A theory of citizenship: organizing plurality in contemporary democracies

A THEORY

ZENSH

This page intentionally left blank

A THEORY OF

Organizing P urality in Contemporary Democracies

Herman van Gunsteren

Westview Press A Member of the Perseus Bc>sksCroup

All Iligl-tts reserved, Printed in tlw United States of America, No part c.tf this ptiblication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mecl-ranical,including photocc>py,recording, or any it~formatic)nstorage and retrieval system, without pennission in writing from the plxblisl-rer, Co.tpyrightQ 2998 by Wesbiew Press, A Member of tl-rePerseus Bcwks Group hblisl-red in 1998 in the United States of girnerica by Wml-itiew Press, 55i10 Central givenue, Boulder, Colorado 80302-2877, and in tl-re United Kingdom by Westrview Press, 12 Hid's Co.tpse Road, Cumnor Hill, Oxford OX2 9J5

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-PublicationData Cunsteren, Herman R, van. A theory of citizenship : organizing plurali? in contempora~ democracies I Herman van Gunsteren. p. cm, fnctudm biblic~graphicalreferences and index. fSBN 0-8133-5%2-S (hardcover),.--- XSBN Q-8133-68612-4(pbk,) I. Citizenship. 2.. Democracy 3. Wortb potitics-1989I. T~tle. JF801.CX6 1998 323.6'W.LW1717---d~22

T11e paper used in this publication meets the requiremen& of tl-te h e r i c a n National Standard for Permmence of Paper for Printed Libra7 Materials 239.48-19M.

a n n

Contents

ix PART I

Why Citizenship?

1 C i t h s h i p on €he Political Agenda

3

Political Earthquakes After 1989,3 Citizenship as a Dynamic Principle of ConstitutionalPolitics, 6 On the Agenda of Redemocratization, 8 2 Theories of Citizenship, Old m d mew

11

A Field of Meanings, 11 The Development of a Citizenship Doctrine, 13 Three Theories of Citizenship, 16 Old Theories in Contemporary Society, 21 Neorepublican Citizenship, 24

PART 2 What C R h n s D o 3 PluralRy in The Unknown Society

33

The Value of Plurality, 34 The Unknown Society, 36 Conceptualizing Plurality, 39 Accepting Plurality, But Not Blindly, 50

4 Agafnst Consensus Fit or Consensus, 53 Condition or Desired Outcome, 55 Cultural Facts, 57

53

vi Cl Contents

5 Deep Groups Under a MulticuItural Surface

59

Deep Groups, 59 Community of Fate, 61 Exclusive Cultwes, 63 Principles for Multicultural Practice, 64 6 C3thns in Public Omce

67

Ruling Cocitizens, 68 Extreme Situations, 70 How Normal? 72 Disturbing Demands, 76

P M T 3 How Citizens Are Formed 7 EMucation

81

Dangerous Questions, 82 Education €orCulture, 83 Educators as Exemplary Citizens, 84 The Problem of Ripeness and Other Dilemmas, 84 Fragmentation and the Avoidance of Experience, 88 Who Educates the Educator? 88 8 Admission and Exclusion

91

Claims for Admission and Grounds for Refusal, 93 Admission Policies and Practices, 96 Exclusion of Citizens, 99 9 Work and Thlrd A g e Citizens

103

From Property to Social Rights, 103 To Work or Not to Work, Is That the Question? 105 Social Rights Are Not Citizen Rights, 106 Third Age Citizens, 103

to Moral Unity or a Steady Diet of Conflicts? Politicians MoralizingAbout Civic Responsibility, 113 The Past as Compass: Filth, Danger, and Purification Rituals, 115 Multiple Calculations Without One Ultimate Standard, 118 Paradoxical Communication and the Ethics of the "Blank Check," 120 The Uninterested Citizen, 121

111

Contents 0 vii Naturalizing Nationalism, 124 Civil Societyr129 t. 1 Political Institutions and the Idea of Citizenship

133

European Citizenship, 134 Redemocratization, 135 The Dialectic of Public and Private Spheres, 136 Representation, 138 Loyalty, 140 Freedom, 144 In Search of Public Context, 147

The Outlook for Citizenship

149 1% 161

This page intentionally left blank

E-7

E-7

E-7

Preface

The revolutions of 1989 inaugurated a period of constitutional politics

and of transfom?ations in rt.girne that continues to this day. The political order of nati.on-states and East-West power blocs is gone, but we camot yet discern the stable shape of a new order, This order is still in the making; and the form it eventuaily takes, for all we know might well depend on contingencies and on the actions of citizens as much as on broad trends. I therefore fnvite readers of this book to consider with me the place of citizerns in the transformations under way: What notion of dtizensftip is appropriate in curmnt circumstances, and what orientation can citizens give to cmgoi~~g constitutional changes? Our goal in this consideration will not be to detail the day-to-day world of politics in all its glory and squalor. Instead, we will seek to define a principle, an attitude, that could make a difference in that world. While exploring the conditions that stimdate dtizenship, we will focus prirnarfiy on how the practical exercise ol citizenship-even under conditions that are far from ideal-keeps it alive. In the book's f i s t two chapters, I have outlined the polities and meaning of citizenship in various epochs. In the next four chapters, we will inquire into what contemporary citizens actually can do, especialty h the trarmoil oE post-3989 democracies, to organize their differences. 'T"hese first six ehapters, in essence, focus on the practicc of h e d o n In. the last five chapters, we will concentrate m the process of ernancipation-on what it takes to become a free citizen-in part, through institutions of education, immigration, and socialization*Together, these chapters preser~t a coherent vision of citizens as organizers of a pluraIist polity, a theory of citizenship fnr c o n t a p o r a y etemocracies. I hope that my rczaders will be stimulated by this vision to contribute more actively as citizens to the constitution and ongoing evolution of a republican order in their own states and communities. I wish to thank a number of colleagues who commented on. my earlier attempts to get the subject right: the late Aaron Wldavsky Hans Overslout, Martin Rein, Geraint Parry, Mavis Maclem, Etieme Balibalt;Robert

van der k e n , Paul den Iloed, Sasja Tempelman, 7'hyl Gheyselinck, Arie de Ruyter, Alfrfjd I'ijpers, Margo Trappcnburg, Koen I(Och, Graharne Lack, Mark Bovens, LofZe Nauta, Claus Offe, jos de Beus, Pauli 't t a r t , m d Desanne van Brederode. I received fine editorial assistance from Phia Koppers. I am fortunate to have fom~din Westview Press not only a publisher but also people I soon felt 1could trust. I am particularly grateful to Rebecca IZitLccz, copy editor, for her delicate and clear suggestictx~s.I am grateful to the Dutcln Scientific COULIC~S. for Gwemmmt Policy for m&ing it possjbIe to commission studies of '"citizenship prartices," some results of which appear in Cl-rapter 7. M i l e wwking as a Council mernber, I profited from the hterventions of fcllow members and from cooperation with Paul den Hoed, RaouX Wirtz, Anne P e t , and Edith van Ruyven. Ideas in the chapter on plurality were first developed in collaboration I thnnk Mary Dotlglas for a conversa.t.ion i,n whieh, wit-,hSasja Te~xpeiman.. she explained thjngs 1wish I had understood when 1started studying citizenship. We never wrote that article on "The voice of the citizen in hierarchies,'"ut some ol the ideas for it can, I hope, be found in thjs book,

Part One 5TTI

a

5111

Why Citizenship?

This page intentionally left blank

ONE

Citizenship on the Political Agenda

The =year1989 marked the beginning of a period of political surprises-of thhgs we thcrught could not happen that nevertheless did. Events again m d again took place that were not only u~nexpectedm d unlikely but also theoreticdly impossible-at least, no provision had been made for them in political theory c u r ~ nat t the time. Who in 2985 could have in-tagined Vriclav Havel as president of the Czech republic, or Nelson Mandefa leading South Africa? Who could have predicted the worldwide resonance their rise to power would evoke? The nonvidetnt accession to office of these erstwhile political prisoners marked an unprecedented reconquest oi public space from totalizing systems and the bureaucratk and military servants of those systems. 'The public actions and statennent-s of Havel and Mandela, which have remahed remarkably free from resentment and revenge, have underscored the naturt. of the crznquest: 7'hetwo leaders have continued to insist on dialogue and cooperation with their cocitizerrs, although the latter group includes the former oppressors of the citizenry. The new leaders w i l l a l y engage fn labor-intensive political crafesmanship and reject temptations to ci.scm,mventthe process by force or t h e & of violence. These exermplary citizens who now O C C U E ~the ) ~ foremost ofices of their republics do not: stand alone, of course. They are members of broader movement.^ ol people who refused to collaborate, who said ""no" to systems that supposedly guaranteed the conditions of their existmce. These new citizens likewise rejected the sort of violent contestation that characterized earlier rclvolutims. It is worth rclnnennbering that "'velvet." revolutions were possible because people acted as citizens, in whatever situations they bund themselveewhether in t-he ranks of t-he opposition or

4

Citizenship a n the Political Agenda

among those in power. A number of soldiers, politicians, and civil servants stoad shot~f.derto shoulder wi& ordinary people in the streets, risking their positions in order to achieve freedom for all in the republic, The Berlin wall was brought down by similar cooperatim ammg antagcmists: dissidents, pocver holders, and ordinary people alite. Unprecedmkd hiAs in political power take place not onliy under autocratic or totalitarian regimes but also where change is regdarly effected by democratic procedures: The political parties that cmtrolled Japan and Italy dter World War I1 have been m a s k e d as corrupt and. incompetmt, and unseated. For the first t h e in fie histclry of its party government, 'The Netherlmds is ruled by a coalition that does not hclude the Christian parties of the center. Everywhere, voters and dissident politicians arc demanding change-no mem changing of the guard, but a completely d j f e r e ~ style ~ t of conducting polities. Rders are shokving sensitivity to such demands but are finding it difficult to devise appropriate respmses. Only fie regents cJf fie European Union appear immune to the infectious spread of popula ~ f u s a l sto go on with politics as usual. The outda.t.ed attitudes of those long accustomed to the isolation of high oificc could cost them, as well as their constituents, dearly r so think mmy ordinary citizens. Frustration ammg citizens with what they perceive as unrespmsive leadership is on the rise, and citizens"efusa1s to go on with politics as usual do not always Row Chrough democra.t.icchannels. Extremim of the far right, marginalization of strangers and other ""sperfious" "people, disgust with politics, and irtdiffrrence to new pwerty in old welfare states have given rise to illegal and often violent acts. III addition, international mobility and communication m a k the maintenmce of law on the territory of the state incremingly difficult. T k national society is no longer the self-evides~tcontext for poljtical, action and order, Other contexts are often mom important, not only for firms but also for national authorities themselws. Both increasingly model their polieies after "unavoidable" jnternatio~~al realities. They coopera& with other staks but at the same time engage in regime covetition with them. States try to distinguish themselves, to develop an exclusive profile of taxatim, busi~~ess opportunity, and style ol livhg, with a view toward m k i n g &emselves attractive to footloose firms. Changes can be lietected also in political representations of reality 'f'he pyramid mod&, based on the logic of rational and central rule, is pass4 (Toulmin 1992; Van Gunsteren 1976). Sovereignty is divided and fragmented, and it, too, has become an outdated concept. Nowaciays, people must deal with multiple and shifting nodes in their relations with emtikies that formerly were represented by a single center. Politics and rule-mking take plaue in diverse locatims that arc. no longer connected to each

Citizenship on the Political Agenda D 5

other in a stable, hkrarchical order. Where people have begun to notice and to accept these developments, the fomer ccnters increashgly are losing their grip. More and more people sense that the tectonic plates on which tbeir political acts are based are shit-ing. The conslitution, wilhin the cmstraints of which politics normally is conducted., has itself become vuhrable to poiitics. fn various ccnantries, new constitutions are being written and enacted. The conte~~t of constitutions m d the rullings of constitutional courts once agaixl matter, and they mi&t even be decisive during tense, life-anddeath political situaticms. h periods of "normal'" polities, the political actors are h o w % limited, and anchored i,n professjnnalism; however, inperiods of constitutional or revolutionary politics, as in France after 1.789or in Eastern E m p e two centwies later, this is not so (Ackerman 1991). POfincl. themselves in situations in litical outsiders m d amateurs sudde~~ly which they turn out to be c m i a l actors, and established politicians and parties suddenly are deprived of their assumedly normal powers. Such times are fascinating but afso full of risks. 'The orienlation that normal politics previously provided (even as it gave rise to popdar boredom and disgust) is no longer fully reliaZlle or valid, and thus people are much more "nakedy"Aependent on each othet: W e n institutional deb ni.tims of what counts as political reality are no longer taken as self-evident culhrral facts (like a cclmmm lmguage, or driving on the right-hand side of"Chc street), people are forced to provide waning, orientation, and dependable relations among themsehes. mere is no fixed set of institutions that reproduces a self-evident "'we" to do this for them. In such mcertairt situations, some search for secttrity in the givens of mce, nation, religion, or international commesce: These types of communities offer a lhited but of ten temporarily workable ""we.'Wthers reject all such totalizations and seek salvation in the strictly individualjstic purs~l,itsof consumption, self-rescue, and e n j o p m t of life as it comes, A third way is l"~ and deliberate that of citkenship-that is, the i ~ ~ d i v i d u aacceptmce moldjng of a p21blic cornunity oE sharcd fate. Citizens are connected by the ways in which they govern themelves and agrt_.eto be governed, by the organization of their cor~flictsand differences. It: is predsety in tlarbwlemt periods of constitutional change that- citizenship is put to the test, Where old il~stitutionsarc cmmbl..ilrg, a robust notion of citizenship may provide an alternate site or a new set of building blocks for reconstructhg the republic under changjng circumstances. :In a time of transition, a valid and vital conceptualkation of citizenship may help to keep politicai contestatim within acceptahle limits. Citizenship offers a compass for orientation and reorientation in n w and unfamiliar situations, :It does not guarmke success-cormption, intimidation, and the infliction of physical harm and other forms of igustice mmain

6

Citizenship a n the Political Agenda

characteristic of a time of transition-brat it is a welcome help in setting out a common course for people who feel the pojitical ground shifting under their feet, In a period of political earthquakes, people" sintest in a practical and workable theory of citizenship naturdly increases: We know that we need a notion ol citizenship sufficiently grounded in the current political realily to engage the support of a majority of citizens, Today, the theory of citizmship begs for reconsideration in the light of post1,989even.t.s m d deveiopmemts. Such was my goal in witing this book.

AS 18 DmAMG ORAL POLlTIa The events of 1989 and their aftmmath have catapulted the world into a period oE constitution maki-ng and transformation of political regimes that transcends the logic of the nation-state. 111 the deliberations that have accompanied the drafting of new constitutims, Che elementary problems of livix~gtogether in a late or postmodem setting have been addressed: How shoutd political decisionmaking be organized so as to facilitate meaningful individual h i n g , productive business practice, ecological responsibility#and justice for future generations? mese arc the great questions at stake in Nrrrth hmerica, Europe. South hfrica, and around the world-h all the more mundane deba.t.esm d fi@s in which the location and legitimation of political decisimmakhg are being reconsidered. To be sure, nation-states are stitl playing a prominent role in this process. For instance, the intergovernmentd conference that was to formulate a revised constitution for the European Union in 1997 was run by civil servants handpicked by the goverx~mentsof nation-states, rather than by delegates to a constitutimal convention elected by the people. But nat-ionstates are no longer the uncontested central actors in the constitrxtionmaking process; nor arc. thry clbviout; fontnls in which tbr results of the process will necessarily be impleme~~ted and modified. Many peapie feel that we live in a transitional period in which new political entities will continue tc:,develop alongside and in competition with the previously domhmt nation-state. Although few believe that the nation-state will soon disappear altogether, many are convinced that its status is fundamentally changing from dominmt form of political organization to one form among mmy- Externally, the nation-state is related to and in competition with political entities such as the Europem tinion, the World Trade Clrganization, the North Atlmtic Treaty-0qmizatior.1, multimtional frms, and entities that are as yet unnamed, or are jllegal, and thus are not formally recognized as political regimes (for example, mafia orgmizations). Ii~ternatlypowerul mass media, big money and the cm-

Citizenship on the Political Agenda D 7 sumer society in recent: t h e s have fundamentally altercld the traditional landscape of parliarncntary democracyppolitical parties, and the rule o( law withh which the position of the ci.tlzen as voter and add.ressee of the nation-state was once secured. Nowadays, the differences between governfnent- and oppctsition, and therefore the significnnce of elections, are often unclear. Elections are supposed to confer legitimate political power, but how can they do so when there is no choice to speak of? fncreasiftgly, pmple ignore the messages that governrne~ntssend because they s e a of little relevmce to daily life, Now that many political issues and actors are situated outside the framework of the mtion-state, whjch moreover has altered its ways of operathg, the question of support for the prevailing political regimes in nation-states becomes crucial. On what grourtds can they claim legitimacy? In liberai political cdtures, these regimes are legitimated by individual consent, However, when elections in nation-states with parliarnentary parties are no longer t.he primary m d obvicrus wenut-, for mgister% consent or dissent by citizens, citize~nshipitself becomes a problematic constitutional issue: In what venue then, is political consent kgitimat@ly to be registered? At stake are the status and meaning of citizenship itself, as well as the dtfinitiorns of who m y or m y not be a citizen. A measure of the new constitutions will be their capaciw for dcfhing and guaranteeing the positim of the citizen-their citizen-pmducing capacity, Citizenship is a princi-ple of constitutional rccmstruction, in the sense that citizens should play an active role in it as well as in the sense that the constibticm should foster citizenship. When the constitutim of a plllitical rt?gi.me fosters citizenship as a dynamic principle of its o~anization-when a rcgime is "owneci" by iits citizen+we call that ~ g i m ae rqzrblic. Citizens of a =publie are both rulers and ruled: They rule djrcctly, or ultimately, m d they obey fellow dtizens in their ruling authority as oificeholders,A republic is local. A world-level approach to establishing constitutional regimes by such methods as adoptjng and eznforci,ng h w a n rights charters lacks local depll-\ and vitality For the tirne being, human rights protections need firm anchoring in the locd political regirne in order to be effective. I use the tern "rqublic" to fofostall idez~tificatio~n of &is political ~ g i r n e with the nation-state and its parties, parliament, and welfare arrangements. Every democracy based on a parliamentary system is a repLlblic, but not every ~ p u h l i is c a democracy based on a pariiarne~~tary system. A republic is a politiral, r e g h e in which, those living under it have some red say but not necessarily through parliammtary party governance. W~etherconsat can be organized and registe~dby other routes is m open question. The ot be decided beforehmd by theortetical fiat, To lirnit citkens" choice to either parZiamentary party demwracy or dictatorship is to ex-

8

Citizenship a n the Political Agenda

cluck mmy other opthns, If the European parliammt m d Europem partits do not: get off the gmund, it does not necessari:iy .follo\v that we shotlld give up all hope of makhg the European Union a r e g h e that is in same meaninghl sense gol~emedby its citizens. 'That is not to say that other ogtions c m easMy be realized. How to org;anize government by "Cbe many" has been a central problem from the begiming of potiticai theorizing, For ent to be viabie, it had to be tempered or mixed, according to Aristotle, and to be kept in line l.hr0ugl-r civic virkne, accordhg to many later thinkers, In modern times, theorists have insisted that democracy must be tempered by basic, individual rigl~tti,lest it become ""totalitarian democracy." If the risks of demcratic degeneration me re& then new checks will have to be invented for those situations of governance that do not permit a direct applicatim of the checks that emerged.historicaily in thc. form of parliamentav party democracy:

ON T m AGErnA OF'mBEMacmnzATloN Over the past fifteen years, citizenship has reemerged as a priority on the politicat agenda ol many estabfished democracies, WSljch Save felt the need to "redemocratize." h Great Britah this is evident in the movement for a written constitution and in the Conservaitive government" '""citizens" charter," in which the citizerz is conceived of as a consumer who exercises rights vis-8-vis service organizations, fn the United States, Newt Glngrich and his &publican party"s Contract for America immediately come to mind; however, many other, less celztral m d visible groups have hsisted with equal. firmness m citizen rights and have criticized their violation by public authorities with equai vigor. Some groups a$vocate citizen trials, citizen police and militias, citizen schools, and cjlizerns bearing thcir own arms. "The search for those who blew up the federal buildjng in Oklahoma City has taken us into a netfterworld of militmts who believe that the federd government is t?lt orle plot against their liberty""wrote Gary Wlls (1995:50-55). MlXs asserted that such groups offer not only actions but also arguments, ""an internally consistent cme for the illegitimacy of federal acts.'" But there is mrnething new about- the grcjups coming to light after Oklahoma City However those groups differ among t h e m s e l v e ~ s o m eespousing vialence, some not; some religic)~~, some secular; some millennial, some gragmatic-they a11 agree in their intern fear of the government, and they have framed a complex analysis of the rnachiner~pof go>vernrnentalrepression, one that even non-atrernisb share an this p i n t or that. In fact, it is hard to trace the eexct line where extremism spills aver into "mahstream" concern about liberty:

Citizenship on the Political Agenda D 9

France recently has witnessed screrningly contradictory developments: a right.-wing rejection of foreigners on French soil, combined vvjtb government demands that French citizenship be exclusive of other citizenships and be acquired h o u g h explieit choice rather than quasi-autornatically; large demonstrations of youth against this official separation between "them" and "usm";d indj:viduals' refusals to compv with uniform dress codes in Frmch scklrols (the head scarf worn by same Islamic girls has been a particuiar focus of cont.ention). Political leaders in The Netherlands have repeatedly criticized the "calculating cilizen'" who uses state welfare arrangements to his own advantage, at the same time as they worry about m alleged gap between themselves and ordinary citizens, who seem mom and, xnore dlsafiected and disengaged from politics. In Germany, this theme has been echoed by descriptions al: Pnrkez'verdrosse~.heit(popular antagonism toward political parties), The German consensus has been ravaged sixzce relmification by complair-zts that the arrogant West Germans have been treating the Ossis, or East Germans, as secmd-class citizelzs who camat be trusted because of their f o r m r 'kallahoration" with the regime of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (C>UR), The vestion of granting German citizenship to foreign hvctl-kers who have lived in Germany for a period of determinate length also has been controversial,, both in theory and in practice, as gangs set fire to foreign workers3dwellings. In Italy; whe~zjudicial magistrates some years ago began to expose the corrupt political establishment, their actions we= weicomed by m q ordh~arycitizens who felt that such an initiative was long overdue. The arrests m d hdictments effectively started a bmader movement of co~zstitutional refom that continues today A guiding concern in these =forms is to find novel ways to bridge the gap between political elites and ordhary citizelzs. The fostering of feelings of Euroyean citizenship and the development of sorne citizen rights has been on the agenda of the European Union for years. Iiesistrxnce in various countries agahst the Maastricht treaties, and especialjy against the clauses on citizm rights, has made European citizenship a contested issue on national political agmdas. 'This, im turn, has heled l-he revival of natio~zal(istic) notions of citizenship. The prohlems of citizenship take various forms on the political agmdas of contemporq democraries, but thejr new wisbility suggests a common link: Political issues increasingly are bejing addressed in terms of citizenship, .A general sirnilarlv also is evident in the policy areas and concerns involved-immigration, poverty and discrimination; cormption and imefficiency in the provision of public services; the gap between politics m d ordinary citisns; and the gap between nationaf and supranational identities. In the debates referred to earlier, these issues are most often dis-

lQ

Citizenship on the F""oiitica1Agenda

cussed in terms of who is in and who is out-h terms of loyatv, belonging, and swness-with the impliejt notio~lof citizelnstnir bci,ng that of mity and consensus. Such terms, however, do not fit well. with the hcreasing liiffermtiatim and plrxfalizaticln evidmt in post-4989 politics. Miould it not be more e f ective to develop a visian of citizenship that acknowledges contemporary differences and focuses m the c ~ a t i v eposi, tive task of citizenship-rganizing those differences-rather than on the negative imposition of unity through uniformi,ty'? The success of tecknological, capitalist societies in the past-1989 era in =solving contemporary pcrlifical probtems will depend to a large exknt. 011 their political resilience m d their- decisionmakkg capacity. The latter, h turn, will dcpend on the vitalitJi of civil societJI,which itself is determined by the activities of citizens. If we as citizens do not succeed in achieving a democracy befitting our times, mare will be lost thm we can begin to imagine. Let us proceed then, to seek a better mderstandhg of who we are as citizens and of what we are groping tokvard.

TWO

Theories of Citizenship, Old and New

Citizenship is not an eternal essellce but a culhrizl artifact, It is what pe0ple make of it. Like language, it depends on, and.changes with, usatge: Changes in political regirnes and agendas usually entail changes in the uses and wanings of citizenship. To understand the potential of citizenship, what it is and what i"tcould become, we m s t h o w its history and understand what it meant to people before us. This chapter maps the coordkates of meankg \zrith,in\zrhich contemporary notions of the citizen are situated. It then brieR;y traces the development of thinking about citizmship in liberal dmocracies since World War II, Following this, the strengths and weaknesses of the Ihree varieties of citizenship theory that pxledominated during that period-liberal, communitarian, and publican-art? assessed. 'Their weahesses, E submit, have become liabilities in post-IS89 social m d politicad conditions: mese theories no longer provide sufiicient orientation, because the social cond.6 tions they presuppose no longer obtain. C)ut of selected elements of the three earljer theories, X then dcvelop m alternative idea that: promises to provide a better orientation for citizens in our t i m : neorepublican citizenship.

:In a republic, the power of the sward and Lal other functions of authority are exercised by cocitizens. Thus, a citizen is both ruler and ruled. fn order to fuX.Eidl&is dollblc functio~loE ruling and beiag rulcd, citizens must have a mirtimum of autonomy, judgmnt, m d loyalty. On this point theoreticians Zly and large agree. When these three aspects oE citizemhip are

f2

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

fleshed out, however, differences of opinion emerge. Wl?o is auy Is compl,ete independence tonomous? Is anyone ever ~ d l arntonornous? required, or is the mrc absence of slave-like relations sufficient?1s a person without property-who, economically speaking, has no say-autonornous? Does a hermit who never participates qualify as a citizen? And. an addict wko "chooses" to tocontinue his addiction and thereby actually loses his freedom to choose and to lead a different life? m a t stanfor the exercise of citizendards and categories of judgment arc s~~fficicnt ship? Shauld one know the name of a cabinet minister or be able to recognize a mass murderer? W ~ amistakes t of judgment disqualify a perbe son as a dtizen? Should the voices of persons suMering from deme~ntia, heededno whom or what should citizens be loyal: their nation, future generations, former generations, newcomers, settled "illegals" (illegal status surc3l,y does not deprive individuals oC ail, human rights), the law, the authorities, the republic, or the queen? I'he substantive elabarations of each of these three aspects of citizenship-autonomy; judgment, and loyalty-thus show cmsiderable diversity. Moreover, ideas about the interactions and interdependence of t h s e three qualities also differ. C m someone who has no capacity whatsoever for judgment be called auto~nonnotts?Should one count the voices of citizens who, hexercising their autonomy, allow themselves to be misXcd by t obvictusly exercising faulty judgment? Can others, and who as a ~ s u lare there be any wtonomy wit-,houtloyalty? And depencli,ng orn how one answers this last question, might requirements of loyalty be imposed on citizens who work for the news media? The &verse possible understmdings of the qualities of citizenship further multiply when we add to these variations two more distinctions: those between citizenship in a strict m d in a wide sense, and citizenship in a fnrmal and in a substan.t.ive sense, 'The term citizenship is used in a strict sense to refer to the status of poli.tical equality and participation, and in a wider sense to refer to status and particigation in tbr wider social sphere. The term, is used in a formal sense to refer to a legal status with rights and duties, and in a substantive sense to refer to the real disposition and political influence that persons have or lack. W ~ e nDutch cabinet ministers recently lame~nteda lack of ""civic responsibility," they were speaking as citizens in a strict, political sense, about citizells in a wide, social sense. n e i r critics, who were i n v o h g the elementary right of the citizetn to say ""no"and to remajn uninterested, based their inkrventions on the formal, legal dcfjnj.tion of citizenship. Questions about the education of new citizens take on a similar ambiguity as they are batted back and fnrth in this field of djverse meanings. 1s our goal in educating newcomers their achievement of political citizento local habits, ship alone, or should we also require their i~~troducticm

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D f 3 norms, and values? Can loyalty be expected from people who actuaily have no say in the affairs of scxiety and thus are excluded from citizenship in a substantke sense? May a formal requirement oi knowledge of the official local language be imposed when access to courses in that language is nonexjstent? Mow shodd we regard political refugees who have been formally admitted to cilizenship but for whom there is no substmtive and livable place in society? The mult-iple meanings of citizenship are givems that camot be erased by a silnple legal or scimtific definition, Even if it werc possible, such an intervention by experts w o d d not be accepted automatically, because more is at stake here than co~~ventians and formal relatio~~s* 'The differelzt meanings that people attach to citizenship have both material and moral consequences and are often rooted in their convictions about justice. However, an awareness of the diversi.ty of the field of waning5 and of the positions that arc taken up within it might belp to avoid quarrels and confusion. Clarity is not achieved by iporing the existence of an ambiguous field of meanings. Those who attempt to assert such "clarity" fact are creating furher ambiguity and misunderstanding, Progress toward clarity may be e x p ~ t e donly when with due respect fctr the views of others, one t&es up a clearty marked position wi"t.hinthe field of meanings of citizenship. The positim presented in this book is that of neorepublican citizenship. Befortl one can explore and defend this position, one must ul~derstandthe h~tellectualcontext in which it is anchored-that is, the competing theories of citizenship that emerged in liberal democracies after World War 11.

A nurnber of valuable studies on aspects and periods of the history of t h i n h g about citizenship have been pubiished in recent years (Heater 1,990, Ro&e 1,992, Oldjeld 1990, De Haan 11993, Kymlicka and Norman 1994). This section provides but a brief sketch of recent doctrinal developments, as a background against which the neorepublican position presented in this book can be appreciated. Between 1945 and 1980, the mlistg consensus in Western countries, fob lftwing the work of T. H. i?narshalI (1450), ran mughly as foUows. Citizenship has three aspects, namely, that citizens have a say in political dtejsionmaking; access to courts of law that are manned by cocitizens who judge accorcling to mtes that equally appfiv to all citizens; and a p a r m t e e of existel~ce.Citizenship is a m&of minimum socioeconomic co~~ditjons ter of emancipation, of successiveIy realizing these h e avects of political, legat. and socicreconomic participation for all people who find them-

14

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

selws on the territory of the state. Given tbis vision, citizmship ceased to be practically and theoretically. interesting once it had been acquired by almost everyone, because it had lost its distinguishing qualities. Further development of the three cmstiSutive aspects of citizenship-the political, the legal, and the socioeconomic-took place under the headhgs of "'democrracyfrthe "rule of Iaw," and "the welfare state," These principles we= a p p l k h o t only within the sphere of the natim-state but also b e p n d itfor instmce in firms and transndionnl arrangemernts-with the goal of acfnievirrg justice for all human beings. Gradually, as the concept of cjtiznship became so all-encompassing, it lost virhaly all sipificance. This situation began to change tokvard the end of the 1970s. Rttlers started speaking of democracy, f i e courts, and the welfare systems as overloaded by the demands of citiaens. Firms began dmanding freedom from the yoke of bureaucracy SO as to cmcentrate once again on their mission of making a profit, The idea that the liberal-democrratie welfare state had burst out of its supporting strucmes soon was a cclmmmplace. But how could it be bmught back wi8hin managede limits? tnstitdions and consensus bad been based on assumptions of contjnuing economjc g r w t h and a paratlel increase in rights and social protection. W u l d it help if individud citize~nsbehaved diferenay? Not as me= holders of rights and receivers of cam, but as respankble hdkiduals who chose from among various options in the m a r k e t p l " ~a d then accepted the consequences of those choices; or as mutudly connected people who gave each other a helping hand; or as proud members of a public community, for the. sake of which they were prepared to make sacrifices? These three different theoretical concepli.ons of citizer~ship-the liberal-individualist, the communitarian, and the republican-wero further elaborated in confrontation with one another. :lnstcad of Wow do you get it? the question of citizenship had become M a t is it? Competition between the different schoolis of thought for the "best" notion of citizenship brmght an enrichment and sharpening of insights. Notwithstanding their differences, however, all were based on the assumptio~nthat there can be such a thing as a single conception of citizenship that is most fitting and most ~ assrtmption ceased to be selfjust in all circumstances. By the 3 9 9 0 ~this evident because the political context within which eitizelnship was supposed to do its work had chmged considerably. At present, after long periods of stagnation or stabiiity political relations m d alig~nmentswithh states are again in flux. 'The nation-state itself is no longer the self-evident center of the exercise of power and the creation of order. The contours of nation-states have become blurred in an international system Chat is mul*olar and is unpredicthly changing. Steerhg by national governments on the basis of data concerning their societies has become ir7creasingly mreliable. It is now clear to everyone

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D f 5

ot control national societies. The free movements of people, goods, and money across fro~ztiersare too nulnerous and too massive, h this context, citizenship has become plural-it is no IImger exceptional that one person be a citizen of several different co for example, the European Union, Turkey; and Amsterdam. There is a phrality also of appropriate conceptions of citizenship-one being preferred in m e sihtation, and tl-te other elsewhere-as the primary purpose of notions of citizezzship is no lo~zgerto make people more equal but: to enable them to organize pturality (inother words, to cope peacefully with bothersome or surprising differences between themselves and others wi& whom they carnot avoid dealjng), The themes of debates about citizenship bave shifted as well: More attentim now is focused on situatimal judgment tRan on the essentials of citizenhip, and the old emphasjs on rights is now accompanied by an emphasis m institutional dutks, concerns, m d loyalties, In other words, the p~iz-ttof d e p a r t w for malysis is no longer uniey but the multiple identities of minorities who have a responsibility to live together as citizens in one republic. The authoritative representation of ""fct" by scicntifically ordered data and of "wiIlr' by constitutionally anchortrld democracy has been overtaken by a diversity of media that present only the aspects of social reality that t h y can profit by portraying. Increasjng attenl-ion is being paid to local and situation& factors. This is rc.mark&le in a world that is becoming more and more internation& and unified. Codd it be that precisely because more and more people now palpably experiMlce the unity of the world, the value of local and bodily proximity and uniqueness are at: last receiving due recognitio~zin the theory and practice of politics? A key question is whether this acknowledgment of the importmce of the local will be e x p ~ s s e din terms of a naticmaiity, race, religion, or another exchsive principle for grouping people, or aiternativel~~ in more indusive terms of c o m m citizenship. Rut Mthy prefer citizenship? For an answer, let us return to the 19Ws and to the question of why, prclciseiy at that t h e , critizenship rose high on the politiral agenda. This was a period of individualization, or more predsely, of Mierarchization, h-t a hierarchy, everything m d everyone has a proper Durhg the 1 9 8 0 ~ hier~ position, which is stably related to o ~ e positions, r archies became disestnbljshed not only in the irnaginatim, as in the 1960s, but also in tbeir actual ordering and disciplining capacitks. h-tdividuals increasingly lost their fixed positions within hierarchical political orders. Many became disinterested fatati.sts or calculating individuals who turned to politics and heeded its requirements and laws m3y when it paid them to do so. Others vested their pr.imary public commitment in religious sects, idealistic movements, or interest groups. .AX"choughU?ose reactions are quite differcmt, the one fmusirrg on the individual and the other on volmtary

f6

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

group" nwer-thekss both have tunled their backs cm the cmmbling hierarchy of politics. For &em, politics has lost its prinnacy as a prhzcipk of ordet As a consequence, political authorities who try to reestnbfish a hierarchical order by appedinir; to moraliv, commmity, thc.nation, and remwed discipline meet with very limited success. M m y addressees sintply do not listen; and among those who do, quite a few experience s w h a p p e a l ~ a s empty rhetoric rekrrhg to an order that no h g e r exists. Painting that order hz harmo~ziouscolors doesn't make it less of a lie. Given the glaring inadequacy of those reactions to dehierarchization, the attractiveness of citizenship as an ordering principle increases. It accepts both the reatity and value of individualization and thc necessity of cohesion by takhg the individual citizen as the parmount principle of public order. horn &is starting point, other institutions in the hkrarcky can be salvaged and connections with kterest grottps, sects, and caXeuIating or disinterested individuals can be recmstituted, This book develops &is theme of the voice of the citizen in hierarchies. The citizm is the axis from whieh cohcshn and colnrnunity can form and he refomed. Hierarchy is no h g e r gken, nor can it be centrally pmdu.ced. Citizens themselves must act so as to produce it. Formerly individuals were more firmly elnbedded in the totdity of tradition or of disdpljning system that we= handled by experts, Now, without any given totdity, they have to rely m m on each other. The awareness that such is indeed our precarious hut exhilarathg situation is beghnhg to dawn on both rulers and ruled. This, however, is but one side of the picture, The other is that just as with hierarchy citizenship itself is not given, It is no deus ex macbina, cornkg out of the blue to save the repdlic. CiC-izenshipis its& a public institution that needs not d y persona1 enthusiasm but aiso other institutions in orcler to functicm, This instituf;ionalsupport for citizemhip wilt be givcn due attention in the chapters that folow. There is a danger in such a focus, bowever. Studies and polkies that pay ample attention to supporting instituf;ictnsand p~cmditionshave tended to make active citizenship djsappear from view by treathg it as a depe~zdentvariable. This book stresses the crzlcial independent role of citizenship in the trmsformation oE political ~ g j m e sBut . it conceives of active citizenship as an instituf;ion that can only work as part of a netbvork of institutions. What has ehanged over the past twenty years or so is the place of citkenshiy in such networks, which has become more central m d decisive thm it used to be.

Liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism, the thrce varieties of citizenship themy that have been most pmminrnt in =cent decades, have

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D f 17"

been amply analyzed in professional journals and books. Their strc-mgths and waknesses therefore will be recailed only briefly hercl. We need this background sketch in order to show that since 1989, their strengths have become less relevmt and their weahesses more sf a drawback, The new politieai and social realities have m d e the older theories of citizenship absolete, because the kind of social order that they presuppose no longer obtahs. Political and social realities have o u t g o m the framework were entbedded, within wl.ricfi these three trheories of citize~~ship In liberal-individual.isttheories, the citizen is represented as a calculating holder of prtrkrences m d rights. The utilitarian variant of such theories is based on the axiom that h~dividualsm a x h k e their own bewfit: 'That is, they calrulate what choice of action will render the highest product of the value attriZllutcld to the desired situation multiplied by &e probability &at &is situatio~~ will w m (C = V x 8 oar choice is equal to value times probabjlity), En the "individual, rights" variant of liberal-individualist theories, choice is defined by cikens' calculations of their own rights within the l h its of their rclspect for the rights of oChers. To the individml, Ehis &nnc.f-ureof rights is given, The n&ts U?emselves may or may not be dcriwd from ut41itarim cmsiderations by the lawn-taker. It is important to note that both variants accept individuaXs, with their rights, ophions, and choices, as ghms, m d that both variants explaFn m d justify politics in terms of nonpolitical givens. Citizenship and other pcriiticaf institutions arc. means &at are accepted only conditionally-&at is, as long as theyr in &e hdividttalls calculations, foster the maximization of private benefit. There am two main prabkrns with such a view of citizmship. First, h w c m hdividuals be prevented from destroybg each other m d from destroying the basis of their muh;lafiy beneficial irtteraction? The war of all against all, the "tragedy of the comxnons,'%e receivers of unemploymmt bmefit?; wh.o secreay work-Ehese all illustrate the same prohlem. The problem is individualism; it is not that people are evil or malevolent. People also can desboy each other thrcrugk friendliness. For examy>le, hnagirme a burn* &eater with a single exit, and everybody saying, ""After you." The second probfem has to do with the ways in which individuals and their ideas are hrmed. The insights and parekrences sf autcmornous indivi,duals nnight originate b n ? "impurrz" processes: The informtion they were provided might be biased or meaningless, or their preferences might hiwe arisen from a fit of anger. Should individual ideas and preferences be accepted as sacrosanct even if it is clear that the holders of these pxleferesnces wodd have rejected them, had they realized how they came about? And isn't the conceptual ideal of a fully autoncrmous individual whose preferences and insights arc immme h m conti;,nge~~t out.side circumstances internally inconsistent? After all, individuals who =main discomected from ail cmtingmcies art? nathirtg. They cannot, in fact, have

f8

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

any preferences at all (except by chance, on MIhich they are forbidden to depencf).Yet, is not the ideal ol an individual's being entidy determined by contingent ci~umstancessimilarly inconsislent? Such a persm is not an individual, but a plaything of whatever happens. These problem WE not so urgel~tas long as individuals still behavecf '"respons&lyu-as long as they went to the polls and dld not vote for antidemocratic parties, or as long as they refrained from collect* health or dis&ility insurmce payments when they were not truly ill or hcapacitated. Those days, however, are over. Many people no longer go to the g o b , a d antidemocratic parties obtain votes. People work without paying taxes. They pretend to be ill or unemployed, and cdect he~ncfjts W e continuing to earn money m the side. They dodge efforts to distirtguish welfare chraters from ""rghthl'" claimants by hiding behind protections of privacy, The remedies that have been suggested for these prohlms have not provtn effective-at least, not as long as they werc. ccmceived within the framewnrk of liberal-individualist theories oE citizensW. i\rll hnve centered aromd. the cukures that support democracy The viability of democracies, it is said, depends u p m such matters as civic-mindedness, rclligion, education in democrati.~rules, or the development of a public morality. I f citizens completely lack these attributes, demncracy cannot exist. However, if these attributes art- embraced too intenselyI democracy might also be destroyed. In the Hrst case, democracy would perish fmm egoism; in the latter, lrom fanaticism. The challmge is to avoid those extremes and maintain a happy medium. Ilowever, even if true, these insights cannot constihte a re~nedyfor the problems of individ,u,alisticcitizenship. It is important to see -whyl Civic-mindedness will hardly develop t h u g h individuafistic people urging each other on.Civic-ntindedness, Legitimacy, and prablic support arise as by-products of other activities and evmts. We prevent their coming about precisely by dirc.cting our will, intention, or manir>ulationtoward them. 'The will is contrary to the nature of the desired result, as is the case with the wish to fall asleep or the desire to be spontaneous. De TocqueviIle showed how strictcless in religion kept individuals in Americm democracy cvithin reasonable limits of freedom. Sharing his illsight that rel.igion and democracy counterbalance each other, however, makes little practical difference. A nonbeliewer c at be converted on the grom~dsthat his cmver would be conducive to democratic peace beot kcome a true believer through calculation. trmieen individuals,Che Dahl(2956) claimed that. consmsus cm basic norms is wcessary in order to make a dcrnocracy wnrk. Such consensus needs to he reproduced through education. But in a sociey of calculating individualists and lacking such a consensus, who will educate the educators? Education is no

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D f 9

remdy, if qualified educators who share Dahl's basic consensus camot be fou~zd. An appeal to public morality also will not help, in a sociev of pure indiviciualists. The development of such a morality will clmtinw to stagnate as long as we try to deduce it fsom a variety of private moratities (Van Gunsteren 1991), for t m masons. Firstly, when private moralities conflict, which one should publicly prevail? Or should we make (30 with the overlapping consensus between them, even when this consensus Rmah~ssilent about the real and mavoidable ethical choices that holders of public office have to make? Secondly, holders of puhlic office may (be obliged to) do things (for instmce, use force) that persnns in their private capacity arc forbidden to do, or that are not allowed by m y of the prevaaing privatre moralities. It is precisely to keep such actions completely out of the private sphere that they ,?re entrusted to pllblic offices and regulated by public ]laws and adversarial procedures. The mles and moral req u i ~ m e n t sassociated with exclusively public actions cannot: be deriived from exclusively private mnraljties-at least, not directly. These efforts to circumvent the weahesses of liberal-;indivicS.uajistthemies of citizenship cannot succeed. the one hand, rational calculation provides insufficient motivation to accept: the proposed repairs. The rational hsight that it is better to be a believer doesn? make one so, Un the other hand, an acceptance of the given historical fact of belsngjng to a moral or religious community; or an. achowledg~aentof the nonderivative character of public morality, constitutes an exact dcnial of the individudisk nonhistorical, and nofipditical premises of liberai-indkiduaiist theorics, 'This does not repair their weaknesses but simply contradicts their core convictisns, Such denials are Infact varieties of commtlnitarian or republicm theories of citizenslzip. Cornunitarian theories of citizenship st:mngXy emphasize the fact that being a citizen involves belonging to a historically develrzped, communit.y. W~ateverindividuality the citizen has is derived from and circumscribed by the community- In this vision, the citizen acts responsibly when he stays within the limits of what is acceptable to the community. Loyalty and eciucatim in loyalty enable both the community and its indivicJual members to aot~rish. There is much to be said for this conception, Firstly, it avoids the problems of liberal-individualist citizenslzip that werc. pointed out earlier. Individuals are formed by the community, By sticking to the a c q u i ~ dcodes of conduct, they will ensure the cmtirrued existence of the community and avoid mrrtuai destruction. They simply repeat the successful formula that enabled the c m u n i t y to origi.nate and survive..Devial.ion fmm the code is rclgarded as corruptlion m d must be ~ s i s t d.A. community in decline can be saved by fighting cormption and returning to its origins, its

20

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

beginnings. In this way, authority and the successhl formula may be restored. A second reason fnr advocating communitarian theories of citizenship lies in the insight that identity- and stabitity oE character cannot be realized without the support oE a cornunity of friends and peers. A persorl with a strong character is steadfast in changing circumstances m d is not easily knocked o f fbdance. For most of us, however, such constancy dep e ~ ~ upon d s the continued existe~~ce of, and our melnbership in, a community of friends who more or less thixrk and act as we do and who share our ways of life Time m d again, research and historical experimce have shown fiat people s p t m t i c a l l y underestimate this dcpendmcc (Nussbaum 19%; Douglas 1.987; Sandei 1982; Milgram 1974). lndlvidual autonomy and irrdependent judgment are not what they appear to be. They are depende~ltu p m t-he s m e commmity against which they m y be in revolt, This dependence &en m a i n s bidden behind a naive self-image. h~dkiduaiistswho have lost such naivety and who achowledge this drpaldencc Will cheris and seek to majntain the commmzity that- preserves their individuaiiv. However, they often fail in this because to them, the community is a rwans. This fact contradicts the alleged essence of a community: its existence as a ""natural" and valuable context of action. and judgmnt, a context that is valued Cor its own sake. A communiv that is merely a means is not a community. The foregohg already has touched upon objections to communitarim theories of citizenship. The first objection is that insight does not lead to change but rather prevents it: Seeing that belonging "naturally" to a givcn commu~~ity is vital far citizenship does not help hvhen such a community is not available. What is "natural" is simply there or not there; it cannot be fabricated. h modem societies, commrmities c for granted and for that reason, ,?re seldom "natural." There is a plurality of communities and of hdkidual codinations of memberships. In such a society, the ccmscirtus creation and cultivation of a community that can be taken for granted is an internally colltradictory xtivity A second objection to the comunitarian perspective is less concerned with how realistic it is than with how desirable it is, Communities are notorious for imposing restrictjons on fseedom. Emancipation often has been achieved thrmgh liberation from the compellislg and,unfalr ties of a community. The emphasis on "right thinkingff"hiclh easily emerges in cornunities that cultivate their own existence, is petrieing. The modem state is supposed to pmtect its citizens against such dangers, It limits and regrllates the reach of communities and protects indiwjduals against them. Given this task, communitarim policies of state governments are? suspect for more than one reason: Not only are such policies likely to violate the state's neutraiity as to the variety of communities-existhg or

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D 2 1 emerging, tightly integrated or tome, ~ r i g i o u sor territorial-but by embrackg the communitarian perspective, the state also risks negleding its function of protecting citizens against the stranglehold of communi.ties. The insight that individuaiity, autonomy, and judgment cannot exist without a common basis does not necessarily entail acceptance of the communitarian perspective. Communities are both idispensable and dangerous. The state should not be identified with the communities it rclgdates. The state allows room for the exjste17ce and creation of c o m u ni.ties and tempers their excesses, Yet what is it that enables the state to do so? m a t communaiity offers the conterct for doing this? One answer is: the public cornmw~ity;the republk. Regubljcan theories of citizenship can thus be seen as a particular variety of communitarian thinking. They place a single community, the public cornunity at the center of pditical life, Courage, devotion, mititasy discipline, and statesmanship are the mpubljcan virtues, Individuality can appear, and individuals can mark thefr place in history by serving the public cornunity This is \zrhere individuds find lulfihent and fpossiblqi) public happiness (for the use of this term, see Arendt 1965:124). Tl~eobjections against the classical ~puhticanconception of citizenship are obvious. In po)iticsl mili,tary virtue is dangerous stuff that is better kept at a distance. This conception does not pay enough attention to economics and trade, nor to the soAer aspects and f u l f i l h a t s of private life. Republican virtues are unilaterally masculine. 'The republican perspective makes one communit)l absolute and shows too little appreciation for the characteristic values and diversity of other communities. Classical republicanism clearly is too far out of step wi& the times to qual.ify as a compass for contemporary citizens, It may amuse curiosiq or admiration, hut it lacks practicai bite. It does not necessarily follow, however, that classical rcpubIicanism is to be re~ectedout of hand. It can serve as an inspiration for ongoing efforts, such as that by Philip Pettit (1997), to rethink and =build the republican idea as an alternative to currently popular forms of Ijberaijsxn, communitaria,nism, and popu,lisrn. This boak is part of that movement. Further on, 1present a thoroughly revised version of republicanism that promises to do better as a guiding value in the ongoing reconstructions of democracies.

OLD T m O

F4

SWETY

The three theories of citizenship-liberal, communitarian, and republican-are unsatisfactory and offer too little guidance. This is so because the societal condilcions they presuppose no longer &lain and cannot be restored simply by insisting on the value of those t-heories,Social ~ l a t i o n -

22

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

ships and processes largely develop beycmd the framewlrrks of social reality presupposed by the older perspeclives, The theories no longer match today % ssoiety. Contemporary society is not a "civil society'kf autmomous individuals. Complex orga,nizations and accmulatiorns of capital to a large exlem.t. determixle the course of events. :IndividuaXs, especially those at the top, are usually not heroes, but well-disciplined managers, trained through therapy or other means to t?ct like dults, gujded by a well-understood intertwining of pemmal gain and the benefit of the organization or department they work for, tnstead of friendships, they have networks of relationships,. In this society of organizations we find m overwhelming variety of ""cmmunities," some of which remah in existence longer than others. Beside the f m i j a r commmities of natiornaiity, religion, and business and labor, we now fa'rrd a host of less familiar and less established ties that often play m important: role in the lives of indiviciuals but that we camot easily call communities, In this societyfgovernment bodies, too, have lost their established places. The national state has becom but one center of aut)-torityarnidst a shifthg field containhg many others, The proliferaC.iorn of communities and governing bodies in the society of organj.zatimshas its consequences, A first consequence is that political m d social identities have become less stable and more varied. Il~dividuals-the substrata of citizerns-are bouquets. They compose their owin mixed identities out of various connections and bands. These hdividuals are not the nabral bearers of civic-mirtdehess and civic virtue, nor are they nat.urally inclined (hnwever often this may be elaimcd) to calculate a1.l action h terms of their own wealth and.pwer. :Modern indjviduals' preferences, p e ~ e p t i m s ,and ways of 'kcaleulating"" vary alld are no longer directly and compellingly derived .from the established ties of work, family, and the state. The articulation m d aggregation of the supposed wishes and needs of citizens by establishrd intermediary organizations that fit these traditjonal bonds ofte2.1fail to represent the indjviduality the self-composed bouytlet, of today" citizen. A second implication of the proliferation of gave ents and communities is the disappearance of a relatively homoge~neousmiddle class, previously considered the backbme of a stable republic of citizens. This class consisted of those not rich enough to buy the support of others and not poor e~noughto have to sell their vote, of thase who had a vested hterest in the continued existence of a republican orber, Until recently this class was made up of paid employees and independent businessmen, and the members of ErausefnoXds that lived on their incomes. hdividualization has dissolved the unity of those households. With the rise of postmodern lgestyles and posthdustrial production processes a d organizations, the

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D 23

d d rniddle class is a dwindlhg minority- that is rapidly losing its attractiveness to new recruits. A third consewmce of the develoyments described above concerns g o v e m n t steering. Public plaming today is even more difficult than it used to be. Fmm the point of view of those governing it, society is becoming less well known, The categories in which soda1 realities are represented (by nurnbers and diagrams) arc. gradually losing their efficacy as descriptors of h c ~ a s i n g l ycomplex sodal actualities m d processes. They do provide snapshots, but these pictures often divert decisionmakers from the right track. The insight that rulers need new categories and coordinates seems to be widespread, Yet when they have to specify what those categories slnollld be, rulers are tongue-tied or can only talk at cross purpaxs, and thus, fail to reach a new consmsus, They struggle on with the old categories and coordinates and find their bearings as best as they can, wi'thout conviction or commitment, with all kinds of ""pictures" retouched ad hoc. This, surely cannot seriousiy be described as planning. Such steering is rather to be characterized as "thriving on chaos" peters 1988). Contemporary society, which from the point of view of its governors is insufficiently h o w n , may rightly be called Tl~eUnknown Society In this contemporary society, matters are determhed neither by established c a m u n i t i e s nor by pmdictably calculating individuals, nor by militarily virbous servants of tbe republic alone. All these are present, but they play a variable role m i d s t a hanging range of other actors. None of the three theories of citizenship that were discussed earlier fits with contempclray society as (far as)we kncrw it. The kinds of motivations and social, relations these theories presuppose do not obtain. n o s e who cherish those theories thus arc tempted to reverse this d i c t m and say that society does m t fit with what they value, with their theory, and should therefore be changed. By moralization, by selective interpretatior~ (excludjng what does not fit their basic assumptions), and by social engineeri-, they will try to reform society in such a way that citizenhip, such as they collceive of and value it, will fiourjsh. Fmm a moral point ol view, such a practice is questionable. It takes the voices of citizens seriously only when they say the right Zhings. When they "misbehave," they are to be br0ugh.t. into line through education alld conditioning. Apart from being questionable on moral grounds, a policy that is almed at changing society in order to =establish the social conditions of earlier times atso is not viable. Efforts to radjcally turn the tide of the postmodem developmnts that form the air and water inwhiclh contemporary citizens live simply cannot: succeed. None of the three conceptions of citizernship can be realized in contemporary society. Shall we then disrniss citizenship as an outdated and unattahable ideal? Must we then engage in cmstitutimal politics tryithout cit-

24

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

izenship as a dynamic principle? Such a conclusitm would be premame. It is true that n m e of the three conceptions can be realized; but we can use some of their elments to fabricale a theory of citizenship that makes sense in our t h e . Call it fabrication, synthesis or bricolage-we have to work with what is at hand, with the inslitutions and ways of Ihinking and acting that have evolved. My conception of neorepublicm citizenship is the product of this bricolage. This conwption does not require that we change social realities before it can begin to work its changes. It accepts the facts of cmtemporaq plurality and of the i_nsufficientlyunderstood but nevertheless verative social malities that we have labeled The Unknocvn Society. It conceives of working ir7 and 811 those =&ties-of the organization of pturality-as the primary task of cmtemporary citizns,

NEOREPUBLICAN CITIZENSHIP

'The neorepubliean cmception of citizenship includes elelnel~tsof cornmunitarian, republican, and liberal-individualist thjnking. First, let us consider a few cornmunitarim elements: The citizen is a , rcpzlblic. For the citizen this c o m u mennber oE a pzlblic c o m w ~ i t ythe nity occupies a central position. k'et from the point of view of the individual-the person who m o n g other thhgs, is a citizen-this cclmmunity is but one amang many; albeit a cornmm~itywith a special position. In that respect, it is similar to the National Bank in The Nethrlands, which is a bank among others but has a special position and task-tl-tat of guarding the structw that elnables all other banks to properly carry nut their activities. By analogy, the task of the public communiw is to guard. the structure that enables other communities to develop and tcr expand their activities. A core task of the repuhlic is tht. organjzation of pluraiiity, not oniy nl individuals but also of cornmunitics. The hallmark of the republic resides in the way it interferes with other commrmities. Altl-rough for practical rclasons such interfernme may be directly effectuated, in the first and last: instance it is mediated and legitimized by citizms, The republic c ~ a t e s and protects the freedarn of i n d i v i d d s to form ccrmn-tunities, to join them, and to exit from them. The neorepublican theory of citizenship also cmtahs republican elements. It knows virtues, but they are not the traditional military ones. 'They concen more peaceful public service througt-t debate, reasonableness, tolerance of plurality and carefu.lly limited use of violence. The term. virtue hnplies that. mom is needed than simply abiding by the mles. It is a matter of sensibly, competently, and responsibly dealing with authority, and with situations and positions of dependence, These functions cannot be exhaustiwely laid down in rules. Individual competence also is essen-

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D 25

tial for the exercise of citizenship. A chairman who does not break the rules but is otherwise incompetent in presid,ing over and gtliding a meeting can be a disaster. The emphasis on cmpetence should not be exaggmated. Virtue stands not only for competa~ce,but also for an ethic of civility, of decent behavior. Neorepublicanism achowledges m autonomous ethic of the public domain that is not p u w v derhed from prhate ethics or opinions, but is rooted in the public d o m i n itself. Because indjviduals in Cheir functions as citizens are of central importance in the public domain, such private ethics and opinions lio play a rote, but never m m than a mediating, fndirclct one. Citizens' ccontributions are ntorc-.than the mere sum, of the opinions and desjres they have as private hbividuals. What is the position of the individual in the neorepuhlican tbecny of citizernshipXiti,zenshipis coneeivccf of as an office in the public contmunity This mems that a citizen is not to be identified with the so-called ordinary person, nor with the entire person. It also means that there am conditions for admission to the practice of citizenship. 'The republic should not only facilitate access but also formulate and maintain those conditions. It does not merely wait for individuafs to present themselves spontmeously as citizens but also promotes the development of people into independent and competent citizens. Ind.ividuals are not naturally given; they are socially fomed. The? =public does not simply leave the ""reproduction""of dtizens to existing communities, but verjfies hlrhether the social education &red by those cornunities actually aIlows for admission to citizenship. Lliherl, this is not the case, or where people La& the formtive support of the cornmzlnily, the govcr Tn the republic, citizenship is the primary office: Office holders are primarily citizens hold an office as part of their exercise. of citizenship. 'They may, at times, do things, or have things done, that "~~ormd'kitizens am not entitled to, Yet, the existence of these special powers should not support the misunderstanding that such holders of offices cease to be citizens as soon as they accept: or fu1filS their office. Precisely becarnse thcse offices are so susceptible to abuse, we want them to be held by, and undcr the supervision of, our ccrcitizens. The task of reproducing citizens is at issue in every government action. W can mort. systmaticatly explain the elemnts of neorepublican citizenship by referclme to three ccmcepts: the publir: realm, organizing pltcmlify#and uctim. The term "republican" situates citizenshiy s ~ a r e X yin the public realm. It is a matter of public institutions and puhlk ethics. Citizenship is cmceived of as an office, an institution, in t-he republic. Every citizen has a right to exercise this office, m d when doing so, his authority is no different from that of other citizens. They are e p d in their political standfng

26

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

and say Politicai equality is a requirement of citizenship. Social equality-that is, the clintination of differences ol standing and power in the social sphere-is not myuired. However, citizmship in a republic does demand that inequal social ~laticmsnot be ailowed to prevent any indivi,dual from having aso on able chances of access to political equaliiry. 1 have used the term. "neorepublican"' to signify that unlike older republican ccmvictions, this type of citizenship demands m overarching or total claims of allegiance to the repuhlic. Neorepublicanjsm acknowledges that individuals may have deep differences and deep foyalties to other communities. It does not require that people aiways put loyalty to the =public above those other loyalties. But it does require that in situations where peopk have to deal with their differences, they do so as citizen+that is, in such a way that access to a position of political equality rclmains a real option for all persons involved. This brjngs us to the organization of plural it^ the second set of elements that characterize neorepublican citizctnship. lib organize ptaralify is the primary task o.f neorepubl.icm citizens; being able to do this competently is their primary virhe. PltlraliQ here refers to diffe~ncesamong people who share a community of fate. 'These differences may be of vasious kjnds-pleasantly sul-prising and exciting, annoying or outright threatening, disturbing and incompmhensible; personal, cuitufal, or phgisical. The point is that people are. so situated with rclgard to each other that lhey cannot avoid dealing with their diffe~nces. (Ignorirtg or avoiding them, then, is to choose one particullar way of dealing wiLh djfferences; and it is interprt-ted as a choice for Mthich citizens can be called to account.) When individuals are so situated that they cmnot avoid bumping into each other without giving up their ways of life and work, when they have to deal somehow with their differences, we speak of a "'community of fate." A c o m u n i t y of fate is a (jjven, in the sense that people find themselves involved in it without much forethought or choice, and the sense that they cannot extricate &emselves .from it without pay jng a heavy price. However, what indjviduals do with this given, bow they interpret m d transfom it, is tl-teir choice and responsibility. 'I'hey can kill the distuibhg other, or put him in a concmtration camp. They can exploit or humiliate, go into hiding or flee. They can join. h religious ecstasy or charitable activities, love or comgassion, What citizens are reqltired tu eto with a c o m u n i t y of fate in whieh they fincf themselves is quite special: They must interpret and trmsform given rclations betwem people in such a way that firstly, such relations are worthy to be chosen (willed) by ail those involved, and secmdly, so that each individ-trd acquires a position of political equatity from Which his actual voice can be raised and his choice be revealed. The duty of citkens is to

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D 2'7

transform a community of fate into a rt.pu2llic that can be wilied by all who are hvolved as citizens. Tn ordcr to achieve this, people need competence, a rcpertoil-c of moves m d skills, Goodwill and a consensus on norms and values, which have a central place in many discourses on "feelings"kf cit-izensfiip, are not enough. They are neither a necessiar)i nor a sufficimt conbition for trms-. forming a community of fate into a republic of citizens. Of course, tolerance and respect-.l-he wish not to humiliate and not to be humiliatedare important; but without competence-the abifity, inventiveness, and good judgment-to actually organize differences, they come to naught. 'The cmpetence of citizens is never a purely individual matter, because the matchislg of competences among all those involved is important, Obviously, it is pmfcrable that all U.S. citizens ccmlmunicate in broken English lhan that they speak their own individual mother tongues perfecly :It takes two to tango, Citizen competence also does not imply individual perfection: All that is required is the willingness and human ability to begin, changing give11 relations between people-a colnmunity of fat the direction of citizenship for alll. What is mquired is that citizens act so as to (relproduce citizenship. 'This brinl;s us tcr the third set of elements that characterize neorepublican citizenship. Citizenship is crated and recreated by citjzens in ncfion. While many theories bcus m the cortditicms and limits of citizensfip, neorepublicanism concent-ratesor1 the actual situded excrcise of ktizenship. C)I: course, conditions are important, but they are not constitutive of citizenship: The existence of the right cmditions does not guarantee the successhl exercise of citizenship; nor does their absence prtlvent citizerns fsom acting in exesnplary farshion, as did some Dutch citizens mder the surely imperfect conditions of German occupatim dufing World War El. The most important condition of citizenship, one could say, is its actual exercise. As with competence, here also, elitist perfection is out of the question, What counts is that in the actual situation in which they find themselves, in which eonditiorzs are never ideal, imperfect citizens get goi,ng on the road toward citiznship fm all in the republic by dealislg with their real differences. M a t comts most, then, is not the arrival at a final destination, but movement, and the direction in w:hich it takes place. M a t is clecisive is whether people act in such a way as to create m d foster citizenship. All public action, undertaken in whatever special public office in the republic, may be evalmted drom this point of view N'eorepublicanism thus presents a conception of citizenship that is narrower thm most others-h that its god is political equality-but that is nonetheless applied m r e widcly--that: is, to all puhlic acmities. C)lzt.side the public sphercz, neorepublicanism is more hesitmt to intervcme than are many other conrep-

28

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

tions. It calls for interference only when pri\late relatiom are such as to prevent reasonable access to citizenship. fn the neorepublican viewr social cmsensus is not a condition for successful citizen activity, Plurality, a lack of consensus, is the characterisitic in m d on which citizens have to work. When they are s~~cczessful situatio~~ in osgaslizjng their differences, the result may be called cmsensus, Consensus is the outcome that their action is aimed at, It does not make sense to make consalsus a condition trhat must be met before persons can begh to act as citizens. Putting consensus before citizen action is putting the cart before the horse. The same Iogic applies to fsecdom: Full f r e d m is not a cor~ditiw~ for citizen action. Citizen actim, rather, cmcems people who are on the road scrmewhercl.betcuem slavery and f ~ e d o mM . e n they move in the right di~ c t i o nWhen , they a d h s s actual probiem of unfrcedom, freedom may appear intheir actinrrs as a kind of by-product. Freebonz is not a possession or a condi.tion, but rather, a quality of action that may rclveal itself in the daing. When citizcns act repeatedly with some measarc3 of success in transfoming disruptive differences into livable relations, their actims may generate, reinforce, or trmsform a public cul.turc.-that is, a =pertoire of established ways of dealkg wilh conflicts, both actual and potential, and a shared definition of acceptable results. Ultimately acceptability has to be eviltuated from the standpoint of justice. Ilowewer, in imperfect situations, imperfect citizens have to he content with, or to make do with, less than full justice; with avoiding violence and humiliation; with small steps in the direction of citizenship for all. The web of relations that results from ~ p e a t e dcitizen action and that we call poljtical culturc is a highly desirable by-pmduct oi citizen action. When it fa& to materialize, citizen action will wither. A suyportive political culture is like oxygen fnr cictizens; but it is oxygal that they Eke plants, produce throltgh their own activities. Such a political cdture cannot be fabricated through moralizing or social engineering. It can only be fvstemd and cherisf-red after it is established, and it can d y be furthered by using its hstitutions and convictions to deal with actual differences among citizens. Such art. the main b e n t s of nempublican citizenship, Mthich I have worked nut and put to the test in the rcrnaindcr of this book. Of course, this notion is not entirely new. It b d d s m earlier theories of citizenship: on Aristotle's idea of ruling and being ruled, on Rousseau's ideal of the citizelz who obeys no one but hhsell, on T. H. Marshall's cmceptualization of the political, juridical, and sorrioecononnic aspects of citizenship, and cm Benjamin Barber's visbn of politics itself as the activity of treat% whatever c o m o n standards of justice we hnve. Indirectly, the theory of neorepublican citizenship dso draws m the work of k n d t , Douglas, Habermas, Foucault, and Wittgenstein. It fol-

Theories of Citizenship, Old and Rew D 29 lows Hannah Arendt in her notions of power (as arising out of acting together) and acting (as beginning something new and as showing who you are in a web of relations), as well as in her insistence that politics should not be centered around work and social life. Hawever, 1 do not agree with Arendt that politics should be restricted to the public realm and its concerns, Although the public r e a h is the natural home of politics, I believe that politicians and citizens should move into other spheres of life in order to secwe a reasol~ablepossibility of access to poli.lrics for all citizens, views echo those of Mary Uouglati in her insistence an the hnportancc of institzlt.ions. mi;nking, perception, and valuation, as Douglas has shown, are shot through with institutionally defhed notions of right social relations. This holds true for those like us, in liberal cultures, who have been taught to believe m d act ""independently'hs individuals. Like other varieties of cctlture, individualism is a culture dependent m supportive institutions. 'These imtitutions have been the more successful if: they have induced us to perceive il~dividuai,autonomy as something '"natural" and. to forget our dependence on them. Upon reflection, however, we realize that citizenship is not a natural attribute of individuafs that we call a republic. The vokc of: but m office in the set of institutio~~s the citizen needs an order of hstitutiosrs, a hiesaschy, both to sound and to have effect. JGrge2.1Habermas, to me, is a s h h h g example of what it takes to hold onto the ideals of the Enlightenment and the FrencIn revolution at a time when harsh diffe~ncesand postmodernism have made them questionable. He does not presuppose rationality as a End of axiom, nor does fie give up on it, Rationality, for him., is "in the makng," ssonnething both found and created by participants irr social and political pmcesses, rather than guaranteed by hi"ory, as in Hegel. Mirhel. Foucault has played an important part in undermining the once self-evidclnt Ex~ligl~te ent truths, but he is closer to Habermas than one might think, In an interview the year he died, he said: "'I ant interested in *at Habermas is doing. 1know that he does not agrcje cvith what X say:I an-t a little more in agreement with him-but there is always something which causes me a proble~x.,. . . The problem is not of tryhg to dissolve them [relationsof power] in the utopia of a perfectly transparent cornmurricaticm, but to give m ' s selE the d e s of law, the techniques of management, and also the ethics, the ellhas, the practice of self, which would dlow these g m e s oi power to be played with a mixlimum of domixlation" (Foucault 1988:18). Late in life, Foucault added to his earlier studies af truth-games, discipline, and power relations a gel~uineinterest in the practices of freedom. This is worked out in interviews and in volu~les2 and 3 of his Histoire de fa sextwlitk. At t-he beginning of the interview al-

30

Theories af Citizenship, Old and Rew

ready qucrted, he said: "Liberation opens up new relatiomhips cJf power, which have to be controlled by practices of liberty- . . . Yes, fnr wh& is morirIit4; if not the pmtice of liberty, the dehbemte practice of liberty?" (Fwcault 4988:4) This study's focus on competence im the organization of pluxaliq continues that Line of th-irnking. My emphasjs on the actual exercise of citiznship rather thm on its pseconditions is fnspied by Ludwig Witttfe"&ein, vvbo insisted that concepts not be abstracted but that- they be shsdied as parts of ongoing practices, or '"forms of life." Wittgmstein dld not deny that people have things in common, but insisted that those common elemmts can be fully appreciated only if they are studied in their various situated appearmces and uses. Following this line of reasoning, citizenship is to be studied locally. In this book, a number of specific local examples f m my own country, The Netherlands, are offercd, as welI as examples from a number of other countries m d regions, These will only be illumjnating to the reader who is willing tc:,think along with them by adding his msimilar or contrasting experiences..If Ihe rcader can recowze the f a d y resentblances in these various local strands, then a more general understandhg of citizenship will have been gained.

Part Two n n n

W h a t Citizens D o

This page intentionally left blank

THREE

Plurality in The Unknown Society

What do citizens actually doXLilkeall other people, they eat, sleep, and pursue their private affairs. But where do they reveal themselves as citizens, and by what actions? Forme* there were three kinds of situations that called for-and thus, defined-itizen action. First, there was narmal poli.lics in established democracies, which involved activities like voting in elecrticms, participating in the work of political parties, servhg in intermedjate social organizafions, performing military service, and paying taxes, Second, under dictatorships, there were secrclt or open activities of resistance and m h a l . And third, there wem episodes of rt.vcrluticmary politics that formed transitions to a new order of normal politics and constitutional. stability. For a brief period. of tj.me, ordinary citizens wwld be actively invdved in ~lativelyunstructu~dpmcesses of decisionmaking; but after the reestablishment of normal, poljtics, most of them wnuld again leave the politicd stage to the professionlal pditical actors. Nowadays, we are wiMess to a fourth, more difhse, settiftg for citizen action that corn-bheselelxents of the other three. Phrases such as "the diffusion of politics" or "the displacement of politics," and "the end of the nation-state'kr "the loss of the center," indicate this. Political leaders rise to power by way of norm& elections; bat i,n the European Wnion, they engage in quasi-revolutionaq constitution-maklng activities that are in fact beyond public democratic ccrntrol. Citizens may engage themselves agahst such a benevolent semidictatorship, or they m y themselves try to establish a European public space, wit.hout mvisioning much of a role in it for the European p a r l i w n t and the so-called Eumpean parties. For example, citizens are organizing themselves in environmental movements such as Greenpeace in order to prevent the international transport of nuclear materials, as well as in other movements pmmoting objectives

34

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

that transcend national borciers. Regional political activities of all kinds are on the rise. Research shows that citize~~s are active, if one defhes their range of activities broadly. But if one sticks to the more traditional nution of politics in the natim-state and looks only at such indicators as party membership, voti,ng turnout, and thc like, then citizenship appears to lack vitality; When people arc. acting specifically as citizms and when tbry arc. not is not easy to determine, these days. With the dece~~tering of politics, boundaries have become blurred, Neorepublicanism offers a d e g ~ of e clarity by asserting that we see citizens act as such whenever they organize pluraLity in a c o m u n i t y of fate: T!zaf is klrhat citizens do. But how do they do it? And what is plurality? We all know that cmtemporary societies are plural; but in what ways, is not immediately clear. Tbcy surely evid,en,ce mny stubborn differences and catastmphic or pleasant s u ~ r i s e sbut ; we often get stuck when we try to give these a place in established schemes of social order and interprctation. And even \zrhen we succeed in doi,ng so, we retain a szlspicior? that we have missed smething important by incorporating them, and that our negligence sooner or later will come home tcr roost. n e s e are precisely the kelings of people who live in The Unbown Scietp, or Die neue Uniibersichtliehkeit (the new inscrutability), as Habermas (1985) called it in his speech to the Spanish parliament. If indeed we live in such a slxjety' thcn a de1:Initi.m of plurditp only in t e r m of social groups and categories will m i t a great many phenomena fnr which we have not yet established a cmceph;lal category. merefore, this book-in contradistinction to many other studies, which start at the level of the group-Sacuses on the micro level of two persons who differ; and their diffcsenre is what we shall define as plurality. It is at this level that we situate our cmeptualizali.ctn of hocv pl~trallivis organbed b y citizens.

Plurality-differences between people who deal with each other-is what politics is cmcerned with. Where we find politics, we find pl~xrality.Plurality is, in the words of Hamah Aretndt (1959:6Q),"the condition . . . of a21 political life,'kwbile freedom is its "raism d'@treu(Amndt 19678:146). :In this view to practice poljtics i s to process plurality into freedom, to translate "blind," "ven differences into willed and consciously accepted ones. Piurality is a recurrent theme in political discourse precisely because it is inherent in political life. In liberal democratic regimes, this theme will always be pmminent for the si~nplereason that the e x e ~ i s eof individual freedom-its core

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 35

value-tends to generate plurdity. This plurality is prima facie legitimate and m y be curtailed only in exceptimal situations, for special reasms. The burdm of proof rests on the curtailer. If you want freedom, you must accept plurality. fn liberal demcracies, pluraliPy is t.herc.fore in princir>le legitinnate, regardless of wt.\et.her we persondly approve of it. This stance is expressed in doctrines of the separation of politics from religion, of law from moraiity, and of justice from notions of the good. Plurality m y be considered legitirna.t.e,but. at the same time he disliked or t:hought undesira:bl+a price to be paid for freedom. However, in 1%eraf democracies a positive valuation of plurdity generaw p ~ v a i l s . Why? Fkstly, variev and novelty arc admired as kteresting and worthwhile expressions of creativity.Secondly, pluraliity is welcomd because it provides a rich menu oE choices to individuals who want to change places in smiety, cvho kvmt to escape from pa.t.terns of living in which they have become enhangled. The exercise of the right to live and organize one's life according to one" own &sights would become m mbearabjle burden if' me had to start from zero, wi'rhnut being allowed to choose fmm a menu of available elements, Fhally, phrality is valued also because it makes for vitality m d resilience. Plurality provides Rexibiliv, faciI2ates adaptatio~~, and ofhrs the possibjlity of generating alternatives that m y prove indispensable under changed circumstances, Ecological and organizational theories have fmiliarized us with the idea that diversity and even chaos As Gould are essel-ttial conditions for evottlCion and improveme~~tf1993:120) wrote: If animals were ideally honed, with each part doing one thing perfectly, then evolut.ic>nwould not occur, for no>thingcould change (without losing vital fundion in the tramition), and life would quickly end as environments altered and organisms did not respc~nd.But ruler; of structure, deeper than natural seledion itself, guarantee that cl-rmplex features must bristle with multiple possibilities-and evolution wins its required flexibility thanks to messiness, redundancy, and lack af perfect f t . Human creativity is no different, for I think we are dealing with a statement about the very nature of organization----something so general that it must apply to any particular instance, How sad then that we live in a culture almost dedicated to wiping out the leisure of arnbiguiq and the creative joy of redundancy . . . Redundancy, and its cl-runterpart csrf ambiguity in multiple meaning, are our way; our most precious, most human way

However, even in liberal democracies, not all plurality is valued positively. There are special arrangments for dealing with disturbing or unacceptable manif-@stations of plurality-for example, rules that forhid disaimhation and curtail the exercise of personal freedom wfien it impinges on the freedom of others. Other examples are the adversarid procedures in law and politics that dlow for a period of competition, comparison,

36

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

criticism, negotiation, and compromfse, followed by a decisjon that is implernent-ed with the backing of the state's monopoly of violalce. It: is preciseIy here, in their methods of dealing with diskl.l;bing pluralityf that liberal democracies recently hawe been running into trouble. Citizens art? contesting or simply ignoring rules and h d i n g clever ways to circmvent them. A crisis of representation has aifected adversarial procedures in politics and lavv, and the implementation of public decisims increasingly humps into ixn,pen.etrabr.e walls-areas where public au.t.hority ought to exercise its monopoly of violence but that in fact remain k p e r vious to it. Examples arc. the ""no go" areas in lafge cities, mafia activities, and ncw communications networks. Liberal prhciples rclmain the same, but social rcaliv and the kind. of plurality it generates are changing.

In our discussjon, therefore, we cannot ignore the changjng social context within which pluralq appears m d is processed. In todays societ~which we may call postmdem, late-modern, or 'The Unhown Society-the label ic; of mhor importmc luraiity has a different place and form lhan it had. in tthe modern industrial society of the 1950s. The following scheme, which recalls the differences, illustrates this. national mitary culture politics of e~~mcipation equality organization, hierarchy rationality fixed identity tjummteed presentation the end of iddogies pragmatism in pditirs

creolization within global culture "lifesqle" politics differentiation, difference reorganimtion, networks rationalitles, "we are all natives nowf" fieeting and multiple identities problematic, ad hoc representation variety of lifestyles and convi,ctions fundamentalism in politics

In modern societies, peofle and thcir differences cotlld he fairly easily located on a map with coordinates for home, work, education, and religim. Their differences were to a large extent h o r n , and their behavior as voters or cmsulners could be fairly well predicted once one hekv their position on the map, They would by and large behave as did other people in similar positions. Differences were part of an overarchhg unity of national culture and state policies. m e ways in which this unity was subdivided might vary, from pillarizatim in Dutch consociational democracy to divisions among class lines in France; but t-he overarching unity, the

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 3'7

boundaries of which coincided with those of "the society,'" was pmvided by the nation-state. Nowadays, the nation-state has lost this central, defn.ing role and hdds an uncomfortable position between mgiondism and intemationalization. Many confiicts can no l o ~ ~ gbe e r adequately mapped in t e r m of the division of labor, religious affiliation, and level of education. Even when one h w s peoplefmocial position in those terms, their behavior remains pretty unpredictable. People often are not what or who they seem to be. They may have mltipie or mixed identities, use identities strategically, and change identities or roles at unexpected moments. 'The estdished hvays of =presenting this social rt?a:[itythrough elections and empirkal, social research often fail to capture what is going on. Mementions by rulers who have to rely on such representative schemes often misfirc. Institutions that earlier helped them to kllocv nnore and bettes now often saddle them with institutional ignorance. They do not and cannot: h o w what many others know from direct observation and experience: The Stasi in East Germany in 1,989 knew a lot-so much, indeed, that they c d d not grasp what was going m. Election research has acq u i ~ better d data and methoefs, but it is less able now than it was thirty years ago to predict ~rotingbehavior. Rulers react to those deficiendes in vasious ways. They may ignore them. 'They may improve the qudity of public managers through trah% and expand Chc base of managerial experience and howledge by :hiring manatgers from the business sector. They may try to reform. institutions that represent social reality for them-hr exmple, by pursuing other rouks of knocvledge production (acqwiring djfferent advisers); by lemhg more heavily on alternative schemes of pohtical representation (e.g., referendums, mass rwdia maniputation, and party reform); or by adoptkg another style of governing. C)1: they may try to discipline the social world so that it behaves more in accordance with the established schemes of repremt"tion and allows the rulers again to do what they are supposed to do: to govern. All of these reactions havc in common that they camot really s u ~ m o mthe t problem of The Unknown Society. On balance, they seem to comist in ad l-tocreprations of a paradigm of wpresentative governme~~t, which, altogether, make this way of governing quite complicated and unstable. The paradigm is one of analysis and instruction, of howing better and of designing clever interventions based on this superior knowledge. This paradigm, it seems to me, is no longer tenable. Rulers nowadays have to expect that among the ruled there is always someone Mxho will outsmart them. That is nothing new. What is new and fatal to the older way of ru1hg is that this unruly beavior is ljkcly to be copied by cocitizens and to become generafized with great speed. Xt s p ~ a d throughout s society before d e r s know what is going on.

38

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

The only viable option for rulers in 'I'he U ~ ~ h o w Society n I think, is to accept proliferatling and q r e d i c t h l e p1uralit.y and make it an ally. Governing then becomes less a matter of analysis and instruction and more a mattcr of variety and selection-that is, of accepting variety and coping with it on the basis of selective values. One such vaiue is citizenship. Rulers who let themselves be guided by this value will rely on citizens as organizers of plurality and will evaluate policies and laws according to their citizenhip-enhancing qualities" h present-day society and in its politics, plurality has acquired a different place-a more central and more problematic one.The ways of dealing wit-,hpluritlity and of"organizjng it, t-herefm, also should be vie wed. If pIuralitJi came in ordered doses, neatly arranging itself rander the labels provided by standard schemes of social classification, then we could safely rely on the established ways of dcaling with pl~trallity,ways that fit those classificatory schems and that have been imprwed on the basis of ample experience and analysis. But wbrn the schelnes of social classification trhmselves serioudy finisfep~sent,or fail alt.ogether to capturc, actual plurality, then the established ways of dealing with differences also fall short of their goal, Interventions based on such schemes will unexpwtedly misfire, The rcpertoi.re that they o k r s u d d d y appears too lirnited or unsuited to deaj with real contemporary plurality, m a t , then, can be done? Next to further analysis and adjustmelnt of the existing official repestoire for organizing plurality :I suggest, it is kperative to appreciate and learn about (and from) this disturbing but real plurality that does not exactly fit our schemcs. We can study how people, at t%lc micro level of daily life, manage to deal peacefully with potentialty disruptive differences, ?"rueFin contemporary societies, we find much disruption, violence, and injustice, but they are not rantpant. T%ey are shown on television and reported precisely because they arc in most places (thank heaven) exceptional. But tryhat about the many cases where violence could have empted but djd not? How do normal people so oAen manage to maintain peace and relatkely civil mlations? If we can get a view on how they do thiswhat skills, ruses, attitudes, and insights it takes-we might subsequently see which parts of:this practical but. unofficial repertoire are fit to be incorporated, into the curmntly too Zimited ofiicial repertoire for o r g a n i z e plurality Also, once we have an idea of what this unofficial repertoire is, we can inquire why a singe act of violence sometimes can mlce the mpertoire disappear into thjn air-and chmge peaceful cohabitation into civil war and chaos,.If we mdcrstand &is, we can try to make the many acts of dvility more robust and immune to such interventions. This purpose, in part, has led tcr the establishment of a number of public instihtitms safe-

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 39

guarding the legal process, f ~ e d o mof speech, movement in the streets, and so on. In. the new plldrality of Th.e Unhown Society, citizelns shodd continue this work of protecting peaceful ways of dea1in.g with difference through the building artd revising of public institutions.

Perceptions of plurality ofien rely on standardizations that depict people primarily as exemplan; of a category instead of as individuals making sense out of who they are and what happens to them.. Front the standpoint of citizenship, this is a fatal mistake. Ci"tzenship is precisely about hdding individuals responsible for the categcnizations that they use to prcsent Chelnsclves and to situate olfners, h d citizen politics is prwisely about changing sociallly established mles of categorization that hinder access to citizenship for all. Ef we allow our conceptudization of pluratity to be dominded by group categorizations as "naturd'"ivens, then a first step away from citizmship has already been taken. Many standard ways oE classifying social pluratity are thus highly undesira:ble from the point of view of"dtizenship. Xf one goes dong with them, Chcln citizens%lipis already damaged. For purpories of citizenship, many conceptudizations of plurality start at too high a level-that is, at the level nl the group rather than of the individual. They begin by &serving that the= are diffemnt groups and categories of people in society: races, classes, genders, natilms, wligions, professions, political parties. Thus, plurality is made primarily a mattes of relations between groups and among aggregates of people, Subsequently, dealing with pluraiity in the irrteraction among individuals is as a matter of fact considered as derivative of these relations. E thjnk that we should, start at a much more basic level-namely, with the experience of plurality of minimally two individuals whose paths in life m s s , This plurdity is cwyc.rielzced,cmrstrnctcd, and processed by individuals in their dealings with each other. Indhiduals experience the fact that other pemple are dilferent as a clash, as an opportMnity, or sjmply as a diiferetnce. This experience is shot through with construction, with interpretation or with "seehg as" (Wittgenstein 19583193-2M). We see the other person as Chinese, a worker, a gelneral, m artist, and so on. Usually this is a direct perceptioln: We do not first see facts and subsequently look for a matching hterpretation to malie sense out of &ern. On tbe contrary sense is given in experience and perception. We stop at: a red traffic light. No reasoning is involved here. A red light means "stop." Our perception and experience are pmmeatcd with self-evident (attributed) meaning. The parentbeses indi-

40

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

cate that although we do attribute meaning, the process is not usuatiy conscious. 'This point of departure therefore might be called phenornen* logical. However, we also consider the social constmction of reality, the attribution of meaning, as m activiv for which we are responsi:ble, as somethkg that we do. How does this relate to the self-evidmt characta of experim e ? As foliows. We can break through the self-evidence of our experience m d of our perception. We can see things in a different light by using different categories and classifications. By creating these new cmstmctions, we can learn to recognize tryhere our first experience also cclntained interpretation and construction, classification and modeling. Although standard classifications and interpretations are a part of uur eveqday life experience, they are not digatory or unavoida:ble. I experience someone else as a black person or as a geznerali, but the naturainess and compulsiozn of this experience can be umasked as a social construction of reality From these assun-tpticms, it foilows that we are coresponsible for the reproduction of sell-evident memhgs in social interactio~n. "Natural" cclasifications and intergretations serve useful functions. "Normality"' provides quick orientation, offers a fund of questions and strategies, m d is a focal point around which people arrange their interaction. Normality organizes plurality, Cigzenship does not answer the que"ions of whether and to what extent certain normal interpretations and classifications are usehl, but it does set a limit to their use: Citizenship is incompati:ble with the compulsion of self-evident sorrial classifications when these in fact prevent ~asrmableaccess to a pclsition of political equality Experienced and constmcted. pluraIitJi is also actjvely processed by the individuals who are encountering each other. Surprising or disturbing djference is transformed by way 05 discourse, movemernts, and procedures; for instance, by saying "I'm sorv"; by going to court; by dancing together and kissing; by being a mernber of a panel; or by allowing someone to pamper yntt. Notice that this processing involves more than one person. The other person may speak wise and friendlJi words, but if 1do not understand the lantguage, then our game, our dance, fais. It does indeed take two to tango. The cmceptualization proposed here can be used to understand situations where plurality is at issue, In this vision, plurality is not something that is simply there, it is what individuals construct in their social interaction. Such construction need not be a "b1hd" process that unfolds behhd the participants-backs. Without being able to control it completely fmm beginni~ngto end, individuals nevertheless influence the direction and outcome of the social.constmction of pluralit)l in which they participate. As citizens, they are ~sponsiblefor directing the constwction of plurality

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 4 l

toward an outcome that instead of simply ignoring or supp~ssingtheir real differences, confirms and reasserts the identities of aX1 pasticipants as equal citizens, Constrncting anci organizing plurafity requires competence and skills that usually are scarce m d not equally avaiiable to all persons. 'The degree to which people succeed in directing their constructions of plurality toward citizenship dso depends on supportive institutions, as welt as m the i,ntemsjt.yof the emotions and Ihe nature of the identities at st&e-all factors that to some degree exceed the reach of even the best-trained and most rational individuals. If constructing plurality necessarily involves competence, institutions, emotions, and identities, then it cannot be a simple affair; the morc so hecause these four items are both objects ofmd irzstrumcrzfsfor the organization of plurality Let us take a closer look at them and their complex relations.

Identities are used to order disturbing and surprising differences. An unh o r n person becomes "known"' by acquiring an identity, a place within existing social schemes. The way in wfiieh identities relate to each other is often embedded in the way in which the identities themselves are constructed. The identity of "worker,'"for instance, relates in contrast to the identity of ""cpita:list."" In the ordering of pluraliv through the assignment of cmtrasting or relative identities, various mchilnisms of rankhg, exclusion, and marginaiization of individuals and groups are at work, Take, for instmce, the ident-ity of "Jew'hnd the ways h hvhich it has acquired various places witihin different systems: as a religious category vis8-vis Islam or Christianity; as a racial category vis-a-vis (t-hat is, infclrior to) the 'Xrym'brrxce; and as a cultural category indicating a people of matrilineal (as opposed to patrilineal) &scent. 8 1 1 of these labels conceal, an "unfair" "duction of pluraliw. r2ltfiotrgt-t idexltit;ies are socialb attributed, they arc also part of our inner experience of self. Our deepest emotions relate to what we believe ourselves to be. This self-awareness uses the social categories with which we have learned to look at others m d at ourselves. Thus, we are not capable of freeing ourselves completely from the social dimension, from labeling and attribution in our interaction with others. Ow idmtities arc. not (jamtents that are draped a r o u ~ ~ andessential, m d nrigislally naked "inner self""and that we can remove whenever we wish. However, it does not necessazily follow that individuals have no freedom hvhatsoever with regard to their sel.f"deflmition.tl~ndercertain circumstances it is possibte to resist the social attribution of identiv and to go one's own way. But ""one'sown way"" is never a purely persmal inven-

42

Plurality in The blnknawn Society

tion. It is, rather, constructed out of certain patterns that individuals encounter in their culture. An interesting example is a discussion that Bared uy some years ago withill the Dutch organization of homosexuals, the Center for Culture m d Relaxation (Cultuur en m t s p m n h g s Centrum, or COC-)-a c e the vanguard for the homosexual liberation movement, the organization came under attack by homosexuals themscrlves around 1990. ?"he COC, it was said, pretended to represent "the homosexual.'Through its hformational activities h schools the organization was said to be confusing young people by telling them what a homosexual " " i s b d by stimulatinfS them to openly =knowledge their homosexud identity C:hildren thus would get th impression that they should become an entirely different person, whie they did not fully understmd what they would be leaving b e h d by deciding i,n favor of this metmorghosis. Critics also accused the COC of xleglectjng the variety of diffemnt ways of lire into which people rnight mold their homosexuality. The COC was said to have attempted to ossifr homosexuality by press~ti,ngit as a &finite choice of identit)i thereby ignoring that homosexual activity may be a transitory experiment and may be accompmied by heterosexuality, In short, the CQC clung to an u~~arrtbiguous and complete homosexual identity that was no longer accepted by other people who preferred homosexuaIity. These people refused to be trapped in a specific homosexual identity, opting instead for a nnore autonomous definition of who asld cvhat they were, Citizenship cmcems this refusal, this right to say "no," to move fn and out oE identities without. being trapped in them, In this sense, citizenship occupies a metapasition and is not just one identity amid others. It fulfills a mediatk~gfunction in the interaction among identities. While questions of dtiztmship used to be concerned mainly with liberation frnm serfdom and other legal forms of domination, they nuw also concern liberation from ossified identities. 'l'he emphasis has shifted from the politics of emmcipation, in h i c h marlJina1izc.d gronps used their identities as a lever to liberate themselves from established structures (women, homosexuals, Catholics), to lifestyle politics. fndividuals =fuse to be committed to one identity or to a single, fjxcd codination of identit.ies. Although citizenship aims at freedom and rejects slavery in, atl its forms, it does not foster a limitlw diwersity of fleeting identities. m e n developing Cheir own Ijfestyle, citizens must always take into account that they may be beld responsible by cocitizens for the exercise of thezir citizenship, Citizenship is more than a happy-go-lucky enjoyment of one's oocvn freedom to live as onc pleases. It also requircJs rcflspect for limits that allow one" ccocitizens to reveal who they are as weail. Those limits forbid every form of social death (Patterson 1982) and humiliation, of treat-

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 43

ing human beings as if they wew ncmhurnan (Margalit 1996) or cocitizens as if they w r e noncitizens.

Everyone knows that pluraliw-confrontation with surprising or disturbing differences with other people-wou~~motions.The experience of pltrra,lity may involve such e~notionsas enthusiasm, falling in love, km, group ""lidarity against outsiders, aggression, paralysis, surrender, or servility. Such emotions have effects on copition and on the process% of plrxrality Especially when we sense that our identjtiy is at stake, we cannot remain idle, Emotions of fear and anger must be expressed, either outwardly toward ohjects or other people, or inwardly, toward ourselves. Fear and related emotions often cause the rclpertoire of behavior to narrow down to paralysis or aggression; to threats rather than discussion; to the Zllarkening of others"reput"tion~ m d to projectim of fear onto other pmple, who become a "danger" by virtue of their difference. %metimes people, such as drunken drivers, really are a danger. Yet projection may inflate and exaggerate this danger. 7'he danger, mort-lover, tends to be ascribed to olfner people who have similar characteristies but in fact are not dangerous at all. Enfiusiasm and f d h g in love, usually seen as positive emotions, may aiso lead to tunnel vision or blindness, which =duce the chances of sensilbly dealing with plurality. However, e~notiansalso can widen the range of actions cmtmplated. When under pressure and in danger, people often become inventive and disposed to unusual forms of cooperatinn and compliance. Thi,nk of the resistance movements du,rkg VVorld VVar I1 or of the emotional, soiidariq that somtimes has arisen between pawmgers and hijackers. Democracy, which requires toleration of plurality, has from its beghnings bad its shadow side (Sagan 1991). On the one hand, it knew respect for tbe right oE cclcitizens to differ; it developed the astonishing idea of a loyal opposition, of ant.agonistic cooperalion, instilled and confirmed through education and legal proceduse. On the other hand, it practiced aggression and showed cmtempt toward outsiders-as mveded in slavery, imperialism, war, and poverty. Democrats felt matters becornhg particularly dangerous when these outsiders entered the demcratic poliq or when the border between the '"side" and the ""outside" was no longer clear nor controlled. The way sedentary democracies have dealt with Gypsies is a classic example.. tn our time, when paranoia has perforated debates on admissicm to citizenship, cm migration, and on social policy, democracy again has become ullcertain of itself. This appears jn a zigzng tmatment of people who are neither inside nor wtside the polity*When dedirrg with such peopk, who are experienced as "monsters"' (because

44

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

they straddle categcrries that ought to mmain separate), emcrtions and paranoia surface at inconvenient moment-s. Today' when people frequently move acmss borders, it is no longer sufficient to accept and apprtrciate pluraiity witbin the nation-state alone. Citizens must also learn to deal with plurality that exists around the borders of the rcpzlblic. This entails learnirtg tu deaf with emotion^ and emotim-steed practices that come with the experience and processing of Chis kfnd of pluratity. Pragmatist theorists of democracy in the period followhg World War II considered emotions dangerous for politics. In their viewf emotions should be kept out of the public sphere m d allowed to function cmly in the atisfiC and private spheres. R e p should play no role in pditics; or at most, they should play only a censored or controlled role, This pragmatic strategy of control had its drawbacks, however. It stifled the emotiondrivan im,agjn&ion that is required for developing sound pdicies and viable compromises. Marewer, emotions often made themselves felt along sneaky pathways, of MIhich those involved were unaware-and with disastrous resuits. In retrospect, it seems wiser to acknowledge emotions and to develop and.foster competencies and institutions that allow citizens to deal with them sensibly. Whether we like it or not, plurality does involve emotions. If we smother or ignore them, they will remain a brute and immutable factor that disbrbs political interactirrn at inconvenient momcmts. :lf we recognize them, WC can place them in the sequence oZI experiencing, constmcting, and pmcessing of plurality Thus we can hope to come to terms with. emotions and give them a rwaningful place in the interacticms between a pltrra,lity of citizens,. emptencl;: and Itlstit~tiams

Having considered idmtity and emotion, the more subjective aspects of the orgmization of phrality, let us t u n to the more objective aspects, those of competence m d instihat-ions.Good intentions and a concern with identity and emotions are generally not enough to secure an organization of phality that is acceptable between citizens. Self-expression alone cannot sccure civility The expression should also be adequate to the situation, be comprehensible to others, and moreover fit together with others' expressive contributions so as to make for a viable way of living together as citize~ns,. This is whercz compete~zceand institutions c m e k t o the picture. Competmee refers to good judgment and practical social skills, such as the ability to listen and to express one's position, ideas, and emtiltns clearly; to exercise seltf-restraint m d self-knowledge; to assess situations; to cope with insecuriv and surprises; and to follow the mnvements and intentions of other people. It also refers to the ability to idicate onefs

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 45

own limits ("If I tolerate this, I will not be able to face myself"");to create a cmtext in which trust and understmding become possible; m d to deal judiciously with me's own freedom and that of others. In practice, competence fn dealing with plurality is eminently important. Yet, in theory and in the preparation for practice, it has rclceived relatively Wtle attention, The subject is oft-cn avoided because the term "competence""rings bells of elitism and meritocracy. Is not a concern for cmpetence hcompatible with equality between citizens and wi& their autonomy? Are not citizens themselves responsible for decidirtg what they will do and kcrw well or badly they will do it? C)n reflection, hokvever, one cannot fail to appreciate the crucial importance of coqetence for the exercise of citizmship, Democratization, for instance, goes awry when participants have insufkient skills to hold meetings and lack insi.ght into their pjtfalls. h d crjtizens who lack competence in public office will. make poor or even disastrous leaders. ?b practice citizenship require" minimurn of competence. A minimum, not a maximum. Citizcns m y m k e mistakes. However, cvhen lack of competence actually becoms destmctive, a mixlimum limit is broken thruugh and intervention takes place. Citizens who lack the ~ ~ i r competence e d arc subjected to temporary or longer-lasting stricti ions on tlne indcpendent e x e ~ i s eof their citizenhip (for instance, bejng confined in a psychiatric b~stibtion). Even though the republic, albeit rel~~ctmtly; will ultimately interfere with the freedom of citizens in such a way, much is done to p ~ v e nmatt ters fmm gettini; that far. For instance, schocrling and h f o m t i m , subsidies and advice may be offemd to citizens who lack certain skills. When traislhg addresses the citizen's competence, it often does so in t w rather unhelpful ways. Either tcrlr subfectively-for exan-tpk, wben training becomes psychotherapy-or too normati.vely, as whe~lit tries to inculcate a consensus m norms and values. Against the first approach, it can be argued that what is ~ q u i r e dis not psychic bahnce but social and political ski:lls. (It is true that peoyle who cannot express themselves, or who suffer from severe psychic disorders, cannot act competently as citizens. Ilowever, not havhg thlrse psychic "defects'Ys surely not a sufficient cmcfitior? for acring connpetently) Againsl the second approaeb, it can be aqued, as I have done in Chapter 1,that consensus on norms and values is neither necessary nor sufficicmt for effective organizaticm of pluraXjty between citizens. m a t ki.ad of cmpetence and training, t-hen, do citizens need? General rules and theoreticat fnsightt; play an important part, but fn themselves they are not su,fficient for acting competently. 011e has to know which rules apply wben; and one has to have the ability to deal with uncertainty, with confljcting values and Lvishes, and with unique sit-

46

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

uations. rTi, be able to act cmpetently in this kind of situatilm =quires practical judgment, in whirh attention to variety and to particufars takes a central place. The competence of the citizen resides h the flexibility with which he can mediate between general ntlcs and insights and special circumstances in such a way as to respect the dynamic and pl~~11:d nature of the republic, HOW can this kind of citizen cmpeknce be acquired? C m it, in fact, be learned? For a large number of civic: ski:lls, the answer is: certainly, but: they are acquired in other ways than by learning the rules and facts by heart. Elements of competence-such as practical judgment ccrnceming the application of rules; the &Sty to deal with intperfectims and onefs own f a i l u ~ sand ; th ability to abtain insight into a sitnaatim so that one can act at the fight time and htbe right way-but also skills, such as cornpete~ntlyconducthg meethgs, require a lot of practice. Citizens do not primarily learn tl-tesc skills in academic courses on citizenship but rather by beh~ginvoked in civil practices or institutions. By &serving tbr actions of other citizens m d by gahhg experience in a variety of practices, the citiz m builds up a repertoire of examples, insights, and actjons. I'he repertoirt? is built up not only from citizensf actuai p e r m a t experience but also from seejing others act and from hearing stories. A responsibility fmum, which always involves stmytellling, constitutes a most important learning place for citizen competence. There, storytelling, expcria~ce,and reflection are intertwined. When a citizeln ir; called to account in front of a judge, for instance, the way in which his hearing or trial is cclnducted may teach him something about competent and respmsible acting*Acthg, evaluating that acting, and learnkg how to act are b m g h t together in a ""hall of mirrors," hwhich the difierent parts are reRected in each other (Schiin 1982220)One must remember, however, that reachhg perfection h the exercise of citizmship is not the point oi competence, Competence signj.fies nut only the ability to bmak thrclugh barriers to learning 'hut also the ability to deal with the restrictions imposed by the enviro ent m d by one's okvn limitations. In the human world of imperfection, acknowledging one's c ~ w weahesses n and l e a m i ~ ~toglive with them, or having the courage to ask for help Jn overcolning thern, perhaps constituk2 a cornyetencc that is far morc important than the continual and stubborn pursuit oi perfection. A certain tolermce in this respect is important not only in one's interaction with other peaple but also in dealing with oneself. li-, act civilly in awkward. situations is a crucial citizen skill. Civility, mannclrs, and good task are more than mere appearances. They cocietcrmine the substantive qua1i.l-y and outcome of political processes. Nadezhda Mandelstarn (1974), Edward Shils, V4clav Havel, and many other thinkers who are primarily interested in sLlbstance have insisted m

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 417"

the importance of the forms of civility. It is t w that there are situations in which mmners and politeness remain merely outward appearances-or worse, in which they reinforce meanness and injustice h the hteraction between people. Ilowewer, it does not follow that we would be better off without manners. l r ~commmities in which manners asld civility are shoved aside, people are even more defenseless agalnst meanness and injustice, once the initial euphoria and goodwill that come with liirect democracy and genuhe hulnan cmtact have worn thin. Unfortunately, civility is not only indispensable but also insufficient, It may be powaless against violence, lies, and the m s e e d y and selfish behaviar that so often characterize real political life. Citizen competence, therefore, also entails the ability to deal with these, to h o w where to draw the line and where to fight the opposite party with its own weapons. This is not easy. h a democracy at what point should onc forbid political parties that undermine democracy? When and how should m e react to marines who try to rt.storc. orcler in a railway station by chasing people Chey suspect of being dsug addicts and dealers, with no explicit orders from the authorities? 111 some cases, the evil is clear but difficult to combat. Other cases are problematic- becausc? of ambiguity in the definition and perception of evil. Gifts, favors, bribeq; corruption, and rewards for services rendesed may be part of the necessary "greasingf"of daily pohtical irrteraction. Simply ignorhg these is the right strateu for citizerls jn s m e situations but nst in others. Here, too, citizens must h o w when m d how to bend the rules, and where and how to toe the line. A crucial aspect of keeping the organization of plurality going is the ability to swit.ch within the repertoire when parties are stuck in one field of interaction or frame of reference, For i~~stal~ce, when formal council meetings show no progress, it may help to arrange an informal and secret gathering. Movement and acknowledgment of the identity and position of parties in one lrame oE rekrence may help to get tbings unstuck and movirtg agah in another field.. 'The double kame prnvides pmties with an eccentric position from whkh they can consider themselves m d their relations. Likewise, humor may constitute a quick change of frame of reference that has liberating consequmces. When we laugh, when WC see the joke, we have something in common, (Even when we discover that we were ail laughing but not all about the same thjng, this may make us laugh together") A most important aspect of citizen competence in afl this is the ability to create a context for mutual action, Without a context, there c m be no meaning; and withotlC meaning, &ere can be no hurnan xtion..Context is for meming what oxygen is for human life. We breathe whakver air is available. So it is with context. In order to see meaning, we take as context

48

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

whatever is available. Cl-rang% and choosing a d i f f e ~ ncontext t so that a different meaning becomes possible is a prirnary skill of citizens, Djfferences also need a context in order to be perceived and understood as differmces. Some sort of context is dways present wherr human intentionaiity is at work. Differences are never contextless. Changjng or e~~riehing the context is a most important step toward organizing differences in a way that befits citizens. How do innovations in the rclpertoire of s k i b come about? n r o u g h detailed attention to situations that are felt to be wrong but that cansrot be handled well through the existing repertoire. Real and stubborn attenticrn to situations of injustice and ddective citjzenship m y lead to innovation in the ways of dealilrg with differences. This is generally a painful and drawn-out search process that requires fmm citizens boldness and civic courage on the one hand and patience and tolerance on the other. mese attributes are not easily combjned. Citizens' competence drrlgmds not mly on other persms but also on the institutional setting, the established ways, within which they act, A. corrupt regime or foreip occupation reguire different actjons from citizens thm a constitutional state that is fmctioning normally Some forms of competemce can only prosper in particular inslitutional senings. Conversely, functioning in certain izlstitutions can lead to occupational disabilities, blirrdiness, and trained incapacity- Koaders can provide their own favorite examples-the one-dimensional mmager, the honest but obtuse civil servant, or the "haw-abidjng"koncentratjon camp commandes. Institutions are, in turn, depedent on cclmpetent use. Useful and citizenshippromoting institutions s ~ ~ as c hthe council of ministers and the parliament can fmction only if people use them competently Weak ministers might harm not only themselves and their departments but also the council of ministers and the parliament. Lnstit.utims provide patterns of and for hteractims (March and Olsen 1989; Douglas 1987). fn plural societies, &err;, are numerous institutims desig~~ed to process plurality: the media, the courts, co~~versatio~~ (talkhg the matter out), therapy, managmnt, a municipal council, a fomm, arbitraticrn, mediation, the free press, parliamtunt, and a party congress. Some of these are d i ~ c t e dexchsjwly toward the arbitration of confiict.j, o t k r s morc generally toward organizjng plurality. Someixlstitlntions offer strictly ordered ribals, while oslthers function more infomally. However, the outcome of the processing of plurality is, in prhciple, never predetermhed, not even in the case of rituals. It depends among other things uyon the compeknt contributions of different persons who are ininvoed in the "coilision"3etween djferent ways ol life. 'The organizalion of plwrality requires from its participmts competent improvisation and trmslation-far m m &an mere obedience and the blind application of formulas.

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 49 I'he pr~cessof organiZing plrxfality between citizens usually at some poht involves a sole occasion, a ritual of sorts that reestablishes and reconfirms the integrity of the parties involved. Such a ritual of purification and mintegration is a reaction to pollution, to the dangers of disntption of the bonds of civiliiry. In liberal democrades, responsibility fora are a prominent form of such rituals, Such fora are activated when situations mcur that are experienced as bad and undeserved@ painful to people. fn the f o r m the chniM of e v e ~ ~that t s led to this situation is reinteryrcted as, and linked to, the actions of persons who can be called to account in the forum. Blind history, a chain of events, is =told as a story of human actions. The happenings in the world are seen as the result ol decisinm ol people who can, as citizens, be called to account for what they have done. :Inthe forum they may give, or may be obliged to give, their version of the story. Having heard this, the forum givcs its verdict and a s s i ~ responsis bility. h doing soI it is reinterpreting the past so as to make possible in the future more outspoken human respmsibility for unpalatable events. socking outcomes bring matters to a farurn, wbere stories are retold, cifizens are made into responsible actors, and.norms are reset, It is importmt to notice that in this normative resettkg, the wice of the accused citizen has a central place, albeit: not a decisive one. 'The citizen participates not only in the actual organization of pluraliiV#but also in reflecting about the norms by which it shoufd be governed. Republ,ics must be endocved with a variety of institutions that help members organize their plurality by offering, and sometimes forcing upon them, a ~pertclirc.of ways of dealing with plurality A p h a l society is inconceivable without such institutions. However, this high-lewl m d differentjated developmnt of institutions also causes problems, Firstly the ~ q u i r e dknowledge and skills are so a h n c e d that the help of experts such as lawyers m d judges is &dispensable- This in turn requires that laymen be capable of dealing with the experts and af correctlly assessing the value of heir contributions. This is no simple matter. %condIyI access to the institutions that process plurality may be pnlbIematic-for instance, because of the cost of expertise, or because of differilT power. Wile one person may have easy access, ano&er may have little or none. In such cases, if ciwnsbip is to be m m than a mese forntality the state (or some other instance) m s t help its citizens. Yet the arrangem a t s made toward that end lead to fhanciaf problems for the state and to certai_l~ citizens takhg mdue advantag of such arrangements. Thirdly, institutions can become ohsolete in the sense that they no t Consequently, their processing of longer adequately r e p ~ s e n plurality pltrrdity will leave m c h to be desired. Representation in today's society is increasingly problematic. Schemes of representation can no longer be trusted blindly. They need to be checked m d judged with regard to their

50

Plurality in inhe blnknawn Society

applicability. Frequently they need some ad hoc adjustmnt. Judgment as to which schemc of =presentation can be used se~nsihlyjn this pmticular situation of plurality is becoming incrclasingly important, Are there experts who can help in this, or must citizctns rev on their own judgment in this crucial question?

WCCERmG PWWLmY, BUT NOT

LY

Although it is n e c e s s q to go to fie micm level to understand what it takes to organize plura%ity,we cannot stay there. Micro transactio~~s congeal into macro outcomes. Moreover, macro forces may be so strong as to leave no frctedorn to speak of at the micro level, the level of i~~dividual choice and identity. A micro vision connbined with a positive acceptance of pfuraZi9 may also conceal differmtiaf power effects and ineyua'fitiesresulting from, or rehforced by, such a micro approach. That is another reason to return to the macro level. The generally positive attitude toward existing plurality needs to be qualified, if it leads to outcomes that are unacceptable when vkwcd in terms of third parties, longer term consequences, and c m d a tive impact. Citizenship involves more than organizing diffemnces between two persons only The central place of plurality in contempormy society can easily lead to blindtness in the face of the effects of power. Plurality can be used to reinforce power, by di:\siding and mling, by rmking m d by categorizing. Listen, br instance, to the conclusion drawn by Benjarnill %jcs at the end of a life of po2itical stmggIe and painstabg research. He asked about the possibiljties for ~ s i s t i n gthe deportation of Ulltch Jews during World I/Var 11: Even if the Jewish citizens had been abte to elect a different Wewish] Council, they would have exez-cised nc, choice in the matteq because only a Council that executed German commands would be accepted by the Germans. That is why it did not matter who was to be at the top of fkc, or of a Jewish Council. The Jewish citizms existed only through the Jewish Council, that is to say, as administrative units numbered cm tists in order to be depc~rtedin due time. "Depersonatizationf'-albeit in the social sense-resulted from the fact that they were isolated. They were no longer '"complete'' "people because they were rejected and in several ways exduded, out of fear, by non-Jews. These Jews no longer were part of the old reality and did not know what to do. More than ever before, they were the plaything of merciless powers, powers they hardly understood. It made them pc~werlemand incapable of action. They could not reach the illegal helpers, who in turn-aside from the real difficulties4ould not reach the Jews, And thus, some 80 percent of the Jews met their death. (Sijes 1974:449)

Plurality in T k Unknown Society D 51 The implication seems to be that the best moment for resisting was when distinctions between kinds of citizens were introduced, At that tirne, common action by citizens on the basis of their common citizenship was still possble. Later, when injustice became more evident, the basis and moment for common action had disappeared* W e n answering the question of whether the p w e r effects of plurality are unacceptable from the point of view of citizens, a disthction can be made between domains: the public-pofilical, the public-social, and the private domains, The first domain is where political. and governmental decisions arc. made concerning (the adjustment of) the orgmization of society- Equdity of citizens as participants and as sources of influence in this process is a core value. Plurality must time and again be constihted and confirmed by the free choice of individual citizms, That is the reason why elections are held periodically and why representatil~esof the people, mce they have been elected., may vote without having to consult their supporters. W e n plurality has power effects that endanger this freedom (for e x a q l e , the democratic empowermnt. oE a Mider), intervention is called for. I'he puhtic-social domain refclrs to the interaction of people in (semi) public areas such as the streets. Here, personal fscedom is central: the ffeedom to come and gu as me pleases, and to have a lifestyle of one's own. Rules of decency and civil law order this interaction. They allow considerable plurality and diffemces inpower, From the point of view of citizenship, a line must be drawn only when these differences actuafly make admission to and exercise of citizenship in the public-politjcal domain impossible. m h k , for example, of street terror or of mimidation at the workglace. Still more restraint is reytlired with mgard, to public intervcntion in the private domains of She home, friendships, and sociai cluhs. Yct even &re, the pocver effects of plurality can be such Ihat access to critizenship actually =mains an illusion, 'The distinctions may be illustrated with = g a d to cdtural mimmities. Except for their responsibjlity to abide bp the law, ( m e d e r s of) minori-. tics are free to form and maintain communities, as well as to propagate their o m c d t u ~A. ~pL117licthat admits plurality will pmmote this freedom and may even providc mans toward that end. Minorities do not have to comply with "~dknationalculhre, The d y reyuirement is that they abide by the law and that tbry be sufficiently competent to act in the public-political domain. Political integratio~~ is obligatory; sociocultural integration is not. Minorities have a right to be protected against the power of the '"normal"' national culture and ways of life. There are two sitmtions in which the h t e r f e ~ n c eof the republic extends beymd tl-tese limits. The first is one in which slavish relationships actudiy prtrwent access to the equal status of citizen, The other sihtation is

52

Plurality in The blnknawn Society

one in which minority communities display a coercive chararter and frustrate the civic f ~ e d o r nof members to leave a community. Such effects ol the celebration of plurality must be firmly limited by the republic, however difficuit this may be, without thereby destrtlyifig plurality more. than is strictly necessary. Plurality is the primary focus of the work oi citizens. It is basic material that they trmsform through antaglmistic cooperation into a livable pditical cztltture. Plurality is disturbixzg (or outright dangerous) to citizens, and it is the basis on which citizens act. Like fuel, it enables us to move, but it can also catch fire. Plurality in a democratic repuhlic is neither to be embraced nos to be re~ected:Xt must be accepted as a rea,lity that is to be transformed in such a way by those involved. that citizmsfip for all participants in a community of fate is secured. In this chapter, we have developed a picture of plurality h co~~temporary society, of the "way we are now." "This picture can be marked by three poirrts of ~ c o p i t i c m : I. The Unhown Society; 2. "We are all natives now" "eertz 1983:lsI)); 3. ""Ef a Iion could talk, we hvctuld not urlclierstand him'' ((Wittgenste;in.I958:223),

The first expression m h d s us that plurdity and difference occupy a central position; that pIurdity is not given but to be discovered; m d that we c m learn from the ways people in The Unknown Society have teamed to live with plurality. The second statement pohts out that there are no privileged and. general language and rationality at band. within which pluratity could be orglmized in an authoritative manner and that we must translate lrom one rationality to another. 'The third statement indicates that a common language alone is not enough to secure mutual. understanding, that it is also a question of ways of life and of self-rvicient ways of acting. The [ion ir;no lamb, nor is he a human being.

FOUR E-7

E-7

E-7

Against Consensus

:In the g ~ amajorily t of studies, discourses, and policies concemixrg citizenship, cmsmsus occupies a central place. This is understandable: If p e q l e agsee, then they have no reason to quarrel. 'The idea then easily folluws that by increasing consensus we shalf dinlinish disturbing and dismptive differmces. This assumption about the goodness and political desirhility of cmsensus is widespread. Nevertheless, nagging questions remain, What if people want to differ, even when they agree about many things? M a t if they search for, ( ~ rc. d tivate m d create, diffesc~ncesto fight about? Does the idea of a consensual society not mn counter to ljberal principles of frcedom and.to the insitgh.t that resilience usually resides in diversity? Isn't a consensual society a dead society, cut off from its sources of vitdity? Many defenders of consensus as a condition of peaceful living together would, grant these polnts and withdraw to a more modest position. In order to differ peaceflrlly about some things, they would say, people need to agree about other things as "basks," or terms of peace. A certain amount of consensus is a necessary prereguisite for social and political order. This study disagrees even wjtb the more modest position. 'The statement that some consensus surely is necessary is either true by ddinir a statement &at c m emtiw-an axiom that cannot be proven fals pirically be falsiiied and that, infact, is not always true. Consensus, I have become convinced, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the orgmization of plurality by citizens in a republic. Let me explain why.

:If a society does nut fly apart but somehow holds together, then it must have parts that fit. When we call this fit ""consensus," we seem to make

51%

Asainst Consensus

an innocent move. Obviously people agree sornehovv, somewhere, do they not? However, the mow is not ht~occntat all, either normtively or empirically The term consensus suggests a way of seein.g and doing t;hings &at those involved would recopize as their own. Consensus need not a h a y s be explicit and conscious; hut: when m irnpficit consensus is pointed out to those involved, they should confirm that this is what they participated in. Otherwise the label ~'comensusffwould be a misnomer. Consensus always carrier; connotations of agreement, consent. 'The behaviors of slave and master fit togcrther, but the= is no (human)consensus. We canncrt conceive that human beings would consmt tcr such a relationship. C)r rather, we do not accept such a relatiot~shipas hurnan, and therefore consider there to be something wrong with the humnmess of those who do (seem to) consent to such ~lationships.Thus, the idea that when behaviors fit together, this hdicates, or must be due to, consensus, is untenlable. Fit ma)i or may not go together with consensus, Even when there is consensus, furlher specification is in order. Is it consensus in values, in lifestyles, in ways of doing that obtain locally (like driving on the right-hand side of the road)? Does cmsensus stand for sameness, or for fitting togetl.ter? The pieces of a puzzle fit togelher, but the ftfn of the p w z k is precisely that they are not obviously the san?e or idmtical, Haw deep and permanent is the consensus? Consensus has connotations of permanence and =liability over time, but how deep and permanent need it achaally be to count as consemsus? Md very When visitors stercfam quarrel with the h t & , they usually do so inEnglish. There sensus to speak this language, but it is neither permanent nor deep. 'The consellsus does not hold in other situations. We have the idea that consensus needs deep and pemanent anchoring-in God, a long history, most convictions, or whatever. Even when metaphysical foundations have become discredited m d u~~stable, people cling t s the idea of deep anchorirrg, which correspond"o the deeply felt human need for a home, roots, continuiv, and a livable futurc.. But why should a need, sjmply because it is deeply fclt, have a deep ""so(ution"'? Hourever, leaving metaphysical and other certainties behind does not imply that we should embrace arbitrarhms and i p o r e the human need for continuity The discovery that Dutch is not a universal language, or that Smta Claus does not exist, does not force us to stop speakin.g Dutch or celebrating Santa Claus's the contingent character of these Zlirthday On the cmtrary, insight i~~tcr particulars hvites us to care for their preservation. We may mislocate the source of consensus, When we shake hands, their forms obviously fit. Is this a cornensus between hands? Obviously not. It is the will, the cmsensus, to shake hands that makes the forms fit, This shows that external fit is not necessarily the source or locus of consensus but rather its result. This insight may in turn, lead to the equally mistaken

Against Consensus D 55

assumptim that there is always an inner source of consensus that accounts for the external fit, Such an assumptio~~ is difficult to refute-when cornercd defenders can always switch to another inner s o u r c e b u t it can surely be undemined by looking at how things go in the world. Then we quickly see that CQJIS~IISLES about values (thhgs we hold dear, deep down inside) is neither a necessary nor a suiSicient condition for peacefuX interacticrn betvveen people. Spouses who agree about a great many values may kill each other (consensus here is not a su,fficiex~tcondifion for peace). mere are cuitures and. situatims in wwhich ""incomprehensible" strmgers are received as guests and friends (not a necessary cmdition, the~fore). The idea that the= rnzist he a consellsus is a requirtsment of our (way of) thinking, of our g r a m a r (inMlittgensteids sense). (ha sirnilar vein, our "feelkg sorner,ne else's pain'" is grammatically impossible: Pain that one k l s is, by definition, on& own,) W always find the repisclmmt confirmed, that where we find p e a c h 1 living together and conmunication, this "must"9e due to a minirnurn of consensus. (Compare: When I &nce wifi someone, wfierz movexnent-sfit together, this must be due to the common rhythm that we hear in our heads and. to the bband's playing with such swing and such ccmtagious cmiction.) m a t makes you so surc of this "nzustff'?Is it based on experience?

In those cases in Mthi& people succeed in dealing peacefully with differences, valtres and principles reveal themselves in their actions. Regardless of whether those values were common before the actfions), they are apparently common n w . A successfUL interaction collstitutes a precedent, offering values and principles for future interactions. 'This hvay of formulating things aclinowitedges that preexisting values are not aIways nece* sary for peaceful interaction and that the interaction its& can create values. However, this way of fomulating Chings, h my view, stifl puts too much emphasis on values, It neglects the fact that values and pri~~ciples, even when firmly established, have to he applied competently and be weighed against conflicljng values and principles. It is precisely in times when pluralv pops up everywhere that cmpetent firandling of conflicts of loydties and values becomes an indispensable civic virtue. I'he exercise of this ability also creates precedents, values, and prjnciples. mese, however, have a metacharacter, and their application demands situational judgment. They arc. neither self-evident m r self-executing. Of course we want a permnent and firm anchoring for institucons that will enable us to deal with c d i c t s peacehlly. Rut no metaphysical anchoring or justification can prevent such metahstitutions in plural soci-

56

Asainst Consensus

eties from becoming objects of prirnary confiict. For organizhg such collisions, Chcrc is no longer-if: there ever was-a single substmli.ve formula binding all members together. Not onlly is plurality a practical problem nowadays, but it p o p ~ epv e r y h r e : in metaphysical foundations, in systerns of rdes, in social kag~wntation.There is no longer one rationality, one administration, one national society Unity is no longer cmsidered as given-a given that we did not always cttrarly see but for which we could search tagcther. U'niQ nokv is not expected to come knrn outside (meta), nor can it be found in sorriety or h systems-steering. R e recurrent pditical task of citizens is to achieve unity by themselves. In m n y theories, consensus is conceived of as a necessary condition for citizens acting together in peace, These views are mistaken. Consensus is not a cmdition but a problem that citizens have to work on. Consensus is not a preconditio~~ but rather a desired outcome of citizen activities. It is m this point that the neorepublican theory of citizenship differs horn other theories. For neclrepublicms, the organization of problematic plurality is a central task, whereas many othcr conceptions define this contemporary problematic out of existence by optjng for a substantke description of citizenship, the unity of which is the exact denial of plurality. Their strategy is to emphasize unity in, order to reduce plurality to the point where it ceases to be a problem. The polnt of neorepublican citizenship is tcr increase cclmpetence in dealing with existing pluraiity. If citizenskp is to be more-. than an idea, it needs to he elnbraced and practiced by actual people. The wish to foster commitment to citizenship and civic virtue is understandawe and legitimate. But it cannot be Mfilled by postulating the necessity and unavoidability of unity and by moralizing about it. This is both bad social science and bad politics: bad social science, because society does not work tAat w v ; bad politics, because it is either ineffective or inimical to the idea of poiit-ical hteractiorz between a plurality of equal citizens, The appeal to consensus is either too vague or simply wrong. It is too vague as long as it relnains unclear what it refers to-sameness, fit, acquiescence, or consent-and whether in ideas or in actual behavior. It is wrong when it assumes the necessity of a. value cansmsus.. No vital contemporary society works that way. It needs tension, differences, dynamics. The idea that unity of values is essefiial conflates a desired result with the conditions for producing it-cmditions that are not pemanent and that do not always consist in values. 'The conditions arc, in fact, variable, and they often have no connection with values, whether deeply held and sharcd or not. When it is said that Holland is a ""ccmsensus society,'-his calls up a picture of agreement as a normal and permanent conctitiom of sodety, of consensus as something given, a starthg point, This picture is mistakn. It ohsews that Dutch people are used to working hard to produce cmsen-

Against Consensus D 5'7 sus, to transforming and defining their differences in such a way that ail can agree to live with them. Such agreeme~~t c m be called "conse~~sus.~' When it is ofien aimed for and achieved, we may speak of a "consensus society""however, without f o r g e t t a that this indicates a desirable outcome of citizen interaction and not a preconditim for it.

Mihy is it that the consensus assumption is so widespread? 'This may have to do with the way people conceive of '"cultural facts,'Tdturd facts are facts that would not exist without human agreement-marriage, soccer, puberty, an order, law, money. They are ontologically sqective (Searle 1,9961, because their exjstence depends on what human st~bjectsdo and intend. In this they differ from ontologically abjecthe facts, like a thunderstom-t or the m m , which arc. what they are regardless of what human beings thhk and do. C)ntological subjertivit_)iand objectivity must be distinguished from episternic subjectivity and objectivity (Searle 1996:8). %stc is epistemically subjective; an observation that can be corrected is epistemicdy objective. Correct use of an esthlished language, st~chas English, is epistemically objective and mtoiogical.ly subjective. Culkrral facts get their sdid, objective "hhardness" (we cannot change them at will) through the "softf~(cultzlraXly and historically variable) aetivitks and interpretations m d e by human subjects. WI-ren these activities and interprtrtaticms stop or change, the cultural facts cease to be (MJhat they were). W e n wnrds, for instance, cease to be talcen or "counteca" as an order bp those hvolved, they cease being m ordcr. This character of cultural facts, once it is appreciated, makes it terrtpting to see them as based on co~~sensus in the seIIse of shared narmative cmvictions of all subjects who are involved h the ""creation" of those facts. However, their involwement need not be nornative at all. Most people are rclaljstic; they are not going to dcny the existence of facts. 'They stick tn the facts, regardless of wheth.er these are 'katural" (ontologically objective) or culturaf (ontdogically sqective). I speak Dutch because that is the lmguage normdy used in the count.ry w h e I~live; 1 use h t c h postage stannps because that is what it takes to send a letter-not because I hold a certain value or norm but because that is what the cultural facts are where I live. Through my behavj,or, X contribtlCe to l.he c o n h u e d existence of those culhral facts; but it is mistaken to see h this a consensus on norms and values. Such normative cmsmsus may or may not be there, empirically, among some of the people invo:[ved. But who acts out of inner conviction and who out of realistic conformism is difficult to sort out as long as the cultural facts are firmly established.

*snsuasua3e ss rroaprnuo;, Jam! m? I+ 8q3eq8:zo se 3a;rdzalq ol paqdmaq a n aivl3et.g ";ro~nsqaq I+ A~~ru~ojuoc, e 'qstlnsas teyt uxs~~~ausraq$ sy -waq$saqgnT3orxr qeyq uxsryeaz $nq"uo;$sp -m;, J a w ue *snswsuo~ qou sf 21 *asuasorr sayeur Waa~Besrp~ e qpj a ~ f ~ ~ -~F?$sP os a e s~3e.jaasaq asnesaq lnq zClan;3em~oum a q ~ J ! M 3 x 3 ~ Laqq asna3aq lou ~ 4 3 IerrrJlns ~ 3 oq yxqs 'am o$ sruaas ;11 "aldoad duvm .-rxlof$rpesjpm? aqqnox wasj3;lte oyiM asoyl %at!yilz E so$" l l i ~ II~M 1~ollsanht.q ~ $ 3 ~ 3 se-wag pq~oddns) e q rorneyaq ayl o$ ysrJs 0 3 f ~ s n ~ janqs ~ panyen V ~ MSOU ' q q f ~r-r~sayoq 30.1 e pazC~1dmAau asatf) asneDaq 'rzaye2s~ursf sul.;sou pug s a n p pa4ueq~ ~ s oaney j Lay2 q~y2 p n p e z p q y 8 w q ~ $ 3 asoql ~ 3 palrod Les o~ *as8qop dcqs n[!ivl 'zo~n.r;lyaq -dns 'urs:~-czas $0 $170 'a~ojaqO ~ M aldoad a s o u epaIt3anas aze s u o ; $ e ~ ~ o m Jql.xea uaq& zaq~exeq32rraprna-jIas ;s?aq~ asof o2 ufXaq ' ~ ~ ~ a p ~ ;iahaJeqiM 2uf " y "/ ~s l ~ eIemIns j uaqivl sa%my;,Afgeaz y 8 w q m uosea z a ~ a ~ l ; iJOJ

Deep Groups Under a Multicultural Surface

We have argued that plurality is not given but socially constructed and that codicts h loyalties are normal occurrences in the lives of citizens, However, in some societies and in certain pericrds we do not find variable pltrra,lity and confljcts but permanent grottps separated by unbridgeabe cleavages, Plurality seems to have frozen into hard groups, whose chiXLy relations are reinforced through repetitive social construction. Tempom"ry c d i c 6 seem to have become permanent emities. The organizatictn of pIusality is failing, again and again. This chapter considers such situations. Many &servers have assumed that they cmstitute the "normal" state societies are h. Earher, we mgued that regadless of wl.rether this was so in the past, at present, pluralily is much more fleetjng and variable. The historical movement is toward a pluralization of pZ"r"lity. (Lately; as in Bosnia, this movement seems to have changed direction, groupAhavirrg becom locked again into permanent e ity Further on h this chapter, 1 show how this change may be understood to arise out of the broader movement of pluritlizali.on.) Neverthdess, fixation into permanent group opposition does occur also in present-day societies and poses a serious cbailenge to the viability of citizenship as a principle of pubtic order.

Three characteristics make such sih;lations intrac.table for neo~publicans. Firstly being a member of a gmuE:, (and not primarily an individual) dominates social. perception and social relations, Assignment to memberhip takes place, vasi-autornaticaily or compulsively, on the basis oE visible

60

Deep Ciroups Under a MuIticuXturaI Surlface

characteristics ( s h , gender) and recognizable ways of living. tlsuatiy group membership also d o ~ ~ h a tself-perception. es But even when it does not, the social classification is so self-evident and dominmt that one can hardly escape it: "You can never forget &at you are black.'"%ey never let you forget that you are a woman." %c03zd1y, instead of the normal confiicts beween the demands of citizenship and, those of &her roles and officesthe normal codicts of loyalty in a differentiakd and plural society--we fhd a permanelt rqjectim oE, or incompatibjljty with, part of the rc3qubemeslts oi dtizenship. The group members are not, or do not behave as, full citizms. rIhirdly, their being less than full cifizms is not purely a result of exclusion a g a ~their t will. Their group metnbership is "willed" in some if not chosen, then at least accepted as an ineluctable part of what constitutes their idmtit)i; cJf who they m.The group membership functions as the context of meaning, the seE-evident settint;, witrhh cvl-rih choice is at ail possible, Mlitlnout that context, the= would, not even be a choosing self, so to say Croup membership has become a primary reality-take that away, and you depri\je people of the world they live in and make sense of, How does the neorepublican perspective deal with this reality of "deep" g o u p membership that confiicts with the requirements of citizens living together in the republic? First, by gi\ri,ng up the claints of exclusiveness that characterized earlier conceptions of camunitarian or republican citizenship. In the neorepuhlican view, claims of citizenship need not always have priari? over the obligations of other offices m d roles. Mso, neorepublicans accept that multiple citizenship-for hstmce, sinnultaneous citizenship of The Netherlands, of Turkey, and of the Emopean Won-has becornc commonp:lace. Corlflicts between the demands of difierent republics of which one and the same person is a member are c o n s i d e ~ dless and less d t e n in exclusive ideological terms of sovereignty or what have you. 'They are pragmatically regulated through tmaties, djplomatic compmmises, and court decisions-that is, if: anyone actually bothers to sort out the details. Mowever, regardless ol cvhether there is ofiicial multiple citizenship or not, the position of (mernbers of) groups inside the republic whose actions and clrnvictions conflict with thct minimum ~quirementsof citizenship camot so easily be accomodated by reddInition and by deideobgizislg conceptions of citizenship. Groups that are visibly characterized by the way they are oppressed, the way they intimidate, the way they live, the way they bok or smell-"guest" workers, mafiosi, women, hdians, Mormons, Muslims, or white male executives-won" go away or change their ~ l n t i o n with s other citizens through ~defir~ition. They pose probtems that extend beyond the conceptual level, But why exactly do they pose problems at all for the republic? Why not live and let live in the multicultural peace of plurality? Because such fixed

Deep Groups Under a Multicultural Surface D 6 1

and separate group life may c d i c t with citizenship in various waynot at its pragmatic periphery; but at its core, The republic wants choice for its citizens, Choice of one" own way of life. For chojce to exist, howto be rczprtduced. Should ever, atternathe ways of life-dhtres-need the republic provide extra protection to vulnerable cultures? X cannot choose to speak a language that nobody speaks. X n order to know what a way of life entails, hgtl-ty education may be needed. The only way to b o w what it is ta be a guru or a musicim is to devote one's life to it, entirely or for a considerable number of years, Citizens should be free to move in a d out of ways of life; but how can this freedom be ensured, when the way of life itself constilutes the context of maning wi.t.him which choice takes place, and when years of discipline might be rewired to begin to appreciate what t-he way of life entails? Sometimes, choice is djfficult to realize. Transsexual operat.ims, c h a n w g the color of one's skin, or acquiring a new Ianguage as a native tongue arc? at best (or at worst?) mly pclssihle for the few (such as Michael Jackstm).Being a member of a group, however much appreciated-as with women-may give disadvantages that citjzens ought not to have, Group life itself may involve relations in which some are permanently powerless and intimidated. Their position brerges on slavery, which may be defined as a situation of long-term,powerlessness. However freely chosen, slavery is not an option on the menu of democratic citizenship.

These considerations illustrate the incompatibility of citisnship with certain forms of sepmate group life. The neorepublican perspective allows for more and a wider variety of ways of life than most earlicr conceptions of citizenship; but its acceptance of plurality does not extend to those forms of behavior that make the organization oE diffewnces among citizens itself impossjble. Rut aga,in: W1-ty not leave the groups that do not fit alone? Why &odd, not all go their own way? Mrhy not let them have their own way of life, in their own 'kepublic""?ecause the lives of group members and those of the other citizens are connected-bp history, clance, earlier choice, or futurt. prospects-in a community of fate. 'They cannot avoid each other withcrut depriwing themselves of what is essential for their way of life (for instance, water supply, a via:ble economy, jnstitut.ions of learnjng, military protection, a judicial system, and. territory). They share a community of fate but disagree about the terms on which it c m be transformed into a republic that is willed by its own mcntbers, its dtizens. There is disagreement about the meanhg of membership that runs as deep as t-he level of what we call ""identity,"of who we a.

62

Deep Ciroups Under a MuIticuXturaI Surlface

A community of fate obtains when people are ccmnected in ways they cannot avoid-bodily (or in symbolic space that works as disedlp as bodily presence) and also systemically (for instance, through envir comections). 'f'he community oE fate is a "gi:venmin the sense that we cannat avoid it. But it only appears and is only expesielzced by way of a particular cultural interpretation. People m the territory are a given. Mihether they are trr-?atedas fellow citizms or lieporkd and killed in gas chambers is culturally variable. The primary given is people bumping into each other. It is this given, this chance event that could have been otherwise, to which citizenship is an answer-an anwer that transforms the givezz into the chosen, ar at least the accepted. Citizenship generates amas of choice, althollgh it is not usually chosen but rather given. What choice is there fn k i n g to die for the country you happm to have been born in (or h e r e your grandparelzts or your formes xnastecs/slaveho$.ers were born, as in the case of American soldiers in Europe during W r l d War D)? Citizens in the ~ p u b I i cconsider chance wm&y of determining their fate, to paraphrase Freud (Rorty 1989:22). The recurrent task of citizens is to transform the ""gven"%encounters between people into relations that artr accepted by citizctns. In order to achieve this, citizens must again m d again reproduce citizenship and the conditions in which it can arise. Logically, however, this trmsformation must be preceded by the perception of a "given'kcommunity of fate..Such communitiies are not given in the way stoncs and plane crashes are. S3eople may fail to notice otbcr people. (When such individuals am accused of bavin.g violated human rights-r of haviMg done notJling to stop the vicrlation-thrir blindness eniibies them to say inretrospect that they did not h o w the vidation was taking place,) The perception of people ""bump@ into" each other is dependent on the culturt! of the percei\.er, that is true; but once it has been perceived, it is a given that cannot be wished or defined away. How and where, then, do reprrblics perceive the community of people that is to be transfomed into citizens? In their practices of admission and exclusionbp deciding who is to be admitted or excluded as a citizezz-repubIics not only define what it is to be a citizen but also circurmscribe the community of fate-that is, the set of people vvho because of their place on earth and in history, qualify as aspiring cit_izens.'The community of- fate that forms the gken substmce of citizenshk is further defined by the way in which aspiring citizens are included. They may be put- in special camps, intermgat-ed by the police, required to take language courses, hvelcomed as vaiuable experts or as cjeaners of offices after working hours, In short, they acquire a p b c e in social and administrative hierarchies. But if h e y are to be citizens, there must be insidc that hierarchy one sphere were they are equals and to which access is never closed off for a long period: the public, politicai sphert?, where equatity between citizens is again and q a i n to

Deep Groups Under a Multicultural Surface D 63

be reconstituted. Citizenslzip is a position, an office within a hierarchy, whjch gives indjviduals an equal voice that is heeded and effective even in the presence of structures of hequality

EXCLUSIVE CULTURES

Earlier, 1 explained why the republic camot allow each and every group its own definition of citizenship (because the contixluation of their separate forms of life depends on the organization of the community of fate that they share). Howcver, these factors do not explain why c m u n i t i e s of fate are perceived today in such divisive and. antagonistic ways by their members. Groups of people increasingly celebrate and insist on their own identities and cu,ltures. States, in turn, are tightening ltle rules of access to citiznship and insisting on the uniqueness of the (culture of the) nation. Religious affiliation is on the rise as a factor defining one's position in the public sphere. Why are we wibessing this tightening of the cultural bonds of the local and the special, in a worln that was supposed to be "glclbaiizing," becoming less rigidly hierarchical and more tolerant of differences?Surprisingly, inFrance and quite a few other cot~ntries,the question of admission to citizenship is most vehemently posed where it matters least: with regard to those who are already on the territory and who are in the labor market and the social security system (Brubaker 1992:181). Unlike potential: immigrants, actual immigrants do not need citizen status to g a h ~access to ccweted positions in welfare states. Granting thern citizerlship does not "'cost" the estabhhed citizcrlry any money. Why, then, do citizens resist the granting of citizenship to immigrants? I'he new emphasis on culturl, and identity may he u n d e ~ t o o das arising out of- the plraralization of social rt.lati,o~~s, rather than as contradicting it. My argument is as follows: When hirmhical rules and constrictions became weak and wbrn plurality and indiviciualism became more prevalent, groups are no longer primarily reproduced by havhg a piace in a given hierarchy. In order to survive, they must constantly redefine and reconfirm *ernselves, :It is conviction, culture, and right thinking that hold them together. Groups-or states-tht kel that their place in the wnrld is not secure and not automatically reproduced resort to such strategies of cultural reproducticrt.1.Ef nothing else hotds "us" together, then a common care, an ida~tity,should do the job. Heated talk and vioient- fighls about identity, &out who ""we"hre, arise precisely whese such identiv is not an easy and setf-evident reality. When such conflicts arise, sects quarrel and split; bigger churches establish hierarchies. Sects quarrel about right thinking and. are divided by their very effort to maintain the community of equally true believers (where. none is holier t-hmanother): Their mern-

64

Deep Ciroups Under a MuIticuXturaI Surlface

bers believe that only right tbinking can hold the gmup together. Hierarchies, in contrast, are held together by established rules and institutions that provide separate compartments for all kinds of thinkhg and dissidence. 'They do not split; they differentiate. This understmding of the increashg emphasis on culture and identity in our times is, of course, not compelfing, because it does not meet the Pctpperian criterion of falsifiability. It understmds both pluralization and its apparent opposite, the new cultucal exclus-iveness, in terms of: the same contixluing trend of dehiesarchizatim, However, it has the merit of at least makhg some sense out of the strong emphasis on culture and identity that characterizes our time.

Mihat repertoire does the newpublican perspective offer for coping with culturat djversity and exclusiveness?Fi,rstl~ it squarely refuses to let itself be drawn into the maelstrom of cultural exclusiveness. It rejects the demand that a supposedly unique naticmai culturc. be the basis of living to(j("thEJ~ 9condl.y it accepts plura:lity as t? basic given in contemporary societies that should be orgmized m d not mitigated or wished away by the actions a d demmds of citizens. 'This point of deparbre makes it easier for nearepublicans to accept multiple citizenship than it was for adherents of prc-1989 conceptions of citizenship. 1Phirdly neoregublicans9focus on practicai competence in tbe organization of plurality rather than on right principles alone gives thcm an eagerness to learn :mm practice and ovation (inventkg new combinations of practices). Such pragmatic flexibility is ofien missing in older notions of citizenship accordjng to which Cheory and pmctice rnight diverge, but such divrrgence had no place in the theory itself. The neorepubfican perspective, in contrast, has a theoretical place for the practical activities a d developi~~g competences of citizezzs in action. Practical arrangements that have developed for dealing with semipermanent incompatibilities betwecln citizenship and o&er culhral loyal~es are sPudjed not only as to their princies but also as to what is rewired to brhg them about, as to how people cczpmduced them. mink, for instmce, about arrangements for consckn~ousobjections to military servire, or for ~ f u s a io sf inocula,tion; of: co~zsoci,atiodarrangeme~~ts in The Nethcslnnds; and of relations betvveen churches and statcrs. What is interestkg Inre is not primarily the principles but ra&er the competences of all involved in the mmkhzg of compromises, whde they disagreed on crucial prkciples. Zn Russia, politicians might want to create coalitions, but often fail-in part, because they simply lack the practical know-how Of course, the neorepubli-

Deep Groups Under a Multicultural Surface D 65

can perspective does not reject principles altogether. fn this book I have formdated prh~ciplesthat may be used both as guides for practicai orientation and as cmstraints on what kinds of plurality s h d d be tolerated. Howevele, the bottleneck for effective citizenship lies not so much with prh~cipleas with using them skilf,fuI],yin a diversity of pracrtical sihations, of people and gmups "bumping" into each other. Some have argued for special puhlic rights for "idtmtitr groups as such, djsl-inct .from Ihe rights of indjviduai ejtizens: cdturilil rights, rights to group representation in politics and to self-government. Kyznlicka (1995:27-B), for instance, distinguishes m m g three forms cJf group-differentiated rights-polyethnic rights, special representation rights, and self-government rights. Here, also, the neorepublican perspective emphasizes practical competence and compromise. It rejects such rights in principle, in the sense that il free to choose, it would ralher grmt rights only to citizens as such, However, the= is never, except in theory, such a freedom to choose. Citizens, whether ruling c ~ rbeing ruled, altvayt; find themselves in a sihaatiosl of given pluxdity and djffercnces that they have not chosen but that they have to wol-k on with citizenship for all as a guideline, The neorepublican view does not make first principles a31important; instead, it e~nplhasizesthe prhciple of practical competence in organizing plurality*It will quite readily accept special, cultural rights, if these do not create too many new inequalities m d c d i c t s . Special practices, s~tchas Ihe religioLtsly correct killing of animals, will be allowed, but only in buil.djngs and in settings where offense and visibility to others is minimal. In The Netherlands, privatre schools organized around particular educational and religous views are p.ublic1y financed on an eqztaX footing with public education. Special group rights in politicai =presentation are less easily accepted from the neorepublican point of view. The citizens themselves should form. groups and be free to exit from them. If group life in the public-social and the public-political reafms is not sustained by the activiks of a sufficient number of free citizens, there must be good and compelling grounds for mahtahing g m p s a I q other mutes, Suck grounds may be found in the preservation of cultures and ways of life fnr future gmeratims, in structural disadvantages for melnbers that extend into the public-political realm itself, and.in the unavailabiliq of alternative ways to maintain civil peace (as in South Africa). Rghts of self-govermnt, finally arc very unat-tractive .from a neorepublican perspective. They arc d y appropriate where the communi.q of y up, or whew splitting it up is not too difficult, ccrsty, fate has a l ~ a d split and unjust. Granti,ng self-government where the c m m i t y of fate remahs illtact and tight is a recipe for inefficiency and conflicts like those we have wibessed in Yugoslavia. Such a policy takes away the stabs of

This page intentionally left blank

SIX E-7

E-7

E-7

Citizens in Public Office

In 19992, Czechoslavak President Vhclav Havel (1992:&8) wrote of the requircments for effective political: leadership: Vi%at you need is tact, the proper instincts, and p o d taste. Che suryrising experience from ''high politics" is this: 1 have discc~veredthat gcmd taste is more important than a postgraduate degree in pc~liticalscience. It is esxntialty a matter of fc?rm:h a w i n g how long to speak, when to begin and when to finish, how say something politely that your oppcysilte number might not want hear, how ta say, always, what is mast essmtial in a given moment, and not to speak of what is not essntial or rminteresting how to insist on your own position without offending, how to create the kind of frimdly atmosphere that makes complex negcgiations easier, how to keep a conversation going without prying or, on the contrary, without being aloof, how to balance xrious political themes with lightex; more relaxing topics, how to plan one's journeys judiciously and how to knaw tvhen it is more appropriate not to go mmewlwrer when to be open and when reticent, and to what degree.

I-low does this emphasis on civility relate to the viotence, lies, and unseelnly and selfish behavior said to be so common in po:[itics? Mavel provided a simple answer: "Rut it is simpIy not true that a politician must lie or intrigue. That is utter nonsense, very often spread about by people who-for whatever reason-wish to discourage olhers from takng an interest in public affairs. . . . It is not true that d y the mfetzl:ing cynj.c, the vain, the brash, and the vulgar can succeed in politics; all such people, it is true, are drawn to politics, but in the end, decorum m d good taste will a h a y s count for mure.'" He had to reconsider his answer, however: This is t v b t I wrote (sr~memonths ago) tvhen I tried to review the experience I had gain& during my presidcmcy. At the time X had no way of knowing that I: would m m fhd that there were occasions when it was indwd dif&cultto go

68

Citizens in Public Office

that route. . . . But I still believe that politicts, in its very esmecl, dcxs not necessarily require one to behave immorally. My latest experience, however, con.firms the truth of xlmethjng that, until scyme weeks ago, T did not really apprec i a t e t h a t the way of truly moral politics is not simple$or easy.

Havel" experience is exemplary for the prclblems experitnced by citizens who want to serve their =public by h d d h g public office. I'his chapter focuses on the special opportunities m d problems of combhing general citizenship with a particular public office. If citizenship entails bein.g ruled by cocitizens, then the way they exttrcise public authority is of central importance: Citizen competence must reveal itself there, if anywhercz. However, the combination of citizenship m d public office is not only centsat but also problematic,. M e n exercising spt?r?iaIpublic authority, citizens arc allc.>wt?dor required to do things that as ordinary citizens they are forbidden to do. Ifolicmen use violence and deprive cocitizens of their freedom; juliges decide m matters of life and death; members of padiament change the laws that as ordinary citizens, they have to obey; and a genaal exposes his men to extraordinary risks. Given the different obligativns ol: citizens and public officers, it is understandable that their dose combination is seldom emphasized. The connection is usually considered in terms of democracy and law. The citizen votes; chosen repremtatives decide; anci their democratic decisions are implemented by officeholders who can, if: necessary, be corrected, by citizens (and other legal subjects, such as iims) through courts of law*In my view, this model is laudable but offers too little, It leaves the citjzernship of those who bold public oMice and excrcise the power of the sword over their fellow citizens out of view, Citizenship &odd make a difference in the exercise of authoriw in all ~ g i o n of s the puhlic &main.. h d it should do so not only by providing ""ordinary" citizerns with rights of refusal and resistance but also by allowing occupants of public office to exexise their ciltizenship while doing their work, Citizmship shoufd appear and work not only ag~insfbut ajso in pllblic oMice. It involves both knowhg how to rule and how to be ruled. If citizenship stops where parot have much effect. ticular public authmity begins, them it c This exnphasis on the citizenship of officehddws is not contmon. Usually the focus is on the "ordinaryff ccitizien, whose ordinariness precisely consists in his not holding any particular office. 'The mere, naked citizen is posited opposite the holders of office. There were good grounds for such a cmceptuaiiizatim hhistorical situations inwhich citizenship for alf was not yet an established constitution& principle, as for example, in E'rmce

Citizens in Public Office D 69 under the old rt;gime or in Czechoslovakia betwen 1968 and 19B. Ch-tce the principle is accepted, however, such a conceptualization is coulzterpmduetive and misses a most important point of cil-izenship, It is cwnt e ~ m b c t i v ebecause efforts to hnprclw the positim cJf "ordinary""citizens can never move beyond generalities, The tlrdjnary citizen is t-he one who is, by definition, wifiolxt special powers. Insofa* as the effort to provide him or her with special powers succeeds, he or she ceases, by defhition, to be an ordi,nary citizczn-'The conceptuation of the citizen as "ordinary" misses an important point by neatly separating the roles oi citizen and officehdder. Such a separation may be convenimt, but it defhes away the very problems of conacting loyalties and the organizdion of plurality, on which citizensfiiy is supposed to work. For neorepuhlicans, citizenship is not a safe and separate possession but rather is hammered out m d given shape in dealhg with dis'tul;&ing and surprising differences, The p1ura.lit.y that citizens organj.ze obtains not ody between individuals and other entities in pulslic-social space but also between offices in pzlblic-political space. The demands of these offices may conflict; and in deciding how to deal with such confljct, citizenship should be a guiding principle. In order to highlight this, I have ccmceptllalized citizenship as an o f i a among other offices. Citizenship is not only defined. and given shape by special institutions and d e s for citizenship, but also in the exercise of other offices, and in institutions that are primarily centered aromzd concerns other than those of citizenship. It is in the osganizatian of the plurality of offices that we (continue to) show, learn, and discover what citizenship is. Citizenship is developed not only when thc clemands of (the office of) citizenship conflict with those oi other public offices but also when various special public officers-for instance, a cabinet minister and a general or the head of the secret scrvice-disagree about what I-heir respansibilities are. Citiznship in this view is a criterion for oritntation and.evaluation in the exercise of puhtic office and the d e s i p of public imtitutions. In 1,992, the htcln Scientific Council on Governfnemt Policy cmmissianed studies to flesh out and test this view (Van Gmsteren and Den Hoed 19532).Scholars with exprtise in a diversity of practices wert?asked to r e p & what orientation-if any-the neo~publicanconceptim of citizenshi.p provided in the particuhr practice they werc concerned with. Most questions and =ports cmcerned practices and roles in the puhliepditical sphere (tax inspector, soldier, po,i.ceman, civil servant under foreign occupation, public rclatims officer, head of the htemal security service).. Some reports conct-tmed practices and roles fn the public-soriat sphere (journalist, teacher, ul-remployed worker). In the folf ocving discussion, I have drawn upun these earlier studles. I have left aside the skdles of other societal practices a d roles-for instance, dnag addicts, mmtatfy

70

Citizens in Public Office

hartdkapped persons, or children-in MIhich those invdved arc. insufficient:ly capable of ruling and therefore are "incompkte'kitizcns. Their position poses different problems, What is at stake in the relations between citizens and pu23lic office? Historically, the delnand for protection against arbitrary rule usually c m e first, claselly followed by the demand for equajity before the law-that is, for one regi"e cJf known laws that applies to all persons eqtraliy. Later came the demmd for democracy, for a say in making and changing the content of the laws, which was closelly fullowed by the demand for democratic cmtrol over policymaking and over administrathe implctmentation of the laws. It has become clear to many that this kind of remote control is at present i n s a c i e n t to ensure the rule of citizens over citizens. In turbulent situations, administrators simply have too much Leeway, too much discretionary power. To keep administration on the republican track, therefore, we want it to be h the hands of socitizens who do not corngietely bracket thrir citizenship but rather, remember while ruling, what it is to be ruled; cocitizens who can stay the course of citizenship even while navigating in turbulent waters. A growing number of scholars of democratic governance insist that. retrcrspectiveiy holding rders ~ s p m s i ble is no longer sufficient to guide most of their public activities. Ordinary citizens expect rulers to use citizenship as a compass in unknown waters, but without neglecting the special rules and requirements of their particdar dices, f17 quieter times, it could still be a s s m d that those rdes and requirements were such. that sticking to them w d d also be the best way to realize citizenship. Ncrwadayt;, when administraton; are more freqraently confronted hvith the unexpected m d the unhown, conRicts between the demands of citiznshiy and those of special offices are sharper and more frequent. How artl citizens who occupy special d i c e s to deal wi& .Crhese?

EXTREME SITUATIONS

:It may be helpful to begin with an erctreme case-that of civil servants in the Net;-herlmds under German occupation, durhg World War 11-where the contours of the problem are retrospectively magnified, Aiter the war, a number of civil servants were b r o u e t to trial before courts and investigative committees for a k g e d wrongdojngs they had committed as civil servants during the foreip occupation, But what exactly had, they done wrong, and under what rules and i11 what capacity were they being tried (Den Hoed 199213 In mmy cases, they had broken no crimhal law, committed no c r h e agaixrst humanit)., and violated no expllcit rule governing their office. Nevertheless, their behavior during the war was deemed

Citizens in Public Office D 7 1

to be wrong and they were disciplined, demoted, c ~ rfired. On what groulzds? The proceedings m d punishments begh to make sense whe~z we see them in terms of citizenship, Civil servants were held accountable as citizens who failed to dt, what is required of citizens in the particular situation they were in-that of: civil, servants under foreign occupation and rule, Fate had brought them into a dificult situation, in which. they failcd to dt, what was necessary to maintain the cornmunip of fate that obtained between citizens. Many civil servants who were found guilty we= convicted not because of their membership in a particular organization of collaborators, nor because they served a fowign power, but because they failed to act adecfclately as the "shield m d sword" of the citizens. The judges argued that t h y should have protected citizens more effectively against the German authorities. Another wrongcfoing, according to the courts, consisted in their havi,ng led citize~zsastray b y setting a bad example: By collaboratirrg with the occupiers, the civil servants had created the hpression that this behavior was right, that this was the thhg to do. 'They had failed to act as exemplary citizens. Another extrem case is that of the secret service that is supposed to monitor and protect the repubiic agahst internal strbversion. At issue here is not foreig~zoccupation but the "no go" areas that ought to be, or that seem to be, ruled by the law and its sword but in, fact are not. The director of the Dutch security service in 3.992 wrote an article tellingly titled 1992). Secz~rityservices "Citize~zshipin extremist' "octers van Lee~~welz use the worst of means, such as asking citizens to inform against each. other, or disseminating knowiedge about somecme without opporbnity for rcbuttd, toward a laudable end-tlhc secwity of the dentncratic state and the rule of law. The latter, in turn, form the framework with;isr which citizenship can be exercised. But instead of protecting citizt-tns, security servkes often have done the reverse. They have a bad puta at ion because they have, as with Napoleon and Fouch4 or the Stasi in East Gemany, been used to protect the state ucyai~zstlegitimate activities of its citizens. The existence in and ol a security service is full of paradoxes and dilemmas. In order to protect a demcratic pmccss, a securiv service is created the actions of which are surrounded by a secrecy tbat, in turn, runs counter to demcratic openness and pu&lie debate. When, on what. gromds, is a security operatiosl that may impirnge heaviiy on the lives of citizens to be started? Mere rurnors are not enough. But what if they concern matters that, if true, are very serious? W e n is it time to stop an operation? 'These are all questions of proportionalit_ythat demand judgment and ""virtuaf" citizenship, that is thinking in terms of citizenship and public M a t e in situations where these cannot fully unfold. In, a dernocraticconstitutional state, cooperation of citizens with the security service is voluntary. May the service accept such cooperation when this puts the cif-

72

Citizens in Public Office

izen in acute danger of which he or she is insufficiently w a r e ? To whom and how should the servke report? If only those who "need to how"' are informed., there is ample room for mnipulation. At least a few persons outside the service should have an overview and be fully informed. This still leaves us with a situatio~~ in which a few b o w "everythhg"; a small number, much; a larger number, something; and many nothing. This is highly undesirable. T l ~ esecurity service should, therefore, not be exennpted from public dhate. It is clifficull to sail between the Scylla of apemess and the Charybdis of secl.ecy; yet it is precisely in such situation+where the democratic pmcess is defective and tl-te leeway for judgment and deception great-that citizenship is needed, that we want to feel that we are ruled by cocitizens.

'The cases of citize~lsinpublic office that we have considered thus far concern situations of extremit-yin which the normal functioning of the repuhlic, including its d e s of office, is defecthe or has been suspended. In such situations, citizenship fmctions as a lcind of alternative site or buiiding block from which the repubk can be reconstituted. But what bearing does h i s have on ncrrmal sikations? Qllite a lot. First oE all, it sharpens our wareness of dangers lurking in apparently normal situa.t.ions*(This may also make people oversuspicious and thereby undermine the republic. However, perception and wareness need ncrt automatically lead to action. Judgme~~t and wisdom lie in h~owingw h e ~ not~ to react, 'This is precisely what reflection on the securiy service may show.) Secondly by seeing distinctions magdied in extreme sihrations, citizens may learn to make finer distinctions and to judge in qujetez; everyday situations as well. mirdly, the normal is no fonger as normal as it used to be, n"i.live, it is said, in turbulent times-tknes in which tradition, self-evident context, and "b~lshessas usual" more and more often p v e unreliable or insufficient guides for action, For m q peopk the unstructured, the extraordinary, the surprising, and the unknown have become normal occurrences, to be expeted as past: of daily life. This; does not mean that we should discard traditional proceduses or take the rdes that govern the hnctioning of public offie lightly acting as if we were altvays in extreme situations: People cannot, or at least shovlld not, be asked or forced to live that way. It is, however, an argument to m r e creatively and frequently use citizenship to keep ~ i n g on s their ""nomal"kcourse in the =public-""nomal"" here meanhg both normative and usual. The relation betvveen citizenship and other public offices in the republic is in fact an old theme. 'I'he right to bear a m s and serve in a citizen arnty;

Citizens in Public Office D 73 the right to a fair trial, to an adversary pmcedurc. in wbich the accused has equal standing with the accusers m d judges; and the principle of no taxation withvut representation were central in the establishment of earlier republics. Citizens acquiwd some stallcling agaitlst plablic authmity that earlier was exercised over them as subjects without their consentW h t is prharily at stake nowadays in a neorepubllican perspeckbe isl however, citizenship in the exercise of public authority, citizwhip as a constitutive principie for design of and judgment in public office. Jacgues van Doom (1992) has argued, in his study ""Cit-izens in Unie will% form," that the citizen who decides to be a soldier and f i e ~ f o r is to bear the furthest reaehing consequence of his crjtizenship (i.e., death) chooses a special status. Citizenship assumes, after all, a certah degree of freedom and independence, whereas for soldiers, loyalty to one's own organization takes priority Van Daorn questioned whether compulsory milibry service should be rcgaded as a duty of citizenship. The system of general, cclmpulst-trymilitary service e n s m s that the msponsibility for maintaining the pnitical commmity is evcnly djstributed. Military service is regarded as a manifestation of dedicated participation in a crucial activity of that s m e community and is part of the educaticm young people rczceive to become respctnsible citizerns. In that- view, compulsory military service is a civic duty, .And yet many democracies have tl-ouble with it or even reject it. Apparently, military service is ~garcledas m instrumernt of the state raCt.ler than as a maniiFestation of ejtizenship. Many people do not acknowledge a citizen duty to serve h an organization in. which so many citizen rights am bracketed. Current social developments confirnn this. The bond betwecn dtizern and army is looserning, and the dcfense of the corntry is left to a specialized force. Fomally, the soldier is a citizm. Xn eality, however, the prac~ceof citi~ n s h i within p the m y appears extremely problematic. The army airns to irnpose its sill on the enemy by way of (the threat) of massiw violence, Its skucture is geartrd toward this goai: It is hkrarchical, discir>lined,fomal, target-orielzt.4, and isolated. As experielzce has shown, such cmtralty led organi.zations tend to discczurage and limit the expression of citizenship by their members; and indeed, the a m y leaves its members little room for the exercise of citizenship, either inside or outside the organization. The tension that is Observed between military service m d citizenship will have to be acct-pkd, however, because tbe army can pose as great a danger to thc. =public when it has too mwh ci,t.izenship as kvhen it has too little: 15 the army is to be an effective fighGng force, its members c individually to assess tbe legality or legithacy of a t; to act according to their separak assessme~zts.Thus, whether a (ow degree of ci"tizenshipin the a m y actually puts the republic at risk necessarily depends more on the mahtrity of the political order within which and on be-

74

Citizens in Public Office

half of which the a m y functions than m the army itself. Nc?ver-thekss,W expect our cocitizel~swho seme in the armed forces to r e a d e r their citizcnsfip at the same time as they obey mititary mles and political, authurities, and to give the demands of citizenship priority on occasim wben they conflict with the demands of the lane%as in&e cases of crimes against hummity or of mtjdernocratic political instructions. Likewise, we expect p"iiwm"n and prosecutors to fotlow the legal rules governing their offices but also not to foset what it is to be a citizeln who is being ruled. In other words, they must take the rules seriously but not as absolute and exclusive guides. This is no easy assipment. The obligation of policemen and prosecutors to treat alleged trespassers of the law as cocitizens and not as people (who have placed themselves) outside the protection of the legd order is alm not easy to fulEill. Talk about ""cimhals'hs if they were another kind of being c m e s easily, but it is wrong. The legal order knows no "criminals" but only citizens or legd subjects who have violated a law, The violator is within the legal order and therefore? is punished as a responsjble citizer~.People who because ol some defect-because they are in s m e way different heing-camot be held rc.sponsi:ble arc. not punished but are put w a y in special institutions such as asylums, where they are treated and kept. The primary paint of police work and prosecution is not exclusion but maintenance of the Legal order. This is too easily forgotten by officeholders at all levels who are no longer guided by mrnory or imaf;jna.t.ianof what it is to be on the otbcr side of office, ammg those who are being ruled by it ( 3 t a r t 1994). They have foqotten their common citizenship. Like soldiers and policemen, tax inspectors today are professionals whose h o r n no longer depends on the amount of taxes that they extort from the king's subjects. They artl officials wlio according to d e s made by the citizelzs' representatives in parliament, determhe what their cocitizens must pay However, in a turbulent world, those rules leave ample and increasing room for interpretation and discretion. I l o w are inspectors to act? In recent decades, in The Netherlands, the answer :has been given in terms of an efficiently managed and '"productive" organi.zatim. The Internal Revenue Service has taken the corporation as its guiding model for rclnrganizjng itself. Ed van dtr Ouderaa (1992) points out that tax inspectors thereby lose their hdependent positjon and wit% it the possibjlity of exercising citizenship in their office. 11%the =design of the internal revenue service, the citizens were cmceived of as clients and the citizenship of the inspector in the fulfillmnt of his office was forgotten. If citizenship is to play a role in the hlfillment oE office, it should also be a principle in the design and (re)orgmization of that office. Until. recently#the political arclna was largely dominated by the power of the w d , the sworcl, and money. In the twntieth century two other

Citizens in Public Office D 75

kinds of power have risen to the fore: organizatim and knwledge, 'The power of organization was recognized by revolutionaries such as Lenin, by businessmen, and by poli.ticians who organized their parties. The que"ticm of what responsibilities citizens who are managers of organizatinns have, becarne pair?fuurly loud when Nazi leader Karl Adolt: Ekhmann, an organizer of the extermjnation of Jews, defended himself against accusations oE war crimes by pointing out: that he personally had never wished the Jews ill; that he hhself had not murdered Jews; and that he had done nothing but follow legal rules and regulations. The power of botrYledl;e is on the rise and is expected to increae in t.he age of informtim that we are now entering. liobert Reich (19x1)consid,ers symbolic analysts, h s e who can understand and rearrange symbols, the primary generators of economic growth and income (for themselves and for others). ?'he responsibiiity olcitizens who have access to technical knowledge is a hotly contested issue. Cases in point arc that of the German rocket scientists, ammg them Wemer von Braun, who were brought to the United States after World War I1 m d granted U.S. citizenship in return for develophg a new generation of weapons; and that of RObert Oppenheher, who headed the team that built the first atomic bomb and who was subsequently accused of un-American conduct. h o t h e r shhing example is the Russian scientist and dissident Andrei Sakharov, Questions concerning these leading scientistsf responsibilities as citizens, which are often ratrher unilfuminatingly ddated in moral terms, can, X submit, become somewhat more tractable when citizenship is defined as a public office. The similar ~spmsibilitiesof o t k r symbolic anaiysts-d the communicators who carry ixnportmt messages to the p.ubl.ic m d of the ~ C W rhetoricians who manipulate these mdia-arc equally great. U.S. Pmsident Ronald 1Ceat;an often has been praised as "the great communicatorf6; but Mifiail Gorbachev's similar success in communication was compared by Gesmm Chancellor Helmut Kohl to that of Paul Joseph Goebb&, the Nazi minister of pmpagmda.. Goebbels the communicator, Von Braun the scientist, Eiclhmmn the organizer: This trio shows how reAectirrg on the documented experience of Hitler" Germany can help clarify the respcmsibilities of citizens h-thigh public office today. The question of citizezzship can be posed not only with regard to occupants of office in public-political space but also with a view to the roles and functions that people fulfil1 in society in what W earlier c d k d public-socid space. mhk.of a journalist, a lilwyer, members of the board n( a foundation, a soccer referee, an mgineer who is in charge of daily operat a conglomerate of tions and security at a nuclear plant, or the p ~ s i d e nof whjch one firm vioXates a weapons boycott or elemelrtary safety precautions, Each may, suddenly and without having chosen to do so, find. himself in a situation in which cocitizens demand, or will ~trospectivelyde-

76

Citizens in Public Office

mand, that he remember his citizenship and bring it to hear on the way he fulfills his special fz~~~cticm. C)bviously, such demancts o&en ace unwelcome, Une w d d rather ignore them, or not have heard them, if only because it is so difiieult to invent a suitable Rsponse. 'lb practice citizenship in such offices is m r e difficdt than it is in the voting booth. Hwever, actors in public-sorrial spare do find orientation in civil law and court decisions, which tell them, through a rich EcaIeidoscope of cases, what they may reasonably expect fmm each other and l.hemselves, Civil law tells them what treating the o t h r s as equal participants hcivil interaction entails-h what ways they are obliged to take into account other persons m d their goads.

DISTURBING DEMANDS

This chapter does not pmvide an exhaustive overvim of citizenship in ld more study and atterntion to public offices and roles, That w ~ t ~require differences of meming by country and era, The above serves mercly to develop some idea of tryhat is invoked. It is a first exerilise from an angle that is usually ignored. The expordion yields some conclusions. Without normality, without things that can be taken Eor granted, good interaction and safe existence ace not possible. This valuable insi@t howevm, does not show us which, or more prtlcisely, Ml)nose things that are taken for granted. will prevajl, The power to define normlity is not divided e ~ a l l yA . second ohserva~onrelating to nomality is that it changes wer time. M a t used to be normal need no longer be so. From the perspective of citizencihip, these two observations-of uneyual power of definiti, and of us to make normaliv a problem. Just as e v e 7 change over tim-fortle speaker of Dutch is a easrier of language, so every citizen is a legithate codefiner of normali@. Nomaliit)i can be adjusted by interventions h x s r citizms and is, to them, not a decisive given. Because of the fact that the mgmizhng power of normality lies to a great extent in its obviaus~~ess, norot be problematized without encomterhg tensions. 'Ihere is not one moraiity, a ki11d of "natural" civic respcmsibility, which springs forth ready-made from society We find instead mdtiple moralitics, connected with the various practices citizens participate in, The citizens9task is to combine these in such a way that the production oE citizens is furthered and not hamperczd. There is no ready-made fnrmula for succeeding in this task, Even when we limit ourselves to two conflicting sets of demands, namely those of citizemhip and those of a particular office, there is no clear-cut priority for the one or the other. From the neorepublican point of view, neither citizenship nor the rules of office may be t a k n as absolute. Of caursc?,in normal circurnstmces the rules of a par-

Citizens in Public Office D 77

ticular office should usually get priority. If it were. otherwise, that wodd mean that the office shodd be =designed. Whe11 m office is reasonably well designed in a repu:blic, we may a s s m that its demands usuallly will. coincide or fit with those Of citizenShip. However well designed, sometimes there are serious conflicts that cannot be resolved by a single fomula. Here we need to practice (to learn by doing) the specific citizemsf competenw of orga"i"ing difkrence: judgmeM, coprodltction with fellw crjtkens, and Ihe cowage to ehoose and stand up for your choice, This is no easy matter-not only because the right course of action is not clbvious but also because the consequences for the person involved nnay be very unpleasant, -Think of the fate of whistle-blowers in organizations, who however they may be admircd in times when they courageously exposed some evil, so oAen ended up with their personal lives and their careers in shambles. The demands of citizenship are disturbikzg not onty because they demand a disruption of what counts as normdcy in the name of the normativity of citizenship but also because they may pose a really tragic choice. Tragir situations are such that whatever way one turns, smething dear and of uncontested value will be sacrificed. Tragic choices are painful. We would like to avoid, thcnt. Where they are unavoidable, we uslralfy entrust them not to individuals but to officials in robes, whose acthities are circumscribed by rules and supported by rituafs of office. If is therefore predsely jn the fulfill.memt of particular pllblic d i c e s t-hat crjtizens will, be confronted with tragic choices, especially so when the demands of citizenship invite them to move beyond the safety provided by the d e s and rituals of: office. W also try to avoid tragic choice by reekristenj,ng the lesser of two evils as goad. h real life, this deception does not work. The killing of one person to save ten other lives may be the thing to do, hut it =mains evil. 'This trutf7 was cantared by Saint Augustjne of f-Ijppo, who told early Christians that they had m ubligatim to serve the state, al.though by hlfilling it, tbry mit;ht commit more sins. This chapter has shown that citizelnship is at stake in the fulfilhnent of public office, and in what ways, It is precisely in addressing the problematic relations between the demands of citizenship and those of a particular office that occqants of those offices and ci.tizens who have to dcal with them show and learn what citizenship in the republic entails. It is there, among other places, that citizens are formed and citizenship is cmstituted. The idea of citizenship is a gtlideline for the fulfillrnetlt ol office; a corrective for the "~narmal"~de.mands of office; and a safety valve for ~votrxtionarysituations in which the constit-utimairdations between offices i,n the republic have been disrupted or have becom unstabk.

This page intentionally left blank

Part Three

How Citizens Are Formed

This page intentionally left blank

SEVEN E-7

E-7

E-7

Education

After havirrg looked at what citizms do, at t h i r practices of frcedom, we now turn to how citizens artr fomed, to cultural ~prcrductionand ernancipation. Citizens do not come into the world all at once, i,n a M y mature state, but are formed through education m d experience, The reproduction of citizens is primarily the business of adult members of society in their practice of freedom. Kztt it is also a question of: Che admission to m e d e r s h i p and the emancipation toward freedom of newcomers, of people in positions cJf quasi slavery, and of children who artl being educated for elntry inlo a particufar culture and political regime. 'This chapter addresses one access route to citizmshlp: the education of children. Other ways along which citizms arc. formed, such as in immigmtion or in the discipline of pertarming a job, will be consid,ered in sllbseqllcnt chapters. Complaints about contemporay eduration are common: It is hefficicnt and expensive, its outdated curricula and methods of teaching do not adequately prepare the brighter students for life in a podindustrial economy, while the less gifkd or less privileged ones d e n leave school: without hawing acquired basic skills of reading, writing, and calculati~~g. Educational reform,, of both inslitations and curricula, is on the agenda. Comp1ain.t~about pditics are heard just as often: Politicians are inept or corrupt, the political process is characterized by inertia and stagnation, ordinary citize~zsturn away fmm ordinary polities tocvard private enjoyment or political ext~misxn,Political reconstruction, as in centrd Europe, the European Unim, Italy, and fapan, is m the agenda. There are fikewise complakts abou"f:rnality: Relativism m d callousness are rmpant, and there is a loss of social cohesion and community, of respomibiljty and civility. Moral ~gemraticmis on the agenda. Coxnbined, the agendas of moral, political, and educatinnai refarln have stimulated an interest in education for citizenship (Pangle 1392; Steiner 19%; Gutman 1987; Dc? WLnter 1995). Would such education pro-

duce politically active and loyal citizens who cherisl-r and respect moral values and norms, and who are competent and flexible e ~ ~ o u gtohfunction in turbulent and high-tech markets? Before one can begin to answer such a question, one must consicier what qualities of education are necessary to the effective practice of dtiztmshjp.

DANGEROUS QUESTIONS

These are dangerous questions. m y ? In studies of citizenship, the turn toward educati.on is always suspect, because it often disguises a failure to understand and i q r o v e citizen interaction among adults. Problems of citizenship concem issues that a d d & have to settle among themsefves. 'The political process itself is the most important ecfucation for citizenship. The concern with education for citiz,enship is often fed by irresponsible, wishful thinking: If men were diEferent, they would not have the problet us &erefore make a new man. Such a trmsformatio~~, if it has a place anywhere, beloqs to the realms of religion and. art, It should be kept out of politics, because there it usually results in hdoctrination and murder. Thus, education and upbringing Should not be used as means for solving problems of citizenship, They should provide access to citizenhip such as it is-no more and no less. The education of children s h o d not be used to solve problems that adults have. However, it is an illusion to thhk that such misuses of education c m be woicied by insisting on 'keutralf%schoolingthat focuses exclusively on readir?g, hvriting, cakulating, and more advanced technicat skills. Tn educational practice, inequality and.dependency are unavoidable. Dealing with them, organizing dilference and unequal vuhera:bility is therclfore?equally una\roi.dable. M e n W recall that the ~ ~ " " j z a t i ool n difference (insuch a wa)i that everyone has a respected place and voice) is what citizenship is about, then we see that citizenship is always at stake in educational practice, regardless of whether those involved h o w it. Shndents learn by how adults, particutirf. their teachers, deal with difference and d e p d e n c e , by how they go &out the tasks of heeding the weaker and inarticukte voices of"mmbers of a commmity and oE fnstering their competence. Education is unavoidably a practical exercise in citizenship. A second reason why neutral schoolhg is not an o p t i o ~is~that citizens do not grow spontaneously from the tree of civil soclet).. Prunhg-m&ing choices of a political natw-is indispensable at mmy turns. Such choices are made by parent" teachenS,and other persons involved heducation. Their discretionary powers are constrained by the requirements of (access to) citizenship. PosiZivt.15 educational prxtice should offer what

Education D 83 is minirnaily r e q u i ~ dto provide (a reasonable chance of) access to a position of political equaljty; and negativeb, while educating fctr wha.t.ever purposes, educators should not use rnems or engage in practices that run counter to the etementary demands of citizenship (no slavery in any form).

EDUCAmON FOR CULT Conceptions of what education entails vary E do not consider them all here but only roughly indicate my own c~nceptio~n of edueatio~n. Education is a Lamarckin transmission of acquired characteristics of culturt?. People are vitalty dependent on cultm, they cannot do without it. For modern man to survive is a matter of "culture or nothing." Cultures are variable, 01e canstot acquire culture in general but only a particular culture. Acquiring a cdture r e ~ i liwing ~ s in a cmtext that is selfevidently given and within which meaning can emerge (Bruner 1990). Wtkout context, there can be no manixlg and no culture, Context is stabilized by institutions that to a 1art;e extent determine what and how we see, kelpand &inkt hstitutions skucture perceptiorn, valuali.on, and experience (DougXas 1992). In modern republics there are institutions that "produce" indi\iiduals. (Ii~dividualstudents, for instance, are requied to wrik their own papers and to give their own mwers, hut these shollld nevertheless meet institufillnd requirements.) Individuals may forget their hstitutional emheddedness and come to think that ''in the beginning was the hdividual.'~utsuch forgetfulness soon leads to the loss of their real indjvibuality. When these is no achowledged institutional hierarchy, there is also no order where the voice of the ii~dividualcitizen c m be heard and be e f ective. In order to flourish, individuality needs a context of institutional hierarchy. Although its place has become uncertah since the erstwhile hierarchy of educational institutions has become fragmetnted, school is still an importmt stabilizes and transmitter of cdtureto be more precise, of the culture of individuality. Let us now consider the relations sf education, thus conceived, with various conceptions of ejtizenship. The coslccption of the citizen as an individual calculator and holder of rights will emphasize aspeclts of education such as the acquisition of indkiduai skills of a technical/instrumc.ntal nature and a sound understanding of personal interest based on calculatim and personal choice. The cmmunitarian will emphasize the importance cJf morality and common values. The republican will foster a readiness for public service and pditicai participation. And kvhat will neorepublicans say? Obviously, they will emphasiz aspects of education that inwolve the sqanization of difference. The elaboration of this point

of view is the main task of this chapter. The other cmceptions of citizenship and their view of education serve as contrasthg backround for this exploration.

What orientation does citizenship provide in the practice of education? What view on education do neorepublicans hold? How will. they act as participants in educationd practices? Neorepublicans conceive of citizenship and education as two disthct practices in their own right, They do not formulate requirements of citizenship and then deductively design an education that serves these. Combining, and where necessary choosing between, requirements of these two practices i s precisely the difficult task that citizens who arc involved in education must undertake. This =quires judgment, which cannot be avoided by applying a theoretical formula or by definhg one practice as subordinate to the other, Teachers are the primary a d h s s e e s of the rczquirements of citizenship. 'They are the fully adult citizens who must practice their citizenship in the educational situation, They are both citizcns and educators, md. the way in which they ccmlbine these offices should offer their pupils instructive exmples of Che exercise of citizenship. Education for living in a plural society i s necessarily polltical. If the core virtue or competence of citkenship is the organization of pluratity, then such edwation is by its very nature educatio~~ for citizenship. Thus, all education, and not o d y the expficit teachings about citizenship in. civics courses, is a ftrrmative exercise in ruling and being d e d . flvlit~atis missing is llxe alternation betwee11 positions of ruler and ruled. X consider this difficuly later on.)The people who have been brought together in the classmom learn to transform their community of fate into an association in which thcre is a place and voice for each and every m e m b e ~In, order to achieve this, they have to organi.zt-'their differences. Mrhat i s being demonstrated m d learned is not primarily that plurality should be organized, but rather honr this might be done-a repertoire of moves, judgments about where to apply them, md.judgments about how this repertclire fits with that of others. When successful, such an organization of plurality may emgemder as by-products loydty and a sense of idantjty as a communiSy member, Education that aims directly at such outcomes will not be effective. It w i l l fail to produce the experiences m d competences in which loyalty and identity are grounded. Neorepuhlican citizens will focus on issues in educational situations that ~ q u i r cand . exemplify citizen competence: hcrw to transform violent

Education D 85

divutes into verbal ones, h w to organize debate and exchange between different poi.nts of vkw, how to relate these to decisionmaking m d authorit-y. They will view educational situations as ""fractals" of politics-at least up to a point, because education msernbles politics in some respects but differs fmm it in aucial others. Education offers young people, precisely because they fack the competence of full, adult citizens, a protected area where they can learn, experiment, fail, and try fiemselves out in relative safety. 'They are protected .from some consequences and implica.t.ions that abtain in adult life for as long as they are thought to lack resources and insight to deal with them. Ihey may he told about the adult world and its dealings without being directly exposed to it. They learn about: politics takng place over there, about what is expected from adult citizen+fiat is, from people that they are going to be but artl not yet. From the point of: view oE citizenship, such teacl-cings about the world out these harbor two dangers, Pupils may come to thi-r\k that citizenship is not their affair and fail to appreciate how educational experiences mold their civic competence. And teachers may c o m to thjnk that they may mold pupils to become a better or different kind of citizen. From a neorepublican point of view, citizenship is at stake in all practices and institutions of social life-in nursjng homes, in asylum, in the secrclt servke, and ineducation, Citizenship is m e principle that orders and guides such activities. It is a reserve circuit for ambiguous and turbulent sibaticms, in whjch it helps us ehoose a course of acti,on that servcs the wproducti~nOT restoration of cit.i;.,enship for all members of a communit)l of fate. Citizenship wwks as a gui$ing principle in situations like that of education, in which people are half free, neither completely autonomous nor pure slaves. The freedom of citizens is not a given possession but appears in the movement from dependence toward autonomy. If one accepts this poinl of view the11 education, with its task of guiding depcndent pupil,s toward the competences of adults, is an experience mnre suited to m d e l ing, building, and practicing citizenship than it might at first appear. What: is it that participant-s learn in educational situations that are guided by cmsiderations of citizenship?They acquire social competences and communicative skills. They learn how actions are related to outcomes, both morally and sociologically. They are informed about nonobvious social mechanisms such as the dilemma of the commons, oligmhization, and private vices and public benefits, and the conditions u ~ ~ d which er these obtain. 'They are taught about, and on a small scale participate h, institutions for dealing with difference, such as committees, electims, representative bodies, judges and juries, and alZ offices wit-,bauthority Thus, it is hoped, they will acquirts the tools for deliberative judgment and learn to avoid the extremes of arlnitrary subjectivity and dogmatic loyalty.

THE PROBLEM OF

m=

ARD QTmK D

Thus, the neorepublican conception of citizenhip provides orientation and guidance im some educational mattcrs. ner(r"is, however, a major educational dilemma that remains beyond its reach, namely the problm of ripeness. Particular elements of human knowledge and karnin.g &odd not be offered to children before they are ready for them. Readiness is s~tpposedto depend on earlier learning and developmmt. Every educator has some notion of stages of development and of the position his pupils occupy in it. In most theories of lievelopment, skipping a stage is s ~ t p p o ~ " Cbe f o detrimental. Ptato (Polifcia WXIil:537-540) &ought that to engage in dialectjc wouldt be destmctive for people under thirity. Pasents from the 1960s, who treated their children as adults, now often achowledge that- as a result their offspring have refused to grow up, re~naining stuck in tke stage of development that was denied. them. Ripeness constitutes a major d i l e m a for educators, including those who wmt to guide their pupils toward citizenship. Citizenship requires alternation between ruling and being ruled, dealing with a plurality of moral convictims and lifestyfes, and fi~irrkingcritically about things that arc normatly taken for granted. But before one can meaningfu1ly engage h such activitks, me must have experienced what it is to be ruled, have acquired primary moral convictions (a mother-moratity like a mother tongue), and been provided with a safe and ""natural"' context within whkh events and actions can acquire maning (without a contat, there can be no meanhg). 'I'he requi~mentsof authority, toleration, and criticism that obtain between citizens have a secondary or metacharacter. They pltesuppose the prior existence and grounding of the primary attitudes and commitments that they morganize. If these are insufficiently grou~zded,as they are in the earlier stages of development, then exposure to the secondary requirements of citizenship will destroy the primary materials and commitmcmts that they are supposed to mcrdify and organize. Children will slip inta premature relativism or inta arbitrary dogmatism-both attihdes that are inimical to t h commitments of citizenship. vvbo are denied the right to be children cannot grow up. Child~n Therefore, the lull requirements and concomitant: rigbts of citizenship should not be visited upon children from the start, Their applicabililty depends on a judgmmt about ripmess. 'This j u d p e n t i.11turn depends on the theory &out development Chat the educalor has and mhis guess about Che stage of development that the pupil, is presently h,On the basis of such guesses, pupils are brought together in classes and beated accordingly Access to citizenship thou* education is heavily depmdent on judgments and theories of educators. Rese, we expect, will be shot through with prejudice. ?'he usual way tc:,combat prejudice, however, cannot be traveled

Education D 87 here. Pupils who are prematurely rewired to decide as fully critical citizens arc thereby dc.nied acccss to full citizemst.rip. Effective citize~~ crriticism of educatinnal fieories md,judgmentsl fierefore, must be largely indirect, Zt wi31 come from parmts m d other rc-tp~sentativesof the pupils, and it will uszlally be of a general naturc?and will not interfere with actual edttcational sihations. Such intcrrference is indicated only in clear cases of ~pression and discriminatiw that is, of education for, or il't a spirit of, slavery, Apart: from ripeness, there are severai other ehcationd dilemmas that remain problematic for morepublican educators, albeit less so than for those who adhere to earlier conceptbnmf citizenship. 111 those earlier visions, consensus and a general atitude of loyalty, discipline, m d eqmljty we= h i values, citizen qualities that pupits were supposed to acquire, :111 the necrrepublican vision, with its emphasis m the organizatirm of piuraXjty these arc?not central ingredients of fdl citizenship. They are indispensable supports at some stages of education on the road toward citizemhip, but they are not core requirements of full citizenship. At the stage of full citizenship, they are rclativii.,ed, criticized, and modified. Let us illustrate this with regard to consensus. fn many theories, consensus is conceiVed as a necessary condition for citizens actillg together in peace. This assumption was criticized in Chapter 4, where 1 argzted that consensus is not a condition but a problem that citizens have to work on. Consensus is not a precondilticm but rather the desired outcome of citizen activities. Thus, inthe classroom, the point of cirizern education will not be to provide a mity of values and manings that will obtah once and for ail, but to acquiw competence in deaiirtf; with difference in such a way that CQJIS~I~SLESis the outcome. Sirnilas arguments appfp to dilcmnras of loyalty, disciplirte, and eyrrality in education. Loyalty discipline, and equality are neitl.ler general values nor necessary eo~nditionsof neorep.ublican cikenship. The specii-ic outcomes that citizen activities strive for are not loyalty in general but loyaltp to the replablic; not general obedience but the discipline to obey citizerns who fulfitl the office of ruling; not social equality but: access for alt to a position of political equalllty. Citizenship involves both the acceptmce of rules of order and the freedom to criticize and chmge the ruies. If citizerns are to have an effective voice, there must be a t.tierarc.hy an established and respected order within whi& their voices can be heard and heeded. Without such a hierarchy, no voice can be heard. Like other voices, the voice of the citizen needs an order within which it can be h e a d and make sense, What is special about a republic is that this voice may rightfully contest and aim to modify the very hierarchy on Mthich it depemcis. But when it corngletely forgets this dependence, then it will soon cease to be hearb. When the individual forgets the institutional supports of his own ""independence," kwill soon lose his autonomy*

:In our considerations up till now we have presupposed protected educational sibations of school and family However, in contemporary socktie, these are no longer the oligopolistic, total institutions that they once might have been. Many educational expericmres take place outside them. Children are consumers, go to discas, travel abroad, learn to make bombs from computer bulleth boards, wakh television, and enjoy commercials. This shift has hivo ccmsequmces. First, school m d family have becorn osanizatims amow others..Educators have to orgmize their place among others. fn families, the question "When do we eat together?" frewel~tlyarises. Secmd, school and family have ceased to be self-evident settings that compel children to l-rave experiences and learn from them, in contemporary sncktjes, pupils havc many escapes &at aUow them to avoid unpleasant experiences, Thus, they can avoid appiness, pain, m d cmelqI but es with real experimce. by tbr s m e tokm also the learning th for t b Does their wider access to the school of reat life not cornpe~~sate paucity of experience and learnixrg in the cllassrom and the family? Did not Mmdela, Havel, and Dostoyevsky learn wkat they became famous for in the school of' red life? Yes, but mny yomg people cannot profit from the school of real life in this way They have ample choicethat is, c~pportunityfor escape from experience that leads to leamhg. h d where they have little choice-such as among ten-year-old boys in South Chicago, who have a choice between dying or becoming a gang member-the learniw is so one-sided as to disable them for citizenship. ace-as with the child who burns his or her hand on the necessary fnr learnirtg. The more choice, the more escape from experience and the less learning. Eclucation fn famfty and school provided a protected environment for Leamjng. Certain experiences, asld therefore some kinds of learnhg, were excluded.. But a plural consumer's socitlty also ofSers m p l e opportunities for escape from experience and leaming: A great deal of jnformtim is avaiiable, but the self-evident context that binds people and within which ixrfarrn&im acquires meaning is missing. 'f'he scarcity of context lea& to a scaxity (trhinness) of meaning m d experience, and this in turn to poor or superficial learning. This, it: seems to me, is the kernel of truth in the otherwise misplaced calls for mom discipline and morality in the cLassrom.

0 EDlfCAmS THE EDlfCATOK?

Neorepublican educators will achowledge the ixrdispensabilily of a primary mother-morality for younger children, W t h older children, they

Education D 89 will cmtinue to e m p h ~ i z the e hnportance of moraii.ty, of having values. Without: vaXues (things that we hold dear), painful experience, perception, and valuation can hardly dcvelop. But neorepublican educators will reject the evation between moral education and education for citizenship. Wth, regard to moralities, citizenship has a metaposition-not highcr, but of a cfiferenl order. Citizenship concerns conflir?tingmoralities, the organization of a diversity of mcrral convictions, both between perand between roles or offices that one person fulfills. After freed- ol so~ls religion, freedom of mnrality became an established princiale. Not because, as some have thought, religion or morality have become less important, but because they are so central that we must do our utmost to learn to organize their differences peaceEully This cannot be done by irnpcwing, or presupposmg, a unity or consensus. m i t y has to be created by the dilfering parties themselves. The hstitutions of the republic provide a settkg and means for citizens to do this, Educational hstitutions should facilitate access to this institutional reality wii;hout, hawever?undermining their own specific institutional character. It is to be expected that educators will sometimes fail in this task. They may harm pupils throu@ cmeltp or out of laziness. But even good intentions are insu,fficientto prevent real harm from education. Educators may withhold precisely what pupiIs need to learn and grow up, E k e all other approaches to citizenship and education, nemqublicanism has to consider what to do w h e ~ thhgs ~ go w r o ~ ~when g, recmmendations do not work or are not implement& as expected. An approach to education and citizenship should not only be judged on its bright side, but aiso on its darker aspects, on how it limits damage when thhgs go wrong. Who will control and educate the educator? C)bviously, a theory of neorepubtican citizenship cannot answw this eternally crucial, question once and for all. But it is h a somewhat better position than its rival theories to tackle it for two Easons: first, because ol: its limited conception cJf citizenship as (access to) pliticwf equdity and second, because of the broad applicability nl this notion of cilizenstnig as a reserve cilruit fur emergendes in all practices of life, includjng those of education, Reproduction of citizms is an important value in the politics of educatio~~ at all levels, from classroom to parliament. Designing and runlliing a program of preparation for citizenship is a thorny and messy affair, both ill theory and in practice. 'The skills that the exercise of citizenship repires are not given by nature but acqztired h the practice of a particular culture and in explicit instruction and learning. What form might the trajectory of access to citizenship take? Obviously, the freedoms of citizenship cannot fully apply there, because those involved (arc supposed, to) lack the requisite competence. The irttmductory s discitrajectory tl-tewforewill be characterized by comtraints ( m i x t u ~of

pline, force, and persuasicm) that are forbidcien in the end state to which it is suppow"do lead The trajectory toward citizerlship has uncivic traits. E-fwlong may prospective citizens be kept irr it, and what examination hurdlet; may be posed at the end of it? What about requirements that exceed, or dwiate horn, those that full citizens actually m e t ? And. what h fact should be taught? Such w s t i o n s must be answered in a coherent way if children arc to get: wfiat (W thjnk) they need: red education-which is djfferemt from learnjng the joys of the consumer society and the bitterness of political conflict.. The allswers need not be the sarne across the board; but within individual educational instituli.ons and trajectories, cohercllnce is imperative, because trust and trainhg require stability and firmness. At the sarne time, we know that siztce education is unavoidably cultural, such '*localf'coherence can be colntested outside the classroom m d particular educational i_nstitutions.Little is hewn about the social and cultural conditions of citizenship, l.;hich makes any attempt to d e s i p a learning program for access to citizenship extremely hazardous.

EIGHT

Admission and Exclusion

When we turn from education of child.= of citizen-parents to the admission of strangers, we must not only a$drt.ss the program oE prc.par&im for ejtizenskp itself but aXso the decision about whet-her peope are ewntually to be admiged to full citizenship. Because citizenship, like havlng a home, is unavoidably local and culturally specific, not all the people in the world. can be admitted to it at the same time. What principle of selection may citizens use? This is not a trivial matter, shcc by selecting they draw the cmtours of their community of fate. They defhe the set of people to whom thcy are related-by chance, late, history, or choice-in hvays that are so bmding or pressjng that they deserve to be trmformed into the equality that obtains between citizens,. The admission decision not oniy dcfines the community of those who deserve to relate as citizens but also excludes the ""undeservisrg"-those whom citizens consider their enemies, or those to whom citizens are indifferent or consid,er themselves only telruotlsly and superfcicially related. Cazy inside, cold. outside: Exclusion is the dark side of noble notions of citizenship. It is difficult to justily exclusion, departing from prt-mises of The oppsite of citizenship is slavery and eqrxality and freedom for d. dictatorship. Once one acknowledges that the price of citizenship for some is slavery and unfreedom for others, the joys of citizenship become tainted. S m e have, as a consewme, shifted their focus fmm the lcxal to the global. They aim for world citizenship, or for a world order in which local citizemhip is accessible to all, or for transnaticmai membership and rights in international migration (Baub6ck 1994; Soysal 1994)"The trouble with such laudable efforts to secure citizenship fur all, everywhere, is that they tend to make citizenship lose its distinctheness and cutting edge.

92

Admission and Exclusion

Wisdom and effectiveness tie someMihere between owerreachfng and exclusiveness, but no one bows exactly where. The first two sections of this chapter consider questions of admission as they arise in normative argument and practical policies. A third and final sectim b r i d y treats forms of exclusior~front citizenst.rip. Exclusior~is often cmsidcred the mil-ror image of admissicm, m the assumption that the criteria for admfssion are identical with those for exclusion. Wly, then, a special section on exclusion? Because the mirror image applies only to the exclusion of those who never were citizens of the particu1a.r polity in. que"ion, Exclusion, partial or total, of those who are, or once were, citizens is an ewirely different matter, a matter that shottid not be regzJiat.ed by rules concerning the admission of newcomers. Traitors, collaborators, crazies, and crooks may be considered fm exclusion, but not on the grounds that they wodd not qualif?r for adntission. Moreover, there are good grounds for maintaining that expulsion from citizenshiy, mce it is obtained, is never justified. Obviously; there are also good reasorls for tseathg adnrtissior~m d exclusion in one chapter. :Not only do both showf somethes painfully, what it is to he or not to be a citizen of &is particular polity, but they also in strme situatims unavoidably touch up011 each other in uneasy ways. Why should this be so? Admission aims at inclusion of peopk as eyual citizens, h order to secure. such inclusim, such access to a position of political equality, it is at times necessary to comparmet~talize,to make disthctions betwee11 categories of people who do m d who presently do not (yet)have the quatities minima3ly ~9uire.dfor the exercise of citizemhip. Newcomers are seldom immediately admitted. Most have to go through various procedures and ""inspections" before the last bamiers to full citizenship are lifted. h r ing these pmcedures, they t h e ~ f o r eare excluded from citizenship. We encollntes a similw compartmetntdization and excl.ttsim with children, demented people, prisoners, and members of minofities with no reasonable access to the politics of citizms, all of whom need special treament, different from what obtains betwee11 ordinary citizens, precisely because they lack the minimum qualities that the exercise of citizenship reyuires. The danger of such compartmentalization, both with newcomers and with people who for the time being cannot function "normally," is semipermanent inequality and hierarchy creeping exchsim under the guise of noving toward emancipation. Just as in cases of citizmship m d other, suppot;e d y "higher" or special offices (considered in Chapter 6), here, with persons who supposedly are "below" the minurl.um requirenents of citizenship, access to citizenship aiso is a governing value. The difference is that here it is not orlc value among others but rathcr Ihe value that is to be maximized. This is so because the position of people who are trctated differentiy has traits &at are the very opposite of citizenship.

Admission and Exclusian D 93

CLMMS FOR ADmSSIOR ARIl GKO

S FOR WFUSAL

There are many claims that individuals make in order to be admitted as new citizens of a particulaf republic. From a nempublicm paint of view, the prima facie accepthle claim can be arranged in three categories"The first princiyle is mutual cmsent betv\reen the aspiring citizen m d the republic. The s e c 4 pri~~ciple is that of a cornunity of fate. It bases the claim of admission on the fact that those aspiring to citizenship are already subjected to the power of the state of which they wish to become a member. The third principle is negative: The prospective citizen's clairn is valid becausc he or shc has no xcess to any other citizenship in the world, and citizenship somewhere should be available to everyone, To rehse such a perscm citizenship wodd be to make the person stateless, effectively dmying him or her cjtizernship inthis hvorld. The first prkciple, mutual consent, seems s h p l e and straightfowarci: m a t can be wrong, "hen both parties agree? But other pa&ies mfght disagree: mird parties migl-tt fee%deprived ol a job that they might havc gotten if the newcomer had not been let in, Those who are not admitted might feel unfairly deprived because others were. And why should G e m m scientists who had worked for their fatherland during World War II be aL lowed. to becow W.S. citizens after the war, white homeless orphans had to make their lives in the etevastated country that the new U.S. cieens had left behbd? Notwithstmding these difficulties in its practical application, the principle itself is unobjecknable from a neorepublican perspective. Choice and f ~ e d o mare centrat values of the public. M e n citizens choose to receive new members, that: is erlough reas011 to admit them. More probltzmatic is the second principle, that people have a claim. to become citizens if in their daily life and its medium-term prospects they cannot avoid being sul?ijr.cted to the state's power. "Ibis principle is problematic because it is based, on the contested notion oi a community of fate. Such a ct,mmuni@ obtains when people are connected in ways they cannot mod-bodily (or in syrnbofic space that works as directly as bodily pmsence) and also systematically (aicpolluting factories do not distinguish between citizens and aliens). However, people disagree in their vkws of what m y be avoided, both empirically and normatively. Some insist on systematic connections that others cannot see or prefer to ignore ot find a way to adequately deal with them. h community of fate obtains when people cannot avoid each other without dcpriving themselves of what is essential. for their way of life. But opinions as to what is essmtial differ, h d what if not: avoiding each other also destroys your way of life? Like the first principlc, the second is unob~ectionable from a neorepublican point of view; but its application in practice is much riddled with problems and c d i c t s . This is so because defining the ccm-

94

Admission and Exclusion

toms of a community of fate is precisely what political c d i c t is often about. The t h i d principle on which claims of access to citizenhip are based is weakest fmm a neoreplablican point of view, because it lies beyond the horizon and p w e r s of the republic. The requirement that there be a republic with decent citizenship for every person in the world is situated at s citizenship, as we have known it until the world level, w h e ~ a effective now i s local. When applied at the world level, beyond the effective reach of the republic, citizenship loses its cutting edge, It becomes an ideal that is insufficiently fed alld realized by institutions. Efforts to develop a world citizelzship have foundered on the inhere~ztlylocal character of citizenship. The world scene, the so-called international society, is at best a place for what Walzer (1994) calls thin, or rninimalist moral argument. Thick moral arguments, which obtain withh the sphere of the domestic republic and its direct environment, are ineffectual and misunderstood when used at the world level. The third principle is accepted in the abstract but in fact is applied by republics d y insofar as it can be mconstructed as a subspecies of the second principle-that is, when something of a special rt.lationsPlip, Esembling a community ol fate, obtains between the aspiring citizen m d the particular republic. The "specialness" may appear quite thh-it may consist in the fact that tbis mpublic happened to be the first to which political rcllugees &d-but it may quickly become strenglt-rened by "thick" arguments from countries that refuse refugees on the grczunds that they first arrived in a neighborkg republic. Obviously, neorepublicms canncrt disagree with the view that c3izenship in a republic should be available to all persons in the world; but they can act d y locally, not globally, to effect this principle, and only for some individuais (to Mlhom they arc. cmnected in local and particdar ways), and not for ohtners. Claims for admksion that are p r i m facie acceptable need not always be decisive. Although the mpublic is clbliged to cmsider h e m seriously, it nevertheless m y refuse candicfates because they do not meet the =quiremmts of citizenship or because there is no roonn for them. What do these gmunds for refusing admission involve, and are they valid? b u r conditions of acceptance are?often brought forward: (a) gencral citizen competence, (b) competence to act as a meHlber of this particdar polily, (c) acceptance of local culture, and (d) enough room for the new citizen. Mequirennent. (a) is rather obvious-Those who want to be citizens must be capable of dialogic performance. They must, withh limits, be ready to argw with oher citizens, to talk and listen to them, and to form juifgmelzts on the basis of such dialogue. They must also be able and willkg to make their actions conform to their words-at least, withh limits.

Admission and Exclusian D 95

Requirement (b) concerns a workiq knowletige of and ~ s p e cfor t the political hvays of life of the =public, and for its legal and political institutions for dealkzg with c d i c t s . In order to particjpatc in the life of this polity, prospective citizens must understand at least one of its languages for pubfic communicatio~~ m d must ~ s p e cits t laws, particdarly its laws for changing laws. a c e they have becom citizens, they m y mgage in poiitical actkity to change the political culture; but as nethrcomers, they can g a h entrance only by acceptkg that culture, This requirement, as obvious as it may seem at first sight may pose serious problems for newcomers when the requirementri of the p ~ v a i l h gpolitical culturl, conflict wit-,hsome of their own "deep'3elic.f~.In Chapter 5, we considered how the republic may accommodate "beep" group differences that arise a m g its own citizens. It shoufd do all i t can, provided it does not put the continuation of the repuhlie itself, or the reproductio11 of citizens, at risk, The same cmcliusim hulds with regard to newcomers who have a prima facie claim to admittance as citizens. The third requirement, that aspiring citizens accept the local cdture (whether it is called national, traditional, or whatever), is squarely rejected by neorepublicans. Citimnship concerns acceptance of and competence in ways of dealing with cultural and scxjal differences, not acceptance of one style of life that happens to be dominant or fashionable. On this point, neowpuhlieans differ sharply with those who hold communitarim views on citize~~ship. The fourth requirtliment, which provides grounds for =fusing citizens with a prima facie acceptable clainl to entry, because the country is "fulIrf' is always suspect, but unlike the third requirement, is not necessarily invalid. Even withh a given communi@ of fate, there may not be a permanent place for every mernber: emember, for instance, that during the Allied landing in Norrnandy in 1944, some had to go .first m d to dic. A republic may be iull, or rather "overfilled," hthe sense that it camot survive without denying a place to s o w persons. Ground (c) is to be re~ectedout of hand. The other grounds are valid, in principle, but their application demands situationaf judgment. They are not equally compelli~~g in all situations, When entry is claimed on the basis of muhaal consent, as fos i,nsta,nce with a valued soccer flayer; manager, or scjentist, rehsal may be based on (a), (b), or (d). When entry claims are based an a community of fate, an de facta subjection to the state" power, then a lack of general and specific citizen competent and (h)-are grounds for mfusal, but nut the argument that there is no room for newcomers (d). In the case af admission claims based on the fact that there is no other place in the world for the prospective citizen, on the contrary, the argument of no room,is in principle valid. (the republic can-

96

Admission and Exclusion

not receive the entire world populdion as members), while the cornp d i n g fol-ce of argument-s of citizen competence is much weaker than in other situations considered here. The first concern is to secure a place for this person as a citizen, not how well he or she may ertercise citizenship in the future.

t prartice? Do the principles These are nempublican principles. W ~ a of provide orientation and correction thert., or are practical pct1i"ies so diferent that principles have no grip on them-that is, on those who make and implement policies? In practice, in Europe and the United States, newcomers and new applicants for citizenship are seen as problems, not as assets, The efforts of the receiving polity are directed twarcl keeping out as many as possible and letting in mly the most deserving. There are m n y rules and sckmes for separating the deserving from the undeserving applicants, There are also schemes far monitoring a d controlling the Row of migraition, Both elfctrts are notoriously inef ective. Ch-teexpfanation (among many) for this failure is that the rules and practices for separating deserving &mundeserving applicmts for citizenslzip demand inwestments of time and judgmem.t.that are incoqatihle with the quick-and-dirty decisionmaking Rquircd to contrd the collective flow of migration. The countries of the E u r o p w Illlion are placing an increasi~~g emphasis on stricter policies oE admissio~~ to and explllsion from their territnries. The common ingrctdients of these policies are quick decisio ecmomic refugees, and international coordination. Quick decisionmaking is thought necessary in order to avoid de facto settlement oxl the territory Economic rehgees should not take the places reserved for "real" (i.e., political) refugees. fntemational coordination is needed to prevent corntries thought to be overly gellerous from being overwhelmed ('rhey should be brought into line); to achieve a reasonable distribution of refugees over west European countries; and to repair ""leaks"h ttbe cmtrol system (for instance, as in Italy or at the Amsterdam airport). Such policies meet with considerable difficulties. Quick decisionmaking on matters of such importace is callousness when information is scarce m d unreliable, whezz barriers of lmguage and culture are cmsiderahle, and. when there is no reasonable period during which the partners involved can try each other out. Wnat is the difference between economic and political rdugees? Politics m d economics, as we know, hang together. m e only sure proof oi being a political refugee seems to be that one should have died but was sawed by an inexplicable miracle. Interna-

Admission and Exclusian D 917"

tiond coordinatim is a s h a d o w affair. Confemnces m m g government s minjsters and civil servants are not public, and only selected ~ s z l l t are ounced. Spin management about the. porwsness oi various west European countries3bcrrders or abouf;the fragiiity of a common European W o n adxnissions policy is a djrficdt affair, particu,larly if one wants to impress persons in faraway countries who are struggling for survival. ents have made strong efforts to speed up the decisio process about inclividraal adnnissions. 'Their ideal is the "airport decision"-that is, deciding about entry or expubion as close as possible to the time and place of arrival of the newcomers. These g m arc notoriously unsuccessful and u ~ ~ j uin s t their outcmes. Gaining entry becomes a lottery; in which some win and others lose. Quick decisionmaking is often based on insufficient or false infornation and sometknes on bribery Officids decidi.ng about entry alvvays exercise their own dismetion, however many rules and instructions there may be. Their judgment may be arbitrary and must therefore be open to challenge before a j u d g e Otherwise the offic.ials would exercise tyranny (arbitrary power unchecked by law) over the entrants, Legal procedures, however, take time. And the longer applicants stay in the country, the better are their chances of staying permanently. 'The legal procedure itself creat-es some kirrd of community of fate. It is notoriously difficult to remove applicants whose leg& appeafs have fhally c o w to naught fmm the territory of the polity M m y European countries offer practically no official immigration possibilities. People c m only enter as political =&gees or as family members of peope who are alfeady legally rcsident inthe country Those who wish to come to the country and.who w ~ u l dsurely take the route of immigration if it were open, have no choice but tcr enter illegally or in the capacity of a helpless rehngee or farnily mennbet: 'These are not promisi.ag tickets with which to start one" voyyage as a new mmber of the republic. Having to belwe as a helpless person is not: a good way to start out as an autonomous citizen. These questions of admission to citisnshiy arise not only at the borders of the polity, 'There are many nmitizens who have been living inside the borders of the =public. Whether their stay has been legal or not, such an extended period of living on the same territory constitutes a community of fate and therefore a claim to be rczcognized as citizens. Should these resident aliens have a right ta acquire citizenship or even be '"dbliged to choose" "tizenship? St.louXd they live accordi.ng to the habits and the prevailil~gculture of the land? From a neorepublican point of view, the first question should. in principle be a n s w e ~ daffirmtively. Mlowing second-class membership to be a permanent or terminal station in the lives of some members of a community of fate wlruld violate the de-

98

Admission and Exclusion

mands of potitical epality in the public. From a neowpublican point of view, lmg-term resid,ents may be rewired to accept citizenship, but not on condition that they give up their '"old""citizmship. Multiple citizenship is quite acceptal->lefor neowpublicans as long as it is based on a cmnectedness that is strong enough to be classified as a community of fateThe reyuirement that lliewcmers integrate into the c u h r e of their new country is increasfngly voiced, these days: Children shoutd not show their religious allegiance at school by how they arc drcssed; nekvcomcrs should. get acquainted with local customs and Christim values. All such requirements to conform are mistaken from a necrrepublican point of view. Mzzlticultura) citizenship, and not. one dominant. monoculturc, is the norm. What shodd be accepted by all, however, are political rules for orgmizing cultural differences, For example, Muslim girls should be free to wenr head scarves in school, but t h y shottld not be obliged to do so agaisrst their will, We begm this inquiry by stating some rules a d principles that from a neorepublicm poht of view would be appropriate as guides regulat-ing admission to citizenship. We then briefly considered admission practices and saw that they tell m entimly different story. The ntles and principles have vmy :little red influence and provide litde guidance for practical pxloblems, We have to conclude that admission of adults to citizenship remains a rather arbitrary affair from a neoreyublican perspective. 'I'his perspectivc works fully and well, inside the republic, but not outside (and around) the borders of the republic. Does this indicate a fatd failure of ncorepublican theory? No, because a theory of citizwhip is not to be takelr as a fuil-Gdged theory of juslice, 'The scope of cjtizenship is limited and local, En our globalizing and.migrating world, insisting on the value : cclnflicts between the demands of of citizenslzip does not p ~ v e n ttragic (jlobal justice and local citizenhip* When the deelision in such tragic dilemmas is left with officialslcitizensof a particular polity, they may decide myopicaily and easily-too easily from the point of view of justic hfavor of the inside perspedive. Some have tried to remedy this unpalatable state of affairs by devetoping notions of world citizenship, tramnational mem27ershipfand rights in migratim (Batabiick 1994; Soysal 1994). Such ideal schemes remain ineffective as long as they are not fed by firmly established institutions, There are efforts to establish such Fnstitutions, as in the case of the Maastricht treaty on crjtjzenship of the European 19nior1, or the khengen a g ~ e m e n t s a m g a number of countries to abolish their mutual border cmtrols; but they run again and again into practical difficulties and outright obstruction by the very national authorities who si.gned the agreements, Wrld ci'tizenship is a reality for an international elite of businessmen, stars, scientists, and others who travel freely around the world and have

Admission and Exclusian D 99

access to the cosmopolis of communicaticm, finance, and leisure, From a neorepubIican perspective, this i s not citizenship. Although neorepubicanism does not r e q ~ i social ~ ~ f equality it does reqrrire poli"ricdequalivthat is, access to political control of the real centers of decisionmaking for ail,, not just for the privileged few.

:111 this section, we look at exclusion fmm citizenship that is not simpIy the ~ s doft a refusal of admission of newcmers but that involves people who are, or at any time have been, citizms of the polity in question, Thme forms of such ertclusion may be distinguished: eliminatim or expulsion; secmd-class citizenship; and strong distinctions between "ordinary'kitizens and "speciai" peopk, such as kings, business leaders, and. other elites. We consider these h1turn. Shaightfcrrward exclusion occws \zrhen citizelnship is taken away and people are remved from the territory, put to death, or forcibly detahed without legal protection. Exclusitrn also obtaixls h e n citizenship is not officidy taken away but is nonetheless unavailable for t?ll practical pwposes. Examples are people who live in ""nogo" areas, where the state provides no legal protection (certain parts of big cities, or activities under mafia prokction), or people who are excluded de hcto fm poljtics because of their convictions (communists in the United. States during the Cold War, Muslim fundmentalists in p~sent-dayAlgeria, and people everywhere who refuscz to join in the swe:lfing&orus of nationalist ""consensus"") .Such unofficial exclusion may be total or partial, An example of this last category is the special treatmat of hard-cow criminals as distinct from ordi-nary trespassers against the law Crimhals who have been labeled hard-core offenders arc rolxtlnely denied certain protections of due process, even wbrn the text of the law does not explicitly allow for such distinctions*Such cases of tlnofficial and partial exclusion from citizenship shade off into the second form of exclusion that we have distinguished, namely, second-class citizenship. Second-class citizenship may be involuntary, as in the case of demented, unerrrployed, or homeless peopIe, or more or less chosen, as with isolates, chaotics, and addicts. In the first category, the questicm is how far to go in meting out special compensatory treatme~ntin order to secure the maximum of access to citizenship that is ubtainable under those circumstances. Some cclmpartmentalizaticmand compensation are indicated, but how much is enough, where should the fine be drawn, and what should we do wben no a m n t of compensation is mough to actually compensate? Wi& t_he second category of peopk, who mom or less voluntarily

f OO

Admission and Exclusion

have exited from full citizenship, the troublirrg question is to wbat extent they may be forced to reintegrate, 'This becomes all. the more troubling when t h i r original choice to exit may have been h e in some sense, but whrn in their present situation their capacity to choose has been lost and reentry is not m option that they can take m d implelxent on their own, w i h t compensation and help. n i n k , for ixrstance, of drug addrcts and of the vestion of forced trt.atmc?-ntand special provisions to "reintegratef' them into the working population. A third, form of exclusion is practieed by those who because of their special functims or valitics, place themelves above or apart fmm socalled ordbary citizens. (It is also practiced by ordinary citizens who defer to this classification.) This form of exclusion is widespread in modem meritocratic swieties. It is wrong. Zn Chapter 6, I aqued that citizenship does not stop wfierfi? special oftices like those of minister, judge, or ekief executhe officer are assumed, but is on the contrary indispensable to keephg the executiczn of such offices comected to the way we have decided to live together-as citizens ~lrhorule each olfner. If being an ordinary citizen is conceived of as being without special powers, offices, or talents (as being a msidual category in a meritocratic sockty), and if occupying an d i c e m d having special powers are taken as signs that one has escaped from behg a "mere" citizen, then citizenshig will remain powerless. Such a view is mistakm, because it in fact defiz~escitizens in such a way that they must relnain powerless.. Inasmuch as "ordinary" "tizelzs acquire special powers, they cease to be ""ordinary" citizens. The only general p o w r that they have is that of voting in elections, which remains futile as long as its otltcomes camot be translated into special powers and decisions, Citizmship is as much a question of ordinary people as of special people who exercise special powers. It is p r e c i ~ l yin the confrontation and uneasy (at tims, even tragic) combhation of these that citizenship is needed. as a guiding value. It is precisely there that it develrzps a cutting edge and that people (pai11tulIy or with pleasure) learn what it takes (inreal cost.) to be a citizen. The second form of exclusion, second-class citizenship, is equdly wrong in princir>lebut more difficult to appreciate and avoid in practice. People are not obliged to be citizens day and night; self-exclusion is permi"cted-but not m a permanent basis or in cases where the return to actual citizenship becomes impossible. Differentiating between peoplc in order to secure or restore their access to citizenship is required; but an overemphasis on emancipation of groups of people may in fact exclude them more permanently, Respect for multiple loyalties is a requirement of citizernship in pluraf sodeties. But \zrhen this leads to such evelzts as Moroccan women in The Netherlands leavjng the police force because t h i r "ownf"peofle threatened them or their relatives with violence unless the

Admission and Exclusian D l O l

f e d e officers provided '"special"' treament, then somethir~ghas gone terrilbly wrollg. The first form of exclusion from citizenship, expulsion or eli&ation, is certaifily no longer a defmsihle option after World War 11and the horrible experiences of persons deprived of the elementaq ptections of citizenship, All human beings have a right to citizenship in some poliity, somewhere. In reality, many cannot realize this right. The least that citkens from polities that consid,er themselves civilized can do is to refrain from adding to those ""many" by depriving their own cocitizens of their citizenship status. W1t3n citizens "misbehave,'~heonly legitimate option is to teqorarily compartmentalize them, to give them speciai treat~~ent, a h a y s with a vicw toward restoring tkeir access to full. citizenship. Thus, admission and exclusion are intertwined and belong together; but they are not each o ~ e r ' smirror image. Both are about who is in and who is not. Both d e fne what it is to be a citizen of this polity and what the contours are of h e community of fate that this pdity cmsiders its& Rsponsihle for, that it wants to take care? of and to civilize, But adxnission and exclusion do not obey the same logic and. rules, because the latter concerns citizens and the first concerns those who wish to became but are not yet citizens. Here, also, being a dtizen does make a cliMerence.

This page intentionally left blank

NINE E-7

E-7

E-7

Work and Third Age Citizens Many modern studies have established a correlation between work and civic participation, Those who have paid work participate more, and mom rczsponsibly. Such fhdirtgs feed the thought that if more people bad a jab, the vitdity o.f citizenship wndd be enhanced. Jobs djscipiine and activate people, For many policymakers in post-1989 democracies, this close connwtim between work and beillg a good citizen is so obvious as to need no argument-and certainly not an argument with long-dead people from the society in which the idea of citizenship was first articulated. h c i e n t Creeks saw work not as activating but as an impediment to citizernship. Those k l r h o bad tt? work had no time for politics. Political activity was reserved for t h e who were h e fmm the burden of work.

Until a hundred years ago, aw g property; rather than having a job, was considered a primaq- condigon for citizenship, Proper$ especlialiy landed proper& was supposed to give people a stake in the c turn, increased the likejhood of their exexising sound judgment and & w i n g loyal attitudes. Uwnership, as indicated by the adage '"my home is n-ty castle,'Uscr was seen as a sancbary from which citizms could say ""nof9topeople in authariv. The preselzce of the key ele~nentsaf citizezzship-judg~xent, loyalty, autonomy, and not being a slave at the mercy oi the power of the rulers-was fiought to be closely rdated to ownership. This idea deserves criticism not only because it excludes so mny peoplc from citizenship but also because it risks maklng a condition of citizenship-property-into its core. Thus, citizen action in the republic would became purely a mems to ensure private property From bei-ng a condition of citizenship, property would become its goat and point. mereby, citizenship would lose much of its sipificance and appeal.

f 04

Work and Third Age Citizens

Later, the set of citizens was enlarged to include workers who eto not ~ e their work. h order to give this illown pmperty but have an i n c o ~ from come a stability comparable to that provided by property functional eyuivalents of ownership were created in the form of collective insurmce that pmvided a substitute inconne hsituations of w~employment,sichess, disabiSiV, and old. age. mereby even nonwners, as long as they were hsured, could become wwlShy in a sense: 'l'be operator of an automobile vvho has h a f i a million; the 6-year-old, for lia:bility jnswmce might be "good for" h forty years of pcnsim benefits; and the injured employee, for years of disabi1i.t.y payments. Or think of the movie &erne of the poor wmtch who swindtes his life ins~trancecompany by fakbg his own dcath, so as to provide his family with what he feels they have lmg deserved, This wish to offer &c. noninsured also the elementary privileges of swne r s h i p a wish that is based on considerations of sociitl justic anly hahosed by swindlers. Social: assistance to d.tizests who did not own prcrperty-and coutd not be sufficimtly insured has been ~ a l i z e din various ways: by incarporathg solidarity elements into social illsurmce schemes (whieh wem orighally based on pun. eyuivalencc, the allowanre behg a function of prc?miumm d risk); by extending the group of perscms entitled to t?llowances from inszxsance; and by ve&fic and general support provided by the state to the noninsured in the form.oi sorrial help, IZelief for the poor was ~ i ~ ~ t e r p mas t ead right to benefits for those citizens who fur whatever reason had no access to stable employment and t-hc swid insu,rmce associated with it. G h m this development, social hmranre became less a set of special rights of workers and morcl a stmcture of rights that all citizms, and not only those who happncd to have a job, (shodd) have. The fact &at those rights were tied to having work was hcreasingly seen as a historical accidmt, as having to do with &c. way in MIhich they were first estiiblished but not with what they esse~~tially are. With regard to citizenship, this development was theorized in the work of T. H . MarshaZI (195(1), who arglxed that after a long struggle, socioecon~micrights were finaw also becoming past: of citizenship. 'This extension of the notion of citizenship was accepted without much criticism for a fairly long pehod. Some debate occurred m the questim of whether social jwslice legitinnizes the state's enforcememt ol solidarity. Yet, the majority of people who answered this question in the affirmative subsequently endorsed Marshall%extension of the mtion of citizenship. Just as had been the case with property, a tel~dencyemcrged here to convert conditions into essences and mems into ends, k the 1960s and 1970s, scrcial rights came to be considered by many as tbe core of citizemhip, The ewality between citizens to them was, at its core, social equality: Poiitical equdity then becarne mrci; one aspect of a more general equality that ought to obtain betwen citizens in a democratic mciety. It is illustraGve

Work and Third Ase Citizens D f 05

that tbe talk was about a demmratic "society" m d that the tern "republicff' wh.ich rclfers only to the puhlic-political spheref wati seldom heard.

&ring the 198C)s,however, these debates changed di~ction.By then, unemployment was kgh, jobs had beci?me scarce, and the continuation of welfare state anmgements was seen as problematic. Thatcherite policies of reform and retrtznchment, as well as sharp new right thinking, became influential m d dominated the poXitical agenda. The im.plementation of the social ri@ts entailed in citizenship was inmasingly criticized. Mead (1986) argued that the actual assipment of these rights also had to be an exercise in citizenship, and that the American practice, which in his view was lax and inwhich the state faj.led to impose its authoriq, did not meet this revirement. If the realization of social rights is a realization of citizen*, he argued, then Che dLtties of citizens wolrld have to be dealt: with in,combinalion with the rights of citizns, Ihis theme of social duties became widely discussed in Western welfare states. In The Ne&erXmds, two skfts occurred h3 this discussio~~. The first concerned the foundation of duties, and the second involved rnakirzg the relat;ionship between rights and duties more dynamic:. In Mead" view the In The m i d rights and duties were conceived of: as a part of citize~~shipNetherlands, people rcasmed in terms of cmtract: Quid pro quo, rights "naturallyffentail duties. If you fail to fulfill your duties, you may not enjoy your rights. h d because social rights are part of citizenship, you may; by failing to MfiU the corrczspondj_ngduties, through your own fault d a m g e your citizmship, which may (partly and tempcrrardy) be wiweld or taken away from you. In this way; citkenship was made to depend on a "contract" (the quotation mark signiiy the lack of voluntariiness and of alternatives). This does not fit Mead" line of thought. In his view citizenship takes central place, and &ties and righls arc3 derived from it-a perspective t-hat many of his 'followers hverted, The second shift in the h t c h d&ate by which iZ:diuerged from Mead invdved moving away from his stmng emphasis ctn duties. Dutch discussions emphasized the clynamic and activating character of mutual relatinns-not just betvveen rights and duties, but also between the citizen/employer/person drawing benefits and the state/emfloper/depar~entprovding bellefits (I.,ang~~an 1992). The general acceptance of Marshall's incorporatian of socioeconomic rights in the notion of citizmship, in combination with the problematic development of employment and social security, has Icd to employmemttaking up a central position in discussims on citizenship. Whereas Hannah Arendt (9959) still believed that citizemhip could be malized only for

f 06

Work and Third Age Citizens

people who were free fmm the concerns and burdens of labor, in many contenporary discussions, having a job is presented as the key to citizenship. Willingness to work becomes the paramount duty of the citizen, Work becomes the most important learning route for citizens. Putting m o peopfe ~ to work is thonght of as a hvay to solve various problems simultaneously, or at least to reduce them to bearale proyortions: Social security would remaill affordable (more premiums, fewer allowances); the national economy would flourish and remain competitive; law enforcement would improve (employees are more law-abiding and. more easily traced); and social fntegration would be stimulated (people who work participate more than those who do not). Even if the parenthetic assumptions are correct, m e might well object to making employment such a central issue of citizenship. 'The chic position of the unemployed is thereby further marginalized. Unpnid activities are undervalued, Those working part-time become part-citizens. All of the intractable problems involved in distinguishing betwem the deserving and the mdeservjng poor are brought back onto the political agenda-among them the invasion of privacy and the unproductive g m e of blaming the victi~nor blaming the state (Whose "fault" is it, when someme does not have a job?). A civic dut-y to work is imposed ort people without an income from property-a duty that wealthy citizens do not bear. 'This collflicts with political eguality which should hold irrespective of privat.e wealth or poverty. From the point of view of citizmsl.ii.y, the m a t important objection to giving paid work such a central posi~onit; that political say and freedom are made dependat on good coztcfuct elsewhere, outside the pzlblic-political sphere. Just as happened- inearfier epochs with property and with sociaf. rights, there is a fatal confusion here between means and gmls for bemem cmtditions and essence), which in fact undermhes or clenies the very idea of citizenship. The point of citizenship is that it provides a pubfic sanchary from which dependencies that exist elsecvhere, including those of (the ohligation to) work, can be modifkd. The criterion is that those depeztdencies should not be such that their continued. existence actually blocks access to fie public sanctuary where citizenhip is exercised. The accessibility of ⁢ smchary should depend as little as possible on conduct m d positions outside that sanctuary. All discussions on citizenship that m k t work the cmtral issue clash with this nucleus of df-izcnshijp.

The foregohg considerations lead. to an irnpasse. Marshall (1950)' and at a later stage, Dahrendorf (1988:148-349), with good reason emphasized

Work and Third Ag~eCitizens D f 07

socicrecommic security for ail as a basis of citizenship for al. tlcrwever, Fhc citimaLng smioeconontic rights so &solute e v e ~ ~ t u undesmi,ned dy zenship they were devised to protect, Mead's emphasis on the implementation of welfare state arrangements as exemplary and standdizing exexises in citizenship was a necessary corrective. If social security and social assistance are to serve citizenhip, their actual procurement &odd be considered also with regard to its effects on the ~pmductionof citizenship. E-fokvcver, m a d ' s inclhation to make the duties absolute d s a undermines citizenship. What position shouId we take, then? Are social. rights citizen rights? There seem to be good Easons for both affirmi~tg and dellying this proposition. What orientation does neorepubliicanism pmvide here? Can it help us out of the impasse? The confusion in t-hinking about work, income, and citizenship can, I thj,te, be woided bp insisting on a Limited conception ol citizenship as politjcal equality, fn this neorepublican view, social and economic rights and duties are not regarded as civic. rights and duties. Although they are u~~nnistak&l,y important to citizenship, that is no reason to turn them into elements of citizenship. closer examination, hlfarshall's incorpmatim of social rights in citizenship does not seeln t?dvisable. Conusion was created, and lilter the opposite of what he htended to achieve was realized: being out of work again became an obstacle for access to citizenship. Conflicts about the organjzation of social, security and msistance are also fowgkt. out now bp means of conRicts about empirical and normative defhitions of citizenship. In this way, the care and s o m e of citizenship is under threat of mmoval from the public-poljtili sphercl to that of work. This point of view does not imply that social security is not (or should not be) a matter of rights and duties. However, tbr rights and duties involved in (the willingness to) work are not identical with the rights and duties of citizens. Sanctions in the area of work may have the side effect of harming or curtailing t-he rights of citizenship. Such a side efkct can be compared to that of being imprisoned because of unpaid debts, for instance. This surcly restricts the citizen's freedm. Yet, the sanction is not imposed as a reaction to the violation of a citizen" duty inthe strict sense. (In a broad sense, smctionhg c m be regarded as a reaction to a personfs failure to abide by the law. However, everyone m a particular territorynot just the citizens-Itas a duty to comply with the law of that territory) Havhg rights h the area of work and income is of crucial importmce to citizenship, but this does not make them into citizen rights, Having rights in the sphere of family and schoohg is aiso of crucial importance to citizenship; but again, this does not make them into citizen rights. 'These are rigMs tbat aim to secure the conditions for access to citizenship, but they are not rights by which citizenship can allow itself to be defined. Citizen-

f 08

Work and Third Age Citizens

ship marks a sanctuary a place of freedom, w h e ~ a these s rights concern release from u~~freedom, access to that smctuary The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for th dutics connected. with these rights, For mmt people, work and social security are important access routes to citizenship, just as family and school are. Furthermore, these access routes should, in g h i p l e , be open to all and &odd therefore be guaranas is possible. VVtlm persons cannot on their own teed by the state i~~sofar meet the conditions of citizemsfnip, such as having suficient m a n s of existence, the state or another institution shoulcjl assist them. fn doing this, the state may surely require from the perscms involved that they contribute whatever they can. After all, it was precisely the fact that they '"could not," or m m predsely, "could not independently" meet the mquiremnts of citizenship that justif-ied the state's prwision of security and assistance. Means testing for welfare rclcipients, or m obligatim to seriously apply for jobs or to retraixl in the case of unemployment, are not incompatible with neorepublican citizenship. However, the content oE citizenship should, not be determined by these. The power to define citizenship should, not be located in procedures that help people fulfil1 the requirements for citizenship. hlthough to most people work alld social security, ljke school and family, provide the m s t jmportmt access routes to citizenship, these should not be made absoiute. OSher ways of access may be less cornonly used and nonetheless legitimate.. Consepently, neorczpublican citizenship implies neither a general duty to work nor a right to a basic income. It does, however, imply the right to assistance for those who cannot independently and fully comply with the conditions of access to citizenship. Within the h m e of this assistmce, a duty to work and a right to incorncl may hold in some circumstances, when one's own mems of existence are insufficient. The demarcation between jobholding and citizensfiip advocated here does not forbid all consideration of issues of employment and social sccurity from the point of view of citizenship. On the contrary, in the neorepubIican view, such considerations are legitimate and desirable. k t , the evaluatim of arrangements for work and social security as to their implications for citizenshir, is mly compulsory on the question of their effectiveness in avoiding slavery-that: is, in mod3yjng dependencies ill such a way that their characteristics of slavery are removed. Social security schoolhg, a suibstitute income, m d havjng work are meane; to achiwe this goal, but thcir elficacy varies accordjrng to circumstances. Work can increase independmce, but the thought that it does so by defjnition is incorrect. In Ilolland, we have known the Arbeifsrinsuh (forced labor assignment du,ri.ngWorld War XI), and we have contelnporary foms of slavery irl, the guiSe of greehouse agP.iculkrre and prostit.ution. Apart from cases oi slavery, no compelling conclusims with = g a d to citizenship may be

Work and Third Ase Citizens D f 09

drawn f r m an evaluatim of arrangements for work and social security. Work may activate, stimulate political m d social participation, m d create '"normalityf' and community feeling. Work for and by everyone may be promoted in view oE tbrse cclnsequences; but it may not be compellingly innposed on everyone, or on all healthy adults, as a civic duty. Neorepubficast citiznship q u i r e s actual political equaliw and political particiy7ation as wefl as a guarantee of access to equality and participation. This guarantee may not be effectuated by imposing social equality and a social duty to work, wfiich would be merely to make m e route by which the guarantee can be effectuated into the ultimate goal.

It is remarkable and sad, in my view, that governments in liberal democracies should try to improve the vita1iit-y of citizenship by focusing on work, precisely in a period when paid and regular jobs are becoming scarce. How can citizmshlp for all be realized thrclugh means that are not accessible for a1l"i't is the mom remarkable, and sadder, that gove do so in a time whcn their societies allow a great n u d e s of people to live withuut work or with part-time work. Think of the elderly, the disabled, and the unemployed. Many of these arc. in what Peter Laslett (1.989) has called ""thethird age." The first and follrth ages are periods of dependency, of being born and growing UP artd of withering away and dying. The second age is the p"xtiod of responsibility and of working fctr a living, and saving. In the third age are those who are free to do what they always wanted to do, Those include not only the elderly with pensions but also young artists and independent younger people who =fuse to engage in the rat race but nevertheless gencra.t.e art income. At praent (for how long, no one knows), many liberal democmcies are rich enough to make this kind of living possible b r many Whether they can decide to do so and c m find ways to divide their riches h such a way as to actualize those possibilities for many is another question, Emphasizing the duty to work will not help to heal social divisions but will rather hcrease the gap between those who can and those who cannot get a job and gcnerate income. Would it not be better to concentrate on the yuestion of real citizenship for the increasing number of persons who find themselves-willingly or not-in the third age? Xn terms of the cwrently p ~ v a i l i n gsorrial hstitutions and conventions, they are superfluous people. They vacaticm off seasm, when resorts are empQ. If they are asked to serve, it is usually in intermediate social organizations and in szxbordinate or ornamental roles, and seldom on boards that give them positions of real power and inauence. Social institutions that regutate access to power

f lO

Work and Third Age Citizens

and prestige are increasingly linked to work and tbus to those in the second age, precisely at a time when the ranks of those h the third age are swelling, It is a legit.i.mate policy to aim at a certain balance between the numbers of those in tAe second a d third ages respectively But this shodd not he done b y l ; i n b g social hstitutions m r e tightly to work and by leaving those who are in the third age in m institutiona1 desert that they can fill only with their prhate initiatiwes. That is a recipe for crt.at% a ncw brand of second-class citizens. Citizenship fos all will not be realized dong this ruute.

TEN

Moral Unity or a Steady Diet of Conflicts?

:Inthe previous chapters, I argued that the actual organization of plurality in a cmtest of public imstituf;ions is ccmstitutive of citizmship. I criticized the tendmcy of many studies to reduce citizenship to its cmditions, to facus on its social conditions and on access to it, instead of on its actual exercise..However, this is not to say that citizens can exist in a sociommaf vacuum. Conditions do matter. The point is to understand where and how, as welt as the n a t m of those conditions. VitaX citizenship is not reproduced by its w n activities alone but needs also to be fed from sources that gelnerate nccv ~ e r u i t s , Sociaf and moral, conditims matter in two ways for citizenship. First, one rnay ask whether they make access to citizemhip reas0na:bly possible for all. Second, one rnay ask wfiether they rnake for participation by a stdficicnt number of people in a responsible way. Up to nowI 1 have repeatedly emphasized the ilnportmce of the first question; in this chapter, I address the second. h Part 2 of this book, entitled " M a t Citizens Do," we explored the meaning of citizenship for those who exercise it, But how many are they? is the number of pclple who take citizenship sericrudy szxffidcnt. to make it: a vital component in the (re)constitution of the republic? And among those who do use their citizen rights, are there mougt~peoy>lewho do so in a ~sponsihleway and not entirely selfishly? 'These questions concern the vita:[ityof cit.izenship. The vitality of citizenship is difficult to observe m d measure directly If citizenship is a rr-?servecirctrit to be activated im unstructured situations of entmgency, when the normat institutions of the republic carnot function as usual, looking at behavior in quiet times does not telf you much, Neorepublicanism does not require that ail participate every day but &vi-

f 12

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

ot work if only a very few ever bolther to act as citizms. Nor can it work when those wlm participate wifhout exception act urnorally and/or selfishly. Because the vitality of citizenship is difficult to observe, it is easy to worry about. This is precisely what many people, particularIy rulers and ktellectuals, do. Vitality depends on social and moral conditions that foster it. m e n vitality is perceived as being dangerously low, tJRerehre, responsible people will be tempted to create or stilnulate those conditions*Such an effort, 1 shall argue, must usually come to naught, It is possible and advisable to protect and foster these sources of citizenship; hut when they arc. lacking, it is not usually possjbte to bring them about in order to boost citizenship. The maniputtke nature of such efforts is incompatibte with the spontaneous and voluntary character of most of the social and moral sources that make for vital citize~~ship. That there are such sources everyone agrees, *inions differ, however, as to what those sources are. As they iio with regard to the question whether these sources can be brought about or strengthe~~ed by educathn, political action, persuasiun, or administrative arrangemnts. This &apt= focuses m the calls for moral regeneration and for ~storationof mord commmity that have rclcently arisen in a number of corntries (Etzioni 1995 and 1996). It focuses, in particular, on two manifestations of this movement, namely appeals by Dutch politicians for m m civic responsibility and argumelnts by ktellectuats for a reevaluati.011 of natimalism, It will contrast the mal uni.ty that is the goal of these appeals with the ~siliencethat ir-theres in the diversity of civil society-that lives, in Hirschman's words (1.995:243), on ""a steady diet of confliicts," on the actual organization of plurality by citizens. in Chapter 4, I argued that consensus is neither a necessary nor a srtfficient condjtion f , r dtizens' living peacefully togethec This conclusion applies also to moral unity.Why, then, bother to pay attention to those who call for moral unity? Because from the thesis that moral unity is neither szxfficient nor indjspensable, it by no m a n s follows that it: has no value whatsoever for vital citizenship, O f course morality makes a difference, h the following, anyway :lshall assume that morality matters to citizenship. I shall, h r the sake of argumel~t,assume thizt it is desirahlc both that people are moral and that there be a certain moral harmony or unity between them. m a t will be questioned are the efforts to reinstate the desired mora1it.y by calling for mord unity. Such mra:lizing is boCfi counterproductive and inappropriate in a republic of citizms who freely organize their differences. Cornensus or moral unity may be the outcome of heir activities, but it is not a requirement that should be met before citize~zs begin to act,

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f f 3

:In The Netherlands, during the first half of the 1990s, several leading pditicians voieed their concern about the civic respmsibility of the Dutch. 'They linked various social problems, such as criminality and bad healthf with the declhe of moral standards that they claimed to observe in society The pditicianskconeern was cmcentrated on two issues: the disintegration of Dutch society and the overbllrdening of systelns of democracy and law. They observed that not much was left of the ordered, well-organized society of some time ago. Most people appreci&e the increased freedthat came with individualism. The politicians pointed out that there is a shadow side to this development. Indlvidualizatictn, emancif)atictn, and djferentiat.im may result in, social disintegration. When disintegration occurs, people thinlc only oi themseIves, and feel no responsibility for the community; they do not exercise social cmtrol by holding each other accountablq for their needs, they call upon the state; they try to b v out of their duty to care ior their kin and theis neighboss by way oi insurance p m i u m s ; or they even avoid payhg dues and taxes. fn short, citizens arc said to be selfish and no longer to believe in the basic standards and values of the sorriety. The politicims insisted that this trend toward. disintegration has disastrous cmseguences. First, dishtegration was clahed to be harmful. to the good life of the citizens themselves, Prime Minister Ruud tu:bbers stated that a growing nulnber of people had become ~ c i p i e n t of s massive and anonymous social care. People .~lrhodepended on this c m would be placed outside the comrnuni@ or feel left out of it. They would become isdatcs, mre clicnts of the systems of the welfare state. A political system that allcrwed this to happen would have forsaken its important task ol integrating cit-ize~~s into the national community in such a way that they can flourish in society and can participate in its social processes. Mhister of Justice Emst Hirsch Ballin was especially concerned about another result of the trend toward. disintegration: It would undemixle the under the very basis of the constitutional state. A Redzts~faat,a ~"c~gime rule of law requires not only Chat the state gmranke the legid ri&ts ol the citizms but also that the latter feel actively responsible for main.taining them. Social disintegration jeoparciizes citizens' attihdc of ~ s p o n s i bility toward the community, without which the realization of forzrral rights will. remain defectfie. A third aspect of the trend toward disintegraticm wap; emphasized by Eelco Brhkman-at the time, leader of the Christim Democratic party in parliament. He worried about the effcct of djsjntegration on prrblic sup-

f 14

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

port for the welfare state. As citizens increashgiy rely upon government care instead of on commmd rcsponsibiljties, it becoms difficult to keep up the necessary level of provisions for those who really need them, These three cor-rcerns are of course closely related. They express the view that crjtizens lack eomunity-mindedncss and a feeling of fesponsibility, witiholxt which the policies of the welfare state cannot work. T l ~ s e fore, the speechrnakers cmcluded, a cmtribution to the scrluticm of the problems of the wt?lfarestate will, to a large extent-, have to come from the comrnuni@itself. This is where politicians join each other inan appeal for civic rttsponsibility. To them, this means active citizenship, which is expressed not only in loyalty to the law and political participat-ion in a nmrow sense but also in the acceptance of respunsibility for oneself and others, in one" cmtributions to social life. Civic responsibiliq is conc&ved of not onXy as pertaining to the sphere oE the state but also as a leading principle outside the public-politic& realm. The second issue politicians wert? concerned about was the werburdelring of democracy and the legal system, A dangerous pincer m v e mmt was said to be taking place: On the one hand, citizens increasingly were turning to politicians and the courts to promote their interests and rigMs, and on the Othe~;they increasingly failed to obey laws and reguiations, They used the legal and democratic systems as it suited them, as consumers, L\rithout accepting ~spmsibilityfor the continufng functionk g of those systems. The latter were becoming overused and overburdened. The politicians admjtted that the governmnt itself was also to blame. Not only had it ma$e too many laws and mgdations but it also had contributed to the ""potlutionof standards" by plac-ing insufficient emphasis on the moral conknt of legd rules, by m a b g obscure regutations, by failing to enforce thr l w , and often by not abiding by its own rules. -fo\vever, the citizelns were also criticized. 'They were said to s h w calculating behavior and to accept moral standards, if they knew them at all, in the abstract but not: to adhere to them in practice. It was time for a nekv public morality: h line with the requirement. that the government learn a new way of governing, the citizm was expected to develop a new lifestyle in which civic rt.spclnsibitity should have a central position. In this context, "civic responsibility'" kvollld mean abiding by the lacvs and rules and hoiding others accountable for doing the same. The emphasis on responsibilitjes and duties, the pditicians insisted, involved more &m a smart attempt to cwtaiS the cost of governmnt provisions or to guarantee connpIia.nce with the law Making individual citizens accountable for their w n deeds and omissions, they argued, wodd be a sign of respect for who and what citizezzs are, m indication that they truly belong to the community as full mmhers, Experienchg and fulfilling duties wodd give the ct, unity the chance to care for the people

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f f 5

who redly do need care, a d it wollld give the citizm the chance to grow from an object of care to a sub~ectof integration and freedom. These in.terventions of the politicians aroused mixed feelings in the popdatim at large and in the news media in particular. Undeniably, they were addressing important matters; but someirhing was wrong with what the politicians werc saying. Or was it the way in which, or the position from which, they said it? In order to clarify these misgiwings, I shall analyze the sayings of the politicims by considering them as speech acts: What did the politicians do by giving these speeches? Three things, it seems to me: I. They drew irtspiration from the past. 2. They misapprehended contemporary pfurality. 3. They spoke to the responsible citizens, who were present, about the calculating citizns, who were absent. These three aspects of the speech acts of politicians are malyzed below.

TIN3 PAST AS COWASS Drawkg inspiration from the past is a well-harun strategy for politicad renewal, Revolutions and revolutionaries model themselves on the past. ?i> the Romans, an appeal to authcrriy (nactttritus) rwant a to the some, to the act of faundalion of Rom. m e n we get stuck, in quarrels or otherwise, we also return to the acts, to the binding decisions and agreements that constituted our relationship. Protestants return to the Acts of thc Apstles, as they were laid dokvn. in the Ribfe. By =turning to the source, future deterioration and corruption may be hught. This is done by way of ribais of codimation and purification. Confirmation rit-ualstake us back to the orighnal source, wEiich regenerates us and gives our common actions direction and power. Before we are able and.al.htwed to get to the pure source, we must cleanse ourselves and the community from impure elements. Without pwificatio~n,there is no regeneration. Purification rituals vary from washing off graffiti to executing traitm, Dirt is matter that is out of place. It disturbs the (correct)order. Dirt that has to be washed oM stands for dmger-the danger of djsintegration m d lack of direction of the community, ""Freign commentators in one voice criticize the poIIution and danger in the streets of the large a t c h cities," wrote the minister of justice (EJirsch Balfin. 1,992). Complaints about m a d l y degenerate behavior, about filth on the neighbar's balcony, about dog shit in the street, and about carelessness, mean more than they seem

f 16

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

to at first. They sipify dmger: Dirt is evidence of the activities of a polluter, a breaker of- order who is dangerous,.Dirt also bears Chc risk of infection. Purification and the cutting out of tumors may be needed. to prevent illnesses from sprc.adil7g. Xnd if such an isolation of dangemus dirt is not possible, them an equally dangerous and potentially polfwting medicine may prove necessafy as m antidote. This vocabulary of dirt, danger, illness, and =generation can be recognized in cantemporary arguments about civic responsibility. A cmparison with oider strategies and vocabdarics of political renewal makes one realize the extent to which current experiences of pollutim and danger may be determhed by the nntions of order Chat people cursclntly hold. Where one person sees plurality, the other sees rubbish. Where one person sees variety, ancrther sees discrriier. M e r e the one sees mnsters (unacceptable combinations such as centaurs), the other sees fascinating novelties. Someone who fears that order will collapse is bound to see many dangers, If dirt is a s i p of danger, then such a person will have a lot of clemskg to do. In view of these considerations, frequent manifestations of concern about a lack of civic respclnsibility first and foremost indkate a fear that order will collapse. Thai: is, someone's fear and someone's conceptio~~ of order. The question of wheSher an acceptable order in political or social interaction is actually in danger cannot be decided simply by ~ f e r r i n gto a particular politician's idea of order. This is so because politics is precisely about conflicting conceptions of order and ways of dealing with them. Conflicting conceptions of order, which are mutually felt to be threa.t.ening,are bottnd to generate experiences of dekrioration and pollution. Politics, therefore, is inherently dirtier than many other human activities m d relations. The past camat, strietly speakng, be brought back, but it is precisely this kpossibility that enables politicims to mobilize and manipulnte it for the purpose of contemporary repairs. "Pillarizationff(the division of society into nonoverlapphg segments) h 'The Netherlmds, for instance, is a thixlg of the past, It may, however, serve as an exampIe of what is pop sible-f what we Dutch once were able to do m d should &erefore be able to do again. It may serve as a m d e l of m d a d e l for a workable politicai community. Politicians want citizens to conform, to such models. I-lowcver, this wish poses a problem. Zn the models, the source of civic rclspor~sibilitytrdtionally has been loca.t.ed outside the publjc-po:ljtical s p h e r e i n a strict religion (De Tocqueville); in the rhythm of working in industry (Durkheim); in disciplirre in schoofs and oher instihttions (Fnucault); or in the hilly.. Politicians look for sources of civic respon"ibility outside the public-political spherc, But where should they look? In contemporary society there is little unity of culture and ways oE life. We find

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f f 7

religious people m d nonbelievers; people who are subjected to the disciplhe of a '"egulas" job and those who do irregular work or have no job; ambitious students and dropouts; families and other foms of cohabitation. While becoming more varied, rr.ligi
f 18

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

mocracy by way of a reclrimtation t o w 4 fie community that is said to have existed in former times run the risk of do-gooders in the public sphese. h the words of cmtemporary thhker Eli Sagan,whose analysis cJf Athenian democracy offers an orGinal combination of political and psy choanalytic insight: "The total paranoid control promised by all schemes of social mgheering and by tota.litarian societies arc attempts to heat the terrible wounds caused by the destruction of kinship f o m of social solidarity They create, h phmtasy or in reality; a solidarity more inflexible, more controlling, more overwhelming t h any kinsblp system ever prowided" (Sagan 1(391:346), k t we do need a source of inspiration, orimtation, and identity This we have to find and give shape to, however, in the present context. An appea1 to a source does not m k when it impfie" ddenlal of currmt social rclalj.ty*h such a denid, the source becomes the opposite of what is wrong now. The ideal then becomes: contemporary society minus its shortcomings. Such an ideat is fed. by rttsentment about how society n w works and by a failure to accept the preent: (with its plurality irnmigrmts, and unintctrested people), fiesentment and nostalgia. are not good guidelines. The present is not an anomaly that can or should be erased as quickly as possible. The spewh-making politicians rcgard contemporary society as an Objectionable fact, a source of problems they have to concoct a solution for. They do not want reality as it: is but as it would surface in its improved 'form from their hterventions. They seem to be wondering: Why do citizens not participate im what is good for them? W I Iare ~ they so st-uhborn or indifferent? If onIy they showed civic responsibility, our tasks would n the old days, people used to participate. tn the be less unmanageable, X olLi days, yes. . . . W ~ e na social, cultural, and normative orientation toward the past is combhed with a pragmatic-technological orientatio~~ toward the hture, we have a conservatism that at first may look reasonable but that as we h o w from bitter experience, is fn fact a vofatile mixture.

An orientation toward the past has cclnsepences for the observatrion of contenporary plura,ljty which is viewed interms of hokv it used to be. We shalt see that this orientation leads to a misperception and misjudgment of conterrtporary society and its possibilities. Contemporary society is imdeed offensive as well as exciting, and it does show disinkegrative tendencies. OId associations are Ming apart or losing influence, Che can no longer trust them or implicitly rely on the behavior of their merrtbers.

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f f 9

New associations, such as temporary employment agencies, fuh;lres markets, old peaple" oqganiaations, organized crime, and ~rariousprotestoriented social movements, corn and go before they have found an acceptable and recognizable place within established decisionmaking structurcls and data colections, The categories by means of which, we classify realiq and make it manageable, such as those of the Central Nureau oE Statistia, or political parties, arc. b r ~ l k nthrough, time and s a i n . 'They probride an insufficient grip on what we want to grasp. The clynamic and multiform social rcality-or should. we say realities?-is not readily repremted either in padiment or other =presentative bodies, or in the classifying work of economi~ts,sociologi~ts,and other scientists. Is there a guaranteeing story, a founding prlnciplc that keeps this recondite plurality manageable and acceptattle? People used to fincl such reassurance in the "hidden hand" "darn Smith); in the dialectic of history (Hegell, Marx); in combating prejudke (the Enlighte cussions, in hearing both sides, and in techndogical pragmatism. Nowadays, however, the belief h t such a foundi,ng principle exists has disappeared. Each attempt to construct an authoritative metastory is suspect. Each attempt to tell such a stcrry is distmsted as ccmcealed tyramy. The task and place of poliics are no longer guarmteed in a metastory, either., Politics-that is, we participants in plural society-must itself mahtain and rmew its legitimacy. The place and task of poZirtjcs are not guaranteed by the stmdards of "the" Dukh culture. That culture is not unitary but plural. Therefore an appeal for civic responsibility cannot refer to a common cultural standard the existence of which is taken for grmted. Misled by an imagir"."ry stability in the past, the politicims construct a false opposition betweell the calculating and the responsible citizen. They misperceivc the indispensable rolc of calcula.t.ion in the organization of pluralit): or for that matter, in any modern form of social order, Even some slaves had to calculate in order to do their work. 50 much more the citizelz. The appeal to the citizens to adhere to stmdards m d not to take a calculating attitude is si.mpb inappropriate. The citizm who complies with this by m t calculating will often disbrb the organization of plurality. ARer all' calculation is indjspensable in the organjzati.on of hang* plurality and in the formation of a judgment about what constitutes a sensi27le application of standards. We count on each other's calculationwithout it, l-he organiza.t.ionof contemporary pluratity is inconceivable. Calculation and adherence to moral or legal standards are not opposites. Wi&out standards, there is no calcdation. Calculation presupposes the at-tribution of value to the elements that are part ol the calculation, as well as rules concerning the combination of these elements. Tn the evaluasittion oE the usehlness and appropriateness of cdculatiorls in a certai~~

f 20

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

uation, standards and calculaticm play a role. Moreover, caiculation is in order with regard to stmdards and their approp"ateness mink, for instance, of the judicial tenets of force rnajeure and of self-defense, which require people to make judgments based on quantitative estimates of risks and dangers. In order to establish proportionahty between a threat. and m e % reactions to it, one must calculate proportions. Calculation is all lowed and is part of the n o m l behavior of citizens. The law both promotes m d restricts calcz~lation.mink, for instance, of the doctrine of the lawful act of government, which states that certain g o w e m n t actions are not unlawful as long as the government pays for the (calculated) d m a g e resultit~gfsom its actions, Calculation is thus used to organize accountability. Cafculation is thinking in terms of cmsequenwq t"king into account that. . . . Consultants, lawyers, and officials of an unemp1oymen.t agency or a business firm assist their citizens/ clients by making calculations in their behalf, Calculation is an indkpens-. able element in the normative organization cJf social interaction.

Who exactly are the people to whom appealdfor civic responsibility are being addressed? 'The active citizens, or those who are uni,nterested?Are companies, consultants, children, and stay-at-homes included? Are people who h e inside the country without having ciltizm status induded? The lack of interest: of citizens is criticized in speflches that in fact are addressed to t h s e who were interested enough to come and listen. The politicians' crilticism, however, is directed at those who don't hear their statements, the outsiders who did not come to listen. Thus, what the speakers are doing in essence is to rally the insiders against the uninterested outsiders. Below! more will be said about uninterested citizens. Mere, we consider first l.he people for whom the appeals are prinnarily meant, the good citizens who have come to listen. .An appeal directed at them also poxvroblems-nan-tely, paradmica1 communication, and the colmization of their life-kvorld. Paradoxical communication arises when the act of communication denies the content of the message that is ccmlmunicated (Hster 1983). ""Be spon.t.aneous"-t:he act of comanding conRicts with the content of the messqe, Such communication leaves its hearers feetjng perplexed., sens-. ing that they are. in a double bind. Imposing civic ~sponsihifityon free citizens, or talking them into it, is experienced as inappropriate by many. "IflZ1 be the judge of that" i s an oft-heard reaction to appeals for civic Espmsibility.

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f 2 f

&e c d d argue that such a reaction is uncaikd for, because these are attempts of citizens to convi,nce their cocitizens. It is not that simple, however. These attempts to convince cocitizens, after allf are being made by people who as officeholders have a compulsory relationship of autl.tority to those they address. To many, a chinet minister is not simply a cocitizen when be is giving a speech. Yet, accusations of a lack of civic responsibility also have their pmblems in a debate betwen free and equat citizens. By making such accusations, the speaker implicitly questions the citizenship, the free m d equal status, of the person addressed. Mihichever way ofie looks at it, appeals for civic mspomibility retail7 a paradoxicai aspect in almost all situations. Citizenship is the basis on which cmvictims and appeals between citizens m y develop. Rarely can this basis itself be protected against erosion by way of appeale;. "Colonization of Che life-world"7s a phrase used by Jiirgen Habermas (1981:416"6).System of health care, finance, higher education, and the like require system-cmforming behavicrr from ordlnary people in order to be rclasonably conmuable and to render their system-products. If such behavior is to be relied on, it should be rooted in the life-world of the people involved. Yet, this world oftm generates standards and bebavior, traditional or not, that do not fit the requircJments of lnodern system-management, Traditional or life-world ethics thus conflicts with modem systemethics. Such a conflict very clearly emerges in c-mvironmental issues. For the purpose of preserving tf-re environment, of system-pre=rvation., we am invited by experts on the system to believe their (often inadequately tested) elaborations and to act accordingly (Wildavsky 1995). We are mwired to do what is ncccssary for the preservatior~of systems on whieh, we are dependent for our survival. Essentially we are being asked to adopt an "emptyfkthics, to pmviefe a Hank check; in concreire terms, possibly tn act against o~trdeepest cmvictions. The lhEng of tradjtionallf substantive values to a fomal willingness to conform to system requirements is pmhlmatic. It leads to ambiguity in the appeals for civic respmsibility Which kind of: civic responsjhility is c d e d for? The one that is traditional in content or the one that supports system-steering?

We now turn to the uninterested citizen, the black sheep in the politicians" speeches, Why, actually would it be wrong for a citizen to be ranj.nterested? After ail, in post-World War 11 thwrizing on democracy, apathy often was regarded as positive. EmthzlsiasGc participation by m n y , it was said, would easily lead. to polakzation, ideologization, and intolerance, It would create totalitarim democracy and might result in civil war. Prtliti-

f 22

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

cal elites that were pragmatic and willing to compmmise, and relatively inactive and obedient nnasses, w e x regarded as conditions fnr a stitbte democracy. Today, this theory offers us no solutions, because the new unintewsted citizens, unlike their counterparts in the 395(3s, do not spmtaThey neously behave ""properlyPf"hat is, in line with the good citizel~s* '"misbehave." Whereas apathy used to be regarded as good for democracy, lack of interest now is seen as undermining it, tn their speeches, Dutch politicians indjcate fntls rnajor problems, the soiution to which in their view, would be thwarted by citizensqlack of interest: I. Maintajning the law and keeping society governabfe; 2. Mutual care and the preservation of national solidarity in the welfare state; 3. PoliZical.participation and the viability of democracy; 4. Participation in employment artd the via:bility of the social market economy By fighting lack of intert-st and by promoting civic ~spcmsibility,the politicians hope to cantribute to the soXution of these problems. Can this be done, and is it permissible? Let us first examine whether it can be done. As we saw earlier, in contemporary society; there is na longer one source, such as Christian ugbring4ngf from which a unified and active citizenry might come forth. The ways of learning that lead to the qualities required under thc four points above are nowadays relathely mconnected. Someone who becomes more kelpfuX does not thereby become mcrrtr law-abiding or politicay more active. Extensive political participation leaves too little time for the work- and the quick dt.cisiclnmakifig reyuircd by the market, The sphercls mntioned above-of law, care, politics, and employment-have developed their own independence and logic inspite o( their mutual intertwining. An appeal for civic rclsponsibility camot bring unity here. If these pmbIems cmnot be handled by a shgle solution, could we not take a more modest approach by promoting civic responsibility per area or sector? We might focus on the interest that the uninterested citizens have in receiwing and maintaining community provisions. This hterest w d d have to be m d e visiblc: Those wfno are already aware of it but: who do not want to pay the price in the form, of a contribution would have to be made to see negative effects on their income or freedom. They would have to see Chat their behavim was no longer paWjng oft. The admirtistration of justice, provision of care, mediation of employment, and admfnistration of social security thus worald becorne disciplinay institu-

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f 23

tions. People have to be shown and told how things are, and those who do not want to listen should be made to feel. In practjce, however, very littk good comes of such an approach, The policymaking bodies remain mmymous to indifferent people, and individual executive civil servants usualty have little real disciphning power. They are often thseatened. by client%m d they c t do much, havixtg no leeway for improwisation. Dsciplining p o w r W only in siktati~ns&at occur withh total instihtions-&at is, hstitutio~nsthat encoIBpass mmy aspects of life. Even prisans and. schools no Ionger work that way today Next, we come to the vestion of whetha i t is permissible to fight a lads of interest as the opposite of civic responsibility With regard to the pubtic-gollitical sphere, various positions can be distinguished: slave (wilf-less follower), citizen (partly giving shape), enemy (uneiermining), contractor-consumer (takhg advantage). From a neorepublicm perspeeot be rejected and combated: Citizens have a right to be uninterested. (Specific obligations in specific situatims-such as serving on a jury-may take priority over this right.) No more obligations may be imposed on citizens who lack hterest than on others, The conditions set for citizens, unh~terestedor otherwise, are the same. Is lack of interczst on, the part of citizens actually bad? i2ssuming that it were allowed and could be effective, would it make sense to fight such lack of interest? The answer is complex: Lack of interest, i p o r i w each other, is often a suecessfu1 way of dcaling with plurality Moreover, allowing for a lack of i n t e ~ sis t essential for a free societe functionkg (Zinoviev 1981; ELster 3983; Elirschman 1970). People wplo sirnply t u " away, who take the option of exitl provide intportaslt signals on the road of peaceful change in a free society. Not only do companis learn from customers who walk away from their products, but politkal parties, systems of care, and systems of law may team from u~nhteresi:as well, A mixture of loyal and unjnterested citizens works best. Those who take the exitoption give a tangible signal, which starts a pmcess of change that is supported by the loyd citizens. Having mly loyal citizens results in blindness; having only un.intert.sted citizens, in powerlessness, The acknowledgment of people" freedom not to be interested-to be neither for nor against but indifferent or simply imterested in matters other t h n citizcnship-bseaks through the smothering logic of "those Mxho are not for us are agahst us." Internal contradic-tion(something is either a or h) works differently from external contradiction (something is e& ther a or non-a; but being non-a does not mean that it is h). The East European communist regimes acted so stupicify, were SO stuck, and nee&d such immense secret services because, among other things, they were caught in the logic of internal contradiction, of friend or foe, In free Epublics, a similar logic surfaces regULarIy, but it also can be freely com-

f 24

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

bated. For instance, the choice '"or or against Europe [maning the European Union]" can be refused, as can the choice ""civicresponsibi)ity or lack of interest." Equating lack of interest with lack of civic rczsponsihility is inappropriate not only became a citizen has the right to be uninterested but a)so because too many essentially different positions are concealed by the phrase "lack of interest."' There are free riders; and there are others w h appear to be taEng advantage, who are interested in the c m m n cause but secretly refrain from contributing whenever they have the chance. Then there arc. the cynics, who can adopt any position yet believe in nothing. And there are those "'weak of will," people of good intentions and weak flesh. mere are unixrtemsted people who am dedicated to matters other than citizenship and who therefore, in tbrir bcrhaviftr, do not show a great deal of civic responsibility. And fhallly; there are real opponents and undcrrniners of the republic. These cannot be successfuly fougtnt by allowing them to hide behind an differentiated screen of uninterested people who are all said to lack civic responsibility Our purpose in this chapter is to expfore how the vitaliq of citizenship can be enhanced. The moral appeals of politicians are not of much help except: in exemplifying what not: to do. C m questions about the vitality of citizenship be better tackled if we d.o not take the view of pditicians in positions of auf;hority, and do not i t d d ~ s individuals s (thereby winfoxing thc inhidualism that was preejsdy the problen?) but the culture that encompasses t:hem'l In the next section, we look at efforts by some intetlectuals to strengthen a nationalism within whjch a sense of citizenslzip can fiourish.

NATURALIZING NATIONALISM

The recmt resurgence of nationalist politicaf movements and conflicts has bee11 reflected upon by inteliectuals who for a long time showed no great interest in suck an outdated. and imaginary phenomenon as nationalism, ?"hey describe, study, explafn, and clmdone. Quite a few have made a change of position that may be characterized as natura1izing nat-ionalism while sirnultmeously historicizhg (denaturalizing) liberal democracy, This change of position is analyzed mom closely below. Not long ago, for the mgority of intellectuals, natio~~alism was sornething contmcted, an artifwt. It was considered dangerous and to be kept strictly to its subaltern place in the politjcai order. Nowadays, for mmy intellectuals who write on nationalism, it is both natural and human, containixlg not only vicious elements but also potential: for peaceful caclperatictn, and forming an indispmsable and cmtrd principle of politic& orcler.

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f 2 5

I-low has this change of vision m m g intdectuafs come about? 'Ib their credit, it must be said that they openly admit to have changed their positions, They report a h d . of conversion, a momnt when they began to see what they could not or would not see earlier. ""Looking back, I see that time i,n the crypt as a momelnt when I began to ehange, wheln some element of respect for the national px^oject began to creep h t o my ietzlings, wben I understood MIhy land and grave matter and why the nations matter Mlhieh protect bot:h""Ignatieff 1993:9%94). Formerlyr the intellectuals tell us, they had, as good liberals, contempt for nationalism. ""Ioth disliked and disbelieved the ambient rhetoric of national declhe. It struck me most..lyas a suppressed f o m of imperial nostalgia, . . . But as I have lived h r e longer, I have come to see that the space for a multi-cultural, mdti-racial, post-nationat cosmopolitanism in Britain was much narrower than E had supposed. . . . h reality; the British are amolng the most fiercely nationdistic of all peoples" (Ignatieff 1993:168). R n y Judt (1994~45)has written af the erstwhile historicist critics of nationalism, bo& liberals m d Marxists: "Natio~nalismm d national idelntity are taken seriously but not on their own terms, and so they elude understanding." Now, h1994, we h o w better: ""Iwe wish to counter such views we have to begin bp acknowledging that they contain a lternel of truth. Thercl an? incommensurate goals and unresolvable pmblems, and the unequal and conflicted divisjon of the world into nations and peoples is not about to wither and shrivel os be overcorn by goodwill or progress"7Judt. 1994:51). Sb see or not (yet) to see, that seems to be the question. As Paul %he& (19%) wrote: "What those critics [of the new acceptmce of natimaism] don't see is that ewry society needs to procwe b r itself some 'Pninima moralia" which consist in more than universal values only." The vision of those converted intellectuals, roughly speaking, is that nationalism is (belongs to living together, fulfills a basic human need) m d is necessay (for living together). The question is no longer nationalism or not, for or agahst. Not whether, but only haw to give it form or how to modify it. It makes no sense to ignore or fight agahst something that is unavoidable and indispensable. How might we mderstand this collective constmctive move that "enlightened" htellectuals have made with regard to natio~nalism? h d what notions of social order are k p l i d h their new ways of seeing? We find the makings of an answer in studies by anthropologi" tiklary Douglas (1975) on sel6evidence and "the naturaleff h every society, some things and relations arc taken as self-evidcnt, hviolable, and natural. Each culture has its awn notion af nature and of the natural. This usually concerns matters m d relations that are so celntral in the prevailing social and moral ordcrs that all doubt about t h m should be banished. They are stated and repeated but by no means argued for.

f 26

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

Their self-evident character is confirmed in t-he way they art. p ~ ~ n t e d . What is naturaii does not evert need argment, Who wouid argue aga.inst: nature? I'he nah;lral is constmcted in such a way that it cmfims and supports the social and mord order. The central eleme~ntsin this order are? placed beyond criticism m d argument. They are selhevident and natural. Whoever douhts them is either crazy or an insufficiently knowledgeL7bfe outsider. Unnatural behavior thus distuhs the sociomorai order, and it is therefore harmful. What is atural shodd be excluded or impl-isaned. Monsters are creatures tha ak throqh "natural" classificatic,ns. Examples are the centaur, which is halt man and half animd, or persons who are not legal residents in the country but who nevertheless avail themselves of social help or vote in elections (ashappened in Amsterdam, in 1994). The mtural orders should be kept mtural and pure, both the order of things (ecology)and that of people. Governments a l s mmt ~ respect the natural givens in society When they fail to do this, their policies will be seen as ineffective and even harmful. From this mthropological point of view, changing conceptions of what is nabral or mavoidable signal changes in social classifications and orders. Let us look in this light at changing ideas about Chc naturalness ol nationalism, Do we find there also the three hallmarks of the natural: (1) repeated presentation of //natural" gjvens without argument, ( 2 ) which szxpport thc sociomoral order and (3) which justjfy exclusion oC what does not fit because of its unnaturahess? Unargued and repeated insistence on t-he unavoidability of some form of natio~nallsmis common to the recent co~nfessionsof ixltellectuals noted above, Their conversion is not a matter of arguments but rather of enlightenment that comes from outside or within but that is surely beyond argurnew, Mow do intellectuals, who after all are specidists h argunte~nt, al.low themselves to become convinced without argumnt? By bad argument, by a presentation that looks like an argument hut that on closer inspection does not hold together, There are four typical ways of doing this. The first is the juxtaposition and interchangeabk use of terms like ""bsic human need," """ientity," "something to hold onto," "belonging,f' ""gmp," "tmdition," and "nationaiismsf'The suggestio~nis that we, the reader and the writer, all b o w what these terms refer to m d what their unaiity is. In their p~smtaticm,some kind of c m comec-tion and co munity is suggested and imaghed. A second way to avoid argurnent is to present pressjng problems, and then, Mlithout argurnent, to qualify them as pmblerns of identity Not every pressing political problem, however, is a problem of idmtity We need to investigate how, in what circumstances, c d i c t s become c d i c t s of identity: fn Gorcles, in Provence, my Dutch children p1ayc.d t-he game of

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f 27

Risk with French children. They hardly understood each other" language. They played well together until the words exchanged between speakers of the native tongue were '"head" by "the others" as a conspiracy to outplay the foreipas. Then the play stopped, its place being taken by a shouting match between the Frc;snch and the Dutch. A third way in which argument is avoided is to insist that something mom is needed to make political democracy and the laws work than the laws Chcmelves, and then to offer feelings of nationaljsm as this "smething," Su,cRy the laws need more thm themselves to work, as they are not self-executing. But what this "more" involves needs argument m d has been widely contested. Candidates have been the djvision of labor ( b k h e i m ) , dkciplinary pmctices (Foucault), the spirit of the laws (Mantesyuieu), the leadership of a lawgiver (Rousseau), and, yes, nationalism. Here also, study and argument are needed ta determhe what prirrciples of order, anchored in feeling and behavior, obtain and can be harnessed, and in what circumstances. A fourth way to avoid argume~ztm d ta naturalize national is^^ is by essentializing situated speech. Talk Labout a national cabinet or the nation itself being in peril during wartime is perfectly understmdahle in its context. But from this it does nat follow that we may study natio~zalismas an attitude, feeling, or essence (as a ghost in the machine, to use Ryle" term). :111 certah sibationri;, the statement ""you are an anger' is perfectly c m prehezzsible, but nowadays this na lo~zgerleads ta investigathg the properties of angels. Why shod4 it be otherwise with nationalism? Naturalizing has its benefits. He who can invoke nabre has reality cm his side. De Schaeflrijver (1995) clearly shows this in her anavsis of matimalism in Belgium: The essentialist vision of language groups as by definition nations, and the homogenizing assumptisn that muftilingualism in one area by itself leads to conflicts, have for quite same time now acquired the pclwer of self-evidence in the articulated public sphere, Thereby the ""natural" evolution, of which Prime Minister Van den Brande spoke, has indeed lost its "natural" limitsp and thereby the political compromise of Sint-Michiefs remains verative on a pragmatic rather than on a principled basis. This merely pragmatic fc>'r,undation enables separatists to paint proponents of even a merely federalized BeXgium as no>stalgicpeople, and to contrast their "eerno>tionalappeals" W-iththe ""cool reality" of the necessity of separation.

While nationalism is naturabzed, Ijberalism is being denaturalized. How does this work? The place of liberalism in the world is basically altered by the insistence on a historically developed consensus as an jndispensable element of a viable political community and as a condition for, or even a core element of, liberalism. Liberalism thereby loses its univer-

f 28

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

sal appeal and openness and is made into a historical pmdutat by virtue of whi& it is no longer accessible to aX1 people. The implications of such a coupling of liberalism with a particular historical cuXture are clearly stated in a newspaper article by the ppliosopher H e m Philips" (19%): ""Thereforethe hflow of immigrants &odd not become too big (also because of werpopulation in our mini-country) and we shall, with care and love, have to initiate the i igrants into the game of democracy and its concon^ritantpublic morality 'Were, the implications of the naturalizatiorz of nationalism are stated without further ado: quantitative contahment and the education of newcomers. Thus, nationalism ascribes certain qualities not onXy to us insiders but also to them, the outsjd,ers. 'They are different, they lack what we have in commn. What element of tl-te internal m r a l and social order is protected and expressed by this externat attribution of properties to outsiders? I suggest: the i;nternal order of useful/suyerfluous people and materials. In contemporary societies, much waste is being produced with great liedication: Dirt-that is, superfluotls nnatter-and une~~ployment-that ist superfluous people. -These accumulate in mountains of polluted earth and lines of people waiting for their turn. To increase efficiency is to do more to get rid, of waste, In a sociornnral order cen.t.ered wit-,hlcss m d t-he~forc-. around hcrcasing efficiency, politics is cornered into the role of waste disposal, of ordering the superfluous, What is usually lacking h the interve~ztionsof intellectuals cmcerning nationalism is content. This is tmderstandable, Each nationalism is supposed to he unique, so MIhat can an indiwidual say about it? In societies that are de facto plural, each pmposal to g h e nationalim a specific content wilI meet with criticism and thus fail to exemplify the consensus that it purports to have found. That something like nationalism is necessary,unavoidable, and mtural is sta.t.ed,but what its content is, and wfin.t. should be done with dissidents, usually remains unclear, What d s o usually remains hidcjen is the constructive activity of the intellecrnls themselves. Nationalism was and remains a constructed artifact. If it fulfills a human need, it does so in a culturally specific way that invokes a culturally specific interpretation or construction of the particular human need. 'This insight is sometimes forgotten by the new nationalists. That does not mean that their constructive activities cease to exist but only that they take place in t11e dark, un~gulatedby law, politics, and empirical testhg. LiberaIism rccopizs the need for order but rejects any mans toward order &at go beyond. &e law, the cmstitution, and poliPics. This posi~on was elcrquently expressed by Justice Jackson of the U.S. Supreme Court (Wt Virgit-linSIntc Bllar~lofEducnli~?r~ 0.Bamcfte' 319 U.S. 624 [1943]):

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D f 29 Struggles tcr ccjerce uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men. Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon but at other times and places the ends have been racial or territorial gcurity support of a dynasty or regime, and particular plans for saving souls. As first and moderate methods to attain unity have failed, those bent on its accomplishment must resort to an ever-increasing severipas. As governmental pressure tow-ard unity becomes greater, so strife becomes mow bitter as to tzrhose unity it shall be. Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provc)cation than from finding it necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public educational officials shall compel youth to unite in embradng. U1timat-efutility of such attempts to compel coherence is the fee son of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity the Inquisition as a means to religious and dynastic unity the Siberian exiles as a means to Russian unit?i;dawn to the fast failing effc7rts of our present totalitarian enemies, Those W ~ Cbegin ) coercive elimination of dissent scion find themselves exterminating dissenters, Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard. It seems trite but necessary to say that the First Amendment to our Constitution was designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings, . . . When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we deaX with here [a refusal to salute the flag], the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom, The test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

The intellectuals who naualize nationalism insuft"iciently appre"ate the dangers of tf7eir strivhg for u l ~ i t yand order. They make nationaljsxn acceptable while leaving its content underspecified. Their own brand of natiodism may look peaceful and acceptable, but: they remain practically defe~~seless against nastier fillings of a theorctiealiy empty shell. They conceive of national unity as an indispensable embedding for citizenship. Believing in this national unity, thm, becomes a primary duty of the citizen. Without much exaggeratio~~, one cot~1dsay that while dealing with differences is the point of citizenship for neorepublicans, for the new nationalists the point of citizensplip is the cultivation of a k e l h g of unity that overrides differences.

We have now looked at two ekfarts to understmd and restore the sources of viable political citizenship: the poit-icians%pgealsfor civic rclsponsibility and the intell.ectualsf insistence on nationalism as a natural necessity.

f 30

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

These efforts were found wanting, both empirically and normatively. 'These social engineers have views of how society works that are steered by their wish that it be orderly and governable, How shodd society be in order to be gowernable, is their leading yuestiom What does not fit this imagix~edsociety is ignored or swept aside as unfitring, The political px.oblem of organizing the plurality of distusbirrg differences and conflicts ZletLveen people is "solved'" by positing its opposite: unity. The moral unity Of responsible jndividuals, or the historical zlnity of the nation. Citjzens, whose task it is to deal with harsh differences among themselves, are here admitted as citizens only after they have shed their disturbing differences. Such attempts to solve problems by denial and exclusion will not work. They also result in poor social analysis and a primitive n&im of social order, because the d e s i ~ doutcome, the unity of =liable order, is posited as the beginning: consensus. h Chapter 4, X questioned the idea underlying these approaches, that consensus is a pmreyuisite for social and political orcler. The search for the sources of vital citizenship rnay thus lead to the abdication of politics m d the trivialization of citizens: The task of citizens in politics is declared doable only when it has already been d m in society How are we then to conceive the relations between pditical cjtizenship and the sociornoral. sources that are supposed to n u r t m it? The idea of civil society, with its emphasis cm the dynamics of self-organization and the rcsilielnce of plrxrality' offers a better perspective.. A civil society is characterized by diversity and by institutions for dealing with c d i c t s without doing away with diversity*The institutions of civil law regulate conacting activities of people \zrithoul demanding that they share the same values. A civil society is not just any society that does not fly apart. It is neither a homot;eneous community nor a market. It has elemmts of these but does not cohcide with them. Nor can a civil society ever hlly coincide with the state, There is always a distance betwem them that is supervised by an independent judiciary and other institutions that mediate their relatio~~s* It is in civil society that people form. t k i r ideas and organize themselves. When ideas and concerns have gmwn and became robustly organized, citizexls rnay effectivrly present them in the pubbc-political sphere. The vitality of citizenship is fed by the vitalitfi of civil society Given this comection, it is understaneiable that politicians who are interested in fostering citizenshjp try to bring state and civil snciety closer together and to use state power to strengthen civil ties. In doing so, however, they often underntir~ewhat they want tcr foster. This is so because civil society usually remains vital o d y so long as the state keeps a proper distmce from it. M e n state and civil society get too close or become identical, they both lose vitality.

Moral UniQ or a Steady Diet af Conflicts? D X 3 X

In a resmt study, Robert Putnam prwided an explanaticm fctr this. He found that in Italy; regional government in regio~~s with a high degree of civil association-that is, with a variety of autonomous social. o ~ a n i z a tion+was stronger, in the sense of being m m effective and more appreciated by citizens, than in regions where adive political patronage was dominant, He also found that both types of mlations between the political and social spheres were stable over time and resistant to change. In all societies . . . dilemmas of coXIective action hamper attempts to cooperate for mutual benefit, whether in politics or in economics. "Third-party en.forcement is an inadequate solution t s this prcbtem. Voluntary cor~peration (like rc~tatingcwdit associations) depends on social capital. Norms of generalized reciprocity and networks of civic engagement encourage social trust and cooperation because they reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and provide models for future cooperatian. Trust itself is an emergent property of the sclcial system, as much as a personal attribute, Individuals are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of the social norms and neworks within which their actions are embedded. Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in soxial equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity civic engagement, and collective well-being. These traits define the civic community. Conversely the absence of these trajb in the zkncivic cl-rmmunity is also self-reinfclrcing. Defection, distrust, shirking, exptoitatim, isola tim, disorder, and stagnation intensi* one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles. This argument suggests that there may be at least tzm broad equilibria toward which all societies that face problems of coXIective action . . . tend to evolve and which, once attained, tend to be self-reinforcing. ( h t n a m 1993:2 77)

&e does not have to repeat Pubam's hypabole in black and M;hite to

see his point His emphasis on trust may again invite the "'unitarian'~idea. that the vitality of citizenship could be restored, by efforts to reestablish trust. Hawevele, this would fly in the face of Pubam's observation that trust is an emerging property of voluntary hvays of dGaling hvilh di.fferences. It arises out of antagonistic cooperationor in terms of this bookl out of the orgmization oE plurality by citizens. The resilience of civil scxiety lils in its capacity for self--organization,in its dkersity of real l& experiences and its capacity to learn from and to orgmize them. Learning from one's own and other pe~'p1e'mistakes successes. Z,earning through variety and seledion. m e n the government with its exclusive authority and its massive resources of knowledt5c; gets too close or hecclmes too overpowering, such learni~~g is stifled by attempts to learn by way of (the best) analysis and instrudion, which is characteristic of monopolistic organizations and unitary structures. merefore, the state should keep its distance from civil society if it wants

f 32

Moral Clnit-y o r a Steady Diet of ConRiciEs?

to drink from this source. However, too much distance is also wrong. 'Then people will nt:, hnger be interested in politics and will use pubic pmvisions in a selfish and purcly calculatirrg manner. How can one know the rig& distance between governmat and civil society? Neither theories of government nor those of civil slxjety give m c h help here. Tt-tey refer us back to where we started: to citizenskown judgment. Ihus, in our search for sources of citizmship, we agaifi and again arrive at where we started: citizenship itseif, 'This is so because active citizenship is an important ingredient of such sources. '"A conception of one" rde and cJbliga~onsas a citizen, coupled. with a co itment to political e p l i t y , is the cultural.cement of the civic comunity" "uln-tam 1,993183). So we have c m e ful.i circle in this chapter. Mie asked about the vitaliw of citizenship, and about sociorncrrat cclnditions that are conducive to it. FolXokvjng the trail of politicians who called on citizens to show morcl civic responsibifit4:, intellectuals who argue for a new nationalism, and Puham, who sings thr praise of civil society time and again we have arrived at our point of departzlre. It hams out that thc m t important facbr maklng for the vitality of citizenship is the reproduction of citizens in the poiitical process itself. Not through indoctrination and training in potitical correc&ess but by organizing differences in such a w y that they, as a by-product, stimulate trust and. enlable people to learn and experience what it takes to be a citizen, In law courts, in activities in pditicai parties, d&ates in mass w d i a , and & w e alS in the fulflillsnent of pllblic offices. I conclude: First, little is known and much remains uncertah about the sources of vital citizenship. Second, those social configuratims that we knocv to be related to vitd citizenship can be fostered and proteckd, but. cannot be brought about through social engirteering and moral appeals. Third, the best way to foster and feed those sources is to exercise citizenship. To avoid misunderstanding, 1 want to emphasize that a1though this &apt= has criticized unitarian moraiizing, by no means do I wish to bePeople are free to fee1 little fee1hgs of national is^^ and civic respo~~sibility. pmud of their naticms; but such feelings arc not ubligatory for all. Those who lack crr reject national pride do not thereby cease to be good citizens. In the s m e token, m e might ri&tly insist on the legitintacy of one's okvn sense oi moral responsibility, but such a responsibility is neither an Obligation of all citizens nor a rc_.quirc?mc.ntfor good citizenship.

ELEVEN

Political Institutions and the Idea of Citizenship

Political institutions are eminently important for the formation of citizens, They tell &m what they may do, offering a repertoire of actions, and they provide them with rights they can use as trumps against other actors and institutions. They also feed an idea of what citizenship is and could ideal)). become. The ensemble of public institutions that we call a liberal democraitic constitution is ordered with a view to making the voice of the citizelz count, Without democratic institutions that give the hdividual voice a place inan order of voices and decisions, citizenship cannot be exercised and reproduced in action. Institutions of ijbcral, democracy are well h o w and analyzed (an excelllent recat treatment is Holmes 1995),The issues they regulate include: the vote; accountability of rulers and the right to dismiss them; lawmaking and setting the major lines of publjc po:[icies; free speech and rights crl demonstration, assembly, and association; access to information and to media; and limitations on the use of money and victience in politics. Znstitutional forms differ across rclgixnes, but there is qreentent that if regintes are to be called liberal democracies, they need to address these issues in such a way as to secure citizens an effective voice in the puhlic hierarchy* 'The point of these institutianal asrange~nentsof fiberal clemocracies, one could salli, is the freedom of citizens. Before 1989, liberal ideas of justice and the ims.titutionalprartices of liberal democracy to a large extelzt determined the contours m d conte~ztof ci.tizenship. Nowadays, this tight comection no longer holds. The idea that tbrre is one themy of justice that can be put to work in all situations in the publk realm has been discredited. Many now co~zsidernotions of justice to be plural and local. And the institutions of liberal democracy are often out of joint: They no longer functicm as harmoniously as tbry used

f 34 Y,

F~""aiitlca1 Xnsliltdlions and the Xdea of Citizenship

to. hstead of citizenshjp and democracy working in tandem, we now hear political elites complaining that democracy is overburdened by overly active and demanding citizens, There is widespread concern about the gap between politics and ordinary citizens, but also fear that bringiw them closcr together, for instance through a referendum, will only inmezlse mistrust. There are widespread doubts not d p about the p ~ s e n t functicmit-tg oE exist* liberal democratic instituticms but dso about the vi,abil,ityof liberal democracy as a progrm fnr cons.t.it~~t.ional construction m d reform. Esthlished liberal democratic iz~stitutionsmay be criticized, but because they are supported by cz~lturalrouthes and expectations, they cmtinue to function, however imperfectly. :In newly established democracies such as those in eastern Europe, m d in new politicd regimes, such as the European Union, that are not nation-states, things are more difficult. There, liberal democratic ideas must be translated into a constitutional design for instiktional pradices, which in turn, it is hoped, will generate the supporting political culture that democratic institutions need to keep functioning. When institutional practices do not get oif the ground to begin with, the routines m d expectations oE a liberal political culture camot develop.

The fate of democracy and citizmship in the European Union offer a telling example. Far a long timef Europem hstitutions developed without adequate dernocratjc controls, There was no parliament and no other democratic device that enabled citizens to effecbate a change cJf rulers. When direct elec.lions to the European parliannent- were fillally held, voter turnout was low Parties at a Europem level did, not really develop. What wmt under the n m e of parZiei.. were hose kderations of like-mimded national parties. In the European pasliment there were quite a nurnber of absentee members who only showed up when some bold action by the parliament had to be stopped. The parliament never voted Eumpean governing elites out of ofiice. Mmy &servers, like those at the authoritative weekly The Ecoaomisl, have given up on the Europem parliament, They think that it wilt never succeed in mak% good the European democratic deficit. If: clemocraey is to be redized at a European level, they think it will certainly not be along lines that copy the institutions of national parliamentary party democracies. The question of citizenship was addressed by the European Council hdd at Fontainebleau in 1984. A year later, the Adomino mport ( C m mission of the European Communities 1985)pmposed a step-by-step ap-

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 35 proach: first, symbols such as a flag and a European hy Beethovezz" Ninth Symphony); then education through hformatian and exchange of teachers m d puyiis. After such rneasurcs of cultural htctgration had begun to take hold, further small steps could be taken toward effective European citizenship, such as the grantiing of voting rights in local elections to all Eumpem Union citizens, For most people, however, Eurogem citizenship has remained stuck at the symbolic level or is simpIy irrcllevant, because whdever European citizenship exjsts remains unconnected to effective control. of real policy issues. The Maastriclht treaty instituted a European citizenship; but like the other parts of the treaty these clauses havc not come alive in Ihe hearts of the new Europeans NN'RT has the t ~ a t led y to m y deepening of legal, socioeconomic, and political citizenship at the European level. Ch the contrary, the institution of second and third pirlars (for matters of justice and foreig~zpo:ljcy) of Ihe European Union has kept matters outside the legal controls that have restrained policymakers in matters falling under the tradition& first pillar. All in all,, European citizenhip re~sainsrnired in the cultural. sphere, without real legal and pol-itical incisiveness. Small wonder, then, that many people remain unimterested.

:It is not only in new polities like h s e of the Eurclpean Union or in newly liberated regirnes like &mania's that demcrcratic institutims artl in difficulty This is also the case in established democracies, where calls for "Rdemocratization," "for constitutional reform, m d for citizen referenda are the order of the day. These states are hawing difficulty coping with extreme right-wing parties (for example, the Frmt Nationai i.n F'rme); with regionalism; with footloose firms in the globalizing economy; and with citizens vvho have htst i n t e ~ sfn t politics at the level of parties in the natim-st&e. Have liberal democsatic institutims lost their power to gencrate enthusiasm and renewal? Such failures of liberal democracy as a program of constihationaf const..ru,cti,onand reform may be woidablc. Maybe it is possible to realize the idea of a republic governed. by citizens by a means other than that of party-parliamentary democracy*Citizenship may serve as a cornpas for keeping constitutional poiitics on course toward an zlnlcnocvn future. m a t the outcome will be, no one yet h o w s . It is clear, however, that if it is to be called a republic, citizms will have to play a crucial role as actors and as a guidbg value in its new constitution. Citizenship, then, works as a value around which new choices and.institutiand arrangements can form and cluster. Citizenship is mom than an established b~stitutionalre-

f 36

F""aiitica1Xnstitulions and the Xdea of Citizenship

ality; it is also m idea that is critical of existing institutions and that gives institutional reform its directior~.Tt-tis chapter i1lustra.t.e~ this roe of citizenship in the reconstruction oi liberal democratic institutions from four perspectives: the public sphere, representation, loyalty and freedom.

The terms ""public" and "private" refer to spheres of activities: A house is private; the s h e t is public. Physical location, however, is not the decisive factor, -The question is how people place their activities and keep theln separate. Something that is appropriate in one sphere is often prohibited in fhe other. Public and private spheres have different rules for abission, for internal il~teraction,for holding people responsible, and for exit, A pub1ic sphere is accessible to anyone who can be regarded as a member of the public. 'This general accessibility is guaranteed by the ccmstitution and other laws. Access to private spheres is also regulated by law, but a sub~ecthe e l m n t is central in these arrangements: the decision of the "owner'" of the sphere about admission to it. 'The boundaries between the public and the private spheres m guarded. Unauthorized and inregular crossing of these boundaries is experienced as annoying, inrproper, offensive, or corrupt. It is prkarily the citizen who is authorized to cross the border in both directions. Crosskgs by othemctors are allowed only so long as they respect and serve directly or indirectly, this authority of the citizen. The existcjnce of both a public and a private sphert. is cmcially fmportant for fssedum. Sonneone MIho is caught in one sphere and is at the mercy of the logic and power refations of that sphere, is not free. Freedm requires the possibility to say no, to refuse, to distance oneself. Mthout a sanctuary in whieh one is safe and cannot be punish,ed for the critical aMitude one adopts, this cannot easily be conceived. Freedom and critical awareness presume an eccentric position, an ""I'frorn the viewpoint of which the relatimfip between the self:and the world can be considered. An eccentric position regarding the exercise of puhlic power requires a worldly anchorage-in weapons, a home ("'my home is my castle"), or a private sphere protected bp law, h eccentric positinn with regard to the exercise of private power (for instance, violence in the home) atso requires a worldiy anchmage-in puhlic spaces, police assistance, freedom of association and meeting, freedom of the prcss, and the right to vote, Tn the eighternth and nineteenth centuries, the idea of a (civil) socicty was developed in the work of the founding philosophers of the Scottish Emlightenmcnt, M u m and SmiCh, and of the "gand" theorists Wegel and Marx. It explained the logic of a sphere of practice in which people, within.certah limits, look after their own interests. W~ichvalues and atti-

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 37 tudes and which collective outccrmes that have not been consciously chcrsen by my of the pt?rtici,pants does this process of hterest articulation entail? The new sciences of sociology and economics addressed this issue. h spite of aIl their differences, scholars from these fields agreed on the following: The possibilities for effective political action depend on (the insight into) processes in society. This was also held to be tme for citizenship. fnsofar as it situated itself outside the boundaries of what the dynamics of socjety allnwed, it hvodd remin an illusion. Citizenship and freedom could only be promoted by ridhli; the most: favorable currents within thcz dynamics of a society. Some-for example, A d m Smih-WE more optimistic about the pssibilities of dvQ this than were others-Karl M m , for instance. Yet none harbored the facile tbought, which later became popular for awhile, that society hvould automaticdy render the corrcct civil, attitudes; that upbringing h family cburch, and school and the pursuit of me%own interest worald quasi-automatically gmerat.e good citizens. rZnywayf it: is clear that in our h e the free interactim of social forces often does not t;pmtmeously produce good citizens, We obseme "free rider" b e h i o r , a pluraGq of nornative orientatims, and an increasingly intmational orientation that b y p m ~ the s framework of the nation-state. Relations betv\reen the economy, the family, and the churcln and their importance for the pLlblic sphere are disputed and no longer taken for grmted. Also, we no longer succeed, from w i t h the public sphere, in mapping the dpamics of the private sphere with a view to htczrvcning in such a way that ciGzt?nship is generated. f i r e thm before, &erefore, citizenship now has tt?be qroduced a l ~ dguaranteed primariiy in the public sphere itself. Over the last tn.enty years, several West Eurapean countf-ieshave witnessed a drive toward narrower boundaries of the public sphere and toward stronger govemntent. wiLhin thesc limits. Its key elements have been privatization of state activities, restriction of gave tasks, and restructuritlg oE the welfare state. The pursuit of socioecmomic equality no longer takes a central place on the political apnda,. This does not impIy, however, that civic equali? within the public sphere has become unimportant. It remains of crucial fmportance for the reinforcement of the public sfiere within its m r e confi-ned botlndarks. This ~infnrcemmt also entails that the government may take correctfie action outside the public sphere insofar as this is necessary for the reaiization of actual equality of citizens within the public sphere: no slavery (with a view to freedom), no starvation (with a view to livhg); m open socriety (so that independent fornation of judgment remains possible); and reasonable chances for nekvconners, such as chiidren and immigrmts (so that their abtahing property and other matters that providc security and satisfaction remains possible).

f 38

F""aiitica1Xnslittdlions and the Xdea of Citizenship

The t e r m ""pubtic" and '"rivatc" do not always stand for the same spheres, It is usually clear from the context what is memt. Roughly; there are three spheres at issue, the pu:blic-political, the public-social, and the personal-private sphere (Castclriadis 1997:7). The first one is that of pcrlitical and adntinistrative decisionmaking about the (adjust~~ent of the) organization of sociew. The second sphere relates to the Lnteraction between people, legal as well as natural perscms, in (semi)gublic places, such as the street. Thc third sphere is that of hnme, friends, m d associations. Three spheres and two w o d s (public m d private) can lead to confusion. The second sphere is sometimes rttgarcied as private-as with '"privatization"-and somctimes as public-as with "making private mtters puhlic,'"is ambiguity can be observed also in the use of the word. "citizen," Sometimes this refers to participation in political decisionmaking (citoym), and sometimes to participation in social interaction (hazlrgeois, the ""ordinary" citizen versus the government). This usage causes m m confusion in theory than it does in practice.. However, what does become clear from these consideratio~~s is that the term "private sphere" is itself arrrbiguous and =quires further specification in practical usage. It may refer to a multinational firm like Shell and to a welfare mother, to a home and to the city park, to the church and to the business fjrm. Equatirrg the private sphere with the market, with the , brotherly care, or with buSiness is therepursuit of personal i n t e ~ s twith fore innccura.t.e,or rhetorical trickery. Mtttatis *-rutandis,the sarne goes for a iurther unspecified use of the term "to privatize." The boundaries between public and private thus turn out to be historically and situationaUy variable. I"his does not posc too many probtems in practice, These bounddes are man-made, a cultural artjfact, However, the requirement that in order to be free, people must have access to at least two d i f f e ~ nspherczs t holds xross the variety of cultural artifacts. h the republic, the private should, be protected when it is at risk of bc.ing overwlelmed by public demands and cmsideraticms; m d cclnversel~the public shoutd be savccf from being submerged in the private. Public as well as private places should rcmain intact and accessible to citizens. An werriding claim of either sphere over the other is fmdamentally wrong.

Representing-jn a sense, making present what is absent-occurs often in daily life. A map, a bees' dance, and a report all =present how matters stand. We can often verifr wheth.er, or experience painfully that, a certain repmsentation was incorrect. The world was nut as it was represented; the ~prewntationproved un~liable.

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 39 I-Cepresmt;lltic>nof people entails speaking and ac'ting in behalf of others. These others are usually absenl; but &is need not be so. A. chairmm at a meeting speaks on behalf of the people present, and a lawyer represents a client who may also be present. Verificatim of the crrrrecbess of the .representa.tim of people has its peculiar aspects. After all, it. is not: the representation of estabiished. facts or fiings hat is the issue here. What is ~prcsented is the s p e a h g m d acting of the person rep~smted-not all object, but his wiH, his persoz-1. How can one esthlish that the presentation is incorrect? The will, which is a notoriously subjective element that is moreover b o n d s to chmge with time, has to be tbr decisive factor in this. n ~ i n g become even more problematic whez-1represe~~tation hvolves a large number of people, each with his or her own "'will." And yet, here too, one can continue to speak of representation only so long as its verification rclmains possible. After alS, it is absurd, to speak of representa.tim when the claim that: sameone or sometl?in.gis represented cm never be verified.. Kepresmbtion of people can be tested in various ways. The rep~sentation can be willcd and authorized in advance. The representativem y have said or done exactly what the represented person wanted to do or say. Or repre~ntedp e s m s can confirm thrir trust irt the rep~smtativeeven if they, had they been present, wodd have willed and acted differently Rousseau rejected political representation because, according to him, ot be =presented. Yet, in contempwary ~publics,in which direct dentocracy is not possible, s o m form, of representation is indispensable. En a representative democracy, citizens holding offices represent those who arc. absent. Such a democracy has procedures for answering the bllowing questions: Are the absentees trul,y r e p ~ s e ~ ~(is t eIhe d representation correct?);who is to determhe this; and how and when does carrection of failing presentation take place? When scznrching for anskvers to these quest.ctns, neorepubIicans use a variety of theories of representation (Pitkin 1972)-reprcsentatim as symbolizatim, as being fomaily au&orized (as in Hobbes), as portrayal, as possibly being called to account, and as substantive promotion of htwests. We cm easily find circurnstmces in. which each of these fieories or visions obviously makes sense. However, are we not inctmsistmt in accepting this variety of tkories? Should we not choose? Mmy discussions seem to assume as much. They assum that it is necessary and possible to use one and only one theory of reprtrsentation in the pLlblic sphere. But why? The judge is presentative in a way quite different from the member of the city council. The drive toward one single conception is, it seems, fed by a lnnging for an ideal, guaranteed system of representatim. But no such guarmteed system can exist. Searchhg for it, however, is undcrstandahle. After al(,representation presupposes a gap, a distmce betvveen the represented. and.the representative. At the same time, it assumes &c duty m d pretension to bridge

f 40

F""aiitica1Xnstitulions and the Xdea of Citizenship

this gap. Howver, if ellforts to bridge the gap were guaranteed to succeed, them there would he no reason for rclpresemtation. Repsclsentatim by its very nature can never be a guarmteed success. We can deal with the gap between the voters a d the elected in differat ways, some of them bad, some beger, but we c m never eEminate it, This applies even more in our time, when society is much less neatly orgmized and contmllable than in earlier days. fn cmtemporary society established sygemmsf representation will have to be adjusted and supplexnented in an ad huc way, ttime and agah. Permanently fixing such supplements is not very useful, because there is a ready chance that the next time, other supplements will be needed. Representation becomes more tailored to each case, and a mpertoirc of various institutions and theories is used for tbis purpose. The search for one system that guarantees success is give11 up. Instead, we try to enrich our repertoire of hstitutions and theories of representation, to st-larpen its tools and to make them mutually compatibk so that they can be connected (in series, p a d Xel, or in a political "story" or cmstit~rion). Representation implies room for correction, Does this mean that we may conclude h m the corrcsction of ~presentaticmthat this representation was not right, not correct? No, not always. What is required to keep endorsing representation is not its correctness in each case, but its w e d 1 reliability. A correction every now alld again can make representation more reliable. Wi.thout room for correction, the tmst put: in the represemlation cannot be tested. Wthout it, we ot decide whether we want to tative. When there is no trust, conthue putting our trust in the rep there is no representation. Representation is not a m t t e r of precise portrayal but of giving and wiwolding tmst. I f a vote of confidence cannot be asked for at set times, true =presentation c Individual citizens are central. in matters of representation-not just '"ordinary" ccit.izens but also citizens as holders of particular public offices such as mernber of parliament, judge, soldier, and policymaker. As citizens, they judge whethcr a vote of- confidence should he asked for and they start procedures to conectlly carry uut such a vote. As citizens, they have a certain degree of immunity, a stabs that provides them the room to do this, Where this crjtizens' perspective is larking, there is no d e m matir representation, A republic is not a direct dem0crac.y; but it is shot through with direct citizenship.

Loyalty suggests havirrg a bum, one" sown place in familiar surroundings of people and objects. It suggests ties that art. not based on calcula-

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 4 f

tion but that, on a deeper level, form a basis of the values that enter into calcu,lations. Loyalty exists in relation to pfaces, people, and ways of acting-in relation to king, nobility, peers, workers of afl countries, village, city, natim, and religion (cobelievers); and since recentl~.;people of the m e sex, anintals, and nature?.The quality of the connection we call, loyalty may differ: Loyalty can be Labsolute or limited, slavish or independent, open and relativizing or reticent and intcllerant, obtuse or intellige11t. Loyalty has the beauty of elementary dedication (such as that of the mother toward the child in the story of :King Solomon and the switched babies [I Kings 3:16--28]), allegiance, and purit)i but it also has the ugliness of exchsion, lack of freedool, and the closed society. The transitirtll to m open society-which was at issue in the various renaissances, in the blightenment, and in movements for modernization and political ernancipation-mant a liberation from established loyalties. (Other loyalties often ~sulltedfrom this liberation, which were different but often no less Zlinding and ""established" thm the d d m s . ) In m open society, loyalties shodd not be a fixed given but should be freely chose11 from a variety ol options. Moreover, m e should retain the option of dismgaging oneself within a =asonable period of time from loyalties that ofie had chcrsen (or acquired) in the past. This means that an open society faces specific problems of organization: How can the interaction between a plurality of loyalties be arranged in such a way that these loyalties are ~ s p e c t e dand can be preserved, so Ihat the one is not destroyed in the encounter cvitl the other, and so that indjviduajs can relatively freely move among the pIurality of loyalties? The republic arranges the interactio~~ betwee11 the loyalties of its citizens, To be able to do this, the republic itself must be able to count on the loyaltp of these citizens. Civic. loyalty, then, concerns loyalty to the replabliran ways of dealkg with pluralii-y. Formerly the lav was central here. Publ.ic virtues primarily cmcemed conduct with regard to makng, enforcing, and obeyirrg tbe law. M a h g law central-no bindirrg of citizens except by choice, or by law crcated in freedom by dtizens-is and has dways been problematic, To guarantee the power of the lawr more is needed than Lhe law itself. Even Rrrusseau thought it necessary to call upon a ~risionaryleader and civil religion to establish the authority of '"the general will." C~urrcntattempts to mvive such a civil religion have had little impact. I-iegel, Durkheim, and other theorists of civil society and its modern divjsior~of labor thought that t-his society wou,ld gencrate its own mrality and culture, which would then serve as a basis for appropriate legislation. Later, however, B e l (19%), Hirsch (1976), and others b a n d that: capitatist smiety undernines its own rnoraf conditions of existence and does not automatically produce n w ones. Foucault (1975) argue""lat the reality of law, rights, and duties could function mly be-

f 42

F""aiitica1Xnstitulions and the Xdea of Citizenship

cause of disciglinary practices that unfolded outside the reach of fiat legal reality. h our time, however, this h d of diseiplhe in schools, prisons, and homes is no longer taken for granted and has lost much of its effectiveness. Rtuals that used to confirm the authority of the law are now rclgarded with suspicio~z,if they occur at ail. h The Netherlands, a pillarized but vital: structure of voluntary associations used to be the key element of cmswiational democracy. It futfilled a cmcial role in the estabAt present, the remnants oE these l i s h n t and emfoscememt of the h. cmsociational structures are to a large extent financially and procedurally kept dive by the state, while they no longer command the support and ohedknce of many citizas. They do not "'grow" from civil snciety but are rooted in the state-in ""ideological state apparatuses," as they were called in fie 197%. In the nineteewh century and the fist halt of Ihe twentieth, the natio~z was the most important and most common repository and guarantor of the authority of tbe law. The nation, this ""large self""fiat appeared in a common past and a cornnon lutusc., was ass~~rned to coincide with the state and with civil society. h fact, the state and its legislation played an important role irr the creation (and destructicm) of nations, not mly outwardly but also wilhin its boundaries. Military service; compulsory education; the use of oon lmguage; the building of museums; and the production of maps, population statistics, and swveys were all brought in to meate the nation, this ""imaginedcommunity" (Anderson f 991), to change '"peasants i n h Frenchmen" (Weber 1976). Today, bowever, such a state approach to nation building is rarely viable. All sorts of nations and would-be nations create their own (would-be) state structures, underground or otherwise, and the citizens of internationally oriented. societies do not want to be tau@t about nationalism by the state. Nationalism has not disappeastld. On the contrary, it has recently grokm stronger. But nationalism no longer lets itself be tempered, shaped, and incorporated by the state on behalf of the authority of the law. Nationalism now is a breaker rdher than a s~~pporter of the laws. It turns w t that nowadays one canstot h d or found one single underlying loyalty that can guarantee the functicming of the republic and its laws-There is a shjfting plusality nl layalties. fn thc midst of these, the crjtizens themsehes m s t generate loyalty in their social interaction-loyalty to the community of citizens and to certain ways of dealing with plurality. 'They can no longer fjnd it in the nation or i,n other coordinatingbelief systems and enthusiasms, but have to turn to the public sphere itself, There they try to generate dedication to certain ways of deaiing with plurality opedy and no longer seesctly by mans of the state-fabricated myth, of an '"existing" nation. The reproduction of citizensbip-and hence of civic loyalty-is a task of tbr republic and therefortr of the citizens themselves.

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 43

This kyalty is not the highest; it cltoes not clairn priority over other loyalties under all crjrcmstmces. It does, however, have a metafunction, a special position, in rclation to other loyalties. But this kplies no more than that civic loyalty "tmmps""other loyalties under certain circumstances. It follnws from the above that in Ihe admissim to citize~~ship, :actors such as descent, place of birth, place of residme, and place of work play a role as indicators of a connection, of loyalty to the mpublic, but that the comection with citizelzship is the more importmt and decisil~efactor: the willingness and ability to be a citizen in this historically developed community, with its own language, parliament, and so on. Does civic loydty have to be so Ictcal and specific? meorcticdy sound arguments can be provided to support this proposition. In any case, existing ~ p u b l i c have s marked local and specific characteristics. Each ensemble oE institutions (ways of dojng) that developed *rough evolutior~and that we call a repubfic is made up of historical "contingencies," and is path-dependent. The question is how to deal with these specific and unique historical traits in an intemationmlizhg world. Should we promote them? Should we incorporate them in a growing international consensus, or C O F L ~ M ~ Idenomh~ator I (MJhich may not be very large), or keep them apart? Neo~publjcanswill strive to retain this special character of thek republic in a world community that bas to rely on openness; but they will also try to make that character as compatible as possible with that of other republics, -They also wilf attempt to keep transitions from one particular republic to another viable, .A world language such as Esperanto does not work. A uniform system for =publies of citizens does not wmk, &er" A better p s p e c t lies in networks of ~ p u h l i c sand their citizens, In such a network, dual (or plural) citizenship, which was thought to be incompdible wi& the exclwiveness of the nation-state, is quite conceivable, even though its concrete organization requires creative thinkhg and meticdous care. Equally, the contrast betwen the particular and the global, world culture need no longer be much of an issue, Wthin the network that we call world culture, various '"creole"' varieties develop-that is, various mixtures of the world-encompassi~~g a n f i e local. Neorqublicans deal with a diversity of loyalties and do not need one leader or one dtimate or basic ideology of the nation, This is not to say that living with a plurality of loyalties is a simple matter. :ill tbr execution of an office it often rclquires tragic choices, as it does in private liCe. Yet, neorepwblican titizens no lunger dlow an ideology such as that of the nation to obscure these choices. Loyalty suggests having a home, m e " ocrwn place w i t h a familiar environment of people and objects. It suggests a comection that comes naturally and is not based on calculation, L0yalt.y is as indispensable as it used to be, but its content and reproduction prcrcesses have

f 44

F""aiitica1Xnstitulions and the Xdea of Citizenship

changed. 'The home of today's citizens is the putntic sphere in their republic, and thcir farndiar envi,ronment is the elntire "creoljzing," "ural world.. :It is the world they watch on tellvision, the products of which they can find in shops in the more prosperclus countries, and the effects of which they notice in rich and poor countries.. h loyalv these am always elements of both. the given and the chosen. Mihen we want to know about loyalty, we immediately ask '"loyalty to what or to whom?'The what m d the whom are, we feel, both givcrf, out these in the world, and chosen, opted for by the one who is loyal. Although the choice and the given artr present in all notions of loyalty, *ere arc sharp differences as to where they are to be located and how they are related. Many observers find the given basis of the loyalty of citizens in the nation, et-hnicity or culture. From a neclrepublican perspective, this is takhg the wrong given as a basis for choice and exclusion. The given is plurality, people wlto c ot avoid having to deal with each other. The point is to transform their rtttations in such a way that they can be accepted by free dtizens. 'This is not done by excluding some people and choosing others to relate with but rather by changing the relations between given people in such a way that tbey are worthy of being chosenlaccepted by citizens. This implies trealing each of the people involved as much as possible as citizens. This does not require that citizenship be their safe and longstanding possession but rather ilnplies treating them as "ha,liwayr' citizens, as cil-izens on the road to freedom, whose citizenship is in the makhg in their very interactions, It is true that in order to transform the given of plurality into refations choser.~by citizens, another "gj,enff should be accepted: the laws and dmocratic pmedurcs that make citizenship poss&le, that are constitutive of it. But these are a kind of second-order given that serves to trmsform givens of the first order. Such second-mder givens shodd, morcover, not be made absolute, because they may be used self-referentially, that is, they themselves may be changed. In sum, nempublican loyalty is loyalty to givcn pluraljty and to Ihe hvays it may be organized by citizens. Its point is to t r m f o m fate, or fortune, into an accepted republic of citizens. Freud wrote about treating chance as worthy cJf determining our fate, 'This is precisely what citizelzs do when they take chance, the give11 pluraliw of people who bump into each other, as the stuff that they feed their republiC with.

Just a few W O ~ Son freedom. Not because the subject is not important, but because it is the heart of the matter. That makes it hard to talk about.

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 45 All instituticms of liberal etemocracy poifit twarcl it, but when we try to tacke it directly, we hesitate and are easily dumbfounded. Philosophers of law know that it is easier to indicate what is unjust than to grasp thr essence of justice. By indicating and fight% injustices, they hope to encompass and approa"h justice, thc great unk~~own. Yet they can never really grasp it. A sinnilar uia negatiz?n, an approach by way of negations, is traveled in our search for freedom, Here, too, it is easier to notice the abselnce ol C~edornthan to name and value its presence. There is something strmgcr in the appreciation of freedom. On the one hand, freedorn is the core of liberal politics and ethics, tbe axiom on whkh all arguntcnts elaborate. C)n thc other hand, we know that freedom, sometimes, is not right for, or is not sought after by free peopje. The enjoyment of freedom can break young people in their cSevelopmnt or can make adults dig their own graves. Apart from this, various socidpsychotogical experiments show that people who otherwise are quite normal al-rd sane, in fact, in practical situations, often value freedom of choice negatively- Freedom is a key vatue the reproduction of \zrhich by free people is pmblematic. Citizens as such are supposed to pursue this vafue in their actions, yet people do not always act spontanwusty as freedom-lavhg citizens. M m y descriptions of freedom exist, The well-known ones are negatke freedm-no interference fl.c)m others-and positive freedom-being able to realize what you want while takhg into consideration the freedom of others. These can be summarized. under the heading of personat freedom. In addition, two other memings are distinguished: sovereign keedorn4oing wh& you want even against the wishes of others; m d civil freedom-participatixlg in the liife and. the administration of the commrmity of which you are a member (Patterson 1991:34). As long as they remain static, these definitions and classifications do not edighten much in tin?es of constitutional change. .A dynamic approach may work better. tn the dynamic view, freedom is not a given, a kind of object, but somethhg that appears in action, someirhing toward which movement is directed. Freedom is somthing that appears, arises, and has to be understood in that movement, Citizens in action make freedom appear. When we observe their actions, we can reconstruct this movement from beginning to end. On the one hand, they act from a certain stah;ls, a position, of freedom; and on the other hand, the outccrme of their citizen actinns is an experience of freedom. me11 this initid status still has to be reached or is uncertain, we speak of liberation practices. When this status is takm as given and used as a matter of fact, we speak of freedom practices, This distinctio~~ involves no more than a difference irz emphasis, Both aspects are always at issue to some extent. Freedom appears in the movement between the two.

f 46

F""aiitica1Xnstitulions and the Xdea of Citizenship

From the requirements of minimal autonorny and competence, such that citizelz action can. begin to get going, it does not follow that citizenship is to be exclusively reserved for people who arc fully free and competent. Such people do not exist at d.Nobody is free. Citizenship involves dealing competently with diiferences, dependerncies, and mfreedoms. men people succeed hdoing this, h e d m appears. Freedom shows itself but is not a possession. When citizens succeed in dohg this together, they generate power. This also is not a possessjon. Freedom, competence, and power appear in, m d as by-products of, citizen action. Acti~~g is beginning something new. Being able and having the courage to do this ir; a rcqiremetnt of citizenship. 'This, however, is something else than a glraracrtee that the intended result will be achieved, Such a guarmtee cannot be given by i n d i d u a l citizens, regardiess of how learned, clever, and czrnning they m y be. The outcome is determjned not so much by individual. competence as by the acting together of a diversjty of citizens, by the ways they find to org""ize their plufality. The dynarnic character of freedom was there horn the start, when freedom emeged from the experiarnce of slavery (Patterson 1991). Freedm appears in poiitical history p ~ c i s e l yat times of mwement and unrest: in the Athenian "polis,"" the Italian city-states of the twelfth cel~tury,the Dutch republir of the Eighty bars" VVar. F ~ e d o malso appears in the way in which citizens futfifl speciat public offices. In eartier chapters I described how crjtizens generate f ~ e d o r nby dealjng competelntly with plurality, The dynamic character of freedom emerged d s o in my discussian of public space, vvhw I emphasized that the possibility of mouing from one sphere to the olfner is m esselntial condition of freedom, The different spheses are gwerned by different rules, which allows people to use one sphere as a kfnd of sanctuary with regard to the other. Citizenship can be cotnceived of as such a sanctuary h kvhict.1people are free and equal, However, this static picture misses an important point, because &:he k e d o m at issue surfaces in the movement betwecm citizmship and other arcas of life. The relations of depadelnce that exist in these other arcas are modulated by the sphere of dtizms:bi.p.This does not imply the creation of equality in the social or personal spheres, but it does imply the adjusmmt of relations in S L I C ~a way that access to citizenship is open to evesyme, Such a mdifiration of dependencies is not withnut problems. Ihe han on slavey or recombinant forms of slavey is rtrlatkety undisputed, at least i,n t-hcary, A slave is a perso11 who is pocverless in a rekt-ionship in which he is caught for a considerableperiod and.which is dishonorable (Patterson 1982 and 1994). Citizenship and slawery are inc:ompatible because slavery is the negatio~nof the dual role of ntlerlmled. Modifications of dependencies becme more problematic when peoyle who art- not slaves apparently act in a constrained way--addicts, lunatics,

Political Institutions and the Idea af Citizenship D f 47

or slavish followers of prevailing opinions and fashion. Intervention here is problematic, except when the dependency is permanat and olnvious. And what should one d.o with nomal citizens whose formation of preferences occasionaily but not permanently "misfires'? ?wir perception and evaluation may be f o r i ~ e din ways they would have rejected had they recognized them. mhk of a fit of anger, of one-sided or hcorrect hformation, and so on. 'Their choice is a free one, but it is not "'purely," not elntirely fredy, brought about. Such problems arise regularly in the spheres of democracy, lawf and educatjon. The dangers of paternalistic compulsion or pressure and of unproductive accusations of "'false conscious~~ess'bre cmsiderable; but they camot be prevented by amounting ""feedom first" a d then pretending a1.l is well, From a nempublican point of view, it is clear which appmach should be adhered to in situations of slavery or recornbinants of slavery: mancipation, liherathn practices, positive discrimination, a d positive action. Yet the legitimation of such intervmticms ends wbrw slavery stops. Farther-reaching elimindion of djsadvantages and the achievemnt of sncial equality are not requirements of neoreprr:blican citizenship, It is more difficult to deternine m attibde toward the second and third sort of cases, the permanently addi,cted and trhe incjdentaily mfree. People who are frce as well as unkee do not fit into the system of categories of citizenship. 'They are ancrmlies that need to be treated carclfinlly, We want to rebin the categories as well as secure the real freedom of the citize~~s, but ot be easily combined, Hence, we have cmpficated and circumies concerning addicfion to akohot or drugs. h d that is why we tread carefully w k n inaccufacies occur in Ihe formation of preferences of citizens who are athewise free, Such cautious interference with haccuracies im the establishment of "free'" judgmmts can be fomd in the practice of education, in contacts with people who sym,pathize with antidemocratic i r clients from themselves partics, and with lawyers who try to protect h by "urgently advising &ern to do m not to do certain tbings. Neorepublican citizcns achovtrtedge that such problems are intncre~~t to a free swiety, to movement in which freedom surfaces. They realize that there are no stmdard solutions and &erc?foredo not kcessimtly try to find them. They achowledge the dile as of freedom m d accept their responsibility for cophg wit21them in ambiguous sihations. "'

It. is clear that the constitution of Ihe public spbcre, of the setting of institutions within which citizens can appear and act, is no longer self-evidently givm. Some commentators complain that it has been taken over

f 48

F""aiitica1Xnstitulions and the Xdea of Citizenship

by the media, technical evert" markdprice calculations, and established i n t e ~ sgroups-in t short, by xtors and factors other thm crjtizens debating and dcciding a m n g each other, Others do not subscribe to such pessirtlistic conclusions, but otherwise sharc. the oloservation that the cantours of public-polit.ical space are changing. -This is most visi:ble in the phlematic role of political parties, which find it increasjngly difficult to attract members and to organize public debate. The reconstihtion of public-po:ljtical space is on the agenda. How this new context: for political action will look is as yet rancertain-multipor European, markczt-like, national parliamentarian? karcity of context is a ubiquitous probleln in our time. When information travels quickly and.is abundant, the self-evident setting within which information acquires meaning a d prowides oriontatim Inay be lost. What is presently going on in politics is a struggle for the context of public action, a struggle about what will count as self-evidmt. What compass will guide us through this stmggle? W1.l it be the natim, race, religion, or the traditional community? C)r will it he civic dedication to the rclpuhlic, to democratic* and legdly guided ways of organizhg differences? We have comidercld a few pLlblic institutions that arc. constitutive for citizenship in liberal. democracies, We also have analyzed examples of how neorcpublicanisrn can help us keep the politics of reform, of those public institutims on ccrufse. This anaiysis of public institutions is f a r from exhaustive, but m e thing is clear: In times of constitutional reform, and turmoil, citizens am fomed by the very struggles for reform that they engage in;by what is on their agenda; by what they do and fail to do. Citizenship is i,n Che making. This is not a bad time for citizenship. Transjtion periods are risky, but they are also invigorating because they offer really good r e a m s for citizen action. As durhg World War E, somethi% important is at stake. 13.7.such times, citizelns can hdced rnake a difference.

E-7

E-7

E-7

The Outlook for Citizenship

Allthough many did not realize it at the time, 1989 was a watershed year, after tryhich. politics would no longer be the same. Political =form turned aut to be more than a set of variations on established truths, themes, and principles: It became a journey into the unknown-a tentatke groping in the dark, an exhilarating or bitterly disappointing common effort to invent ncw political forms and relationships, to =constitute publ.c space and viable formns of living togethes. Although 1989 marked a Ziberation from oppression, it s o m became painfully clear that this lbiberatio~~ was not identical wi.Lh the triumph of liberal democratic ideas and practices or with t h judicious implementation of a tried-and-tme m i x of market reform (privatization and competition) and dei~ocratiaation(parties and elections). Such "liberalizatiorr'" often failed to liberate as was promised and hoped for. And it was not only in new or =stored democracies that the blessings af lb;i-beral reform failed to materialize. Established liberal demacracies also were affected by the changes summrized under the i&eX of '"989."" Their trusted ways of conducting politics became undermined by criticism and disaffection, by internal sflintering and external wdignxnei~ts. Externally, they were confronted with the end of the Cold War, with regroupings of nations, with new mgjmes and with natims splitting up, with the growhg importance and reach of international orgmizatiorrs such as the European Union or the human rights court of justice in Strasbourg, with tjlobalization and a worldwide ecmomic boom. All this necessitated a repositioning of the sovereigi~national state, Was i t still the major unit of action in the world? And if not, what would citizenship h a disempowered nation-state count for? Internally, estabiiskd liberal democracies were confsanted with, jnereasing plllraiization and diffezence; with grmps that no longer considered the nation-state theirs; with nationalist separatism; and with citizens who showed no intewst whatsoever hpolitics as usual. These challenges, in turn, have led to the &sewation that polihcs has become decentered. The theme of the displacement of politics is echoed in

f 50

The Outlook fox Citizenship

one form or another in many cmtemporary writings. If it is indeed true that politjcs as usual is losing its center in political parties and parliaments in the nation-state, then the position of the citizen unaffected. :lf those who are hterestcd in the douZlle gos and being rued turn to other arenas of political activity then crjlizenship, in t:he traditional sense of participation h t:he institutions of liberal democracy, mfght evaporate into thin air. the very least, its pwiously secure position of equality in the public realm is beirtg translormed into an uncertain position in changing networks and processes. There are good rczasons to rczsist such a development. AltZlough citizenship w s meant to be for all, innetworks there is ljttle or no place for Losers, for those who are not attractive enough to become a nodat point h such ship invited persans to act in a public space that allowed for differe~~ce, conaid, and nornormal initiatives; but life in network is much less friendly to what is not normal and what does not ""sellf Those who care for the values of citizenship and freedom for all therefore will not accept the di,splacement of politics as a simple fact of life. Where possible, they will oppose it or slow it down. And where it seems inevitable, they will try to realize t-he values of citizenship and freedom inside the new network;s, in the places and relations to which what was known as poli.t.ics h s moved. Some have accepkd globalization as a fact m d are working to realize the values of citizenship at a world level through human ri(ghts, hurnanitaJ-ian international intervrsntions, a strengthening of world opinion, and alliances of democracies. Bushess leaders and multinational fims are urged to accept their responsibiliv t~ make this crmerghg w r i d order a civilized one. A new order or new orders are surely in the makixlg; but will they have enough bite to ensure the protection that citizenship in the nation-state used to provi,de? Whatever the answer may be, sueh a world order surely needs local allies and a f i m ianchnring in locally sovereig instihtims. This is emphasized by those who insist fiat the nation-state mains as indjspensabk h r red citizemsf.lig as it was before. Citizenship needs a setting of autharitative instit.utims and culture if it is to make a real differMlce and to provide real protection. 'I'here is nothing in sight beyond the nation-state that can provide this" If the nation-state is in trouble, therefore, it needs to be strengthened by morc, and more direct, political participaticm of ordinary citizens and/or Zly a mom vigorous national culture. The first option, reinforcing the framework of l.he nation-state through more democracy, is eloquently advocated by Btnjarnin Barber (1995) in his study with the telling title of filuzd US. Mczuodd. 'I'he seccmd option, relyhg on. the local national culture and on feelings of belmghg, is gaining popularity with an increasing number of intellectual commntators. fn Chagter If),I have giwn my argun-tents for reecting that option.

The Outlook for Citizenship D f 5f

a h e r s insist that if citizenship is to make a difference, its place within the franncwork of the changing nation-stde needs rethinking. They develop notions of deliberative democracy and agoni.stic modelc; of politics that enable citizens to make better sense of the contemporary perplexities of delsacracy in natio11-states (Benhabib 1996:9). 'These insights, both old and new can then be used in other contexts-h regimes other than nation-states-where people bump into each other. Thus, Michael Walzer in an ekgant study (1497) has t?ppiiedl or rather, has scnsitiliely "translated," insights on toleration that he has gained on his home ground to other regimes, such as multinational empires, international society, consociations, m d immigrant societies" This book has joined the rethinking of cithenship in its old and ncrw settings. It is part of m ongoing rc.fIectian in political fieory, MIhich in turn is part of an ongoing politics of constitutional recorzstmcton. It: shares themes and concerns with other studies, like pluralizatim in the work of Connolily (19951, or the insistence on nondominatjon in Pettit's study of republicanism (1997). Of course, it also differs from. s~lchstudies. However, viduaily all writers on the subject agRe tkat after 1983, fhe naturc of the political, and our understandirtg of the ideal role of citizens, cannot be taken for granted. Beyond that point, I c m o t speak b r them. Let me &e~Eore,by way of mmmary of this sh;ldy speak for myself, and cmtsast my own theory of citizenship with contributions from before 1989. Wham the dder approaches primarily aniilyzed the conditions that supposedly must be met before citizms can begin to act as such, neoreand imperfect exercise of citizenship itpu?ollcanism sees h the di.f_ficult self the min genccative condiljnn for the "reprodu,cti,on of citizens." 'This stance has implications for the way we address questions of access, culture, and participation. ot be citizenship if &ere is no accr.ss to it.. Citizenship is not a natural. attribute of people but a public status with specific conditions of acigration, and ean~ingcapaciq or wnerslzip. cess through education, i Ideally, in democsacies, the status is accessible to d; but in fact, this is never the case. Xn order to m k e gmd the democratic ideal, mmy theorists previously focused on questions of access, of emancipation towad freedom r&er than on its actual practice, n e ~ i nthey , &otrght, Iies the crucial test for any theory of citizenship. However, such demands overstretch, theories of ciltizenship a d tend to make them vacuous. A theory of citizen rif5f7t.sin migsatiol~,for instance, prclsupposes either a hvorld-emcornpassing notion oi jus~ceor the realization of world citizenhip. The real protection and exercise of citizenship, howwer, are inetuctabfy local. because Education for crjtizenship is an jnkemtly antbiguous notio~~, education requirers and accepts inequalities that arcl inadmissible beheen U-fledged citizens. meories that respcmd to people's hopes for the revi-

f 52

The Outlook fox Citizenship

talkation of citizmship through educational reform therefore artr bound to disappoint. 'They try to rclstore citizenship by improvi.ng its conditions, by focusing on a setting of inequality and domination in which citjzenship cannot be fully exercised. We find a s:irnilar dekct in approaches that squady concentrate on impmving the socioeconomic conditions of citizenship. Here, also, an emphasis on liberation, cm freeing routes of access to citiaenship, tends to overshadow the actual exercise of citizenshjp inpractices of freedom. C%viousiy, the person who has nothilrg to eat and no place to sleep cannot surviwe and speak out as a citizen. But thinking about citizenship hecomes a muddle if one makes socioeconomic security and social rights the crux of citizenship, as have the many followers of 7:FI, Marshall. The core of citizenship lies in the public realm, in acting as citizens, and not in the sodoeconomic sphet"~? of work. That people have no job or ,?re unwilling to work may be unjust or mnrally wrong; but from the point of view of citizenship, these facts are only important illsofar as they impinge m the individuals' performance as crjiizens in the puhljc spbcre. Without cwlhtve, the= can be no citizenship. Howeve&from this it does not follow, as many hawe implicitly a s s w e d , that a unity of values, vi&ucsf or normative orientations is a requirement for viable citizenship. This study sees resilience and viable living togetfner as arising out of the ongoing organfzatim of differmces. tn orcler to be widble, a society of ritiZ~IZS needs, in the words of Aibert EXirscbm (2995:243), "a steady diet of conficts," The c u h r a l condition of citizenship is not consensus but a rich rqertoire for acZcnowIedghg and dealing with contlicts. Consensus is not a cmdition but- is the preferred outcome of orgmizing differa~ces.True, if there never wem some sort of consensus or peace between people, we could not speak of ci-tizcns living together; but an emphasis on consmsus and cohesion througt-t unity leads to wishful thinking. It posits the preiemd outcome of inkraction between citizens as its preondition, fn this book, consensus is not considered a necessav condition for viable citizen action. Thus, my view differs from Rawtsian (Rawls 1993) notions of overlapping consensus; from commmitarians like Sandel(1982), who emyhasize the necessiy of integr;ltion in a historical community; and from all those who put theis hopes fctr a revivat of citizenship m a strengthening of moratiq, virkres, and social cohesion. They afl assume that a uniw of feelcming or convictions constitutes the cement of a repuhlic of citizens. 11% tsast in this book, I have focusczd on the irratimal feetings, the hatrcd and the experience oi difference that obtalrn between people who c dealing with each other, people who find themsc-'lvesconnected in a commwity of fate. Such a commmity is given, not chosen. If Che people involved act as citizens, t h y trmsform this community into a reyublic in which every person involved has the status of pubiic chooscrr.

The Outlook for Citizenship D f 53

If no one actually participate.^;, there is no citizenship, However, this study does not share the ernphasis of mny others on increasing particjpation. It rather focuses on those persons who, in whatever function and fcltr whatever =ason, art. already active somewhercl. in the public sphere.. Mow do their actions look fmm the point ol view crf citizens? Do these enhance or hinder the reproduction of ci.tizenshiy? Uo they =member and take into account what it is to be subected to the power that their function entails? Do they h o w how to rule and to be rued? The drive toward more particiyatiosl and emancipation is laudable but tends to make studies exhortative instead of analytical. In its extreme farm, it also selfdestructs: The ordinary dtizen is conceived of as powerless, and insofar as there is success in maklng him, powerful in s o m specific sense, he ceases, by defh~itition,to be an ordinary citizen. I fully a p e with fiwrists who, like Kenjamin Barber (1989, raise the R a g of better public deliberation and participation by more citizens. The only difference is one of emphasis. :Neompuhlicanism expects to achieve the greatest effect from emphasizing the citizen qualities of ongoing participation in the public sphere, and therefore, does not focus exdusively on deliberative demncratic pmcesses but considers the exercise of citizenship in various other public functions, such as those of policemn, tax inspector, head of secret service, and press secretary These public officers must cope with their differences with others as well as with differences within themselves, sometimes encom~teringtragic cmfliclts between the demands of special office and Ihose of citizenship, Rather than focusing on the mObilizatim and instmction of complete newcomers, n e o r e u l i c a n i focuses m improving and enlarging the repertoire and compete~~ce of those who, however cluxnsilyIhave already begtm to participate. Citizmship is not a pmsession that may be achfeved completely and secured forever but rather is constituted in its imperfect exercise by citizens, along the way

References

Ackerman, Bruce. 1991. We tlze Peollle: Foundations, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. . 1942. The Fzitrire of Liber~tRevohifion. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Anderson, Benedict. 1994. bnagitzed Commzr nr'ties. Landc~n:Verso. Andrews, Cmff, ed, 1991. Citizerfship. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Arendt, Hannah. 1959. Tltg H u f n n ~Corzdition. Garden City, N .Ye:Doubleday Anchar. . 1965. Ola Revolzatio~~. New Ycfrk: Viking Press. 1 968. Between Past and Future. New York:V i k h g Press, Balibar, gtienne. 1997. La rninte dl.s masses: Politiqlre et plzlrilosopilir arrant et apr2s Mnm, Paris: Galilke, Baz;&er;Benjamin. 19884,. Stmng Democracy: F"nrttc+ntol-y Politicsfur a New Age. Berkeley: University of California Press. . 1388. The Conquest of Xsolifics:Liberal P!tilosoplzy in Be~rwcmtz'cErnes. Princeton, N.J.: Princetom University Press. . 1995. jilfzad vs. Mczuorld. New Yak: Random House. Baubiick, Rainer. 1994. Transnational Gitkenship: Membership alzd RigFsts izz Tnfernntionnl Migmtion. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar. Bell, Daniel. 19176, Tlze Culturnl Conlr~dictionsc$Cnpitnlisnz. New York:Basic Bctoks. Benhabib, Seyla, ed. 4996. Democracy alzd Dzference: Cor2fesfiftgthe Bt~urzdnriesof: the 170liticnl. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universiy Press. Brubaker, Rogers. 4992. Citize~zshipand Nalz'orzllood in Fragce and Gertr~atly.Cambridge, Mass,: Hamard University 13ress, , Mass.: Harvard University Bruner, Jerome, 1990. Acts of M e ~ n i f t gCambridge, Press. Burke, John. 1986. Bzrreaucrafk Responsib-ility.Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopklins University Press. Gastc~riadis,Cornelius, 199'7. "Democracy as Procedure and Democracy a s Regirne."To~tsletlatiotzs:An lntertznlicl~traljourrlat of Critical n ~ Demucmi".ic d Tfieory. Vol. 4, no. 1 (April), pp.1-18, " of Commission af the European Communities. 4985. "A People's E u ~ e , Bulleti~t Supplement 7-85, Luxembourg: Office for Official the Eurqjeau Commzk~itles~ Publications af the European Communities.

References D f 55 Connolly, Wiliarn, 1995. The Etlzos of-Pluratt'zatiatz. Minneapcrlis: University crf Minnesota Press. DahX, Robert. 1956. A Prefnce Co Denzocunfk 77~t70fyChicago: . University of Chicago Press. . 2 989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, Ccrnn.: Yale U ~ v e r s i t yPress. Dahrendorf, RaXf. 1988, Tlte lLloderr? Social ConJZict.London: WeidenfeXd and Niculson. De Haan, Ido. 1993. Zelpesh.luur en Stnatsbelwer: fief Potilkkc Debal rlzwr Bzlrgerschnp en RecI~tsstaatin dc Ttuirzligste Eezlzu. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Den Hcsred, Paul, 4992. ""Ambtenaren als Burgers." Pp. 227-256 in Bzkrgcrsc/zap in Prnktijk~z,VC)].1, eds. Herman van Gunsteren and Paul den Hoed-.The Hague: Sdu uitgeverij. De Sefiraepdrijver, Sc~phle.1995. ""Belgig als Kunslurerk, of de Versplintering van een Natiebegrip," fileid b M~latsclznpp;i;i. No. 2, pp. 209-12 C;, De Wnter, Micha. 1995. Kindere~znls Medeburgers: Kilzder en feugdpauticipatie nls Maa tscl2appelr'j"kOpz7oedir?gs;~ersyectieUtrecht, The Netherlands: De Tijdstrocrm. Docters van Leeuwen, Arthur, 4992. "Rurgerschap in extremis." Pp. 245-259 in Burgersclzap in Prcaktijke~z,vol. 2, eds. Herman van Gunsteren and Paul den Hoed. T11e Hague: Sdu uitgeverij, Dt~uglas,Mary 1975. Tmpfkit Meanizzgs. London: Rc>utledge, . 1987. HOWT~nstitulionsTlzizzk. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. . 19132. Risk and Bfi317te.London: Routldge. . 2996, TfzoziglrtStyles. London: Sage. Elster, Jon. 1983. Sour Grapes: S t udies in tlze Subt?ersion of RRtl'onality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Etzioni, Amitai. 1988, Tfzc Moral Dirne~zsi~~iz: Torunrd a New Ecur?omics. New York: Free Press. . 1995. The Spirit of(llummnrtity: Riglzfs, Repur?sibils'ties,a ~ the d ComrnzrniZrilrinn AgenlZa. Idondon:Fontana Press. . 1996. 77~eNew Goldez~Rule: Corrzntzinity and M o r ~ l i f iz'yzzn Den~ocrntkSociety. New York: Basic Books. Fuucauft, Michel. 1975, Szrrveilfir et punk. Paris: Gallirnard. . 1988. "The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: An Interview with Michel Foucauft on January 20, 2984." In Tlte Fit-zal Folkcaulf, eds. lames Bei-nauer and David Rasmussen, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Geerkz, Cliffcjrd, 1973. The In terprefntiorz of Cultu res. New York: Basic Bnc~ks. 19133. Local Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, Gellner, Emest. 1987. Cziltzdre, Idc~ztify,a~zdPofifics,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Giddens, Anthony. 1994. Beyond Left and Riglst: The Fufure ~fRndicnl Pt~ll'tics.CambridgepEnggfand: Polity Press. Gould, Stephen. 2 993. Eigltt Little Piggies. London: Jonathan Cape. Gray, John. 1997. Endganrlss: Quest ions in Late Modcrn XSolitz'mE Tlzouglzt. Cambridge, England: 130fityPress, Greider, Williarn. 1992. Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of Amel-ican Democracy, New York: Simcm & &huster,

f 56

References

Gutman, Amy. 1985'. Demoemtic Eduetktic~tz,Princetcm, N.J.: Princeton University Press. CamGutman, Amy, and Bemis Thompsm. 1996, Detrzocracy and Bisl-rg~e~rzent, bridge, Mass.: P-iarvard University Press, Habermas, JGrgen. 1983. Tlzeorie ders kumtnz-lnihfie Handeltzs. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. . 1985. Die RCUC Unilbersichffichkeit.FrankfurZ am Main: Sufirkamp. . 2992, Faktizitgt iknd Geftung,Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. . 1 9 6 . Die L'inbeziei~~ifjg dcs Andere~z.Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. H a d , V6clav. 1987. Livizzg i~ Truth. tc~ndon:Faber & Faber. . 2 992, ""Paradise Lost.'" The New York Xetliew c?(Boob.April 9, pp. 65-23. Heater, Derek. 1990, Cilizenslzip: The Civic Ideal in Worl"Idisfoq,PoEifics,and EdrreaCion. London: Longman. Hirsch, Fred, 1976, Social Wnzits fo Growth, London: Harvard University Press, Hirsch Ballin, Ernst. 4992. NIZC HandeEsblnd. February 27, p. 9, Hirschman, Albert. 1970. Exit, V o k , and Loyalty: Respnss ko Decll'r-zein Fl'rnls, QY,~anizafl'ons,and States. London: Hamar8 University Press. . 1982, Sfzftitzg lnzlolvemetzfs: Priz7ezf.eln tercst a ~ Ptl d blic A c t i ~ tOxf~~rd: ~. Martin Rs>bertrio)n. . 1995, A Propensity to ScpSubt7ersion. Cambridge, Mass.: Haward University Press. Holmes, Stephen. 1993. The Annionty of Antilibeualisnt. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . 4995. Passi~~rzs and Gonsfmints:On ttw Tbcoy L?fLiberal Demucmq. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. f-lometh, Axe]. 1994. Katrzpfumr Anerkennttng. Frankfu& am Main: Suhrkamp. Ipatieff, Mhitichael. 1993. Blood and Bel~~ngitzg. London: Chatto &r Windus. Iyengar, Shanto. 1991. 1s Anyone Responsible? HOZUTelevision Fmmes &l ificnl ISSZC~S. Chicago: University of Chicago 13ress, Jordan, Bill. 4989. The Commotz Good: Cifziertship,Morntily, and $CV-lntercst. Oxfcjrd: Basil Blackwelt. Judt, Tony. 1994, "The New Old Nationalism." N m York Rezliew $Books, May 26. Kaaw, Max, and Kenneth Newton. 49%. Beligs in Govcrr-zmertt.Oxford: Qxfcord University Press. Karst, Kenneth. 1989, Belougirzg to Anzerica: Eqtral Citizenship and trlte Constitution. New Haven, Corm,: Yale University Press. ~ of Place. Norman: University of Kemmis, Daniel. 1990. Comntzinify and t l 170lifics Okf ahama Press, Kymlicka, Will, 1995. Multicutftir~lGifizetzship. Qxfcjrd, England: Cltarendon Press. Kymticka, Will, and Wayne Norman. 1994. "Return of the Citizen: A Sullrey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory." Etlzics. No, 204 (January 2994), pp. 352-381. tangman, M. A, 4992. "Arbeidsgarticipatie is Vijgeblad vosr Politiek," Het Finartekel Dagbfad. August 26. Laslett, 13eteu:2989. A Frr~slzlLlnp of tifii: Tke Efrzergener.of t l Third ~ Age, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

References D f 57 Lind, Michael, 1995, The Next Americnr~Nntiotz: The New Nafio~zalisrnand fhe Fourttz Afrrericcan Rezjolutz'on. New York: Free Press. lEJinz,Juan, and A l f ~ dStepan. 1996. Probletns of Denzacrntic Transition and Consolidntl'on. Baltimore' Md,: Johns Hopkins University f3ress. Mandeistam, Nadezhda. 153179, Hope Abandoned. Tr. Max Hayward. New York: Athenaeum. March, James, and Johan Olsen. 1989. Rediscoveti~zgTnsl-ifutions:The Qrg~nizational Bras& of Politics. New York: Free Press. . 1995. Democratic Goz?ernn~ce.New York: Free Press, Margalit, Avishai. 1996, Tlze Decent Society, Cambridge, Mass.: Piarvard University Press. Marshall, Thurgoud. 1950. Citizensltip and Soclial Class nrzd Ottter Essays. Carnbridge: Cambridge University 13ress, Mead, 1,awrence. 1986. Beyond Entillemeszf: The Social Oltl'igatio-onsof Gifize~zshig. New York: Basic Bcyoks. Meehan, Elizabeth. 1993. Citizeszsirip anlzd rlze Eztropean Contnzunity. London: Sage. Milgram, Stanley. 11974, Obedieto2ce to AuISflorify:An El;rperime?zfnlView. New York: Harper $r Row. Miller, Toby. 11i393, Tlze Well-Tempered S e q Cilizenslzip, Cultzrre, and Pusfmodei-rz Szibjecf, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Moon, Donald, 1993. Constrricling Cotlrrtflrnify:Muml Plznmlism alzd Pagic Confiicks. Princetan, N.J.: 13rincetonUniversity Press, NicoXet, CXaude. 15376. Le mktier de citayen dans In Rome rkpubll'cnine. Paris: Gallimar& . 1982. Lii& r@zrblIcnine en France: Essai d'lzistozlrc critique. Paris: Galfirnard. Ncjrton, David. 1991, Democracy and Moral Developmetzt: A Polikics of Virtzre. BerkeXey: University of California Press. Nussbaum, Ma&l.ra. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness: Lilck ~ l z dEZhics in Greek Tragedy and PI.tl'losokjhy,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Bidfield, Adrian. 1990. Cilizensttip and Gontmunity: Civic Repgiblicnrzism nrzd the Modern World. London: Routledge. PangXe, Thornas. 1992. The Ennobling of Democraq: The Clmlleng of the Posdmodem Age, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, Parker, juIia. 1975. Social Policy and Cilizenshif2. kyndon: Macmillan. Pattersan, Orlando. 4982. Slave?-y and Social Death: A Comparative Stzidy. Carnbridge, Mass,: Hamard University Press, . 4994. Freedom. London: I, B. Tauris. Peters, Tom. 1988. T l ~ r i u013i ~Clzaos. London: Macmillan. Pettit, Philip. 1997. Repu blicgnisrrf:A Tlteoy of Freedorn nnd Covernntent. Oxford, England: Clarendon Press. Philipse, Herman-.1994, NXC Hgndelsblad. September 8. Pitkin, Hanna. 1972. The Concept of Reprtrse~ttni'iorz.Berkeley: University of California Press. Pctlanyi, Michael. 4967. Tlze Tacit Dime~zsion.Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor. Przeworski, Adam. 1995. Szlstai~zableDemocracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

f 58

References

Putnam, Rctbert. 1993, Making Deitnocracy Work: Civic Traditions in Moder~zItnty. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Universiq Press. Ratvfs! J a h . 1993, Polifz'mlLiber~Eism.New York: Columbia Univtzrsity Press. Reich, Robert. 1li391, The Work of Nnliorzs: Prcpnritzg Oursclvcsfor 2lst-C"entury Capikalisnt. London: Simon & Schuster. Rescher, Nichulas. 1993, Pluralism: 12gnz'~zsttile Denznnd for Consensus, Oxford, England: CLarendon Press. d h n ~ g ein ModRoche, Maurice. 1992. Retfzi~kirzgCifizensIf+: Wcvare, Ideology! a ~ C ern Society, Cambridge, England: Polity Press. Rorty, Richard-.19639. Contingencyf lunny, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Rosas, Allan, and Eska Antola, eds. 1995. A Citizens' Europe: In Smrck ofa Ncw Ouder. London: Sage, Ryle, Gilbert. 1963, The Concept of Mind. f-larmondswo&h,England: 13enguin. Sagan, Eli. 1994, The Hotzey arzd the Hemlock: Democmcy and innrn~zoi~ in Ancietzt A f l l ~ nand s Modern Anterim. New York: Basic Books. Sandel, Michaet. 1982. Liberalism and trlte tinzits I?(Jzrstice.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 3996. Dentocraq's Discontent: America in Sealrell of n Public Philosoplzy. Cambridge, Mass,: Hamard University 13ress, gheffer, Paul, 4995, "Meclerland als een Open Detrr." NRC kinrzdclsblnd, January I . khnapper; Dominique. 1994, La confnztanaut&des citc?yens:Sznr l5de"emolaernc de nation. Paris: Gallimard, Schijn, Donald. 19137. Educatirzg fhRepectiw Pmcfifiorzcr. New York: Basic Bwks. khuck, Peter, and Rogers Smith. 1985. Citizendrz)l W f h o u t Consent: TIleg~lAliens in tile A nzericnn I")olity.New Haven, Corn.: Yale University Press. Schwarlz, Nancy. 1988. The Blue Czrilnr: r""uliticalRepresezztniiiun a~zdGammurzity. Chicago: Univeniiq of Chicago Press. %artcl?, John. 1996, The Soclizl Constnrction of Reality. Harmundswort England: Penguin. Shils, Edward. 1983. Tradifion. London: Faber & Faber. Sijes, Benjamin. 1974. Studies aver JclzTt.nverz;algitlg,Assen, "fe Netherlands: Van Gc>rcum, Soysal, Yasernjn Nuhoglu. 1994. Limits cf Citizeszsltip: Migmnfs and Posfnatliorzal Membership irz Eztroije, Chicago: University af Chicago 13ress. Sperber; Dan, and Deirdre Mrilsctn. 1986. Xdemlzce: Commza~icnlicl~t alzd Cr2gr-zifit>tz. Oxford: Blackwell. Spinner, Jeff. 1994. TIze Bolandaries of Cifizenslz*: Race, Etl'zni~ify~ and izlationnlr'fyin fkLibem/ Slniie. Baltimore, Md.: Jahns Hclpkins t i ~ v e r s i l yPress. Steiner, David. 1994. Relllz'lzking Den~oeratz'cEducnfion: The 17ulitics of Reform. Baltimore, Md.: Johns f-lopkins University 13ress, Sullivan, William. 1982, Reconsfntctitzg Pzrblic Philosopf~y.Berkeley: University of Califc>-omiaPress. Sunstein, Cass. 1996, Legal Reasoniag a ~ Polifz'ml d Cc~fzjicf, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

References D f 59 "t Hart, A. C, 1994, Oyet~bnerrMi??l's tel-ie cn Recl&tsfmndl?avi~?g~ Art-tern, The Netherlands: Gouda Quint. Thompson, Dennls. 1987. Pt~liticalEflzics nlzd Pziblk Ofice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U ~ v e r s i t yPress. Thompsc>n,Michael, Richard Elfis, and Aaron Wildavsky 1990. Cultzsml Tlieory. Boulder: Wstview Press. Tc>ulmin,Stephen. 19132. Gosntqritfz's:The Hidden Agend~ofModemz'ty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. d The Debate ozler Refonrzism, London: Turner, Bryan. 1986, Citkenslzip a ~ Cayitalisnz: ALlen & Untzrin, Turner, Bryan, ed. 1993, Citizenslzip a ~ Soer'nl d Theo~y.London: Sage. Van der Buderaa, ed-.1992. ""Brgerschap en Belastingen." Pp. 41-98 in Bzrrgersclfay I'll Pr~ktqken,volt. 2, eds. Herman van Gunsteren and Paul den Hoed, The Hague: W u uitgeverij. Van Doorn, Jacques. 1992. ""Efrgers in Uniform: over de Kelaties tussen Krijgsrnacht en StaatsbttrgerscI.-tap. Pp. 195-21 2 in Burgerscllap in Pmktijken, vol. 1, eds. Herman van Cunfiteren and Paul den Hoed. The EIague: Sdu uitgeverij, Van Gunsteren, Herman. 1976. The Quest for Control: A CI-itiqueof the Rat ional-Gentrat-Rule Rpproaclz itz Pzibtic Afairs. London: Wiley. . 1991, "The Ethical Context of Bureaucracy and 13erformanceAnalysis." Pp. 309-325 in The Public Secfor: Cltaflengefinr Coordz'~ztioand Learnirzg, ed. Fram-Xaver Kaufmann. Berlin: Wal ter de Gruy ter. . 1994. Cznlluren vmz Besturen. Amsterdam: Boom. Van Cunsteren, Herman, and Rudy Andeweg. 4994. Het Grore O~tgenoegert:over de Kl~oftussen, Btnrgers en Pi~litz'ek* Bloemendaal, The Netherlands: Aramith. Van Cunsteren, Herman, and Paul den Hoed, eds. 4992. Bz~rgersctzpin Prerktijket~. 2 volts. The Hague: Sdu uitgevtzrij. Van Gunstel-en, E-lerman, and Edith van Ruyven, eds. 1995. Best~tznrin de OngekThe Hague: Sdu uitgeverij. ende Snme~levi~zgVan Steenbergen, Bart, ed. 1994. Tlze Condition,c$ Giti;zenstzip.London: Sage. Vernon, Richard. 1986. Cit-ize~slzipand Order: Studies ifz Fre~zchPolitical Thozight. Tc?mnto:University of Tc>rc>nto Press. Viard, jean, ed. 1996. Azlx sozrrccs d ~poplrlisllie i nnfionaliste.Paris: gditions de 1'Aube. Vincent, Andrew and Raymond Plant. 1984. Hzilos~plzy~ F;"ulilics.,and Cifizenslzip: TIte Lye and Tltoztghl ofthe Brifisfi Idealisfs. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Walzer, Michael. 1994. T3zick and T'lzirz: Moral Argurrrent at Honze a ~ Abroad, d Natre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. . 1997. 0 1 2 Tolemti;on. New Haven, Cum.: Yale University Press, Ware, AXan. 1987. Citizens, Parties, and the Slrafe. Oxford, England: Polity Press. Weber, Etagen. 1976, Peasn~tsirtfo Frenefzmen.Stanford: Stanford University 13ress, Weissberg, Rubert. 1974. P(~fiticnlLearningp Political Glzuicepand Denzocuntic Citizenshi~9.Englewomd Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Wells, Charlotte. 1995. Law and Cifizeszsiripin Early Modern France. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Wiebe;?, Robert. 1995, Seq-Rule: A Cultural Hktory c?fArrrerican Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

160

References

Wildavsky, Aarctn. lli384. The Nursing Fatj~l:.Moses ~sa Political Leader. Tuscalansa: University of Alabama Press. . 1995. Buf Is I f True? A Gz'fiz~n'sC;z~i&to En~?ironntentlirIHealtll alzd Safely 1ssues. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Wills, Gary. 1995. "The New RevoXutionaries," Tlze Nezo Yol'kr Review of Books. August 40, pp. 50-55. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. Philosoplzz'ccalI?zz?estigsltrions.New Yc3rk: Macmillan. Young, Iris Marion. 4990. lustice arzd the Politics of Dyfcre~zce.Princeton, N.J .: Princetan University Press. Zinsviev, Alexander. 1981, 'The fimnitzg kieig1z;Pflts-Harmondswarth, England: Penguin.

E-7

E-7

E-7

Index Ackerman, Druce, 5 gic"con, 3,20,27,28, 112,131, 133, 137, 145-148,151 Admission, 12,43,52,81,91-1Q1,111,143. See also Refrrgees Adonnit10 reportp1% 'Affaire du fc3ulard" 3 Age, 104,109,110 Agrwment, See Co)nsenst~s Algeria, 99 ginzsterdarn, 15,54,96, 126 hderson, Benedict, l42 Apathy, 4,9,148,121, 123,124,149 Arbeitsein~tz(forced labor), 108 Armdt, Hannah, 21,28,29,3,, 105 histotie, 8/26 Art, 82 Atl~ens,118,146 Augu&ine of Wippc), 77 Authority, 4, 11,20,24,25,68,73,86, 103, 105,115,121,124,131,1%, 142, 146 Autc)nonny, 11,12,17,20-22,88, 103 Barber; Benjamin, 28,1511,153 Basic income, See Income Baubiick, Rainer, 9rt,98 Bell, Daniel, 11-21 Benhabib, %yla, 151 Berlin wall, 4 Borders, 15,34,44,97,9&,136, 138, 142, 5 ~ e also Schengen agreement Bosnia, 59 Boundaries. See Borders Brinkman, Eelcu, 113 Britain, 8,1125 Embaker, Rogers, 63 Bruner, jerome, 83 Business, 4, 6, 14,22,135, 15tl

Cafculating citiwn. See Citizen as individual catculatc~r Castoriadis, Cr>rnelius,138 Categories, 23,38,3842,60,126 Catholics, 42. Sec also Religion Children, 81, 137'. See also Education Choice, 51, 61, 42,65, TTt 33. Seealso Freedom Cl~ristianity,41, 129. SE also Religion Churches. SPPReligion Citizen as individual cafculator, 8,9,23,83, 115,119,1217, 132,140, 141, 243 Citizenship European, 9,135 local, 91,93,94. SLY also Citizenship, world mt~lticulhxral.5 ~ Multicrt~ltt~raIism. e mt~ttiple,15,60,Ci.;C,98,143 nationalistic notions of, 9 as office. See Office right to, 110 rules and requirements of, 45,63,69,83,

92 second class, 9,9i", '39,100,110 theol-ies of, 10,21,150,151. SW also Commtmitarianism; Liberalism; Neorepublicanism; Republicanism "irtual" 771 world, 91,93,94,38, 151. See also Citizensl~ip,l d Civic-mindednws, 18,22 Civic responsibiliq, 12,76,132-114,116,117, 119-122,124, 129,132. Stv also Duties Civic virtue, See Virtue Civility, 25,46,47,49,67,81, 117 Civil senrice, i'0,71 Civil s o c i e t ~10,22, 129-132, 135, 141, 142 Class, 36,39

Classification. See Categcjries C K . See Dutch organization of homosexuals Cold War, 99,149 Communication. See Dialogue Communitarianism, 11, 14,16, 19,20,60,83, 95, Srre ulso Citizenship, theoslia col Commtmit~16,19,20,23-26,29,52,81, 109, 112-116,118,127, 130,132,142, 143,145,148,152 of fate, 5,26,34,41--64,71,84,91,93,34, 9 7 98,101,144,152 Compdence, 24,25,27,30,3& 41,447,55, 56,664,84,85,92,94-96,952,146,153 Comprcjmise, 65 e Difference; Conflict, 59, 112. 5 ~ ulso Violmce Connolly, William, 151 Consensus, 18,28,53-58,8?, 112,127,130, 143,152 Consent, 93,96, See ulso Legitimacy Consociational democracy 36,56,M, 142, 151. See also Filbrization Crjnstitution, 5-8, 128, 129, 133, 134-136 Co)nstittrtior-ralpolitics, 6,23,33,134, 13Sf 148,151 Constructivism. See %~ociafconstruction Crjntexl; 20,47,48, Sw also %lf-evidence Crjntract:with America, 8 Corn~ptic~n, 5,9, 19,47, 48 Cosmopolitanism, 125 CreoXizatic)~,36,343,144 Criminals, 74'99 Cultural minorities, 51,65 Cultural reproduction, SW Edtration Culture, 11,12,18,26,28,36,54,55,57,58, 61-65, 83, 9tII Y5,96,98,116,119, 125,128,134,135,138,141,143,144, 1%-152. Cynicism, 67,124 CzechosXsvakia, 67,69 Czeclr Republic, 3 Dahl, Robe&, 18,19 Dahrencll~rf~ Ralf, 106 DDR. SW Germmy Decenterilrg, 33, 149. SW also Unknown SocietJr; Nation-state Decorum, 67 De Haan, Ido, 13 Deliberation, 85

Dernentd people, Y2,W Democrag; 8,14,18,33-35,%, 43,70,71, 103, l04 113,114, 117, 118,121, 127, 128,134,151 deliberative, 151,153 direct, 140 representative, 139 Democratization, 4,8,45,135,149 Den Hc~ed,Paul, 69, 70 Dependency, 10B,l45-147. See also Slavery De Scl-raepdri?ver,Sophie, 127 De Winter, Micka, 81 DiaXogue, 94,95 Dictatorship, 33,93 Difference, 9,28, % t 3 M 0 , 43,48,53,56,65, 82,8$, 95, 113, 129, 130, 132,145, 149,152,153. 5er also Plurality Disability, 104,109 Disciplil~e,21,29,73, 87,88, 116, 142 Disintegration, 113, 117 Diverf;iqI53,112,130,131. SW ulso Plurality Doclers van Leeuwen, Arthur, 71 Dostoye'c~skj~ Fyodor, 88 Douglas Mary, 22, 28,29,48,83,125 e Drug a~tdicts,99,146,147. 5 ~ also Deeendmc y Dtlrkheirn, Emile, 116,127,141 Dutclr organization of homosexuals (COC), 42 Dutcl-rkientific Council on Government Poticy 69 Dtlties,12,15,105,107-l@, 114, 129,1132, 141. See also Civic responsibility Ecorzomist, The, 1% Education, 12, 18, 19,23,25,36, 37, 43f455, 42, 65,81--90, l(%, 112, 117, 121, 128, 129,142,151 problem of ripeness, 8%87 Eiclhmann, Karl Adorlf, 75 Elderly. See Age Elections, 33,37, 100. SW also Voting Elitism, 45 Elster, Jon,120, 123 Emancipation, 13,20,36,42,113,100 Emt3tion, 43,44,127, 152 Employment. See Work Enligl-rte~lment, 29, 119, 141 Envirc>nment,6, 33 Equality, 41,45,51,63, 70, 82,87,91,92,97;, 104,106,137, El, 152

political, 12, 13,25-27, 107, 109, 121, 132 socioeconc?mic,13,26, 109,137, 152 Esperanto, 143 Etzioni, Amitai, 1832 Europe, 9,62,36,134,148 Eastern, 5, 6,82, 223,134 Western, 96,137 Etgropean parliament; 8,33,134 European Uniczn, 4,4,8,9, 15,33,60,81, 9&98,124,13.2,135,14(j1 Evolution, 35 Exclusion, 62,91-101,130, 141,144. See also Exptrlsion Exclusiveness, 60,63,44 Expulsion, 99,101. S1.e also Exclusion Extremism, 4,8,9, 117, 235 Fmily, 22,88, 108, 117, 137 Fate, 62,71,144. See also Community of fate Fc>ntainebleau,l34 Forurn, 49 Foucatrlt Michel, 2%30,116, 127,141 Folxche, 71 France, 9,36,63,68,135 Freedom, 4,20, 28,3(jf %,35,42,45,51-53, 81,87,91,93, 206,108, 115, 127,121, 122,133,136-.138,141,1&147, 14%-151,153 French Revolrttic~n,5,29 Freud, Sigmrrnd, 62,144 Frc~ntNational, 135 Fundamentalism,36 Gastarbeiter, 9 . 5 also ~ Germany Geertz, Cliffclrd, 36, 52- Sr.e also "We are alt natives nt3w" Gender, 39 Germany, 9,27,75 East, 37, 71 Gingrich, Newt, 8 Globalization, 4, 37,63,68, 135,143, 150 Goebbels, Paul Joseph, 75 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 75 Goutd, Stephen, 35 Greeks, Ancient, 103, l l Y P 1118 Greenpeace, 33 Grc~ups,%,39,42, 126. SE ulso Categoslia; Organizations Gutman, Amy, 883 Gypsies, 43

Habermas, JOrgen,28,29,34,121 Havel, VBtlav, 3,46,67,68, 88 Heater, Derek, 13 Hegel, Georg Wilihelrn Friedrich, 29, l1gr 136,141 Hierarcl~y15, 16,29, %,62-64, 73,83, 87,92 Hirscln, Fred, 141 Hirsck Ballin, Ernst, 113, 115 Hirschman, Albert, 112,123,152 Hitler, Ado& 51, T5 Hobbes, Thornas, 139 Hc~lmes,Stepl-ren, 133 Home, 36,51,99,140--144 HomosexrraliQ, 42 Hume, David, 136 Humor, 47 Identily, 15,22,36,37,41,42,44,61), 63-45, 89,118,125,126 Ideology, % IpatieE, Mickaeh125 Immigrants, 9,663, 218, 128,137. SLY also Strangers lOt&ll.r,l0b-l19B Income, 1l.r,l0b-l19M Individuality, 5,117,20,21,29,39, 117.5~e ulso Citizm as iinctividual calculator Individualization, 15,1C;,22,113 Inequality. See Quafity; klierarchp InstihticJns, 5, 14, 16, 25,29, 37, 39,41, 44, 46,4& 49,55,64,69,83, 88-90, 94, 95,98,1830,111,123,130,133--135, 140,143,145,147,148,150 Integration, 98, 113,115 Interests, 136,139, 148 Internal Revenue Service (IRS), 74 IRS. Sec linternal Revenue Sewice Islam, 9,41, W Italy, 4,9,81,96, 131,146 Jackson, Justice, 128 Jackson, Micl~ael,61 Japan, 4,81 Jews, 41,50,75 Judgrnmt; 11,12,20,21,103 J u d t %ny, 125 Justice, 4,2X, 35,44,51,77,38, 111.2, 122, 133, 145,151

Kohl, E-lelmut, 75 Kymlicb, Will, 13,45 Lamarcbc, 83. SLY also Education Langman, M.A., 105 Language, 11, 13,27,52,54,57,61,76,35, 96,126,12'i', 142,143 Laslett, Peter, 109 Law, rule of, 7,14,29,;75,71,72,7'4,95,113, 122,127,128,141,142 Legi~rnacy6-43!18 Lenin, V.I., 7'5 Liberal democracy, 13,13,14,33,34,49,124, 133-135,3 45,149,150. S6.e also Democracy Liberalism, 11, 24,16,17, 29,127,128 Liberty. Se"(>Freedom Lifestyle, 36. SLY also Pluralily. Loyalty, 10-12,15, 19,26,55(3,M, 49,82,iW, 86,8T, 100,103,114,123,136, 140-lM, 24% 150 Lubbers, Ruud, 113 Maastricht treaty, 9,98,135 Mafia, 6, 36'99 Mandela, Nelson, 3,88 Mandelstam, Nadezhda, 46 Marcl%Jarnes, 48 Margalit, Aviskai, 43 Marshall, T.H., 23,28,104-1Q6,152 Marx, Kark, 119,125,136,137 Mead, Lawrence, 105,107 Media, 37, 115,132,133, 148 Membersl-tip,59-61 Meritocracy, 45,100 Migratic>n,4,15,43,44,91,96,98,151 Milgram, Stanley 20 Military sewice, 33, 23/74, l42 Minorities, 15,52,56,92 Montesqrr ieu, Cl-tartes-Louis de Scondat; Baron de, 127 Morality, 16,19,20,23,30,35,47,68,81,83, 86,88,89,t06,112-115,219, 125, 126,128,132,141,252 Moro~cc)~ 100 M~~fticultLlralism, 60, 38, 125 M~~ttil-rationat firms. Sec Business Napoleon, 73 Nation, 16,39,63,64,130,132,141-144,148f 149

Nationalism, 3, 112,12&129,132, 142, 149 Nationaliq, 15,222 Nation-state, 4,6,7, 14,20,21,33,34,3?, 44, 56,63,137,142,149-151 NATO. SCe North Attantic Treaty Organization e %IfNatural, 2Q,29,40,86, 125128. 5 ~ulso evidence Neorepublicimism, 11,13,21,24,34,56, 5941,64,66,49,73,76, 84,87-89, 93-97, 99,107,11)8,123,129,139, 143, 144, 147, 151, 153. See also Citizenship, th~heuriesof Nelherfands, 4,9, 12,24, 27, 39; 36,50,54, 56,6C),64,1;5, 70,74,96,100, 105, 108,112,113,115,226,119,142, 246 Neittlrorks, 22,28,29,36,150 1989 (year), 3,6,10,11, 17',64,103, 133, 149, 151. See also Revolution 'No gokreas, 36,71 Normaliv, JO,76,77,111 Normal politics, 5/33 Norman, Wyne, 13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 6 Nussbaurn, Martha, 20 Office, 14,19,25,43,67--TIS,72,73,76, 77,86, 92, 100, 121, 132,139, 140,146, 153 Oklahoma City bombing#8 Old field, Adrian, 13 Olsm, Johan, 48 Qppenheirner, Robed, 75 Order, 16,19,22,2S1,34,59,87,225,116,124, 126-328,130 OrgmRizations, 22,33,36,73-5,130,131, 138 Qssis, 9, See also Germmy Outsiders, SE Strangers Ownership. SPCPmperty PanglegTlzomas, 81 Parteiverdrc>ssenI-teit',9. SE ulso Germany Participation, 12, 13,56,84,95, 203,106, 109, 111,113,114, 11aR121,122,145,150, 151,153 Parties, political, 7, 33#3-4, 37, 39, 119, 123, 132,134,135, 14&-l50 Pattersc>n,Orlando, 4'2,145,146 Periciles, 137' Peters?Tom, 23

Pettie Philip, 21,151 Pl~ilipse,Heman, 128 Piliiarization, 36, 116,142 Pitkin, Wanna, 139 Piato, 86,117 Plurality, 24,26,28, 3(1,34--53, 55,56,5941, Gi(7,li.g, 65,59,84,87, 121, 142, 145-117,118,119, 223/ 128, 230,133, 137,lif1,142,1~,146,149,151 Politics, 4,5,3,23,67,81 Populism, 21 Pc~stmodernism, 22,29 Pc>verty,4,43 Pragmatism, 36,44 Pfisoners, 32 Private sphere, 28,11 7, 136-138,143 Proper?, 12,203,1M,I06,137 Protestants, 215 Public sphere, 105,130,13&138,142,144, 147-1561,152,153 Pul-ification Ilittlals, 49, 215 Putnam, Robert, 134, 232

Romans, 115,129 Rorty, &chard, 62 Rc>uriseau,f ean-Jacquw,28,227,139,241 Rule of taw. Sec Law rule of Russia, 64,129 Ryle, Cilbert.,127

Sagan, Eli, 43,118 Sakharov, Andrei, 75 Sandet, Micl~ael,20, 152 Santa Clarxs, 54 Scheffer, Paul, 125 Schengen agrwment; 98. See also Borders Schbn, Dunatd, 46 Scottish Enlightenment.,1% Searle, Jolnn, 57, SWulso Social construction Scret sewice, 71,72,123,153 Self-evidence, 5,20,39,40,58,125 Shilr;,Edward, 46 Sijes, Benjamin, 50 Slavery, 28,42,43,%, 61,87,91,103,108, 119,123,137,146,147 Smidn, Adam, 119,134,137 Race, 15,39,148 Social constn~ction,25,40,41,57-59,128 Rationality 4, 29, 336,52,56 Social frapentation, 56,81,106 Rawls, John, 152 Reagan, Ronald, 75 Social sectrrity, 63,106-108 Recl~Qstaat,113. S t y also Law, rrttle of Socrates, 117 Redemscratization. Sec Constibtionat Solidarity, 104 politics; Democratization Sotornon, King#141 South Africa/ 3,6,65. SLY also Mandela, Referendum, 35: 134 Nelson Refugees, 13,94,96 Regionalism, 3'7 Sovereignty74,60 Soysat, Yasernin, 91,9& Reich, Rcibert, 75 Stasi, 37,71.5ee ulso Germany, East Relativism, 81,86 State, 21, 22,63,130, 131,142. See also Religion, 15,18,21,22,26, 3537,39,41,63, Nation-state 45,1;=2,89,98,11~117,129,137,14f, Statelessness, 93, W 148 Steiner, Bavid, 81 Representation, 36,37,49,50,65, 73, 236, Strange%,4,9,91 2 3&140 Rqtrblic, 7 Strasbourg#149 Republicanism, 11, 14,16,21,40,83, 117 Taxes, 33/74 Resilience, 53, 111, 131,252 Territory, 14,21,62,97,129 Resistance movements, 43 't Hart, A.C., 74 Responsbiliv, 18,83,109,113 Revolution, 3,5,6,33,77, 115. S t y also Thatclzer, Mareret, 105 Third age. S t y Age Mctrmat politics Riglxts, 7,8,15,17,83,87, 204-107, 208,114, "Tscqueville,Alexis de, 18,116 123,133,151,149-152 Tclieration, 43f 446,86,151 Roche, Mauriccr.,13 Tc~tzlmin,Stephen, 4 Romania, 135 li.adition, 58, 126

%msnation;rl membership, 91,9X. See also (Zitizcjnsl~ip, world Trust, 133,132,139, 140 Turke):. 15,60 Tyranny 117 Unemployment, 99,104,2Q5,1i.B,128.5~e a k a Empl~~ymenl United States, 8, 18,2"7 75,36 Unity, See Difference; PIurafitp Unhc?wn Society 23,34, S-39,52, Sep also Decentering; Nalic>n-state Die neue, 34. See also Un6be~ichtlichkeit~ Haber~nas,Jiirgen Values, 13,55,125,136,141, 250, 152 Van der O ~ ~ J e r aEd, a , 74 Van Doorn, Jaccyues, 73 Van Gunsteren, Heman, 4, 19,69 Violence, 36,38,47, 57'fl 68, 133, 236 Virtue, 8,21,22,24,25f 11'7,141,152 Voice, 63,106, 133

Walzer, Michael, 94, 151 "We are all native ni>-w",34,52. See also Geertz, Cliffarcl Weber, Eugen, 142 Wetfare statef9,14, 105,107,1114,137,122, 137 Wildavsky, Aaron, 121 Wills, Cary 8 WitQenslein, Ludwig, 28, 33,39,52,55 Wi>men,4'2, 10lS Work, I8,222,36,43,103, 106, I(18-110, 117, 122,143,152 Wc'trld "TradeOrganization, 6 Wi>rfdWar TT, 13,27,43,44,50,62,70, 75, 101,148

2;inovie.i; Alexander, 123