva, Kokand and Bokhara. Although they were not themselves taken immediately, sizeable slices of territory were captured from them by General Kaufman, which included the cities of Tashkent and Samarkand. Russian policy, then, sought to fill the power vacuum in Central Asia, as well as counteracting any potential British influence there.

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One of the key debates within the Russian leadership concerned the search for a safe border. The debate polarised between the Russian Foreign Ministry, headed by Gorchakov between 1856 and 1882, and the Russian military, headed by Minister for War General D.A. Milyutin between 1861 and 1881. Gorchakov argued that once Russia had reached what is now approximately the southern border of Kazakhstan, it would be advisable to stop there and proceed no further. Once there, ‘Russia had no interest in further expansion’ and Gorchakov warned against further ‘acquisition of new territory’.9 Conversely, the atmosphere and outlook of military life in Central Asia meant that there was great pressure upon the men to overcome boredom and debt and to earn promotion and their fortune in Central Asia.10 Consequently, the army in the region was predisposed to involvement in activities which compromised Gorchakov’s stable frontier. As a Foreign Ministry man, this was something which Gorchakov then found himself having to explain to the outside world in terms of civilising the heathen and fighting off unruly bandits on the frontier. As these wars progressed and the Russian Empire found itself absorbing more territory, the safe frontier was becoming no longer safe for Russian men on the spot. Milyutin, as Minister for War, saw the need to protect his men and accepted the need to drive on. Russian Government policy, then, followed the exploits of the generals in Central Asia. These generals could not be controlled without periodic dismissals, such as that of Cherniaev in 1866. In addition, the suspicions of the British were also aroused. Gorchakov became worried by the situation and admitted to the Tsar that he ‘feared the action of our distant [military] chiefs, who, having the local circumstances exclusively in view, do not sufficiently ponder the influence that their acts could have on general policy’.11 With Gorchakov’s declaration that Afghanistan lay outside the Russian sphere of influence, it became clear that this would become the safe border. This sentiment was also echoed by Milyutin who, despite the inclination of the soldiers in the region to act unilaterally in the furtherance of glory and fortune, wrote in his diary in October 1878: ‘The independence of Afghanistan is fundamentally necessary to preserve the political equilibrium of Britain and Russia in Asia.’12

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9

The political situation in Central Asia left the Russians with four main avenues of expansion open to them: the Khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, and Kokand, as well as the Turkoman steppe to the north of Persia. At the same time, British concern over the position of Afghanistan began to reach fever pitch. New Russian incursions into Khiva in 1873 gave fresh impetus to the British view that Afghanistan would have to be protected. In light of this, the fortress city of Herat was seen as being the key to Afghanistan, and thence India, as well as to Kandahar and the Persian Gulf. Russian power had exerted itself over Bokhara and Khiva and the former had accepted its dependency upon Russia by 1870. This had left Kokand geographically isolated. Though Kokand was a faithful ally to Russia after 1868, a civil war broke out in 1875, destabilising the region. General Skobolev was placed in charge of operations, and in 1876 Kokand and Andijan fell to the Russian forces. The only avenue remaining for Russian imperial expansion was now the Turkoman steppe.13 In early 1878, a Russian diplomatic mission arrived in Kabul under General M. Stolyetov. The Government of India acted quickly and gave the Amir an ultimatum for the removal of the Russian mission. In the absence of a response from the Amir, they invaded and installed their own representative, Louis Cavaignari, whose murder inaugurated the second phase of the Second Afghan War. By the end of 1880, the British had emerged with some small dignity intact after the disaster of Maiwand and with Abdur Rahman Khan on the throne. The Lyall agreement of July 1880 with the new Amir, albeit temporarily, secured Afghanistan’s borders against attack.14 The war itself stirred Russian curiosity over the British position generally and over Afghanistan in particular, leading Major-General L.N. Sobolev, the Chief of the Asiatic Department of the General Staff, to investigate the situation. He collated information from the British press, published British documents, and information from spies and informants. Sobolev came to some shrewd conclusions in his The Anglo– Afghan Struggle: A Sketch of the War of 1879–1880, observing that: The absence of a seriously considered plan of operations, the inability to combine caution with decision, the utter helplessness

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire shown in securing the lines of communication, the miserable condition of the intelligence and scouting services, the inability to arrange for the proper despatch of transport trains, the want of tact shown to the native population, the burdening of the troops with a mass of unnecessary work in requiring them to defend the Commissariat stores and to make up for the want of transport by manual labour, the subjection of military operations to political considerations – these, in our opinion, are the chief negative deductions which can be drawn from a minute examination of the Anglo–Afghan Campaign of 1878–1879.15

This demonstrated to the Russian military the weaknesses of the British position in India and sowed the seeds for the later Kuropatkin and Rittich invasion plans. At the same time, the Russians had their eye on the Turkoman steppe and General M.D. Skobolev was tasked with subduing the native Turkomans. He began with meticulous preparations, notably with regard to his logistics. Once the campaign had started, the Turkomans withdrew to their fortress at Geok Tepe and Skobolev followed up with his army, accompanied by sappers and artillery. He subjected the fortress to a severe bombardment and used his sappers to undermine the walls. The Turkoman forces fled and were pursued and massacred by Russian forces. In the following year, 1881, a force under Colonel Kuropatkin captured Askabad, prompting Merv to join the Russian Empire voluntarily in 1884.16 Skobolev’s exploits also aroused the interest of the officers of the British Royal United Services Institute. Captain J.C. Dalton translated Skobolev’s orders, which placed great emphasis on reconnaissance and the use of artillery. His instructions to the latter conveyed his attitude towards it clearly: ‘In these decisive moments “the artillery must have a soul”, for the gunner is not simply a mechanic.’ This attitude paid dividends at Geok Tepe. Lieutenant J.J. Leverson translated some material from the Russian Military Journal on Skobolev’s advance, concentrating on the supply aspect, which entailed large quantities of water and forage being carried by the camels. He noted that ‘the expenditure of the camels [was] small, considering the few opportunities of watering

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them’. The camels carried everything, including the artillery and the infantry, and ‘with few exceptions, had marched well’. In addition to the careful preparations given to logistics and the artillery, the infantry were dedicated and ready to fight.17 The danger of a forward Russian policy in Central Asia in general and Afghanistan in particular was made evident by the Panjdeh Incident. In March 1885 the Russians seized the Panjdeh Oasis from Afghanistan, inflicting a catastrophic defeat on the garrison there. Though the British considered going to war over the annexation, it soon became clear that they could not win. However, they had undertaken to uphold Afghan territorial integrity in July 1880. They were relieved of the problem by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, who voluntarily gave up the Panjdeh Oasis and its environs to the Russians, being aware that he could control neither the area nor the situation. This allowed the British to keep face.18 However, British vulnerabilities over the annexation would still have played on the minds of the Russians, especially with regard to Sobolev’s assessment of Britain’s performance during the Second Afghan War. With this crisis, the Russian anti-British party grew in strength and influence and men on the spot were emboldened.19 On the ground, though, Russian occupation was characterised by maladministration, inefficiency and corruption, which led to an awakening of a basic, defiant nationalism among the peoples of Central Asia. This type of nationalism, though, took the form of antipathy towards Russian rule, rather than any positive espousal of Islamic or cultural values. There were several revolts against Russian rule: in Tashkent in 1892, in Andijan in 1898, and during the 1905 Revolution there was much unrest in Central Asia consisting of strikes, mutinies and troop disorders. In many ways, these were precursors of the great revolt of 1916. In this context, it is easy to understand Russian concerns for the safety of their rule in Central Asia and their belief in the possibility of an Anglo–Afghan attack, especially in light of the tension in the region during the Russo–Japanese War.20 At the same time, a difference of opinion developed regarding any further expansion into Afghanistan. While the military wished to press on with an attack, the Foreign Ministry resisted such measures

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and wanted to come to an understanding with the British, despite being under pressure to reach an agreement with Germany. Sir Charles Hardinge, the Ambassador to Russia from 1904 to 1906, reported several instances in this period of the military’s dislike of the British and their wish to invade India.21 While this thinking had spawned the Kuropatkin and Rittich plans, there was also a strong wish for peace in the ranks of the Russian Government. This collective attitude was the result of an attempt to unify government and foreign policy so that one view would be carried by all. After the debacle of the Russo–Japanese War, it became painfully apparent that a united direction in foreign policy was needed, though this was hotly contested by a group of pro-Germans in the Government. The most prominent member was P.N. Durnovo, the Minister of the Interior, who believed that the issue of Russia’s security would be better served by an agreement with Germany than by one with Britain. Otherwise, he argued, Russia would be forced to go to war with Germany. Russia would lose such a war, and would be consumed by revolution. It was therefore vital, in Durnovo’s view, to buy time with an agreement with Germany in order that Russia might consolidate her overall position, a situation which would have to last at least 20 years. This position was pushed further by the Kaiser, Wilhelm II, who advocated, in correspondence with Tsar Nicolas II, a Russian attack on Afghanistan and India, as this was ‘the only part of the globe where the whole of her battlefleets are of no avail to England and where her guns are powerless to meet the invader’.22 Before the diplomats won the upper hand, elements of the Russian military were still keen to expand into Afghanistan, their enthusiasm heightened by an awareness of British vulnerabilities in the region. The same argument was used to link the questions of Persia and Afghanistan to that of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus Straits, which would become a pressing Russian concern vis-à-vis the projection of their naval power during the Russo–Japanese War.23 Further pressure exerted itself with Russian railway construction in Central Asia. During the Russo–Japanese War and after, British intelligence saw both the Orenburg–Tashkent and the Trans-Caspian railways as a threat to the security of Afghanistan and, by implication,

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India. Despite early British reactions, though, Russian railways were designed to consolidate Russia’s hold on its newly won Central Asian empire, rather than as preliminaries to further expansionism in the direction of Afghanistan, a position which would not preclude the option of bluffing were it perceived necessary.24 Despite these defensive inclinations, there was nevertheless a sizeable element within the Russian military which advocated an invasion of India in addition to Afghanistan. Before he became Minister for War, A.N. Kuropatkin formulated a plan to invade India in 1891. He envisaged the invasion in three stages: The first wave would take Herat, Maimana, Balkh and Badakshan. The second wave would drive into Kashmir, Kashgar, Kandahar and Kabul. The third stage would involve the British losing their influence in India. Kuropatkin believed that the British would ‘find themselves in the same state as they were in 1857’, as the Indians would side with the Russians. For this to happen on such a wide scale, he believed that it would be necessary to establish the climate for such a rising to take place in advance of any invasion. He therefore advised that, before Herat was taken, the Russians should seize Khorasan, and with it Meshed, believing that this would enhance Russian prestige among the Muslims. After this an Islamic Sheikh or Cleric should be put up to advocate cooperation with the Russians. Such a figure would also ‘make all arrangements with the Mullahs for [facilitating] our advance’. The forces required to carry out the invasion would be made up of two Army Corps. The First Army Corps was to operate from Samarkand and fight on the eastern flank of operations, driving towards Kabul, Kashgar and the Pamirs. The Second Army Corps was to conduct operations in the West against Khorasan and Herat. Reserves for these forces were to be based on the rail lines between Askabad and Samarkand and, when the war started, the Army Corps would then strike out in columns to seize their objectives. Kuropatkin also believed that for an operation of this sort the lines of supply would have to be well organised in advance and was confident that the troops could be fed as long as the distribution network operated smoothly. He stated categorically that, ‘there is enough wheat in Khorasan and Merv for the supply of the main army’. Finally, he fully appreciated the

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importance of outflanking the British position in Kandahar and the need to counteract any British landings at Bandar Abbas, as well as drawing troops from Kandahar to Seistan.25 The invasion plan of Staff Captain P.A. Rittich was different. It was more detailed than Kuropatkin’s had been and it was clear that Rittich had researched his subject. He began with the premise that the British wished to extend their influence into Persia, Afghanistan, Tibet and Turkey. He also believed that the British wished to cut the Russians off from a warm water port, especially one in the Gulf or in Turkey, and had done so since the Congress of Berlin. His argument was that Russia required such a port in the Persian Gulf, in ‘compensation there for the Straits we have been deprived of’. The British opposition to this took the form of using Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet as buffers against Russia, and Rittich believed that there would be a war between Britain and Russia: ‘The English will not succeed in finally seizing the whole of the Near East without a bloody fight with us.’ Rittich then went on to describe Afghan geography and concluded that more intelligence needed to be gathered. Despite this, he was still able to discuss the disposition of the Afghan Army and criticised the condition of their Officer Corps and fortresses. Rittich saw four invasion routes and described them. The routes were: 1. Through Herat and Kandahar to Quetta; 2. From Samarkand through Mazar-i-Sharif and Kabul to Peshawar; 3. The Russians would advance through Faizabad to Chitral or the Indus, in order to cross the Khyber; 4. Through the Pamirs to the Indus and Kashmir. His description of these routes demonstrated reasonable intelligence. Rittich’s conclusions about the nature of campaign revealed his strong grasp of military strategy and he saw Afghanistan as a serious factor. In contrast to the British position at the time, he took the view that a British defensive position on the North-West Frontier and the Indus would be a stronger defence than a line based from Kabul to Kandahar. The British at that time favoured a forward defence, a position which, in Rittich’s view, compromised any defence of Afghanistan

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and of India. Like Kuropatkin he discussed the possibility of a mutiny in India, writing that: ‘It is better not to calculate on a mutiny in India, it is only possible at the end of a campaign with great successes on our part; Moreover, such a mutiny demands a serious preparation in peace time, which we have not yet even thought of, either in practice or in theory.’ In connection with this, Rittich believed that it was necessary to bring Afghanistan on side through means of buying ‘their alliance and co-operation with a monetary subsidy, and with the promise of extending the frontier of Afghanistan at the expense of the North-West Frontier of India’. For the invasion itself, Rittich stated that the army required would have to be ‘not less than the Manchurian army’ in size and large forces would also be required on the lines of communication. He also believed that the most vital collision of the war would take place outside Kandahar and that the war would last about two years. The premise was that lasting peace in Central Asia could be achieved through a war which would decisively end Anglo–Russian rivalry in the region. For this, the whole army would have to be ready, with railways and stores available for campaigning. Rittich argued that, as war was inevitable, it would be better to be prepared for its outbreak than not. In such a case, the Russians would win and their victory would guarantee a lasting peace in Central Asia.26 In spite of all this planning, the Russian Government finally realised that they could not go beyond their present borders and that, ‘expanding Russia’s frontiers to the borders of India was simply not worth antagonising the British’. This was informed by the position in Europe and, for the Russian Ministry of War at St Petersburg, the priority was to defend Russia there first. This had the effect of making them unwilling to devote more resources to Central Asia. When Kuropatkin was made Minister for War in 1898, he began to realise the priority of Europe over Central Asia and responded accordingly. The closer links with France were, after all, designed to assist in the protection of Russia in Europe and Central Asia again took second place. In the Staff Talks of 1900–01, Russia pledged to make a diversionary attack on Afghanistan if Britain attacked France. The Russian General Staff believed that the Orenburg–Tashkent railway,

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when complete, could put 300,000 troops on the Afghan border, more than enough to make such a diversion possible. If Britain attacked Russia, it was planned that the French would station 150,000 men on the Channel, threatening the invasion of England. Russian imperialism in Central Asia could convincingly be characterised as rashly conceived and ill thought-out. Once territory had been taken, the defence of recent acquisitions had not been thought through and, in any case, the Russian position in Central Asia was always going to be subsidiary to policy in Europe.27 Overall, Russian forward policy in Central Asia and Afghanistan suffered from tensions which pulled in several different directions. There was still dissent in policy, even when it was supposedly unified after the Russo–Japanese War. Some of the military, such as Rittich, called for an invasion of Afghanistan and India, while others, like Stolypin, Russian Prime Minister from 1906 to 1911, saw that the stance in Central Asia would have to be defensive to give time for consolidation. Such a position would enable the Russians to put pressure on the British. Though the pro-Germans tried to carry their influence, it became apparent after the Russo–Japanese War and the Revolution of 1905 that Russian aims would be best served by agreement with Britain. This took the form of the Anglo–Russian Convention of August 1907, but there would be a long road to travel to arrive at that destination.

British Forward Policy on the North-West Frontier and in Afghanistan On the other side of Afghanistan lay British India. Over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a debate raged over strategy in the face of a potential Russian invasion of Afghanistan. After the disaster of the First Afghan War, the decision was taken to adopt a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan and what became the North-West Frontier. At this point, British policy was inherited from that of the Sikhs, from whom they had taken over. Everything was seen through the prism of a policy centred on the Punjab and it was from there that the North-West Frontier was administered.

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Sir John Lawrence, Viceroy from 1865 to 1869, wanted to remain distanced and avoid any relationship with the tribes. If they were to attack British interests, the Indian Army would respond with a punitive expedition. Were the Russians to attack Afghanistan, the prevailing view was that it was as a precursor to an invasion of India. The defensive stance, then, would be a rearward one and it was considered that the best line to hold was on the Indus River. Over time, the stance changed. Lord Lytton, Viceroy from 1876 to 1880, considered the creation of a North-West Frontier Province, to be separated from the Punjab. The position then was still a close border one but the Second Afghan War led to a significant change. The installation of Abdur Rahman Khan as Amir in 1880 and the agreement of that year effectively to guarantee Afghan territorial integrity created a situation where a rearward defence on the Indus or in the Suleiman Mountains became impracticable.28 At the same time, Sir Robert Sandeman, the Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan in the 1880s and 1890s, had been evolving a policy of pacifying the tribesmen there by dealing with them at a local level. This had been paying dividends and its success was widely acknowledged at the time. Indeed, it was so successful that it was being considered as a template for the North-West Frontier.29 Impetus for this came when the Russians annexed Panjdeh in 1885. As one discussion several years later put it: The Russian approach through Turkestan to the borders of Afghanistan, and the serious [Panjdeh] incident of 1885, which brought us to the verge of war with Russia, drove home the truth that frontier policy was no longer a thing for academic discussion but a matter of vital Imperial importance.30 Codification of this took the form of the Durand Line in 1893, when many tribes that considered themselves as Afghan found themselves on the Indian side of the border. The policing of these tribes took place along the lines of the Sandeman Policy but, where it had worked well in Baluchistan, its effects on the North-West Frontier were decidedly mixed. The

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consequences were ever-increasing numbers of punitive expeditions and blockades and, over time, they involved ever-increasing numbers of troops. It became clear that the Sandeman Policy was not working there and that, as one commentator put it: ‘What had succeeded with the feudal Baluch was inapplicable to the masterless Pathan.’ A change of direction was called for.31 This change came about with the accession of Lord Curzon as Viceroy in 1899. The period also saw a comprehensive clarification of what a forward policy actually meant in several different contexts. The first of these was that there was complete unanimity of opinion in the British and Indian militaries that a Russian invasion of Afghanistan would need to be met in Afghanistan, rather than in British India. It was considered that, although a rearward defence would be easier to supply, the political implications would be significant as there was the fear of an uprising in India if the Russians got too near. The effect of this would be a forward defence on what became known as the Kabul–Kandahar Line. It was there that the Russians would be met and stopped if they invaded. A forward defence in Afghanistan entailed a frontier policy designed to keep the situation stable and the tribes quiet. While it was apparent that the Sandeman Policy could not be applied to the North-West Frontier in all its particulars, it was also clear that there was much in the Policy which was worth keeping. The result was a hybrid of the Sandeman Policy and elements of the old close border policy.32 The latter was reflected by the fact that the garrisons in tribal territory were removed. They had been a bone of contention with the tribes and their presence had caused deep resentment at what was seen by the tribesmen as a policy of armed occupation. Their replacement by tribal militias reflected those elements of the Sandeman system seen as most effective. The relationship with the militias was conducted principally through political officers who, for the most part, built up a friendship and rapport with the tribes. The final element was the creation of the North-West Frontier Province in 1905. The success of this policy was reflected by the number of expeditions against the tribes. In the 15 years from 1899, when Lord Curzon became Viceroy, to 1914, when the First World War broke out, there

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were three expeditions against the tribes. In the 15 years before, there were twelve.33 Only in 1919 did the system unravel, but by then the relationship with Afghanistan had fundamentally changed.

Themes in Afghanistan in the Defence of Empire In any treatment of Afghanistan as a factor in British Imperial defence and diplomacy, it is evident that a number of themes recur throughout the period in question. These are: geographical; military and logistical; socio-cultural; and those involving governance and diplomacy. These are all dealt with in the chapters which follow and, put together, show how Afghanistan became such an important aspect of Imperial defence. The importance of the geography of Afghanistan cannot be underestimated; it is a very inhospitable environment in which to wage war. It is a truism that the land cannot supply a large army and a small one would easily be swallowed up and defeated. The landscape, too, is unforgiving. The mountains are all but impassable and the deserts are not places an army would wish to enter. Yet this landscape was one in which the Indian Army would have to meet any Russian invasion. Come what may, the army would need to be supplied along routes running through a permeable frontier. This leads to the second theme: that of the military. When discussion of forward defence on the Kabul–Kandahar Line took place, the ‘elephant in the room’ was supply through very difficult terrain. The General Staffs of both Britain and India considered such supply possible. Other personalities, such as Sir George Clarke, Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence, thought it was not. While Clarke may have had right on his side, he had not reckoned on the Liberal Government’s willingness to side with Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army. The era was one in which confidence in the ability to win was supreme. There was no doubt in the minds of the militaries of both Britain and India that they could overcome the obstacles they faced, whether in Afghanistan or anywhere else. While such confidence is a common feature of empire, there is a thin line between it and the sort of overconfidence which gives rise to debacle and disaster. Yet, despite

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the setbacks of two Afghan Wars and numerous frontier campaigns, there was no doubt in the minds of the generals that they could, and would, win. Such overconfidence, then as now, gave rise to failings in the field. While intelligence was generally good on the frontier, it was more uneven regarding Afghanistan itself. A recurring theme of British involvement was a flawed assessment of the degree of resistance which would be encountered, a factor which caught out the Indian Army in both the First and Second Afghan Wars. This went hand-in-hand with logistical unpreparedness. It was a feature of campaigning the generals did not understand and which they considered beneath them, despite it being essential to keep an army in the field. Other aspects which were poorly understood were socio-cultural ones. There was no real understanding at the time of the way in which Islam or tribe could be factors in rallying the population to resistance. In almost all respects, these factors were of no interest to the policy establishment at all as they were dismissed as the superstition of savages. The same mistakes were made over and over again as the late-Victorian and early-Edwardian mindset stressed the superiority of their own values over those of others. Governance and diplomacy also emerge as key factors. In many respects, the former was never really understood with regard to Afghanistan, despite its role in informing the latter. The Government of India, like that of Britain, never really understood either the nature of core–periphery relations inside Afghanistan or the nature of the contending imperatives pressing themselves on the Amir and his court. The result was a misreading by men like Curzon of the relationship with the Amir. While later viceroys’ outlooks were less blinkered, they still knew little of what was really happening in Kabul and even less so elsewhere in the country. Diplomacy emerges in this period as the key to resolving outstanding issues. Paramount of these was the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907 which, to a certain degree, represents the defence of India by containment by alliance. Before this, diplomacy was an attempt to find allies against Russia. The onus of the Liberal position was very much

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the former, while the Conservatives balanced the latter with pourparlers with Russia. While the triumph of the diplomats was a defence of India by treaty, the overarching factor governing the British relationship with Afghanistan was ignorance: actual, accidental and intentional in different degrees as the reality of dealing with that country failed to penetrate into policy. Despite the lessons of the past, the geography was not properly understood. The complications of logistics were ignored. The degree of resistance which would be encountered was underestimated. The belief that a modern army could win was supreme to the point of overconfidence. Religion, tribe and locale were never really understood, especially as elements around which resistance could rally. The problems of governing Afghanistan were never properly appreciated either, leading to an inadequate understanding of the relationship with the Amir. Without the diplomats, British involvement with Afghanistan would have been so much the poorer.

The Following Chapters The chapters which follow each dwell on a diplomatic or a military theme and, taken together, they juxtapose the impossibility of a military solution with the increasing successes of diplomatic ones. The first chapter looks at the problem of Herat. It was long considered vulnerable to Russian attack and there was consensus from the 1880s onwards that sooner or later it would be annexed and the Indian Army would find itself at war. In 1903, it was discovered that the local Russian officials across the border were trying to secure direct relations with the Afghans in Herat. This they were forbidden to do and there were fears that this might presage a strengthening of Russian interests there. At the same time, several of the boundary pillars demarcating the border had fallen into disrepair, leading to some small Russian penetration in the border areas. A mission under Henry Dobbs, a Political Officer, was duly despatched to the region to block further Russian intrigue. The mission then went on to Kabul, surveying the Hazarajat on the way, where the situation was discussed with the Amir. The mission is little discussed in the literature and the

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discussions with the Amir not at all. Also missing in the literature is the connection to the later Dane Mission to Kabul in 1905. Chapter 2 is about the war scare of 1904, where the British in India and in London became convinced that war was going to break out imminently. The Russo–Japanese War had started and Japan was a British ally. Both the British and the Russians feared attack from the other and planned for war. The British defence of India would take place in Afghanistan and the Committee of Imperial Defence and British military began to look at how the war would be fought. The biggest worry for the Indian Army was the rapid completion of strategic railways in Russian Central Asia, notably the Orenburg–Tashkent Line, which could significantly increase the number of troops the Russians could deploy on the northern Afghan border. The third chapter concerns British strategic considerations at a time when it was starting to appear that there might be certain fundamental flaws in the British forward defence strategy. Key to a forward deployment was the attitude of the frontier tribes, which were well armed and getting more guns every year. It became clear that large numbers of troops would have to be placed on the lines of communication and supply. Logistics became an important issue, too, as it started to become clear that adequate supply might become problematic. Sir George Clarke, Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence certainly thought so but found it difficult to convince the defence establishment, which accepted Kitchener’s more linear calculations. Kitchener, himself, had an agenda in India and wanted to push ahead reforms to enable the Indian Army to be able to place more men in the field more efficiently. This was thought necessary as the structure was seen hitherto as inefficient. In addition, it would be necessary for reinforcements to be sent to India in the event of war and they would have to get there quickly. The truth of difficulty of the forward policy was beginning to dawn on the establishment in London. Chapter 4 deals with the Dane Mission to Kabul in 1905. The Mission arose because the old Amir, Abdur Rahman Khan, had died in 1901. He was succeeded by his son Habibullah Khan and the Government of India had decided that the terms of the 1880 Agreement with Abdur Rahman Khan ought to be renewed with the

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new Amir. The Afghan view was that the agreement was still binding, whereas the Government of India took the view that it was specific to the Amir. There was also a wish to make it clear to the Russians that the terms of the treaty had been renewed, thus making any Russian incursion a casus belli. When he got to Kabul, Sir Louis Dane, the Indian Foreign Secretary negotiating the treaty, found that the court was split and that the Amir was trying to avoid being tied to the terms of the treaty. After several months of negotiating, the treaty was signed in March 1905. The Dane Treaty formed part of a series of diplomatic measures designed to help the defence of India. The Anglo–Japanese Alliance was another part of this. Chapter 5 looks at the strategic planning in 1906 and 1907 and starts with the Alliance and the negotiations with the Japanese. Their value lay in the ability to open a second front, as their deployment in India was problematic. The rest of the chapter looks at the Morley Sub-Committee on Indian Defence. The new Liberal Government was keen to look at the issue and to understand it. At the same time, they were pushing for a domestic reform agenda and were not keen to spend too much on defence. Russia was also no longer perceived as the threat she had been before and during the Russo– Japanese War and the Liberals were interested in a diplomatic solution. The effect of the decisions taken as a result of the Sub-Committee represented the new reality. Clarke’s arguments were ignored in favour of those of the Kitchener and his staff, who were placated as part of a quid pro quo to allow the Liberal reform agenda to take place. The diplomats were already talking and a solution was not far off. The final chapter looks at the diplomatic defence of India. The talks were successful in great measure due to the start made by the outgoing Conservative Government. They had started talks with the previous Russian administration and Sir Charles Hardinge, then Ambassador at St Petersburg, had been instrumental. With changes of government in both countries, he was brought back to London to the Foreign Office and worked with the new Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to negotiate what became the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907. A number of voices rose in opposition to it, most notably in India, and the Amir was not pleased either. Despite this, there was sufficient

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goodwill on both sides to allow the Convention to function well with regard to Afghanistan. This allowed a successful resolution to the Jamshedi Crisis, which would have been a serious diplomatic incident a few years before. In Kabul, the Amir had come to accept the reality of the position and adopted a pro-British stance. This did not find favour at court. As the Ottoman Empire faced difficulties in the years leading up to the First World War, anti-British elements started agitating in favour of a jihad. Once the war had started, the Germans sent a mission to Kabul to try to get the Afghans to invade India. Habibullah held his nerve and managed to steer a neutral course, while having little room for manoeuvre. The contending pressures and imperatives on the Amir were much the same as they had been over the preceding years and the same balancing act was required then as when Henry Dobbs visited Kabul eleven years before.

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1 THE PROBLEM OF HERAT

When Henry Dobbs looked out from the defences of Herat in June 1904, he would have seen around him the field on which the great game would be played. Nowhere was the British position more vulnerable than here. Loss of control of the status quo ante here was thought to entail an unravelling of the whole defensive position of India. Although the Russians had their own difficulties in the region, statements by some officials, coupled with ongoing railway construction and troop movements, did lead to real anxiety among members of the governments and military of both Britain and India. The background to the British position regarding Herat lay in the 1880 agreement with Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in which the Government of India was committed to the defence of Afghan territorial integrity. The test came in 1885 when the Russians annexed Panjdeh. While war was unthinkable, so was inaction, and thus a solution had to be found. Fortunately for the Indian Army, the region was too remote for the Amir to be able to exercise control over it, so he was willing to relinquish it to the Russians without invoking the agreement. After his death, the British were concerned that this situation might recur, this time with Herat, and the accession of a new Amir from 1901, with the imperative for a renewal of the agreement, meant that the need for a solution had become pressing. This was made more complex as the Russians attempted to secure direct relations with the Afghan Government, which had been

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forbidden in the 1880 agreement and to which the Russians had assented in 1900. Men on the spot in Russian Central Asia were, once again, influencing policy by their actions and creating difficulties for all concerned. A mission to Herat to resolve the demarcation of the border following the dilapidation of the boundary pillars, as well as other outstanding issues, was mooted. At the same time, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity between London and St Petersburg, as well as a concerted attempt by the authorities of both countries to influence the local situation in Herat. This manifested itself in the Dobbs Mission to Herat. The mission was conducted at a difficult time as British diplomacy with Russia was subject to a lack of unity between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the military, exposing it to a number of contradictions. Not least of these was the fact that the resolution of the boundary pillars issue was incomplete by the time Dobbs had left Herat for Kabul. Significantly, Dobbs went to Kabul, rather than back to Meshed as stated in the historiography, so setting the scene for the Dane Mission of 1905, of which he was a member, and this establishes a continuity in policy which has been missed in the literature.

The Vulnerability of Herat and Afghan Turkestan Great Britain had undertaken to uphold Afghanistan’s territorial integrity from 1880 onwards. The concern of the Government of India was how effectively to guarantee this in the north-west region of Afghanistan. Part of the problem lay in the attitude of the inhabitants. Roberts, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, put this complication thus:1 It must be remembered, however, that the inhabitants of Afghan Turkestan are most closely allied to those living TransOxus than to the Afghans proper, and are a softer race [than the Pathans] altogether. Moreover, it is generally believed that they would welcome a Russian army as delivering them from the irksome yoke of the Amir.

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The Problem of Herat

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There were also close economic ties with the Russians such as illegal trading, forbidden by the Amir, as well as smuggling, the purchase of land by the Russians, and a trade in revenue grain from Herat to Kushk.2 The position of Herat and Afghan Turkestan was, then, a vulnerable one and this was recognised throughout the establishment. St John Brodrick, the Secretary of State for India, believed that ‘Herat is absolutely defenceless’ and Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, stated that ‘Herat is Russian whenever she chooses to take it’.3 In spite of this, Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, believed that the engagement to maintain the integrity of Afghanistan should be upheld, a view which Field Marshal Sir Frederick Roberts, Britain’s most senior soldier, shared. Roberts also believed, as did many others, that any Russian advance into Afghanistan should be treated as a casus belli. Inaction in such an event ‘would be disastrous to our prestige as an Eastern Power’. The whole of the eastern world would then believe that the British were ‘unwilling or unable to fulfil our engagements at the risk of a conflict with Russia’, with the result that there would be trouble on the North-West Frontier and in other parts of India. If this happened, ‘intrigue and disaffection would rapidly spread’. Roberts concluded that, ‘without being defeated, we should experience all the moral and political effects of defeat’.4 Moreover, Kitchener recognised that, in the event of such an invasion by Russia, there was little that the British could do. He wrote in July 1905, ‘she may at any time seize either Afghan Turkestan or the Herat province with comparative ease and with little risk. At the present day, indeed, she could do this with practical immunity.’5 Kitchener had written to Brodrick along the same lines several months earlier, making clear what he meant by ‘practical immunity’:6 The Russians could advance through the low-lands of AfghanTurkestan without firing a shot, except to disperse the paltry and ill-organised Afghan forces that would be opposed to them; and they could rapidly push forward their advanced troops far towards the Hindu Kush, so as to completely cover their convoys and working parties, without any difficulty. It is

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire in this difference between their conditions and ours that they have a large advantage.

Finally, Kitchener wrote of the population of Herat and Afghan Turkestan that: ‘We know that the Usberg [Uzbek] and Tajik inhabitants of the lowlands of Afghan Turkestan would not oppose the Russians, but are in sympathy with them.’7 These groups in the north were far removed from the Pashtuns of the south and east of the country. They were akin to the populations in Russian Central Asia, had different customs and spoke a different language, Dari.8 This problem was compounded, too, by the attitude of the Amir. If the Russians were to invade, it was clear that the British would have, somehow, to assist. The Amir, however, believed that he would not need the help of the Indian Army in the north on the grounds that his forces could defend it on their own. Sir Alfred Lyall, a former Foreign Secretary to the Indian Foreign Department, disagreed and argued that the Afghan army would be incapable of defending the north against Russian attack. The assistance of the Indian Army was therefore vital. The difficulty was that once the Russians had invaded, they would prove to be almost impossible to dislodge.9 Such a situation would have been made worse by the fact that the Amir would not request aid from the Government of India until his army had been beaten and that the Government of India had not proposed to enter Afghanistan until requested to do so by the Amir. This would create a delay, by which time the Russians would already have seized Herat and Afghan Turkestan and be consolidating their hold there. The prevailing opinion was that Russian forces would stop and would not proceed further into Afghanistan towards India at the time, a case Lyall was to put forward in the Morley Sub-Committee in 1907.10 This ‘salami slicing’ was viewed from London with some concern. The view of the General Staff at the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) on action to be taken in the event of a Russian occupation of Herat and Afghan Turkestan was shaped by questions forwarded to them in May 1905 by the Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour. The upshot was that if British policy was to defend the territorial integrity

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of Afghanistan, the Indian Army would need to be ready to meet the Russians on the Kabul–Kandahar Line or ‘to go beyond that line to meet her should she adopt a waiting attitude in the northern provinces’, as well as to be able to deal effectively with hostile tribesmen.11 The final problem was that campaigning in the north of Afghanistan was generally held to be impossible to conduct successfully. Lyall made this clear at the Morley Sub-Committee, saying that ‘if we had not patched up the quarrel in 1885, we should have marched to our destruction’. Roberts concurred, stating that a successful campaign in northern Afghanistan would be ‘impossible’ and that ‘it simply could not be done’. There was, therefore, nothing that the British could do by direct action in the north of Afghanistan.12 The darkness was, however, not entirely unrelieved. The Russians, on account of the very same agreement which bound the British to assist the Amir, were afraid to violate the Afghan frontier. Lyall made this clear when he said that ‘it is a serious matter to displease a European Power’. Sir George Clarke, the Secretary of the CID, agreed and argued that ‘Herat has, I imagine, remained an Afghan possession only because the Russian Government is not sure of our attitude if it were to be occupied’, implying that they were unsure whether a casus belli would entail outright war or another Panjdeh.13 Clarke also believed that the Russians would have the same sort of logistical problems as the British in a war, observing that:14 Probably no inhabited portion of the world is more unfavourable to an invader, who must traverse it in great force, than Afghanistan, which as the Prime Minister has stated, ‘presents most formidable obstacles to an attack on the Indian frontier by reason of the absence of roads, railways, foodstuffs, and transport animals, in addition to the natural defences presented by the conformation of the country’. Thus Clarke believed that the Russian Government would not risk war in Afghanistan. Despite his observations, there were few who agreed with him.15

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The final method of inducing the Russians to withdraw from Herat in the event of an invasion, or to deter them from this act, was to use British naval power to attack Russia’s coastline. This was discussed at the end of April 1903. Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to Lord Curzon, the Viceroy, stating that Balfour was in favour of ‘bombarding Cronstadt’ in the event of an invasion. Hamilton also used similar language the following day, saying: We could not prevent her from taking it [Herat], neither could we at the outset of war oust her from the position she thus obtained. ... The best defence that we can give to Herat is to make it known to Russia that a movement of this kind entails war in all parts of the Globe with Great Britain. This measure had the overtones of British plans for action in the Baltic and elsewhere during the Crimean War, although it received none of the planning and discussion in depth which other issues with a bearing on Afghanistan had been given.16

Russian Attempts to Secure Direct Relations: 1903 The threat of Russia in the north of Afghanistan was a matter of great concern for the British, both in India and at home. Memories were still fresh from Russian attempts to place an envoy at Kabul, their absorption of the Central Asian Khanates, and the annexation of Panjdeh. It was in this light that Russian attempts to secure direct relations with Afghanistan were seen as hostile and potentially dangerous, both to India and to Afghanistan’s position as a buffer state. Consequently, it seemed important to prevent such communication – especially communication with political content. Matters of a purely local character, however, were permitted. The chief difficulty was that Russia, feeling in a strong position, believed that she could deal direct with the Afghans over their northern border. She also believed that she could get away with doing this with or without the approval of the British, so it became important that those running the British Empire make

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some sort of concession to allow the Russians local communication with some grace.17 The event which triggered off the discussion of the subject of direct relations was a dispute between the governors of Herat and Askabad over irrigation rights – a political issue. The matter was discussed between Sir George Hamilton, Secretary of State for India, and the Government of India. Hamilton wanted the Amir to find out what was happening in the north of his country so that the case could be raised at a meeting between representatives of the British and Russian governments on the subject of direct communication. The Government of India agreed that if the Russians were allowed to interfere with Afghan irrigation arrangements, then ‘a most undesirable precedent would be set’.18 The Foreign Office was also busy on the matter. Scott, the Ambassador at St Petersburg, wrote to Lansdowne, the Foreign Secretary, confirming that there would be discussion of direct relations. Moreover, he commented that the Russian position was the same as it had hitherto been, namely that they wished for direct local and commercial relations and that they were ready to ‘exclude all possibility of touching political matters’ in such relations. It was also at this stage that some of the boundary pillars that made up the Russo– Afghan frontier were found to have been destroyed, which prompted both more debate and, later, a British mission to Herat.19 The conversation between the British and Russian governments on the subject of direct relations resumed after an interval on 17 January 1903 when Scott discussed the issue with Lamsdorff, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Lamsdorff made it clear that the view of his government was as stated in the Memorandum of the Russian Government to the British Government of 6 February 1900 in which the Russian Government stated its willingness not to bring up political matters. Lamsdorff also said that all he wanted was direct local and non-political communication, while declaring that he ‘would strongly deprecate and oppose any idea of entering on further relations’. In addition, he agreed that the arrangements were also a useful bulwark against the Russian military, saying that he ‘regarded these arrangements as necessary safeguards against the creation of disturbing incidents by the action of Russian authorities on the frontier not under

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the immediate control of the Foreign Office at St Petersburg’. Finally, he disclaimed any intention of imposing direct relations on the Amir against his will.20 Four days later the Russian Foreign Minister reaffirmed to Scott his desire for direct relations of a non-political character and recognised that Afghanistan was ‘within our [the British] political sphere of influence’. At the same time, Lansdowne discussed the matter with Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador to London, who suggested ‘a “negative” understanding, under which certain matters should be specifically excluded from local treatment’. Lansdowne thought the proposal to be ‘worthy of attentive examination’.21 Discussions over the matter of direct relations continued at the start of February, when Scott raised the issue once more with Lamsdorff. The latter’s position was that ‘it is no longer possible or compatible with the dignity of Russia that the ordinary relations arising out of contiguity with another country should be conducted through the channel of a third country’. Scott replied that any change in the status quo without British approval or mutual agreement would be inconsistent with the reassurances of the Russian Government. On the same day Lamsdorff sent a memorandum to the British Embassy, the main sense of which was to reaffirm Russia’s policy as that set down in the memorandum of 1900. However, the memorandum concluded by saying that things should change and that there ought to be an opening in relations, but that they should be of a non-political nature. Moreover, it stated that the despatch of Russian Agents into Afghanistan was not contemplated at that time. This did not, however, ‘exclude the possibility of sending agents into Afghanistan in the future’.22 Hamilton took the line that the Russian memorandum was dangerous for relations between Britain and Russia, writing in March that it was ‘a very sinister document’ and that it was ‘an argument against trusting in the future to an understanding or convention made with Russia. It is a cynical document.’ Once the Government of India had seen this memorandum, they, too, were sceptical of its contents: Literally interpreted, [it] is a repudiation of Russia’s existing engagements regarding Afghanistan; but it is more probable

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that [the] Russians are trying to cover the failure of their attempt to establish the relations they desired with the Ameer by a piece of bravado. Lansdowne at the Foreign Office also had misgivings about Russian promises. He reminded Count Benckendorff that although the Russians had disclaimed all wish for political relations, they still claimed the right to send agents into Afghanistan ‘and of discussing with the Afghan authorities questions of more than mere local importance’.23 The dispute between Askabad and Herat, however, continued over the issue of irrigation. The Governor of Askabad had felt chagrined over the fact that water from the Heri-Rud and Murghab rivers was in short supply, believing that this was due to Afghan irrigation arrangements. In fact, this was not the case and the Governor of Herat wrote to his opposite at Askabad via Whyte, the British Consul at Meshed, that the water shortage was due to drought, not Afghan irrigation, adding that the Russians would have less to complain about by March, as the rivers would be rising again.24 In addition to these developments, the issue of a number of destroyed boundary pillars, which delineated the Russo–Afghan frontier, came to the fore. The Government of India had learned from Whyte that those boundary pillars in the neighbourhood of Kushk had been destroyed by refugees, shepherds, and even by Russian soldiers, who had taken off some of the bricks that made up the pillars to make an oven. It was also discovered that the Russians had dug a canal near the Murghab River which ran 400 paces into Afghan territory. The Afghans had destroyed some of it at the time and were to destroy the rest of it later. The Government of India consequently took the view that representation should be made to the Russian Government in order to ‘invite them to restrain their subjects’.25 The mood from Sir Arthur Hardinge, the British Minister at Tehran, was, however, typically one of caution. Seeing that the issue of direct relations was ‘a question of some delicacy’, he wrote to Whyte asking him to persuade the Russian Minister at Meshed to act as a medium of communication of the Russian authorities of Trans-Caspia

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and Turkestan, rather than using Whyte as intermediary between the Governors of Herat and Askabad as he could then represent the Afghans. If the Russian Minister refused, or was unable to do this, then matters could be referred to the Tehran Legation or the British Ambassador at St Petersburg. This advice was then communicated to Lansdowne.26 Lansdowne saw Benckendorff the next day and discussed with him some of the implications of the Russian memorandum. The two areas discussed were the despatch of Russian agents into Afghanistan and direct relations. With regard to the former, Lansdowne made it clear that he viewed the despatch of agents as permissible only under the condition that they were to deal ‘on matters of purely local detail’. He made it plain, however, that the whole concept of sending Russian agents into Afghanistan was ‘most questionable’. On the issue of direct communications, the views of both parties were not dissimilar. Benckendorff knew that these communications went on ‘and it was impossible to prevent it’. Being aware of this difficulty, Lansdowne said that it was time the two sides sat down to discuss the problem and that the British Government would approach the issue in ‘a reasonable and conciliatory spirit’, while emphasising that any change in the position would be objectionable in the absence of previous agreement between the British and Russian governments.27 At the same time, Hamilton wrote to the Government of India in response to their telegram of 23 March in which they had expressed their doubts concerning the Russian memorandum. He had received information from Lansdowne and the Foreign Office and pointed out to the Viceroy that Benckendorff had accepted that Afghanistan was outside the Russian sphere of political influence. In addition, the Russian wish to send an agent to Afghanistan was put into a clearer context. Although they had contemplated the possibility of sending such an agent at some point in the future, there was no plan to do so at the present time and such an agent would not be a political one. If sent, he would be ‘a medium of communications between Russia and Afghanistan on matters of purely local interest’. Hamilton also recognised, as had Lansdowne, that these communications would

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be inevitable and thus it would ‘be better to regularise what cannot be stopped’. With a view to doing this, the Foreign Office had suggested a basis for an arrangement under two heads: the first of these was for the Russian Government to give an assurance that they would not send an agent into Afghanistan without first consulting the British Government, so that they might have the opportunity to discuss the matter both with the Amir and the Russian Government. Secondly, the British Government was prepared to allow communication between the Russian Government and the Amir as long as this was ‘confined to correspondence of an unquestionably non-political character in reference to matters of purely local interest’. Hamilton added that the Amir would have to be consulted and that any undertaking would have to be signed by him in order to allow things to run smoothly.28 The end of March and early April saw matters become more difficult. Benckendorff, as he had indicated in his letter of 13/26 March, was unable to negotiate without further instructions from St Petersburg. In the absence of this, Lansdowne, therefore, had little choice but to outline the British position, namely that they were willing to negotiate on direct relations under the stipulations he had outlined, and to ask Benckendorff to pass this on to Lamsdorff.29 Another area of difficulty lay in the obstreperous attitude of the Government of India, which wrote to the Secretary of State in response to his telegram of 27 March under the same heads as those in the Foreign Office plan presented to them. On the matter of local correspondence the Government of India considered the idea feasible, ‘though not without danger’, and recommended to Hamilton the need to consult with the Amir over this issue, as otherwise he would ‘have good grounds of offence, if he found that, without consulting him, we made an agreement with Russia modifying his obligations to us’. The Amir’s reaction to the Anglo–Russian Convention in 1907 and 1908 illustrates the truth of this statement. On the issue of agents, the Government of India strongly deprecated any idea of Russia having, with or without previous consultation, any right to send agents into Afghanistan. Yet there was also the danger that they would try to send agents there even if they had been denied permission to do so.

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In such a case, a ‘delicate situation’ might emerge. The Government of India’s opinion on the matter was that: ‘We regard the employment of Russian agents in Afghanistan, whether on commercial excuse or otherwise, as fraught with serious mischief, and tantamount to the rescission of Russia’s engagements about Afghanistan.’ The Government of India ended its letter by stating that it believed ‘that there is a strong element of bluff in these proposals’.30 The scepticism of the Government of India was undiminished the next day. The Russians had suggested that the Afghans have officials at Sheikh Junaid and Panjdeh. This suggestion had gone to the Governor of Herat, Ahmed Jan Khan, who had not replied and Curzon argued that this case emphasised the importance of not accepting Russian proposals until the Amir had been consulted. At this point, Curzon still had some faith in the friendship of the Amir and adopted his stance accordingly.31 After having seen these opinions from the Government of India, the Foreign Office put its case through the India Office. The Foreign Office referred the India Office to Lansdowne’s despatch 66A to St Petersburg, which set out the line that the British Government viewed it as acceptable for local communication to happen as long as an arrangement was in place. Lansdowne, however, agreed in principle that the Amir should be consulted over direct relations, believing that he would offer ‘some practical suggestions’ on the issue. On the subject of agents, Lansdowne stated that he ‘avoided any admission of the right of Russia to send such agents into Afghanistan’, thinking that if Russian agents were sent into Afghanistan British ones would have to be sent there too. However, if he were to be consulted, the Amir would almost certainly ‘express his reluctance to receive either British or Russian Agents’.32 Once the India Office received this letter from the Foreign Office, it set out to communicate its substance to the Government of India. At the Foreign Office, Lansdowne intended to send Benckendorff an official note declaring that, when the Amir was consulted, he would have to be shown Russian assurances as to the character of the proposed communications. He also brought up the idea that the Amir would find the despatch of agents unacceptable and that the British Government

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and the Amir ‘earnestly trust that the Russian Government will not revert again to the idea, which, apparently, they have for the present abandoned, of placing their agents in Afghanistan’. After having reported this, Hamilton requested the opinion of the Government of India on the matter. Curzon replied the following day: My only suggestion is that it should be clearly explained to the Russian Government that we cannot undertake to compel the Amir to accept their proposals for trans-frontier correspondence should he reject them. Otherwise I agree.33 The Foreign Office was made aware of this view and Lansdowne accepted Curzon’s comments. In conversation with Benckendorff, he made the point that it was necessary to have the concurrence of the Amir before ‘a clear understanding should be arrived at between the British and the Russian Governments’. Benckendorff agreed with this, adding that he hoped the two governments could bring about a more satisfactory arrangement than the prevailing one.34 Several days later the issue of the boundary pillars in the north of Afghanistan was raised again and it was decided that action should be taken. The Amir wrote to the Government of India emphasising that it was the British Government’s duty to ensure that the northern border of his country was respected by the Russians. With a view to supporting this ideal, the Government of India suggested that it would be wise to send an officer from McMahon’s Seistan Arbitration Commission, which was finalising its work in the region at the time, to Herat. The issue had another bent to it. In the opinion of the Government of India, the incidents in the north clearly demonstrated that the Russians had taken the Amir’s consent to an agreement for granted and so suggested that, since the Amir’s consent was not likely to be forthcoming, Lansdowne should inform Benckendorff of this position.35 It became apparent at the end of April and early May that the Russians were attempting to secure direct trading relations with Afghanistan and ‘that Russian merchants will be allowed to go to Afghanistan for trade purposes’. This information was said to have

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come from the Russian authorities at Bokhara. Moreover, there were reports from Meshed that, in consequence of great scarcity existing in Herat, the Russians at Kushk Post and elsewhere are selling grain at cheap rates on credit to Firozkuhis and Jamshedis [northern Afghan tribes] and people from Herat, and that as security they are trying to obtain mortgages of their lands from the purchasers. The British authorities in both Persia and India took a dim view of this and Whyte was instructed to warn the Governor of Herat that ‘trouble will certainly result from such mortgages’.36 At the same time, the Secretary of State for India approved the sending of an officer from McMahon’s commission to deal with the case of the boundary pillars. He believed that this should be done before the wider issue of direct relations was resolved. The Government of India also suggested that the authorities in both Russian Central Asia and Herat should communicate with one another through the medium of the British Consul General at Meshed. Hamilton was in agreement as this rendered the resolution of questions more ‘convenient and efficient’.37 Matters were not, however, eased by the conduct of the Russian officials in Central Asia. The Herat agent reported the following unsettling occurrence: ‘A letter has been addressed to the Governor of Herat by the Governor of Askabad, in which he asks for permission to send a representative to Herat to make certain representations. The Governor of Herat has forwarded a copy of the letter to the Amir.’ The man in question turned out to be a Russian savant, named Clementico, who claimed to wish to visit Herat for a scientific expedition. Permission was requested for this visit to take place.38 One week later it became clear to Scott at St Petersburg that the matter of the northern Afghan frontier was one which would have to be discussed seriously. With a view to this, he communicated the standpoint of the British Government to Lamsdorff in the form of a Pro-Memoriâ. This sought to put right the issues of the destroyed boundary pillars and the infringement of Afghan territory in order to

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construct a canal. Regarding the boundary pillars, it was considered that an officer from the McMahon Seistan Arbitration Commission should be sent to Herat to investigate reports received. The Russian Government was also invited to send an officer of similar rank to meet the British officer and then the two of them would cooperate in the restoration of the pillars. This would, then, justify the settlement of the issue, since the Anglo–Russian Boundary Commission of 1884 to 1886 that set up the pillars in the first place had also been a joint affair. Finally, it was suggested that communication between the two countries should be conducted through the medium of the Meshed Consulate.39 There was, however, diversification of opinion between the Russian Government at St Petersburg and their authorities in Trans-Caspia, as the latter behaved more like independent agents than delegated authorities:40 The military districts of Asia have become a species of penitentiary to which officers who have fallen under the displeasure of the Tsar or the War Department, who have outraged the laws of honour or become financially bankrupt, are deported in order that they may be given an opportunity of purging their offences, and working their way back to favour by feats of valour. Later, Spring-Rice, the British Minister at Tehran in 1907, who had been at the British Embassy at St Petersburg from 1903 to 1906, wrote on this subject to Grey, Lansdowne’s successor as Foreign Secretary, arguing a similar case, that men deployed to the region were of a very different stamp to those like Count Benckendorff, who were altogether more urbane.41 This difference became clearer as time went on and in the middle of June, the Government of India reported an incident clearly reflecting this. Some horses were stolen from Kushk and the Governor there wrote to the Governor of Herat requesting his assistance in the matter. The letter was given to two Russian Turcomen troopers and they took it direct to Herat. Once they had arrived, they were asked why they

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had not given the letter to the Afghan frontier officials. Their replies were found wanting and led the Governor of Herat to believe that they ‘were acting under orders from the Russians’. The Government of India also saw the matter in a bad light, labelling it as ‘an innovation, and an objectionable one’, concluding that: ‘This action by the Russian Authorities in Trans-Caspia appears to be inconsistent with negotiations now proceeding between His Majesty’s Government and Russia. They seem determined to force to the front the question of direct communications with Herat.’ In addition, it was discovered that when the Turcomen soldiers arrived at Herat, they took an interest in the Afghan troops drilling there.42 Lansdowne now decided that this matter needed to be dealt with urgently and so he took the matter up with Benckendorff. He stated that the Russian activity in the north was a practice to which ‘we [the British Government] took exception’ and that it was somewhat at odds with the common position the two governments were trying to achieve. In addition, Lansdowne did not see it as proper to consider the Governor of Herat as ‘a mere frontier official’. Benckendorff’s reply was that the issue of direct communications was not being lost sight of, adding that he believed there would be no difficulty in coming to an arrangement concerning it.43 Two days later Benckendorff returned to see Lansdowne. The Foreign Secretary then read him the Pro-Memoriâ which Scott had written. Benckendorff, however, had been absent from London at the time and had not seen it. The Russian Ambassador was told of the British plan to use the Meshed Consulate as a medium of communication and was also reminded of how unfortunate it was in British eyes that the Russian frontier officials sought to deal with Herat direct. Benckendorff replied that he thought it doubtful that the Russian Government would agree to this proposal, even as a temporary measure. He then went on to say that there was nothing wrong with the trans-frontier communications and that such correspondence should be allowed to ‘legitimately take place’. Lansdowne refused to accept this argument, which seemed to be something of a volte face on the part of Benckendorff. He concluded that no arrangement could come into being in any case without the agreement of the Amir.44

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Foreign Office concern over the Russian position was articulated the next day by Sir Charles Hardinge, then Lansdowne’s Private Secretary at the Foreign Office:45 There is some risk that the Russian Government may adopt dilatory tactics with regard to the Meshed proposal, and, in the meantime, endeavour to establish by a series of precedents ... a practice of direct communications to which His Majesty’s Government are bound to object. At the same time the Government of India was furious with the Russian attempts to secure these relations and had made an effort to acquire the letters sent from Russian Central Asia. They also juxtaposed the attitudes of both the local officials and the Russian Government by saying that the latter was ‘affecting to discuss matters’ while the former were ‘trying to establish the practice’, concluding that ‘the only consequence of such conduct is, that in order to check these intrigues, we shall be compelled to place [a] permanent British representative at Herat’. Three days later they wrote to Hamilton again, this time with new information. Firstly, it was established that the Turcomen troopers ‘deliberately came by [an] unusual route’ to Herat. The Amir believed that they had done so in order that they might be molested by Afghan troops providing the Russians with an ‘excuse for interference’, something the Amir saw as ‘quite irregular’. Secondly, the Government of India was assured of the Amir’s cooperation, as he had stated that he would not correspond with the Russians and requested that the British Government prevent such violations of his territory.46 The news from St Petersburg, however, was not good. It was discovered through a Russian newspaper, the St Petersburger Zeitung, that the Russian trade figures for Afghanistan had improved. This must have been a move from the Russian Government, which controlled the press, as the numbers given correspond exactly to official figures. The fact that they do demonstrates the intention of the Russian Government to exercise what they considered to be a legitimate right to direct relations.47

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It seemed that Benckendorff had been right to believe that his government would reject British proposals over Meshed. In conversation with Lamsdorff, Scott was told that the matter had been referred to General Ivanoff at Tashkent, and that the issue was still under consideration. This delay, Scott feared, would be utilised by the Russian authorities in Central Asia to try to persuade the Amir to avoid the more lengthy means of communication advocated by the Government of India and the British Government and thereby pressure him to agree to the quicker method of direct communication with Tashkent.48 Consequently, the end of July saw a concerted attempt by Curzon to win over the Amir. He continued to believe at this time that the attitude of the Amir was friendly and he had ‘no evidence of his taking part in Russian intrigues’. So he wrote to the Amir asking to meet him in order to discuss ‘the advance of Russian forces towards the Afghan border’ which may lead to ‘peril to your country’. In the end, however, the Amir did not visit Curzon. His dislike of the Viceroy meant that the two would never meet, despite Curzon’s continual attempts to do so.49 By the beginning of August neither Lansdowne nor Scott had heard from the Russians, so Scott was instructed to bring the matter up with Lamsdorff. He had believed the matter to have been settled by Benckendorff and had thus done nothing, but in reality Benckendorff had referred the matter to Lamsdorff, who promised to straighten out this misunderstanding. Scott, however, reminded Lamsdorff that the issue of the destroyed boundary pillars was a political one and that the Amir had wished the Governor of Herat to communicate with the Russian Central Asian authorities through the Meshed Consulate. Unfortunately, Lamsdorff did not want to discuss the matter further, leading Scott to suspect that Lamsdorff’s statement that he thought Benckendorff had settled the matter was made after Benckendorff had told Lansdowne that he did not believe the Russian Government would accept the proposals on Meshed. This, Scott believed, ‘may have been based on some official communication of the views of his Government, which it was hoped would prevent their being pressed for an official refusal in writing’.50

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At the same time, the Amir reiterated ‘his resolve to adhere firmly to [the] British alliance’, and complained that there was a delay in sending a British officer to inspect the boundary pillars. The Government of India thought this reasonable and believed that the Russian Government’s failure to reply to Lansdowne should not delay matters further.51 They suggested that an officer be sent to Herat to examine the complaints regarding the boundary pillars and the Russian construction of a canal infringing Afghan territory. This would not necessitate any change in existing arrangements, save the repair of several dilapidated pillars. In the case of the canal, if a Russian officer accepted the British invitation to meet their officer, the issue could be resolved on the spot. If not, the view was taken that the British officer would have to confine his activities to reporting events rather than rectifying the alleged encroachments on Afghan territory.52 The Russian Central Asian authorities, however, were eager to resolve the boundary pillars issue without recourse to discussion with the British. The Governor of Herat informed Meshed that he had received a letter from the Governor of Askabad to the effect that if he did not receive a response over the boundary pillars by the next month, the pillars would be re-erected by a Russian officer. The Governor of Herat asked Whyte at Meshed to inform him of instructions as soon as possible, assuming that the Amir and the Viceroy were communicating on the subject. The letter was sent to the Amir, but the Governor was afraid of not receiving instructions by the appointed time, in which case a Russian officer would put the pillars up himself. In such a case, ‘serious difficulties might arise in the future as he could place them where he likes’. The Governor was, then, anxious that, until the British and Russian governments issued their instructions, the Russian Government should be asked to defer sending an officer to re-erect the pillars.53 The India Office view, however, was more relaxed: Lord George Hamilton can hardly believe that the action of the Governor of Askabad was taken with the cognizance of the Russian Government, seeing that they were informed in May last of the view of His Majesty’s Government that the question

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Sir Arthur Godley, the Permanent Under-Secretary for the India Office, suggested that the Russian Government should be requested to send one of their officers to meet the British officer as soon as possible to iron out any difficulties on the frontier and recommended that the letter from the Governor of Askabad should be acknowledged as having been received by His Majesty’s Government.54 At the Foreign Office, the prevailing opinion remained that direct communications could not be carried out without the agreement of the Amir, so it was a logical corollary of this to bring him on side. The way to do this was to secure an undertaking from the Amir listing his objections to the establishment of direct relations. Such a document ‘could not but considerably strengthen our hands in any future discussions on this subject, and would conclusively demonstrate the loyal attitude of the Amir in his relations with the Government of India’. This would be ‘as complete and definite as possible, and to leave no room for doubt as to the attitude he has adopted on the question of direct relations’.55 The following day the India Office informed the Government of India of the developments which had occurred and that an officer was about to be instructed to proceed to Herat. The Amir should also be ‘given an opening for the further expression of his views’ so that these could be conveyed to the Russian Government.56 At St Petersburg, Lamsdorff had been as evasive as ever, which prompted Scott to write to him direct. The substance of the letter from Askabad was repeated to him, as was the proposal to send a British officer to be met by a Russian counterpart of ‘suitable rank’. By 21 August, Scott had received an answer. This was to state that the Russian position had been stated in the memorandum of 6 February 1900 and that ‘the [Russian] Government see no reason for modifying the decision then arrived at’.57 It was, therefore, important that an officer be sent to Herat. After originally considering sending someone from McMahon’s Commission, Whyte was going to go but fell ill. It was then decided to revert to the

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original plan and Henry Dobbs, a Political Officer on deputation to McMahon’s Commission, was sent.58 On 25 August Lansdowne at last received an answer from the Russians to Scott’s memorandum of 27 May. On 20 August, Lamsdorff had sent Scott a memorandum stating the Russian position. This recapped on Scott’s proposals that the boundary pillars should be reerected under the conditions that they had been originally put up and that Meshed should act as a medium of communication between Central Asia and Herat. Lamsdorff went on to state, as he had done before, that Russian policy was encapsulated in the memorandum of 6 February 1900 and that circumstances permitted the Russian Government to have ‘direct communication with the Afghan authorities for the settlement of all frontier matters’. The Russian Government was, therefore, ‘not able to accept the proposals’ as they had already set out their policy in 1900, which had been accepted by the British Government. This, they believed, was ‘best able to contribute to the settlement of order and tranquillity on the Central Asian Frontier – a settlement as much desired in the interests of Russia as in those of Great Britain’.59 The Government of India, on hearing the news of the Russian refusal, was both perplexed and angry. While it was thought that the Russian Government might refuse mediation through Meshed, Curzon was at a loss to understand Russian reluctance to restore the boundary pillars with British officers. If the negotiations over direct relations were ‘in suspense in consequence of [the] last Russian reply’, the Russian Government should be informed of the views of the Amir and the British Government and the correspondence to Herat from Russian Central Asia should also be shown to Benckendorff. If the Russians still refused to meet Whyte on the frontier, contrary to the Amir’s and British wishes, Curzon believed ‘it will be necessary for us to explain to [the] Amir [the] seriousness of [the] situation’. In addition, Curzon recommended that the Amir’s position should be sought in order to allow the British to ‘maintain officers at suitable points on [the] frontier’. This result, though, would almost certainly ‘not be agreeable to Russia’. Curzon concluded by saying that under the circumstances it might ‘be desirable to publish [the] whole correspondence’.60

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Hamilton decided to submit a proposal to Lansdowne for further representation to the Russian Government concerning the boundary pillars, as this ‘cannot be regarded as non-political’ as was contemplated in the Russian memorandum of 6 February 1900. The Government of India was ready to send someone to repair the boundary pillars, but they preferred the work to be done in cooperation with a Russian officer. Lansdowne accepted this and passed Hamilton’s observation on to Scott at St Petersburg.61

The Northern Afghan Frontier and the Dobbs Mission to Herat The Government of India had written to the Amir, who had contacted the Governor of Herat, to confirm arrangements for their agent’s arrival and reception. Dobbs, accompanied by Major Wanliss of the Meshed Intelligence Branch, was to be met by General Ghaus-ud-din Khan, who commanded the Maimama garrison north-east of Herat. In addition, the Amir in Kabul promised to abstain from communication with the Russians and to send any letters he received from them direct to the Government of India.62 The Dobbs Mission to Herat is one event in the study of Anglo– Afghan relations that has been almost completely neglected. While the Dane Mission to Kabul of 1905 has attracted some attention, the mission which preceded it has not. Most historians of this period make no mention of it whatsoever, though Adamec, Dilks and Bilgrami do so, although briefly. Adamec and Bilgrami, however, seem to have missed some aspects of the Mission. As a result, the literature does not assign to it the importance it deserves. This section, therefore, seeks to rectify that omission in the study of this period.63 At St Petersburg, Scott saw Lamsdorff over the Russian refusal to accept the British proposals. He criticised the Russian use of the 1900 memorandum as it declared that it would limit communication to non-political matters and the boundary pillars issue ‘could not be regarded as non-political’. Scott also repeated that a British officer would be sent to Herat and that the British Government preferred that a Russian officer cooperate with him in pillar reconstruction.

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The substance of this constituted a Pro-Memoriâ sent to Lamsdorff in order to render Scott’s message ‘quite clear’. Scott also expressed his personal opinion that the matter was one of ‘serious importance’ and, as the situation stood, it was likely to ‘lead to a deadlock and give rise to misunderstanding’. For his part, the Amir remained unhappy with the situation, prompting Scott to state that the attitude of the Russian Central Asian authorities in trying to push direct relations to the contravention of engagements between the Amir and the Government of India, without any form of consultation, might result in ‘serious difficulties’. Scott concluded with a conversation he had had with Count Benckendorff, then on leave in St Petersburg, in which the Count said that he had made it clear in his official reports that the British Government viewed the situation in the north of Afghanistan as of great importance, but that Lamsdorff and the Russian Foreign Ministry considered that he had taken an exaggerated view of the seriousness of the question. Lamsdorff accepted the personal nature of much of what Scott had said, as well as the official position from the Foreign Office in London. Lansdowne approved this language.64 The view at this time from Amir Habibullah at Kabul was one of anger and distrust at the Russian behaviour over the northern Afghanistan question, and he wrote to Curzon to this effect:65 The wishes of the Russian Government are so plain that they are no longer under a veil; and their intention is clearly observed that they want to possess the whole world for themselves. ... [and that] if they make an advance their real object will be Indian territory ... their first step of advance is Afghanistan and their second India. Several days later a disturbing report reached the Government of India that seemed to confirm some of the Amir’s concerns. A new communication had arrived, sent to the Governor of Herat, stating that an Afghan commission must be on the frontier by 1/14 October to meet the Russian commission for the restoration of the boundary pillars. At the same time, the Foreign Office proposed to the India Office

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that they report the Amir’s view, as encapsulated in his correspondence to the Viceroy, on the issue of direct relations to the Russian Government.66 Matters were made worse by a reported outbreak of cholera in Afghanistan. The authorities at Askabad felt that something ought to be done and, suspiciously, an article appeared in the newspaper Novoe Vremya, which was controlled in great measure by the Russian Government. The article argued that European Russian outbreaks of cholera came from Persia and Afghanistan and that in order to contain it, it was necessary to make some representation to Afghanistan. The article went on to say that some sanitary measures could be taken against Persian imports but, due to the hostility of the Afghan Government and the indeterminate character of relations, this could not be done in the case of Afghanistan. This was complicated by irregular trade which existed ‘by circuitous routes which we do not, and which the Afghan Government cannot, prevent, and which increases every year’. The author went on to state that the present ‘anomalous situation’ could not continue and that there should be some form of consular representation in Afghanistan in order both to establish trade relations and to take ‘precautions against such a calamity as an invasion of the cholera’. Seemingly in parallel, the Department of Indirect Taxation authorised the drawback of excise and the payment of premiums on certain goods entering Afghanistan through the Sarrakhs Custom House.67 In another example of the lack of unity in the Russian policy establishment, Lamsdorff again made it clear that at this time the issue of the northern Afghan frontier was definitely closed as the Russian Government had made its position plain in the memorandum of 6 February 1900.68 Almost two weeks later Spring-Rice, then temporarily in charge of the St Petersburg Embassy, mentioned to Prince Obolensky, the acting Minister of Foreign Affairs while Lamsdorff was away, that he hoped there would be no frontier incident when the Russian officer arrived to restore the boundary pillars. Obolensky replied that this would not occur as it was precluded by the instructions sent to that officer. Spring-Rice was thus instructed the next day to find out what he could unofficially about the Russian officer’s instructions and his

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procedure, and then to report back to Lansdowne. He should not, though, ‘show too much anxiety in the matter’.69 The Russian view then became the subject of communication between the Secretary of State for India and the Government of India in early October. The new Secretary of State for India, St John Brodrick, conveyed to the Government of India that the Russian Government regarded the question of direct relations as closed. He then asked what their position would be if the Russians refused to cooperate with Dobbs or recognise him. The Government of India replied that Dobbs should accompany or follow the Afghan commissioners to the frontier. He would then be in a position to remain with them on the frontier and advise them should the Russians prove difficult. If the Russians refused to cooperate in the matter of the reconstruction of the pillars, these could then be set up by the Afghans, the sites being fixed by the surveyor who was accompanying Dobbs. Finally, the Government of India viewed Russian actions on the northern Afghan frontier as a new innovation. Curzon took the view that the Russians appeared to have shifted their ground by contemplating a political arrangement direct with the Afghans which ran counter to their policy as stated in their memorandum of 6 February 1900.70 Less than a week later, it was reported that three Russian officers had left Askabad for the Afghan frontier to reconstruct the boundary pillars. The British Consul at Meshed asked the Governor of Herat to request the Russians to postpone the meeting with the Afghan commissioners, otherwise it was feared that the Russians would try to do everything on their own. Curzon’s advice on action to be taken if the Russians went ahead and rebuilt the pillars was that ‘Dobbs should be instructed to check the work, and report whether the original site has been taken for the reconstructed pillars’.71 At St Petersburg, the British Chargé d’Affairs Spring-Rice had come to the conclusion that there is little to be gained by further correspondence with the Russian Government. It is useless to appeal to the understanding between Great Britain and Afghanistan, which Count Lamsdorff has expressly stated as not binding on Russia. It is

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For Spring-Rice, the correspondence over this issue could be summed up by the fact that ‘Russia has notified her intention of sending, when she pleases, her agents into Afghanistan’. Once this supposed right was exercised, she would then be in a position to ‘acquire a predominant influence in the councils of the [Afghan] Government’.72 Later, in conversation with Prince Obolensky, the Acting Russian Foreign Minister, Spring-Rice made it clear that the introduction of a Russian agent into Afghanistan could become a casus belli, especially as the Amir was opposed to such proposed Russian action. He also expressed his hope that the Russian Government ‘was alive to the gravity of the situation’. With regard to the Russian officer to be sent to the northern Afghan frontier, Spring-Rice was concerned that the Russian officer and Dobbs ‘would adopt the attitude of two Englishmen in a waiting room who had not been formally introduced’. Obolensky replied that the instructions given to the officer ‘precluded the possibility of an “incident” ’. Spring-Rice thus indicated to his Government that the behaviour of the Russian Government showed that they continued to desire the right to enter into direct relations on the frontier. Moreover, when the Russian officer was to arrive, he would be doing so at the invitation of the British and Afghan authorities and, consequently, he could not refuse to communicate with these representatives. Spring-Rice added that he believed that the Amir should be brought in more closely and that Anglo–Afghan agreements should be made more open, as it was expected that the Amir should also take the British line. In closing, he discussed the value of Russian promises, stating that the Russian semi-official press was full of cases that showed that ‘with changing circumstances, the “voluntary assurances” of the Russian Government cease to be obligatory’.73 Several days later Spring-Rice had discovered the Russian officer’s instructions over the boundary pillars. They were as follows: ‘He is to avoid anything likely to create an incident, and is to adopt a conciliatory

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attitude towards [the] British officers and Afghan representatives, but he is not to recognise the former officially.’ At the same time, the instructions to Dobbs were ratified by the British Government. In the event that the work was done before he got there, Dobbs was to check to see that the pillars were properly repaired and in their correct places. The Afghans were then to ask the Russian representative for an official record of their re-erection.74 At St Petersburg, Spring-Rice suggested some measures to be taken on the northern Afghan frontier. These were that: firstly, the British officers be informed that all negotiations must pass through them. Secondly, that there was no point in repeating further the British Government’s opinion on the question in view of the tone of the last Russian communication. Finally, the officers were to be ‘conciliatory and friendly’ in order to prevent the possibility of an incident. In so doing, the British Government would ‘be merely imitating the Russian Government’. These suggestions were approved by Lansdowne and sent to Dobbs.75 Later the same day, Spring-Rice reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry representative for Askabad and two Colonels left that city for the Afghan frontier on 12 October. These men were to repair the boundary pillars and ‘the Afghan authorities have been invited to send delegates to avoid any misunderstandings’.76 Several days later, Spring-Rice reported an interesting volte face on the part of the Russian Government. In conversation with Benckendorff, who was still on leave, the latter mentioned that the Russian Government might be prepared to make ‘precise guarantees’ with regard to direct relations. Benckendorff had the feeling that the Russian Foreign Ministry would be favourable to an agreement with Britain. Moreover, the head of the Asiatic Department was speaking ‘in much the same sense’. Spring-Rice concluded on the basis of this that it would be worthwhile holding out for a treaty as anything else would be practically worthless. He also observed that this change of heart may well have been due to the situation which was developing in the Far East, as well as what appeared to be Lamsdorff’s increasingly insecure position at the Russian Foreign Ministry. He ended by reporting on the development of Russo–Afghan trade which illustrated in part the gulf that existed between the men at St Petersburg

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and the men on the spot in Russian Central Asia.77 Clearly, the unity of the Russian policy establishment had still to come into being at this point. This difference manifested itself in an article in the Trans-Caspian Review. In mentioning the presence of Russian personnel to repair the boundary pillars, the article went on to speak of their British counterparts as ‘uninvited guests’ and continued to criticise their presence as uncalled for and ‘invited by nobody’. The tone of the article was a shrill articulation of direct relations as a right without recourse to the British. This was not the line, recently articulated by Benckendorff, of the Russian Foreign Ministry.78 At the beginning of November, Dobbs reported to the Government of India on his activities. The Russians, it seemed, only wished to repair a few pillars despite widespread damage on the frontier and they had stated that, once the pillars had been re-erected, they could not be altered without the consent of the Tsar. They therefore wanted the Governor of Herat to depute an Afghan officer, something Dobbs persuaded him not to do. In addition, the feeling among the Afghans was that if the Russians were going to repair a few pillars among themselves, then the British and the Afghans were within their rights to repair the remainder without Russian assistance. Curzon wrote that there were several measures that should be adopted. Dobbs should propose to the Russians that the dilapidated pillars should be ‘mutually inspected’ and was to request instructions if the Russians declined. In this event, Curzon deemed that once the Russians retired after repairing the four pillars they considered required restoration, Dobbs should proceed along the entire frontier with the Afghans and repair any damaged pillars. Curzon also took the view that it would be impossible to ignore Afghan sentiment on this matter. At the same time, the Russians would be unable to object as they had put up the pillars without Afghan cooperation.79 Dobbs also believed that if the Afghans communicated with the Russians over the reconstruction of the boundary pillars, it would be ‘a complete abandonment of the British claim to control the foreign relations of Afghanistan’. He opposed the idea of the Russians and the Afghans communicating and wished to supervise the repair of the

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pillars and thence ‘secure a diplomatic victory’. Unsurprisingly, this line was approved by the Government of India.80 The volte face of the Russian Government, reported at the end of October, became official at the beginning of November. Benckendorff, now back in England, set out the new Russian position. He informed Lansdowne that Lamsdorff wished to ‘remove all sources of misunderstanding’ between the two governments and, with a view to this, had instructed Benckendorff to discuss outstanding questions in order to arrive at an agreement. He was then to proceed back to St Petersburg at the start of the new year to report developments to his Government. Benckendorff also informed Lansdowne that the Russian demand for agents in Afghanistan had been dropped. On the issue of boundary pillars, Lansdowne criticised the Russian refusal to have their officer cooperate with Dobbs. Benckendorff’s reply was that, even though the pillars had been erected jointly, the reason for this was to demarcate the frontier. Since this had already been done, it was no longer necessary for a joint deputation to restore them as a Russian officer could do this on his own. Lansdowne was sceptical of this argument and made it clear to Benckendorff that the whole issue would produce ‘a very bad effect on public opinion in this country’.81 Anglophobes in the semi-official Russian press, however, continued to advocate contacts with Afghanistan. An author in the Trans-Caspian Review even went so far as to argue that the Russian troops in Central Asia should use their weight to deter Great Britain from supporting Japan in the Far East under the Anglo–Japanese Alliance.82 By 25 November, the newfound conciliatory attitude of the Russian Government gave rise to a full discussion on issues of contention between the two countries. In the conversation on Afghanistan, Lansdowne made his government’s position clear: this was that Afghanistan was within the British sphere of influence and that Britain controlled Afghan foreign relations. Direct communication between Russia and Afghanistan would be permitted only on local and non-political matters. Furthermore, any agreement arrived at on Afghanistan would have to have the blessing of the Amir and ‘Russia would have to agree to abstain from sending agents into Afghanistan’. Benckendorff did not object to any of the proposals made by Lansdowne.83

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The next day, it became clear that various forces from Russian business were opposing the new line of the Government. Trade figures were released for imports and exports with Afghanistan showing an improvement in trade from 1896 to 1901. In addition to this, a statement appeared in the Trans-Caspian Review arguing that the establishment of regular trading relations between Russia and Afghanistan owed much to ‘the initiative of a large transport company having its principal house of business in St Petersburg’. This trade aroused interest in Trans-Caspia and it was said that the Russian Government had decided to establish a consulate in Afghanistan.84 At the end of November the Government of India received a telegram from Dobbs, stating that the Russian officer, who was to accompany him in the repair of the pillars, had returned to Panjdeh after having repaired only a few of them. These were numbers 36 to 39. Dobbs thus wanted to inspect the Russian work and then proceed along the frontier in order to repair other reportedly damaged pillars. He found support for these intentions from both the Government of India and the India Office.85 In the middle of December, it became clear that, rather than adopting a new conciliatory policy, the Russians were merely putting a more agreeable face on the old one. Both Lamsdorff and Benckendorff reverted to the position that they intended to proceed along the lines indicated in their memorandum of 1900. That a change had been made there was no doubt. This quasi-reversion of policy was probably due to a tougher line from the Russian Foreign Ministry, with Lamsdorff regaining some power in the organisation. As far as the Russians were concerned, they believed that the boundary pillars, if only four of them, had now been repaired and that his would serve their wish to close the issue and to reassert the status quo ante.86 At this time, the Government of India also received two telegrams, written in late November and early December, from Dobbs. On inspecting the Russian workmanship, Dobbs commented that it was ‘executed in a disgraceful fashion’ as they had been repaired with mud which was already falling into ruin, rather than with mortar. In spite of this, the pillars were situated correctly. A new problem had,

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however, arisen in the form of obstruction by the Governor of Herat, Ahmed Jan Khan, ‘who is clearly desirous of frustrating our policy’, and it had become necessary to gain the Amir’s approval before going further. As if this were not enough, one of the pillars, number 35, had, due to geological movements, ended up ‘permanently under water in the river Murghab’, so it became necessary for a new site to be chosen for it. This could only be done by a meeting of British and Russian representatives, which necessitated renewed discussion of the situation with the Russian Government. Curzon believed that it would be best for Dobbs to repair the remaining pillars, then the case of pillar number 35 could be brought up with the Russian Government as it would then have been left until last. The view of the Foreign Office, on receiving this information, was to agree with the Viceroy’s position and that the matter of the inundated pillar should be left until the restoration of the others had been completed. Once this had been done, representation would have to be made to the Russian Government.87 News also came from Dobbs on the attitude of the Governor of Herat and it seemed that Dobbs had outstayed his welcome. The Governor of Herat had given orders that the Afghan authorities on the frontier should communicate with the Russian authorities across the border regarding certain thefts that had occurred. As there was a moratorium on such communication, the action of the Governor ‘appears to be a defiance of the policy not only of the British Government but of the Ameer, and as such it will be widely interpreted’. Dobbs wrote of the Governor that he was ‘secretly fighting tooth and nail against the Amir’s ostensible policy of preventing direct communication with the Russians’, and Dobbs concluded that he was a Russophile. It was also observed that the Governor of Herat was scheming for greater independence from Kabul and that, in order to fulfil this aim, he was ‘anxious to adopt the practice of direct correspondence with the Russians’. This was reported to Brodrick in the most scathing terms by Curzon, who added that the Governor had been paid by the Russians and had taken their side.88 Dobbs, however, had not only outstayed his welcome in Herat, but also in Afghanistan. The Amir wrote to the Viceroy that due to the

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severe winter, as well as to the fact that the Russians had satisfactorily repaired the dilapidated boundary pillars, Dobbs should return to Meshed. If anything were to be done at a later date, the Amir would inform Curzon. The Viceroy took a dim view of this since the winter season was already half over and so argued that Dobbs should remain where he was until the beginning of March and resume his work then. Curzon then proposed to communicate with the Amir about the matter and instructed Dobbs not to move pending further instructions.89 Dobbs’ position at Herat had become more isolated by the beginning of February. The Governor of Herat wanted to repair other pillars directly with the Russians and, in so doing, ignore Dobbs’ role and presence. In response, Dobbs had advised the Afghans not to communicate with the Russians on this issue. He summed up the situation thus: It is hardly to be expected that the Russians will venture, in the absence of Afghan and British Representatives, to select a new site for pillar number 35, and we may bring them to account on this point. No orders to build without the Russians seem to have been received from the Amir, otherwise I should endeavour, in order to maintain our position, to insist on the immediate construction of some pillars by us without the Russians. Curzon’s reply was that Dobbs should continue to advise the Afghans to refuse to deal with the Russians directly. At the same time, he was also expecting a letter from the Amir to clarify the position.90 The expected letter arrived at the beginning of March and was not as satisfactory in all particulars as the Viceroy would have liked. The Amir thought that there was no longer anything to be gained from Dobbs’ continued presence at Herat. Withdrawing Dobbs would be unfortunate, especially regarding the Governor of Herat’s pro-Russian position. The matter was, in Curzon’s eyes, all the more important because ‘serious responsibility is entailed by the obligation to defend the Herat frontier, having regard to the strong Russophile tendencies of the border population, and the lamentable condition of the frontier

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itself’. Finally, the possibility was expressed of Dobbs proceeding to Kabul after having checked the pillars as far as Mazar-i-Sharif. The Viceroy liked the idea as the Amir might speak ‘more freely’ to Dobbs than he had done in correspondence.91 Dobbs’ view of events was that ‘a project has been concerted between the Afghans and the Russians to secure my withdrawal from Afghanistan’, and he feared that after he left the Russians would be able to repair some of the pillars without British cooperation before a protest from the British Government could be effective. A precedent would then be set which would exclude British agents from the repair and inspection of the boundary pillars, something to be guarded against to prevent a triumph of Russian diplomacy.92 At the same time, though, he believed that there was little or nothing which could be done to prevent ongoing communications between Russia and Afghanistan.93 At the India Office, Brodrick’s opinion was that the Dobbs Mission should continue and he agreed with Curzon’s view that Dobbs’ ‘withdrawal is undesirable’, but said that although he would prefer it if Dobbs did not go to Kabul to discuss matters with the Amir, he would be willing to allow him to go to there in order to hear the views of the Amir and to relay them to the Government of India. He also made it clear that Dobbs was in the north-west of Afghanistan in order to ensure that the frontier was correctly demarcated. In the context of British help to resist Russian aggression, it was ‘hardly wise of the Ameer to thwart proceedings which, having no other object than the furtherance of his interests and the security of his throne, were originally undertaken at his own request’.94 Brodrick’s view on the matter seems to have undergone a change in the preceding days, as he now argued that there was little to be gained by keeping Dobbs where he was contrary to the wishes of the Amir. Both Balfour and Lansdowne agreed with him, presenting the Viceroy with a united Cabinet line. Curzon vehemently disagreed, stating that the repair of the pillars by the Russians and the Afghans alone, as well as the Russian intrigues in Herat and Afghan Turkestan, would be thwarted as long as Dobbs was there. The Viceroy also made it clear that the Amir had believed his own position to be

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threatened by Russia even if he no longer wanted Dobbs at Herat, so he agreed that Dobbs should proceed to Kabul to ‘explain matters personally’ to the Amir. In this instance, Brodrick agreed to Curzon’s suggestions.95 At the end of March, rumours of contacts between the Amir and the Russians surfaced from a British subject, one Mr Thornton, who had just returned from Kabul. Apparently two Russians had arrived in the Afghan capital, a fact confirmed by the British Agent there, and were granted an audience with the Amir. There ‘they asked for passage through Afghanistan to India for the Russian Army’. Unsurprisingly, their request was refused but they were not imprisoned and, rather oddly, were allowed to remain in Kabul. Moreover, there were rumours of communications between the Russians in Turkestan and the Amir, but the Government of India found it hard to credit that particular report. New reports of Afghan duplicity came to light in April when Major Wanliss, who was accompanying Dobbs, reported direct communications with the Russians from the Governor of Herat on the subject of preventing the British from repairing the boundary pillars. The Amir was also involved in attempting to remove the Dobbs Mission from the frontier.96 May saw the arrival of a letter from the Amir to Curzon. The Amir wished for Dobbs to be removed from the northern frontier on the grounds that, if Dobbs were to reconstruct the dilapidated pillars without Russian assistance, it was feared the Russians would pull them down again and so resurrect the old problem again until they had secured direct relations. The Amir did not want this to happen and so considered Dobbs’ continued presence to be ‘productive of harm’. In illustrating that he had not deserted the British, the Amir wrote that ‘the Afghan Government will not speak to Russia in political matters with any other mouth or tongue than that of sword and rifle’. Habibullah was also content for Dobbs to proceed to Kabul via either the Kandahar or Hazara route. The Viceroy agreed and instructed Dobbs accordingly. His preference was for Dobbs to proceed along the Hazara route as the Government of India had virtually no information concerning it. This was approved by Brodrick and the instructions were promptly issued.97

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Just before Dobbs’ departure from Herat, he made a tour of its defences, the vulnerability of which to an invasion by Russia was all too apparent from Dobbs’ recounting of events in his diary:98 In the afternoon Major Wanliss and I made a tour of the defences of Herat, inspecting all the principal powers and gunemplacements. There is a wonderful collection of old, heavy, smooth bore guns of varying sizes and dates ... The total number of guns mounted on the defences is 72. They are kept in good order, as also are the fortifications. It was pathetic to see the pride of the ragged gunners in them, and their obvious pleasure at the interest which we displayed. They told us wonderful stories of the range of the guns; but I fear that it is so long since they have had any artillery practice that the performances of these guns have become quite legendary. In early June, Brodrick in London formulated a set of draft instructions for Dobbs for his visit to Kabul. They were: first, Dobbs was in Kabul because the Amir wanted him out of Herat and to hear from him what he had seen there. Second, while in Kabul, Dobbs had no authority to enter into any negotiations or to state any political opinions. Third, Dobbs had two functions while at Kabul. These were to tell the Amir what went on at Herat, but with propriety, and to hear what the Amir had to say to him and faithfully report his views to the Government of India. Dobbs was also to make it clear to the Amir that his instructions were ‘of a closely restricted nature’. Fourth, Dobbs was to make his stay at Kabul as brief as possible. Fifth, Dobbs was to gather what information he could on the situation at Kabul. When he was there, he was to conduct himself ‘with a becoming sense of responsibility’, being a representative of his country. Finally, Dobbs was to learn what he could from the British Agent at Kabul, Tiwana Malik, but not to ‘repose any confidence in him’. Curzon agreed entirely with these instructions.99 Wanliss and Dobbs arrived at Kabul on 8 July to a cordial reception. In a series of interviews with Dobbs the Afghan ruler made it plain that he wanted more guns and ammunition to make the defence

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of Afghanistan, and by implication India, stronger. This was a theme which was explored in the Dane Mission to Kabul of 1904–05, of which Dobbs was a member. Dobbs believed that the Amir was using the opportunity of his presence to express his opinions on these matters in order to avoid visiting the Viceroy or receiving a mission at Kabul. In addition, the Amir wanted a written note from Dobbs on the Herat situation which he, albeit reluctantly, agreed to furnish. Finally, Dobbs received a memorandum on non-interference in Afghanistan stating that the country should be better armed in order to defend itself, which was in line with Habibullah’s ideal of a strong Afghanistan as a buffer state. After these brief interviews, Dobbs’ mission was completed. He left Kabul at the beginning of August and made his way to Peshawar and thence to the Government of India to make his report.100

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2 EVENTS IN RUSSIAN CENTRAL ASIA AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

During the latter part of Dobbs’ Mission to Herat the situation in the region grew more precarious, as Russo–Japanese relations worsened. This chapter covers the military planning which took place as war in the Far East became inevitable. This was to give rise to concerns in London that an attack against Afghanistan was likely and a great deal of time and energy went into military planning and scoping out potential Russian avenues of advance.

Russian Railways and Rumours of Military Preparations As a precautionary measure, the Russians began to build up their troop concentrations in Central Asia in order to fulfil three functions. First, they could potentially be despatched to the front in the Far East to fight the Japanese and to protect Russian interests there. Second, the troops were in Central Asia to guard Russian possessions against an anticipated attack from the British, who were allies of Japan, were the war to escalate. Connected to this, troops were also in the region to prevent a British-inspired Muslim insurrection against their Russian overlords. Fraser-Tytler cites General Palitsyn, the Russian Chief of the General Staff, who feared that Britain, which had so many Muslims

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in the Empire, might ‘at some future time, when we were in disagreement with Russia, raise the Muhammedans against them, and hurl the Afghans against their borders’. This, Fraser-Tytler believed, was a ‘genuine fear of British aggression against Russia’s Central Asian possessions’.1 Finally, Russian troops were employed as a means of putting political pressure on Britain. There were other causes of consternation, too, most notably the rapid development of Russian strategic railways and the weakness of British intelligence in penetrating the mountains of the Hindu Kush. This weakness was highlighted by observations made by several important personages. Sir Charles Hardinge, at this point the new Ambassador at St Petersburg, wrote that ‘it is impossible for ... me to know really what is going on in Central Asia’.2 Lord Kitchener, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, was also baffled and stated that ‘I cannot make out what their intentions are’.3 He encapsulated this frustration thus: ‘We are in no position at any time to judge with even approximate accuracy as to what may be actually taking place behind the impenetrable screen with which we are confronted ... it is quite possible for extensive preparations to be quietly proceeding without our being very much the wiser.’4 Further difficulties lay in the unreliability of information received by the Government of India and the intelligence-gathering network at Meshed. Such information came from the natives of the territories concerned or from merchants travelling through areas of political sensibility. Their inclination was to tell the British what they thought they would be most willing to believe, or what they thought they wanted to hear. This source of information lacked accuracy in consequence and, even if intelligence of this sort were reported faithfully, it was tainted by bazaar rumour and useless, untrue or out-of-date tales which bore little or no relation to the reality on the ground. This deficiency was made worse by Kitchener’s readiness to believe much of this information, despite its evident dubiousness.5 All these concerns, however, related to one overwhelming fact: there was a large strategic railway network in Russian Central Asia, its logistical support was improving all the time, soldiers were arriving in the region in large numbers, and there was little or nothing that British intelligence could do to ascertain what was really happening.

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Consequently, the British military went about calculating what would happen if the Russians invaded. In a wargame played at Simla in 1903, the Russians had won and pursued a battered Indian Army into India itself. In order to explain this somewhat embarrassing outcome away, it was shown that the Russians had too many men and that their logistical base would not be sufficiently developed to allow them to move troops as far or as fast as they had done in the simulation. Despite this, the figures were produced which allowed the Russians some movement along a single line of railway, which would, in this case, be the Orenburg–Tashkent line. Kitchener added his voice to the question by stating that he believed, on the basis of his own calculations, that 400,000 men, instead of 200,000 men, could be supplied in the case of the Russians invading. He therefore attacked the conclusions of those who believed Russian capabilities to be overestimated and prompted a fear that the Russians really could invade in force.6 Certainly, the opinion of such a senior soldier would have commanded the respect of those involved and have significantly added to the debate at the time. The first indications of increased activity started in late 1903. It was reported by the Russian press that the southern section of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway would be opening for passenger traffic from 28 October. One train would operate daily for a distance of 156 miles, from Tashkent to Turkestan. Two weeks later it was reported that 550 miles of track had been laid. Spring-Rice concluded, ‘judging from the rate at which work has progressed up to the present, it is assumed that the whole line will be opened for traffic in the course of next year’.7 Matters looked even worse at the end of the year when, in addition to the rapid work on the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, it was reported that the Russian Railway Department had decided to make surveys for a railway from Samarkand to Termez. This line would run for a distance of 200 miles and was an important development because, if the line was completed, along with the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, ‘Russia would then possess two distinct lines of attack against Afghanistan’. The first would be the Trans-Caspian line to Kushk and the other would be via Orenburg and Tashkent to Termez on the Oxus.8

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At the same time, an article appeared in the Trans-Caspian Review on the subject of war in Central Asia. The author wrote, ‘our chances of success depend on the rapidity which we shall be able to exhibit in the massing of troops on the Afghan frontier’. The means to do this were then discussed, emphasising the roles of strategic railways and the Caspian Flotilla in such an operation. In addition, Colonel H.D. Napier, the British Military Attaché at St Petersburg, reported that water condensers were being shipped to Krasnovodsk ‘with a view to the supply of the water required for any large movement of troops’.9 A fortnight later another article appeared in the same journal arguing the case for the Samarkand–Termez railway. The author felt that it would be beneficial for trade and, that, were the situation to tend towards war, the railway to Termez would be useful as a further railway could be built towards Kabul as a means ‘of checking England’s encroachments in those regions’. The only criticism was that the route would be more economical and easier to construct if the line went from Bokhara, instead of Samarkand, to Termez. Scott was also concerned that this railway was particularly significant as it was ‘the shortest road to India’ and was ‘establishing unbroken communication with Central Russia’.10 Napier also heard that the Staffs of Smolensk, Orel and Kozlov were to mobilise ‘in case of offensive action against Afghanistan’. Despite it being evident that they were being prepared for service in the Far East, he was still concerned about their proceeding to Trans-Caspia. The reason for this was that the Chief of Staff was ‘a rabid Anglophobe and an earnest advocate of a campaign against India’. In Napier’s view, it was highly undesirable to have such a man in command of troops in Trans-Caspia.11 It was also at this time that the proposed Samarkand–Termez railway, which had caused so much anxiety, came under the scrutiny of the Committee of Imperial Defence, or CID. The Intelligence Department at the War Office submitted a paper on this, using as its frame of reference Scott’s despatch of 17 December 1903.12 The paper first referred to the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, of which the Samarkand–Termez railway was to be an extension. The former would be completed either

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in late 1904 or early 1905. Then work on the extension could be started at the beginning of 1905.13 There were several strategic advantages in this line. The first was that there would be ‘a distinct gain’ in having two lines terminating on the northern Afghan Frontier at both Kushk and Termez, respectively. Secondly, Russian troops could advance on Kabul, from Termez via Mazar-i-Sharif, faster than would have been possible hitherto. More troops could advance and be supplied as the logistics would have been improved by the railway. With these railways ‘Russia could supply in Central Asia a total force of 300,000 men’, so the two lines would greatly facilitate Russian movement to Kabul and Kandahar. Russian troops could proceed from Termez via Mazar-i-Sharif and Bamian to Kabul, a distance of 430 miles, in 36 marches and from Kushk via Herat and Farah to Kandahar, a distance of 483 miles, in 35 marches.14 The final advantage of the Termez extension was that, in the event of war, troops could be transferred from Termez to Kushk, or vice versa, if they were needed to reinforce one or other axis of attack. For example, if the Russians were advancing strongly from Farah to Kandahar, and yet encountering stiff resistance at Charikar or Bamian, troops could be transferred from Kushk to Termez to provide reinforcement on the Kabul line. Such movement could be carried out ‘more rapidly and secretly than at present’ and could be used as a feint to catch the British off-guard in any campaign.15 There were also proposals as to what should be done in India while the Russian railways were being built and it was advised that the Peshawar–Dakka railway extension should be pushed on, and quickly. Renewed efforts would also have to be made to induce the Amir to build telegraphs in order to inform the Indian authorities what was occurring at Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif in the event of a Russian attack. It was argued that there should also be more troops ready to meet an attack, either by an increase in the size of the Indian Army or prompt reinforcement of it from overseas.16 There was also the concern that further railway extension was being considered for construction by the Russians; a branch line from Omsk to Tashkent. In the provinces through which this line was to pass, there were plenty of animals for use as both food and pack transport.

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Including nomadic cattle, there were an estimated 11,500,000 animals in the region consisting of horses, cattle, sheep and camels. It was concluded that, ‘if these additional sources of supply and transport became available, Russia would be able to make a corresponding increase in the number of men dispatched across the Afghan frontier’.17 Curzon was concerned that this military build-up in Russian Central Asia could become dangerous and that the Russians would turn to British India. He wrote: ‘Sooner or later, whether it be from the lust of victory, or from the anger of defeat, Russia will probably feel tempted to exert greater pressure on every side of India, and ... the Persian and Afghan outlook becomes in consequence not less, but more menacing.’18 New developments were reported in mid- to late February 1904. More of the southern section of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway had been opened and there were a mere 218 miles of track left to be laid. In addition to this, three important Russian Generals left St Petersburg heading for Central Asia. These were the Governor of Turkestan, General Ivanov, his Chief of Staff, General Sakharov, and General Usakovski, the commander of Trans-Caspia and of the 2nd Turkestan Army Corps. This was especially worrying for the British given the Anglophobe feeling in Russia and the near completion of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, ‘which will nearly double the effective strength of Russia on the Afghan frontier’. Napier felt that if Russia did badly against Japan in the Far East, she would then ‘look southwards to retrieve some of her lost prestige in what is regarded by many Russians as an easier and more profitable campaign towards India’. Finally, the Russians were building food depots on parts of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway able to feed 1,000 men at a time. Napier thus urged consideration of an increased number of troops for India and, somewhat alarmingly, stated that the Orenburg–Tashkent railway would be completed within four months.19 There then followed a plethora of reports on Russian movements in Central Asia. Charles Minchin, now Consul at Meshed, reported to the Government of India that the Russians were collecting transports and stores for the mobilisation of a force of between 40,000 and 50,000 men on the Afghan frontier, although no abnormal troop movements

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seemed to be in progress. A further report stated that 1,250 cavalry and 8,000 infantry had passed through Krasnovodsk to Askabad and Kushk with a further 8,000 troops going to the latter place complete with supplies in wagons and rolling stock. The Russian authorities were also commandeering camels and transport, prompting many camel owners to leave cities such as Askabad. These transport operations were denied by the Russian War Ministry and the General Staff told Napier that there was no mobilisation in the Caucasus impending or expected and ‘no intention of increasing the garrison in Central Asia’. Despite this, there were still reports of troop movements in the region and of 250,000 more troops heading for Kushk and Termez.20 Faced with these reports, Brodrick asked Curzon if a counterdemonstration was possible. The Viceroy’s response was that the only counter-demonstration possible would be the mobilisation of a division at either Quetta or Peshawar or both. Curzon, however, did not recommend this action, viewing it as an act of brinkmanship given the circumstances and stating that it would have a negative effect on the mind of the Amir.21 Lord Roberts, too, had heard of some of these developments from both Kitchener and official sources, yet he was not privy to all the reports that arrived in London. He did, however, believe that measures would have to be taken. He wrote: ‘What I want is to see the extension of the railway from Peshawar towards Dakka along the valley of the Kabul river. I hear the Russians are pushing on the Orenburg– Tashkent line, and we shall bitterly regret not having rail communications further than Peshawar if we have to go to Kabul.’22 Reports continued to flood in of troop movements between Merv, Tashkent, Askabad, Kushk and Panjdeh. It was also reported that the manager of the Russian Bank in Persia was attempting to buy up wheat and grain for a large force which, he stated, was to be mobilised in Turkestan.23 Dobbs, at this stage still in Afghanistan, was also investigating the Russian Central Asian military position. His report was considerably less alarmist than those issued by the intelligence agency at Meshed or by Napier. He had been informed that the Russian garrison at Sheikh Junaid had been reduced to half its normal size and that there was no sign of reinforcements. Dobbs’ informant

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told him that the same state of affairs existed all along the frontier and there seemed no indication that the Russians were collecting camels in the region. He was sufficiently confident in the information he had been given to add that it would be corroborated by information received by the Afghan authorities.24 Notwithstanding Dobbs’ observations, Minchin attacked what appeared to him to be a misguided stance, writing: ‘It is my belief that, to prevent Dobbs from making the arrival of Russian reinforcements an excuse for stopping longer on [the] frontier, the Afghans are purposely misinforming him as to [the] situation.’25 Yet Dobbs continued to receive reports of an ‘entire absence of military activity across [the] frontier from separate informants’. He argued that the Herati authorities were pursuing two seemingly contradictory policies. On the one hand, they were eager to avoid a scare in India which would precipitate the arrival of the Indian Army in Afghanistan. On the other hand, they wished to make Dobbs believe that the Russians were too formidable to be trifled with. The Herati generals Dobbs dealt with were convinced that the Meshed rumours emanated from Russian sources, ‘the object being to raise in India a cheap and easy scare’. Dobbs concurred with this view, and was convinced that rumours of a Russian advance into Seistan did not even merit consideration.26 Despite all Dobbs had reported, there were still contradictory elements in his information. He had written to the Government of India earlier stating that there was no indication that the Russians were collecting camels in the region.27 A few days after he sent this information to Curzon, he was informed by his camel-man that it was impossible to afford to buy camels in the area as all surplus camels had been exported to Russian Central Asia and were being bought up for high prices. Dobbs, however, seems to have drawn a different conclusion. Instead of seeing this as a Russian acquisition of pack transport for military reasons he saw it as a proof of the extensiveness of the practice of smuggling, especially as the export of camels was absolutely forbidden by the Amir.28 The fact that Dobbs was not thinking in line with prevailing opinion was illustrated by Scott’s perspective on the matter. He agreed with Dobbs that much of the rumour going via Meshed was ‘purposely

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spread to create a scare in India’, and was convinced that no serious action was contemplated in that area. He did, however, believe that the Russians would use the position in Central Asia to divert British attention from the peace negotiations which would take place at the end of the war with Japan.29 In London, Lord Roberts had written to Balfour on the subject of the rapid construction of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway and the implications of this for the defence of India. He was concerned about four major issues. The first was that, given the final construction of this railway, the Russians could put 200,000 men on the Afghan frontier. Second, the railway was being built faster than was anticipated with the consequence that pressure could be put on Britain on the Afghan frontier during the course of the peace negotiations which would arise at the end of the Russo–Japanese War. Roberts’ third point was that once the railway had been built, the Russian invasion of parts of northern Afghanistan would be greatly facilitated, thus making it harder for the British to force the Russians to withdraw. Finally, Roberts expressed his concern over the lack of knowledge of this railway. The CID plans were based upon the number of troops which the Russians could put on the Oxus from the Trans-Caspian line. The problem for Roberts was that ‘we have not as yet considered what arrangements would have to be made to counterbalance the additional number that could be brought to the front by the Orenburg–Tashkent line’.30 Reports came in from Meshed of a build-up from Krasnovodsk to Merv and Askabad, and many veterans of over three years service were being withdrawn from Trans-Caspia to Manchuria. This implied a movement of men from European Russia to Central Asia and thence to the Far East.31 The railway from Krasnovodsk to Askabad was being improved at a rapid rate and the garrisons in Central Asia were apparently being increased. It was also added that there was no reason to believe that the Russians would strike at Seistan. This information seems to suggest that the Russians were merely improving their railway in order to facilitate the movement of troops to the Far East. The apparent increase in garrisons was also consistent with the Russian desire to defend their territory in Central Asia in the event of a British

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attack or British-sponsored Muslim insurrection. The troops would also be there due to bottlenecks in the railway system as there were more troops coming into the region than leaving due to prevailing inefficiencies and the amount of track. It was also easier to move men east than to move them north to join the Trans-Siberian line, because the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was still incomplete at this time.32 From the Trans-Siberian line troops would be able to move more efficiently to the front. Nevertheless, the movement of these troops was a great logistical feat. This concerned the British, whose situation is well encapsulated by Beryl J. Williams, who, in turn, refers to a communication of Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador to Japan, to Lansdowne of 15 July 1905: ‘He pointed out that, in spite of defeat, the Russians were still capable of maintaining, in July 1905, an army of 250,000 men three thousand miles from Russia proper and linked only by a single track of railway. India, he added ominously, was a great deal nearer than Manchuria.’33 Sir George Clarke, Secretary to the CID, disagreed with much of what MacDonald had thought and written. He believed that the rate at which Russian troops could concentrate at the railheads depended upon the ‘meat, grain and forage of Central Asia’. The Russians had depended upon this factor in Manchuria and Mongolia but, due to the lack of such locally procurable supplies in Central Asia, the force to be built up there could not be anything like the size of that in Manchuria where the countryside was more fertile. Moreover, a large amount of supplies and stores would have to be sent to Central Asia at the start of the war and this would take time. Clarke concluded that ‘it must also be borne in mind that arrival at [the] railhead does not mean, in the case of the Russian Army, that the troops will be ready in all respects to take the field’.34 As late as 1910, Hardinge referred to the Trans-Siberian railway and the Russian Central Asian strategic railway network as a ‘sword of Damocles’ waiting to drop, and there was still the fear that the Russians would turn on India. The logistical effectiveness of their strategic railways did nothing to alleviate British concerns.35 This was echoed by Kitchener in May 1904, writing that with such improvements to the Russian Central Asian railway system, something should

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be done by the British to make the Indian Army more battle ready. He wrote: I call Russian policy aggressive because the Orenburg–Tashkent Railway, as a mercantile concern, cannot pay, and was never intended to do so. Its object is therefore solely to enable Russia to employ her vast military resources at the end of the line against India, whenever she chooses to do so. The result of the construction of this railway is to double the number of troops Russia can place in the field at the end of the line, practically on our frontier, and we have therefore to take corresponding steps to increase our defensive armaments and men.36 At this time Russian railway activity was pronounced, with a large movement of stores eastwards through Central Asia. In addition, Russian river power was improved, the Amu Darya (Oxus) flotilla being ‘greatly augmented’ with twelve steamers in service. Yet it was reported that ‘no field army is massed at any one point’. This indicated a renewed movement of troops to the Far East. The flotilla on the Oxus would have been augmented as a defensive measure and the increased railway activity would have been troop movements in the same direction.37 Further, the War Office in London presented a report to the Foreign Office entitled ‘Note on Reported Russian Activity in Central Asia’ in which the intelligence information received hitherto had been collated.38 After receiving this information, Sir Thomas Sanderson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, though acknowledging that the movements in Central Asia ‘sound apocryphal’, deemed that preparation for an attack would be ‘prudent and material’. He nevertheless took the view that there was little to be worried about as Patrick Stevens, the Consul at Batoum, ‘sends no note of alarm – and if anything extraordinary is going on he might have some inkling [sic] of it’.39 Hardinge at St Petersburg also arrived at the same conclusion at the same time. Napier had discovered that the situation in Turkestan was normal and that there was ‘no question of mobilisation’. His opinion

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was that the reports received by the Viceroy were mostly from an Oriental source full of ‘errors and exaggerations’ and that, as such, ‘ought not to be literally accepted’.40 In London, Lansdowne saw Benckendorff to discuss the Russian military activity in Central Asia. Though sceptical of the reports he had seen, Lansdowne still wanted reassurance that these movements were not of an aggressive nature, so Benckendorff returned to his Embassy for instructions.41 The Government of India, meanwhile, received more information which stated that within three months the Orenburg–Tashkent railway would be completed and within six months it would be running in full order. The informant, however, saw ‘no immediate risk of war with Russia’.42 Several days later Benckendorff returned to see Lansdowne to discuss the situation in Central Asia. He had not yet received an answer from his government, but was, nevertheless, convinced that any apprehensions were unfounded. He stated that, although movement may have been pronounced at the outbreak of war, there was no question of such moves at that time.43 More news came from Hardinge at St Petersburg. He reported that many of the Russian troops in Turkestan were there to disarm the Turcomen tribes and counteract the ‘unrest and fanatical excitement’ which had followed reports of Russian defeats at the hands of the Japanese. There was, therefore, some exaggeration of Russian strength by officers in order to reassure the population. The Government of India’s informant in Central Asia seemed to have been particularly susceptible to these rumours. It was also considered unlikely that the Russian movements in Central Asia presaged an attack on Afghanistan, though naturally the Russians would keep troops there ‘in anticipation of a conflict with England’. In addition, many of these developments were symptomatic of the Russians putting their Central Asian house in order. It was therefore believed that the idea that Russia was carrying out these manoeuvrings in order to put pressure on the British over the egress of the Black Sea Fleet through the Dardanelles and over other issues was mistaken. It was also discovered that progress on the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was not as far advanced as had previously been believed.44 The scepticism with which the reports of Russian

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activity were greeted spread to the India Office and Brodrick passed this view on to the Government of India, informing the Viceroy that there was no question of mobilisation in Central Asia and that the reports of the informant ‘should not be taken literally, as they contain ... exaggerations and mistakes’.45 On 14 June Benckendorff once again saw Lansdowne. He had received a reply from Count Lamsdorff of a reassuring nature, which said that, due to the uncertainty of the situation at the start of the war, certain military preparations had been made along the frontier, but these had been discontinued as they were seen to be unnecessary. He added that ‘no military measures of an extraordinary or exceptional character were at present being taken in that quarter’. Lamsdorff also endorsed Benckendorff’s language and concluded that: ‘Any hostile intention with regard to the British possessions was completely foreign to the Imperial Policy. Nothing was further removed from the programme of that policy than any idea of aggression in the regions bordering on British possessions.’46

Planning for War in Afghanistan The defence establishment was, nevertheless, still concerned about the possible threat to the security of northern Afghanistan and, by implication, the British position in India. One major area of concern was the increase in Russian strength on the Afghan frontier once the railway system had been extended to Termez. In a memorandum on this, it was stated that the previous figures on this Russian strength would have to be brought up-to-date in the light of construction work on the Orenburg–Tashkent railway and the ‘natural corollary’ of this, which was the extension to Termez. The Russians would also have to make certain preparations, requiring more railway material sufficient to build a railway into Afghanistan as well as all kinds of supplies at various points on the border. Moreover, the Russians would have to bring a large number of troops into Central Asia to augment the pre-existing peacetime garrisons there to a war footing. They would, therefore, require both transport and reinforcements for campaigning. At the same time, the General Staff had come to the conclusion that

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the conditions were not as favourable to the Russians in reality as they had seemed to have been in the wargame played at Simla in 1903. For example, the Russians would have problems with transport and additionally ‘it is impossible that warlike preparations on a scale such as this could be made without becoming known throughout the world months before they had been completed’, which would give the British sufficient time to react.47 General Sir James Grierson, the Director of Military Operations and the author of the memorandum, pointed out that the rate and the strength of any Russian advance would depend on the rate at which she extended her railways. On the Kabul line, this would average less than one mile a day. The Russians would still require pack transport and forage. On the Herat line, the rate of construction would be just over one mile a day. The supplies of both routes that were readily available would only allow the Russians to maintain 150,000 men 150 miles from a slowly moving railhead. If they were nearer, more men could be maintained and the reverse was true if they were further away. The problem of procuring enough transport for the men was an acute one. General Alexander Kuropatkin, the General commanding the Russian forces in the Far East, seemed to have enough trouble in Manchuria providing this transport and the advantages prevailing there would not be present in Afghanistan.48 The memorandum then went on to show the movement of Russian troops in certain months of the campaign, assuming that the operation would start in May when the Hindu Kush mountains were at their most open. The dispositions are given in Table 1 below. After a year, it was thought that all local supplies would be exhausted and the Russians would have to bring up their supplies by rail. Taking into account the rate at which these railways were built, it was estimated ‘that the carrying capacity of each line would not exceed the requirements of a force of 100,000 men’. In the north, the railway could supply fewer men as it could not be built as quickly, so communication by road would have to be improved. In the south, the railway construction rate would be faster. The Russians were also thought to be able to maintain sufficient reserves at Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif to replace casualties and wastage.49

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Events in Russian Central Asia Table 1

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Russian troop dispositions in the first eight months

AT END OF SECOND MONTH Hindu Kush passes and Bamian Between above line and railhead at Ghaznigak Northern Line total Farah Between Farah and railhead, about ten miles North of Herat Southern Line total

30,000 30,000 60,000 30,000 20,000 50,000

AT END OF FOURTH MONTH Charikar and Unai Pass Between above line and railway at Robat Northern Line total Dilaram Between Dilaram and railhead, 50 miles south of Herat Southern Line total

55,000 30,000 85,000 50,000 20,000 70,000

AT END OF SIXTH MONTH Vicinity of Kabul Between Kabul and railway at Doshi Northern Line total Girishk Between Girishk and railhead near Khosk Southern Line total

60,000 30,000 90,000 50,000 20,000 70,000

AT END OF EIGHTH MONTH Kabul and vicinity Between Kabul and railhead (either Sangbura in the East or Doab-i-Mehkzari in the West) Northern Line total Kandahar Between Kandahar and railhead at Siahab Southern Line total

60,000 30,000 90,000 50,000 20,000 70,000

Grierson then went on to explain that the figures were based on the supposition that the Russians divided their troops for the two theatres relatively evenly. They could then put more men in one theatre than the other or elect to advance in greater strength at a slower rate in order to have a stronger front line. They could also move smaller columns faster along these routes. Moreover, Grierson did not rule out detachments of Russian soldiers moving over the Wakhan Peninsula to Chitral and through Persia to Seistan and Nushki. These detachments

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would, however, ‘entail a corresponding reduction in the strength of the troops employed on the main lines of advance’.50 It should be remembered that the whole idea of having the Russian railway system extended to Termez was that troops could be shifted to and from Kushk to give very rapid strength and reinforcement to one or other of the lines of attack and too much activity on the flanks would run counter to this. Grierson concluded that a copy of the memorandum should be sent to Kitchener. Roberts, in his note at the end of the memorandum, argued that the figures seemed to him accurate and that Kitchener should undertake measures to prepare for war. He added that Kitchener would require reinforcements from England and that ‘it is essential that the Government of India should be prepared to give effect to Lord Kitchener’s redistribution scheme’. Roberts argued that until this was done, ‘no final decision as to our estimated war requirements ... can be arrived at’.51 General Herbert Mullaly, the Deputy Quarter Master General in India, also addressed the issue. In his memorandum of 30 June he cited and summarised Grierson’s earlier observations. Mullaly clearly appreciated that some of Grierson’s estimates were too high and that there were other factors to be considered. As a result, he estimated the number of Russian troops that could move on the two fronts as slightly lower than the figures in Grierson’s memorandum, which Mullaly stated was an estimate to be ‘accepted with limitations’.52 It was, nevertheless, clear that the British position over the defence of Afghanistan was a weak one. It was, then, important to have the Indian Army ready for the defence of Afghanistan and India as soon as possible. After two months in the north, the Indian Army would be able to place 25,356 men north of Kabul. This was in addition to 12,678 in Kabul and its environs and 17,301 men holding the lines of communication to India. Russia’s southern drive would be met by 25,356 men on the Helmand River and between there and Kandahar. This would be the same sized force as was being used north of Kabul, namely two Divisions and two Cavalry Brigades and would be supported by 4,090 men, in addition to a railway corps working on the line.53 By the end of the second month the relative dispositions would be as at Table 2 below:54

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Events in Russian Central Asia Table 2

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Relative dispositions after two months First line

Second line

Total

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

24,000

78

24,000

78

48,000

156

24,000

78

16,000

52

40,000

130

48,000

156

40,000

130

88,000

286

38,034

120

17,301

52

55,335

172

25,356

80

4,090

6

29,446

86

63,390

200

21,391

58

84,781

258

RUSSIANS Northern Line Southern Line Total BRITISH Northern Line Southern Line Total

At the end of four months, the Indian Army would be able to place 50,712 men to contest the Russian advance near Charikar, 11,173 men in and around Kabul and 18,384 men to cover the communications. In the south 39,539 men could be placed around the Helmand and Kandahar, with a further 15,263 men between Quetta and Kandahar.55 The picture at the end of four months was estimated to be as shown in Table 3.56 Mullaly then went on to consider the more speculative aspect of what the relative numbers would look like if reinforcements57 were added at the end of the sixth and eighth months. His conclusion appears in Table 4.58 At the end of a year, both powers would have augmented their railway networks, allowing them to place more troops in the field. Mullaly estimated the relative numbers at this point to be as shown in Table 5.59 Mullaly concluded with the following observations: firstly, it was essential that no time be lost in the reorganisation and preparation of the Indian Army for war by Kitchener along the lines he had advocated.

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78 Table 3

Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire Relative dispositions after four months First line

RUSSIANS Northern Line Southern Line Total

Second line

Total

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

44,000

143

24,000

78

68,000

221

40,000

130

16,000

52

56,000

182

84,000

273

40,000

130

124,000

403

61,885

194

18,384

36

80,269

230

39,359

126

15,263

40

54,802

166

101,424

358*

33,647

76

135,071

434

BRITISH Northern Line Southern Line Total

* These include all the guns in the Corps Artillery, as by this time they would all be in the field.

Table 4

Relative numbers after eight months following reinforcement First line

Russian British

Table 5

Second line

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

88,000 122,126

286 406

40,000 33,647

130 76

128,000 155,773

416 482

Relative numbers after one year with railway networks in place First line

Russian British

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Total

Second line

Total

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

Sabres and bayonets

Guns

120,000 155,934

390 478

40,000 33,647

130 76

160,000 189,581

520 554

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Second, it was vital that railway communication be improved to enable troops to arrive at the front in good time. Third, with these preparations made, it could be reasonably expected that the Indian Army would be able to hold its own and defend the Kabul–Kandahar Line. There were two other observations which required attention as well. Mullaly’s fourth point was that, within four months of the commencement of the campaign, troops would have to arrive as reinforcements in India, in addition to drafts raised there in order to counteract the effect of wastage. Finally, around eight months into the campaign it was estimated that the Indian Army would require four divisions as reinforcements as well as the drafts which would have to be raised. Mullaly finished by stating that if these measures were undertaken, the Indian Army possessed a ‘reasonable prospect of success during the first year of the campaign’.60 In Turkestan, meanwhile, it seemed as if the Russians were preparing offensive moves. An Imperial Ukase was given to reorganise the batteries of the Turkestan Military District. There was also an extensive reorganisation of Turkestan rifle brigades and local infantry detachments. The 6th Siberian Army Corps and the 61st and 78th Divisions were also being moved north of Orenburg. This worried Napier because the troops could be moved south in small groups along the completed sections of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway ‘without our receiving any information of the fact’. Moreover, there seemed to be no good military reason to keep these troops where they were unless they were to be moved south to Turkestan when the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was complete.61 The fear that there would be war was accentuated by a report of two officers who were travelling around the country between Tashkent and Meshed: ‘They found a curious unanimity of opinion that before long there would be a war between Great Britain and Russia.’ It was also believed that the Russians would advance into Kashgaria as a counterpoise to Colonel Younghusband’s mission to Tibet. They reported that: ‘Everywhere Russians were very bitter against England, and [the] Chief of Staff of the Turkestan Army used very warlike language. Russian insurance companies refuse insurance against war risks to British goods coming via Batoum and Baku.’ 62

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British worries were compounded by the rapid Russian progress in constructing their strategic railways. News had reached Meshed that the Samarkand–Oxus line had just started to be built and Napier at St Petersburg reported that progress on the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was rapid. This prompted Brodrick to advocate preparations in India to Lord Ampthill, the Governor of Madras who was temporarily replacing Curzon as acting Viceroy, on the grounds that the ‘extreme haste with which [the] Orenburg–Tashkent railway is being pushed on appears to indicate [an] intention of threatening us on [the] NorthWest frontier of Afghanistan’.63 The issue was also discussed at the CID. Brodrick believed that the movement of Russian troops in Central Asia was ‘undertaken rather with a political than a military object’, with the intention of putting pressure on the British Government, so as ‘to make us more complacent as regards the settlement of other controversies between the two Governments’. It was also suggested that the war against Japan in the Far East may have caused unrest in Turkestan and that the presence of troops there was ‘only in the nature of precautionary measures directed against the inhabitants of that province’. Brodrick also told the Committee that the Government of India wanted to purchase mules and horses for pack transport for the Indian Army. Kitchener, too, had requested that officers join their commands in readiness for mobilisation. Finally, it was declared that stores worth £666,000 had been procured and were in the process of shipment.64 At St Petersburg, Hardinge asked Lamsdorff if he could give him an explanation of the reports regarding the concentration of troops on the Afghan frontier. Lamsdorff replied that although there were movements of troops in Central Asia from time to time, he had no knowledge of any concentration on the Afghan frontier. He then asked Hardinge to convey to Lansdowne that ‘he could at once categorically deny that any such movement had taken place with a hostile intent’. Lamsdorff concluded that no report on the subject had reached him from Benckendorff.65 More news, however, was received on Russian military preparations. It was reported that the 1st Caucasian Army Corps and the 2nd Caucasian Rifle Brigade were to be mobilised. It was also understood

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that there were over 100,000 men in Turkestan and that fortified harbours were being readied. Once the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was completed, it was thought that the Russians would be able to put 120,000 men on the Afghan frontier, as opposed to the 80,000 that could have been placed there before. Although these reports were considered by the Intelligence Department to have a basis in truth, it was thought that the object of preparations was not as much a strategic as a political demonstration.66 Additional reports came from Batoum and Odessa, both inside the Russian Empire. Reinforcements were to proceed to Central Asia and men there were supposedly to deploy along the Afghan frontier. Reports that the completion of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway would enable the Russians to field 120,000 men on the Afghan frontier were reiterated by Stevens, as well as reports of the stockpiling of food, materials, clothing and camels in Central Asia. It was also said that officers there were of the opinion that war would be inevitable, and one told his men ‘that they would shortly be offered an opportunity to reassert the name and fame which the Russian military forces in Central Asia had, “in the days of yore”, gained for themselves’. It was expected that 15 infantry divisions and 12 sapper battalions would be mobilised and that all reservists of 1893 to 1903 were to be called up. It was rumoured that their objective upon mobilisation was going to be Central Asia.67 The Government of India, though, reacted uncharacteristically calmly to the claims made about the number of Russian troops in Central Asia, believing that it could not exceed 75,000. The number of troops on the Afghan frontier was considered to be not more than 25,000 men, although there were reports of 80,000 men there.68 At St Petersburg, Hardinge asked Lamsdorff once more about Russian troop movements in Central Asia. It had occurred to him that either Lamsdorff was deceiving the Foreign Office or was himself being deceived by the Russian Ministry of War. The Russian Foreign Minister, however, reiterated his position, also voiced through Benckendorff, that ‘no exceptional military measures were being taken in Turkestan’. Hardinge’s information now led him to accept this view. The peacetime strength of the Turkestan Military District was 45,449

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men with 112 guns to be augmented upon mobilisation to 86,301 men and 176 guns. Since they were not supposed to have been mobilised, the former total was likely to be the number of men there. Napier calculated from reports sent to him that 17,351 troops had entered the region and that 5,230 men had left. This made an overall increase of 12,121 men, creating a new total of 57,570 men. The state of mobilisation in the region, however, had not been clearly ascertained, so that it was possible that there could be more men there, 100,000 men being the figure given. It was unlikely, though, that many troops could enter Turkestan from the north as the Orenburg–Tashkent railway had not been completed, so they would need to travel along the Trans-Caspian line and any increase of men along this railway was bound to be noticed by Stevens at Batoum. Hardinge did not, therefore, consider the forces in Central Asia to be overly numerous. Nevertheless, it did not seem to occur to Hardinge that if the Turkestan Military District were mobilised, something not inconceivable given the war with Japan and a perceived threat from Britain in Central Asia, then this figure combined with the known increase would give 98,422 men – almost the 100,000 men considered. In spite of this, Hardinge did believe that a strong Russian movement would be possible at a later stage as a means of putting pressure on Britain not to interfere in the peace process to come at the end of the war with Japan.69 Further news from Hardinge arrived over the course of late August and early September. It was reported that elements of the Caucasian Army Corps were to be mobilised. There were three possible places for these units to go. They could go to the Far East, as desired by Kuropatkin; they could stay where they were as ‘the internal state of affairs in the Caucasus is known to be unsatisfactory’; or they could be sent to the Afghan frontier to put pressure on the British Government. A second item of news concerned the progress of the Orenburg– Tashkent railway, which was reported to have a mere 67 miles left to go to completion. The earthwork for the basis of the tracks had been put down, but the tracks and sleepers had been delayed in arriving at their destinations. Yet Hardinge recognised that, although there was a concern in both London and India about Russian movements in Central Asia, there had been no confirmation of these fears, leading

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him to observe that there was ‘no need for immediate alarm but much need of careful watching’.70 Hardinge also reported to Lansdowne that Napier intended to visit Central Asia and was ready to travel almost immediately, but the British Ambassador had wanted to clear the matter with Lansdowne first. It was intended that Napier should travel by way of Odessa, the Caucasus, the Trans-Caspian railway, and – if it had been completed – the Orenburg–Tashkent railway. With such a journey, ‘the military situation in Central Asia could thus be definitely ascertained’. The Foreign Secretary assented.71 Lansdowne wrote to Hardinge on the same day, 5 September 1904, on the subject of the Russian Central Asian troop concentrations. He had been visited by Benckendorff, who had received a letter from Lamsdorff reviewing the situation. At the commencement of the war with Japan, the Russian authorities were uncertain and suspicious of the attitude of Britain and ‘it was thought necessary to make some provision with regard to possible eventualities’, but numbers of troops in the Caucasus had been relatively low. The letter also reiterated the message that the Russian Government had ‘absolutely no aggressive designs’ and went on to state some of the reasons for Russian concern in Central Asia. The Russians had been concerned about possible unrest among the peoples there and there was also anxiety over the attitude of Afghanistan. Moreover, the Russians believed that there was a possibility of disturbances on the Persian frontier and in Armenia. At the same time, British preparations in India had ‘caused some stir in Russian military circles’. For these reasons the Russian Government decided to keep up their armed forces in Central Asia and move not more than one division to Turkestan.72 It was stated that ‘these troops were intended to deal solely with local requirements, and there was no question whatever of aggression’. Lamsdorff concluded by saying that he wanted clear and frank communication between the two countries. Benckendorff, for his part, concluded by saying that Lamsdorff had telegraphed him since receiving a report of British information and that he viewed the number of troops estimated by the British in the region to be ‘fantastic’, and rumours of Russian aggressive designs to be ‘absurd’.73

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Despite this, various reports continued to arrive on the state of affairs in Central Asia. The Government of India reported that a movement of troops towards Kushk and Merv had been stopped due to a cholera epidemic and that there were 6,000 troops encamped in the environs of Askabad. Lansdowne had also received information from the Consul at Kiev that 40,000 troops had embarked for Turkestan at Baku and Napier reported that stores, rails, sleepers and spikes had been stockpiled at Krasnovodsk for work on the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, which was hoped to be ready for an inspection by 5 or 6 October. The Government of India also accused the Russian authorities in Central Asia of trying to re-open direct relations with the Afghans. At the end of September, Hardinge reported a statement that was reproduced in the Russian press that ‘the northern and southern sections of the Orenburg–Tashkent railway have been joined’.74 The beginning of October saw further discussion between Lansdowne and Benckendorff on the subject of the attempts by high-ranking Russian officials in Turkestan to secure direct relations with the Governor of Herat. Benckendorff stated that the British Government had already discussed ‘the question of the admissibility of such proceedings’ with him but Lansdowne replied that there had been no ‘distinct understanding upon the subject’. He also made it clear that he believed that, ‘pending further discussion, the Russian Government should avoid any action calculated to give rise to complications upon the Russo–Afghan frontier’, reminding the Russian Ambassador that nothing could be done without the agreement of the Amir. Benckendorff did not dispute this but did mention rumours which had come to him of a large Afghan military build-up. Lansdowne responded that he had heard these stories, too, but believed them to be exaggerated and asked him whether the Russian Government had any complaints of Afghan aggression. The Russian Ambassador stated that he did not believe that there were any, ‘but there was undoubtedly much uneasiness’.75 Additional reports were received that troops, supplies and munitions had arrived at Krasnovodsk and that the Governor-General of Turkestan had left St Petersburg on 29 September and arrived at Tashkent via the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, ‘in a through carriage

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from St Petersburg’. It was also said that the Russian Military Council resolved to form 50 companies and mounted chasseurs in the battalions of the Turkestan Rifle Brigade and the Kushka Cadre Transport Company.76 By the end of October 1904, Napier had returned from Central Asia. His journey there seemed to prove that the rumours that had been reported were either exaggerated or untrue. He saw no signs of military activity when he was there and observed that there was no anticipation of war with England, nor any aggressive action from the Russian officials, who were conciliatory. The artillery there had not received new guns, no troops had arrived by the Orenburg–Tashkent railway, no regiments or units from European Russia had arrived or were seen in Turkestan, and the reserve units had not been mobilised. At the same time, the logistical apparatus to fight a war was ready and Napier considered that, if required, an Army Corps could be put into the field without delay with a view, if necessary, to put pressure on Britain.77 Napier’s information, though positive, did not echo the views of the Government of India, which continued to accept inaccurate accounts by excitable agents and informants.78 Everyone else took the less shrill line that it was about pressure. Stevens at Batoum saw the procurement of pack transport, despite the fact that no troops had been moved, as preparations to put pressure on Britain, rather than for war. Sir George Clarke at the CID also thought that all that had gone before was a Russian bluff, commenting that ‘it has for years been the Russian game to frighten us on the Afghan border’.79 The realisation had set in and, by the beginning of July 1905, Hardinge and Napier ‘agreed that the danger of the [Russo–Japanese] war being extended to the NorthWest Frontier was over’.80

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3 BRITISH STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE, 1903–05

The Committee of Imperial Defence, or CID, was a committee made up of prominent Whitehall Secretaries of State and senior military figures. It was chaired by the Prime Minister and, during this period, Sir George Clarke was its secretary. The CID looked at a number of Imperial defence issues, such as the Anglo–German naval arms race, but nothing preoccupied them more in the period up to and including 1907 than the defence of India. From 1903, with the vulnerability of northern Afghanistan and the problem of reaching Kabul before the Russians in a war, it became obvious that the British position in the region was precarious. There were several factors which demonstrated the moribund state of the mechanism to defend India. The first problem was that of the frontier tribes, which would be a barrier to any British advance to engage the Russians in Afghanistan proper. Their allegiances were uncertain, their ferocity unbridled and their frequent risings ensured the constant tying down of troops in the administered area between the Durand Line and India proper. Pitted against them and the Russians was the Indian Army, a force which was weak, imbalanced and in need of reform. In any war, they

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would need to be augmented by reinforcements but it was feared that by the time they arrived it would be too late to influence the outcome. For these troops to get to the frontline, railways were required but these had not yet been built. Most crucial of all was the problem of logistics from the railhead – problems which men like Sir George Clarke considered insuperable. The strategic situation, then, looked bleak for the British as it was considered that the Indian Army was, in so many particulars, unready to fight a war. Initially, the Indian Army and the War Office were confident of their ability to repel a Russian attack under three conditions. First, the Amir and the tribes would have to be compliant. Second, reinforcements would have to be forthcoming and third, railways would have to be constructed in order to facilitate logistical backup for the frontline. It was upon these three pillars that British strategic thinking and planning was based and where, when reality intruded, it was found wanting.

Forward Defence and the Tribes The frontier tribes were located in three distinct areas. The first of these was north of the Kabul River, constituting Dir, Swat, Bajour, Chitral, Buner and Mohmand territory. The second area lay between the Kabul and Kurram rivers, which included a large area known as Tirah, which was inhabited by Afridi clans. The final area was Waziristan, which was inhabited mainly by Mahsuds and Wazirs. The tribes in each of these areas were a constant nuisance to the British and there had been numerous attacks and retaliatory expeditions since the British first entered the area. The most recent were in Waziristan in 1894–95, Chitral in 1895, Malakand and the Tirah in 1897–98 and Waziristan in 1900–02. When these tribes were not fighting the British, they fought each other. Such violence was an endemic part of harsh tribal life, especially as the tribes cherished their independence from the British, the Afghans, and one another.1 It was, in consequence, believed that some form of control ought to be instituted. There were several means by which this might be done.

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After an expedition, itself an – albeit tacit – form of control, fines could be levied against a tribe, such as happened against the Mahsuds after their 1900–02 rising on the frontier. Other measures could also be taken, such as after the suppression of Buner in 1898 when 600 rifles were surrendered.2 This was something of a drop in the ocean compared to the vast number of firearms which entered Afghanistan and the NorthWest Frontier each year. Colonel A.C. Yate of the Indian Political Department wrote that 25,000 rifles had been exported from Muscat during 1901 and that many of these had been collected by Afghans at Bandar Abbas and Charbar. Yate concluded that this trade was a ‘pressing danger to us, and I know of no way to stop it but by the prohibition of the import of arms into Muscat’.3 The Muscat arms trade, however, had been sealed by international agreement which would be hard to change. In any case, an illegal arms trade would flourish whatever the circumstances. There were other problems, too. Lieutenant Colonel Kemball, the British Consul at Bushire, cited Major Percy Cox, the Political Agent for the Gulf, in defining these: first, ‘it is practically impossible for our ships of war to take effective action on the High Seas’. The reason for this was that a few gunboats could not possibly cover the whole Gulf trying to stop small smuggling boats, some of which would make illegal coastline drops, rather than calling at ports. Second, it seemed that the Persian authorities, being weak anyway, were ‘wholly incapable of putting a stop to the smuggling of arms into Persian territory’.4 Once rifles had reached the coast, some made their way to Kandahar and thence to the frontier tribes. The route traditionally taken was not, as might be thought, through Baluchistan but through Persia, where shipments were less easily interdicted by the British. The route was from Bandar Abbas and its environs, up to Kirman, through Yezd and north to Meshed. Thence, the guns would go across to Herat and, from there, could be moved throughout the country. It is small wonder Ahmed Jan Khan, the governor of that region, was keen that Dobbs move on as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, Afghans were frequently caught attempting to procure weapons recently arrived in southern Persia.5

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The increase in the number of breech-loading rifles on the frontier became a serious problem in the decade between 1897 and 1907. The arms trade was legal in Muscat and the Sultan there was receiving a six per cent duty on the trade. The Persians, for their part, lacked both the inclination and the troops to sort out the problem. As a result, modern arms made their way to the North-West Frontier, transported by trading caravans which took the guns from Bandar Abbas and Minab to cities in Afghanistan. Interdicting this traffic was a difficult and sometimes fruitless task. Many shipments of arms, on small boats, were able to evade the Indian coastal craft in the Gulf. Inland interdiction was just as difficult for the authorities. In addition to the route through Herat, caravans went into Seistan, to Kuh-i Malik Siah or Nasratabad, and thence along the Helmand Valley to Girishk and Kandahar. As in the north, once in Afghanistan they would not be interfered with by the local authorities who would themselves have profited from the trade. The following years saw improved British and Indian intelligence which, coupled with an increasingly effective blockade, cut off most of the arms traffic through Persia. However, the problem of armed tribesmen would not go away, as workshops on the North-West Frontier were also able to make precise copies of the latest rifles. Other sources were guns taken from sentries, cantonments and frontier stations. Disaffected sepoys may also have had a role and profited from any involvement. Yet two-thirds of the breech-loading rifles came from the British authorities themselves, given to maliks and villagers to keep the peace.6 Although policy regarding the illicit arms trade suffered from being virtually ineffectual, there were other methods which seemed to have had some effect in limiting the bellicosity of the tribes. That they appeared to work is borne out by the fact that there was no major tribal activity on the frontier necessitating an expedition between the end of 1902 and halfway through 1908, one of the longest periods of relative calm on the frontier. The first of these measures was the installation of a tribal militia, which was intended to enable the tribes to police themselves. Members of the tribe would enrol in the militia which would then keep order. The scheme was successful along the

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frontier and allowed Curzon to claim that it would not be necessary to keep any soldiers in places like Waziristan.7 The other method of bringing order to the frontier was through the use of railways throughout Administered Territory. The ideal was to use the railways to integrate the tribal economic infrastructure with that of India. Once this was done and the tribes discovered the merits of peace and the increase of general wealth through trading, it became more likely that they would abandon brigandage. Roberts believed that such railways held the key to the solution of the tribal question, citing the example of Swat which had been pacified in just this way.8 The Indian and British military establishments both saw the importance of the tribes in the context of a campaign against Russia, rather than involving the low-level brigandage on the frontier. Following the forward defence school of the day, it had been decided to occupy a line between Kabul and Kandahar to meet the Russian onslaught. In order to do this effectively, the tribes had to be kept under control so that the lines of communication and supply could be kept open. Lord Roberts was alive to the importance of this. Having 200,000 armed tribesmen between the Indus and the Durand Line was certainly going to be a complicating factor. He took the view that integrating the tribes into the wider Indian economy would pay dividends and this was far more effective than repeated blockades and expeditions, which failed to win hearts and minds. For Roberts, failure to do this could compromise a successful outcome on the Kabul–Kandahar Line and he argued that a change in policy to bring the tribes on side should occur as soon as possible, as there was no time to waste.9 The view of Kitchener was similar to that of Roberts. Both believed in the ineffectiveness of expedition after expedition. They had divergent views, however, in other respects. Whereas Roberts wished to attach the tribes’ economic infrastructure to that of India, so the tribes would not rise up without damaging their own interests, Kitchener preferred to annex tribal territory right up to the Durand Line. As the safety of a British force in Afghanistan depended to a large degree upon the attitude of the tribes, he believed that the best way to integrate the tribes was by occupation and disarmament. Kitchener saw

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that the situation would become militarily dangerous if there were no change in policy.10 The view of Clarke at the CID was again different. He believed that no war could conceivably take place as the logistics were so difficult. Consequently, he believed that the tribes should be left alone, as this would guarantee a form of stability. As the tribesmen were well armed in terrain suited to guerrilla warfare, circumstances were unlikely to favour the Indian Army for the foreseeable future. Moreover, Clarke believed that the Afghans would resist any Russian invasion, being spurred on by the recent Japanese victories in the Far East. Politically, Clarke fell into line with Sir Harold Deane, the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, who argued that Kitchener’s ideal of occupation and disarmament was both undesirable and impractical.11 Clarke saw the tribes as part of the general problem of Afghanistan, believing that they would follow the lead of the Amir in a war. The tribes, however, could not always be controlled from Kabul. A good example of this was the Mohmand territory which straddled the Durand Line, where the Amir could not stop tribesmen from crossing to and from Afghanistan. On the other side of the frontier, the authorities in Simla were no closer to a solution of the tribal problem than they had been in the days of the Malakand Expedition.

Reform and Reinforcements In March 1903, the Intelligence Department of the War Office prepared a memorandum for the CID on the defence of India. The brief the CID gave them was to provide reports for the defence of India from a military offensive and defensive stance with or without railways having been built to Kandahar, Jalalabad or Kabul. The calculations were almost guesswork, given the slender evidence base. The Russian concentration on the Afghan frontier without railways was held to be 124,000 men and 248 guns. With the Orenburg–Tashkent railway this number rose to 300,000 men. If Russia’s object was to be the occupation of Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, and the territory of Afghan Turkestan between them, 80,000 men were considered to be sufficient for this operation.

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Set against this was the force required to defend the Kabul– Kandahar Line, some 116,000 men including reserves. This was the same as had been estimated in 1891. It was considered that such numbers ‘would still suffice to meet requirements’, despite Russia’s improved position. In addition, it was believed that reinforcements of 70,000 men should be sent to India, making a total force of 186,000 men. Consequently, the Indian Army could meet the enemy in reasonable numbers, superior even if the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was not completed. Moreover, the two Russian armies, advancing on Kabul and Kandahar, would be separated due to the intervening countryside and thus unable to coordinate effectively. If railways were constructed to Jalalabad and Kandahar matters would be eased, but the success of the British force would, in any case, depend upon the attitude of the frontier tribes and the Afghans. In the event of war, however, the Afghan Army would almost certainly oppose the Russians. Although it was ‘ill-disciplined and imperfectly trained’, it nevertheless ‘contains good fighting material, [and] is exceedingly well armed’. Its strength and distribution were estimated to be: 60,000 men in Kabul; 9,000 men in Kandahar; 1,500 men in Farah; 10,000 men in Herat; 18,000 men in Turkestan; and 5,000 men in Badakshan, making a total of 103,500 men. The numbers were broken down as follows:

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Kabul Division Kabul District Jalalabad and Asmar District Khost, Ghazni, Hazarajat Total

34,000 14,000 12,000 60,000

Kandahar Division Kandahar, Girishk, Kelat-i-Ghilzai Farah Province Total

9,000 men 1,500 men 10,500 men

Herat Division Herat and District Total

10,000 men 10,000 men

men men men men

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British Strategic Considerations Turkestan Division Mazar-i-Sharif District Badakshan District Total Grand total

18,000 5,000 23,000 103,500

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men men men men

With these added to British forces, defensive strength in Afghanistan would be formidable. The argument for the Kabul–Kandahar Line was a strong one which had general opinion behind it: ‘The advocates of the Indus Line have gradually become fewer, and have now, it is believed, almost, if not entirely, disappeared.’ The Government of India believed that the occupation of the Kabul–Kandahar Line would require fewer troops than the Indus Line, the former requiring 186,000 men and the latter needing 300,000 men. This led to the conclusion that ‘from a purely strategical point of view, the value of the Kabul–Kandahar alignment is unquestionable’, especially as ‘the essence of strategy is to be able to concentrate in superior force against a divided enemy’. There was also the fear that the Russians would gain the initiative for an attack on India if the Indian Army waited on the Indus, as the people of India would thus see this as weakness and might rise up against the British.12 In the following year and a half, numerous memoranda were written and discussed at the CID. One key area concerned railways to Seistan, which was considered a ‘subsidiary line of advance’. The Russians could use the line to assist in the supply of troops on their way to Kandahar. As the British would be in Seistan there should be fewer supplies available to the Russians, both locally and from Russia, so she ‘would not keep a large force there’. The British force would have to be small, as few men could be spared from the main theatre of operations, and would be involved in holding actions involving 5,000 to 10,000 men which would probably ‘suffice to delay for a considerable time, if not defeat, any Russian force likely to be employed in this theatre’. The Russians would also have to be cautious as the railway supplying the British would suggest that a larger force might be ready to come to their aid. If it became necessary to ‘at all costs hold on to

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Seistan’, then a force much larger than 10,000 men would be required. If the Russians were to take Seistan, they could move more men to Kandahar, as they would be better supplied with ‘the whole of the resources of Seistan’. This would, then, necessitate a corresponding increase of British troops at the Kandahar end of the defensive line.13 Later, Balfour concluded that there was too much risk in extending the railway network beyond Nushki. The best result would be some kind of accord with Russia to avoid building railways in eastern Persia.14 At the end of May, the CID turned its attention towards the issue of reinforcements.15 The calculations put forward had five premises. The first of these was that both the Afghans and the frontier tribes were neutral; second, that both sides mobilised on the same date; third, the Orenburg–Tashkent railway was assumed to have been completed; fourth, that the Russians would move to the Kabul–Kandahar Line, rather than pausing at Herat and Afghan Turkestan. Finally, the Indian Army would oppose the Russians on the Kabul–Kandahar Line. If Russia advanced without pausing at Herat and Afghan Turkestan, she could not transport more than 120,000, divided into two columns of 70,000 and 50,000 respectively. These would be unlikely to make it beyond Farah and Bamian respectively. Although Kabul and Kandahar were fertile provinces, they would almost certainly not fall into Russian hands, as the British were closer to the Kabul–Kandahar Line than the Russians: Kushk Post to Kandahar Chaman to Kandahar Termez to Kabul Peshawar to Kabul

483 miles 73 miles 430 miles 181 miles

or 35 marches or 7 marches or 36 marches or 16 marches

Therefore, the Indian Army would arrive first, unless ‘Russia begins her preparations long before we begin ours’.16 By June, it had been suggested that communication for the Russians might be improved by using the Oxus to ferry men and supplies. The value of such a route would be small at the beginning of a

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campaign, but the Oxus flotilla could be augmented by other boats from elsewhere and its importance would gradually increase. It was also considered that the bad quality of the roads in the north could be improved to allow for wheeled transport. If these factors were taken into consideration it was believed that the Russians could base at least 50,000 men at Kabul at the end of a year, as opposed to 35,000 at the end of six months. In addition to the 70,000 men at Kandahar and 50,000 at Kabul, there would also be more men available to replace casualties and wastage. The disposition for the Russian Army at the end of a year would therefore be: Vicinity of Kandahar Line of communication to Herat Vicinity of Kabul Line of communication to Mazar-i-Sharif Reserve at Farah Reserve at, and in front of, Mazar-i-Sharif In Russian Central Asia Total

70,000 10,000 50,000 10,000 50,000 30,000 80,000 300,000

men men men men men men men men

To meet these numbers, additional troops were required for the defence of India: 28,300 troops would be required in the first reinforcement, with a further 70,000 troops later. The chief complication was that the Russians would be able to replace wastage more quickly than the British could. This would be so much more the case once the Russian Central Asian railway network was completed. Consequently, over time, the Indian Army would find a temporary superiority of numbers rapidly shrinking to an overall inferiority.17 An aspect of great concern regarding the Indian Army was the comparatively small number of men it could put into the field relative to its size. Kitchener was aware of the problem and realised that reform was necessary. March 1904 saw his ‘Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army of India and the Preparation of the Army in India for War’, the document in which he set forth his plan for reforms in India.18 This paper was divided into three parts: the internal defence of India,

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the redistribution plan for the Army, and the preparation of that army for war. Regarding the internal defence of India, Kitchener had several considerations which needed to be addressed. The first was to determine what force could safely be left in India to hold the country. Such troops would have to guard the internal lines of communication. They would also be required to prevent ‘armed rebellion’. Finally, these troops would be assisted by volunteers, the Militia and Levy Corps, and the police. Moreover, it was realised that the railway network of the country should be maintained and classified in order of class of routes. There were to be four classes of railway in descending order. The first of these were the most important, linking the major cities of India, for example the Peshawar–Lahore line. The remaining three classes dealt with smaller cities, and the lower the class, the smaller the city. Such classification provided an ‘order of importance’ for the Indian railways for their strategic use. Such improved communications, aided by the telegraph, were able to spread news of insurrection quickly. This ‘simplified’ the problem. The volunteer force was also now stronger, making internal defence easier. It was almost as strong as it had been when the 1857 Mutiny broke out. At the end of 1856 the British forces in India had been 39,375 men strong, whereas the white volunteer force in 1903–04 was 32,830. This would strengthen the British position in the internal defence of India. The final consideration of internal defence was that of the strength of the army. In the event of war it was necessary to reduce internal garrisons partially for action at the front. However, the garrisons left behind would have to be able to carry out their functions and may be called upon to act in ‘minor cases of mobilisation’, such as actions against the frontier tribesmen. In addition, matters would be expedited by the swift despatch of reinforcements from Britain and the Empire. Since the government had been reluctant to issue a guarantee regarding such reinforcements – command of the sea, strength of troops, and the timing of their arrival – the situation became more difficult. The dilemma then became more acute. Either the forces at the front would have to become weaker in order to guarantee internal

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security, or the garrisons would have to be reduced to prevent defeat in Afghanistan. Kitchener believed that the latter course was more feasible. He hoped, however, that reinforcements would arrive in good time so that a balance could be more rigorously maintained between the two strategies. Regarding the proposed redistribution of the Indian Army, it was suggested that each division be allocated a ‘definite area’ so that the unit could be kept as a ‘homogeneous division, with homogeneous brigades – to be rapidly mobilised when required’. When the division was mobilised, ‘there would be left behind, throughout the country, a series of definite tactical units, each allotted for the internal defence of its given area’. These divisions would be based with a bias towards operations on the North-West Frontier. With regard to the preparation of the Indian Army for war it was considered necessary to have ‘a predetermined system’ for mobilisation. Kitchener argued that change was necessary to alter the existing system. Since the 1857 Mutiny, the army had been geared towards internal defence. With changing conditions four large divisions were seen to be unnecessary. Kitchener believed that nine smaller, yet more efficient, divisions would be more desirable, not only for the continuance of internal defence, but also for defence against ‘external aggression’. The argument for change was a powerful one. Many troops had been employed in the Tirah and the Malakand Expeditions and the weaknesses of the old system became apparent at that time. The Indian Army would have found itself in serious difficulty if the Afghan Army had ‘thrown in their lot with the tribesmen’. Afghanistan itself would be a test of efficiency for the Army as the existing four divisions would be incapable of holding a forward position on the Kabul–Kandahar Line. Russia’s powerful striking position in the north would further demonstrate the need for military reform. In such a war, British success would depend upon the seizure of certain strategic positions in order to hold the line. The problem in this area remained the lack of a quantifiable guarantee on the reinforcements issue from the Home Government. Moreover, even if troops could be spared and were ready, the naval forces necessary to transport them would have to gain command of the

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sea. Thus ‘India must provide for eventualities without any guarantee as to the date of arrival of troops from England or overseas’. In this case, the Indian Army would have to be reorganised and prepared so that it could perform its task on its own ‘until the resources of the rest of the Empire can be brought to her aid’. This preparation would mean that the Indian Army would have to be able to fulfil various functions. The first of these was that the Indian Army would have to seize and hold strategic objectives on and beyond the frontier which would prove ‘vital for the subsequent success of the operations’. Second, the Army would have to be well located so as to allow rapid mobilisation ‘in suitable formations’. Third, it would have to be both well equipped and well trained. Fourth, strategic railways would have to be built to enable troops to arrive at the front quickly and to be well supplied. Finally, it was expected that, with the envisaged reforms, the Indian Army could ‘maintain itself in the field on its own resources for a year’. As matters stood, the Indian Army was unsuited for campaigning. Yet there was opposition to the scheme, rooted in the view that there would never be a war in Afghanistan, so the need for change was questionable. The most prominent advocate of this view was Sir George Clarke. In July, he attacked Kitchener’s urgency in adopting his reforms for the Indian Army, criticising the extra expense involved, seeing it as unjustifiable. He took the view that Russia was so preoccupied with Japan that she would not make a move against India. Brodrick was inclined to agree, as the cost of the Russo–Japanese War was sufficiently crippling to keep Russia from foreign adventures for the foreseeable future.19 By March 1905, Clarke had started critiquing all aspects of the military planning being conducted. He argued that the projected speed of Russian railway construction was ‘conjectural’. Moreover, such estimates were unsustainable due to ‘the great natural difficulties of the routes’. Regarding the bridging of the Oxus, Clarke believed that with 1,000 yards width, channels 50 feet deep, and a five-knot current, the Oxus could not be bridged within one month – such an operation was ‘absolutely impossible’. On the subject of transport, he asserted that the Russians would require more camels than the mere one per

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man which had been used in the Russian Central Asian campaigns. In more favourable conditions in Manchuria the Russians had ‘great difficulty in feeding 30,000 men at 40 miles from a railway’. It was clear that 150,000 men ‘could not operate at 150 miles from the railhead of a hastily constructed and necessarily imperfect line in such a country as Afghanistan in the face of a British Army’. For Clarke, the Indian Army would be cut to pieces as a small force and, as a large force, would be impossible to supply en masse. He believed that the idea of holding the Kabul–Kandahar line was problematic, as such an advance would depend upon the attitude of the Afghans. In any case the British position would be ‘immensely superior to that of the Russians at Termez ... for the purposes of a rapid advance to the Afghan capital’. Any advance by the Russians in the numbers envisaged would require ‘an impossible rate of progress for the Russian railway’. Geography also had a role to play. Clarke wrote that ‘probably no inhabited portion of the world is more unfavourable to an invader, who must traverse it in great force, than Afghanistan’. There would, consequently, be more problems for the Russians than originally thought. The General Staff had believed in a rapid Russian attack with little or no Afghan resistance, yet Clarke asserted that a war in the region ‘would impose a heavier and a more sudden strain upon our resources than any other’. The same would apply to the Russians. If the Afghans were hostile to the British, it would be virtually impossible to take Kabul. This would mean the Kabul–Kandahar alignment could not be held. Such a scenario ‘might practically entail upon us a defensive attitude on our North-West Frontier’, which meant the Indus Line. Clarke believed this should be taken into consideration. Like Brodrick, Clarke believed Russia would take some time to recover from the Russo–Japanese War: ‘It is not too much to assert that a Russian invasion of India of the type contemplated in the “kriegsspiel” is out of the question for 20 years’. The possibility, however, of a mere occupation of Herat and Afghan Turkestan, in order to regain lost prestige, was another question. This was easy for the Russians to do, especially with the improvement in their situation, and entailing complications for the British in upholding their obligations from 1880.

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Clarke believed that the Russians would not invade Afghanistan, let alone India, and they had agreed to leave Afghanistan alone in their memorandum of February 1900. By this, ‘Afghanistan is recognised to be within the exclusive sphere of British influence’. If Britain declared war, it would have to be decided what the limit of advance would be. Any forward movement beyond the Kabul– Kandahar line would have to be in the nature of defensive movements rather than preliminaries to further advances. Were Kandahar to be occupied, it had to be asked whether it would be feasible to take the lower Helmand as well. The reinforcement question would have to be considered, too. It would also be necessary to consider what would happen if the Amir came to terms with the Russians. In such a case dispositions would be different and a forward defence would become untenable. It would be out of the question to go beyond the Kabul– Kandahar alignment and even that alignment would be untenable if the Afghans were hostile. In such a case, the Indian Army was in no position to defend Afghanistan against a Russian encroachment. Any attempt ‘to do so on political grounds would be to court a disaster the effect of which on the Indian Army might be most serious’. Clarke suggested a defensive attitude on the North-West frontier and an offensive one at Kandahar and the lower Helmand, concluding: ‘If it were understood that we were perfectly prepared to occupy Kandahar and the lower Helmand at short notice, the chances of Russian aggression on the further frontier of Afghanistan would be lessened.’20 Clarke again went on the attack in early September 1905, arguing that Russia would be unable to supply the number of men Kitchener believed they would put into Kabul over the Hindu Kush. For Clarke, the terrain was a key factor and, if the Afghans were hostile, the Russian would be unable to supply the forward advance. The same reasoning would apply to a British advance to the Durand Line. He also criticised Kitchener’s plan on the grounds of cost.21 On Kitchener’s plans for a gradual occupation and disarmament of the tribal territories, he took the same line as Sir Harold Deane, the Political Agent to the North-West Frontier Province, who strongly dissented from such a policy. Clarke went on to argue that the policy of occupation up to the Durand Line would not be possible as some of

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it, such as the Mohmand territory, was undemarcated. The line would also not be easily defended and getting there would take years of conflict with the tribes, who would not give up their independence to be part of British India.22 It was clear throughout all this planning that a great deal of money and many men would be needed in the event of war and the constant demand for reinforcements would virtually bleed the army dry. As a result, Balfour considered introducing conscription to resolve the problem of reinforcements. This, it seemed, would be the answer to the problem, yet it would be impolitic for any government to adopt these measures.23 Of all the problems the Indian Army was to face, the most important was that of logistics. Without a properly functioning supply system, the troops would have no food, no ammunition and none of the essentials for campaigning, such as artillery or fodder and farriery facilities for the cavalry. This would also be the greatest test for military planning as, without a serious discussion of logistics, it could never be complete.

Railways and Logistics The first serious attempt by the CID to investigate the question of logistics took place in March 1903 with an attempt to determine the extent of locally obtainable supplies in Afghanistan. Details were given of forage and supply available in four areas: Afghan Turkestan, Herat, Kabul and Kandahar. Afghan Turkestan was described as a province of ‘great natural fertility’ that ‘could feed a Russian force of 10,000 fighting men for four or five months’. If the land were cultivated it could supply 60,000 men permanently. In the case of Herat, it was calculated that a Russian Army Corps of 40,000 men could be supplied in the Herat Valley for six to seven months and the animal pack transport could be supplied for two to three months. With help from Farah the province could support 15,000 to 20,000 men, which could be increased with improved cultivation. In Kabul food was quite plentiful and it was believed that it could supply up to 10,000 men for one year, but afterwards supplies would

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be exhausted. Moreover, it was mentioned that in the Second Afghan War virtually everything had been procured locally with ‘little or no assistance from India’. It has to be remembered, though, that the armies then were smaller than those being considered by the General Staff and the CID. Although the Afghan countryside was thought of as fertile in places, any army living off the land would have to spread out. Singhal, for example, mentions 140,000 soldiers in the 1878–80 campaign. However, these men could be fed because they were never all in the same place at the same time, thus easing the army’s food requirements. Finally, Kandahar was held to be ‘very fertile’ and could ‘furnish large quantities of supplies’. What they did not grow they could import. For example, ‘sheep are procurable in large numbers from Zamindawar and the Hazarajat’. Kandahar was also considered to be able to supply a force of 15,000 men with 15,000 followers. The Caspian Sea Fleet was also growing considerably. This was doubly important as it was the main route for moving troops eastwards from European Russia before the Orenburg– Tashkent railway was completed. It was believed that the Russians could detrain 60,000 men at Kushk from Europe in 75 days, though this would depend upon a sound logistical system.24 By April, the discussion had turned to the effect of railways. It was estimated that each train running could not consist of more than 35 10-ton cars, giving a maximum freight of 350 tons. The daily carrying capacity would thus be 350 x 7 to give 2,450 tons. To arrive at the force which this tonnage could feed, a force of 10,000 men was taken as the basis of calculation. Such a force would be comprised as follows: Infantry Cavalry Artillery and engineers Sub-total

8,000 1,000 1,000 10,000

men men men men

Non-combatants Native transport followers Sub-total Grand total Horses

1,600 5,000 6,600 16,600 3,400

men men men men horses

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The scale of transport for these men would be one camel, or two other pack animals for each combatant and non-combatant. This proportion provided also for native followers and food for the animals. The transport could then be made up of two-thirds camels and one-third mules or pack horses. This would amount to: Camels Mules and pack horses

(2x11,600) ÷ 3 = 7,733.3 (2x11,600) ÷ 3 = 7,733.3

The daily rations, in pounds, for the force discussed would be:

Each man Each Cavalry/Artillery horse Each camel Each mule or pack horse

Food 3 – – –

Grain – 10 6 6

Dry Fodder – 20 25 15

Therefore, the total daily weight of supplies for 10,000 men would be 247 tons. A force of 100,000 men would, therefore, require 2470 tons. This was ‘20 tons per diem more than the railway could carry. Moreover, the calculation makes no allowance for accidents or interruptions.’ There was, however, a flaw in this logic. It was felt ‘exceedingly unlikely that the full amount of forage for animals – the largest item – would be conveyed’. Such forage would be obtainable quite readily in Central Asia and some could also be gathered from Khorasan and Afghanistan. If such supplies of locally procurable forage were gathered and their distribution managed well, it was considered that the Russian Central Asian Railway would be able to supply and maintain 100,000 men at 150 miles from the railhead. It was considered, at the time this was written, that the Orenburg–Tashkent railway would not be able to ‘exceed the carrying capacity of the Central Asian Line’. The supplies available for the first year would be: By Central Asian Railway By Orenburg–Tashkent Railway (assumed) From Russian Central Asia Khorasan

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Herat and Afghan Turkestan Total

25,000 men 320,000 men

There would also be some difficulty in collecting these supplies at the time, and ‘the amount actually available would depend to some extent upon the season’. With this allowed for, it was believed that supplies would only be sufficient for 300,000 men. Such logistical theory was also applicable to the British. Both Roberts and Nicholson believed that without the Kabul River Line, no large force could be kept in Kabul.25 It was believed that less pack transport would be available in the second half of the year than in the first, due to the ‘exhaustion of local resources and the consequent difficulty of replacing wastage’. Such wastage would be ten per cent per month, which would mean about 12,000 camels or their equivalent in other pack transport. Such numbers would be difficult for the Russians to assemble. The problem could, however, be sidestepped ‘by the gradual introduction of wheeled transport’. It was stated that the roads were easy and that locally procurable wheeled transport could be brought from Russia. The profitability of such an approach was outlined thus: The great advantage of using wheeled transport is evident from the fact that a mule, pony, or pack bullock will carry 160 lbs., and a camel 400 lbs, while a Russian mule or pony cart will carry 450 lbs. and a two bullock cart 800 lbs. In such a way, the wastage of pack transport could be reduced and its carrying capacity increased.26 By the spring of 1904, the question of obtaining pack transport came to the fore. The Government of India wanted to obtain more pack transport, ‘to make purchases ... in time of war in the Argentine Republic, in North America, and in Hungary, and to arrange for shipping the animals to India’. Such pack transport had to be enough to assist in the mobilisation of the Indian Army after Kitchener’s reforms had taken place. Moreover, We should require further supplies of animals to be acclimatised in India with a view to future replacements, and for this purpose

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at least 11,500 horses would be necessary during the first year of operations calculated on a wastage of 50 per cent. As regards mules we should require large numbers (over 21,000) to admit of our mobilising eight divisions on the existing scale of transport, and some 27,000 more in order to supply replacements during a year’s campaign if the wastage amounted to 60 per cent. The Government of India wanted the War Office to act on this matter.27 For the CID, there would be no problem acquiring the 21,000 mules requested by the Government of India, but it would take 96 days to get them to Bombay or Karachi. It was estimated that ‘the cost of each mule landed in India would be about £45’. The movement of any more would create transport difficulties. Moreover, due to political reasons, it would prove impossible to use the American Pacific coast and Canadian Pacific ports would be ‘unworkable in winter owing to the climactic conditions’. Horses in small numbers could, however, come from Australia and New Zealand and 20,000 horses could also be supplied from the United Kingdom. It was, however, questionable whether as many as 30,000 suitable horses could be procured overseas within a year.28 Several different types of pack transport would be required: mules, ponies, camels and bullocks. The nine divisions of the field army required 26,880 mules in 32 pack mule corps; 43,740 camels in 45 camel corps; and nine pony cart trains consisting of 5,220 carts, 10,476 ponies and 11,250 bullocks. The eight cavalry brigades required 2,400 carts and 7,488 mules. The nine special service brigades required seven pack mule corps consisting of 5,880 mules, nine camel corps consisting of 8,748 camels, and nine half troops of bullocks consisting of 450 bullocks. Additional batteries and hospital troops, which counted as corps troops, required one mule corps of 840 mules, three camel corps of 2,916 camels and 2,000 bullocks. Thus the whole Indian Army required, in Kitchener’s view, 41,088 mules, 55,404 camels, 13,700 bullocks, and nine pony cart trains. Aligned with this vast amount of pack transport, strategic railways would also be necessary. The three lines it was thought most crucial to

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build were to the Peiwar Kotal, over the Khyber range, and between Bombay and Sind. The first two railways were to take troops to the front and it would be from these railheads that the pack transport would be deployed. The third was to facilitate internal communication and the movement of troops in India.29 In June 1904, it was decided to investigate the logistical position in the Second Afghan War to see what could be learned. The most important aspect of this related to the issue of transport animals. The total number of camels in use during the war was 101,745. Of these the casualties amounted to 41,000 camels. The most in use at one time did not exceed 40,000 and the monthly wastage was 17 per cent. Unfortunately there were no figures on other pack animals, such as ponies or mules, except in the second phase of the campaign between 5 September 1879 and 16 September 1880. The numbers raised were 8,366 mules, 32,766 ponies, 9,654 bullocks, and 8,521 donkeys. However there was ‘nothing to show the wastage during the second phase of the campaign’, though this might well have been around 41 per cent, given the wastage rate of the camels.30 Mid-August saw Clarke’s contribution to the discussion and he began by assessing the Indian Army’s requirements in mules. For the existing (that is pre-Kitchener reforms) Army, a force of four divisions and five cavalry brigades with lines of communication, 22,622 mules would be required. There were 22,541 in the authorised establishment of mules, but many of these were already in use in the North-West Frontier and Burma and so could not be called upon for mobilisation. The Government of India had, however, classified mules under two headings. The first of these was called A Complement. These were mules always available for mobilisation. The second was, somewhat predictably, termed B Complement, which consisted of unavailable mules. These complements stood at 16,951 and 4,798 mules, respectively. In addition, there were 792 mules for machine guns. There was, therefore, a deficiency in A Complement of 5,311 mules. Moreover, for the numbers required in war, wastage was not taken into consideration. There were also many mules being used in Younghusband’s Tibetan Expedition, which was still taking place at this time. The pack transport at Younghusband’s disposal was 6,000 mules, 1,500 ponies, and

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2,000 bullocks. These were, by definition, unavailable for the NorthWest Frontier. There would also be wastage in these, even if the force was brought back before the mountain passes were closed. Given this consideration, A Complement would be further reduced in size. The complement would thus be reduced from 16,951 to 10,951, giving a total deficiency of 11,311 mules. This news was not good and Clarke recommended buying more mules as soon as possible.31 At the same time, Lord Roberts articulated his concerns. He started by attacking Kitchener’s notion that five divisions could be maintained at Kabul. Roberts understood the region to be ‘sparsely populated, and grain is only grown in sufficient quantities for the consumption of the inhabitants’. When Roberts was at Kabul in 1880, with the addition of Stewart’s force, there were 20,000 troops, 18,000 followers, and 11,000 animals which were mainly horses and mules. He observed that Kitchener intended to put 80,000 to 100,000 men at Kabul, ‘possibly more’. This would be five times the number of men that Roberts had, and he had encountered great difficulty with this comparatively small number of men: It was with the greatest difficulty that sufficient supplies could be obtained even for my small force; at the end of the ten months all the food for men within reachable distance of Kabul had been eaten up, and the animals would have fared badly had we not been able to feed them on the green barley then beginning to ripen. Kitchener’s five divisions would have to be supplied in the main by pack transport and, for this, it would be necessary for 3,029,310 pounds of supplies to be delivered daily at Kabul. The pack transport would have to carry these supplies there from the railhead. The railway, at the time of writing, had only reached Jamrud, and it was from there that Roberts took his railhead. This was 170 miles from Kabul. Roberts estimated that 7,574 camels would have to reach Kabul daily. Thus 234,794 camels would be required to supply five divisions at Kabul per month. Roberts’ calculations, moreover, do not take into account wastage. On the question of other fronts, Roberts believed that the British troops heading for Kandahar would have a much easier time of

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it. The same would be the case for Russian troops going from Herat and Farah. The Russians would encounter difficulties on the Termez– Kabul route, though. Roberts suggested that the Peshawar–Dakka extension and the Kurram Valley line needed to be extended as soon as possible. Roberts also took the view that the Amir should not be consulted over the construction of these railways, as they were to be built in British territory. He also reiterated his view on the pacificatory efforts of such railways on the frontier tribes, such as the people of Swat, as an additional benefit.32 Clarke agreed with Roberts’ overall view that it would not be possible to supply a large army without advanced railways and a large amount of pack transport. However, he did take the view that any Russian advance from Termez would be comparatively easy as far as the Hindu Kush passes, where they would have a much harder time of it. From the British side of those passes, he believed that the situating of five divisions in and around Kabul on the time-scale envisaged was madness.33 After two years of looking into the question of the logistics required, it was decided to ask the Viceroy for his view. The CID wished to know how many camels and other pack transport could be procured in India for service on the Kabul and Kandahar lines of advance and how many men would these be able to supply.34 The Viceroy’s response was that there were 180,000 camels, 7,000 mules, 3,500 pack and 4,000 draught ponies which were fit. In addition, ‘bullocks and country carts are unlimited’. These would not exhaust Indian resources as there were estimated to be, in the registered districts alone, 500,000 camels, 5,000 mules, and 100,000 ponies which were unregistered. It was thought that this transport would suffice for the whole Indian Field Army and could be used for ‘considerable reinforcements’. More transport could be provided in the form of the camel corps, which would be able to supply the first and second lines of transport for two divisions. Mule and pony corps could do the same for eight divisions and eight cavalry brigades and there were enough bullocks for siege train equipment and 69 field hospitals out of a total of 110.35 Roberts then submitted his views on the question. He argued that there were not the camels ready to support the Indian Army in the way

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Kitchener had envisaged. Even though there were many camels in the registered districts, these were quite delicate and would die if they were moved from the plain into mountainous territory and ate forage to which they were unaccustomed. Roberts also considered that ponies were inferior to mules for pack transport purposes. Roberts’ own experience led him to believe that ponies used for frontier expeditions were ‘useless’. Moreover, ponies would have to carry their own supplies as grass was rare in Afghanistan and forage limited. Roberts concluded that: On the whole, it seems clear to me that the transport resources of India, as specified in the Viceroy’s telegram, would be quite inadequate to meet the demands of such a force as Lord Kitchener proposes to put into the field at any considerable distance from our railway termini.36 By mid-May, the General Staff submitted their opinion on Roberts’ observations.37 They agreed that it would be virtually impossible to go to Kabul in force without strategic railways being built. The problems of supply would otherwise be immense. Yet they went on to argue, with examples from the Second Afghan War, ‘that a force of two Indian divisions could, unless the population were actively and determinedly hostile, support itself in the Kabul Valley for one year at least without drawing anything whatsoever, except luxuries, from India’. The General Staff estimated that 341,247 camels would be needed on the Kabul front, with a further 441,170 on the Kandahar front. These were more than Roberts had estimated. Even though this seemed high, it could be reduced by the employment of bullock carts. These were estimated to make a reduction of 154,408 camels on the Kabul line and 75,068 on the Kandahar line, some 211,694 overall. The General Staff also believed that the employment of ‘mechanical transport’ would reduce the number of camels required. This would, however, have been impracticable at this time and would have been subject to its own logistical difficulties. It was also argued that less pack transport would be used due to the ‘shortening of the lines of communication between the railheads and the Kabul–Kandahar alignment’ with the building of forward strategic railways. They

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argued that ‘Roberts seems to have overlooked the reduction made in recent years in the number of followers which accompany the troops and have to be fed’, as these had significantly reduced since the Second Afghan War. The General Staff thus concluded that the estimates, as they had made them, ‘would suffice to place and maintain on the Kabul–Kandahar line the whole of the Indian Field Army’.38 All these figures were at odds with Clarke’s view and he responded in early June, offering a different basis for the calculation of the pack transport required by the Indian Army.39 He differentiated between two different types of pack transport. The first was pack transport to distribute supplies once a position had been reached. The second was to take supplies from the railhead to the position in question. The first group would be of a largely permanent number, whereas the second group would be more variable. Clarke also argued that the barren landscape of Afghanistan would render foodstuffs hard to procure. This ‘would throw additional strain on the transport’. For Clarke, pack transport would be the deciding factor as the first battles would depend on the efficiency with which the army could supply the frontline from the railhead. Clarke saw it as doubtful whether two divisions could be supplied at Kabul for a year. Indeed, ‘if the Afghans were hostile, it would probably be impossible’. If a deprived Indian Army had to use force to procure its supplies from the local population, the Afghans would become even more hostile. If all the forage were used up and the countryside became exhausted, 545,000 camels would be required to supply five divisions seven marches from the railhead. A staggering 3,056,000 camels would be needed to supply them at fifteen marches. If forage were available this figure would correspondingly reduce to 302,000 and 743,000 respectively. However, given the rapid consumption of forage, the propensity would be towards the latter figure. Consequently, Clarke argued that, ‘it is clearly impracticable to maintain five British divisions in and around Kabul for a period of a year from a railhead at Dakka’. Clarke went on to say that: The working of huge numbers of animals backwards and forwards on these mountain routes of which all except one are

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closed for at least four months during the year, and where in many places camels cannot pass each other, is impracticable.40 He argued that ‘where large numbers of animals are involved, the breadth of the available routes imposes sharp limitations upon the stream of transport’. For example, ‘the roads to Kabul from the Peiwar Kotal and from Jallalabad are in many places so narrow as only to permit camels to pass in single file’. It was inevitable there would be bottlenecks, with a concomitant effect on supply. There was also the complication that ‘in some stages of the roads ... there is not the space to park and rest the animals at night. This alone would tend to cause a breakdown of transport, even if attacks on convoys are left out of account.’ In spite of this, it was thought the British would have a slight edge in the race for Kabul. Yet such a war, in logistical terms, would be unprecedented and Clarke made it plain that this was due to its complete impracticability.41 To illustrate this more graphically, Clarke outlined his assumptions: The daily allowance of food for a camel is 6 lbs. of grain and 25 l. of forage; a day’s ration for a driver weighs 2lb ... The supplies and stores of all kinds, exclusive of fuel, required daily by an Indian division ... amounts to 284 tons = 636,000 l. or 1,600 camel loads. He then calculated the number of camels which would be required to ‘maintain an Indian division seven days march from its advanced base in a barren country’, showing that camels on one stage would have to carry the supplies for the camels and drivers for the next, in addition to supplies for the troops. The camels on the march would consequently appear as follows on the next page. Clarke wrote: From the above it will be seen that as the advanced base is approached from the front, the number of camels on each successive stage increases in geometrical progression, the constant increment for each stage being one-fifth of the number on the preceding stage.

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Kabul 7 1,760 ↑ Stage 6 2,112 ↑ Stage 5 2,534 ↑ Stage 4 3,040 ↑ Stage 3 3,648 ↑ Stage 2 4,376 ↑ Stage 1 5,250

1,760 ↓ 2,112 ↓ 2,534 ↓ 3,040 ↓ 3,648 ↓ 4,376 ↓ 5,250

Advanced Base 0 The numbers of the camels operating both from the advanced base to Kabul and back again came to 45,440. Clarke added that, ‘allowing 20 per cent for camels resting, and 100 per cent per annum for casualties, the total number required for the line for a year’ would become 109,056 camels.42 He used the same basis of calculation for several other scenarios, most notably that 611,212 camels would be required for fifteen days’ march in barren country. Thus, just over five times more camels would be required to travel double the distance. The soundness of this line of reasoning became evident from comparative rates in various recent campaigns from the region. In the Russian campaign of 1879 against the Akhal Teke, the annual wastage rate was 204 per cent. In the same

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campaign of 1880, it was 232.8 per cent and the rate for the Kurram Field Force in 1878–79 was 137 per cent.43 Viewed from the Committee of Imperial Defence, the primacy of logistics in any operation in Afghanistan was evident to all. While there were disagreements on the finer detail of planning, there was some unanimity of opinion, with the exception of Clarke, on what needed to be done. The insight Clarke gives us, however, was that a war on a forward line in a hostile Afghanistan, with the frontier tribes across the lines of communication and supply, would be an impossible one to provision. Those deliberations at Number 2 Whitehall Gardens between 1903 and 1905 represent, to a certain degree, an end to the old way of doing things. While the military men were becoming aware of the limitations of their position, the diplomats were seeking other avenues. In due course the primacy would be theirs, under a new, Liberal government.

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4 THE DANE MISSION TO KABUL AND THE TREATY OF THE MOLE

While the Committee of Imperial Defence and the militaries of Britain and India were trying to ascertain the situation in Central Asia, the Government of India sought to strengthen its relationship with the Afghan Government in Kabul. To this end, it sent the Foreign Secretary of India, Sir Louis Dane, to Kabul, to sign a treaty with Amir Habibullah. The genesis of the Dane Mission to Kabul lay in the events immediately preceding it – Russian attempts to secure direct relations, Dobbs’ Mission to Herat, and the perceived Russian threat in northern Afghanistan. Since Habibullah’s accession in 1901, Curzon had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the new Amir to meet with him in order to arrive at a formal understanding for the ratification of the existing relations between the two countries. The fact that the Amir had been on the throne for nearly four years when the treaty was signed proves that recent events and perceptions had shaped the necessity for it.1

A Renewal of Engagements The precedent for the renewal of engagements came from a letter from former Indian Foreign Secretary Sir Alfred Lyall to Abdur Rahman Khan in July 1880. The British Government had no desire to interfere

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in Afghan internal affairs or to appoint a British resident anywhere in Afghanistan, but it did want Afghanistan to have foreign relations only with it. Were Afghanistan to be attacked, the British Government would intervene as it saw fit on the condition that Abdur Rahman followed their advice. This arrangement did not take the form of a treaty, but was merely an understanding, so no formal treaty as such was to be ratified.2 Curzon believed, on Habibullah’s accession to the Afghan throne, that a renewal of this agreement would be a step in securing Afghanistan’s position within the context of the defence of India. This gained a fresh urgency with the events of 1903 and 1904 in northern Afghanistan and Russian Central Asia. Dobbs had already set the scene for a mission, and by implication an agreement, on his visit to Kabul. Since the Amir would not leave Afghanistan, it was believed that a mission to Kabul would be the most expeditious method for the renewal of engagements. Lord Ampthill, Curzon’s temporary replacement as Acting Viceroy, undertook the task of negotiating with the Amir, whose increasing bellicosity towards the Russians was another cause for concern and haste.3 Meanwhile, Curzon wrote to Barnes at the India Office to present draft instructions for the Kabul Mission.4 Dane was instructed to renew the agreement of 1880 and was to emphasise that there was no wish on the part of the British Government to interfere in Afghan internal affairs. Neither would the British Government press for a more formal agreement, as the diplomatic form was not as important as the spirit. The foreign relations of Afghanistan were controlled by the British and the Amir was prepared to accept the protection of India, which prevented foreign encroachment. The Russians were eager to dismantle this, especially in the light of events on the Russo–Afghan border near Herat, so the Amir’s cooperation was required to ensure that British control over foreign relations remained paramount. Curzon saw this as essential and suggested that without it the British Government would have to consider whether it was worthwhile having an agreement with the Amir. Assistance was also required from the Amir to try to curb Russian trade, which was illicit, and his help was needed to keep his frontier

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officers under control. Finally, the British were obliged to act in repelling attack by the assurance of 1880 and discussions would be undertaken over a joint military defence of Afghanistan. On the military defence of Afghanistan, the weakness of Afghan defences against Russian invasion was recognised, in spite of the Amir’s exaggeration of the strength of his army. Although Habibullah compared his army and its capability to that of the Japanese, such a comparison offered no meaningful analogy between the two. Dane was to emphasise to the Amir that the Afghan army could not fight the Russians alone and that ‘he must not expect to be successful. On the contrary, he would with difficulty escape irretrievable disaster.’ He would also have to reiterate the question of British treaty obligations to the Amir and stress that in order to carry these out, strategic railways in the Khyber and Kurram Valleys would have to be built. Finally, Dane was to emphasise that Britain’s primary objective was the defence of India. In addition, Curzon sought an understanding on the issue of arms control. The Government of India had wanted to curb the importation of arms into Afghanistan as weapons were ending up in the hands of the frontier tribesmen. The Amir had been opposed to these restrictions, but it was clear that some sort of accommodation would have to be reached. As a certain amount of the Amir’s subsidy went on defence, it was important to compare the legitimate arming and training of his army with the prevailing situation. In the event of the Amir rejecting the terms offered to him, he was to be told that the British Government would dispense with their arrangement with him and conduct Indian defence policy ‘without reference to him’. The Viceroy believed that such an ultimatum would be sufficient to ensure his cooperation and somewhat arrogantly believed that the Amir would ‘hasten down to India to negotiate’ if such an understanding could be arrived at with Curzon himself. This was to be misplaced in view of the Amir’s refusal to see him and the difficulties which Dane was to face in negotiations.5 The policy establishment had several observations of their own. Lord Kitchener took the view that the military dimension should be brought to the fore in Dane’s negotiations with the Amir. He pointed

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out that the central aim of the relationship with Afghanistan was the defence of India and that any agreement should reflect this. Habibullah would have to be persuaded that a revised agreement would save him from the Russian forces to the north, which would defeat Afghan forces in any war.6 At the India Office, Brodrick’s concern was that, if the Government of India’s approach was too high handed and the Amir treated as a mere vassal, no agreement would be forthcoming.7 The Prime Minister, Arthur Balfour, was in broad agreement with Curzon’s memorandum, but raised several other considerations. Firstly, he did not want to see a strong Afghanistan since this would be a threat to India. Instead, ‘her inalienable value to us lies, not in the efficiency of her army, but in her difficult passes and barren ranges’. Secondly, the Amir would have to understand that if the Indian Army conducted preparations for war, such as railway construction on the British side of the frontier, he should have no objections, as it was in British territory that these preparations were being carried out. Thirdly, Balfour doubted the wisdom of sending British officers to parts of the Amir’s dominions. It would be, in his view, better to communicate with the Amir ‘only by means of occasional missions’. Finally, regarding arms, he stated that it would be more expedient to supply the Amir with weapons than to allow him to go to another market. Despite these observations, Balfour was in agreement with most of the memorandum.8 Brodrick sent the draft treaty to the Government of India at the end of October. It had the following stipulations: first, the agreement would be continued from Abdur Rahman’s day regarding British assistance to Afghanistan in the event of aggression by a foreign power. Second, the Amir was to have no political relations with other powers and would agree to follow British advice on such matters. Third, if any other power intervened in Afghanistan, the British Government was willing to support the Amir against aggression ‘to such extent as may appear to them necessary, and in such manner as they may deem advisable’.9 Dane’s instructions on the matter of British obligations in the event of unprovoked aggression on Afghanistan were to remain the same and he was to avoid any discussion on what form this assurance would

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take. Regarding arms importation into Afghanistan, the British Government were prepared to allow the Amir to import arms from India in accordance with requirements for the defence of Afghanistan. On the actual form of the agreement itself Dane was instructed that the renewal should resemble the agreement of 1880, so there should be no change in Britain’s obligations to the Amir. The treaty should be personal and would also lead to the protection of Afghans abroad.10 While at Kabul, Dane was also to seek an understanding on subsidiary matters, which could be attached to the treaty. There were a number of factors involved in the draft of the subsidiary agreement Dane was given. These were: Indian Army officers were to consult with the Afghan Army and survey geographical features; British officers were to go to Afghanistan to settle such disputes ‘as may be likely to lead to complications with other powers’; an Indian representative was to reside at the Amir’s court; new News-Writers were to be stationed at Faizabad, Mazar-i-Sharif and Maimena, in addition to those already at Kandahar and Herat. At that time, the News-Writer at Herat was Khan Bahadur Mirza Yakub Ali Khan, and his colleague at Kandahar was Said Abid Hosain. The role of these News-Writers was to gather intelligence information for the Government of India, which enabled them to watch over developments in Afghanistan. The Afghan population, however, believed them to be traitors and spies for the British, who were unpopular, and treated them with suspicion and scorn. The Amir’s communications from other powers were to be reported to the Government of India and their advice on such matters was to be taken. The Durand Line was to be respected and undemarcated areas were to be demarcated in accordance with the 1893 agreement. Regarding the North-West Frontier, the stipulations that existed on the northern border with Russia were to be respected for the Indian frontier. Moreover, no Afghan interference would be permitted with tribes in British territory. The relationship between the Afghan Government and the frontier tribes, however, was not as solid as the British believed and it is clear that the Afghan Government had no territorial designs on the frontier tribes during this period. They were, however, interested in using the threat of tribal uprisings in the NorthWest Frontier Province as a kind of leverage against the British, being

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fully aware that annexation would invite trouble. There was certainly no policy of a Pashtunistan at the time, which was a development to occur later. Officers from both sides were to abstain from aggressive behaviour and to avoid cross-border incidents. In the event of frontier offences the two governments were to cooperate in the punishment of the offender(s) and either his payment of compensation or the restoration of stolen goods. With regard to trade, the Amir was to allow British subjects in as traders and protect them whilst in Afghanistan. Finally, the agreement was personal to the Amir. He could import a ‘reasonable amount’ of duty-free arms. The Amir was also to be paid eighteen and a half Lakhs of Rupees a year as a subsidy ‘towards the maintenance and support of His Highness’ position and the defence of his dominions, including the province of Wakhan’, the same amount as Abdur Rahman Khan had received per annum from March 1897. Wakhan was important to prevent Russia from crossing the Pamirs to Hunza, Gilgit or Chitral.11

Negotiating the Treaty With instructions in hand, the scene was thus set for the mission to proceed to Kabul. The mission finally arrived there on 12 December 1904 and negotiations commenced shortly after pleasantries were exchanged.12 The first issue to be discussed, on 15 December, was the nature of the agreement of 1880. The Amir viewed it as disadvantageous to have to renew a personal agreement on the death of every ruler. Nasrullah Khan, who was present, was expected to be the next Amir and, as such, had a stake in the shape of an agreement to which he would be party. The discussion moved on to the issue of Japan and the way in which the Amir compared the Japanese to his own countrymen. The Amir believed that if Japan could defeat Russia, he could do so too. Dane warned him of the folly of this and assured him that Britain would not acquiesce in the conquest of Afghanistan. The Amir echoed his willingness to conduct his foreign relations through the British and stated that he would ask for what assistance he could without compromising both his ‘honour and religious prestige’ and stated

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that he believed the Russian threat was greater at that time than it had ever been in his father’s day. He declared that he would give Dane a written statement of his views.13 Already, Dane had made two mistakes. The first of these was to bring up military issues too early in the negotiations. The second was to allow the initiative to shift to the Amir in his use of written statements of position. Once the Government of India heard the news, they were critical of Dane’s handling of the negotiations with the Amir. E.H.S. Clarke, the Assistant Secretary to the Foreign Department, argued that the early emphasis on the military question was counterproductive as it constrained British freedom of movement. Moreover, Curzon, who had just returned to India, wrote to Dane in early December warning him of the pitfalls of the situation he was in. The Home Government was not convinced of the Amir’s part in a scheme to defend India and it was not believed that he either would or could bring the frontier tribes into line in any scheme of defence, emphasising that it was the Amir’s aim to be fully independent. The Balfour Government took the wider view that a treaty with the Amir was valuable chiefly as a signal to Russia that Britain would treat violation of Afghan territorial integrity as a casus belli. The situation at Kabul, however, was more difficult than Curzon had imagined. The Amir had the Dane Mission where he wanted it and was able to dictate the pace of negotiations, and Dane had had to keep up and make decisions on the spot before having the chance to consult the Government of India. In addition, the Amir chose to concentrate on the defence of Afghanistan, making it virtually impossible for Dane to discuss other issues. At this time, the Amir was prepared to agree to a British survey of the country beyond Kabul as he wished to be ready for war. He also disputed the contention that Afghanistan was not equal to Japan as he believed that there were millions of his coreligionists in Russian Central Asia who would rise up against the Russians if he declared a jihad. Consequently, the Amir suggested that the best way to remove the threat from the north was to attack the Russians there. Once informed, the mood in India was one of astonishment and consternation. Curzon believed that the military discussion at Kabul

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was out of hand and was a direct consequence of Dane’s having brought up military issues too early. Moreover, the Amir reserved judgement on the surveying of the country beyond Kabul until the treaty was in operation. With the use of written statements of position, the influence of courtiers like Abdul Quddus Khan was also perceived.14 Following Dane’s explanation of the deterrent effect a treaty would have on Russia, he and the Amir went on to discuss subsidiary issues. On the problem of the frontier tribes inside British territory, the Amir claimed not to control them. Dane responded that any outside interference would not be smiled upon by the Government of India. Regarding relations between Britain and Afghanistan, both Dane and the Amir wished to cooperate on policing the frontier, especially in dealing with outlaws, and were prepared to entertain the notion of a British Agent at Kabul and an Afghan Agent with the Government of India. They then discussed the Amir’s subsidy and the importation of arms into Afghanistan and, on the latter, Dane agreed that some could be brought in and that the Afghans would have to keep their weapons, rather than allow them to fall into the hands of the frontier tribes. Finally, the Amir could ‘only purchase from British firms’. The Amir replied with a memorandum received on 26 December. In this he demonstrated how he was controlling the discussion and concentrated on the basis of the treaty, writing of it as a personal undertaking, rather than as something to be renewed, as such. His case was that the arrangement made with his father was private and that it was a nonsense to refer to the new treaty as a renewal as this was a contradiction in terms. Moreover, the arrangement was not made with an enthroned Amir of Afghanistan at the time. Habibullah was, however, prepared to adhere to his father’s word as expressed in the agreement of 1880 and considered the original undertaking, with all its deterrent effects, as still in force, while expressing a wish to strengthen the treaty. Dane responded the next day that he saw the new treaty as a renewal. He also, no doubt deliberately, introduced the question of an increase in the Amir’s subsidy. In addition, Dane informed the Amir that his Wakhan allowance, of 50,000 Rupees from 1 March 1897 was still in operation. Dane concluded that the British Government wished the

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assurances previously made to be renewed in a formal treaty. He therefore wanted to waste no more time on this question and get on with signing a formal treaty with the Amir.15 Back in India, the anxiety felt by the Viceroy during Dane’s negotiations now turned to disappointment. Curzon believed that if the current state of affairs continued, there was a strong possibility that negotiations would collapse and failure to arrive at a treaty would be unfortunate.16 The Amir’s reply to Dane at the beginning of 1905 set the scene for negotiations which would last almost another three months. He stated that the issue at hand was to repel Russian aggression, rather than the renewal of agreements and, in this sense, the agreement with Abdur Rahman Khan of 1880 did not require renewal. Habibullah thus wished to honour the existing agreement whilst concluding a treaty which contained more. Dane disagreed. He attributed the Amir’s dissension on this issue to a wish for control in three main areas: external Afghan relations, control of munitions, and the payment of arrears in his subsidy.17 In Kabul, Malleson, accompanying Dane as a military advisor on the mission, wrote to Kitchener on the progress being made. He felt, as did Dane, that the Amir would talk to the Russians if he believed that he could get better terms. Malleson, however, observed that, given the new political climate in England and the near certainty of a Liberal Government, there was the possibility that the British and Russian governments could make an agreement together over the Amir’s head, carving Afghanistan up into zones of control. This was a contingency that the Amir and his courtiers had neither foreseen nor considered and Malleson believed it was a trump card which, if played, would cause the Amir to think twice.18 The Government of India wrote to Brodrick at this time to inform him of the news from Dane. He had reported that the Afghans wished for some form of non-political relations with Russia. Dane mistakenly believed that treaty arrangements precluded this. In fact, the British position allowed non-political relations to be conducted, as was illustrated by the discussions in 1903 and 1904. Curzon told Brodrick that he would inform Dane of his misinterpretation and instruct him

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that he wished for a similar situation on the North-West Frontier of India to that which prevailed on the northern Afghan frontier with Russia.19 Reports also arrived at this time from Meshed, via the Foreign Office, dating from November. It was reported that some Afghan thieves had stolen some Russian rifles and that a list of trade debts owed by Afghans to the Russians had been reported to the Herat Agent. The Governor of Herat, Ahmed Jan Khan, as was evident from the Dobbs Mission, was pro-Russian and insisted that these debts be paid, in part to preserve his distant power base from encroachment from Kabul. He stood to gain financially by trading with the Russians and would have had many merchants attempting to persuade him to carry on such trade, despite its prohibition.20 On 9 January, the Government of India wrote to Brodrick on Dane’s latest report. A memorandum had been written to Dane from the Afghan Council of State. They were surprised that there had been no discussion about trying to expel Russia from Asia or resisting the Russian advance. The Afghan line was repeated, no doubt at the Amir’s behest, that previous engagements entered into still held good. With regard to military preparations, they wished to submit separate proposals to be incorporated into a separate agreement. There were nine points: 1. The quantity of arms sent to the Amir were to be of a fixed amount. 2. In order to defend Turkestan, Britain was to build forts on the Oxus and the Helmand. Gunboats were to be employed on the Oxus river by both Governments. In addition, roads in the Chitral would be made ready for railways. 3. That to support Herat, the British should help build forts in Hashtadan. These were to be held by the Afghans until they were reached by railway, then they would be made over to the British Government. 4. Forts were to be built and held by the British in Afghan Seistan. 5. The defences of south-east Afghanistan were to be conducted jointly by the Afghans in the Hills and the British below.

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6. The British were to send forces from Chaman to Kandahar in the event of the enemy reaching there. 7. The British were to do the same for Kabul, the Peiwar Kotal and the eastern districts of Afghanistan. 8. As a British railway to Hashtadan was considered necessary, land would be given for this along the Persian frontier. 9. The Afghans themselves were to undertake the defences of the Hindu Kush. There was some amazement at this plan for military cooperation. Dane had made no mention of Hashtadan, Seistan, the Oxus or Chitral, or any railways.21 However, these proposals were subject to certain conditions: first, that arms were supplied by the British Government; second, land was to be given in exchange for land required; third, the funds for forts and roads were to be supplied by the Government of India. Finally, if the British wanted the size and quality of the Afghan Army to be increased, they would have to pay for it. Curzon was taken aback at these developments and urged action to be taken as quickly as possible.22 E.H.S. Clarke in the Foreign Department in India thought that the Amir’s stance was linked to fears that he might lose some of his subsidy arrears, and he recommended that Dane drop the hint that payment depended upon the Amir’s cooperation in reaching a rapid settlement. He also believed that the proposals for military cooperation were being made in order to be rejected and that plans for building forts on the Oxus would very quickly lead to war with Russia. The memorandum had shown that the Afghan Government had not wanted British cooperation in the interior except in extremis. Curzon added that the memorandum was the result of Dane’s failure to bring the question of the Amir’s subsidy adequately to the fore.23 The following day, the Government of India reported this to Brodrick. The agreement on subsidy was set down and the Amir would get this when he signed the British treaty. The Government of India continued that ‘we regard the scheme as a genuine one, though fantastic in particulars, and we consider it would be undesirable to snub this, the first scheme of military cooperation ever put forward by

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a ruler of Afghanistan’. Dane, however, could not discuss the issue as it was considered that military factors should only be discussed after the treaty had been signed.24 Back in Kabul, Dane and Malleson disagreed as to what should be said to the Amir on the subject of military cooperation between Afghanistan and India. Malleson wanted Dane to point out to the Amir that reliance on his army against the Russians would not be a success and made it clear that the Indian Army could only provide two divisions in under two months. Deployment could only start from when the Amir asked for assistance, which would be five months after the start of the war. Even then the Russians would be in a position to place 60,000 men on the near side of the Hindu Kush. In this case the two British divisions would not be able to do much, especially as the Afghan Army would have been defeated and the country would be in a state of anarchy. Dane, on the other hand, believed his instructions prevented him from going into the subject. Malleson found the position intolerable.25 At this stage, the Government of India decided to make concessions on the question of arms imported into Afghanistan. Since the British Government had decided that Dane should return with a treaty, it was decided to permit the Amir to import arms, free of duty, to equip the whole of his army. Brodrick did not see this concession as an abandonment of Britain’s rights and Curzon instructed Dane to proceed. Consideration of the type of arms to be imported was to be left until after the treaty had been signed. These terms were then conveyed to the Amir.26 On 11 January, Curzon wrote to the King complaining of the lack of progress in Kabul. He continued to believe that progress could only be made if the Amir came to India and somewhat arrogantly assumed that an agreement could be reached within days. From the outset, it seemed that Dane would receive little support from a Viceroy who was pressing for his own solution.27 Brodrick wrote to the Government of India on the subject of direct communications on 20 January, believing that the system as set down should continue. The Amir was to be informed that local relations could be permitted, but political relations were quite out of the question. If

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the Amir received any correspondence from the Russians he was to forward it to the Government of India, as per the subsidiary agreement. The wording in the subsidiary agreement was to be subtly altered to make the British Government’s meaning clearer. Article I of the draft treaty ‘should be maintained intact’, and this was conveyed to Dane.28 At the beginning of February, Dane reported the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations to the Government of India. The Amir had still insisted on Dane’s acceptance of his draft treaty and maintained that former engagements were not personal. For his part, Curzon believed that the Amir was not in full control of things at court and that the written memoranda were the product of Nasrullah Khan, Muhammad Hussain Khan, and Abdul Quddus Khan, who were perceived as wanting to stall negotiations. Apart from the factor of bias arising from Curzon’s wish for the Amir to visit him in India, his assessment did not take into account the complexities of Habibullah’s own position. For the Amir, it was important to balance contending parties at court, as well as regional great powers. Not seeing this, Dane considered breaking off the negotiations as being the only way to persuade the Amir to cooperate and felt unable to act until he had the views of the British Government on this situation.29 Brodrick then responded to the Government of India. He wrote that the decision for Dane to withdraw from Kabul would be best left to the Government of India and that Dane should decline to discuss the Amir’s scheme for military cooperation. He should also refuse to consider the Amir’s draft treaty ‘embodying the status quo’, ‘unless our reasonable subjects of complaint are first settled’. After this brief digression, Brodrick returned to the subject of the breakdown in the negotiations. He wrote: ‘Disturbing effect cannot fail to be produced by [the] interruption of the negotiations, which may also precipitate action of Russia, if her preparations at Tashkend mean anything.’ Moreover, the ‘rupture of the negotiations would seem to be most undesirable’. The only alternative would be the ‘acceptance of settlement on the basis of the Ameer’s draft treaty, subject, however, to explicit recital of engagements set forth in our draft being incorporated in the treaty’. The King, writing on the basis of information given to him by Curzon, was also disappointed with Dane’s progress.30

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On 6 February, the Government of India received a telegraph from Dane saying that he had had a discussion with the Amir a week before in which the Afghan defence scheme was brought up and that he had passed on the Home Government’s message about postponing consideration of this plan. Two days later the Government of India received another communication from Dane regarding the same meeting. The Amir brought up the subject of foreign relations, saying that it was not a case between Afghanistan and Britain but between Britain, Russia and Persia and it was they who had to be told to avoid the direct communications. He also stated that it was for the British Government to tell him what they considered political and what they considered nonpolitical, and that once an understanding on this had been reached, the Russians would be prevented from attempting to establish direct relations. Negotiations then moved on to the issue of the frontier tribes. The Amir made it clear that he was unable to control them: ‘Already, he said, he had got half his troops posted on that frontier in order to prevent Afridi raids on Afghan territory; and unless he keeps them in good humour he would have to put the whole of his army there, and still would be unable to keep them in order.’ As regards the Amir’s position in Kabul, he confessed that this, too, was not entirely stable and that he was not in a position even to guarantee the position of British agents in the capital. Moreover, he did not allow communication between the British and the Afghan Sirdars, as the latter, who were anti-British, were likely to intrigue against him. Dane added amusingly, ‘Abdul Kudus endeavoured to make out that to have friendly relations with an Indian representative of the British Government was contrary to his religion’. The Amir then went on to the question of the treaty. His argument against signing a formal treaty was based on the fact that Abdur Rahman had not done so. Despite Dane’s insistence that at least he had signed something, the Amir declared that he could not go beyond his own draft treaty. In response Dane argued that if the negotiations were broken off at this time the Amir would stand to lose any chance he had to increase his subsidy. Dane wanted this to be brought to the Amir’s attention ‘in view of the very hostile attitude assumed by Nasrullah Khan and Abdul Kudus’.31

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Dane had indicated in his letters regarding the meeting of 30 January that the Amir would have more to say the following day. The Amir had given Dane a letter to the effect that the Amir would require ‘power from the Afghan Nation’ to conclude the treaty, believing that, otherwise, the effect of the treaty would be ‘to destroy their independence’. In addition, the Afghan defence scheme had been withdrawn by the Afghan Council of State because they understood that Britain had ‘not realised their [the Afghans’] good intentions’. He also believed that he had not been dealt with fairly by the British who would eventually take Afghan independence from the country. Dane felt that he had been misrepresented, but that the British Government should give the Amir one last chance to change his attitude. Dane repudiated the Amir’s claims that the British wished to take Afghanistan’s independence, interfere with Afghan internal affairs or undermine the Amir’s authority and declared that the Amir was being asked to sign nothing new. The Amir had also wanted Britain to define his political and nonpolitical relations, yet he had given no view on the matter. Some of the misunderstanding between the two parties became clear when Dane’s letter was read to the Amir. The Afghan ruler seemed to have been of the view that Afghan independence was guaranteed by the Great Powers. He added that the Afghan Defence Scheme could remain open. He still argued, however, that he should consult his people on the issue. Dane later indicated that there would be no further improvement on other issues outside the treaty, no matter how much more discussion there was, as the Afghans were also ‘most uncompromising’ on the question of the permanent nature of the agreement. Dane, once again, saw the influence of Nasrullah Khan and Abdul Quddus Khan and their attempt ‘to secure all advantages in the event of [the] Ameer dying suddenly’.32 Dane then communicated a letter which had been sent to him by the Amir. Unfortunately, ‘His Highness has not improved matters’. His line was that the British Government should be grateful to him for not inviting Russian officials to Kabul, that he had allowed the British to effect the Seistan settlement, and that he had not retaken tribal territory and incited the tribes. He also reiterated his line that

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the 1880 agreement was not personal, but dynastic, in character and that he felt that a British treaty would be tantamount to a rescission of independence on his part. Furthermore, if the British Government were to agree then he would be prepared to sign an enlarged treaty. If not, then he wished for the restitution of territory which former Amirs had ceded to the British.33 Curzon was incensed, writing that ‘never before has the British Government been addressed in so insolent a tone by an Amir of Afghanistan’. He believed that the Amir wanted a great deal from the British while giving up nothing in return. Britain would lose many of her advantages, especially a weakening of her right to control Afghan foreign relations. The result of this was that ‘there will be a continuance of the same trouble as hitherto, aggravated by the fact that the present negotiations have resulted in a defeat for us’. His response was to threaten to withdraw the mission by a fixed date if the Amir were unwilling to discuss matters from the basis of the British draft treaty and the subsidiary agreement. The other course, that of accepting the Amir’s terms, was unthinkable as a blow to British prestige in the region. The Viceroy continued: We consider, however, that even if the breakdown of negotiations should be the result, this would, in the long run, be preferable to the consequences of a complete surrender on our part. Every means of pressure which we possess would have been sacrificed, and we should leave Cabul without a single point to our credit. Were the Amir successful in dictating to us in the present case, he would follow it up by adopting a similar attitude in other cases, with the result that at no distant date a rupture would take place. Curzon, however, had another plan. These were to be alternative proposals which appeared to be ‘the most which we might concede without humiliation’. The first of these was that an identical agreement to that of July 1880 would be signed by Dane and that an acceptance of this was to be signed by the Amir. It would also be made clear to the Amir that he may enter into correspondence with the Russians on

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non-political issues. The Government of India wanted copies of this correspondence from the Amir, but they would not press the point if he complained too vehemently against it. The second proposal was that the Durand Agreement of 1893 would be signed by both the Amir and Dane. The final proposal was a new agreement. Article I would be that the Amir would agree to observe the terms of the agreements of 20 July 1880 and 12 November 1893 and ‘that he will not act contrary to them at any time or in any way’. Article II would be the same, but with a declaration by Dane on behalf of the British Government. Furthermore, it was considered that the Amir should give an undertaking, before any agreements were signed, that he would honour the Durand Line and refrain from stirring up the frontier tribes. Two other issues that the Government of India would have liked to have implemented were that news-writers were to be present ‘in the neighbourhood of the Russo–Afghan Frontier’ and ‘for a concession of a railroad at Kam Dakka in return for equivalent territory elsewhere’. Kitchener attached ‘great value’ to this latter issue. The Government of India, however, would not make either of these points ‘absolute sine qua non of settlement’. They took the same view over the Subsidiary Agreement ‘in view of the present temper of the Ameer’. Finally, if the Amir refused this revised set of proposals, Dane was to leave Kabul.34 At this time, Benckendorff went to see Lansdowne to make some enquiries as to the mission at Kabul. He sought assurance that the Dane Mission did not presage an annexation or occupation of Afghan territory. Lansdowne replied that the mission was only there due to a change of Amir and did not denote a change in British policy. He added that British policy towards Afghanistan was well known to the Russians and that he hoped that Russia did not wish to alter the status quo. Benckendorff at once declared that this was the case and concluded that a decisive settlement on the direct communications issue was desirable to the Russian Government, but that it was not at the forefront of things at that time.35 Writing from the India Office in London, Brodrick believed that the Amir had addressed the main object of the mission by accepting the obligations previously taken by Abdur Rahman. In this sense his treaty was viewed by the India Office as adequate for this purpose.

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This was considered to be the case even though it was clear that there could be no settlement of subsidiary issues at that time. Brodrick’s view, then, was that ‘provided we secure the control of the Ameer’s relations with foreign Powers, no question of form should, we consider, be allowed to stand in the way’. The Secretary of State was of the view that it would be premature to withdraw the mission. If the mission stayed, they could sign a treaty which could last for 20 years. On the other side of the coin, if the mission were withdrawn, it was feared that the Amir might stir up the tribes and turn to the Russians. Brodrick then wrote that for these reasons: ‘His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that the conclusion of the Treaty which the Ameer proposes to sign, though it falls far short of the ideal, would relieve us of the considerable dangers which would attend the withdrawal of the Mission without any agreement having been concluded.’ The Amir’s treaty, then, was considered as a possible basis of a settlement. It had been studied by the Lord Chancellor and was considered to be binding if signed, a view with which the British Government concurred. By his own terms, the Amir would have to respect the Durand Agreement and the British could act if he was recalcitrant by stopping the importation of arms or by suspending the Afghan leader’s subsidy. With regard to the issues of additional news-writers or the railhead at Kam Dakka, it was believed that it would be impossible to obtain these concessions. The arrears in the Amir’s subsidy were also to be handed over. The British Government, therefore, authorised Dane to sign the Amir’s treaty. Any discussion on the subsidiary issues was to be adjourned. In addition, ‘until the draft treaty is signed, Dane should refrain from mentioning any subsidiary matters’. If the Amir still proved to be obstreperous, ‘there is no alternative left for us but to face the grave situation which withdrawal of [the] mission may produce’.36 Brodrick’s line was the product of a memorandum circulated by him with notes appended by Roberts and Godley. He believed that there were powerful arguments for accepting the Amir’s treaty. The first of these was that the prestige of the control of Afghan foreign relations had a powerful effect on the frontier tribes and the people of India. Second, the preceding agreement had kept peace for 22 years.

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Third, if there were to be a break with the Amir, the frontier tribes would almost certainly rise up at his behest. Fourth, the defence of India along the Kabul–Kandahar Line would be facilitated by not breaking with the Amir. Finally, accepting the Amir’s treaty would be to maintain relations with him and thus keep the Russians out. These considerations were also ‘stated very forcibly’ in notes by Roberts and Godley. Brodrick thus argued: ‘I think it may be taken that the balance of opinion in England and in India would be strongly in favour of renewing the arrangement with the Amir’.37 In reply to Brodrick, the Government of India responded in typical Curzonian style. The question of the treaty had, in Curzon’s view, ‘resolved itself into one of terms’. The Viceroy went on: We fully recognise the great weight which attaches to the strong opinion expressed by the Lord Chancellor, but it seems to us certain that it is upon the views entertained by [the] Ameer himself, and not upon the highest British legal opinion, that the future interpretation of the Treaty by Afghanistan will depend. Curzon believed that, if the British Government accepted the Amir’s treaty, they would lose any control over Afghanistan and her foreign relations. Moreover, the acceptance of the Amir’s treaty would make Britain appear to be weak. Another problem was that the British would find themselves in difficulties if they interpreted the treaty differently to the Amir and that such troubles could manifest themselves in tribal uprisings. Curzon did, however, agree with Brodrick on the suspension of subsidiary matters and the Viceroy wanted his views on the issue to be discussed and considered by the British Government.38 Brodrick responded to Curzon on 21 February, stating that a rupture caused by the withdrawal of the mission would be disadvantageous. The position of the Amir was also not as disagreeable as it might have been. He was willing to agree to three papers. The first was to accept assurances identical to those of 20 July 1880. Secondly, he was to sign agreements identical to the Durand agreements of 12 November 1893, and lastly to publish these documents with his treaty. Only after these things had been done could Dane discuss any

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subsidiary issues. Moreover, once signed, the treaty would become binding and the Amir would be more willing to exercise a restraining influence on the frontier tribes. The reverse would, of course, be the case if he chose to become hostile. He maintained the view that, as long as an understanding was reached, the form of the treaty would be immaterial, being convinced ‘that it would be a serious misfortune were the Mission to return without a treaty having been concluded, and that subsidiary considerations must give way to the renewal of the former obligations’. The Secretary of State added that Dane should be told this. Dane was also to facilitate the signing by the Amir of his own treaty. If the Amir proved difficult and Dane was unable to persuade him to cooperate, the mission was to leave Kabul. Subsidiary issues were to be suspended. The differences of opinion between the Government of India and the Government in London became acute at this point as the latter chose to disregard issues which seemed very real to the Viceroy.39 At this time, several other events occurred which encouraged the conclusion of a treaty with the Amir. The first of these was a report from Meshed which detailed Russian Central Asian troop movements and the corresponding Afghan wish to augment the Herat Garrison. The Governor of Herat was ‘to fortify without delay passes in the mountains to the north of that place’. These troop movements were almost certainly part of the Russian move to protect their own interests in Central Asia during their war with Japan. The second issue was reported by Dane. This consisted of several letters sent to the Amir by Russian Central Asian officials. The first two of these letters were from the First Assistant to the Bokhara Political Agent and the Officer of the Pamir District, both from December 1904. These dealt with the case of a Bokharan Mir who travelled to Faizabad in order to persuade his brother, a refugee, to return with him to Bokhara. The Afghans were suspicious and arrested the Mir as a spy. He was only released on the payment by him of a large amount of gold. The letters demanded that this gold be restored. Another letter, written at the same time, came from the First Assistant to the Bokhara Political Agent, which alleged that a Bokharan subject had been drowned in the Oxus by three Afghan soldiers and demanded financial compensation for this

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act. The Afghan Governor of Badakshan wrote to the Amir to mention another major issue. This was on a disputed island on the Oxus called Yangi Kila. The Oxus either ran to the north or to the south of the island, and both the Russians and the Afghan claimed it as their own. Both had guards posted on the island between 300 and 400 yards apart. The Governor of Badakshan instructed his guards to have no communication with their Russian counterparts. This was indeed a very political issue and Dane advised that a British officer should be deputed to the Oxus to monitor the situation. The Amir believed that the Russians were trying to cause trouble by these actions and communications.40 At the end of February, the Viceroy wrote to Brodrick, with a certain lack of grace, once again to register the complaint against the decision by the British Government to accept the Amir’s treaty. Curzon believed that by such action ‘we have formed the consequences of a complete surrender’. Such action would, in Curzon’s view, ‘engender in [the] Ameer an exaggerated idea of his own importance to us, and will produce conviction that rather than break off relations we will put up with anything’. Curzon went on, elucidating the Government of India’s position: From such consequences it is the Government of India who will primarily suffer, and the task which will devolve upon ourselves and upon our successors of maintaining friendly relations with an ally to whom we shall have surrendered everything, in return for so little, is one to which we cannot look forward without apprehension. Curzon ended this part of the letter with pointed deferential sarcasm: ‘It is, however, unnecessary for us to pursue the discussion, since His Majesty’s Government are satisfied that the treaty concedes their main requirements, of which they, and not we, must necessarily be the judges.’ Finally, Curzon reported that he had instructed Dane as to the line he should take as dictated by the British Government.41 At the beginning of March, Brodrick wrote to the Government of India on the issue of a British officer to be deputed to deal with the

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disputed island of Yangi Kila. Dane had originally come up with this idea, but Brodrick viewed such a proposal as ‘premature at present’.42 At this time, Dane telegraphed the Government of India on the subject of a slight alteration in the wording of the treaty. Dane wanted to remove the word ‘renewal’ in favour of the word ‘continuance’. The Indian Foreign Secretary was concerned that if ‘renewal’ were left in, the Amir might become difficult and the Government of India was concerned over this issue as it believed that a permanent, as opposed to a personal, agreement would be open to abuse of interpretation by the Amir. The India Office agreed to this on 8 March.43 The next day in London, Benckendorff called on Lansdowne once more seeking reassurance that any fears they had of British interference in Afghanistan were unfounded. Lansdowne reassured him that British policy towards Afghanistan had not changed and that there would be no occupation or annexation of Afghan territory. Benckendorff added that Russia, too, wished to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state. This appreciation seemed to Lansdowne to be ‘an appropriate description of the position which both Governments desired to assign to Afghanistan’.44 In the meantime, Dane telegraphed the Government of India commenting on the apparent changes in the Afghan Court. Sirdar Muhammad Yusuf Khan, a senior courtier whose daughter was the Amir’s second wife, had arrived back in Kabul from India and was ‘shocked to find what an ascendancy has been acquired here by Nasrulla Khan and Abdul Kudus’. These men were extremely Anglophobic, ‘and have threatened that if [the] Ameer makes any concession to the British he and others will be shot’, declaring that they believed that the British were trying to force the Amir to convert to Christianity. Muhammad Yusuf Khan believed that they were digging Afghanistan into a hole and needed to be brought under control. It seems his arrival at court would help restore the balance there.45 On 15 March, Dane had an interview with the Amir, giving him a copy of the draft treaty ‘arranged for signature’ and told him that the British Government ‘were willing to accept his draft treaty for the continuance of the engagements made with his father’. Dane was authorised to sign it and informed the Amir of this. Habibullah was

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pleased. The draft treaty had two clauses which were nothing new, but a new feature was the heading. This made the treaty ‘a national one between Great Britain and Afghanistan, instead of a personal adherence’. Although the heading was ‘A Treaty of confirmation of friendship and alliance between the British Government and the Government of Afghanistan’, Dane recommended that it would be reasonable to abandon that wording.46 At 5 pm on 21 March 1905, Dane signed the treaty with the Amir, a matter of relief for all concerned. When the treaty was signed, it was reported: During the signing of the treaty an incident occurred, which has not been reported in the official account of the interview. A drop of ink had incidentally fallen from the Amir’s pen upon the copy of the treaty which was to be kept by His Highness. The Amir at first tried to remove it; but finally said – ‘Let it be. It is no more than a mole on a fair face.’ Mr Dane thereupon quoted the well-known line from Sadi: – ‘Ba Khal-i-Hinduwash diham Samarkand O Bokharara.’ (For her black mole I will give Samarkand and Bokhara.) This quotation was much appreciated by the Afghan Council, and ... they would always remember the quotation in connection with the treaty. It was also reported that: This apt quotation eased the situation, but Abdul Kuddus exclaimed: ‘See, Your Majesty, Mr. Dane gives you Samarkand and Bokhara’. But Dane’s prompt reply was: ‘Nay, the mole is on the face of the British Treaty and for this the Amir abandons Samarkand and Bokhara’. The Treaty is still known as ‘The Treaty of the Mole’. The Government of India was prepared to free the importation of arms into Afghanistan as long as the treaty remained unbroken, though Dane could not say how long this would be. He telegraphed the next day that the ‘Afghans present at this interview seemed to be pleased

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that [the] Treaty was signed, the only exception being Nasrulla Khan’. The Amir then informed Dane of his willingness to act on subsidiary issues. The most important of these was that the Amir would not interfere with the tribes and that, ‘as regards crime on the frontier, [the] Ameer is appointing seven special officers, who are to travel about continually on the frontier and to settle ... all such cases between the parties’, seeing Afghanistan as ‘the Sentinel of India’.47

The Reaction to the Treaty The full text of the treaty was communicated by the Government of India to the India Office on 31 March. Curzon was furious about the treaty and told the Prime Minister in no uncertain terms what he thought. He compared it with the British Government’s overturning of the Younghusband Treaty the year before, where significant gains had been abandoned. The Viceroy even wrote to the King to explain that concerns in India were being disregarded by a government contemplating the scene from the comfort of London and complaining how vital influence over the Amir had been lost. By this time, however, it was too late to do anything, as the Mission had already left Kabul, arriving safely at Landi Kotal on 9 April.48 On 15 April 1905 Dane submitted his report on the negotiations with the Amir. Before long, the Viceroy lashed out again. At the beginning of May the Government of India sent to Brodrick two memoranda. One of these was a ‘Historical Summary’ of what had occurred. The other consisted of the views of the Government of India on the Dane Mission. They commented on several issues. These began with a reiteration by Curzon of his displeasure at having to sign the Amir’s, as opposed to the British Government’s, treaty. In addition, the Government of India found ‘the Amir’s language on the subject of the control of his foreign relations was at times highly unsatisfactory, and even menacing’. Third, Curzon attacked the lack of progress on military matters, commenting: ‘the military question, in fact, stands exactly where it did before the Mission was despatched to Kabul.’ Curzon’s critique continued on the questions of the Amir’s subsidy arrears and the importation of arms into Afghanistan. In the first

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instance Curzon stated that technically no arrears should be paid to the Amir if he thought the agreement with Abdur Rahman was personal, as he had no claim on them. Regarding arms, Curzon did not consider the position ‘to have been materially advanced’. He saw progress with the Amir as not forthcoming on several military issues connected with the frontier tribes, as was clear regarding British plans for railways running through tribal territory. Curzon also distrusted the Amir’s stated willingness to refrain from intrigues with the tribes, particularly the Afridis, and wrote that ‘we cannot feel very sanguine as to the future’. The same lack of success manifested itself regarding trade, as Dane had reported Russian goods on sale at the bazaars of Kabul. Curzon wanted similar trading advantages for British goods. Given this lack of progress, Curzon’s general mood towards the achievements of the Mission was summarised by him as follows:49 We think, however, in the interests of our future relations with the Amir, which it will rest with the Government of India to conduct, that there could be no greater error than to live in an atmosphere of unrealities, or to assume that problems have been solved which have, in fact, either not been advanced at all or have been expressly shelved. The result arrived at could in our opinion have been equally obtained by never sending Mr. Dane to Kabul at all. The Viceroy also stated that he would have resigned over the matter had he felt able to speak publicly about it. However, in spite of all this, he had been in constant communication with the Amir since his accession and had got nowhere. For his part, Habibullah, along with his courtiers, wished no longer for his country to be treated as a vassal state of India and, though their means, outlooks and visions for the future of Afghanistan differed, there was some unity of purpose on this point. The form of the final treaty reflected a certain degree of acknowledgement of this from London. The Amir was also able to assert more control over his court, though it was still a complex balancing act, and, as he had got what he

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wanted regarding the treaty, the relationship with the Government of India gradually improved. His later visit to a new Viceroy in India and still later neutrality in the First World War is testament to this.50 It is often said that a person’s character can be judged from the way they treat subordinates, and Curzon’s conduct after the mission does him little credit. Having commended Dane for his part in securing the treaty, the Viceroy sought to withhold honours from him, a position Brodrick found disagreeable. The Secretary of State decided to award a KCIE and CIE to Dane and Dobbs, respectively, and in this had the unanimous support of the Cabinet.51 Isolated and outmanoeuvred by both the Amir and his own government, Curzon’s fall was not far off and, from this point, the stewardship of Indian Defence would lie with a new government in London.

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5 MORLEY’S SUB-COMMITTEE AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 1906–07

Military Planning to 1907 In the months following the Dane Mission to Kabul, consideration was being given to another diplomatic solution to the defence of India: the alliance with Japan. The Anglo–Japanese Alliance of 30 January 1902 set the scene for possible Japanese cooperation in the defence of India. The need for a more dynamic policy became apparent to Lansdowne on his appointment to the Foreign Office, especially as the defence of British interests became of greater importance.1 An emerging naval rivalry with Germany meant that Britain could spare fewer naval vessels for the Far East and a more efficient reordering of those ships presented itself. Although the defence of India was not mentioned in the first alliance, it was discussed in the negotiations. While the 1902 alliance concentrated on Korea and China, rather than on India, it did have ramifications which were felt later on. These fell into two parts. The first of these was that the alliance provided a framework from which to develop. As the Russo–Japanese War of 1904–05 went on it became clear that the geographical scope of the alliance could be extended. Secondly, the terms of the alliance allowed the possibility that India might become involved:

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If in the above event [a war between one Contracting Party and a Third Power] any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against the ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.2 Such a war would commit the Indian authorities to go to war in Afghanistan or Persia or both, and they might even have to commit troops to Burma or Indo-China if the third Power were France. There were also concerns that British authorities might not be in a position to furnish reinforcements if they were tied down in an African or European campaign. This, again, would be likely if France were the third Power. Here, the Indian Army would then have to hold its own in its part of the world with little or no reinforcements and it was this factor which demonstrated the need for an increased scope to the alliance. For their part, the Russians believed that, if there were a war between themselves and the Japanese, the British would not intervene on the Japanese side. This belief had some justification, as the 1902 alliance was a defensive one. In addition to the widespread Anglophobe feeling in Russia, this confirmed them in their view that they could do as they wished in the Far East and there was an increase in their confidence as a result.3 There were several factors which brought Britain to the brink of war with Russia during the war with Japan. These were the possible egress of the Black Sea Fleet and the Dogger Bank incident. Regarding the former, if the Black Sea Fleet were to leave that sea, Russia would be acting in contravention of the Black Sea Clauses. Imposed after the Crimean War and reiterated in 1878, these clauses prevented the egress of the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The Admiralty had decided that the only way of persuading Russia not to act would be a show of force in the Aegean, on the basis that this was the sort of gesture Russia would require in order to see that the British Government meant what it said.4 Lansdowne also made the British position clear to Benckendorff, stating that the egress of the Black Sea Fleet would ‘create an

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international situation of the most serious kind’. Benckendorff replied that the Russian Government wanted to use the Baltic Fleet to go to the Far East, rather than the Black Sea Fleet.5 The matter was resolved by Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff, who viewed any usage of the Black Sea Fleet as ‘ridiculous and absurd’.6 The second factor which brought Britain to within a whisker of war with Russia was the North Sea, or Dogger Bank, incident. This took place when Russian ships fired on the Hull fishing fleet, mistaking them for the Japanese, and resulting in some loss of life. The reaction in England was angry, immediate and, Hardinge thought, dangerously jingoistic.7 In order to resolve the situation an International Commission of Enquiry was set up. This commission had its basis under Articles IX and XIV of the Hague Conference of 29 July 1899, of which Britain was a signatory.8 This defused tempers on both sides and managed to mollify a bellicose British public opinion. The result was that the Russians apologised for the conduct of their fleet and the officers concerned were punished. War on this occasion had been a near thing. As Balfour had written in October 1903: ‘If Japan goes to war, who is going to lay long odds that we are not at loggerheads with Russia within six months?’9 These events demonstrated the need for the renewal and update of the alliance with Japan that would lead to a geographical extension in scope which would encompass India, a perspective which found favour with Liberals and the Conservatives alike. The Japanese, however, were more sceptical of this view. Baron Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador in London, indicated that the Japanese Government was prepared to discuss renewal but not extension of the terms of the treaty. When Lansdowne discussed the matter with Hayashi again in May 1905, the latter made it clear that the alliance covered only the Far East: ‘India, in his opinion, formed no part of that region’.10 May proved to be a crucial month in the making of the new alliance, which the Japanese Foreign Minister believed would prevent war. On 26 May the Draft Treaty was submitted to Hayashi and on the following day Sir George Clarke studied the proposals. Although he was critical of many of the ideals behind the Japanese proposals, Lord Esher disagreed with him. After much dissent and argument on

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the British side, the Japanese were given new proposals on 10 June. The most important of these was Note B, which read as follows: It is agreed that Japan will, in the event of war, provide and maintain a force which shall be equal to the force of British troops from time to time in India up to a limit of ,000.11 This note caused a great deal of debate between the Japanese and the British. On 14 July 1905 both parties eventually agreed to drop both Note A, which dealt with naval matters, and Note B. These were substituted with a new article providing for military and naval talks to be held by the relevant authorities of both parties, who would consult each other where necessary.12 This had the effect of relieving either side of any commitment on the matter and so set in motion a renewal of the debate in British circles on Japanese military assistance in a possible war with Russia. The new alliance had other effects, too. In judging these it is necessary to see the alliance as a continuation of the discussion of certain issues which began before its conclusion and which would continue for several years afterwards. In a despatch to Lansdowne, Hardinge brought up the idea that relations with Russia could be improved as a direct result of the renewal of the alliance. He wrote: The day will sooner or later arrive when an announcement [of the new alliance] will have to be made and, if there should be no objection, I think it would be a good thing that before publication is made the Russian Government should be told and should be assured of its unaggressive and purely defensive character. If the war is then over we could simultaneously ask the Russian Government to resume the negotiations which you began and which were interrupted by the war, and I feel confident that you would find them easier to deal with than before. Lamsdorff and other Ministers have frequently told me of their determination to come to terms with us as soon as the war was over.13 This was taken to mean that the new alliance was having effects outside the scope of the Far East. The effects for India especially were of

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great importance and might have led to the security which the governments of India and Britain had craved for so long. Balfour’s view on the matter was articulated thus: The really important changes are that it is a defensive alliance, not against any two powers, but against any single power, which attacks either us or Japan in the East: So that Japan can depend upon our fleet for defending Korea, etc, and we can depend upon her Army to aid us on the North-West Frontier if the security of India is imperilled in that quarter.14 The final clauses arrived at in July 1905 helped, as we have seen, to revive the debate on the scale and nature of what help the Japanese might give to the British in a war with Russia. The very existence of the Indian Empire, it was thought, might hinge upon this question. The issue sprang from the discussions held between the Japanese and British naval and military authorities at the Winchester House Conference of July 1902. This had been held to discuss issues of cooperation between the two countries in time of war. A precis of the conference and its results regarding both India and Manchuria was sent by Hardinge to Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador to Tokyo, in August 1903. The memorandum stated: It will be recollected that in the conference held last year to discuss the question of joint action in war, the Japanese Military Representative pressed for an undertaking that British troops to the extent of at least one Army Corps, or more if available, should be sent to Manchuria to cooperate with the Japanese troops as soon as possible after the attainment of sea command. In reply to this suggestion the British Military Representative expressed a doubt whether His Majesty’s Government would give any definite pledge on the subject, or whether, having regard to other calls on our forces, any British troops could be spared at the commencement of the campaign. Finally it was agreed by the conference that ‘The proposal for the joint co-operation of the Anglo–Japanese forces in Manchuria should be noted, but the

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despatch of a British field Army to Manchuria must depend on circumstances and no definite pledge can be given’. The matter was thus left entirely open, and in the opinion of Lord Roberts it is not expedient that action should be taken which might lead the Japanese Military Authorities to conceive that our attitude has since been modified and that they can rely with any certainty on British military reinforcements being sent to their assistance.15 This latter assumption was largely based on the belief that the French would assist Russia in a war. It is clear from this that the British had no intention of rendering any assistance whatsoever to the Japanese in Manchuria. Since the Japanese did not get what they wanted with regard to this, it is unsurprising that they were reluctant in later years to reciprocate in India. Japanese victories in the Far East had some effect across India, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The inhabitants there were gratified by the success of an Asian power over a European one and this helped nurture the feeling that independence could be achieved.16 These very successes at Mukden, Port Arthur and Tsushima led to very real concerns in India as to whether Japanese involvement in the region was actually desirable. When the General Staff addressed the issue in June, they came to the conclusion that Japanese involvement would not be feasible. Apart from the effect on Indian opinion, there was also the factor that if Japan did send troops there would be difficulties, for example with compatibilities and ensuing supply of ammunition and equipment as well as with their deployment. The CID met in February 1906 to discuss this issue and also arrived at the conclusion that no exchange of troops, either Japanese on the North-West Frontier or British in the Far East, would be either practicable or desirable. That unanimity of opinion became particularly evident when both the new Viceroy, Lord Minto, and Lord Kitchener, still Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, also agreed on the inadvisability of such a scheme.17 The true value of the renewed alliance, though, was less about Japanese troops fighting their way through the tribes to get to the

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Kabul–Kandahar Line and more about the message being given to the Russians that an attack in Central Asia meant a war on two fronts. In the event of war, the Japanese help to the British would be to provide a second front, and consequently divide the Russian armies. The remainder of 1906 saw a continuation of the same kind of planning which had occurred in the previous three years. There was, however, a significant difference. The Conservative government of Arthur Balfour was no longer in office and had been replaced with a Liberal one under Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. They saw the interests of the country differently and the international relations of the day had moved on from the Russo–Japanese War and the possibility of an extension of it to the more pressing danger of an ever more assertive Germany. Increasingly, the politicians and the military saw a convention with Russia as a potential means of blocking German hegemony in Europe. Other aspects of the change to a Liberal administration made themselves felt when the new government’s wish to avoid both war and large expense came to the fore. Consequently, the need to prepare for war was greatly reduced and Haldane, the new Minister for War, attacked the cost of the military in the House of Commons, referring to ‘an avalanche of expense’, ‘money thrown away’, ‘wastages of public money’, and military ‘extravagance’.18 Support for this line came from Sir George Clarke, who argued that there was no threat to India from Russia. In late September and early October, he made the case that there would be no attack from that quarter, seeing Kitchener’s reforms to meet such an eventuality as a needless expense. He also resisted Kitchener’s plan to occupy the tribal areas, with its associated cost, and underlined his support for an agreement with Russia on the Afghan question. The raison d’être of this position was the impending visit of the Amir to India to discuss the subsidiary questions upon which Dane had failed to secure an understanding while in Kabul.19 As these discussions continued, negotiations were in train for a convention with Russia and the new Liberal administration was concerned with some of the attitudes expressed by India. Secretary of State for India John Morley took the view that Indian policy should be directed

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from London, not India, and was adamant that the days of Curzonian Indian autonomy and aggrandisement should not be resurrected, as the responsibility for India lay with the India Office.20 It is through this prism that his chairmanship of what became known as the Morley Sub-Committee is perhaps best seen.

The Morley Sub-Committee The beginning of 1907 saw the advent of the Morley Sub-Committee on the defence of India. This was to be the final arena in which the contending visions for Indian defence met one another face to face. The terms of reference of the Sub-Committee were put forward by Morley himself, who stated that it was set up to cover the military requirements of the Empire with regard to the defence of India, writing that: ‘the needs of India are the key to this question’. Lieutenant General Sir Beauchamp Duff represented Kitchener at the Sub-Committee and gave his testimony as to the needs of India.21 Morley opened the first meeting and outlined the terms of reference. He then introduced Duff, who read out his memorandum.22 He began with a summary of points which he would cover: first, ‘the sufficiency or otherwise of the present European garrison of that country for the maintenance of internal order and the suppression of mutiny or rebellion’; second, ‘the military dangers to which India may be exposed from without and the means of meeting them available locally’; and finally, ‘the circumstances under which India would require assistance from England and the number of men necessary’.23 Duff then discussed the European garrison. He concluded that: ‘On a balance of all these considerations the view held in India is that our present British garrison provides us with a reasonable, but by no means, excessive margin of safety.’24 Duff then turned to the second subject, the military dangers to which India would be exposed from outside. He believed that there should be no analysis of this problem which did not include the North-West Frontier of India. Duff divided the North-West Frontier administration into three parts. The first of these was to the north of the Kabul River, including Dir, Swat, Buner and Bajaur, as well as the

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Mohmands. He estimated the fighting strength of this to be 163,837 men and they were believed to be armed with 65,056 breech-loading and 37,049 muzzle-loading rifles. The second group lay between the Kabul River and the Kurram Valley. Here lived the Shinwaris, the Afridis and the Orakzais, and their combined fighting strength totalled 64,026 fighting men armed with 23,545 breech-loading and 14,178 muzzle-loading rifles. The final group inhabited the country from the Kurram Valley south to the Gomal River. These comprised predominantly Wazirs and Mahsuds. They numbered 44,140 fighting men with 5,933 breech-loading and 15,027 muzzle-loading rifles. These three regions combined to give a grand total of 272,003 fighting men with 94,534 breech-loading and 66,254 muzzle-loading rifles. There was also the complication of arms trafficking. Duff stated that ‘under existing conditions India can do practically nothing to stop this traffick, and the power of these tribes for mischief is, therefore, a growing one’. He also believed that the payments which went to the tribes to ensure their good behaviour were not a good idea, stating that, ‘peace purchased by payment of blackmail is never secure or lasting’. He then went on to discuss the problem of tribal policy, arguing that retaliation against the tribes would have to take the form of blockades or an expedition as the tribes only feared one thing – ‘the loss of their independence’. Duff continued: There appear to be only two methods by which permanent peace on the border can be secured. The first of these is a deliberate policy of conquest, annexation, and disarmament right up to the Durand Line. The problem was all the more acute as, in the ten years since the Tirah Campaign, the armaments on the frontier had increased by onethird.25 Duff then discussed the Amir of Afghanistan, who was clearly impressed by the victories of Japan over Russia, and believed that he, too, could emulate their example. The Afghan Army, the instrument of whatever policy the Amir chose to pursue, consisted of between

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80,000 and 100,000 men and, although it was ill-trained, the men were brave and were armed with modern rifles. The problems of the tribes and the Afghans also manifested itself in Duff’s estimate that the Indian Army would require 50,000 to 60,000 men against the tribes with a similar number against the Afghan Army.26 At this point in the proceedings, Morley intervened in order to ask if there were any questions to be put to Duff. In the course of the questioning Sir George Clarke asked Duff several questions regarding the transport for the men he intended to supply. Clarke asked him whether he had calculated the transport required for 50,000 men. Duff replied that he could not furnish the figures. Clarke then argued that 50,000 to 60,000 men were ‘rather a large force to supply continuously over such difficult lines of communication. It means an enormous amount of transport.’ Duff replied that these troops were not just going to Kabul, but to Kandahar as well. Clarke then intervened to say that it would be impracticable to place 25,000 men at Kabul when at war with the Afghans and the tribes.27 Duff then went on to discuss the question of Russia. Although he appreciated the state of Russia, he argued that ‘this state of things cannot last forever’. He believed that Russia would regenerate itself and ‘as a military power, be at least equal to the Russia of the past’. Duff then argued that it would be no problem for Russia to mobilise sufficient men to invade Afghanistan, stating that her weak point would be more financial than military. Moreover, the Russian railways which had been constructed in Central Asia would facilitate an invasion of Afghanistan. In such an event, the British would be treaty bound to act and take up the forward defence position on the Kabul–Kandahar Line. This Duff saw to be ‘the minimum action on our part which can be regarded as fulfilling that pledge to cover Kabul and Kandahar’. Such a defensive position ‘would appear to offer the best prospects of success’. It was also clear that the Amir would be unable to abandon Afghan Turkestan and Herat, yet it was evident that the Afghan Army could not hold such a position. Duff also believed that the Russians would collect enough transport to move large numbers of troops. He was, however, incorrect in his appraisal of the Russian logistical situation. He believed that the Russians would be able to maintain

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300,000 men within a radius of 75 miles of their railhead. He also believed that this meant that 150,000 men could be supplied 150 miles away and that 75,000 men could be supplied 300 miles away. Clarke had, however, shown in two previous papers at the middle and end of 1905 that the logistics of supply and transport would not be able to work this way. Consequently, Duff’s calculations seemed to be inaccurate. Yet despite all Clarke had said, Duff still believed that the Russians would be able to place 48,000 men near Kabul at the end of six months with a further 24,000 men behind. This was plainly an unrealistic estimate.28 The next issue Duff addressed was that of reinforcements. He stated that the British Army would need to assist the Indian Army, ‘to the utmost extent of its power’ yet accepted that unspecified numbers of troops might be sent, due to the fact that there may be other pressures affecting their deployment. He was still of the view that England would have a striking force of 150,000 men which would be in addition to the home army. Duff, therefore, clearly believed that these men would be available as reinforcements to India. He was still, though, at pains to indicate that he understood, and that the Indian authorities understood, that, although no pledge could be given, reinforcements would still, at some stage, be forthcoming. In the case of a war, reinforcements would be required at 93,000 officers and men as a direct reinforcement with a further 42,500 drafts in order to replace naturally occurring wastage. The grand total would be 135,500 men required. It was obvious from the way Duff argued that he perceived this to be well within the mark of the 150,000 men considered which made up the striking force to be ready for use in India.29 Lord Esher then asked if these reinforcements were for the first year, and Duff replied that they were. Haldane asked when these troops would begin to arrive. Duff replied that he wished the first of these troops to arrive within four months and the second batch to arrive within eight months and the third within nine months. This would account for the 135,500 men.30 Duff then went on to discuss other issues which related to the reinforcement question. The first of these was the command of the sea. While he appreciated that this would have to be guaranteed in order to allow the troops to be conveyed to

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India, he did, however, state that the reinforcements should appear as quickly and in as much force as possible, adding that: The deliberate opinion which is held in India is that the defence of that country against Russian aggression with the forces now locally available is not possible, and that therefore no scheme for doing this can be formulated.31 Finally, the question of Seistan was brought up. It was clear that Russia should not be allowed to establish her influence there, either as a means for reaching the Gulf, or outflanking the Kabul–Kandahar alignment. However, in the final analysis Duff believed: ‘If we can keep others out of it – well and good; That if it should become a question of occupation by ourselves or Russia, then I think we should occupy it, and even at the risk of war.’32 After Duff had concluded, several questions were asked, requesting elucidation from Duff on points he had made earlier. These revolved around the question of the occupation of the Kabul–Kandahar Line in opposition to a Russian advance into Afghanistan. During these questions, Duff adhered to the line he had taken previously in his memorandum. There were, however, several other points made which are of interest. It was clear that Duff had little faith in the ability of the Afghan Army effectively to oppose a Russian advance, as he said ‘I do not think the Afghan Army, as an Army, is a good one’. He went on to state that the Afghan forces would only be able to delay the Russians for a week, provided they chose to oppose them. In addition, it would be important for the Indian Army to have developed frontier railways in order to deploy to the forward defence positions. Yet the position against Russia could not be properly established until the reinforcements question had been resolved. It was therefore, according to Duff, impossible for the Indian Army to make plans for a forward defence strategy in detail.33 Later on in the questioning, Duff was quizzed in detail by Clarke, who believed that, although the Afghan Army might not be as strong as it could be, it was still ‘very formidable in guerrilla warfare’. Moreover, the country was mountainous, which was ideally suited for

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such activity. Clarke then asked about a Russian invasion of Herat and Afghan Turkestan, which would necessitate the Indian Army taking up their forward line. Duff stated that he did not want to do this without an invitation from the Amir. Clarke then attacked Duff’s position. It was assumed that Russian and British arrival in Afghanistan would be simultaneous. Yet this would not be the case. If the Amir waited until he had been defeated by the Russians, at least a week, then the British would have to wait, consequently finding themselves disadvantaged in the race for Kabul. The plan would have to be altered, having the effect of disrupting the arrival of reinforcements and their timing. Duff thought this was a little wide of the mark and asserted that ‘small errors of calculation ... need not involve altering the plan’. Clarke also attacked Duff’s ideas regarding supply. When Clarke asked Duff to elucidate on how he would calculate the daily requirements of an Indian division, and thus by implication the whole supply situation at Kabul, Duff wavered, stating that he could supply the figures at a later date and preferred not to trust to his memory. He would not be drawn to make even a general observation. General Lyttelton, Chief of the General Staff, also prompted Duff, mentioning that Roberts had given figures before, and Clarke then stated that Roberts’ figures had come to 270 tons per day for one division, and that General MacDonald’s figures were 283 tons per day. In spite of this, Duff still refused to be drawn.34 Clarke then went on to the issue of turning the Russians out of Herat and Afghan Turkestan. Duff replied that the contingency had not been planned for and he agreed that such an action would be impossible. Clarke then stated that the situation might arise if British troops remained in Kabul for several years. Yet Duff took a more global view, envisaging a war with Russia ‘all over the world’. He said that ‘a state of “stalemate” might result locally, but a decision might be arrived at elsewhere’. Clarke then countered by saying: Therefore any possibility of turning the Russians out of Afghan Turkestan and Herat must entirely depend on action taken elsewhere; not action taken by India which would have no effect one way or the other.

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Although Clarke believed that such long-term occupation of Kabul would be a strain on the Indian Army, Duff disagreed and pointed out that the Indian Army would be content to remain there as long as it was paid, though he neglected to consider the effects of other factors, such as domestic leave. Clarke then brought up the issue of the supply of 30,000 Russians over the passes of the Hindu Kush. This was the figure given by Duff as the number of men which could be supplied over the passes. Clarke said that it would be difficult for these men to be camped in the lower valleys as they would be vulnerable. They could not be kept in the passes as ‘there is not standing room’ there. Duff vacillated again by stating that he could not answer the question on the spot and refused to respond. Clarke then pushed again, forcing Duff to state that it would be impossible to place all these men on the passes, but that they could be held with outposts with the main force kept behind. It is evident at this point that Duff was becoming irritated and flustered with the questions Clarke was putting to him. Clarke kept up the pressure and stated that these passes were mere camel tracks and disputed whether it would be possible to deploy forces on them in any strength. Duff replied that a pass over which wheeled artillery could be taken could not be that narrow, to which Clarke countered that it was a question of width, arguing that although artillery might be able to cross, there was not necessarily the space for deploying a company. Yet Duff stated that it would be sufficient. Clarke disagreed. He stated that with troops in such a vulnerable position, ‘it ought not to be difficult to make an effective resistance to such a movement’, to which Duff accused him of speaking theoretically. Clarke replied that they had nothing else before them but maps and route reports. Duff asked Clarke whether he thought it was important, and the latter responded that he believed that it was ‘very important’. Duff disagreed, arguing that he saw that there was no more difficulty in camping troops in the Hindu Kush than in the Tirah. Clarke destroyed this by stating that the conditions differed enormously, with Maiden providing some camping grounds.35 Duff still did not believe that the Russians would have a problem. Duff was then questioned by Haldane, who asked about the safety of the Kabul–Kandahar Line if the Afghan Army were only worth seven

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days’ delay. He alluded to the wargame at Simla of 1903, where Indian forces were defeated and had to retreat from their forward defence position, and it was posited here that the British would have the goodwill of the Amir and the tribes. Duff responded that he did not believe that this would occur and that the Amir and the tribes would only become hostile once the Kabul–Kandahar Line was vacated. There was still the problem of defeat, which Haldane believed to be an important material consideration. This prompted Morley to ask Duff about the Indus School. He asked whether this school still had any adherents in India. Duff replied that there was no one left. Finally Duff stated that he wanted reinforcements of 135,000 men in the case of a war. In this, he assumed that Kitchener’s reforms were completed.36 After the first meeting, Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Private Secretary to Morley at the India Office, confided Morley’s views in his diary. Morley, the Foreign Secretary, Grey, and the Secretary for War, Haldane, were all agreed that they were content with Duff’s evidence and Kitchener’s emissary had appreciated that this was the case more generally, with the exception of Clarke who was seen as a lone voice against him.37 The second meeting on 23 January saw General W.G. Nicholson, the Quarter Master General, examined as a witness. The questioning was mainly concerned with the logistics of supply on the North-West Frontier with reference to Nicholson’s experience in Tirah in 1897.38 Nicholson stated that he had 20,000 men with 20,000 pack animals. These were ‘of the worst quality I have ever seen’. The pack transport consisted of mules and ponies collected from the Punjab. The country was too mountainous for camels. If it had been possible to use camels, Nicholson said that he would have had less pack transport as camels could carry more. Their employment would have reduced the number of transport animals by half. Good ponies would have reduced the number by one-third. Nicholson also stated that the Malakand Expedition under General Sir Bindon Blood was much better equipped than he had been. On the question of a ratio of men to pack transport, Nicholson believed that one mule for every man would suffice and this figure could be halved to one camel for every two men.39 General Lyttelton questioned this as the camels would have to carry their own supplies. Nicholson replied that he was talking in terms of

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frontier expeditions, near to the base of Peshawar, not of long marches. However, he then cited Roberts’ Kabul to Kandahar march as having 10,000 mules for 10,000 men. Nicholson added that when he was at the Tirah he would have required more transport if he had acted outside the summer months.40 Morley then asked Nicholson whether he believed Kitchener’s plans to maintain five divisions at Kabul and four at Girishk were possible, to which he responded that it would be impossible without railways built to Kabul and to Kandahar. The mere extension of the railway system from Peshawar to Dakka ‘would not meet your requirements’. Regarding the Russians, Nicholson believed that they would have as many problems keeping 30,000 men on the Hindu Kush as the British would, but that 30,000 men could be placed in Afghan Turkestan. He also believed that it would be impossible for the Russians to place 40,000 men at Kabul without substantial improvement of their road and rail communications. In Afghanistan all these would have to be built. Nicholson was then asked about the experience of the Russo– Japanese War in Manchuria. The Russians had no trouble gathering forage and could use bullock-driven carts. Neither of these considerations applied in Afghanistan. The only danger would be a Russophile Amir inviting the Russians to Kabul.41 Nicholson was then asked how many troops could be maintained at Kabul in the event of a war with Russia. He replied that it would be possible to place 12,000 men, one division, at Kabul with troops on the lines of communication, which would be all that could be done until the railways were brought up. This would have to be brought up at least to Jalalabad, which would control the passes, and the Kurram Valley line, which was closed for four months of the year, would be a useful ‘supplementary line’. Regarding Kandahar, Nicholson believed that it should be occupied by one division with another at Quetta until the railway could be built to Kandahar itself. Nicholson believed that this would take six months due to the rivers and streams which would delay progress. Nicholson also, innovatively, believed that the supply situation could be relieved in great measure by mechanised transport on good roads, though this would take time. He also felt sure that Russian preparations for war would

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be noticed by the British, which would give the Indian Army a certain amount of leverage and time. It would also be possible, if the Afghan Army were trained along British lines, to stop the Russians on the northern passes.42 Nicholson was then asked by Clarke whether the Tirah expedition threw a ‘great strain on the transport resources of India’. Nicholson replied that he believed it had, especially in the Punjab where many animals were seized. This action caused much complaint. Clarke then asked whether ‘we must regard the transport resources of India as strictly limited’. Nicholson stated that they were, adding: ‘At the end of that period it was said that the authorities had got every animal they could possibly squeeze out of the Punjab.’ Esher confirmed this, giving a figure of 43,810 transport animals, a ‘considerable number’, and a ‘very great strain’ on the Punjab. Many of these animals also died. It was added that much of this pack transport was used for operations in the Swat Valley, which fell outside Tirah.43 The discussion then returned to the scenario of a war with Russia. Nicholson believed that the likely route the Russians would take to India would follow that travelled by Alexander the Great through Kabul, Rawalpindi and Lahore. Clarke stated that Afghanistan was a ‘most difficult country to traverse’ and that an invasion would be a ‘stupendous operation’. Nicholson stated in reply that an operation would be: Not only stupendous, but I think they would be destroyed by their own numbers. Afghanistan is like Spain, of which Napoleon said: ‘It is a country in which a large army would starve, and a small army be annihilated.’ Nicholson also thought that the Russians would have logistical difficulties in supplying the 70,000 men it was estimated they would have between Kushk and Girishk. Reinforcements of 20,000 men would also be required to guard against the eventuality of the tribesmen and Afghans becoming hostile.44 The discussion then centred upon the pros and cons of the Indus and the forward defence lines. Nicholson cited the disadvantages of

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the Indus line, arguing that to defend upon the Indus ‘would produce an exceedingly unfortunate impression in India’, as native opinion would conclude the Indian Army could not adequately defend the country. He concluded that the Kabul–Ghazni–Kandahar Line was the best line, adding that it would require fewer men to hold this line than defending along the Indus. Esher then asked about the problems of collecting camels to defend on the Forward Line. The British had been able to collect 60,000 camels and 40,000 other pack animals during the Second Afghan War. Of the 60,000 camels collected, 20,000 died during operations, mostly in mountainous country. The Russians would easily be able to collect camels, but they would have a harder task procuring mules. There were hardly any mules in Central Asia north of the Oxus, but they were plentiful in Khorasan in Persia, a region where Russian interests were dominant. The final area of questioning related to Seistan. Nicholson believed that Seistan would be useful to the Russians as a resting place in a drive to the Gulf. He also believed that if the British were already there, then the Russians would not be able to take it. Its value to an invading Russian army would also be significantly reduced by diverting the waters of the River Helmand, which would ‘render Seistan a desert’. Curzon had previously used this argument in a joint memorandum with Kitchener and his evidence for this was taken from the findings of McMahon’s Seistan Arbitration Commission.45 The third meeting of the Sub-Committee took place on 25 January. There were three witnesses giving evidence. They were R.T. Ritchie, Secretary in the Political Department of the India Office, General Sir Edward Stedman, Secretary in the Military Department of the India Office, and Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, formerly of the Indian Survey Department. Ritchie’s role at the Sub-Committee was simple. He explained the agreements with the Amir of 1880 and 1905 and the Durand agreements of 1893.46 Stedman was then examined. He argued that a railway would have to be built to Kabul to keep the envisaged five divisions supplied there, as pack transport could not hold up to the demands placed upon it for such supply operations. He called on his experience from the Second Afghan War, stating, ‘we had great trouble in getting up

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supplies. We killed nearly all the camels in India.’ Opposite them, Russian troops on the Termez line would encounter ‘great difficulties with supplies’, though he believed that the Russians would encounter no great problems with their military operations until they reached the Hindu Kush, where progress would be hard. The British, for their part, would have to struggle against the geography of their side too. Stedman declared that ‘a tremendous amount of rock cutting’ would be necessary. Matters would be made extremely difficult, if not impossible, in the face of hostile tribesmen. Yet Stedman believed that it would be worth it as ‘every ten miles of railway is an enormous saving of land carriage’.47 Stedman also made clear the shortcomings of a railway from Peshawar to Dakka. This, in his view, would only be sufficient to supply one division at Kabul. If the railway were taken as far as Gandamak, it would be possible to supply four divisions. The Russians would have even greater difficulty in this regard as ‘the passes of the Hindu Kush are much worse than the passes towards India on this side of Kabul’. Stedman then gave examples from both the First and the Second Afghan Wars to demonstrate the difficulties involved. This would consequently give the Russians severe trouble as they ‘would not be able to bring up large reinforcements as we did’. The problem for the Russians was neatly encapsulated by General Lyttelton, who stated: ‘It would be a flying column with no base; at least with a distant base.’ Stedman agreed, saying that such an action would be ‘a very rash thing’ and that ‘I cannot imagine any General doing it’. Moreover, their difficulties would be added to by the opposition of the northern tribes.48 Instead of such a bold, swift move, Stedman believed that the Russian tactic would be one of ‘slow absorption’. He was aware that the Russians ‘could take Herat whenever they wish’ and believed that they would begin there and in Afghan Turkestan, then they would ‘consolidate quietly as hitherto’. Stedman saw a gradual policy of control. He was then asked about a Russian advance to Kandahar. It was clear that this was the easier of the two routes for the Russians to reach India. The route as far as Farah was considered to be ‘very easy’. Stedman believed that this drive was the central feature of the campaign: ‘My

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own plan of campaign, if I were the authority, would be to keep back my right flank and push forward my left. I should occupy Kandahar as soon as I could.’49 Stedman was then asked for his views on the Afghan Army. His opinion of them was low. They were neither drilled nor disciplined and he considered the tribesmen to be more valuable. Moreover, such tribes would also be able to harry the British lines of communication in their advance to Kabul. These tribesmen would be ‘very formidable’ in their own territories. Their nuisance value would increase if the Amir declared a jihad. In such an instance, however, Stedman believed that the Muslim troops of the Indian Army would still be reliable and that included the Afghan and tribal troops in the ranks. The discussion then returned to the Russian drive on Kandahar. It was established that the Russians would have an easy march there and that they would not be short of food and water. Another problem was, however, the danger that the Russians might bring modern artillery with them. If that happened, Kandahar, an ancient walled city, would not be able to hold out against a prolonged bombardment by such modern artillery. At this point Stedman withdrew.50 The final witness called before the third meeting was Holdich. It was his experience at the Indian Survey Department which formed the basis of his evidence and the questions he was asked. Holdich made it clear that Afghanistan would be problematic for the Russians due to the ‘exceeding roughness of the country’, which, north of Kabul, was very formidable. The Russians would have severe supply problems there, as the Hindu Kush was, in Holdich’s words, ‘a barrier’. The best route through it was a road built from Afghan Turkestan to Kabul which was ‘very passable’. If the Russians were to invade, it would be vital that they were prevented from making use of that road and Holdich believed that the Afghans, ‘if properly trained, could keep any force out’. The most effective Russian position would be to circumvent the Hindu Kush and drive on Seistan. This advance, though not threatening India proper, would still have to be met with force to prevent the Russians from installing themselves there. It was, however, apparent that Holdich perceived the military frontier to be the forward Kabul–Ghazni–Kandahar line.51

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Holdich was then quizzed on the fighting ability of the Afghans. He believed that they were not well organised in the European sense, but ‘the raw material is most valuable’. Their greatest strengths were: I think ... they could harass an opposing army. They would not be able to meet a Russian force in the open field, but in their own mountains the Russians would not be anywhere in it with them. No Russian troops, no European troops ... are any match whatever for the Afghan troops as mountaineers. Holdich added that he had been accompanied by Afghan troops in Kafiristan and that they had given a good account of themselves.52 The conversation then went on to the relative positions of the British and the Russians. Holdich believed that a Peshawar–Dakka railway would not be of much use, whereas one to Kabul would ‘be a very great advantage’. The supply problem would be made less difficult with the railway pushed on to Jalalabad or Gandamak, though the situation would be far from perfect. The chief complication would be the slow rate of construction, put by Holdich at two miles a week, much to Esher’s astonishment. The Russian position was not a favourable one, except for the road through the mountains. This, however, could be easily blocked by a harrying guerrilla force. The road was, nevertheless, suitable for both wheeled transport and camels.53 The next area to be discussed was that of previous invasions of Afghanistan and the routes which these took. It was clear that the previous invasions of Baber or Alexander had been easier to undertake than a projected Russian invasion might be. This was because the country had become less fertile over time. Although Alexander’s armies had grown in size as they went, forage was available then. They also required less baggage than modern armies and they did not carry artillery. Finally, conquering armies in previous times had been much smaller than the mass armies it was envisaged would fight in Afghanistan.54 Holdich was then asked about the Russian troops in Central Asia. He replied that ‘the Cossacks were rather a mixed lot, but most useful.

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The infantry struck me as inferior in physique.’ Holdich also put the Turkoman troops on a par with the Afghan Army. Regarding supply, ‘their commissariat arrangements are nothing like as formidable or as complete as ours under any circumstances’. Having said this, Holdich stated that this would probably not matter much in the South in a Russian drive from Herat to Farah as both forage and water were plentiful there. Moreover, a railway could be built on this route at a rate of just less than one mile per day. Holdich was then asked about the feasibility of a Russian railway over the Hindu Kush from Termez to Kabul. He replied: It would be rash to say anything was impossible in railway construction. It is possible, but it would be a tremendous undertaking. I have lately had an opportunity of seeing the railway which is being built across the Andes, and it is nothing to what a line across the Hindu Kush would be.55 At this stage Sir George Clarke intervened in order to pose logistical questions to Holdich. Russia’s collection of pack transport in the region would take time and the Central Asian camels they would collect were unsuited to the harsh mountainous terrain of the Hindu Kush. They would also have trouble putting their men through the northern mountain passes and it would be impossible for 30,000 Russians to camp there. Instead they would have to be sent in slender columns and regroup at the southern end of the passes. This would make them extremely vulnerable to attacks from the Amir’s troops in the mountains. Holdich stated that ‘If you had opposition like that of the Afridis, with something like discipline, I should say it would be practically impossible’ for the Russians to invade successfully through the passes. Moreover, the Russian troops would be further slowed by having to carry their own food, due to the lack of forage. It was clear that the Afghans, if properly supervised, could hold the Russians on the passes. The British position would also be difficult on the Kabul route of advance, for similar reasons, if they had to fight the Amir and the tribes. The southern route to Kandahar would present fewer problems for both sides. However, Holdich indicated that the Russians

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would not be able to use Seistan as a base for a large army on this axis of advance.56 The fourth meeting on 28 January saw Lord Roberts called as a witness. At the beginning of the meeting Roberts read out a memorandum he had previously prepared.57 He began by stating that he concurred in the main with Duff’s view. He believed, though, that it would be convenient to add his own opinion. Roberts took the view that ‘the campaign would be decided in favour of whoever is first to reach the Hindu Kush’. To this end, strategic railways would have to be built to facilitate the advance. The Russians, for their part, would encounter little resistance from the northern Afghans. The British, similarly, would have few problems with the Afghans, though complications might ensue with the frontier tribes. Roberts cited the trouble caused by them in both the Second Afghan War and in Tirah as evidence of this. Roberts also supported Kitchener’s ideal of a gradual occupation of tribal territory. He agreed that this should be done slowly and without aggression, stating: I would suggest rather that any offer, such as has been repeatedly made by the Shiah Orakzais for us to take over and administer their country, should be accepted, and that we should publish our intention to remain permanently in occupation of the territory of any tribe which shall in the future force us to take punitive measures against it.58 With regard to British requirements on the lines of communication, Roberts believed that Duff’s previous estimates of troops to guard these were too low. He was convinced that the issue was too important to leave to the possibility of friendly Amir and frontier tribes, stating that, ‘it would be running a very great risk of disaster to leave our communications so weakly guarded’. In the former Commanderin-Chief’s view, it was important to be ready for a Russian attack. It was thus essential that any Russian advance be treated as a casus belli because failure to do so would result in the spread of ‘intrigue and disaffection’. Moreover, ‘the whole Eastern world would assume, and not without reason, that we were unwilling or unable to fulfil

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our engagements at a risk of a conflict with Russia’. Consequently, it was essential ‘to bring our military resources up to the standard required by our policy’. Even if Russia could not be moved from her position, it would be important to ‘show our willingness to do what we can’. Roberts concluded this part of the memorandum by endorsing Kitchener’s views regarding troop requirements. It was vital, in Roberts’ view, for the reinforcements to be present when Kitchener needed them. He added that the internal position of India had also to be considered. Moreover, the Russians had been able to supply 700,000 men in Manchuria across the Trans-Siberian railway. British troops would be required en masse to prevent a similar Russian preponderance of force occurring in Afghanistan. He put British requirements at a minimum of 500,000.59 Roberts then turned to the position of Seistan as a flank to the Kabul–Kandahar Line, stating the arguments for occupation. The first of these was that the Russians could build up an advanced base there for operations on the Helmand if the British were not there to stop them. The second reason was to protect British trade between Quetta and Seistan. Such a stance would ‘show that we intend to maintain our position against all aggression’. The final reason for occupation was that Seistan was on the flank of any Russian drive through Farah towards Girishk, and, at length, Kandahar. The problem for Roberts was one of resources. In stating the arguments against occupation, it became evident that it was beyond the means of the Indian Army. The first point was that the army would be unnecessarily dispersed defending Kandahar and Seistan. Second, a small force sent out could not defeat the Russians and a large force capable of so doing would be ‘beyond our powers’. Third, the occupation of Seistan would greatly lengthen the British line. Finally, any British railways there would make India vulnerable in that quarter. Therefore, Roberts concluded that Seistan should not be occupied.60 Morley began the questioning on the subject of the tribes. Roberts responded that railways through tribal territories would bring the tribes under control. It would be vital to bring these tribes on side as they could disrupt operations if they were hostile. He stated: ‘If the tribesmen, who are 270,000 strong, were against us, I do not think we

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could possibly send up enough men to the Hindu Kush as quickly as they would be required.’ Roberts saw a potential solution in paying the tribes ‘to guard the country and keep order’. He also reiterated his wish for occupation of tribal territory on a gradual basis, before a war began, as this would strengthen the British position. Matters could be further improved by the introduction of railways with their pacificatory influence. Roberts indicated that this would be the way he would deal with the Zakha Khels, who were troublesome at the time. Once this absorption took place on the strategically valuable parts of the frontier, it would be possible for the British to advance to the Durand Line and for the Kabul–Ghazni–Kandahar line to be the effective frontier of British India for military defensive purposes. Roberts was, however, at pains to point out that this occupation did not entail all tribal territory, merely that south of the Kabul River. Thus tribes like the Chitralis would not be occupied unless they desired it. This also meant that the problem of the demarcation of the territory of tribes such as the Mohmands, which straddled the Durand Line, would be conveniently procrastinated.61 The discussion then turned to a possible war scenario. Roberts stated, as had others, that the Indian Army could not do much without advanced railways. To build them to Dakka would not be far enough as the distance from there to Kabul was 140 miles, which was ‘a long distance for camel and mule transport’. Yet for Roberts, Kabul was the key to the question. He wrote: ‘It is essential that, by hook or by crook, we must have enough men on the Kabul side to hold the passes over the Hindu Kush.’ It was vital that the passes be held. Supply would be a problem, yet Roberts stated that he had managed to live off the land, ‘from Kabul and the district immediately around’, for a force of between 10,000 and 12,000 men for 10 months. For the force Duff contemplated, 50,000 men, Roberts believed that such supply would be impossible. For supply, it was vital that a railway be built through Parachinar to Khost. Roberts also reiterated his view that Duff’s estimates for men on the lines of communication were too low. If the Russians were to take Herat and Afghan Turkestan, Roberts believed that it was essential to declare war and take up the

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Kabul–Kandahar Line quickly. The Amir’s Army, he believed, would be beaten and he believed that Kabul would be the main Russian objective. He also stated that the Russians could not be evicted from the north as they were too strong and the British force would be too far away to engage the Russians effectively. In addition, the Russians would stir up native Indian malcontents against the British who would try to undermine the Indian Army by sedition, blowing up bridges and committing terrorist outrages. Roberts believed that a future war would last at least two years and that the contest would be decided in Afghanistan, arguing that: ‘She is invulnerable by us everywhere. We could not injure her in any other part of the world. Even if we blockaded all her ports, the whole continent would be open to her for supplies.’ For such a contest, Roberts wanted 500,000 more British troops as reinforcements. He stated that not all of these would go to Afghanistan and that some would be used for internal law and order roles inside India, as it was important for India to be properly policed internally. The effect of a British defeat on the minds of the peoples of India was one which the Government of India feared. Three hundred million Indians were kept in check by only a few thousand European civil servants and soldiers, as well as by some degree of goodwill. Increasingly, however, the Indian nationalist movement was gaining prestige in the eyes of more and more Indians. This increase in nationalist feeling, coupled with any defeat of the Indian Army, would destroy the goodwill that existed and lead to the downfall of British rule as a result of an insurrection, or a mutiny, inside India itself. British troops would also be required as Roberts did not believe that the native army could be depended upon for more than two years. Moreover, tribal levies could also be recruited to lighten the British load behind the lines. Roberts also acknowledged the problem of a deficiency of intelligence over Russian movements in Central Asia.62 Clarke then began to quiz Roberts on what actions he would take in a war. Roberts stated that he would advance to Kabul whether or not he was invited to do so by the Amir. If he waited until asked, the delay would become too great and the Russians would get to Kabul first. With regard to supply, Clarke extracted from Roberts

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the response that he would not supply a large force at Kabul as it could not be maintained there. Roberts believed that the only way such a force could be supplied would be to have railway communication all the way to Kabul. Without it, supply would be impossible as the wastage of camels would exceed their replacement. Consequently, pack transport could not be relied upon for any great period. It was also clear that the British would have an easier time of it in the south as ‘the tribes are less truculent ... and a certain amount of transport is obtainable in that direction’. Roberts then reiterated his points regarding reinforcements and more men required on the lines of communication – points he was plainly keen to get across. Roberts was then asked about the possibility of a jihad being declared. He responded that he did not believe it would affect native Muslim troops. Lyttelton then intervened. The subject turned to the Afghans’ fighting ability. Roberts did not rate this at all highly. He believed it would be possible for the Russians to take Kabul by a coup de main by sending a small reconnoitring force through the passes. He thought that they could do this even without sufficient transport, arguing that: ‘In war one always has to work under difficulties. Sufficient transport is rarely available to move a large army.’ Roberts also believed that if the British were driven back by the Russians, it would be the First Afghan War all over again. Lyttelton asked him whether this could be avoided by taking the Indus line. Roberts replied that such a stance would engender the view in the native population that ‘we were afraid to meet the Russians and they would no longer believe in British ability to rule’. Roberts believed that it would be possible to fight a war with uncertain reinforcements if the frontier tribes were brought on side. He concluded that, with the tribesmen on side, he would not hesitate to go to Kabul with the Indian Army.63 Roberts wrote to Minto, the new Viceroy, after he had been to the Morley Sub-Committee, enclosing the memorandum he had read out. He, like Morley, believed that Duff had stood cross-examination well. What was clear was that Roberts believed the Indian Army to be totally unprepared for war against Russia in Afghanistan unless reforms were made. In this regard, he endorsed Kitchener’s reforms.64

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The fifth meeting of the Sub-Committee took place on 7 February 1907. Several witnesses were questioned. The first of these was Sir Hugh Barnes, a member of the Council of India. The first subject to be discussed was the Russian advance to Kandahar. Barnes stated that the region was well cultivated and that the ‘Herat–Farah–Kandahar [route] was the only line by which they could bring a large force’. Moreover, he added ‘there are supplies for a considerable number of men passing through, but not enough to maintain a large number for long in one place’. If the season were good, Barnes estimated that the Russians could take 20,000 men towards Kandahar. Over such country, there would be little geographically to prevent the Russians from building a railway. The conversation then turned to the Afghan reaction. It became clear that the Afghans would only ask for assistance once they had been defeated and Barnes hoped that the Amir would ‘readily agree to our occupying Kandahar at once’. This would be vital as the position of Kandahar was a strong one. It would be almost impossible to outflank, due to the geographical configuration of the countryside, rendering any Russian advance to Kandahar a frontal attack across open, flat ground.65 Esher then asked Barnes about the position regarding Herat. If the Russians invaded and the Amir were defeated, it would be vital for the British to act quickly. Yet the Indian Army could not evict the Russians from Herat and Afghan Turkestan. The idea might have been feasible at the time of the Second Afghan War, before the Russians built the railway to Merv, but later it would have become impossible. The Russian position would be a stronger one with newer railways and an entrenched position in northern Afghanistan. Barnes suggested that the best solution would be to occupy Kandahar in force and ‘to go to the Afghans’ support’. There were also fears that Russia could be making preparations in secret behind the Oxus and the threat that the Kandahar front could be turned by a Russian drive on Seistan. On the British side, matters would be different. The tribesmen would follow the lead of the Amir and give the British few problems. However, a Russian occupation of Kabul would have ‘a most disastrous effect’ on India. Consequently, in a war, the Indian Army would require more British troops in order both to oppose the European

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Russian troops and keep order internally. The Indian Army also had several advantages on their side. The first was that the invading Russian armies would be unable to communicate with each other laterally owing to the terrain. In contrast to Roberts, Barnes saw Kandahar as the main invasion route. In order to move there in force, the Russians would require a railway to be speedily built, otherwise they could move no more than 15,000 to 20,000 men. The Indian Army would also require a railway to Kandahar, but this line would be shorter as it could be built from Chaman, as opposed to a Russian line from Kushk. Moreover, such a British railway would solve most of the supply problems to the forward part of the Kandahar front at Girishk. There would also be no trouble from the tribes on this part of the line.66 Clarke then directed the discussion to the issue of the frontier tribes. Barnes agreed that the tribal militia had been a success, but he viewed it as inevitable that the tribes would be absorbed up to the Durand Line. He wished to see the old Sandeman Policy, which had been so successful in Baluchistan, implemented in Waziristan, believing that this policy of getting in among the tribes would be more beneficial than the prevailing policy of expeditions which ‘unnecessarily restricted our political officers’. He added that Sandeman himself had wished his policy to be extended in this way. Barnes went on to state that he viewed disarmament after occupation as the way to go. He qualified this by stating that he meant disarmament of modern rifles, rather than ‘country arms’ or jezails. He also believed that the tribes would be quiescent with large numbers of troops in their territories, as had been the case during the Second Afghan War. Barnes added that the civil administration of these tribal areas would not cost much and the Afghans would not, in his view, become involved. The tribes could also be pacified by the trading influence of railways, particularly the one planned to Dakka. Though this was in Afghanistan, Barnes hoped that a lease could be secured from the Amir.67 Barnes favoured allowing the Amir to hold Kabul while pushing forward two divisions to assist him. The railway would be essential for both getting these troops to Kabul in the first place and then reinforcing the position in the event of an Afghan military collapse

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in that theatre. It might be necessary to occupy Kabul later. Barnes was still of the view that the prevailing Indian drive should be on Kandahar. Indeed, he believed that the forward railways gave the Indian Army a choice not to go to Kabul unless absolutely necessary. The only problem left would be to prevent an occupation of Seistan by Russian troops. This was important as, if Russia established herself there, she ‘could give us very serious trouble on the whole of our Baluchistan border down to the sea’. Moreover, the Russians would ‘be on the flank of our advanced position at Girishk’, and this could cause Baluch unrest behind the British lines. Barnes saw that the best way to prevent this was to have a mounted force in Seistan which could ‘make themselves very unpleasant on the communications of any army advancing from Herat to Kandahar’. Yet Barnes also made it clear that Seistan would be a sideshow to the main operations going on in Afghanistan proper.68 The next witness to be called was Sir Alfred Lyall, formerly Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the 1880s. Lyall believed that tribal policy was dependent upon three factors: the tribes, the Amir and the Russians. If the Russians were to attack, it was clear that the Amir would wish to repel them himself. In such a case, Lyall preferred to delay going to Kabul until absolutely necessary. If the Russians advanced no further than Herat and Afghan Turkestan, he saw no point in going to Kabul. The Indian population, however, saw a Russian invasion of Afghanistan as a sign that ‘our rule was in danger’. Lyall saw the situation as ridiculous as the ideal of holding the Kabul–Kandahar Line in peacetime as a deterrent was impracticable. He blamed the situation on the Dane Treaty, which enshrined previous British obligations in treaty form. This was more binding than the previous assurance and restricted British freedom of manoeuvre so that the extenuating circumstances surrounding the Panjdeh incident could not be applied to a Russian occupation of Herat and Afghan Turkestan. Lyall neatly encapsulated the problem: ‘We are bound to defend the whole Afghan frontier; how we should do so I do not know. We might attack possibly. It is a very serious thing, but we are bound to defend it.’ It would be impossible for the Indian Army to remove the Russians from Herat by force of arms alone.69

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In the event of an invasion, the Amir may not request British assistance straight away, in which case he would fight until he had to come to terms with Russia or until he had to ask for British help. While it was clear that the Russians should not be allowed to occupy Kabul, he believed that the Indian Army should not be forced to occupy Kabul for any great length of time. The Amir could consequently make the British position more difficult by delaying any decision to act until the last moment. The tribes were also a problem. Lyall believed that the only way to control them would be by disarmament, which would be extremely difficult. Clarke then asked Lyall whether a realistic solution to these difficulties could be found in an agreement with Russia. Lyall replied that he had advocated an understanding since 1881 and that ‘I still think so more than ever’.70 The third witness to be called was Sir Mortimer Durand, formerly Foreign Secretary to the Government of India in the 1890s. His area of expertise concerned the frontier and the tribes and he had been responsible for demarcating the frontier which bore his name. Nevertheless, there had still been problems. The first possibility was that, regardless of the frontier, the Amir could stir up trouble among the tribes whenever he wished. This was countered, however, by the British ability to punish the tribes without recourse to the Amir. A second complication lay in the Mohmand demarcation, which was incomplete. Consequently, these tribesmen could cross the frontier with practical impunity, as the line running through their territory was apparent only on the map.71 The discussion then turned to tribal policy. Durand was in favour of extending the Sandeman system north. This system was simply to get in among the tribesmen and pacify them by meeting them and ‘dealing with them personally and individually’. This could then influence tribal chiefs and Jirgas, ‘with a view to their ultimate incorporation’. The success of this policy also hinged upon carefully selected officers. This system had worked well in Baluchistan and Sandeman himself had indicated that he wanted the system extended to Waziristan. In addition, the system would have to be ‘introduced tentatively and quietly’ and should not be applied to the entire frontier. The antithesis of this was the Punjab system. The tenets of this

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were to leave the tribes alone unless they raided. In such a case, the first measures to be taken were blockades, followed by expeditions if the earlier methods failed to work. Durand believed that there was much in this policy which was counter-productive, particularly the policy of devastation which was carried out by the punitive expeditions. Durand said of it that: ‘Burning a man’s house and haystack is apt to irritate him more than anything else. I do not think as a rule it does much good.’72 The final witness called was Colonel G.K. Scott-Moncrieff of the Royal Engineers, who had extensive experience on the frontier. His observations on railway construction were a far cry from these envisaged by the Committee of Imperial Defence. He believed that the Russians would have a harder time of it than had been thought. It would be very difficult for them to build a railway to Kabul from the north. On the Kandahar front the news was also bad for the Russians. A railway from Kushk to Herat would take at least six months and it would take two years to build one from Herat to Kandahar. Since any large force was dependent upon railways for their supply, this would correspondingly reduce the number of men it was believed Russia could put into the field. British estimates for the construction of their own railways would also have to be revised. The railway from Peshawar to Dakka would take one year to build. From Dakka to Jalalabad would take four months. There was a perfectly good road between Jalalabad and Gandamak and a railway from Gandamak would be easiest made along the Kabul River, though this was still a difficult route and a railway would take three or four years to build. Any railways from Thal to Parachinar would be relatively easy to build and could follow the Kurram River. Finally, a railway from Chaman presented no difficulties and could be completed in four months.73 Following the fifth meeting, the General Staff submitted their memorandum, dated 12 February 1907, to the Sub-Committee. They came to four conclusions: first, 20,000 men would have to be sent to India as soon as war seemed imminent. Second, garrison units would be sent to India from home. Third, drafts to replace wastage would also be sent. Finally, ‘very large reinforcements’ could be sent if the Russians pushed their railway southwards.74

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Duff was recalled for the sixth meeting and he immediately set about criticising the memorandum on the grounds that Russian difficulties in pushing on these railways had been ‘over-estimated’. He also attacked Holdich’s position on railways. While considering his opinion as of ‘great value’, he nevertheless believed that he was ‘in no sense a railway expert’. Duff thought that the Russians would take easier lines than Holdich had suggested. He also criticised Scott-Moncrieff’s ‘rough guesses’ and stated that ‘he has no personal knowledge of the country under consideration’. The basis of his criticism lay in the fact that different sections of the line could be worked on simultaneously, which would increase the average rate of miles constructed per day. Duff also believed that Russian pack transport would enable them to move from the railhead with comparative ease. He equated the difficulty of the countryside to that near Simla, where there was no problem with supply, and stated that: ‘To keep back men and to stock food ahead of them is the whole secret of feeding troops away from the railhead.’ He was also sceptical about difficulties at Kabul, which he described as ‘much exaggerated’.75 Duff was adamant that Afghanistan could still be taken by storm and that Russian railways could still be constructed quickly, arguing that British strategic railways should also ‘be proceeded with as rapidly as possible’. For Duff, the demise of the ‘masterly inactivity’ doctrine meant that the forward defence was the only feasible way to protect India. Clarke attacked this thinking vigorously in the questioning which followed. He firstly demonstrated that railway construction would be extremely difficult in the face of tribal opposition. Duff then stated that he believed that 30,000 civilians at Simla would be harder to supply than 30,000 combatants in the field. Clarke’s tone betrayed incredulity at this point, which turned to frustration at Duff’s refusal to be pinned down over forestalling the Russians at Kabul.76 The discussion then turned towards the logistics of supply, of which Duff was ignorant. Clarke stated authoritatively: ‘It actually works out in a geometrical ratio: The smaller number of men for the longer distance requires enormously more transport.’ The problem of Seistan was then discussed. The Indian Army would be unable to forestall the Russians there with their present numbers and would require heavy

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reinforcements to take the region and hold it. Failure to do so would be to allow the Russians to take Girishk, threatening Kandahar. On the other side of the line, Clarke quizzed Duff on the value of the Shilman Ghakke and Kabul River lines. Duff admitted that these railways would not be of use in the first year of war, but ‘would naturally be useful afterwards’. Esher, for his part, was more concerned over the issue of reinforcements. The differences between the organisation of the British and Indian Armies could be a problem, yet Duff believed that these differences could be ironed out. Clarke intervened again, keen to get Duff back on to the subject of logistics, stating that the supply position for Russia would be bad. On the basis of one camel transporting 400lb, they would require 400,000 camels to cross the Hindu Kush. Clarke stated that the supply of ‘a large number of men over a considerable distance ... is immensely difficult’. Duff had the last word, however, and cited the number of men General Badcock was able to feed, from locally obtained supplies, during the Second Afghan War: 3 months 3 months 1 month 3 months

October to December 1879 January to March 1880 April 1880 May to July 1880

10,950 7,150 27,550 41,730

Supplies would also, presumably, be plentiful in August and September. Duff then withdrew.77 After Duff had withdrawn, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian Hamilton was examined. Morley left and Esher took the chair. The first area discussed was the race to Kabul. Hamilton believed that the Russians could only put one division, 10,000 to 12,000 men, at Kabul to anticipate the British. The obstacles to a Russian advance were, in his view, insuperable for 20,000 men, but not for 10,000. This would still be ‘extraordinarily difficult’, but ‘people can do things for a push and a pinch, and for a short time by half rations’. The British position would also be difficult due to the frontier tribes. In order to counter this disadvantage, Hamilton advocated going up to the Durand Line. Yet there was still the problem of the Amir’s consent for British forces to

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enter Afghanistan. If they went to Kabul uninvited, they could risk the ‘danger of isolation and defeat’. A solution would be to prevent a Russian force taking Kabul, to engage them, and then to withdraw to keep Kabul out of their hands. It would also be important to prevent the Amir from being bribed to join the Russians or for them to place a pretender on the Afghan throne. It was, therefore, vital for the Amir to remain on side, as to act without his approval would incur the ire of both the Afghans and the tribes.78 The discussion then turned to the British position on the frontier. This position would improve, in Hamilton’s view, with railways being built to Parachinar and Dakka. Hamilton, like Duff, did not believe the Afghan Army to be worth much. The tribes were another matter. They were, he stated, ‘some of the finest fighting men in the world’ and their loyalties could have a decisive impact on a campaign. In the British position on the frontier, logistics would play a crucial role. Hamilton stated that there were adequate supplies in and around Kabul to maintain three divisions for six months or two divisions and a cavalry brigade for a year. Maintaining troops at a considerable distance from the railhead was another issue, however. Hamilton had been Chief Staff Officer on the lines of communication to Chitral in 1895. He had had to maintain 2,000 men with 15,000 on the lines of communication, 200 miles from their base at Nowshera. For this he used 39,000 animals. The force was in the field for six months and Hamilton believed that it could have remained there six months longer. However, more camels would have been needed if all 17,000 men were at the front. The country was also similar to that between Dakka and Kabul and the passes at Chitral were also more suitable for mule transport than for camels.79 Hamilton was then asked about the employment of Japanese troops to assist in the defence of India. Sir John French asked him what the effect would be on the native Indian population ‘if we brought alien troops into the country to fight for us’. Hamilton replied that he did not think that the population would mind ‘if we were simply making a convenient exchange’. However, if ‘we were relying upon other people to fight our battles, the effect would be bad’. French then posed the possibility that the Indian population might not know

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of such an exchange. In this case, Hamilton was unsure of what the native response would be. On the one hand, the natives might feel that with Japanese help, the British would be bound to win. On the other hand, they might believe that ‘the English are no good; they cannot do without outside help’.80 The discussion then went on to the tribal policy. Hamilton wanted the tribes assimilated with the rest of India as the present system was clearly not working as it should. He believed that the tribes should be absorbed gradually and that if they rebelled, they should be occupied. Finally, he disagreed with the idea that the result of such a change in policy would be to set the frontier ablaze. He then withdrew.81 After the meeting Morley was full of praise for Duff and his evidence. In contrast, his views on Clarke were distinctly unfavourable. The diary of Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Morley’s Private Secretary, is particularly revealing in this regard, showing that this dislike was a long-standing one. After the proceedings of the Sub-Committee were over, Morley’s criticism became more pointed, seeing Clarke as a problem.82 The report of the Sub-Committee was written up and presented on 1 May 1907 by the Secretary, Captain A.B. Lindsay. Though conceding that India’s defence lay in diplomacy, the report nevertheless pointed out that for a secure forward policy, certain military preparations would have to be made. There were also several recommendations contained in the report. Some of these were merely reiterations of old policy, while others were new developments. The first recommendation was that Russian aggression against Afghanistan should be taken as a casus belli. Secondly, the forward policy into Afghanistan would alter depending on the attitude of the frontier tribes. If they were friendly, the Indian Army would occupy Kabul and Kandahar. If they were hostile, they would occupy Jalalabad and Kandahar. At the same time, forward railways would be pushed on as far and as fast as possible in these directions. The third area concerned the Indian Army and reinforcements. The Kitchener reforms were endorsed by the Home Government and it was decided that ‘the military organisation of Great Britain should be such as to enable 100,000 men to be dispatched to India during the first year of war’. Moreover, Kitchener was to receive the reinforcements he wanted. This was, at last, the pledge

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for reinforcements the Indian Army had requested, but which Balfour, in his time as Prime Minister, had declined to give. Clarke was disappointed and refused to sign the report. Somewhat more disturbingly, the acceptance of it by the rest of the establishment signified a firm rejection of Clarke’s ideals and beliefs regarding Indian defence. It was, however, clear that, despite these undertakings, Morley himself was unconvinced of the Russian threat to India.83 In addition, he would have been aware of the negotiations proceeding on the Anglo–Russian Convention. Knowing this, Morley used the report of his sub-committee to placate the fears of the British military establishment and allow the Liberal Government sufficient room for manoeuvre to pursue a domestic reform agenda. Morley’s report also coincided with the War Office’s ‘Report on the Military Resources of the Russian Empire’. While the War Office accepted the Russian threat as a real one, analysing their primary lines of advance to Kabul and Kandahar and their flanking attacks, through Seistan and over the Pamirs, it was believed that there were enough men in Gilgit and Chitral to halt the small Russian force coming over the Pamirs, and Russian forces would be limited in any attack on Seistan. The British position looked safe enough in this regard and analysis earlier in the report concerning the defects of the Russian Army in the war with Japan tended to reinforce this observation. There was, however, one flaw in planning, which was financial. If Russia ever managed to conquer Afghanistan so as ‘to make the Russian and British frontiers coterminous’, The military burdens of India and of the Empire will be so enormously increased that, short of a recasting of our whole military system, it will become a question of practical politics whether it is worth our while to retain India or not.84 These arguments indicate a clear winding down of military rivalry and planning. The Russian threat was not seen as the danger it had been perceived to be a mere two years before. Russia’s difficulties, coupled with those of Britain, made it apparent that an understanding would be necessary regarding the Afghan and Central Asian questions.

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After the Convention, military contingency planning dwindled significantly, with documentation from 1908 emphasising Indian military expenditure. Morley simply believed that, with a Russian threat gone after the signing of an Entente, the Indian Army should undergo cuts to its expenditure.85 India’s loss was to be Britain’s gain.

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6 A DIPLOMATIC DEFENCE OF INDIA

Plans, Overtures and the Search for an Agreement The rapprochement which led to the Anglo–Russian Convention of August 1907 began with tentative feelers put out by Lord Lansdowne, leading to talks in late 1903 and 1904. These negotiations were, however, abandoned by Benckendorff on account of the Russo–Japanese War. As the war drew to a close, many in London wished for a resumption of talks, which became a reality in 1906 and the negotiations continued until August 1907 when the Anglo–Russian Convention came into being. Several issues were discussed, the first being Persia. The Russian Government’s view on this was that, while they recognised the dominant position of Britain in the Gulf, they had no wish for Persia to be divided into northern and southern spheres of interest as this would restrict their trading position.1 At the same time they wished to maintain their hold on the north without annexing it to the Russian Empire. With regard to Seistan, Sir Charles Hardinge, the future Ambassador at St Petersburg, made it plain to Benckendorff that Britain would not tolerate Russian influence in that region as it adjoined the Indian and Afghan borders. Benckendorff agreed, stating that the Russian Government viewed Seistan as one of those places ‘which might be

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considered as entirely within the British sphere of influence and as involved in the defence of Indian interests’.2 The position of both sides over Afghanistan had changed little since the Aide-Memoire communicated by the Russian Government of 6 February 1900, which re-affirmed Afghanistan as being within the British sphere of influence. The Russian Government also declined to send agents into Afghanistan and restricted border communications between the two states to those of a purely local character. The Russian position in November 1903 did not deviate from this.3 The situation regarding Tibet was different. Lansdowne believed that Tibet lay firmly within the British sphere of influence and that the Russian Government should accept it as such. Sir Charles Hardinge, at St Petersburg, passed this opinion on to Lamsdorff, the Russian Foreign Minister, qualifying it by stating that the British had no intention of annexing Tibet. The Russians were, despite these assurances, still somewhat suspicious of British motives, especially after the harsh treaty set down by Younghusband in September 1904.4 Thus the basis of an agreement was set down and towards the end of 1905 the Foreign Office and the India Office once more asserted that they were in favour of an understanding, based upon the resumption of negotiations. Voices supporting this came from three main places: the British Embassy at St Petersburg, the Foreign Office in London, and the British Legation at Tehran. At St Petersburg Hardinge had long been working for an agreement, a view echoed by Lamsdorff, who had declared ‘that it was his great aim and object to improve relations between England and Russia’, and that both he and Hardinge should ‘work strenuously together to remove all those points of dissension which in his opinion were based solely on unreasoning prejudice’.5 Lansdowne, a keen proponent of an understanding, decided to bring Hardinge back to London in order to strengthen work for an agreement. He wrote to Spring-Rice, the Minister at Tehran, concerning a meeting with Benckendorff, saying that he attached great importance to having an official in London who was ‘thoroughly conversant with the recent course of Anglo–Russian diplomatic relations’

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and that this individual should have the ear of the Foreign Secretary. The Russian Government would thus benefit from having ‘so tried a friend of Russia as Sir Charles Hardinge’ at the Foreign Office in London. Benckendorff concurred.6 On 1 January 1904, Lansdowne submitted his plan for an agreement with Russia to Cabinet. This scheme was more wide-ranging than the Liberal Entente of 1907. Regarding Afghanistan, Russia was to recognise that country as ‘entirely within the British sphere of influence’ and to accept British control over her foreign affairs. Direct relations were only permitted between Russia and Afghanistan if they involved purely local matters. Political communications were still forbidden. Lansdowne added that it would be necessary to secure the concurrence of the Amir for such an agreement to go ahead. Russia was to recognise Tibet as entirely within the British sphere of influence. Persia formed the bulk of the plan. This allowed Russian special interests in the north in return for the recognition of British interests in the south. The integrity of Persia was to be upheld and the Powers were to act in concert in rendering her assistance. All previous treaty rights of Britain in Persia were to be respected and when the embargo on railways was to be lifted Britain and Russia were ‘to consult together with a view to arriving at an amicable arrangement respecting the control and construction of the lines projected in their respective spheres of influence’. Britain was also not to construct fortifications in the south of Persia and the Gulf as long as Persia remained independent. The Russians were to recognise Seistan as within the British sphere of influence. The final area dealt with in Lansdowne’s draft, which was not included in Grey’s Entente, was that of Manchuria. The British would recognise Russian interests there in return for a guarantee that Britain’s treaty rights in China would be respected.7 Sir Edward Grey, Lansdowne’s successor, was also an advocate of an agreement with Russia and had discussed this with Benckendorff shortly after taking office. The Russian Ambassador had stated that he himself had been responsible for the suspension of negotiations, and that they should not be resumed until the Russian internal situation had improved. They agreed that such a resumption would be desirable to both sides.8

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The final voice of the Foreign Office advocating a convention came from the British Legation at Tehran. As early as October 1905, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice agreed in principle, writing to the Prime Minister to support an understanding with Russia. Yet, at the same time, he was concerned that the Russians might live up to their reputation for not adhering to agreements. He was also concerned that negotiations might be complicated by Russia having to give up its position of being able to put pressure on the British in the region. For Spring-Rice, an agreement with Russia would also be a useful addition to the recent entente with France, which had resolved tensions in Africa.9 Allied to Spring-Rice on the question of an agreement was Sir Valentine Chirol of The Times. As the two corresponded frequently, Chirol knew of plans for a projected agreement. Indeed, if he had not found out from Spring-Rice, he would have done so from Sir Charles Hardinge or Sir George Clarke, with whom he also corresponded. Chirol believed in an agreement in principle in the same way that Spring-Rice had done and recognised the potential dividends vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier.10 The final voice from this quarter was that of Sir Arthur Hardinge, the former British Minister at Tehran. Though agreeing to an understanding, he believed that the Russians would not agree to respective spheres of influence in Persia when they would lead to a Russian protectorate in the north and a British one in the south. This would, in turn, lead to ‘the definite abandonment of Russia’s aspirations to reach the open ocean’, something that the Russians, in his view, would find unacceptable. Instead he saw an agreement as a mere ‘suspension of the diplomatic conflict ... on the lines of the Austro–Russian Agreement respecting the Balkan Peninsula’. In this way, at least, Britain and Russia could combine to preserve Persia and reform it. Sir Arthur also realised that nothing further could be done until a ‘more stable Russian Government has been evolved out of the existing chaos’.11 Advocacy of an entente came, too, from the India Office. In this there was a bitter difference of opinion between this office, in London, and the Government of India, which was overruled in its opposition to an agreement. Hamilton had long believed it essential for Britain to

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come to an understanding with Russia over Central Asia, in order to prevent Russian influence prevailing in the north of Persia spreading south. For him, the question was one of containment by alliance, or convention, while, at the same time, ensuring that British interests in the region were protected. In Persia, this meant keeping the Russians out of Seistan and away from the Afghan border.12 Curzon was opposed to an agreement on the grounds that it would represent a surrender of the British position in the region and never missed an opportunity to articulate his view, both as Viceroy and subsequently. Curzon and the Government of India were, in the end, overruled on the question of making an agreement and their opinion on the matter consequently disregarded by the Government in London. It would be a similar story for Curzon’s successor.13

The Entente Secured The Anglo–Russian Entente came into being as the result of the weaknesses of both sides. British India was militarily weak on all her frontier buffer states: Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Moreover, help would not be forthcoming from Japan in these regions in the event of a war. Russia, too, was weak after having lost the war with Japan, especially in the light of the bankruptcy which ensued and the revolution which shook the country. Britain required an agreement which would ensure the safety of India. Russia needed a breathing space.14 The diplomats at the Foreign Office most responsible for the conclusion of the Entente were Nicolson and Hardinge. Nicolson, a Russophile and the Ambassador at St Petersburg, worked with Isvolsky, the new Russian Foreign Minister, while Hardinge, recently transferred from St Petersburg and now Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office in London, worked with Grey and Benckendorff. This partnership had the expertise, ability and experience to work with the Russians and the conclusion of the Entente was largely due to them. No sooner had the Liberal administration taken office than it resumed the rapprochement with Russia. Serious discussions, however, did not come about until the summer of 1906. There was doubt initially as to whether the Russian Government would prove stable or

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whether it would fall, in which case it became questionable whether negotiations would be worth pursuing. Nicolson believed that it was important to continue negotiating with the government in power and gave three compelling reasons for so doing: first, breaking off negotiations might sour relations with the Russians, lose momentum and compromise the atmosphere of goodwill then prevailing. Second, if negotiations were to be suspended until the Russian Government seemed more stable, St Petersburg might question the need for a convention. Finally, if matters were left as they were, there was the concern that the Germans would make their presence felt in Persia to the detriment of both Britain and Russia.15 Nicolson’s instructions for negotiating with Russia were lax in their terms, their chief object being to bring the Russians to the negotiating table. Yet they simultaneously ensured that areas within the British sphere of influence, such as Afghanistan, remained as they were. Given the range of issues involved, negotiations proceeded apace and by the end of January 1907 they seemed to be well on the way to completion. Tibet was practically settled and Afghanistan would present few difficulties as the Russians were prepared to accept it as outside their sphere of influence. All that had to be done was for the Persian zones of influence to be defined. However, this was to prove more difficult than had hitherto been believed.16 The next bump in the road came in March, when the issue of the Dardanelles surfaced. It was a long-standing aim of the Russians for their Black Sea Fleet to have right of egress there. Diplomacy during the Russo–Japanese War had been sufficient to prevent this, but now this had become an issue the Russians were keen to link to that of the Persian zones.17 Despite Hardinge’s inclination to allow a concession in favour of reciprocity elsewhere, his view did not find favour in Cabinet and negotiations over the Dardanelles were eventually dropped, only to be resurrected in 1915. The negotiations proceeded through the spring and early summer, with Persia remaining the sticking point. The clauses regarding Afghanistan, though, remained virtually unchanged and progress was assured on that front. However, in Tehran, Spring-Rice continued to have concerns over whether Russia would see the terms as binding in

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the long term. The need for a convention at the time took precedence, but as events in Persia took a turn for the worse in the years immediately before the First World War, it is clear that Spring-Rice’s reservations were not totally unjustified.18 Throughout, support continued to be forthcoming from the India Office, where drafts from the Foreign Office had been shared with key officials. The Political and Secret Department was particularly pleased with them. There were lingering concerns, though, about the Russian Central Asian railway network as well as the need for an effective buffer zone between British and Russian spheres of influence in Persia, which would not allow any part of any Russian zone to border Afghanistan. At the Council of India, as well as at the India Office, Sir William Lee-Warner, Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick and Sir Arthur Godley were all united in the need for an enduring convention, covering all the key issues in the region. Although Fitzpatrick, like Spring-Rice, also had concerns over the duration of any convention as an effective instrument, these did nothing to undermine his belief in the need for it.19 Against this stood an isolated Government of India. The Viceroy and Sir James Dunlop-Smith, his Private Secretary, doggedly resisted any move for an understanding. They were finally overruled, but their stance against a rapprochement shows a deep-seated unwillingness to accept their role as a subsidiary body. While Morley sought to curb the Curzonian attitudes which sometimes surfaced in the new Viceroy, the Government of India continued to exceed its role and acted in a manner more akin to an allied independent power. Their importance over the issue lies in this, rather than in their failure to prevent the signing of a convention. Much of the correspondence between Morley and Minto sheds light on that relationship. When the ideal of an entente became a serious possibility, Morley made Minto aware of the fact. The Viceroy replied that, even though an agreement might seem like a good idea, it was an impracticable one because of the unreliability of Russian diplomacy. There were too many pressures on Russia for her policy to be consistent from one day to the next. In a gesture which seemed designed to be inclusive, Morley’s response was to ask him what the Government

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of India would want from an agreement. Minto’s reply emphasised the need not to lose sight of the Afghan dimension on the grounds that the Amir must be kept on side and not allowed to drift towards Russia. The Viceroy also believed that this would also be necessary to keep the Afghan Army in check.20 What is particularly interesting here is the way that the Government of India saw Afghanistan as the key issue, while the Foreign Office, looking at the matter from London, saw Persia as the most important factor. This is mirrored, to a certain extent, by Kitchener’s response, when asked by a reluctant Minto what he thought the most important aspects were. Kitchener, above all, wanted a settlement reasonable for the defence of India and, in his view, the key issues were to ensure that Afghanistan remained within a British sphere of influence; that there was no extension of the Russian Central Asian railway network towards Afghanistan; Seistan to be within the British sphere; and for the integrity of China in Kashgar to be respected.21 The great debate came to a head in June 1906. Minto wrote to Morley once more arguing the case for not coming to an agreement, arguing that a convention would tie British hands to renounce railway construction towards Afghanistan when Russia had done all she would do in building railways towards the Afghan frontier. This left the Indian authorities with construction still to do, especially in the event of changed circumstances on the North-West Frontier. As a result of this, therefore, the forward defence of India in Afghanistan would be compromised and the Indian Army constrained. Japanese opinion was another consideration. The Viceroy posed the question of how an agreement would affect the alliance with Japan, doubting that Russian policy could be predictable due to Russia’s defeat and the revolution there. Moreover, Russia’s defeat raised questions regarding the attitude of the Amir, who continued to compare his army with that of the Japanese. Indeed, Minto believed that a convention need not cover Central Asia at all and that public opinion would not be in sympathy with it.22 By this time Morley had had enough. He stated that there would not be much point in a convention which did not deal with the problems of the region and added that the British Government had made

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up its mind that this was its policy. He emphasised that it was officials’ job to follow instructions, rather than question them, and that there would be one foreign policy, not two.23 While Morley had to contend with the Viceroy and the Government of India, a new front opened in Parliament where there was condemnation from political persuasions of both parties amid concerns that he had sold out the Popular Party in Persia and the Amir of Afghanistan. In July, Morley discovered that Lansdowne, during his time as Foreign Secretary, had conducted negotiations on the same basis as those currently being undertaken. Politically astute as ever, he was keen to keep this information quiet, in case the Liberals were attacked by the Conservatives in Parliament.24 They were not. The threat he had to be wary of was the radical wing of his own party, a wing with which Morley himself was closely associated. Despite the concerns of the naysayers, the Anglo–Russian Convention was signed on 31 August 1907. The terms concerning Afghanistan were contained in five articles. The first of these bound Britain not to encourage Afghanistan in any hostile action against Russia. For their part, the Russians agreed that Afghanistan lay outside their sphere of influence and that any relations conducted with it would be through the medium of the British Government. They also agreed not to send any agents into Afghanistan. The second article linked the new convention to the Dane Treaty of 1905. Here the British Government undertook not to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and not to annex any part of it. This was contingent on the continued adherence of the Amir to the treaty concluded in 1905. Connected to this, Article 3 renewed Russian undertakings that any dealings between frontier officials would be of a non-political nature. Article 4 guaranteed equal trading rights between Britain and Russia in Afghanistan. If circumstances later merited it, the two governments would consult on whether commercial agents would be necessary. The final article was the most difficult of all. It stipulated that the arrangements in the other four articles would only come into force once the Amir had agreed to them and this had been notified by the British Government to St Petersburg.25

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The new reality was well encapsulated in a conversation between Isvolsky and King Edward VII a few days later: M Isvolsky laid great stress upon the future attitude of the Government of India in all matters affecting Central Asia as of great importance for the maintenance of good relations between the two countries. He was well aware that the Government of India had been very suspicious of the Russian Government in the past ... The Russian Government had however been equally suspicious of the Government of India, but he trusted that all cause for suspicion would now be removed. The King replied that, as there was now a basis of agreement between the two countries, there should be no difficulty in settling any question that might arise by a free ‘give and take’ on each side.26

The Reception of the Anglo–Russian Convention: The Amir, the Convention and the Response of Parliament The year 1907 began with relations appearing to be good between the Government of India and the Amir. With the Amir’s visit to India, the two sides were pleasantly surprised by each other and the Viceroy and the Amir got on well. When the Amir reviewed 30,000 Indian troops on parade he was struck by their discipline and numbers. He cannot have failed to have been impressed by the sight of this and the realisation that the Indian Army was but a part of the forces available to Britain’s far-flung Empire. Yet when the Amir arrived in India he was not fully cognisant of these facts, as he had been led by his Commander-in-Chief to believe that the Afghan Army was the best in the world. The Commander-inChief paid the penalty for his deception and, on the Amir’s return to Kabul, he was blown from a gun. Nevertheless, the visit had been a great success, a fact reinforced by the Amir’s friendly farewell telegram of 10 March.27 Several months later the position had changed for the worse and a year later relations between the Governments of India and Afghanistan had become seriously strained.

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Morley was quick to inform the Viceroy of the need for the Amir to agree to the convention and wrote to him to this effect in September. The Secretary of State wanted the Amir informed of the Convention straight away and hoped he would agree to it very soon.28 This was not the case. In India, on 21 October, Kitchener submitted his memorandum on the ‘Consideration of the effect of the Anglo–Russian Convention on the Strength of the Army in India’ for consideration. The Commanderin-Chief of the Indian Army had a difficult line to walk. While the Morley Sub-Committee had endorsed his reforms, there would be little point in bringing them into force if there were no Russian threat and no need to meet their army on the Kabul–Kandahar Line. The wish of the Liberal Government in London to cut military expenditure in favour of spending on domestic reform would have weighed with him and he would need to push his case with some vigour. Although the Indian Army was useful to protect India from external attack, to fulfil treaty obligations to Afghanistan and for overseas operations, Kitchener argued that its main function was to defend against internal insurrection and to maintain order among the frontier tribes. Kitchener was particularly concerned over the threat of internal revolt and how the weakness of the British position had not been appreciated. The Commander-in-Chief recalled the mutiny of 1857 and the weakness of the British position at that time. He was afraid of a recurrence of the same situation in the wake of any new reductions and his position seems to have been tinged with a very real concern. The provinces of Bengal, Eastern Bengal, and Assam were particularly troubling, with sedition against British rule rife. The Indian Army had to administer an area of 207,428 square miles with 80 million inhabitants. There were also the twin fears in India of Pan-Asiatism and Pan-Islam. Nowhere were these forces stronger than on the North-West Frontier. Kitchener cited the example of the Tirah Campaign of 1897, making the point that the entire Indian Army, four divisions, had to be deployed there for a year to restore order. The situation was getting progressively more difficult, with more guns finding their way into the hands of the tribesmen. For Kitchener, any reduction in troop

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numbers would compromise British rule in India.29 While India remained safely under British control, Kitchener’s comments on the North-West Frontier did have a certain prescience, with 1908 seeing the largest tribal uprising for a decade. In February 1908, the convention was discussed in Parliament. The debate in the Lords on 6 February was an instructive one. It centred upon Lord Curzon, who was opposed to the Convention in its minutiae, as well as in principle, and who wished to press for a motion that an address be presented to the King for papers respecting the Convention relating to the interests of Britain and Russia in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet. Regarding its generality, he stated that he would have given it his blessing if it had led to ‘an honourable and permanent peace’. He believed, though, that the Convention provided neither. In Persia, he felt that too much had been conceded, especially regarding trade. He also believed that the absence of an accord concerning the preservation of the British position in the Gulf was a lamentable omission. Regarding Afghanistan, Curzon argued that the Convention had provided nothing new. The undertaking that Afghanistan lay outside the Russian sphere of influence had been repeated many times, in 1869, 1874, 1876, 1877, 1878, 1882, 1884, 1885, 1887, 1888 and 1900. Curzon stated ‘I am not aware that it gains validity by being repeated for the twelfth time’. Moreover, he felt that reciprocal undertakings regarding Afghanistan were to Britain’s disadvantage: ‘Meanwhile we have tied our hands and the hands of the Amir by a number of engagements which may possibly be a source of some anxiety in the future.’30 Those in favour of the convention took the line that the convention should be seen from the wider perspective of, as Fitzmaurice, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, put it, ‘the standard of peace’, rather than in its particulars. Lord Cromer, too, argued that, ‘anything that can be done to mitigate the inevitable risk arising from the jealousy of European Powers on eastern questions should be welcome’. It would not only provide peace in Central Asia, but it would also have effects in Europe. There were, too, the dimensions of risk and opportunities lost. Lord Lamington, Governor of Bombay, 1903–07 feared that the Amir would refuse to sign the Convention, which would prejudice the agreement altogether. He also stated that ‘I think

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it is to be regretted that the opportunity was not taken to safeguard to the utmost possibility our paramountcy in the Gulf’.31 The debate was then adjourned until 10 February. Lord Sanderson began the new debate with the assertion that a convention would have been concluded sooner had it not been for the war party at St Petersburg opposing the measure. Since then circumstances had changed and he viewed the new Russian position as positive and in the interests of peace. Moreover, Sanderson believed that the new agreement would put an end to the ‘condition of constant rivalry and at times of only half-suppressed antagonism’ and stated that, to come to this point, a spirit of give and take was necessary.32 Viscount Midleton, St John Brodrick the former Secretary of State for India, concurred, saying ‘I think every member of the late Government would be ready to give assent to the course which has been taken by the present Government’ and that he hoped the Convention would secure peace. Lord Lansdowne’s views, however, were somewhat different. While welcoming the agreement as a means of ‘diminishing the prospect of international conflict’ and of preventing a ‘somewhat sordid and expensive rivalry’, Lansdowne saw the terms of the Convention to be ‘entirely new and ... entirely unlike any previous proposition entertained by the late Government’. He then attacked the terms for Persia, believing that the spheres there were ‘extremely advantageous to her [Russia] and extremely disadvantageous to us’. He also found the omission of a clause on the British position in the Gulf to be unfavourable. In contrast, he did welcome the clauses regarding Afghanistan, defending Russian assurances as genuine since they were, unlike their predecessors, enshrined in treaty. Like others, Lansdowne was concerned about the effects on the Convention were the Amir to refuse to sign. Nevertheless, he welcomed the treaty as a factor for peace.33 The Lord President of the Council, the Earl of Crewe, argued the same case as those that had gone before, even going so far as to accuse Curzon of losing ‘sight of the broader aspects of the case’. He welcomed the Convention, but perceived its effects differently: We think, therefore, that, considered in its broader aspect, this Agreement will not only tend to the most desirable result of

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closer amity with Russia, but also achieve what, after all, is the main object of all our diplomacy – The assurance of the peace of Europe, and thereby of the whole civilised world.34 Such overwhelming pressure in favour of the principle of a convention forced Curzon to withdraw his motion and the debate was closed.35 The debate in the Commons was similar to that held in the Lords the week before. The opposition believed the Convention to be inadequate and that Britain was losing out diplomatically, commercially and territorially. Grey, however, stressed that the advantages to be gained from the Convention outweighed the disadvantages. The agreement, Grey believed, ‘materially, and I hope permanently, improved the prospects of peace’. There was some consensus gained here and Balfour, though criticising some of the areas of disadvantage in the agreement, nevertheless welcomed it as ‘a great diplomatic success’, with ‘substantial advantages’, leading to ‘great security of peace and good-will’.36 Outside Parliament, there was increasing concern about the slowness of the Amir to respond to, let alone sign, the convention. This was blamed by Minto on the perceived influence of Nasrullah at the Afghan Court. Morley feared that, if the Amir refused to sign the Convention, the Russian Government and the war party at St Petersburg might regard the agreement ‘as hollow and exploded’. Morley also wrote that the Amir would have to be brought round in order to avoid ‘our present rather ugly corner’.37 By June, the Amir had still not signed and the question of his assent was brought up in conversation between Hardinge and Isvolsky during the Royal trip to Russia that month. Hardinge pointed out that the goodwill between the Powers had been put to the test by the expedition against Zakha Khel tribesmen but that the Convention was clearly working. He also hoped for the Amir’s assent as soon as possible, but reported that there was a delay caused by the machinations of Nasrullah at the Afghan Court. Isvolsky politely replied that he was glad that the expedition had not had to go into Afghanistan, as this would have caused complications and ‘expressed the hope that the Ameer’s assent might not be much longer delayed’. The Tsar, too,

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was friendly and stated his conviction that relations between the two countries could mature and strengthen.38 Matters had still not improved a month later and, although friendly communications had been received from Kabul, the Viceroy believed that the Amir would still be almost impossible to persuade. While Minto argued that this was due to distrust of Russia, Morley perceived, probably correctly, that the Amir feared that his country would be partitioned. In India, the Government of India had given up hope that he would sign and Minto requested instructions on what steps should be taken if this happened. If the Amir failed to agree, Morley suggested writing to him explaining the terms of the convention and pointing out what might happen on the northern Afghan border if Russia felt free to act there. In the event of the Amir not replying, the Secretary of State simply recommended trying again.39 Minto wrote to the Amir as instructed but wished to know whether the Russians would declare the Convention void if the Amir refused to sign. The Viceroy was concerned not to allow Russia freedom of action on the Afghan frontier and assumed there would be a resumption of the status quo ante. For Morley, this was unthinkable and there was a very real fear that the position could become worse than it had been before, with renewed Russian intrigue in the region, a collapse of the British diplomatic position and a considerable loss of face, both in India and in Europe.40 In London, Hardinge believed that it was time to settle the question of the Amir’s refusal to sign. Convinced that the Russians could be persuaded to regard the Convention as in operation without it, he decided to raise the matter with Isvolsky. The Jamshedi Crisis taking place at that time provided fresh impetus to his decision. He was, at the same time, annoyed that the Government of India had opposed an entente with Russia ‘from the very beginning’ and confided to Nicolson that ‘I feel that they have not acted quite loyally in their attitude towards the Convention’.41 A week later, the Government of India wrote to Morley stating that they had received a reply from the Amir. His letter had argued that it would be better to strengthen Afghanistan against the Russians rather than treat with them, as they had broken many of their treaties. For

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Habibullah, the convention offered nothing for the British and he reaffirmed the doctrine of friendship with Britain and hostility to Russia as set down by Abdur Rahman. The Amir stated that he had no reason to alter his stance, to which he had repeatedly referred during the negotiations for the Dane Treaty. He concluded that the British had shifted their ground and accused them of double standards.42 Morley suggested that the best way to respond to the Amir’s letter was to reassure him that both Britain and Russia would respect Afghan territorial integrity and independence. Yet Habibullah still refused to sign. Nevertheless, Russian willingness to allow the Convention to continue in the absence of his signature during the Jamshedi Crisis secured the results that the British Government had wished for, and it rendered the question of a reversion to the status quo ante redundant.43

The Jamshedi Crisis The efficacy and value of the Anglo–Russian Convention was tested early with the Jamshedi Crisis of 1908–09. During this crisis both the British and the Russians kept their heads and cooperated to resolve a thorny issue, which a mere five years earlier would have been a frontier incident of dangerous and threatening moment. Russian good intentions appeared with reports in the semi-official press that the Russian Government did not view the Amir’s disinclination to sign as conducive to a change in their attitude. Isvolsky’s position was evidence of this as, although he regarded the Convention as in operation, he was also aware that the Amir’s stance ‘made the situation embarrassing’. Still, Russian willingness to cooperate was to stand both sides in good stead in the crisis to come.44 Two months later, in July 1908, the crisis broke. It started when Minto reported that rumours had come to his notice that 10,000 Northern Afghan Jamshedi tribesmen had left Afghanistan for Russian territory. However, neither the British Agent at Kabul nor the Meshed Agency had heard anything at that point. A week later, it was discovered that the Jamshedi leader, Saiyid Ahmed Beg, had decided to base himself at Samarkand; proof, as the Viceroy saw it, of Russian connivance.45

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In August more information on the Jamshedis arrived from Meshed. It was reported that, when the Jamshedis entered Russian territory, Afghan troops had tried to stop them. They then moved up more troops to try to prevent the Jamshedis leaving Afghanistan and skirmishes broke out between the troops and the tribesmen. The Jamshedis were sufficiently successful to be able to cross into Russian territory, where the Turkomans who lived there were incensed by their presence in ‘their ancestral grazing lands’. They viewed this as an infringement of their rights and threatened to emigrate to Afghanistan in retaliation.46 The Jamshedis finally settled between Panjdeh and Kushk and then began raiding into Afghanistan. It was reported that: On their raids into Afghanistan they have robbed and carried off into Russian territory some Afghan flocks; in retaliation for this the Afghans have carried off some flocks belonging to Russian Turkomans. This has increased the Turkoman’s dislike for the Jamshedis.47 The embarrassment to which Isvolsky had alluded earlier in the year became quite acute in September when Minto wrote to the Amir in an attempt to gain his cooperation. Minto wrote of his concern over the Jamshedi issue and, to this end, asked the Amir to sign the Convention in a roundabout and flattering way. A week later Morley wrote of his concerns to Minto, adding his frustration at the lack of response from the Amir, as it seemed to be impossible to do anything until this was forthcoming. However, the concerns of both the Government of India and the India Office were laid to rest two weeks later when Nicolson reported that the Russian Foreign Ministry was prepared to act as if the Convention were in force without recourse to the Amir.48 The end of the year saw the situation change as the Jamshedis eventually outstayed their welcome. It was reported that the Jamshedi leader and several others of the tribe at Samarkand were ‘giving the Russians a good deal of trouble with their intrigues, [and their] demands for money’. It was also reported that the Jamshedis were ‘intriguing with some people in Herat, too’.49 A week later the

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situation had changed. The hostile reaction of the Turkomans, combined with increased financial hardship and an increasingly irritated Russia administration at both the local and national level, served to disillusion most Jamshedis, who took their possessions and returned to Afghanistan. It was reported in November that there were only 400 Jamshedis left in the Kushk District, with the headmen having left for Samarkand and Tashkent and the rest returning to Afghanistan.50 During the crisis the Russian Government had behaved in a restrained manner, prompting the already Russophile Nicolson’s admiration. He wrote that: ‘Throughout the phases of the incident connected with the Jamshedis the Russian Government have followed a very correct and loyal course.’ Moreover, matters had been expedited by their willingness to move the Jamshedis further from the frontier in order to minimalise the possibility of frontier incidents. Nicolson was also encouraged that the Russian Government ‘have observed the provisions of the Convention as though it were in force’.51 The Russian authorities were also keen to repatriate the refugees in order to avoid difficulties. They made their position clear in an aidememoire in February 1909: The Imperial Ministry cannot but note that the residence of a portion of the Jamshedi tribe on Russian territory, together with the extreme difficulty of preventing communication between these refugees and their comrades in Afghanistan, might easily lead to inconveniences for the avoidance of which the Imperial Government would wish to surround their departure with all such conditions as would tend to insure the return of all those Jamshedis who have taken refuge across the Russian Frontier.52 The issue was almost over at the end of February. It would take several more months for the matter to be entirely resolved. The final point was that the Jamshedi Khans wished to remain in Samarkand and the Russian Government was content to allow their families to join them. This would then remove their ties to Afghanistan and stop them causing intrigue on the border. The Amir agreed to the arrangements in February 1910 and the matter was closed.53

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The resolution of the Jamshedi Crisis demonstrated that Britain and Russia could cooperate over frontier issues of this kind. The cooperation established here contrasted greatly with the circumstances surrounding Dobbs’ mission to Herat a mere six years before. It has to be stressed, though, that while the Russians may have cooperated over Afghanistan, their actions in Persia at this time still placed them at odds with the British. Yet, regarding Afghanistan, the Anglo–Russian rivalry there was, until the Bolshevik revolution came to the region, now over.

The Problems of Turkey, Jihad and the Niedermayer-Hentig Mission The situation vis-à-vis Afghanistan changed after 1910. The new threat to British rule would come from a pan-Islamic fervour which was spreading to Afghanistan, the North-West Frontier and India. Its adherents were animated by the belief that the European, Christian, Powers were trying to stamp out Islam, a belief which gained credence with the Italo–Turkish and Balkan Wars. Turkish entry into the First World War was seen by many Afghans as a final response to, and thereby proof of, this. The Afghans felt particularly uneasy as both Britain and Russia devoted much attention to Turkey. With the Russian threat gone, Sir Charles Hardinge, made Viceroy in 1910, stated: ‘at present what we have to look forward to is possible trouble from Afghanistan’. He wrote again, five months later, that: ‘On the North-West Frontier we require an Army to keep the Afghans in check, but not to meet a modern Russian Army.’ At this time, Muslim feeling in India was also growing, particularly in the north and Bengal. Hardinge reported that ‘Mahommedan feeling has never been so intense’. This was heightened by the possibility of war with Turkey over tensions in the Persian Gulf.54 The tension had not yet spread to the North-West Frontier where the new Chief Commissioner of the province, Roos-Keppel, was doing good work keeping the peace. The new Viceroy was, however, concerned to avoid war with Afghanistan. Though such a ‘contingency has to be faced’, Hardinge also believed that past wars with Afghanistan

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had been fruitless, with a ‘heavy sacrifice of men and money’. He also appreciated that Afghanistan’s defensive position had improved, ‘owing to the large importation of modern arms’. Consequently, the occupation of Kabul would be much more difficult than in Roberts’ day. He thus believed that the easier methods of blockading the Afghan frontier or occupying Kandahar would most readily bring the Amir to reason were a potentially bellicose situation to appear.55 Though war with Afghanistan seemed unlikely, a rising on the frontier appeared a closer possibility. The Italo–Turkish War produced much agitation among the Muslim peoples of India, the tribes and the Afghans. The war was widely discussed on the frontier and in Afghanistan, and many there believed that the British ‘have conspired with Italy to help her to seize Tripoli’. The Viceroy expressed the hope that ‘this will not lead to frontier risings as happened in 1897, of which the Greco–Turkish War was one of the chief causes’. Hardinge therefore hoped that the war would not last long, that Turkey could save face, and that any ill-feeling might dampen down.56 Frontier pacification in light of these developments went ahead vigorously. In March, Hardinge reported an improvement in railway construction in Waziristan, along the lines of which Roberts had, years before, raised in relation to Swat. Hardinge believed that: ‘It is better to spend a small sum on extending our railway communications rather than a big sum on a fruitless campaign against a very poor tribe.’57 Internal opinion also had to be pacified. To this end, Hardinge commented that it was necessary to reassure Indian Muslims that Britain was not ‘in collusion with Italy and other Powers for the disruption of the Turkish Empire, [or] in collusion with Russia for the partition of Persia’.58 Quiet for once on the British side, the frontier was in revolt on the Afghan side, where there was an uprising by tribes who besieged the city of Khost.59 At this time Hardinge was touring the British side of the frontier and met the jirgas from all the important tribes, who appeared to be friendly. He believed that, as the tribes became more prosperous, ‘civilisation is gradually beginning to spread among them, and they now realise how much their own interests are bound up in good relations with us’. The Viceroy also observed that this,

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combined with the presence of advanced posts of British troops, was ‘a check on the predatory instincts of the people’. However, there was still the threat of the Mangal tribesmen besieging Khost crossing the frontier, and Hardinge considered it prudent to wait and do nothing to encourage them. If they crossed the frontier, they could be disarmed by troops from the advanced posts. By June attempts had been made to stir up the tribes on the British side, but they were unsuccessful and the Mangals had been dealt with in several small skirmishes.60 Meanwhile, there was unrest among the Muslims of India. The Viceroy thought this to be a reaction to the Italo–Turkish War and the Russian bombardment of the Shrine at Meshed, and found it irksome that ‘we should have to suffer for events over which His Majesty’s Government have no control whatsoever’. Matters were not helped by the spread of outlandish rumours, such as that the Italians were going to bomb Mecca from aeroplanes and that the Russians had stolen money from the Shrine at Meshed in order to build a fleet. Hardinge did his best, with mixed effects, to see that the rumours were quashed.61 This, to some extent, cushioned the blow of the news of the First Balkan War. Though there was still some unrest, the Viceroy expected ‘no serious trouble’. The loss of the war against Italy and the news of Turkish reversals in the Balkans also served to reduce PanIslamic unrest. Moreover: ‘The Moslem attitude towards the British Government has also undergone a change, and there is greater disposition to conciliate than to criticise it.’ There was, however, a dedicated hard core of revolutionaries who desired an end to British rule and were responsible for an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Hardinge at the end of the year.62 The year 1913 saw internal Muslim dissent, though the frontier was still calm. The Muslims were initially disquieted by the belief that the Christian Powers were combining to wage war on Islam and these feelings were encouraged by Amir Ali, his Red Crescent Fund and the All-India Muslim League. Rumours of a Christian partition of the Islamic world were still pervasive. This tension was exacerbated by the Cawnpore Mosque Riot. In addition, the Government of India

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enacted a Press Law in order to silence the seditious writings of some of the Muslim provincial papers.63 The North-West Frontier remained unusually, almost worryingly, quiet. The Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, Sir George Roos-Keppel, had written to Hardinge to say that the Muslims on the frontier appeared to have little interest in Turkey’s Balkan War. The Viceroy ascribed this to Roos-Keppel’s capable management of the tribes. At the same time, the Amir’s internal control of Afghanistan was weakening with the refusal of the Khostwals to pay revenue. It was also rumoured that the Amir was taking attractive women from the Afghan tribesmen for his pleasure and then returning them, which was an affront to them and which, if true, would account for their rebellious behaviour. As the situation in Afghanistan became ever more tense, even the anti-European attitude of Nasrullah was temporarily beginning to wane, the result of the Amir becoming harsher at court and threatening to cut out the tongue of anyone threatening an anti-British jihad. In spite of this, the Afghan population was still strongly pro-Turkish.64 By September the state of affairs had visibly worsened, and Hardinge received extremely disconcerting news. As the revolt in the east of the country took hold, other provinces felt able not to pay taxes to the government in Kabul. In some areas, there was virtual anarchy as the rudimentary apparatus of the Afghan state collapsed and it was said that the road running from Kabul to the Khyber had become unsafe only a few miles outside the capital. This was felt sufficiently worrying for the Amir to send military escorts to accompany the transit of his own goods. In Khost itself, the authority of the government had become non-existent and the writ of the governor, himself a virtual prisoner in his own compound, ran no further than its walls. The Viceroy was concerned that, were the revolt to spread, the Afghan Government could be in danger of falling.65 If there were to be a Third Afghan War, it would find the Indian Army virtually unable to act. As Hardinge put it: ‘As for preparation for war, I am confident that, had we really a serious affair in Afghanistan at the present moment, we should find some very serious defects on the mobilisation of our first divisions.’ His hopes rested

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with Sir Beauchamp Duff, whose appointment as Commander-inChief of the Indian Army would bring with it both efficiency and preparedness for war.66 The problem of the insurgent Afghans then began to spill over into the North-West Frontier Province in 1914. The Khostwals had been kidnapping Hindus in Indian territory, and were later made to return them. Pressure was put on the Amir to deal with the outlaws at Khost by arresting all the Khostwals on British territory. The Amir was afraid that the Government of India might take ‘drastic measures in the event of further outrages by the outlaws’, so he decided to send a special officer to Khost if the Governor did not sort out the problem. However, the Amir did not keep his word, leaving the Government of India with the options of either closing the passes in the autumn or giving the Amir the names of the outlaws and where they lived so that he could deal with them in his own territory. It was believed that such action to coerce the Amir would have the desired effect.67 Now the unrest spread throughout the tribal areas. The Bunerwals had been restive and it was decided to send a small expedition to deal with them, which proved both brief and successful. Then unrest spread to Waziristan when the Political Agent, Major Dodd, was murdered in Tank, outside the administered territory. The Mahsuds were instructed to hand over the murderers and the subsidy paid to the tribe was stopped. Colonel Donald, the Chief Commissioner, was to hold a jirga with the Mahsuds in order to ensure their compliance. Hardinge stated that ‘there can be no going back afterwards’ with the Mahsuds, otherwise other murders would take place as before. The jirga did not go as well as planned and Donald received no answer, leading Hardinge to consider measures to be taken against them. These included ‘seizing every Mahsud that comes into our territory’ and armed retaliation against raids. The Marquess of Crewe, now Secretary of State for India, wrote back to Hardinge, mentioning that he had seen Roos-Keppel, who was on leave, and that he had thought that the Mahsud unrest was due to the machinations of the followers of the late Mullah Powindah.68 June saw a little progress on the Mahsud issue. It had become apparent that one part of the tribes, the Abdur Rahman Khels, was

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responsible for the situation and Donald reported the suspected influence of the Mullah Abdul Hakim, who had assumed the Mullah Powindah’s mantle. Hardinge believed it best to ignore him and to deal with the tribe by opening up the regions in which they lived by constructing roads and posts in their population centres. If this could not be done, he ‘would rather not go in at all’. Inaction seems to have calmed the situation somewhat and another jirga was scheduled for 10 July. Here the tribe refused to hand over the culprits, leaving both Donald and Hardinge to conclude that ‘the only permanent solution of the Mahsud question will ... be the occupation of the country’. Donald, therefore, wished to summon some of the Maliks of the tribes and to impress upon them ‘the fixed determination of Government to exact reparation for the Tank crime’ and that further misconduct would likely result in an expedition against them. However, by this time, war had broken out in Europe and troops would be required for operations in France. Crewe informed the Viceroy: ‘It is perhaps scarcely the moment to talk of expeditions or blockades, but your frontier forces would not be interfered with, so far as mere operations are concerned, except on a large scale, there would be no apparent difficulty. But the whole situation may cause you to wait before suggesting action.’ Thus the Mahsuds were spared an expedition. Hardinge, however, resolved to maintain the pressure on them. Their subsidy was stopped and this was beginning to bite. It was also decided that the Mahsuds coming into British territory should be stopped and that members of the offending section of the tribe should be detained and held as hostages until those guilty of Dodd’s murder were handed over, a policy which had worked well with the Khostwals and which the Viceroy was optimistic would work again.69 The latter half of the year also held another reason for concern. The drift towards, and adhesion to, the Central Powers made Turkey a threat which, it was feared, could destabilise Muslim India. The situation could, in Hardinge’s words, be found to be ‘complicated by the Mahomedans if we found ourselves at war with Turkey’. He also believed that any trouble would be internal and that there would be none with the troops. There would be other problems for India, as

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Crewe put it: ‘If the Turks are such fools as to engage in a war against us, there would be many anxieties for you.’ Hardinge also made efforts in India to prevent news of the strained relations with Turkey spreading. He then hoped that the Government would be restrained and would ‘allow the Turks to declare war, or even to take some military action against us, in the first instance’. Then, he believed, the Indian people would be loyal. If Britain declared war on Turkey, the native people and the Pan-Islamic press would become incensed and become much more difficult to deal with, something to be avoided. At home, Crewe wrote that troops would be required on the Western Front and stated that in the worst-case scenario – ‘Turkey against us, Afghanistan in motion, and the frontier in a blaze’ – India would only require four divisions, which would be sufficient to maintain internal order.70 In September, Hardinge observed that the news regarding Turkey looked bad, yet remained optimistic that the Indian Muslims would not revolt, having already been assured by many Muslims who had sent him telegrams ‘expressing their profound loyalty to the Crown and their desire for the success of our arms’. At the same time, they held meetings to try to urge Turkey to stay neutral. The big concern for Hardinge was the attitude of Afghanistan and the tribes. If there were a war with Turkey, it was feared that internal trouble in India would follow, coupled with the consequent immobilisation of troops. Hardinge had, however, become much more confident towards the end of October. He observed that the ‘spirit of India is admirable’, and he was not afraid of the attitude of the Muslims in a war with Turkey. It was, however, still important not to strike a blow at Turkey, so that the responsibility for any belligerency could be laid at her door. By the beginning of November, Turkey had declared war on Britain and her allies. This had the desired effect among the Indian Muslims, who flocked to express their disapproval of Turkish action and to profess their loyalty to the British. Those who supported the action of Turkey were still a small minority.71 The Amir’s response was to choose neutrality and he prevented his people and their religious leaders from attacking or disturbing the peace of India, stating that: ‘There was no lawful reason on the part of the Moslems for commencing hostilities, and that it was not lawful

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to proclaim a holy war against Christian nations so long as they abide by their pledges and they are unwilling to take any aggressive action against them.’ This was despite what many saw as the binding legality of proclamations issuing from the Caliphate. The Amir stood resolute in his neutrality and was ‘keeping his head in the face of surrounding excitement’. He also ‘suppressed a native Kabul paper [the Siraj al-Akhbar] which threatened to become dangerous by its warlike attitude’. Despite this, public opinion in Afghanistan was still strongly pro-Turkish and it was both difficult and unpopular for the Amir to restrain his subjects. Some Afghans defied the wrath of the Amir and attacked the Miram Shah Post in the Tochi Valley. They were, however, beaten back and returned home.72 Habibullah appears to have concluded that Turkey would be unable to influence the position decisively in the region. With Afghanistan between two allied powers, his freedom of manoeuvre would have been very limited. In addition to the geopolitics, he had to contend with both traditionalist and modernist nationalists who were content to risk war to overturn what must have seemed to them a humiliating series of settlements imposed on them over the years. Habibullah did just enough to placate them, just enough to placate the tribes, just enough to placate the British and, when the time came, just enough to placate the Germans. While many have seen Habibullah as very much in his father’s shadow, his genius is to have ruled for almost as long while balancing almost irreconcilable positions. Matters were also rendered more complex by the despatch from Turkey of seditionists, ‘to stir up pan-Islamic anti-British feeling’. These men travelled from Turkey through Persia and thence to Afghanistan. Their movement to Afghanistan caused a stir in late 1914 and they would become a considerable nuisance in 1915 and 1916.73 This would be followed by the threat of agents from Germany and their attempts to stir up revolt on the North-West Frontier with an Afghan invasion of India. The Turkish leader, Enver Pasha, had been promised men and arms by Habibullah to invade India. In reality Habibullah had no real intention of honouring his commitment, but had to be seen to make the right sort of offer to the Turks by his people and by factions at court.74

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In the event of war, the Germans had a plan to carry the fight to the British throughout the Middle East and South Asia. Ideologues like Max von Oppenheim in the German Foreign Ministry were instrumental in creating a scheme to stir up a jihad across the region and use it to sweep away British influence and sources of manpower. For men like von Oppenheim, it was essential that the British be denied Persia, Palestine, the two Holy Places and the Suez Canal. Further risings in India would stretch British forces there to a limit which would then be broken by an Afghan invasion. The first salvo was launched when a mission under Wilhelm Wassmuss was sent to Persia.75 As far as Afghanistan was concerned, the original plan was for the Germans to go to Kabul as part of a Turkish mission. This would have demonstrated to the Amir the range of powers arrayed against Britain and would have helped sway opinion in favour of an invasion. However, the German preparations took place sufficiently quickly to make it possible to go to Afghanistan under a German flag, an outcome more desirable to the German Foreign Ministry, which led the mission jointly with the General Staff. This sort of thinking helped undermine the mission before it left, as Turkish war aims were concentrated on the Turkic peoples of Central Asia and carving out Ottoman influence there, whereas the Germans were concentrating on Persia and Afghanistan. With preparations made, what became known as the NiedermayerHentig Mission set out in mid-January 1915. The march was a long and arduous one and the mission was reported entering Seistan in late July. An attack was contemplated by the British while the mission was still in Persia, but it was realised that there were insufficient numbers locally available to interdict and overwhelm Niedermayer’s small force in time before he could slip across the border into Afghanistan.76 Hardinge was concerned that the appearance of a German mission would give rise to rumours that the force entering Afghanistan was greater than it really was, and he was keen to avoid this. Writing to the Amir, he secured a promise that Afghanistan would remain neutral and he seems to have had confidence in that undertaking. By August, the Niedermayer-Hentig Mission had entered Afghanistan and the British were able over July and August to gather

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some reasonable intelligence as to the number of men it had, where they were from and even the names of many of the more important personages. On entering Herat, they were accorded an official welcome and Niedermayer made promises of German guns, troops and other military help. There were also promises of increased territory for Afghanistan after the war, with the new border stretching to Bombay in the South and Samarkand in the North. Despite these promises, the Afghans had real concerns for their position and were afraid of a large army entering the country from the West. With a view to this, they attempted to seal the border. The mission was, however, permitted to travel to Kabul and it arrived there on 28 September 1915. Aware of the potential for trouble, Habibullah had the members of the mission quarantined, even from members of his family and the court which were thought to be pro-Turkish. He was wise to do so, as both Nasrullah and Inayatullah were keen to join the Central Powers and declare a jihad. Niedermayer and Hentig were also kept waiting and the Amir did not see them until 16 October. When he did meet them, they repeated their promises of military aid, yet the Amir was reported by the Political and Secret Department to have informed Niedermayer and Hentig that he was obliged not to break faith with the British and would not allow the passage of Turkish or German troops through his territory. The mission also brought a letter to the Amir from Enver Pasha, and Habibullah’s response was revealing. As well as reiterating the demand that troops not enter Afghanistan, he argued that it was too early for Afghanistan to abandon its neutral status. Nor would he take the initiative in breaking off relations with the British. Further, mullahs outside Afghanistan might or might not preach jihad, but they were not to do so in Afghanistan and those on the North-West Frontier would not be instigated to do so by the Amir. In November, Habibullah reinforced his message to Niedermayer and Hentig by adding that Afghanistan possessed neither the military or economic means to wage war against a Western great power for very long, in spite of any wish to do so. He also alluded to Afghanistan not being dependent on any foreign power, a hint that he would not accept a loan from the Central Powers to enhance readiness for an offensive

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war. Niedermayer responded by promising military aid and a subsidy from the Central Powers to make up for any loss of the British one, yet the Amir remained resolute. He did so in the face of considerable pressure. It was reported by Roos-Keppel that people were openly denouncing the Amir as a kafir and the British Agent in Kabul received rumours that elements of the Afghan Army were saying that, if the Amir would not lead them in a jihad, they would find someone who would. That someone was Nasrullah, who publicly made it clear that the treaties which bound his brother the Amir did not apply to him. In this he was supported by Inayatullah and they both stated that they would join a jihad in the spring. A forged letter was then sent to the North-West Frontier, addressed to the tribal chiefs and the mullahs, saying that there would be a jihad in the summer. It was intercepted by the British and a potentially serious crisis was averted.77 In Kabul, Habibullah realised that his options were narrowing and, on 24 January 1916, he signed a draft treaty with the Germans. It reiterated the acceptance of the independence of Afghanistan and the Germans undertook to provide 100,000 rifles and 300 guns, as well as military advisors. A fund of the equivalent of £10 million would also be given to the Afghan Government. The Amir would also be able to establish an embassy in Persia, in order to facilitate diplomatic relations with the Turks, Germans and Austrians and there would be a bilateral trading treaty between Germany and Afghanistan at the end of the war.78 The Amir had another trick up his sleeve, too. Neither Niedermayer nor Hentig had been given the plenipotentiary powers necessary to sign a treaty with the Amir and they had admitted as such. As a result, it was necessary for the draft treaty to be sent to Berlin for ratification. The Germans duly dispatched a messenger to take it to Turkey, from where it could be sent on, but the messenger was arrested. The treaty never reached Berlin and the Amir, for his part, had had no intention of abiding by it anyway. The truth of this dawned on Niedermayer and Hentig and they reached the conclusion that the Amir would not support them. They briefly entertained the notion of a coup and wrote a letter to this

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effect to the German Minister in Tehran. This, too, was intercepted by the British and they then forwarded it to the Amir to poison the relationship with the Germans. It spelled the end of the mission and Niedermayer, Hentig and those with them were dismissed from the court, leaving Kabul on 22 May 1916.79 By imposing his authority at this time, and so publicly, Nasrullah and Inayatullah had no room for manoeuvre and could do nothing. Habibullah had retained his position of neutrality throughout and had kept faith with the British at considerable personal risk. As the First World War went on, the war party at court grew in strength and feeling against the Amir with it. Habibullah had been able expertly to balance the contending factions at court for almost 18 years but, when those factions briefly united against him, he could do so no longer and was assassinated while out hunting on 19 February 1919.

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CONCLUSION

The position of Afghanistan in the defence of India was a vital one. Though Herat and Afghan Turkestan were vulnerable to attack, they were defended diplomatically. The first arrangement to do this was that of July 1880, signed by Sir Alfred Lyall, which was an agreement rather than a treaty. War was avoided over the Panjdeh incident of 1885 when the Russians demonstrated the weaknesses of northwestern Afghanistan. Russian moves towards direct relations in 1903 brought about a decision to hold Herat and Afghan Turkestan. The decision was taken to send Henry Dobbs there both to investigate the situation and thwart Russian scheming. Dobbs alone, wielding the diplomatic initiative, achieved more at Herat than the Indian Army ever could. At the same time the Foreign Office pushed for a renunciation of the rights of direct political relations from the Russians and a pledge that Afghanistan lay outside the Russian sphere of influence. Dobbs had succeeded in his task and returned to India via Kabul. While there, he met the Amir and had talks on Afghan defence with him and, in so doing, laid the groundwork for the Dane Treaty of March 1905. These talks revealed two things which would characterise the relationship with Afghanistan in this period. The first was the Amir’s inflated view of the size and strength of his own military forces. This would be a cause for concern because the Russian military, even with its relatively small force in Central Asia, was more than a match for the Afghan military in the north. Habibullah’s opinion of the strength of his army also made it more likely that border incidents would take place, as the Russians would perceive no deterrent effect.

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The second point at issue was the Amir’s reluctance to travel to India to see the Viceroy. There were several factors at play. The first was that Habibullah may have not felt his position safe enough to leave the country. Contending pressures inside the court and the weakness of central authority would have helped bolster that view. The other factor was that the Amir had come to dislike Lord Curzon and the advent of a high-handed policy from the Government of India. Later relations with Lord Minto were far more cordial. At the same time, during the Russo–Japanese War, a stream of rumours and stories appeared, both at the Embassy at St Petersburg and the Intelligence Branch at Meshed, that there was a massive military build-up in Russian Central Asia. The reality was that this was partly defensive, but the military establishment believed that there was about to be a concerted drive against Afghanistan. These stories gained credibility because it was generally believed that the Russians would attack Japan’s ally, Great Britain, at her weakest point, in Central Asia. The rumours continued to be believed after the war due to concerns about a Russian war of revanche to regain lost prestige in Afghanistan, a view which started to change with Napier’s report on Central Asia in 1905. These concerns, however, had animated the British and Indian authorities sufficiently to make them act seriously to tighten the diplomatic defence of the Oxus line. The result of this was the Dane Mission, and the renewal of previous agreements in the Kabul Treaty was the product of the events preceding it. The defence of the territorial integrity of Afghanistan could not be achieved by the Indian Army alone. Conversely, it could be achieved diplomatically with the threat of worldwide war if Russia were to invade. The diplomatic resolution of the Indian defence issue derived from the inability of the Indian Army to fight a war and win. The army was weak and ill-prepared for battle. Advanced railways were not pushed on as far as they needed to be in order to reach Kabul in force. Operations to Kabul would also be complicated by other factors. The frontier tribes could disrupt operations on a large scale. Moreover, the Indian Army needed the permission of the Amir in order to enter Afghanistan. By then it might be too late. Even if the British could get to the Kabul–Kandahar Line in time, there was always the possibility

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that the Russians would seize Herat and its environs and then proceed no further. This would leave the Indian Army with the unenviable task of holding the line in readiness for an attack which might never come. They would not have been able to advance further, as supply would become impossible, and they would not be able to retreat, as prestige and the whole policy on which the relationship with Afghanistan was based would be in ruins if they did. The forward Kabul–Kandahar line also had the problem of being very difficult to supply. Logistics formed the single largest complication on this front and it was the most prohibitive factor against the forward defence. Clarke calculated that it might take millions of camels to supply the men at the front before the railways could be brought forward. Though his observations were not accepted in their entirety, there was no serious attempt to dispute them. Eventually, the establishment decided against him at the Morley Sub-Committee. The Indian Army also had problems with reinforcements. No pledge could be given, as the number and timing of reinforcements depended upon the European situation and the Admiralty’s command of the sea. An attempt to circumvent this problem through the Anglo–Japanese Alliances of 1902 and 1905 failed as Hayashi and the Japanese military refused to send troops to India, though the possibility of a second front was raised in the event of unprovoked aggression. Moreover, the Indian authorities did not want them there as the prospect of employing Asian troops to fight Europeans to allow other Europeans to rule over other Asians, with all that that meant, was seen as particularly unwelcome. The advance to the Kabul–Kandahar Line would also depend upon the attitude of the tribes. A new policy to bring them under control was, therefore, required. The old policy of expeditions was clearly not working. There was also doubt that the new, hybrid Sandeman/close border strategy could work in wartime. The solution of occupation and disarmament up to the Durand Line was discussed but never implemented. The Indian Army, with all these difficulties arrayed against it, was in no position to fight and win a war in Afghanistan. This fact strengthened the advocacy of a diplomatic defence of India which led eventually to the Anglo–Russian Entente of 1907.

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That entente worked well for Afghanistan and Isvolsky was prepared to see it as in operation in spite of the Amir’s refusal to sign the Convention. Further evidence of this lay in the conduct of the Russian Government over the Jamshedi Crisis, which could have been a major diplomatic incident a mere six years earlier. The successful resolution of this crisis demonstrated that the diplomatic defence of India was effective and that relations with Russia over the question of Afghanistan had dramatically improved, though the position remained difficult in neighbouring Persia. The removal of the Russian threat was an achievement which was balanced by a new Afghan problem. Pan-Islamic influences were making themselves felt in India, Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier. These influences were the result of a widespread Muslim fear that the Christian Powers were trying to stamp out Islam. At the same time the Amir’s authority in Afghanistan was waning in the face of widespread revolt and non-payment of taxes. The twin factors of panIslamic fervour and turmoil in Afghanistan were a dangerous, combustable mixture. When Turkey entered the First World War most Afghans were in sympathy with her. However, the tribes of the North-West Frontier and the peoples of India were calm, with many Indians openly supporting British rule. The Amir declared his country neutral in the face of a bellicose war party and pro-Turkish public opinion. This decision was deeply unpopular and, despite the Niedermayer-Hentig Mission, the Amir remained resolute. Overall, the Amir’s control over Afghanistan, though never complete, dramatically weakened in the war years. Relations with the British had been reasonable in the early years, reaching their peak with the Amir’s visit to India. After the conclusion of the Anglo–Russian Convention, relations soured. Despite the Amir’s stance, there was no longer any need for the Indian Army to take to the Kabul–Kandahar Line as the Russian threat was, in effect, neutralised. Moreover, the British had continued, and strengthened, their diplomatic defence of northern Afghanistan over the Amir’s head. The success of British policy in dealing with Afghanistan and Russia between 1903 and the First World War lay in her Foreign Office, as

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well as an emerging understanding of both the bigger picture and the reality on the ground at the India Office. Afghanistan’s importance in the defence of India, in the defence of Empire, came through these and represented the victory of patient diplomacy and realpolitik. During the First World War, there was still a battle for policy between the Amir and the war party in the Kabul court. Though the Amir controlled most aspects of policy most of the time, his decision for neutrality, coupled with the turmoil in Afghanistan, represented the beginning of the final battle for control which the Amir was to lose as the Nasrullah and Amanullah-led factions both wanted war. The decision for neutrality secured two very mixed results. It saved the British position in India, but at the same time it heralded the processes which would eventually lead to a Third Afghan War and to the emergence of an independent Afghan state.

After Habibullah The event which led to the independence of Afghanistan was the assassination of Habibullah on a hunting trip in the Laghman Valley on 19 February 1919. While the true identity of the assassin is not known, it is generally accepted that Amanullah was behind it. Amanullah was perfectly positioned to take over as he was in Kabul and could seize the reins of powers easily. Nasrullah, on the other hand, was in Jalalabad and, while some of the tribesmen might rally to him, he was isolated from the court, the civil service and the army. In spite of this, on hearing the news, Nasrullah had himself crowned Amir in Jalalabad. An outraged Amanullah denounced his treachery and blamed him for Habibullah’s murder. At this point, Nasrullah came to the realisation that he had been outmanoeuvred and that he would not be able to win the civil war which might ensue. In consequence, he abdicated in favour of Amanullah. This action was rewarded with a life sentence in prison. Nasrullah was declared guilty of the assassination and incarcerated. His life sentence did not last long and he died in prison a few years later.1 Amanullah’s next act was to attack India. His motivations for doing so have been contested. It has been argued that he did so in

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order to unify the country behind him following the unpopularity of Nasrullah’s sentencing. Others have argued that he found it necessary to attack in order to reinforce the message of his declaration of Afghan independence that March. The truth is likely to be a bit of both, but the effect was to stir up the tribes and create a position where the war was fought, for the most part, on the frontier.2 While India had been denuded of troops in the First World War, there were still sufficient numbers there to defend against the Afghan attack. Motorised transport and aeroplanes were used for the first time against the tribes and the latter even bombed Kabul. At length, though, the reality of not being able to impose control over Afghanistan began to dawn and the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August only served to demonstrate a British acknowledgement of that fact.3 At the same time, two new forces were emerging in the region: Bolshevism and Modernism. The former was a very different sort of modernism to that prevailing elsewhere in Asia and it raised the spectre of a new Great Game in Central Asia. Once Afghanistan became independent, Amanullah signed friendship and trade treaties with the Soviets, something Habibullah could and would never have been able to do only a few years before. There was nothing the British could do. The force of Modernism affected the three main independent Muslim states at that time and was very much a feature of the postGreat War world. Amanullah saw a kindred spirit in Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in Turkey and their agenda, along with that of Reza Shah in Persia, sought to impose a westernised modernism on their societies.4 Amanullah’s regime was dedicated to the modernisation of Afghanistan. With the traditionalists swept aside, Amanullah was able to inaugurate a wide-ranging series of reforms. These ranged from infrastructural changes, like roads and a small railway, to educational reforms and the adoption of Western dress. Amanullah also took the title of King, rather than Amir, with all that entailed and his queen, Soraya, was seen unveiled. The reforms were not well received in the population at large and resistance to the Amanullah regime finally broke with a large tribal revolt in Khost, lasting from March 1924 to January 1925. While the revolt was finally suppressed and

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Amanullah felt able to embark upon a tour of India, Persia, Egypt, Turkey and Europe, discontent was brewing and another revolt broke out in Jalalabad in November 1928. It quickly spread and other tribes joined the uprising. Kabul was weakly defended and it fell to a Tajik bandit called Habibullah Kalakani, also called Bacha Saqqao, who deposed Amanullah and ruled from January to October 1929. Amanullah was not strong enough to defeat him and many in his government, as well as Amanullah himself, fled to Turkey.5 Bacha Saqqao’s reign was unhappy and brief, ending with his execution before the year was out. A new dynasty took power: the Musabihan. Their rule was to last until the Saur Revolution of 1978. General Nadir Shah seized power and was successful in forestalling a civil war. He was able to consolidate that power and, in spite of his assassination in 1933, the crown was passed to his son, the boy king Zahir Shah. His reign was a long and comparatively peaceful one, at least until his overthrow by his cousin Prince Daoud in 1973.6 The most fraught issue of the period was the Pashtunistan issue with Pakistan. Zahir Shah’s reign had started with the British on the other side of the Durand Line. When it ended, Pakistan had been there for 25 years. When Pakistan came into being, there was a referendum in the North-West Frontier Province on whether they wanted to join Pakistan, and the people there chose to do so. Afghanistan challenged this and questioned the continuing validity of the Durand Line as a legitimate international boundary. The two sides came close to war over the issue between 1947 and 1953 and the Afghans chose not to press the issue. It has festered ever since.7 In other ways, though, the Musabihan period was just what the country needed after the upheavals of 1929. Progress was slow but there were reforms, not least a formal constitution in 1964. While reform was not rapid, it was nonetheless stable. The pace was felt by some to be too slow and Daoud’s seizure of power was, in many respects, an effort to move things along more quickly.8 While Daoud moved more quickly than his predecessor, he was not moving fast enough for the Communists, who took over in April 1978. They made the same mistakes Amanullah had and widespread revolt was the consequence. Attempts to crack down and assert control

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over the situation only made matters worse. Fearing the collapse of an allied government, the Soviet Union decided to intervene and they invaded in December 1979. They left, badly mauled, ten years later. Civil war, the Taliban, 9/11 and a new intervention were to follow.9

Some Lessons of History What lessons can be learned from the history of the British experience of Afghanistan? Throughout the period, the themes of geography, the military and logistics, Afghan society and governance and diplomacy recur. Cross cutting these is a need to be mindful of what we do not know, whether this involves fighting in the country, understanding resistance and the society, being aware of the competing imperatives at work on the Afghan Government, or in the conduct of diplomacy. In terms of the landscape, echoing Sir George Clarke and many before him, David Loyn is right to point out that it is ‘natural guerrilla country’. This is certainly true and invading forces have always come unstuck in the mountains and deserts. The deserts are inhospitable and hard to control. Even in the settled countryside, where it is comparatively flat, there are also wadis, irrigation ditches, rivers and fortified compounds. All of these can be defended, and are.10 Mountains have always been an aid to a defender and Afghanistan is no different from other places in that regard. Add to this a determination not to be defeated, no matter what the casualties are, and they are a very difficult obstacle indeed. Every piece of high ground can be defended like a strongpoint and breaking through is time-consuming and difficult. Even then, another defensive position is near and the exercise needs to be repeated again.11 Afghanistan has always been a place where a large army cannot be effectively supplied and where a small one would be cut to pieces. The terrain facilitates this by forcing invading forces into narrow defiles, where they can be easily attacked, or by forcing set piece attritional actions around isolated bases. These problems were as familiar to Roberts and Kitchener as they are to more contemporary Russian, Pakistani and ISAF commanders.12

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Actions on the North-West Frontier and the planned forward stance on the Kabul–Kandahar Line would both have required the implementation of a tactical doctrine based on taking the kotals, the heights, in a given area to allow following troops to pass through unmolested. These sorts of actions were extremely time consuming and required the stationing of large numbers of troops on the lines of communication and supply. Pakistani forces today have the same difficulties in frontier warfare in places like the Malakand or Waziristan as the British had in 1897–98 and 1900–02, respectively. In the case of the latter, the significant campaigns of 1919 and 1936–37 only reinforced these lessons.13 Another feature of geography is the border, most notably the Durand Line. Almost the entire border of Afghanistan is permeable. Tribesmen regularly cross borders only apparent on the map. In many places these are not clearly demarcated or regularly patrolled and it has been perfectly possible to travel across the borders unmolested. Support to tribal uprisings across the Durand Line was often part of an Amir’s everyday policy and, more often than not, was a way to get troublesome young ghazis out of the country to stop them being a nuisance to the Afghan state.14 The geography of the country is also most unforgiving when it comes to military factors like logistics. In campaigning, the most crucial task is to keep the army in the field in the first place. When Sir George Clarke contested Kitchener’s and Duff’s assumptions about the logistics of a force in Afghanistan, in 1907, he was talking about camels and bullock carts going through narrow and precipitate mountain passes. Today this is done by truck, helicopter and plane. It is a truism of logistics that large amounts of transport require a logistical apparatus of their own. For Clarke, it was the large quantities of fodder needed to keep the camels fed and moving, quite apart from the food, water, equipment and ammunition they would have had to deliver to the troops on the Kabul–Kandahar Line. Today the principle is much the same. Helicopters and trucks need fuel, oil and spare parts to keep supplying the troops in the country. It is said that the cost of a gallon of petrol on the frontline is $400.15 When the defence of the lines of supply and communication are disrupted, the effects can be disastrous, such as the total destruction

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of a fuel depot near Peshawar in December 2008. Mujahideen attacks on Soviet supply convoys had a similar effect and it is a key tactic employed by leaders such as Hakimullah Mehsud today. Not only can a force not fight without proper supply, but it becomes vulnerable to disease as necessities such as clean drinking water become scare. This was a particular problem for the Soviets, who encountered dysentery, hepatitis, malaria, typhus, intestinal parasites and heat stroke, to name a few. Grau and Gress have noted that 2.33 percent of men serving in Afghanistan were killed, 8.67 percent were injured and no less than 67.09 percent hospitalised for serious diseases. Sir George Clarke was right to stress the importance of logistics as a factor in campaigning in Afghanistan.16 Aside from logistics, military considerations tend to fall into two parts. The first of these is overconfidence in the superiority of modern armies and their force; the second lies in the fairly consistent flawed assessment of the degree of resistance which is going to be faced. In the first case, the reliance on modern technology is not a panacea for the complications of campaigning in the region and, as Loyn points out, the presumption of tactical superiority arising from this can be deceptive. The same, too, can be said of the trappings of a modern military, such as drill and aspects of command and control. Yet the same mistakes of over-reliance on weaponry and tactical doctrine are made time and again as witnessed by three Anglo–Afghan Wars, numerous expeditions on the North-West Frontier, a Russian invasion and today’s war.17 In Kitchener’s day, the British and Indian armies were modern, drilled formations with the latest artillery. This, however, was never enough to allow them a decisive victory either in Afghanistan or on the North-West Frontier. The introduction of aeroplanes in the area in the Third Afghan War in 1919 did little to influence this fact – a constant, as the Russians would later discover. When other elements fail, such as during Operation Anaconda, tried and tested tactics will fail, too. Similarly, Soviet tactics in the Panjshir Valley against Ahmed Shah Massoud required extensive planning and resourcing to succeed and the success of one operation is no guarantee of victory against a guerrilla force which can just melt away into the

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civilian population. Coordination is also crucial and failure to achieve it can compromise operations.18 Aligned with this is the underestimation of the degree of resistance which would be faced. When Kitchener, Roberts and others talked of going to meet the Russians on the Kabul–Kandahar Line, the assumption was always that they were entering the country as liberators to keep the Russians out. Very little consideration was ever given to a full rising on the frontier and in Afghanistan itself. In this, their assumptions were not dissimilar to those made at the outset of both the First and Second Afghan Wars. The same thinking has applied more recently. The troops in the first Russian wave in 1979 assumed their stay would be a short one and, later, it was thought that British troops could hold Helmand without firing a shot. The beguiling truth is that Afghanistan is a relatively easy place for an army to enter. Staying and leaving are an entirely different matter.19 Resistance is also informed by social factors, like tribe and religion. The lure of men like the Hadda Mullah, the Mullah Powindah or the Fakir of Ipi were never really understood at the time, but they were able to tap into a motivation to protect a tribesman’s locale, tribe and religion. This is easily done in Afghanistan and on the North-West Frontier because of the way tribal codes and religion fit together in identity formation. Men like the Mullah Powindah or, later, the Fakir of Ipi were able to call on religion to rally the tribes against foreign forces in a way which paid heed to and reinforced tribal cohesion.20 Today’s Taliban movement calls upon the same dynamic and uses imagery which links directly to the recent past. Hakimullah Mehsud, leader of the Tehrik-e Taliban came from the same Mahsud tribe in Waziristan as the Mullah Powindah and could call upon a rich tradition and lore to reinforce his call to fight. Similarly, when in power in Afghanistan in 1996, Taliban leader the Mullah Omar exhibited a holy relic, the cloak of Muhammad, and put it on. At the same time, he took the title of Amir al-Momineen, the leader of the faithful. The last Amir to hold this title was Habibullah and the last time the cloak was worn was by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan 100 years before. The last time before that was in the reign of Amir Dost Muhammad. In

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doing this, the Mullah Omar established a concrete link to two of the greatest figures in Afghan history.21 These lineages, titles and gestures have a very real and powerful resonance among the population which cannot and should not be underestimated. They confer legitimacy and aspects such as this need to be understood by Western diplomats and soldiers who deal with the Afghans and tribal elders. A hundred years ago, men like Sir Harold Deane, Sir George Roos-Keppel, I.M. Crump and many other political officers did understand the power of these traditions and enjoyed comparative success in their dealings on the frontier as a result. This type of knowledge and experience would pay dividends today. Aligned with this is the need to understand the role of the tribe in the society and its connection to local factors. Development would need to take place from the bottom up as communities are brought into a modern setting. This is as true today as it has always been and, with regard to loyalties accruing from identity formation, Afghans will identify first with their locale, their sub-tribe and their tribe. In most cases, the authority of the state does not impinge on day-to-day life, something also true in Habibullah’s day.22 These factors give rise to contending pressures on the government of the country, so the need to understand the relationship of the core and the periphery in the governance of Afghanistan is particularly pressing. In Habibullah’s day, the writ of the government did not extend far from the capital, even though important governors were part of that government. When Dobbs was in Herat he became aware that the governor there was doing as he pleased, with little interference from Kabul. As the unrest a decade later shows, once it spread, there was a domino effect, both geographically and with regard to governance. Once the authority of the governors was lost, there was little the central government could do. With the unrest came the refusal to follow the Amir’s code and, with it, the loss of tax revenue. For a country as poor as Afghanistan, this was particularly disastrous. With no reserves to speak of, there would be little to spare to pay the army and police. They, too, could easily turn against the state and the concerns of people like Nasrullah in 1913 show how seriously the situation was taken. The situation in 1929 also shows how this could happen.

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This has also happened more recently, as demonstrated by the number of mutinies in 1979 when the army turned against the central government. This is also so much more the case when a powerful element turns against Kabul, such as happened when General Rashid Dostem joined the mujahideen against Najibullah in 1992.23 Afghanistan, as Barnett Rubin has shown, is a rentier state and the core–periphery relationship has always been a precarious one. The key dilemma is that the government requires foreign aid to balance the books and to run the country to the limited degree that it can. Foreign aid, whether from the British, Russians or Americans, always comes with a quid pro quo. Most often the bargain is seen by the population as a Faustian one, especially where foreign intervention is concerned.24 At the same time, the people ruling the country, to the extent that they can, have a series of other pressures on them that they need to balance and there is some need to understand the contending imperatives that any leadership of the country faces. Habibullah was, for most of his reign, a master at doing this. He had to balance the imperatives of modernity and tradition; the local, regional and the national; the Russians and the British; nationalist pulls and neutrality, along with all the various configurations at court that these entailed. Not dissimilar contending imperatives exist in more modern times and the difficulties facing Nur Muhammad Taraki, Muhammad Najibullah, Burhanuddin Rabbani or Hamid Karzai would have been familiar to Habibullah or Abdur Rahman Khan. There is, it seems, a need to understand these imperatives, as it is difficult enough to run a country like Afghanistan, let alone when one has responsibility but little power. The need for an effective diplomatic settlement of issues affecting the region flows from this. Diplomacy always works best when diplomats are able to see other points of view, as well as their own. Isvolsky was able to see the bigger picture and so observed the Anglo–Russian Convention during the Jamshedi Crisis, despite the Amir not having signed it. Other things were more important and an Entente with the British was not worth tearing up for the sake of the Jamshedis, especially in the wake of the Bosnian Crisis and the Young Turk Revolution.

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Similar diplomatic skills are needed today, especially when the region is so tense. Diplomacy between Afghanistan and its neighbours would also be required to address concerns like the outside sponsorship of indigenous groups and the status of her borders. Throughout, the need to understand and recognise irredentist imperatives is essential.25 When the British first became involved in Afghanistan, there was never really much understanding of the country. Over time the position improved and more information became available through news writers, agents and political officers. In spite of this, there was always a willingness on the part of those in authority to ignore what was known about the country: Lord Curzon dealt with Habibullah as if he were just another Asian ruler; the generals thought they could supply huge numbers of men in Afghanistan when the evidence, and bitter experience, said it was not possible; the Russians believed they could conquer the country; the NATO countries thought they would be welcomed after the Taliban had gone. Perhaps the most useful lesson of history regarding Afghanistan is the need to understand the limits of what is known and act on the basis of what we do know. The situation of Afghanistan today, then, is in several respects similar to that of 100 years ago. While many things have changed over the intervening period, the essence of the challenges faced in the current situation has changed little, if at all. In this sense, there is much of value that can be learned from the hard-won experience of the past.

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NOTES

Introduction 1. Arnold Fletcher, Afghanistan: Highway of Conquest (Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 176, 177; Abdul Ali Arghandawi, British Imperialism and Afghanistan’s Struggle for Independence, 1914–1921 (New Delhi, 1989), pp. 41, 42, 76–79; Abdul Hakim Tabibi, Afghanistan: A Nation in Love with Freedom (Cedar Rapids, IA, 1985), pp. 67–71; Leon B. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919–1929: King Amanulla’s Failure to Modernize a Tribal Society (Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 35–45; Vartan Gregorian, ‘Mahmud Tarzi and Saraj-ol-Akhbar: Ideology of Nationalism and Modernization in Afghanistan’, Middle East Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 2, 1967. 2. Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 41, 67–71. 3. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, p. 22; Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 5–9. 4. Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, pp. 19–24. 5. Schofield, Victoria, Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict (I.B.Tauris, London, 2008), pp. 116–20; Roe, Andrew M., Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849–1947 (Modern War Studies, Kansas, 2010), pp. 44–46. 6. Metcalf, Barbara, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900 (OUP, 2007), pp. 62–63, 80–85, 102, 265, 296–314; Olesen, Asta, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Curzon, 1995), pp. 41–44, 96–99; Haroon, Sana, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo–Afghan Borderland (Hurst, London, 2007), pp. 91–104. 7. IOLR MSS Eur F 111/138 Part II Curzon to the King, 21 January 1904, p. 113; Cab 37/74/29 Paper entitled ‘Afghanistan’. This encloses a ‘Note by Lord Roberts of 13th February 1905’. The quotation is from page 4; Cab 37/76/67 Final Report on the Mission to Kabul, 15 April 1905, page 14. 8. Dominic Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War (London 1983); David Walder, The Short Victorious War: The Russo–Japanese Conflict 1904–1905 (London, 1973); Dietrich Geyer, Russian Imperialism (London, 1987); E.W. Edwards, ‘The Far Eastern Agreements of 1907’, Journal Of Modern History,

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Notes

9.

10. 11. 12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

20.

223

Vol. 26 (1954); Beryl Williams, ‘The Revolution of 1905 and Russian Foreign Policy’, in Essays in Honour of EH Carr (London, 1974). Seymour Becker, ‘The Russian Conquest of Central Asia and Kazakhstan: Motives, Methods, Consequences’, in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and Future Prospects (ed. Hafeez Malik) (Macmillan, London, 1994), pp. 23, 24. Burnaby, A Ride to Khiva (Century, London, 1983), pp. 168, 169, 181. William C. Fuller, Jr, Strategy and Power in Russia. 1600–1914 (The Free Press, New York, 1992), pp. 289–92. Olaf Caroe, Abridged translation and commentary on F Kh Yuldashbayeva, ‘The Russo–Afghan Demarcation and the Intensification of British Aggression in Central Asia and Afghanistan, 1872–1880’, in Central Asian Review, Vol. VI, 1958, pp. 209, 221, 227. A.P. Thornton, ‘Afghanistan in Anglo–Russian Diplomacy, 1869–1873’, The Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. XI (1954) and Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867–1917: A Study in Colonial Rule (University of California Press 1960), pp. 22–37. John Lowe Duthie, ‘Pragmatic Diplomacy or Imperial Encroachment?: British Policy Towards Afghanistan, 1874–1879’, International History Review, Vol. 5 (1983). Brian Robson, ‘A Russian View of the Second Afghan War’, Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 67 (1989), pp. 115, 116. Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 41, 42. J.C. Dalton, ‘General Skobeleff’s Instructions for the Reconnaissance and Battle of Geok Tepe on the 17th July and 30th December 1880’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute. Vol. XXV (1881), p. 715; J.J. Leverson, ‘March of the Turkestan Detachment Across the Desert From the Amu Darya (Oxus) to the Akhal Tekke Oasis, During Skobeleff’s Campaign against the Tekke Turkomans, 1880’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. XXVI (1882), pp. 568, 569; Alexis Krausse, Russia In Asia: A Record and a Study 1558–1899 (London, 1973), p. 134. Dilip Kumar Ghose, England and Afghanistan: A Phase in their Relations (Calcutta, 1960), pp. 159–200. Krausse, Russia In Asia, p. 134 and Peter Morris, ‘The Russians in Central Asia 1870–1887’, Slavonic and Eastern European Review, Vol. 53 (1975). The other sources cited are from Morris, pp. 521–23. D.S.M. Williams, ‘Imperial Russian Rule in Turkestan: The Pahlen Investigation, 1908–1909’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 58, New Series Vol. III (1971); Pierce, Russian Central Asia, pp. 221–96; Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, chapters 5 and 6 in Central Asia: 120 Years of Russian Rule (ed. Edward Allworth) (Duke University Press 1989), p. 188.

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21. Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 6, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 25 May 1904 and Hardinge to Bertie, 29 September 1904. 22. David Maclaren McDonald, United Government and Foreign Policy in Russia 1900–1914 (Harvard University Press, 1992); Dominic Lieven, ‘Pro-Germans and Russian Foreign Policy 1890–1914’, International History Review, Vol. 2 (1980); ‘Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Late Imperial Russia: The Personality, Career, and Opinions of P.N. Durnovo’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 26 (1983); Russia’s Rulers Under the Old Regime (London, 1989), Chapter 6; Russia and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1983) pp. 78–83; and The Kaiser’s Letters to the Tsar – The Willy-Nicky Correspondence (ed. N.F. Grant) (London 1920), p. 148. 23. A. Popov, ‘Angliiskaya Politika v Indii i Russko-lndiiskiye Otnosheniya v 1897– 1905 g.g.’ (English Policy in India and Russo–lndian Relations 1897–1905) Krasny Archiv, Vol. 19 (1926), p. 59. The policy of employing pressure in sensitive areas seems to have been a widely used one. Lobanoff-Rostovsky in Russia and Asia (Michigan, 1965) states that ‘Russia was in no way interested in Tibet except as a valuable bargaining card in any negotiations with Great Britain’, pp. 247, 248; Podpisi (No Initial) – ‘K Istorii Anglo-Russkogo Soglasheniya 1907 g’. (On the History of the Anglo–Russian Agreement of 1907) Krasny Archiv Vol. 69/70 (1935), p. 11; Reisner, ‘Anglo-Russkaya Konventsiya 1907 g. i Razdel Afganistana’ (The Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907 and the Partition of Afghanistan) Krasny Archiv Vol. 10 (1925), pp. 55, 56. 24. Peter Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy 1850–1917 (London 1986), p. 173; Sarah Searight, ‘Russian Railway Penetration of Central Asia’, Asian Affairs, Vol. XXIII (1992), p. 171; WO 33/419 ‘Report on the Military Resources of the Russian Empire’, War Office 1907; WO 33/533 ‘Military Report on Russian Turkestan or Central Asia’, General Staff, WO, 1905; WO 106/182 ‘The Central Asian Railways in Russian Turkestan’, by Duff, 5 December 1907, pp. 68, 82, 83. 25. Cab 38/1/2 ‘General Kouropatkine’s Scheme for a Russian Advance upon India’, August 1891. 26. British Documents on Foreign Affairs (eds Bourne and Watt) Series B Part 1, Vol. 12 ‘Summary by Lieutenant-Colonel Napier of a Pamphlet entitled “The Afghan Question” a military and geographical and political study by Staff Captain PA Rittich, of the Lifeguard Jaeger Regiment. St. Petersburg 1905’, pp. 459–70. 27. Fuller, Strategy and Power in Russia, pp. 364–66, 387. 28. Round Table, ‘The Indian Frontier Problem’ The Round Table, Vol. 16, No. 61 (1925–26), p. 103; Adye, General Sir John, Indian Frontier Policy (London, 1897), pp. 57, 58.

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29. Tucker, A.L.P., Sir Robert Sandeman and Baluchistan (London, 1921); Round Table, ‘The Indian Frontier Problem’, pp. 105, 106; Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, pp. 83–87. 30. Round Table, ‘The Indian Frontier Problem’, p. 105. 31. Round Table, ‘The Indian Frontier Problem’, p. 106; Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, pp. 96–101. 32. Round Table, ‘The Indian Frontier Problem’, p. 106; Roe, Waging War in Waziristan, p. 197. 33. The expeditions in the 15 years before 1899 were: 1888 against the Black Mountain tribes; 1890 in the Zhob Valley; 1891 against the Black Mountain tribes; 1891 at Miranzai; 1891 at Hunza and Nagar; 1894 against the Mahsuds; 1895 in Chitral; 1897 in Tochi; 1897 in the Malakand; 1897 against the Mohmands; 1897 against the Orakzais in Miranzai and Kurram; and 1897 against the Afridis in Khyber and Tirah. The three from 1899 to 1914 were: 1900–02 against the Mahsuds; 1908 against the Zakha Khel; and 1908 against the Mohmands. The list is from Appendix D of Captain H.L. Nevill, North-West Frontier: British and Indian Army Campaigns on the North-West Frontier of India 1849–1908 (London, 1912). The campaigns themselves are covered in chapters VI to XXIII.

1 The Problem of Herat 1. PRO 30/57/28 Kitchener Correspondence with Roberts, Paper II 50, Summary of Roberts’ evidence of 28 January 1907, p. 5. See also ‘The Russo–Afghan Frontier’ by General J.T. Walker, paper of 27 February 1885 in Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. XXIX (1885–86), No. 128, pp. 213–32. The sympathies of the inhabitants had changed little between when this was written and Roberts made his observations. See particularly pp. 220–23 incl. The 1880 Agreement is at Appendix 1. 2. FO 181/805 Diary of Dobbs for fortnight ending 3 April 1904, Entry for 27 March, p. 2. Written up and dated 4 April 1904; Also Foreign Department Memorandum by EHS Clarke, Section on Herat, Simla, 1 May 1904, p. 9; FO 181/814 Diary of Dobbs for fortnight ending 17 November 1903, Entry for 6 November, p. 2. Written up and dated 20 November 1903. 3. Cab 37/69/50 Paper headed ‘Afghanistan’ by Brodrick, 28 March 1904, p. 2; and Bodleian Library, Selborne Papers 10, Curzon to Selborne, 21 December 1903, fol. 113. See also Dilks, who writes of Herat and Afghan Turkestan that ‘those regions were past praying for’ in Curzon in India Vol. II (London 1970), p. 158. 4. Cab 16/2 Report of the Morley Sub-Committee, p. ii, and PRO 30/57/28 Paper II 50, p. 11.

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5. PRO 30/57/30 ‘Note on the Military Policy of India’ by Kitchener, 19 July 1905, p. 6. 6. British Library Balfour Papers MSS 49721, Copy of Kitchener to Brodrick, 9 January 1905, fol. 113. 7. Ibid., fol.s 112 and 113. 8. Martin McCauley, Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Modern History (Longman, 2002), p. 60; Rosanne Klass (ed), Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (New York 1987), p. 194. 9. Cab 16/2 Fifth Meeting of the Morley Sub-Committee, p. 130, Question 1030. Lyall: ‘he [the Amir] could not contend against Russia without our help’. 10. Cab 16/2 First Meeting, p. 39, Questions 265 to 267, and Fifth Meeting, p. 144, Question 1073. 11. Cab 38/9/62 ‘Action to be taken in the event of a Russian Occupation of Herat and Afghan Turkestan’ by General Staff, WO, 13 July 1905. The Appendix which sets out the questions asked is dated 12 May 1905, p. 5. 12. Cab 16/2 Fifth Meeting, p. 142, Questions 1053 and 1054; PRO 30/57/28, Paper II 32, Roberts to Kitchener, 25 August 1904, fol. 113 verso. 13. Cab 16/2 Fifth Meeting, p. 143, Question 1061; British Library Sydenham Papers Add. MSS 50836, Paper entitled ‘Our relations with Afghanistan. Note on discussion of 3rd Instant’, by Sir George Clarke, 6 August 1904, Sent to Balfour on 9 August 1904, fol. 99; Also Add MSS 50836 ‘Note on Afghan Armaments’, 2 August 1904, fol.s 96 and 97. 14. Cab 38/6/26 Paper entitled ‘The Afghanistan Problem’ by Clarke, 20 March 1905, p. 4. 15. Despite this, Clarke was still aware that even if the Russians did not face these difficulties they would still be able to invade with comparative ease. See Ibid., pp. 3 and 5; Add Mss 50836, ‘Note on Afghan Armaments’ by Clarke, 2 August 1904, fol. 96; and finally PRO 30/57/34 Clarke to Kitchener, 8 November 1904, fol. 4 verso in which Clarke emphasises this point and also criticises the position of being treaty bound to defend the undefendable. Clarke’s ‘Note on Afghan Armaments’ was in response to Balfour’s note of July 1904. 16. IOLR MSS Eur F 111/162 Part I, Curzon Papers, Hamilton to Curzon, 23 April 1903, p. 100; Hamilton to Curzon, 24 April 1903, p. 108. See also Dilks, Curzon in India Vol. II (London 1970), p. 59. For British planning against Russia, see Barbara Jelavich ‘British Means of Offence against Russia in the Nineteenth Century’, in Russian History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1974), especially pp. 126–35. See also Mahajan, ‘The Defence of India and the End of Isolation: A Study in the Foreign Policy of the Conservative Government

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17. 18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

227

1900–1905’‚ in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981–82), p. 170; Robert Blake, Disraeli (London, 1966), pp. 659, 660, see Blake’s note 1 on p. 660. See also Churchill College Cambridge, GrantDuff Papers AGDF 2/1 CID Diary 28 September 1910–18 December 1911, entry for 19 January 1911, p. 37, where the possibility of a Polish insurrection was discussed between Wolseley and Bismarck if Russia had attacked Afghanistan in the 1870s and 1880s and where the German Chancellor had stated that he would not object to this. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/162, Part I, Godley to Curzon, 1 January 1903, p. 3. FO 539/86 Further Correspondence Respecting Central Asia, Vol. 5, Hamilton to the Government of India, 31 December 1902, p. 1; and Government of India to Hamilton, 7 January 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 8 January 1903, R. 9 January 1903, p. 2. FO 539/86 Scott to Lansdowne No. 3, D. and R. 10 January 1903, pp. 2 and 3; IO to FO, D. 20 January 1903, R. 21 January 1903, p. 5, enclosing: Whyte to the Government of India, 12 September 1902, pp. 5 and 6; Government of India to Whyte, 18 September 1902, p. 6; Whyte to the Government of India, 11 November 1902, p. 6; Government of India to Whyte, 13 November 1902, p. 6; Whyte to Government of India, 11 December 1902, p. 6; Government of India to Whyte, 16 December 1902, p. 7. FO 65/1726 Scott to Lansdowne No. 17, 17 January 1903, fol.s 24 to 28, also printed in FO 539/86, pp. 9 and 10, received at the FO 26 January 1903; Also FO 65/1726 Memorandum Communicated by the Russian Embassy, 6 February 1900, fol.s 32 recto and verso; See also, for a brief mention of this document, Ludwig W. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 31, 32; Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India 1793–1907: A Study in Foreign Relations (Delhi 1972), pp. 241–43; and D.P. Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876–1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations (St Lucia, 1963), pp. 168, 169. See Appendix 2 for the text of selected parts of the Memorandum communicated by the Russian Embassy, 6 February 1900. FO 65/1726 Scott to Lansdowne No. 4, D. 21 January 1903 – 9:10pm, R. 21 January 1903 – 10:50pm, fol. 35. Also found in FO 539/86, p. 7; FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 14 A, 21 January 1903, p. 8. FO 539/86 Scott to Lansdowne No. 29, D. 4 February 1903, R. 9 February 1903, p. 15; FO 65/1726 Memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, St Petersburg, 23 January/5 February 1903, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 31, D. 6 February 1903, R. 9 February 1903. A copy can also be found in FO 539/86, pp. 15 and 16. Finally, a copy of the Memorandum in its

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228

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire original Russian form can be found in FO 181/792. The substance of this was reported to the Government of India by Hamilton on 13 February 1903. This is in FO 539/86, p. 35. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/162 Part I, Hamilton to Curzon, 13 March 1903, p. 61; and same to same, 19 March 1903, p. 69; FO 65/1726 Government of India to Hamilton, 23 March 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, 23 March 1903, fol. 105 verso. This is also found in FO 539/86, p. 42; FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 30 A, 11 February 1903, p. 17. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 3 March 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, 4 March 1903, p. 34; Amir of Afghanistan to Government of India, 14 February 1903, p. 37; Whyte to Government of India, 24 February 1903, pp. 37 and 38; same to same, 21 January 1903, p. 44; Governor of Herat to Whyte, 29 November 1902, pp. 44 and 45; Whyte to Governor of Herat, 19 January 1903, p. 45; Whyte to British News-Writer at Herat, 19 January 1903, pp. 45 and 46. The latter four documents enclosed in IO to FO (A), D. 28 March 1903, R. 30 March 1903, p. 44. FO 539/86 Government of India to Amir of Afghanistan, 18 February 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 18 March 1903, R. 19 March 1903, p. 38. The following are enclosed in IO to FO (B), D. 18 March 1903, R. 30 March 1903, p. 46: Whyte to Government of India, 24 January 1903, p. 46; Governor of Herat to Whyte, 3 September 1902, pp. 46 and 47; Whyte to Governor of Herat, 19 September 1902, p. 47; same to same, 22 November 1902, p. 47; Governor of Herat to Whyte, 29 November 1902, p. 47; Whyte to Governor of Herat, 18 December 1902, p. 48; Governor of Herat to Whyte, 31 December 1902, p. 48; Whyte to Governor of Herat, 19 January 1903, p. 48; Whyte to General Officer Commanding at Kushk, 22 November 1902, pp. 48 and 49; same to same, 6/19 January 1903, p. 49. FO 539/86 Sir Arthur Hardinge to Whyte No. 10, 24 February 1903, enclosed in Sir Arthur Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 31, D. 3 March 1903, R. 23 March 1903, pp. 40 and 41. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 66 A, 24 March 1903, p. 43. This can also be found in FO 65/1726, fol.s 144 recto and verso. See also FO 539/86 Memorandum communicated to Count Benckendorff on the discussion of 24 March, 25 March 1903, sent by Lansdowne. Enclosed in Lansdowne to Scott No. 74, 1 April 1903, pp. 51 to 53. Benckendorff’s reply was broadly in agreement with Lansdowne proposed line. See Benckendorff to Lansdowne, 13/26 March 1903, p. 53. FO 539/86 Hamilton to Government of India, 27 March 1903, pp. 49 and 50. The substance of this document also exists in a very different style in FO 65/1726, fol. 154, though the content is, itself, similar.

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29. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Benckendorff, 30 March 1903, p. 54. 30. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 1 April 1903, pp. 54 and 55. 31. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 2 April 1903, p. 55. See also the end of the letter of 1 April on the same page. 32. FO 539/86 FO to IO, 4 April 1903, p. 56. See my note 27 in this chapter for despatch 66 A. 33. FO 539/86 Hamilton to Government of India, 6 April 1903, pp. 57 and 58; Government of India to Hamilton, 7 April 1903, p. 58. 34. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 83, 8 April 1903, p. 59. 35. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, D. 11 April 1903, R. 13 April 1903, pp. 61 and 62; see also same to same, 16 April 1903, pp. 71A and 71B, enclosed in IO to FO, 14 May 1903, p. 71 A; and Government of India to Amir, 15 April 1903, p. 71C. 36. FO 60/665 Monthly summary of events in Persia not reported in separate despatches, by Sir Arthur Hardinge, Tehran, 28 April 1903, p. 6. For trade see Rossiya i Afganistan (Russia and Afghanistan), ed. U.V. Gankovskii (Publishing House ‘Naooka’, 1989), Chapter 9, pp. 154–58. See also FO 539/86 Whyte to Government of India, 19 April 1903, p. 72; FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 1 May 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, 1 May 1903, p. 68. 37. This was reported by Lansdowne to Scott No. 116, 19 May 1903, found in FO 539/86, p. 72. 38. FO 539/86 Sir Arthur Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 70, 20 May 1903, p. 72*. See also Government of India to Hamilton, 22 May 1903, and Government of India to Hamilton, 3 June 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, 3 June 1903, p. 79. Whyte was to send the correspondence on the issue to the Government of India, which he did at the end of May; Whyte to Government of India, 29 May 1903, p. 120, plus enclosures, pp. 121 to 126, all enclosed in IO to FO, D. 5 August 1903, R. 7 August 1903, p. 120. Finally, see Government of India to Hamilton, 10 June 1903, p. 85. 39. FO 539/86 Pro-Memoriâ of 14/27 May 1903 (St. Petersburg) enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 150, D. 28 May 1903, R. 1 June 1903, pp. 78 and 79. 40. Alexis Krausse, Russia in Asia (London 1973), p. 134. 41. Churchill College Cambridge Spring-Rice Papers, CASR 10/5, Spring-Rice to Grey, 20 June 1907. 42. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 15 June 1903, enclosed in IO to FO 16 June 1903, p. 87; Government of India to Hamilton, 18 June 1903, enclosed in IO to FO 19 June 1903, pp. 87 and 88. 43. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 135, 22 June 1903, p. 88. 44. 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 169, 24 June 1903, p. 101.

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45. FO 539/86 FO to IO, 25 June 1903, p. 102. 46. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 5 July 1903, p. 103; and same to same, 8 July 1903, pp. 103 and 104. 47. FO 65/1726 Scott to Lansdowne No. 189, 7 July 1903, fol. 293. A copy of this also exists in FO 539/86, p. 107. The official figures are in Rossiya i Afganistan, p. 155. 48. FO 539/86 Scott to Lansdowne No. 197, 8 July 1903, p. 107. 49. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/138 Part II, Curzon to the King, 23 July 1903, p. 100; FO 181/808 Curzon to the Amir, 24 July 1903; D.P. Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876–1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations (St Lucia, 1963), pp. 165–68. 50. FO 539/86 Scott to Lansdowne No. 225, D. 5 August 1903, R. 10 August 1903, pp. 126 and 127. 51. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 8 August 1903, p. 128, enclosed in IO to FO, 10 August 1903, p. 127. 52. FO 539/86 IO to FO, D. 12 August 1903, R. 13 August 1903, pp. 128 and 129. 53. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 12 August 1903, p. 130; See also Lansdowne to Scott No. 130, 13 August 1903, p. 130*; FO to IO, 14 August 1903, p. 131. 54. FO 539/86 IO to FO, D. 14 August 1903, R. 15 August 1903, pp. 131 and 132. 55. FO 539/86 FO to IO, 14 August 1903, pp. 130 and 131. 56. FO 539/86 Hamilton to Government of India, 15 August 1903, pp. 132 and 133. 57. FO 539/86 Scott to Lamsdorff, 1/14 August 1903, pp. 143 and 144, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 246, D. 20 August 1903, R. 24 August 1903, p. 143; Scott to Lansdowne Tel. No. 68, 21 August 1903, p. 143. 58. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 22 August 1903, p. 144, enclosed in IO to FO, 24 August 1903, p. 144. 59. FO 539/86 Memorandum by Lamsdorff, 7/20 August 1903, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 250, D. 21 August 1903, R. 25 August 1903, p. 145. 60. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 28 August 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, 29 August 1903, pp. 146 and 147. 61. FO 539/86 IO to FO, D. 3 September 1903, R. 4 September 1903, pp. 158 and 159; FO to IO, 8 September 1903, pp. 159 and 160; Lansdowne to Scott No. 156, 8 September 1903, p. 159; Hamilton to Government of India, 9 September 1903, p. 177; Lansdowne to Scott No. 248, 16 September 1903, p. 179. 62. FO 539/86 IO to FO, D. 18 September 1903, R. 19 September 1903, p. 188, and Government of India to Hamilton, 17 September 1903, p. 189.

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63. Beryl J.Williams, ‘The Strategic Background’; Sykes, History of Afghanistan (London, 1940); Habberton, Anglo–Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan (Urbana, 1937); Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments (Oxford 1967); and Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876–1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations (St Lucia, 1963) all omit coverage of the Dobbs Mission. Both Dilks (Curzon in India Vol. II (London, 1970), p. 152) and Adamec (Afghanistan 1900–1923: A Diplomatic History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1967), pp. 35–37), make brief mention of Dobbs’ mission. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India 1793–1907: A Study in Foreign Relations (Delhi, 1972), is inaccurate when he states that Dobbs ‘was compelled to leave Afghanistan by way of Meshed under the orders of the Amir’, on p. 252. He cites Adamec, p. 36, for this information. Bilgrami is mistaken. Dobbs left via Kabul, not Meshed. See also IOLR L/P&S/18 A164 ‘Afghanistan [History of Recent British Relations; Policies of HMG and Government of India]’ by St J. Brodrick, 12 August 1905, p. 10. Thus his importance, both in the context of the defence of northern Afghanistan and as a springboard for the Dane Mission to Kabul of 1905 of which he was a member, has not been fully appreciated. 64. FO 539/86 Scott to Lansdowne No. 284, D. 16 September 1903, R. 21 September 1903, pp. 189 and 190; Pro-Memoriâ (sent privately to Count Lamsdorff), 30 August/12 September 1903, pp. 190 and 191; Lansdowne to Scott No. 263, 29 September 1903, pp. 195 and 196. 65. FO 181/808 Amir to Viceroy No. 39, 26 Jamadi-us-Sani 1321AH, Corresponding to 19 September 1903, p. 5. 66. FO 539/86 Government of India to Hamilton, 29 September 1903, p. 196. This letter regarding an Afghan Commission came from Whyte, and the Government of India requested him to pass it on to Dobbs. This document is enclosed in IO to FO, 30 September 1903, p. 196. Finally, see FO to IO, 30 September 1903, p. 196. 67. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice (At this point Chargé d’ Affairs at the St Petersburg Embassy) to Lansdowne No. 302, D. 30 September 1903, R. 5 October 1903, p. 197, enclosing ‘Precis of Article in the Novoe Vremya’ of 30 September 1903, p. 198. See also Rossiya i Afganistan, pp. 154–56, in which it was revealed that a large amount of the illicit trade was going through the Pendinskaya Custom House near Kushk; Finally, on the Department of Indirect Taxation, see FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No 306, D. 1 October 1903, R. 5 October 1903, p. 198. 68. FO 539/86 Pro-Memoriâ, St Petersburg, 22 September/5 October 1903, p. 202. 69. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 106, 13 October 1903, and Lansdowne to Spring-Rice No. 201, 14 October 1903, both on p. 204.

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70. FO 539/86 Brodrick to Government of India, 10 October 1903, p. 213; Government of India to Brodrick, 14 October 1903, pp. 213 and 214; Latter enclosed in IO to FO, 15 October 1903, p. 213. 71. FO 539/86 Government of India to Brodrick, 16 October 1903, p. 214. 72. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 326, D. 12 October 1903, R. 19 October 1903, pp. 215 and 216. Also enclosed is a ‘Precis by Mr. Parker on the Subject of Russo–Afghan Relations’, 12 October 1903, pp. 216–22. 73. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 328, D. 14 October 1903, R. 19 October 1903, pp. 222 and 223; same to same No. 334, D. 15 October 1903, R. 19 October 1903, pp. 223 and 224, plus enclosures. 74. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 113, 19 October 1903, p. 225; FO to IO, 20 October 1903, pp. 226 and 227; Brodrick to Government of India, 20 October 1903, p. 239; Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 117, 22 October 1903, p. 239; Finally, Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 353, D. 26 October 1903, R. 2 November 1903, pp. 249 and 250. Also Brodrick to Government of India, 16 October 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 19 October 1903, R. 20 October 1903, pp. 225 and 226. 75. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 115, 20 October 1903, p. 226; Lansdowne to Spring-Rice No. 203, 21 October 1903, p. 238*; Government of India to Brodrick, 22 October 1903, p. 240. 76. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 116, 20 October 1903, p. 226; Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 354, D. 26 October 1903, R. 2 November 1903, plus enclosures, pp. 250 and 251. 77. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 118, 24 October 1903, p. 240; Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 348, D. 24 October 1903, R. 2 November 1903, plus enclosures, pp. 246 to 248. 78. FO 539/86 ‘Extract of an Article from the Trans-Caspian Review’ of 7/20 October 1903, enclosed in Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 356, D. 26 October 1903, R. 2 November 1903, both on p. 253. 79. FO 539/86 Government of India to Brodrick, 4 November 1903, pp. 255 and 256, enclosed in IO to FO, 5 November 1903, p. 255. 80. FO 539/86 Government of India to Brodrick, 6 November 1903, pp. 263 and 264, enclosed in IO to FO, 7 November 1903, p. 263. See also Government of India to Brodrick, 12 November 1903, pp. 267 and 268. 81. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Spring-Rice No. 307, 7 November 1903, pp. 264 and 265. 82. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne, No. 394, D. 15 November 1903, R. 18 November 1903, enclosing ‘Summary of an Article in the Trans-Caspian Review’, of 25 October/6 November 1903, pp. 270 and 271.

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83. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Spring-Rice No. 334, 25 November 1903, pp. 272 and 273. This was reported to the Government of India on 3 December 1903, see pp. 277 and 278. 84. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 141, D. & R. 26 November 1903, p. 274; same to same No. 411, D. 26 November 1903, R. 30 November 1903, p. 274; same to same No. 412, D. 26 November 1903, R. 30 November 1903, p. 275; Scott to Lansdowne No. 434, D. 14 December 1903, R. 21 December 1903, p. 286; Finally, same to same No.435, D. 16 December 1903, R. 21 December 1903, plus enclosure, pp. 286 and 287. 85. FO 539/86 Government of India to Brodrick, 30 November 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 30 November 1903, R. 2 December 1903, both p. 276. See also Brodrick to the Government of India, 2 December 1903, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 12 December 1903, p. 279. 86. FO 539/86 Lansdowne to Scott No. 367, 16 December 1903, p. 280; Benckendorff to Lansdowne, D. & R. 17 December 1903, pp. 280 and 281; Lansdowne to Scott No. 370, 22 December 1903, p. 287*. 87. FO 539/86 Government of India to Brodrick, 18 December 1903, pp. 281 and 282, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 19 December 1903, p. 281. See Also FO 539/88 IO to FO, D. 31 December 1903, R. 4 January 1904, p. 1; Dobbs to Government of India, 7 November 1903, pp. 1 to 3, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 7 January 1904, R. 8 January 1904, p. 1, plus enclosures, pp. 3 to 6; FO 539/88 FO to IO, 11 January 1904, p. 10. 88. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 25 January 1904, p. 13, (enclosure 3 in No. 10); FO 181/814 Telegram from Fisher (Acting Consul General at Meshed) to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India Foreign Department at Calcutta, 20 January 1904; Diary of Dobbs for fortnight ending 17 November 1903, entry for 6 November, p. 2, written up and dated 20 November 1903; FO 181/808 Foreign Department Memorandum by EHS Clarke, section on Herat, Calcutta, 1 December 1903, pp. 10 and 11; IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/163 Part II Curzon to Brodrick, letters of 7 January 1904 and 17 March 1904, pp. 3 and 54 respectively, and FO 181/814 Telegram from Viceroy, 6 March 1904, p. 2. 89. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 25 January 1904, p. 13, (enclosure 4 in No. 10); Government of India to Brodrick, 28 January 1904, p. 14, in which Dobbs cites ‘the secret co-operation of the Governor of Herat with the Russians as the motive for trying to remove him’. This is enclosed in IO to FO, D. 28 January 1904, R. 29 January 1904, pp. 13 and 14; Government of India to Amir, 26 December 1903, pp. 14 and 15, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 4 February 1904, R. 6 February 1904, p. 14; Amir to Government of India, 5 January 1904, pp. 15 and 16, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 8 February

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234

90. 91. 92.

93. 94. 95.

96.

97.

98.

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire 1904, R. 11 February 1904, p. 15; Finally, Government of India to Amir, 28 January 1904, pp. 19 and 20, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 24 February 1904, p. 19. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 23 February 1904, pp. 20 and 21, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 24 February 1904, p. 20. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 6 March 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 7 March 1904, both p. 24. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 17 March 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 17 March 1904, R. 18 March 1904, both on p. 27. At the end of his telegram Dobbs wrote that he would elucidate by letter. This was written before he sent the telegram. See Dobbs to Government of India, 13 February 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 7 April 1904, R. 8 April 1904, pp. 40 and 41. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900 to 1923, pp. 36 and 37. FO 539/88 Brodrick to Government of India, 18 March 1904, pp. 30 and 31, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 21 March 1904, p. 30. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 22 March 1904, p. 47; Brodrick to Government of India, 25 March 1904, pp. 47 and 48; Government of India to Brodrick, 28 March 1904, p. 48; Brodrick to Government of India, 30 March 1904, p. 48; all enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 12 April 1904, p. 47. Curzon wrote to the Amir in this sense, 1 April 1904, p. 52, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 26 April 1904, R. 28 April 1904, p. 51. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 30 March 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 30 March 1904, R. 31 March 1904, both 36. See also British Agent at Kabul to Government of India, 19 March 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 26 April 1904, R. 28 April 1904, both p. 51; Government of India to Brodrick, 28 April 1904, p. 53, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 29 April 1904, p. 52. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 6 May 1904, p. 54, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 7 May 1904, p. 53; Brodrick to Government of India, 9 May 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 10 May 1904, R. 11 May 1904, both p. 55; For the Amir’s letter itself, see Amir to Viceroy, 27 April 1904, pp. 64 to 67, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 6 June 1904, R. 8 June 1904, p. 64; Government of India to Minchin (to send on to Dobbs), 16 May 1904, p. 70, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 7 June 1904, R. 8 June 1904, p. 67. See also British Library Balfour MSS 49720 Balfour to Brodrick, 17 December 1903, fol. 270. FO 181/819 Diary of Dobbs ending 4 June 1904, entry for 4 June 1904, written up 5 June 1904, p. 4. See also FO 181/813 ‘Matters to be brought to the notice of His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan in connection with the Herat Frontier’, sections on ‘Weak and defenceless state of the frontier’,

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‘Inclinations of the border tribes and population’, and ‘Russian attempts to establish communication with Afghan officials’, by Dobbs, 17 July 1904. 99. FO 539/88 Draft of instructions from IO to Mr. Dobbs, June 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 7 July 1904, R. 8 July 1904, pp. 77 and 78. 100. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 18 July 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 18 July 1904, both p. 82; same to same, 22 July 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 23 July 1904, pp. 83 and 84; same to same, 28 July 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 29 July 1904, pp. 86 and 87; same to same, 4 August 1904, enclosed in IO to FO D. & R. 5 August 1904, p. 89; same to same, 1 August 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 3 August 1904, pp. 88 and 89; same to same, 10 August 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 11 August 1904, R, 12 August 1904, p. 91; Finally, see also the Government of India Memorandum entitled ‘enclosures of a letter to His Majesty’s Secretary of State for India, No. 178, dated 15 September 1904’, found in FO 181/823.

2 Events in Russian Central Asia and their Relevance to Afghanistan 1. W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan: A Study of Political Developments (Oxford, 1967), p. 177. He cites this as coming from Lieutenant-Colonel Napier to Sir Arthur Nicolson, 27 April 1907, from Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Vol. IV, p. 530. Even though this fear was articulated in 1907, it seems to have been a prevalent one even before this date. See also FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 26 December 1904, pp. 181 and 182, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 27 December 1904, p. 181; Amir to Government of India, 11 November 1904, pp. 182–84, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 28 December 1904, R. 29 December 1904, p. 182; Finally, Government of India to Brodrick, 29 December 1904, pp. 184 and 185, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 30 December 1904, p. 184. See also Gooch, Plans of War (London 1974), p. 231. 2. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 6 (Letterbook May 1904 – October 1905), Hardinge to Sanderson, 8 February 1905, fol.s 70 verso and 71 recto. 3. Churchill College Cambridge, Spring-Rice Papers, CASR 1/46, Kitchener to Spring-Rice, 26 May 1904. 4. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/264 ‘Comments on The War Office Memoranda on the Defence of India’, pp. 1 and 2, 15 February 1904. 5. Churchill College Cambridge, Spring-Rice Papers, CASR 1/46, Kitchener to Spring-Rice, letters of 21 July 1904 and 8 June 1905.

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6. Cab 38/5/43 ‘Observations on the Records of a Wargame played at Simla, 1903’, General Staff, WO, 5 May 1904; Cab 38/2/22 ‘Diary of Movements of Russian and British Forces in Afghanistan and Maximum Force that can be supplied by a Single Line of Railway’, Intelligence Department, WO, 7 April 1903; PRO 30/57/29 Kitchener to Roberts, Paper Q 14, 23 July 1903. See also Gooch Plans of War, pp. 217, 218, 221. 7. FO 539/86 Spring-Rice to Lansdowne No. 350, D. 26 October 1903, R. 2 November 1903, p. 249 and same to same No. 376, D. 9 November 1903, R. 16 November 1903, pp. 268 and 269. 8. FO 539/86 Scott to Lansdowne No. 437, D. 17 December 1903, R. 28 December 1903, p. 287. 9. FO 539/88 Extract from the Trans-Caspian Review, 3/16 December 1903, pp. 7 and 8, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 448, D. 26 December 1903, R. 11 January 1904, p. 7. 10. FO 539/88 Extract from the Trans-Caspian Review, 16/29 December 1903, pp. 8 and 9, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 9, D. 7 January 1904, R. 11 January 1904, p. 8. 11. FO 539/88 Napier to Scott No. 3, D. 18 January 1904, R. 23 January 1904, p. 11. 12. See my note 8 in this chapter. 13. Cab 38/4/4 ‘Strategical Effect of an extension of the Russian Railway System from Samarkand to Termez’, Intelligence Department, WO, 20 January 1904, p. 3. 14. The reason why Russian troops could travel from Kushk to Kandahar in 35 marches despite travelling 53 miles further than the distance from Termez to Kabul, which was covered in 36 marches, was because the territory from Kushk to Kandahar was generally flatter and more fertile than the harsh mountainous territory lying north of Kabul. 15. 38/4/4 Paragraphs 5 and 6, pp. 3 and 4. 16. Ibid., Paragraphs 7 and 8, p. 4. 17. Ibid., Paragraph 9, pp. 4 and 5. 18. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/163, Part II, Curzon to Brodrick, 11 February 1904, p. 32; same to same, 17 March 1904, p. 53. 19. FO 539/88 Extract from the Novoe Vremya, 2/15 February 1904, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 62, D. 16 February 1904, R. 20 February 1904, both found on p. 18. This is also found in FO 181/812. See also Napier to Scott No. 12, 18 February 1904, pp. 18 and 19, enclosed in Scott to Lansdowne No. 71, D. 18 February 1904, R. 22 February 1904, p. 18. 20. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 29 February 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 29 February 1904, both p. 21; same to same, 3 March

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Notes

21.

22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

237

1904, p. 22, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 4 March 1904, pp. 21 and 22; Scott to Lansdowne No. 60, D. & R. 5 March 1904, p. 23; Napier to Scott No. 14, D. 2 March 1904, R. at FO 7 March 1904, p. 23; Scott to Lansdowne No. 101, D. 3 March 1904, R. 7 March 1904, p. 23. FO 539/88 Brodrick to Government of India, 4 March 1904; Government of India to Brodrick, 7 March 1904, both enclosed in IO to FO, D. 8 March 1904, R. 9 March 1904, all p. 25. National Army Museum Archive Roberts Letterbook Vol. VII, 7101–23122–7, Document 641, Roberts to Kitchener, 10 March 1904. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 14 March 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 15 March 1904, both p. 26; Government of India to Brodrick, 16 March 1904, pp. 26 and 27, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 16 March 1904, R. 17 March 1904, p. 26. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 24 March 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 24 March 1904, both p. 31. Also: ‘At the outbreak of war there was not a single soldier or battery taken from Turkestan to the Japanese front. This was in connection with the measures of Lord Kitchener in northern India towards the Russians themselves, and they had come to think by that time of an increase in the numbers of the occupying army.’ From I. Reisner, ‘Anglo–Russkaya Konventsiya 1907g i Razdel Afganistana’ (The Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907 and the Partition of Afghanistan) in Krasny Archiv, Vol. 10 (1925), p. 54. See also my note 1 in this chapter FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 1 April 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 2 April 1904, both p. 37. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 4 April 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 5 April 1904, R. 6 April 1904, both p. 39. See note 23 above. FO 181/805 Diary of Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, for the fortnight ending on 3 April 1904. Entry for 27 March on p. 2. This was written up on 4 April. 539/88 Scott to Lansdowne No. 169, D. 12 April 1904, R. 18 April 1904, p. 50. British Library Balfour MSS 49725, Roberts to Balfour, 5 April 1904, fol.s 55 recto to 57 verso. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 20 April 1904, pp. 50 and 51, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 21 April 1904, p. 50. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 19 May 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 19 May 1904, both p. 56. Beryl J.Williams, ‘The Strategic Background to the Anglo-Russian Entente of August 1907’, Historical Journal 1966, Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 362.

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33. Cab 38/5/46 The Siberian and Manchurian Railways’, General Staff, WO, 10 May 1904 and Beryl J.Williams, ‘The Strategic Background’, p. 362. 34. Churchill College Cambridge, Esher Papers, ESHR 10/36, Correspondence with Sir George Clarke 1905, Vol. IV, Section just headed ‘Notes’. Note written sometime between 23 and 27 June 1905. 35. Beryl J.Williams, ‘The Strategic Background’, p. 364. 36. PRO 30/67/20 Brodrick Papers, Kitchener to Brodrick, 19 May 1904, fol. 1042. 37. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 21 May 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 24 May 1904, both p. 57; same to same, 27 May 1904, pp. 57 and 58, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 28 May 1904, p. 57. 38. FO 539/88 ‘Note on Reported Russian Activity in Central Asia’, General Staff, WO, 30 May 1904, pp. 58 to 60, enclosed in Intelligence Division to FO, D. 31 May 1904, R. 1 June 1904, p. 58. See also other enclosures, pp. 60 and 61. 39. Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 7, Sanderson to Hardinge, 1 June 1904, fol.s 70 recto and verso. 40. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 104, D. & R. 1 June 1904, p. 62; same to same No. 275, D. 31 May 1904, R. 7 June 1904, p. 63. 41. FO 539/88 Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 226, 3 June 1904, pp. 62 and 63. The original copy of this is in FO 181/805 and was received in St. Petersburg on 19 June 1904. 42. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 4 June 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 6 June 1904, both p. 63. This despatch was reprinted for the CID as Cab 38/5/54. 43. FO 539/88 Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 226B, 8 June 1904, p. 71. 44. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 279, D. 5 June 1904, R. 13 June 1904, pp. 71 and 72; same to same No. 284, D. 9 June 1904, R. 13 June 1904, plus enclosure, p. 72; Finally, same to same No. 290, D. 9 June 1904, R. 13 June 1904, plus enclosure, p. 73. 45. FO 539/88 Brodrick to Government of India, 6 June 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 13 June 1904, R. 14 June 1904, both p. 74. 46. FO 539/88 Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 231, 14 June 1904, p. 74. 47. Cab 38/5/62 ‘Memorandum by the General Staff on the Strength in which Russia can Advance Towards India when her Railway System is Extended to Termez and Note by Field-Marshall Lord Roberts’. Memorandum of 16 June 1904 and Note of 20 June 1904, paragraphs 1 to 4, pp. 1 and 2. 48. Ibid., Paragraphs 5 to 7, p. 2. 49. Ibid., Paragraph 8, pp. 2 to 4. 50. Ibid., Paragraph 9, p. 4. Paragraph 10 is a summary of the figures given in paragraph 8.

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51. Ibid., Paragraph 11, p. 5, and Note by Roberts, also p. 5. 52. WO 105/42 ‘Estimate of the Forces Required to Oppose Russia Successfully for the Defence of India’ by Mullaly, 30 June 1904, paragraphs 1 to 3, pp. 1 to 3. 53. Ibid., Paragraphs 4 to 8, pp. 3 to 6. 54. Ibid., Paragraph 9, taken from table on p. 7. 55. Ibid., Paragraphs 10 and 11, pp. 7 and 8. 56. Ibid., Paragraph 12, taken from table on p. 8. This is discussed in paragraph 13. 57. Ibid. A large table for reinforcements and drafts appears in Appendices B I and II, pp. 14 and 15. 58. Ibid., Paragraph 14, taken from table on p. 9. 59. Ibid., Paragraph 15, taken from table on p. 10. 60. Ibid., Paragraph 16, pp. 10 and 11. 61. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne, No. 324, D. 29 June 1904, R. 2 July 1904, plus enclosure, pp. 76 and 77; Napier to Hardinge No. 44, 20 July 1904, p. 85, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 364, D. 20 July 1904, R. 25 July 1904, p. 84; and Napier to Hardinge No. 48, 21 July 1904, pp. 85 and 86, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 370, D. 21 July 1904, R. 25 July 1904, p. 85. 62. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 28 July 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 29 July 1904, both p. 87. 63. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 2 August 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 2 August 1904, both p. 88; Napier to Hardinge No. 49, 31 July 1904, p. 90, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 380, D. 2 August 1904, R. 8 August 1904, p. 89; and IOLR MSS Eur D 573/27 Brodrick to Ampthill, 18 August 1904, fol. 69. 64. Cab 38/6/90 Minutes of CID 55th Meeting, 25 August 1904, ‘Military Activity in Russian Turkestan and Afghanistan’, p. 2 and 3. 65. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 132, D. & R. 26 August 1904, p. 96. See also Brodrick to Government of India, 29 August 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 7 September 1904, both p. 111. 66. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 134, D. & R. 30 August 1904, p. 103; Brodrick to Government of India, 24 August 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 31 August 1904, both p. 103. 67. FO 539/88 Stevens to Lansdowne No. 23, D. 18 August 1904, R. 2 September 1904, p. 104; Bosanquet to Lansdowne No. 111, D. 29 August 1904, R. 2 September 1904, p. 104. 68. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 2 September 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 3 September 1904, both p. 105.

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69. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 428, D. 27 August 1904, R. 5 September 1904, pp. 105 and 106. 70. FO 539/88 Napier to Hardinge No. 55, 30 August 1904, p. 107, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 432, D. 30 August 1904, R. 5 September 1904, pp. 106 and 107; Napier to Hardinge No. 56, 31 August 1904, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 439, D. 1 September 1904, R. 5 September 1904, both p. 108; Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 5, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 3 September 1904, fol.8; Finally, see FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 443, D. 4 September 1904, R. 7 September 1904, p. 109. 71. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 135, D. & R. 5 September 1904, p. 108; Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 168, 10 September 1904, p. 112. 72. Turkestan was the Russian province in Central Asia which lay east of TransCaspia. It comprised what is today eastern Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrghizstan, and southern Kazakhstan. The name itself is something of a misnomer as not all the peoples within the province had Turkic origins, such as the Tajiks. Other countries also had provinces inhabited by Turkic peoples, such as the provinces of Afghan Turkestan in the north of Afghanistan and Sinkiang, or Chinese Turkestan, in China. The name of the province of Turkestan should not be confused with the modern-day republic of Turkmenistan. 73. FO 539/88 Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 328, 5 September 1904, pp. 108 and 109. 74. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 15 September 1904, p. 113, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 15 September 1904, R. 16 September 1904, p. 112; Lansdowne to Stevens No. 1, 16 September 1904, p. 113; Napier to Hardinge No. 60, 13 September 1904, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 455, D. 14 September 1904, R. 19 September 1904, both p. 113; Government of India to Brodrick, 17 September 1904, pp. 114 and 115, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 19 September 1904, p. 114; Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 483, D. 28 September 1904, R. 3 October 1904, p. 118. 75. FO 539/88 Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 353, 5 October 1904, p. 119; For more correspondence on this see IO to FO, D. & R. 17 October 1904, plus enclosure, p. 129; IO to FO, D. & R. 18 October 1904, plus enclosures, pp. 129 to 136; IO to FO, D. & R. 31 October 1904, plus enclosures, pp. 138 to 144; Government of India to Brodrick, 6 November 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 7 November 1904, R. 8 November 1904, both p. 145. 76. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 5 October 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 6 October 1904, R. 7 October 1904, both p. 120; Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 501, D. 8 October 1904, R. 12 October 1904, p. 120; See

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Notes

77.

78. 79.

80.

241

also extract from the Official Law Register of 9 October 1904, enclosed in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 502, D. 10 October 1904, R. 13 October 1904, both p. 121; Government of India to Brodrick, 18 October 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 18 October 1904, both on p. 136. FO 539/88 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 166, D. & R. 29 October 1904, p. 137. Hardinge ended by stating that Napier’s full report would be sent in the next bag. Napier’s report is full of detail, yet the synopsis of the position that Hardinge gave on 29 October is a fair one. The report of 9 November 1904 is found in Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 579, D. 10 November 1904, R. 14 November 1904, on pp. 150 to 169 incl. FO 539/88 Government of India to Brodrick, 3 November 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 3 November 1904, both p. 144. FO 539/88 Stevens to Lansdowne No. 27, D. 20 October 1904, R. 7 November 1904, pp. 144 and 145; FO 539/88 Grant-Duff (Tehran) to Lansdowne No. 128, D. & R. 11 November 1904, p. 149; Stevens to Lansdowne No. 29, D. 15 November 1904, R. 28 November 1904, p. 170 and 171; Government of India to Brodrick, 26 November 1904, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 28 November 1904, p. 171; Bodleian Library, MS Rumbold Dep 12, Horace Rumbold (British Agency Cairo) to his father, 27 November 1904, fol. 36. Churchill College Cambridge Esher Papers, ESHR 10/34, Correspondence with Sir George Clarke 1904, Vol. II, Clarke to Esher, 18 November 1904. Beryl J.Williams, ‘The Strategic Background’, p. 363.

3 British Strategic Considerations and the Committee of Imperial Defence, 1903–05 1. T.R. Moreman, ‘The British and Indian Armies and North-West Frontier Warfare, 1849–1914’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 20, No. 1, January 1992, p. 44.; J.G. Elliot, The Frontier: 1839–1947: The Study of the North-West Frontier of India (London, 1968) 2. IOLR. Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/162 Part II, Curzon to Hamilton, 29 January 1903, p. 22. The fine was levied in October 1902; Viscount Fincastle, VC and P.C. Eliot-Lockhart, A Frontier Campaign (London, 1898). 3. FO 539/87 Further Correspondence Respecting the Traffic in Arms in the Persian Gulf 1903, Colonel Yate to the Government of India, 2 May 1902, p. 9, enclosed in Government of India to Hamilton, 29 January 1903, enclosed in turn in IO to FO, D. 25 February 1903, R. 26 February 1903, p. 6.

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4. FO 539/87 Lieutenant Colonel Kemball (Bushire) to Government of India, 4 April 1902, p. 12, enclosed in Government of India to Hamilton, 29 January 1903, p. 6, enclosed in turn in IO to FO, D. 25 February 1903, R. 26 February 1903, p. 6. 5. FO 539/87 Colonel Yate to Government of India, 16 July 1902, p. 25, and extract of paragraph 1 from the diary of Sardar Muhammad Rafiq Khan, Native Assistant Chaman, dated 5 July 1902, also p. 25, enclosed in Government of India to Hamilton, 29 January 1903, p. 6, enclosed in turn in IO to FO, D. 25 February 1903, R. 26 February 1903, p. 6; Mr Kennedy to Major Cox, 16 August 1899, p. 125, enclosed in Admiralty to Foreign Office, D. 18 November 1903, R. 21 November 1903, p. 119. From this it appears that Mr Kennedy was an Admiralty official working in Bombay in 1899. FO 60/687 Extract from the Diary of the Political residency in the Persian Gulf for the Week Ending 8 April 1904, Bunder Abbas, entry for 28 March 1904, unfolioed. 6. R.M. Burrell, ‘Arms and Afghans in Makran: An Episode in Anglo-Persian Relations 1905–1912’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. 49, 1986 and T.R. Moreman, ‘The Arms Trade and the North-West Frontier Pathan Tribes, 1890–1914’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1994. 7. IOLR. Kilbracken Papers MSS Eur F 102/21 Curzon to Godley, 20 May 1903, fol. 80. For the origins of the Militia, see Thomas D Farrell, ‘The Founding of the North-West Frontier Militias’, Asian Affairs – The Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. 59, New Series Vol. III, Part 2, June 1972, pp. 165–78. For the Militia in Waziristan, see Major General A. le G. Jacob, ‘Waziristan’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XIV, Part III, 1927, pp. 244, 245. 8. British Library Balfour MSS 49725 Roberts to Balfour, 19 July 1904, fol.s 78 verso and 79 recto. 9. IOLR. Kitchener Papers MSS Eur D 686/17 Roberts to Kitchener, 5 March 1903, fol. 3. See also PRO 30/57/28, Paper II 6, Roberts to Kitchener, 27 March 1903, fol. 20 verso. For this in Waziristan, see ‘Waziristan’ by Jacob, pp. 250 and 257; PRO 30/57/28 Roberts to Kitchener, 13 April 1904, fol. 21 verso; PRO 30/57/28 Paper II 13, Roberts to Kitchener, 4 June 1903; 10. PRO 30/57/30 ‘Note on the Military Policy of India’, 19 July 1905, by Kitchener, pp. 23–25. 11. British Library Sydenham MSS 50836, Note by Clarke on ‘Our Relations with Afghanistan’, 6 August 1904; British Library Balfour MSS 49702 Clarke’s notes on ‘Summary of Lord Kitchener’s Minute (Secret of 19 July 1905) on the Military Policy of India’, fol.s 108ff.

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12. Cab 38/2/12 ‘Memorandum on the Defence of India’ prepared for the CID by the Intelligence Department, WO, 10 March 1903; Cab 38/2/18 ‘Explanatory Notes on the “Memorandum on the Defence of India”, 10 March, 1903’, Intelligence Department, WO, 28 March 1903. 13. Cab 38/2/18 p. 9. 14. Cab 38/2/35 ‘Second Instalment of Draft Conclusions on Indian Defence by Mr. Balfour, Dealing Chiefly with Seistan’, 20 May 1903. The accord was signed in which ‘Persia has bound herself to Russia not to construct railways herself, or to allow them to be constructed by others, until 1910’. Ibid., p. 4. 15. Cab 38/2/37 ‘Additional Troops Required by the Field Army in India, in order that Russia may be met in slightly superior force in the vicinity of Kabul and Kandahar’, Intelligence Department, WO, 23 May 1903. 16. Ibid., p. 1, paragraphs 2 and 3. Reference is made here to Cab 38/2/22 ‘Diary of Movements of Russian and British Forces in Afghanistan’. 17. Cab 38/3/45 ‘Defence of India. I. – Estimated maximum force which Russia could assemble in the vicinity of Kabul and Kandahar within one year. II. – Additional British troops required by the field army in India in order that Russia may be opposed in slightly superior strength.’ Intelligence Department, WO, 13 June 1903. 18. Cab 38/7/126 ‘Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army in India and the Preparation of the Army in India for War’, March 1904. 19. British Library Sydenham Papers Add. MSS 50836 ‘Lord Kitchener’s Scheme for Organizing Nine Divisions. Notes on the Discussion of 8 July 1904’, by Clarke, dated 9 July 1904, fol. 91. Clarke argued along the same lines in Churchill College Cambridge Esher Papers ESHR 10/33, Clarke to Esher, 31 May 1904; PRO 30/67/21 Midleton Papers, Brodrick to Kitchener, 11 November 1904, fol. 1124. 20. Cab 38/8/26 ‘The Afghanistan Problem’ 20 March 1905 by Clarke. 21. Churchill College Cambridge Esher Papers ESHR 10/37 Clarke to Esher, 11 September 1905. Clarke talks of the Durand Line cutting across tribal boundaries. A good example of this is the Mohmand territory which is bisected by the line. For a map, see J.G. Elliot, The Frontier, map facing p. 71. See also Victoria Schofield, Every Rock. Every Hill: A Plain Tale of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan (London, 1987), p. 132. 22. British Library Balfour MSS 49702. The critique is dated 29 September 1905 by Clarke, fol.s 108 ff. It was sent to Balfour on 14 October 1905, see covering note, fol.s 104 to 107. 23. British Library Balfour MSS 49725, Balfour to Roberts, 20 November 1905, fol. 248; Zara Steiner, Britain and the Origins of the First World War (London, 1977), pp. 160–63. See also J.A. Thompson and Arthur Mejia (eds)

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24.

25.

26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

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Edwardian Conservatism: Five Studies in Adaptation (Kent, 1988), chapter on Roberts, pp. 61–72. Cab 38/2/18 ‘Explanatory Notes on the “Memorandum on the Defence of India”, Dated the 10th March, 1903’, Intelligence Department, WO, 28 March 1903; Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876–1907, Chapter 6. For the Kabul–Kandahar march by Roberts in the Second Afghan War see J.H. Anderson, The Afghan War 1878–1880 (London 1905), pp. 49–55; D.S. Richards, The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars (London, 1990), pp. 105–9; Lord Roberts, Forty-One Years in India (London, 1897) pp. 336–61; Major-General J.L. Chappie and Colonel D.R. Wood (eds), ‘Kabul to Kandahar, 1880: Extracts from the Diary of Lieutenant E.A. Travers, 2nd P.W.O. Goorkhas’, The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research, Vol. 59, no number given, 1981, pp. 207–28; and Lieutenant-Colonel E.F. Chapman, ‘The March from Kabul to Kandahar in August and the Battle of The 1st September, 1880’, in the Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. XXV, No. 1, pp. 282–315. For aspects of the logistics of supply, see Anderson, The Afghan War 1878–1880, p. 51; Richards, The Savage Frontier, p. 108; Roberts, Forty-One Years in India, pp. 345–48; and Chappie and Woods, ‘Diary of Travers’, pp. 217–28. Cab 38/2/22 ‘Diary of Movements of Russian and British Forces in Afghanistan and The Maximum Force that can be Supplied by a Single Line of Railway’, by Roberts, 20 April 1903. The reason why ‘mules and pack horses’ are also at two-thirds, instead of one-third, in the calculations is that two mules or pack horses are considered to be worth one camel. This is from Ibid., pp. 8 and 9, paragraph 6. Cab 38/3/45 ‘Defence of India. I. – Estimated maximum force which Russia could assemble in the vicinity of Kabul and Kandahar within one year. II. – Additional British troops required by the field army in India in order that Russia may be opposed in slightly superior strength.’ Intelligence Department, WO, 13 June 1903, pp. 1 and 2. Cab 38/4/15 paper 42 D, Government of India to Brodrick, No. 39 of 1904, 10 March 1904. Cab 38/4/23 Minutes of 37th Meeting, 30 March 1904, pp. 1 and 2. Cab 38/7/126 ‘Scheme for the Redistribution of the Army in India and the Preparation of the Army in India for War’, March 1904, pp. 135, 156, 161–64. Cab 38/5/63 ‘Memorandum by the General Staff Embodying Information Regarding the Second Afghan War’, General Staff, WO, June 20th 1904, pp. 1–6. Consideration of contemporary sources would have been profitable, too, notably Samuel Spence Parkyn’s book Transport in Southern Afghanistan Between Sukkur and Quetta, 1878–1880, published in 1882. Parkyn sets out

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31.

32.

33. 34. 35.

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on pp. 3–38 a number of problems encountered. Among them were that animals were collected without regard to their condition. Many animals were unfit for work and many of those charged with looking after them were ignorant of how to treat them. The effect was that many animals were overworked in the heat, overladen or incorrectly loaded, so they quickly got sore backs and were unable to work further. During the hot season, from May to October, animals could only be worked for an even more limited time than usual before needing rest. There was also a period of time required for resting after animals had eaten before they could work. There was little fodder or fit drinking water on the route Parkyn took. The consequence was that the fodder the animals were supposed to be transporting was often eaten. The supply situation for the frontline was also compounded by the lack of carts. There were problems in the supply train, too. Often the train would break up and Parkyn reports in several places that there was a lack of an escort. Undefended, the stores and animals were open to theft, both from the inhabitants of the area through which the train was passing and from the people looking after the animals who had not been paid. Many took animals and stores away with them and simply deserted. Unattended animals would also roam. On one leg of the journey, the losses were 50 per cent. The problem was made still worse by different regiments and trains taking each other’s animals, either by accident or design. British Library Sydenham Papers Add. MSS 50836 ‘Statement as to present position of Indian transport asked for by the P.M.’ Sent to Balfour 18 August 1904. There is no actual date as to when the statement was written, though it can only be a few days before it was sent to Balfour as Clarke was usually quite prompt in these matters. This is on fol.s 101 and 102. Cab 38/6/91 ‘Supplies in Afghanistan – Memorandum by Earl Roberts’, 26 August 1904. A typescript draft of this paper can be found in IOLR Kitchener/Birdwood Papers MSS Eur D 686/43. British Library Balfour MSS 49701, Roberts to Clarke, 10 January 1905, fol.s 21 recto to 22 recto; PRO 30/57/28 Roberts to Kitchener, 5 January 1905, fol. 137; Churchill College Cambridge Esher Papers ESHR 10/35, Clarke to Esher, 28 March 1905, where it became clear that Roberts was opposed to Kitchener. British Library Balfour MSS 49700 Clarke to Balfour, 23 September 1904, fol. 151 verso; Clarke to Balfour, 19 November 1904, fol.s 206 verso and 207 verso. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/27 Telegrams from the Curzon Viceroyalty, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 22 April 1905, fol. 126. Cab 38/9/37 ‘Transport Resources of India’, Telegram from the Viceroy, 3 May 1905, fol. 127.

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36. Cab 38/9/37 ‘Transport Resources of India – Memorandum by Lord Roberts’ 6 May 1905. 37. Cab 38/9/42 ‘Transport Resources of India and Supplies in Afghanistan’ General Staff, WO, 15 May 1905. They are commenting on papers Cab 38/6/91 and Cab 38/9/37. 38. Ibid., pp. 1–5. The memorandum argued that bullock carts could be used due to their apparent practicability during the Chitral expedition. Qualification has to be made regarding pack transport in Chitral. The roads to Chitral fell into three parts: Beyond the Swat the road runs through the territories of the Khan of Dir, north and east to Sadu, an obscure village thirty-five miles from Malakand. This marks the end of the first section, and further than this wheeled traffic cannot go. The road now becomes a camel track ... to Dir itself, some fifty miles from Sadu. Beyond Dir camels cannot proceed, and here begins the third section – a path practicable only for mules, and about sixty miles long. This comes from Winston S. Churchill, The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War (London, 1898), p. 16. A map clearly showing these sections can be seen in Captain H.L. Nevill, North-West Frontier: British and Indian Army Campaigns on the North-West Frontier of India. 1849–1908 (London, 1912), p. 202. Bullock carts were also not practical in the Malakand. Fincastle and Lockhart wrote on pp. 190–91 of A Frontier Campaign: On all frontier expeditions, the Indian Commisariat Transport Department has many difficulties to contend with. To fully appreciate these, it must be remembered that seldom if ever can wheeled transport be employed, owing to the entire absence of roads, and that all the supplies consumed by a force in the field have to be carried with it, or to it, on pack animals. 39. Cab 38/9/46 ‘Suggestions as to the basis for the calculation of the required transport of an Army operating in Afghanistan’, by Clarke, 5 June 1905. This is preceded by a note by Clarke of 28 June 1905. 40. The route which would not be closed during the year was the Bolan Pass from Quetta in the south. The other three main passes were the Kohat Pass along the Kurram Valley, the Khyber Pass and the Malakand Pass. See Schofield, Every Rock. Every Hill, Chapter 2. 41. Cab 38/9/46 pp. 1–6. This is the introductory note of 28 June 1905. 42. Ibid., pp. 6, 7. This seems more scientifically based than Kitchener’s more linear calculations. For a good example of this, see PRO 30/57/31 ‘Plan for Supply in Afghan Campaign’, Paper BB 72, fol. 184.

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43. Ibid., pp. 5, 8. There are other calculations. These are summarised on p. 5 and the cases are presented on pp. 9–12. Clarke continued making his point with Cab 38/10/84 ‘Suggestions as to a basis for the calculation of the required transport of an Army operating in Afghanistan’, by Clarke, 20 November 1905.

4 The Dane Mission to Kabul and the Treaty of the Mole 1. D.P. Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876–1907: A Study in Diplomatic Relations (University of Queensland Press, 1963), pp. 165–68; Ludwig Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923: A Diplomatic History (University of California Press, 1967), Chapter 3. 2. University of Leeds Brotherton Library, Parliamentary Papers 1881, Vol. LXX )Bluebook Accounts and Papers – Afghanistan and Mysore). Lyall to Stewart (Commanding forces in Northern and Eastern Afghanistan), 20 July 1880, fol.s 75 to 78, and suggested communication sent to Abdur Rahman Khan, merely dated July 1880, fol. 78, enclosed in Government of India to Hartington (Secretary of State for India), 20 July 1880. Past agreements with Afghanistan can be found in Cab 37/75/63, Circulated by Brodrick, of 6 April 1905. 3. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 40 and 41. 4. Cab 37/72/125 ‘Heads of instructions for Envoy to the Amir’, by Brodrick, 13 October 1904. Aide-Memoire for Sir Hugh Barnes by Curzon, 5 October 1904. 5. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/138 Part II, Curzon to the King, 21 January 1904, p. 113. 6. Cab 37/72/125 Ampthill to Brodrick, Letters of 9 October 1904 and 12 October 1904, pp. 9 and 10. See also Adamec, pp. 41 and 42. 7. Cab 37/72/125 Brodrick to Balfour, 8 October 1904, pp. 10 and 11. 8. Ibid., Balfour to Brodrick, 11 October 1904, pp. 11–13. 9. Cab 37/72/129 ‘Final Instructions to Envoy and Covering Despatch to Viceroy’, 28 October 1904, by Brodrick, fol. 413; also ‘Covering despatch on Relations with Afghanistan’ by Brodrick, 21 October 1904, fol.s 410 to 412; PRO 30/57/31 Paper BB 16, Brodrick to Ampthill, 28 October 1904, fol. 41. 10. Cab 37/72/129 Aide-Memoire for Mr. Dane, 21 October 1904, paragraph 7, p. 2. 11. FO 539/90 Doc. 7, IO to FO, D. 12 January 1905, R. 13 January 1905, p. 6; FO 539/90 Inclosure No. 1 in Doc. 7, Government of India to Brodrick, 15

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November 1904, pp. 6 and 7; Inclosure No. 2 in Doc. 7, Draft of Definitive Treaty, p. 8; Though written later, the following throws some light on Afghan tribal policy: IOLR L/MIL/17/14/15/2 Final Report on Afghanistan by Malik Talib Mehdi Khan, 1914, p. 8 on the Afghan attitude towards the frontier tribes; FO 539/90 Inclosure No. 2 in Doc. 7, Draft of Subsidiary Agreement, pp. 9 and 10. 12. See Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, p. 49. The member of the Mission, besides Dane, were Henry Dobbs, Secretary; H.A. Grant, in charge of frontier matters and mission accounts; W. Malleson and Captain Brooke, in charge of military matters; Major Norman, Camp Commandant; Captain Turnball, physician, and his medical assistant; Khan Bahadur Maula Bakhsh, translator; Rai Bahadur Arbab Muhammad Azam Khan, Mohmand. The Amir’s Council consisted of Sardar Nasrullah Khan, Sardar Abdul Quddus Khan, Sardar Mohammad Asif Khan, Loinab Kushdil Khan, Muhammad Husayn Khan, and Muhammad Sulayman Khan. This list comes from Adamec, p. 220. 13. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 49 to 51. 14. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 51–53; FO 539/90 Dane to Government of India, 23 December 1904, p. 29, enclosing ‘Memorandum [by Dane] of some of the Matters for the Consideration of His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan*. Written between 20 and 23 December 1904, pp. 29 and 30. Both enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 3 February 1905, p. 21. The Amir’s comparison with Japan which Dane alluded to was taken from ‘Translation of His Highness the Ameer’s Memorandum without Date or Signature’ (Received 18 December 1904). He complained that the British had underestimated ‘the population of my nation’ and believed that his co-religionists would rise up against the Russians in the event of a war. Moreover, the Amir claimed his men to be better than the Russians, arguing that: ‘I consider one of my men equal to two foreigners in any place.’ In such an instance the Amir wanted to attack Russia while she was engaged with Japan, saying, ‘there is no better opportunity than this ... to turn her out of Asia, if our two Governments became allied. If we lose time and wait, when again shall we find ourselves so strong and her so weak?’ The Amir also declared that he would declare a jihad which would involve Turkey and the whole Islamic World. This is in FO 539/90, pp. 30 to 35. The Amir also got information from outside Afghanistan which would have reinforced his view that his country, like Japan, could beat Russia. One such example is: FO 181/835 ‘Translation of a News-letter from Abdulla Khan, the Afghan Agent at Meshed, dated 9 Zikada 1322 AH (15 January 1905), forming an enclosure to the Amir’s letter of the 19th March 1905.’ Fol.s 51 verso to 53 recto.

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15.

16.

17. 18. 19. 20.

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Moreover, the Amir’s resolve on this issue would also be strengthened by his advisors at Court. An example of this was Abdul Quddus’ declaration, made ‘with considerable excitement’, that the Turcomans in Russian Central Asia were ‘about to rise’. This comes from FO 181/835 ‘Memorandum of the Business Connected with the Signature of the Treaty by His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan and Mr. Dane’ on 21 March 1905. See fol. 54. See also Asghar H. Bilgrami, Afghanistan and British India 1793–1907: A Study in Foreign Relations (Delhi 1972), pp. 256, 257; and Dilks, Curzon in India Vol. II (London 1970), pp. 151, 160, 161, 162, 165. On p. 162 he writes on the feeling in Asia: ‘The thrill and the lesson of victory over a white foe were experienced everywhere.’ On p. 165 he shows how this affected the negotiations: ‘Curzon too had surmised that each Russian defeat increased Habibullah’s intractability.’ FO 539/90 Dane to Government of India, 24 December 1904, p. 35, enclosing ‘Memorandum [By Dane] of the Subjects Discussed between His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and the Government of India’ on 22 December 1904, pp. 36 to 40; Dane to Government of India, 28 December 1904, p. 41 enclosing ‘Translation of His Highness the Ameer’s Memorandum, Without Date or Signature (Received 26 December 1904)’, pp. 42 to 44. This was reported to the IO in Government of India to Brodrick, 2 January 1905, pp. 40 and 41; ‘Pro-Memoriâ Note for His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan’, 27 December 1904, pp. 44 and 45, enclosed in Dane to Government of India, 28 December 1904, p. 41. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, p. 54; FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 6 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 9 January 1905, both p. 2. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 2 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, 3 January 1905, pp. 1 and 2. IOLR Birdwood/Kitchener Papers MSS Eur D 686/45, Malleson to Kitchener, 6 January 1905, pp. 1 to 3. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 7 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 9 January 1905, p. 2. FO 539/90 Lieutenant-Colonel Minchin [Meshed] to Government of India, 5 November 1904 and same to same, 22 November 1904, both enclosed in IO to FO, D. 9 January 1905, R. 10 January 1905, all on p. 3. Russian attempts at interference in Afghanistan by direct communications were reported by Dane in Dane to Government of India, 28 December 1904, pp. 22 to 26, enclosing Tcherkasoff [First assistant of the Political Agency in Bokhara] to the Amir, Bokhara, 21 October/3 November 1904, pp. 26 to 27; Tcherkasoff to Captain Abdul Mansur Khan [The Hakim of Kila Bar

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21. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire Panja], Bokhara, 16/29 August 1904, p. 27; Tcherkasoff to Brigadier Haji Gul Khan [Governor of Badakhshan], Bokhara, 16/29 August 1904, p. 28. Bokhara borders part of Afghanistan in the North. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 9 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 10 January 1905, pp. 3 and 4. IOLR L/P&S/10/18 Telegram from Viceroy (to Brodrick), 9 January 1905, labelled ‘Proposals from Amir’, fol 411. See also Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 55, 56. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 56, 57. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 10 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 11 January 1905, both p. 5. A telegram in the same sense, but worded differently, can be found in IOLR LP&S/10/18 Telegram from Viceroy, 10 January 1905, fol. 410. IOLR Birdwood/Kitchener Papers MSS Eur D 686/45 Malleson to Kitchener, 10 January 1905, p. 1. Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 57, 58; FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 11 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 12 January 1905, pp. 5 and 6. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/136 Part II Curzon to the King, 11 January 1905, p. 121. FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 20 January 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 23 January 1905, R. 24 January 1905, p. 17; Government of India to Brodrick, 23 January 1905, pp. 18 and 19, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 23 January 1905, R. 24 January 1905, p. 18. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 2 February 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 3 February 1905, both p. 21. See also IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/162 Part II, Curzon to Brodrick, 7 November 1903, p. 399. FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 3 February 1905, pp. 50 and 51, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 6 February 1905, p. 50. A copy of this is in IOLR L/P&S/10/18, fol. 343; IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/136 Part I, The King to Curzon, 3 February 1905, p. 60. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 6 February 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 6 February 1905, both p. 51. Another copy exists in Cab 37/74/25, Viceroy to Secretary of State, 6 February 1905, reports telegram from Dane of 20 January 1905; FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 8 February 1905, pp. 52 and 53, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 8 February 1905, p. 51. This is also in Cab 37/74/26. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 9 February 1905, pp. 53 to 55, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 10 February 1905, p. 53. See also a slightly different version of the same telegram in Cab 37/74/27, pp. 1 and 2.

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33. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 10 February 1905, pp. 55 and 56, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 10 February 1905, p. 55. See also Cab 37/74/27, pp. 2 and 3. 34. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 10 February 1905, pp. 56 to 58, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 10 February 1905, p. 55. See also Cab 37/74/27, pp. 3 to 5. 35. FO 539/90 Lansdowne to Sir Charles Hardinge No. 55, 15 February 1905, p. 59. A copy of this is also available in FO 181/835, fol. 131. Lansdowne’s argument that the mission was there due to the change of Amir (four years after his accession) seems unlikely. It is more likely to have been the result of increased fear concerning Russian activity in Central Asia in 1903 and 1904. 36. FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 16 February 1905, pp. 64 and 65, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 17 February 1905, p. 64. A different version of the same telegram can be found in Cab 37/74/33. See also drafts from these in Cab 37/74/32 as Draft Telegram to Viceroy (proposed by the Prime Minister). 37. Cab 37/74/29 Memorandum entitled ‘Afghanistan’ by Brodrick, 14 February 1905, pp. 1 to 3; Note by Roberts of 13 February 1905, pp. 4 and 5; and Note by Godley of 14 February 1905, pp. 5 to 7. 38. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 18 February 1905, pp. 67 to 69, enclosed in IO to FO, D. & R. 20 February 1905, p. 66. 39. FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 21 February 1905, pp. 69 to 71, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 22 February 1905, p. 69. A draft of this telegram exists in Cab 37/75/36 – Draft Telegram to Viceroy – 20 February 1905, on pp. 1 and 2. A copy of Curzon’s telegram of 18 February 1905 to the Secretary of State can be found on pp. 3 and 4. 40. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 22 February 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 22 February 1905, R. 23 February 1905, both p. 72; Government of India to Brodrick, 24 February 1905, pp. 73 and 74, enclosed in IO to FO, D and R. 24 February 1905, p. 72. Dane’s original telegram is printed in the mission correspondence in FO 181/857/1 – Dane to the Foreign Secretary Calcutta, telegram No. 216 K, dated 22 February 1905, on pp. 118 and 119. 41. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 27 February 1905, pp. 74 to 76, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 28 February 1905, p. 74. Brodrick’s response to this was to assert that he had consulted with India Office advisors and felt that his view of the Amir’s treaty was sound. Moreover, he informed Curzon that His Majesty’s Government would ‘accept full responsibility’. See FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 2 March 1905, pp. 77 and 78, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 4 March 1905, p. 77.

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42. FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 1 March 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 2 March 1905, R. 3 March 1905, both p. 76. See also FO 181/835 Translation of a letter from Brigadier Haji Gul Mahammad Khan, Governor of Badakshan, to His Highness the Amir of Afghanistan, dated 4 Zihijja 1322 AH. (Corresponding to 9 February 1905), fol.s 49 verso and 50 recto. New developments on the issue of Yangi Kila came about after the treaty had been signed and Dane had returned to India. The Amir did not wish to lay claim to the island. There was, however, no absolute right of possession as the river that formed the border moved in tracts to the north and the south of the island. At that time, the tract ran to the north of the island. In May the Foreign Office reported that: ‘It appears that the Russians have withdrawn from the debatable tract on the Oxus, and that the Amir does not press for a decision on this question.’ Moreover, the Foreign Office still regarded any attempts at direct communications on this or any other political issue ‘as of an entirely irregular kind’. Given the Amir’s views on this question the India Office believed, ‘that it would not be desirable to raise either of these questions formally with the Russian Government at the present time’. See FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 20 April 1905, pp. 96 and 97, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 17 May 1905, R. 19 May 1905, p. 96; FO to IO, (by E Gorst), 27 May 1905, pp. 97 and 98; IO to FO D, 6 June 1905, R. 7 June 1905, p. 100; Lansdowne to Sir Charles Hardinge (No. 191), 21 June 1905, p. 100. Finally, see FO 181/857/1 Dane to Foreign Secretary Calcutta, telegram No. 216 K, 22 February 1905, fol.s 131 verso and 132 recto, and Foreign Secretary Calcutta to Dane, telegram No. 727 P., 27 February 1905, fol. 132 recto. 43. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 7 March 1905, pp. 78 and 79, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 8 March 1905, p. 78; FO 539/90 Brodrick to Government of India, 8 March 1905, p. 80, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 9 March 1905, R. 10 March 1905, p. 79. 44. FO 539/90 Lansdowne to Sir Charles Hardinge, No. 88, 8 March 1905, p. 79. A copy of this also exists in FO 181/857/1, fol.s 86 and 87. 45. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 18 March 1905, pp. 83 and 84, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 20 March 1905, p. 83. 46. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 20 March 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 21 March 1905, both p. 84; FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 21 March 1905, p. 85, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 21 March 1905, p. 84: Government of India to Brodrick, 25 March 1905, pp. 85 to 86, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 25 March 1905, p. 85; FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 27 March 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 28 March 1905, both p. 89.

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253

47. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 28 March 1905, pp. 90 and 91, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 29 March 1905, p. 90. See also FO 181/835 telegram No. 282 K, dated Landi Kotal, the 23 March 1905, from Dane to Foreign Secretary Calcutta from 20 March, fol. 132; and telegram No. 292 K, dated Landi Kotal, the 26 March 1905, from same to same from 23 March, fol. 133. See also Adamec, pp. 61 and 62; FO 181/835, fol. 47; Sir Percy Sykes, A History of Afghanistan Vol. II (London 1940), pp. 221, 222; Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, p. 61. 48. FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 31 March 1905, p. 93, enclosed in IO to F.O, D. and R. 1 April 1905, p. 92. The text of the Treaty is in Appendix 3. See also ‘Treaty’ enclosed in IO to FO, D. 17 April 1905, R. 18 April 1905, both p. 95. This copy was also sent to the Director of Military Operations; British Library Balfour MSS 49721 ‘extracts from Curzon’, letter of 30 March 1905, fol. 138. He was referring to the treaty at Lhasa secured by Younghusband in 1904, which was overturned by the Home Government which substituted it with a less exacting treaty; IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/136 Part II, Curzon to the King, Calcutta, 29 March 1905, p. 128; FO 539/90 Government of India to Brodrick, 4 April 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 10 April 1905, both p. 44. And Government of India to Brodrick, 10 April 1905, enclosed in IO to FO, 12 April 1905, R. 13 April 1905, both p. 94. 49. Cab 37/76/67 ‘Final Report on the Mission to Kabul’ From Dane, Foreign Secretary representing the Government of India in Afghanistan, to S.M. Fraser, Officiating Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, dated Simla 15 April 1905; Cab 37/76/77 Government of India to Brodrick, No. 76 of 1905, 4 May 1905; Cab 37/76/76 Government of India to Brodrick, No. 75 of 1905, pp. 1 and 2; Ibid, p. 3, which demonstrates that Curzon still believed that the Amir would have cooperated if his subsidy had been threatened. Finally, Ibid, pp. 3 to 5. 50. Dilks, Curzon in India Vol. II (London 1970), pp. 171, 172; Adamec, Afghanistan 1900–1923, pp. 63, 64; Singhal, India and Afghanistan 1876–1907, p. 172; Sykes, A History of Afghanistan Vol. II (London 1940), pp. 223, 224. 51. Cab 37/76/76 pp. 5 and 6; Bodleian Library Selborne Papers Vol. 2, Brodrick to Selborne, 12 May 1905, pp. 3 and 4, fol.s 43 and 44; Cab 37/77/92 Paper entitled The Treaty with the Amir’, 22 May 1905, by Brodrick. His paper comprises p. 1 and Curzon’s letters from p. 2. The second of these is an extract of the Government of India’s despatch No. 75, dated 4 May 1905. The first of these is headed ‘Viceroy’s Private and Confidential Statement’, which is undated. Also Bodleian Library Selborne Papers Vol. 2, Brodrick to Selborne, 26 May 1905, pp. 3 and 4 of the letter.

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5

Morley’s Sub-Committee and Strategic Planning 1906–07

1. Zara Steiner, ‘Great Britain and the Creation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance’, Journal of Modern History, Vol. 31 (1959), p. 33. 2. Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan 1911–1915 (Glasgow 1969), Appendix 1.1, p. 54. Though India was not mentioned in the Alliance, it was discussed in the negotiations. See G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898–1914 (London, 1927), Vol. II, Chapter XI, pp. 89ff. For the terms of the 1902 Treaty, see Appendix 4. 3. FO 262/878 A Herbert [British Minister at Darmstadt] to Lansdowne, No. 39. 29 November 1903, fol. 255; FO 181/808 JW Fenton [Reuters Telegram Co Ltd, Tientsin] to Managing Director Reuters, Communicated to the FO 8 December 1903, fol. 3; Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 6, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 25 May 1904, fol. 2; Bodleian Library Sandars Papers, MS. Eng. Hist. C. 748, Hardinge to Sandars, 21 July 1904, fol. 151; FO 181/807 Hardinge to Lansdowne No. 569, 7 November 1904; Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 6, Hardinge to Bertie, 29 September 1904, fol. 39. Such Anglophobe feeling was also exacerbated by encouragement from elsewhere. The Kaiser tried to prompt Nicolas II to further extremes: ‘The Indian frontier and Afghanistan are the only part of the Globe where the whole of her battlefleets are of no avail to England and where their guns are powerless to meet the invader.’ From, William II (‘Willy’) to Nicolas II (‘Nicky’), 17 November 1904, letter number XL in The Kaiser’s letters to the Tsar, The Willy-Nicky Correspondence, (ed N.F. Grant, London, 1920), p. 148. See also Gooch, Plans of War, p. 198. 4. Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 6, Hardinge to Prince Louis of Battenburg, 17 December 1904, fol. 56. 5. FO 46/624 Lansdowne to Hardinge No. 45, 8 June 1904, fol. 391. 6. FO 800/141 Hardinge to Lansdowne, 14 December 1904, fol. 99. 7. Hardinge Papers Vol. 5, Hardinge’s Diary, 12 November 1904, fol. 12. 8. Cab 37/72/138 Paper entitled ‘North Sea Incident’, 3 November 1904. 9. Cited in Ian Nish, The Anglo–Japanese Alliance (London, 1966). Originally from British Library Balfour MSS 49720, Balfour to Brodrick, 28 October 1903. 10. Cab 37/77/91 Lansdowne to MacDonald, No. 88, 20 May 1905, and Gooch and Temperley, British Documents ,Vol. IV, MacDonald to Lansdowne, No. 170, 8 July 1905, pp. 144, 145. 11. See Nish, The Anglo–Japanese Alliance, p. 325.

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12. Ibid. Nish cites this as coming from FO Japan 673, Lansdowne to MacDonald, 14 July 1905. For the terms of the 1905 Treaty, see Appendix 5. 13. FO 800/141 Hardinge to Lansdowne, 16 August 1905, fol. 190. 14. British Library Balfour MSS 49747, Balfour to Mr. Cooper, 11 September 1904, fol.s 192 to 194 inclusive. 15. FO 262/878 Intelligence Division Memorandum, No. 105, unsigned, 1 July 1903, fol. 37, enclosed in Hardinge to MacDonald, 7 August 1903, fol. 35; See also FO 262/877 FC Campbell to MacDonald No. 37, 9 April 1903, pp. 249 and 250; and FO 262/878 Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Director General of Military Intelligence, 18 July 1903, fol. 48 recto and verso. 16. IOLR Kilbracken Papers MSS Eur F 102/23 Ampthill to Godley, 31 May 1904, fol.s 35 verso and 36 recto. 17. National Library of Scotland, Minto Papers MS 12764 Part I, Kitchener to Minto, 1 March 1906, p. 134A; IOLR L/MIL/5/711 Memorandum regarding the Japanese, uncredited and undated, from Simla, pp. 3 and 4. 18. Cab 38/11/11 CID 85th Meeting, 9 March 1906, p. 2. This view was echoed in Parliament, see Hansard Vol. CLIII Fourth Series Army Estimates, 1906–7, columns 1460, 1464 and 1465. 19. Churchill College, Cambridge Esher Papers ESHR 10/39 Clarke to Esher, 26 September 1906; Clarke to Esher, 29 September 1906; Cab 38/12/52 ‘British Policy in relation to Afghanistan’, by Clarke, 1 October 1906; Cab 38/12/53 ‘Notes by Lord Esher on “British Policy in relation to Afghanistan” with replies by Sir George Clarke’, 10 October 1906. Esher’s Comments 7 October, Clarke’s Replies 10 October. These notes and replies are mainly elucidatory to Clarke’s earlier memorandum. 20. British Library Kilbracken MSS 44902 Morley to Godley, 10 January 1907, fol.s 115 recto and verso. 21. Cab 16/2 ‘Report and Minutes of Evidence of the Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence Appointed by the Prime Minister to Consider the Military Requirements of the Empire as Affected by the Defence of India 1907.’ The terms of reference came from IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/37 ‘Questions which require consideration by the Sub-Committee appointed by the Prime Minister to report upon the Military requirements of India and the constant demands on the military forces at home.’ Draft by Morley, undated; also Cab 16/2 Terms of Reference, fol. 2. The membership of the Sub-Committee was: Morley (Chair), Grey, Haldane, Asquith, Lord Esher, General Lyttelton, Major-General Ewart, Lieutenant-General Sir John French and Sir George Clarke. Captain A.B. Lindsay was the Secretary. 22. Cab 16/2 pp. 1 to 3.

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256 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., pp. 3 to 5. Ibid., pp. 5 to 7 and 18 and 19. Ibid., pp. 9 and 10. Ibid., pp. 20 to 24. Ibid., pp. 10 to 13. Ibid., pp. 13 and 14. Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., pp. 14 and 15. Ibid., pp. 15 to 17. Ibid., pp. 25 to 38 inclusive. Ibid p. 40. In Appendix II on p. 226, it states that supplies for men and animals weighed 34 tons per cavalry brigade and 114 tons for an infantry division. They were substantially less than those cited by men who had seen action in Afghanistan. Duff also refused to be drawn on the supplies which could be furnished from Kabul. See Lionel James, The Indian Frontier War. Being an Account of the Mohmund and Tirah Expeditions 1897 (London 1898), Chapters XV and XVI, pp. 144–69. Cab 16/2 pp. 39 to 44. IOLR Hirtzel Papers MSS Eur D 1090/2 Hirtzel Diary, entry for Tuesday, 22 January 1907. For a general history of the Tirah expedition, see Colonel H.D. Hutchinson, The Campaign in Tirah 1897–1898 (London, 1898). Cab 16/2 pp. 45 and 46. Cab 16/2 p. 47, questions 325 and 326. Lyttleton seems to have had in mind Clarke’s earlier Camel papers, yet strangely he did not press the point and Clarke himself did not contribute. Roberts’ march to Kandahar was also a different case in point. Roberts’ men nearly starved. They had little water and food and were saved by their coming across a flock of 4,000 sheep. Ibid., pp. 47 to 51. Ibid., pp. 51 to 56. Ibid., p. 57. Ibid., p. 58. Ibid., pp. 59 to 61. Ibid., pp. 63 to 79. Ibid., pp. 78 to 80. Ibid., pp. 80 to 83. Ibid., p. 83. Ibid., pp. 83 to 85.

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Notes 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77.

257

Ibid., pp. 86 to 88. Ibid., pp. 89 and 90. Ibid., pp. 90 to 92. Ibid., pp. 93 to 94. Ibid., pp. 94 to 96. Ibid., pp. 96 to 99. The text of this memorandum is in Cab 16/2, but there is a copy in PRO 30/57/28 Paper II 50, fol.s 176ff. Cab 16/2 pp. 101 to 106, quote from p. 105. Ibid., pp. 107 to 109. Ibid., pp. 109 and 110. Ibid., pp. 110 to 112. Ibid., pp. 113 to 118, quote from p. 117. This contrasts greatly with the views of Duff, Curzon and Hamilton. Ibid., pp. 119 to 122. National Library of Scotland Minto Papers MS 12776 Part I, Roberts to Minto, 31 January 1907, pp. 114d to 126. It is likely Minto passed this on to Kitchener which is why it is in the Kitchener Papers PRO 30/57/28 Paper II 50. Cab 16/2 pp. 123 to 127. Ibid., pp. 127 to 132. Ibid., pp. 132 to 134. Barnes reiterated his belief in the Sandeman policy in May 1927 at a meeting of the Central Asian Society in discussion after Major-General Jacobs’s paper on Waziristan. See Journal of the Central Asian Society, Vol. XIV, 1927, Part III, pp. 252–54. Cab 16/2 pp. 134 to 137. Cab 16/2 pp. 138 to 142; Baron Sydenham, My Working Life (London, 1927), pp. 200, 201. Cab 16/2 pp. 142 to 148. See also Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India (London, 1985), pp. 231–33. Cab 16/2 pp. 148 to 149. Ibid., pp. 150 to 158. Ibid., pp. 158 to 163. Scott-Moncrieff’s experiences in India can be found in Canals and Campaigns: An Engineer Officer in India 1877–1885 (Reprinted London, 1987). Cab 16/2 pp. 228 to 234. The memorandum is by Lyttleton, the Chief of the General Staff. Ibid., pp. 165 to 169. Ibid., pp. 170 to 176. Ibid., pp. 176 to 180.

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78. Ibid., pp. 180 to 183. 79. Ibid., pp. 183 to 186. 80. Ibid. Hamilton’s memorandum of 18 February, p. 239, and French’s question 1428 in the 6th Meeting is on p. 187. 81. Ibid., pp. 188 to 192. 82. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/2 Morley to Minto, 24 January 1907, fol. 19; Morley to Minto, 28 March 1907, fol. 64; IOLR MSS Eur D 1090/1 Hirtzel Diary, Entry for 12 December 1905; and MSS Eur D 1090/2 Hirtzel Diary, Entry for 19 March 1907. 83. Cab 16/2 pp. i to xiv; Sydenham, My Working Life, p. 201. 84. WO 33/419 ‘Report on the Military Resources of the Russian Empire’, WO, 1907. Beryl Williams puts this memorandum in early 1907. See Beryl J.Williams, ‘The Strategic Background’, pp. 364–66, 371, 372. 85. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/37 Morley to Minto, Military (Secret) No. 50, 20 March 1908, ‘Bearing of the Anglo–Russian Convention on Indian Military Expenditure’, M. 4048 of 1908.

6

A Diplomatic Defence of India

1. Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Vol. IV, Doc. 181 (a), Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, FO China 1747 (No. 330) 17 November 1903, p. 183. See also Doc. 181(b), C. Hardinge to Lansdowne, FO Embassy Archives Russia 181/793, Hardinge’s conversation with Benckendorff, Windsor Castle, 22 November 1903, p. 185. 2. Ibid. Doc. 181(b), p. 185. 3. FO 65/1726 ‘Memorandum Communicated by the Russian Embassy’, 6 February 1900, fol. 32 and Scott to the Marquess of Lansdowne, D. 21 January 1903 9:10 pm, R. 10:50pm, No. 4 Telegraphic, fol. 35. See also Scott to Lansdowne, D. 6 February 1903, R. 9 February 1903, No. 31, enclosing ‘Memorandum for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, St Petersburg, 23 January/5 February 1903. The original is in Russian in FO 181/792, complete with translation. The volume is unfolioed and the original is headed in English ‘Afghanistan – Views of the Russian Government’; Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Vol. IV, Doc. 181(b), p. 185, and Doc. 182, Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, FO Embassy Archives, Russia 181/791, 25 November 1903, (No. 384 [No. 334]), Very Confidential, p. 186. 4. Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Vol. IV, Doc. 182, p. 187; Doc. 185, C. Hardinge to Lansdowne, FO Russia 1680, (No. 256), St Petersburg, D. 18 May 1904, R. 28 May 1904, p. 191.

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Notes

259

5. FO 181/857/4, Hardinge to Lansdowne, 30 May 1905, No. 350; and FO 181/857/5 Hardinge to Lansdowne, 9 September 1905, No. 536. Both volumes are unfolioed. Hardinge’s pivotal role was also brought out in Harold Nicolson, Lord Carnock (London, 1930), p. 206. 6. FO 181/842 Lansdowne to Spring-Rice, No. 384, 13 December 1905, fol.s 110 recto and verso. 7. Cab 37/68/1 ‘Proposed Agreement with Russia’, FO, Lansdowne, 1 January 1904. 8. FO 181/852 Grey to Spring-Rice, No. 427, 13 December 1905, fol.s 120 and 121. 9. Churchill College Cambridge, Spring-Rice Papers, CASR 8/1, Spring-Rice to Balfour, 2 October 1905; CASR 9/4, Spring-Rice to unknown, undated, yet is certainly October, November or December 1905. 10. Churchill College Cambridge, Spring-Rice Papers, CASR 1/11, Chirol to Spring-Rice, Peshawar, 14 December 1905, fol. 80. Chirol was also in contact with Sir Charles Hardinge and wrote to him on the build up to an agreement. From Cambridge University Library, Hardinge Papers, Vol. 7, Chirol to Hardinge, 3 October 1905, fol.s 547 recto and verso. 11. Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Vol. IV, Doc. 322, Sir Arthur Hardinge to Grey, FO 371/102, London, D. 23 December 1905, R. 3 January 1906, section concerning ‘Possible Anglo-Russian Understanding’, pp. 376 and 377. 12. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/162 Part I, Hamilton to Curzon, 6 January 1903, pp. 6 and 7; Hamilton to Curzon, 19 February 1903, pp. 39 and 40. 13. IOLR Curzon Papers MSS Eur F 111/162 Part II, Curzon to Hamilton, 12 March 1903, p. 71; Curzon to Hamilton, 19 March 1903, pp. 81 and 82. 14. Alistair Lamb, The MacMahon Line, Vol. 1 (London 1966), p. 79. Lamb refers to A.J.P. Taylor’s The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1915 (London, 1954), p. 442, in which Taylor wrote: ‘It was the Russians who changed their mood, just as the French change of mood caused the Entente of 1904.’ 15. Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, Vol. IV, Docs 204 to 217, pp. 218 to 232; Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 8, Nicolson to Hardinge, 29 July 1906, fol.s 96 to 98 verso. 16. Churchill College, Cambridge Esher Papers, ESHR 13/10, India Office 1904–10, Memorandum entitled ‘Anglo-Russian Relations’, this is undated, but forms the basis of what became Nicolson’s instructions for dealing with the Russian Government. See also Cambridge University Library, Hardinge Papers Vol. 8, Nicolson to Hardinge, 6 December 1906 fol. 176 verso; and Churchill College Cambridge, Esher Papers ESHR 13/10, Nicolson to Grey,

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260

17.

18.

19.

20.

21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

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No. 375, St Petersburg, D. 14 July R. 22 July 1907, pp. 1 to 3; Cambridge University Library, Hardinge Papers Vol. 10, Nicolson to Hardinge, 31 January 1907, fol. 66. I Reisner, ‘Anglo-Russkaya Konventsiya 1907 g. i Razdel Afganistana’ (‘The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and the Partition of Afghanistan’) Krasny Archiv, Vol. 10 (1925), p. 55. Churchill College, Cambridge Spring-Rice Papers; CASR 4/2, Spring-Rice to Hardinge, 31 January 1906, CASR 10/4, Spring-Rice to Grey, 30 January 1907; CASR 10/5, Spring-Rice to Morley, 26 April 1907; Spring-Rice to Grey, 22 May 1907; CASR 1/21 Spring-Rice to Chirol, letters of 24 May and 13 September 1907; David H. Burton, Cecil Spring-Rice: A Diplomat’s Life (London, 1990), p. 140. IOLR L/P&S/10/122, Paper 3128, ‘The Proposed Discussion with Russia of Points of Agreement Regarding Afghanistan’, by Lee Warner, 12 June 1906; Paper of 7 March 1907, fol. 132. St Anthony’s College, Oxford, Dunlop Smith Papers, ‘Dunlop-Smith: Provisional Note’, by Anthony Verrier; Martin Gilbert, Servant of India, p. 94; IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/1 Morley to Minto, 25 January 1906, fol. 27; MSS Eur D 573/7, Minto to Morley, 15 February 1906, fol.s 37 and 38; MSS Eur D 573/1, Morley to Minto, 23 March 1906, fol.s 65 and 66; MSS Eur D 573/8, Minto to Morley, 9 April 1906, fol.s 5 and 6. Churchill College Cambridge, Esher Papers, ESHR 13/10, Kitchener to Minto, 28 April 1906. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/1, Minto to Morley, 12 June 1906, fol.s 81 to 98; and John Buchan, Lord Minto (London 1925), pp. 225 to 229; MSS Eur D 573/8, Minto to Morley, 20 June 1906, fol. 101 verso. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/1, Morley to Minto, 6 July 1906, fol.s 144 to 146. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/2, Morley to Minto, 24 May 1907, fol.s 114 and 115; Morley to Minto, 11 July 1907, fol. 156. See Appendix 6. Cambridge University Library, Hardinge Papers, Vol. 9, ‘Notes dictated by the King upon His Majesty’s interview at Marienbad with M. Isvolsky’, 8 September 1907, fol.s 48 to 49. The Convention was circulated to Cabinet on 6 September 1907, see Cab 37/89/80. Mary, Countess of Minto, India: Minto and Morley (London, 1934), pp. 74–93, Chapter VII ‘The Visit of the Amir of Afghanistan’. See also John Buchan, Lord Minto (London, 1925), p. 249. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/28 Morley to Minto, 1 September 1907, fol. 160.

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Notes

261

29. IOLR Kitchener/Birdwood Papers MSS Eur D 686/41 ‘Consideration of the effect of the Anglo–Russian Convention on the Strength of the Army in India’, by Kitchener, 21 October 1907. A copy of this also exists in the Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/37. 30. Hansard Parliamentary Debates Vol. 183 Lords Debate on the Anglo–Russian Convention, 6 February 1908, Curzon’s Speech, Columns 999 to 1024. 31. Ibid. Cramer’s Speech, Columns 1024 to 1028; Fitzmaurice’s Speech, Column 1042; Lamington’s Speech, Columns 1043 to 1046. 32. Ibid. Sanderson’s Speech of February 10th, Columns 1306 to 1310. 33. Ibid. Midleton’s Speech of February 10th 1908, Columns 1311 and 1318; Lansdowne’s Speech, Columns 1323 to 1335. 34. Ibid. Crewe’s Speech, Columns 1335 to 1344. 35. Ibid. Column 1353. 36. Hansard Parliamentary Debates Vol. 184 House of Commons Debate of 17 February 1908, Columns 460 to 564. 37. National Library of Scotland Minto Papers MS 12776 Part II, Minto to Sir Arthur Nicolson, 20 February 1908, pp. 133 and 134; Countess of Minto, India: Minto and Morley, Morley to Minto, letter of 30 April 1908, p. 177. 38. Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 14, Memorandum by Hardinge, 12 June 1908, fol.s 174 to 177. 39. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/16 Minto to Morley, 1 July 1908, fol.s 58 and 59; MSS Eur D 573/3 Morley to Minto, 16 July 1908, fol.s 217; FO 371/514 Government of India to Morley, 25 July 1908, enclosed in IO to FO, D. 31 July 1908, R. 1 August 1908, both fol. 167 recto; Morley to Government of India, 30 July 1908, fol. 167 verso. 40. FO 371/514 Government of India to Morley, 5 August 1908, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 6 August 1908; IOLR MSS Eur D 573/3 Morley to Minto, 6 August 1908, fol.s 237 and 238. 41. Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 13, Hardinge to Nicolson, 15 September 1908, fol.s 260 to 263. See also Hardinge Papers Vol. 12, Nicolson to Hardinge, 9 September 1908, fol.s 58ff. 42. FO 371/514 Government of India to Morley, 21 September 1908, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 22 September 1908, fol.s 192 and 193. 43. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/3 Morley to Minto, 24 September 1908, fol.s 281 and 282. See also FO 371/514 Government of India to Morley, 3 October 1908, enclosed in IO to FO, D. and R. 5 October 1908, fol.s 219 and 220; Countess of Minto, India: Minto and Morley, Morley to Minto, 14 October 1908, p. 182. 44. FO 371/516 O’Beirne (Chargé D’Affairs at St Petersburg in Nicolson’s absence on leave) to Grey (No. 235) D. 19 May 1908, R. 25 May 1908, fol.

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262

45. 46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51. 52. 53.

54.

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Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire 341. The Jamshedi Crisis is an issue which appears to have been ignored in the literature dealing with this period. IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/16 Minto to Morley, 21 July 1908, fol. 96; Minto to Morley, 29 July 1908, fol. 107. FO 371/499 Diary of Military Attaché, Meshed, for week ending 15 August 1908, No. 33 Sarakhs Report of 5 August 1908, fol. 487 verso; Merv-Kushk Report of 8 August 1908, fol. 487 verso; Diary of Military Attaché, Meshed, for week ending 22 August 1908, No. 34, Summary of News, fol. 488 recto, and Sarakhs Report 7–14 August 1908, fol. 488 verso. FO 371/499 Diary of Military Attaché, Meshed, for week ending 29 August 1908, No. 35, Summary of News, fol. 489 recto, and Sarakhs Report 14–20 August 1908, fol. 489 National Library of Scotland Minto Papers MS 12769 Part II Minto to the Amir of Afghanistan, 2 September 1908, pp. 45 and 46; IOLR Morley Papers MSS Eur D 573/3 Morley to Minto, 10 September 1908, fol.s 264 and 265; Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 12 Nicolson to Hardinge, (Private), 24 September 1908, fol.s 65ff. FO 371/499 Diary of Military Attaché at Meshed for week ending 14 November 1908, No. 46, Summary of News, fol. 559 verso and Samarkand Report, 23–31 October 1908, fol. 560 recto. FO 371/499 Diary of Military Attaché at Meshed for week ending 21 November 1908, No. 47, Kushk Report, 6 November 1908, fol. 561 recto. This information was reported to the FO in FO 371/724 IO to FO, signed Godley, 12 January 1909, fol. 402. FO 371/724 Nicolson to Grey (No. 91), 7 February 1909, fol. 476. FO 371/725 Nicolson to Grey (No. 133), D. 25 February 1909, R. 1 March 1909, enclosing Aide-Memoire, St Petersburg, 11 (24) February 1909, fol. 17. National Library of Scotland Minto Papers MS 12634 ‘Summary of the principal events and measures of the Viceroyalty of HE The Earl of Minto Viceroy and Governor-General of India from November 1905 to July 1910 Vol. I Afghanistan, North-West Frontier, Chinese Turkestan, Gilgit Agency’ Foreign Department, Simla 1910, pp. 19 and 20; FO 371/725 Nicolson to Grey (No. 487), D. and R. 15 November 1909, fol. 190; Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 16, Nicolson to Hardinge, 17 November 1909, fol.s 187 verso ff; FO 371/725 Morley to Government of India, 10 December 1909, enclosed in IO to FO D. 14 December 1909, R. 15 December 1909, fol. 245; and Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol. 16 Nicolson to Hardinge, 16 December 1909, fol.s 196 recto ff. Cambridge University Library Hardinge Papers Vol.117 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, letters of 11 January 1911 and 8 June 1911, pp. 33 and 161,

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Notes

55. 56.

57. 58. 59.

60. 61.

62.

63.

64.

263

respectively; Hardinge to Crewe, letters of 1 December 1910 and 22 February 1911, pp. 6 and 84 to 89, respectively; Hardinge to Morley, 11 April 1911, p. 117. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 117 Part II Note by Hardinge, 30 August 1911, p. 253 enclosed in Hardinge to Crewe, 21 September 1911, pp. 248 ff. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 117 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 12 October 1911, p. 261; IOLR L/P&S/10/200 Frontier Diary by E.H.S. Clarke, 1 January 1912, pp. 5 and 6; Hardinge Papers Vol. 83 Part I Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 2 February 1912, p. 63. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 7 March 1912, pp. 16 and 17. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 27 March 1912, p. 26. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 3 April 1912, p. 30; Hardinge to Crewe, 17 April 1912, p. 34; Hardinge Papers Vol. 84 Part I Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 25 October 1912, pp. 298 and 299; Hardinge Papers Vol. 83 Part I Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 28 May 1912, p. 149; RoosKeppel to Hardinge, 22 May 1912, pp. 250 and 251. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 16 April 1912, pp. 31 and 32, 30 May 1912, p. 70, 13 June 1912, p. 81. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, letters of 24 and 30 July, pp. 104 and 107, respectively, and Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part I, Crewe to Hardinge, 15 August 1912, p. 74. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 118 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 13 October 1912, pp. 145 and 146; same to same 5 and 13 November 1912, pp. 154 and 155, respectively; Hardinge to Sydenham, 24 February 1913, p. 46, and Hardinge, My Indian Years 1910–1916 (London, 1948) pp. 80–82. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 119 Part I Crewe to Hardinge, 13 March 1913, p. 16, plus enclosure from Amir Ali of 7 March 1913, pp. 18 and 19; Crewe to Hardinge, 19 March 1913, pp. 20 and 21; Crewe to Hardinge, 3 April 1913, p. 25; Vol. 119 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 6 August 1913, p. 103; Hardinge to Crewe, 14 August 1913, pp. 106 to 108; Hardinge to Crewe, 27 August 1913, p. 115, enclosing Meston (Governor of United Provinces) to Hardinge, 25 August 1913, pp. 117 and 118; Hardinge to Holderness (Under Secretary of State for India) 11 September 1913, p. 124; Hardinge to Holderness, 6 October 1913, p. 138; Hardinge to Crewe, 17 September 1913, p. 127. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 119 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 6 March 1913, p. 16; Hardinge to Crewe, 27 March 1913, pp. 24 and 25; CUL Crewe Papers I 14/3 Minute by Hirtzel, 24 July 1913; CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 85 Part I Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, 6 March 1913, p. 86; Hardinge Papers Vol. 85

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264

65.

66. 67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

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Part II Hardinge to Roos-Keppel, 14 March 1913, p. 69; Hardinge Papers Vol. 85 Part I Roos-Keppel to Hardinge, letters of 22 March 1913 and 17 April 1913, pp. 161 and 200, respectively; IOLR L/P&S/10/200 Diary of the British Agent at Kabul, No. 110, for the week ending 15 February 1913, fol. 27; L/P&S/10/201 North-West Frontier Provincial Diary, No. 32, for the week ending 9 August 1913, fol. 357; Diary of the British Agent at Kabul, No. 135, for the week ending 6 September 1913, fol. 336 verso; Diary of the British Agent at Kabul, for the week ending 16 December 1913, fol. 250. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 119 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 4 September 1913, p. 120. Hardinge got this from Roos-Keppel, and his rendition is almost word-for-word the same. See Hardinge Papers Vol. 86 Part I RoosKeppel to Hardinge, 25 August 1913, pp. 162 and 163. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 119 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 22 October 1913, p.144. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, letters of 12 March, 6 May, 3 June, 22 July 1914, pp. 27, 49, 89 and 90, and 117, respectively. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, letters of 26 February, 4 March, and 12 March 1914, pp. 20D, 22, and 27, respectively; Also 15 April, p. 42; 22 April, p. 44; 6 May, p. 49; Hardinge to Holderness, 13 May 1914, pp. 75 and 76; Hardinge to Crewe, 20 May 1914, pp. 77 and 78; Vol. 120 Part I Crewe to Hardinge, 21 May 1914, pp. 44 and 45. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 3 June 1914, p. 88, plus enclosures from Donald, pp. 90 to 93 inclusive; Hardinge to Crewe, 11 June 1914, p. 96; Hardinge to Crewe, 2 July 1914, p. 108; Hardinge to Crewe, 30 July 1914, p. 121, plus enclosures to and from Donald, pp. 123 to 127; Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part I, Crewe to Hardinge, 21 August 1914, pp. 86 and 87; Vol. 120 Part II, Hardinge to Crewe, 8 October 1914, pp. 162 and 163. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe 13 August 1914, p. 130; Vol. 120 Part I Crewe to Hardinge, 14 August 1914, p. 82; Holderness to Hardinge, 14 August 1914, p. 84; Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 20 August 1914, p. 133; Vol. 120 Part I Crewe to Hardinge, 28 August 1914, pp. 87 and 88. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 93 Part II Hardinge to Chirol, 16 September 1914, pp. 196 and 197; Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 3 September 1914, pp. 138 and 139; Hardinge to Crewe, 17 September 1914, p. 153, enclosing O’Dwyer to Hardinge, 13 September 1914, pp. 155 and 156; Hardinge to Crewe, 23 September 1914, p. 158; Hardinge to Crewe, 8

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Notes

72.

73.

74. 75.

265

October 1914, p. 164; Hardinge to Crewe, 21 October 1914, p. 168; Hardinge to Holderness, 21 October 1914, p. 170; Hardinge to Crewe, 29 October 1914, pp. 171 and 172; Vol. 120 Part I Crewe to Hardinge, 29 October 1914, p. 108; Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 5 November 1914, pp. 185 and 186; Hardinge to Crewe, 11 November 1914, p. 188; Hardinge Papers Vol. 88 Part I Craddock, Member of the Viceroy’s Council, to Hardinge, 2 November 1914, p. 359; Bayley, Lieutenant-Governor of Bihar and Orissa, to Hardinge, 30 November 1914, p. 426; Hardinge Papers Vol. 93 Part I Chirol to Hardinge, 5 December 1914, p. 410 A. CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 120 Part II Hardinge to Crewe, letters of 11 November, 26 November, and 2 December 1914, on pp. 188 and 189, 195, and 198, respectively; Part I Holderness to Hardinge, 4 December 1914, p. 121; Part II Hardinge to Crewe, 10 December 1914, p. 202; IOLR L/P&S/10/201 Diary of the British Agent at Kabul for the week ending 8 September 1914, fol. 61; North-West Frontier Provincial Diary, No. 40, for the week ending 3 October 1914, fol. 35; Diary of the British Agent at Kabul for the week ending 8 October 1914, fol. 32; North-West Frontier Provincial Diary, No. 45, for the week ending 7 November 1914, fol. 11; CUL Hardinge Papers Vol. 88 Part I Lord Willingdon, Governor of Bombay, to Hardinge, 19 November 1914, pp. 408 and 409. IOLR L/P&S/10/472 Decypher of telegram from Beaumont, Constantinople, No. 521, copy, (38217/14), D. 11 August 1914, R. 12 August 1914; Secretary of State to Viceroy, By Hirtzel, 19 October 1914; Arthur Hardinge to Grey, No. 227, 12 December 1914 (84254); Cypher to Townley at Tehran, from FO, No. 321, 24 December 1914. Arghandawi, British Imperialism, p. 85; Hardinge, My Indian Years, pp. 131, 132. Rolf-Dieter Müller, ‘Afghanistan als militärisches Ziel deutscher Auβenpolitik im Zeitalter der Weltkreige’, in Bernhard Chairi (ed) Wegweiser zur Geschichte Afghanistan (Paderborn, 2009); Thomas G. Fraser, ‘Germany and the Indian Revolution, 1914–18’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 12, No. 2, 1977; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ‘Die Berliner Djihadisierung des Islam: Wie Max von Oppenheim die islamische Revolution schürte’, KAS-Auslandsinformationen 10/2004; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ‘Germany’s Middle East Policy’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 3, September 2007; Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, ‘Djihad “Made in Germany”: Der Streit um den Heiligen Krieg 1914–1915’, Sozial Geschichte, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2003; Thomas L. Hughes, ‘The German Mission to Afghanistan, 1915–16’, German Studies Review, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2002), Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 86, 87.

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76. Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 88–92; Hardinge, My Indian Years, pp. 132, 133. 77. Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 93–103. 78. Hughes, ‘The German Mission to Afghanistan’, p. 471. See also Appendix 7. 79. Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 103–6; Hughes, ‘The German Mission to Afghanistan’, pp. 471, 472; Hardinge in My Indian Years, p. 133, encapsulated the effect of the letter with the masterly understatement of a seasoned diplomat: ‘as I know him to be a man who would not run any personal risks, I expect he gave the Germans in Cabul a very poor time in consequence.’

Conclusion 1. Dupree, Louis, Afghanistan (OUP, 1997), p. 441; Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, pp. 44–45; Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 169–77. 2. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 442–43; Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 177–82. 3. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 446–49; Arghandawi, British Imperialism, pp. 182–233. 4. Dupree, Afghanistan, 450–52; Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, p. 48. 5. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 450–56; Poullada, Reform and Rebellion, pp. 160–93. 6. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 458–658. 7. Dupree, Afghanistan, pp. 485–94; Syed Abdul Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan: A Geopolitical Study (Lahore, 1982), pp. 89–168; Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History (I.B.Tauris, 2005), pp. 27–37. 8. Amin Saikal, Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival (I.B.Tauris, 2006), pp. 117–186; Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, pp. 27–66. 9. Saikal, Modern Afghanistan, pp. 187 onwards; Rasanayagam Afghanistan: A Modern History, pp. 66 onwards; Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (Lexington, Plymouth, 2008); Seth G. Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan (Norton, New York, 2009). 10. Loyn, David, Butcher and Bolt: Two Hundred Years of Foreign Engagement in Afghanistan (Windmill, London, 2009); Loyn, David, ‘Five Afghan History Lessons for Obama’s New General’ Foreign Policy, online, (June 2009). 11. Loyn, Butcher and Bolt and ‘Five Afghan History Lessons’; Lester W. Grau, ‘The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2004).

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Notes

267

12. Loyn, David, Butcher and Bolt; The point was well made by Nicholson at the Morley Sub-Committee. See text and my note 44 in Chapter 5. 13. B.D. Hopkins, ‘Jihad on the Frontier: A History of Religion’s Revolt on the North-West Frontier, 1800–1947’, History Compass, Cambridge, No. 7 (2009); Brian Robson, Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan (Stroud, 2004); Indian General Staff, Operations in Waziristan, 1919–20 (Calcutta, 1921); Andrew M. Roe, Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849–1947 (Modern War Studies, Kansas, 2010); Lieut-Colonel C.E. Bruce, Waziristan, 1936–37: The Problems of the North-West Frontiers of India and their Solutions (Aldershot, 1938); Alan Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army: The North West Frontier Revolt of 1936–37 (OUP, 2000). 14. Mohammad Ali, ‘The Durand Line’ Afghanistan, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1955); Bijan Omrani, ‘The Durand Line: History and Problems of the Afghan-Pakistan Border’, Asian Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2009); M. Fahim Khan, ‘The Frontier Rising of 1897’, Central Asia: Journal of the Area Studies Centre, Peshawar, No. 15 (Winter 1984). 15. Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear: Soviet Military Performance in Afghanistan (Brassey’s, London, 1991), pp. 112–116. See also ‘$400 per Gallon Gas to Drive Debate over Cost of War in Afghanistan’, The Hill, 15 October 2009. This followed notification by Pentagon officials of this to the House Appropriations Defense Sub-Committee. 16. McMichael, Stumbling Bear; Russian General Staff (ed and trans. by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress), The Soviet–Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost (Kansas, 2002), pp. 300–303. See also ‘Taliban Attacks on NATO Convoys force Planners to seek new Supply Line Routes’ Telegraph, 9 December 2008. 17. Loyn – Butcher and Bolt; Olivier Roy, The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War (Adelphi Paper 259, IISS, Brassey’s, 1991). 18. Stephen Tanner, Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Fall of the Taliban (Da Capo, Cambridge, MA, 2003); Roy The Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War; Harjeet Singh, ‘The Jihadi War’, Indian Defence Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2008); Richard Kugler, Michael Baranick and Hans Binnendijk, Operation Anaconda: Lessons for Joint Operations National Defense University, Center for Technology and National Security Policy (Washington, 2009); Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan (Cass, London, 2001); Lester W. Grau, ‘The Soviet-Afghan War: A Superpower Mired in the Mountains’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2004); Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare: In the Words of the Mujahideen Fighters (Compendium, London, 2001).

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19. Loyn, Butcher and Bolt, pp. 294–296; Lester W. Grau, ‘Breaking Contact without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (2007). 20. Khan, ‘The Frontier Rising’; Roe, Waging War in Waziristan; Warren, Waziristan, the Faqir of Ipi and the Indian Army; Milan Hauner, ‘One Man against the Empire: The Faqir of Ipi and the British in Central Asia on the Eve of and during the Second World War’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1981). 21. Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia (IBT, 2000), p. 42. 22. Dupree, Afghanistan; Roe, Waging War in Waziristan; Saikal, Modern Afghanistan; Roy, Olivier, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (CUP, 1990); Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Curzon, 1995); Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo–Afghan Borderland (Hurst, London, 2007); Seth G. Jones, ‘Going Local: The Key to Afghanistan’, Wall Street Journal (7 August 2009); Seth G. Jones, ‘It Takes the Villages: Bringing Change from Below in Afghanistan’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 3 (2010); Arne Strand and Organisation for Sustainable Development and Research, Kabul, Faryab Survey: Comparison of Findings from Maymane, 2006 and 2009 Chr Michelsen Institute, CMI Paper R2009:2 (Oslo, 2009). 23. Antonio Giustozzi, Empires of Mud: Wars and Warlords in Afghanistan (Hurst, London, 2009), pp. 55–58. 24. Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (Yale, 1995). 25. Omrani, ‘The Durand Line’; Quddus, Afghanistan and Pakistan; Rory Stewart, ‘The Irresistible Illusion’, London Review of Books, Vol. 31, No. 13 (July 2009).

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APPENDIX 1

The Lyall Agreement of July 1880 The Agreement was formed in a letter from Lyall to Abdur Rahman Khan of July 1880. The terms of the Agreement came into being with the assent of the new Amir. After compliments.

July 1880

His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General in Council has learnt with pleasure that Your Highness has proceeded toward Kabul, in accordance with the invitation of the British Government. Therefore, in consideration of the friendly sentiments by which your Highness is animated, and of the advantage to be derived by the Sirdars and people from the establishment of a settled government under your Highness’s authority, the British Government recognizes your Highness as Amir of Kabul. I am further empowered, on the part of the Viceroy and Governor General of India, to inform your Highness that the British Government has no desire to interfere in the internal government of the territories in possession of your Highness, and has no wish that an English Resident should be stationed anywhere within those territories. For the convenience of ordinary friendly intercourse, such is maintained between two adjoining States, it may be advisable that a Muhammedan Agent of the British Government should reside, by agreement, at Kabul. Your Highness has requested that the views and intentions of the British Government with regard to the position of the ruler at Kabul in relation to foreign powers, should be placed on record for your Highness’ information. The Viceroy and Governor General in Council authorizes me to declare to you that since the British Government admits no right of interference by foreign powers within Afghanistan, and since both Russia and Persia are pledged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Afghanistan, it is plain that your Highness

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can have no political relations with any foreign power except with the British Government. If any foreign power should attempt to interfere in Afghanistan, and if such interference should lead to unprovoked aggression on the dominions of your Highness, in that event the British Government would be prepared to aid you, to such extent and in such manner as may appear to the British Government necessary, in repelling it; provided that your Highness follows unreservedly the advice of the British Government in regard to your external relations. I have, &c., Sir Alfred Lyall.

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APPENDIX 2

Selected Parts of the Memorandum communicated by the Russian Embassy 6 February 1900 The rapport of Russia with Afghanistan was defined by arrangements arrived at in 1872 and 1873 between the Cabinets of St. Petersburg and London. By virtue of these arrangements, which are still in force, Russia recognised that Afghanistan was entirely outside her sphere of influence. The Imperial Government has strictly conformed to this principle ... Although it had renounced the exercise of political relations with Afghanistan, she has consented, guided by an amicable interest with regard to Great Britain, to abstain in given circumstances, from the same non-political relations, the exchange of which are generally usual between neighbouring states ... It is quite natural that the [previously existing] state of things, as was indicated by the local authorities and the Russian border customs men, gave rise to a series of new questions concerning the reciprocal interests of the subjects of these different countries ... In consequence, the Imperial Government believes in its right to carry out, with the knowledge of the London Cabinet to see as indispensible the reestablishment of direct relations between Russia and Afghanistan concerning the affairs of the frontier. These relations will not take on a political character. The Imperial Government maintains its previous arrangements and continues to regard Afghanistan as outside the sphere of influence of Russia.

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APPENDIX 3

The Kabul Treaty 21 March 1905 He is God! Extolled be his perfection! His Majesty Siraj-ul-millat-wa-ud-din Amir Habibulla Khan, Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its dependencies, on the one part, and the Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane, CSI, Foreign Secretary of the Mighty Government of India and Representative of the Exalted British Government, on the other part. His said Majesty does hereby agree to this, that in the principles and in the matters of subsidiary importance of the Treaty regarding internal and external affairs, and of the engagements which His Highness my late father, that is, Ziaul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy, may God enlighten his tomb! concluded and acted upon with the Exalted British Government, I also have acted, am acting, and will act upon the same Agreement and compact, and I will not contravene them in any dealing or in any promise. The said Honourable Mr. Louis William Dane does hereby agree to this, that as to the very Agreement and engagement which the Exalted British Government concluded and acted upon with the noble father of His Majesty Siraj-ul-millatwa-ud-din, that is, His Highness Zia-ul-millat-wa-ud-din, who has found mercy, regarding internal and external affairs, and matters of principle or of subsidiary importance, I confirm them and write that they (the British Government) will not act contrary to those Agreements and engagements in any way or at any time. Made on Tuesday, the 14th day of Muharram-ul-haram of the year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the 21st day of March, of the year 1905 AD (LS.) (Persian seal of Amir Habibulla Khan) This is correct. I Have sealed and signed. AMIR HABIBULLA LOUIS W. DANE, Foreign Secretary, representing the Government of India

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APPENDIX 4

The Anglo–Japanese Alliance 30 January 1902 The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the Extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Corea, and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:ARTICLE I. – The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects. ARTICLE II. – If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. ARTICLE III. – If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

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ARTICLE IV. – The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described. ARTICLE V. – Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with each other fully and frankly. ARTICLE VI. – The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded. In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of January, 1902. (LS.) (Signed) LANSDOWNE, His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (LS.) (Signed) HAYASHI, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

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APPENDIX 5

The Anglo–Japanese Alliance 12 August 1905 Preamble The Government of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January, 1902 by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object (a.) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India; (b.) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China; (c.) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests. II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. III. Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Corea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of

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guidance, control, and protection in Corea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations. IV. Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions. V. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement. VI. As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan. VII. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest. VIII. The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded. In faith whereof the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and have affixed thereto their seals. Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

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(LS.) LANSDOWNE, His Britannic Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. (LS.) TADASU HAYASHI, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan at the Court of St. James.

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APPENDIX 6

The Anglo–Russian Convention Concerning Afghanistan 31 August 1907 The High Contracting Parties, in order to ensure perfect security on their respective frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in these regions a solid and lasting peace, have concluded the following Convention: ARTICLE I His Britannic Majesty’s Government declare that they have no intention of changing the political status of Afghanistan. His Britannic Majesty’s Government further engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan only in the pacific sense, and they will not themselves take, nor encourage Afghanistan to take, any measures threatening Russia. The Russian Government, on their part, declare that they recognise Afghanistan as outside the sphere of Russian influence, and they engage that all their political relations with Afghanistan shall be conducted through the intermediary of His Britannic Majesty’s Government; They further engage not to send any agents into Afghanistan. ARTICLE II The Government of His Britannic Majesty having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul on the 21st March 1905, that they recognise the Agreement and the engagements concluded with the late Amir Abdur Rahman, and that they have no intention of interfering in the internal government of Afghan territory, Great Britain engages neither to annex nor to occupy in contravention of that Treaty any portion of Afghanistan or to interfere in the internal administration of the country, provided that the Amir fulfils the engagements already contracted by him towards His Britannic Majesty’s Government under the above-mentioned Treaty.

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ARTICLE III The Russian and Afghan authorities specially designated for the purpose on the frontier or in the frontier provinces, may establish direct relations with each other for the settlement of local questions of a non-political character. ARTICLE IV His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Russian Government affirm their adherence to the principle of equality of commercial opportunity in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facilities which may have been, or shall be hereafter obtained for British and British-Indian trade and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian trade and traders. Should the progress of trade establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, the two Governments will agree as to what measures shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had to the Amir’s sovereign rights. ARTICLE V The present arrangements will only come into force when His Britannic Majesty’s Government shall have notified to the Russian Government the consent of the Amir to the terms stipulated above.

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APPENDIX 7

Proposed Treaty between the Amir of Afghanistan and German Mission 24 January 1916 The following Friendship Treaty is concluded between the All-highest Godgiven Afghan Government and the Highest German Government. This Treaty and Friendship shall exist for the present and future between the Allhighest God-given Afghan Government and the Highest German Government and their revered masters. 1) The Afghan Government postulates her complete independence and political freedom. 2) The German Government takes it upon herself to help the Afghan Government so far as she can do so. Recognises the independence of Afghanistan, and will cause the Austrian and Bulgarian Governments to recognise it on their part. 3) The Afghan Government begins forthwith with the perfecting of her military resources and administration, as also with political relations with the peoples of Persia, India and Russian Turkestan. 4) The German Government is pledged to furnish the Afghan Government as assistance as quickly as possible, gratis and without return, 100,000 rifles of the newest pattern, and 300 guns, small and big, with complete new pattern equipment of the appropriate munitions, and other necessary war material, and a crore fund, i.e. 10 mil. sterling. She takes it upon herself, moreover, to open the way through Persia in order that the German Empire may give the Afghan Kingdom officers, engineers, and other officials, of whom Afghanistan stands in need and that these may remain officials of the Afghan Kingdom and be honoured as such. 5) The Afghan Kingdom lays down categorically that these measures are for this purpose, that when they are taken she may strengthen herself and will draw benefit from them in time of necessity.

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6) The German Government is pledged in the event of Afghanistan having entered into the war or making expeditious preparations of a military or external political character, to enter the lists for the possession of lost and conquered territories and always to defend the Afghan Kingdom with all measures against foreign conquest in the rear of the Afghan Kingdom. 7) The Afghan Government recognises the Embassy Secretary of the German Empire, Herr von Hentig, and sends forthwith her own envoy with limited powers to the Persian capital, in order to negotiate there in secrecy with the German, Turkish, and Austrian envoys. As soon as the time is come and he can show openly that he is the deputy of the Afghan Government, he will openly declare himself Minister of Afghanistan: and at the time of the general conclusion of peace a plenipotentiary, qualified for the Conference, will be appointed with plenary powers as Afghanistan’s plenipotentiary on behalf of the rights of the Afghan Government. 8) Relating to the Embassy are: a) The escort of the Embassy shall not be more than 20 to 30 strong. b) It will be permitted to buy up to 20 jaribs of land for the Ambassador’s residence and to build the Embassy on it. c) If a subject of Afghanistan or some other Power seeks refuge in the Embassy after the commission of a crime, it is essential that the Embassy should give him no protection. d) If a subject of the Kingdoms possessing an Embassy in Afghanistan has a lawsuit, the decision shall be pleaded according to Afghan laws, and his Ambassador shall have no concern with it. For various commercial suits and others which have not yet arisen in any form in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government will make new laws. 9) After the general peace a Commerical Treaty will be concluded between the Afghan and German Governments with mutually binding conditions. 10) Both parties shall regard themselves bound when the Afghan envoy in the Persian capital receives news from the German Government that this Treaty has been ratified by the German Government. True copy of His Majesty’s endorsement. I, on behalf of the Highest Afghan Government, in accordance with the conditions of the above Treaty with the German Government, desire that an alliance shall be concluded. Signed. Lamp of the Nation and Religion, Kabul, the 18th Rabi-ul-Awal, 1916.

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True copy of the endorsement by Captains Niedermayer and von Hentig. The Afghan Government desires the friendship of the German Government and to conclude a treaty in accordance with this draft. I send this copy of the Afghan Treaty to the German Government. Now that I have seen Afghanistan I recommend one to the German Government, and I hope that she will accept this Friendship Treaty. 24th January 1916. Niedermayer. Von Hentig.

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DRAMATIS PERSONAE

Abdul Quddus Khan – Chamberlain, 1901–16. An influential Sirdar at the Afghan court. He was vehemently anti-British and was allied to Nasrullah Khan. Abdullah Khan – The Afghan agent at Meshed in 1904. The Amir used his intelligence to gain a wider perspective on the faltering Russian position in the region. Abdul-Mansur Khan, Captain – The Hakim of Kila Bar Panja. One of the recipients of Russian attempts at direct communication with the Afghans in 1904. Abdur Rahman Khan – Amir of Afghanistan 1880–1901. He was termed ‘the Iron Amir’ because of his harsh repressive rule and brutal quashing of rebellions during his reign. Many see him as the father of modern Afghanistan. Ahmed Jan Khan – The Governor of Herat in 1903–4. Dobbs believed him to be a Russophile during his visit to the region. He was replaced in late 1904. Alexander II – Tsar of Russia, 1856–81. Alexander III – Tsar of Russia, 1882–94. Amanullah Khan – The third son of the Amir Habibullah. He was a passionate moderniser and was closely linked to Mahmud Tarzi at court, also marrying his daughter, later Queen Soraya. He was Amir of Afghanistan from 1919 to 1929. Amir Ali – He ran the Red Crescent Relief Fund for Turkey during the Balkan Wars and was a senior personage in the All India Muslim League. He was suspected of Pan-Islamic activities in India by the British in 1913. Ampthill, Lord – Governor of Madras 1899–1905 and Acting Viceroy during Curzon’s absence in England between April and December 1904. Arnold Forster, H.O. – Secretary of State for War 1903–5. Asquith, H.H. – Liberal MP, 1886–1918; Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1905–8; Prime Minister, 1908–16.

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Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal – Turkish general who took power after the First World War and embarked on a modernising series of reforms. Ayub Khan – Afghan general and victor at Maiwand. He was defeated by the forces of Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880 and fled to India. Bacha Saqqao – Aka Habibullah Kalakani – Tajik bandit who became Amir for most of 1929. He ruled as Habibullah II and was deposed by Nadir Shah. Balfour, Arthur – Conservative MP, 1874–1922; Prime Minister, 1902–5; Foreign Secretary 1916–19. Barnes, Sir Hugh – Member of the Council of India and called before the Morley Sub-Committee on 7 February 1907. Barrow, General Sir Edmund – Secretary to the Government of India Military Department 1901–3; Commander of Southern Army, India, 1908–12; Military Secretary to the India Office 1914–17; Member of the Council of India 1917–24. Battenberg, Prince Louis of – First Lord of the Admiralty, 1902–5. Bayley, Charles – Resident at Hyderabad 1907–8; Knighted 1908; LieutenantGovernor of Eastern Bengal and Assam 1908–12; Lieutenant-Governor of Bihar and Orissa 1912–15; Member of the Council of India 1915–24. Benckendorff, Count Alexander – Russian Ambassador at London, 1903–17. Bertie, Sir Francis – British Ambassador, Rome, 1903–4; British Ambassador, Paris, 1905–18. Bigge, Sir Arthur – Private Secretary to George V from 1910, and created Baron Stamfordham in 1911. Bismarck, Otto von – Prime Minister of Prussia then Chancellor of Germany, 1862–90. Bosanquet, Vivian – British Consul at Odessa in 1904. Brodrick, St John – Conservative MP 1880–1906; Secretary of State for War 1900–3; Secretary of State for India 1903–5; involved in the Curzon–Kitchener dispute, on the latter’s side; became Viscount Midleton in 1907. Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry – Liberal MP, 1868–1908; Prime Minister, 1905–1908. Cavaignari, Louis – British Agent at Kabul in 1878. His murder heralded the second phase of the Second Afghan War. Chamberlain, Austen – He became Secretary of State for India in April 1915. Chirol, Valentine – Journalist; Director of the Foreign Department of The Times 1899–1920; Knighted in 1912.

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Churchill, Sir Winston – Served as a Subaltern in India, 1897–99; fought on the North-West Frontier and published The Story of The Malakand Field Force in 1898; MP from 1900 onwards; First Lord of the Admiralty, 1911–14. Clarke, E.H.S. – Assistant Secretary in the Foreign Department of the Government of India during the Dane Mission to Kabul in 1904–5. Clarke, Sir George Sydenham – Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence 1904–7; Governor of Bombay 1907–13; created Baron Sydenham in 1913; author of numerous letters and Memoranda and of My Working Life (1927). Cox, Sir Percy – Consul and Political Agent, Muscat, 1899–1904; ConsulGeneral and Political Resident, Persian Gulf, 1904–14; knighted in 1911; British Minister to Persia, 1918–20; High Commissioner, Mesopotamia, 1920–23. Craddock, Reginald – Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces 1907–12; knighted 1911; Home Member of the Viceroy’s Council 1912–17. Creagh, General Sir O’Moore – Secretary to the Military Department of the India Office, 1907–9; Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, 1909–14. Crewe, Marquess of – Secretary of State for India from 1910 to 1915. Cromer, Sir Evelyn Baring Earl of – Private Secretary to the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, 1872–76; Agent and Consul-General in Egypt, 1883–1907; created Baron Cromer in 1892, Viscount in 1898, and Earl in 1901. Crump, I.M. – Political Officer in Waziristan in 1908. He wrote an important memorandum concerning the internal control of the Mahsud tribe. Curzon, George Nathaniel – Undersecretary of State for India 1891–92; Viceroy of India 1899–1905. He travelled extensively in Asia before 1895 and was the author of Russia in Central Asia (1889) and Persia and the Persian Question (1892). Dane, Sir Louis – Indian Civil Servant; Resident in Kashmir 1901–2; In charge of the Mission to Kabul in 1904–5; Concluded Kabul Treaty with the Amir in March 1905; Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department 1902–8; Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 1908–13. Prince Muhammad Daoud Khan – Cousin of King Zahir Shah, who overthrew him in a coup in 1973. Was himself overthrown in the Saur Revolution of April 1978. Deane, Sir Harold – Political Resident in Kashmir, 1900–1901. Chief Commissioner North–West Frontier Province 1901–8. Disraeli, Benjamin – Conservative Prime Minister, 1868 and 1874–80. Dodd, Major – Political Agent in Waziristan in 1914. He was murdered by the Mahsuds in that year.

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Dobbs, Henry R.C. – Political Agent on deputation to Seistan and Kain; Sent on a mission to Herat in 1903–4 to investigate reports of Russian intrigues on the northern Afghan Frontier. He then went to Kabul to interview the Amir. He accompanied Dane to Kabul in 1904–5. Later Indian Foreign Secretary during the Third Afghan War. Donald, Colonel – Chief Commissioner in Waziristan in 1914. He held several meetings and Jirgas with the Mahsuds in order to counteract Mahsud unrest and resolve the question of the murder of Major Dodd. Dost Muhammad – Amir of Afghanistan, from 1826 to 1839 and again from 1843 to 1863. Dostem, General Rashid – Afghan General who switched sides to the Mujahideen, which precipitated the fall of the Najibullah regime. Douglas, Colonel J.A. – Military Attaché at the British Legation at Tehran in 1904. Duff, Sir Beauchamp – Lieutenant-General of the Indian Army; Represented Kitchener at the first and sixth meetings of the Morley Sub-Committee in 1907; Became Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army in 1914. Dunlop-Smith, Sir James – Private Secretary to Lord Minto as Viceroy 1905–10. He was well known for his opposition to an Entente with Russia regarding Central Asia. Durand, Sir Mortimer – Former Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department. He demarcated the Indo–Afghan frontier in two agreements with the Amir, Abdur Rahman, in 1893. Called before the Morley SubCommittee on 7 February 1907. Durnovo, P.N. – Russian Minister of the Interior, 1905–6. Formerly Chief of Police. Edward VII – King and Emperor, 1901–10. Esher, Lord Reginald Balliol Brett Second Viscount – Non-political defence expert. He was influential in both the Committee of Imperial Defence and the Morley Sub-Committee. He corresponded regularly with Sir George Clarke. Fakir of Ipi – Leader of the great uprising in Waziristan in 1936 and 1937. Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-Din – British Agent at Kabul, 1907–10. Fisher, Colonel John – Acting Consul General at Meshed during Whyte’s illness in 1903. Fitzmaurice, Lord E. – Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1883–85 and 1905–8. Fitzpatrick, Sir Dennis – Member of the Council of India, 1896–1907.

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French, Sir John, First Viscount Ypres – Major-General commanding the First Army Corps, 1901–7; Field Marshal, 1913; Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 1911–14. George V – King and Emperor, 1910–36. Ghaus-ud-Din, General – Commander of the Garrison at Maimana. He liaised with Dobbs during his time at Herat. He was reputed to have led the Afghan resistance to the Russians at Penjdeh. Ghulam Hayder Charkhi – Abdur Rahman’s top general and defeated many enemies of the regime; father of Generals Ghulam Nabi and Ghulam Siddiq; he became head of the Charkhi clan at the court of Habibullah. Godfrey, S.H. – Major of the Indian Army 1881–1916; served in the Indian Political Department on the North-West Frontier; Political Agent for Malakand, Dir, Swat, and Chitral in 1908. Godley, Sir Arthur – Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India 1883–1909. He became Baron Kilbracken in 1909. Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich – Russian Foreign Minister, 1856–82 and Russian Chancellor, 1867–82. Grant Duff, Evelyn – Secretary of the Tehran Legation, 1903–6. Grey, Sir Edward – Liberal MP, 1885–1916; Foreign Secretary 1905–16. Grierson, General Sir James – Director of Military Operations, 1904–6. Grodokov, Colonel N.I. – Russian military spy. He made extensive journeys throughout Central Asia and Afghanistan. He wrote Colonel Grodekoff’s Ride from Samarkand to Herat in 1880. Gurden, B.E.M. – Political Agent in the Khyber in 1908. Habibullah Khan – Amir of Afghanistan 1901–19. He was criticised in Afghanistan for being too pro-British. His insistence on neutrality in the First World War helped the British position in India, but he was assassinated in 1919. Hadda Mullah – Leader of the uprising on the North-West Frontier in 1897. Hafiz Saifullah Khan – British Agent at Kabul, 1913–19. Haji Gul Mohammad Khan, Brigadier – Governor of Badakhshan in the early years of Habibullah’s reign. He was one of the recipients of Russian attempts at direct communications in 1904. Hakim, Mullah Abdul – He assumed Powinda’s mantel and, in 1914, tried to stir up the Mahsuds against the British.

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Haldane, Richard Burdon – Liberal MP 1885–1911; Secretary of State for War 1905–12; created Viscount 1911. Hamilton, Lord George – Conservative MP 1868–1906; Secretary of State for India 1895–1903. Hamilton, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian – Chief Staff Officer on the lines of communication to Chitral in 1895; gave evidence before the Morley Sub-Committee on 5 February 1907; Adjutant-General to the forces, 1909–10; Inspector-General Overseas Forces, 1910–15; commanded the forces at the Dardanelles in 1915. Hardinge, Arthur – British Minister in Persia, 1900–5. Hardinge, Sir Charles – British Ambassador to St Petersburg, 1904–6; Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1906–10 and 1916–20; Viceroy of India, 1910–16; Created Baron 1910; Ambassador to France 1920–23; Author of My Indian Years in 1948. Hartington, Marquess of – Secretary of State for India 1880–82. Hayashi, Baron – Japanese Minister at London, 1900–5; Ambassador, 1905–6; Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1906–8. Hentig, Werner Otto von – German Diplomatic Corps. Joint head of a German mission to Afghanistan in 1915. His task was to persuade the Amir to join the Central Powers. Herbert, A. – British Minister at Darmstadt in 1903. Hirtzel, Sir Arthur – Private Secretary to Brodrick and Morley at the India Office 1903–9; Secretary to the Political Department of the India Office 1909–17. Holderness, T.W. – Undersecretary of State for India 1913–15. Holdich, Sir Thomas – Formerly of the Indian Survey Department and was active during the demarcation of the Afghan border in the 1880s and 1890s. He was called before the Morley Sub-Committee on 25 January 1907. Inayatullah Khan – Habibullah’s eldest son and head of the Afghan Defence Department. He visited India in 1904 at the same time as the Dane Mission and was mostly aligned with Amanullah at the Afghan Court. He, too, married one of Tarzi’s daughters and was briefly Amir in 1929. Isvolsky, Alexander M. – Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1906–10. Karzai, Hamid – Afghan President from 2004 to the present. Kauffman, General K.P. – The first Russian Governor-General at Tashkent in 1867; General in command of the Bokhara Expedition in 1868; General in command of the Khiva Expedition in 1873.

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Kelly, Colonel – Senior Officer at Gilgit, sent to relieve the siege of Chitral in 1895. Kemball, Lieutenant-Colonel C.A. – Consul at Bushire in 1903. Kitchener, Herbert Horatio – Adjutant-General, Egyptian Army, 1888–92; commanded the Khartoum Expedition, 1898; created Baron after Omdurman; Commander-in-Chief during the Boer War, 1900–2; created Viscount in 1902; Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, 1902–9; created Field Marshal in 1909; Consul-General in Egypt, 1911–14; Secretary of State for War, 1914–16; Drowned in 1916 on the way to Russia when the ship in which he was travelling struck a mine. Klemm, M. – Russian Minister at Bombay, 1895–1905. Kokovtsov, V.N. – Russian Minister of Finance, 1903–14. Komura, Baron – Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1901–6 and 1908–11; Plenipotentiary to the Portsmouth peace negotiations in 1905; Ambassador to London, 1906–8. Kuropatkin, General A.N. – Russian Minister of War, 1898–1904. He captured Askabad in 1881 as Colonel; he wrote the invasion plan of Afghanistan and India in 1891; Chief of the General Staff in 1898; placed in overall command of Russian forces during the Russo–Japanese War. Lord Lamington – Governor of Bombay, 1903–7. Lamsdorff, Count V.N. – Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1901–6. Lansdowne, Lord – Governor-General of Canada, 1883–88; Viceroy of India, 1888–93; Secretary of State for War, 1895–1900; Foreign Secretary, 1900–1905. Lee Warner, Sir William – Indian Civil Service 1869–95; Secretary in the Political and Secret Departments of the India Office 1895–1902; Member of the Council of India 1902–12. Lessar, Count Pavel Mikhailovich – Russian Political Agent at Bokhara, 1890–95. He was then posted to the London Embassy, 1895–1903. Lindsay, Captain A.B. – Secretary to the Morley Sub-Committee, 1907. Lyall, Sir Alfred – Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department during the Second Afghan War. He made the agreement for Abdur Rahman Khan to become Amir in July 1880. He was called before the Morley Sub-Committee on 7 February 1907. Lyttelton, General Sir N.G. – Chief of the General Staff 1904–8. He was also a member of the Morley Sub-Committee in 1907.

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Lytton, Lord – Viceroy of India during the Second Afghan War, 1877–82. Macartney, Sir George – British Consul at Kashgar, 1904–10; Consul General, 1910–18. MacDonald, Sir Claude – British Ambassador to Japan, 1900–1912. Malik Talib Mehdi Khan – British Agent at Kabul, 1910–13. Malleson, Colonel W. – Military representative sent by the Indian Army to Kabul with the Dane Mission in 1904–5. Massoud, Ahmed Shah – Afghan Mujahideen commander in the Jamiat-i Islami. Fought the Soviets from his base in the Panjshir Valley and took part in the Civil War. Assassinated on 9 September 2001. McMahon, Sir Henry – Political Agent at Chitral 1899–1901; Arbitrated Perso– Afghan Boundary Commission 1903–5; In charge of the Amir’s Visit to India in 1907; Political Agent in Baluchistan 1905–11; Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department 1911–14. Mehsud, Hakimullah – Tehrik-i Taliban Leader responsible for attacks on the US and Pakistani militaries in 2009. Milyutin, General D.A. – Russian Minister for War, 1861–81. Minchin, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Frederick – Consul General at Meshed, 1903–5. Minto, Gilbert Elliot, 4th Earl of Minto – Fought in the Second Afghan War in 1879; Governor-General of Canada 1898–1904; Viceroy of India 1905–10. Morley, John – Liberal MP 1883–1908; Secretary of State for India 1905–10; Set up a Sub-Committee on the Military Requirements of the Empire in 1907; Created Viscount 1908; He resigned from the Cabinet in August 1914 in opposition to the war. Muhammad Akbar Khan – Sirdar and Governor of Khost during Habibullah’s reign and the brother-in-law of Nasrullah. Muhammad Hussain Khan – Influential Sirdar at the Afghan Court and head of the Afghan Finance Department. He was strongly anti-British and acted as Chief Secretary during the negotiations for the Dane Treaty at Kabul in 1904 and 1905. Muhammad Usman Khan – Strongly anti-British Governor of Kandahar during Habibullah’s reign.

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Muhammad Yusuf Khan – Head of the pro-British faction at Court. He accompanied Inayatullah Khan to India and was shocked by the ascendancy gained by Nasrullah on his return. Mullah Omar – Taliban Leader from the movement’s inception to the present. Mullaly, Herbert General – Deputy Quarter-Master-General in India in 1905. Nadir Shah, General – A top personage of the Musabihan. He quelled the Mangal rebellion of 1913 and was Amir from 1929 to 1933. Najibullah, Muhammad – Final Soviet-backed leader of Afghanistan in the Parcham wing of the Communist Party. Formerly head of the Secret Police, he came to power in 1986 and was overthrown in 1992. Napier, Lieutenant-Colonel H.D. – British Military Attaché at St Petersburg, 1903–7. Nasrullah Khan – Vehemently anti-British brother of the Amir Habibullah. He visited England to request direct relations with the British Government in 1894, but was rebuffed by Salisbury. He was Prime Minister during the reign of Habibullah and was allied to Abdul Quddus and Muhammad Hussain Khan at Court. He stood for conservative nationalist values. Nicholson, General W.G. – Quarter-Master-General of the British Army 1905–7; he had been in command of logistical support for the Tirah Expedition in 1897; British Military Attaché with the Japanese Army, 1904–5; gave evidence before the Morley Sub-Committee on 23 January 1907. He was Chief of the General Staff and Third Military Member of the Army Council, 1908–12. Nicolas II – Tsar of Russia, 1894–1917. Nicolson, Sir Arthur (Lord Carnock) – British Ambassador to Russia, 1906–10. Niedermeyer, Oskar von – Captain in the German Army: Joint head of a German mission to Afghanistan in 1915. O’Beirne, H.J. – Counsellor of the British Embassy at St Petersburg, 1906–15. He sometimes acted as Chargé d’Affairs, such as during Nicolson’s leave of absence to Britain in 1908. Obolensky, Prince – Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during Lamsdorff’s leave in 1903. O’Dwyer, Sir Michael – Revenue Commissioner North-West Frontier Province 1901–8; Resident Hyderabad 1908–9; knighted 1913; Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab 1913–19; he wrote his autobiography India as I Knew It in 1933.

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Oppenheim, Max von – German Foreign Ministry. Leading Orientalist and ideologue behind the effort to stir up the Middle East and South and Central Asia against the British in the First World War. Palitsyn, General – Head of the Russian General Staff, 1905–8. Powindah, The Mullah – Waziri Mullah who repeatedly stirred up the tribes of Waziristan. He favoured union with Afghanistan, but was coldly rebuffed by Amir Habibullah. Rabbani, Burhannuddin – Leader of Jamiat-i Islami and President from 1992 to 1996 and briefly at the end of 2001. Reza Shah – Persian General who came to power after the First World War with a modernising agenda. Ritchie, Sir Richmond – Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for India, Hamilton, 1895–1902; Secretary of the Political Department of the India Office, 1902–10; Succeeded Godley as Permanent Undersecretary of State for India 1910–12; He was called before the Morley Sub-Committee on 25 January 1907. Rittich, Staff Captain PA – Staff captain of the Lifeguard Jaeger Regiment and author of a plan to invade Afghanistan and India in 1905. Roberts, Sir Frederick Field Marshal Earl – Extensive experience in India and Afghanistan, culminating in his being made Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army, 1885–93; commanded in South Africa, 1899–1900; involved with the Committee of Imperial Defence 1902–14; gave evidence before the Morley SubCommittee, 28 January 1907; Colonel-in-Chief of Indian Forces in Europe, 1914; died of pneumonia on the Western Front in 1914. Roos-Keppel, Sir George – Chief Commissioner North-West Frontier Province 1908–19. He was promoted Major-General and Military Governor of the NorthWest Frontier Martial Law Area in 1919. Rumbold, Sir Horace – British Consul in Cairo, 1904–5. Saiyid Ahmed Beg – The leader of the Jamshedi tribe in the period 1908–10. He led his people out of Afghanistan into Russian Turkestan and based himself at Samarkand. He remained there when his people returned to Afghanistan in order to escape the inevitable reprisals. Salisbury, 3rd Marquess, Robert Gascoyne Cecil – Conservative Prime Minister, 1885–86, 1886–92, 1895–1902. Sandeman, Sir Robert – Architect of the Sandeman Policy of pacifying the tribesmen by dealing with them at a personal level. This was effective in Baluchistan where Sandeman had been Chief Commissioner in the 1880s and the 1890s.

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married his daughters. He published his newspaper the Siraj-al-Akhbar [The Torch of the News of Afghanistan] from 1911 to 1918. Tcherkassoff, M. – First Assistant of the Political Agency in Bokhara in 1904. Tiwana, Malik – British Agent at Kabul, 1903–7. Wanliss, Major C. – A Major in the Meshed Intelligence Branch. He accompanied Dobbs on his mission to Herat in 1903–4. Wassmuss, Wilhelm – Leader of failed expedition to Persia in 1915, the precursor to the Niedermeyer-Hentig Mission. Whyte, Colonel J.F. – British Consul at Meshed, mid-1903. Wilhelm II – German Kaiser (Emperor) and King of Prussia, 1888–1918 Willcocks, Sir James – Entered Army 1878; served in Afghanistan in 1879; Waziristan, 1881; Burma, 1886–89; knighted in 1900; commanded the Zakha Khel Expedition in 1908. Winter, Captain – Consul at Turbat-i Haidari, Seistan 1903–4. Witte, S.Y. – Russian Foreign Minister, 1892–1903; Plenipotentiary to the Portsmouth peace negotiations in 1905; Prime Minister, 1905–6. Wolseley, Sir Garnet Field Marshal Viscount – Roberts’ predecessor as Britain’s most senior soldier. He commanded the British forces in Egypt in the 1880s and later became Commander-in-Chief of the British Army. Yate, Colonel A.C. – Officer in the Indian Political Department. He was sent as negotiator between the Afghans and the Russians at Penjdeh in 1885. Younghusband, Colonel Francis – Explorer in Central Asia, 1886–92; Political Agent Chitral, 1893–94; Resident Indore, 1902–3; he led the expedition to Lhasa as Commissioner for Tibet, 1903–4; criticised for the harshness of his treaty, which was overturned in favour of more lenient terms; Resident in Kashmir, 1906–9. Zahir Shah – King of Afghanistan from 1933 to 1973. Zinoviev, I.A. – The Head of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry in 1906.

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INDEX

Abdul Hakim 201 Abdullah Khan 283 Abdul-Mansur Khan, Captain 283 Abdul Quddus Khan 3, 4, 121, 126–128, 135, 136, 248, 249, 283, 291 Abdur Rahman Khan 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 17, 22, 25, 114, 115, 117, 119, 122, 127, 130, 138, 193, 218, 220, 247, 269, 278, 283, 284, 287, 289, 294 Abdur Rahman Khels 200 Administered Territory 90, 200 Admiralty 141, 210, 242, 284, 285, 293 Aegean 141 Aeroplanes 198, 213 Afghan Army xiii, 4, 14, 28, 92, 97, 116, 118, 124, 125, 148, 149, 151, 153, 156, 159, 161, 174, 185, 187, 206 Afghan Council of State 123, 128, 136 Afghan Court 3, 135, 191, 283, 288, 290 Afghan Defence Scheme 127, 128 Afghan Government 3, 25, 48, 50, 58, 114, 118, 124, 199, 206, 215, 280–282 Afghan Territorial Integrity 11, 17, 25, 120, 193

Wyatt_index.indd 315

Afghan Wars 1, 20, 158, 217, 218; See also First Afghan War, Second Afghan War, Third Afghan War Afridi Tribe xiv, 87, 127, 138, 148, 161, 225 Agreement of 1880 11, 17, 22, 25, 26, 99, 114–116, 118, 119, 121, 122, 129, 130, 132, 157, 208; See also Lyall Agreement Ahmed Jan Khan 36, 55, 85, 123, 283; See also Governor of Herat Alexander the Great 156, 160 Alexander II 283 Alexander III 283 All India Muslim League 198, 283 Amanullah Khan 3, 4, 212–214, 283 America 104, 105, 220 Amir, See Habibullah Khan Amir Ali 198, 263, 283 Amir’s Code 4, 219 Amir’s Subsidy 116, 119, 121, 122, 124, 127, 131, 137, 253 Ampthill, Lord 80, 115, 283 Andijan xi, xii, 9, 11 Anglo-German Naval Arms Race 86, 140 Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902) 7, 23, 53, 140, 210, 273–274 Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905) 210, 275–277

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316

Afghanistan and the Defence of Empire

Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission 39 Anglo-Russian Convention 2, 16, 20, 23, 35, 176, 178, 186–188, 193, 211, 220, 278, 279; As Anglo-Russian Entente 182, 210 Aral Sea xi, xii Armenia 83 Arms Control 116 Arms Trade 88, 89, 123 Arnold Forster, H.O. 283 Artillery 10, 11, 59, 78, 85, 101–103, 153, 159, 160, 217 Askabad xi, xii, 10, 13, 31, 33, 34, 38, 43, 44, 48, 49, 51, 67, 69, 84, 289 Asquith, H.H. 255, 283 Assam 188, 284 Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal 213, 284 Austria 7, 206, 280, 281 Austro-Russian Agreement 181; See also Murzsteg Agreement Ayub Khan 284 Baber 160 Bacha Saqqao 214, 284 Badakhshan xiii, 4, 6, 287 Bajaur xiv, 147 Baku 79, 84, 293 Balfour, Arthur 28, 50, 57, 69, 94, 101, 117, 120, 142, 144, 146, 176, 191, 243, 284 Balkans 6, 7, 198 Balkan Wars 7, 196, 198, 199, 283 Balkash, Lake xi, xii Baltic Fleet 142 Baluch 18, 169 Baluchistan xiv 17, 88, 168–170, 290, 292 Bamian xiii, 65, 75, 94 Bandar Abbas 14, 88, 89 Bannu xiv Bara River xiv Barelvi 5 Barnes, Sir Hugh 115, 167–169, 257, 284

Wyatt_index.indd 316

Barrow, General Sir Edmund 284 Batoum 71, 79, 81, 82, 85, 293 Battenberg, Prince Louis of 284 Bayley, Charles 284 Benckendorff, Count Alexander 32–37, 39, 40, 42, 45, 47, 51–54, 72, 73, 80, 81, 83, 84, 130, 135, 141, 142, 178–180, 182, 228, 284 Bengal 188, 196, 284 Berlin 206; See also Congress of Berlin Bertie, Sir Francis 284 Bigge, Sir Arthur 284 Bismarck, Otto von 6, 7, 227, 284 Black Sea Clauses 141 Black Sea Fleet 72, 141, 142, 183 Blockades 18, 89, 90, 148, 171, 201 Bokhara xi, xii, 7, 9, 38, 64, 133, 136, 249, 288, 289, 294 Bolshevik Revolution 196 Bombay 105, 106, 189, 205, 242, 285, 289 Bosanquet, Vivian 284 Bosnian Crisis 7, 220 Boundary Pillars 21, 26, 31, 33, 37–39, 42, 43, 45–54, 56–58 British Agent at Kabul 58, 59, 121, 127, 193, 206, 284, 286, 287, 290, 294; See also Tiwana Malik, Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-din, Malik Talib Mehdi Khan and Hafiz Saifullah Khan British Government 31, 34–38, 40–42, 45–47, 51, 55, 57, 80, 82, 84, 114–118, 121, 123–132, 134–137, 141, 185, 186, 193, 198, 269, 270, 272, 291 Brodrick, St. John 27, 49, 55, 57–59, 67, 73, 80, 98, 99, 117, 122–126, 130–135, 137, 139, 190, 231, 251, 252, 284 Buner xiv, 87, 88, 147, 200 Bunerwals 200 Burma 106, 141, 294 Bushire 88, 289

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Index Caliphate 203 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir Henry 146, 284 Caspian Flotilla 64, 102 Caspian Sea xi, xii Casus Belli 23, 27, 29, 50, 120, 162, 175 Caucasus 67, 82, 83 Cavaignari, Louis 9, 284 Cavalry 67, 76, 101–103, 105, 106, 108, 174, 256 Cawnpore Mosque Riot 198 Central Asia xi, xii, 2, 6–9, 11–13, 15, 16, 22, 26, 28, 30, 38, 41–43, 45, 47–53, 61–73, 80–85, 95, 99, 103, 114, 115, 120, 133, 145, 146, 149, 157, 160, 161, 176, 182, 184, 185, 187, 189, 204, 208, 209, 213, 240, 249, 251, 278, 285–287, 292, 294 Central Powers 201, 205, 206, 288 Chakdara xiv Chaman 94, 124, 168, 171 Chamberlain, Austen 284 Charbar 88 Charikar 65, 75, 77 Charjui xii Charkhi Clan 3, 4, 287 Cheliabinsk xii China 7, 140, 180, 185, 240, 273, 275 Chinese Turkestan xi, xii, 240 Chirol, Valentine 181, 259, 284 Chitral xiv, 14, 75, 87, 119, 123, 124, 174, 176, 225, 246, 287, 288–290, 294 Chitral Campaign 87, 174, 176, 225, 246, 288, 289 Chitralis 164 Churchill, Sir Winston 246, 285 Clarke, E.H.S. 120, 124, 285 Clarke, Sir George Sydenham 19, 22, 23, 29, 70, 85–87, 91, 98–100, 106– 108, 100–113, 142, 146, 149–154, 156, 161, 165, 168, 170, 172, 173, 175, 176, 181, 210, 215–217, 226, 243, 245, 247, 255, 256, 285

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Clementico 38 Cloak of Muhammad 218 Close Border Policy 18 Command of the sea 96, 150, 210, Committee of Imperial Defence 19, 22, 28, 29, 64, 69, 70, 80, 85, 86, 91, 93, 94, 101, 102, 105, 108, 113, 114, 145, 171, 255, 285, 286, 292; As CID 28, 29, 64, 69, 70, 80, 85, 86, 91, 93, 94, 101, 102, 105, 108, 145 Congress of Berlin 6, 14 Conservative Government 23, 146, 284, 288 Conservatives 21, 142, 186, 284, 285, 288, 292 Council of India 167, 184, 189, 284, 286, 289 Cox, Sir Percy 88, 285 Craddock, Reginald 285 Creagh, General Sir O’Moore 285 Crewe, Marquess of 190, 200–202, 285 Crimean War 7, 30, 41 Cromer, Sir Evelyn Baring Earl of 189, 285 Crump, I.M. 219, 285 Curzon, George Nathaniel 18, 20, 27, 30, 36, 37, 42, 45, 47, 49, 52, 55–59, 66–68, 80, 90, 114–117, 120, 122, 124–126, 129, 132, 134, 137–139, 147, 157, 182, 184, 189–191, 209, 221, 249, 251, 253, 285 Dakka xiv, 110, 130, 131, 155, 158, 164, 168, 171, 174 Dane, Sir Louis 6, 22, 23, 26, 46, 60, 114–140, 146, 169, 186, 193, 208, 209, 231, 248, 249, 252, 272, 285, 286, 290 Dane Mission 22, 26, 46, 60, 114, 120, 130, 137, 140, 209, 231, 285, 288, 290 Dane Treaty 23, 169, 186, 193, 208, 290; See also Kabul Treaty Daoud Khan, Prince Muhammad 214, 285

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Dardanelles 12, 72, 183, 288 Dari 28 Deane, Sir Harold 91, 100, 219, 285 Defence of India 1, 20–23, 69, 86, 91, 95, 96, 115–117, 132, 140, 147, 174, 178, 179, 185, 208, 210–212, 255 Delhi xii Deoband 5 Dera Ismail Khan xiv Dir xiv, 87, 147, 246 Direct Communications 34, 40, 41, 44, 58, 125, 127, 130, 249, 252, 287 Direct Relations 21, 25, 30–36, 38, 41, 44, 45, 47–52, 58, 84, 114, 127, 180, 208, 271, 279 Disraeli, Benjamin 6, 285 Dobbs, Henry R.C. 21, 24–26, 45, 46, 49–61, 67, 68, 88, 114, 115, 123, 139, 196, 208, 219, 231, 233–235, 248, 283, 286, 287, 294 Dobbs Mission 26, 46, 57, 58, 60, 61, 114, 123, 196, 231 Dodd, Major 200, 201, 285 Dogger Bank Incident 141, 142 Donald, Colonel 200, 201, 286 Doshi xiii, 75 Dost Muhammad 218, 286 Dostem, General Rashid 220, 286 Douglas, Colonel J.A. 286 Duff, Sir Beauchamp 147–154, 162, 164, 166, 172–175, 200, 216, 256, 286 Dunlop-Smith, Sir James 184, 286 Durand Agreement 130–132, 167 Durand Line xiv, 2, 17, 86, 90, 91, 100, 118, 130, 148, 164, 168, 173, 210, 214, 216, 243 Durand, Sir Mortimer 170, 171, 286 Durnovo, P.N. 12, 286

Esher, Lord Reginald Balliol Brett Second Viscount 142, 150, 156, 157, 160, 167, 173, 255, 286 Expeditions (against the Tribes) 17–19, 87–91, 97, 109, 148, 154–156, 168, 171, 191, 200, 201, 210, 217, 225, 246, 291, 294; See also Blockades and Frontier Tribes

Edward VII 286 Egypt 2, 214, 285, 289, 294 Entente Cordiale 2, 181 Enver Pasha 203, 205

Gandamak xiv, 158, 160, 171 Geography 14, 19, 21, 99, 158, 215, 216; See also Terrain Geok Tepe 10, 293

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Faizabad 14, 118, 133 Fakir of Ipi 218, 286 Fakir Saiyid Iftikhar-ud-Din 286 Farah 4, 65, 75, 92, 94, 95, 101, 108, 158, 161, 163, 167 Far East 2, 6, 7, 51, 53, 61, 64, 66, 69, 71, 74, 80, 82, 91, 140–143, 145 Firozkuhis 38 First Afghan War 16, 20, 166, 218 First Balkan War 198 First World War 2, 4, 7, 18, 24, 139, 184, 196, 207, 211–213, 284, 287, 292 Fisher, Colonel John 286 Fitzmaurice, Lord E. 189, 286 Fitzpatrick, Sir Dennis 184, 286 Forage 10, 70, 74, 101, 103, 109–111, 155, 160, 161 Foreign Office 23, 31–37, 41, 44, 47, 55, 71, 81, 123, 140, 179–182, 184, 185, 208, 211, 252 Forward Defence Strategy 14, 18, 19, 22, 87, 90, 100, 149, 151, 154, 156, 172, 185, 210 France 2, 7, 15, 16, 141, 145, 181, 201, 259, 288 French, Sir John 174, 255, 287 Frontier Tribes 6, 22, 86–88, 92, 94, 96, 108, 113, 116, 120, 121, 127, 130–133, 138, 162, 166, 168, 173, 175, 188, 209; See also Blockades, Expedition and Policy of Occupation and Disarmament

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Index George V 284, 287 German Foreign Ministry 204, 292 Germany 2, 6, 7, 12, 140, 146, 203, 206, 284 Ghaus-ud-Din, General 46, 287 Ghazni xiii, xiv, 92, 157, 159, 164 Ghilzai 4, 92 Ghulam Hayder Charkhi 4, 287 Gilgit xiii, xiv, 119, 176, 289 Girishk xiii, 75, 89, 92, 155, 156, 163, 168, 169, 173 Godfrey, S.H. 287 Godley, Sir Arthur 44, 131, 132, 184, 287 Gorchakov, Prince Alexander Mikhailovich 8, 287 Government of India 2, 9, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 31–47, 49, 52–54, 57–60, 62, 66, 68, 72, 73, 76, 80, 81, 84, 85, 93, 104–106, 114, 116–118, 120–127, 130, 132–139, 165, 169, 170, 181, 182, 184–187, 192, 194, 198, 200, 209, 231, 272, 284, 286, 289, 290 Governor of Herat 33, 36, 38–40, 42, 43, 46, 47, 49, 52, 55, 56, 58, 84, 123, 133, 283; See also Ahmed Jan Khan Grant Duff, Evelyn 287 Great Game 1, 2, 25, 213 Great Powers 2, 126, 128, 205 Greco-Turkish War 197 Grey, Sir Edward 23, 39, 154, 180, 182, 191, 255, 287 Grierson, General Sir James 74–76, 287 Grodokov, Colonel NI 287 Guerrillas 91, 151, 160, 215, 217 Gurden, B.E.M. 287 Habibia College 4 Habibullah Khan x, 2–4, 6, 22, 24, 47, 58, 60, 114–117, 121, 122, 126, 135, 138, 193, 203, 205–209, 212, 213, 218–221, 249, 272, 283, 287, 288, 290–292; Habibullah under

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Amir 2–6, 9, 20–29, 31, 32, 35–38, 40–48, 50, 53, 55–60, 65, 67, 68, 84, 87, 91, 100, 108, 114–139, 146, 148, 149, 152, 154, 155, 157, 159 161, 162, 165, 167–170, 173, 174, 176, 180, 185–195, 197, 199, 200, 202–209, 211–213, 216, 220, 226, 231, 248, 249, 251–253, 278–280, 283, 285, 286, 288, 290; Habibullah under Ameer x, 33, 55, 57, 126, 128, 130–132, 134, 135, 137, 191, 248 Hadda Mullah 218, 287 Hafiz Saifullah Khan 287 Hague Conference 142 Haji Gul Mohammad Khan, Brigadier 252, 287 Hakim, Mullah Abdul 201, 287 Haldane, Richard 146, 150, 153, 154, 255, 288 Hamilton, Lord George 30–35, 37, 38, 41, 43, 46, 181, 288, 292 Hamilton, Lieutenant-General Sir Ian 173–175, 288 Hardinge, Arthur 33, 181, 288 Hardinge, Sir Charles 12, 23, 41, 62, 70–72, 80–85, 142–144, 178–183, 191, 192, 196–202, 204, 259, 266, 288 Hartington, Marquess of 288 Hashtadan 123, 124 Hayashi, Baron 142, 210, 274, 277, 288 Hazarajat xiii, 21, 58, 92, 102 Helmand River and Valley 76, 77, 89, 100, 123, 157, 163, 218 Hentig, Werner Otto von 196, 204– 207, 211, 281, 282, 288, 294 Herat xii, xiii, 4, 6, 9, 13, 14, 21, 61, 65, 68, 74, 75, 84, 88, 89, 91, 92, 94, 95, 99, 101, 104, 108, 114, 115, 118, 123, 133, 194, 196, 205, 208, 210, 219, 283, 286, 287, 294; See also Russian attempts to secure direct relations and Dobbs Mission. Discussed at the Morley SubCommittee 149, 152, 158, 161, 164, 167, 169, 171

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Herat Division xiii, 92 Herbert, A. 288 Heri Rud River xiii, 33 Hindu Kush Mountains xiii, 27, 62, 74, 75, 100, 108, 124, 125, 153, 155, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 173 Hirtzel, Sir Arthur 154, 175, 288 Holderness, T.W. 288 Holdich, Sir Thomas 157, 159–161, 172, 288 Hunza 119, 225 Imperial Defence 19, 86 Inayatullah Khan 3, 4, 205–207, 288, 291, 293 India Office 36, 43, 44, 47, 54, 57, 73, 115, 117, 130, 135, 137, 147, 154, 157, 179, 181, 184, 194, 212, 251, 252, 284, 285, 288, 289, 292, 293 India Office Political Department 157, 288, 292 Indian Army 17, 19–22, 25–29, 62, 63, 65, 68, 71, 76, 77, 79, 80, 86, 87, 91–95, 97–101, 104–106, 108, 110, 117, 118, 125, 141, 145, 149–153, 156, 157, 159, 163–170, 172, 175–177, 185, 187, 188, 199, 200, 208–211, 285–287, 289, 290, 292 Indian Mutiny 96, 97, 188 Indian Nationalists 165 Indian Political Department 88, 287, 294 Indian Survey Department 157, 159, 288 Indochina 141 Indus Line 93, 99, 156, 157, 166 Indus River xii, xiv, 14, 17, 90, 93 Indus School 154 Infantry 11, 67, 79, 81, 102, 161, 256 Intelligence 10, 12, 14, 20, 46, 62, 67, 71, 89, 118, 165, 205, 209, 283, 294 Intelligence Department 64, 81, 91 ISAF 215 Islam 5, 11, 13, 20, 188, 196, 198, 202, 203, 211, 248, 283, 290, 292

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Isvolsky, Alexander M. 182, 187, 191–194, 211, 220, 260, 288 Italo-Turkish War 196–198; As Tripoli War 7 Jalalabad xiii, xiv, 91, 92, 111, 155, 160, 171, 175, 212, 214 Jamrud 107 Jamshedi Crisis 1, 24, 192, 193, 196, 211, 220, 262 Jamshedis 38, 193–196, 220, 292 Japan 7, 22, 53, 61, 66, 69, 70, 80, 82, 83, 98, 116, 119, 120, 133, 140–146, 148, 155, 174–176, 182, 185, 209, 210, 248, 273–277, 288–290; See also Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902), Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1905) and Russo-Japanese War Jaxartes River xi, xii Jihad x, 5, 24, 120, 159, 166, 196, 199, 204–206, 248 Jirga 4, 5, 170, 197, 200, 201, 286 Kabul x, xii, xiii, xiv, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 13, 14, 20–24, 26, 30, 46, 47, 55, 57–60, 64, 65, 74–76, 86, 90–92, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101, 104, 107–112, 114–140, 146, 149, 150, 152, 153, 155–161, 164–176, 187, 192, 193, 197, 199, 203–209, 212–214, 219, 220, 231, 236, 256, 269, 272, 278, 281, 284–287, 290, 293, 294 Kabul Division xiii, 92 Kabul-Kandahar Line xiii, 18, 19, 29, 79, 90, 92–94, 97, 99, 100, 109, 110, 132, 146, 149, 151, 153, 154, 157, 159, 163–165, 169, 188, 209–211, 216, 218 Kabul River xiv, 67, 87, 104, 147, 148, 164, 171, 173 Kabul River Line 104, 173 As Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension 65, 67, 108, 155, 158, 160, 164, 168, 171, 174

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Index Kabul Treaty 209, 272; See also Dane Treaty Kafiristan 160; See also Nuristan Kandahar x, xii, xiii, 4, 9, 13–15, 58, 65, 75–77, 88–95, 100–102, 107– 109, 118, 124, 149, 155, 158, 159, 161, 163, 167–169, 171, 173, 175, 176, 197, 236, 256, 290, 293 Kandahar Division xiii, 92 Karachi 105 Karzai, Hamid 220, 288 Kashgar 13, 79, 185, 290; See also Chinese Turkestan Kashmir 13, 14, 285, 294 Kauffman, General K.P. 288 Kazakh Horde 7 Kazakhstan 8, 240 Kelly, Colonel 289 Kemball, Lieutenant Colonel C.A. 88, 289 Khan Bahadur Mirza Yakub Ali Khan 118 Khiva 7, 9, 288 Khorasan 13, 103, 157 Khost xiii, xiv, 4, 92, 164, 197–200, 213, 290 Khostwals 199–201 Khyber Pass xiv, 14, 106, 116, 199, 225, 246, 287 Kirman 88 Kitchener, Lord Herbert Horatio 19, 22, 23, 27, 28, 62, 63, 67, 70, 76, 77, 80, 90, 91, 95–98, 100, 109, 116, 122, 130, 145, 147, 155, 157, 162, 163, 175, 185, 188, 189, 215–218, 237, 246, 284, 286, 289 Kitchener’s Reform of the Indian Army 22, 95–98, 104–107, 154, 166, 175 Kizil Arvat xii Klemm, M. 289 Kohat xiv, 246 Kokand xi, xii, 7, 9 Kokovtsov, V.N. 289

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Komura, Baron 289 Korea 140, 144 Krasnovodsk xi, xii, 64, 67, 69, 84 Kuh-i Malik Siah 89 Kuropatkin, General A.N. 10, 12–15, 74, 82, 289 Kurram 108, 113, 116, 148, 155, 225, 246 Kurram River xiv, 87, 171 Kushk xi, xii, xiii, 27, 33, 38, 39, 63, 65, 67, 76, 84, 94, 102, 156, 168, 171, 194, 195, 231, 236 Laghman xiv, 212 Lahore xii, 96, 156 Lamington, Lord 189, 289 Lamsdorff, Count V.N. 31, 32, 35, 38, 42, 44–49, 51, 53, 54, 73, 80, 81, 83, 142, 143, 179, 289, 291 Landi Kotal 137 Lansdowne, Lord 31–37, 39–43, 45–47, 49, 51, 53, 57, 70, 72, 73, 80, 83, 84, 130, 135, 140–143, 178–180, 186, 190, 251, 274, 277, 289 Lee Warner, Sir William 184, 289 Lessar, Count Pavel Mikhailovich 289 Liberal Government 19, 23, 113, 122, 176, 188 Liberals 20, 23, 113, 142, 146, 176, 180, 182, 186, 283, 284, 287, 288, 290 Lindsay, Captain A.B. 175, 255, 289 Lines of Communication 10, 15, 22, 76, 90, 96, 106, 109, 113, 149, 155, 159, 162, 166, 174, 216, 288 Logistics 10, 11, 21, 22, 65, 87, 91, 101, 108, 113, 150, 154, 172–174, 210, 215–217; See also Supply Loya Jirga 4 Lyall Agreement 9, 114, 208, 269, 270; See also Agreement of 1880 Lyall, Sir Alfred 28, 29, 169, 170, 208, 226, 289 Lyttelton, General Sir N.G. 152, 154, 158, 166, 255, 289 Lytton, Lord 17, 290

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Macartney, Sir George 290; See also Kashgar and Chinese Turkestan MacDonald, Sir Claude 70, 144, 152, 290 Madras 80, 283 Mahsud Tribe xiv, 87, 88, 148, 200, 201, 218, 225, 285–287 Maiden 153 Maimana xiii, 13, 287 Maiwand 1, 9, 284 Malakand xiv, 87, 216, 246, 287 Malakand Expedition 91, 97, 154, 225, 246, 285 Malakand Pass 246 Malik Talib Mehdi Khan 248, 290 Malleson, Colonel W. 122, 125, 248, 290 Manchuria 15, 69, 70, 74, 99, 144, 145, 155, 163, 180 Mangals 198, 291 Massoud, Ahmed Shah 217, 290 Mazar-i Sharif xii, xiii, 14, 57, 65, 74, 91, 93, 95, 118 McMahon, Sir Henry 37–39, 44, 45, 157, 290 Mecca 198 Mehsud, Hakimullah 217, 218, 290 Merv xi, xii, xiii, 10, 13, 67, 69, 84, 167 Meshed xi, xii, 13, 26, 33, 38–46, 49, 56, 62, 66–69, 79, 80, 88, 123, 133, 193, 194, 198, 209, 231, 283, 286, 290, 293, 294 Meshed Consulate 39, 40, 42 Meshed Intelligence Branch 46, 62, 67, 209, 294 Milyutin, General D.A. 8, 290 Minchin, Lieutenant Colonel Charles Frederick 66, 68, 290 Minto, Gilbert Elliot, 4th Earl of Minto 145, 166, 184, 185, 191–194, 209, 257, 286, 290 Miram Shah xiv, 203 Mohmand Tribe xiv, 87, 91, 101, 148, 164, 170, 225, 243, 248 Morley, John 146, 147, 149, 154, 155, 163, 166, 173, 175–177, 184–186, 188, 191–194, 290

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Morley Sub-Committee 23, 28, 29, 188, 210, 226, 255, 267, 284, 286, 288–293 Proceedings 147–177 Muhammad Akbar Khan 4, 290 Muhammad Hussain Khan 3, 126, 248, 290, 291 Muhammad Usman Khan 4, 290 Muhammad Yusuf Khan 135, 291 Mujahideen 217, 220, 286, 290 Mukden 7, 145 Mullah Omar 218, 219, 291 Mullaly, Herbert General 76, 77, 79, 291 Multan xii Murghab River xiii, 33, 55 Murzsteg Agreement 7; See also AustroRussian Agreement Musabihan 3, 4, 214, 291 Muscat 88, 89, 285 Nadir Shah, General 214, 284, 291 Najibullah, Muhammad 220, 286, 291 Napier, Lieutenant Colonel H.D. 64, 66, 67, 71, 79, 80, 82–85, 209, 241, 291 Nasratabad 89 Nasrullah Khan 3, 4, 119, 126–128, 135, 137, 191, 199, 205–207, 212, 213, 219, 248, 283, 290, 291 NATO 221 Near East 14 Nicholson, General W.G. 104, 154–157, 267, 291 Nicolas II 12, 254, 291 Niedermeyer-Hentig Mission 196, 204, 205–207, 211 Niedermeyer, Oskar von 291, 294 Niedermeyer Treaty 280–282 North-West Frontier xiv, 5, 14–18, 20, 27, 85, 88–90, 97, 99, 100, 106, 107, 118, 123, 144 145, 147, 154, 181, 185, 188, 189, 196, 199, 200, 203, 205, 206, 211, 214, 216–218, 225, 246, 285, 287, 293; See also Frontier Tribes North-West Frontier Province xiv, 17, 18, 91, 285, 291, 292 Novoe Vremya 48, 231

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Index Nowshera xiv, 174 Nuristan xiv; See also Kafiristan Nushki 75, 94 O’Beirne, H.J. 291 Obolensky, Prince 48, 50, 291 Odessa 81, 83, 284 O’Dwyer, Sir Michael 291 Omsk xii, 65 Operation Anaconda 217 Oppenheim, Max von 204, 292 Orakzai Tribe xiv, 148, 162, 225 Orenburg xii, 63 Orenburg-Tashkent Railway xii, 12, 15, 22, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69–73, 79–85, 91, 92, 94, 102, 103 Ottoman Empire 3, 7, 24, 204, 293; See also Turkey Oxus Flotilla 71, 95 Oxus River xiii, 2, 26, 63, 69, 80, 94, 98, 123, 124, 133, 134, 157, 167, 209, 252 Pack Transport, See Transport Pakistan 214–216 Palitsyn, General 61, 292 Pamir xi, 13, 14, 119, 133, 146 Pamirs Agreement 7 Pan-Islam 188, 196, 198, 202, 203, 211, 283 Panjdeh xi, 11, 17, 25, 29, 30 36, 54, 67, 194 Panjdeh Incident 11, 17, 169, 208 Panj Kora River xiv Panjshir Valley 217, 290 Parachinar xiv, 164, 171, 174 Pashtunistan 119, 214 Pashtuns 5, 28; See also Frontier Tribes Pashtunwali 5 Pathans, See Pashtuns and Frontier Tribes Peiwar Kotal xiv, 106, 111, 124 Persia xii, xiii, 4, 9, 12, 14, 38, 48, 66, 67, 75, 83, 88, 89, 94, 124, 127, 141, 157, 178, 180–186, 189, 190, 196, 197, 203, 204, 206, 211, 213, 214, 243, 269, 280, 281, 285, 288, 292, 294

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Persian Gulf 7, 9, 196, 285 Under Gulf 14, 88, 89, 151, 157, 178, 180, 189, 190 Peshawar xii, xiv, 14, 60, 67, 94, 96, 155, 217 Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension 65, 67, 108, 155, 158, 160, 164, 168, 171, 174 As Kabul River Line 104, 173 Petropavlovsk xii Political and Secret Department 184, 205, 289 Political Officers 5, 18, 21, 45, 168, 219, 221, 285 Policy of Occupation and Disarmament 90, 91, 100, 210 Port Arthur 7, 145 Powindah, The Mullah 200, 201, 218, 292 Punjab 16, 17, 154, 156, 170, 285, 291 Punjab System 170 Qawm 5 Quetta xii, xiii, 14, 67, 77, 155, 163, 246 Rabbani, Burhannuddin 220, 292 Railheads 70, 74, 75, 87, 99, 103, 106, 107, 109, 110, 131, 150, 172, 174; See also Railways and Strategic Railways Railways 12, 13, 15, 22, 25, 29, 61, 63–67, 69–85, 87, 90–96, 98, 99, 101–103, 105–109, 116, 117, 123, 124, 138, 149, 151, 155, 157, 158, 160–164, 166–169, 171–175, 180, 184, 185, 197, 209, 210, 213, 243; See also Railheads and Strategic Railways Rawalpindi xiv, 156 Razmak xiv Red Crescent Fund 198, 283 Reinforcements (to India) 22, 65, 67, 76–79, 81, 87, 91, 92, 94–97, 100, 101, 108, 141, 145, 150–152, 154, 156, 163, 165, 166, 171, 173, 175, 176, 210 Reinsurance Treaty 7

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Reza Shah 213, 292 Rifles 88, 89, 123, 148, 149, 168, 206, 280 Ritchie, Sir Richmond 157, 292 Rittich, Staff Captain P.A. 10, 12, 14–16, 292 Roberts, Sir Frederick Field Marshal Earl 26, 27, 29, 67, 69, 76, 90, 104, 107–110, 131, 132, 145, 152, 155, 162–166, 168, 197, 215, 218, 244, 256, 292, 294 Roos-Keppel, Sir George 196, 199, 200, 206, 219, 292 Rumbold, Sir Horace 292 Russia 21, 25, 32, 47–52, 58, 114, 127, 180, 208, 271, 279; See also Central Asia, Russian Turkestan under Turkestan and Anglo-Russian Convention Russian Agents (to Afghanistan) 32–37, 50, 53, 179, 186, 278 Russian Army 26, 58, 70, 79–81, 95, 101, 157, 176, 196 Russian attempts to secure direct relations 21, 25, 30, 41, 44, 45, 47–52, 58, 84, 114, 127, 180, 208, 271, 279 Russian Foreign Ministry 8, 26, 47, 51, 52, 54, 194, 294 Russian Government 8, 12, 15, 29, 31–35, 37, 39–51, 53–55, 83, 84, 122, 130, 142, 143, 178–183, 187, 191, 193, 195, 211, 252, 259, 278, 279 Russian Invasion of Afghanistan (1979) 215, 217, 218 Russian Memorandum of 6 February 1900 31, 32, 44–46, 48, 49, 54, 100, 271 Russian Revolution (1905) 7, 11, 16, 182, 185 Russo-Japanese War 2, 11, 12, 16, 22, 23, 69, 85, 98, 99, 140, 146, 155, 178, 183, 209, 289; See also Manchuria, Far East, Mukden, Port Arthur and Tsushima

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Russo-Turkish War 6; See also Treaty of San Stefano and Congress of Berlin Said Abid Hosain 118 Saiyid Ahmed Beg 193, 292 Salisbury, 3rd Marquess, Robert Gascoyne Cecil 291, 292 Samara xii Samarkand xi, xii, 7, 13, 14, 63, 64, 80, 136, 193–195, 205, 292 Samarkand-Termez Railway 63, 64, 73, 76, As Samarkand-Oxus Line 80 Sandeman Policy 17, 18, 168, 170, 210, 257 Sandeman, Sir Robert 17, 168, 292 Sanderson, Sir T.H. 71, 190, 293 Sarrakhs 48 Satow, Sir Ernest 293 Saur Revolution 214, 285 Sazonov Sergei 293 Scott-Moncrieff, Major General Sir George 171, 172, 293 Second Afghan War 1, 9, 11, 17, 20, 102, 106, 109, 110, 157, 158, 162, 167, 168, 173, 218, 244, 284, 289, 290, 293 Seistan xiii, 14, 68, 69, 75, 89, 93, 94, 123, 124, 128, 151, 157, 159, 162, 163, 167, 169, 172, 176, 178, 180, 182, 185, 204, 243, 286, 294 Seistan Arbitration Commission 37–39, 44, 45, 157, 290 Selborne, Earl William of 293 Sepoys 89 Sheikh Junaid 35, 67 Sher Ali 293 Shilman-Ghakke Line 173 Simla 63, 74, 91, 154, 172 Sind 106 Siraj-al-Akhbar Afghania 3, 203, 294 Sirdars 46, 127, 269 Skobolev, General M.D. 9, 10, 293 Smyth, Captain H 293 Sobolev, Major-General L.N. 9, 11, 293 Soraya, Queen 213, 283, 293 Soviet Union 215

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Index Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil 39, 48–51, 63, 179, 181, 183, 184, 293 Stedman, Sir Edward 157–159, 293 Stevens, Patrick 71, 81, 83, 85, 293 Stewart, General Donald 107, 247, 293 Stolyetov, General M. 9, 293 Stolypin, P.A. 16, 293 St Petersburg 15, 23, 26, 31, 32, 34–36, 38, 39, 41, 44, 46–49, 51, 53, 54, 62, 64, 66, 71, 72, 80, 81, 84, 85, 178, 179, 182, 183, 186, 190, 191, 209, 271, 288, 291, 293 St Petersburger Zeitung 41 Strategic Railways xii, 22, 62, 64, 70, 80, 95, 98, 105, 109, 116, 162, 172; See also Orenburg Tashkent Railway, Trans-Caspian Railway, TransSiberian Railway, Samarkand-Termez Railway, Peshawar-Dakka Railway Extension, Kabul River Line, Railways and Railheads Supplies 67, 70, 73, 74, 84, 93, 94, 101, 104, 107, 109, 111, 154, 158, 165, 167, 173, 174, 246, 256 Supply 10, 13, 18, 19, 22, 33, 64–66, 74, 90, 93, 99–103, 105, 107–111, 113, 117, 145, 149, 150, 152–161, 163–166, 168, 171–173, 210, 216, 217, 221, 245; See also Logistics Swat xiv, 87, 90, 108, 147, 156, 197, 246, 287 Swat River xiv Tajiks 28, 214, 240, 284 Taliban 215, 218, 221, 290, 291 Tank xiv, 200, 201 Taraki, Nur Muhammad 220, 293 Tarzi, Mahmud 3, 4, 283, 288, 293 Tashkent xi, xii, 7, 11, 42, 63, 65, 67, 79, 84, 195, 288 Tcherkassoff, M. 294 Tehran 33, 34, 39, 179, 181, 183, 207, 286, 287, 293 Termez xii, xiii, 63–67, 73, 76, 94, 99, 108, 158, 161, 236

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325

Terrain 2, 19, 91, 100, 161, 168, 215; See also Geography Thal 171 Third Afghan War 1, 199, 212, 217, 286; See also Treaty of Rawalpindi Tibet 14, 79, 106, 179, 180, 182, 183, 189, 224, 294; See also Younghusband Times (Newspaper) 181, 284 Tirah xiv, 87, 97, 148, 153–56, 162, 225 Tirah Expedition and Campaign 87, 97, 148, 156, 188, 291 Tiwana Malik 59, 294 Tochi xiv, 203, 225 Trade (between Russia and Afghanistan) 27, 37, 41, 48, 51, 54, 64, 115, 123, 138, 231, 279 Trans-Caspia 33, 39, 40, 54, 64, 66, 69, 240 Trans-Caspian Railway xii, 12, 63, 69, 82, 83 Trans-Caspian Review 52–54, 64 Transport - Mechanised Transport 109, 155; Motorised Transport 213; Pack Transport 65, 68, 74, 80, 85, 101, 104–110, 154, 156, 157, 161, 166, 172, 246; Animals 29, 65, 66, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 154, 156, 157, 174, 245, 246, 256; Bullocks 104–109, 155, 216, 246; Camels 10, 11, 66–68, 81, 98, 103– 112, 153, 154, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 166, 173, 174, 210, 216, 244, 246, 256; Horses 66, 80, 102, 103, 105, 107, 244; Mules 80, 103–109, 154, 155, 157, 164, 174, 244, 246; Ponies 105, 106, 108, 109, 154; Wheeled Transport 95, 104, 160 246 Trans-Siberian Railway 70, 163 Treaty of Paris 7 Treaty of Rawalpindi 213 Treaty of San Stefano 6 Tribal Militias 18, 89, 168 Tripoli War 7; As Italo-Turkish War 196–198

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Tsushima 7, 145 Turkestan 240; Afghan Turkestan 4, 6, 26–28, 57, 91, 92, 94, 99, 101, 104, 123, 149, 152, 155, 158, 159, 164, 167, 169, 208, 225, 240; Chinese Turkestan xi, xii, 240; Russian Turkestan 17, 34, 58, 63, 66, 67, 71, 72, 79–85, 91, 237, 240, 280, 292 Turkestan Division xiii, 93 Turkestan Military District 79, 81, 82 Turkey 6, 14, 196, 197, 199, 201–203, 206, 211, 213, 214, 248, 283; See also Ottoman Empire Turkoman 10, 161, 194, 195, 293 Turkoman Steppe 9, 10 Ufa xii Uzbeks 28 Wakhan 75, 119, 121 Wakhan Allowance 119, 121 Wana xiv Wanliss, Major C. 46, 58, 59, 294 Wargame at Simla (1903) 63, 74, 154; As Kriegsspiel 99 War Office 64, 71, 87, 91, 105, 176 Wassmuss, Wilhelm 204, 294

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Wastage 74, 79, 95, 104–107, 112, 150, 166, 171 Wazirs xiv, 87, 148, 292 Waziristan xiv, 87, 90, 168, 170, 197, 200, 216, 218, 285, 286, 292, 294 Whyte, Colonel J.F. 33, 34, 38, 43–46, 286, 294 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 7, 12, 254, 294 Willcocks, Sir James 294 Winchester House Conference 144 Winter, Captain 294 Witte, S.Y. 294 Wolseley, Sir Garnet Field Marshal Viscount 227, 294 Yangi Kila 134, 135, 252 Yate, Colonel A.C. 88, 294 Yezd 88 Younghusband, Colonel Francis 294; Expeditionary Mission to Tibet 79, 106 Younghusband Treaty 137, 179, 253 Young Turk Revolution 4, 7, 220 Yusufzai Tribe xiv Zahir Shah 214, 285, 294 Zakha Khels 164, 191, 225, 294 Zinoviev, I.A. 294

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