Acre

ACRE

THE HISTORY AND SOCIETY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST

          Leila Fawaz, General Editor Janet Afary The Iranian Constitution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism Andrea B. Rugh Within the Circle: Parents and Children in an Arab Village Juan Cole Modernity and the Millennium: The Genesis of the Baha’i Faith in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East Selma Botman Engendering Citizenship in Egypt

ACRE THE RISE AND FALL OF A PALESTINIAN CITY, 1730–1831

THOMAS PHILIPP

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York Chichester, West Sussex Copyright 䉷 2001 Columbia University Press All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Thomas, Philipp. Acre : the rise and fall of a Palestinian city, 1730–1831 / Philipp Thomas. p. cm. — (History and society of the modern Middle East series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-231-12326-4 (cloth ; alk. paper)—ISBN 0-231-12327-2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Acre (Israel)—History—18th century. 2. Acre (Israel)—History— 19th century. 3. Palestine—History—1799–1917. I. Title. II. Series. DS110.A3 T44 2002 956.94'5—dc21 2001047080

Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 p 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To the memory of my father, whose conversations I still miss

This page intentionally left blank

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ix

Introduction 1 1. Southwest Syria in the Eighteenth Century: Highways, Sea Lanes, and Populations 9 2. The Politics of Acre 29 3. Trade: Local Rulers and the World Economy 94 4. Government: The Military and Administration 136 5. Society and Its Structure in Acre 170 Concluding Observations 187 The Population of Acre 193 Trade: Tables and Figures 197 C . Administrative Positions and Their Occupants 215 D . Maps 223

APPENDIX A . APPENDIX B . APPENDIX APPENDIX NOTES

233

TRANSLATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY INDEX

283

267 277

This page intentionally left blank

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This study has been longer in the making than I care to think of. A grant from the Social Science Research Council supported my research in the archives of the Chamber of Commerce in Marseilles. I am grateful to the Gerda Henkel Stiftung for enabling me to carry out research in Damascus. Many people were at various stages willing to listen to my queries and to give me advice. My special thanks go to Butrus Abu Manneh, Andre´ Raymond, and Eugene Rogan, who all commented on the project or read parts of the work in progress and gave me much encouragement. Thanks also to the anonymous readers whose recommendations and advice helped me to improve the structure of the book. I am indebted to Mary Starkey and Robert Hemenway for their painstaking efforts to put my English into a readable form and to catch my inconsistencies and errors.

ACRE

INTRODUCTION

The city of Acre on the Syrian coast was once a famous Crusader stronghold. In the centuries following the Crusades the city had slipped into oblivion, and by the time of the Ottoman conquest, Acre was a collection of ruins in which only a few Arab fishermen found shelter. But in the eighteenth century Acre witnessed a dramatic rise in its fortunes, making it in 1785 the third largest city in Syria—after Aleppo and Damascus—and the largest port on the Syrian coast. By that time it had become the capital of a major politically integrated area in southwest Syria. Acre was the key to the first region in the eastern Mediterranean that was tied into the modern world economy. The rise of Acre from a fishing village to an important fortified port city of perhaps 25,000 inhabitants was closely connected with the ever-rising demand for cotton in Europe. Although at the end of the eighteenth century the first signs of decline could be seen in Acre and its hinterland, another boom phase followed with highly profitable grain exports to Britain during the Napoleonic Wars. Thereafter the political and economic decline continued despite the persisting European demand for cotton and grain. One aim of this study is to reconstruct the history of a region. This region does not fit easily into the history of any one of the provinces of the Ottoman administration. It is not the history of either the vilayet of Sidon or that of Note: Throughout this volume we have provided English translations to passages in a foreign language. Short translations appear in brackets in the text. Longer passages are identified with an asterisk indicating that the translation appears at the back of the book (pp. 267 ff.).

2

INTRODUCTION

Damascus, though both provinces provide the context for this region. Minorities of all sorts play a considerable role in this region, but it is not a history of sects that is to be told here. Most certainly this regional history cannot be described in retrospectively superimposed terms such as “Syria” or “Palestine.”1 Although Acre plays a pivotal role in the story, it is not simply the history of a city that is to be presented here. The region in question consisted of Acre and its realm, whose limits were constantly changing but always included at least the Galilee and some of the coast north and south of the city. It was a region that for a brief time formed a political and economic entity, quite independent from the Ottoman central government, not fitting its administrative borders, and differing widely from such anachronistic categories as “Palestine.” Discussing the rise of Izmir some 150 years earlier, Goffman writes: “The economic transformation of the Ottoman Empire had loosened administrative ties between agricultural regions and Istanbul and created other authorities to whom a foreign state could address grievances, thus enabling natural economic centers, such as Izmir, to develop without the constraints of a highly centralized administration.”2 Doumani discusses Nablus and its hinterland during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in similar terms: “Scores of roughly similar regions filled the interior of the vast and multiethnic Ottoman Empire and surrounded each of its few large international trading cities, like a sea around an island. These discrete regions were located at one and the same time at the material core and the political periphery of the Ottoman world.”3 Perhaps it can help us in our understanding to visualize the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire since the seventeenth century as a loose arrangement of a great number of more or less autonomous cities, each with its hinterland. It certainly would be going too far to speak of “city-states.” This would be to gravely understate the legitimacy and authority, both ideological and physical, that the empire enjoyed even at its weakest moments in the eighteenth century. Acre became one of the “economic centers.” Unlike Nablus, Damascus, and other inland cities, it was not a “discrete region known for centuries.”4 It was rather like Izmir, a frontier city and society. Izmir’s economic rise occurred close to the political center of a still relatively well-integrated empire, and although it enjoyed great economic autonomy there was no talk of political autonomy. Acre, developing 150 years later, did so in the context of a dramatically and visibly weakened empire and very much on what was then the empire’s geographical periphery. Not only for local notables but also for representatives of the Ottoman ruling class, the option of political autonomy—if not independence—became a very real and

INTRODUCTION

3

tempting one, especially since during the last quarter of the eighteenth century Acre also began to play a role in international politics. This is a local history of the first region in the Arab East to be inextricably linked to the modern European world economy. Only the highly profitable export of cash crops—first cotton, then grain—made it possible for Acre to become, for a short century, from 1730 to 1831, the largest center of trade and political power on the Syrian coast and the third largest city in geographic Syria. The rise and fall of Acre in early modern times must be seen against the background of two major processes touching the Ottoman Empire at the time and two further developments emanating largely from the first two. During the eighteenth century the weakness of the empire and the central government became apparent to all. Not only did the European powers witness the disastrous defeats of the Ottoman armies, but the people in the provinces of the empire sensed the growing inability of the central government to project its power. By the middle of the eighteenth century, in Damascus, the end of the Ottoman dynasty was at least imaginable, if not thought of as likely.5 Foreign powers would soon interfere directly in the politics of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. During this period of political decline the ever-growing demands of European markets linked the economy of the empire to Europe in new ways. Under political and economic pressure the geographic structure of commerce shifted; the merchandise changed as new agricultural products were exported to new markets; and the social structure of commerce changed as new groups of merchants engaged in trade. This twofold process of political decay at the center and increasing European economic penetration was accompanied by a third process. Local power centers sprang up, and limited regional integration, political and/or economic, took place. In the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire the effects of these changes took two different forms. On the one hand, traditional power centers, long submerged under central imperial rule, resurfaced again during the eighteenth century. Examples include the consolidation of dynastic power of the local al-‘Azm family in Damascus and the rise to power of the Neo-Mamluks in Cairo, ruling over an Egypt independent in all but name. In both cases, the political weakness of the central government was a decisive factor in letting old political structures reemerge. On the other hand, new centers of gravity developed, integrating economically whole regions in new configurations and linking them to European markets. Developments in the Mount

4

INTRODUCTION

Lebanon region point in this direction; silk became an important cash crop here during the eighteenth century, and the process of political consolidation and regional integration started in the early nineteenth century. The Mount Nablus region in Palestine was integrated into the world economy in a similar fashion during the nineteenth century.6 After the Crusades Acre had never again been a center of political or administrative, let alone economic, power. Yet it was to become the center of the first region in the Arab provinces touched profoundly by new European demands for raw materials. During the eighteenth century cotton provided the economic base for the importance of Acre and the might of its rulers, while grain played that role in the first two decades of the nineteenth. Here the process of regional integration and political autonomy was fueled exclusively by the new opportunities for wealth that the linkage of the region to the European-dominated world economy offered. The tie to international markets could convert local cash crops into economic and political power for local rulers. The rise of Acre and the integration of its hinterland into an autonomous region must also be seen in the context of the overall shift of the location of economic activity and political power in the Syrian region from inland to the coastal area and in the concomitant change of commercial patterns and networks. As long ago as the end of the fifteenth century a revival of trade and a renewal of the economy had begun in the Syrian region. Aleppo became the most important emporium for merchandise from Central Asia, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. Merchants from France, England, Venice, and Holland settled in Aleppo, and the city soon became the third largest in the Ottoman Empire. During the seventeenth century the English were the most important traders in Aleppo, mainly exchanging their wool cloths for silk. Silk, one of the major items of trade in Aleppo, was imported from Persia. Damascus gained its commercial importance as the starting point for the annual pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. On the way back, merchandise from South Arabia, eastern Africa, and India was brought to Damascus. Probably because of the specifically religious character of the pilgrimage, Europeans and minorities played an insignificant role in this trade. This economic structure of the Syrian region, in which long-distance transit trade via Damascus and Aleppo, Alexandretta, and Anatolia was the dominant feature, changed profoundly during the eighteenth century. The silk trade with Aleppo lost its importance, not because England’s demand for silk diminished but because more convenient supply sources were found.7

INTRODUCTION

5

Simultaneously, Aleppo lost its main supplier of silk with the disintegration of Safavid Iran. During the same period we can observe a revival of French trade in the Levant. Originally this was the result of Colbert’s reorganization of the Chamber of Commerce of Marseilles, but soon the rapidly increasing French demand for silk and raw cotton became the driving force behind the revival. By the middle of the eighteenth century the French had replaced the British as the most important European commercial power in Aleppo. Earlier and more important, however, was the development of French trade with the Syrian coastal cities from Jaffa to Tripoli. In the hinterland of these port cities silk and cotton cultivation increased steadily. The crops could be sold directly to the French in the coastal towns, bypassing Aleppo. The economic center of gravity moved slowly from inland Syria to the coastal lands of the southwest. Long-distance trade lost some of its importance, and local cultivation of cash crops became a significant economic factor. The overall framework of these distinct but related processes—the decay of central power in the Ottoman Empire, the concomitant rise of local power centers on the periphery, the early integration of some Arab regions into the European-dominated world economy, and the shift of economic activity and commercial gains from the Syrian inland area to the coastal regions—provides the context for the history of Acre and its hinterland during the period. The history of this particular region gains its meaning from this context, and only within this context can relevant questions be addressed regarding local history. It is easy to understand that the revenue from cotton or grain exports could finance the military expenses of local rulers who thereby could obtain considerable power. But this obvious link aside, how did the new sources of wealth and new patterns of commerce mesh with traditional forms of political power and social organization? Or were these at all “traditional forms of political power and social organization”? When Masters, for instance, discusses the changes from a traditional to a Western-dominated economy in Aleppo,8 he starts out with a tradition of political rule, social formation, and commercial interaction in Aleppo. But Acre is a highly atypical case of urban history in Syria. It was a new foundation, settled by immigrants in the eighteenth century. The city came into being even as the new commercial linkage to Europe developed. Much of the hinterland, too, was settled only during this time by immigrants coming from various directions and for different reasons. In this sense we do not have to do with a traditional society,

6

INTRODUCTION

however defined. Might it be more appropriate to speak of a “frontier society”? Was this society subjected to traditional patterns of political rule? If so, which? Was it Mamluk households, tribal power, local alliances of important families? Did new classes develop under the circumstances of an immigrant society and new commercial needs? Why did the cotton trade with France, profitable for all participants, come to an end? How did cotton come to be such an important cash crop in the region? And finally, why did Acre, after such propitious beginnings in the eighteenth century, which made it the center of export trade on the Syrian coast and of political and military power strong enough to defy Napoleon’s army, give way to the dazzling rise of Beirut in the nineteenth century? This last set of questions revolves largely around another salient feature of life in Acre during the period: the policy of economic monopolies. Such monopolistic interference by the government in the economy with regard to the production and/or marketing of certain goods was not entirely unknown in Islamic history, but it would be difficult to find another example where this policy became as all-pervasive and dominant as in Acre. It took another two generations before Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ of Egypt would apply monopoly policies in an even more rigorous fashion. Then, too, the export of raw materials to world markets—especially grain and cotton—would become pivotal. In trying to reconstruct the history of this region and to answer some of the questions raised here, we are helped by a great variety of primary sources. At the same time students and researchers are faced with considerable lacunae in our information and a dearth of scholarly work. Fortunately we have at our disposal a host of local histories written in Arabic by eyewitnesses,9 among them two accounts of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s life10 and a most detailed history of the rule of Sulayma¯n Pasha.11 They were, together with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, the three important rulers of Acre, controlling its fate from 1740 to 1819. But, curiously, no comparable account exists for Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r.12 These accounts abound with information on the political and administrative history of the region and the men who shaped it. They also provide some systematic reporting on sectarian history and a mass of incidental or anecdotal information on social life, families, worldviews and values, and daily life. I have argued elsewhere13 that the appearance at the turn of the eighteenth century of a group of regional historians—mainly, but not exclusively, Greek Catholics and typically educated sons of prosperous merchant families— was in itself an expression of the profound changes the region underwent

INTRODUCTION

7

during this time. Read with the critical eye of comparative analysis, these reports yield an enormous amount of information. A second set of sources is useful precisely on issues that the local histories gloss over or provide only incidental glimpses into; the economy and, in particular, agriculture and commerce with Europe. Here the French consular correspondence from Acre and Sidon,14 and also from Tripoli, Aleppo, and Rosetta, are of great value. Commerce was the main topic. Here we find detailed reports on the interaction of French merchants with local potentates, powerful administrators, Arab traders, and the peasants of the hinterland. Considerable, but never complete, statistical evidence for the economy and international export commerce can be reconstructed from the consular reports, though there was hardly any direct reporting on the state of agriculture. Depending on the individual consul and the circumstances, we also find detailed memos on political events, which are usefully juxtaposed with the accounts from other sources. The copious travel literature to the Holy Land and Syria must be looked at cautiously. It shares all the weaknesses of general travel literature—exaggerations, search for the exotic, superficial impressions, copying of other travelers’ writings, strictly personal viewpoints, etc. Yet there are the occasional superb reports by travelers, lending an outsider’s keen eye to the observation of local circumstances. Critical analysis of the travelers’ texts can provide insights on a large variety of issues. The Ottoman archives concerning the region have been extensively used in A. Cohen’s work on Palestine in the eighteenth century. They concern mainly fiscal, tax, and administrative affairs and relations to the central government. Sorely missing from the list of archives are any local archives in Acre: the sijilla¯t of the courts, for instance, or private materials. Intensive search for the sijilla¯t of the period has not provided any clue to their possible whereabouts. If they were not destroyed during the Israeli conquest of Acre in 1948, they are likely to have been destroyed during the British bombardment in 1840, or that of the Egyptians in 1831, or the French siege in 1799, or perhaps during an earthquake. Secondary and scholarly literature on the topic yields very uneven results. There has been a considerable outpouring of research on Ottoman Palestine,15 almost all of which is concerned with nineteenth-century history. A recent boom of research on urban history in Syria, from Damascus and Aleppo to Beirut, Jerusalem, and Jaffa,16 has been most helpful in formulating some of the questions raised in the present study, though not yielding any concrete

8

INTRODUCTION

materials for the history of Acre and its hinterland. Very little scholarly work exists on the region itself during the eighteenth century. An early attempt was Uriel Heyd’s small study on Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, and Doumani’s study of the Nablus region has now been added. But Doumani’s period is much more the nineteenth century and his focus Nablus, with Acre appearing at the periphery. Also of recent date is a history of Acre by N. Shu¯r. It is a narrative account of Acre through the ages until the present, relying heavily on European histories and travel accounts. The only extensive work on the topic of the present study is A. Cohen’s Palestine in the Eighteenth Century, by now a classic. As mentioned before, Cohen has made extensive use of the Ottoman archives; administrative and fiscal affairs and relations to the central government were his main concern, and he succeeded in providing a wealth of material and analysis. The conceptual framework “Palestine” sits awkwardly, since it is neither an administrative nor a fiscal entity and Cohen has to move around, treating the two vilayets of Damascus and Sidon in addition to the sancakfi of Jerusalem. I have relied on his very thorough research wherever appropriate. The main focus of the present study is on Acre and its hinterland as a political and economic entity, regardless of Ottoman administrative borders. The development of the regional history during the period is seen in close relation to its economic links with Europe. The goal is to provide a more meaningful framework and one that is more relevant.

chapter 1

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: HIGHWAYS, SEA LANES, AND POPULATIONS

The Arab lands of the eastern Mediterranean region had first been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the sixteenth century. The Syrian region between the Taurus Mountains and the Sinai Peninsula—known to its inhabitants and neighbors as Bila¯d al-Sha¯m, usually translated as the Geographic Syria or the Land of Syria—fulfilled an essential function in the imperial strategy of Istanbul. The region insured the overland link to the rich province of Egypt for an empire in which the use of maritime connections always remained of secondary importance. With the city of Damascus, Syria also provided the base for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, the successful management of which added legitimacy to Ottoman rule. Aleppo became the third largest city of the empire as the entrepoˆt of commerce from all points east and, of course, as the conduit of trade from Arabia and Egypt via Damascus to the north. Finally, considerable importance was attached to Jerusalem as the third holiest city of Islam. The spinal cord holding these centers of economic and cultural activity together was the great northsouth axis, the highway coming from the north via Aleppo, connecting to Damascus and eventually to Mecca in the south. A branch-off from Damascus to the southwest provided links to Jerusalem and Egypt. The coastal towns, on the other hand, had lost their importance, and, as far as we can judge, the coastal regions were only very thinly populated. Links between the coast and the hinterland were rare and precarious. Some of these features of infrastructure and demography began to change in the eighteenth century. A short introductory description of the main characteristics of these conditions and an interpretation of the trends and direction of changes in these patterns, especially as they pertained to the situation in southwest Syria, follows.

10

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

HIGHWAYS AND SEA LANES The changes in the physical web of communications in southwest Syria during the eighteenth century and until the Egyptian invasion of 1831 closely reflected the changes in political conditions and economic circumstances of the area. New technical needs or technological and material improvements, however, hardly played a role. At the beginning of the century there existed a fairly simple set of longdistance highways, which fulfilled two main functions, religious and commercial, as carriers of pilgrimage and trade. Coming from the north, a major road, traveled by merchants as well as pilgrims, connected Aleppo to Damascus. After Damascus the highway bifurcated, one branch going directly south to the Hejaz carrying the same sort of traffic, and the other one turning southwest, crossing the Jordan at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, continuing to Janı¯n and from there to Ramla and Jaffa, and finally overland via Gaza to Egypt or, occasionally, by sea to Damiette. The route from Damascus to Egypt served mainly commercial interests. A minor route branched off at Nablus to Jerusalem and via Hebron to Gaza. No major traffic went through the western Galilee. Along the coast local shipping—not roads—carried the traffic.1 Over the century the infrastructure of the area was to become more complex in pattern, reflecting the growth of new political and commercial centers. The routes of the pilgrimage were perhaps least influenced by such changes, as their functions and destination remained the same.2 The two H fi ajj routes of interest to us here are well established and documented and need no more discussion. As routes with a specialized function, they had such specific features as well-spaced rest stations and fortifications to insure the safety of the pilgrims.3 For our general discussion about the infrastructure and integration of Bila¯d al-Sha¯m it is of interest to note how the sancakfi of Gaza and Ramla were integrated into the Syrian province: although closer to ‘Aqaba, which the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan regularly passed, the sancakfi had to send financial contributions to the pilgrimage caravan starting from Damascus and even provide men to guard it.4 Although the major purpose of the pilgrimage route was religious, it always played an important role for international trade. But only once, with the Wahhabi advances toward Syria at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was the pilgrimage route south of Damascus used as a major military avenue. A certain curiosity value can be attached to the attempt of the Copts to

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

11

establish a regular pilgrimage to Jerusalem in 1753. Since they hired Bedouins, they presumably wanted to cross the Sinai to Gaza. But the pilgrimage that started with much pomp was interdicted by the ‘ulama¯’ for fear that the Copts would want to compete with the H fi ajj.5 A more regular feature was the pilgrimage of European Christians who would usually arrive by ship in Jaffa and continue from there to Jerusalem. From Jerusalem they would venture on short excursions to such sites as Bethlehem or Jericho, security conditions permitting.6 Trade routes7 overlapped to a certain degree with pilgrimage routes or military highways. Merchandise was transported either by beasts of burden or by ship. Sea lanes played a much more important role for trade than they did for military purposes. Throughout the period there existed a very active coastal shipping connecting all the ports from Damiette to Jaffa, Acre, Tyre, Sidon, Beirut, Tripoli, and Cyprus. The shipping business was in the hands of individual entrepreneurs of various religious and ethnic backgrounds.8 As long as Maltese pirates constituted a threat along the coast, French tramps had an edge over others in the business as did shippers of the Greek Catholic Arabic-speaking community, as their certified Catholicism secured a certain measure of protection from Maltese piracy.9 The coastal trade was one of the major north-south trade links in the area. Wood from Mount Lebanon was shipped via Beirut and Jaffa to Jerusalem; silk went via Beirut to Sidon or Acre, from where it was exported to Marseilles. Wood and soap went to Egypt via Jaffa and Damiette, while rice from the latter port was shipped to Acre. Trade with Europe shifted during the eighteenth century. Originally most trade went via Alexandretta or Tripoli to Aleppo and fed directly into longdistance trade routes connecting to Iran, the Hejaz, and beyond. Though the trade with the Hejaz continued to play an important role, by the early eighteenth century Iran had sunk into political chaos, and the important trade in silk and silk textiles from Iran to Aleppo ceased. The French silk industry had to look for new sources of silk supplies. By mid-century Acre became the focal point of European—that is to say, almost exclusively French—trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Increasing trade with raw materials linked Marseilles directly with Acre and the immediate hinterland in the Galilee and Mount Lebanon, from where locally cultivated cotton and silk were brought to Acre for export. With the limited exception of rice shipped from Damiette, no other trade routes fed into this overseas trade. East-west links, albeit rather weak ones, between the inland trade routes

12

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

and the coastal shipping lanes existed at several points: from Damascus a road went via the Biqa¯‘a to Sidon and also to Beirut. Damascus was also linked to the coast via Tiberias, and Nazareth to Acre. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar, who was to become the founder of Acre as the new center for export trade, had started his career as a trader between Tiberias and Damascus. Further south, Nablus was connected via Nazareth to Acre and via Ramla to Jaffa. There is hardly any evidence that commercial traffic ran directly between Jerusalem and the coast; the link between Hebron and Gaza also seems to have been a tenuous one. Worth mentioning, too, is the fact that all trade from Palestine went—via the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, north of Lake Tiberias—to Damascus. No commercial connections existed with other points east of the Jordan, unless we count the occasional plundering of pilgrim caravans by Bedouins and the sale of that merchandise smuggled into the Galilee as “commercial” activities.10 From the middle of the eighteenth century there existed three major trading networks: the traditional one linking long-distance international trade from the Indian Ocean via the Hejaz to Damascus and Aleppo, the latter being also the entrepoˆt for merchandise from Iran; a local trade connecting the Syrian coast with Egypt and trading traditional items such as wood, soap, and tobacco from southwest Syria for rice, skins, and wheat from Egypt, and the newly developed export trade of raw materials from the immediate coastal region via Acre to France. Apart from some items such as alkali from the Balqa¯’, or rice from Damiette, neither the traditional local trade nor the traditional long-distance trade meshed with this new export trade of cotton and silk from the coastal hinterland. Silk and cotton were brought directly from the villages to Acre, Sidon, or Beirut and shipped from there. Thus the above-mentioned east-west trading links from inland were not significantly strengthened. This disconnectedness of the trading networks might also explain, at least partially, why connecting highways between Damascus and Acre, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Jaffa, etc. remained in such bad repair. The flow of trade depended on markets and producers, and also shifted with the political circumstances. When, for instance, Iran sank into chaos with the end of Safavid rule in the eighteenth century, silk exports to Aleppo ceased. This led to the decay of British trade in Aleppo, but also to an expansion of silk production in Lebanon, bought mainly by the French. The coffee trade from Yemen to the Syrian coast had lost its importance and had been replaced by imports from the British or French colonies. When, late in the eighteenth century, the Wahhabis began to attack the pilgrimage caravan, the trade of Damascus suffered. On the other hand, periods of unrest in Aleppo

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

13

caused many merchants residing there to relocate to Damascus. In this sense, politics of course played a major role in the economics and the trade of the region. But what is conspicuously absent is any conscious, comprehensive economic policy of the government, not to mention any attempt to introduce government monopolies on all or any goods. Neither did the Ottoman government take any measures to direct the flow of trade or the production of goods by maintaining, let alone developing, the infrastructure of the region— the only exception being the route of the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. The rise of Acre, its fortification as a seaport, and the systematic attempt of its rulers to impose an all-pervasive economic monopoly policy was a radical break with the existing patterns. As we shall see, this policy had farreaching implications for the geographic stretch of Acre and its realm, for the structure of society in Acre, and for the fate of other port cities such as Jaffa, Sidon and, most important, Beirut. Soldiers, pilgrims, and merchants usually travel along known highways. Their movements follow certain recurring patterns, well defined by the purpose and destination of their journeys. In some ways the movements of individual travelers, be they tourists, government agents, individual pilgrims, or all of the above, are more difficult to summarize in patterns. Individual traveling adapts rapidly to changing circumstances and road conditions. Factors such as safety, expenditure, and road quality are quickly responded to. Fortunately for our period a considerable number of European travelers arrived in what was usually called “Syria and the Holy Land.” Most often they were tourists and pilgrims at the same time and were keen to put down their experiences in writing. Their reports—together with those of traveling scholars from Egypt or Damascus, or of government representatives and messengers from Istanbul—tell us a great deal about the changing conditions of the road network. The first observation we can make is that even for the purpose of tourism travel was not as individual as all that. Most of the European and some of the Ottoman travelers tried to combine a visit to the holy places with their traveling. For the Christians this always meant Jerusalem, often also a visit to Nazareth and its surroundings. Most European travelers would land in Jaffa, arriving either directly from Europe or via Damiette, Acre, or Cyprus. From Jaffa the road would lead via Ramla to Jerusalem. Excursions from there to Jericho, Bethlehem, etc. depended on the existing safety conditions. At very safe times the traveler might continue from Jerusalem via Nablus to Nazareth and Acre. But usually travelers would return the same way and take a boat from Jaffa to Acre, then venture from there to Nazareth and back. The

14

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Ramla-Jerusalem route mainly served tourists and pilgrims, the poor quality of the road apparently not allowing any other traffic.11 A further reason why travel by individual tourists was not so freely undertaken was the concern with safety. In the early eighteenth century especially, tourists or pilgrims would attach themselves to caravans or form larger groups, seeking safety in numbers. Travelers would wait for groups or caravans to join them.12 They would cancel their journeys if they could not find such groups in time,13 or they would change their routes.14 They would take detours to avoid dangerous areas. Consider, for instance, Ku¯sa¯ Kahfi ya¯, katkhuda¯ of the government. On his way back from the pilgrimage to Mecca he turned from Damascus west to go to Acre, took a boat from there to Jaffa, and continued to Jerusalem. Returning from Jerusalem, he departed by ship from Jaffa for Istanbul. To turn off, for instance, at the pilgrimage station of ‘Ayn Zarqa’ and proceed directly west to Jerusalem was apparently not safe or possible.15 Security seems to have been good in the first century of Ottoman rule. Around 1550 a traveler stated explicitly: “I often moved just by myself in Bethlehem, Gaza, Cairo, Alexandria, but I never was attacked or taken prisoner.”16 Even in the early seventeenth century, traveling to Nazareth, Nablus, and Jerusalem did not provoke any particular safety concerns.17 D’Arvieux, however, felt by 1658 the need always to travel with groups or with a military escort.18 In the following hundred years traveling became increasingly unsafe: fear of kidnapping for ransom, unrest, highway robbery, the extortion of protection money, and other perils weighed heavily on the mind of every traveler. But from the middle of the eighteenth century, travel reports give a differentiated picture. Korten had gone to Jerusalem in 1740, where he had planned to stay a year. In view of the lack of security, however, he left very soon and took a boat from Jaffa to Acre. Traveling in the Galilee, he commented: “It should be known that travel there is much safer than around Jerusalem.” He attributed the greater security in the Galilee to the open landscape and the fact that the region was thinly settled.19 Although his observation was correct, his explanation was not. The better security situation was the result of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule in the Galilee; he had by 1737 achieved a considerable pacification of the Galilee, so that “a woman could travel with gold in her hand, without anyone confronting her on the road and without her being afraid in the least.”20 Ten years later Hasselquist had a “horrible” journey to Jerusalem but wrote of his trip from Acre to Nazareth that he had “a pleasant journey in a land where one travels safely and on good roads.”21

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

15

After the death of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r in 1804, a very high level of internal security in the realm of Acre was achieved under Sulayma¯n Pasha, his successor. Even the coastal highway was now safe. Sulayma¯n’s mutasallim in Jaffa made it a point to move rapidly between Acre and Jaffa. Often he would take a fast camel and a few companions and travel lightly armed in one day or one night directly along the coast.22 In 1813 Sulayma¯n Pasha also took measures to improve the security of the coastal highway to the north of Acre by having watchtowers built and manned with guards. In 1817 Irby and Mangles traveled overland from Cairo to Jaffa and marched from there to Caesarea, Tfi antfiu¯ra, ‘Atlit, Haifa, and Acre. After some traveling in northern Syria they came back to Damascus, from where they proceeded to the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters: “In some places there were traces of an ancient paved way, probably the Roman road leading from Damascus to Caesarea.”23 They traveled to Tiberias, crossed to the Yarmuk River, crossed back to Baysa¯n, back to Jarrash, al-Salt, and back again to Nablus. From there they traveled to Jerusalem, Hebron, Kerak, and back to al-Salt, Jarrash, Nazareth, and finally Acre. Here they embarked for Istanbul. Not only the coastal highway but even the crossing to the east bank of the Jordan had become safe. That the route from Nazareth to Janı¯n, Nablus, Ra¯malla¯h, and Jerusalem was perfectly safe was confirmed by another traveler during the same year.24 The claim that only Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha and his Egyptian troops brought security and accessibility to the traveler, especially foreigners, in Syria is not correct. Certainly in southwest Syria, and in particular as far as the influence of Acre reached, security on the highways had been established a generation earlier. The less travelers were concerned with their personal safety, the more they complained about the quality of the roads. Roads were “execrable,” “excessively steep and rugged,” “very rugged and bad.”25 Or: “The whole distance between Jerusalem to Jaffa . . . could be traveled normally in 13 hours, but the rugged and pathless rocks, which the traveler has to cross, extend the journey to a day and a half.”26 As late as 1821 the Acre-Damascus road was so bad that no cannons could be dragged over it.27 All heavy equipment, cannons, ammunition, and wood were, if at all possible, shipped along the coast. We hear of a very limited and relatively late attempt by Sulayma¯n Pasha to have the coastal road from Acre to Beirut improved, for example by widening the path in the rock at Ra’s al-Naqu¯ra, building a bridge over the Zahrani River, providing a water fountain.28 But this was clearly exceptional. While considerable efforts were made to construct fortifications and large sums were

16

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

invested in the reconstruction of cities and the port of Acre, it seems that not the slightest effort was made to upgrade the communication system by leveling roads, building bridges, or strengthening the roadbed. The first explanation that comes to mind is the one valid for the whole Ottoman Empire: goods were transported by beasts of burden, so roads did not have to be paved and straightened. This certainly holds true for southwest Syria during the period.29 Furthermore, though trade intensified during the eighteenth century, the new trade routes were, as we have seen, juxtaposed but not linked to traditional ones. The commercial wealth of Acre originated from the villages in the immediate hinterland, not from long-distance overland trade routes from Damascus, for instance. Thus the upgrading or new construction of roads was of no interest to the rulers of Acre.

FORTRESSES AND TERRITORY 3 0 The military highway along the Syrian coast via Sinai to Egypt had already fallen into disuse during the late Mamluk period. The Ottoman conquerors marched from the north via Damascus to Laju¯n, Janı¯n, and via Gaza to Egypt. Only with the weakening of central power in the Ottoman Empire and the consolidation of Neo-Mamluk power in Egypt did Egypt’s traditional interest in Syria as a rampart for its own power position reawaken. In the short time-span from 1770 to 1831, four large-scale invasions of Syria were started from Egypt. They all followed the same path along the coast via Gaza to Jaffa and on to Acre. Jaffa was put under siege at least six times, and Acre was besieged or bombed eight times. By the early eighteenth century the Ottoman authorities began to fortify Jaffa. This was aimed, however, not so much against overland attacks as against raids by pirates.31 Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar started fortification works at Acre by mid-century. Control over both cities was decisive for the conquest of the rest of Syria. Difficult sieges of Jaffa and Acre preceded the usually easy surrender of Damascus and the march north toward Aleppo. In Syria, just as in Egypt, local centers of power had consolidated during the eighteenth century. Acre had become the foremost such new base of local power and the most important port on the Syrian coast. No invader could ignore Acre or Jaffa, the latter often serving as an extension of the power base of the former. The coastal cities further north, such as Sidon, Beirut, and Tripoli, were no longer or not yet of economic or strategic importance. Such was also the case with the inland cities in the south— Hebron, Jerusalem, and, to a degree, Nablus. After securing Acre the armies

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

17

had to turn inland to Damascus, the “Gate to the Pilgrimage” and the seat of the most powerful representative of Ottoman might, the governor of Damascus and his troops. Damascus was the key to the military highway to the north, to Aleppo, and beyond. Just as Acre was decisive for the conquest of Syria, so control over Jaffa was essential for the rulers of Acre if they wanted to protect themselves against an Egyptian invasion. During those six decades Jaffa was conquered at least nine times. Apart from three more or less peaceful surrenders, sieges lasted from four days to several months, and usually ended in considerable bloodshed. The only marching route from Acre to Jaffa for a long time led ¯ mir, as far as Megiddo, where it from Acre southeast to the Marj ibn ‘A crossed the Muqatfifita‘ River and passed through the mountains, reaching the coast roughly at Caesarea. It seems that Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab’s army, at least on the second occasion in 1775, marched directly up the coast from Jaffa to Acre, accompanied by one warship.32 The French and then later Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha followed the same route. The coastal plain of Palestine was convenient for the movement of large bodies of troops. Sufficient water could be found, and predatory Bedouins were no threat to troops counted by the thousands. No mountain passes endangered the passage of the troops. But there were no paved or fortified roads. No vehicle could pass, and even light artillery had to be disassembled and carried on camels. “Thousands of beasts” were part of every military campaign. Heavy guns and bulk materials were shipped from Damiette to the Syrian coast. But naval warfare was of secondary importance. To begin with, neither the Mamluks nor the rulers in Acre seem to have had many ships available for this purpose. The port of Jaffa offered no shelter against storms, and even when supplied by the sea, Jaffa could not withstand a siege from the land side. Acre turned out to be a much more formidable obstacle from sea as well as from land. H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha conquered Acre after a bombardment from the sea in 1775, but only because the octogenarian Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar had already lost control over Acre, and his artillery refused to return fire. Even the twenty-two, presumably new, ships of Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha were in 1831 of no use for the conquest of Acre, which at this point was protected by massively improved fortifications and heavy guns. Only the British navy could, in the early nineteenth century, effectively blockade the Egyptian and Syrian coast, intercept the local ships Bonaparte used to supply his troops in Palestine, defend Acre from the sea against conquest from the land in 1799, and conquer it from the sea in 1840. Attempts to conquer Acre from the land side were either unsuccessful or succeeded only after long sieges. In 1789 al-

18

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

Jazza¯r’s rebellious Mamluks briefly besieged him in Acre but were beaten off. So were the French in 1799 after two months of intensive siege and bombardments. In 1821–22 a nine-month siege by Darwı¯sh Pasha could not force ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha to surrender. Conquest came only after a six-month siege by the Egyptian army under Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha in 1832. Conquest also became possible in situations in which the defenders, through fear, treachery, or dissent, had lost the stamina to defend the city and withdrew voluntarily, as occurred (twice) in 1775 and in 1804. Throughout, Acre remained the pivotal point of all military campaigns. With the reestablishment of Ottoman central power in Syria after 1840 Acre sank into oblivion, and the military highway between Egypt and Syria played no further role until British troops set out from Egypt to conquer Syria during World War I. While the long-distance military highways were clearly marked—coming from the north via Aleppo to Damascus and from the south via Gaza and Jaffa to Acre—it is the region between the coast and Damascus where the trails for military expeditions seem to multiply.33 The major military clashes occurred here during the period, with Damascus representing local and imperial interests and Acre representing its own local and/or Egyptian interests. Perhaps the best way to consider the local military staging areas and highways is to look at fortifications and walled cities. The struggle for control over fortified cities also in many ways defined the limits of the realm of the rulers in Acre. Though control over fortresses and fortified towns shifted back and forth according to changing military and political constellations of the moment, the decisive and frequently challenged fortified points that could circumscribe the territory of the Acre region were Jaffa, Sfi a¯nu¯r at the northern approaches to Nablus, Tiberias, Beirut, and Sidon, and, of course, as the last resort, Acre itself. Sieges were as frequent as open-field battles and usually more decisive. Small fortified places dotted the northern Galilee and the Metuali Mountains and served local chieftains as retreats in case of emergency. Their strategic value was rather limited, their importance only local. Such places were used by the sons of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar to defend themselves against their father. Further north, the Metualis tried to offer resistance in their fortifications to Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r until he had them destroyed. In the early eighteenth century only Damascus and Jerusalem were effectively fortified cities and only the former played any military role. At the very time the Ottomans were putting up fortifications around Jaffa, Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar was repairing the fortifications of Tiberias. In the 1770s Beirut was

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

19

fortified by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. But the single most important development was the fortification of Acre begun by Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar in mid-century and carried on by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and his successors. As long as Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar was based in the eastern Galilee, the governor of Damascus would move along the southwestern highway from Damascus, cross the Jordan at the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, and try to break Zfi a¯hı¯r al‘Umar’s power by besieging him in Tiberias. A few more open battles were fought for control of the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters, but the upper Jordan River was soon established as the permanent borderline between the realm of the rulers of Acre and that of the governors of Damascus. Once Acre became Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s base, the dimensions of warfare shifted. In addition to Damascus, now Sidon and Nablus had to pay attention to Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s intentions. From Acre, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar first expanded his area of control to Haifa, Tfi antfiu¯ra, and Nazareth, which was the entrepoˆt for Nablus (bandar alna¯bulusiyya). The whole region had been under the control of Nablus, includ¯ mir, which provided easy access to the bay of Acre. In ing the Marj ibn al-‘A this plain, near Nazareth, the battle against the people from Nablus was fought. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar pursued the defeated troops as far as Jabal Nablus but could not hope to overcome the fortifications on that mountain. Muhfi ammad ibn Ibra¯hı¯m al-Jarra¯r held the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r in Jabal Nablus. This seems to have marked the limit of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar’s realm.34 Over the next eighty years Sfi a¯nu¯r remained a daunting challenge to the rulers of Acre and defined the limits of their control. When in 1790 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus for the second time, he sent a representative there but stayed in Acre. He also confirmed the leaders of Nablus in their positions. All submitted to him and made an appearance at Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s court, with the exception of Yu¯suf al-Jarra¯r, mutasallim of Janı¯n. The latter held out in the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r; a fifty-day siege by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r failed in spite of heavy bombardments. An ill-advised mining of the fortifications literally backfired and destroyed most of the camp of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r.35 In 1803 al-Jazza¯r tried for a second time to conquer Sfi a¯nu¯r. But, as had been the case the first time, Druze elements supportive of and supported by al-Jazza¯r came under attack by other Druze factions, and al-Jazza¯r had to shift his attention to the north. Where Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar and Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had failed militarily, Sulayma¯n Pasha gained a certain influence over the affairs of Nablus by diplomacy. In 1830 the sancakfi of Nablus was given by the Ottoman government to the governor of Sidon, ‘Abdalla¯h, the ruler of Acre. Damascus had com-

20

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

plained that it could not collect taxes from there because of resistance by the population. Nablus rebelled and ‘Abdalla¯h, provided with new authority, sent troops and besieged the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r. After a lengthy siege the fortress was stormed. This was the first time that Acre could assert its military control over Nablus. Ironically, one year later, with the Egyptian conquest of Syria, Acre ceased to exist as an autonomous power and soon slipped into oblivion. Once Acre had become the power base of the local rulers, control over the coast to the north became important. Tyre, and more important, Sidon, not only constituted commercial competition for Acre, but could always serve as a base for attacks on it. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar tried to establish his control over this coast, and al-Jazza¯r never gave it up. The latter had started his rise to power in Syria when he put himself in control of Beirut and had it fortified. After he had been appointed governor of Sidon, with Acre as the seat of his power, he never again gave up control of Beirut. Sidon and Beirut served as military bases to project his influence into Mount Lebanon. Sulayma¯n Pasha, his successor, was forced to give up full control over Beirut—much to the detriment of the economic fortunes of Acre. On the coast to the south of Acre the fortress of Jaffa became the pivotal point of strategic importance as the first defense of southwest Syria against invasions from Egypt, just as it could be used as the base for any military expeditions from the north into Egypt. At the same time it also served as the port for the commerce of Nablus. In the five years 1770–75 a three-pronged war broke out between ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, the governor of Damascus, backed by Istanbul and in a loose alliance with forces in Nablus, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, based in Acre, and, finally, different Mamluk factions from Egypt. During this period Jaffa changed hands six times, suffering at least three devastating sieges. Nor does the story end here. Control over Jaffa seems to have reverted to Nablus, and indirectly to the governor of Damascus after the death of Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar and Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab in 1775. As late as 1792 Jaffa was a refuge for the French merchants from Acre—beyond the reach of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. When the French army under Napoleon, however, moved in 1799 from Egypt to Syria, al-Jazza¯r’s troops defended Jaffa in a bitter siege which ended with the execution of these troops after their surrender. Thereafter, the Ottoman government made repeated attempts to establish its direct control over the fortress of Jaffa, but from early 1807 on Jaffa remained firmly attached to Acre. During this short century of autonomy enjoyed by Acre and its realm, between 1743 and 1831, fortresses and fortified cities played a major role in

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

21

defining the political and economic reach of Acre. Since the old international transit routes of commerce and the new system of export of cash crops did not really mesh, no need arose to add to or improve the road system. As beasts of burden were always used, no investment in road maintenance was necessary, but there was also a positive reason to leave the road system in such an abysmal state, and this explains the enormous role fortifications played: the road system could not accommodate armies dragging siege equipment. Bad roads made for good defense.36 The Egyptian invasion radically changed the political and economic landscape, especially that of southwest Syria. In October 1831, 20,000 troops set out from Egypt overland via Gaza to Jaffa, where they were joined on November 8 by an Egyptian fleet carrying 6,000 marines. The 250 Albanian troops constituting the garrison of Jaffa surrendered immediately, only trying, rather pathetically, to negotiate for salaries from Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha, which ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had not paid them for months. The ruler of Acre no longer had the resources to defend Jaffa. Acre itself, however, resisted the Egyptian onslaught for another six months.37 By the time of the only further conquest of Syria to start from Egypt, Allenby’s invasion in 1917–18, Jaffa had long ceased to be a military obstacle. In conclusion one can observe that the local military highways depended naturally on the geostrategic conditions of the area, but also to a large degree upon the existence of fortified places. Fortifications played a surprisingly large role in the warfare of the period. The sea lanes had a rather limited function in regional or local warfare. Typically, the sea route from Damiette to Jaffa and Acre played at best a supportive role for overland troop movements. The actual number of ships involved was usually very small. The use of sea routes from across the Mediterranean implied great-power interference. The appearance of Russian ships and the Ottoman fleet on the Syrian coast between 1770 and 1776, though, remained rather tentative. After 1798 only the British navy was able to project its power successfully in the region. After the end of the Egyptian occupation in 1840 the newly strengthened central government of the Ottoman Empire never again allowed quasiindependent rulers such as those of the Acre region to emerge in Syria. The increasing integration of the Syrian hinterland into the European economy during the nineteenth century, especially after the arrival of the steamship, made the development of the infrastructure—first roads, then railways—a necessity. Eventually, all these developments ensured the predominant role of Beirut on the Syrian coast and the decline of Acre.

22

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

POPULATIONS AND MIGRATIONS During the eighteenth century Acre was the only city in the Arab Middle East to experience a dramatic boom, one that turned it from a small fishing village into the most important port on the Syrian coast, well fortified by new walls and towers. The population grew from some 400 to about 25,000, and even more at its height. The boom was followed by a bust, which reduced Acre again to little more than a village by 1840. Even the most cursory look at the population curve of the city of Acre shows a dramatic growth and decline within one century. But before commenting on it a word of warning is necessary, as always when dealing with population figures during this time. No censuses were conducted; local historians were supremely uninterested in numbers.38 European travelers, on the other hand, often used numbers to provide their reports with a certain air of scholarship and authenticity. But they, too, did not actually count populations. Most of the numbers, therefore, come from outside observers who made more or less precise estimates, copied estimates from others, or relied on hearsay, but rarely tell us how they reached their statistical conclusions. Therefore it often remains difficult to say anything about the reliability of the data. We can assume that some observers provided sounder estimates than others, such as the French consuls who lived for lengthy periods in Acre itself. But in the end much of the information is impressionistic, and at best we can only establish rough sizes of populations and demographic trends. Even this claim has to be qualified further by limiting it to the city of Acre without its hinterland. For the period we are interested in we have no quantitative data whatsoever for the countryside and are restricted to anecdotal information. When a traveler wrote that plains were “empty of population,” did he mean empty in comparison to the abundant ruins from classical times, empty in comparison to the size of the population that theoretically could make a living from agriculture, empty in comparison to the observations of previous travelers, or empty in comparison to his homeland? Usually, he does not tell us. Other information is more helpful—such as “many peasants died from starvation,” or “people fled their villages for the mountains,” or “peasants from the mountains settled in the plains.” Here we may be able to establish some migratory patterns without, however, being able to discuss quantities. Though unresolved contradictions remain, the general trend and size of population development in Acre can be established. More problematic is reconstructing a reliable picture of the sectarian distribution of the population.

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

23

The major underlying factor shaping the population curve is the tremendous economic boom during the middle of the eighteenth century. The detailed contours of the general trend are formed by such events as plague, famine, war, and earthquakes. Clearly, these factors contributed to the rate of growth and decline but in themselves were not decisive for the direction of the development. The plague in 1760 reduced the population by roughly a third, but the population continued to increase rapidly in the 1760s, while after 1785 every disaster accelerated the general downward trend of the population size. A graph, with annotations, showing the shifts in population between 1700 and 1840 appears in appendix A. Any attempt to determine trends of particular sectarian populations has to take two difficulties into consideration. (a) Numbers are even less reliable than usual. Not only are sources scarce but we must treat them with suspicion: frequently there was a definite interest in overestimating the size of one community at the cost of others. (b) It appears that diseases and especially the plague hit the Muslim population much harder than the Christian. A report on the plague of 1806 claims that while 25–50 percent of the Muslim population perished, not one of the Christians died.39 The Christians were quarantined and took other precautionary measures, believing as they did in the communicability of the disease. Their Muslim neighbors, denying this, took by and large no precautions. Mortality during the epidemics depended not only on religious beliefs and resulting attitudes toward protective measures, but also on wealth (i.e., the means to leave town or to store enough supplies in available living space to lock oneself up for a time). In a general manner we know that during the eighteenth century Christians migrated toward the coast—Greek Catholics from Damascus and Aleppo, especially, but also Greek Orthodox from Nazareth, for instance. In addition, some Greeks came from the Greek islands and were quickly Arabized, as were some families who came from Malta.40 We can also conclude that during the time of Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh many Greek Catholics were attracted to Acre, just as the Jews were later, during the time of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar pursued a policy of stimulating immigration to his realm, but with different results for different communities. It seems that throughout the eighteenth century the Christians constituted the majority of the population, with the Greek Catholics and the Greek Orthodox being by far the largest groups.41 With the decay of the city and the disappearance of trade the absolute number and the relative size of the Christian population of Acre dwindled. In Acre we can observe for the eighteenth century the link between a growing Christian population and

24

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

foreign trade that becomes so typical in the nineteenth century for such cities as Alexandria, Beirut, and Izmir. Carmel is wrong when he contrasts Acre to Haifa, saying: “Neighboring Acre persisted in its exclusively Muslim character.”42 Rather, Acre turned slowly into a more Muslim city after having been a predominantly Christian city in the eighteenth century. The waqf deed from 1830 of a Muslim notable by the name of Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı shows that of the five houses he had bought in Acre two had been bought from Jews, two from Christians, and only one from a Muslim. In view of the numerical evidence given before, this appears to confirm a shift in the denominational balance in the early nineteenth century.43 Numbers for the Jewish population are even less precise.44 The Igrot and Sholhei Aretz Israel literature of the time clearly shows Jerusalem and Safed to be the centers of Jewish immigration. Acre is only mentioned as a port of entry. The motivation for Jewish immigration to Palestine during this time had nothing to do with the economic boom generated through cotton exports. The steep increase of Jewish population in Acre coincided exactly with the years during which H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, the Jewish vezier to Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha, could serve as a powerful patron.45 The rapid exodus from the city after 1820 is understandable in light of the murder of Farhfi ¯ı and the loss of protection for the Jews. The following observations may summarize the population trends and developments. 1. During the eighteenth century Acre experienced a population increase unparalleled in the Arab lands: from a fishing village of 300–400 people it became a city of 25,000–30,000 inhabitants. Only in the nineteenth century do we find examples of similar rapid growth in other places: Beirut, Izmir, Alexandria. 2. From the end of the eighteenth century we can observe a continued decline in the population of Acre until it was reduced by the middle of the nineteenth century to 2,000. 3. While Acre was predominantly a Christian city in the eighteenth century, it became a mainly Muslim city in the nineteenth century. 4. Throughout the period Jews remained few in number. Only in the early 1800s did the community flourish considerably under the protecting hand of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. 5. Plague, famine, war, and earthquakes were important factors shaping the patterns of the demographic trends, but underlying and most decisive

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

25

for the direction of these trends was the economic development of the city and its surroundings.

THE PHYSICAL SHAPING OF ACRE Although the results of the reconstruction of Acre during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries are quite visible, information about the history of these reconstructions is scant. There is, for instance, not a word in the records about the construction of private houses and apartments. And while the construction of public buildings is usually mentioned by local historians and travelers, we have little information about the costs, the sources of financing, the labor force, its organization, and so on. We can only indicate in a very crude manner some of the general trends in which construction activities developed. We know that in the early eighteenth century Acre was mainly a pile of rubble and ruins. In spite of the fact that the harbor was useless and that in nearby Haifa a much-better-protected bay was to be found, Zfi a¯hı¯r al-‘Umar nevertheless decided to make Acre the center of his realm, precisely because of Acre’s ruins: they provided cheap precut building materials on location. A great number of Crusader structures were destroyed in the process. For convenience’s sake we can group the construction activity other than private housing according to the functions it fulfilled: religious, commercial, military-political, and public services. This shall serve only as a summary overview of the construction in Acre. In the following chapters we shall refer to specific building activities as they become pertinent. For the locations of these buildings the city plan of Acre in the appendix to this volume should be consulted.46

Religious Buildings Around 1700 one mosque, al-Sina¯n mosque, existed in Acre—it was later rebuilt as al-Bahfi r mosque by Sulayma¯n Pasha. Soon another mosque was added, al-Ramal mosque. By mid-century al-Mu‘allaq mosque— built in 1748 by Shaykh Suhayl—and al-Zaytu¯na mosque—built in 1754 by H fi a¯jj Muhfi ammad al-Sfi a¯diq—were erected. As far as we know, in all cases the initiative and the money came from private sources. To these four mosques only one more, but by far the largest and most beautiful, was added in 1778

26

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

by Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, built with forced labor and financed by his treasury. All five of the churches in Acre—the Franciscan church, the Greek Orthodox church of St. George, the Maronite church, and the two Greek Catholic churches, St. Andrew and St. John, were built or extensively enlarged and renovated between 1730 and 1770. Naturally, they were not financed by the government. With the exception of the great mosque of al-Jazza¯r, which was clearly built for reasons of representations and political legitimization, all the other religious buildings were built before the al-Jazza¯r period, some of them in fact even before Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had made Acre the seat of his government. It is reasonable to assume that their construction responded to the rapidly increasing population, both Christian and Muslim, during this period.

Commercial Structures During the first half of the eighteenth century the Kha¯n-al-Faranj remained the only real center of economic activity. But when Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar moved into the city, he was well aware of the importance of cotton exports and other economic activities. Zfi a¯hir decided to build a new port in the southern part of Haifa Bay, while at the old port of Acre he had in 1761 only some wave breakers added to protect boats and light vessels. In Acre he had two new Kha¯ns built—Kha¯n Shu¯na¯ in 1765, the eastern part of Kha¯n alShuwarda, and a large bazaar, where today the Su¯q al-Abyadfi stands. Al-Jazza¯r attributed at least as much importance to the economy as did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. He doubled the size of the Kha¯n al-Shuwarda and added Kha¯n al-‘Umda¯n and Su¯q al-Jazza¯r plus some minor structures. During the reign of Sulayma¯n Pasha very few structures were added: a donkey kha¯n for small traders with daily merchandise was erected in 1810. Seven years later Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s bazaar burned down and Sulayma¯n Pasha had the Su¯q al-Abyadfi built in its stead. But significantly, where once 110 shops had existed, the reconstruction housed only 64 shops.

Military-Political Structures Almost immediately after entering the town, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began a major construction project: the fortification of the city by a wall seven meters high and one meter wide. The wall was to protect against Bedouin

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

27

bands, sea pirates, and eventually the French army. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar rehabilitated the crusader fortress and made it his palace. He added to it a fortified tower. Both Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha added structures of their own. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar also built the Busta, or seraglio, where he conducted the daily business of government. The importance of city walls was driven home to al-Jazza¯r during the French siege. After the French retreat, alJazza¯r had the old, thin, vertical wall of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar repaired, and set out to have a new and enormous additional defense structure added. This included a much larger wall, sloped and covered by earth, much better suited to resist modern artillery, together with a moat and towers. Sulayma¯n Pasha and ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha added to the city walls and raised a few more buildings for their palaces. The latter also had some residences constructed outside the walls.

Public Utilities Here we must mention the bathhouses. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Ahmad Pasha al-Jazza¯r each had a big public bath erected. Al-Jazza¯r undertookfi another major enterprise, bringing fresh water by way of an aqueduct, which was destroyed during the French siege and reconstructed only in 1815 by Sulayma¯n Pasha. From this in no way exhaustive list of constructions a few valid observations can be made: 1. Most of the religious buildings were built during the early period and reflected the increasing population of Acre. 2. Both Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and Ahfi mad al-Jazza¯r sought to fortify the city and enhance its economic facilities. In fact it seems that al-Jazza¯r’s efforts greatly surpassed those of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. This stands in clear contrast to the trends of the growth and decline of the population and the economy, a point to which we shall return. 3. Sulayma¯n Pasha added considerably to the building substance in all categories. 4. The bombardment by Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha in 1831, the subsequent earthquake, and the final bombardment by the British in 1840 reduced the city to what it had been 150 years earlier: a pile of rubble.

We have sketched briefly in this chapter the development and meaning of the infrastructure of southwest Syria, the demographic trends of Acre and its

28

SOUTHWEST SYRIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

hinterland, and building activities in Acre. Although all these aspects changed during the period, the phases of their development were not synchronous. What linked and shaped them was an underlying development of rapidly increasing export of cash crops and the changing balance between local and imperial politics.

chapter 2

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

So far we have only looked at the physical layout, the existing infrastructure, and the demographic trends of Acre and its hinterland during the period studied here. The aim of this chapter is to reconstruct a political history for this region with Acre as the focal point. A number of chronicles from the period itself and shortly afterward exist, often written by eyewitnesses. They touch on Acre in various forms, dealing with one ruler or another, with regional or communal affairs of various groups, with the history of the vilayets or with the major urban centers such as Damascus and Aleppo. These chronicles provide a wealth of information, though the specific agendas of the authors are often recognizable and much of the information of interest to us comes in anecdotal or incidental form. French consular reports can often be very helpful here in providing a different perspective and a fairly precise time frame for the sequence of events as they evolved. Modern historians have difficulties in classifying Acre and its hinterland. It was neither the precursor of an independent state nor the center of a later nationalism; as it evolved in the eighteenth century it neither constituted an Ottoman administrative unit nor predetermined later Mandatory entities, as did Mount Lebanon for instance. The region at the beginning of the eighteenth century can be best described as a border region whose contours are not clearly defined: Haifa was under the control of Nablus, i.e. it belonged by extension to the vilayet of Damascus. But it was also called “Little Malta” because no government authority reached to there and pirates used it as a refuge. Nazareth and Tiberias had been under Druze control, i.e., indirectly under the authority of the governor of Sidon, but while Tiberias reverted directly to the latter, Nazareth had moved under the control of Nablus, i.e.,

30

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

the governor of Damascus. On the whole the position of the governor was exceedingly weak. Different elements such as Bedouin tribes in the Galilee, ¯ mil, the Druze, the Metualis in the bordering mountain range of Jabal al-‘A and the ruling elite of Nablus all pursued local rivalries without much direct interference by the Ottoman governors of Sidon and Damascus, not to speak of the Ottoman government itself. In this vaguely defined political borderland Acre and its realm slowly took political and economic shape, and inserted itself like a wedge between the vilayet of Sidon and that of Damascus, eventually taking over the former and reducing the latter. It is this process that I aim to trace in this chapter. Since the political development of Acre and its realm was, as we shall see, heavily influenced by the dominant political presence of its first three rulers, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, and Sulayma¯n Pasha, it seems helpful also to use the political career of each as an organizing principle for this chapter.

fiZ¯A HIR AL-‘UMAR’S RISE TO POWER AND THE FORMATION OF THE REALM OF ACRE Two biographies of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar (d. 1775) were written by contemporaries or near contemporaries: one was by Mikha¯’ı¯l Niqu¯la¯ alSfi abba¯gh,1 and the other by ‘Abbu¯d al-Sfi abba¯gh. Mikha¯’ı¯l was the grandson of the most important vezier of Zfi a¯hir, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. He had a great sense for the anecdotal detail but a complete disregard for chronological sequence and was more concerned with the good image of Zfi a¯hir and his vezier than with precise dates. Mikha¯’ı¯l apparently also wrote a biography of his grandfather Ibra¯hı¯m.2 ‘Abbu¯d was also related to Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh.3 Since Ibra¯hı¯m, as we shall see, was closely associated with Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, both authors take a rather favorable, if not apologetic, approach to their subject—Mikha¯’ı¯l more so than ‘Abbu¯d. However, all later biographical material relies most heavily on these two biographies. For some important aspects of al-‘Umar’s life in Acre, though, other chronicles, mentioned below, the French consular reports, as well as Mariti’s travel report, provide an independent source. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯ was a local man, a leader of men, a consummate politician and an astute merchant. He was born around 1690 into a family of some standing in the region between Tiberias and Safed. The Zayda¯nı¯ clan was most likely of Bedouin background, and had settled in the region of Tiberias in the second half of the seventeenth century. Zfi a¯hir’s father,

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

31

al-‘Umar, and grandfather, Zayda¯n, were already multazims of Tiberias, a position they were granted by the amirs of the Druze who, in turn, were the tax-farmers for all of Mount Lebanon by authority of the governor of Sidon. An uncle, ‘Alı¯, obtained the tax-farm for Da¯mu¯n, close to Acre. At the same time the Zayda¯nı¯s carried on a lively trade from the Galilee to Damascus and Aleppo. They established contacts with families in Damascus and relations with tribes in the region. With the death of al-‘Umar at the beginning of the eighteenth century his oldest son Sa‘d became the head of the clan, but nominally his younger brother, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar al-Zayda¯nı¯, became the most powerful man since the family transferred all tax-farms into his name because “they did not want to have a name with the government.”4 The assumption was that in case of defaulted tax payments the government, i.e., the governor of Sidon, could only hold a young lad answerable but not the actual holders of the tax-farms. Around 1707 Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, still in his teens, was involved in a brawl, killing a man from Tiberias. His oldest brother, Sa‘d, thought it advisable to remove the Zayda¯nı¯ clan from the region of Tiberias. The opportunity came in the form of an offer from the leaders of the Sfi aqr tribe to reside with them in ‘Arra¯ba, a village remote from major highways but almost equidistant from Safed, Tiberias, and Nazareth and not much further from Acre. Events until the mid-1730s are not firmly dated. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar obtained some formal schooling from an ‘a¯lim by the name of ‘Abd al-Qa¯dir alH fi ifna¯wı¯. As a young lad he roamed the countryside and learned to hunt and to fight. He played a major role in defending the village of Ba‘na against the rapacious governor of Sidon. This must have occurred some time between 1713 and 1718.5 His heroic defense of the village, his dramatic escape, his justice, and his moderation made him during these years, according to the chroniclers, into a regional folk hero. In the 1720s Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar won for himself a name among the peasants as a fighter and a man of justice but also drew the respect—based on his commercial rather than his martial abilities—of Damascene urbanites. Together with his brother Sa‘d he pursued the trade connections his father had already established. They would often travel with caravans from the Galilee to Damascus, selling and buying merchandise there. His visits to Damascus led to important social and commercial contacts and to a friendship with the ‘a¯lim ‘Abd al-Ghaffa¯r al-Shuwaykı¯, who presumably came from Shuwayk, a village near Nablus. In his house he was introduced to one Sayyid Muhfi ammad of the H fi usaynı¯ Sharı¯fs, the elite of Damascus.6 The latter eventually offered Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar his daughter in marriage. Zfi a¯hir’s Damascene wife

32

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

found ‘Arra¯ba too small a place to live in and insisted on moving to Nazareth. When his wife’s father died he became the sole inheritor of the not inconsiderable fortune.7 The Sfi aqr tribe, roaming between Safed and Nablus, had a bad—but probably well-deserved—reputation as an unruly, dangerous element, making highways insecure, endangering commercial traffic, looting and plundering, and not paying taxes. The governor of Sidon tried to subdue them with the help of the people from Nablus. The Sfi aqr, feeling cornered or simply looking for ways to enhance their position, sought to improve their relations with the government. For the purpose of better representation with the Ottoman administration they looked for a notable or dignitary from the urban population as their official chief, one who could negotiate with the authorities better than they themselves could. Their choice fell on Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar alZayda¯nı¯. This must have occurred around 1730.8 By choosing Zfi a¯hir rather than his older brother Sa‘d, the recognized leader of the clan, the Sfi aqr also made it clear that they had no intention of simply submitting to the will of the Zayda¯nı¯s. They probably hoped to use the Zayda¯nı¯s for their own purposes. They did not anticipate how quickly Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar would use them for his own ambitions and then eventually drop them when they became an obstacle to his plans. The first result of this alliance was that Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, with the help of the Sfi aqr, took over Tiberias sometime around 1730. Cleverly preparing his move, he persuaded the governor in Sidon to sanction the usurpation and make him multazim of Tiberias and ‘Arra¯ba. The appointment itself was an indication of the receding power of the Druze amirs over the region: thirty years earlier ‘Umar, Zfi a¯hir’s father, had been appointed multazim of Tiberias by the Druze amirs and not directly by the governor of Sidon. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar proceeded to make Tiberias his first real power base. Members of the Zayda¯nı¯ clan joined him there, and he soon had a troop of some two hundred Zayda¯nı¯ horsemen at his disposal. He appointed his cousin Muhfi ammad al-‘Alı¯ as their commander.9 Efforts were also made to fortify Tiberias. He spent the 1730s working to expand his realm and consolidate his rule. He seems to have been a relatively just and reasonably fair ruler. According to the chronicler, people took refuge in his realm and volunteered to come under his rule.10 But he certainly also took military measures to assert his dominant position in the Galilee. In 1738 he conquered the castle of Jiddı¯n, which controlled the region of Tarshı¯hfi a, Wabar, and Abu¯ Sina¯n. After much negotiation and pressure Safed was surrendered to him by the local strongman and multazim Muhfi ammad Na¯f‘i. A year later he besieged

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

33

the fortified village of Ba‘na unsuccessfully. Eventually, marriage to the daughter of the ruler of Ba‘na achieved the desired result.11 With this the whole northeast of the Galilee had come under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s control.12 In the west his cousin, Muhfi ammad ibn ‘Alı¯ al-Zayda¯nı¯, controlled Da¯mu¯n and eventually Shfa¯ ‘Amr. The same cousin also commanded the Zayda¯nı¯ horsemen who fought for Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. His brother Sa‘d had moved from ‘Arra¯ba to Dayr H fi ana¯, adding to the presence of the Zayda¯nı¯s in the western Galilee. In the fights for Jiddı¯n Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had encountered a young Maghrebi mercenary, Ahfi mad al-Dinkizlı¯, whom he hired and charged with building up a unit consisting of over a thousand of his compatriots.13 This troop of mercenaries would be costly, but liberated Zfi a¯hir from dependence on the voluntary Zayda¯nı¯ horsemen and the Sfi aqr tribesmen, who were unruly and usually available for short periods only. While consolidating and expanding his realm, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began to come into contact with more powerful opponents. But here, too, it remains difficult to establish the exact sequence of events. The various accounts probably fused different events into one. Nazareth was the residence of his first wife and the hometown of his second. Gaining control over it was most likely a drawn-out process, punctuated by clashes with the people from ¯ mir belonged to the district of Nablus. Nazareth and the plain of Marj ibn ‘A Safed but, in fact, had fallen under the control of Nablus. In the 1730s Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began to challenge the power of Nablus.14 At stake was control over commerce in Nazareth and over the trade routes between Nablus and Damascus. This challenge mobilized the leaders of Nablus. Most immediately concerned were the al-Jarra¯r clan, originating from Janı¯n and having only recently risen to power when they made Sfi a¯nu¯r, on the northern accesses of Nablus, their fortified base. They were able to draw to their side the Banu¯ Sfi aqr, until then allies of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. A battle ensued in the Marj ibn ‘A¯mir. Forewarned that the Banu¯ Sfi aqr would turn against him, Zfi a¯hir was able to win the battle with the help of his Maghrebi troops,15 his Zayda¯nı¯ cavalry, and the active support of the people of Nazareth. He pursued the beaten Nabulusı¯s to the fortress of Sfi a¯nu¯r. There he had to accept that he did not have the means to besiege the town. Thanks to the resistance of the alJarra¯r, he could not force the people of Nablus into submission, but he could maintain his control over his newly incorporated towns and regions, which ¯ mir and Nazareth.16 The successful resistance of now included the Marj ibn ‘A the al-Jarra¯r clan to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s attacks at Sfi a¯nu¯r consolidated their ascendancy over the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in Nablus. Eventually members of the al-Jarra¯r

34

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

clan were appointed mutasallims of Nablus, a position they would hold until 1771.17 The al-Jarra¯rs concluded a peace agreement for Nablus with Zfi a¯hir, but ¯ mir and were they had suffered great losses with the defeat in Marj ibn ‘A forced to surrender control over Nazareth and the surrounding region to him. For the next thirty years they would rally the forces of Nablus against further expansions of Zfi a¯hir to the south. In the 1730s Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was able to carve out for himself a power base in the eastern Galilee, a region which had previously been a contested border region between the vilayets of Sidon and Damascus, represented locally by the Druze and the Nabulusı¯s respectively.18 Zfi a¯hir succeeded in pushing back both forces. There was no challenge to be anticipated from the governor of Sidon, whose power was waning and for whom Tiberias was of peripheral importance anyway. For the powerful governors of Damascus the situation presented itself differently: Zfi a¯hir’s growing realm between Tiberias and Safed straddled the trade route and communications between Damascus and Nablus, an important part of the province of Damascus. By extension communications with Egypt were also affected. Zfi a¯hir’s unchecked rise to power in the region therefore worried the governors of Damascus greatly.19 The rise of new local power centers in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century was not restricted to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s expanding realm in the Galilee. In a sense, the foundation of the Arab Greek Catholic community in Damascus belonged to the same trend.20 More important, however, was the rise of the ‘Azfi m clan in Damascus. With their arrival on the scene the Ottoman policy of appointing outsiders as governors of Damascus, and always for short terms only, was disrupted. During the career of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, 1725 to 1775, members of the ‘Azfi m family held the governorship of Damascus for a total of twenty-seven years. The consolidation of the family’s power in Damascus was accompanied by an attempt to expand it to other governorships, especially that of Sidon. Both governorships were repeatedly occupied simultaneously by members of the ‘Azfi m clan. ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, a Mamluk of As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azfi m21 and therefore closely linked to the ‘Azfi ms, pursued the same policy by having his sons appointed as governors of Sidon and Tripoli. Zfi a¯hir’s control over the trade between Damascus and Nablus and the continued expansion of his hold over the province of Sidon was bound to bring him into conflict with the governors of Damascus. Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘Azfi m had been governor of Sidon in 1733 and ruled Damascus as governor from 1734 to 1738 and from 1741 until his death in 1743. He had ample reason to observe with concern Zfi a¯hir’s fortification of

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

35

Tiberias and his expansion to Safed and its surroundings, and to listen to the complaints from Nablus, which Zfi a¯hir had already successfully challenged. He tried to reduce Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s power by conquering the fortress of Tiberias. A first attack was carried out in 1738 but failed.22 In his second tenure as governor Sulayma¯n spent considerable efforts on the conquest of Tiberias. In 1741 he requested support from his nephew Ibra¯hı¯m, governor of Sidon. But Zfi a¯hir defeated the latter’s troops near Acre.23 The following year Sulayma¯n Pasha personally led the campaign against Tiberias and besieged it for some ninety days, supported by his nephew. The Jews in Tiberias had been forewarned by their coreligionists in Damascus about the imminent attack, but had decided to stay in Tiberias and support Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar.24 The latter protested his innocence and his loyal obedience to the authorities of the empire. He tried to negotiate with the pasha of Damascus, but to no avail. Eventually the pasha had to lift the siege because the time had approached for the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca, which he as governor of Damascus was obliged to lead. Zfi a¯hir used the interval to sway opinion in Istanbul to his favor by requesting the French merchants in Acre to send a message to their ambassador in Istanbul to exert pressure. Not sure this channel of communication would work, he tried to open a second one by asking the Jews in Tiberias to establish a conduit through their coreligionists in Damascus and Istanbul to the imperial government.25 These efforts—such as they were— were of no avail. After his return from Mecca the pasha launched, in 1743, a renewed attempt to conquer Tiberias. But the campaign was barely under way when Sulayma¯n Pasha died. His successor, As‘ad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, had no further desire to press the campaign against Tiberias. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had survived the challenge against his dominant position in the eastern Galilee, and could now turn westward in earnest, and concentrate in particular on Acre. He had already demonstrated the seriousness of his ambitions for Acre when he had his nephew Muhfi ammad al-‘Ala¯ arrested and killed. Muhfi ammad had once been commander of some of Zfi a¯hir’s troops and multazim of Da¯mu¯n in the western Galilee. But when he appeared to gain influence in Acre, Zfi a¯hir moved against him.26 The taking of Acre was a drawn-out and gradual process. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had been aware of the commercial potential of Acre for a long time—by 1731 he had good relations with some French merchants there. Blanc and Treilhier are mentioned.27 A local merchant, the Greek Catholic Yu¯suf al-Qassı¯s, became his agent and representative in Acre.28 Although commerce was probably lucrative for Zfi a¯hir, he understood that only political control over Acre would optimize business conditions for him. With the appointment of As‘ad

36

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Pasha al-‘Azfi m as governor in October 1743, a peaceful standoff with Damascus began, and lasted for the next fourteen years. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar could now afford to move on Acre in earnest. Cautious as ever, he tried first to obtain the tax-farm of Acre from the governor in Sidon by agreement. The governor of Sidon refused, despite his repeated requests. Clearly, he observed with great apprehension the rise to power of his multazim in the Galilee. Eventually, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar marched on Acre with troops, had the local multazim killed, and declared himself multazim. The astute observation of his brother Sa‘d, that the government would be in no position to oppose him, proved to be true.29 In 1746 the French reported that since July Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was the “gouverneur et douanier d’Acre,”30 which probably means that at that point he was officially invested as multazim of Acre. He himself, though, preferred for the time being to reside in his castle in Dayr H fi ana¯ a few miles outside Acre. In late 1750 Zfi a¯hir—now a man “qui peut tout ce qu’il veut” [able to fulfill his every desire]—made an enormous effort to have a wall built around Acre while the governor of Damascus was away for a few months on the pilgrimage. He fortified the city, had buildings constructed, and tried to populate the city.31 In 1757 he annexed Haifa and Tantura to his realm.32 From this time on, Acre can be said to be Zfi a¯hir’s base and a new center of local power on the coast of southern Syria, challenging the dominance of Damascus in profound ways. Officially though, Zfi a¯hir remained a multazim for the governor of Sidon. Only in 1768 was his preeminent position recognized by the Ottoman government when he was given the title of “Shaykh of Acre, Amir of Nazareth, Tiberias, Safed and Shaykh of all of Galilee.”33 Finally, on March 9, 1774, he was about to be appointed governor of Sidon, an order that was, however, quickly rescinded by Istanbul.34 Interwoven into and concurrent with the events of the conquest of the western Galilee and Acre are the conflicts and various alliances with the Metualis. This Shı¯‘ı¯ Arab community lives in the mountainous region, now ¯ mil, stretching northwest of Safed to the coast at Tyre. Jabal called Jabal ‘A ¯ ‘Amil was part of the province of Sidon and was most often under the direct control of the Shiha¯bı¯ amirs of the Druze. After Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had established his authority over Safed in the late 1730s he came into direct contact with the Metualis, with whom relations had been good until then. But his territorial ambitions were bound to lead to clashes with them sooner or later. Once more the time frame of the narrative is most difficult to establish. We have two sources for the relations between Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and the Metualis under Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r: Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Sfi abba¯gh’s history, written some

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

37

twenty-five years after Zfi a¯hir’s death, and al-Rukaynı¯’s chronicle of Jabal ‘A¯mil. The latter is rather dry and very economical in its information, but in many ways is the more reliable source. Al-Rukaynı¯ was a contemporary of these events and apparently wrote his chronicle in the form of a diary. Hence his dating of events can be trusted more than all later sources.35 All sources agree on the immediate cause for the clash—possession of two villages. They disagree on the outcome of the decisive battle, though they are unanimous that after the battle an alliance between the two sides was struck. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar provoked the conflict by claiming as his own two villages which traditionally belonged to the Metualis: Balla and Ya¯ru¯n.36 In response the Metualis fought various skirmishes. At some point later a decisive battle ¯ l Sfi afa¯, a nationalist Metuali historian of the early was fought at Tfi arbı¯hfi a. A twentieth century, tried to depict this as a qualified victory for Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r, while al-Sfi abba¯gh claimed a clear victory by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. The earliest source, al-Rukaynı¯, described the battle as a disastrous defeat for Zfi a¯hir, who suffered heavy losses.37 Eventually an alliance between Na¯sfi¯ıf Nasfisfia¯r and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was forged and ceremoniously pledged, whereby the latter committed himself to represent the Metualis to the governor of Sidon, regulating all their tax issues with him, and to defend them against incursions by the Druze amirs. In return the Metualis pledged military support for Zfi a¯hir.38 AlSfi abba¯gh places all these events somewhere between the takeover of Safed by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and his conquest of Acre, i.e., somewhere in the 1740s.39 From the context of his narration A¯l Sfi afa¯ implies that the events took place some time in the early 1750s.40 Only al-Rukaynı¯ provides us with precise and, most likely, reliable dates. The battle of Tfi arbı¯hfi a took place on Oct. 7, 1766 (8 Jumada II 1180), and he gives the date of the treaty as Nov. 24, 1767, i.e., a whole year later. This would imply that the incorporation of Safed into Zfi a¯hir’s realm did not lead immediately to decisive clashes with the Metualis, but rather was followed by some twenty-five years of low-keyed conflict as well as cooperation.41 It is very likely that the border region and its villages ¯ mil and Zfi a¯hir’s realm remained contested for a long time, between Jabal ‘A while at the same time the Metualis supported Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar—for instance, against the Sfi aqr tribe—or Zfi a¯hir sent troops in defense of the Metualis against the incursion of Amı¯r Mulhfi im Shiha¯b. Only after fortifying Acre and enjoying high revenues from cotton exports did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar feel secure enough to challenge the Metualis seriously. But it remains doubtful whether it was this challenge that brought the Metualis to the negotiation table in Sidon. The outcome of the battle of Tfi arbı¯hfi a was obviously open to interpretation. Also the fact that Na¯sfi¯ıf

38

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Nasfisfia¯r negotiated the alliance only a year later indicates that he did not act under the pressure of a defeat in battle. Nevertheless, the alliance enhanced and strengthened Zfi a¯hir’s position as ruler of the region. Apart from a mutual defense pact, the alliance’s most important element was Zfi a¯hir’s new role as the exclusive mediator between the governor in Sidon and the Metualis. This concerned in particular the tax payments of the Metualis, for which Zfi a¯hir took responsibility. In other words, he became de facto the multazim of the ¯ mil region, though not appointed de jure by the governor of Sidon. Jabal ‘A The alliance enlarged Zfi a¯hir’s realm considerably and reinforced his military strength by adding the Metuali forces, who remained faithful allies almost until Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s dramatic end. For the Metualis the alliance implied the surrender of, at least, their financial autonomy and the acknowledgment of Zfi a¯hir as their overlord. As we have seen, Zfi a¯hir’s military strength cannot have been the decisive factor for this step by the Metualis. The cause is more likely to be found in the relations between the Metualis and the governor of Sidon. Since the early 1750s the governor of Sidon had started five major campaigns, usually with the help of the Druze, to subdue the Metualis and collect taxes from them perforce. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and the Metualis shared the same interests in this point. Both aimed at reducing the authority of the governor of Sidon, and both were wary of the power of the Druze in the north. A political and military alliance made perfect sense, and was to prove its value in the following years in some fifteen joint military campaigns against the people of Nablus, the Druze, the governors of Damascus and Sidon, and in the conquest of Sidon42—especially at a time when the governor of Damascus was again trying to extend his control over the region. The years between 1744 and 1765 were a long, calm period in which Zfi a¯hir al‘Umar consolidated his power. He moved his base from Tiberias to the coast. After fortifying Acre and making it his residence, Zfi a¯hir attached Haifa, Tfi antfiu¯ra and Mount Carmel to his rule. These were probably most prosperous years in the Galilee, and trade flourished. By establishing a monopoly over the cotton exports, Zfi a¯hir was able to obtain maximum prices for cotton from the French. Cotton exports increased in value and quantity. Internal security was established and people from abroad moved to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s realm to settle there and enjoy his benign rule. Zfi a¯hir had the good business sense not to exploit peasants to the point of destruction, but kept his financial demands to a more moderate level. He would even grant tax relief when harvests were bad or when immigrants undertook to put new land under cultivation. The population of Acre increased dramatically. Acre became the capital of the

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

39

new de facto state. Administration and army became somewhat more institutionalized. Internal dissent among the tribes and family squabbles with his sons, who were ruling in his name in different districts, remained on the level of occasional skirmishes, as did border disputes with the Metualis. External threats did not exist. The governor of Sidon was in no position to challenge the discreetly expanding influence and power of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, and As‘ad al-‘Azfi m, the governor of Damascus, was for thirteen years preoccupied with the reconstruction of Damascus and apparently in no mood to confront the rising power of his neighbor. Not even the annexation of Haifa caused him to take serious measures against Zfi a¯hir. The first rumblings of change could be heard when in 1761 ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, governor of Damascus, obtained a firma¯n from the Ottoman government to reattach Haifa to his province. He ordered the governor of Sidon, Muhfi ammad Pasha, to send troops to Haifa to occupy it for him. The full extent of the governor’s impotence quickly became evident. All he could send were thirty soldiers, and he had to ask a French captain to transport them from Sidon to Haifa, since he himself had no ship. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar simply had the ship seized, the troops arrested, and the captain fined.43 He could feel secure, militarily as well as politically, and apparently had contacts in Istanbul who were able to deflect any serious measures against him. He had hosted a certain Ya‘qu¯b Agha, an official of the Ottoman government, who was on his way to Jerusalem. While this official was staying in Acre Zfi a¯hir had ingratiated himself with him, and a permanent relationship was established. In Istanbul Ya‘qu¯b Agha had close contacts with the qizla¯r agha and the fisilihfi da¯r, a certain Sulayma¯n Agha. He wrote to them and had the orders to Muhfi ammad Pasha of Sidon rescinded.44 Eventually Ya‘qu¯b Agha was executed, the qizla¯r agha died, and Sulayma¯n Agha was either exiled to Cyprus or became its governor in 1766.45 These changes encouraged ‘Uthma¯n Pasha of Damascus to try again to obtain backing from Istanbul for his fight against Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Zfi a¯hir turned to Sulayma¯n Agha in Cyprus for support. When Sulayma¯n Agha was returned to Istanbul he succeeded in arranging arbitration over Haifa. His own delegate was sent as the representative of Muhfi ammad Pasha to Acre, where the rest of the arbitration committee consisted of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, and the muftı¯ and qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre. Not surprisingly, the issue was decided in Zfi a¯hir’s favor.46 But Zfi a¯hir must have recognized that ‘Uthma¯n Pasha was a tenacious enemy. It may have been this recognition that induced him to conclude the treaty with the Metualis in late 1767. With the death of Sulayma¯n Agha a few years later, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar lost all support in Istanbul and ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, governor of Damascus, was able—

40

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

after having placed his son Muhfi ammad as governor of Tripoli—to obtain the governorship of Sidon for his twenty-five-year-old second son, Darwı¯sh, in November 1770.47 By July 1770 signs of new tensions could be detected. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar began new fortification work in Acre, perhaps upon hearing of the death of Sulayma¯n Agha in Istanbul, and had all male inhabitants of Acre, Muslim and Christians, armed with rifle, saber, and two pistols.48 In the following months Zfi a¯hir succeeded in reconciling all his sons and forged thereby a powerful alliance. In a sense, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had reached the zenith of his power: he controlled a firm alliance with the Metualis, his sons were—for the time being— united with him, neither the people of his realm nor his troops were in any mood to rebel, and in addition, he must have possessed considerable financial means, since the cotton export trade had been very profitable for two decades. Yet never had his position been as precarious as now: he had lost all contacts and protection in Istanbul—such as they had been. It was his luck that just then Istanbul was preoccupied with the Russian war. His major enemy, ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, the governor of Damascus, was fiercely determined to eliminate him. For this purpose he had struck an alliance with the Druze and found enough support in Istanbul to have his sons invested as governors of Tripoli and Sidon, the province from which Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had carved out most of his principality. Nablus, to the south, also belonged to the province of Damascus and was controlled by the al-Jarra¯rs, who still bore a grudge against Zfi a¯hir. Strong but surrounded by an alliance of enemies and without backing from Istanbul, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar must have been in desperate need for an ally to support him. This ally he found in ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r in Egypt. ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r had only recently established himself as sole ruler in Egypt and had conquered the Red Sea coast and the Hejaz. Strategic considerations caused him, like all strong autonomous rulers of Egypt before him, to turn his attention to Syria, which could serve as the base for an attack on Egypt or as the glacis of Egypt’s defense if it was under Egyptian control. In addition, ‘Alı¯ Bey nursed an old animosity against ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯. When Istanbul’s attention and energies were absorbed by the war with Russia, the moment seemed to have come for a march on Syria. It is not clear which of the two, ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r or Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, who obviously shared common interests, initiated the alliance.49 There is no doubt that Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh was the most influential policy maker in the government of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and that the network of Syrian immigrants in Egypt had become

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

41

powerful. It provided Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar with the contact he was missing so badly in Istanbul and Damascus. In contrast to the Jews, the Greek Catholics were not an imperial millet with representation in Istanbul but a local minority without legal recognition, well established on the Syrian coast and in Egypt. Their interests were as local as those of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabir, and they seem to have been instrumental in forging the alliance between the two. In November 1770 ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r sent the first Egyptian troops to Gaza and Jaffa. With that step he set the stage for the last act of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule in Acre, five years which in human greed, hubris, and bravery, in dramatic, unforeseen turns of events, and in grandeur and catastrophe lacked nothing of Greek tragedy. The expeditionary corps of some 15,000 to 20,000 men, under the command of Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, arrived in the region of Jaffa at the end of November.50 He proceeded slowly but without encountering any resistance to Damascus. He arrived there just as ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯ was setting out on the pilgrimage. Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey decided not to attack him, apparently because he thought it improper to do battle with the pilgrims.51 He returned with his troops to the coast of Jaffa, where he lingered during the spring without any particular plan. Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar complained angrily to ‘Alı¯ Bey about this inactivity, which gave other pashas the opportunity to collect troops in Damascus. In May 1771 ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r dispatched new troops, some 35,000, under the command of his Mamluk Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, who moved quickly on Damascus, defeated the troops of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, and in June entered the city. Apparently under the moral influence of the abovementioned Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab turned in Damascus from a Saul into a Paul and saw the moral impropriety of waging war against the troops of the sultan, the defender of Islam. He left Damascus almost in panic and returned with his troops to Egypt.52 Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was stunned by this sudden change in the situation, and felt extremely vulnerable to the renewed threat from Damascus. He had just taken Sidon, together with his Metuali allies, from where Darwı¯sh Pasha, the son of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, had fled. In August he took Jaffa and fortified it with a 2,000-man garrison, and in September he, together with Metuali troops, inflicted a severe defeat upon ‘Uthma¯n Pasha west of the Bridge of Jacob’s Daughters in the Jordan Valley.53 The attempt to take Sfi a¯nu¯r in August failed, as did a later siege on Nablus in April 1772. In the meantime Zfi a¯hir’s son ‘Alı¯ was carrying the war to the H fi awra¯n, the high plain south of Damascus.54 Although worried about his exposure and the force of the enemy, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was actually able, after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, to expand his realm as never before. It now

42

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

included Jaffa and Sidon, and a military presence in the H fi awra¯n. Nablus, though cut off from its port, Jaffa, remained unconquerable. May 1772 brought some reverses: ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r arrived in Acre as a refugee, having lost Egypt to Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab. In the same month Muhfi ammad Tfi u¯qa¯n of the Na¯bulusı¯ clan took Jaffa from Zfi a¯hir. ‘Alı¯ Bey and Zfi a¯hir were forced to spend a great deal of energy and resources on the siege of Jaffa for the next nine months before they were able to wrest it from Na¯bulusı¯ control. If they had any hope of bringing Egypt again under the control of ‘Alı¯ Bey, Jaffa had to be in their hands. Indeed, ‘Alı¯ Bey set out to Egypt in March 1773 only a month after Jaffa had been retaken. He was killed by Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab’s forces soon after his arrival.55 From June 1772 the Russian fleet under Orloff cruised on the Syrian coast, supporting in a haphazard fashion the siege against Jaffa and also against Beirut, where since June Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, who would before long become ruler of Acre, had entrenched himself, challenging the Druze for possession of the town. This led to a rapprochement between the Druze and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, whose help they needed for conquering Beirut. The proZfi a¯hir faction among the Druze gained strength against the Druze Amı¯r Yu¯suf, ally of ‘Uthma¯n Pasha. In June 1773 a formal reconciliation between the Metualis, the Druze, and Zfi a¯hir took place. That step blocked the access of troops from Damascus to the coastal region. Still, it took until early October before the new alliance could dislodge al-Jazza¯r from Beirut.56 Ever since the death of ‘Alı¯ Bey, Zfi a¯hir had made great efforts to strengthen the defenses of Jaffa and to conquer Jerusalem—which, however, he failed to do. At the beginning of 1774 the French consul in Sidon, de Taules, wrote in the report to his government that complete peace was reigning in Syria. The Russian fleet, with its unpredictable actions, had been withdrawn, and ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Misfirı¯, who had been appointed as commander-general of all of Syria to reestablish law and order, seemed to accept the fact that he could not defeat Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, who now appeared to be very conciliatory.57 The pasha negotiated with Istanbul to give Zfi a¯hir the governorship of Sidon, on condition that he pay all outstanding taxes. The official legitimization of Zfi a¯hir’s position seemed to be forthcoming when an edict from ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Misfirı¯ was sent on February 17, 1774, to Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, naming him governor of Sidon and Nablus, Gaza, Ramla, Jaffa, and Jabal ‘Ajlu¯n. ‘Uthma¯n Pasha referred to a decision by the sultan in this matter, although the final ratification of the appointment still needed the sultan’s signature.58 For a moment it appeared as if Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, now an octogenarian, had reached a new peak in his extraordinary career.59 He was to be the legitimate ruler of

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

43

¯ mil and all of Palestine, the whole Syrian coast from Gaza to Beirut, of Jabal ‘A though he would have no actual control over Nablus and Jerusalem. He had an agreement with the Druze and no powerful enemy threatened his borders. The only clouds on the horizon were his sons, who, getting on in age themselves, finally wanted power for themselves and punctuated the peace with repeated rebellions. ‘Alı¯, based in Safed and probably the most talented of the sons, became a particular problem. He challenged his father for control over villages in the Galilee. Only a precarious alliance with another son, Ahfi mad, who resided in Tiberias and from there controlled Jabal ‘Ajlu¯n, enabled Zfi a¯hir to defeat ‘Alı¯. A third son, Sa‘ı¯d, presented yet another challenge to his father. For the time being Zfi a¯hir could again establish his authority over his sons. But his resources were stretched to the utmost, and desertions became endemic among his Maghrebi troops. For want of pay they went over to ‘Alı¯.60 The peace was precarious at best, and the legitimacy of Zfi a¯hir’s rule was lacking the final signature. By the summer of 1774 ‘Uthma¯n Pasha, who had assured Zfi a¯hir that the governorship of Sidon was his, had been called back and Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m had been appointed governor of Damascus. More important, the Ottoman government had in July 1774 signed the peace treaty of Ku¨cu¨k Kainarce with Russia, terminating thereby the threat to the very existence of the empire. It was now to demonstrate that it was by no means willing to make good on promises to provincial rebels, given under the duress of the war with Russia. The new pasha of Damascus, not able to defeat Zfi a¯hir militarily, promised to negotiate a pardon for him from the government. But there was no more talk of the governorship of Sidon. When the Ottoman government finally did grant Zfi a¯hir a general pardon in April 1775, it occurred almost simultaneously with the renewed invasion of Palestine by Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, who had been encouraged by the government to do so, in order to destroy Zfi a¯hir’s power.61 Egyptian troops took Jaffa on May 20, 1775. The male population was put to the sword and the city was plundered. Upon the news, panic spread in Acre. All its inhabitants fled, depositing their valuables in the French khan in the hope that the khan would not be touched. Zfi a¯hir himself left on May 24. His son ‘Alı¯ used the opportunity—somewhat pathetically—to enter the deserted city and proclaim himself governor of Acre. His glory lasted only a week, after which, under the threat of the approaching Egyptian troops, his soldiers plundered whatever was left in the city and disappeared.62 On the following day Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab moved into Acre. The rule of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had collapsed. He and his vezier were refugees.

44

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

His sons tried to cut personal deals with the invader. The army had disintegrated. Nothing could stop the Mamluk army. But once more Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab caused—though this time not deliberately—a complete turnaround in the situation. He suddenly fell sick and died on June 10. His Mamluks, well aware that the question of his succession would be settled in Cairo and not in Acre, broke camp almost immediately and left the next day in all haste toward the south. This left the city in anarchy and at the mercy of Maghrebi soldiery. An internecine struggle for the control of the city threatened to break out among the Maghrebi mercenaries, who had served different masters.63 Only the diplomatic skills of al-Dinkizlı¯ and the charismatic personality of Zfi a¯hir, returning to the city on June 12, succeeded in establishing discipline among the troops.64 Once more, it seemed, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had saved his rule and realm, though severely battered, in the nick of time. But the death of Muhfi ammad Bey Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, inconvenient as it was, did not change the determination of the government in Istanbul to bring this local rebel to heel once and for all. Almost immediately the government decided to send another expeditionfi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, newly appointed admiral of ary corps against Zfi a¯hir.65 H the Ottoman navy, arrived in early August in the bay of Haifa with some eight ships. His major task, it seems, was to collect several years’ outstanding taxes from Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, without necessarily conquering Acre or killing Zfi a¯hir. Yet this is precisely what occurred within a few short weeks. Reports about the events that led to the violent end of Zfi a¯hir and his rule differ in their interpretation of the causes. The various narratives basically offer two versions. It is well worth looking into them more carefully, since they reflect very different and opposing perceptions of the weakness of the imperial center and its relations to its provinces striving for autonomy. The two historians of the al-Sfi abba¯gh family seem to have much inside information, but their story has a particular slant. Both agree that there existed a willingness in principle to pay but that negotiations with H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha were sabotaged by the greed and ambitions of various people—the worst among them Ahfi mad al-Dinkizlı¯, who betrayed his master of forty years.66 A French report written immediately after the events seems to confirm parts of this narrative.67 The second version is given by the historian H fi aydar Ahfi mad Shiha¯b— about whom more later—and sheds a very different light on the events. When H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha demanded the outstanding taxes be paid, Zfi a¯hir consulted with his top officials. Opinions were divided. Ahfi mad Agha alDinkizlı¯ advised payment of the debts and submission to the Ottoman au-

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

45

thority. Zfi a¯hir concurred: “This is the right thing to do. I am an old man and I don’t have the nerve anymore for fighting and endless marches in the mountains. For me the most important issue is to die with a calm mind as an obedient [servant] of the Sultan.” But Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, Zfi a¯hir’s vezier and chief financial administrator, demurred and claimed that the money was not available for these payments. Besides, he argued, “even if we had it and we gave a lot, the government would never be satisfied. . . . Shaykh Zfi a¯hir has no money but he has gunpowder and men, war and battle.” When al-Dinkizlı¯ realized that al-Sfi abba¯gh’s opinion had carried the day, he gave orders to his Maghrebi troops and the artillery not to fight: “We are Muslim people, obedient to the Sultan. For the Muslim, believing in One God, it is not permitted to fight against the Sultan in any form.” Thereupon the soldiers refused to fight, H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha took the city, and Zfi a¯hir was killed by a soldier while fleeing from Acre.68 An anonymous report by an author who was perhaps Egyptian, more likely a Syrian living in Egypt, and probably a Muslim, tells a similar story, putting the blame squarely on al-Sfi abba¯gh’s excessive greed.69 The two men, Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh and Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯, seem to have been personal enemies, and both tried to manipulate the octogenarian Zfi a¯hir. The two sources written by members of the al-Sfi abba¯gh family put the blame for the final catastrophe squarely on al-Dinkizlı¯, although no motive for such an outrageous act of betrayal after forty years of loyalty is given. We can safely assume a deliberate attempt by both authors to exonerate their relative. Shiha¯b’s account seems more trustworthy, not only because it carries no familial prejudice, but also because it makes more sense in its general development. The anonymous account also documents Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh’s absolute refusal to seek a compromise and conciliation. This attitude is actually confirmed, as we shall see, by earlier observations by the French consul. The struggle between the two men shows, too, that there existed, beyond the personal rivalries, profound differences of opinion regarding politics, the role of the empire, and its future. It was, once more, the question of the relations between a weakening center and a provincial periphery teeming with tendencies toward autonomy. In pursuit of his political aims Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was quite prepared, as we have seen, to disregard the will of the governor of Sidon, to kill his multazim, to arrest his soldiers, and in general to do battle with him. He also challenged the authority of the governor of Damascus when he extended his control to regions belonging to Nablus. Furthermore, at least twice he resisted, in the fortified town of Tiberias, attempts by the governor to subdue him militarily.

46

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

He dealt with the French merchants on his own terms, sometimes with very little respect for treaties the French had signed with the sultan. He raised and maintained his own standing army and signed treaties with his neighbors in Nablus and with the Metualis. In short, he demonstrated a great deal of independence in his actions. Yet at the same time he was eager to maintain contact with Istanbul. During the siege in Tiberias he sent messages via the French and the Jews to present his case and to profess his obedience to the sultan. When his possession of Haifa was challenged by the governor of Damascus, he submitted to arbitration, though most likely he fixed the results. Nevertheless, it provided his expansion with legitimacy from the Ottoman government. He also seems to have paid taxes quite regularly—the ultimate proof of loyalty. The situation was considerably radicalized in 1770, when, having lost support in Istanbul and threatened by a determined governor in Damascus, he forged his alliance with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r of Egypt. The latter had his own motives for this alliance, and it has been repeatedly but inconclusively debated whether he himself was striving for total independence from the Ottoman Empire. We are, I believe, on firmer ground as far as Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar is concerned. There is no doubt that he was willing to use the alliance to fight the governor of Damascus and to expel the governor of Sidon and that he profited from the occasion to expand his realm to the strategically important towns of Jaffa and Beirut. He was willing to do practically anything in the region to ensure his power, possibly even to defend himself against the admiral of the Ottoman fleet. But at the same time he was also eagerly negotiating to have his power legitimized by the Ottoman government and to be installed as governor of Sidon. When this did not work out, it was important for him to obtain a general pardon from the government. Even in his last struggle, his first direct confrontation with the Ottoman government, his automatic reaction seems to have been to comply with the demands of the government. The sentiment expressed by Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯, that it was unacceptable for a Muslim to fight against his overlord the sultan, must have been a genuine one and was probably shared by Zfi a¯hir. It was the same sentiment that prompted Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey, the Mamluk commander from Egypt, and most likely also Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab, to abstain from attacking the amı¯r al-hfi a¯jj and from following through with their conquest of Syria.70 When Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab invaded Syria a second time, he immediately sent Isma¯‘ı¯l Bey as an emissary to Istanbul to negotiate the appointment as governor for him. For all participants, the framework of legitimacy for the exercise of political power remained the Ottoman Empire and appointment by the sultan.

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

47

But there are also other tendencies recognizable, which crystallized by the middle of the century and responded to the signs of weakness in the central government. The tendencies toward local autonomy, of which Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar himself was part, reflected this weakness. The disastrous Russo-Turkish War, 1768–1774, introduced a new situation in the eastern Mediterranean. For the first time a European power, a fleet under Russian command, interfered directly along the Syrian coast, looking for possible allies against the Ottoman Empire. With that, local fights between pashas and local strongmen could acquire international dimensions. It was the introduction of modern international politics to the Syrian coast, conceptualized so aptly by Carl L. Brown as the “penetrated system.”71 The signs of weakness at the center were visible enough for prophecies about the end of the Ottoman dynasty and the fall of Istanbul to circulate in the Syrian region by 1758.72 Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh was the most unequivocal advocate of those who concluded that the Ottoman Empire was about to collapse and disintegrate. He belonged to a community, the Greek Catholics, that had itself arisen out of a challenge to the power of the patriarch in Istanbul and indirectly to the authority of the Ottoman government whose representative he was. It is reported, unfortunately without giving a date, that a European approached Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh, suggesting he declare Acre independent from the Ottoman Empire. In return Hapsburgian protection and financial support was to be offered. Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh was not disinclined to listen to the offer, but being a wary politician he suspected the European to be an agent provocateur sent by the Ottomans. When he asked for a written commitment, the emissary refused to give it.73 And there was a curious incident during the siege of Jaffa by ‘Alı¯ Bey and Zfi a¯hir. A ship with supplies for them was sent from Acre. Originally it flew the Russian flag, but then flew the one which Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh had provided.”74 One can only speculate what this flag might have been, but it is not far-fetched to assume here an attempt at establishing symbols of sovereignty. In 1773 al-Sfi abba¯gh had discussed with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, living in exile in Acre, the possibility of proposing a pact to the British to help ‘Alı¯ Bey to conquer Arabia in return for naval bases in the Red Sea.75 In the same year the French consul de Taules heard al-Sfi abba¯gh say that “l’Empire Ottoman n’existoit plus, et qu’il n’y avoit dans le monde qu’une seule nation (la Russe) comme un seul Dieu dans le ciel.”76* De Taules warned al-Sfi abba¯gh about these illusions, and with a clairvoyance which would prove to be true for the next 140 years he wrote to alSfi abba¯gh: “L’Empire Ottoman, quoiqu’on en dise, ne sauroit tomber. Il y a des puissances inte´resse´es a` le maintenir dans sa force, et c’est lorsqu’il risquera

48

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

d’eˆtre entie`rement abattu qu’on verra les secours accourir.”77* This argument apparently left no impression on Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. When in August 1775 the final crisis developed and the question arose whether to pay the outstanding taxes to the Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, it may have been al-Sfi abba¯gh’s rivalry with Ahfi mad Agha al-Dinkizlı¯ or his often quoted greed that made him refuse the payments. But he could make this decision only because he had fatally underestimated the new lease of life the Ottoman Empire had obtained with the peace of 1774 and the European strategic concerns that would keep the Eastern Question—and the Ottoman Empire—alive for generations to come.

AHfi MAD PASHA AL-JAZZA¯R: CONSOLIDATION OF POLITICAL POWER, 1775–1804 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and His Biographers Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was born into impoverished circumstances some time in the late 1730s in Bosnia. He died in 1804 in Acre as the undisputed governor of the province of Sidon, a position he had held for almost thirty years. Between these two dates lies a life of adventure, betrayal, cruelty, failure, and grandiose success. His career and personality were judged very differently by various of his contemporaries and later observers: “This lion, let loose against humanity;”78 “Jamais aucun tyran, aucun usurpateur n’a re´pandu, de sangue froid et sans motive, autant de sang humain que Djezar.”79 [No tyrant, no usurper has ever, coldly and without reason, spilt as much human blood as has Djezar.] “The right honorable, the magnificent counselor, the great vezier, the famous ruler Ahmad Pasha, known widely as alJazza¯r . . . in short he was one of the marvels of his age: anecdotes about him are too numerous to be recorded by the pen and memory cannot do justice to them. Collected, they would fill volumes. Had his only achievement been his victory over the French and his steadfastness in resisting [their siege] more than two months without interruption, that would have been enough.”80 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was certainly an extraordinary man. He ruled for a generation over Acre and its realm, most often with the support of the Ottoman government, sometimes against its will. He distinguished himself by great courage, sober tactical thinking, and, apparently, by excessive rage and cruelty. His greatest achievement in the minds of his contemporaries, both Muslim and Christian, was his successful defeat of Bonaparte, who

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

49

besieged him for two months in the spring of 1799 in Acre. In Muslim public opinion al-Jazza¯r became the defender of the faith, the fighter of the holy war. Biographies and long panegyric odes were dedicated to him by his contemporaries.81 For European observers al-Jazza¯r remained one of the few who had succeeded in defeating Napoleon. This fascination with al-Jazza¯r’s person led, in the first half of the nineteenth century, to a considerable amount of literary production. It is therefore the more remarkable that since that time nothing more has been written about him, and in particular no scholarly monograph—with the exception of one unpublished M.A. thesis82—has been dedicated to him. I suspect this has to do with some of the general motives for writing history. The early reports on him had drawn such an ambivalent or straight-out negative picture that no national historiography cared to claim him. His field of operation had been too far removed from Bosnia for any Bosnian nationalism to co-opt al-Jazza¯r as its own. Palestinian national historiography has tentatively integrated Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar as a part of its history but did not care to burden its image with the ill repute of al-Jazza¯r.83 The problem is more general and concerns all the late Mamluk establishments, which were ruling elites of decidedly foreign background. Egyptian national historiography has only recently begun to discuss the Mamluks in Egypt in the eighteenth century and is not at all certain how to evaluate their role.84 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was a Mamluk and his bad press outweighed by far any positive image. Basically there seem to be two different approaches to the interpretation of his career. For convenience, we shall call them the French and the Arabic school of biographical interpretation. Both counted insightful and reliable observers among their authors. To illustrate the difference in approach we shall take the descriptions of the first period of his life until he arrived in Syria. Two Arab contemporaries of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r give detailed accounts of this period. ‘Abd alRahfi ma¯n al-Jabartı¯ and H fi aydar Ahfi mad al-Shiha¯b both had excellent access to information about Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. The first was a conscientious and sober chronicler living in Cairo who made it his business to get the most reliable information. The second, as secretary to Amı¯r Bashı¯r, had direct dealings with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. In fact, the two reports are often so similar that one wonders whether the authors worked from the same sources or corresponded with each other. But we have not the slightest indication that this was the case.85 Both authors agree that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r originated from Bosnia and had probably come to Istanbul around 1755 in his late teens. He worked

50

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

as a barber and his job brought him in touch with the retinue of ‘Alı¯ Bey Agha, who was appointed governor of Egypt in 1756. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r went to Egypt as a member of his household. For a while he served ‘Alı¯ Pasha in the Citadel. It is possible that he then had a quarrel with one of ‘Alı¯ Pasha’s followers—or perhaps he genuinely desired to go on the pilgrimage; whatever the reason, he left the Citadel and joined the service of Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, commander of the pilgrimage in 1758. The two became friends. Upon his return from the pilgrimage Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r entered, in rapid sequence, the service of several Mamluks. He began to wear the dress of the Mamluks and learned to speak Arabic. He acquired the skills of a Mamluk and began to advance in life. When one of his masters, ‘Abdalla¯h Bey, was killed by Bedouins, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r avenged him by setting a trap and killing some seventy of them. This act of loyalty and revenge for his master gained him respect and acceptance from the Mamluks, who now gave him the sobriquet of al-Jazza¯r— “the Butcher.” From “Ahfi mad, the Bosnian” he had now advanced to “Ahfi mad Bey al-Jazza¯r.” In the monumental chronicle of Egyptian history by al-Jabartı¯, the sobriquet “al-Jazza¯r” appears as an honorary epithet—and not merely a description of profession. A certain Yu¯suf Bey acquired the name “al-Jazza¯r” under circumstances identical to those of Ahfi mad Bey: he slaughtered a great number of Bedouins. It may be that the term was only used with regard to the fight against Bedouins.86 It certainly was meant as a term of respect and did not reflect a perception of general cruelty of character, as later European writers were inclined to believe. ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r was impressed by al-Jazza¯r’s courage and loyalty. He made him his prote´ge´ and promoted him. He also used him as his private strongman and occasionally asked him to liquidate personal enemies. Ahfi mad al-Jazza¯r “had changed the profession of the razor for that of the sword”87 and though he was not, properly speaking, a Mamluk, he was accepted as one of the “numbered Amirs.” His career in Egypt, however, came to an abrupt end in September 1768 following one final intrigue. ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, who upon his return from exile in Upper Egypt had allied himself with Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, now felt that the latter had become a threatening rival and asked his two henchmen, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and Muhfi ammad Abu¯ ’l-Dhahab, to assassinate him. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r balked at the thought of killing his old friend and even went secretly to him to warn him. Sfi a¯lihfi Bey did not believe him and even mentioned the matter to ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r. The latter succeeded in reassuring him that all this had only been a test of the faithfulness of this followers. When Sfi a¯lihfi Bey was finally ambushed and killed, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

51

was present but did not draw his sword or participate in the assassination. After the deed Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab commented on Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s lack of enthusiasm, and may even have tried to set a trap and kill him. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r realized that ‘Alı¯ Bey would never again trust him because of the loyalty he had displayed for Sfi a¯lihfi Bey. Seeing that his life was in danger, he fled immediately, telling his household to pretend that he was ill and could not be visited. Disguised as a Maghrebi he fled to Alexandria and embarked on a ship to Istanbul only hours before ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r’s men arrived in Alexandria to arrest him. According to his own somewhat apologetic and not entirely true comments on his life in Egypt Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had gone there as a freeman and a Bosnian and therefore had to move from master to master since the Mamluks would never accept him as one of their own—an opinion which alJabartı¯ shared.88 Our knowledge of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s whereabouts and actions becomes somewhat vague after his departure. He may have drifted through Anatolia to Aleppo. Al-Jabartı¯ claims that he returned secretly to Egypt in an attempt to link up with some Bedouin tribe to fight ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r, but had to flee again.89 It is, however, certain that in 1770 he surfaced in Dayr al-Qamar in Lebanon, so destitute that he was forced to sell the clothes off his back to get food.90 The Druze Amı¯r Yu¯suf took an interest in him and had him fed and provided for. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r stayed for a while, went down to the coast, and, finding no employment, drifted to Damascus. His prospects did not improve and he made a short journey to Egypt, disguised as an Armenian, to collect some valuables and money from his house in Azbakiya.91 Fate finally offered him an opportunity when Amı¯r Yu¯suf asked the governor of Damascus, ‘Uthma¯n Bey, to send him Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and some troops in order to defend Beirut against the Russian fleet. Beirut became the first stepping-stone of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s career in Syria. He very quickly had its fortifications improved and then used it as a power base against Amı¯r Yu¯suf, claiming that he was defending the interests of the Ottoman government. Only a four-month joint siege by Amı¯r Yu¯suf and Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar could dislodge him from there. His importance was emphasized, if only in a negative way, when in the same year 1772, Muhfi a¯mmad Bey Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab offered Amı¯r Yu¯suf 200,000 piasters for the head of al-Jazza¯r. The rivalries from the Egyptian years were still strong.92 In summary, we get here a picture of a young adventurer, somewhat of a drifter perhaps, who knew how to ingratiate himself with his masters. He

52

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

seized opportunities when they offered themselves: a man on the make, rising through the ranks and usually not hesitating to fight and kill when it was necessary or demanded from him. Constantly shifting alliances, intrigues, betrayal, and assassinations were surely at the time nothing extraordinary in the daily politics of the Mamluks in Egypt in their chronic power struggles. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r spent formative years in Egypt among the Mamluks. He became an accomplished fighter, courageous and strong-willed, and also a man deeply loyal to friends and masters. He was admired by the Mamluks for his act of vengeance against the tribe who had killed his master. When requested to assassinate his friend and former master, Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, he had refused. Even after Sfi a¯lihfi Bey dismissed his warnings, Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r couldn’t bring himself to participate in his murder, though he must have realized that this would put himself in danger and certainly would end his career in Egypt. It was an outstanding act of loyalty in those times of treachery. How very different is the story told by the French school of interpretation! The first French reports we have about Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r are those of the great travelers Volney and Baron de Tott, the latter being at the time an adviser to the Ottoman government. They saw Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r in Acre in 1783 and 1784, respectively. To them should be added the French viceconsul in Acre, Renaudot, who wrote a lengthy report in July 1783.93 Major later reports come from Olivier, who also met Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r in 1802, from De´nain in his general work on the French expedition to Egypt, and much later the first—and last—attempt at a general history of alJazza¯r Pasha by E. Lockroy.94 Volney provides us with a motive for Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s departure from Bosnia: he had to flee after trying, at the age of sixteen, to rape his sister-in-law. In Istanbul he found himself destitute and sold himself into slavery to a merchant who shipped him to Egypt, where he was bought by ‘Alı¯ Bey—presumably Volney means ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r distinguished himself through courage and a willingness to assassinate whomsoever he was ordered to kill. This earned him the title al-Jazza¯r. He hesitated only once to kill “either from humanity or some secret friendship” and even “remonstrated against the order.”95 This forced him to leave Egypt. De Tott has very little to say about the early life of al-Jazza¯r except that he himself had taken the name of al-Jazza¯r “the butcher in which he gloried.”96 Olivier, who met Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r almost twenty years later, has some features to add: al-Jazza¯r had to flee his homeland, at the age of seventeen, after stabbing a woman who did not submit to his wishes. After working as a

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

53

sailor he drifted through Anatolia and sold himself to a Turkish slave trader. Once in Egypt he converted to Islam.97 Sold to ‘Alı¯ Bey, he distinguished himself with cold-blooded atrocities, for which his comrades gave him the title al-Jazza¯r. He had to flee Egypt when he showed scruples “dont il ne paraissait pas capable” [of which he seemed not capable].98 De´nain follows by and large the earlier French reports. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r’s selling himself into slavery acquires now a more programmatic meaning: “il renonc¸a a` sa liberte´ comme il avait renonc¸´e a` sa patrie” [he renounced his freedom as he had renounced his fatherland]. De´nain emphasizes that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r named himself “al-Jazza¯r,” a title which he made it a point to justify. Al-Jazza¯r refused to bring ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r the head of Sfi a¯lihfi Bey. But De´nain does not mention any motive for this refusal, and Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s behavior seems capricious. Like de Tott, he mentions an incident in which Christians in Beirut were immured alive upon the orders of al-Jazza¯r, but what were “a few” in de Tott’s narrative have become now “all the Greek Orthodox.”99 In Lockroy’s account, at the end of the nineteenth century, the Turkish slave trader to whom al-Jazza¯r sold himself has become a Jewish merchant, probably a reflection of the increased anti-Semitism in Europe. The merchant received 1,200 francs for the boy. The story about the assassination of Sfi a¯lı¯hfi Bey becomes garbled. According to Lockroy, ‘Alı¯ Bey wanted to get at Abu¯ ‘lDhahab by having his friend Sfi a¯lihfi killed. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r refused to carry out the order because he did not want to fall into disfavor with Abu¯ ‘lDhahab. Yet the latter did not hesitate to kill Sfi a¯lihfi Bey himself. We should perhaps add here a further, Arabic, source from a time slightly earlier than Lockroy, but as confused. This source simply states that Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r one day invited eighteen Mamluks to his home, gave them dinner, made them drunk, and killed them all. Thereupon he had to flee Egypt.100 In summary, a picture differing very much from that drawn by the contemporary Arabic sources is presented here. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r tries to rape even members of his family, he sells his freedom just as he renounces his fatherland, he takes pleasure in killing, he boasts of it and calls himself “the Butcher.” His loyalty to Sfi a¯lihfi Bey, when mentioned at all, is dismissed as an erratic move. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r is not just “a bad lot,” he is evil personified, “un Monstre.” Our French authors never tire of adding examples from all periods of his life to illustrate his bloodthirstiness and his capricious, cruel, and unreasonable behavior.

54

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Why was there an almost systematic effort to paint an even darker picture of a man who certainly had some highly unpleasant traits of character; and why is this tendency only to be found in the French writers? Volney, de Tott, and Renaudot, the French vice-consul in Acre, were not only professional men, educated visitors in a foreign society, they were also profoundly engaged in the political debate in their own country on the eve of the French Revolution. Renaudot, for instance, who set out to write a memo about French trade in the area, treats us to long paragraphs on political thought and despotism: “Dans un des plus beaux pays du monde, les hommes sont me´chants, et Esclaves, et telle est la nature du Gouvernement Despotique que celui qui donne La Loi est plus Esclave que celui qui La rec¸oit. Un Pacha, avec deux milles hommes de troupes, peut-eˆtre les plus me´prisables qu’il y ait au monde, fait trembler douze cent mille habitans: a` Son tour il a les plus grandes frayeurs au milieu des mise´rables qui ´exe´cutent ses volonte´s, toujours prestes a` fle´chir le genoux devant lui, ou prestes a` lui porter le coup mortel.”101* On a more mundane level it should be added that a perusal of the French consular correspondence of the time shows the French merchants calling a tyrant practically any local ruler who was able to force the French to pay higher prices for local goods. Volney writes: “In Turkey, as everywhere else, we must be convinced that arbitrary power in the sovereign is fatal to the state” and, echoing the thoughts of Voltaire in his play Mahomet, Volney tells us that the Koran incites fanaticism, demands total devotion, and thereby prepares the way for total despotism.102 Baron de Tott lectures us that “painting the weakness of the despot and the cowardice of his subordinate officers, who awe him at a distance, gives, at one stroke of the pencil, the picture of the Ottoman empire.”103 “Dans des contre´es ou` rien ne stipule la mesure des droits de ceux qui gouvernent sur ceux qui sont gouverne´s, ou` l’abus de la force semble ˆetre inhe´rent au pouvoir, Djezaar eut l’art de passer tout le monde en injustices gratuites et en cruaute´s monomanes.”104* These comments about despotism were directed at the French reader and were part of the political debate in prerevolutionary France. The Ottoman Empire, two hundred years earlier admired and feared in Europe for its firm organization and effective centralism, served now as an example of the harmful effects of despotism. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r became the incarnation of this political pattern. He was consistently described as tyrant, despot, and usurper. Unfettered by the limits of law, he committed crime upon crime. His picture, as the tyrant par excellence, could not be drawn in colors too dark or bloody. One reason for the choice of al-Jazza¯r for this role had to do simply with

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

55

the accessibility of Acre for Europeans. It was easier to observe at first hand al-Jazza¯r’s rule and its results than the unpleasantnesses inflicted, for instance, by the Shiha¯bis upon each other, or the governors of Damascus upon its population. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r stayed in power much longer than anybody else, almost thirty years, but even after his death his fame lingered on as the first to have defeated Napoleon. There is, of course, a further explanation for the gory descriptions that the French authors provide. Their reports belong to that at the time most popular genre of travel literature. This literature, to be sure, sought to inform and instruct but also to entertain. Dramatization and exaggeration were needed— especially when the journey itself had become rather commonplace, as was the case with the Holy Land in the early nineteenth century. When travelers followed each other in quick succession with their publications, they had to outdo their predecessors in their descriptions. This explains also why the descriptions of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s character and deeds became bloodier, more cruel, and, indeed, pornographic as time went by. Even the approach to Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s citadel in Acre lets the reader shudder delightfully: At the sight of these ruined fortifications, sad habitations of misfortune and desperation, my heart contracted with indignation and horror. . . . Having reached an alley we saw on one side the cannons arranged in front of the palace and on the other side well guarded a prison, whose doors, however, remain open so that the people can see those unfortunate ones, loaded with chains, destined for torture or the final martyrdom. Farther away a mosque surrounded by sycamores and finally a fountain decorated with marble and raised by the Ahfi mad Pasha for the poor. Vain monument of a false and sterile piety. We are made to pass the gate of the palace and are conducted through an obscure and sinister corridor to a large hall.105

Most instructive is another incident which has all the ingredients for drama and good horrifying entertainment: intrigue, sex, bloody murder. In 1789, upon his return from the pilgrimage, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r believed he had evidence of amorous relationships between some of his Mamluks and some of the women in his harem. He chased away all those involved. So far all major sources agree. Al-Jabartı¯ adds that he killed those he suspected in this affair. H fi aydar Shiha¯b reports a highly dramatic battle in the palace between Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and some faithful followers on the one side and the accused Mamluks on the other. The battle ended in a stalemate and

56

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

the Mamluks were granted free exit from the city. The author reports nothing about later executions. The Englishman E. D. Clarke, who visited Acre in 1801 and seems to have been a rather sober observer, concedes that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r apparently killed seven of his wives when he had reason to suspect their faithfulness. But he doubts much of what is told about Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. “Such stories are easily propagated, and as readily believed and it is probable that many of them are without foundation.”106 Olivier, visiting only two years later, told how the older and less beautiful women were packed into boats to be drowned in the sea, others were sewn into leather sacks and thrown in the Gulf of Acre, others again were tortured and thrown alive into a cistern. Olivier then treats us to the last encounter between Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and his most beloved wife “d’une beaute´ ravissante.” Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r accused her of unfaithfulness. Her denial of any wrongdoing infuriated him only more. Suddenly he cut off both her hands, which were clasped together, then he cut off her breasts. Not satisfied with this “le monstre . . . il lui fend le ventre! . . . Sa main se prome`ne dans ses entrailles palpitants” [the monster . . . slit open her belly . . . His hand moves around in her throbbing intestines].107 Olivier tells us all this, of course, only in order to raise our political consciousness. It might be useful, he explains, to describe such acts of cruelty in all this detail because it shows us how much a man can abuse authority which he inherited from his father or which he usurped.108 De´nain obviously had read Olivier, too, but adds even more details: Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had all the women of his harem lined up naked and all those who showed signs of pregnancy had their stomachs cut open by him. Generally speaking, De´nain assures us that innumerable young slaves were put into the harem every year: they would come running trembling at the slightest wink of Ahfi mad Pasha; weak women, whom the scimitar readies for pleasure, and “who more than once were transported in his arms from amorous spasms to spasms of death.”109 And so on ad nauseam. I have no intention of trivializing the cruelties Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r no doubt committed throughout his life. The testimony is too general and too consistent to dismiss all accusations against him. Years after his death the visitor to Acre was struck by the great number of mutilated persons—usually missing an eye, or ear, or part of the nose, or all three. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r was toward the end of his life aware of the image Europeans had of him. In response he remarked: “They say that al-Jazza¯r is cruel and barbaric; he is only just.” About his style of government he commented that contrary

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

57

to the accusations against him he was a just ruler, and “in order to govern the people of this land one cannot be too severe. But if I strike with one hand I recompense with the other. This is how I have maintained for thirty years, in spite of everybody, complete possession of all [the land] between the Orontos and the estuary of the Jordan.”110 This surely was a self-serving statement, but it also reflected an opinion widely shared by contemporary rulers and governors. The grand vezier Yu¯suf, upon entering Syria in 1800, had a great number of rebellious elements executed. Abdalla¯h Pasha al-Azfi m, upon being appointed governor of Damascus in 1799, immediately had several enemies hung—mainly, one feels, in order to establish beyond doubt who could execute whom in the city. Neither, as we have seen, were the Mamluks in Egypt particularly concerned about shedding blood. There can be no doubt that there was a streak of cruelty and perhaps of sadism in Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. An uncontrollable temper, when provoked, often pushed him to violence; at other occasions he seems to have murdered in cold blood and for no visible reason. In 1789, when the rebellion of his own Mamluks presented the gravest internal challenge to his rule, he reacted violently, spilling the blood of anyone he suspected to be part of the conspiracy. As one chronicler reports: “After that event he became like a wild animal, so that nobody could stand before him and he believed in his imagination that the whole world was against him.”111 In the context of his own times al-Jazza¯r’s cruelty seems not quite so outrageous—at least in the Egyptian context of internecine struggles he was one of the few to show any scruples and loyalty at all. We also might add that Napoleon thought nothing of having 4,000 of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s troops systematically executed in the dunes of Jaffa after they had become prisoners of the French. Napoleon probably had more people killed there in one day than Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r killed in a lifetime. In addition, the image of the cruel tyrant was built up in the French sources. Clearly, al-Jazza¯r served the French authors as an instructive example of the evil excesses of despotism and as a titillating monstrous attraction for the reading public. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had a far more complex personality, and cruelty was only one of his character traits. De Taules, French consul in Sidon, was probably the first Frenchman to meet Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r personally. This was in 1773, during the time that al-Jazza¯r was attempting to establish a power base in Beirut. De Taules observed him to have a violent temper, which was only made worse through his excessive drinking. De Taules concedes “un certain esprit” [a certain intelligence] but expects nothing but “du bruit et du mal” [noise and evil] from this man.112

58

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Volney found him “not destitute of talent and especially cunning,” in fact, “too cunning to shed blood while there are any hopes of getting money.”113 Renaudot, the French vice-consul who, living in Acre, must have had daily contact with Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r in the 1780s, drew a far more complex picture: This Pasha is choleric, violent, carried away by his temperament, though he is not inaccessible; with patience and subtlety one can get one’s way with him. He is a mixture of vice and virtue. He has without doubt made the greatest efforts to contain his mad character in the space he had to travel through from his birth to the position which he has now reached. But like a volcano his irruptions were violent when he could enjoy full liberty . . . He guards his authority jealously and to excess. He wants to lord it over all, to judge everything, and his judgments always reflect the state of his soul. He is sometimes just, great, and generous, at other times furious and bloody. He stabs with one hand and gives his own blood with the other. He speaks of himself with great complaisance and is fond of flaunting his talents, his knowledge, his martial qualities, his bravado with which nothing can compare, and his military exploits. He lends his ear to flattery and cherishes the adulators.114

Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had, indeed, some justification for boasting of his personal courage and physical stamina. At the age of about sixty he still scaled the walls of Acre and fought man-to-man with the French.115 He showed tenacity and the cool head of a superb tactician, as his defense of Beirut or the quelling of the rebellion of his Mamluks proved. The sheer length of his stay in power speaks for his political skills. He succeeded under unusually difficult circumstances which demanded much more from him than simpleminded repression and cruelty. Apart from these qualities Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had considerable engineering skills, though we do not know where or how he acquired them. “He formed the plans, drew the designs, and supervised the execution” of building the mosque, the bazaar and the fountain.116 He was directly involved in the construction of the fortifications until his last years.117 He took an interest in gardening, and in his later years he showed a talent for making paper cutouts, with which he entertained his guests and his harem. The later French visitors who drew such a negative picture of him reflect the complexity and even the positive characteristics of Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r’s personality almost in spite of themselves when they report direct personal encounters with him. Olivier and Jaubert visited him in 1800 and

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

59

1802 respectively. Their personal impressions are confirmed by Clarke, the Englishman who met him in 1801. At the time al-Jazza¯r was over sixty with a white beard but still of muscular build and very agile.118 “Habile dans tout l’exercice du corps, il conserve encore tous les gouˆts de l’e´ducation qu’il a rec¸ue parmi les Mamluks: il se sert ´egalement bien du sabre et du fusil; il monte un dromadaire et dompte un cheval fougueux avec autant d’adresse que d’agilite´.”119* He apparently had given up drinking in 1791 when he made the H fi ajj.120 Toward the end of his life he gave, in fact, the impression of an ascetic man. He received his visitors sitting on the ground under a palm tree, dressed in coarse cloth and with an old shawl on his head. He could have been mistaken for a beggar.121 At other times his guests would find him in common Arab dress, plain but clean, sitting on a board without any cushions or carpet. But Clarke also suspected that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was “betraying as much ostentation in the seeming privations to which he exposed himself, as he might have done by the most stately magnificence.”122 Nevertheless, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r does not seem to have been a man given to conspicuous consumption. The only exception was his building activity. This was partially done for security reasons—the extensive fortification of Acre; or for public benefit—the drinking fountain, the aqueduct, the bath, the bazaar; or for religious purposes—the famous mosque, which also served as a means of political legitimization. He also lavishly spent money in Istanbul for presents and bribes to maintain support for himself in the Ottoman government. Otherwise, as Clarke informs us, “extravagance of any kind, except in cruelty, [was] inconsistent with Djezzar’s character.”123 Olivier, who depicted him as an extremely cruel and bloody tyrant, had nevertheless this to say after seeing him in Acre: Simple in his manners [Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r] becomes popular and sometimes familiar with the inhabitants of Acre. Charitable and compassionate in appearance, he himself administers to the poor the remedies which he believes to be efficient for their ills. He seats the unhappy next to him and they show complete confidence in him. He consoles them with his talk and nurtures them with his own hand. He has constantly enormous pots of rice in his palace for the destitute and the old. He has money distributed to them every week with the greatest regularity.124

This surprising image of generosity and compassion is confirmed by other testimony. When, for instance, he had to surrender, after a bitter siege, the city of Beirut, he demanded as a condition that the population should not be

60

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

punished by the conqueror.125 Perhaps most touching was the scene when Sulayma¯n, who had been the leader of the rebellion against Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r in 1789, returned humbly to Acre seventeen years later, ready to accept death. Al-Jazza¯r received him like the prodigal son and restored him to his rank and full honor.126 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s European interlocutors were impressed by his intellectual acumen and alertness. He would concentrate in quick sequence on totally different subjects, could change from the most serious topics to the most subtle pleasantries, and could “move from one to the other with alacrity, a precision, a clearness which showed that everything was organized in his head in an admirable order.”127 He would often sidetrack the conversations with stories, parables, and anecdotes while at the same time keeping himself busy with paper cutouts. But from behind this apparent frivolity of behavior he observed the effect of his words on the visitors and listened carefully to what they had to say.128 European visitors to Acre and to Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r—even those who wrote about him first and foremost as an example of despotism or as an exotic human monstrosity—could not but acknowledge the complexity of his personality: a measure of compassion along with his cruelty, vanity along with his courage, astuteness and even sagacity together with a violent temper. It is only in the works of later authors, such as Lockroy and Misha¯qa, that the description of al-Jazza¯r is reduced entirely to the monstrous and sensational. A conscious effort is needed to break through the various cliche´s that have been developed for political or entertainment reasons and to reach a more balanced view of the man. Only then will it be possible to evaluate his role in the development of Acre proper. On the whole, it seems that the two contemporary Arabic reports remain the most useful—they had very limited reasons to praise Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and none to demonize him. A careful reading of the sources and the reconstruction of the historical context should help us in this task. When we consider in the following pages how he dealt with issues many of which Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar had faced before him, we can establish already two important differences which determined at least some of his political behavior: in contrast to his predecessor he was not a local man and had no local clan or family connections. In addition to SerboCroat he spoke Ottoman Turkish and Arabic with a thick Egyptian accent, and possibly some Italian. His education had been that of a soldier, a Mamluk. At the time he was appointed governor of Sidon he had had no economic or commercial experience worth mentioning. With this background he fitted,

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

61

much more than did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar, the mold of the traditional ruling elite in the Ottoman provinces at that time.

Acre’s Relation with Its Neighbors During Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s Rule THE DRUZE

¯ mil, the region of the North of the Galilee and of Jabal al-‘A Metualis, we reach the southern parts of Mount Lebanon, which at the time were exclusively settled by the Druze. The Arabic-speaking Druze are variously described as a religious community or as an ethnicity with feudalist structures. An off-branch of Isma¯‘ı¯lı¯ Shı¯‘ism and settled since the eleventh century in the region, they remained very much a territorially circumscribed religious community. How important the religious aspect was for the identity of the Druze remains questionable, as the knowledge of the religion and its contents remained the privilege of the few initiated (the ‘uqala¯’), while the majority of the community (the juhala¯’) had only marginal knowledge of their religion. As has been pointed out129 it was the strict rule of endogamy, imposed by the religion, that was instrumental in creating an identity. The society was one in which patrilineal descent determined the individual’s loyalties to the clan, the social ranking of clans, and the options for alliances. The genealogical aspect is so important that often the term “tribe” is used in describing the Druze. Thanks to the dominant role of the aspect of kinship and family relations, neither the Druze nor their neighbors had any difficulty in knowing who belonged to the Druze community and who did not. Politically and administratively they were organized along feudalistic lines in the ima¯ra system. It should be noted, however, that it differed in an important aspect of feudalism as generally defined: genealogical coherence was so strong that there was no clear-cut differentiation between estates. In the case of war the feudal lord would mobilize all peasants as warriors.130 This meant wars could not be fought for very long without tremendous damage to agricultural production, as wars involved the total population. Each village was organized along clan lines. Several villages, or a region, were ruled by one of the distinguished clans, whose heads carried the title amı¯r. To those clans belonged the Ma‘n, Shiha¯b, Arsla¯n, and Abu¯ ‘l-Lam‘a. Slightly lesser but still important clans were those with the rank of shaykh, such as the Junbala¯fit, Abu¯ Nakad, al-H fi a¯zin, and others. From the early eighteenth century the Shiha¯b clan also provided the amı¯r hfi a¯kim, who ruled over the

62

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

whole Druze region and represented it to the outside world. His official recognition in the Ottoman context manifested itself in the confirmation of his position by the governor of Sidon, to whose province the region of the Druze was attached. The amı¯r hfi a¯kim in return committed himself to deliver the annual tax payments to the governor of Sidon. During the period concerning us a Druze identity was firmly established, and the ima¯ra system was officially recognized, internally by a Druze consensus that the Shiha¯b clan always provided the amı¯r hfi a¯kim and externally by the confirmation of his position from Sidon. The question important to us— or, to be more precise, to al-Jazza¯r—was the extent to which these characteristics of the Druze community were basis enough for common political will and action. During Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rule the realm of Acre was isolated from the Druze in the north by an alliance with the Metuali shaykhs and a rather powerless governor in Sidon. Only toward the end of his rule, after linking up with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r from Egypt, did Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar expand his realm to the north by chasing away the governor of Sidon in a joint effort with his Metuali allies. He appointed one of his senior officers, al-Dinkizlı¯, who was the commander of the Maghrebi troops, as his mutasallim in Sidon. With this step he became a direct neighbor of the Druze, who controlled Beirut. Egyptian support for Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar soon crumbled when Abu¯ ‘l-Dhahab carried out his remarkable retreat from Damascus and the governor of Damascus, ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Kurjı¯, could return to his seat of government. At this point Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b appeared at his court and had the governor appoint him as ruler of Mount Lebanon instead of his uncle, Amı¯r Mansfiu¯r, who had ruled for twenty-four years. An alliance was forged between the new governor of Damascus, ‘Uthma¯n Pasha al-Misfirı¯, and Amı¯r Yu¯suf in order to push out Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar from Sidon and reinstate the governor of Sidon. The attempt was defeated by Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s troops and his Metuali allies in October 1772. The Russian fleet, which had helped to defend Sidon, moved north and threatened Beirut. Amı¯r Yu¯suf asked the governor of Damascus to send him Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r with troops to secure Beirut. Once established in Beirut, al-Jazza¯r saw the opportunity to build his own power base, always acting in the name of the Ottoman government. When it became apparent that he had no intention of leaving Beirut after the Russian fleet disappeared, Amı¯r Yu¯suf tried to rally the Druze to dislodge him from the city. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r could stave off these attempts because, as the chronicler observed, “In appearance the Druze shaykhs supported Amı¯r Yu¯suf but secretly they opposed him.”131 With bribes al-Jazza¯r was able to set

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

63

them against each other. He learned here a lesson that would serve him well in all his future dealings with the Druze: they were deeply divided amongst themselves and therefore easily manipulated. Another pattern of political relations was also now established: fights in the Druze Mountain were always intertwined with interests from the surrounding seats of Ottoman governors, Tripoli, Damascus, and Sidon, and could be easily turned into proxy wars for the various outsiders. Only when Zfi ahir al-‘Umar joined forces with Amı¯r Yu¯suf and defeated the troops of three pashas sent to break the siege against al-Jazza¯r was the latter prepared to accept defeat and leave Beirut. After spending some time in Acre he traveled either to Damascus or, more likely, to Istanbul, biding his time.132 Installed as wa¯lı¯ of Sidon after the death of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar in 1776, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r gained a foothold in the politics of the Druze, which Zfi ahir al‘Umar had never possessed. As governor of Sidon he was in a position to grant legitimacy to the ruler of the Mountain. He lost no time laying hands on Beirut, which the admiral of the Ottoman fleet, H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha, had assigned to Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b. In a second move, to establish his authority as wa¯lı¯ of Sidon over Mount Lebanon, al-Jazza¯r demanded from Amı¯r Yu¯suf the payment of taxes from the Mount Lebanon area, taxes which H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha had just collected in the name of the Ottoman government. A first military encounter between troops of al-Jazza¯r and Druze elements occurred in August 1776 near Beirut.133 Bent on gaining control over the Mount Lebanon region, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r appealed, perhaps somewhat naively, in 1777 to the new governor of Damascus, Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, and his son Yu¯suf, who ruled over Tripoli, to join him in an attack on Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b. But these two declined, claiming that Amı¯r Yu¯suf was a loyal, tax-paying servant of the Ottoman sultan. In fact, they saw in Amı¯r Yu¯suf an ally against the new and ambitious governor of Sidon.134 Musfifitafa¯ ibn Qara¯ Mulla¯, commander of al-Jazza¯r’s Maghrebi troops in Sidon, marched via Beirut into the Mountain with the intention of collecting money and the hope of killing Amı¯r Yu¯suf at the same time. But he was forced to retreat to Sidon. Thereupon he tried another route through the Biqa¯‘a Valley. After he had confiscated the harvest there, and after some bloody but indecisive fighting, here too his assault was stopped.135 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s first opportunity to exercise control over the Mountain came when the rifts between various Druze factions could not be contained by Amı¯r Yu¯suf anymore and turned into open defiance against him. The Druze clans of the Junbala¯fit and the Abu¯ Nakad conspired with two brothers of Amı¯r Yu¯suf, Amı¯r Sayyid Ahfi mad and Amı¯r Afandı¯, to have him

64

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

deposed and his two brothers appointed rulers of the Mountain. For this purpose, they offered al-Jazza¯r 50,000 ghirsh in September 1778. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r accepted the offer and appointed them.136 To support their claim he also moved with troops to Beirut and tried from there to march into the Mountain and besiege Jubayl. Amı¯r Yu¯suf, assisted by another brother, Amı¯r Muhfi ammad, and supported by the governor of Tripoli, could hold his own, but in the ensuing stalemate he finally offered al-Jazza¯r 100,000 ghirsh to be reappointed as ruler of Mount Lebanon. The development of these events during the first two years of al-Jazza¯r’s rule contains all the elements that would define his relations with the Druze over the next quarter of a century: attempts at military subjugation were costly and mostly futile. The internal rifts of the Druze could be used to destabilize the area and at the same time to obtain considerable payments from the various factions. The factionalism of the Druze frequently attracted outside interference not only from Acre but also from the governors of Tripoli and Damascus, who tended to turn the internal strife of the Druze into proxy wars with Acre. For the next dozen years Amı¯r Yu¯suf Shiha¯b remained the dominant figure in Druze politics and the major opponent of al-Jazza¯r. This, however, is not to say that political stability was achieved. On the contrary, several times Amı¯r Yu¯suf lost his position as amı¯r hfi a¯kim of the Mountain, only to be reappointed sooner or later. The challenge against him usually came from a coalition of other members of the Shiha¯b clan in alliance with some other clans. All were aware that to obtain legitimacy for their claim to rulership they needed al-Jazza¯r’s consent and official investiture by him. To obtain such consent they were willing to pay ever more. When in 1778 two brothers of Amı¯r Yu¯suf offered 50,000 ghirsh to be appointed as co-rulers over the Druze region, Amı¯r Yu¯suf made a counter-offer of 100,000 ghirsh. Six years later Amı¯r Yu¯suf as well as his uncle Amı¯r Isma¯‘ı¯l each offered 300,000 ghirsh for the appointment.137 In a final round Amı¯r Yu¯suf, having once more lost the position of amı¯r hfi a¯kim, in 1790 offered al-Jazza¯r 600,000 ghirsh for his reappointment. This offer was countered by Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b with a promise of the enormous sum of 1,750,000 ghirsh. Subsequent promises for payments would reach over 2 million ghirsh. It is impossible to determine how many of these promissory commitments were actually paid up, but even if only a part was eventually paid it is easy to see how the financial burden on the population of the Mountain increased. This was also the cause for the permanent political instability. Each time al-Jazza¯r invested another member of the Shiha¯b clan, the new appointee had to try to raise the promised sums.

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

65

This promptly antagonized the population. New coalitions against the new ruler quickly found popular support. At one point, in 1788, Amı¯r Yu¯suf had killed and maimed so many of his own immediate relatives138 that he felt secure enough in his position to defy Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r and refuse to pay the regular taxes. Such rebelliousness triggered swift action by al-Jazza¯r. By August 1779 an expeditionary corps, albeit the third sent from Acre against the Druze for this purpose, was able to effect the disposal of Amı¯r Yu¯suf for the time being. During his intermittent warfare against the Druze al-Jazza¯r used a period of relative calm to turn his attention to the Metualis. In a campaign with some 3,000 troops under the command of his Mamluk Salı¯m Pasha, the Metualis were defeated in a large battle on September 23, 1781. Their most important shaykhs were killed and the others fled into exile. Al-Jazza¯r’s troops conquered and destroyed all the fortifications of the Metualis and collected rich booty. The port of Tyre became permanently part of al-Jazza¯r’s realm.139 When in 1784 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s foray into the Mountain was repelled by Amı¯r Yu¯suf and a united Druze front, this perceived weakness encouraged the Metualis to rise against him after having been crushed by him and driven into exile only three years earlier. Once more they were decimated by alJazza¯r’s troops, and their leadership was—this time for good—driven into exile. The Metualis were numerically much inferior to the Druze, and Jabal ‘A¯mil was more accessible than the Druze region. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r repeatedly tried to force his will upon the Druze during these years by dispatching military expeditions into their region. Eventually he had to accept the fact that, although his troops could usually penetrate the region quite quickly, they could never hold their position or establish permanent political control. All Druze peasants could always be also mobilized as warriors. Familiar with the mountainous terrain, they could use it to their advantage and could resist any intruding regular army. In addition, too much military pressure on the Druze would without fail push opposing elements to seek help from Damascus. This led easily either to dangerous, direct confrontations between al-Jazza¯r’s forces and those of Damascus or to costly, protracted proxy wars between different Druze factions. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had to learn another lesson about the limitations of his power: even when he was simultaneously governor of Damascus and Sidon140 —and the Druze could therefore not play one governor against the other—he could not impose a military solution on the Druze region. In addition to the disadvantages for regular troops in the difficult terrain of the Mountain, al-Jazza¯r was also obliged as governor of Damascus to command

66

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

the annual pilgrimage caravan, which meant that at least for four months he was absent from Bila¯d al-Sha¯m altogether. Eventually Amı¯r Yu¯suf was killed in one of al-Jazza¯r’s prisons in 1791. His death solved none of the issues in the political relations between al-Jazza¯r and the Druze. It only meant the surfacing of another dominant personality in Druze politics, Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b. With his own alliances, especially with Shaykh Bashı¯r Junbala¯fit, he tried to maintain his position as amı¯r hfi a¯kim with varying success. The following five years signified another round of war between Druze factions, military campaigns by al-Jazza¯r’s troops, and a quick sequence of appointments and dismissals for the position of the amı¯r hfi a¯kim accompanied by demands for extortionary sums of money. Even though alJazza¯r was for most of the time governor of Sidon as well as of Damascus, he was unable to force his will upon the Druze. In 1796, having lost the governorship of Damascus to his archrival ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m, al-Jazza¯r realized the advantages of a strong ally (rather than weak enemies) in the Druze Mountain and reappointed Amı¯r Bashı¯r Shiha¯b as amı¯r hfi akim. After some proxy wars between the latter and some sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf supported by Damascus, Jubayl and the Biqa¯‘a Valley came under the control of Amı¯r Bashı¯r, i.e., under the governorship of Sidon. Together with Shaykh Bashı¯r Junbala¯fit, Amı¯r Bashı¯r began to liquidate other Druze shaykhs, especially those of the Abu¯ Nakad. Some were able to flee to Damascus. Ironically, all these exiles, including the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf, ended up in Acre, where they were welcomed at the court of al-Jazza¯r, provided with all necessities, and, presumably, kept under surveillance. Apparently al-Jazza¯r regarded them or some of them as potential alternatives for the leadership in Mount Lebanon— a possibility that did not escape Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s wary eye.141 The French invasion of Egypt in 1798 and, in particular, the French march on Acre a year later changed the political scene radically. For the time being al-Jazza¯r was forced to forgo all attempts to prevent Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s consolidation of power in the Mountain. During the French siege of Acre Amı¯r Bashı¯r observed strict neutrality, neither collaborating with the French nor coming to the support of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. He established, however, close contacts with Admiral Smith and won thereby the backing of the British. When the grand vezier Yu¯suf came to Syria in 1800 with an Ottoman army on his way to Egypt, Amı¯r Bashı¯r provided him unstintingly with cash and supplies for his army. In return the grand vezier appointed him ruler over all of Mount Lebanon, including the Biqa¯‘a Valley, Ba‘lbak, Wa¯dı¯ Taym, and the Metuali regions. Tax payments were no longer to go to the governor of Sidon, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, but directly to the Ottoman government.142

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

67

Al-Jazza¯r did not hesitate to challenge this new arrangement by once more appointing the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf as rulers over the Mountain. He provided them with two expeditionary corps which moved on the Mountain in the familiar pincer movement. With this act al-Jazza¯r put himself into direct opposition to the Ottoman government. Nevertheless, Amı¯r Bashı¯r was forced to flee. With the backing of Smith he went to Egypt to the camp of the grand vezier. The sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf, however, were not able to pacify the Mountain in spite of the military support of al-Jazza¯r. The familiar round of civil war, oppression, destruction, and extortion began with the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf being themselves under pressure to fulfill their financial commitments to al-Jazza¯r. The devastation and impoverishment of the region reached new heights. Opposition grew, and when Amı¯r Bashı¯r returned to Tripoli in May 1801 the majority of the Druze shaykhs offered to accept his rule over the Mountain for his lifetime.143 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r provided Jirjis Ba¯z and the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf with several thousand additional troops, North Africans and Albanians. But the bitter and destructive fights in the following months made it clear that al-Jazza¯r could not provide a military solution to the Druze problem. Eventually he was forced to withdraw his troops in order to save them. At that point Jirjis Ba¯z went over to the camp of Amı¯r Bashı¯r, who made him his adviser and gave the sons of Amı¯r Yu¯suf control over Jubayl.144 Once more, in August and September 1802, al-Jazza¯r thought he saw an opportunity to interfere in the politics of the Mountain by supporting one Druze faction militarily against another. He sent an expeditionary corps under Sulayma¯n Pasha to support the claims of the ‘Ima¯d clan. These troops, too, were beaten. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, “having experienced many times that he could not take possession of the Mountain without the consent of its people,” withdrew his troops.145 When the ‘Ima¯d clan tried, shortly before alJazza¯r’s death, to draw him back into their intrigues against Amı¯r Bashı¯r, he refused. The Druze had, as we have seen, a strong sense of identity, but were divided among themselves and factionalized to the point that the term “Druze” becomes misleading when analyzing the political events of the time. There was no Druze political entity that behaved as such in any recognizable way. The only political consensus shown by the Druze—which, by the way, al-Jazza¯r shared—was the general belief that legitimate political leadership had to come from the Shiha¯bı¯ clan and that the leader, agreed upon—or, rather, fought over—among the Druze, needed formal confirmation from political authorities beyond the Mountain, i.e., the governor of Sidon. This consensus, however, did not exclude political divisions leading to fratricide

68

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

even within the immediate family, nor did it prevent opposing Druze factions from seeking the support of the governors of Damascus or Tripoli. There was no accepted method to select the ruler, nor was it clear who had ultimate authority in making his formal appointment. This is why we can observe the continued destabilization of the region and protracted periods of civil strife, which seem to have increased in intensity: villages were destroyed, their inhabitants killed or expelled, and the fruit trees uprooted.146 Seemingly the pattern of relations between Acre and Mount Lebanon remained the same during all of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s rule: the Druze were hopelessly divided against themselves, each faction was willing to seek outside support, and more often than not such factional strife was transformed into proxy wars between the governors of Sidon and Damascus, promoting their own strategic interest or, at the very least, trying to extort large sums from the Druze for their support. At the same time, the geography of the Mountain was such that neither of the governors was able to impose permanently his political authority and order. Even when Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r was simultaneously governor of Acre and Damascus, he was not able to subdue the Druze completely, his major constraint being that as governor of Damascus he had to leave Syria every year for four months as commander of the pilgrimage. Al-Jazza¯r demanded, in return for his support, increasingly large sums which, though usually collected only partially, led, together with the continuous civil strife, to increased devastation and pauperization of the region. At the same time, his enormous military efforts to exert direct control over the Mountain came to naught. He repeatedly suffered heavy losses of men and mate´riel. Yet, following the French siege of Acre the political structure of Mount Lebanon, and with that its relations with Acre, began to change. For the first time the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the eastern Mediterranean had become part of the “penetrated system.”147 Political events in Syria became of importance, too, and were influenced by European powers. Amı¯r Bashı¯r, until then just one of the many claimants to the rulership, was able to garner British support. He also was able to gain direct legitimization of his rule from Istanbul and establish, albeit not completely successfully, the principle of the region’s autonomy from the governor of Sidon. The fact that in the end most Druze factions rallied behind him and that the shaykhs offered him lifetime rule certainly was a sign of the general exhaustion of society after a generation of incessant war and civil strife. As a result Amı¯r Bashı¯r’s position as ruler of the Mountain was considerably elevated, providing him with the base to become a powerful autocratic ruler in the next decade. The

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

69

¯ dil and ‘Abdalla¯h successors of Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, Sulayma¯n Pasha al-‘A Pasha, ruling in Acre from 1804 to 1831 as governors of Sidon, would never again try to control Mount Lebanon but preferred to forge alliances. DAMASCUS AND SOUTHERN PALESTINE

While Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r ruled from Acre as governor of Sidon, military actions and political intrigues involving the Druze required incessant attention, energy, and expenditure. But one reason why warfare in the Mountain was so protracted and costly and why politics seemed to be an endless process of shifting alliances was precisely that more was at stake than Druze insubordination and rebelliousness. The Druze might have thought that all that counted were their own internecine quarrels, for which they mobilized support from outside. In fact they were often only the means of determining the larger issue of the balance of power between Damascus and Acre. The latter’s rise as a center of economic and political power coincided with the rise to power in Damascus of a remarkable family, al-‘Azfi m, which for much of the century provided the governors of Damascus and sometimes Tripoli. Since the 1730s a basic political pattern in Damascus had been changing, reflecting the decreasing hold of the central government over the provincial centers, old and new. Traditionally Ottoman governors were sent by Istanbul, and ruled for a very short time so they would not be able to develop a provincial power base, but the general weakness of the Ottoman Empire permitted the rise of local governors and rulers whose tenure as governors lasted much longer, if not for a lifetime—such as those of Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha. Though they usually professed loyalty to the sultan, they were fairly free to run their own affairs as long as they paid some taxes and—in Damascus—guaranteed the organization and safety of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. Just when the ‘Azfi m family began to buttress its position of power in Damascus, Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar was busy creating a new power base in Acre. As we have seen, much of al-‘Umar’s political and military energy went into this relation with Damascus. The ‘Azfi ms saw a clear danger to their own interests in Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar’s rise to power. The latter’s ambitions, though, were limited. He created an alliance with the Metualis, did not project his power or ambitions into the Druze area, and recognized Nablus as part of the vilayet of Damascus. His interest was focused on the Galilee and its cotton-growing regions, and it would not have occurred to him to press any claims to Damascus. Only during the very last years of his rule, when he had forged an alliance with ‘Alı¯ Bey al-Kabı¯r from Egypt, did he expand his control—with

70

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

mixed success—to Jaffa and Sidon, but he failed completely to make Nablus part of his realm. Until the very end he remained the unruly mutasallim of the governor of Sidon, albeit a governor whose authority did not reach beyond the city limits. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r started from a different position—he was eventually made governor of Sidon—and had different ambitions. If until the death of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar Damascus felt challenged because its traditional sphere of influence on the coast was taken away from it, the issue now was how far Damascus would belong to Acre’s sphere of influence; hence the bitter wars in Mount Lebanon, where both sides struggled over territory, influence, and possible tax revenues. It is, indeed, remarkable that during the next thirtyfive years, from 1785 to 1820, the governor of Sidon was also made governor of Damascus six times, for a total of twelve years. Most often the Ottoman government would make such appointments when a governor with political power and economic resources was needed to insure the safety of the pilgrimage, or defend the region against outside enemies such as the French or the Wahhabis; needless to say, massive payments to the right people at the Sublime Porte were helpful, too. The Ottoman government routinely shifted governors from one appointment to another. What was unique in this situation was that the governor of Sidon appointed to Damascus would keep both positions. Repeatedly, these appointed governors would continue to reside in Acre and send subordinates to manage the affairs of Damascus and the pilgrimage. The center of power had shifted from Damascus to the coast. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r understood the importance of the governorship of Damascus as soon as he was made governor of Sidon. In September 1775 he had been made muhfi a¯fiz of Acre. But promotion to governor was not quickly forthcoming. His enemy H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha, commander of the imperial fleet, was busy in Istanbul preventing such a step. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s own influence in Istanbul finally resulted in his being granted the third horsetail as pasha in the spring of 1776. But nomination as governor of Sidon still took another year. In May 1777, when he was finally made governor of Sidon,148 he apparently had been close to open rebellion against an imperial government that did not grant him his wishes. When he moved to Acre a year later and began to fortify it, he was still fearing a possible attempt by the government to eliminate him.149 When in April 1783 Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m died, al-Jazza¯r tried to move things in Istanbul in his favor, but his hopes were dashed and another pasha was appointed governor.150 Three pashas were appointed governor of Damascus in quick succession. The first died after only twenty-nine days in office. The next two, Darwı¯sh Pasha and

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

71

Muhfi ammad Batfifita¯l Pasha, were disastrously incompetent.151 In March 1785, after spending an immense fortune to build up support for himself in Istanbul, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s appointment finally came through. It required some extra pressure to have the government appoint his katkhuda¯ Salı¯m Pasha al-Kabı¯r as governor of Sidon during his absence in Damascus,152 while Sulayma¯n Pasha became governor of Tripoli. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r left Acre in the middle of April for Damascus in great pomp and military strength. In June and July he “made the rounds,” aldawra,153 in Palestine. With an army of five thousand he created terror, fought down Nablus, and made its inhabitants for a long time “undesiring to rebel.” He occupied Hebron and Jerusalem, where he appointed one of his Mamluks, Qa¯sim Bey, his mutasallim, taking away this position of power from the Nimr clan in Nablus.154 People fled Palestine in fear, though they probably were also trying to flee the rapidly spreading plague and the famine. The expedition was clearly meant not only to collect revenues but to establish al-Jazza¯r’s authority in the province before his October departure for four months on the pilgrimage. By mid-July, al-Jazza¯r was “master of all of Syria.”155 Yet his tenure in office as governor of Damascus was short and perhaps only meant to carry out a successful, i.e., safe, pilgrimage. It may also have been his attempts to monopolize the grain trade from the H fi awra¯n to Acre, provoking the protests of the Damascenes, that cost him his job. Deposed in 1786 by an imperial order, he returned without resistance to Acre, accepting fully the authority of the Ottoman government over him.156 It was to be the only time that he would move his residence to Damascus when appointed governor. On later occasions he would appoint a mutasallim to rule Damascus in his name, though most often he would personally command the pilgrimage caravan. He never again gave up the governorship of Sidon, which he had some difficulty regaining after being dismissed as governor of Damascus in 1786.157 Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was again appointed governor of Damascus in October 1790 and stayed in this position for five years. The extraordinary length of stay in office has been explained by the fact that his archenemy, H fi asan K fi apu¯da¯n Pasha, had died and that Sultan Selim III was preoccupied with internal reforms.158 In 1798, after a popular rebellion against Ibra¯hı¯m Pasha, then the governor of Damascus, and with the French danger looming from Egypt, al-Jazza¯r was made not governor but a sort of caretaker of Syria.159 A few months later ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m was again appointed governor of Damascus. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r held the position of governor of Damascus once more, during the last few months before his death in April 1804.

72

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

The decisive period of al-Jazza¯r’s control over Damascus is his second tenure as governor, from 1790 to 1795. Cohen has observed that the rivalry between al-Jazza¯r and the ‘Azfi m family was an underlying theme of all political relations between Acre and Damascus160 —as indeed it had already been during the time of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Schatkowski Schilcher provides a convincing analysis of the internal city politics of the time, whereby the ‘Azfi m clan was allied with the aghas of the northern part of the city against the aghas of the southern part, the Mayda¯n, who controlled the grain trade from the H fi awra¯n.161 It would seem only logical to assume, as Schatkowski Schilcher does, that given these circumstances al-Jazza¯r sided with the Mayda¯nı¯s against the northern aghas and the ‘Azfi m clan. In addition, she sees a common commercial interest between the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants and al-Jazza¯r in diverting the grain trade to Acre. Jewish financial interests in Acre supposedly provided the link with the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants and it is, indeed, during this time that H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, scion of a powerful Jewish family in Damascus, was brought to Acre by al-Jazza¯r as his top financial adviser—though most likely that was done for other reasons. The relations with the Mayda¯nı¯s remained very complex but scarcely cooperative. Al-Jazza¯r’s attempt in 1785 to monopolize the grain trade of the H fi awra¯n had caused sufficient protest to have him deposed. The protest must have come from the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants who were immediately affected by this step. It was not in the character of al-Jazza¯r to have accommodated a fairly autonomous merchant class. His aim was to take over the grain trade, control it, fix prices, and exclude all middlemen. That the Ottoman government sent, in response to the protests, the order of al-Jazza¯r’s dismissal to the qa¯dfi¯ı of the city, who belonged to the northern faction, insured the unrelenting hostility of al-Jazza¯r against the latter, but does not disprove the opposition of the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants.162 When Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus the second time, he only sent a mutasallim to rule in his stead: a certain Muhfi ammad Arfa¯ Amı¯nı¯, or, more likely, Muhfi ammad Agha, his trustee,163 who seems to have been unusually oppressive. Through his mutasallim he had certain economic monopolies reestablished. He also lashed out against the al-‘Azfi m faction by having one of them, ‘Alı¯ ibn Muhfi ammad Pasha al-‘Azfi m, killed and his holdings confiscated. Another important member of the northern faction executed was Ahfi mad Agha Za‘faranjı¯. He had been head of the imperial qabı¯qu¯l (kfi api kfi ul) troops and commander of the citadel. When in 1786 a particularly incompetent pasha was appointed governor, public rioting against him was supported by

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

73

Za‘faranjı¯. After being forced out of the city, the pasha gathered new military support from the government. He besieged Damascus successfully and turned his wrath particularly against Za‘faranjı¯, who had to leave town.164 The latter eventually linked up with al-Jazza¯r. He returned to the city when al-Jazza¯r was appointed its governor. Apparently al-Jazza¯r later saw in Za‘faranjı¯ a danger as one of the northern aghas or as a popular commander linked to the Mayda¯nı¯s. He had him executed before he left for the pilgrimage in 1791. In addition, al-Jazza¯r, or rather his mutasallim Muhfi ammad Agha, had Damascenes executed by the tens and hundreds.165 Clearly, Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r did not rely on coopting certain factions of the city in order to control it, and he established no common commercial interests with the Mayda¯nı¯s. He relied on force and terror. In 1794 Ahfi mad Agha, the trustee of al-Sina¯niyya, one of the major Mayda¯nı¯ mosques, offered al-Jazza¯r sufficient money for the job of mutasallim. Muhfi ammad Agha was deposed166 and the new mutasallim used his time, while al-Jazza¯r was on pilgrimage, for an all-out attack on the Jewish financial interests in Damascus. This action certainly does not point to shared interests of Jewish finances and Mayda¯nı¯ commerce via Acre. Ahfi mad Agha seems to have been aware that he did not act in the interest of al-Jazza¯r, because he fled Damascus shortly before al-Jazza¯r returned from the pilgrimage. During his last appointment as governor of Damascus, al-Jazza¯r’s relations to the Mayda¯n remained as unstable as ever. During the interregnum, while al-Jazza¯r was busy fighting the French, a certain Abu¯ H fi amza, together with the scrap-metal dealer Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l from the Mayda¯n, had more or less run things in Damascus. When ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m was made governor of Damascus for the second time in 1799, he had Abu¯ H fi amza killed, but apparently did not dare to touch Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l. Caught up in his rivalry with the al-‘Azfi ms, al-Jazza¯r soon prepared the next round, having ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m dismissed. Among other things he corresponded with Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l, sent 2,000 troops, and had him take steps in Damascus before al-Jazza¯r was officially declared governor. He asked him to arrest the qa¯dfi¯ı ‘Abd al-Rahfi ma¯n Afandı¯ Mura¯dı¯ and kill him. How delicate such a matter was is evident from the fact that al-Jazza¯r did not sign the order, and Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l only pretended to execute the order and in fact hid the qa¯dfi¯ı in the dungeons of the citadel. It was his bad luck that ‘Abd alRahfi ma¯n died nevertheless. When the Ottoman government reprimanded alJazza¯r for having killed a religious dignitary, al-Jazza¯r pretended to be outraged and hauled Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l to Acre. He had him executed, though not before having found out from Muhfi ammad ‘Aqı¯l, under torture, where

74

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

he hid his money.167 This certainly was not an act to endear him to the Mayda¯nı¯s. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had no power base in Damascus. He was hostile to the aghas of the north and their allies the ‘Azfi m, but he had never struck an alliance with the Mayda¯nı¯s either, basically because his economic interests contradicted those of the Mayda¯nı¯ merchants. In the end he ruled through oppression, sheer force, and occasional short-lived alliances of convenience. During his last appointment as governor, which lasted only a few months until his death, he entrusted the control of Damascus to units commanded by Tfi aha¯ al-Kurdı¯, whose position would today be called chief of internal security. The latter, together with other fellow Kurds, had distinguished himself in Acre as chief jailer and overseer of tortures. The moment the news reached Damascus that al-Jazza¯r had died, the populace went after the Kurd troops with a vengeance and lynched them.168 Tfi aha¯ himself was killed in Acre. What benefits accrued to al-Jazza¯r from being governor of a city whose populace was rebellious and whose elites were not inclined to collaborate, and where the fiscal burdens, especially the expenditures for the pilgrimage, were considerable—all making a net profit for him unlikely?169 We know that al-Jazza¯r spent great sums in Istanbul to obtain this appointment, just as he had to finance a permanent lobby in Istanbul to have his annual appointment as governor of Sidon renewed. The governorship of Damascus was one of the most prestigious because it included the command of the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. The pilgrimage was politically a double-edged sword. To carry it out successfully promised prestige and influence in Istanbul. After all, the Ottoman government itself drew its legitimacy partially from its ability to provide for the believers the conditions to fulfill their religious duties, among them the pilgrimage to Mecca. At the end of the eighteenth century this ability to safeguard and carry out the annual pilgrimage was put very much into question. In the eastern parts of the Arab peninsula a new puritanic Islamic sect had developed, commonly called, after the name of its founder, the Wahhabiyya. It combined its Islamic puritanism with political ambitions. Preventing the pilgrimage caravan from access to the holy places in Mecca and Medina meant hitting the Ottoman Empire where it hurt most. Having the financial and military capability to command the pilgrimage caravan several times and bring it back safely made al-Jazza¯r, under the circumstances of the period, almost irreplaceable in the eyes of Istanbul. This was precisely his aim. But the annual absence of the governor for four months on the pilgrimage was also the time when all the forces of political opposition could

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

75

plot to have him removed, as al-Jazza¯r found out at the end of his first year as governor of Damascus. Many of the executions he had carried out in Damascus during his second term were related to his attempt to prevent any possible opposition during his absence on the pilgrimage. Another advantage of his governorship of Damascus was that he could deal with his archrivals, the ‘Azfi m clan. But since they also enjoyed the backing of Istanbul, precisely as a counterweight to al-Jazza¯r’s power, he never was able to eliminate them completely. The governorship of Damascus also included legitimate control over the southern parts of Palestine, a right al-Jazza¯r certainly tried to exercise. Here too his success was more than questionable. In 1785, when making “the rounds” in southern Palestine for the collection of taxes, he reduced all resistance by military force and appointed his own Mamluk mutasallim in Jerusalem. But then and later his hold over the region remained tentative. In particular, al-Jazza¯r’s attitude toward Jaffa was curious. Jaffa had been occupied by the forces of H fi asan Kfi apu¯da¯n Pasha during his campaign against Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar. Presumably afterwards a mutasallim, answerable directly to the Ottoman government, was installed, though traditionally Jaffa had been under the control of Nablus, which belonged to Damascus. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r seems never to have challenged this arrangement. This is curious because al-Jazza¯r himself had experienced in recent warfare the importance of fortifications and he had witnessed the strategic value of Jaffa as the rampart against invasions from Egypt. When he was appointed governor of Damascus for the second time, in the fall of 1790, it so happened that the crisis with the French merchants also came to a head. He expelled them from Acre, and they found refuge in Jaffa and Ramla, which apparently were beyond his reach. Even shortly before the French invasion of Palestine a report in Arabic and French asserts that the government (hfi uku¯ma) of alJazza¯r begins in Caesarea and that the coast from there to the Carmel Mountain was only during al-Jazza¯r’s rule attached to the province of Sidon, having belonged before that to Damascus.170 The importance of Jaffa had apparently dawned upon al-Jazza¯r only on the eve of the French invasion, when he hurriedly had its fortifications repaired and its garrison reinforced. After the defeat of the French and the return of the Ottoman land army from Egypt, the Ottoman grand vezier and commander of the army, Yu¯suf Zfi iya¯ Pasha, installed Abu¯ Maraq171 in Jaffa as governor of the southern Palestinian districts, in an obvious attempt to limit al-Jazza¯r’s power. Ahfi mad Pasha alJazza¯r immediately besieged Jaffa172 in order to dislodge Abu¯ Maraq from there. He was quite prepared to provoke the extreme displeasure of the

76

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Ottoman government, which at one point declared him a rebel against the sultan. Jaffa’s strategic importance for the realm of Acre had been driven home to al-Jazza¯r, and he was not going to lose control over it again. In addition, Abu¯ Maraq, a local from the Hebron region, had allied himself with the Jarra¯rs in Nablus, thus recreating the traditional Nablus-Jaffa axis, possibly with the backing of Damascus and indirectly with that of Istanbul. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r’s heroic defense of Acre against the French made him most famous. As we have seen, he was praised as the defender of Islam. His personal courage, his skills as a military commander, and his stamina are testified to by many, including French officers.173 Al-Jazza¯r’s status rose in the eyes of the Ottoman government. But that was a dubious distinction, because any local governor gaining too much power was a potential danger to Istanbul. Very soon he was declared a rebel, only to be reinstated and even made once more governor of Damascus. The results of the French siege of Acre were actually minimal: al-Jazza¯r’s power and relationship with Istanbul remained unchanged; the financial pressure on the population and their economic misery became, if possible, even greater; over the next thirty years the governors would spend enormous sums on the fortification of Acre; and Jaffa would be permanently attached to the governorship of Sidon. For the five years of his second term as governor of Damascus al-Jazza¯r had fought a continuous war against Nablus; more precisely, he was able to establish an alliance with the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan and even appoint in 1794 Ahfi mad Bey Tfi u¯qa¯n as mutasallim in Nablus. But the al-Jarra¯r clan, in alliance with the al-Nimr clan, offered resistance. Fortified in Sfi a¯nu¯r at the northern access to Nablus, the al-Jarra¯rs withstood lengthy sieges by al-Jazza¯r’s troops. The losses before Sfi a¯nu¯r were heavy, and al-Jazza¯r repeatedly had to face up to the limits of his military capacities, since troops tied down before Sfi a¯nu¯r were desperately needed elsewhere. In the end he was unable, though governor of Sidon and of Damascus, to subdue Nablus. In late 1803, after being appointed governor of Damascus for the last time, he immediately turned against Sfi a¯nu¯r and besieged it again. But while he had been able to conquer Jaffa, after several months’ siege in early 1803, he could never dislodge the Jarra¯rs from Sfi a¯nu¯r.174 What remains remarkable is that Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r, regardless of his volatile temper, hunger for power, and political ambitions, always played within the rules of the “Ottoman game.” Though unruly, he ultimately accepted the authority of Istanbul and derived his own legitimacy from the Ottoman state and its sultan. Each time he was dismissed from his position as governor of Damascus he left in good order and without any resistance. In

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

77

June 1789 a Russian emissary came to Acre in order to “sonder si l’on pouvait se flatter de de´tacher ce Pacha du joug de la Porte pour causer une diversion. Dge´zzar ne voulut ni le voir ni l’entendre.”175* Even when his own aims were diametrically opposed to the interests of the government in Istanbul he would, at least in appearance, comply with orders, though he may well have been promoting his own interests subversively. He was familiar with the rules of the game, and rather than initiate an open rebellion he preferred to lobby in Istanbul, distribute his money astutely, and bide his time until the next opportunity. His obedience, though, had its limits. When the grand vezier Yu¯suf Pasha, on his way back from Egypt, installed Abu¯ Maraq in Jaffa in an open attempt to limit his power, al-Jazza¯r did not hesitate to go to war against the governor installed by the Ottoman government. A firma¯n by the government declaring him an enemy of the sultan and God and making him an outlaw did not impress him.176 The government lacked the means to enforce its decisions, and al-Jazza¯r certainly had no thought of giving up Acre and his position as governor of Sidon. Rather, he continued his war against Abu¯ Maraq until he had ousted him from Jaffa. At the same time he activated his lobby in Istanbul, provided large sums of money, and, after having created facts on the ground, swayed the government in his favor. He was so successful with this two-pronged policy that once more he was made governor of Sidon and Damascus. To this evidence of his ultimate political goals—holding on to Acre at any price and maintaining good relations with Istanbul as much as possible— other examples could be added: during the whole period of the French invasion of Egypt and Palestine he did not once leave Acre to fight the French in Egypt as the grand vezier had requested. In 1780, when the government in Istanbul equipped a large fleet while the governor of Damascus was simultaneously raising an army, al-Jazza¯r suspected that he was the real target. Quite willing to offer open resistance against the Ottoman government, he began intense preparations to withstand a possible siege of Acre.177 According to the French consul, al-Jazza¯r was prepared to hold on to Acre in open rebellion even before he was appointed governor of Sidon for the first time.178 Likewise, al-Jazza¯r rejected all attempts to lure him out of his lair. When he was asked by the Ottoman government in 1784 to send troops to Egypt, he, according to his own statement, stimulated dissent among the Druze to demonstrate the necessity of keeping his troops in Acre. He used the same stratagem in May 1789.179 Throughout his political career Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r considered Acre his power base, the center of his activities. It was his permanent goal to

78

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

strengthen and secure this base. From here he tried to subdue neighboring areas, whether for economic or strategic reasons or both. This brought him into almost permanent conflict with the Druze region, protracted warfare with Nablus, and—linked to Nablus and the French invasion—efforts to assert control over Jaffa. As attractive as the governorship of Damascus was, it remained a means to these goals. Giving it up was feasible, surrendering Acre was unthinkable. It is this difference that describes fairly precisely the extent of al-Jazza¯r’s loyalty to the Ottoman government.180

SULAYMA¯N PASHA AND HIS SUCCESSOR: BRIEF RESURGENCE AND COMPLETE DECLINE, 1805–1831 At the decisive moment Sulayma¯n Pasha was absent from Acre. In place of the sick al-Jazza¯r, he had been leading the pilgrimage caravan to Mecca. He was on the way back when al-Jazza¯r died. The Ottoman government had tried to preempt any power struggle by appointing, secretly, the governor of Aleppo also governor of Sidon and Damascus a month before alJazza¯r actually died. But a certain Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha, having only recently joined al-Jazza¯r’s army as a commander but already sacked and jailed in Acre, was the man on the spot. Released from jail by some troops he assumed command in Acre181 and tried to assert his authority. People such as Amı¯r Bashı¯r were far too cautious to recognize such authority. Hearing of the appointment of the governor of Aleppo and that an Ottoman fleet was sailing for Acre, Isma¯‘ı¯l began to prepare the defense of the city. In response, the Ottoman government in June 1804 declared him a rebel to be fought.182 In the meantime Sulayma¯n Pasha had returned to Damascus from the pilgrimage, and, jointly with the governor of Aleppo (and now also Damascus and Sidon), he marched on Acre. A siege of four months yielded no results, and the new governor of Damascus came under time pressure to prepare for the next pilgrimage caravan, which was to leave Damascus in January 1805 and had to be preceded by the governor’s round through the districts, asserting his authority and collecting the taxes that paid for the pilgrimage. Sulayma¯n Pasha continued the siege of Acre, while the government rewarded him with the governorship of Sidon—reason enough to defeat Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha. The decisive battle was fought near Shfa¯ ‘Amr when Isma¯‘ı¯l’s troops attempted a sortie from Acre. Sulayma¯n Pasha was probably in his late fifties when he took power in Acre.183 Originally from the Caucasus, probably Georgia, he had traveled far

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

79

and experienced more than his share of crises and turns of fate. He had already spent some twenty to twenty-five years in Acre and its realm as military commander, as mutasallim of Sidon, and as commander of the pilgrimage. Though not a local himself, he had acquired an intimate knowledge of local politics. His early policy statements revealed a sense of moderation and deliberation which contrasted strongly with al-Jazza¯r’s policies. Perhaps the new policy reflected only a realistic awareness of the state of the realm. The reduction of export trade at the time of increased building activities by al-Jazza¯r, the devastating period of the French siege of Acre, endless wars with the Druze, and the permanent squeezing of the population for taxes had left an exhausted and depopulated realm. For the establishment of firm political relations with his neighbors Sulayma¯n Pasha would rely much more on diplomacy than on military strength. His army was usually only half the size of that of al-Jazza¯r, if that much. It was this spirit, which contrasted so sharply with al-Jazza¯r’s, that provided Sulayma¯n Pasha with the ¯ dil, “the Just.” sobriquet al-‘A But before he could pursue policies of diplomacy and moderation one further battle had to be won: the battle for Jaffa. After al-Jazza¯r had fought bitterly and against the explicit order of the Ottoman government to dislodge Muhfi ammad Abu¯ Maraq, the latter had used the upheavals after the death of al-Jazza¯r to return and to ingratiate himself with Isma¯‘ı¯l Pasha, who promptly made him commander of Jaffa again. This time, however, the Ottoman government did not back him. The French sources assert that he was financed by the British.184 When Abu¯ Maraq openly defied Ottoman orders to march against the Wahhabis, Sulayma¯n Pasha was ordered to do battle with him. It must have suited Sulayma¯n Pasha’s own interests to extend the influence of the realm of Acre to Jaffa: recent history had demonstrated Jaffa’s strategic importance. Though the siege was long, its successful conclusion in the first half of 1806 raised Sulayma¯n Pasha’s standing in Istanbul as somebody who could get things done in Syria. Subsequently the government invested him with the control over the sancakfi s of Gaza, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, a special waqf of the sultan.185 This extended the realm of Acre legally to all of southwest Palestine. Nablus, though denied access to Jaffa, was noticeably missing from this realm. The chance to assert his influence over Jerusalem came soon, when local unrest could not be handled by the mutasallim appointed by Damascus. Troops sent by Sulayma¯n Pasha established order, and their commander, Muhfi ammad Agha Abu¯ Dharı¯‘a, was appointed temporary mutasallim. Sulayma¯n Pasha was not yet willing to challenge the authority of the governor of Damascus for that appointment.186

80

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Sulayma¯n Pasha’s policies toward his northern neighbors were diametrically opposed to those of his predecessor. Where Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had chosen confrontation and military strength to pulverize any Metuali resistance and to assert his direct control over them, Sulayma¯n Pasha relied on negotiations and agreements, and was willing to concede internal autonomy. Where al-Jazza¯r had used any intrigue to play one Druze faction against the other—an easy game since there were willing players—Sulayma¯n Pasha relied from the beginning on a firm alliance with Amı¯r Bashı¯r.187 ¯ mil region, Seeing the destruction and the depopulation of the Jabal ‘A Sulayma¯n Pasha sought to reassure the Metuali population and to attract and pacify the shaykhs who had fled. He offered them villages and tax-exempted lands in the region of Shu¯mar on condition that they would settle there and cultivate the land. He offered guarantees of security and internal autonomy, naming Fa¯ris Nasfi¯ıf as the head of all the shaykhs. In return the legal land tax—and only that—was to be paid, and tribal levies were to be supplied whenever the government needed them. The shaykhs also pledged not to interfere in any form or way in the affairs of the rest of the Metuali region, Bila¯d Bisha¯ra. Sulayma¯n Pasha hoped to co-opt the antagonistic exiled shaykhs of the Metualis by settling them and giving them secure incomes. He was aware that the government in Acre had too often double-crossed the Metualis, and that they would not trust his offer. He therefore asked Amı¯r Bashı¯r to mediate and convince the shaykhs of the seriousness of the offer. Amı¯r Bashı¯r gladly obliged, seeing for himself a chance to ingratiate himself even more with Sulayma¯n Pasha. Finally, a general meeting was called in Acre at which Fa¯ris Nasfi¯ıf, other Metuali shaykhs, Sulayma¯n Pasha, Raghı¯b Efendi (sent by the Ottoman government to make a record of the estate of al-Jazza¯r), H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, ‘Alı¯ Agha Khazinda¯r, and H fi ana¯’ al-‘Awra, as well as the muftı¯ of Acre, the qa¯dfi¯ı, and a representative of Amı¯r Bashı¯r, took part. In sessions over several days an agreement was worked out and eventually confirmed by the Ottoman government.188 After some initial difficulties this agreement lasted for the length of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule. It seems that from the outset Sulayma¯n Pasha had a good working relationship with Amı¯r Bashı¯r. Immediately upon becoming governor of Sidon he confirmed Bashı¯r as amir of Mount Lebanon. Bashı¯r cooperated willingly, trying to enhance his standing with Sulayma¯n Pasha and to make himself the only conduit for all dealings with the Druze and Mount Lebanon. Sulayma¯n Pasha rewarded Bashı¯r’s loyalty by in 1810 appointing him amir of Mount Lebanon for life.189 By far the most important regional relations of Acre were still those with

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

81

Damascus. Since the time of Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar these had been hostile more often than not. Acre’s power challenged Damascus control over southern Palestine, in particular over Nablus, Jerusalem, and the port of Jaffa. In the north influence with the Druze and control over the Biqa¯‘a were the flashpoints of conflict. Control over the export of grain from the H fi awra¯n and cotton from the Galilee and the Nablus region was another bone of contention. In the last two generations the balance of power had definitely shifted in favor of Acre and its rulers. The first official recognition of this change was when al-Jazza¯r was appointed governor of Damascus while maintaining his governorship of Acre. But the struggle for regional predominance had by no means been decided, and Sulayma¯n Pasha was almost destined to enter into conflict with Damascus, once he had secured his southern and northern flanks. Though the structural conditions for further conflict existed, it was apparently the struggle between two powerful families of administrators and bankers, the Greek Catholic Bahfi rı¯s and the Jewish Farhfi ¯ıs, that ignited the fight. The Bahfi rı¯s were originally from Homs. The poet Mikha¯’ı¯l al-Bahfi rı¯ had been educated in Acre under Zfi a¯hir al-‘Umar and was employed by the latter’s vezier, the Greek Catholic Ibra¯hı¯m al-Sfi abba¯gh. Later he worked for Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r but fled to Beirut after having been jailed and mutilated. His sons Jirma¯nu¯s, ‘Abbu¯d, and H fi ana¯’ excelled as administrators and secretaries. Jirma¯nu¯s was initially employed by Sulayma¯n Pasha, while his two brothers began to make their careers in Damascus under ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha al-‘Azfi m, governor from 1805 to 1807. During his rule ‘Abbu¯d became the close confidant of Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha, who succeeded ‘Abdalla¯h in 1807. Under Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha the Bahfi rı¯ brothers rose to the highest positions. H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, in the meantime, had succeeded in expelling Jirma¯nu¯s from Acre. But the Farhfi ¯ıs in Damascus were seriously worried that the intimate relationship between the Bahfi rı¯ brothers and Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha would cost them their own positions as chief bankers and men of finance. Attempts to discredit ‘Abbu¯d al-Bahfi rı¯ with Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha backfired. The Farhfi ¯ıs and the Bahfi rı¯s began now to draw their respective masters into their fight. The opportunity to raise the mutual animosity of the two governors to the level of open hostility offered itself over the eternal question of the borders between the two provinces of Damascus and Sidon; in this case ownership of a few villages situated between Nablus (Damascus) and Nazareth (Sidon) was at stake. An arbiter was sent from Istanbul to gather evidence from both sides. The Farhfi ¯ıs had insured through bribes that the testimony of the muftı¯ and the qa¯dfi¯ı of Damascus would be in favor of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s claim. The result of this arbitration,

82

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

combined with a timely dispatch from Acre of two shiploads of grain to a starving Istanbul—most likely the idea of H fi aim—strengthened Sulayma¯n Pasha’s position in Istanbul considerably. In the meantime, Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha was as unable to deal with the Wahhabi threat as the preceding governors of Damascus. He tried to compensate for his failure to defeat the Wahhabis by directing Muslim sentiments in Damascus against the Christians and the Jews. The pilgrimage had been suspended for several years, and in 1809 the Wahhabis actually approached Damascus itself. Thereupon the Ottoman government had Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha removed from the governorship and made Sulayma¯n Pasha governor of Damascus in addition to his position in Sidon.190 In close collaboration with Amı¯r Bashı¯r, Sulayma¯n Pasha took Damascus after Kanj Yu¯suf Pasha had fled to Egypt with his Bahfi rı¯ secretaries. Sulayma¯n Pasha proceeded to appoint and confirm local mutasallims. The list expresses well the extent of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s power.191 He made appointments from Homs to Jerusalem and Tripoli.192 The importance of Tripoli had recently declined, and for some time it had not been governed by a governor but only by a mutasallim. The question, however, of whether the governor of Sidon or the governor of Damascus could make that appointment remained open. With both governorships in his hands, Sulayma¯n Pasha ruled virtually all of Bila¯d al-Sha¯m with the exception of Aleppo in the north. Some of the appointments reflected an acknowledgment of local powers such as the amirship of Bashı¯r, or the appointment of a member of the allimportant Tfi u¯qa¯n clan as mutasallim in Nablus and probably also the appointment of Musfifitafa¯ Barbar, who was a local man from the lower classes of Tripoli. But a great number of positions were also filled by Mamluks, most of whom had already served under Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r. Sulayma¯n Pasha’s governorship of Damascus lasted exactly two years.193 But he held on to the region of Tripoli and Latakia, which was officially attached to the province of Sidon.194 Twice more the province of Damascus came under his control, though only in the form of a trusteeship for the appointed governor, who was kept from reaching Damascus for other reasons. In early 1816 Sulayma¯n Pasha was called upon to act as governor when the last one had died suddenly and the newly appointed one, ‘Alı¯ Pasha, had not yet arrived. This temporary appointment lasted not even a year, and the position was given in late 1816 to Sfi a¯lihfi Pasha. Once again, the newly appointed governor could not come immediately, and Sulayma¯n Pasha was made his representative.195 Each time it was the critical phase before the pilgrimage began during which the tax moneys had to be collected from the sancakfi s, especially Nablus, to pay for the expenditures of the pilgrimage

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

83

caravan. On other occasions the governor of Damascus asked him explicitly for armed support. In each case this helped Sulayma¯n Pasha to strengthen his control or influence over the southern regions of Palestine. Mount Nablus remained an especially thorny problem. The factionalization of politics in Nablus pitted clans against each other in continuously changing alliances. The most important clans throughout the period were the Tfi u¯qa¯ns, al-Jarra¯rs, and al-Nimrs. This situation was encouraged and stimulated by outside powers, such as the governors of Damascus and Sidon, and it also gave occasion for outside interference. But even when Sidon and Damascus were united in the hands of one governor, he could only interfere and meddle in the affairs of Nablus. He could create a balance of power within Nablus by supporting one clan or the other, and thus prevent Nablus from becoming a united powerful political entity. But he could never—even militarily—subdue Nablus and exercise direct control. Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had tried this and spent many months besieging Sfi a¯nu¯r, the fortress of the alJarra¯r clan. But he had been no more successful with this than with his attempt to impose his will forcibly on all of Mount Lebanon. As in most instances, Sulayma¯n Pasha took a somewhat different approach to relations with his neighbors. He never attempted to use military force to impose his will on Nablus—even when he was governor of both provinces. But he continued al-Jazza¯r’s policy of support for the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan. The alliance between Sulayma¯n Pasha and the Tfi u¯qa¯ns was confirmed in 1807, when the British began to threaten Sulayma¯n Pasha. The British expeditionary corps in Egypt had already lost its ally Abu¯ Maraq, and was about to be completely defeated by Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯, yet the British threatened to devastate the coast of Syria “if Sulayma¯n Pasha did not grant free access to English traders.”196 The threat never materialized, but the Ottoman government had perceived the Tfi u¯qa¯ns as the natural allies of Sulayma¯n Pasha. The rise of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in Nablus led to an alliance between the al-Nimr and the al-Jarra¯r clans. In 1811 wheat prices had risen so high that peasants could not afford their own product and fled to Nablus and/or attacked the granaries of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns in their villages. The Tfi u¯qa¯ns were convinced the unrest was the result of incitement by the al-Nimr clan. They asked Sulayma¯n Pasha, who at that time was also governor of Damascus, for support. He backed the Tfi u¯qa¯ns fully and ordered the removal of all peasants from Nablus. What is not mentioned in the documents of the time or in al-‘Abba¯sı¯’s study is the underlying reason for the high prices of wheat which caused the peasant rebellion. It was the very monopoly policy of Sulayma¯n Pasha and his highly profitable exports to England during the time of the Continental System that

84

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

emptied the whole region of affordable grain. If the peasants attacked the full granaries of the Tfi u¯qa¯ns and merchant caravans it is because the Tfi u¯qa¯ns were business partners of Sulayma¯n Pasha and profited, if indirectly, from the export business in Acre.197 Eventually the Tfi u¯qa¯ns felt strong enough to attempt the physical removal of the al-Nimr clan from Nablus. With this step, however, they had crossed a threshold of tolerance, and all the clans in Nablus united to fight the Tfi u¯qa¯ns. The event is referred to as the Great Rebellion, al-thawra al-kubra, which began in 1817. In fact it was a nasty civil war, each clan having its own fortified residences—comparable to the family towers in Florence—within and without the city of Nablus, controlling different quarters and city gates and stretches of the hinterland. A chaotic stalemate ensued. Al-‘Abba¯sı¯ would have us believe that the alliance with the Tfi u¯qa¯ns remained the dominant strategy of Sulayma¯n Pasha.198 The contemporary observer Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra points out that Sulayma¯n Pasha actually began to lean toward the ‘Abd alHa¯dı¯ and the al-Jarra¯r clans, while his katkhuda¯ ‘Alı¯ Pasha leaned more toward the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan.199 This was most likely a deliberate policy in Acre, since only a balance of power or, more correctly, a balance of impotence in Nablus assured Acre’s influence there. The outbreak of civil war did not move Sulayma¯n Pasha to interfere militarily or exclusively on the side of the Tfi u¯qa¯n; rather, he did what best suited his temperament: he began negotiations. For this purpose he invited representatives of all clans to Acre for a conference. They were received with great hospitality and all signs of respect. They were provided with all creature comforts possible. But it also was made clear to them that they were not going to leave Acre before they had come to an agreement and a conclusion of their strife. After a speech of rebuke and a sumptuous dinner the participants retired to their quarters. For the following ten days they met with each other, with Sulayma¯n Pasha alone, or in groups. He addressed them repeatedly, carefully reducing tension among them and establishing himself as the honest broker. It nevertheless took two weeks of cajoling and discreet threats before all were willing to compromise and accept Sulayma¯n Pasha’s arrangement. The Tfi u¯qa¯ns were forced to pay a considerable amount as blood money to several clans who had lost members in the fights. But Mu¯sa¯ Tfi u¯qa¯n remained mutasallim of Nablus. The agreement’s major shortcoming was that the al-Nimr clan had no part in it. Sulayma¯n Pasha addressed this problem by asking the muftı¯ of Nablus in July 1818 to negotiate between the al-Nimr and the Tfi u¯qa¯n clan.200 For the time being peace was being restored. It reflects Sulayma¯n Pasha’s authority in the region that, though he was

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

85

not governor of Damascus at that time, almost all the parties responded to his invitation201 and he was able to impose terms on them. Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra, a contemporary, himself commented on this phenomenon and indicated some important reasons for this situation: the geographic proximity of Acre to the region; the preoccupation of the governor of Damascus with the preparation of the pilgrimage and his four-month absence from the city while accompanying it; and the frequent replacement of the governor of Damascus, often every year, which made a thorough knowledge of the area and its politics as impossible as any long-term planning. At the same time, Sulayma¯n Pasha ruled Sidon as a permanent malika¯na granted to him for his lifetime, something even al-Jazza¯r had never obtained; Acre was an impregnable fortress and could not be defeated.202 Al-‘Awra leaves out the fact that Sulayma¯n Pasha’s defeat of Abu¯ Maraq had brought the sancakfi s of Jaffa and Gaza under his control and with that the trade of Nablus.203 In fact, he does not mention at all—and that is quite typical for his whole work—the economic policy of Sulayma¯n Pasha that made Acre the only export port along the whole Syrian coast and provided him with considerable income for several years when grain exports to England paid huge profits, not to mention the monopoly policy concerning less important items, such as cotton, olive oil, and tobacco from the north. As we shall see, the most powerful man in Acre would become—with the death of ‘Alı¯ Pasha in 1814, the expulsion of Abu¯ Nabu¯t from Jaffa, and the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha in August 1819—H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı. Brought to Acre initially by al-Jazza¯r as his counselor for financial and administrative affairs, H fi aim rose, under Sulayma¯n Pasha, to control the administration, enjoy influential contacts in Istanbul, and dispose of considerable personal wealth to back up his power. But being a dhimmı¯, a non-Muslim minority member, he was also extremely vulnerable in his position in spite of—or, more correctly, just because of—his wealth and power. His power derived from the fact of his being employed by Sulayma¯n Pasha, but even so it made him enemies. It was quite inconceivable in the tradition of Islamic societies that he should exercise power in his own name. For this reason, he applied all his energies and considerable wealth in Istanbul to have his prote´ge´ ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha appointed as governor of Sidon after the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha. He was convinced that this youth of eighteen years, who already owed him a lot, would be malleable in his hands and provide the legitimacy for H fi aim’s own power. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was the son of ‘Alı¯ Pasha, the katkhuda¯ of Sulayma¯n

86

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

Pasha. ‘Alı¯ Pasha died in 1814 of overexertion soon after he had purchased fi aim to take care two Georgian beauties.204 On his deathbed he had begged H of his son ‘Abdalla¯h. H fi aim was delighted to promote the boy against people with a more serious claim to power. Apparently Sulayma¯n Pasha had the same idea. Tired of having a powerful rival with his own claim to power, he quickly appointed the thirteen-year-old ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha as his katkhuda¯. The appointment came as a surprise to all except the mother of ‘Abdalla¯h, who had lobbied heavily with Sulayma¯n Pasha and H fi aim for her son. Lest anybody, including ‘Abdalla¯h himself, should be unaware of the change in the balance of power, Sulayma¯n laid down the rules: in contrast to his father ‘Abdallah was not to have his own ottoman in the Bu¯sta¯, the government building, but was to sit with all the other employees and administrators. He was not to drink his coffee together with Sulayma¯n Pasha, and nobody was fi aim Farhfi ¯ı never perceived ‘Abdalla¯h as a threat to his to kiss his hand.205 H own plans. Rather, he was willing to help him to remove more serious contenders to the successorship of Sulayma¯n Pasha, such as Abu¯ Nabu¯t, the mutasallim of Jaffa, or Musfifitafa¯, the nephew of Sulayma¯n Pasha. The contemporary observer Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra considered H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı as second only to Sulayma¯n Pasha in actual power, if not formal ranking. He called him sharı¯k fi aim Farhfi ¯ı was actually more al-hfi ukm, partner in power,206 suggesting that H powerful than ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r, and describing how H fi aim would speak in the name of Sulayma¯n Pasha without the latter even knowing about it: “H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı held all the reins of government and did as he pleased. Whoever claims that the rule of a Jew over Muslims and Christians, old and young, close and far, in complete liberty is an easy matter and does not weigh heavily on nature—has lost touch with reason.”207 A few words of explanation are needed here concerning Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra’s own position in the matter. That he was a close and good observer of the affairs of government in Acre is beyond doubt. His father, though clearly subordinate to H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı in fact, held formally a comparable position as chief Arabic secretary, and a certain amount of competitiveness can be sensed in Ibra¯hı¯m’s narrative. Ibra¯hı¯m’s family was Greek Catholic and keenly aware of the fight the Jews in Damascus—and especially the Farhfi ¯ı family—were carrying on with the most important Greek Catholic family there, the Bahfi rı¯s, with the Jews apparently winning the fight.208 Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra’s father, H fi ana¯’, had been Arabic secretary during this time, and the sectarian loyalties were understood by all. However, apparently H fi aim and H fi ana¯’ never had a serious open clash, and on the whole H fi aim preferred as employees Greek Catholics to Greek Orthodox, never trusting

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

87

the latter after his encounter with the Sakru¯j brothers.209 Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra was aware of all these ambivalent relations and appears particularly critical of H fi aim. In addition it is worth considering that he wrote his biography of Sulayma¯n Pasha between 1848 and 1853, some years after the famous bloodlibel case of Damascus210 and the arrival of European anti-Semitism in the Middle East. Occasionally one can discover a whiff of it in Ibra¯hı¯m’s comments about H fi aim.211 Though Ibra¯hı¯m al-‘Awra may have been biased, his opinion that H fi aim was the most powerful man in Acre is again and again confirmed by the French consular sources: “Soleiman Pacha ou pour mieux dire, le Juif qui gouverne en son nom. . . . Son Kiaia et ce Juif qui ne pensent qu’a` amasser auront un jour le sort qu’ils me´ritent et le faible Soleiman sera la victime de leur avidite´.”* According to the French a dervish coming from Istanbul publicly blamed the pasha for being governor in name only and letting the Jew manage him.212 Another consular report, this one from Tripoli, put it as follows: “Un Juif qui sous le titre de sarraf du miri est le ve´ritable commandant de toute la coˆte de Syrie.”213* The reason for the French dislike for H fi aim is quite obvious; their commercial interests ran counter to “l’inte´reˆt du Juif du Pacha qui ne veut pas la liberte´ du commerce; il a des compagnons qui savent se joindre a` lui pour de´pouiller l’Europe´en.”214* Sulayma¯n Pasha was said to hold the cow of Syria by its horns while the Jew was milking it. In fact the accusations of the French against H fi aim and his despotism sound very much like those they had issued fifty years earlier against Ibra¯hı¯m alSfi abba¯gh. For the French, despotism meant the economic monopoly policy concerning exports. There is no denying that the Farhfi ¯ıs in Syria and in particular H fi aim in Acre were powerful and wealthy. The wealth of the Farhfi ¯ıs was reflected in the luxurious furnishing of their residence in Damascus. Yet its external appearance betrayed at the same time the precariousness of this wealth and power.215 In Acre H fi aim lived more modestly, residing in an apartment in the Kha¯n alFaranj. But his power was enormous, and Sulayma¯n Pasha’s trust in him was apparently boundless. H fi aim felt so secure in his position that he did not hesitate to deal harshly with Muslim officials. When the multazim of ‘Atlit, Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı, tried to meddle in the financial affairs of the province, H fi aim vilified him publicly: Every single one of you remains a donkey, who does not know anything about this world. When God, the Highest, bestowed his grace upon you, and removed the horseshoes from your feet, you believed you had become something important. You sat in the meetings of veziers and rulers and

88

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

interfered in affairs that were none of your business. You opened your big mouth [baju¯q] without discerning what came out of it. . . . Lest it would be said that H fi aim put his intelligence on the same level as the limited intelligence of so and so I would show you how I would deal with you, impudent blabbermouth and intriguer. . . . Get up, bother your peasants with your insights and join their company.216

Though the patron of Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı was none other than ‘Alı¯ Pasha Khazinda¯r, al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı found it advisable to retire to ‘Atlit and keep a low profile. In another incident, H fi aim insulted a powerful Mamluk in front of Sulayma¯n Pasha’s dı¯wa¯n by reminding him of a large debt he owed the government.217 H fi aim also was instrumental in removing Abu¯ Nabu¯t from Jaffa. Abu¯ Nabu¯t had become the center of the Mamluk party, which hoped to reestablish its rule after the death of Sulayma¯n Pasha and stood in the way of the ambitions of the young ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and those of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı.218 But even after the removal of Abu¯ Nabu¯t, H fi aim could not be sure that he had contained the Mamluk party, especially since Abu¯ Nabu¯t had gone to Istanbul, where he could intrigue further against H fi aim. While Sulayma¯n Pasha was on his deathbed in the summer of 1819, H fi aim began to make every effort to have his prote´ge´ ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, now eighteen, appointed as governor. With the help of Hesekiel al-Baghda¯dı¯, who was a bursar at the Sublime Porte, and with the payment of some 11 million piasters fi aim had his prote´ge´ appointed. It to the influential people in Istanbul,219 H had taken H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı five months of intense negotiation before the Ottoman government conceded the position of governor of Sidon to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. On January 27, 1820, the long-expected firma¯n finally came. It was probably the peak of H fi aim’s power. But this success contained the seeds of his destruction. Barely half a year later ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had H fi aim strangled and his corpse flung into the water: “They tied a heavy stone around his neck and dumped him. The fish ate him.”220 How was such an ignominious end to such an illustrious career possible? European accounts usually speak of the fickleness and the ingratitude of the young ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. They are correct, in that whatever power H fi aim enjoyed depended upon the protection of his master. Once this protection was withdrawn H fi aim was not even left with the means to insure his own survival. The Arab chroniclers provide us with more specific reasons for the change of heart of ‘Abdalla¯h. During his long stay in power H fi aim had created some mortal enemies with his high-handed manner, such as, for instance, Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı or Abu¯ Nabu¯t. Most of the Mamluks had considered the latter their leader and had therefore become the enemies

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

89

and challengers of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and, of course, of his patron H fi aim. But it was not they who brought about the murder of H fi aim. Rather, it was a new group that slowly had taken shape during Sulayma¯n Pasha’s rule and which was able to gain access to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı in particular succeeded in influencing the young governor. He appealed to his ego, describing Sulayma¯n Pasha as a simpleton who had been duped by H fi aim—something ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha should avoid. More compelling was the argument that, since H fi aim had been able to obtain ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s appointment from Istanbul, he could also, as long as he was alive, obtain his dismissal. Much of the argument was couched in religious terms; that it was against the Islamic law to have a Jew manage the treasury of the Muslims; that God had already pointed out the wickedness of the Jews in the revelation, and so on.221 Shortly after the death of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı, the French consul in Acre, Ruffin, wrote a lengthy report on the affair. He pointed to the enormous increase in H fi aim’s power as the basic cause for the assassination. He provided, as almost all later reports do in one version or the other, the anecdote of tensions between H fi aim and ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha which always culminates in the same question: who was the pasha, H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı or ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha? No doubt, after the appointment of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha as governor the struggle for actual authority in Acre began. In this struggle, as Ruffin points out, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was backed especially by three men: the newly appointed qa¯dfi¯ı of Acre, Muhfi ammad Efendi Abu¯ ‘l-Huda¯;222 the personal ima¯m of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, Shaykh Musfifitafa¯; and Shaykh Mas‘u¯d al-Ma¯dfi ¯ı.223 They seem to have worked rather dexterously on the religious feelings that ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha himself harbored. Ruffin labeled them as Musulmans fanatiques who expressed their disgust at the fact that a Jew ruled Syria, that H fi aim was in fact the pasha of Acre, and that “Les voeux et les prie`res des derviches et des faqhirs, n’avaientils donc contribue´ qu’a` une autorite´ sans bornes accorde´e a` un juif que le commun des musulmans respectaient plus que le gouverneur lui-meˆme?”* A first expression of these sentiments was that the Christians, and soon after the Jews, were ordered to wear specific clothes, in modest and dull colors. H fi aim was offered an exemption from this ruling but insisted on wearing the same outfit as his coreligionists. Then his functions and his authority were progressively reduced. Recognizing the writing on the wall, he requested to be relieved from his functions in order to retire to Damascus. This must have appeared too dangerous to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, who insisted that H fi aim stay in Acre. It came down to a final acerbic argument between the two, according to the information of Ruffin, in which H fi aim pointed out that ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha owed him the governorship of the province. This was the final straw.

90

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

On the same night of August 8, 1820, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha gave orders to have H fi aim strangled.224 The contest between the two men over the actual power in Acre and its realm, rather than the issue of religious propriety, must have been the dominant theme of the whole affair. Surprisingly enough, a few days after the death of H fi aim ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha offered the position to his brother, Mu¯sa¯. Later another dhimmı¯, Yu¯suf Qarda¯hfi ¯ı, scribe of long standing in the administration, was appointed to the position,225 which only confirms that a struggle for power, not a sense of religious impropriety, brought about H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı’s assassination. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha had been appointed governor of Sidon in all the ways that Sulayma¯n Pasha had been, including jurisdiction over the provinces of Sidon and Tripoli, Arab Latakia, and the liwa¯s Gaza, Ramla, and Jaffa. He also received the rank of wazı¯r. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was a young man, rash and inexperienced. He reverted to policies vis-a`-vis Amı¯r Bashı¯r which Ahfi mad Pasha al-Jazza¯r had applied and with which he believed he could extort much larger sums than had his predecessor. When Amı¯r Bashı¯r proved unwilling or unable to pay these sums, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha deposed him and appointed somebody else as amı¯r. But the new appointees were even less able to raise money in Mount Lebanon and eventually ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha reconciled with Amı¯r Bashı¯r and reappointed him as amir. The relations remained correct enough throughout the period but less reliable than those between Amı¯r Bashı¯r and Sulayma¯n Pasha had been. At decisive moments, for instance when ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was besieged in Acre, Amı¯r Bashı¯r excused himself and did not come to his support. In a move that was meant to win the support of the Metualis, ‘Abdalla¯h ¯ mil to them. With the same move he freed Pasha returned control of Jabal ‘A himself of the Mamluks of Sulayma¯n Pasha who had been lording over the region. Relations with Damascus were tense from the beginning. But the first serious, one might say existential, crisis for Acre was precipitated by ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s murder of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı in 1820. It triggered intensive activities within the influential Farhfi ¯ı family in Damascus as well as in Istanbul seeking revenge for this murder. Clashes over territorial claims in the Biqa¯‘a Valley and the Golan became frequent in early 1822. The appointment of the mutasallim of Nablus became another issue. As we have seen, these quarrels were part of the old pattern of hostilities between the two provinces, and they were now instrumentalized by the Farhfi ¯ı brothers for their own purposes. There is no doubt that they actively interfered in politics.226

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

91

At the end of May 1822 the forces of Damascus suffered a major defeat on the Golan Heights thanks to an alliance between ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and Amı¯r Bashı¯r. At the same time the Farhfi ¯ıs had mobilized support in Istanbul for Darwı¯sh Pasha, the governor of Damascus. In June orders were issued to Musfitafa¯ Pasha, governor of Aleppo, to support Darwı¯sh Pasha militarily. A firma¯nfi announced the deposal of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, declaring him a rebel and appointing Darwı¯sh Pasha to the former’s position, in addition to the governorship of Damascus.227 Amı¯r Bashı¯r, faced with a choice of either being disloyal to his immediate superior ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha or defying the Ottoman government, decided to remove himself from the scene and travel to Egypt. Without Druze opposition the united armies of the two governors could march on Acre. By the end of July 1822 the siege of Acre began. It lasted six months, but with no results to show for it. Salumu¯n Farhfi ¯ı participated financially and personally in the campaign of Darwı¯sh Pasha against Acre. But when it appeared that Darwı¯sh was unable to take Acre, and when Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ of Egypt, at the same time lending his support to the sultan in the war in the Morea, interfered on behalf of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, the Ottoman government shifted its position. Darwı¯sh was dismissed as governor of Damascus and Sidon. After a short transition period during which Musfifitafa¯ Pasha was appointed, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was forgiven and reinstated as governor of Sidon, though without control over the southern Palestinian liwa¯s. They were returned to him only a year later. Musfifitafa¯ Pasha, like ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha, put the blame for the whole campaign against Acre squarely on the shoulders of the Farhfi ¯ıs. Apparently under the impact of these accusations—Musfifitafa¯ Pasha produced documents proving his point—Salumu¯n Farhfi ¯ı fell ill and died in the camp before Acre.228 The assassination of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı had been motivated by the strictly personal fears and ambitions of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha. The military actions against ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha and the siege of Acre had been instigated by the Farhfi ¯ıs exerting their influence in Istanbul and trying to take their revenge. Calling off the siege, however, involved a quite different set of political measures. The shift of support from the Farhfi ¯ıs to ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha by the Ottoman government reflected a basic shift in policy toward the Jewish financiers, as Okawara has shown.229 In preparation for the weakening and eventual liquidation of the Janissaries, Sultan Malmu¯d II eliminated elements that provided them with support. In Istanbul the contact man of the Farhfi is had been the banker Hesekiel alBaghda¯dı¯, possibly a relative of the Farhfi ¯ıs by marriage. He was a descendant of the famous Jewish banking family Gabbay, the later Sassouns, in Baghdad.

92

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

In Istanbul he became the banker of Halet Efendi, ‘a¯lim and conservative politician in Istanbul. In 1810 he had broken the power of the Mamluk rulers in Baghdad and submitted the province to direct Ottoman control. Perhaps at this time the contact between Hesekiel and Halet had been established. Halet became a fierce opponent of all reform attempts in Istanbul and especially a defender of the Janissaries. Through him Hesekiel had close business ties with the Janissaries. He had engineered the appointment of ‘Abdalla¯h as governor of Sidon on behalf of H fi aim Farhfi ¯ı and also the campaign against him after the death of H fi aim. Eventually, in early 1823, Halet Efendi’s reformist opponents had him dismissed, exiled, and executed.230 His Jewish banker Hesekiel was killed in May 1823 as was his brother Ezra in Baghdad. During the next year the property of twenty-three Jewish banking families was confiscated, including that of the Farhfi ¯ıs. It was part of the policy of Mahfi mu¯d II to destroy the conservative opposition and its financial supporters—as the Jews were perceived—before liquidating the Janissaries themselves.231 With the termination of the siege, the position of Acre had apparently been restored and with it the power of its governor. In reality, however, the whole campaign had ushered in a new balance of power in Syria. For the first time in three generations a governor of Damascus seriously, albeit not successfully, challenged the ruler of Acre and its realm. The governor of Damascus was also appointed governor of Sidon. This had happened heretofore only the other way around. The French consul, who had resided in Cyprus during the siege of Acre, returned as consul of Acre, Sidon, and Beirut but chose to reside in Sidon, and was already eyeing Beirut as the optimal place fi aim and Salumu¯n for the French consul’s residence.232 With the death of H the rapid decline not only of the Farhfi ¯ı family but of the Jewish community in Syria began, while the Christian communities were able to enhance their power and standing. Within the next ten years—culminating in the Damascus blood libel of 1840—the Jews were to lose even the semblance of the power they had held in Syria for almost a century.233 The Druze under Amı¯r Bashı¯r had become a force in their own right. Finally, the role in Syria of the new Egypt under Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ announced itself. His support of the sultan gave him a say in the affairs of Syria. Thus he could impose the restoration of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha to his position—although Muhfi ammad ‘Alı¯ was soon to annex all of Syria to his own realm. It was only the extreme instability of politics in Damascus during the next few years—ten different governors between 1820 and 1831—and the preoccupation of the Ottoman government with internal reforms and the Greek war

THE POLITICS OF ACRE

93

that disguised the weakness of ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha’s regime in Acre, though economically and militarily Acre had already become only a shadow of its former self. In 1826 the French consul reported that “Abd-Allah Pacha gouverne comme si la politique lui conseillait de s’entourer de Ruines, afin que tout le pays sous sa domination pre´sente l’aspect de la solitude et de la pauvrete´.”* As revenues declined, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha extended monopolistic control even to imports to Acre. The result was that commerce moved away from Acre even faster. Cotton from Nablus, for instance, was traded via Damascus to Beirut for export.234 The economic basis of Acre was vanishing and, while Beirut flourished, ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was reduced to haggling with his own chief adviser-cum-manager235 over the jewelry of the latter’s wife and daughters.236 Yet once more ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was called upon by the Ottoman government to exercise authority when he was appointed in October 1830 over the sancakfi s of Jerusalem, Hebron, and Nablus, to collect the taxes for the pilgrimage—the Damascene governor being unable to do so.237 A second consideration of the government was that an Egyptian invasion was imminent and Acre the only formidable obstacle to it in Syria. The appointment led ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha into a direct confrontation with the al-Jarra¯r clan, who were unwilling to recognize his authority. Yet another siege of Sfi a¯nu¯r was organized, which lasted for three months. ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was convinced that by conquering Sfi a¯nu¯r his name would be placed “a` coˆte´ de ceux des plus grands capitaines du monde.”238* Eventually he succeeded where everybody else had failed: in early March 1831 the defenders of Sfi a¯nu¯r surrendered and the fortress was leveled to the ground.239 The irony of this victory is obvious: within the year ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha was to change roles and become the defender of Acre in the last great siege of that city. For half a year, from November 1831 to May 1832, the Egyptian troops besieged the by now formidable fortifications of Acre and eventually destroyed the city completely with their artillery. During the last months ‘Abdalla¯h Pasha lived underground with his family. When he finally emerged and surrendered, the history of Acre and its realm as a semi-autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire had come to an end.

chapter 3

TRADE: LOCAL RULERS AND THE WORLD ECONOMY

Now that we have considered the analysis of the political history of Acre and its realm during the period, we shall turn to the economic underpinnings of these developments. It is my contention that only the unique economic opportunities and the specific ways in which they were used made the political developments possible. The focus will be on the development of Acre’s export trade during the eighteenth century, which means mainly the new development of the export of raw cotton to France. Several basic questions may be raised here: How was the cotton trade with Europe handled? Who was engaged in it? Who profited from it? Who controlled it? During the eighteenth century the shipping and the marketing in Europe of Acre’s exports was almost exclusively in the hands of French merchants from Marseilles, while the responsibility for cotton cultivation and its delivery to the coast was usually in the hands of village shaykhs, local traders, tax collectors, and, eventually, agents of the ruler in Acre. How did the French merchants deal with the local conditions of economy and politics, and how did the local elites cope with the new—but very rewarding—demands of overseas markets? By concentrating on the relationship between the French merchants and their local counterparts I shall highlight the mechanisms that led to the success of this commercial relationship and that eventually caused its collapse. The trade between Europe and Muslim states had been regulated since the Middle Ages by what came be known as Capitulations, treaties between Muslim rulers and their European counterparts, that granted residence, independent jurisdiction, and trade privileges to European merchants in Mus-

TRADE

95

lim cities. In the Ottoman centuries, these rights and privileges waxed, even as the power of the Ottoman Empire waned. The first comprehensive Capitulations with France were negotiated in the year 1569, when Istanbul was seeking the support of France against Venice. They were renegotiated at the time of Colbert in 1673 and expanded again in 1740, when France sided with the Ottomans in the Peace of Belgrade. The right to protect the Catholics in the empire and the reduction of the tax on trade to 3 percent were among the more important privileges the French gained. When Colbert reorganized French trade at the end of the seventeenth century, Marseilles’ Mediterranean trade monopoly was confirmed. French merchants were organized in each of the various Mediterranean ports as a nation under a consul or vice-consul. A nation’s members consisted of ne´gociants, merchants, and commis, acting as their agents. In addition a physician, a watchmaker, a baker, and other French residents might be members of the nation. The consul, who most of the time was also a ne´gociant, was responsible for the nation. He dealt with the local authorities, protecting the merchants from greedy governors, extortion, and other calamities. He reported to Marseilles and to Paris, sending annual statistics, providing evaluations of the merchants, and giving reports on political affairs. He watched over the behavior of the members of his nation, reprimanding them when necessary and, in severe cases, having them shipped back to France. He also guided the nation, calling assemblies where all important issues were discussed and where the annual issue of fixing prices for buying and selling merchandise was settled.1 It is striking how well this organization of the French merchants as a guild or corporation, as a nation in the commercial centers, fit into the overall organization of the Ottoman Empire. The parallel to the millet system is remarkable. The French lived more or less together and were recognizable by their different dress. The merchants were treated, like the dhimmı¯s, as a group. If the local governor, for instance, wanted to raise—legally or not— money from the merchants, he would always address himself to the whole nation. As a group they were held responsible—rightly or wrongly—for such issues as the Maltese pirates who preyed on the coast of Syria. Negotiations with the local authorities were carried out in the name of the nation by the consul, just as the local leader of a millet would deal with the local authorities. If a serious crisis developed, the consul could always turn to Istanbul, where the French ambassador (like the patriarch of a millet) would try to convince the central government to take measures; usually a tedious, expensive, and time-consuming process.

96

TRADE

Though the millet and the nation shared a similar style of social interaction and sense of themselves, and were seen as similar institutions by others, the parallel should not be carried too far. The essential difference between millet and nation was that the French were not subjects of the Ottoman sultan and had in the last analysis the ever-increasing strength of the French state to protect them and their privileges. But the power of France in the Ottoman Empire was, as yet, still limited. It could be exercised mainly through diplomatic access in Istanbul. Whether pressure applied in the capital would ameliorate the conditions of the French nation in any given locality of the Ottoman Empire depended very much on the ability of the central government to assert its authority and power in its own provinces, a capability which in the eighteenth century, and especially in the regions we are concerned with, could no longer be taken for granted. Though the French occasionally sent navy ships into the region, usually combating corsairs, they were not yet willing—at least until the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt—to interfere militarily in local politics. Active gunboat politics was to make its appearance only in the following century as part of European imperialism. French merchants could, indeed, be harassed considerably by local authorities and even be expelled, as happened with the French in Acre in 1790. At the beginning of the eighteenth century there were three French nations in Syria, each headed by a consul: in Aleppo, Tripoli, and Sidon. In addition, there were individual merchants in Ramla, Jaffa, and Acre. These French merchants, appointed by the chamber of commerce in Marseilles as the only representatives of French trade in the Levant, saw their role as limited to selling imported French merchandise for cash and buying local products for export at prices set by themselves; hoping to avoid at the same time any entanglement in local politics, finances, and business. The reality, alas, was quite different and ever-changing, and therein lies a story. At the end of the seventeenth century Acre had little to offer merchants. Travelers described it as a spacious ruin with a few miserable cottages in its middle. Its three hundred or so inhabitants eked out a living as fishermen. The only structures that stood out from the city’s rubble were a mosque and a large khan. The latter was the center of all business activity, and the French merchants—in 1691 there were thirteen of them—used it as their base.2 Acre lay unprotected on the tip of the bay. Nomad