Advances in Psychology Volume 38 The Roots of Perception

THE ROOTS OF PERCEPTION Individual Differences in Information Processing within and beyond Awareness

ADVANCES IN PSYCHOLOGY 38 Editors

G. E. STELMACH

P. A . VROON

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM . NEW YORK . OXFORD .TOKYO

THE ROOTS OF PERCEPTION Individual Differences in Information Processing within and beyond Awareness Edircd b y

Uwe HENTSCHEL Psychology Department Mainz University Mainz FRG

Gudmund SMITH Psychology Departmenf Lund University Lund Sweden

Juris G. DRAGUNS Psychology Department Pennsylvania State University Pennsylvariir U.S . A .

NORTH-HOLLAND AMSTERDAM. NEW YORK . OXFORD .TOKYO

QELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V.. 1986 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprotluced. stored in a retrieval system, o r transmitted, in any form o r by any means, electronic, mechanical. photocopying. recording o r otherwise. without the prior permission of the copyright owner

ISBN: 0 444 70075 7

Publish ers: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHERS B.V P.O. Box 1991 1000 B Z Amsterdam The Netherlands Sole distributors for the U.S . A . nnrl Cnriricla: ELSEVIER SCIENCE PUBLISHING COMPANY. INC. S2Vanderbilt Avenue NewYork, N.Y. 10017 U.S.A.

Library of Congress Catalogingin-PublirrtionData

The Roots of perception. (Advances i n psychology ; 3b) Includes indexes. 1. Perccption. 2. Human information procession. 3. Subconsciousness. 4. I n d i v i d u a l i t y . I. Hentschel, W e . 11. Smith, Gudmund John Wilhelm, 1920111. flraguns, Juris G., 1932IV. Series: Advances i n psychology (Amsterdam, Netherlands) ; 38. BF311. Abh 198t 153.7 CC-lb563 ISBN 0-444-70075-7

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PRINTED I N T H E NETHERLANDS

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vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

xi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xv

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

xvii

PART I: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Chapter 1. Subliminal perception, microgenesis, and personality. Uwe Hentschel, Gudrnund Smith, & Juris G. Draguns ......................................

3

PAR J 11: EXPERIMENTS ON PRECONSCIOUS PROCESSING: EFFECTS RELA TED TO DIFFERENT METHODS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Chapter 2. Personality factors and subliminal perception. Norman F. Dixon & Susan H.A. Henley .............................................................

39

Chapter 3. The subliminal psychodynamic activation method: Comprehensive listing update, individual differences, and other considerations. Lloyd H. Silverman & Carol J. Geisler ............................................................. 49 Chapter 4. The effects of subliminally presented sexual and aggressive stimuli on literary creativity. Maxine J. Antell & Leo Goldberger ..................................................................... 75 Chapter 5. Perceptual defense: A paradigm for investigating psychopathology? Susan H. A. Henley ............................................................................................... 93 Chapter 6. Size and shape of the subliminal window. Donald P. Spence, Lorrie Klein, & Ricardo J. Fernandez ...............................

103

PART 111: THE FURTHER UNFOLDING OF THE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS: JHREA T AND DEFENSE IN PERCEPT-GENETIC PROCEDURES

Chapter 7. Life panorama under the microscope: A paradigmatic case study. U l f Kragh ................................................................................................................

145

Table of Contents

viii

Chapter 8. Activation of intrapsychic conflict and defense: The amauroscopic technique. Bert Westerlundh & Hans Sjoback ..................................................................... 161 Chapter 9. Percept-genetic defenses against anxiety and a threatened sense of self as seen in terms of t h e Spiral Aftereffect Technique. Alf L. Andersson & Margot Bengtsson ............................................................. PART

IV.

RELATING

SEMANTIC

PRECONSClOUS

STRUCTURES:

PROCESSES

SUBLIMINAL

TO

COGNlTlVE

PERCEPTION

AND

217 AND

MICRO-

GENESIS COMBINED

Chapter 10. Psychodynamic personality correlates of creativity. Uwe Hentschel & Uta Schneider ..... .................................................... Chapter 11. Identification with another person: Manipulated by means of subliminal stimulation. 277 Gudmund Smith, Ingegerd Carlsson, & Anna Danielsson ........... Chapter 12. Schizophrenic perception and i t s psychopathological implications: A microgenetic study. Hans Kreitler & Shulamith Kreitler ..................... I ............................................ 301 Chapter 13. Subliminal perception as the first stage of the perceptual process: Can personality be revealed so early in the sequence? Juris G. Draguns .................................................................................................

331

PART V : PSYCHOPHYSlOLOGlCAL CORRELATES OF T H E PERCEPTUAL PROCESS: EEG A N D CBF AS INDICATORS

Chapter 14. Regional changes in cerebral blood flow during increased anxiety in patients with anxiety neurosis. Aki M. Johanson, Jar1 Risberg, Peter Silfverskiold, & Gudmund Smith ..... 353

Chapter 15. Evoked potentials as unconscious indicators of cognitive control. Wolfram Ehlers & Dietrich Munz ......................................................................

361

Chapter 16. Anxiety and covert changes of attention control. Peter Glanzmann & Werner D. Frohlich ..........................................................

381

Table of Contents PART

VI.

A

ix

CRITICAL

MICROGENESIS:

LOOK

COMMENTS

AT AND

SUBLIMINAL REVIEWS

PERCEPTION FROM

AND

DIFFERENT

STANDPOINTS

Chapter 17. Percept-genesis and the 'scientific method'. Martin Johnson ....................................................................................

.... 403

Chapter 18. Looking at some New Look problems from an information processing point of view. Wolfgang Prinz ............................. ............................................ ..... 419 Chapter 19. Microgenesis and general systems in psychology. Kazimierz Obuchowski ........... .................................................

..... 427

Chapter 20. A metatheoretical analysis of the percept-genetic personality theory. 441 K. A. M adsen ......................................................................................................... Name index 1 ................................

...............................................

455

.............................

.....................................................

465

Subject index

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xi

PREFACE

In searching for empirical avenues of assessing personality, psychologists almost inevitably come to grips with the phenomena of perception in their several guises. Even in responding to simple questionnaire items self-observation is indispensable, When person perception comes into play, the impression of the other, based a6 it is on the perceiver's characteristic style and mode of perceiving the external environment, in turn offers clues to the distinguishing features of the perceiver, It is this latter approach that is typical of the contributions of this volume. It is prominently exemplified by the operations of experiments in which different groups of subjects are compared by means of their perceptual responses. This avenue of investigation has a long research history. It acquired prominent international visibility through the efforts of the pioneers of the New Look movement. In the chapters of this book, the authors have ns a rule not chosen objects of perception arbitrerily for purposes of personality assessment. Nor have they focused upon the automatized perceptual processes that loom large in traditional experimental psychology research. Rathe r , the question has been posed about the perception of two kinds of s t i m uli: those that remain below the absolute threshold for protracted periods of time (subliminal perception/preconscious processing) and the perception of which is followed over time from tcmporary subliminality to a point of clear recognition ( Aktualgenese , microgenesis, percept-genesis) Under the title of "The Roots of Perception'' the temporal portion of each perceptual process is articulated which is relevant to individual or group differences in the variables identified by the several subheadings of the volume. Preconscious processing and microgenesis are at this point not parts of the mainstream of psychology. They are, however, separately and jointly, two active and dynamic branches of research. A t the very least, they may be expected to provide an invigorating effect upon individually oriented psychology of perception in the future. Each of these two research topics has its own history of development, marked by some features that have remained constant over time and by others that have undergone dramatic transformations. Some of these changes are so pronounced that they can be accommodated under the original label only with the greatest of difficulty. In the case of subliminal perception, it is above all the area of

.

xii

Preface

methodology that has proved to be very sensitive to change. In the course of time, a considerably increased degree of objectivity has been achieved as a result of these methodological refinements. A s the mainly German enterprise of microgenesis (Aktualgenese) was transmuted to percept-genesis in Sweden, the objectives shifted from general to differential psychology and came to be focused upon the standardization and validation of personality assessment procedures. The vitality of a research area is attested not only by the number of relevant publications, but also by meetings and conferences for face-toface exchange of technical and scientific information. In 1977, the First Conference on Microgenesis took place in Mainz. In 1980, the Second Conference was held in Lund under the title of "Microgenesis and Related Issues. It The proceedings of both of theae international meetings have been published (see References in Chapter 1). At the Second European Conference on Personality in Bielefeld in 1984, chaired by A. Angleitner, one of the editors (U.H.) organized a symposium composed of contributions by investigators of both of the topics represented in the present volume : preconscious processing and microgenesis. These presentations were followed by a panel discussion at which a number of invited speakers provided an appraisal of these two lines of research from their respective theoretical points of view. After the tlymposium, the editors tried to supplement the papers given with other contributions relevant to the several topics of the volume. They also preparcd an introductory chapter. Each of the contributions was written to be understandable on its own. Only in those chapters in which a critical appraisal of preconscious processing and microgenesis is undertaken is the knowledge of the principles of these two phenomena presupposed. A s editors, we have tried to make sure that the connection between the two planes of data and theory is at all times clear to the reader. This aspiration, however, does not go so far as to make the volume a "practical manual" for the application of the experimental procedures in question. Those readers who may want to undertake studies with these methods are encouraged to solicit further relevant information from the respective authors who, as we know, will respond to these inquiries readily and gladly. The formulation of specific research questions and the development of methods tailor-made in response to these conceptualizations is a charncteristic feature of these two topics of investigation. These special and, sometimes, unusual methods are in turn linked to the theoretical assumptions on

Preface

xiii

which the investigation of these topics rests. In this manner, it imbues the several chapters with their specific and differentiating accents. In the introductory chapter we have attempted to pinpoint the commonalities among t h e several contributions. Even though the various arguments for or against preconscious processing and/or microgenesis may be found in Part VI of the volume and thus may anticipate the conclusions of the reader, we have striven to leave our readers' judgment enough play for them to arrive at their own evaluation of the concepts and findings presented here. We would be happy i f we have managed to communicate some of the personal fascination with preconscious processing and microgenesis that the three of us share. The three editors proceeded from a common conception about the book from the very s t a r t , shared much of the editorial work among them, and arrived at high ?'interrater reliability" in judging proposals for the final version. However, team work also meant division of labor: Uwe Hentschel collected most of the material and corresponded with the contributors: for obvious geographical reasons, only he and Gudmund Smith were able to meet before preparing the final version of the manuscript; Juris Draguns undertook to scrutinize and improve the language of several chapters and to translate some contributions originally written in German. Mainz, West Germany

U.H.

Lund, Sweden

G.S.

. .

University Park, Penn , U S . A . March 1986

J.G.D.

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xv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When preparing a book with contributions from several authors, editors depend on the generous help of many hands. The beginning of the present editorial endeavor was facilitated b y the conference board and program committee of the Second European Conference of Personality in Bielefeld, West Germany, of May 1984. When the group of oontributors was enlarged beyond the participants at that conference, the editors encountered very cooperative and encouraging responses from the new authors. All of the contributors offered their cooperation from the very beginning and up to the point when the final edition of the manuscript was ready for processing. The cooperation with North-Holland and its representatives has also been rewarding throughout. The road from the initial conception of a book to a camera-ready manuscript is full of obstacles. The publisher gave

US

all the advice and support we asked for and needed.

Mr. Alfred K. Weber deserves special thanks, not only for his typing of the final manuscript but for his competent solutions of many intricate editorial problems, not least, problems of language. He readily accepted the responsibility for bringing the manuscript into i t s final form and for adapting the reference lists to the APA standards.

M s . Barbara Pitzer assisted him most competently in typing several of the manuscripts.

MS. Sunhild Kohz redrew several of the figures, often found radically new solutions to improve them, and generally offered useful advice about lay-out

.

For the drawing on the half-title page we are indebted to the original to be found in Descartes' Discours De La Mkthode as first published by Jan Maire, Leyden, in 1637.

M r . Gernod Pfeiffer read and corrected all the galley-proofs. hlr. Manfred KieRling accomplished the final paging on the word processor.

Ms. Andrea Wigand helped compile the subject and name index. We gratefully acknowledge the permissions granted for the use of the following figures: chapter 1, Figure 1: Joseph R . Royce, University of Al-

xvi

Acknowledgements

berta, Edmonton and Academic Press, Orlando, Florida; chapter 1, Figure

2: Norman F. Dixon, University College, London; chapter 1, Figure 3: U11chapter 9 , Figures 1,2,3: Bouvier Verlag, Bonn. The Scandinavian Journal of Psychology generously allowed us to reprint material and text appearing in chapter 9 and 11; for chapter 4 copyright permission was granted by the Psychological Research Bulletin. We are grateful to tho Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat of Mainz for giving us access to their word processors, to the 'Verein zur Farderung pershlichkeits- und sozialpsychologischer Forschung e . V . I , and to the Swedish Humanistic and Social Science Research Council for various forms of financial support. stein Verlag, West-Berlin;

xvii

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Andersson, Alf L. Department of Applied Psychology. University of Lund, Lund, Sweden Antell, Maxine Joan Department of Psychology, New York University, Hew York, N Y 10003, USA

Bengtsson, Margot Department of Applied Psychology, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden Carlsson. Ingegerd Department of Psychology, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden Danielsson, Anna Department of Psychology, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden Dixon. Norman F. Department of Psychology, University College London, London WCIE 6BT, UIC Draguns , Juris G

.

Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA Ehlers, Wolfram Forschungsstelle fur Fernandez , Ricardo J

.

Psychotherapie,

Stuttgart

70,

West

Germany

Department of Psychiatry, UMDNJ-Rutgers Medical School, Piscataway , NJ 08854, USA Frohlich , Werner D. Institute of Psychology, Johannes Gutenberg-University , Mainz , West Germany Geisler, Carol J. Department of Psychology, N e w York University, New York,

N Y 10003, USA Glanzmann, Peter Institute of Psychology, Johannes Gutenberg-University , Mainz , West Germany Goldberger , Leo Department

of

NY 10003, USA . '.

.

Psychology,

New

York

University,

New

York,

List of Contributors

xviii

Henley, Susan H.A. Department of Psychology, University College London, London WCIE 6BT, U K Hentschel, Uwe Institute of Psychology, Johannes Gutenberg-University , hlainz , West Germany Johanson. A k i M. Department of Psychiatry, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden Johnson, Martin Parapsychological Laboratory, University of Utrecht , Utrecht , The Netherlands Kreitler, Hans Department of Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel Kreitler , Shulamith Department of Psychology, Tel-Aviv University, Tel-Aviv, Israel Madsen, K . B . Department of Education and Psychology, The Royal Danish School of

. .

Educational Studies, Copenhagen N V , Denmark Munz , Dietrich Forschungsstellc ftir Psychotherapie, Stuttgart 7 0 , West Germany Obuchowski, Kazimierz Department of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poznan, Poland Prinz, Wolfgang Department of Psychology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld , West G e r many Risberg, Jar1 Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital, Lund , Sweden Schneider , Uta Institute of Psychology, Johannes Gutenberg-University

, hlainz , West

Germany Silfverskidld , Peter Department of Psychiatry, University Hospital, Lund , Sweden Silverman, Lloyd H . Department of Psychology, New York University, New York,

N Y 10003, USA Sjoback, Hans Department of Psychology, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden

List of Contributors

xix

Smith, Gudmund J.W. Department of Psychology, University of Lund, Lund , Sweden Spence, Donald P . Department of Psychiatry, UMDNJ-Rutgers Medical School, Piscataway , NJ 08854, USA

Westerlundh, Bert Department of Psychology, University of Lund , Lund, Sweden

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PART I INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

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The Roots of Perception U.Hentechel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

3

SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION, MICROGENESIS, AND PERSONALITY

U w e Hcntschel University of Mainz Gudmund Smith Lund University Juris G . Draguns The Pennsylvania State university

PERCEPTION : A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE Perception abides by general laws, yet it is at the same time a highly individualized phenomenon. It is this apparent contradiction that makes the study of perception relevant both from a general psychological as well as from R differential point of view. The contradiction is dissolved if general species-specific regularities are effectively differentiated from processes which are individually structured and invested with meaning on the basis of their personal and subjective significance. In the present volume we propose to concentrate on the latter, individualized, aspects of perception. This kind of emphasis is not novel, yet it remains somewhat unusual. For this reason, it may be useful to specify the distinguishing features of the present volume : (1) We view perception as an evcnt over tine rather than a s an in-

stantaneous reaction to outside stimulation; ( 2 ) We also consider perception as an event the roots of which are to

be found beyond the restricted confines of awareness, often closely intertwined with the observer's private world of memories and emotional experiences. It may be illuminating, however, to begin this chapter with a few examples from the traditional areas of research in perception. These examples are chosen to show that even when experimenters have tried to keep perception isolated from such contaminating influences as motivation, emotion, or

past

biographical

experience

they

are

likely

to

confront

many

4

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

complications as they attempt to demonstrate the identity between an external object and its perceptual representation, which has been the core assumption of most of the classical or traditional theories of perception. In the case of color vision, the physical conditions which are necessary for color to be experienced are well established a s are also the physiological processing mechanisms. Yet, it has not been possible to this date to formulate a direct immediate connection between wave length and color perception. Thus, the Rtatement that "an object reflecting waves in the range of 7600-6500 Angstrom is upon qualitative transformations in the perceptual apparatus perceived as red by a human observer" is usually valid but subject to modification under certain conditions. On the stimulus side, perception can be influenced by admixture of white light and, even more importantly, by the variation of temporally and spatially contiguous stimulus objects. On the perceiver's side, social perception experiments have convincingly demonstrated the subordination of colors to concrete objects on the basis of individually characteristic or socially shared expectancies. In order to be able to say anything nhout the perceived color properties of a physically defined stimulus, the reaction of the perceiver must be taken into account. The psychometric identification of differences is also dcpendent upon the method. used, e.g., color naming, cancellation methods, or multidimensional scaling techniques (cf. Boynton, 1 9 7 5 ) . This example highlights the dependence of R general perceptual reaction upon the specific physical stimulus characteristics, the general stinulus field, the internal systemic features of the observer, and the method of measurement. The relationship of a theoretical statement to the method on which it is based encompasses both the interrelatedness of physical stimulus characteristics and their links to the responses. The clarification of this methodological dependence is indispensable for the formulation of a theory. Indeed. according to Coomhs, Raiffa, and Thrall (1954), it constitutes the very core of o theory.

PERCEPTION AS A PROCESS Even at the risk of further complicating the complex objectives of this inquiry, it must be admitted that not all the relevant aspects have been considered so far. In everyday experience, environmental stimuli are reg-

5

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

istered

quasi-automatically

.

Shaped

by

experience

and

motivational

objectives, a restriction of meaning has almost inevitably taken place in such a case. This kind of narrowing of meaning and function is most likely traceable to the development of various codes for the representation of stimuli. In the course of ontogenesis, the focus is shifted from "enactive" through r5conict7to "symbolic representation" (cf. Bruner , 1964). Yet, the former two categories are never quite discarded, even in the adult portion of the human life span. A cherry tree may be constant in its symbolic rcp-

resentation across the seasons. Its meaning, however, in relation to concrete courses of action may be subject to dramatic changes. For example, at the end of winter the tree must be expertly trimmed, in spring its blossoms are admired and in summer its fruit is harvested, Perception then, as we have already pointed out, is not a momentary final product,but a process extended in time and culminating in conscious representation and meaning. The fact that in everyday functioning meaning is assigned to perceptual inputs virtually instantaneously obscures the realization of the temporally extended character of human perccption. The momentary recognition of most objects of our experience, however, only comes about through multiple repetition going back to the earliest phases of human development. This process is objectively and subjectively cxperienced only as perceptual conditions are restricted or impoverished. In the case of vision, such restrictions are brought about upon presentation time, brightness, masking by other stimuli, and impovcrishrnent of stimulus form and content. By means of these methods, the signal to noise ratio of a specific representation can be changed and such ratios of a progression of stimuli can be serially arranged. Even in relcitively simple recognition tasks, information processing appears to be inextricably linked with a demand for integration. This formulation is in keeping with Llarr's (1982) approach, which is neurophysiological, but clearly emphasizes events over time. Massaro and Cohen (1983) investigated the conditions for the integration of exclusively auditorily presented stimuli which were supplemented by visual stimuli (lip movements of the speaker) for the perception of syllables. In other experinents simple variations of visual configurations (i.e., letters and words) were used. These experiments, conceived in a different theoretical tradition, appear to have a degree of similarity with the findings of percept-genetic studies. To be s u r e , ndditional assumptions (see below) are indispensable for the percept-genetic approach, which typically is applied to stimuli of

6

U. Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

much greater complexity. The global objective, however, which animates the percept-genetic approach, can be defined, as recognized by Linschoten (1959) as an integrative "effort after meaning" (Draguns 1984a). The foregoing discussion has introduced the incompatibility of perceptual functioning with a pure stimulus-response model. We agree with Kelly (1955) and Laing, Phillipson, and Lee (1966) that organisms respond on the basis of their subjective experience with a stimulus, and not to the objective-physical stimulus pattern, Once again, this recognition points to the central significance of meaning and thereby opens allusively yet anothe r aspect of perceptual experience. The final product of conscious perceptual apprehension of an external object is in many cnses but an intermediate step in a more extended sequence of information processing. It may also be a point of departure, an instrument, or a trigger for further cognitive processes. In the case of concept formation problem solving, thinking, and attitude development, these progressions nny take place exclusively within the individual. Natur d l y , major differences in the functional integration of perceptions can appear in the course of these operations. In contemplating a sunset at the end of a summer day, i t makes a major difference whether this activity is an end in itself or whether it is focused upon the detection of a lighthouse or another kind of landmark against the setting sun while sailing. In person perception, we approach the interpersonal dimension which is also implicated in communicating personal contents. At the same time, we are forced to leave behind the perspective whereby perceptual responses are considered as a purely experimental object of investigation. Human beings can and must communicate about their perceptions. The moaning of the events and actions of others is typically attributed on the basis of communicative everyday experience (cf. Habermas, 1970). If the communication process is emphasized and placed in the foreground, this results in according greater prominence to hermeneutics over experimentation. At the same time, the ability to perceive a stimulus objectively, independently of its social field, is called into question by the proponents of the hermeneutic point of view. The clash between the hermeneutic vs. experimental approach need not be absolute nor require an either-or decision (cf. Hentschel. 1985). An elegant solution of this dilemma is foreshadowed in Kelly's (1955) personality theory in which constructs, essentially based on perception, determine the goodness of predictions of external events. In Kelly's framework, adequacy of interpersonal communications is crucially

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

7

dependent upon the similarity of individual construct systems. It is in this case as though various events were viewed through another person's glasses. The social context of perception, however, need not necessarily constitute the cornerstone of a conceptualization of perceptual activity. On the plane of experimental research on perception, such an objective would not be very easy to realize. As a background variable, however, the social context has an important role to play, a s exemplified by studies of perceptual process in the "percept-geneticT1tradition in which "social schemata" are taken into account in interpreting individual differences in object perception (cf. Hentschel & Smith, 1980; Kragh & Smith, 19708; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980). In this perspective, the investigators proceed from an objectifiable final product, in the form of verbal reports about what the subjects perceived in tachiutoscopic presentations. They interpret individual differences by means of an epigenetic node1 against the background of subjective experience in the course of social development.

PERCEPTION A N D KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION It is not surprising that perception as our link to the natural and cultural environment has had a major impact upon metatheoretical and epistemological considerations.

Plato's cane metaphor comes to mind. It is

interpretable epistemologically. Virtually all theoriefi of philosophy of science contain statements about the role of perception, either explicitly or implicitly. This state of affairs is especially apparent in the case of empirical realism and of phe~~omenological and positivistic conceptualization. The role of perception is less emphasized in Popper's (1963) critical realism, with its highly complex chain of appropriate proofs for theoretical statements. Similarly, perception has less of a central role to play in those conceptualizations which emphasize the action aspects of scientific knowledge (e.g., Holzkamp, 1972). Royce (1974), among others, pointed to the parallels between psychology and philosophy, which, however, do not constitute identical modes of knowing, in such cognitive structurcs as "reality image ,'"'cognitive processes, I' and "epistemological criteria. '' In hi6 assumption about the three fundamental pathways to knowledge (see Figure l), emphasis upon perception is placed in the lowest route. However, Royce cautioned against viewing these three pathways as independent. How this knowledge is to be viewed in an ontological context when it transcends

U.Hentschel, G.Smith, and J.G. Draguns

8

subjective experience ie a philosophical, and not a psycholodcal, problem, Popper and Eccles (1977) have postulated A world of its own ("World 3") for this kind of knowledge. It is accessible to subjective experience (of "World 2") and helps comprehend the real objects of 9Vorld 1."

Processes o f man

U

Figure 1. I h e basic paths

t o knowledge

(after Royce, 1974, p . 153)

PERCEPTIOtI AFIU CONSCIOUSNESS The problem of consciousness is intimately connected with that of knowledge based on subjective expcrience and perception by means of which it is mediated. For the present volume, it iR important to elucidate consciousness because the majority of contributors concern themselves with the assumptions and consequences of preconscious perception.

For the

start, let us define preconscious perception simply as the nbsence of conscious perception. This is not the time to attcnpt a derivation of consciousness from i t s neurophysiologlcal substrates, even though we may not be able to avoid discussing certain indispensable physiological assumptions, In everyday speech, consciousness is deternined by intersubjective agreement on introspectively experienced mental states. A gencral definition of consciousness, especially one with potentially operational criteria, is, however, not easy to provide. Lowenhard (1981) provided an overview of the

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

9

various definitions of consciousness. In particular, he analyzed the conceptualizations based on systems theory, information processing theory, and evolutionary principles and identified points of contact among these three views. From the evolutionary perspective, a parallel can be drawn to the phenomenon of life. The ability to process stimuli consciously improves the chances of adaptation to a complex environment. The evolutionary principle can be interpreted in terms of higher adaptive performnnce (negentropic flexibility, Sayre, 19761, of conscious individuals in receiving and processing information. From the biological point of view, however, it would be highly wasteful to let all of the information that impinges upon u s become conscious. For perception research, of both general and differentinl varieties, it is highly relevant to follow, in Lowenhard's terms, the fate of information. Of the 1 08 bits per second of the retina input, approximately 50 bits are transmitted to higher centers. Even these 50 bits are a rela-

tively vague and uncertain estimate since measurement in bits lends itself poorly for the assessment of human information processing. The assumption of processing in terms of gestaltlike units would allow a more adequatc representation. It i s , however, not biologically meaningful to make the reactions of potentially conscious organisms exclusively dependent on conscious representation and to proceed from the assumption of a restricted channel capacity of conscious stimulus processing. Everyday experience teaches us that conscious processing can be dispensed with even for many complex reactions. I t is also generally known that contents of consciousness are not directly linked to external stimuli. Dixon (1981) captured this state of affairs in a scheme (see Figure 2 ) which recognizes the possibility of a perfect correlation of subjective experience and information flow, but

I

Subjective exDerience

Max. Cn w

.-o

c)

u m* .-

E uE) L

o c

L m -C I - 'L

Max.

Zero Response determination by external stimuli

Figure 2. Schematic representation of the relationship between information flow and subjective perceptual experience (after Dlxon, 1981, p. 2 )

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

10

also allows for their reciprocal independence.

"As we move along the

continuum of subjective experience, through such intermediary stages as those of illusions, hypnogogic imagery, dreams, and hallucinations, there may be no fall-off in such perceptual attributes as vividness, salience, clarity, and emotional significance. But, over the same range of external stimulus control, the relationship between information read in and that contained in the output drops to zero" (Dixon, 1981, p. 2). "Expressed behavior" is not yet incorporated into this scheme. Such behavior can vary freely in terms of its stimulus dependence and conscious representation. The possibilities of combining information inputs from external and internal sources, from conscious and preconscious representation, and from silcnt and overt reactions would provide little opportunity for planned investigation,

THE ADAPTIVE FUNCTIONS OF PERCEPTION

Fortunately, these variations are not very arbitrary since our behavior may be regarded as being for the most part adaptive and certain pntterns of behavior are effectively explained by virtue of their being embedded into functional sequences of biological adaptation, Such a perspective appears to be one of the few available justifications for choosing an experimental approach for the investigation of human perception and for gathering leads by experimental mcans about characteristic group modes of reaction. One of the first to attempt the formulation of interdependence between the milieu and the perceptual and behavioral performance of animals which inhabit i t was J. von Uexkiill (1921) with his schema of a functional circle (Funktionskreis) (see Figure 3 ) . This interdependence is best illustrated in the case of the tick. Even for very simple reactions von Uexkiill assumed a series of concentric information circles, as elucidated by the acts of seeing, grasping, and eating an apple. The visual index for grasping, the tactile index for bringing i t to the mouth, the taste index for eating !'blend the three partial acts into a holistic act of consuming the apple" 1 (v. Uexkiill, 1980, p . 373) Integration of three sensory modalities into

.

an experience of action is assumed in this example. The interdependence of subject and milieu can be generally extended without difficulty to subliminal indicators. Such indicators may acquire a

Su blimiml Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

11

Perceptual World

e

Organ

-u L' 0 O9

Organ

E O C C -4J

Receptor Carrier of the Perceptual Index Interrelational Structure Carrier o f the Activating Index Effector

Effectory World Figure 3. Schema of the functional circle (Funktionskreis)(after

v.Uexkul1, 1980,

pp. 330, 372)

special meaning in the perceptual world

(Merkwelt) of the individual

through the influence of psychodynamic subject variables. What is less precisely specified in most of the postulates of subliminal perception - implicitly extending the scope of the functional circle - is the point of attack for the effector. An approach of another provenance, which, however, shows a certain degree of similarity to the assumptions underlying functional circles, is the Gestalt region theory (Gestaltkreis, cf. von Weizsacker, 1940). This conceptualization has provided many demonstrations of integrative cooperation of perception and motion in the so called biological acts of fitting living organisms into their environment. According to the equivalence principle postulated by the Gestalt-region theorists, a perception can be substituted for a motion, and vice versa. A s an example, the experiment by v . Auersperg and Sprockhoff (1935) can be mentioned. These investigators used a cylinder rotated on its vertical axis, which was provided with a series of holes in i t s outside wall and with a light source located within the cylinder. A s the cylinder was rotated, the points of light merged into a continuous line. When the subjects were asked to perform vertical eye movements, so called irregular after image strips were experienced. In the objective control experiment with a camera two horizontal merger lines were represented instead of the subjectively perceived horizontal main line. The

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G.Draguns

12

phenomenal correlate preserves from the objective comparison a reduced representation. Moreover, the merged line appears to be constant in space and time and independent of the spatially displaced retinal images.Thus the discrepancies between the physical sequence and the subjective phenomena can be summed up in terms of reduction, phenomenal constancy, and simultaneity of temporally disparate events. The Gestalt region theory has formulated the general tenet according to which no percept can be conceived as involving identity between an object and i t s experience. "Each perceptual act is experienced as the appearance of the object and its predicativefl (von Weizsacker, 1947, p. 1 0 9 ) . l Each object then can have several modes of appearance. Von Weizsiicker cites the simple example of several possible perceptual experiences of two points on a white background. They can be perceived as being horizontally adjacent, as a pair, as two discrete objects, each of which possibilities represents different modes of contact with various aspects of the objective environment. Both of the above theories attempt to incorporate the subject-object relationships into a comprehensive observational framework. They also emphasize the coherence of subject and environment. The perceiver is viewed as an active subject; the rhythmic properties of all living phenomena are highlighted. Thus both theories are implicitly relevant to many contributions in this volume, with its emphasis upon interpenetration between external stimuli and internal systemic variables and between perceivers and objects of perception, even if no chapter, outside of this introduction, refers to these formulations explicitly. The relevance of these two theories can be elucidated by way of contrast. If attempts at integration into a more complex functional reference system are abandoned --with the attendant apparent advantages of easier operationalization and experimental manipulation

-

the putative dimensions could easily disintegrate into a multi-

plicity of discrete variables and these variables, in t u r n , would decompose into dichotomous contrasts. That the reverse route by way of accumulation of discrete experimental findings would result in integration is most unlikely, Allen Newel1 (1973) commented upon this state of affairs by saying: "You can't play twenty questions with nature and win" and thereby indicated his opinion of the prospects of blind empiricism in perceptual research.

13

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality THE BASIC THEME OF THIS BOOK: PERSONALITY FACTORS I N PERCEPTION

With respect to the danger of blind empiricism, the task of the contributors to the present volume is considerably easier. Even though there is a great deal of heterogeneity in method and findings among the authors,

their contributions converge upon the research topics of subliminal percep-

.

tion and microgenesis or percept-genesis One of these two research areas is variously in focus or both of them are combined. In the last section of the volume, attempts are made to 8stablish the conceptual locus of the two types of phenomena investigated, to relate the findings metatheoretical issues.

reported

to

other

theories,

and

to

address

Thus all the problems of a personality centered perceptual research program, so far but cursorily mentioned in the introduction, reappear in another guise. even though by this time they are channeled into one of the two topics of investigation. These considerations are relevant to the issues of stimulus, person, and methodological influences, various modes of coding of perceptual experiences,

their observability in process, even

their interpersonal significancc, together with sundry metatheoretical considerations. The product of perceptual information processing sequences is relcvant in the normal range of functioning: in everyday behavior, to responses to potential dangers, successful problem solving performances, and creative productions. In psychopathology, the investigation of these phenomena is potentially applicable to the diagnosis of aberrant behavior patterns and psychological disturbance and may even be therapeutically useful. AS the general objective of these empirical contribution8 we can posit the description and prediction of adaptive processes which bring to light the potentials and limits of perceptual information processing in various groups of subjects. The concept of adaptation is understood here not just as passive fitting in, but as an active process of possible restructuring of objects as they are given, similar to what is observed in all kinds of creative achievements. Its component processes may be elucidated by reference to Piagst's terms of assimilation and accomodotion. Each approach to the investigation of individual differences in perception and personality must proceed from at least two postulates: the existence of individual diffcr-

14

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

ences in perception and information processing of stimuli and the relntionship of these individual differences to the personal biographical experience of the individual in question. The first postulate can be understood to imply that the active perceiver forms hypotheses about the perceptual object, constructs or reconstructs i t , and evaluates it in accordance with his or her momentary or long-range cognitive and emotional goals. Extensions of the second postulate can be derived from virtually all personality theories and can be verified by multiple demonstrations of formal and content differences in perception. The long-term effect of "selective visual exposure" in the early stages of development upon functional cell characteristics, interpretable as a neuronal substrRte of fixation, has been demonstrated in animals as well as in humans (see the review of literature by Hirsch and Jacobson, 1975). The lasting effect of certain spatial structures (e.g., carpentered world vs.open vistas) upon habitual perceptual performance has also been verified in cross cultural studies (e.g. , Segall, Campbell, & Herskovits, 1966; see Deregowski, 1980, for a comprehensive review of relevant research). There are numerouR studies of iridividual differences in formal perceptual principles, "cognitive controls" as Klein (1970) , Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) and Witkin, et al. (1962) called them. Their moderating influence upon behavior and experience is well documented. There is a multiplicity of investigations which proceed from the assumptions of regression and fixation. These studics have attempted to trace differences in perception and cognitive processing to specific stages in the development of personality. These then are the common threads running through the volume; its heterogeneity in content, methods. and conclusions is the result of the manifold possibilities of construing human behavior, experience, and dispositions, of fitting these characteristics with different situations in experiments and of verifying them through group comparisons and ctme studies. Since, however, all of the contributions were chosen on the basis of their relevance to the thcoretical frame of reference adopted here and were consequently focused upon preconscious processing or microgenesis, we express the hope that the reader will not find it difficult to establish similarities among these chapters on a higher plane and to fit the many discrete colorful pieces into a mosaic with clearly delineated component structures.

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

15

EXPER /MEN TS ON PRECONSCIOUS PROCESSING

In addition to the present overview, there are five more sections in this volume. Part 11 is basically devoted to experiments on preconscious processing. A s Dixon (1981) pointed out, the existence of preconscious perception has been successfully upheld against all reasonable objections and criticisms. Resistance against accepting the accumulated research findings has, however, remained, probably because subliminal perception runs counter to everyday experience and can not be easily reconciled to i t . The belief in freedom of will also appears to be threatened by these findings. The indignation of the critics has above nll been directed at the alleged danger of behavioral manipulation by advertisers or at the service of moral or political courses (cf, Brand, 1978). This potential area of application

is, however, not discussed in the several chapters in Section 11. Enough controversies remain, however. One of these pertains to the alleged effectiveness of symbiotic subliminal stimuli as a therapeutic technique whereby the question of influencing behavior is raised once again, albeit with a different objective and by means of a much more sophisticated methodology (see Silverman & Geisler, chapter 3). Werth (1983) proposed to introduce natural science criteria for the determination of consciousness in psychological and physiological experiments. These standards could be operationalized by so-called experiments of the l s t , 2nd, and 3rd rank. According to the 1st rank critcrion,the subject should be capable of discovering the stimulus, localizing it, and differentiating it from other stimuli. Conforming to criterion of the 2nd rank would require awareness of ability to discriminate and meeting the criterion of the 3rd rank would entail being cognizant of the connection of discriminatory ability with a state of consciousness. At a minimum, the criterion of the 1st rank must be satisfied for sublimiiially effective stimuli whereby diEcriminatory ability mny also be evident through its secondary effwts, such as neurophysiological reactions, dream content, memory, needs and emotions, defenses, and behavioral changes (cf. Dixon, 1971; Dixon, Hentschel, & Smith, in press). An important question which is explicitly discussed in several chapters in Part I1 concerns the intactness or the completeness with which the subliminal message is received as well as the involvement of "ambient vs. foveal vision" (Leibowitz & Owens, 1977). The experimental possibilities of varying the general as well as the personal relevance of stimulus materials and their reconstructability are as

16

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

yet by no means exhausted. Pespite the apparent partial convergence between microgenesis and subliminal perception, the answer to the question, "Why subliminal effects?" is different in accent from the response to the question, "Why microgenesis?" (Draguns, 1984b). With the development of awareness of ability to discriminate stimulus configurations, largely unconscious strategies lead to gestalt completion and filling of gaps in the available information which, in combination with the techniques of stimulus presentation, lead to a typical microgenetic process. The cognitive mechanisms of reconstruction and transformation constitute its central postulates, as they are retrieved from the subjects' reports. In a series of slowly increasing presentation times, form and content are successively determined by the subject, i.s., in the course of this process experiences can be accumulated, irrelevant options eliminated, inappropriate ones rejected and, i f necessary replaced by spontaneous new creations (cf. Kragh & Smith, 1970b; Smith, Kragh, & Hentschel, 1080). The reversal of this process, to the extent that the effortfully achieved stimulw meaning can be discarded or, in Kelly's (1955) terminology, constructs can be loosened, has proved to be another relevant technique of investigating perception perstinnlity variahles (see Smith, Carlsson, 6 Danielsson, chapter 11, and Hentschel 6 Schneider, chapter 1 0 ) . In subliminal perception experiments, on the other hand, the traditional signal to noise ratio is kept below the absolute threshold for conscious recognition for the given individual. This is true of presenting discrete stimuli as well as for repeated stimulus presentation. In neither case is the recognition process directly explored in so far as it does not even come about on the conscious plane. Rather, the focus is exclusively upon the effect of the subliminal stimulus. In many experiments with anxiety-arousing as well RS reinforcing stimuli what is astounding is the innocuousness of these stimuli. Their effectiveness is difficult to explain unless one posits a "restricting effect of awareness" (Spence & Holland, 1962). The correctness of this assumption is indirectly corroborated by the observation that the identical stimuli presented supraliminslly Rcarcely lend themselves to the demonstration of either general or differential effects. What this amounts to is that under conscious control the negative stimulus configurations do not appear especially dangerous nor do the positive ones appear particularly attractive. Under what kind of marginal conditions do subliminal stinuli show effects

Su bliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

17

boils down in the general psychological perspective to a question concerning the function and capacity of the perceptual apparatus. In this connection, the reader is referred to Dixon's (1971. 1981) monographs in which he discusses thoroughly the physiological prerequisites for the experience of subliminal perception. In the present volume, some of the positions espoused by the contributors are controversial on the issue of ideal stimulus features and optimal stimulus localization for receptivity to subliminal stinuli. Spence, Klein, and Fernandez (chapter 6 ) varied stimulus complexity and regions of registration. Their results point to the limits in receptivity to subliminal stimuli and stand in certain contrast (as long as verbel stimuli are exclusively used) to the effects demonstrated with more complex symbiotic messagcs (not controlled for laterality) by Silverman and Geisler (chapter 3 ) in their review of this specialized research area. A s yet, neither point of view can be rejected on logical grounds and through operationalization of experimental conditions. It is quite certain that these two research teams have proceeded from different points of departure, above all through the use of verbal or pictorial stimulus materials, or a combination of both. A s editors we hope that the juxtaposition of these two contributions will stimulate discussion on H higher plane of specificity, thereby facilitating operationalization and narrowing down the range of possible explanations. Should this objective be achieved, it would justify the title of the series in which this book is included. Part I1 of the volume is opened with a contribution by Dixon Fnd Henley (chapter 2 ) in which a new method for the generation of subliminal stimuli is introduced. The authors have also pioneered a new approach in the detection of subliminal effects in subjects. Subliminality was attained by means of apparently superimposed letter strings on the computer screen, mostly in the form of nonsense syllables with n few critical words thrown in. The effects were investigated by means of free associations, ratings, and picture selection. The objective of the experimenters was to determine the nature of individual semantic networks through the receptivity of subjects to specific stimuli. In their review Silverman and Geisler (chapter 3) summarize the results of over sixty investigations using the subliminal paychodynarnic activation method. This method was applied on the basis of psychoanalytically derived hypotheses for symptom reinforcement by means of generating conflicts specific to various psychopathological disorders, for improving per-

18

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

formance in sports by activating unconscious oedipal fantasies and for facilitating adaptive behavior through the activation of symbiotic fantasies, The authors arrive at cssentially positive conclusions concerning the support received for their hypotheses in research conducted so far. They provide a multiplicity of technical and procedural hints which should be useful to all potential experimenters in this research area. They also point t o the importance of taking individual differences into account in choosing appropriate psychodynamic activating stimuli. In the process, they demonstrate that moderating influences of the percciver are operative in subliminal stimulation. Consequently, pcrsons should not be regnrded as equally passive receivers of a more or less generally effective message. In their study Antoll and Goldberger (chapter 4 ) investigated the effect of sexual and aggressive drive derivatives activated b y means of subliminally presented pictorial stimuli upon creative achievement. Subliminal activation with sexual stimuli was shown to facilitate simple, associative performance, but had a counterproductive effect upon the formation of metaphors. When the group was divided into creative and noncreativc subjects, the aggressive stimulus impaired performance, more so in noncreative than in creative participants. Creative subjects expericnced no n e p tive effects of the sexual stimulus upon nctaphor formation, contrary to their noncreativc counterparts. The authors' hypotheses were not generally supported, but the investigators succeeded in demonstrating the interaction of stimuli and subject group characteristics upon positive and negative stimuli, deliberately cho5en to correspond to the two basic drives in psychoanalytic theory. Susan Henley presents a case study (chapter 5 ) . Her subject, a heavy smoker, WHS confronted with various emotional and neutral stimuli. The effects of verbal and pictorial stimuli, presented subliminally to the right eye were controlled by means of the dependent variable of awareness threshold for light in the left eye. Threshold for awareness for light varied as a function of subliminal stimuli with contrary tendencies for threatening verbal and pictorial stimuli. The experiment was also structured as R reliability study. For the case in question i t provided an important demonstration of temporal stability and consistency of the effects over a series of trials. The final chapter in Part I I is the report mentioned before, by Spence, Klein, and Fernandez (chapter 6 ) which is concerned with the capacity of the sensory system for processing subliminal stimuli nnd with the

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

19

related methodological issues of stimulus presentation, Four experiments nre reported in which subjects were asked to respond to target words. In two experincnts targets presented at subliminal exposure speeds focally vs. peripherally to the right vs. left visual field with different semantic characteristics (relatedness , concreteness, complexity) were prececded by primes. Various modes of influence of priming stimuli upon the torgets were tested by means of correctness and fipeed of target recognition. In two more experiments, commands varied in visual field, location, positive vs. negative nodes, spacing, and length of message preceedod target presentation. This very complex research design allowed conclusions to be drawn conccrning general conditions for the effectiveness of subliminal stimuli in relation to their quality (semantic relations) as well as their formal structure, such as the length of message, its peripheral vs. focal localization in the perceptual field and the chances of their transfer across hemispheres. The authors conclude that there is no unlimitcd rimorphous receptivity in the human perceptual system even for subliminal stimuli. Instead, they propose a "subliminal window'' for structuring the flow of infornation,

T H R E A T A N D DEFENSE IN PERCEPT-GENESIS

In Part I11 of the volume are to be found investigatioiis in which the perceptuol process is followed through a series of threatening (i.e., aggression and deprivation pictures) and sexual stimuli and the defensive niechanisms mobilized for coping with these threats are observed. All of the three chapters in this section are strongly influenced by the psychcfnalytic frame of reference and all of them rely upon the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) developed by Kragh (1969) or a closely related procedure. The fundamental assumption shared by the authors is that the presentation of such pictures provokes secondary anxiety. The following sequence io then experienced: Stimulation of id-impulses , experience of a threat situation by the ego, anxiety signals for the activation of defenses against the internal threat. Pictures of DMT feature a central or hero figure. It is assumed that subjects identify with it. A peripheral figure, which is typically threatening, is also included in the picture. Pictures are designed to represent direct aggression as well as sexual attacks, sexually deviant behavior, and

20

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

various manifestations of deprivation. Threat is directed against the projections of the subject's ego. As a result o€ the indirect mode of the projective releaser, anxiety can remain below the overt level of manifestation (Kragh, 197Oa). In the contribution by Kragh a case study is presented (chapter 7 ) . At the Second European Conference on Personality in Bielefeld, his paper provoked a very lively discussion and generated considerable controversy. Kragh proceeds from the so called postulate of micro-macro correspondence which posito that percept-genetic processes reflect biographical events in their chronological succession (cf. Kragh, 1970b). His case study is so structured that the experimenter with access to the DMT percept-genesis formulates retrospective predictions concerning biographical events, facts, subjective experiences pertaining to particular periods of the subjects life. It is as though the experimenter made a bct that he would be able to arrive at a blind diagnosis on data concerning his subject's ontogenetic development on the basis of the DMT protocol alone. To this end, the experimenter formulated his interpretations in writing. He then asked the suhject to respond to these statements and to confirm or refute them. Some difficulties of fttranslatingfftest data into life events appeared, but a major share of predictions were confirmed subject to the a priori criteria which Kragh had formulated. In each of their three experiments Westerlundh and Sjoback (chnpter 8) provide baseline data for the percept-genetic amauroscopic technique. N r s t , a neutral picture is serially presented with increasing brightness levels, starting with a subliminal range. The second portion of the task consists of the determination of the awareness threshold for light in the left eye. Alternatively, time estimation is demanded for the span of activating one of the two light diodes, Simultaneously, the conflict-arousing picture is presented to the right eye subliminally, i.e., at a low level of brightness. The effects of this stimulation are followed through the perceptgenetic sequence of presenting a neutral picture tachistoscopically at increasing exposure speeds. In the first and second expcriment the experimental effects are compared to the reactions o€ a control group receiving a neutral stimulation. In the third experiment there is no control group and the observations are focused exclusively upon the characteristics of subliminal threat. In all of the three experiments reality-distorting indicators of defense appeared which could be distinguished across stimuli and groups of subjects.

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

21

These manifestations of defense were interpreted as a consequence of subliminal stimulation in partial interaction with individual differences in susceptibility to experiencing conflict. Andersson and Bengtsson present in chapter 9 a comparison of DMT results and spiral after effects. In experimenting with the Spiral After Effect Technique (SAT) it is especially important to ascertain the length of the after cffects at the conclusion of ten separate trials.The temporal trends of the phenomenon reported by the subjects over ten trials are also recorded. The spiral after effect sequences were interpreted by Andersson (1984) in terms of a dialectical conception of cognitive growth. In keeping with this conception and with psychoanalytic assumptions (cf. Gedo 8 Goldberg, 19731, the authors predicted a hierarchical succession of stages each of which is concerned with resolving a specific conflict. SAT processes were classified and particular patterns of experience were then related to defense mechanisms as they were expressed in the DMT. In an earlier study (Andersson 6. Weikert , 1980) a pronounced relationship between defenses and SAT progression was demonstrated. From the authors' point of view, their present study is an attempt at cross-validation with a female sample. At the same time, however, the results are utilized in order to extend their developmental frmework and its relationship to the developmentally relevant assumptions of other psychoanalytic theoreticians.

SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION A N D MICROGENESIS COMBINED

In section I V of the volume experiments are described which attempt to relate subliminal stimulation and microgenetic perceptual processeo. The focus of the several chapters is placed upon the role of cognitive variables and on the assessment of mcaning in the course of microgenesie. Hentschel and Schneider (chapter 1 0 ) attempt to predict creative performance among design students. Their dependent variables are based upon the reports of subjects in the course of an inverted percept-genesis, similar to the procedure used earlier by Smith and associates. The basic objective was to ascertain how the subjects can free themselves from a once attained reality-based stimulus recognition in the course of a series of presentations at progressively decreasing exposure times, i.e. , achieve a loosening of their constructs in Kelly's (1955) sense. Measures derived from these reports were found to be related to external criteria of creative

22

U.Hentschel, G. Smith,and J.G. Draguns

performance. The independent variables consisted of receptivity to an aggressive stimulus subliminally presented at low levels of illumination and defense mechanisms established by means of a sclf-report inventory. The results showed interactions between susceptibility to an aggressive subliminal stimulus and modes of defense. In this investigation also the merger of the perceiver with the object of perception became clearly apparent. In discussion, the authors attempt to relate these findings to a functionalist frame of reference, proceeding from the assumption of internal and external influences upon perception viewed here in accordance with the microgenetic tradition as a process. Smith, Carlsson, and Daniolsson (chapter 11) also combine subliminal stimulation with microgenetic procedures. The authors present two experiments on poychopathology and creativity, respectively. In both of these studies, they attempted to demonstrate identifications and resistances by means of the subliminal presentation of the word I1I". In the first study with paranoid and borderline patients, identification with the aggressor and with the victim was compared. In the second experiment in which professional artists served as subjects, the word IfI" was projected subliminally upon a human figure placed either before an open background or before a wall. In both experiments the effectiveness of subliminal manipulation of identification was clcmonstrated and the patterns of responses could be grouped on the basis of psychiatric symptomatology or level of creativity. Hans and Shulamith Kreitler (chapter 1 2 ) proceed from their earlier work with normal subjects in applying the method of meaning analysis for purposes of microgenetic pcrceptual diagnosis in a group of schizophrenics whose responses were compared with those of a normal control group examined earlier. Three kinds of stimuli, distinguished on the basis of their ease of recognition were varied in terms of their ease of presentation and placed on three comparable interval scales, with five steps below and four above the threshold. Exposure values were varied by means of blurring, illumination, and presentation time. Each subject was shown twenty stimuli at ten different exposure times. Phase 1 is characterized by a stepwise progression toward object recognition, or the astlignment of meaning values of a few dimensions to the referent. In Phase 2 , the meaning of a referent is elaborated in a specific interpersonally shared manner. In Phase 3, meaning assigrirnent is shifted to the more individually preferred meaning dimensions. These three stages were also predicted for schizophrenics, but

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

23

with important deviations in process. The results showed among other things that schizophrenics identify stimuli later in the sequence, attribute to them inappropriate meaning values and in the more idiosyncratically structured Phase 3 rely more prominently on metaphors and symbols. The results of these studies confirm earlier clinical observations by Conrad (1958) and Matussek (1953) both of whom emphmized the predominance of atmospheric and connotative meaning in responses of schizophrenics, especially in the early phases of the disorder. (In English these findings are described by Fish, 1961). The Kreitlers attempted to identify the reasons for the differences between normals and schizophrenics in perception and information processing. In addition to i t , they pursued the promissing possibility of changing the types of relation between referent and meaning values in schizophrenics by means of a specialized type of training. Draguns poses the question in his contribution (chapter 13) on how early in the perceptual progressions, with which most of the authors in this volume are concerned, personality factors come into play. He advances a number of theoretical considerations and illustrates them by empirical results. The studies he cites are notable for the attempt to capture both subliminal processing and microgenetic perceiving in one progression. H i s conclusions pertain to the present state of investigation in this area and provide a plan of possible future investigations. Even though the question posed in the title of Draguns’ chapter is not conclusively answered, it can be inferred that different personality processes are implicated in the subliminal and supraliminal segments of the perceptual progression. Within the limits of personality measures used and personality characteristics investigated, it would appear that 8 greater number of correlates appear in the supraliniinal rather than in the subliminal part of the sequence. But, as indeed many of the other contributions to the volume denonstrate, subliminal responding is by no means irrelevant to personality functioning.

PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL

CORRELATES OF

THE

PERCEPTUAL

PROCESS: EEG AND CBF AS INDlCATORS

Part V comprises studies concerned with psychophysiological correlates of perceptual and recognition processes. The comparison of physiological processes with perceptual operations has only recently attracted the attention of investigators of microgenesis (cf. Frohlich, 1984). Altercative-

24

U.Hentschel, G.Smith, and J.G.Draguns

ly, the search for connections and parallels between these two modes of responding was stinulated by the recognition of theoretical similarities bctween the formulations of psychophysiologists and those of microgenetically oriented researchers (e.g., Lindsley, 1984). A s Leibowitz (1984) emphasized and Marr (1982) demonstrated in their work on three-dimensional perception, there are several ways to come to grips with the temporal development of perception. An interdisciplinary approach must, therefore, include psychophysiological parameters. An integrated conception encompassing both physiological and cognitive progressions together with their possible diverse interactions remains, even if parallel recordings have bcen obtained, an exception rather than the rule. The focus is typically upon the explanation of one set of variables in the process while the other set i R treated as a correlate. The studies in Part V , however, demonstrate how promising i t is to use physiological indicators. Through these kinds of research the understanding of the process as a whole is advanced and the individually patterned reactions can be more realistically described. In the study by Johanson, Risberg, Silfverskiold, and Smith (chapter 14) regional cerebral blood-flow (CBF) is used as an indicator of anxiety reactions in a group of anxiety-neurotics. These subjects were given the percept-genetic Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT, Smith, Johnson, B Almp e n , 1982). Answers indicating anxiety were identified in their protocols. During the measurement of the patients' regional cerebral blood-flow , their own individual anxiety answers were presented to them with the instruction to associate. Nearly all patients reacted with signs of heightened anxiety, even with near-panic, incidentally a proof of the power of the MCT. Compared to a basic blood-flow level when no anxidty was induced, the patients showed a simultaneous increase of cerebral activity in the leftfrontal-orbital region. The meaning of this increase was discussed in relation to other pertinent findings. Ehlers and Munz (chapter 15) use EEG evoked potentials as physiological indicators. They presented Stroop Test items (Stroop, 1935) to a mixed sample of neurotics and normals individually on a projection screen. First, subjects were divided on the basis of the difference between their time scores for incongruously colored color names and a conventional color naming task into high interference-prone and low interference-prone groups. Then subjects' EEG measures were obtained in three positions ( C 2 ; P2; 03) during the simple word-reading and color-naming task under the interference condition. The authors' hypotheses concerning discrete

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

25

evoked potential components refer to latencies and amplitude differentials. At P300 and also at NZo0 amplitude differentials between the word-reading

and color-naming tasks appeared at all of three electrode positions, as hypothesized. These findings were interpreted as evidence of a higher-cognition effort of color-naming under interference conditions. Differences between high and low interference-prone groups were limited to latency differences in the very early components of EEG. Ehlers and Munz interpret their evoked potential findings in conformity with their theoretical model for coping with the interference task, i.e., that EEG indicators which precede the onset of the verbal reaction required suggest the operation of an unconscious information processing process involved in search. Glanzmann and Frohlich (chapter 16) also use an EEG parameter as their physiological measure. The central theme of their study concerns differences in information processing between groups differing in trait-anxiety

.

Contingent-negative

variation

(CNV)

was chosen

as

an

event-related slow potential. Typically, the CNV appears following a warning stimulus which in turn precedes an imperative stimulus after which a specific reaction to warning stimulus is expected to take place. Glanzmann and Frohlich used high-pitch and low-pitch tones as warning stimuli. In response to the high tone (GO-condition). a button was to be pressed after the onset of the imperative stimulus; no reaction was expected to the low tone (NOGO-condition) Thirty subjects were administered the German version (Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, 81 Spielberger, 191tl) of the State-

.

Trait-Anxiety

Inventory

(Spielberger, Gorsuch,

&

Lushene,

1970)

and

were divided in a high and a low anxious group on the bRsis of extreme scores on this test. Five subjects from each group were randomly assigned to ego-involving, pain-threat

, or

neutral experimental conditions. Low anx-

ious subjects were found to be more strongly influenced by pain threat than high anxious subjects. Under this condition, they showed no differential CNV between GO- and NOGO-condition. For the anxious subjects, this differential was reduced above all in the ego-threat condition. In discussion, the significance of these findings for the concept of attention was emphasized and related to the assumptions underlying microgenetic processes.

26

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns A CRlTlCAL LOOK A T S U B L l M l N A L PERCEPTION A N D MlCROGENESlS

At the symposium at the Second Conferencc on Personality in Bielefeld, there were four invited discussants. In this volume, they hove been given the opportunity to develop their arguments pertaining to subliminal perception and microgenesis at greater length. Martin Johnson critically analyscs percept-genesis in his contribution (chapter 17). Following Popper, he evaluates these investigations on the basis of their falsifiability , i. e. , whether incremental information conccrning the usefulness of a theory is obtained even in the case of negative results. Within this conceptual framework, quality, variety, and precision are more essential criteria than the mere number of hypotheses confirmed. In this connection, Johnson scrutinizes critically the demonstrative power of case studies and proposes studios with a greater emphasis upon the examination of basic concepts. Proceeding from specific percept-genetic studies he discusses concretely the psychometric criteria of objectivity, reliability, and specific validity. On balance, despite a number of doubts, objections, and limitations, Johnson's judgment of the prospects of this line of investigation is quitc positive. Wolfgang Prinz (chapter 18) propounds the view that a new orientation away from perceptual content toward formal analysis would facilitate the progress in research on perception and personality. The active role of the perceiver is more strongly accented thereby as information transmission has given way to information processing in which an assured place is found for subjective experiences and selective conditions of a perceiver. In Prinz's view, the assumption of subliminal perception is compatible with this new approach. While in hi6 opinion, several aspects of subliminal perception remain unsolved, the major unsolved problem, however, is that of functions of consciousness. Its solution is impeded by attributing an ever greater number of control functions to the preconscious region. Prinz also looks critically R t the serial responses of subjects in microgenetic experiments which, in his opinion, inevitably result in falsification of perception. Kazimierz Obuchowski attempts in his contribution (chapter 1 9 ) to forge a link between the assumptions of subliminal perception and microgenesis and general considerations based on systems theory. In the first part of his contribution he discusses the various codes of information processing. He summarizes the essential differences between the various modes

Sublimiml Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

27

of function. In particular, he differentiates the patterns of behavior (1) acquired according to laws of contiguity and subsequently automatically operating in accordance with monoconcrete codes from ( 2 ) the pictures of policoncrete codes acquired through coordinated learning as well as ( 3 ) the hierarchical models which make the representation of reality possible in a model and ( 4 ) the creative code built upon the information of preceding codes and not limited to the reproduction of concrete experience, but represented by a multidimensional process. Obuchowski deals with the significance of emotional processes as a consequence of selection of the various codes and attempts to develop a general model of psychological processes. This ultimately empirically untestable 'la priori model" contains eight interconnected systemic elements. In the context of this volume, he proposes alternative interpretations of microgenetic and subliminal perception findings and elucidates the potential of this model by means of several pertinent examples. The contribution by K .B. Madsen (chapter 2 0 ) evaluates percept-genetic research principally from the metatheoretical and philosophy of science perspective. In his analyses, Madsen distinguishes three planes: those of data, hypotheses, and philosophical statements, the last pertaining to the implicit image of man and to basic epistemological and methodological assumptions. He arrives at the conclusion that the empirical data are predominant over theory in percept-genesis.

This circumstance results in its

tenets being testable.

SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTIOM AND MICROGENESIS IN RELATION TO GENERAL THEORY

All of the contributions to this volume pertain to perception, through the avenues of subliminal perception and microgenesis. Most of them are conceived as presentations of systematic programs of experimental investigations. One of the contributions presents a review of literature on a specialized method of preconscious investigation. In two chapters the empirical results serve mostly as points of departure for extending theoretical considerations. Contributions in Part VI analyze from a variety of vantage points research in both of the domains included in this book. In the present chapter we have already tackled the task of comparing the two areas of research. Time has now come to pursue this undertaking

U.Hentschel, G.Smith, and J.G. Draguns

28

and to delimit and specify a number of points, even if a residual degree of imprecision will unavoidably remain. First, the close conceptual proximity of these lines of investigation to the information-processing approach, implicit in the title of the volume, deserves to be mentioned. Haber (1969) has speculated that microgenesis could be subsumed under the heading of information processing. Even though process description is one of the cornerstones on which microgenetic approaches rest (cf. IIentschel, 1984), certain doubts do arise upon the comparison of the two types of investigation a s to whether their goals are really identical. Information processing has principally dealt with general psychological questions in aiming to describe all operations spanning the interval between stimulus onset and the response (Ilaber, 1969). The thrust of microgenetic investigation also was originally toward the elucidation of questions of general psychological interest, above all the process of emergence of gestalten and the interplay of meaning and structure (cf. Flavell

&

Draguns, 1957; Graumann, 1959;

Sander, 1928/1B61; Werner, 1956). Gradually, however, microgenetic researchers turned to problems of differential psychology, broadening thereby the scope of microgenetic conceptualization. Assumptions about the effect of specific pictorial or other stimuli, principles for classifying groups of subjects or other variables were borrowed in microgenetic studies, including those represented in this volume, from other sources, mostly from personality theories including formulations concerning normal and deviant behavior, and from psychiatry in the more restricted sense of the term. Hence the multiplicity of methods of stimulus presentation, apparent even from the preview in this chapter and even more readily observable upon examining the various contributions to this volume.

For the domain of

subliminal perception this state of affairs can be summarized as follows: stimuli can be kept below the threshold by low intensities, short exposure times, and other means of reducing signal to noise ratio, i . e . , keeping the proportion of signals low. The range of concrete content of these stimuli is unlimited. Restricted to certain domains, but still diverse, are the possibilities of controlling the effects of these stimuli. The situation is similar in the case of microgenetic investigations. There are different techniques and procedures for representing the sequence of phases prior to the recognition of the stimulus and the stabilization of perception (cf. Smith,

1984). What binds all of these approaches together is the possibility of dividing the final product of perception into stages, with the fascinating opportunity for observing this process in action. The focus of interest in

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

29

following these progressions may be placed upon the formal aspects, such as fluctuations in the duration of after effects, or upon the content, a s in the case of reality-distorting interpretations of a threatening stimulus. A s in the case of subliminal stimuli, there is no restriction upon the specific content of the stimuli. For the investigation of this process, verbal reports by the subjects and sometimes their drawing productions are used. The validation of this approach is undertaken by means of the comparison of various kinds of stimuli or by the use of moderator variables drawn from personality psychology. The reader should not get the impression that any stimulus material can be exploited in experiments on subliminal perception and nicrogenesis. Newcomers to the field all to often encounter unexpected difficulties when attempting to translate their ideas into experimental designs. Abstract figures

devoid

of

meaning,

for

instance,

cannot

be

used

to

obtain

mierogeneses. They do not "make contact" with the subject's personal history as a face or a group of persons would. Even carefully thought out, meaningful stimuli can produce unexpected results. One of the present authors found that a still-life with a bottle for alcoholic beverages in the foreground was almost useless for i t s original, rather neutral purpose when reformed alcoholics served a s subjects : they simply refused to recognize the bottle as long a s possible. Variations in light and shadow, shifts in emphasis on one structure or another, etc., may be very important. As we have seen already in this chapter analogous problems pertain to experiments in subliminal perception.

Even i f a perceptual process generally

starts as an flarousal'f of a broad spectrum of developmental possibilities, this spectrum is always restricted by the stimulus meaning. To put i t in more general terms, in order to get a reasonably true picture of a personls functional landscape you have to use a carefully balanced selection of stimuli, often tried out in laborious pilot studies. The task may seem difficult sometimes, much more difficult than throwing in some well-known questionnaire, but, as attested by experiments described in this book, in the end it can be surprisingly rewarding. The impression of diversity of formulations concerning content is derived from the major personality theories which provide the background

and dictate the choice of stimulus material and the use of group comparisons in microgenetic experiments. If recurrent trends are in evidence, this may stem from the fact that a large number of investigations have been conceived in relation to psychoanalysis or to psychoanalytically derived

30

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

constructs. This circumstance is not accidental, but is traceable to the prominence accorded to the unconscious in psychoanalytic theory, even though, as Shevrin and Dickman (1980) emphasized, no psychological theor y can neglect the concept of the unconscious. Moreover, as Dixon (1981) pointed out, the effects of subliminal stimuli need not be exclusively explained in terms of psychoanalytic concepts. Another important series of contributions toward a more uniform approach to problems has likewise been impregnated by psychoanalytic terminology, We are referring here to conceptualizing conflict-related distortions of reality on the basis of defense mechanisms. All major personality theories with the exception of pure behaviorists have incorporated this construct, even though some of them have imbued i t with new meaning. This has been a major priority of percept-genetic investigation which has made a major contribution to making defenses amenable to experimental investigation. However, as several of the chapters show plainly, psychoanalysis is not the only conceptual background for microgenetic and percept-genetic research.

Indeec , several of the participating authors would vehemently

oppose such an assertion if i t were to be made. Cognitive constructs and behavioristic and psychometric points of departure are detectable in several of the studies included in this volume. This heterogeneity of theoretical assumptions and conceptions poses as much of an obstacle for the construction of a common frame of reference as the variety of methods and techniques. In 1984, the proceedings of two earlier microgenesis confercnccs, held in

Llainz

Draguns,

and &

Lund

respectively,

were

published

Hentschel, 1984; Smith, Frohlich,

&

(Frijhlich,

Smith,

Hentschel, 1984). In both

of these volumes, points of contact to subliminal perception were already in evidence. In the present book, this contact has been further extended and developed, through the inclusion of symposium papers from the Second European Conference on Personality in Bielefeld and the addition of other pertinent contributions. In many of them, the convergence of outlooks of the exponents of these two research areas is quite readily apparent. A s editors, we consider this development to be natural and are hope-

ful that this rapprochement will stimulate and enhance research on both of these topics. Both areas of investigation are essentially experimental in their orientation. In applying the experimental method to psychology, the questions

Subliminal Perception, Microgenesis, and Personality

31

of relevance and generalization have forever been paramount. Within this context, moreover, there has been an implicit clash between content and precision, with the former often being sacrificed for the benefit of the latter. In contrast to a major share of experimental research in psychology, investigators of subliminal perception and nicrogenesis have demonstrated that meaningful content-oriented problems which often pertain to the core of human modes of experience and behavior are amenable to experimentation. In this chapter, w e have tried to identify and analyze what we consider to be some meaningful dimensions of perception in coping with reality in relation to the biologically oriented models of adaptation to the environment. Proceeding from this model, we have tried to follow closely the entire span from subliminal reactivity to the conscious recognition of stimuli. The degree to which the generalizability of these observations is limited by methodological or conceptual considerations varies from chapter to chapter, Many of the contributions, moreover, clearly provide leads for clinically diagnostic and therapeutic application as well as for practical personality assessment.

A s w e see i t , research programs on microgenesis and subliminal perception exercisc a strong integrative effect in a number of directions. This effect is achieved,

first

of all, by virtue of the

generally relevant

questions investigated. It is also the result of a "suction effect" upon the various general theories, brought about by the diverse theories being applied and evaluated in light of the results of one or both of these research approaches. The multiplicity of theoretical explanations then is one of the advantages in these two fields of rcsearch. A s efforts toward greater conceptual convergence continue, the gap between the various omnibus theories of psychology can be expected to shrink.

NOTE

I) Translated from German by the authors.

U.Hentschel, G. Smith, and J.G. Draguns

32

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Hentschel, U., & Smith, G. (in press). Subliminal perception and

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E. (1949). Intolerance of ambiguity as a n emotional and

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(1984). Processing through search. In W.D. Frohlich, G. Smith,

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fiir experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 6, 410-448. Haber, R.N. (1969). Introduction. In R.N. Haber (Ed.), Information-Processing Approaches t o Visual Perception (pp. 1-15). New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winst on. Habermas, J. (1970). Zur Logik der Soeialwissenschaften. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Hentschel, U. (1984). Microgenesis and process description. In W.D.

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Cognition and Personality (pp. 59-70). Washington: Hemisphere. Hentschel, U. (1985). Zur Validitat d e s Abwehrkonstruktes: Experimentelle Belege. In D. Czogalik, W. Ehlers, & R. Teufel (Eds.),

Perspektiven der

Psychotherapieforschung (pp. 157- 175). Frei burg: Hochsc hulve rlag. Hentschel, U., & Smith, G. (1980). Experimentelle Pers6nlichkeitspsychologie. Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Hirsch, H.V.B., & Jacobson, M. (1975). T h e perfectible brain: Principles of neuronal development. In M. Gazzaniga & C. Blakemore (Eds.), Handbook

of Psychobiology (pp. 107-137). New York: Academic Press. Holzkamp. K. (1972). Kritische Psychologie. Frankfurt: Fischer. Kelly, G.A. (1955). The Psychology of Personal Constructs. New York: Norton. Klein, G.S. (1970). Perception, Motives, and Personality. New York: Knopf. Kragh, U.

(1969). Manual till DMT. Defense Mechanism Test. Stockholm:

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Skandinaviska Test forlaget. Kragh, U. (1970a). Defensive Orgnization in Percept-Genesis.

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don: Tavistock. Laux, L., Glanzmann, P., Schaffner, P., & Spielberger, C.D.

(1981). Manual fur

das State-Trait-Anxiety Inventar (STAI). Weinheim: Beltz. (1984). Foreword. In W.D. Frohlich, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns,

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& U. Hentschel (Eds.),

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ality. Washington: Hemisphere. Leibowitz, H.W., & Owens, D.A. (1977). Nighttime driving accidents and selective visual degradation.

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Lindsley, D.B. (1984). Brain potentials, brain mechanisms, and the complexity of visual information processing. In W.D. Frohlich, G.Smith, J.G. & U. Hentschel (Eds.),

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ality (pp. 231-245). Washington: Hemisphere. Linschoten, J. (1959). Aktualgenese und heuristisches Prinzip. Zeitschrift fur experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 6, 449-473. Lowenhard, P. (1981). Consciousness: A biological view. Giiteborg Psychological Reports, ll(10). M a r r , D. (1982). Vision. A Computational Investigation into t h e Human Re-

presentation and Processing of Visual Information San Francisco: Freeman. Massaro, D.W., & Cohen, M.M. (1983). Evaluation and integration of visual and auditory information in spatial perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 9, 753-771. Matussek, P. (1953). Untersuchungen uber die Wahnwahrnehmung. 2. Mitteilung: Der abnorme Vorrang der Wesenseigenschaften.

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Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 71, 189-210. McConell, J.V.,

Cutler, R.L.,

& McNeil, E.B.

(1958). Subliminal stimulation:

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& Eccles, J.C.

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(1977). The Self and Its Brain.

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Culture on Visual Perception. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Shevrin, H., & Dickman, S. (1980). The psychological unconscious: A necessary assumption for all psychological theory? American Psychologist, 35, 421434. Smith, G. (1984). Stabilization and automatization of perceptual activity over time. In W.D.

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(1982). MCT

-

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Stockholm: Psykologiforlaget. Smith, G., Kragh, U., & Hentschel, U. (1980). Historische und methodologische Ubersicht uber perzeptgenetische Verfahren. In U. Hentschel & G. Smith (Eds.), Experimentelle Personlichkeitspsychologie (pp. 33-63). Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Smith, G., & Westerlundh, B. (1980). Perceptgenesis: A process perspective on perception-personality. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology (pp. 94-124). Beverly Hills: Sage. Spence, D.P.,

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(Edited by Thure von

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Uexkiill.) Frankfurt: Ullstein. Weizsacker, V. von (1947). Der Gestaltkreis (3rd. ed.). Stuttgart: Thieme. Werner, H. (1956). Microgenesis and aphasia. Journal of Abnormal and Social

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PART I1 EXPERIMENTS ON PRECONSCIOUS PROCESSING: EFFECTS RELATED TO DIFFERENT METHODS AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguna (editors) 0 Elaevier Science Pu bliahera B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

39

PERSONALITY FACTORS AND SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION

Norman F. Dixon and Susan H.A. Henley University College London

Whether one thinks of pcrsonality in terms of traits or reactions to particular situations, it is surely the case that many of the factors which determine how a person feels, thinks, and reacts are not available to conscious scrutiny (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). The most extreme version of this

v i e w is that embodied in psychoanalytic theory. If, to parnphrase Rannister (19661, man were a dark cellar in which a well bred spinster was locked in combat with a sex crazcd monkey while the whole contest was refereed by a nervous bank clerk, then personality would be the noise coming up the cellar nteps and how i t is perceived would depend upon who is listening. Two reasons may be given for the concealment of underlying psychopathology. First, the very limited channel capacity of conscious experience precludes representation of all but a fraction of past events or current inflow. Secondly there are thorn various defense mechanisms which militate against conscious representation of unconscious emotional material. However, there ere at least three ways of uncovering those aspects of underlying psychopathology which may play a significant role in determining manifestations of personality. They include: the use of drugF and hypnosis to circumvent defenses : the obtaining of responses to supraliminal projective tests wherein the subject remains unaware of the significance of what he is saying; and, finally, applications of stimuli at signal to noise ratios below the conscious threshold. The last paradigm includes studies of meta-contrast (Smith & Danielsson, 1982; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980), and the Defense Mechanism Test (Kragh, 1965) wherein the subject's description of a neutral picture or 'hero' figure, respectively, is biased, without his knowledge, by R masked or peripherally presented threat stinulus. Another model involving subliminal perception, of considerable relevance to personality is that pioneered by Poetzl (1917) and later Fisher (1960). The data from a typical

N.F. Dixon and S.H.A. Henley

40

experiment suggest that it is those parts of a briefly exposed picture which are

n o t

consciously perceived at the time of i t s presentation

that make contact with unconscious psychopathology, and become manifest in subsequent dreams or associations. As for the extensive studies of perceptual defense (Dixon, 1981),

they might be said to constitute a sensitive measure of the extent to which particular stimuli or events excite defensive responses in the recipient. Finally, there is the paradigm of subliminal psychodynamic activation developed by Silverman (1976; see also Dixon, 1981) through which significant changes in underlying pathology and overt behavior can be achieved as a result of presenting verbal messages below the conscious threshold. The common denominator of all these paradigms is that since the subject is unaware of the fitimulus and therefore unaware of being stimulated he remains oblivious of contingencies between the stimulus and the responses which he gives. From noting the effect of particular stimuli upon say dreams or projective tests, the experimenter is better able to deduce possible content of underlying psychopathology. Conversely (and more importantly), he can test hypothcses by comparing differences between complex-related and neutral stimuli. It is in this context that we would like to outline some ongoing research which attempts to explore underlying psychopathology with a new paradigm involving continuous successive backward masking. The general method entails using a Commodore PET 2001 micro-processor, so programmed as to display a sequence of letter strings with each string exactly superimposed upon its predeccssor. Sincc the SOA for each string is only 35 msec. and the I . S . I . is zero, all that the subject consciously perceives is a flickering jumble of letter elements. From a number of pilot experiments (Dixon, Henley,

&

Weir,

1984) using this method, it was concluded that: 1.

When asked to stop the display whenever they thought a word was present among a series of strings, subjects could do this significantly often even when unaware what the word was.

2.

There was a significant tcndcncy to avoid stopping the display when the embedded word or phrase (sequence of 4-lett e r words) was aversive.

3.

Occasionally for some subjects critical words appeared to "jump out" and become consciously perceptible.

Personality Factors

41

On the basis of these findings we have run a second experiment of a slightly modified design in which letter Etrings are presented. When viewed through a synoptophore. the letter strings, which are in fmt presented alternately to the two eyes, appear superimposed. By thus combining backward and forward masking in the context of a binocular rivalry situation, the %ubliminalityl' of the stimulus is increased, although the actual rate of gain of information to each eye is halved. For a pilot investigation using this method, a young female subject (who was not a psychologist) was asked to give free associations following each of the following four words - B I R D , HARP, NUDE, and SHIP. Om each trial, one of these words was embedded in a sequence of 49 4-letter nonsense strings recycled five t i m e s . On control trials the procedure wos the same except thnt an additional nonsense string WQS substituted for the experimental words. In addition to giving free associations after each of the control trials and each of the experimental trials, at the end of the control trials and each of the experimental trials, the subject was asked to sort 32 cards, each one bearing a word, four of which were the words actually used in the experimental trials ('critical' words), into three piles "certain it was presented", %ncertain", and "certain it was not presentedl'. The results from this treatment were as follows: after the control trials, the subject assigned 3 of the 4 stimulus words to the "certain it was not presented" category, and 1 to the Tfuncertain"category. Following the experimentnl trials, however, the word about which she had previously been %ncertain" was now placed in the "certain it was presented" categor y , aa were two of the three words previously assigned to the "certain it was not presented" category. The remaining word (previously in the %ertain i t was not presented" category) was now assigned to the "uncertain" category. In other words, following the experimental trials, all four 'critical' words were moved to categories in the direction of the "certain it was presented" judgement, a result which is significant at beyond the 0.0258 level, one tail (Mc Nemar teRt for the significance of changes). It is of some interest that, between control and experimental trials, judgements for synonyms of the critical words also 'moved up'. A s can be seen from Table 1, a comparison between the free asswietions given by the subject after the experimental trials and those given after the control trinls also indicate that her choice of words is influenced by the masked stimuli.

42

N.F. Dhon and S.H.A. Henley Table 1 Associations following masked verbal s t i m u l i

Stimulus

Responses Experimental

Ship

Control

men near water,

antiques ,

b o a t s and buoys,

barns, cows,

t r a v e l agency,

carriage, carts,

s a i l s , blue water

harness,

and palm t r e e a ,

t a p room,

ocean l i n e r ,

oats,

sound recording s t u dio. tube s t a t i o n .

Bird

l o t s of planes,

f o o t b a l l stadium,

old fashioned b i -

plastic seats,

planes,

s t a t u e s of

black crows over a

m i l i t a r y men.

field, sky d i v e r s .

Harp

church,

sounds of singing,

orchestra p i t ,

room with white

clarinet,

walls, desk,

trombones

,

and carpet.

wunan with key tuning a harp.

Nude

workshop with nude

Street o r modern

pinup on wall.

buildings.

Personality Factors

43

Encouraged by these results we introduced further modifications of the paradigm. On the assumption (Dixon, 1981) that subliminal stimuli are processed by the right hemisphere, we used picture selections as independent variables.

Instead of giving free associations, the subjects were

asked to select pictures from a complex display. For this cxperiment all subjects were presented with the word COCK and, in addition, since vtc were concerned with exploring semantic networks underlying personality, words especially selected in the light of what was known about the subjects in question. By way of checking the significance of pictorial stimulus selections, each subject underwent a sccond administration of the entire experiment one week after the first, with the stimulus words presented in a different random order, the question being, would subjects choose the same pictures for the same stimulus words as on the previous occasion? The following table shows for each of the five subjects the number of identical selections made on the two occasions.

Table 2

Number of Repeated S e l e c t i o n s

Sub

S t i m u l u s Words

jects 1

p .OO2

2

3

p .0006

p .005

4

p .03

5

6

p -036

7

8

9

10

p .0003

p .036

p .018

p .018

p .027

1

5(5)

(NUDE)

(GIRL)

(BABY)

(SHIP)

(HILL)

(YANK)

(CAKE)

(COAT)

(CATS)

4(5)

2(2)

4(4)

8(9)

6( 9)

6(6)

1(1)

5(6)

5(5)

44

N.F. Dixon and S.H.A. Henley

5(8)

(NUDE)

(JACK)

(PRAM)

(HAND)

(BATH)

(WASP)

5(5)

5(7)

11(11)

4(5)

5(7)

7(10)

p .003

p ,00016 p $02

p .001

p .001

p .001 p .007

9(11)

p .00005

3

4(5)

(SHIP)

(BIRD)

(CATS)

(NLTDE)

(BABY)

(BATH)

(HARP)

(HILL)

(JILL)

5(6)

5(5)

5(5)

4(4)

6(8)

4(4)

7(7)

6(6)

4(5)

p .001

p ,001

p .02

p .0067

p .056

p .0019

p .OOZE

p .05

p 026

p .007

p ,015

p .016 p .002

4

p -08

p .09

p .10

p .33

p .02 5

*

Figures i n parentheses refer to 'repetitions' before corrections for sequential dependencies.

When considering these data, the following points should be born in mind: 1 . T o control against the possibility that the number of repeated selections might be artificially inflated due to sequential dependencies hetween responses, intercorrelations were computed between all selections made, and the actual number of repeated selections reduced accordingly (i.e. if the correlation between any repeated Selections for a particular stimulus were

significant, only one of them would be counted for the purpose of computing the final probability value of the selections made). 2. The probability, using Chi-square, of any repeated selections nlso occurring for other stimulus presentations was also computed. In those cases where the Chi-square value proved significant, no significance was claimed for the repeated solections in question (e.g. in the cases of subjects 4 and 5 , significance cannot be claimed for repeated selections for the stimuli

BIRD, C A T S , HARP, o r NUDE, respectively).

Personality Factors

45

3. In the case of subjects 3 and 5 , because of the exploratory nature of

this investigation, four of the stimulus words used in the first administration of the paradigm were not in fact used in the second administration. This was to see whether the introduction of new stinulus words would produce any change in the overall results. Despite the foregoing adjustments and modifications, it is possible to draw the following conclusions from the results of this experiment: 1. Out of the total of 45 cases in which the five subjects were

presented with the same stimulus words on a suhsequent occasion, 36 resulted in a significant number of repeated selections. Over all five subjects, three of whom scored significantly above chance, the metln probability of repeated selections was 0 . 0 4 1 (one tail probability). 2 . Clearly, there arc considerable individual differences in the effects of masked stimuli upon subsequent picture selection. 3. As exemplified by the picture selections following stimulation with the word COCK, the tendency to choose symbolic responses to subliminal words, shown in earlier research (see Dixon, 19811, may also occur for masked words.

Table 3 Response s e l e c t i o n s of p i c t u r e s made by Subject No. 3 following stimulus word COCK

Expts. 1 and 2

Expts. 1 and 3

Elephan

Teapot

K nife

Cannon Fork

p-0.001

Horse

Peg

Dog

Train

Ring Hammer B all

Pump Crane Bike

p - 0 . 00005

46

N.F. Dixon and S.H.A. Henley

Of particular interest in this context are the responses of subject 3 to the stimulus word WASP. For this subject. unlike for the others, the entire experiment was administered on no less than three occasions. On all three she selected the response "PLANE" for the stimulus WASP. The probability of this occurring by chance - based on the total number of times she used the response "PLANE" throughout the experiment - is 0,008.

Obviously there is a long way to go, but we feel that through a number of pilot investigations we are developing a new paradigm for investigating semantic networks underlying individual personality structure. The following advantages can be claimed for the method being used: 1. The position and nature of the stimulus material can be quickly and

easily changed from trial to trial. 2 . Though psychologically subliminal, the presence at receptor level of the

stimuli which are presented can be assured. 3. By using dichoptic presentation it is poseible to investigate the effect

of different temporal relationships between any primes to one eye and targets to the other o r , S R ~ of , amounts of summation between o r within eyes of structurally identical or semantically similar words for their effect upon subsequent responding. The results to date, from using this method, suggest that for some subjects information extracted from a display of masked letters which is changing so rapidly as to defy consciouR comprehension may affect the subsequent selection of items from a pictorial array. The content of the responses made in this paradigm appear to reflect the activation of preconscious semantic networks with implications for underlying determinants of personality.

41

Personality Factors REFERENCES

Bannister, D. (1966). Psychology a s an exercise in paradox. Bulletin of t h e British Psychological Society, 19, 21 -27. Dixon, N.F. (1981). Preconscious processing. Chichester: Wiley. Dixon, N.F., Henley, S.H.A., from

continuously

& Weir, C. (1984). The extraction of information

masked

successive

stimuli.

Current

Psychological

Research and Reviews, 3,1, 1-7. Fisher, C. (1960). Subliminal and supraliminal influences on dreams. American Journal of Psychiatry, 116, 1009-17. Kragh, U. (1969). Manual till DMT

-

Defense Mechanism Test.

Stockholm:

Skandinaviska Test forlaget. Nisbett, R.E. & Wilson, T.D. (1977).Telling more than w e know: verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological Review, 84, 23 1-59. Poetzl, 0. (1917). The

relationship between

images and indirect

vision.

experimentally induced

Monograph No.7,

Psychological

dream

Issues,

2,

41-120 (1960) Silverman, L.H.

(1976). Psychoanalytic theory: "the reports of my death are

greatly exaggerated. I' American Psychologist, 31, 62 1 - 37. Smith, G.J.W.

& Danielsson,

A.

(1982). Anxiety and defensive strategies in

childhood and adolescence. Psychological Issues, Monograph No. 52, N e w York: International Universities Press. Smith, G.J.W. & Westerlundh, B. (1980). Perceptgenesis: a process perspective on perception-personality. In L. Wheeler (Ed.) Review of Personality

and Social Psychology, Vol. 1. (pp. 94-124). Beverly Hills: Sage.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.(North-Holland), 1986

49

THE SUBLIMINAL PSYCHODYNAMIC ACTIVATION METHOD: COMPREHENSIVE LISTING UPDATE, INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES, AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Lloyd 11. Silverman and Carol J. Geisler New York University

REVIEW OF THE METHOD: ITS APPLICATIONS AND RESULTS In this paper, we shall address a number of matters related to subliminal psychodynamic activation research. It is intended as a follow-up to a recent publication (Silverman, 1983) describing the yield of studies in this area through 1981. In part, the current paper brings this summary up to date and in part it deals with a number of issues raised by subliminal psychodynamic research, particularly the role of individual differences. There are now over 60 articles and doctoral dissertations reporting clear evidence of subliminal psychodynamic activation effects.

That is,

when a visual stimulus (verbal message and/or picture) is tachistoscopical1 ly exposed at a subliminal level t o groups of subjects for whom the stinulus is psychodynamically relevant, it produces changes in behavior that do not appear after the subliminal exposure of neutral stimuli. Overall, these findings can be viewed a s providing strong support for a key psychoanalytic proposition : behavior

-

particularly psychopathological behavior

motivated in part b y "psychodynamic motives"

-

- is

i .e, , unconscious wishes,

fears, and fantasies. In addition, the results yielded have supported particular psychodynamic relationships, some of which have attained a consensus in the psychoanalytic literature, whereas others arc more controversial. Among the former are the postulates that: 1) homosexual feelings in men frequently involve a flight from incest (supported by experiments by Silverman, Kwawer , Wolitzky , and Coron, 1973 ; and Silverman, Bronstein, and Mendelsohn, 1976); 2) depressive feelings often are motivated by unconscious hostile wishes turned against the self (Supported by Cox, 1974; Miller, 1973; Rutstein and Goldberger, 1973; and Varga, 1973); 3) stuttering frequently involves a displacement upward of unconscious conflict over

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

50

anality (supported by Silverman, Klinger, Lustbader, Farrell, and Martin, 1972; and Silverman, Bronstein, and Mendelsohn, 1976); and 4) schizophrenic pathology expresses, in part, conflict over unconscious ornlaggressive wishes (supported b y Litwack, Wiedemnnn, and Yager, 1979; Lomangino, 1969, and ten other studies reviewed in Mendclsohn and Silverman, 1982). Among the more controversial psychodynamic relationships thnt have been supported are the postulates that : 1) behavior, in general, bccomes more adaptive nfter unconscious symbiotic fantasies are activated (supported by over thirty experiments summarized in Silvermnn, Lachmann, and Milich, 1982); and 2 ) effectiveness in sports competition can be enhanced o r impeded after different kinds of unconscious oedipal fantasies are activated (supported by Carroll, 1979; Clennon, 1983; Hayden and Silverstein, 1983; Lonski anti Palumbo, 1978; Palumbo, in press; er.d Silverman, ROSR, Adler, and Lustig, 1978). In judging the effectiveness of the subliminal psychodynamic activation method for studying psychodynamic activation method for studying psychoanalytic psychodynamic postulates, one needs to know more than simply the number of studies that have reported positive results. The following questions are germane: 1 What is the ratio of studies reporting positive results to those re2 porting negative Sindings? The ratio is 4:l. 2 Is it possible that the positive to ncgative results ratio is artifactually weighted on the former side since positive results studies may be more apt to be reported? It would not appear that way since what is true of articles is not true of doctoral dissertations. Once a dissertntion study is carried out, the results are reported whether they are positive or negative, and an objective determination can be made of all doctoral dissertations conducted in an are8 through a search of Psychological Abstracts and Dissertation Abstracts. Almost all of the studies reported both in Silverman, 1983, and in note 2 in this paper were Sirst reported as doctoral dissertations . 3 Could artifacts have been responsible for the positive findings? The two most frequently operative artifacts in psychological experiments are experimenter bias and subject expectations. These, we believe, for all intents and purposes have been eliminated through the use of double-blind procedures. Subjects nre blind to stimulus conditions since the tachistoscopic exposures m e subliminal (see Note 1).

Experimcntcrs are blind in

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

51

that when they insert the stimuli. they view only the backs of the cards which have been coded beforehand by someone else.3 One could, of course, ask if we arc certain that the experincnters maintain their "blindness," so that the following findings are relevant. In each instance, the results reported could not be attributed to experimenter bias even if the experimenters had not maintdned their blindness (which they claimed they had maintained) : a) In investigations by Cohen (19C7), Kaye (1975), and Clendelsohn (19811, the strongest subliminal psychodynamic effects emerged from stimuli that the investigators predicted would have either no or weak effects. b) In one of the experiments reported by Silverman et al., 1978, the experimenters, who were students, were unaware that the senior investigator who designed the experiment had predicted that experimental effects would occur under low illumination conditions but not under high illumination conditions. (The experimenters were simply instructed to set the illumination dials differently for different subjects.) The hypothesized interaction was borne out. c ) In several studies (Dauber, 1984; Fribourg, 1981; Geisler, in press; Schmidt, 1981) interactions were predicted and borne out between experimental effects and subject characteristics in which the experimenter: either was a student who had no knowledge of the hypothesized interaction, or had no way of knowing which subjects fell into one category or the other, since the subject characteristic variable was scored either after the experiment was completed or by someone else. blhereas in the above mentioned studies there was evidence beyond tho experimenters' claims of blindness for experimental conditions that experimenter bias was not ~ p e r a t i v e , in ~ the great majority of subliminal psychodynamic activation studies there was no additional evidence. Thus, it is of some importance to consider the number of positive result studies that were carried out in independent laboratories. There POW have been 5 over 20 such studies. 4 What was the quality of the positive result studies? In our judgment, the quality of the overwhelming majority of these studies was very high (certainly nc lower than the quality of the studies that have reported negative findings), though interested parties should read through the 6 studies themselves, all o f which are accessible.

L.H.Silverman and C.J. Geisler

52

How robust have the effects been in the studies reporting positive findings? The answer to this question varies across the studies. There have been a number of investigations in which the results could be characterized as robust in the sense that the differences between the experimental and the control conditions were of noteworthy magnitude, and there have been other studies in which the results have been robust in the sense that they have been highly consistent from one experiment to the next. And there has been one series of studies in which the findings have been both highly consistent across studies and of notable magnitude. We are referring in the last mentioned category to the treatment adjunct studies of "high dosage". These are studies in which subjects received Rubliminal stimulation three or more times a week for 3-6 weeks QS an accompaniment to either therapeutic or educational interventions, with one group receiving MOMMY AND I ARE ONE and the other a control stimulus. To date, ten studies of this kind have been carried out? all having produced positive findings, and in most, the difference between the experimental and control groups has been not only statistically significant but of considerable magnitude. These studies can be contrasted with what we have termed "laboratory studies" in which the same subjects receive both the experimental and control condition on only one occasion and the effects of the two are compared. In one group of the latter studies (eummarized in Silverman, 1983) involving the effects of the symbiotic stimulus (the verbal message MOMMY AND I ARE ONE) on schizophrenics, the findings have been consistently positive, but not of notable magnitude. The high dosage treatment adjunct studies can also be contrasted with the laboratory studies involving the effects of Oedipal messages on sports competition (dart throwing ability), in which the findings acrow studies have been notably mixed (Silvermar,, 1983). In some of these experiments (Silvermart, Ross, Adler, L Lustig, 1978), the findings have been of greRt magnitude. Although the results from Rtudies that have been carried out with the subliminal psychodynamic activation method have been preponderantly positive, there have been negative findings in about 20% of the experiments. When a subliminal psychodynamic activation experiment yields negative reFults, a number of possibilities need to be entertained. 1 The hypothesis being tested may be invalid. However, before entertaining this possibility, one should consider whether there is evidence to support any of tho other explanatory possibilities that follow. 5

53

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method 2

The hypothesis may be valid but subliminal registration mny not

have taken place. Regktration can be interfered with under the following circumstances : a) Crucial information from the stimulus does not enter the fovea. This can occur if either the stimulus is not properly centered or thc stimulus extcnds too far to the sides of the stimulus card so that the entire stimulus does not register in the fovea.* According to Vinnett and van Santen (19811, this was likely the case in thc recent study by Heilbrun (1980) who reported wgative results in a dart study.

9

b ) "Bleaching" (Kaufman, 1974) interferes with visual registration. (See Silverman et nl.,

1978, pp. 3 5 0 - 3 5 3 , for

A

probable example.)

This can take place i f : 1- the illumination of the blank field is sct too high in relation to the ambient illumination o r the illumination of the stimulus field is too high in relation to the blank field;"

2- i f the

glare from a lightbulb nakes contact with the subject's eyes just prior to tachistoscopic stimulation; 3- if the blank field does not go off during the four-msec period when the stimulus field comes on so that the latter is doubly illuminated; 4- i f the subject has been keeping his eyes closed so that when they are opened right before tachistoscopic stimulation there is a sudden sharp increase in the amount of light entering thc eyes. c) The stimulus may be exposed at a level too close to or even above threshold." The exposures should be such that no partial cues are available: and even beyond this, the cxposure level should bc comfortably below threshold.12 A t four msec, the stimulus may be a t , or too close to, threshold i f the lines of the stimulus tire too dark in relation to the illumination of the blank and stimulus fields. 3

The amount of subliminal stimulation provided may be insufficient.

Thus Packer (1982) found that whcr. subliminal psychodynamic stimulation was administered four times

weekly as an accompaniment to behavior

assertiveness training, it affected outcome in a way that twice-weekly stimulation did not. And both Arian and Siller (1982) and Parker (1982) found that symbiotic stirnulation when delivered several times weekly inproved gradcs after six weeks of the intervention but not after three weeks. Thus "dosage" is important both in terms of frequency of utimulation (i.e., sessions per week) and duration (number of weeks of stimulation). 4

The hypothesis may be valid but the failure to use a verbal and

pictorial stimulus together may have eliminated (or weakened) the effects.

54

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

In different subliminal psychodynamic activation experiments, the stimuli used have sometimes been only pictures, sometimes only verbal messages, and sometimes both. In the pathology intensification studies, positive results have emerged under all three circumstances. though there are pilot data from our laboratory suggesting that the strongest effects occur when pictures and words are uued together. In the pathology reduction studies - at least thoRe in which the M O M M Y AND I ARE ONE stimulus has been used, the picture alone (of a man and a woman merged at the shoulders like Siamese twins) has not produced effects. In this type of study, an even stronger case can be made for using the verbal messages and pictures together than in the pathology intensification investigations. For in two dissertation studies (Bryant-Tuckett , 1980; Kaplan. 19761, whereaR subjects who received words alone produced subliminal psychodynamic RCtivation effects, these were weaker than the effects produced by subjects receiving both pictures and verbal messages. As to why words and pictures work better, one possibility is that both hemispheres of the brain are more apt to be activated if both types of stimuli are used. Another possibility - and the two are not mutually exclusive - is that the words and pictures potentiate each other. That is, it may be that pictures are a more powerful eliciter of reactions ("one picture is worth a thousand words") but that words are necessary to code the meaning of the picture that the experimenter wants to convey. In any case, it would seem desirable for experiments to uue both kinds of stimuli unless there are compelling reasons to use only one. l 3 Experimenters should note that when both words and pictures are used, they should be presented alterrwtsly, rather than together on the same stimulus card. 14 5 The hypothesis may be valid for the group under study, but the stimulus chosen to "ceptureIt the psychodynamic content that is to be activated may have been a bad choice.15 A s is discussed elsewhere (Silverman, 1983, pp.79-80), the use of the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus with subjects who did not use the word Tbnommyfqduring their childhood is 16 R striking example. 6 The hypothesis may be valid, but particular experimenter characteristics could have interfered with psychodynamic effects. Citrin (1979) and Silverman et al. (1978) reported that in the dart experiments referred to earlier female experimenters did not elicit the psychodynamic effects that male experimenters did.

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

55

7 The hypothesis may have merit but not for the particular sample being investigated. Individual differences that are relcvant to the hypothesis that is being tested n a y have to be taken into account.l7 In the remainder of this paper, we will cite evidence from a variety of studies to

support this point.

EFFECTS OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES The importance of taking into account personality differences among individuals when engaging in clinical research is implicit in psychoanalytic theory. If one is to test a psychoanalytic postulate in which a psychodynamic motive has been posited as rclnted to a specific form of pathology, it is mandatory to have some basis for assuming that such a motive is present and active in the subjects being studied.18 The minimal step to be taken is to use subjects who share in common a particular diagnosis, symptom, set of attitudes or behaviors which would allow one to infer the presence of the particular motive under consideration. The value of taking such characteristics into account in subliminal psychodynamic activation research has been demonstrated in a series of experiments by Silverman, Bronstein, and klendelsohn (1976). In this investigation, groups of schizophrenics, depressives, homosexuals, and stutterers were seen, each for three (counterbnlanced) conditions, in which the following stinuli were subliminally exposed: (1) e. wish-related stimulus that the clinical psychoanalytic literature deems as "relevant1' for the pathology in question and that had actually intensified this type of pathology in earlier studies : oral- aggressive for the schizophrenics and depressives, incest for the homosexuals, and anal for the stutterers;19 ( 2 ) a wish-related stimulus that the literature dGes not view as relevant and for which there was no empirical support for R psychodynamic relationship : incest for the schizophrenics and stutterers, aggressive for the homosexuals. and anal for the depressives; and (3) a neutral control stimulus. The findings for each of these groups were consistent. Whereas further support wa5 obtained for the original relevant psychodynamic relationship studied, in no instance did the second (non-relevant) wish-related condition influence the pathology under consideration : that is, in each case the effect of the latter stimulus did not differ from that of the neutral control condition.

56

L.H.Silverman and C.J. Geisler

The above results point to the importance of taking into account the particular defining characteristics of the subjectu in testing the impact of particular psychodynamic activating stimuli. It may, however, not always be sufficient to only take into account the primary characteristic which defines a particular sample. If such a sample is further differentiated on the basis of a secondary characteristic, which there is reason to believe has relevance for the lrariable under study, psychodynamic effects may be revealed that would have remained obscure if only the primary characteristic was considered, This, in fact, has been demonstrated in one group of the studies OP the adaptation-enhancing effects of activating unconscious symbiotic fantasies. In eleven studies carried out with male schizophrenics (reviewed in Silverman, Lachmann, and Milich, 1982, chapter 4 1 , the subliminal exposure of the MOMMY AND I ARE O N E stimulus resulted in decreased pathology that was not in evidence after subliminal control stimulation. This well replicated finding was subject to the following qualification, however. The pathology reduction that was €ound only held for Schizophrenics who could be characterized as Itrelatively differentiated from their mothers" - that ifi for those who gave evidence of having an image of themselves that was somewhat differentiated from their image of their mothers." Fur less differentinted schizophrenics, on the other hand (and this was the case in four of the studies cited - Fribourg, 1981; Leiter, 1982; Silverman et al., 1969; T. Spiro, 1975), the stimulation of the symbiotic fantasy did not lead to pathology reduction. In one study it even led to its intensification (Leiter, 1982). The explanation offered for this finding (Silverman, Lachmann, and Milich, 1982, chapter 4) was the following. Unconscious oymbiotic fantasies can serve a number of adaptation-enhancing functions such as the fulfillment of libidinal wishes, insurance against object loss, and as a protection against both destructive wishes and external destruction. However, such fantasies also can pose a thrent; they can lead to a loss of sense of self, an experience that schizophrenics are particularly vulnerable to. Thus. whether or not a schizophrenic will respord positively to the stinulation of a symbiotic fantasy will depend on the degree to which this threat is mobilized. For schizophrenics who are relatively differentiated, the balance of forces favors an adaptation-enhancing outcome, while for those who are highly undifferentiated, this is not the case.

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

51

Another characteristic of schizophrenics also has proven to be decisive in terms of whether or not the MOWMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus led to decreased pathology - whether they were men or women. Whereas in almost all of the experiments carried out with male schizophrenics there has been pathology reduction after the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE condition, in the two studies wherc there were samples of female schizophrenics (Cohen, 1977; Jackson, 19831, this condition had no effect.

However, in both

studies just cited, a different stimulus - DADDY AND I ARE ONE 21 found to reduce pathology. The failure of the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus to diminish pathology

in

schizophrenic

women is

paralleled

by

three

studies

with

non-schizophrenics in which this same stimulus was adaptation-enhancing for the males in the sample but not for the females (Hobbs,

1983;

Silverman h Grabowski, 1982; Zuckerman, 1980). And looking at all studies in which MOULlY AND I ARE ONE was used with non-schizophrenic women, only about half have produced positive findings, while with male samples there were adaptation-enhancing effects in almost every study. Why should it be the case that women do not react as reliably to the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus a s men do? It has been proposed (Silverman, Lachmann, and Milich, 1982, chapter 5 ) that it is the result of the difference between men and women in the degree to which they are differentiated from their mothers. The following evidence has been marshalled to support this position: Bernstein (1980), after considering both the clinical literature and case material of her own, concludes that women tend to be less differentiated from their mothers than men. Her conclusion seems particulnrly warranted given the following considerations. First, as Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) have noted, many kinds of observations support the proposition

that females are notably less aggressive than males,

and it has been

posited by such psychoanalytic writers as Jacobson (1964) that aggression

aids infants in differentiating from their mothers.

Moreover,

because

daughters are the same gender as their mothers, they have less of a basis for differentiating themselves from their mothers than do sons (Silverman, Lachmann,

&

Milich, 1982, pp.112-113).

In keeping with our earlier discussion of relatively undifferentiated schizophrenics, we postulate that because women are less apt to have differentiated themselves from their mothers to a high degree, the MOMMY

AND I ARE ONE fantasy is more apt to pose a threat to their sense of self.

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

58

This then would account for why this fantasy is less reliably adaptation-enhancing for females. Such a supposition can also render understandable one other finding from subliminal psychodynamic activation research. In Cohen's (1977) and Jackson's (1983) studies it already has been noted that the female schizophrenics did respond positively to DADDY A N D I ARE ONE. And in the Silverman and Grabowski (1982)

study cited

above, a sample of non-schizophrenic women (college students), though not responding with greater adaptive ability after this same stimulus, did show better adaptation after a new stimulus message: MY LOVER AND I ARE ONE. Both these findings can be explained by the assumption that oneness with someone other than "mommyTTfrom whom the women felt more differentiated did not threaten their sense of self. Characteristics bcyond primary designations also have proven to bc important in subliminal psychodynamic activation studies of depression. Dauber (1984) in an initial study found that a sample of depressed college women manifested increased dysphoric reactions after the guilt inducing subliminal stimulus LEAVING M O M IS WRONG. In a second study Dauber, following Blatt

(1979),

reasoned that only some depressions are guilt

induced and that if he identified deprcssives whose depressions were so based, such a group would more clearly be responsive to the guilt-related subliminal message. He thus administered to a new group of depressive women Quinlan,

the

Depressive

1976)

Experience

Questionnaire

(Blatt ,

that was designed to distinguish between

D'Afflitti,

b

guilt-related

("introjective") and loss-related (vtanaclitic") depression. A s Dauber predicted, whereas the 'anaclitic subgroup showed no response to the LEAVING M O M IS WRONG message, the introjective subgroup showed an increase in depression. Brennan (19831, studying another group of depressed college women, used the same LEAVING MOM IS WRONG stimulus and divided her subjects on the basis of the Depressive Experience Questionnaire into subgroups that were high and low for introjective depression. Like Dauber, Brennan found that only the high introjcctive subgroup showed increased depression after the experimental condition.

In addition, Brennan found that

when she further subdivided her subjects into those who lived on campus and those who lived at home, i t was only the former who had become more depressed. She interpreted this as implying that when young women move away from hone they become particularly prone to feeling guilty over "leaving mom." This latter finding further argues for the value of looking

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

59

for individual differences beyond the primary group designation. Finally, Schmidt (1981) also used the Depressive Experience Questionnaire and divided a group of college students into those prone to introjective depression and a group prone to anaclitic depression. It was hypothesized that the introjective group would show increased depression after the subliminal message, I HAVE BEEN B A D , but not after the message, I HAVE LOST MOMMY, and that the anaclitic group would respond in the

converse way. These hypotheses were borne out. The results from these three studies of depression strongly support the view that, in addition to assessing a particular pathology, the assessment of additional subject characteristics (such as the presence of anaclitic or introjective proclivities) makes it more possible to demonstrate subliminal psychodynamic activation effects. A study which further makes this point, but for a group with a different type of pathology was recently carried out by Geisler (in press). Her study was designed to demonstrate repression and used a group of women found to be high in sexual guilt on the basis of a sexual guilt questionnaire. Geisler reasoned that the subliminal activation of Oedipal conflict (using the verbal message, LOVING DADDY IS W R O N G , accompanied by a picture of a nude man and woman in a sexually suggestive pose) was more likely to have an impact on sexually guilty women whose personality development was at a higher level. That i s , such a subgroup could be expected both to be burdened specifically by oedipally related sexual guilt and to use repression as a defense. Accordingly, Geisler divided her group on the basis of Draw-a-Person

scores into a subgroup

with more highly developed personalities and another one with less developed personalities. A s she predicted, only thc former subgroup showed repression when presented with the Oedipally related subliminal stimulus. A further series of studies yielded post hoc findings that further pointto the importance of assessing additional characteristics of subjects for determining thcir responsiveness to subliminal psychodynamic activation (Carroll,

1979; Glennon,

1983; Litwack,

Wiedemann,

&

Yager,

1979;

Silverman et al., 1976). In the Litwack et a1.(1979) study, i t was found that for the two experimental stimuli that intensified pathology in a schizophrcnic sample - the aggressive stimulus, CANNIBAL EATS PERSON, and the anxiety-over-separation stimulus, I AM LOSING MOMMY

-

the effectiveness of the experi-

mental conditions depended upon the degree to which the subjects dc-

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

60

fended against aggressive and anxiety-related ideas, The overall effects of each of the psychodynamic stimuli were "carried" by those schizophrenics who independently could be characterized as l'relatively nondefended The more defended subjects, on the other hand, did not react with increased pathology, presumably because they found more adaptive ways of handling the psychodynamically related contents that were stirred up by 23 the experimental stimuli, The Silverman et

a1.(1976)

study included,

a s noted earlier,

a

depressive group and this was divided post hoc into one subgroup that used denial against dysphoric affect and another that did not. An increase in dysphoria after subliminal aggressive stimulation was in evidence only for the latter group presumably because the former subgroup was able to deny the depressive feelings that were stirred up. Both Carroll (1979) and Glennon (1983) were among those carrying out the dart throwing experiments noted earlier. College males, after being primed for competition, particularly in relation to their fathers, threw several series of eight darts, each series being preceded by tachistoscopic stimulation. The Oedipal-level stimuli that were used included one that was intended to sanction surpassing father in competition (BEATING DAD IS O K , accompanied by a picture of an older man looking approvingly at a

younger man) and another one condemning such competition (BEATING

DAD IS WRONG, accompanied by a picture of an older man looking disapprovingly). In three experiments that were initially conducted in our laboratory (Silverman, Ross, Adler, 8 Lustig, 19781, the OK stimulus led to significantly higher dart scores than the WRONG stimulus. Carroll and Glennon both obtained replications of these results.

In

addition, each of them independently examined subject variables that correlated with their experimental effects and reached a similar conclusion: the overall group effects obtained were carried by subjects whose defenses could be characterized as relatively "ineffective or unsuccessful" (Carroll, 1979, p.31). From the studies of Litwack et al.,

1979, Silverman e t al., 1976,

Carroll, 1979, and Glennon, 1983, there is evidence to suggest that responsiveness to subliminal psychodynamic activation is less likely to occur in subjects who are relatively well dofended against the psychodynamic content that the experimental stimuli activate. So far this evidence has emerged for such diverse dynamic contents as oral aggression, anxiety over separation, and Oedipal Competition, and with groups ranging from

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

61

schizophrenics through depressives to nonclinical populations. Further experiments are in order both to seek replications of these findings and to test the generalizability of the formulation that has been suggested. In conclusion, over a dozen studies have examined individual differences in subliminal psychodynamic activation research. Responsiveness to the activation of particular psychodynamic motives has been found to be dependent not only on membership in groups with particular primary designations - e . g . ,

schizophrenics - but

also on subgroup characteristics

such as whether the schizophrenics are relatively differentiated or undifferentiated; are men or women; or are relatively well defended or undefended

against

disturbing

ideation.

Future

investigators

using

the

subliminal psychodynamic activation method would do well to consider the role of individual diffcrences for whatever psychodynamic relationship they are studying. They also should keep in mind the other conditions that need

to

be

fulfilled

to

maximize

the

chances of

finding

subliminal

psychodynamic activation effects. These include: 1 alerting oneself to conditions that could interfere with subliminal regis-

tration; 2

providing a high ”dosage” of subliminal psychodynamic activation (both

in terms of frequency and duration) whenever possible; 3 employing verbal and pictorial stimuli together whenever feasible; 4

using stimuli that best capture the psychodynamic content that one

wants to activate; and 5 considering experimenter characteristics that might facilitate or interfere with experimental effects. One final note can be added. The subliminal psychodynamic activation method and the research studies which have derived from this method comprise a counterexample that refutes Popper’s (1962) contention, recently discussed by Grunbaum (19841, that psychoanalysis is an “untestableT7theory. The examination of individual differences in particular (in addition to making it more possible for the investigator to obtain results with otherwise may be obscured when a group as a whole is examined) allows for the refined testing of the theory and can yield data that support, extend, or challenge particular psychoanalytic dynamic relationships.

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

62 NOTES

1) "Subliminal level" is defined as one at which subjects cannot discriminate the exposures of one stimulus from those made by another, This

is ascertained by the use of a "discrimination task" described in detail elsewhere (e.g., Silverman, Ross, Adler, B Lustig, 1978, pp. 346-347). In all but three of the studies reviewed in Silverman (1983), the stimuli were subliminal by virtue

of

very

brief

exposures

-

typically

4-msec tachistoscopic exposures. In the remaining three studies (Hines, 1977; Lodl, 1980; Sackeim, 197?), the stimuli were subliminal by virtue of

very low illumination, with their having been projected onto a screen. Since these studies reported subliminal psychodynamic effects and since their procedure allows for group "delivery" of the stimuli (as well as group administration of tests to assess effects), further exploration of this modality is clearly in order. 2 ) Since the Silverman (1983) article was written, additional studies have been reported

by Augenbraun

(1982), Ausubel (19811, Brenner

( 1 9 8 0 ) , Brush (1982), Burkham (19811, Conte ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Geisler (in p r e s s ) ,

Glennon (1983), Gordon (19821, Haspel and Harris (19821, Hayden and Silverstein (1983), Hobbs (1983), Meyers (19811, Mindes (1983), Newman and Hirt (1983), Packer (19821, Pfanner (19821, Robertson (19821, Schmidt (1981), Silbert (1982), and Trieber (1983). Using the same criteria as were employed in the Silverman, 1983 listing ( p . 901, the studies of Conte, Geisler , Glennon , Hayden and Silverstein, Hobbs , Mindes Packer, Robertson, Schmidt, and Silbert can be classified as "clearly supportive ,'I those of Ausubel, Rrenner, Brush, Meyers, Newman and Hirt, Pfanner, and Trieber as "mixed, weak, or as providing Inonhypothesized support', and those of Augenbraun, Burkham, Gordon, and Haspel and Harris as "clearly nonsupportive

.

It

3) There have been r a m occasions when experimenters have been accidentally deblinded ( e . g . ,

a stimulus card might fall to the floor) and

when this happens we have proceeded a s follows: (a) the experimenter informs another member of the research team of what has happened so that the cards can be recoded; ( b ) the data from such a subject are not included in the data analysis.

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

63

However, while this procedure makes sense in “laboratory experiments”

-

i . e . , where a subject is seen for a single experimental and single

control session - i t does not make sense in treatment adjunct studies where a subject receives the same stimulus (either experimental or control) in many sessions as a treatment aid. While none of our experimenters has yet become deblindcd in this type of study, we have prepared for this eventuality by preparing separate stimulus cards for each subject (with the subject’s name written on the back) so that if the experimenter does become deblinded for a subject, i t does not deblind him or her for the other subjects. If feasible, we would replace any subject for whom the experimenter was not blind to stimulus conditions; if not feasible, we would report separately results for such subjects. One final point about experimenters hnvin-g been blind for stimulus conditions: the cards on which the stimuli appear have been of sufficient thickness so that no part of the stimulus could be seen through the back of the card.

4) In considering the possibility that unconscious experimenter bias can influence the results of subliminal activation experiments (as they can in any experiment - see Rosenthal, 19661, it should be kept in mind that this possibility would apply to negative result studies as well as positive result studies. In fact, there is a greater likelihood of this being the case, since the mechanism by which a bias could lead to negative results is considerably more apparent. That is, an experimenter could simply forget to set a dial correctly or forget to check the light bulbs for proper illumination. 5 ) The recent studies listed in Note 2 by Conte, Hayden and Silver-

stein, Mindes, and Schmidt can be added to those listed in Silverman,

1983, p . 9 0 . 6) The doctoral dissertations are available either on microfilm or in printed form from University Microfilms International, P.O. Box 1764, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. Fifteen of the dissertation studies also have been either published o r accepted for publication, ten of these having been listed in the Silverman, 1983 article

and five others by Ariam and Siller

(1982), Bronstein and Rodin (1983), Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman (19841, Jackson (1982), and Leiter (1982). Several other of the dissertation

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geider

64

studies have been submitted for publication, 7) Ariam and Siller (1982), Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman (1984), Hobbs (1983), Packer ( 1982). Parker (1982), Qureshi (in preparation), Palmatier and Bornstein (1980). Robertson (19821, Trieber (1983), and Zuckerman(l980). 8 ) To ensure that the entire stimulus registers on the fovea, the horizontal visual angle of the stimulus should be under 5 . 5 O . The visual angle

is calculated by using the following formula: Tan 112 =

112 width of message viewing distance

Thus, if the width of the message is 4 " and the viewing distance 40", tan1 / 2 = 2/40 = 1 / 2 0 = .05. In a tangent table, this yields a value of 2.36 for half the angle and hence 5.72 for the full visual angle. In terms of the above mentioned criterion, this angle is slightly too large so that tho letters

of the message should be made somewhat less wide, thus reducing the angle. 9) Winnett and van Santen (1981) called to our attention that Heilbrun

(1980) used the same stimuli as did Silverman e t al. (1978) but reported a viewing distance that was . 3 meters less than in the original experiment. This, they calculated, resulted in visual angles that were 10-308 higher than those of Silverman et a1.(1978). (1980) were incorrectly calculated;

(The angles reported by Heilbrun Heilbrun

(1982)

hns

acknowledged

this.) Consequently, Winnett and van Santen point out, it is quite possible that one or two letters of each stimulus message did not register, thus changing the meaning of these messages. 10) In our laboratory, the blank field illurnination has been set at

about the same level as the room illumination (typically between 4 and 15 footlamberts) and the ratio of blank field to stimulus field illumination has ranged from 1:l to 3 : l . The setting of the stimulus field illumination within this range will depend on the darkness of the stimulus lines: the darker the lines, the lower the setting would have to be in order for the stimulus to register %omfortably below threshold" (see note 13)

.

Illumination level should be determined with the use of a photometer, In measuring the illumination

of

the blank

and

stimulus

fields,

the

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

65

photometer should be focused through the eyepiece of the tachistoscope onto the field being measured, with a blank white card in the field and the field in the "constant on" position. In measuring the illumination of the room (ambient illumination) the photometer should be focused on the area the subject's eyes will be most in contact with during the experiment. 11) This is what w e believe occurred in a study by Emmelkamp and

Straatman (1976). Two of their subjects were able to report the entire content of the MOMMY A N D I ARE ONE message so that obviously their exposures were not below threshold. The negative results obtained in this study can be contrasted with other treatment adjunct studies reporting positive findings ( e . g . , Linehan & O'Toole, 1982; Parker, 1982) where careful questioning of the subjects failed to elicit even one instance in which any aspects of the stimulus could be correctly described. 12) The criterion for ttcomfortably below threshold" is that no lines should be visible during an ascending threshold task (starting at 4 msec and increasing exposures at 3-msec intervals) at less than 1 3 msec for any pilot subject. That i s , before an experiment is begun, it is recommended that at least five subjects view the stimulus at increasing exposures and if any can see even a single line at less than 13 msec, then one should either lighten the stimuli or lower the illumination of the stimulus field. While we do not know at what level a stimulus is too weak to subliminally register, we have obtained subliminal effects with stimulus field illumination settings and the lightness of lines such that no pilot subject could report A line until exposures were for more than 50 msec. Thus, the range of first report for even a line should be between 13 and 50 msec for the most acutely perceiving pilot subject. 1 3 ) For example, an experimenter might want to use words alone be-

cause they were used in a study that he or she wants to replicate; o r because the experimenter wants to equate experimental and control stimuli for structural characteristics and it is easier to equate verbal messagcs than pictorial content. 14) In

D

study of schizophrenics by Silbert (1982), the words M O M M Y

A N D I ARE ONE were put on the same stimulus card as a symbiotic-like

picture. This led to increased pathology - an effect opposite to what has

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

66

been obtained in studies where the verbal message and the picture viere on different cards and also the opposite of what Silbert himself found for the verbal message alone. This paradoxical finding for the verbal message and picture being on the same card was (tentatively) attributed to the message-picture

combination

producing

a kind

of stimulus overload that

stressed the subjects and rendered the emotion-laden

words

patholo-

gy-inducing rather than adaptation-enhancing as they usually are. 1 5 ) To avoid this problem, Ariam and Siller (1982) conducted a pilot

study to determine the appropriate stimulus for testing their hypothesis. 16) Subjects who come from homes in which English was not the main

language spoken during childhood, have not been expected to respond in the same way as subjects from English speaking homes (when verbal stimuli are used). Thus, we have either avoided using such subjects or have used them but considered their data separately. The criterion for %sin language used" is the language in which the parents spoke to the child during childhood. If more than one language was used, i t is better to consider these subjects, for the purposes of the experiment, as not "from English speaking homes. I' 17) Condon and Allen's (1980) failure to replicate Silverman, Frank,

and Dachinger's (1974) finding that subliminal symbiotic stimulation facilitntcd systematic desensitization in the treatment of insect phobias may have been due to notable differences in the two subject samples. The subjects in the original investigation were women who answered a newspaper advertisement offering treatment for insect phobias and who were troubled enough by their phobias to travel to the hospital where the study was conducted. Condon and Allen ( 1 9 8 0 ) , on the other hand, used introductory psychology students fulfilling a course requirement. Thus i t was likely that the latter subjects were considerably less motivated than the former, and, more importantly, that they werc less phobic than those of Silverman et al. (1974). 18) See Ceisler (1985) for a discussion of the failure to consider indi-

vidual differences in experiments using a vmiety of experimental paradigms in the testing of the psychoanalytic concept of repression and the consequent failure of the investigators to find evidence supporting this concept.

The Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation Method

67

19) The oral-aggressive stimulus was a picture of an angry looking man with teeth bared and about to stab a woman, accompanied by the verbal message, DESTROY MOTHER. The incest stimulus was a picture of a nude man and a woman in a sexually suggestive pose, accompanied by the verbal message, FUCK MOMMY. The anality stimulus consisted of a picture of a rear view of a person crouched and defecating, accompanied by the verbal message, GO SHIT. 20) Subjects

have

been

classified

on

the

differentiation

variable

through the administration of an adjective rating scale (Silverman et al.,

1969). Subjects first rate themselves on a 6-point scale for 20 descriptive Then, on the same scale, they rate either their own mothers o r a picture of a woman in-

adjectives (e.g. , happy, nervous, sociable, depressed).

tended as a mother figure for the same adjectives. The difference between the self- ratings and the ratings of either the actual nother or the mother figure constitutes the differentiation score, with a total of 2 4 or more qualifying a subject as "relatively differentiated.

If

In various hospital sam-

ples, anywhere between 50% and 80% of the patients have been classified as differentiated. A study by Fribourg (1979) found that 75% of subjects given the Adjective Rating Scale a second time a month after they were originally tested retained their classification as either "differentiated" or %ondifferentiated. ?( Thus, the differentiation variable appears to be stable for the majority of schizophrenics. However, because there was n sizable number (25%) for whom this was not the c m e , it would seem important to administer the Adjective Rating Scale the same day as the experiment proper. This would ensure that the subjects who qualify as "relatively differentiated" would still come under this heading when the subliminal oneness condition is administered. 2 1 ) The DADDY AND I ARE ONE stimulus failed to reduce pathology

in two studies of male schizophrenics: (I) a study by Kaye (1975) in which there was pathology reduction after MOMMY AND I ARE ONE; ( 2 ) Jackson's (1983) study referred to earlier in which both a female and male sample of schizophrenics were seen. The males responded positively only to the MOMMY AND I ARE ONE stimulus and the females only to DADDY A N D

I ARE ONE. 22) "Nondefcnded"

subjects were

those whose associations to the

L.H. Silverman and C.J.Geisler

68

aggressive and separation stimuli (after the subliminal part of the experiment was completed) showed no evidence of attempts to mute the impact of what was assumed to be disturbing content, 23) A second subject variable that contributed to the differences between the experimental and control conditions was whether or not the subject's associations to the control stimuli were "neutral." A s hypothesized, the experimental effects were carried by those subjects whose associations to the control stimulus were indeed neutral. A s Litwack et a1.(1979) argue: "labeling a stimulus 'neutral' does not make it so, and a subliminal stimulus designed to elicit pathology should not be expected to do so relative to another stimulus which also elicits pathology." (p.87)

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& Grabowski, R.

(1982). The effects of activating oneness

fantasies on the anxiety level of male and female college students. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, New York University. Silverman, L.H.,

Klinger, H., Lustbader, L., Farrell, J., & Martin, A. (1972).

The effect of subliminal drive stimulation on the speech of stutterers.

Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 155, 14-21. Silverman, L.H.,

Kwawer, J.S.,

Wolitzky, C., & Coron, M. (1973). An experi-

mental study of aspects of t h e psychoanalytic theory of

male homo-

sexuality. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 82, 178-188. Silverman, L.H.,

Lachmann, F., & Milich, R. (1982).The Search for Oneness.

New York: International Universities Press. Silverman, L.H.,

Ross, D., Adler, J., & Lustig, D. (1978). A simple research

paradigm for demonstrating subliminal psychodynamic activation. Journal

of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 341-357. Silverman, L.H.,

Spiro, R.H., Weissberg, J., & Candell, P. (1969).The effects of

aggressive activation of the need to merge on pathological thinking in schizophrenia. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 148, 39-51. Spiro, T. (1975). The e f f e c t s of laboratory stimulation of symbiotic fantasies and bodily self-awareness on relatively differentiated and non-differentiated shizophrenics.

Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York Uni-

versity. Trieber, E. (1983) The e f f e c t s of supraliminal stimulation combined with subliminal symbiotic stimuli on academic performance. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University, School of Education.

14

L.H. Silverman and C.J. Geisler

Varga, M. (1973). An experimental study of aspects of the psychoanalytic

study of elation. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University. Winnett, R., & van Santen, J. (1981). Personal communication, March. Zuckerman, S. (1980).The effects of subliminal symbiotic and success-related stimuli on the school performance of high school underachievers. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, N e w York University, School of Education.

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel. G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

75

THE EFFECTS O F SUBLIMINALLY PRESENTED SEXUAL AtID AGGRESSIVE STIMULI ON LITERARY CREATIVITY Maxine J . Antell and Leo Goldberger Ncw York Univcrsity

INTRODUCTION Great creators, as Hanns Sachs (1942) points out, have across the centuries been called "dreamers . I t Freud's (1900) conception of mental processes as the dynamic interplay between primary and secondary process levels of psychic functioning providcs R framework within which this nearly universal metaphor acquires spccific aptness. For psychoanalytic theorists believe that the creative process entails a shift in what has been termcd the "cathexis of certnin ego functions ,'I a regression to primary process modes of ideation, similar to that of the dream, which allows in both cases communication with repressed wishes and phantasies, that is, with id impulses and their close derivatives. This corresponds to the stage of the creative process called "inspiration, Ir characterized not only by more fluid and drive dominated thinking, but also by intcnse emotionality and heightened tension and excitement. But the dream of course is formless aesthetically, egocentric, and obscure; the formal bcauty and social meaningfulness of the artistic work i m plies that the creative process which begins in a primitivization of ego functioning must culminate in a second or elaborative stage of slow, secondary process work, during which the ore gleaned from commerce with the deepest layers of the mind is refined, given aesthetic form and rendered meaningful to others. The conceptualization of changes in cathexis of ego functions a s corresponding to stages in the creative process is rooted in Freud's idea of "flexibility of repression" first put forth in 1905 in Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious and developed under the aegis of ICris's (1952) concern with the integrative function of the CEO. As in any situation in which id impulses intrude, there is a dangerOUB,

potentially pathologic aspect to this process. In this sense pathologic

76

M.J.Ante11 and L. Goldberger

dispositions may be part of what constitutes the artist's increased psychic capacity. However the increased psychic capacity can have extremely beneficial adaptive consequences for the artiat RS well, not the least of which is the gratification of the id wishes in a displaced symbolic form arid the reduction of guilt by "seduction" of the audience into sharing conflictunl phantasies. Thus, the gaining of access to id material without being overwhelmed by it through the making of appropriately rapid shifts in levels of psychic functioning has been called lTadaptiveregression" or "regression in the service of the ego." In stressing the special relationship between conflict and a r t , we do not intend to suggest that all creative work remains tied to conflict. Like other ego capacities for which psychological conflict provides an essential ingredient and incentive in development, creativity can emerge from conflict involvement and acquire relative autonomy - Hartmann's "secondary autonomy" (1958). Kris (1964) even hints that such relative autonomy may be required for the highest achievement of a r t . Nevertheless, in time of intensification of conflict we would expect the genetic relationship between modes of' handling drives and creativity to show up dynamically. Kris's hypotheses require the study of creativity as a dynamic process, an interplay between different levels of psychic functioning and the factors, such as drive activation, that affect this interplay. While previous research in the area of creative process has not been extensive, there have been scmp studies which support the above formulations. D. Silverman (19631, in an attempt to investigate the dynamic events surrounding the creative sct , scored the verbalizations of fourthgrade pupils a s they painted for adaptive regression, using R modified vcrsion of the Holt and Have1 Rorschach Kanual (1960). The paintings, four per subject, were rated for creativity by artists. When individual paintings were considered, the relation of degree of adaptive regression to creativity was as predicted. (However, adaptive regression scores did not correlate with subject's average creativity scores. Cohen (1960) scored Rorschachs of two groups, a r t students rated creative versus random a r t students, for form level of responses showing primary process, High form level, or maintaining perceptual accuracy during primary process production, was taken as an operational memure of adaptive regression. As predicted the more creative subjects showed a higher form level. The groups did not differ on form level of non-primar:r responses, showing that i t was not a simple difference in perceptual accu-

Effects o f Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

77

racy but a different way of integrating primary process production. Rogalsky (1960) used the same measure on creative and uncreative third-grade children. She found that form level rating of primary process production did not differentiate the groups. However, for boys, the creatives showed higher form level in non-primary process material, as well as more primary process material. Thus, more primary process and better control seemed present, but in different responses, leading to the speculation that their integration is a later developmental task. The measures of control were better predictors than the measures of amount of primary process. Bowers (1967) examined the effect of hypnosis and suFgeEtions of reduced defensiveness on creative test performance. While for non-creative subjects hypnosis made no difference, for creative subjects there was a significant difference between hynotized and waking groups on the creativity battery, showing that creative subjects could use the ego regression induced b y hypnosis in the .service of creative functioning. Thus, the general validity of Kris's concept of adaptive regression has received some experimental confirmation while much remains to be learned about its phenomenology, genetic history, and its specific role and range of applicability in various kinds of creative functioning. In a recent series of papers, L. Silverman has described an experimental mcthod for studying the effects of the activation of drive dcrivatives on ego functioning (summarized in Silverman, 1971, 1975). He found that when drive-related , especially aggressive, stimuli were presented to subjects tachistoscopically at a subliminal level, various pathological processes appeared, in particular, "regressed" thinking. The presentation of stimuli had to be subliminal for the effects to appear; and in non-schizophrenic subjects they did not appear unless a "priming" procedure or external activation of aggrescjve ideas occurred first (Silverman, 1965 ; Silverman & Goldweber, 1966) in contrast to schizophrenic subjects who responded with regressed thinking simply on the basis of the subliminal drive activation (e .g., Silverman, 1966). The necessity of subliminality of stimuli is not clearly understood. One possibility, deduced from the model of Spence and Holland (1962, p. 164) is that "reduction of awarenem.. (leads) to a greater spread of activity. One idea can spread more freely

.

throughout the system than is possible in conscious thinking. One percept can make contact with e. wider range of traces ,'I The relationship between lack of awareness and altered possibilities for discharge may also be

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger

78

involved. In any case, it supports the clinical notion of the efficacy of awareness in dissipating the effects of drive and conflict activation. Silverman's (1971, 1975) investigations have focused exclusively on the pethologlcal consequences of this process, such as on regressed thinking. We have already pointed to the close relationship in psychoanalytic thinking between creativity and pathology: the person averts danger by controlling and making use of the very regression that proves overwhelming in other cases. If this conception is correct, it should be possible to show that creative people can make adaptive use (that is, respond with creativity) of the arousal pigocess that produced pathologic81 regression in people without this capacity. This was the purpose of the present study. An additional set of quostions was: to what extent is this specific to either aggressive or sexual stimulation? If both are effective, is oce more effective than the other? Psychoanalytic theory postulates that the impetus for creativity is in large part sublimated sexuality, so it was predicted that sexual stimulation would be more effective. Since the aggremive drive in its 'tneutralized" form is believed to have an intimate connection with enerdzing the ego functions (cf. Hartmann, 1940). aggressive stimulation was also expected to have a facilitating effect.

HYPOTHESES

1. Creative subjects would show a grenter incrense in creativity than non-creative subjects under conditions of subliminal drive stimulation. 2 . This heightening of creativity would be grcnter for sexual than for aggressive stimulation.

METHOD DESIGN

Each subject was seen for throe sessions. In each sossion subjects were te8ted on two measures of creativity after exposuro to subliminal stimulation with a "baseline neutraltt stimulus, and then again after subliminal stimulation with three kinds of stimuli (conditions) : aggressive, sexual, and neutral (control) again for the control condition. Each subject served

Effects o f Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

79

as his own control that is, each subject appeared for three sessions during each of which he got one condition. The order was counterbalanced so that the same number of subjects received each of the six possible orderings of the three conditions. One could then ascertain the effects of the drive stimulation by comparing the change in performance during the sessions when the second stimulus was aggressive or sexual with the session when it was neutral. The statistical method was analysis of co-variance.

SUBJECTS A total of 30 creative and 30 non-creative subjects were used. The

"creative" subjects were students enrolled in creative writing courses in two local liberal a r t s colleges. Enrollment in thesc courses is dependent upon submission of previous writing of sufficient accomplishment to the instructor of the course. Fourteen of the 30 plan careers in writing. Noncreative subjects were 30 students from the same schools who were English majors but who had never taken writing courses. None was considering a career that involved creative writing. This control group was chosen to eliminate general intellectual level and interest in literary expression a s variables. The two groups were balanced almost equally for sex and for proportion coming from each college.

A PPA R A TUS

The neutral stimulus consisted of drawings of two men with rather benign expressions. The aggressive stimulus was a drawing of a man with his mouth twisted into a ferocious grimace, holding a long dagger poised above the head of a cowering woman, The sexual stimulus was a drawing of a naked man and woman, the woman standing in such a posture that her breasts and genitals arc exposed. The pictures were mounted on 2 x 2 slides. The slides were shown from an Anscomatic slide projector equipped with an Ilex Universal Shutter No. 4 . Shutter speed averaged 23.1 msec. The power output was 72.8 watts. Amount of illumination coming from the screen averaged 0 . 0 2 6 foot candles for the slide plus background. The screen was located 19.3 feet in front of the projector and 9.75 feet in

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger

80

front of the subjects. The size of the image on the screen was 4 1 inches for the three initial (neutral) stimuli and about 5 2 inches for the critical stimuli. (Further specification of the experimental set-up can be obtained from the authors.)'

PROCEDURE The back bone of each session was essentially: a priming procedure, followed by neutral stimulation and administration of a set of baseline measures of the dependent variables,

followed by the critical stimulation

(either aggressive, sexual or control) and a critical administration of the dependent variable measures,

1. PRIMING

The passages intended to produce the priming (arousal of ideas associated with a particular drive) were presented as part of a memory task. Subjects were told that the experimenter would play two passages on a tape recorder to which they should listen very carefully because after each one they would be asked to write as much 8s they could remember of the passage. The first, "buffer", passage in each case was a neutral one presented solely to obscure the experimenter's intentions. The subject matter was Italian medieval universities, changes in U . S

. census

procedures, and

the derivation of the name of the element mercury, The second passage was filled with either sexual or aggressive images depending on the condi-

tion. In the neutral condition half of the subjects (selected at random) got sexual priming, half aggressive, so that any difference between the drive conditions and the neutral condition could not be attributed to the simple effect of having used drive priming for the forner and not the latter. None of the subjects guessed the true nature of this manipulation.

2. N E U T R A L S T I M U L A T I O N A N D BASELINE MEASURES

Subjects were now told that at various points during the experiment, the experimenter would ask them to look at the screen and would darken

Effects of Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

81

the room. They were told they must be s u r e to keep looking at the center of the screen where they would see flashes of light, that they should keep focusing on the center regardless of what they saw, especially when experimenter said the words, "ready, get set" over the intercom. Questions were discouraged at this point. The experimenter flashed the neutral picture on the screen four times at 15 second intervals, preceding each flash with the alerting signal, "ready, get set." Subjects were then given the Metaphor Task. They were again told to look at the screen and four more flashes of the same neutral stimulus ("refresher" flashes) were shown, that is, to renew the effect of the stimulus. Finally subjects were given the Remote Associates Test.

3. CRITICAL STIMULUS A N D CRITICAL MEASURES

This step was exactly like the one preceding it in all details except that the content of the stimulus was now the aggressive slide, the sexual slide or the control slide. It should be clear that the subjects were never told how many sets of stimuli were in each session (two); those who believed that there was anything at all being flashed on the screen tended to believe therc were four sets. Moreover, the rhythm of the procedure apparently did not lend itself to disclosing the pre-post

format despite the two parallel sets of

measures.

4. DlSCRlMlNATlON

TASK TO CHECK FOR T H E SUBLlMlNALlTY OF

THE STIMULUS

In a third session subjects were told that the experimenter wanted to see how well they could distinguish between two slides, A and B , which the experimenter was going to show them at a very rapid rate of speed; that they would be shown four flashes of A , then of B , and then of A and

B in random order 10 times. In each case they were to write down which they thought was being shown. They were also told the best performance would be rewarded by a five dollar prize. The exposure procedure was the same as i t had been during the experiment proper, including time interval between flashes and the alerting signal. If, following Silverman, one con-

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger

82

siders eight or more correct answers out of the 10 trials as a non-chance performance ( p < 0.10, two-tailed t e s t ) , no subject in the present study met this criterion. Thus, the finding of differential effects of the drive and control stimuli was not a function of differences (partial cues) of which the subject was aware.

THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 1. R E M O T E ASSOCIATES TEST ( R A T )

The RAT, devised by Mednick (1962), is a test not of literary creativity per se but of the kind of flexibility in thinking, associative freedom, and ability to form connections between disparate elements believed by many to be involved in literary creativity. This test asks subjects !'to form associative elements into new combinations by providing mediating connective links." A test item consists of a set of three words drawn from "mutually remote associative clusters" and subjects must respond with a word that serves as an associative link between the three. Mednick reports that in two studies of the test's reliability (Spearman-Brown) , high scores were attained (0.92 and 0.91) and in a series of validation studies, the test was able to predict: creativity in architecture students and psychology graduate students (Mednick, 1962). "atypical attitudes" and high scores on the artist, psychologist, physician, mathematician, and author-journalist scales of the Strong Vocational Interest Blank (Kowalski, 1960), originality and quality in an anagrams test (Karp, 1960), and originality on thc IPAR scalc (Mednick, 1962). RAT scorcs correlated negatively or did not correlate with Miller Analogies Test scores, grade averages of undergraduates in a school of technology, and summer Rchool grades in an Eastern liberal arts collegc (Mednick, 1962; Miller, 1960). Sixty published RAT item8 were divided at random into six sets of 10 each and the sets were assigned at random for the three baseline and the three 3 critical assessments. The score was the number of correct items. The range of scores was from zero to nine. In the present study the mean was 4.06, the standard deviation 1.97. Test-retest reliability (correlation between baseline and critical scores in the neutral condition) was 0.59 for the non-creatives and 0.36 for the creative subjects.

Effects o f Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

83

2. METAPHOR TASK

This task was made up by the first author. Subjects were provided with a set of stems, for example, "The day was as dark a s . . . .I1, and asked to compose metaphors or similes with them. They were told to make them as expressive as possible. The time allowed was eight minutes for a set of four. All subjects received the same set of metaphors with a particular kind of stimulation. To establish comparability of the six sets used in the study, the six forms were divided among 70 college students in a separate administration. The metaphors were rated in the same way as were those in 3 the experiment proper by four raters. The metaphors were rated by four judges - an assistant professor of English, two graduate students in English, and the first author ( B . A . in English). The judges were all unaware of which subjects had produced which responses and even of which responses were given by a single subject. Thus there was no halo effect. Aside from the experimenter, judges had no knowledge even of what the experiment was about. Judges were instructed to rate each metaphor from one to six (six being the highest score) for creativity and to take into account such factors as originality, imaginativeness, aptness, expressiveness, vividness, and the formal skill it shows. An anchoring description of what the various cores should suggest was provided. The sum of the ratings for all four metaphors in a set was taken as the metaphor score for that set. Subjects were well represented across B wide range of scores, from 12 to 5 9 . The mean was 30.63, the standard deviation, 7 . 7 0 . The range of cqrelation coefficient between pairs of judges was from 0 . 4 5 to 0 . 5 4 . The average value was 49.33 which, using the Spearman-Brown Prediction Formula, yields a reliability quotient of 0 . 7 9 . The correlation between baseline and critical scores in the neutral condition which is analogous to a test-retest reliability quotient was 0.73 for creatives and 0 . 4 9 for non-creatives, so that test reliability was deemed adequate,

84

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger RESULTS 1. REMOTE ASSOCIATES TEST 1. G R O U P BASELINE P E R F O R M A N C E :

The point-biserial correlation coefficient betwecn group membership and baseline scores summed over the three conditions was found to be zcro. The interaction between groups and conditions was predicted on the basis of a presumed initial difference between the two groups that the data does not bear out. The kind of creativity represented by performance on the RAT appears to have been equally distributed in the groups we are calling creative and non-creative

.

2. EFFECT O F T H E S T I M U L A T I O N :

The analysis of covariance results are presented in Table 1. Table 1 Analysis of Covariance for the Remote Associates Test.

Source of v a r i a t i o n

ss

A (cr. v s . non-cr.)

4.0611

1

193.3789

57

3.3926

67,8853

2

33.9426

Subj.

W.

A

B (agg. vs. s e x . v s . n e u t . ) AB

B x Ss

W.

A

df

MS

F

4.0671

1.1988

1.9098

2

.9578

211.1544

115

2.3578

14.3958.' .4050

.*p < .001

A s the table reveals, the conditions factor was significant, not the

interaction nor, as foreshadowed by the non-significant point-biserial r for the baseline, the groups factor. In order to see which specific comparisons carried the significant effect, adjusted means were computed (Table 2) and t tests performed (Table 3 ) . All the comparisons were significant and all in the predicted direction. That is, not only were both drive conditions higher than neutral but

Effects of Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

85

Table 2 Adjusted Means on Remote Associates Test.

Stimuli Aggressive

Sexual

Neutral

Groups Non-creative

4.53

5.27

3.61

Creative

4.58

5.61

3.93

Table 3

t Values for Condition Comparisons on Remote Associates Test.

Groups

Non-creative

Creative

Conditions

t

P

neut.

5.10

< .005

sex. vs. neut.

12.63

e .005

agg.

VS.

sex.

VS.

agg.

1.808

e.05

agg.

VS.

neut.

2.65

e.02

sex. vs. neut.

12.41

< .005

sex. vs. agg.

6.510

C.005

the sexual was higher than the aggressive. The difference between the sexual and aggressive change scores was significant for the creative subjects (t=3.32) at beyond the 0 . 0 1 level; there was a non-significant trend in the same direction for the non-creatives - for all subjects combined, the difference was significant (t=3.76, p e 0.001).

/I: METAPHOR TASK 1. G R O U P BASELINE P E R F O R M A N C E :

The point-biserial correlation coefficient between creative and noncreative group membership and the sum of the baseline measurements for each subject was 0 . 4 2 , a significant value (p
86

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger 2. EFFECT OF THE STIMULATION

The results of the analysis of co-variance (Table 4 ) revealed that the group effect just misses significance (an F of 4 . 0 2 is significant at the 0.05 level). The F for conditions was significant beyond the 0,005 level. The predicted interaction effect was not significant.

Table 4 Anelyois of Co-variance for Metaphor Task. Adjusted

Source of variation

df

MS

F

ss A ( cr .

SubJ.

B (agg. AB

B x Ss

*

non-cr.)

VS.

W.

186.92 46.79

535.82 134.25

2 2

267.91 67.125

3891.34

115

33.837

2667.5 sex. vs. neut.)

VI.

1

57

186.92

A

W.

A

3.994

7.917 1.983

*

pc.005

The adjusted means are presented in Table 5 . In contrast to the results for the RAT, and contrary to expectations, the means for the drive conditions on the metaphors were significantly lower than the means for the neutral (control) condition. Table 5 Adjusted Means on Metaphor Task.

*

Stimuli

Aggressive

*

Sexual

Neutral

Non-creative

28.74

(27.03)

32.69

(31.57)

34.90

(32.73)

Creative

29.68

(31.77)

31.15

(32.37)

32.00

(33.73)

m e corresponding non-adjusted mans a re given i n parentheses t o show t h a t the apparent superior scores of the non-creative8 do not r e f l e c t a superior performance but a r e a r t i f a c t s of the co-variance adjustment.

Effects o f Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

87

t tcsts for the adjusted cell means (given in Table 6 ) yielded the following results: for the non-creative subjects, the difference between any two means was significant, and for the creative subjects, the aggressive and neutral conditions were significantly different. Despite the fact that the overall F for the interaction was not significant, a separate comparison of the neutral-aggressive difference, using adjusted means for the non-creative versus the creatives showed it to be significantly greater for the non-creatives (t=3.21, p c 0 . 0 1 ) . Table 6 t Values for Condition Comparisons on Metaphor Task.

Croups

Conditions

Non-creative

aggressive

VS.

neutral

sexual

VS.

neutral

aggressive vs. sexual

Creat ive

**

pC.005

t

** * 2.173 *

16.75

2.153

*

aggressive

VS.

neutral

2.414

sexual

VS.

neutral

n.s.

aggressive

VS.

sexual

n.s.

*

pC.05

The results indicate that as with the RAT the drive stimulation affected creativity. However, in the case of the metaphors its direction was opposite to that predicted by the hypothesis. The drive stimulation had the effect of interfering with the production of metaphors. This impairment effect parallels the sort of results L. Silverman has found in his studies. It is noteworthy, however, that the impairment effect is smaller and less pervasive in the creative group. It is significant only in the aggressive condition, whereas for the non-creatives i t is significant in both drive conditions ; moreover, even for the aggressive condition the difference between neutral and aggressive levels of performance is significantly smaller for the creatives than the non-creatives, where both drives produced significant impairment, the sexual condition produced significantly less impairment than the aggressive one. Focusing on the performance of individuals rather than groups, it was found that the drive activation did not have the same effect on all sub-

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger

88

jects. In fact, for the creative subjects, most of whose baseline-neutral change scores moved in the same direction (21 positive, eight negative, one no change, yielding a significant sign test p e 0 . 0 5 , two-tailed t e s t ) , almost a s many subject change scores were positive a s negative after sexual or aggressive activation (sexual: 12 positive and 15 negative; aggressive: 14 positive and 15 negative, neither yielding a significant sign test).

DISCUSSION

Were we able to promote a more creative performance? The answer for the RAT measure is that subliminal drive arousal did indeed facilitate performance, with sexual stimulation leading to the most creative performance, in accordance with our prediction. A s for the metaphor measure, the aggressive activation led to impaired performance for both groups, but a greater impairment for the non-creativos. The sexual activation led to impaired performance for the non-creative8 only: for the creative group performance was not significantly impaired. Within the creative group those rated most creative by their instructors improved or retained their level, or had the least negative effects after stimulation, Thus the differential effects of the specific drives were agnin demonstrated, with sexual stimulation again more favorable to performance. Also, as predicted, differences in the initial level of creativity showed some correspondence with difference in reaction to drive stimulation. However, the prediction of drive facilitation was contradicted: stimulation was disruptive, as in Silverman's studies of the effects of aggressive stimulation on schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics with poor capacity for drive neutralization (cf. Silverman , 1971). Differences in the intrinsic requirements of the two tasks used in the present study to tap creativity may perhaps help explain why the stimulation acted in opposite ways. Success 011 the RAT is mainly dependent upon wide-ranging associational excursions, while the secondary process aspect of the task is confined to recognition of the most suitnble options encountered through this mobility of thought. This might represent a relatively passive relation to the secondary process, o r , expressed differently, a small demand for secondary process activity. On the other hand, nfter a regressive or ltinspirational" phase, a more active and open-ended elaborational or organizational accomplishment, and one that is more internally

Effects o f Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

89

structured, is called for in the Metaphor Task. This may account for why it is more subject to disruption a s well as why it is a more sensitive discriminator of creative functioning between the groups. The creative subjects’ performance was not as impaired as that of the non-creative subjects’ for the same reason that our original prediction was that they would improve more, namely their being more able to retain their adaptive a i m s in the face of drive stimulation. A possible additional factor related to why creative subjects did not improve on the Metaphor Task is that the experiment’s attempt to inpose an artificial timetable of shifting between the two processes may have violated too much the natural timetable of creative production which allows a longer time for working through the raw materials of the initial phase. The element that stands out as a similarity in the performance on both tasks is the generally favorable impact of sexual stimulation

as

compared to that of aggressive stimulation. That vicissitudes of the sexual drive are more benign is consistent with psychoanalytic formulations of psychopathology, in which neurotic problems are linked to the fate of the sexual drives, but in which it is deviations in the handling of the aggressive drive that are associated with the more severe forms of pathology.

I t may be recallcd that our intertwined hypotheses stated that creative subjects would perform more creatively under drivc conditions, especially under the sway of sexual stimulation. This was fully borne out in the results for the RAT measure. For the Metaphor Task thc findings were more complex and not directly confirmatory of our initial hypotheses. Despite the fact that the results were not uniformly in keeping with the predictions made, this study further supports and extends t h e notion that intricate psychic processes and reactions can be stimulated by the subliminal activation of drive derivatives, and demonstrates that such drive stimulation has the power of enhancing a s well as impairing psychic functioning. The experiment illustrates both effects, but as we are usually so impressed with the disruptive aspects of the drives as they function out of awareness, there is perhaps the greater usefulness in i t s focusing on their enriching and invigorating aspects.

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger

90 NOTES

1) A s practicality dictated that the first author run the experimental sessions herself, subjects werc scheduled to providc balanced representation of both creative and non-creative groups within each session. To further control for contamination, as much of the procedure was standardized as was possible. For instance, the priming passages were recorded by a colleague, the instructions for the tasks were printed for the subjects rather than given them orally, and experimenter did not stay in the room while they were writing, but observed from the projection room. 2) Since subjects were to receive a particular set of RAT items with a particular baseline or critical assessment, the comparability of the six sets had to be independently evaluated (as was the case with the metaphor forms). In an independent administration of these sets to 121 college students (n's ranging from 19 to 24), the means ranged from 1.37 to 4.16. An analysis of variance led to an F significant at the 0.001 level and the Duncan test for multiple comparisons as extended by Kramer (1956) for the case of unequal n's showed that the lowest mean was significantly lower than all the other means (using the 0.05 level for the shortest significant range), but that there were no significant differences among any of the others. Since in the experiment proper the most difficult form happened to be matched with the baseline administration in the neutral condition, this differcnce could only work against the hypothesis by increasing the baseline-critical change in the neutral (non-drive) condition, and therefore would not compromise a significant finding. Unlike on the published version. subjects werc given only five minutes for each set of 10 items in order to make the ceiling difficult to reach, thereby insuring room for improvement to be manifested. 3) The Spearman-Brown reliability coefficient was o .76. The analysis of variance for the six groups yielded a non-significant F of 1.56; the Duncan test for multiple comparisons (as extended by Kramer, 1956, for unequal n's) showed none of the means to be significantly different from any of the others.

Effectsof Subliminally Presented Stimuli on Creativity

91

REFERENCES Bowers, P.B. (1967). Effect to hypnosis and suggestions of reduced defensiveness on creativity test performance. Journal of Personality, 35, 311-322. Cohen, I.H. (1960). An investigation of t h e relationship between adaptive regression, dogmatism, and creativity using t h e Rorschach and dogmatism

scale. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University. Freud, S. (1953). The interpretation of dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol 5). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1900) Freud S. (1953). Jokes and their relation t o the unconscious. In J. Strachey (Ed.), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 8). London: Hogarth Press. Original work published 1905) Hartmann, H. (1958). Ego Psychology and t h e Problem of Adaptation (D. Rapaport, Trans.).

New York: International Universities Press. (Original work

published 1939) Hartmann, H. (1948). Comments on the psychoanalytic theory of instinctual drives. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17, 368-388. Holt, R.R., & Havel, J. (1960). A method for assessing primary and secondary process in the Rorschach. In M.A.

Rickers-Ovsiankina

(Ed.)

Rorschach

Psychology (pp. 263-315). New Y o r k Wiley. Karp, S.A. (1960). A validity study of a measure of creativity. Senior honors thesis, University of Michigan. Kowalski, J. (1960). Attitudes and occupational interests of creative individuals. Senior honors thesis, University of Michigan. Kramer, C.Y. (1956). Extension of multiple range tests t o group means with unequal numbers of replications. Biometrics, 12, 307-310. Kris, E. (1964). Psychoanalytic Exploration i n Art. New York: Schocken Books. (Original work published 1952) Mednick, S.A. (1962). The associative bases of the creative process. Psychological Review, 69, 220-232. Miller, B. (1962). A study of creativity in college students and teaching method types. Psychological Review, 69, 228. Rogalsky, M.M. (1968). Artistic creativity and adaptive regression in third grade children. Journal of Projective Technique and Personality Assessment, 32, 53-62. Sachs, H. (1942). The Creative Unconscious. Cambridge: Sci- Art Publishers. Silverman, D.K. (1964) Adaptive regression and creativity: A study of child-

M.J. Antell and L. Goldberger

92

ren's verbalizations while painting.

Unpublished

doctoral

dissertation,

New York University. Silverman, L.H. (1965). A study of the effects of subliminally presented aggressive stimuli on the production of pathological thinking in a non-psychiatric population. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 141, 443-455. Silverman, L.H. (1966). A technique for the study of psycho-dynamic relationships: The effects of subliminally presented aggressive stimuli on the production of pathological thinking in a schizophrenic population. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 30, 103-111. Silverman, L.H. (1971). An experimental technique for the study of unconscious conflict. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 48, 291-298. Silverman, L.H., & Goldweber, A. (1966). A further study of the effects of subliminal aggressive stimulation on thinking. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 143, 463-472. Spence, D.P., & Holland, B. (1962). The restricting effects of awareness: A paradox and an explanation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64, 163-174.

Watson, J.P.

(1975).

An experimental method for the study of unconscious

conflict. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 48, 299-301.

The R o o t s of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Dmguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.(North-Holland), 1986

93

PERCEPTUAL DEFENSE : A PARADIGM FOR INVESTIGATING PSYCHOPATHOLOGY?

Susan H . A . Henley University College London

INTRODUCTION Data from a number of studies of dichotic listening (e.g. Corteen Wood, 1972; Corteen

&

Dunn, 1974; Govier

&

Pitts, 1982; Henley

&

&

Dixon,

1974; Mackay, 1973; Mykel & Daves, 1 9 7 9 ) , dichoptic viewing (Somekh &

Wilding, 1973) and the cross-modal effects of subliminal verbal stimuli (Henley, 1975) have suggested that material of which subjects remain unaware, on an unattended channel, is not only analyzed for meaning, but may be integrated with primary material on the attended channel when it is relevant to the task at hand. One implication of these results is that preconscious processing is geared towards maximizing behavioral efficiency in an ongoing task. Consistent with this implication are findings from studies of perceptual defense (see Dixon, 1981). Clearly, performance in an ongoing task is less likely to be disrupted if, a s these data suggest, attention can be directed away from anxiety provoking stimuli before they ever reach awareness o r , alternatively, if some characteristic mode of defense can be brought into operation at this preconscious stage. The following investigation of perceptual defense utilized the method of closed loop control pioneered by Dixon (1958).

In several studies em-

ploying this method, Dixon and coworkers (Dixon, 1958;1960;

Dixon

&

Haider, 1961) have demonstrated that the threshold of awareness for light presented to one eye will vary a s a function of subthreshold presentations to the other eye. The present study sought to replicate and extend these findings (a) by examining the effects of the same verbal stimuli used in some of Dixon's experiments (cf. e.g. Dixon, 19601, but using the same subject on repeated trials, spaced over different sessions, and thereby

S.H.A. Henley

94

making it possible to examine the reliability of any effects observed, and (b) by including a set of pictorial stimuli.

METHOD

The method (following Dixon, 1958) involved taking a continuous measure of the subject's awareness threshold for light presented to the left eye while emotional and neutral stimuli wePe presented, below thresh-

-

old, to the right eye.

APPARATUS A N D M A T E R I A L S

The closed loop apparatus was constructed around two Salford Electrical Instruments photometers. Each consisted of a simple telescope through which the eyes were trained onto a diffusely lit screen, the illumination of which was variable and under the control of the experimenter. Two projectors (one for each eye) were aimed onto the rear of the screen. These held interchangeable 2" x 2 " slides. The brightness level of the two images could be manipulated by means of two knobs, calibrated in log. ft. I t . , and by neutral density filters. Each photometer, in addition to giving a picture of the scrcen, also had in its center of view a small spot approximately 1 1 2 degree wide. The brightness of the spot could be (a) preset by the experimenter and switched onloff, and (b) raised and lowered by the subject by means of a box with a 'joystick'. The range of brightness could be varied between 0.01 and 10,000 ft. It.

There was provision for altering the interocular distance, focusing etc., and bellows prevented extraneous light from reaching the eyes. The observation and control of various functions by the experimenter were made possible by a main control box which consisted of two meters for brightness in log. ft. It., two integrators gIving an integration of spot brightness being varied by the subject against time, and switches for projectors, integrator start, spots, and left or right spot motor drive power. Outputs from the two spot meters were taken to a two-channel Washington pen recorder for 8 permanent record of the rise and fall of spot brightness during the experiment.

Perceptual Defense

95

The stimulus material consisted of the words CANCER, BREAST, STANCE, and RECANT. The pictorial stimuli were ones used previously by Dunn (1954) in a study involving schizophrenic patients. Three of these depicted mother-child interactions (a whipping scene, a scolding scene, and a feeding scene); the fourth, a 'neutral' stimulus, was a picture of a house and a tree.

SUBJECT

The subject was an undergraduate psychology student from University College London who was paid for his participation. He was familiar with the work on subliminal perception, and with the series of stimuli, both verbal and pictorial, being used. However, in view of the facts (a) that during the experiment the slides were presented at an intensity well below his awareness threshold, and ( b ) that on every trial the stimuli were presented in a different random order which remained unknown to the experimenter until the end of the trial in question, it was not thought likely that this prior knowledge could influence the results. The advantage of using a sophisticated subject was that he was sufficiently 'ego-involvedl in the problem under investigation to be willing to cooperate for a large number of trials, and thus make it possible to examine habituation effects.

PROCEDURE

The subject was advised that the purpose of largely to test the apparatus, but that i t was of whether the effects found previously by Dixon. in number of students, could be obtained over repeated

the experiment was interest to examine studies involving a trials with one sub-

ject. Following adjustments to the apparatus to ensure that the visual fields overlapped, and that the spot of light was in focus, the background illumination was set at a brightness level of log. 1 ft. It., and the word CANCER presented in the right eye field at a supraliminal intensity.

S.H.A. Henley

96

The threshold for the word CANCER was then found by the descending method of limits. This procedure was repeated using a neutral pictorial stimulus - two rectanglos. The threshold was the same in both cases (and remained unchanged at the end of the experiment). Brightness intensity was subsequently adjusted to give an image brightness to the right eye 0.3 log. unit below the point at which the subject reported that the stimulus had disappeared. He was then given the control box and instructed: "All I want you to do when I give the signal 'GO' is to raise the lever until a spot of light appears, then to depress it again until the spot of light starts to disappear. As soon as i t starts to disappear, raise the lever until you can see i t again. In other words, your task is to keep making the spot appear and disappear until I tell you to stop." After a short practice, the eight stimuli were presented, in random order, for a duration of thirty seconds each. Left spot brightness (preset at log. 1 ft. It. before each stimulus presentation) was continuously recorded during this time. At the end of each trial (i.e. presentation of eight stimuli) the random order of the slides was changed (luminous dots on one corner of each slide made it possible for them to be re-shuffled and placed in the apparatus the correct way u p , without the experimenter ever having to be aware of their content). In twelve trials, during three sessions spaced over two days, the subject was presented with both the verbal and pictorial stimuli. In a fourth session, five days after the first, he performed on an additional four trials during which he was presented with only the verbal stimuli, again in random order, but this time for durations which varied at random from between thirty and sixty seconds. Finally, the subject was asked to rank order, first the verbal stimuli, and then the pictorial stimuli, in terms of unpleasantness.

RESULTS INTROSPECTIVE DATA

The

main

point

of

interest

to

emerge

from

the

subject's

introspections was that on a number of trials he found himself able to 'guess' whether or not the presentation was of an emotional stimulus. This

Perceptual Defense

97

guessing, he reported, was based upon the fact that, during the presentation of some stimuli, there was no doubt that the spot of light seemed to disappear very much more rapidly than during the presentation of others: there was never any question of his being aware of anything other than the spot. A check on his accuracy at the end of several trials confirmed that his guesses a s to which stimuli were 'particularly emotional' were frequently correct. This finding is of some interest because it supports the view that the emotional content of subliminal stimuli brings about a change in sensitivity which is apparent at the subjective level. While ranking the stimuli for unpleasantness, the subject, who was a heavy smoker (he chain-smoked throughout the entire experiment), spontaneously remarked that the word CANCER was particularly threatening for him: only the week previously he had been for an X-ray to reassure himself that he had not been smitten by the disease. Of the pictures, he found the scolding scene and the whipping scene equally 'unpleasant', punished

but reported that because he had been verbally

a s a child,

the

whipping scene was,

for

him,

the most

'threatening' since i t signified an unknown entity. A final comment which proved to be of some relevance to the results was that, during the first twelve trials, the subject found that he was predicting the end of each presentation interval and "bringing the spot back to base (i.e. brightness log. 1 ft. I t . ) accordingly,''

EFFECTS O F VERBAL STIMULI

Figure 1 shows the mean spot brightness value, over sixteen trials, given by the subject during subliminal stimulation with emotional and neutral words, at intervals of one second, from between 10 and 29 seconds after stimulus onset.

(Brightness values for the thirtieth second after

stimulus onset have been omitted since; due to mis-timing,

these data

were not available for all trials.) Introspective data, and data from the last four trials, during which stimulus presentations were of varying durations, confirmed that the apparent drop in threshold for the emotional words towards the end of the 29-second interval, was due to the fact that the subject was anticipating the end of each presentation and bringing spot brightness 'back to base' during the first twelve trials.

S.H.A. Henley

98 2.1 -

-

t 2.0-= z d

2

1.9--

v)

cn Y Iz -z

s 1.8.-

LI m 02

1.7-

- _ - N. WORDS

I 1,-

Stimulus Onset

/I3

'

1'2

1'4

'

1'6 ' 1'8 ' i0 $2 ' TIME ELAPSE0 I N SECONDS

24

'

216

'

2'8

'

3b

Figure 1. Mean spot brightness values (over 16 t r i a l s ) recorded a t 1-second i n t e r v a l s during subliminal stimulation with emotional (E.) and neutral (N.) words.

The overall mean spot brightness value, during the 29-second interval following each of the four stimulus words, is shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Mean brightness value, over 16 t r i a l s , during the 29-second i n t e r v a l following stimulus onset.

RECANT

BRIGHTNESS (log. u n i t )

*

*

1.78

CANCER

1.83

STANCE

1.78

BREAST

1.81

1 log. unit- 10 foot lamberts.

For the purpose of statistical analysis, ranks were assigned to the mean brightness values obtained during presentation of each word on each trial, the rank I being assigned to the highest value, and rank IV being assigned to the lowest value on any given trial. The distribution of these ranks among the four words over the sixteen trials is given in Table 2 .

Perceptual Defense

99 Table 2 Distribution of ranks.

FREQUENCY

RECANT

CANCER

STANCE

BREAST

Rank

High brightness

Low brightness

I.

0

9

3

4

XI.

6

1

4

5

111.

4

5

2

5

6

1

7

2

IV

.

Although it is apparent from Table 1 that both emotional words produced raised thresholds relative to the neutral words, only the distribution of ranks for CANCER differed from chance expectation ( ~ 4 . 0 2 , two-tail, X 2 one sample test for goodness of fit). It will be observed from Table 2 that on 9 of the 16 trials the highest mean brightness value was obtained during presentation of the word CANCER. The two-tailed probability of this result occurring by chance

was found, by application of the binomial formula, to be 0.000054. Thus i t can be concluded that subliminal presentations of the word CANCER to one eye 'evoked' higher thresholds for light presented to the other eye than did the words BREAST, STANCE, or RECANT. This effect persisted until the end of the experiment: there was no evidence of habituation over trials.

S.H.A. Henley

100

EFFECTS O F PICTORIAL STIMULI Overall mean brightness values obtained during the 29second intervals following onset of each of the four pictorial stimuli are given in Table 3. Table 3 Mean brfghtness value, over 1 2 t r i a l s , during the 29-second interval following stimulus onset.

m i p p i n g scene

Brightness (log. unit)

*

*

Scolding scene

1.749

1.807

Feeding scene

Neutral stimulus

1.781

1.794

l l o g . u n i t = 10 foot lamberts.

Brightness values obtained during presentations of the interpersonal stimuli

(whipping scene,

scolding scene.

and

feeding

scene)

were

compared with those obtained during presentations of the neutral scene. Only performance during presentations of the whipping scene differed significantly from that during presentations of the neutral ocene. On 10/12 trials the subject gave

lower

brightness values for the former than

for the latter. This effect is significant (pe0.038, two-tail) by a sign test. Again, there was no evidence of habituation over trials. Since perceptual defense can be defined a s 9 systematic relationship between awareness threshold and stimulus emotionality, and since the .whipping

scene was the one selected b y the subject as being the most

threatening of the series for him it can be concluded that this result is supportive of the perceptual defense hypothesis.

DISCUSSION The present results are consistent with those of Dixon (1958, 1960) and of Dixon and Haider (1961) in demonstrating that the threshold of

Perceptual Defense

101

awareness for light presented to one eye will vary as a function of subthreshold presentations to the other eye. They have indicated, moreover, that the effects of a given subliminal stimulus will, in this respect, persist in the same subjects over trittls and tine. The unexpected finding that the subject, while showing a raised threshold for a verbal stimulus which he found threatening, showed a lowered threshold for a pictorial stimulus which he found threatening, may be explicable in terms of functional asymmetry between the hernispheres (i.e. the fact that, while the left hemisphere is responsible for processing verbal material, the right hemisphere is concerned with the processing of nonverbal, including spatial, inputs)

.

An alternative explanation for this result may rest with the nature of the threats implied by the two stimuli. There are threats which can be avoided and for which it is biologically adaptive to be vigilant; the whipping scene, possibly to a greater extent than thc word CANCER, is representative of this category. There are other (maybe psychopathologically relevant) stimuli and situations, however, for which vigilance is likely to achieve little more than an increase in anxiety; from the point of view of maximizing behavioral efficiency, perceptual defense for stimuli of this calibre would be the most adaptive response. One implication of this suggestion is that preconscious processing, of which perceptual defense is a subcategory, is governed by the needs

-

both psychopathological and momentary

-

of the individual.

This is essentially the view expressed in Dixon's (1981) model of n t tention, and is one which may have relevance for an understanding of various forms of psychopathology. In particular, it is suggested here that the perceptual defense paradigm could prove an invaluable tool for investigating hypotheses relating to the nature of disorders which are believed to be psychogenic in origin.

S.H.A. Henley

102

REFERENCES

Corteen, R.S. & Dunn, D. (1974). Shock associated words in a non-attended message: A test for momentary awareness. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 102, 1143-1144. Corteen, R.S. & Wood, B. (1972). Autonomic

responses to shock-associated

words in an unattended channel. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 94, 308-313.

Dixon, N.F. (1958). Apparent changes in the visual threshold as a function of subliminal stimulation: A preliminary report. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 10, 211-219. Dixon, N.F. (1960). Apparent changes in the visual threshold: Central or peripheral? British Journal of Psychology, 51, 297-309. Dixon, N.F. & Haider, M. (1961).Changes in the visual threshold as a function of subception. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 13, 229235.

Dunn, W.L. (1954). Visual discrimination of schizophrenic subjects as a function of stimulus meaning. Journal of Personality, 23, 48-64. Govier, E. & Pitts, M. (1982). The contextual disambiguation of a polysemous word in an unatteded message. British Journal of Psychology, 73, 537551.

Henley, S.H.A.

(1975). Cross-modal effects of subliminal verbal stimuli. Scan-

dinavian Journal of Psychology, 16, 30-36. Henley, S.H.A.

& Dixon,

N.F.

(1974). Laterality differences in the effects

of incidental stimuli upon evoked imagery. British Journal of Psychology, 65,4, 529-536.

Mackay, D.G. (1973). Aspects of the theory of comprehension, memory, and attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 25,1, 22-40. Mykel, N. & Daves, W.F. (1979). Emergence of unreported stimuli into imagery as a function of laterality of presentation: A replication and extension of research by Henley and Dixon (1974). British Journal of Psychology, 70, 253-258.

Somekh, D.E. & Wilding, J.M.

(1973). Perception without awareness in a di-

choptic viewing situation. British Journal of Psychology, 64,3, 339-349.

The Roots of Perception U.Hentachel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) Q Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.(North-Holland), 1986

103

SIZE A N D SHAPE OF THE SUBLIMINAL WINDOW

Donald P. Spence, Lorrie Klein, and Ricardo J. Fernandez UMDNJ-Rutger s Medical School

INTRODUCTION What is the relationship of conscious awareness to information processing? Our subjective impression of a perceptual stimulus is clearly not isomorphic with the total spectrum of stimulation needed to achieve that inpression, but the form and content of unconscious processing is still open to many descriptions. From one point of view, there is a tendency to equate unconscious processing with The Unconscious, the central concept of psychoanalytic theory. In this view, subliminal experiments become a means of exploring different aspects of the dynamic unconscious and of generating an experimental model for the study of Freud's theory of the mind. From another point of view, most clearly expressed by Marcel (1983b), unconscious processing is essentially content-free and differs from conscious processing in the kind and amount of information available. Our conscious impression is neither more nor less in contact with dynamic aspects of our personality, but simply ''an attempt to make sense of a s much data as possible at the most useful level, according to culturally given presuppositions.. ."(Marcel, 1983b, p.250). According to the first view, a subliminal stimulus, because it is out of awareness, is automatically subjected to the processing features of the dynamic unconscious. These features, generally described as the laws of primary process thinking, include such operations as condensation, displacement, and other forms of transformation; thus, to expose a stimulus below awareness is to assume that i t will necessarily be transformed according to primary process laws. Because unconscious thinking is dominated by wishes (in contrast to conscious thinking which is presumed to be logical), a subliminal stimulus is presumed to have privileged access to the more primitive and infantile aspects of the subject's personality. "A subliminal stimulus containing wish-related content first should make contact

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

104

with derivatives of the related wish if the wish is currently active in the individual. .The derivatives could be expected to press for expression without the person's awareness.. I' and the appropriate response measures would reveal an increase in psychopathology (Silverman, 1976, p .625). Thus a subliminal stimulus makes direct contact with the more forbidden areas of the subject's personality, and by carefully manipulating stimulus content and the form of the subsequent response measure, it should be possible to test specific propositions about the nature of the dynamic unconscious. Thus the subliminal stimuli "DESTROY MOTHER" and "CANNIBAL EATS PERSON'' appear to intensify pathology in schizophrenics (Silverman, 1976, pp. 626, 629). More ego-syntonic subliminal stimuli are assumed to diminish unconscious conflict and thus diminish pathology; thus ''MOMMY AND I ARE ONE" in seven different studies (as of 1976) apparently reduced pathology when exposed to schizophrenics (Silverman, 1976, p.629). Differences between subliminal and supraliminal presentations come about because of the differential action of the ego's defensive system. A subliminal stimulus triggers an unconscious wish without bringing it into awareness; a s a result, the expected derivatives are not warded off and produce the expected intensification of pathology. The same stimulus, when supraliminal , will necessarily activate the subject's defenses against that wish, and the resulting affect will be sharply attenuated, perhaps even unseen. According to the second view, a subliminal stimulus maintains i t s veridical form; i t is registered essentially intact; and its effective meaning is no different from its meaning in full awareness. Because of the probabilistic nature of the visual system and because brief exposures bring about a significant reduction in input redundancy, it is expected that some degrading of information takes place at subliminal levels. It should be noted, however, that transformations caused by stimulus instability arc largely probabilistic and should be distinguished from the schematic transformations brought about by the laws of the primary process. According to this view, differences between subliminal and supraliminal presentations are a function of what happens when we impose discrete categories on continuous stimuli; the transition can be thought of as a shift from analogue to digital processing. Thus, to make a conscious report about a percept is to give it a location, a content, and where possible, a meaning. Each of these responses imposes a certain kind of categorization on an underlying continuum of information. Thus Marcel writes that "phe-

..

.

Size and Shape o f the Subliminal Window

I05

nomenal experience consists in the imposition of a particular segmentation and structure on what is otherwise unsegmented ( i . e . , non intensional) and the imposition of a particular interpretation on what otherwise consists of multiple interpretations.

..

(198313, p . 243).

The Freudian model, by contrast, takes what might be called a Polaroid view of the visual system which assumes that what is presented to the visual field is veridically registered and necessarily sent on to the higher centers. But it is not at all certain whether a reasonably complex sentence such as "MOMMY AND I ARE ONE" can be veridically registered at subliminal exposures. Not only must separate words be registered in the proper order, but in addition, they must be syntactically combined in a grammatically lawful manner. Consider first the problem of registration. To read a sentence under ordinary conditions, we must scan it in a left-to-right sequence and make successive fixations over the length of the sentence. Fixations must be carefully controlled with respect to duration and interval.

If the sentence is presented out of awareness, there is no chance for systematic scanning. Depending on where fixation happens to fall, we may register the middle words of the sentence, the last words, or perhaps only the white space before the first word. If a sentence normally rcquiring four fixations is flashed only once, there is an inevitable loss of information no matter how fortunate the direction of gaze. Second, there is the matter of hemisphere activation. If we fixate the middle of the sentence, the first half will register in the left visual field and be processed in the right hemisphere. But there is increasing evidence to indicate! (in normal, right-handed subjects) that the right hemisphere is not equipped to handle complicated syntactic processing (see Zaidel, 1978; Levy, 1983). Under these conditions, the first half of the subliminal sentence might be processed a s a collection of separate words. While the second half of the sentence might be processed in the normal fashion, its meaning would obviously be quite different from the meaning of the complete sentence. A third consideration has to do with foveal proccssing. Stimuli which

register in the foveal region of the eye ( 0 to 3O visual angle) are perceived with substantially greater clarity than stimuli which register in the periphery; indeed, the act of reading is designed to maximize foveai scanning of the string of words. We can ask whether peripheral subliminal stimuli would be understood more in terms of overall shape than a s a string of letters ( i . e . , seen as a form rather than a word). Such differences would have obvious implications for what meaning is being registered.

I06

D.P.Spence,L.Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

Thus it would appear as if a subliminal message of more than one word or subtending more than 3O of visual angle might have quite different meanings depending on where in the visual field i t registered and under what degree of fixation control. Peripheral words might be registered with different (less word-like) meanings than foveal words. If the stimulus is centered around the fixation point, only some words may be syntactically processed. Words in the left visual field (right hemisphere) might be processed independently and not syntactically. The resulting consequence of these transformations might appear to be the result of primary process mechanisms, but to invoke such an explanaticn would be less than parsimonious if simpler explanations can be found. The uncertainties surrounding subliminal exposures nay also explain the changing face of the literature. It seems uncommonly difficult to replicate results in this field (see Table 1) and some of the unreliability may stem from the fact that the subliminal stimulus presented by the replicating experimenter is not necessarily the stimulus presented in the original study. If fixation is not controlled, for example, different parts of the message

will register on different parts of the retina at different times, and the effective stimuli might easily vary across experiments. Any experiment using complex stimuli which require some degree of syntactic processing is particularly vulnerable to these variations. Conversely, the chance of successful replication would be substantially improved if' the mechanisms of verbal perception were brought under tighter experimental control. Such controls might often be counter-intuitive. For example, if we are right in arguing that syntactic processing in right-handed subjects is generally impaired in the right hemisphere (left visual field), then it follows that a complex subliminal stimulus must necessarily be presented to the right of the fixation point (stimulating only the right visual field or left hemisphere) and not centered on the screen, as is normally the case, In addition, eye fixation must be carefully controlled. Under these conditions, there would also be critical limits to the length of the message ( i . e , , the size of the visual angle) because only half of the visual field would be available. And finally, if the left hemisphere is critical for syntactic registration, it would be necessary to exclude left-handed subjects because they tend to be unevenly lateralized. From a sample of recent subliminal experiments (all studies published from February 1980 to August 1983 in the JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY) we compiled the accompanying table (see Table 1 ) . It can be

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

I07

Table 1 Perceptual Features of Recent Subliminal Studies

study

Fixation

Stimulus

Lines of Messas

Visual Angle Results (degrees)

* Condon and

no information

MOMMY AND I ARE ONE

?

not available

n.s.

2

Horizontal:6.09'

n.s.

DADDY AND 1 ARE ONE

Allen, 1980

Heilbrun, 1980 frame of blank

BEATING DAD IS OK

* Experiment I

field

* Experiment I1

fixation point

SAME

2

same

n.s.

Experiment I11 fixation point

SAME

2

same

n.s.

*

Ariarn and

frame of blank

Siller, 1982

field

BEATING DAD IS WRONG

MOMMY AND 1 ARE ONE

Vertical: 1.43'

2

p= .01

Horizontal:9.2'

MY TEACHER AND I ARE

(computed from

for main

ONE (Hebrew trans-

authors' data)

effect

lations)

of stimulus

* Haspel and Harris, 1982

* Oliver and Burkham, 1982

frame of blank

BEATING DAD IS OK

field

BEATING DAD IS WRONG

frame of lighted MOMMY AND I ARE ONE screen; Ss told

2

Horizontal:3.9lo

n.6.

Vertical: 1.30'

7

not available

n.s.

MOMMY LOVES ME AS I AM

to "focus on the center of the screen"

Indicates a failure to replicate N.B.

Handedness was not measured i n any experiment. We are also assuming that the stimulus

was always centered in the fixation field although this information was never made explicit.

seen that none of the studies controlled for handedness; that all of the studies apparently centered the subliminal stimulus in the visual field; that only two studies out of seven used a fixation point; and that in five studies the subliminal stimulus subtended a visual angle of more than 3 O , putting parts of the message outside of the foveal area (assuming central fixation). Such an assumption is naturally problematic in all studies using the frame of the blank field to outline the stimulus area; under these condi-

108

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

tions, it is anyone's guess which parts of the stimulus were being registered. Where the stimulus subtended a large visual angle, particularly when it was presented in two lines of type, w e must assume that multiple fixations were needed to scan the complete message. In many cases, the message was presented more than once (four exposures seems the mode), but without controlled fixations, four exposures will produce just as much of a word salad a s one presentation. Even when fixation was controlled (as in Heilbrun's Experiments I1 and HI), there is still the uncertainty surrounding right hemisphere registration. Assuming that only the right-hand segment is syntactically processed, the meaning of BEATING DAD IS O K , distributed over two lines, is going to be quite different from the meaning intended by the experimenter. And even if all four words were registered, a difference in processing sequence from that intended by the experimenter would obviously result in a difference in meaning. To explore the dimensions of the subliminal window, w e took advan-

tage of the fact that the time needed to decide whether a stimulus is a word or a nonword is significantly shortened when the target word is either accompanied b y , or preceded b y , a related prime ( e . g . , NURSE-DOC* TOR). Meyer et al. (1975) have shown that the recognition of a target word is significantly shortened when it follows the appearance of a supraliminal associate; Marcel and Patterson (1978) and Marcel (1983a) extended the finding to tachistoscopic stimuli; and Crawford (1981) has shown that a priming effect also obtains when the prime is peripheral to the fixation point and therefore slightly out of awareness. We attempted to extend Crawford's procedure to nearliminal and subliminal exposures. In the first two studies reported here, w e presented the prime in one of four positions in the visual field: focal right, focal left, peripheral right, and peripheral left. We expected to find more priming effect in the two focal positions because the stimulus would register with greater clarity at those locations. We also expected that primes in the right visual field would be more effective because they were engaging the left hemisphere. Whatever the outcome, the pattern of results would give us an approximate idea of the shape of the subliminal window. We would then be in a position to present more complex stimuli across the most sensitive part of the window. In Ex-

*

We are indebted to Dr. Hollis Scarborough for f i r s t suggesting t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y .

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

109

periment 111, we presented the complex message to only one visual field; in Experiment I V , w e presented the complex message to both fields. Both experiments would allow us to study the interaction of syntactic processing with hemisphere. The subjects in the four following experiments were all members of the Rutgers school community. They had at least a high school education, and the majority had finished college. This was probably thcir first subliminal experiment. They had practically no knowledge of this area of research.

EXPERlMENT I METHOD

Subjects. Eleven Rutgers College undergraduates (3 males, 8 females,aged 18 to 32) participated in the experiment, All subjects were strongly right-handed

with scores of 15 or above on the Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971). The Edinburgh Inventory is a widely used test of handedness which consists of 12 items each related to a specific activity ( e . g . , which hand do you use to deal playing cards?). Each item is scored on n five- point scale from always right (+2) to always left ( - 2 ) ;

the twelve items are sumrncd

and the highcr the score, the more right-handed the subject. It goes without saying that scorcs can range from 24 to - 2 4 . A score of 9 to 24 is usually taken as the criterion for righthandedness

.

Stimuli. The priming stimuli were presented at two speeds

-

135 and 30 msec.

One hundred and fourteen target words were presented in each condition. Each list was composed of 96 real words plus 18 pronounceable nonwords. The real words ranged in length from 3 to 7 letters and in frequency from 1 to 1599 occurrences per million words (ICu6era and Francis, 1967). Each

real word was preceded by one of three classes of primes: semantically related (e.g. , STORY-BOOK) ; semantically unrelated (e.g.

, WINDOW-PEEL) ;

and pronounceable nonsense (e.g., EMPOD-LOOK) , Half of the semantically related primes on each list were abstract nouns or adjectives ( c . g . , REASON) which were all below 4 . 7 3 on the norms published by Toglia and Battig (1978), and half were concrete nouns or adjectives ( e . g . , LION), all above 5.15. Primes ranged in length from 4 to 6 letters. If hemisphere ac-

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

110

tivation made a difference, w e would expect to see the left hemisphere particularly sensitive to abstract primes (see Day, 1977; Ellis and Shepherd, 1974).

Each priming stimulus was presented in one of four positions in the subject's visual field. Focal right and left displaced .5 to 2.6O of visual angle and peripheral right and left displaced from 4.7 to 7 O of visual angle on either side of the fixation point. For any given stimulus position ( e . g . , focal right), 24 pairs of words were divided equally between the two types of primes (abstract and concrete) and the three types of semantic link (related, unrelated, and nonsense). Each of the six cells contained four pairs of words. Target words were balanced for length and frequency across semantic link. Position and type of prime was systematically randomized over the list. Nonword targets were presented intermittently and neve r appeared more than twice in a row. Eye movements were controlled by the use of a constant fixation point, by a chin rest which stabilized the subject's head, and by the use of a vertical target word which required the subject to center his gaze on the fixation point. Deviations from midfield would significantly increase reaction times to the target word and thus diminish the expected priming effect (Note 1). Apparatus. The stimuli were presented by an Apple I1 Plus micro-computer. Rate of presentation was controlled by the experimenter by means of a telegraph key patched into the Apple 110 connector. Reaction times were measured by an assembly language subroutine which measured the interval from the appearance of a target word to the keypress by the subject, using a timing * board obtained from Mountain Computer, Inc. Timing of the subliminal stimulus, the onset-offset interval, and random readings of the internal clock were checked by a millisecond timer patched into the Apple 1 / 0 connector. Times and keypress locations were stored by the same program that presented the stimuli. Visual angle was controlled by fixing the subject's chin in a rest 25.6 inches from the monitor screen. Each prime was exposed (at either 135 or 30 msec., depending on condition ) by pressing the telegraph key. A white mask in the same plane as the fixation point immediately followed the prime and remained visible for either 80 or 185 msec. (duration of prime plus mask always added to a con-

*

We are indebted to Dr. Hollis Scarborough for first suggesting t h i s possibility.

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

111

stant). It was followed immediately by the target word which appeared vertically with its first letter displacing the fixation point. The target word remained visible until the subject pressed one of the two response keys. Illumination levels were set at 2 . 4 footlamberts for the blank screen of the Apple monitor; 2.45 footlamberts for the prime and target words; and 3.0 footlamberts for the horizontal white mask. The room illumination was set at .20 footlamberts. All four experiments used the same illumination levels. Procedure. Subject was seated in front of the monitor, chin in the chin r e s t , and his index fingers placed on the left and right response keys ( A and L on the Apple keyboard). Each subject was asked to focus on the s t a r which appeared in the middle of the screen. He was told that after a warning click he would see a word appear vertically in the center of the screen and had to decide, as quickly a s possible, whether it was a word o r a nonword. H e was to press the left key if it was a word and the right key if it was a nonword. Speed and accuracy were stressed. After about every 25 words, the subject was given a short rest. Fifteen practice words pre-

ceded the main list. The slow condition always came first. After both lists had been presented, recognition was tested by repeating the first half of each list with slightly different instructions. The subject was told to focus on the s t a r , a s before, and to watch for a word which would appear very quickly before the vertical word. On each expos u r e , he was to report location (left or right, near or far) and content where possible. RESULTS

Each subject’s record was screened first for keypress errors and the average reaction time (RT) in the corresponding cell of four words was adjueted accordingly. All averages were rounded to the nearest millisecond and entered into a four-way analysis of variance with 24 repeated measures. The four factors were: Semantic Link (related, unrelated, control) ; Prime Concreteness (abstract, concrete) ; Visual Field (right, left) ; and Offset (peripheral, focal). Analyses were carried out separately for each exposure speed. 135 msec. Effect of Semantic Link was significant: F=5.72, p e . 0 2 5 ,

2 / 2 0 d.f.

Target words preceded by associates were recognized at an average RT of

112

D.P.Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

626 msec. ; targets preceded by nonassociates were recognized at an aver-

age of 677 msec.; and targets preceded by nonsense words (the no-meaning, o r control condition) were recognized at an average RT of 667 msec. (see Figure 1). The priming hypothesis is supported: if there is a semantic link between prime and target word, it appears to facilitate its recognition; i f there is no semantic link, the prime appears to delay recognition. Average facilitation effect across all words (control - associates) is 4 1 msec. ; average inhibition effect (nonassociate - control) is 10 msec. The pattern of RTs suggests that it is the meaning of the prime and not i t s membership in the family of word-like shapes that is responsible for the facilitation effect. To further clarify the role of meaning, we repeated the analysis with the nonsense primes excluded. Effect of Semantic Link (associates vs. nonassociates) remained significant (F=7.96, p c .025, 1 / 1 0 d.f.) which indicates that even when both primes are words, it is the semantic link to the target word which facilitates recognition. In a final analysis, we compared nonassociate with control and found no main effect (F= .58, p > . 4 ) ; in other words, a meaningful prime will not lower RT if there is no semantic link between prime and target. This finding makes it clear that more than a word-like shape is being processed: some degree of meaning is also being extracted and having an effect on the subsequent target word. Semantic Link interacted

significantly

with

Visual

Field:

F=5.83,

pc.025, 2 / 2 0 d.f. (see Figure 1). Priming was more effective when the associate was presented in the right visual field (which actiirates the left, or language hemisphere). Average RTR for associates, nonassociates , and controls in the right visual field were 578, 653, and 648 msec., respectively, giving a facilitation effect of 70 msec. and an inhibition effect of 5 msec. The corresponding values for the left visual field were 674, 7 0 4 , and 686 msec., respectively, giving a facilitation effect of 1 2 msec. and an inhibition effect of 18 msec. Semantic Link interacted significantly with Prime Concreteness : F= 3.88, p c . 0 5 , 2 / 2 0 d.f. (see Figure 1). Priming was more effective with concrete than with abstract stimuli (e.g., LION vs. REASON). Average FtTs for associates, nonassociates, and controls for concrete primes were 631, 709, and 710 msec., respectively, giving a facilitation effect of 79 msec. and an inhibition effect of -1 msec. The corresponding values for abstract primes were 621, 648, and 624 msec., respectively, giving a facilitation effect of 3 msec. and an inhibition effect of 24 rnsec.

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

1 I3 -1100

ABSTRACT P R I M E S

L

RELATED UNRELATED NONSENSE

135msec R T l m s e c ) 900

800

700

600

500

i I

CONCRETE

'H

LEFT VISUAL FIELD

RIGHT VISUAL FIELD

(RIGHT HEMISPHERE)

(LEFT HEMISPHERE)

NONWOR

500

1100

PRIMES

'-7 -. RELATED 0 UNRELATED NONSENSE

R T l m s e c l 900

no0

700

600

ioo

500 PERIPH

FOCAL

LEFT VISUAL FIELD IRIGHT HEMISPHERE 1

Figure 1

FOCAL

PERIPH

NONWORO

RIGHT V I S U A L FIELD ILEFT HEMISPHERE)

Faperiment I. Reaction time for correct recognition of the target word when it was preceded by related, unrelated, or nonsense stimulus as a function of visual field and p r i m concreteness.

D.P.Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

I14

There was a significant triple interaction between Semantic Link, Offs e t , and Prime Concreteness: F=5.29, p c . 0 2 5 ,

2/20 d.f.

For concrete

primes, facilitation effects were roughly equal in both focal and peripheral fields, whereas inhibition effects appeared only in the focal field. For abstract primes, facilitation effects appeared only in the peripheral field, whereas inhibition effects were roughly equal in both fields. Finally, there was a significant four-way interaction between Semantic Link, Offset, Prime Concreteness, and Visual Field: F=6.49, p c -01, 2 / 2 0 d.f. The strongest facilitation effect occurred with concrete right focal field ( 1 4 2 msec.) ; the weakest effect occurred primes in the right focal field (-60 msec.) (see Figure 1). inhibition effect occurred with abstract primes in the right

primes in the with abstract The strongest focal and left

peripheral fields (100 msec. ) ; the weakest inhibition effect occurred with concrete primes in the left peripheral field (-65 msec.). The fact that we found no significant interaction between Offset and Semantic Link indicates that the priming effect is just as strong when the prime was presented in the peripheral field (displacing a visual angle of 7O) a s when it was presented to the focal field of . 5 to 2 . 6 O . It would appear a s i f 135 msec. were sufficient time to allow a peripheral sti-

4 . 7 to

mulus to register as a meaningful icon and to be processed for i t s semantic and imagistic information. At the same time, the four-way interaction makes it clear that a subliminal effect will be maximized by presenting a concrete stimulus in the focal right visual field subtending a visual angle of no more than 3O. Such a stimulus would seem to activate both the semantic and imagistic coding systems and is processed by the left hemisphere where these codes are presumably more systematically represented. The fact that we found no interaction between prime concreteness and visual field indicates that the left hemisphere is no more sensitive to concrete than to abstract primes. Unlike Ellis and Shepherd (1974) or Day (1977), we did not find a greater visual field asymmetry for abstract than for concrete stimuli. 30 msec. To measure the effect of the subliminal prime when it was flashed a t 30 msec., we carried out a second four-factor ANOVA with repeated measures. (One subject was eliminated because he made too many errors. ) The main effect of Semantic Link was not significant. There was a marginal interaction of Semantic Link with Prime Concreteness (F=2.93, p e . 0 8 , 2 / 18 d.f.1 and a signiricant four-way interaction of Semantic Link X Prime Concreteness X Visual Field X Displacement (F=6.56, p c .01, 2/18 d.f.1.

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

115

Recognition of prime varied significantly with speed, visual field, and offset. In the slow condition, correct recognition averaged 388, ranging from 25 to 51%. In the tast condition, the average was 25% correct, ranging from 9 to 42%. Recognition of right field primes was superior to left field primes, and recognition of focal primes was superior to peripheral primes. Each of the main effects

-

speed, position, and offset

-

was significant;

the respective Fs are 66.28, 11.79, and 415.48. There were no significant interactions. Of particular interest is the fact that 6 Ss in the slow condition re-

cognized no words correctly when they appeared in either the right or left peripheral fields; for the fast condition, the number increased to 11 (the total sample). On the average, recognition was from five to ten times more effective when the prime was focal than when it was peripheral, a difference that accords well with our knowledge of retinal architecture. Yet despite the clear effect of offset on recognition, we failed to find a similar tendency when we looked at changes in RT. In the slow condition, peripheral primes seemed fully a s effective as focal primes, and we found no interaction between offset and semantic link. These two findings taken together can be seen as evidence for preconscious processing. Peripheral primes appear to influence the recognition of related target words even when the prime cannot be consciously recognized. Errors. Errors in response to the target word ranged from 0 to 7 in the 135 msec. condition and from 0 to 4 in the 30 msec. condition. In the former, significantly more errors were caused by peripheral primes than by focal primes (F=11.01, p e . 0 1 , 1/10 d . f . ) ,

and more errors were caused by

primes in the left visual field than by primes in the right visual field (F=

5.26, p e . 0 5 , 1/10 d.f.1.

Neither of these effects were sustained in the

fast condition. DISC USSl ON Primes presented for 135 msec. produced a significantly shorter rcsponse to a semantically related target word. We can assume that the expo-

sure of the prime activated a network of associates which somehow facilitated the S's lexical decision. The facilitation effect was particularly pronounced in the right visual field (left hemisphere) and appeared more clearly with concrete primes. We might assume that the association network

116

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

is more faithfully represented in the left hemisphere : thus hypotheses based on different kinds of semantic links and different degrees of association strength (the assumptions underlying the pairing of the prime and target words) would apply with more force to stimuli presented to the right visual field. Much less clear are the findings form the fast condition. At 30 msec., the p r i m failed to produce a significant savings in S's lexical decision, although we did see a slight advantage of concrete over abstract primes. Either a brief presentation was insufficient to activate the association network, or the level of prime-target association strength was not sufficiently high to activate an enabling hypothesis. Some evidence contributing to this possibility appears from a comparison of the association strength of concrete primes and targets in the slow and fast conditions. In the former, the average association strength is Z56

-

that is, 256 subjects out of a

sample of 1000 chose thc target word as their first response to the prime. In the latter, the average association strength is 125. A s a result, we would expect that many concrete primes in the fast condition would activate a hypothesis which would not match the target word, thus leading to a delayed instead of a quickened RT. Thus the difference in activation may be less a function of prime exposure than a consequence of a difference in association strength. The next experiment controlled for association strength. In addition, two other changes were made. Instead of concrete and abstract primes, we chose to use primes with high levels of imagery on the assumption that this variable may be more directly related to hemisphere asymmetries. And because of the possibility that the offset-onset interval in the fast condition was too long and as a result suppressed the priming effect, we shortened the interval to a standard length. EXPERIMEN J I / METHOD

Subjects. Twelve members of the Rutgers Mcdical School community participated in the experiment. There were 6 males and 6 females, ages ranging from

17 to 37. All were strongly right-handed with scores of 16 or above on the Edinburgh Inventory. Stimuli. The stimuli were presented in two lists of 95 words each: 80 target words plus 15 pronounceable nonwords. The target words ranged in length

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

I17

from 3 to 6 letters and in frequency from 1 to 1207 occurrences per million words. They were all nouns. Each target word was preceded by either an associated word or a pronounceable nonsense word. Two levels of association were used, as indicated by word association norms (Palermo and Jenkins, 1954). The targets were either high associates of the prime (having a frequency between 80 and 706 out cjf 1000 subjects at college level) or low associates (frequency between 6 and 18). All of the primes were high imagery nouns, with a mean score of 5.86 and a range from 5.22 to 6.38 (Toglia and Battig, 1978). Each prime appeared twice (but never in succession), once with a high associate target and once with a low associate target. Control targets, matched to the associated targets by usage frequency and word length,

were preceded by nonsense primes.

Primes

ranged in length from 4 to 6 letters. The primes were positioned in the visual field as in Experiment 1. In this experiment, however, the primes were presented at 7Omsee. on the first list and at 30 msec. on the second list. The offset-onset interval was always fixed at 80 msec. For any given stimulus position (e.g., focal right), the 80 prime-target pairs were equally divided between the four types of semantic link (high and low associates and matched controls). Each of the 16 cells contained 5 word pairs. Target words were balanced for length, frequency, and imagery across semantic link and position. Position and type of prime were systematically randomized over the list. Nonword targets were presented intermittently and never appeared twice or more in a row. The two word lists were given in opposite orders for half the subjects. Procedure. Same as in Experiment I except in recognition testing. In this part of Experiment 11, both complete lists were given. The subject was told that occasionally the question l'WORD?'f would appear in the upper left-hand corner of the screen after he had made a word vs. nonword decision. When this occurred, the subject was to report the content and location (left or right, near or far) of the word (if he saw one) that flashed by prior to the target word. RESULTS

Each subject's record was screened for keypress errors and the cell averages adjusted accordingly. For each condition, we reduced the data by means of a four-factor analysis of variance with repeated measures.

118

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez 70 msec.

Effect of Semantic Link was highly significant: F=45.0, p<.OOl, 1/11 d.f. Target words preceded by associates were recognized at an average RT of 707 msec., whereas target words preceded by nonsense primes were recognized with an average RT of 781 msec.. yielding a facilitation effect of 74 msec. (see Figure 2 ) . There was no significant interaction between Semantic Link and level of association. There was, however, a main effect of association level (F=8.60, pc.025, 1/11 d.f.1; targets preceded by high associate primes (and paired nonsense words) were recognized faster (719 msec.) than targets preceded by low associate primes and their pairs (769 msec.). Because the crucial difference lies in the link between related prime and target word (the nonsense primes, after all, are uniformly unrelated), this finding would seem to support the hypothesis. To clarify the meaning of this finding, we repeated the analysis using only the nonsense primes. The difference between high and low groups was not significant (F=2.71). It would seem that when the target word is preceded by a prime which is highly related in meaning, its recognition is significantly improved, suggesting that what might be called the semantic demand characteristics of the prime have an influence on recognition of the target word. Semantic Link interacted significantly with Offset: F = 9.34, p < ,025, 1/11 d.f. When the primes were presented in either right or left focal field, the facilitation effect was 114 msec.; when the primes were presented in either peripheral field, the facilitation effect decreased to 34 msec. Finally, there was a significant interaction between Semantic Link,

Level of Association, Visual Field, and Offset: F=15.22, p < .005, 1/11 d.f. The shortest RT occurred in the peripheral right visual field with highstrength associates; the longest RT occurred in the focal right visual field with nonsense primes. Recognition. Correct identification of the nearliminal primes ranged from 4 to 22 out of a possible 4 0 ; it was significantly influenced b y Offset and Visual Field. Main effect of Offset was highly significant (F=75.45, p < ,001, 1/11 d.f.1 with focal primes recognized much more often than peripheral primes. Main effect of Field was significant (F=41.59, p < .001, 1/11 d.f.1 with primes in the right visual field recognized more often; and the interaction of Offset by Field was significant, with proportionately more primes recognized in the focal right than in the peripheral right visual field (F=5.62, ~ 4 . 0 5 , 1/11 d.f.1. The focal primes would seem to be nearliminal, whereas

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

119

T I2Oo 0

ASSOCIATE NONSENSE

RT(msec)SOo

800

700

t

600

600 PtRlPH

FOCAL

FOCAL

PERIPH

PfRlPH

FOCAL

FOCAL

PtRlPH

NONWORO

LEFT VISUAL FIELD LEFT VISUAL FIELD RIGHT VISUAL FIELD RIGHT VISUAL FIELD

HIGH ASSOCIATION

LOW

ASSOCIATION

1l2O0

0 ASSOCIATE

PtRlPH

FOCA1

FOCAl

PERIPH

PERIPH

FOCAL

FOCAL

PERIPH

NONWORO

LEFT VISUAL FIELD LEFT VISUAL FIELD RIGHT VISUAL FIELD RIGHT VISUAL FIELD HIGH ASSOCIATION

Figure 2.

LOW

ASSOCIATION

Experiment 11. Reaction time for correct recognition of the target word when it was preceded by h i g h imagery associates and nonsense words as a function of exposure speed, visual f i e l d , and level of association between prime and target.

120

D.P.Spence. L.Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

the peripheral primes are much more subliminal, and this difference in awareness was partly reflected in target recognition, for as we have just seen, targets preceded by focal primes were identiried faster than targets preceded by peripheral primes. But because there was a main effect for Semantic Link, it follows that awareness of the prime is not a necessary condition for facilitation. Awareness of position was much better than correct identification. Number of correct lateral placements (right or left) ranged from 29 to 40, and number of correct offset placements (near or far) ranged from 23 to 40.

To get a better understanding of the extent to which awareness might have contributed to the facilitation effect, we divided the sample into two groups according to the number of primes correctly recognized and repeated the initial four-factor analysis. Interaction of Semantic Link with awareness was not significant, indicating that the more-aware subjects were not more responsive to the nearliminal prime than the less-aware subjects. Errors, Keypress errors ranged from 0 to 6. A four-factor a r d y s i s of variance showed a main effect for Semantic Link (F=5.20, p c .05, 1/11 d.f.1 with more errors following nonsense primes than target associates; a Visual Field X Semantic Link interaction, with proportionately more errors following the nonsense primes in the right visual field than in the left visual field: F=6.49, p c .05, 1/11 d.f.; and a significant interaction between Visual Field, Level of Association, and Semantic Link: F=5.36, p c . 0 5 , 1/11 d.f. No subject made any errors on the 10 target words preceded by high associate primes, whereas the greatest number of errors (50% of the subjects) were made on target words preceded by nonsense primes. 30 msec. Effect of Semantic Link was highly significant: F=35.05, p c .001, 1/11 d.f. Target words preceded by associates were recognized at an average RT of 666 msec. ; target words preceded by nonsense primes were recognized at an average R T of 742 msec., yielding a facilitation effect of 76 msec. Once again, degree of association did not interact with Level of Association, but as before, there was a main effect of Association Level (F= 8 . 7 , p c . 0 5 , 1/11 d.f.1 which stemmed largely from the related associates. When the analysis was repeated with only the nonsense primes, the effect of level disappeared (F=.03), an indication that level of semantic link plays an important role in the facilitation effect.

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

121

Neither Visual Field X Semantic Link nor Offset X Semantic Link interaction was significant, indicating that the associate prime was equally effective in all four locations. There was a near-significant interaction between Semantic Link, Level of Association, Visual Field, and Offset: F=4.74, p c .06, 1/11 d.f. The largest facilitation effect occurs in the right focal visual field with highstrength primes; the lowest effect occurs in the left focal visual field with low-strength primes. To look more carefully at the effect of peripheral primes, we repeated the analysis but excluded the focal stimuli. Effect of Semantic Link was still significant (F=9.52, p c .025, 1/11 d . f . ) with target words preceded by associates recognized with an average RT of 652 msec. and target words preceded by nonsense primes recognized with an average RT of 722 msec. (facilitation effect = 70 msec., roughly the same difference as was found using all the data). Semantic Link did not interact with visual field (F= .12), an indication that both right and left peripheral primes are equally effective in facilitating the response to related target words. These data would suggest that high imagery stimuli can be registered in the more peripheral parts of both visual fields (visual angles from 4 . 7 to 7 O ) and that meaning can be extracted by both right and left hemispheres. Recognition. Correct identification of primes ranged from 7 to 2 1 out of a possible 40; once again, i t was significantly influenced by offset and visual field. Main effect of Offset was highly significant (F442.55, p c .001, 1/11 d.f.1

with focal primes recognized much more often (%=3.25 out of a possible 20) than peripheral primes (Z=.29). Main effect of Field was significant (F= 44.45, p c .001, 1/11 d.f.) with primes in the right visual field recognized more often than primes in the left; and the interaction of Offset by Field

was significant, with proportionately more primes recognized in the focal right than in the peripheral right visual field (F=70.40, p c .001,

1/11

d.f.). Awareness of lateral position (right or left ) ranged from 29 to 40, and awareness of offset (near or far) ranged from 28 to 39. To further understand the role of awareness, we again divided the subjects into two groups according to correct recognition and repeated the analysis. There was no Awareness X Semantic Link interaction. Errors. Keypress errors ranged from 0 to 3. A four-factor analysis of variance revealed no main effects and no signiricant interaction.

122

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez DISC USSl 0 N

Target words preceded by semantically related primes were identified faster than equivalent words preceded by pronounceable nonsense words. The facilitation effect occurred at both 70 and 30 msec. and in both right and left visual fields. Degree of offset affected the facilitation effect in the slow condition but was (surprisingly) not a factor in the fast condition. At the faster speed, i t would seem as i f a single-word stimulus registers with equal effectiveness in all four regions of the visual field. Conscious awareness of the semantically related prime did not always parallel the pattern of target word activation, which suggests that awareness may be neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the stimulus to affect reaction time. The disparity is particularly striking with respect to the peripheral primes in the 30 msec. condition. Whereas they were recognized significantly less often than the focal primes, their influence on recognition of the target word was not significantly reduced. Even though not in conscious awareness, it would seem as if the peripheral primes triggered an enabling hypothesis which, because it matched the target word, allowed the subject to respond with a faster discrimination, We tentatively hypothesize that even when the stimulus registers outside the foveal area, the icon is maintained long enough to allow for some kind of information transfer. We are now in a position to explore the effects of a complex subliminal message. We have learned from Experiment I1 that the meaning of simple words can be registered even if they are presented as far as 4 . 7 to T o to the left or right of the fixation point. I t now remains to be seen whether a sentence can be syntactically processed when exposed to the same part of the retina. For this experiment, we chose the stimuli llPlense Press Left/ Right" and "DO Not Press LeftlRight .It The expected response to target words is once again a left keypress. If the complete stimulus is processed, we would expect to see slower reaction times to the target word when the stimuli were "Please Press Right" and "DO Not Press Left," and faster reaction times when the stimuli were !'Please Press LeftT1and "DO Not Press Right . I 1 If "Please" and "Do Not" are called Commands and "Left"/"Right" are called Locations, we would expect to see an interaction between Command and Location. On the other hand, if only single words were processed, (as might be the case. for example, when only the right hemisphere is activated), then we might see a main effect for Location and perhaps a main effect for Command. A main effect for Location would pre-

Size ond Shope of the fiblimiwl Window

123

dict that the words "Left" or %ight" would influence reaction time without regard to the earlier part of the sentence; in other words, Location was not modified by Command. A main effect for Command would predict that the words "Please" and "DO Not" would be obeyed without regard to Location. Suppose single words were processed by one hemisphere and the complete sentence in the other. Under those conditions, we might expect to find a triple interaction between Command, Location, and Visual Field.

EXPERIMENT 111 METHOD

Subjects. Ten members of the Rutgers Medical School community participated in the experiment. There were 3 males and 7 females, ages ranging from 16 to 37. All Ss were right-handed with scores of 13 or above on the Edinburgh Inventory. Stimuli Two lists of 95 target words were presented: 80 real words plus 15

.

pronounceable nonwords (the lists were identical to those used in Experiment 11). Half the Ss received List 1 first. The subliminal clue was presented at 30 msec. and appeared in either the right or left visual field; it commanded the subject to "Please Press" or "DO Not Press" and it referred to either of two locations: ttLeft't or 1Right.77The eight possible combinations of two visual fields, two verbs (commands), and two locations were distributed over the 80 target words, yielding 10 words in each cell; cells were matched for word frequency and word length. Nonwords were distributed randomly throughout the list and were preceded by a nonsense prime exposed for 30 msec. in either right or left peripheral field. Offset-onset interval was increased to 230 msec. to allow for syntactic processing of the clue. Procedure. Same as Experiment I1 except for recognition testing; the new version is described below. RESULTS

All lexical choices were inspected first for accuracy; instances of incorrect keypress were deleted; and from the remaining RTs, eight sets of

D.P.Spence, L.Klein, and R.J. Fernundez

124

averages were computed for each subject for each trial. A four-factor analysis of variance was used to reduce the data: the factors are Trial, Command, Visual Field, and Location. Mean RTs are shown in Figure 3 averaged across both trials (the main effect for trials was significant - RTs decrease signiticantly over time, F=7.57, p c ,025, 1/9 d.f. - but there were no significant interactions between Trial and any other variables). RT I msec)

t

1400

00 NOT PRESS

PLEASE PRESS

LEFT VISUAL FIELD (RIGHT HEMIS.) Figure 3.

PLEASE PRESS

00 NOT PRESS

RIGHT VISUAL FIELD (LEFT HEMIS.)

Experiment 111. Reaction time for correct recognition of the target word as a function of visual field, Command (PLEASE PRESS

VS.

Do NOT PRESS), and key

location (Left va.Right).

Main effect for Location was highly significant (F=7.57, p c . 0 2 5 , 1 / 9 d.f.). This finding indicates that RTs to target words preceded by the word trRight17. regardless of context or visual field, were significantly longer (z=863 msec.) than RTs to target words preceded by the word TTLefttq (z=773 msec.) There was a nonsignificant interaction between Location and Visual Field, indicating that the clues TrRightvfand "Lefttt were equally effective in either visual field, despite the fact that in half the trials, they were displaced to the far right of the screen (see Figure 3 ) . Main effect for Command was significant (F=10.64, p c .01, 1 / 9 d . f . ) ; the command "Do Not Press'! resulted (somewhat paradoxically) in significantly shorter RTs than the command "Please Press." I t will be seen from

.

125

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

Figure 3 that this difference stems largely from the findings for the right visual field. A significant interaction between Command and Visual Field (F=20.60, p c .005, 1 / 9 d.f.1 supports this observation. Of most relevance to the main hypothesis is the significant interaction between Command, Location, and Visual Field (F=5.33, p < . 0 5 , 1/9 d.f.1 which suggests that Command modified Location more in one visual field than in the other. To further explore this finding, we carried out separate analyses for the two visual fields. When the subliminal clue was presented to the right visual field (left hemisphere), there was a main effect for Command (17.85, p c .002, 1 / 9 d.f.1,

a main effect for Location (F=6.66,

p c .05, 1 / 9 d . f . ) , and a significant Command X Location interaction (F= 6.66, p < .05, 1 / 9 d . f . ) , suggesting that some kind of syntactic processing

is taking place and that Command is modifying Location. As can be seen from Figure 3 , the presence of "DO Not" in the right visual field substantially reduces the RT to "Right." On the other hand, when the clue was presented to the left visual field (right hemisphere), there is only a main effect for Location (F=16.94, p c .002, 1/9 d.f.) and no other main effects or interactions, suggesting that a more primitive kind of processing may be taking place and that only the words "Left" and "Right" were influencing the response to the target word. Figure 3 makes clear that the difference between "Right" and "Left" is essentially the same whether preceded by "Please Press" or "DO Not Press." Although it might be argued that the changes in Command did not register in the peripheral left visual field, evidence from the first two experiments would argue against such an assumption. Recognition. After the two lists had been presented, we sampled awareness of the subliminal clue by presenting 24 target words from one of the previous lists, measuring RT to the target word in the standard manner, and also asking, after each lexical decision, whether anything had been seen to "flash by" before the target word appeared and what and where it was. Twenty-one priming clues were presented, distributed over the eight possible combinations. A complete clue was never seen, and the number of partial clues recognized by any subject ranged from 0 to 8 out of a possible 21. Partial awareness of the clues in the right visual field was greater than awareness of clues in the left visual field; eight Ss were able to identify parts of one or more clues in t h e former as compared to only one

S making partial identification of clues in the latter ( p c .05, two-tailed

126

D.P. Spence. L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

Wilcoxon test). Within each visual field, correct recognition of specific clue parts was averaged over all Ss and the scores corrected for frequency of appearance. The percent recognition scores are shown in table 2 . The first Table 2 Correct Recognition of Clue Parts

Experiment 111 L e f t Visual F i e l d

Right Visual F i e l d

W NOTlPLEASE PRESS LEFT/ RIGHT % Correct

3

Subjects (N)

1

0

0

0

0

DO NOTlPLEASE

10

50

5

8

PRESS LEFTlRIGHT

0

0

0

Experiment IV

PRESS

/

AVOID

LEFT

I

RIGHT

More V i s i b l e % Correct

1

7

28

14

Subjects (N)

1

1

4

2

Trial

1

Less V i s i b l e % Correct

0

Subjects (N)

DO NOT

/ PLEASE

2

8

5

1

4

3

PRESS

YOUR LEFT

/

HAND

RIGHT

Spaced % Correct

0

0

Subjects (N)

2.5

0

0

0

0

1 Trial

2

Crowded % Correct

Subjects (N)

0

0

6.2

0

0

0

0

4

word or words in each field are much better identified than subsequent words, and there is a tendency for accuracy to decrease in a left-to-right manner. Number of S s contributing to each score are shown in the second line of Table 2 ; recognition is confined to the first word or words in each clue with "Please" slightly more visible than "Do Not . I q

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

127

Errors. Errors per subject ranged from 1 to 7 out of 80 words on the first trial and from 0 to 3 on the second. A four-factor analysis of variance showed a main effect for Trial (more errors in the first

-

F=17.19, pc.002,

1/9 d.f.1; a significant interaction between Trial and Location (more errors following "RightT1 than llLeft'l in Trial 1 but not in Trial 2 - F=5.19, p c . 0 5 , 1/9 d.f.1; and a significant interaction between Command, Location, and Visual Field (F=7.11, p c . 0 3 , 1/9 d . f . ) . On Trial l, where the majority of the errors occurred, the greatest number were made following "Please Press Right" in the right visual field. Since an error results from pressing the right-hand key, the presence of crrors suggests that the subject was responding to the clue and (as instructed) was pressing the right-hand key. This finding would also seem to support the hypothesis that full syntactic processing was taking place in the left hemisphere. On the other hand, the smallest number of errors (0) in Trial 1 followed the clue "DO Not Press Left" in the left visual field. If the full sentence were parsed, it would prompt the subject to press the right-hand key, i.e., to make an error. Because no errors appeared, we can draw the tentative conclusion that syntactic processing did not take place and that the subject responded only to the word "Left" (and perhaps "Press"). DISCUSSION

The results of Experiment I11 make it clear that where the prompting stimulus appears in the visual field makes a critical difference to its interpretation. If it falls in the right visual field, it will more likely be syntactically processed than i f it falls in the left. This finding has obvious implications for those subliminal studies (see Table 1) which fail to provide a central fixation point for the subject. If fixation is constrained by only the outlines of the blank field, what mcssage is syntactically processed will depend on where fixation happens to fall. Table 1 also makes it clear that no experiment has presented the critical stimulus to the right of the fixation point. Only in this way would the total message be processed b y the left hemisphere. The findings of Experiment 111 make this oversight all the more critical because they suggest that, to date, no study has properly tested the impact of a complex subliminal mcssage,

Our findings would suggest that when the subliminal stimulus is centered around a fixation point, the words to the right of center (registered

128

D.P.Spence, L.Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

by the left hemisphere) would be syntactically processed whereas the words to the left of center (right hemisphere) might register in a more primitive manner, not necessarily incorporated in the total stimulus. In an effort to explore these possibilities, we attempted to influence lexical choice with a message that spanned both halves of the visual field. If both hemispheres contribute equally to message processing, we should expect to see an interaction between Command ("Please PressTt vs "DO Not Press") and Location ("Left" vs. "Right"). If stimuli to the left of center are not syntactically processed, then we would expect to see a Location effect but no interaction. Earlier experiments using simpler stimuli have suggested that peripheral stimuli are significantly influenced by spacing. Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) presented peripheral letters on either side of a target letter; when the former matched the latter, they found a significant facilitation effect. It is important to note that the size of this effect varied with between-letter spacing; the more white space between the priming letters, the more they decreased RT to the target word. The authors concluded that open spacing makes the peripheral letters more discriminable. In a related experiment, Mackworth (1965) found that perception of peripheral letters (displaced up to loo of visual angle) was virtually perfect when only one letter was shown in each visual field, but that adding extra letters or lines of letters sharply decreased recognition. Adding only one letter to the outside of the field decreased accuracy from 99% to 41%. These findings have important implications for arranging the format of a subliminal message. Because the majority of words in such a message will be peripherally registered to some degree, it seems important that they be surrounded by enough white space to be clearly distinguished. I t would also follow that simpler messages, having few words, are probably more effective than complex messages. To study this possibility, we presented the prompting message to both hemispheres in both a simple and complex form. For the former, we presented the words "PressIAvoid" 'fLeftlRightlf in both spaced and crowded formats. For the latter, we presented the message "Please/Do Not Press Your LeftlRight Hand," both spaced and crowded. If spacing makes a difference, we would expect that the simpler message would be more effective in general, and particularly when presented in the spaced format; that spaced formats would be more effective than crowded formats; and that Message should interact with Spacing.

.

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

129

EXPERIMENT IV METHOD

Subjects. Ten members of the Rutgers College community participated in the experiment - 4 men and 6 women. Ages ranged from 18 to 24. All Ss were right-handed with scores of 16 to 24 on the Edinburgh Inventory. Stimuli. Two lists of words were presented using, with minor exceptions, the same words presented in Experiment 111. The subliminal clue was presented at 30 msec. and always stimulated both visual fields. In Trial 1, it commanded the subject to "Press" or tfAvoidff (left visual field) 7tLeft77or "Right" (right visual field). Two levels of spacing were tested. In the more open condition, command and location were presented alone and the total stimulus subtended 6O of visual angle; in the more crowded condition, the nonwords "XXXX" were presented just before the command and just after the location, and the total stimulus subtended 9.8O of visual angle (see Figure 4 ) .

Rllmsec) 1000

800 700

PRESS AVO10

*

LEFT RIGHT

xxxx

PRESS AVOlO

n

r

600 PRESS

AVOID

PRESS

OPEN Figure 4.

AVOlO

CROWDED

Experiment I V , Trial 1. Reaction time for correct recognition of the target word AVOID), key location (Left v8. Right), and

a8 a function of Command (PRESS

VS.

mode of presentation (open: 6';

crowded: 9 . 8 ' ) .

In Trial 2 , the stimulus was the sentence "DO Not/Please Press Your Right/Left Hand." I t spanned both visual fields (see Figure 5 ) . Two levels of spacing were tested. In the spaced condition, the sentence spanned the

D.P.Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

130

full width of the viewing field ( 1 4 O of visual angle). In the unspaced condition, the sentence began closer to the fixation point on the left and ended closer on the right ( l o o of visual angle). RTI msec) PLEASE

PRESS

*

YOUR

LEFT RIGHT

HANO

800 700

600

KEY

L R PLEASE

L R 00 NOT

L R PLEASE

NONWORO

CROWOEO

SPACED Figure 5.

L R 00 NOT

Experiment IV, Trial 2. Reaction time for correct recognition of the target word as a function of Command (PLEASE PRESS

VS.

DO NOT PRESS), key location (Left v8.

Right), and mode of presentation (spaced: 14';

crowded: 10').

On both trials, the eight conditions were distributed randomly over the 80 target words. Each set of 10 words was matched for word frequency and word length. Fifteen pronounceable nonwords were distributed randomly throughout the list and were preceded by a real word in both right and left visual field. Offset-onset interval remained the same as in Experiment 111 (230 msec.). Procedure. Same as Experiment 111 except that the target word was cued by a short tone created by the microcomputer. Recognition testing was slightly altered, and the new version is described below. RESULTS

All lexical choices were inspected first for accuracy. All errors were tallied, their times subtracted from the cell means, and new means were computed. A three-factor analysis of variance was used to reduce the data for Trial 1 and for Trial 2 ; the factors are Spacing, Command, and Location, Mean RTs are shown in Figures 4 and 5 averaged across subjects. (Two subjects were eliminated from Trial 2 because recognition testing

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

131

showed that they were partly aware of a significant number of subliminal clues. Trial 1. Main effect for Location was significant (F=16.06, p c .005, 1 / 9 d.f.1,

an indication that RTs to target words preceded by the word "Left" were significantly shorter (%=690 msec) than RTs preceded by the word "Right" (%=759msec). The difference of 69 msec. in this condition is somewhat less than the difference of 90 msec. reported in Experiment 111, and the accompanying F is appreciably smaller than the F in Experiment 111 (43.69). Location interacted significantly with clue spacing. In the more open condition when only two words were presented, the leftlright difference was much larger (93 msec.) than in the more crowded condition where i t dropped to 45 msec. The interaction between Location and Spacing yielded an F of 9.79, p c .025, 1 / 9 d . f . There was a significant interaction of Command with Location, but in a direction opposite from what was predicted. When the Location clues were they tended to further increase the differences that preceded by 1fAvoidv7, appeared when they were preceded by "Pressff (see Figure 5 ) . The interaction yielded an F of 13.25, p e .01, 119 d . f . Trial 2 . Main effect for Location was significant (F=28.20, p c .005, 117 d.f.1. Once again, RTs to target words were facilitated by the clue "Left" regardless of the other variables of Command or Spacing (% Left =694 msec. ;

E Right =755 msec.). Neither the size nor the significance of the difference matches the results of Experiment 111. Main effect for Command was marginally significant (F=4.54, p c .07,

117 d.f.1; the command "Please Press" resulted in shorter RTs than the command "DO Not Press" (see Figure 5). On the other hand, there was no evidence that Command interacted with Location (F=2.39, p>. 1 0 , 1 / 7 d . f. ) , and thus no evidence that the full sentence had been processed. What is more, Spacing did not interact with either Command or Location.

Recognition. After both lists had been presented, we sampled awareness of the subliminal clue by presenting the target word for a fixed period (500 msec.) and asking the subject to report the target word and, in addition, whatever else he had seen. None of the subjects were able to make out the complete clue on either trial. Correct recognition of specific clue parts is presented in Table 2 for each trial. It can be seen that on Trial 1 more

132

D.P.Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

information is picked up when the clues are presented alone than when they are accompanied by visual noise; that more clues are perceived in the right visual field than in the left; and that the word "Left" is slightly more visible than the word "Right." About the only finding of interest in Trial 2 is the recognition of the word "Press." Errors. Errors per subject ranged from 0 to 9 on Trial 1 and from 0 to 7 on Trial 2 . In both trials, more errors occurred when the target word was preceded by a misleading clue (tfRight'f). On Trial 1 , F for Location is 6.7, p c - 0 5 , 1/9 d . f . , and on Trial 2 . F for Location is 4.34, p c .08, 1 / 7 d.f. DISCUSSION The results from the first set of clues in Experiment IV tend to support the hypothesis that spaced formats are more effective than crowded formats. The results from both sets of clues support the hypothesis that what is registered in the right visual field takes precedence over what is registered in the left, and in neither trial do we find any evidence that both hemispheres can collaborate in processing a verbal message. In Trial 2 , Command did not interact with Location, and in Trial 1 , although we found an interaction. we also found that the effective meaning of 1'Press7' and "Avoid" was the opposite from what we would have predicted. Clearly, the effect of a stimulus which spans both visual fields cannot be predicted from the words alone; the effective stimulus under these conditions is apparently quite different from i t s literal meaning. We are on somewhat safer ground in trying to predict the effect of a stimulus in the right visual field but a long way from learning the meaning of stimuli in the left visual field, and equally in the dark in trying to understand the conditions under which the two visual fields can work together to process a sentence or phrase that falls on both sides of the fixation point. These findings have obvious implications for subliminal research. Because the left hemisphere appears to assume priority, it may be necessary to learn to "read" from right to left and become aware of the fact that the right side of the stimulus may assume semantic priority. Its meaning will either not be modiried by left-side stimuli (as in Trial 21, or it will be modified by a peculiar distortion of left-side stimuli (as in Trial 1 where ffAvoidTf was more facilitative than "Pressfr). It may also be true that leftside stimuli may actually interfere with right-side processing. The best ev-

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

133

idence for this statement comes from a comparison of Experiments 111 and IV. Only when both Command and Location were presented in the right visual field did we find a significant effect of the first on the second. To

share the same message between the two hemispheres (as in Experiment IV) would seem to eliminate the first part and limit the effect to the right side.

GENERAL DISCUSSION Choice of visual field would seem to place a much more significant restriction on the impact of the subliminal stimulus than distance from central fixation. With both simple and complex stimuli, it would not seem to matter (within the limits under study in the present set of experiments) whether the critical clues fall within the focal or peripheral regions of the viewing rield. Further experiments will be needed to determine the outer limits of this window, but it seems clear from the present data that words falling as tar a s

7O

from the fixation point can still be meaningfully processed (see

Experiments I and 11, and the Location effect in Experiment 111, right visual field). Which hemisphere is invoked is a much more important question, and this difference does not appear clearly until we move from simple to complex stimuli. In Table 3 , we have brought together the relevant data from Experiments 11, 111, and I V to show how effect size varies with complexity of stimulus and region of registration (only the 30 msec. conditions are included). Single words facilitated lexical decision equally well in both right and left hemispheres, with high associate primes producing a greater effect than low associate primes. When we moved from simple stimuli to the more complex phrase used in Experiment 111, w e found it to have considerably more effect when i t was presented to the left hemisphere than when i t was presented to the right. When a complex stimulus was presented to both hemispheres, we found no evidence for syntactic processing; the combined effect of command and location w a s either negative or not significant. It seems clear that the impact of a complex phrase can change significantly depending on whether it is presented entirely in the left visual field, half in left and half in right, or entirely in the right. changes, the role of eye fixation becomes crucial.

Because of these

D.P.Spence, L.Klein, and R.J. Fernondez

134

Table 3 Summary o f E f f e c t s of Cueing Stimuli Presented a t 30 msec. Left Hemisphere

Right Hemisphere

Facil.

Facil.

Eff.

Eff.

(meec.) -

F P -

(msec.) F P -

Unilateral

Single Words

*

(Exp. 11)

High Assoc.

122

12.48

.005

83

15.12

.005

Low Assoc.

43

3.02

.10

56

4.05

.05

6.66

.05

-7

Phrase (Exp. 111)

**

144

Bilateral

**

.04

.SO

Facil. Eff.

F P -(msec.)

Phrase (Exp. IV)

* **

** **

Trial 1

-78

13.25

.01

Trial 2

57

2.39

.10

Combined focal and p e r i p h e r a l e f f e c t s We computed t h e combined e f f e c t of Command and Location by s u b t r a c t i n g t h e Left-Right d i f f e r e n c e following t h e negative command from the Left-Right d i f f e r e n c e following the p o s i t i v e command.

Why is the left visual field not able to participate in syntactic processing when we have evidence (from Experiments I and 11) that it is capable of simple semantic priming? Zaidel (1983) reports that in two commissurotomy patients, the right hemisphere is somewhat impoverished relative to the left; simple words are "decoded consistently better than the longer phrases" and "syntactic structures are available but limited by load on short-term memoryTt ( p . 5 4 2 ) . If we apply these findings to the current

Site and Shape of the Subliminal Window

135

study, we could argue that some of the grammar necessary to parse the commands in Experiments I11 and I V is stored only in the left hemisphere. If the verb (when presented to the left of the fixation point) is first processed by the right hemisphere, it may be necessary to transfer its meaning to the language hemisphere before it can be coupled with the object (the words "Left" or "Right"). The time necessary for this transfer may exceed the offset-onset time of 230 msec., and as a result, we do not see any evidence of Command interacting with Location. But there is a further complication that is suggested by the results of Experiment I V , Trial 1. When the command "Avoid" preceded the words "Left" o r TIRight",we found a greater Location effect than when they were preceded by the command flPress.fl One way to understand these paradoxical findings is to argue that the right hemisphere is primarily responsive to such variables as word frequency, concreteness, and imagery. If an abstract o r infrequent word is presented, it may not be registered at all. From this rule we can conclude that "Avoid" may have been ignored, and thus the effective stimulus was either "Left" or 1fRight.f7But how do we account for the weak effect of "Press"? We have already argued that right hemisphere information cannot be used to modify left hemisphere information; the former may simply be represented as a rival stimulus which somehow competes with the meaning of the other parts of the message. Both "Press" and "Left"/"Right" may have been interpreted as separate and independent commands rather than as a verb modified by a noun. Assume that single-word processing can be accomplished equally well by either hemisphere. Then stimuli in the left visual field have a slight advantage because they arrive first at the right motor cortex which is the trigger point for a left-hand key press. Information about location would arrive slightly later, but if the "Press" command was obeyed, it could not affect choice of key. Thus the verb becomes an interfering stimulus which effectively obscures the information about location. Further interference seems to occur in the crowded condition where both 'lXXXX" and "Press" may have been processed before "Left"/ llRightqt(see Figure 5 ) . We are now in a position to return to the evidence presented in Table 1) and consider i t with enlarged understanding. Suppose that the subjects' fixation was always central. Then it is not surprising that the majority of the effects were non-signiricant because, in the first place, the full message could not be syntactically processed (Experiment I V , Trial 2 ) and. in the second place, because whatever was in the right side of the mes-

136

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

sage and processed by the left hemisphere might be canceled by words in the left side (Trial 1). Only if fixation was maintained at the starting point of the message would we expect that complete (right visual field) processing would take place, and no subliminal experiment provided unambiguously for this possibility. What about those subliminal studies which report positive results with a complex message? It seems more than likely that such effects are carried by the right-side words in the stimulus which register in the right visual field (left hemisphere). I t may be no coincidence that the single significant finding tallied in Table 1 was provided by the Hebrew stimulus "MOMMY AND I ARB ONE", because only in this case (because of the right-to-left rules of the language) would M O M M Y be presented to the right visual field (left hemisphere). The significant results may have been a consequence of that accident. In all the other studies in Table 1, the critical parts of the message (MOMMY, DADDY, and BEATING) would be sent to the non-dominant hemisphere, and none of these results were significant. Whether we are correct in all aspects of this argument, it seems safe to conclude that a detailed knowledge of differential hemisphere processing is needed before we can predict the effects of a complex subliminal stimulus. As soon as the message impinges on both visual fields, its effective meaning will necessarily be quite different from its literal meaning - in other words, a message will mean one thing when foveally processed in the usual left-to-right manner, and quite another when i t is presented to focal and peripheral regions of the right and left visual fields. The significant aspect of subliminal processing may thus be less the factor of speed of exposure and much more the factor of region of registration. and up to this point, the first variable has not been separated from the second. Because region of registration has never been brought under experimental control, much of the unreliability in subliminal studies in general may stem more from problems of message processing than from problems of acuity and the consequences of reduced information. When region of registration (and the correlated variable of handedness) is brought under stricter experimental control, we may begin to see much greater regularity emerging from subliminal experiments. What, finally. is the relation between subliminal effects and the Freudian Unconscious? The verdict is still out. We have seen (in Experiments I11 and IV) that the effective stimulus may be significantly different from the stimulus as read, but the transformations may be less a function

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

137

of the primary process and more a consequence of peculiarities of hemisphere processing. Complex messages presented to the left visual field do not seem to be syntactically processed, and we might speculate (from Experiment 111) that what happens instead is that the more concrete words take precedence over the more abstract, and nouns take precedence over verbs. To what extent this effect is the result of region of registration will need to be explored in future studies. We also found (in Experiment

IV) that right-hemisphere information is not necessarily integrated with the left-hemisphere remainder of the message; as a result, the right side of the message sometimes takes precedence over the left, depending on the frequency and concreteness of the latter, and that where fixation happens to fall will significantly determine the impact of the stimulus. Consequences of eye position are clearly of a different order from consequences of the primary process, and it begins to appear as if the latter cannot be properly studied until we understand more about the former. A stimulus outside of awareness may be processed according to a quite different set of operotions than we find in conscious processing, but pains must be taken to make sure that the intended message reaches the processing centers with its meaning intact. We can then begin to study the ways in which its meaning is subsequently transformed by primary process or similar kinds of mechanisms. But unless an intact message reaches the higher centers,

none of these questions can ever be asked. Whatever the final standing of the primary process, it seems more parsimonious at the moment to assume that the unconscious system is content-free and that it should be distinguished from conscious processing largely along formal lines. This approach would suggest that brief stimuli are registered intact; that they are not automatically subject to the categorical transformations which are assumed to be part of the primary process; and that what appears as changes in form and meaning is due more to the effects of the visual processing system (and the subject's effort to make sense of these changes) than to something called The Unconscious. What are these formal differences? It might be useful at this point to summarize the main discrepancies between conscious reports (as gathered in the Recognition section of each experiment) and the subliminal and nearliminal priming effects, because at the very least, they support Marcel's hypothesis that "the structural languages of conscious representations are not directly mappable onto those of non-conscious representations, i.e. neither commensurate nor coextensive" (Marcel, 1983b, p. 2 5 6 ) .

p

they are

138

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandez

1. In the faster part of Experiment I1 (30 msec. exposure), the priming effect was equally strong in both right and left visual fields, and in both focal and peripheral locations. On the other hand, correct identification of the priming stimulus signiticantly favored focal over peripheral primes ( p e .001) and right visual field over left visual ( p e .001). Marcel has suggested that conscious awareness results from the "imposition of a particular interpretation on what otherwise consists of multiple interpretations" ( p . 2431, and it may be that the pattern of correct identifications reflects a tendency (favored by reading) to sweep the visual field [after the query "WORD?") in a left-to-right direction. This tendency would favor the right visual field and (assuming a gradual decay of information) the right focal over the right peripheral field. But it is clear from the findings that recognition reports are not isomorphic with stimulus registration and should not be taken as necessarily indicative of the full spectrum of stimulus processing. 2 . A similar left-right bias was evident in Experiment I11 where recognition of the priming stimulus favored the right over the left visual field, and the left portion of each visual field (see Table 2 ) . There was a clear discrepancy between the very strong subliminal effects of Location ( p e ,001) and the failure of any subject to report seeing the words "Left" or "Right" in either visual field. Once again, correct recognition did not predict the precise form of the subliminal effect: once again, the information available to the subject in the priming part of the experiment was not adequately sampled by the recognition trials. 3. Another kind of discrepancy was manifested in Experiment I1 when we divided the subjects into two groups according to correct recognition and looked at the difference in priming effects. In neither the slow nor the fast condition did we find an interaction between awareness of the stimulus and degree of priming, which indicates that conscious awareness does not predict amount of subliminal priming, and which again suggests that what is consciously reported is not a simple transform of what is unconsciously available. And it is also well known that the kind of information gathered during recognition or threshold trials is extraordinarily sensitive to the questions being asked (and, by implication, to the expectation of the subject). 4 . In Experiment IV, Trial 2 , we found a clear preference for recognition of the command "Press" and no awareness of the location terms fTLeftttand llRight.ff Yet the priming effect was almost entirely accounted

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

139

for by the two location cues (see Figure 5) with a main effect for Location which was highly significant ( p < . 0 0 5 ) . Once again, conscious report does not represent all the information available. Not apparent from Table 3 but clearly evident during the recognition procedure was the difficulty experienced by the subject in trying to report on fleeting impressions and the way in which conventional categories were used to shape his or her sensory experience. Partial cues were more often reported as words than as strings of letters, and once a response was coded as a word, the same label tended to be used in subsequent trials, often in response to different cues. Fleeting left-hand cues were often located on the right (and it is this distortion which accounts in part for the strong right-side bias shown in Table 2 - the left-hand cues were underreported), and in Experiments I and 11, the somewhat more unusual primes were often distorted to make rather common words. These are not systematic data, but our overall impression docs support the assumption that conventional categories (equivalent to Marcel's "culturally given presuppositions") played a strong role in giving final form to the subject's conscious sense impression. It is worth noting, in conclusion, how these conventions were implid t l y missing from unconscious processing of the same stimuli. The content of the more unusual primes was maintained intact, for otherwise a facilitated response to the associated target word would not have appeared. The predominant right-side bias was not in effect, and primes in both Visual fields were equally effective. Most impressive of all, the overriding preference for focal over peripheral registration was set aside with the result that offsets of T o to left and right of fixation did not prevent the meaning of the prime from being registered and influencing the subsequent lexical decision. Data such as these would suggest that information processing outside of awareness is exquisitely responsive to a full range of stimulus vanations and that information filtered through conscious reports tells us more about stereotype and convention than about the true capacity of the sensory system.

140

D.P.Spence, L.Klein, and R.J. Fernandez NOTE

1)

Eye movements were not monitored during the experiment and the skeptical reader might ask how we can be sure that central fixation was maintained during the lexical decision trials. We draw attention, first, to the fact that position of the prime was always changing, and no two successive locations were the same. Second, it is well established that the latency of saccadic eye movements is of the order of 180 to 250 msec. (see Haber and Hershenson, 1973, p. 207). Third, it is known that saccadic eye movements are ballistic in that path and distances are determined prior to movement. If a fixation were caused by a brief peripheral stimulus, the eye would first fixate the stimulus and then return to the center of the screen in order to process the word. The two saccadic movements would each consume about 200 msec. Thus, a failure to maintain central fixation would increase lexical decision time by at least 400 msec. and add substantial variance to the data, thus reducing the chances of finding significant differences. It would seem to follow that the facilitation effects reported here must come about as a result of priming caused by stimuli which were presented to specific parts of the peripheral visual field and which could not be centrally fixated. It might also be argued that the exposure speeds used in these studies are not truly subliminal because the stimulus could sometimes be identified. We were constrained in this respect b y the limitations of the Apple micro-computer which does not permit exposures much below 25 msec.; future studies, using a somewhat different technology, will explore the lower limits of the exposure continuum. It should be kept in mind, however, that shorter exposure speeds would not affect region of registration; differences due to visual field or degree of offset should continue to appear, If syntactic processing, for example, fails to take place in the right hemisphere at 30 msec., it seems unlikely that it will begin to reappear at 4 msec.

Size and Shape of the Subliminal Window

141

REFERENCES

A r i a m , S., & Siller, J. (1982). Effects of subliminal oneness stimuli in Hebrew on academic performance of lsraeli high school students: Futher evidence on the adaptation-enhancing

effects of symbiotic fantasies in another

culture using another language. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 91, 343349. Condon, T.J., & Allen, G.J.

(1980). The role of psychoanalytic merging fanta-

sies in systematic desensitization: A rigorous methodological examination.

Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 437-443. Crawford, P. J. (1981). The effects of word-type and laterality on the priming

of word associates. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, New York University. Day, J. (1977). Right hemisphere language processing in normal right handers.

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 3, 518-528.

Ellis, H.D.,

& Shepherd, J.W.

(1974). Recognition of abstract and concrete

words presented in left and right visual fields. Journal of Experimental

Psychology, 103, 1035- 1036. Erikson, B.A.,

& Eriksen, C.W.

(1974). Effects of noise letters upon the identi-

fication of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Perception and Psycho-

physics, 16, 143-149. Haber, R.N.,

& Hershenson, M. (1973). The Psychology of Visual Perception.

New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Haspel, K.C.,

& Harris, R.S.

(1982). Effect of tachistoscopic stimulation of

subconscious Oedipal wishes on competitive performance:

A failure to

replicate. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 91(6), 437-443. Heilbrun, K.S. (1980). Silverman's subliminal psychodynamic activation: A failure to replicate. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 89, 560-566. Kulera, H.,

& Francis,

W.

(1967). Computational Analysis of Present-Day

American English Providence: Brown University Press. Levy, J. (1983). Language, cognition, and the right hemisphere. American Psychologist, 38, 538-541. Mackworth, N.H. (1965). Visual noise causes tunnel vision. Psychonomic Science, 3, 67-68. (1983a). Conscious and unconscious perception: Experiments on

Marcel, A.J.

visual masking and word recognition. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 197-237. Marcel, A.J. (1983b). Conscious and unconscious perception: An approach to the

D.P. Spence, L. Klein, and R.J. Fernandet

142

relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes. Cognitive Psychology, 15, 238-300. Marcel, A.J., & Patterson, K.E. (1978). Word recognition and production: Reciprocity in clinical and normal studies.

Attention and Performance, 7,

209-226. Meyer, D.E., Schvaneveldt, R.W., & Ruddy, M. (1975). Loci of contextual effects on visual word-recognition. In P. Rabbit & S. Dornic (Eds.), Attention and Performance V. New York: Academic Press. Oldfield, R.C. (1971). The assessment and analysis of handedness: The Edinburgh Inventory. Neuropsychologica, 9, 97-113. Oliver, J.M., & Burkham, R. (1982). Subliminal psychodynamic activation in depression: A failure t o replicate. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 91, 337-342. Palermo, S., & Jenkins, J. (1964). Word Association Norms: Grade School through College. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Silverman, L.H. (1976). Psychoanalytic theory: The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated. American Psychologist, 31, 621-637. Toglia, M.P., & Battig, W.F. (1978). Handbook of Semantic Word Norms. New York: Wiley. Zaidel, E. (1978). Lexical organization in the right hemisphere. In P.A. Buser & A. Rogued-Buser (Eds.), Cerebral Correlates of Conscious Experience. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.

PART 111 THE FURTHER UNFOLDING OF THE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS: THREAT AND DEFEtISE IN PERCEPT-GENETIC PROCEDURES

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Dmguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

145

LIFE PANORAMA UNDER THE MICROSCOPE: A PARADIGMATIC CASE STUDY

Ulf Kragh Lurid University

INTRODUCTION The ain of the present study is to demonstrate, by means of an illustrative case, thRt a parallelism exists between the successive phases of two perceptgeneses on the one hand Rnd the life history of the subject or, the other.

*

This has sometimes been called the correspondence of micro-macro

theory. The notion of such a parallelism between perception and life histor y is difficult for most present-day psychologists to accept. Still, the phenomenon terned "panoramic memory, " somewhat related to the "micro-macro theory, recently attracted an increased interest. Thc very conception of perceptual development occurring in a given situation, termed microgenesis or Aktualgenese, is given little attention, if any, in most textbooks on perception and cognition. There are many reasons for this state of affairs. The notion of microgenesis itself is counter-intuitive. On the basis of unsophisticated observation and reflection it seems quite evident that perception is momentary and that there are no pre-stages involved. One should note, however, that intuition and conmon sense tell us nothing specific either about the existence of atoms or cells, or of billions of galaxies. The stimulus-response scheme, supported by common sense, has prevailed throughout the history of the psychology of perception. To focus attention on the process of construction of the percept virtually amounts to a reversal of most psychologists' habits of thinking in the realm of perception. Instituting such a reversal would require a revision of the ingrained notion of memory traces, so closely associated with the S-R scheme. --

*

The client was remitted to me by the courtesy of D r . K . von Krogh, Oslo, Norway.

146

U.Kragh

It would also lead to a change from emphasis upon geometric or supposedly "simpletv stimuli to "socially relevant" ones like human faces. Such a change of emphasis tends to move the concept of personality into the realn of perception proper. At the same time, contemporary textbooks on personality often use concepts and ideas tailored after the model of a subject's possessing attributes, This too represents an ingrained common-sense mode of thinking, one frequently evident in the interpretation given to such concepts as personality, ego, self, organism, or even TTsubject.ff The attributes in question are termed abilities, traits, functions, structures, and the like. I t is also difficult perhaps to visualize personality in terms of a genctic/hierarchical sequence in micro-time which in some respects is easy and in other respects difficult to change. Difficult or not, conceiving of personality in this manner seems to me, for the reasons just alluded to, to be important for an adequate understanding of the human being, as regards the aspects of perception and of personality alike. Although the "micro-macro theory" was formulated as early as 1955 (Kragh, 1 9 5 5 ; Smith 8 Kragh, 19551, no really comprehensive and systematic presentation of it has been provided heretofore. In the present paper, a few steps will be taken toward this goal. Some of the major factors which impede or preclude attempts to assess "micro-macro parallelism" in a perceptgenetic (PC) series on a strictly cmpirical basis will be listed: 1. METHODOLOGICAL FACTORS a ) Stimulus intensities may be too strong or too weak, preventing the relevant as well as the sufficient range of pre-phases in perception (P-phases) from appearing. b) The use of trial experiments or of retesting after less than one year may make the perceptgeneses too short, abolishing all or most of the P-phases. c ) The instructions used, unless properly worded and presented, may induce the subject to report only what is clearly recognizable. d) In early PC phases most subjects cannot assess the historical relevance of the concrete information involved; they are unable to remember as far back, for example, as the age of three years. At the same time, and at the other end of the PG, phase contents is increasingly dominated by "stimulus properties" and the number of historically identifiable events reduced.

Life Panorama under the Microscope

147

2. FACTORS OF DEFENSE

a) True instances of isolation or of other defenses may be misinterpreted by the psychologist

as representing concrete life history

events. Examples are reports of eye glasses or of a moustache in series 11, phases 18-19 in the case study presented below. This is true a s well of structural anxiety manifest in the PG as black color. At the same time, a sign of defense or anxiety sometimes not only represents a structure but also has reference to life history. In one phase in DMT (Defense Mechanism T e s t ) , for example. one subject saw a black judo belt on the threatening person. The real historical person actually did carry a black judo belt and in addition provoked anxiety in the subject - but was not recognized and identified by the subject at the testing proper (cf. also I , 4 . 1,16, and I,19 in the case study below). b) Generally, high frequencies of the mechanism of isolation - notably in compulsive subjects

-

impedes the assessment of parallelisms be-

tween DMT contents and life history. The same is true of the mechanism of repression, in particular when the stimulus depicts a relation between a man and a woman. It is also valid for the mechanism of introjection in states of depression involving stereotypy and retardation and of regression in schizophrenics with T'symbolic'Tor strongly distorted phase contents, 3. STATE FACTORS

States of strong affects or wishes (hunger, sexual desire, etc.) can readily affect phase contents, although they tend to do so in a more or less uniform way. The situation here is similar to that in a psychoanalytic session with a hungry patient who mainly associates to food. In spite of such restrictions it is possible to observe parallelism in the great majority of P G s , if they are administered with appropriate apparatus and with adequate instructions which motivate the subject to describe carefully his impressions. The example presented here is in no way extraordinary. In this introduction a short comment should be made on the use of a geometrical series of presentation times. This methodological device is related to the fact that throughout our lives (and particularly from one to

U.Kragh

I48

about twenty years of age) a fixed unit of time, say one year, seems to be expcrienced by u s according to a "law of diminishing returns." By using a geometrical series of presentation times in the tachistoscope an arithmetical increase of years is obtained in PGs where "micro-macro" correspondence can be assessed.

METHOD The first (male) picture of the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT, clinical version; ILragh, 1984) was applied twice to a man 23 years of age at the first and 26 at the second testing. It depicts a centrally placed boy and a threatening, peripherally placed, elderly man. There were 20 tachistoscopic presentations ( 0 . 0 2 - 2 sec.) in succession, with presentation times being increased geometrically. The subject reported what had been seen after each prcsentation, both verbally and by means of a simple drawing. The PGs of the same subject have been analyzed in a previous paper (Kragh, 1983) from the point of view of therapy outcome. For details of the method see Kragh

Smith (1970) and Kragh (1984). A f e w months after the second testing the subject was asked by letter to write his comments upon some written questions formulated by the au&

thor. The introductory instruction was: "Here are two pages with qucstions or gucsses based on your test. The questions refer to events in your life. On the left margin I have written the age t o which I hypothetically attribute the event. The questions, I think, have been so formulated that you will be able either to reject or to accept them. Please put a cross at 'yes', 'no', or 'don't know', and perhaps also add a comment. This will be of great help to me in interpreting the test . I '

ANALYSIS

In the following (cf. Table 1 a-k), the portion8 of the subject's reports on which the hypotheses (questions) are based are given in sequencc, together with the serial number of the exposure. In some instances the drawing which the subject made simultaneously with giving his verbal report is also presented. The third column presents the author's

I49

Life Panorama under the Microscope

hypotheses and the next column the subject's comments, the correctness or incorrectness of the outcome being shown by + or - in the last column. I , 1 in the first column, for example, means the first presentation in the first of the two PGs. In both PGs the first presentation also represcnts the first phase. It should be stressed that only those sentences o r parts of sentences that generated predictions have been documented here and that no predictions have been omitted. The author's statements always refer to a specific age; both the age and the event have to be correct for a positive score to he given. Table l(a-k) Excerpts from the subject's DMT protocol together with the author's comments

Presen-

Author's statements

Report, drawings

tation

Subject's

Gut-

comments

come

Age: 3 years (Table la)

1,l

A small girl with a white collar, You wore a white dress.

NO

and an old lady, 65 years of age, Grandmother often supervised with grey hair and a hair knot.

you.

lhey had no contact with each

She had grey hair and wore

other.

No

Yes

a hair knot. The contact between her and

Yes

you was poor.

II,1

A small boy with curled hair

Your were wearing a sailor's

and sailor's suit.

suit.

Yes

Age: 5 years (Table lb)

I,4-5

The boy is wearing garters and a

You were in the habit of

white shirt with black stripes.

wearing trousers with garters.

An old lady with grey hair and

Grandmother still exerted

Somewhat

a knot.

great influence on you.

uncertain

Ye8

U.Kragh

150

Pig. 1: Drawings of the s u b j e c t a f t e r p r e s e n t a t i o n s 1 and 4 i n the f i r s t PG

Reren-

Report, drawings

Author's statements

tation

II,4-5

Subject s

Out-

comments

come

A five-year old boy t o g e t h e r

You were a goodlooking boy

with a woman....The

i n your opinion.

Yes

+

The boy was n i c e l y dressed.

You were n i c e l y dressed.

Yes

+

The woman wants t o e x e r t power

Your grandmother was an au-

over t h e boy.

t h o r i t a r i a n person.

Yes

+

boy looks

nice.

The wman is not t h e mother

-

a l i t t l e more d i s t a n t r e l a t i v e .

(This underpins t h e hypot h e s i s of grandmother i n s e r i e s I )

Age: 6-7 years (Table lc)

I,6-9

The o l d woman and t h e boy a r e

B e t t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p between

s i t t i n g c l o s e t o each other.

you and your grandmother.

The woman's a t t i t u d e is s t i l l

She is s t i l l e x e r t i n g power

authoritarian.

over you.

She has grey h a i r .

Her h a i r became grey a t t h a t

She s t i l l wears a knot.

She is s t i l l wearing a knot.

Her hands a r e r e c l i n i n g i n h e r

A c h a r a c t e r i n t i c p o s i t i o n of

lap.

h e r s : s i t t i n g with h e r hands

time

.

i n h e r lap.

Uncertain

Yes

?

+

Yes

+

Yes

(+I

Yes

+

Life Panorama under the Microscope Report, drawings

Presen-

151

Author's statements

tation

II,6-7

Subject's

Out-

comments

come

The woman c o n t r o l s t h e boy.

Age: 8 years (Table Id)

II,8

The boy is 8 years old; he is

You were p a r t i c u l a r l y well

very nicely dressed.

dressed a t t h e age of 8.

The boy i s idealized by h i s

You were idealized by your

mother.

mother,

The boy looks dressed up.

You considered yourself a t

+

Yes

Don't know.

?

the time t o be very well

+

Yes

dressed.

Age: 9 years (Table 1 e )

1,lO-12

The c h i l d i s crying l i k e in old drawings: desolation, poverty.

A sudden change t o the worse i n t h e family

-

of t h e finan-

c i a l s i t u a t i o n perhaps?

Don't know.

'Ihe old lady gives the boy

Your grandma has turned l e s s

conso l a t i o n ,

severe and gives you consolation.

No

There i s l i t t l e defiance i n

You d i d n ' t oppose her.

Yes

the boy. Age: 10 years (Table l f )

I,14

She suddenly looked younger, i t

Your grandma d i e s

could be h i s mother, 30 years

suddenly.

old.

No, she died a f a f t e r a prolonged disease when I was 1 2 . Due t o h e r long s t a y in bed, with complete p a r a l y s i s , she t e r r o r i z e d t h e family, myself.

including

U.Kragh

152

Presen-

Report, drawings

Author's statements

S u b j e c t ' s comments

tation

Outcome

+

The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the

Grandma stood between you

two persons was a l o t friend-;

and your mother; a f t e r h e r

Partially

l i e r t h e d i s t a n c e was smaller.

death t h e r e l a t i o n between

c o r r e c t . I was bound

you and your mother be-

t o mother during

came c l o s e r .

t h a t period, although

Yes.

she gave l i t t l e i n return. But she d i d give me much care.

AIJ3 Fig. 2: Drawings of t h e subject of t h e presentations 13 and 14 i n the f i r s t PG

Age:12 years (Table lg)

I,15

II,13

She looks very demanding

You begin t o experience

and fussy.

your mother a s demanding

She is obtrusive, d e c e i t -

and fussy; she i n t e r -

f u l and s i l l y .

f e r e s too much with your affairs.

I ,I4

153

Life Panorama under the Microscope F'resen-

Report, drawings

Author's statements

S u b j e c t ' s comments

tation

I,16

Outcome

(Hero is a woman,

'Ihe r e l a t i o n between your

the o t h e r person is a man.)

mother and your f a t h e r

Yes,

+

probably, but mostly

There is a bad r e l a t i o n s h i p

is bad: he is c r o s s ,

t h i s was fought out

between them: he was c r o s s ,

she is not i n t e r e s t e d

behind closed doors,

she was uninterested.

i n him.

and t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p had been s t r a i n e d throughout the sickness of my my grandmother.

Age: 12-13 years (Table Ih)

I,l6

There was a change.

Your f a t h e r now de-

A man was s i t t i n g t o

f i n i t e l y e n t e r s the

t h e r i g h t , in t h e

stage a s an authority.

Yes.

+

Yes.

+

background. He looked grim, cross, f o r no reason. He had a white s h i r t .

Your f a t h e r o f t e n wore white s h i r t s .

II,16

A man s i t t i n g there,

Before t h a t time he

cross and very grim.

Contact before was s c a n t ,

lacked a u t h o r i t y due

I think, but he had pro-

t o t h e f a c t t h a t con-

bably exerted considerable

t a c t with him was r e -

a u t h o r i t y due t o h i s being

stricted.

absent.

?

Age: 13-14 years (Table l i )

I,17

A c r o s s man, 30-40

Serious c o n f l i c t s

There were s e r i o u s c o n f l i c t s

years old. He pressed

s t a r t with your f a -

but st t h e age of 15-16 r a t h -

t h e boy down, com-

ther. Your f a t h e r was

e r than a t t h e age of 13-14.

35 years old a t t h e

Father was then 45 years of

manded him.

t ime II,17

.

The boy, 13-14 years

Your f a t h e r was very

o l d , dominated by t h e

authoritarian.

angry man, 40-50 years old.

+

-

age.

Yes

+

154

U.Kragh

I,18

II ,17 Fig. 3: Drawings of the subject after presentations 15 and 18 in the first PG and after presentations 14 and 17 in the second PG.

Presen-

Report, drawings

Author's statements

Subject's coments

tation

cutcome

Age 14 years (Table lj)

1,18-19

A book on the table:

Conffrmatlon. Father

the Bible o r lessons.

wanted you to study

m e boy was not inte-

the Bible and to do

this.

rested in the book.

your lessons well.

Partly true. I was much

Yes,

*

but also mother was keen on

You were not much in- against doing lessons, but terested in doing

I read much more literature

SO.

and history than my classmates, without atimulation from my parents.

+

155

Life Panorama under the Microscope Presen-

Report, drawings

Author's statements

S u b j e c t ' s comments

tation

Outcome

II,18-191he man was c r o s s .

F a t h e r ' s mood towards

Yes

you: c r o s s .

He had a moustache,

+

He had a moustache

looked l i k e Strindberg. and looked l i k e S t r i n d -

No

berg.

Age: 15 years (Table l k )

I,20

The man looked l i k e

You t h i n k your f a t h e r

a worker i n t h e twen-

was ill dressed

t i e s , with f r i e z e

a worker in t h e twen-

-

He wore an alpen cap and was

l i k e perhaps r a t h e r informally

c l o t h and a cap.

t i e s , with a cap.

The man is dominating.

Your f a t h e r has on the

dressed in h i s l e i s u r e time.

+

He h a s a u t h o r i t y s i n c e whole been a powerful he i s a powerful

person; he has a genuine

person.

authority.

Yes

+

DI S C U SSION T H E C H R O N O L O G Y OF P-PHASES

The analysis of parallelisms between the PGs and the subject's life history is mainly based on four characteristics of the phases: 1. Phase contents which can easily be identified in terms of some historical

event in the subject's life. These often concern some traumatic event, such as the death of a parent, the phase contents of which tend to appear at a corresponding level in any PG obtained from the subject. Such phases have been called ?'key phases." They represent the point of departure for ordering the phases of several PGs of the subject in question in relation to each other and to the subject's lifc history (cf. Kragh, 1960; Kragh Smith, 1970). Phases of this kind can be seen in 1.14 and 11, 6-8,

&

in

U.Kragh

156

which the old woman disappears and changes into a young one. This m i r rors the mother's taking over

-

with modifications - of the grandmother's

role as administrator of norms. 2 . Phase contents which refer to a particular historical event without clear

traumatic significance and without correspondence being evident between series. An example of this is "the Bible" in I,19. 3. Instances of obvious correspondence of visual organization and meaning

between two or more P G s without direct reference to any historical event; Phases I , 1 7 and II,12 exemplify this: an angry, cross, and oppressive man enters the scene, and the size of the boy diminishes (cf. Kragh, 1980). 4.

Series of phases in which the age of the hero increases by several

steps. This we find in a portion of the second DMT, e.g. in exposures 5-11,

in which the age increases almost regularly about a year at a time

through six phases, from five years in Phase 5 to twelve years in Phase 11.

COMMENTS ON POSITIVE ANSWERS

The reason for identifying the old lady in both PGs with the parental grandmother is that she is located at the place of the elderly man in the DMT (cf. the concept "C-phase identity," Kragh, 1955, pp. 92-94 and 140141). The attribution of the age of fivc to the subject in Phases 4-5 refers to the hero's age. The black braces in I,4 give evidence of the "double

function" of particular phase contents : there is connection with a historical fact, and at the same time, the contents carry the meaning of latent anxiety (cf. Westerlundh, 1976). In Phase I , 1 6 a shift takes placc in the sex of the hero, and the relation between the two persons is described in terms of a scene between a wife (protagonist!) and a husband. The two persons a r e identified by the author a s the subject's mother and father, and thc author's statement, sustained by the subject, is formulated accordingly. However, it cannot be determined in what way this internalization of the mother should be interpreted. The white shirt of the %ross man" in I,16 corresponds to a historical fact; it is possible that it also conveys the dynamic structural meaning of the defense of isolation.

Life Panorama under the Microscope

157

COMMENTS ON NEGATlVE ANSWERS

As regards the first period, the age of about three years, it is natural that impressions and facts that far back should be difficult to recall from memory and to assess. We also find an equal proportion of yes ( 3 ) and no (3) answers for that period. This suggests that the subject has not slanted his comments so a s to please the investigator. Two negative answers corresponding to the age of nine are connected with the paternal grandmother. The subject rejects the statements that the grandmother was kind and consoling towards him; what he remembers is her authoritarian strain of character. For age ten we find two negative comments. The first concerns the subject's age at the death of his grandmother; the investigator's prediction was ten years, and the correct one twelve. Secondly, the grandmother did not die suddenly, but after a prolonged disease. - The author's prediction of a sudden change from grandmother to mother was based on the sudden decrease in the old woman's age in 1,14, a s well a s on the reports that "now she looked like the boy's mother'' and that the relationship between the two persons had become "much more friendly, harmonious

." The

temporal m i s s in connection with grandmother's death was by just two years, but due to the rather rigorous standards used here, a negative score is given. In addition, since the old lady's influence remained unbroken until the very end, i t may well be that her death was actually experienced by the subject as a sudden and unexpected event. This instance illustrates how difficult i t can sometimes be to directly translate phase contents, which represent the experiential world, into historical events. One miss concerns the father's age when he took over the directing, evaluating, and punishing role. The wrong prediction of thirty-five years was derived from the peripheral person's age in I,17. In the corresponding phases of series 11, phases 11-13, the age of the "cross-looking man'' is 6 5 , 40, and 4 7 , respectively. The mean value of these ages, combined with the age in 1,17,

would have agreed closely with the correct age ( 4 5

years). The moustache finally, erroneously assumed to have adorned the father's face, was based on I , 1 9 . The dark surface covering the peripheral person's mouth and reconstructed b y the subject in terms of a moustache, would constitute a visual expression of latent anxiety, located a t , and assigned to, the threatening, scolding, and criticizing mouth of the periphe-

U.Kragh

158

ral person. But there existed no counterpart for it in the father's real exterior.

SUMMARY T H E VlClSSl TUDES OF E X T E R N A L A N D INTERNALIZED PARENTAL POWER REPRESENTATIVES

Applying the micro-macro theory of parallelism between the two DMT reports and the subject's life history, it has been possible to demonstrate how the grandmother prescribed the rules of conduct for the subject through the ages of about three to twelve years. Her introject would have contributed to the larger part of his superego structure (she is at the place of the threatening man in the DMT picture! 1. It was possible to predict the shift which took place after the grandmother's death, the mother intermittently replacing the grandmother and substituting mild standards for the old woman's rigorous ones. In puberty, as represented by phases in the last third of the DMT series, the subject's father finally enters the scene , re-instituting the authoritarian power of the grandmother.

OUTCOME OF PREDICTIVE STA TEMENTS

The results obtained here are in line with those of a number of previous investigations involving the micro-macro theory of parallclism (Kragh, 1955. 1060. 1982, 1 9 8 0 , 1983; cf. also chapter 6 in Kragh 8 Smith, 1970). In the present study 38 predictive statements were formulate d , of which 2 6 , or 68.4% of all the ones made, were substantiated by the subject while 7 ( 1 8 . 4 8 ) were rejected, and 5 (13.2%) were undecided. This outcome supports the theory of parallelism.

Life Panorama under the Microscope

1.59 REFERENCES

Kragh, U. (1955). T h e Actual-Genetic Model of Perception-Personality.

Lund:

Gleerup. Kragh, U. (1960). Pathogenesis in dipsomania: An illustration of the actualgenetic model of perception-personality. Acta Psychiatrica et Neurologica Scandinavia, 35, 207-222, 261-288, 480-497. Kragh, U. (1962). A case of infantile animal phobia in adult precognitive organization. Vita humana, 4, 166-172. Kragh, U. (1980). Rekonstruktion verschiedener Aspekte einer Personlichkeitsentwicklung mit dem Defense Mechanism Test. Eine Fallbeschreibung. In U. Hentschel & G. Smith (Eds.), Experimentelle Persiinlichkeitspsycholo-

gie. Wiesbaden : Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Kragh U. (1983). Studying effects of psychotherapy by the Defense Mechanism Test: Two case illustrations. Archiv fiir Psychologie, 135, 73-82. Kragh, U. (1984). DMT Manual. Stockholm: Swedish Psychology. Kragh, U., & Smith, G. (1970). Percept-Genetic Analysis. Lund Gleerup. Smith, G.,

e(

Kragh, U. (1955). Do micro-genetic sequences reflect life histo-

ry? An illustration. A c t a Psychologica, 11, 504-512. Westerlundh, B. (1976). Aggression, Anxiety, and Defence. Lund: Gleerup.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

161

ACTIVATION OF INTRAPSY CHIC CONFLICT AND DEFENSE: THE AMAUROSCOPIC TECHNIQUE Bert Westerlundh and Hans Sjoblck Lund University

THEORY, METHOD, AND BASIC EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN Attempts to examine psychoanalytic hypothescs by means of experimental methods began rather soon after the publication of Freud's first great works. The experiments by Poetzl (1917) are well-known. However, over decades, most endeavors to study Freudian ideas were, on the whole, restricted to the use of classical projective techniques and various psychometric methods. The greater part of the work done to this day, as reported by Kline (19811, is of this kind. The insurmountable difficulties connected with the use of projective techniques in this context were irrefutably pointed out by Heath (1958). The highly restricted value of questionnaires cannot be a question of dispute. Among the percept-genetic

techniques of personality measurement,

there are some that have been developed to examine Freudian hypotheses. They avoid the pitfalls that mar the use of the methods mentioned above (and most others a s well) and yield data of singular rclevance and reliability. The basic information provided by thc two standardized methods, the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) and the Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT) , consists of signs of defensive processcs in operation. To a certain extent, "disturbance" s i p s of intrapsychic conflict, signs of activation of painful affect, and impulse breakthrough may be observed, hut these are generally secondary data (cf. IZragh

&

Smith, 1970; Westerlundh

%

Smith, 1983).

Kragh's DMT and Smith's MCT follow the development of reports to a stimulus presented tachistoscopically at increasing exposure times. Initial Presentations are (generally) subliminal; final ones call forth veridical reports. The difference between the methods is primarily that the DMT uses single-tachistoscopic presentations of one stimulus whereas the MCT uses two component stimuli in a backward masking design. In the following,

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjobiick

162

"percept-genesis" will be used a s an adjective and a s a noun to refer to such series of presentations, and/or the series of reports on them, These methods, and the results obtained with t h e n , have earned highly favorable comments in the pertinent international literature (cf. , e . g . , Dixon, 1981; Kline, 1981). They have, of course, also been subject to criticism. The latter has mainly focused on the objection that the distortions and the omissions of picture contents, as observed during a percept-genetic series and interpreted as signs of defensive processes at work, can be explained in terms of incomplete or primitive cognitive analysis. We will have reason to return to these objections, as the results of the experiments to be reported below - where a percept-genetic method is employed as a dependent variable - contribute to their refutation.

GENERAL THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

We will approach the question to which extent and in which way these percept-genetic methods can be said to yield results which arc reasonably interpreted as experiential referents of mechanisms of defense. However, wc shall first describe those psychoanalytic propositions which are fundamental for the endeavors to test hypotheses about the activity of the diverse postulated mechanisms of defense. There are five such propositions: (1) In the course of an intrapsychic conflict around objectionable impulses, defense is directed not only against the impulse as such, against the represcntations of danger that make the impulse objectionable and conflict-arousing , and against the painful affect (mostly anxiety and guilt) which is unleashed by the representations of danger and which is the proximal cause of the defensive effort. Attempts at warding off are directed outward as well - against the perception of objects and events which are interpreted as temptations for proscribed impulses or as threats, i . e . , as reminders of the basic situations of danger which are situations of tfpunishment.TtCf. Freud (1926), SE X X , pp. 158-159, where he discusses I t . . .the task of defence against dangerous perceptions. . ,It and Fenichel's discourse on "The External World In Neurotic Conflicts" (Fenichel, 1946, pp. 130-131). ( 2 ) The mechanisms of defense employed against intrapsychic stimuli are, with certain exceptions, likewise employed against distressing external

.

Zntmpsychic Conflict Activation

163

stimuli. In her work on the mechanisms of defense, Anna Freud developed some notions of her father and introduced this hypothesis in psychoanalytic thinking when she launched the concept of I ! . .parallels be-

.

tween the ego's defensive measures against external and against internal

.

. I f ( A . Freud, 1946, p. 1 9 0 ; cf. Sjoback, 1973, pp. 209-238.) These assumptions imply that the defense directed outward does not only consist of suppression, but also contains transformations and distortions of perceptual contents before they attain conscious representation. This presupposition may be considered problematic, as it is gainsaid by the conception of the perceptual process in classical psychoanalysis. Thus

danger.. (3)

Hartmannian ego psychology (Hartmann , 1964) entailed a "mirror" conceptualization of perception which was seen a s an imiliediately conscious reflection of reality (cf. Westerlundh & Smith, 1983). However, clinical experience a s well as laboratory work on such phenomena as unconscious percepts and perceptual defense have necessitated reformulations of Hartmann's conception. For such theorists as Rapaport ( 1 9 5 1 and 1960) and Sandler and Joffe ( 1 9 6 9 ) , perception is no longer an immediate reflection but a process of oonstruction of reality. They propose that percepts, just as drive stimuli, have unconscious and preconscious stages before they reach conscious representation. Processing of internal and external stimuli is essentially identical. Since its inception, this has been one of the cornerstones of percept-genetic theory (cf. Kragh & Smith, 1 9 7 0 ) . ( 4 ) The analytic theory posits concatenations between different types of impulses and different types of defense. These concatenations emerge during early development, a s the different defense mechanisms appear a s potentialities in a predetermined order concomitant with the phases of instinctual development (cf. Fenichel, 1946, pp. 522-524). Thus, the proscribed phallic sexual impulses are kept out of consciousness by repression, whereas the anal-sadistic impulses of the obsessive-compulsive character are warded off by means of isolation, reaction formation, and undoing. In general, phallic sexual impulses tend to be countered by repression and aggressive impulses by isolation. ( 5 ) This assumption leads to the corollary that individual differences in defenses mainly come to the fore in typical combinations of "specific proscribed impulse-specific defense against it. It Fenichel states that It the fixation to certain defense mechanisms and character attitudes" among oth-

er things depends on "the nature of the instinctual impulses that have to be warded off" (Fenichel, 1946, p. 5 2 3 ) . Individual salience of such corn-

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

164

hinations is explained in terms of a parallel impulse and ego fixation (cf. Sandler 8 Joffe, 1965). These five assumptions form the theoretical justification for all endeavors to investigate postulated processes of defense through attempts a t their activation from without. The two last assumptions provide the specific basis for experiments in which stimuli representing 9 h r e a t s t t and I'temptations" are systematically varied, with the expectation that these stimuli lead to predicted shifts in the overall arrays of signs of defense. This general assumption is, of coursc, specified according to the nature of the stimuli used and the assumed or known characteristics of the persons taking part in an experiment of this kind.

TYPES OF EVIDENCE

With these analytic theoretical preconditions in mind, of all attempts to study the experiential and behavioral referents of intrapsychic conflict, and especially processes of defense, we may proceed to describe the types of research data that so far have been gathered supporting the assumptions of the inventors of the pertinent percept-genetic techniques that the latter reveal signs of classical defense mechanisms and of some other aspects of intrapsychic conflict as defined in analytic theory. There arc five types of evidence: (1) There is, in some instances, a clear structural identity between the signs of defense, a s they are observed in protocols of percept-genetic series, and the workings and results of the classical mechanisms, as defined in the theory (cf. Kragh, 1969). ( 2 ) Comparisons between clinical groups (e.g., groups of obsessivccompulsive neurotics and groups of hysterics) have revealed differences in predominant signs of defense in accordance with analytic expectations concerning such differences in defense (cf. Kragh & Smith, 1970). (3) Comparisons between the rcsults of percept-genetic testing of patients in psychoanalysis with the ratings of thcir analysts a s to their predominant defonsive efforts during the analysis have yielded positive results (cf. Sharma, 1977; Kragh, 1980). ( 4 ) Studies of the defensive endeavors of children, form the age when they are amenable to percept-genetic investigation on upward

-

-

i.e.,

from four

have revealed a development of defensive strategies with in-

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

165

creasing age that essentially corresponds to psychoanalytic conceptions about the ontogenetic development of the defensive organization (Smith

&

Danielsson , 1982). (5)

Finally, we may systematically vary different kinds of stimuli

whose contents, according to analytic theory, represent various "threats" ("warnings of punishment , I 1 according to Fenichel (1946) ) or "temptations" (reminders or provocations of repressed objectionable impulses), and then examine the effects of such variation of stimuli on defense as revealed in the contents of the percept-genetic series. Thus, the latter is here e m ployed as an experimental dependent variable, According to analytic theory, every adult individual is characterized by a rather stable defensive organization. Actually, this organization is regarded a s one of the most stable and most striking of those personality characteristics which differentiate individuals. Sinultaneously , however, it is postulated that we change defensive strategies

depending

on

the

nature

and

the

intensity

of

the

de-

fense-provoking event (cf. the general assumption of concatenation between impulse and defense described above)

.

Specific analytic assumptions

of such concatenations make these shifts of defense to a certain extent predictable.

EX PER IMEN T AL PA R A DIG M

There a r e two ways of employing experimental manipulation in attempts to influence a person's defensive organization. (1) The first type of experimental operation refers to overt provoca-

tion or threat. Classical examples of the use of such operations to test Freudian hypotheses can be found in Sarnoff (19711, for instance. Within the field of percept-genetic research on defense, Westerlundh (1976) has performed a successful series of such experiments. The theoretical justification for such experiments is, of course, that even an overt provocation, of which the subject is clearly aware, gives rise to an intensification of conflict and defense because it has unconscious repercussions that a r e repressed. Infantile fantasies about impulses and threats are aroused but remain inaccessible at a conscious level of representation. The technique of overt provocation has certain limitations which drastically reduce its applicability, but we need not digress on these problems here.

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjobiick

166 (2)

The second type of experimental operation refers to the use of

subliminal presentations of conflict-arousing stimuli. This method has become well-known through the research work of L.M. Silverman and his co-worker8 (Silverman, 1982; Silverman & Geisler, this volume, chapter 3 ) . The research work done by these investigators has two aspects of relevance here: a) the subliminal activation is accomplished by means of very short (tachistoscopic) presentations of the stimuli that function as independent consist conflict toms").

variables (invariably 4 msec) ; b) the dependent variables mainly of direct signs of aggravations or alleviation of an intrapsychic (aggravation v s . alleviation of "symptomsft and of "signs of sympIn other words, these investigators have not studied experiential

and behavioral referents of defensive processes per se. Within the field of percept-genetic investigation, we find studies where a subliminal "priming" stimulus is employed to influence the perceptgenesis of a second stimulus (cf. Smith & Henriksson, 1955) and where a systematic variation of such priming stimuli is employed (cf. Smith, Spence, 8 Klein, 1959), but these experiments do not refer to defensive operations. In the Meta-Contrast Technique, likewise, priming stimuli are used, but these stimuli are allowed to intrude into the main pictures of the percept-genetic series - presenting the subject with the task of assimilating them into those latter pictures. In addition, no research has been conducted in which these priming stimuli have been systematically varied and referred to one and the same percept-genetic main picture. Thus, the experiments to be reported below are the first in which visual stimuli, systematically varied and consistently presented under the intensity limit of conscious perception, were employed to influence the contents of a percept-genetic series.

METHOD

We use the term "amauroscopic" (amauros: Gk.=dark) to refer to relatively protracted, low intensity presentations of stimuli. An amauroscopic subliminal stimulus is thus a stimulus of such low intensity that i t is not phenomenally represented at all, or at least not represented in terms of meaning, for the subject.

This type of stimulation has been used in

Zntmpsychic Conflict Activation

Dixon's perceptual defense paradigm

167

(Dixon,

1971),

for instance.

An

amauroscopic percept-genesis is the presentation of a stimulus at increasing intensities and the sequence of reports given by the subject on this stimulus. The intensities range from weak, when the stimulus is subliminal, to strong, when the stimulus allows correct recognition. BASIC DESIGN

The experiments to be presented all follow the same basic design (see Table 1). Subjects are seen individually for one session, with a standard duration of about an hour, but varying from around 45 to around 90 minutes. The first part of the session involves the administration of a tachistoscopic or amauroscopic criterion percept-genesis. Experimental data are later to be related to this criterion genesis. Thc second part, the experiment proper, has three components, a masking task with a concurrent subliminal amauroscopic presentation of experimental stimuli, and a following tachistoscopic percept-genetic presentation of a neutral stinulus (dependent measure). These components constitute a trial. Trials are continuously repeated with unvarying masking task and amauroscopic presentation, but with successively increased tachistoscopic presentation times. The series is terminated at the 20th trial , or earlier if the subject reaches a stable correct recognition ( C phase), i.e.. gives a correct report on the tachistoscopic presentation three times in a row. Examples of amauroscopic and tachistoscopic stimuli are found in section 111 of this chapter.

APPA R A TUS

The apparatus is a box with a viewing aperture, divided by two tubes with inner diameter of 75mm into channels for the separate eyes. All internal areas of the apparatus seen by the subject are black, except for the stimulus fields proper. The tubes are covered by a standard DMT foam rubber eyepiece and shaded by a cover to avoid light reflexes. The left eye channel is used for the masking task. At a distance of 150mm from the eye, two standard red LEDs with a diameter of 4mm (horizontal visual angle of 1 . 5 O ) are mounted vertically, with their centers being 13mm apart. The upper one is covered by a 50%, the lower one by n 10% (threshold task) or, respectively, a 50% (time estimation task) gelatine grey filter. The right eye channel is used for amauroscopic and tachisto-

168

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjobiick Table 1 Design and conditions summary

EXPERIMENT

SUBJECTS

CRITERION PERCEPTGENESIS

RANDOMI-

ZATION

EXPERIMENTAL TRIALS

masking task

dependent

and amauro-

tachistoscopic

scopic presen-

percept-genetic

tation

presentation

absolute light amauroscopic,

threshold and aggressive

1

40

neutral

_ _ _ _ _male _ _- male _ _ theme __

woman-child

- - - - _ _ _ _ -_male _ _theme

120 d

homosexual 40

male

neutral theme

40

amauroscopic,

male

neutral male

-

male

theme

- male theme

time estimation and

neutral

castrative 40

- - - - _ _female-male _ _ _ _ _theme 2

120 $

woman-child

best Fa1 40

--_________ theme 40

1 neutral

female-wolf theme

female

neutral

theme

-

male

female-male theme

absolute light tachisto-

threshold and

scopic,

oral-sexual

man 3

8o

40

woman-child theme -----------

threatening boy theme

40

neutral

oral-deprivative

woman

woman-child theme

theme

- child

(DMT)

scopic presentations. Nearest to the eye, at 60mm, is a x2 magnifying lens. Behind i t , there are two interchangeable Agfascope slide viewers

Zntmpsychic Conflict Activation

169

(horizontal visual angle of 35O). The upper one is an arnauroscope. It has a standard 220V, 15W milky projection lamp. Light intensity can be varied by a copper-coil resistor. The viewing area is covered by gelatine grey filters, reducing light emittance by 97.5%. Presentation time is regulated by a timer. Amauroscopic percept-genetic presentations are alwRys for 5 seconds, start at 40V, and proceed in 1OV intervals. Amauroscopic subliminal presentations are for 20 seconds and at 50V (experiments 1 and 2 ) or 45V (experiment 3 ) . hydrogen

gas lamp with

The lower viewer is a tachistoscope. I t has a a

12mm,

14

filament

receiving a

13.25V,

0.75amp, highly stabilized, direct current via a timer. The latter gives impulses from 10 to 2000msec arranged in 20 steps on a logarithmic scale (for time values, see Kragh, 1969). The viewing area is covered by gelatine filters, reducing light emittance by 90%. Light meter readings, with the sensor at the place of the eye, give ca 0 lx when no stimulus or a 50V amauroscopic stimulus is presented, and ca 0.10 lx with a tachistoscopic stimulus shown at extended time.

PROCEDURE

General experimental conditions, such as room and light arrangements, are very much like those of individual testing with the DMT. Instructions and reporting to the criterion percept-genesis completely parallel those for the DMT (Kragh, 1969). The subject is told to report what he has seen and to make a simple drawing of it at the same time. A s instruction to the experiment proper, the subject is told that he will see pictures and should report on them a s before, but that this time, he is to do something else before each such picture. He is then given the instruction to attend to the diodes. In the threshold task he is then asked to report when each diode disappears and reappears. Here, the intensity of the diodes is regulated by the experimenter with a potentiometer. There is one descending and one ascending run in each trial. During this task, an amauroscopic presentation of the experimental stimulus is given for 20 seconds. Immediately afterwards, the subject is given a tachistoscopic presentation and has to report on i t (dependent variable). In the time estimation task, on the other hand, the subject is given the instruction to attend to the diodes and then to estimate the time the upper diode is lit (actually 6.3 seconds) and, after 10 seconds, to reproduce this interval himself by

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjobiick

170

turning the diode on and off. The subject has 15 seconds for this task. The lower diode, which has been on from the start of the r u n , then goes off as a sign that the run is over. During the last 20 seconds, an amauroscopic subliminal prescntation is given, followed by a tachistoscopic one as above.

SUBLlMlNALlTY

Dixon's (1971, p . 18) third and most important criterion for inferring subliminal perception is stated as follows : "The occurrence of contingent responses, without reported awareness of the stimulus, that differ qualitatively from those elicited by the same stimulus when presented above the awareness threshold." Silverman (1982) has demonstrated that within his paradigm, supraliminal presentations of the experimental stimuli do not result in psychodynamic activation. Thus, in the studies to be reported, reports which differ strongly from both amauroscopic and tachistoscopic stimuli but are related to them as transformations following psychodynamic laws, are ips0 facto evidence of subliminal perception. However, we can also rely on more direct evidence of the subliminality of the independent variable presentations. Their duration (20 seconds) as well a8 their presentation intensity (50V in experiments 1 and 2, 45V in experiment 3) were chosen on the basis of pretests to give subjects no phenomenal representation or, at most, a "primal mist" representation anteceding the stage of subjective Gestalt construction (cf. Sander & Volkelt , 1962 for this microgenetic approach). There are no inquiry data for experiment 1, but such data for 30 subjectR in each condition of experiment 2, and for all in experiment 3. These data show that no subject was able to report any structured impression of these amauroscopic stimuli. Data from the amauroscopic percept-geneses in experiments 1 and 2, which are in many ways comparable to the amauroscopic subliminal presentations, show that a very considerable number of subjects (85-9091) reach the stage of primal mist before any can report subjective Gestalt. The highest percentage reporting primal m i s t to the amauroscopic subliminal presentations is as low as 5 0 , a fact which substantiates the claim that no subject ever reached the level of subjective Gestalt construction for the independent amauroscopic presentations,

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

171

D A T A A N D ANALYSES

The dependent measures in these experiments are percept-geneses

.

These reports contain a complex pattern of drive-related and affective stimulus interpretations as well as defensive transformations of stimulus content which aim at saving the individual conscious displeasure. They are scored for such signs with an adapted version of Kragh's DMT scoring scheme. The main difference to standard DMT scoring is that the so-called sequential signs (of the type, "12 reports in a row with unchanged hero"), which are specially tailored to the DMT format and indicative of some degree of psychopathology, are excluded. Some reports of affect (fear, etc.) have been added. Scoring dimensions will be introduced in the presentations of the results. Scoring gives information about thresholds and sign variants, The latter are combined to sign classes, the main unit used for further analyses. Two forms of this measure are reported: a) raw frequency, number of subjects in each group ascribed to a certain sign class; b ) weighted frequency. Incidence of a sign class in a subject's report on the first exposure is ascribed a weight of 11, in that on the second exposure one of 12, etc. to the maximum of 30 in that on the 20th exposure. These weights are added, giving a class weight for each subject. Groups are later compared for frequency of subjects over class weight median, or for extreme subjects. The basic idea behind the weighting procedure is that while a specific operation may not be efficient enough to increase frequency base rate, it can still influence incidence in the individual protocol. Further, reports of the sign in question towards the end of the series, where stinulus as operator has B stronger influence, should be considered more clear-cut instances of experimental influence. Three types of analysis can be made in regards to this material: (1) Between-group comparisons of sign class frequency as a function of different experimental operations. This is the basic analysis of experimental outcome. No single conflict theme can be made completely unambiguous for the subject. Individual psychodynamics will determine i t s relationship to othex conflict themes. However, there are typical

impulse-anxiety-defense constellations. Clinical and developmental psychoanalytic theory gives some indication about what to expect in different conditions. (2)

Within-group analyses of reaction subgroups. Theoretically, we would

172

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

expect that for each conflict theme a number of different processing strategies would be open to the subjects. An appreciable proportion of subjects, those who lack fixations relating to the theme in question, would not react at all. In other subjects, the theme could give rise to one or more of many possible forms of scorable reports. In these analyses, attempts are made to study i f clear-cut reaction patterns exist and, if so, to identify them. ( 3 ) Comparisons to the criterion percept-genesis. The question asked here is whether the criterion genesis will predict experimental results. This touches upon the issue of the specificity versus traitlikeness of defensive reactions (operationally, no relationship versus a perfect one between the geneses). Psychodynamic theory posits that defenses in normals are organized in a complex hierarchical system. Determinants of what defense is chosen in a specific situation are, among other things, type of provocation and type and intensity of anxiety. This theory points to a criterion-experimental genesis relationship, but not on a sign-to-sign correspondence basis. The theory also implies that these analyses can reveal something about the psychological level at which the subliminal operations are effective. Westerlundh (1976) found no relationships between the DMT and experimental effects when the latter were caused by a fantasy-level operation in reaction to a film. However, when caused by interpersonal operations, effects had complex relations to the DMT.

SJA JlSJlCAL JREA JMENT

The resulting crossbreaks have been tested for significance by use of the

standard

tables

(Mainland,

Herrera,

&

Sutcliffe,

1956; Finney,

Latscha, Bennett, & Hsu, 1963). Estimates of the quantitative association between variables, the Goodman-Kruskal A B-index of predictive association (Hays, 1973) and the Holley-Risberg (1972) D estimate of item discrimination, have been obtained. When no variable is superordinate, A A B and an index DD are given, the latter simply being the combined D estimates, using each variable as superordinate, divided by 2 (see Westerlundh, 1976).

173

Zntrapsychic Conflict Ac tiuation EXPERIMENT I: A STUDY ON MOTIVE STRUCTURE IN MALES

In this section, a first application of the technique is presented. Responses of young male subjects to a tachistoscopic percept-genetic series

of a picture depicting two young men in neutral interaction are influenced by immediately preceding amauroscopic (relatively long-term, low intensity) subliminal presentations of stimuli depicting the same two young men in a) aggressive (AGG), b ) homosexual (SEX), and c) neutral ( N E U ) interaction. The neutral stimulus is the same as that used in the following percept-genetic presentations. The N E U stimulus shows the two young men standing u p , evidently engaged in discussion. In the AGG stimulus, the young man to the right is aggressive and raises a knife towards the other who is bleeding and suffering. In the SEX stimulus, they t u r n towards each other with looks of longing, without pants, and exposing erect male organs.

SUBJECTS

The subjects were 120 male university students, paid volunteers, randomly distributed over conditions as shown in Table 2 . Table 2 Distribution of subjects over conditions in Experiment -

N

I.

AGG

SEX

NEU

40

40

40

Age Mean

23

23

23

Age Range

19-28

19-32

18-33

CRITER ION GENESIS

The first part of the session, the criterion percept-genesis, consists of amauroscopic presentations of a stimulus of 5 seconds duration, starting at 40V and proceeding in steps of 1OV to 170V. The series is administered for these 1 4 exposures or until the subject reaches the C phase (correct recognition). The stimulus is the distractor picture of the DMT (Kragh,

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

174

1 9 6 9 ) , depicting an adult, reclining woman with a small boy, touching her

bosom, in her lap. The interaction between them is positive or neutral. The C phase criterion is two phases in a row with this content and no scorable signs.

EXPERIMEN T A L CONDlTlONS

The subliminal stimuli are always presented for 20 seconds at 50V. The immediately following tachistoscopic stimulus is presented ad modum DMT for 20 exposures or less, if the subject reaches C phase. The C phase criterion is reports of two young men, 15-39 years old, in neutral interaction, with no scorable signs, for three phases in a row. MASKING TASKS

The threshold task was administered omauroscopic subliminal presentations.

concurrently

with

the

SCORING

The percept-genetic material in this experiment was scored independently by both authors. The few disagreements were resolved in discussion.

HYPOTHESES

The AGG and SEX conditions are considered to be conflict activating according to the impulse-anxiety-defense scheme. The hypotheues concerning experimental outcome are of three kinds: a ) general measures, b ) signs common to the provoking conditions, and c ) signs uniquc to one provoking condition. GENERAL MEASURES

Corresponding to many measures of thought disturbance, etc. , these concern thresholds and number of scored signs. Two types of threshold are registered, first P (preparatory) phase (the first report mentioning localized and specified object) and C phase (correct recognition according to given definitions). The location of first P phase seems primarily to bc determined physiologically and is not expected to be influenced by the provoking operations. However, these should complicate and lengthen

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

175

percept-geneses by the activation of defenses. Thus, ( I ) the location of the first C phase ( i . e . , the exposure number corresponding to the report) is expected to be later, and (11) the number of scored signs is expected to be greater in conditions AGG and S E X in comparison to condition N E U . COMMON SlGNS

Both provoking operations are expected to produce increased anxiety in predisposed subjects. Two signs of anxiety are scored in the material, blackening of reported configurations (a perceptual anxiety equivalent), and reports of fearlunpleasure. Thus, (111) signs of blackening, and of fearIunpleasure (sign classes 520+, 620+, and 520+620+; the construction of the experimental measures is presented below), are expected to be more prevalent in conditions AGG and S E X in comparison to condition N E U . U N l Q U E SlGNS

Two defenses, important in persons with conflicts around aggression, are supposed to become activated in the AGG condition: ( I V ) in this condition, all signs of reaction formation against aggres-

sion ( i . e . , reports where perceived persons are said to have a positive relationship; sign class 4+) are expected to be more prevalent than in conditions S E X and N E U . ( V ) In the same way, all signs of isolation (all sign classes with a

number beginning with 2 ) are expected to be more prevalent in this condition than in the other ones. In the S E X condition, a type of report equivalent to ( I V ) above and defenses theoretically and clinically associated with sexual identity problems, are supposed to become activated: ( I V ) In this condition, signs of reaction formation against homosexual

arousal ( i . e . , reports where perceived persons a r e said to have an aggressive relationship o r this is explicitly denied; sign class 310+ 510+) are expected to be more prevalent than in conditions AGG and NEU.

( V I I ) In the same way, all signs of sexual identity diffusion and distortion (all sign classes with a number beginning with 7 ) are expected to be more prevalent in this condition than in the other ones.

(VIII) Further, "multiplications,I' a sign of polymorphous identification

176

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjaback Table 3 Sign v a r i a n t s and c l a s s e s . (For explanation, s e e t e x t . "Hero" r e f e r s t o t h e l e f t person depicted i n t h e stimulus, "pp" ( p e r i p h e r a l person) t o t h e r i g h t one.)

Sign v a r i a n t

Sign c l a s s

1+ Repreasion

110

Both hero and pp a r e r i g i d , inanimate beings.

111

Hero i s a r i g i d or inanimate being.

112

Pp i s a r i g i d or inanimate being.

120

Both hero and pp a r e animals.

121

Hero i s an animal.

122

Pp i s an animal.

130

Both h e r o and pp a r e "face masks" or "dressed up."

131

Hero i s "face mask" or "dressed up."

132

Pp i s "face mask" or "dressed up."

140

Both hero and pp a r e o b j e c t s .

141

Hero i s an object.

142

Pp i s an o b j e c t .

Note As regards c a t e g o r i e s 130, 131, 132, only the s p e c i a l instance "shows the backside"

i s found

i n the material. See Kragh (1969, 1971).

132

Sexual symbolism, pp, I

2+ I s o l a t i o n

132 210

Hero and pp a r e i s o l a t e d from each o t h e r by a s e p a r a t i n g l i n e o r area.

211

Hero moves away from pp.

212

Pp moves away from hero.

213

The d i s t a n c e between hero and pp i s increased from

214

Hero or pp r a i s e s an arm so t h a t eye contact between

220

T h e faces of both h e r o and pp a r e o u t l i n e d , r e l a t i v e l y

l a s t report.

them i s impossible.

homogeneous white or shining s p o t s .

221

Hero's face i s such a white or shining spot.

222

P p ' s face is such a white or shining spot.

230

S t r u c t u r e disappears over the whole f i e l d in one phase.

231

Hero disappears i n one phase.

2 32

Pp disappears i n one phase.

940

S t r u c t u r e i s completely lacking in a t l e a s t two phases i n a row.

241

Hero i s lacking i n at l e a s t two phases i n a row.

177

Intrapaychic Conflict Activation Sign v a r i a n t

Sign c l a s s

242

210

Barrier isolation, I

210

214

B a r r i e r i s o l a t i o n , I1

214

Pp i s lacking i n a t l e a s t two phases i n a row.

210+ Barrier i s o l a t t o n , 111

210, 214

220+ D e f i c i e n t reconstruction

220, 221,

310+510+ Aggression

310

Aggression is e x p l i c i t l y denied, a s regards t h e p i c t u r e

311

Aggression is denied aa regards hero.

2, 230, 231,

21

1, 24

i n i t s t o t a l i t y , a s i n t e r a c t i o n or f e e l i n g .

4+ Reaction formation

312

Aggression is denied as regards pp.

510

The r e l a t i o n s h i p between hero and pp is aggressive.

511

Hero i s aggressive towards pp.

512

Pp i s aggressive towards hero.

410

Hero and pp have a mutual p o s i t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p : they

are dancing, etc. 411

Hero i s p o s i t i v e , h e l p f u l , or laughs, e t c .

412

Pp is p o s i t i v e , h e l p f u l , o r laughs, e t c .

420

The t o t a l mood of t h e p i c t u r e i s s a i d t o be p l e a s a n t , quiet, etc.

520t Anxiety I

520

Hero and pp a r e a f r a i d , scared, e t c .

521

Hero i s a f r a i d , scared, e t c .

522

Pp i s a f r a i d , scared, e t c .

530

'Ihe mood of t h e p i c t u r e is s a i d t o be dangerous, unpleasant, etc.

610+ Introaggression

610

Both hero and pp a r e h u r t , bleeding, have some kind of bodily i n j u r y or m u t i l a t i n g i n v a l i d i t y .

611

Hero is h u r t a s above.

612

Pp is h u r t a s above.

613

A h u r t or i n f e r i o r o b j e c t i s located i n t h e f i e l d .

650

A l l of t h e f i e l d i s c h a o t i c , denoting violence and destruction,

and

decidedly

stimlus

inadequate.

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjoback

178

Sign class

620+ Anxiety I1

Sign variants

620

Both hero and pp are stimulus inadequately blackened.

621

Hero is blackened in a stimulus inadequate way.

622

Pp is blackened in a stimulus inadequate way.

623

An object (objects, animals, and persons except hero

and pp) in the field is blackened in a stimulus inadequate way.

52Ot620t Anxiety I11

520, 521, 522, 530, 620, 621, 622, 623.

710

Feminization I

710

Both hero and pp are ascribed incorrect sex.

711

Heterosexualization I

711

Hero is ascribed incorrect sex.

712

Heterosexualization I1

712

Pp is ascribed incorrect sex.

711t Heterosexrla1ization I11

711, 712.

720+ Feminization I1

720

Incorrect sex ascription of hero and pp remains even in the last exposure.

721

Incorrect sex ascription of hero remains even in the last exposure.

722

Incorrect sex ascription oi pp remains even in the last exposure.

710t Feminization I11

710, 720, 721, 722.

130+ Sexual symbolism

130, 131, 132, and 730

Both hero and pp carry attributes which belong to incorrect sex ascription (round, hollow, “feminine“

at-

tributes).

132+ Sexual symbolism, pp, I1

731

Hero carries such an attribute.

732

Pp carries such an attribute.

132, 732.

740t Inadequate sex

attribution, I

740

Both hero and pp change sex from correct to undecided.

179

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation Sign v a r i a n t

Sign c l a s s

750+

741

Hero changes sex from c o r r e c t t o undecided.

142

Pp changes sex from c o r r e c t t o undecided.

Inadequate sex a t t r i b u t i o n , I1

750

Both hero and pp change sex from c o r r e c t t o i n c o r r e c t .

751

Hero changes sex from c o r r e c t t o i n c o r r e c t .

752

Pp changes sex from c o r r e c t t o i n c o r r e c t .

740+750+ Inadequate sex a t t r i b u t i o n , I11

810

Duplication

740, 741, 742, 750, 751, 752.

8 10

Hero and pp a r e very much a l i k e , are dressed a l i k e , a r e equal-aged brothers, a r e twins.

820+

Kultiplications

820

There i s a t h i r d person i n the p i c t u r e .

8 30

Except hero and pp, t h e r e a r e a t l e a s t two persons or f a c e s belonging t o persons i n t h e p i c t u r e .

840+ Old age r e p o r t s

840

Both hero and pp a r e a t l e a s t 40 y e a r s o l d i n a t l e a s t

841

Hero i s aL l e a s t 40 y e a r s o l d i n a t l e a s t t h r e e phases

842

Pp is a t l e a s t 40 years old i n a t l e a s t t h r e e phases

t h r e e phases i n a row.

i n a row.

in a row.

000

Infant i l i z a t ion

000

Hero and pp a r e c h i l d r e n under 15 years of age.

(reports where more than two persons are perceived and reported; sign class 820+), are expected to be more prevalent in this condition than in the other ones. Clinically, this type of report in males is indicative of genital problems and passive sexual organization (Nilsson , Colleen, & Mardh, 1975).

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

180 CONSTRUCTION OF E X P E R I M E N T A L MEASURES

In this section, we will illustrate the construction of experimental measures (sign classes) by presenting the percept-genetic scoring schemc and demonstrating how the classes are constructed from the basic sign variants. This is shown in Table 3. The classes are given in the left column, and those variants which form the class are listed to the right. \Wen defenses or signs of defense are mentioned in this chapter, this always refers operationally to phenomenal reports on the percept-genetic stimuli, with contents specified by the sign variant listing.

RESUL TS G E N E R A L MEASURES

The cumulative number of subjects reaching first C phase at different exposures shows stable, significant differences in the expected direction between the provoked conditions and the neutral one. There is also a significant difference (at the 0.01 level) for number of subjects not reaching C phase: In AGG 16, in SEX 18, and in N E U 7 . The hypothesis for a greater number of scored signs in these conditions is also supported. The grand median for scored signs is 13.5. Number of subjects over this median is 2 2 in AGG. 29 in SEX, and 11 in N E U . The A G G / N E U contrast is significant at the 0 . 0 5 level, the SEXlNEU one at the 0.001 level. Evidently, the provoking experimental operations have been efficient in activating conflict. The SEX stimulus seems to have been a somewhat more cfficient provocation than the AGG one. C O M M O N SIGNS

Results for the anxiety signs are given in Table 4 . A s discussed in the first section, the table gives raw and weighted frequencies for the signs. The hypothesis of anxiety increase is supported for the SEX, but not for the AGG condition. Again, the SEX stimulus might have been B more efficient provocation. Alternatively, defenses in the AGG condition might be so effective as not to permit leaking anxiety.

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

181

Table 4 C m n signs. The frequency of anxiety signs i n the t h r e e conditions.

': onetafled tests.

AGG

SEX

NEU

520+

1

7

1

NS

--X

620+

4

6

2

NS

--X

NSX

520+620+

5

12

3

NS

NSX

.or

Anxiety

P

~

~ P

> ~

~ ~

~ ~

raw .05x

weighted: no t e s t a b l e r e s u l t s

U N I Q U E SIGNS: T H E AGG CONDITION

Results for signs of isolation and reaction formation against aggression are presented in Table 5 . As can be seen, the hypothesis of an inTable 5 Unique s i g n s , aggression. The frequency of i s o l a t i o n and reaction formation

i n t h e three conditions. ':

Isolation

AGG

SEX

NEU

onetailed t e s t s .

~WSEX

EAGONEU

%EX>NELI

raw 2+

31

30

23

NSX

.05'

NS

210+

26

20

13

NSX

.0 l X

NS

210

16

10

7

NSX

.05'

NS

214

16

11

9

NSX

NSX

NS

220+

16

16

13

NSX

NSX

NS

2+v

19

15

8

NSX

.0 l X

NS

weighted

210+v

14

13

3

NSX

.0lX

210v

8

7

2

NSX

.05'

214V

8

7

3

NSX

NSX

NS

220+v

8

8

8

NSX

NSX

NS

15

24

15

.05x

N Sx

NS

8

13

7

NSX

NSX

NS

.05 NS

Reaction formation raw

4+ weighted

4+v

~ >

~

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

182

creased frequency of isolation in the AGG condition is supported in the AGG/NEU comparisons, generally and especially as regards barrier isolation. The prevalence of such reports in the SEX condition is in between that in the AGG and NEU conditions, and in one instance reaches a significance in comparison to NEU The impossibility of creating unambiguous provocations was discussed in the first section of the chapter. The hypothesis of an increased frequency of reaction formation against aggression in the AGG condition is not supported. Instead, this sign ( i . e . , reports of friendly interaction or atmosphere) is most prevalent in the SEX condi tion. Here, it evidently has the character of a break-through of the drive-related stimulus message, a somewhat unexpected finding.

.

U N l Q U E SIGNS: T H E SEX CONDITION

Results for the signs predicted to be more prevalent in the SEX condition are found in Table 6. The hypothesis concerning reaction formation against homosexual impulses, i. e. , reports of aggression, does not receive support in this group of subjects. The hypothesis concerning person multiplications is supported in the S E X / N E U comparison. The results for signs of sexual identity disturbance are somewhat more complicated. The sign 710+, the most inclusive class of feminization, is significantly more prevalent in the AGG and SEX conditions than in NEU. However, this way of introducing women in the perceived is perhaps most easily interpreted as a way of denying the personal relevance of the situation, i . e . , as a species of denial. The categories which are clearly dominant in the SEX condition are those of inadequate sex attribution: 740+, 750+, 740+750+. Hallborg (1971) found such percept-genetic signs to be true manifestations of introjectivc defenses. A s for the AGG condition, the strongest contrast to the results in the SEX condition is provided by NEU. Again, the other provoking condition seems to be in between.

183

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

-

Table 6 Unique signs, homosexuality. The frequency of aggression,

sexual identity disturbance, and multiplications in the three conditions, K:

Aggression

onetailed tests.

AGG

SEX

NEU

5

6

7

NSX

NS

N Sx

2

6

1

NSX

--

NSX

P

~

~ P

> ~

~ ~ 'SEX>NEU ~ >

~ ~

raw 310+510+

weighted 310+510+V

Sexual identity disturbance raw 710

7

6

2

NSX

NS

NSX

711

7

13

11

NSX

NS

N Sx

712

25

24

24

NSX

NS

NSX

711+

26

29

28

N Sx

NS

NSX

740+

13

21

9

N Sx

NS

.or

750+

9

14

5

NSX

NS

'05'

19

28

11

NS

.0OlX

740+750+

.05'

720+

5

7

3

NSX

NS

N Sx

710+

12

13

4

NSX

.05

.oSX

710V

2

5

1

NSX

--

NSX

711V

1

8

6

NS

NSX

weighted

.05'

712V

13

13

11

NSX

NS

NSX

711+V

12

17

13

NSX

NS

NSX

740+V

7

11

5

N Sx

NS

75wv

2

9

3

.05'

740+750+V

8

16

5

.05'

5

11

3

NSX NSX

NS

.or

NS

.OSX

Multiplicw raw 820+

NSX

weighted: no testable results

Note:

Due ta the specific scoring requirements of sign variants 720, 721, 722, classes 720+

and 710+ are not included in the weighting system.

~

B. Weeterlundh and H.Sjobiick

184

UNPREDICT E D RESULTS

A few significant results outside of those predicted are presented in table 7. The signs 130+V and 132+, denoting a person or persons in the picture a s seen from behind o r holding a female attribute, have been interpreted as instances of sexual symbolism. The strong difference between Table 7 Significant non-predicted differences.

Repression,

ACC

SEX

NEU

4

11

3

NS

--

.05

1

8

2

.05

--

NS

20

22

8

NS

.01

-01

P

~

~P

~~

> ~P

~ ~~

sexual symbolism raw 132+

weighted 130+V

Infantilization raw 000

the provoking conditions and N EU a s regards infantilization (000) is interesting. This seems to be a denial strategy implying "this does not concern me, it is childish." It can be seen as a parallel to the feminization reports. IN J E R R E L A TIONSHIP OF SIGNS

The structure and meaning of defensive strategies can be further elucidated by studying how the signs that show increased frequency at R specific provocation are interrelated. Results of such an analysis are presented in Table 8. In the AGG condition, reports of infantilization ( 0 0 0 ) and feminization (710+) tend to be positively related. We have interpreted both at attempts to deny the personal relevance of the situation. Further, the typical reports of isolation ( 2 . , ) are related to the many-scored-signs category. Since reports of isolation are what boosts the number of signs in this condition, it can be stated that those who resort to isolation as R defense against fantasies of victimization tend to give reports with this content to many exposures in the series.

.

~ >~

~~

185

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

Table 8 Relations between independent signs significantly more prevalent in conditions AGG and SEX: significancies and tendencies and the measures of association DD andAAB. 'Pwotailed tests.

Signs Mdn

AGG

710+

tot

No C phase

.02

+.43

.29

2+

.oi

+.4a

.26

210

.10

+.33

.18

2+v

.10

+.36

.30

210+v

.10

+.35

.13

210v

.01

+.46

.15

000

.10

+.30

.26

Signs

SEX

Mdn

.10

+.33

.19

mAB 132+

tot

740+

p

.10

No C phase 132+

-05

+.38

.OO

130+V

.10

+.31

.OO

210+v

.10

+.31

.OO

4+

.05

+.44

.19

+.35

m

711V

A

B p<

750+ .10

710+ .10

750+V

+.34

.05

740+750+V 000

.10

+.35

DD

A AB

.17

-.30

.10

+.46

.ll

.05

+.43

.I8

.05

+.48

.12

.10

+.37

.17

.16

.17

Such increased phase width is not characteristic of the typical introjective signs (740+, 750+, 740+750+) in the related to the many-scored-signs category. the hero as a woman in many phases has a to categories such as 751, where the hero's

SEX condition. These are not In this condition, 711V, seeing rather self-evident relationship sex is changed from correct to

incorrect. However, the less liberal feminization sign 710+ is not well related to introjective defenses, a fact which supports our interpretation of it as primarily a sign of denial.

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

186

T H E C R I T E R I O N PERCEPTGENESIS

A s stated, the stimulus used in the criterion genesis is the distractor picture of the DMT, presented amauroscopically. Subjects’ reports were scored using the DMT scoring scheme (Kragh, 1969, 1 9 7 1 ) , with a few additions. The child in the picture was regarded as hero, the woman a s pp. The additions are as follows: 2 1 1 , hero and pp are separated in space and have no body contact; 710, both hero and pp are ascribed incorrect sex;

711, hero is ascribed incorrect sex: 7 1 2 , pp is ascribed incorrect sex;

741, hero’s sex is changed from correct to undecided: 751, hero’s sex is changed from correct t o incorrect;

820, there is a third person in the picture: 830, there a r e four or more persons in the picture. Sign variants are combined to form four classes: all repression ( l t o t ) , all isolation % t o t ) , all sexual identity disturbance (7totU8tot), and all other signs ( 0 s ) . These classes follow the weighting system, with a weight of 11 being given for class presence in the first exposure, and a weight of 24 for class presence in the last possible, 14th exposure. The criterion gene-

sis classes are defined and ascribed as follows: 1. Late first p phase. Ascribed to persons over the total median, which is 8.5. The criterion geneses, from P1 to C , are thus generally rather short.

2. No C phase. Here, faulty testings are excluded (which reduces N_, see Table 8). Only persons who have not reached C phase at the 14th expos u r e are assigned to this class. 3. 4.

@.

All signs of repression. Ascribed when class presence wcight=%O.

w. All signs of isolation. Ascribed when class presence weight=20.

5. 7totUBtot. All variants of sign 7 , with 820 and 830. When only variant

711 is scored, the class is ascribed when the weight

2 0 , otherwise, it is

ascribed on appearance. 6.

E.Extremely

few scored sign variants. Ascribed when the weights for

l t o t , 2tot, 7totU8tot, and 0 s together = 20. 7.

E. Extremely

many scored sign variants. Ascribed when the weights

for l t o t , 2tot, 7totUBtot, and 0 s together = 115. The distribution of these signs on persons over conditions is shown in Table 9. A s can be seen, the groups do not differ appreciably on the criterion percept-genesis classes.

187

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

Table 9 Subjects assigned to criterion percept-genesis classes in the different conditions.

AGG

SEX

NEU

Late first P phase

16

10

17

No C phase

11/35

13/37

15/38

ltot

7

14

10

2tot

24

18

18

7totuat0t

18

13

14

2s

6

9

10

MS

a

7

9

E X P E R I M E N T A L - C R I T E R I O N GENESlS RELATIONSHIPS

The relationships between those classes which significantly dominate in an experimental condition and the criterion genesis classes, are given in Table 10. Predictions are from the criterion genesis classes. As in other such analyses (e.e;.

, Westerlundh,

1976), there are no

strong general relationships between the geneses. Percept-gencsis points to a great degree of flexibility in the defense organization of normals. Howeve r , there are two important groups of results: (a) in the criterion genesis, the category ZS, extremely few signs, shows a number of negative relationships to categories which have been frequent after the AGG and SEX operations. The most important such relationships ore between the class and the typical barrier reports ( 2 1 0 . . )

of AGG.

Thus we have identified the refractory persons as those who do not rcspond to the subliminal stimuli; ( b ) persons with many signs (MS) and with signs of sexual identity disturbance (7totU8tot) in the criterion genesis respond more frequently than others with the typical undecided sex attributions (740+750+,

etc.) of the

SEX condition. The theme of the criterion genesis is of course sexual, a phallic-oedipal one. The stimulus has thus been able to pinpoint those with a special sensitivity to the homosexual conflict theme.

Table 10 Relations between experimental and criterion percept-geneses. Tendencies and significances and the measures of association Experimental genesis

D

and

AB.

Twotailed tests.

Criterion genesis

-----Late first P

No C phase

1 tot

zs

7totUBtot

Ms

phase

E<

n

.05

-.40

AG G SfgnS>Udn ?Ot

AB

E<

2

AB

E< ?!

A B E< D

aB

n

.05

A,

.10 - . 3 2

.13

2104

.10 +.33

.OO

-.57

.29

210

.10 -.47

.oo

2+v

.05 -.56

.21

.10

-.41

.OO

.10 -.39

.oo

740+750+V

No C phase

.10 .05

+.47

E<

D

A~

.33

No C phase

21wv

SEX

E<

-.28

.oo

.10 -.26

.OO

.33 +.2a

.oo

210

.lo

nov

.10 +.28

-00

520+

.10 +.28

.OO

b

52Oc62Oe

2 m -4

75w

-05 +.39

.21

.05 +.43

.31

74w75w 740+750+V 820+

NEU

000 740+

.10

-.25

.OO

740+750+

.05

-.33

.on

.01 +.79

.SO

-10 +.36

.OO

+.55

.31

.05

.10 -.36

-00

.10 -.42

.28

e s a

B P

3

Q

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

189

The results of this study conform reasonably well with our expectations, as can be seen from the listing of hypotheses and their status in light of our results (see Table 11). The results for anxiety should be interpreted in terms of strength of activated anxiety and effectiveness of defenses. For AGG, the hypothesis for isolation was supported, especially as regards barrier reports. However, the hypothesis for reaction formation against aggression was not supported. The results here should be compared to Westerlundh's earlier (1976) findings of an increase in barrier isolation, when subjects were victims of aggression, and an increase in reaction formation when subjects were aggrefisors. In the present experimenTable 11 Summary of hypotheses and results in Experiment I.

AGG

SEX

Late C phase

yes

yes

More signs

yes

yes

Anxiety

no

yes

Isolation

yes

Reaction formation

no

Aggression

no

Introjection of opposite sex

yes

Multiplications

yes

tal situation, the AGG stimulus seems to have triggered fantasies of victimization rather than fantasies of active aggression. The hypothesis of increased incidence of reports of aggression in the SEX condition was not supported, although there is a tendency for the weighted sign. The strategy, perhaps limited to specific groups, such as the juvenile offenders studied by Kragh and Kroon (1966). is one o f pseudomasculinity covering up sexual identity diffusion. Other hypotheses for this condition have received support. There are R number of unpredicted results: in the SEX condition for a variant of barrier isolation (here, the homosexual theme is probably interpreted as a threat to body integrity), a variant of positive interaction or feeling (a break-through of the drive theme, but in desexualized form),

I90

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

and some forms of report interpreted as sexual symbolism; in both, thc A G G and the SEX condition, for two ways of denying the personal relevance of the situation, feminization and infantilization, While not foreseen, these results are in line with those predicted. In no instance has the neutral stimulus given rise to increased frequency of signs of defense. The comparison with the criterion genesis gave a number of meaningful relationships. Those between many signs and signs of introjection in the criterion genesis and inadequate sex attributions in the SEX condition of course strengthen the interpretation of the latter a s true signs of introjective defense (and not, e.g., as species of denial). The negative relations of very few criterion signs (ZS) to isolation signs in the experimental genesis may point to the weakness in the scoring system in that isolation of affect (DMT 2 4 3 , the threat is neutral) can hardly be scored when neutral stimuli are used. The present investigation is an attempt to study psychoanalytic propositions in the laboratory. The percept-genetic technique allows for a nearer approach to the constructs of the theory than is generally found in such research. The study gives experimental support to Kragh's (1969) percept-genetic scoring scheme, while at the same time elucidating psychoanalytic ideas about drive and ego fixations and about how the choice of defense in conflict depends upon these and upon certain general and quantitative factors.

EXPERIMENT 11: A STUDY ON MOTIVE STRUCTURE IN FEMALES It might be useful at this point to mention again the general basic ideas behind our rescarch, guiding also the second experiment. The presentation of a stimulus carrying a message leads at an unconscious level to the activation of a broad array of personal meanings of this stimulus. Normally just a few of these - adaptive and reality oriented - will become conscious. However, the percept-genetic technique allows for ordered reconstruction of the array of meanings, and thc elaborations of them (defensive, etc.) in the mental apparatus. The concurrent use of a subliminal stimulus serves to activate or potentiate certain (neutral or conflict arousing) meanings. This allows for controlled experimentation concerning motive structure during different conditions. We will now proceed to further use this technique to study certain aspects of the psychology of women and,

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

191

furthermore, to investigate the effects of subliminal stimuli not structurally similar to the tachistoscopic one. Those used in experiment I possessed such a similarity of structure. However, Westerlundh (1979) found effects using a dissimilar stimulus depicting persons of both sexes. The subliminal stimuli show adults in anxiety-arousing sexual and aggressive interactions,

By use of stimuli with persons of diffcrent sex, it is possible to tag the self reference to one of the depicted persons, that of the same sex a s the subject. Here, we want to investigate the effects on women of subliminal stimuli depicting (a) woman as cnstrator of the male (AGG), and ( b ) woman a s victim of bestial male sexual attack (SEX). in comparison to ( c ) a neutral man-woman stimulus (NEU) A s usual, the percept-genetic stimulus

.

corresponds to the neutral subliminal one.

SUBJECTS

The subjects were 120 female university students, paid volunteers, randomly distributed over conditions as shown in table 12. Table 12 Distribution of subjects over conditions in Experiment I1

N Age Mean Age Range

AGG

SEX

NEU

40

40

40

22 18-27

21 18-27

22 18-30

CRITERION GENESIS

A s in the earlier study, this was an amauroscopic percept-genesis with presentations of 5 seconds duration, starting at 40 V and proceeding in steps of 10 V , this time to maximally 190 V . The series is administered for these 16 exposures or until C phase. The stimulus is a variant of the DMTdistractor picture (Eragh, 1969), depicting an adult, reclining woman with a small girl in her lap, touching her bosom. The interaction between them is positive or neutral. The C phase criterion is two phases in n row with this content and no scorablc signs.

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjoback

192 EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS

The experimental stimuli are depicted in Figure 1. The subliminal and tachistoscopic stimuli are presented as in the earlier study. The C phase criterion is again three correct reports in a row. MASKJNG TASKS

The time estimation task was administered concurrently with the amauroscopic subliminal presentations. SCORING

The percept-genetic material in this experiment was scored independently by both authors. The few disagreements were resolved by discussion.

HYPOTHESES

As in the earlier experiment, we subdivided hypotheses into generd measures, common signs, and unique signs. GENERAL MEASURES

( I ) The location of the first C phase (i.e., the exposure number corresponding to the report) is expected to be later, and (11) the number of scored signs to be greater in conditions AGG and SEX than in condition NEU. COMMON SIGNS (111) If the experimental operations are effective, and defenses are not activated, the anxiety signs of blackening and fearlunpleasure (sign classes 520+, 620+, and 520+620+) are expected to be more prevalent in conditions AGG and SEX than in condition NEU. There arc further possibilities, as we saw in the last experiment, or general strategies of denying the personal relevance of the situation (feminization, in fantilization) However, no specific hypotheses concerning such strategies have been advanced.

.

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

Figure 1 Cnstrative, bestial and neutral stimuli used in the subliminal presentation conditions. The neutral stimulus is the same as that used tachistoscopically.

193

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

194 UNfQUE SIGNS

Clinical and percept-genetic knowledge allows u s to state that i f we are successful in activating fantasies of active aggression in a non-hospitalized group such a s the one studied, an increase can bc expected in signs of affect isolation and reaction formation against aggression. However, of the types of isolation scored in the DMT, isolation of affect ( 2 4 3 , the threat is neutral) is a stimulus adequate response to neutral stimuli and can hardly be scored. The only hypothesis put forward hcre is t h u s , (IV) in the A G G condition, all signs of reaction formation against aggression ( i . e . , reports of positive interaction o r feeling, sign classes 4,..)

ore expected to be more prevalent than in condition S E X and

NEU.

The S E X stimulus has as i t s most important meaning components a tabooed heterosexual thome and a theme of bodily sexual aggression. In this condition,

(V) the heterosexual threat should give more signs of repression (all signs beginning with 1) than is found in conditions A G G and N E U ; and (VI) the threat to body integrity should give more signs of barrier isolation (all signs beginning with 2 1 ) than is found in conditions AGG and N E U .

SCORING V A R I A N T S A N D E X P E R I M E N T A L MEASURES

The scoring scheme i s , with a few modifications, identical to that used in the former experiment. The woman in the picture was regarded as hero, the man a s pp. A variant 2 1 5 , hero and pp arc scon as upside down, is addcd together with a variant 5 1 3 , threat appears in the field. The definition of 7 3 0 is modified to fit the stimulus: both hero and pp carr y attributes belonging to incorrect sex attribution (pp round, hollow, 'tfeminineT' attributes, hero pointing, penetrating, "masculine" ones)

.

With a few exceptions, the sign classes are the same as in the earlier experiment.

The 7 3 0 s were dropped from sexual symbolism, since they

were not scored in the material, except in a few dubious cases. The category 41+, reaction formation against aggression except mood reports, was included for theoretical and methodological reasons. The numbcr of 4 2 0 rcports in a protocol (of importance for the weighted sign) is one of the few

Intrwsychic Conflict Activation

195

percept-genetic variables that can be influenced by the tester's inquiry. The change of sex of the persons in the tachistoscopic picture necessitated a few changes in the scoring of introjection. As before, raw and weighted class frequencies will be presented; the

latter follow the 11 to 3 0 system discussed in the first section.

RESULTS G E N E R A L MEASURES

The hypothesis concerning later onset of C phase was supported only for the SEX condition which shows a significant difference to N E U in exposures 1 5 to 20 and in number of subjects not reaching C phase ( 2 8 1 1 7 ; p c 0.05).

The grand median for number of scored signs is 10.0.

Number

of subjects over this median is 2 1 in A G G , 25 in SEX, and 12 in N E U . The contrasts A G G / N E U and SEXINEU are significant, at the 0 . 0 5 and 0.01 level, respectively. So far, the SEX stimulus seems to have been a more efficient provocation than the A G G stimulus. C O M M O N SIGNS

Results for the anxiety signs are in the right direction but fail to reach significance in any comparison. U N I Q U E SIGNS: THE AGG C O N D l T l O N

Results for reaction formation against aggrcssion are presented in Table 1 3 . A s is evident, the hypothesis of an increase in the AGG condition

is not supported at all. To the contrary, there is a significantly higher incidence of positive moodlrelationship reports in the SEX condition. Table 13 Unique s i g n s , aggression. The frequency of reaction formation i n the three conditions. x : onetailed t e s t s .

Reaction format&

AGG

SEX

NEU

4+

23

28

22

N Sx

NSX

NS

41+

20

28

17

NSX

NSX

.05

4+v

7

18

11

.0 l X

NSX

NS

41+V

8

16

8

.05'

NSX

NS

raw

weighted

196

B. Westerlundh and H.aoback U N l Q U E SIGNS: THE SEX CONDITlON

Results for repression and barrier isolation are given in Table 14. Table 14 Unique signs, heterosexual aggression. "he frequency of repression and barrier isolation in the three conditions.(x: onetailed tests.)

AGG

SEX

NEU

1t

13

16

7

NSX

NS

,05x

1301

11

13

4

NSX

NS

.

131

4

10

2

NSX

--

.OSx

132

4

7

2

NSX

--

1tv

5

10

3

NSX

13OtV

3

9

2

NSX

131"

1

6

1

NSX

132V

1

4

1

--X

210t

15

18

10

NSX

NS

210

10

14

6

NSX

NS

214

7

4

5

NSX

NS

210tv

6

12

3

NSX

NS

210v

2

10

2

.OSx

214V

3

2

3

---

Repression

P

~

~

>

~

~

~

raw

05x

NSX

weighted

Barrier isolation raw

NSX

.

OSx

NSX

weighted

--X

.

0lX

.05'

--

X

As can be seen, the hypotheses of an increased incidence of these signs in the SEX condition are largely supported in the SEXINEU comparisons. A s was generally found in the eerlier experiment, results for A G G , the other provoking condition, falls in between.

UNPREDICJED RESULTS

As seen from Table 15, there are significant findings for two signs

outside of those predicted. The increased frequency of isolation ( 2 + , 2+V)

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

197

in the SEX condition in comparison to N E U ,

is a consequence of the

increase in barrier isolation. The other result concerns 710+. Either the persons exchange sex, and/or there is a faulty sex attribution in the last

Table 15 S i g n i f i c a n t non-predicted d i f f e r e n c e s .

Isolation

AGG

SEX

NEU

21

25

15

NS

NS

.05

11

14

5

NS

NS

-05

13

4

NS

.05

.05

'AGGSEX

'AGGDNEU

'SEX>NEU

raw 2+ weighted

2+v

Disturbed sex a t t r i b u t i o n

710+

12

exposure. This sign is more frequent in both the AGG and SEX conditions than in N E U . It belongs to the general strategy of denying the personal relevance of the situation, discussed in the second part of this chaptcr in connection with the signs of feminization and infantilization. I N T E R R E L A TIONSHIP OF SIGNS

The question raised here is if a specific subgroup of thc subjects in a condition underlies all of the experimental outcome, i . e . , i f a group of conflict-sensitive subjects answer with all of those signs which increase significantly in the condition. Since there is only one sign (710+) in AGG which fulfills this requirement, the question can hardly be raised for this condition. An analysis for

SEX shows that a number of those signs which dominate in the condition have increased the total number of scored signs (Signs Mdntot), and the length of the genesis (No C phase). However, the signs are not significantly interrelated. This indicates that different forms of anxiety and defensive endeavors are activated in different subjects. THE C R I T E R I O N PERCEPTGENESIS

All aspects of scoring and class construction pertaining to the criterion percept-genesis are the same in this experiment

RS

in the earlier one.

The only changes, due to the increased lcngth of the genesis, concern the

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

198

ascription weight for classes ZS and MS. ZS is now ascribed, when the weight for ltot, these signs 150. tions is shown in underrepresented

2tot, 'ItotUltot and 0 s 50, MS, when the weight for The distribution of these signs on persons over condiTable 16. A s can be seen, the N E U group is significantly on signs ltot and MS.

Table 16 Criterion percept-genesis classes ascribed t o subjects in the three conditions, and significant differences. Twotailed tests.

AGG

SEX

NEU

late first P phase

12

12

17

No C phase

11

7

7

1 tot

19

19

6

2 tot

25

26

28

7totUEtot

26

30

28

2s

7

8

14

MS

14

13

4

EXPERIMENTAL

-

P

~

~

~

.

01

.Ol

.05

.05

>

C R I T E R I O N GENESIS R E L A TIONSHIPS

As in the earlier study, signs which are influenced significantly by

the experimental operations have been related to the criterion genesis classes in all three conditions. The results are, however, on chance level. R E A N A L Y S I S OF E X P E R I M E N T A L D A T A

Even though there are no systematic relationships bctween the geneses, it could possibly be argued that the experimental results were produced, not by the experimental operations, but by initial group differences. To check for this, 15 subjects with class ltot were randomly ex-

cluded from each of conditions AGG and SEX. The resulting groups do not differ from N E U on criterion genesis classes. When experimental outcome is studied in these groups, the main results

-

significant dominance for the

SEX condition for signs of repression, barrier isolation, and reaction formation, a s well a s for both provoking conditions for disturbed sex attribution - all reappear. No other significant results are found. Evidently, criterion genesis distributions do not offer alternative hypotheses to the experimental ones.

~

~

199

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation DISC USSlO N

Hypotheses and results are recapitulated in Table 17. Table 1 7 Summary of hypotheses and r e s u l t s i n experiment I1

AGG

Late C phase

More s i g n s Anxiety

SEX

no yes no

Repression Barrter i s o l a t i o n Reaction formation

no

The only non-predicted result concerns 710+, disturbed sex attribution, which is more frequent in both provoking conditions than in NEU. We have interpreted it as an attempt to deny the personal relevance of the situation, equivalent to strategies found in the earlier experiment. Results for the AGG condition amply demonstrate that the stimulus has not functioned as intended. There are generally more signs in A G G than in N E U , but not distributed as expected. For instance, there is a tendency for the repression category 130+ to be more frequent in A G G than in N E U . The exposed penis of the male seems to have been a more effective provocation than the castrative intent of the woman. The lack of conflict in the sphere of aggression is remarkable. In the group of women studied, fantasies of castrating the male do not seem to be ego-dystonic. The results for anxiety point to provocation inefficiency in the A G G and to defense efficaciousness in the SEX condition. In the latter, the libidinal element of the stimulus is used to ward off the aggressive component. Thus the results for reaction formation against aggression stand in contrast to the hypothesis. Otherwise, the SEX condition gives results much as expected. This, together with the results of Westerlundh (1979), allows us to state that structural similarity of provoking subliminal and dependent percept-genetic stimulus is not a necessary condition for obtaining conflict activation effects in the research paradigm used. In the earlier experiment, the provoking stimuli constituted rather unequivocal meaning totalities, resulting in unitary main results for the

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

200

conditions: an increased frequency of barrier isolation for AGG and an increased frequency for introjectionlidentificationwith the opposite sex for SEX. In this experiment, the SEX stimulus has two main meaning components: the coitus and the violence towards the self representation. AS in Westerlundh ( 1 9 7 9 ) , the former, heterosexual taboo, leads to increased frequency of repression, the latter, to increased frequency of barrier isolation. Different subjects seem to react to the different aspects of the provocation. In this investigation, there were no systematic relationships between the criterion and the experimental geneses. AS stated in the first part of the chapter, defensive functioning in normals, as studied by percept-genetic methods, has been found to be flexible. This often causes little agreement between geneses. Many factors play a role here: technical differ- MCT, Palmquist, 1974); importance for the

ences (differences DMT

psychic dynamic of the conflict activated by the percept-genetic stimulus (e.g., good rf?l€itiOnShipS of the DMT to results frorn experiment on aggression, Westerlundh, 1976) ; and thematic relationship between the different percept-genetic stimuli ( e . g . , serial correspondence in the DMT) . This last factor should perhaps be stressed in the present context. A father daughter stimulus would have been more apposite for the conflicts studied. In the present investigation, the amauroscopic technique has been used to investigate certain conflict reactions in women. The results for the SEX condition provide further experimental support for Kragh's ( 1969) DMT scoring scheme. In this case, especially percept-genetic signs of repression have functioned according to theoretical expectations.

EXPERIMENT 111: A STUDY ON THE EFFECTS OF SUBLIMINAL STIMULI WITH INFANTILE CONTENT Relying on the same basic ideas as in the preceding two experiments, an application of the technique with subliminal stimuli of a different kind is presented in the third one. This time the depicted person, intended as self-representation distinguished by it 8ex, is an infant. This is important since such stimuli open a possibility to investigate developmental and etiological psychoanalytic hypotheses. A t the same time it can be expected that the number of non-hospitalized subjects, who react to specific themes like that, will be rather smail.

20 1

I n trapsychic Conflict Activation

Further, there is no control group in the study. This is a dangerous research strategy at best, but i t had to be used for reasons of cost efficiency. In these studies, we have often seen that the neutral control establishes an anxietyldefense baseline, and that a specific provocation leads to an increase in certain kinds of defensive reports. Results in the third group, with a contrasting provocation, often fall in between. The reason for this is twofold. Anxieties developmentally lean on one another, which leads to idiosyncratic interpretations, with a mixing of meanings, of the experimental stimuli. Secondly, a content used to ward off a certain provocation may in itself activate anxiety and further defensive activity. This means that to have a chance of achieving differentiation in a contrasting provocations design, it is necessary to use stimuli for which rathe r clearly differentiated predictions can be made. In this case, stimuli were chosen on the basis of the earlier studies in this series and Westerlundh's (1979) prior research. Both of the changes mentioned suggest a further type of data analy-

sis. Beside raw and weighted frequencies, the distribution on conditions of those with extremely high weights will be studied for certain frequent

signs. A s in the earlier studies, the meaning of the experimental operations determines the name given to the conditions. A s usual, they are called A G G and SEX.

SUBJECTS

The subjects werc 80 male university students, paid volunteers, randomly distributed over conditions, as shown in Table 18. Table 18 Distribution of subjects over conditions in Experiment 111

AGC

SEX 40

N

40

Age Mean

22

22

Age Range

21-28

21-25

202

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjobiick CRI JERlON GENESIS

The criterion genesis was studied by means of tachistoscopic presentations of the DMT M 2 , the picture for the second series of the male version of the DMT. Test administration and scoring completely followed that of the DUT.

EXPERIMEN JAL CONDITIONS

The subliminal stimuli depict two mother-child scenes. In the AGG condition, a crying, possibly starving baby is shown lying in a crib. A fat woman is sitting, turned away from i t , eating. In the SEX condition, a standing woman with a satisfied baby at her breast is shown. The meaning of the stimuli is discussed in the hypotheses section. They were always presented for 20 seconds at 45V. The tachistoscopic dependent stimulus following the subliminal presentations, was the DMT distractor picture showing an adult, reclining woman with a small boy, touching hcr bosom, in her lap. The interaction between them is positive or neutral. It was presented, ad modum DMT, for 20 exposures, or less if the subject reached C phase. The C phase criterion is three correct reports in a row. MASKING TASKS

The threshold task was administered concurrently with the amauroscopic subliminal presentations. SCORING

The percept-genetic material was scored by one author. All scoring was performed blindly.

HYPOTHESES

Since two conditions with supposedly different provoking content are being compared, the only type of hypothesis relevant in this investigation is that which concerns signs unique to the separate provoking conditions. Whereas the stimuli used in the earlier experiments were evidently provoking on common sense grounds, this is not the case with those of the pre-

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

203

sent one. However, they were developed on the basis of psychoanalytic developmental theory to relate to infantile conflicts. The theme of the tachistoscopic dependent stimulus is constructed so as to have clear oedipal connotations. The body contact of mother and child is centered on the erogenous zones of the woman and refers to the sexual aims of the oedipal child. But the satisfaction of such desire on the body of the mother is prohibited, a prohibition built into the child by the development of the superego at the resolution of the oedipus complex. The SEX stimulus depicts the most self-evident

of such satisfactions. In the

present context, it should strengthen the oedipal theme and give rise to phallic castration anxiety and to associated defense. Westerlundh (1979) found a differentiation in reports of anxiety: a phallic-sexual theme gave an increase in reports of anxiety (blackening) bound to objects, whereas an aggressive object theme increased reports of fear lunpleasure. A special developmental percept-genetic study of these phenomena has been made by Smith and Danielsson (1982). For S E X , in comparison to AGG , we thus expect:

( I ) an increasc in reports of anxiety bound to objects (620+), and especially, (11) an increase in reports of anxiety located on the intended self representation (castration anxiety, 621). A s for defenses, in line with earlier studies, we expect

(111) an increase in signs of repression (l..) in S E X . The AGG stimulus in this experiment relates to anxieties of being victimized by the bad, aggressive object. In this case it is an aggression by neglect, a theme of deprivation. The theme opens possibilities for oral-paranoid interpretations: "she is starving me while she gorges herself." In accordance with the earlier discussion, we expect that

(IV) if any form of anxiety increases in the AGG condition (in comparison to S E X ) , this should be of the fear/unpleasure kind (520+). Moreover it is expected:

(V) that reports of aggression and introaggression, generally (510+ 610+), and (VI) reports of aggression on the part of the self representation, turned towards object or self, in particular (511U611), will be more frequent in the AGG than in the SEX condition. Finally, since the theme is an aggressive one, we expect

(VII) an increase in reports of isolation (2. .) in AGO in comparison

B. Westerlundh and H. aob6ck

204

to the SEX condition. However, since the threat is not directly aimed at the body of the self representation, in which case we would have expected an increase especially in barrier isolation, we cannot predict exactly in what subgroup of isolation the increase will fall.

SCORING VARIANTS AND EXPERIMENTAL MEASURES

The scoring scheme used for the distractor picture i s , with few exceptions the same as that presented earlier. The boy is regarded as hero, the woman as pp. The exceptions are as follows: Repression: for a variant of repression to be scored for pp. the configuration corresponding to the sign must be located a t , or include, the upper part of the depicted womanls body, not just her legs and hips. Isolation: there are just two variants of the 2 1 category, 210, as before, and 211, hero and pp being separated in space and having no body contact. 2 4 2 is not scored before pp has been reported (DMT initial 242b:s are not scored). With the stimulus used, pp often has a higher threshold than hero. This was not the case with the stimuli used in thc earlier studies, where all such reports were of the DMT 242a kind. Reaction formation: as regards 420, only reports of positive mood which have been given spontaneously and not as a result of inquiry, have been scored. Existence of variants of sign 4 is compatible with C phase ascription. Identification with the opposite sex: the scoring of variants of sign 7 is adapted to the stimulus. Thus 710 means that hero is given female and

pp malc sex, etc. A category 991, hero is an adult, is added. Extreme weights: In order not to multiply analyses in studying the extreme groups, a simple cut-off criterion was applied. When a weighted sign was found in more than 15 subject in A G G and SEX together, the distribution on conditions of the 5 to 6 most extreme subjects was studied. M e n such a sign was found in more than 20 subjects in AGG and SEX together, the distribution of the 10 to 1 2 most extreme was studied. The comparisons of extremes are indicated by a rlW1’ after the sign designation ( 1 + W , etc.).

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

205

RESUL TS

In accordance with expectations, the conditions do not differ as rcgards C phase and number of scored signs. The results for signs predicted specifically to increase in the AGG condition are presented in Table 19. The hypothesis of an increase in the Table 19 Unique signs, aggression. The frequency of isolation, aggressionlintroaggression and fearlunpleasure in the conditions. Onetailed tests.

AGG

SEX

2+

36

37

__

210+

33

32

NS

220+230+

27

23

NS

230

17

7

.05

240+

10

4

.10

2+v

20

16

NS

210+v

15

17

NS

220+230+240+V

16

9

.10

2+w

5

5

NS

210+w

4

7

NS

9 20+230+240+W

9

2

.05

51G+610+

12

11

NS

511U6ll

9

3

.10

510+610+V

7

5

NS

511U611 V

6

1

.10

3

4

Isolation raw

weighted

extremes

Aggressionlintroaggresston raw

weighted

Fearlunpleasure raw 52W

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjoback

206

anxiety sign of fearlunplcasure was not supported. This, as stated earlie r , can be due to inefficiency of the provocation or efficiency of the defenses used. The hypothesis of an increase of reports of aggressionhntroaggression is not generally supported, but as expected, there are tendencies showing an increase of such reports as regards the hero. A number of tendencies and significances show an increase in a subcategory of isolation, compulsive discontinuities. Thus there is the expected increase of isolation, but in a subgroup of reports hitherto not influenced. Table 20 gives the equivalent results for the SEX condition. Table 20 Unique signs, sexuality. The frequency of repression and blackeningjanxiety in the conditions. Onetailed tests.

AGG

SEX

1+

18

19

NS

110+140t

11

12

NS

120+

10

10

NS

Repression

PACG>SEX

raw

weighted

11

NS

10+140+V

8

.10

120+v

6

NS

0

6

.05

620+

8

16

.05

621

5

14

.05

1+v

extreme s 1tw Rlackening/anxiety raw

weighted 620+V

3

9

.10

621V

2

8

.05

As can be seen, the hypothesis of an increase of reports of blacken-

inglanxiety is well supported, both generally and as regards the hero. The hypothesis for repression receives an amount of support. There is a tendency for increasc of rigid repression in the comparison for the weighted sign, and a significant difference for the sign generally, as regards

Intropsychic Conflict Activation

201

extremes. There seems to be a subgroup of subjects who are very much influenced b y the experimental operation in this condition and thus increase their use of repressive defense. Table 2 1 presents the results that were not predicted. Since reports Table 21 Non-predicted d i f f e r e n c e s . Significances and tendencies, twotailed tests.

Reaction formation

AGG

SEX

P

~

~

~

raw 25

24

NS

410+

14

22

.10

420

18

8

.05

2

9

.05

4+

Adult hero extremes 991w

of positive interaction or mood could be expected to increase in both conditions, no hypotheses were formulated for this type of report. In the SEX condition, they could increase as a result of break-through of the libidinal theme (as seen earlier in these studies), whereas they could increase a s defensive reaction formations in AGG. What is actually found is a differen-

tial increase.

There is a weak tendency for reports of positive interaction

to be given by more persons in the SEX condition, whereas reports of positive mood are significantly more prevalent in AGG. Finally, in SEX, i . e . ,

the incest taboo condition, there are signifi-

cantly more often long series of reports of hero as an adult. This is another instance of the defensive meaning transformation strategies used to save persons from conscious unpleasure. I N T E R R E L A TIONSHIP OF SIGNS

No significant relations or tendencies were found between the independent signs which significantly or tendentiously increase in a condition. Evidently, such signs are distributed over many persons. The total number of persons (category ttTotal't) showing such signs is 34 in the AGG condition and 31 in the SEX condition.

>

~

B. Westerlundh and H.Sjoback

208 T H E C R I T E R I O N PERCEPTGENESIS

The criterion genesis stimulus was, as stated, the DMT M 2 picture administered and scored ad niodum DMT. Thirteen classes were created. Those significantly related to experimental categories are presented, with ascription requirements and group frequencies, in Table 2 2 . A s can be seen, there are no significant differences between the conditions. Table 22 The DMT classes.

DMT classes

120t

variants

120, 121, 122.

designation and

condition frequencies

ascription requirements

AGG

SEX

Less rigid repressions;

5

3

15

21

9

11

10

15

9

11

11

7

appearance

210

210a, 210b, 210c.

Barrier isolation; appearance

243

243.

Affectless perception; at least 6 scored in genesis

4t

410, 411, 412, 420, 4 3 0 .

Reaction formation; appearance

41Ot

410, 411, 412.

Reaction formation 11; appearance

620

620.

Blackeninglanxiety appearance

E X P E R I M E N T A L - C R I T E R I O N GENESIS R E L A T I O N S H I P S

A s in earlicr studies, the 15 signs, which have shown experimental increase in frequency, have, together with the "Total" category, been related to the criterion genesis. Results are shown in Table 23. Predictions are from the DMT. There are R number of interesting relationships between the geneses. In the SEX condition, affectless perception (243) in the DklT tends to be negatively related to the Total category, indicating that persons with this

1

Fa V

a

a V

m

. i D

9

m

00.

rl

?

0

0 m

00.

m

9

0

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

r D ,

4 d

+

0 rl N

V

a

U

LI

o

m

c1

ri

0

0

?

m

0 m

4

00.

m

m

9 9

m

+ +

d

? ?

4

5‘9

x Y cn

0

I

x 9

209

B. Westerlundh and H.Goback

210

type of adaptation do not react to the experimental operation. Those with barrier isolation (210) in the DMT tend to react to the aggressive provocation, especially with reaction formation. There are some relations between blackeninglanxiety (62. .) in the DMT and in the S E X condition, indicating an activation of oedipal castration anxiety common to the themes despite their difference as regards content. There are also R number of further relationships between signs in the geneses.

DISCUSSION

Hypotheses and outcome are recapitulated in Table 2 4 . Table 24 Summary of hypotheses and results in Experiment I11

AGG

Isolation

yes (discontinuities)

Aggressionlintroaggression, generally

no

Aggressionlintroaggression, hero

(yes)

Fearlunpleasure

No

SEX

Repression

Yes

Blackeninglanxiety, generally

yes

Blackeninglanxiety, hero

Yes

There is some support for all hypotheses, except that for fearlunpleasure in the AGG condition. In all experiments in this series, results for the SEX condition have been stronger generally, especially so for affect manifestations. This may be due to the activation of the defense of affect isolation in some AGG subjects which results in stimulus adequate reports to the neutral tachistoscopic stimuli. The non-predicted results of an increase in reports of positive interaction in SEX and of positive mood in AGG, as well as in long sequences of reports of adult hero in S E X , are in line with our general expectations for the operations used. These results allow us to conclude that the contrasting groups design has worked in this experiment. This is especially interesting, since pictures of mother-child interactions were used as experimental stimuli, and

Zntrapsychic Conflict Activation

21 1

the subjects were non-hospitalized. Evidently, early self and object representations remain dynamically active even in members of such a group. There were no significant interrelations between the increasing signs, which implies that they are widely distributed over persons in a condition. However, in contrast to results in the second experiment, there were a number of relationships between experimental and criterion percept-genesis classes. This highlights the central position of the conflict evoked by the DMT, especially for male subjects. In the comparison of experimental and criterion geneses, somc negative relations between DMT 243, affectless perception and reactions to the provocation of the AGG condition were found. This should be related to the equivalent result for few scored signs in the criterion genesis in the first experiment. A s w e have just argued, few signs in the neutral percept-geneses may well be another instance of isolation of affect. Such inhibitions of aggression and affect are often characterological, i.e. , have a traitlike character (Fenichel, 1946). The same type of criterion-experimental genesis relationships were found by Westerlundh (1976). A point of importance in the present study is that the interaction of meaning between independent and dependent stimuli is rather complex in

the SEX condition. There, i t is not just an introduction of a provocation affecting a neutral stimulus, it is an activation of contents which relate to a prohibited oedipal aim by the use of an independent oral t'aim'l and a dependent oedipal "forepleasure" stimulus. When object cathexes are abandoned, internal object relationships remain. The use of stimuli such as those of the present experiment opens an avenue for the study of psychoanalytic developmental and etiological hypotheses. This step towards central theoretical propositions has, of course, already been taken by Silverman ( e . g . , 1982) whose stimuli have moved from "a tiger chasing a monkey" to directly incestuous and oedipal messages.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Evidently, the experimental testing of psychoanalytic propositions hinges upon the correspondence of the experimental variables to the theor y . The concepts underlying the present operationalization were discussed in the first section of the chapter. Roughly, we build upon the following two basic conceptions:

B. Westerlundh and H. Sjoback

212

(1) The proposition that internal and external stimuli are processed equivalently by the mental apparatus (Rapaport, 1960; Sandler & Joffe, 1969), opens a way for systematic experimental activation of drive and affect states by subliminal stimuli. ( 2 ) The possibility to study the consequences of this in mental functioning is assured by the compatibility of percept-genetic data with those obtained b y psychoanalytic observation methods ( c f . , Westerlundh & Smith, 1983). This has been discussed by Kline (19811, who concludes that the perceptgenetic methods assess defenses as conceivcd of in psychoanalysis. This conclusion is strengthened by the present research. The experimental strategy used has a number of limitations (frequent conflict themes have to be used; the hypotheses have to concern frequent types of defensive transformations). Yet, it has been possible to substantiate psychoanalytic descriptions of the nature and components of intrapsychic conflict and to provide experimental validation of a number of important scoring dimensions of Kragh's (1969) DMT. In particular, we have demonstrated that the cognitive reinterprctation of percept-genesis is not tenable, A s stated, this reinterpretation tries to explain the effectiveness of percept-genetic instruments in diagnosis and high-stress job selection in cognitive terms : that percept-genesis reveals a generally incomplete or primitive type of sense data analysis. However, the predicted differential results of these and other experiments using percept-geneses as dependent variables show that the scoring dimensions actually function in the manner of defenses as described in psychoanalytic theory. Genernlly, the results of this series of experiments on normals seem to point to the prevalence and importance of conflict in human mental functioning. They are not compatible with theoretical orientations that play down the role of intrapsychic conflict in the mediation of human behavior (e.g., Bandura, 1969).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The reported research was supported by the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Intrapsychic Conflict Activation

213

REFERENCES Bandura, A. (1969). Principles of Behavior Modification. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Dixon, N.F. (1971). Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy. London: McGraw-Hill. Dixon, N.F. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Fenichel, 0. (1946). The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Finney, D.J., Latscha, R., Bennett, B.M., & Hsu, P. (1963). Tables for Testing

Significance in a 2 x 2 contingency table. Cambridge: The Biometrika trustees. Freud, A. (1946). The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. New York: International Universities Press. Freud, S. (1959). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. Standard Edition (Vol. 20, pp. 87-172). London: Hogarth Press. Hallborg, A. (1971). En undersbkning med storleks-avstandstecknik av kathek-

tiska preferenser jiimfbrt med personlighetskarakteristika i DMT och AlS. Unpublished FiLIic. thesis, Dept of Psychology, Lund University. Hartmann, H. (1964). Essays on Ego Psychology. New York: International Universities Press. Hays, W.L.

(1973). Statistics for t h e Social Sciences (2nd ed.).

New York:

Holt, Rinehart RC Winston. Heath, D. (1958). Projective tests as measures of defensive activity. Journal

of Projective Techniques, 22, 284-292. Holley, J.W., & Risberg, J. (1972). On the D estimate of discriminatory effectiveness. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 12( 12). Kline, P. (1981). Fact and Fantasy in Freudian Theory (2nd ed.).

London:

Met huen. Kragh, U.

(1969).

Manual till DMT. Defense Mechanism Test.

Stockholm:

Skandinaviska Test forlaget. Kragh, U. (1971). Kodshema f o r DMT. Mimeo, Department of Psychology, Lund University. Kragh, U. (1980). Rekonstruktion verschiedener Aspekte einer Personlichkeitsentwicklung mit dem Defense-Mechanism-Test: U. Hentschel 81 G.J.W.

eine Fallbeschreibung.

In

Smith (Eds.), Experimentelle PerGnlichkeitspsy-

chologie (pp. 107-131). Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Kragh, U., & Kroon, T. (1966). An analysis of aggression and identification in

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young offenders by t h e study of perceptual development. Human Development, 9, 209-221. Kragh, U., & Smith, G.J.W.

(1970). Percept-Genetic Analysis. Lund: Gleerup.

Mainland, D., Herrera, L., & Sutcliffe, M.I. (1956). Statistical Tables for Use with Binomial Samples. New York: Department of medical statistics, N.Y.U.

college of medicine.

Nilsson, I.-K., Colleen, S., & Mardh, P.-A. (1975). Relationship between psychological and laboratory findings in patients with symptoms of nonacute prostatitis. In D. Danielsson, L. Juhlin, & P.-A. Mardh (Eds.), Genital Infections and Their Complications. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksel International. Palmquist, A. (1974). JHmfbrelser av DMT och MCT baserade p a fyra kliniska grupper. Unpublished fiL1ic. thesis, Lund: Department of Psychology. Poetzl, 0. (1917). Experimentell erregte Traumbilder in ihren Beziehungen zum indirekten Sehen. Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 37, 278-349.

Rapaport, D. (1951). Toward a theory of thinking. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and Pathology of Thought. New York: Columbia University Press. Rapaport, D. (1960) The structure of psychoanalytic theory. Psychological Issues, (Monograph No.6). New Y o r k International Universities Press. Sander, F., & Volkelt, H. (1962). Ganzheitspsychologie. Munchen: Beck. Sandler, j., & Joffe, W. (1965). Notes on obsessional manifestations in children. The Psychoanalytic Study of t h e Child, 20, 425-438. Sandler, J., & Joffe, W. (1969). Towards a basic psychoanalytic model. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 50, 79-91. Sarnoff, 1. (1971). Testing Freudian Concepts. New York: Springer. Sharma, V.P. Application of a perceptgenetic test in a clinical setting. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Lund University: Depart ment of Psychology. Silverman, L.H. (1982). The subliminal psychodynamic activation method: Overview and comprehensive listing of studies. In J. Masling (Ed.), Empirical Studies of Psychoanalytic Theory (Vol. 1, pp. 69-100). New jersey: Erlbaum. Silverman, L.H., & Geisler, C.J. (this volume, chapter 3). The subliminal psychodynamic activation method: Comprehensive listing update, individual differences, and other considerations. Sjobiick, H. (1973). The Psychoanalytic Theory of Defensive Processes. York: Wiley.

New

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& Henriksson, M. (1955). The effect on an established percept

of a perceptual process beyond awareness. Acta Psychologica, 11, 346355. Smith, C.J.W.,

Spence, D.P., & Klein, G.S.

(1959). Subliminal effects of verbal

stimuli. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 167-176. Smith, G.J.W.,

& Danielsson, A.

(1982). Anxiety and defensive strategies in

childhood and adolescence. Psychological Issues (Monograph No. 52). New York: International Universities Press. Westerlundh, B. (1976). Aggression, Anxiety, and Defence. Lund: Gleerup. Westerlundh, B. (1979). Conflict activation: Two experimental operations and their influence on percept-genesis. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund

University, lY(8). Westerlundh, B., & Smith, G.J.W.

(1983). Perceptgenesis and the psychodyna-

mics of perception. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6, 597640.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Dmguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

217

PERCEPT-GENETIC DEFENSES AGAINST ANXIETY A N D A THREATENED SENSE OF SELF AS SEEN IN TERMS OF THE SPIRAL AFTEREFFECT TECHNIQUE Alf L. Andersson and Margot Bengtsson Lund University, Sweden

INTRODUCTION The Spiral Aftereffect Technique (SAT) (Andersson, 1969, 1972) and a modified version of the Kragh (1960) Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) are both so-called perceptgenetic tools (Kragh

&

Smith, 1970; Smith

&

Wester-

lundh, , 1980) developed for personality research and diagnostic purposes. They were employed in the present study with the aim of exploring relationships between measures they provided and of cross-validating, i f possible, the findings of a previous investigation involving male subjects (Andersson 8 Weikert, 1 9 7 4 , 1980). Subjects in the present study were female university students. The DMT was administered as an individual test, rather than as a group test as in the previous study, Moreover, the second of two tachistoscopically presented motifs in the DMT was varied from that normally employed with women subjects, the peripherally placed figure of a threatening woman bcing exchanged for that of a threatening man. Thus the version of DMT used here allowed perceptgenetic defenses to appear in relation to a "threatening other" of each sex. Despite these differences a s compared with the earlier investigation, our expectation was that the same basic relationships between SAT and DMT measures would be found as previously. In the SAT the subject reports the duration of the aftereffect experience resulting from viewing a rotating spiral line. Ten trials are given in direct succession, thus providing ten duration scores in sequence. One of the major measures pertaining to the sequence is that of the final level of aftereffect duration ( f L ) , referred to a s SAT identity; another is an expression of linear regression or change in aftereffect duration over the ten trials ( R ) , referred to as SAT strategy. It turned out in the Andersson

&

218

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

Weikert (1974) study that the fL and R variables were both related to perceptgenetic defense indices in the DMT , but to basically different ones.

SAT STRATEGY A N D PERCEPT-GENETIC DEFENSES In the Andersson & Weikert (1974) study there was a pronounced difference in SAT strategy between subjects scored for repression and those scored for introaggression or turning (of aggression) against the self in DMT. (Details of scoring appear in the Method section.) A s predicted, repression tended to occur together with a minus trend (RcO) in SAT and introaggression together with a plus trend (R>O). When descriptions of negative intent were obtained regarding not the hero (introaggression) but the hero's attribute or the peripheral, threatening figure (projected introaggression), a minus trend in SAT tended to be more common than a plus trend, For the type of isolation in DMT, where a clear-cut barrier was introduced between the hero and the peripheral figure, the question of which SAT trend obtained was found to depend on whether or not the subject also displayed repression. When appearing without repression it was accompanied b y a plus trend. Unfortunately, we were unable to investigate such a relationship in the present study since practically no subject was found to score for isolation of the type just described. Regarding two other forms of isolation, namely loss of the total configuration reported in a previous exposure and the threatening figure being reported as a white or shining field or object, support was obtained in the previous study for the prediction that these would more often be found among subjects classified as LL or M,, in SAT (cf. Method) than among s other subjects. Another form of isolation, considered here, though not examined in the previous study, is characterized by a frame or contour reported at the location of the peripheral figure being empty of inside content. This defensive measure may be more closely akin to the form of isolation where a clear-cut barrier is introduced between the hero and the peripheral figure than to one where the threat is "whitewashed. There were two other indices of defense not considered in the previous study, indices based on specific scorings of repression and projected introaggression. The indices in question were named by Kragh (1969) after the clinical state to which they are assumed to relate. One, "depressive

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral Aftereffect Technique inhibition,

219

refers to repression scores of the peripheral figure appearing

in a consecutive series of phases. The other, 'Idepression without inhibition, involves projected introaggression scores appearing late in the DMT genesis, obtained for the peripheral figure. In a previous study concerning a clinical group, a plus trend in SAT was more often found with !la depressive mood not possible to divert" and a minus trend with !la depressive mood possible to divert" (Andersson, 1967). Since these characteristics appeared together with more and with less frequent occurrence, respectively, of clinically observed depressive inhibition, it was predicted that the DMT index of depressive inhibition would be linked with a plus trend in SAT, depression without inhibition with a minus trend. This prediction, to be s u r e , might seem at odds with a finding of Smith et al. (1971) that ratings of depressive retardation in a moderately depressive clinical group were more often linked with a minus rather than a plus trend. In that study, however, the SAT trend estimate was primarily determined by trials in excess of the ten of the standard technique used here. Another sign considered in the present, but not in the previous, study should strictly speaking be regarded not as an indication of defense but as an attempt by the subject to express the anticipated danger or anxiety experienced in the DMT. Rather than taking the form of (la specific meaning" (as in repression, introaggression or projected introaggression) or "an exclusion of meaning" (as in some forms of isolation), such an expression should be characterized by the reverse of this: looseness, vagueness, unstructuredness, etc. This is exactly what Kragh (1969) and Smith, Johnson,

&

Almgren (1982) have interpreted a s anxiety, and (as

described under Method) we have adopted from them two perceptgenetic varieties by which anxiety is assumed to be expressed. Since expressions of anxiety are centered on the personal self, it was reasoned that they should more often appear in connection with a plus trend in SAT ("self orientation") than with a minus trend ("nonself orientation"). It was also reasoned that the awareness and expression of anxiety should be more common among subjects who are prone to manifest anxiety, especially subjects who could be expected, in particular, to display an H+ pattern (cf. Method) in SAT (Andersson, 1972; Smith, Hentschel, & Andersson, 1980). There were also other DMT indices considered in relation to the R variable in the previous study. One of these, introaggressionlstereotypy, could not be dealt with here, since the shift in testing procedure made it

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

220

impossible to use the previous form of scoring. Another index, projection/ sensitivity, had been found in the previous study to be partly confounded with other indices, making an assessment of its separate contribution to variations in the R variable difficult. Because of this and because of difficulties which were soon observed in applying the previous form of scoring, we decided to make no use of this index in the present study either.

W e decided, on the other hand, to explore still another index of defense, reaction formation, not in relationship to the R variable as previously, but in relationship to the fL variable. This was due to a reconsideration of the possible relationships between SAT and DMT measures as presented below.

SAT IDENTITY A N D PERCEPTGENETIC DEFENSES

In the previous study, reaction formation was scored whenever the threatening figure was denoted as sympathetic andlor had, o r tried to get, a positive contact with the hero. In some subjects this perceptgenetic defense was even more pronounced, the hero and the peripheral figure also being judged a s having a mutually active and positive relationship. All subjects with this last-mentioned characteristic were likewise scored for some or one of various possible forms of introjection, namely introjection of the opposite sex (male subjects reporting the male hero in a long series of exposures as being female or reporting changes of the sex of the hero from male to female), polymorphous introjection (both hero and the peripheral figure being reported as children, or two persons being reported at the place of the hero, or report being given of many shifts of the scx of the hero), or projected introjection (the peripheral figure being explicitly denoted as the mother of the boylhero or a s a child younger than the hero). A s predicted, introjection indices in the Andersson

&

Weikert (1974)

study were more often found with subjects who obtained a SAT classification of LLs, LL, L , or H than with M subjects who have an intermediate fL (cf. Method). Moreover, projected introjection was more often found with H subjects than with other subjects. We expected the same results to appear in the present study. We also wanted to explore relationships between the

fL variable and other indices which, like introjection. could be subsumed under the category of perceptgenetic defense referred to recently as disavowal (Andersson, 1983), a category implying defensive denial through

22 1

PerceptGenetic Defenses and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

a reversal in meaning of the "true" characteristics of a DMT motif. Such reversals were found to primarily apply to the sex, age, number, or threat characteristics of the hero andlor the peripheral figure; they were assumed to be used by the subject in the presence of anxiety due to a threatened sense of self. In contrast, M subjects, due to their more autonomous

and

self-providing

identity,

were

expected

to

be

less

vulnerable to anxiety of this sort as aroused by a threat external to the (projected) self, i . e . , as aroused by the kind of object relation brought about by the DMT. We were also interested in distinguishing, if possible, between two kinds of disavowal indices, those which at least in some sense corresponded to the distinction previously made between projected introjection and other forms of introjection. The guiding principle here was the (heuristic) idea of the hero figure representing the projected self (as a child or teenager) and of the peripheral figure representing the projected other (as a parental, threatening adult). These self and other representations are seen as part of the same unit o r totality, the assumption being that when the defense of disavowal is activated i t may indicate more of one than of the other of two basic interactional or relational conditions (Andersson, 1984). One of these, the more primordial one, implies a kind of subordination to the other a s a way of maintaining a secure sense of self. Within the selfother relationship which is activated here, there is more of a denial or devaluation of the subject's own sense of self than of the identity of the other. In contrast to this, a secure sense of self may be achieved or maintained by means of the reverse of subordination, where instead of denying one's own sense of self, the subject denies, devaluates, or takes over, the identity of the (powerful) other. Such a denial might take the form of what above was referred to as projected introjection. We could also think of the following percept-genetic expressions of this form of denial through reversal: substitution of the peripheral figure and of the hero for each other, taking on of characteristics by the hero, like those of old age o r , possibly, the peripheral figure's threatening character ( "identification with the aggressor!' in Kragh, 1969), shifts in the sex of the peripheral figure, and more than one person being seen at the place of the peripheral figure. None of these indices were used in the Andersson L Weikert (1974) study, but these or similar indices have been explored in other perceptgenetic

A.L. Andersson and M . Bengtsson

222

studies (Smith & Nordstrom, 1975; Sharma, 1977; Neuman, 1978; Smith B Danielsson, 1982 : Westerlundh, 1982) Since disavowal was understood as denial through reversal of mean-

.

ing, we were also interested in a kind of defense which could be referred to as plain denial - not to be confused with the psychodynamic defense of negation (cf. Sjoblck. 1973). Plain denial is a defensive measure which does not operate by means of reversal but is nevertheless directed primarily against external danger or something representing external danger. According to Anna Freud (1946). the counterpart of such a defense, if directed against internal danger, would be repression. This suggests that (plain) denial should be more related to the R variable than to the fL variable o r , possibly, to a combination of these variables. We could think of two varieties of denial, both subsumed by Kragh (1969) under the defense of isolation. The more clear-cut one is revealed by a long series in which no reference is made to the peripheral figure or in which there is a refusal to give an interpretation of this figure beyond that of it being "something." The other variety involves a refusal to report any kind of threatening or even unsympathetic connotation of the peripheral figure. This kind of denial might, however, be closer to the defense of disavowal than to plain denial. Accordingly, in the final scheme of scoring it was subsumed under the category of disavowal.

METHOD SUBJECTS

After the exclusion of two subjects who turned out to have been acquainted with the DMT beforehand, the present sample comprised 48 female students who had just begun their studies at Lund University. They were all tested with the SAT and DMT as part of a more comprehensive investigation, both of subjects' patterns of perceived similarity (identification) with their parents, and of their choice of an area for academic studies (Bengtsson, 1 9 8 3 ) . Half of the subjects had just commenced their studies in humanities, the other half in natural sciences. Their median age was 2 0 . 4 years. with an age range of 19 to 35 years (as compared with a median age of 22 years and an age range of 20 to 3 1 years in the previous, male sample).

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

223

SA T

The standard SAT procedure was employed, i . e . , each subject was f i s t acquainted with the aftereffect phenomenon before the main trials began about half an hour later. A s usual, the aftereffect was induced on each trial by means of the subject's watching for 45 seconds a spiral line seeming to rotate towards its center. Immediately thereafter, a stationary circle was shown onto which the subject "projected" her aftereffect experience of apparent expansion andlor approach of the circle. The subject's task was to determine when the aftereffect experience had terminated and to report this to the experimenter (cf. Fig. 1). For a full account of the SAT, the reader should consult Andersson (1972). The apparatus was the same as described in Andersson, Nilsson, and Henriksson (1970).

ROTATINQ SPIRAL WUlCH APPEARS TO CONTRACT

-

45 SEC -~ --T

TIME DIMENSION

+ I

AFTEREFFECT OURITION

n

POINTOF REFERENCE WHERE THE CIRCLE IS PERCEIVED AS STATIONARV

Figure 1. The SAT during one t r i a l (from Andersson, 1983).

The ten main trials were in direct succession and the scores of aftereffect duration obtained from them were used when calculating the appropriate measures. The arithmetic mean of trials 9 and 10 defined the fL

A.L. Andersson and M . Bengtsson

224

measure. The R measure was calculated according to the formula 4.5t10+ 3.5t +2.5t +l.5t7+0.5t6-(0.5t5+1. 5t4+2.5t3+3 .5t2+4,5tl), where tl, t 2 , etc. 9 8 denote the consecutive scores of aftereffect duration within a margin of exactness of half a second. The cutoff points for the fL and R measures used in defining various SAT groups (cf. Fig. 2 ) , were taken from Andersson (1969) and Andersson k Weikert (1974). The H group referred to subjects with fL above 16.5 seconds; the M group to fL being in the range of 7.5 to 16.5 seconds; the L group to fL being below 7.5 but above or at 3.25 seconds; the LL group

to fL being below 3.25 seconds. Subjects with none of their ten scores above 2.5 seconds were not placed in the LL group but in the LLs group. The minus (-) or plus (+) trend was indicated by appending the appropriate sign to the subject’s L , M , or H designation. LLs and LL subjects were always considered to have a minus trend. A zero ( 0 ) trend, used only with M subjects, was defined by the R range of -20 to +20. The subjects a s a whole showed the following distribution: 2LLs, 7LL, 12L-, 1L+, EM- (of whicb 3 were Mo), 6 M + (of which none was Mo), 5H-, and 7H+.

Figure 2. Schematic presentation of different spiral aftereffect (SAE) patterns over the t r i a l s (from Andersson, 1983).

Percept-Genetic Defenees and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

225

DMT

The apparatus used for tachistoscopic exposure of the DMT motifs was the same as described by Kragh (1969).

The exposure times followed an

increasing scale of 1 5 steps from 10 to 50 milliseconds. This scale was used with each of the two main motifs in an attempt to repeat a s closely as possible the conditions employed in the previous study. A distractor motif was shown for 30 milliseconds three times: prior to presentation of the first main motif series, between presentations of the

first and second main motif series, and following the presentation of the second main motif series. The distractor motif was constructed to be a s neutral in content as possible, displaying a field of unpatterned dots. The reason for choosing this motif to frame the exposure series of the main motifs was experience from the previous study indicating that in some subjects distinct connotations of a distractor motif (as in the standard DMT) easily penetrate into the reports of the subsequent main motifs. The subject's task was to make a simple drawing of what she had perceived after each exposure and to supplement the drawing with a verbal statement which the experimenter recorded. In the instruction, the subject was told to report all impressions she might have of an exposure. She was also told to report any person she saw and, if she did see one, to t r y to report the person's state of mind, age, and sex. Using this instruction kept inquiries during testing at a minimum. The instruction was similar to the one used in the previous study, with one exception. In that study subjects were told beforehand (in line with the group testing procedure) to report any threat that might possibly occur. In the main motif shown to the subject first in the present study, the centrally placed hero figure was a girl sitting at a table with a plate on it. In the right-hand upper corner of the picture the upper part of the body of a middle-aged woman who had a threatening expression on her face was shown. In the second main motif the hero figure was a female teenager who was kneeling and holding a half-opened wrist-bag in her hands. Behind h e r , in the left-hand upper corner of the picture, was the upper part of the body of a middle-aged man who was stretching his hand towards h e r , displaying a threatening expression on his face. In scoring the DMT, the two main series were treated separately. If not otherwise indicated, the scoring as presented below refers to the occurrence of a sign in any phaselexposure of the two series. There was

226

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

practically total agreement between independently made scorings by the two authors. The only index where some uncertainty prevailed was the second category of anxiety. Here there were two cases where we had to settle the scoring by finding and agreeing on supportive signs in the DMT protocols as a whole. The scoring scheme was guided by the considerations mentioned in the introduction and was made as similar as possible to the onc used and presented in Andersson

&

Weikert (1974). When needed, for example, for

describing a defensive category more inclusively than previously or for determining the number of phases required for a scoring not previously used, Kragh's (1969) scheme was consulted. However, for two of his categories, to which we refer as disavowal 4a and 5a, it WAS decided on the basis of the present protocol material to introduce the requirement that a sign appear in at least two phases for the category to be scored. A s already noted in the introduction, some varieties of DMT defenses were not observed among the present subjects and consequently were not included in the scheme which follows. It should be observed that this scheme partly deviates from the one used by Kragh (1969) as it is described in chapter 9 . Repression. The (1) hero and/or ( 2 ) the peripheral figure or face is reported as (a) petrified, inanimate, or disguised. (b) an animal, or ( c ) a specified object. (3) Hero's attribute is reported as (a) a petrified or inanimate creature or (b) an animal. Repression l b and l c , as listed here, were not found among the present subjects. Introaggression , The hero is reported as injured, worthless, unhappy, exposed, or whatever, as directing aggression, criticism, and the like against her/himself, or as involved in situation of destruction or chaos. Projected introaggression. The (1) peripheral figure is reported as injured, tormented, dejected, unhappy, frightened, alarmed, worried, exposed, or whatever, or ( 2 the hero's attribute is reported as damaged, broken, worthless, something bad, as restricting, and the like, o r , in the exposure series of the second motif, as being dropped or missing. Isolation. (1) There is loss in one phase or in two consecutive phases of the total content reported earlier. The peripheral figure is reported as ( 2 ) a

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral Aftereffect Technique

221

light or shining object, surface or face, or as ( 3 ) an object, surface, or face in contour, i t s inside being empty. Depression. (1) Repression 2a or repression 2c is found in at least 5 consecutive phases, or ( 2 ) projected introaggression 1 is observed in at least 2 phases late in the series of exposures (exposures 11 to 15).

Anxiety. (1) Something dissolved, fragmentary, or shaded is reported at the location of the peripheral figure before it is reported as a person or a face; this scoring is not given when the peripheral figure is simply reported as a diffuse spot, something diffuse, or whatever, without further specification. ( 2 ) The report of the peripheral figure as a person or a face is changed to its being seen as something dissolved, diffuse, blurred, greyish, whitish, and the like, or to its being markedly smudged out (but not lost); i t is not scored when the peripheral figure is simply reported as less visible than before. Denial. There is nothing reported at the place of the peripheral figure, or this figure is not interpreted beyond being "something (light/dark)" in at least 7 consecutive phases from the first phase (exposure) onward. Disavowal. The following varieties of disavowal were seored, specified here according to the kind of more or less clear-cut reversal used by the subject: (1)

through doubling or multiplying (a) the hero figure ( b ) the peripheral figure

(2)

through substitution, that is (a) exchange in location of the hero and the peripheral figure (b) the peripheral figure being reported as looking like the hero

(3)

through inversed or indefinite sex (a) the sex of the hero i s changed from being correct in one phase to incorrect in the next and is denoted as incorrect or indefinite in the last (15th) phase (b) the same as (a) but the correct sex of the hero being denoted in the last phase (c) the sex of the hero being incorrect in all phases where it is denoted ( d ) the sex of the hero being incorrect in at least 8 consecutive phases where the sex is denoted

A.L. Andersson and M.Bengtsson

228

(el the sex of the hero being indefinite in all phases ( f ) the sex of the peripheral figure being changed from being correct in one phase to being incorrect in the next (not scored when the peripheral figure is denoted as unsympathetic or threatening at the phase where change occurs) through incorrect age (a) both hero and the peripheral figure being reported as children in at least 2 phases (not scored when the peripheral figure is denoted as unsympathetic or threatening in these phases) (b) the hero being reported as child or a young person and the peripheral figure as a (neither unsympathetic nor threatening) person younger than the hero (this category was not observed among the present subjects) (c) the hero being changed from a child or young person in one phase to an elderly person ( 3 5 years of age or more ) in the next ( d ) the hero being reported as an elderly person in at least 12 consecutive phases through inversion of threat or lack of recognition of it (a) the peripheral figure is denoted as positive, or both the hero nnd the peripheral figure are reported as positive or as having a positive relationship in at least 2 phases ( b ) the hero being reported as angry or threatening, whereas the peripheral figure is seen as neither unsympathetic nor threatening (c) the peripheral figure in the exposure series of the second motif being explicitly denoted as the hero's (neither unsympathetic nor threatening) mother (d) the peripheral figure, though reported as a person or a face, being reported in no phase as unsympathetic or threatening.

RESULTS Among the present subjects perceptgenetic indices of disavowal were more than twice as common for the first DMT motif, with the female threat, than for the second, with the male threat. This finding was the reverse of that for DMT indices other than disavowal, that were more than twice as frequent for the second motif as for the first.

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

229

Comparing the indices of repression and introaggression yielded results in the expected direction; introaggression occurred more often with a plus trend in SAT, repression more often with a minus trend (Table 1; Fisher's exact test of 2x2 tables, two-tailed, is used throughout comparisons, both in the tables and in the text). Table 1 Distribution of subjects on SAT patterns and on DMT indices of repression and introaggression

Characteristic

LLs, LL, L-, M-, H-

(a) Neither repression nor lntroaggression

13

(b) Repression but not introaggression

15

(c) Introaggression and repression

2

(d) Introaggression but not repression

4

Cf. (b)

VS.

(c) and (d):

p=0.002.

L+,

M+,

Ht

Cf. (a) and (b) vs. (c) and (d): p=0.0004.

Similar results appeared with the indices of introaggression and projected introaggression. A s predicted, the latter variable was linked with a minus trend, a close relationship between a plus trend and introaggression being found, except when this index occurred together with projected introaggression (Table 2 ) . Table 2 Distribution of subjects on SAT patterns and on DMT lndlces

of introaggression and projected introaggresslon

LL, L-, M-, H-

LL

Characteristic

L+, M+, H+

S'

22

1

(b) Projected lntrosggression but not introaggression

6

1

(c) Projected introapgresslon and introaggresslon

4

1

2

11

(a) Neither lntroaggtession nor projected introaggression

(d)

Introaggression but not projected introaggre8s ion

Cf. (b) and (c)

vs. ( d ) : p=O.002.

Cf. (a), (b), and (c)

VS.

(d): p=0.000002.

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

230

The prediction that isolation 1 and 2 should be more common among LLs and M o subjects than among other subjects was not supported. The

two LLs subjects showed one or the other of these indices, whereas the three M o subjects showed none. For isolation 3 , however, the results were in line with expectations, this index being more often found with a plus trend in SAT than with a minus trend (frequencies 4 vs. 2 and 10 vs. 3 2 , p=o . l o ) . Depression 2 was found in only one subject (an H-), while depression 1 was observed among 5 subjects and, as expected, was more frequently found with a plus than with a minus trend. A difference in SAT trend between subjects scored for depression 1 and those scored for repression but

not for depression 1 was also evident (Table 3 ) . Table 3 Distribution of subjects on SAT patterns and on DMT indices of repression and depressive inhibition (depression 1)

LLs, LL, L-, M-, H-

Characteristic

(a) Neither repression nor depressive inhibition

17

(b) Repression but not depressive inhibition

16

(c) Depressive inhibition

Cf. (b) vs. (c): p-0.03.

L+, M+, H+

1

Cf. (a) and (b) vs. ( c ) : p-0.04.

There was strong support for our hypothesis that anxiety would be more frequently associated with a plus trend in SAT than with a minus trend (frequencies 8 vs. 1 and 6 vs. 3 3 , p=O.OOOl). Among SAT patterns, H+ was, as expected, the one most closely related to anxiety (frequencies 5 vs. 4 and 2 vs. 3 7 , p=0.003). LLs and L subjects showed denial more

often than other subjects (frequencies 7 vs. 2 and 7 vs. 3 2 , p=0.002). Table 4 is a summing up of the more clear-cut findings concerning DLlT indices and SAT trend o r strategy.

Percept-Genetic Defenseu and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

23 1

Table 4 Distribution of subjects on SAT patterns and on DMT indices of repression, introaggression, projected introaggression, depressive inhibition (depression 1) and anxiety

LLs, LL, L-, M-, H-

Characteristics

L+, M+,

H+

(a) Neither repression, introaggression, projected introaggression, depressive inhibition nor anxiety

9

0

21

0

4

14

(b) Repression and/or projected introsggression but neither introaggression without projected lntroaggression, depressive inhibition nor anxiety (c) One or more of: introaggression without projected introaggression, depressive inhibition, anxiety

Cf. (b)

vs. (c): p-0.0000004.

Cf. (a) and (b) vs. (c): p=O.OOOOOOOO.

The distribution of the present subjects with respect to SAT identity characteristics and those indices of disavowal also used in the previous study (but there referred to as introjection and projected introjection) is shown in Table 5 . Table 5 Distribution of subjects on SAT identity characteristics and on DMT indices of disavowal employed in the previous study (but referred to there as introjection and pro jected introjection)

maracteristic

LL

Disavowal la, 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, &a, or 5c

LL, L

16

8’

Not these indices of disavowal

6

H

5

7

M

2

12

Cf. LL

8’

LL, L, and H

VS.

M: p-0.006,

The results were in line with what the previous findings could have led one to expect, M subjects being scored for these DMT indices less often than other subjects. However, among the present subjects, one of the two indices previously referred to a s projected introjection, disavowal 4b, was not observed and the other, disavowal 5c, appeared in only two

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

232

subjects, who were both classified a s M , where it had been expected that

it would instead be H subjects who would show this sign. The same two M subjects were also scored for disavowal 5d, a characteristic that otherwise was more often found in H subjects than in other subjects (frequencies 7 vs. 8 and 5 vs. 28, p=O.O5). Incidentally, all subjects with disavowal 5d were also scored for some other index of disavowal. Disavowal 2a-b and disavowal 4c-d,

respectively,

were more often

found in H subjects than in other subjects (frequencies 4 vs. 0 and 8 vs.

36, p=0.005; 6 vs. 0 and 6 vs. 36, p=0.0002). Disavowal l b and 3f were both observed among too few subjects to allow a definite conclusion to be drawn though three of the four subjects with these indices were also classified as H . Disavowal 3a-b and disavowal 3a-d, respectively, were more common among L subjects than among other subjects (frequencies 5 vs. 3 and 8 vs. 32, p=O.O5; 8 vs. 1 0 and 5 vs. 25, p=O.O8). Disavowal 5b was not found for any H subject, suggesting that this index should not be subsumed under the same subcategory as disavowal l b , 2a-b, 3f, and 4c-d. The presentation in Table 6 is merely an attempt to delineate subcategories as suggested by this finding, as well as by the ideas presented in the introduction and the assessment that indices in category 5 are of a different order than other indices of disavowal. In any case, the prediction that disavowal would be less often found with M than with LLs, LL, L, and H subjects was strongly supported. Table 6 Distribution of subjects on SAT identity characteristics and on DMT categories of disavowal A (la, 3a-e, 4a), B (5a-d), and C (lb, 2a-b, 3f, 4c-d)

LLs, LL, L

Characteristic

Disavowal

A and

B

H

9

M

1

1

0

A

7

1

B

2

0

1

1

4

0

A,

B, and C

A and C

0

0

0

B and C

0

3

0

Not A, B, or C

3

0

12

Cf. A, B, or C vs. not A, B, o r C f o r LL Cf. C vs. not C for H

VB.

LL

8’

LL, L and H vs. M: p=O.OOOOOl.

LL, L, and M: p=O.O000002. 8’

233

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral Aftereffect Technique DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS It can be concluded that the major findings in Andersson

&

Weikert

(1974) were successfully cross-validated in the present study, Thus, the

relationships between SAT and DMT data seem to be comparable across sexes and also across rather broad educational levels, the group of male conscripts tested in the earlier study being less selected in this respect than the present group of female university students. Moreover, use of the modified version of DMT called forth a broad repertoire of perceptgenetic expressions of defense. In the previous study, the conceptual frame of reference inherent in the SAT was used for interpreting different types of percept-genetic defense. This frame of reference will also be used here, but now as part of a developmental model formulated recently (Andersson, 1983) and shown in Fig. 3. That model aims at linking the SAT variables with a dialectical conception of cognitive growth (Andersson, Franzen,

&

Ruuth, 1972; An-

DANGER OF REALISTIC THREATS DANGER OF LOSS OF SENSE OF SELF DANGER OF LOSS OF SELF-ESTEEM DANGEI! OF UNREALISTIC, FANTASIED (E.G. OEDIPAL1THREATS DANGER OF LOSSOF LOVE OF LOVE-OBJECT151 .~. DANGEROF LOSS OF SELFOBJECT IS) DANGER OF TRAUMATIC OVERSTIMULATION TOPOGRAPHIC MODEL 4 DC ;11 yeorr CREATIVITY PRINCIPLE

__________________________

,

; I

PF -----o

I

-

; '

18monlhs

2

MODEL OF SELF AND OBJECT

' PLEASURE PRINCIPLE

I

I

,.'

SM I

TR

I

-

MODEL OF NUCLEI OF EGO A N D SUPEREGO REPETITION PRINCIPLE

I

& I

, ;

REFLEX ARC MODEL UNPLEASURE PRINCIPLE 2 3 4 L L L H + 0

5

6

7phon

M

LL,

Figure 3. Outline of cognitive growth as related to psychoanalytic conceptions of mind and to strategy (-, +, 0) and identity (LLs, LL, L, H, M) characteristics of SAT (from Andersson, 1983, somewhat modified).

234

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

dersson , Johansson , Karlsson , h Ohlsson , 1972 : Andersson, Ruuth, 8 Ageberg, 1977; Andersson, 1984) and with the hierarchical view of psychoanalytic theory of Gedo & Goldberg (1973). A s shown diagrammatically in Fig. 3 , the model contains two main lines of cognitive development, the SM-CO line ("sensorimotor actions toward signaled things" and "conceptual-operational transformations") and the PF-DC line ("perceptual-figural regulations" and '?dialectical constructions"), These are seen as having their counterparts in social-emotional growth, notably in the respective developmental lines of object love and narcissism of psychoanalytic theory (Kohut, 1971, 1977). The developmental lines of object love is rclated primarily to one particular motive for dcfense, namely anxiety as evoked by fantasies of as yet unconscious threats o r dangers. According to the model, such fantasies are at their height in phase 4 ("danger of unrealistic, fantasied - e.g. Oedipal - threats"), various forms of intrapsychic defense against them being assumed to be effective from the next phase (phase 5 ) on. The developmental line of narciss i s m is not primarily related to unconscious fantasies of danger as a motive for defense, but to preconscious ones conceived of as a threat to onels secure sense of self or feeling of identity. These fantasies are seen as being particularly activated in phase 6 ("danger of loss of sense of self"), with effective defenses against them appearing from the next phase (phase 7 ) on. Percept-genetic indices of defense aroused by an unconscious fantasy of danger are considered, according to the model, as being linked with the R variable, and those aroused by a preconscious fantasy of a threatened sense of self as being linked with the fL variable in SAT. The SAT strategies of minus, plus, and zero trends are considered to have their origin in phases 1, 2 , and 3 , respectively, along the SM line. Likewise, the roots of the LL or L , H, and M designations, all referring to different kinds of SAT identity, are viewed as being found in phases 3 , 4 , and 5 , respectively, along the PF line. LLs is a special case. Although related to phase 3 , just as zero trend and LL are, as well, its prototypical stage should primarily be at phase 1 on the TR line (Wopistic-reflex reactions to stimuli") . The prototypical phases are regarded as normal developmental positions. This means they are recognized primarily on the basis of the object relations, anxieties, and ways of handling anxiety specific to them. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these phases are reconstructed

23 5

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

under more structured mental conditions later in life. It is not until then that they receive their specific meaning and significance a s an asset or a liability within the formation of individual personalities (Andersson, 1984). That defenses employed against an unconscious fantasy of danger should not appear in a more mature form until phase 5 or later, is an idea supported by the findings of Smith

&

Danielsson (1982) who used the per-

cept-genetic Meta Contrast Technique (cf. Smith

&

Carlsson, 1983). From

then on, anxiety is thus more evidently due to intrapsychic conflict than before, with its more marked effects observable in various types of neurosis. The model of mind that Freud (1923) developed for understanding

such conflict is the tripartite or structural one. The major conflict there could either be one between the ego and the id (as in a refined form in hysteria, where the superego is still partly merged with the i d ) , between the ego and the superego (as in depressive neurosis), o r between the superego and the id (as in compulsive-obsessive neurosis, where ego and superego a r e strongly merged).

If one thinks of these conflicts as forming a developmental hierarchy, it should be possible to trace their roots back to long before the i d , ego, and superego can be inferred as being separate structures. The model of the nuclei of ego and superego (see Fig. 3) was referred to previously (Andersson. 1983).

in accordance with the scheme of Gedo

&

Goldberg

( 1 9 7 3 ) , as the model of the nuclei of self and object. The designation used

here is presumed to be in better agreement with our dialectical conception

of mental growth. Thus the ground plan of what later takes more distinct form should be estnblished during the first years of life, whereas the form which finally evolves after the Oedipal crisis has been solved can be understood in terms of the tripartite model. This idea seems to be in line with the thinking of Melanie Elein (cf. Segal, 1964). We believe i t to be more than a mere coincidence, in fact, that the developmental positions in her theory, namely the paranoid-schizoid, the depressive, and the (less well-known) manic-obsessional (Klein , 1935, 1940, 1 9 4 6 ) , can be linked with phases 1, 2 , and 3 , respectively, of the present model. Fairbairn (1944) should also be mentioned here, since he maintains that hysteria has its roots in the first Kleinian position, i.e., in the paranoid-schizoid one (cf. Klein, 1 9 4 6 ) . Other psychoanalysts ( e . g . Marmor, 1953) have also stressed the early origins of hysteria by pointing to i t s oral component alongside the commonly accepted phallic-narcissistic one.

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

236

The Kleinian view of developmental positions should be a help in interpreting what kinds of basic anxiety are subsumed under our broad concept of "unconscious fantasy of danger." The anxiety which originates in the paranoid-schizoid position is referred to as persecutory (paranoid) anxiety, i . e . ,

as the dread of being attacked by bad or evil (part-)

objects. Projection of bad o r (self-)destructive impulses o r splitting into good and bad parts are presumed to be the most typical defenses used against this form of anxiety. Repression is regarded by Rlein as a mature form of splitting defense. According to the present model, the SAT strategy of a minus trend, assumed to have its origin in phase 1, should be linked primarily with defenses that are used to deal with persecutory anxiety. The present results indicate the percept-genetic defenses involved here to be projected introaggression and repression, defenses which coincide well with the Kleinian

view just referred to (cf. Table 7 ) . One should note too the role played Table 7 Synopsis of the major r e s u l t s and t h e i r conceptual framework

Basic motive

P r o t o t y p i c a l phase

for defense

Related

o r developmental

Motive

activated in

percept-genetic

Related SAT

p o s i t i o n according

defense,

the DMT

defense

characteristic

t o model i n Fig. 3

specified

Unconscious

Projected introag-

Minus trend ( - )

fantasy of

gression o r

danger

repression

1

for

Persecutory anxiety

____________________________________ Ditto

Introaggression or

Plus trend (+)

2

depressive i n h i b i t ion

Depressive anxiety

(depression 1 )

________________------------

Preconscious

Disavowal A o r B

LL, including

fantasy of a

( c f . Table 6 )

LL

a'

3

or L

Feared l o s s of an

threatened

idealized

self-ob J e c t

sense of s e l f

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Ditto

Disavowal C

H

4

Feared loss of a grandiose self

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral Aftereffect Technique

237

by the threatening DUT figure when persecutory anxiety is activated. Usually this figure is seen to represent (on an unconscious level) a punitive parental figure. This punitive figure is probably not as "trulyTrrepresentative of the superego in the case of persecutory anxiety as in the case of depressive (or obsessional) anxiety (cf. below). In the former case, such a figure might appropriately be characterized by features that Fairbairn (1944) refers to as those of "an unconditionally bad object" not yet linked with "the moral defense!' and its developmentally later level of organization. Perhaps this is the reason why the defense of repression is not restricted to appearing with the peripheral figure but can also appear with the other stimulus configurations in DMT, viz. the hero and its attribute. Depressive anxiety is aroused in the depressive position when, in accordance with Kleinian theory, the infant finds out that his love and his hate are directed towards the same (whole) object. The infant's solution to this basic conflict of ambivalence is to protect from its hatred the object which it depends on and to make reparation for what damage it can have done to that object. One prominent form of defense under such circumstances seems to be to direct aggression, not against the object, but against the self. This defense appears to u s , later in development, when the superego takes over the role of the ambivalently loved object, to be closely linked with guilt. It is thus the superego which gives rise to feelings of guilt and self-reproach, feelings which can reasonably be assumed to be severe when the forerunner of the superego appears in an early phase of the depressive position. Again our results seem to f i t quite well with the v i e w just presented. Thus the SAT strategy of a plus trend, assumed to be linked with phase 2 in the model, was most typically related to the percept-genetic defenses of introaggression (turning of aggression against the self) and depressive inhibition (depression 1). The last-mentioned defense seems to imply that repression is used to defend against a scvere superego. It is of interest to note that only the male (second DMT motif) and not the female threat was the one to arouse this defense in the present group. Isolation 3 might also be thought of as used against a stern superego. This must be a more tentative interpretation, though, since the relationship with the plus trend in SAT was not as evident here as for introaggression and depressive inhibition. Anxiety, on the other hand (the scoring of which was restricted here to the peripheral figure), was clearly linked with a plus trend. This form of anxiety could thus be an expression

238

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

of superego fear, perhaps having its roots in the Kleinian depressive pos ition. In the previous study, LLs and M,, subjects were characterized more often than other subjects by isolation 1 or 2. We were not able, however, to cross-validate this finding with the present subjects. For this reason we have not included in Table 7 the unconscious fantasy of danger which is referred to as obsessional anxiety and which should characterize the Kleinian manic-obsessional position corresponding to (one aspect of) phase 3 of the present model. Still, i t is of some interest to interpret the findings of the previous study in terms of the Kleinian ideas of this position. In the manic-obsessional position a strong intention of the infant, according to Klein, is to overcome dependency on the highly valued and ambivalently loved (whole) object created in the depressive position. Since this object represents an important part of the infant's internal world, a part later to be represented in the superego, an avoidance of such dependency can imply either a total or a partial restriction of psychic reality. This is referred to by Klein a s the manic defense, in its extreme leading to a loss of the inner or emotional significance of experience. Perhaps the percept-genetic defenses here referred to as isolation 1 and 2 are examples of this mode of operation. In any case, they are most typically found among compulsive-obsessive subjects (cf. Andersson & Weikert, 19741, i.e. among subjects who can be thought of as having reached a kind of quasi-independence due to a too strong identification with their ambivalently loved objects, These and similar defenses seem also to be revived in early adolescence (Smith 8 Daniolsson, 1982; cf. Nilsson, 1982; Westerlundh 8 Smith, 1 9 8 3 ) , which would be in phase 7 in terms of

the present model, a phase supposedly involving a higher-order reconstruction of phase 3. The percept-genetic defenses discussed thus far can be thought of as operating in accordance with what Freud (1900) referred to as the first censorship, the one which in his topographic model appears between the unconscious and preconscious system. This censorship is seen in the present model as being in operation after the solution of the Oedipus crisis, i.e. with the beginning of the latency period (phase 5 1 , when the superego is established as a separate structure. There is also a second censorship included in the topographic model, however, the one between the preconscious and consciousness system. Although this censorship might have primitive forerunners in phase 3 of the present model (cf. Basch,

239

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral AftereffectTechnique

1974, 1981), it cannot be particularly effective before the individual has

achieved

a

high

capacity

for

reflective

self-awareness

of

the

kind

appearing in early adolescence (phase 7 ) . The defenses used from early adolescence on to maintain a secure sense of self should primarily be determined by anxieties involved in the formation of narcissistic object relations earlier in life, especially those involved in the formation of relations between self and selfobjects (Kohut. 1971, 1977). From a "narcissistic" point of view, that is from the point of

view of creation of the self as distinguished from formation of the object (in connection with which the formation of the superego a s an internalized object has been particularly stressed already), the (whole) object established in phase 2 of the model can be regarded as a selfobject. By that we mean a highly valued and therefore emotionally invested object which the infant does not as yct experience a s an autonomous center of activities or events. This makes separation from such an object very traumatizing to the infant. However, the relation between the very young child's growing self and i t s selfobjects undergoes drastic changes as development proceeds. Especially important in this process is the need to establish idealized ("perfect and good") selfobjects which it is possible to rely on and be subservient to. Closely akin to this need is another, namely to take the place or position of the idealized selfobject, the child emphasizing thereby the omnipotent or grandiose part of i t s self. Iiohut is probably the modern psychoanalyst who has most convincingly advocated the view of an antithetical and complementary character of the idealized selfobject (parent imago) and the grandiose self. According to the present model, these formations of the mind are activated with particular strength (where one formation may dominate over the other) in phases 3 and 4 , respectively, and there as part of normal development. In the next phase, phase 5 , self-constancy is established (Andersson, 1983; cf. Steingart, 1969).

at the same time as the idealized part of the

superego, or what Freud (1914) referred to as the ego ideal, takes shape. The "individuation of the self" reaches i t s first more mature forms here, with possibilities of regulating self-esteem from within, although its truly advanced development has to wait until late adolescence o r early adulthood (cf. Blos, 1 9 6 2 , 1979). Against this background it is possible to specify different motives for defense in the DMT as related to a preconscious fantasy of a threatened

240

A.L. Andersson and M. Bengtsson

sense of self. Fundamental to this is the principle that the threatening person might represent not only a punitive superego figure with the allied anxieties and defenses discussed above, but also a nonempathic attacker on the integrity of the subject's projected self (hero figure). This might signal for some subjects the loss of an idealized selfobject (parent imago), and for others the loss of a grandiose self, where the kinds of narcissistic or disavowal defenses required would differ in these two cases. It should be observed, however, that it is more difficult to make a sharp demarcation between such defenses than between those connected with persecutory and depressive anxiety as motives for defense. In fact, in the present as well as in the previous study, H subjects, for whom phase 4 i s seen a s prototypical, frequently showed forms of disavowal also found in LL and L subjects for whom phase 3 is assumed to be the prototypical developmental position. According to Kohut (1971) there are two main forms of transference that can be observed in narcissistically disturbed patients during psychoanalytic therapy: mirror transference (where aspects of the grandiose self are reactivated) and idealizing transference. In mirror transference the analysand seems to strive for a diffusion that includes the analyst in the (grandiose) self; this is in contrast to idealizing transference, where the analysand's effort is more in the direction of reestablishing a merger with an idealized selfobject. These two forms of transference may be of some help in understanding disavowal defenses, since the DMT and the therapeutic situation seem to share at least one basic characteristic: the temporary loosening of the demarcation between self and selfobjects. Mirror transference would seem to correspond to disavowal C (Tables 6 and 71, especially a s regards the indices disavowal 2 and 4 c-d. These indices appear to possess basic characteristics similar to those of the oedipal conflict: the overstepping of the barrier between generations, the child taking the role of one of the parents (usually the one of the opposite sex) (cf. Stierlin, 1971). Note that these indices were most often found in H subjects, i.e. among subjects whose SAT identity is linked in the developmental model with the "true" oedipal period or phase 4 . The "true" oedipal period requires a more evident demarcation between the sexes than can be established by the pre-oedipal child. An important aspect of idealizing transference is that its pre-oedipal features often imply an overstepping of the barrier connected with the characteristics of the sexes (such as in perverse fantasies). A parallel might be seen in

Percept-Genetic Defenses and the Spiral Aftereffect Technique disavowal 3 a-d,

where

24 I

sex of hero either changes from correct to

incorrect, is incorrect in a long series of phases, or is incorrect each time

it is denoted. Such indices were most often found in L subjects, i.e. in subjects whose SAT identity is anchored in the model associated with the (pre-oedipal) phallic-narcissistic

stage late in phase 3 (cf. Edgcumbe

&

Burgner , 1975). LL and LL subjects should also be characterized by pre-oedipal moS

des of operation since they are, according to the model, assumed to have their roots at an earlier stagc than the phallic-narcissistic one. Unfortunately, no particular disavowal defenses, or cluster of such defenses, were found in LL and LL subjects that were not also found in L and H subS

jects. Therefore, we can only suggest that disavowal defenses, which we feel are primarily related to pre-phallic modes of functioning, are also used by subjects located at a later stage on the dimension of narcissistic development, though this would be less likely, of course, in the case of M subjects. Typical "pre-phallic" indices would be those of disavowal l a and 4b,

where

a replica of the (projected) self is reported,

a s well as

disavowal 5a and 5 c-d, which would express rather directly the defensive use of idealization a s a cover up for anger against a rejecting selfobject. Disavowal 5b would tend to be indicative of an I'aggressive dependency" on such an object. In the present study our concern has been mainly with the SAT variables R and f L taken separately, and only occasionally with SAT patterns where these variables are combined (except where the latter is the case by definition, a s with LLs and LL)

. One

exception to this. however, was the

confirmed prediction of the H+ pattern being closely related to anxiety scores in the DMT. However, there was one defense, denial, which appeared not to be connected directly with any particular SAT variable. It is therefore of some interest that denial was most often found among LLs and L subjects. In 1926 Freud linked denial with the character of hysteria. A s

noted above, hysteria can be assumed to have i t s roots both in phase 1 (paranoid-schizoid position) and late in phase 3 (phallic-narcissistic stage) of the present model, where the two taken together correspond to the L pattern. With respect to both SAT strategy and identity, the LLs pattern

is linked with phase 1. We would stress, in closing, that our primary aim has not been to test hypotheses derived from psychoanalytic theory, nor to evaluate the consistency of different theoretical and empirical approaches within

A.L. Andersson and M.Bengtsson

242

psychoanalysis. Rather, the study is part of an ultimate aim of constructing and exploring, with the help of percept-genetic techniques applied in both the non-clinical and clinical areas, a developmental franie of reference useful for personality research and diagnostics, It is obvious, however, that to be able to fulfill such an ambition, we must not only relate psychoanalytic models of mind to cognitive growth but also choose among such models on the basis of our empirical findings. In this sense, the interpretation of the results provided here could be seen as an attempt to integrate Freudian, Kleinian , and Kohutian conceptualizations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This study was supported by grants from the Swedish Council for Social Science Research and the National Swedish Board of Universities and Colleges.

243

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Press. Edgcumbe, R., & Burgner, M. (1975). The phallic-narcissistic phase. A differentiation between preoedipal and oedipal aspects of phallic development. The Psychoanalytic Study of t h e Child, 30, 161-180. Fairbairn, W.R.D. (1944). Endopsychic structure considered in terms of objectrelationships. The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 25, 70-93. Freud, A. (1946). The Ego and t h e Mechansisms of Defence. N e w York: International Universities Press. Freud, S. (1964). The interpretation of dreams. Standard Edition (Vols. 4-5). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1900) Freud, S. (1964). On narcissism: An introduction. Standard Edition (Vol. 14, pp. 73-102). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1914) Freud, S. (1964). The ego and the id. Standard Edition (Vol. 19, pp. 12-59). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1923) Freud, S. (1964). Inhibitions, symptoms, and anxiety. Standard Edition (Vol. 20, pp. 87-172). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1926) Gedo, J.E., & Goldberg, A. (1973). Models of the Mind. A Psychoanalytic Theory.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Klein, M. (1935). A contribution to the psychogenesis of manic-depressive states. The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 16, 145-174. Klein, M. (1940). Mourning and its relation to manic-depressive states. The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 21, 125-1 5 3. Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 27, 99-110.

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Kohut, H. (1971). The Analysis of t h e Self. A Systematic Approach t o the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders. N e w York: International Universities Press. Kohut, H. (1977). The Restoration of the Self. New York: International Universities Press. Kragh, U. (1960). The Defense Mechanism Test: A new method for diagnosis and personnel selection. Journal of Applied Psychology, 44, 303-309. Kragh, U. (1969). Manual till DMT

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Defense Mechanism Test. Stockholm:

Skandinaviska Test forlaget. Kragh, U.,

& Smith, G.J.W.

(Eds.).

(1970).

Percept-Genetic

Analysis. Lund:

Gleerup. Marmor, J. (1953). Orality in the hysterical personality. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 1, 656-671. Neuman, T. (1978). Dimensionering och validering av perceptgenesens forsvarsmekanismer. En hierarkisk analys mot pilotens stressbeteende. FOA rapport (No. 55020-H6). Stockholm: Forsvarets forskningsanstalt. Nilsson, A.

(1982). Application of a percept-genetic

approach t o separation

and oedipal conflict problems in primitive-hysteria and obsessive-compul-

sive neurosis. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 22( 1). Segal, H. (1964). Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein. London: Hogarth Press. Sharma, V.P.

(1977). Application of a percept-genetic test in a clinical set-

ting. Dissertation Series, Department of

Psychology,

Lund University,

No. 18. Sjoback, H. (1973). The Psychoanalytic Theory of Defensive Processes. Lund: Gleerup. Smith, G.J.W.,

& Carlsson, 1. (1983). Creativity in early and middle school

years. International Journal of Behavioral Development, 6, 167-195. Smith, G.J.W.,

& Danielsson,

A. (1982). Anxiety and Defensive Strategies in

Childhood and Adolescence. New York: International Ilniversities Press. Smith, G.J.W.,

Fries, I.,

Andersson, A.L.,

ploitation of visual aftereffect

& Ried, J.

measures in a

(1971). Diagnostic exmoderately depressive

patient group. Scandianavian Journal of Psychology, 12, 68-79. Smith, G.J.W.,

Hentschel, U., & Andersson, A.L. (1980). Visuelle Nacheffekte:

Physiologische und psychologische

Annahmen und Methodologie.

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Smith (Eds.),

In U.

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logie (pp. 135 160). Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaf t. Smith, G.J.W.,

Johnson, G., & Almgren, P.-E.

(1982). MCT-metakontrasttek-

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niken. Stockholm: Psykologiforlaget. Smith, G.J.W., & Nordstrom, M. (1975). Anxiety and defense against anxiety in childhood and adolescence. Yearbook of the New Society of L e t t e r s at Lund (pp. 67-102). Lund: Gleerup. Smith, G.J.W., & Westerlundh, B. (1980). Perceptgenesis: A process perspective on perception-personality. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology (pp. 94-124). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. Steingart, I. (1969). On self, character, and t h e development of a psychic

apparatus. The Psychoanalytic Study of t h e Child, 24, 271-303. Stierlin, H. (1971). Das Tun des Einen ist das Tun des Anderen. Frankfurt a m Main: Suhrkamp. Westerlundh, 8. (1982). Personal organization of the visual field: A study of ambient t o focal reports of threatening stimuli. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 22(4). Westerlundh, B., & Smith, G.J.W. (1983). Perceptgenesis and the psychodynamics of perception. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6, 597640.

P A R T IV RELATING PRECONSCIOUS PROCESSES TO COGNITIVE AND SEMANTIC STRUCTURES: SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION AND MICROGENESIS COMBINED

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Dragune (editors) 0 Elaevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

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PSY CHODYNARIIC PERSONALITY CORRELATES O F CREATIVITY

Uwe Hentschel and Uta Schneider University of Mainz

INTRODUCTION Creativity as a concept evokes almost exclusively positive associations, ranging from flexibility of thought to originality, productivity, and the great cultural achievements in the history of mankind. These positive associations, together with the easy availability of individual examples that can be regarded as self-evident proofs of creativity, might help counteract the absence of a generally accepted definition of creativity. A common feature of many definitions of creativity is the emphasis upon new approaches, outcomes, or products. Novelty, however, is not a sufficient condition of creativity. Not all new solutions can be considered creative. Other important criteria are reference to reality, usefulness, and social acceptance - even, if not necessarily, an immediate one - by at least some groups. It is questionable whether creative acts can be compared directly when they relate to different products, such as scientific discoveries, technological inventions, or artistic creations. Like in other fields of personality research, different theoretical approaches to creativity stress either the situational influences or personality characteristics or t r y to combine different sets of variables that are specifically considered important. Earlier than in other fields of personality research, however, assumptions of a general underlying process prevailed, with more or less differentiated models attempting to describe a number of consecutive stages (cf. Wallas, 1926; Rossman, 1931). The four general stages postulated by Wallas (19261, preparation, incubation, illumination, and verification, are comparable to the four typical stages in microgenesis (Sander, 1927) which uses a person-related information processing "Gestalt-approach" : "intake and organization of stimuli", "desintegration and experience of chaos", "assimilation and hypothesis formation", and the final "meaningful solution.

In reference to Guilford's

250

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

(1956) distinction between convergent and divergent thinking, microgenesis

is, traditionally, an approach for the study of convergent processes in perception and thought. On a concrete level, composing a symphony, inventing a new machine, or designing an experiment in chemistry, for example, have not much in common. By registering a number of general stages or phases of information-processing which lead to good results in their respective fields, different tasks, however, can be compared and may reveal important similarities in the underlying creative process. Assuming that not everyone can reach the same solution under all conditions, the basic elements for explaining the creative process are necessarily personality and situation related. A s it is impossible to arrive at a complete taxonomy of situations, and as the creative climate can also be referred to the personal ability to establish such a climate, a process-oriented trait approach seems to be a good compromise, even more so within a functionalist frame of reference which includes at least some situational elements (according to their hypothetical functional relevance). One of the basic media between persons and external reality is perception. It carries an array of different functions. The fact that perception is not a completely objective mechanism provides the basis for its use as a central variable in theories of personality, in general, and makes it an experimentally interesting approach to creativity in particular, too. Perception, in a broader sense including, for example, attention, aesthetic appreciation, etc., can, in reference to creativity, even be regarded as a common element of different theoretical points of view - cf. Greenacres's (1957) formulation of a greater sensitivity to sensory stimulation of the creative child with Maslow's (1971) assumption of greater receptivity on the part of creative people. Differences in perception are to be seen more as a guiding line than as a distinct set of variables for creativity research, but some have been used repeatedly, among others "openness to experience It (cf. Mtzgerald, 1966; Schulman, 1966). The greater tolerance of creative people for apparent inconsistencies or for disorder (Barron, 1963; Ehrenzweig, 1967) is also related to perception. Perception could be regarded as a possible line of convergence for different theoretical views of creativity, but the hypothesized reasons for perceptual differences are still controversial, even within the restricted scope of theories that take psychodynamic variables into account. It is for example

25 1

Personality Correlates of Creativity

a matter of debate whether developmental personal conflicts are an unequivocal prerequisite for creativity. Neurotic conflicts are still given a central position by some theoreticians (cf. Rangell, 1978). This, however,

is no longer done along the lines that genius and insanity go together, but rather in the tradition of Freud's (1908) wish fulfillment assumption or with a view towards exemplifying individual conflicts in relation to creativity in case histories (e.g. Rubenstein

& Levitt, 1980; Anthi, 1981; Eissler, 1963). The contrary position does not deny the influence of primary process thinking, which is a central theme in psychodynamic creativity re-

search (Suler, 19801, but postulates either an intact ego control throughout the process or an easy return to the normal level. in either case with the assumption that ego controls have to be partially lowered (Schaefer,

1975) o r , to say it in Kris's famous words, a "regression in the service of the ego" or some form of "magic synthesis between primary and secondary process" (Arieti, 1976), has to take place. Schlesinger (1980/81), while not denying intrapsychic conflicts ' a s an essential element in creativity, still stresses subjective meaning and the capacity to construe incongruence in order to arrive at a creative individual solution more. Experimental studies striving for dynamic variables, including subconscious processes, must necessarily encompass broader dimensions which, in psychoanalytic tradition, are linked to the libido-aggression motivational dichotomy, with cognitive styles and defensive structures acting as interfaces to

ego-functions.

Holt

(1956) developed a scoring system

for

Rorschach protocols with the aim of assessing primary and secondary process thinking. This system has also been used in creativity studies (cf. Suler, 1980). In a study comparing experienced artists and students of a r t (painters and sculptors), Dudek and Chamberland-Bouhadana (1982), in using Holt's system, found deeper levels of regression and more efficient and adaptive defenses in the experienced group. In perceptgenetic theory, based on theoretical assumptions and empirical results (cf. Kragh & Smith,

1974; Hentschel

&

Smith, 1980; Smith, 1981; Westerlundh

&

Smith, 1983),

it has been acknowledged that creativity has a psychodynamic basis, but interest has been generally more directed to intentional moments and to cognitive processes, such as being able to see a stimulus objectively and at the same time t o maintain a subjective personal meaning of it. This has much in common with the already mentioned formulation of Schlesinger

(1980/81) which, however, is based exclusively on a theoretical analysis of while the terms used in percept genesis also have an

creativity,

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

252

operational meaning. From the above-mentioned considerations no common definition of creativity can be abstracted, but by selcctively combining theoretical postulates and empirical results, a circumscriptive approximation can be arrived at. Creativity is not an ahistorical trait. Rather, it usually has an individual history with dynamic intrapersonal sources of an eventually conflictual nature. Many people have psychic conflicts; to transform them into a creative solution of an objectively given problem obviously requires some additional capacity to overcome incongruence. A basic prerequisite in that direction seems to be a sensitivity for problems and the ability to think imaginatively and metaphorically (cf. Ricoeur, 1977; Miller, 1982). These requirements, often referred to as the functions of the right hemisphere (Torrance 8 Mourad, 1979; Gowan, 1979; Torrance, 1 9 8 2 ) , may, in combination with a tolerance for apparent disorder, lead to a harmonic restitution, a reality-adapted metamorphosis, of perceptions and thoughts of a higher order. In that process, the quality and level of defenses determining the proportions of subconscious and ego-control involvement seem to be of general importance. Subconscious impulses are not directly measurable, either by questionnaires or by the actual conscious reactions in experiments. There always have to be some extrapolations made or special techniques used. One hypothetical link is the already mentioned defensive structure, another the susceptibility to subliminal stimulation which, according to Dixon (19711, is enhanced by a state of low nrousal with broadened attention and cognitions not rigidly restricted by logical analysis. Indicators f o r CreatlVltY

Indicators f o r the habltual regulation o f S u b c o n s c i o u s and e g o - c o n t r o l l e d reaCtiOnS

INDEPENDENT

VARIABLES

Susceptibility to subliminal s t i m u l a t i o n w i t h an a y g r e r r i v e s t imu I u s

DEPENDENT

VARIABLES

differences in perceptual r e c o n s t r u c t l o n

PG-Test:

Figure 1. Hypothetical relation of the variables used i n the study

EXTERNAL

CRITERIA

Grades I n a deslyn Course

Personality Correlates of Creativity

253

From the whole range of hypothetically relevant variables for creativi t y , as seen from a psychodynamic point of view, three sets of variables were chosen for the present study which theoretically and methodologically follows the approaches of percept genesis (PG) and subliminal stimulation. The general hypothesis states that there is a basic relationship between susceptibility to subliminal stimulation, the personal organization of defense mechanisms (used as independent variables), and the subjective perceptual constructions of an objective pictorial stimulus. This stimulus is presented by means of a PG-technique, and the resulting reports are uscd as the dependent variables for determining perceptual creativity in students of design. N o concrete predictions for specific groups were made, but a simple positive relationship of a high susceptibility to subliminal stimulation and creative performance seemed rather improbable, considering the kind of stimulus and the effects registered. In view of the relationship of the number of subjects tested to the number of possible single variable relationships, the specific hypotheses (cf. method-section) had to be

restricted to some variables within each set (cf. Fig.1).

METHOD SAMPLE

Subjects in the study were 40 students taking courses in one of their first five terms in visual communication and design at the Technical College in Mainz in the Federal Republic of Germany. There were altogether 20 males and 20 females, ranging in age from 20 to 30. Because of missing data, 5 subjects ( h a l e , 4 females) could not be included in all calculations (cf. the varying N in the tables).

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE OPERA J l O N A L l Z A JlONS OF THE l N D E f E N D E N T V A R I A B L E S

a) Subliminal stimulation The subjects were introduced to the task with the comment that the experimenter was interested in the effect of very slight stimulus changes on the subjective recognition and impression formation of the observer. In

254

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

order to attain a subliminal stimulation, the individual thresholds were first determined by a method previously used, for example, by Allison (1963) and by Sackeim, Packer, and Gur (1977). The subject was placed at a distance of 140 c m in front of a seni-transparent screen ( 4 8 x 49 cm in size). The room was darkened (1 lux measured at the height of the subjects' eyes, without a stimulus on the screen). Two projectors P1 and P2 (Leitz Prada; lense: Leitz Hector, f=100mm, 1 : 2 . 5 ; bulb: Osram 58.8190 E , 100 Watt, 220 Volt) were used to present the supraliminal and subliminal stimuli. P1 was fixed in luminance and position. For P2 the luminance could be varied by means of a transformer ranging in voltage from 0 to 250 Volt. It could be adjusted in all directions so that, when using the same stimuli in P1 and P2, a congruent projection could be produced on the screen. For establishing the individual thresholds, a schematic neutral face was placed in P1, and the same stimulus was inserted upside down in P2. Starting with a luminance near 0 in P2, the voltage was increased in steps of 5 Volts, with the subject being asked at every step if he or she cold see any changes on the screen, until the first differences were reported (vague new lines, shadows). The voltage of that trial minus half a step (=minus 2 . 5 Volt) was registered. The procedure was repeated 5 times and the mean voltage of the five registrations was used for the proper experiment to follow. In that experiment a distractor stimulus was presented and then the experimental stimulus, both also with a subliminal stimulus added and with the instruction that a change might occur. The experimental stimulus was a neutral scene with two musicians, a guitarist and a singer, supraliminally shown. The neutral impression of the scene had been ascertained in a pilot study using different pictures. Under the subliminal condition, the content was only slightly different in terms of the figural composition but differed a great deal in meaning, with the singer threatening the guitarist. During the presentation of the experimental stimulus, the light was 12 - 15 lux at the screen (M=14lux) and 3 . 5 lux at the height of the subjects' eyes. There were two variations of the whole series: one in which the subjects had to give free reports, and one in which they had to rate their overall impressions of the presented picture on 53 &point scales of a Semantic Differential. The Semantic Differential was constructed on the basis of already existing scales (Hentschel & Klintman, 1974) with new items added and tested for their content validity and applicability in a pilot study (Burggasser, 1983).

255

Personality Correlates of Creativity Table 1 Order of stimulus sequence for subliminal stimulation

Trials

Stimulus presented 30 sec

Task of the subject in

in each trial

Trial 1

-

4 Trial 5

1 1 s

P 1 : dietractor stimulus

free

ratings

2 1 6

P 1 : distractor stimulus

reports

of atmo-

P2 : slightly dark-colored,

of

sphere

at-

on a

empty slide

-

3 1 1

P 1 : twa musicians (neutral scene)

mo

4 1 8

P 2 : twa msicians (aggressive scene)

sphere

-

8

Semantic Differential

The sequence of the stimulus presentation is summarized in Tablc 1. P1 was always used for projecting the supraliminal stimulus, P2 was individually adjusted at the previously established level below the threshold. In order to avoid subjects staring at the screen during the whole session, a time limit of 30 sec per trial was introduced. Variables comprising the susceptibility to subliminal stimulation were the differences on the factor scales 'Aggression' and 'Dysphoria' extracted from the Semantic Differential under the condition of neutral scene only and of neutral scene plus subliminal stimulus (trials 7 and 8 , cf. table 1). b) Defense mechanisms Defense mechanisms comprise behavioral constructs,

cognitive and

perceptual phenomena, and affective and motivational representations, Provided a workable definition is used, all these aspects could possibly be considered in clinical ratings. The test chosen for the present study, the German version of Gleser and Ihilevich's (1969) Defense Mechanism Inventory (Hentschel b Hickel, in preparation), deals only with imagined behavior and feelings in a frustrating situation. The DMI is a paper and pencil test. The subjects are given 10 short stories, in which persons appear in various conflict situations, and have to choose among 5 pre-stated reactions on the behavioral and emotional level, as i f he or she were in the situation described. By means of the test, 5 clusters of defense mechanisms can be discerned (cf. table 2 ) .

256

U.Hen tschel and U.Schneider Table 2 Five clusters of defense mechanisms

TAO

Turning against objects Aggressive reactions against an external object perceived as a source of frustration

PRO

Projection The object is attributed with negative intentions or characteristics

PRN

Principalization Splitting off affects by intellectualization, rationalization, and isolation

TAS

Turning against self Coping with the conflict is attempted by directing the action against subject himself

REV

Reversal Ihe frustrating object is attributed with positive or neutral intentions of traits characterizing reaction formation, undoing, repression, and reversal

DMI variables selected for the study were TAO and PRN. OPERATlONALIZATlON

was

OF THE DEPENDENT V A R I A B L E S

The method for registering the subjective perceptual reconstruction a PG-technique developed by Smith and Danielsson (1980). All

PG-techniques a i m at a comprehension of the adaptive perceptual process of the subjects. In contrast to the standard procedures which use threatening stimuli, the stimulus for evoking creativity-relevant reactions is a neutral still-life by the Finnish artist E. Aalto: a bottle and a bowl

which for many subjects possess physiognomic qualities. The requirements for an adaptive recognition by the subjects are twofold in the course of

Personality Correlates of Creativity

257

the whole series. In the first part, the picture is presented with increasing presentation times, starting with very short exposition times (cf.Fig.2).

presentation times

1.

/I

Figure 2. Presentation times for Normal and Inverted PG

Particularly in the beginning of the series, the normal PG reveals the investment of subjective meaning which later on, usually over intermediate phases, converges into the recognition of the "objective stimulus", i.e., pictorial structures that most people can, with improved conscious control, extract under presentation times of sufficient length. In the second part with the inverted PG (cf. Fig. 21, presentation times are again reduced. This stimulates reactions to one's own earlier reports, i.e., the subject has to come to terms with his or her previous subjective interpretations. The process can thus reveal if a person is bound to the finally attained "objective meaning", or if he or she maintains preference for earlier subjective interpretations, of if he or she can find some form of integration of the early subjective interpretations within the final objective pictorial structure. Irrespective of the actual recognition times needed, the picture was shown 20 times (with the exposition times given in Fig.2) to all subjects, and then the inverted series was initiated. For subjects who did not reach a complete recognition, the two objects on the picture were named before starting the inverted PG, thereby ensuring that all subjects had the same information in the second part of the experiment. The subjects were asked to give reports of their actual perceptions as well as of their impressions, feelings, and possible recollections. The scoring categories

U. Hentschel and U, Schneider were derived with some minor changes from the system developed by Smith and Danielsson (1980) and are related to a dimension which might bc called stimulus boundedness-stimulus remoteness as outlined above. They are summarized in Table 3 . Table 3 PG-Variables

INVERTED PG

NORMAL PG

Level of recognition: LC

xx

The whole series is classified in

The C-phase content disappears and instead an 'incorrect' report is

P-phases and C-phases. P-phases are

given.

all presentations which evoke reports with some meaningful confi-

X

guration. C-phases start when one

The C-phase content disappears but returns directly at the next ex-

object is correctly recognized,

posure of the C-phase content and

final C-phase is reached when both

is maintained together with a de-

objects are recognized (cf.weights

viating interpretation ('now 1

for Ri).

understand why I saw the bottle as a bird').

Number of phases needed for a corNC

rect recognition.

A

X

The C-phase content is changed only in parts of an object ('the

Ri

Richness of ideas

shadow on

Sum of points given for different

an old man').

the bottle

looks

like

themes in the normal PG P 1.0 pt

1

- P

n for every theme reported

0

previous phases ('now it is like in the beginning').

('a burning newspaper' ) 0 . 5 pt

partial change of an already mentioned theme ('on

0

pt

Reports with a vague reference to

S

The C-phase content is maintained

that newspaper a picture

but formal changes are explicitly

with a round object')

mentioned (changes in form, size,

changes in light, contrast,

distance, depth, perspective, al-

etc.

so

scored for pictorial elements)

Personality Correlates of Creativity

259

Normal PG

c1 - cn 1.0 p t

changes of theme reported f o r the second o b j e c t

0 . 5 pt

0

pt

p a r t i a l changes changes i n l i g h t , c o n t r a s t , e t c . , small changes, e.g.

from ' b o t t l e '

t o ' b o t t l e with a cork'.

Ri

Sum of points reached according t o the scoring categories weighted f o r meaningfulness, operationalized a s completeness of recognition ( t h e sum of p o i n t s f o r s u b j e c t s who recognized onl y one object c o r r e c t l y was weighted with t h e f a c t o r 0.75 and f o r those who d i d not reach C1, with the f a c t o r 0.5).

All protocols were rated independently by two judges. In case of differing decisions, the lower point estimate o r , respectively, the category indicative of creativity was taken as the final one. Ri, X , and S were included as dependent variables for determining the subjective perceptual reconstruction. TESTING PROCEDURES A N D SELECTION OF V A R I A B L E S

All subjects were tested individually. The mean duration of

B

test

session was 1 hour and 45 minutes. The tasks were presented to the subjects in the following order: normal and inverted P G , DMI, subliminal stimulation. The study was started with the general hypothesis as formulated in the introduction. Stated as a working hypothesis it anticipates that the kind of tackling of aggressive subliminal stimuli and the type of handling of one's own aggressive impulses will influence creative performance. The inclusion of all variables registered within the three sets (subliminal stimulation : three factors in the Semantic Differential: defensive structure : five

U. Hentschel and U.Schneider

260

groups of defenses ; perceptual reconstruction : nine variables) would have resulted in far too many statistical tests compared to the number of subjects - unless one wcre exclusively interested in multivariate relations. To reduce the number of variables in a meaningful way, a mixed strategy was chosen, based on the available formal test criteria for the different variables and content related decisions. It yielded three dependent variables and four - two for each set - independent variables for the analysis of variance design. It was furthermore postulated that the dependent variables should show relations to external criteria to be regarded as relevant in the context of creativity.

RESULTS CONSTRUCTION O F F A C T O R SCALES FOR M E A S U R I N G T H E S U B L I M I N A L EFFECTS

The Semantic Differential was submitted to a principal axis factor analysis. Three factors explaining 88% of the variance were extracted and, after a varimax rotation, interpreted a s Vicious aggression", "introverted relaxation", and "dysphoria". With regard to their direct content relation to aggression, positively and negatively pooled, it was decided to use the first and the third factor as independent variables for estimating subjects# susceptibility to aggressive subliminal stimulation. Items were placed on a scale according to their highest loadings (at least . 4 5 ) . The aggression and dysphoria measures were then constructed by summing up the differences in the ratings between the conditidon without and the condition with subliminal stimulation over all items in the respective scale (cf. Table 4 ) . C O N T E N T V A L I D I T Y A N D I N T E R C O R R E L A T I O N S OF T H E DMI-SCALES

A s measure for the DMI-scale, the reactions on both levels, that of the imagined behavior and that of feelings and thoughts, were summed up to one score for each cluster.

Studies with the original version (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969; Blacha & Fancher, 1977) have, for the selected scales TAO and PRN, shown good content validity for PRN and a certain amount of items rated as %on-defensive" for TAO. Content validity ratings for the German version were very good for both scales (over 90% of the defenses correctly classified into the respective category). The five scales a r e however not independent of each other (cf. Table 5 ) .

26 1

Personality Correlates of Creativity Table 4 Items used for the construction of the two factor scales

Vicious Aggression

Dysphoria

rigid

depressive

rude

worried

chilly

discouraging

cruel

gloomy

ugly

apathetic

tense

unhappy

negative

sad

in timidat ing

hopeless

threatening

dissatisfied

cold

pessimistic

mean suspicious inconsiderate militant violent rejecting terrifying unpleasant stressed unsympathetic imbalanced bad unappreciative perfidious embarrassing

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

262

Table 5 Intercorrelations of the DMI-Scales (N-160; student sample)

1

2

3

4

5

TAO

TAS

PRN

PRO

REV

-

.05

-.37

1 TAO

2 TAS

-.33

*

*

3 PRN

-.33

-.09

-.22

-.46

*

*

* *

.19

*

4 PRO

5

.08

-.41

REV

*

p .c .05

PRN shows a negative relation to all other scales with the exception of REV. TAO is more independent but correlates negatively with REV and PRN with which it has roughly 14%of variance in common. O B J E C J f V l T Y A N D E X T E R N A L V A L f D l T Y OF T H E PG MEASURES

In Table 6 the results for the interrater reliability (of two independent raters are presented. Table 6 I n t e r r a t e r l i e l i a b i l i t i e s for the PG-Variables

NORMAL PG

Level of recognition (L )

Points given f o r d i f f e r e n t themes

1.00

.91

INVERTED PG

xx

.95

x

.84

(Rf) A

x

-74

0

.68

S

.85

Personality Correlates of Creativity

263

On the basis of these results for all three measures uscd a s dependent variables, good reliabilities can be inferred. It was hypothesized that the normal and inverted PG should be interrelated. The result is presented in Table 7.

Table 7 I n t e r c o r r e l a t i o n of Normal and Inverted PG

Ri> Mdn

-

Ri c -

no X and XX

no X and XX

Ri> -

I

Mdn

X and/or XX

x2corr= 9.19;

Ris -

Mdn

Mdn

X and/or XX

df = 39;

p c -01

Subjects who present many new themes in the normal PG can obviously also refer more often to their previous subjective reports in the inverted PG. Smith and Danielsson (1979) have reported very weak associations between the number of phases and the themes reported. In the present study, a correlation of r= .58 resulted betwccn the phase length and the number of different themes. The attempt was made to use ratings of the staff of the Technical College as external creativity criteria. As the estimates of objectivity based on the interrater correlations were very low, the ratings could not be used. Instead, the PG categories were compared to the grades in a course called "Basic Techniques of Design". The result indicates a relation to originality (X and X X v s . no X and no X X , F1,34=4.37 ; p c

.05) slightly

at the expense of convergent stimulus recognition in the perceptual process (level of recognition: grades, r= -0.27;

p < .05).

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

264

SUSCEPTlBlLlTY TO S U B L I M I N A L S T I M U L A T I O N , DEFENSES, A N D PERCEPTUAL RECONSTR UCTlON

The effects of defenses and susceptibility to subliminal stimulation on the PG test variables were analyzed by means of two way analyses of variance, carried out separately for each of the three dependent variables (X,S,Ri). With the combination of two defenses (TAO, PRN) and two scales for measuring subliminal effects (Aggression, Dysphoria), there were 1 2 analyses. For the classification of high and low groups on the independent variables, the median was used as cut-off point. In 4 cases the results were significant. In Table 8 the ANOVA results of the included variables for the 35 subjects with complete sets of data are summarized.

Table 8 Summary of t h e 2way ANOVA r e s u l t s

main effects

X

S

Ri

TAO

AGGR

TAO

DYSPHOR

PRN

AGGR

PRN

DYSPHOR

TAO

AGGR

TAO

DYSPHOR

PRN

AGGR

PRN

DYSPHOR

TAO

AGGR

TAO

DYSPHOR

PRN

AGGR

PRN

DYSPHOR

(TAO)

p e .04

interact ion

p e .03

p e -04

p c .01

p c .01

The nature of the significant results for the 4 combinations of defenses, reactions to subliminal stimulation, and the PG test variables is shown in Figure 3. This Figure suggests the occurrence of special group effects in some cases. In order to single out these effects, one-way analyses of variance

Personality Correlates of Creativity

265

-

susceptibility to subliminal stimulation Aggr. low high+- - - - - 0

low

TAO

high

-

susceptibility to subliminal stimulation Aggr.

low

higho-----

TAO

I

low

high

a

-

susceptibility to subliminal stimulation Aggr. low higho---- - - o

jl

0

)

-0

b

'1\

-

susceptibility to subliminal stimulation Oysp hor.

low

high - - - - - a

0'

'0

PR N low

PRN

4,

low

high

high

C

d

Figure 3. Analyses of variance: Graphical presentation o f s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t s

were conducted as follow-up tests, with estimates for the F-ratio of mean squares 'within' taken from the two-way analysis and a correction of the level of significance to n12 in comparison to the two-way analyses. The critical F-value for p c

.025

(F1131=5.57) was reached for special group

effects in the cases of Fig. 3 a , c , d , which is also in good congruence with the inferences one can draw from the graphic presentation of the results. In Fig,3a, significance for the follow-up test is reached for the difference between the groups with low vs. high scores on the aggrcssion scale in combination with high TAO-scores (F=7.58). In Fig.Bc, the group effect high vs. low aggression scores is more important in the combination with low PRN-scores (F=6.03). Fig.3d shows that a differentiation of the

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

266

groups with low vs. high reaction on the dysphoria scale (in consequence of the subliminal stimulation ) is more marked for the group with low PRN-values (F=7.52). If the respective dependent variables are included, the meaning of the revealed differences can be summarized verbally in the following way: a low undistorted susceptibility to aggressive subliminal stimuli (low scores on the AGGR-scale) combined with a high habitual tendency to react aggressively to frustrating objects (high TAO) tcnds to stimulate subjective contents in perceptual reconstruction (X, cf. Pig. 3a) and decreases reactions of sensitivity (S) which are also low for the combination high scores on the aggression scale and low scores on TAO. Sensitivity reactions (S) are more prominent in the groups showing a similar level on both scales (AGGR and TAO, low o r high, cf. Fig.3b). In the combination with PRN , this picture is almost reversed, sensitivity reactions in the PG test being more typical for the group with high susceptibility to aggressive subliminal stimulation (high score on the AGGR- scale and low defense scores of the intellectualization and isolation type (low PRN) than for the combination low susceptibility, low PRN (cf. F i g . 3 ~ ) . Being less influenced by aggressive subliminal stimulation in the dysphoric direction (low scores on the DYSPHOR-scale) , combined with less intellectualization (low PRN-scores), leads to more different meaningful themes in the normal PG ( R i ) than a high tendency to be influenced by the subliminal stimulation in a dysphoric direction (high scores on the DYSPHOR-scale and a low PRN defense score; cf. Fig.3d). Referring to the higher degrees of susceptibility to subliminal stimulation on both scales, the results indicate that being directly susceptible to subliminal aggressive stimulation (high scorcs on the AGGR-scale) hampers subjective content-related reconstructions (X) in combination with habitual aggressive reaction (high TAO) , but favors sensitivity reactions (S), if combined with high direct aggressivity (TAO) or low level of defensive control by intellectualization (PRN) (cf. Fig.3a,b,c). Subjects with a tendency to be strongly influenced in a dysphoric direction by an aggressive subliminal stimulation (high scores on thc DYSPHOR-scale) rcach only low Ri-scores when endowed with a low levcl of defensive control by intellectualization (PRN) .

267

Personality Correlates of Creativity DISCUSSION

The experiment was designed, and the basic hypotheses of the study were formulated under the assumption that creativity requires some form of integration of less structured, subconscious, subjective material into the normal functioning of consciously controlled convergent perceptions and thoughts and that the individual mode of coping with aggressive impulses could have a moderating effect upon this operation. Although the control of the experimental condition was a rather strict one. given the number of design students who served as subjects in relation to the number of variables included, the results have to be discussed more in terms of an exploratory data analysis than as the outcome of a completely controlled experiment. They should be interpreted merely as indicators in favor of, or in contrast to, the basic hypothesis. It is unavoidable that a number of open questions remain upon completion of this type of data analysis. The defense mechanisms have been selected with regard to a relatively open expression of age;ression (TAO) versus compulsive control (PRN: intellectualization, isolation, etc. ) , but what about the other mechanisms comprised in the DMI, and, more important, what about another representation of defense mechanisms a s , for example, in the Defense Mechanism Test (Kragh, 1969)? Also, susceptibility to aggressive subliminal stimulation might be operationalized in a completely different manner, such a s , for example, auditorily. And last not least, there is a number of different possibilities to measure creativity, even if in this study and in other research validity estimates for the way in which it was measured here could be ascertained (cf. Westerlundh

..

.% Smith,

1983,

e. g ) Some of the problems mentioned could possibly have been solved with a larger sample or by multivariate techniques of defining reliable dimensions for each of the three sets of variables and showing the intercorrelation of these dimensions. Even i f , as in the present study, the positive results seem rather clear cut, one is on safer grounds with such a small sample if there is also some independent support from other studies that, in a more or less direct way, can give greater weight to the indicators in question. Taking for granted the influence of subconscious activity on creative performance, different studies have used different techniques to find access to a level beyond preconsciousness. Hypnotic states, dreams, daydreams, and sensory deprivation and meditation techniques, all used as

268

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider

hypothetically relevant variables in the context of creativity (cf, Krippner, 1981; Domino, 1982; Aquino, 1982; Bowers, 1967; Barrios & Singer, 1981/ 82; Aron s Aron, 19821, reveal this assumption in a rather straightforward manner. There are also some studies on creativity using subliminal

stimuli which, according to Shevrin and Dickman (1980), might be ranked among the means to explore the differences between unconscious and conscious processes. By analogy to Silverman's ( e . g . , 1975) technique, some studies on creativity have controlled the effect of subliminal stimuli on creative performance. Antell and Goldberger (cf. chapter 4 ) compared the effects of a neutral, sexual, and of an aggressive stimulus; Smith and coworkers (Smith & Danielsson, 1979; Smith & Carlsson, 1983) used a neutrnl and a threatening one. No common summary is possible for these studies, for the most part presumably due to differences in the dependent creativit y variables. The threatening stimulus in the studies by Smith and coworkers stimulated the performance during the inverted percept genesis ; in the Antell and Goldberger study, the sexual and neutral stimuli improved the performance only in an easy creativity task (remote associations), whereas the aggressive stimulus impaired the performance of both, the creative and the non-creative groups on the metaphor test, but was more detrimental for the noncreative group which showed impairment from subliminal sexual stimulation a s well. In our study, subliminal stimulation was used with a different aim and meaning. I t could by no means directly influence the performance on the PG-test, as i t was given first. Our subliminal stimulation could be regarded, rather, a s an attempt to register dispositions with a tendency to see the atmosphere of the neutral supraliminal picture as more aggressive or more dysphoric and to observe some consequences of the susceptibility to the aggressive subliminal stimulus. The influence to be expected form this kind of outside stimulation is of course hypothetically related to the disposition, for instance, of how the individual is able to channel i t s own aggressive impulses, a question which in psychodynamic theory is linked to the structure of defense. Defense mechanisms belong to those psychoanalytical constructs which have a good validity from an experimental point of view, too (cf. Hentschel, 1 9 8 5 ) . In other studies results have been reported that creative people tend to be more aggressive or to show a more direct acting out of aggressive impulses (see, for example, McKinnon, 1965; Barron, 1968; Rubin, 1980, quoted aft e r Strauss et al, 1981). Smith and Carlsson (in preparation), who in their study with 16-year-old boys found an easier identification with the aggres-

Personality Correlates of Creativity

269

sor on the part of the creative group,

have nevertheless questioned

whether their creative subjects should be regarded a s more aggressive. Instead, they have stressed the absence of certain defenses, a certain tolerance of anxiety, and the active tackling of preconscious contents. In em phasizing active reconstruction, this interpretation is both in line with the basic assumptions in PG-theory, as well as bridging the gap to the more cognitive theories of creativity already mentioned or to postulated associations between conscious imagery and creativity (cf. Forisha, 1978; Gordon &

Poze, 1981; Hentschel, 1984; Barrios

&

Singer, 1981/82).

In a natural way of reaching a creative solution, functioning may shift from unconscious to conscious levels. In experimental studies the personality mechanisms to be observed of course show some correspondence to

the

experimentally imposed

requirements

for

adaptation,

too

(cf.

Draguns, chapter 13). PG-techniques of the kind used here for determining the dependent variables have the advantage of providing at least some insight into the adaptive process. The reactions to subliminal stimuli in the present study have to be interpreted in terms of a disposition and not as a situational effect. Being easily influenced by a subliminal aggressive stimulus to perceive a supraliminal neutral scene as aggressive or transposed into a dysphoric atmosphere is, in interaction with types of defense (mostly against aggressive impulses), important for a subjective perspective on objective stimuli. Taking the X and Ri variables of the PG-test as positive signs for creative perception and S as a negative or at least doubtful one, subjects susceptible to direct influence by aggressive subliminal contents and/or with defenses of a compulsive type (intellectualization, isolation) are worse off than subjects having a habitual open outlet of aggression (TAO)

. For

subjects, however, whose reactions shift into a dys-

phoric direction as a consequence of subliminal stimulation, a higher defensive control is not so detrimental. Vaillant (1974) has, in his attempt to define mental health, modified Freud's "love and work" postulate in an important way - turning it into the "joyful expression of sex and of anger.'! Mental health also implies the ability to cope with conflicts rather than the complete absence of conflicts. Through creative acts which may also serve onels self-realization, personal conflicts can be neutralized. We have not studied the influence of sexual subliminal stimuli, but "joyful expression of anger'9, in combination with a lack of an almost oversensitive early extraction of affective meaning (Zajonc, 1980) of a negative kind, seems to also be a good indicator of perceptual creativity. And there are also signs of a possible counterbalance of negative effects by defense mechanisms.

270

U.Hentschel and U.Schneider It can be hypothesized that interactions with susceptibility to positive

subliminal stimuli would show a completely different pattern. The proof for the effectiveness of subliminal stimuli can be found in many different studies (cf. Dixon, 1071, 1081). From an evolutionary perspective, reactivity to subliminal stimuli seems a necessary and meaningful mechanism for which physiological explanations can be provided as well. But despite the efficacy of subliminal stimuli in normal perception, its consequences are not only positive, for example, in case of an interactive process with traumatic experiences stored in long-term memory (tantamount to a complex) (Dixon, 1980). To study interactive links of this kind seems to bc a promising endeavor, especially if the elements involved can be related to broader dimensions and not only to idiosyncratic events. Trying to include external and internal variables in studies of perception is also in the tradition of the functionalistic approach a s advocated by Brunswik, for example. Pigure 4 shows an application of Brunswik's lens model (Brunswik, 1955) to the variables in the study. Without the assumption of probabilistic inferen-

ces by the observer of distal variables, a "recognition test" with the instruction to describe a stimulus, such as, for example, the objects in E . Aaltols still-life, could not be used as a creativity task. If perception were completely deterministic, there would simply be no room for subjective interpretations. Within the range from very short to relatively long presentation times, which for most subjects finally allow a "correct" recognition, the probabilities for the perceptual hypotheses of the observer are changed. The individual increase in the probabilities for a correct recognition and the decrease for subjective hypotheses determined by intrasystcmic constituents, can be conceptualized as the main process comprised in the normal PG. Figure 4 would represent one single presentation with a distinct exposure time within the range of 0.01 to 3 . 6 sec. If the stimuli were of very low complexity, the model would permit a quantification, for example, by changing the PG-test into a signal detection task. In creativity tests, stimuli have to be more complex. A s a con sequence of this complexity, the number of possible subjective alternative hypotheses makes a quantification by means of probabilities related to all objects reported by the subject very difficult. The model thus seems to be more useful for exemplifying the interrelatedness of internal and external constituents and the substitutability of stimulus cues, including subliminal ones, on a descriptive level. For subliminal stimuli the model implies that such stimuli have stronger impact if they are ecologically relevant or close-

27 1

Personality Correlates of Creativity

functional validity

/ -

ecoloaical validitv

intrasvstemic constituent

7

distal v a r i a b l e

central response

Figure 4. Brunswik's Lens Model and t h e variables of the study

ly related to intrasystemic variables. By the tachistoscopic presentation with increasing times in PG-techniques, the quality of the cues in terms of a signal to noise ratio is changed over the series (cf. Dixon, Hentschel, & Smith, in preparation). This, in interaction with intrasystemic constituents, leads to different functional validities during the different phases of the process. The functional validity in the model is restricted to convergent recognition. Adapting the model to creativity research implies a necessary broadening of ''achievement" to divergent solutions as well, There are thus additional ends for which perception can provide the means.

U. Hentschel and U. Schneider

272

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(1981). Ibsen: Narcissism and creativity. Scandinavian Psychoana-

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Smith (Eds.), Ex-

perimentelle Persiinlichkeitspsychologie (pp. 372-394). Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Dixon, N. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Dixon, N.,

Hentschel, U., & Smith, G.J.W.

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(1963). Goethe: A Psychoanalytic Study.

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versity Press. Fitzgerald, E.T. (1966). Measurement of openness t o experience: A study of regression in t h e service of the ego. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 655-663. Freud, S. (1941). Charakter und Analerotik. Gesammelte Werke (Vol. 7). London: Imago. (Original work published 1908) Forisha, B.L.

(1978). Creativity and imagery in men and women. Perceptual

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& Ihilevich, D.

(1969). An objective instrument for measuring

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(1956). The structure of intellect.

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267-293. Hentschel, U. (1984). Bildhafte Vorstellung oder eidetische Anschauungsbilder? Sprache und Kognition, 3, 26 -40. Hentschel, U. (1985). Zur Validitat des Abwehrkonst rukts: Experimentelle Belege. In D. Czogalik, W.Ehlers, & R. Teufel (Eds.), Perspektiven der Psychotherapieforschung (pp. 157-175). Freiburg: Hochschulverlag. Hentschel, U., & Hickel, U. (in preparation). Frustrations-Abwehr-Skala. Hentschel, U., & Klintman, H.

(1974). A 28-variable

semantic differential.

1. On the factorial identification of content. Psychological Research Bul-

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letin, Lund University, 14(4). Hentschel, U., & Smith, G.J.W. (Eds.). (1980). Experimentelle Persclnlichkeitspsychologie. Wiesbaden: A kademisc he Verlagsgesellschaf t Holt, R.R. (1956). Gauging primary and secondary processes in Rorschach

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responses. Journal of Projective Techniques, 20, 14-25. Kragh, U. (1969). Manual till DMT - Defense Mechanism Test: Stockholm: Skandinaviska Test f orlaget. Kragh, U., & Smith, G.J.W. (1974). Forming new patters of experiences: A classical problem viewed within a percept-genetic model. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 14(6). Krippner, S. (1981). Access to hidden reserves of the unconscious through dreams in creative problem solving. Journal of Creative Behavior, 15, 1 1-22.

Kris, E. (1952). Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art. New York: International Universities Press. MacKinnon, D.W. (1965). Personality and the realization of creative potential. American Psyhologist, 20, 273-281. Maslow, A.H. (1971). The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. N e w York: Viking Press. Miller, D.F. Rangell, L. Imago, Ricoeur, P.

(1982). Metaphor, thinking, and thought. Et cetera, 39, 134-150. (1978). The creative trust:

A psychoanalytic theory.

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35, 27-44. (1977). The Rule of

Metaphor. Toronto: University of Toronto

Press. Rossman, J. (1931). The Pschology of t h e Inventor. Washington, DC: Inventors Publishing. Rubenstein, D., & Levitt, M. (1980). The creative process and the narcissistic personality disorder. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 8, 461-482. Sackeim, H.A.,

Packer, I.K.,

& Gur, R.C.

(1977). Hemisphericity, cognitive set,

and susceptibility to subliminal perception. Journal of Abnormal Rychology, 86, 624-630. Sander, C.F.

(1927).

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In

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Schlesinger, K. (1980/81). On t h e c r e a t i v e process a n d t h e h u m a n c a p a c i t y t o const rue. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy, 8, 483500.

Schulman, D. (1966). Opennes of perception as a condition for creativity. Ex-

ceptional Children, 33, 89-94. Shevrin, H., & Dickman, S. (1980). T h e psychological unconscious. American

Psychologist, 35, 421-434. Silverman, L.H. (1975). An e x p e r i m e n t a l technique for t h e s t u d y of unconscious conflict: A progress report. British Journal of Medical Psychology,

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(1981). Creation and reconstruction. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 4, 275-286.

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& Carlsson, I.

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study. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 24 107-115. Smith, C.J.W.,

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for a e s t h e t i c c r e a t i o n : An e x p e r i m e n t a l s t u d y utilizing subliminal s t i m u lation a n d a p e r c e p t - g e n e t i c technique. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 19(3,4). S m i t h , G.J.W.,

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Effektivitat bei einer Gruppe von Natur- und Geisteswissenschaftlern.

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Experimentelle Persijnlichkeitspsychologie (pp. 350-371). Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. U. Hentschel & G.J.W.

Smith (Eds.),

S t r a w s , H., H a d a r , M., Shavit, H., & Itskowitz, R. (1981). Relationship bet w e e n c r e a t i v i t y , repression a n d a n x i e t y in first graders. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 53, 275-282.

(1980). Primary process thinking a n d creativity. Psychological Rulletin, 88, 144-165.

Suler, J.R.

T o r r a n c e , E.P. (1982). Hemisphericity a n d c r e a t i v e functioning. Journal of Re-

search and Development in Education, 15, 29-37. T o r r a n c e , E.P., & Mourad, S. (1979). R o l e of hemisphericity in p e r f o r m a n c e o n s e l e c t e d measures of creativity. Gifted Child Quarterly, 23, 44-55. Vaillant, G.E. (1974). Adaptation to life. Boston: L i t t l e , Brown, & Co. Wallas, G. (1926). The Art of Thought. New York: H a r c o u r t , Brace. Westerlundh, B., & S m i t h , G. (1983). Perceptgenesis a n d t h e psychodynamics of perception. Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, 6, 597-640. Zajonc, P.B.

(1980). Feeling and thinking: American Psychologist, 35, 151-175.

P r e f e r e n c e s n e e d n o inferences.

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The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publihhers B. V.(North-Holland), 1986

271

IDENTIFICATION WITH ANOTHER PERSON : MANIPULATED BY MEANS OF SUBLIMINAL STIMULATION Gudmund J.W. Smith Ingegerd Carlsson Anna Danielsson Lund University

IMTRODUCTION Research using stimulation outside awareness was for many decades mainly concerned with ascertaining its effects, i f any, on the perceiver. A s is well known, the subject-matter still remains controversial. However, after the publication of Dixon's two books (1971, 1981), where the accumulated evidence in favor of subliminal perception seems overwhelming, it has become more opportune to exploit subliminal stimulation a s a tool in personality and clinical research. One reason for the efficacy of such stimulation would be that it can bypass the constricting effects of awareness and reach beyond the surface of everyday experience. Silverman (e.g., 1980) has been a pioneer in research using subliminal psychodynamic activation. In the present paper we utilize subliminal verbal material, like Silverclan, but do so within a meta-contrast design. The meta-contrast technique has been applied in studying certain assumptions concerning subliminal perception (Smith & Henriksson, 1955 ; Smith. Spence, & Klein, 1959) and in following the development of a new percept within the context of a stabilized one. The latter procedure has been formalized into the personality test called MCT (Smith, Johnson, & Alrngren, 1982). The present paper deals with a new application of the meta-contrast design presented in its first version some years ago by Smith and Danielsson (1979). In this test the subject is confronted with a drawing of two people symmetrically standing on either side of the vertical median. This picture (referred to in the text as B , with one of a variety of suffixes) is flashed tachistoscopically onto a screen. By systematically increasing the exposure values before the real test begins, the experi-

278

G. Smith,I. Carlsson, and A. Danielsson

menter allows the subject to perceive the two persons correctly. After that, using subliminal flashes of the word I (Swedish "JAG") on either the left hand or the right hand figure, the experimenter tries to direct the subject's attention to one figure o r the other. It is assumed that the figure thus subliminally reinforced (the subliminal stimulus referred to in the text as A, with one of a variety of suffixes), will also be the one with whom the subject attempts to identify. In particular, the use of the word I should promote such identification. After having tried this technique with a B stimulus depicting an aggressor and a victim facing each other, w e became aware of its intrinsic potential for elucidating a wide range of problems of identification and empathy. In order to test the assumptions underlying this application of the new technique, for which we have coined the term identification test ( I T ) , we needed a number of independent criteria to characterize our subjects and to enable predictions of their test behavior. For the B stimulus just described, we decided to use clinical subjects with problems of aggression. One such group of subjects, borderline patients, could be described by means of carefully sifted clinical evidence; another group, characterized by projective defense mechanisms, could be identified using the results of the MCT (see below). Since, however, we also wanted to apply the IT in groups of non-clinical subjects, another version of i t was included among the tests to be used in a creativity project. In this version, the B stimulus depicted two similar persons standing against different backgrounds, one representing the walls of a narrow room, the other an open horizon. The subjects were professional artists about whom w e collected information of both their creative functioning and their artistic production - the results of a creative functioning test and the evaluation of their work by a professor of art history having been selected to serve as independent criteria. These were a number of reasons for believing that the design would work. A s already mentioned, we tested several subjects before embarking on a more systematic study. We were also aware of the powerful semantic effects of words presented subliminally (Smith, Spence, & Klein, 19591, an effect even more striking when they are presented well below the threshold, rather than just above i t (Spence & Holland, 1962). Further evidence for this has been presented more recently by other experimenters ( e . g . , Somekh & Wilding, 1973; Henley , 1975; Silverman, 1980; Westerlundh, 1983) and been comprehensively and critically summarized by Dixon (1971,

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

219

1981) who has supplemented the tachistoscopic techniques with extended low intensity presentations. I t may well be that some subjects are more sensitive to subliminal stimulation than others, such individual differences presumably being open to exploitation by the experimenter. The presentation of the IT will be divided in three p a r t s , one part dealing with the first and more preliminary study of borderline and paranoid-sensitive patients, another describing the testing of professional artists, and a final one devoted to the discussion of the technique.

EXPERIMENT I: A STUDY O F BORDERLINE AND PARANOIDSENSITIVE PATIENTS METHOD AND DESIGN T H E IDENTIFICATION TEST, FIRST VERSION ( I T : 1)

The basic assumption underlying the test design was that, on a picture depicting an tfaggressorll and a l'victimtl face to face, subliminal projection of the word I on one figure or the other should affect a subject's impression of, or attitude to, the contrasting roles they represent. The tendencies derived from pilot studies with normal subjects were t h a t , when I was flashed on the llaggressorlt, subjects were inclined to vindicate him and to find fault with the lTvictimlf;and that, after I was then shifted to the "victim", subjects were no longer so certain of their first impression, but often considered the "aggressor" unfair and rather repellent, instead. The picture was drawn by D r . Bert Westerlundh. The aggressor and the victim, both male, stand half facing each other, the aggressor to the left. The victim is holding his arms stretched downwards in an open gesture, the aggressor's arms are bent at the elbows and his fists clenched. The mouths of both figures are half open a s if they were talking, and that of the aggressor is twisted to

R

snarl.

The picture and the word I were presented by an MCT tachistoscope having two projectors placed behind the projection screen. The subject sat in front of the screen, which had a projection area of 35x35 cm, at a distance of 1.6 m .

The room was dimly lit

approximately 1 . 2 Lux at the

screen surface, increasing slightly (to about 1 . 5 Lux) when the picture was projected. Exposure times began at 0.01 sec and could be prolonged

G.Smith, I. Carlsson, and A . Danielsson

280

step by step with a quotient of V2. Step 2 thus represents a value of 0 . 0 1 4 sec, step 3 a value of 0 . 0 2 sec. and step 6 a value of 0.057 sec, etc. When subliminal stimuli were used they were flashed immediately before the picture. The subject received the following instructions: W e are going to show pictures on the screen in front of you. Presentations will be brief so please bc prepared. Look towards the middle of the screen when I soy,

NOW." - "First of all I want you to describe what you saw. But I would also like you to tell me your impression of the figures in the picture, what kind of people they are, whether you like them, what you believe they are thinking and feeling. Also t r y to describe the atmofiphere in the picture." - qlSometimes you may think that the pictures we show are very much alike, sometimes that they change from one exposure to the next. Please, notice such changes. l1 The experimenter asked the subjcct to give a general description after each exposure of the picture. a characterization of the two persons and of the mood. At the end of the entire experiment she also asked whether the subject had glimpsed anything else - any trace of structures not belonging to the picture. Let us use the letter B1 to represent the aggressor-victim picture, the letters I for the word I when flashed at the place of the aggressor aggr and Idct when flashed at the place of the victim. As already mentioned, B was always exposed with the aggressor to the left a s seen by the sub1 ject. Starting with an exposure value of 0 . 0 1 sec, B1 was then presented in the series of increasing time values. This series continued until the

subject, if possible, had correctly recognized the aggressor and the victim. Thereafter, the following four series were given, the exposure for the I stimuli having been 0 . 0 1 4 sec and for the B 1 stimulus 0.057 sec: 1 . B 1 alone 5 times 2 . Iaggr + B1 5 times 3. Idct

+ B 1 5 times

4 . B1 alone 5 times

The order between 2 and 3 was randomized, the experimenter himself being unaware of the presentation order used. The manipulation the experimenter had to make in order to switch from I aggr to Idct, camouflaged by several faked manipulations.

o r vice versa, was

28 1

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation THE M E T A -CON JRAST TECHNlQUE

The experimenter also presented the subject with the threat series of the MCT (Meta-Contrast Technique) unless, as in some cases, the test had already been given by a clinical psychologist at the psychological laboratory of the Psychiatric Clinic. The general rule was to give the IT1 first and the more provocative MCT afterwards. For those already tested with the MCT the interval between the testings was considerable, the patients being "old customers" at the Clinic. The MCT consists of two pictures, one of which (B) shows a young person sitting at a table with a window in the background wall. Once B has been presented in an ascending time series until it has been correctly recognized by the subject, the presentation time is cut back to step 6 (0.057

sec). Having first presented a series of B alone at this exposure

level, the experimenter then inserts stimulus A immediately before B . A depicts a threatening face and is projected on the same part of the screen as the window in B . Exposure times for A are prolonged step by step while that for B is kept constant. The subliminal registration of A may influence the perception of B. Eventually A appears as a perceptual struct u r e in its own right, and, finally, it is correctly recognized by most subjects. Over a period of two decades, several investigators have shown that changes in the B-percept and the distortions of A reveal whether a subject tends to defend himself against anxiety provoking threats and reflect the form of this defense. The test has been reported elsewhere (Hentschel Smith, 1980; Smith

&

Danielsson, 1982; Smith, Johnson,

&

summarizing more than 25 different validating papers).

&

Almgren, 1982, In the present

study we are particularly interested in projective defenses. SCORING OF THE TESTS

The MCT was scored by G . S .

and A.D.

There were no disagrec-

ments. The IRTl scoring entailed summarizing each subject's reports in each of the four series. Since the effects of the subliminal stimulation might not penetrate immediately or might carry over from one series to the next, we concentrated on the last three trials in each series (cf. the discussion).

The main emphasis will be on the difference between series

and those where it was where I was projected upon the aggressor (&) projected upon the victim ( E l . We also agreed on these summaries, some of which will be presented below (with the aggressor in the picture denoted by A and the victim by V). The first

control series served a s a

G.Smith, I. Carlason, and A. Danielsson

282

baseline for scoring the subliminal series Iaggr + B1 and Ivict + B 1 , i . e . , in order to be noted a subject's report should differ from the baseline.

SUBJECTS

The subjects were all in-patients at the Psychiatric Clinic I of Lund University Hospital. Because he may have glimpsed some letter in the B1 picture, one subject was excluded, stimuli at threshold level being apt to carry structural messages different from their actual meaning (Spence, 1962; Dixon, 1971, 1981). Of the remaining 18 subjects, 11 were women and 7 men. The age span was 15-57 years and the median age 28 years. The median age of subjects characterized a s indubitable borderline or projective-sensitive cases below was 27 years. Since we wanted to collect people with problems pertaining to identification and aggression, our subjects are not representative of the patient population. The following summary may illustrate this point: 11 subjects, including two marginal cases, were scored for projection-sensitivity in the MCT (see below); 9 subjects first focused the victim in the introductory percept-genesis (the victim was "easiest to see," seemed closer, was moving, was the person first described by the subject, or the person described in most detail); 3 focused the aggressor; 2 had difficulties in recognizing the B1 motif, one of the refusing to do so throughout the test; 3 subjects were clear borderline cases (see below). SCORING OF PROJECTIONISENSI J l V l T Y

The MCT signs used for this classification have been validated many times against symptom criteria (for an English summory, see Smith & Danielsson, 1982). Four categories were distinguished: 1. Clear signs of projection. Examples : interaction between thc threatening person and the young person; the young person reported as known to the subject; an additional figure spotted. 2 . Moderate signs of projection, generally reports of movement, 3. Clear signs of sensitivity. Examples: several spatial changes in the B

stimulus while A remains subliminal, changes more pronounced than in the control series. 4 . Marginal signs of projection-sensitivity or no signs at all.

283

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation DlAGNOSlNG BORDERLINE CONDl TlONS

According to their therapists, the three borderline cases were all characterized by extreme self-centercdness and lack of genuine sympathy with other people, narcissistic vulnerability, and dread of open aggression. Their instable occupational life and impermanent personal relations were

typical.

They

always

seemed close

to

primary

process

break-

throughs. Two of them had brief psychotic episodes with bizarre fantasies and a blurred distinction between self and other. One of them lived a very protected life with an understanding husband and did not regress into psychoticism. Still, she remained peculiarly elusive, lacking, as it were, a real self. PREDICTIONS F O R SUBJECTS W l T H PROJECTlVE DEFENSES

The projective defense strategy implies that unacceptable impulses of an aggressive, sexual, etc. nature are not identified as part of oneself but as belonging to the outside world. In more pathological cases the person constructs elaborate systems of persecution. A more common, not necessarily pathogenic form of projection has been described by Nyman and Smith

(1961) under the name of sensitivity. The sensitive person is particularly aware of himself as the center of attention, even in innocent social gatherings. Like the paranoid person he is acutely sensitive to the undercurrent of person-to-person relationships, but more stimulus proximal in his reporting and more flexible. We predict that all subjects with projective defenses, above all those with strong projections according to the MCT hierarchy, will find it difficult to identify with the aggressor and thus to accept their own aggressive tendencies. Identification with the victim is likely to be easier for them, especially i f they can justify the victim in his relation to the aggressor. Moreover, identification with the victim would allow the subject to indulge in his fascination with aggression in others. PREDICTIONS F O R B O R D E R L I N E SUBJECTS

It may seem risky to include the borderline personality as a criterion dimension. Many clinicians regard borderline states as a diagnostic wastepaper basket. We prefer to agree with Kernberg (1967, 19751, however, that borderline patients do indeed have a specific personality organization which is not a transitory state fluctuating between psychosis and neurosis; in fact, of course, the uniqueness of the borderline condition was discovered long ago (Stern, 1938; Deutsch, 19421, even if systematic studies

G. Smith, I. Carlsson, and A . Danielsson

284

were late to appear (Grinker, Werble, b Drye, 1968). Diagnosis seems difficult because the clinician must confine his attention to basic metapsychological perspectives rather than focus upon specific symptoms (Meissner , 1978). The central defect is in the organizing structure of the self (Ross, 1976). a defect which becomes particularly glaring in unstructured settings. Except for brief psychotic episodes in some cases, borderline people differ from psychotics in their ability to maintain object relations and to preserve reality testing, and from neurotics in their inability to integrate positive and negative introjections and identifications as well as in their all too readily undertaken shifts toward primary process thinking. In this context we wish to emphasize signs of identity diffusion and narcissism. Borderline people, says Ross (1976), are likely to experience other people without recognition, as "mere surface." It is obvious that these people are bound to face grave difficulties in the IT1. Even i f any identification would be problematic for them, we expect them to differentiate between the aggressor and the victim as objects of identification and understanding. The crucial event in the etiology of most borderline cases seems to be a very early narcissistic damage ("the blow") to their fragile self-esteem and feeling of security. Giving expression to aggressive impulses can therefore be particularly dangerous to borderline persons because, as they see i t , the anticipated revenge would have severe and unbearable consequences. Even if less dangerous, however, the role of the victim is certainly not going to be easy either, Given tendencies to projection, the borderline person might find the victim more comforting, as the victim would then be entitled to fight back. While both paranoid and borderline subjects will thus find identification with the aggressor difficult, the latter will to some extent also tend to resist identification with the victim, owing to the feared revenge.

RESULTS

Summaries of IT1 protocols will first be presented for subjects who were scored for signs of projection-sensitivity in the M C T but were not considered as borderline personalities, and, thereafter, for the three borderline cases. & represents series where I was flashed on the aggressor (called A_ below), series where it was flashed on the victim (called V ) . All but one of the subjects were able to recognize the B1 motif before

285

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation the subliminal series started.

N O N - B O R D E R L I N E SUBJECTS WlTH SlGNS OF P R O J E C T l O N I S E N S I J I V l J Y

=:

Subjects with clear signs of projection: The subject seems completely bewildered. 1. Vict : 2.

Correct differentiation. =: & is shrinking, seems inferior to UP

1;or

the two roles are mixed

-

Vict:

Correct differentiation. But

is perfectly in his rights and A_ is

now easier to identify. Subjects with more moderate signs of projection: The picture theme is subdued and the differentiation unclear. 3.

a: Vict: -

Correct differentiation and open identification with V_. This seems

to entitle the subject to a renewed interest in A_. V_ makes a gesture 4.

towards A's crotch. Both series incorrect, but

Vict

less so, since the aggressive atmo-

sphere is mentioned. Subjects with clear signs of sensitivity: 5.

Both series incorrect, but

6.

m:Doubtful

Vict

less

RO,

since the aggressive atmo-

sphere is mentioned.

Vict : -

differentiation at first, incorrect in the end.

Correct differentiation.

7.

Both series correctly differentiated, But V_ disappears in both.

10.

e: The subject finds the picture difficult

B O R D E R L l N E SUBJECTS

to perceive, mixes A_ and

x,is confused about their sex, softens the aggressive theme which fi-

nally disappears altogether. Vict: -

This series does not lead to perceptual difficulties. The subject

recognizes himself in both persons, however, wants to shift between them, combines man with woman and man with man in open sexual intercourse, shows signs of mounting anxiety and embarks on loose associations.

11.

e: No differentiation, both A_ and V_ are aggressive. Vict:

Correct differentiation. Finally, V_ gives up and falls to the

ground.

12.

a: Everything seems harmless, no differentiation. Vict: V_

is identified as the victim but gets the upper hand while

begins to behave like a submissive dog.

4

G.Smith, I. Corlsson, and A . Danielsson

286

All borderline subjects reacted very much like the foregoing group of subjects in the series. However, even in the Vict series they ran into complications total surrender, attempts at double identification, insurrection. One projecting borderline personality, subject 11, seems to accept the role of V_ rather easily. In the last control series, where the subject is no longer supported by subliminal stimulation for his choice of identification, the following happens in the borderline group. 10. There is no relation any more between A_ and V_, the subject does not like them, sees them as bad but disguised people, and shows signs of severe anxiety. 11. The differentiation is less clear now than in the series and the descriptions are more hypothetical. 12. The motif seems more threatening. Table 1 presents an overview of the results in the and Vict series. A s just pointed out, the borderline cases differ from the other cases with respect to their complicated Vict series, Most projective-sensiTable 1 Sumnary of results in the

Incorrect differentiation

& and Yice

Correct differentiation

in

in

Vict -

Vict -

partly correct but com-

mainly

less in-

correct

correct

correct,

correct,

and better

but not

not com-

aggr.

differen-

better

tiation

differen-

plex iden- plex iden- perceived tification tification

0

Not incorrect but evasive

Vict -

group

3

&

Vict -

Clinical

Borderline

series.

Vict _ I

tiation

0

0

0

0

Clear proj.

0

2

0

0

0

0

Movement

0

1

1

0

0

0

Clear sens.

0

1

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

I

5

1

Not more than marginal cases

287

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

tive subjects manage to differentiate A_ and V_ in the in the

Vict

series, but not

series. While these subjects make mistakes of differentiation

either in one or both series, the remaining subjects do not (one subject by evading the issue throughout the test). If we distinguish the borderline cases from the rest of the subjects, exclude the subject who was never able to recognize the picture motif, and divide the remaining group of 17 in two by a vertical median, we obtain a four-field table of (9-0):(1-7). A s tested by Fisher's exact t e s t , onetailed, the difference is significant

(p=0.0004) and remains highly significant (p=O.OOOS) even i f the subjects to the extreme right in the table were deleted as dubious.

EXPERIMENT 11: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL ARTISTS The second study was primarily concerned with creative functioning in a group of 32 professional artists but included a version of the identification tests (IT2) specifically adapted to the creativity area. The results of a creative functioning test and of an a r t historian's evaluation of the artists' productions were selected to serve as independent criteria.

METHOD AND DESIGN

THE IDENJlFlCAJlON TEST, SECOND VERSION ( I T : 2) The B2 picture was drawn by one of the present authors ( I . C . ) . Two human figures stand half facing each other. Except for minor differences in hair and dress they are quite similar, wearing trousers and lacking inobvious sex attributes. They are separated by a partition with a glass pane. The crucial difference between the two sides of the picture concerns the background, the left figures is standing against an open, diffusely structured background, the right figure against a wall close behind. IT2 was presented in exactly the same way as IT1.

The second and third

series in IT2 were thus Iopen (against the figure with the open background) and Iclosed (against the figure with the closed background) + B 2 , or vice versa for half of the subjects according to a randomized doubleblind design.

G. Smith, I. Carlsson, and A . Danielsson

288 SCORING OF I T : 2

Since the scoring of IT2 might be more open to subjective influences than the scoring of IT1. two of the present authors ( G . S . , I . C . ) , on the one hand, and an extra judge, on the other, scored the protocols independently of each other, the following scoring rulcs having been formulated: Use +, -, +/-, or 0 to characterize each of the two subliminally manipulated (middle) series. The latter three presentations in a series of five should be most decisive for the overall characterization. The control series should serve as a "baseline. I' + is given when the picture is described in clearly positive words; when the environment and sex of the figures are more clearly perceived than before; when the subject's interest in the picture is increasing; when there is more contact between the two figures.

-

is given when the picture is described in such clearly negative

words as aggressive, anxiety laden, etc.; when the subject finds it artificial, tries to deprecate the drawing, becomes irritated or tired, loses interest; when the sex of the figures is changed (within the series); when the environment is concealed or transfigured or when other defensive strategies are used; when the subject obviously attends to the "opposite" side. +I- is given when both the above alternatives can be applied to the snme series (even to thc same single projection). 0 is given when +,

-, or +I- do not apply, i . e . , when the subliminal

stimulation has no noticeable effect. The judges were also admonished not to rely on single, vague signs, particularly not in the beginning of a series, and to avoid drawing farreaching conclusions from temporary shifts of attention. They were also reminded that both the control series and the introductory series could be used to define a subject's habitual style of reporting and hence facilitate the judge's decision as to when to score real change in later series. Because the sex of the two figures was indeterminate, sex attribution varied considerably among the subjects. We used three classes to characterize this variation: No change, early attribution and no subsequent change; Change, sex attribution not later than the control series ( N o . l ) , change of attribution as a result of the subliminal stimulation (series No. 2 and/or No. 3 ) ; Indet, indeterminate about sex. THE C R E A T I V E F U N C T I O N I N G TEST (PG)

This test has been describedin detail in other recent publications (c.g., Smith

B

Cnrlsson, 1983), where validation data are also given.

289

Identification Manipulated by Subliminnl Stimulation

It rests on the assumption that creative people are willing and able to go beyond the confines of a stabilized perception impression. A still-life is presented on a screen in front of the subject using a percept-genetic technique - i.e., starting with sub-threshold exposure values which are gradually prolonged. After the subject has correctly recognized the stimulus, the procedure is reversed with gradually diminished exposure times. In this inverted series, subjects who eventually entertain subjective themes instead of the correct one, receive an X X score, whereas those who simultaneously retain the consensus meaning somewhere in the background, receive an X score. ( X ) refers to partial changes from correct to incorrect reporting; 0 to more fleeting impressions of alternative meanings; S to instances where the meaning of the picture does not change but only the apparent size of the structures or the perspective under which they are seen, etc. Protocols without changes receive a

- score. The series of

scores represents an approximate interval scale (Smith

&

Carlsson, 1983).

Here, clear changes (XX,X) are given a value of 3 , partial o r fleeting changes ( ( X I , 0 , S) a value of 2 , and no changes (-1 a value of 1. Human motifs reported in the ascending presentation series of the 'lstraightl' percept-genesis make for another useful scoring category, particularly known to reflect emotional involvement in creative work (cf. Stein, 1975). The protocols were scored b y two independent raters (G.S., I . C . ) . A s before, there were few disagreements, all of them easily resolved. A R J DIMENSIONS

The a r t specialist, Professor Sven Sandstrijm , working independently of the present authors, used 11 dimensions to describe the artistic production of 2 9 artists whose work he felt he knew well enough. The following dimensions will be used here: form (emphasis on formal matters), struct u r e , renewal, originality, expression, static (as opposed to dynamic), and pamphleteering (letting one1s products

be influenced by concern with

humanlsocial issues). A plus denoted certainty that the a r t products were, for instance, original, a minus equal certainty that they were not, and a zero uncertainty.

290

G.Smith, I. Carlsson, and A. Danielsson SUBJEC JS

The subjects were profcssional artists living in the southwestern part of Sweden not too far from the laboratory, a list of nrtists compiled by a local employment agency having served as a basis for selection. Our art specialist deleted what he considered %on-serious" artists from the list and added others instead. Altogether 33 subjects participated in the investigation and were paid a nominal fee for their trouble. Twelve artists declined to participate, for various reasons. One of the 33 subjects was excluded from the group because of suspected brain damage, leaving 32 subjects for the main comparisons. There were 23 men and 9 women; 7 subjects were younger than 40 and 13 older than 49. A s already mentioned, comparisons between tcst results and judgments by the art specialists was limited to 29 subjects,

PREDlCJlONS

Bg was drawn for specific use with professional artists. The main contrast between the two sides of the pictures should be open versus closed. Our first, rather simplistic assumption was that a preference for the open alternative would coincide with a strong urge to create. A s shown in previous studies (Smith & Carlsson, 1983), anxiety is part of the creativity complex, o r , to put it in other words, creative people seem relatively tolerant of the anxiety accompanying creative work. This was seen as an additional reason for creative subjects not shunning the open alternative with its relative lack of structure. A s we shall see, outright preference for the I open alternative is rare. Instead, we get a group of artists who are ambivalent when directed to identify with the open side, being sometimes negative to the other alternative and sometimes not. Moreover, few people are unequivocally positive when the subliminal stimulus points to the closed alternative. The two antagonistic preferences just do not materialize in the way we had anticipated. One reason might be that many artists viewed the picture with a rather detached, professional eye. Taking these response patterns into account, we had to include in the category of subjects expected to score high on the PG test, not only those who clearly prefer identification with the open side, but also all subjects

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

29 1

with ambivalent reaction to the Iopen alternative. A middle cluster of subjects ( l c , 2a, 2b, in the classification below) do not react positively to the open side and receive mostly negative scores. Before deciding what to expect of these people in the PG test, we should consider subjects who do not react at all o r whose reactions are at best doubtful, perhaps because they are insensitive to subliminal stimulation o r to the difference between the alternatives, or to both. Since the closed-open contrast seems to be no problem for these people, or since they are generally insensitive, w e assume that they do not really know what creative functioning implies. Unlike these insensitive subjects, the middle cluster subjects are all somehow sensitive to at least the introduction of subliminal stimulation, most of them even to the difference between the Iopen and 'closed alternatives. We therefore expect them t o show at least some signs of crcativity. It would be easy to extend the prcdictions to a number of dimensions included in the creativity project and known to be closely associated with the results in the PG test, e . g . , awareness of the discomforts of creative work, moments of inspiration, and oceanic experiences. We will, however, limit our comparisons to one reliable dimension : personal involvement in creative work as evidenced by the use of human motifs in the P G test. Other comparisons to be presented below concern the attribution of sex to the figures in the stimulus picture and evaluations of the subjects as painters made by the art specialist. Spesking very generally, we assume that subjects, who are relatively oblivious to the sex of the figures in B2 or who at least do not feel forced to change the sex attribution with the introduction or shift of subliminal stimulation, are more inclined to crcative empathy with these figures and more likely to score high on the PG test. Finally, artists whose work is very formalized and tightly structured would probably be less positive toward the open alternative in B2 or generally less sensitive to the thematic contrast between its left and right sides.

RESULTS R E L I A BIL ITY

Each subject was scored for two scries: Iopen + B2 and Iclosed + B2. Taking + and + / - scores as similar, the independent sets of judges agrced in 25 of 32 cases (groups l a , l c , 2 , and 4 , below). In 4 of the 7 cases of disagreement, the extra judge hesitated between one alternative implying

G.Smith, I. Carlsson, and A. Danielsson

292

full agreement with the other judges. and another, slightly different alternative, finally settling on the latter. The three remaining disagreements were also slight. GROUPlNG

When grouping subjects to test predictions, we took both agreements as well as disagreements into consideration, constructing groups l b and 3 to contain the latter. Group 1 All subjects in this group differentiate betweon the alternatives by reacting positively (ambivalently) to one of them and negatively to the other. la. Positive (ambivalent) in the Iopen series (consensus) - 1 4 subjects. l b . Positive (ambivalent) in the Iopen series (one set of judges; all judges agreeing that reactions in the Iclosed series are more negative) - 2 subjects. lc. Negative in the Iopen series (consensus) - 2 subjects. A transitional category. Group 2 No positive scores in this group; negative scores at least in the 'closed series. 2a. Negative in the Iclosed series only (consensus) - 2 subjects. 2b. Negative in both series (consensus) - 3 subjects. Group 3 Slight disagreement between judges in all cases because of the indeterminate character of the reports, close to the zero score line (in 4 subjects ( 5 , if the first assessment is considered), nothing but zero scores according to one set of judges; in the remaining subject very similar, vague reactions) - 5 subjects. Group 4 Only zero scores (consensus)

-

4 subjects.

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

293

COMPARISONS W I T H C R I T E R I A

Table 2 compares the IT2 groupings with the creative functioning

(PG) test, two quasi scales having been constructed, one for each dimension. The IT2 groups l a and l b have been separated from l c because the former subjects' reactions to the Iopen alternative are at least partly positive. The product-moment correlation is 0.70 ( p 0.01). Table 2 I T

2

groups and the c r e a t i v i t y s c a l e

PG test Creativity scale

-2

3

values

--

(X) / O D

XX/X

Scale IT2 groups

-1

Figures within parentheses show how s u b j e c t s a r e regrouped when sex a t t r i b u t i o n data a r e used t o redefine t h e middle IT

2

groups (see t e x t ) .

In order to render the differentiation between groups l c , 2a, and 2b, on the one hand, and group 3 , on the other, more reliable, we have used the sex attribution data. Subjects in groups l c , 2a, and 2b, who belong to class I1 (those who change sex attribution with the introduction andlor shift of the subliminal I ) , have been moved from the second to the third

row in Table 2 . The correlation increases to 0.82. Table 3 I T

2

groups and human themes In t h e PG t e s t

PG t e s t IT

2

groups

la, b the r e s t

Human themes

No human themes

16

0

7

9

G. Smith, I, Carlsson, and A . Danielsson

294

If the sex attribution classes Indet, No change, Change are given scale values of 3, 2 , 1, we can calculate their correlation with the creativity functioning test. It is 0.41 (p=0.05). Table 3 is a four-field arrangement showing the association between

human motifs in the ascending series of the PG test and the IT2 grouping. Fisher's exact p value is 0.0004 (one-sided test). The C index of agreement based on this contrast is 0 . 5 6 (Holley Ih Guilford. 1964). Correlation with the art dimensions form and structure is shown in Table 4 . We predicted a negative correlation between the IT2 scale as presented in Table 2 , on the one hand, and a formalized and tightly structured a r t production, on the other. We have distinguished between subjects with plus scores for both form and structure, subjects with a plus for either dimension, and one subject with no plus score at all, giving these three classes the values of 3 , 2 , 1. The correlation is - 0 . 4 4 ( ~ ~ 0 . 0 5 , two-sided test). Since, however, the distribution of scores is rather skewed, we decided to cut the left, double plus, column in two by using another related dimension: renewal. Subjects not scoring plus for renewal were placed in a new column given the value of 4 . The new correlation soars to - . 7 8 ( p e 0.01, two-sided test). Using the sex attribution data as above, the correlation value can be further enhanced. Table 4 IT groups and a r t i s t i c dimensions 2

Form and Structure Plus f o r both IT

Plus f o r one

No plus

Renewal

2 groups

considered Scale values

(4) (2)

-3

-2

-1

h,b

4

(2)

(4)

6

8

1

l c , 2a,b

3

(3)

(2)

5

1

0

3

2

(2)

(1)

3

1

0

4

1

(4)

(0)

4

0

0

Figures within parentheses show how subjects are regrouped when the column "Plus f o r both" is divided in two, one with no p l u s for "Renewal" such a score

(2).

(k),

the other with

295

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

Exploring certain other a r t dimensions we found a few additional correlations, most of them implying that IT2 group 4 differs from the others. These dimensions are originality (group 4 being less original), expression (group 4 and partly group 3 being less expressive in their art productions), and pamphleteering (groups 2b, 3 , 4 being less inclined in that direction). In Table 5 the a r t dimension static is grouped with the sex attribution classes. As expected, the work of subjects in group Change is more often judged as static. Contrasting Change with No change + Indeterminate we get an exact p value of 0.007 (one-sided Fisher test). The G index of agreement is 0.52. Table 5 Sex attribution groups in IT and the art dimension Static 2

Static

Sex attribution groups

Plus

No change

3

Indeterminate

a

Change

Not plus

10

DISCUSSION The aim of this paper has been to introduce a new test principle rather than to present a complete test instrument. Many concrete details remain to be discussed - e.g., the formal quality of the picture material. Nevertheless, the two sets of stimuli have served their original purpose: to manipulatc subliminally the observer's identification with either of two contrasting human figures. The term "identification" has been used in the sense adopted in the classical TAT tradition (Murray et al, 1938), where "to identify" is taken to mean: to assume the point of view of someone else, to make this someone the %era" of a story o r , in our arrangement, to see him or her as the center against the periphery, "the self" against ''the other." The results show (1) that this identification can be manipulated by means of a

296

G.Smith, I. Carlsson, and A . Danielsson

subliminal verbal stimulus, (2) that the identification may encounter various kinds of resistance in the subject. Both the sensitivity to subliminal manipulation and the resistance to it can be exploited diagnostically. We have found that some of our subjects respond as if they were generally insensitive to subliminal stimulation. After looking more closely at our data, however, we hesitate to say that these subjects are impervious to influence from all aspects of the subliminal manipulation (cf. Sackeim, Packer, & Gur, 1977). In experiment 11, for instance, while the IT2 groups 3 and 4 appear to be oblivious to the shifts of the subliminal I between the Iopen and the 'closed alternatives in B2, many of these zero score subjects nevertheless change their sex attribution. The insensitivity score in groups 3 and 4 apparently reflects only part of the thematic contrast between Iopen and 'closed' To some readers i t may seem too rash to conclude that the word trI" is a prerequisite for the success of the technique. A meaningless sign or the letter X would pcrhaps suffice to direct the subject's attention subliminally to one o r the other figure in B and to so control the process of identification. A s we have seen, however, it is not enough to draw the subject's attention to one of the persons in B to actualize problems of identification. A subliminal I may very likely have the necessary extra persuasive power lacking in a sign without meaning. A special experiment would, naturally, be needcd to clarify this issue, but even without it we can still exploit the IT principle. Spence, Klein, and Fernandez (see Chapter 6 of this volume) have recently drawn attention to the importance of a fixation point in experiments employing subliminal stimulation. Their results demonstrate that it is necessary to know if the stimulation is unilateral or foveal in order to predict its effects, particularly if stimuli are complex verbal messages. In our type of design, with the stimulation shifted from one side to the other, the use of either one, middle fixation point or two alternating points to the left or the right, would be unthinkable, for obvious reasons. In spite of all we got predicted effects. One reason could be that the word I is both short and "basic," another that the first subliminal projection (on one of the figures in B ) in a block of five directed the subject's attention to that figure and ensured at least approximately foveal stimulation in the following four. It may be recalled that we particularly emphasized the effects of the last three stimulations in each block of five. The reliability was not formally assessed in experiment 1 because both judges easily agreed on the scoring. In experiment I1 we compared the re-

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

291

sults of two independent sets of judges. While agreement was not perfect, it was good in view of the fact that judging experiment I1 protocols seems to be a more delicate task. The reliability of various criteria is more difficult to estimate. In experiment I , clinical diagnosis was mainly based on MCT data; in the case of borderline patients only very obvious symptoms were admitted. In experiment 11, the main criteria were taken from the PCi test. The evaluations by the a r t specialist were, he explained, on the whole supported by one of his colleagues. Judging by the general reliability of MCT and PG data and by the careful scrutiny of the "free" evaluations, we feel entitled to regard the criteria as quite reliable. The validity was tested against a broad range of criteria, the outcome being generally good. In experiment 11, sex attribution was added as an interesting dimension. The prerequisite for maintaining a satisfactory degree of validity, however, seems to be adherence to evaluation rules that are not only theoretically sound, but also strict and detailed. Indulgence in the ever present temptation to overexploit good test instruments (of which there are all too few in the field of personality) is, of course, a threat to their validity and reliability. A s far as experiment I is concerned, the introductory hypotheses, which were not very difficult to formulate, appear to have been confirmed. Both borderline and projection cases found identification with the aggressor difficult, even impossible. Some subjects reported bewilderment about the two figures in B and their relationship with each other, while others refused to recognize the central theme. Perceptual difficulties in a more limited sense were also noted. A s we had surmised, it was relatively easy for projecting people to accept open identification with the victim - i.e., to distinguish correctly between the aggressor and the victim when I was projected on the latter. They even indulged in the aggressor's aggression. For borderline cases, on the other hand, this shift of identification implied only marginal relief because any attempt at identification with another person must be difficult for them. The results of experiment I1 can be used to highlight different types of artists as defined, among other things, by their artistic work. This is not the place, however, to dwell on the artistic side of these problems. What is psychologically more interesting is, above all, the association between IT2 results and creativity scores. The more creative these subjects, the more sensitive they were to the thematic contrast, and the more willing also to affirm, at least to some degree, the open alternative. The same

298

G. Smith, I. Carlsson, and A. Danielsson

sensitivity is typical of those artists whose work is characterized by openness, expressiveness, originality, and renewal. There is also an interesting correlation between the static-dynamic dimension and sex attribution; the less dynamic hislher work the less flexible was an artist's sex identification. Naturally, the two pairs of identification alternatives tried in these experiments are not the only possible ones, and a number of variations could be suggested. With regard to sex roles, for instance, a man could be matched with a woman, a masculine man (woman) with a feminine counterpart, etc. Age contrasts would be another possibility. Varying the background as in experiment 11, a lonely person might be compared with one seen against a group of other people, Instead of the aggressor and victim, a sad person could be combined with a happy one. The permutations are as many as there are questions to be posed.

ACKMO\VLEDGEhIENT The present study was supported by a grant from the Swedish Humanistic and Social Science Research Council.

Identification Manipulated by Subliminal Stimulation

299

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Deutsch, H. (1942). Some forms of emotional disturbance and their relation t o schizophrenia.

Psychoanalysis, 11, 30 1 - 32 1.

Dixon, N.F. (1971). Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy. London: McGraw-Hill. Dixon, N.F. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Grinker, R.R., Werble, B., & Drye, R.C. (1968). The Borderline Syndrome. New York: Basic Books. Henley, S. (1975). Cross-modal effects of subliminal verbal stimuli. Scandina-

vian Journal of Psychology, 15, 30-36. Hentschel, U., & Smith, G.J.W.

(Eds.).

(1980). Experimentelle Persiinlichkeits-

psychologie. Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. & Guilford, J.P.

Holley, J.W.,

(1964). A note on the G index of agreement.

Educational and Psychological Measurement, 24, 749-753. Kernberg, O.F.

(1967). Borderline personality organization.

Journal of t h e

American Psychoanalytic Association, 15, 641-685. Kernberg, O.F. (1975). Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism. N e w York: Aronson. Meissner, W.W.

(1978). Notes on some conceptual aspects of borderline per-

sonality organization. International Review of Psychoanalysis, 5, 297-311. Kragh, U.,

& Smith, G.J.W.

(Eds.).

(1970). Perceptgenetic Analysis.

Lund:

Gleerup. Murray, H.A.,

et al.

(1938). Explorations in Personality. New York:

Oxford

University Press. Nyman, G.E.,

& Smith, G.J.W.

(1961). Experimental differentiation of clinical

syndromes in a sample of young neurotics. Acta Psychiatrica et Neurologica Scandinavica, 37, 14-31. Ross, M.

(1976). The borderline diathesis. analysis, 3, 305-321.

Sackeim, H.A., Packer I.K.,

& Gur, R.C.

International Review of Psycho-

(1977). Hemisphericity, cognitive set,

and susceptibility t o subliminal perception. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86, 624-630. Silverman, L.H. (1980). A comprehensive report on studies using the subliminal psychodynamic activation method. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 20( 3). Smith, G.J.W.,

PC Carlsson,

1. (1983). Creativity and anxiety:

study. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 24, 107-115.

An experimental

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300 Smith, G.J.W.,

& Danielsson, A. (1979). A test of identification using sublimi-

nal stimulation in a meta-cont rast design. Psychological Research Bulletin, Lund University, 19 (9-10). Smith, G.J.W., & Danielsson, A. (1982). Anxiety and defensive strategies in childhood and adolescence. Psychological Issues, (Monograph No. 52). New York: International Universities Press. Smith, G.J.W., & Henriksson, A4. (1955). The effect on an established percept of a perceptual process beyond awareness. Acta Psychologica, 11, 346355. Smith, G.J.W.,

Johnson, G.,

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Almgren, P.E.

(1982).

MCT-metakontrasttek-

niken. Stockholm: Psykologiforlaget. Smith, G.J.W.,

Spence, D.P., & Klein, G.S. (1959). Subliminal effects of verbal

stimuli. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59, 167-176. Somekh, D.H., & Wilding, J.W. (1973). Perception without awareness in a dioptic viewing situation. British Journal of Psychology, 64, 339-349. Spence, D.P.,

Klein, L., & Fernandez, R. (this volume, chapter 6). Size and

shape of the subliminal window. Spence, D.P.,

& Holland,

B. (1962). The restricting effects of awareness: A

paradox and an explanation. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 64, 163-174.

Stein, M.I.

(1975). Manual for PCT, the Physiognomic Cue Test. New York:

Behavioral Publications. Stern, A. (1938). A psychoanalytic investigation of therapy in the borderline neuroses. Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 7, 467-489. Westerlundh, B. (1983).

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The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

301

SCHIZOPHRENIC PERCEPTION AND ITS PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS : A MICROGENETIC STUDY Hans Kreitler and Shulamith Kreitler Tel-Aviv University

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this study was to gain new insight into the process of schizophrenic perception by studying the sequence of perceptual events with a microgenetic method, interpreting the results in line with our psychosemantic theory of cognition (Kreitler 8 Kreitler. l98!2), and comparing these findings with the performance of normal subjects studied and interpreted in the same manner. Since Kraepelin (1896) pointed to the extremely poor attention deployment of schizophrenics and Bleuler (1950) emphasized their disturbed associational process, morbid aspects of schizophrenic cognition in general and perceptual disturbances in particular have become the major topic of experimental

investigations into the

psychological

of schizo-

deficiencies

phrenics. Attention was focused on these deficiencies partly because of their accessibility t o controlled and replicable experimentation, and partly because of the assumption that any abnormality in perception may eventually result in abnormal performance. One by one the common elements of perception were scrutinized. It was shown that there is in schizophrenics an abnormally prolonged reaction tine to perceptual stimuli (Shakow , 1962, 1963. 1974); a different approach to experimental tasks than in normals (Sutton, 1975), probably because of fears or hesitations to reveal hallucinations (Spring ure-background

&

Zubin, 1978); an alteration in depth perception and fig-

discrimination, especially during acute episodes

man, 1976); distortions due to response biases (Chapman 1973) ; excessive attention to irrelevant details (McGhie

&

&

( Freed-

Chapman,

Chapman, 1973) ;

and impaired size constancy (Maher, 1966; Spohn, Thetford,

&

Cancro,

1976) which has been identified by some a s underestimation, particularly in

paranoids and acute schizophrenics (Silverman, 1964a, 1964b) and by othe r s as overestimation (McKinnon

&

Singer, 1969).

302

H. Kreitler and S. Kreitler

In summarizing these and similar findings, Shapiro (1981, p. 59) concluded, "To date it appears that the difficulty is not in the reception and transmission of sensations to the cortex b u t , rather, in the integration of sensory impressions into a context andlor the attribution of meaning , I ' A different, more process-oriented claim - rather in line with the Wurzburg School - was made by Shakow (1962, 1963) who emphasized the schizophrenic inability to maintain a major set or - in terms of the concepts introduced by Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) - to stick to a guiding plan (Callaway, 1972). There arc further experimentally studied schizophrenic characteristics that havc been suggested as factors affecting schizophrenic perception. These include mainly overinclusion (Cameron, 19641, the formation of chain concepts (Goldstein & Scheerer, 1964). identifying inputs in an ambiguous manner (Bateson, Jackson. Haley, & Weakland. 1956, 1963; Singer & Wynne. 1965; Wynne & Singer, 19631, lack of selective attention (McGhie & Chapman, 1961), response biases mainly in line with habitual or common associations (Chapnan & Chapman, 19731, and the impact of belief-induced meanings on initial input identification (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976, Chap ter 12). Most of the above-mentioned investigators used their findings as a core for a more comprehensive theory of schizophrenia or of schizophrenic thought disorders. They did not, however, present a coherent description of the chain of operations or events that constitutes Schizophrenic perception in the sense of input identification. To our mind, there are two prerequisites for such a description: first, applying a microgenetic method of data collection, and secondly, analyzing the subjects' responses in line with a cognitive theory which - due to its psychosemantic foundation - allows for quantification and qualification of cognitive contents. The quantification would be required for the sake of comparisons, and the qualification for the sake of an interpretative analysis of the results and their integration in a cognitive theory of schizophrenia. The potential value of the microgenetic approach for the study of pathological cognition in schizophrenia was emphasized by Flavell and Draguns (1957). Previous attempts to investigate schizophrenic cognition by applying the microgenetic principle or methodology include Schilder's (1942, 1951) mostly theoretical explorations, and studies notably by Draguns (1961, 1963). Phillips and Framo (19541, and Smith et al. (Smith, Johnson, 8 Ljunghill-Anderson, 1970). These, as well as the microgenetic

Sch itophrenic Perception

303

studies of different neurotic groups of patients (Kragh, 1955, 1 9 5 9 , 1960, Magnusson. Nilsson. & Henriksson , 1977; Nilsson, 1 9 8 3 ) , 1983; brain-injured patients (Werner, 1956) and normals under stressful conditions (see review in Flavell & Draguns, 1957; Kragh, 1 9 5 5 ) , strongly suggest that microgenesis could promote substantial progress in understanding the key issue of input identification in schizophrenics. I t was the purpose of this study to contribute to the attainment of this goal by applying jointly microgenesis and a semantically-based cognitive approach. The contributions of such a combination to a better understanding of input identification were demonstrated by the results of IL previous study with normal subjects in which the same methodological procedure was applied (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1984a). Since the schizophrenic patients who served as subjects in the present study were chosen so as to match the subjects of the former study in all important respects (see Method Section) the results of the two studies can be compared. Indced, we use some of the more general findings of the former study as guidelines for the nnalysis and interpretation of the present study. The data collection in both studies was carried out in line with the hologenic microgenetic method (Draguns, 1984; for details of the 10 increasing Exposure Values, see Method Section). For coding the obtained data and for their initial interpretation we used variables and concepts derived from our psychosemantic theory of cognition. Therefore, the understanding of our previous and present studies requires a more detailed presentation of this theory at this point. We regard cognition as a meaning processing and meaning processed system, tho system that learns, assigns, develops, and manipulates meaning b u t , in t u r n , is influenced by the impact of meaning. This statement obviously requires further qualification, pmtly because of the claim that the processed takes part in the proccssing but mainly because of the lack of clarity of the term "meaningTT.As regards the double-faced and apparently contradictory designation of meaning which has come to be traditional - with meaning figuring once as a processed element and once as a processing agent - it is to be recalled that one of the great achievements of twentieth century thought has been unifying that which was once regarded as distinct, or even as contradictory. Mass and energy, particle and wave, event and observer in physics, form and content in the arts, normal and abnormal processes in psychoanalysis are only a few examples. Considering meaning according to function and circumstances at one time as contents

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304

and at another time as process is well in line with this tendency; moreover, it is an empirical necessity and constitutes the core of a fruitful research strategy (Kreitler h Kreitler, 1985a, 198513, 1985c, 1985d). The lack of clarity of the term "meaning" is, to our mind, eliminated by the manner in which we define and measure meaning.

THE MEANING SYSTEM We define meaning as a referent-related pattern of cognitive content elements that are called moaning values (Kreitler 8 Kreitler, 1968; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1982). A referent is anything to which meaning values are assigned. It may be an experimentally presented stimulus, a part of this input, an illusion induced by the presented input, or a sudden idea of the subject. Meaning values are the minimal units of cognitive contents assigned to the referent, e. g. , 9 s red", "rather square", ltugly", Vnakes me shiver", etc. Thus, referent and meaning value are complementary terms, like mother and son. Referent is that to which meanings are assigned, whereas meaning values are the cognitive units assigned to the referent. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between stimulus or input, on the one hand, and referent, on the other hand, even in the case of normal adult subjects. Each meaning value is coded according to four principles or viewpoints: a) the kind of contents it conveys in regard to the referent (Meaning Dimensions); b) the formal aspects of its relation to the referent (Forms of Relation); c) representational aspects of its relation to the referent (Types of Relation); and d) indications about the referent to which the meaning value relates (Referent Shift Variables). In contrast to meaning values that present specific contents, meaning dimensions are categories of contents or basic types of references to inputs of all kinds. For instance, if the subject says or thinks about a visual input. "it is red", this meaning value would be coded in the dimension Sensory Qualities. Likewise, "it is in the left corner" would be coded in the dimension Locational Qualities; "it is fading away" would be coded in the dimension State and Possible Changes in I t , and "I dislike the color" would be coded in the dimension Judgments and Evaluations. On the basis of extensive research with thousands of subjects we determined 22 meaning dimensions (see full list in Table l ) , and found that they suffice for characterizing all cognitive contents.

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305

For the purpose of a more detailed analysis each meaning dimension can be divided into subdimensions. For example, the meaning dimension Sensory Qualities includes the subdimensions of visual, auditory, olfactory. internal, etc. sensations; the dimension Causes and Antecedents includes the subdimensions of cognitive-mental

causes, physical causes, emotional

causes, developmental antecedents, and so on. The subdimensions of any meaning dimension are defined by means of the other meaning dimensions applied to the contents of that dimension. Forms of relation specify whether the meaning value relates to the referent in an assertive, negative, conjunctive, or disjunctive manner, etc. For example, "it is either red or yellow" would be coded as a disjunction, and "it is neither a hare nor a rabbit" would be coded a s a double negation. Types of relation specify whether the representational relation between the meaning value and the referent is attributive ( e . g . , "it is crimson"), comparative (e. g. , "it is darker than the background"), exemplifying-illustrative ( e . g . , "it is the color seen at sunset in a tropical country"), or metaphoric-symbolic ( e . g . , 9 t is the color of a gloomy mood"). Table 1 Major Variables of the Meaning System

Types of Relation

Meaning Dimensions

Dim. 1.

Contextual Allocation

Dim. 2 .

Range of Inclusion

Dim. 3.

Function, Purpose, h Role

Dim. 4.

Actions h Potentialities for Action

TR 1.

la. Qualities to substance

lb. Actions to agent

(2a: Subclasses; 2b: Parts)

(4a:

Attributive

TR 2 .

Comparative 2a. Similarity 2b. Difference

by ref.; 4b: to ref.)

2c. Complementariness

Dim. 5 .

Manner of Occurrence h Operation

Dim. 6 .

Antecedents

Dim. 7.

Consequences & Results

Dim. 8.

Domain of Application

3a. Exemplifying instance

(8a: as subject; 8b: as object)

3b. Exemplifying situation

Dim. 9.

Material

3c. Exemplifying scene

Dim. 10.

Structure

Dim. 11.

State h Possible Changes in It

4b. Metaphor

Dim. 12.

Weight & Mass

4c. Symbol

&

2d. Relationality

Causes TR 3.

TR 4 .

Exemplifying Illustrative

4a. Interpretation

H.Kreitler and S.Kreitler

3 06

Forms of Relations

Meaning Dimensions

Dim. 13.

Size & Dimensionality

FR 1.

Positive

Dim. 14.

Quantity & Mass

FR 2.

Negative

Dim. 15.

Locational Qualities

FR 3.

Mixed

Dim. 16.

Temporal Qua1 ities

FR 4.

Conjunctive

Dim. 17.

Possessions (17a)

FR 5.

Disjunctive

Dim. 18.

Development

FR 6,

Obligatory

Dim. 19.

Sensory Qualities

&

Belongingness (17b)

(19 a: of ref.; 19b: by ref.) Dim. 20.

Dim. 21.

&

negative

Shifts in Referent

Feelings h Emotions (20 a: evoked by ref.;

SR 1.

Identical

20b: felt by ref.)

SR 3.

Partial

SR 4. Previous

SR 6. Higher-

SR 5.

Modified

SR 7.

Associative SR 8. Grammatical

SR 9.

Linguistic

level

Cognitive Qualities (22a: evoked by ref.; 22b: of ref.)

SR 2. Obverse

meaning value

Judgments & Evaluations (21 a: about ref.; 21 b: by ref.)

Dim. 22.

positive

referent

variation

SR 10. Unrelated

label

Referent shift indications exploit indices in the answer of the subject in order to determine whether the subject reacted to the presented input, whether (s)he deviated from his or her previous referent, whether (s)he reacted only to a part of the previous referent, and so on. For example, i f the subject spoke in the first answer of "something eliptic with two

points in it" and then said, ''the points may be eyes", the second answer relates to a part of the previous meaning value. A final remark about the double-faced nature of meaning. We consider

meaning as contents insofar as it answers the question implied in each of the meaning dimensions, as for instance, 'What does it look like or how does i t smell?' (Sensory Qualities), 'What does it do or what can it do?' (Actions and Potentialities for Action), Vhat is the more encompassing concept or system of which i t forms a part?' (Contextual Allocation), etc. But we consider meaning as an active agent whenever we focus our attention on the changes that meanings assigned to a referent undergo when further meaning is assigned to that referent, or when, in the course of meaning elaboration, one meaning value brings to the fore another meaning

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307

value o r induces referent shifts or combines with other meaning values into a new belief (Kreitler Kreitler, 1985)

.

&

Kreitler, 1976, Chap. 4 ; Kreitler, Drechsler,

&

PERCEPTION I N NORMAL ADULTS In line with our approach to cognition, we regard perception a s a sequence of meaning assignments to a sensorily mediated input that stands in need of identification andlor clarification. Owing to the speed of perception under usual conditions, microgenesis is undoubtedly the most efficient method of observation because it enforces a reduction of the speed of perceptual processes to that which can best be called slow motion. Thus, the different acts and stages of meaning assignment become amenable to analysis. A s mentioned above, w e studied the sample of normal adults with the

same techniques applied in the present study. Details concerning the performance of normals can be found in the tables comparing the two groups (see Tables 2-5;

see also Kreitler

&

Kreitler, 1984a). In the present con-

text we will summarize only those aspects of normal perception that would facilitate a faster and more profound understanding of the unique features of schizophrenic perception and, moreover, enable u s to devote the discussion of the present results primarily to their psychopathological implications. The perceptual performance of normal subjects shows a clear distinction between predication and referentiation, between assigning meaning values and identifying a referent, notwithstanding their interactions. Since perception is referent focused, the findings can best be organized into three phases, each characterized by a common feature of referentiation. In the first phase, the referent is established; in the second phase, its clarification proceeds by focusing primarily upon those of i t s features that nre interpersonally

shared,

whereas referent

clarification in the third

phase is predominantly idiosyncratic. Phase 1. Across the 20 stimuli, each of which was presented microgenetically, in the first three projections all subjects (n=50) assigned meaning values of two out of the three following meaning dimensions: Sensory Qualities (e.g.,

"it is bright"), Locational Qualities ( e . g . , "down, in the

corner"), and Quantity and Number (e.g., "two parts").

In other words,

the subjects activated the meaning dimensions most adequate to the input.

H.Kreitler and S. Kreitler

308

Still, in the course of the first three projections 43 subjects (86%) attempted to formulate a referent, which at this early stage was necessarily mostly global and undifferentiated, e . g . , q'somethingT1,!' a blob",

kind of

drawing". During the next one or two projections more meaning values of the same meaning dimensions were used but now more frequently in specific subdimensions (e.g., "it is red", which is coded in the dimension Sensory Qualities, subdimension: Color). Moreover, two other meaning dimensions gained in frequency: Structure (e.g., "it is symmetrical") and Size and Dimensionality (e.g., "it is big", "it is thick"). In general, meaning values became more elaborate and previously assigned meaning values which were retained were amended. At the same time, the referent gained in specificity, e . g . , instead of "a picture", the subject would say now, Ira picture, not of an animal, maybe humant1, or 'Iperhaps a kind of map!'. In case a roferent had to be discarded, the whole sequence of predication and referentiation is repeated. However, more often than not, discarded referents are reintroduced in later phases, mainly in an auxiliary function (see below). Of considerable significance for theories of perception is the following very stable observation. Whereas meaning values are presented without any indication of doubt and only in 2% of the cases later renounced, formulation and tone of the stating of the referent suggest that the subjects consider their referent at first merely as an hypothesis or a guess. Obviously, Bruner's theory of hypothesis testing (Bruner, 1957; Bruner 6 Klein, 1960) holds true for the process culminating in the establishment of a referent. By contrast, the immediacy, speed, and conviction characteristic of the presentation and assignment of meaning values lend strong support to nativistic theories that stress immediacy, objectivity, and the role of genetic factors in perception (e.g., Gibson, 1960). In other words, both Bruner and Gibson are right, the former as regards the referent, the latter as regards meaning values. _ Phase __ 2 .~Whereas in phase 1 the meaning values were steps toward

the refcrent o r building blocks for a referent, in phase 2 i t is the referent and its label that dominate meaning value assignment. For instance, i f the referent is a human, 85% of the meaning values fall in the meaning dimensions State and Actions, e . g . , "the man is sitting, he reads a book." Notably, i f the meaning dimensions State and Actions appear, the sequence of a meaning value in State followed by a meaning value in Actions occurs in 94% of the cases. We do not know whether this tendency is culturally induced or stems from deeper roots. But the tendency to stick to this se-

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309

quencc is so strong that it is preserved even if adequate meaning values are missing. In the latter case, an empty slot is often inserted in the sequence instead of the missing meaning value, as demonstrated in the following example: "A leisurely standing man; I don't know what he is doing." If the referent is an object, the most prominent meaning dimension is structure (48%). Concomitantly with more elaborate meaning values, the referent too gains in detail and elaboration, e . g . , a prior response, such as man" is followed by man with a beard, no, no, a cigar in his mouth." Phase 3. In order to demonstrate the idiosyncratic nature of phase 3 , a brief description of the meaning questionnaire administered to the subjects is required. In this questionnaire the subject was instructed to communicate the meaning of 18 stimuli (words, sentences, paragraphs, and drawings) to an imagined other who presumably understands language and other means of communication but does not know what the stimuli mean. The subjects' responses were coded in terms of the four sets of variables that constitute the system of meaning (Table 1). Normal adults use 1218 meaning dimensions, depending on intelligence and education. However, each of the thousands of subjects hitherto tested has one or more clusters of individually preferred meaning variables, including meaning dimensions, that correlate highly with his or her personality traits (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1983, 198413, 1985a). In phase 3 the individually preferred meaning dimensions clearly dominate meaning assignment: 95% of the subjects used at least one of their three most preferred meaning dimensions in further elaborating the meaning in this phase. Another characteristic of phase 3 is the tendency to revive formerly discarded referents (a process beginning already in phase 2 ) and to connect the previous and present referents b y means of a situational description or a short story. I f , for example, the subject previously identified Ira child" and then man", (s)he may now say, "There is a child near the bearded man, they are father and son; the child is bored and wants to play with the father."

METHOD SUBJEC JS

The subjects were 50 psychiatric patients (25 men, 25 women) in Israel in the age range 18-40 y r . (E=27.2 yr.; S.D.=1.1 y r . ) , of medium

H. Kreitler and S.Kreitler

310

SES, a mean of 13.1 y r . of education, 84%of European o r American cultural background and the rest of Middle Eastern or North African background. They were all chronic schizophrenics with no admixture of other functional or organic disorders. Fifteen had paranoid features, eight catatonic features, seven simplex features, seven hebephrenic features, and thirteen were undifferentiated schizophrenics. They were all hospitalized

(Z=28.3 months, S.D.=?.9), in one of three different hospitals (14-17 from each hospital). They were matched to the normals studied before (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1984a) in gender, age (E=26.8 y r . ) , SES, years of education (f=13.5 y r ) , and cultural background.

.

PROCEDURE

In order to project the stimuli to the subjects we used a 35-mm slide projector with a lens of 100-mm focal length and an aperture of 2 . 8 . In front of the lens an ILEX Number 3 Universal Shutter was placed. For the sake of studying the nicrogenetic process, i t was necessary to produce a sequence of Exposure Values (EVs) that would form at least an approximate interval scale. Such a sequence comprising 10 degrees was created by manipulating the exposure time and the aperture of the lens. Each degree of EV was defined in terms of these two factors, exposure time being either 50, 7 5 , o r 100 msec. and the aperture of the lens being one of the 1 2 degrees of aperture (i.e., minimum to 4 ) . In order to produce a scale of 10 degrees of E V s even in regard to relatively easily identifiable stimuli like words, the factor of focal sharpness was added. By adjusting the lens, three degrees of sharpness were produced: full or optimal sharpness, partly reduced sharpness (the lens was brought 6 mm nearer to the slide), and greatly reduced sharpness (the lens was brought 9 m n nearer to the elide). Thus, by manipulating exposure tine, aperture size, and focal sharpness, three different E V interval scales were produced: the scale of Series 1 , the scale of Series 2 , and the scale of Series 3. In each of the three scales we defined sequential steps a s intervals reflecting half the amount of light between one degree of an EV and the preceding one. We used the EV scale of Series 1 for the least easily identified stimuli (the stimuli of Series 1 were presented with full focal sharpness); the E V scale of Series 2 for stimuli of medium identification difficulty (the stimuli of Series 2 were

Schizophrenic Perception

31 I

presented with partly reduced sharpness); and the EV scale of Series 3 for the most easily identified stimuli, i . e . , only words (the stimuli of Series 3 were presented with greatly reduced sharpness). The EV characteristic of threshold perception was about 10.16 for Series 1; and 12.16 for Series 2 and 3 , In each series there were five E V steps below threshold and four EV steps above i t . (For more details see Kreitler

&

Kreitler,

1984a). The stimuli projected microgenetically differed in color, contents, complexity, familiarity, etc. They included drawings of objects and geometric forms, magazine photographs, paintings, and words. They were selected from a larger pool of stimuli on the basis of two criteria:

great

variation in contents and structure, and intermediate difficulty in identification so as to provide for an increased generalization of the findings and the possibility of microgenetic s t u d y , respectively (see Kreitler

&

Kreitler, 1984a) , There were! two matched series of 20 stimuli each, each projected to half of the sample, randomly selected. Each stimulus was projected 10 times under conditions of one of the three EV scales, as determined b y pretests prior to the experiment. The subjects, tested in the hospital, were seated 2 . 5 m away from the screen on which the 50 x 80 cm image was projected.

They were instructed to report anything they perceived as fully and early as possible. Two months before or after the experiment each subject was administered the meaning questionnaire in which ( s ) h e was instructed to communicate through any expressive means the meaning of 11 words, 3 sentences, 2 paragraphs, and 2 drawings to an imagined other person.

The responses to the projected stimuli and to the questionnaire were elaborated in terms of the four sets of meaning variables (Table 1). The intercoder reliability between two independent coders was .93.

RESULTS The data were analyzed together because there were no significant differences between the genders, subtypes of schizophrenics, the two series of stimuli, and the subjects who got the questionnaire before or after the microgenetic session. In presenting the results we focus primarily on the three phases of perceptual meaning assignment described above, dwell-

H.Kreitler and S.Kreitler

312

ing in particular on the comparison of schizophrenics with normals as regards characteristics of referents and meaning values in each phase. Phase 1. Schizophrenics resemble normals in their reaction time to the projections (Table 2, row 31, and in the nature and sequence of meaning dimensions characterizing the meaning values they used in the first projections (Table 3, rows 1-3). Like normals. they (98%) focused first on meaning values of the dimensions Sensory Qualities (brightness), Locational Qualities and Quantity, then (84%) on Sensory Qualities (form) and Structure, followed by Sensory Qualities (color) and Size. But they differ from normals in using more meaning values in this phase (Table 2, row 4 ) . Since, however, they tend to use fewer meaning dimensions than normals (Table 2, row 51, it may be expected that they would use more frequently the major meaning dimensions characteristic for this phase. Indeed, mean comparisons of the two groups in the frequencies of meaning dimensions in this phase show that schizophrenics use more frequently meaning values of Locational Qualities (Schiz

. 1=3.5,

Norm. Z=2.9, p<. 05) and Sensory Quali-

ties (Schiz. Z=3.4, Norm. Z=2.4, pc.05). An examination of the responses shows that in the focal dimensions of this phase schizophrenics often produce several meaning values in a row before shifting to another dimension. Further, if the schizophrenics produced bizarre meaning values in this phase (0.9% of all meaning values provided by schizophrenics in this phase and 0% of all those provided by normals), then these always occurred in the focal meaning values of Locational Qualities: "In the upper part, somewhat to the left, above the poison, off center." Both schizophrenics and normals use in phase 1 meaning values in further dimensions (Table 2, row 51, yet their frequencies are low and only in two cases the differences were significant (State: Schiz. Z= .40, Norm. F= .71, p c . 0 5 ; Judgments and Evaluations: Schiz. 1= .El, Norm. Z= .22, p-= . 0 5 ) . Thus, in phase 1, schizophrenics predominantly use meaning values in the same major meaning dimensions as normals but they tend to use more meaning values in these dimensions than normals. In cont r a s t , in normals there is a higher rate of shifting between meaning dimensions with fewer meaning values per each dimension.

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313

Table 2 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of Length, Reaction Time, Meaning Values, and 1) Kinds of Meaning Variables i n t h e n r e e Phases

Variable

Group

Phase 1

Phase 2

Phase 3

No. of Projections: Range

Schiz.

1 - 5

6 - 1

8

- 10

Norm.

1 - 4

5 - 7

8

-

Schiz.

2.9

Norm.

No. of Projections: Mean

*

*

0.8

2.9

1.2

2.1

2.6

10

RT (Mean p e r S per proj.)

Schiz.

1.0

1.4

1.8

( I n sec.)

Norm.

0.9

1.2

1.5

No. of Meaning Values

Schiz

11.8

7.9

13.4

(Mean per S)

Norm.

5.4

6.8

8.6

No. of Different Meaning D i -

Schiz.

4.2

6.3

8.4

mensions (Mean per S)

Norm.

1.6

6.9

5.9

No. of Dif. Forms of Relation

Schiz.

2.8

2.9

3.6

(Mean per S)

Norm.

1.1

1.4

1.8

No. of Dif. Types of Relation

Schiz.

1.9

2.0

2.5

(Mean p e r S)

Norm.

1.1

1.3

1.1

No. of Dif. Referent-Shift Var.

Schiz.

2.0

2.8

(Mean per S )

Norm.

1.4

1.6

.

*

*

*

*

3.2

*

*

*

*

*

1.7

The group of normals includes t h e 30 Ss examined i n t h e former study ( K r e i t l e r 6 K r e i t l e r ,

1984 a ) under n e u t r a l experimental conditions.

*

p < .05 (based on t - t e s t s of t h e means i n t h e same c e l l )

H. Kreitler and S. Kreitler

314

Table 3 Sequences of Phase S p e c i f i c Meaning Values in Schizophrenics 1) and Normals Variable

1.

% of s u b j e c t s who used

Schizoph.

Normals

98

100

84

90

69

61

i n p r o j e c t i o n s 1-3 meaning values of a t

l e a s t two of t h e following: Sens. Qual. ( b r i g h t n e s s ) , Locational Quality, Quantity

2.

% of s u b j e c t s who used i n p r o j e c t i o n s 2-4 ( a f t e r those i n 1.)

meaning values of Sens. Qual. (form) and S t r u c t u r e

3.

% of s u b j e c t s who used

i n p r o j e c t i o n s 3-5 ( a f t e r those i n 2.)

meaning values of Sens. Qual. ( c o l o r ) and Size

4.

% of s u b j e c t s who used i n phase 2 meaning values i n S t a t e and

Actions when r e f e r e n t was i d e n t i f i e d as human

5.

**

40

90

% of s u b j e c t a who used i n phase 2 meaning values i n S t a t e and

Actions when r e f e r e n t waa i d e n t i f i e d a s inanimate

6.

% of s u b j e c t s who used i n phase 2 meaning values i n a t l e a s t

two of following: S t r u c t u r e , Material, Sens. Qual. (form) when r e f e r e n t was i d e n t i f i e d a s human

7.

% of s u b j e c t s who used

52

**

10

i n phase 2 meaning values i n at l e a s t

two of following: S t r u c t u r e , Material, Sens. @ a l . (form) when r e f e r e n t was i d e n t i f i e d a s inanimate

')

**

See note t o Table 2. p c .01

48

50

315

Schizophrenic Perception Table 4 C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of R e f e r e n t i a t i o n s i n Schizophrenics and Normals

Variable

Schizoph.

*

1.

Mean number of meaning values before r e f e r e n t is i d e n t i f i e d

2.

Mean number of p r o j e c t i o n s before r e f e r e n t is i d e n t i f i e d

2.9

3.

No. of r e f e r e n t s suggested i n phase 1 (mean per S )

4.8

4.

'% of

5.

'% of c a s e s (out of t o t a l no. of responses t o 1st p r o j . )

6.

'% of r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l no. of r e f e r e n t s ) based on

7.

9% of r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l no. of r e f e r e n t s ) based on

Ss presenting i n phase 1 more than one p o s s i b l e r e f e r e n t

11.8

*

**

***

92

1)

Normals

5.4

1.2

1.3

10

c**

6

0

presenting a complete s t o r y i n 1st p r o j . m

26

r e l a t i v e l y small number of d e t a i l s

2

***

6

background d e t a i l s

***

0

a.

% of negative r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l r e f . no.)

16

9.

'% of a s s o c i a t i o n a l r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l r e f . no.)

29

2.4

10.

'% of metaphoric-symbolic r e f .

*w 31

2.8

11.

'% of contaminations i n r e f .

12.

% of o v e r i n c l u s i v e r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l r e f . no.)

13.

% of incongruously constructed r e f .

(out of t o t a l r e f . no.)

a

14.

Referents with no obvious r e l a t i o n t o input c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s

9

15.

No. of s t e p s in s p e c i f i c a t i o n of r e f . a f t e r i d e n t i f i c a t i o n

5.1

16.

9% of r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l r e f . no.) r e t a i n e d without

(out of t o t a l ref. no.)

(out of t o t a l r e f . no.)

***

***

9

***

10

***

1.1

0

1.2

0

*M

0.2

*

8.7

( m a n p e r S per r e f . )

changes

4.2

2.3

316

H. Kreitler and S. Kreitler Variable

Schizoph.

17.

% of r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l r e f . no.)

18.

% of r e f e r e n t s ( o u t o f t o t a l r e f . no.) d i s c a r d e d & n o t

retained 6 further

e l a b o r a t e d ( a f t e r i n t e r v a l o f 0-2 p r o j . )

re-

adopted

19.

% of r e f e r e n t s (out of t o t a l r e f .

no.) d i s c a r d e d & l a t e r

( a f t e r i n t e r v a l of 3 or more p r o j . ) re-adopted

20.

% of c a a e s (out of total no. of r e s p o n s e s t o s t i m u l i , i.e.,

10,000 I n s c h i z . .

**

12

***

13

***

71

**

3

Normals

26

56

16

0.02

6000 i n norm.) with no r e l a t i o n s between

r e f e r e n t s i d e n t i f i e d i n d i f . p a r t s of s l i d e

(see no. 2 0 ) w i t h b i z a r r e combinations o f referents

21.

% of c a s e s

22.

% of c a s e s ( s e e no.

20) of new r e f e r e n t s completely u n r e l a t e d

6

5

*** ***

0

0.02

t o p r e v i o u s ones

See n o t e t o t a b l e 2.

*

p<.o5;

**

p c .01;

***

p c .001

Examining the meaning values from viewpoints other than meaning dimensions reveals differences between schizophrenics and normals.

First,

schizophrenics use a greater variety of forms of relation than normals (Table 2 , row 6). manifested also in higher frequencies of the negative (Schiz. Z=.36, Norm. f = . 0 4 , pc.05) and the conjunctive (Schiz. Z=.29, Norm. f = . 0 5 , pc.05) forms of relation. Thus, the schizophrenics' statements of meaning values are more differentiated in this respect than those of normals. Secondly, even at this early phase schizophrenics use the metaphoric-symbolic type of relation more than normals (Schiz. Z=.7 5 , Norm.

Z = . l l , pc.01). e . g . , A schizophrenic would say "gloom in the heart of the thing" when referring to a dark patch in the center. Particularly striking are the differences between schizophrenics and normals in regard to referentiation. On the whole, phase 1 is significantly longer in schizophrenics than in normals (Table 2 , rows 1 & 2 ) . This reflects the findings that the majority of schizophrenics state a significantly

Schizophrenic Perception

317

higher number of meaning values before they identify a referent and also delay the identification longer than normals do (Table 4, rows 1 & 2 ) . However, in 6% of the responses to the first projection (i.e., 60 responses given by 1 5 , that is 3 0 8 , of the schizophrenics: Table 4 , row 5 ) the patients provided a full-fledged 'Tstory", complete with referents, as is habitual in normals only in phase 3. Needless to mention that these "stories" had no relation to the input. Another difference in referentiation between the two groups is that most schizophrenics (928) suggest a higher number than normals of possible referents (Table 4 , rows 3 & 4 ) . One striking outcome of sticking to a multiplicity of suggested referents is contamination. Instead of selecting out of two or three possible referents one that fits the data best or that one likes best, patients may tend to retain all of them in conjoint constructs like a "woman-chair"

, a "cow-guitar" , or a "vegetable-city" (Table

4, row 11). Referents of schizophrenics differ from those of normals also in other respects (Table 4, rows 6-14) which clarify why the overall impression of a schizophrenic percept is so often uncannily bizarre though i t is mostly somehow related to input. Schizophrenics state associational referents. To a slide with a guitar, for instance, a patient may respond by saying,"the color that fits the tones of a guitar" o r , "the shadow of a musical instrument;" i f there is a table, he may say, "religion" - because of an association to a book of basic religious rules called "The Set Table." No less characteristic are symbolic or metaphoric referents (e.g., a patient said "war" when she perceived darkness that - as she later explained - denoted death which could be caused by war), incongruously constructed referents ( e . g . , "it is a pentagon, it is in the middle, i t has thin contours, i t is a pentagonal drop"), negational referents (e. g . , Ifit is not blood"), overinclusive referents (e. g . , "the country'7), and referents based on relatively small details ( e . g . , to a man with a hat a patient may respond by,"a hat") or background details. Phase 2 . This phase is shorter in schizophrenics than in normals (Table 2 , rows 1 & 2). This finding reflects the facts that schizophrenics dwell less on the interpersonal characteristic of the referents, have shorte r chains of specification of the referents (Table 4, row 15) and pass sooner to the stage of free interpretation, characteristic of phase 3. Another important difference between the two groups concerns the differentiation of human and inanimate referents. In contrast to normals who use

H. Kreitler and S. Kreitler

318

meaning values of different meaning dimensions in referring to humans and inanimates, schizophrenics note meaning values of much the same dimensions in regard to a human referent as those they note in regard to objects (Table 3 , rows 4-7). Several characteristic ways of elaborating and interrelating referents become evident already in this phase. These include primarily the tendency to assign to referents inappropriate meaning values sometimes observed in other parts of the slide (e.g., "two half circles in the upper corner, red in the lower corner...the two half circles are red" when they wcre actually Table 5 S i g n i f i c a n t C o r r e l a t i o n s between Frequencies'.)

of

Meaning Variables i n t h e Meaning Questionnaire and in Phase 3 Meaning Variables

2)

Dim.

2b

Dim.

3

Dim.

4a+b

Dim.

6

Dim.

7

Dim.

9

Dim.

11

Dim.

13

Dim,

14

Dim,

15

Schiz.

Norm.

* ** * 48 ** .49 ** .46 **

.37

** .44 **

.37

* *** .56 * .31 * -34 *** .56 **

.30

Dim.

16

Dim.

17a+b

.42

Dim.

19a+b

Dim.

20a+b

Dim.

22b

*** .59 *** .65 ** .45

.52

.40

*

**

-48

* * .42 ** .54 *

.38

Meaning Variables 2,

TR

la+b

TR

2a+b+c+d

TR

3a+b+c

TR

4a+b+c

F R 2

*** .66 ***

.64

.32

4

.37

FR

5

.33

SR

2

.45

SR

3

5 6

SR

7

.51

SR 10

Norm.

*

.38 .41

*

*

FR

SR

.48

.31

3

SR

*

*

FR

.39

** .55 **

Schiz.

* *

** *** .51 *** .56 ** .40 *** .68 **

.36 .39

.48 .50 .59

* *

** **

**

.48

In order t o c o n t r o l for i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r e n c e s i n t o t a l no. of responses t o questionn a i r e , the frequencies were transformed t o proportions out of the t o t a l per S. *)

For code of v a r i a b l e s see Table 1. See n o t e t o Table 2.

*

p < .05;

**

p < .01;

***

p < .001

Schizophrenic Perception

319

g r e y ) , shifting to completely new referents unrelated to previous meanings (Table 4, row 22; Table 2 , row 8), and mainly reviving referents that were previously discarded a s unsupported or otherwise inadequate (Table

4, rows 18-19). Phase 3 . In this last phase normals too provide mainly personal interpretations. Schizophrenics do so much more expansively, though: they use more meaning values, more different meaning dimensions, more different forms and types of rclation, and more different referent shifts (Table 2, rows 4-8). Thus, the accounts schizophrenics provided of the input in phase 3 are richer, more elaborate, and in general go more boldly beyond the information given. This is also reflected in the differences in mean frequencies of meaning variables characterizing the productions of phase 3. Schizophrenics used more the dimensions Action (Schiz. 2=3.42, Norm. F=2.26, p < .05), Temporal Qualities (Schiz. f=2,44, Norm. Z=l . 3 , p c . 0 5 ) , Feelings and Emotions (Schiz. Z-2.22, Norm. and Evaluations (Schiz. Z=2.75, Norm.

Z=l.06, p c

Z=. 89, p

c

.05)

, Judgments

.01), the conjunctive

form of relation (Schiz. %=1.75, Norm. Z=.35, p c .Ol),

the metaphoric-

symbolic type of relation (Schiz. Z = 3 . 4 5 , Norm. 32=.12, p < .001), and the referent shifts of associations (Schiz. %=2.57, Norm. Z=,42, p < .001) and fragmentation (Schiz. f=1.01, Norm. ?=.02),

while they used less the di-

mensions Consequences (Schiz. f=. 74, Norm. F=2.94) and Sensory Qualities (Schiz. i=1.41, Norm. f=.70, p c .05) and the referent shift variable of forming more inclusive groupings (Schiz. E=.95, Norms. 37=2.10, p

c .01).

However, in both groups the responses in phase 3 arc based on applying one's preferred meaning variables. Table 5 shows how broad is the range of correlations between the applied and the preferred meaning variables. It also shows that the number and size of the correlations are comparable in the two groups (number of correlations is 23 vs 21, and the mean correlation is .46 v s .45 in schizophrenics and normals, respectively. Probably due to the improved perceptual conditions there is in phase 3 an increased tendency in both groups to integrate the previously noted

different referents and meaning values. The difficulty is presumably greate r for schizophrenics than normals because they had more referents and meaning values (Tables 2

&

3 ) , more referents in foreground and back-

ground (Table 4 , row 71, more shifts in referentiation (Table 4 , row 221, and a stronger tendency to stick to referents and to revive previously discarded referents even when unsupported or inadequate (Table 4, row8

18-19). Thus we find that they more often provide interpretations with

H.Kreitler and S. Kreitler

320

different uncombined referents ( e . g . , Ira hat, a galaxy, and a hanging leg") o r bizarrely combined referents (e.g., 'Ithe boy is the U.S.," when there is a boy in one part and an eagle-like bird in another part). In phase 3 also other tendencies characteristic of the schizophrenics' meaning assignment in general become increasingly salient. First, there is the issue of fragmentation: schizophrenics respond more than normals to particular subparts of the projected image as if they were independent (see also Toble 4 , row 2 2 ) . Moreover, they do not elaborate all subparts or different referents to the same degree or conjointedly so that in the last projections it may occur that some parts of the input have the characteristics of phase 1, some of phase 2 , and some of phase 3. And secondly, there is the issue of sharp shifts o r breaks in referentiation that entail dismantling or ignoring previous constructions or producing new referents unrelated in any obvious or traceable way to previous ones (Table 4 , row 2 2 ) . The shifts may be so sharp that the whole image may seem unfamiliar to the subject. In some cases the patient has even complained that the experimenter has changed the slide without forewarning.

DISCUSSION

Whereas artistic creations of today are not necessarily expected to take issue with the art of yesterday, new scientific insights have to reevaluate and re-integrate previous findings that were obtained by means of accepted scientific procedures. Does tho combination of the process oriented microgenetic method of data collection with our psychosemantic method of data elaboration fulfill this requirement in the domain of schizophrenic perception? To our mind, it does. Take the prolonged reaction time of schizophrcnics that has so often been observed ( e . g . , Shakow, 1 9 6 2 ) . Since our normal and schizophrenic subjects wore not instructed to react to a stimulus but to identify i t , our finding that there were no significant differences in the reaction times of the two groups does not constitute a refutation of the reaction time measurements mentioned above. Yet, our observations suggest a reinterpretation of the previous measurements of reaction time. A s may be recalled, 30% of the schizophrenic subjects gave at least one response to the first projection of a stimulus which contained already a referent plus an explanatory story. Likewise, in phase 1, 10% of the normals but 92% of the

Schizophrenic Perception

321

schizophrenics suggested more than one referent, most of which were discarded immediately o r at the next projection. Evidently, schizophrenics are more eager than normals to convince themselves andlor the experimenter that they are cognitively well-oriented in the real world. This interpretation is supported not only by the well-known schizophrenic endeavor to dissimulate and to hide hallucinations (Spring

&

Zubin, 19781, but also by

the strong and very prolonged orientation response of schizophrenics (Gruzelier

&

Venables, 1972; Lader, 1975; Spohn

&

Patterson, 1979; Ven-

ables, 1975). Given this excessively strong tendency of schizophrenics to orient themselves, their difficulty in attaining the orientation, demonstrated experimentally by the delay in the extinction of the orienting response, and their inclination to restructure experimental tasks (Sutton, 19751, we assume that the prolonged reaction time of schizophrenics is due to their attempt to first identify inputs before, or instead of, pressing the button. By the same token, every perceived detail is immediately used as a referent,

notwithstanding the resulting fractionalization

of the visual field

brought about by too frequent referent shifts (Freedman. 1976). However, in phases 2 and 3 of microgenetic perception it becomes evident that schizophrenic are very well capable of distinguishing between figure and background as well as of organizing the whole visual field. Likewise, it should be noted that for initial input identification schizophrenics use meaning values of the same two or three meaning dimensions applied by normal subjects. In view of these findings, we suggest not to regard prolonged reaction time, fractionalization, and figure-background distortions as evidence for a basic cognitive inability, but as symptoms resulting from fear of disorientation and several other cognitive factors discussed below. However, one should not overlook the pathogenic impact of symptoms, particularly in perception where even a relatively small distortion is likely to bring about a bigger one. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that also Shakow's (1962, 1963, 1972) claim that schizophrenics are incapable of sustaining a major set holds, but only if data collection is restricted to phase 1 and sometimes phase 2. In phase 3 most of the schizophrenics reintegrate previously developed and then abandoned referents. In Shakow's terms, they do deviate from their set but nevertheless recall it and often revive it. Indeed, the tendency to reinstate discarded referents is stronger in schizophrenics than in normals, so that many of the eventually identified referents a r e overinclusive in the sense of Cameron (1964) or symbolic in the form that, according to Goldstein and Scheerer (1941), indicates concrete thinking,

322

H.Kreitler and S. Kreitler

A mechanism of schizophrenic thought that could be expected to influence schizophrenic input identification but was by far more prominent in normals than in schizophrenics is the response bias, in the sense of Chapman and Chapman (1973), so frequently discussed. As may be recalled, the Chapmans found that schizophrenics are so fixated on the most common associations of a verbal label that they fail in cognitive tasks that require switching to another train of thought, whereas normal subjects perform this switch. Chapman and Chapman regard this response bias as a general characteristic of schizophrenic cognition. Hence, it should have showed up in phase 2 of our experiment. But this was not the case. In our experiment the normals, having identified and labelled a referent, elaborate this referent in phase 2 by assigning to it the meaning values most commonly associated with its verbal label. The schizophrenics excel in bringing up uncommon and unconventional meaning values, many of them hardly ever associated to the label before. One manifestation of this tendency is the observation that in phase 2 there is in schizophrenics no differentiation, such as there is in normals, between the meaning dimensions applied in regard to human and inanimate referents, so that the Schizophrenics' meaning values are often inadequate, overstepping the boundaries of conventional categories. The observations of uncommon associations by schizophrenics are sufficiently frequent to cast doubt on the generality of Chapmanian response bias in schizophrenic cognition. Let us turn now from the discussion of prior findings in the light of our own observations to the more purely cognitive aspects of schizophrenic performance, that is, to their processing of meaning. In this domain, several pathological and pathogenic deviations were revealed. The most obvious are the tendencies to bring up a multiplicity of referents already in the first projections (phase 1) and to reinstitute the discarded referents later. One might be tempted to explain this phenomenon as resulting from the fractionalization of the visual field and, hence, as a symptom-produced symptom. However, as is so often the case with schizophrenic symptoms, the reverse interpretation also seems plausible, namely, that, due to the Schizophrenics' tendency to bring up many referents, fractionalization can hardly be avoided. The contradiction can be eliminated or at least reduced if one considers that "vI8ua1 field" is in fact a physicalistic concept presupposing a perfect or at least a high correlation of the concomitant retinal stimulation with the area attended. Yet perception does not heed the laws of physics and physiology. In psychological terms, the visual field is the

Schizophrenic Perception

323

outcome of perceptual construction, fractionalized if the referents are unconnected, unified i f the referents are related to one another. The normals structure the visual field systematically, mostly by proceeding from a single referent to a, grouping of referents, sometimes preceded or interrupted by a vague global answer, e . g . , "a kind of picture." The schizophrenics often structure it erratically, treating small configurations as a whole and much bigger ones as details, connecting unconnected lines o r , less frequently, dismantling formerly perceived wholes. They turn meaning values into referents and use referents as meaning values. "Though this be madness, yet there is method in't." The method consists in using preferentially the metaphoric-symbolic type of relation because the schizophrenics regard symbols as the most adequate expression of their reality. Thus they could accept "to be and not to be" as the answer to Hamlet's dilemma and to their own, too. We do not know whether the tolerance for inconsistencies and contradictions on the perceptual level is related to the so frequently discussed tolerance of schizophrenics for sustaining severe emotional ambivalence during long periods of time (Arieti, 1974; Fairbairn, 1952; Sullivan, 1 9 6 2 ) . But our data point to a direct relation between perceptual inconsistencies and the production of highly contaminated referents, particularly in phase 3. Incidentally, it should be mentioned that retaining concomitnntly several referents and some of their meaning values may be quite a strain on the memory, requiring cognitive effort. Hence, it may well be one of the causes for the high level of arousal observed in many schizophrenic patients (Spohn & Patterson, 1 9 7 9 ; Venables, 1 9 6 4 ) . An interesting aspect of schizophrenic cognition becomes evident by comparing the groups of normals and schizophrenics as regards their use of meaning variables. Tho range and frequency of applying the different meaning variables vary in the three phases. Most notable is the difference in the use of meaning dimensions. While in the third phase schizophrenics applied more different meaning dimensions than normals, they applied fewer than normals in the first phase. This finding indicates that, though schizophrenics have available more meaning dimensions, they used fewer of them for identifying a particular referent. While normals used meaning values of several meaning dimensions for each referent, schizophrenics identified each referent with meaning values of but a few dimensions, almost to the point of perseveration, but made use of other dimensions for

3 24

H.Kreitler and S.Kreitler

identifying the next referent. Since it is not the use of many meaning values but the use of variegated meaning dimensions that provides for proper identification of a referent, the identifications of the schizophrenics were imprecise, fuzzy, and frequently totally unrealistic. Other factors co-responsible for the inadequate o r bizarre referent identification of schizophrenics are their fairly frequent use of the negative form of relation between the referent and the meaning value ( e . g . , "it is not a mountain"), their salient use of the metaphoric-symbolic type of relation (e.g., "it is a square that wants to be a circle but will turn into a poisonous snake"), and their uncanny referent-shifts, primarily by turning an assigned meaning value into a referent and assigning to it further meaning values without returning to the original referent. The following series exemplifies such associational referents: "A man with a hat, it is made of straw. they wear them in South America, it is Mexico." Recalling our results and their discussion, one is again faced with a well-known but nevertheless challenging discrepancy. On the one hand, paranoid, hebephrenic, and younger catatonic schizophrenics evidence mastery of all the meaning variables required for proper input identification and thus markedly differ in this respect from the retarded, brain damaged patients and schizophrenics of the simplex subtype who were found to have R limited mastery of meaning dimensions and other meaning variables (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1977; S. Kreitler & Kreitler, 1985b). On the other hand, schizophrenics, when faced with a task of input identification or with other tasks requiring intelligence, perform very poorly most of the time ( e . g . , Kilborg & Siegel, 1976). The problem boils down to the simple question as to why schizophrenics apply their cognitive resources in so uncanny a fashion. We have several interrelated answers to this question, without considering one o r the othcr or even all of them together as a final resolution of the schizophrenic enigma. The first answer was suggested by some of the results of a recently concluded study designed to examine whether experimentally induced modification of meaning assigning tendencies in schizophrenics and normals modifies their Rorschach test performance (Kreitler, Kreitler, & Wanunu, 1985). Altogether four groups of subjects participated in the experiment: two matched experimental groups, one of 32 schizophrenics and one of 32 normals, and two further matched control groups, also of 32 of each. The target of the modification was the type of relation between the referent and the meaning values. These variables

Schizophrenic Perceptioh

3 25

were trained in a session lasting 1 0 minutes. The experimental group of 32 schizophrenics was trained in the use of the attributive and comparative types of relation and the experimental group of 32 normals was trained in the use of the exemplifying-illustrative and the metaphoric-symbolic types of relation. After the training both groups were administered the Rorschach test. The control groups of schizophrenics and of normals received no meaning training whatsoever before performing the Rorschach test. The results, too extensive to be presented here in detail, were qualitatively and quantitatively far better than expected. The trained group of schizophrenics showed ip almost all 57 variables a marked improvement. For example, in the trained schizophrenic group, as compared with the untrained schizophrenic control group, F+% was 77.64 vs 64.02,

C (expressed in

means of percentages) was .84 vs 4 . 6 0 , Experiential Type (M:C) was 2.05 vs .83, popular responses were 32.83% vs 20.06%, the total of special phenomena (following the list of Bohm) was 2.63% vs 18.90%, etc. In the group of normals the training resulted in an inverse t r e n d , significantly reducing the gap between normal and schizophrenic test performance. Recalling the standard instructions of the Rorschach t e s t , we can define the task of the subject as assigning meanings to inkblots for the sake of their identification. Therefore we may summarize the above findings a s demonstrating that the assignment of normal or interpersonally shared meanings depends on the preferential use of the attributive and the cornparative types of relation, whereas the assignment of very personal and often pathological meanings is promoted by the preferential use of the metaphoric-symbolio and the exemplifying-illustrative types of relation. Our second answer is derived from an extensive study of the relation of constellations of orientative beliefs, on the one hand, and particular schizophrenic symptoms, on the other hand (Kreitler B Kreitler,

1965;

1976, Chap. 1 0 ) . Several of these relations were revealed, each one found in at least 80% of the schizophrenics and in less than 10% of the normal control group. However, one belief which did not apparently orient towards a particular symptom but could contribute to all of them was found in each of our 40 schizophrenics and in none of the normals. It was found also in 60 additional chronic schizophrenics examined solely for the purpose of corroborating this amazing finding in a replication. This was the belief in absolute, cotnplete, and unrestricted freedom as the fundamental right and privilege of every individual. The freedom is threatened from within, e . g . , by hunger, sex, hatred, love, emotional attachment, e t c . , as well a s

H. Kreitler and S. Kreitler

326

by outside sources, e . g. , hospital regulations, daily duties like washing o r getting up in the morning, commitments and conventions including semantic and syntactic rules and so on. Thus, following a phonetic temptation, schizophrenics may identify the projected drawing of a man as the drawing of a can o r , in line with some present mood, as a map of disaster, in this manner proving to themselves and to their surroundings that they are free from the conventional constraints of reality. Again, nt the next projection of the stimulus the same patient, frightened by the discrepancy between percept and interpretation, may give a sound description of a small and irrelevant detail or may carelessly assign obscure meaning values o r , more often, cover up the poor reality testing manifested earlier by the excessive use of metaphors and symbols. In sum, if we recall the pathogenic impact of on exaggerated use of metaphors and symbols and likewise the necessary consequences of unrealistic beliefs, such as in the right to absolute and unrestrained freedom, it is plausible to suggest that these are the major sources of the uncanny use schizophrenics make of their meaning potentials in the course of input identification. Another probably related source is the spiral-like feedback loop set in motion by a misleading meaning value or an erroneous refcrentiation inducing anxiety-evoking disorientation that in turn interferes with renewed matching and hypothesis testing, either culminating in a vague metaphor or being interrupted by a referent shift so aptly performed that a new loop of this type is set in motion. Finally, having dealt exclusively with schizophrenic perception should not lead us to explain schizophrenia merely in terms of faulty input identification, symptom-inducing as that may be.

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ly? The meaning structure of jokes. Semiotica (In press). Kreitler, S., Kreitler, H., & Wanunu, V. (1985). Experimental modification of test performance in schizophrenics and normals. British Journal of Clinical Psychology (Under review). Magnusson, P.A., Nilsson, A., 6( Henriksson, N.G. (1977). Psychogenic vertigo within an anxiety frame of reference:

An experimental study. British

Journal of Medical Psychology, 50, 187-201. (1966). Principles of Psychopathology. N e w York: McGraw-Hill.

Maher, B.A.

McGhie, A., Chapman, J. (1973). Attention and perception schizophrenia. In R. Cancro (Ed.), AMUI

Review of the Schizophrenic Syndrome 1972. New

York: Brunner/Mazel. McKinnon, T., & Singer, G. (1969). Schizophrenia and the scanning cognitive control: A re-evaluation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 74, 242-248. Miller, G.A.,

Galanter, E., & Pribram, K. (1960). Plans and the Structure of

Human Behavior. N e w York: Holt. Nilsson, A. (1983). Application of a percept-genetic approach to separation and

Oedipal

problems

in

primitive-hysteria

and

obsessive-compulsive

neurosis. hrchiv f i r Psychologie, 135, 135-148. Phillips, L., & Framo, J.L. (1954). Developmental theory applied t o normal and psychopathological perception. Journal of Personality, 22, 465-474. Schilder, P. (1942). Mind: Perception and Thought in their Constructive Aspects. New York: Columbia University Press. Schilder, P. (1951). On the develpment of thoughts.

In D.

Rapaport

(Ed.),

Organization and Pathology of Thought. New York: Columbia University Press. Shakow, D. (1962). Segmental set. Archives of General Psychiatry, 6, 1-17. Shakow, D. (1963). Psychological deficit in schizophrenia. Behavioral Science, 8, 275-305.

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Shakow, D. (1974). Some observations on the psychology (and some fewer, on the biology) of schizophrenia. In R. Cancro (Ed.), Annual Review of t h e Schizophrenic Syndrome 1973. New York: Brunner/Mazel. Shapiro, S.A. (1981). Contemporary Theories of Schizophrenia: Review and Synthesis. New York: McGraw-Hill. Silverman, J. (1964a). The problem of attention in theory and research in schizophrenia. Psychological Review, 71, 352-379. Silverman, J. (1964b). Perceptual control of stimulus intensity in paranoid and non-paranoid schizophrenia. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease,

139, 544-548. Singer, M.T., & Wynne, L. (1965). Thought disorder and family relations of schizophrenics. 111. Methodology using projective techniques. IV. Results and interpretations. Archives of General Psychiatry, 12, 187-212. Smith, G.J.W., Johnson, G., & Ljunghill-Andersson, P.W. (1970). M C T Metakontrasttekniken. Stockholm: Skandinaviska Testfarlaget. Spohn, H.E., & Patterson, T. (1979). Recent studies of psychophysiology in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 5, 581-611. Spohn, H.E., Thetford, P.E., & Cancro, R. (1971). The effects of phenothiazine medication on skin conductance and heart rate in schizophrenic patients. Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease, 152, 129-139. Spring, B.J., &: Zubin, J. (1978). Attention and information processing as indicators of vulnerability t o schizophrenic episodes. In L.C. Wynne, R.L. Cromwell, & S. Matthysse (Eds.), The Nature of Schizophrenia.

New

York: Wiley. Sullivan, H.S. (1962). Schizophrenia as a Human Process. New York: Norton. Sutton, S.A. (1975). A psychophysiological approach t o psychopathology. Annual Review of Psychology, 26, 648-656. Venables, P.H. (1964). Input dysfunction in schizophrenia. In B.A. Maher (Ed.), Progress in Experimental Personality Research (Vol. 1). New York: Academic Press. Venables, P.H. (1975). Psychophysiological studies of schizophrenic pathology. In P.H.

Venables & M.J. Christie (Eds.), Research in Psychophysiology. New York: Wiley. Wynne, L. & Singer, M. (1963). Thought disorder and family relations of schizophrenics. 1. A research strategy. 11. A classification of forms. Archives of General Psychiatry, 9, 191-206.

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.(North-Holland), 1986

33 1

SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION AS THE FIRST STAGE OF THE

PERCEPTUAL PROCESS : CAM PERSONALITY BE REVEALED SO EARLY I N THE SEQUENCE?

Juris G . Draguns The Pennsylvania Stnte University

MICROGENESIS, SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION, AND PERSONALITY : TOWARD PINPOINTING THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP Microgenesis and subliminal perception both investigate perception in process. Both of them are concerned with the presentation of suboptimal information and both of them deal with fragments of stimuli that may in some way be registered or reported.

These fragments, however, a r e

generally assumed to be inadequate for the veridical and certain recognition of the stimuli presented.

SUBLlMlNAL PERCEPTION

The two traditions of investigation have, however, developed independently. Throughout much of their history, these two lines of research have remained mutually isolated, barely aware of the existence of the other body of findings and data. Moreover, a sharp delineation between these two research enterprises is not only possible, but obvious. Subliminal perception deals, by definition, with data below the absolute threshold for the verbal report of

E

given stimulus. Data demonstrating the existence of

subliminal perception, or of subliminal sensory processing (Dixon, 1981) have been primarily in the form of psychophysiological reactions. Alternatively, the investigators of subliminal perception have concentrated upon demonstrating the effects of

subliminal presentations upon

subsequent

supraliminal stimuli (e.g., Spence, 1983). In both cases, the role of verbal report has been minimal, subsidiary, or indirect. Subliminal perception by its nttture depends upon nonverbal avenues of reactivity par excellence.

J. G.Draguns

332

M ICR OG ENESlS By contrast, microgenesis has been crucially dependent upon verbal reports of the subjects from the very start. In Sander's (1928/1961, p. 101 ; Frohlich & Drever, 1983) classical definition, microgenesis is the experience of percept formation in consciousness, The three pioneers of this procedure, the German Sander (1928/1961), the native German and later U S immigrant Werner (1956, 19571, and the Italian Gemelli (1928), solicited elaborate verbal accounts from their subjects, not only about the content of the stimuli shown, but also about the emotional and personal reactions during their presentation. In the more modern parlance, microgenesis was conceived and studied as an encounter of the whole person with an emerging sensory stimulus (cf. Flavell & Draguns, 1957 ; Graumann, 1959). It is not coincidental that these early experimental demonstrations were embedded in holistic conceptions and, as such, at least potentially allowed for the role of personality in directing, coloring, and influencing the course and nature of the perceptual process. The few attempts to incorporate personality into microgenetic studies were limited to typologies ( e . g . , Schmidt-Durban, 1939). The reason for i t , at least in the case of Sander and the productive and inventive group of investigators he supervised and coordinated at the Universities of Leipzig and Jena, is that their concept of personality, though holistic, was nondynamic. It took the Lund University investigators two decades later (ICragh, 1955; Smith, 1957) to merge psychodynamic conceptualization with microgenetic research approaches. Thus the percept-genetic approach to the study of personality came into being. Over the ensuing thirty years, i t has yielded a rich harvest of experimental results, prominently represented in several chapters of this volume (cf. Hentschel & Smith, 1980; Kragh & Smith, 1970; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980). The other major distinction between subliminal perception and microgenesis is that the later is, of course, confined to supraliminal presentation. A s pointed out elsewhere (Draguns, 19841, the span within which microgenesis occurs is between the absolute and the differential threshold for the object o r stimulus being presented. In everyday perception, as Prinz emphasizes in chapter 18 of this volume, the gap between these two points is minimal or even altogether absent. In experiential terms, w e recognize the object as soon as w e become aware of i t s presence, i.e., notice it. There a r e , of course, instances in real life where such instantaneous

333

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

recognition is aborted because of poor illumination, sensory defects, intentional or fortuitoue camouflage, and natural barriers, such a s fog. The perceptual process may also be extended in time as we are confronted with novel or unusually complex stimuli. More subtly, it may come into play a s

w e explore with a degree of unusual thoroughness everyday objects which we may have noticed but never penetratingly examined. Witness the behavior of the commuter who for the first time takes the time to look a t the architecture, landscaping, materials, and colors of houses which he has been passing for years. Whether these are atypical and exceptional occurrences, as the traditional critics of microgenetic research have repeatedly asserted, or whether these reactions are primary and our instantaneous, overlearned recognition reactions in a predictable and familiar environment are secondary, a s , among others, Kragh and Smith (1970) maintain, is an issue that is difficult, perhaps impossible, to resolve by empirical means. In any case, microgenesis is an empirically observable phenomenon under laboratory or naturalistic conditions in which a perceptual scarch culminating in a recognition takes place. In both microgenesis and subliminal perception then the stimulus presented is a question or an enigma; clues to it are provided by bodily, preverbal reactivity in the former case and by an active and deliberate quest in the latter.

MICROGENESIS AND SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION: STEPS TOWARD A RAPPROCHEMENT

If as earlier indicated, microgenetic and subliminal perception studies proceeded along their separate paths for years and decades, a degree of convergence has become apparent in the last few years. Two special issues of Archiv f u r Psychologie (Smith, 1983a, 1983b) have been devoted to the results of work by both subliminal perception investigators and researchers on microgenesis. The volume edited by Frohlich, Smith, Draguns, and Hentschel (1984) likewise is concerned with forging links between perception researchcra on subliminal reactivity and supraliminal responsiveness. The symposium on which this volume is based is the third step toward bringing together and blending these two lines of research. One of the major points of contact between these two types of studies

is

the

often

intuitive

recognition that

both

are intimately,

perhaps

J. G.Draguns

334

inextricably, linked to personality. But what personality is and how it comes into play in these perceptual activities is in itself a major problem in psychology. The problem with the multiplicity of definitions of personality is widely known; it scarcely needs reiterating (cf., Allport, 1961; Herrmann, 1976). Since personality has been rarely defined in research of microgenesis and subliminal processes, the concept of personality impinges upon such investigations in the form of a vague aura. To paraphrase, these studies are often animated by the expectation that something about personality is related to something in microgenesis and/or preconscious processing. To the extent that this expectation is further pinpointed, personality tends to refer to individual differences, to adaptive processes, and to the influence of unconscious processes upon subsequent experience and behavior (cf. Draguns, 1975). All of these three topics do indeed loom large in most conventional treatments of personality. In more global terms, however, much of personality-related research on perceptunl processes is animated by the intuitive expectation that to respond to such stimuli,the person must mobilize all of his or her distinctive personal resources. This expectation is strengthened by the familiarity of most psychologists with the projective hypothesis (cf., Frank, 1948; also see Draguns, in press). Attempts indeed have not been lacking to develop projective techniques based on research materials used in microgenetic investigations (e.g., Brengelmann, 1953; Sander, 1928; Voigt, 1956). The preconscious reactivity in subliminal experiments, while quite apparently different from the mode of responding to projective stimuli shares the property of stimulus impoverishment with projective techniques. All of these considerations could not help but strcngthen the general, if somewhat intuitive, belief that personality is of necessity involved in shaping responses to subliminal stimuli or to ambiguous, but supraliminal progressions.

MICROGENESIS TO

AND

SUBLIMINAL

PERCEPTION

IN

RELA TlON

PERSONALITY

The objective of the present chapter is to go beyond this widely shared, albeit little articulated, consensus. To this end, a major definition of personality will be presented and the several aspects of personality, amenable to experimental and systematic empirical investigation, will be identified.

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

335

A s is well known, Allport (1961, p. 28) defined personality as: ?Ithe

dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine his characteristic behavior and thought .I1 The terms of this classical definition can be reduced to three classes of manifestations of personality in observable behavior and reportable experience : individualit y , organization, and consistency (cf. Draguns, 1975). To elaborate on each of these three terms, personality is, first of all, expressed when a response or a pattern of responses differentiates a person from some or all other people. A s Kluckhohn. Murray, and Schneider (1953, p. 53) put i t , "every man is in certain respects: (a) like all other men, (b) like some other men, (c) like no other men." Personality, however, also concerns the organization and integration of various forces or unconsummated tendencies toward behavior within a person. The general assumption underlying this statement is that these various action tendencies are not haphazard, but embedded in a hierarchical relationship with well established and individually characteristic priorities of responses. Finally, personality refers to intraindividual consistencies across time and place. Personality characteristics are inferred from their stability over a period of time and from their generality in a variety of different situations These statements, of course, have been vigorously challenged and contested in the last two decades (cf. Mischel, 1 9 7 3 ) . The proponents of nomothetic and idiographic approaches have clashed over the universal or individual patterning of personality, diverging in their understanding of the hallmarks of individuality and organization. The proponents of situationist and interactionist views have called into question the widely held belief that personality is organized on the basis of large-scale dimensions in depth or breadth (cf. Kreitler & Kreitler, 1 9 8 3 ) . This is not the time nor the place to consider the merits of the positions of the several participants in this controversy. Within the context of the present chapter, suffice it to say that nobody at this point denies the relevance or the justification of the concept of personality in toto. The putative manifestations of personality in the course of coming to grips with a subliminally presented or supraliminal , but gradually emerging, stimulus could be accommodated within any of the positions in these controversies; the likelihood and scope of the personality manifestations to be encountered would be a matter on which expectations and predictions of the exponents of the several views would differ.

336

J.G. Draguns

Research on personality, however, as it is expressed in microgenetic and subliminal perception studies, preceded the formulation of these theoretical positions. A s a result, they have not explicitly influenced work in these two areas. Nonetheless, different decisions have been taken by various experimenters, either emphasizing standardization of stimuli and procedures or adapting them to the experiences and circumstances of the subject, a s , in addition to several authors represented in this volume, Emrich and Heinemann (1966) have done in the case of subliminal perception research. These investigators selected individually the anxiety-arousing stimuli for each of their subjects which were then subliminally presented. A s far as the situationist , interactionist , and trait positions are concerned, investigators have differed on the "proximal" vs. "distal" nature of the personality correlates that they have sought for a variety of microgenetic and subliminal perception indicators. Even within a specific measure, the Defense Mechanism Test (cf. ICragh k Smith, 1970), the operational definitions of some defenses are beholden to a symbolic interpretation, e . g . , masks as indicators of repression, while others are based on more direct and obvious parallels to the mechanism assessed, e . g . , a wall between the threat and the hero as a sign of isolation. To return, however, to the basic theme of reflection of personality in perceptual processes. if the link between perception and personality is to be demonstrated in these operations, it would need to be shown that: ( a )

individual differences are observed in the course of these progressions and that they are related to some valid and established indicators of personalit y ; (b) these responses are organized and that their organization reflects the manner in which more macroscopic aspects of personality are grouped, patterned, and integrated; and (c.) identifiable patterns of consistency obtain, both within subliminal processing andlor microgenetic progressions and beyond them. Personality research in these two perceptual areas has differed in its relative prominence as well as in the nature of specific content areas investigated. In the case of subliminal perception, a major share of research has been focused on problems of general psychology, e . g . , reactivity without awareness, and on limitations of consciousness (Dixon , 1971, 1981, 1983; Shevrin & Dickman, 1980). Personality research has been concentrated on what, within the tripartite scheme adopted within this paper, might be called problems of organization : how do unconscious influences impinge upon concurrent and subsequent perceptual operations and how are drive

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

337

representations expressed in a symbolic disguise. Less attention has been paid to individual differences in actual subliminal reactivity, although individual differences in the consequences of such reactivity have been explored, among others by several contributors to this volume, e . g . , Antell and Goldberger, chapter 4 , Silverman and Geisler, chapter 3 , and Hentschel and Schneider, chapter 10. As far as consistency is concerned, the gist of the results of preconscious processing studies point to a high degree of specifity of such effects. In any case, to this writer's knowledge no attempt of including an ecologically representative sample of subliminal stimuli has been undertaken nor has there been any concerted attempt to compare and correlate reactivity to several types of stimuli presented below the absolute threshold. Of course, studies of aggressive and sexual stimuli and their priming effects constitute an exception to this rule. I t should, however, be kept in mind that even in these studies discrete stimuli were studied at the pleasure of the experimenter rather than a s representative and characteristic exemplars of their respective classes of stimuli. Personality-related study of microgenesis has focused on three phenomena. First and foremost among these is the concept of defense, operationalized by the percept-genetic investigators and studied for over three decades. While developed independently, the conception of manifestation of several defenses upon confrontation with an instinct, if supraliminal, stimulus represents a major advance over the traditional notion of perceptual defense, defined operationally as lag of recognition of conflict arousing o r threatening stimuli. Percept-genetic investigators have been able to demonstrate that such a delayed recognition response is but one of the defense mechanisms observable in coping with a supraliminal gradually appearing threat. The second focus of microgenetic investigation has concerned the formal, stylistically distinctive features of progressions obstructed by interference, vagueness, ambiguity, complexity, etc. (Hentschel, 1980 ; Smith &

Nyman, 1959). The third facet of such research is almost exclusively ex-

emplified by the systematic attempts by Ulf Kragh, represented in this volume ( c f . , chapter 7 ) , of demonstrating parallels between chronological sequences in real-life and in microgenetic, especially Defense Mechanism Test (DMT), progressions.

In the first of these three instances we are

dealing with primarily the study of individual differences and secondarily the investigation of intrapsychic organization. Consistency is also explored as when direct similarities between coping with DMT. pictures and real-life threat as demonstrated. Likewise, constancy in style across stimuli and

J. G.Draguns

338

situations is an important theme in investigating the formal characteristics of perceptual processes. Consistency, however, between two domains of functioning so far removed from each other as to make any demonstrations of its occurrence appear counterintuitive is the major concern of Kragh’s investigations in which microgenesis is shown to recapitulate ontogenesis.

MlCROGENESlS

AND

SUBLlMlNAL

PERCEPTlON

AS ONE PROCESS

None of the bodies of work surveyed so far combines microgenesis and subliminal responsiveness into one sequence and relates them to personality on the planes of individual differences, intrapersonal organization, and cross-situational consistency. A s already pointed out, both of these phenomena concern responses to stimuli presented under suboptimal conditions and occurring under uncertainty. They differ, however, in two important respects: not only in the segment of the perceptual span investigated. below and above the absolute threshold, but also in the modality of reactivity-nonverbal and verbal. I t is the later circumstance that poses obstacles to the practical implementation of studying both of these phenomena in the same sequence. Nonetheless. the two segments of percept formation, subliminal and supraliminal or preconscious and conscious, may be conceived as constituting the full span of the perceptual process. During this sequence, a number of thresholds are traversed, or a number of markers occur that are not temporally simultaneous or synchronized. This view is not altogether novel; i t is implicit in Flavell and Draguns’ (1957) review of classical microgenetic research, is consistent with the explicit formulation by Smith ( 1 9 5 7 ) of visual perception as an event over time and is a major feature of Erdelyi’s integration of perceptual defense research with the results of microgenetic and subliminal processing study. The gist of this position is best provided in Erdelyi’s ( 1 9 7 4 , p. 13-14) own words: “Broadly speaking, perceptual processes may be best thought of as spanning the full sequence of events associated with information intake and consolidation beginning just after stimulus input and ending prior to permanent storage in long-term memory. As such, perception represents not a locus, but a vast region of processing space,

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

339

SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION AND MICROGENESIS I N ONE PROCESS: A N EMPIRICAL STUDY

Consistent with this formulation, a preliminary attempt was made by Lieberman ( 1974) to study subliminal perception and microgenesis within the same progression of tachistoscopic stimulus presentation. This effort was guided by the general expectation that personality is revealed in all three stages of perception : subliminal, microgenetic, and ordinary unobstructed and unlimited viewing. In keeping with the conclusions from the literature, a s already presented earlier in this chapter, the personality aspects revealed in the course of thcse three segments of perceptual processes are expected to be different. Primary process was predicted to be expressed during subliminal presentation. In the microgenetic phase, defense mechanisms where hypothesized to appear and adaptation to reality was the process expected to be demonstrated during unobstructed viewing. In all three cases the Holtzman Inkblot Technique (Holtzman, Thorpe, Swartz, & Herron , 1961) , a statistically refined and methodologically streamlined inkblot test that has been applied with a reasonable degree of success in personality and clinical research (Gamble, 1972; Fischer 8 Spada, 1973; Hartmann

&

von Rosenstiel, 1977; Holtzman, 1981; Swartz,

Reinehr, 8 Holtzman. 19831, was chosen a s the criterion measure of relevant personality constructs.

SUBJECTS

Sixty-four male inmates at a state correctional institution in Central Pennsylvania were recruited for participation in this study. Recruitment was in all cases on a volunteer basis. The choice of this population of subjects was in part dictated by practical considerations, i.e., their availabiity More important, however, it was thought that, because of their

.

socialization experience, personality characteristics, and conviction of crimes, many of which were aggressive in nature, these subjects would have both earlier and more intense intrapsychic conflicts of interest to this study, i.e., over both aggression and passivity. In any case, the use of this relatively homogeneous group was in keeping with the practices of numerous microgenetic and subliminal perception researchers who concentrated upon the study of special and relatively homogeneous populations of

J. G.Draguns

340

subjects, as exemplified in several chapters of this volume (e.g., Antell 8 Goldberger; Hentschel 8 Schneider). The ages of the Ss ranged from 2 0 to 50 years, with a mean of 28 years and a standard deviation of five. The range of the criminal offenses of which the subjects were convicted was broad. One third of all Ss were serving time for drug-related crimes; the remaining two thirds had histories of larceny, assault, sexual transgressions, and murder. Educational level of Ss ranged from eighth grade to second year of college. The Ss' effective reading level was unobtrusively and practically ascertained; only one person who was unable to read written instructions was eliminated in this manner.

MEASURES

Words were chosen as the stimuli for this study. They were selected to represent three categories: aggressive, neutral. and passive. They were presented by means of a Scientific Prototype two-channel tachistoscope. Presentation times for the three levels - subliminal, microgenetic or perceptual defense, and above veridical recognition - were based on pilot work, With a group of 10 subjects comparable to those participating in the actual experiment i t was established that all subjects correctly identified all of six neutral stimuli at the exposure speed of 0 . 1 sec. At 0.03 seconds, Ss were correct in identifying about one-third of all stimuli, neutral in tone, but, of course, different in content. At exposure speeds of 0 . 0 0 2 5 sec., presentation of six more neutral words yielded no correct recognitions or guesses, nor was there any reported or detected awareness of a word being flashed. These three levels, 0.0025, 0.03, and 0 . 1 sec., were then chosen to represent the subliminal, perceptual defense or microgenetic, and veridical recognition levels respectively. Illumination of both the actual stimuli as well as that of the field upon which Ss were fixated was kept uniform throughout the process of gathering data; it was 0 . 5 2 -+ 0 . 0 2 log.-ft. lamberts. Stimuli were presented on 4 " x 7" index cards in capital letters. A total of 66 words was chosen for use in this study. Words were selected on the basis of their frequency of occurrence in the English language by means of the ICu6era and Francis (1967) list which provides objective data on frequency of U.S. usage of 50,000 English words. Word length was kept at or below the level of eight letters. Neutral, aggressive, and pas-

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

34 1

sive words were first picked on an a priori basis and then submitted for ratings to 35 male and female college students in an introductory psychology course. The words finally chosen were those rated as both threatening and passive in the case of the two non-neutral categories. Words with overlapping ratings, e. g. , aggressive and passive, were eliminated. Neutral words were only retained if the ratings demonstrated that they were free of threatening, aggressive, and passive connotations. In this manner, six neutral pre-experiment words were chosen as well as 18 aggressive, 18 passive, and 24 neutral words for the actual experimental presentation. Neutral words were exemplified by "chair" , Wem", and "speech", aggressive ones by "roar", "wild", and rffistfr,and passive ones by "empty", Yonely" , and "victim". The personality measure chosen was the Holtzman Inkblot Technique (HIT) which was administered by means of slides in a group setting.

PROCEDURE

The Ss' tasks in responding to the word stimuli were to name the word shown, to match that word with a word from a list of words in which the three categories were represented, and to rate this word on the scales of active-passive, aggressive-defensive , and threatening vs. nonthreatening. I t was explained to the Ss that some of the words would be flashed long enough to be easily recognized, others might be recognizable with difficulty, and still others might not be possible to recognize at all. In all cases, however, the Ss were assured that a word would be flashed. They were admonished to guess at all times when they were not sure. Each subject was seen individually.

RESEARCH DESlGN

The independent variables in this experiment were as follows: (1) personality adaptation, passive vs. active. of Ss, as determined by the ratio of these two responses on the HIT; ( 2 ) subliminal stimulus type: passive vs. active; ( 3 ) exposure level presentation order, subliminal to recognition- level, or vice versa; ( 4 ) defensive style of S s , measured by the ratio, at the microgenetic or perceptual defense level of presentation, be-

342

J.G. Draguns

tween the association times for aggressive or passive vs. neutral words, depending on the person’s adaptation style (aggressive vs. passive) and resulting in the two categories of dcniers and nondeniers; ( 5 ) three exposure levels : subliminal, microgenetic, and recognition-level; ( 6 ) three kinds of stimulus words: neutral, aggressive. and passive. These six variables were incorporated into a factorial analysis of variance research design consisting of 2 (adaptation styles) x 2 (subliminal word context) x 2 (exposure level orders) x 2 (defensive styles) x 3 (exposure levels) x 3 (stimulus word contents), The principal dependent variable consisted of ratings of neutral, aggressive, and passive words on three seven-point scales : activepassive, aggressive-defensive , and threatening-nonthreatening. Since the design of the study was complicated, the readers may find it useful to refer to Table 1 in which the various factors are identified and listed.

RESULTS

As might have been expected, the results of this complex study were themselves complex. A t this time, it is neither possible nor nccessary to present a complete array of results. For this information. the interested reader is referred to Lieberman (1974). Only a few of the more theoretically meaningful findings will be presented and discussed. As anticipated, adaptation level (passive vs. aggressive) was shown to be significant in determining how subjects perceived stimuli at the recognition level. Defensive style (denial vs. nondenial), on the other hand, was found to be related to ratings of words at the intermediate or microgenetic level of presentation. When words were presented in the supraliminal to subliminal order of exposure, the type of subliminal stimulus (aggressive vs. passive vs. neutral) affected the direction of the response, but had no effect upon either personality adaptation (passive vs. aggressive) or preferred mode of defense (denial vs. nondenial) When subliminal stimulation set in before the display of recognition-level stimuli, the subliminal stimuli proved to be sufficiently powerful to change and disrupt the responses reflecting the S’s style of personality adaptation. So far the results presented were in keeping with expectations on which the study was based. I t is also worth noting, however, that there were no significant

.

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

343 1)

Table 1 Definitions of Factors

A (Personality adaptation)

A A

B (Subliminal stimulus type)

1 2

(Passive adaptation) (Aggressive adaptation)

B (Passive subliminal stimulus type) 1

B (Aggressive subliminal stimulus type) 2

C

(Exposure level presentation order)

C

1

C

D (Defensive style)

2

D (Non-deniers) 1

D

e (Exposure level)

(Supraliminal to subliminal exposure order) (Subliminal to supraliminal exposure order)

2

(Deniers)

E (Supraliminal level) 1

E (Perceptual defense level) 2

E (Subliminal level) 3

F (Rated stimulus words)

F (Neutral rated stimulus words) 1

F (Aggressive rated stimulus words) 2

F (Passive rated stimulus words) 3

')

From Lieberman (1974).

effects at an "inappropriate" level, i . e . , other than the one for which such results were predicted. Subject to the inherent ambiguity of negative results, these findings indicate that there were no "false hits", i . e . , results that were positive but not based on theoretical expectancies nor easily interpretable. The rating scales proved to be the most useful measure throughout the three exposure levels. They were also most amenable to interpretation ; active-passive and aggressive-defensive scales were the most sensitive. Personality variables and experimental manipulations had the greatest effect upon aggressive words, as compared with neutral and passive.

344

J.G. Draguns DISC USSl ON

On the most general plane, the results of this study demonstrated that response formation varied with stimulus visibility. The nature of the relationship that emerged between response formation processes and characteristic adaptation and thought styles was consonant with predictions based on psychoanalysis and microgenetic investigation : as stimulus ambiguity was increased, developmentally earlier processes made their appearance. I t could be conjectured that subliminal presentation of drive-related and conflictual stimuli was experienced by subjects as a powerful and threatening internal event. This effect was especially pronounced when subliminal stimuli preceded the two more visible levels of presentation. Conversely, when subliminal stimuli followed more visible levels, they were experienced as being less anxiety-producing One could speculate that subliminal stimuli were experienccd as being external in origin in such a case and, hence, as being more controllable and less aversive. It is also worth noting that many subliminal phenomena reported by other investigators appeared among the results of this study. At subliminal levels of exposure Ss were found to be cRpable of discriminating between neutral and drive-related words. Stimuli that were consistent with the person's characteristic mode of personality adaptation were more frequently incorporated into the response process than stimuli that were extraneous to their personality adaptation. Variations in the order of exposure levels showed that priming was not a necessary condition for the occurrence of subliminal phenomena. However, the results obtained without priming were different from those which appeared after priming. These results are subject to a number of major limitations. The most important of these was that the microgenetic and subliminal progressions were both reduced to single points in time exemplifying each of these two phenomena. Unfortunately, it proved impractical to encumber the already complex research design by introducing graduations in subliminal and microgenetic levels of presentation. But the unique value, especially of studying microgenetic sequences, lies in the alternation of various characteristic adaptive and defensive reactions. Perhaps my view is biased by a prolonged commitment to the process format of investigating perceptual and heuristic activity. My expectation, however, is that the phenomena revealed in this study would have appeared more clearly and prominently if several levels of both subliminal and microgenetic presentation were includ-

.

Subliminal Perception as the First Stage

345

ed. Another limitation is that the experiment followed the traditional perceptual defense tradition by collapsing all defenses under the heading of denial. Kragh and others have demonstrated that a variety of defenses are observable in the percept-genetic progression. To this end, however, it is necessary to use more complex and multidimensional stimuli that would likely be pictorial rather than verbal. Moreover, more individualized procedures might have been followed in identifying individual conflicts and in extending their range, although it could plausibly be argued that aggression and passivity should have been an important component in the biographical history of the correctional inmates being investigated. Finally, the far-reaching objectives of this study proved to be too heavy a burden to carry and too ambitious a goal to realize. Virtually every aspect of the study carried a degree of noise or error which, cumulatively, pulled it down and prevented it from realizing all of its aims. The criterion personality measure, though useful and promising, is not a foolproof measure of passive v s . aggressive adaptation. The population investigated, with its special characteristics, and the setting in which they were studied no doubt left their mark and limited the generalization value of the study. Despite all of these limitations, the objectives which animated this research were at least in part realized. On the perception side, the results are consonant with the view that perception is not a momentary point-form event, but a process extended in tine, that verbal indicators are important components of this progression, but not their only markers, and that the several markers of this process do not occur simultaneously.

A s far as

personality is concerned, it was shown to impinge upon the preverbal reactivity as well as upon the verbal reports in the perccptual process. Although not all aspects of the correspondencc between the primary process-defense-adaptation

sequence

and

the

subliminal-microgenetic-re-

cognition level presentation were successfully demonstrated, the positive results obtained were consistent with this scheme. Thus, instances of individual

differences,

intrapsychic

organization,

and

cross-situational

consistency were shown to come into play in responding to momentary flashes, some of them not consciously visible. The question posed in the title of this paper can be answered in the affirmative, although in light of the data obtained, this answer must remain tentative for the time being. It would, moreover, appear that i t is intrapsychic organizational factors that are more clearly discernible at this level than are individual differences or consistencies

across

situations.

In

general,

there

are

reflections

of

J.G. Draguns

346

personality throughout the perceptual process, but their nature varies with its stage. If perception of novel, complex, emerging, and personally relevant stimuli is considered an event extended in time rather than a momentary occurrence, then these various correlates of personality functioning can readily be incorporated and accomodated This formulation makes postulating a homunculus, a perceiver within the perceiver who sorts out percepts before they are noticed find recognized, unnecessary. Rather, perception of complex and ambiguous stimuli requires senrch, especially when these stimuli matter personally. Under these conditions, perception occurs in bits and pieces which are scattered in time. I t takes the person's lifelong individually patterned experience, i.e. , his or her personality, to make sense of these fragments and to reconstruct on their basis a meaningful and coherent whole.

.

Subliminal Perception as the First Stwe

347

REFERENCES (1961). Pattern and Growth in t h e Development of Personality.

Allport, G.W.

New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Antell, M.J.,

& Goldberger, L. (this volume, chapter 4). The effects of sub-

liminally presented sexual and aggressive stimuli on literary creativity. Brengelmann, J.C.

(1953).

Der visuelle Objekterkennungstest.

Zeitschrift f i r

experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 1, 422-452. Dixon, N.F.

(1971). Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy. New

York McGraw-Hill. Dixon, N.F. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Dixon, N.F.

(1983). The conscious-unconscious

interface: Contribution to an

understanding. Archiv fiir Psychologie, 135, 55-66. Draguns, J.G.

(1975).

Assessment of Personality.

Homewood, IL:

Learning

Systems Company. Draguns, J.G.

(1984). Microgenesis by any other name.. ..In

Smith, J.G.

W.D.

Frohlich, G.

Draguns, & U. Hentschel (Eds.), Psychological Processes in

Cognition and Personality. Washington: Hemisphere. Draguns, J.G. (in press). Projective techniques. In A. Kuper & J. Kuper (Eds.), Social Science Encyclopedia. London: Rout ledge Kegan Paul. Emrich, H., & Heinemann, L.G. (1966). EEG bei unterschwelliger Wahrnehmung

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emotional bedeu t same r Wort er Psychologische Forschung , 29, 285 - 296. Erdelyi, M.H.

(1974). A new look a t the New Look: Perceptual defense and

vigilance. Psychological Review, 81, 1-25. Fischer, G.H., & Spada, H. (1973). Die psychometrischen Grundagen des Rorschachtests und der Holtzman lnklot Technique. Bern: Huber. Flavell, J.H., & Draguns, J.G. (1957). A microgenetic approach to perception and thought. Psychological Bulletin, 54, 197-217. Frank, L.K. (1948). Projective Methods. Springfield, IL: Thomas. Frohlich, W.D., & Drever, J. (1983). Wlirterbuch zur Psychologie (14th ed.). Miinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. Frohlich, W.D., Smith, G.J.W., Draguns, J.G., & Hentschel, U. (Eds.). (1984). Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality. Washington: Hernisphere. Gamble, K.R. (1972). The Holtzman Inkblot Technique: A review. Psychological Bulletin, 77, 172-194. Gemelli, A. (1928). I1 comparire e il scomparire delle forme. Contributi di Laboratorio della Psicologia e Biologia, Universitil del Sacro Cuore, 3, 385436

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Graumann, C.F. (1959). Aktualgenese. Die deskriptiven Grundlagen und die theoretischen Wandlungen d e s aktualgenetischen Forschungsansatzes. Zeit-

schrift fur experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 6, 410-448. Hartmann, H.A., & Rosenstiel, L. von (Eds.). (1977). Lehrbuch der HoltzmanInkblot Technique. Bern: Huber. Hentschel, U. (1980). Kognitive Kontrollprinzipien und Neuroseformen. In U. Hentschel & G. Smith (Eds.), Experimentelle Persc5nlichkeitspsychologie (pp. 227-321). Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Hentschel, U., & Schneider, U. (this volume, c h a p t e r 10). Psychodynamic personality c o r r e l a t e s of creativity. (1980). Experimentelle Pershlichkeitspsychologie. Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft.

Hentschel, U., & Smith, G.J.W.

Herrmann, T. (1976). Lehrbuch der empirischen Peranlichkeitsforschung. Gottingen: Hogrefe. Holtzrnan, W.H.

(1981). Holtzman Inkblot Technique. In A.I.

Rabin (Ed.), As-

sessment with Projective Techniques: A Concise Introduction New York: Springer. Holtzman, W.H.,

Thorpe, J.S.,

Swartz, J.D.,

& Herron, E.W.

Perception and Personality: Holtzman Inkblot Technique.

(1961).

Austin:

Inkblot Uni-

versity of T e x a s Press. Kluckhohn, C.,

Murray, H.A.,

& Schneider, P. (1953). Personality in Nature,

Society, and Culture. New York: Knopf. Kragh, U. (1955). Actual-Genetic Model of Gleerups.

Perception-Personality.

Lund:

Kragh, U. (this volume, c h a p t e r 8). Life panorama under t h e microscope: A paradigmatic case study. Kragh, U., & Smith, G.J.W.

(Eds.).

(1970).

Percept-Genetic

Analysis. Lund:

Gleerup. Kreitler, S., & Kreitler, H. (1983). T h e consistency of behavioral inconsistencies. Archiv fiir Psychologie, 135, 199-218. (1967). Computational Analyses of Present-Day American English Providence: Brown University Press.

Kuzera, H., & Francis, W.N. Lieberman, H.J.

(1974). A study of the relationship between developmentally

determined personality and associated thought styles and tachistoscopic exposure time as reflected in conflict resolution Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Pennsylvania St a t e University. Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive learning reconceptualization of personality. Psychological Review, 80, 252-283.

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Sander, F. (1928). Experimentelle Ergebnisse der Gestaltpsychologie. In the Bericht iiber den 10. Kongres fiir experirnentelle Psychologie. (Reprinted in C.F. Sander & H. Volkelt (Eds.), Ganzheitspsychologie. (1961). Miinchen: Beck.) Schmidt-Durban, W. (1939). Experimentelle Untersuchung zur Typologie der Wahrnehmung. Neue Psychologische Studien, 15, 1-85. Shevrin, H., & Dickman, S. (1980). The psychological unconscious: A necessary assumption for all psychological theory? American Psychologist, 33, 421-434.

Silverman, L.H., & Geisler, C.J. (this volume, chapter 3). The subliminal psychodynarnic activation method: Comprehensive listing update, individual differences, and other considerations. Psychological Smith, G. J. W. (1957). Visual perception: An event over time. Review, 64, 306-313. Smith, G. J. W. (Ed.). (1983 a). Microgenesis and related issues I.

Archiv fiir

Psychologie, 135, 1-82. Smith, G. J. W. (Ed.). (1983 b). Microgenesis and related issues 11. Archiv fiir Psychologie, 135, 85-161. Smith, G. J. W., & Nyman, G. E. (1959). Psychopathologic behaviour in a serial experiment. Investigations of neurotic, psychotic, psychopathic, and normal 0

subjects. Lunds Universitets Arsskrift. N.F., A v d 2, 56, 5. Smith, G. J. W., & Westerlundh, B. (1980). PerceptgenesisZA process perspective on perception-personality. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 1, 94-124.

Spence, D. P. (1983). Subliminal effects on lexical decision Psychologie, 135, 67-72. Swartz, J. D., Reinehr, R. C., & Holtzman, W. H. (1983).

time.

Archiv fiir

Holtzman Inkblot

Technique, 1956 - 1982 : An annotated bibliography. Austin, Texas: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health. Voigt, J. (1956). Die Aktualgenese in der psychologischen Diagnostik. Psychologische BeitrHge, 2, 67-72. Werner, H. (1956). Microgenesis and aphasia. Journal of Abnormal and Social PSyChOlO~,52, 347-353. Werner, H. (1957). The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of view. In D.B.

Harris (Ed.),

Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

The concept of development.

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

PART V

PSY CHOPHY SIOLOGICAL CORRELATES OF THE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS : EEG AND C B F A S INDICATORS

This Page Intentionally Left Blank

The Roots o Perception U.Hentachel G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

353

REGIONAL CHANGES I N CEREBRAL BLOOD FLOW DURING INCREASED ANXIETY IN PATIENTS WITH ANXIETY NEUROSIS

Aki M. Johanson, Jar1 Risberg, Peter Silfverskiold and Gudmund Smith Lund University

INTRODUCTION Few investigators have studied the relationship between cerebral blood flow or metabolism and the level of anxiety. An early observation was made by Kety (19501, who reported increased cerebral oxygen metabolism in one subject with anxiety. In another study, Reivich, Gur and Alavi (1938) made observations of normal subjects, who underwent positron emission scanning for measurement of local cerebral glucose metabolism. Many of the subjects showed anxiety, possibly due to the arterial and venous catheterization, the injection of the isotope and the scanning. A positive correlation was found between rating of level of anxiety and frontal metabolic rates. An asymmetry with higher metabolism in the right frontal cortex of the most anxious subjects was also reported. The aim of the present investigation was to study changes of regional cerebral blood flow (rCI3F) in anxiety-neurotic patients during experimentally controlled elevation of the state of anxiety.

MATERIAL AND METHODS Twelve in-patients, 8 women and 4 men, with a mean age of 40 years (range 23-62) participated in the study. All patients were primarily diagnosed as anxiety-neurotics; in addition some of them had depressive symptoms. Phobic reactions were reported in 8 patients. None of the patients had any known organic brain disorder and they were all somatically healthy. Patients with alcohol or a r u g abuse were excluded. 'I'wo patients had ,no medication. Seven patients were on a low to moderate dose of hypnotics, either a sleep inducing benzodiazepine andlor a phentiazine derivate.

A.M. Johanson et al.

3 54

Because of asthma, one of these patients was also taking a low dose of theophylline, terbutaline and cimetidine. Four patients were treated with a low dose of beneodiazepine 1-3 times daily and one patient had a moderate dose of thioridaaino , Two patients received tricyclic antidepressant drugs and one patient was on lithium. The patients were informed in detail about the measurement proce* dures. When the patients had been selected and given their informed consent the following methods were used. PER SON A L IT Y TESTING

Personality testing was made by the Meta-Contrast Technique (MCT) , (Smith and Nyman, 1961; Smith and Daniolsson, 1982). Two pictures, A and B, were shown on a screen in front of the patient with tachistoscopic technique. Picture A may be seen as a threat directed against a person in the more neutral scene shown in picture B. First, the picture B was presented alone in a series of increasing exposure times until a correct identification of the picture is obtained. Thereafter, the exposure time was cut back to a standardized level. Without the patient knowing i t , picture A was then introduced, always immediately before picture B. Picture A was exposed in the same way as B until the correct meaning is reported. The patient gave a verbal report, which the psychologist recorded carefully together with observations of non-verbal reactions in the test situation. The method is thought to activate perceptual defenses analogous to the defense system described in psychoanalytic theory. Furthermore, MCT might elucidate signs of anxiety. In this study anxiety responses in MCT were used as activation-stimuli during measurement of rCBF. There is a broad range of anxiety signs in MCT, the most common being reports of stimulus-inadequate black structures. One patient with many signs of anxiety in the MCT test reported for instance a black, hroken window. R E G I O N A L C E R E B R A L BLOOD FLOW M E A S U R E M E N T S ( r C 8 F j

Regional cerebral blood flow measurements were made by the non-traumatic 133xenon inhalation technique using a standard bilateral 32 detector system (Novo Diagnostic Systems, Hadsund, Denmark). During the measurements the patients breathed the inert and freely diffusible tracer 133Xe

*The study has been approved b y the ethics commitee.

Changes in Cerebral Blood Flow during Increased Anxiety

355

mixed with air for one minute via a face mask and a spirometer system. The one minute 133Xe inhalation was followed by ten minutes of normal air breathing. The arrival and disappearance of the isotope were recorded by 32 scintillation detectors placed in parallel at a right angle to the lateral surfaces of both hemispheres. The rate of the isotope-washout from the brain provides the basis for the flow calculation. The data were analyzed by means of computer programs based on principles developed by Obrist, Thompson, Wang and Wilkinson (19751, Risberg et al. (1975) and Risberg (1980). In this study rCBF will be described by the Initial Slope Index ( I S I ) , a parameter dominated by grey matter blood flow. Arterial pC02 was estimated from the recordings of end-tidal C 0 2 concentrations and blood pressure was measured by auscultation. Communication with the patient during measurement was possible by means of a microphone in the face mask.

PROCEDURE

The rCBF measurements were performed 3-4 days after the psychological investigation. The first measurement was carried out during "restingT7 conditions. The patient was silent and the eyes were closed. During the second rCBF measurement attempts were made to increase the degree of anxiety. Consequently, the experimenter asked the patient to freely associate to answers given in the MCT situation, identified by the present authors as typical signs of anxiety. For example, one patient was asked to think about what he saw behind the black, broken window, how his thoughts and associations were related to that picture. The patient was asked to remain silent, with eyes closed during the entire rCBF examination. During the rCBF measurement, systematic observations of the behavior of the patient were made and the provocation of anxiety was partly adjusted to the patients reactions. After the rCBF examination, a conversation followed, in which the patient was asked about thoughts, feelings and associations during the rCBF measurements. Both the observations and the report by the patient were documented in detail and evaluated regarding signs of elevated anxiety. After the examination the patient was carefully followed up with further therapeutic sessions, sometimes aided by the information obtained in the present study.

A.M. Johanson et al.

356

RESULTS All twelve patients showed obvious signs of anxiety during the MCT test, There were also frequent behavior changes indicating anxiety when the pictures became threatening. None of the patients did, however, interrupt the test. During the second rCBF measurement with anxiety-activation , there were evident signs of increased anxiety in all but one patient. Vegetative symptoms like perspiration, restlessness, frequent swallow-movements , blushing and fast andlor irregular breathing were observed. The 11 patients, who displayed overt anxiety, also reported that their associations and thoughts had been very anxiety-loaded and provocative. The remaining patient did not express or show any anxiety during the second rCBF measurement.

REST

ANXIETY

ANXIETY REST

-

Rt

El +Z5U

Figure 1. The regional c e re bra l blood flow during r e s t and anxiety i n 12 p a t i e n t s w i t h anxiety neurosis. The diffe re nc e between r e s t and anxiety is shown t o the r i ght . The I n i t i a l Slope Index (IS11 is used as flow parameter. l h e hemispheric means during rest a r e shown i n the boxes and t h e “clock“ symbols i n d i cat e regional flow i n percent of t h e hemispheric mean (25%-90 ). Black i n d i cat es a value above and s t r i p e d a value below t h e hemispheric mean. manges of mean and regional flow during increased anxiety a r e shown t o t h e r i g h t using the same type of symbols. Note t h e s i g n i f i c a n t increase i n the l e f t f r onto-orbita l region.

Changes in Cerebral Blood Flow during Increased Anxiety

351

A s shown in Fig. 1, both the rCBF level and regional distribution were normal during the rest situation. The hemispheric mean flow levels did not change significantly during increased anxiety. Only a slight de-

crease was noted, probably due to a somewhat lower arterial pC02. Increased anxiety was, however, associated with regional increases of blood flow in front-temporal areas. The most marked and significant ( p < .01; t-test) increase was seen in the fronto-orbital area of the left hemisphere.

IS1 % diff.

det. L 3 p c .006

Figure 2 . Changes o f the blood flow o f t h e l e f t fronto-orbital region during anxiety provocation i n the 1 2 p a t i e n t s . The p a t i e n t who showed a decrease of flow was the one who did not d i s p l a y or report elevated anxiety during provocation.

An analysis of flow changes in the left fronto-orbital region (Fig. 2 ) showed that only one patient did not show flow increases during anxiety provocation. This patient was the only one who did not display or report increased anxiety during the rCBF measurement. Fig. 3 presents flow changes during increased anxiety in a single patient. This patient, who had very evident signs of increased anxiety, also showed the most marked global and regional flow increases among the patients.

358

A.M. Johanson et al.

ANXIETY ACTIVATION

- REST Lt

Rt

E i

ISI -25%

+25%

pco*

+?%

Figure 3. Changes of rCBP during increased anxiety i n one of t h e p a t i e n t s (female, 5 3 ) . Clock-symbols denote changes from t h e corresponding regional r e s t i n g value (25%90').

DISCUSSION

The investigator communicated with the patients during the anxiety provocation. It seems, however, unlikely that the flow increase in the left fronto-orbital region is caused by listening per se, since measurements in normals listening to a neutral word-list did not show increases in this area (Maximilian, 1982). The left-sided fronto-orbital elevation found in our study does not agree with the results of Reichvich et al. (19831, who found the most marked increase in the right frontal region. It i s , however, evident that differences exist between the two studies in the type of anxiety induced. The subjects undergoing positron emission scanning were likely to experience a more object-related type of anxiety, while the anxiety in our patients was rather of the internalized variety triggered by verbal information. Most of our patients had suffered from anxiety for many years, while Reichvich's normal subjects were reacting acutely to the measurement situation. The difference in results can most likely be explained by these factors. Obviously there is an activation of the frontal lobes, when an individual is being aroused and anxious. It is a well established fact that there are higher blood flow values in the frontal lobes than in other parts of the hemispheres in resting normal subjects (Wilkinson e t al. 1969; Ingvar, 1979; Prohovnik, Hikansson and Risberg, 1980). This "hyper-frontality" has been explained b y , among other factors, stress and anxiety, which is in line with the present results.

Changes in Cerebral Blood Flow during Increased Anxiety

359

Further evidence of the linkage between the frontal lobes and anxiety has been demonstrated by Kullberg and Risberg (1978) who measured rCBF in patients submitted to stereotactic psychosurgery due to severe anxiety. The main finding was a flow reduction in frontal regions following the operation and parallel to the reduction of symptoms of anxiety. The fronto-orbital rCBF increases in the patients in our study might indicate a connection between anxiety and increased circulation and function in this area. The results are in line with other findings indicating the involvement of the fronto-limbic system in anxiety states (Nauta, 1971).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study was supported by the Swedish Council for Social Science, The Swedish Medical Research Council (grants No 3950, 4969, 6606) and The King Gustaf V and Queen Victoria’s Foundation. The authors are indebted to Maj Lantz for preparing the manuscript, and to Siv Karlson and Helena Ferno for aid with rCBF measurements and illustrations.

REFERENCES

lngvar, D.H.

(1979).

“Hyperfronta118distribution of the cerebral grey matter

flow in resting wakefulness: On the functional anatomy of conscious state. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica, 60, 12-25. Kety, S. (1950). Circulation and metabolism of the human brain in health and disease. The American Journal of Medicine, 8, 205-217. Kullberg, G., & Risberg, J. (1978). Changes in regional cerebral blood flow following stereotactic psychosurgery. Applied Neurophysiology, 41, 79-85. Maximilian, V.A. (1982). Cortical blood flow asymmetries during monaural verbal stimulation. Brain & Language, 15, 1-11. Nauta, W.J. (1971). The problem of the frontal lobe: A reinterpretation. Jour-

nal of Psychiatric Research, 8, 167-187. Obrist, W.D., Thompson, H.K., Wang, H.S., & Wilkinson, W.E. (1975). Regional cerebral blood flow estimated by 133xenon inhalation. Stroke, 6, 245-256.

A.M. Johanson et al.

360

Hgkansson, K., & Risberg, J. (1980). Observations on the func-

Prohovnik, I.,

tional significance of regional cerebral blood flow in "resting" normal subjects. Neuropsychologia, 18, 203-217. Reivich, M., Gur, R., & Alavi, A. (1983). Positron emission tomographic studies of sensory stimuli, cognitive processes, and anxiety. Human Neurobiology, 2, 25-33.

Risberg, J. (1980). Regional cerebral blood flow measurements by 133Xe-inhalation: Methodology and applications in neuropsychology and psychiatry. Brain & Language, 9, 9-34. Risberg, J., Ali, Z., Wilson, E.M., Wills, E.L., & Halsey, J.M. (1975). Regional cerebral blood flow measurements by 133xenon inhalation: Preliminary evaluation of an initial slope index in patients with unstable flow compartments. Stroke, 6, 142-148. & Danielsson, A.

Smith, G.J.W.,

(1982). Anxiety and defensive strategies in

childhood and adolescence. Psychological Issues, 52. New York: national Universities Press. Smith, G.J.W.,

& Nyman, G.E.

Inter-

(1961). A serial tachistoscopic experiment and

its clinical application. Acta Psychologica, 18, 67-84. Wilkinson, I.M.S., R.W.,

Bull, J.W.D.,

du Boulay, G.H.,

Marshall, J., Ross-Russell,

& Symon, L. (1969). Regional blood flow in t h e normal cerebral

hemisphere. Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery 8 Psychiatry, 32, 376378.

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

36 1

EVOKED POTEIJTIALS AS UNCONSCIOUS INDICATORS OF COGNITIVE CONTROL

Wolfram Ehlers and Dietrich Munz Research Center for Psychotherapy (Forschungsstelle fur Psychotherapie) - Stuttgart

COG NIT/ V E CONTROL Cognitive controls are considered as steering mechanisms in the conflict between the ego and the environment, between the drives and the normative values. Hentschel (1980) has shown that they control not only normal behavior but that they also influence the adaptation strategies in neurotic conflict. We are indepted to Klein (1954) for having directed attention to the influence of individual cognitive functions on reality adaptation. Based on interference tendency obtained in the STROOP Test (Color-Word Test by Stroop, 19351, Klein established that people with stronger and weaker interference tendencies also regulated their needs (e.g. thirst) differently. He established the typology of the "restricting versus the flexible ego control" as a cognitive control principle. Persons with a higher interference tendency showed less flexible reactions to adaptive test demands: discs with interfering picture stimuli were underestimated in their magnitude an6 peripheral stimuli were even more inaccurately recognized in tachistoscopic presentation, In self-assessment such persons were characterized by orderliness, pedantry, and affect control. We would like to present the approach to the study of the interference phenomenon as follows: A color word is presented that is colored-in in an incongruent color in comparison to the semantic meaning of the word. When the subject receives the instruction to read the color word, the information can be processed automatically. If the subject is called upon to name the color, a slowing down of the reaction is the result which can be associated also with an affective disturbance with a considerable number of symptoms.

W.Ehlera and D.Munz

362

The subjects ' I . . .become more tense, they strain forward, they show expressions of eye strain, they gesticulate with their arms and hands and occasionally stamp their feet. A few subjects even burst into laughter." (Jensen, 1965) A s a rule, the subject is able to overcome this interference, but a considerable extension of the time is needed for the task. The most striking aspect of this interference phenomenon is the disproportion between the simplicity of the activity to be carried out and the massive character of the interference experienced. Apart from the differential consideration of the interference tendency, various functional models are postulated for the explanation of the interference phenomenon itself. THE RESPONSE C O N F L I C T HYPOTHESIS

Stroop ( 1 9 3 5 ) explained the difficulty in naming the color of an incongruent colored-in word in terms of a conflict between two reactions of unequal habit strength, as a result of which reading (the stronger reaction) has to be suppressed in favor of the naming of the color word (the weaker reaction). This description corresponds to the experience of subjects who attribute difficulty in suppressing the interfering word information during the speaking process. Contrary to the instruction to name only the color, a process of internal verbalization of verbal information must also be presupposed, so that for the speech program two different kinds of information are available, of which only one can be expressed. HYPOTHESIS

OF

THE

COGNITIVE

REPRESENTA T l O N

OF

THE

IN T E R F E R E N C E PHENOMENON

In postulating a process of internal verbalization, a second functional step, the tfcognitive representation of the interference", is however introduced in addition to the response conflict. An indication of the fact that cognitive representations of the verbalization processes are affected is given in an invcstigation of Cohen, Maier, & Schulze (1983) with aphasic patients. For these patients the Stroop phenomcnon failed to appear. They showed no increase in reaction time for incongruent stimuli, which was attributed to the lower interference by verbal information for aphasics. The degree of aphasia correlated - 0 . 4 1 with interference. Since, however, both sensory and motor aphasia were involved, either a disturbance on the sensorial or motorial processing levcl of word information could be the cause. An isolated re-

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

363

sponse conflict should accordingly not be postulated. A conflict in the decoding of word and color information in the interference phenomenon cannot be ruled out in this case. Morton

(1969, 1970) postulated in a functional model that when a

word is availabe a s an answer to a visual or acoustical stimulus, the same cognitive unit, a logogen, is always involved. Every word in the vocabulary of a person is accordingly represented in a logogen system. During the process of inner verbalization the corresponding word is made ready in the response buffer. The word and color information are processed in parallel and coded verbally in the logogen system. Since, however, the motoric program for thc word becomes more quickly available than that for the color, word information reaches the response buffer first. Since only one piece of information can be processed here per unit of time, information concerning the color is blocked until the store is free again. In the cognitive system the semantic description of the material analyzed in the logogen system then follows. Through the feedback from this longterm storage, context information (about semantic like logogens) can conversely be communicated. Thus Klein (1964) was able to demonstrate not only that the color word of thc classical interference stimulus but also other color words and words associated with colors can lead to a slowing down of reaction time, even though to a smaller extent than with the classical Stroop stimulus. In Morton's model, the reading and naming process takes place automatically through the logogen system. The model does not speciry how information about the correct stimulus-reaction arrangement is maintained during the processing of word and picture information and how a stimulus-reaction arrangement in accordance witn instruction is obtained. We consider a model that we have developed on the basis of the work from Mainka (1970) and Seymour (1973) to be more suitable for the explanation of this aspect of stimulus processing for the Stroop phenomenon (Fig.1): The visual receptor analysis of the color and brightness distribution of the stimulus and the first storage of this afferent input is followed by concept formation and second storage of information in the logogen system. The resulting concept (afferent storage 2 ) is influenced by the comparison of the semantic interpretation with the information

of the afferent

storage 1. If the two sets of information are the same, the concept is given to the articulatory programs (efferent storage). Before an arti-

W.Ehlers and D.Munz

3 64

culatory response is given to the effector system, a comparison of the stored response is made with the contents of the afferent storage 2 . If there is no conflict between afference and efference information, the effector system can be started. If the instruction is to read the word, only one kind of information, i.e. the word, has to be analyzed and stored If the result of the comparison of efferent storage and afferent storage 2 is congruent, the verbalization is possible immediately. This is the case in the automatic process of word reading.

"lo

'300

p200

N200

Fig.

Model for processing the two dimension

AFFERENCE

- EFFERENCE

color (C) and word (W) i n the Stroop-Color-

Word-Interference-Test.

If the instruction is to label the color, the logogen concept is formed for both kinds of information ( C and W ) . Thus results a time delay for the process of concept formation. The further comparison and afference storage is a more complex process in view of the two kinds ot information which require a greater cognitive effort. In the following step articulation is delayed because a decision is necessary between the two sets ot information C and W in the efferent storage. This determination requires a comparison of afference and efference storage and the decision which fits the correct response for the two informations in the afferent storage 2 . This is only possible with the help of the semantic interpretation enabling the steering program to decide which of the efferent informations is going to be vocalized. Both of these effects (conflict in the afferent and efferent comparison) are responsible for the time lag in labeling the color.

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

365

How can this hypothesis about the processing of word and color information on presentation of an interference stimulus be tested experimentally? One possibility would be to investigate the different processing speeds of word and color information by tachistoscopic and temporally divided presentation of the word and color information in the time domain of 200 msec which corresponds to the measured time delay between naming and word reading. The experimental evidence by Neumann (1980) and Glaser (1981) indicates that a prerun of the word or color information of around 200 msec leads to a removal of the delay in reaction time in the Stroop phenomenon. However, another possibility would be to test in a psychophysiological experiment whether a difference in the late components of' the evoked potential could result. Evoked potential in this case is measured after the onset

01

the stimulus separately tor the instructions to "read

the word" o r to "name the color" for the same stimulus presentation. Before we present some experimental result on this point, we would like to say a few words about the meaning of components of the evoked potentials in the recognition experiment.

MEANlNG OF THE COMPONENTS OF THE EVOKED POTENTIALS IN THE

RECOGNlTlON EXPERlMENT

P1 (a positive shift of about 50 msec) is thought to originate from different regions of the visual cortex (Fig.2), depending on the portion of the visual field stimulated (Coff et al., 1978). NIOO refers to a sequence with a negative shift peaking between 90

and 150 msec, followed by a positive deflection at about 160-220 msec (Pzo0). NIOO and Pzo0 have been observed to be similarly distributed across the scalp for all modalities, with amplitude maxima near the vertex. It is also called the Vertex Potential. It is assumed that vertex potentials (NlO0

-

Pzo0) in different modalities share a certain functional similarity.

They vary with attention showing larger amplitudes when attention is shifted to the evoking stimulus. Hillyard, Picton, and Regan (1978) concluded that the Vertex Potential might be a correlate of a filter mode of selective attention directed towards attributes of the attended channel. This selection includes stimulus

-

or pattern

-

recognition. Perhaps one

W. Ehlers and D.Mum

366

(msec.)

V i s u a l l y evoked p o t e n t i a l

FUNCTIONAL INTERPRETATION OF EP - COMPONENTS: . STIMULATION OF VISUAL CORTEX Ploo : NIOO

:

Pzo0

:

N200

:

STIMULUS STORAGE STIMULUS - CONCEPT FORMATION COMPARISON WITH STORED PATTERN

P300 : READJUSTMENT OF COGNITIVE STRATEGIES Fig. 2. Averaged v i s u a l evoked p o t e n t i a l and functional interpretation of t h e components.

can relate the NIOO amplitude to stimulus encoding, the Pzo0 to stimulus concept formation in the logogen model (according to the model of Morton (1970) and Seymour (1973)). The NZOOis most reliably observed if a stimulus is omitted from time to time within a series of stimuli (Donchin et al., 1978). Naatanen, Hukkanen, and Jhrviletho (1980) found earlier and larger peak amplitudes of NZOOand PgOuwhen the difference between standard and deviant stimulus was increased. Uonchin et al. (1978) propose that the N200 initiates two simultaneous processes when the eliciting stimuli require discriminative responses. It is precisely this stimulation paradigm that is given in our functional model. The only difference is that in our case there are two stimulus aspects which are. according to the instructions, to be processed in two different ways. The component Pgo0 describes a positive-going deflection with a latency that varies between 250 and 400 msec. I t can reach 600 msec sometimes. Sutton, Tueting, Zubin, and John (1967) consider the P300 to be an index of information delivery and uncertainty reduction. Donchin

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

367

(1979,1980) and Donchin, Ritter, and McCallum (1979) consider the P300 to reflect a readjustment of cognitive strategies in preparation for future responses. The Pso0 is related to processes with which the CNS continuously generates hypotheses about the environment which are then validated against the input information. The latency of the P300 is assumed to be a measure of processing and categorization time which the subject requires to recognize and categorize the stimulus and evaluate i t s relevance (Tueting, 1980; Donchin & Israel, 1980). The P300 seems to be triggered by target identification but occurs prior to response-related processes (Hillyard & Woods, 1979). From the functional model we would expect that there would be a latency difference between the processing of word and color information, if the brain works with different speed of information processing in the cognitive representation of the Stroop conflict. This latency difference must be found in the components P200 or NZOO or P300 of the evoked potential which must be averaged for 7'word reading and "color naming". Otherwise, if there is no influence of time delay between word reading and color naming at this step of information processing in the Stroop conflict, we would expect that there will be only an amplitude difference for word and color processing. In that case one must look for psychological correlates of time delay in the processing of articulatory programs. Proceeding from these interpretations of the Pso0, N 2 0 0 , and P300 of the evoked potential, we are able to distinguish by measurement of evoked potential whether the Stroop phenomenon is a conflict in the afferent and efferent system or whether i t is only a response conflict in the efferent system.

METHOD PROCEDURE A N D MATERIALS

Following a rest phase, the subject was called upon in the first part of the experiment to react as quickly as possible to each of the 96 individual visual stimuli of the various experimental conditions of the Stroop Test. For the condition I'name color" ( C ) colored right angles with the colors red, green, blue, and yellow were to be named. For the condition "read word" ( W ) the achromatic word stimuli of these colors were to be

W. Ehlers and D.Mum

368

read. On presentation of an incongruent color word wether the color was to be named (CWc) or the color name to be read (CWw). The test stimulus was presented for the duration of the reaction time. 100 msec after the measurement of the reaction time the test stimulus was turned off with an acoustic switch and 700 msec later the new test stimulus was turned an. Both the arrangement of the experimental conditions (C, W , CWc, CWw) and the sequence of the test stimuli ( r e d , green, blue, yellow)

were randomized. This section of the experiment should make possible, by analogy to the tabular presentation of the test stimuli (Stroop, 1 9 3 5 ) , a subdivision of the subjects into two groups with high or low interference tendency. On the basis of the distribution of the difference values between the experimental conditions (CWc minus C ) the investigated group was divided at the median into high ( H I ) and low interference (LI) groups. The average value

(CWc)

for the high interference group

(HI)

amounted to

EHI=910 msec. The average value for the low interference group (LI) de-

creased to ZNI=?4O msec. After completion of this part of the experiment, presentation of the 96 incongruent colored-in color words for the measurement of the evoked potentials (Fig.3) followed after a 3 minute rest period.

Five sec. before each test stimulus a small bright light point for fixating the eyes was presented on the screen. Three sec. before each test stimulus an indicating tone (of 500 Hz or 1000 H z at 60 dB) was switched on through headphones. According to the tone frequency the subject had either to read the word (CWw) or to name the color of the test stimulus (CWc). This is a new experimental paradigm for research with the Stroop Test, as, in the course of the experiment, the instructions change. Consequently, effects of habituation are the same for both sets of instructions during the experiment. RECORDING OF EEG A N D S I G N A L A N A L Y S I S EEG was recorded with Ag-AgC1 electrodes (10-20 system, impedance

less than 5kL9 from the electrode positions C z , P z , and O1 (based on linked ear lobes). The EEG signals were amplified, filtered (high pass: d B ) , and stored on tape. The off-line digitalized EEG and vertical EOG (200 sampleslsec) was averaged with the aid

0 . 2 H z ; low pass: 30 Hz;-3

of a PDP l l l t 5 5 laboratory computer after excluding EEG segments with

369

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

4-

I

kiPOINT

, 3sec. I , . . .

TONE 500HZ lOOOHZ

1

I

S C R E E N

2sec.

:'OOP STIMU-

HIGH PASS .2Hz LOW PASS 30Hz

START

STOP

COMPUTER (PDP l l / t 5 5 ) 11 STEERING PROGRAM

FOR S T I M U L I PRESENTATION

2 ) D I G I T I Z I N G AND AVERAGING OF STIMULUS LOCKED EEG

Fig. 3. Block diagram for stimulus presentation (left side) and EEG-recording technique

(right side) and stimulus sequence ( t o p ) .

artifacts caused by eye blinks or eye movements ( 15 V) in the time domain of 200 msec before and 800 msec after onset of the stimuli. The amplitude of the EEG signal after stimulus onset is referred to the average of the 200 msec before stimulation. The EEG segments belonging to the two different stimulus conditions CWw and CWc were averaged separately. The latencies and amplitudes of the components of the averaged evoked

W.Ehlers and D.Mum

3 I0

potentials were identified from the maximum amplitudes in the following time ranges: Plo0: 50-90 msec; NlO0: 70-160 msec; Pzo0: 140-170 msec; NZOO:260-350 msec; P300: 350-450 msec. The statistical analysis was conducted with the aid of SPSS 8 . The significance for reaction times was tested by means of the t-test. The components of evoked potentials were tested by one factorial variance analysis with repeated measurement for the whole experimental group (factor: instruction CWw CWc) and secondly for each instruction (factor: group HI; group L I ) separately.

SUBJECTS

The subjects (Ss) were 24 hospitalized patients (Psychotherapeutic Clinic, Stuttgart) with neurotic depression and 24 healthy S s . All Ss were paid for their participation. Prior to testing, all Ss demonstrated their ability to discriminate the colors used in the experiment. After subdivision of the whole sample of Ss into the two groups with high or low interference tendency (HI, LI) patients and healthy Ss were found to be equally distributed in these two groups. Therefore we excluded this factor from further examination. In the HI-group there were 15 female and 9 male Ss. In the LI-group there were 18 female and 6 male Ss. This proportion of sex-distribution is similar to the clinic population. = 3 0 , 4 ( s = 9 . 0 2 ) and for the The mean age of the HI-group was LI-group Z = 2 9 . 8 ( 6 4 . 1 0 ) . The hypothesis by Klein (1954) that persons with high interference tendency are characterized by orderliness, pedantry, and affect control could not be confirmed. There was no significant difference for five secondary factors (depressive/ hysterical object-relation , depressiveIgenita1 affect-tolerance, control of the sadistic impulses, control of anal impulses, super-ego-impulses) between the high and low interference group. These five secondary factors were extracted from 30 questionnaire scales from the psychoanalytical personality inventories PSACII (Psychoanalytischer Charaktertyp-Fragebogen) , GT (GieRen-Test) and ES (Ego-StrengthScale), as well as from the psychological personality test FPI (Freiburger Personlichkeitsinventar), all of which were given to 233 patients and 59 healthy Ss (Ehlers & Czogalik, 1 9 8 4 ) . The examination of the evoked potentials showed that only 29 out of 48 Ss had enough EEG samples with-

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

37 1

out artifacts (movements or EOG). We accepted this reduced sample because there was no significant difference in reaction- time distribution between these two groups. The distribution of sex, age, and illness was also not significant in relation to the sample we started with.

RESULTS REACTION TIME

A s is to be expected on the basis of previous findings concerning the interference phenomenon, a clear difference of 300 msec is seen

(Fig.4) between the instruction "read word" (CWw) and "name color" (CWc).

The differential effect of interference for subjects with high (HI)

and low ( L I ) interference is only seen in the CWc condition and not in the control conditions CWw, C , and W. In the second part of the experiment the interference stimulus (CW) was presented with random succession of the two instructions I7word reading" (CWw) and 'Icolor naming'? (CW ) . Interesting for our understanding of the functional model is the C linear decrease of reaction time in the condition "word reading" (Fig.5). If we compare this result with the first part of the experiment where we presented the two instructions "word reading" and "color naming" before separated trials of stimulus presentations, we find that in the first part (Fig.4) the stimulus (CWw) could be processed in a shorter time (500 msec). In the course of time we found no decrease like that observed in the second part of the experiment (Fig.5). Therefore we must conclude that the presentation of the instruction before each stimulus is more disturbing for word and color coding in the logogen system in the second part of our experiment than in the first part (parallel to the classical STROOP Test). We think that this result demonstrates the influence of the semantic interpretation on the logogen system. The random succession of the alternating instructions must have caused a disruption in the afferent comparison system. This effect undergoes habituation during the experiment. After 72 stimulus presentations the influence of instruction on information processing is reduced. This process of habituation to the influence of the semantic interpretation can only be proven for the group with higher interference (HI) in the condition %olor naming". We conclude that subjects with high interference are

W. Ehlers and D.Mum

312

z

a

L

3

W

CWW

C

SELECTION OF INTERFERENCE TYPE: HIGH INTERFERENCE CWc LOW

INTERFERENCE CWc

-

C

MEDIAN

C

MEDIAN

Fig. 4. Mean reaction t i m a (ms) for High-Interference (HI) and Low-Interference (LI) group

in the four experimental conditions read neutral word (W), read color word of incongruent stimulus (CW ), name color of colored right angles (C) and name color

of incongruent stimulus (CW ).

more disturbed by the switch of the instruction at the beginning of the experiment, but that they can adapt to this condition. Nevertheless there is a significant difference in effort between high and low interference group in the condition "color naming" (C\Vc) in the first section of the experiment (stimulus numbers 1-24) and not in the condition "word reading" (CWw). We can now analyze the differential effect of interference on evoked potentials in the remaining part of this paper.

COMPONENTS OF THE EVOKED POTENTfALS

W e hypothesized that the components N200 and Pso0 in the evoked potential will show an increase of amplitude (Fig.6) for the interference

Evoked Potentials as UnconsciousIndicators of Cognitive Control STROOP-PRESENTATION Y I T H INTERRUPTION : HIGH INTERFERENCE ( H I 1 LOU INTERFERENCE (LII

R E A C I I O n TIME

REACTION TIME

WORD READING

373

+ 8COLOR NAMING

x

HIGH INTERFERENCE

0 LOU INTERFERENCE X HIGH INTERFERENCE

-

0

800

LOU INTERFERENCE

u

P

Y

v

r

-

- 800

c

I

700

u

d

5 700 600

1

- 24

25

- 48

49

- 72

73

-

96

1-24

STIMULUS NUWER

25-48

49-72

73-96

STIMULUS NUMBER

Fig. 5. Reaction time for incongruent c o l o r word s t i m u l i (CW) a f t e r the i n s t r u c t i o n "read word" (CWw; l e f t ) and "name color" (CW ; r i g h t ) . w+ marks s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f e r e n c e s ( p < . 0 5 ) between two following stimulus blocks

for t h e same experimental group (HI; LI).

condition ( CWc) "name color" in comparison with the control condition (CWw) "read word". This effect could be proven in all three electrode positions for the component P300. An amplitude difference in the same direction is seen in the component N 2 0 0 . It is conceivable that the postulated higher cognitive effort for the information processing in the condition "color naming" could produce this increased positivization of the components P300 and N Z O O . In an earlier component, namely P z o 0 , we observe an increase of the latency time, which is greatest at the occipital electrode position. This component of evoked potential is, as mentioned, related to stimulus concept formation and thus in our model influenced by the instruction. It is important to note that a given instruction already influences a state of stimulus evaluation at an early time. This latency difference could be explained by the hypothesis that the afferent storage for the instruction "read word" needs less time than that for the instruction "name color", as color naming needs storage of two aspects of information, whereas following the instruction "read word" only one aspect had to be coded.

W.Ehlers and D.Munz

314

t 5

L I I E N C V (mrec.)

5 It

g

10

-.

5

-.

0

-.

-5

-.

-10

-

-15

-'

-20

-.

oz

10

5

Pz

--

s o It;

g

--

-5 -10

--

-15

.-

o

90

1

r

n

w

m

m

m

m

~

4

5

0

1

tAirNcY (nsac.)

Fig. 6. Latency and amplitude of the components of averaged evoked potentials for the two instructions "read word" (CW ----I

and "name color" (CW -)

measured at elec-

erode position Cz, Pz, and 0 1' +and t mark significant (pc . 0 5 ) differences in latency ( + ) and amplitude ( * ) .

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

375

The hypothesis about differences in the personality variable "interference tendency" postulated that the components NZOOor PZo0 lead to a greater amplitude for higher interference tendency or even to an enlargement of the latency of these components. This could not be verified (Fig.7).

-

a-

6 .. 4 '. 2 '.

'1

N2

'2

N2

WORD

p3

READING

"

0 .'

- 2- 4-

6..

- a-10-12 .'

..

POSITION: C,

POSITION: Cz

-14 .' -16 ..

-18 .' -20 -

Fig. 7. Latency and amplitude of the components of averaged evoked potentials for the H i g h Interference (HI----) and Low Interference (LI-) "read word" (CW -and

4 mark

-

W'

group in the two conditions

left) and "name color" (CWc; right).

significant (p < . 0 5 ) differences in latency

(%+)

and amplitude (

$).

Only a latency difference between the persons with higher and lower interference tendency for the attentiveness-dependent components at the beginning of the vertex complex, i.e. during stimulus decoding, by 13-17 msec (N1) was seen. The latency difference of the component Pzoo for the condition "color naming" was only significant at the 10%-level, so that there was only a tendency in the postulated direction. We can conclude first. that there is a latency difference between the processing of word and color information

W.Ehlers and D.M u m

316

in the P200 of the evoked potential, a component, which is responsible for the aspect of concept formation in the process of stimulus encoding. There is also a tendency for this component to be relevant to individual differences between high and low interference type of behavior. Second, the amplitude differences between the processing of word and color information for the components N200 and P300 could demonstrate the higher cognitive effort of color naming. I n regard to our model of information processing, there is a brain correlate for the afferent information coding in cognitive control of the interference phenomenon.

DISCUSSION

If the components of the evoked potentials P 2 0 0 ,

N200, and P300 have an indicator function for the cognitive control during the stimulus evaluation, the question may be posed to what extent we are dealing with an unconscious indicator function here. The question contains two aspects:

IS THE INDICA TOR I TSELF UNCONSCIOUS ?

Since the components of the evoked potential (EP) are to be recorded long before the beginning of the reaction, it may be supposed that the observed differences in latency and amplitude are not accessible to introspection. The extent to which the EEG itself or even certain cornponents of the EP are accessible to conscious control is, on the basis of numerous feedback investigations with the EEC, at least questionable. The postulate of unconscious functioning for physiological processes should therefore be accepted. While i t , however, comes as no surprise, the next question is indeed more interesting.

IS THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FUNCTION, FOR WHICH THE EVOKED POTENTIAL

SERVES AS AN INDlCA TOR, UNCONSCIOUS ?

As explained at the beginning, only the response conflict in the in-

terference phenomena is accessible to introspection. The components of the evoked potential provide indicators, though, for the evaluation of the

Evoked Potentials as Unconscious Indicators of Cognitive Control

311

stimuli just before the reaction program is started. This part of stimulus evaluation not accessible to consciousness or introspection is decisive for our answer. Our results show that not only P300 is a relevant indicator for cognitive control, but that P200 and N Z o 0 are too. The psychological function of stimulus encoding and selection of information is not accessible to introspection. Therefore we propose that the process of decoding the word and color information is outside of awareness. Thus w e can conclude that P200,N200, and P300 are unconscious indicators of cognitive control. This answer is in accordance with the conclusions of Shevrin and Dickman (1980) who analyzed different avenues of attentional research. They postulated that: 1. the initial cognitive stage for all stimuli occurs outside of consciousness ; 2. this initial cognitive stage outside of consciousness is psychological in

nature, is active in its effect on consciousness. and can be different from conscious cognition in its principles of operation; 3. consciousness of a stimulus is a later and optional stage in cognition.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this section we shall elaborate on our conviction that measurement of evoked potentials may be a helpful method in subliminal perception research. First, observation of EPs following subliminal perception by Shevrin et el. (1971) demonstrated that ' I . . .evoked potential research on subliminal perception is of special relevance because it showed for the first time that the existence of unconscious cognitive processes need not be based solely on clinical phenomena or presumed on the basis of theoretical necessity, but can be demonstrated objectively."(Shevrin,

1975)

As shown above, EPs are, with regard to investigations of cognitive psy-

chology and electrophysiology (reviewed, for example, by Hillyard and Kutas, 1983) a helpful method to get indicators for the processing of perception and to base conclusions not merely on the verbal andlor behavioral consequences of the subliminal percept. With our investigations, for example, we have been able to demonstrate, not only that the response

is influenced by the Stroop interference 19811, but also that the timing of the process of

competition

(Duncan-Johnson,

W.Ehlers and D.M u m

378

stimulus evaluation (encoding, recognition, and classirication) is different for word reading and color naming in the Stroop Test. In our opinion, measurements of EPs may provide further information about the preconscious process of the stimulus evaluation of subliminal percepts and especially about the early stages of the information processing of subliminal stimuli. For psychological experimentation it is a difficult question whether only verbal andlor behavioral reactions are influenced and changed by subliminal percepts. or if the processing of the percept itself is also changed by the subliminal stimulus. Looking to the model presented above concerning the processing of verbal information, the latencies of the components of the EP are indicators of the timing of the different cognitive processes of perception. and the amplitudes of the EPs may give information about the activation of the different stages of stimulus processing before the output of the cognitive process is given to the effector. Components of the evoked potentials could thus be good indicators for the influence of subliminal stimuli on the percept itself.

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Shevrin, H., Dickman, S. (1980). The Psychological Unconscious. A Necessary Assumption for all Psychological Theory? American Psychologist, 35, 421-434.

Shevrin, H., Smith, W.H.,

Fitzler, D.E.

(1971). Average Evoked Response and

Verbal Correlates of Unconscious Mental Processes. Psychophysiology, 8,2, 149- 162.

Stroop, J.R.

(1935). Studies of interference in serial verbal reactions.

Jour-

nal of Experimental Psychology, 18, 643-662. Sutton, S., Tueting, P., Zubin, J., John, E.R. (1967). Information Delivery and t h e Sensory Evoked Potentials. Science, 155, 1187-1188. Tueting, P. (1978). Event-Related Potentials, Cognitive Events, and Information Processing: A Summary of Issues and Discussion. In D.A.

O t t o (Ed.)

Multidisciplinary Perspectives in Event-Related Brain Potential Research

(pp. 159-169). Washington: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel. G. Smith, J.G. D M ~ U(editors) ~S 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

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ANXIETY AND COVERT CHANGES OF ATTENTION CONTROL Peter G . Glanzmann and Werner D . Frohlich University of Mainz

INTRODUCTION In the past two decades, sophisticated models of subjective anxiety experiences in humans have been developed. While in early experimental work on this topic, anxiety was conceptualized as an unidimensional construct which exerts its influence solely by its energizing properties (Taylor, 1951). the rapid accumulation of relevant data has led research-

ers in the field to the conviction that, in addition to emotional and motivational determinants, attentional factors play a major role in the encounter of anxiety-provoking situations (Frohlich, 1978, 1983; Liebert & Morris, 1967; Sarason, 1972; Wine, 1971). Evidence regarding these attentional processes is necessarily indirect and it is most often based on more or less intuitive inferences drawn from self-report and performance data. Nevertheless, it seems possible to obtain more direct information about the predominantly covert impact of emotional processes on attentional functioning by studying electrophysiological activity of cortical structures that are most probably involved in the regulation of the organismic interactions with the environment. Cortical slow potentials, and specifically the contingent negative variation ( C N V ) , have been shown to reflect subtle changes in nttention control (Tecce, 1972; Tecce (h Cattanach, 1982). In this chapter, a research paradigm will be introduced that allows the study of covert attentional processes in threatening situations and their relationship to the subjective experience of anxiety. It will be shown that these processes mediate changes of attention control beyond awareness by influencing the selective organization of behavior.

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CONTINGENT NEGATIVE VARIATION (CNV) The CNV is a surface-negative slow potential that arises in the interstimulus interval of a forewarned reaction time task, where a warning signal (Sl) precedes an imperative stimulus (521, to which an overt motor response is required. If the interstimulus interval is shorter than approximately 3 seconds, CNV appears as a continuously rising negativity of up to 20 microvolts that reaches its maximum with the presentation of the imperative stimulus. An informative review of investigations utilizing short interstimulus intervals is presented by Tecce (1972). In early reports (Walter, McCallum, Cooper, Aldridge, & Winter, 19641, CNV was interpreted as a cortical sign of sensori-motor association or of cortical "primingtf, preparing or facilitating the execution of the motor response to s2. In subsequent studies, the interstimulus interval between the warning and the imperative stimulus was extended to durations of 3 seconds and more to investigate different stages of covert preparatory processes. In tasks with prolonged interstimulus intervals, C N V is comprised of two separate negative potential shifts (Loveless & Sanford, 1974; Weerts & Lang, 1973). which differ in temporal, topographical, and functional characteristics, as well. Early CNV reaches its peak amplitude within 1500 milliseconds after the warning stimulus. This wave is characterized by a frontal maximum and it is frequently interpreted as the cortical equivalent of the orientation response to S1 (Klorman & Bentsen, 1975; Loveless & Sanford, 1974; Weerts & Lang, 1973). Early negativity quite often returns to baseline in the middle of the interstimulus interval. It is followed by a second, slowly rising negativity which usually reaches its maximum with the presentation of S2. This late CNV component most often displays a central maximum. Therefore, it seems to be functionally related to the preparation of the motor response following 52 (Rohrbaugh, Syndulko, & Lindsley, 1976). Tecce and Cattanach (1982) present an overview of more recent findings on different CNV components. While the two components of the CNV are easily discernible in long interstimulus intervals, a further subdivision of early CNV is achieved by the employment of factor analytical techniques (Rohrbaugh, Syndulko, & Lindsley. 1978, 1979; Simson , Vaughan, & Ritter, 1977). Again, an early negative component can be separated from a later componenet, in both topographical and functional characteristics. In Figure 1, the results of a

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factor analysis of slow potential data from an experiment described by Frohlich and Glanzmann (1982) are depicted. The interstimulus interval was 4 seconds; the raw data matrix refers to 2 0 subjects with 30 trials each. Voltages were measured from frontal (Fz), central ( C z ) , and parietal (Pz) leads (Jasper, 1958) referenced to the left mastoid process. Factor analysis revealed six factors, three of which displayed high loadings in the interstimulus interval. The two separate negative shifts are shown in the bottom trace of Figure 1. Factor analysis furthermore reveals that early negativity is comprised of two different components. The first part of early CNV (factor 5) is characterized by a frontal maximum of negativity with simultaneous parietal positivity, the second part of early CNV shows negative voltages at all three recording sites, also displaying a frontal maximum. Late C N V , on the other hand (factor 1) shows a definite fronto-central maximum of negativity. factor 2

factor 6

S1

I

I

1

2

I 3

I

I

I

s2

5

6 sec

Figure 1. Factor loadings and grand man average of CNV data recorded from Fz, C z , Pz. The data are based on 30 individual records with 15 GO and 15 NOGO t r i a l s each.

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384

Three factors show high loadings in the time interval after S2, where factors 4 and 6 seem to reflect similar responses to the imperative stimulus as factors 3 and 5 reflect responses to the warning stimulus, and factor 2 obviously represents the return of the voltage to prestimulus baseline. Although factor analysis reveals 6 different factors, i t is evident from the factor loadings depicted in Figure 1 that there is a considerable overlap of components. A s to the comparability of CNV components in short and long interstimulus intervals. the central maximum of uniphasic CNV in short interstimulus intervals points towards its resemblance to late CNV found in longer intervals. Nevertheless i t seems quite probable that uniphasic CNV is a hybrid wave comprised of those components that appear in longer interstimulus intervals, since factor analysis of CNV in short intervals reveals different components as well (McCarthy

&

Donchin, 1978).

THE GO-NOGO PARADIGM Slow potentials are occasionally recorded in a differential forewarned reaction time task, where two different warning stimuli precede a single second Stimulus. The most simple kind of this task requires subjects to press a button in response to the second stimulus only i f it is preceded by n high warning tone, e . g . , and not to respond to the second stimulus if it

is preceded by a low tone, e.g. Slow potentials recorded in the interstimulus interval of such tasks differ as a function of the significance of the

warning stimulus. Whenever a response is rcquired after S2, CNV appears as biphasic negativity (see fig. 2 ) : an early wave with a pronounced frontal maximum is followed by a late wave characterized by a fronto-central maximum. Although the topographic distribution of the late wave may differ depending on the specific stimulus modnlity employed (Gaillard, 1976). early and late components remuin clearly distinguishable. When no response is required after S2, only early CNV emerges. and late negativity is most often negligible (see fig. 3 ) . From these GO-NOGO tasks, several parameters of cortical activity

can be computed.

Besides the voltages of slow potentials in GO-

and

a combined index, GO-voltage minus NOGO-trials , respectively, NOGO-voltage, characterizes the amount of GO-NOGO differentiation at a cortical level. This index appears especially useful, since it represents the individual cortical net activity in GO-trials relative to NOGO-trials.

Anxiety and Covert Changes in Attention Control

385

. . . .... ........... ..................

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8

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12

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Figure 2. Voltages at Fz, Cz, and Pz In GO-trials.

Figure 3. Voltages at Fz, Cz, and Pz in NOGO-trials.

Furthermore, it can be compared across laboratories, since unique features of recording equipment, data analyzing techniques, and artifact handling procedures that may lead to the incomparability of absolute voltages, are negligible. Apart from these advantages, GO-PIOGO tasks allow for an evaluation and a direct comparison of activity-related processes

(GO) and those processes that are related to the voluntary suppression, omission, withholding or inhibition of simple motor responses ( N O G O ) . Another feature of slow potential recordings in these tasks refers to the specific location of the leads. Most often, midline derivations are preferred, which typically include leads at Fz, C z , and Pz according to the

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P. Gianzmonn and W.D. Frohlich

international 10-20-system (Jasper, 1958). These leads are usually referenced to linked earlobes or to electrodes at the mastoid process. This specific choice of electrode locations has received comparatively little attention. Nevertheless, a few conclusions can be drawn from clinical evidence (Goldhahn, 19701, as to what extent frontal, central. and parietal midline regions should be expected to differ with regard to their functional properties. Cz is close to the somatotopically structured motor regions of the cortex. Activity recorded from this lead most probably reflects direct receptor-cortex (gyrus postcentralis) or cortex-effector (gyrus praecentralis) interactions, In contrast, frontal and parietal regions are considered to represent non-specific association areas, that are functionally related to the selection and integration, but not to the immediate execution of motor programs. Goldhahn (1970) reviewed case histories of patients with lesions of different cortical lobes. She concluded that patients with frontal lesions show, among a variety of symptoms, a characteristic behavioral disinhibition. Patients with parietal lesions, on the other hand, exhibit apraxia among other symptoms. From these clinical studies, conclusions may be derived with regard to the functional properties of the frontal versus parietal cortex regions: one major function of the frontal cortex seems to be the inhibition of ongoing behavior as a starting point for the initiation of new behavior. This interpretation is consistent with the hypothesis derived from CNV studies, viz., that early CNV with its frontal maximum represents the cortical equivalence of the orienting reaction. The parietal region, on the other hand, obviously seems to be involved in the selection of behavior and its stimulus-dependent meaningful integration into ongoing behavioral sequences. These interpretations can be utilized to develop a model of frontal, central, and parietal activity with regard to the processes involved in a differential reaction time paradigm of the GO-NOGO type. The warning stimulus leads to an interruption of ongoing behavior (early CNV frontal cortex), and the organism selects an adequate motor program (parietal cortex) which is executed by the motor cortex (late CNV; central region) in the case of GO-trials only; in NOGO-trials, on the other hand, there is no need for the selection of a motor program. From these assumptions, it follows that in simple tasks as the forewarned differential reaction time paradigm, the selection of the adequate motor program requires only a decision between responding and non-responding, thus leading to only minimal parietal activity. I t might be further hypothesized that the amount of

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parietal activity should be a direct function of a ) the number of possible programs from which the organism has to make a selection and of b) the complexity of the second stimulus, as far as it is assigned signal value by experimenter's instruction or by the task. This hypothesis can be easily subjected to empirical test. In sum, slow cortical potentials in a GO-NOGO-paradigm enable researchers to evaluate facilitative (GO) cortical processes against their inhibitory intraindividual counterparts (NOGO). The extension of the interstimulus interval of the forewarning period furthermore provides for a means to relate behavior to either stimulus evaluation (early CNV) or response preparation (late CNV) . Depending on the specific locus of cortical activity (Fz, C z , Pz), information can be gathered as to the functional properties of the specific processes under study.

MODELS OF ANXIETY Anxiety has been defined on the grounds of several aspects, the most prominent of which refers to the trait-state distinction (Cattell & Scheier, 1961; Spielberger, 1972). common to current definitions of anxiety is the implicit or explicit assumption that this emotional state can be assessed in terms of i t s experienced feeling component. Accordingly, the vast majority of operationalizations relies on subjective self-reports in the measurement of anxiety (Spielberger, Gorsuch

&

Lushene, 1970). Furthermore, the role

of the specific situation, designed to elicit the situational arousal of anxiety, has received considerable attention (Endler, 1980). The factorial distinction of anxiety as a trait and anxiety as a state on the basis of self-report data goes back to Cattell and Scheier (1961). Utilizing this distinction, Spielberger et al. (1970) developed a carefully constructed inventory, that contains two separate scales for the measurement of state anxiety and trait anxiety. State anxiety is defined as a transitory emotional condition characterized by subjective, consciously perceived feelings of tension and apprehension, and activation of the autonomic nervous system. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, refers to relatively stable individual differences in the disposition to perceive a wide range of stimulus situations as dangerous or threatening, and in the tendency to respond to such threats with state anxiety increases.

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In his Trait-State Anxiety Theory, Spielberger (1972) specifies the relationship of trait anxiety and state anxiety. High trait anxiety should be predictive of higher increases in state anxiety only i f the situation is characterized by threat to self-esteem ; but there should be no relationship of trait anxiety and state anxiety increases if the situation involves physical danger. The results concerning the trait-state relationship (for a summary see Eysenck, 1982) clearly demonstrate that high trait anxious persons are characterized by chronically heightened state anxiety levels. Differences in state anxicty levels between high and low anxious persons are large in the presence of ego threat, less marked in neutral situations and often negligible in the presence of pain threat. Differential increases in state anxiety in response to stress situations are only found in ego-threatening situations. There is usually no difference in response to pain threat, thus providing support for Spielberger's Trait-State Anxiety Theory. The influence of the specific stress situation with regard to the anxiety-performance relationship is similarly important. According to reviews provided by Saltz (19701, and by Spence and Spence (1966). performance decrements of high anxious persons are mainly found in ego-threatening situations, while performance decrements of low anxious persons are mainly found in physical danger situations.

RELATIONSHIP OF ANXIETY A N D CONTINGENT NEGATIVE VARIATION The usual strategy in the investigation of the effects of trait anxiety on the contingent negative variation is to form extreme or median groups of persons differing in self-report trait anxiety and to subject them to various experimental manipulations designed to elicit situational anxiety. Subjects always perform some kind of forewarned reaction time task. The interpretation of results, however, requires the consideration of situational and population-specific ramifications. First, it seems reasonablc to differentiate between results from healthy volunteers and those obtained from psychiatric patients, since it cannot be excluded that these populations not only differ in the intensity of experienced anxiety states, but also with regard to qualitative features of the individual experience of anxiety. Second, it has been shown that the type of situation employed to elicit sit-

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3 89

uational anxiety is of crucial importance for the predictive validity of trait anxiety with regard to state anxiety and learning performance. A s to the specific type of the situation that is employed, it seems useful to distinguish at least between neutral, ego-involving and physical danger situations (Saltz , 1970 ; Spence 8 Spence, 1966 ; Spielberger , 1972). In a series of experiments, Knott and Irwin (1967, 1968, 1973) studied high and low anxious persons in a differential reaction time paradigm of the GO-NOGO type. In one experimental condition ("low stress"), the second stimulus was neutral, in the other condition ("high stress") it was an unpleasant electrical shock. The initial hypothesis of Knott and Irwin was, that CNV should be considered a measure of generalized drive level as specified in Hull's (1943) learning theory. Consequently, C N V should vary with trait anxiety level, stress intensity, and response requirements, since all of these variables should increase drive level. Knott and Irwin (1973) found a three-way interaction between trait anxiety, stress intensi-

t y , and response requirements, where the only difference in C N V magnitude between high and low anxious persons was found in the GO-trials of the high stress condition. Contrary to expectation, high anxious persons displayed lower C N V s than low anxious persons. In an attempt to explain this seemingly paradoxical result, Knott and Irwin (1967, 1968, 1973) argued that high anxious persons establish a somewhat higher baseline of cortical negativity than low anxious persons if the situation is characterized by "high stress". Additional increases of drive level, as required by GO- in contrast to NOGO-trials, thus lead to a paradoxical reduction of CNV magnitude in high anxious persons. This explanation has become known as the ceiling hypothesis of CNV. In two further experiments by Knott and his coworkers (Knott, Van Veen. Miller, Peters, & Cohen, 1973; Van Veen, Peters, Knott, Miller, Q Cohen, 1973), high and low trait anxious persons were subjected to two different stress intensities (slightly supra-threshold electrical shock versus painful electrical shock as the imperative stimulus). Again, high trait anxious persons as opposed to low trait anxious persons did not display any GO-NOGO differentiation when stress intensity was high. But, in addition, low trait anxious persons did not display any GO-NOGO differentiation when stress intensity was just supraliminal. Even when the stressor - a painful electrical tooth stimulation in this case - is applied immediately prior to the warning stimulus, there is a reduced C N V of high anxious as compared to low anxious persons (Rizzo,

390

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Caporali, Pierelli, Spadaro, Zanasi. Morocutti, & Albani, 1984); this is in agreement with the results of Knott and his coworkers. For physical danger stressors of low intensity, on the other hand, Proulx and Picton (1984) found augmented C N V s of high anxious persons as compared to low anxious persons with a 90 dB tone as the imperative stimulus, and Glanzmann and Frohlich (1984) reported reduced GO-NOGO differentiations of low anxious as compared to high anxious persons when unpleasant electrical shocks were announced but not applied. Summarizing the results of the relationship of trait anxiety and CNV in physical danger situations, it seems obvious that therc is a lack of GO-NOGO differentiation of high anxious persons w i t h high stress intensities and a lack of differentiation of low anxious persons with low stress intensities. If situational anxiety is aroused by ego-threatening stressors, there are consistent deficits of high anxious as opposed to low anxious persons, either in terms of a reduced GO-NOGO differentiation (Glanzmann & Friihlich, 1984) or in terms of reduced CNV magnitude with increasing task difficulty (Low & Swift, 1971; McCallum & Papakostopoulos, 1973). Birbaumer and Tunner (19711, who applied systematic desensitization procedures to high test anxious students, found an increase of CNV magnitude following treatment. If the experimental situation is not characterized by explicit stress instructions or manipulations, high anxious persons display a more pronounced GO-NOGO differentiation than low anxious persons (Glanzmann & Frohlich. 1984). But even in a neutral or non-threatening experimental environment, the trait anxiety-CNV relationship proves extremely sensitive to situational variations: if an easy discrimination task is announced to the subjects, high anxious subjects display larger C N V s than low anxious subjects, irrespective of the actual difficulty of the discrimination task; if a difficult discrimination task is announced, C N V s of high anxious persons are drastically reduced to a level much lower than that of low anxious persons (Frohlich & Glanzmann, 1983). To summarize these results, the relationship between trait anxiety and the amount of GO-NOGO differentiation in dependence on the specific experimental situation is depicted in Figure 4. The data for the neutral, ego-threatening, and low pain situation were computed from results described by Glanzmann and Frohlich (1984). The high pain threat data were obtained by Knott et al. (1973). The vertical axis of the Figure gives the difference in voltages of GO- minus NOGO-trials; for the sake of simplic-

391

Anxiety and Covert Changes in Attention Control

ity , negative signs were omitted. High values represent larger negativity in GO- relative to NOGO-trials: small values represent little GO-NOGO differentiation. It should be noted, however, that the consistency of the anxiety-CNV relationship is restricted to the GO-NOGO differentiation. Absolute voltages of the CNV in simple reaction time tasks. however, often appear to be unrelated to anxiety (Low, Coats, Rettig, Syndulko, Parker, Maltzman, & Ziskind, 1976).

&

McSherry, 1971;

\

a

0

d’ I NfUTRAl

EGO

LOWPAIN

HIGH PAIN

SITUATION

Figure 4. Relationship between trait anxiety, situation, and GO-NOGO differentiation in late CNV at Cz. Ihe Figure i s based on data reported by Glanzmann and Frahlich (1984). Data for the high pain situation were reported by Knott and Irwin (1973).

While all of these results refer to the trait anxiety-CNV relationship, few attempts have been made to study the relationship between state anxiety and slow potential changes. Glanzmann and Frohlich (1984) reported that cortical GO-NOGO differentiation decreased with state anxiety only in high trait anxious subjects whereas state anxiety and GO-NOGO differentiation were unrelated in low trait anxious subjects. These findings were replicated in three further unpublished studies in our laboratory.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS The data base concerning the relationship of anxiety and CNV appears relatively consistent, if CNV is conceptualized as the amount of

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P. Glanzmann and W.D. Frohlich

GO-NOGO differentiation : GO-NOGO differentiation of high trait anxious persons is larger than that of low trait anxious persons in non-threatening situations and in situations characterized by mild physical danger; in egothreatening situations and in situations characterized by painful stimulation, however, it is smaller than that of low trait anxious persons. An explanation of these results by the ceiling hypothesis of Knott and Irwin (1976, 1968, 1973) seems feasible for high trait anxious persons only: any increase of situational threat (ego-threat, mild and strong pain-threat) leads to a reduction of GO-NOGO differentiation. Low anxious persons' behavior, on the other hand, is at odds with n ceiling hypothesis explanation, since they do not respond with an increase of GO-NOGO differentiation confronted with strong physical danger, and they even display reduced differentiation when confronted with mild physical danger. If one accepts Knott and Irwin's basic premise, that high trait anxious persons operate from a higher base level of cortical negativity in intense stress situations, then low trait anxious subjects should respond with an increase of CNV magnitude to any source of stress, b u t , in fact, they do so only in ego-threatening situations. A more sophisticated model of the anxiety-CNV relationship is provided by Tecce's distraction-arousal hypothesis (Tecce, 1972 ; Tecce & Cole, 1976). According to this explanation, CNV magnitude depends on two factors: a) CNV magnitude varies a s a positive monotonous function of attention towards the imperative stimulus. b) CNV magnitude varies a s an inverted-U function of situational arousal level. Tecce's model seems superior to the ceiling hypothesis. It can, in addition to the phenomena accounted for by the ceiling hypothesis, explain low anxious persons' reactions to strong pain stimulation. I t fails to account, however, for low trait anxious persons' lack of GO-NOGO differentiation in response to mild physical danger. It should be noted that this specific relationship obviously has been overlooked in the relevant literature. In specifying the effects of anxiety on CNV magnitude, Tecce and Cole (1976) propose that they are primarily mediated by feelings of worry and apprehension. The state anxiety-CNV data of Glanzmann and Frohlich (1984) seem to support this notion. These explanatory accounts seem only adequate with regard to CNVchanges in high trait anxious persons, and not in low trait anxious per-

Anxiety and Covert Changes in Attention Control

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sons. In contrast to the original hypothesis of Knott and Irwin (19671, which posits CNV-increases with increasing situational arousal or anxiety, the data of high anxious persons point toward the importance of distracting attentional processes in high anxiety states. It was shown, that distraction a s reflected in reduced GO-NOGO

differentiation covaries with

feelings of anxiety only in high trait anxious subjects. In low trait anxious subjects, however, no subjective concomitants of reduced GO-NOGO differentiation can be identified. A hint towards the solution of this theoretical dilemma was presented

by Frohlich (1982, 1983). According to this view, the amount of GO-NOGO differentiation may be regarded as an index of task-specific effort expenditure: large differentiations represent a maximum of effort and vice versa. While effort expenditure of high trait anxious persons is reduced with increases of subjectively perceived fcelings of anxiety, low trait anxious persons seem to respond immediately to the situational demand characteristics. If a situation is not very demanding (as in neutral situations or in situations with slightly subliminal electrical shocks), effort expenditure and therefore GO-NOGO differentiation is small. If the situation is, on the other hand, defined by the importance of one's intellectual capacity (egothreat, announcement of a difficult task) or by painful electrical shocks, effort expenditure and therefore GO-NOGO differentiation becomes larger. This explanation rests on the implicit assumption, that high trait anxious persons are generally more disrupted by their internal feeling states than low trait anxious persons (Sarason, 1975; Spence berger, 1972; Tecce

&

&

Spence, 1966; Spiel-

Cole, 1976; Wine,1971). But a s the data from Figure

4 show, this disruption seems to manifest itself only when deviations from

the "normal" anxiety levels (as in neutral experimental situations) are registered. The data depicted in Figure 4 furthermore reveal almost identical patterns of the interaction between trait anxiety and the situation, i f the two situations not involving physical danger (neutral, ego) are considered separately from those involving physical danger (low pain, high pain). The only difference between those patterns is in the overall level of GO-NOGO differentiation: the introduction of elements posing physical danger seems to lower the amount of GO-NOGO differentiation. If physical danger is regarded a s a distractor from the experimental task (differential reaction time task), then the reduction in level may be interpreted in terms of the distraction hypothesis (Tecce, 19721, such that high and low trait anxious

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P. Glanzmann and W.D. Frohlich

persons in the specific situation are equally affected by distraction. Apart from the difference in absolute level, the interactional patterns in both types of situations reveal that high trait anxious subjects display a reduction of GO-NOGO diffcrentiation to any increase of stress intensity (ego, high pain), while low trait anxious persons display an augmentation of GO-NOGO differentiation to any increase of stress intensity. This seems to be true irrespective of the speciflc source of stress employed to elicit situational anxiety. But one has to keep in mind, that this generalization does not account for trait anxiety-related state anxiety or performance patterns typically obtained in the respective situations (cf. Saltz, 1970; Spielberger , 10'72). In conclusion, CNV does not seem to be an indicator of drive level as specifled in Hullian learning theory. It also does not seem to be a ffpure" indicator of attention towards the imperative stimulus. A preliminary plausible and feasible hypothesis conceives of GO-NOGO differentiation as an indicator of task-specific effort expenditure, which covaries with state anxiety levels in high trait anxious persons and which covaries with immediate situational demands in low trait anxious persons. It seems rather tempting to discuss these data in terms of the conscious representation of information (Dixon, 1981). First of all, the representation of dangerous or threatening situations gives rise to state anxiety reactions. If, these reactions are asscssed by self-report scales, subjective feelings of anxiety require consciousness by definition. Only those anxiety states may become disturbing that have received conscious representation. It is the conscious experience of anxiety in particular that gives rise to the possibility of interference. A s a matter of fact, the conscious representation of anxiety states is regarded as the main cause of interference with performance in test anxiety theory (Sarason, 1975 ; Wine. 1971). In these theories, i t is proposed that feelings, especially of the worry-type of anxiety, are detrimental to cognitive functioning in high trait anxious persons, a notion that has received wide empirical support. But there are more subtle changes in anxiety-provoking situations that remain inaccessible for conscious representation, A s the CNV data show, there is an obvious correspondence of subjectively perceived anxiety level and corresponding GO-NOGO differentiation only in high trait anxious subjects, i.e., both, the overt experience of anxiety and the covert cortical changes show a considerable degree of covariation. Quite a different pattern of results emerges in low trait anxious subjects: subjective feelings of

Anxiety and Covert Changes in Attention Control

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anxiety are well aroused by situational stress manipulations, but cortical indicants of attentional control do not correspond to consciously perceived changes in state anxiety levels, i.e., low trait anxious persons' conscious representation of their respective feeling states is dissociated from simultaneous covert attentional regulation. There are several possible conclusions to be drawn from this specific constellation of results. First of all, in high trait anxious subjects, consciously perceived threat or danger seems to be an important correlate of covert attentional functioning, whereas in low trait anxious subjects, it appears irrelevant for the regulation of attention. A possible explanation for this discrepancy may be found in a correlate of trait anxiety, which refers to the cognitive styles of repression and sensitization. In this theoretical framework, it is hypothesized that high trait anxious persons are characterized by a tendency to direct their attention to anxiety-provoking aspects of the situation (sensitization), while low trait anxious persons direct their attention away from threatening aspects of the situation (repression), so that high trait anxious persons should be more ready to experience anxiety in threatening situations than low trait anxious subjects. A look at the relevant experimental literature disposes of this view as not fcasible : at least in situations characterized by physical danger, state anxiety increases of high and low trait anxious persons are at a comparable level. Thus, situational anxiety is elicited in both, high and low trait anxious subjects. But whereas state anxiety increases in high trait anxious subjects lead to consequences in the control of attention, they do not in low anxious persons. Thus, the repression-sensitization dimension may be reinterpreted in terms of the behavioral relevancc of situational changes in anxiety level: sensitization obviously implies high relevance, repression, on the other hand, implies no relevance. While this view is highly speculative, it nevertheless accounts for the anxiety-CNV relationship. Obviously, individual differences in trait anxiety seem to determine state anxiety rcactions, at least in ego-involving situations (Spielberger , 1972). But the process that leads to the elicitation of situational anxiety is basically unknown. Nevertheless, at some point in time, feelings of anxiety become part of the conscious representation, i , e. , they are stated, whenever subjects are asked respective questions by means of standardized self-report questionnaires. It is rather tempting to assume that high anxious persons are quite willing to report their feelings of anxiety honestly, which would explain the covariation with attentional functioning again. Low

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trait anxious persons, however, deny, are reluctant to describe, suppress, or are unaware of their respective feeling states, which would result in a dissociation of subjectively reported anxiety and covert attentional functioning. These two interpretations of the anxiety-CNV relationship appear quite similar at first sight. But there is an essential difference. While the first explanation implies that low trait anxious subjects honestly state their feelings of anxiety and that their behavior is not affected b y these feelings, the second hypothesis implies that low trait anxious subjects actively manipulate oral or written reports of their respective feeling states, thus obscuring the relationship between anxiety level and control of attention. The latter view rests on the assumption that attentional functioning is generally affected by the feeling state of the organism. But irrespective of what specific explanatory account is accepted, it seems obvious that in high trait anxious persons subjective feelings of anxiety parallel attentional malfunctioning as represented by covert changes in GO-NOGO differentiation while in low trait anxious persons the subjective representation of anxiety does not correspond with changes in attention control. These relationships are found irrespective of the specific situation that is employed to elicit situational anxiety. In very general terms, data on the anxiety-CNV relationship demonstrate that the intensity of a feeling state in situations requiring emotional appraisal modulates attention control in a covert way. The effects of these modulations are read into that system of attention control that responds, again beyond awareness, with changes in the allocation of mobilized effort, which is proportional to the intensity of feeling. The missing link between what happens at the cognitive level and at the level of GO-NOGO differentiation seems to be an interaction of intensity changes and their interpretation by various still unknown mechanisms of the central nervous system.

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Anxiety and Covert Changes in Attention Control REFERENCES

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(1978). Stress, anxiety, and t h e control of attention. In C.D.

Spielberger & I.G. Sarason (Eds.), Stress and Anxiety (Vol. 5, pp.99-130). Washington, DC: Hemisphere. Frohlich, W.D.

(1982). Angst: Gefahrensignale und ihre psychologische Bedeu-

tung. Munchen: dtv.

(1983). Perspektiven der Angstforschung. In H. Thomae (Ed.), Enzyklopiidie der Psychologie: Serie: Motivation und Emotion: Rd. 2: Psychologie der Motive (pp. 110-320). Gottingen: Hogrefe. Frohlich, W.D., & Glanzmann, P. (1982). Aufmerksamkeitsregulation und Angst. Frohlich, W.D.

DFG-Bericht. Frohlich, W.D.,

& Glanzmann, P. (1983). Kortikale Aufmerksamkeitsregulation,

Angstneigung und subjektive Erwartung. In G. Luer (Ed.), Bericht iiber 33. KongreS d e r Deutschen Gesellschaft fiir Psychologie in Maim 1982 (Vol. 1, pp. 232-236). Gottingen: Hogrefe. Gaillard, A.W.K.

(1976). Effects of warning-signal modality on the contingent negative variation (CNV). Biological Psychology, 4, 139-154. Glanzmann, P., & Frohlich, W.D. (1984). Anxiety, stress, and contingent negative variation reconsidered. In R. Karrer, J. Cohen, & P. Tueting (Eds.), Brain and Information:

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Knott, J.R., & Irwin, D.A. (1973). Anxiety, stress, and t h e contingent negative variation. Archives of General Psychiatry, 29, 538-541. Knott, J.R.,

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Spence, J.T., & Spence, K.W. (1966). The motivational components of manifest anxiety: Drive and drive stimuli. In C.D. Spielberger (Ed.), Anxiety and behavior (pp. 291-326). New York: Academic Press. Spielberger, C.D. (1972). Anxiety as an emotional state. In C.C.

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dermeyer & F. Lopes d a Silva (Eds.), Electroencephalography: Basic Principles, Clinical Applications, and Related Fields (pp. 543-562). Baltimore: Urban & Schwarzenberg. Tecce, J.J., & Cole, J.O. (1976). The distraction-arousal hypothesis, CNV, and schizophrenia. In D.I.

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of Physiological Activity (pp. 162-219). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Van Veen, W.J., Peters, J.F., Knott, J.R., M i l l e r , L.H., & Cohen, S.I. (1973). Temporal characteristics of the contingent negative variation: Relationships with anxiety, perceptual mode, sex, and stress. Biological Psychiatry, 7, 101-111. Walter, W.G., Cooper, R., Aldridge, V.J., McCallum, W.C., 81 Winter, A.L. (1964). Contingent negative variation: An electric sign of sensori-motor association and expextancy in the human brain. Nature, 203, 380-384. Weerts, T.C., & Lang, P.J. (1973). The effects of eye fixation and stimulus and response location on the contingent negative variation (CNV). Biological Psychology, 1, 1- 19. Wine, J. (1971). Test anxiety and direction of attention. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 92-104.

PART VI A CRITICAL LOOK A T SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION AND MICROGENESIS: COMMENTS AND REVIEWS FROM DIFFERENT STANDPOINTS

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PERCEPT-GENESIS AND THE 'SCIENTIFIC METHOD' Martin Johnson University of Utrecht

MY PERSONAL BIAS

All of us have personal biases. Such biases may be especially relevant to consider when working in the social sciences. Complete flobjectivitylt of a scientist, and especially of a social scientist, is a myth, as has been made clear, among others, by Gunnar Myrdal (1944). I make this point because I have both the advantage and in a way the disadvantage of having been trained in the percept-genetic school founded by Kragh and Smith at the University of Lund. However. for quite some time now, 1 have been engaged in research activities in the human factor area and still more in the

challenging

but

in

many

ways

exceedingly

difficult

area

of

parapsychology. My main interests and activities attempting to t r y to create at lest a proto-science within the field, have been in the areas of the philosophy of science and methodology. However, in my experimental work within pnrapsychology, I have made extensive use of the Defense Mechanism Test (DMT) while attempting to predict "above chance" scores and "below chance" scores respectively, in so-called ESP experiments when the task has been to guess or predict sequences of "targets" which have been randomly generated. My frequent exchanges with percept-genetic research in Lund mean that I have had the privilege of following its development and also the criticism which has been levelled at its proponents' their way of doing research and interpreting results. Much of my criticism will be of a rather general nature and could be directed towards almost any area or any "school" within the behavioral sciences. To start with personal information, my background was in the natural science, specifically in astronomy, before I turned to psychology. At a rather early stage, I was introduced to the percept-genetic model of perception while the DMT was bcing developed by Kragh as an instrument for the selection of military personnel, especially those who were to be exposed to emotional stress. It goes

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without saying that I soon became aware of the many difficulties associated with projective techniques such as the Rorschach, TAT etc. A s time went by I became rather thrilled about the rationale behind the serial presentation and analysis; the way Kragh and Smith considered perception as a process in time, and the startling and somewhat poetic view that a parallel may exist between a person's life history and hislher perceptual development - the concept of a micro-macro correspondence. A s can be concluded from many case studies he has done, Kragh has been more keen on stressing that part of the percept-genetic paradigm than Smith. Be that as i t may, as I understand i t , the notion of a micro-macro correspondence is by no means a sine qua non for the percept-genetic model and for understanding the success which its authors have had with the DMT and with related measures, such as the Meta-Contrast Technique, (MCT)

.

Before I embark upon a critical discussion, I would like to dwell on some of the concepts of science and pseudo-science respectively, and on being lTscientificl' versus !'pseudo-scientific''!

WHAT IS THAT THING SCIENCE? Volumes of books and papers have been devoted to addressing this question. Even in Omar Khayyam's famous Rubayat this question is touched upon. One of the important issues within the philosophy of science during this century has been the attempt to draw a demarcation line between science and pseudo-science (or metaphysics). Important attempts to find and specify limits of rationality were also made by a number of influential philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Carnap. A s you all know, there has been much discussion and even quarrelling about whether science can be distinguished from other human activities or not. On the one hand, Karl Popper takes a strongly normative view of science; on the other hand, we have representatives of the more sociological approach like Thomas Kuhn. Taking an extremely relativistic view of science, we have Paul Feyerabend (1970) who, simply stated, is of the opinion that "anything goes!'. Kuhn as well as Feyerabend by and large describe what scientists are doing; not what they should do. They dismiss decisively the view that a certain experiment is crucial in strict sense. They are very sceptical, to say the least, of the view that rationality is the decisive factor in the choice between an old and a new theory,

or between

simultaneously

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competing paradigms. Only in retrospect will historians of science be able to state what may seem to be a crucial experiment. Somewhere between the Popperian and the Kuhnian views one can find the opinions expressed by Imre Lakatos. I think there is much supporting evidence for his ideas on how "research programs" are established and how they work. However, he gives more attention to the role of rationality in science than (at least) Feyerabend does. A s a general introduction as regards these different views within the philosophy of science see Lakatos and Musgrave (1970). Because I am rather strongly influenced by Karl Popper's view of what science should b e , I shall shortly discuss some of his views. Howeve r , at the very beginning and before the somewhat more detailed discussion on falsificationism, I would like to recall the traditional distinction which is fundamental in some philosophers' and historians' view: that between methodology in the natural sciences and in the humanities. I am of course thinking of the distinction between nomothetic and ideographic science. Dilthey and Collingwood thought that the cardinal approach to the investigation of human activities should aim at understanding whereas in the natural sciences the finding of explanations should be the principal approach. The distinction between these two approaches may be relevant to the question about the use and soundness of so-called case studies. Karl Popper, however, has questioned the soundness of making a distinction between "understanding" and

which Dilthey , Colling-

wood and others have emphasized. He believes that the goal of all explanations is really to understand a problem or a problem situation. In Popper's (1974, p.185) words, "Thus I oppose the attempt to proclaim the method of' understanding as the characteristics of humanities, the mark by which we can distinguish them from the natural sciences". Although all philosophies have their limitations, I have to confess that one part of my personal bias as a scientist is my admiration for the clarity of Popper's philosophy of science. I am also strongly influenced by the ethical imperative he has proclaimed for doing research.

SHOULD WE WORK AS VERIFICATIONISTS OR FALSIFICATIONISTS? It may be relevant to remind the reader that Godel has shown that within some consistent systems of logic, there are propositions which can be seen to be t r u e , but which are not provable in the system.

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The question whether we should work as verificationists or falsificationists is central to Karl Popper and his philosophy of science. One cornerstone in his thinking is the asymmetry between falsification and verification. According to Popper a full verification of a hypothesis is not possible in principle. He is here, among other things, referring to Godel's theorem. One of Popper's basic ideas is that by just one single attempt to falsify a theory (he speaks rather of a hypothesis or even conjecture) one can refute it. The philosophers of science have quarreled and argued much about this issue (see Ayer, 1946). Another cornerstone in Popper's philosophy of science is a moral one. Honesty demands that we should specify the kind of observations that would be inconsistent with our conjectures. If we cannot specify any observations that would indicate that our conjectures are wrong, the theory or model we are trying to test is empirically vacuous. It has been stressed, and rightly so, that the criterion of refutation is much easier to apply in formal logic than in science in general, and still less so in the behavioral sciences where the use of this criterion has to be based on statistical considerations, perhaps to the extent that single experiments only just qualify as units to be considered for a signtest. To the best of my knowledge, Popper himself has never quite made clear how he views the use of his criterion in sciences where a statistical approach is used. It should be mentioned that Popper's view may have changed over the years of criticism, which would be in accordance with his view of progressing through criticism and trial and error. Popper as the naive falsificationist may never have existed. He certainly deserves to be looked upon as the sophisticated falsificationist, although that very descriptive term is more a statement of values or taste rather than the conveyor of relevant information.

HOW VALUABLE ARE CASE STUDIES FOR SUPPORTING THE PERCEPT-GENETIC THEORY ? At the core of Popper's criticism as regards the verification of one's ideas, are some experiences from his youth in Vienna, related to the way in which Freud and Adler would argue: "The Freudian analysts emphasized that their theories were constantly verified by their "clinical" observations. A s for Adler, I was much impressed by a personal experience. Once in 1919, I reported to him

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a case which to me did not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so sure. "Because of my thousandfold

experience" he replied; whereupon I could not help saying: I'and with this new case, I suppose; your experience has become thousand-andone-fold." (Popper, 1969, p.35) Popper's comment on "thousand-and-one-fold"

becomes especially amu-

sing, if translated into Swedish, in which case "one-fold" would have the connotation of being stupidly uncritical! However sophisticated a case study may be - and Kragh's designs have often reached a quite respectable level - nevertheless one should always remain aware of Adler's mistake - the risk of validating onel8 expectations. What I want to stress is the importance of: a) taking measures to avoid selective reporting, that is, only reporting cases where the observations seem to fit one's expectations ; b) stating expectations beforehand, and c) carrying out the process of ffvalidation7T blindly and following a methodology that allows for the measurement of interrater reliability. I think these requirements also apply to studies with percept-genetic techniques. However, I am not so rigid a s to claim that studies of indivi-

dual cases may have heuristic value, but I am clearly against letting it count as a valid verification for a general theory. I do not know to what extent readers may see the case study presented in this volume by U . Kragh (chapter 7) as an instance of verification or at least corroboration of the micro-macro correspondence, based on extensive empirical testing of that concept. O r will it be taken as an example of how the microgenetic concept can be of use to the clinical psychologist in his work? My suggestion is to consider the three aspects already mentioned (see points a , b , c ) and more often to put one's ideas to risky tests of falsification, in the true spirit of Karl Popper. I believe that it would be a much more powerful and convincing test of the micro-macro correspondence concept i f , based on the information that one may obtain from available biographical data (including a clinical interview), one could predict in a rather precise way what and where in the percept-genesis certain "signs" would appear for the individual subjects. At any rate I think that it may be a rather risky enterprise to allow the same person first to carry out the percept-genetic test, and then more or less in the light of his/her

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expectations t o %ilidate" these expectations by findings from an interview, carried out by the same person. A somewhat more elaborate procedure would be to use a jury of persons, all having a rather extensive background in the percept-genetic field as well a s in clinical psychology. These persons would then have to carry out a blind-matching of perceptgenetic data against interview data - data which should have been obtained by independent experimenters. This methodology would relieve the author of the case study of the very difficult task of checking one's own bias when looking for confirming evidence while neglecting the non-confirming information. To mc at least, it is very difficult to judge how meaningful o r '%eridical" it may be that a subject reports that h e has seen ''a man with a white shirt" on the DMT picture(cf. Kragh's case study, chapter 7 ) . I have doubts in my mind about how unique such a piece of information may be. There are some other difficulties involved, difficulties which I tend to see rather as challenges than as unwelcome problems. How can we distinguish between ontogenetic manifestations in a protocol and activation of defense mechanisms? Could the "seeing of a man in a white shirt" be attributed to the mechanism of isolation (cf. the DMT scoring categories presented in the contributions of Andersson b Bengtsson, chapter 9 , and Westerlundh b Sjbback, chapter ,a). Many such very ambiguous reports can occur and in such a way one would have rather scanty criteria for producing a trustworthy interpretation. Sometimes the projection of ontogenetic information may become mixed up with the activation of "defense mechanisms", and in other cases i t will be free of these. Another issue worthy of consideration may be the following: How can we refer in a reliable way an event in a person's life to a certain level in the percept-genesis? It may be tempting and even probable, that an important event in a lifehistory taking place before the age of 10 will be reflected at "early phase level1'. But what happens if very strong isolation is maintained over the phases which are referred to that exposure-level? In that case one may have no information at all, except for the belief that the events encountered resulted in the establishment of a rigid system of defense. Yet another question to ponder upon and t r y to study is as follows: If important events from a subject's lire-history are reflected in the percept-genesis how can we know that the events are reflected in a reasonably equidistant form over time? Here I could think of a number of artifacts based on factors unrelated to issues considered in the

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percept-genetic model. If one believes at all in the concept of micro-macro correspondence, one could also think that experiences and emotions of different emotional intensity will need a very different number of phases in order to be expressed. Perhaps a highly traumatic experience needs a greater "phase breath" for being reflected; than a less traumatic one.

THE STATEGY OF CONCEPT VALIDATION I suggest that more extensive work be directed towards testing some of the corner-stones of the percept-genetic model. You may consider such

studies as an attempt to carry out concept validations. I would rather describe such work a s attempts to put onel8 assumptions to risky tests of refutation. One crucial concept here is the idea that an identification takes place with the central person in the test picture. Admittedly, the Lund School of percept-genesis has carried out several studies in order to shed some light on that central issue - and with quitc interesting results. However, more studies attempting to refute the different conjectures should be carried out, studies which would probably impress the critics somewhat independently of their outcome. Our imagination is the only limit for all the possible and in this context relevant criterion-groups one can consider to study. How will very specific and emotionally important events in the family affect the perception of the central hero figure or the threatening, marginal figure in a typical DMT stimulus picture? To what extent do we really project our experiences, needs etc., upon the hero-figure? Will the loss of sight on one eye influence our perception of the corresponding eye of the hero? If so, under what conditions will such correspondence take place and will there be any correspondence as regards the perceptual level? How might a subject's perception of the hero be influenced by the subject's loss of an arm o r a leg or by other damages occurring to his body? Do characteristic and changes take place at the "appropriate" phaselevels? Admittedly, quite a number of studies paying attention to more or less similar matters have indeed been carried out by Kragh and others. (See Kragh, 1955, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c, 1970d; see also Kragh and Kroon, 1970) Some recent studies designed to focus on the process of identification incorporating the meta contrast technique (the "masking technique") have also been carried out by Smith, Carlsson and Danielsson (cf. chapter 11).

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They have used what they describe as the Identification-Test ( I T ) where the subject's ability to identify with the aggressor has been studied. All the studies mentioned have shown more o r less interesting results. To my taste these results would have been still more interesting i f more risky predictions had been made, e . g . if they had tried to falsify themselves! Here I would like to remind you of the amusing story of one of the few scientists who so far has adhered in practice to the Popperian rule, of carrying out research: Sir John Eccles, the noted neurophysiologist. During his time at Oxford, his fellow scientists looked upon him with a mixture of admiration and astonishment, One scientist reportedly expressed his views about Eccles in approximately the following way: Eccles, quite a man, but he must be somewhat mad since he tries to show that he is wrong! This anecdote highlights the fact that very few scientists do work according to Popperian ideology , but usually instead as verificationists according to the deductive ideology. That shows that percept-genetic research so far seem8 to be in good company. It is also self-evident, that the great majority of break throughs in science have taken place along the lines which Popper criticizes, but these facts do not necessarily tell us that there is something wrong with Popper's approach!

PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE TECHNIQUE OF AN INVERTED PERCEPT-GENESIS I would now like to make some comments on studies using an inverted percept-genetic

analysis, for example for the study of creativity

(cf.

Smith, Carlsson L Danielsson, chapter 11, and Hentschel L Schneider, chapter 1 0 ) .

The cardinal problem here may be related to establishing

sound and relevant criteria for creativity. Under certain conditions I could imagine that a contamination could occur between the criteria, especially if only one rater is used with whom the experimenter is in close contact even if, in these cases, the authors have tried to avoid such pitfalls.

I think that there may be a lot of difficulties with the establishment of "valid" and non-trivial criteria. Again, I would like to recommend that measures of interrater reliability always be obtained. Perhaps persons being absolutely ignorant of the system of values and interpretations that is used in the evaluation of a percept-genesis could be of help. It would be

Percept-Genesis and the 'Scientific Method'

41 1

in itself interesting to see: a) if there was a sufficient degree of "do you see what I see" in the classifications done by the two raters and b ) whether the second rater when trying to apply the criteria as described by the first attains the same degree of correlation with the way the experimenter is evaluating information.

I wonder which aspects of the creative process are really grasped by the inverted P G . Some emphasis evidently is put on flexibility regarding interpretations of meaning, the "Janus-syndrome"

, among other things im-

plying that one's thoughts or interpretations contain not only dual but antithetical possibilities. Concerning what is measured in the reversed PG , to what extent can this be distinguished from what I would call confabulatory ability? Other techniques should be tested in order to see if they give similar results. One could use also the amauroscopic technique proposed by Westerlundh and Sjoback (see chapter 8) in a reversed manner i.e. to make a picture in a controllable fashion step by step increasingly dim. The aims of such studies should be clearly stated e.g. whether preconscious processing of creative painters is the main topic or a new theory of a r t is aimed at. I think the method of the invcrted PG may nevertheless have certain

advantages which other psychological techniques do not have. The stimulus

is fractioned and as I can understand, you can study in more detail the process of reconstruction than is possible with the use of other psychological techniques

-

projective techniques included.

PERCEPT-GENESIS - A PROMISING THEORY? Lauridsen and Madsen (1982) have given, from their metatheoretical point of view, a generally favorable review of the studies and the concepts of the Lund School of percept-genesis. Within this program, Kragh's DMT

is the most extensively researched instrument in the area of suboptimal perception. It has been very successful in its application for selection of pilots for the Royal Swedish A i r Force (Kragh, 1970d, Neumann, 1978) and elsewhere. However, it may not be fully as good for this purpose as it looks, as a certain portion of the very much improved passlfail ratio may be attributed to changes in the procedures for training pilots and to the introduction of new aircraft (sce Sjoberg, 1981).

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It is very encouraging to see accurate predictions based on the DMT being made and a rather high degree of interrater reliabilities being obtained. At the same time I think we should remember that experimental success is not a sufficient condition for demonstrating the correctness of the theory underlying the test. It is not my intention to dwell here on the epistemological difficulties connected with proving or verifying a theory.

As I proposed at the beginning of this chapter, one may never in principle be able to verify a theory. Examples from the history of science may illustrate this point. Think of the phlogiston-theory from which excellent predictions could be made. Moreover, results received not only intralaboratory but also interlaboratory replication. Nevertheless, we now know, with certainty that the thcory was false! The percept-genetic model however, is in principle at least in one sense a "good model" and this point deserves to be emphasized. I t stipulates quite a number of falsitiable consequences. This can and should be put to a number of risky tests. Again, the problem of what constitutes a validation of a theory and to what extent the percept-genetic model can be considered to be a well validated one, remains a matter of opinions. In this context, some enlightenment as well as comfort may be obtained from what Abraham Kaplan says about validation of theories : "At any given moment a particular theory will be accepted by some scientists, for some of their purposes, and not by other scientists, or not for other contexts of possible application. Even men of sound scientific judgment, as evinced by their own distinguished achievements, have often rejected theories, or expressed dissatisfaction with them

....

long after the views in question had won widespread acceptance In behavioral science, this state of affair is the rule rather than the exception, very few theories are generally accepted" (Kaplan, 1964).

WHAT ARE THE MAIN MERITS OF THE PERCEPT-GENETIC MODEL? What I consider rather remarkable is that here, for the first time we have a method which can be used for critical testing of many aspects of the psychoanalytic theory which have hitherto been passed only on "clinical observations". I believe that this development may help establish an experimental clinical psychology, something that may sound like a misno-

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mer, a contradiction or even impossibility according to traditional ways of viewing psychological disciplines. This is not to say that attempts at constructing experimental bases for clinical psychology have not been made before. Even i f I have indicated a few misgivings concerning the methodology and the conclusions drawn about what the findings mean, I am impressed by the diversity of the evidence or corroboration that has becn presented. The strength of the work that has been carried out at Lund, by Kragh, Smith, Sjoback, Westerlundh and others, is the variety of application3 of the percept-genetic approach. In addition to the somewhat different basic approaches which have been used, there is a patterning of results leading in a certain direction. I am thinking on the use of the DMT and the MCT on the one hand and the interesting results which have been obtained by the after-image studies. Here I would like to add that from the point of view of the philosophy of science the increase of corroboration of an effect is not proportional to the number of the established, favorable outcomes. The quality, variety and precision of supporting evidence are factors of greater importance than the mere number of "confirmations". Hempel's (1966, p. 3 4 ) statement is relevant in this connection: "If the earlier cases have all becn obtained by tests of the same kind, but the new findings is the results of a different kind of test, the confirmation of the hypothesis may be significantly enhanced. For the confirmation of a hypothesis depends not only on the quantity of the favorable evidence available, but also on the variety: the greater the variety, the stronger the resulting support . I '

WHY IS PERCEPT-GENESIS STILL SOMEWHAT OF A N OUTSIDER WITHIN ACADEMIC PSYCHOLOGY? What is the reason why the percept-genetic method and studies in subliminal perception are still rejected by many psychologists as well as by mainstream editors of psychological journals? I believe that Dixon has pointed to one important reason when he stresses that the concept of subliminal perception is rather disturbing, since w e are afraid that we could be exposed to manipulation without being aware of it. (Dixon, 1981, p.182).

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It is disturbing but at the same time rather funny that the stated reason for rejecting papers based on the percept-genetic method not infrequently is that "unwarranted assumptions are made" o r that the "standard method" for studies in psychology has not been followed! Even i f conservatism is one of the legitimate means of keeping science "unpolluted" by pseudo-scientific or proto-scientific ideas and practices, one may wonder whether any growth of scientific knowledge could have taken place without a continuous change and adaption of what at a certain time may have been considered as the "standard method". However, I insist again that there is need for greater openness to the idea of trying to refute some of the tenets of percept-genesis

than to

"prove" them. I do believe that a tendency may exist - to say the least, to practice selective reporting, a misconduct ~ a t h e rcommon within behavioral science. I would like to suggest that editors in the percept-genetic tield should follow the same publication policy that we have tried to follow at the Parapsychology Laboratory at the State University of Utrecht. A hallmark for our journal, the European Journal of Parapsychology, is to t r y to avoid selective reporting, that is the tendency to bury "negative" results and only to publish the studies that "turned out". The acceptance or rejection of a manuscript should take place prior to the collection of experimental data. The quality of the design and methodology and the rationale of the study should be the criterion for acceptance or rejection, not the level of significance of the outcome of the study.

WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE PERCEPT-GENETIC APPROACH? What is the future of the percept-genetic research program? We cannot know for sure. Most theories turn out to be rather ephemeral. An exception, but one from the natural sciences, is, of course, Newton's theory of gravitation. In spite of the appearance of anomalies, which the Newtonian theory could not come to terms with, it remains perhaps the most important of the cornerstones in physics, in spite of the advent of Einstein's theories and of the development of quantum mechanics. But how long a theory may last is not only a question of the logic of the theory. A s you may recall, Max Planck was once asked how long he thought a theory could survive. H i s answer still applies: until the detenders of the theory have died out! I have a distinct feeling that it will take quite some

Percept-Genesis and the 'ScientificMethod'

415

time before the defenders of the PG paradigm will die out. How long it will take will depend on both the log~cof the discoveries made and on sociological and social-psychological factors and financial ones. A s I have hinte d , 1 think the PG approach deserves more international recognition than it has received so far. However, this international recognition seems to be slowly, but steadily increasing. The success will finally depend on the inventiveness as well as the strategies of research that will be used. lmre Lakatos (1970) has argued that "empirical success is merely a matter of luck." This is probably an exaggeration. I think that i f the theoretician is more imaginative, it is more likely that his theoretical program will achieve at least some "empirical success".

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REFERENCES Anderson, A.L., & Bengtsson, M. (this volume, chapter 9). Percept-genetic defenses against anxiety and a threatened sense of self as seen in terms of t h e Spiral Aftereffect Technique. Ayer, A.J. (1946). Language, Truth, and Logic. N e w York: Dower. Dixon, N.F. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Feyerabend, P. (1970). Against method. In M. Radner & S. Winokur (Eds.), Analysis of Theories and Methods of Physics and Psychology. (Minnesota Studies in t h e Philosophy of Science, 4, pp.

17-130).

Minnesota: Uni-

versity of Minnesota Press. Hempel, C.G.

(1966). Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:

Prentice-Hall. Hentschel, U., & Schneider, U. (this volume, chapter 10). Psychodynamic personality correlates of creativity. Kaplan, A. (1964). The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavior Science. Scranton, N.J.:

Chandelar.

K ragh, U. (1955). The Actual-Genetic Model of Perception-Personality.

Lund:

Gleerup. K ragh, U. (1970a). Parallelism between percept-genesis and ontogenesis with and without loss of father. In U. Kragh & G. Smith (Eds.),

Percept-

Genetic Analysis (pp. 135-150). Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. (1970b). A case of infantile animal phobia in adult percept-genetic organization. In U. Kragh & G. Smith (Eds.), Percept-Genetic

Analysis

(pp. 151-160). Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. ( 1 9 7 0 ~ ) .Pathogenesis in dipsomania. In U. Kragh & G. Smith (Eds.), Percept-Genetic Analysis (pp. 160-178). Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. (1970d). The Defense Mechanism Test

(DMT) as a method for

diagnosis and personnel selection. In U. Kragh & G. Smith (Eds.), Percept-Genetic Analysis (pp. 179-189). Lund: Gleerup. Kragh, U. (this volume, chapter 7). Life panorama under the microscope:

A

paradigmatic case study. Kragh, U., & Kroon, T. (1970). An analysis of aggression and identification in young offenders by the study of perceptual development. In U. Kragh 8: G. Smith (Eds.), Percept-Genetic Analysis (pp.190-199). Lund: Gleerup.

Lakatos, I., & Musgrave, A. (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lauridsen, P., & Madsen, K.B.

(1982). Eine Besprechung von U. Hentschel &

417

Percept-Genesis and the ‘ScientificMethod’

G. Smith (Eds.), Experimentelle Persiinlichkeitspsychologie unter meta-

theoretischen Gesichtspunkten. Psychologische Beitriige, 24, 628-636. Myrdal, G. (1944). Methodological note on facts and validation in social science. In G. Myrdal (Ed.), An American Dilemma (pp. 1027-1064). New York Harper & Row. Neumann, T. (1978). Dimensionering av validering av perceptgenesens fsrsvarsmekanismer: En hierarkisk analys mot piloters stressbeteende. Stockholm: FOA-rapport C 55020-116. Popper, K.

(1969). Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of

Scientific

Knowledge. London: Rout ledge. Popper, K. (1974). Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach.

Oxford:

Clarendon. Sjoberg, L. (1981). DMT vid urval av flygforare. Nordisk Psykologi, 33, 240-

248. Smith, G., Carlsson, I., & Danielsson, A.

(this volume, chapter 11).

Identifi-

cation with another person: Manipulated by means of subliminal stimulation. Westerlundh, R., & Sjoback, H. (this volume, chapter 8). Activation of intrapsychic conflict and defense: The amauroscopic method.

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The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V.(North-Holland), 1986

419

LOOKING AT SOME NEW LOOK PROBLEMS FROM AN INFORMATION PROCESSING POINT OF VIEW Wolfgang Prinz University of Bielefeld

INTRODUCTION This chapter contains brief comments on three issues. The first comment pertains to some recent changes in our perspectives on perception that have lead u s to a better understanding of the perceptionlpersonality interface. The second comment pertains to the systematical status of subliminal perception and to the issue of the possible function of consciousness. The last point is a critical comment on some varieties of the microgenetic method and the limitations of the conclusions that can be drawn from the results of their application.

CHANGING PERSPECTIVES ON PERCEPTION

In the late forties, when the New Look movement in perception started, the idea that perceptual experiences might be related to various aspects of the transient and permanent state of the perceiver seems to have irritated most of the then active investigators of perception. When we take a fresh look at this issue today, we feel much less surprised at this idea. This change is obviously due to a change in the general framework for asking questions about perception that has occurred in the meantime. This change has lead us no longer to consider "perception" and "personality" disparate and incompatible categories as was obviously the case forty years ago. It seems that the general leitmotif underlying this change has been to focus on processes rather than contents - on external perceptual activities and internal perceptual operations rather than perceptual experiences or perceptual responses (cf.. Draguns, 1983, 1 9 8 4 ) . In a sense the emphasis

W.Prim

420

has shifted from the percept to the act of perceiving, and this shift has drawn our attention to those determinants of perception which do not arise from the transient information provided by the stimulus, but rather from the more pormanent features of a system for processing that information. With this general view, the perceptionlpersonality-interface looks much less cumbersome than it must have looked forty years ago. For the sake of illustration, consider the following three (interconnected) dimensions along which the old and the new views differ.

PASSlVE RECEPTlON VERSUS ACT/VE PERCEPT/ON

According to the passive reception view, the perceptual system is passively waiting for the stimulus and reacts to it when i t occurs. The system's reaction can either be described as a perceptual experience (percept) or as a perceptual response, depending on whether one prefers a mental or a behavioral language of analysis. Unless a stimulus impinges on the receptor's surface the system persists in a zero state. According to the active perception view, the perceptual system is regarded as an instrument of the perceiver who is in search of the information required for performing an intended action or for solving a given task. Within this view, it is natural for the system to be in a non-zero state when the stimulus arrives. The perceiver's intontions precede the relevant stimulation, and those intentions have both external and internal consequences. A s an external consequence of a task-induced intention, the perceiver will move around and search for task-relevant information, rather than sitting still and waiting until a stimulus arrives. At the same time, as an internal consequence the system may be biased toward accepting certain classes of stimulus information more easily than others or even rejecting certain other classes completely (see below). However the details of the active perception view may be conceptualized, it is obvious that there is ample room for stimulus-independent factors to govern the pcrceiver's mode of active information pick-up. Such strategies underlying both the overt gathering and the covert selection of information with respect to given intentions are obvious candidates for "perceptual" activities under the control of "personality" factors.

New Look Problems from an Information Processing Point of View

42 1

INFORMATION TRANSMISSION VERSUS INFORMATION PROCESSING

With respect to such strategies of information intake one might argue that they do not pertain to perception proper but rather to the control of its antecedent conditions. This objection no longer applies when the information transmission view is replaced by the information processing view. In the early fifties, with the advent of information theory, the information transmission view was a popular metaphor for paraphrasing problems of perception. Within this metaphor, the perceptual system is viewed a s a communication channel that maps certain outputs to certain inputs according to transmission rules that are eitner built in or have been established in previous learning. transformations,

Although these rules may imply rather complex

the basic principle that the output is completely de-

termined by properties of the input, is never violated with this approach. It can therefore be considered a paraphrase in somewhat technical terms of what has been (and still is) an important implicit assumption of all kinds of psychophysical approaches to perception - namely that the percept or the perceptual response is in principle completely determined by properties of the stimulus information. Although psychophysical approaches may differ with respect to the complexity of the properties for which they postulate such direct psychophysical correspondence (either assuming low-level correspondence as in the classical approaches or correspondence at the level of high-order invariants a s in the Gibsonian approach), they share the basic conviction that the information provided by the stimulus is the sole ba-

sis of the percept and that no other ingredients contribute to i t . This conviction has been abandoned with the advent of the information processing view which has come to supplement - and in some respects even to replace - the traditional psychophysical transmission view. The proper meaning of the term "information processing" has been discussed at some length ( e . g . , Neisser, 1967; Massaro, 1975, 1985; Prinz, 1983). For the present purpose only one of the usually considered defining features is critical: The notion of information processing implies various kinds of interaction between information provided by the stimulus and information stored in memory, rather than mere transformations of the stimulus information. In adopting that viewpoint, the simple fact is theoretically acknowledged that perception always involves recognition - which in turn implies matching the information provided by the stimulus against information 1983, chapters 1-3). Traditional stored in memory (see Prinz,

W.Prinz

422

psychophysical theory has always taken care not to confound the issue of transformation rules with that of the algorithms for matching stimulus information against information in memory. Although keeping these two issues separate may be wise for a number of methodological reasons,

such

separation leads to an inappropriate (at least: incomplete) account of the operations inherent in perception. The information processing view can be considered to be the first approach toward perception that permits us to construct functional models of how a person's l'experiencesll affect his or her perceptions. In these models "experiences" are represented in terms of memory traces of previous events which now interact with actual stimulus information and contribute to the resulting percepts. It is apparent that with this view the process of perceiving and its product, the percept, do not only depend on stimulus factors, but also on factors related to the perceiver's learning history. Accordingly, it is no longer surprising that "personality" affects "perception". Rather, w e should be surprised i f this were not the case.

UNBIASED REPRESENTATION VERSUS BIASED SELECTION

This contrast is closely related to the former. With the psychophysical transmission view, the stimulus is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of a corresponding percept. When a particular stimulus impinges on the receptor surface the system has no choice but represent this stimulus information according to its transmission rules.

This unbiased

representation view is being more and more replaced by the vlew that the operations underlying the processing of perceptual information tend to be selectively biased by their very nature. Though the mere existence of some kind of selectivity in perception has also been recognized within the framework of the traditional psychophysical approach, the selective aspects of perception have only in the last two dccades received the theoretical attention they deserve. According to this perspective, selectivity is a central, defining feature of all kinds of perceptual activity, and the enormous amount of experimental research devoted to these issues has yielded a considerable amount of knowledge about the operations that mediate selective perception (see Moray, 1969; Broadbent, 1971; Prinz, 1983, chapters 3, 6; Neumann, 1984 for overviews).

New Look Problems from an Information ProcessingPoint o f View

423

The selective operation of the system is clearly based on the state of the information contained in memory at the moment the stimulus information arrives. In the same way as the perceiver's "experiences" are implemented as permanent memory traces his transient selective condition is implemented in terms of particular functional states of these traces. Both, "experiences" and "selective conditions", can therefore be effective as pre-conditions of the perceptual process that is triggered by the stimulus, From this viewpoint it is inappropriate to think of the stimulus as triggering the perceptual process. Rather, the stimulus triggers the last act of this process, the limiting conditions of which have been implemented in various acts prior to stimulation. To summarize, the changes in our perspectives of perception that have been developed over the last thirty years seem to converge toward a conception of perception which is much more compatible with the idea that "perception" is "affected" by "personality" or b y personality-related actual states of the perceiver. Perception, as we view i t now, is the mediated result of a complex pattern of operations that process stimulus information and memory information in a sequence of interrelated stages.

VARIETIES OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE AND THE FUNCTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS How could one approach the issue of subliminal perception from this combined general perspective? A possible answer can be outlined as follows: If one conceives of an information processing system with several subsequent stages of processing, and i f one assumes (as some of the more recent theories of selective attention do) that much of the incoming information is completely processed before, but a small fraction of i t is selected for conscious representation, one has to draw a distinction between two kinds of perceptual knowledge that arise in the system: explicit versus implicit knowledge (cf. Prinz, 1983). Explicit knowledge refers to what the perceiver knows about those parts and aspects of the stimulus pattern that are consciously represented. The fact that explicit knowledge focuses only on very few aspects of the stimulation does, however, not imply that the perceiver has no knowledge at all of the rejected information. Usually he will be aware of its existence, and he will also have some awareness of the fact that the rejected informa-

424

W.Prinz

tion does not contain anything relevant to his present selective condition. Explicit knowledge implies "knowing what" the stimulus is, whereas implicit knowledge implies "knowing that" there is additional information which is not relevant to the present situation. However, as this type of late - selection approach assumes that the separation between accepted and rejected - explicitly versus implicitly represented - information is based on previous identification of all parts and aspects of the stimulus pattern, it is assumed that the system actually knows much more about the stimulus pattern than the perceiver is aware of. Accordingly, many of the demonstrations of subliminal perception can be interpreted as demonstrations of pre-selective identification, i.e., of the existence of some latent knowledge about certain aspects of the stimulus that can control or influence executive functions without the perceiver's awareness. However, if the executive can be controlled by information of which the perceiver is not aware, it is no longer apparent what function consciousness might serve at all. This is because of two of the more traditional answers to this question are not very compatible with this view. The first answer is that the function of consciousness is to control the executive. If this were true, control of the executive without conscious awareness should not be allowed to occur. The second answer considers conscious representation a prerequisite for full identification. However, as this view would only be compatible with the assumption that the operations that precede selection do not imply full processing, this answer does not make much sense with this approach either. What then is the function of consciousness? This question is a s open as i t has ever been, and I will resist the temptation of further speculating on this issue in this comment.

YOU CAN'T PLAY 1 5 QUESTIONS WITH YOUR SUBJECT AND WIN

The above heading is worded after the title of a well-known paper by Newel1 (1973). My commentary will be quite brief simply because it is not new, but has been frequently made with respect to the microgenetic method (see, for example, Linschoten, 1959). Although students of microgenesis have always invested much effort in trying to persuade us that their subjects only report what they see and not what they believe they see, I must confess that I still have tremendous difficulties in believing it. What I do believe is that you can't ask the same subject fifteen times what

New Look Problems from an Information ProcessingPoint o f View

425

he or she sees in fifteen consecutive tachistoscopic presentations of the same display without converting perception into conception. Hislher reports will inevitably be affected, to say the least, by hislher desire to give an intelligent-looking series of reports in the face of a situation with highly unstructured task demands. In my opinion, the ideas underlying the microgenetic approach are unnecessarily weakened when they are too closely linked to such ambiguous tasks. To be more precise, this critical comment is not so much directed at the microgenetic method per se but rather i t is focused upon the claim that its application can tell us something about ordinary perception. If one gives up this claim and adopts the position that microgenesis is "necessari-

... that

is triggered by the demand or challenge of . or of completing the incompletetf, going beyond the information given there is no problem with the application of this method: "Microgenesis may serve, then, as the point of reference for the investigation of a variety of phenomena, all of which require an extended search in time." (Draguns, 1984, pp, 4 . 13). Even i f , in agreement with this view, the microgenetic ly a heuristic activity

..

method may be an appropriate means to study heuristic processes in extended search, it seems to be difficult to maintain the claim that i t is also an appropriate approach for studying ordinary perception.

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426

REFERENCES Broadbent, D.E.

(1971). Decision and Stress.

Press. Draguns, J.G. (1983).

Why microgenesis?

London, New York: Academic An inquiry on t h e motivational

sources of going beyond the information given. Archiv fur Psychologie, 135, 5-16

Draguns, J.G. (1984). Microgenesis by any other name...

In W.D.

Frohlich,

G. Smith, J.G. Draguns, and U. Hentschel (Eds.), Psychological Processes

in Cognition and Personality. Washington: Hemisphere. Linschoten, J. (1959). Aktualgenese und heuristisches Prinzip. Zeitschrift fSr experimentelle und angewandte Psychologie, 6, 449-473. Massaro, D. (1975). Experimental Psychology and Information Processing. Chicago: Rand McNally. Massaro, D. (1985). Information processing theory and strong interference: A paradigm for psychological inquiry. In H. Heuer & A.F.

Sanders (Eds.),

Perception and Action. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum. Moray, N. (1969). Attention. Selective Processes in Vision and Hearing. London: Hutchinson. Neisser, U. (1967). Cognitive Psychology. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Neumann, 0. (1984). Automatic processing: A review of recent findings and a plea for an old theory. In W. Prinz & A.F. Sanders (Eds.), Cognition and Motor Processes. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer. Newell, A. (1973). You c a n ' t play 20 questions with nature and win: Projective comments on t h e papers of this symposium. In W.G. Chase (Ed.), Visual Information Processing. New York: Academic Press. Prinz, W. (1983). Wahrnehmung und Tatigkeitssteuerung. Berlin: Springer.

The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J.G. Druguns (editors) 0 Elseuier Science k'u blishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

427

MICROGENESIS AND GENERAL SYSTEMS I N PSYCHOLOGY Kazimierz Obuchowski Polish Academy of Scienccs Poznafi, Poland

INTRODUCTION We are presently witnessing a rapid development of psychological research focused upon the discovery and description of mechanisms and determinants of responses that go beyond merely stimulus-related predictions. This research covers a wide range of topics like cognitive, emotional, motivational, and preconscious processes, concept formation, and their psychophysiological correlates, all of them in interaction with situational contexts. At the same time, a strong tendency is manifest to overcome the existing fragmentation of psychology. This trend finds expression in research hypotheses trying to combine various psychological phenomena. Hence, this area of psychologica research generates new ideas while simultaneously i t returns to some of the older and seemingly torgotten or neglected concepts. The introduction of subliminal stimulation techniques allows us, for example, to study the intuitive superego concept of Freud and to develop methods for stuaying clinical problems of anxiety related to social orientation. It has been shown that projective techniques can reveal fundamental aspects of personality, and that they can be useful, for example, in helping us understand creativity as an integrated characteristic partaking of the elements of conscious and prcconscious perception. New possibilities have emerged and the idea of microgenetic research has evolved from "going beyond the information given" towards a more general approach which Draguns describes in the following manner: "While differing in their

.

theoretical and empirical objectives, these approaches. .are broadly concerned with events that transpire between the presentation of a stimulus and the formation of a stabilized response to it and are, as such, germane

K. Obuchowaki

428

.

to microgenesis in the classical sense of the term.. .The essential hallmark of microgenesis is a sequence of directly observable events between the presentation of a stimulus and the formation of a stable response.n (Draguns, 1984, pp.3-4) A detailed analysis of the most recent studies indicates that the above mentioned '!directly observable events" often turn out to be rather complex hypothetical constructs, such a s heuristic strategies or defense mechanisms. Microgenesis thus increasingly appears to be a domain of psychology which takes a most lively interest in integrated and complex psychological concepts. The field of microgenesis thus manifests a considerable assimilating power, not only witn respect to phenomena often ignored by general psychology, such a s consciousness, personality, situational context, etc., but also in relation to the attempts to construct general systems of psycnological processes, as, tor example, in Norman Uixon's (1984) model. In the present paper I want to outline two theories with a quite different background which, however, might be useful for the interpretation of the results of microgenetic research. The first theory aims at the development of a kind of grammar of psychological processes and has been called "Code-Emotions Theory , I 1 while the second one represents a preliminary attempt to unify general psychology and psychology of personality into a single model called "Integrated Model of the Processes of Psychological Regulation - (IMP)" which includes the Code-Emotions Theory,

THE BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE CODE-EMOTIONS THEORY The basic assumption of the present concept is that the totality of psychological processes serve human survival. The process of anticipating events and of accommodating onel8 skills and one's Ifblueprints of action" to the actual results is a condition of survival. Perception, thinking, memory, emotions, and motivation, distinguished early in the history of psychology, can now be regarded as different aspects of the realization of the same process. Their regularity does not so much consist of an adequate reflection of reality nor of logical problem-solving as of their relevance for the specific interests and functioning of a person. Thus perceptual reflection of realities might be true in some cases while in others a blurring seems to take place due, for example, to processes of generaliza-

Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology

429

tion. In some cases it is appropriate to interpret a given event without reference to a person's experience, while in others personal experience may play a prominent role, Table 1 Schema of t h e Code-Emotions lheory

CODES -

RULES

Simultaneous spatio-temporal

RESULTS

Explorative, a l t e r n a t i v e c r e a t i -

Creative

vity (illumination, insight)

operations

Linear operations on t h e h i e r -

Models of t h e world ( l i n e a r

Hierarchic

creativity)

a r c h i c a l l y organized concepts

P r i n c i p l e s of t h e higher nervous

P i c t u r e of the world ( s t o r e of

Policoncrete

concrete d a t a )

activity

S t a t i s t i c s of experience

Preorganization of data. Last

Monoconcrete

b a r r i e r a g a i n s t entropy

------CONCRETE CODES

Maximization of economy

Minimization of economy.

Minimal u t i l i z a t i o n of concrete

Maximal u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e conc r e t e experience

experience The r e s u l t s of system functioning

The r e s u l t s of system function-

a r e less r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of empi-

ing a r e more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of

rical reality.

empirical r e a l i t y .

"he p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e r e a l i t y

The p r e d i c t i o n of f u t u r e r e a l i t y

i s worse.

is better.

Positive

emotional

professes

determine

that

abstract

codes

will

be

preferred.

Negative

emotional

processes

determine

that

concrete

codes

will

be

preferred.

Activation determines f l e x i b i l i t y ( o r f i x a t i o n ) i n s e l e c t i o n of t h e codes.

If we call such systems of perception

and information processing

"codes" we have to assume that the human brain is capable of grasping the

K. Obuchowski

430

world in terms of various codes. None of them is better or worse in general terms. They differ with respect to their objectives. Thus they can only be applied properly or improperly. Traditionally, two groups of codes can be distinguished: concrete and abstract (cf. Goldstein & Gelb, 1920). Concrete codes serve a rather mechanical anticipation and consist of attempts to extrapolate the future from experience, Conditioned reflexes are instances of the basic mechanism of this extrapolation. The adequacy of mechanical anticipation depends on the degree to which a new situation is similar to an already known one, and on the speed with which one should respond to the new situation. The rules of mechanical anticipation can be genetically determined. Abstract codes serve the purpose of creative nnticipation which consists of a conceptualization of the future not necessarily based on concrete individual experiences. The adequacy of the creative anticipation depends on how well we know the rules by which reality is changed and on how well these changes are socially accepted. Creative anticipation is the better form of anticipation in all cases in which the reality to be predicted is distant in time and/or differs qualitatively from the known reality. In particular cases we may also transform reality according to our expectations. The rules of creative anticipation are always learned. Based on principles given elsewhere (Obuchowski, 1982a) at least two kinds of concrete and abstract codes may be distinguished (cf. Table 1).

CONCRETE CODES MONOCONCRETE CODE

With the help of a monoconcrete code we register a statistical relation between two phenomena according to the principle: the more frequently an event appears together with another one, the greater is the probability that both will also occur together in the future. One of the assumptions of the code-emotions theory is that each intellectual operation is a more or less conscious act of interpretation. Only operations at a level of the monoconcrete code can be performed without an internal representation of the task, running, as they do, automatically, on the basis of associative probabilities. Due to this characteristic a monoconcrete code can be "the last ditch" resistance against the danger of dis-

Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology

43 1

integration of the psychological regulation processes of a person who, for example, may, in the case of a frontal lobe lesion, lose the ability to undertake and pursue certain tasks o r , when focusing on some task, may fail to perform that activity independently from another activity which was once superncially linked to it. Let us, for example, take a smoker who, upon lignting a candle, attempts to put the lit candle to his mouth. POLICONCRETE CODE

hlased on the polyconcrete code, reality is registered as a "picture." The picture is a relatively stable one. It is coded in the cerebral cortex and is entirely formed by events which once coexisted in time and had a very specific value for the individual. Conditioned reflexes are such units. The area in which organization and processing of information is accomplished due to the utilization of a polyconcrete code, includes all those numerous regularities which were discovered by Pavlov and his followers. Pavlov presented metaphorically what we just described a s a "picture." A picture in a given situation is strongly connected to the current functions of individual strivings. It is possible that other pictures of reality can activate a person's hunger, o r his fright, o r impulses to explore the environment, etc. A polyconcrete picture thus cannot be separated from the situation in which the individual finds himself. Generalization leads basically to the false perception of a picture enabling the individual to recognize an object similar to A as A . One should expect that generalization would increase when the actions of an individual aimed at the satisfaction of his needs become less successful. Negative emotions and the accompanying increase in activation are the signals for inefficient action. It may thus be said that emotional processes are the elements which activate and intensify the mechanism of generalization. This has been confirmed in a number of empirical studies. Inefficiency of an act which should, in t u r n , become intensified a s the picture is falsified through generalization, is compensated for by a broadening of the scope of responses instead of transfer. The mistake caused by an improper recognition of an event is reduced when the components of a picture belonging to the subordinate elements of the structure become blurred first. Since reality changes primarily in subordinate details, the more significant elements being the more stable ones. the possibility of a false response is also diminished. Generalization also leads to broader anticipations. It can be demon-

K. Obuchowski

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strated that a picture may become anachronistic with respect to the reality in which it was crcated. Its anachronism depends on the time range of the anticipation. We can safely hypothesize that the less a picture of a given reality is differentiated, the more adequately for various states of reality will it be anticipated further into the future. This sketchy prcsentation of the mechanisms of functioning in a polyconcrete code can supply the basis for psychological concepts of neurosis, psychosis, and changes of functioning in difficult situations.

ABSTRACT CODES H I E R A R C H I C CODE

With the help of a hierarchic code we register reality a s a model or a set of models of a random order of generality. The model is based on concepts that are not signs of any concrete designations. They are only classes referring to designations (actual or invented ones) characteristic for the abstract criterion - for example, types of objects, processes, symbols, functions, properties, etc. In order for a given concept to be employed in a hierarchic code, at least one other concept of the same meaning but different range - for example, triangle-equilateral triangle, red-purple , etc. - is necessary. In this manner each concept can form hierarchic organizations with other concepts. A model having no actual equivalent is also a hierarchic organization. A s the model is distant from situational determinants, i t provides for far-reaching predictions for situations which are not deducible from the existing reality. A concept of creativity may imply that we can create realities which are "actually improbable," or that we can make them probable by means of appropriate actions, or that we can at lcast prepare ourselves for their appearance. The above statement does not imply that creativity is just the 'kreation of the improbable." That would lower the value of creativity for a person's actual functioning in the world, reducing it to the category of an artistic creativity. Not wanting to diminish the value of a r t , it can nevertheless be stated that creativity as an instrument of pragmatically oriented daily actions differs very much from creativity with free alternatives. Pragmatic creativity according to the hierarchic code must be expressed within a framework of definite rules.

Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology Any model always contains some arbitrariness, though.

433

Subjective-

ly, it leaves us insecure to a certain degree, and we tend to base our practical action on pictures which are the results of a mechanical anticipation rather than the results of a model. Thus, particularly in uncertain or difficult situations, there is a tendency to use pictures instead of models or to give pictures at least an auxiliary role (for instance, as concretizations of hypotheses). The reverse can also happen. The picture described in a very free manner may for some time acquire the role of a model, i.e. become characterized by sufficiently general conceptual categories to make i t impossible for us to reduce it to any concrete picture. Since it is not a part of a theoretical network, it remains a kind of empty label. With the help of a model one can obtain quite new, creative, qualitatively different solutions of problems, even predictions. However, this is just a single, quite limited type of creativity. The limits stem from the verbal form of the model. Creation can also assume a linear form. It seems to me that this is not the way to accomplish a creation of completely new concepts which are an alternative to that which we know already. The hierarchic code allows only for straightforward linear creation. Alternative creation requires a different code. C R E A T I V E CODE

The above mentioned limitations of the hierarchic code stimulated the seiirch for another code which would be an instrument of anticipation neither restricted to a simple reproduction of experience nor obtained by conscious linguistic operations based on definite rules of thinking. Among the essential postulates for such a new code would be the possibility of simultaneous processing of different data which cannot be grasped as semantic units within the concept of a linear language. Two questions arise in this context: 1. Are there data which would indicate a possibility of performing intellectual operations with the help of pictures, and not words, which

could be characterized as a process of thinking taking place outside the limits of consciousness? 2. Are there any data which point to the way in which a translation

of the results of a creative process from this hypothetical code into

a hierarchic one is accomplished? (Surely it is not very probable that such a translation is a direct one, as the followers of an intuitive view of creative thinking secm to suggest. 1

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434

Both questions can be answerod in the affirmative. Though any nnswers are far from complete, a few basic theses will be articulated in the following pa-agraphs: ( a ) Therc are mnny instances from daily expericnces which would indicatc that the meaning of sentcnces we utter is coded in the system of information from which we somehow "decode" i t . This decoding nay

lead to confusing results. We sometimes change the contents of our utterances fecling that "this is not what I wanted to say." This €eeling

01

dispRrity between wliat had been formulated and what should

have becm formulated docs not refer only to the formal aspects of such an utterance, but also to i t s meaning. ( b ) In some organic disorders, such as semantic aphasia, a patient is

unablc to select words for contents which have to be spelled out, There a r e , however, reasons to believe that the contents "exist" beyond linguistic structurcs and that cognitive operations are performed with their help, ( c ) There are numerous self-reports of many cre,ltive scientists (cf.

Hodamard, 1049) who say that, before they had solved the problem, they had

21

fcccling of a IIEeneral direction" and knew precisely where

the solution was and what was relevant for i t . The others felt at lcflst that the decisive stage of creative problem-solving had been accomplished outside of their consciousness and that they were unable to reconstruct its course. ( d ) On the basis of the hypothetical characteristics of n crentive code, we may assume that thc results of this multidimensional process should be given originally in the guise of a picture, i . e . , it should be t-ansferrcd to a polyconcrete code. It is subsequently decoded and trans?ated into a hierarchic one. Our data with respect to the phases of incubation cind illumination in ciwitive processes can confirm this hypothesis. There arc ~ l s oreasons to assume that there is a lasting network of ir.formation in the brain which is supefior to all information structures organized with the help cf the conc-ete and hiororchic codes. What has been descrihed hr\re as a creative code is a manner of organizing the totality of informetion found in the human brain. Under specific conditions these data can be distinguished as simple association, pictures, or models.

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435

REGULA TlVE FUNCTIONS OF THE EMOTIONAL PROCESSES

The model of organization of the cognitive processes presented in the preceding pnragraphs (cf. also Obuchowski, 1980b) would remain incomplete if we failed to reveal those psychological processes which determine which code is to be chosen in a given concrete situation. There are no reasons to believe that the choice in this case is a conscious one. It is also improbable that a person is free to choose the best code from the point of view of human survival. We have to postulate the existence of an independent system of steering for the cognitive processes. This system has to register nothing but the positive and negative subjective states and the intensity of these psychological states. In reference to the neurophysiology of emotions, to the evolution of the emotional processes, and to the role of emotions in the functioning of people and animals, the following conclusions can be drawn: 1. Three separate emotional processes can be assumed : activation, negative emotion and positive emotion. They differ with respect to their physiological characteristics, are generated b y separate brain structures, and have bcen formed at different stages in phylogenesis. 2 . The negative emotion is a process generated in a situation of di-

rect failure, of limited orientation, of danger. It may easily be demonstrated that the concrete codes in this situation are more secure since they furnish a key to a more precise utilization of the concrete situational experience. Abstract codes are more risky, and their advantages can be first perceived only after some time has elapsed. Thus i t can be assumed that the process of a negative emotion acts exclusively as an activatior of the concrete codes. The only situation which is suited to allow a person to employ abstract codes is the situation of complete security, perfect orientation in a situation of concrete, continuous success. In this case positive emotion is an activator, 3. The intensity of negative and positlve characteristics of a situation

is responsible for activation. It is easy to theoretically deduce and empirically confirm that a high intensity of activation results in the blocking of cognitive processes at a given level of code. As soon as a high activation level becomes stabilized, however, a new phenomenon, the facilitation of functioning, appears. This can be defined as a narrowing down of the information from the external world, both, in the

K. Obuchowski

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case of positive emotion where it is the result of a renunciation of concrete data, and in the case of negative emotion where it is the result of excessive generalization making it impossible to differentiate the stimuli. In the case of an excessive lowering of activation, which indicates a low value of the situation, 'a person usually switches into the concrete code as the more economic one.

THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL FOR THE PROCESSES OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL REGULATION (IMP) Any reasonable attempt to explain a given psychological mechanism requires a precise description of the task of this mechanism. While constructing the code-emotions theory, I assumed that this task, based on brain processes, is the anticipation of events. The distance of the postulated anticipation is a varying criterion for the efficiency of the brain. I have assumed that the longer the temporal distance of anticipation the higher the cost paid for its validity. But this is not a linear relation. History of science seems to indicate that the validity of long-distance anticipation increases rapidly i f a good theory of high complexity is available. The code-emotions theory indicates that i f the brain is an instrument for anticipating events, then the efficiency of this instrument depends on the selection of an appropriate code for this task on the basis of an individual's experience. Apart from code selection, the general orientation of the whole system towards internal data processing or towards external search for data also plays an important role. The above mentioned mechanics of tuning the instruments to the task, so that our experience will be used in an optimal way and not disrupt the

process of adaptive anticipation, do not sufficiently explain the choice of the direction of an activity, its stabilization or changes, nor do they explain the functioning of evaluational standards. Thus the mechanisms in question are applicable to the explanation of the phenomena which psychology of personality deals with, i.e. of those which go beyond the scope of psychological reality accounted for by the code-emotions theory. A person becomes conscious of some phenomena and elaborates concepts to account for them. Part of his knowledge about renlity remains outside of his consciousness,

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At this point we must introduce the principle of regulation, related both to simple activities which are the subject for general psychology and to complex personal conduct. The concept of regulation is not an internal one. I conceive of the standard of regulation as being external with respect to the elements of the system, sharing with them only its genesis. The standard of regulation is more than a product of the system. The whole human psychological system is a product, not only of cerebral organization, but also of subjective experience combined with the experience of others, the patterns of culture, and of the individual strategies of data processing. The standards of psychological regulation are thus actually generated by a broader variety of phenomena than the individual psychological unit which articulated them. We have now to proceed to the construction of a model of psychological regulation that is more complex than the once popular concept of homeostasis. The construction of the model i s , however, not completely finished, and I shall limit myself to the explanation of the core scheme and some of its consequences (cf. Table 2 and

Fig. 1). Let me begin with the element (1) called l'Motive.lf I have previously expressed (Obuchowski, 1982a) the idea that any consciously attempted activity becomes possible only after the program and task of a specific activity or conduct are consciously articulated. A Motive in the IMP model is a precondition for any organized activity. In our model the Motive thus links the whole structure of the processes of psychological regulation to the Environment (8) and the Results (7). The Motive closes the circuit of psychological regulation mechanisms of integrating external situations. The Standard of the Regulative Processes ( 2 ) is defined as the state of things which an individual considers to be his or her desired degree of performance in the organization of the task, according to his more or less rigid inner control. If a Standard of Regulation happens to be strongly task-related, the activity results in a definite external or internal state. If the rigid inner control (compulsion) is the Standard of Regulation, the external results of the activity arc negligible as long as only inner tension is reduced. We are dealing with two different motivational mechanisms, the first one being oriented towards the achievement of some definite product, the second one being a typical mechanism of tension reduction. A Standard of Regulation can therefore be clearly formulated and linked to one's own tasks and it is then an expression of the intentional self.

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The Directional Regulator ( 3 ) is particularly complex. Within the theory of developmental personality (cf. Obuchowski, 1980a, 1981), the Directional Regulator is an element of personality and considered a Programming System which is connected with different states of consciousness; or better, it ascribes various data to various states of consciousness, though, according to the model, only knowledge and emotional attitudes can be accorded the status of being conscious or unconscious.

Table 2 The Integrative Model of the Psychological Regulative Processes (components)

1. MOTIVE

7, THE RESULTS OF ONE'S OWN ACTIVITY

The formula8.

THE EXTERNAL SITVATION

tion of the 2. STANDARD OF THE REGULATIVE PROCESSES

Task Organization

aim and the program of the task oriented

Compulsion 3. DIRECTIONAL REGULATOR

activity

a. Cultural Paradigms (supraconsciousness) b. Knowledge

-

abstract and concrete 5 . CODE OF REGULATIVE OPERATIONS

(consciousness, unconsciousness) C.

Emotional Attitudes

-

abstract and concrete

Creative Code

(consciousness, unconsciousness)

Hierarchic (abstract) Code

d. Background Motivation (passive unconsciousn.)

Policoncrete Code

e. Defense Mechanisms (active unconsciousness)

Monoconcrete Code Simple Unconditioned Reflex

4. OPERATIONAL REGULATOR

Reactivity (by Strelau)

6.

Emotional Stability (by Eysenck) Introversion-Extraversion (by Eysenck or in Perceptual Organization (approach in Ro or

MODIFIERS OF THE CODE Activation

RO)

Negative Emotion Positive Emotion

cognitive style) Productivity (R in R" or number of the themes in TAT) Trait Anxiety (questionnaire or Ro or.. .) General Intelligence Special Abilities

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Knowledge and attitudes cover the greatest part of individual data organisation, i . e . , structures that give individual answers to questions referring to specific reality-related stimuli. Knowledge includes both, the pictures acquired through experience, and the models referring to deeper hidden characteristics of the world.

OIRECTIONAL

0REGULATOR

-

*

@

COOE OF REGULATIVE OPERATIONS .

Figure 1 Zhe Integrative Model of the Psychological Regulative Processes (IMP).

Attitudes are expressions of emotional preferences, both a s results of some concrete experience (emotional conditioned reflexes) and a s a results of self-reflections about the world and ourselves. Cultural paradigms occupy a separate position. They are composites of ideas (!la just world"), acquired from a given culture without our control. We become aware of their existence only in those historical periods when they undergo some transformations. We do not manipulate these cultural paradigms consciously nor do they belong to the contents of consciousness. Those cultural paradigms o r archetypes should be granted a separate state

- that

of "supraconsciousness

.

Their supraindividual ontological status

links them more closely with social consciousness phenomena than with individual ones.

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440

In the fourth edition of "Psychology of Human Strivings" (Obuchowski, 1982b) background motivation has been outlined as a manifestation of inborn drives. We assume that a s a result of inhibiting effects of the learning processes in ontogenesis, these biological drives cannot be directly manifestea in normal adult behavior. Background motivation, in contrast to defense mechanisms, does not seem to influence perception or memory. This enables u s to ascribe to such motivation a separate state of consciousness, that of "passive unconsciousness11a s opposed to "active unconsciousness." Defense mechanisms, as defined by Freud and a s investigated by several contributors to this volume, act as unconscious psychological regulators and can actively modify the course of conscious psychological activity. In the the theory of personality development (cf. Obuchowski, 1980a, 19811, the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has been included in the so-called basic system. I t is composed of those personality aspects which we traditionally count among the formal ones. They can be regarded a s indicators of various functional characteristics of brain tissue and of brain organiza-

tion influencing the processes of psychological regulation.

They decide

both the preference in the selection of operations and the course of these operations. Their number in the model has not been speciried but can be limited by assuming that categories like introversion, reactivity, or the cognitive styles are only different indicators of the same brain properties. For instance, reactivity is, according to Strelau (1983), preference with respect to the intensity of stimulation. Thus reactive persons, like the introverts, limit Stimulation, which should influence their cognitive style. Also trait anxiety, according to code-emotions theory, should influence the input of external data and preferences for the policoncrete code, which in turn should result in a compensatory generation of a greater number of internal concrete data in the operational memory. The whole model of IMP is composed of 8 elements (cf. Figure l ) , the most central being the Standard of Regulation ( 2 ) . Functionally the most heavlly burdened, i.e., the one with the largest number of interconnections: 3 input and 3 output routes, is the Directional Regulator ( 3 ) . The Code of Regulative Operations (5) has 2 input and 3 output routes. The Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has 2 output routes and 1 input route linking it with the Environment ( 8 ) . We may assume that the number of input routes compared to the output routes is an indicator of the operational power of a specific component of the model. While Moditiers of the Code ( 6 ) and

Microgenesis and General Systems in Psychology

44 1

Standard of Regulation ( 2 ) are equal with respect to the operational power, the Directional Regulator (3) and the Code of Regulation ( 5 ) have a stronger impact on the operational functions according to IMP. The Operational Regulator ( 4 ) and Motive (1) have more instrumental functions in the operations. All eight IMP components can fulfill executive functions, i . e . , they all have at least one input and one output route. The elements 7 and 8 play a particular role. They have been included in the IMP in order to stress the constant presence of the Environment in which a person functions and to point out the vital role of feedback from the results of an individual's activity.

What do the arrows in the model mean? Where do they come from and what determines their number and direction? The IMP does not give a complete representation of the flow of data between the various components and, accordingly, i t cannot throughout all subsystems be used as a flow chart. The arrows and their direction indicate only that a specific state of a given subsystem must be preceded b y a specific state of another subsystem. The types of connections and their number have been determined by an analysis of empirical data from various areas of psychology. IMP is an attempt at a synthesis of different theoretical standpoints. It allows the prediction of research results in various areas. The model was not constructed to account for results in subliminal stimulation experiments, for example. Nevertheless, it rollows from the IMP tnat we should expect data rrom subliminal stimulation to reach 3 only when certain conditions are mct in 4 . They can be blocked, for example, if 4 is characterized by a high degree of trait anxiety. A low anxiety threshold should, according to code-emotions theory, block the route of external data input and lead to an increase in the orientation towards internal data changing the standard ot regulation and the motivational state. This might help us explain results indicating that subjects with low anxiety are more oriented towards physical properties of the world and high-anxiety subjects more towards social ones. An interesting result has been obtained by Obuchowska (1971) upon studying two groups of children. One was composed of children with clinical symptoms of failure anxiet y , while the control group included children who responded adequately to failure. Neurotic anxiety over failure manifested itself in such behavior

K. Obuchowski

442

as fear of submitting properly executed classwork for evaluation, inability to continue a game of chess in spite of winning, etc. Children from both groups completed first a jig-saw puzzle which posed no problems for untrained children. Then the conditions were changed in such a way as to make successful completion impossible. The experimenter told the children that when he would be able to predict that their way to the solution would be wrong he would flash a lamp. Children from the normal group responded with a number of changing moves when the light was flashed. Neurotic children responded with the same changes even before the lamp was flashed, and after a few trials of this kind, the changes occurred immediately after the task had been started. This means that children with anxiety over failure responded in a way to the Environment which did not result from the properties of the Environment, but from the properties of the Directional Regulator, i.e., from internal data. Dixon's model (Dixon, 1 9 8 1 ; cf. also Dixon & Henley, Chapter 2 ) indicates that the integration of subliminal and supraliminal information is performed at the level of physiological mechanisms. According to the IMP conventions, the Operational Regulator corresponds also to the physiological level. The study by Hentschel and Schneider (cf. Chapter 10) demonstrated that defense mechanisms can moderate the ability to integrate subliminal and supraliminal data, indicating, in terms of IMP, the participation of the Operational Regulator, We may, hypothetically, assume that a psychological core of creativity is based at a physiological level on 4 , and not on 3 or 5 , because creative individuals demonstrate a high degree of integration of conscious and subconscious data (cf. the study by Smith, Carlsson, 8 Danielsson. Chapter 11). According to IMP, one should expect that in spite of blocking of data between 4 and 3 , 6 - including the basic emotional responses - will be activated. It' this is the case, we should encounter changes of mood and other consequences of an influence of emotions, as well as an overall activation of psychological processes, all as a result of nonassimilated subliminal information, i.e., of blocked data processing from 4 to 3. It is thus probable that the route 8-4-6-5-3-2-1 is actually being employed. There are numerous examples for changes in autonomic reations, sensation thresholds, perceptual attitudes (cf. Dixon, 1981) occurring as a consequence of confronting subjects with subliminal data. (8)

In microgenetic experiments, the expected features of the environment are obscured and appear novel and strange. External inputs are un-

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structured at first and are, moreover, directly or indirectly threatening. The principal motive (1) for behavlor in compliance witn instructions is, for most subjects, the recapture of meaningful structured impressions (erfort after meaning), even when the result ('0 of this effort is still far from perfect. Only in the course of serial presentation is convergence of subjective outputs and objective inputs increasingly experienced. 'The standard of the regulative processes ( 2 ) is directed outward, toward a performance that is adequate to the situation; internally, its objective is the reduction of tension and reconstitution of internal balance. In a multitude of percept-genetic studies, the moderating influence of the personality-specific functional features of the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) has been demonstrated. In the contributions to the present volume, there are numerous instances that impressively document the operation of this influence. The Directional Regulator (3) is, according to percept-genetic and psychodynamic assumptions, for the most part restricted to the operation of defense mechanisms which influence the subjects' pertormance by obstructing the awareness of threatening stimuli and by simultaneously preventing their veridical perception. The inactive unconscious of the culturally shared assumptions has barely been investigated in microgenetic experiments. The pursuit of this line of investigation would provide an opportunity to derive new hypotheses for microgenetic research from the IMP model. In the normal mode of ascending presentation in percept-genesis, the subject is at first confronted with a task which proceeds from severe (limited orientation, in Obuchowski's, 1982, terms) to gradually decreasing restriction of information. Under these circumstances, the utilization of concrete codes ( 5 ) should be favored. Even though percept-genetic protocols have not been categorized along these lines, published case studies with protocols seem to suggest the utility of such an interpretation. The experimental situation, however, under no circumstances favors the use of creative codes. This is quite different in the case of inverted percept-genesis. There, a paradigmatic rethinking becomes possible ( 6 : Modifier of the Code), the attainment of objective meaning and the security thereby achieved providing a greater amount of freedom for multidimensional information processing (creative code), For this situation, the moderating influence of the Operational Regulator ( 4 ) with its formal principles of operation and of the Directional Regulator ( 3 ) is clearly illustrated in several studies of this volume.

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On the whole, the IMP model appears to be well suited to at least partly provide an alternative explanation of microgenetic assumptions. If an attempt were to be made to represent thc discrete phases of the perceptgenetic progression in terms of all the elements of this model, a number of

.

additional variables, e ,g , the parallel processes of activation and the positive and negative emotional states, would need to be controlled. Even at the present stage of theoretical analysis, however, connections between the IMP model and microgenesis become apparent. These links could be empirically examined in a concrete experiment. In principle, the IMP provides a closed circuit of the progression from input to output which lends itself to the specirication of each of the phases of percept-genesis. Proceeding from the assumption, however, that differences are more clearly delineated in the comparison or longer segments, one could divide the progression into bigger chunks, corresponding perhaps to three thirds of the perceptual process. Such a mode of division into three or four segments prior to the

.

veridical recognition of the stimulus has been undertaken bcfore The IMP model then places only limited demands for the modiIication of the typical experimental microgenetic sequence. Its true advantage lies in the opening of new perspectives from which, in the optimal case, new meaningtul formulations of hypotheses for applied research may result. It is possible that further analysis of empirical data will make additional modifications of IMP necessary. However, the results collected so far seem to justify its public presentation and release for analysis and critical scrutiny. Its basic structure at least seems defensible. The aim of the present paper was not to persuade the reader that IMP is a perfect model, but to demonstrate some promising possibilities of an interpretation of results from microgenesis and subliminal stimulation from a very different point of view.

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REFERENCES Dixon, N. (1981). Preconscious Processing. Chichester: Wiley. Dixon, N.

(1984). The conscious-unconscious

understanding.

In G.J.W.

Smith, W.D.

interface:

Contribution t o a n

Frohlich, & U.

Hentschel (Eds.),

From Private to Public Reality (pp. 55-66). Bonn: Bouvier. Dixon, N., 8 Henley, S., (this volume, chapter2). subliminal

Personality

factors

and

perception.

Draguns, J.G. (1984). Microgenesis by any other name. In W.D. Frohlich, G.J. W. Smith, J.G. Draguns, & U. Hentschel (Eds.), Psychological Processes in Cognition and Personality (pp. 3-17). Washington: Hemisphere.

Goldstein, K., & Gelb, A. (1920). Psychologische Analysen hirnpathologischer

Faille. Leipzig: Barth. Hadamard, J. (1949). An Essay on the Psychology of Invention in t h e Mathe-

matical Field. Princeton: University of Princeton Press. Hentschel, U. & Schneider, U. (this volume, chapter 10). Psychodynamic personalit y correlates of creativity. Obuchowska

I.

(1971). Psychological mechanisms of anxiety and failure in

children. Polish Psychological Bulletin, 2, 115-118. Obuchowski, K. (1980a). Einige Probleme der entwicklungsfahigen Personlichkeit. In A. Kossakowski (Ed.), Psychologie im Sozialismus (pp. 153-169). Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.

Obuchowski, K. (U980b). Regulative functions of emotional processes. In Congress Report of the 4th Meeting of Psychologists from the Danubian Countries: Problems of the Regulation of Activity (pp. 131-139). Budapest: Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Obuchowski, K. (1981). Personality and Effectivity. Wroclaw: Ossolineum. Obuchowski, K. (1982a). Orientierung und Emotion Berlin: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaf ten. Obuchowski , K.( 1982b).F%ychologia d e h ludekich Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe (4th ed.). Smith, G., Carlsson, I., & Danielsson, A. (this volume, chapter 11). Identification with another person: Manipulated by means of subliminal stimulation. Strelau, J. (1983). Temperament Press.

-

Personality

-

Activity. London: Academic

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The Roots of Perception U.Hentschel, G. Smith, J. G. Draguns (editors) 0 Elsevier Science Publishers B. V. (North-Holland), 1986

447

A METATHEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEPT-GENETIC

PERSONALITY THEORY K.B. Madsen

The Royal Danish School of Educational Studies, Copenhagen

INTRODUCTION In the following pages I am presenting a very brief and concentrated metatheoretical analysis of the "percept-genetic personality theory1' (PGP)

.

This presentation is furthermore concentrated on one book edited by Uwe Hentschel and Gudmund Smith (Hentschel

&

Smith, 1980). This book is se-

lected as representative for the PGP, because it is a comprehensive and detailed summary of several decades of research. It is analyzed in more detail elsewhere (see Lauridsen & Madsen, 1982). Perhaps, on a later occasion I shall be able to present a more comprehensive and detailed metatheoretical analysis of some other main works from the PGP tradition. To begin with, I would like to make a systematic classirication of PGP and, thereafter, present a metatheoretical analysis of the different levels in this research tradition.

SYSTEMATIC CLASSIFICATION llPersonality psychology" occurs in many forms, some of them very limited, others more comprehensive. The different forms can be described by means of a systematic classification model. A s can be seen in Fig. 1, the most limited form of a personality psychology is one which focuses on personality factors, i.e. dynamic dispo-

sitional variables causing individual differences, as its sole object of research (lowest right corner in Fig. 1). One example would be classical temperament theories and other examples are later typologies like those of

K.B. Madsen

448

Pavlov and Jung. Even some variants of factoranalytic personality theory belong to this category, e. g. Eysenck's well-known personality theory.

Developmenti

-

~ ~ F ~ l G e n ePsycholog\ r a l n 2

-$ ,g (D

3 Y

1

Learning. Perception and other Cognitive Processes

Motivational and Emotional Procassss

-

a& Figure 1 Systematic classification of psychological disciplines.

A more extended form of personality psychology also includes dynamic

processes such as motivation and emotions (lowest left corner in Fig. 1). It is via these processes that individual personality factors (dispositions) manifest themselves empirically in consciousness and action. Some personality theories also encompass the ontogenetic development of personality factors (see Fig. 1). Freud's psychoanalysis is a well-known example of a personality theory focusing all dynamic variables - both the processes and the factors together with their development. One form of personality psychology, finally, also uses information variables in its research. It thus focuses intelligence and ability factors (upper right corner in Fig. 1) together with the information handling (cognitive) processes influenced by these factors (upper left corner in Fig. 1). In addition, it takes into account the development of these factors and processes. This latter form of personality psychology is obviously the most comprehensive. It is both differential and general; it is developmental with respect to dynamic as well as information variables. This all-embracing form could perhaps be called an Apart from PGP there lity psychology. Presently Arnold Powell's "Theory of

integrating personality psychology. are some few other examples of such a personaI would like to mention Joseph A . Royce's and Personality and Individual Differences: Factors,

A Metatheoretical Analysis of Percept-Genetic Theory

449

Systems, and Processes" (Royce L Powell, 1983). because it is a very systematic, comprehensive, and exact theory. Although these two examples of integrating personality theories differ considerably, a comparison might prove very fruitful. It can, however, be made only after a metatheoretical analysis of PGP.

METATHEORETICAL ANALYSIS In order to make a systematic comparison we have to look at a very brief, concentrated presentation of our "systematological metatheory" : According to i t , scientific production takes place at three levels, and any complete scientific product (a scientific text) should encompass all three levels (see Fig. 2 ) . We shall present the three levels for the PGP-theory:

THE DATA LEVEL

The most concrete level of representation is called the empirical or data level (cf. Madsen, 1974, 1984). It includes descriptions of empirical research, methods, as well as results (data). PGP data are most often collected by means of two kinds of methods which are often combined: 1. Experiments using a tachistoscope; 2 . Tests using projective material (6 la TAT).

These two methods have been combined in some studies in such a way that projective material was presented tachistoscopically, but other ingenious methods have also been used. The percept-genetic personality psychology has applied these methods to many different groups of subjects, ranging from patients with various forms of neurosis to research workers in biology and humanistic disciplines. PGP methods have proven very useful, particularly in diagnostic clinical work.

THE HYPO THESIS LEVEL

The middle level of presentation (see Fig. 2 ) is called the theory or hypothesis level, because it includes the explanatory andlor interpretative hypotheses or models.

K.B.Madsen

450

rhc M e l a - Level:

Philosophy

Philosophy

the World

Science

I'hc I l y p o l l i e t i c u l - l e v e l :

A

J

~

~

Pert.- conscious

Irl @ Hypothesis

@ Hypothesis

I

Hypothesis

I

unconscious 0

I Figure 2 Systematological Metatheory.

PGP is characterized by its intcgration of hypotheses from two very

different research traditions: 1. Perceptual and cognitive psychology; 2 , Psychoanalysis.

The superordinate hypotheses could be described as follows : 1st Hypothesis: perception is a genetic process which produces a percept constituting the conscious information;

A Metatheoretical Analysis of Percept-Genetic Theory

45 I

2nd Hypothesis : the percept-genesis is influenced by other, simultaneous (cognitive or dynamic) processes and by the structure of the entire personality (innate dispositions as well as previous experience) ; 3rd Hypothesis: the percept-genetic phases reflect the stages of personality development. It i s , naturally, the second and third hypotheses which make possible a combination of personality psychology, in a limited sense, with psychology of perception and cognition. Moreover, the second and, especially, the third hypothesis invite an experimental testing of percept-genesis and of the relationships between personality and perception. The psychanalytically inspired hypotheses could be conceived of as subordinate to the second and third hypotheses. Defense mechanisms and their influence in the percept-genesis are, for instance, a central theme in PGP.

THE META-LEVEL

The most abstract level of representation is the meta-level which refers to the philosophical presuppositions of the scientific production (approximately Kuhn's paradigm). The meta-level can be divided in two parts: The ontology This represents the metaphysical suppositions of the production as far as psychology is concerned, particularly the view of human nature. PGP is explicitly biological in this respect, which can be formulated in the following way (Hentschel & Smith, 1980, p. 397): "The main trend running through all the chapters is the assumption that the individual can be viewed as an adaptive system.'f This biological conception of man is set forth in greater detail in Lauridsen and Madsen (1982). However, one misses more explicit formulations regarding the superordinate psycho-physical problem. The philosophy of science This part of the philosophical suppositions ecompasses the epistemological, meta-theoretical, and methodological presumptions. PGP psychologists are most explicit with regard to the epistemological presuppositions. They profess themselves adherents of a "constructivistic epistemologyTT(Hentschel b Smith, 1980) : percepts and other cognitive phenomena (explanations, concepts, etc. ) are thus constructs arranged in a hierarchy with respect to their closeness to reality. It should be empha-

K.B. Madsen

452

sized that there is a highly consistent agreement between the epistemological presumptions of the percept-genetic theory of personality and its empirical research findings, The metatheoretical presuppositions are not made explicit but it seems obvious that PGP has a nomothetic (scientific) ideal - with experiments as the preferred methodology. After this metatheoretical analysis of PGP we will formulate a coherent, general characterization of it by comparing it with Royce and Powellls theory.

COMPARISON T H E META-LEVEL

PGP and Royce's personality psychology resemble each other above all in being comprehensive and integrative. There is also considerable resemblance with respect to the content of the meta-levels. Both productions have a biological view of human nature, a constructivistic epistemology, and a nomothetic ideal. However, Royce and Powell formulate the meta-level in greater detail. About 20% of their book is devoted to the meta-level, only about 3% in Hentschel and Smith's.

THE HYPOTHESIS LEVEL

A s far as content is concerned there is also some resemblance with

respect to superordinate hypotheses. We have already presented the main hypotheses of PGP. Royce's theory holds that all psychological processes can also be considered as information handling processes (including, even, the dynamic processes). These processes exist in a hierarchical system the "total psychological system" or the "personality system" - which consists of 6 subsystems: the sensoric, the rnotoric, the cognitive, the affective, the "style-l1, and the "value-system". These subsystems include the factoranalytical personality factors as basic elements. The scopes of the hypothesis levels are very different. In Hentschel and Smith they comprise only a few percent of the book's pages, in Royce and Powell the remaining 80%. The formalization is also different: Royce and Powell present plenty of graphical models while Hentschel and Smith formulate their hypotheses. verbally.

-

A Metatheoretical Analysis of Percept-Genetic Theory

453

THE DATA LEVEL

This part of the representation is very different between these two forms of personality psychology. The scope varies from more than 90% in Hentschel and Smith to close to 0% in Royce and Powell. However, the latter authors refer to a lot of empirical studies done by Royce and coworke r s over more than three decades. As far as content is concerned the data presentations also differ considerably. Royce and coworkers mostly present factoranalytical test data, whereas PGP data reflect an original integration of experimental and projective test results.

CONCLUSION

To sum up, from a theory of science point of view, the psychology of Royce and coworkers can be described as a theoretically developed psychology, whereas PGP is more empirically developed. This difference could be expressed by means of a hypothesis quotient (HQ) which is a quantitative estimation of the testability of a scientific theory. HQ is an inverse expression of testability: a low HQ corresponding to high testability, and vice versa. I have not yet estimated the HQ for the two theories under consideration here, but I guess that the HQ for PGP is low (meaning a high degree of testability) while it is high for Royce and Powell's theory (meaning a low degree of testability; cf. Madsen, 1984). In spite of these differences, however, the fact remains that both theories are integrating personality psychologies. Perhaps they could even enhance their integrative power by means of mutual, fruitful inspiration.

454

K.B. Madsen REFERENCES

Hentschel, U., & Smith, G. (Eds.).

(1980).

Experimentelle Persiinlichkeitspsy-

chologie. Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft. Madsen, K.B. (1974). Theories of Motivation. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. Madsen, K.B. (1984). The hypotheses quotient. In J.R. Royce (Ed.), Annals of Theoretical Psychology. New York: Plenum. Lauridsen, P., & Madsen, K.B. (1982). Eine Besprechung von U. Hentschel & G. Smith (Eds.), Experimentelle Persiinlichkeitspsychologie unter rnetatheoretischen Gesichtspunkten. Psychologische Beitriige, 24, 628-636. Royce, J.R., & Powell, A. (1983). Theory of Personality and Individual Differences: Factors, Systems, and Processes. Englewood-Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall.

455

NAME INDEX

Adler ,A . Adler ,J

406

.

Barron, F,

250,268,272

2,73

Basch ,M. F.

Ageberg, G.

234,243

Bateson, G .

Alavi ,A. A1bani, G

353,360

Battig, W .F.

390,398

Bengtson ,M.

50,51,

.

Aldridge, V . J

.

382,400

Ali,Z.

360

Allen, G.J.

66,69,107,141

. Allison, T .

Allison, J

.

Allport, G ,W Almgren,P.E.

223,224,226,233-235,238, 239,243,245,408,416

Ariarn ,S Arieti, S

.

18,75,268,272,

..

.

Bentsen ,E.

382,398

.

. .

57,68

.

390,397

Blacha ,M D

260,272

Blatt ,S. J. Bleuler ,E

58,68

.

301,326

Blos,P.

239,244

Bohm,E.

325

Bornstein,P.M. Bowers,P. B

.

240,347

Boynton,R.M. Brand,H. W.

268,272

Brcngelrnann, J. C

1U7,141 251,272,323,326

Aron,A.

268,272

Aron ,E N

268,272

4,32

. Brenner ,D .P. Broadbent ,D.E . Brennan ,S

64,72 77,91,268,272

251,272 53,63,64,66,68,

..

172,213

Birbaumer ,N

277,281,300

Aquino, C C

408,416

.

Bennett, B M.

379 24,35,219,245,

Anthi,P.P.

21,217,222,244,

Bernstein ,D

Andersson, A . L 21,32,2 17-22 1,

Antel1,M. J.

302,326 109,117,142

254,272 334,335,347

.

238,244

.

15,32 334,347 58,68 62,69 422,426

Bronstein,A. 49,5U, 55,63,69,73 Bruner, J.

5,32,308,326,327

Auersperg ,A . von

11.32

Brunswik,E.

Augenbraun ,H. R

62,68

Brush, J.

62,68

Bryant-Tuckett,R. 54,63,64,139

Ausubcl, J .E. Ayer ,A. J.

.

406,416

Bull. J. W . D

6%,69

.

Burggasser,R. Bandura,A.

212,213

Burgner ,M ,

Bannister, D

39,47

Burkham, R .

. Barrios, M,V .

268,269,272

270,272

360 254,272 241,244 62,69,107,142

456

Name Index

Callaway, E

.

Cameron, N. Campbell ,D ,T

. Candell, P .

302,327 302,321,327

.

14,35

Dachfnger ,P.

66,73

D’Aftlitti,J . P.

58,68

Danielsson,A.

16,22,39,47,

Cancro, R

301,330

165,203,215,222,238,245,

73

256,258,263,268,275,277,

Caporali , M ,

390,398

Carlsson, I .

268,275,277,288,290,299,

Cattanach, L. Cattell, R.B.

410,417,442,445

.

51,58,69

Daves ,W. F.

93,102

Dauber, R

409,410,417,442,445

.

Carroll, R

281,282,300,354,360,409,

16,22,235,245,

50,59,60,69

Day,J.

381,382,399

Deregowski,J.B.

387,397

Chamberland-Bouhadana ,G

.

110,141

Deutsch,H.

Chapman, J. P.

301,302,321, 327,329

.

Citrin ,M

.

Coats ,A. C Cohen, I. H

. .

252,270-272,277,278,282,

5,34 362,378

Cole, J . 0.

392,393,399

Collingwood, R. G

.. Conrad, K .

Condon, T J Conte ,M.

Coron ,M

.

.

179,214

.

Corteen, R . S. Cox,L.

299,331,336,347,394,397,

.

413,416,428,442,445

Domino, G 268,273 Donchin,E. 366,367,378,384,398 Dragun8,J.G. 3,6,16,23,28,30, 32,33,269,273,302,303,

327,331-335,338,347,419,

405

66,69,107,141 23,32 62,63,69

Coombs, C . H . Cooper, R

39,40,43,45,47,93,94,

54,69

389,398,400

.

9,10,15,17,30,32,

100-102,162,167,170,213,

Cohen, S . I . Colleen, S

405

Dixon,N.F.

76.91

.

Cohen ,R

336,349,377,380

68 391,398

Cohen,M.M.

30,35,268,275,

.

Dilthey ,W

Chapman, L. J. 301,302,321,327 Chevron, E

283,299

Dickman ,S ,

251,273

14,32

4,32 382,400 49,73 93,102

425-428,445

Drechsler ,I .

307,329

Drever ,J.

332,347

Drye,R, C

.

. .

du Boulay ,G H Dudek ,S. 2. Dunn, D

.

Dyk,R. B.

284,299 360 251,273 93,95,102 36

49,69

Crawford, P. J .

108,141

Ecc1es’J.C.

Czogalik, D ,

370,378

Edgcumbe ,R .

8,35,410 241,244

Name Index

451

Ehlers, W. 24,361,370,378 Ehrenzweig,A. 250,273 Einstein, A. Eissler ,K R ,

414 251,273 110,141

.

.

Ellis, H D.

. .

Emmelkamp ,P M

. Endler ,N .S . Erdelyi, M .H ,

65,69

Frenkel-Brunswik,E.

14,33

Freud , A . 163,213,222,244 Freud, S 75,91,103,105, 162,213,235,238,239,244,

.

251,269,273,427,440,448 Fribourg ,A ,

51,56,67,70

Emrich, H

336,347 387,397 338,347

Fries, I. 245 Frohlich,W .D. 23,25,30,33,35

Eriksen, B . A .

128,141 128,141

390-393,397

Eriksen, C . W . Eysenck,H. J .

438,448 388,397

..

Eysenc k ,M \V

.

Fairbairn, W R . D Fancher, R. E Farrell, J.

.

.

235,237, 244,323,327 50,73

..

Fernandez , R .

18,103,296,300 404,405,416

Feyerabend ,P.

..

Finney ,D J

Nscher , G . H. Fish, F.

.

Ntzler ,D. E . Flavel1,J.H.

. .

Gaillard, A .W K

.

302,329 Gamble, I(. H. 338,347 Ged0,J.E. 21,33,234,235,244

..

Geisler ,C J

15,17,49,51, 62,66,70,166,214,349

Gelb,A.

430,445

Gemelli, A .

332,347 308,327 25,34,381,383,

Gibson, J. J. Glanzmann,P.

390-392,397

172,213 339,347

Glaser ,M.0. G1ennon.S.S.

23,33 39,47 250,273

Gleser , G . C.

380 28,33,302,303,

365,378 50,59,60,62,70 255,260.273

Godel, K ,

405 365,379 Goldberg,A. 21,33,234,235,244 Goff, W .R

.

Goldberger ,L

.

.

Forisha, H L.

..

Francis, W. Frank,L. K. Frank, S

.

Franzen ,G

.

Freedman, B

269,273 302,329 109,141,340,348 334,347

.

66,73 233,243 301,321,327

18,49,72,75, 268,272,340,347

327,332,338,347 Framo, J L

384,397

Galanter,E.

260,272

Faterson, H k’ 36 Feniche1,O. 162,163,165,213

Fisher, C Ntzgerald ,E ,T

332,333,347,381,383,

Goldhahn ,G Goldstein, K

. .

386,397 302,321, 327,430,445

Goldweber ,A. Goodenough ,D R

.

Gordon, W Gorsuch , R .L.

77,92 36 62,70,269,273 25,35,387,399

. .

Name Index

458

Govier, E

.

Gowan,J.C.

57,58,73

. .

Gruzelier ,J H Guilford, J .P

.

.

Hentschel, U.

28,33,332,347

Grinker, R.R. Grunbaum ,A.

249,251,254,255,268,269,

284,299

271-274,281,299,333,337,

61,70

340,347,348,361,379,410,

321,327

416,442,445,447,451-454

Herrera, L

Haider ,M Haley ,J

.

.

Hallborg ,A.

Hobbs ,S R

182,213

Holland,B. 16,35,77,92,278,300

. .

. Heath ,D .

.

Heilbrun ,K

.

Holzkamp ,K .

76,91 50,62,63,70

14,33 62,72 57,62,64,70 172,213,294,299

Holtzman ,V/ H.

62,70s107 1 4 1

Hayden, B Hays, \V L.

Holley, J . W. Holt ,R.R

.

.

.

62,70

302,326

62,70.107,141

.

255,273 365,367,377,379

. . .

Hartmann, H . 76,78,91,163,213 Hartmann, H A. 339,347 Haspel, K. C Ilavel, J

14,35

..

Hirsch ,H V B H i r t ,M.

360

.

140,141

Hers kovit z ,M J Hickel, U

358,360

Halsey ,J .M : Harris, R. S

Hershenson, M.

.

275

.

339,348

Hillyard, S. Hines ,K.

93,100,102

Hhkansson ,K

334,348

..

434,445

Hadar ,M.

172,214

.

Herron, E W

6,33

Habermas, J .

.

Herrmann, T

28,33,140,141

.

I

250,273

299,353,360

Hadamard, J

3,6,7,15,16,21

28,30,32,33,35,219,245,

249,273,294,299 254,274,296,

Haber,R .N.

223,243, 303,329

252,273

Grabowski, R. Graumann , C . F. Greenacre, P.

Gur ,R . C

. .

Henriksson ,N G

93,102

Hsu,P. Hukkanen,S. Hull, C .L .

76,91,251,274 339,348,349 7,33 172,213 366,379 389,3Y7

172,213 161,213

. . .

Heinemann ,L G Hempe1.C. G .

. .

Ihilevich ,D

.

53,64,70,

Ingvar , D . H.

107,108,141

1rwin.D.A. Itskowitz , R .

336,347

255,260,273 358,359 389,391,392,398 275

413,416

Henley ,S H A. 17,18,39,40

I

47

93,102,278,299,442,445

Henriksson,M. 166,215,277,300

9

. .

57,71

Jack8on.D.D.

302,326

Jacklin, C N Jackson, J

.

57,58,63.67,70

459

Name Index Jacobson, J .

57,70

Jacobson ,M.

14,33

.

Jarvilehto, T

366,379

. . .

Jasper ,H H Jenkins, J Jens, R

.

.

Jensen , A . R Joffe, W

383,386,397

.

.

Johanson ,A. M Johansson , A .

. .

John, E H

Johnson , G .

Knott,J.R. Kohut ,H

389-392,398,400

.

234,239,240,245

Kowalski,J. Kraepelin ,E

.

117,142

Kragh,U. 7,16,19,20,33-35,39,

391,399

47,145,146,148,155,156,

362,379

158,159,161,163,164,169,

163,164,212,214

171,173,186,189-191,200,

24,353

212-214,217-219,221,222,

234,243

226,225,245,251,267,274,

366,380

299,303,328,332,333,336,

24,35,219,245,

337,348,404,407-409.411,

277,281,300,302,330

.

Johnson, M

26,403

.

Jung, C .G

82,91 301,328

448

416

. .

Kramer ,C Y Kreitler ,H

.

90,91 22,23,301-304,

307,309-311,313,324,

Kaplan , A . Kaplan ,R

412,416

.

54.71

.

Karlsson, B

325,328,329,335,348

Kreitler ,S.

234,243

Karp ,S. A .

36,82,91

Kaufman, L.

53,71

Kaye,M.

51,67,71

Kelly, G . A .

6,16,21,33

.

325,328,329,335,348

Krippner ,S Kroon ,T

Kuzera, H

Kety,S. Khayyam ,0

353,359

Kuhn , T .

Kilborg ,R R

324,327

. . Klein, G. S .

14,33,166,215,

268,274 75-77,91,251,274

.

283,299 404

.

K r i s .E.

Kernberg ,O F.

.

22,23,301-304,

307,309-311,313,324,

189,213,409,416

.

109,141,340,348 404,405

Kullberg ,G

.

359 377,379

Kutas,M. Kwawer, J . S.

49,73

277,278,300,308,327, 361,363,370,379

Klein ,L

.

. Kline ,P .

18,103,296,300

Klein ,M

Klinger ,H

.

Lachmann, F. Lader ,M

.

321,328

235,236,238,244

Laing,R.D.

161,162,212,213

Lakatos ,I .

50,73

Lang ,P. J

.

254,273

Latscha, R

Klorman ,R

382,398

Lauridsen, P.

Kluckhohn, C

.

335,348

6,34 405,415,416

.

Klintman, H .

.

50,56,57,73

382,400 172,213 411,416,447, 451,454

460

Name Index

Laux, L.

25,34 6,34 15,24,34

Lee, A. R. Leibowitz, H.W. Leiter,E.

56,63.71 251.274

Levitt , M .

Levy, J. 105,141 Lieberman,H.J.339,342,343,348

.

Liebert ,R M. Linds1ey.D.B.

381,398 24,34,382,399

Linehan ,E Linschoten, J.

65,71 6,34,424,426

Litwack,T .R.

50,59,60,68,71

.

Ljunghill-Andersson ,P. W.

.

62,71

Lomangino, L. Lonski ,M

.

50,71 50,71 382,398

..

Loveless, N E

Lowenhard,P.

8,9,34 390,391,398 25,35,387,399

Low , M . D. Lushene,R.E. Lustbader ,L. Lustig, D

50,73 50,51,60,62,73

.

179,214 235,245 5,24,54

Marmor ,J. Marr ,D

.

Marshall,J . Martin, A .

Massaro, D. W.

5,34,421,426

Matussek, P.

23,34 358,359 367,378,382,

Maximilian ,V .A. McCallum, W

.C .

McCarthy ,G

MacKinnon , D . W McKinnon ,T

57,71 Mackay , D G. 93,102 Mackworth, N. H. 128,141 Madsen,K. B. 27,411,416,447,

.

449,451,453,454

.

Magnusson ,P A.

.

McSherry ,J . W. Mednick, S . A .

. . Mendelsohn ,E . Meyer ,D.E . Meyers, H .G. Milich ,R . Miller, B . Meissner ,W W

391,398 82.91 284,299 49-51,55,71,73 108,142 62,71 50,56,57,73

Miller, D F

302,329

Miller, J

.

. . Mischel, W . Moray, M .

Miller, L. H Mindes, C

Maier ,E ,

363,378

. Morris, L .W .

Mainka,G.

363,379

Morton, J ,

172,214 391.399 103,104,108, 137-159,191,142

Mourad ,S

.

268,274 301,329

Miller, G .A.

303,329 301,329

Maltzman, I. Marcel, A . J

.

384,398 301,302,389

82,91 252,274

Maher , B , A .

Mainland, D ,

390,398,400

.

. .

Maccoby ,E.E.

360 50,73 250,274

.

Maslow,A . H

McGhie,A,

302,330 Lodl, C M.

Mardh, P. A .

Morocutti, C

49,71 389,398,400 62,63,71 335,348 422,426 390,398 381,398

Murray, H . A .

363,366,379 252,275 24,361 295,299,335,348

Musgrave, A.

405,416

.

Munz,D.

Name Index Mykel ,N

46 1

.

Myrdal, G

93,102 403,417

.

Patterson,K.E. Patterson, T

108,142 321,323,330 431,448 389,398,400 62.72

.

Pavlov, I. Naatanen ,R ,

366,379

..

Naut a , W J Ncisser ,U Meuman, T

.

.

Newel1,A.

..

New man, R S Nilsson, A.

.

Nilsson ,I. K

179,214

Nisbett,R.E.

222,246 283,299,337,

.

349,354,360 Obrist, W . D .

355,359 441,445

Obuchowska, I. Obuchowski, K

Picton, T. W. Picrclli, F. Pitts ,n!.

. Oldfield, R .C . Oliver, J. M .

109,142 107,142

72,405-407,410,417 Powel1,A.

448,449,452-454

Poze,T.

269,273 Pribram ,K . 302,329 Prim ,W 26,419,421-423,426

.

Prohovnik, I. Proulx ,G B

. . .

Quinlan ,D M. Qureshi ,Z. Raiffa, H

.

.

Rangell, L

Owens ,D.A.

15,34

Rapaport ,D

Packer, S .B. Palermo, S

.

Re gan ,

117,142

. .

Palmatier, J R

414 39,47,161,214 7,8,26,34,35,61,

Poet zl, 0 , Popper,K.R.

65,71

254 ,274,296,299 53,62,64,72

34 365,379,390,398 93,102

O'Toole, J.

.

302,329

390,398

.

Planck ,M

.

26,27,427,430 435,437,438,440,443,445 Ohlsson, M 234,243

Packer, I. K

. .

Phillipson ,H G

39,47

Nordstrom ,M. Nyman ,G .E

Phillips, L.

.

Pfanner ,D

421,426 222,245,411,417 365,379,422,426 12,34,424,426 62,72 223,238,243, 245,303,329

.

Neumann , O

Peters, J. F.

359

.

.

Reinehr ,R C Reivich ,M

.

Rettig, G .M. Ricoeur ,P

.

358,360 390,398 58,68 64,72 4,32 251,274 163,212,214 365,379 339,349 353,358,360 391,398 252,274

64,72 200,214 50,71,72

Risberg, J

245 24,172,213,353,

Parker ,D.A.

390,398 391,399

Ritter ,W.

355,358-360 367,378,382,399

Parker, K . A .

53,64,65,72

Palmquist ,A. Palumbo, R

.

Papakostopoulos ,D

.

Ried, J.

Rizzo, P. A.

389,398

462

Name Index

..

Robertson, S R Rodin, G

.

62,64,72

Roga1sky.M.M.

Schmidt-Durban. W .

332,349

63,69

Schneider ,P.

335,348

77,91

Schneider, U.

Rohrbaugh, J.W.

382,399

Rosenstiel, L. von

339,348

Rosenthal, R . Ross, D

63,72

.

50,51,60,62,73

Schulman ,D. Schulze, U

.

Segal H

Rossman ,J.

249,274

Segall ,M. H

Royce,J.R.

3 60

7,8,35,448,449,

362,378

Schvaneveldt ,R . W.

284,299

.

250,275

.

Ross,M. Ross-Russcl, R. W

16,21,249,340,

348,410,416,442,445

235,245

.

14,35

Seym0ur.P.H.K. Shakow ,D.

363,366,380

301,302,320,321,

452-454

Rubenstein,D. Rubin, E.

251,274

.

Ruddy, Iv~ Rutstein,E.H.

Sharma,V .P.

142

Shavit ,H 275 Shepherd, J W 110,141 Shevrin,H. 30,35,268,275,336,

233,234,243

Sachs,

75,91

Sackeim ,H.A.

62,72,254,274, 296,299

Saltz ,E.

388,389,394,399

Sander,F.

329,330 302,330

Shapir0,S.A.

268 49,72

Ruuth,E.

142

.

Siegel. A. W

164,214,222,245

..

349,377,380

.

324,327

Silbert ,J .

62,65,73

Silfvcrskiold, P , Siller ,J

.

24,353

53,63,64,66,68,

28,35,170,214,249,

. .

107,141

274,332,334,349

Silverman, D K

76,91

Sandler ,J. Sanford,A. J.

163,164,212,214

Silverman, J. Silverman, L.H .

301,330

Sarason,I.G. Sarnoff, I ,

381,393,394,399

Sayre, K

382,398 165,214

.

Scarborough, H

.

Schaefer, c .

. Scheier ,I. H . Scheerer ,M

Schlesinger ,K Schmidt, J.M.

.

49-60,62-64,66,67,69,71,

73,77,78,81,87,88,92,104,

142,166,170,211,214,268,

108,110 251,274

Schaffner, P.

Schilder,P.

9,35

15,17,40,47,

275,277,278,299,349

Silverstein, R

.

25,34

Simson, R

302,321,327

Singer, G.

.

50,62,63,70 382,399

.

301,329

387,397

Singer, J. L

302 329

Singer, M. T. 302,330 Sjoback,H. 20,161,163,214,222,

251,275 51,59,62,63

268,269,272

245,408,411,417

Name Index

463

Sjoberg,L.

411,417

Smith, G . J . W .

3,7,15,16, 22,24,28,30,32-35,39, 47,146,148,155,158,159, 161,163-166,203,212,214, 215,217,219,222,235,238, 245,246,251,256,258,263, 267,268,271,272,274,275,

277,278,281-283,288,290, 299,300,302,330,332,333, 336-338,347-349,353,354,

360,404,409,410,417,442, 445,447,451-454 Smith, W . H . Somekh , D .E, Spada, H

.

Spadaro, M

380 93,102,278,300 339,347

.

390,398 Spence,D .P. 16,18,35,77,92, 103,166,215,277,278,282,

.

Spence, J . T

Spence,R.W.

296,300,331,349 388,389,393,399 388,389,393,399

. . 25,34,35, 387-389,393-395.399 Spiro, R. H . 56,73 Spohn , H .E. 301,321,323,330

Suler, J . R .

Sutcliff, M. I. 172,214 Sutton, S , 301,321,330,366,380 Swartz, J.D. Swift,J.S.

339,348,349 390,398

Symon, L Syndulko, K

360 382,391,399

.

.

Taylor, J. A. 381,399 Tecce,J.J. 381,382,392,393,399 Thetford, P. E.

.

.

Sprockhoff, H . Stein , M . I. Steingart ,I.

239,246 283,300 240,246

Stern,A. Stierlin ,H. Straatman, H Strauss,H. Strelau, J . Stro0p.J

301,321,330 11,32 289,300

.

65,69 268,275 438,440,445

24,35,361,362,364,

367,368,371,377,378,380

301,330

Thompson, H. K

.

Thorpe, J . S . Thrall, R M

355,359 339,348 4,32

.

109,117,142 252,275

. . Toglia ,M .P .

Torrance, E P. Trieber ,E

.

62,64,73 366,367,380 390,397

Tueting,P. Tunner ,CV

.

Uexkiill, J . von

Spielberger ,C D

Spring, B J

251,275 323,330

..

Sullivan, H S

Vaillant ,G. E

lO,ll,35

.

269,275 53,64,74 Van Veen,W,J. 389,398 Varga, M 49,74 379,382,399 Vaughan ,H . G Venables,P.H. 321,323,327,330 Voigt ,J , 334,349 van Santen ,J .

.

Volkelt ,H

.

.

Wallas, G.

249,275

Walter, W .G. Wang ,H S

.

Wanunu ,V

170,214

.

.

Watson, J.P.

382,400 355,359 324,329 92

Name Index

464

Weakland, J .

302,326

. . .

Weerts, T C

382,400

Weikert ,C

21,32,217,218,

220,221,224,226,238,243 Wein,,S.

68

Weir,C.

40,47

Weissberg,J .

73

Weizsacker,V. von

.

Werble ,B Werner , H . Werth ,R

11,12,36 284,299

28,36,303,332,349

.

15,36

Westerlundh, B ,

7,20,35, 39.47,156,159,161,163,

165,172,187 ,189,191,199. 200,201,203,211,212,215, 217,222,238,246,251,267, 275 ,2 7 8 , 2 7 9 , 3 0 0 , 3 3 2 , 3 4 9 , 408,411,417 Wedemann, C . F. Wilding, J . M . Wilkinson,I.M.S. Wilkinson,W.E. Wills, E. L.

. . .

Wilson, E M . Wilson, T D Wine, J .

50,59,71 93,102,278,300 355,358,360 355,359 360 3 60 39,47

381,393,394,400

Winnett , R .

53,64,74

Winter, A . L.

382,400

Witkin, H . A .

14,36 49,73

Wolit z k y ,C Wood, B Woods, D ,

W ynne ,L

Y ager, J.

.

.

93,102 367,379 302,330 50,59,71

Zaidel, E . Zajonc, P.B

. .

Zanasi ,M Ziskind ,E Zubin, J .

105,134,142

.

269,275 390,398

391,399 301,321,330,366.380

Zuckerman, S

.

57,64,74

465

SUBJECT INDEX

Aphasic patients

Activation of painful affects

161

A c t of perceiving

4 20

Approaches to personality - idiographic 325 -

Adaptation enhancing functions

362

nomothetic

325

56

Association network

67

Asymmetry of visual field 114 Awareness threshold for light 18,20,93,94,101,170

Adjective Rating Scale for measuring differentiation

115

Aftereffects

-

change in duration 217 duration 217,224

Behavior asscrtiveness training

final level

Biologically oriented

217,223

models of adaptation

After images - irregular strips

11

Aggressive dependency

241

Ambient vs. foveal vision

-

increase in left frontoorbital area 357

Borderline patients 20,

278,279, 282-286,297

20,167-200

Amauroscopic technique

31

Blood flow

15

Amauroscopic percept-genesis

53

Brunswik's lens model 2 7 0 , 2 7 1

167-200

Anality stimulus Anxiety -evoking disorientation

55,67 326

Capacity of the sensory system

Anxiety experience - subjective 3 8 1 , 3 9 4 ,SY5

-

Anxiet y-neurotics Anxiety

Castration anxiety Castration fantasies

-

CBF(Cerebra1 blood flow)

object related vs. internalized

24,353

general scientific value of

406,407 203.210 199

Ceiling hypothesis of

Anxiety, state of

Cerebral blood flow (CBF)

experimentally controlled elevation 353

24,

353-359

358

Anxiety over separation 59.60 Anxiety provocation 357

-

139

Case studies

CNV

389,392 24,

353-359

Subject Index

466

Cerebral glucose m et aboli s m

353

Cerebra1 oxygen met abolism353 Channel - attended 93,365 - unattended 93 Channel capacity of conscious experience

39

C NV ( Contin gent negative

variation ) 25,381-395 Code-Emotions Theory 4 2 8 , 4 2 9 , 430,436,441

Codes abstract concrete - creative

-

430,432,435 430,434-436,443

hierarchic - monoconcrete - polyconcrete -

433,434 432-434 430 431,432

Codes for the representation of stimuli

5

Codes of information processing

26

2 37

321

and passivity

339

Conflict over anality Conflict over oral-

50

aggressive wishes Conflict-related distortions of reality Constricting effects of

50 30

awareness 277 Constructivistic epistemology in PG 451,452 Contaminated referents 323 Contingent negative variation( C N V ) 381-395 - early 25,382,383,386,387 - late 25,382-384,386,387 Convergent thinking

250

tions Covert at t ent ional

386

38 ,396 processes 430 Creative anticipation Creative functioning test

(see also PG Test and in verted PG) 21,257-259,262,

12

263,268,288-291,293,294,297

4

410,411

Creativity complex Criterion percept-

subliminal experiments 122-128,130-133,135,138

Commissurotomy patients 134 Communication of perceptual content s Complex-related stimuli

Conflict of ambivalence Conflict over aggression

302

Coherence of subject and environment Color vision Commands for reaction in

409

Cortex-effector interac-

Code of Regulative Operations in IMP 438-440,441 Cognitive control 3 6 1 , 3 7 6 , 3 7 7 Cognitive theory of schizophrenia

Concept validation Concrete thinking in schizophrenics

6 40

genesis Critical realism Culturally given presuppositions

290 167-211 7

139

Subject Index

461

Data level in meta-

DMI(Defense Mechanism Inven-

theoretical analysis 449,453 Defense Mechanism

tory)

255,256,260,262,267

DMT(Defense Mechanism Test)

Inventory(DMI)255,256,260,

19,21,39,147,148,

262,267 Defense Mechanism Test(DMT)

158,161,167,169,171, 174,186,191,200,202,

Defensive organisation

165

208,210,211,217-222, 225,229-232,237,240,

164 341- 343

267,336,403,404,408, 409,411,413 DMT scoring scheme 225-228 Double blind procedure in

Defensive strategies - development of Defensive style

Defensive transformation of stimulus content

171

Delayed recognition response as a perceptual defense mechanism 337 Depression

-

analytic introjective Depressive Experience

59 59

psychodynamic activation 50-52 experiments Drawings of the subject in the DMT Drive activation

148-155,225

- subliminal Drive related stimulus

78,79

break through of 182 Dysphoria-scale for measuring effects of subliminal

58,59 Questionnaire Depressive retardation 219 Desensitization of insect

-

66 phobias Dialectical conception of cognitive growth 233,235

stimulation 255,260,261,266 Dysphoric reactions 58,60, 266,268,269 Early CNV 25,382,383,386,387 Edinburgh Inventory 109,116,

Dichotic listening Dichoptic presentation

93 46

Dichoptic viewing

93

Differcntiai reaction time paradigm

386

Dimensions of artistic production Directional Regulator in IMP Disavowal -

varieties of

129 Effort after meaning

289

438-440,441,443

221,222,228, 231-233,240,241 Divergent thinking 250

6

Ego - integrative functions of 75 Ego control in the creative process

251,252

Ego-strength-scale(ES) 370 Ego-threat as a stressor in anxiety research 388,390 Environment in IMP 437,440, 442

468

Subject Index

ES(Ego-strength scale)

370

ESP(Extra-sensory403 perception) Evoked potentials in EEG 24, 361,365,367,370,376 -

components of 25,365,367, 369,370,373,376,378

Evolutionary principle - adaptive functions of

9

Freiburger Personlichkeitsinventar (FPI) 370 Fronto-limbic system - involvement in anxiety 359 Functional circle (Funktionskreis)

Functionalistic frame of reference 250,270 Functional validity in

EVs(Exposure Values) 22,310, 311,341-344 Experimenter bias 51 Exposure values(EVs) 22,310, 311.341-344 Eye movement - control of

110

Falsificationism 405,406 Fear of disorientation in schizophrenics 321 Features of schizophrenia -

-

catatonic hebephrenic

paranoid simplex Fixation

10

perception research

271

General system of psychological processes 428 Gestalt region theory ( Gestaltkreis) CieOen Test(GT) GT(GieRen Test) Handedness control

11,12 370 370 105,107

Hemispheric activation complicated syntactic processing of the right

310 310

-

310 3 10

hemisphere Hemisphere asymmetries

105 116

Hemispheric mean blood flow

central 106,133,135,140 - controlled 105,106 - point of 106-108,110,111, 127,130 -

level Hermeneutics

357 VS.

experi-

mentation Heterosexual threat High imagery stimuli

6 194 117,121

- successive 105 Foveal area registration of stimulus 105,107,122 FPI (Freiburger Pers8nlich-

Historical events in the subject's life 155,156 HIT (Holtzman Inkblot

keit sinventar ) Fractionalization of the visual field in schizo-

339,341 Technique) Hologenic microgenetic method 304

370

p hrenics

321-323

Fragment at ion

319,320

Holtzman Inkblot Technique (HIT)

339,341

469

Subject Index

Hyper-frontalit y

358

Information processing approach to perception 2 8 ,

Hypnotic states related

-

267 to creativity Hypnosis level in metatheo-

-

retical analysis Hypothesis quotient

453

278-281,284,287,288,293 294-296.410

Identification with the aggressor - subliminally induced 284,410 Identification with the victim subliminally induced 284,297 Identity diffusion 284

-

Inadequate sex attribution 182,190 Incest stimulus Inceot taboo

207 211

-

related to conscious

awareness Initial Slope Index(IS1) Integrated model of the

355

processes of psychological regulation(1MP) 4 2 8 , 438,440-444

Interference phenomenon (see also Stroop Test)

362, 363,371

Internal verbalisation Intrasystenic variables

271

Inverted percept-genesis

21,

362

257-259,262,263,266, 410,411

ISI(1nitial Slope Index) IT( Identification Test)

355

293-296,410 55

Individual thresholds in subliminal experiments

254

Individuation of the self

239

Infantile conflicts

Judgements of reality by means of the Directional Regulator 438,439 'Just World' as a cultural paradigm example

reactivation through subliminal stimulation 203 184,190,192,197

semantic Information intake strategies

103

278-281,284,287,288,

psychodynamic activation research

-

376,378

55,67

Incestuous messages Individual differences in

Infantilization Information - imagistic

371,373,

449,452

Idealized self-object 239,240 Identification Test(1T)

-

421,423

early states of

114 114

439

'Key phases' in perceptgenesis Knowledge aquisition Knowledge - explicit vs. implicit

155 7

423,424 421

Subject Index

410 Language hemisphere

135

-

25.329.383, 384,386,387

dimensions of 304-308, 312,316,319,321 323,324

Level of association 118-120 Levels of psychic functioning 75

Meaningful icon 114 Meaning training 325,326 Meaning values 304-309,312-324

Lexical decisions 115,116,125, 128,130,140

Meditation techniques related

Late C N V

Location of stimuli in subliminal experiments 122-128,130-133, 135,138-140

to creativity 267 Memory traces in the S-R scheme Meta Contrast design

MetaContrast Technique (MCT) 24,161,166,200,235,277,279 281-284,297,354,355,356,

Logogen systems 364,366,371 Loosening of constructs 21

404,409,413 Metaphoric-sym bolic type

Magic synthesis of primary and secondary process in creativity 251 Manic defense 238 Manifest anxiety in DMT 221,230 Manifestations of personality in the perceptual process 335

of relation

316,319, 323- 325 Metaphor task 81,83,85-89,268 Metatheoretical analysis of percept-genetic personality theory Microgenesis

-

backward(see also Meta Contrast) 40,41,161,167, 168,174,192,202 forward

41

MCT (Meta Contrast Technique) 24,161,166,200,235,277,279, 281-284,297,354,355,356,

404,409,413 Meaning analysis Meaning - assigned to referents

22

304,311,324

447-452

-

emerging sensory stimulus

-

332 psychodynamic concepts in

-

332 the role of verbal report

Masking -

145 39,277

332,345 Micro-macro correspondence 20,145,146,158 404,407,409 'blirror'conceptualisation of perception 163 Modes of appearence of an object 12 Modiriers of the code in IMP 438,440,443

47 1

Subject Index

Paranoid-sensitive patients 279

Motive in IMP 437-439,441,443 Motive structure in females 190 -2 00

Percept-genesis (PG) - ornouroscopic 167-200 -

Motive structure in males 173-190

Narcissistic damage

284

Narcissistic vulnerability

283

Negative emotion a s a signal for inefficient action

167-2 11

inverted 2 1 , 2 5 7 - 2 6 8 , 4 1 0 , 4 1 1 - normal 1 6 2 - 1 6 5 , 1 9 0 , 2 1 2 , 2 2 0 , 253,256-259,263,270,415

Perception - as an event over time 3,338,345,404

431,435,443

Neurotic conflicts related to 251 creativity New Look movement

criterion

-

-

as a process

-

as a reality construction process 163

-

a s a sequence of meaning

331-333,345

419

Nonself orientation in SAT 219

4-6,

assignment Observers's private world Oedipal competibon Oedipal messages Oedipal threats

3 60

Ontology

451

Openess to experience 250 Operational Regulator in IMP 438,440,441,443

Oral-aggressive stimulus

-

382,386

Overlearned recognition reactions Overt motor response

382

Paradoxical reduction of CNV magnitude in high 389 anxious persons Parallels between perceptgenesis and life history (see also micro-macro correspondence) 1 4 5 , 1 5 5 , 1 5 8

421

Perception /personality interface 419,420 Perceptual accuracy Perceptual creativity

76 269

Perceptual defense tradition 40,93,332,333,345

Perceptual research - blind empiricism in

333

8

psychophysical approaches to

55, 66,67

Orientation response

- preconscious

52,59,211 234

307

12,13

functionalistic approach 250,270 to

Perceptual restrictions

5

Perceptual span in microgenesis and subliminal perception

338

Perceptual world (Merkwelt) 11 Personality adaptation passive vs. aggressive 341-344

Subject Index

412

PG-Test (see also inverted PG

Prompting stimulus

127,128

and Creative Functioning Test) 290,291,293,294,297

PSACH (Psychoanalytischer Choraktertypfragebogen) 370

Philosophy of science 404-406,413,451

Psychoanalytischer Charakter-

Physical danger in anxiety research 388-392,395

Psychodynamic activation method

Picture selection method 43-45 Polymorphous identification 175 Positron emission scanning 358

Psychodynamic motives Psychosemantic theory of

Pragmatic creativity 432 Preconscious processes related 427 to IMP assumptions Preconscious reality image 7 Primary process production 76,77,104,106,197, 283,339 Primary process thinking 75,103,104,251 Primes -

-

-

abstract concrete

1U9-121 1OY ,117,119-121 109,11U-11~,114

high associates of 117,119 high imagery nouns 117 low associates of 117 nonsense 109,117,119-121

Priming 80,108,116,166,337 - facihtation effect of 112,114,115,119-122, 128,138,139 inhibition effect of 112,114 Priming hypothesis 112 Processing -

-

typfragebogen (PSACH) 370

cognition

170 49

301,304

Questionnaire for measuring defense mechanisms 255,256 Questionnaire for measuring handedness

109

RAT (Remote Associates Test) 82,84-88 Rate of isotope washout Reaction formation-

355

against aggression 175,182, 189,194,195,199 - against homosexual

-

impulses 175,182 Reactivity without awareness 336 Receptor-cortex interactions 386 Recognition of prime 115, 118-122,129,131 Regions of registration 17, 133,136,137 Regression

roveal shift from analogue to

105

-

digital

104

76,251 Remote Associates Test (RAT)

syntactic 105-109,122,127, 128,133-135,137,140

adaptive 76,77 in the service of the ego

82,84-89

413

Subject Index Remote associations

268

Repression

-

flexibility of Repressed wishes

75

-

communication with

75

Repression/Sensitization

395

Retinal architecture

115

Response formation related to stimulus visibility

344

Response preparation Restricting effects of

387

awareness

16

Hestricting vs. flexible ego-control

361

Results in IMP

437,438,443

Rorschach Test

324,325,404

-

modified form

76

Saccadic eye movements

140

SAT (Spiral Aftereffect Technique)

21,217-224, 229-236,240

Scanning -

foveal

105

-

systematic Schizophrenic

105

-

thought disorders

302

-

pathological cognition

322

-

perception

301,307,320,326

Schizophrenics -

decreased pathology in

-

deficiencies in

-

differentiated

301 56,57,61 60,65,104

lack of selective attention

-

regressed thinking of

-

undifferentiated

302

orientation response in 3 2 1

77 56 9

57,61,310

Secondary process thinking 75,88,251

Selective visud exposure

14

Scintillation detectors

355

Self-constancy

239

Self orientation in SAT

219

Self-other relationship

221

Semantic demand characteristics

118

Semantic Differential -

scale for measuring effects of subliminal stimulation 254,255,259,260

Semantic link

110- 121

Semantic network determined by subliminal stimuli Sense of self -

17,19,46 57,58

loss of

57,58,234

Sensory deprivation related to creativity

267

Sexual guilt

59

Sexual identity disturbance 175,182,183,186,189,199

Signal-to-noise-ratio

5,16, 28,39,271

Spiral Aftereffect Technique (SAT)

56

- increased pathology in -

-

21,217-224, 229-236,240

Standard of Regulation in IMP 437-440,441,443

State anxiety

388,389, 391,394,395

-

definition

387

Subject Index

414 State of anxiety - experimentally controlled 353 elevation of

Time estimation task in

Stereotactic psychosurgery 359

amauroscopic conflict activation 169,192 Tolerance for disorder 250

-

Trait anxiety 25,388,389, 390,392,393-395,440,491

guilt inducing

58.59

high dosage condition in 52,61

-

scolding scenes as Y5,lUO symbiotic 15.52-54 - tachistoscopic 108,161, 166-174,182,186,192,195,

-

203,210,217,339,361,365 types of 18,55,173, 268,337,340-343

Subliminal window 19,103,108 Symbiotic fantasies 18 Symbiotic messages 17 Symbiotic stimulation 15,53,54, 56,57 Systematological metatheory 449,450 Systems theory - applied to perception research

-

remoteness Stimulus complexity Stimulus cues -

internal and external constituents

270

Stimulus evaluation in anxiety research Stimulus overload Stroop Test

387 66

24,362,365,367,

368,371,377,378 Stuttering 49,55 Subliminal activation of drive and affect 212 77,88

108,109,111, 112,117

effect of prime on 108,113, 116,118-125,128,130,131 TAT (Thematic Apperception

-

Test)

258 133

Subliminal drive stimulation 26

Test of Handedness

387

Stimulus boundednesslstimulus

Subliminal messages -

Target word

definition

295,404 109

Thematic Apperception Test (TAT 1 295,404 Threshold task in amauroscopic conflict activation 169,202

impact of complex

information in 127 Subliminal perception - fragments of stimuli in 331 - the role of verbal report in Subliminal psychodynamic activation

331

17.40,50.52,53, 58-61,277

Subliminal psychodynamic research 49,61,332,334 Subliminal registration

53,61

415

Subject Index Wavelenght related to

Subliminal stimulation

-

susceptibility to

22,252,

253,264,266-268

color perception 4 Word recognition in subliminal perception experiments

Subliminal stimuli

-

aggressive

40-46,115,118,

18,22,59,78-80,

121,125,131

88,173,337

-

amauroscopic

-

feeding scene a s

166-170,411 55,60

133Xenon Inhalation Technique

95,100

354

emotional content of

Trait-State-Anxiety Theory388

Yes-No decisions in

Traumatic events in the subject's life

retrospective predictions 155

of live events

149-155

Tripartite model of mind 235,336

Zone of registration in the visual field

Unconscious experimenter bias

63

Unconscious wishes, fears, fantasies process through series of threatening and sexual stimuli

19,146,162,163,225

Validation of theories

412

Vegetative symptoms

356

Verificationist s

406,410

Vertex potential

365

Vicious aggression

-

stimulusin subliminal experiments

2 6 0 , 261,264

Visual angle

-

control of

ness of subliminal messages

40

Unfolding of the perceptual

-

related to the effective-

110

Visual system Polaroid v i e w of

-

105

- probabilistic nature of

104

103-140

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