A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East

ALSO

BY

DAVID

F R O M K I N

The

Independence

of

The

Question

Government

of

Nations

DAVID F R O M K I N

A PEACE TO END A L L PEACE T H E

F A L L

AND

T H E

O F

T H E

O T T O M A N

CREATION M I D D L E

O F

T H E

E A S T

AN OWL BOOK HENRY

HOLT AND NEW

YORK

COMPANY

E M P I R E M O D E R N

Henry Holt and Company, L L C Publishers since 1866 115 West 18th Street New York, N e w York 10011 Henry Holt® is a registered trademark o f Henry Holt and Company, L L C . Copyright © 1989 by David Fromkin All rights reserved. Distributed in Canada by H. B. Fenn and Company L t d . L i b r a r y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D a t a Fromkin, David. A peace to end all peace. Bibliography : p. Includes index. I S B N 0-8050-6884-8 1. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Middle East. 2. Middle E a s t — F o r e i g n relations—Great Britain. 3. Middle East—Politics and government—1914-1945. I. Title. DS63.2.G7F76 1989 327.41056 88-34727

Henry Holt books are available for special promotions and premiums. For details contact: Director, Special Markets. First published in hardcover in 1989 by Henry Holt and Company First Owl Books Edition 2001 Printed in the United States of America 13

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"After 'the war to end war' they s e e m to have been pretty successful in Paris at m a k i n g a 'Peace to end P e a c e . ' " A r c h i b a l d Wavell (later F i e l d M a r s h a l Earl Wavell), an officer who s e r v e d u n d e r Allenby in the Palestine c a m p a i g n , c o m m e n t i n g on the treaties b r i n g i n g the F i r s t World War to an e n d

C O N T E N T S

List of Illustrations and Maps Photo Credits Acknowledgments A Note on Spelling Introduction

10 11 12 14 15

P A R T I At the C r o s s r o a d s of History 1

T H E L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE

23

2

T H E L E G A C Y OF T H E G R E A T GAME IN ASIA

26

3

T H E M I D D L E E A S T B E F O R E T H E WAR

33

4

T H E YOUNG T U R K S URGENTLY S E E K AN ALLY

45

5

W I N S T O N C H U R C H I L L O N T H E E V E O F WAR

51

6

C H U R C H I L L S E I Z E S T U R K E Y ' S WARSHIPS

54

7

AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E SUBLIME PORTE

62

8

K I T C H E N E R T A K E S COMMAND

9

KITCHENER'S LIEUTENANTS

88 96

P A R T I I Kitchener o f K h a r t o u m L o o k s A h e a d 79

10

KITCHENER S E T S OUT TO CAPTURE ISLAM

11

INDIA P R O T E S T S

106

12

T H E MAN IN T H E M I D D L E

111

P A R T I I I Britain i s D r a w n into the Middle Eastern Quagmire 13

T H E T U R K I S H C O M M A N D E R S A L M O S T L O S E T H E WAR

119

14

KITCHENER ALLOWS BRITAIN TO A T T A C K T U R K E Y

124

15

ON TO VICTORY AT T H E DARDANELLES

130

16

RUSSIA'S GRAB FOR T U R K E Y

137

17

DEFINING BRITAIN'S GOALS IN T H E MIDDLE EAST

146

18

AT T H E NARROWS OF F O R T U N E

150

19

T H E WARRIORS

155

20

T H E POLITICIANS

159

21

THE LIGHT THAT FAILED

163

8

CONTENTS

22

C R E A T I N G T H E ARAB B U R E A U

168

23

MAKING PROMISES TO T H E ARABS

173

24

MAKING PROMISES TO T H E EUROPEAN A L L I E S

188

25

TURKEY'S TRIUMPH AT T H E TIGRIS

200

26

BEHIND ENEMY LINES

27

KITCHENER'S LAST MISSION

216

28

HUSSEIN'S REVOLT

218

29

T H E F A L L OF T H E A L L I E D GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND FRANCE

231

30

T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR

239

PART

IV

Subversion 207

P A R T V T h e Allies a t the N a d i r o f T h e i r F o r t u n e s

P A R T VI

N e w Worlds and Promised

Lands

31

T H E NEW W O R L D

32

LLOYD GEORGE'S ZIONISM

253 263

33

TOWARD T H E BALFOUR D E C L A R A T I O N

276

34

T H E PROMISED LAND

284

P A R T VII

I n v a d i n g the M i d d l e E a s t

35

J E R U S A L E M FOR CHRISTMAS

305

36

T H E ROAD T O D A M A S C U S

315

37

T H E B A T T L E FOR SYRIA

332

38

T H E P A R T I N G O F T H E WAYS

39

BY T H E S H O R E S OF T R O Y

P A R T V I I I T h e S p o i l s o f Victory 351 '

363

P A R T I X T h e T i d e G o e s Out 40

THE TICKING CLOCK

383

41

BETRAYAL

389

42

T H E U N R E A L WORLD OF T H E PEACE C O N F E R E N C E S

403

43

T H E T R O U B L E S B E G I N : 1919—1921

44

E G Y P T : T H E W I N T E R O F 1918—1919

417

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A F G H A N I S T A N : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919

421

46

A R A B I A : T H E S P R I N G O F 1919

424

47

T U R K E Y : J A N U A R Y 1920

427

P A R T X S t o r m over Asia 415

CONTENTS

9

48

S Y R I A A N D L E B A N O N : T H E S P R I N G A N D S U M M E R O F 1920

435

49

E A S T E R N P A L E S T I N E ( T R A N S J O R D A N ) : 1920

441

50

P A L E S T I N E — A R A B S A N D J E W S : 1920

51

M E S O P O T A M I A ( I R A Q ) : 1920

52

P E R S I A ( I R A N ) : 1920

4 45 449 45 5

P A R T X I R u s s i a R e t u r n s t o the M i d d l e E a s t 53

UNMASKING BRITAIN'S ENEMIES

465

54

T H E SOVIET CHALLENGE IN T H E MIDDLE EAST

471

55

MOSCOW'S G O A L S

475

56

A D E A T H IN B U K H A R A

480

57

WINSTON CHURCHILL T A K E S CHARGE

493

58

C H U R C H I L L AND T H E QUESTION OF PALESTINE

515

59

T H E A L L I A N C E S COME APART

530

P A R T X I I T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n Settlement o f 1922

60

A GREEK TRAGEDY

540

61

T H E S E T T L E M E N T OF T H E MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION

558

Notes

569

Bibliography

607

Index

621

L I S T

O F

I L L U S T R A T I O N S

AND

MAPS

1 Lord Kitchener 2 Sir Mark Sykes 3 Enver 4 Talaat 5 Djemal 6 Crowds gather outside the Sublime Porte, 1913 7 Turkish soldiers at Dardanelles fort, 1915 8 Allied fleet at entrance to Dardanelles 9 Pictorial map of the Dardanelles 10 H . M . S . Cornwallis 11 Anzac beach 12 Australian troops at Gallipoli 13 Winston Churchill 14 Russian troop column 15 Russian advance-guard in Turkey, 1916 16 Russian occupation of Erzerum 17 Russian troops in Trebizond 18 British camel column in the Jordan Valley 19 British survey party in Palestine 20 Transport camels 21 View of Beersheba 22 The Hejaz flag 23 Prince Feisal 24 King Hussein of the Hejaz 25 T . E . Lawrence with Lowell Thomas 26 David Ben-Gurion 27 Vladimir Jabotinsky 28 Chaim Weizmann with Lord Balfour 29 Union Jack hoisted above Basra 30 Street scene in Baghdad 31 Reading of General Allenby's proclamation of martial law, 1917 32 Australian Light Horse entering Damascus, 1918 33 General Allenby enters Aleppo, 1919 34 Ottoman soldiers surrender, November 1918 35 British sentry, Constantinople, 1920 36 Admiral Calthorpe's flagship, 1918 10

L I S T OF I L L U S T R A T I O N S AND MAPS

11

37 Woodrow Wilson 38 Lloyd George 39 Signing of the Treaty of Sevres, 1920 40 British bluejackets in Constantinople, 1920 41 French quarter of Smyrna after the fall of the city, 1922 42 French troops enter Damascus, 1920 43 Bodies of Greek soldiers in a Turkish field, 1922 44 Mustapha Kemal 45 Reza Khan 46 Amanullah Khan 47 King Fuad of Egypt 48 Zaghlul Pasha 49 Sons of King Hussein of the Hejaz: Feisal, King of Iraq; Abdullah, Emir of Transjordan; and Ali, later briefly to be King of the Hejaz 50 Ibn Saud with Sir Percy Cox and Gertrude Bell Photo Credits 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 80 are reproduced courtesy of The Illustrated London News Picture Library, London. 2, 5, 25 , 45 , 49 are reproduced courtesy of UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos, New York. 26 is reproduced courtesy of the Bettmann Archive, New York. 27 and 28 are reproduced courtesy of the Zionist Archives and Library. Maps (Between pages 20 and 21) The Middle East in 1914 T h e Campaign in Central Asia The Greek-Turkish War The Middle East in the 1920s Cartography by Sue Lawes

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

T h e idea of writing this book c a m e to me in the c o u r s e of a conversation with T i m o t h y D i c k i n s o n in which he asked my views a b o u t the history of the M i d d l e E a s t . L a t e r I p u t my ideas in written f o r m . J a s o n E p s t e i n s u g g e s t e d that the book be s t r u c t u r e d a r o u n d a personality. I took his s u g g e s t i o n a n d c h o s e Winston Churchill. N o w I cannot think of how the book could have been s t r u c t u r e d any other way. As books on my subject a p p e a r e d in L o n d o n , my friend and colleague R o b e r t L . S i g m o n would b u y t h e m for m e a n d s e n d t h e m to me by airmail. A n d Professor S t a n l e y Mallach of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee helped me find b o o k s I could not find elsewhere. Alain Silvera, Professor of H i s t o r y at Bryn M a w r College a n d a lifelong friend, kept me abreast of the latest scholarship by s u p p l y i n g me with articles from learned j o u r n a l s as well as valuable ideas, information, a n d s u g g e s t i o n s . He r e a d and re-read the m a n u s c r i p t and offered detailed marginal corrections and c o m m e n t s . He showed the m a n u s c r i p t also t o his P h . D . student K a y Patterson, who offered extensive a n d careful c o m m e n t s . At my request, Professor E r n e s t Gellner of C a m b r i d g e University kindly arranged for me to meet Professor Elie K e d o u r i e , w h o m I wanted to p e r s u a d e to be the other a c a d e m i c reader of my m a n u s c r i p t . Professor K e d o u r i e read the m a n u s c r i p t and g a v e me the benefit of his i m m e n s e erudition a n d authoritative c o m m e n t s . I am grateful to him, and to M r s K e d o u r i e for her kindness a n d patience in p u t t i n g up with my d e m a n d s on her h u s b a n d ' s time. D r N i c h o l a s R i z o p o u l o s read the G r e e k - T u r k i s h episodes a n d offered valuable s u g g e s t i o n s . I hope I need not a d d that Professor K e d o u r i e , Professor Silvera, D r R i z o p o u l o s , a n d M r s Patterson are not r e s p o n s i b l e in any way for the opinions and conclusions I e x p r e s s in the book. M o r e o v e r , the m a n u s c r i p t has been extensively rewritten since they saw it, so there may well be factual or other s t a t e m e n t s in it they would have advised me to c h a n g e . A c a d e m i c r e a d e r s , in particular, will observe in reading the book 12

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

13

that I owe an i m m e n s e intellectual d e b t to the b o o k s and e s s a y s of m a n y other s c h o l a r s — m o r e , indeed, than there is s p a c e to n a m e here. Chief a m o n g those to w h o m I am thus indebted are Elie K e d o u r i e , for his masterful s t u d i e s of M i d d l e E a s t e r n a n d British history and politics, a n d M a r t i n G i l b e r t , whose great life of Winston Churchill is essential to anyone writing a b o u t this p e r i o d . I have leaned heavily on G i l b e r t ' s v o l u m e s — a s everyone now m u s t . A n d I was inspired by the e x a m p l e of H o w a r d S a c h a r to believe that a history of the M i d d l e E a s t can be w r i t t e n — a s I was a t t e m p t i n g to d o — o n a very b r o a d scale. S a m u e l C l a y t o n , the son of Sir G i l b e r t Clayton, was kind e n o u g h to s p e n d the best part of an afternoon talking to me a b o u t his father. My thanks to h i m , a n d to his wife, the L a d y M a r y , for their hospitality in having me to tea at K e n s i n g t o n Palace. In the c o u r s e of my research in archives in Britain a n d elsewhere over the years, I have benefited f r o m the kindness and patience of s u c h unfailingly helpful librarians as L e s l e y F o r b e s of the University of D u r h a m , Clive H u g h e s of the I m p e r i a l War M u s e u m , N o r m a n H i g s o n of the University of Hull, Alan Bell of R h o d e s H o u s e , O x f o r d , a n d Gillian G r a n t o f the M i d d l e E a s t C e n t r e , S t Antony's College, O x f o r d . My heartfelt thanks to t h e m all. I owe an i m m e n s e d e b t of g r a t i t u d e to R o b Cowley, my editor at H e n r y Holt and an authority on the F i r s t World War, for his knowledgeable a n d helpful s u g g e s t i o n s and for his constant e n c o u r a g e m e n t and e n t h u s i a s m . M a r i a n W o o d at H e n r y Holt and S a r a M e n g u g at A n d r e D e u t s c h saw me through the publication p r o c e s s with unfailing cheer and a w e s o m e efficiency. F o r permission to r e p r o d u c e q u o t a t i o n s from d o c u m e n t s I am indebted to the following: — T h e C l e r k of the R e c o r d s , H o u s e of L o r d s R e c o r d Office, for permission to quote from the L l o y d G e o r g e Papers in the Beaverbrook Collection in the custody of the H o u s e of L o r d s R e c o r d Office; — t h e S u d a n Archive of the University of D u r h a m , on whose extensive collection I have d r a w n freely; — M r s T h e r e s a S e a r i g h t , and the R h o d e s H o u s e L i b r a r y , for permission to q u o t e from the diaries of R i c h a r d M e i n e r t z h a g e n ; — t h e B r y n m o r J o n e s L i b r a r y of the University of Hull a n d S i r T a t t o n S y k e s , B a r t . , for permission to q u o t e from the p a p e r s of Sir Mark Sykes; — t h e M i d d l e E a s t C e n t r e , St Antony's College, O x f o r d , for permission to q u ot e from their extensive collection, including the p a p e r s o f S i r H u b e r t Y o u n g , T . E . L a w r e n c e , L o r d Allenby, William Y a l e , F . R . S o m e r s e t , C . D . B r u n t o n , a n d the K i n g Feisal and Balfour Declaration files; — t h e Warden and Fellows of N e w College, O x f o r d , for per-

14

A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

mission t o q u o t e from L o r d Milner's f i l e s ; — t h e T r u s t e e s of the L i d d e l l H a r t C e n t r e for Military A r c h i v e s at K i n g ' s College, L o n d o n , for p e r m i s s i o n t o q u o t e f r o m L o r d Allenby's papers. T r a n s c r i p t s / T r a n s l a t i o n s of C r o w n copyright r e c o r d s in the P u b l i c R e c o r d Office a p p e a r by p e r m i s s i o n of the Controller of H. M. Stationery Office. F o r access to d o c u m e n t a r y material, I wish also to thank the British L i b r a r y , L o n d o n ; Camellia I n v e s t m e n t s , Pic, L o n d o n ; the Weizmann Archives, R e h o v o t , I s r a e l ; the Bodleian L i b r a r y , O x f o r d ; the I m p e r i a l War M u s e u m , L o n d o n ; the H o u g h t o n L i b r a r y of H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y ; a n d the N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y .

A

Note

on

Spelling

In spelling T u r k i s h , A r a b i c , a n d Persian n a m e s a n d titles, I have u s e d whatever form of spelling I am m o s t familiar with f r o m my reading over the years. So there is no s y s t e m or consistency in it; b u t I would g u e s s that the spellings m o s t familiar to me will be the m o s t familiar to the general reader as well.

I N T R O D U C T I O N

T h e M i d d l e E a s t , a s w e know i t f r o m today's headlines, e m e r g e d f r o m decisions m a d e by the Allies d u r i n g and after the F i r s t World War. In the p a g e s that follow I set out to tell in one v o l u m e the wide-ranging story of how a n d w h y — a n d out of what hopes a n d fears, loves a n d h a t r e d s , mistakes a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s — t h e s e decisions were m a d e . R u s s i a n a n d F r e n c h official a c c o u n t s of what they were doing in the M i d d l e E a s t at that time were, not unnaturally, works of p r o p a g a n d a ; British official a c c o u n t s — a n d even the later m e m o i r s of the officials c o n c e r n e d — w e r e untruthful too. British officials who played a major role in the m a k i n g of these decisions provided a version of events that was, at best, edited a n d , at worst, fictitious. T h e y s o u g h t to hide their m e d d l i n g in M o s l e m religious affairs ( p a g e s 96—105) a n d to pretend that they had entered the M i d d l e E a s t as p a t r o n s of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e — a cause in which they did not in fact believe. Moreover, the A r a b Revolt that f o r m e d the centerpiece of their narrative o c c u r r e d not so m u c h in reality as in the wonderful imagination of T. E. L a w r e n c e , a teller of fantastic tales w h o m the A m e r i c a n s h o w m a n L o w e l l T h o m a s t r a n s f o r m e d into " L a w r e n c e o f A r a b i a . " T h e truth has c o m e out over the c o u r s e of d e c a d e s in bits a n d pieces, and now, toward the end, in one great h e a p , with the o p e n i n g of archives of hitherto secret official d o c u m e n t s a n d private p a p e r s . It s e e m e d to m e — i n 1979, when I started my r e s e a r c h — t h a t we h a d arrived at a point where at last it w o u l d be possible to tell the real story of what h a p p e n e d ; hence this b o o k . D u r i n g the past d e c a d e I have w o r k e d in the archives, s t u d i e d the literature, and p u t together the findings of m o d e r n scholarship to show the picture that is f o r m e d when the pieces of the puzzle are a s s e m b l e d . T h e a u t h o r s whose works I cite in the N o t e s at the e n d of the book m a d e m o s t of the new discoveries, t h o u g h I have m a d e s o m e too: what the Y o u n g T u r k leaders m a y have done in order to p e r s u a d e the G e r m a n s to ally with t h e m on 1 A u g u s t 1914 ( p a g e s 60—6), for e x a m p l e , and why the A r a b negotiator a l - F a r u q i m a y 15

16

INTRODUCTION

have d r a w n a line t h r o u g h inland S y r i a as the frontier of A r a b national independence ( p a g e 178). T h e n , too, I m a y be the first to disentangle, or at any rate to d r a w attention to, the m a n y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s which in 1916 set off a hidden tug-of-war within the British b u r e a u c r a c y between S i r M a r k S y k e s , L o n d o n ' s desk m a n in charge of the M i d d l e E a s t , and his friend G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the head of intelligence in C a i r o ( p a g e 193). I found that neither S y k e s nor Clayton ever realized that S y k e s , in the 1916 negotiations with F r a n c e , m i s u n d e r s t o o d what Clayton h a d asked him to d o . S y k e s did the exact o p p o s i t e , believing in all innocence that he was carrying out Clayton's wishes, while C l a y t o n felt s u r e that S y k e s h a d knowingly let h i m d o w n . S i n c e Clayton never mentioned the m a t t e r to him, S y k e s r e m a i n e d u n a w a r e that differences h a d arisen between him a n d his colleague. So in the m o n t h s a n d years that followed, S y k e s mistakenly a s s u m e d that he and Clayton were still at one, when in fact within the b u r e a u c r a c y Clayton had b e c o m e an a d v e r s a r y of his p o l i c y — a n d p e r h a p s the m o s t d a n g e r o u s one. G e t t i n g the b u r e a u c r a t i c politics r i g h t — a n d I hope that is what I have d o n e — h a s been one of my chief endeavors. B u t I have tried to do m o r e than clarify specific p r o c e s s e s and e p i s o d e s . T h e b o o k is meant to give a p a n o r a m i c view of what was h a p p e n i n g to the M i d d l e E a s t as a whole, and to show that its reshaping was a function of G r e a t Power politics at a u n i q u e t i m e : the exact m o m e n t when the waves of western E u r o p e a n imperial e x p a n s i o n i s m flowed forward to hit their high-water m a r k , a n d then felt the first powerful t u g s of the tide that was g o i n g to pull t h e m b a c k . T h e M i d d l e E a s t , as I conceive it, m e a n s not only E g y p t , Israel, I r a n , T u r k e y , a n d the A r a b states of Asia, b u t also Soviet Central A s i a and A f g h a n i s t a n : the entire arena in which Britain, from the N a p o l e o n i c Wars o n w a r d , fought to shield the road to I n d i a from the o n s l a u g h t s first of F r a n c e a n d t h e n of R u s s i a in what c a m e to be known a s "the G r e a t G a m e . " Other studies of the F i r s t World War and its aftermath in the region have t e n d e d to deal with a single country or area. E v e n those dealing with E u r o p e a n policy in the A r a b or T u r k i s h E a s t as a whole have focused solely, for e x a m p l e , on the role of Britain, or of Britain a n d F r a n c e . B u t I place the creation of the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t in a wider f r a m e w o r k : I see what h a p p e n e d as the culmination of the nineteenth-century G r e a t G a m e , a n d therefore show R u s s i a , too, playing a leading role in the story. It was in whole or in part b e c a u s e of R u s s i a that K i t c h e n e r initiated a British alliance with the A r a b M o s l e m world ( p a g e s 9 7 — 8 ) ; that Britain and F r a n c e , though they would have preferred to preserve the T u r k i s h E m p i r e in the region, decided instead to o c c u p y a n d partition the M i d d l e E a s t ( p a g e s 137—42); that the F o r e i g n Office publicly proclaimed British s u p p o r t

INTRODUCTION

17

for the establishment of a J e w i s h National H o m e in Palestine ( p a g e s 184—93); a n d that, after the war, a n u m b e r of British officials felt that Britain was obliged to hold the line in the M i d d l e E a s t against c r u s a d i n g B o l s h e v i s m ( p a g e s 4 6 5 — 8 ) . Yet, so far as I know, this is the first b o o k to tell the story as that of the M i d d l e E a s t in the widest s e n s e : the G r e a t G a m e sense, in which R u s s i a plays a central role. As you will see when you r e a d the book, M i d d l e E a s t e r n p e r s o n alities, c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d political cultures do not figure a g r e a t deal in the narrative that follows, except when I s u g g e s t the outlines a n d d i m e n s i o n s of what E u r o p e a n politicians were ignoring when they m a d e their decisions. T h i s is a book a b o u t the decision-making p r o c e s s , a n d in the 1914—22 p e r i o d , E u r o p e a n s and A m e r i c a n s were the only ones seated a r o u n d the table when the decisions were m a d e . It was an era in which M i d d l e E a s t e r n countries a n d frontiers were fabricated in E u r o p e . I r a q a n d what we now call J o r d a n , for e x a m p l e , were British inventions, lines d r a w n on an e m p t y m a p by British politicians after the F i r s t World W a r ; while the b o u n d a r i e s of S a u d i A r a b i a , K u w a i t , a n d I r a q were established by a British civil servant in 1922, a n d the frontiers between M o s l e m s and C h r i s t i a n s were d r a w n by F r a n c e in S y r i a - L e b a n o n a n d by R u s s i a on the b o r d e r s of A r m e n i a a n d Soviet A z e r b a i j a n . T h e E u r o p e a n powers at that time believed they could c h a n g e M o s l e m A s i a in the very f u n d a m e n t a l s of its political existence, a n d in their a t t e m p t to do so i n t r o d u c e d an artificial state s y s t e m into the M i d d l e E a s t that has m a d e it into a region of countries that have not b e c o m e nations even t o d a y . T h e b a s i s of political life in t h e M i d d l e E a s t — r e l i g i o n — w a s called into question by the R u s s i a n s , who p r o p o s e d c o m m u n i s m , a n d by the British, who p r o p o s e d nationalism or dynastic loyalty, in its place. K h o m e i n i ' s Iran in the Shi'ite world and the M o s l e m B r o t h e r h o o d in E g y p t , S y r i a , and elsewhere in the S u n n i world keep that issue alive. T h e F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t , which in the M i d d l e E a s t did allow religion to be the basis of politics—even of its o w n — c h a m p i o n e d one sect against the others; and that, too, is an issue kept alive, notably in the c o m m u n a l strife that has r a v a g e d L e b a n o n in the 1970s a n d 1980s. T h e year 1922 s e e m s to me to have been the point of no return in setting the various clans of the M i d d l e E a s t on their collision c o u r s e s , so that the especial interest a n d excitement of the years with which this book is concerned, 1914 t h r o u g h 1922, is that they were the creative, formative y e a r s , in which everything s e e m e d (and may indeed have been) p o s s i b l e . It was a time when E u r o p e a n s , not implausibly, believed A r a b and J e w i s h nationalism to be natural allies; when the F r e n c h , not the A r a b s , were the d a n g e r o u s enemies of the Zionist m o v e m e n t ; a n d when oil was not an important factor in the politics of the M i d d l e E a s t . By 1922, however, the choices had narrowed a n d the c o u r s e s had

18

INTRODUCTION

been set; the M i d d l e E a s t h a d started along a road that was to lead to the endless w a r s (between Israel a n d her neighbors, a m o n g others, a n d between rival militias in L e b a n o n ) a n d to the always-escalating acts of terrorism (hijacking, assassination, a n d r a n d o m m a s s a c r e ) that have been a characteristic feature of international life in the 1970s a n d 1980s. T h e s e are a part of the legacy of the history recounted in the p a g e s that follow. T w o stories are told in the book a n d then m e r g e into one. T h e first b e g i n s with L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s decision at the outset of the F i r s t World War to partition the M i d d l e E a s t after the war between Britain, F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a , a n d with his a p p o i n t m e n t o f S i r M a r k S y k e s to work out the details. T h e b o o k then follows S y k e s d u r i n g the w a r t i m e years, as he worked out Britain's blueprint for the M i d d l e E a s t ' s future. It g o e s on to show that, in large part, the p r o g r a m S y k e s had formulated was realized after the war, a n d w a s e m b o d i e d in d o c u m e n t s formally a d o p t e d (for the m o s t part) in 1922. T h i s was the story that I originally set out to write. It was meant to show that if you p u t together a n u m b e r of the d o c u m e n t s a n d decisions of 1922—the Allenby D e c l a r a t i o n establishing nominal ind e p e n d e n c e for E g y p t , the Palestine M a n d a t e a n d the Churchill White P a p e r for Palestine (from which Israel a n d J o r d a n s p r i n g ) , the British treaty establishing the s t a t u s of I r a q , the F r e n c h M a n d a t e for S y r i a and L e b a n o n , Britain's placing new m o n a r c h s on the thrones of E g y p t a n d I r a q a n d s p o n s o r i n g a new princely ruler for (what was to b e c o m e ) J o r d a n , the R u s s i a n proclamation of a Soviet U n i o n in which R u s s i a would re-establish her rule in M o s l e m Central A s i a — you would see that when taken together they a m o u n t e d to an overall settlement of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n . Moreover, this settlement of 1922 (as I call it, b e c a u s e m o s t of its elements cluster in a n d a r o u n d that year) flowed from the wartime negotiations which S i r M a r k S y k e s h a d c o n d u c t e d with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a to agree u p o n a partition o f the postwar M i d d l e E a s t between them. T h e F r e n c h received a bit less than had been a g r e e d , a n d the R u s s i a n s were only allowed to keep what they had already taken before the war, but the principle of allowing t h e m to s h a r e with Britain in the partition and rule of M o s l e m A s i a was r e s p e c t e d . Within the British s p h e r e , all went a c c o r d i n g to the S y k e s p l a n : Britain ruled for the m o s t part indirectly, as protector of nominally independent A r a b m o n archies, a n d p r o c l a i m e d herself the s p o n s o r of both A r a b a n d J e w i s h nationalism. In addition to establishing that there h a d been a settlement of 1922 in the M i d d l e E a s t , I show that our quarrel with that settlement (to the extent that with hindsight we would have designed the new M i d d l e E a s t differently) is not what we s o m e t i m e s believe it to b e . It

INTRODUCTION

19

is not even that the British g o v e r n m e n t at that time failed to devise a settlement that would satisfy the n e e d s a n d desires of the p e o p l e s of the M i d d l e E a s t ; it is that they were trying to do s o m e t h i n g altogether different. F o r L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his delegated agent M a r k S y k e s the M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s t i o n was what it had been for m o r e than a century: where w o u l d the F r e n c h frontier in the M i d d l e E a s t be d r a w n a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t , where w o u l d the R u s s i a n frontier in the Middle East be drawn? T h a t , as I say, is the story which I set out to tell. B u t in the telling of it, another e m e r g e d : the story of how, between 1914 a n d 1922, Britain c h a n g e d , a n d British officials a n d politicians c h a n g e d their m i n d s , so that by 1922—when they formally c o m m i t t e d themselves to their p r o g r a m for r e m a k i n g the M i d d l e E a s t — t h e y no longer believed in it. In the c o u r s e of the narrative we see the British g o v e r n m e n t of 1914, 1915, a n d 1916, which w e l c o m e d a R u s s i a n a n d a F r e n c h p r e s e n c e in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , turn into a postwar g o v e r n m e n t that r e g a r d e d R u s s i a in the M i d d l e E a s t as a d a n g e r a n d F r a n c e in the region as a disaster. We see the p r o - Z i o n i s t s of 1917 turn into the anti-Zionists of 1921 a n d 1922; and the enthusiasts for Feisal's A r a b M o v e m e n t turn against Feisal a s untrustworthy a n d against his brother A b d u l l a h as hopelessly ineffectual. A b o v e all, we see Britain e m b a r k i n g on a vast new imperial enterprise in the M i d d l e E a s t — o n e that w o u l d take generations to achieve, if its object were to r e m a k e the M i d d l e E a s t as I n d i a had been r e m a d e — a t the very time that the British p u b l i c was t u r n i n g to a policy of scaling down overseas c o m m i t m e n t s a n d was deciding it wanted no m o r e imperial a d v e n t u r e s . It m a y well be that the crisis of political civilization that the M i d d l e E a s t e n d u r e s today s t e m s not merely from Britain's d e s t r u c tion of the old order in the region in 1918, a n d her decisions in 1922 about how it should be replaced, b u t also from the lack of conviction she b r o u g h t in s u b s e q u e n t years to the p r o g r a m of i m p o s i n g the settlement of 1922 to which she was p l e d g e d . T h e b o o k I intended to write was only about how E u r o p e went about c h a n g i n g the M i d d l e E a s t ; the book that e m e r g e d was also about how E u r o p e c h a n g e d at the s a m e time, a n d a b o u t how the two m o v e m e n t s interacted. L l o y d G e o r g e , Woodrow Wilson, K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m , L a w r e n c e of A r a b i a , L e n i n , S t a l i n , a n d M u s s o l i n i — m e n who helped s h a p e the twentieth c e n t u r y — a r e a m o n g those who played leading roles in the d r a m a that unfolds in A Peace to End All Peace, striving to remake the world in the light of their own vision. Winston Churchill, above all, p r e s i d e s over the p a g e s of this b o o k : a dominating figure whose g e n i u s a n i m a t e d events a n d whose larger-thanlife personality colored and enlivened t h e m .

20

INTRODUCTION

F o r Churchill, a s for L l o y d G e o r g e , Wilson, L e n i n , S t a l i n , and the o t h e r s — a n d for s u c h m e n a s J a n Christian S m u t s , L e o A m e r y , a n d L o r d M i l n e r — t h e M i d d l e E a s t was an essential c o m p o n e n t or a testing area of their worldview. T h e i r vision of the future of the M i d d l e E a s t was central to their idea of the sort of twentieth century they passionately believed would or s h o u l d e m e r g e as a phoenix from the ashes of the F i r s t World War. In that sense, the history recounted in the p a g e s that follow is the story of how the twentieth century was created, as well as the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t .

PART I AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY

1 T H E L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE i In the late s p r i n g of 1912, the graceful yacht Enchantress put out to sea from rainy G e n o a for a M e d i t e r r a n e a n p l e a s u r e cruise—-a carefree cruise without itinerary or t i m e - s c h e d u l e . T h e skies brightened as she s t e a m e d s o u t h . S o o n she was b a t h e d in s u n s h i n e . Enchantress b e l o n g e d to the British A d m i r a l t y . T h e a c c o m m o dation a b o a r d was as g r a n d as that on the K i n g ' s own yacht. T h e crew n u m b e r e d nearly a h u n d r e d a n d served a dozen or so g u e s t s , who had c o m e from Britain via P a r i s , where they had stayed at the R i t z . A m o n g them were the British P r i m e Minister, H e r b e r t A s q u i t h ; his brilliant 25-year-old d a u g h t e r Violet; the civilian head of the A d m i r a l t y , Winston C h u r c h i l l ; and Churchill's small party of family m e m b e r s a n d close colleagues. In the final enchanted years before the F i r s t World War b r o u g h t their world to an end, they were as privileged a g r o u p as any the world has known. Violet A s q u i t h kept a diary of her j o u r n e y . In Pompeii she a n d her friends w a n d e r e d "down the long lovely silent streets" that once had p u l s a t e d with the life of I m p e r i a l R o m e ; now, she noted, those once lively streets were overgrown with g r a s s a n d v e g e t a t i o n . In Sicily her party c l i m b e d to the ruins of an ancient G r e e k fortress a n d , a m i d s t wild lavender and h e r b s , had a picnic lunch, sitting on blocks of stone f r o m the fallen walls. L a t e r they went higher still to watch the sunset over the sea f r o m what r e m a i n e d of the old G r e e k theater on the heights. T h e r e they lay " a m o n g wild thyme a n d h u m m i n g bees and watched the sea c h a n g i n g from b l u e to flame a n d then to cool j a d e green as the s u n d r o p p e d into it a n d the s t a r s c a m e o u t . " 1

2

Rotations and revolutions—the heavenly m o v e m e n t s that c a u s e day to b e c o m e night a n d s p r i n g / s u m m e r to b e c o m e a u t u m n / w i n t e r — were reflected in her observations of the l a n d s c a p e a n d its lighting; but a sense of the mortality of civilizations and of political p o w e r s a n d dominations did not o v e r s h a d o w Violet's cheerful vision of her youthful voyage to the l a n d s of antiquity. H e r father p r e s i d e d over 23

24

AT THE CROSSROADS OF HISTORY

an e m p i r e roughly twice as large as the R o m a n E m p i r e at its zenith; she m a y well have t h o u g h t that her father's e m p i r e would last twice as long too. T h e P r i m e Minister, a n enthusiastic sightseer, was inseparable from his Baedeker g u i d e b o o k . An ardent classicist, he read a n d wrote with ease a n d pleasure in classical G r e e k a n d L a t i n . Winston Churchill, no scholar of ancient l a n g u a g e s or literature, was as jealous as a child. " T h o s e G r e e k s a n d R o m a n s , " he protested, "they are so overrated. T h e y only said everything first. I've said just as g o o d things myself. B u t they got in before m e . " Violet noted that, "It was in vain that my father pointed out that the world had been g o i n g on for q u i t e a long time before the G r e e k s and R o m a n s a p p e a r e d u p o n the s c e n e . " T h e Prime Minister was a n intellectual, aware that the trend a m o n g historians of the ancient world was away f r o m an exclusive concern with the E u r o p e a n cultures o f the G r e e k s a n d R o m a n s . T h e American professor J a m e s H e n r y B r e a s t e d had won wide a c c e p t a n c e for the thesis that m o d e r n civilization—that is, E u r o p e a n civilization—had its b e g i n n i n g s not in G r e e c e and R o m e , b u t in the M i d d l e E a s t : in E g y p t and J u d a e a , B a b y l o n i a a n d A s s y r i a , S u m e r a n d A k k a d . Civilization—whose roots stretched t h o u s a n d s of years into the past, into the soil of those M i d d l e E a s t e r n monarchies that long a g o had c r u m b l e d into d u s t — was seen to have c u l m i n a t e d in the global s u p r e m a c y of the E u r o pean peoples, their ideals, a n d their way of life. 3

4

In the early years of the twentieth century, when Churchill a n d his g u e s t s v o y a g e d a b o a r d the Enchantress, it was usual to a s s u m e that the E u r o p e a n peoples w o u l d continue to play a d o m i n a t i n g role in world affairs for as far ahead in time as the mind's eye could see. It was also not u n c o m m o n to s u p p o s e that, having already a c c o m p l i s h e d m o s t of what m a n y r e g a r d e d as the West's historical m i s s i o n — s h a p i n g the political destinies of the other p e o p l e s of the g l o b e — t h e y would eventually c o m p l e t e it. C o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g the d o m a i n s still to be dealt with were those of the M i d d l e E a s t , one of the few regions left on the planet that had not yet been socially, culturally, a n d politically reshaped in the i m a g e of E u r o p e .

II T h e M i d d l e E a s t , although it had been of great interest to western d i p l o m a t s a n d politicians d u r i n g the nineteenth century as an arena in which G r e a t G a m e rivalries were played out, was of only marginal concern to them in the early years of the twentieth century when those rivalries were a p p a r e n t l y resolved. T h e region had b e c o m e a political backwater. It was a s s u m e d that the E u r o p e a n powers would

THE L A S T DAYS OF OLD EUROPE

25

one day take the region in hand, but there was no longer a sense of urgency about their doing so. F e w E u r o p e a n s of Churchill's generation knew or cared what went on in the l a n g u i d e m p i r e s of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n or the Persian S h a h . An occasional T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e of A r m e n i a n s would lead to a p u b l i c outcry in the West, b u t w o u l d evoke no m o r e lasting concern than R u s s i a n m a s s a c r e s of J e w s . Worldly statesmen who privately believed there was nothing to be d o n e w o u l d go t h r o u g h the p u b l i c m o t i o n s of u r g i n g the S u l t a n to r e f o r m ; there the matter w o u l d end. Petty intrigues at court, a c o r r u p t officialdom, shifting tribal alliances, and a s l u g g i s h , apathetic population c o m p o s e d the picture that E u r o p e a n s formed of the region's affairs. T h e r e was little in the picture to c a u s e o r d i n a r y p e o p l e living in L o n d o n , or P a r i s , or N e w Y o r k to believe that it affected their lives or interests. In Berlin, it is t r u e , planners looked to the o p e n i n g up of railroads a n d new markets in the region; b u t these were commercial ventures. T h e p a s s i o n s that now drive t r o o p s a n d terrorists to kill a n d be k i l l e d — a n d that c o m p e l global a t t e n t i o n — h a d not yet been a r o u s e d . At the t i m e , the political l a n d s c a p e of the M i d d l e E a s t looked different f r o m that of today. Israel, J o r d a n , S y r i a , I r a q , a n d S a u d i A r a b i a did not exist then. M o s t of the M i d d l e E a s t still rested, as it had for centuries, u n d e r the d r o w s y a n d negligent sway of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a relatively tranquil d o m a i n in which history, like everything else, m o v e d slowly. T o d a y , toward the close of the twentieth century, the politics of the M i d d l e E a s t present a completely different a s p e c t : they are explosive. No m a n played a m o r e crucial role—at times unintentionally—in g i v i n g birth to the M i d d l e E a s t we live with today than did Winston Churchill, who before the F i r s t World War was a rising but widely d i s t r u s t e d y o u n g E n g l i s h politician with no particular interest in M o s l e m A s i a . A c u r i o u s destiny d r o v e Churchill and the M i d d l e E a s t to interfere repeatedly in one another's political lives. T h i s left its m a r k s ; there are frontier lines now r u n n i n g a c r o s s the face of the M i d d l e E a s t that are scar-lines from those encounters with him.

* T h e Baghdad Railway project remains the best-known example of German economic penetration of the region. T h e story is a tangled one and often misunderstood, but the British originally encouraged and supported the project, little aware at the outset of the dangers it might pose. Eventually the project became a source of discord between Britain and Germany which, however, was resolved by an agreement reached between the two countries in 1914.

T H E LEGACY OF T H E GREAT GAME IN ASIA i Churchill, A s q u i t h , a n d s u c h C a b i n e t colleagues as the F o r e i g n Secretary, S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , a n d , later, the War Minister, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , were to play a decisive role in creating the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t ; b u t in d o i n g so they were u n a b l e to e s c a p e f r o m a Victorian political legacy that A s q u i t h ' s L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t thought it had rejected. A s q u i t h and G r e y , having turned their b a c k s on the nineteenth-century rivalry with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a in the M i d d l e E a s t , believed that they could walk away from it; b u t events were to prove them w r o n g .

II T h e s t r u g g l e for the M i d d l e E a s t , pitting E n g l a n d against E u r o p e a n rivals, was a result of the imperial expansion ushered in by the voyages o f C o l u m b u s , V a s c o d a G a m a , Magellan, a n d D r a k e . H a v i n g discovered the sea routes in the fifteenth a n d sixteenth centuries, the E u r o p e a n powers went on to vie with one another for control of the rest of the world. E n g l a n d w a s a relatively late starter in the race, but eventually s u r p a s s e d the others. D u r i n g the eighteenth century the British Isles, despite their small size, finally established an e m p i r e that encircled the g l o b e . L i k e the S p a n i a r d s and the D u t c h before t h e m , the British b o a s t e d that their m o n a r c h now reigned over d o m i n i o n s on which the sun never set. By 1912, when Winston Churchill a n d Herbert A s q u i t h cruised a b o a r d the Enchantress, their m o n a r c h , G e o r g e V, ruled a q u a r t e r of the land surface of the planet. Of none of their c o n q u e s t s were the British m o r e p r o u d than those in the storied E a s t . Y e t there was irony in these t r i u m p h s ; for in besting F r a n c e in A s i a a n d the Pacific, a n d in crowning that achievement by winning I n d i a , Britain had stretched her line of transport 26

THE LEGACY OF THE GREAT GAME

IN

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a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s so far that it could be cut at rnany points. N a p o l e o n B o n a p a r t e e x p o s e d this vulnerability in 1798, when he i n v a d e d E g y p t a n d m a r c h e d on S y r i a — i n t e n d i n g , he later m a i n tained, from there to follow the p a t h of legend a n d glory, p a s t B a b y l o n , to I n d i a . T h o u g h checked in his own p l a n s , N a p o l e o n afterwards p e r s u a d e d the m a d C z a r Paul to launch the R u s s i a n a r m y on the s a m e p a t h . Britain's r e s p o n s e was to s u p p o r t the native r e g i m e s of the M i d d l e E a s t against E u r o p e a n e x p a n s i o n . S h e d i d not desire to control the region, b u t to keep any other E u r o p e a n power from d o i n g s o . T h r o u g h o u t the nineteenth century, successive British g o v e r n m e n t s therefore p u r s u e d a policy of p r o p p i n g up the tottering I s l a m i c r e a l m s in A s i a against E u r o p e a n interference, s u b v e r s i o n , a n d invasion. In d o i n g so their principal o p p o n e n t s o o n b e c a m e the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . D e f e a t i n g R u s s i a n d e s i g n s in A s i a e m e r g e d as the o b s e s s i v e goal of generations of British civilian a n d military officials. T h e i r a t t e m p t to do so w a s , for t h e m , "the G r e a t G a m e , " in which the stakes ran high. G e o r g e C u r z o n , the future Viceroy of I n d i a , defined the stakes clearly: " T u r k e s t a n , A f g h a n i s t a n , T r a n s c a s p i a , P e r s i a — t o m a n y these n a m e s breathe only a sense of utter r e m o t e n e s s . .. To m e , I confess, they are the pieces on a c h e s s b o a r d u p o n which is b e i n g played out a g a m e for the d o m i n i o n of the w o r l d . " Q u e e n Victoria put it even m o r e clearly: it w a s , she said, "a q u e s t i o n of R u s s i a n or British s u p r e m a c y in the w o r l d . " 1

2

3

Ill It a p p e a r s to have been a British officer n a m e d A r t h u r Conolly who first called it "the G r e a t G a m e . " He played it gallantly, along the H i m a l a y a n frontier a n d in the deserts and oases of Central A s i a , a n d lost in a terrible w a y : an U z b e k e m i r cast him for two m o n t h s into a well which w a s filled with vermin a n d reptiles, a n d then what remained o f h i m was b r o u g h t u p a n d b e h e a d e d . T h e p h r a s e "the G r e a t G a m e " was found in his p a p e r s a n d q u o t e d by a historian of the F i r s t A f g h a n W a r . R u d y a r d K i p l i n g m a d e it f a m o u s in his novel Kim, the story of an A n g l o - I n d i a n boy a n d his A f g h a n mentor foiling R u s s i a n intrigues along the highways to I n d i a . * 4

T h e g a m e had b e g u n even before 1829, when the D u k e o f Wellington, then P r i m e Minister, entered into official c o r r e s p o n dence on the subject of how best to protect India against a R u s s i a n * These activities of the rival intelligence services are what some writers mean by the Great G a m e ; others use the phrase in the broader sense in which it is used in this book.

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attack through A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e best way, it was a g r e e d , was by keeping R u s s i a out of A f g h a n i s t a n . British strategy thereafter was to employ the decaying regimes of I s l a m i c A s i a as a gigantic buffer between British I n d i a a n d its route to E g y p t , and the threatening R u s s i a n s . T h i s policy was associated especially with the n a m e of L o r d P a l m e r s t o n , who developed it d u r i n g his many years as F o r e i g n Minister ( 1 8 3 0 - 4 , 1 8 3 6 - 4 1 , a n d 1 8 4 6 - 5 1 ) a n d P r i m e Minister ( 1 8 5 5 - 8 and 1 8 5 9 - 6 5 ) . T h e battle to s u p p o r t friendly buffer regimes raged with particular intensity at the western a n d eastern e n d s of the Asian continent, where the control of d o m i n a t i n g strategic positions was at stake. In western A s i a the locus of strategic concern was C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ( I s t a n b u l ) , the ancient B y z a n t i u m , which for centuries had d o m i n a t e d the c r o s s r o a d s of world politics. S i t u a t e d above the narrow straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s , it c o m m a n d e d both the east/west p a s s a g e between E u r o p e and A s i a a n d the north/south p a s s a g e between the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d the Black S e a . So long as C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s not in unfriendly h a n d s , the powerful British navy could sail t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s into the Black S e a to d o m i n a t e the R u s s i a n coastline. B u t if the R u s s i a n s were to c o n q u e r the straits they could not merely keep the British fleet from c o m i n g in; they could also send their own fleet out, into the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , where its presence could threaten the British lifeline. T o w a r d the far side of the A s i a n continent, the locus of strategic concern was the stretch of high m o u n t a i n ranges in a n d adjoining Afghanistan, f r o m which invaders could p o u r down into the plains of British India. Britain's aim in eastern Asia was to keep R u s s i a from establishing any sort of presence on those d o m i n a t i n g heights. S o m e t i m e s as a cold war, s o m e t i m e s as a hot one, the struggle between Britain a n d R u s s i a r a g e d f r o m the D a r d a n e l l e s to the H i m a l a y a s for almost a h u n d r e d y e a r s . Its o u t c o m e was s o m e t h i n g of a draw.

IV T h e r e were vital m a t t e r s at stake in Britain's long s t r u g g l e against R u s s i a ; a n d while s o m e of these eventually fell by the wayside, others r e m a i n e d , alongside newer ones that e m e r g e d . In 1791 Britain's P r i m e Minister, William Pitt, e x p r e s s e d fear that the R u s s i a n E m p i r e m i g h t be able to overthrow the E u r o p e a n balance of power. T h a t fear revived after R u s s i a played a crucial role in the final defeat of N a p o l e o n in 1 8 1 4 - 1 5 , but diminished again after 1856, when R u s s i a was defeated in the C r i m e a n War. F r o m 1830 o n w a r d , L o r d P a l m e r s t o n and his successors feared

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that if R u s s i a d e s t r o y e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e the s c r a m b l e to pick up the pieces might lead to a m a j o r war between the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . T h a t always remained a concern. By the m i d d l e of the nineteenth century, British t r a d e with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e b e g a n to a s s u m e a m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e , a n d economic issues were a d d e d to the controversy, pitting free trade Britain against protectionist R u s s i a . T h e d e e p financial involvement o f F r a n c e a n d Italy in O t t o m a n affairs, followed by G e r m a n economic penetration, turned the area in which R u s s i a a n d Britain c o n d u c t e d their s t r u g g l e into a minefield of national e c o n o m i c interests. Oil entered the picture only in the early twentieth century. B u t it did not play a m a j o r role in the G r e a t G a m e even then, both b e c a u s e there were few politicians who foresaw the c o m i n g i m p o r t a n c e of oil, a n d b e c a u s e it was not then known that oil existed in the M i d d l e E a s t in s u c h a g r e a t quantity. M o s t of Britain's oil ( m o r e than 80 percent, before a n d d u r i n g the F i r s t World War) c a m e from the U n i t e d S t a t e s . At the t i m e , Persia was the only significant M i d d l e E a s t e r n p r o d u c e r other than R u s s i a , a n d even Persia's o u t p u t was insignificant in terms of world p r o d u c t i o n . In 1913, for e x a m p l e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o d u c e d 140 t i m e s m o r e oil than d i d P e r s i a . s

F r o m the century, the safety of the of E m p r e s s evolution of Empire and lifeline, b u t the c z a r s .

b e g i n n i n g of the G r e a t G a m e until far into the twentieth m o s t deeply felt concern of British leaders was for the r o a d to the E a s t . When Q u e e n Victoria a s s u m e d the title of I n d i a in 1877 formal recognition was given to the Britain into a species of d u a l m o n a r c h y — t h e British the E m p i r e of I n d i a . T h e line between them was t h u s a over it, a n d casting a long s h a d o w , h u n g the s w o r d of

British leaders s e e m e d not to take into account the possibility that, in e x p a n d i n g s o u t h w a r d s a n d e a s t w a r d s , the R u s s i a n s were impelled by internal historical imperatives of their own which h a d nothing to do with I n d i a or Britain. T h e c z a r s a n d their ministers believed that it was their country's destiny to c o n q u e r the south a n d the east, j u s t as the A m e r i c a n s at the time believed it their manifest destiny to c o n q u e r the west. In each c a s e , the d r e a m was to fill out an entire continent f r o m ocean t o ocean. T h e R u s s i a n Imperial Chancellor, Prince G o r c h a k o v , put it m o r e or less in those t e r m s in 1864 in a m e m o r a n d u m in which he set forth his g o a l s for his country. He a r g u e d that the need for s e c u r e frontiers obliged the R u s s i a n s to go on d e v o u r i n g the rotting r e g i m e s to their s o u t h . He pointed out that "the U n i t e d S t a t e s in A m e r i c a , F r a n c e in Algiers, H o l l a n d in her colonies—all have been d r a w n into a c o u r s e where ambition plays a smaller role than i m p e r i o u s necessity, a n d the greatest difficulty is knowing where to s t o p . " 6

T h e British feared that R u s s i a did not know where to s t o p ; a n d , as

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an increasingly d e m o c r a t i c society e n g a g e d generation after generation in the conflict with despotic R u s s i a , they eventually developed a hatred of R u s s i a that went b e y o n d the particular political and economic differences that divided the two countries. Britons grew to object to R u s s i a n s not merely for what they did but for who they were. At the s a m e time, however, L i b e r a l s in and out of Parliament began to e x p r e s s their abhorrence of the corrupt and despotic M i d d l e E a s t e r n r e g i m e s that their own g o v e r n m e n t s u p p o r t e d against the R u s s i a n threat. In d o i n g s o , they struck a responsive chord in the country's electorate. Atrocities c o m m i t t e d by the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against Christian minorities were thunderingly d e n o u n c e d by the L i b e r a l leader, William E w a r t G l a d s t o n e , in the 1880 election c a m paign in which he overthrew and replaced the C o n s e r v a t i v e P r i m e Minister, B e n j a m i n Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. C l a i m i n g that the Sultan's r e g i m e was "a b o t t o m l e s s pit of fraud and f a l s e h o o d , " G l a d s t o n e , in his 1880—5 administration, washed Britain's h a n d s of the O t t o m a n involvement, and the British government withdrew its protection and influence from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e T u r k s , u n a b l e to stand on their own, turned therefore for s u p p o r t to another power, B i s m a r c k ' s G e r m a n y ; and G e r m a n y took Britain's place at the S u b l i m e P o r t e . 7

When the C o n s e r v a t i v e s returned to office, it was too late to go back. R o b e r t Cecil, 3rd M a r q u e s s of S a l i s b u r y ( P r i m e Minister: 1 8 8 5 - 6 , 1 8 8 6 - 9 2 , 1 8 9 5 - 1 9 0 0 , 1 9 0 0 - 2 ) , aware that the O t t o m a n rulers were j e o p a r d i z i n g their own sovereignty through m i s m a n a g e ment, h a d thought of u s i n g s u c h influence as Britain could exert to g u i d e a n d , to s o m e extent, reform the r e g i m e . Of G l a d s t o n e ' s having dissipated that influence, he l a m e n t e d : " T h e y have just thrown it away into the sea, without getting anything whatever in e x c h a n g e . " 8

V G e r m a n y ' s entry on the scene, at Constantinople and elsewhere, marked the beginning of a new age in world politics. T h e G e r m a n E m p i r e , formally created on 18 J a n u a r y 1871, within d e c a d e s had replaced R u s s i a as the principal threat to British interests. In part this was b e c a u s e of Britain's relative industrial decline. In the m i d d l e of the nineteenth century, Britain p r o d u c e d about twothirds of the world's coal, a b o u t half of its iron, and m o r e than 70 percent of its steel; indeed over 40 percent of the entire world output of t r a de d m a n u f a c t u r e d g o o d s was p r o d u c e d within the British Isles at that time. Half the world's industrial production was then Britishowned, but by 1870 the figure had sunk to 32 percent, and by 1910,

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9

to 15 p e r c e n t . In newer a n d increasingly more important industries, such as chemicals and machine-tools, G e r m a n y took the lead. E v e n Britain's pre-eminent position in world finance—in 1914 she held 41 percent of g r o s s international i n v e s t m e n t — w a s a facet of decline; British investors preferred to place their money in dynamic economies in the A m e r i c a s and elsewhere a b r o a d . Military factors were also involved. T h e development of railroads radically altered the strategic balance between land power and sea power to the detriment of the latter. Sir Halford M a c k i n d e r , the prophet of geopolitics, underlined the realities of a new situation in which enemy railroad trains would speed troops and munitions directly to their destination by the straight line which constitutes the shortest distance between two points, while the British navy would sail slowly a r o u n d the circumference of a continent and arrive too late. T h e railroad network of the G e r m a n E m p i r e m a d e the K a i s e r ' s realm the m o s t a d v a n c e d military power in the world, and Britain's precarious naval s u p r e m a c y began to seem less relevant than it had been. 10

Walter B a g e h o t , editor of the influential L o n d o n m a g a z i n e , The Economist, drew the conclusion that, b e c a u s e of G e r m a n y , R u s s i a n expansion no longer needed to be feared: " . . . the old idea that R u s s i a is already so great a power that E u r o p e needs to be afraid of her . . . belongs t o the p r e - G e r m a n i c a g e . " Russia's disastrous defeat by J a p a n ( 1 9 0 4 — 5 ) , followed by revolutionary u p r i s i n g s in St P e t e r s b u r g and throughout the country in 1905, s u g g e s t e d that, in any event, the C z a r ' s a r m i e s were no longer strong enough to remain a cause for concern. 11

T h e C o n s e r v a t i v e g o v e r n m e n t o f A r t h u r J a m e s Balfour (1902—5) nonetheless continued to p u r s u e the old rivalry as well as the new one, allying Britain not only with J a p a n against R u s s i a , but also with F r a n c e against G e r m a n y . B u t S i r E d w a r d G r e y , F o r e i g n S e c retary in the successor L i b e r a l administration of Henry C a m p b e l l B a n n e r m a n (1905 — 8 ) , pictured the two policies as contradictory. " R u s s i a was the ally of F r a n c e , " he wrote, "we could not p u r s u e at one and the s a m e time a policy of agreement with F r a n c e and a policy of counteralliances against R u s s i a . " 1 2

G r e y therefore negotiated a treaty with R u s s i a , executed in 1907, that reconciled the differences between the two countries in A s i a . T i b e t was neutralized; R u s s i a gave up her interest in Afghanistan, and left control of that country's foreign policy in Britain's h a n d s ; and Persia was divided into a R u s s i a n zone, a neutral zone, and a British zone. T h e G r e a t G a m e had seemingly been b r o u g h t to an end. It could have been anticipated that the settlement of 1907 would arouse fears in Constantinople that Britain would no longer protect

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T u r k e y against R u s s i a . A P a l m e r s t o n or a S t r a t f o r d C a n n i n g might have allayed such fears, but neither S i r E d w a r d G r e y nor his a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e took the trouble to do s o .

VI T h e r e was an intellectual time lag between L o n d o n and the o u t p o s t s of e m p i r e . G r e y , A s q u i t h , and their L i b e r a l colleagues saw Britain's traditional rivals, F r a n c e and R u s s i a , as British friends and allies in the post-Victorian a g e . But British officers, agents, a n d civil servants stationed along the great arc that s w u n g from E g y p t and the S u d a n to India failed in m a n y cases to a d o p t the new outlook. H a v i n g spent a lifetime countering R u s s i a n and F r e n c h intrigues in the M i d d l e E a s t , they continued to regard R u s s i a and F r a n c e as their country's enemies. E v e n t s in 1914 and the s u c c e e d i n g years were to b r i n g their Victorian political views back into unexpected p r o m i n e n c e . In one respect officers in the field and ministers in L o n d o n were in a g r e e m e n t : both shared the a s s u m p t i o n that what remained of the independent M i d d l e E a s t would eventually fall under E u r o p e a n influence and g u i d a n c e . A s q u i t h and G r e y had no desire for Britain to e x p a n d further into the M i d d l e E a s t , while junior British officers in C a i r o and K h a r t o u m harbored d e s i g n s on the A r a b - s p e a k i n g provinces to their east. Both g r o u p s believed, however, that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the M i d d l e E a s t would collapse one day and that one or m o r e of the E u r o p e a n powers would have to pick up the pieces. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n — t h a t when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e d i s a p p e a r e d , E u r o p e would have to take its p l a c e — p r o v e d to be one of those m o t o r s that drive history.

3 T H E M I D D L E EAST BEFORE T H E WAR i F o r d e c a d e s and indeed centuries before the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the native r e g i m e s of the M i d d l e E a s t had been, in every sense, losing g r o u n d to E u r o p e . T h e khanates of Central Asia, including K h i v a and B u k h a r a , had fallen to R u s s i a , as had portions of the Persian E m p i r e . T h e A r a b s h e i k h d o m s along the Gulf coast route from S u e z to I n d i a had been brought under British sway; and C y p r u s a n d E g y p t , though formally still attached to T u r k e y , were in fact occupied a n d administered by Britain. T h e A n g l o - R u s s i a n A g r e e m e n t of 1907 b r o u g h t Afghanistan into the British s p h e r e , and divided most of Persia between Britain and R u s s i a . In the M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t , only the O t t o m a n E m p i r e effectively retained its i n d e p e n d e n c e — t h o u g h precariously, as its frontiers c a m e under p r e s s u r e . I n d e e d , the still-independent T u r k i s h S u l t a n a t e looked out of place in the m o d e r n world. L i k e a ruined temple of classical antiquity, with s o m e of its shattered c o l u m n s still erect and visible to tourists s u c h as those a b o a r d the Enchantress, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was a structure that had survived the bygone era to which it belonged. It was a relic of invasions from the east a millennium a g o : beginning a r o u n d AD 1,000, waves of n o m a d horsemen s t r e a m e d forth from the s t e p p e s and deserts of central and northeast A s i a , c o n q u e r i n g the peoples and lands in their path as they rode west. Pagan or animist in religious belief, and speaking one or other of the Mongolian or T u r k i s h languages, they carved out a variety of principalities and k i n g d o m s for themselves, a m o n g them the e m p i r e s of G e n g h i s K h a n a n d T a m e r l a n e . T h e O t t o m a n (or O s m a n l i ) E m p i r e , founded by T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g horsemen who had converted to I s l a m , was another such e m p i r e ; it took its n a m e from O s m a n , a b o r d e r l a n d ghazi (warrior for the M o s l e m faith) born in the thirteenth century, who c a m p a i g n e d on the outskirts of the E a s t e r n R o m a n (or Byzantine) E m p i r e in Anatolia.

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In the fifteenth century O s m a n ' s s u c c e s s o r s c o n q u e r e d and replaced the Byzantine E m p i r e . R i d i n g on to new c o n q u e s t s , the O t t o m a n T u r k s e x p a n d e d in all directions: north to the C r i m e a , east to B a g h d a d and B a s r a , south to the coasts of A r a b i a and the Gulf, west to E g y p t and N o r t h A f r i c a — a n d into E u r o p e . At its peak, in the sixteenth century, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e included most of the M i d d l e E a s t , N o r t h Africa, and what are now the Balkan countries of E u r o p e — G r e e c e , Y u g o s l a v i a , A l b a n i a , R u m a n i a , and B u l g a r i a — a s well as m u c h of H u n g a r y . It stretched from the Persian G u l f to the river D a n u b e ; its a r m i e s s t o p p e d only at the g a t e s of Vienna. Its population was estimated at between thirty and fifty million at a time when E n g l a n d ' s population was p e r h a p s four million; and it ruled more than twenty nationalities. 1

T h e O t t o m a n s never entirely outgrew their origins as a m a r a u d i n g war b a n d . T h e y enriched themselves by c a p t u r i n g wealth and slaves; the slaves, conscripted into the O t t o m a n ranks, rose to replace the c o m m a n d e r s who retired, and went on to c a p t u r e wealth and slaves in their turn. I n v a d i n g new territories was the only path they knew to economic g r o w t h . In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the c o n q u e s t s turned into defeats and retreats, the d y n a m i c of O t t o m a n existence was lost; the T u r k s had m a s t e r e d the arts of war but not those of g o v e r n m e n t . O t t o m a n leaders in the nineteenth century attempted p r o g r a m s of sweeping reform. T h e i r g o a l s were the centralization of g o v e r n m e n t ; the establishment of an executive branch under the S u l t a n ' s chief minister, the G r a n d Vizier; the rationalization of taxation and conscription; the establishment of constitutional g u a r a n t e e s ; the founding of secular public schools offering technical, vocational, and other training; and the like. A s t a r t — b u t not m u c h m o r e — w a s m a d e along these lines. M o s t of the reforms took place only on p a p e r ; and as an anachronism in the m o d e r n world, the ramshackle O t t o m a n r e g i m e s e e m e d d o o m e d to d i s a p p e a r . T h e e m p i r e was incoherent. Its O t t o m a n rulers were not an ethnic g r o u p ; though they s p o k e T u r k i s h , m a n y were descendants of onceChristian slaves from Balkan E u r o p e and elsewhere. T h e empire's s u b j e c t s (a wide variety of p e o p l e s , speaking T u r k i s h , S e m i t i c , K u r d i s h , S l a v i c , A r m e n i a n , G r e e k , and other languages) had little in c o m m o n with, and in m a n y cases little love for, one another. T h o u g h E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s later were to generalize a b o u t , for e x a m p l e , " A r a b s , " in fact E g y p t i a n s and A r a b i a n s , S v r i a n s and Iraqis were peoples of different history, ethnic b a c k g r o u n d , and outlook. T h e multinational, multilingual empire was a mosaic of peoples who did not m i x ; in the towns, A r m e n i a n s , G r e e k s , J e w s , and others each lived in their own separate q u a r t e r s . Religion had s o m e sort of unifying effect, for the empire was a

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t h e o c r a c y — a M o s l e m rather than a T u r k i s h s t a t e — a n d most of its s u b j e c t s were M o s l e m s . T h e O t t o m a n S u l t a n was regarded a s caliph (temporal and spiritual s u c c e s s o r to the Prophet, M o h a m m e d ) by the majority g r o u p within I s l a m , the S u n n i s . B u t a m o n g others of the seventy-one sects of I s l a m , especially the n u m e r o u s Shi'ites, there was doctrinal opposition to the Sultan's S u n n i faith and to his claims to the caliphate. A n d for those who were not M o s l e m ( p e r h a p s 25 percent of the population at the beginning of the twentieth c e n t u r y ) , but G r e e k O r t h o d o x , R o m a n C a t h o l i c , A r m e n i a n Catholic, A r m e n i a n G r e g o r i a n , J e w i s h , Protestant, M a r o n i t e , S a m a r i t a n , Nestorian Christian, S y r i a n U n i t e d O r t h o d o x , M o n o p h y s i t e , or any one of a n u m b e r of others, religion was a divisive rather than a unifying political factor. T h e extent to which religion g o v e r n e d everyday life in the M i d d l e E a s t was s o m e t h i n g that E u r o p e a n visitors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries found r e m a r k a b l e ; for religion had played no such role in E u r o p e for centuries. I n d e e d , E u r o p e a n s visited the M i d d l e E a s t largely to see the past. T h e y c a m e to see Biblical sites, or excavated w o n d e r s of the ancient world, or n o m a d s who lived as they had in the time of A b r a h a m . T h e Porte, too, a p p e a r e d to live in the p a s t . O t t o m a n officials continued to pretend, for e x a m p l e , that Bulgaria formed part of the e m p i r e long after losing control of that territory in 1878, a n d counted E g y p t i a n s as a m o n g its s u b j e c t s even after Britain occupied E g y p t in 1882. F o r this and other reasons, O t t o m a n statistics were unreliable, and it is only in the roughest sense that we can say that the empire's population in the early twentieth century may have been a b o u t twenty to twenty-five million, in a t e r r i t o r y — d e p e n d i n g on how it is d e f i n e d — a b o u t six times the size of T e x a s . It c o m p r i s e d , broadly speaking, most of the A r a b i a n peninsula and what is now T u r k e y , Israel, L e b a n o n , J o r d a n , S y r i a , and I r a q . Until the early twentieth century, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was for most of the time under the absolute personal rule of the S u l t a n . In at least one respect he was quite unlike a E u r o p e a n m o n a r c h : as the son of a w o m a n of the h a r e m , he was always half-slave by birth. U n d e r his rule civil, military, and Holy L a w administrations could be discerned in an e m p i r e carefully divided into provinces and cantons. B u t the a p p e a r a n c e of orderly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — i n d e e d of effective administration of any s o r t — w a s chimerical. As G e r t r u d e Bell, an experienced English traveler in M i d d l e E a s t e r n lands, was later to write, " N o country which turned to the eye of the world an a p p e a r ance of established rule and centralized G o v e r n m e n t was, to a greater extent than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a land of m a k e - b e l i e v e . " T h e r e were army g a r r i s o n s , it is t r u e , scattered about the e m p i r e , but otherwise power was diffuse and the centralized authority was m o r e 2

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myth than reality. G e r t r u d e Bell, in the course of her travels, found that outside the towns, O t t o m a n administration vanished a n d the local sheikh or h e a d m a n ruled instead. T h e r e were districts, too, where b r i g a n d s r o a m e d a t will. T h e rickety T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t was even incapable of collecting its own t a x e s , the m o s t b a s i c act of imperial administration. On the eve of the F i r s t World War, only a b o u t 5 percent of taxes w a s collected by the g o v e r n m e n t ; the other 95 percent w a s collected by i n d e p e n d e n t tax f a r m e r s . 3

F o r e i g n countries exercised v a r y i n g d e g r e e s of influence a n d control within the e m p i r e . It w a s not only that E g y p t a n d C y p r u s were in fact g o v e r n e d by Britain, which had occupied them in the late nineteenth century; a n d that the s h e i k h d o m s along the G u l f coast were u n d e r British control. L e b a n o n , a s e p a r a t e canton u n d e r arr a n g e m e n t s established in 1864, w a s g o v e r n e d by a Christian military governor directly serving u n d e r the Porte which, however, w a s o b liged to act only in consultation with six E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . R u s s i a a n d F r a n c e reserved to t h e m s e l v e s the right to protect, respectively, the O r t h o d o x a n d Catholic p o p u l a t i o n s of the e m p i r e ; a n d other p o w e r s also asserted a right to intervene in T u r k i s h affairs on behalf of the g r o u p s they s p o n s o r e d . What w a s m o r e than a little unreal, then, w a s the claim that the S u l t a n a n d his g o v e r n m e n t ruled their d o m a i n s in the s e n s e in which E u r o p e a n s u n d e r s t o o d g o v e r n m e n t a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . What was real in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e t e n d e d to be local: a t r i b e , a clan, a sect, or a town was the t r u e political unit to which loyalties a d h e r e d . T h i s c o n f u s e d E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s , w h o s e m o d e r n notions of citizenship a n d nationality were i n a p p l i c a b l e to the crazy quilt of O t t o m a n politics. E u r o p e a n s a s s u m e d that eventually they themselves would take control of the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s a n d organize them on a m o r e rational b a s i s . In the early years of the twentieth century it w a s reasonable to believe that the d a y s of T u r k i s h dominion were numbered. By 1914 the m u c h - d i m i n i s h e d O t t o m a n E m p i r e no longer ruled N o r t h Africa or H u n g a r y or m o s t of southeastern E u r o p e . It had been in a retreat since the eighteenth century that finally looked like a rout. F o r d e c a d e s , in the O t t o m a n a r m y a n d in the schools, discontented m e n had told one another in the course of clandestine m e e t i n g s that the e m p i r e h a d to be rapidly c h a n g e d to meet the intellectual, industrial, a n d military challenges of m o d e r n E u r o p e . S t i m u l a t e d but c o n f u s e d by the nationalism that had b e c o m e E u r o p e ' s c r e e d , intellectuals a m o n g s t the diverse T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g a n d A r a b i c speaking p e o p l e s of the e m p i r e s o u g h t to discover or to forge s o m e sense of their own political identity. In the final years before the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War, o b s c u r e but a m b i t i o u s new m e n took power in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ,

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relegating the S u l t a n to a figurehead position. T h e new m e n , leaders of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, were at once the result a n d the c a u s e of ferment in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the O t t o m a n capital, as they tried to meet the challenge of b r i n g i n g T u r k e y ' s e m p i r e into the twentieth century before the m o d e r n world h a d t i m e to destroy it.

II C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — t h e city originally called B y z a n t i u m a n d today known as I s t a n b u l — w a s for m o r e than eleven centuries the capital of the R o m a n E m p i r e in the E a s t , a n d then for m o r e than four centuries the capital of its s u c c e s s o r , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . L i k e R o m e , C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s built on seven hills a n d , like R o m e , it was an eternal city: its strategic location g a v e it an a b i d i n g i m p o r t a n c e in the world's affairs. C o n s t a n t i n o p l e is a collection of towns located principally on the E u r o p e a n side of the great waterway that links the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to the Black S e a , at a point where the channel s e p a r a t i n g E u r o p e from A s i a n a r r o w s to w i d t h s of as little as a half-mile. T h e site is a natural fortress, difficult to c o n q u e r or even to attack. A b a y s o m e four miles long, known as the G o l d e n H o r n , f o r m s a magnificent natural harbor that p r o v i d e s shelter a n d protection for a defending fleet. In 1914 the p o p u l a t i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e stood at a b o u t a million. It w a s a c o s m o p o l i t a n a n d polyglot p o p u l a t i o n : most residents of the city were M o s l e m , G r e e k , or A r m e n i a n , b u t there w a s also a considerable colony of E u r o p e a n a n d other foreigners. A E u r o p e a n influence w a s evident in the architectural style of the newer b u i l d i n g s , in the style of d r e s s , a n d in s u c h innovations as street lights. R u d i m e n t a r y modernization h a d only just b e g u n . In 1912 electric lighting h a d been i n t r o d u c e d into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e for the first t i m e . A start h a d been m a d e toward c o n s t r u c t i n g a d r a i n a g e s y s t e m for the city's narrow, filthy s t r e e t s ; a n d the p a c k s of wild d o g s that for centuries had patrolled the city were, by decision of the municipal council, s h i p p e d to a waterless island to d i e . S o m e work h a d been done on the p a v i n g of r o a d s , b u t not m u c h ; m o s t streets still t u r n e d to m u d in the frequent r a i n s t o r m s , or c o u g h e d dry d u s t into the air as winds blew t h r o u g h the city. 4

5

Violent alternating north a n d south w i n d s d o m i n a t e d the city's climate, b r i n g i n g s u d d e n c h a n g e s of e x t r e m e heat or cold. T h e political climate, too, w a s s u b j e c t to s u d d e n and e x t r e m e c h a n g e s at the beginning of the twentieth century; and for m a n y years prior to 1914 British o b s e r v e r s had shown that they had no idea where the winds were c o m i n g from or which way they were blowing. Political m a n e u v e r i n g s at the S u b l i m e Porte, the g a t e to the G r a n d Vizier's

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offices from which the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t took its n a m e , were c o n d u c t e d behind a veil of mystery that the British e m b a s s y time a n d again h a d failed to penetrate.

Ill T h e British e m b a s s y , like those of the other G r e a t Powers, was located in Pera, the E u r o p e a n q u a r t e r of the city, which lay to the north of the G o l d e n H o r n . F o r e i g n c o m m u n i t i e s h a d g r o w n up in proximity to their e m b a s s i e s , a n d lived their own lives, separately f r o m that of the city. In P e r a , F r e n c h was the l a n g u a g e of legation parties a n d entertainments; G r e e k , not T u r k i s h , was the l a n g u a g e of the streets. T h r e e theaters offered revues a n d plays i m p o r t e d from Paris. T h e Pera Palace Hotel offered physical facilities c o m p a r a b l e with those available in the palatial hotels of the m a j o r cities of Europe. M o s t E u r o p e a n s s u c c u m b e d to the temptation to live in the isolation of their own enclave. F e w were at home in the narrow, dirty lanes of S t a m b o u l , the old section of the city south of the G o l d e n H o r n , with its walls a n d fortifications c r u m b l i n g into ruin. O n e of the few who felt at ease on either side of the G o l d e n H o r n was an E n g l i s h m a n n a m e d W y n d h a m D e e d e s , who h a d c o m e t o play a n important role in the new Y o u n g T u r k e y administration. D e e d e s was from a county family of K e n t : four centuries of E n g l i s h country gentlemen h a d p r e c e d e d h i m . After E t o n , he took a c o m m i s s i o n in the K i n g ' s O w n Rifles, a n d for twenty-two years thereafter he r e m a i n e d a British officer. (When asked once a b o u t the horrors of the B o e r War, he replied, "Well, anything was better than E t o n . " ) E a r l y in his military career, D e e d e s volunteered to serve in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e , a newly created T u r k i s h police force c o m m a n d e d by E u r o p e a n officers. Its creation was a reform forced u p o n the S u l t a n by the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s , for the old police force h a d b e c o m e indistinguishable from the r o b b e r b a n d s it was s u p p o s e d to s u p p r e s s . D e e d e s a n d his E u r o p e a n colleagues were c o m m i s s i o n e d as officers of the new force while, at the s a m e time, retaining their c o m m i s s i o n s in their respective national armies. 6

As viewed in old p h o t o g r a p h s , D e e d e s looked an oddity in the oriental s u r r o u n d i n g s in which service in the G e n d a r m e r i e placed h i m . S m a l l , painfully thin, a n d light-complexioned, he did not blend into the O t t o m a n l a n d s c a p e . Ascetic a n d deeply Christian, he had little use for sleep, rest, or food. He worked fifteen h o u r s a day, indifferent to comfort a n d careless of d a n g e r ; n o b o d y could have been m o r e unlike the T u r k i s h officers who, if E u r o p e a n accounts were to be believed, were in m a n y cases corrupt a n d cowardly. He

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m a d e a s u c c e s s of his challenging a s s i g n m e n t , a n d won popularity with the T u r k s . D e e d e s was an unknown figure when he entered the G e n d a r m e r i e in 1910. F o u r years later he had achieved s u c h high s t a n d i n g that he was co-opted by the leading figure in the new O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to help run the Ministry of the Interior. By the time of his thirty-first birthday in 1914, D e e d e s , who had learned to speak T u r k i s h fluently, was one of the few E n g l i s h m e n who u n d e r s t o o d T u r k i s h affairs. Y e t his g o v e r n m e n t d i d not m a k e real use of his experience a n d knowle d g e . O n e of the c o n t i n u o u s t h e m e s of the years to c o m e was that D e e d e s was a C a s s a n d r a : his g o v e r n m e n t chose to d i s r e g a r d his warnings and to ignore his accurate analyses of T u r k i s h political motives. T h e minister u n d e r w h o m D e e d e s served i n the O t t o m a n g o v e r n ment in 1914 was M e h m e d T a l a a t . M o s t of what the British government thought it knew at the time a b o u t T a l a a t a n d a b o u t the political party that T a l a a t led w a s e r r o n e o u s ; a n d at least s o m e of it could have been corrected by D e e d e s . B u t the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e believed that it knew the truth a b o u t O t t o m a n politics already, and therefore that it did not have to inquire further.

IV M e h m e d T a l a a t , the Minister of the Interior a n d the leader of the largest faction within the g o v e r n i n g political party, was a figure whom British d i p l o m a t s did not r e g a r d as a gentleman. T h e y believed that he lacked race and b r e e d i n g ; they scornfully reported that he was of g y p s y origin. He had thick black hair, heavy black eyebrows, a hawk-like nose, and what one of the few s y m p a t h e t i c British observers d e s c r i b e d as "a light in his eyes, rarely seen in m e n but s o m e t i m e s in a n i m a l s at d u s k . " 7

T a l a a t was the single m o s t i m p o r t a n t figure in T u r k i s h politics. He was very m u c h a self-made m a n . Little is known of his origins and b a c k g r o u n d except that they were h u m b l e . He b e g a n life as a minor e m p l o y e e of the Post a n d T e l e g r a p h Office a n d is believed to have been a Bektashi, that is, a m e m b e r of the largest of the T u r k i s h D e r v i s h o r d e r s . ( T h e D e r v i s h e s were M o s l e m religious b r o t h e r h o o d s . ) He is believed to have joined a F r e e m a s o n lodge, is known to have organized a secret political society, and to have been i m p r i s o n e d for a time for his u n d e r g r o u n d activities. J o i n i n g a secret organization was a c o m m o n activity in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o f T a l a a t ' s youth. U n d e r the autocratic S u l t a n A b d u l H a m i d , who reigned f r o m 1876 to 1909, open political activity was d a n g e r o u s .

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T h e S u l t a n , who s u s p e n d e d the constitution a n d d i s b a n d e d Parliament, was intolerant of dissent a n d e m p l o y e d a secret police force to deal with it. T h e political life of the e m p i r e was driven u n d e r g r o u n d , where secret societies proliferated. T h e earliest ones took their inspiration f r o m nineteenth-century E u r o p e a n revolutionary g r o u p s , especially the Italian carbonari, a n d organized themselves into cells of a handful of m e m b e r s , only one of w h o m , typically, would know a m e m b e r of another cell. M a n y of t h e m , including the forerunner of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, were f o u n d e d by university and military a c a d e m y s t u d e n t s . T h e a r m y , too, was an especially fertile b r e e d i n g g r o u n d for s u c h societies; its younger m e m b e r s were s h a m e d by their empire's d i s a s t r o u s s h o w i n g on one battlefield after another. A b d u l H a m i d ' s police forces s u c c e e d e d in s m a s h i n g the secret societies in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d elsewhere. B e y o n d their g r a s p , however, was S a l o n i k a , the b u s t l i n g a n d u n - T u r k i s h M a c e d o n i a n port in what is now G r e e c e . S a l o n i k a is where a n u m b e r of the secret societies established their h e a d q u a r t e r s , developing close relationships with m e m b e r s of the O t t o m a n T h i r d A r m y , which had its headq u a r t e r s there. T h e disorder a n d disintegration with which the T h i r d A r m y had to deal in M a c e d o n i a — a frontier region of the e m p i r e — i n itself was a formative experience that helped the secret societies to enlist recruits within the ranks of the a r m y . T a l a a t , who lived a n d worked in S a l o n i k a , was one of the founders of one s u c h secret society which eventually b e c a m e the principal faction within a m e r g e d g r o u p that called itself the C o m m i t t e e of U n i o n a n d P r o g r e s s — t h e C . U . P . as it will be called hereafter. It was known, too, as the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party, and later its m e m b e r s were called the Y o u n g T u r k s . U p o n joining it, initiates swore an oath on the K o r a n a n d a g u n . D j e m a l Bey, a staff officer who later played a major role in M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics, was T a l a a t ' s initial recruit a m o n g the leadership of the T h i r d A r m y . O n e day in 1908 a junior a r m y officer n a m e d E n v e r , who was stationed in S a l o n i k a a n d who had also joined T a l a a t ' s g r o u p , was ordered to return to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Afraid that his m e m b e r s h i p had been discovered by the secret police, he s l i p p e d out of S a l o n i k a a n d took to the hills, to which another Y o u n g T u r k e y a r m y colleague had already e s c a p e d . T h e n another a r m y officer followed his e x a m p l e , taking t r o o p s a n d a m m u n i t i o n with h i m . T h e S u l t a n sent t r o o p s against t h e m , b u t the troops joined the rebels. T h e r e was a s p o n taneous c o m b u s t i o n of a bloodless revolution in S a l o n i k a : the C . U . P . took control. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s seized control o f the T e l e g r a p h Office—it m a y have been no coincidence that T a l a a t was one of its officials—and established contact with C . U . P . cells that honeyc o m b e d the a r m y a n d the e m p i r e . When the s m o k e had cleared the constitution had been restored, parliamentary and party politics had

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r e s u m e d , a n d the following year the S u l t a n a b d i c a t e d in favor of his brother. T h e old politicians took office, while the Y o u n g T u r k s r e m a i n e d in the . b a c k g r o u n d . B u t the C . U . P . had b e c o m e a force with which to reckon, a n d not merely b e c a u s e of its s t r o n g representation in the officer c o r p s of the a r m y . In a d i s o r g a n i z e d society, the strength of the C . U . P . was that it had b r a n c h e s everywhere, criss-crossing the empire. T h e leaders of the successful u p r i s i n g at first enjoyed a g o o d enough p r e s s in the western world so that in c o m m o n parlance " Y o u n g T u r k s " c a m e to m e a n any b r a s h g r o u p of y o u n g people with d y n a m i c ideas who rebel against an o u t m o d e d leadership. T h e y were viewed with s y m p a t h y by the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n , but were disliked a n d d i s d a i n e d in the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e a m b a s s a d o r , S i r G e r a r d L o w t h e r , s e e m s t o have fallen completely u n d e r the influence of G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e , his F i r s t D r a g o m a n , or official interpreter a n d adviser on oriental affairs; a n d F i t z M a u r i c e detested the C . U . P . almost f r o m the very outset. F i t z M a u r i c e ' s interpretation of the events of 1908 was colored by the fact that they had o c c u r r e d in S a l o n i k a , a b o u t half of whose 130,000 inhabitants were either J e w s or D u n m e h s ( m e m b e r s of a J e w i s h sect that had converted to I s l a m in the seventeenth c e n t u r y ) . S a l o n i k a was also a city in which there were F r e e m a s o n l o d g e s . E m m a n u e l C a r a s s o (or K a r a s u ) , a J e w i s h lawyer, h a d f o u n d e d an Italian F r e e m a s o n lodge in which he apparently allowed T a l a a t ' s secret society to meet when it was in h i d i n g from the Sultan's secret police. F i t z M a u r i c e concluded that the C . U . P . was a Latin-influenced international J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n c o n s p i r a c y ; and L o w t h e r duly reported this to the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n . L o w t h e r referred to the C . U . P . a s "the J e w C o m m i t t e e o f U n i o n and P r o g r e s s . " 8

F i t z M a u r i c e later c o n d u c t e d an investigation of the C . U . P . , the results of which were reflected in a confidential report sent by Lowther u n d e r his own n a m e on 29 M a y 1910, to the official head of the F o r e i g n Office, S i r C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e . I n his report, L o w t h e r pointed out that "liberie, egalite, fraternite" (liberty, equality, fraternity), words d r a w n f r o m the F r e n c h Revolution, were both the slogan of the Italian F r e e m a s o n s (hence K a r a s u ' s lodge) a n d of the Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t . T h e Y o u n g T u r k s , h e claimed, were "imitating the F r e n c h Revolution a n d its g o d l e s s a n d levelling m e t h o d s . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t s of the F r e n c h Revolution led to a n t a g o n i s m between E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e , a n d should the T u r k i s h revolution develop o n the s a m e lines, it m a y find itself similarly in a n t a g o n i s m with British ideals a n d i n t e r e s t s . " 9

In his detailed report of m o r e than 5,000 w o r d s , L o w t h e r alleged that J e w s had taken over a F r e e m a s o n network ( " T h e Oriental J e w

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is an a d e p t at m a n i p u l a t i n g occult forces . . . " ) a n d t h r o u g h it h a d taken control of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . A m o n g s t the ringleaders of the J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n c o n s p i r a c y , a c c o r d i n g to L o w t h e r , was the U . S . a m b a s s a d o r t o T u r k e y , O s c a r S t r a u s , whose b r o t h e r s owned the N e w Y o r k d e p a r t m e n t stores M a c y ' s and A b r a h a m & S t r a u s . T h e d a n g e r t o E n g l a n d , wrote L o w t h e r , i s that " T h e J e w hates R u s s i a a n d its G o v e r n m e n t , a n d the fact that E n g l a n d is now friendly to R u s s i a has the effect of m a k i n g the J e w to a certain extent antiBritish . . . a consideration to which the G e r m a n s are, I think, a l i v e . " I n d e e d , L o w t h e r c o n c l u d e d , "I have reason to believe that my G e r m a n colleague is aware of the extent to which J e w i s h a n d L a t i n M a s o n r y inspires the C o m m i t t e e , a n d that he has confidentially kept his G o v e r n m e n t informed as to this feature of Y o u n g T u r k e y politics." 10

11

However, when the 2 8 8 - m a n O t t o m a n Parliament was elected in 1908, only four J e w s were elected to it, a n d when the C . U . P . created a Central C o m m i t t e e in 1909, K a r a s u was not elected to m e m b e r ship on it, nor did he ever rise to a leadership position either in the party or in the g o v e r n m e n t ; he was never the influential figure that foreigners s u p p o s e d h i m t o b e . A s d e p u t i e s i n Parliament, K a r a s u a n d the three other J e w s bent over b a c k w a r d s to p r o v e that they were T u r k s f i r s t and J e w s only s e c o n d ; indeed, they s u p p o r t e d the C . U . P . ' s m e a s u r e s against Zionist settlement in Palestine. L o w t h e r explained this away by c l a i m i n g that the new goal of Z i o n i s m was to create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d not in Palestine but instead in a section of what is now I r a q . T h e F i t z M a u r i c e and L o w t h e r report won wide acceptance a m o n g British officials a n d led the British g o v e r n m e n t into at least three p r o f o u n d m i s c o n c e p t i o n s that h a d important c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e first of these concerned the inner workings of the C . U . P . F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r misled their g o v e r n m e n t into believing that the Y o u n g T u r k s were controlled by two m e n . T a l a a t a n d D j a v i d ("who is a C r y p t o - J e w " ) were, a c c o r d i n g to F i t z M a u r i c e and L o w t h e r , "the official manifestations of the occult power of the C o m m i t t e e . T h e y are the only m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t who really count, a n d are also the apex of F r e e m a s o n r y in T u r k e y . " In fact the C . U . P . was split into factions—factions with which the British g o v e r n m e n t c o u l d have intrigued, had it known that they e x i s t e d . It was an ironic coincidence that D j a v i d , w h o m F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r feared as a C r y p t o - J e w , was the leader of the pro-British faction; but F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r did not know that. 1 2

13

A second misconception was that a g r o u p of J e w s wielded political K a r a s u , however, did attempt at various times to reconcile the aims of Zionism with those of C . U . P . nationalism.

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power in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — o r indeed anywhere else in the world at that t i m e . A few y e a r s later F i t z M a u r i c e drew an o b v i o u s conclusion from his m i s c o n c e p t i o n : that the world war (in which Britain was by then e n g a g e d ) could be won by b u y i n g the s u p p o r t of this powerful g r o u p . I t s s u p p o r t c o u l d b e b o u g h t , h e d e c i d e d , b y p r o m i s ing to s u p p o r t the establishment of a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine (he h a d by then determined that the Zionist m o v e m e n t desired to return to Z i o n , not to I r a q ) . T h i s reasoning helped to p e r s u a d e the F o r e i g n Office that it o u g h t to p l e d g e British s u p p o r t to the Zionist p r o g r a m — w h i c h it eventually d i d in 1917. F i t z M a u r i c e ' s misinformation led to yet another conclusion with important c o n s e q u e n c e s : that the Y o u n g T u r k leaders were foreigners, not T u r k s , a n d that they served foreign interests. T h i s was the o p p o s i t e of the truth, a n d led British o b s e r v e r s to miscalculate what the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d d o . I n fact, a s even F i t z M a u r i c e a n d L o w t h e r saw, a principal failing of the C . U . P . was its T u r k i s h c h a u v i n i s m . I t d i s c r i m i n a t e d against J e w s , A r m e n i a n s , G r e e k s , A r a b s , a n d others. Its s t r e n g t h was that it was o p p o s e d to all foreign interests; its a n t i - E u r o p e a n bias attracted wide p o p u l a r support. T h e British government never learned that Lowther and FitzMaurice had s u p p l i e d it with a w a r p e d view of O t t o m a n politics. J o h n B u c h a n , who b e c a m e w a r t i m e D i r e c t o r of Information for the British g o v e r n m e n t , d e s c r i b e d the C . U . P . leaders as "a collection of J e w s a n d g i p s i e s , " p i c t u r e d the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t as the tool of world J e w r y , a n d called E n v e r P a s h a "a Polish a d v e n t u r e r " — c o n f u s i n g him with another T u r k i s h officer whose n a m e was similar a n d whose father was Polish t h o u g h not J e w i s h . 1 4

V T h e years after 1908 p r o v e d to be a disaster for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , in a war against Italy a n d in another against a Balkan coalition; a n d , in 1913, it w a s in the p r o c e s s of losing a s e c o n d Balkan War when the C . U . P . s u d d e n l y seized control o f the g o v e r n m e n t . Y o u n g E n v e r — the s a m e officer who h a d precipitated the events of 1908 in S a l o n i k a — i m p e t u o u s l y led a raid on the S u b l i m e Porte; his raiding party killed the Minister of War. E n v e r a n d his friends took office; he was p r o m o t e d to a field c o m m a n d in which he covered himself with glory, a n d on 4 J a n u a r y 1914, he took over the War M i n i s t r y for himself. T h i r t y - o n e years old, E n v e r m a r r i e d the niece of the S u l t a n , m o v e d into a p a l a c e , a n d b e c a m e the center of attention in T u r k i s h politics. D j e m a l P a s h a b e c a m e Military G o v e r n o r of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d

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in that position consolidated the C . U . P . ' s hold on the seat of government. Halil Bey, President of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s , also a s s u m e d an important role, as did M e h m e d D j a v i d , an economics teacher who was a p p o i n t e d Minister o f F i n a n c e . T a l a a t , the principal C . U . P . leader, b e c a m e Minister of the Interior and the real leader of the g o v e r n m e n t . T h e courtly Prince S a i d H a l i m provided respectability as G r a n d Vizier and F o r e i g n Minister. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t sent out a new a m b a s s a d o r , S i r L o u i s Mallet, who was s y m p a t h e t i c t o the Y o u n g T u r k s . H e too, however, was uninformed a b o u t what was h a p p e n i n g in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Where his p r e d e c e s s o r had detected J e w i s h a n d G e r m a n control, Mallet sent d i s p a t c h e s to L o n d o n that radiated a m i s l e a d i n g o p t i m i s m about the Porte's intentions. L i k e the previous a m b a s s a d o r , Mallet failed to u n d e r s t a n d what the C . U . P . leaders believed T u r k e y ' s interests to be. In L o n d o n the C a b i n e t persisted in accepting L o w t h e r a n d F i t z M a u r i c e ' s mistaken notion that the C . U . P . was a monolithic b o d y . L o w t h e r a n d F i t z M a u r i c e had reported that it was controlled by T a l a a t and D j a v i d , while a c c o r d i n g to later reports—followed by most historians—it was ruled by a dictatorial triumvirate of E n v e r , T a l a a t , a n d D j e m a l . In fact, as the G e r m a n archives now show, power was wielded by the C . U . P . ' s Central C o m m i t t e e of about forty m e m b e r s , and especially by its general directorate of a b o u t twelve m e m b e r s who functioned as a sort of politburo, in which personal rivalries a b o u n d e d . D e c i s i o n s of the Central C o m m i t t e e were reflected in the positions taken by party m e m b e r s in the C a b i n e t and in the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s . The faction nature nature

C . U . P . e n c o m p a s s e d a variety of opinions, and was rife with a n d intrigue. T h e r e was, however, a c o n s e n s u s about the of the threat that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e faced a n d about the of the policy that ought to be a d o p t e d to counter it.

4 T H E YOUNG T U R K S U R G E N T L Y S E E K AN A L L Y i T h e Y o u n g T u r k outlook o n current affairs was colored b y the t r a u m a of continuing territorial disintegration. T h e provinces of Bosnia a n d H e r c e g o v i n a (in what is now Y u g o s l a v i a ) , nominally still T u r k i s h , were formally annexed by A u s t r o - H u n g a r y in 1 9 0 8 — a troubling m o v e that p r o v i d e d the b a c k g r o u n d in 1914 to the assassination of the A r c h d u k e F r a n c i s F e r d i n a n d and the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War. Italy, a latecomer to imperial e x p a n s i o n , m a d e no secret of her d e s i g n s on O t t o m a n territory a n d , on a flimsy pretext, attacked T u r k e y and in 1911 — 12 c a p t u r e d the coast of what is now L i b y a , as well as R h o d e s a n d other islands off the T u r k i s h coast. At a b o u t the s a m e time, Albania revolted against O t t o m a n rule, raising a serious question as to whether the e m p i r e could hold the loyalties of its n o n - T u r k i s h s u b j e c t s . Meanwhile, in the F i r s t Balkan War (1912—13) the Balkan L e a g u e ( B u l g a r i a , G r e e c e , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d S e r b i a ) defeated T u r k e y and annexed almost all of the territory the O t t o m a n E m p i r e still held in E u r o p e . In the S e c o n d Balkan War ( 1 9 1 3 ) , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a n a g e d to regain s o m e territory in T h r a c e , immediately across the water from Asiatic T u r k e y ; b u t that looked to offer merely a brief respite in the empire's continuing disintegration. In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the b a n d of Y o u n g T u r k a d v e n t u r e r s who had seized power and who ruled the e m p i r e as the S u l t a n ' s ministers, feared that their d o m a i n s were in mortal d a n g e r and that the E u r o p e a n p r e d a t o r s were closing in for the kill. Only a short time before, the nations of E u r o p e had divided up the African continent a m o n g themselves. S o m e of them were now hungry for new c o n q u e s t s . T h e r e were not many directions in which they could look. M u c h of the surface of the globe was already taken: a quarter by the British E m p i r e a n d a sixth by the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . T h e western h e m i s p h e r e fell within the a m b i t of the M o n r o e Doctrine and thus was shielded by the U n i t e d S t a t e s . T h e M i d d l e E a s t was

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the only vulnerable region left. T h e r e were r u m o r s of F r e n c h a m bitions in S y r i a ; of Italian a n d R u s s i a n d e s i g n s further north; a n d of rival G r e e k , B u l g a r i a n , a n d A u s t r i a n claims to the west. B e y o n d the eampfires, the C . U . P . leaders c o u l d sense the a n i m a l s in the dark m o v i n g in for the attack.

II T h e C . U . P . leadership w a s convinced that its p r o g r a m o f freeing the empire from E u r o p e a n c o n t r o l — a p r o g r a m that British statesmen, a m o n g others, either did not know a b o u t or did not u n d e r s t a n d — w o u l d precipitate the attack. A m b i v a l e n t in its attitude t o w a r d E u r o p e — s c o r n i n g it as n o n - M o s l e m , while a d m i r i n g its m o d e r n ways and a c h i e v e m e n t s — t h e C . U . P . intended to throw off the shackles of E u r o p e i n order t o imitate E u r o p e m o r e closely. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s s e e m to have had no coherent plan for b r i n g i n g E u r o p e a n economic domination to an end, but they w a n t e d , s o m e h o w , to do it. A vital item on the C.LT.P.'s internal a g e n d a was the modernization of transport and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . E u r o p e a n interests were willing to s u p p l y the networks and s y s t e m s which the O t t o m a n E m p i r e lacked, but of course wanted to own them, preferably on the basis of exclusive concessions. T h e C . U . P . leaders, like other O t t o m a n leaders before them, wanted the E u r o p e a n technologies to be introduced but were determined to avoid E u r o p e a n ownership or control. D u r i n g the nineteenth century, T u r k e y h a d created her own postal service, even though it coexisted within the e m p i r e alongside postal services maintained for themselves by various E u r o p e a n p o w e r s . R e jecting an offer from a British c o m p a n y , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e also created its own telegraph n e t w o r k . A few telephones were in u s e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e and S m y r n a in 1914; a foreign g r o u p had been given a concession to install a telephone s y s t e m in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1911, but had not m a d e m u c h p r o g r e s s . 1

2

3

T h e c o m i n g of the s t e a m s h i p h a d put O t t o m a n m a r i t i m e traffic largely in the hands of foreign i n t e r e s t s . S u c h as they were, the empire's few railway lines were also in foreign h a n d s . * T h e r e were few roads and still fewer a u t o m o b i l e s to m a k e use of t h e m : 110 in Constantinople and 77 elsewhere by 1914. T h e traditional f o r m of transportation w a s the caravan of c a m e l s , horses, mules, a n d animaldrawn carts—and it could not c o m p e t e against the foreign-owned 4

"It is a measure of the iow degree of development of the Ottoman Empire that in 1914, its 1,900,000 square kilometers had only 5,991 kilometers of railways," all of it single-track. 3

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railroads. T h e usual s p e e d of a m i x e d c a r a v a n was between two a n d three miles an hour, a n d its daily s t a g e w a s only between fifteen and twenty m i l e s . R a i l r o a d s p e e d s were at least ten times greater, and the railroad cost of t r a n s p o r t i n g g o o d s was p e r h a p s only 10 percent of the caravan c o s t . T h e C . U . P . d i l e m m a lay in wanting to switch from caravan to railroad without allowing the e m p i r e to p a s s into the control of the E u r o p e a n s who owned the r a i l r o a d s . E u r o p e a n s already exercised an economic p r e p o n d e r a n c e which the C . U . P . resented b u t could d o nothing a b o u t . T u r k e y was in the u n e q u a l position of b e i n g able to s u p p l y only natural r e s o u r c e s a n d having to i m p o r t her m a n u factured needs. Industrialization was necessary in order to r e d r e s s the b a l a n c e ; but the Porte had no p r o g r a m to achieve it. T h e e m p i r e could s u p p l y only unskilled l a b o r ; as the E u r o p e a n s constructed railroads a n d other types of machinery, they b r o u g h t along E u r o peans to maintain t h e m . T e c h n i c a l training for the local population was what was n e e d e d ; again the Porte h a d no p r o g r a m to p r o v i d e it. 6

7

E u r o p e a n s also shared in the control of what is at the heart of a political entity: its finances. B e c a u s e the Porte h a d defaulted on a public d e b t of m o r e than a t h o u s a n d million dollars in 1875, the S u l t a n was o b l i g e d to issue a decree in 1881 that placed a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt in E u r o p e a n h a n d s . A council was created for the p u r p o s e a n d was given control of almost one-quarter of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s revenues. It wielded exclusive authority over the c u s t o m s duties on s u c h b a s i c items as alcoholic spirits, s t a m p s , salt, and f i s h . T h e S u b l i m e Porte was n o longer master even o f its own T r e a s u r y o r C u s t o m s H o u s e . T h e C . U . P . wanted t o take back control in these areas, t h o u g h it had no refinancing p r o g r a m to p r o p o s e . 8

Bitterly resented by all O t t o m a n leaders were the C a p i t u l a t i o n s , the concessions that p r o v i d e d E u r o p e a n s with a privileged economic position within the e m p i r e a n d which placed them for m a n y p u r p o s e s under the jurisdiction of their own consuls rather than of the O t t o m a n c o u r t s . No T u r k i s h policeman could enter the p r e m i s e s of a E u r o p e a n or A m e r i c a n without the p e r m i s s i o n of the latter's consul. T h e C . U . P . wanted t o cancel these Capitulation privileges. A n o t h e r g r o u n d for C . U . P . resentment was that the E u r o p e a n powers h a d , on occasion, violated O t t o m a n sovereignty in intervening in defense of Christian minorities a n d Christian rights. T h e E u r o p e a n disposition to do so p o s e d a threat to the C . U . P . ' s secret a g e n d a , for the Y o u n g T u r k s p r o p o s e d to assert their power not only against foreigners but also against other g r o u p s inhabiting the e m p i r e . T h i s ran contrary to what they had p l e d g e d in 1908. T h e p u b l i c p r o g r a m of the C . U . P . h a d called for equal rights for all the m a n y

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religious, ethnic, a n d linguistic g r o u p s that resided within the e m p i r e . O n c e in power the C . U . P . s h o w e d the d a r k side of its nationalism by asserting instead the h e g e m o n y of T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g M o s l e m s over all others. T h e T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g a n d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n s of the e m p i r e were roughly e q u a l — e a c h a b o u t 10 million people, or a b o u t 40 percent of the total p o p u l a t i o n apiece—yet in the O t t o m a n C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s there were p e r h a p s 150 T u r k s as against only a b o u t 60 A r a b s . ( T h e figures are not exact b e c a u s e it is not clear in every c a s e who was A r a b a n d who was T u r k . ) T h e r e m a i n i n g 2 0 percent of the population, including the important G r e e k , A r m e n i a n , K u r d i s h , a n d J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s , was discriminated against even m o r e severely than were the A r a b s . A c c o r d i n g to the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 1 9 1 0 — 1 1 ) , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at the time was inhabited by twenty-two different "races", yet "no s u c h thing as an O t t o m a n nation has ever been c r e a t e d . " If ever there were a chance of creating one, the C . U . P . leaders threw it away by excluding 60 percent of the population from its purview. T a l a a t , E n v e r , a n d their colleagues were nationalists without a nation. Within the e m p i r e (as distinct from the s t e p p e s to its e a s t ) , even those who s p o k e T u r k i s h were often of n o n - T u r k i s h origin. Sir M a r k S y k e s , a British M e m b e r of' Parliament who had traveled extensively in A s i a , b e g a n one of his b o o k s by a s k i n g : "How m a n y people realize, when they s p e a k of T u r k e y a n d the T u r k s , that there is no s u c h place a n d no s u c h p e o p l e . . . ? " T h e ancient h o m e l a n d of the T u r k i s h peoples, T u r k e s t a n , w a s in the p o s s e s s i o n of R u s s i a a n d C h i n a . M o r e than half the T u r k i s h p e o p l e s of A s i a lived either there or elsewhere outside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , so that the C z a r could lay greater claim to s p e a k for the ethnic T u r k s than could the S u l t a n . E n v e r P a s h a was later associated with the d r e a m of reuniting all the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g peoples a n d d o m a i n s of A s i a , a n d certainly the idea was familiar to him in 1914—intellectually it was in the a i r — b u t , as of then, it did not enter into his plans. A small m a n , m u c h a d d i c t e d to theatrical g e s t u r e s a n d to large p r o g r a m s that b e g a n with the prefix "pan-," E n v e r was also s u p p o s e d to harbor p a n - I s l a m i c a m b i t i o n s . H i s treatment of A r a b fellow-Moslems shows that this, too, was a slogan that he d i d not translate into policy. 9

In the view of the C . U . P . leadership, E u r o p e would not let the e m p i r e survive in any e v e n t — a n d certainly would not allow the C . U . P . to carry t h r o u g h its p r o g r a m — u n l e s s one of the G r e a t Powers could be induced to b e c o m e T u r k e y ' s protector. T h u s the search for a E u r o p e a n ally was the urgent a n d overriding item on the C . U . P . a g e n d a . D j e m a l P a s h a w a s p r o - F r e n c h , but when eventually he heard that E n v e r had p r o p o s e d an alliance with G e r m a n y , he a p p r o v i n g l y c o m m e n t e d that "I should not hesitate to accept any alliance which rescued T u r k e y f r o m her present position of i s o l a t i o n . " 10

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III All s h a d e s of opinion within the C . U . P . were in agreement that the most urgent item on T u r k e y ' s a g e n d a was to secure a powerful E u r o p e a n ally. T h e Y o u n g T u r k s believed that one o f the E u r o p e a n blocs or indeed any one of the leading G r e a t P o w e r s — B r i t a i n , F r a n c e , o r G e r m a n y — c o u l d protect the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against further e n c r o a c h m e n t s on its territory. Other than R u s s i a , the countries that were m o s t likely to invade the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were powers of lesser s t r e n g t h : Italy, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , G r e e c e , or Bulgaria. D j a v i d , the p r o - B r i t i s h C . U . P . Minister o f F i n a n c e , had already appealed to Britain. H i s a p p e a l had been m a d e in 1911, at the time of the initial Italian attack on T u r k e y . Churchill was the only senior C a b i n e t minister who had wanted to r e s p o n d positively. A r g u i n g that T u r k e y ' s friendship was m o r e i m p o r t a n t than Italy's, Churchill wrote to the F o r e i g n Secretary that T u r k e y "is the greatest land weapon wh the G e r m a n s cd use against us." At the end of 1911, when D j a v i d wrote to p r o p o s e a p e r m a n e n t alliance with Britain, Churchill wanted to s e n d an e n c o u r a g i n g reply, but the F o r e i g n Office would not agree to his d o i n g s o . Between M a y a n d J u l y 1914, with increasing urgency the C . U . P . leaders secretly a p p r o a c h e d three other E u r o p e a n G r e a t Powers in search of an a l l y . D j e m a l , the Minister of M a r i n e , who was p r o F r e n c h , m a d e overtures to F r a n c e b u t was rebuffed. T a l a a t , in desperation, a p p r o a c h e d R u s s i a — w h i c h was like asking the chief burglar to b e c o m e chief of p o l i c e — a n d his proposal, too, was rebuffed. Finally, the C . U . P . leaders conferred together at the villa of the G r a n d Vizier a n d authorized E n v e r , who had served in Berlin, to a p p r o a c h G e r m a n y with a r e q u e s t for an alliance. E n v e r m a d e his a p p r o a c h o n 2 2 J u l y 1914. H i s p r o p o s a l was turned d o w n b y H a n s von W a n g e n h e i m , G e r m a n y ' s a m b a s s a d o r i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s diplomatic isolation was c o m p l e t e ; no G r e a t Power would agree to protect it. 11

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T h e O t t o m a n War Minister was q u i t e open in explaining to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r why the Y o u n g T u r k s were seeking an ally. E n v e r explained to von W a n g e n h e i m that the domestic r e f o r m s planned by the C . U . P . could be carried out only if the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were "secured against attacks f r o m a b r o a d . " H e e x p r e s s e d his belief that the e m p i r e could be s e c u r e d against s u c h attacks only by "the s u p p o r t of one of the g r o u p s of G r e a t P o w e r s . " A p p a r e n t l y he was unable to p e r s u a d e the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e had anything of sufficient value to give in return. 1 4

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T h e g o v e r n m e n t of Britain, meanwhile, was unaware of the flurry of T u r k i s h diplomatic activity a n d d i d not realize that the Porte was

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urgently seeking a G r e a t Power alliance. A few days after the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e rejected the O t t o m a n p r o p o s a l , British ministers received their first intimation that a war crisis might arise in E u r o p e that could involve Britain. Between 23 J u l y 1914, when A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y sent an u l t i m a t u m to S e r b i a , a n d 4 A u g u s t , when Britain unexpectedly f o u n d herself at war alongside the Entente Powers ( F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a ) a n d against the Central Powers ( G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) , few thoughts were s p a r e d for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; but to the extent that they were, the c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n was that G e r m a n y m i g h t a t t e m p t to entice the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into an alliance. British leaders at the t i m e never s u s p e c t e d that it was the other way a r o u n d : that T u r k e y was seeking an alliance with G e r m a n y , a n d that G e r m a n y was reluctant to grant it. E v e n after the war was over, when it was discovered that T a l a a t a n d Enver had s o u g h t the alliance, details of how the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d G e r m a n y forged their alliance r e m a i n e d o b s c u r e . C o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d a n u m b e r of historians b l a m e d Winston Churchill, who w a s said to have driven the T u r k s into G e r m a n y ' s a r m s ; but the still-emerging evidence f r o m d i p l o m a t i c archives tells a different a n d m o r e c o m p l e x story—which b e g a n in 1914, on the eve of a s u d d e n war crisis that neither Churchill nor his C a b i n e t colleagues h a d foreseen.

5 WINSTON C H U R C H I L L ON T H E EVE OF WAR i In 1914, at the age of thirty-nine, Winston Churchill w a s a b o u t to begin his fourth year as F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y in the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t o f P r i m e Minister H e r b e r t A s q u i t h . T h o u g h h e a d m i n istered his i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t m e n t a l office ably a n d vigorously, he was not then the i m p o s i n g figure the world later c a m e to know. H i s energy a n d t a l e n t — a n d his gift for publicizing his own e x p l o i t s — h a d b r o u g h t h i m forward at an early a g e ; b u t it was largely the a m u s e d indulgence of the P r i m e Minister a n d the powerful s p o n s o r s h i p of D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , that sustained him in his governmental position. He was a decade or m o r e younger than the other m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t , a n d the opinion was wides p r e a d that he was not sufficiently steady or m a t u r e to have been entrusted with high office. He still s p o k e with the trace of a schoolboy lisp. H i s face h a d just b e g u n to lose its last hints of adolescence. Only recently h a d the belligerent tilt of the head, the b r o o d i n g scowl, a n d the thrusting cigar started to take c o m m a n d ; a n d his s a n d y hair had b e g u n to thin a bit. He h a d put on s o m e weight in recent years, b u t was not yet portly. Of r u d d y c o m p l e x i o n , m e d i u m height, a n d with a hint of r o u n d e d lines, he was physically u n p r e p o s s e s s i n g ; only with hindsight could it have been seen that he would one day a p p e a r f o r m i d a b l e . It was not his p e r s o n b u t his driving personality that fascinated those who encountered h i m . He w a s a mercurial figure, h a u n t e d by the specter of his brilliant, diseased father who h a d died a political failure at the a g e of forty-five. F e a r i n g that he, too, w o u l d die y o u n g , Churchill had shamelessly elbowed friend and foe a s i d e in his d a s h to the top in the short time that he believed still remained to h i m . S o m e s u s p e c t e d that, like his father, he w a s emotionally u n b a l a n c e d , while others r e g a r d e d h i m as merely too y o u n g . He c o m b i n e d a s p e c t s of greatness with those of childishness; b u t his colleagues recognized the childishness m o r e readily than they did the g r e a t n e s s . He was 51

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m o o d y ; he took things personally; a n d he often e m b a r k e d on lengthy tirades when instead he s h o u l d have been listening or o b s e r v i n g . T h o u g h g e n e r o u s a n d w a r m - h e a r t e d , he was not sensitive to the thoughts a n d feelings of others, a n d often was unaware of the effect p r o d u c e d by his own w o r d s a n d behavior. He was noisy; he b r o u g h t p a s s i o n into everything he u n d e r t o o k . Colleagues who a i m e d at detachment and understatement found him tiresome. He often c h a n g e d his views; a n d since he always held his views passionately, his c h a n g e s of m i n d were as violent a n d e x t r e m e as they were frequent. He h a d been a T o r y a n d now was a L i b e r a l . He h a d been the m o s t p r o - G e r m a n of ministers a n d h a d b e c o m e the m o s t a n t i - G e r m a n . He h a d been the l e a d i n g p r o - T u r k in the C a b i n e t and was t o b e c o m e the m o s t a n t i - T u r k . T o his enemies h e a p p e a r e d d a n g e r o u s l y foolish, a n d even his friends r e m a r k e d that he allowed himself to be too easily carried away. Unlike the others, he d i s d a i n e d to play it safe. He had soldiered in I n d i a , seen war in C u b a a n d the S u d a n , a n d b e c o m e a hero by e s c a p i n g from a prisoner-of-war c a m p in S o u t h Africa. T a k i n g risks had b r o u g h t him f a m e a n d h a d c a t a p u l t e d him to the top in politics. He w a s h a p p y in his m a r r i a g e a n d in his high g o v e r n m e n t office, but his t e m p e r a m e n t w a s restless: he s o u g h t worlds to c o n q u e r . T h r e e years before—in the s u m m e r o f 1911—an u n e x p e c t e d o p portunity h a d o p e n e d up for h i m to fulfill s o m e of his a m b i t i o n s . At that t i m e , d u r i n g the c o u r s e of a brief international crisis, the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had been s h o c k e d to learn that the A d m i r a l t y was not p r e p a r e d to carry out w a r t i m e m i s s i o n s in s u p p o r t of the a r m y . To their a m a z e m e n t , C a b i n e t ministers at the time were told that the Royal N a v y was u n a b l e to t r a n s p o r t a British E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e across the E n g l i s h Channel. T h e y also learned that the A d m i r a l t y was unwilling to create a N a v a l War Staff. It b e c a m e clear to A s q u i t h and his colleagues that a new F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y h a d to be a p p o i n t e d to institute basic r e f o r m s . Churchill, then H o m e S e c r e t a r y , angled for the j o b , a n d his mentor, L l o y d G e o r g e , p r o p o s e d h i m for it. Predictably, his c a n d i dacy was h a m p e r e d by his youth. At thirty-six he was already, with a solitary exception, the y o u n g e s t p e r s o n ever to serve as H o m e S e c retary; a n d his m a n y enemies, who claimed that he h a d p u s h e d himself forward with u n s e e m l y haste, a r g u e d that he had run ahead of himself. To t h e m he a p p e a r e d to p o s s e s s in excess the characteristic faults of y o u t h : obstinacy, inexperience, poor j u d g m e n t , a n d i m p u l siveness. T h e other leading contender for the position of F i r s t L o r d e x p r e s s e d w a r m a d m i r a t i o n for Churchill's energy and c o u r a g e , b u t echoed the usual accusation that the y o u n g H o m e Secretary was too apt to act first and think a f t e r w a r d . 1

F o r whatever reason, the P r i m e Minister decided to take a chance

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on C h u r c h i l l ; a n d the record of the A d m i r a l t y from the s u m m e r of 1911 to the s u m m e r of 1914 showed that he had won his wager. Inspired by L o r d F i s h e r , the retired b u t still controversial A d m i r a l of the Fleet, Churchill had t r a n s f o r m e d the coal-burning nineteenthcentury fleet into an oil-burning twentieth-century navy.

II Elected to Parliament for the first time in 1900, Churchill took his seat (in 1901) as a m e m b e r of the Conservative P a r t y : a Unionist (the term usually u s e d at this p e r i o d ) , or a C o n s e r v a t i v e , or ( u s i n g the older w o r d ) a T o r y . B u t on the bitterly d i s p u t e d issue of free t r a d e , in 1904, he c r o s s e d the floor of the H o u s e a n d joined the Liberals. As a political r e n e g a d e , Churchill was distrusted by both p a r t i e s — n o t entirely without r e a s o n , for his political instincts were never wholly at one with either of t h e m . He tended toward L i b e r a l i s m on social a n d e c o n o m i c issues, b u t on q u e s t i o n s of foreign a n d defense policy his instincts were T o r y . Churchill was belligerent by nature a n d out of s y m p a t h y with the streak of idealistic pacifism that ran through the L i b e r a l P a r t y . He inherited a g e n i u s for warfare f r o m Britain's greatest general, his ancestor the D u k e of M a r l b o r o u g h ; he had been schooled at a military a c a d e m y rather than at a university; he had served on active duty as an a r m y officer; a n d he was enthralled by the profession of a r m s . When Violet A s q u i t h , a b o a r d the Enchantress in 1912, looked out at the lovely M e d i t e r r a n e a n coastline a n d e x c l a i m e d , "How perfect!", he replied, " Y e s — r a n g e perfect—visibility p e r f e c t — I f we had got s o m e six-inch g u n s o n b o a r d how easily w e could b o m b a r d . . . " 2

As war c l o u d s s u d d e n l y g a t h e r e d over the s u m m e r t i m e skies of 1914, L i b e r a l pacifists s e e m e d to be out of touch with events while Churchill at the A d m i r a l t y s e e m e d to be the right m a n at the right place at the right t i m e .

C H U R C H I L L SEIZES T U R K E Y ' S WARSHIPS i On the outbreak of war, Winston Churchill briefly b e c a m e a national hero in Britain. A l t h o u g h the C a b i n e t had refused him p e r m i s s i o n to do s o , he had mobilized the fleet on his own responsibility in the last days of peacetime a n d had sent it north to S c a p a F l o w , where it would not be vulnerable to a G e r m a n s u r p r i s e attack. What he had done was p r o b a b l y illegal, but events had justified his actions, which in Britain were a p p l a u d e d on all s i d e s . M a r g o t A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's wife, once wondered in her diary what it w a s that m a d e Winston Churchill pre-eminent. "It certainly is not his m i n d , " she wrote. "Certainly not his j u d g m e n t — h e is constantly very w r o n g indeed . . . " S h e concluded that: "It is of c o u r s e his c o u r a g e a n d c o l o u r — h i s a m a z i n g m i x t u r e of industry a n d enterprise. He can a n d d o e s always—all w a y s p u t s himself in the pool. He never shirks, h e d g e s , or protects himself—though he thinks of himself perpetually. He takes huge risks [original e m p h a s i s ] . " 1

Mobilizing the fleet despite the Cabinet's decision not to do so was a h u g e risk that e n d e d in t r i u m p h . In the days following Britain's entry into the war even his bitterest political enemies wrote to Churchill to e x p r e s s their a d m i r a t i o n of h i m . F o r m u c h of the rest of his life, his p r o u d e s t boast was that when war c a m e , the fleet was r e a d y . At the time, his c o m m a n d e e r i n g of T u r k i s h battleships for the Royal N a v y was a p p l a u d e d almost a s m u c h . A n illustrated p a g e in the Taller of 12 A u g u s t 1914 r e p r o d u c e d a p h o t o g r a p h of a determined-looking Churchill, with an inset of his wife, u n d e r the heading " B R A V O W I N S T O N ! T h e R a p i d Mobilisation and P u r c h a s e o f the T w o F o r e i g n D r e a d n o u g h t s S p o k e V o l u m e s for your Work a n d Wisdom." 2

T h e battleships were the Reshadieh a n d the larger Sultan Osman I. B o t h h a d been built in British shipyards a n d were i m m e n s e l y p o w e r ful; the Osman m o u n t e d m o r e heavy g u n s than any battleship ever built b e f o r e . E a c h originally had been ordered by Brazil, but then 3

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had been built instead for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Reshadieh, though launched in 1913, had not been delivered b e c a u s e the T u r k s had lacked a d e q u a t e m o d e r n d o c k i n g facilities to a c c o m m o d a t e her. With Churchill's s u p p o r t , R e a r - A d m i r a l S i r A r t h u r H . L i m p u s , head of the British naval m i s s i o n , had lobbied successfully with the O t t o m a n authorities to secure the contract to build docking facilities for two British f i r m s — V i c k e r s , and A r m s t r o n g Whitworth. T h e docking facilities having been c o m p l e t e d , the Reshadieh was scheduled to leave Britain soon after the Sultan Osman I, which was to be c o m p l e t e d in A u g u s t 1914. Churchill was aware that these vessels meant a great deal to the Ottoman E m p i r e . T h e y were intended to be the m a k i n g of the m o d e r n O t t o m a n navy, a n d it was a s s u m e d that they would enable the e m p i r e to face G r e e c e in the A e g e a n and R u s s i a in the Black S e a . T h e i r p u r c h a s e had been m a d e p o s s i b l e b y patriotic public s u b s c r i p tion throughout the e m p i r e . T h e tales m a y have been i m p r o v e d in the telling, b u t it was said that w o m e n had sold their jewelry a n d schoolchildren had given up their pocket-money to contribute to the popular s u b s c r i p t i o n . A d m i r a l L i m p u s had put out to sea from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 27 J u l y 1914, with ships of the T u r k i s h navy, waiting to greet the Sultan Osman I a n d escort her back t h r o u g h the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s to the O t t o m a n capital, where a "navy week" had been s c h e d u l e d with lavish ceremonies for the Minister of M a r i n e , A h m e d D j e m a l , and for the cause of B r i t i s h - O t t o m a n friendship. 4

Churchill, who was reckoned the m o s t p r o - T u r k m e m b e r of the A s q u i t h C a b i n e t , had followed with care, a n d had s u p p o r t e d with e n t h u s i a s m , the m i s s i o n of A d m i r a l L i m p u s in T u r k e y ever since its inception years before. T h e British advisory mission to the O t t o m a n navy was a l m o s t as large as the similar G e r m a n mission to the O t t o m a n a r m y , led by the P r u s s i a n G e n e r a l of Cavalry, O t t o L i m a n von S a n d e r s . T h e two m i s s i o n s t o s o m e extent c o u n t e r - b a l a n c e d each other. British influence was thought to be strong in the M a r i n e Ministry. G e r m a n influence was strongest in the War Ministry. In L o n d o n little was known of M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics, but Churchill enjoyed the rare a d v a n t a g e of having personally met three of the five leading figures in the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t : T a l a a t , E n v e r , and the Minister of F i n a n c e , D j a v i d . He therefore had been given an o p p o r tunity to learn that Britain's conduct as naval s u p p l i e r a n d adviser could have political repercussions in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e E u r o p e a n war crisis, however, propelled the newly built T u r k i s h vessels into significance in both L o n d o n a n d Berlin. T h e Reshadieh a n d Sultan Osman I were battleships of the new D r e a d n o u g h t class. As s u c h , they o v e r s h a d o w e d other surface vessels a n d , in a sense, r e n d e r e d them obsolete. By the s u m m e r of 1914 the

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R o y a l N a v y h a d taken delivery of only e n o u g h to give B r i t a i n a m a r gin over G e r m a n y o f seven D r e a d n o u g h t s . S i n c e the E u r o p e a n war was e x p e c t e d to be a s h o r t one, there s e e m e d to be no t i m e to b u i l d m o r e o f t h e m before battle was j o i n e d a n d d e c i d e d . T h e a d d i t i o n o f the two D r e a d n o u g h t s built for T u r k e y w o u l d increase the p o w e r of the R o y a l N a v y significantly. Conversely, their a c q u i s i t i o n by the G e r m a n E m p i r e or its allies c o u l d decisively shift the b a l a n c e of forces a g a i n s t Britain. It was not fanciful to s u p p o s e that the Reshadieh a n d Sultan Osman I c o u l d p l a y a material role in d e t e r m i n ing the o u t c o m e of what was to b e c o m e the F i r s t World War. E a r l y in the week of 27 J u l y 1914, as the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y took precautionary m e a s u r e s in the war crisis, he raised the issue of whether the two T u r k i s h battleships could be taken by the Royal N a v y . T h e chain of events which apparently flowed from Churchill's initiative in this matter eventually led to him being b l a m e d for the tragic outbreak of war in the M i d d l e E a s t . In turn he later a t t e m p t e d to defend himself by p r e t e n d i n g that he had done no m o r e than to carry into effect s t a n d i n g o r d e r s . T h e history of these matters has been confused ever since b e c a u s e both Churchill's story a n d the story told by his detractors were false. A c c o r d i n g to Churchill's history of the F i r s t World War, British contingency p l a n s a d o p t e d in 1912 provided for the taking of all foreign warships b e i n g built in British yards in the event that war should ever occur. When the war broke out in 1914, w a r s h i p s were being built in British yards for T u r k e y , Chile, G r e e c e , Brazil, and H o l l a n d . A c c o r d i n g to Churchill, he d i d nothing m o r e than follow the regulations a d o p t e d in 1912. H i s version of the matter implied that he did not single out the O t t o m a n vessels, but instead issued orders applicable to all foreign w a r s h i p s then under construction; he wrote that the a r r a n g e m e n t s for the taking of such vessels "comprised an elaborate s c h e m e " that had been devised years before a n d had been b r o u g h t up to date in 1 9 1 2 . s

T h i s account was not t r u e . S e i z i n g the T u r k i s h warships was an original idea of Churchill's a n d it c a m e to him in the s u m m e r of 1914. D u r i n g the week before the war, the question of taking foreign vessels was raised for the first time on T u e s d a y , 28 J u l y 1914, in an inquiry that Churchill directed to the F i r s t S e a L o r d , Prince L o u i s o f B a t t e n b e r g , a n d t o the T h i r d S e a L o r d , S i r A r c h i b a l d M o o r e . "In case it m a y b e c o m e necessary to acquire the 2 T u r k i s h battleships that are nearing completion in British y a r d s , " he wrote, "please formulate p l a n s in detail s h o w i n g exactly the administrative action involved in their acquisition a n d the p r o s p e c t i v e financial transactions." 6

A d m i r a l M o o r e looked into the matter, and found no administrative

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or legal p r o c e d u r e that would justify seizing the T u r k i s h s h i p s . He consulted one of the legal officers of the F o r e i g n Office, who told him that there was no precedent for taking any s u c h action. T h e F o r e i g n Office lawyer said that if Britain were at war it could be a r g u e d that national interests take precedence over legal rights, b u t that since Britain was not at war it w o u l d be illegal for Churchill to take the foreign-owned vessels. T h e lawyer advised the A d m i r a l t y that, if it really needed the s h i p s , it s h o u l d try to p e r s u a d e the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t to sell t h e m . 7

T h e T u r k s s u s p e c t e d what Churchill had in m i n d , for on 29 J u l y the F o r e i g n Office warned the A d m i r a l t y that the Sultan Osman I was taking on fuel a n d was u n d e r o r d e r s to depart for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e immediately, even t h o u g h u n f i n i s h e d . Churchill immediately ordered the b u i l d e r s of both battleships to detain t h e m . He also ordered British security forces to g u a r d the vessels and to prevent T u r k i s h crews from b o a r d i n g them or from raising the O t t o m a n flag over them (which w o u l d have converted them, u n d e r prevailing international law, into O t t o m a n territory). 8

T h e following day the A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l advised Churchill that what he was d o i n g was not justified by statute, but that the welfare of the C o m m o n w e a l t h took precedence over other considerations and might e x c u s e his temporarily detaining the v e s s e l s . A high-ranking p e r m a n e n t official in the F o r e i g n Office took the s a m e point of view that day b u t p l a c e d it in a b r o a d e r a n d m o r e practical political perspective. "I think we m u s t let the A d m i r a l t y deal with this q u e s tion as they consider n e c e s s a r y , " he m i n u t e d , "and afterwards m a k e such defence of our action to T u r k e y as we c a n . " 9

1 0

On 31 J u l y the C a b i n e t accepted Churchill's view that he o u g h t to take both T u r k i s h vessels for the Royal N a v y for possible use against G e r m a n y in the event of war; w h e r e u p o n British sailors b o a r d e d the Sultan Osman I. T h e O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r called at the F o r e i g n Office to ask for an explanation, b u t was told only that the battleship was being detained for the time b e i n g . T o w a r d m i d n i g h t on 1 A u g u s t Churchill wrote instructions to A d m i r a l M o o r e , in connection with the mobilization of the fleet, to notify both Vickers a n d A r m s t r o n g that the O t t o m a n w a r s h i p s were to be detained a n d that the A d m i r a l t y p r o p o s e d to enter into negotiations for their p u r c h a s e . F o r the first time Churchill noted that w a r s h i p s were also being built in British s h i p y a r d s for countries other than T u r k e y . A d m i r a l M o o r e had b r o u g h t this to the F i r s t L o r d ' s attention several d a y s before, but Churchill had not r e s p o n d e d ; n o w — a l t h o u g h the other 1 1

1 2

* T h i s opinion was rendered a week before, the outbreak of war between Britain and Germany.

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foreign vessels were not of equal i m p o r t a n c e — h e ordered them to be detained, too, for completion and eventual p u r c h a s e . On 3 A u g u s t the A d m i r a l t y entered into a r r a n g e m e n t s with A r m s t r o n g for taking the Sultan Osman I into the Royal N a v y i m m e d i a t e l y . T h a t evening the F o r e i g n Office cabled the British e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with instructions to inform the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t that Britain desired to have the contract for the p u r c h a s e of the Osman transferred to H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t . T h e following day Sir E d w a r d G r e y sent a further cable to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , saying that he was s u r e the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t would u n d e r s t a n d Britain's position, a n d that "financial & other loss to T u r k e y will receive all d u e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " 13

1 4

15

A key, but overlooked, point is that the O t t o m a n government did not learn for the first time of Churchill's seizure of the battleship when officially informed of it in the 3 A u g u s t cable. T h e T u r k s knew that the battleships were b e i n g taken on 31 J u l y , and on or before 29 J u l y strongly s u s p e c t e d that they were g o i n g to be taken. T h e significance of these dates will b e c o m e clear presently.

II In Berlin the onset of the war crisis on 23 J u l y led to s o m e second t h o u g h t s a b o u t the value of T u r k e y as an ally. On 24 J u l y 1914, K a i s e r Wilhelm II personally overruled the negative decision of his a m b a s s a d o r to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d ordered that Enver's offer of an alliance should be e x p l o r e d . An Austrian u l t i m a t u m to S e r b i a — t h e u l t i m a t u m that initiated the war crisis in E u r o p e — h a d been delivered the previous evening, a n d the K a i s e r decided that "at the present m o m e n t " O t t o m a n interest in contracting an alliance should be taken a d v a n t a g e of "for reasons of e x p e d i e n c y . " ' Secret talks b e g a n at once in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . On the O t t o m a n side, the negotiators were Prince S a i d H a l i m , the G r a n d Vizier and F o r e i g n Minister; T a l a a t Bey, Minister of the Interior; and E n v e r P a s h a , Minister of War. A l t h o u g h E n v e r had told the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r that a majority of the m e m b e r s of the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e were in favor of an alliance with G e r m a n y , the three O t t o m a n leaders kept their negotiations secret from the Central C o m m i t t e e and even from their powerful colleague D j e m a l Pasha, Minister of the M a r i n e . On 28 J u l y the O t t o m a n leaders forwarded their draft of a p r o p o s e d treaty of alliance to Berlin. D e s p i t e the K a i s e r ' s views, the G e r m a n Prime Minister, Chancellor T h e o b a l d von B e t h m a n n Hollweg, remained unenthusiastic a b o u t the potential entanglement. On 31 J u l y , the day the G e n e r a l Staff told him to issue the order to go to war, 6

1 7

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B e t h m a n n H o l l w e g sent a wire to his a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , instructing him not to sign a treaty of alliance with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e u n l e s s he w a s certain that " T u r k e y either can or will undertake s o m e action against R u s s i a worthy of the n a m e . " A u g u s t 1 w a s the crucial day in the negotiations. D e t a i l s of what was said in the c o u r s e of the b a r g a i n i n g are still not known. On the G e r m a n side, von W a n g e n h e i m w a s o p e r a t i n g under direct instructions from the head of his g o v e r n m e n t : the Chancellor in Berlin had m a d e it quite clear that the O t t o m a n p r o p o s a l s h o u l d be rejected unless the T u r k s h a d s o m e t h i n g u n e x p e c t e d l y significant to contribute to the G e r m a n c a u s e in the war. In fact, the T u r k s did not want to join in the fighting at all. As later events were to show, the G r a n d Vizier a n d his associates h o p e d that they would not be d r a g g e d into the war. T h u s on the face of it they h a d little to offer. Yet by the end of the day the three Y o u n g T u r k s had w r u n g an alliance agreement from the G e r m a n s , which both s i d e s s i g n e d the following afternoon. 1 8

N o t merely h a d the negotiations been conducted in secret, b u t Article 8 of the treaty p r o v i d e d that the agreement should continue to be kept secret. Article 4 was what the C . U . P . leaders had chiefly s o u g h t : " G e r m a n y obligates itself, by force of a r m s if need b e , to defend O t t o m a n territory in c a s e it should be t h r e a t e n e d . " G e r m a n y ' s obligation was a c o n t i n u i n g one for the length of the treaty, which w a s s c h e d u l e d to expire on 31 D e c e m b e r 1918. 19

T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e i n turn u n d e r t o o k t o o b s e r v e strict neutrality in the then current conflict between S e r b i a and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and to go to war only if G e r m a n y were r e q u i r e d to enter the fighting by the t e r m s of her treaty with A u s t r i a . In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a n d in s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s only, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e p l e d g e d that it too would intervene, a n d w o u l d allow the G e r m a n military m i s s i o n in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to exercise "effective influence" over the c o n d u c t of its a r m i e s . T h e day after the treaty w a s s i g n e d , the Porte ordered general mobilization to b e g i n , b u t also p r o c l a i m e d neutrality in the E u r o p e a n conflict. T h e treaty r e m a i n e d a s e c r e t ; and E n v e r a n d his coc o n s p i r a t o r s c l a i m e d that the p r o g r a m of mobilization was not directed against the Allied P o w e r s . T h e O t t o m a n leaders went out of their way in conversations with Allied representatives to stress the possibility of friendly relationships, a n d E n v e r went so far as to s u g g e s t that T u r k e y m i g h t join the Allies.

* T h e treaty was signed the day after Germany had declared war on Russia. Germany had not been required to declare war by the terms of her treaty with Austria; as it happened, Germany declared war several days before Austria-Hungary did. T h e oddly drawn treaty with the Ottoman Empire therefore did not—if read literally—obligate the Turks to enter the war.

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Berlin, hitherto skeptical of what the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could contribute, now b e c a m e a n x i o u s to obtain T u r k i s h a s s i s t a n c e . On 5 A u g u s t the Chief of the G e r m a n General Staff, who only weeks before had said that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at G e r m a n y ' s side w o u l d not be an "asset," b e g a n to p r e s s for T u r k i s h aid against Britain as well as R u s s i a ; b u t the T u r k s refused to be hurried into taking action. Indeed the lack of transportation facilities m a d e it i m p o s s i b l e for the e m p i r e to mobilize swiftly. 2 0

T h e a r m y had been g u i d e d for several years by a G e r m a n military m i s s i o n , s o the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r p r e s u m a b l y had been i n f o r m e d that it would be physically i m p o s s i b l e for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to enter the war until the late a u t u m n or the winter. S i n c e a l m o s t everybody's a s s u m p t i o n on 1 A u g u s t was that the war would be over within a few m o n t h s , von W a n g e n h e i m had g r a n t e d the Y o u n g T u r k s an alliance even t h o u g h he m u s t have believed that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would not be r e a d y to fight until the war was a l m o s t over. Y e t his instructions from Berlin were that he s h o u l d not conclude an alliance unless the Y o u n g T u r k s could p r o v e to him that they had s o m e t h i n g meaningful to contribute to the G e r m a n war effort. What was that "something meaningful"? T h e c o m m o n a s s u m p t i o n o f historians s e e m s t o b e that the T u r k s offered nothing new that d a y — t h a t , in effect, von W a n g e n h e i m ignored his instructions f r o m Berlin. If s o , he m a y have been seeking to please the K a i s e r ; or it m a y be that the threatened o u t b r e a k of a general E u r o p e a n war led h i m to view the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as m o r e significant militarily than he had believed ten d a y s before. If, however, von Wangenheim did a t t e m p t to follow the instructions he had received from Berlin, then the q u e s t i o n which historians have not asked b e c o m e s intriguing: what d i d E n v e r offer G e r m a n y on 1 A u g u s t that was so i m p o r t a n t that the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r c h a n g e d his m i n d and agreed that, in return, G e r m a n y would protect the O t t o m a n Empire?

Ill A couple of d e c a d e s a g o , a c u r i o u s fact c a m e to light. A student of the G e r m a n diplomatic archives disclosed that they showed that on 1 A u g u s t 1914 E n v e r and T a l a a t , in a meeting with A m b a s s a d o r von W a n g e n h e i m , s u d d e n l y offered to t u r n over to G e r m a n y one of the m o s t powerful w a r s h i p s in the world: the Sultan Osman. Von W a n g e n h e i m a c c e p t e d the offer; a n d B r i t i s h Intelligence r e p o r t s from behind G e r m a n lines two weeks later showed that officers of the G e r m a n fleet had eagerly e x p e c t e d to receive the vitally important 21

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new w a r s h i p — a n d a p p a r e n t l y were bitterly d i s a p p o i n t e d when Churchill seized the vessel i n s t e a d . H i s t o r i a n s have not e x a m i n e d this e p i s o d e in any great detail, p o s s i b l y b e c a u s e on the s u r f a c e it s e e m s so difficult to explain. E n v e r a n d T a l a a t could not p o s s i b l y have intended to give away T u r k e y ' s prize battleship, in which the p o p u l a c e had invested so m u c h emotion as well as money; a n d in which the e m p i r e took s u c h p r i d e ; it would have been political suicide for any O t t o m a n leader to even p r o p o s e to do s o . Y e t the evidence cannot be d i s p u t e d ; in secret, they m a d e von W a n g e n h e i m the offer. In another connection, s o m e twenty years ago a student of the O t t o m a n archives m e n t i o n e d , in p a s s i n g , a conversation that might p r o v i d e a n explanation. O n the s a m e d a y that E n v e r a n d T a l a a t m a d e their offer to G e r m a n y — 1 A u g u s t 1 9 1 4 — E n v e r revealed to fellow Y o u n g T u r k leaders that Britain had seized the Osman. T h u s on 1 A u g u s t he already knew! I n d e e d — s i n c e it is now known that, in L o n d o n , the T u r k s s u s p e c t e d on 29 J u l y that Churchill was a b o u t to seize the Osman, and on 31 J u l y protested that he had already d o n e s o — i t is entirely p o s s i b l e that even before 1 A u g u s t Enver knew that the battleship had b e e n taken by B r i t a i n . 2 2

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M i g h t this not p r o v i d e the answer to an earlier question? V o n W a n g e n h e i m was not s u p p o s e d to g r a n t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e an alliance unless the T u r k s could show that they would m a k e a material contribution to the defeat of the Allies. B u t nonetheless he a g r e e d to an alliance on 1 A u g u s t , when the week before he had not believed that the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces could m a k e s u c h a contribution. Was not the offer of the Osman on 1 A u g u s t , therefore, the material contribution that b o u g h t E n v e r a n d T a l a a t their G e r m a n alliance? If E n v e r a n d T a l a a t knew before m a k i n g their secret offer that they had already lost the Osman to B r i t a i n — t h a t it was therefore no longer theirs to d i s p o s e of—they could have m a d e the offer; they could have m a d e it with impunity. In fact the G e r m a n s never discovered that they had been d u p e d . T h e y s e e m to have a s s u m e d that E n v e r a n d T a l a a t meant to keep their side of the b a r g a i n , a n d only learned they could not do so when they received official notification of Churchill's action several d a y s later—after G e r m a n y h a d already signed a p l e d g e to protect the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against its enemies, largely in return (it is s p e c u l a t e d here) for E n v e r ' s a n d T a l a a t ' s worthless p r o m i s e .

7 AN I N T R I G U E AT T H E S U B L I M E PORTE i In the c o u r s e of the secret negotiations between G e r m a n y and the Y o u n g T u r k s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 1 A u g u s t , E n v e r , the Minister of War, held a private meeting in the G e r m a n e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n tinople with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , H a n s von W a n g e n h e i m , and with the head of the G e r m a n military mission, Otto L i m a n von S a n d e r s . T h e three m e n d i s c u s s e d the form that military collaboration between their countries m i g h t take if T u r k e y a n d B u l g a r i a should contract with each other to join in a war against R u s s i a on G e r m a n y ' s side. It s e e m e d to t h e m that naval m a s t e r y was essential if a successful c a m p a i g n were to be m o u n t e d . T h e y concluded that the G e r m a n M e d i t e r r a n e a n fleet, consisting of the powerful Goeben and its sister s h i p , the Breslau, s h o u l d c o m e to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to strengthen the O t t o m a n fleet in the Black S e a so as to give the T u r k i s h - B u l g a r i a n armies a free hand in invading R u s s i a . Significantly, none of the three m e n a p p e a r s to have believed that the Osman might be available to fulfill that function. P r e s u m a b l y E n v e r already knew that he had lost the battleship to B r i t a i n ; while the G e r m a n s believed that the v e s s e l — u n d e r orders from E n v e r — w a s g o i n g to join the G e r m a n fleet at a N o r t h S e a port, so that the Goeben a n d the Breslau, which already were in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , could m o r e conveniently c o m e t o C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . 1

After the conference, L i m a n a n d von Wangenheim r e q u e s t e d their g o v e r n m e n t to send the G e r m a n s h i p s to T u r k e y . On 3 A u g u s t the G e r m a n A d m i r a l t y d i s p a t c h e d o r d e r s to that effect to R e a r - A d m i r a l Wilhelm S o u c h o n , c o m m a n d e r o f the Mediterranean S q u a d r o n . T h e wireless m e s s a g e reached S o u c h o n in the early m o r n i n g of 4 A u g u s t , when he was close to the coast of Algeria where he intended to disrupt the flow of t r o o p s f r o m F r e n c h N o r t h Africa to the m a i n l a n d of F r a n c e . D e c i d i n g not to turn back immediately, S o u c h o n first shelled two port cities of Algeria, a n d only then t u r n e d back to refuel in the neutral Italian port of M e s s i n a in Sicily, where G e r m a n 62

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coaling-stations awaited him. S l o w e d d o w n by defective boilers on the Goeben, the s q u a d r o n did not reach M e s s i n a until the m o r n i n g of 5 August. At his refueling s t o p , S o u c h o n received a telegram from Berlin apparently c h a n g i n g his o r d e r s again. E n v e r had not consulted his colleagues before inviting the G e r m a n warships to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ; they were by no m e a n s a n x i o u s to be drawn into the fighting, and when the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t learned that the s h i p s were en route, it warned Berlin not to let t h e m c o m e . Berlin cabled S o u c h o n that his call on the O t t o m a n capital was "not possible"; b u t S o u c h o n chose to interpret this merely as a w a r n i n g rather than as an order, and determined to p r o c e e d to T u r k e y to force the i s s u e . T h i s personal decision of the G e r m a n admiral was a turning point in events. Meanwhile, the British, w h o m Churchill had o r d e r e d to s h a d o w the Goeben, had lost sight of her u n d e r cover of night on 4 A u g u s t ; but on the 5th s h e was sighted again, a n d the c o m m a n d i n g E n g l i s h admiral positioned his naval s q u a d r o n to intercept her when she should c o m e out of the straits of M e s s i n a after refueling. He placed his s q u a d r o n west of Sicily, to meet her as she returned to attack N o r t h Africa again, which is what he s u p p o s e d she would d o . A m u c h smaller force was already stationed in the Adriatic S e a , far to the northeast, to block her s h o u l d she attempt to return to her h o m e port of Pola (in what "was then A u s t r i a , b u t is now Y u g o s l a v i a ) . On the British side there was as m a s s i v e a failure of political imagination in L o n d o n , as there was of military c o m p e t e n c e at sea. It s e e m s never to have occurred to the F o r e i g n Office, the War Office, or the A d m i r a l t y that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ought to figure in strategic calculations. Neither in L o n d o n nor in the field did anybody in c o m m a n d consider the possibility that A d m i r a l S o u c h o n might be h e a d e d toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e y a s s u m e d that when he h e a d e d east it was in order to elude them a n d d o u b l e back t o w a r d the west. When the Goeben and her sister s h i p , the Breslau, e m e r g e d from the straits of M e s s i n a on 6 A u g u s t , A d m i r a l S o u c h o n expected to find his way blocked by a superior British force. Instead he found the way clear, a n d set his c o u r s e toward the A e g e a n . "It was all the A d m i r a l s ' fault," the P r i m e Minister's daughter later told Churchill. "Who but an A d m i r a l would not have p u t a battle-cruiser at both e n d s of the M e s s i n a S t r a i t s , instead of p u t t i n g two at one end a n d none at the o t h e r ? " S h e advised him to retire all his a d m i r a l s a n d p r o m o t e captains in their place. S o u c h o n did encounter a British naval contingent as he s t e a m e d eastward, but it withdrew rather than risk battle with the formidable Goeben. After p r o d i g i e s of exertion on the part of the G e r m a n s , a n d of b l u n d e r i n g on the part of the E n g l i s h p u r s u e r s , S o u c h o n ' s force arrived at the entrance to the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s . 2

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II At 1:00 in the m o r n i n g on 6 A u g u s t , the G r a n d Vizier d i s c u s s e d the fate of the Goeben a n d Breslau with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r . T h e British M e d i t e r r a n e a n S q u a d r o n was following close behind the two G e r m a n s h i p s , so that if T u r k e y refused t h e m admittance to the straits, they would be t r a p p e d between the T u r k i s h forts in front of them a n d the British s q u a d r o n behind t h e m . T h e G r a n d Vizier, S a i d H a l i m , a n n o u n c e d that his g o v e r n m e n t had decided to allow the G e r m a n ships to enter the straits so that they could m a k e g o o d their e s c a p e . B u t , he said, conditions were attached to this p e r m i s s i o n ; a n d when he a n n o u n c e d what they were, it b e c a m e clear that his t e r m s were s t e e p . T h e y showed t h a t — c o n t r a r y to what British observers believed—the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t intended t o escape domination by the G e r m a n s , as well as other E u r o p e a n s . T h e Porte d e m a n d e d that G e r m a n y accept six far-reaching p r o p o s a l s , the first of which was high on the list of C . U . P . priorities—abolition of the C a p i t u l a t i o n s , a n d thus of privileges hitherto a c c o r d e d to the G e r m a n s a n d other E u r o p e a n s . Other p r o p o s a l s guaranteed T u r k e y a share of the spoils of victory if G e r m a n y won the war. F r o m a G e r m a n point of view these p r o p o s a l s were o u t r a g e o u s , b u t unless von W a n g e n h e i m wanted to a b a n d o n the Goeben a n d Breslau to the long-range g u n s of the British navy, he had no choice b u t to a g r e e . T h e T u r k s had h i m a t g u n point. At the A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n , T u r k e y ' s decision to admit the G e r m a n w a r s h i p s looked like collusion between Constantinople and Berlin. Churchill a n d his colleagues had no idea that what really was going on was extortion; a n d Churchill angrily d a s h e d off a telegram to his forces ordering them to institute a blockade of the D a r d a n e l l e s . He had no authority to issue s u c h an order on his own a n d , had the order been carried out, it could have been c o n s t r u e d in Constantinople as an act of war. In reply to a request for clarification, the A d m i r a l t y cabled back that there had been a "mistake in wording" a n d "no blockade i n t e n d e d . " Instead the British ships were to wait in international waters for the G e r m a n s h i p s to c o m e out. 3

4

Britain protested to the S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t that under accepted conventions of international law T u r k e y , as a neutral, was obliged either to send the G e r m a n s h i p s b a c k out or to intern t h e m . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t did neither. I n s t e a d , the legal situation p r o m p t e d the Porte to extract further concessions from the G e r m a n s . V o n W a n g e n h e i m h a d barely recovered from the extortionate d e m a n d s of 6 A u g u s t when, on 9 A u g u s t , the G r a n d Vizier had m o r e news for the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r . S a i d H a l i m a n n o u n c e d that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e might join with G r e e c e a n d R u m a n i a in a public pact of neutrality in the E u r o p e a n conflict. If s o , s o m e t h i n g would

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have to be done a b o u t the continuing presence of the Goeben a n d the Breslau in T u r k i s h waters so as not to c o m p r o m i s e T u r k i s h neutrality. T h e Porte p r o p o s e d a fictitious p u r c h a s e of the two w a r s h i p s : the T u r k s w o u l d take over ownership of the vessels, and w o u l d pretend to have p a i d for t h e m . In that way there could be no objection to the s h i p s r e m a i n i n g in T u r k e y ; there w o u l d be no breaching of the laws of neutrality. On 10 A u g u s t the G e r m a n Chancellor cabled von W a n g e n h e i m from Berlin rejecting this T u r k i s h p r o p o s a l a n d u r g i n g i m m e d i a t e T u r k i s h entry into the war. T h e Y o u n g T u r k leaders, however, were reluctant to involve the e m p i r e in the E u r o p e a n conflict. Von Wangenheim was s u m m o n e d that day to the S u b l i m e Porte, where the G r a n d Vizier angrily r e p r o a c h e d him for the p r e m a t u r e arrival of the Goeben a n d the Breslau. I g n o r i n g his own government's c o m plicity in the affair of the G e r m a n w a r s h i p s , S a i d H a l i m repeated his p r o p o s a l that the ships should be transferred to T u r k i s h o w n e r s h i p . Von W a n g e n h e i m refused the p r o p o s a l . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t t h e r e u p o n unilaterally issued a public declaration falsely claiming that it had b o u g h t the two G e r m a n cruisers a n d had p a i d eighty million m a r k s for them. Public opinion t h r o u g h o u t the e m p i r e was elated, a n d on 14 A u g u s t a frustrated von W a n g e n h e i m a d v i s e d Berlin that there w a s no choice b u t to go along with the "sale"; to d i s a v o w it risked turning local sentiment violently a r o u n d against the G e r m a n c a u s e . H i s advice was heeded, a n d at a ceremony on 16 A u g u s t the Minister of the M a r i n e , D j e m a l P a s h a , formally received the vessels into the O t t o m a n navy. T h e T u r k s did not have the trained officers and crews that were needed to operate a n d maintain s u c h sophisticated vessels, a n d d e cided that, for the time being, the G e r m a n s should do it for t h e m . A d m i r a l S o u c h o n was a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r of the O t t o m a n Black S e a Fleet, while his sailors were given fezzes a n d O t t o m a n u n i f o r m s , and went t h r o u g h the f o r m s of enlisting in the S u l t a n ' s n a v y . In L o n d o n the entire e p i s o d e was viewed as a calculated G e r m a n m a n e u v e r d e s i g n e d to show that G e r m a n y was generously restoring to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e the type of m o d e r n warships that Churchill had wrongfully taken a w a y ; a n d , even today, historians continue to repeat that account of the affair. 5

It was little m o r e than a week since angry schoolchildren had p o u r e d into the streets of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to protest at Churchill's seizure of the battleships that had been p u r c h a s e d with their m o n e y . British g o v e r n m e n t leaders were certain that there was a connection between the two events. T h e P r i m e Minister's c o m m e n t a b o u t T u r k e y ' s " p u r c h a s e " of the G e r m a n s h i p s was that " T h e T u r k s are very a n g r y — n o t u n n a t u r a l l y — a t Winston's seizure of their battleships here." 6

7

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P r i m e Minister noted that "Winston, in his m o s t bellicose m o o d all for s e n d i n g a t o r p e d o flotilla thro' the D a r d a n e l l e s — t o threaten & if necessary to sink the Goeben & her c o n s o r t . " C a b i n e t opinion, however, was swayed by the views of the Secretary of S t a t e for War and the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , who a r g u e d that it w o u l d be d a m a g i n g for Britain to a p p e a r to be the a g g r e s s o r against the Ottoman Empire. It a p p e a r e d , however, that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was m o v i n g toward the e n e m y c a m p , and the plausible explanation c o m m o n l y a c c e p t e d in L o n d o n was that it was Churchill's seizure of the T u r k i s h battleships which had c a u s e d that to h a p p e n . W y n d h a m D e e d e s , who had returned from T u r k e y to E n g l a n d in a daring journey via Berlin, went to see his friend, the O t t o m a n a m b a s s a d o r , in L o n d o n a n d discovered that, in fact, that explanation was u n t r u e : the battleships were not at the heart of the p r o b l e m . Of course the Porte was u p s e t a b o u t the seizure of the s h i p s , b u t would not change its p r o - G e r m a n policy even if the ships were r e t u r n e d . 8

F e a r of R u s s i a n e x p a n s i o n i s m w a s at the heart of the Porte's policy. T h e T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r told D e e d e s that if the Allies won the war, they would c a u s e or allow the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to be partitioned, while if G e r m a n y won the war, no s u c h partition would be allowed to o c c u r . T h a t was why the Porte had b e c o m e proG e r m a n . D e e d e s denied that the Allies would allow the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to be partitioned, b u t the a m b a s s a d o r had been told by E n v e r that the Allied Powers had given similar a s s u r a n c e s years before but had not kept their w o r d . ( E n v e r did not mention that, in addition, G e r m a n y had given a written g u a r a n t e e to protect O t t o m a n territory. He a n d his colleagues continued to keep their treaty of alliance with G e r m a n y a secret, and its existence was not revealed until m a n y years later.) 9

D e e d e s was a l a r m e d by his conversation with the T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r , a n d warned the new British War Minister, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , that T u r k e y w a s drifting into the enemy c a m p b e c a u s e of her fears of Allied intentions. S i n c e Britain had allied herself with R u s s i a — R u s s i a , which had been a t t e m p t i n g to d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for a century a n d a half—it w o u l d be no easy task to reassure the Porte, but D e e d e s u r g e d that the effort s h o u l d be m a d e . Churchill, meanwhile, was increasingly belligerent toward the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which he r e g a r d e d as b e c o m i n g e n e m y territory. Information reaching h i m in the last half of A u g u s t indicated that G e r m a n officers a n d m e n were m o v i n g overland, through neutral B u l g a r i a , to a s s u m e positions in the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces. As early as 26 A u g u s t A d m i r a l L i m p u s had reported to Churchill that "Constantinople is almost completely in G e r m a n h a n d s at this moment." 10

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Churchill continued to p r e s s for action. On 1 S e p t e m b e r he initiated staff talks between the A d m i r a l t y a n d the War Office to plan an attack on T u r k e y in the event of war. T h e following day he received authority f r o m the C a b i n e t to sink T u r k i s h vessels if they issued from the D a r d a n e l l e s in c o m p a n y with the Goeben a n d Breslau. L a t e r he authorized his D a r d a n e l l e s s q u a d r o n c o m m a n d e r to u s e his own discretion as to whether to turn back T u r k i s h vessels attempting t o c o m e out from the D a r d a n e l l e s b y themselves. T h i s was a b l u n d e r : it drove the T u r k s to strike b a c k with s t u n n i n g effectiveness. P u r s u a n t to Churchill's authorization, the s q u a d r o n s t o p p e d a T u r k i s h t o r p e d o boat on 27 S e p t e m b e r a n d turned it back; for, in violation of O t t o m a n neutrality, it had G e r m a n sailors a b o a r d . In retaliation, E n v e r P a s h a authorized the G e r m a n officer c o m m a n d i n g the T u r k i s h defenses of the D a r d a n e l l e s to order the straits to be sealed off a n d to c o m p l e t e the laying of minefields across t h e m . T h i s cut off the flow of Allied m e r c h a n t s h i p p i n g a n d thus struck a crippling blow. T h e D a r d a n e l l e s had been R u s s i a ' s one ice-free m a r i t i m e p a s s a g e w a y to the west. T h r o u g h them she sent 50 percent of her export t r a d e , notably her wheat c r o p which, in t u r n , enabled her to buy a r m s a n d a m m u n i t i o n for the w a r . H a d the Allied leaders realized that the F i r s t World War w a s g o i n g to develop into a long war of attrition, they could have seen that T u r k e y ' s m i n i n g of the straits threatened to b r i n g d o w n C z a r i s t R u s s i a a n d , with her, the Allied c a u s e . 1 1

F r e e p a s s a g e t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s had been a s s u r e d b y treaty; once again the O t t o m a n authorities were violating their obligations u n d e r international law, and once again they a p p e a r e d to have been provoked to do so by the actions of Winston Churchill. Y e t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a d e no m o v e to declare war. Its position of passive hostility left Churchill baffled a n d f r u s t r a t e d . 12

Ill T h o u g h Churchill d i d not know it, f r o m the point of view of the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t , too, the situation was baffling a n d frustrating; G e r m a n military officers a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g T u r k e y into the war found themselves driven to anger a n d d e s p a i r . Berlin w a s bitterly d i s a p p o i n t e d that the continuing presence of the Goeben a n d Breslau did not provoke Britain into declaring war; a n d the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s received repeated d e m a n d s f r o m their h o m e g o v e r n m e n t s to p u s h the T u r k s into taking action. B o t h a m b a s s a d o r s recognized, however, that whatever the Y o u n g T u r k s ' ultimate intentions m i g h t b e , the G r a n d Vizier

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and his colleagues had valid reasons for not m o v i n g toward intervention in the E u r o p e a n conflict immediately. Mobilization of the a r m e d forces was not yet c o m p l e t e d ; a n d it was not clear, once mobilization had been c o m p l e t e d , how the fragile O t t o m a n exchequer could continue to s u p p o r t it. M o r e o v e r , T u r k i s h negotiations with neighboring B a l k a n countries, a n d particularly with B u l g a r i a , had not yet c o m e to fruition. F r o m the beginning, the Porte h a d m a d e clear its view that T u r k e y could intervene in the war only in p a r t n e r s h i p with B u l g a r i a . I n d e e d , the c a m p a i g n plan that had been worked out on 1 A u g u s t by E n v e r , W a n g e n h e i m , a n d L i m a n von S a n d e r s p r e s u p p o s e d that B u l g a r i a a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would c o m b i n e forces. B u l g a r i a sat astride T u r k e y ' s principal land route to the rest of E u r o p e a n d — o f m o r e i m m e d i a t e i m p o r t a n c e — w a s a n e i g h b o r who coveted additional territory. Were B u l g a r i a to invade T u r k e y while the O t t o m a n armies were away fighting the R u s s i a n s , the e m p i r e would be helpless. " S u r e l y , " the G r a n d Vizier r e m a r k e d to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , " G e r m a n y would not want T u r k e y to c o m m i t s u i c i d e . " 13

T h e B u l g a r i a n s , however, were reluctant to c o m m i t themselves, a n d while T a l a a t s u c c e e d e d in negotiating a defensive treaty with B u l g a r i a , signed on 19 A u g u s t , which p r o v i d e d for m u t u a l assistance in certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s in case either country was attacked by a third party, the t e r m s of the treaty were inapplicable to the situation that would arise if T u r k e y s h o u l d join G e r m a n y in the war against R u s s i a . B u l g a r i a was not p r e p a r e d to intervene in the R u s s o - G e r m a n conflict; a n d , as the G e r m a n s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e had been m a d e to u n d e r s t a n d , this meant that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , too, w o u l d continue to maintain its neutrality. Berlin a n d L o n d o n b o t h viewed C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with d e s p o n d e n c y . Churchill, it will be recalled, no longer believed in T u r k i s h neutrality a n d had p r o p o s e d to the C a b i n e t that a flotilla be sent up to the D a r d a n e l l e s to sink the Goeben a n d Breslau. B u t in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e only two d a y s later, G e n e r a l L i m a n von S a n d e r s — f r o m the o p p o s i t e point of v i e w — d e s p a i r e d of b r i n g i n g T u r k e y into the war a n d sent a r e q u e s t to the K a i s e r that he a n d his military mission be allowed to return h o m e . L i k e Churchill, he r a g e d against the Y o u n g T u r k s ; h e s p o k e o f challenging E n v e r a n d D j e m a l to d u e l s . In his r e q u e s t to the K a i s e r , L i m a n pointed out that Enver's recent statements and military dispositions indicated that the C . U . P . intended to keep T u r k e y on the sidelines until the war was over, or at least until it b e c a m e clear b e y o n d a d o u b t that G e r m a n y was g o i n g to win it. He also pointed out that the O t t o m a n armies might collapse even before entering the war, for lack of m o n e y a n d food, if the Porte continued to keep them in a state of m o b i l i z a t i o n . A t roughly the s a m e t i m e that A d m i r a l L i m p u s was reporting t o 1 4

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Winston Churchill that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s almost completely in G e r m a n h a n d s , G e n e r a l L i m a n von S a n d e r s w a s reporting t o the K a i s e r that the whole a t m o s p h e r e of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e m a d e it a l m o s t u n b e a r a b l e for G e r m a n officers to continue their service t h e r e . T h e K a i s e r , however, refused L i m a n ' s r e q u e s t that h e s h o u l d b e allowed to return to G e r m a n y . G e r m a n y ' s plan to win the war quickly by a r a p i d victory in western E u r o p e h a d collapsed at the first Battle of the M a r n e in early S e p t e m b e r ; a n d thereafter Berlin s t e p p e d u p the p r e s s u r e t o b r i n g T u r k e y into the war. T h e G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , von W a n g e n h e i m , w a s u n a b l e to explain to his h o m e g o v e r n m e n t how unrealistic, at least for the time being, that project a p p e a r e d to be in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . E v e n E n v e r , w h o m the a m b a s s a d o r had once d e s c r i b e d as s t a n d i n g "like a rock for G e r m a n y , " believed that the time for action had not yet c o m e : T u r k e y was not ready militarily a n d , in any event, E n v e r ' s colleagues were still o p p o s e d to intervention. 1 6

1 7

T h e difference between the ultimate objectives of the two g o v e r n m e n t s b e c a m e vividly evident on 8 S e p t e m b e r 1914, when the Porte s udde n l y a n n o u n c e d its unilateral a b r o g a t i o n of the C a p i t u l a t i o n s privileges o f all foreign p o w e r s — i n c l u d i n g G e r m a n y . T h e G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r flew into a rage u p o n receiving the news, a n d threatened that he a n d the military mission w o u l d p a c k up a n d leave for h o m e immediately. In the event, however, neither he nor the m i s s i o n left. T h a t they stayed illustrated the i m p r o v e m e n t in the T u r k i s h b a r g a i n i n g position since late J u l y . I n a n extraordinary m a n e u v e r , the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s joined with their enemies in the war, the British, F r e n c h , a n d R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r s , in p r e s e n t i n g a joint E u r o p e a n protest to the Porte, w h e r e u p o n it b e c a m e evident how skillful the T u r k i s h leaders had been in flirting without c o m m i t t i n g themselves. F o r the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s privately intimated to the Porte that they w o u l d not p r e s s the issue for the time being, while the Allied a m b a s s a d o r s , in t u r n , intimated that they w o u l d accept the T u r k i s h decision if T u r k e y continued to remain neutral. T h e Porte went O c t o b e r all foreign were m a d e s u b j e c t on foreign i m p o r t s

a h e a d to p u t its decision into effect. In early p o s t offices in the e m p i r e were c l o s e d ; foreigners t o T u r k i s h laws a n d c o u r t s ; a n d c u s t o m s d u t ie s not only were taken over, b u t were also raised.

IV C o n s i d e r i n g the tangible benefits that h a d b e g u n to flow f r o m the policy of non-intervention, it s e e m s astonishing that at a b o u t this time E n v e r P a s h a b e g a n to plot against that policy a n d against its

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leading p r o p o n e n t , the G r a n d Vizier. T h e substantial G e r m a n military presence in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , s u p p o r t e d by the Goeben a n d Breslau, m a y have played a role in his calculations; b u t what E n v e r had in m i n d is m o r e likely to have been the c o u r s e of the R u s s o G e r m a n war. I n J u l y a n d A u g u s t his policy had been motivated b y fear of R u s s i a n seizures of T u r k i s h territory; but in S e p t e m b e r , in the wake of the R u s s i a n collapse, he s e e m s to have turned to t h o u g h t s of T u r k e y seizing R u s s i a n territory. He switched f r o m a defensive to an aggressive policy. H i s switch was a turning point in O t t o m a n and M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs. I t m a y b e s u r m i s e d that the spectacular G e r m a n military t r i u m p h s over the R u s s i a n s at the battle of T a n n e n b e r g at the end of A u g u s t , and in the o n g o i n g battle of the M a s u r i a n L a k e s that b e g a n in S e p t e m b e r , p e r s u a d e d E n v e r that, if T u r k e y wanted to win a share of R u s s i a n territory, she would have to intervene s o o n , before G e r m a n y had won an u n a i d e d victory. H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of R u s s i a n t r o o p s had been killed or c a p t u r e d by the G e r m a n s , a n d even a less i m p e t u o u s observer than E n v e r might have c o n c l u d e d that R u s s i a was a b o u t to lose the war. T h e G e r m a n victory train was leaving the station, a n d the o p p o r t u n i s t i c E n v e r s e e m s to have been jolted into believing that it was his last chance to j u m p a b o a r d . On 26 S e p t e m b e r E n v e r personally o r d e r e d the closing of the D a r d a n e l l e s to all foreign s h i p s (in effect, to Allied s h i p p i n g ) without consulting his colleagues. A week later he told von Wangenheim that the G r a n d Vizier was no longer in control of the situation. A b i d for power was taking place in Constantinople behind closed d o o r s . T h e British F o r e i g n Office, which knew next to nothing a b o u t the internal politics of the C . U . P . , took a simplistic view of the affair. S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the F o r e i g n Secretary, later r e m e m b e r e d remarking that "nothing but the assassination of E n v e r would keep T u r k e y from joining G e r m a n y , " a n d a d d i n g "that, in times of crisis a n d violence in T u r k e y , there were a p t to be two classes of p e r s o n — a s s a s s i n s a n d a s s a s s i n a t e d , a n d that the G r a n d Vizier was m o r e likely than his o p p o n e n t to b e l o n g to the latter c l a s s . " 18

W o u l d it have been p o s s i b l e for a well-informed British a m b a s s a d o r to have exerted s o m e influence on the evolution of events in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ? H i s t o r i a n s continue to debate the question, a n d of c o u r s e there is now no way to p u t the matter to the t e s t . O b s c u r e though the details remain, what was g o i n g on in the a u t u m n of 1914 was a p r o c e s s in which rival factions and personalities m a n e u v e r e d for s u p p o r t within the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e . Enver's g r o w i n g influence c a m e from winning over T a l a a t B e y to his point of view, for T a l a a t headed the principal faction in the party. Other C . U . P . leaders, while s h a r i n g Enver's belief that G e r m a n y would p r o b a b l y win the war, until now h a d seen no reason to hazard 1 9

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their empire's future on the accuracy of that prediction. T h e y were politicians, while E n v e r was a warrior, younger a n d m o r e i m p e t u o u s than Churchill b u t filled with m u c h the s a m e passion for glory. As War Minister a n d G e r m a n y ' s best friend, he stood to benefit personally from the m a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s to increase his fame a n d position that war at G e r m a n y ' s side would offer. A d a s h i n g figure who had enjoyed almost unlimited luck b u t had d e m o n s t r a t e d only limited ability, he failed to see that bets can be lost as well as won. In putting his chips on G e r m a n y , he t h o u g h t he was m a k i n g an investm e n t — w h e n he was d o i n g no m o r e than placing a w a g e r . On 9 O c t o b e r , E n v e r informed von W a n g e n h e i m that he had won the s u p p o r t of T a l a a t a n d of Halil B e y , President of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s . T h e next m o v e , he s a i d , w o u l d be to try to g a i n the s u p p o r t of D j e m a l P a s h a , Minister of the M a r i n e . F a i l i n g that, he said, he p l a n n e d to provoke a C a b i n e t c r i s i s ; he claimed, on the b a s i s of his following in the Central C o m m i t t e e — w h i c h , in reality, was T a l a a t ' s following—that he could install a new pro-interventionist g o v e r n m e n t . O v e r s t a t i n g his political strength, E n v e r a s s u r e d the G e r m a n s that he c o u l d b r i n g T u r k e y into the war by m i d - O c t o b e r . All he n e e d e d , he told t h e m , w a s G e r m a n gold to s u p p o r t the army. T h e G e r m a n s , o f c o u r s e , were already aware that the O t t o m a n forces w o u l d need m o n e y ; L i m a n had reported to the K a i s e r that they w o u l d be in i m m i n e n t d a n g e r of collapse without it. 2 0

On 10 O c t o b e r , D j e m a l joined the conspiracy. On 11 O c t o b e r , E n v e r , T a l a a t , Halil, and D j e m a l conferred, a n d informed the G e r m a n s that their faction was now c o m m i t t e d to war a n d would authorize A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to attack R u s s i a as soon as G e r m a n y deposited two million T u r k i s h p o u n d s in gold in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to s u p p o r t the a r m e d forces. T h e G e r m a n s r e s p o n d e d b y s e n d i n g a million p o u n d s on 12 O c t o b e r a n d a further million on 17 O c t o b e r , s h i p p i n g the gold b y rail t h r o u g h neutral R u m a n i a . T h e second s h i p m e n t arrived in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e on 21 October. T a l a a t a n d Halil then c h a n g e d their m i n d s : they p r o p o s e d to keep the gold b u t , nonetheless, to remain neutral in the war. E n v e r reported this to the G e r m a n s on 23 O c t o b e r , but claimed that it did not matter as long as he could still count on the other military service minister, D j e m a l . T h o u g h h e later a n n o u n c e d that T a l a a t had s w u n g back again to the pro-interventionist c a u s e , E n v e r gave up a t t e m p t i n g to p e r s u a d e his p a r t y and his g o v e r n m e n t to intervene in the war. He could not get T u r k e y to declare war on the Allies so he pinned his hopes on a plan to provoke the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s to declare war on Turkey. E n v e r a n d D j e m a l issued secret o r d e r s allowing A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to lead the Goeben a n d Breslau into the Black S e a to attack R u s s i a n vessels. Enver's plan w a s to claim that the warships had been attacked

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by the R u s s i a n s a n d had been forced to defend themselves. A d m i r a l S o u c h o n , however, d i s o b e y e d E n v e r ' s o r d e r s a n d openly started the fighting by b o m b a r d i n g the R u s s i a n coast. O n c e again the G e r m a n admiral gave history a p u s h . H i s p u r p o s e , he stated later, was "to force the T u r k s , even against their will, to s p r e a d the w a r . " As a result of his actions, it was all too clear that the Goeben a n d Breslau had struck a p r e m e d i t a t e d blow; there was now no lie behind which E n v e r could conceal what he had allowed to h a p p e n . T h e incident led to an o p e n s h o w d o w n in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e G r a n d Vizier and the C a b i n e t forced E n v e r to cable an o r d e r to A d m i r a l S o u c h o n to cease fire. A political crisis ensued that lasted for nearly two d a y s , the details of which were veiled even f r o m the normally well-informed G e r m a n s and A u s t r i a n s . T h e r e were meetings of the O t t o m a n Cabinet a n d of the C . U . P . Central C o m m i t t e e . D e b a t e was joined, threats were issued, coalitions were f o r m e d , resignations were tendered, a n d resignations were withd r a w n . A p p a r e n t l y the c o n s e n s u s a p p r o x i m a t e d the thinking of A s q u i t h in Britain j u s t before the outbreak of war: that the first priority was to maintain party unity. E v e n though a majority in the Central C o m m i t t e e s u p p o r t e d the newly f o r m e d triumvirate of T a l a a t , E n v e r , a n d D j e m a l in the view that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e now ought to enter the war, it deferred to the views of the minority, led by the G r a n d Vizier a n d the Minister of F i n a n c e , rather than allow a party split to occur. 21

On 31 O c t o b e r E n v e r reported to the G e r m a n s that his colleagues in the Cabinet insisted on d i s p a t c h i n g a note of apology to the R u s s i a n s . F r o m the G e r m a n point of view this w a s a d a n g e r o u s p r o p o s a l , b u t E n v e r said that, having " d u p e d " his colleagues a b o u t the attack on R u s s i a , he now found himself isolated in the C a b i n e t ; his h a n d s , he s a i d , were t i e d . T h o u g h E n v e r and his G e r m a n co-conspirators did not yet know it, there was no need for a l a r m : in L o n d o n the British C a b i n e t had already risen to the bait. T h e British were unaware of the deep split in Y o u n g T u r k ranks and believed the Porte to have been in collusion with G e r m a n y all along. R e s p o n d i n g to S o u c h o n ' s attack even before the Porte drafted its a p o l o g y , the C a b i n e t authorized the s e n d i n g of an ultimatum requiring the T u r k s immediately to expel the G e r m a n military mission a n d to remove the G e r m a n officers and m e n from the Goeben a n d Breslau. When the T u r k s did not c o m p l y , Churchill did not bother to refer the matter back to the C a b i n e t ; on his own initiative he dispatched an order to his forces in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n on the afternoon of 31 O c t o b e r to " C o m m e n c e hostilities at once against T u r k e y . " 2 2

2 3

T h e British admiral who received Churchill's order d i d not carry it out immediately a n d , in c o n s e q u e n c e , T u r k e y was u n a w a r e that

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Britain had g o n e to war against her. In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , E n v e r still feared that the T u r k i s h apology t o R u s s i a might b e a c c e p t e d . T o prevent that f r o m h a p p e n i n g , he again foiled the intentions of his C a b i n e t colleagues by inserting into the T u r k i s h note an o u t r a g e o u s allegation that R u s s i a had provoked the a t t a c k . Predictably the Czar's g o v e r n m e n t rejected the allegation, issued an u l t i m a t u m to the Porte, a n d on 2 N o v e m b e r declared war. British naval forces c o m m e n c e d hostile operations against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e on 1 N o v e m b e r . At a d r a m a t i c meeting of the O t t o m a n C a b i n e t on the night of N o v e m b e r 1—2, even the G r a n d Vizier's peace faction was obliged to recognize that the e m p i r e was now at war, like it or not. Yet no declaration of war was issued from London. On 3 N o v e m b e r , on instructions f r o m Churchill, British w a r s h i p s b o m b a r d e d the outer forts of the D a r d a n e l l e s . Critics later c h a r g e d that this w a s a piece of childish petulance on Churchill's p a r t which alerted T u r k e y to the vulnerability of the forts. T h e r e is no evidence, however, that T u r k e y r e s p o n d e d to the warning. At the time, the chief significance of the b o m b a r d m e n t s e e m e d to be its demonstration that hostilities h a d c o m m e n c e d . On 4 N o v e m b e r , A s q u i t h confided that "we are now frankly at war with T u r k e y . " T h e formalities, however, were neglected. It was not until the m o r n i n g of 5 N o v e m b e r that, at a meeting with the Privy Council, the p r o c l a m a t i o n s of war against the Hohenzollern a n d H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s were a m e n d e d to include the O t t o m a n Empire. T h e relative c a s u a l n e s s with which the British drifted into the O t t o m a n war reflected the attitudes of British Cabinet ministers at the t i m e : it was not a war to which they attached m u c h i m p o r t a n c e , and they m a d e no great effort to prevent it. T h e y did not regard T u r k e y as an especially d a n g e r o u s enemy. 24

2 5

V In L o n d o n it was still not k n o w n — i n d e e d it would not be known until years later—that E n v e r h a d taken the initiative in p r o p o s i n g , negotiating, and executing a secret treaty of alliance with G e r m a n y before the A d m i r a l t y had seized the T u r k i s h battleships. It also was not known that it was the Porte that had seized the Goeben a n d Breslau, and that it had done so over G e r m a n protest. In D o w n i n g Street the official account was believed, according to which the K a i s e r had initiated the transfer to T u r k e y of the G e r m a n vessels to replace the Osman a n d Reshadieh in order to win over to G e r m a n y the T u r k s w h o m Churchill had alienated.

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It was the c o m m o n view, therefore, that it was Churchill who had b r o u g h t a b o u t the war with T u r k e y . I n d e e d , L l o y d G e o r g e continued to level the c h a r g e against h i m as late as 1 9 2 1 . S o u c h o n a n d E n v e r had in fact started the war between T u r k e y a n d the Allies, b u t in the public imagination of the British it w a s Churchill who had done so. Churchill, for his p a r t , b e g a n to point out in A u g u s t 1 9 1 4 — a n d continued to point out thereafter—that having the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for an e n e m y had its a d v a n t a g e s . F r e e at last to cut up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to offer portions of its territory to other countries at the eventual p e a c e settlement, Britain could now hold out the lure of territorial gains in order to b r i n g Italy a n d the Balkan countries into the war on her side. Italy, a latecomer to the p u r s u i t of colonial e m p i r e , h a d c o m e to see the vulnerable O t t o m a n d o m a i n s as the principal territories still available for acquisition. S h e r e m a i n e d anxious to a c q u i r e even m o r e O t t o m a n territory. Eventually, the lure of acquisition helped to b r i n g her into the war on the Allied s i d e . T h e Balkan countries, too, coveted additional territorial g a i n s . F o r Britain to forge an alliance with all the Balkan countries by the p r o m i s e of O t t o m a n territory r e q u i r e d the reconciliation of s o m e of their rival a m b i t i o n s ; b u t if this c o u l d be achieved, s u c h a c o m b i nation would b r i n g powerful forces to b e a r against the O t t o m a n a n d H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s , a n d offered the p r o s p e c t of helping b r i n g the war against G e r m a n y to a swift a n d successful conclusion. Already on 14 A u g u s t , A s q u i t h noted that "Venizelos, the G r e e k Prime Minister, has a great s c h e m e on foot for a federation of B a l k a n S t a t e s against G e r m a n y a n d A u s t r i a . . . " O n 2 1 A u g u s t , A s q u i t h characterized a n u m b e r of his ministers as looking to Italy, R u m a n i a , or B u l g a r i a as potential allies of i m p o r t a n c e ; L l o y d G e o r g e as being "keen for B a l k a n confederation"; a n d "Winston violently antiT u r k . " He himself, however, was "very m u c h against any aggressive action vis-a-vis T u r k e y wh. w d . excite our M u s s u l m a n s in I n d i a & E g y p t . " Churchill was not so i m p e t u o u s as that m a d e him s o u n d . In fact he had taken the time a n d trouble to c o m m u n i c a t e personally with E n v e r and other O t t o m a n leaders who were h o p i n g to keep their country neutral. He had given up on them two m o n t h s too soon; b u t it was only when he had b e c o m e convinced that there was no chance of keeping T u r k e y out of the war that he had s w u n g a r o u n d to pointing out the a d v a n t a g e s of having her in it. 2 6

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By the end of A u g u s t , Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e were enthusiastic advocates of the B a l k a n a p p r o a c h . On 31 A u g u s t Churchill wrote a private letter to Balkan leaders u r g i n g the creation of a confederation o f B u l g a r i a , S e r b i a , R u m a n i a , M o n t e n e g r o , a n d G r e e c e to join the Allies. On 2 S e p t e m b e r he initiated private talks with the G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t to d i s c u s s the form that military cooperation

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between their two countries m i g h t take in an offensive operation against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . At the e n d of S e p t e m b e r , Churchill wrote to S i r E d w a r d G r e y that "in our a t t e m p t to placate T u r k e y we are crippling our policy in the B a l k a n s . I am not s u g g e s t i n g that we s h o u l d take a g g r e s s i v e action against T u r k e y or declare war on her ourselves, but we o u g h t from now to m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s with the Balkan S t a t e s , particularly B u l g a r i a , without r e g a r d to the interests or integrity of T u r k e y . " He c o n c l u d e d his additional r e m a r k s by a d d i n g that "All I am a s k i n g is that the interests a n d integrity of T u r k e y shall no longer be c o n s i d e r e d by you in any efforts which are m a d e to s e c u r e c o m m o n action a m o n g the C h r i s t i a n Balkan S t a t e s . " 2 9

G r e y a n d A s q u i t h were m o r e c a u t i o u s in their a p p r o a c h , a n d less enthusiastic a b o u t the p r o p o s e d B a l k a n Confederation than were Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e , b u t in at least one respect their thinking evolved in a parallel way. In order to p e r s u a d e T u r k e y to r e m a i n neutral, the representatives of the British g o v e r n m e n t eventually h a d been instructed to give a s s u r a n c e s that, if she did s o , O t t o m a n territorial integrity w o u l d be r e s p e c t e d . F r o m this there followed a converse proposition, that G r e y h a d m a d e explicit as early as 15 A u g u s t , "that, on the other h a n d , if T u r k e y s i d e d with G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a , and they were defeated, of c o u r s e we could not answer for what might b e taken from T u r k e y i n A s i a M i n o r . " 3 0

When the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the w a r — p u l l e d into it by Churchill as it s e e m e d then, p u s h e d into it by E n v e r a n d S o u c h o n as it s e e m s n o w — t h e conclusion that British policy-makers drew therefore s e e m e d to be i n e s c a p a b l e . In a s p e e c h delivered in L o n d o n on 9 N o v e m b e r 1914, the P r i m e Minister predicted that the war h a d "rung the death-knell of O t t o m a n d o m i n i o n , not only in E u r o p e , b u t in A s i a . " 3 1

Earlier in 1914, S i r M a r k S y k e s , the T o r y M . P . who was his party's leading e x p e r t on T u r k i s h affairs, had w a r n e d the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that "the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m u s t be the first step t o w a r d s the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of our own." Wellington, C a n n i n g , P a l m e r s t o n , a n d Disraeli had all felt that preserving the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was of i m p o r t a n c e to Britain a n d to E u r o p e . Y e t in a little less than a h u n d r e d days the British g o v e r n ment h a d completely reversed the policy of m o r e than a h u n d r e d y e a r s , a n d now s o u g h t to destroy the great buffer e m p i r e that in times p a s t British g o v e r n m e n t s had risked a n d w a g e d w a r s to s a f e g u a r d . 3

T h e Cabinet's new policy was p r e d i c a t e d on the theory that T u r k e y h a d forfeited any claim to enjoy the protection of Britain. In the turmoil of war the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had lost sight of one of the m o s t important truths a b o u t traditional British foreign policy: that the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was to be protected not in order

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to serve the best interests of T u r k e y b u t in order to serve the best interests of Britain. In t u r n , the British decision to d i s m a n t l e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e finally b r o u g h t into play the a s s u m p t i o n that E u r o p e a n s h a d s h a r e d a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t for c e n t u r i e s : that its p o s t - O t t o m a n political destinies w o u l d be taken in h a n d by one or m o r e of the E u r o p e a n powers. T h u s the one thing which B r i t i s h leaders foresaw in 1914 with perfect clarity was that O t t o m a n entry into the war m a r k e d the first step on the r o a d to a r e m a k i n g of the M i d d l e E a s t : to the creation, indeed, of the m o d e r n M i d d l e E a s t .

PART II KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM LOOKS AHEAD

8 K I T C H E N E R T A K E S COMMAND

i D u r i n g the s u m m e r a n d a u t u m n o f 1914, a s the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was drifting into the war, an i m p o r t a n t new g o v e r n m e n t a l appointment in L o n d o n w a s b e g i n n i n g to affect British policy in the M i d d l e E a s t . It b e g a n , as so m a n y things d i d , with Winston Churchill. On 28 J u l y 1914, the s a m e day that he initiated the seizure of the T u r k i s h vessels, Churchill held a luncheon meeting with F i e l d M a r s h a l H o r a t i o H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r to d i s c u s s the d e e p e n i n g international crisis. As p r o c o n s u l in E g y p t , the veteran c o m m a n d e r of Britain's imperial a r m i e s was r e s p o n s i b l e for the security of the S u e z C a n a l a n d of the t r o o p s f r o m I n d i a who were to be t r a n s p o r t e d through it in the event of war. Churchill, the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y , was r e s p o n s i b l e for the naval escort of the t r o o p s h i p s on their long voyage to E u r o p e ; a n d over lunch the y o u n g politician a n d the old soldier e x c h a n g e d views. Churchill told K i t c h e n e r that "If war c o m e s , you will not go b a c k to E u r o p e . " It w a s not what the field m a r s h a l wanted to hear. K i t c h e n e r h a d c o m e to Britain intending to stay only long e n o u g h to attend the 17 J u l y c e r e m o n i e s elevating h i m to the rank a n d title of E a r l K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ; he was anxious to return to his post as British A g e n t a n d C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in E g y p t as soon as p o s s i b l e . H i s eyes h a d always been t u r n e d t o w a r d the E a s t ; h e told K i n g G e o r g e that he wanted to be a p p o i n t e d Viceroy of I n d i a when that post b e c a m e available as s c h e d u l e d in 1915, t h o u g h he feared that "the politicians" w o u l d block his a p p o i n t m e n t . T h e c r u s t y , b a d - t e m p e r e d K i t c h e n e r loathed politicians. 1

2

E v e n the disintegrating international situation could not keep h i m in L o n d o n . E a r l y in A u g u s t he traveled to D o v e r to catch a Channel s t e a m e r ; the plan w a s that he w o u l d take the train f r o m C a l a i s to Marseilles, a n d there w o u l d b o a r d a cruiser for E g y p t . S h o r t l y before noon on 3 A u g u s t , he b o a r d e d the s t e a m e r at D o v e r , a n d c o m p l a i n e d 79

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impatiently when it failed to set off for C a l a i s at the s c h e d u l e d departure time. As it h a p p e n e d , his d e p a r t u r e was a b o u t to be cancelled rather than delayed. T h e previous evening, in the s m o k i n g r o o m of B r o o k s ' s , a L o n d o n c l u b , s o m e o n e who fell into conversation with a C o n s e r v a tive M e m b e r of Parliament r e m a r k e d that the War Office was in an absolutely chaotic state a n d that it was a pity that K i t c h e n e r had not been asked to take it over. L a t e r that evening, the M . P . reported his conversation to two of his party's leaders who were in a semi-private r o o m of the club d i s c u s s i n g the international situation. A n d r e w B o n a r L a w a n d S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n — t h e leaders t o w h o m the conversation was r e p o r t e d — t o o k the matter up with A r t h u r Balfour, the former Conservative P r i m e Minister, who p a s s e d the s u g g e s t i o n on to Churchill, with w h o m he was on g o o d t e r m s . On the m o r n i n g of 3 A u g u s t — t h e d a y G e r m a n y declared war on F r a n c e — a n article a p p e a r e d in The Times, written by its military c o r r e s p o n d e n t , u r g i n g the a p p o i n t m e n t of K i t c h e n e r to head the War Office. T h a t s a m e m o r n i n g , Churchill saw the P r i m e Minister a n d p r o p o s e d K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , t h o u g h apparently without indicating that the p r o p o s a l c a m e from the Conservatives as well as from himself. Churchill's notes indicate that he thought that A s q u i t h had accepted the p r o p o s a l at the t i m e ; b u t in fact the P r i m e Minister was reluctant to make the a p p o i n t m e n t , a n d decided instead to keep K i t c h e n e r in Britain merely in an a d v i s o r y position. On b o a r d the C h a n n e l s t e a m e r , which had not yet left D o v e r , K i t c h e n e r received a m e s s a g e f r o m the P r i m e Minister asking him to return immediately to L o n d o n . T h e field marshal at first r e f u s e d ; and it was with difficulty that he was p e r s u a d e d to d i s e m b a r k . H i s fears were justified; back in L o n d o n he found that A s q u i t h did not s e e m to be thinking of a regular position for him, let alone one with clearly defined p o w e r s a n d responsibilities. U r g e d on by his colleagues, K i t c h e n e r decided to force the i s s u e ; he went to see the P r i m e Minister for a one-hour meeting on the evening of 4 A u g u s t — the night Britain decided to go to war, by which time G e r m a n a r m i e s were already o v e r r u n n i n g B e l g i u m — a n d stated that, if obliged to remain in L o n d o n , he w o u l d accept no position less than S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War. P u s h e d by politicians a n d the p r e s s , the P r i m e Minister g a v e way the next d a y , a n d K i t c h e n e r was a p p o i n t e d War Minister. As he wrote: " K . was (to do h i m justice) not at all anxious to c o m e in, but when it was presented to h i m as a d u t y he a g r e e d . It is clearly u n d e r s t o o d that he has no politics, & that his place at C a i r o is kept o p e n — s o that he can return to it when peace c o m e s . It is a h a z a r d o u s experiment, but the best in the c i r c u m s t a n c e s , I think." A s s u m i n g , as did nearly everybody else, that the war would last no m o r e than a 3

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few m o n t h s , A s q u i t h did not replace K i t c h e n e r as A g e n t and C o n s u l G e n e r a l in E g y p t ; he thought that the field m a r s h a l would be returning to his post there shortly. On 6 A u g u s t K i t c h e n e r took up his new duties in the War Office in Whitehall. L o r d K i t c h e n e r lived in a b o r r o w e d h o u s e in L o n d o n , m a k i n g it plain that he d i d not intend to stay. It w a s located just off the intersection o f C a r l t o n H o u s e T e r r a c e a n d C a r l t o n G a r d e n s , less than a five-minute walk from the War Office, which m e a n t that he could s p e n d almost every waking m o m e n t on the j o b . He arose at 6:00 a . m . , arrived at his office at 9 : 0 0 a . m . , generally took a cold lunch there, returned to his t e m p o r a r y h o m e at 6:00 p . m . to read the evening p a p e r s a n d n a p , a n d then after dinner would r e a d official cables until late at n i g h t . T h e g l a s s or two of wine with dinner and the nightly scotch a n d s o d a that h a d been his c o m f o r t s in E g y p t were forsworn; at the request of G e o r g e V he h a d p l e d g e d to set a national e x a m p l e by drinking no alcoholic b e v e r a g e s d u r i n g the war. 4

Asquith's reluctance to b r i n g the f a m o u s soldier into the C a b i n e t s e e m s to have been p r o m p t e d by the fear that, as S e c r e t a r y for War, K i t c h e n e r , rather than the P r i m e Minister, would e m e r g e as Britain's w a r t i m e leader. No great soldier h a d served in a m a j o r office of state since the D u k e of Wellington's ministry nearly a century b e f o r e ; a n d no serving a r m y officer h a d been i n c l u d e d in a C a b i n e t since G e n e r a l G e o r g e M o n k , who in 1660 restored the m o n a r c h y a n d then was r e w a r d e d with high office. T h e principle of civilian authority had been u p h e l d jealously since then; b u t A s q u i t h felt obliged to s u b o r d i nate it to his urgent need for F i e l d M a r s h a l Kitchener's services. K i t c h e n e r w a s a figure of l e g e n d — a national m y t h w h o s e photo h u n g on walls t h r o u g h o u t the k i n g d o m . After he took up his C a b i n e t a p p o i n t m e n t , large c r o w d s would gather to watch h i m enter a n d leave the War Office each d a y . As the P r i m e Minister's d a u g h t e r later wrote: He w a s an almost s y m b o l i c figure a n d what he s y m b o l i z e d , I think, was s t r e n g t h , decision, and a b o v e all s u c c e s s . . . [Everything that he t o u c h e d 'came o f f . T h e r e was a feeling that K i t c h e n e r c o u l d not fail. T h e psychological effect of his a p p o i n t ment, the tonic to p u b l i c confidence, were instantaneous a n d overwhelming. A n d he at once g a v e , in his own right, a national status to the g o v e r n m e n t . 5

T h e p u b l i c , it w a s s a i d , d i d not reason a b o u t K i t c h e n e r , but s i m p l y trusted him completely, s a y i n g " K i t c h e n e r is there; it is all r i g h t . " In the p a s t he h a d always b r o u g h t things to a successful conclusion. 6

In March 1915 he moved into York House, St James's Palace, a residence provided for him by K i n g George.

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He had avenged the m u r d e r of G e n e r a l C h a r l e s G e o r g e G o r d o n in the fall of K h a r t o u m by d e s t r o y i n g the e m p i r e of the D e r v i s h e s and r e c o n q u e r i n g the S u d a n . T h e F r e n c h had then a t t e m p t e d t o intrude u p o n Britain's imperial d o m a i n s , b u t in 1898 K i t c h e n e r firmly confronted t h e m at the fort of F a s h o d a in the S u d a n , a n d the F r e n c h contingent b a c k e d d o w n a n d withdrew from the fort. In S o u t h Africa the B o e r War h a d b e g u n b a d l y ; then K i t c h e n e r c a m e to take charge and b r o u g h t it to a victorious conclusion. As c o m m a n d e r of the armies of I n d i a in the early twentieth century, he had i m p o s e d his will as decisively as he had d o n e in E g y p t . T h e far-off o u t p o s t s of e m p i r e in which he won his brilliant victories lent h i m their g l a m o r . D i s t a n c e m a d e him s e e m at once magical a n d larger-than-life, like a s p h i n x presiding over the desert. A lone, insecure, and secretive figure who u s e d a small g r o u p of aides as a wall against the world, he a p p e a r e d instead to be the s t r o n g and silent hero of p o p u l a r m y t h o l o g y . H i s painful shyness w a s not seen as s u c h ; his fear of his political colleagues a p p e a r e d to be d i s d a i n . A y o u n g F o r e i g n Office clerk w h o watched the field marshal at a gathering with the P r i m e Minister, S i r E d w a r d G r e y , a n d D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , recorded in his diary that "Kitchener looked like an officer who has got m i x e d up with a lot of strolling players a n d is trying to p r e t e n d he doesn't know t h e m . " 7

T a l l , b r o a d - s h o u l d e r e d , s q u a r e - j a w e d , with b u s h y eyebrows, bristling m o u s t a c h e , cold b l u e eyes set widely apart, a n d an intimidating glower, he towered physically over his fellows and looked the part for which destiny a n d the p o p u l a r p r e s s had cast him. F r o m his earliest c a m p a i g n s , he was fortunate in the journalists who followed his career a n d who created his p u b l i c i m a g e . He was fortunate, too, in the timing of his career, which coincided with the rise of imperial sentiment, literature, a n d ideology in Britain. Disraeli, K i p l i n g , A. E. W. M a s o n (author of Four Feathers), L i o n e l C u r t i s (a founder of the Round Table, the imperialist q u a r t e r l y ) , J o h n B u c h a n , and others created the tidal wave of feeling on the crest of which he r o d e . G e o r g e S t e e v e n s of the Daily Mail, who was p e r h a p s the leading war c o r r e s p o n d e n t of his t i m e , told his readers in 1900 that Kitchener's "precision is so u n h u m a n l y unerring he is m o r e like a machine than a m a n . " S t e e v e n s wrote a book a b o u t the S u d a n c a m p a i g n , telling how K i t c h e n e r (then sirdar, or c o m m a n d e r , of the E g y p t i a n a r m y ) led his a r m i e s south over nearly a t h o u s a n d miles of rock and s a n d , from the waters of the N i l e Valley to l a n d s where rain never falls, to c o n q u e r a country of a million s q u a r e miles. I g n o r i n g the episodes in which Kitchener's generalship was open to criticism, the book dwelt at length on the characteristic organizational ability that derived from the sirdar's b a c k g r o u n d as an engineering officer. A c c o r d i n g to S t e e v e n s , K i t c h e n e r p r e p a r e d his m o v e m e n t s with s u c h 8

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care that "he has never given battle without m a k i n g certain of an annihilating victory . . . " S t e e v e n s wrote that "the m a n has d i s a p peared . . . there i s n o m a n H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r , b u t only the S i r d a r , neither as k i n g affection nor giving it. H i s officers a n d m e n are wheels in the m a c h i n e : he feeds t h e m e n o u g h to m a k e t h e m efficient, and works t h e m as mercilessly as he works h i m s e l f . " When he joined the C a b i n e t , a n d indeed for m a n y m o n t h s afterw a r d , its other m e m b e r s — t o m o s t of w h o m he was a s t r a n g e r — w e r e in awe of h i m . A l t h o u g h they were jolted by his military p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , which ran counter to everything which they had been led to believe, they a c c e p t e d his j u d g m e n t s without d e m u r . T h e y h a d believed the professional British a r m y to be of a d e q u a t e size, but d u r i n g his first d a y at the War Office, K i t c h e n e r r e m a r k e d , " T h e r e is no a r m y . " T h e accepted view was that the war would be a short one, b u t K i t c h e n e r with unerring foresight told an astonished ( a n d , according to Churchill, a skeptical) C a b i n e t that Britain would have to maintain an a r m y of millions of m e n in the field; that the war w o u l d last at least three y e a r s ; a n d that it would only be d e c i d e d by bloody battles on the continent of E u r o p e a n d not at s e a . D e f y i n g the conventional view that a large a r m y could be created only by conscription, K i t c h e n e r instead raised his m a s s a r m y by a volunteer recruitment c a m p a i g n , which s u r p r i s e d his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s as m u c h as it has a m a z e d posterity. 10

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K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d to win the war by organizing his forces as thoroughly as he h a d d o n e in a d v a n c e of the K h a r t o u m c a m p a i g n . He w o u l d s p e n d the first years methodically creating, training, a n d e q u i p p i n g an a r m y of o v e r w h e l m i n g strength, a n d would concentrate his forces, not d i s s i p a t e t h e m in s i d e s h o w s . T h e i m p e n d i n g O t t o m a n war, he felt, w o u l d be a s i d e s h o w ; it w o u l d be a waste of r e s o u r c e s to send additional t r o o p s to fight the T u r k s . He feared a T u r k i s h attack on the S u e z C a n a l — h i s only military concern in the M i d d l e E a s t — but he believed that the British forces in E g y p t could deal with it. T h e M i d d l e E a s t played no role in his plans for winning the war. B u t that did not m e a n that K i t c h e n e r h a d no M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy; as will be seen presently, he held s t r o n g views a b o u t what role Britain s h o u l d play in the region once the E u r o p e a n war was won.

II It was p u r e accident that the military hero brought into the g o v e r n ment to p r e s i d e over the war effort should have been one who r e g a r d e d himself, a n d was r e g a r d e d by others, as having the E a s t for his special province. F r o m that accident c a m e the distinctive outlines of the policy that e m e r g e d .

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M o s t recently, K i t c h e n e r h a d g o v e r n e d E g y p t , a country officially still part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , b u t which h a d in effect been an independent country until the British h a d o c c u p i e d it in 1882, with the stated a i m of restoring order and then leaving. I n s t e a d of leaving, the British stayed on. As of 1914, E g y p t was a relatively recent addition to the British s p h e r e of influence, a n d British officers who served there with K i t c h e n e r h a d b e g u n to develop a distinctive outlook on events. S t a t i o n e d as they were in an A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g country, they had c o m e to r e g a r d themselves, mistakenly, as e x p e r t s on A r a b affairs, a n d were all the m o r e frustrated to be e x c l u d e d from foreign policy m a k i n g by the F o r e i g n Office a n d by the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a — t h e two b o d i e s that traditionally dealt with the A r a b i c s p e a k i n g portions of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Neither K i t c h e n e r nor his aides d e m o n s t r a t e d any real awareness of the great differences b e tween the m a n y c o m m u n i t i e s in the M i d d l e E a s t . A r a b i a n s a n d E g y p t i a n s , for e x a m p l e , t h o u g h both A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g , were otherwise different—in population mix, history, culture, outlook, a n d c i r c u m stances. E v e n had they been the e x p e r t s on E g y p t which they believed themselves to b e , that w o u l d not necessarily have m a d e K i t c h e n e r ' s aides the experts on A r a b i a they c l a i m e d to b e . In the S u d a n c a m p a i g n , u n d e r t a k e n in the face of m i s g i v i n g s within both the F o r e i g n Office a n d L o r d C r o m e r ' s E g y p t i a n a d min is t r a t io n , K i t c h e n e r had greatly e x p a n d e d the area of Britain's control of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. I t m a y have been d u r i n g the S u d a n c a m p a i g n that K i t c h e n e r first b e g a n to d r e a m of carving out a great new imperial d o m a i n for Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t , in which he w o u l d serve as her viceroy. As early as the end of the nineteenth century, British officials were aware that the K h e d i v e — t h e native prince from behind whose throne Britain ruled E g y p t — w a s a m b i t i o u s to e x p a n d his authority. Alt h o u g h in theory he was the O t t o m a n Sultan's viceroy in E g y p t , there were persistent r u m o r s that he considered the possibility of taking the S u l t a n ' s place as temporal a n d spiritual l o r d — S u l t a n and C a l i p h — o f the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces of the e m p i r e , thereby splitting the e m p i r e in half. A variant was the r u m o r that he p l a n n e d to annex the M o s l e m H o l y Places in A r a b i a and establish a caliph there u n d e r his p r o t e c t i o n . T h e British a n d E g y p t i a n officers attached to him would u n d e r s t a n d that the achievement of any s u c h plan would b r i n g greatly enlarged authority to themselves. 13

At the t i m e — t h e end of the nineteenth c e n t u r y — t h e G r e a t Power principally o p p o s e d to the e x p a n s i o n of British E g y p t was F r a n c e , which had aligned herself with R u s s i a . As viewed from Britain's o u t p o s t s b o r d e r i n g the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the alliance s e e m e d to be directed against Britain. B u t R u s s i a was far away; a n d in E g y p t and the S u d a n , F r a n c e was the enemy whose threatening presence was

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felt close at h a n d . Rivalry with F r a n c e for position a n d influence in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g w o r l d : that was the policy in the service of which K i t c h e n e r ' s officers h a d been r e a r e d . L a r g e r c o m b i n a t i o n s a n d considerations in world politics were beyond the range of the typical officer in British C a i r o , an enclave that p o s s e s s e d (wrote o n e of K i t c h e n e r ' s a i d e s ) "all the n a r r o w n e s s a n d p r o v i n c i a l i s m of an E n g l i s h g a r r i s o n t o w n . . . " T h e local c o m m u n i t y o f B r i t i s h officials a n d their families w a s tight a n d h o m o g e n e o u s . I t s life centered a r o u n d the S p o r t i n g C l u b , the T u r f C l u b , and the balls given at a leading hotel six nights out of seven. 14

It was from this provincial g a r r i s o n c o m m u n i t y — i t s views on A r a b policy hitherto ignored by the m a k e r s of British world policy—that L o r d Kitchener emerged.

Ill T h e outbreak of the war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m a d e it necessary to clarify the nature of Britain's presence in E g y p t a n d C y p r u s , for both were nominally still part of the S u l t a n ' s e m p i r e . T h e C a b i n e t was in favor of an n e x i n g both countries a n d , indeed, a c c o r d i n g to what officials in C a i r o were told, h a d already m a d e the decision. R o n a l d S t o r r s , the Oriental S e c r e t a r y (which is to say, the staff specialist in E a s t e r n affairs) to L o r d K i t c h e n e r in C a i r o , protested that, in the case of E g y p t , s u c h a decision violated forty years of p r o m i s e s by British g o v e r n m e n t s that the British occupation was merely t e m p o r a r y . T h e A g e n c y (that is, the office of the British A g e n t in E g y p t , L o r d K i t c h e n e r ) a d v o c a t e d a protectorate s t a t u s for E g y p t , with at least token reference to, eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e — a case a r g u e d effectively by Milne C h e e t h a m (acting chief of the A g e n c y in K i t c h e n e r ' s a b s e n c e ) . T h e C a b i n e t a b a n d o n e d its own views in deference to those of the A g e n c y , and thus showed the direction of things to c o m e . T h e C a b i n e t , in this instance, allowed Kitchener's A g e n c y to establish the p r o t o t y p e of the form of rule that the field m a r s h a l and his staff eventually wanted Britain to exercise throughout the A r a b i c speaking world. It was not to be direct rule, s u c h as was practiced in p a r t s of I n d i a . In K i t c h e n e r ' s E g y p t a hereditary prince a n d native C a b i n e t ministers a n d g o v e r n o r s went t h r o u g h the motions of governing. T h e y p r o m u l g a t e d u n d e r their own n a m e decisions reco m m e n d e d to t h e m by the British a d v i s e r s attached to their respective offices; that w a s the form of protectorate g o v e r n m e n t favored by the K i t c h e n e r g r o u p . In the artful w o r d s of R o n a l d S t o r r s : "We d e p recated the I m p e r a t i v e , preferring the S u b j u n c t i v e , even the wistful, Optative m o o d . " 1 5

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T h e E g y p t i a n decision w a s the forerunner of others in which S t o r r s a n d other m e m b e r s of K i t c h e n e r ' s entourage m a d e policy decisions for the M i d d l e E a s t u n d e r cover of the reclusive field marshal's authority. When the views of the g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the E a s t c a m e into conflict with those of L o r d K i t c h e n e r , it was the latter that were likely to prevail. D e c i s i o n s that normally w o u l d have been m a d e by the P r i m e Minister, the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , the Viceroy of I n d i a , or the C a b i n e t were instead m a d e by relatively junior officials who represented K i t c h e n e r a n d p u r p o r t e d to represent his views. Only the field marshal's u n i q u e prestige m a d e this p o s s i b l e . O n one t e l e g r a m f r o m C a i r o , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the F o r e i g n Secretary, m i n u t e d " D o e s L o r d K i t c h e n e r agree? If s o , I will a p p r o v e . " He c o u l d have written the s a m e inscription on t h e m all. K i t c h e n e r was s c r u p u l o u s in clearing foreign-policy decisions with G r e y , b u t G r e y deferred t o him, a n d a p p r o v e d even those p r o p o s a l s of the War Minister with which he d i s a g r e e d . O n e reason that M e m b e r s of Parliament and the C a b i n e t left eastern questions so m u c h to K i t c h e n e r a n d his e n t o u r a g e was that they themselves knew little a b o u t t h e m . To a g o v e r n m e n t official in the 1980s, a c c u s t o m e d to b u l g i n g reference libraries, to worldwide p r e s s coverage, a n d to the o v e r w h e l m i n g s u p p l y of detailed information a b o u t foreign countries g a t h e r e d by the m a j o r g o v e r n m e n t s , British ignorance of the M i d d l e E a s t d u r i n g the 1914 war would be u n i m a g i n a b l e . Shortly after Britain f o u n d herself at war with the Porte, S i r M a r k S y k e s , one of the few M . P . s who had traveled in the E a s t , c o m p l a i n e d that in the E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e there was not so m u c h as one authentic history of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Of the histories then current, none was b a s e d on original research, a n d all were b a s e d on a G e r m a n work that left off in the year 1744, a n d were therefore long out of d a t e . As late as 1917, when British armies were poised to invade northward toward S y r i a , British Intelligence, asked by the a r m y to p r o v i d e a g u i d e to conditions there, reported that there was no b o o k in any E u r o p e a n l a n g u a g e that provided a survey of the social a n d political conditions of the area. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t lacked even the most elementary type of i n f o r m a t i o n — i n c l u d i n g m a p s — o f the empire with which it was at war. In 1913 — 14, one of K i t c h e n e r ' s intelligence officers h a d secretly surveyed a n d m a p p e d a wilderness area close to British E g y p t ' s Sinai frontier; it was one of a m e r e handful of s u r v e y s g a t h e r e d by British I n t e l l i g e n c e . F o r the m o s t part, British officers c o n d u c t i n g operations in O t t o m a n territory in the first years of the war were operating in the d a r k . O n e of the m a n y reasons for the failure of Britain's invasion of T u r k e y in 1915 was that the British invasion force was s u p p l i e d with only one m a p of the peninsula it was to a t t a c k — a n d that m a p , it turned out, was inaccurate. When it c a m e to 1 6

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the M i d d l e E a s t , the politicians, like the soldiers, were aware that they were m o v i n g in areas that were literally u n c h a r t e d . B u t the C a b i n e t ministers who deferred to K i t c h e n e r in M i d d l e E a s t e r n matters were unaware of how little was really u n d e r s t o o d about the M i d d l e E a s t either by the War Minister or by the aides in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m on w h o m he relied for advice a n d information.

9 KITCHENER'S LIEUTENANTS i A v o i d i n g not merely w o m e n (as he had always done) b u t the outside world as a whole, the War M i n i s t e r lived in a m a s c u l i n e preserve with his personal Military S e c r e t a r y , L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , a s his a l m o s t sole a n d constant c o m p a n i o n . F i t z G e r a l d c o r r e s p o n d e d a n d conversed on K i t c h e n e r ' s behalf; when p e o p l e said they had written to or heard f r o m K i t c h e n e r , they meant that they had written to or heard from F i t z G e r a l d . K i t c h e n e r had always relied heavily on his staff. N o w that he had m o v e d into the center of power in L o n d o n , not only F i t z G e r a l d , but also the staff remaining in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n m o v e d toward the center o f power with h i m . T h u s L o r d K i t c h e n e r i m p o s e d his design on policy not merely by s h a p i n g a new a p p r o a c h toward the M i d d l e E a s t , b u t also by delegating power to chosen officers in the field who would g u i d e a n d execute that policy. Instead of being ignored or neglected, as they felt they h a d been in the p a s t , British officials in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n were given a chance to m a k e their weight felt. K i t c h e n e r ' s old lieutenants in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world rose with him to p r e - e m i n e n c e in E a s t e r n policy-making. What w a s c o n s p i c u o u s at the end of 1914 w a s that K i t c h e n e r had s t a m p e d his personal b r a n d on the g o v e r n m e n t ' s policies, but what t u r n e d out to be of m o r e lasting i m p o r t a n c e w a s that he h a d chosen the p e o p l e who were to inform a n d to advise the British g o v e r n m e n t a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t t h r o u g h o u t the w a r — a n d afterward. By tranferring authority to them, K i t c h e n e r m o v e d m u c h of the evaluation of information and the m a k i n g of policy from the capital city of a world e m p i r e , where officials—even t h o u g h not specifically knowledgeable a b o u t M i d d l e E a s t e r n a f f a i r s — t e n d e d toward a b r o a d and c o s m o p o l i t a n view of matters, to the colonial capitals of E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , where the prejudices of old h a n d s went unchallenged a n d unchecked. T h e British enclaves in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m were the environment to 88

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which the War Minister longed to return a n d f r o m which spiritually he h a d never d e p a r t e d . T h e War Minister's weakness, a c c o r d i n g t o one observer, w a s that "He is m o r e or less a foreigner" in E n g l a n d . To him, L o n d o n was m o r e alien than C a i r o or C a l c u t t a . T h e field marshal was profoundly ill at ease with unfamiliar faces. I n s t e a d of relying on the War Office a n d the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n for information a n d advice a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t , he continued to fall b a c k on his staff in E g y p t . When he was a p p o i n t e d War Minister, he asked R o n a l d S t o r r s , his Oriental S e c r e t a r y , to stay on in L o n d o n with h i m . S t o r r s pointed out that g o v e r n m e n t a l regulations w o u l d not allow it but, when S t o r r s returned to E g y p t , K i t c h e n e r continued to be inspired by his s u g g e s t i o n s . S t o r r s , the son of an Anglican c l e r g y m a n , was an intellectually elegant g r a d u a t e of P e m b r o k e College, C a m b r i d g e , then in his mid-thirties. A l t h o u g h he h a d no m o r e than an u n d e r g r a d u a t e education in E a s t e r n l a n g u a g e s and literature, service as Oriental S e c r e t a r y of the A g e n c y in C a i r o for m o r e than a d e c a d e h a d established h i m as a specialist in M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs. H i s lowly r a n k — a f t e r the o u t b r e a k of war, he finally obtained diplomatic s t a n d i n g , t h o u g h only as a second s e c r e t a r y — g a v e no indication of his high position in the field marshal's esteem. 1

II By the end of 1914, it was clear that the war was not c o m i n g to a quick conclusion, that the field m a r s h a l would not be able to return to C a i r o for s o m e time, a n d that therefore a new British proconsul h a d to be selected for E g y p t . K i t c h e n e r , in order to keep the position in C a i r o vacant for his return, personally selected S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n to serve as his replacement ( u n d e r the-new title of H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , rather than A g e n t ) ; M c M a h o n was a colorless official from I n d i a , on the verge of retirement. D e s p i t e M c M a h o n ' s a p p o i n t m e n t , R o n a l d S t o r r s a n d his colleagues in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n continued to look u p o n the War Minister as their real chief. S i r J o h n M a x w e l l , c o m m a n d i n g general of the British forces in E g y p t , r e p o r t e d directly to K i t c h e n e r at the War Office rather than to, or t h r o u g h , the new H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r . T h e senior figure in the War Minister's following in the M i d d l e E a s t was L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l S i r F r a n c i s R e g i n a l d Wingate, who had s u c c e e d e d K i t c h e n e r as s i r d a r of the E g y p t i a n a r m y and G o v e r n o r G e n e r a l of the S u d a n . Wingate's entire career had been one of military service in the E a s t , principally in Military Intelligence. He p a s s e d for a m a s t e r of A r a b i c . Of his role in K i t c h e n e r ' s K h a r t o u m

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c a m p a i g n , the journalist G e o r g e S t e e v e n s wrote that "Whatever there was to know, Colonel Wingate surely knew it, for he m a k e s it his b u s i n e s s to know everything . . . As for that mysterious child of lies, the A r a b , Colonel Wingate can converse with him for h o u r s , a n d at the end know not only how m u c h truth he has told, but exactly what truth he has s u p p r e s s e d .. . N o t h i n g is hid f r o m Colonel W i n g a t e . " Wingate governed the S u d a n f r o m K h a r t o u m , a s u n - s c o r c h e d capital city of s o m e 7 0 , 0 0 0 inhabitants that had been completely rebuilt to the specifications of L o r d K i t c h e n e r . By steamer and railroad, it was 1,345 miles away f r o m C a i r o , a n d Wingate felt cut off a n d neglected. On 18 F e b r u a r y 1915, he sent a letter m a r k e d Very Private to his A g e n t in the E g y p t i a n capital that cried out with his sense of hurt: 2

T h e m o r e that I think over the A r a b i a n Policy question & the peculiar situation into which it has drifted owing to the n u m b e r of "cooks" c o n c e r n e d in its concoction—the less I consider it desirable we should show our h a n d s unless we are officially called u p o n for a s t a t e m e n t of our views. S p e a k i n g for m y s e l f — y o u m u s t r e m e m b e r that in spite of my position in E g y p t & the S u d a n & the n u m b e r of years I have been in the country, little u s e has been m a d e of my experience in this, or in other m a t t e r s connected with the situation. As I have often said before, I think that our geopolitical position & our connection with the A r a b i a n Provinces nearest to u s , has given us opportunities for u n d e r s t a n d i n g the situation t h e r e — a n d the views of the M o s l e m s of the Holy P l a c e s — b e t t e r than m a n y others; b u t clearly that view is not s h a r e d by either the H o m e or I n d i a n authorities & therefore, I prefer to keep silent for the time b e i n g . 3

In fact Wingate could not bear to keep silent, a n d only twelve days later he wrote that he had c h a n g e d his m i n d and had decided "that we ought not to keep entirely to ourselves information & views which m a y be helpful" to those r e s p o n s i b l e for m a k i n g p o l i c y . Wingate's A g e n t in C a i r o — t h e official representative in E g y p t of the S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t — w a s G i l b e r t Clayton, who had also served under L o r d K i t c h e n e r in the S u d a n c a m p a i g n . After receiving his c o m m i s s i o n in the Royal Artillery in 1895, Clayton went out to E g y p t a n d had been stationed there or in the S u d a n ever since. F r o m 1908 to 1913 he served as Private Secretary to Wingate. F r o m 1913 onward he served as S u d a n A g e n t in C a i r o a n d , at the s a m e time, as D i r e c t o r of Intelligence of the E g y p t i a n a r m y . C l a y t o n m o v e d into a central position in m a k i n g Britain's A r a b policy on 31 4

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October 1914, when, by decision of the C o m m a n d i n g G e n e r a l in E g y p t , S i r J o h n Maxwell, who r e p o r t e d directly to K i t c h e n e r , he b e c a m e head of all intelligence services in C a i r o — o f the British civil authority a n d the British a r m y , as well as the E g y p t i a n a r m y . T h u s L o n d o n heard only one version of intelligence data from E g y p t — C l a y t o n ' s — i n s t e a d of three. A former a r m y captain, Clayton rapidly m o v e d up the ranks during'the war a n d by the e n d of it was a general. In this fatherly way, C l a y t o n served as mentor to the a d v e n t u r o u s y o u n g archaeologists a n d orientalists who flocked to C a i r o to serve in the intelligence services d u r i n g the war. He m u s t have h a d o u t s t a n d ing h u m a n qualities, for his y o u n g m e n , though diverse in other r e g a r d s , all liked a n d r e s p e c t e d h i m . T h e y saw h i m as s h r e w d , sober, sensible, a n d steady. He was a b o u t ten years older than m o s t of them a n d , whether or not they took it, they listened to his advice. F o r t h e m he was the incarnation of the old h a n d .

Ill A l t h o u g h the F o r e i g n Office a n d the I n d i a Office often d i s p u t e d the views or p r o p o s a l s that Wingate a n d Clayton e s p o u s e d , nobody d u r i n g the war q u e s t i o n e d their professional ability or their expert knowledge b a s e d on long experience in the M i d d l e E a s t . It was not until years after the war h a d e n d e d that D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , u s i n g information that b e c a m e available f r o m the G e r m a n side, m a d e a case for the proposition that they were d a n g e r o u s l y in c o mp e t e n t . A c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , the British authorities in C a i r o were blind to what w a s h a p p e n i n g behind enemy lines. In particular, he wrote, there was a point in 1916 when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was too exhausted to continue fighting. If the British forces in E g y p t h a d launched an attack on Sinai and Palestine t h e n — o r even in 1 9 1 5 — little effort would have been n e e d e d , a c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , to "have c r u m p l e d . . . u p " the T u r k s , which i n turn w o u l d have allowed Britain to m o v e t h r o u g h the Balkans to defeat G e r m a n y . T h e o p p o r t u n i t y was m i s s e d , a c c o r d i n g to him, b e c a u s e the intelligence services either did not know, or failed to report, what was g o i n g on inside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . As a result, he claimed, the British g o v e r n m e n t failed to win the war d u r i n g the years when the war still could have been won on British t e r m s . 5

A m o r e easily p r o v e d failing of C a i r o Intelligence was that it was unaware of the extent to which the E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d been infiltrated by e n e m y a g e n t s . It was not until that expert on O t t o m a n affairs, W y n d h a m D e e d e s , went to work in C a i r o in 1916, a n d

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discovered that the E g y p t i a n police forces were h o n e y c o m b e d with s p i e s , that the T u r k i s h network was s m a s h e d . An early sign of the i n a d e q u a c y of Cairo's intelligence a p p a r a t u s that o u g h t to have sent up a w a r n i n g signal, but d i d not, a p p e a r e d in the a u t u m n of 1914, a b o u t a m o n t h before the O t t o m a n war b e g a n , when the local British a r m y c o m m a n d e r , G e n e r a l Maxwell, wrote from E g y p t to L o r d K i t c h e n e r that "It is very difficult to p u t a true value on all the r e p o r t s f r o m C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , A s i a M i n o r a n d S y r i a . . . I can get n o information direct a s the T u r k s g u a r d the frontier very closely—our agents cannot get t h r o u g h — t h o s e we had on the other side have been b a g g e d . " He a d d e d a d i s q u i e t i n g note a b o u t the intelligence i m b a l a n c e : " T h e E a s t is full of G e r m a n spies a n d they get fairly g o o d i n f o r m a t i o n . " 6

At least Maxwell was aware that he d i d not know what was g o i n g on in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Wingate a n d C l a y t o n fell into the t r a p of believing that they d i d . T h e y a c c e p t e d G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e ' s mistaken theory that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was in the h a n d s of a g r o u p of p r o - G e r m a n J e w s . At the end of 1914 G e n e r a l Wingate b l a m e d the war on "a syndicate of J e w s , financiers, a n d low-born intriguers" in Constantinople. 7

He a n d his colleagues c o m p o u n d e d the error by linking it to m i s l e a d i n g information a b o u t the state of M o s l e m opinion. J u s t after the war b e g a n , S t o r r s sent Maxwell a report of r e m a r k s m a d e by a S y r i a n informant a b o u t p u b l i c opinion b e h i n d enemy lines. A c c o r d i n g to the informant, the inhabitants of S y r i a were filled with hatred of the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t b e c a u s e they believed it w o u l d s u p p o r t Z i o n i s m . " T h e s e Zionists are closely connected with Berlin a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d are the m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in the policy of Palestine," the informant s t a t e d . T h e false r u m o r that Berlin a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e were a b o u t to back Z i o n i s m echoed back a n d forth through the years, a n d later in the w a r misled the British C a b i n e t into believing that it h a d to issue a p r o - Z i o n i s t Declaration immediately. 8

S t o r r s wrote to K i t c h e n e r (which is to say, to his personal military secretary, L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d ) at the end of the year. H e c o m m e n t e d o n p l a n s for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , a n d claimed that M o s l e m s w o u l d o p p o s e a J e w i s h Palestine b e c a u s e they b l a m e d J e w s for the war. "Again would not I s l a m be extremely indignant at the idea of h a n d i n g over our c o n q u e s t s to a people which has taken no p a r t as a nation in the war, a n d a section of which has u n d o u b t e d l y helped to thrust the T u r k s over the precip i c e . " In fact, as F o r e i g n Office a n d A r a b B u r e a u reports later were to show, M o s l e m opinion, even in n o n - T u r k i s h areas, generally s u p p o r t e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d its alliance with G e r m a n y . S t o r r s w a s w r o n g , too, in s u p p o s i n g that M o s l e m s were o p p o s e d to a J e w i s h Palestine b e c a u s e of the w a r ; M o s l e m opposition to a J e w i s h Palestine 9

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had arisen long before the war, in the w a k e of Zionist colonization at the end of the nineteenth century. A characteristic flaw in the information-gathering c o n d u c t e d by Clayton a n d S t o r r s was that they frequently accepted information s u p p l i e d by a single informant without testing a n d checking it. Instead they seemingly relied on the sort of intuitive ability that S t e e v e n s had a s c r i b e d to W i n g a t e : the gift of b e i n g able to divine the extent to which any native is telling the truth. J o h n B u c h a n , who later b e c a m e w a r t i m e D i r e c t o r of I n f o r m a t i o n in L o n d o n , wrote in the second chapter of his a d v e n t u r e novel Greenmantle that "the truth is that we are the only race on earth that can p r o d u c e m e n c a p a b l e of getting inside the skin of r e m o t e p e o p l e s . P e r h a p s the S c o t s are better than the E n g l i s h , b u t we're all a t h o u s a n d percent better than a n y b o d y else." Wingate, C l a y t o n , and S t o r r s acted as t h o u g h they u n d e r s t o o d the natives of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as well as did the S c o t s hero of B u c h a n ' s novel. As it t r a n s p i r e d , their ability to u n d e r s t a n d the natives w a s quite limited. In evaluating r e p o r t s that there was dissatisfaction with O t t o m a n rule in s o m e sections of the e m p i r e , British Cairo particularly misu n d e r s t o o d one of the salient characteristics of the M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t : to the extent that it was politically conscious, it was not willing to be ruled by n o n - M o s l e m s . B e h i n d e n e m y lines there were M o s l e m s who were dissatisfied with the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t , b u t they p r o p o s e d to replace it with a different T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t , or at any rate a different I s l a m i c g o v e r n m e n t . T h e y r e g a r d e d rule by a C h r i s tian E u r o p e a n power, s u c h as Britain, as intolerable. S t o r r s a p p a r e n t l y believed that he c o u l d get a r o u n d that by p r e tending that it was E g y p t i a n rule that w o u l d be s u b s t i t u t e d for T u r k i s h rule. He p r o p o s e d to create what would a p p e a r to be a new E g y p t i a n e m p i r e to replace the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the A r a b i c speaking M i d d l e E a s t ; it was behind that facade that L o r d K i t c h e n e r w o u l d rule as Britain's viceroy. S t o r r s derived particular satisfaction from reports that O t t o m a n rule h a d b e c o m e u n p o p u l a r in S y r i a ; he believed thai he could offer the S y r i a n s a p o p u l a r alternative. A c c u rate r e p o r t s , received with s o m e frequency, indicated that—other than the M a r o n i t e s , a Christian sect with ties to the F r e n c h — m o s t S y r i a n s who held political views objected to the p r o s p e c t of b e i n g ruled in the postwar world by F r a n c e , and since S t o r r s a n d his colleagues took it for g r a n t e d that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g peoples could not govern t h e m s e l v e s , the only possibility left was the one advocated by S t o r r s : the incorporation of S y r i a into British E g y p t . S e e n in that light, reports that S y r i a n s considered the G e r m a n s and T u r k s to be Zionists a n d the F r e n c h to be detestable meant that the S y r i a n s m u s t be p r o - B r i t i s h . S u m m a r i z i n g a m e m o r a n d u m s u b mitted by a S y r i a n leader who called for A r a b independence, C l a y t o n

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stated that "it is to E n g l a n d , and to E n g l a n d alone, that both S y r i a n C h r i s t i a n s a n d P a n - A r a b s are t u r n i n g . " O n 2 F e b r u a r y 1915, S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that " T h e r e is no d o u b t that local S y r i a n feeling, b o t h C h r i s t i a n a n d M u s l i m , is strongly in favor of our a d d i n g that country t o the E g y p t i a n S u l t a n a t e . . . " T h e question was whether actively to p r o m o t e that feeling. T h e newly arrived H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o , M c M a h o n , writing the s a m e d a y to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r to seek g u i d a n c e , outlined the alternatives as they had u n d o u b t e d l y been d e s c r i b e d to him by S t o r r s a n d C l a y t o n : " T h e S y r i a n s want our intervention and say that unless we can give t h e m s o m e a s s u r a n c e of s u p p o r t they will have to turn to the F r e n c h altho they w o u l d prefer us to the F r e n c h . " W r o n g - h e a d e d a n d professionally a m b i t i o u s , Britain's m e n on the s p o t s u p p o s e d that A r a b s w a n t e d t o b e ruled b y E u r o p e a n s , a n d b u o y e d by this mistaken belief, K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants a i m e d at taking control of S y r i a . F r a n c e ' s m e n on the s p o t were w r o n g - h e a d e d a n d a m b i t i o u s t o o ; a n d they also a i m e d to take S y r i a . 10

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IV D u r i n g the C r u s a d e s , F r e n c h knights w o n k i n g d o m s a n d built castles in S y r i a ; a n d in 1 9 1 4 — a millennium later—there were still F r e n c h m e n who r e g a r d e d S y r i a a s p r o p e r l y part o f F r a n c e . F r a n c e m a i n tained close ties with one of the C h r i s t i a n c o m m u n i t i e s a l o n g the M o u n t L e b a n o n coast of S y r i a , a n d F r e n c h s h i p p i n g , silk, a n d other interests eyed c o m m e r c i a l possibilities in the area. T h u s for religious, e c o n o m i c , a n d historical r e a s o n s , F r a n c e saw herself as h a v i n g a role to play in Syria's affairs. T h e m o m e n t that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, F r e n c h officials in the M i d d l e E a s t (like their British c o u n t e r p a r t s , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s ) therefore f o r m u l a t e d p l a n s t o annex T u r k e y ' s S y r i a n p r o v i n c e s . F r a n c e ' s minister in C a i r o and C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in Beirut immediately joined in u r g i n g their g o v e r n m e n t to invade the L e b a n e s e coast. T h e i r quixotic plan called for a landing of only about 2,000 French troops, who would be joined—they believed—by 3 0 , 0 0 0 local volunteers. S p e e d w a s of the essence, in their view; F r a n c e would have to strike before T u r k e y could raise an a r m y a n d before Britain c o u l d strike f i r s t . 13

T h e i r p r o p o s a l could hardly have been m o r e i n o p p o r t u n e . I t reached the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in N o v e m b e r 1914, when it w a s still in exile in B o r d e a u x , having fled from Paris in the face of the G e r m a n a d v a n c e to the M a r n e . While there were powerful colonialist figures in P a r l i a m e n t , the F o r e i g n Ministry, a n d the C a b i n e t , N o v e m b e r w a s a m o n t h in which everyone's attention was still f o c u s e d

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o n the mortal s t r u g g l e i n northern F r a n c e a n d B e l g i u m . T h e p r o p o s a l to d i s p a t c h troops to S y r i a was rejected. T h e following m o n t h , h o w e v e r — t h e contending a r m i e s i n E u r o p e having settled d o w n in their trenches, a n d the g o v e r n m e n t having returned to P a r i s — t h e p r o p o s a l to invade S y r i a did receive attention. A delegation of colonialist politicians s e c u r e d the agreement, in principle, of A l e x a n d r e M i l l e r a n d , the Minister of War, to s u p p o r t a S y r i a n expedition. F o r e i g n Minister T h e o p h i l e D e l c a s s e , however, r e m a i n e d vehemently o p p o s e d : " N o t h i n g a p p e a r s less desirable than intervention in S y r i a , " he s a i d . D e l c a s s e was one of the m a n y F r e n c h officials who believed that a n n e x i n g S y r i a would be of m u c h less value to his country than p r e s e r v i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d b e . As of 1914 F r a n c e s u p p l i e d 45 percent of the foreign capital in the private sector of the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y a n d 60 percent of the O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt, a n d thus h a d an e n o r m o u s stake in the empire's continued existence a n d v i t a l i t y . 1 4

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O n 30—31 D e c e m b e r 1914, S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , who was a b o u t to take up his duties as K i t c h e n e r ' s replacement in C a i r o , visited Paris. He m e t with officials of the F o r e i g n Ministry and War Ministry but failed to reply coherently to their q u e s t i o n s a b o u t Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy. M c M a h o n was notoriously dull-witted a n d ineffectual, b u t the F r e n c h , who d i d not know him, a s s u m e d he m u s t be clever a n d a s t u t e : his i n c o m p e t e n t replies were interpreted by M i l l e r a n d , the War Minister, as deliberate a n d s u b t l e evasions, m a s k i n g a secret British plan to invade a n d o c c u p y S y r i a by t h e m s e l v e s . 16

Millerand immediately r e p o r t e d these conversations to the F r e n c h C a b i n e t , which authorized h i m to create an expeditionary force to invade S y r i a whenever Britain d i d , whether invited by her to participate or not. In F e b r u a r y 1915, D e l c a s s e went over to L o n d o n and took u p the m a t t e r o f S y r i a with S i r E d w a r d G r e y . T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Minister was r e a s s u r e d that Britain would not invade S y r i a without g i v i n g prior notice. T h e two foreign ministers a p p e a r to have agreed that if the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were to be partitioned, Britain would not o p p o s e F r a n c e ' s d e s i g n s on S y r i a , b u t that it would be far preferable for the e m p i r e not to be broken u p . T h u s the foreign ministers settled the differences between their two c o u n t r i e s — t e m p o r a r i l y . B u t their m e n on the s p o t in the M i d d l e E a s t continued to stir up trouble between Britain a n d F r a n c e ; a n d , m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g the region, K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants also went on to p u r s u e other d a n g e r o u s d e s i g n s there.

10 K I T C H E N E R S E T S OUT T O CAPTURE ISLAM i T h e West a n d the M i d d l e E a s t have m i s u n d e r s t o o d each other throughout m o s t of the twentieth century; a n d m u c h of that m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be traced b a c k to L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s initiatives in the early years of the F i r s t World War. T h e peculiarities of his character, the deficiencies of his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the M o s l e m world, the misinformation regularly s u p p l i e d to him by his lieutenants in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m , a n d his choice of A r a b politicians with w h o m to deal have colored the c o u r s e of political events ever since. To a p p r e c i a t e the novelty of K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p r o a c h to the M i d d l e E a s t , i t m u s t b e r e m e m b e r e d that when the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the F i r s t World War, A s q u i t h , G r e y , a n d Churchill did not intend to retaliate by seizing any of its d o m a i n s for Britain. T h e y did p r o p o s e to allow Britain's allies to m a k e territorial g a i n s in E u r o p e a n d A s i a M i n o r at T u r k e y ' s e x p e n s e ; b u t A s q u i t h ' s Britain h a d no territorial d e s i g n s of her own on O t t o m a n l a n d s , either in the M i d d l e E a s t or elsewhere. K i t c h e n e r , however, maintained that when the war was over, it was in Britain's vital interest to seize m u c h of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for herself: the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g part. T h i s would m e a n a total reversal of Britain's traditional policy. K i t c h e n e r , like m o s t B r i t o n s who h a d lived in the E a s t , believed that in the M o s l e m world religion counts for everything. B u t the field m a r s h a l a n d his colleagues in C a i r o and K h a r t o u m mistakenly s e e m e d to believe that M o h a m m e d a n i s m was a centralized, authoritarian s t r u c t u r e . T h e y r e g a r d e d I s l a m as a single entity: as an "it," as an organization. T h e y believed that it o b e y e d its leaders. C e n t u r i e s before, C o r t e z had won control of M e x i c o by seizing the Aztec e m p e r o r ; a n d medieval F r e n c h kings h a d tried to control C h r i s t e n d o m by keeping the p o p e captive in A v i g n o n . In m u c h the s a m e spirit, K i t c h e n e r a n d his colleagues believed that I s l a m could be b o u g h t , m a n i p u l a t e d , or c a p t u r e d by b u y i n g , m a n i p u l a t i n g , or c a p t u r i n g its 96

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religious l e a d e r s h i p . T h e y were intrigued by the notion that whoever controlled the p e r s o n of the C a l i p h — M o h a m m e d ' s s u c c e s s o r — c o n trolled I s l a m . Central to K i t c h e n e r ' s analysis w a s the contention that the C a l i p h might hurl I s l a m against Britain. S i n c e S u n n i M o s l e m s (who p r e d o m i n a t e d in M o h a m m e d a n I n d i a ) r e g a r d e d the T u r k i s h S u l t a n as a C a l i p h , K i t c h e n e r perceived this as a continuing threat. In C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m it was believed that, as of 1914, the C a l i p h had fallen into the h a n d s of J e w s a n d G e r m a n s ; the War Minister worried that once the world war was won, the C a l i p h m i g h t b e c o m e a tool in the h a n d s of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t rivals, particularly R u s s i a . I n enemy h a n d s , the caliphate c o u l d b e u s e d ( K i t c h e n e r believed) to u n d e r m i n e Britain's position in J n d i a , E g y p t , and the S u d a n . Britain ruled over half of the world's M o s l e m s . In India alone there were almost seventy million of t h e m , a n d M o h a m m e d a n s constituted a disproportionately large part of the I n d i a n A r m y . In E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , Britain ruled millions m o r e , who lived alongside the S u e z Canal sea r o a d to I n d i a . T i n y British g a r r i s o n s policed these tens of millions of natives, b u t K i t c h e n e r knew that they could not even begin to deal with a revolt. 1

T h e British imagination was h a u n t e d b y the I n d i a n M u t i n y (1857—9), the m y s t e r i o u s u p r i s i n g , incited by religion, that had b r o u g h t d o w n the rule of the E a s t I n d i a C o m p a n y . M o r e recently the u p r i s i n g in the S u d a n , which K i t c h e n e r had so brilliantly avenged, was inspired by a new religious leader who called himself the M a h d i , a title E u r o p e a n s translated as " M e s s i a h . " P a n - I s l a m i c unrest in E g y p t in 1905—6 had c a u s e d Britain deep concern. F o r K i t c h e n e r a n d his e n t o u r a g e , the possibility of a M o s l e m Holy War against Britain was a recurring n i g h t m a r e . T h e D i r e c t o r o f I n f o r m a t i o n , J o h n B u c h a n , d r a m a t i z e d these fears in his 1916 novel Greenmantle, in which G e r m a n y m a k e s use of a M o s l e m p r o p h e t in a plot to destroy Britain's e m p i r e . T h e prophet a p p e a r s in T u r k e y ; there are portents of his c o m i n g ; there is an ancient p r o p h e c y ; there is a m o d e r n revelation; and the region in which he intends to ignite a rebellion is m a d e explicit. " T h e r e is a dry wind b l o w i n g t h r o u g h the E a s t , and the parched g r a s s e s wait the s p a r k . A n d the wind is blowing t o w a r d s the I n d i a n b o r d e r . " 2

K i t c h e n e r believed that a call to a r m s by the C a l i p h against Britain d u r i n g the 1914 war c o u l d p e r h a p s be offset by the w o r d s or actions of other M o s l e m religious leaders. After Britain had won the war, however, m o r e decisive action w o u l d b e necessary. T h e reason was that when the war h a d been won, R u s s i a was s u r e to take p o s s e s s i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d — u n l e s s s o m e t h i n g were d o n e a b o u t it—of the C a l i p h . K i t c h e n e r saw a G e r m a n - c o n t r o l l e d C a l i p h as merely

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d a n g e r o u s — h e would a t t e m p t to foment unrest in I n d i a to throw Britain off balance in the E u r o p e a n war. B u t he saw a R u s s i a n controlled C a l i p h as a mortal d a n g e r to the British E m p i r e ; for (unlike A s q u i t h a n d G r e y ) . K i t c h e n e r believed that R u s s i a still harb o r e d a m b i t i o n s of taking I n d i a away from Britain. In K i t c h e n e r ' s view, G e r m a n y was an e n e m y in E u r o p e a n d R u s s i a was an enemy in A s i a : the p a r a d o x of the 1914 war in which Britain and R u s s i a were allied was t h a t by winning in E u r o p e , Britain risked losing in A s i a . T h e only completely satisfactory o u t c o m e of the war, from K i t c h e n e r ' s point of view, was for G e r m a n y to lose it without R u s s i a winning i t — a n d in 1914 it was not clear how that could be acc o m p l i s h e d . So the War Minister p l a n n e d to strike first in the c o m i n g postwar s t r u g g l e with R u s s i a for control of the road to a n d into India. K i t c h e n e r ' s p r o p o s a l was that, after the war, Britain s h o u l d a r r a n g e for her own nominee to b e c o m e C a l i p h . M o h a m m e d h a d been an A r a b i a n ; K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d to e n c o u r a g e the view that M o h a m m e d ' s s u c c e s s o r s a s C a l i p h should b e A r a b i a n , too. T h e a d v a n t a g e o f this was that the coastline of the A r a b i a n peninsula could easily be controlled by the British navy; Britain would be able to insulate the C a l i p h f r o m the influence of Britain's E u r o p e a n rivals. O n c e Britain could install the C a l i p h within her s p h e r e of influence in A r a b i a , K i t c h e n e r believed she could g a i n control of I s l a m . A n d even before the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants in C a i r o r e m i n d e d the War Minister that an obvious c a n d i d a t e to be the A r a b i a n c a l i p h — t h e ruler of M e c c a — h a d already been in touch with him.

II T o w a r d the end of the s u m m e r of 1914, as the O t t o m a n war a p p r o a c h e d , G i l b e r t Clayton recalled that A b d u l l a h , the favorite son of H u s s e i n , the ruler of M e c c a , had visited Cairo s o m e m o n t h s earlier and had s u g g e s t e d that A r a b i a m i g h t be ripe for revolt. At the time, A b d u l l a h h a d been afraid that the Y o u n g T u r k s were a b o u t to m o v e against his father; a n d A b d u l l a h , whose indolent disposition hid a bold intelligence, looked a b o u t for p o s s i b l e s u p p o r t from a b r o a d . B u t shortly afterward his father a n d the Porte c o m p o s e d their differences, so that British assistance was no longer needed. E v e n now, it is not certain what A b d u l l a h said in C a i r o a n d what was said to him. A b d u l l a h a p p a r e n t l y first met L o r d K i t c h e n e r there in 1912 or 1913. He met K i t c h e n e r in C a i r o again in F e b r u a r y a n d April 1914, a n d also m e t with R o n a l d S t o r r s . A b d u l l a h s e e m s to have s o u g h t a s s u r a n c e s of British help if the Porte were to seek to

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d e p o s e his father. At the t i m e , K i t c h e n e r , who i n q u i r e d in detail a b o u t the difficulties in A r a b i a , s e e m s to have d i s c l a i m e d any interest in interfering in internal O t t o m a n affairs. A b d u l l a h m a y have been less i m p r e s s e d by the disclaimer of interest than by the e x p r e s s i o n of concern. T o S t o r r s , A b d u l l a h a p p a r e n t l y c l a i m e d — f a l s e l y — t h a t the rival chiefs of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a were p r e p a r e d to follow his father in o p p o s i n g the Porte's d e s i g n s . He s u g g e s t e d a future relationship between A r a b i a a n d Britain similar to that between A f g h a n i s t a n a n d Britain, in which the former exercised internal self-rule a n d the latter a d m i n i s t e r e d all foreign relations. T h o u g h the idea was attractive to him, S t o r r s , like his chief, was u n a b l e to offer A b d u l l a h the encoura g e m e n t that h e s o u g h t . 3

4

Several A r a b i a n e m i r s had indeed been in conflict for years with the Y o u n g T u r k leadership i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . B u t G i l b e r t Clayton failed to appreciate the extent to which religious, dynastic, a n d other differences divided t h e m . A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g e m i g r e s in C a i r o , with w h o m he met, m a y have misled h i m in this connection. In fact none of the A r a b i a n e m i r s was willing to accept one of the others as a leader. Prominent a m o n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g exiles living in C a i r o with w h o m Clayton s p o k e was a colorful former O t t o m a n a r m y officer a n d C . U . P . politician n a m e d Aziz Ali a l - M a s r i . A l - M a s r i , o f C i r c a s s i a n ancestry,* was b o r n a n d b r o u g h t up in E g y p t ; he h a d a t t e n d e d military school in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . After military service in the field, he h a d e m e r g e d as a leader of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party. Y e t he was a m e r e major attached to the G e n e r a l Staff at a t i m e when E n v e r , a c l a s s m a t e of w h o m he held a low opinion, h a d b e c o m e Minister of War. D i s c o n t e n t e d , a l - M a s r i r e s p o n d e d by organizing al'Ahd, a small secret society of a r m y officers who objected to the C . U . P . ' s centralizing policies a n d its failure to give those who s p o k e A r a b i c their fair s h a r e of high office. T h e officers of al-'Ahd were united in their o p p o s i t i o n to the T u r k i f y i n g policies a d o p t e d by the C . U . P . T h e y advocated either a d m i t t i n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u lations to a greater share of power in the central g o v e r n m e n t , or else decentralizing a n d allowing them g r e a t e r a u t o n o m y at the local level, or p e r h a p s b o t h . 5

E n v e r P a s h a was responsible for h a v i n g h a d M a j o r a l - M a s r i arrested and convicted on t r u m p e d - u p c h a r g e s in early 1914. T h u s a l - M a s r i unwillingly f o u n d himself cast in the role of an A r a b r e v o l u t i o n a r y — unwillingly, b e c a u s e he a s p i r e d to leadership of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as a whole, not a m e r e section of it. R e s p o n d i n g to opinion in C a i r o , * T h e Circassians were a people from the Caucasus, once ruled by Turkey and later by Russia.

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L o r d K i t c h e n e r intervened o n his behalf; a n d D j e m a l P a s h a a r r a n g e d to have him p a r d o n e d a n d exiled to his native E g y p t . An o p p o n e n t , since his childhood, of British rule in E g y p t , anti-British, p r o - G e r m a n , a s u p p o r t e r of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e who was o p p o s e d only to its g o v e r n m e n t , a military politician who n u m b e r e d a m e r e handful of colleagues a m o n g his s u p p o r t e r s , a l - M a s r i was m i s u n d e r s t o o d by the British intelligence officers who wrongly r e g a r d e d him both as powerful a n d as a potential ally. In early S e p t e m b e r 1914, it a p p e a r s that a l - M a s r i visited the British A g e n c y in C a i r o , a n d met with C l a y t o n . A l - M a s r i knew that A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d a n d other A r a b i a n leaders had in the p a s t considered rising against the P o r t e . P e r h a p s he told C l a y t o n s o . P e r h a p s Clayton was r e m i n d e d of A b d u l l a h ' s visit and of what he h a d said to S t o r r s a n d K i t c h e n e r . After seeing a l - M a s r i , Clayton met with R o n a l d S t o r r s and m a d e a r r a n g e m e n t s for him to forward a secret m e m o r a n d u m to L o r d K i t c h e n e r . T h e Clayton m e m o r a n d u m was enclosed in a letter that S t o r r s was to s e n d to his old chief on the relatively innocuous subject of c a m e l s . 6

Ill It was a c o m m o n British concern in 1914 that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , if it entered the war, m i g h t launch an attack against the S u e z C a n a l ; a n d , like officials in the war ministries of E u r o p e who analyzed the military potential of n e i g h b o r i n g e n e m y countries in t e r m s of railroad facilities, R o n a l d S t o r r s focused attention on the s u p p l y of c a m e l s available to the O t t o m a n forces. T h e O t t o m a n a r m y , he wrote in his letter to K i t c h e n e r , w o u l d count on obtaining its animals from the c a m e l - b r e e d e r s of the western district of A r a b i a , the H e j a z , and what S t o r r s p r o p o s e d was to e n c o u r a g e the local r u l e r — t h e E m i r of M e c c a — n o t to deliver t h e m . T h e m e s s a g e a b o u t c a m e l s served as his cover: with it S t o r r s forwarded Clayton's secret m e m o r a n d u m of 6 S e p t e m b e r 1914 to K i t c h e n e r which u r g e d h i m to enter into conversations with the ruler of M e c c a for other p u r p o s e s . O n e of the issues raised in Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m was whether the O t t o m a n S u l t a n could b e replaced a s C a l i p h of I s l a m by an A r a b i a n leader friendly to Britain. If s o , the E m i r of M e c c a , the g u a r d i a n of the M o s l e m H o l y Places, was an o b v i o u s c a n d i d a t e , the m o r e so as he was in a position to p r o v i d e Britain with important assistance in the matter of p i l g r i m a g e s . In the r h y t h m of life in the I s l a m i c E a s t , no activity was m o r e important than the m a s s p i l g r i m a g e each year to the H o l y Places of A r a b i a — a p i l g r i m a g e that every M o s l e m able to do so is c o m m a n d e d to m a k e at least once in his lifetime. T h e world war interfered,

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particularly in 1915. E v e n if I n d i a n M o s l e m s were to forgive Britain for g o i n g to war against the only significant i n d e p e n d e n t I s l a m i c power, there was a question as to whether they w o u l d forgive the disruption of the p i l g r i m a g e that played so large a role in their lives. T h e H o l y Places o f A r a b i a , M e c c a , a n d M e d i n a are located i n the H e j a z , whose ruler therefore was in a position to s a f e g u a r d the right of British M o s l e m s to continue visiting their shrines despite the war. C l a i m i n g descent f r o m the Prophet's family, the E m i r of M e c c a — i n addition to b e i n g ruler of the H e j a z — w a s in a position to a s s u m e the mantle of the C a l i p h . In his secret m e m o r a n d u m , C l a y t o n m a d e the erroneous assertion that the rival regional leaders of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a — t h e rulers of Asir a n d the Y e m e n , a s well a s I b n S a u d a n d p e r h a p s I b n R a s h i d o f N e j d — w e r e c o m i n g together with the ruler of M e c c a to work for "an A r a b i a for the A r a b s . " A c c o r d i n g to Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m , the m o v e m e n t was e n c o u r a g e d by the K h e d i v e , the nominal ruler of E g y p t u n d e r the S u l t a n , who also r e g a r d e d himself as a c a n d i d a t e to succeed the S u l t a n as C a l i p h of I s l a m . It is not clear how Clayton intended to reconcile the conflicting a m b i t i o n s of this diverse g r o u p . 7

T h e claim that the other rival leaders w o u l d unite b e h i n d the E m i r of M e c c a was one that A b d u l l a h h a d a d v a n c e d on his father's behalf s o m e five m o n t h s before in conversations with R o n a l d S t o r r s . In presenting it as fresh information, C l a y t o n m a y have been indicating that the information h a d been recently confirmed to him by a l - M a s r i or by s o m e other exiled O t t o m a n figure. T h e novelty of the m e m o r a n d u m lay in the suggestion that the A r a b i a n s could be of service to Britain d u r i n g the war, a n d not merely afterward. K i t c h e n e r r e s p o n d e d immediately. He sent a cable to C a i r o on 24 S e p t e m b e r 1914, in which he o r d e r e d that S t o r r s be told to s e n d a trusted m e s s e n g e r to A b d u l l a h to ask a q u e s t i o n in confidence: in the event of war, w o u l d the H e j a z be for or against Britain? Before s e n d i n g his c a b l e , K i t c h e n e r cleared it with S i r E d w a r d G r e y , who was i m p r e s s e d by Clayton's m e m o r a n d u m , which he t e r m e d "very important." 8

A few weeks later the m e s s e n g e r returned from his undercover j o u r n e y to O t t o m a n A r a b i a with a v a g u e but e n c o u r a g i n g reply. It invited the War Minister to spell out what he h a d in m i n d . C a i r o cabled K i t c h e n e r that " C o m m u n i c a t i o n is g u a r d e d , b u t friendly a n d favourable." 9

Meanwhile the A g e n c y h a d again been in c o m m u n i c a t i o n with M a j o r a l - M a s r i and also other A r a b i c e m i g r e s in C a i r o . T h e s e exiles from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e continued to carry on the d e c a d e s - o l d discussion of who the various a n d diverse A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s of the e m p i r e were, or o u g h t to b e . T h i s question of national identity was one which h a d been raised in the coffee h o u s e s of D a m a s c u s a n d Beirut, and in the student q u a r t e r s of Paris from the nineteenth

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century o n w a r d , a n d h a d given rise to a variety of literary c l u b s a n d secret societies within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . In the context of O t t o m a n politics, the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g exiles in C a i r o were r e s p o n d i n g to those policies of the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n ment which s u b j e c t e d the majority of the inhabitants of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to the h e g e m o n y of the roughly 40 percent of the population who s p o k e T u r k i s h . In one way or another, what the exiles advocated was a greater say in g o v e r n m e n t a l matters, a n d m o r e a n d higher official positions for those who s p o k e A r a b i c — a b o u t the s a m e percentage a s s p o k e T u r k i s h . T h o u g h often referred to as nationalists, these m e n are m o r e accurately d e s c r i b e d as s e p a r a t i s t s . T h e y did not ask for independ e n c e ; they asked for a greater m e a s u r e of participation a n d local rule. T h e y were willing to be ruled largely by T u r k s b e c a u s e the T u r k s were fellow-Moslems. U n l i k e E u r o p e a n nationalists, they were people whose beliefs existed in a religious rather than secular framework. T h e y lived within the walls of the city of I s l a m in a sense in which E u r o p e had not lived within C h r i s t e n d o m since the early M i d d l e A g e s ; for, like the cities built in the A r a b world in medieval times, the lives of M o s l e m s circle a r o u n d a central m o s q u e . T h e y did not represent an ethnic g r o u p , for historically, the only ethnic or "true" A r a b s were the inhabitants of A r a b i a , while the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p o p u l a t i o n s of s u c h provinces as B a g h d a d or D a m a s c u s , or of s u c h cities as Algiers or C a i r o , were of m i x e d ethnic stock a n d b a c k g r o u n d , s p a n n i n g the vast r a n g e of ancient p e o p l e s and cultures that e x t e n d e d from the Atlantic O c e a n to the Persian G u l f . 10

T h e r e were only a few dozen p e o p l e who were active partisans of A r a b i c nationalism ( s e p a r a t i s m ) in O c t o b e r 1914, as m e m b e r s of one or m o r e of the secret societies, s u c h as a l - F a t a t and al-'Ahd, of which the British A g e n c y in C a i r o was b e c o m i n g increasingly a w a r e . A great deal m o r e is now known a b o u t these m e n a n d what they represented than was known to the British at the t i m e . In large part they were m e m b e r s of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g elites who had been well connected with the r e g i m e which h a d been overthrown by the Y o u n g T u r k s and who felt threatened by the p r o - T u r k i s h and centralizing t r e n d s i n C . U . P . p o l i c y . Milne C h e e t h a m , the acting A g e n t and C o n s u l - G e n e r a l in C a i r o , cabled an intelligence m e m o r a n d u m a b o u t the secret societies to K i t c h e n e r on 26 October 1914, as the field marshal p o n d e r e d the t e r m s of his next m e s s a g e to A r a b i a . 1 1

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that "If the A r a b nation assist E n g l a n d in this war that has been forced u p o n us by T u r k e y , E n g l a n d will g u a r a n t e e that no internal intervention take place in A r a b i a , a n d will give A r a b s every assistance against foreign a g g r e s s i o n . " ( B y " A r a b s , " K i t c h e n e r here meant those who lived in A r a b i a . ) In other w o r d s , if the A r a b i a n leaders freed their p e n i n s u l a f r o m the S u l t a n a n d declared their i n d e p e n d e n c e , Britain would help to protect t h e m against any invasion from a b r o a d . At the A g e n c y , C h e e t h a m a n d S t o r r s were r e s p o n s i b l e for s u p e r vising the translation of this m e s s a g e into A r a b i c . A p p a r e n t l y with the e n c o u r a g e m e n t of C l a y t o n , they b r o a d e n e d its l a n g u a g e to p l e d g e British s u p p o r t for "the e m a n c i p a t i o n of the A r a b s . " T h i s went far in the direction pointed out by R e g i n a l d Wingate. Wingate believed in stirring up the tribes of A r a b i a on Britain's behalf. U n l i k e K i t c h e n e r , who p r o p o s e d to deal with A r a b i a at the end of the war, the impatient Wingate u r g e d i m m e d i a t e action at the b e g i n n i n g of the war. H i s goal was to lure the A r a b s away from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d as early as 14 J a n u a r y 1915 he wrote to C l a y t o n that "I fear British action has been so long delayed that it is doubtful if we shall now s u c c e e d i n detaching the A r a b s . . . " H i s familiar c o m plaint was that his s u p e r i o r s h a d not heeded his advice in t i m e . 1 3

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As the K i t c h e n e r m e s s a g e w a s b e i n g sent out in A r a b i c translation, the e m i g r e g r o u p s with which C l a y t o n kept in contact in C a i r o s e e m to have told him that A r a b s in the H e j a z would be s u s p i c i o u s of British intentions, a n d that s o m e sort of clarification of what was b e i n g p r o m i s e d w o u l d be in o r d e r . K i t c h e n e r , with G r e y ' s a p p r o v a l , immediately authorized the A g e n c y to issue a further statement. A g a i n the A g e n c y went b e y o n d its instructions, a n d i s s u e d proclam a t i o n s directed not merely to A r a b i a , but to practically all of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a ("Palestine, S y r i a a n d M e s o p o t a m i a " ) , p r o m i s ing that if their inhabitants threw off the T u r k s , Britain would recognize a n d g u a r a n t e e their i n d e p e n d e n c e . 15

A l t h o u g h the A g e n c y exceeded its instructions in m a k i n g this public offer, the p l e d g e itself was a reasonable one. Britain h a d not yet m a d e any conflicting c o m m i t m e n t to the Allied Powers r e g a r d i n g the future of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a . If the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces, in defiance of all the probabilities, h a d struck a m a j o r blow for the Allied c a u s e by s e c e d i n g from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d by successfully winning their f r e e d o m by their own exertions, there was no reason why Britain s h o u l d not have g u a r a n t e e d help in protecting their future i n d e p e n d e n c e . It would have been in Britain's national interest, with respect b o t h to w a r t i m e a n d to postwar rivalries, to do s o . It was rather the m e s s a g e that K i t c h e n e r had authorized that was troubling, for—reflecting his belief that A r a b i a was important not for the role it c o u l d play in the war b u t for the role it could play after the w a r — h e h a d closed his m e s s a g e to M e c c a with his b o m b s h e l l : "It

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m a y be that an A r a b of true race will a s s u m e the K h a l i f a t e at M e c c a or M e d i n a , a n d so g o o d m a y c o m e by the help of G o d out of all the evil that is now o c c u r r i n g . " R e s t o r i n g the caliphate to A r a b i a , where it a n d M o h a m m e d were b o r n thirteen centuries before, was K i t c h e n e r ' s strategy for p r e p a r i n g for the rivalry with R u s s i a which was b o u n d to follow the conclusion of the war against G e r m a n y . B u t A r a b i a n s , living within the political confines of their own peninsula, were not likely to u n d e r s t a n d what he h a d in m i n d . T h e y would not know that at the outset of one great conflict between E u r o p e a n p o w e r s he was already thinking a h e a d to the next. T h e y would be even less likely to recognize that K i t c h e n e r , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s did not u n d e r s t a n d the nature of the caliphate. 16

S c h o l a r s have been kept b u s y ever since explaining to western s t u d e n t s of the M i d d l e E a s t that the split between t e m p o r a l a n d spiritual authority, that in medieval E u r o p e pitted p o p e against e m peror, d i d not o c c u r in the world of I s l a m . K i t c h e n e r , Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s were mistaken in believing that the C a l i p h could be a spiritual leader only. In I s l a m , all of life, including g o v e r n m e n t a n d politics, falls within the g o v e r n a n c e of the H o l y L a w ; so that in the eyes of S u n n i M o s l e m s , s u c h as the O t t o m a n S u l t a n a n d the E m i r of M e c c a , the d o m i n i o n of the C a l i p h as u p h o l d e r of the H o l y L a w is p e r v a s i v e . What B r i t i s h C a i r o d i d not see is that the C a l i p h is also a p r i n c e : a governor a n d a leader in battle as well as a leader in prayer. K i t c h e n e r ' s followers, for all their s u p p o s e d knowledge of the I s l a m i c world, m i s s e d the i m p o r t a n c e of another point: they ignored the extent of I s l a m i c disunity a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n . T h u s the K i t c h e n e r plan called for I b n S a u d , leader of the fierce puritanical Wahhabi sect, to recognize the spiritual authority of the S u n n i ruler of M e c c a ; b u t that was not a realistic possibility, for like so m a n y of the d o z e n s of c o n t e n d i n g sects into which I s l a m is divided, theirs were at daggers drawn. T h e p r o p o s a l which K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers sent off to M e c c a misled its recipient, who read it as an offer to make him ruler of a vast k i n g d o m ; for that, of c o u r s e , is what the new C a l i p h of I s l a m would have been. As will be seen, when the ruler of M e c c a o p e n e d the di s c u s s i o n of what the b o u n d a r i e s of his new k i n g d o m were to b e , S t o r r s w a s a p p a l l e d ; for he a n d K i t c h e n e r had not intended that the area ruled by the E m i r s h o u l d be e x p a n d e d . In the s u m m e r of 1915, S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that if the ruler of M e c c a could conciliate the other ruling e m i r s a n d chieftains of the A r a b i a n peninsula, a n d i m p r e s s u p o n t h e m that "he has no idea of p r e t e n d i n g to any temporal rights within their territories, his chances of a g e n e r a l — t h o u g h hardly yet of a universal—recognition as C a l i p h will be good." 1 7

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T h e British intended to s u p p o r t the c a n d i d a c y of H u s s e i n for the position of "Pope" of I s l a m — a position that ( u n b e k n o w n to t h e m ) did not exist; while ( u n b e k n o w n to t h e m too) the l a n g u a g e they u s e d e n c o u r a g e d him to a t t e m p t to b e c o m e ruler of the entire A r a b w o r l d — t h o u g h in fact S t o r r s believed that it w a s a mistake for H u s s e i n to aim at e x t e n d i n g his rule at all. K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants would have been astonished to learn what their c o m m u n i c a t i o n signified to M o s l e m s in A r a b i a .

11 INDIA P R O T E S T S i A r t h u r Hirtzel, S e c r e t a r y to the Political D e p a r t m e n t of the I n d i a Office, w a s not shown the K i t c h e n e r m e s s a g e s to H u s s e i n until 12 D e c e m b e r 1914—after they h a d reached M e c c a . He was a g h a s t . Hirtzel quickly criticized "a very d a n g e r o u s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " which, in hinting at an A r a b caliphate, "does the very thing which this Office has always u n d e r s t o o d that H . M . G . would not d o . " T h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , L o r d C r e w e , privately told the Viceroy that K i t c h e n e r refused to see that the spiritual prestige of the existing C a l i p h — t h e T u r k i s h S u l t a n — r e m a i n e d intact, and that M o s l e m s in I n d i a , who held h i m in high r e g a r d , even if they accepted his being replaced would never accept his b e i n g replaced as a result of foreign meddling. 1

2

W h e n h e saw K i t c h e n e r ' s p l e d g e t o protect A r a b i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e , H i r t z e l p r o t e s t e d that it w a s "a startling d o c u m e n t , " "a g u a r a n t e e given . . . i n writing w i t h o u t the a u t h o r i t y o f H . M . G . " H i r t z e l ' s protest was b u t t r e s s e d by an earlier m e m o r a n d u m from the F o r e i g n D e p a r t m e n t of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , forwarded to the I n d i a Office with s u p p o r t from the g o v e r n o r s of A d e n , B o m b a y , a n d elsewhere, which explained that, "What we want is not a U n i t e d A r a b i a : but a weak a n d disunited A r a b i a , split up into little principalities so far as possible u n d e r o u r s u z e r a i n t y — b u t i n c a p a b l e of coordinated action against u s , f o r m i n g a buffer against the P o w e r s in the W e s t . " T h i s m i s u n d e r s t o o d British Cairo's intentions: as Clayton later wrote to Wingate, " I n d i a s e e m s o b s e s s e d with the fear of a powerful a n d united A r a b state, which can never exist unless we are fool e n o u g h to create it." 3

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A t t e m p t i n g to soothe feelings in the India Office and in the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , L o r d C r e w e explained that there had been no prior consultation a b o u t the K i t c h e n e r pledge b e c a u s e "this was a private c o m m u n i c a t i o n of L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s " rather than an official 106

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c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t . B u t the j u r i s d i c tional d i s p u t e that h a d flared up w a s not extinguished by s u c h a s s u r a n c e s ; it flamed on heatedly t h r o u g h o u t the war a n d afterward.

II India's institutional outlook w a s that of a b e l e a g u e r e d g a r r i s o n s p r e a d too thin along an o v e r e x t e n d e d line. H e r instinct w a s to avoid new involvements. H e r strategy for the M i d d l e E a s t w a s to hold the bare m i n i m u m — t h e coastline of the G u l f , to keep o p e n the sea r o a d to a n d f r o m B r i t a i n — a n d t o refuse t o b e d r a w n inland. N o n e t h e l e s s the u n w a n t e d war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o p e n e d u p the possibility o f a n n e x i n g n e a r b y B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d . Colonization a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t of these provinces w o u l d b r i n g great riches, it w a s believed; a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a w a s t e m p t e d , even t h o u g h in the p a s t its officials h a d often w a r n e d against a s s u m i n g further territorial responsibilities. Whatever she did, British I n d i a w a s d e t e r m i n e d to identify her interests with those o f her s u b j e c t s , m a n y o f w h o m were M o s l e m ; a n d L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s I s l a m i c policy p o s e d a threat to this vital interest. K i t c h e n e r ' s initiatives also i n t r u d e d into a foreign policy s p h e r e in which the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a jealously g u a r d e d its rights against c o m p e t i t o r s within the British g o v e r n m e n t . T h e F o r e i g n D e p a r t m e n t of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a exercised responsibility for relations with s u c h n e i g h b o r i n g areas a s T i b e t , A f g h a n i s t a n , Persia, a n d eastern A r a b i a ; a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a also a d m i n i s t e r e d Britain's protectorate over A d e n a n d the G u l f s h e i k h d o m s t h r o u g h a network of g o v e r n o r s a n d resident a g e n t s . T h u s when K i t c h e n e r entered into d i s c u s s i o n s with the ruler of M e c c a , he intervened in an area of I n d i a n concern a n d activity. T h o u g h the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a h a d long followed a policy of holding the coastal p o r t s along the Persian G u l f sea route to S u e z , it had avoided involvement in the politics of the interior. E v e n s o , C a p t a i n William H e n r y S h a k e s p e a r , an officer in the I n d i a n Political S e r v i c e , h a d , as Political A g e n t in K u w a i t , entered into relations of political a n d personal friendship with A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , a n emir and a rising p o w e r in central A r a b i a , in the years immediately p r e c e d i n g the o u t b r e a k o f w a r . L i k e A b d u l l a h i n C a i r o , I b n S a u d h a d e x p r e s s e d a willingness for his d o m a i n to b e c o m e a British client s t a t e ; a n d like K i t c h e n e r a n d S t o r r s , S h a k e s p e a r w a s obliged to indicate that his g o v e r n m e n t w a s unwilling to interfere in m a t t e r s of purely d o m e s t i c O t t o m a n concern. T h i s w a s even m o r e t r u e at the time b e c a u s e the F o r e i g n Office b a c k e d the p r o - T u r k i s h H o u s e of 7

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R a s h i d , the p a r a m o u n t rulers of central A r a b i a a n d the H o u s e of S a u d ' s hereditary e n e m y . B u t with the o u t b r e a k of war, I n d i a was free to b a c k her p r o t e g e I b n S a u d , only to find C a i r o b a c k i n g a rival in M e c c a . C a i r o , in turn, found its own projects thwarted by I n d i a . In N o v e m b e r 1914, the m o n t h that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, C a i r o p r o p o s e d (with the a p p r o v a l of Sir E d w a r d G r e y ) to s e n d M a j o r a l - M a s r i on an expedition to organize agitation a n d p e r h a p s revolution in M e s o p o t a m i a . E v e r fearful of igniting a conflagration that c o u l d blaze out of control, I n d i a blocked the p r o p o s a l . I n d i a believed that if the A r a b s ever were to turn against the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t , I b n S a u d s h o u l d lead this revolt; b u t a s o f D e c e m b e r 1914, the Viceroy a r g u e d that action along these lines would be p r e m a t u r e . T a k i n g a contrary view, K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m looked to Sherif H u s s e i n as Britain's important A r a b i a n ally, a n d i s s u e d p r o c l a m a t i o n s u r g i n g A r a b s t o revolt. A p a r t f r o m this difference in overall strategy, S i m l a , on the b a s i s of prewar dealings, was aware of others in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world who might be alienated by British s u p p o r t for the E m i r of Mecca's pretensions. T h e r e w a s S h e i k h M u b a r a k of K u w a i t , long a friend of B r i t a i n ; there was the friendly ruler of the Persian port of M u h a m m a r a ; there was even S a y y i d T a l i b , the m a g n a t e o f B a s r a , "dangerous scoundrel" t h o u g h Hirtzel believed him to b e . A F o r e i g n Office official, in warning of r e p e r c u s s i o n s in A r a b i a , noted that the E m i r o f Mecca's two enemies t h e r e — I b n S a u d a n d S e y y i d M o h a m m e d a l - I d r i s i , the ruler of A s i r — w e r e , in his view, Britain's friends. 8

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I n d i a n officials m a d e the point that Cairo's policies were reckless; worse, they w o u l d not work. Britain's s p o n s o r s h i p of an A r a b caliphate would not only adversely affect M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a ( a n d M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a was, f r o m the British point of view, what the caliphate issue was principally a b o u t ) ; it would also do no g o o d in the A r a b world. Percy C o x , of the Indian Political S e r v i c e , reported in D e c e m b e r 1915 that he h a d held meetings with the S h e i k h of K u w a i t a n d I b n S a u d , a n d that he had f o u n d the caliphate question to be of no interest to t h e m . I b n S a u d said that a m o n g the A r a b i a n chiefs "no one cared in the least who called himself C a l i p h , " a n d claimed that his W a h h a b i sect did not recognize any caliphs after the first four (the last of w h o m h a d died m o r e than a t h o u s a n d years before). 1 1

* "Simla" is often used to mean the Government of India, whose summer capital it was.

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III O d d l y , n o b o d y in L o n d o n or in S i m l a s e e m s to have d r a w n the a p p r o p r i a t e conclusion f r o m art e p i s o d e at the end of 1914 that showed the power of the C a l i p h h a d been put to the test a n d had been shown to be illusory. In N o v e m b e r 1914, u p o n entering the F i r s t World War, the S u l t a n / C a l i p h p r o c l a i m e d a jihad, or H o l y War, against Britain, a m i d s t well-planned d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e r e were c r o w d s , b a n d s , a n d s p e e c h e s . T h e W i l h e m s t r a s s e o r d e r e d copies o f the proclamation to be forwarded immediately to Berlin for translation into "Arabic a n d I n d i a n " (sic) for leaflet p r o p a g a n d a a m o n g M o s l e m t r o o p s i n e n e m y a r m i e s . T h e staff o f the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Ministry predicted that the S u l t a n ' s actions w o u l d "awaken the fanaticism of I s l a m " a n d m i g h t lead to a large-scale revolution in I n d i a . 1 2

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T h e G e r m a n military attache in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e believed that the proclamation w o u l d influence M o s l e m soldiers in the British a n d F r e n c h a r m i e s not to fire on G e r m a n t r o o p s . However, the skeptical G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r p r o v e d a better p r o p h e t : he wrote in a private letter that the p r o c l a m a t i o n would "coax only a few M o s l e m s " to c o m e over to the side of the Central P o w e r s . He was right. The jihad p r o v e d to b e , in a coinage of the F i r s t World War, a " d u d " : a shell that was fired, b u t failed to explode.* 1 4

E n t h u s i a s m for a Holy War was low, even in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e jihad was p r o c l a i m e d , b u t nothing h a p p e n e d . T h e British, however, continued to be wary a n d feared that any jolt might c a u s e the unexp l o d e d shell s u d d e n l y to go off. In O c t o b e r 1915 G i l b e r t C l a y t o n wrote a m e m o r a n d u m a r g u i n g that although the jihad until then had been a failure, it still m i g h t c o m e a l i v e . A c c o r d i n g to L o r d C r e w e , Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , the only reason it had not worked was b e c a u s e the Porte did not control the Holy Places of the H e j a z : "If the C o m m i t t e e of U n i o n a n d P r o g r e s s get control of M e c c a , they might be able to declare a regular J e h a d [sic], p r o b a b l y affecting Afghanistan, a n d g i v i n g serious t r o u b l e in I n d i a . " 15

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Meanwhile Wingate, Clayton, a n d S t o r r s were actively p u r s u i n g the K i t c h e n e r plan that called for an association in the postwar world with A r a b i a a n d with a n A r a b i a n religious p r i m a t e . T h e cautious Clayton w a r n e d that the A r a b caliphate was a delicate matter a n d should b e p r o p o s e d b y A r a b s t h e m s e l v e s ; but Wingate, a s always impatient to m o v e forward, a s s u r e d F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that "We shall do what we can to p u s h the A r a b m o v e m e n t & I have got various irons in the fire in this c o n n e c t i o n . " 17

18

* Troubles caused by groups such as the nomadic Senussi on Egypt's Libyan frontier were minor, and might well have occurred in any event.

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B u t the I n d i a Office continued to fear that, as a result of these activities, M e c c a would be d r a w n into the vortex of world p o l i t i c s — a n eventuality that might d i s t u r b opinion in I n d i a at a time when any d i s t u r b a n c e could prove fatal. D u r i n g the c o u r s e of the war, S i m l a was g o i n g to s e n d m a n y of its E u r o p e a n soldiers to E u r o p e , a n d large n u m b e r s of I n d i a n t r o o p s as well. F o r the duration of the war it was in a weak position to quell whatever u p r i s i n g s m i g h t occur. C a i r o a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e both s e e m e d to S i m l a to be p u r s u i n g policies that threatened to inflame M o s l e m p a s s i o n s in I n d i a a n d t h u s to imperil the I n d i a n E m p i r e . As the war p r o g r e s s e d , British officials who ruled I n d i a increasingly c a m e to believe that their m o s t d a n g e r o u s adversaries were neither the T u r k s nor the G e r m a n s , b u t the British officials g o v e r n i n g E g y p t ; for despite India's p r o t e s t s , B r i t i s h C a i r o went a h e a d with its intrigues in M e c c a .

12 T H E MAN IN T H E M I D D L E i M e c c a , where M o h a m m e d was b o r n , a n d M e d i n a , t o which h e e m i g r a t e d , are the holy cities that for M o s l e m s everywhere give u n i q u e i m p o r t a n c e to the m o u n t a i n o u s H e j a z , the long a n d narrow western section of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a b o r d e r i n g the R e d S e a . H e j a z m e a n s " s e p a r a t i n g " — a reference to the highlands that divide it f r o m the plateau to the east. In the early twentieth century A r a b i a was an e m p t y a n d desolate land, a n d the H e j a z , in the w o r d s of the 1910 Encyclopaedia Britannica, w a s "physically the m o s t desolate and uninviting province in A r a b i a . " Whole sections of it were u n watered a n d u n i n h a b i t e d wilderness. A b o u t 750 miles long a n d , at its widest, a b o u t 200 miles a c r o s s , the H e j a z precariously s u p p o r t e d a population estimated at 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , half-Bedouin a n d half-townsmen. A l t h o u g h it f o r m e d part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , its distance f r o m C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , magnified by the primitive state of transportation a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , h a d always lent it considerable a u t o n o m y . D a t e s , of which a h u n d r e d varieties were said to grow, were the staple c r o p ; but the real industry of the province was the annual p i l g r i m a g e . A b o u t 7 0 , 0 0 0 p i l g r i m s m a d e the journey t o M e c c a each year. Protecting the p i l g r i m s from m a r a u d i n g B e d o u i n tribes was a principal function of the local representative of the O t t o m a n government ; a n d the authorities m a d e a practice of offering s u b s i d i e s to the tribes in the hope of p e r s u a d i n g t h e m that there was better pay in s a f e g u a r d i n g than in molesting the visitors. M e c c a was a two-day camel j o u r n e y , or a b o u t forty-five miles, f r o m the nearest coastal p o r t . It lay in a hot a n d b a r r e n valley, a n d controlled the p a s s a g e s t h r o u g h the s u r r o u n d i n g hills. Its population was estimated at 6 0 , 0 0 0 . E n t r a n c e into its precincts was prohibited to n o n - M o s l e m s , a n d exercised the powerful lure of the f o r b i d d e n . Only a few E u r o p e a n travelers had s u c c e e d e d in penetrating the city in d i s g u i s e a n d b r i n g i n g back detailed descriptions of it.

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T h e s e E u r o p e a n s reported that even in the holy city certain dark practices lingered from a primitive p a s t . A c c o r d i n g to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, " T h e u n s p e a k a b l e vices of M e c c a are a scandal to all I s l a m , a n d a constant s o u r c e of wonder to pious p i l g r i m s . T h e slave trade has connexions with the p i l g r i m a g e which are not thoroughly clear; b u t u n d e r cover of the p i l g r i m a g e a great deal of importation a n d exportation of slaves g o e s on." Y e t E u r o p e a n travelers also r e p o r t e d that the people of the H e j a z , and indeed of all A r a b i a , were a m o n g nature's aristocrats. A c c o r d i n g to the Britannica: Physically the A r a b s are one of the strongest a n d noblest races of the world . .. T h u s , physically, they yield to few races, if any, of m a n k i n d ; mentally, they s u r p a s s m o s t , a n d are only kept b a c k in the m a r c h of p r o g r e s s by the r e m a r k a b l e defect of organizing power and incapacity for c o m b i n e d action. L a x a n d imperfect as are their f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t , it is with impatience that even these are b o r n e . . . T h e j o b of the E m i r of M e c c a , if the Britannica was to be believed, was not an easy one. F o r M o s l e m s , M e c c a had always been the center of the world. N o w , the a m b i t i o n s of K i t c h e n e r ' s C a i r o a n d of the C . U . P . ' s C o n s t a n t i n o p l e b r o u g h t the arid H e j a z into the center of twentieth-century politics. T h e new attentions that M e c c a received in the 1914 war b r o u g h t it into the center in other ways, less welcome to its E m i r ; he found himself caught in the m i d d l e . H u s s e i n ibn Ali, who ruled the H e j a z on behalf of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n , was styled the Sherif of M e c c a a n d its E m i r . To be a sherif, or notable, was to be a d e s c e n d a n t of M o h a m m e d ; a n d H u s s e i n , like M o h a m m e d himself, was a m e m b e r of the H o u s e of H a s h e m . F o r s o m e time it had been the practice of the O t t o m a n regime to appoint the E m i r of M e c c a from a m o n g rival sherifs. In 1908 H u s s e i n , of the D h a w u - ' A w n clan, was personally selected by the S u l t a n , over the opposition of the C . U . P . , which backed the candidate of a rival clan. H u s s e i n , like his courtly friend the G r a n d Vizier and like the S u l t a n himself, w a s a m a n of old-fashioned b r e e d i n g a n d learning whose style of expression was ornate. Of m e d i u m height, with a white b e a r d , a n d a b o u t sixty years of a g e in 1914, he had spent m u c h of his life in glorified captivity at the court in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e r e , even the p r y i n g eyes of enemies were unable to detect him in any i m p r o p e r c o n d u c t ; he spent his time in meditation. H u s s e i n continually e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g personal loyalty to the S u l t a n . T h e S u l t a n , however, was a figurehead. Real power at the Porte was Hussein referred to himself and his family as "Hashemites."

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wielded by the Y o u n g T u r k s , new m e n without family b a c k g r o u n d , with w h o m he was out of s y m p a t h y . T h o u g h loyal to the S u l t a n , he found himself increasingly at o d d s with the Sultan's g o v e r n m e n t , a n d in particular with its policy of centralization. Hussein's a m b i t i o n was to m a k e his position as E m i r s e c u r e for himself a n d , in perpetuity, for his family. He strove to increase his independence, while the centralizing C . U . P . g o v e r n m e n t c o n s p i r e d to decrease it. T h e g o v e r n m e n t p u s h e d forward with construction of the H e j a z railroad, a i m e d , a m o n g other things, at curtailing the E m i r ' s a u t o n o m y . T h e railroad already ran from D a m a s c u s , capital of what is now S y r i a , to M e d i n a in the H e j a z . What the g o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e d was to extend the line to M e c c a and to the port of J e d d a h . T h i s was a threat to the c a m e l - o w n i n g B e d o u i n tribes of the H e j a z and to their lucrative control of the pilgrim routes to the Holy Places. U s i n g the railroad and also the t e l e g r a p h , the C . U . P . threatened to exercise direct rule over M e d i n a , M e c c a , and the rest of the H e j a z . If carried into effect, the T u r k i s h government's plan would make H u s s e i n into a m e r e s u b o r d i n a t e functionary. H u s s e i n res p o n d e d by inspiring civil d i s t u r b a n c e s . F o r H u s s e i n , who h a d b e g u n his administration of affairs by u s i n g T u r k i s h t r o o p s against the A r a b i a n tribes, this represented a c h a n g e in policy, b u t not a c h a n g e in allegiance. He remained in the a m b i g u ous position of s u p p o r t i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e while o p p o s i n g its government. In the years just before the b e g i n n i n g of the E u r o p e a n war, the secret societies in D a m a s c u s a n d the various rival lords of A r a b i a were in frequent touch with one another; they explored the possibility of uniting against the Y o u n g T u r k s in s u p p o r t of greater rights for the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g half of the e m p i r e . At one time or another most of the principal A r a b i a n chiefs were involved in s u c h conversations. In 1911, the A r a b d e p u t i e s in the O t t o m a n Parliament asked H u s s e i n to lead the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s in throwing off the T u r k i s h yoke; he r e f u s e d . A year later the secret societies s e e m to have a p p r o a c h e d his rivals, b u t not H u s s e i n . By 1913 A r a b nationalists apparently r e g a r d e d him as "a tool in the hands of the T u r k s for striking the A r a b s . " Y e t the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t also strongly distrusted him, a n d e x p l o r e d the possibility of d e p o s i n g h i m . 1

T w o of H u s s e i n ' s sons were active politically. A b d u l l a h , his favorite, was a d e p u t y from M e c c a in the O t t o m a n Parliament, while Feisal was a d e p u t y from J e d d a h . A b d u l l a h counselled his father to resist the g o v e r n m e n t ; he believed that with the s u p p o r t of the secret societies a n d of Britain it could be d o n e . F e i s a l advised against o p p o s i n g the g o v e r n m e n t . A b d u l l a h , a short, heavy-set, astute man with a politician's conciliating manner, was for b o l d n e s s . Feisal, tall, quick, a n d n e r v o u s , was for caution.

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H u s s e i n , who h a d played off his enemies against one another for years, was inclined to t e m p o r i z e a n d delay. With each year in office as E m i r he had increased his prestige and his m a s t e r y over the c o m p l e x web of personal, family, a n d tribal relationships that m a d e for authority in the H e j a z . He h a d r e d u c e d the political influence of the local C . U . P . l o d g e s in M e c c a a n d M e d i n a . H i s p r i m a c y within his own emirate was established firmly. In 1913 a n d 1914, however, he found himself s u r r o u n d e d by external enemies. T h e r e were his neighbors a n d traditional rivals, the A r a b i a n lords to his south a n d east, w h o m he h a d threatened a n d who threatened him. T h e r e were the A r a b nationalists, s o m e of w h o m r e g a r d e d him as an essentially T u r k i s h official. T h e r e were the British, whose navy could easily d o m i n a t e the long coastline of the H e j a z once they went to war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — a n d he knew that they w o u l d b e c o m e his enemies if he threw in his lot with the e m p i r e . Finally, there was the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t which threatened a s h o w d o w n on the issue of the E m i r ' s a u t o n o m y . N o w , for the duration of the war, the C . U . P . p o s t p o n e d completion of the railroad a n d the a d o p t i o n of its new governmental regulations, as well as its secret plan to a p p o i n t a new emir in H u s s e i n ' s p l a c e . B u t it o r d e r e d H u s s e i n to s u p p l y m a n p o w e r for the a r m y . H u s s e i n a n d A b d u l l a h m a y well have s u s p e c t e d a C . U . P . p l o t : the m e n of the H e j a z w o u l d be sent as soldiers to distant battlefields, while regular T u r k i s h t r o o p s would be sent to take their place in g a r r i s o n i n g the H e j a z , a n d would then seize control of it. H u s s e i n a s s u r e d all his d a n g e r o u s neighbors that he would a c t in a c c o r d a n c e with their w i s h e s — b u t p u t off d o i n g so until s o m e time in the f u t u r e . He asked the advice of A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , his rival a n d a powerful warlord to the east, as to whether or not he s h o u l d associate M e c c a with the S u l t a n ' s call for a Holy War against Britain a n d her allies; a n d he d i s c u s s e d with A r a b i c nationalist leaders from D a m a s c u s the possibility of joint action against the Porte. In reply to r e q u e s t s a n d d e m a n d s from the Porte, he asked for mo n e y to raise t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , but continued to postp o n e s e n d i n g any contingents to the T u r k i s h a r m y . He gave Kitchener's messages and promises a warm response. At the s a m e t i m e — a t the e n d of 1 9 1 4 — w h e n D j e m a l P a s h a p r e p a r e d to attack the British at the S u e z C a n a l , H u s s e i n wrote to him, p r o m i s i n g to s e n d t r o o p s to join in the attack; while A b d u l l a h replied to S t o r r s in British C a i r o that the H e j a z h a d d e c i d e d to side with Britain in the war. A b d u l l a h explained, however, that this would have to be kept a secret. F o r the m o m e n t , it was not p o s s i b l e for the E m i r to reveal his intention of allying with Britain, nor could he take action. A c c o r d i n g to A b d u l l a h a n d H u s s e i n , the time was not yet ripe.

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II S t o r r s w a s p l e a s e d that his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e h a d p l a c e d the R e s i d e n c y , the office of the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , on t e r m s of close cordiality with M e c c a . O n 2 7 J a n u a r y 1915, h e wrote F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r that "I am still in very friendly a n d intimate contact with the Sherif of M e c c a , a n d am firmly convinced that he is a m o r e p a y i n g p r o p o s i t i o n for our care a n d attention than any purely local Chieftain (however powerful in himself) who cannot enjoy the p r e s tige of receiving the annual h o m a g e of the representatives of I s l a m t h r o u g h o u t the w o r l d . " 2

F o r the m o m e n t all that K i t c h e n e r a n d the R e s i d e n c y really asked of H u s s e i n was neutrality. S i n c e H u s s e i n ' s desire was to avoid b e i n g d r a w n into the perilous war, the two parties to the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e were in a c c o r d . H u s s e i n d i d nothing to associate himself or M e c c a with the p r o c l a m a t i o n of a H o l y War. F o r the R e s i d e n c y , the corres p o n d e n c e therefore h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d everything that could reasonably have been d e s i r e d . T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , r e p o r t e d to K i t c h e n e r on 2 F e b r u a r y 1915, that "there is no need for i m m e d i a t e action . . . as all that is necessary for the m o m e n t , with the Sherif of M e c c a — h a d been d o n e . " 3

T h e War Minister w a s satisfied. H e did not share Wingate's belief that a tribal revolt in A r a b i a could affect Britain's fortunes in the war; he g a v e no sign of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t when H u s s e i n d i d not p r o p o s e to lead s u c h a revolt. K i t c h e n e r believed that G e r m a n y was the enemy that m a t t e r e d and that E u r o p e w a s the only battlefield that c o u n t e d . H i s long-term plan to c a p t u r e the caliphate w a s d e signed for the p o s t w a r world. In his view, he a n d i t — a n d the M i d d l e E a s t — c o u l d wait until the war w a s over.

PART III BRITAIN IS DRAWN INTO THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUAGMIRE

13 T H E T U R K I S H COMMANDERS A L M O S T L O S E T H E WAR i At the time of his a p p o i n t m e n t as War Minister, K i t c h e n e r did not intend Britain to be d r a w n into any involvement in the M i d d l e E a s t d u r i n g the war. When he started a l o n g the road that led to s u c h an involvement, he was not aware that this was what he was d o i n g . L a t e r , in 1915—16, when he found his country fully e n g a g e d in the M i d d l e E a s t , he m u s t have w o n d e r e d how he had allowed such a situation to c o m e a b o u t . F r o m the outset of the war, it had been his unwavering doctrine to d i s r e g a r d the E a s t while focusing on the western front. K i t c h e n e r ' s opinion that T u r k e y a n d the M i d d l e E a s t c o u l d safely be ignored for the duration of the E u r o p e a n conflict derived in part from the a s s u m p t i o n that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e d i d not p o s e a significant military threat. T h i s was an a s s u m p t i o n that was widely shared. British officials viewed O t t o m a n military capability with c o n t e m p t ; a n d the record of the first six m o n t h s of warfare in the E a s t confirmed them in their view. F r o m O c t o b e r 1914, when the Goeben a n d Breslau o p e n e d fire on the R u s s i a n coast, until F e b r u a r y 1915, when an a v e n g i n g British fleet b e g a n its b o m b a r d m e n t of the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s a n d then s t e a m e d t o w a r d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the O t t o m a n a r m i e s b l u n d e r e d f r o m one defeat to another. T h e S u p r e m e C o m m a n d e r o f the T u r k i s h a r m e d forces was E n v e r P a s h a , who a week before the war b e g a n had p r o c l a i m e d himself "vice-generalissimo." In theory this placed h i m s e c o n d only to the figurehead S u l t a n . In practice it placed h i m second to none. E n v e r h a d the qualities of a lone adventurer, not those of a general. T h o u g h a u d a c i o u s a n d c u n n i n g , he was an incompetent c o m m a n d e r . L i m a n von S a n d e r s , the P r u s s i a n a r m y adviser with w h o m he frequently f o u n d himself at o d d s , r e g a r d e d E n v e r as a buffoon in military m a t t e r s . E n v e r , however, pictured himself as a leader of a wholly different 119

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character. He portrayed himself as an heir to the founders of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e : the b a n d of ghazis—crusading warriors for the Islamic faith—who in the fourteenth century had galloped f r o m the obscurity of the Byzantine frontier onto the center stage of history. At the outset of the war, he hastened to attack the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . T h e r e was an obstacle in his p a t h : the forbidding C a u c a s u s mountain r a n g e , which formed the land frontier between the two e m p i r e s . Against the advice of L i m a n von S a n d e r s , he d e t e r m i n e d to launch a frontal attack across that d a u n t i n g natural frontier, which the R u s s i a n s , in secure p o s s e s s i o n of the high g r o u n d , had heavily fortified—and to do so in the d e p t h s of winter. He p r o p o s e d initially to g r o u p his forces along an e n o r m o u s territory within T u r k e y , 600 miles long a n d 300 miles wide, t h r o u g h which there was no railroad to t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s or s u p p l i e s . T h e few roads were steep a n d narrow. T h e rivers could be c r o s s e d only by fording, the b r i d g e s having collapsed long before a n d having never been repaired. B e c a u s e the nearest railhead was over 600 miles away, every bullet, every shell, had to be t r a n s p o r t e d by c a m e l — a journey of six weeks. M u c h of the territory was without track or habitation, unexplored a n d uncharted. L o n g winters a n d m o u n t a i n s n o w s t o r m s m a d e whole sections of it u n p a s s a b l e m u c h of the year. 1

E n v e r ' s plan, as he explained it to L i m a n von S a n d e r s , was to then m o v e out of this s t a g i n g area, cross the frontier into Czarist territory, a n d attack the fortified R u s s i a n position on the C a u c a s u s plateau by the sort of orchestrated m o v e m e n t pictured in military textbooks, with s o m e c o l u m n s attacking directly, and others m o v i n g out at an angle and then wheeling a b o u t to flank or encircle. He was u n m o v e d by the reminder that, without railroads or other t r a n s p o r t , the strategic mobility r e q u i r e d for the military m o v e m e n t s that he envisaged would be unavailable. He entertained no d o u b t s of his s u c c e s s . H a v i n g c r u s h e d the R u s s i a n s , said E n v e r , he would then m a r c h via Afghanistan to the c o n q u e s t of India. On 6 D e c e m b e r 1914, E n v e r left Constantinople a n d on 21 D e c e m b e r took c o m m a n d of the O t t o m a n T h i r d A r m y . He led the attack on the C a u c a s u s plateau in p e r s o n . T h e R u s s i a n s were terrified and appealed to Britain to help s o m e h o w ; they had no idea they faced a foe who was utterly inept. E n v e r left his artillery behind b e c a u s e of the deep snow. H i s troops were forced to bivouac in the bitter cold (as low as m i n u s thirty degrees Fahrenheit without t e n t s ) . T h e y ran short of food. An epidemic of t y p h u s broke out. With routes blocked by the winter snows, they lost their way in the tangled mountain p a s s e s . Enver's plan was for his forces to launch a coordinated s u r p r i s e attack on the R u s s i a n b a s e called S a r i k a m i s h , which blocked the invasion highway;

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but, having lost touch with one another, the various T u r k i s h c o r p s arrived at different times at S a r i k a m i s h to attack a n d to be destroyed piecemeal. T h e r e m n a n t s of what had once been an a r m y s t r a g g l e d b a c k into eastern T u r k e y in J a n u a r y 1915. Of the p e r h a p s 100,000 m e n who took part in the a t t a c k , 86 percent were lost. A G e r m a n officer attached to the O t t o m a n G e n e r a l Staff d e s c r i b e d what h a p p e n e d to the T h i r d A r m y by s a y i n g that it h a d "suffered a disaster which for rapidity a n d c o m p l e t e n e s s is without parallel in military history." Y e t even as he r o d e back f r o m the catastrophe in the northeast, E n v e r o r d e r e d another ill-conceived offensive. In c o m m a n d was D j e m a l P a s h a , the Minister of the M a r i n e . J e a l o u s of E n v e r , whose prestige a n d power had b e g u n to o v e r s h a d o w those of the other Y o u n g T u r k s , D j e m a l took the field as c o m m a n d e r of the O t t o m a n F o u r t h A r m y , b a s e d in S y r i a a n d Palestine. On 15 J a n u a r y 1915, he b e g a n his m a r c h toward E g y p t to launch a s u r p r i s e attack across the Suez Canal. 2

3

A g a i n , the logistical p r o b l e m s were ignored. T h e r o a d s of S y r i a and Palestine were so b a d that not even horse-drawn carts could m o v e along m a n y of t h e m ; a n d the wastes of the 130-mile wide Sinai desert were trackless. T h e O t t o m a n soldiery nonetheless perf o r m e d p r o d i g i e s of e n d u r a n c e a n d valor. S o m e h o w they t r a n s p o r t e d themselves a n d their e q u i p m e n t f r o m S y r i a t o S u e z . K r e s s von K r e s s e n s t e i n , a G e r m a n engineering officer, d u g wells along the route, which enabled t h e m to survive the m a r c h through the desert. T h e time of year, for once, was well c h o s e n : J a n u a r y is the best m o n t h in E g y p t for avoiding the terrible heat. 4

B u t when the F o u r t h A r m y reached the b a n k s of the S u e z C a n a l , D j e m a l d i s c o v e r e d that m o s t of his t r o o p s could not use the b r i d g i n g p o n t o o n s that were meant to t r a n s p o r t t h e m to the other side. T h e G e r m a n engineers h a d b r o u g h t the p o n t o o n s from G e r m a n y , b u t the troops had not been trained in their u s e . D j e m a l o r d e r e d the attack to c o m m e n c e nonetheless. E a r l y in the m o r n i n g of 3 F e b r u a r y , while the sky was still half-dark, it b e g a n . T h e British, from b e h i n d their fortifications, awoke to discover an O t t o m a n a r m y on the o p p o s i t e b a n k of the e n o r m o u s d i t c h ; a n d with their superior w e a p o n r y they o p e n e d fire u p o n it. In the battle a n d the s u b s e q u e n t rout, 2 , 0 0 0 O t t o m a n t r o o p s — a b o u t 10 percent of D j e m a l ' s forces—were killed. D j e m a l o r d e r e d a retreat; a n d kept on g o i n g all the way b a c k to Syria. 5

T u r k i s h g e n e r a l s h i p b e c a m e a j o k e . A u b r e y H e r b e r t wrote from S h e p h e a r d ' s Hotel in C a i r o to his friend M a r k S y k e s that the latest O t t o m a n plan was "that the T u r k s are to b r i n g t h o u s a n d s of c a m e l s down to the C a n a l a n d then set a light to their hair. T h e c a m e l ,

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u s i n g its well known reasoning p o w e r s , will d a s h to the C a n a l to put the fire out. When they have done this in sufficient quantities the T u r k s will m a r c h over t h e m . " I n L o n d o n the P r i m e Minister lightly d i s m i s s e d the O t t o m a n invasion by saying that " T h e T u r k s have been trying to throw a b r i d g e across the S u e z C a n a l & in that ingenious fashion to find a way into E g y p t . T h e poor things & their w o u l d - b e b r i d g e were blown into smithereens, and they have retired into the d e s e r t . " 6

7

II E n v e r had a s s u m e d that the war w o u l d be short, a n d that it would be decided in a few lightning c a m p a i g n s . He had neither a plan for a war of attrition nor an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what s u c h a war m i g h t entail. He had no gift for organization, no head for logistics, a n d no patience for administration. As War Minister he thoughtlessly led his country into c h a o s . He b e g a n by o r d e r i n g all eligible m e n throughout the imperial d o m a i n s to report for induction into the a r m y immediately, b r i n g i n g with t h e m enough food for three d a y s . When they reported as o r d e r e d — w h i c h is to say, all at the s a m e time—their n u m b e r s dwarfed the conscription offices, which could not deal with so m a n y at once. H a v i n g flooded in from the countryside, the draftees ate up their three d a y s ' s u p p l y of food a n d then had nothing to eat. S o o n they b e g a n to drift away, labeled as deserters, afraid to return either to the conscription offices or to their h o m e s . B r i n g i n g in the m a n p o w e r f r o m the countryside ruined what w o u l d have been the bountiful harvest of 1914. It set a terrible p a t t e r n : t h r o u g h o u t the war, the draft of m e n a n d pack animals b r o u g h t famine in g o o d years as well as b a d . D u r i n g the war years, the s u p p l y of draft animals fell, horses to 40 percent and oxen a n d buffaloes to 15 percent of what they had been. T h e shrinkage in agricultural activity was equally d r a m a t i c : cereal acreage was cut in half, a n d cotton fell to 8 percent of its prewar p r o d u c t i o n level. Control of the scarce s u p p l i e s of food a n d other g o o d s b e c a m e the key to wealth a n d power. In the sprawling metropolis of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a Chicago-style political b o s s with g a n g l a n d connections fought against E n v e r ' s G e n e r a l Director of the C o m m i s s a r i a t for effective control of the e c o n o m y . T h e transportation s y s t e m of the e m p i r e was also shattered by the war. In the a b s e n c e of railroads a n d u s a b l e r o a d s , in the past g o o d s had been mostly s h i p p e d by sea. N o w the empire's 5,000 miles of coastline were u n d e r the g u n s of the Allied navies. In the north the G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s pulled back the Goeben and Breslau for the 8

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defense of the D a r d a n e l l e s , a b a n d o n i n g the Black S e a to the newly built battleships o f the R u s s i a n s . T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n was d o m i n a t e d by the F r e n c h a n d British navies. Allied s h i p s cut off the O t t o m a n coal s u p p l y ; thereafter the e m p i r e d e p e n d e d for its fuel on the m e a g r e s u p p l i e s that could b e b r o u g h t overland from G e r m a n y . On the eve of war, there were only a b o u t 17,000 industrial workers in an e m p i r e of 25 million p e o p l e ; for practical p u r p o s e s , the country h a d no i n d u s t r y . All that it h a d was agriculture, which was now ruined. By the e n d of the war, the export trade was down to a q u a r t e r a n d the i m p o r t trade d o w n to a tenth of what they had been. T h e Porte ran u p h u g e b u d g e t deficits d u r i n g the wartime years, a n d helplessly ran p a p e r m o n e y off the printing p r e s s e s to pay for t h e m . D u r i n g the war prices rose 1,675 percent. Before long, the war h a d b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n e c o n o m y a l m o s t to its knees; a n d the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t had no idea what to do a b o u t it. 9

14

K I T C H E N E R ALLOWS BRITAIN TO ATTACK TURKEY i T h e British g o v e r n m e n t , too, e n c o u n t e r e d u n e x p e c t e d p r o b l e m s with which it h a d no idea how to deal. At the outset of war n o b o d y in Britain h a d foreseen that the w a r r i n g a r m i e s w o u l d d i g trenches across western E u r o p e . N o w that they had done s o , n o b o d y in Britain had any idea of how to b r e a k t h r o u g h enemy lines. As 1914 turned into 1915, the British C a b i n e t b e c a m e increasingly u n h a p p y a b o u t the direction of the war. L o r d Kitchener's strategy of concentrating all forces in western E u r o p e s e e m e d to offer no hope of victory in the foreseeable f u t u r e . T h e wiliest politician in the C a b i n e t — D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e — w a s c o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g those who looked for a way out. L l o y d G e o r g e , after A s q u i t h the m o s t powerful politician in the L i b e r a l Party a n d in the C a b i n e t , was not one who willingly goes down with a sinking s h i p . He was, a b o v e all, a s u r v i v o r : years later it could be seen that he was the only B r i t i s h minister who s u c c e e d e d in staying in the C a b i n e t from the o u t b r e a k of the F i r s t World War until its e n d . T h e glowing, d y n a m i c political wizard from Wales was the s u p r e m e s t r a t e g i s t — o r , s o m e w o u l d say, o p p o r t u n i s t — o f his time. " T o L l o y d G e o r g e no policy was p e r m a n e n t , no p l e d g e final," wrote one of his c o n t e m p o r a r i e s ; the zig-zags in his policy forced him to seek s u p p o r t first f r o m one g r o u p then from another, so that "He b e c a m e like a trick rider at the circus, as he w a s c o m p e l l e d to leap from one b a c k to another H i s d e v i o u s n e s s was a b y w o r d , so that even an admirer said that his truth w a s not a straight line but "more of a c u r v e . " T h e way he himself p u t it was that, "I never believed in costly frontal attacks either in war or politics, if there were a way round." No minister felt m o r e greatly frustrated than he did by the way Allied c o m m a n d e r s were fighting the war in F r a n c e a n d F l a n d e r s : hopeless direct assaults on entrenched enemy positions. E v e r y time 2

3

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that he s o u g h t a way out or a way a r o u n d , he f o u n d the route blocked either by the War Office on behalf of Britain's generals, or by the F o r e i g n Office on behalf of Britain's allies. F r o m the b e g i n n i n g , L l o y d G e o r g e looked for a solution in the E a s t . He was a m o n g those who favored entering into Balkan alliances, notably with G r e e c e , in order to defeat the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to turn the G e r m a n flank. Other C a b i n e t ministers a g r e e d . S o did M a u r i c e H a n k e y , Secretary of the War C a b i n e t a n d m o s t influential of the civil s e r v a n t s . Hankey's m e m o r a n d u m of 28 D e c e m b e r 1914, p r o p o s i n g an assault on the D a r d a n e l l e s in collaboration with Balkan allies, cogently outlined the a r g u m e n t s underlining the Cabinet's belief that " G e r m a n y can p e r h a p s be struck m o s t effectively, a n d with the m o s t lasting results on the p e a c e of the world through her allies, a n d particularly through T u r k e y . " 4

T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , blocked this a p p r o a c h . It was G r e y , a c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s associates in the left wing of the L i b e r a l Party, who had closed off Britain's alternative of remaining neutral in the war; he h a d d o n e this, they c l a i m e d , by his secret prewar a r r a n g e m e n t s with F r a n c e . ( T h e philosopher B e r t r a n d Russell later w r o t e : "I h a d noticed d u r i n g previous years how c a r e fully S i r E d w a r d G r e y lied in order to prevent the p u b l i c from knowing the m e t h o d s by which he w a s c o m m i t t i n g us to the s u p p o r t of F r a n c e in the event of w a r . " ) N o w again it was G r e y , who h a d entered into secret p r e w a r a r r a n g e m e n t s with R u s s i a r e g a r d i n g the D a r d a n e l l e s , who a r g u e d that Allied claims to postwar territorial gains p r e c l u d e d b r i n g i n g the Balkan states into the war. It was the F o r e i g n Office's view not only that Bulgaria's rivalry with R u m a n i a a n d G r e e c e rendered an alliance that included all three states unfeasible, but that G r e e k help in c a p t u r i n g C o n s t a n t i n o p l e was unacceptable b e c a u s e it w o u l d offend the R u s s i a n s . 6

Y e t it was a g r e e d by the A d m i r a l t y , the War Office, a n d "the C a b i n e t alike that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e could not be c a p t u r e d by the Royal N a v y alone. An a r m y , they a r g u e d , w a s needed as well. If the G r e e k army or another B a l k a n a r m y were not to be allowed to help, then the British a r m y w o u l d b e n e e d e d ; b u t L o r d K i t c h e n e r s u p p o r t e d those Allied field c o m m a n d e r s who decreed that no t r o o p s s h o u l d be diverted f r o m the trenches of the western front until the war in E u r o p e was won. Yet, notwithstanding the field, nothing in the to the leading m e m b e r s war was b e i n g won or

the hopeful views of Allied c o m m a n d e r s in first m o n t h s a n d years of the war s u g g e s t e d of the C a b i n e t that on the western front the even could be won. As early as 7 O c t o b e r 5

* T h e historical evidence now shows that this was not t r u e . But the left wing of the Liberal Party continued to believe that it was.

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1914, A s q u i t h noted that K i t c h e n e r "thinks it is not i m p r o b a b l e that . . . the b i g o p p o s i n g a r m i e s m a y i n s o m e months' t i m e c o m e t o s o m e t h i n g like s t a l e m a t e . " By the end of D e c e m b e r , Winston Churchill (as he informed the P r i m e Minister) thought it "quite p o s s i b l e that neither side will have the strength to penetrate the other's lines in the Western theatre"; while, at the s a m e time, L l o y d G e o r g e , in a m e m o r a n d u m to C a b i n e t colleagues, d i s m i s s e d the p r o s p e c t s of a b r e a k t h r o u g h on the western front as an "impossibility." History had seen nothing like the trench warfare that s p o n t a n e o u s l y e m e r g e d in the a u t u m n of 1914; a n d K i t c h e n e r , t h o u g h he quickly divined the p r o b l e m , a d m i t t e d that he saw no solution. T h e E n t e n t e Powers a n d the Central Powers m a n n e d parallel lines of fortifications that soon stretched all the way f r o m the Atlantic O c e a n to the A l p s . E a c h side thus decisively b a r r e d the way to the other. T r e n c h warfare b e g a n as an e n d u r a n c e contest a n d e n d e d as a survival contest. Beneath the g r o u n d , in the p e r h a p s 3 5 , 0 0 0 miles of trenches that they eventually d u g , the o p p o s i n g a r m i e s lived in bloody s q u a l o r a n d s u b j e c t e d one another to p u n i s h i n g a n d almost ceaseless artillery b a r r a g e s , p u n c t u a t e d by suicidally futile charges against the other side's b a r b e d wire a n d machine g u n s . Alternately executioners a n d executed, one side played the role of the firing s q u a d whenever the other side launched one of its frequent attacks. No g r o u n d was g a i n e d . It was a deadlock. 7

8

T h e civilian ministers turned for g u i d a n c e to the military oracle in their m i d s t , but the oracle s o m e t i m e s was awkwardly silent a n d at other times s p o k e a g i b b e r i s h that u n d e r m i n e d belief in his p o w e r s of divination. In the C a b i n e t , unfortunately, F i t z G e r a l d was not available to s p e a k a n d listen for h i m . F i e l d M a r s h a l K i t c h e n e r always had f o u n d it immensely difficult to explain his military views, even to close colleagues; in the c o m p a n y of those w h o m he f e a r e d — s t r a n g e r s , civilians, politicians—he w a s s t r u c k d u m b . T o break the silence, h e s o m e t i m e s launched into long d i s c o u r s e s on nonmilitary s u b j e c t s of which he knew little or nothing. He s p o k e of Ireland to the Irish leader, C a r s o n , and of Wales to L l o y d G e o r g e ; both m e n were s u r p r i s e d to find him ignorant a n d foolish. T h e r e was genius within h i m , b u t it manifested itself only on occasion. Y e a r s after the war, having remarked that K i t c h e n e r "talked t w a d d l e , " L l o y d G e o r g e took it back by a d d i n g : N o ! He was like a great revolving lighthouse. S o m e t i m e s the b e a m of his m i n d u s e d to shoot out, s h o w i n g one E u r o p e a n d the a s s e m b l e d a r m i e s in a vast a n d illimitable perspective, till one felt that one was looking along it into the heart of reality— a n d then the shutter w o u l d turn a n d for weeks there w o u l d be nothing b u t a blank d a r k n e s s . 9

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K i t c h e n e r ' s failure to show t h e m a way out of the d e a d l o c k on the western front led the country's civilian leaders to devise p l a n s of their own. T h e plans r e s e m b l e d one another in p r o p o s i n g to swing a r o u n d the fortified western front in order to attack from the north, the south, or the east. T h e doctrine of the generals was to attack the enemy at his strongest point; that of the politicians was to attack at his weakest. L l o y d G e o r g e ' s m i n d inclined t o w a r d collaboration with G r e e c e in the vulnerable southeast of E u r o p e . Churchill, inspired by A d m i r a l L o r d F i s h e r ( w h o m he had b r o u g h t b a c k f r o m retirement to serve as F i r s t S e a L o r d ) , p r o p o s e d a landing in the northwest of E u r o p e , on an island off G e r m a n y ' s Baltic S e a coast. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , however, carried all before him with his p e r s u a s i v e m e m o r a n d u m of 28 D e c e m b e r 1914. Hankey p r o p o s e d that Britain s h o u l d m o v e three a r m y c o r p s to participate with G r e e c e , B u l g a r i a , a n d R u m a n i a in an attack on T u r k e y at the D a r d a n e l l e s that w o u l d lead to the occupation of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the s u b s e q u e n t defeat of G e r m a n y ' s two allies, the O t t o m a n and H a b s b u r g e m p i r e s . T h e political p r o b l e m o f reconciling B u l g a r i a with G r e e c e a n d R u m a n i a , he pointed out, would have to be o v e r c o m e ; b u t he believed that this could be done as a result of Allied military participation in the c a m p a i g n a n d Allied g u a r a n t e e s that all three states would receive a fair s h a r e of the spoils of victory. When shown the m e m o r a n d u m , Churchill c o m m e n t e d that he himself had a d v o c a t e d an attack at the D a r d a n e l l e s two m o n t h s earlier, but that K i t c h e n e r had refused to s u p p l y the needed m a n power; a n d that such an action w o u l d be m u c h m o r e difficult to m o u n t in J a n u a r y than it would have been in N o v e m b e r . Churchill continued to believe that the Baltic S e a project was a m o r e p r o m i s i n g m o v e , but recognized that he a n d H a n k e y thought alike in e s p o u s i n g s o m e sort of flanking attack. Hankey's plan, however, was never put to the test. It foundered on the usual s h o a l s : K i t c h e n e r ' s unwillingness to divert t r o o p s from the west, a n d S i r E d w a r d G r e y ' s worry that a G r e e k m a r c h on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e might be t r o u b l i n g to R u s s i a . G r e y was not hopeful of reconciling B u l g a r i a n claims with those of the other B a l k a n states b u t , a b o v e all, what led h i m to o p p o s e a G r e e k attack at the D a r d a n e l l e s was the fear that it m i g h t s u c c e e d ; for if the G r e e k s were to c o n q u e r their old imperial capital, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the B y z a n t i u m of their great d a y s , they would be unlikely to give it u p ; while R u s s i a , rather than let any other country seize it, m i g h t well (in G r e y ' s view) c h a n g e sides in the war. T h e situation in A t h e n s was that the P r i m e Minister, Venizelos, who at the outset of the world war h a d offered to enter into a war

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with T u r k e y , was still inclined to join the Allies, while his political a d v e r s a r y , the K a i s e r ' s brother-in-law, p r o - G e r m a n K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e , acted to prevent him f r o m d o i n g so. I n s t e a d of throwing its weight behind Venizelos, the British F o r e i g n Office, like K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e , o p p o s e d G r e e k entry into the war. In retrospect it s e e m s clear that if the G r e e k a r m y h a d m a r c h e d on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in early 1915, a l o n g s i d e the British navy, the O t t o m a n capital w o u l d have been defenseless. T h e a n g u i s h of Winston Churchill when this w a s not allowed to h a p p e n is evident in the p h r a s e s of a letter that he wrote to G r e y in the winter of 1915 b u t never sent: I beseech you . . . Half-hearted m e a s u r e s will ruin a l l — & a million m e n will die t h r o u g h the prolongation of the war . . . [ N ] o i m p e d i m e n t m u s t be p l a c e d in the way of G r e e k c o o p e r a t i o n — I am so afraid of your losing G r e e c e , & yet paying all the future into R u s s i a n h a n d s . If R u s s i a prevents G r e e c e helping, I will d o m y u t m o s t t o o p p o s e her having C p l e . . . P S If you don't back up this G r e e c e — t h e G r e e c e of Venizelos—you will have another who will cleave to G e r m a n y . 1 0

II When 1915 b e g a n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r s u d d e n l y c h a n g e d his m i n d a n d p r o p o s e d that Britain s h o u l d attack the D a r d a n e l l e s . T h e R u s s i a n high c o m m a n d h a d urgently asked h i m to stage a diversionary attack there, a n d he was fearful that if he did not c o m p l y R u s s i a might be driven out of the w a r — w h i c h at that point would have been fatal for Britain a n d F r a n c e , for it w o u l d have allowed the G e r m a n s to concentrate all their forces in the west. K i t c h e n e r insisted, however, that the attack h a d to be m o u n t e d by the Royal N a v y on its o w n : he would m a k e no troops available. No m a t t e r ; civilian m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t leaped at the chance to e s c a p e f r o m the western front strategy which they (unlike the Allied generals) r e g a r d e d as hopeless. Enver's attack on the C a u c a s u s was responsible for the R u s s i a n plea a n d hence for K i t c h e n e r ' s c h a n g e of m i n d . R u s s i a ' s cry for help c a m e before her quick, easy, a n d decisive victory over Enver's T u r k s in J a n u a r y 1915. L o g i c a l l y , after c r u s h i n g the O t t o m a n invaders that m o n t h , the R u s s i a n s s h o u l d have told L o r d K i t c h e n e r that it was no longer necessary for h i m to launch a diversionary attack on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — o r K i t c h e n e r s h o u l d have drawn that conclusion for himself. I n s t e a d , t h r o u g h o u t J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y , Britain's leaders considered how best to attack C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in order to relieve R u s s i a from a T u r k i s h threat that no longer existed.

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T h u s b e g a n the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n , which was to so alter the fortunes o f Churchill a n d K i t c h e n e r , A s q u i t h a n d L l o y d G e o r g e , Britain a n d the M i d d l e E a s t .

15 ON TO VICTORY AT T H E DARDANELLES i When L o r d K i t c h e n e r p r o p o s e d that an expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s should be m o u n t e d by the Royal N a v y alone, Churchill's reply from the A d m i r a l t y echoed what every informed p e r s o n in the military and in g o v e r n m e n t s a i d : that the D a r d a n e l l e s could be forced only by a c o m b i n e d operation in which the navy was joined by the a r m y . A glance at the m a p w o u l d show why. T h e 38-mile-long straits are at no point m o r e than 4 miles w i d e . W a r s h i p s a t t e m p t i n g to force their p a s s a g e against the s t r o n g current w o u l d face lines of m i n e s in front of t h e m a n d a crossfire of cannon b a r r a g e s from the E u r o p e a n a n d A s i a n s h o r e s . T h i r t e e n miles after entering the waterway, s h i p s reach the N a r r o w s , a m e r e 1,600 y a r d s a c r o s s , which can be d o m i nated by the g u n s of the forts on shore. Only if an attacking a r m y took p o s s e s s i o n of the coastline could it silence the artillery on shore a n d give its fleet a chance to s w e e p the m i n e s ahead of it; the forts, in other w o r d s , h a d to be s t o r m e d or destroyed to allow the navy to get t h r o u g h . K i t c h e n e r m e t with his advisers at the War Office to ask t h e m to reconsider their position a b o u t the opening of the new front, but they were a d a m a n t in reiterating that no troops could be m a d e available. In t u r n , Churchill, on the m o r n i n g of 3 J a n u a r y 1915, met with his War G r o u p at the A d m i r a l t y to reconsider whether, given the i m p o r t a n c e of keeping R u s s i a in the war, it really would be out of the question to m o u n t a wholly naval operation. T h e idea of employing only w a r s h i p s that were old a n d e x p e n d a b l e was r a i s e d ; and the War G r o u p decided to ask the c o m m a n d e r on the spot for his views. S o o n after the m e e t i n g a d j o u r n e d , Churchill sent an inquiry to the c o m m a n d e r of the British naval s q u a d r o n off the D a r d a n e l l e s , A d m i r a l Sackville C a r d e n . In his cable Churchill a s k e d : " D o you consider the forcing of the D a r d a n e l l e s by s h i p s alone a practicable o p e r a t i o n ? " — a d d i n g that older s h i p s would be u s e d , a n d that the i m p o r t a n c e of the operation would justify severe l o s s e s . 1

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T o everybody's s u r p r i s e , A d m i r a l C a r d e n replied t o Churchill that, while the D a r d a n e l l e s could not be "rushed"—in other w o r d s , could not be seized in a single a t t a c k — " T h e y might be forced by extended operations with a large n u m b e r of s h i p s . " C a r d e n h a d been in c o m m a n d at the D a r d a n e l l e s for m o n t h s , a n d his views carried the day. T h e C a b i n e t overruled C h u r c h i l l — w h o a r g u e d in favor of a naval strike in the Baltic i n s t e a d — a n d authorized him to put C a r d e n ' s D a r d a n e l l e s plan into operation. Churchill was not o p p o s e d to the D a r d a n e l l e s p l a n ; it was s i m p l y that he preferred his Baltic p l a n . O n c e the D a r d a n e l l e s decision h a d been taken, he m o v e d to carry it out with all of his energy and e n t h u s i a s m . 2

II T h o u g h gifted in m a n y other ways, Churchill was insensitive to the m o o d s a n d reactions of his colleagues, and oblivious to the effect he p r o d u c e d u p o n others. When he g a v e o r d e r s that naval officers felt ought properly to have been i s s u e d by one of t h e m s e l v e s , he inspired a collegia] a n d institutional hostility of which he was una w a r e ; he did not know that they viewed him as an interfering a m a t e u r , a n d that his imprecision in the u s e of their technical l a n g u a g e fueled their resentment. He also did not know (for they did not tell him) how m u c h his colleagues in the C a b i n e t were alienated by his other traits. He b u b b l e d over with ideas for their d e p a r t m e n t s , which they r e g a r d e d as m e d d l i n g . He talked at s u c h length that they could not e n d u r e it. Neither s u b o r d i n a t e s nor colleagues d a r e d to tell h i m to his face that he was often i m p o s s i b l e to work with. E v e n F i s h e r , his naval idol a n d mentor, w h o m he had chosen as F i r s t S e a L o r d , found it difficult to c o m m u n i c a t e with h i m ; t h o u g h , it s h o u l d be said, the p r o b l e m was m u t u a l . L o r d F i s h e r , w h o s e intuitive g e n i u s a n d extreme eccentricity were rather like K i t c h e n e r ' s , h a d a s u d d e n h u n c h , on or before 19 J a n u a r y , that s e n d i n g a naval expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s was a m i s t a k e . B u t he was never able to articulate the basis for his foreboding, so he could not p e r s u a d e Churchill to c h a n g e c o u r s e . S u p p o r t for the D a r d a n e l l e s expedition initially h a d been unanim o u s , b u t from that rising high tide of e n t h u s i a s m there h a d been a turn, an e b b i n g , so that within d a y s the tide had reversed direction a n d was flowing swiftly the other way. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , to w h o m F i s h e r h a d c o m p l a i n e d of Churchill in J a n u a r y , b e g a n establishing a record that he, too, w a s o p p o s e d to the expedition unless the a r m y participated in it. As the m o s t skillful

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b u r e a u c r a t of his t i m e , H a n k e y w a s m o r e sensitive to the currents of opinion that prevailed in Churchill's A d m i r a l t y than was Churchill himself. He was aware that by the m i d d l e of F e b r u a r y , A d m i r a l t y opinion h a d t u r n e d against the idea of a purely naval venture, although the attack was s c h e d u l e d to begin in a matter of d a y s . * On 15 F e b r u a r y , S i r H e n r y J a c k s o n , who a m o n t h earlier h a d u r g e d Churchill to i m p l e m e n t C a r d e n ' s p l a n s immediately, circulated a m e m o r a n d u m in which he said that the purely naval plan "is not r e c o m m e n d e d as a s o u n d military o p e r a t i o n . " C a p t a i n H e r b e r t William R i c h m o n d , Assistant D i r e c t o r of O p e r a t i o n s , w a s also a s sociated with this criticism, h a v i n g written a m e m o r a n d u m of his own along similar lines the day before, a copy of which he had forwarded to H a n k e y . 6

E a r l y in the m o r n i n g of 16 F e b r u a r y F i s h e r sent a similar warning to Churchill, who was t h u n d e r s t r u c k : he was driven to seek an i m m e d i a t e e m e r g e n c y session with whatever m e m b e r s of the War Council of the C a b i n e t were available. T h e dire situation was this: the British naval a r m a d a off the T u r k i s h coast was d u e to c o m m e n c e its attack within forty-eight to seventy-two h o u r s ; the a r m a d a could not p o s t p o n e its attack while r e m a i n i n g in the area, for enemy s u b m a r i n e s m i g h t soon be sent to sink i t ; b u t if the a r m a d a p r o c e e d e d to attack, it w o u l d fail, a c c o r d i n g to this s u d d e n l y revised opinion of the naval leadership of the A d m i r a l t y , unless a substantial b o d y of troops was sent to s u p p o r t i t — t r o o p s that K i t c h e n e r h a d repeatedly refused to s e n d a n d which, in any event, could hardly be expected to arrive in time even if d i s p a t c h e d immediately. 7

Before attending the War C o u n c i l , K i t c h e n e r s p o k e with W y n d h a m D e e d e s , the officer who had s e r v e d in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e before the war, now a captain in intelligence serving in L o n d o n , and asked his opinion of a naval attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s . D e e d e s replied that in his view s u c h a plan w o u l d be fundamentally u n s o u n d . As he b e g a n to explain why that w o u l d be so, an enraged K i t c h e n e r cut him short, told h i m he did not know what he was talking a b o u t , and a b r u p t l y d i s m i s s e d h i m .

* He told the Cabinet so; he told the Prime Minister so; and he recorded his opinion in letters and memoranda. In a diary entry for 19 March he recorded that "On the first day proposal was made I warned P. M . , Lord K, Chief of Staff, L. George and Balfour that Fleet could not effect passage and that all naval officers thought so." Hankey indeed had issued such warnings, but a month later than he claimed. It was not on 13 January (when the Cabinet committee decided on the Dardanelles expedition) but on 10 February that he wrote to Balfour along those lines. Later still he spoke to Asquith. On 13 February, the Prime Minister noted that "I have just been having a talk with Hankey, whose views are always worth hearing. He thinks very strongly that the naval operations . . . should be supported by landing a fairly strong military force. I have been for some time coming to the same opinion .. . " 3

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Y e t the interview with D e e d e s c h a n g e d K i t c h e n e r ' s m i n d . A few h o u r s later, K i t c h e n e r told m e m b e r s of the War C o u n c i l that he would agree to send the 29th D i v i s i o n — t h e only regular a r m y division that r e m a i n e d in B r i t a i n — t o the A e g e a n to s u p p o r t the navy's attack. In addition, the new A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d t r o o p s who had arrived in E g y p t c o u l d be d i s p a t c h e d if necessary. T h e plan, which now met the r e q u i r e m e n t s of F i s h e r , J a c k s o n , R i c h m o n d , a n d the others, was that once the navy's ships had won the battle for the straits, the t r o o p s w o u l d c o m e in behind t h e m to o c c u p y the adjacent shore a n d , thereafter, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . A c c o r d i n g to a diary entry, " L o r d K ' s w o r d s to Winston were: ' Y o u get t h r o u g h ! I will find the m e n . ' " 8

T h e plan was f l a w e d . I f the T u r k i s h defenders h a d c o m p e t e n t leadership a n d a d e q u a t e a m m u n i t i o n , a c o m b i n e d assault w a s called for. I n s t e a d of waiting for the navy to win the battle, the a r m y o u g h t to have helped by attacking the D a r d a n e l l e s forts. T h e civilian M a u r i c e H a n k e y saw this clearly; the a d m i r a l s a n d generals did not. On 22 F e b r u a r y , the A d m i r a l t y i s s u e d a public c o m m u n i q u e announcing that the D a r d a n e l l e s attack h a d b e g u n a n d d e s c r i b i n g it in detail. T h e n e w s p a p e r s took up the story, focusing attention on the attack a n d a r o u s i n g public expectations. The Times noted that " b o m b a r d m e n t f r o m the sea will not carry s u c h a project very far unless it is c o m b i n e d with troops"; a n d w a r n e d that " T h e one thing the Allies d a r e not risk in a persistent attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s is failure." K i t c h e n e r i s s u e d a similar w a r n i n g of his own to C a b i n e t colleagues. A l t h o u g h he had originally p r o p o s e d to "leave off the b o m b a r d m e n t if it were ineffective," when L l o y d G e o r g e a r g u e d in favor of a d h e r i n g to that plan ("If we failed at the D a r d a n e l l e s we ought to be immediately ready to try s o m e t h i n g else"), K i t c h e n e r c h a n g e d his m i n d . At a meeting of the War Council on 24 F e b r u a r y , the War Minister cited the A d m i r a l t y ' s public c o m m u n i q u e as his reason for the c h a n g e . " T h e effect of a defeat in the Orient w o u l d be very s e r i o u s . T h e r e c o u l d b e n o g o i n g b a c k . T h e publicity o f the a n n o u n c e m e n t had c o m m i t t e d u s . " If the fleet failed, he s a i d , "the a r m y o u g h t to see the b u s i n e s s t h r o u g h . " 9

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F i r s t he had s u g g e s t e d s e n d i n g in the navy. N o w he h a d decided to send in the a r m y . S t e p by s t e p , without m e a n i n g to, K i t c h e n e r was allowing Britain to be d r a w n into a major e n g a g e m e n t in the Middle East.

Ill T h e T u r k s expected Churchill's attack o n the D a r d a n e l l e s ; b u t for the m o m e n t they had no m e a n s to defend against it. N o t even

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W y n d h a m D e e d e s — u s u a l l y so well informed on O t t o m a n a f f a i r s — knew this secret, although the G e r m a n s were well aware of it. At the outset of the war, the O t t o m a n forces a n d their G e r m a n advisers h a d b e g u n to strengthen the forts on b o t h sides of the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t saw their efforts nullified by the lack of a m m u n i t i o n . At the end of 1914 a n d at the b e g i n n i n g of 1915, Berlin learned that the s u p p l y of a m m u n i t i o n at the straits was e n o u g h to fight only a b o u t one e n g a g e m e n t , a n d that s o m e of the O t t o m a n g u n b o a t s h a d e n o u g h shells to fire for a b o u t one m i n u t e each. D u r i n g the next six weeks, the O t t o m a n high c o m m a n d received a n u m b e r of intelligence r e p o r t s indicating that an Allied naval attack on the straits was i m m i n e n t . On 15 F e b r u a r y 1915, detailed information was received on a concentration of British a n d F r e n c h war vessels in the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n . On the m o r n i n g of 19 F e b r u a r y , A d m i r a l C a r d e n ' s British w a r s h i p s fired the o p e n i n g shots i n the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . T h e U . S . a m b a s s a d o r to T u r k e y noted that the s u c c e s s of the Allied forces s e e m e d inevitable, a n d the inhabitants of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e thought that their city w o u l d fall within d a y s . It was a m e a s u r e of the Porte's despair that it even considered seeking help f r o m R u s s i a , its age-old enemy. T h e d a y after the British attack b e g a n , the T u r k i s h a m b a s s a d o r t o G e r m a n y s u g g e s t e d the creation of a R u s s i a n - T u r k i s h - G e r m a n alliance: R u s s i a , he p r o p o s e d , s h o u l d be offered free p a s s a g e through the D a r d a n e l l e s in return for switching s i d e s in the w a r . As the G r a n d Vizier explained to the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , "One o u g h t to m a k e peace with R u s s i a so that one could then hit E n g l a n d all the h a r d e r . " T h e G e r m a n s relayed the p r o p o s a l t o R u s s i a , b u t nothing c a m e of it. F o r the T u r k s there s e e m e d to be no way out of a losing battle for the straits. 1 2

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T h e roar of the British naval g u n s at the m o u t h of the D a r d a n e l l e s echoed politically t h r o u g h the capital cities of the strategically crucial Balkan countries. In A t h e n s , in B u c h a r e s t , a n d in Sofia politicians started m o v i n g toward the Allied c a m p . It was evident that all of them, even B u l g a r i a , w o u l d enter the war alongside the E n t e n t e Powers i f the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n were w o n . A s L l o y d G e o r g e had repeatedly a r g u e d , with the B a l k a n countries as allies, Britain could b r i n g the war to an end by m o v i n g through the disaffected A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e to invade G e r m a n y from the relatively undefended south. 1 5

When the a r m a d a of British w a r s h i p s , s u p p o r t e d by a F r e n c h s q u a d r o n , o p e n e d fire at long r a n g e on the m o r n i n g of 19 F e b r u a r y , the T u r k i s h shore batteries at the m o u t h of the D a r d a n e l l e s lacked the range even to reply. In order to inflict greater d a m a g e on the T u r k i s h shore fortifications, C a r d e n m o v e d his w a r s h i p s closer to

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shore. T h a t night the weather t u r n e d , a n d the navy was o b l i g e d to discontinue operations for five d a y s b e c a u s e of poor visibility a n d icy gales. On 25 F e b r u a r y the attack r e s u m e d . British m a r i n e s who were put on shore at the tip of the peninsula found the forts at the entrance of the straits d e s e r t e d ; the T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s h a d withdrawn to the N a r r o w s , where the artillery defenses of the D a r d a n e l l e s were concentrated. T h e British mission in Sofia r e p o r t e d that the Bulgarian a r m y might join in the attack on T u r k e y . T h e P r i m e Minister of R u m a n i a indicated to the British representative in B u c h a r e s t that not only was his own country a friend to the Allies b u t that "Italy would m o v e s o o n . " In early M a r c h a joyful a n d excited Churchill received a secret cable from Venizelos-—still serving as Prime Minister—-promising G r e e k s u p p o r t , including three a r m y divisions for G a l l i p o l i ; a n d , a c c o r d i n g to Venizelos, even the p r o - G e r m a n K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e was p r e p a r e d to join the A l l i e s . 16

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Victory was in the air. T h o u g h suffering from influenza, Churchill was elated. He confessed to Violet A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's daughter, that "I think a c u r s e s h o u l d rest on me b e c a u s e I am so h a p p y . I know this war is s m a s h i n g a n d shattering the lives of t h o u s a n d s every m o m e n t — a n d y e t — I cannot help i t — I enjoy every second I live." A c c o r d i n g to a cable from A d m i r a l C a r d e n to Churchill dated 4 M a r c h , the fleet could expect to arrive at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , weather permitting, in a b o u t fourteen d a y s . T h e postwar fate of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e leaped to the t o p of the international a g e n d a ; even the Italians, who had not yet entered the war, b e g a n to claim their "share in the eventual partition of T u r k e y . " Churchill s e e m s to have sensed that such claims were p r e m a t u r e : in a confidential letter to the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , he p r o p o s e d that E u r o p e a n T u r k e y should be c a p t u r e d but that the Allies s h o u l d dictate an armistice that would leave O t t o m a n A s i a in O t t o m a n h a n d s at least t e m p o r a r i l y . 8

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Only F i s h e r r e m a i n e d skeptical for a few d a y s m o r e . "The more I consider the Dardanelles, the less I like it I" (original e m p h a s i s ) , he w r o t e . B u t on 10 M a r c h , even he was converted when intercepted G e r m a n wireless m e s s a g e s revealed that the remaining D a r d a n e l l e s forts, including the key ones d o m i n a t i n g the N a r r o w s , were a b o u t to run out of a m m u n i t i o n . Shifting s u d d e n l y to great e n t h u s i a s m , F i s h e r p r o p o s e d to go out to the A e g e a n a n d personally a s s u m e c o m m a n d of the a r m a d a . T h e rush to take credit for the i m p e n d i n g victory was on. 2 2

O n e evening after d i n n e r — a rare social occasion for the War Minister—Violet A s q u i t h s p o k e with L o r d Kitchener, and told him that it was Churchill who would deserve the accolades of t r i u m p h . S h e said that "If the D a r d a n e l l e s c o m e s off W. will deserve full and

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almost sole credit. He has shown s u c h c o u r a g e a n d consistency in taking the responsibility t h r o u g h o u t all the vacillations of F i s h e r and others." I n her diary she r e c o r d e d that " L o r d K . replied indignantly: 'Not at a l l — I was always strongly in favour of it.' " 2 3

16 RUSSIA'S GRAB FOR T U R K E Y i It was at R u s s i a ' s u r g i n g that K i t c h e n e r a n d Churchill h a d launched the expedition to the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t when it looked as t h o u g h that expedition m i g h t s u c c e e d , the C z a r ' s g o v e r n m e n t p a n i c k e d . An Allied victory at the D a r d a n e l l e s m i g h t s e e m an occasion for rejoicing; b u t it w o u l d m e a n that C o n s t a n t i n o p l e would fall into British h a n d s — a n d s udd e n l y a century of G r e a t G a m e fears a n d jealousies revived in R u s s i a n m i n d s . T h e R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t worried that once the British c a p t u r e d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e they m i g h t decide to keep it. On 4 M a r c h 1915 the R u s s i a n F o r e i g n Minister, S e r g e i S a z a n o v , sent a secret circular t e l e g r a m to L o n d o n a n d Paris conveying a m e s s a g e f r o m C z a r Nicholas I I , d e m a n d i n g that the Allies turn over C o n s t a n t i n o p l e and the s t r a i t s — a n d also adjacent territories—to R u s s i a . In return, the C z a r and S a z a n o v p r o m i s e d to listen with s y m p a t h e t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g to British a n d F r e n c h plans to achieve their own national a m b i t i o n s in other regions of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e and elsewhere. In Paris the R u s s i a n d e m a n d was received with d i s m a y . Afraid that p o s s e s s i o n of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w o u l d enable R u s s i a to b e c o m e France's rival in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t att e m p t e d to put off the R u s s i a n s with v a g u e expressions of "goodwill." D e l c a s s e s u g g e s t e d that a detailed territorial settlement s h o u l d await the eventual peace conference. 1

Sir E d w a r d G r e y u n d e r c u t the F r e n c h position. I n his s y m p a t h y for the susceptibilities of his country's Allies, G r e y , who h a d allayed F r e n c h s u s p i c i o n s of British intentions in S y r i a , now m o v e d to allay R u s s i a n s u s p i c i o n s of British intentions at the D a r d a n e l l e s . In d o i n g so he o p e n e d P a n d o r a ' s box. If R u s s i a n claims were g r a n t e d in a d v a n c e of the peace conference, then F r a n c e would be m o v e d to s u b m i t her claims, and L o r d K i t c h e n e r would b e m o v e d t o s u b m i t his. H o w e v e r alive he m a y have been to s u c h d a n g e r s , G r e y g a v e priority to t h e need to reassure R u s s i a . H7

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II A c c o r d i n g to the British F o r e i g n Office, the position of the p r o Allied ministry in P e t r o g r a d might be u n d e r m i n e d by p r o - G e r m a n o p p o n e n t s if R u s s i a were not given satisfaction in the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e matter. G r e y later explained how p r o - G e r m a n elements at the R u s s i a n court-—whom he s e e m s to have genuinely f e a r e d — w o u l d m i s r e p resent British military operations at the D a r d a n e l l e s if s u c h an a s s u r a n c e were not given: It had always been British policy to keep R u s s i a out of Constantinople a n d the S t r a i t s . . . of course it was our policy still. Britain was now g o i n g to o c c u p y Constantinople in order that when Britain a n d F r a n c e h a d been enabled, by R u s s i a ' s help, to win the war, R u s s i a should not have Constantinople at the peace. If this were not s o , why were British forces being sent to the D a r d a n e l l e s at a time when the F r e n c h and British armies were being so h a r d p r e s s e d in F r a n c e that the R u s s i a n A r m i e s were m a k i n g u n h e a r d of sacrifices to save t h e m ? 2

G r e y a n d A s q u i t h , the leaders of the L i b e r a l administration, were, in any event, d i s p o s e d to m a k e the concession that Britain's wartime ally r e q u e s t e d . H e i r s to the political tradition of G l a d s t o n e , they were a n t i - T u r k a n d sympathetic to R u s s i a n aspirations; a n d they could point to the conclusion of the C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e , arrived at in 1903 d u r i n g a C o n s e r v a t i v e administration, that to exclude R u s s i a from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s no longer a vital British interest. At the outset of the O t t o m a n war, the P r i m e Minister wrote that " F e w things wd. give me greater pleasure than to see the T u r k i s h E m p i r e finally d i s a p p e a r from E u r o p e , & Constantinople either b e c o m e R u s s i a n (which I think is its p r o p e r destiny) or if that is i m p o s s i b l e neutralised .. . " In M a r c h 1915, when the issue a r o s e , he wrote of Constantinople and the straits that "It has b e c o m e quite clear that R u s s i a m e a n s to incorporate them in her own E m p i r e , " and a d d e d that "Personally I have always been & am in favour of Russia's claim . . . " 3

4

U n b e k n o w n s t to the rest of the C a b i n e t , S i r E d w a r d G r e y had already c o m m i t t e d the country to eventual R u s s i a n control of Constantinople, having m a d e p r o m i s e s along these lines to the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t in 1 9 0 8 . H i s view was that if R u s s i a ' s legitimate aspirations were satisfied at the straits, she would not p r e s s claims in Persia, eastern E u r o p e , or elsewhere. T h e month before, G r e y had refused t o encourage a n a n t i - G e r m a n coup d'etat in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , aimed at taking T u r k e y out of the war, b e c a u s e it would have prevented him from giving C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to R u s s i a . What he had done w a s in line with British decisions 5

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regarding G r e e c e a n d the Balkan s t a t e s , not b r i n g i n g t h e m into the war on the Allied side b e c a u s e d o i n g so m i g h t have meant, in G r e y ' s w o r d s , "the unsettlement of R u s s i a ' s wholeheartedness in the w a r . " Churchill d i s s e n t e d . H e was o p p o s e d t o issuing anything m o r e than a general statement of s y m p a t h y for R u s s i a n a s p i r a t i o n s , a n d wrote to G r e y that he h a d instructed the A d m i r a l t y to u n d e r t a k e a s t u d y of how R u s s i a n control of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the straits would affect British interests. H e u r g e d looking b e y o n d i m m e d i a t e w a r t i m e concerns: " E n g l i s h history will not e n d with this war," he c a u t i o n e d . D e s p i t e Churchill's counsel, the g o v e r n m e n t , m o v e d by an overriding fear that R u s s i a m i g h t seek a s e p a r a t e p e a c e , a g r e e d to the t e r m s p r o p o s e d b y S a z a n o v and the C z a r . T h e British ( 1 2 M a r c h 1915), belatedly followed by the F r e n c h (10 April 1915), formally accepted the secret p r o p o s a l , reiterating that their a c c e p t a n c e was conditional on their own desires with respect to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e being realized, a n d on the war b e i n g p r o s e c u t e d by all of t h e m to a final successful conclusion. 7

8

In an additional British m e m o r a n d u m , also dated 10 M a r c h 1915, G r e y p r o v i d e d S a z a n o v with a n u m b e r of other B r i t i s h c o m m e n t s a n d qualifications. O b s e r v i n g that R u s s i a h a d originally asked only for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the straits b u t was now a s k in g for adjacent territories as well, G r e y also p o i n t e d out that before Britain h a d been given a chance to decide u p o n her o w n war g o a l s , " R u s s i a is a s k in g for a definite p r o m i s e that her wishes shall be satisfied with r e g a r d to what is in fact the richest prize of the entire war." G r e y repeatedly e m p h a s i z e d that in a g r e e i n g to the C z a r ' s p r o p o s a l s , the British g o v e r n m e n t was g i v i n g the greatest p o s s i b l e proof of its friendship and loyalty to R u s s i a . It w o u l d be i m p o s s i b l e , wrote G r e y , for any British g o v e r n m e n t to do any m o r e than A s q u i t h was d o i n g in meeting R u s s i a ' s desires, for the c o m m i t m e n t into which he h a d j u s t entered "involves a c o m p l e t e reversal of the traditional policy of H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t , a n d is in direct opposition to the opinions a n d sentiments at one time universally held in E n g l a n d a n d which have still by no m e a n s died out." G r e y went on to outline what R u s s i a m i g h t be expected to concede in return. He m a d e it clear that his g o v e r n m e n t h a d not yet f o r m u lated m o s t of its o w n objectives in the E a s t , b u t that one of t h e m would be revision of the 1907 A n g l o - R u s s i a n A g r e e m e n t so as to give Britain the hitherto neutral third of Persia in addition to the third she already o c c u p i e d . He e m p h a s i z e d , too, that the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a g r e e m e n t they h a d just reached was to be kept secret. T h e a g r e e m e n t was t o b e kept secret b e c a u s e G r e y was worried a b o u t the effect on M o s l e m opinion in I n d i a if its t e r m s were revealed. He feared that Britain w o u l d be seen as a party to the destruction of the last r e m a i n i n g independent M o h a m m e d a n power

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of any c o n s e q u e n c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , G r e y told the R u s s i a n s that if the t e r m s of their a g r e e m e n t were to b e c o m e known, he w o u l d want to state publicly "that t h r o u g h o u t the negotiations, H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t have stipulated that the M u s s u l m a n Holy Places a n d A r a b i a shall u n d e r all c i r c u m s t a n c e s remain u n d e r independent Mussulman dominion." As G r e y viewed it, Britain w o u l d have to c o m p e n s a t e I s l a m for destroying the O t t o m a n E m p i r e by establishing a M o s l e m state elsewhere, a n d M e c c a a n d M e d i n a m a d e it unthinkable from a religious point of view that it s h o u l d be established anywhere b u t in A r a b i a . B e s i d e s , the p r o m i s e was an easy one to m a k e ; it was a territory that none of the G r e a t Powers coveted. D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e later wrote that "no one c o n t e m p l a t e d that foreign t r o o p s s h o u l d o c c u p y any p a r t of A r a b i a . It was too arid a country to m a k e it worth the while of any ravenous Power to o c c u p y as a p e r m a n e n t p a s t u r e . " It w a s not then known that there were i m m e n s e deposits of oil in the region. 9

1 0

Ill A r a b i a d i d , however, play a role in the postwar plans of the powerful British S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War. R u s s i a ' s d e m a n d s of 4 M a r c h 1915, a n d their a c c e p t a n c e by Britain on 12 M a r c h , led L o r d K i t c h e n e r to warn the C a b i n e t in a m e m o r a n d u m dated 16 M a r c h that after the war "old enmities a n d jealousies which have been stilled by the existing crisis in E u r o p e m a y revive" and that Britain m i g h t be "at enmity with R u s s i a , or with F r a n c e , or with both in c o m b i n a t i o n . " What he anticipated was no less than a revival of the G r e a t G a m e . H e , too, u r g e d the creation o f a n independent A r a b i a n k i n g d o m to include M e c c a a n d M e d i n a , but he a d d e d that it s h o u l d exist u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . It w a s essential that it s h o u l d do so in order to give Britain a hold on the spiritual leadership of the M o s l e m world. 11

In K i t c h e n e r ' s c o m p r e h e n s i v e design for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , Britain, f r o m its recently a n n e x e d M e d i t e r r a n e a n island of C y p r u s , would control a convenient land route to India safe from disruption by F r a n c e or R u s s i a . T h e War Minister's plan was for Britain to take p o s s e s s i o n of Alexandretta, the great natural port on the A s i a n m a i n l a n d o p p o s i t e C y p r u s , a n d to construct a railroad f r o m it to the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces (now in I r a q ) , of which Britain would also

* Now called Iskenderun, and located in the extreme south of what is now Turkey, near the frontier of what is now Syria.

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take p o s s e s s i o n . It was generally believed (though not yet p r o v e n ) that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces contained large oil reserves which were d e e m e d i m p o r t a n t by Churchill a n d the A d m i r a l t y . It was believed, too, by K i t c h e n e r a n d others, that the ancient M e s o p o t a m i a n l a n d s watered b y the T i g r i s and E u p h r a t e s rivers could be developed so as to p r o d u c e agricultural riches; b u t in K i t c h e n e r ' s view the principal a d v a n t a g e s of his p r o p o s a l were strategic. T h e British railroad from the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to the head of the Persian G u l f w o u l d enable t r o o p s to m o v e to a n d f r o m I n d i a rapidly. T h e b r o a d swath of British-owned territory it w o u l d traverse w o u l d p r o v i d e a shield for the Persian Gulf, as well as a r o a d to I n d i a . If Britain failed to take p o s s e s s i o n of it, he feared that R u s s i a would. S i r A r t h u r Hirtzel of the I n d i a Office wrote a similar m e m o r a n d u m at a b o u t the s a m e time, with one significant difference in e m p h a s i s : he u r g e d that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces should be incorporated into the I n d i a n E m p i r e . He viewed it as an area that could be irrigated and m a d e rich by colonists f r o m I n d i a . In his s c h e m e , the administration of the area would be e n t r u s t e d to the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a a n d w o u l d fall within the jurisdiction of the I n d i a Office. It was b e c o m i n g increasingly clear that in L o n d o n two of the c o n t e n d i n g rival p o w e r s fighting one another for a s h a r e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o a n d the British Viceroy in Simla. 1 2

U n d e r l y i n g b o t h Hirtzel's a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s m e m o r a n d a w a s the a s s u m p t i o n , s h a r e d by m o s t m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t , that it was now in Britain's interest to carve up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d to take a large piece of it. T h e P r i m e Minister was practically alone in seeing a need to e x a m i n e that a s s u m p t i o n in a critical light. He a d m i t t e d , however, that politicians s u c h as Churchill, who felt that Britain ought to do as well out of the war as her allies, s p o k e for practically everybody else on this i s s u e . A s q u i t h wrote: I believe that, at the m o m e n t , G r e y a n d I are the only two m e n who d o u b t & d i s t r u s t any s u c h settlement. We b o t h think that in the real interest of our own future, the best thing w o u l d be if, at the e n d of the War, we c o u l d say that . . . we have taken & gained nothing. A n d that not from a merely moral & sentimental point of view .. . b u t from purely material considerations. T a k i n g on M e s o p o t a m i a , for instance—with or without Alexandretta . .. m e a n s s p e n d i n g millions in irrigation & develo p m e n t with no i m m e d i a t e or early r e t u r n ; keeping up q u i t e a large a r m y white & coloured in an unfamiliar c o u n t r y ; tackling every kind of tangled administrative question, worse than we have ever h a d in I n d i a with a hornet's nest of A r a b t r i b e s . 1 3

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T h e P r i m e Minister told m e m b e r s of his C a b i n e t that when they d i s c u s s e d the future of the O t t o m a n territories, their "discussion h a d r e s e m b l e d that of a g a n g of b u c c a n e e r s . " B u t it was typical of h i m that he did not take a s t a n d against t h e m . What he told the C a b i n e t was that, while he was in s y m p a t h y with G r e y ' s view "that we have already as m u c h territory as we are able to h o l d , " he did not r e g a r d himself a n d his colleagues as "free a g e n t s " who were entitled to hold back f r o m taking m o r e . If "we were to leave the other nations to s c r a m b l e for T u r k e y without taking anything ourselves, we s h o u l d not b e d o i n g our d u t y . " 14

15

In the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e that c o m p r i s e d the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a g r e e ment, R u s s i a in effect h a d challenged the western p o w e r s to formulate their own territorial d e m a n d s . A s q u i t h took up the challenge: he appointed an interdepartmental g r o u p under the c h a i r m a n s h i p of a career d i p l o m a t , S i r M a u r i c e de B u n s e n , to study the matter a n d to r e c o m m e n d what Britain o u g h t to ask from an O t t o m a n peace settlement. L a r g e l y unnoticed a n d u n d i s c u s s e d , another m a j o r step had been taken. In the 100 days between the o u t b r e a k of the G e r m a n war a n d the outbreak of the O t t o m a n war, Britain h a d overturned the foreign policy of m o r e than a century by a b a n d o n i n g any c o m m i t m e n t to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . N o w , in the 150 d a y s since the o u t b r e a k of the O t t o m a n war, the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t h a d c o m e a r o u n d to the view that dividing up the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was positively desirable, a n d that Britain w o u l d benefit f r o m taking part in it.

IV T h e A s q u i t h government's m o v e to plan the b r e a k u p of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was p r o m p t e d b y the R u s s i a n d e m a n d for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . L o r d K i t c h e n e r h a d anticipated that d e m a n d at the outset of the war. M o n t h s before A s q u i t h a p p o i n t e d the interdepartmental c o m m i t t e e chaired by the d i p l o m a t S i r M a u r i c e de B u n s e n to outline Britain's a i m s in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , K i t c h e n e r h a d initiated informal inquiries of his own along these lines, which his lieutenants p u r s u e d before, d u r i n g , a n d after the de B u n s e n proceedings. K i t c h e n e r turned to his former staff in C a i r o to elaborate the details of his p l a n s for the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t , with special reference to the possibility that R u s s i a a n d F r a n c e might r e s u m e their traditional hostility to Britain in that part of the world. A p p a r e n t l y O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , K i t c h e n e r ' s aide, wrote t o S t o r r s asking for c o m m e n t s on the role of Palestine after the war with

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respect to a p r o b a b l e F r e n c h a n d / o r R u s s i a n position further north. It was one of the first t i m e s that Z i o n i s m — t h e m o v e m e n t to create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine—entered into British wartime s p e c u lations. S t o r r s replied at the e n d of 1914: With r e g a r d to Palestine, I s u p p o s e that while we naturally do not want to b u r d e n ourselves with fresh responsibilities as would be i m p o s e d u p o n us by annexation, we a r e , I take it, averse to the p r o s p e c t of a R u s s i a n a d v a n c e S o u t h w a r d s into S y r i a , or of a too great extension of the inevitable F r e n c h Protectorate over the L e b a n o n , etc. F r a n c e would be a better n e i g h b o u r than R u s s i a , b u t we cannot count on the p e r m a n e n c e of any E n t e n t e , however C o r d i a l e , when the generation that is full of war m e m o r i e s p a s s e s away. A buffer S t a t e is m o s t desirable, but can we get one u p ? T h e r e is no visible indigenous elements out of which a M o s l e m K i n g d o m of Palestine can be c o n s t r u c t e d . T h e J e w i s h S t a t e is in theory an attractive idea; but the J e w s , t h o u g h they constitute a majority in J e r u s a l e m itself are very m u c h in a minority in Palestine generally, a n d form indeed a b a r e sixth of the whole p o p u l a t i o n . After considering the alternatives, S t o r r s c o n c l u d e d that the m o s t attractive a p p r o a c h w o u l d be to annex a n d incorporate Palestine into E g y p t . H e e n d e d b y saying, "Please r e m e m b e r m e t o the Chief. E g y p t i a n s are h o p i n g that he will continue to direct their fate from afar." S t o r r s wrote again at the b e g i n n i n g of M a r c h 1915, p r o p o s i n g that after the war K i t c h e n e r s h o u l d return to a new " N o r t h African or N e a r E a s t e r n Vice-Royalty including E g y p t and the S u d a n a n d across the way from A d e n to A l e x a n d r e t t a . " T h i s , he s u g g e s t e d , w o u l d offer K i t c h e n e r an attractive alternative to b e c o m i n g Viceroy of I n d i a . In effect he was p r o p o s i n g that m o s t of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world s h o u l d be o r g a n i z e d into a confederation that would be a British protectorate ruled b y K i t c h e n e r from C a i r o . 16

7

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As he developed a M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy for Britain, the War Minister b a s e d it on the S t o r r s p r o p o s a l . On 11 N o v e m b e r 1914, K i t c h e n e r wrote to S i r E d w a r d G r e y that the F r e n c h s h o u l d be p e r s u a d e d to forego their traditional interest in S y r i a , a n d s h o u l d in exchange be given m o r e of N o r t h Africa after the w a r ; while S y r i a should be nominally independent under a British protectorate a n d should be joined to A r a b i a u n d e r the spiritual leadership of an A r a b caliph. ( T h i s w a s the matter a b o u t which K i t c h e n e r h a d c o r r e s p o n d e d with H u s s e i n of M e c c a m o n t h s b e f o r e . ) K i t c h e n e r later s u g g e s t e d to G r e y that negotiations might be opened with A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g leaders without telling the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t ; b u t L o r d C r e w e , the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , told

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G r e y that s u c h a course of p r o c e e d i n g s would not be "feasible." In any event, K i t c h e n e r , S t o r r s , a n d S i r M a r k S y k e s , the T o r y M . P . who joined the K i t c h e n e r e n t o u r a g e in 1915, all wrongly believed that the F r e n c h could be p e r s u a d e d to a b a n d o n their interest in S y r i a (except for the C h r i s t i a n a r e a s of M o u n t L e b a n o n , where their presence m i g h t prove to b e , a c c o r d i n g to S t o r r s , " i n e v i t a b l e " ) . As to the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s , it long had been an article of faith a m o n g the British officials who dealt with oriental affairs that they were incapable of g e n u i n e i n d e p e n d e n c e . G e r t r u d e Bell, the most f a m o u s of prewar British travelers in A r a b i a n lands, repeated what was r e g a r d e d as o b v i o u s when she wrote that "the A r a b s can't govern t h e m s e l v e s . " A s u s e d b y B r i t i s h officials a m o n g themselves d u r i n g the war, "independence" for A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a r e a s merely meant independence from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d indicated that such areas would m o v e instead into the orbit of s o m e E u r o p e a n 20

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power. T h r o u g h o u t the next two years, K i t c h e n e r and his colleagues continued to p r e s s their s c h e m e . On 26 A u g u s t 1915, the field marshal's colleague, R e g i n a l d Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of the S u d a n , wrote the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a that "I conceive it to be not i m p o s s i b l e that in the d i m future a federation of s e m i - i n d e p e n d e n t A r a b S t a t e s might exist u n d e r E u r o p e a n g u i d a n c e a n d s u p p o r t , linked together by racial a n d linguistic g r o u n d s , owing spiritual allegiance to a single A r a b P r i m a t e , a n d looking to G r e a t Britain as its patron a n d p r o t e c t o r . " T a k i n g the lead in p u s h i n g for an A r a b caliphate, Wingate corr e s p o n d e d with K i t c h e n e r ' s c a n d i d a t e for the p o s i t i o n — H u s s e i n , the ruler of M e c c a a n d M e d i n a — t h r o u g h an A r a b religious leader in the S u d a n , S i r S a y y i d Ali a l - M i r g h a n i . C a p t a i n G . S . S y m e s , Wingate's private secretary, p r o d u c e d a detailed m e m o r a n d u m outlining the p a n - A r a b s c h e m e of which the caliphate would be p a r t ; and S t o r r s s u b m i t t e d another m e m o r a n d u m s u p p o r t i n g the A r a b caliphate on 2 M a y 1915. G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the C a i r o Intelligence chief, s u p p o r t i n g the plan for Britain to take S y r i a a n d for the caliphate to be brought to A r a b i a , m a d e it s e e m that m a n y voices were urging the s c h e m e , when in fact it was only a single faction s p e a k i n g , t h o u g h with several v o i c e s . I n L o n d o n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r explained t o his c o l l e a g u e s — i n c l u d i n g the representative of I n d i a , which h a d been a l a r m e d by his corres p o n d e n c e with H u s s e i n m o n t h s b e f o r e — w h y the m o v i n g of the caliphate was central to his strategy for the postwar world. At a meeting of the War C o m m i t t e e of the Cabinet on 19 M a r c h 1915, L o r d C r e w e said that two different views were taken in the India Office about the future of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e Political D e p a r t m e n t wanted to sacrifice T u r k e y to A r a b i a , while the Military 23

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D e p a r t m e n t wanted to make T u r k e y as s t r o n g as possible as a barrier against a potential R u s s i a n threat. M i n u t e s of the m e e t i n g record that L O R D K I T C H E N E R objected to the Military D e p a r t m e n t ' s p l a n . T h e T u r k s , h e s a i d , would always b e u n d e r p r e s s u r e from their s t r o n g R u s s i a n n e i g h b o u r , with the result that the K h a l i f a t e m i g h t be to a great extent u n d e r R u s s i a n domination, and the R u s s i a n influence m i g h t indirectly assert itself over the M o h a m m e d a n part of the p o p u l a t i o n of I n d i a . If, on the other h a n d , the K h a l i f a t e were transferred to A r a b i a , it would r e m a i n to a g r e a t extent under our i n f l u e n c e . 25

T h e F o r e i g n Office d e e m e d it unwise to interfere in M o s l e m religious affairs; the I n d i a Office went further and called it dangero u s . B u t the F o r e i g n Office would not, and the I n d i a Office could not, overrule the j u d g m e n t of H e r b e r t K i t c h e n e r . He was m o r e than the head of the War Office, m o r e than a C a b i n e t minister, m o r e than an old hand at African a n d A s i a n affairs, m o r e than the empire's greatest soldier. He was a living legend west a n d east of S u e z . He was K i t c h e n e r of K h a r t o u m ; a n d in the sunset of his career, the tall old soldier cast a long s h a d o w over the future of the M i d d l e E a s t .

T h e image is one used by Lord Beaverbrook.

17 D E F I N I N G BRITAIN'S GOALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST T h e d e B u n s e n c o m m i t t e e — t h e interdepartmental g r o u p that A s q u i t h created to a d v i s e the C a b i n e t as to what Britain o u g h t to want in the M i d d l e E a s t — w a s a p p o i n t e d on 8 April 1915, a n d p r o d u c e d its report on 30 J u n e 1915. T h e committee was c o m p o s e d of one representative each from the F o r e i g n Office, the A d m i r a l t y , the India Office, a n d other relevant d e p a r t m e n t s . K i t c h e n e r ' s War Office was represented on the c o m m i t t e e by G e n e r a l Sir C h a r l e s Calwell, D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of Military O p e r a t i o n s . In addition, K i t c h e n e r placed S i r M a r k S y k e s on the c o m m i t t e e as his personal (as distinct from his d e p a r t m e n t a l ) representative; a n d t h r o u g h S y k e s , the War Minister d o m i n a t e d the committee's p r o c e e d i n g s . T h e r e a f t e r S y k e s remained the L o n d o n b u r e a u c r a t charged with responsibility for M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs t h r o u g h o u t the war. S y k e s , a wealthy, 36-year-old R o m a n Catholic T o r y baronet, had been elected to the H o u s e of C o m m o n s in 1911. D u r i n g and after his u n d e r g r a d u a t e years at C a m b r i d g e , he h a d traveled widely in Asiatic T u r k e y a n d h a d p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t s o f his j o u r n e y s . T h i s h a d m a d e him one of the Conservative Party's experts on O t t o m a n affairs, b u t as O t t o m a n affairs had not played any significant role in British politics between 1911 a n d 1914, a n d as his party was out of office, S y k e s was not well known either to the public or to his fellow politicians. S y k e s was the p r o d u c t of a c u r i o u s b a c k g r o u n d . He was the only child of an u n h a p p y m a r r i a g e : his w a r m - h e a r t e d b u t wanton mother a n d his harsh elderly father lived a p a r t . At the age of three, when his mother converted to R o m a n C a t h o l i c i s m , he b e c a m e a Catholic, too. When he was seven his father took him on a trip to the E a s t . H i s religion a n d his travels in the E a s t remained lifelong p a s s i o n s . H i s education was fitful. He was m o v e d from school to school a n d there were times when he was not at school at all. He spent two years at J e s u s C o l l e g e , C a m b r i d g e , b u t d i d not stay to take his d e g r e e . He was restless. T h e vast estates that he inherited a n d his horse-breeding stables did not keep him at h o m e . He r o a m e d the E a s t , and spent 146

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four years attached to the e m b a s s y in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . He was welc o m e d everywhere for his talents. He w a s a caricaturist a n d a m i m e , in both cases of almost professional quality. He was a m u s i n g a n d m a d e friends easily. H e held opinions strongly, b u t c h a n g e d t h e m rapidly. When the war c a m e , S y k e s m a d e an effort to find a j o b that w o u l d m a k e use of his M i d d l e E a s t e r n e x p e r t i s e . In the s u m m e r of 1914 he wrote a letter to Winston Churchill a s k i n g for a j o b "on the spot" working against T u r k e y , offering to "raise native scallywag c o r p s , win over notables, or any other o d d m e n t . " He wrote that "I know you won't think me self-seeking if I say all the knowledge I have of local tendencies a n d possibilities, are at your d i s p o s a l but Churchill either d i d not have a position for h i m or did not offer it. S y k e s fell into K i t c h e n e r ' s orbit as a result of meeting L i e u t e n a n t Colonel O s w a l d F i t z G e r a l d , the field marshal's close friend a n d personal military secretary. F i t z G e r a l d a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to be b r o u g h t into the War Office early in 1915, where he served u n d e r Calwell p r e p a r i n g information booklets for troops in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n area. While there, he m a d e an especial friend of G. M. W. M a c d o n o g h , a fellow R o m a n Catholic who h a d attended the s a m e p u b l i c school; as D i r e c t o r of Military Intelligence, M a c d o n o g h p r o v e d a valuable ally in a d v a n c i n g S y k e s ' s career. S h o r t l y after his arrival at the War Office, S y k e s was given his de B u n s e n a s s i g n m e n t . K i t c h e n e r r e q u i r e d a y o u n g politician who knew the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d y o u n g S i r M a r k S y k e s was one of the handful of M e m b e r s of Parliament who knew the area. As a T o r y , he s h a r e d m a n y of K i t c h e n e r ' s sentiments a n d p r e j u d i c e s . In every sense they were m e m b e r s of the s a m e c l u b . Y e t , at the t i m e of his a p p o i n t m e n t , he barely knew K i t c h e n e r ; and was never to know him m u c h better. S y k e s was directed to call F i t z G e r a l d every evening to give a full report of the de B u n s e n committee's d i s c u s s i o n s . F i t z G e r a l d would later tell him what K i t c h e n e r wanted him to say or do at the meetings that followed. H i s few a t t e m p t s at actually seeing the reclusive national legend evidently p r o v e d unsatisfactory; S y k e s later c o m m e n t e d that " T h e less I saw of him, the easier it was to do what he required . .. " 2

F r o m the outset, t h o u g h , the other m e m b e r s a s s u m e d that he spoke with the full weight of L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s authority. T h e relatively inexperienced M . P . controlled the interdepartmental c o m mittee. H e was o u t s p o k e n a n d opinionated. H e was the only m e m b e r of the c o m m i t t e e who h a d been to m o s t parts of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; he alone could speak f r o m first-hand knowledge. T h e n , too, * Both belonged to the Other Club, founded by Winston Churchill and F. E. Smith.

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he was a politician. He m a d e the other key m e m b e r of the c o m m i t t e e , M a u r i c e H a n k e y , into a friend a n d personal s u p p o r t e r . H a n k e y , also in his thirties, was S e c r e t a r y to the C o m m i t t e e of I m p e r i a l D e f e n c e a n d S e c r e t a r y to the War C o u n c i l of the C a b i n e t , and was to b e c o m e the first holder of the office of Secretary of the British C a b i n e t . Controlling the a g e n d a , a n d writing the m i n u t e s of what was said a n d decided at meetings, H a n k e y was on the r o a d to b e c o m i n g the m o s t valuable a n d i m p o r t a n t m a n in the b u r e a u c r a c y , a n d his s u p p o r t p r o v e d invaluable to S y k e s . In the de B u n s e n p r o c e e d i n g s , it was S y k e s who outlined the alternatives that were available to Britain. He explored the relative a d v a n t a g e s of several different k i n d s of territorial settlement: annexation of the O t t o m a n territories by the Allied P o w e r s ; dividing the territories into s p h e r e s of influence instead of annexing them outright; leaving the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in place, b u t rendering its g o v e r n m e n t s u b m i s s i v e ; or decentralizing the administration of the e m p i r e into s e m i - a u t o n o m o u s units. (Eventually the c o m m i t t e e reco m m e n d e d trying the last choice first, as being the easiest.) In order to d i s c u s s these m a t t e r s , the c o m m i t t e e had to decide what n a m e s to give to the various areas into which they m i g h t want to divide the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . It is indicative of the spirit in which they a p p r o a c h e d their task that they saw no need to follow the lines of existing political s u b d i v i s i o n s of the e m p i r e , the vilayets (or p r o v i n c e s ) , a n d felt free to r e m a k e the face of the M i d d l e E a s t as they saw fit. In any event, the tendency of the c o m m i t t e e m e m b e r s , like that of the British g o v e r n i n g class in general, was to be g u i d e d in s u c h m a t t e r s by the G r e e k a n d L a t i n classics they had studied at public school: they e m p l o y e d the v a g u e G r e e k t e r m s u s e d by Hellenistic g e o g r a p h e r s two t h o u s a n d years earlier. T h e A r a b i c s p e a k i n g areas of A s i a to the north of A r a b i a thus collectively were referred to as " M e s o p o t a m i a " in the east and " S y r i a " in the west, though the areas to be included in each were unclear. T h e southern part of S y r i a was called "Palestine," a corruption of "Philistia," the coastal strip o c c u p i e d by the Philistines m o r e than a t h o u s a n d years before C h r i s t ; a n d while no country had ever called itself Palestine, it was a g e o g r a p h i c t e r m current in the Christian western world to describe the H o l y L a n d . T h e c o m m i t t e e , led by M a r k S y k e s , p r o p o s e d the creation of five largely a u t o n o m o u s provinces in the decentralized O t t o m a n E m p i r e which they e n v i s a g e d . T h e y were to be S y r i a , Palestine, A r m e n i a , Anatolia, a n d J a z i r a h - I r a q (the northern and southern p a r t s of M e s o p o t a m i a ) , As the c o m m i t t e e saw it, British influence or control would be desirable in a wide swath across the M i d d l e E a s t from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. A British railroad was to be constructed from a M e d i t e r r a n e a n port to M e s o p o t a m i a , to p r o v i d e

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the overland r o a d to the E a s t . K i t c h e n e r continued to insist on Alexandretta as the port, but S y k e s d e m a n d e d that it be H a i f a , a n d F i t z G e r a l d , m e d i a t i n g between the two, let S y k e s have his way. In all other respects S y k e s hewed close to the K i t c h e n e r line, though with slight modifications of his own. L i k e K i t c h e n e r , he advocated m o v i n g the caliphate to the s o u t h to put it out of the reach of R u s s i a ' s influence; b u t he a d d e d that it also would put it out of reach of financial control by F r a n c e , for he a s s u m e d that O t t o m a n finances would be largely controlled by the F r e n c h in view of the large F r e n c h investment in the O t t o m a n public d e b t . T h e overall a p p r o a c h , however, was K i t c h e n e r ' s . S y k e s , who had been a c o n s p i c u o u s m e m b e r of the p r o - T u r k i s h bloc in Parliament, a b a n d o n e d his conviction that the integrity of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e o u g h t to be maintained. To his intimate friend a n d fellow p r o T u r k i s h M . P . , A u b r e y H e r b e r t , h e wrote o n April Fool's D a y : 3

I perceive by your letter that you are p r o - T u r k still. I got a s u m m o n s f r o m F i e l d to attend a meeting of the O t t o m a n Society to which I never b e l o n g e d . . . I immediately wired to M c K e n n a [ H o m e S e c r e t a r y ] a n d I have every hope that the whole c r o w d have been c l a p p e d into b a r b e d w i r e — h a ! ha! H o w furious this m u s t m a k e y o u ha! ha! again. Y o u r Policy i s wrong. T u r k e y m u s t cease to b e . S m y r n a shall be G r e e k . Adalia Italian, S o u t h e r n T a u r u s and N o r t h S y r i a F r e n c h , Filistin [Palestine] British, M e s o p o t a m i a British a n d everything else R u s s i a n — including C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , .. . and I shall sing a Te Deum in S t . S o p h i a and a Nunc Dimittis in the M o s q u e of O m a r . We will s i n g it in Welsh, Polish, K e l t i c , a n d A r m e n i a n in honour of all the gallant little nations. After m o r e of the s a m e , S y k e s closed with a note: T o the C e n s o r T h i s is a brilliant letter from one g e n i u s to another. M e n of b a s e clay cannot be expected to u n d e r s t a n d . Pray p a s s on without fear. M a r k S y k e s L t . Col. F R G S , M P , C C , J P .

4

18 AT T H E NARROWS OF F O R T U N E i L o n d o n was dealing quickly with the political c o n s e q u e n c e s of the i m p e n d i n g victory at the D a r d a n e l l e s b u t , at the scene of battle, the f l e e t m o v e d slowly. T h e weather kept the w a r s h i p s f r o m b r i n g i n g their full fire power to bear. As the d a y s went by, the T u r k i s h troops along the shore b e g a n to regain their confidence, and learned to harass the British m i n e s w e e p e r s by firing on t h e m with howitzers and small m o b i l e g u n s . On 13 M a r c h Churchill received a cable from C a r d e n s a y i n g that m i n e s w e e p i n g was not p r o c e e d i n g satisfactorily d u e to what C a r d e n claimed was heavy T u r k i s h fire, although no British casualties h a d been suffered. T h i s , noted Churchill, "makes me s q u i r m " ; "I do not u n d e r s t a n d why m i n e s w e e p i n g s h o u l d be interfered with by fire which c a u s e s no casualties. T w o or three h u n d r e d casualties w o u l d be a small price to pay for s w e e p i n g up as far as the N a r r o w s . " Part of the p r o b l e m — a n d it was one of the defects in A d m i r a l C a r d e n ' s original p l a n — w a s that the m i n e s w e e p e r s were m a n n e d by civilian e m p l o y e e s , who were not willing to operate u n d e r fire; b u t the major p r o b l e m was that A d m i r a l C a r d e n was losing his nerve. Churchill h a d cabled h i m on 13 M a r c h reporting that "we have information that the T u r k i s h F o r t s are short of a m m u n i t i o n a n d that the G e r m a n officers have m a d e d e s p o n d i n g r e p o r t s , " to which C a r d e n replied that he w o u l d launch the m a i n attack into the straits a n d w a g e the battle for the crucial N a r r o w s on or a b o u t 17 M a r c h , d e p e n d i n g on the weather; b u t the admiral worried, a n d could neither eat nor sleep. He had lost no s h i p s a n d reported that he h a d suffered no casualties, b u t the strain of anxiety proved too m u c h for him a n d s u d d e n l y his nerves b r o k e . On the eve of the m a i n battle for the straits, A d m i r a l C a r d e n told his s e c o n d s - i n - c o m m a n d that he could no longer go on. He s u m m o n e d a fleet physician, who e x a m i n e d h i m and certified that he was suffering from indigestion a n d that he s h o u l d be placed on the sick list 1

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for three or four weeks. On 16 M a r c h C a r d e n cabled Churchill " M u c h regret obliged to go on the sick list. Decision of Medical Officer follows." Churchill p r o m p t l y appointed J o h n d e R o b e c k , the second-inc o m m a n d , to take his place. De R o b e c k , according to his cabled report to the A d m i r a l t y , then c o m m e n c e d the main attack at 10:45 on the m o r n i n g of 18 M a r c h . T h e day b e g a n to go badly when a F r e n c h battleship mysteriously e x p l o d e d a n d d i s a p p e a r e d just before 2:00 in the afternoon. T w o hours later two British battleships struck mines. A vessel sent to rescue one of t h e m , the Irresistible, also struck a m i n e ; a n d it a n d the Irresistible both sank. T h e n a F r e n c h warship d a m a g e d by gunfire was b e a c h e d . De R o b e c k reported to the A d m i r a l t y , however, that the rest of his s h i p s would be ready to r e c o m m e n c e action in three or four d a y s . At the A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n , there was elation, for N a v a l Intelligence had discovered that when the action r e c o m m e n c e d , the enemy would collapse. On the afternoon of 19 M a r c h , C a p t a i n William R e g i n a l d Hall, the D i r e c t o r of N a v a l Intelligence, b r o u g h t Churchill and F i s h e r an intercepted, d e c o d e d m e s s a g e from the G e r m a n K a i s e r ; they g r a s p e d its significance immediately. Churchill cried out in excitement that "they've c o m e to the end of their a m munition," as indeed they h a d . F i s h e r waved the m e s s a g e over his head a n d s h o u t e d , "By G o d , I'll go t h r o u g h tomorrow" and then repeated " T o m o r r o w ! We shall p r o b a b l y lose six s h i p s , b u t I'm going t h r o u g h . " Churchill a n d F i s h e r did not tell the C a b i n e t , for fear of c o m p r o m i s i n g their intelligence s o u r c e s , nor did they tell de R o b e c k ; they merely cabled him that it was important not to give the i m p r e s s i o n that operations were s u s p e n d e d . 3

4

U n k n o w n to Churchill and F i s h e r , at M a u r i c e Hankey's s u g g e s tion, the D i r e c t o r of N a v a l Intelligence, C a p t a i n Hall, had initiated negotiations with T a l a a t Bey, the y o u n g T u r k leader, a i m e d at inducing the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to leave the war in return for a large p a y m e n t of m o n e y . T h e British a n d T u r k i s h negotiators met at a seaport in E u r o p e a n T u r k e y on 15 M a r c h . T h e negotiations failed because the British g o v e r n m e n t felt unable to give a s s u r a n c e s that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could retain C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — s o deeply were the British now c o m m i t t e d to satisfying R u s s i a ' s a m b i t i o n s . C a p t a i n Hall had not yet learned of the collapse of the negotiations when, on the night of 19 M a r c h , he told Churchill of the plan to offer four million p o u n d s to T u r k e y if she would leave the war. Churchill was aghast a n d F i s h e r was furious. At their insistence, Hall cabled his emissaries to withdraw the offer. Hall later recalled that F i s h e r started up f r o m his chair a n d s h o u t e d " F o u r million? N o , no. I tell you I'm g o i n g t h r o u g h t o m o r r o w . " 5

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II All that stood between the British-led Allied fleet a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e were a few s u b m e r g e d mines, a n d O t t o m a n s u p p l i e s of these were so depleted that the T u r k s were driven to catch and re-use the mines that the R u s s i a n s were u s i n g against t h e m . M o r a l e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e disintegrated. A m i d s t r u m o r s and panic, the evacuation of the city c o m m e n c e d . T h e state archives a n d the gold reserves of the b a n k s were sent to safety. Special trains were p r e p a r e d for the S u l t a n a n d for the foreign diplomatic colony. T h e well-to-do sent wives a n d families ahead to the interior of the country. T a l a a t , the Minister of the Interior, requisitioned a powerful M e r c e d e s for his personal use, a n d e q u i p p e d it with extra petrol tanks for the long drive to a distant place of refuge. P l a c a r d s denouncing the g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n to a p p e a r in the streets of the city. T h e G r e e k a n d A r m e n i a n c o m m u n i t i e s were expected b y the a u thorities to welcome the Allies, b u t now the police b e g a n to arrest s u s p e c t s within the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g c o m m u n i t y as well. Meanwhile those m e m b e r s of the E n v e r - T a l a a t faction who had s u p p o r t e d it to the bitter end g a t h e r e d up petrol a n d p r e p a r e d to b u r n down the city when the Allies a r r i v e d , a n d wired St S o p h i a a n d the other great m o n u m e n t s with d y n a m i t e . T h e Goeben m a d e ready to escape into the Black S e a . E n v e r bravely planned to remain a n d defend the city, b u t his military dispositions were so incompetent t h a t — a s L i m a n von S a n d e r s later r e c a l l e d — a n y T u r k i s h attempt at o p p o s i n g an Allied landing in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e had been rendered i m p o s s i b l e .

Ill L o n d o n rejoiced a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e d e s p a i r e d , but in the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s , the m o o d of the British c o m m a n d was bleak. T h e casualties a n d losses from m i n e s on 18 M a r c h had left A d m i r a l de R o b e c k d e s p o n d e n t . He feared for his career. A c c o r d i n g to one report, when evening c a m e on the 18th and de R o b e c k s u r v e y e d the results of the day's battle, he s a i d "I s u p p o s e I am done f o r . " De R o b e c k was u n n e r v e d b e c a u s e he did not know what had caused his losses. In fact his s h i p s had run into a single line of m i n e s running parallel to the shore rather than across the straits. T h e y had been placed there the night before a n d had e s c a p e d notice by British aerial o b s e r v e r s . It was a one-time fluke. F a t e now a p p e a r e d in the c h a r m i n g person of General S i r Ian H a m i l t o n , w h o m K i t c h e n e r had sent out in advance of the forthc o m i n g t r o o p s . H a m i l t o n was to be their c o m m a n d e r , with o r d e r s to 7

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let the navy win the c a m p a i g n a n d then to d i s e m b a r k a n d take possession of the shore. If the navy failed to win t h r o u g h on its own, Hamilton's alternative orders were to invade the E u r o p e a n shore of the straits, c a p t u r e the N a r r o w s , a n d let the navy t h r o u g h . O n c e A d m i r a l de R o b e c k realized that he had an alternative to going back into battle—that in L o n d o n it was r e g a r d e d as acceptable for him to turn over the responsibility to H a m i l t o n a n d the a r m y if he chose to do s o — h e saw no reason to run further risks. Whoever said it first, de R o b e c k and H a m i l t o n a g r e e d that the navy s h o u l d wait until the a r m y could c o m e into action. H a m i l t o n had already cabled his views to K i t c h e n e r , who on 18 M a r c h s h o w e d the cable to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ; the cable p e r s u a d e d A s q u i t h that " T h e A d m i r a l t y have been o v e r - s a n g u i n e as to what they c d . do by s h i p s a l o n e . " De R o b e c k cabled Churchill, after m e e t i n g with I a n H a m i l t o n on 22 M a r c h , that "having m e t G e n e r a l H a m i l t o n . . . and heard his p r o p o s a l s I now consider" that the a r m y has to enter the c a m p a i g n . 8

9

On the m o r n i n g of 23 M a r c h the War G r o u p met at the A d m i r a l t y to d i s c u s s de R o b e c k ' s decision. Winston Churchill was a p p a l l e d a n d shocked, but the F i r s t S e a L o r d , A d m i r a l F i s h e r , took the view that the decision of the m a n on the s p o t h a d to be a c c e p t e d , like it or not, a n d in this view he was s u p p o r t e d by A d m i r a l of the Fleet S i r A r t h u r Wilson and A d m i r a l Sir H e n r y J a c k s o n . Churchill violently disa g r e e d , a n d took the matter to the C a b i n e t when the War G r o u p m e e t i n g e n d e d . He h a d drafted a s t r o n g cable to de R o b e c k which he b r o u g h t along for the Cabinet's a p p r o v a l , a n d which in no uncertain t e r m s o r d e r e d the a d m i r a l to renew the attack. At the Cabinet meeting Churchill received s u p p o r t from both the P r i m e Minister a n d from K i t c h e n e r , who drafted a p p r o p r i a t e l y s t r o n g cables to S i r Ian H a m i l t o n . R e t u r n i n g to the A d m i r a l t y that afternoon, Churchill found that F i s h e r , Wilson, a n d J a c k s o n r e m a i n e d a d a m a n t l y o p p o s e d t o his s e n d i n g the cabled order to de R o b e c k . As a civilian minister att e m p t i n g to overrule the F i r s t S e a L o r d a n d his fellow a d m i r a l s on a naval matter, Churchill felt obliged to return to A s q u i t h a n d ask for the P r i m e Minister's consent. A s q u i t h , however, refused to give it. H i s personal view was that the attack s h o u l d be r e s u m e d , b u t he would not order it over the o p p o s i t i o n of the S e a L o r d s at the Admiralty. K n o w i n g as he did that the a m m u n i t i o n crisis in T u r k e y meant that the r o a d to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w a s o p e n , Churchill fought back against the decision to let the navy a b a n d o n the c a m p a i g n . S i n c e he could not give de R o b e c k o r d e r s to r e s u m e the attack, he a t t e m p t e d to get him to do it through p e r s u a s i o n . He sent cables in which he a t t e m p t e d to reason with the a d m i r a l a n d to show h i m why a res u m p t i o n of the naval attack was i m p o r t a n t . He s p o k e again with the

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P r i m e Minister who e x p r e s s e d his "hope" that the attack would r e s u m e s o o n . It was to no avail. O n l y a few h u n d r e d casualties had been suffered, b u t the A d m i r a l t y ' s D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n was over. 1 0

IV After the battle of 18 M a r c h — t h e battle that so a l a r m e d de R o b e c k that he decided to t u r n his s h i p s a r o u n d a n d s t e a m a w a y — t h e O t t o m a n c o m m a n d e r s c o n c l u d e d that their cause was lost. While A d m i r a l de R o b e c k , a b o a r d s h i p , was g i v i n g his o r d e r s to give up the fight, on shore the T u r k i s h d e f e n d i n g forces, unaware of de R o b e c k ' s decision, received o r d e r s to fire their remaining r o u n d s of a m munition a n d then to a b a n d o n their coastal positions. If A d m i r a l de R o b e c k , who h a d led his fleet in battle for only one day, had p l u n g e d b a c k into battle for a s e c o n d day he w o u l d have seen the enemy forces withdraw a n d melt a w a y . In a few h o u r s his m i n e s w e e p e r s , working without interruption or o p p o s i t i o n , could have cleared a path t h r o u g h the N a r r o w s ; a n d once the lines of m i n e s s u r r o u n d i n g the N a r r o w s had g o n e , there were no m o r e laid. T h e fleet w o u l d have s t e a m e d into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e without opposition. F o r Winston Churchill, who was only h o u r s away f r o m victory, the nearness of it—the knowledge that he was almost there, that it was within his g r a s p — w a s to b e c o m e the torment of a lifetime. It was m o r e than a personal t r i u m p h that h a d s l i p p e d t h r o u g h his fingers. It was also his last chance to s a v e the world in which he h a d g r o w n u p : to win the war while the familiar, traditional E u r o p e of established monarchies and e m p i r e s still survived. It was also the lost last chance for Britain, F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a to i m p o s e their d e s i g n s on the M i d d l e E a s t with e a s e . T h o u g h they w o u l d continue to p u r s u e their nineteenth-century goals in the region, thereafter they w o u l d do so in the uncongenial environment of the twentieth century. T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which h a d been sentenced t o death, h a d received an u n e x p e c t e d last-minute reprieve. Its leaders rushed to m a k e use of the time that Britain h a d allowed t h e m before the new trial of a r m s b e g a n .

* Historians still debate the question of whether victory in the Ottoman war in 1915 would have led to a rapid Allied victory in the German war. T h e "Easterners," led by Lloyd George, never doubted that it would have done so.

19 T H E WARRIORS i S h a k e n by the Allied b o m b a r d m e n t of 18 M a r c h , E n v e r P a s h a announced an uncharacteristic and important decision: he relinquished c o m m a n d of the O t t o m a n forces at the D a r d a n e l l e s to the G e r m a n general, L i m a n von S a n d e r s . It ran counter to all of Enver's instincts to turn over his M o s l e m warriors to a f o r e i g n — a n d C h r i s t i a n — c o m m a n d e r . Until that m o m e n t he h a d resisted p r e s s u r e s to turn over authority, even to the G e r m a n experts who served as d e p a r t mental a n d staff a d v i s e r s . A l t h o u g h he h a d allowed G e r m a n officers in his War Ministry to m o v e into key p o s t s in the D e p a r t m e n t s of O p e r a t i o n s , Intelligence, R a i l r o a d s , S u p p l y , M u n i t i o n s , C o a l , and F o r t r e s s e s , he h a d jealously q u e s t i o n e d the j u d g m e n t s a n d c i r c u m scribed the authority of his G e r m a n colleagues; and in m a n y a r e a s he continued to do s o . Y e t u n d e r the g u n s of the Allied a r m a d a he finally s t e p p e d aside on the battlefield that m o s t m a t t e r e d . L i m a n h a d little t i m e , a n d wasted none. H e a s s e m b l e d s u c h forces a n d s u p p l i e s as were to be f o u n d a m i d s t the wreckage of the empire's resources. H e m a d e his own c o m m a n d a p p o i n t m e n t s , notably giving a responsible position to M u s t a p h a K e m a l , a T u r k i s h officer who a d m i r e d E u r o p e a n ways a n d whose scorn o f O t t o m a n b a c k w a r d n e s s a n d bitter c o n s c i o u s n e s s that he was superior to those a d v a n c e d over his h e a d h a d , until then, kept h i m in o b s c u r e a n d u n r e w a r d i n g a s s i g n m e n t s . K e m a l was to prove the battlefield genius of the c o m i n g c o m b a t : the c o m m a n d e r with the eye for the key tactical position, who would seize the high g r o u n d a n d d o m i n a t e the field. L i m a n w a s kept well informed of B r i t i s h p r o g r e s s in o r g a n i z i n g an invasion force. N e w s of the British expedition's a s s e m b l y and e m barkation in E g y p t was p u b l i s h e d by n e w s p a p e r s in C a i r o and rep o r t e d t o the T u r k s b y m e r c h a n t s i n A l e x a n d r i a . L a t e r , O t t o m a n agents in neutral G r e e c e could hardly have m i s s e d noticing the vast fleet as it m o v e d t h r o u g h the islands of the A e g e a n , its lights and 155

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signal l a m p s shining brightly t h r o u g h the night, its military b a n d s blaring a b o v e the s o u n d of winds a n d waves by day. Well-officered for once, the O t t o m a n defending forces u n d e r L i m a n ' s workmanlike direction were waiting for the British invasion when it c a m e . It was the t y p e of e n g a g e m e n t in which the steadfastness of the O t t o m a n soldiery could be e m p l o y e d fo best a d v a n t a g e . S i r M a r k S y k e s had pointed this out in late F e b r u a r y in a letter to Churchill. He wrote that t h o u g h they could be routed by a s u r p r i s e attack, " T u r k s always g r o w f o r m i d a b l e if given time to think." 1

II F o r S i r I a n H a m i l t o n , the British C o m m a n d e r , the c a m p a i g n began the m o r n i n g of 12 M a r c h when L o r d K i t c h e n e r u n e x p e c t e d l y — a n d without e x p l a n a t i o n — s u m m o n e d h i m to the War Office to offer him the c o m m a n d . He told the War Minister that he knew nothing a b o u t T u r k e y , a n d therefore that he needed at least s o m e w o r d of explanation and guidance. As H a m i l t o n later recalled, at their meeting the War Minister, while giving him c o m m a n d of the division that initially was b e i n g sent out to the D a r d a n e l l e s in s u p p o r t of the navy, warned that the t r o o p s were "only to be a loan a n d are to be returned the m o m e n t they can be s p a r e d . " He explained that "all things e a r m a r k e d for the E a s t are looked on by powerful interests both at h o m e a n d in F r a n c e as having been stolen from the W e s t . " 2

T h e Director of Military O p e r a t i o n s at the War Office then briefed H a m i l t o n by showing h i m a m a p a n d a plan of attack b o r r o w e d from the G r e e k G e n e r a l Staff. T h e War Office h a d not taken the time or trouble to work out one of their own. G e n e r a l H a m i l t o n was sent out with an inaccurate a n d out-of-date m a p , a n d little else to g u i d e h i m . On seeing the Gallipoli peninsula for the first time, he r e m a r k e d immediately that "the Peninsula looks a tougher nut to crack than it did on L o r d K . ' s small and featureless m a p . " It was a r u g g e d l a n d s c a p e of ravines, a n d hills that divided the shoreline into tiny beaches cut off from one another. 3

H a v i n g traveled on a fast naval cruiser from Marseilles, H a m i l t o n reached the coast of Gallipoli on 18 M a r c h , in time to influence de R o b e c k to call off the naval c a m p a i g n . By late April he was s t e a m i n g back toward the straits to c o m m a n d the army's attack. He carefully followed the instructions that the War Minister h a d given him for the c a m p a i g n . He was to attack only the E u r o p e a n side of the s t r a i t s : the Gallipoli peninsula. He was not to attack until he had his whole force, which is why (despite his own misgivings) he had o r d e r e d the navy to take him back from T u r k e y to E g y p t to a s s e m b l e his forces. It took h i m a b o u t three weeks to organize his expeditionary force;

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then the navy took h i m back to T u r k e y to launch his invasion of Gallipoli, the western (or E u r o p e a n ) shore of the D a r d a n e l l e s . It was a risky v e n t u r e : indeed p r e w a r British military studies that were revealed to the C a b i n e t by A s q u i t h at the end of F e b r u a r y had c o n c l u d e d that an attack on Gallipoli by the British a r m y was too risky to be u n d e r t a k e n . K i t c h e n e r h a d o r d e r e d that it s h o u l d be done nonetheless, s a y i n g that he believed the O t t o m a n generals had left the E u r o p e a n side of the straits m o r e or less u n d e f e n d e d . At a War C o u n c i l meeting, its only T o r y m e m b e r — t h e former P r i m e Minister A r t h u r B a l f o u r — a s k e d "whether the T u r k s were likely, if cut off, to s u r r e n d e r or to fight with their b a c k to the wall." L l o y d G e o r g e said he "thought it m o r e p r o b a b l e that they w o u l d m a k e a s t a n d " ; b u t K i t c h e n e r replied that they w o u l d p r o b a b l y surrender. 4

5

A year later, a verdict on the matter was returned by Allied a r m i e s serving in the field. C o m p t o n M a c k e n z i e , the y o u n g novelist-turnedwar c o r r e s p o n d e n t , r e p o r t e d f r o m the D a r d a n e l l e s that " F r e n c h officers who have fought in the West say that as a fighting unit one T u r k is worth two G e r m a n s ; in fact, with his back to the wall the T u r k i s magnificent." 6

Ill At dawn on 25 April 1915, the B r i t i s h , D o m i n i o n , a n d Allied a r m i e s w a d e d ashore onto six narrow, unconnected beaches on the Gallipoli peninsula. T h e T u r k s , who h a d known when b u t not where the Allies would attack, were taken by s u r p r i s e a n d p r o b a b l y could have been o v e r w h e l m e d that d a y . T h e n o r t h e r n m o s t invasion site, A r i B u r n u , also p r o v e d a s u r p r i s e to the A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d t r o o p s who landed t h e r e — t h e navy h a d taken t h e m to the w r o n g b e a c h . A s c e n d i n g the steep slopes to the ridge a b o v e , they encountered T u r k i s h soldiers who fled until rallied b y their c o m m a n d e r , M u s t a p h a K e m a l . T h e battle r a g e d all day. T h e r e were m o m e n t s when it could have gone either way; but in the end the T u r k s d r o v e the i n v a d e r s b a c k down the s l o p e . At the tip of G a l l i p o l i , the five other Allied landings were at b e a c h h e a d s c o d e - n a m e d S, V, W, X, a n d Y. At Y there were no T u r k s , and the invaders c l i m b e d u n o p p o s e d to the top of the cliff that d o m i n a t e d the b e a c h ; but instead of m a r c h i n g on, they s t o p p e d b e c a u s e of confusion as to who was in c o m m a n d . At X, m e e t i n g little opposition, the attackers also m o u n t e d the cliff—and also s t o p p e d there. A t S , the landing party m e t little opposition, b u t m a d e c a m p on the beach without a t t e m p t i n g to a s c e n d to the top of the s l o p e that overlooked it. T h e Allies held a n o v e r w h e l m i n g numerical superiority that d a y —

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m o s t of L i m a n ' s forces were held in reserve at a distance f r o m the battlefield—and at b e a c h e s Y, X, a n d S the invasion forces could have exploited their s u r p r i s e attack by a d v a n c i n g a n d d e s t r o y i n g the small T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n in the vicinity. B y 2 6 April the situation h a d c h a n g e d . T u r k i s h reinforcements started to p o u r in, a n d in a s e n s e it w a s all over: a cheap victory at Gallipoli w a s no longer in sight for the Allies. G e n e r a l B i r d w o o d , c o m m a n d e r of the A N Z A C forces, on the advice of his officers, r e c o m m e n d e d r e - e m b a r k i n g a n d a b a n d o n i n g the positions his forces o c c u p i e d . B u t S i r I a n H a m i l t o n , B i r d w o o d ' s c o m m a n d i n g officer, d e c i d e d instead to d i g in. U n k n o w i n g l y , H a m i l t o n thereby c o n c e d e d that the expedition he l e d — a n d which w a s intended to b r e a k the military stalemate in the w a r — w a s d o o m e d to fail. As h a d been shown in F r a n c e a n d F l a n d e r s , d i g g i n g in w a s m o r e likely to p r o d u c e a stalemate than b r e a k o n e ; a n d indeed, in futile, b l o o d y a s s a u l t s on fixed positions, Gallipoli was to b e c o m e a d r a w n - o u t replay of the trench warfare on the western front. H a m i l t o n h a d positioned his t r o o p s at best to fight the T u r k s to a d r a w , b u t at worst to suffer disaster. While the T u r k s d u g in on the d o m i n a t i n g heights, the British c o m m a n d e r s o r d e r e d their t r o o p s to entrench on the b e a c h e s ; a n d there at the water's e d g e the Allied fight eventually b e c a m e one for survival. S o o n m o s t m e m b e r s of the British g o v e r n m e n t in L o n d o n c a m e to view evacuation as the only solution, but Churchill a n d K i t c h e n e r fought against it: Churchill b e c a u s e he w a s never willing to a c c e p t defeat, a n d K i t c h e n e r b e c a u s e he believed it w o u l d be a d i s a s t e r for a British a r m y to be seen to be defeated by a M i d d l e E a s t e r n one.

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Winston Churchill's d o g g e d determination to fight on at Gallipoli until victory was won kept him in the spotlight even after the army had taken over the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n from the navy. He a p p e a r e d to be both the m a n who had b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n war a b o u t , a n d the m a n who had c a u s e d Britain to suffer one defeat after another in that war. Although from April o n w a r d the battle for the straits was no longer the A d m i r a l t y ' s operation, Churchill was m a d e the s c a p e g o a t for the continuing casualties a n d setbacks as the Allied a r m i e s fought on hopelessly at Gallipoli. K i t c h e n e r ' s prestige was so great that the p r e s s , the p u b l i c , a n d Parliament f o u n d it inconceivable that he had been responsible for the b l u n d e r s that had been c o m m i t t e d ; b u t Churchill was an interfering civilian a n d it was easy to believe the a d m i r a l s who claimed that his a m a t e u r i s h m e d d l i n g in naval m a t t e r s had been the c a u s e of British s e t b a c k s . The Times gave voice to a gathering c o n s e n s u s in 1915 when its 18 M a y editorial p r o c l a i m e d that What long ago p a s s e d b e y o n d the stage of mere r u m o u r is the c h a r g e , which has been repeatedly a n d categorically m a d e in public, that the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y has been a s s u m i n g responsibilities a n d overriding his expert advisers to a degree which m i g h t at any time e n d a n g e r the national safety . . . When a civilian Minister in charge of a fighting service persistently seeks to g r a s p p o w e r which s h o u l d not p a s s into his u n g u i d e d hands, a n d a t t e m p t s to u s e that power in perilous ways, it is time for his colleagues in the C a b i n e t to take s o m e definite action. 1

O u t s i d e of the War C a b i n e t , it was not generally known that L o r d K i t c h e n e r w a s the author of the plan to send the navy on its own to attack the D a r d a n e l l e s . Churchill w a s b l a m e d for the decision, and 159

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therefore for the several weeks of a d v a n c e warning that had been given to E n v e r and L i m a n von S a n d e r s , which enabled them to entrench their armies to repel the Allied assault on Gallipoli. T h e officers on the Gallipoli beaches saw the earlier naval attack as a show-off stunt by the F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y , a coup that had failed and threatened to lose t h e m their lives. A u b r e y H e r b e r t , who served in the a r m e d forces there, wrote in his diary that "Winston's n a m e fills everyone with r a g e . R o m a n e m p e r o r s killed slaves to m a k e themselves p o p u l a r , he is killing free m e n to m a k e himself f a m o u s . If he hadn't tried that coup but had cooperated with the A r m y , we might have got to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e with very little l o s s . " L a t e r he wrote that "As for Winston, I would like him to die in s o m e of the t o r m e n t s I have seen so m a n y die in h e r e . " 2

3

A b u s e was heaped on Churchill f r o m all q u a r t e r s , a n d his political position deteriorated rapidly. A final split between Churchill and Britain's greatest sailor, A d m i r a l of the Fleet L o r d F i s h e r , the F i r s t S e a L o r d , b r o u g h t m a t t e r s to a h e a d . Churchill and F i s h e r had conferred and had reached agreement on a p r o g r a m of reinforcements of the fleet s u p p o r t i n g the Gallipoli c a m p a i g n on F r i d a y , 14 M a y . E a r l y the following m o r n i n g F i s h e r received several m e m o r a n d a f r o m Churchill s u m m a r i z i n g the points on which they had a g r e e d , b u t also a d d i n g new s u g g e s t i o n s of his own. Infuriated, F i s h e r , who had a n n o u n c e d that he was resigning on eight previous occasions, walked over from the A d m i r a l t y to n e a r b y 11 D o w n i n g Street a n d told the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , that he was resigning his office. L l o y d G e o r g e sent for the Prime Minister, who was next door at 10 D o w n i n g Street, a n d the two of them a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e F i s h e r that he had to remain at his post at least temporarily. F i s h e r refused, a n d then went back to his r o o m at the A d m i r a l t y , locked the door, a n d drew the blinds. L a t e r , he d i s a p p e a r e d from view for a time. Churchill learned of the situation from his colleagues, for F i s h e r refused to see him. T h e i m m e d i a t e p r o b l e m was that the navy—in the m i d d l e of a w a r — w a s without its chief c o m m a n d i n g officer, and that the intentions of the other m e m b e r s of the A d m i r a l t y B o a r d were unknown. Churchill was a s s u r e d on S u n d a y , 16 M a y , that the S e c o n d , T h i r d , a n d F o u r t h S e a L o r d s were all willing to continue in their positions. He also secured the agreement of A d m i r a l of the Fleet Sir A r t h u r Wilson to return to his prewar position of F i r s t S e a L o r d in Fisher's place. S i n c e the p r e s s and the political world did not yet know of Fisher's resignation, Churchill planned to a n n o u n c e both Fisher's resignation a n d the new dispositions at the A d m i r a l t y to the H o u s e of C o m m o n s on M o n d a y m o r n i n g — b e f o r e the O p p o s i t i o n h a d time to d i s r u p t his p l a n s . F i s h e r , however, sent a hint of what he had done to A n d r e w B o n a r

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L a w , leader of the O p p o s i t i o n . B o n a r L a w g u e s s e d what it meant, a n d called o n L l o y d G e o r g e first thing M o n d a y m o r n i n g . H e asked the Chancellor whether F i s h e r had r e s i g n e d . When L l o y d G e o r g e confirmed that he h a d , B o n a r L a w explained his own view of the g r a v e political c o n s e q u e n c e s that could b e expected t o e n s u e . T h e O p p o s i t i o n theretofore had refrained f r o m challenging the government in w a r t i m e , but B o n a r L a w s a i d that he could no longer restrain his followers: F i s h e r w a s their hero, and they would not let Churchill stay at the A d m i r a l t y if F i s h e r went. N o r would they s t o p their attacks there, for the T o r y M e m b e r s of Parliament, in the face of one military failure after another, no longer felt that they could give the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t their unqualified s u p p o r t . B o n a r L a w ' s solution w a s t o b r o a d e n the g o v e r n m e n t . H e p r o p o s e d that the L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be replaced by a coalition government, r e p r e s e n t i n g the two m a j o r parties in Parliament, a n d Labour. L l o y d G e o r g e instantly saw the force of the a r g u m e n t . He asked B o n a r L a w to wait at 11 D o w n i n g S t r e e t while he went next d o o r to consult the P r i m e M i n i s t e r . L l o y d G e o r g e then put the case for a coalition forcefully to A s q u i t h , who a b r u p t l y a g r e e d . Churchill knew none of this. E a r l y that afternoon he went to the H o u s e of C o m m o n s to a n n o u n c e that the S e a L o r d s had a g r e e d to stay on with A d m i r a l of the Fleet Wilson as their new head. He arrived to find that L l o y d G e o r g e a n d A s q u i t h would not let him m a k e his s p e e c h . A s q u i t h said that he did not want the s c h e d u l e d d e b a t e between the parties to take p l a c e . He told Churchill that he would f o r m a new g o v e r n m e n t in which the L i b e r a l s would share office with the C o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d with L a b o u r . On 19 M a y 1915, the new g o v e r n m e n t w a s a n n o u n c e d . Churchill w a s r e m o v e d f r o m the A d m i r a l t y a n d given the minor position of Chancellor of the D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r — i n effect, Minister Without P o r t f o l i o — a l t h o u g h he r e m a i n e d in the War C a b i n e t . T h e political world d i d not know at the time that, if Churchill had been listened to, the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n could have been won at a time when only a few h u n d r e d casualties had been i n c u r r e d ; and that it w a s b e c a u s e the a d m i r a l s a n d g e n e r a l s h a d overruled h i m that Britain h a d e m b a r k e d on a c a m p a i g n that was in the p r o c e s s of costing her m o r e than 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 casualties. T h u s it failed to g r a s p the essential fact that Britain's generals a n d a d m i r a l s were losing the war for her a n d that the country urgently needed not less but m o r e civilian control of the military. T h e political world in Britain also failed to g r a s p another essential fact: the war in the E a s t w a s not merely being lost by the Allies, it was being won by the other side. T h e results of the c a m p a i g n were a reflection of the fact that the c o u r a g e a n d tenacity of the A u s t r a l i a n ,

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N e w Z e a l a n d , British, and F r e n c h soldiery was being m a t c h e d by the c o u r a g e a n d tenacity of their O t t o m a n o p p o n e n t s .

II L l o y d G e o r g e had b r o u g h t a b o u t the creation of this first coalition g o v e r n m e n t , which e x c l u d e d Churchill f r o m a major C a b i n e t p o sition. He claimed that "he had fought to get Winston high office .. . H i s colleagues would not, however, a g r e e to Winston's having anything but a minor p o s i t i o n . " L l o y d G e o r g e was aware, however, that a hurt a n d a n g r y Churchill p l a c e d the b l a m e on h i m . Churchill's wife, even years later, s p o k e bitterly of the Chancellor as a J u d a s w h o s e "Welsh trickiness" h a d shattered the F i r s t L o r d ' s career; and the D u k e of M a r l b o r o u g h , Churchill's cousin, sent a note on 24 M a y s a y i n g "Pro tern L G has d o n e you i n . " Churchill himself e x c l a i m e d : "I am the victim of a political intrigue. I am finished!'" 4

5

6

L l o y d G e o r g e had always r e g a r d e d the O t t o m a n war a s Churchill's fault. In the s p r i n g of 1915 the Chancellor took an even wider view of his former protege's failings. When it b e c a m e clear that Churchill would have to leave the A d m i r a l t y , L l o y d G e o r g e c o m m e n t e d : "It is the N e m e s i s of the m a n who has fought for this war for years. When the war c a m e he saw in it the c h a n c e for glory for himself, & has accordingly entered on a risky c a m p a i g n without caring a straw for the misery a n d h a r d s h i p it would b r i n g to t h o u s a n d s , in the hope that he would p r o v e to be the o u t s t a n d i n g m a n m this w a r . "

21 T H E L I G H T T H A T FAILED i T h e U n i o n i s t - C o n s e r v a t i v e m e m b e r s of the new British g o v e r n m e n t took office in the belief that their task would be to protect the country's military leadership f r o m civilian interference. H a v i n g s u c ceeded in r e m o v i n g Churchill f r o m the A d m i r a l t y , they took it that the next item on the a g e n d a s h o u l d be the defense of L o r d K i t c h e n e r against his principal a d v e r s a r y , the L i b e r a l politician L l o y d G e o r g e . D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , held the distinction of having b e e n the first m e m b e r of the C a b i n e t to q u e s t i o n a decision of F i e l d M a r s h a l K i t c h e n e r ' s after the latter b e c a m e S e c retary of S t a t e for W a r . O n c e started on questioning K i t c h e n e r ' s j u d g m e n t s , L l o y d G e o r g e never s t o p p e d . A v o i d i n g the pitfall that was Churchill's u n d o i n g at the A d m i r a l t y , the L i b e r a l politician did not at first d a r e to challenge the field m a r s h a l on issues that were strictly military. I n s t e a d the Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r w a g e d his c a m p a i g n on g r o u n d s of his o w n choosing. T h e issue that he raised was the s h o r t a g e of munitions a n d other s u p p l i e s . Involving q u e s t i o n s of labor, p r o d u c t i o n , and finance, it w a s an issue r e g a r d i n g which his qualifications to s p e a k were greater than K i t c h e n e r ' s . On 19 M a y 1915, the day on which formation of the new government was a n n o u n c e d , L l o y d G e o r g e i n a u g u r a t e d the final p h a s e s of a c a m p a i g n that s u c c e e d e d in d e t a c h i n g the munitions a n d s u p p l y functions f r o m K i t c h e n e r ' s War Office a n d placing t h e m u n d e r himself as Minister of M u n i t i o n s . In his new ministry he s u c c e e d e d in starting to do what K i t c h e n e r h a d not been able to d o : e x p a n d i n g civilian p r o d u c t i o n of war material a n d finding new s o u r c e s of s u p p l y . T h e U n i o n i s t - C o n s e r v a t i v e M . P . s who entered the new coalition g o v e r n m e n t b e g a n t o take another look a t L l o y d G e o r g e a n d L o r d K i t c h e n e r , whose q u a r r e l they h a d p r e j u d g e d . As Minister of M u n i t i o n s , L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e a t o r n a d o twisting with elemental force t o d e s t r o y the e n e m y . T h e T o r i e s c a m e t o a d m i r e a n d a p p l a u d his efforts. B o n a r L a w and his colleagues h a d c o m e into the C a b i n e t

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to protect K i t c h e n e r and the military from interference by amateurish L i b e r a l civilians, but to their s u r p r i s e found themselves r a n g e d alongside L l o y d G e o r g e in q u e s t i o n i n g Kitchener's c o m p e t e n c e . T h e i m m e d i a t e military decision facing the new g o v e r n m e n t was what to do about the Gallipoli expedition. T h e War C o u n c i l of the Cabinet reconstituted itself as the D a r d a n e l l e s C o m m i t t e e , a n d held its first meeting in A s q u i t h ' s r o o m s at the H o u s e of C o m m o n s on 7 J u n e 1915, to deliberate the matter. T h e r e a f t e r it met often. T h e T o r i e s discovered that the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War did not s u p p l y them with the information they required in order to form a j u d g m e n t . K i t c h e n e r was secretive a n d reluctant to disclose military information to civilians. At times he a v o i d e d answering questions b e c a u s e he was not fully a n d accurately i n f o r m e d . At times he e s p o u s e d positions that were contradictory. B o n a r L a w and his principal T o r y colleague, the new AttorneyG e n e r a l , S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n , were inclined either to a b a n d o n the venture or else to send e n o u g h reinforcements to Gallipoli to e n s u r e s u c c e s s . T h e question was what level of reinforcements w o u l d e n s u r e s u c c e s s , b u t K i t c h e n e r would not say how m a n y t r o o p s the T u r k s h a d at Gallipoli or how m a n y B r i t i s h troops were needed in order to win. I n s t e a d he continued to talk in t e r m s of how m a n y t r o o p s could be s p a r e d f r o m the western front. In exasperation, by early S e p t e m b e r C a r s o n was writing that "What I feel so acutely a b o u t is that all our calculations (if we can dignify t h e m by that n a m e ) are absolutely h a p h a z a r d — w e are always told what we can send & not how m a n y are necessary . . . " l

By q u e s t i o n i n g the War Office on one occasion, ministers found that an important piece of c a b l e d information h a d been received there although the War Minister denied all knowledge of it. Either K i t c h e n e r h a d forgotten the cable or h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d it. On 10 D o w n i n g Street stationery, C a r s o n p e n n e d a note a n d p a s s e d it along the C a b i n e t table t o L l o y d G e o r g e : " K doesn't read the t e l e g r a m s — & we don't see t h e m — i t is i n t o l e r a b l e . " 2

C a r s o n b e g a n c r o s s - e x a m i n i n g K i t c h e n e r in C a b i n e t m e e t i n g s as though he were an a c c u s e d criminal in the dock. T h e field marshal's evasiveness, c o m b i n e d with hopeful predictions f r o m S i r I a n H a m i l t o n that never s e e m e d to be fulfilled, b r o u g h t the T o r y leaders to frustration and d e s p a i r . T y p i c a l c o m m e n t s d u r i n g sessions of the D a r d a n e l l e s C o m m i t t e e were " S I R E . C A R S O N said that the slaughter which h a d g o n e on w a s no s u c c e s s , and inquired if it were to be continued" and " M R . B O N A R L A W asked i f S i r Ian Hamilton was t o continue attacking when such action was obviously h o p e l e s s . " 3

T h e question of what to do d r a g g e d on into the late a u t u m n . C a b i n e t opinion b e g a n to h a r d e n in favor of withdrawal from Ga l l i p o l i ; for K i t c h e n e r failed to offer an alternative that p r o m i s e d

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s u c c e s s . K i t c h e n e r d i s s e n t e d , a r g u i n g that Britain should soldier on. He claimed that " a b a n d o n m e n t w o u l d be the m o s t d i s a s t r o u s event in the history of the E m p i r e , " t h o u g h he a d m i t t e d that he "would like to liquidate the s i t u a t i o n . " T h e C a b i n e t was unwilling to order a withdrawal from Gallipoli without L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s sanction, the m o r e s o a s the c o m m a n d e r on the spot, S i r I a n H a m i l t o n , r e m a i n e d hopeful. On the Gallipoli b e a c h e s the situation was d e s p e r a t e , a n d W y n d h a m D e e d e s , the officer who had w a r n e d K i t c h e n e r against the D a r d a n e l l e s adventure but who was serving there, joined together with two other officers, G e o r g e L l o y d a n d G u y D a w n a y , t o d o s o m e t h i n g a b o u t it. T h e y s c h e m e d to get one of their n u m b e r sent back to L o n d o n to tell the C a b i n e t the truth a b o u t their situation. D a w n a y h a d the chance, and seized it. 4

B a c k in L o n d o n , D a w n a y saw K i t c h e n e r and other British leaders, even including the recently d e m o t e d Churchill. He tried to get his m e s s a g e through to t h e m , b u t they were reluctant to accept the unpa l a t a b l e truth. D e e d e s had also g u e s s e d what D a w n a y would discover, a n d told h i m s o : "And I bet the best you found was Winston after all!" In the end, I a n H a m i l t o n w a s r e p l a c e d ; a n d the new British c o m m a n d e r saw at once that the situation w a s hopeless a n d called for an i m m e d i a t e evacuation. B u t the C a b i n e t continued to hesitate; the p r o b l e m , a s always, was L o r d K i t c h e n e r . 5

II In L l o y d G e o r g e ' s vivid i m a g e , K i t c h e n e r ' s m i n d was pictured as the m o v i n g , t u r n i n g turret of a lighthouse; b u t s o m e w h e r e in the r a g i n g s t o r m of the Gallipoli c a m p a i g n the light h a d s u d d e n l y gone out. T h e f i e l d m a r s h a l ' s colleagues waited with g r o w i n g anger a n d impatience in the d a r k n e s s for the powerful b e a m of light that never again s w u n g a r o u n d to dispel the night. E v e n the T o r y B o n a r L a w had c o m e a r o u n d s o far a s t o p r o p o s e that L l o y d G e o r g e s h o u l d replace K i t c h e n e r at the War Office, b u t the P r i m e Minister resisted the p r o p o s a l . Only the inner g r o u p in the g o v e r n m e n t was aware of the field marshal's failings; he retained his following in the country, a n d A s q u i t h felt that to replace him would be politically i m p o s s i b l e . T h e P r i m e Minister's typical solution was to s e n d K i t c h e n e r out to the D a r d a n e l l e s on a fact-finding expedition in the hope that he would be detained there indefinitely. In the event, o n c e he went out a n d saw the battlefield himself, K i t c h e n e r felt c o m p e l l e d to agree that Gallipoli s h o u l d be a b a n d o n e d . A r m e d with K i t c h e n e r ' s a p p r o v a l , the C a b i n e t finally i s s u e d the

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necessary authorization; a n d , at the b e g i n n i n g of 1916, the evacuation—which was far a n d away the m o s t brilliant operation of the c a m p a i g n — w a s c o m p l e t e d . D e e d e s called the evacuation "one of the m o s t r e m a r k a b l e things in h i s t o r y . " 6

Ill On 25 April 1915, the Allies c o u l d have won an easy, b l o o d l e s s victory by their s u r p r i s e attack; b u t 2 5 9 d a y s later, when they withdrew in defeat f r o m their last positions on the b l o o d - s o a k e d beaches of the D a r d a n e l l e s , it e m e r g e d that they h a d lost one of the costliest military e n g a g e m e n t s in history. Half a million soldiers h a d been e n g a g e d in battle on each side, a n d each h a d suffered a q u a r t e r of a million casualties. It was a decisive battle, in that the Allies could have won it, a n d , with it, the M i d d l e E a s t e r n w a r — b u t did not. It f o r e s h a d o w e d , too, things to c o m e ; a s u p p o s e d l y b a c k w a r d A s i a n a r m y h a d defeated a m o d e r n E u r o p e a n one. It h a d the effect of d r a w i n g E u r o p e into M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs on a long-term b a s i s . T h e military involvement which K i t c h e n e r h a d feared b u t failed to prevent was s u s p e n d e d temporarily by the Allied evacuation, but w o u l d r e s u m e a year later. M o r e i m p o r t a n t , the setback to Allied fortunes d r o v e Britain both in a specific a n d a general sense to involve herself m o r e deeply in M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs. In a specific sense, as will be seen presently, it d r o v e K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants to ally themselves with a M i d d l e E a s t e r n ruler they believed c o u l d help to s a v e S i r I a n Hamilton's a r m i e s at Gallipoli f r o m perishing. A n d in a general sense, the sheer m a g n i t u d e of Britain's c o m m i t m e n t and loss at Gallipoli m a d e it s e e m vital years later that she s h o u l d play a m a j o r role in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t to give s o m e sort of m e a n i n g to so g r e a t a sacrifice.

IV On 18 N o v e m b e r 1915, having resigned as Chancellor of the D u c h y of L a n c a s t e r , Winston Churchill c r o s s e d over to F r a n c e to serve, at his own r e q u e s t , as an a r m y officer on the western front. T h e political world continued to place the b l a m e for Gallipoli on h i m . In the C a b i n e t , however, K i t c h e n e r was b l a m e d too; a n d K i t c h e n e r knew it. L o r d K i t c h e n e r was aware that his C a b i n e t colleagues h o p e d he w o u l d not return f r o m his trip to the D a r d a n e l l e s , b u t deliberately d i s a p p o i n t e d t h e m . On returning to L o n d o n at the end of 1915, he

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s p o k e frankly with the P r i m e Minister a b o u t his loss of s u p p o r t within the C a b i n e t , a n d offered to resign. When an a c c e p t a b l e replacement could not be f o u n d for h i m , he a d o p t e d a different a p p r o a c h . With the P r i m e Minister's a p p r o v a l , he a r r a n g e d for a b a s i c change in the nature of the position he held as War Minister, r e d u c ing the p o w e r s a n d responsibilities of the j o b . A fighting soldier f r o m the western front, F i e l d M a r s h a l S i r William R o b e r t s o n , was then b r o u g h t into office as Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff with widely e x p a n d e d p o w e r s that until then h a d fallen within K i t c h e n e r ' s d o m a i n as War Minister. Y e t K i t c h e n e r retained authority in formulating political policy for the M i d d l e E a s t . When he returned to L o n d o n at the end of 1915, his aide S i r M a r k S y k e s also returned to L o n d o n f r o m a long factfinding trip, b r i n g i n g with h i m exciting news of a M i d d l e E a s t e r n ruler who m i g h t ally himself with Britain, a n d a revolutionary p r o g r a m on the basis of that alliance for t u r n i n g the tide in the O t t o m a n w a r — a p r o g r a m that K i t c h e n e r was t o p u s h t h r o u g h the Cabinet.

22 CREATING T H E ARAB BUREAU i In the winter of 1915—16, as the Allies p l a n n e d and executed their evacuation of Gallipoli a n d as L o r d K i t c h e n e r took a lesser role in the c o n d u c t of the war, British policy in the M i d d l e E a s t took a new t u r n : K i t c h e n e r a n d his colleagues b e g a n to focus in an organized way on the uses Britain might m a k e of discontented A r a b leaders a n d soldiers within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e y acted on the basis of r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s b r o u g h t back f r o m the E a s t b y S i r M a r k S y k e s , Kitchener's personally a p p o i n t e d M i d d l e E a s t expert. S y k e s was returning h o m e from a long mission of inquiry into how the Allies s h o u l d deal with the defeated M i d d l e E a s t — a mission without m u c h urgency after T u r k e y ' s victory at Gallipoli. Projects often develop a m o m e n t u m of their own: in the winter of 1915 the British naval attack on the D a r d a n e l l e s had g o n e forward even after the R u s s i a n p r o b l e m it was meant to alleviate h a d been solved, and when the winter was over the planning of how to carve up the M i d d l e E a s t went forward even t h o u g h Churchill's expected c o n q u e s t of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — w h i c h was the reason for d o i n g the p l a n n i n g — h a d not materialized. After the de B u n s e n c o m m i t t e e — w h i c h Sir M a r k S y k e s had g u i d e d — s u b m i t t e d its report on the postwar M i d d l e E a s t on 30 J u n e 1915, the British g o v e r n m e n t sent S y k e s out to the E a s t to d i s c u s s the committee's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s with officers a n d officials on the s p o t . He traveled to the B a l k a n s , to E g y p t twice (on the way out and on the way b a c k ) , to the Persian Gulf, to M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d to I n d i a . It was a m a j o r u n d e r t a k i n g ; Sykes's journey lasted half a year. It g a v e him a u n i q u e e x p o s u r e to a range of different points of view, but it was almost 1916 before he was able to meet with C a b i n e t m e m b e r s in L o n d o n to tell t h e m in p e r s o n what he h a d learned. In his first s t o p in C a i r o — o n the way out, in the s u m m e r of 1 9 1 5 — S y k e s met with K i t c h e n e r ' s M i d d l e E a s t advisers in E g y p t . R o n a l d S t o r r s , w h o m he had known before the war, introduced him 168

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to G i l b e r t C l a y t o n . Religion f o r m e d an instant b o n d : Clayton was a devout C h r i s t i a n whose s e r i o u s n e s s i m p r e s s e d S y k e s deeply. T h e y b e c a m e friends as well as colleagues, although S y k e s w a s . m o r e o p e n in his dealings with Clayton than C l a y t o n was in r e t u r n . S y k e s was introduced by his friends to A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e r s o n alities of engagingly p r o - B r i t i s h views, a n d b e c a m e an advocate of Clayton's view that S y r i a s h o u l d b e c o m e British. He w a s led by Clayton a n d S t o r r s to believe that the populations of the region would welcome s u c h a d e v e l o p m e n t . F r a n c e could be given c o m p e n sation elsewhere, he s a i d ; a n d , in any event, the only g r o u p s in F r a n c e that wanted S y r i a were clerics or p r o m o t e r s of c o m m e r c i a l c o n c e s s i o n s . Attracted by the plan e s p o u s e d at that time by his friends a n d by Wingate for the Sherif H u s s e i n to be elevated to the caliphate, a plan that a c c o r d e d perfectly with his own view that the caliphate s h o u l d be m o v e d s o u t h , S y k e s was won over to the S t o r r s " E g y p t i a n E m p i r e " s c h e m e . T h i s p r o p o s e d a single A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g entity, u n d e r the spiritual rule of the Sherif a n d the nominal t e m p o r a l rule of the figurehead m o n a r c h of E g y p t , to be governed f r o m C a i r o by the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r — w h o was to be L o r d K i t c h e n e r . 1

T h e r e was, however, a current of opinion in C a i r o that S y k e s found d i s t u r b i n g : the talk of rivalry between Britain a n d F r a n c e in the M i d d l e E a s t . S y k e s did not believe that there were any serious g r o u n d s for d i s a g r e e m e n t between the two wartime allies; he t h o u g h t that F r a n c e did not really care a b o u t S y r i a , a n d could be i n d u c e d to look elsewhere for her share of the winnings. H i s a s s u m p t i o n was that the talk of rivalry was inspired by enemy p r o p a g a n d i s t s . Only many m o n t h s later did he learn that the a n t i - F r e n c h talk ( a n d m o r e than talk) c a m e f r o m s o m e of his own friends in C a i r o ; a n d he never learned that one of the ringleaders of the g r o u p was his friend Gi l ber t C l a y t o n .

II In I n d i a , at the o p p o s i t e political pole, S y k e s found a reception that was less than cordial. He was a y o u n g m a n , halfway t h r o u g h his first year in his first g o v e r n m e n t a l j o b , and he had c o m e out f r o m L o n d o n to tell I n d i a a b o u t the E a s t . T h e m a n he had c o m e to see was two de c a d e s his senior, h a d spent a lifetime in g o v e r n m e n t service, a n d was one of Britain's m o s t distinguished foreign policy professionals. C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e , a former a m b a s s a d o r to R u s s i a , had been the career official in charge of the F o r e i g n Office before c o m i n g out to India as Viceroy. As G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , he served in a family tradition that harked b a c k to the previous century; his g r a n d f a t h e r h a d been G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a in the 1840s, the d e c a d e before the

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Mutiny. H a r d i n g e ' s policy was for I n d i a to o c c u p y a n d annex M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d his view of C a i r o ' s p r o p o s a l s was that they were "absolutely fantastic" a n d "perfectly fatal." He rejected the notion of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e , however n o m i n a l ; he wrote that "Sykes d o e s not s e e m to be able to g r a s p the fact that there are p a r t s of T u r k e y unfit for representative institutions." M o r e inclined than ever to s u p p o r t C a i r o against S i m l a , S y k e s also c a m e to believe that the conflict in views a n d in jurisdictions was harmful in itself. He a r g u e d that "our traditional way of letting various offices run their own s h o w s , which was allright in the past when such sectors dealt with varying p r o b l e m s which were not related, but it is b a d now that each sector is dealing in reality with a c o m m o n e n e m y . " T h e r e was n o central policy: S i m l a , C a i r o , the F o r e i g n Office, the War Office, a n d the A d m i r a l t y each ran its own operation, as did officials in the field, each working in ignorance of what the others were doing, and often at c r o s s - p u r p o s e s . T h e o b stacles in the way of arriving at a policy were f o r m i d a b l e : S y k e s once counted eighteen agencies that would have to be consulted before an a g r e e d decision could b e r e a c h e d . 2

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D u r i n g the course of his trip, S y k e s explored the idea of establishing an overall b u r e a u to a s s u m e charge of A r a b affairs. C a i r o was enthusiastic; on 13 D e c e m b e r 1915, C l a y t o n reported that he had started to a s s e m b l e the nucleus of a N e a r E a s t Office a n d h o p e d that S y k e s w o u l d p r e s s forward with the p r o j e c t . R e t u r n i n g to L o n d o n at the end of 1915, S y k e s did p r e s s forward by p r o p o s i n g the creation of a central agency to coordinate policy: an A r a b B u r e a u , to be established in C a i r o u n d e r his own direction. T h e new S e c r e t a r y for I n d i a , A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n , at the s a m e time u r g e d the creation of an I s l a m i c B u r e a u , to c o m b a t seditious e n e m y p r o p a g a n d a in I n d i a , Persia, and A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e Viceroy of I n d i a , in r e s p o n s e , m a d e it clear that he o p p o s e d the creation of any b u r e a u that planned to intrude into areas within his jurisdiction, especially if S y k e s a n d his friends were to be in c h a r g e . E a r l y in J a n u a r y 1916 A s q u i t h o r d e r e d an interdepartmental conference to consider the creation of an I s l a m i c Bureau. s

At the conference, agreement was reached to accept the S y k e s p r o p o s a l , b u t with a m a j o r modification that cut the s u b s t a n c e out of it. T h e A r a b B u r e a u (as it was to be called) was not to be a s e p a r a t e body, but merely a section of the C a i r o Intelligence D e p a r t m e n t . T h i s was insisted on by K i t c h e n e r (represented by F i t z G e r a l d ) and by the F o r e i g n Office; they did not intend to s u r r e n d e r the control they exercised over British policy. C a i r o was authorized to establish and staff a new entity; b u t a central agency to take c h a r g e of overall policy was not c r e a t e d — a n d that h a d been the point of the S y k e s

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p r o p o s a l . T h e various d e p a r t m e n t s of g o v e r n m e n t continued to m a k e a n d carry out their independent a n d often conflicting policies. T h e leading role continued to be played by K i t c h e n e r , to w h o m the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y deferred. S y k e s continued to m a k e policy only as a representative of K i t c h e n e r , a n d not in his own right as chief of an independent agency; K i t c h e n e r , who d i d not wish to relinquish control, insisted that the situation s h o u l d remain that way. T h e head of N a v a l Intelligence q u e s t i o n e d the desirability of creating the new b u r e a u in C a i r o a l o n g the lines that S y k e s a n d Clayton p r o p o s e d ; t o placate him, his c a n d i d a t e , D a v i d G . H o g a r t h , an O x f o r d archaeologist serving as a N a v a l Intelligence officer, was n a m e d to be its h e a d . H o g a r t h was a s h a d o w y figure who had worked with British intelligence agencies before the war. H o g a r t h replaced the acting head of the A r a b B u r e a u , Alfred Parker, a career a r m y officer who was Kitchener's nephew. F r o m the outset H o g a r t h worked directly u n d e r C l a y t o n , whose principal views he s e e m s to have s h a r e d . U n d e r H o g a r t h , the b u r e a u fought to assert the views of Wingate a n d C l a y t o n — w h o wanted to e x p a n d British E g y p t ' s control of the A r a b w o r l d — a s against those of the F o r e i g n Office a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a . An e v e n - t e m p e r e d , low-keyed officer of the S u d a n g o v e r n m e n t n a m e d K i n a h a n Cornwallis b e c a m e H o g a r t h ' s d e p u t y , a n d Wingate's secretary, a n officer n a m e d G . S . S y m e s , c a m e over t o the A r a b B u r e a u from the S u d a n . Philip G r a v e s , a former Times c o r r e s p o n d ent, also joined the b u r e a u ; a n d H o g a r t h b r o u g h t i n T h o m a s E d w a r d ( " T . E . " ) L a w r e n c e , a y o u n g m a n who had worked for him at the A s h m o l e a n M u s e u m in O x f o r d a n d over whose career he had p r e s i d e d ever since. L a w r e n c e was later to win renown as " L a w r e n c e of Arabia." At the b e g i n n i n g Clayton did not have an expert in T u r k i s h a f f a i r s — a n d in w a g i n g an intelligence w a r against T u r k e y that was an evident d i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e n he h a d a stroke of luck. On 10 D e c e m b e r 1915, W y n d h a m D e e d e s — w h o had served in the O t t o m a n G e n d a r m e r i e before the w a r — a r r i v e d in Cairo from G a l l i p o l i ; in early J a n u a r y Clayton s u c c e e d e d in co-opting h i m as d e p u t y head of E g y p t i a n Intelligence, where his k n o w l e d g e of T u r k i s h affairs p r o v e d an invaluable asset. S o o n C a i r o was bustling with y o u n g M e m b e r s of Parliament a n d others a m b i t i o u s to have a say in M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy, revolving a r o u n d the A r a b B u r e a u . A m o n g t h e m were A u b r e y H e r b e r t , M . P . , and G e o r g e L l o y d , M . P . , both M a r k Sykes's friends f r o m before the Lawrence worked closely with the Arab Bureau, but was not officially posted to it until the end of 1916.

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war. At last C a i r o had b e c o m e a center of British p o l i c y - m a k i n g for the M i d d l e E a s t ; a n d Clayton had the satisfaction of knowing that in L o n d o n the real m a k e r s of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t policy were Cairo's leader, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , a n d his representative, M a r k S y k e s .

23 M A K I N G PROMISES TO T H E ARABS i When S y k e s r e t u r n e d f r o m the E a s t at the end of 1915, he b r o u g h t back t o L o n d o n s o m e t h i n g m o r e i m m e d i a t e l y startling a n d o f m o r e lasting i m p o r t a n c e than his idea of creating an A r a b B u r e a u . What he b r o u g h t was news of a m y s t e r i o u s y o u n g A r a b who claimed that he and his friends c o u l d help Britain win the war. T h e y o u n g m a n ' s n a m e w a s M u h a m m e d Sharif a l - F a r u q i . N o t h i n g w a s known of a l - F a r u q i then; a n d little is known of h i m now. He e m e r g e d f r o m obscurity in the a u t u m n of 1915, a n d held the attention of the British g o v e r n m e n t well into 1916, b e f o r e s l i p p i n g b a c k into o b s c u r i t y a n d d y i n g y o u n g , killed on a road in I r a q in 1920 d u r i n g a tribal r a i d . D u r i n g his m o n t h s in the spotlight in 1915—16, he directly or indirectly led Britain to p r o m i s e concessions to F r a n c e , R u s s i a , A r a b s , a n d others i n the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t . A s m i d d l e m a n between B r i t i s h officials a n d A r a b l e a d e r s , he w a s either m i s u n d e r stood or else m i s r e p r e s e n t e d each to the other. O n e can only g u e s s at his m o t i v e s . To the twentieth-century M i d d l e E a s t , he left a legacy of m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g that time h a s not yet entirely d i s s i p a t e d .

II T h e b a c k g r o u n d t o the a s t o n i s h i n g a l - F a r u q i e p i s o d e w a s the q u a s i a g r e e m e n t L o r d K i t c h e n e r h a d r e a c h e d with the E m i r H u s s e i n o f M e c c a at the outset of the war. As noted earlier, L o r d K i t c h e n e r , r e g a r d i n g the E m i r H u s s e i n as a spiritual rather than a material force,* had initiated a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with him in the a u t u m n of

* Reginald Wingate, who governed the Sudan, was alone among Kitchener's followers in believing from the very outset of the Ottoman war that Hussein could be of military assistance to Britain. 173

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1914 that had been c o n c l u d e d on t e r m s satisfactory to both m e n . Hussein* was to do nothing for the m o m e n t ; he would not use his spiritual prestige against Britain in the O t t o m a n war (as K i t c h e n e r had feared he m i g h t d o ) a n d , at s o m e future point, he w o u l d use it in favor of Britain (as K i t c h e n e r h o p e d he w o u l d do when the war was over a n d British rivalry with R u s s i a r e s u m e d ) . M a t t e r s having been settled early in 1915, the British R e s i d e n c y in C a i r o was s u r p r i s e d to receive another letter from H u s s e i n half a year later, in the s u m m e r of 1915, s u d d e n l y d e m a n d i n g — w i t h o u t explanation—that almost all of A r a b A s i a s h o u l d b e c o m e an independent k i n g d o m u n d e r his rule. ( A s indicated earlier, British officials were u n a w a r e that H u s s e i n w o u l d u n d e r s t a n d that they were offering him a k i n g d o m when they s u g g e s t e d that he should b e c o m e the A r a b caliph; a n d it was the k i n g d o m , not the caliphate, that t e m p t e d h i m at the t i m e . ) H u s s e i n ' s u n e x p e c t e d d e m a n d , c o m i n g without explanation after m o n t h s of silence, a r o u s e d wonder a n d mirth in British C a i r o . An a m u s e d R o n a l d S t o r r s c o m m e n t e d that H u s s e i n ought to be satisfied to be allowed to keep the province of the H e j a z . S t o r r s c o m m e n t e d that H u s s e i n "knows he is d e m a n d i n g , possibly as a b a s i s of negotiations, far m o r e than he has the right, the hope, or the p o w e r to expect." S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n E g y p t , not wishing to d i s c o u r a g e H u s s e i n , gently replied to him that discussion of M i d d l e E a s t e r n frontiers ought to be p o s t p o n e d until the e n d of the war. B u t H u s s e i n ' s s u d d e n d e m a n d for a n independent A r a b k i n g d o m was by no m e a n s the u n r e a s o n a b l e act that it a p p e a r e d to be at the time in C a i r o . U n b e k n o w n s t to M c M a h o n and S t o r r s , what had h a p p e n e d in M e c c a was that in J a n u a r y 1915 H u s s e i n had discovered written evidence that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t was p l a n n i n g to d e p o s e him at the end of the w a r — a n d indeed had p o s t p o n e d d e p o s ing him only b e c a u s e of the c o m i n g of the w a r . He p r o m p t l y sent his s o n Feisal to see the G r a n d Vizier in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , b u t learned that there was little c h a n c e of p e r s u a d i n g the Porte to reverse this decision. 1

2

T h e Y o u n g T u r k plan t o d e p o s e h i m forced H u s s e i n , against his inclinations, to consider o p p o s i n g T u r k e y in the war. F e a r i n g that to do so might isolate h i m in the A r a b world, H u s s e i n sent F e i s a l to D a m a s c u s to s o u n d out the possibility of obtaining s u p p o r t from the A r a b secret societies h e a d q u a r t e r e d there. In carrying out this mission, Feisal s t o p p e d in D a m a s c u s twice: en route to

Hussein ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca and its Emir, is referred to variously as Hussein, the Sherif, the Sherif Hussein, the Emir Hussein and, later, K i n g Hussein. He is also referred to as the ruler of the Hejaz and, later, as K i n g of the Hejaz.

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C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to see the G r a n d Vizier, a n d again on his way back from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e afterwards. On his first s t o p in D a m a s c u s , in late M a r c h 1915, Feisal was told that there were three O t t o m a n a r m y divisions with mainly A r a b soldiers concentrated in the D a m a s c u s area, a n d that the secret society c o n s p i r a t o r s believed that these divisions would follow their lead. T h o u g h they talked of leading a revolt against T u r k e y , the m e m b e r s of the secret societies also e x p r e s s e d reservations a b o u t doing s o . F o r one thing, m o s t o f t h e m believed G e r m a n y would s o o n win the w a r ; they were b o u n d to ask themselves why they s h o u l d join the losing side. F o r another, as between the O t t o m a n E m p i r e and the E u r o p e a n Allies, they preferred to be ruled by M o s l e m T u r k s than b y E u r o p e a n C h r i s t i a n s . A l t h o u g h evidence of what they were p l a n n i n g is scanty, the secret societies a p p a r e n t l y were inclined to set up a b i d d i n g competition between Britain a n d T u r k e y for A r a b loyalties. T h e y a d v i s e d H u s s e i n (through F e i s a l ) not to join the Allies unless Britain p l e d g e d to s u p p o r t i n d e p e n d e n c e for m o s t of A r a b western A s i a . With s u c h a British p l e d g e in h a n d , the secret societies c o u l d then have asked the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to m a t c h it. After his m e e t i n g s in D a m a s c u s , F e i s a l p r o c e e d e d to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to meet with the G r a n d Vizier. When he returned to D a m a s c u s on 23 M a y 1915, on his way h o m e , he f o u n d the situation considerably c h a n g e d . D j e m a l P a s h a , the T u r k i s h governor o f S y r i a , h a d scented an A r a b plot a n d taken s t e p s to s m a s h it. He h a d c r u s h e d the secret societies, arresting m a n y of the ringleaders a n d d i s p e r s i n g others. He had broken up the three A r a b a r m y divisions, a n d h a d sent m a n y of their officers away to Gallipoli a n d e l s e w h e r e . 3

A handful of the r e m a i n i n g c o n s p i r a t o r s — s i x men a c c o r d i n g to one account, nine a c c o r d i n g to a n o t h e r — n o w told Feisal that they could no longer initiate a revolt against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; H u s s e i n should do it, a n d they would follow him—if H u s s e i n could first induce the British to p l e d g e s u p p o r t for A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e m e n of the secret societies h a d drafted a d o c u m e n t defining the territories that were to be A r a b a n d independent. T h e d o c u m e n t w a s called the D a m a s c u s Protocol. Feisal b r o u g h t it b a c k from D a m a s c u s to M e c c a . It set forth the d e m a n d s that the E m i r H u s s e i n was to s u b m i t to B r i t a i n . H u s s e i n h a d nothing to lose in m a k i n g the d e m a n d s . D o i n g s o w o u l d help him obtain s u p p o r t f r o m the secret societies—for whatever that m i g h t be worth—when he launched his revolt; it would also stake his c l a i m to leadership in A r a b i a n a n d A r a b politics, a n d w o u l d help to justify his s u p p o r t of C h r i s t i a n s against M o s l e m T u r k e y . So in the s u m m e r of 1915 he sent his letter incorporating the D a m a s c u s Protocol d e m a n d s to the British Residency in C a i r o , where the d e m a n d s — a s has been s e e n — w e r e not taken seriously. 4

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III L i e u t e n a n t M u h a m m e d S h a r i f a l - F a r u q i , a 24-year-old A r a b O t t o m a n staff officer from M o s u l (in what is now I r a q ) , was a secret society m e m b e r stationed in D a m a s c u s at the time of Feisal's first s t o p there in early 1915. He m a y have been a m o n g those who m e t with Feisal there at that t i m e ; if not, he learned what had been said from colleagues who had a t t e n d e d the meeting. A l - F a r u q i was one of the secret society officers o r d e r e d out of D a m a s c u s a n d sent by D j e m a l P a s h a to the Gallipoli front, where casualties were high. S e n d i n g s u s p e c t e d A r a b plotters to the front lines to be killed looked to be a deliberate policy of D j e m a l ' s in crushing sedition. On the other h a n d , there were valid military reasons for s e n d i n g t r o o p s to reinforce the Gallipoli front where the O t t o m a n r e g i m e was fighting for survival. A l - F a r u q i m a y have s u s pected, but could not have been s u r e , that his p o s t i n g to Gallipoli showed that D j e m a l s u s p e c t e d h i m of treason. A l - F a r u q i kept in touch with secret society officers who r e m a i n e d in D a m a s c u s . F r o m t h e m he learned further details of what F e i s a l a n d H u s s e i n were d o i n g . He learned that the remnant of the secret societies in D a m a s c u s h a d e n c o u r a g e d H u s s e i n to lead an A r a b revolt against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e if Britain would first agree to s u p p o r t the D a m a s c u s Protocol: the secret society p r o g r a m for A r a b i n d e p e n d ence. He learned, too, that H u s s e i n had in fact written to the British in C a i r o in the s u m m e r of 1915 incorporating the D a m a s c u s Protocol in his letter a n d presenting it as his own set of d e m a n d s for his establishment as m o n a r c h of an A r a b k i n g d o m c o m p r i s i n g a l m o s t all of A r a b western A s i a . In the a u t u m n of 1915, L i e u t e n a n t a l - F a r u q i deserted the O t t o m a n forces at Gallipoli and c r o s s e d over to Allied lines. He claimed to have important information for British Intelligence in C a i r o , a n d was p r o m p t l y sent to E g y p t for interrogation. P e r h a p s he feared that D j e m a l was a b o u t to obtain proof of his m e m b e r s h i p in the antiT u r k i s h conspiracy, a n d d e c i d e d to e s c a p e while there was time. P e r h a p s he h o p e d to win glory by playing a lone hand in world politics. Whatever his motives, he acted on an i m p u l s e of his o w n : n o b o d y had entrusted h i m with a m i s s i o n . A l - F a r u q i s p o k e little E n g l i s h , a n d it is difficult to tell f r o m the f r a g m e n t a r y historical record the extent to which he was correctly u n d e r s t o o d or the extent to which w o r d s were put in his m o u t h by those who wanted to hear what they claimed he s a i d . U n d e r interrogation by British Intelligence officials, the y o u n g officer c l a i m e d to be a m e m b e r of the secret A r a b military society a l - A h d . He invoked the n a m e of its leading figure stationed in D a m a s c u s , G e n e r a l Y a s i n a l - H a s h i m i , Chief of Staff of the O t t o m a n 12th Division, a n d although a l - F a r u q i a d m i t t e d that "I am not authorized

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to d i s c u s s with you officially" the p r o p o s a l s of al-'Ahd, the y o u n g deserter p r e t e n d e d — f o r whatever r e a s o n — t o be a s p o k e s m a n for the organization a n d was accepted as s u c h by G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the head of British Intelligence in C a i r o . T h o u g h his story was unverified, British Intelligence believed it and did not investigate further. He was not in fact a representative of al-'Ahd or indeed of any other g r o u p : Clayton had been d u p e d . 5

What g a v e plausibility to a l - F a r u q i ' s claim to represent al-'Ahd was t h a t — f r o m his colleagues in D a m a s c u s — h e knew the details of the British c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with Sherif H u s s e i n a n d knew a b o u t the d e m a n d s that H u s s e i n h a d sent to C a i r o in the s u m m e r of 1915. A l - F a r u q i , p u r p o r t e d l y s p e a k i n g for the A r a b a r m y officers in D a m a s c u s , d e m a n d e d that Britain give a p l e d g e to s u p p o r t an independent A r a b state within the frontiers that H u s s e i n had outlined. When he did so the pieces s u d d e n l y s e e m e d to fall into place for British Intelligence. Clayton g r a s p e d the essential fact it was no coincidence that the two sets of d e m a n d s were identical a n d that both were the s a m e as those that a l - M a s r i — t h e founder of a l - ' A h d — a n d other A r a b exiles in C a i r o had been m a k i n g since the outset of the war. If the secret societies were b a c k i n g H u s s e i n , the E m i r of M e c c a was no longer to be thought of as representing merely his section of the A r a b i a n p e n i n s u l a . F o r if the A r a b secret societies were as powerful as a l - F a r u q i represented t h e m to be and as C l a y t o n erroneously i m a g i n e d t h e m to be, H u s s e i n would be s p e a k i n g for h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of O t t o m a n t r o o p s a n d millions of O t t o m a n subjects. A l - F a r u q i w a r n e d C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues that they m u s t reply to H u s s e i n immediately. A c c o r d i n g to a l - F a r u q i , the British h a d to g u a r a n t e e the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t if they wanted al-'Ahd to lead an A r a b rising within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Presenting an u l t i m a t u m , the y o u n g man g a v e Britain only a few weeks to accept the offer; otherwise, he s a i d , the A r a b m o v e m e n t would throw all of its s u p p o r t behind G e r m a n y a n d the O t t o m a n Empire. C a i r o was seized with excitement. R o n a l d S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r on 10 O c t o b e r 1915, that " T h e A r a b q u e s t i o n is reaching an acute s t a t e . " At a b o u t the s a m e time Clayton c o m p o s e d a m e m o r a n d u m outlining his conversations with a l - F a r u q i for General Maxwell, the British army c o m m a n d e r in E g y p t , who urgently cabled K i t c h e n e r on 12 O c t o b e r that a "powerful organisation" existed b e h i n d enemy lines, that Hussein's p r o p o s a l s had actually c o m e from that organization, and that unless a g r e e m e n t were reached with it, the A r a b s would go over to the e n e m y . 6

7

Kitchener's followers in C a i r o apparently believed that an A r a b * A curious assertion, since the Arabs were already in the enemy camp.

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rebellion would enable t h e m to s a v e the Allied a r m i e s who were fighting for their lives at the e d g e s of the Gallipoli peninsula in the D a r d a n e l l e s . T h e British a r m y c o m m a n d e r a t Gallipoli was Ian H a m i l t o n , a K i t c h e n e r p r o t e g e , a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s C a i r o followers m a y well have been in touch with h i m to help t h e m p e r s u a d e the reluctant H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t , S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , to meet the A r a b d e m a n d s . T h a t they did so is s u g g e s t e d by a statement m a d e by M c M a h o n a year later, d i s a v o w i n g responsibility for the (by then u n s u c c e s s f u l ) A r a b Revolt. A c c o r d i n g t o M c M a h o n , It was the m o s t unfortunate date in my life when I was left in charge of the A r a b m o v e m e n t a n d I think a few words are necessary to explain that it is nothing to do with m e : it is purely military b u s i n e s s . It b e g a n at the urgent request of S i r I a n H a m i l t o n at Gallipoli. I was b e g g e d by the F o r e i g n Office to take i m m e d i a t e action and draw the A r a b s out of the war. At that m o m e n t a large portion of the forces at Gallipoli a n d nearly the whole o f the force i n M e s o p o t a m i a were A r a b s . . . 8

While urgently pleading with L o n d o n for authorization to meet alF a r u q i ' s d e m a n d s , the R e s i d e n c y r e p o r t e d that those d e m a n d s were o p e n to negotiation: the y o u n g A r a b would make concessions where necessary. In the weeks a n d m o n t h s that followed, a l - F a r u q i s u c ceeded in r e m a i n i n g at the center of the dialogue. In what was b e c o m i n g a great hoax, the y o u n g m a n drew a n d redrew the frontiers of countries a n d e m p i r e s , in the c o u r s e of exchanges a m o n g the British R e s i d e n c y , the E m i r of M e c c a , a n d A r a b nationalist leaders, each of w h o m took a l - F a r u q i to be the emissary of one of the other parties. A l - F a r u q i introduced himself in a letter to H u s s e i n as an al'Ahd m e m b e r who h a d the ear of the British, while in C a i r o he p u r p o r t e d to negotiate for H u s s e i n . Feisal tried to discover the identity of the m y s t e r i o u s A r a b w h o h a d b e c o m e so important in C a i r o , b u t learned only his n a m e , which told him nothing: "I did not know h i m , " Feisal wrote in a report to H u s s e i n . 9

IV Clayton, who was strongly d i s p o s e d to o p p o s e F r e n c h claims to the interior of S y r i a (on a line that r u n s from A l e p p o to D a m a s c u s through H o r n s and H a m a ) , reported that a l - F a r u q i said H u s s e i n would never allow F r a n c e to have A l e p p o , Horns, H a m a , and D a m a s c u s . Whether C l a y t o n was q u o t i n g , m i s q u o t i n g , o r p a r a p h r a s i n g what a l - F a r u q i actually told him m a y never be known. Clayton recognized that F r a n c e could not be excluded from the coast

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of S y r i a - L e b a n o n , where C h r i s t i a n s u n d e r F r e n c h p a t r o n a g e res i d e d ; a n d again he reported that a l - F a r u q i fell in with his views, a n d s e e m e d willing, in H u s s e i n ' s n a m e , to s u r r e n d e r A r a b claims in that area. A l - F a r u q i informed H u s s e i n that he had been asked to m a k e s u c h a c o n c e s s i o n — a n d h a d refused. B a s e d o n Clayton's r e p o r t s , the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , in a cable to the F o r e i g n Office quoted a l - F a r u q i as saying that the E m i r of M e c c a w o u l d not insist on maintaining his original d e m a n d that his western frontier should extend to the sea, b u t that he would o p p o s e "by force of a r m s " any F r e n c h attempt to occupy the districts o f A l e p p o , Horns, H a m a , a n d D a m a s c u s . M c M a h o n a n d Clayton wanted authorization to accept these t e r m s . B u t the geographical references m a d e by M c M a h o n were hazy. Was reference m a d e , for e x a m p l e , to the city of D a m a s c u s , the environs of D a m a s c u s , or the province of D a m a s c u s ? D i d "districts" mean wilayahs (environs) or vilayets (provinces)? Was it a l - F a r u q i who s p o k e of districts, or was it M c M a h o n or Clayton? By districts, did the British m e a n towns? T h e significance o f the A l e p p o - H o m s - H a m a - D a m a s c u s d e m a n d has been bitterly d e b a t e d ever since. F o r d e c a d e s afterward p a r t i s a n s of an A r a b Palestine a r g u e d that if these four geographical t e r m s were properly u n d e r s t o o d , British C a i r o had p r o m i s e d that Palestine would be A r a b ; while partisans of a J e w i s h Palestine a r g u e d the reverse. In a sense the debate was pointless; as will be seen, when the time c a m e to m a k e pledges, M c M a h o n deliberately u s e d p h r a s e s so devious as to c o m m i t himself to nothing at all. If Clayton was the author of the A l e p p o - H o m s - H a m a - D a m a s c u s geographical definition, he was p r o b a b l y thinking of S y r i a and L e b a n o n a n d of how to split off the interior of the country from the French-influenced coast. T h e seacoast represented one of the two north-south lines of civilization in S y r i a ; the four towns represented the other. S i t u a t e d between m o u n t a i n a n d unrelieved desert, they defined the long narrow corridor which w a s the agriculturally cultivated region of inland S y r i a . On the m a p of S y r i a in the then-current (1910) edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , Horns, a n d H a m a are shown as the only towns of inland S y r i a ; so they were the towns an E n g l i s h m a n might specify if he sought to define the territory of inland S y r i a . G r a n t e d , the towns are dissimilar, so that leading historians* have thought it illogical to g r o u p them together; b u t to a reader of the Encyclopaedia the logic of g r o u p i n g them together would be evident. 1 0

T h e towns had another important feature in c o m m o n : they constituted the railroad line. T h e F r e n c h - b u i l t line of the Societe O t t o m a n e * Professor Elie Kedourie among them.

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du C h e m i n de F e r D a m a s - H a m a et P r o l o n g e m e n t s , which was opened in 1895, connected A l e p p o in the north of Syria to D a m a s c u s in the s o u t h . D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , H o r n s , and H a m a were its four s t o p s . At D a m a s c u s one m a d e the connection with the H e j a z railroad, which ran south to M e d i n a , connecting S y r i a with H u s s e i n ' s d o m a i n . S u r e l y this would have a p p e a r e d to be of i m m e n s e significance at the t i m e ; a n d if a l - F a r u q i , not C l a y t o n , was the one who first mentioned the four towns by n a m e , surely it was this that he h a d in m i n d . 1 1

In an era in which railroads were considered to be of p r i m e military and political i m p o r t a n c e , any soldier or politician representing H u s s e i n in a territorial negotiation would p r e s u m a b l y have insisted on gaining control of the railroad stations: not merely of D a m a s c u s , as the metropolis of the south, a n d of A l e p p o , as the metropolis of the north, but also of the two railroad towns that connected t h e m : H o m s a n d H a m a . Recent experience dictated the d e m a n d . T h e Y o u n g T u r k s (before the war intervened) had planned to d o m i n a t e the H e j a z by control of the railroad line r u n n i n g from D a m a s c u s down to the main cities of the H e j a z . It was only to be expected that if H u s s e i n were on the winning side of the war he would p u r s u e the mirror o p p o s i t e of their strategy: he would d o m i n a t e inland S y r i a by control of its railroad line. Whether or not they formulated a l - F a r u q i ' s A l e p p o - t o - D a m a s c u s d e m a n d s , C l a y t o n a n d his friends were afraid that other British officials might not u n d e r s t a n d the i m p o r t a n c e of meeting t h e m . Referring to S i r Milne C h e e t h a m , his superior at the R e s i d e n c y who had been acting head until M c M a h o n arrived, R o n a l d S t o r r s wrote to F i t z G e r a l d / K i t c h e n e r at C h r i s t m a s i m p l o r i n g t h e m to give priority to the A r a b negotiation a n d a d d i n g " E x c u s e my worrying you with these difficulties, b u t if you knew the difficulty Clayton a n d I had all last a u t u m n in getting S i r Milne to m a k e any proposal a b o u t , or take any interest in, the A r a b q u e s t i o n , vou would u n d e r s t a n d our •

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anxiety. Clayton's luck was that S i r M a r k S y k e s — a s mentioned e a r l i e r — h a d s t o p p e d in C a i r o again on his way back from India to L o n d o n in N o v e m b e r 1915. H a v i n g told S y k e s the a l - F a r u q i story, Clayton a n d his colleagues infected S y k e s with their belief in the electrifying possibility that the A r a b half of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m i g h t c o m e over to the Allied side of the war. T h i s was the a m a z i n g news that greeted S y k e s on his arrival, a n d that necessarily altered all calculations. T h a t the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world could be a major factor in the war c a m e as especial news to S y k e s . His view of politics in the area had been that a r r a n g e m e n t s were m a d e between the rival foreign G r e a t P o w e r s ; the interests and aspirations of native populations had not

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entered in any significant way into his calculations. He h a d always a d m i r e d the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g ruling class but had not thought m u c h of the subject populations of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in Asia. H i s u n d e r g r a d u a t e d e s c r i p t i o n s of t h e m had been an exercise in pejorative vocabulary. Of town A r a b s , he h a d written that they were "cowardly," "insolent yet d i s p i c a b l e [ s i c ] , " "vicious as far as their feeble bodies will a d m i t . " B e d o u i n A r a b s were "rapacious, greedy . . . a n i m a l s . " Y e t these were to be Britain's key allies in the M i d d l e Eastern fighting, according to the new information s u p p l i e d by C l a y t o n . S y k e s , who had a reputation for picking up opinions a n d a r g u m e n t s without taking the time to think them t h r o u g h , now showed that he could discard them with equal e a s e . He b e c a m e a s u d d e n convert to the c a u s e of the native peoples of the M i d d l e E a s t . l j

F r o m school days o n w a r d , S y k e s had harbored a n a b i d i n g and almost obsessive fear of J e w s , whose web of d a n g e r o u s international intrigue he discerned in m a n y an o b s c u r e corner. Y e t there was another g r o u p a b o u t which his feelings had been even m o r e violent. "Even J e w s have their g o o d points," he had written, "but A r m e n i a n s have n o n e . " N o w S y k e s met with A r m e n i a n leaders in C a i r o , a n d enthusiastically p r o p o s e d the creation of an A r m e n i a n a r m y , to be recruited from prisoners-of-war a n d A r m e n i a n s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , to invade T u r k e y . He g a v e it as his opinion that he could have the a r m y in b e i n g in a b o u t eight w e e k s . 14

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Newly enthusiastic about M i d d l e E a s t e r n e r s , S y k e s was entirely won over to Clayton's view that A r a b a r m i e s could s u p p l y the key to victory. Clayton p r i m e d him to return to L o n d o n p r e p a r e d to a r g u e Cairo's new thesis that H u s s e i n could be m o r e i m p o r t a n t than the F r e n c h in b r i n g i n g the war in the E a s t to a swift conclusion. Clayton also coached A u b r e y H e r b e r t , an M . P . serving in C a i r o Intelligence, who was returning to L o n d o n , and who undertook to see L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , Sir E d w a r d G r e y , t o explain m a t t e r s to t h e m . H e r b e r t , with Clayton's help, drafted a s t r o n g m e m o r a n d u m u r g i n g the F r e n c h to give up their claim to D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , H o m s , and H a m a , s o that the towns could b e ceded to H u s s e i n .

V With m u c h that was new to report and to advocate, S y k e s returned to a w a r m w e l c o m e in L o n d o n in D e c e m b e r 1915. It was then that he p r o p o s e d creating an A r a b B u r e a u a n d took the first s t e p s leading to its establishment (see C h a p t e r 2 2 ) . No other man had m e t with every important British officer from

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the B a l k a n s a n d E g y p t to I n d i a . M a u r i c e H a n k e y a r r a n g e d an audience for h i m with K i n g G e o r g e . H a n k e y also a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to go before the inner War C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t , of which he was Secretary. T h e principal m e s s a g e that S y k e s b r o u g h t back to the C a b i n e t was that the A r a b s — w h o m he h a d previously d i s r e g a r d e d as a factor in the w a r — w e r e now of p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e to the Allies; and that it was vitally and urgently important to reach agreement with H u s s e i n . Although C a i r o a n d S y k e s s e e m e d unaware of the fact, in L o n d o n it was recognized that Britain w o u l d have to pay a p r i c e — a n d a high one-—to obtain F r a n c e ' s consent to the m a k i n g of p r o m i s e s to H u s s e i n ; she would have to m a k e major concessions to the F r e n c h in return for the privilege of b e i n g allowed to m a k e concessions to the A r a b s . K i t c h e n e r and G r e y were willing to p a y the price. O t h e r s were not. It was the view of L o r d C u r z o n , former Viceroy of I n d i a , that no p r o m i s e s should be m a d e to the A r a b s b e c a u s e they were "a p e o p l e who are at this m o m e n t fighting against us as h a r d as they c a n . " T h e new Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n , was also o p p o s e d t o d o i n g s o ; but K i t c h e n e r , b a c k i n g S y k e s , C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s , vehemently insisted on authorizing C a i r o to r e s p o n d immediately a n d to reach agreement with H u s s e i n ; a n d K i t c h e n e r ' s views carried the day. A u t h o r i z e d a n d directed to do so by L o n d o n , Sir H e n r y M c M a h o n then r e s u m e d the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with M e c c a — t h e f a m o u s M c M a h o n letters, the m e a n i n g of which has been d e b a t e d so m u c h a n d so long by partisans of A r a b and J e w i s h c a u s e s in Palestine. 1 6

In the interim, H u s s e i n h a d written M c M a h o n a second letter. In it he accused M c M a h o n of "lukewarmth a n d hesitancy" b e c a u s e of his reluctance to d i s c u s s frontiers and b o u n d a r i e s . H a d they been merely his own claims (the E m i r continued) s u c h a discussion indeed could have been p o s t p o n e d until the end of the war. B u t they were not his own claims. T h e y did not even represent his own s u g g e s t i o n s . T h e y were d e m a n d s that h a d been formulated by o t h e r s : by "our p e o p l e . " C a i r o R e s i d e n c y officials now knew that this m e a n t the mysterious secret society conspirators whom they imagined had a m a s s following in the A r a b world. 17

On 24 October 1915 M c M a h o n replied in a quite different spirit to H u s s e i n . Instructed b y L o r d K i t c h e n e r t o m a k e the necessary p l e d g e s , he reluctantly a g r e e d to enter into a discussion of specific territories a n d frontiers; b u t as he evidently was unwilling to a s s u m e

* As noted earlier, advocates of an Arab Palestine have argued for decades that the geographical terms employed by McMahon, if properly interpreted, indicate that McMahon was pledging that Palestine would be Arab; and advocates of a Jewish Palestine have argued the reverse.

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personal responsibility for m a k i n g definite c o m m i t m e n t s , he u s e d l a n g u a g e evasively. On the one h a n d , he a g r e e d that after the war the A r a b s s h o u l d have their i n d e p e n d e n c e ; b u t , on the other, he indicated that E u r o p e a n advisers and officials would be needed to establish the administration of A r a b countries, a n d insisted that these advisers and officials s h o u l d be exclusively British. In other w o r d s , any "independent" A r a b k i n g d o m in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t would have to be a British protectorate. What territories should be included in the British-protected independent A r a b k i n g d o m ? M c M a h o n replied b y dividing the lands claimed by H u s s e i n into four areas a n d explaining that Britain could not bind herself to s u p p o r t H u s s e i n ' s claims in any one of t h e m . M c M a h o n b e g a n b y r e m a r k i n g that H u s s e i n m u s t give u p claim t o territory west of the districts of D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , Horns, a n d H a m a . A l - F a r u q i already had a g r e e d (or at least M c M a h o n thought he h a d ) that H u s s e i n would concede this point. M c M a h o n later wrote that he intended to say that the territories H u s s e i n a n d the A r a b s were not to have were coastal S y r i a , L e b a n o n , a n d Palestine, with an eastern frontier that might be d r a w n s o m e w h e r e in what is now J o r d a n . H i s l a n g u a g e can be read that way, but on a m o r e natural reading he was referring only to S y r i a - L e b a n o n here, not Palestine. In the eastern portion of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t , the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces o f B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d , M c M a h o n o b s e r v e d that the established position a n d interests of Britain were s u c h that she would have to establish "special administrative a r r a n g e m e n t s " with respect to t h e m ; whether s u c h a r r a n g e m e n t s would leave any r o o m for an assertion of A r a b s o v e r e i g n t y — a n d if so when a n d to what e x t e n t — w a s left u n s a i d . In the western p o r t i o n — S y r i a and P a l e s t i n e — B r i t a i n could extend a s s u r a n c e s to H u s s e i n only in those territories "in which she can act without detriment to the interests of her ally F r a n c e . " S i n c e F r a n c e at the time claimed those territories in their entirety (indeed S y k e s discussed F r a n c e ' s claim to Palestine with a l - F a r u q i in N o v e m b e r 1915) it followed that Britain could not p l e d g e s u p p o r t for A r a b claims with respect to them either—not even to D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , Horns, and H a m a . T h a t left only A r a b i a , which at the time was divided a m o n g a n u m b e r of leaders, of w h o m H u s s e i n was one. Britain at the time enjoyed treaty relationships with other A r a b i a n chiefs, including H u s s e i n ' s rival, I b n S a u d . In his letter, M c M a h o n pointed out that he could not p r o m i s e anything to H u s s e i n that w o u l d p r e j u d i c e Britain's relationships with other A r a b chiefs. By p r o c e s s of elimination, therefore, Britain did not bind herself to s u p p o r t H u s s e i n ' s claims anywhere at all.

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A c c o r d i n g to a s u m m a r y later p u b l i s h e d in the secret Arab Bulletin (no. 5, 18 J u n e 1916), for Britain's military, political, a n d intelligence leaders, the u p s h o t of the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e was that H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t had indicated a willingness to p r o m o t e indep e n d e n c e in A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a b u t had refused to c o m m i t itself with respect to the f o r m s of g o v e r n m e n t that would be installed in the area or with respect to precise b o u n d a r i e s . M c M a h o n , an experienced b u r e a u c r a t , had seen the need to be completely noncommittal. T h e negotiations between S y k e s a n d the F r e n c h a b o u t the future of the M i d d l e E a s t — t o be d e s c r i b e d p r e s e n t l y — h a d not yet taken place, a n d n o b o d y in the British government knew with any certainty what would have to be conceded to F r a n c e or, afterwards, t o R u s s i a . M c M a h o n was u n d e r o r d e r s from K i t c h e n e r not to lose the alliance with H u s s e i n ; b u t the H i g h C o m missioner m u s t have feared that he w o u l d be m a d e the s c a p e g o a t if he did go ahead to meet H u s s e i n ' s d e m a n d s , and later it was discovered that those d e m a n d s clashed with other conflicting c o m m i t m e n t s Britain might be called u p o n to m a k e . S u c h fears were b y n o m e a n s u n r e a s o n a b l e . A s W y n d h a m D e e d e s — t h e C a i r o Intelligence expert o n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — analyzed the situation early in 1916, there were three g r o u p s of A r a b s ; a n d in all honesty Britain could not agree to satisfy the d e m a n d s of any one of the three. T h e r e were the S y r i a n s , whose m a i n aim w a s that the hated F r e n c h s h o u l d not be allowed in ("It is difficult rather to account for this extraordinary dislike he wrote, b u t nonetheless it was t h e r e ) ; a n d of course that ran counter to the d e m a n d s of F r a n c e . T h e r e was H u s s e i n , whose aim w a s to head an A r a b k i n g d o m ; b u t D e e d e s said that m o s t A r a b s a n d all T u r k s would be o p p o s e d to this. He wrote that "I think it is the view of m o s t of u s , a n d is the view of m a n y of the A r a b s a n d all of the T u r k s themselves" that "this idea is not a practical one." Other A r a b s , wrote D e e d e s , were unwilling to accept H u s s e i n as their leader. Finally, there were the A r a b s of I r a q , who (he believed) wanted i n d e p e n d e n c e for themselves, b u t were up against the intention of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a to annex and rule t h e m . D e e d e s feared that the difficulties in the way of arriving at an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with the A r a b s accordingly might p r o v e " i n s u p e r a b l e . " 18

It therefore w o u l d have been d a n g e r o u s for M c M a h o n as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r to have m a d e any firm c o m m i t m e n t s to H u s s e i n . He believed that the impatient Wingate had tried to p u s h h i m into doing so. B u t R e g i n a l d Wingate wrote to Clayton that M c M a h o n had misinterpreted his views, as had L o r d H a r d i n g e , the Viceroy of India: I am afraid b o t h the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a n d L o r d H a r d i n g e are u n d e r the i m p r e s s i o n that I am a believer in the creation of

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a consolidated A r a b K i n g d o m u n d e r the S h e r i f — O f course any such notion is altogether remote f r o m my real views, b u t it has suited m e , as I believe it has suited all of u s , to give the leaders of the A r a b m o v e m e n t this i m p r e s s i o n a n d we are quite sufficiently covered by the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e which has taken place to show that we are acting in g o o d faith with the A r a b s as far as w e have g o n e . 1 9

G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , who strongly o p p o s e d defining Britain's relations with the A r a b s until the war w a s over, believed that the M c M a h o n letters had s u c c e e d e d in p u t t i n g the matter off a n d in a v o i d i n g the giving of any meaningful c o m m i t m e n t . M o n t h s later C l a y t o n s u m m a r i z e d what M c M a h o n h a d d o n e by writing that " L u c k i l y we have been very careful indeed to c o m m i t ourselves to nothing whatsoever." 20

H u s s e i n replied to M c M a h o n that he could not accept the A l e p p o - H o m s - H a m a - D a m a s c u s f o r m u l a . H e insisted o n having the provinces of A l e p p o a n d B e i r u t . N o t i n g F r a n c e ' s c l a i m to L e b a n o n , he wrote that "any concession d e s i g n e d to give F r a n c e or any other P o w e r p o s s e s s i o n of a single s q u a r e foot of territory in those p a r t s is quite out of the q u e s t i o n . " So he failed to reach agreement with M c M a h o n , b u t felt compelled to s u p p o r t the Allies nonetheless: the Y o u n g T u r k s were g o i n g t o d e p o s e h i m , s o h e had to rebel against t h e m whether Britain met his t e r m s or not. In a conversation s o m e years later with D a v i d H o g a r t h , of the A r a b B u r e a u of British Intelligence in C a i r o , H u s s e i n indicated that with r e g a r d to Palestine a n d also with r e g a r d to L e b a n o n a n d the other lands in the M i d d l e E a s t , he did not r e g a r d matters as h a v i n g been settled. He indicated that he r e g a r d e d all m a t t e r s as b e i n g s u b j e c t to negotiation at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . A c c o r d i n g to H o g a r t h , "He c o m p a r e d o u r s e l v e s a n d himself . . . t o two p e r s o n s a b o u t t o inhabit one house, b u t not a g r e e d which s h o u l d take which floors or r o o m s . " 2 1

In L o n d o n the F o r e i g n Office took the view that the p r o m i s e s would never b e c o m e d u e for p a y m e n t : that Britain had p l e d g e d herself to s u p p o r t A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e only if the A r a b half of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e rose against the S u l t a n — w h i c h (the F o r e i g n Office believed) it would never d o . S i n c e the A r a b s would not keep their side of the b a r g a i n (so ran the a r g u m e n t ) , the British w o u l d be u n d e r no obligation to keep theirs. T h e F o r e i g n Office, which did not rely on Clayton, b u t h a d its own sources of information, did not believe that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world w a s a b o u t to change sides in the war, b u t the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , saw no h a r m in letting K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants p r o m i s e anything they wanted as an inducement to the A r a b s to defect. G r e y told A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n not to worry a b o u t the offers b e i n g m a d e by Cairo as "the whole thing was a castle in the air which w o u l d never m a t e r i a l i z e . " 22

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M c M a h o n , on the other h a n d , worried that the whole thing might not be a castle in the air. He c a m e , after all, from the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , whose constant anxiety was the prospect of nationalist agitation. M c M a h o n confided to W y n d h a m D e e d e s that his fear was not that the plan for an A r a b revolt would break down, but rather that it w o u l d s u c c e e d — a n d then w o u l d p o s e a danger to B r i t a i n . To the Viceroy of I n d i a , who claimed that India's interests were neglected in the c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with H u s s e i n , M c M a h o n explained that "I had necessarily to be v a g u e as on the one hand H M G disliked being c o m m i t t e d to definite future action, and on the other h a n d any detailed definition of our d e m a n d s would have frightened off the A r a b . " He claimed that the negotiations with H u s s e i n w o u l d neither "establish our rights . . . o r b i n d our h a n d s . " 23

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T h i s explanation d i s t u r b e d the Viceroy, who wrote to the Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a a b o u t M c M a h o n ' s claim "that the negotiations are merely a matter of w o r d s a n d will neither establish our rights, nor bind our h a n d s in that country. T h a t m a y prove eventually to be the case, especially if the A r a b s continue to help the enemy, b u t I did not like p l e d g e s given when there is no intention of keeping t h e m . " In early 1916 A z i z a l - M a s r i , the A r a b secret society leader, wrote t o L o r d K i t c h e n e r a p p r o a c h i n g the a r g u m e n t from the other side. He wrote (in F r e n c h , the l a n g u a g e of d i p l o m a c y ) that Britain could not achieve her objectives in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t unless she were willing to leave its peoples free to exercise full a n d genuine i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h o s e for w h o m he s p o k e wanted from Britain "non pas une domination ou un protectorat," that is, they d i d not want British d o m i n a t i o n or a British p r o t e c t o r a t e . T h e y w o u l d not accept what M c M a h o n a n d C l a y t o n called A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e : they dem a n d e d the real thing. T h e y w o u l d not s u p p o r t Britain, he wrote, if she intended to g o v e r n t h e m — w h i c h of course was exactly what M c M a h o n a n d C l a y t o n intended Britain t o d o . 25

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A l - M a s r i had spotted the falseness in the British position. K i t c h e n e r and his followers badly wanted to win A r a b s u p p o r t b u t were unwilling to pay the price the E m i r H u s s e i n d e m a n d e d for it; so instead they were a t t e m p t i n g to cheat, by p r e t e n d i n g to meet H u s s e i n ' s d e m a n d s when in fact they were giving him the counterfeit coin of m e a n i n g l e s s language. T h o u g h C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues did not know it, a l - M a s r i , alF a r u q i , and the E m i r H u s s e i n were offering Britain coin that was equally counterfeit. H u s s e i n had no a r m y , a n d the secret societies had no visible following. T h e i r talk of rallying tens or h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of A r a b t r o o p s to their c a u s e , whether or not they believed it themselves, was sheer fantasy. A l - F a r u q i , who had p r o m i s e d an A r a b revolt when he first arrived, c h a n g e d his story by 15 N o v e m b e r , when he met S i r M a r k S y k e s : he

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now said that there c o u l d be no A r a b u p r i s i n g until a n d unless Allied a r m i e s first landed in force on the S y r i a n coast. H u s s e i n , too, h o p i n g Britain would take the military lead, refused to go into action by claiming it would be p r e m a t u r e to launch an u p r i s i n g . T h e A r a b s , in other w o r d s , w o u l d do nothing until British armies arrived on the scene. S y k e s , a c c e p t i n g these s t a t e m e n t s at face value, c o n c l u d e d that it was u r g e n t for Britain to invade S y r i a and Palestine.

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MAKING PROMISES TO T H E EUROPEAN A L L I E S i In D e c e m b e r 1915 S y k e s reported to his g o v e r n m e n t that in C a i r o he had been told by a l - F a r u q i that if British E g y p t were to launch an invasion of Palestine a n d S y r i a , it w o u l d trigger a revolt in which the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g t r o o p s a n d p r o v i n c e s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d c o m e over to the Allied s i d e . T h e p r o b l e m was that Britain needed F r a n c e ' s p e r m i s s i o n to divert the resources from the western front to launch s u c h an offensive; a n d what S y k e s told the C a b i n e t ministers was that they o u g h t to seek s u c h p e r m i s s i o n from the F r e n c h immediately. ( F r a n c e was reluctant to allow any diversion of resources from E u r o p e , a n d not without r e a s o n ; early in 1916 G e r m a n y attacked V e r d u n in what by 1918 was to b e c o m e the biggest battle in world history. S e v e n h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d m e n on both sides were to be killed, w o u n d e d , g a s s e d , or c a p t u r e d at V e r d u n in 1916, a n d 1,200,000 at the S o m m e ; it was not a year in which the Allies could easily afford to send m a n p o w e r elsewhere.) At the s a m e time, S y k e s raised a related matter: the Sherif H u s s e i n hesitated to c o m e over to the Allied side ( S y k e s r e p o r t e d ) for fear of F r e n c h a m b i t i o n s in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. N e g o t i a t i o n s with F r a n c e a i m e d at allaying s u c h fears were the answer, he s a i d . If these p r o b l e m s with F r a n c e were not resolved soon, S y k e s w a r n e d , the Sherif m i g h t be d e p o s e d a n d killed by the T u r k s , a n d events in the Holy Places m i g h t ignite a real H o l y W a r . 1

T h e radical new view that S y k e s had b r o u g h t back with h i m f r o m the M i d d l e E a s t was that in t e r m s of winning the war, the A r a b s were m o r e important than the F r e n c h . F r a n c e was a m o d e r n industrial power that had mobilized eight million m e n to fight the war, while H u s s e i n , without industrial, financial, military, or m a n p o w e r resources, b r o u g h t with him only an uncertain prospect of s u b v e r t i n g loyalty in the O t t o m a n c a m p ; in retrospect, Sykes's new view was u n b a l a n c e d , b u t his g o v e r n m e n t nonetheless a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e F r a n c e to m a k e the concessions S y k e s believed to be necessary. 2

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In fact, the British g o v e r n m e n t already h a d initiated talks with F r a n c e . Britain could not m a k e p r o m i s e s a b o u t S y r i a to the E m i r H u s s e i n without F r a n c e ' s p e r m i s s i o n , for the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , S i r E d w a r d G r e y , h a d recognized F r a n c e ' s special interest in that area. Moreover, a l - F a r u q i had p e r s u a d e d L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers that H u s s e i n ' s claims to S y r i a also h a d to be a c c o m m o d a t e d , at least to s o m e extent. T h e F o r e i g n Office, having authorized M c M a h o n to m a k e p l e d g e s to H u s s e i n on 20 O c t o b e r 1915, therefore immediately r e q u e s t e d the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t to send a delegate over to L o n d o n to negotiate the future frontiers of S y r i a so as to define the extent to which Britain was free to deal with H u s s e i n . T h u s not only the M c M a h o n letters, but a l s o — a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y — the negotiations with F r a n c e , R u s s i a , a n d later Italy that ultimately resulted in the S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e m e n t and s u b s e q u e n t Allied secret treaty u n d e r s t a n d i n g s were a m o n g the results of L i e u t e n a n t a l - F a r u q i ' s hoax.

II T h e F r e n c h representative, F r a n c o i s G e o r g e s Picot, c a m e over t o L o n d o n a n d c o m m e n c e d negotiations o n 2 3 N o v e m b e r 1915. T h e British negotiating team was at first h e a d e d by S i r A r t h u r N i c o l s o n , Permanent U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y at the F o r e i g n Office, a n d included senior representatives from the F o r e i g n , I n d i a , a n d War Offices. T h e talks h a d d e a d l o c k e d by the time S y k e s returned to L o n d o n in D e c e m b e r ; late that m o n t h the British g o v e r n m e n t delegated S y k e s — K i t c h e n e r ' s m a n — t o take the place of the N i c o l s o n t e a m in order to break the deadlock. In effect the F o r e i g n Office t u r n e d the responsibility over t o L o r d K i t c h e n e r . S y k e s p o s s e s s e d s o m e of the qualifications necessary to carry out his a s s i g n m e n t . He passionately wanted to succeed in reaching an a g r e e m e n t with the other side. He was p r o - F r e n c h . As a result of early schooling a b r o a d , he s p o k e F r e n c h — t h o u g h it is not clear how well. As a R o m a n Catholic himself, he was not p r e j u d i c e d against F r a n c e ' s goal of p r o m o t i n g Catholic interests in L e b a n o n . He h a d lived and traveled in the E a s t , a n d h a d m e t with and knew the views of Britain's soldiers a n d civil s e r v a n t s there. On the other h a n d , he h a d held g o v e r n m e n t office for less than a year, a n d it was his first d i p l o m a t i c a s s i g n m e n t . He had no experience in negotiating with a foreign g o v e r n m e n t , a n d was in a weak b a r g a i n ing position b e c a u s e he wanted too m u c h from the other side, too obviously. Until 3 J a n u a r y 1916 S y k e s went to the F r e n c h e m b a s s y on a daily basis to negotiate. He reported in detail at night to F i t z G e r a l d a n d

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through him continued to receive the ghostly g u i d a n c e of K i t c h e n e r . It is i m p o s s i b l e to know what S y k e s s a i d or was told: K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d kept no p r o p e r files, a n d n o n e of the three m e n left a record of what occurred. T h e r e m a y have been a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g between them as to what S y k e s w a s instructed to d e m a n d a n d what he was told to c o n c e d e . L a t e r , in d e s c r i b i n g his dealings with L o r d K i t c h e n e r , M a r k S y k e s r e m a r k e d that "I could never m a k e myself u n d e r s t o o d ; I could never u n d e r s t a n d what he thought, and he could never u n d e r s t a n d what I t h o u g h t . " 4

T h e r e is m o r e evidence from the F r e n c h side of the negotiations than f r o m the British s i d e as to the secret hopes a n d p l a n s that were involved. D o c u m e n t s exist that establish what Picot a n d his political associates h o p e d to gain f r o m the negotiations and how they h o p e d to achieve their g o a l s . Picot, the scion of a colonialist dynasty in F r a n c e — h i s father w a s a founder of the C o m i t e de l'Afrique F r a n c a i s e , a n d his brother was treasurer of the C o m i t e de l'Asie F r a n c a i s e , of which his father was also a m e m b e r — a c t e d effectively as the advocate of the colonialist party within the Q u a i d'Orsay a n d was as dedicated a p r o p o n e n t of a F r e n c h S y r i a as his g o v e r n m e n t could have chosen to represent i t . Earlier in 1915 Picot had inspired a parliamentary c a m p a i g n in Paris against the ministers who were p r e p a r e d to give way to Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t . T h e m i x t u r e o f d o m e s t i c F r e n c h commercial, clerical, a n d political interests in s u p p o r t of Picot's position p r o v e d potent. T h e L y o n s a n d Marseilles C h a m b e r s o f C o m m e r c e sent resolutions to the Quai d'Orsay in s u p p o r t of a F r e n c h S y r i a . P r o p o n e n t s of a F r e n c h S y r i a took control of the C o m m i t t e e on F o r e i g n Affairs of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s . 5

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Pierre-Etienne F l a n d i n , leader of the F r e n c h S y r i a m o v e m e n t in the S e n a t e , issued a report on S y r i a and Palestine in 1915 that b e c a m e the manifesto of the " S y r i a n P a r t y " in F r e n c h politics—the party that Picot c h a m p i o n e d . S y r i a a n d Palestine form one country, he a r g u e d , that for centuries had been s h a p e d by F r a n c e , to s u c h an extent that it f o r m e d the F r a n c e of the N e a r E a s t . ( H i s a r g u m e n t harked back nearly a t h o u s a n d years, to the C r u s a d e s a n d the e s t a b lishment of L a t i n C r u s a d e r k i n g d o m s in S y r i a and Palestine.) It was i n c u m b e n t u p o n F r a n c e to continue its "mission historique" there, he wrote. T h e potential wealth of the country was i m m e n s e , he c l a i m e d , so that for c o m m e r c i a l r e a s o n s , as well as historic a n d g e o g r a p h i c ones, it was vital for the F r e n c h E m p i r e to p o s s e s s it. T h e n , too, a c c o r d i n g to F l a n d i n , it was vital for strategic r e a s o n s . Paralleling K i t c h e n e r ' s views a b o u t M e c c a and the caliphate, F l a n d i n claimed that D a m a s c u s was the third holiest city in I s l a m a n d was the potential center of an A r a b i c I s l a m ; F r a n c e d a r e d not let another

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power direct it a n d p e r h a p s u s e it a g a i n s t F r a n c e . F l a n d i n claimed that at heart Syria-Palestine was F r e n c h already. I t s inhabitants, according to him a n d his colleagues, were u n a n i m o u s in desiring to b e ruled b y F r a n c e . T h e F r e n c h d e l u d e d themselves. O p p o s i t i o n t o F r e n c h rule was intense a m o n g the e d u c a t e d classes in S y r i a (other than the M a r o n i t e s , the E a s t e r n - r i t e R o m a n Catholic c o m m u n i t y s p o n s o r e d by F r a n c e ) . S y k e s a n d his friends in C a i r o believed that the F r e n c h were blinding themselves when they ignored this o p p o s i t i o n . ( C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues did not see, however, that they were d e l u d i n g themselves in the s a m e way by thinking that the p e o p l e s of those areas ardently desired to be g o v e r n e d by B r i t a i n . ) Picot drafted his own negotiating instructions outlining a strategy to win the concessions that he w a n t e d from the British. T h e y show that he w o u l d have preferred to p r e s e r v e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e intact, for its "feeble condition" offered F r a n c e "limitless s c o p e " to e x p a n d her economic i n f l u e n c e . Partition h a d b e c o m e inevitable, however; it therefore was a d v i s a b l e to take control of S y r i a a n d Palestine, even t h o u g h F r a n c e w o u l d d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e b y d o i n g s o . 8

T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Office recognized that policing inland S y r i a w o u l d strain F r e n c h r e s o u r c e s ; what Picot a n d his g o v e r n m e n t m o s t desired was to assert direct F r e n c h rule only over the M e d i t e r r a n e a n coastline a n d an e n l a r g e d L e b a n o n , a n d to control the rest of S y r i a indirectly t h r o u g h A r a b p u p p e t rulers. Picot's plan was to pretend to S y k e s that F r a n c e insisted on o b t a i n i n g direct rule over all of S y r i a , so that when he m o d e r a t e d the claim he c o u l d obtain s o m e concession in return. What he h o p e d to get was an extension of the F r e n c h sphere of influence e a s t w a r d f r o m S y r i a to M o s u l (in what is now Iraq). In secretly p l a n n i n g to take M o s u l , Picot w a s unaware that K i t c h e n e r a n d S y k e s were secretly p l a n n i n g to give it to h i m . T h e y wanted the F r e n c h s p h e r e of influence to be ex t e n d e d f r o m the M e d i t e r r a n e a n coast on the west all the way to the east so that it paralleled a n d a d j o i n e d R u s s i a n - h e l d z o n e s ; the F r e n c h zone was to p r o v i d e Britain with a shield against R u s s i a . F r a n c e and R u s s i a would be b a l a n c e d one against the other, so that the F r e n c h M i d d l e E a s t , like the G r e a t Wall of C h i n a , would protect the British M i d d l e E a s t f r o m attack by the R u s s i a n b a r b a r i a n s to the north. T h i s concept had a p p e a r e d in the de B u n s e n p r o c e e d i n g s . It h a d been s u g g e s t e d to K i t c h e n e r , p e r h a p s by S t o r r s , a n d it b e c a m e central to his strategic plan for the p o s t w a r E a s t . E v e n Britain's claim to M o s u l , with the oil riches strongly s u s p e c t e d to exist there, was to be sacrificed in order to place the F r e n c h in the front line, at a point where the R u s s i a n s might be e x p e c t e d one day to attack. T h e War Office point of view

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was that " F r o m a military point of view, the principle of inserting a w e d g e of F r e n c h territory between any British zone a n d the R u s s i a n C a u c a s u s would seem in every way d e s i r a b l e . " On the British side of the negotiations S y k e s also wanted F r a n c e ' s agreement to an E g y p t i a n offensive; K i t c h e n e r wanted A l e x a n d r e t t a , and an agreement that Britain could invade the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at A l e x a n d r e t t a ; S y k e s held a brief from C a i r o to reserve the towns in S y r i a that were being p r o m i s e d to the Sherif H u s s e i n ; a n d n o b o d y in the British g o v e r n m e n t wanted to see any other G r e a t Power e s t a b lished in the postwar world astride the road to I n d i a . It was a challenging a g e n d a , especially for S y k e s , a neophyte in d i p l o m a c y . 9

T h e British feared that Picot w o u l d not c o m p r o m i s e on F r a n c e ' s claim to exercise direct rule over all of S y r i a , while the F r e n c h feared that they w o u l d not be allowed to rule any of it, not even coastal L e b a n o n . Picot a r g u e d that C h r i s t i a n L e b a n o n would not tolerate even the nominal rule of the E m i r of M e c c a , while Paul C a m b o n , the F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r in L o n d o n , w a r n e d that F r e n c h rule would be necessary to avert the o u t b r e a k of a religious war: "It is e n o u g h to know the intensity of rivalries between the various rites a n d religions in the Orient to foresee the violence of the internal strife in L e b a n o n as soon as no external authority is there to c u r b i t . " 10

In the end both S y k e s a n d Picot o b t a i n e d what they wanted f r o m one another: F r a n c e was to rule a G r e a t e r L e b a n o n and to exert an exclusive influence over the rest of S y r i a . S y k e s s u c c e e d e d in giving, and Picot s u c c e e d e d in taking, a s p h e r e of F r e n c h influence that extended t o M o s u l . B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d , the two M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces, were to go to Britain. Palestine p r o v e d to be a s t u m b l i n g block. S y k e s wanted it for Britain, even though L o r d K i t c h e n e r did not, while Picot w a s d e termined to get it for F r a n c e . In the end a c o m p r o m i s e w a s r e a c h e d : Britain was to have the p o r t s of A c r e a n d H a i f a (rather than Alexandretta, north of S y r i a , the h a r b o r that K i t c h e n e r preferred) a n d a territorial belt on which to construct a railroad from there to M e s o p o t a m i a , while the rest of the country was to fall u n d e r s o m e sort of international a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . E x c e p t for Palestine a n d for the a r e a s in which F r a n c e or Britain exercised direct rule, the M i d d l e E a s t was to form an A r a b state or confederation of states, nominally i n d e p e n d e n t but in reality divided into F r e n c h and British s p h e r e s of influence. T h e a g r e e m e n t reached by S y k e s a n d Picot was to c o m e into effect only after the A r a b Revolt was p r o c l a i m e d . Picot a n d the F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r , C a m b o n , were not p e r s u a d e d that H u s s e i n w o u l d contribute anything of value to the Allied c a u s e ; they told their F o r e i g n Minister to ratify the preliminary S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t ( c o n c l u d e d on 3 J a n u a r y 1916) as soon as p o s s i b l e , before the British h a d a

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chance to b e c o m e disillusioned a b o u t the A r a b s , a n d therefore to regret the extensive c o n c e s s i o n s they h a d m a d e to F r a n c e in order to be free to deal with H u s s e i n . 1 1

Ill Sir M a r k S y k e s believed that he h a d won for the A r a b s what H u s s e i n and a l - F a r u q i h a d d e m a n d e d . S y k e s characterized A r a b s a s wanting recognition of their essential unity, but only as an ideal; in practice, he s a i d , s u c h unity would not be in h a r m o n y with their national genius, nor would it p r o v e feasible f r o m the point of view of finance a n d administration. He h a d told the War C a b i n e t that A r a b s "have no national spirit in o u r sense of the w o r d , but they have got a sense of racial p r i d e , which is as g o o d . " T h e y s h o u l d be content, he said, with a "confederation of A r a b i c s p e a k i n g states, under the aegis of an A r a b i a n p r i n c e . " S y k e s failed to recognize that H u s s e i n a n d the secret societies were asking for a unified A r a b state, just as they were asking for a state that w a s fully i n d e p e n d e n t rather than a E u r o p e a n protectorate. 1 2

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S y k e s also h a d m i s u n d e r s t o o d his British friends a n d colleagues in C a i r o . U n d e r his veneer of worldliness, S y k e s w a s . a n innocent: he believed that p e o p l e m e a n t what they s a i d . C l a y t o n , directly, and also t h r o u g h A u b r e y H e r b e r t , h a d told h i m that it was i m p o r t a n t to the Allied c a u s e t o p r o m i s e D a m a s c u s , A l e p p o , Horns, a n d H a m a t o H u s s e i n ' s i n d e p e n d e n t A r a b confederation. S y k e s therefore asked Picot to agree to this ( a n d imagined that he h a d won Picot's consent, not knowing that Picot wanted to give i t ) . T h e S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e ment p r o v i d e d that the four towns s h o u l d be excluded from the area of direct F r e n c h rule a n d instead s h o u l d fall within the s c o p e of an independent A r a b state or s t a t e s — t h o u g h subject, of c o u r s e , to exclusive F r e n c h influence. To S y k e s it a p p e a r e d that he had tailored the c o m m i t m e n t s to F r a n c e and to the A r a b s to fit together, a n d also that he h a d s e c u r e d precisely the concession f r o m F r a n c e that his friends in C a i r o h a d asked for. S y k e s h a d concentrated on satisfying what C a i r o h a d told him were H u s s e i n ' s c l a i m s , and did not see that b e h i n d t h e m C a i r o was advancing c l a i m s of its own. What S y k e s did not u n d e r s t a n d was that when Clayton a n d S t o r r s said they wanted inland S y r i a for the A r a b s , they really m e a n t that they wanted it for Britain, a n d for themselves as Britain's representatives in the region, a d v a n c i n g b e hind an A r a b f a c a d e ; a n d when they said they wanted it to be independent, they m e a n t that they wanted it to be a d m i n i s t e r e d by Britain rather than F r a n c e . S y k e s did not see that H u s s e i n ' s S y r i a n d o m a i n s w o u l d be any the

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less independent for b e i n g a d v i s e d by F r e n c h rather than by British officials. In C a i r o , however, a world of difference was seen between British and F r e n c h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . N o t entirely without r e a s o n , Clayton a n d his colleagues believed F r e n c h colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r s to be incapable of allowing a country to retain its own character. What the F r e n c h termed their "civilizing mission" was seen as annexationism by the B r i t i s h ; often it s e e m e d to involve i m p o s i n g the F r e n c h l a n g u a g e a n d culture on a native society. T h e British, on the other h a n d , in E g y p t a n d elsewhere, kept to t h e m s e l v e s , dwelt in their own c l u b s and c o m p o u n d s , a n d , a p a r t from s u p e r v i s i n g the administration of the g o v e r n m e n t , left the country a n d its people alone. In the eyes of C l a y t o n a n d his colleagues, this was the greatest degree of i n d e p e n d e n c e to which A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g peoples could a s pire. As one of Clayton's colleagues told s t u d e n t s at a British Military Staff College a few years later, e d u c a t e d A r a b s regarded British rule as "the only decent alternative" to O t t o m a n r u l e . 1 4

E q u a t i n g , as they d i d , a F r e n c h presence with annexation a n d a British presence with i n d e p e n d e n c e , Clayton a n d his colleagues (though they did not tell S y k e s so) r e g a r d e d the Sykes-Picot A g r e e ment as a betrayal of the p l e d g e to g r a n t independence to the p r o p o s e d A r a b confederation. K i t c h e n e r ' s followers a s p i r e d to rule S y r i a themselves, a n d believed that S y k e s had let them d o w n . B u t that is not the way they p u t it. What they said w a s : S y k e s has let down the Arabs (as t h o u g h it were the A r a b s rather than themselves who desired Britain to rule S y r i a ) . F o r whatever it meant to them politically, and p e r h a p s even personally, Clayton a n d S t o r r s saw that S y k e s had foreclosed the p o s s i bility of their creating a new E g y p t i a n e m p i r e . S i m l a had already staked out a claim to the n e a r b y M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces, so B a g h d a d a n d B a s r a — t h e principal British zone in the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t — w o u l d be ruled by their a d v e r s a r y , the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a ; while S y r i a , which c o u l d have b e e n in Cairo's s p h e r e , was instead s u r r e n d e r e d t o F r a n c e . T h e a g r e e m e n t allowed C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m to e x p a n d their influence only in arid, inhospitable A r a b i a . K i t c h e n e r , after the war, could go out to I n d i a as Viceroy; but Clayton and S t o r r s were A r a b i s t s , tied emotionally a n d professionally to the fortunes of the C a i r o R e s i d e n c y . T h e y could hardly help b u t b e d i s m a y e d b y what S y k e s had d o n e . S y k e s never u n d e r s t o o d that his friends in C a i r o held these views; he thought that he had done what they had a s k e d . He thought he had won inland S y r i a for the A r a b s ; he did not realize that they thought he h a d lost it. He never s u s p e c t e d that C a i r o was g o i n g to try to u n d e r m i n e the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t . He was p r o u d of the agreement, and it was ironic that the A r a b B u r e a u which he had created b e c a m e the center of the plot to destroy it.

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H i s old friend A u b r e y H e r b e r t worked with the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o a n d so H e r b e r t knew (while S y k e s did not) that Clayton bitterly believed that the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t had r e d u c e d Cairo's A r a b policy to tatters. H e r b e r t cast the b l a m e on Picot. He wrote: I am afraid that swine M o n s i e u r Pficot] has let M . S . [ M a r k S y k e s ] b a d l y down. I told h i m I thought it would h a p p e n . It is an awful pity both for the thing itself, a n d for M. a n d also b e c a u s e it is one up to the old early Victorians who are in a position to say "We told you s o . T h i s is what c o m e s of disreg a r d i n g the A B C of D i p l o m a c y , and letting A m a t e u r s have a shy at delicate and important n e g o t i a t i o n s . " 15

IV T h e Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t was a p p r o v e d b y the British a n d F r e n c h C a b i n e t s at the b e g i n n i n g of F e b r u a r y 1916. B u t its t e r m s and even its existence were kept secret; the very fact that the Allies had reached an agreement a b o u t the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t was not revealed until almost two years later. S o m e of the few officials in L o n d o n who knew of the agreement e x p r e s s e d reservations a b o u t it. T h e c o m m o n British c o m p l a i n t was that it g a v e away too m u c h to the F r e n c h . F o r S y k e s , s o m e of the justification for giving way to the F r e n c h was soon d e s t r o y e d . S y k e s had wanted to win France's a p p r o v a l of Cairo's proposal to invade S y r i a a n d thereby s p a r k a l - F a r u q i ' s p r o m ised A r a b Revolt. B u t the P r i m e Minister, deferring to the generals who insisted on concentrating all forces on the western front in E u r o p e , ruled out a new M i d d l e E a s t e r n c a m p a i g n b e c a u s e of the diversion of resources that it would entail. A furious S y k e s delivered a s p e e c h in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s denouncing A s q u i t h ' s leadership as m u d d l e d , and d e m a n d i n g the establishment of a f o u r - m e m b e r C a b i n e t c o m m i t t e e to run the war. Delivered at a time when the P r i m e Minister was faltering as a leader, the speech attracted wide a n d favorable publicity. It also led S y k e s to two meetings that p r o v e d i m p o r t a n t in his c l i m b up the political l a d d e r : one with L l o y d G e o r g e , and one with the former proconsul in S o u t h Africa, L o r d Milner, a n d his influential coterie, including Geoffrey R o b i n s o n , editor of The Times. D e s p i t e his failure to win a p p r o v a l for an invasion of S y r i a , S y k e s believed that it was important to c o n c l u d e the a r r a n g e m e n t s with F r a n c e o n the b a s i s that h a d been a g r e e d . T h e Sykes-Picot A g r e e ment achieved what K i t c h e n e r , at least, wanted to achieve: the containment of R u s s i a in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . M o r e o v e r , S y k e s seemed to believe that for the Allies to resolve their differences a n d

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arrive at a definite a g r e e m e n t was in itself a g o o d thing. R u s s i a n ratification was required, so the i m m e d i a t e assignment for S y k e s was to join Picot—who was already in P e t r o g r a d — t o help secure R u s s i a n approval of their a g r e e m e n t .

V T h e r e was a c u r i o u s o m i s s i o n in the a g r e e m e n t S y k e s a n d Picot were bringing to P e t r o g r a d . As r e g a r d s Palestine, the d o c u m e n t took a c count of the interests of F r a n c e , Britain, the other Allies, a n d the M o s l e m A r a b leader H u s s e i n of M e c c a ; but no reference was m a d e to the interests of the people of the Biblical Holy L a n d — t h e J e w s . Yet political Z i o n i s m — t h e organized J e w i s h m o v e m e n t a i m i n g at a national return of the J e w i s h people to P a l e s t i n e — h a d been an active force in the world for two or three d e c a d e s . J e w i s h resettlement of Palestine had g o n e on in the nineteenth a n d early twentieth centuries, and by 1916 there was a substantial J e w i s h population living and working there. Before S y k e s e m b a r k e d for R u s s i a , his attention w a s c a u g h t by an observation m a d e a b o u t this by C a p t a i n William R e g i n a l d Hall, the head of intelligence at the A d m i r a l t y . Hall objected to the inducements b e i n g offered to H u s s e i n ' s A r a b s , saying that the British should land troops in Palestine, for only then would the A r a b s c o m e over to the Allies. " F o r c e is the best A r a b p r o p a g a n d a , " claimed Hall, and b e s i d e s p r o m i s e s to the A r a b s might be o p p o s e d by J e w s , who had "a strong material, a n d a very strong political, interest in the future of the country [original e m p h a s i s ] . " S y k e s was struck by the mention of J e w s . Until then they had not figured in his calculations. Before leaving for R u s s i a , S y k e s therefore contacted H e r b e r t S a m u e l , the H o m e S e c r e t a r y , who w a s J e w i s h , h o p i n g to learn about Zionism. 1 6

It will be r e m e m b e r e d that in their negotiations, S y k e s and Picot had c o m p r o m i s e d their differences a b o u t Palestine by agreeing that m o s t of it would be placed under an international regime, the precise form of which would be determined after consultation with the other interested A l l i e s — R u s s i a a n d I t a l y — a n d with H u s s e i n of M e c c a . C a p t a i n Hall's c o m m e n t s led S y k e s to worry, however, that the c o m p r o m i s e at which he a n d Picot had arrived had left a principal factor out of a c c o u n t : they had not taken into consideration the possibility that J e w s m i g h t be concerned in the political future of Palestine. Evidently S y k e s was afraid that when he b r o u g h t this omission to the attention of Picot, the F r e n c h m a n would think that he was d o i n g so in o r d e r to back out of their agreement. Accordingly, on

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his arrival in P e t r o g r a d he was at p a i n s to establish his g o o d faith. In his innocence he did not know-—or even s u s p e c t — t h a t the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t h a d already g o n e b e h i n d his back to renege on the Palestine c o m p r o m i s e they had a g r e e d u p o n . In secret negotiations with the R u s s i a n s initiated by the F r e n c h Premier, Aristide B r i a n d , on 25 M a r c h 1916, the F r e n c h s e c u r e d R u s s i a n agreement that an international r e g i m e for Palestine-—the a r r a n g e m e n t S y k e s h a d a g r e e d u p o n with P i c o t — w o u l d be impractical a n d that instead a F r e n c h r e g i m e o u g h t to be installed. A secret F r a n c o - R u s s i a n e x c h a n g e of notes on 26 April 1916 outlined an a g r e e m e n t between the governm e n t s as to their respective s p h e r e s of influence in the O t t o m a n territories, a n d e m b o d i e d a R u s s i a n p l e d g e to F r a n c e "to s u p p o r t in negotiations with the British g o v e r n m e n t the d e s i g n s of the g o v e r n ment of the R e p u b l i c [ F r a n c e ] on P a l e s t i n e . " 17

T h e R u s s i a n s h a d n o s y m p a t h y for J e w s o r for J e w i s h claims, and when S y k e s arrived in P e t r o g r a d , his C z a r i s t hosts p e r s u a d e d him that Zionist J e w s were a great a n d potentially hostile power within R u s s i a . T h e r e a f t e r S y k e s was seized with the conviction that J e w s were a power in a great m a n y places a n d might s a b o t a g e the Allied c a u s e . B u t unlike the R u s s i a n s , S y k e s believed in a t t e m p t i n g to win t h e m over. He reported to the F o r e i g n Office that he h a d told Picot that, while Britain h a d no interest in taking possession of Palestine, it was what the Z i o n i s t s wanted, a n d that they ought to be propitiated if the Allies were to have a chance of winning the war. H i s own notion was to offer the Zionists an incorporated land c o m p a n y in Palestine; his question to the F o r e i g n Office was "Is a land c o m p a n y e n o u g h ? " — t o which the b r u s q u e r e s p o n s e from the F o r e i g n Office was that he s h o u l d keep his t h o u g h t s to h i m s e l f . ( E v i d e n t l y the F o r e i g n Office did not want S y k e s to m e d d l e in a matter a b o u t which-—it was c l e a r — h e knew n o t h i n g . ) 8

19

R e t u r n i n g to L o n d o n in April 1916, S y k e s took further s t e p s to learn a b o u t Z i o n i s m . He again s a w S a m u e l , who introduced him to D r M o s e s G a s t e r , chief R a b b i o f the S e p h a r d i c J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . A c c o r d i n g to S y k e s , G a s t e r "opened my eyes to what Z i o n i s m meant." S y k e s then introduced G a s t e r to the F r e n c h negotiator, G e o r g e s Picot, a n d s u g g e s t e d to Picot that F r a n c e a n d Britain, instead of o p e r a t i n g independently of one another in the M i d d l e E a s t , s h o u l d work together as p a t r o n s of A r a b s a n d J e w s . Picot was i m p r e s s e d neither by G a s t e r nor by S y k e s ' s p r o p o s a l , a n d held fast to his territorial d e s i g n s . 2

S y k e s b e g a n to worry, at a time when a decisive Allied victory s e e m e d at best a remote possibility, that J e w i s h forces w o u l d tilt the scales in favor of the G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s . He a t t e m p t e d to p e r s u a d e * Jews whose ancestors in the Middle Ages lived in Spain and Portugal.

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Picot that if the Allies failed to offer J e w s a position in Palestine, F r a n c e m i g h t lose the war a n d , with it, cities a n d provinces in F r a n c e herself, of m u c h m o r e c o n s e q u e n c e to F r e n c h m e n than Palestine. He u r g e d Picot to tell his g o v e r n m e n t that s a v i n g Paris a n d V e r d u n a n d regaining A l s a c e were worth concessions in the Middle East. While S y k e s was in the p r o c e s s of discovering the Zionist i s s u e — before, d u r i n g , a n d after his P e t r o g r a d trip)—so was the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n , p r o m p t e d by S y k e s ' s old friend G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e . F i t z M a u r i c e , who h a d attended the s a m e p u b l i c school ( B e a u m o n t ) a n d h a d a c q u i r e d m a n y o f the s a m e views a n d p r e j u d i c e s as h a d S y k e s , w a s — i t will be r e m e m b e r e d — t h e principal s o u r c e within the British g o v e r n m e n t of the fallacy that the S u b l i m e Porte had fallen into the h a n d s of J e w s . At the A d m i r a l t y early in 1916, F i t z M a u r i c e hit u p o n the converse of that p r o p o s i t i o n : he inspired a F o r e i g n Office colleague—another O l d B o y of B e a u m o n t , n a m e d H u g h O ' B e i r n e — t o s u g g e s t that "if we could offer the J e w s an a r r a n g e m e n t as to Palestine which w o u l d strongly appeal to t h e m we might conceivably be able to strike a b a r g a i n with t h e m as to withdr a w i n g their s u p p o r t from the Y o u n g T u r k G o v e r n m e n t which would then automatically c o l l a p s e . " J u s t as C a i r o believed in powerful, m y s t e r i o u s A r a b societies that could overthrow the Y o u n g T u r k s , L o n d o n believed in powerful, m y s t e r i o u s J e w i s h societies that could do s o , too. 21

O'Beirne evidently intended to p u r s u e the matter within the F o r e i g n Office himself, but d i d not get the chance to do s o : he died in the s p r i n g of 1916. So it was, after all, left to S y k e s to raise the issue of Z i o n i s m within the British b u r e a u c r a c y , little t h o u g h he knew of J e w s or their affairs. L i k e F i t z M a u r i c e , S y k e s retained his childhood belief in the existence of a cohesive world J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y that m o v e d in h i d d e n ways to control the world. Britain's foremost a c a d e m i c authority on the M i d d l e E a s t , E d w a r d G r a n v i l l e B r o w n e , A d a m s Professor o f A r a b i c at C a m b r i d g e University, who h a d known S y k e s as a pupil, t h o u g h he h a d praise for him in other respects, c o m m e n t e d that S y k e s "sees J e w s in e v e r y t h i n g . " 22

VI Z i o n i s m , however, was far f r o m b e i n g the chief issue with which S y k e s dealt in wintry P e t r o g r a d in 1916. T h e b r o a d outlines of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement were at i s s u e , a n d when he arrived he found that the R u s s i a n leaders—like British officials in L o n d o n — claimed that F r a n c e was b e i n g p r o m i s e d too m u c h . In r e s p o n s e , the

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F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r , M a u r i c e Paleologue, explained t o the R u s s i a n F o r e i g n Minister that the reason Britain h a d p u s h e d F r a n c e to extend her claims so far to the east was to p r o v i d e Britain with a buffer against R u s s i a . T h i s w a s perfectly t r u e , but the F o r e i g n Office i n L o n d o n was furious a t b e i n g given away, a n d b o m b a r d e d P e t r o g r a d with official denials. Privately, F o r e i g n Office officials d e s c r i b e d Paleologue as "really i n c o r r i g i b l e . " 2 3

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It was b e c a u s e C a i r o , taken in by a l - F a r u q i ' s hoax a n d believing fully in the potency of A r a b secret societies, h a d p e r s u a d e d L o n d o n that H u s s e i n of M e c c a could tear d o w n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e that all of these c o m m i t m e n t s , m o r t g a g i n g the future of the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , h a d been m a d e by the A s q u i t h coalition g o v e r n m e n t . W a s it worth the price? Within a few weeks of the S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e m e n t , Britain was to find out.

25 T U R K E Y ' S TRIUMPH A T T H E TIGRIS i As the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o waited a n d hoped for an A r a b rebellion that would b r i n g d o w n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , it was called u p o n to help British India liquidate yet another d i s a s t r o u s a n d m u d d l e - h e a d e d enterprise in the war against T u r k e y : a smaller-scale b u t m o r e shameful Gallipoli by the shores of the T i g r i s river in M e s o p o t a m i a . A m o n t h before the o u t b r e a k of the O t t o m a n war in the a u t u m n of 1914, L o n d o n had o r d e r e d a s t a n d b y force to be sent from I n d i a to the Persian G u l f to protect Britain's oil s u p p l i e s from Persia in case they should be threatened. I t s initial objective in case of war was to protect the oil refinery at A b a d a n , a Persian island in the Shatt al-'Arab, the waterway at the head of the Persian G u l f where the E u p h r a t e s a n d T i g r i s rivers meet. On 6 N o v e m b e r 1914, the day after Britain declared war on T u r k e y , this force, by now a u g m e n t e d , m o v e d forward. T h e T u r k i s h fort at F a o at the m o u t h of the S h a t t al-'Arab fell after a brief b o m b a r d m e n t by a British g u n b o a t , the river sloop Odin; and a fortnight later, several t h o u s a n d British troops occupied the M e s o p o t a m i a n city of B a s r a seventy-five miles upriver. A l t h o u g h the British Indian force had landed in M e s o p o t a m i a , it did so to shield neighboring Persia f r o m attack. 1

T u r k i s h resistance was feeble, for the B a s r a front was h u n d r e d s of miles from the main concentrations of O t t o m a n t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s near B a g h d a d . As the British Indian expeditionary force went a b o u t rounding out its position in B a s r a province, it parried T u r k i s h counterattacks with ease. D r a w n into the interior of m a r s h y lower M e s o p o t a m i a by the T u r k i s h retreat, an a m b i t i o u s newly a p p o i n t e d British c o m m a n d i n g officer, S i r J o h n N i x o n , who had arrived in April 1915, sent his officer in the field, M a j o r - G e n e r a l C h a r l e s Vere F e r r e r s T o w n s h e n d , further and further u p s t r e a m in q u e s t of new victories b u t with no great sense of direction or strategic p u r p o s e . Finally, N i x o n ordered the t r o o p s — d e s p i t e T o w n s h e n d ' s m i s g i v i n g s — t o keep on m a r c h i n g all the way to B a g h d a d .

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A successful a d v a n c e from B a s r a to B a g h d a d w o u l d have r e q u i r e d a m a s t e r y of logistics a n d an a b u n d a n c e of troops, river transport, hospital e q u i p m e n t , artillery, and s u p p l i e s that British I n d i a d i d not make available to the expeditionary force. T h e troops were a d v a n c i n g into a country of s w a m p s and deserts, without r o a d s or railroads, a n d were therefore obliged to follow the m e a n d e r i n g course of the shallow, treacherous T i g r i s river. F o r this they needed flotillas of riverboats suited to the T i g r i s . T h e country was pestilential—there were m a d d e n i n g , sickening s w a r m s of flies a n d m o s q u i t o s — s o m o b i l e hospitals a n d medical s u p p l i e s w o u l d be r e q u i r e d . Whereas in B a s r a the weakened T u r k s were at the end of their long s u p p l y line, in front of B a g h d a d T o w n s h e n d ' s forces w o u l d be at the e n d of t h e i r s — and would need to have b r o u g h t with t h e m a d e q u a t e s u p p l i e s of food and ammunition. T h o u g h his forces lacked these a p p a r e n t necessities, T o w n s h e n d , whose talent for generalship was close to g e n i u s , almost fought his way t h r o u g h to victory. B u t his final t r i u m p h , if it can be so t e r m e d — a t C t e s i p h o n , a b o u t twenty-five miles southeast of B a g h d a d , and h u n d r e d s of river miles from the b a s e of his s u p p l y line at B a s r a — w a s P y r r h i c : he lost half of his small force. On the night of 25 N o v e m b e r he b e g a n his retreat. T o w n s h e n d h a d learned that F i e l d M a r s h a l C o l m a n von der G o l t z , w h o m he r e g a r d e d as one of the great strategists of his t i m e , had a s s u m e d overall c o m m a n d of O t t o m a n forces in M e s o p o t a m i a . He h a d learned, too, that 3 0 , 0 0 0 T u r k i s h t r o o p s were a b o u t to reinforce the 13,000 that h a d o p p o s e d him at C t e s i p h o n . T o w n s h e n d ' s own fighting forces now n u m b e r e d 4 , 5 0 0 ; a n d they were short of a m m u nition a n d food. T o w n s h e n d believed—with g o o d r e a s o n — t h a t the closest safe place for him to m a k e a s t a n d was s o m e 250 miles d o w n s t r e a m , but d e c i d e d — u n w i s e l y — t h a t his e x h a u s t e d t r o o p s could not go that distance. After a p u n i s h i n g week-long retreat of nearly a h u n d r e d miles, p u n c t u a t e d b y battles with the p u r s u i n g T u r k s , T o w n s h e n d , who had suffered a t h o u s a n d m o r e casualties, chose to s t o p and m a k e his stand a t K u t e l - A m a r a . K u t was a m u d village caught in a loop in the T i g r i s river, a n d s u r r o u n d e d by water on three s i d e s . Sheltering within it a n d entrenching the fourth side, T o w n s h e n d i m p r i s o ne d himself in a fortress-like position. It m a d e it difficult for the T u r k s to get in or for him to get out. In the event, von der Goltz's O t t o m a n a r m i e s left a sufficient force at K u t to g u a r d against a British breakout, a n d then m a r c h e d on to entrench themselves downriver so as to block any force Britain m i g h t send to the rescue. T o w n s h e n d planned to be r e s c u e d , but ruined his own chances. Although he had s u p p l i e s sufficient to last until April 1916, he cabled that he c o u l d only hold out until J a n u a r y . T h e full forces

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available to rescue him c o u l d not be a s s e m b l e d by t h e n — a few weeks m o r e were r e q u i r e d — b u t driven o n b y T o w n s h e n d ' s inconsistent a n d increasingly u n b a l a n c e d c a b l e s , the partial forces available launched one p r e m a t u r e attack after another a n d were beaten back. H a d they waited until they could attack in force, they m i g h t have fought their way t h r o u g h .

II On 26 April 1916, the g a r r i s o n at K u t having e x h a u s t e d its last rations of food, the War Office in L o n d o n offered T o w n s h e n d the services o f C a p t a i n s A u b r e y H e r b e r t a n d T . E . L a w r e n c e i n negotiating a s u r r e n d e r . B o t h were a s s o c i a t e d with the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o , a n d H e r b e r t , a M e m b e r of Parliament, had been a well-known friend of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e before the war. B o t h h a d just arrived in M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d L a w r e n c e h a d already been stricken with the prevalent local fever. T h e siege of K u t h a d by then lasted 146 d a y s , exceeding the records previously set by the f a m o u s sieges of L a d y s m i t h (in the Boer War) a n d Plevna (in the R u s s o - T u r k i s h war of 1877). It was an epic of h e r o i s m — a s the defenders faced disease, starvation, a n d f l o o d s — a n d of heartbreak, as s u p p l i e s p a r a c h u t e d to t h e m were blown offcourse into the river, a n d riverboats sent to their aid went a g r o u n d or were s t o p p e d by chains the T u r k s stretched a c r o s s the river. T o w n s h e n d , who h a d never quite recovered from a fever contracted in 125-degree heat the s u m m e r before, had b e c o m e emotionally u n b a l a n c e d . At s o m e point d u r i n g the siege he h a d d e c i d e d that the T u r k s m i g h t let him a n d his m e n go free on parole in return for a p a y m e n t of a million p o u n d s . H e r b e r t a n d L a w r e n c e , who went with h i m on 27—8 April to negotiate t e r m s , were authorized by L o n d o n to offer even m o r e : a s h a m e d t h o u g h they were of doing s o , they offered the T u r k s two million p o u n d s . O n o r d e r s from E n v e r , who apparently enjoyed Britain's humiliation in b e g g i n g to b u y the freed o m of her t r o o p s , the T u r k i s h c o m m a n d e r rejected the offer. T h e British defenders o f K u t t h e r e u p o n destroyed their g u n s a n d unconditionally s u r r e n d e r e d . T o w n s h e n d was treated with courtesy, a n d sent by the T u r k s to live in c o m f o r t — a n d indeed l u x u r y — i n C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . H i s d i s e a s e d , s t a r v i n g t r o o p s , however, were sent on a death m a r c h — 1 0 0 miles to B a g h d a d , then 500 m o r e to A n a t o l i a — and then were p u t to work on railroad chain g a n g s . F e w of t h e m s ur v i v e d . T o w n s h e n d ' s forces suffered m o r e than 10,000 casualties between

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the start of their a d v a n c e on B a g h d a d a n d their s u r r e n d e r . T w e n t y three t h o u s a n d casualties were suffered by the British forces seeking to rescue t h e m f r o m K u t ; yet the g a r r i s o n w a s carried off into captivity a n d f o u n d d e a t h along the w a y . It w a s another national humiliation inflicted u p o n Britain by an O t t o m a n foe British officials h a d always r e g a r d e d as ineffectual—and w h o m the A r a b B u r e a u p r o p o s e d t o b r i n g crashing down b y internal s u b v e r s i o n later in 1916.

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26 BEHIND ENEMY L I N E S i In 1916 the question s e e m e d to b e : which of the w a r r i n g coalitions, G e r m a n y a n d her allies or Britain a n d her allies, w o u l d collapse first u n d e r the e n o r m o u s strains i m p o s e d by the war? C a i r o , with its own special point of view, was betting that T u r k e y w o u l d be the first to crack. W o u l d H u s s e i n ' s revolt, s c h e d u l e d to occur in m i d - 1 9 1 6 , be able to s u b v e r t the loyalty of h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of O t t o m a n soldiers a n d millions of O t t o m a n s u b j e c t s ? B r i t i s h Intelligence thought it not i m p r o b a b l e , always having r e g a r d e d the Sultan's regime as feeble. In the western world it h a d been a s s u m e d for d e c a d e s that one day or another the r a m s h a c k l e O t t o m a n E m p i r e would collapse or disinteg r a t e . By s u c h reckoning, the strain of w a g i n g war against Britain, F r a n c e , a n d R u s s i a would b r i n g it crashing d o w n ; a n d s u b v e r s i o n from within w o u l d a d d to the strain. Y e t the record as of m i d - 1 9 1 6 s u g g e s t e d otherwise. As nationalists who c a m p a i g n e d against foreign influence a n d to eradicate the vestiges of colonialism, the Y o u n g T u r k leaders were sensitive to any alien presence in their m i d s t — e v e n that of their allies. B o t h E n v e r a n d T a l a a t e x p r e s s e d concern a b o u t the reach of G e r m a n influence in the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of T u r k e y ' s wartime effort. Y e t no serious w e d g e was driven between T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s . A l t h o u g h m a n y G e r m a n s serving with the O t t o m a n forces exp r e s s e d frustration a n d d i s g u s t at the obstacles placed in the way of getting their o r d e r s executed, they d i d not allow their relationship * After Gallipoli, Enver resumed his earlier campaign to curb German influence. In early 1916 he indicated that even the 5,500 German troops then in the Ottoman Empire were too many, and should be withdrawn. To demonstrate that Turkey had no need of them, he insisted on sending seven Ottoman divisions to southern Europe to fight alongside the armies of other of the Central Powers. His efforts were not entirely successful; indeed, by the end of the war, there were 25,000 German officers and men serving in the Ottoman Empire. 207

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with the T u r k s to break d o w n . G e r m a n y exerted influence only with a view toward winning the war a n d m a d e no m o v e to s u b v e r t the independence of the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t or the position of the C . U . P . leaders. M o r e than any other G r e a t Power o n either s i d e , G e r m a n y d e m o n s t r a t e d an ability to keep postwar a m b i t i o n s in A s i a from intruding into w a r t i m e d e c i s i o n s ; a n d as a result she was best able to take a d v a n t a g e of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to stir up trouble behind enemy lines. T h e H a b s b u r g a n d O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t s were s u s picious of each other, as well as of the G e r m a n s , a n d there was the inevitable bickering in the field between jealous officers; b u t , on the whole, the G e r m a n s i m p o s e d u p o n their allies, in the first years of the war in A s i a , a sense that winning the war took priority over other objectives.* A f g h a n i s t a n was an e x c e p t i o n : where it was concerned, officers in the field let their m u t u a l m i s t r u s t get the better of t h e m . T h e i r mission was to s u b v e r t B r i t i s h control of that fierce I s l a m i c country—-a control exercised u n d e r the terms of the a g r e e m e n t of 1907 that ended the G r e a t G a m e between R u s s i a a n d Britain. As a result of bickering between G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s a n d between G e r m a n s a n d other G e r m a n s , only one of the four overland expeditions to A f g h a n i s t a n sent out at the b e g i n n i n g of the war went on to reach K a b u l , where the G e r m a n s spent six m o n t h s vainly a t t e m p t ing to p e r s u a d e the E m i r to c o m e into the war against Britain. T h e E m i r declined to act unless the Central Powers could place a r m i e s in the field to e n s u r e the s u c c e s s of his rebellion. T h e y could not do s o , so the E m i r quietly remained within the British fold. -

In Persia, however, the C e n t r a l Powers enjoyed a considerable s u c c e s s . T h e G e r m a n s , long before the war, had solidified their relations with leading Persian politicians, and in 1915 they s u c c e e d e d in i n d u c i n g the P r i m e Minister to sign a secret treaty of alliance. T h e G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r also s e c u r e d the s u p p o r t of the 7 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g Swedish-officered g e n d a r m e r i e , while his secret agents built up s u p port a m o n g the various tribes that constituted a b o u t 20 percent of the total p o p u l a t i o n . By the end of 1915 the Allies found the situation so m e n a c i n g that the R u s s i a n s , s u p p o r t e d by the 8 , 0 0 0 - s t r o n g

It was not easy. As the archives of Austria-Hungary show, Habsburg officials expressed deep distrust of the ambitions for expansion that they ascribed to the German and Turkish empires. For centuries, Austria-Hungary had been encroaching on Ottoman territories in Europe. Her annexation of Ottoman Bosnia had brought on the Balkan Wars and set the stage for Sarajevo. She continued to dispute the Ottoman title to Albania, which she occupied in the earlier part of the world war. Harboring territorial designs of their own, Habsburg officials suspected that Hohenzollern officials were thinking along similar lines, so that Djemal's Suez campaign brought expressions of concern from them that Germany might attempt to annex Egypt; while Ottoman officials, as always, distrusted their European partners. 1

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Russian-officered Persian C o s s a c k s , o c c u p i e d the north of the country, taking over the capital city of T e h e r a n a n d , with it, the weak, recently crowned y o u n g S h a h . T h e m o s t p r o - G e r m a n o f the politicians fled, initially to the holy city of Q u m , a n d later to K e r m a n s h a h , near the O t t o m a n frontier, where a G e r m a n p u p p e t g o v e r n m e n t was established, backed by O t t o m a n t r o o p s . In the s o u t h , the m o s t successful of the G e r m a n agents, Wilhelm W a s s m u s s , stirred up a fierce tribal u p r i s i n g that was quelled only with the u t m o s t difficulty by B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l S i r Percy S y k e s , of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , who" in 1916 created an 1 1 , 0 0 0 - m a n British-officered native force, the S o u t h Persia Rifles, and took c o m m a n d of the south with a b a s e of authority in S h i r a z . T h e S o u t h Persia Rifles, the Persian C o s s a c k s , the tattered r e m n a n t s of the g e n d a r m e r i e , a n d the G e r m a n - s p o n s o r e d tribal confederations were the only o r g a n i z e d a r m e d forces that r e m a i n e d in what had b e e n at one time a sovereign, a n d indeed considerable, country. T h e S h a h had no effective forces at his disposal to u p h o l d Persia's neutrality, enforce her laws, or defend her territorial integrity. In the north the province of A z e r b a i j a n had been a battlefield between T u r k e y a n d R u s s i a ever since E n v e r ' s attack on the C a u c a s u s at the outset of the war; a n d as the war went on, R u s s i a n a n d O t t o m a n t r o o p s s u r g e d back a n d forth, m o v i n g t h r o u g h a n d o c c u p y i n g Persian territory at will. T h e G e r m a n - O t t o m a n allies converted Persia, which had been an Allied preserve, into a contested battlefield. By 1915 — 16 the country had, for all practical p u r p o s e s , d i s a p p e a r e d as a sovereign entity, let alone one fully controlled by the Allied Powers.

II Britain's efforts to s u b v e r t the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g population behind O t t o m a n lines had met with no c o m p a r a b l e s u c c e s s . B u t D j e m a l P a s h a , the C . U . P . triumvir o p e r a t i n g out of D a m a s c u s , took the subversion threat seriously e n o u g h to crack down on those he s u s pected of treason. In the wake of his raids in 1915 on the A r a b secret societies in S y r i a , he published in S t a m b o u l in 1916, under the imprint of the O t t o m a n F o u r t h A r m y , a book entitled La Verite sur la question syrienne, setting forth the evidence that he claimed would justify his treatment of the alleged plotters. In the b o o k he d i s c u s s e d the secret societies a n d their a i m s in s o m e detail, and a r g u e d that the convicted m e n were traitors, not nationalists. Whether because or in spite of D j e m a l ' s crackdown, the A r a b i c speaking p o p u l a t i o n did not waver in its loyalty. M o r e i m p o r t a n t to the Porte, A r a b soldiers d e m o n s t r a t e d loyalty not only to I s l a m but

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also to the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t . A B r i t i s h Intelligence m e m o r a n d u m b a s e d on interviews with c a p t u r e d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g officers in prisoner-of-war c a m p s r e p o r t e d that m o s t of the officers actually s u p p o r t e d the Y o u n g T u r k s , and that even the minority who did not were "unable to s q u a r e their consciences with a military revolt in the face of the e n e m y . " 2

IP In the eyes of the Y o u n g T u r k s , the loyalty of n o n - M o s l e m inhabitants of the e m p i r e was o p e n to q u e s t i o n . T h e Porte was s u s p i c i o u s , not only of C h r i s t i a n s , b u t also of J e w s — e s p e c i a l l y the 6 0 , 0 0 0 or m o r e of t h e m in Palestine. It d i s t u r b e d T a l a a t a n d his colleagues that at least half of the J e w s in Palestine were not O t t o m a n s u b j e c t s . A l m o s t all of those who were not O t t o m a n s u b j e c t s had c o m e f r o m the R u s s i a n E m p i r e , mostly d u r i n g the half century before 1914 a n d r e m a i n e d — i n t h e o r y — s u b j e c t s of the C z a r . T h e Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t h a d n o reason t o m i s t r u s t t h e m ; they h a d left E u r o p e to e s c a p e f r o m politics and conspiracies, not to e n g a g e in t h e m . F l e e i n g the p o g r o m s of R u s s i a , the U k r a i n e , a n d Poland, they c o u l d have f o u n d a new h o m e — a s m a n y J e w s d i d — i n lands of o p p o r t u n i t y s u c h as the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which w e l c o m e d i m m i g r a n t s . T h o s e who chose instead the h a r d s h i p s of pioneer life in barren Palestine were d r e a m e r s who asked only to be allowed to practice their religion or their ideals in peace. S o m e were d r a w n to the H o l y L a n d by religion; others were inspired to re-create the J u d a e a n nationality that the R o m a n s had detroyed 2 , 0 0 0 years b e f o r e ; b u t m o s t were socialist idealists who a i m e d at establishing an egalitarian, cooperative society in selfsufficient agricultural settlements in a country distant from E u r o p e a n a n t i - S e m i t i s m . O n c e arrived, they revived the ancient H e b r e w l a n g u a g e , restored the depleted soil, a n d cultivated self-reliance. By the early part of the twentieth century their settlements had b e g u n to flourish; m o r e than forty of t h e m dotted the landscape of the H o l y L a n d . T h e y constructed towns as well; in 1909, on b a r r e n s a n d d u n e s by the sea, they b e g a n to build what is now T e l Aviv. T h e y were e n c o u r a g e d a n d s u p p o r t e d from a b r o a d by the relatively small g r o u p of J e w s whose p r o g r a m called for a return to Z i o n : the Zionist movement. At the end of 1914, just after the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the F i r s t World War, D j e m a l P a s h a , who b e c a m e T u r k e y ' s ruler of S y r i a and Palestine, took violent action against the J e w i s h settlers. Influenced by a bitterly anti-Zionist O t t o m a n official n a m e d B e h a - e d - d i n ,

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D j e m a l m o v e d t o destroy the Zionist settlements a n d o r d e r e d the expulsion of all foreign J e w s — w h i c h is to s a y , most of J e w i s h Palestine. T h e e x p u l s i o n s h a d already b e g u n before the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t — fearful of alienating J e w i s h opinion in neutral c o u n t r i e s — i n d u c e d T a l a a t a n d E n v e r t o intervene. T h e A m e r i c a n a m b a s s a d o r , H e n r y M o r g e n t h a u , acted together with von W a n g e n h e i m in the matter. T h o u g h the A m e r i c a n a n d G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t s were a b l e t o influence the Porte, the Porte was not always able to control the actions of D j e m a l , who frequently played a lone hand and looked u p o n the Palestinian J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y a s potentially seditious. T o s o m e extent this p r o v e d to be a self-fulfilling p r o p h e c y . While m o s t Palestinian J e w s chose to avoid involvement in the world war, D a v i d B e n - G u r i o n a n d Itzhak B e n Zvi, former law s t u d e n t s at the U n i v e r sity of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e who were leaders of the L a b o r Zionist m o v e ment, offered to organize a Palestinian J e w i s h a r m y in 1914 to defend O t t o m a n Palestine. B u t , instead of accepting their offer, D j e m a l d e p o r t e d t h e m a n d other Zionist leaders in 1915. B e n - G u r i o n a n d B e n Zvi went to the U n i t e d S t a t e s , where they continued to c a m p a i g n for the creation of a p r o - O t t o m a n J e w i s h a r m y . B u t early in 1918 they rallied to a J e w i s h a r m y formation that was to fight in Palestine on the British side against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . N o t h i n g the w a r t i m e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d done h a d given t h e m c a u s e to remain p r o - T u r k . Y e t despite D j e m a l ' s capricious and often cruel m e a s u r e s , m o s t J e w i s h settlers in Palestine did nothing to s u b v e r t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; a n d only a tiny m i n o r i t y — a l b e i t a highly effective o n e — worked against it. Of that tiny minority, led by an agricultural scientist n a m e d A a r o n A a r o n s o h n , m o r e will be said later.

IV A c c o r d i n g to the T u r k s , in 1914—15 R u s s i a n efforts at s u b v e r s i o n behind O t t o m a n lines were directed across the frontier at the A r m e n i a n s of northeastern Anatolia, adjacent to R u s s i a n A r m e n i a . T h e e p i s o d e has been a subject of violent controversy ever since. T u r k i s h A r m e n i a w a s the s t a g i n g area for Enver's initial attack on the C a u c a s u s plateau, a n d it was the initial objective of the R u s s i a n a r m i e s when, in turn, b e g i n n i n g in 1915, they s t r e a m e d down f r o m the C a u c a s u s to invade T u r k e y . As C h r i s t i a n s , the A r m e n i a n s were inclined to prefer the R u s s i a n to the T u r k i s h c a u s e . N o t h i n g in the history of O t t o m a n rule p r e d i s p o s e d t h e m to r e m a i n loyal to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e s of A r m e n i a n s in 1894, 1895, 1896, a n d 1909 were still fresh in their m i n d s . T h e n , too, E n v e r h a d sent their blood enemies, the K u r d s , into A r m e n i a in

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O t t o m a n military units, rekindling ancient f e u d s a n d giving rise to new ones. In early 1915, E n v e r , as Minister of War, a n d T a l a a t , as Minister of the Interior, claimed that the A r m e n i a n s were openly s u p p o r t i n g R u s s i a , a n d h a d taken to m o b violence. In reprisal they ordered the deportation of the entire A r m e n i a n p o p u l a t i o n from the northeastern provinces to locations outside of Anatolia. T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t r e p resentatives even today insist that "At the instigation a n d with the s u p p o r t of C z a r i s t R u s s i a , A r m e n i a n insurgents s o u g h t to establish an A r m e n i a n state in an area that was p r e d o m i n a n t l y T u r k i s h " a n d that, prior to the d e p o r t a t i o n s , " A r m e n i a n forces h a d already m a s sacred the M o s l e m p o p u l a t i o n of the city of Van a n d e n g a g e d in hita n d - r u n actions against the flanks of the T u r k i s h a r m y . " 3

T h e deportations, o r g a n i z e d by T a l a a t as Minister of the Interior, are still r e m e m b e r e d as the A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s of 1915. R a p e a n d beating were c o m m o n p l a c e . T h o s e who were not killed at once were driven through m o u n t a i n s a n d deserts without food, drink, or shelter. H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of A r m e n i a n s eventually s u c c u m b e d or were killed; A r m e n i a n s o u r c e s have put the figure as high as 1,500,000, and t h o u g h the figures are still the s u b j e c t of bitter d i s p u t e , there can b e n o d i s p u t i n g the result: T u r k i s h A r m e n i a was d e s t r o y e d , a n d a b o u t half its p e o p l e p e r i s h e d . T h e r e are historians today who continue to s u p p o r t the claim of E n v e r and T a l a a t that the O t t o m a n rulers acted only after A r m e n i a h a d risen against t h e m . B u t o b s e r v e r s at the time who were by no m e a n s a n t i - T u r k r e p o r t e d that s u c h was not the case. G e r m a n officers stationed there agreed that the area was quiet until the deportations began. 4

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At the G e r m a n and A u s t r i a n e m b a s s i e s , the first reports of the deportations were i g n o r e d : officials clearly believed that m a s s a c r e s of C h r i s t i a n s were a b o u t to take place, b u t did not want to know a b o u t t h e m . T h e y accepted T a l a a t ' s r e a s s u r a n c e s eagerly. By M a y 1915 m a s s a c r e reports were too persuasive to be ignored any longer. T h e A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r told his g o v e r n m e n t that he thought he ought to "alert the T u r k i s h statesmen in a friendly manner" to the possible a d v e r s e r e p e r c u s s i o n s of their p r o c e e d i n g s . He later reported that he h a d in fact s p o k e n with T a l a a t , had u r g e d that the matter be handled carefully, a n d h a d s u g g e s t e d avoiding "persecution of women and children" b e c a u s e it would play into the h a n d s of Allied p r o p a g a n d i s t s . On 24 M a y the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s d e n o u n c e d the Porte's policy of " m a s s m u r d e r " ; to which the Porte replied that responsibility rested on the Allies for having organized the insurrection in A r m e n i a . (Whether there h a d been s u c h an insurrection, a n d , if s o , whether R u s s i a organized or merely encoura g e d it, r e m a i n , as noted earlier, controversial i s s u e s . ) 6

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R e p o r t s p o u r e d in f r o m G e r m a n officials in the field with g r u e s o m e details of atrocities; von W a n g e n h e i m , the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r , found it increasingly difficult to overlook what was g o i n g on. By the m i d d l e of J u n e , he cabled Berlin that T a l a a t had a d m i t t e d that the m a s s deportations were not being carried out b e c a u s e of "military considerations a l o n e . " T h o u g h they received no g u i d a n c e from their h o m e g o v e r n m e n t s , von W a n g e n h e i m a n d his A u s t r i a n counterpart, Pallavicini, c o m m u n i c a t e d to the Porte their feelings that the indiscriminate m a s s d e p o r t a t i o n s , especially when a c c o m p a n i e d by pillagings a n d m a s s a c r e s , created a very b a d impression a b r o a d , especially in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , a n d that this adversely affected the interests that G e r m a n y a n d T u r k e y had i n c o m m o n . 9

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In J u l y , von W a n g e n h e i m reported to the G e r m a n Chancellor that there no longer was any d o u b t that the Porte was trying to "exterminate the A r m e n i a n race in the T u r k i s h e m p i r e . " He a n d Pallavicini both c o n c l u d e d that a t t e m p t i n g to interfere did no g o o d . H i s reco m m e n d a t i o n to his g o v e r n m e n t was to build a record s h o w i n g that G e r m a n y was not responsible for what was h a p p e n i n g . Other G e r m a n officials d i s a g r e e d , a n d tried to interfere, as did the G e r m a n Pastor J o h a n n u s L e p s i u s , but the Wilhelmstrasse accepted von Wangenheim's advice. In O c t o b e r it asked the Porte to issue a p u b l i c statement clearing G e r m a n y of complicity and stating that G e r m a n representatives in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d tried to s a v e the A r m e n i a n s . When the Porte refused, the Wilhelmstrasse threatened to issue such a statement on its own, but then backed d o w n for fear of d a m a g i n g the T u r k i s h alliance. 11

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T h e A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s provided useful a n d effective p r o p a g a n d a for the Allied Powers, as the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r i a n a m b a s s a d o r s h a d feared. P e r h a p s the m a s s a c r e s also affected Allied thinking a b o u t the t e r m s of a future postwar settlement, for they reinforced the a r g u m e n t that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could not be left in control of n o n - M o s l e m p o p u l a t i o n s , and possibly not even of n o n - T u r k i s h speaking p o p u l a t i o n s . It was evident to neutral opinion that T a l a a t and E n v e r were h a p p y to have rid themselves of the A r m e n i a n s . T h e i r public position was that they had foiled an a t t e m p t at s u b v e r s i o n . Certainly they h a d s u c c e e d e d in eliminating unrest; A r m e n i a b e c a m e as quiet as death itself. * T h e Liberal statesman, historian, and jurist, James Bryce, a pro-Armenian who headed a commission to investigate the 1915 — 16 Armenian Massacres during the war, issued a report that was damning to the C . U . P . government. Turkish spokesmen still claim that the Bryce report was a one-sided and distorted work of wartime propaganda, and cite the admission of Arnold Toynbee, one of Bryce's assistants, that the report was intended to further Britain's propaganda and policy objectives. In this it succeeded. 14

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V T h e Allies did have one clear o p p o r t u n i t y to subvert the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , b u t they deliberately p a s s e d it u p . It was offered to t h e m by Djemal Pasha. Alone a m o n g the Y o u n g T u r k t r i u m v i r s , D j e m a l took s t e p s t o distance himself from the A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s . H i s a p p a r e n t a i m was to keep open his avenues to the Allied P o w e r s . S i n c e his defeat at the S u e z C a n a l in early 1915, D j e m a l h a d settled in D a m a s c u s a n d had c o m e to rule G r e a t e r S y r i a — t h e southwestern provinces that today c o m p r i s e S y r i a , L e b a n o n , J o r d a n , a n d I s r a e l — a l m o s t a s his private fiefdom. At the end of 1915, while the A r m e n i a n M a s s a c r e s were taking place, he p r o p o s e d , with Allied help, to seize the O t t o m a n throne for himself. M a k i n g use of the representative of the d o m i n a n t A r m e n i a n political society, the D a s h n a k t s u t i u m ( A r m e n i a n Revolutionary F e d e r ation), to convey his p r o p o s a l s , D j e m a l a p p e a r s to have acted on the mistaken a s s u m p t i o n that s a v i n g the A r m e n i a n s — a s distinct from merely exploiting their plight for p r o p a g a n d a p u r p o s e s — w a s an important Allied objective. In D e c e m b e r 1915 Dr Zavriev, a D a s h n a k emissary to the Allies, informed the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t that D j e m a l was p r e p a r e d to overthrow the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s w a s the m o n t h that the Allied evacuation from Gallipoli b e g a n ; in the wake of that d i s a s t r o u s expedition it could have been expected that the Allies would be willing to pay a price to b r i n g hostilities with T u r k e y to an end. D j e m a l ' s t e r m s , a s outlined b y S a z a n o v , the R u s s i a n F o r e i g n Minister, envisaged a free a n d i n d e p e n d e n t Asiatic T u r k e y (consisting of S y r i a , M e s o p o t a m i a , a Christian A r m e n i a , Cilicia, a n d K u r d i s t a n a s a u t o n o m o u s provinces) whose s u p r e m e ruler w o u l d b e D j e m a l a s S u l t a n . D j e m a l agreed in a d v a n c e to the inevitable R u s s i a n d e m a n d to be given C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s . He also offered to take i m m e d i a t e s t e p s to save the surviving A r m e n i a n s . He p r o p o s e d , with Allied help, to m a r c h on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to d e p o s e the S u l t a n and his g o v e r n m e n t ; and in return he asked financial aid to help reconstruct his country after the war. T h e R u s s i a n s p r o p o s e d t o accept D j e m a l ' s proposal, a n d S a z a n o v seemed confident that his allies w o u l d agree to do s o . B u t , in M a r c h 1916, F r a n c e rejected the p r o p o s a l a n d insisted on h a v i n g Cilicia (in the south of what is now T u r k e y ) a n d G r e a t e r S y r i a for herself. S i r E d w a r d G r e y , the British F o r e i g n Secretary, also showed himself to be unwilling to encourage revolt b e h i n d enemy lines if doing so meant foregoing the territorial g a i n s in Asiatic T u r k e y that Britain had p r o m i s e d to her allies. In their p a s s i o n for booty, the Allied I S

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g o v e r n m e n t s lost sight of the condition u p o n which future g a i n s were p r e d i c a t e d : winning the war. B l i n d e d by the prize, they did not see that there w a s a contest. D j e m a l ' s offer afforded the Allies their one great o p p o r t u n i t y to subvert the O t t o m a n E m p i r e from within; a n d they let it g o . E n v e r and T a l a a t never discovered D j e m a l ' s secret c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the enemy, and D j e m a l continued the fight against the Allies at their side.

VI T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e benefited from the fact that it w a s not the principal theater of war for any of its o p p o n e n t s , all of whose forces a n d energies were concentrated elsewhere. E v e n s o , its wartime p e r f o r m a n c e was surprisingly successful. E n g a g e d in a three-front war, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e defeated Britain a n d F r a n c e in the west in 1915 — 16, c r u s h e d the a d v a n c i n g a r m i e s of British I n d i a in the east at the s a m e t i m e , a n d in the north held off the R u s s i a n invasion forces. B e h i n d e n e m y lines, the O t t o m a n p e r f o r m a n c e was equally outstanding. T u r k i s h a n d G e r m a n s u b v e r s i o n had m a d e a s h a m b l e s of the Allied-controlled Persian E m p i r e . In striking contrast, as of mid-1916 Britain had failed in her efforts to win over the A r a b i c speaking p e o p l e s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d R u s s i a ' s a p p e a l to the A r m e n i a n s had been followed only by their dreadful m a s s a c r e . Would H u s s e i n ' s i m m i n e n t revolt in J u n e 1916 turn the situation a r o u n d ? Would it p r o v e any m o r e successful than p r e v i o u s Allied efforts to stir up trouble behind O t t o m a n lines? On the basis of the record to m i d - 1 9 1 6 the chances would have had to be rated as low, but Clayton a n d his colleagues were hopeful, a n d if they were right they stood to win a great prize. F o r H u s s e i n ' s imminent revolt was Cairo's chance to win the war in the E a s t , a n d to salvage the w a r t i m e reputation of its leader, L o r d K i t c h e n e r .

27 K I T C H E N E R ' S L A S T MISSION In L o n d o n direction of the war w a s now entrusted not to the War Minister, b u t to the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff. T h e C a b i n e t h a d reason to believe that K i t c h e n e r h a d lost his touch even in the area he was s u p p o s e d to know b e s t — t h e E a s t . T h e only British military operation he h a d o p p o s e d there until the e n d — t h e evacuation from G a l l i p o l i — w a s the only one to have p r o v e d a brilliant s u c c e s s . A s q u i t h , who believed it politically i m p o s s i b l e to let K i t c h e n e r resign a n d yet f o u n d it a w k w a r d to retain him in office, hit on the expedient of s e n d i n g the War Minister a w a y on another long m i s s i o n — a mission to R u s s i a . A trip t h e r e — h e of course was obliged to travel by s h i p — w o u l d take m o s t of the last half of 1916. A long, d a n g e r o u s voyage in arctic seas w a s m u c h to ask of the aging soldier f r o m the tropics, b u t he accepted his new a s s i g n m e n t and m a d e his p r e p a r a t i o n s to d e p a r t . H i s long run of luck h a d finally r u n out. If he had died in 1914 he w o u l d have been r e m e m b e r e d as the greatest British general since Wellington. H a d he died in 1915 he w o u l d have been r e m e m b e r e d as the p r o p h e t who foretold the nature a n d duration of the F i r s t World War and as the organizer of Britain's m a s s a r m y . B u t in 1916 he had b e c o m e the a g i n g veteran of a b y g o n e era who c o u l d not c o p e with the d e m a n d s placed u p o n him in c h a n g i n g times. " T h e y expect too m u c h of m e , these fellows," he is s u p p o s e d to have confided to a C a b i n e t c o l l e a g u e ; "I don't know E u r o p e , I don't know E n g l a n d , and I don't know the British A r m y . " H i s heart a n d m i n d r e m a i n e d with the colonial a r m i e s of E g y p t a n d I n d i a that he had reorganized and that were trained to do his b i d d i n g . In m o d e r n E u r o p e he was lost. 1

Shortly before noon on F r i d a y , 2 J u n e 1916, L o r d K i t c h e n e r went to the K i n g ' s C r o s s railroad station almost unattended a n d unnoticed. T h e train was a m i n u t e a n d a half late in starting, a n d he was seized with i m p a t i e n c e ; he hated delay. O n c e started, the train s p e d him to his port of e m b a r k a t i o n . At S c a p a F l o w , the h e a d q u a r t e r s of the G r a n d Fleet off the

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northern tip of S c o t l a n d , K i t c h e n e r a n d the faithful F i t z G e r a l d b o a r d e d the a r m o r e d cruiser Hampshire the afternoon of 5 J u n e 1916, b o u n d for the R u s s i a n port of A r c h a n g e l . T h e d e p a r t u r e route of the Hampshire had already been plotted, b u t should have been c h a n g e d . N a v a l Intelligence, which earlier had broken the G e r m a n radio c o d e , intercepted a m e s s a g e to the G e r m a n minelaying s u b m a rine U 7 5 in late M a y . It indicated that the s u b m a r i n e was to m i n e the p a s s a g e that the Hampshire intended to follow. T w o further intercepts confirmed the information, as did sightings of the s u b m a r i n e . In the confusion at British h e a d q u a r t e r s at S c a p a F l o w , A d m i r a l S i r J o h n Jellicoe, the British naval c o m m a n d e r , a n d his staff s o m e h o w failed to read or to u n d e r s t a n d the w a r n i n g s that N a v a l Intelligence sent to their flagship. (At a court of inquiry that convened later in 1916 to look into the matter, A d m i r a l Jellicoe s u c c e e d e d in hiding the existence of these intelligence w a r n i n g s , which were revealed only i n 1985. ) 2

T h e seas were s t o r m y , but K i t c h e n e r refused to delay his d e p a r t u r e . A d m i r a l Jellicoe's officers h a d m i s r e a d the weather charts, which should have shown them that the s t o r m would intensify, and they believed that it w o u l d a b a t e . At 4:45 p . m . the Hampshire p u t out to sea into a r a g i n g g a l e . T h e weather p r o v e d too m u c h for the destroyers a s s i g n e d to escort d u t y ; after two h o u r s , they t u r n e d back. T h e Hampshire s t e a m e d ahead alone. S o m e t i m e between 7:30 and 7:45 it struck one of the U 7 5 ' s m i n e s a n d went d o w n with almost all h a n d s . A s soon a s the m i n e e x p l o d e d , K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d c a m e out on the s t a r b o a r d q u a r t e r d e c k , followed by officers of their staff. O n e survivor later recalled that the " C a p t a i n was calling to L o r d K to go to a boat b u t L o r d K apparently did not hear him or else took no notice." E s c a p e f r o m the d o o m e d vessel s e e m e d out of the question, and the field m a r s h a l m a d e no m o v e to a t t e m p t it. He stood on deck, calm a n d expressionless, for a b o u t a q u a r t e r of an hour. T h e only survivor of the Hampshire who is still alive has never forgotten a last g l i m p s e of him, d r e s s e d in a greatcoat, s t a n d i n g on deck a n d waiting impassively for the ship t o s i n k . T h e n L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his ship went down beneath the turbulent w a v e s . 3

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F i t z G e r a l d ' s b o d y was washed a s h o r e , b u t K i t c h e n e r d i s a p p e a r e d into the d e p t h s of the sea. A p o p u l a r legend s p r a n g up in Britain soon afterward, a c c o r d i n g to which L o r d K i t c h e n e r had e s c a p e d from death a n d w o u l d one day return.

28 H U S S E I N ' S REVOLT i By a coincidence that often has been r e m a r k e d u p o n , L o r d K i t c h e n e r was lost at sea just as the E m i r H u s s e i n of M e c c a p r o c l a i m e d his rebellion against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . H u s s e i n ordered it when he discovered that the Y o u n g T u r k s intended t o d e p o s e h i m . B u t British officialdom in C a i r o a n d K h a r t o u m , u n a w a r e of this, r e g a r d e d the rebellion as an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of the school of K i t c h e n e r — o f Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s — a n d of their tactic of d a n g l i n g vague b u t g r a n d i o s e p r o s p e c t s of future glory in front of the E m i r ' s eyes. T h e R e s i d e n c y h a d been working to generate the u p r i s i n g for almost nine m o n t h s . When the news of the desert u p r i s i n g reached C a i r o , W y n d h a m D e e d e s called it "a great t r i u m p h for C l a y t o n . " F o r H u s s e i n , it was s o m e t h i n g closer to an a d m i s s i o n of defeat; his policy had been to remain neutral a n d collect b r i b e s from both sides. He m o v e d to the Allied side reluctantly, forced to do so by the imminent d a n g e r that the Y o u n g T u r k s would overthrow h i m . H a v i n g already discovered that they intended to d e p o s e him eventually, he f o u n d himself e x p o s e d to new risks, starting in the s u m m e r of 1915, when D j e m a l P a s h a b e g a n to c r u s h dissent in the A r a b circles with which H u s s e i n ( t h r o u g h his son F e i s a l ) had been in contact in D a m a s c u s . D j e m a l acted on the basis of d o c u m e n t s o b tained from the F r e n c h consulates in Beirut a n d D a m a s c u s that betrayed the n a m e s of A r a b c o n s p i r a t o r s a n d of at least one key British agent. A r r e s t s were m a d e . Interrogations, torture, a n d trials by military court took place. On 21 A u g u s t 1915 eleven p e r s o n s convicted of treason were e x e c u t e d . In the following m o n t h s there were m o r e arrests a n d m o r e trials. A n u m b e r of those arrested were prominent figures in A r a b life. A m o n g those u n d e r g o i n g torture a n d interrogation in jail were p e o p l e who could have revealed details of Feisal's conversations with the secret societies al-'Ahd a n d a l - F a t a t , and o f H u s s e i n ' s p r o m i s e s t o K i t c h e n e r and M c M a h o n . T h e E m i r could not be s u r e that they would r e m a i n silent. He sent pleas to 1

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D j e m a l a n d to the Porte a s k i n g that they show mercy to the p r i s o n e r s . T h e pleas only c o m p r o m i s e d h i m further. T h e n , in April 1916, H u s s e i n learned f r o m D j e m a l that a picked and specially trained O t t o m a n force of 3 , 5 0 0 m e n was a b o u t to m a r c h t h r o u g h the H e j a z to the tip of the A r a b i a n peninsula, where an a c c o m p a n y i n g party of G e r m a n officers planned to establish a telegraph station. T h e O t t o m a n force was sufficiently s t r o n g t o c r u s h H u s s e i n as it m a r c h e d t h r o u g h his d o m a i n . T h e news threw the E m i r into hasty and i m p r o v i s e d activity; it obliged h i m to strike first, and to seek the protection of the Royal N a v y along his coast. On 6 M a y there were twenty-one new executions in Beirut a n d D a m a s c u s ; the news was u n e x p e c t e d , a n d s p e e d e d u p Hussein's s c h e d u l e . Prudently, H u s s e i n h a d already obtained m o r e than 5 0 , 0 0 0 gold p o u n d s from the Porte with which to raise a n d e q u i p forces to c o m b a t the B r i t i s h . To this he a d d e d the first installment of a substantial p a y m e n t from Britain with which to raise and e q u i p forces t o c o m b a t the T u r k s . T h e revolt i n the H e j a z was p r o c l a i m e d s o m e t i m e between 5 a n d 10 J u n e 1916. T h e Royal N a v y immediately m o v e d along the H e j a z coastline, which deterred the G e r m a n T u r k i s h force f r o m a d v a n c i n g further. 2

T h e A r a b B u r e a u believed that the u p r i s i n g would d r a w s u p p o r t throughout the M o s l e m a n d A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g worlds. M o s t important of all, it believed that the revolt w o u l d d r a w s u p p o r t from what the British believed to be a largely A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n a r m y . F e i s a l a n d H u s s e i n r e p o r t e d that they expected to be joined by a b o u t 100,000 A r a b t r o o p s . T h a t w o u l d have been about a third of the O t t o m a n a r m y ' s fighting strength. A c c o r d i n g to other r e p o r t s , H u s s e i n expected to be joined by a b o u t 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s , or a l m o s t the whole of the T u r k i s h army's functional c o m b a t t r o o p s . 3

4

In the event, the A r a b revolt for which H u s s e i n h o p e d never took place. No A r a b i c units of the O t t o m a n a r m y c a m e over to H u s s e i n . No political or military figures of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e defected to him a n d the Allies. T h e powerful secret military organization that a l - F a r u q i h a d p r o m i s e d would rally to H u s s e i n failed to m a k e itself known. A few t h o u s a n d t r i b e s m e n , s u b s i d i z e d by British money, constituted H u s s e i n ' s t r o o p s . H e h a d n o regular a r m y . O u t s i d e the H e j a z and its tribal neighbors, there w a s no visible s u p p o r t for the revolt in any part of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world. T h e handful of nonHejazi officers who joined the E m i r ' s a r m e d forces were prisoners-ofwar or exiles who already resided in British-controlled territories. An initial military p r o b l e m was that the E m i r ' s small b a n d of tribal followers were helpless against O t t o m a n artillery. T h e i r attacks on the T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n s i n M e c c a and nearby T a i f were r e p u l s e d , a s were their attacks on M e d i n a a n d on the port of J e d d a h . British s h i p s a n d airplanes c a m e t o the r e s c u e b y attacking J e d d a h . O n c e the port

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was s e c u r e d the British landed M o s l e m t r o o p s from the E g y p t i a n a r m y , who m o v e d inland t o help H u s s e i n take M e c c a a n d T a i f . T h e port of R a b e g h , defended by fewer than thirty T u r k s , was c a p t u r e d with ease, as was the port of Y a n b o . T h u s the British Royal N a v y won control of the R e d S e a coast of A r a b i a , and established a British presence ashore in the p o r t s . H u s s e i n would not allow Christian British military units to m o v e inland. H i s e x p r e s s e d view, which the British found parochial, was that it w o u l d c o m p r o m i s e his position in the M o s l e m world and would be deeply resented if n o n - M o s l e m s were to enter the land that e m b r a c e d the H o l y Places. T h e p r o b l e m was that H u s s e i n on his own was no match for the T u r k s . T h e activist R e g i n a l d Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f the S u d a n , wrote to C l a y t o n that Britain ought to s e n d in t r o o p s whether H u s s e i n wanted t h e m or not. He noted that he had been in favor of sending a British expeditionary force to the H e j a z all a l o n g . B u t Wingate's s u p e r i o r s d i s a g r e e d with h i m , and it b e c a m e British policy, insofar as it was p o s s i b l e , to s u p p l y professional military assistance to the H e j a z from a m o n g M o s l e m officers a n d t r o o p s . In a land of intrigue, this policy was also beset with difficulties. 5

M a j o r a l - M a s r i , strongly r e c o m m e n d e d by the British authorities, was appointed Chief of Staff of the forces nominally c o m m a n d e d by the E m i r ' s son Ali. He took up his position in late 1916, a n d within a m o n t h was r e m o v e d f r o m c o m m a n d as a result of a m u r k y intrigue. He was replaced by the able J a a f a r al-Askari, an A r a b general in the O t t o m a n a r m y w h o m the British h a d taken prisoner. A c c o r d i n g to one account, a l - M a s r i was plotting to take over control f r o m H u s s e i n in order to negotiate to change sides. He s p o k e of c o m i n g to an a r r a n g e m e n t whereby the H e j a z forces w o u l d return to the O t t o m a n fold in return for an agreement by the Porte to grant local a u t o n o m y to A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a r e a s . 6

It was not merely that a l - M a s r i a n d his colleagues believed that G e r m a n y would win the war. T w o years later, when it h a d b e c o m e clear that it was the Allies who were g o i n g to win, the one-time A r a b secret society c o m m a n d e r in D a m a s c u s ( w h o m a l - F a r u q i had purp o r t e d to represent when he d u p e d C l a y t o n and the others in C a i r o ) , General Y a s i n a l - H a s h i m i , still refused to change sides. G i l b e r t Clayton had m i s r e a d the politics of the A r a b secret societies: they were profoundly o p p o s e d to British d e s i g n s in the M i d d l e E a s t . At the beginning of the war they h a d resolved to s u p p o r t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e against the threat o f E u r o p e a n c o n q u e s t . T h e y r e m a i n e d faithful to their resolve. T h e y preferred a u t o n o m y or i n d e p e n d e n c e if they could get it; b u t if they could not, they preferred to be ruled b y T u r k i s h M o s l e m s rather than b y C h r i s t i a n s . 7

H u s s e i n himself, from the o p e n i n g d a y s of his revolt, continued-to

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c o m m u n i c a t e with the Y o u n g T u r k s with a view to c h a n g i n g b a c k to the O t t o m a n side of the war. T h e Arab Bulletin (no. 2 5 , 7 October 1916) q u o t e d the A r a b i a n warlord A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d a s c h a r g i n g that "Sherif's original intention was to play off the British against the T u r k s , a n d thus get the T u r k s to g r a n t him independence g u a r a n t e e d by Germany." Hussein's basic p r o g r a m r e m a i n e d constant: he wanted m o r e power and a u t o n o m y as E m i r within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a n d he wanted his position to be m a d e hereditary. A l t h o u g h the British were not yet aware of his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the enemy, they rapidly b e c a m e disenchanted with the E m i r for other r e a s o n s . As they c a m e to see it, H u s s e i n , far from b e i n g the leader of a newly created A r a b nationalism, was a ruler who took little interest in nationalism a n d whose only concern was for the acquisition of new p o w e r s a n d territories for himself. D a v i d H o g a r t h , the intelligence officer who headed the A r a b B u r e a u , drily c o m m e n t e d that, "It is obvious that the K i n g r e g a r d s A r a b Unity as s y n o n y m o u s with his own K i n g s h i p . . . " 8

T h e E m i r insisted on p r o c l a i m i n g himself king of the A r a b s , although R o n a l d S t o r r s on behalf of C a i r o had warned him not to do so. S t o r r s later wrote that "he knew better than we that he could lay no kind of genuine claim" to be the king of all the A r a b s . In this respect, S t o r r s found that "his pretensions b o r d e r e d on the tragicomic," yet felt that Britain was now obliged to s u p p o r t him as far as p o s s i b l e . T h e A r a b B u r e a u was deeply d i s a p p o i n t e d b y the failure of H u s s e i n ' s leadership to take hold. 9

10

II It is d u e to T. E. L a w r e n c e , a j u n i o r m e m b e r of the A r a b B u r e a u , that its real views were recorded in convenient f o r m , p r o v i d i n g an account of the c o n t e m p o r a r y o b s e r v a t i o n s and private t h o u g h t s of the small b a n d of Kitchener's followers who had organized Hussein's revolt a n d who had placed so m u c h h o p e in it. It was L a w r e n c e who s u g g e s t e d that the A r a b B u r e a u p u b l i s h an information bulletin. Originally issued under the title Arab Bureau Summaries, it then b e c a m e the Arab Bulletin. It a p p e a r e d at irregular intervals, c o m mencing 6 J u n e 1916, a n d continuing until the end of 1918. T h e first issue was edited by L a w r e n c e . F o r m o s t of the next three m o n t h s , issues were edited by L i e u t e n a n t - C o m m a n d e r D a v i d H o g a r t h , the O x f o r d archaeologist who served as D i r e c t o r of the A r a b B u r e a u . At the end of the s u m m e r , C a p t a i n K i n a h a n Cornwallis, H o g a r t h ' s deputy, took over as the regular editor. I s s u e d from the A r a b B u r e a u offices in the S a v o y Hotel, C a i r o , the Arab Bulletin was labeled " S e c r e t . " Only twenty-six copies were

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printed of each issue. T h e restricted distribution list included the Viceroy of I n d i a a n d the British commanders-in-chief in E g y p t and the S u d a n . A copy each also went to the War Office a n d to the A d m i r a l t y in L o n d o n . T h e issues p r o v i d e d a wide range of confidential current and b a c k g r o u n d information a b o u t the A r a b a n d M o s l e m worlds. L a w r e n c e , in the first issue (6 J u n e 1916), which a p p e a r e d just as the revolt in the H e j a z b e g a n , indicated that there were p r o b l e m s in holding A r a b s together even for the p u r p o s e s of revolt. He wrote that whenever there were large tribal gatherings, dissensions soon a r o s e ; a n d , knowing this, the T u r k s held back a n d did nothing. T h e y delayed "in the s u r e expectation that tribal dissension w o u l d soon d i s m e m b e r their o p p o n e n t s . " T h e Arab Bulletin, no. 5 (18 J u n e 1916), reported the b e g i n n i n g of H u s s e i n ' s proclaimed revolt a week or two earlier. T h i s issue a n d issue no. 6 (23 J u n e 1916) indicate that H u s s e i n ' s military operations had achieved only m o d e s t s u c c e s s , a n d that even this had been d u e to British forces. A c c o r d i n g to issue no. 6, the T u r k s on the coast were c a u g h t between British s h i p s a n d seaplanes, a n d the A r a b s . S e e k i n g cover behind walls, the T u r k s were driven to s u r r e n d e r for lack of food and water, for their wells were outside the walls. T u r k i s h prisoners taken at J e d d a h were q u o t e d in the Arab Bulletin, no. 7 (30 J u n e 1916), as saying that E n g l i s h "shells and b o m b s it was that really took the town." H u s s e i n ' s t r o o p s were belittled as soldiers. A c c o r d i n g to issue no. 6, " T h e y are p r e s u m a b l y t r i b e s m e n only"; and " T h e y are all u n trained, and have no artillery or m a c h i n e g u n s . T h e i r preference is for the showy side of warfare, and it will be difficult to hold them together for any length of time, unless the pay a n d rations are attractive." A detailed analysis a n d description written by T. E. L a w r e n c e , which a p p e a r e d in issue no. 32 (26 N o v e m b e r 1916), w a s in the s a m e vein: "I think one c o m p a n y of T u r k s , properly entrenched in open country, w o u l d defeat the Sherif's a r m i e s . T h e value of the tribes is defensive only, a n d their real s p h e r e is guerilla warfare." He wrote that they were "too individualistic to e n d u r e c o m m a n d s , or fight in line, or help each other. It would, I think, be i m p o s s i b l e to m a k e an organized force out of t h e m . " H u s s e i n ' s call to revolt fell on deaf ears throughout the A r a b and M o s l e m w o r l d s , a c c o r d i n g to the Arab Bulletin. S o u n d i n g s of opinion a r o u n d the g l o b e , as reported in issues t h r o u g h o u t 1916, elicited r e s p o n s e s r a n g i n g from indifference to hostility. I s s u e no. 29 (8 N o v e m b e r 1916), which reported Hussein's proclamation that he was a s s u m i n g the title of K i n g of the A r a b s , c o m m e n t e d icily that "the prince, claiming s u c h recognition, is very far from being in a position to substantiate his pretension," and that H i s Majesty's

HUSSEIN'S

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G o v e r n m e n t was not g o i n g to sign a blank check on the future political organization of the A r a b p e o p l e s . In issue no. 41 (6 F e b r u a r y 1917), H o g a r t h wrote that "the p r o s p e c t of A r a b i a united u n d e r either the K i n g of the H e j a z or anyone else s e e m s very r e m o t e . T h e 'Arab C a u s e ' is evidently a very weak cement in the p e n i n s u l a ; dislike of the T u r k is stronger; a n d a desire to stand well with us is p e r h a p s stronger still." N e a r l y a year after H u s s e i n p r o c l a i m e d the A r a b Revolt, H o g a r t h was p r e p a r e d to write it off as a failure. In reviewing what he called "A Y e a r of Revolt" in the H e j a z for the Arab Bulletin, no. 52 (31 M a y 1917), he c o n c l u d e d that it had not fulfilled the hopes placed in it nor did it justify further expectations: " T h a t the H e j a z B e d o u i n s were s i m p l y guerillas, a n d not of g o o d quality at that, had been a m p l y d e m o n s t r a t e d , even in the early sieges; a n d it was never in d o u b t that they would not attack nor withstand T u r k i s h r e g u l a r s . " T h e best that could be hoped for in the future from H u s s e i n ' s A r a b M o v e m e n t , he wrote, was that it would "just hold its own in p l a c e . " It was not m u c h of a return on the British investment. A c c o r d i n g to a later account by R o n a l d S t o r r s , Britain spent, in all, 11 million p o u n d s sterling to s u b s i d i z e H u s s e i n ' s r e v o l t . At the time this was a b o u t 44 million d o l l a r s ; in today's currency it would be closer to 400 million dollars. Britain's military a n d political investment in H u s s e i n ' s revolt was also c o n s i d e r a b l e . On 21 S e p t e m b e r 1918 R e g i n a l d Wingate, who by then had s u c c e e d e d K i t c h e n e r a n d M c M a h o n as British proconsul in E g y p t , wrote that " M o s l e m s in general have hitherto r e g a r d e d the H e j a z revolt, a n d our share in it, with suspicion or dislike"; a n d that it was i m p o r t a n t to make H u s s e i n look as t h o u g h he had not been a failure in order to keep Britain from looking b a d . 11

1 2

Ill T h r e e weeks after H u s s e i n a n n o u n c e d his rebellion, the British War Office told the C a b i n e t in L o n d o n that the A r a b world was not following his lead. In a secret m e m o r a n d u m p r e p a r e d for the War C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t on 1 J u l y 1916, the G e n e r a l Staff of the War Office reported that H u s s e i n "has always represented himself, in his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , as b e i n g the s p o k e s m a n of the A r a b nation, but so far as is known, he is not s u p p o r t e d by any organization of A r a b s nearly general enough to secure . . . a u t o m a t i c acceptance of the t e r m s agreed to by h i m . " As a result, a c c o r d i n g to the m e m o r a n d u m , the British g o v e r n m e n t ought not to a s s u m e that a g r e e m e n t s reached with him w o u l d be honored by other A r a b leaders. 13

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In a secret m e m o r a n d u m entitled " T h e P r o b l e m of the N e a r E a s t , " p r e p a r e d at about the s a m e time, S i r M a r k S y k e s predicted that if British aid were not forthcoming, the Sherif H u s s e i n ' s m o v e ment would be c r u s h e d by early 1917. G l o o m i l y , S y k e s foresaw that by the close of the war, T u r k e y would be the most exhausted of the belligerent countries a n d , as a result, w o u l d be taken over by her partner, G e r m a n y . T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e , wrote S y k e s , w o u l d bec o m e little m o r e than a G e r m a n c o l o n y . H i s analysis in this respect foreshadowed the new views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t that were to b e c o m e current in British official circles the following year under the influence of L e o A m e r y and his colleagues. 14

S y k e s had b e c o m e an assistant to his friend M a u r i c e H a n k e y , Secretary of A s q u i t h ' s War C a b i n e t . In his new position S y k e s continued to concern himself with the E a s t . He had p u b l i s h e d an Arabian Report, a L o n d o n forerunner of Cairo's Arab Bulletin. When his friend G i l b e r t Clayton arrived f r o m E g y p t in the latter half of 1916, the two m e n went before the War C o m m i t t e e to u r g e s u p p o r t for H u s s e i n ' s revolt in the H e j a z . T h e y also urged- that S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n should be replaced as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t ; for M c M a h o n had been a p p o i n t e d only to keep the position available for K i t c h e n e r , and when the field m a r s h a l died, K i t c h e n e r ' s followers wanted the j o b for R e g i n a l d Wingate, one of their own.* D u r i n g the s u m m e r of 1916, S y k e s spent a g o o d deal of time m a k i n g public s p e e c h e s . In his s p e e c h e s he gave currency to the new descriptive p h r a s e , "the M i d d l e E a s t , " which the A m e r i c a n naval officer a n d historian Alfred T h a y e r M a h a n had invented in 1902 to designate the area between A r a b i a a n d I n d i a ; a n d he a d d e d to his public reputation as an expert on that area of the world. In S e p t e m b e r , as intelligence r e p o r t s from Cairo indicated that the revolt in the H e j a z was collapsing even m o r e rapidly than he had anticipated, S y k e s a d v o c a t e d s e n d i n g out military s u p p o r t to H u s s e i n i m m e d i a t e l y — a plan vigorously a d v a n c e d b y M c M a h o n a n d Wingate. H i s u r g i n g s were in vain: R o b e r t s o n , the all-powerful new Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, refused to divert troops or efforts from the western front. T h e late s u m m e r a n d a u t u m n of 1916 a p p e a r e d to be d e s p e r a t e times for H u s s e i n ' s c a u s e , t h o u g h in retrospect Britain's naval control of the R e d S e a coastline p r o b a b l y e n s u r e d the survival of the E m i r ' s s u p p o r t e r s . T h e British hit on the idea of s e n d i n g a few h u n d r e d A r a b prisoners-of-war f r o m India's M e s o p o t a m i a n front to join H u s s e i n . When S i r A r c h i b a l d M u r r a y , c o m m a n d i n g general (since J a n u a r y 1916) of the British a r m y in E g y p t , reiterated that he could 1 5

* In the end, they succeeded. Wingate was appointed High Commissioner, but not until January 1917.

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s p a r e no t r o o p s to s e n d to H u s s e i n ' s defense, the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , s u g g e s t e d asking for help from F r a n c e . H e also sent R o n a l d S t o r r s , his aide at the Residency, on a m i s s i o n to A r a b i a to inquire as to what else could be done.

IV At the end of the s u m m e r of 1916, the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t sent a mission to the H e j a z to attempt to s t o p the Sherif H u s s e i n ' s revolt from collapsing. L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l E d o u a r d B r e m o n d , h e a d i n g the F r e n c h mission, arrived in Alexandria 1 S e p t e m b e r 1916, and from there took ship for A r a b i a , arriving at the Hejazi port of J e d d a h on 20 S e p t e m b e r . B r e m o n d ' s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r i n J e d d a h w a s Colonel C . E . Wilson, the senior British officer in the H e j a z and representative of the G o v e r n m e n t of the S u d a n — w h i c h is to say of Wingate, who was soon to a s s u m e operational control of the British side of the H e j a z revolt. H i s assistant, C a p t a i n H u b e r t Y o u n g , was at the British consulate in J e d d a h (which called itself the P i l g r i m a g e Office, as it dealt with the affairs of M o s l e m p i l g r i m s from British I n d i a a n d elsewhere) to greet B r e m o n d when he arrived. B r e m o n d also met Vice-Admiral S i r R o s s l y n W e m y s s , whose British fleet controlled the R e d S e a p a s s a g e between E g y p t and the S u d a n and A r a b i a , a n d who ferried officers a n d m e n across it. 1 6

B r e m o n d ' s a s s i g n m e n t was to s h o r e up the H e j a z revolt by s u p p l y ing a cadre of professional military advisers from a m o n g the M o h a m m e d a n population of the F r e n c h E m p i r e who, as M o s l e m s , would be a c c e p t a b l e to the Sherif. T h e F r e n c h mission led by B r e m o n d c o m p r i s e d 42 officers a n d 983 m e n . T h e size of the F r e n c h mission p r o m p t e d the rival British to s e n d out a further c o m p l e m e n t of officers of their own to serve u n d e r Wilson. B r e m o n d , in t u r n , contemplated increasing the size of his forces in order to strengthen the forces of the Sherif, which were d a n g e r o u s l y weak. I n d e e d , A b d u l l a h , the son closest to the Sherif's thinking, was fearful that the O t t o m a n forces b a s e d in M e d i n a might attack a n d overrun the rebel positions on the road to M e c c a . In the m i d d l e of O c t o b e r , R o n a l d S t o r r s , of the British R e s i d e n c y in C a i r o , took ship from E g y p t to the H e j a z with an alternative a p p r o a c h . He c a m e in s u p p o r t of M a j o r Aziz a l - M a s r i , the nationalist secret society leader, w h o m C a i r o had nominated to take in h a n d the training a n d reorganization of the H e j a z forces, a n d whose brief tenure in c o m m a n d was d e s c r i b e d earlier (see p a g e 2 2 0 ) . A l - M a s r i was of the opinion that it would be a political disaster to allow Allied t r o o p s , even t h o u g h M o s l e m , to b e c o m e too visibly involved in the

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Sherif's c a m p a i g n . H i s view was that the forces of M e c c a could fight effectively on their own if trained in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. S t o r r s a r r a n g e d for his y o u n g friend, the junior intelligence officer T . E . L a w r e n c e , t o c o m e along o n the s h i p t o J e d d a h . L a w r e n c e had a c c u m u l a t e d a few weeks of leave time, and wanted to s p e n d t h e m in A r a b i a , which he had never visited. S t o r r s obtained p e r m i s s i o n for L a w r e n c e to c o m e along with h i m ; so they arrived in J e d d a h together. T h o m a s E d w a r d L a w r e n c e was twenty-eight years old, t h o u g h h e looked closer to nineteen or twenty. He had been turned down for a r m y service as too s m a l l ; he stood only a few inches above five feet in height. H u b e r t Y o u n g called h i m "a quiet little m a n . " R o n a l d S t o r r s , like most others, called h i m "little L a w r e n c e , " t h o u g h S t o r r s also called him " s u p e r - c e r e b r a l . " H i s personal c i r c u m s t a n c e s s e e m e d u n d i s t i n g u i s h e d . H e was apparently of a poor family and of m o d e s t b a c k g r o u n d , in an A r a b B u r e a u g r o u p that included M e m b e r s of Parliament, millionaires, a n d aristocrats. He had attended the City School at h o m e in O x f o r d rather than a public school (in the British s e n s e ) : E t o n , H a r r o w , Winchester, or the like. In A r a b B u r e a u circles he ranked low, and had no military a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s to his credit. L a w r e n c e had worked for the archaeologist D a v i d H o g a r t h at the A s h m o l e a n M u s e u m , a n d H o g a r t h — w h o later b e c a m e head of the A r a b B u r e a u — h a d gotten him into the geographical section of the War Office in the a u t u m n of 1914 as a t e m p o r a r y second lieutenantt r a n s l a t o r . F r o m there he went out to the M i d d l e E a s t to do survey m a p s . He stayed on in C a i r o to do other j o b s . When S t o r r s a n d L a w r e n c e arrived i n J e d d a h , the E m i r H u s s e i n ' s son A b d u l l a h met t h e m . A b d u l l a h p r o v e d an i m m e d i a t e disappointment to L a w r e n c e , but L a w r e n c e so i m p r e s s e d A b d u l l a h that he won coveted permission to go into the field to meet the E m i r of M e c c a ' s other sons. F o r L a w r e n c e this was a m a j o r coup. Colonel Alfred Parker, who had been the first head of the A r a b B u r e a u a n d who served as h e a d of Military Intelligence in the H e j a z revolt, wrote to Clayton on 24 O c t o b e r 1916, that "Before L a w r e n c e arrived I had been p u s h i n g the idea of g o i n g up country and had h o p e d to go u p . Don't think I g r u d g e him, especially as he will do it as well or better than anyone. S i n c e he has been g o n e " the H e j a z g o v e r n m e n t "is not inclined to agree to other t r i p s . " 1 7

18

19

2 0

In the field, L a w r e n c e visited F e i s a l and the other leaders and found Feisal e n c h a n t i n g : "an a b s o l u t e r i p p e r , " he later wrote to a c o l l e a g u e . L a w r e n c e decided that Feisal should b e c o m e the field c o m m a n d e r of the H e j a z revolt. A m o n g his other qualities, Feisal looked the p a r t . 21

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On his own initiative, L a w r e n c e sent a written report to R e g i n a l d Wingate, G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of the S u d a n , who was soon to be sent to E g y p t to replace M c M a h o n as H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r . When L a w r e n c e left the H e j a z in N o v e m b e r , instead of returning directly to C a i r o , he e m b a r k e d for the S u d a n to introduce himself to Wingate. L a w r e n c e — t h r o u g h his friendship with G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , the S u d a n ' s representative in C a i r o — m u s t have been familiar with Wingate's outlook on the future of M i d d l e E a s t e r n politics. He would have known that Wingate a i m e d at s e c u r i n g British domination of the postwar A r a b M i d d l e E a s t a n d (like himself) at preventing F r a n c e f r o m establishing a position in the region. A l t h o u g h Wingate wanted Hussein's forces to be s a v e d from defeat a n d possible destruction, he could not have wanted the rescue to be undertaken by F r e n c h m e n — for that would risk b r i n g i n g H u s s e i n ' s A r a b M o v e m e n t u n d e r longterm F r e n c h influence. L a w r e n c e p r o p o s e d to Wingate an alternative to B r e m o n d ' s project of e m p l o y i n g F r e n c h and other Allied regular a r m y units to do the bulk of H u s s e i n ' s fighting for h i m : Hussein's t r i b e s m e n s h o u l d be u s e d as irregulars in a British-led guerrilla warfare c a m p a i g n . Aziz a l - M a s r i h a d originally s u g g e s t e d the guerrilla warfare idea to L a w r e n c e , intending t o exclude F r a n c e and Britain f r o m A r a b i a ; L a w r e n c e modified the plan so as to exclude only F r a n c e . L a w r e n c e a d d e d that F e i s a l s h o u l d be a p p o i n t e d to c o m m a n d the Sherifian striking forces, a n d claimed that he himself was the only liaison officer with w h o m Feisal would work. Wingate t e n d e d to agree. B a c k in 1914 he had been the first to u r g e that the A r a b i a n tribes s h o u l d be stirred up to m a k e trouble for T u r k e y . In a sense it w a s Wingate's own plan that L a w r e n c e was advocating. I n d e e d , writing to a fellow general s o m e two d e c a d e s later, Wingate claimed that it w a s h e — a n d not "poor little L a w r e n c e " — w h o h a d launched, s u p p o r t e d , a n d m a d e p o s s i b l e the Arab Movement. 2 2

L a w r e n c e ' s p r o p o s a l s were also congenial to the British military authorities in C a i r o . T h e y did not expect his guerrilla warfare c a m paign to be a great s u c c e s s — q u i t e the c o n t r a r y — b u t they h a d no troops to s p a r e for the H e j a z a n d therefore were delighted to hear that none were n e e d e d . L a w r e n c e rose high in their estimation by not asking for any. L a w r e n c e left C a i r o again on 25 N o v e m b e r 1916, a n d by early D e c e m b e r h a d taken up his position with F e i s a l . Wingate b e c a m e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in J a n u a r y 1917, a n d s u p p l i e d L a w r e n c e with increasingly large s u m s of gold with which to b u y s u p p o r t f r o m the A r a b tribes. Y e t the winter a n d s p r i n g of 1917 went by with no news of any significant military s u c c e s s that L a w r e n c e ' s t r i b e s m e n h a d won.

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V T h e most c o n s p i c u o u s failure of the M e c c a revolt was its failure to carry with it M e d i n a , the other large holy city of the H e j a z . M e d i n a lay s o m e 300 miles to the northeast of M e c c a , blocking the route that continued northward toward S y r i a . F o l l o w e r s of the Sherif H u s s e i n attacked it in the first d a y s of the revolt, but were beaten off with e a s e ; and the Sherif's forces were u n a b l e to capture it d u r i n g the war. N o r could they b y - p a s s it and allow its large T u r k i s h garrison to attack them on the flank or from the rear. M e d i n a was s u r r o u n d e d by a solid stone wall, said to date from the twelfth century, d o m i n a t e d by towers a n d , at the northwest, by a castle m a n n e d by the O t t o m a n g a r r i s o n . T h e terminal of the H e j a z railroad from D a m a s c u s was situated within its walls, a n d p r o v i d e d access to s u p p l i e s and reinforcements. A l t h o u g h the railroad track was repeatedly d y n a m i t e d d u r i n g the war by Allied-led B e d o u i n raiding parties, the O t t o m a n g a r r i s o n continued to repair it and keep it in u s e . T h e O t t o m a n presence at M e d i n a , blocking the line of a d v a n c e that the Sherifian t r i b e s m e n w o u l d have to follow in order to participate in the main theater of operations of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n war, s e e m e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that H u s s e i n w a s not g o i n g anywhere. T h e rebellion that s t r e a m e d forth from M e c c a was visibly b r o u g h t to a halt by the centuries-old walls of M e d i n a . T h e structure of O t t o m a n authority held firm. It had not been in the state of a d v a n c e d decay that E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s had reported it to b e .

PART V THE ALLIES AT THE NADIR OF THEIR FORTUNES

29 THE FALL OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND FRANCE i Between a u t u m n 1916 a n d a u t u m n 1917, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e held firm while the g o v e r n m e n t s of its adversaries, the Allied P o w e r s , collapsed. T h i s was very m u c h contrary t o what E u r o p e a n political and military leaders h a d e x p e c t e d . T h e O t t o m a n a r m y ' s s u c c e s s in h o l d i n g the D a r d a n e l l e s p l a y e d a direct role in the overthrow of P r i m e M i n i s t e r A s q u i t h ' s g o v e r n m e n t in Britain a n d that of C z a r N i c h o l a s in R u s s i a . T h e overthrow of the British a n d R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d of the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in 1917, b r o u g h t to power in the three Allied capitals new leaders who held s t r o n g views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t which were totally at variance with those of their p r e d e c e s s o r s . T h e P r i m e Minister w h o h a d b r o u g h t Britain into the war w a s the first Allied leader to fall victim to it. B o n a r L a w o n c e o b s e r v e d , in a letter to A s q u i t h , that " I n war it is n e c e s s a r y not only to be active but to s e e m a c t i v e . " A s q u i t h , with his indolent patrician w a y s , s e e m e d the r e v e r s e . He h a d achieved a towering position in British politics, b u t it w a s an aspect of his special g e n i u s to m a k e his t r i u m p h s a p p e a r effortless. In the transaction of political a n d g o v e r n mental b u s i n e s s he was u n h u r r i e d : he always s e e m e d to have time for another dinner party, another visit to the countryside, or—all too often—another c o g n a c . 1

A s military c a t a s t r o p h e s multiplied i n M e s o p o t a m i a , G a l l i p o l i , a n d on the western front, the P r i m e Minister's m e t h o d of C a b i n e t g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n s u s s e e m e d indecisive, while his unwillingness to call u p o n the nation for s u c h s t r o n g m e a s u r e s as c o m p u l s o r y military service s u g g e s t e d that he w a s less than completely d e d i c a t e d to winning the war. L l o y d G e o r g e , i n d r a m a t i c contrast, m a d e the conscription issue his o w n . In taking the lead on this i s s u e he s h o w e d how m u c h his 231

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political position had c h a n g e d . While A s q u i t h , who had b r o u g h t the country into the war, c o n t i n u e d to u p h o l d p e a c e t i m e civil liberties a n d L i b e r a l values, L l o y d G e o r g e , the one-time R a d i c a l who until the last m o m e n t had o p p o s e d entry into the war, e m e r g e d as a leader p r e p a r e d to sacrifice individual rights for the sake of victory. T r a ditional L i b e r a l s , who h a d always o p p o s e d c o m p u l s i o n , felt that L l o y d G e o r g e w a s g o i n g over t o the other c a m p . As he lost his old political friends, L l o y d G e o r g e a c q u i r e d new ones, two of w h o m p r o v e d to be especially i m p o r t a n t . O n e w a s S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n , the rebel I r i s h T o r y who led the fight for c o n s c r i p tion in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . T h e other was the c h a m p i o n of i m p e r i a l i s m , Alfred Milner, who led the fight for conscription in the H o u s e of L o r d s a n d , as c h a i r m a n of the National S e r v i c e L e a g u e , in the country. Milner, an o u t s t a n d i n g colonial administrator, h a d been largely r e s p o n s i b l e for launching the B o e r War, the venture in S o u t h Africa at the turn of the century that L l o y d G e o r g e as a y o u n g idealist h a d vigorously o p p o s e d . A t the time L l o y d G e o r g e had attacked Milner bitterly. As a R a d i c a l , the y o u n g W e l s h m a n h a d o p p o s e d imperial e x p a n s i o n , foreign involvement, a n d military vent u r e s ; while L o r d Milner, as a L i b e r a l U n i o n i s t who b e c a m e the inspiration of right-wing T o r i e s , m a d e himself the center of imperialist thought. H i s ideal w a s imperial u n i o n . T o g e t h e r with the y o u n g m e n a s s e m b l e d in S o u t h Africa u n d e r his l e a d e r s h i p — " M i l n e r ' s K i n d e r g a r t e n " — h e h a d s t i m u l a t e d the m o v e m e n t for integration of the far-flung e m p i r e into one o r g a n i c unit. Milner was a s u p e r b a d m i n i s t r a t o r whose skills were later to prove invaluable to L l o y d G e o r g e in winning the war. 2

II In 1916, L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War when K i t c h e n e r d i e d , but found himself powerless to put an end to the sickening military d i s a s t e r s of that year. It has been e s t i m a t e d that the total of military a n d civilian casualties in all of E u r o p e ' s d o m e s t i c a n d international conflicts in the 100 years between 1815 a n d 1915 was no greater than a single day's c o m b a t losses in any of the great battles of 1 9 1 6 . C o m i n g after G a l l i p o l i and M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d such 3

* Milner's ideal was a union of the white peoples of the British Empire. Other members of the Milner circle, however, advocated a multiracial imperial union. Lionel George Curtis, his former secretary, in 1910 helped to found the quarterly review the Round Table which advocated British imperial federalism. Another former secretary, John Buchan, was a fervent imperialist who won over a vast public by his popular adventure novels. Another graduate of the Kindergarten, Geoffrey Robinson, edited The Times.

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gory episodes as the 142,000 British casualties suffered in just four days of fighting at A r r a s in F r a n c e , the terrible S o m m e offensive of J u l y 1916 a r o u s e d a climax of d e s p a i r . On 1 J u l y the British lost 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , the heaviest casualties ever suffered in a single day by a British a r m y . By the time the offensive was over, British casualties a t the S o m m e had m o u n t e d t o 4 2 0 , 0 0 0 . A m o n g them was R a y m o n d A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's son. L l o y d G e o r g e d e s p a i r e d of victory as he o b s e r v e d the lengthy a n d inefficient m e e t i n g s of A s q u i t h ' s large War C a b i n e t , d e b a t i n g endlessly and deciding nothing. On 9 N o v e m b e r he told M a u r i c e H a n k e y that "We are g o i n g to lose this w a r . " At a b o u t the s a m e time, the Gallipoli controversy was revived, r e m i n d i n g the political world how ineptly the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had w a g e d war. U n w i s e l y , the g o v e r n m e n t had sanctioned an official inquiry in J u n e into the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . Churchill, now out of office, devoted himself to d o c u m e n t i n g the case that his colleagues were to b l a m e for the Gallipoli disaster. T h e a l a r m e d P r i m e Minister m a n a g e d to have the report restricted to the C o m m i s s i o n of Inquiry's conclusions, omitting the testimony a n d other evidence on which they were b a s e d . Nonetheless, the political d a m a g e was done and the Gallipoli inquiry c o n t r i b u t e d to the collapse of the first coalition government. 4

5

T h e story of A s q u i t h ' s overthrow has been told too often for it to need retelling here at any length. A principal role in his downfall was played by the British p r e s s , d o m i n a t e d then, as it never has been before or since, by one m a n . Alfred H a r m s w o r t h , Viscount Northcliffe, controlled half the L o n d o n p r e s s , at a time, before radio or television, when publications were the only media of m a s s c o m munication. H i s ownership of The Times, with its prestige, a n d of the Daily Mail, with its p o p u l a r a p p e a l , gave him both "the classes and the m a s s e s . " Northcliffe u s e d his i m m e n s e power to d r a m a t i z e the case that A s q u i t h a n d his civilian colleagues were preventing the generals a n d a d m i r a l s from winning the war. 6

Northcliffe's n e w s p a p e r s ranged themselves behind S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n , Britain's leading trial lawyer, who led the revolt against the g o v e r n m e n t in Parliament and in the country. C a r s o n on the attack was the m o s t d a n g e r o u s animal in the political j u n g l e . As he lashed out against the g o v e r n m e n t , the lean, dark, and bitter I r i s h m a n s e e m e d to be everything the P r i m e Minister was not. As a historian has written of him, " T h e notion b e c a m e current that he p o s s e s s e d a drive, a remorseless determination, a n d unrelenting hostility to the G e r m a n s , which contrasted strongly with the dismal procrastination attributed to A s q u i t h a n d his c o l l e a g u e s . " 7

A l t h o u g h he denied it, in the a u t u m n of 1916 L l o y d G e o r g e b e g a n working closely with C a r s o n ; and S i r M a x Aitken (later L o r d

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V T h e most c o n s p i c u o u s failure of the M e c c a revolt was its failure to carry with it M e d i n a , the other large holy city of the H e j a z . M e d i n a lay s o m e 300 miles to the northeast of M e c c a , blocking the route that continued northward toward S y r i a . Followers of the Sherif H u s s e i n attacked it in the first days of the revolt, but were beaten off with e a s e ; and the Sherif's forces were u n a b l e to c a p t u r e it d u r i n g the war. N o r could they b y - p a s s it and allow its large T u r k i s h garrison to attack them on the flank or from the rear. M e d i n a was s u r r o u n d e d by a solid stone wall, said to date from the twelfth century, d o m i n a t e d by towers a n d , at the northwest, by a castle m a n n e d by the O t t o m a n g a r r i s o n . T h e terminal of the H e j a z railroad from D a m a s c u s was situated within its walls, and provided access to s u p p l i e s and reinforcements. Although the railroad track was repeatedly d y n a m i t e d d u r i n g the war by Allied-led B e d o u i n raiding parties, the O t t o m a n garrison continued to repair it a n d keep it in u s e . T h e O t t o m a n presence at M e d i n a , blocking the line of a d v a n c e that the Sherifian tribesmen would have to follow in order to participate in the main theater of o p e r a t i o n s of the M i d d l e Eastern war, s e e m e d to d e m o n s t r a t e that H u s s e i n was not g o i n g anywhere. T h e rebellion that s t r e a m e d forth from M e c c a was visibly b r o u g h t to a halt by the centuries-old walls of M e d i n a . T h e structure of O t t o m a n authority held firm. It had not been in the state of a d v a n c e d decay that E u r o p e a n o b s e r v e r s had reported it to b e .

2 S i r M a r k S y k e s at his d e s k in 1916

16 R u s s i a n o c c u p a t i o n of E r z e r u m

17

R u s s i a n t r o o p s in T r e b i z o n d

11 j

I•

i ^

PART V THE ALLIES AT THE NADIR OF THEIR FORTUNES

29 THE FALL OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS: BRITAIN AND FRANCE i Between a u t u m n 1916 a n d a u t u m n 1917, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e held firm while the g o v e r n m e n t s of its adversaries, the Allied Powers, collapsed. T h i s was very m u c h contrary to what E u r o p e a n political and military leaders h a d e x p e c t e d . T h e O t t o m a n army's s u c c e s s in h o l d i n g the D a r d a n e l l e s played a direct role in the overthrow of P r i m e Minister A s q u i t h ' s g o v e r n m e n t in Britain a n d that of C z a r N i c h o l a s in R u s s i a . T h e overthrow of the British a n d R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t s , a n d of the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in 1917, b r o u g h t to power in the three Allied capitals new leaders who held s t r o n g views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t which were totally at variance with those of their p r e d e c e s s o r s . T h e P r i m e Minister who h a d b r o u g h t Britain into the war was the first Allied leader to fall victim to it. B o n a r L a w once o b s e r v e d , in a letter to A s q u i t h , that "In war it is necessary not only to be active but to s e e m active." A s q u i t h , with his indolent patrician ways, s e e m e d the reverse. He h a d achieved a towering position in British politics, b u t it was an aspect of his special genius to m a k e his t r i u m p h s a p p e a r effortless. In the transaction of political a n d g o v e r n mental b u s i n e s s he was u n h u r r i e d : he always s e e m e d to have time for another dinner p a r t y , another visit to the countryside, o r — a l l too often—another c o g n a c . 1

As military c a t a s t r o p h e s multiplied in M e s o p o t a m i a , G a l l i p o l i , a n d on the western front, the P r i m e Minister's m e t h o d of C a b i n e t g o v e r n m e n t by c o n s e n s u s s e e m e d indecisive, while his unwillingness to call u p o n the nation for s u c h s t r o n g m e a s u r e s as c o m p u l s o r y military service s u g g e s t e d that he was less than completely dedicated to winning the w a r . L l o y d G e o r g e , in d r a m a t i c contrast, m a d e the conscription issue his own. In taking the lead on this issue he s h o w e d how m u c h his 231

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political position had c h a n g e d . While A s q u i t h , who h a d b r o u g h t the country into the war, continued to u p h o l d peacetime civil liberties and L i b e r a l values, L l o y d G e o r g e , the one-time R a d i c a l who until the last m o m e n t had o p p o s e d entry into the war, e m e r g e d as a leader p r e p a r e d to sacrifice individual rights for the sake of victory. T r a ditional L i b e r a l s , who h a d always o p p o s e d c o m p u l s i o n , felt that L l o y d G e o r g e w a s g o i n g over t o the other c a m p . As he lost his old political friends, L l o y d G e o r g e a c q u i r e d new ones, two of w h o m p r o v e d to be especially i m p o r t a n t . O n e w a s S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n , the rebel Irish T o r y who led the fight for c o n s c r i p tion in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . T h e other was the c h a m p i o n of i m p e r i a l i s m , Alfred Milner, who led the fight for conscription in the H o u s e of L o r d s a n d , as c h a i r m a n of the National S e r v i c e L e a g u e , in the country. Milner, an o u t s t a n d i n g colonial a d m i n i s t r a t o r , h a d been largely r e s p o n s i b l e for l a u n c h i n g the B o e r War, the venture in S o u t h Africa at the turn of the century that L l o y d G e o r g e as a y o u n g idealist h a d vigorously o p p o s e d . A t the time L l o y d G e o r g e h a d attacked Milner bitterly. As a R a d i c a l , the y o u n g W e l s h m a n h a d o p p o s e d imperial e x p a n s i o n , foreign involvement, a n d military vent u r e s ; while L o r d Milner, as a L i b e r a l U n i o n i s t who b e c a m e the inspiration of right-wing T o r i e s , m a d e himself the center of imperialist thought. H i s ideal w a s imperial union. T o g e t h e r with the y o u n g men a s s e m b l e d in S o u t h Africa u n d e r his l e a d e r s h i p — " M i l n e r ' s K i n d e r g a r t e n " — h e h a d s t i m u l a t e d the m o v e m e n t for integration of the far-flung e m p i r e into one organic unit. Milner w a s a s u p e r b a d m i n i s t r a t o r w h o s e skills were later to prove invaluable to L l o y d G e o r g e in winning the war. 2

II In 1916, L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for War when K i t c h e n e r d i e d , but found himself powerless to put an end to the sickening military d i s a s t e r s of that year. It has been estimated that the total of military a n d civilian casualties in all of E u r o p e ' s d o m e s t i c a n d international conflicts in the 100 years between 1815 a n d 1915 was no greater than a single day's c o m b a t losses in any of the great battles of 1 9 1 6 . C o m i n g after Gallipoli a n d M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d such 3

* Milner's ideal was a union of the white peoples of the British Empire. Other members of the Milner circle, however, advocated a multiracial imperial union. Lionel George Curtis, his former secretary, in 1910 helped to found the quarterly review the Round Table which advocated British imperial federalism. Another former secretary, John Buchan, was a fervent imperialist who won over a vast public by his popular adventure novels. Another graduate of the Kindergarten, Geoffrey Robinson, edited The Times.

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gory e p i s o d e s as the 142,000 British casualties suffered in just four d a y s of fighting at A r r a s in F r a n c e , the terrible S o m m e offensive of J u l y 1916 a r o u s e d a climax of d e s p a i r . On 1 J u l y the British lost 6 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , the heaviest casualties ever suffered in a single day by a British a r m y . By the time the offensive was over, British casualties a t the S o m m e had m o u n t e d t o 4 2 0 , 0 0 0 . A m o n g them was R a y m o n d A s q u i t h , the P r i m e Minister's son. L l o y d G e o r g e d e s p a i r e d of victory as he o b s e r v e d the lengthy and inefficient meetings of A s q u i t h ' s large War C a b i n e t , d e b a t i n g endlessly a n d deciding nothing. On 9 N o v e m b e r he told M a u r i c e H a n k e y that "We are g o i n g to lose this w a r . " At a b o u t the s a m e time, the Gallipoli controversy was revived, r e m i n d i n g the political world how ineptly the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t had w a g e d war. U n w i s e l y , the g o v e r n m e n t had sanctioned an official inquiry in J u n e into the D a r d a n e l l e s c a m p a i g n . Churchill, now out of office, devoted himself to d o c u m e n t i n g the case that his colleagues were to b l a m e for the Gallipoli disaster. T h e a l a r m e d P r i m e Minister m a n a g e d to have the report restricted to the C o m m i s s i o n of Inquiry's conclusions, omitting the testimony a n d other evidence on which they were b a s e d . Nonetheless, the political d a m a g e was done a n d the Gallipoli inquiry c o n t r i b u t e d to the collapse of the first coalition government. 4

5

T h e story of A s q u i t h ' s overthrow has been told too often for it to need retelling here at any length. A principal role in his downfall was played by the British p r e s s , d o m i n a t e d then, as it never has been before or since, by one m a n . Alfred H a r m s w o r t h , Viscount Northcliffe, controlled half the L o n d o n p r e s s , at a time, before radio or television, when publications were the only media of m a s s c o m munication. H i s ownership of The Times, with its prestige, a n d of the Daily Mail, with its p o p u l a r a p p e a l , gave him both "the classes a n d the m a s s e s . " Northcliffe u s e d his i m m e n s e power to d r a m a t i z e the case that A s q u i t h a n d his civilian colleagues were preventing the generals a n d a d m i r a l s from winning the war. 6

Northcliffe's n e w s p a p e r s ranged themselves behind S i r E d w a r d C a r s o n , Britain's leading trial lawyer, who led the revolt against the g o v e r n m e n t in Parliament and in the country. C a r s o n on the attack was the m o s t d a n g e r o u s animal in the political j u n g l e . As he lashed out against the g o v e r n m e n t , the lean, dark, and bitter I r i s h m a n s e e m e d to be everything the P r i m e Minister was not. As a historian has written of him, " T h e notion b e c a m e current that he p o s s e s s e d a drive, a r e m o r s e l e s s determination, a n d unrelenting hostility to the G e r m a n s , which contrasted strongly with the dismal procrastination attributed to A s q u i t h a n d his colleagues."' A l t h o u g h he denied it, in the a u t u m n of 1916 L l o y d G e o r g e b e g a n working closely with C a r s o n ; a n d S i r M a x Aitken (later L o r d

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B e a v e r b r o o k ) b r o u g h t B o n a r L a w into a political combination with them. After intricate m a n e u v e r i n g s , A s q u i t h resigned a n d went into O p p o s i t i o n , taking half of his L i b e r a l P a r t y — a n d all of its leaders except L l o y d G e o r g e — w i t h h i m . P u s h e d by Aitken ("It was he who m a d e B . L . decide t o break u p the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t , " said L l o y d G e o r g e ) , B o n a r L a w threw the weight of the U n i o n i s t - C o n s e r v a t i v e Party behind L l o y d G e o r g e . ( A m a j o r condition i m p o s e d b y the Conservatives was that Churchill s h o u l d be excluded from the new g o v e r n m e n t . ) A substantial n u m b e r of b a c k b e n c h L i b e r a l s joined with t h e m , as did the tiny L a b o u r Party. On 7 D e c e m b e r 1916, D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e P r i m e Minister of Britain as head of the s e c o n d coalition g o v e r n m e n t . 8

L l o y d G e o r g e m o v e d quickly to i m p o s e a war dictatorship. D i r e c tion of the war was entrusted to a War C a b i n e t , c o m p o s e d initially of five m e m b e r s . T h e new P r i m e Minister headed it himself. B o n a r L a w , who also b e c a m e L e a d e r of the H o u s e and Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , b e c a m e a m e m b e r , as did L a b o u r ' s A r t h u r H e n d e r s o n . T h e work of the War C a b i n e t was d o n e principally by its other two m e m b e r s , L o r d Milner, o n w h o m L l o y d G e o r g e especially relied, and to a lesser extent, L o r d C u r z o n . M a u r i c e Hankey b e c a m e S e c retary to the War C a b i n e t , a n d took c h a r g e of seeing that its decisions were carried out. It was a sweeping, revolutionary c h a n g e in the way the country was g o v e r n e d . A r t h u r B a l f o u r , the former P r i m e Minister who bec a m e F o r e i g n Minister in the new g o v e r n m e n t , r e m a r k e d of L l o y d G e o r g e at the t i m e : "If he wants to be a dictator, let him b e . If he thinks that he can win the war, I'm all for his having a t r y . " A chance effect of the c h a n g e in g o v e r n m e n t was that it c h a n g e d Britain's objectives in the M i d d l e E a s t . A s q u i t h and G r e y , the only two men in the g o v e r n m e n t who d o u b t e d the desirability of a c q u i r i n g new territories in the E a s t , h a d been driven from office. L o r d K i t c h e n e r , who h a d i m p o s e d his own M i d d l e E a s t e r n views on the C a b i n e t , was d e a d ; and the new P r i m e Minister had been an o p ponent of K i t c h e n e r ' s views all along. 9

Unlike K i t c h e n e r , L l o y d G e o r g e h a d believed, a n d continued t o believe, that the E a s t could be of great importance in winning the war. T y p i c a l l y , only a few days after L l o y d G e o r g e took office as P r i m e Minister, H a n k e y recorded in his diary that "I lunched along with L I . G . , who d i s c o u r s e d mainly on his plans for a b i g military coup in S y r i a . " 1 0

As for the future of the area, he was m o v e d in large part by his hatred of the T u r k i s h r e g i m e . F r o m his first political leader, the nineteeth-century L i b e r a l , William E w a r t G l a d s t o n e , he had inherited an abhorrence of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e for its cruelty toward its

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Christian s u b j e c t s . H e was s y m p a t h e t i c t o G r e e c e , which had territorial a m b i t i o n s in A s i a M i n o r , a n d e s p o u s e d Zionist aspirations in the Holy L a n d . In the latter case he had m a d e clear, however, that he expected the J e w i s h National H o m e to develop within the context of British rule. What b e c a m e clear only after L l o y d G e o r g e had been in office for a year or two was that he envisioned the M i d d l e E a s t , not just as the road to I n d i a , but as a prize worth seeking in itself. Unlike British ministers of the nineteenth century, whose aim was limited to excluding other E u r o p e a n p o w e r s from the region, L l o y d G e o r g e therefore s o u g h t British h e g e m o n y in the M i d d l e E a s t . A s P r i m e Minister, L l o y d G e o r g e m o v e d ever closer t o Milner a n d i m p e r i a l i s m . H a n k e y later wrote that Milner "was L l o y d G e o r g e ' s m o s t t r u s t e d colleague; except, p e r h a p s B o n a r L a w — b u t h e was m o r e for political a d v i c e . " L l o y d G e o r g e was a p r a g m a t i c , intuitive opportunist who i m p r o v i s e d ; Milner, with his G e r m a n b a c k g r o u n d , was methodical in action a n d systematic in thought, s u p p l y i n g what the P r i m e Minister lacked. Milner further strengthened his hold on the L l o y d G e o r g e government by p l a c i n g his own followers within Hankey's secretariat. Hankey was able to retain S i r M a r k S y k e s , his personal choice, as one of his three assistants,* b u t the other two were L e o A m e r y , one of Milner's leading adherents, and William O r m s b y - G o r e , Milner's Parliamentary S e c r e t a r y . When L l o y d G e o r g e , after the fashion of an A m e r i c a n president in the White H o u s e , set up his own informal staff, Milner had a h a n d in including s o m e of his own followers, s u c h as L i o n e l C u r t i s , a founder of the m a g a z i n e Round Table, which e s p o u s e d imperial union, a n d Philip K e r r , the magazine's editor. T h e staff was set up in t e m p o r a r y buildings in the g a r d e n of 10 D o w n i n g Street and was d u b b e d the "Garden suburb." A sort of dictatorship of two e m e r g e d from the early days of the new P r i m e Minister's period of office: at 11:00 each m o r n i n g L l o y d G e o r g e w o u l d meet with Milner, along with H a n k e y a n d the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff, a n d only at noon would they meet with the other m e m b e r s of the War C a b i n e t . In 1918 Milner b e c a m e War Minister in n a m e as well as reality. He had the experience needed for the j o b : he had run the civilian side of the Boer War a n d now, u n d e r L l o y d G e o r g e , ran the civilian side of the F i r s t World War. 11

L l o y d G e o r g e ' s association with the Milner circle was intellectual as well as practical a n d b u r e a u c r a t i c . T h e P r i m e Minister c a m e to Hankey wrote to Lloyd George that Sykes was "mainly an expert on Arab affairs" but that he was "by no means a one-sided man" and that his breadth of vision could be "invaluable in fixing up the terms of p e a c e . " 12

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social gatherings where the R o u n d T a b l e r s met to exchange views. In the m i d d l e of 1917 H a n k e y o b s e r v e d that " A m o n g the m o s t influential at the present m o m e n t I would place the R o u n d T a b l e g r o u p . T h e y dine every M o n d a y . . . Milner is the real leader in this g r o u p . . . L l o y d G e o r g e s o m e t i m e s a t t e n d s their g a t h e r i n g s . " T h e influence was m u t u a l . S h o r t l y afterward H a n k e y noted that Milner had "come completely r o u n d to L I . G . ' s view . . . that it is necessary to devote our main efforts against T u r k e y . " 13

1 4

Ill In F r a n c e , several g o v e r n m e n t s h a d fallen d u r i n g the c o u r s e of the war, but the differences between one g o v e r n m e n t and another were not d r a m a t i c . In 1917 that c h a n g e d . T h e m u t i n y of the F r e n c h a r m y in M a y 1917 b r o u g h t a b o u t the fall of the last of F r a n c e ' s w a r t i m e g o v e r n m e n t s with which her politicians felt c o m f o r t a b l e . T h e traditional leadership w a s discredited. T h e Viviani, B r i a n d , a n d R i b o t g o v e r n m e n t s h a d been allowed to resign, b u t the Paul Painleve government h a d not b e e n : in N o v e m b e r of 1917 the F r e n c h Parliament overthrew it. T h e r e was only one potential p r e m i e r yet untried who might fight on to victory, but he w a s the m o s t feared a n d detested m a n in p u b l i c life. As L l o y d G e o r g e r e m a r k e d of h i m , " T h e r e w a s only one m a n left, a n d it is not too m u c h to say that no one w a n t e d h i m . " He w a s the m a n who had e x p o s e d the c o r r u p t practices of his political c o l l e a g u e s — a n d they h a d never forgiven h i m . 1 5

G e o r g e s C l e m e n c e a u w a s , like L l o y d G e o r g e , a political "loner." H e , too, w a s a R a d i c a l , t h o u g h in F r a n c e the label h a d rather a different m e a n i n g . L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , he was believed to have a b a n d o n e d the leftist tenets of his y o u t h . L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , the m a n of "the knock-out blow," he h a d d e n o u n c e d p r o p o n e n t s of a c o m p r o m i s e p e a c e , a n d indeed h a d b r o u g h t an end to d i s c u s s i o n s along those lines initiated by the G e r m a n s through Aristide B r i a n d in 1917. He was g r o w i n g deaf a n d fat a n d was seventy-six years old, but he r e m a i n e d the fighter he h a d been all his life; a n d the President, who felt obliged to offer him the p r e m i e r s h i p , noted that this "devil of a m a n has all patriots on his side, a n d if I did not call on him his legendary strength would m a k e any alternative cabinet w e a k . " 1 6

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C l e m e n c e a u w a s a b o v e all a hater, and in all the world what he most hated w a s G e r m a n y . He was the last survivor of the National A s s e m b l y that in 1871 h a d protested against the harsh peace t e r m s G e r m a n y h a d i m p o s e d u p o n a v a n q u i s h e d F r a n c e . H e h a d never given u p . It had always been his view that F r a n c e s h o u l d concentrate on b u i l d i n g up her strength against G e r m a n y , a n d therefore that

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diverting strength into colonial a d v e n t u r e s was a mistake. T h u s the senators a n d d e p u t i e s who a i m e d at a n n e x i n g S y r i a a n d Palestine to F r a n c e saw in him their chief e n e m y . Between 1881 a n d 1885, over C l e m e n c e a u ' s protests, F r a n c e had led the way in new colonial e x p a n s i o n . On a pretext, the F r e n c h first invaded a n d c o n q u e r e d T u n i s i a in N o r t h Africa, a n d then the states that b e c a m e I n d o c h i n a in A s i a . Prince Otto von B i s m a r c k , the G e r m a n leader, s u p p o r t e d and indeed e n c o u r a g e d s u c h F r e n c h ventures. On 27 N o v e m b e r 1884, C l e m e n c e a u told the F r e n c h C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s that " B i s m a r c k is a d a n g e r o u s enemy, b u t even m o r e d a n g e r o u s p e r h a p s as a friend; he s h o w e d us T u n i s , p l a c i n g us in conflict with E n g l a n d . " 1 8

In Parliament a n d in his journal, La Justice, C l e m e n c e a u denounced the acquisition of colonies as a financial and military b u r d e n , a distraction f r o m the p r o b l e m of the G e r m a n frontier, a n d a clever G e r m a n - i n s p i r e d m o v e that Berlin h o p e d would drive F r a n c e into quarrels with Britain. In o p p o s i n g the policy, he e x p o s e d the financial corruption that a c c o m p a n i e d F r e n c h colonial politics. La Justice's suggestion of sinister m a n i p u l a t i o n s in the T u n i s i a affair were not far off the m a r k : there were speculations in real estate, railway concessions, a n d s u b m a r i n e cable telegraph concessions, whatever their relation m i g h t have been to the formulation of g o v e r n m e n t policy. T h e financial corruption s u r r o u n d i n g the adventure in I n d o c h i n a was even m o r e lurid. C l e m e n c e a u ' s accusations a n d e x p o s u r e s destroyed reputations a n d b r o u g h t d o w n g o v e r n m e n t s . H e b e c a m e known as "the wrecker" even before he b e c a m e known as "the tiger." Of F r e n c h parliamentary life at the time, Winston Churchill later wrote, " T h e life of the F r e n c h C h a m b e r , hectic, fierce, p o i s o n o u s , flowed t h r o u g h a succession of s c a n d a l s and swindles, of e x p o s u r e s , of perjuries, a n d m u r d e r s , of plottings a n d intriguings, of personal ambitions a n d revenges, of crooking and double-crossing, which find their m o d e r n parallel only in the underworld of C h i c a g o . " C l e m e n c e a u s t r o d e t h r o u g h it all in a m u r d e r o u s r a g e . In an age when it was still the c u s t o m to settle q u a r r e l s on the field of honor, he was a feared duellist. A speaker in the C h a m b e r t a u n t e d the other m e m b e r s by saying of C l e m e n c e a u that "he has three things you fear: his s w o r d , his pistol, and his t o n g u e . " 19

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F o r fear of h i m the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t in 1882 hesitated to join in the occupation of E g y p t , with the result that Britain took E g y p t entirely for herself. H i s opposition to colonial expansion could easily be p o r t r a y e d — a n d was p o r t r a y e d — a s benefiting the British E m p i r e . T h a t was the line his o p p o n e n t s took when he b e c a m e vulnerable to political attack. T h e y p r o d u c e d a forgery to prove that he had sold out to Britain. Hecklers were hired to follow him a r o u n d shouting

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"Aoh yes," a n d free copies of a n e w s p a p e r were circulated containing a cartoon showing him j u g g l i n g with s a c k s of p o u n d s s t e r l i n g . In 1892 one leading British politician wrote to another that "A F r e n c h m a n was here yesterday who told me an extraordinary cock a n d bull which is apparently believed in Paris where they will believe anything . . . It is to the effect that C l e m e n c e a u ' s p a p e r La Justice which is said to be losing money is financed f r o m E n g l a n d on behalf of G e r m a n y a n d E n g l a n d . " In 1893 he was defeated for re-election a n d was driven out of p a r l i a m e n t a r y life for a d e c a d e . T h i s was the m a n w h o m a d e s p a i r i n g F r a n c e turned to in the darkest m o m e n t of 1917, a n d who s o o n i m p o s e d his will u p o n the government of his nation. L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , he b e c a m e a sort of war dictator, incarnating a driving determination to fight on until G e r m a n y was totally c r u s h e d . L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , too, h e h a p p e n e d to b r i n g to office a special view a b o u t policy in the M i d d l e E a s t . As premier, he continued to have no territorial goals for F r a n c e outside of E u r o p e . Of the traditional F r e n c h claim to S y r i a , reflected in the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , C l e m e n c e a u said that if L l o y d G e o r g e could get F r a n c e the right to install a protectorate r e g i m e there he would not refuse it, "as it would please s o m e reactionaries," b u t that he himself attached no i m p o r t a n c e to i t . T h e fortunes of war a n d politics had b r o u g h t into power in their respective countries the first British P r i m e Minister who wanted to acquire territory in the M i d d l e E a s t a n d the only F r e n c h politician who did not want to do s o . 21

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30 T H E OVERTHROW OF T H E CZAR i It was an i m p r o b a b l e chain of c i r c u m s t a n c e s that led F r a n c e to rally behind a leader who w a s o p p o s e d to F r e n c h i m p e r i a l i s m in the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d an even o d d e r chain of c i r c u m s t a n c e s that led R u s s i a in the s a m e m o n t h to fall u n d e r the sway of a leader who also claimed to o p p o s e R u s s i a n i m p e r i a l i s m in the region. If one thing s e e m e d clear by the b e g i n n i n g of 1917, it was that R u s s i a held the e d g e in the M i d d l e E a s t e r n war against T u r k e y . Enver's catastrophic defeat in early 1915 on the C a u c a s u s front was followed by a successful R u s s i a n invasion of eastern Anatolia in 1916. T h e R u s s i a n s h a d s t r e n g t h e n e d their strategic position by winning m a s t e r y of the Black S e a a n d by constructing railroad lines from the C a u c a s u s toward their new front line in eastern T u r k e y . T h e G r a n d D u k e N i c h o l a s , the R u s s i a n c o m m a n d e r , planned t o m o u n t a new offensive as soon as the railroad lines were c o m p l e t e d . A c c o r d i n g to a G e r m a n staff officer attached to the O t t o m a n a r m e d forces, the g r a n d duke's offensive w o u l d "have led to a c o m p l e t e victory a n d p e r h a p s driven T u r k e y out of the war in the s u m m e r of 1917." 1

Y e t years later, L l o y d G e o r g e told the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that "the collapse of R u s s i a was almbst entirely d u e " to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e b a s i s o f L l o y d G e o r g e ' s opinion was that b y closing off m o s t of R u s s i a ' s i m p o r t s a n d e x p o r t s , the Y o u n g T u r k m a s t e r s of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e h a d d e p r i v e d her of a r m a m e n t s a n d revenues. T h o s e who d i s a g r e e with L l o y d G e o r g e ' s a s s e s s m e n t are able to a r g u e that even if the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e trade route h a d remained o p e n , w a r t i m e R u s s i a , with her p e a s a n t f a r m e r s away in the a r m y , p r o d u c e d less than the normal a m o u n t of food a n d so h a d less to export, and her Allies had little a m m u n i t i o n to s e n d her. B u t either observation points to the p a r a d o x i c a l truth that R u s s i a ' s military s u c c e s s e s on the C a u c a s u s front were in a s e n s e irrelevant: the real war had b e c o m e an economic a n d social survival contest. 2

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T h e industrialist Walter R a t h e n a u in G e r m a n y was the pioneer in u n d e r s t a n d i n g this. In 1914 he o r g a n i z e d a Division of R a w Materials for a skeptical Ministry of War in Berlin. He was given a secretary a n d one small r o o m at the back of the ministry. By the e n d of 1918 it was the largest unit in the m i n i s t r y ; it h a d s p r e a d over several blocks of b u i l d i n g s and almost o v e r s h a d o w e d the r e s t . In Rathenau's prescient vision, warfare was u n d e r g o i n g its industrial revolution, b e c o m i n g a matter of financing, m o v i n g , a n d s u p p l y i n g on a gigantic scale, a n d therefore r e q u i r e d central allocation, planning, a n d control over the whole e c o n o m y . 3

L l o y d G e o r g e in his p r a g m a t i c way learned to see things m u c h the s a m e way. He b r o u g h t war socialism to the hitherto individualistic British e c o n o m y . When he started the Ministry of M u n i t i o n s in a requisitioned hotel, he h a d no staff at all. By the end of the war, the ministry had 6 5 , 0 0 0 e m p l o y e e s a n d it exercised control over three million w o r k e r s . In industry after industry, s u p p l i e s were requisitioned a n d allocated. N e w workers, including large n u m b e r s of w o m e n , were b r o u g h t into the labor force. 4

In R u s s i a , as in G e r m a n y a n d Britain, the violent a n d r a p i d social c h a n g e s that a c c o m p a n i e d this w a r t i m e industrial revolution t u g g e d at the s t r u c t u r e of society, straining pillars and s u p p o r t s never designed to carry a great weight. T h e r e were d i s p l a c e m e n t s in m o r a l s , politics, e m p l o y m e n t p a t t e r n s , investment patterns, family s t r u c t u r e , personal h a b i t s , a n d l a n g u a g e . S o m e idea of the m a g n i t u d e of the c h a n g e s m a y be s u g g e s t e d by the length of the C a r n e g i e E n d o w m e n t ' s postwar survey of the economic a n d social c h a n g e s that h a d occurred in twenty-one c ou n t r i e s : it ran to 150 v o l u m e s . T h e British series alone ran to 24 v o l u m e s . Of the principal E u r o p e a n belligerents in the F i r s t World War, Czarist R u s s i a p r o v e d the least a b l e to c o p e with these challenges for it was weak in the elements of i n f r a s t r u c t u r e — t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s y s t e m s , c o m m u n i c a t i o n s y s t e m s , engineering industries, a n d capital m a r k e t s — t h a t m a k e a m o d e r n e c o n o m y resilient a n d a d a p t a b l e . M o r e than anything else, however, R u s s i a ' s failure was a failure of leadership. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of the T u r k i s h stranglehold on the D a r d a n e l l e s u n d e r s c o r e d the lack of patriotism in s o m e elements of the g o v e r n i n g classes a n d the lack of c o m p e t e n c e in others. T h e r e was no e x c u s e for the terrible s h o r t a g e s that d e v e l o p e d in 1916 a n d 1917. R u s s i a was a country naturally rich in a g r i c u l t u r e : the peasantry m a d e up 80 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n , a n d cereals alone constituted half of her e x p o r t s . With the export trade cut off at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , all the food formerly sent out of the country w a s available to be c o n s u m e d at h o m e ; a n d t h o u g h there was a fall in the production of agricultural estates c a u s e d by the loss of labor to the a r m y , m o r e than e n o u g h s

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food was p r o d u c e d to feed the c o u n t r y . T h e s h o r t a g e s resulted instead f r o m disruption of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n a n d distribution, d u e in part to bottlenecks a n d b r e a k d o w n s , b u t d u e also to deliberate m a n e u v e r s : speculation, profiteering, a n d h o a r d i n g . T h e C z a r ' s g o v e r n m e n t recklessly i g n o r e d the need to crack down on the profiteers who accentuated the c o n s e q u e n c e s of T u r k e y ' s stranglehold on R u s s i a ' s t r a d e route to the West. W i d e s p r e a d industrial strikes a n d the onset of financial c h a o s failed to m o v e the g o v e r n m e n t to act. By 1917 current interest and sinking fund paym e n t s d u e on its p u b l i c d e b t were greater than the total revenues of the state in 1916, a national insolvency with which the g o v e r n m e n t dealt by printing p a p e r m o n e y , so that prices d u r i n g w a r t i m e years rose by 1,000 p e r c e n t . 7

An o b v i o u s way out of the crisis was to b r i n g the war to an e n d . In 1915 the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d G e r m a n y had offered R u s s i a right of p a s s a g e t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s if she would a b a n d o n the Allies. T h r o u g h o u t 1916 G e r m a n y continued to s o u n d out the possibility of c o n c l u d i n g a s e p a r a t e peace with R u s s i a . M a n y of the s o u n d i n g s took place i n neutral S w e d e n . T h e s t u m b l i n g block, s o m e have s a i d , was the C z a r ' s unwillingness to relinquish his g r i p on P o l a n d . H o w e v e r , the R u s s i a n Minister to S w e d e n explained to the G e r m a n s that in his "personal opinion" R u s s i a would have to continue in the war on the Allied side until she received the "key to the Black S e a " : which is to say, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s . On the field of battle the C z a r ' s h u n g r y a n d tattered soldiery were s t r u g g l i n g for survival, but his r e s p o n s e to the G e r m a n overtures s h o w s that N i c h o l a s II continued to give priority to his imperial a m b i t i o n s — a b o v e all, p e r h a p s , to the c o n q u e s t of the long-sought-for D a r d a n e l l e s . 8

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II T h e history of the R u s s i a n revolutions of 1917, which is still b e i n g written a n d which r e m a i n s timelessly relevant to the world's condition, falls o u t s i d e the s c o p e of the present s t u d y . O n e aspect of that history, however, is of concern here a n d will be p u r s u e d in the following p a g e s : the plot to p r o m o t e the fortunes of the then-unknown L e n i n that was hatched in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . In the d i s a s t r o u s c o u r s e of R u s s i a ' s participation in the E u r o p e a n war, those in control of R u s s i a ' s g o v e r n m e n t , finance, a n d industry d e m o n s t r a t e d that their interests d i v e r g e d from those of the p o p u lation at l a r g e . At the leftward fringe of the outlawed revolutionary u n d e r g r o u n d , an o b s c u r e a n d isolated figure had said as m u c h — though for theoretical reasons of his o w n — f r o m the m o m e n t the war began. D u r i n g the war he lived, s t u d i e d , a n d wrote in penniless exile

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in Z u r i c h , Switzerland. He was in his mid-forties and was not yet f a m o u s b e y o n d police a n d revolutionary circles. Vladimir Ilyich U l y a n o v , who in 1901 h a d a d o p t e d the p s e u d o n y m of L e n i n , was a former attorney who h a d devoted his life to M a r x i s t theory and factional d i s p u t e s . S t o c k y , m u s c u l a r , with the hunched s h o u l d e r s of a fighter,- he was a brilliant but abrasive a n d intolerant m a n who fearlessly followed the j u g g e r n a u t of his logic wherever it m i g h t lead. At the outset of the war he was shocked to see his socialist colleagues flock to the s u p p o r t of their respective countries. L e n i n ' s theory led him to s t a n d alone in opposition to the war and therefore in opposition to his c o u n t r y . It set him a p a r t from the others. E v e n his own political faction, the Bolsheviks, did not fully u n d e r s t a n d his views on the war. At the b e g i n n i n g of S e p t e m b e r 1914, he drafted his Seven Theses on the War, in which he wrote that: " F r o m the point of view of the laboring class a n d the toiling m a s s e s of all the peoples of R u s s i a , the lesser evil would be the defeat of the tsarist m o n a r c h y a n d its a r m y , which o p p r e s s e s P o l a n d , the U k r a i n e , a n d a n u m b e r of other peoples of R u s s i a . " In his Theses he repeatedly d e n o u n c e d the e m p i r e exercised by the R u s s i a n s over the other peoples ruled by the C z a r . He w a s a R u s s i a n ; b u t it w a s his d u t y , as he saw it, to aim at R u s s i a ' s defeat and at the d i s m e m b e r m e n t of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . 1 0

In C o n s t a n t i n o p l e at the time there lived a former colleague of L e n i n ' s , a fellow leader of the Socialist S e c o n d International, who had arrived at similar conclusions. A l e x a n d e r Israel H e l p h a n d , who had a d o p t e d the u n d e r g r o u n d p s e u d o n y m of " P a r v u s , " was a R u s s i a n J e w whose professed political objective was the destruction of the C z a r i s t E m p i r e . Where L e n i n was merely indifferent to the prospect of a G e r m a n victory, H e l p h a n d was positively enthusiastic about it. As it h a p p e n e d , H e l p h a n d p o s s e s s e d the money a n d political contacts that enabled him to p u r s u e his p r o - G e r m a n inclinations. 1 1

Of the s a m e generation as L e n i n ( H e l p h a n d was born in 1869, L e n i n in 1870), P a r v u s had been one of the other intellectually c o m m a n d i n g figures on the left w i n g of the revolutionary socialist m o v e m e n t . L e a v i n g R u s s i a for G e r m a n y in the early 1890s, he had m a d e his n a m e as a theorist a n d journalist fighting alongside the Polish-born G e r m a n J e w e s s R o s a L u x e m b u r g for a p u r e revolutionary position. In the early years of the twentieth century, he had b e c o m e the mentor of L e o n T r o t s k y , a n d in 1905 he had originated what was to b e c o m e T r o t s k y ' s theory of the "permanent revolution." R e t u r n i n g to R u s s i a , P a r v u s was b a n i s h e d to S i b e r i a , but soon e s c a p e d to western E u r o p e . B u t there was another s i d e to H e l p h a n d / P a r v u s , which showed itself only g r a d u a l l y : he was a s h a d y p r o m o t e r who, from the point of view of his fellow-idealists, did suspiciously well for himself. He

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had set up p u b l i s h i n g ventures that were meant to serve the revolutionary c a u s e but s e e m e d to serve his personal interests even better. L e n i n and his Bolshevik faction h a d g o o d reason for believing that in 1904 P a r v u s had embezzled p e r h a p s 130,000 marks* (roughly 3 0 , 0 0 0 dollars) in literary royalties that the writer M a x i m G o r k y h a d contributed to the Social D e m o c r a t i c Party. T h e y confronted him with it a n d the explanations that he offered were unconvincing. A b a n d o n i n g p u b l i s h i n g a n d revolutionary activities, he h a d turned full-time to a variety of b u s i n e s s e s , m o v i n g on via Vienna to the Balkans a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , where he b e c a m e interested in the Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t a n d b e g a n dealing in corn a n d other c o m m o d i t i e s . By 1912 he h a d established close contact with Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t officials, with whose aid he obtained contracts to provide s u p p l i e s for the O t t o m a n a r m i e s in the Balkan W a r s . When the F i r s t World War b r o k e out in E u r o p e , Helpharid p u b lished an article in the T u r k i s h p r e s s advising the O t t o m a n government that its interests would be served by a G e r m a n victory. He also helped foment p r o - G e r m a n feeling in the Balkan countries. When the O t t o m a n E m p i r e entered the war, he helped the Porte obtain vital s u p p l i e s of grain a n d railroad p a r t s , t h o u g h of course at a profit to himself; he also advised the g o v e r n m e n t on various a s p e c t s of mobilizing its e c o n o m y for the war effort. D e s t r o y i n g the g o v e r n m e n t of R u s s i a was his goal, and his h o m e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e b e c a m e a meeting place for plotters against the C z a r . T h r o u g h his contacts, H e l p h a n d m a n a g e d to arrange an interview with the G e r m a n a m b a s s a d o r to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . He m e t von W a n g e n h e i m on 7 J a n u a r y 1915, a n d told him that " T h e interests of the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t are identical with those of the R u s s i a n r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s . " V o n W a n g e n h e i m cabled a report of the meeting to the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office two d a y s later, in which he reported that H e l p h a n d h a d told him "that the R u s s i a n D e m o c r a t s could achieve their a i m only by the total destruction of C z a r i s m a n d the division of R u s s i a into smaller s t a t e s . " H e l p h a n d p r o p o s e d that G e r m a n y s h o u l d help him unite the revolutionaries behind a p r o g r a m of s u b v e r t i n g the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . 12

13

At a high level, the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t evinced interest in his p r o p o s a l . At the end of F e b r u a r y 1915 H e l p h a n d went to Berlin to meet with officials at the F o r e i g n Ministry. T h e y asked h i m to recapitulate his p r o p o s a l in writing; in r e s p o n s e , on 9 M a r c h , he s u b m i t t e d a m e m o r a n d u m to them e m b o d y i n g a vast plan for the subversion of C z a r i s t R u s s i a by e n c o u r a g i n g socialist revolutionaries and nationalists. He told the G e r m a n s a b o u t L e n i n a n d his Bolshevik faction, reported that L e n i n a n d s o m e of his followers were in * There is some dispute about the exact figure.

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Switzerland, and singled t h e m out a s especially worth G e r m a n s u p port. T h u s H e l p h a n d discovered a n d identified L e n i n for the Germans. T h e G e r m a n leaders a g r e e d t o a d o p t H e l p h a n d ' s p r o p o s a l s a n d a t the end of M a r c h g a v e h i m an initial p a y m e n t of a million m a r k s (equal at that time to roughly 2 4 0 , 0 0 0 dollars in U . S . currency) to begin the work of a t t e m p t i n g to unify the various revolutionary groups. H i s initial overtures to his former c o m r a d e s were r e b u f f e d . In Berlin, R o s a L u x e m b u r g d i d not even give him an o p p o r t u n i t y to s p e a k : she showed him to the d o o r . L e v D a v i d o v i c h B r o n s t e i n , who called himself T r o t s k y , a d m i t t e d that P a r v u s h a d once been an important figure, a friend a n d teacher, b u t c o n c l u d e d that in 1914 he had c h a n g e d , a n d that h e was now "politically d e c e a s e d . " T h e attitude of P a r v u s ' s former socialist-revolutionary colleagues was described by one of t h e m who said they r e g a r d e d him as "a R u s s i a n informer, a scoundrel, a confidence trickster, . . . a n d now a T u r k i s h agent a n d s p e c u l a t o r . " 14

15

In the s p r i n g he m a d e his m o s t i m p o r t a n t a p p r o a c h . He went to Zurich a n d set u p court a t the l u x u r i o u s B a u r a u L a c H o t e l . T h e r e he lived ostentatiously, drinking a bottle of c h a m p a g n e each m o r n i n g at breakfast, s m o k i n g cigars of e n o r m o u s size, a n d s u r r o u n d i n g himself with showy w o m e n . H e also b e g a n s p r e a d i n g mo n e y a r o u n d a m o n g the poorer exiles, p e r s u a d i n g t h e m that he had b e c o m e the p a y m a s t e r of the revolution. 1 6

At the end of M a y he s o u g h t out L e n i n at the restaurant where the Bolshevik theorist usually was to be f o u n d , went over to the table where L e n i n a n d his associates were lunching, spoke to t h e m , a n d a c c o m p a n i e d t h e m b a c k t o L e n i n ' s a p a r t m e n t . H e l p h a n d explained his m i s s i o n . L e n i n , having listened to his presentation, a c c u s e d him of having turned into a G e r m a n "chauvinist," a n d o r d e r e d him to leave a n d never c o m e b a c k . 1 7

Y e t a friend of L e n i n ' s left with H e l p h a n d to start p u t t i n g the plan of s u b v e r s i o n into effect. T h e i r b a s e of operation was to be S t o c k h o l m . T h r o u g h his friend, L e n i n was able to learn of developm e n t s as they o c c u r r e d . M o r e o v e r , L e n i n a n d the Bolshevik Party accepted m o n e y from H e l p h a n d via a Polish and a R u s s i a n Social D e m o c r a t ; L e n i n later denied this, b u t his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e shows that his denials were u n t r u e . 1 8

T h e b u s i n e s s in which H e l p h a n d ostensibly e n g a g e d w a s a t r a d i n g firm, whose activities in fact enriched him enormously. Secretly he organized s u b v e r s i o n a n d p u b l i s h e d a revolutionary n e w s p a p e r , which the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t financed. T h e publication was not a great success. He a t t e m p t e d to organize a general strike in R u s s i a , even without the aid of L e n i n a n d the others. It was a m u c h greater

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s u c c e s s ; he did not achieve a general strike, but b r o u g h t as m a n y as 4 5 , 0 0 0 protesters into the streets of P e t r o g r a d (as St P e t e r s b u r g , the R u s s i a n capital, had been called since 1914). B u t H e l p h a n d h a d focused the G e r m a n government's attention on the particular i m p o r t a n c e of L e n i n as a disruptive force a n d , t h r o u g h other agents, the G e r m a n s a r r a n g e d to watch over the Bolshevik theorist a n d to lend h i m additional m o n e y when he needed it without his necessarily having to acknowledge the source of the f u n d s . T h u s H e l p h a n d , the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e - b a s e d intimate o f the Y o u n g T u r k s , h a d b r o u g h t into play a s t r a n g e new w e a p o n with which T u r k e y ' s ally G e r m a n y could a t t e m p t to b r i n g their c o m m o n R u s s i a n foe c r a s h i n g d o w n .

Ill P e t r o g r a d was a long distance away from the g r a n a r y of the south, a n d its population suffered f r o m food shortages a n d soaring food prices t h r o u g h o u t 1916 a n d 1917. D u r i n g that time strikes a n d protests b e c a m e a way of life: including those inspired by H e l p h a n d , between m i d - 1 9 1 5 a n d F e b r u a r y 1917, there were 1,163 s t r i k e s . Over half of these were politically rather than economically motivated, which showed that the revolt against the r e g i m e had b e g u n to transcend the issue of s h o r t a g e s . 19

On 8 M a r c h 1917 a d e m o n s t r a t i o n took place in celebration of International Women's D a y . H o u s e w i v e s , protesting against food shortages, joined the d e m o n s t r a t i o n ; so did m a n y of the roughly 9 0 , 0 0 0 workers then on strike in a b o u t fifty factories. T h e next day there were a b o u t 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 on strike, a n d the day afterward the strike b e c a m e general. T w o d a y s later four regiments of soldiers joined the p o p u l a c e , strengthening the d e m o n s t r a t o r s against the increasingly helpless police. T h e a r m y mutiny p r o v e d decisive, only b e c a u s e effective g o v e r n m e n t had long since vanished. T h e governor of the city o r d e r e d p r o c l a m a t i o n s of martial law to be put u p , b u t there was no glue to hold the p o s t e r s on the w a l l s . 2 0

On 15 M a r c h C z a r N i c h o l a s II a b d i c a t e d , effective f r o m the following day, in favor of his brother, the G r a n d D u k e Michael. T h e following day the G r a n d D u k e Michael declined to accept the throne, a n d R u s s i a b e c a m e a republic g o v e r n e d by a Provisional G o v e r n m e n t originally led b y Prince G . E . L v o v a n d later b y Alexander K e r e n s k y . Politicians of all s h a d e s of opinion were s u r p r i s e d to find that what the population of P e t r o g r a d had p u s h e d against was an o p e n door. As a leading historian of these events has written, " T h e revolutionary parties played no direct part in the m a k i n g of the revolution. T h e y did not expect it . . . " Were the events in Petrograd instead the 2 1

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fruition of the conspiracy conceived by P a r v u s , the associate of the Y o u n g T u r k s ? H e l p h a n d and the G e r m a n General Staff, t h r o u g h their agents a n d their g o l d , did play a role in inciting R u s s i a n s to strike a n d to rebel, t h o u g h surely not to the extent s u s p e c t e d by British Intelligence. At first it was not even clear whether the overthrow of the C z a r could help t h e m to achieve their g o a l — w h i c h was to defeat R u s s i a . At the time all political parties, including the Bolsheviks, were in favor of p r o s e c u t i n g the war; now that they no longer had a g o v e r n m e n t they detested, as R u s s i a n patriots they wanted to defeat their enemies, the G e r m a n s and T u r k s . B u t , as H e l p h a n d alone u n d e r s t o o d , L e n i n was of a different p e r s u a s i o n — a n d was beside himself with frustration. He was in Z u r i c h , cut off from participation in the great events in R u s s i a ; a n d his followers in Petrograd m i s u n d e r s t o o d what he wanted t h e m to do. H e l p h a n d h a d anticipated the Bolshevik theorist's reaction. Without a s k i n g L e n i n , H e l p h a n d went ahead to make a r r a n g e m e n t s with the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff to have a railroad train placed at L e n i n ' s disposal to take him a n d his closest political associate, G r e g o r i Zinoviev, b a c k to P e t r o g r a d . When he then i s s u e d the invitation to L e n i n , the latter warily refused a n d a t t e m p t e d instead to m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s that did not involve H e l p h a n d . He also p o s e d conditions: between twenty a n d sixty R u s s i a n exiles s h o u l d be allowed on the train, without r e g a r d to their views a b o u t the war, and the train s h o u l d enjoy extraterritorial rights. T h e G e r m a n Minister in B e r n e cabled the G e r m a n F o r e i g n Office that L e n i n and Zinoviev "believed that they h a d , in this way, insured themselves against b e i n g c o m p r o mised in R u s s i a . " T h e G e r m a n government understood and agreed. In April of 1917 L e n i n was sent in his sealed train on his way to Russia. 2 2

F r o m the m o m e n t that he arrived at the F i n l a n d station in P e t r o g r a d , with typically acerbic greetings to those who m e t him, L e n i n set a b o u t positioning his Bolshevik f a c t i o n — a s H e l p h a n d h a d e x p e c t e d — a s the only political g r o u p in R u s s i a that a d v o c a t e d ending the war immediately. H i s followers h a d believed that they s h o u l d s u p p o r t their country now that it h a d a republican g o v e r n m e n t of the political left. T h e y had fallen, a c c o r d i n g to L e n i n , into error. In his view, the war d e m o n s t r a t e d that capitalism had entered into its imperialist s t a g e , which he r e g a r d e d as its final s t a g e ; it therefore was the right time for socialist parties throughout E u r o p e to launch revolutions. It was not the time to w a g e international war, especially in alliance with g o v e r n m e n t s s u c h as those of F r a n c e a n d Britain that o u g h t to be overthrown. In the a u t u m n of 1917, when L e n i n — w i t h the aid of additional financial s u b s i d i e s from G e r m a n y — s e i z e d power in P e t r o g r a d a n d m a d e himself dictator of what r e m a i n e d of the shattered R u s s i a n

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state, he m o v e d immediately to take his country out of the war. In M a r c h 1918 he accepted defeat by agreeing to a peace treaty that met G e r m a n y ' s t e r m s . It a p p e a r e d that H e l p h a n d had served his friends in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d Berlin well; as he had foretold, b a c k i n g L e n i n had helped to drive R u s s i a out of the war.

IV British o b s e r v e r s of the R u s s i a n revolutions in 1917 were s t r u c k by the apparent conjunction of Bolsheviks, G e r m a n s , a n d J e w s . M a n y of the Bolshevik leaders were of J e w i s h origin. So was H e l p h a n d , who had b r o u g h t them G e r m a n m o n e y a n d s u p p o r t — a n d who had c o m e from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d was an intimate of the Y o u n g T u r k s . T h e Y o u n g T u r k s — a c c o r d i n g to the doctrine long held by British officials—were controlled by J e w i s h F r e e m a s o n s who had b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into alliance with G e r m a n y . It was a longs t a n d i n g British belief that J e w s a n d G e r m a n s were intimately related. It all s e e m e d to fit. J o h n B u c h a n , the p o p u l a r novelist of i m p e r i a l i s m , who had been Milner's Private Secretary in S o u t h Africa and who, on Milner's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , later b e c a m e director of information services for L l o y d G e o r g e ' s g o v e r n m e n t , e x p r e s s e d this view in the first chapter of his classic novel of s u s p e n s e , The Thirty-Nine Steps ( 1 9 1 5 ) : A w a y behind all the g o v e r n m e n t s and the armies there was a b i g s u b t e r r a n e a n m o v e m e n t g o i n g on, engineered by very d a n g e r o u s people . .. [ T ] h a t explained a lot . . . things that h a p p e n e d in the Balkan War, how one state s u d d e n l y c a m e out on t o p , why alliances were m a d e a n d broken, why certain m e n d i s a p p e a r e d , a n d where the sinews of war c a m e from. T h e aim of the whole conspiracy was to get R u s s i a and G e r m a n y at l o g g e r h e a d s . . . [ T J h e J e w was behind it, and the J e w hated R u s s i a worse than hell . . . [ T ] h i s is the return match for the p o g r o m s . T h e J e w is everywhere . . . with an eye like a rattlesnake .. . [ H ] e is the m a n who is ruling the world just now, and he has his knife in the e m p i r e of the T s a r . T h u s the Bolsheviks c a m e to be viewed, not as R u s s i a n s or even as ideological extremists, but as enemy secret agents called into existence by G e r m a n s d o i n g the work of J e w s who were devoted to the vengeful destruction of R u s s i a . In 1917 and for m a n y years afterward British officials continued to believe that the Bolsheviks were not principals in their own right, with their own a g e n d a a n d their own objectives, b u t were m e r e e m p l o y e e s of the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff who took their o r d e r s from J e w s a n d P r u s s i a n s in Berlin.

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T h e possibility that R u s s i a m i g h t collapse h a d been Britain's nightmare ever since S e p t e m b e r 1914, just as it h a d been the d r e a m of E n v e r P a s h a — a d r e a m which inspired h i m to b r i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the war on the s i d e of the Central P o w e r s . T h e Bolshevik Revolution had t u r n e d the one's n i g h t m a r e a n d the other's d r e a m into reality. S c h o l a r s still differ in their accounts of how it c a m e a b o u t , but without q u e s t i o n R u s s i a ' s leaving the war in 1917 was a severe blow to Britain a n d her allies, a n d an e n o r m o u s victory not only for G e r m a n y b u t also for O t t o m a n T u r k e y .

V D u r i n g the Gallipoli a d v e n t u r e , Winston Churchill h a d s a i d , " T h i s is one of the great c a m p a i g n s in history. T h i n k what C o n s t a n t i n o p l e is to the E a s t . It is m o r e than L o n d o n , Paris, a n d Berlin all rolled into one are to the West. T h i n k how it has d o m i n a t e d the E a s t . T h i n k what its fall will m e a n . " Y e t its c a p t u r e — w h i c h h a d s e e m e d imminent to Churchill in M a r c h 1 9 1 5 — c o n t i n u e d to p r o v e elusive. After the Allies' failure to win t h r o u g h to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1915, it was the turn of the R u s s i a n s , who s c o r e d s u c c e s s e s in T u r k i s h A r m e n i a in 1916 a n d were poised to m a r c h toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in 1917. T h e n c a m e the revolutions in P e t r o g r a d , a n d the R u s s i a n armies on T u r k i s h soil, believing the war was c o m i n g to an end, g a v e up all thought of launching an attack. 2 3

By then the T u r k s were too e x h a u s t e d to exploit the situation by launching an attack of their own on the R u s s i a n s . B u t their o p p o n e n t s were e x h a u s t e d too; sufficiently so to consider giving up s u c h a m bitious g o a l s as winning C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . In 1917 Milner, a n d p e r h a p s L l o y d G e o r g e , flirted with the idea of c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with G e r m a n y , in which the R u s s i a n E m p i r e rather than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e could be partitioned as the spoils of v i c t o r y . 24

A g a i n s t all o d d s , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d held its own. T h e g o v e r n m e n t s that h a d b r o u g h t the Allied G r e a t Powers into the war against T u r k e y — t h e A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t i n Britain, the R e n e Viviani g o v e r n m e n t in F r a n c e , a n d the C z a r and his minister S a z a n o v in R u s s i a — h a d all been overthrown. In s o m e m e a s u r e it was T u r k e y ' s successful defense of the D a r d a n e l l e s that was responsible for b r i n g i n g t h e m d o w n . T h o u g h at first it h a d s e e m e d a m a d l y reckless act of E n v e r and T a l a a t to b r i n g the tottering O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the war, they h a d b r o u g h t it off; they h a d lost s o m e territory b u t they also s e e m e d poised to gain s o m e , a n d at the end of 1917 they were m o r e powerful than ever within the S u b l i m e P o r t e . T h e y no longer felt the need to cloak themselves in the respectability of Prince S a i d

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H a l i m a n d finally allowed him to resign as G r a n d Vizier. T h e selfm a d e party b o s s T a l a a t B e y boldly took the title into his own unaristocratic h a n d s . Y e t for T a l a a t and E n v e r the road a h e a d was perilous. T h o u g h the threat from R u s s i a was r e m o v e d , the threat from Britain was renewed. T h e i r enemy, the new P r i m e Minister of Britain, was a d y n a m o a n d a war leader of g e n i u s . T h o u g h L l o y d G e o r g e was willing to explore the possibility of a c o m p r o m i s e peace with the Y o u n g T u r k s , he was a fighter—and his heart was in the fight to destroy T u r k e y ' s e m p i r e .

PART VI NEW WORLDS AND PROMISED LANDS

31 T H E NEW WORLD i In 1916—17, the s h a d o w of the U n i t e d S t a t e s first fell over L l o y d G e o r g e ' s imperial a m b i t i o n s in the M i d d l e E a s t . By the last q u a r t e r of 1916, the Allies h a d b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t u p o n the U n i t e d S t a t e s not merely for s u p p l i e s b u t for financing. T h e y were r u n n i n g out of m o n e y , and the economist J o h n M a y n a r d K e y n e s , s p e a k i n g for the British T r e a s u r y , w a r n e d the Cabinet that by the end of the year "the A m e r i c a n executive a n d the A m e r i c a n p u b l i c will be in a position to dictate to this c o u n t r y . " President W o o d r o w Wilson underlined the point by interfering with a J. P. M o r g a n financing for Britain in D e c e m b e r 1 9 1 6 — d e m o n s t r a t i n g that he c o u l d destroy the market for Allied loans in the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d thereby drive Britain and F r a n c e into i n s o l v e n c y . 1

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T h e Allies were u n s u r e of Wilson's intentions. In fact he was o p p o s e d to their imperialist a m b i t i o n s a n d intended to thwart t h e m . " E n g l a n d a n d F r a n c e have not the s a m e views with r e g a r d to peace that we h a v e , " he noted, a n d he p r o p o s e d to "force t h e m to our way of thinking." T h e conflict between his goals and t h e i r s — i n the M i d d l e E a s t as e l s e w h e r e — w a s to s h a p e the politics of the years that followed. T h e entry of Wilson's A m e r i c a onto the world s t a g e therefore o p e n e d up d a n g e r s as well as opportunities for L l o y d G e o r g e . 3

As a p u b l i c figure, Wilson w a s not easy for t h e m to u n d e r s t a n d . T h e g r a n d s o n of a p a s t o r a n d the son of a Presbyterian minister, Wilson had s t u d i e d law a n d g o v e r n m e n t , b e c a m e a professor, then President of Princeton University, G o v e r n o r of N e w J e r s e y , a n d finally President of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Y e t in character, thought, a n d t e m p e r a m e n t , he was not so m u c h a lawyer, a scholar, or a politician as he was, like his father a n d g r a n d f a t h e r , a t h e o l o g i a n . He a i m e d at converting or—failing t h a t — d e f e a t i n g rather than a p p e a s i n g . A politician takes professional p r i d e in achieving c o m p r o m i s e s , but Wilson—who did not wish to a p p e a r a politician—prided himself on avoiding t h e m . 4

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A m a n of high m i n d , character, a n d principles, he often saw. moral issues in a controversy when others d i d not; he frequently inspired others to share his vision. He was, a n d still remains, a controversial figure: p r i m a n d bespectacled, the aloof and scholarly President, whose features a p p e a r e d finely ascetic to his a d m i r e r s , a p p e a r e d p r i g g i s h a n d self-righteous to others. He was a c o m p l e x a n d forb i d d i n g figure. T h e Allies at times misinterpreted the President's w o r d s and actions as a show put on for p u r p o s e s of domestic politics, a n d failed to a p p r e c i a t e the sincerity of his desire to keep the U n i t e d S t a t e s out of the world w a r — a n d to keep them out of the new colonies they planned to establish for themselves in s u c h areas as the M i d d l e E a s t . T h u s they m i s u n d e r s t o o d Wilson's attempt to mediate an end to the w a r — a mission that he undertook at the request of the G e r m a n Chancellor at the end of 1916. B e t h m a n n Hollweg, the civilian Chancellor of G e r m a n y , who for m o n t h s had desired a negotiated settlement, forwarded a note to the U n i t e d S t a t e s on 12 D e c e m b e r 1916, e x p r e s s i n g a willingness to talk p e a c e . B e t h m a n n , for reasons of d o m e s t i c politics, was u n a b l e to m a k e the note m o r e specific; b u t Wilson went a h e a d to issue a peace note of his own on 18 D e c e m b e r , asking the Allies to define their war goals in the hope of narrowing the differences between the two sides. L l o y d G e o r g e had j u s t b e c o m e P r i m e Minister, a n d h e a n d the F r e n c h believed that Wilson was really asking for a p r o g r a m on the basis of which he could b r i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s into the war—which is what S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e R o b e r t L a n s i n g allowed them to unders t a n d . L a n s i n g , who was pro-intervention, in fact was undercutting the President's peace policy by s u g g e s t i n g to the Allies the t e r m s of their reply. T h e Allies o b l i g e d ; they defined their goals in sweeping t e r m s , a m o n g t h e m — " T h e liberation of the peoples who now live beneath the m u r d e r o u s tyranny of the T u r k s , a n d the expulsion from E u r o p e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which has p r o v e d itself radically alien to Western civilization." T h i s w a s not a peace p r o p o s a l b u t a war cry; clearly the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would not negotiate a c o m p r o mise peace on the basis of it. It was contrary to what the President had s o u g h t , a n d it is not clear how he would have p r o c e e d e d if G e r m a n y had not s u d d e n l y p u s h e d him into the a r m s of the Allies. 5

II B e t h m a n n lost all control of his g o v e r n m e n t in early 1917. T h e new Chief of the G e n e r a l Staff, Paul von H i n d e n b u r g , a n d his animating military g e n i u s , E r i c h L u d e n d o r f f , believed that the war could be

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won speedily and that c o m p r o m i s e was u n n e c e s s a r y . G e r m a n policy was dictated by the military leaders, who a s s u r e d the K a i s e r in J a n u a r y 1917 that unrestricted s u b m a r i n e warfare c o u l d force the British into s u b m i s s i o n within six m o n t h s , a n d that A m e r i c a n intervention in the war, if it c a m e , would c o m e too late. T h e G e r m a n s u b m a r i n e c a m p a i g n , e x a c e r b a t e d b y the notorious Z i m m e r m a n t e l e g r a m , p u s h e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s toward a declaration of war, t h o u g h substantial n u m b e r s of A m e r i c a n s resisted the logic of events and remained a d a m a n t l y o p p o s e d to involvement in the war. S w e p t against his will into the Allied c a m p , the President faced the challenge of uniting his country b e h i n d h i m . T h e President's political p r o b l e m — w h i c h was about to play a role in s h a p i n g his g o a l s in the M i d d l e E a s t a n d elsewhere—was that he was the leader of a minority party. In 1912 he h a d won the presidency only b e c a u s e the majority p a r t y — t h e R e p u b l i c a n s — h a d split in two, with s o m e voting for William H o w a r d T a f t ' s R e g u l a r s a n d others for T h e o d o r e Roosevelt's P r o g r e s s i v e s ; a n d in 1916 he had been reelected only with the s u p p o r t of the P r o g r e s s i v e s in the normally R e p u b l i c a n M i d d l e a n d F a r West. T o carry the country behind his c a n d i d a t e s a n d his p r o g r a m in future elections he would need to hold the s a m e s w i n g voting g r o u p s that had thrown the 1916 race to h i m : the big-city Irish Catholics who were anti-British a n d the mainly R e p u b l i c a n , M i d d l e Western G e r m a n - A m e r i c a n s ( m a n y of t h e m b o r n in G e r m a n y ) who were p r o - G e r m a n . H o w was he to b r i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s into the Allied c a m p without alienating these groups? Yet the U - b o a t s left him no choice: on 17 M a r c h 1917, G e r m a n s u b m a r i n e s sank three A m e r i c a n m e r c h a n t vessels. O n 2 0 M a r c h the President m e t with his C a b i n e t to solicit advice. He listened to the views of his C a b i n e t and said little, although he r e m a r k e d on the "apparent a p a t h y of the M i d d l e West" as a p r o b l e m to be o v e r c o m e . He did not tell the C a b i n e t whether he h a d m a d e up his m i n d what to d o . 6

On 24 M a r c h J o s e p h Patrick T u m u l t y , the President's long-time private secretary, wrote to him that the opinion of the A m e r i c a n public, as revealed by editorials in n e w s p a p e r s all over the country, was that if the U n i t e d S t a t e s went to war against G e r m a n y , "it should be on an issue directly between us and t h e m . " A m e r i c a should not be tied to Allied war g o a l s , whatever their m e r i t s ; A m e r i c a n s s h o u l d not be asked to die for other people's c a u s e s . 7

T h e German Foreign Secretary, Arthur Zimmerman, sent a secret cable instructing his Minister in Mexico to seek an alliance with Mexico against the United States. Mexico was to be given Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. T h e British government turned over an intercepted copy of Zimmerman's cable to President Wilson, who published it.

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When Wilson went before C o n g r e s s the evening of 2 April to ask for a declaration of war against the G e r m a n E m p i r e , it b e c a m e evident that he was thinking along the s a m e lines, for he devoted m u c h of his speech to the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' special g o a l s . In explaining why he felt c o m p e l l e d to ask for a declaration of war, he narrowed the focus of the quarrel with G e r m a n y to g r o u n d s on which it was difficult to fault h i m : the G e r m a n s h a d s u n k three A m e r i c a n merchant vessels a n d p r o p o s e d to sink m o r e . A c t s of war were b e i n g c o m m i t t e d against the U n i t e d S t a t e s , to which she had no honorable choice b u t to r e s p o n d in kind. To e m p h a s i z e that the quarrel w a s a b o u t the sinking of A m e r i c a n s h i p s , the President p o s t p o n e d consideration of relations with G e r m a n y ' s ally, the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e . H e said that since A u s t r i a H u n g a r y h a d not m a d e war on the U n i t e d S t a t e s , the U n i t e d S t a t e s , at least for the m o m e n t , would not m a k e war on her. ( I n the event, the U n i t e d S t a t e s did not declare war against the H a b s b u r g E m p i r e until the e n d of 1917.) E m p h a s i z i n g even further that he p r o p o s e d to enter the war on political g r o u n d s of his own choosing, the President did not mention the O t t o m a n E m p i r e at all, nor B u l g a r i a , which h a d recently joined the Central P o w e r s . In fact the U n i t e d S t a t e s never declared or m a d e war against t h e m , although the P o r t e — a s a result of G e r m a n p r e s s u r e — b r o k e off d i p l o m a t i c relations with the U n i t e d States. B u t he d e p a r t e d from the specific quarrel about the merchant vessels to challenge the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t — a n d the Allied governm e nt s t o o — o n m o r e general g r o u n d s . T h e actions o f the K a i s e r ' s g o v e r n m e n t , he told C o n g r e s s , constituted "a war against all nations"; a n d so " T h e challenge is to all m a n k i n d . " T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , he said, would fight "for the ultimate p e a c e of the world, a n d for the liberation of its p e o p l e s , the G e r m a n peoples included"; a n d , in a p h r a s e that b e c a m e f a m o u s , he asserted that " T h e world m u s t be m a d e safe for d e m o c r a c y . " Implicitly distinguishing A m e r i c a n policy from that of the Allied Powers, Wilson p r o c l a i m e d that "We have no selfish e n d s to serve. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material c o m p e n s a t i o n for the sacrifices we shall freely m a k e . " 8

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T h e point was later m a d e explicit when the U n i t e d S t a t e s — keeping her distance f r o m the E u r o p e a n s and their s u s p e c t political a m b i t i o n s — d e c l i n e d to b e c o m e one of the Allies, a n d chose to be designated as an associate rather than as an ally. T h i s was an extraordinary decision: to fight a l o n g s i d e Britain, F r a n c e , Italy, a n d R u s s i a , b u t to refuse to be their ally; a n d to fight against G e r m a n y , but to refuse to fight against G e r m a n y ' s allies. It was an indication of a fundamental conflict between the E u r o p e a n belligerents a n d Wilson's A m e r i c a as to the p u r p o s e of the war a n d the s h a p e of the

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peace. T h e intervention of the U n i t e d S t a t e s was to cast a long s h a d o w over the g a i n s with which the E n t e n t e Powers had p r o m i s e d to reward one another at the e n d of the war, especially in the M i d d l e East.

Ill T h e President was concerned a b o u t the attacks on his war policy by P r o g r e s s i v e and Socialist leaders in the M i d d l e West, for they represented voting blocs he could not i g n o r e . T h e y d e n o u n c e d his policy as aiding i m p e r i a l i s m , a n d c l a i m e d the war was b e i n g fought in the service of major financial interests. T h e y pictured the war as a greedy s t r u g g l e for spoils. T h e y attacked where the President felt vulnerable, for he believed, correctly, that the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s h a d entered into secret agreem e n t s with one another to a g g r a n d i z e their e m p i r e s , a n d feared that if these a g r e e m e n t s were m a d e known they might confirm the c h a r g e leveled against him that he h a d associated the U n i t e d S t a t e s with a war that served essentially imperialistic interests. T h e secret S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t , for e x a m p l e , p r o v i d e d for Britain a n d F r a n c e to divide u p the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t . Other a g r e e m e n t s p r o vided for R u s s i a a n d Italy to annex portions of what is now T u r k e y . Wilson i n q u i r e d into the details of the secret treaties—even t h o u g h his political confidant, E d w a r d M a n d e l l H o u s e , felt these were matters best not g o n e into until the war w a s won. In r e s p o n s e to the President's inquiry, the British F o r e i g n Secretary, A r t h u r Balfour, sent copies of the secret a g r e e m e n t s to Washington on 18 M a y 1917. H o u s e (who u s e d his honorary T e x a s title of colonel) was d i s m a y e d by their contents. Of the plan to partition the M i d d l e E a s t , Colonel H o u s e presciently r e m a r k e d that "It is all b a d and I told Balfour s o . T h e y are m a k i n g it a b r e e d i n g place for future w a r . " 11

T h e Allies would not renounce the claims that they h a d staked out for themselves in their secret a g r e e m e n t s . T h e President could not use coercion to m a k e t h e m do s o : while fighting a l o n g s i d e t h e m he could not hurt t h e m without hurting the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Y e t he knew that if news of the a g r e e m e n t s leaked out it would hurt t h e m all. As an o p p o n e n t , on principle, of secret treaties, he was p u s h e d into the paradoxical position of trying to keep the M i d d l e E a s t e r n a g r e e m e n t s a secret; b u t he was not able to do s o . When the Bolsheviks seized power in P e t r o g r a d , they p u b l i s h e d the copies of the secret a g r e e m e nt s that they discovered in the R u s s i a n archives. F e a r f u l of the effect on A m e r i c a n p u b l i c opinion, Wilson t r i e d — b u t failed—to prevent the publication of the treaties in the U n i t e d S t a t e s .

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F a l l i n g back on a s u g g e s t i o n by his brilliant y o u n g journalist s u p p o r t e r Walter L i p p m a n n , then an editor of the New Republic, Wilson took the offensive by redefining the goals for which the war was b e i n g fought, in a way that he j u d g e d would purify the Allied c a u s e , in the hopes of b o o s t i n g public morale on his own side and of again a p p e a l i n g to the G e r m a n people over the heads of their leaders. Wilson defined the new war goals in several ways a n d on a n u m b e r of occasions. M o s t f a m o u s were the F o u r t e e n Points, which he outlined to a joint session of C o n g r e s s on 8 J a n u a r y 1918. Of these, s o m e were of a general n a t u r e : no m o r e secret a g r e e m e n t s between countries; d i p l o m a c y and negotiation always to take place in the public view; freedom of the s e a s ; freedom of trade, a n d an end of tariff a n d other economic b a r r i e r s ; general d i s a r m a m e n t ; a n d the establishment of an association of nations to guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of all nations. Others dealt with specific i s s u e s ; a n d , of these, Point T w e l v e , although the U n i t e d S t a t e s was not at war with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , outlined A m e r i c a n objectives with respect to it: "12. T h e T u r k i s h portions of the present O t t o m a n e m p i r e should be a s s u r e d a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now u n d e r T u r k i s h rule s h o u l d be a s s u r e d an u n d o u b t e d security of life a n d an absolutely u n m o l e s t e d opportunity of a u t o n o m o u s d e v e l o p m e n t . " In an earlier draft, Wilson had p r o p o s e d that T u r k e y be wiped off the m a p ; his main interest in the M i d d l e E a s t was missionary a n d , like L l o y d G e o r g e , he s e e m s to have kept in m i n d the T u r k i s h m a s s a c r e s of C h r i s t i a n s . T h e final version, however, drafted by his a d v i s e r s , was in line with the President's claim that the U n i t e d S t a t e s was fighting the g o v e r n m e n t s rather than the peoples of her a d v e r s a r i e s . 12

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Point T w e l v e e x p r e s s e d the view, s h a r e d by Wilson a n d H o u s e , that the M i d d l e E a s t should not be divided a m o n g the belligerent p o w e r s ; that peoples hitherto ruled by the T u r k s s h o u l d b e c o m e a u t o n o m o u s . Only a year before, however, Wilson a n d H o u s e had a g r e e d that it would be unwise for the President to d i s c u s s in public his plans for d i s p l a c i n g the O t t o m a n regime b e c a u s e his w o r d s might endanger the A m e r i c a n missionary colleges in Beirut a n d outside Constantinople. 1 4

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A m o n t h later, on 11 F e b r u a r y 1918, Wilson s p o k e to C o n g r e s s a n d defined in a general way the F o u r Principles u p o n which the peace settlement should b e m a d e . T h e second and third principles were: 2. T h a t peoples from sovereignty p a w n s in a g a m e , of the balance of

a n d provinces are not to be bartered a b o u t to sovereignty as if they were chattels or even the great g a m e , now for ever discredited, p o w e r ; but that

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3. E v e r y territorial settlement involved in this war m u s t be m a d e in the interest and for the benefit of the p o p u l a t i o n s concerned, a n d not as a part of any m e r e a d j u s t m e n t or c o m p r o m i s e of claims a m o n g s t rival states . . . In a speech on 4 J u l y 1918, Wilson defined the F o u r E n d s for which the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d its associates were fighting as including T h e settlement of every question, whether of territory or sovereignty, of economic a r r a n g e m e n t , or of political relationship, u p o n the b a s i s of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, a n d not u p o n the basis of the material interest or a d v a n t a g e of any other nation or people which m a y desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or m a s t e r y . Wilson's peace p r o p o s a l s were received with a r d e n t enthusia s m , b u t , revealingly, not by the Allied g o v e r n m e n t s . As Walter L i p p m a n n ' s b i o g r a p h e r has written, At first this p u z z l e d L i p p m a n n , for he had a s s u m e d that Wilson had coordinated his plan with the Allies before m a k i n g it p u b l i c . He h a d not, a n d for a g o o d r e a s o n : he knew they would turn it d o w n . D e f e a t e d in his efforts to p e r s u a d e the Allies to r e p u d i a t e the secret treaties, he h a d tried to induce the peoples of E u r o p e to p u t p r e s s u r e on their own g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e tactic failed, a n d as a result the F o u r t e e n Points were simply a unilateral A m e r i c a n p r o n o u n c e m e n t rather than a declaration of Allied p o l i c y . 16

I n d e e d they represented a challenge to the Allied as well as to the enemy g o v e r n m e n t s .

IV Point T w e l v e was not only unilateral b u t also a n o m a l o u s : the President was p r o p o s i n g to d i s m e m b e r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , with which the U n i t e d S t a t e s was not at war. It also s e e m e d an anomaly that the U n i t e d S t a t e s should have declared war against G e r m a n y and later against A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y without also declaring war against their allies. T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e a p p e a r e d t o b e i n favor of i s s u i n g the additional declarations of war. Its chairman asked S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e L a n s i n g for a fuller explanation of the Administration's r e a s o n s for not d o i n g s o . In a lengthy m e m o r a n d u m s u b m i t t e d by L a n s i n g in reply, the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e cited a n u m b e r of r e a s o n s . At the t i m e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s held no significant t r a d e ,

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economic, or political stakes in the M i d d l e E a s t other than two Protestant m i s s i o n a r y - s u p p o r t e d c o l l e g e s — R o b e r t College a n d the S y r i a n Protestant College—with which Wilson's friend a n d chief f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t e r , Cleveland D o d g e , was intimately concerned. B u t L a n s i n g a r g u e d that s a f e g u a r d i n g these institutions in itself was of sufficient i m p o r t a n c e to justify the Administration's policy. He indicated that these institutions were worth millions of dollars and m i g h t be confiscated in the event of war. He also w a r n e d that, in the event of war, Christians and J e w s in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e might b e c o m e the victims of new m a s s a c r e s . L a n s i n g saw no particular a d v a n t a g e to be gained by declaring war, a n d pointed out that T u r k e y had not attacked the U n i t e d S t a t e s . D e s p i t e the m a n y reasons cited by L a n s i n g for the Administration's decision, C o n g r e s s r e m a i n e d unconvinced, and a resolution was introduced in the S e n a t e in 1918 calling for the additional declarations of war. T e s t i f y i n g before the S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e , L a n s i n g said that the decision was essentially one for C o n g r e s s to m a k e . At the request of the c o m m i t t e e , he agreed to s o u n d out the Allies as to whether they believed the additional declarations of war would help or hinder the war effort. In M a y , L a n s i n g reported to the President that the Allies were of the opinion that it w o u l d be helpful if the U n i t e d S t a t e s were to issue the additional declarations of war. L a n s i n g pointed out to the President, however, that m o r e than a million dollars a m o n t h was being sent to A m e r i c a n missionaries in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to feed and care for S y r i a n s a n d A r m e n i a n s , a n d that this aid w o u l d be cut off in the event of w a r . T h e President reaffirmed his decision not to declare war. T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e w a s s o informed a n d reluctantly accepted his decision. T h u s the U n i t e d S t a t e s r e m a i n e d at peace with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e while the President continued to formulate his plans for breaking it u p . 1 8

V At the President's r e q u e s t , Colonel H o u s e , b y - p a s s i n g the S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t , b e g a n in early S e p t e m b e r 1917 to a s s e m b l e a g r o u p of assistants to help him formulate America's plans for the postwar world. It was to be an independent g r o u p to which no publicity was to be g i v e n : it was c o d e - n a m e d "the I n q u i r y . " It met at first in the N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y . A t Wilson's suggestion, H o u s e drew participants principally from the a c a d e m i c world, b e g i n n i n g with n a m e s r e c o m m e n d e d by the president of H a r v a r d University a n d by the editor of the New Republic. President Wilson personally chose

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Walter L i p p m a n n . A t its peak, the g r o u p a s s e m b l e d b y H o u s e n u m b e r e d 126. T h e vast majority of its m e m b e r s had received their final a c a d e m i c d e g r e e s from one of four elite u n i v e r s i t i e s — C h i c a g o , C o l u m b i a , H a r v a r d , a n d Y a l e — a n d m a n y were recruited directly from the faculties of those or similar i n s t i t u t i o n s . Y e t the I n q u i r y — a p a r t f r o m its professionally d r a w n m a p s — was c o n d u c t e d a m a t e u r i s h l y . T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n g r o u p , c o m p o s e d of ten scholars o p e r a t i n g out of Princeton University, d i d not include any specialists in the c o n t e m p o r a r y M i d d l e E a s t ; its c h a i r m a n was a student of the C r u s a d e s . T h e chairman's s o n , also a m e m b e r , was a specialist in L a t i n A m e r i c a n s t u d i e s . A m o n g other m e m b e r s were an expert on the A m e r i c a n I n d i a n , an engineer, a n d two p r o f e s s o r s who specialized in ancient Persian l a n g u a g e s a n d l i t e r a t u r e . 19

2 0

21

T h e choice of the N e w Y o r k Public L i b r a r y as its first h e a d q u a r t e r s s y m b o l i z e d the a p p r o a c h a d o p t e d by the I n q u i r y : having raised all the political q u e s t i o n s that divide the h u m a n race, the I n q u i r y p r o ceeded to look t h e m u p . M a n y of the researchers d i d no m o r e than s u m m a r i z e the information that they found in an encyclopaedia. M a n y delved into q u e s t i o n s of literature a n d architecture that could have no conceivable b e a r i n g on the t e r m s of an eventual peace treaty. F e w of the reports h a d any b e a r i n g on the question of A m e r i c a n national i n t e r e s t s . 22

It was typical that even in the e c o n o m i c section of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n g r o u p ' s report, there was no mention of the possibility that significant d e p o s i t s of p e t r o l e u m m i g h t be found in that part of the world. Y e t in 1918, in w a g i n g a twentieth-century war in which tanks a n d airplanes m a d e their a p p e a r a n c e , the U n i t e d S t a t e s discovered ( a s did F r a n c e that s a m e year, a n d as Winston Churchill h a d done in Britain before the war) that the vast quantities of petroleum r e q u i r e d in m o d e r n warfare had rendered the potential oil resources which were s u s p e c t e d to exist in the M i d d l e E a s t of considerable i m p o r t a n c e . T h a t the Inquiry's reports o n the M i d d l e E a s t ignored the oil issue was an indication of the unworldliness of the President's m e n that b o d e d ill for the future Peace C o n f e r e n c e . 23

VI While the President's peace p r o g r a m w a s in s o m e r e s p e c t s quixotic, the extraordinary r e s p o n s e that it evoked throughout the world showed that it e x p r e s s e d a w i d e s p r e a d yearning to u n d e r s t a n d why the war w a s b e i n g f o u g h t . Britain's F o r e i g n Secretary, B a l f o u r , said that the war "was p e r h a p s the b i g g e s t event in history" b u t that, beyond that, his m i n d would not g o : " C o m i n g generations m i g h t find it possible to see the thing as it really existed," b u t he a n d his

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generation could not. T h e war, by 1917, had g r o w n so m u c h larger than the events that c a u s e d it that its c a u s e s s e e m e d a l m o s t a b s u r d l y insignificant by c o m p a r i s o n . T h e day after W o o d r o w Wilson delivered his speech to C o n g r e s s asking for a declaration of war, Walter L i p p m a n n wrote to h i m (in w o r d s that were to a p p e a r in the New Republic later in the w e e k ) : "Only a s t a t e s m a n who will be called great could have m a d e America's intervention m e a n so m u c h to the g e n e r o u s forces of the world, could have lifted the inevitable horror of war into a deed so full of m e a n i n g . " L i p p m a n n , as he so often did, had found the word for it: the President, by a d o p t i n g the g o a l s that he d i d , had given the war a meaning. 25

Y e a r s later, in off-the-record c o m m e n t s a b o a r d ship en route to the peace conferences in 1919, Wilson told his associates that "I am convinced that if this peace is not m a d e on the highest principles of justice, it will be swept away by the peoples of the world in less than a generation. If it is any other sort of peace then I shall want to run away a n d hide . . . for there will follow not m e r e conflict b u t cataclysm." H o w e v e r , neither Wilson nor those who took part in his I n q u i r y had f o r m u l a t e d concrete p r o g r a m s that would translate p r o m i s e s into realities: the President's p r o g r a m was v a g u e a n d b o u n d to a r o u s e millennial expectations—which m a d e it practically certain that any agreement achieved by politicians w o u l d d i s a p p o i n t . 26

32 L L O Y D GEORGE'S ZIONISM

i As h u m a n b e i n g s , no two men could have been less alike than the austere A m e r i c a n President a n d the c h a r m i n g b u t morally lax British P r i m e Minister. As politicians, t h o u g h , they were s i m i l a r : loners who h a d won power t h r o u g h the fluke of a party split. E a c h carried on a personal foreign policy, b y - p a s s i n g the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e and the F o r e i g n Office. B o t h Wilson a n d L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been reluctant to let their countries enter the war a n d , after o p t i n g for war, h a d found it difficult to keep their pacifist a n d anti-war s u p p o r t e r s in line. B o t h m e n were of the political left; b u t there the similarities c a m e to an end, for while Wilson was m o v i n g in an ever m o r e progressive a n d idealistic direction, L l o y d G e o r g e was d o i n g j u s t the opposite. H a d his political p a s t been a g u i d e to his future p e r f o r m a n c e , L l o y d G e o r g e could have been e x p e c t e d t o s h a r e the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' aversion to imperialist d e s i g n s on the M i d d l e E a s t . In his Radical youth he h a d o p p o s e d British i m p e r i a l i s m a n d it would have been in character for h i m , on b e c o m i n g P r i m e Minister, to have overturned the A s q u i t h Cabinet's agreement with the Allies to e x p a n d their e m p i r e s — b u t he did not do s o . L l o y d G e o r g e felt m u c h the s a m e need to reformulate war goals that Wilson d i d , but arrived at different conclusions. Wilson p r o claimed that the enormity of the war required peace without annexations. L l o y d G e o r g e took the other view: the enormity of the war required indemnities a n d annexations on an e n o r m o u s scale. B o t h Wilson a n d L l o y d G e o r g e p r o m i s e d the p e o p l e s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a better life, b u t where Wilson held out the h o p e of self-government, L l o y d G e o r g e , while e m p l o y i n g the rhetoric of national liberation, p r o p o s e d to give the M i d d l e E a s t better government than it c o u l d give itself. In this the P r i m e Minister's goals coincided with those of K i t c h e n e r ' s lieutenants who exercised day-today control of British Cairo's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy; thus the chances that his policy would actually be carried out were i m p r o v e d .

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T a k i n g office as 1916 turned into 1917, the new P r i m e Minister b r o u g h t old-fashioned R a d i c a l fervor to s u c h e m e r g i n g war goals as the destruction of the reactionary O t t o m a n E m p i r e — g o a l s that harked back to the glorious d a y s of nineteenth-century L i b e r a l i s m . O n e of L l o y d G e o r g e ' s first actions on b e c o m i n g P r i m e Minister was to order his armies in E g y p t onto the offensive. O n e of the others was to order J o h n B u c h a n , w h o m he installed at Milner's s u g g e s t i o n as D i r e c t o r of Information, to launch a p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a i g n portraying the destruction of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as a m a j o r p u r p o s e of the war. T h e c a m p a i g n c a p t u r e d the imagination of the p u b l i c : " T h e T u r k M u s t G o ! " p r o v e d t o b e a n effective s l o g a n . L i k e Wilson's proclaimed points a n d principles, it also p r o v e d , at least in the short run, g o o d politics. 1

L l o y d G e o r g e ' s p r o g r a m of s e n d i n g troops to fight in the E a s t b r o u g h t h i m into i m m e d i a t e conflict with his generals; they continued to d e m a n d s u p r e m e control over military decisions, a n d in this were s u p p o r t e d b y K i n g G e o r g e . T h e i r strategy, a s always, was t o concentrate all resources on the western front, and they c o m p l a i n e d that their professional j u d g m e n t w a s b e i n g defied by the new P r i m e Minister. T h e i r n e w s p a p e r friends on Fleet Street took up the c a u s e . In early J a n u a r y the p r e s s lord, L o r d Northcliffe, in a heated conversation threatened "to break" L l o y d G e o r g e unless he called off his eastern s t r a t e g y . Northcliffe g a v e himself the credit for having overthrown A s q u i t h in D e c e m b e r , a n d a p p e a r e d confident that he could b r i n g d o w n L l o y d G e o r g e in J a n u a r y if he chose. 2

At a b o u t the s a m e time, the War Office asked s o m e o n e close to L l o y d G e o r g e to warn h i m that the generals were going to fight him a n d that he "might not get the best of it [original e m p h a s i s ] . " In G e r m a n y the G e n e r a l Staff was in the process of sweeping aside the civilian Chancellor. With the K i n g , the leaders of his own L i b e r a l Party, the p r e s s , and the g e n e r a l s against him, the P r i m e Minister could not be certain that the British I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff would not attempt s o m e t h i n g similar. It w a s one of those times in world politics when anything, even the previously u n i m a g i n a b l e , s e e m e d possible. 3

Yet he stood as firm as he could on his eastern strategy, scornful of his military advisers. L o n g afterward, he wrote that "nothing a n d n o b o d y could have saved the T u r k from complete collapse in 1915 and 1916 except our G e n e r a l S t a f f . " A c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , a victory over the O t t o m a n E m p i r e before the end of 1916, when B u l g a r i a entered the war, would "have p r o d u c e d a decisive effect on the fortunes of the W a r . " It would have been easy to beat T u r k e y at any time, he s a i d : "the resolute facade the T u r k s presented to the Allies . . . had nothing behind it. It was part of the War Office g a m e to pretend that the T u r k s had f o r m i d a b l e forces with a m p l e reserves. 4

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T h e y m a y have believed it, b u t if s o , either their information w a s defective, or they were easily taken i n . " F r o m the b e g i n n i n g of the war, L l o y d G e o r g e had a r g u e d that G e r m a n y c o u l d be beaten by an attack t h r o u g h the B a l k a n s . D e f e a t i n g T u r k e y would open up the B a l k a n s to s u c h an attack. Writing long afterward, he w a s able to s u p p o r t his position by q u o t i n g von H i n d e n b u r g , the chief of the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff: "If ever there w a s a p r o s p e c t of a brilliant strategic feat, it w a s here . . . Why did E n g l a n d never m a k e use o f her o p p o r t u n i t y ? . . . S o m e day history will p e r h a p s clear up this q u e s t i o n . . . " 6

7

L l o y d G e o r g e wanted to do it, but his p r o b l e m w a s that he lacked the political strength to face d o w n the g e n e r a l s a n d to c o m m a n d e e r troops a n d e q u i p m e n t in sufficient quantity to do the j o b . T h r o u g h out 1917 a n d well into 1918, he a n d Britain's military leaders fought a war of m a n e u v e r a n d intrigue against each other. L l o y d G e o r g e ' s position w a s p r e c a r i o u s ; he had no d e p t h of s u p p o r t in Parliament, where he w a s s u s t a i n e d for the time b e i n g by former enemies and distrusted by former friends. T h e m o s t d a n g e r o u s politician to attack the g o v e r n m e n t w a s his one-time p r o t e g e Winston Churchill. "His tone w a s rather bitter in s p e a k i n g of L l o y d G e o r g e w h o m he h a d evidently c o m e to consider as his detested antagonist," noted a friend of the two m e n . Churchill had c a u s e to be bitter; L l o y d G e o r g e had e x c l u d e d him f r o m the C a b i n e t . "He b r o u g h t T u r k e y into the W a r , " the P r i m e M i n i s t e r s a i d . " S u c h m e n are too d a n g e r o u s for high office." 8

9

In s p e e c h e s a n d n e w s p a p e r articles, Churchill b r o u g h t to b e a r his vast knowledge of military affairs a n d his g r a s p of detail in criticizing the c o n d u c t of the war. As L l o y d G e o r g e knew well, there w a s m u c h to criticize; he w a s powerless to i m p o s e his own views on the Allied c o m m a n d e r s , yet as P r i m e Minister he was responsible to Parliament for their continuing costly failures. K e e p i n g his lines of c o m m u n i cation open, Churchill sent a private w a r n i n g to the P r i m e Minister that, dissatisfied with the c o n d u c t of the war, the d i s p a r a t e opposition g r o u p s in the C o m m o n s might unite to b r i n g him d o w n . On 10 M a y 1917 Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e h a p p e n e d to meet after a session of the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , a n d the P r i m e Minister spoke of his desire to have Churchill in the C a b i n e t . T h o u g h he still thought Churchill had "spoilt himself by reading a b o u t N a p o l e o n , " L l o y d G e o r g e confided t o F r a n c e s S t e v e n s o n , his secretary and mistress, that he n e e d e d Churchill to cheer him up and e n c o u r a g e him at a time when he w a s s u r r o u n d e d by colleagues with g l o o m y faces. 1 0

As always, it w a s a q u e s t i o n of whether it was a greater risk to leave Churchill out or to b r i n g h i m in. In m i d - J u l y he a p p o i n t e d Churchill M i n i s t e r of M u n i t i o n s ; a n d , even t h o u g h the p o s t did not

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carry with it m e m b e r s h i p in the W a r C a b i n e t , the a p p o i n t m e n t immediately a r o u s e d s u c h o p p o s i t i o n that for a time it endangered the government's existence.* Churchill's aunt, writing to c o n g r a t u l a t e him on b e c o m i n g Minister of M u n i t i o n s , a d d e d " M y advice is stick to munitions & don't try & run the g o v e r n m e n t ! " T h e new a p p o i n t m e n t p r o m p t e d The Times to warn that the country "is in no m o o d to tolerate even a forlorn attempt to resuscitate a m a t e u r s t r a t e g y . " Churchill's family a n d friends, who were worried for h i m , a n d his legions of enemies a n d detractors, who were worried for the country, would have been d i s m a y e d b u t not s u r p r i s e d to learn that, within a week of his a p p o i n t m e n t , he had a p p r o a c h e d the S e c r e t a r y of the War C a b i n e t with a revived plan to invade the M i d d l e E a s t . He p r o p o s e d to land British a r m i e s at the port of A l e x a n d r e t t a to invade northern S y r i a a n d cut across the lines of transportation and c o m m u n i c a t i o n of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e W a r C a b i n e t ignored his p r o p o s a l , a n d i t c a m e to nothing. 12

13

1 4

II Within m o n t h s of taking office, L l o y d G e o r g e was engaged in secret negotiations with the Y o u n g T u r k leader, E n v e r P a s h a . T h e P r i m e Minister's agent in the negotiations was Vincent C a i l l a r d , financial director of the giant a r m a m e n t s firm Vickers, who had spent m a n y years in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e as president of the council of administration of the O t t o m a n Public D e b t . C a i l l a r d , in turn, acted t h r o u g h his close b u s i n e s s associate, Basil Zaharoff, who had risen from the underworld of S m y r n a to b e c o m e the world's m o s t notorious a r m s s a l e s m a n , known in the p o p u l a r p r e s s as the "merchant of d e a t h . " Zaharoff j o u r n e y e d to G e n e v a in 1917 a n d 1918 a n d reported that he was able to conduct negotiations there with E n v e r P a s h a , at first through a go-between and then f a c e - t o - f a c e . T h r o u g h his emissary, the P r i m e Minister offered b r i b e s — l a r g e bank a c c o u n t s — t o E n v e r a n d his associates to leave the war on Britain's terms, which were: A r a b i a to be independent; A r m e n i a a n d S y r i a to enjoy local a u t o n o m y within the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; M e s o p o t a m i a a n d Palestine to b e c o m e de facto British protectorates, 15

Lloyd George was saved by Bonar Law, who held his angry Conservatives in line. Bonar Law disliked Churchill, and was bitter about not having been consulted in the matter. Nonetheless, he remained loyal to the Prime Minister. Lloyd George cleverly told him that Asquith had pledged, if he came back as Prime Minister, to bring Churchill back to power as First Lord of the Admiralty. T h e implied message was that a Lloyd George government, with Churchill confined to a relatively less important position, was preferable. 11

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like E g y p t before the war, though u n d e r formal O t t o m a n suzerainty; a n d freedom of navigation t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s to be s e c u r e d . In return, L l o y d G e o r g e offered to p l e d g e that the C a p i t u l a t i o n s (the treaties giving preferential treatment to E u r o p e a n s ) would remain abolished, a n d that g e n e r o u s financial treatment would be given to T u r k e y t o aid her economic recovery. T h e t e r m s offered b y L l o y d G e o r g e differed in two important ways f r o m those envisaged by the prior A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t : F r a n c e , Italy, a n d R u s s i a were to get nothing; a n d Britain was to take Palestine as well as M e s o p o t a m i a . Zaharoff's r e p o r t s — t h e veracity of which it is difficult to j u d g e — indicate that E n v e r , after mercurial c h a n g e s of m i n d a n d m o o d , did not accept L l o y d G e o r g e ' s offer. It d o e s not s o u n d as t h o u g h he ever seriously intended to do s o . B u t the instructions that Zaharoff received reveal L l o y d G e o r g e ' s intentions with regard to the M i d d l e East.

Ill In a secret session of the H o u s e of C o m m o n s on 10 M a y 1917, the Prime Minister s u r p r i s e d even a close collaborator by saying u n equivocally that Britain was not g o i n g to give back the G e r m a n colonies in Africa c a p t u r e d d u r i n g the war, a n d that T u r k e y would not be allowed to keep Palestine or M e s o p o t a m i a . T h o u g h L l o y d G e o r g e had definite ideas a b o u t the future of the liberated O t t o m a n lands, few of his colleagues were aware of them. He avoided official channels a n d m a d e his ideas known in detail only in the c o u r s e of the secret negotiations with E n v e r P a s h a ; hence the importance of what they revealed. 1 6

T h e P r i m e Minister intended to deny F r a n c e the position that S i r M a r k S y k e s had p r o m i s e d her in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , a n d took the view that the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t was u n i m p o r t a n t ; that physical p o s s e s s i o n was all that m a t t e r e d . R e g a r d i n g Palestine, he told the British a m b a s s a d o r to F r a n c e in April 1917 that the F r e n c h would be obliged to accept a fait accompli: "We shall be there by conquest a n d shall r e m a i n . " 17

L l o y d G e o r g e was the only m a n in his g o v e r n m e n t who had always wanted to a c q u i r e Palestine for Britain. He also wanted to encourage the d e v e l o p m e n t of a J e w i s h homeland in Palestine. H i s colleagues failed to u n d e r s t a n d how strongly he held these views. T h e r e was a b a c k g r o u n d to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s beliefs of which his colleagues were largely ignorant. He was not, like A s q u i t h a n d the other m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t , educated in an exclusive public school that s t r e s s e d the G r e e k a n d L a t i n classics; he was b r o u g h t up on the B i b l e . R e p e a t e d l y he r e m a r k e d that the Biblical place n a m e s

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were better known to him than were those of the battles a n d the d i s p u t e d frontiers that figured in the E u r o p e a n war. He expressed himself a b o u t these places with fervor. In his later m e m o i r s he wrote that he had objected to the division of Palestine in the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t (most of it g o i n g to F r a n c e or into an international zone) on the g r o u n d s that it mutilated the country. He said it was not worth winning the H o l y L a n d only to "hew it in pieces before the L o r d . " He asserted that "Palestine, if recaptured, m u s t be one and indivisible to renew its g r e a t n e s s as a living e n t i t y . " 1 8

19

IV Unlike his colleagues he was keenly aware that there were centuriesold tendencies in British N o n c o n f o r m i s t and Evangelical thought toward taking the lead in restoring the J e w s to Zion. I n d e e d they formed the b a c k g r o u n d of his own N o n c o n f o r m i s t faith. He was only the latest in a long line of Christian Zionists in Britain that stretched back to the Puritans a n d the era in which the Mayflower set sail for the N e w World. P r o m i s e d lands were still m u c h thought a b o u t in those d a y s , whether in the U n i t e d S t a t e s or in Palestine. In the mid-seventeenth century, two E n g l i s h Puritans residing in H o l l a n d — J o a n n a a n d E b e n e z e r C a r t w r i g h t — p e t i t i o n e d their government " T h a t this N a t i o n of E n g l a n d , with the inhabitants of the N e t h e r l a n d s , shall be the first a n d the readiest to transport Izraell's sons and d a u g h t e r s in their ships to the L a n d p r o m i s e d by their forefathers, A b r a h a m , I s a a c , a n d J a c o b for an everlasting Inherit a n c e . " G u i d e d by the S c r i p t u r e s , the Puritans believed that the advent of the M e s s i a h would occur once the people of J u d a e a were restored to their native land. 20

T h e idea r e c u r r e d : in the mid-nineteenth century, the social reformer A n t h o n y C o o p e r , who b e c a m e Earl of S h a f t e s b u r y , inspired a powerful evangelical m o v e m e n t within the C h u r c h of E n g l a n d that a i m e d at b r i n g i n g the J e w s back to Palestine, converting t h e m to Christianity, and hastening the S e c o n d C o m i n g . S h a f t e s b u r y also ins p i r e d P a l m e r s t o n , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y and his relation by m a r riage, to extend British consular protection to J e w s in Palestine: "Palmerston had already been chosen by G o d to be an instrument of g o o d to H i s ancient p e o p l e , " S h a f t e s b u r y noted in his d i a r y . 2 1

Palmerston acted from a m i x t u r e of idealistic and practical reasons not unlike those of L l o y d G e o r g e in the next century. He p r e s s e d a J e w i s h Palestine on the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the context of the G r e a t G a m e rivalry with F r a n c e , at a time in the 1830s and 1840s when the rebelling Viceroy of E g y p t , M e h e m e t Ali, backed by F r a n c e , m a r c h e d from E g y p t on S y r i a to threaten the territorial integrity of the e m p i r e

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and the throne of its S u l t a n . As u s u a l , Palmerston u p h e l d the O t t o m a n c a u s e . O n e of his p u r p o s e s in advocating a J e w i s h Palestine was to strengthen the O t t o m a n r e g i m e , by providing it with J e w i s h s u p p o r t . Another was to foil the F r e n c h a n d their p r o t e g e M e h e m e t Ali by placing along their line of m a r c h a British-backed J e w i s h homeland which would block their a d v a n c e . Another was to provide Britain with a client in the M i d d l e E a s t , and therefore an excuse for intervention in O t t o m a n affairs. T h e R u s s i a n s , as defenders of the O r t h o d o x faith, a n d the F r e n c h , as c h a m p i o n s of the important and strategically located M a r o n i t e ( R o m a n Catholic) c o m m u n i t y in L e b a n o n , claimed to represent significant M i d d l e E a s t e r n interests a n d c o m m u n i t i e s . F o r the want of Protestants in the area, Britain had to a d o p t s o m e other protege in order to be able to m a k e a similar claim. Palmerston's notion of restoring the P r o m i s e d L a n d to the J e w i s h people also p r o v e d to be shrewd d o m e s t i c politics. It struck a responsive c h o r d in British public opinion that harked back to Puritan enthusiasm. A c c o r d i n g to the leading authority on Palmerston's diplomacy, his policy "became connected with" a mystical idea, never altogether lost in the nineteenth century, that Britain was to be the chosen instrument of G o d to b r i n g back the J e w s to the Holy L a n d . " T h i s s o m e h o w coexisted, at least in Britain's u p p e r classes, with pervasive a n t i - S e m i t i s m . 2 2

In 1914 the entry of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the war a p p e a r e d to have b r o u g h t a b o u t the political c i r c u m s t a n c e s in which the Zionist d r e a m at last could be realized. "What is to prevent the J e w s having Palestine a n d restoring a real J u d a e a ? " asked H. G. Wells in an open newspaper letter p e n n e d the m o m e n t that T u r k e y c a m e into the war. A similar thought occurred soon afterward to Sir H e r b e r t S a m u e l , P o s t m a s t e r General in Asquith's C a b i n e t , one of the leaders of the L i b e r a l Party, a n d the first person of the J e w i s h faith to sit in a British C a b i n e t . In J a n u a r y 1915 he sent a m e m o r a n d u m to P r i m e Minister A s q u i t h p r o p o s i n g that Palestine should b e c o m e a British p r o t e c t o r a t e — b e c a u s e it was of strategic importance to the British E m p i r e — a n d u r g i n g the a d v a n t a g e s of encouraging large-scale J e w i s h settlement there. T h e P r i m e Minister had j u s t been reading Tancred— a novel by B e n j a m i n Disraeli, the nineteenth-century British leader (baptized a Christian, but born of a J e w i s h family), who advocated a J e w i s h return to P a l e s t i n e — a n d A s q u i t h confided that S a m u e l ' s m e m o r a n d u m "reads almost like a new edition of Tancred b r o u g h t up to d a t e . I confess I am not attracted by this p r o p o s e d addition

It was a vision that inspired secular idealists as well. George Eliot, in her novel

Daniel Deronda (1876), proposed a Zionist program.

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to our responsibilities. B u t it is a curious illustration of Dizzy's [Disraeli's] favourite m a x i m that 'race is everything' to find this almost lyrical o u t b u r s t p r o c e e d i n g f r o m the well-ordered a n d m e thodical brain o f H . S . . . . " In M a r c h 1915 a revised version of S a m u e l ' s m e m o r a n d u m was circulated to the C a b i n e t . It d i d not attract s u p p o r t , a n d Asquith's private c o m m e n t was that "Curiously enough the only other partisan of this proposal is L l o y d G e o r g e , who, I need not say, does not care a d a m n for the J e w s o r their past o r their future . . . " T h e P r i m e Minister was unaware of the c o m p l e x of motives behind the position taken by L l o y d G e o r g e , who told the C a b i n e t that it would be an outrage to let the Christian Holy Places in Palestine fall into the h a n d s of "Agnostic Atheistic F r a n c e . " A s q u i t h found it o d d that S a m u e l a n d L l o y d G e o r g e should a d v o c a t e a British protectorate for Palestine for s u c h different r e a s o n s : "Isn't it singular that the s a m e conclusion s h d . be c a p a b l e of being c o m e to by s u c h different r o a d s ? " It w a s a prescient remark for, in the years to c o m e , British officials traveling along m a n y different r o a d s h a p p e n e d to arrive at the s a m e conclusion: a distinctive characteristic of Britain's evolving Palestine policy was that there was no single reason for it. 2 3

2 4

2 5

2 6

K i t c h e n e r threw the great weight of his authority against S a m u e l ' s p r o p o s a l . He told the C a b i n e t that Palestine was of little value, strategic or otherwise, a n d that it did not have even one decent h a r b o r . S a m u e l ' s p r o p o s a l , therefore, was not a d o p t e d ; b u t L l o y d G e o r g e continued to disagree with K i t c h e n e r a b o u t the strategic importance of Palestine. 2 7

V L l o y d G e o r g e , though of a Welsh family, was born in M a n c h e s t e r , Britain's s e c o n d l a r g e s t city, a n d the h o m e of the Radical L i b e r a l tradition which he was to u p h o l d throughout m u c h of his political life. M a n c h e s t e r was also, next to L o n d o n , the h o m e of Britain's largest J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y ; a n d M e m b e r s of Parliament f r o m the area, such as Balfour a n d Churchill, were aware of the special concerns of their J e w i s h constituents. :

C P . S c o t t , editor o f the great L i b e r a l newspaper the Manchester Guardian, was converted to Z i o n i s m in 1914 by C h a i m W e i z m a n n , a R u s s i a n J e w i s h chemist who had settled in Manchester. S c o t t , who was considered to be L l o y d G e o r g e ' s closest political confidant, took up the cause with all the force of his idealistic nature. T h e military correspondent of the Guardian, H e r b e r t S i d e b o t h a m , saw a c o m plementary, aspect of the m a t t e r : a military a d v a n t a g e to Britain. In the issue of 26 N o v e m b e r 1915, he wrote that "the whole future of

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the British E m p i r e as a S e a E m p i r e " d e p e n d e d u p o n Palestine bec o m i n g a buffer state inhabited "by an intensely patriotic r a c e . " T h e Manchester Guardian's conversion was b r o u g h t a b o u t in the context of the F i r s t World War, b u t L l o y d G e o r g e h a d c o m e to Z i o n i s m — o r rather it had c o m e to h i m — m o r e than a d e c a d e before. In 1903 he had been retained as the British attorney for the Zionist m o v e m e n t and for its founder, Dr T h e o d o r e Herzl, in connection with an issue that c a u s e d an agonizing split in Zionist r a n k s : whether a J e w i s h state necessarily had to be located in Palestine. As one who represented Herzl at the m o m e n t of decision, he was in a position to u n d e r s t a n d the movement's d i l e m m a s . 2 8

T h e Zionist m o v e m e n t was new, b u t its roots were as old as J u d a e a , whose i n d e p e n d e n c e was u n d e r m i n e d a n d later c r u s h e d b y ancient R o m e , a n d m o s t of whose inhabitants were driven into foreign l a n d s in the s e c o n d century A D . E v e n in exile the J u d a e a n s — or J e w s , as they c a m e to be k n o w n — c l u n g to their own religion, with its distinctive laws a n d c u s t o m s , setting them apart f r o m the p e o p l e s a m o n g s t w h o m they lived a n d m o v e d . Inferior s t a t u s , persecutions, frequent m a s s a c r e s , a n d repeated e x p u l s i o n s f r o m one country after another further reinforced their s e n s e of s e p a r a t e identity a n d special destiny. In the e n d — a c c o r d i n g to their religious t e a c h i n g s — G o d would b r i n g them b a c k to Z i o n , a n d in the course of their Passover ceremony each year they would repeat the ritual prayer, " N e x t year in J e r u s a l e m ! " T h e future return to Zion r e m a i n e d a M e s s i a n i c vision until the ideology of nineteenth-century E u r o p e converted it into a c o n t e m p o rary political p r o g r a m . A representative idea of that t i m e — w h i c h had been planted everywhere by the a r m i e s of the F r e n c h Revolution a n d had flourished—was that every nation ought to have an independent country of its own ( t h o u g h , of c o u r s e , what constituted a nation was a n o p e n q u e s t i o n ) . T h e Italian revolutionary G i u s e p p e Mazzini was the o u t s t a n d i n g p r o p o n e n t of this doctrine, according to which each nation s h o u l d be freed to realize its u n i q u e g e n i u s a n d to p u r s u e its particular mission in the service of m a n k i n d . T h u s the nationalism of each nation serves not merely its own interests b u t also those of its n e i g h b o r s ; a n d in the service of this creed Mazzini's colleague G i u s e p p e G a r i b a l d i — I t a l y ' s greatest h e r o — f o u g h t for U r u g u a y a n d F r a n c e a s well as Italy. A converse of this proposition was that a fundamental c a u s e of the world's ills was that s o m e nations were being kept f r o m achieving unity or i n d e p e n d e n c e — a situation that Mazzini and his followers p r o p o s e d to c h a n g e by war or revolution. T h e i r p r o g r a m was taken over f r o m the left by the r i g h t — I t a l y and G e r m a n y were f o r m e d into countries by C a v o u r a n d B i s m a r c k respectively—and b e c a m e a c o m mon theme of E u r o p e a n political d i s c o u r s e . N a t i o n a l i s m was taken a

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s t e p further in the S w i s s ( 1 8 4 7 ) a n d A m e r i c a n (1861—5) civil w a r s , when seven confederated S w i s s c a n t o n s and eleven C o n f e d e r a t e d S t a t e s of A m e r i c a a t t e m p t e d to s e c e d e — a n d were c r u s h e d by the a r m i e s of their respective federal g o v e r n m e n t s . T h u s peoples were to be unified into one nation, like it or not. T h i s s u g g e s t e d there m i g h t be a d a r k s i d e to the new n a t i o n a l i s m : intolerance of g r o u p s different from the majority. J e w s encountered this at once. In the nationalist e n v i r o n m e n t of western E u r o p e , the J e w i s h question a s s u m e d new g u i s e s : were the J e w s o f G e r m a n y G e r m a n s ? were the J e w s of F r a n c e F r e n c h ? — a n d , if s o , what of their special identity? By the end of the nineteenth century, the J e w s of western E u r o p e h a d achieved legal e m a n c i p a t i o n f r o m m a n y of the restrictions that h a d confined t h e m for centuries: they could m o v e out of their ghettos, practice the t r a d e or profession of their choice, b u y land, and enjoy the rights of c i t i z e n s h i p — b u t they still encountered a wave of hostility f r o m their n e i g h b o r s who c o n s i d e r e d them alien. I n eastern E u r o p e — t h e R u s s i a n E m p i r e , including P o l a n d , the Baltic l a n d s , and the U k r a i n e — t h e J e w i s h situation w a s p e r i l o u s . M o s t of the world's J e w s then lived within the section of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e to which they were confined so long as they lived within the C z a r ' s d o m a i n s : the P a l e , or enclosure (from the w o r d for a wooden stake u s e d in b u i l d i n g f e n c e s ) . Only a few of t h e m — s o m e illegally, s o m e by special p e r m i s s i o n — l i v e d in St P e t e r s b u r g , M o s c o w , or elsewhere o u t s i d e the Pale. T h e six million within the Pale were R u s s i a n J e w s who were not allowed t o b e J e w i s h R u s s i a n s . T h e y were not only shackled by legal restrictions, but were victimized by the organized m a s s a c r e s called p o g r o m s . In the last half of the nineteenth century a n d the first years of the twentieth century, these g r e w so terrible that J e w s in large n u m b e r fled the R u s s i a n E m p i r e in search of r e f u g e . S i n c e nationalism w a s then c o n s i d e r e d the cure-all for political ills, it w a s inevitable that s o m e b o d y would p r o p o s e it as the answer to the J e w i s h p r o b l e m . National unity a n d self-determination within an i n d e p e n d e n t J e w i s h c o m m o n w e a l t h were, in fact, p r o p o s e d in a n u m b e r of eloquent b o o k s whose a u t h o r s h a d arrived at their conclusions independently.* So T h e o d o r e Herzl was not the first to f o r m u l a t e s u c h a p r o g r a m , b u t he was the first to give it tangible political e x p r e s s i o n , a t ' a time when J e w i s h pioneers f r o m R u s s i a were b e g i n n i n g to colonize Palestine without waiting for the politics to be t h r a s h e d out. * Among them were Moses Hess's Rome and Jerusalem (1862) and L e o Pinsker's

Auto-Emancipation

(1882).

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When H e r z l , an assimilated J e w , conceived the idea of political Z i o n i s m , his notion h a d been that J e w s needed to have a national state of their o w n — b u t that its location was not of p r i m a r y i m p o r tance. Of J e w s a n d J u d a i s m Herzl knew next to nothing. He was a fashionable journalist, the Paris c o r r e s p o n d e n t of a Viennese newsp a p e r who h a d forgotten his J e w i s h origins until the shock of F r e n c h a n t i - S e m i t i s m in the D r e y f u s case convinced him of the need to r e s c u e the world's J e w s from their historical plight. As a m a n of the world, he knew how political b u s i n e s s was transacted in the E u r o p e of his time a n d b e g a n by establishing a Zionist organization. He then c o m m e n c e d negotiations on its behalf with officials of v a r i o u s g o v e r n m e n t s . Only after he h a d c o m e into working contact with other J e w s , a n d with J e w i s h organizations that for years had been fostering settlements in the H o l y L a n d , did he c o m e to recognize the u n i q u e a p p e a l of the country that the world called P a l e s t i n e — t h e L a n d of the P h i l i s t i n e s — b u t that J e w s called the L a n d of I s r a e l . By the b e g i n n i n g of the twentieth century, Herzl's negotiations with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d convinced h i m that the S u l t a n w o u l d not agree to the Zionist p r o p o s a l s — a t least for the time b e i n g . So he looked elsewhere. In 1902 Herzl held an important meeting with J o s e p h C h a m b e r l a i n , the powerful Colonial Secretary in the S a l i s b u r y and Balfour C a b i n e t s a n d the father of m o d e r n British i m p e r i a l i s m . C h a m b e r l a i n , too, believed in a national solution to the J e w i s h p r o b l e m , a n d listened sympathetically to Herzl's fall-back p r o p o s a l that a J e w i s h political c o m m u n i t y should initially be established across the frontier f r o m Palestine, in the hope that Palestine w o u l d eventually b e c o m e available, s o m e h o w or other. Herzl was talking in t e r m s of either C y p r u s or the El A r i s h strip at the e d g e of the Sinai peninsula, next to Palestine, both areas nominally p a r t s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e but in fact o c c u p i e d by Britain. C h a m b e r l a i n ruled out C y p r u s b u t offered to help Herzl obtain the consent of the British officials in c h a r g e of S i n a i . T o a p p l y for this consent, Herzl, t h r o u g h his British representative, L e o p o l d G r e e n b e r g , d e c i d e d to retain the services of a politically knowledgeable lawyer, a n d chose D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , who p e r s o n ally h a n d l e d the matter on behalf of his L o n d o n firm, L l o y d G e o r g e , R o b e r t s & C o . T h e p r o p o s a l f o u n d e r e d as a result of o p p o s i t i o n from the British a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in E g y p t a n d the F o r e i g n Office sent letters to Dr Herzl on 19 J u n e a n d 16 J u l y 1903 informing him that his p r o p o s a l was not practical. C h a m b e r l a i n then s u g g e s t e d that he could offer an area for J e w i s h settlement within the jurisdiction of his own d e p a r t m e n t a n d offered the p r o s p e c t of settlement in U g a n d a in British E a s t Africa. T h e

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P r i m e Minister, A r t h u r J a m e s B a l f o u r , who had also thought deeply a b o u t the J e w i s h q u e s t i o n a n d h a d c o n c l u d e d that it required a national solution, s u p p o r t e d C h a m b e r l a i n ' s p r o p o s a l . Herzl a g r e e d , a n d L l o y d G e o r g e accordingly drafted a C h a r t e r for the J e w i s h Settlement, and s u b m i t t e d it formally to the British g o v e r n m e n t for a p p r o v a l . In the s u m m e r of 1903 the F o r e i g n Office replied in a g u a r d e d b u t affirmative way that if s t u d i e s a n d talks over the c o u r s e of the next year were successful, H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t would consider favorably p r o p o s a l s for the creation of a J e w i s h colony. It was the first official declaration by a g o v e r n m e n t to the Zionist m o v e m e n t a n d the first official s t a t e m e n t implying national s t a t u s for the J e w i s h p e o p l e . It was the first B a l f o u r Declaration. 2 9

A meeting of the World Zionist C o n g r e s s convened shortly thereafter, where Herzl p r e s e n t e d the U g a n d a p r o p o s a l , u r g i n g the settlement of E a s t Africa as a way-station a n d refuge along the road to the P r o m i s e d L a n d , where the J e w s o f the C z a r i s t E m p i r e could escape the terrors of the p o g r o m s . Herzl's a r g u m e n t s swayed h e a d s but not hearts. T h o u g h they let their leader win the vote on the issue, m o s t delegates were not interested in any land other than that of their ancestors. T h e Zionist m o v e m e n t w a s at a d e a d - e n d : Herzl d i d not know how to lead it to Palestine but it would not follow him anywhere else. In the s u m m e r of 1904 Herzl died, leaving behind a fragmented and deeply divided l e a d e r s h i p . In 1906, with a new L i b e r a l g o v e r n m e n t in Britain, L l o y d G e o r g e again s u b m i t t e d the S i n a i p r o p o s a l for consideration, at the instigation of L e o p o l d G r e e n b e r g . A g a i n the British g o v e r n m e n t rejected it, a n d S i r E d w a r d G r e y wrote on 20 M a r c h 1906 to say that the F o r e i g n Office position had not c h a n g e d . D u r i n g its formative years, then, D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e h a d r e p resented the Zionist m o v e m e n t as it s o u g h t to define itself. It was no m o r e than one of his m a n y c l i e n t s — a n d not a major one at that—yet, as a result of his professional representation of it, no other British political leader was in a better position than he to u n d e r s t a n d its character a n d its g o a l s . As he c o n t e m p l a t e d the c o n q u e s t of Palestine in 1917 a n d 1918, n o b o d y had a clearer idea than he of what to do with it once it w a s his. 3 0

L i k e W o o d r o w Wilson, whose concern in the M i d d l e E a s t was for A m e r i c a n Protestant schools a n d m i s s i o n s , L l o y d G e o r g e wanted his country to carry out what he r e g a r d e d as the L o r d ' s work in the region. B u t , unlike the President, the P r i m e Minister planned to a g g r a n d i z e his country's e m p i r e by d o i n g so. L l o y d G e o r g e had followed his own intellectual path to the conclusion that Britain s h o u l d s p o n s o r J e w i s h nationalism in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . A n u m b e r of his colleagues within the British government arrived at the s a m e conclusion in 1917, t h o u g h by different

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p a t h s — m a n y r o a d s led to Zion. T h e o d d thing was that, j u s t as they had s u p p o r t e d the E m i r H u s s e i n b e c a u s e of mistaken notions a b o u t A r a b s a n d M o s l e m s , they were now a b o u t to s u p p o r t Z i o n i s m b e c a u s e of mistaken notions a b o u t J e w s .

33 TOWARD T H E BALFOUR DECLARATION i L l o y d G e o r g e — a n " E a s t e r n e r " both in his war strategy a n d in his war g o a l s — s u c c e e d e d in winning s u p p o r t for his views from important civilian m e m b e r s of the g o v e r n m e n t , who c a m e to view the M i d d l e E a s t in general, a n d Palestine in particular, as vital imperial interests, a n d who arrived independently and by various p a t h s at the conclusion that an alliance with Z i o n i s m would serve Britain's needs in war a n d p e a c e . L l o y d G e o r g e p e r s u a d e d L o r d M i l n e r a n d his associates o f the strategic i m p o r t a n c e of the war in the E a s t in the winter of 1917, when it w a s by no m e a n s clear that the Allies would be able to win a decisive victory there or anywhere else. E v e n after the U n i t e d S t a t e s entered the war in the s p r i n g , it s e e m e d entirely p o s s i b l e that the A m e r i c a n s might not arrive in time to stave off a negotiated peace agreement that would leave the belligerent countries m o r e or less in their existing positions. T h e r e were also those who were worried about allowing the G e r m a n s a n d T u r k s to retain control of an area whose vital i m p o r t a n c e h a d been u n d e r s c o r e d by the P r i m e Minister. T h e assistant secretaries o f the War C a b i n e t , L e o A m e r y a n d M a r k S y k e s , worried that in the p o s t w a r world the O t t o m a n E m p i r e might fall completely into the clutches of G e r m a n y . Were that to h a p p e n , the road to I n d i a would be in enemy h a n d s — a threat that the British E m p i r e could avert only by ejecting the T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s , a n d taking into British h a n d s the southern perimeter of the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s . T h e C a b i n e t , from the beginning, h a d thought of annexing M e s o p o t a m i a . As for A r a b i a , a r r a n g e m e n t s had been m a d e with the local rulers who h a d a s s e r t e d their i n d e p e n d e n c e : they were s u b s i d i z e d a n d could be relied u p o n to remain p r o - B r i t i s h . T h a t left Palestine as the only point of vulnerability. As the b r i d g e between Africa a n d A s i a , it blocked the land road f r o m E g y p t to I n d i a a n d , by its proximity, it threatened the S u e z C a n a l and hence the sea r o a d as well. 276

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A m e r y , the leading figure a m o n g Milner's associates in the g o v e r n m e n t , d i s c u s s e d the matter in a m e m o r a n d u m to the C a b i n e t dated 11 April 1917. W a r n i n g against allowing G e r m a n y to strike again at Britain t h r o u g h domination of E u r o p e or the M i d d l e E a s t after the war, he a r g u e d that " G e r m a n control of Palestine" was one of "the greatest of all d a n g e r s which can confront the British E m p i r e in the f u t u r e . " 1

A m e r y , along with M a r k S y k e s a n d , later, William O r m s b y - G o r e , had been a p p o i n t e d assistant to M a u r i c e H a n k e y in h e a d i n g the secretariat of the War C a b i n e t . A M e m b e r of Parliament a n d an army officer who had been serving in the War Office, A m e r y had b e c o m e o n e of the inner b a n d directing the war effort. In the division of responsibilities within the secretariat, the M i d d l e E a s t fell outside A m e r y ' s s p h e r e a n d within that of S y k e s . Y e t A m e r y had already involved himself in a m a t t e r affecting M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy by lending a h a n d to an old friend. An a r m y officer w h o m A m e r y had known in S o u t h Africa, L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l J o h n Henry Patterson, had c o m m a n d e d a J e w i s h c o r p s in the Gallipoli c a m p a i g n , and asked A m e r y to help get permission from the War Office to create a regiment of non-British J e w s to fight u n d e r British c o m m a n d . T h i s regiment would then be sent to fight in Palestine if a n d when Britain invaded the O t t o m a n E m p i r e from E g y p t a n d the S i n a i . Patterson was an Irish Protestant, a student of the Bible, a professional a r m y officer a n d a m a t e u r lion hunter, known for his best-selling book The Man-eaters of Tsavo and for his b u c c a n e e r i n g spirit. T h e idea of a J e w i s h regiment had c o m e from V l a d i m i r J a b o t i n s k y , a fiery R u s s i a n J e w i s h journalist who believed that E n g l i s h m e n resented the presence in Britain of a large i m m i g r a n t p o p u l a t i o n of a b l e - b o d i e d R u s s i a n J e w s who were not yet British s u b j e c t s a n d who did not u n d e r t a k e military service. While he did not at first say s o , J a b o t i n s k y was inspired by the thought that a J e w i s h military unit helping to liberate Palestine w o u l d go far toward m a k i n g the Zionist d r e a m a r e a l i t y . Patterson was enthusiastic; the J e w i s h c o r p s he had c o m m a n d e d at Gallipoli had been created in large part t h r o u g h the efforts of J a b o t i n s k y ' s associate, C a p t a i n J o s e p h T r u m p e l d o r , a n d Patterson had enjoyed c o m m a n d i n g i t . 2

3

A m e r y a g r e e d to help Patterson, b u t it was not an easy undertaking. Official J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y leaders o p p o s e d the project bitterly; in their view it e n d a n g e r e d J e w s who lived in the G e r m a n , A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n , and O t t o m a n e m p i r e s b y s u g g e s t i n g that J e w s , a s such, were on the Allied side. T h e Zionist leadership, t h o u g h at o d d s with the British J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in m o s t other m a t t e r s , joined in d e p l o r i n g the identification of the Zionist c a u s e with one or the other of the warring E u r o p e a n coalitions. When J a b o t i n s k y raised the issue for the first time in 1915, the British authorities also saw

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little merit in his proposal that the J e w i s h unit should help to liberate Palestine. " B u t n o b o d y knows yet when we shall go to Palestine," said one high official, "and L o r d K i t c h e n e r says n e v e r . " A m e r y persisted throughout 1916 a n d 1917 a n d s u c c e e d e d in laying J a b o t i n s k y ' s petition before the War C a b i n e t . T h e British g o v e r n m e n t then went forward to negotiate a convention with the other Allied g o v e r n m e n t s , allowing each country to take into military service the resident nationals of the o t h e r s ; in other w o r d s , R u s s i a n J e w s living in Britain could join the British a r m y . Parliament authorized the convention, a n d in the s u m m e r of 1917 the J e w i s h unit (later called the J e w i s h L e g i o n ) was f o r m e d within the British a r m y under the c o m m a n d of L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l Patterson. L l o y d G e o r g e was enthusiastic: " T h e J e w s might b e able t o render u s m o r e a s s i s tance than the A r a b s " in the Palestine c a m p a i g n , he s a i d . 4

5

Until his colleague M a r k S y k e s s p o k e to him about Z i o n i s m , A m e r y h a d not put his strategic c o n c e r n s a b o u t Palestine a n d his s u p p o r t of the J e w i s h L e g i o n into a unified focus, even t h o u g h his general leanings were toward Z i o n i s m . A J e w i s h national entity had behind it the authority of his political mentor, the late J o s e p h C h a m b e r l a i n , a n d was viewed favorably by his leader, L o r d Milner, who had a c q u i r e d a s y m p a t h y for Z i o n i s m early in life. A m e r y himself felt a similar s y m p a t h y ; he later wrote that, apart from the U n i t e d S t a t e s , "Bible r e a d i n g a n d Bible thinking E n g l a n d was the only country where the desire of the J e w s to return to their ancient homeland has always been r e g a r d e d as a natural aspiration which ought not to be d e n i e d . " 6

When William O r m s b y - G o r e joined A m e r y a n d S y k e s as one of the three assistant secretaries of the War C a b i n e t , he b r o u g h t with him a m o r e concrete interest in the i m m e d i a t e p r o s p e c t s of the Zionist idea. O r m s b y - G o r e , a M e m b e r of Parliament a n d secretary to L o r d Milner, h a d g o n e out to the M i d d l e E a s t to work with the A r a b B u r e a u . U n d e r his personal c o m m a n d was A a r o n A a r o n s o h n , leader of a highly effective, intelligence-gathering g r o u p operation working behind O t t o m a n lines in J e w i s h Palestine to p r o v i d e information a b o u t T u r k i s h troop m o v e m e n t s . L i k e J a b o t i n s k y , A a r o n s o h n was attacked by fellow J e w s for identifying Zionist interests with those of the A l l i e s — a n d thus e n d a n g e r i n g the Palestinian J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y , which D j e m a l P a s h a w a s t e m p t e d to treat as his colleagues h a d treated the A r m e n i a n s . Aaronsohn's information a b o u t T u r k i s h defenses a n d military dispositions p r o v e d to be of great value to the British military c o m m a n d in E g y p t , however, a n d was appreciated by O r m s b y - G o r e . Another aspect of A a r o n s o h n ' s life that fascinated O r m s b y - G o r e w a s his agricultural exploration a n d e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n — t h e career in which he had b e c o m e f a m o u s . A d e c a d e earlier, A a r o n s o h n had

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joined in the search for the original strain of wild wheat that h a d flourished t h o u s a n d s of years a g o . S i n c e that time the plant had deteriorated as a result of intensive inbreeding, b e c o m i n g increasingly vulnerable to d i s e a s e . To save the planet's basic grain food by finding nature's original plant was a r o m a n t i c q u e s t for the blue-eyed, fairhaired A a r o n A a r o n s o h n . In the s p r i n g of 1906 he m a d e the find of a lifetime: wild wheat blowing in the breezes at the foot of M o u n t H e r m o n , near the J e w i s h settlement of R o s h Pina. O r m s b y - G o r e was struck by the work A a r o n s o h n h a d done at his station for agricultural research in Palestine, for it went to the heart o f the a r g u m e n t a b o u t Z i o n i s m . T h e case against Z i o n i s m , which was m a d e in the C a b i n e t by L o r d C u r z o n , was that Palestine was too barren a land to s u p p o r t the millions of J e w s who h o p e d to settle there. T h e a r g u m e n t m a d e later b y A r a b g r o u p s , who c l a i m e d there was no r o o m in the country for additional settlers, was that "no r o o m can be m a d e in Palestine for a s e c o n d nation," as G e o r g e A n t o n i u s , an eloquent A r a b s p o k e s m a n , wrote long afterward, "except by dislodging or exterminating the nation in p o s s e s s i o n . " A a r o n s o h n ' s experiments rebutted that a r g u m e n t . * H i s work tended to show that, without d i s p l a c i n g any of the 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 or so inhabitants of western Palestine, millions m o r e could be settled on land m a d e rich a n d fertile by scientific agriculture. H i s work had wider a p p l i c a t i o n s : O r m s b y - G o r e b r o u g h t b a c k with him to L o n d o n the idea that Zionist J e w s could help the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g a n d other p e o p l e s of the M i d d l e E a s t to regenerate their region of the g l o b e so that the desert could once m o r e b l o o m . 7

II A s soon a s L l o y d G e o r g e b e c a m e P r i m e Minister, L e o A m e r y initiated a m o v e that placed Palestine within the context of the future of the British E m p i r e . At the end of 1916 A m e r y p r o p o s e d creating an I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t , a n d sent a note on the subject to L o r d Milner, who a r r a n g e d for L l o y d G e o r g e to put the idea in m o t i o n . T h e war h a d created a need for s u c h a b o d y : the e m p i r e had contributed so m u c h m a n p o w e r to the war effort that t r o o p s from outside Britain constituted a substantial part of the British a r m e d forces. T h e D o m i n i o n s alone c o n t r i b u t e d m o r e than a million m e n to the a r m e d forces, while the I n d i a n E m p i r e contributed at least a half million fighting m e n a n d h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of s u p p o r t t r o o p s . 8

* At the end of 1984 the population of Israel was 4,235,000 and that of the West Bank was 1,300,000—a total of 5,535,000 people now living in about 25 percent of the territory of Palestine as defined by the British Mandate.

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Y e t C a n a d a , Australia, N e w Z e a l a n d , I n d i a , a n d Britain's other p a r t n e r s in the fighting had never been consulted a b o u t whether to go to war. G e o r g e V h a d declared war, a n d his governor-generals in his D o m i n i o n s overseas h a d p r o m u l g a t e d declarations on their behalf. Neither the p a r l i a m e n t s nor the g o v e r n m e n t s of the D o m i n i o n s had been involved in those decisions. A m e r y ' s p r o p o s a l was to recognize, however belatedly, the i m p o r t a n c e of these partners by giving them representation in a central b o d y in L o n d o n dealing with the overall direction of the war. A m e r y was convinced, as were L o r d Milner's other friends, that the structure of the British E m p i r e had to be changed fundamentally; and by the end of 1916, as the political situation in L o n d o n b e c a m e fluid, and party a n d other divisions were breaking down, m u c h s e e m e d p o s s i b l e that w o u l d not h a v e s e e m e d so before. Until the t i m e of D i s r a e l i , the creation of the e m p i r e had been a h a p h a z a r d a n d , it was s a i d , an a b s e n t - m i n d e d affair. D i s r a e l i g a v e it g l a m o r a n d focused attention on it. C o m i n g afterward, A m e r y a n d his friends in the Milner circle, who had worked in concert with Cecil R h o d e s a n d J o s e p h C h a m b e r l a i n , were a m o n g the f i r s t conscious a n d systematic p r o p o n e n t s of e m p i r e , while their associates R u d y a r d K i p l i n g a n d J o h n B u c h a n were a m o n g its deliberate glorifiers. M a n y a m o n g them advocated the creation of an e m p i r e - w i d e economic s y s t e m , closed to o u t s i d e r s by tariffs. O t h e r s , who recognized that various p a r t s of the e m p i r e often a p p e a r e d to o c c u p y economic positions in conflict with one another, advocated closer political association. L i o n e l C u r t i s , a founder of their publication, the Round Table, claimed that the British E m p i r e had no choice but federation or disintegration. He s p o k e for those in the Milner circle whose p r o g r a m was o r g a n i c , political union of the e m p i r e , with an imperial parliament elected from the D o m i n i o n s as well as from Britain, g i v i n g rise to an imperial C a b i n e t which w o u l d rule the e m p i r e as a whole. T h e p r o g r a m had been rejected at an imperial conference in 1911, b u t the b r e a k d o w n of world political s t r u c t u r e s d u r i n g the F i r s t World War s e e m e d to offer a second c h a n c e . On 19 D e c e m b e r 1916, acting on A m e r y ' s s u g g e s t i o n , L l o y d G e o r g e told the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that "We feel that the t i m e has c o m e when the D o m i n i o n s o u g h t to be m o r e formally consulted" on the issues of war a n d p e a c e . A c c o r d i n g l y , he convoked an Imperial War Conference, confusingly also called the I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t , to meet in L o n d o n three m o n t h s later. N o b o d y was m o r e s u s p i c i o u s of the government's intentions than the delegate f r o m S o u t h Africa, J a n Christian S m u t s , a lawyerturned-general who h a d fought against the British in the Boer War; he had no desire to be ruled f r o m L o n d o n . He arrived in L o n d o n for the conference on 12 M a r c h 1917, a n d his suspicions were d e e p e n e d 9

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when, the s a m e day, he received an invitation to dine at Brooks's with L o r d Milner, his former a d v e r s a r y . When the conference o p e n e d , issue was joined at once and S m u t s won a lasting victory. On 16 M a r c h 1917 he p u s h e d through a resolution that p o s t p o n e d consideration of the details of how the British E m p i r e should be reorganized until the end of the war, b u t c o m m i t t e d the participants in a d v a n c e to the proposition that the b a s i s of the reorganization w o u l d be the independence of S o u t h Africa, C a n a d a , Australia, and N e w Z e a l a n d . L l o y d G e o r g e m a y have been less d i s a p p o i n t e d at this o u t c o m e than were his colleagues in Milner's circle. T h e P r i m e Minister had p u r p o s e s of his own, a n d saw ways in which S m u t s , in particular, could serve t h e m . S m u t s was a s u p e r b administrator of the calibre of Milner, A m e r y , a n d H a n k e y , a n d c o u l d help them to run the war effort. As a successful general in his B o e r War days a n d m o r e recently in E a s t Africa, and a representative of the D o m i n i o n s , he could also help L l o y d G e o r g e by throwing his weight against the British generals. L l o y d G e o r g e prevailed u p o n S m u t s to stay on in L o n d o n a n d serve in the War C a b i n e t "on loan" from his own country's C a b i n e t . T h u s he served not only as a m e m b e r of the British C a b i n e t , b u t also as the S o u t h African representative in the Imperial War C a b i n e t (or I m p e r i a l War C o n f e r e n c e ) . He was the only C a b i n e t minister in m o d e r n British history to have no connection with either H o u s e of P a r l i a m e n t ; a n d spent the rest of the war away from h o m e , living in a hotel r o o m at the S a v o y . 1 0

"General S m u t s had e x p r e s s e d very decided views as to the strategical i m p o r t a n c e of Palestine to the British E m p i r e , " L l o y d G e o r g e later w r o t e , " and b e c a m e immediately involved with the i s s u e . P e r h a p s b e c a u s e it had been d e c i d e d that the political links of the empire were not to be tightened, S m u t s a n d A m e r y m o v e d at the s a m e time to cement the geographical links of the entities c o m p r i s i n g the British s y s t e m ; a n d both m e n concentrated on the i m p o r t a n c e of Palestine. If b r o a d l y defined, a n d in conjunction with M e s o p o t a m i a , Palestine g a v e Britain the land road from E g y p t to India and b r o u g h t together the e m p i r e s of Africa and A s i a . T h e c a p t u r e of G e r m a n E a s t Africa by B o t h a a n d S m u t s had already created a continuous stretch of British-controlled territories between, on the one h a n d , C a p e T o w n , the Atlantic Ocean port at the southern tip of Africa, a n d , on the other, S u e z , which b r i d g e d the Mediterranean a n d the R e d S e a at the continent's northeastern tip. With the addition of Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a , the C a p e T o w n t o S u e z stretch could b e linked up with the stretch of territory that ran t h r o u g h Britishcontrolled Persia a n d the I n d i a n E m p i r e to B u r m a , M a l a y a , a n d the two great D o m i n i o n s in the Pacific—Australia a n d N e w Z e a l a n d . As of 1917, Palestine was the key m i s s i n g link that could join together

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the parts of the British E m p i r e so that they would form a continuous chain from the Atlantic to the m i d d l e of the Pacific. T h e P r i m e Minister, of c o u r s e , saw it the s a m e way. As he wrote later, " F o r the British E m p i r e , the fight with T u r k e y h a d a special i m p o r t a n c e of its own . .. T h e T u r k i s h E m p i r e lay right across the track by land or water to our great p o s s e s s i o n s in the E a s t — I n d i a , B u r m a , M a l a y a , B o r n e o , H o n g K o n g , a n d the D o m i n i o n s o f A u s t r a l i a and N e w Z e a l a n d . " A m e r y , who was a b o u t to advise the C a b i n e t that continued O t t o m a n (and thus G e r m a n ) control of Palestine was a future d a n g e r to the British E m p i r e , believed, with the P r i m e Minister, that Palestine ought to be invaded i m m e d i a t e l y — a n d that S m u t s was the general to do it. F o r S m u t s was not only a brilliantly successful general, b u t also s h a r e d their i m m e d i a t e strategic a n d b r o a d e r geopolitical g o a l s . 12

On 15 M a r c h 1917, the day that S m u t s won his victory at the Imperial C o n f e r e n c e , A m e r y wrote to him that T h e one thing, however, that is essential if we are g o i n g to do a b i g thing quickly in the Palestine direction, is a m o r e d a s h i n g general . . . If I were dictator, I s h o u l d ask you to do it as the only leading soldier who h a d h a d experience of mobile warfare .. . a n d has not yet got trenches d u g deep in his m i n d . 1 3

L l o y d G e o r g e offered the c o m m a n d t o S m u t s , who hesitated and asked the advice of the S o u t h African P r i m e Minister, G e n e r a l L o u i s B o t h a . S m u t s , who was in favor of accepting, reasoned that "Position on the other fronts m o s t difficult a n d Palestine is only one where p e r h a p s with great p u s h it is p o s s i b l e to achieve considerable s u c c e s s . " After consultation, B o t h a a n d S m u t s decided that the offer s h o u l d be accepted if the c a m p a i g n were to be m o u n t e d "on a large scale," "a first class c a m p a i g n in m e n and g u n s . " 14

1 5

S m u t s then conferred with S i r William R o b e r t s o n , Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, who m a d e clear that he was not g o i n g to release the necessary t r o o p s a n d s u p p l i e s from the western front, and d i s m i s s e d the M i d d l e E a s t as a private obsession of the P r i m e Minister's, a n d at best "only a s i d e s h o w . " L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been in office only a few m o n t h s a n d his position was t e n u o u s ; his authority over the military was limited; and his p r o m i s e of full s u p p o r t , S m u t s c o n c l u d e d , was not one that he would be able to keep. T h u s S m u t s turned d o w n the offer of the Palestine c o m m a n d , feeling that the c a m p a i g n in the E a s t would be s a b o t a g e d by R o b e r t s o n a n d his colleagues. 16

S m u t s continued, t h o u g h , to take a keen interest in Palestine. He and A m e r y later went out together to the M i d d l e E a s t to s t u d y the situation a n d r e p o r t ; a n d both of t h e m c a m e b a c k u r g i n g a s t r o n g Palestine offensive.

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As a Boer, s t e e p e d in the B i b l e , S m u t s strongly s u p p o r t e d the Zionist idea when it was raised in the C a b i n e t . As he later pointed out, the "people of S o u t h Africa a n d especially the older D u t c h population has been b r o u g h t up almost entirely on J e w i s h tradition. T h e Old T e s t a m e n t . . . has been the very marrow of D u t c h culture here i n S o u t h A f r i c a . " L i k e L l o y d G e o r g e , h e had g r o w n u p believing that "the day will c o m e when the w o r d s of the p r o p h e t s will b e c o m e true, a n d Israel will return to its own l a n d , " a n d he fully agreed with L l o y d G e o r g e that the J e w i s h h o me la n d s h o u l d be established in Palestine u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . Whether or not he originated the idea, S m u t s was r e s p o n s i b l e for finding the f o r m u l a — acceptable to W o o d r o w W i l s o n — u n d e r which countries like Britain would a s s u m e responsibility for the administration of territories s u c h as Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a : they would govern p u r s u a n t to a "mandate" from the future L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . T h e territories would be held in trust for their p e o p l e s — a f o r m u l a designed to be c o m p a t ible with A m e r i c a n anti-imperialist notions. 17

18

A m e r y put together the pieces of this new imperial vision at the end of 1918, when he wrote to S m u t s that Britain's hold on the M i d d l e E a s t s h o u l d be p e r m a n e n t , a n d not terminate when the m a n d a t e s d i d . Without spelling out the details, he wrote that even when Palestine, M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d an A r a b i a n state b e c a m e independent of British t r u s t e e s h i p , they s h o u l d remain within the British imperial s y s t e m . T h e British E m p i r e of the future, as he saw it, would be like a smaller L e a g u e of N a t i o n s ; and other s u c h minileagues w o u l d e m e r g e elsewhere in the world. Woodrow Wilson's overall L e a g u e of N a t i o n s would therefore have relatively few m e m b e r s : there would be one representative from the British s y s t e m , and one from each of the several other s u b - s y s t e m s . 1 9

T h u s A m e r y saw no incompatibility between a British Palestine a n d a J e w i s h Palestine. He also saw no reason why either British or J e w i s h aspirations s h o u l d not be in h a r m o n y with A r a b a s p i r a t i o n s . D e c a d e s later, he wrote of the p r o p o n e n t s of the Zionist d r e a m in 1917—18 that " M o s t of us younger m e n who s h a r e d this hope were, like M a r k S y k e s , p r o - A r a b as well as p r o - Z i o n i s t , a n d saw no essential incompatibility between the two i d e a l s . " 20

34

T H E PROMISED LAND i As the eventful year 1917 ran its c o u r s e , Britain's Palestine policy continued to be s h a p e d by m a n y h a n d s : C a b i n e t ministers at one level; b u r e a u c r a t s , little known b e y o n d official circles a n d little known today, at another. Within the powerful secretariat of the War C a b i n e t , the M i d d l e E a s t fell within the d o m a i n of K i t c h e n e r ' s protege S i r M a r k S y k e s , as it had d o n e since shortly after the outset of the war. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , his superior, held no s t r o n g views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d since the deaths of K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d , S y k e s h a d been acting without any real direction f r o m a b o v e . He did not know that the new P r i m e Minister held d e c i d e d views a b o u t a M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement which were considerably different from his o w n ; nor was he involved in the secret negotiations t h r o u g h Zaharoff in which the P r i m e Minister's t e r m s for peace in the M i d d l e E a s t were revealed. On his own, then, and u n g u i d e d , S y k e s continued to circle uncertainly a r o u n d the q u e s t i o n of Palestine. H i s instructions f r o m K i t c h e n e r a n d F i t z G e r a l d h a d been to regard it as of no strategic i m p o r t a n c e to Britain, a n d those instructions h a d never been cancelled. Y e t he h a d been m a d e aware in the course of his negotiations with F r a n c e a n d R u s s i a in 1916 that the Holy L a n d held a p a s s i o n a t e interest for m a n y J e w s whose s u p p o r t , S y k e s felt, might be vital to the Allies. Y e t J e w i s h opinion m i g h t be alienated by s o m e of the a r r a n g e m e n t s for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t that he was negotiating with Britain's allies a n d potential s u p p o r t e r s . As he held d i s c u s s i o n s with F r e n c h m e n a n d R u s s i a n s , A r m e n i a n s a n d A r a b s , h e was h a u n t e d by a f e a r — g r o u n d l e s s , b u t real to h i m nonetheless—that each of his transactions risked r u n n i n g afoul of J e w i s h opposition. At the b e g i n n i n g of 1917 S y k e s was e n g a g e d in a dialogue with J a m e s M a l c o l m , a n A r m e n i a n b u s i n e s s m a n , a b o u t establishing a n independent A r m e n i a n national state. T h e y c o n s i d e r e d inviting R u s s i a into the postwar M i d d l e E a s t as the protecting power for a 284

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united A r m e n i a ; b u t , as S y k e s believed J e w i s h opinion to be violently a n t i - R u s s i a n , he s u g g e s t e d that s o m e t h i n g o u g h t to be done in a d vance to d i s a r m potential J e w i s h o p p o s i t i o n to a s c h e m e that allowed imperial R u s s i a to e x p a n d . S y k e s a s k e d M a l c o l m to find out for him who the leaders of Z i o n i s m were so that he could a p p r o a c h t h e m about this. M a l c o l m had met L e o p o l d G r e e n b e r g , editor and co-owner of the Jewish Chronicle who, as it h a p p e n e d , h a d also served as T h e o d o r e Herzl's British representative. M a l c o l m wrote to ask h i m who were the leaders of the Zionist organization, a n d p a s s e d on the information he received in reply to S y k e s . T w o n a m e s a p p e a r e d to be of especial i m p o r t a n c e : N a h u m S o k o l o w , an official of the international Zionist m o v e m e n t ; a n d Dr C h a i m W e i z m a n n , an official of the British Zionist F e d e r a t i o n , who was o p p o s e d to the decision of the Zionist m o v e m e n t to remain neutral in the world war. M a l c o l m introduced himself to W e i z m a n n and shortly afterward, on 28 J a n u a r y 1917, introduced W e i z m a n n to S y k e s . W e i z m a n n — a l t h o u g h he did not know that the Allies were already m a k i n g plans for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t — w a n t e d to secure a c o m m i t m e n t f r o m Britain a b o u t Palestine while the war was still in p r o g r e s s . As a chemist, he m a d e a significant contribution to the war effort by d o n a t i n g to the g o v e r n m e n t his discovery of a p r o c e s s to extract acetone f r o m m a i z e — a c e t o n e b e i n g a vital ingredient in the m a n u f a c t u r e of explosives. B u t , despite his war work a n d his increasing a c q u a i n t a n c e with the circle of high-ranking officials who were directing the war effort, he d i d not know that Britain h a d an official whose brief was to negotiate the design of the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t . Another British Zionist leader, R a b b i G a s t e r , knew S y k e s — a n d knew that S y k e s held that j o b — b u t , seeing W e i z m a n n as a rival, jealously kept the information to himself. T h u s Weizmann learned of S y k e s only by a c c i d e n t — i n early 1917 when S y k e s m e n t i o n e d his j o b to J a m e s de R o t h s c h i l d in the c o u r s e of a chance conversation a b o u t their respective h o r s e - b r e e d i n g stables. Rothschild p a s s e d on the information to W e i z m a n n , a n d W e i z m a n n was a b o u t to a r r a n g e to meet S y k e s when J a m e s M a l c o l m a r r a n g e d for S y k e s to meet Weizmann.

* Born in Russia and naturalized a British subject, he was passionately pro-Allied and believed that only the western democracies were compatible with Jewish ideals. Since he held no official position in the international Zionist movement, he was free to depart from its neutrality; but as an official of the British Zionist Federation, he could nonetheless speak in a representative capacity. Years after the war, Lloyd George—in writing his memoirs—invented the story that he had given the Balfour Declaration in gratitude for Weizmann's invention. Weizmann's important invention was real, but Lloyd George's story was a work of fiction.

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E a c h wanted to do what the other wanted d o n e . S y k e s wanted to find s o m e o n e with w h o m he c o u l d negotiate an alliance between British and Zionist interests; a n d Weizmann wanted to be that person. T h e i r first meetings were on an unofficial b a s i s . F r o m the start, S y k e s , as he always did, tried to fit all M i d d l e E a s t e r n projects within the e x i s t i n g — b u t still s e c r e t — S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e ment, of which W e i z m a n n knew nothing. In the agreement, the Holy Places were to be placed u n d e r an international a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; so S y k e s began by p r o p o s i n g that a J e w i s h entity in Palestine should be u n d e r joint A n g l o - F r e n c h rule ( " c o n d o m i n i u m " ) — t h o u g h he could not reveal to Weizmann why he was m a k i n g the p r o p o s a l . T h o u g h S y k e s did not realize it, he was out of step not only with the Zionist leaders but also with the P r i m e Minister. L l o y d G e o r g e — l i k e W e i z m a n n and his c o l l e a g u e s — w a n t e d Palestine to be British. C. P. S c o t t , editor of the Manchester Guardian and L l o y d G e o r g e ' s confidant, a d v i s e d Weizmann to take the matter up with the P r i m e Minister; but W e i z m a n n decided to concentrate on c h a n g i n g Sykes's m i n d rather than g o i n g over his h e a d . 1

In L o n d o n , on 7 F e b r u a r y 1917, S y k e s met with W e i z m a n n a n d other British Zionists who told h i m that they were o p p o s e d to the c o n d o m i n i u m idea a n d wanted Palestine to be ruled by Britain. S y k e s replied that all the other difficulties could be resolved ("the A r a b s could be m a n a g e d , " he said) b u t that rejection of the c o n d o m i n i u m a p p r o a c h b r o u g h t them up against a p r o b l e m for which he had no s u r e solution: F r a n c e , he said, was "the serious difficulty." F r a n c e , he explained, refused to recognize that concessions to Z i o n i s m might help win the w a r ; and he confessed to the Zionist leaders that he could not u n d e r s t a n d F r e n c h policy in this respect. "What was their m o t i v e ? " he a s k e d . 2

3

T h e next day, at his L o n d o n residence at 9 B u c k i n g h a m G a t e , S y k e s introduced the worldly Zionist leader N a h u m Sokolow to F r a n c o i s G e o r g e s Picot, who told S o k o l o w that, having seen the results of J e w i s h colonization in Palestine, he believed the p r o g r a m of J e w i s h settlement was feasible. Sokolow told Picot that J e w s greatly a d m i r e d F r a n c e but "had long in m i n d the suzerainty of the British g o v e r n m e n t . " Picot replied that the question of suzerainty was one for the Allies to decide a m o n g themselves. He said that he would do his best to m a k e the Zionists' a i m s known to his g o v e r n ment, but that in his view there was no possibility of his g o v e r n m e n t deciding to renounce its claim to Palestine. I n d e e d , he s a i d , 95 percent of the F r e n c h people wanted F r a n c e to annex P a l e s t i n e . 4

5

All concerned a g r e e d to wait u p o n events, which were not slow in c o m i n g . Within two m o n t h s the C z a r was overthrown a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s had entered the war. S y k e s quickly saw the implications of

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both events for his a r r a n g e m e n t s with Picot. Millions of J e w s lived within the C z a r i s t E m p i r e ; their s u p p o r t , S y k e s a r g u e d after the R u s s i a n Revolution in M a r c h , could help induce the new R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t to remain in the w a r . At the s a m e time, the A m e r i c a n entry into the war strengthened his conviction that the E u r o p e a n Allies would have to validate their claims to a position in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t by s p o n s o r s h i p of o p p r e s s e d peoples, s u c h as J e w s , A r a b s , and A r m e n i a n s . On both c o u n t s he felt he h a d new a r g u m e n t s with which to p e r s u a d e the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t to a d o p t a more s y m p a t h e t i c attitude toward Z i o n i s m . 6

M e a n w h i l e his conversations with Picot were about to r e o p e n : L l o y d G e o r g e s u c c e e d e d in ordering the British a r m y in E g y p t to a t t e m p t an invasion of Palestine in 1917, leading the F r e n c h government to insist on s e n d i n g Picot to E g y p t to a c c o m p a n y the British invasion f o r c e s — t o which the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n d e d by ordering S y k e s to go there, too, to interpose between Picot a n d the British c o m m a n d i n g general. Picot viewed the p r o p o s e d British invasion as an attack on F r e n c h interests. He reported that " L o n d o n now considers o u r a g r e e m e n t s a d e a d letter. E n g l i s h troops will enter S y r i a from the s o u t h " — f r o m E g y p t a n d Palestine—"and d i s p e r s e our s u p p o r t e r s . " ' L l o y d G e o r g e , impatient with F r a n c e ' s pretensions in the M i d d l e E a s t , told W e i z m a n n that the future of Palestine was a question that would b e resolved between B r i t o n s and J e w s . H e professed t o b e unable to u n d e r s t a n d why S y k e s was so concerned a b o u t F r e n c h objections a n d told Weizmann that Palestine "was to him the one really interesting part of the w a r . " 8

9

On the afternoon of 3 April 1917 S y k e s , newly a p p o i n t e d as h e a d of the political mission to the G e n e r a l Officer C o m m a n d i n g - i n - C h i e f the E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e , went to 10 D o w n i n g Street to receive his p a r t i n g instructions. T h e r e he met with the P r i m e Minister, L o r d C u r z o n , and M a u r i c e H a n k e y . S y k e s p r o p o s e d t o try to raise an A r a b tribal rebellion b e h i n d enemy lines, but L l o y d G e o r g e a n d C u r z o n i m p r e s s e d u p o n h i m the i m p o r t a n c e of not c o m mitting Britain to an a g r e e m e n t with the tribes that w o u l d be p r e j u dicial to British interests. Specifically they told him not to do anything that would worsen the p r o b l e m with F r a n c e , and to bear in m i n d the "importance of not p r e j u d i c i n g the Zionist m o v e m e n t a n d the p o s s i bility of its d e v e l o p m e n t u n d e r British a u s p i c e s . " A c c o r d i n g to notes of the conference, " T h e P r i m e Minister laid s t r e s s on the i m p o r t a n c e , if p o s s i b l e , of securing the addition of Palestine to the British area i n the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . " T h e P r i m e Minister warned S y k e s not to m a k e p l e d g e s to the A r a b s "and particularly none in r e g a r d to P a l e s t i n e . " 10

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S y k e s s t o p p e d first in Paris, where he stayed at the Hotel L o t t i on

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the R u e C a s t i g l i o n e , only a few s t e p s away from the Place V e n d o m e , with its m o n u m e n t a l reminder of N a p o l e o n B o n a p a r t e a n d his c o n q u e s t s . While there, S y k e s told Picot that F r a n c e would have to change her way of thinking a n d c o m e a r o u n d to a nonannexationist approach, and that this might involve American or British sponsorship of a reborn J u d a e a , a n d F r e n c h s p o n s o r s h i p of a reborn A r m e n i a . He was s u r p r i s e d that Picot a p p e a r e d disconcerted by what he s a i d . F r o m the H o t e f L o t t i , S y k e s wrote on 8 April 1917 to the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , A r t h u r B a l f o u r , that the F r e n c h were hostile to the notion of b r i n g i n g the U n i t e d S t a t e s into Palestine as a patron of Z i o n i s m ; they feared that, if i n t r o d u c e d into the M i d d l e E a s t , the U n i t e d S t a t e s might b e c o m e F r a n c e ' s c o m m e r c i a l rival there. "As r e g a r d s Z i o n i s m itself," he continued, "the F r e n c h are b e g i n n i n g to realize they are up against a big thing, a n d that they cannot close their eyes to i t . " T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry, like S y k e s , now believed that R u s s i a ' s J e w s m i g h t help to keep R u s s i a in the war at a time when military disasters on the western front m a d e the eastern front especially crucial. N a h u m S o k o l o w , w h o m S y k e s introduced to the Q u a i d'Orsay, s e e m e d willing to help in this respect. H i s discussions with the F r e n c h officials went well. On 9 April S y k e s wrote to Balfour that " T h e situation now is therefore that Zionist aspirations are recognized as legitimate by the F r e n c h . " F r a n c e r e m a i n e d a d a m a n t , however, in maintaining her own claims in the M i d d l e E a s t . S y k e s m e t with the leader of the F r e n c h colonialist bloc, S e n a t o r Pierre-Etienne F l a n d i n ; a n d on 15 April wrote to the F o r e i g n Office that F l a n d i n continued to insist that F r a n c e m u s t have the whole sea-coast of S y r i a , L e b a n o n , a n d Palestine d o w n to El A r i s h in the E g y p t i a n S i n a i . F l a n d i n claimed that "Picot was a fool who h a d betrayed F r a n c e " by c o m p r o m i s i n g with Britain in the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t . 1 3

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F r o m P a r i s , S y k e s went on to R o m e , where he a r r a n g e d for N a h u m S o k o l o w to p l e a d the Zionist case with the P o p e a n d other Vatican officials. Whatever inspiration he m a y have derived from these m e e t i n g s w a s c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by the e m e r g e n c e of a new p r o b l e m : Italy's F o r e i g n Minister, B a r o n S i d n e y S o n n i n o , strongly asserted Italian claims to a s h a r e in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . O n c e in C a i r o , S y k e s b r o u g h t together his diverse allies to p e r s u a d e t h e m to work together. He i n t r o d u c e d Picot to A r a b leaders in C a i r o , a n d later a r r a n g e d for Picot to c o m e with him on a journey to A r a b i a to meet with Sherif H u s s e i n to outline for him, at least in a general way, the t e r m s of the secret S y k e s - P i c o t - S a z a n o v A g r e e m e n t . S y k e s optimistically believed that he h a d got H u s s e i n to a d m i t that the F r e n c h c o u l d p r o v e helpful to the A r a b s in S y r i a ; that he h a d pers u a d e d A r a b leaders to see that the A r a b s were too weak to a s s u m e

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responsibility for an area of s u c h c o m p l e x interests as Palestine; a n d that he h a d reached an u n d e r s t a n d i n g that Palestinian A r a b s w o u l d agree to a national status* for the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in Palestine if the A r a b c o m m u n i t y received the s a m e d e s i g n a t i o n . In C a i r o , S y k e s w a s w a r n e d by C l a y t o n a n d his friends at the A r a b B u r e a u that a F r e n c h presence in the M i d d l e E a s t would c a u s e t r o u b l e . B u t S y k e s , faithful a n d g o o d - h e a r t e d as ever, continued to maintain that his friends had fallen victim to " F a s h o d i s m " — a desire to best the F r e n c h , as K i t c h e n e r had d o n e at F a s h o d a — a n d that they ought to show m o r e loyalty to their ally. He continued to a t t e m p t to convert Picot into a g e n u i n e partner, a n d s u g g e s t e d that the F r e n c h representative work out a c o m m o n policy with Hussein's sons so that Britain and F r a n c e could p u r s u e parallel, constructive, cooperative relationships with the new A r a b rulers of the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t . On 12 M a y he c a b l e d L o n d o n that "Picot h a s c o m e to t e r m s with the A r a b r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . " A few weeks later he wrote to a colleague: "I think F r e n c h will be ready to c o - o p e r a t e with us in a c o m m o n policy t o w a r d s the A r a b s p e a k i n g p e o p l e . . . " 17

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II In the first half of 1917, G e n e r a l S i r A r c h i b a l d M u r r a y , c o m m a n d e r o f the British a r m y i n E g y p t — t h e E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e — sent his t r o o p s lurching in fits a n d starts toward Palestine. Whether b e c a u s e L o n d o n kept issuing a n d then c o u n t e r m a n d i n g instructions, or b e c a u s e he himself w a s inept, or a c o m b i n a t i o n of both, M u r r a y allowed the G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s a n d their T u r k i s h t r o o p s time t o r e g r o u p . B u t then h e hastily a t t a c k e d — a t G a z a , which d o m i n a t e d the coastal road to Palestine—in the early m o r n i n g fog on 26 M a r c h , a n d w a s b e a t e n . K r e s s von K r e s s e n s t e i n , the brilliant G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r , who h a d fortified G a z a effectively, suffered only half as m a n y casualties as the B r i t i s h . C a l l i n g up reinforcements f r o m E g y p t , M u r r a y launched a second attack on fortified G a z a on 29 A p r i l , a n d K r e s s e n s t e i n defeated him even m o r e decisively: the ratio of British to T u r k i s h casualties was three to one. Weary a n d d i s c o u r a g e d , the British a r m i e s withdrew; a n d within weeks S i r A r c h i b a l d M u r r a y w a s relieved of his c o m m a n d . L l o y d G e o r g e w a s determined to renew the battle for Palestine in the a u t u m n b u t , for the m o m e n t , L o n d o n w a s unwilling to c o m m i t fresh t r o o p s to the c a m p a i g n .

* T h e reference was to "millet" a term used in the Ottoman Empire to designate a community entitled to a certain amount of autonomy in administering the affairs of its members.

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M u r r a y ' s two defeats led Sir M a r k S y k e s to worry that the T u r k s — i n the breathing s p a c e before Britain r e s u m e d the attack in the a u t u m n — m i g h t retaliate against the J e w i s h , A r a b , and A r m e n i a n populations whose s u p p o r t he h a d been enlisting on behalf of the Allies. He cabled the F o r e i g n Office s u g g e s t i n g that Britain should not go forward with Zionist, A r a b , a n d A r m e n i a n projects so long as they e x p o s e d these peoples to j e o p a r d y . H i s suggestion met with no response. 2 1

D i s c o u r a g e d by the war n e w s — t h e failure of the F r e n c h offensive in C h a m p a g n e , the mutiny of F r e n c h a r m y units there, the disintegration of R u s s i a , a n d M u r r a y ' s failure to invade P a l e s t i n e — S y k e s attached even greater i m p o r t a n c e to winning the s u p p o r t of the peoples of the M i d d l e E a s t . To him it s e e m e d , as it did to L e o A m e r y a n d his colleagues, that even if the Allies were to win the war, their victory might be an inconclusive one; a n d that such positions as they might win for themselves in the M i d d l e E a s t could be subject to continual p r e s s u r e by a G e r m a n - c o n t r o l l e d T u r k e y that would make full use of the S u l t a n ' s leadership of I s l a m . In his view, that m a d e the annexationist claims of p r e - C l e m e n c e a u F r a n c e and of B a r o n Sonnino's Italy all the m o r e s h o r t - s i g h t e d . In a " M e m o r a n d u m on the A s i a - M i n o r A g r e e m e n t " he wrote that T h e idea of annexation definitely m u s t be d i s m i s s e d , it is contrary to the spirit of the time, a n d if at any m o m e n t the R u s s i a n extremists got hold of a copy they could m a k e m u c h capital against the whole E n t e n t e , this is especially so with the Italian claim which runs counter to nationality, g e o g r a p h y , a n d c o m m o n sense, and is merely B a r o n Sonnino's concession to a chauvinist g r o u p who only think in b a l d t e r m s of g r a b . He went on to say that F r a n c e , if she were wise, would deal with her areas of influence in the M i d d l e E a s t as Britain planned to deal with h e r s : in S y r i a a n d the L e b a n o n F r a n c e s h o u l d s p o n s o r A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . If she did not do s o , wrote S y k e s , Britain s h o u l d do nothing to help F r a n c e deal with the t r o u b l e s she would have brought on her own head. Outlining his own vision of the future, S y k e s wrote that "I want to see a p e r m a n e n t A n g l o - F r e n c h entente allied to the J e w s , A r a b s , a n d A r m e n i a n s which will render p a n - I s l a m i s m innocuous a n d protect I n d i a and Africa from the T u r c o - G e r m a n c o m b i n e , which I believe m a y well survive H o h e n z o l l e r n s . " S y k e s h a d won over A m e r y to this point of view, a n d A m e r y later wrote that "the J e w s alone can build up a s t r o n g civilisation in Palestine which could help that country to hold its own against G e r m a n - T u r k i s h o p p r e s s i o n . . . It would be a fatal thing if, after 22

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the war, the interests of the J e w s t h r o u g h o u t the world were enlisted on the side of the G e r m a n s . " 2 3

Ill C h a i m W e i z m a n n was elected President of the British Zionist F e d e r a t i o n in F e b r u a r y 1917, e n a b l i n g h i m to p r o p o s e officially that the British g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d make a p u b l i c c o m m i t m e n t to s u p p o r t a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine. After his meetings with S y k e s he continued to meet with p u b l i c officials who e x p r e s s e d s y m p a t h y with his ideas. L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, Parliamentary U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for F o r e i g n Affairs, a n d the third son of L o r d S a l i s b u r y , Victoria's last P r i m e Minister, b e c a m e a devoted convert. F i v e y o u n g Cecils were killed in the F i r s t World War, and L o r d R o b e r t was m o v e d to draft a m e m o r a n d u m outlining a plan for perpetual p e a c e : the first draft of what later b e c a m e the C o v e n a n t of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s . H i s ideas of self-determination disconcerted his political colleagues, who pointed out that logically his plan w o u l d lead to the dissolution of the British E m p i r e . A c o n t e m p o r a r y essayist wrote in wonder that "He took the cross in an o d d international c r u s a d e for p e a c e ; a n d he f o u n d his allies in places where Cecils normally look for their e n e m i e s . " In a similar c r u s a d i n g spirit he took up the cause of a J e w i s h Palestine. 2 4

23

A n o t h e r s y m p a t h i z e r was S i r R o n a l d G r a h a m , a n A r a b i s t who h a d c o m e back to the F o r e i g n Office after m o r e than a d e c a d e of service in E g y p t , where he h a d been the first British official to d i s c u s s with Vladimir J a b o t i n s k y the creation of a J e w i s h unit within the British a r m y . N o w , having returned to L o n d o n , he u r g e d the F o r e i g n Office to m a k e its s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m p u b l i c . While the notion of c o m mitting Britain to Z i o n i s m was inspired by G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e a n d M a r k S y k e s , G r a h a m was p r o b a b l y m o r e responsible than anyone else in the g o v e r n m e n t for actually e m b o d y i n g the c o m m i t m e n t in an official d o c u m e n t , t h o u g h his role tends to be p a s s e d over by h i s t o r i a n s — p o s s i b l y b e c a u s e he failed to leave a significant archive of private p a p e r s b e h i n d h i m . G r a h a m and other officials of the F o r e i g n Office were keenly aware that F r a n c e w a s the obstacle in the way of giving C h a i m W e i z ma n n the p u b l i c c o m m i t m e n t h e r e q u e s t e d . G r a h a m c o n c l u d e d , as h a d S y k e s , that Z i o n i s m was weakened by its exclusive attachment to Britain. He worried that the Zionists were g a m b l i n g everything on the p r o s p e c t that Britain w o u l d g o v e r n Palestine—in ignorance of the secret S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t in which Britain had p l e d g e d not to

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do s o . On 19 April 1917 G r a h a m wrote to S y k e s that it was disquieting that the Zionist m o v e m e n t relied so completely on the prospect of Britain having P a l e s t i n e . H o w e v e r it was difficult to see how the Zionist m o v e m e n t could turn to F r a n c e for s u p p o r t . Within the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry Z i o n i s m w a s spoken of with scorn, a n d i m p o r t a n t s e g m e n t s of F r e n c h opinion had e x p r e s s e d hostility all along to the m o v e m e n t , which was r e g a r d e d a s p r o - G e r m a n . Z i o n i s m h a d attracted little s u p p o r t a m o n g F r a n c e ' s J e w s a n d , as a result, the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t held a low opinion of its strength—until the revolution in R u s s i a m a d e J e w s seem m u c h m o r e politically i m p o r t a n t than they were. E v e n after events in R u s s i a m a d e it s e e m desirable to win Zionist s u p p o r t , the Quai d'Orsay hesitated to bid for it, fearing that an Allied c o m m i t ment to Z i o n i s m might a m o u n t to an a b a n d o n m e n t of F r a n c e ' s claim to Palestine. 26

T h e p r o b l e m was solved by N a h u m Sokolow who, in his negotiations with the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry, pointedly d i d not raise the question of which country s h o u l d be the protecting power for Palestine. Officials at the Quai d'Orsay therefore were led to a s s u m e that Zionists would remain neutral on that issue. F r e n c h officials were not p r e p a r e d to s u p p o r t Z i o n i s m in a postwar P a l e s t i n e — a n d did not envisage allowing J e w s to achieve a separate national s t a t u s — b u t they saw no h a r m in offering the Zionists w o r d s of e n c o u r a g e ment so long as they were m e a n i n g l e s s . T h e y believed that those who held Zionist " d a y d r e a m s " might be won over by g r a n t i n g t h e m s o m e form of verbal e n c o u r a g e m e n t that did not constitute a real c o m m i t m e n t . In return for Sokolow's agreement to go to R u s s i a to use his influence with the J e w s there, on 4 J u n e 1917 J u l e s C a m b o n , D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l of the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry, g a v e h i m a written formal a s s u r a n c e from the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t of its s y m p a t h y in the following t e r m s : 27

Y o u were g o o d e n o u g h to present the project to which you are devoting your efforts which has for its object the d e v e l o p m e n t of J e w i s h colonization in Palestine. Y o u consider that, c i r c u m stances permitting, a n d the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the H o l y Places b e i n g s a f e g u a r d e d on the other hand, it would be a d e e d of justice a n d of reparation to assist, by the protection of the Allied Powers, in the renaissance of the J e w i s h nationality in that land f r o m which the p e o p l e of Israel were exiled so m a n y centuries a g o . T h e F r e n c h G o v e r n m e n t , which entered this present war to defend a people wrongfully attacked, and which continues the s t r u g g l e to a s s u r e the victory of right over m i g h t , cannot b u t

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feel s y m p a t h y for your c a u s e , the t r i u m p h of which is b o u n d up with that of the Allies. I am h a p p y to give you herewith s u c h a s s u r a n c e . 2 8

It was subtly p h r a s e d . O m i t t e d f r o m the p l e d g e was the c r u x of the Zionist i d e a : that the renaissance of the J e w i s h nation s h o u l d occur within the context of a political entity of its own. M o r e o v e r , the Holy Places, which were to remain independent of the p l e d g e of s y m p a t h y , had already been defined by the F r e n c h in the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t as a large enclave that took in most of inhabited Palestine west of the J o r d a n river. If that definition were to a p p l y , F r e n c h s y m p a t h y for the J e w i s h nation in Palestine would be restricted to H a i f a , H e b r o n , northern G a l i l e e , and the N e g e v D e s e r t . T h e C a m b o n letter w a s , as it was intended to b e , n o n c o m m i t t a l . N o n e t h e l e s s , the F r e n c h had o u t m a n e u v e r e d themselves. T h e i r formal a s s u r a n c e was too cautiously p h r a s e d to be meaningful, but its existence licensed the British to issue an a s s u r a n c e of their own. O n c e it b e c a m e c o m m o n g r o u n d that the Allies s u p p o r t e d J e w i s h aspirations in Palestine, however defined, the Zionist m o v e m e n t would have an important role in selecting its protector, a n d would choose Britain. T h i s was a matter of less concern to G r a h a m a n d S y k e s , whose principal objective at that time was to s e c u r e a h o m e l a n d in Palestine for the J e w s , than to L e o A m e r y a n d his friends, to w h o m Z i o n i s m was attractive mainly b e c a u s e it e n s u r e d that Palestine would be B r i t i s h . A r m e d with the written F r e n c h statement that S o k o l o w h a d b r o u g h t b a c k with h i m f r o m P a r i s , G r a h a m and Cecil advised a willing Balfour in m i d - J u n e 1917 that the time had c o m e to issue a written p u b l i c British c o m m i t m e n t to Z i o n i s m . B a l f o u r invited Weizmann to participate in the p r o c e s s of drafting an a p p r o p r i a t e d o c u m e n t . It was what W e i z m a n n a n d S y k e s h a d s o u g h t all along. T h e p r o c e s s of drafting the a p p r o p r i a t e l a n g u a g e , a n d d e c i d i n g to w h o m it s h o u l d be a d d r e s s e d , went on through the s u m m e r until S e p t e m b e r , when Milner a n d L e o A m e r y took charge of it. A l m o s t all the g o v e r n m e n t a l figures who m a t t e r e d were d i s p o s e d favorably toward the p r o p o s e d declaration. S y k e s , fortified by O r m s b y - G o r e , had converted the War C a b i n e t secretariat to Z i o n i s m . B a l f o u r , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , h a d long s y m p a t h i z e d with Z i o n i s m a n d now believed that Britain s h o u l d go on record in its favor; a n d within his own d e p a r t m e n t he was p u s h e d forward in this by Cecil a n d G r a h a m . * It is sometimes pointed out that the Balfour Declaration was equally vague. But, unlike the Cambon letter, the Balfour Declaration (a) was published, (b) referred to the whole of Palestine, and (c) referred to the creation of an entity that was to have a distinctly Jewish national identity—a National Home.

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S m u t s was deeply p r o - Z i o n i s t . M i l n e r a n d his set, including Philip K e r r of the P r i m e Minister's secretariat, h a d c o m e to view the establishment of a J e w i s h Palestine as a vital British imperial interest. T h e P r i m e Minister h a d always p l a n n e d to carry t h r o u g h a Zionist p r o g r a m ; a n d while he did not e x p r e s s an interest in declaring Britain's intentions in a d v a n c e , neither did he place any obstacle in the way of his government's d o i n g so once his colleagues thought it useful. Y e t the p r o p o s a l that B a l f o u r s h o u l d issue his pro-Zionist declaration s u d d e n l y encountered o p p o s i t i o n that b r o u g h t it to a halt. T h e opposition c a m e f r o m leading figures in the British J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . E d w i n M o n t a g u , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , led the opposition g r o u p within the C a b i n e t . H e , along with his cousin, H e r b e r t S a m u e l , a n d R u f u s I s a a c s ( L o r d R e a d i n g ) h a d broken new g r o u n d for their co-religionists: they h a d been the first J e w s to sit in a British C a b i n e t . T h e s e c o n d son of a successful financier who h a d been ennobled, M o n t a g u saw Z i o n i s m as a threat to the position in British society that he a n d his family h a d so recently, and with so m u c h exertion, attained. J u d a i s m , he a r g u e d , was a religion, not a nationality, a n d to say otherwise w a s to say that he was less than 100 percent British. M o n t a g u was r e g a r d e d as by far the m o s t c a p a b l e of the younger m e n in the L i b e r a l ranks, a n d it was d e e m e d a political m a s t e r s t r o k e for the P r i m e Minister to have taken h i m and Churchill away from A s q u i t h . Y e t a typical political c o m m e n t at the time ( f r o m L o r d D e r b y , the War Minister) was, " T h e a p p o i n t m e n t of M o n t a g u , a J e w , to the I n d i a Office has m a d e , as far as I can j u d g e , an uneasy feeling both in I n d i a a n d here"; t h o u g h D e r b y a d d e d that " I , personally, have a very high opinion of his capability a n d I expect he will do w e l l . " It bothered M o n t a g u that, despite his lack of religious faith, he c o u l d not avoid b e i n g categorized as a J e w . He was the millionaire son of an E n g l i s h lord, b u t was driven to lament that "I have been striving all my life to e s c a p e from the G h e t t o . " 29

3 0

T h e evidence s u g g e s t e d that in his n o n - Z i o n i s m , M o n t a g u was s p e a k i n g for a majority of J e w s . As of 1913, the last d a t e for which there were figures, only a b o u t one percent of the world's J e w s h a d signified their adherence to Z i o n i s m . British Intelligence reports indicated a s u r g e of Zionist feeling d u r i n g the war in the Pale of R u s s i a , b u t there were no figures either to substantiate or to quantify i t . I n Britain, the Conjoint C o m m i t t e e , which represented British J e w r y in all m a t t e r s affecting J e w s a b r o a d , h a d been against Z i o n i s m from the start a n d r e m a i n e d s o . 3 1

3 2

3 3

M o n t a g u ' s opposition b r o u g h t all matters to a halt. In d i s g u s t , * Disraeli, of course, though of Jewish ancestry, was baptized a Christian.

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G r a h a m r e p o r t e d that the p r o p o s e d declaration was "hung u p " b y M o n t a g u , "who represents a certain section of the rich J e w s a n d who s e e m s to fear that he and his like will be expelled f r o m E n g l a n d a n d asked to cultivate f a r m s in P a l e s t i n e . " T h e s u b - C a b i n e t officials who were p u s h i n g for a pro-Zionist c o m m i t m e n t a t t e m p t e d to allay s u c h fears. A m e r y , who w a s helping Milner redraft the p r o p o s e d D e c l a r a t i o n , explained the concept behind it to a C a b i n e t m e m b e r as not really b e i n g a d d r e s s e d to British s u b j e c t s of the J e w i s h faith, b u t to J e w s who resided in countries that denied t h e m real citizenship. "Apart f r o m those J e w s who have b e c o m e citizens of this or any other country in the fullest sense, there is also a large b o d y , m o r e particularly of the J e w s in Poland and R u s s i a . . . who are still in a very real sense a separate nation . . . " D e n i e d the right to b e c o m e R u s s i a n s , they would be offered a chance to r e b u i l d their own h o m e l a n d in Palestine. 34

3 5

M o n t a g u , however, took little interest in the position of J e w s in other countries. It was the position of J e w s in British society that concerned h i m ; feeling threatened, he fought b a c k with a ferocity that b r o u g h t the Cabinet's deliberations on the matter to a standstill. M o n t a g u was a i d e d b y L o r d C u r z o n , who a r g u e d that Palestine was too m e a g r e in r e s o u r c e s to a c c o m m o d a t e the Zionist d r e a m . M o r e i m p o r t a n t , he was aided by A n d r e w B o n a r L a w — l e a d e r of the dominant party in the Coalition g o v e r n m e n t a n d the P r i m e Minister's powerful political p a r t n e r — w h o u r g e d delay. B o n a r L a w a r g u e d that the time was not yet ripe for a consideration of the Zionist i s s u e . M o n t a g u was also aided by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , which, until m i d October 1917, cautiously counselled delay. President Wilson was s y m p a t h e t i c to Z i o n i s m , b u t s u s p i c i o u s of British m o t i v e s ; he favored a J e w i s h Palestine b u t was less enthusiastic about a British Palestine. As the British C a b i n e t considered i s s u i n g the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , it solicited the advice, a n d by implication the s u p p o r t , of President Wilson. T h e p r o p o s e d D e c l a r a t i o n was d e s c r i b e d b y the C a b i n e t t o the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t as an e x p r e s s i o n of s y m p a t h y for Zionist aspirations, as t h o u g h it were motivated solely by concern for the plight of p e r s e c u t e d J e w s . Wilson's foreign policy adviser, Colonel H o u s e , translated this as follows: " T h e E n g l i s h naturally want the road to E g y p t a n d I n d i a blocked, a n d L l o y d G e o r g e is not a b o v e u s i n g us to further this p l a n . " 3 6

T h i s was a fair interpretation of the views of the P r i m e Minister a n d of the Milner circle which a d v i s e d him. A c c o r d i n g to C h a i m Weizmann, Philip K e r r (the former Milner aide who served as L l o y d G e o r g e ' s secretary) "saw in a J e w i s h Palestine a b r i d g e between Africa, A s i a a n d E u r o p e on the r o a d to I n d i a . " It was not, however, a fair interpretation of the views of the F o r e i g n Office, which h a d been won over by the a r g u m e n t that a pro-Zionist declaration would 37

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prove a crucial w e a p o n against G e r m a n y in the war a n d afterward. T h e F o r e i g n Office believed that the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s in A m e r i c a a n d , a b o v e all, R u s s i a , wielded great power. T h e British a m b a s s a d o r in P e t r o g r a d , well aware that J e w s were a weak a n d p e r s e c u t e d minority in imperial R u s s i a and of no political c o n s e q u e n c e , r e p o r t e d that Zionists could not affect the o u t c o m e of the s t r u g g l e for power in R u s s i a . H i s h o m e g o v e r n m e n t p e r s i s t e d in believing, however, that the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in R u s s i a c o u l d keep the g o v e r n m e n t that ruled t h e m in the Allied c a m p . As the crisis in R u s s i a d e e p e n e d , the F o r e i g n Office was seized by a s e n s e of urgency in seeking J e w i s h support.

IV F e a r begets fear. In G e r m a n y the p r e s s was a r o u s e d by r u m o r s of what the British F o r e i g n Office intended to d o . In J u n e 1917 S i r R o n a l d G r a h a m received from C h a i m W e i z m a n n an issue of a Berlin n e w s p a p e r known for its close relationship to the g o v e r n m e n t , reporting that the British were flirting with the idea of e n d o r s i n g Z i o n i s m in o r d e r to a c q u i r e the Palestinian land b r i d g e on the road from E g y p t to I n d i a , a n d p r o p o s i n g that G e r m a n y forestall the m a n e u v e r by e n d o r s i n g Z i o n i s m first. ( T h o u g h the British did not know it, the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t took little interest in a d o p t i n g a pro-Zionist s t a n c e ; it w a s the G e r m a n p r e s s that took an interest in T h a t s u m m e r G r a h a m c o m m u n i c a t e d his fears t o Balfour. I n his m i n u t e , G r a h a m wrote that he h a d heard there w a s to be another p o s t p o n e m e n t which he believed w o u l d "jeopardise the whole J e w i s h situation." T h i s e n d a n g e r e d the position in R u s s i a where, he a s s e r t e d , the J e w s were all anti-Ally a n d , to a lesser extent, it w o u l d antagonize p u b l i c opinion in the U n i t e d S t a t e s . W a r n i n g that Britain m u s t not "throw the Zionists into the a r m s of the G e r m a n s , " he a r g u e d that "We might at any m o m e n t be confronted by a G e r m a n m o v e on the Zionist q u e s t i o n a n d it m u s t be r e m e m b e r e d that Z i o n i s m w a s originally if not a G e r m a n J e w i s h at any rate an A u s t r i a n J e w i s h idea." 38

G r a h a m attached to his m i n u t e a list of dates s h o w i n g how extensive the g o v e r n m e n t ' s delays h a d been in dealing with the Zionist matter. In O c t o b e r , B a l f o u r f o r w a r d e d the minute to the P r i m e Minister, along with the list of d a t e s which he said showed that the Zionists h a d reasonable c a u s e to c o m p l a i n , to which he a d d e d his own r e c o m m e n d a t i o n that the q u e s t i o n be taken up by the C a b i n e t a s soon a s p o s s i b l e . 3 9

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On 26 O c t o b e r 1917, The Times p u b l i s h e d a leading article attacking the continuing delay. S t a t i n g that it was no secret that British a n d Allied g o v e r n m e n t s had b e e n . considering a statement a b o u t Palestine, The Times a r g u e d that the t i m e had c o m e to m a k e o n e . Do our statesmen fail to see how valuable to the Allied c a u s e w o u l d be the hearty s y m p a t h y of the J e w s throughout the world which an unequivocal declaration of British policy might win? G e r m a n y has been q u i c k to perceive the d a n g e r to her s c h e m e s and to her p r o p a g a n d a that w o u l d be involved in the association of the Allies with J e w i s h national h o p e s , a n d she has not been idle in a t t e m p t i n g to forestall u s . On 31 O c t o b e r 1917 the C a b i n e t overrode the o p p o s i t i o n of M o n t a g u a n d C u r z o n a n d authorized the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y to issue a m u c h - d i l u t e d version of the a s s u r a n c e of s u p p o r t that W e i z m a n n had r e q u e s t e d . An ebullient S y k e s r u s h e d over with the news, " D r . W e i z m a n n , it's a boy"; b u t the Zionist leader was u n h a p p y that the original l a n g u a g e had been so watered d o w n . A d d r e s s e d to the m o s t illustrious n a m e in British J e w r y , the F o r e i g n Secretary's letter of 2 N o v e m b e r 1917 s t a t e d : 4 0

Dear L o r d Rothschild, I have m u c h pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of H i s M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n m e n t , the following declaration of s y m p a t h y with J e w i s h Zionist aspirations which has been s u b m i t t e d to, a n d a p p r o v e d by, the C a b i n e t : "His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national h o m e for the J e w i s h people, a n d will use their best e n d e a v o u r s to facilitate the achievement of this object, it b e i n g clearly u n d e r s t o o d that nothing shall be d o n e which m a y p r e j u d i c e the civil a n d religious rights of existing n o n - J e w i s h c o m m u n i t i e s in Palestine, or the rights a n d political s t a t u s enjoyed by J e w s in any other c o u n t r y . " I should be grateful if you would b r i n g this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist F e d e r a t i o n . Britain's leaders anticipated no a d v e r s e reaction f r o m their A r a b allies; they h a d seen F r a n c e as their only p r o b l e m in this connection, and that had been resolved. T h e P r i m e Minister later wrote of the A r a b leaders that "Palestine did not seem to give them m u c h a n x i e t y . " H e pointed out that his g o v e r n m e n t had informed K i n g H u s s e i n a n d Prince Feisal of its plans to re-create a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in the H o l y L a n d . He caustically a d d e d that "We c o u l d not get in touch with the Palestinian A r a b s as they were fighting against u s . " 41

4 2

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Chronicle. By then the news was o v e r s h a d o w e d by reports from P e t r o g r a d that L e n i n a n d T r o t s k y had seized power. T h e F o r e i g n Office had h o p e d the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n would help to swing R u s s i a n J e w i s h s u p p o r t to the Allied side a n d against B o l s h e v i s m . T h i s hope remained alive until the Bolsheviks decisively won the R u s s i a n Civil War in the early 1920s. In N o v e m b e r of 1917 the battle against B o l s h e v i s m in R u s s i a h a d just b e g u n , a n d those B r i t o n s who s u p p o r t e d the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , b e c a u s e they mistakenly believed R u s s i a n J e w s were powerful a n d c o u l d be valuable allies, were driven to s u p p o r t it all the m o r e by the d r a m a t i c news f r o m P e t r o g r a d . It was not until 9 N o v e m b e r that The Times was able to report the a n n o u n c e m e n t of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , a n d not until 3 D e c e m b e r that it p u b l i s h e d c o m m e n t s a p p r o v i n g it. T h e c o m m e n t s followed u p o n a celebration at the L o n d o n O p e r a H o u s e on 2 D e c e m b e r organized by the British Zionist F e d e r a t i o n . In addition to the Zionist leaders, s p e a k e r s included L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, S i r M a r k S y k e s , and William O r m s b y - G o r e , as well as a Syrian Christian, an A r a b nationalist, a n d s p o k e s m e n for A r m e n i a . T h e theme of the meeting, eloquently p u r s u e d by m a n y of the s p e a k e r s , was the need for J e w s , A r a b s , a n d A r m e n i a n s to help one another a n d to m o v e forward in h a r m o n y . T h e opinion of The Times was that " T h e presence a n d the words of influential representatives of the A r a b and A r m e n i a n peoples, a n d their a s s u r a n c e s of a g r e e m e n t a n d cooperation with the J e w s , would alone have sufficed to m a k e the meeting m e m o r a b l e . " 43

Of the meeting, The Times wrote that "its o u t s t a n d i n g features were the O l d T e s t a m e n t spirit which p e r v a d e d it a n d the feeling that, in the s o m e w h a t i n c o n g r u o u s setting of a L o n d o n theatre, the a p p r o a c h i n g fulfillment of ancient p r o p h e c y was b e i n g celebrated with faith a n d f e r v o u r . " It was a p p r o p r i a t e that it should be s o : Biblical p r o p h e c y was the first a n d m o s t e n d u r i n g of the m a n y motives that led B r i t o n s to want to restore the J e w s to Z i o n . T h e P r i m e Minister planned to foster a J e w i s h h o m e in Palestine, in any event, a n d later wrote that the peace treaty would have p r o v i d e d that Palestine s h o u l d be a h o m e l a n d for the J e w s "even had there been no previous pledge or p r o m i s e . " T h e i m p o r t a n c e of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , he wrote, was its contribution to the war effort. He claimed that R u s s i a n J e w s had given invaluable s u p p o r t to the war against G e r m a n y b e c a u s e of it. T h e grateful Zionist leaders had p r o m i s e d to work toward an Allied v i c t o r y — a n d had done s o . Writing two d e c a d e s later, as the British g o v e r n m e n t was a b o u t to a b a n d o n the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , he said that the Zionists "kept their w o r d in the letter a n d the spirit, a n d the only question that remains now is whether we m e a n to h o n o u r o u r s . " 44

4 5

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T h e P r i m e Minister u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the effect of the Balfour Declaration on the eventual peace settlement. Its character as a

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public d o c u m e n t — i s s u e d with the a p p r o v a l of the U n i t e d S t a t e s and F r a n c e and after consultation with Italy a n d the Vatican, a n d g r e e t e d with a p p r o v a l by the p u b l i c a n d the p r e s s t h r o u g h o u t the western w o r l d — m a d e it a c o m m i t m e n t that w a s difficult to ignore when the peace settlement was b e i n g negotiated. It took on a life a n d m o m e n t u m of its own.

V T h e Declaration also played a role in the d e v e l o p m e n t of the Zionist m o v e m e n t in the A m e r i c a n J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . A m e r i c a n Z i o n i s m had been a tiny m o v e m e n t when the war b e g a n . Of the roughly three million J e w s who then lived in the U n i t e d S t a t e s , only 12,000 belonged to the often ephemeral g r o u p s loosely b o u n d together in the amateurishly led Zionist F e d e r a t i o n . T h e m o v e m e n t ' s treasury contained 15,000 d o l l a r s ; its annual b u d g e t never e x c e e d e d 5,200 d o l l a r s . T h e largest single donation the F e d e r a t i o n ever received prior to 1914 was 2 0 0 d o l l a r s . In N e w Y o r k the m o v e m e n t h a d only 500 m e m b e r s . 4 7

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L o u i s D . B r a n d e i s , a n o u t s t a n d i n g B o s t o n lawyer not previously identified with specifically J e w i s h c a u s e s , had b e c o m e a Zionist in 1912 a n d took over leadership of the m o v e m e n t in 1914. As the intellectual giant of the P r o g r e s s i v e m o v e m e n t in A m e r i c a n politics, he was believed to exert great influence over President Wilson. B r a n d e i s w a s p e r h a p s the first J e w to play an i m p o r t a n t part in A m e r i c a n politics since the Civil War. Only one J e w h a d ever been a m e m b e r of a president's cabinet, a n d B r a n d e i s himself w a s to b e c o m e the first J e w i s h m e m b e r o f the U . S . S u p r e m e C o u r t . T h e great waves of J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n into the U n i t e d S t a t e s were recent, a n d m o s t i m m i g r a n t s were a n x i o u s to learn E n g l i s h , to s h e d their foreign accents a n d w a y s , and to b e c o m e A m e r i c a n . A m e r i c a n - b o r n J e w s , too, wanted to distance themselves from any foreign taint a n d feared that a t t a c h m e n t to Z i o n i s m on their part might m a k e t h e m s e e m less than wholehearted in their loyalty to the United States. It w a s this i s s u e , a b o v e all, that B r a n d e i s set out to a d d r e s s . As he saw it, A m e r i c a n J e w s lacked s o m e t h i n g i m p o r t a n t that other A m e r i c a n s p o s s e s s e d : a national p a s t . O t h e r s could point to an ancestral h o m e l a n d a n d take p r i d e in it a n d in t h e m s e l v e s . B r a n d e i s especially a d m i r e d I r i s h - A m e r i c a n s in this respect a n d for manifesting their opposition to continued British rule in I r e l a n d . A r g u i n g that this kind of political concern and involvement is * Oscar Straus, Secretary of Commerce and L a b o r from 1906 to 1909.

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entirely consistent with A m e r i c a n p a t r i o t i s m , a n d indeed enhances it, he p r o c l a i m e d that "Every I r i s h - A m e r i c a n who contributed towards a d v a n c i n g h o m e rule was a better m a n and a better A m e r i c a n for the sacrifice he m a d e . E v e r y A m e r i c a n J e w who aids in a d v a n c i n g the J e w i s h settlement in Palestine . . . will likewise be a better m a n and a better A m e r i c a n for doing s o . " T h e ethical idealism of B r a n d e i s m a d e a powerful i m p r e s s i o n on A r t h u r Balfour when the B r i t i s h F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y visited the U n i t e d S t a t e s in 1917 and d i s c u s s e d the future of Palestine. In t u r n , the Balfour Declaration vindicated the a r g u m e n t s that B r a n d e i s had u s e d in his a p p e a l s to the A m e r i c a n J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y . It s h o w e d that Z i o n i s m w a s in h a r m o n y with patriotism in wartime b e c a u s e a J e w i s h Palestine was an Allied war goal. S o o n afterward it also b e c a m e an officially s u p p o r t e d A m e r i c a n goal. On the occasion of the J e w i s h N e w Y e a r in S e p t e m b e r 1918, President Wilson e n d o r s e d the principles of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n in a letter of holiday greetings to the American Jewish community. 5 2

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Whether b e c a u s e of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n or b e c a u s e of Brandeis's effective a n d professional leadership, s u p p o r t for Z i o n i s m within the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y grew dramatically. In 1919 m e m b e r s h i p of the Zionist F e d e r a t i o n grew to m o r e than 175,000, t h o u g h Zionist s u p porters r e m a i n e d a minority g r o u p within A m e r i c a n J e w r y and still encountered fierce o p p o s i t i o n from the richer a n d m o r e established J e w s — o p p o s i t i o n that was not really o v e r c o m e until the 1940s. B u t B r a n d e i s h a d m a d e A m e r i c a n Z i o n i s m into a substantial organization along the lines pioneered by I r i s h - A m e r i c a n s who s u p p o r t e d indep e n d e n c e for I r e l a n d ; and the B a l f o u r Declaration h a d helped him to do s o — e v e n though the F o r e i g n Office had issued the declaration in part b e c a u s e they s u p p o s e d s u c h a force was already in existence a n d needed to be a p p e a s e d .

VI A m e a s u r e of how far British war g o a l s had m o v e d in the year since L l o y d G e o r g e replaced A s q u i t h i s p r o v i d e d b y L e o A m e r y ' s reflections in his diary at the end of 1917. L o o k i n g back a n d evaluating what he had been able to a c c o m p l i s h d u r i n g the year, he wrote that one of his m a i n achievements in dealing with British g o v e r n m e n t colleagues had been "all the work on Peace terms which gradually drove into their heads the i m p o r t a n c e of E a s t Africa, Palestine, a n d M e s o p o t a m i a a n d the I m p e r i a l outlook g e n e r a l l y . " As A m e r y indicated, Britain's m a i n objectives by now were not in E u r o p e . T h e destruction wrought in the first three years of the war m a d e a meaningful victory in E u r o p e i m p o s s i b l e . T h e rival warring 54

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E u r o p e a n coalitions were r u i n e d . It was not feasible to look for an annexation or acquisition in E u r o p e to m a k e up for what had been lost. E v e n the destruction of G e r m a n y would not meet Britain's needs. In a w a r t i m e s p e e c h S m u t s pointed out that G e r m a n y had to remain a substantial power in order to u p h o l d the E u r o p e a n balance of power, which it was in Britain's vital interest to m a i n t a i n . It was an o p e n q u e s t i o n as to whether the Britain that sailed onto the world ocean a n d a r o u n d the g l o b e u n d e r S i r F r a n c i s D r a k e had perished forever with the generation of 1914 on the western front. If that Britain c o u l d be revived, it would have to be t h r o u g h imperial e x p a n s i o n , partly in Africa b u t principally in the M i d d l e E a s t — t h a t was the direction in which the P r i m e Minister and the Milner circle were looking. s s

T h i s shift in outlook b r o u g h t the O t t o m a n war, which h a d b e g u n as an accidental irrelevance, f r o m the periphery to the very center of the P r i m e Minister's world policy. F r o m the beginning he had said that the G r e a t War c o u l d be won there. N o w he was saying that his postwar objectives could be won there too. With his political instinct, he felt that it was an area in which he c o u l d win tangible r e w a r d s for his c o u n t r y m e n , a n d with his strategic vision he s a w — a s did Milner, A m e r y , S m u t s , K e r r , a n d O r m s b y - G o r e — t h a t , b y s u p p l y i n g the m i s s i n g section of the line that led from C a p e T o w n to I n d i a and on to A u s t r a l i a a n d N e w Z e a l a n d , it offered a new lease on Britain's e m p i r e in Africa, Asia, a n d the Pacific. Where the A s q u i t h C a b i n e t eventually c a m e to see h e g e m o n y over portions of the M i d d l e E a s t as something that Britain merely wanted, the L l o y d G e o r g e g o v e r n m e n t c a m e to see it as territory that Britain needed. .

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J E R U S A L E M FOR CHRISTMAS i At the end of 1916, when D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e took office as P r i m e Minister, British fortunes in the E a s t took a turn for the better. T h e b l u n d e r i n g incompetence of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a in c o n d u c t i n g the M e s o p o t a m i a n c a m p a i g n — t h e a d v a n c e on B a g h d a d late in 1915 that e n d e d in the s p r i n g of 1916 in the defeat a n d s u r r e n d e r of the British I n d i a n A r m y a t K u t e l - A m a r a — h a d shocked L o n d o n into m a k i n g a clean sweep at the t o p . T h u s a new chief of the expeditionary a r m y , w h o u n d e r s t o o d its logistical r e q u i r e m e n t s , r e - o p e n e d the c a m p a i g n u n d e r a new S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , a new Viceroy, and a new c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f of the I n d i a n A r m y . M a j o r - G e n e r a l Stanley M a u d e led his A n g l o - I n d i a n A r m y of the T i g r i s forward into the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces in D e c e m b e r 1916, a n d in a methodical c a m p a i g n c a p t u r e d B a g h d a d on 11 M a r c h 1917. A l t h o u g h it had never been clear as to what p u r p o s e the B a g h d a d c a m p a i g n was meant to serve in the overall strategy of the world war, the c a p t u r e of the ancient capital, g l a m o r o u s f r o m its association with the Arabian Nights, c a u g h t the imagination of the new P r i m e Minister. It b r o u g h t h i m cheer at a time when it w a s b a d l y n e e d e d , a n d inspired h i m to a i m at J e r u s a l e m for Britain's next great t r i u m p h . T h e s u c c e s s e s of the A r m y of the T i g r i s raised the question of what was to be d o n e with the O t t o m a n provinces that it had occupied. T h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , although wary of c o m m i t t i n g itself, had envisaged all along that the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces of B a s r a and B a g h d a d w o u l d fall within its s p h e r e if they were detached from the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T o S i r M a r k S y k e s a n d his A r a b B u r e a u friends, the notion that s u c h a r e a s s h o u l d be administered in what they r e g a r d e d as India's paternalistic way was a b h o r r e n t . In a m e m o r a n d u m written in 1916, S y k e s w a r n e d the C a b i n e t that "if you work f r o m I n d i a you have all the old traditions of black a n d white, and you can not r u n the A r a b s on black a n d white lines." 1

T o m a r k the c a p t u r e o f B a g h d a d , S i r Percy C o x , chief political 305

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officer of G e n e r a l M a u d e ' s e x p e d i t i o n a r y force, drafted a proclamation to the p o p u l a c e that essentially limited itself to calling for cooperation with the provisional B r i t i s h - I n d i a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; but L o n d o n o r d e r e d h i m not to issue it. S e v e r a l drafts were written in L o n d o n , a n d after d i s c u s s i o n the War C a b i n e t chose one written by S i r M a r k S y k e s as a b a s i s for the text that was finally a p p r o v e d . T h e p r o c l a m a t i o n invited the A r a b s ' l e a d e r s — t h o u g h it was unclear who they were to b e — t o participate in the g o v e r n m e n t in collaboration with the British authorities. It s p o k e — a s was S y k e s ' s wont—in highflown p h r a s e s of liberation a n d f r e e d o m , of p a s t glory a n d future g r e a t n e s s , a n d e x p r e s s e d the h o p e that the A r a b i c peoples m i g h t find unity north, s o u t h , east, a n d west. It pointed, however vaguely, toward an A r a b M i d d l e E a s t e r n confederation u n d e r the leadership o f K i n g H u s s e i n — a S u n n i M o s l e m , although most o f the inhabitants of the provinces of B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d were Shi'ite, a n d the differences between S u n n i s and Shi'ites were p r o f o u n d a n d m o r e than a t h o u s a n d years old. G e n e r a l M a u d e o b j e c t e d to the S y k e s draft. As a military m a n , he d e e m e d it essential to install a British administration to maintain security while the war c o n t i n u e d . M o r e o v e r , he o b s e r v e d that in offering a m e a s u r e of self-government to the A r a b s of B a g h d a d , the p r o c l a m a t i o n took no note of the fact t h a t — a c c o r d i n g to h i m — a majority of the inhabitants of the city were not A r a b s b u t J e w s . * T h e S y k e s draft nonetheless was i m p o s e d o n G e n e r a l M a u d e a n d S i r Percy C o x b y L o n d o n , a n d c a u s e d w i d e s p r e a d confusion. A p p a r ently intended to assert that the o c c u p y i n g forces of British I n d i a were not g o i n g to rule the p r o v i n c e s of M e s o p o t a m i a , the proclam a t i o n did not m a k e clear who w a s g o i n g to rule in their p l a c e . On 16 M a r c h 1917 the War C a b i n e t created a M e s o p o t a m i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p o f L o r d C u r z o n to d e t e r m i n e what form of g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d be installed in the c a p t u r e d p r o v i n c e s . T h e c o m m i t t e e d e c i d e d that the p r o v i n c e of B a s r a s h o u l d b e c o m e B r i t i s h — n o t B r i t i s h - I n d i a n — w h i l e the province of B a g h d a d s h o u l d join or s h o u l d b e c o m e an A r a b political entity subject to a British p r o t e c t o r a t e . M e a n w h i l e I n d i a n personnel s h o u l d b e w i t h d r a w n f r o m the o c c u p i e d p r o v i n c e s . G e n e r a l M a u d e had cabled to his s u p e r i o r s that "local conditions Whether or not they constituted a majority in the city—and the then-current Encyclopaedia Britannica indicated that they did not—the Jews were economically preponderant. Baghdad, along with Jerusalem, was one of the two great Jewish cities of Asia, and a thousand years before had become the seat of the exilarch—the head of the Jewish religion in the eastern diaspora— and thus the capital of oriental Judaism. Jews in large numbers had lived in the Mesopotamian provinces since the time of the Babylonian captivity—about 600 B C — a n d thus were settled in the country a thousand years before the coming of the Arabs in AD 634.

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do not permit of e m p l o y i n g in r e s p o n s i b l e positions any b u t British officers c o m p e t e n t to deal with Military authorities a n d with p e o p l e of the country. Before any truly A r a b f a c a d e can be a p p l i e d to edifice it s e e m s essential that foundation of law a n d order s h o u l d be well a n d truly l a i d . " S i r Percy C o x raised the s a m e issues in a different way when he asked w h o the A r a b leader of B a g h d a d was g o i n g to b e . It was evident that L o n d o n either was not aware of, or h a d given no thought to, the p o p u l a t i o n m i x of the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces. T h e antipathy between the minority of M o s l e m s who were S u n n i s a n d the majority who were Shi'ites, the rivalries of tribes and clans, the historic and g e o g r a p h i c divisions of the provinces, a n d the c o m mercial p r e d o m i n a n c e of the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in the city of B a g h d a d m a d e it difficult to achieve a single unified g o v e r n m e n t that was at the s a m e time representative, effective, a n d widely s u p p o r t e d . 2

C o x raised other i m m e d i a t e a n d practical issues that obviously had not been thought t h r o u g h in L o n d o n . T h e laborers a n d other nonc o m b a t a n t s u p p o r t g r o u p s of the A r m y of the T i g r i s were I n d i a n ; if the C a b i n e t were serious in o r d e r i n g the I n d i a n s out of the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces, who would take their place? M o r e o v e r , u n d e r T u r k e y , the s y s t e m of law c o u r t s in the provinces had operated u n d e r , a n d with a right of appeal to, the high court in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , while u n d e r G e n e r a l M a u d e the court s y s t e m of I n d i a offered similar r i g h t s ; b u t if the connection with I n d i a were to be broken, what would h a p p e n to the administration of justice? T h e M e s o p o t a m i a n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n C o m m i t t e e had n o ready replies, for the O t t o m a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of M e s o p o t a m i a h a d been driven out, and no b o d y of experienced officials other than those of British I n d i a existed in the provinces to replace it. T h e war continued, a n d o r d e r s h a d to be given a n d administrative decisions taken daily. Public facilities a n d utilities had to be m a n a g e d . Who was to do it? L o n d o n was driven to reconsider, a n d to accept the administration of the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a so long as it w a s agreed that it s h o u l d not be p e r m a n e n t . G e n e r a l M a u d e , in whose n a m e the S y k e s p r o c lamation h a d been i s s u e d , was p u t in the position of p r e a c h i n g selfrule while d i s c o u r a g i n g its practice. T h e c o m p r o m i s e f o r m u l a at which the British had arrived might have been expressly d e s i g n e d to arouse dissatisfaction a n d u n r e s t : h a v i n g volunteered what s o u n d e d like a p l e d g e of independence to an area that h a d not asked for it, the military and civil authorities of the o c c u p y i n g power then p r o c e e d e d to withhold it. T h e M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces were the first t o b e c a p t u r e d f r o m the O t t o m a n E m p i r e by Britain d u r i n g the war. Whitehall's failure to think through in practical detail how to fulfill the p r o m i s e s g r a t u i tously m a d e to a section of the local inhabitants was revealing, a n d

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b o d e d ill for the provinces that were the next to be i n v a d e d : Palestine, S y r i a , and L e b a n o n . I t s h o w e d that S i r M a r k S y k e s a n d his colleagues h a d a d o p t e d policies for the M i d d l e E a s t without first considering whether in existing conditions they could feasibly be i m p l e m e n t e d , a n d , if s o , whether British officers on the spot would actually allow t h e m to be i m p l e m e n t e d . It was an inauspicious b e g i n n i n g a n d s u g g e s t e d the extent to which the British g o v e r n m e n t did not know what it was getting into when it d e c i d e d to s u p e r s e d e the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in A s i a . If there was this m u c h m u d d l e when British India o c c u p i e d n e a r b y M e s o p o t a m i a , it was reasonable to s u p p o s e there w o u l d be even m o r e m u d d l e when British E g y p t m a r c h e d on an area of s u c h c o m p l e x international interests as Palestine.

II T h e new c o m m a n d i n g officer sent out t o E g y p t w a s G e n e r a l Sir E d m u n d Allenby, a cavalry officer who h a d served a n d c o m m a n d e d with distinction in F r a n c e . He w a s c h o s e n in J u n e 1917, after S m u t s h a d definitely decided that he would not accept the a p p o i n t m e n t . Allenby's c o m m i s s i o n from the P r i m e Minister was to invade a n d o c c u p y Palestine a n d to take J e r u s a l e m before C h r i s t m a s . Allenby b r o u g h t drive a n d discipline to the E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e , a n d a new p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m . As head of Military Intelligence he chose Colonel R i c h a r d M e i n e r t z h a g e n , who had distinguished himself in a similar capacity with S m u t s in E a s t Africa. Meinertzhagen chose W y n d h a m D e e d e s , the expert on O t t o m a n affairs, to serve u n d e r him in c h a r g e of the political section of the division. M e i n e r t z h a g e n took c h a r g e of e s p i o n a g e operations b e h i n d e n e m y l i n e s — o p e r a t i o n s m e a n t to p a v e the way for Allenby to invade Palestine. T h o u g h he had been strongly anti-Jewish, M e i n e r t z h a g e n was m o v e d to c h a n g e his m i n d by A a r o n A a r o n s o h n , w h o s e s p y network in J e w i s h Palestine he r e g a r d e d as invaluable. B u t A a r o n s o h n paid a high price for winning the respect a n d friendship of British Military Intelligence: his s p y ring e x p o s e d the J e w i s h settlers in Palestine to p o s s i b l e T u r k i s h r e p r i s a l s — a t the worst of t i m e s , for the local O t t o m a n administration was inclined to strike out against the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in any event. In the s p r i n g of 1917, on the feast of Passover, D j e m a l expelled the J e w s a n d A r a b s of J a f f a ; it was not clear where he meant t h e m to g o , although he s p o k e vaguely of the S y r i a n hinterland. T h e plight of the refugees, without m e a n s or s u p p l i e s , evoked m e m o r i e s of the A r m e n i a n s . S o o n afterward D j e m a l

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indicated that he meant to d e p o r t the civil population of J e r u s a l e m , of which the majority was J e w i s h . Only the firm intervention of the G e r m a n F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y kept the tragedy from o c c u r r i n g . In these c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the Palestinian J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y faced catastrophe if the extent a n d effectiveness of A a r o n s o h n ' s activities were u n c o v e r e d — a s eventually they were. Aaron's sister S a r a h a n d a n u m b e r of her associates were arrested by the T u r k s in O c t o b e r 1917, tortured a n d interrogated. S o m e were h a n g e d . S a r a h A a r o n s o h n , after four d a y s of torture, s u c c e e d e d in c o m m i t t i n g s u i c i d e . R e p r i s a l s against the J e w i s h population m i g h t have followed h a d not the G e r m a n s and T a l a a t intervened. As it was, only about a third of the J e w i s h p o p u l a t i o n r e m a i n e d in J e r u s a l e m by the e n d of 1917; m o s t of the rest h a d died of starvation or d i s e a s e .

Ill M e i n e r t z h a g e n was i m p r e s s e d by the effectiveness of A a r o n s o h n ' s J e w s in contributing to the p r e p a r a t i o n s for a British invasion of Palestine, b u t was less i m p r e s s e d by the effectiveness of Feisal's Arabs. T h e British civil authorities i n C a i r o had little contact with T . E . L a w r e n c e , their liaison with Feisal's A r a b i a n guerrillas: a n d in the s p r i n g of 1917 he d i s a p p e a r e d into the desert. T h e British military authorities in C a i r o showed little concern for whatever L a w r e n c e a n d Feisal might be d o i n g , having given up interest in the A r a b Revolt the p r e v i o u s year. L a w r e n c e h a d g o n e off with A u d a a b u T a y i , the fighting chief of the B e d o u i n tribal confederation of northern A r a b i a , whose adherence L a w r e n c e h a d s e c u r e d by the p a y m e n t of 10,000 p o u n d s sterling. T h e i r objective was A q a b a , a sleepy, tiny port at the southern tip of Palestine, situated at the head of a channel of the R e d S e a so narrow that the R o y a l N a v y d a r e d not enter it while its shore batteries were in enemy h a n d s . Its several h u n d r e d O t t o m a n defenders a n d their g u n positions faced out to sea, so A u d a ' s b a n d planned to steal up from behind to take A q a b a by a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k . * It was A u d a who led the expedition, though L a w r e n c e r o d e with him. With B e d o u i n c u n n i n g , A u d a led his followers from the A r a b i a n coastline n o r t h w a r d into the desert, where their m o v e m e n t s were lost from view. When they r e a p p e a r e d in southern Palestine two m o n t h s later, their c o m i n g was a total s u r p r i s e . On 6 J u l y they o v e r w h e l m e d * It was probably Lawrence's idea, though Auda and/or Feisal may have thought of it independently.

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A q a b a ' s small and u n p r e p a r e d T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n . D e s p i t e his two p u n i s h i n g m o n t h s in the desert, L a w r e n c e immediately set off on an a r d u o u s a n d d a n g e r o u s trip across a wilderness of enemy-held territories to S u e z to report A u d a ' s c a p t u r e of A q a b a . He astonished everyone by unexpectedly e m e r g i n g f r o m the Sinai desert, in A r a b d r e s s , creating a sensation at h e a d q u a r t e r s just after G e n e r a l Allenby c a m e to take up his new c o m m a n d . L a w r e n c e p o s s e s s e d m a n y virtues but honesty was not a m o n g t h e m ; he p a s s e d off his fantasies as the truth. A few m o n t h s before, he h a d sent a letter to G e n e r a l C l a y t o n that contained an almost certainly fictitious account of an expedition he claimed to have undertaken on his o w n . N o w he had real personal exploits to announce a n d to e x a g g e r a t e , as he allowed his listeners to u n d e r s t a n d that he h a d played the chief role in the A q a b a c a m p a i g n . L a w r e n c e ' s arrival with the news f r o m A q a b a c o m p l e t e d his nine m o n t h s ' transformation into a military hero. A u d a a b u T a y i , sheikh of the eastern Howeitat, who had in fact won the victory, did not have a n a m e that tripped easily off the t o n g u e s of British officers. I n s t e a d they said, as historians did later, that " L a w r e n c e took A q a b a . " 3

Whoever deserved credit, the c a p t u r e of A q a b a t r a n s f o r m e d the H e j a z rebellion which h a d hitherto been bottled up in the A r a b i a n peninsula b y the T u r k i s h g a r r i s o n a t M e d i n a . N o w the Royal N a v y could transport A r a b i a n t r i b e s m e n to Palestine; a n d t h u s , for the first time, Hussein's forces could reach a battlefield on which the B r i t i s h - T u r k i s h war was actually to be fought, for L a w r e n c e pers u a d e d Allenby that A r a b irregulars could assist British forces in the c o m i n g Palestine and S y r i a c a m p a i g n s . Feisal still r e m a i n e d at h e a d q u a r t e r s in the H e j a z when Allenby a p p r o v e d L a w r e n c e ' s plan to transport h i m and a small striking force of his t r i b e s m e n by sea from the British-held coast of A r a b i a to A q a b a — a sea voyage of 250 miles. T h e r e they could act as a diversionary force on the right flank of the British a r m y in the c o m i n g Palestine c a m p a i g n which Allenby p l a n n e d to launch in the a u t u m n . Feisal accepted the plan, although it meant cutting himself off f r o m the H e j a z , his father, a n d his b r o t h e r s ; he was deputized as a British general a n d c a m e u n d e r Allenby's c o m m a n d . A few m o n t h s earlier, the A r a b B u r e a u had considered the p r o b lems that would arise from any a t t e m p t to employ Feisal's forces in the Palestine a n d S y r i a c a m p a i g n s . T h e b u r e a u h a d reported t o Clayton on 16 M a y 1917 that Feisal's B e d o u i n s could not s t a n d up to regular t r o o p s , and that an additional d i s a d v a n t a g e of e m p l o y i n g t h e m was that their g o i n g into settled districts w o u l d be u n w e l c o m e to town dwellers. A c c o r d i n g to the A r a b B u r e a u , the p r o b l e m could be solved by recruiting S y r i a n deserters from the O t t o m a n a r m y to serve u n d e r F e i s a l . T h i s w o u l d "change the character of Sherif

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Feisal's c a m p a i g n from a series of desultory raids against the railway to an organized a t t e m p t to free the c o u n t r y . " * 4

IV In the a u t u m n of 1917 Allenby invaded Palestine. T h e T u r k s and their G e r m a n c o m m a n d e r s expected h i m to launch his attack on coastal G a z a , the o b v i o u s gateway to Palestine; but its defenses a n d defenders were well p r e p a r e d and A l l e n b y merely feinted at it while, with stealth a n d s p e e d , his m a i n forces s w u n g a r o u n d t h r o u g h the desert to attack inland at B e e r s h e b a instead. T h e O t t o m a n forces were taken by s u r p r i s e , a n d fell back in disarray. O n e reason for the T u r k s ' s u r p r i s e was a r u s e devised a n d executed by M e i n e r t z h a g e n . On 10 O c t o b e r he r o d e into no man's l a n d ; when an O t t o m a n cavalry patrol fired at him he pretended to be hit, and d r o p p e d a blood-stained sack that contained apparently confidential British d o c u m e n t s indicating that the m a i n attack would be at G a z a . "Meinertzhagen's device won the b a t t l e , " D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e later wrote; he was "One of the ablest a n d m o s t successful b r a i n s I had met in any a r m y . " L l o y d G e o r g e a d d e d that " N e e d l e s s to say he never rose in the war a b o v e the rank of C o l o n e l . " 6

While Allenby's forces were rolling up the G a z a - t o - B e e r s h e b a line, Feisal's forces h a r a s s e d the T u r k s on the British right flank. As liaison officer between the British a n d A r a b officers, first as a m a j o r and then as a colonel, T. E. L a w r e n c e enjoyed a colorful c a m p a i g n that later won him great p u b l i c i t y — b u t also m u c h envy. B r e m o n d , the F r e n c h representative in the H e j a z , later jealously o b s e r v e d that L a w r e n c e "represented" 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s s t e r l i n g , but it was m o r e than that: by the end of the war, the A r a b Revolt had cost Britain m o r e than fifty times that a m o u n t . Whatever the s u m , it was i m m e n s e in those d a y s — a n d m o r e so by desert B e d o u i n stand a r d s . T h e tribes h a d never known s u c h wealth a s L a w r e n c e b r o u g h t t h e m . Eventually the wealth t r a n s f o r m e d not merely the face of 7

* British officers put this program into effect when Feisal came to Aqaba, and served with him to provide professional advice and guidance. Lieutenant-Colonel Pierce Charles Joyce, stationed at Aqaba, was the senior British officer serving with Feisal's corps, as O . C . (Officer Commanding) Hejaz operations, reporting to Colonel Alan Dawnay of Allenby's General Staff. Dawnay at the planning level and Joyce at the operations level were the principal British officers placed in charge of the Arab army corps. General Harry Chauvel, commander of the Australian army in the Palestine and Syria campaigns, later wrote that "Joyce was the organiser of the only fighting force of any real value in the whole of the Arab Army and I always thought that he had more to do with the success of the Hejaz operations than any other British officer." 5

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tribal allegiances b u t also the a p p e a r a n c e of the y o u n g E n g l i s h m a n who served as p a y m a s t e r ; his A r a b w a r d r o b e grew to be even m o r e splendid than Feisal's. N e a r l y half a century later, when asked if he r e m e m b e r e d L a w r e n c e , a B e d o u i n sheikh replied "He was the m a n with the g o l d . " T h e sheer logistics of getting the g o l d safely to L a w r e n c e p o s e d a p r o b l e m , for not m a n y p e o p l e could be trusted with the p o s s e s s i o n of it. I n C a i r o , W y n d h a m D e e d e s u s e d t o s p e n d his S a t u r d a y afternoons personally p a c k i n g gold sovereigns into cartridge cases a n d watching them b e i n g loaded onto c a m e l s for the journey to L a w r e n c e in the desert. 8

A p a r t f r o m the tribes, whose role was s p o r a d i c , Feisal's a r m y consisted of a b o u t 1,000 B e d o u i n s s u p p l e m e n t e d by a b o u t 2 , 5 0 0 O t t o m a n ex-prisoners of war. British expectations that the exprisoners of war w o u l d t r a n s f o r m F e i s a l ' s forces into s o m e t h i n g akin to a regular army were, at first, a d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . A representative of the U . S . D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e in C a i r o reported at the end of 1917 that Feisal's a r m y r e m a i n e d "incapable of c o p i n g with disciplined troops"; and his report u n d o u b t e d l y echoed official British opinion in C a i r o at the t i m e . Another d i s a p p o i n t m e n t w a s the p e r f o r m a n c e of L a w r e n c e ' s raiding party when a s s i g n e d a specific operational task by A l l e n b y : they were to d y n a m i t e a high-arched viaduct to cut the railroad c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of the O t t o m a n forces h e a d q u a r t e r e d in J e r u s a l e m . L a w r e n c e a n d his m e n failed in the task, b u t Allenby, h a v i n g p u s h e d the T u r k i s h right flank north of J a f f a , then t h r u s t t h r o u g h the J u d a e a n hills, and c a p t u r e d J e r u s a l e m a n y w a y — e v e n earlier than C h r i s t m a s . T h o u g h L a w r e n c e bitterly b l a m e d himself for his failure, Allenby did n o t — a n d s h o w e d it by inviting L a w r e n c e to attend, as staff officer of the day to G e n e r a l C l a y t o n , the c e r e m o n y of entrance into J e r u s a l e m . 9

V On 11 D e c e m b e r 1917 G e n e r a l S i r E d m u n d Allenby a n d his officers entered the H o l y City of J e r u s a l e m at the J a f f a G a t e , on foot. At the Citadel, Allenby read out a p r o c l a m a t i o n placing the city u n d e r martial law. T o the F r e n c h representative, Picot, Allenby explained that the city fell within the military zone, so that authority in the area was vested solely in the c o m m a n d i n g general. As c o m m a n d i n g general, Allenby would decide how long the area would r e m a i n u n d e r an exclusively military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Only when he d e e m e d that the military situation p e r m i t t e d him to do s o , said Allenby, w o u l d he allow civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n to be instituted. Until then, the

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question of the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t a n d the ultimate disposition of Palestine would be d e f e r r e d . T h e liberation of what he called "the m o s t f a m o u s city in the world" was what the P r i m e Minister h a d wanted for C h r i s t m a s ; with it, he later wrote, C h r i s t e n d o m had been able "to regain p o s s e s s i o n o f its s a c r e d s h r i n e s . " T h e c a p t u r e o f B a g h d a d a n d J e r u s a l e m h a d p r o d u c e d a t r e m e n d o u s psychological effect, he c l a i m e d , but also a material o n e . " T h e calling of the T u r k i s h bluff was not only the beginning of the c r a c k i n g - u p of that military i m p o s t e r s h i p which the incompetence of our war direction h a d p e r m i t t e d to intimidate us for y e a r s ; it was itself a real contribution to ultimate v i c t o r y . " 10

11

After the c a p t u r e of J e r u s a l e m , Feisal's A r a b forces, u n d e r various A r a b a n d B r i t i s h officers, s h o w e d their worth. C a m p a i g n i n g in T r a n s j o r d a n , the raiding parties continued their hit-and-run attacks, while the r e g u l a r s , trained by J o y c e a n d t r a n s p o r t e d by his colleague H u b e r t Y o u n g , d i s p r o v e d the contention—frequently a d v a n c e d b y British intelligence officers in the p a s t — t h a t they could not stand up to the T u r k i s h a r m y . A significant role was planned for t h e m in the next p h a s e of the c a m p a i g n by Allenby, who intended t h e m to s p r e a d d i s o r d e r a m o n g the T u r k s on his right flank. Allenby w a s now in a position to m a r c h on D a m a s c u s , a n d then on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to deliver the knock-out blow to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , but just a t that m o m e n t his h a n d w a s stayed. T h e G e r m a n s were p r e p a r i n g a n offensive against western E u r o p e , m a d e p o s s i b l e b y R u s s i a ' s s u r r e n d e r , which allowed L u d e n d o r f f to b r i n g b a c k G e r m a n y ' s a r m i e s from the eastern front. S u d d e n l y Allenby was obliged to s e n d b a c k to E u r o p e almost all of his British t r o o p s . On the first d a y of s p r i n g 1918, G e r m a n t r o o p s launched a s u r p r i s e attack that s m a s h e d t h r o u g h Allied lines in northern F r a n c e and threatened to win the war before A m e r i c a n reinforcements could arrive. It w a s not until the s u m m e r that the fury of L u d e n d o r f f ' s offensive was s p e n t . Meanwhile Allenby remained in Palestine, rebuilding his forces for the future. F r o m C h r i s t m a s until s u m m e r ' s e n d , as Allenby awaited a chance to r e s u m e his offensive, political battle lines were f o r m i n g within the British g o v e r n m e n t a n d the Allied c a m p as to the ultimate disposition of the l a n d s c o m p o s i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . M e a n w h i l e E n v e r P a s h a was starting on a sort of L u d e n d o r f f offensive of his own in the north, d e s i g n e d to c a p t u r e the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g l a n d s of the C z a r i s t E m p i r e — A z e r b a i j a n a n d T u r k e s t a n — a n d p e r h a p s then t o d e s c e n d on P e r s i a , A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d I n d i a to destroy Britain's eastern e m p i r e while all of her British t r o o p s were away in E u r o p e . In retrospect, E n v e r ' s offensive, like L u d e n d o r f f ' s , looks like having been a last d e s p e r a t e throw of the dice. B u t at the time the O t t o m a n

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E m p i r e ' s capabilities a n d intentions were less easy to a s s e s s ; a n d the O t t o m a n offensive b r o u g h t vast a r e a s of the northern M i d d l e E a s t , hitherto uncontested in the war, into the spotlight of world war and politics. While E n v e r was attacking north a n d east, Allenby was at last able to r e s u m e his attack on Enver's forces in the west.

36 T H E ROAD TO DAMASCUS i Between C h r i s t m a s of 1917 a n d the s u m m e r of 1918, Allenby laid the foundation for r e s u m i n g his c a m p a i g n against the T u r k s . In J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y h e restored a n d extended J e r u s a l e m ' s railway connections to the coast, so as to relieve his army's d e p e n d e n c e u p o n pack a n i m a l s a n d ruined r o a d s . He r a i d e d enemy forces to keep t h e m off balance. M e a n w h i l e he trained his raw Indian t r o o p s for the coming campaign. D a m a s c u s was the next objective on his line of m a r c h . E v e n m o r e than B a g h d a d a n d J e r u s a l e m , it was an important city for all historical ages. Believed to be the oldest continuously inhabited u r b a n center in the world, its origins were lost in the mists of time. D a m a s c u s was a flourishing oasis town before there were J e w s or Arabs, Moslems or Christians, Englishmen or G e r m a n s . T h e capture of D a m a s c u s w o u l d symbolically c o m p l e t e not merely the British occupation of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e , b u t also a s s u r e Britain's place in the line of legitimate succession from the ancient world c o n q u e r o r s who had sealed their t r i u m p h s by achieving m a s t e r y of the oases of S y r i a . Britain c l a i m e d to be s o m e t h i n g other than a traditional c o n q u e r o r , for she was acting on behalf of an array of associated p o w e r s and c a u s e s . Allenby w a s an Allied c o m m a n d e r , a n d his a r m i e s were p r e p a r e d t o a d v a n c e under m a n y f l a g s . A m o n g their b a n n e r s w a s one designed b y S i r M a r k S y k e s for H u s s e i n a n d the A r a b c a u s e . Its c o l o r s — b l a c k , white, g r e e n , a n d r e d — w e r e meant to s y m b o l i z e the past glory of M o s l e m A r a b e m p i r e s a n d to s u g g e s t that H u s s e i n w a s their c o n t e m p o r a r y c h a m p i o n . H u s s e i n ' s only modification of the design was to c h a n g e the hue of the r e d . S y k e s h a d o r d e r e d flags to be m a d e up by the British military s u p p l y offices in E g y p t , a n d then had them delivered to the H e j a z forces. 1

T h e B r i t i s h - d e s i g n e d , B r i t i s h - p r o d u c e d f l a g o f A r a b nationalism signaled a critical issue as Allenby's a r m i e s p r e p a r e d to m a r c h on 315

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D a m a s c u s : the extent to which the particular British officials who mattered m o s t in s h a p i n g M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy were sincere or cynical in their espousal of the v a r i o u s causes to which they had s u p p o s e d l y been converted along the way. S i r M a r k S y k e s , who before 1914 had a d m i r e d the T u r k s as a ruling p e o p l e , had b e c o m e converted d u r i n g the war to the c a u s e of liberating the subject peoples from O t t o m a n tyranny. An o u t s p o k e n a n t i - S e m i t e , he had c o m e to e x p r e s s his concern for the J e w s , as did M e i n e r t z h a g e n , also an avowed a n t i - S e m i t e . Colonial officials s u c h as S t o r r s and Clayton, who had always maintained that A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g natives were inc a p a b l e of self-government, a p p e a r e d to s u p p o r t S y k e s as he hailed the renaissance of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . N o t all of these conversions were genuine. At one end of the s p e c t r u m w a s S y k e s , who believed in honoring the pledges of which, in large part, he was the author. At the other end were operational officers who d e p l o r e d the p l e d g e s , a n d at times d e p r e c a t e d the c a u s e s in whose n a m e s they had been m a d e . At the beginning of 1918 S y k e s , in L o n d o n , m o v e d into a F o r e i g n Office position in charge of the politics of the O t t o m a n theater of war. T h o s e in charge of the politics of the O t t o m a n theater of war in the field—Clayton in Palestine, Wingate in E g y p t , a n d the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a in B a g h d a d — w e r e skeptical of the politics of idealism that S y k e s had c o m e to e s p o u s e , t h o u g h they did not tell h i m so openly. Beneath the surface civility of British g o v e r n m e n t interchanges in 1918 there ran a hidden line on which the F o r e i g n Office a n d officers in the field pulled in o p p o s i t e directions. B a g h d a d , J e r u s a l e m , a n d , b e y o n d Allied lines, D a m a s c u s , awaited word of their eventual fate, unaware that a tug- of war within the British b u r e a u c r a c y m i g h t decide it.

II B r i g a d i e r G e n e r a l G i l b e r t C l a y t o n s e r v e d as chief political officer to G e n e r a l Allenby, b u t r e m a i n e d the political alter ego of S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate, the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C a i r o . He thus occupied a c o m m a n d i n g position in d e t e r m i n i n g the politics of both E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , as well as those of the a r m y of occupation in Palestine. C l a y t o n was a career a r m y officer whose professional caution often kept h i m f r o m e x p r e s s i n g his views freely when they contradicted those of his s u p e r i o r s . He therefore e x p r e s s e d his views candidly to Wingate, with w h o m he a g r e e d , b u t g u a r d e d l y to S y k e s , with w h o m he did not. C l a y t o n a n d S t o r r s e n v i s a g e d a n A r a b k i n g d o m o r confederation g u i d e d by the British in a M i d d l e E a s t in which there was no r o o m

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for F r a n c e (except p e r h a p s in L e b a n o n ) . C l a y t o n denied that he was a n t i - F r e n c h ; it was not, he e x p l a i n e d , as though he wanted to e x c l u d e the F r e n c h from S y r i a . It w a s the fault of the F r e n c h t h e m s e l v e s : they were detested by the S y r i a n s a n d , if given a chance to rule S y r i a , w o u l d b u n g l e it. C l a y t o n s a i d he would not connive at b r i n g i n g a b o u t that result; it w a s s i m p l y that he w a s p r e d i c t i n g it. "You need not be afraid of any F a s h o d a - i s m on my p a r t , " he wrote to S y k e s on 20 A u g u s t 1 9 1 7 . It w a s rather that he feared Britain w o u l d be b l a m e d for F r a n c e ' s failure, a n d told S y k e s that the important thing w a s to establish a record s h o w i n g that it w a s not Britain's fault. 2

T h o u g h d e n y i n g a n t i - F r e n c h bias, h e d i d admit h a v i n g reservations about Britain's other M i d d l e E a s t e r n allies. E v e n by the s t a n d a r d s of the time, C l a y t o n and his colleague, W i n g a t e , were strongly d i s p o s e d to be a n t i - J e w i s h . Wingate h a d b l a m e d J e w s for inciting the o u t b r e a k of the O t t o m a n war. In 1916 C l a y t o n r e p o r t e d to W i n g a t e that J e w s were b e h i n d the m o v e m e n t to m a k e p e a c e with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as well. B u t when the issue of a c o m p r o m i s e p e a c e with T u r k e y again c a m e to the fore in 1917, Clayton a r g u e d that Britain h a d no moral right to negotiate b e c a u s e "We are c o m m i t t e d to the s u p p o r t of A r a b s , S y r i a n s , J e w s , and A r m e n i a n s " and therefore h a d t o p r e s s forward to c o m p l e t e v i c t o r y . At the s a m e time, he o p p o s e d entering into just s u c h c o m m i t m e n t s , including the c o m m i t m e n t to Z i o n i s m . As the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n w a s b e i n g d r a f t e d , he wrote to S y k e s that it w o u l d be b e s t to keep A a r o n A a r o n s o h n a n d the J e w s "in play" without m a k i n g any statement of B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n s . Politics, he wrote, tended to distract J e w s a n d A r a b s from the war effort. By nature c a u t i o u s , he saw no need in any event to m a k e p l e d g e s in advance. 4

5

A m o n t h after the i s s u a n c e of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n , Clayton wrote to S y k e s s u g g e s t i n g that it might have been a m i s t a k e . I am not fully aware of the weight which Zionists carry, especially in A m e r i c a a n d R u s s i a , a n d of the c o n s e q u e n t necessity of giving t h e m everything for which they may ask, b u t I m u s t * In the summer of 1916, when the Tory leader Lord Lansdowne privately argued in favor of a compromise peace, Clayton was in London; and on returning to Cairo wrote Wingate that "One impression I gained which confirmed what I have always thought, and which I know you take an interest in, was the widespread influence of the Jews. It is everywhere and always on the 'moderation' tack. The Jews do not want to see anyone 'downed'. There are English Jews, French Jews, German Jews, Austrian Jews & Salonika Jews—but all are J E W S .. . You hear peace talk and generally somewhere behind is the Jew. You hear pro-Turk talk and desires for a separate peace with Turkey—again the Jew (the mainspring of the C . U . P . ) [original emphasis]." 3

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point out that, by p u s h i n g them as hard as we a p p e a r to be doing, we are risking the possibility of A r a b unity b e c o m i n g s o m e t h i n g like an a c c o m p l i s h e d fact a n d b e i n g ranged against us. 6

Nonetheless, Clayton was not p r o - A r a b , in the sense of favoring A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . On the contrary, early in 1917 he and Wingate p r o p o s e d to abolish even the nominal independence of E g y p t and to move toward outright annexation-—a j u d g m e n t which the F o r e i g n Office successfully o p p o s e d . Writing to S y k e s at the time, in s u p p o r t of his own p r o p o s a l a n d against the officials in L o n d o n who had blocked it, Clayton claimed that It is s t r o n g a n d I know d e a d against their policy, b u t , m a r k my w o r d s , I know I am right. All this c l a p t r a p about S u l t a n s & self g o v e r n m e n t for E g y p t is rot. T h e y are not nearly ready for it and if you have a Palace, every ounce of power a n d self government which you think you are giving to the People will go straight into the h a n d s of the S u l t a n & his minister to be u s e d against you. Beautiful theories are all very nice, b u t hard facts remain. 7

A l t h o u g h Clayton had been the first to make m u c h of the A r a b secret societies, even before the outbreak of the O t t o m a n war, he consistently ignored what they told h i m : they did not want to be ruled by C h r i s t i a n s or E u r o p e a n s — n o t even the British. A reminder of. this c a m e in early 1918 in the diplomatic p o u c h from M a d r i d , where the British a m b a s s a d o r had seen Aziz a l - M a s r i , the secret society leader, and reported receiving a p r o p o s a l from him to organize the overthrow of the E n v e r - T a l a a t government in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e would then b e reorganized along federal lines, offering local a u t o n o m y to A r a b s a n d others, a n d reconciling the reorganized e m p i r e with the Allied P o w e r s . A l - M a s r i had often said m u c h the s a m e thing to Clayton in C a i r o at the beginning of the war, b u t it did not s e e m to register on Clayton that it meant that those for w h o m a l - M a s r i s p o k e , t h o u g h willing to be ruled by the T u r k i s h Porte, refused to be ruled by the British R e s i d e n c y . What C l a y t o n was p r o p o s i n g — a British protectorate for the A r a b M i d d l e E a s t — w a s what a l - M a s r i indicated he would never accept. 8

T h u s Clayton, the officer who a d v i s e d Allenby a b o u t the policies t o b e p u r s u e d i n occupied Palestine, T r a n s j o r d a n , L e b a n o n , a n d S y r i a , t h o u g h he claimed he w a s not an enemy of the F r e n c h , a n d insisted he was a friend of both the Zionists a n d the A r a b s , in practice o p p o s e d the a m b i t i o n s of all three.

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III S i r M a r k S y k e s was a novice in g o v e r n m e n t — i n 1917 he h a d held executive office for only two y e a r s — a n d was a mercurial personality who remained subject to s u d d e n e n t h u s i a s m s . As r e m a r k e d earlier, he was q u i c k to take up a c a u s e or to p u t it d o w n . B u t t h o u g h inconsistent, he was not d i s h o n e s t : he did not d i s s e m b l e . H a v i n g converted f r o m a n t i - A r a b , a n t i - J e w , a n t i - A r m e n i a n to p r o - A r a b , proJ e w , p r o - A r m e n i a n , he knew no way b u t one to keep faith with his new friends—with a whole heart. S y k e s , who believed in keeping the p r o m i s e s he h a d m a d e to A r a b s , J e w s , A r m e n i a n s , and F r e n c h m e n , continued to labor in 1917—18 to keep his d i s p a r a t e coalition together. C h a i m W e i z m a n n d e s c r i b e d his o u t s t a n d i n g qualities by writing that "He was not very consistent or logical in his thinking, b u t he was g e n e r o u s a n d w a r m h e a r t e d . " B e c a u s e of his role in helping to fulfill J e w i s h national aspirations, it was a p p r o p r i a t e that the door to S y k e s ' s office was known to the Zionist leader N a h u m S o k o l o w as "the D o o r of H o p e . " B u t within his own g o v e r n m e n t there were those who objected to this generosity to foreigners. I n d e e d Sykes's principal p r o b l e m was to secure the s u p p o r t of his own colleagues, who were p u z z l e d by his v i e w s — p u z z l e d , b e c a u s e it s e e m s not to have occurred to t h e m that he was, by their s t a n d a r d s , naive. 9

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Part of Sykes's p r o b l e m was that he d i d not know which of his colleagues were in favor of what; he did not u n d e r s t a n d that s o m e of them kept their motives and p l a n s h i d d e n . In confidential conferences a n d c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with t r u s t e d British g o v e r n m e n t colleagues, he felt that he c o u l d e x p r e s s his views openly a n d fully, a n d wrongly a s s u m e d that they felt the s a m e way. Civil servants a n d career a r m y officers like C l a y t o n were cautious by profession a n d , unlike S y k e s , were d i s p o s e d not to show their h a n d s . S y k e s was a H o u s e of C o m m o n s m a n ; it was his t r a d e to m a k e speeches. By profession he spoke u p ; while, by profession, m e n like Clayton kept their own counsel. R e t u r n i n g to L o n d o n in the s u m m e r of 1917, S y k e s discovered that p r o - O t t o m a n m e m b e r s of the F o r e i g n Office, in c o m b i n a t i o n with the former A m e r i c a n a m b a s s a d o r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , H e n r y M o r g e n t h a u , h a d a t t e m p t e d in his a b s e n c e to negotiate a s e p a r a t e peace with T u r k e y — a n a t t e m p t a b o r t e d by the p r o m p t opposition of C h a i m W e i z m a n n , a m o n g others. S y k e s wrote to Clayton that "On my arrival I f o u n d that the F o r e i g n Office h a d been carefully destroying everything I h a d d o n e in the past 2 years. S t i m u l a t i n g antiEntente feelings [i.e., a n t i - F r e n c h feelings] a n d p u s h i n g s e p a r a t e negotiations with T u r k e y ideas. I n d e e d I just arrived in the nick of

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time. L u c k i l y Z i o n i s m held g o o d . . . " H e was right a b o u t Z i o n i s m , b u t wrong a b o u t the F o r e i g n Office, which was not a n t i - F r e n c h ; the a n t i - F r e n c h organization was Clayton's A r a b B u r e a u , which S y k e s himself had created. D a v i d H o g a r t h , director of the A r a b B u r e a u , had been in L o n d o n in 1917 just before S y k e s r e t u r n e d ; a n d had lobbied against the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , against a F r e n c h role in the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d in favor of a British protectorate over a H u s s e i n - l e d A r a b confederation. In private G i l b e r t Clayton's views were almost identical to those e x p r e s s e d by the m o r e c a n d i d H o g a r t h , b u t S y k e s was unaware of that. S y k e s wrote to C l a y t o n that " H o g a r t h arrived a n d played hell by writing an a n t i - F r e n c h a n d anti A g r e e m e n t m e m o r a n d u m . P o u r i n g cold water on the A r a b m o v e m e n t a n d g o i n g in for . . . a British M e c c a . " S y k e s gleefully r e p o r t e d : "He got trounced . . . " R e p e a t i n g that " T h e m a i n thing is never to yield to F a s h o d a - i s m F r e n c h or B r i t i s h , " S y k e s a n n o u n c e d that he and Picot (referred to as P) were g o i n g to force both the F r e n c h a n d British g o v e r n m e n t s to be honest with one another and honest with the A r a b s : " . . . there is only one p o s s i b l e policy, the E n t e n t e first and last, a n d the A r a b nation the child of the E n t e n t e . " T h e A r a b s , too, h a d to be taken in hand and m a d e to see that they s h o u l d not try to split the A n g l o F r e n c h E n t e n t e . "Get your E n g l i s h m e n to stand up to the A r a b s on this a n d never let t h e m accept flattery of the 'you very g o o d m a n him very b a d m a n ' kind. I am g o i n g to s l a m into Paris to m a k e the F r e n c h play up to the A r a b c a u s e as their only hope. C o l o n i a l i s m is m a d n e s s a n d I believe P and I can p r o v e it to t h e m . " S y k e s did not s e e m to s u s p e c t that Picot himself r e m a i n e d a colonialist, who saw Britain as his country's rival in the M i d d l e E a s t , nor did he suspect that Clayton h o p e d to keep F r a n c e out of the region altogether. 11

Clayton p r o v e d to be quite unwilling even to work with Picot a n d protested against c a r r y i n g out an a g r e e m e n t — r e a c h e d with the F r e n c h d u r i n g the A s q u i t h government—-whereby a joint A n g l o - F r e n c h a d ministration would be introduced into the territories in the M i d d l e E a s t occupied d u r i n g the war. Picot, acting as the F r e n c h representative at Allenby's h e a d q u a r t e r s , asserted that S i r E d w a r d G r e y had p r o m i s e d it to h i m ; but C l a y t o n wrote to S y k e s that "If this is s o , I have heard nothing of it, a n d I cannot protest too strongly against any s u c h unworkable a n d m i s c h i e v o u s a r r a n g e m e n t . " In any event, General A l l e n b y exercised his authority to p o s t p o n e consideration of s u c h m a t t e r s until the military situation was d e e m e d suitable by him, which, in effect, cancelled that particular agreement for the time being. 12

With respect t o A r a b s , J e w s , a n d A r m e n i a n s , Clayton e x p r e s s e d his views to S y k e s m o r e g u a r d e d l y . In the week following the publication of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n , an exuberant S y k e s sent a cypher

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cable to an unenthusiastic C l a y t o n i n f o r m i n g him that the Zionist m o v e m e n t was p r e p a r e d to work on behalf of A r a b s a n d A r m e n i a n s and that he, S y k e s , was in p r o c e s s of f o r m i n g a joint c o m m i t t e e to unify the three g r o u p s . C h a i m W e i z m a n n would represent the Z i o n i s t s ; J a m e s M a l c o l m , the A r m e n i a n s ; a n d a S y r i a n Christian a n d a n A r a b M o s l e m w o u l d jointly represent the A r a b s . I t was important that m o r e A r a b s s h o u l d join, a d d e d S y k e s , for it would help A r a b s everywhere. 1 3

A few weeks later S y k e s cabled C l a y t o n again, r e p o r t i n g that he had prevailed on the Zionist leadership to a d o p t a s t r o n g p r o - A r a b l i n e . He asked Clayton to tell the S y r i a n A r a b g r o u p s in C a i r o that if the T u r k s a n d G e r m a n s c a p t u r e d Zionist s u p p o r t , it would be b a d for t h e m as well as everyone else whose h o p e s rode with the Allies. He thus implied that the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n was i s s u e d in the A r a b as well as in the British interest. Shortly after cabling C l a y t o n , S y k e s sent a m e s s a g e to Picot, telling him that A r a b interests were b e i n g a m p l y s a f e g u a r d e d a n d that J e w s i n Palestine would pay s c r u p u l o u s attention to A r a b r i g h t s . S y k e s also sent a letter to C l a y t o n telling him that the Zionist a n d A r m e n i a n leaders were in c o m p l e t e a c c o r d and that it was important that A r a b leaders s h o u l d also join "the combine." 14

1 5

16

P o u r i n g cold water, Clayton in reply cabled that "in spite of all a r g u m e n t s M e c c a dislikes J e w s a n d A r m e n i a n s and wishes t o have nothing to do with t h e m , while A r a b s of S y r i a and Palestine fear repetition of the story of J a c o b a n d E s a u . In any case an A r a b - J e w i s h A r m e n i a n c o m b i n a t i o n is so foreign to any p r e v i o u s experience and to existing sentiment that we m u s t p r o c e e d with great c a u t i o n . " He a d d e d that it w o u l d not be feasible to s e n d an A r a b delegation to L o n d o n to join the c o m m i t t e e , as S y k e s had a s k e d , b e c a u s e the A r a b s were too d i v i d e d . A few d a y s later he wrote to S y k e s in a m o r e conciliatory vein that "I quite see your a r g u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g an A r a b - J e w - A r m e n i a n c o m bine a n d the a d v a n t a g e s that would a c c r u e if it could be b r o u g h t off. We will try it, b u t it m u s t be d o n e very cautiously a n d , honestly, I see no great chance of any real s u c c e s s . It is an a t t e m p t to c h a n g e in a few weeks the traditional sentiment of centuries." C a u t i o n i n g especially against the J e w i s h aspect of the c o m b i n e , he a d d e d that "We have . . . to consider whether the situation d e m a n d s out a n d out s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m at the risk of alienating the A r a b s at a critical moment." 17

18

T h e next day Clayton's closest associate, the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t , S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate, wrote to Allenby that " M a r k S y k e s is a bit carried away with 'the e x u b e r a n c e of his own verbosity' in regard to Z i o n i s m a n d unless he goes a bit slower he m a y quite unintentionally u p s e t the a p p l e c a r t . However C l a y t o n has written h i m an excellent letter which, I h o p e , m a y have an a n o d y n e e f f e c t . " 19

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Nonetheless Clayton held a m e e t i n g with S y r i a n representatives in C a i r o , as S y k e s had a s k e d , a n d a p p e a r s to have told t h e m , as he had been instructed, that only if J e w i s h s u p p o r t for the Allied side were forthcoming would the A r a b c a u s e , which was b o u n d up with that of the Allies, s t a n d a chance of winning. He told them that J e w s desired a h o m e in Palestine but had no intention of creating a J e w i s h state there. 2 0

T h e S y r i a n A r a b s r e s p o n d e d favorably, a n d a n A r a b B u r e a u report to C l a y t o n q u o t e d a s p o k e s m a n for the S y r i a n c o m m i t t e e as s a y i n g that its m e m b e r s "fully realized that their best and only policy was to co-operate with the J e w s on the lines you s u g g e s t e d . He a s s u r e d me that the S y r i a n s quite u n d e r s t a n d the power and position of the J e w s and that they now wish to d i s s e m i n a t e p r o p a g a n d a to e m p h a s i z e S y r i a n - J e w i s h fraternity a n d unity as r e g a r d s P a l e s t i n e . " 21

Clayton reported to S y k e s that he believed J e w s a n d A r a b s were in fact c o m i n g together. H e also r e p o r t e d that h e h a d instructed T . E . L a w r e n c e , the British liaison officer with Feisal, to i m p r e s s u p o n Feisal his need to form an entente with the J e w s . In a d m i n i s t e r i n g the liberated a r e a s of Palestine, however, British officials m a d e no a t t e m p t to take a d v a n t a g e of this favorable d i s p o sition. A l t h o u g h the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n was p u b l i s h e d in L o n d o n a m o n t h before Allenby entered J e r u s a l e m , the British military authorities refused to p u b l i s h it in J e r u s a l e m . T h u s it did not enter into the policy of the provisional military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n established by Allenby under R o n a l d S t o r r s , who declined to raise potentially d i s t u r b i n g issues while the war was b e i n g fought. C a i r o Intelligence told the F o r e i g n Office that applications by J e w s to proceed to settle in Palestine s h o u l d be denied until the military situation was resolved a n d until an organization h a d been created to deal with the various p r o b l e m s that might b e expected t o a r i s e . 2 2

2 3

T h e r e was an evident tendency on the part of military a d m i n i s tration officials to believe that officials at h o m e in L o n d o n d i d not appreciate the very real difficulty of reconciling M o s l e m s in Palestine to the p r o s p e c t of an increase in J e w i s h settlement in the country. T h e y therefore g a v e the i m p r e s s i o n of b e i n g unwilling to carry the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n into effect. S o m e observers noted, too, a tendency to prefer M o s l e m s , who were treated as "natives," to C h r i s t i a n s and J e w s , w h o m it was m o r e difficult to treat as s u c h . William O r m s b y - G o r e , one of the three assistant secretaries of the War C a b i net, wrote to his colleague M a r k S y k e s from T e l Aviv in the s u m m e r of 1918 that the military occupation officers, drawn from service in E g y p t a n d the S u d a n , were p e r s o n s "whose experience . . . d o e s not m a k e for a r e a d y realisation of the very wide questions of world policy which affect Palestine. O n e can't help noticing the ineradicable tendency of the E n g l i s h m a n w h o has lived in India or the S u d a n to

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favour quite unconsciously the M o s l e m both against C h r i s t i a n a n d J e w . " He a d d e d that " T h e A r a b s in Palestine are, I gather, showing their old tendency to c o r r u p t m e t h o d s a n d b a c k s h e e s h a n d are end e a v o u r i n g to 'steal a m a r c h ' on the J e w s . " Clayton forwarded the O r s m b y - G o r e letter to S y k e s with a covering letter of his own, s a y i n g that he felt it was somewhat m i s l e a d i n g . Clayton protested that he personally was in favor of Z i o n i s m . A p p a r e n t l y he h a d c o m e a r o u n d to the view that an agreement between A r a b s and J e w s c o u l d b e w o r k e d out. H e held n o high opinion of the local A r a b s a n d he wrote to G e r t r u d e Bell, the author and traveler in the E a s t who was serving in the British administration in B a g h d a d , that the "so-called A r a b s of Palestine are not to be c o m p a r e d with the real A r a b of the D e s e r t or even of other civilised districts i n S y r i a a n d M e s o p o t a m i a . " 2 4

2 5

26

R o n a l d S t o r r s , who was a p p o i n t e d military governor of J e r u s a l e m , wrote to S y k e s in the s u m m e r of 1918 that non-Jewish elements in the population, having eventually to take "a lower place in the land which the others are in the e n d absolutely certain to p o s s e s s , the transaction s h o u l d be effected so far as p o s s i b l e with decency, gentleness, a n d tact, a n d that the o u t g o i n g g a r r i s o n s h o u l d be allowed something of the h o n o u r s of W a r . " U r g i n g a policy of g o i n g slowly, he wrote that "It will take m o n t h s , p o s s i b l y y e a r s , of patient work to show the J e w s that we are not run by the A r a b s , a n d the A r a b s that we are not b o u g h t by the J e w s . " 2 7

In the s a m e letter, S t o r r s wrote that "it is one thing to see clearly enough the p r o b a b l e future of this country, a n d another thing to fail to m a k e allowances for the position of the weaker a n d p r o b a b l y d i s a p p e a r i n g element. T h e results of the c h a n g e s will be m o r e satisfactory a n d m o r e lasting if they are b r o u g h t a b o u t g r a d u a l l y with patience, a n d without violent e x p r e s s i o n s of illwill, leaving b e h i n d them an abiding r a n c o u r . " 28

T h e q u e s t i o n this raised for S y k e s a n d his colleagues in L o n d o n was whether this policy advocated by the m a n on the s p o t was better calculated to achieve, or to defeat, their objectives.

IV In early 1918 S y k e s a n d his colleagues at the F o r e i g n Office took s t e p s to carry their Palestine policy into effect. On 13 F e b r u a r y the F o r e i g n Office d i s p a t c h e d a cable to S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate at the R e s i d e n c y in C a i r o to inform him that a Zionist C o m m i s s i o n h a d been created a n d was b e i n g sent out to the M i d d l e E a s t . C o m p o s e d of representatives from British a n d other Zionist m o v e m e n t s , it was headed by Dr C h a i m Weizmann a n d was to be p l a c e d in the c h a r g e

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of William O r m s b y - G o r e . Its object w a s to p r e p a r e the way to carry out the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n . I n a u g u r a t i n g the work of the Zionist C o m m i s s i o n , A l a n D a w n a y , of Allenby's staff, a r r a n g e d for W e i z m a n n to meet Prince Feisal, a n d wrote to L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l P. C. J o y c e , the senior British officer with F e i s a l , that " F r o m what I gathered of the Zionist a i m s , in rather a short conversation, I think there should be no difficulty in establishing a friendly relationship between t h e m . " W e i z m a n n was introduced to Prince Feisal and was enthusiastic a b o u t h i m . Of F e i s a l , W e i z m a n n wrote to his wife that "He is the first real A r a b nationalist I have met. He is a leader! He's q u i t e intelligent and a very honest m a n , h a n d s o m e as a p i c t u r e ! He is not interested in Palestine, but on the other hand he wants D a m a s c u s a n d the whole of northern S y r i a . . . He is c o n t e m p t u o u s of the Palestinian A r a b s w h o m h e doesn't even regard a s A r a b s ! " 29

30

3 1

T h i s was in line with what O r m s b y - G o r e told a Zionist m e e t i n g in L o n d o n s o m e m o n t h s later. A c c o r d i n g to a s u m m a r y of his speech, he told the Zionist Political C o m m i t t e e that the true A r a b m o v e m e n t really existed outside Palestine. T h e m o v e m e n t led by Prince Feisal w a s not unlike the Zionist m o v e m e n t . It contained real A r a b s who were real m e n . T h e A r a b s in t r a n s - J o r d a n i a were fine p e o p l e . T h e west of the J o r d a n the people were not A r a b s , but only A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g . Zionists should recognise in the A r a b m o v e m e n t , originally centered in the H e j a z , b u t now m o v i n g north, a fellow m o v e ment with high i d e a l s . 3 2

Feisal's senior British military adviser, L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l J o y c e , attended the W e i z m a n n - F e i s a l meeting a n d reported his personal opinion that Feisal w e l c o m e d the p r o s p e c t of J e w i s h cooperation a n d in fact r e g a r d e d it as essential to the realization of A r a b a m b i t i o n s . T h o u g h Feisal w a s u n a b l e to e x p r e s s definite views without receiving authorization from his father, a c c o r d i n g to J o y c e , he would accept a J e w i s h Palestine if d o i n g so would influence the Allies to s u p p o r t his claim to S y r i a . T h e m e e t i n g went well, and p a v e d the way for the p u b l i c s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m offered by Feisal at the Peace Conference the following year. 3 3

In J e r u s a l e m , W e i z m a n n found his M o s l e m audiences less receptive, t h o u g h he a s s u r e d them that Palestine was large e n o u g h to a c c o m m o d a t e all its c o m m u n i t i e s a n d that J e w i s h settlement would not be undertaken at the e x p e n s e of M o s l e m s or C h r i s t i a n s . He w a s

* T h i s may have been the first indication that high-ranking British officials were thinking of restricting Zionism to those sections of Biblical Palestine that lay west of the Jordan river.

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disquieted by the attitude of British administrative officials in Palestine: when W e i z m a n n u r g e d t h e m to avow their government's Balfour Declaration policy openly a n d to explain it to the M o s l e m c o m m u n i t y , R o n a l d S t o r r s a n d his colleagues refused. In his c o m m e n t s to the F o r e i g n Office, S t o r r s took issue with Weizmann's contention that it was the b u s i n e s s of the military a d ministration to b r i n g h o m e to the M o s l e m population the s e r i o u s n e s s of Britain's pro-Zionist intentions. T h a t h a d already been d o n e , he s a i d , by B a l f o u r in L o n d o n a n d by the world's n e w s p a p e r s . What was needed was for the Zionist C o m m i s s i o n to i m a g i n e itself in the position of n o n - J e w i s h inhabitants of the country a n d to recognize how very m u c h r e a s s u r a n c e they w o u l d need. "Palestine, up to now a M o s l e m country, has fallen into the h a n d s of a Christian Power which on the eve of its c o n q u e s t a n n o u n c e s that a considerable portion of its land is to be h a n d e d over for colonisation p u r p o s e s to a nowhere very p o p u l a r p e o p l e . " It w a s not lost on the u r b a n e R o n a l d S t o r r s that he was g o v e r n o r of J e r u s a l e m in line of succession from Pontius Pilate; a n d as s u c h he w a s h e d his h a n d s of an issue for which he did not hold himself r e s p o n s i b l e . He insisted to the F o r e i g n Office, however, that he s p o k e "as a convinced Z i o n i s t . " 34

G i l b e r t C l a y t o n also advocated delay. H i s strategy, of which he g a v e an indication in early 1918, was not merely to p o s t p o n e the Zionist issue b u t to link it to the issue of an A r a b S y r i a , as Feisal also p r o p o s e d t o d o . T o the strongly pro-Zionist L e o A m e r y , C l a y t o n explained that "the two m o s t i m p o r t a n t points are not to m a k e too m u c h of a s p l a s h locally with Z i o n i s m until the A r a b s have got a slice of cake themselves, i.e., D a m a s c u s , a n d to get the F r e n c h to c o m e out clearly . . . d i s a v o w i n g any ideas of Colonial annexation a n d e m p h a s i z i n g their adherence to the idea of A r a b a u t o n o m y . " 35

Neither Clayton nor S t o r r s a d d r e s s e d the question of whether, if they refused to a d m i t in J e r u s a l e m that their g o v e r n m e n t h a d issued the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n in L o n d o n , A r a b s a n d J e w s in Palestine w o u l d ever learn to trust the British any m o r e than M o s l e m s in S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n trusted the F r e n c h . As it was, the Zionist leaders were given c a u s e to worry that the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n policy p r o c l a i m e d in L o n d o n might be u n d e r m i n e d in Palestine by C l a y t o n , S t o r r s , and other officers on the s p o t .

V In B a g h d a d a n d B a s r a , not m u c h m o r e than lip service w a s p a i d to the p r o - A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e policies p r o c l a i m e d by S y k e s a n d the F o r e i g n Office. S i r Percy C o x was obliged to leave on a lengthy tour a n d eventually to return to Persia; in his a b s e n c e , his d e p u t y , C a p t a i n

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A r n o l d T. Wilson, acted in his place a n d then s u c c e e d e d him as civil c o m m i s s i o n e r . Wilson, an officer in the Indian A r m y , believed neither in independence for the provinces he governed nor in a role for K i n g H u s s e i n of the far-off H e j a z in their affairs. T h e m o s t f a m o u s author of b o o k s a b o u t A r a b lands of her day, G e r t r u d e Bell, had c o m e up to B a g h d a d with the A r m y of the T i g r i s and served as Wilson's assistant. S h e at first employed her great prestige a n d extensive network of family a n d social friendships to back up his policy. N o t m u c h of a political thinker, she was given to e n t h u s i a s m s a n d , at the time, w a s enthusiastic a b o u t Wilson's views. In F e b r u a r y 1918 she wrote to her old friend C h a r l e s H a r d i n g e , P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of the F o r e i g n Office, that "amazing strides have been m a d e t o w a r d s o r d e r e d government . . . T h e r e ' s n o important element against u s . . . T h e stronger the hold w e are able to keep here the better the inhabitants will be pleased. What they d r e a d is any half m e a s u r e . . . " S h e c o n c l u d e d that no one in B a g h d a d or B a s r a could conceive of an independent A r a b g o v e r n m e n t . 36

T h i s was a far cry from the proclamation drafted by S i r M a r k S y k e s on the liberation of B a g h d a d , calling for a renaissance of the A r a b nation, such as was p r o p o s e d by the E m i r of M e c c a in the H u s s e i n - M c M a h o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , a n d hinting that H u s s e i n would b e c o m e the leader of the A r a b nation. Elsewhere, too, Sykes's alliance politics were modified as British officials m o v e d away f r o m their wartime enthusiasm for the ruler of M e c c a . While S y k e s continued to c h a m p i o n Hussein's c a u s e , British officials noted the deterioration of the K i n g ' s position vis-d-vis his rival, A b d u l Aziz I b n S a u d , lord of the Arabian district of N e j d , w h o m I n d i a had backed all along. S y k e s had received a hint of this deterioration when he visited the H e j a z in the s p r i n g of 1917; H u s s e i n had been surprisingly conciliatory in agreeing to cooperate with Britain in M e s o p o t a m i a a n d even with F r a n c e in S y r i a , a d d i n g "but we do ask that G r e a t Britain will help us with I b n S a u d . " * 3 7

One of the great failures of Kitchener and his colleagues in the intelligence field had been their ignorance of the spectacular revival of the puritanical Wahhabi sect in Arabia which had begun under the sponsorship of Ibn Saud, and, in late 1912, gave birth to a warrior brotherhood: the fierce Ikhwan. Minutes of a Cabinet War Committee meeting on 16 December 1915, to hear testimony from Sir Mark Sykes on the Arab question, show Lord Kitchener asking, "Wahabism, does that still exist?" and Sykes answering, "I think it is a dying fire." T w o years later—and a full five years after the Wahhabi warrior brotherhood began to form—Gilbert Clayton for the first time reported to Sykes that "we have indications of considerable revivalist movement on Wahhabi lines in Central Arabia, such as has in the past occurred when the prestige of Islam has fallen low. We are not yet in a position to appreciate the strength of this movement," but conditions "conduce to fostering it. This question is engaging our serious attention here . . . it may modify the whole situation considerably. 38

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I n J a n u a r y 1918 K i n g H u s s e i n told a n A r a b B u r e a u officer, M a j o r K i n a h a n C o r n w a l l i s , that he w a s thinking of p r o c l a i m i n g himself C a l i p h . T h r e e years earlier this h a d b e e n L o r d K i t c h e n e r ' s plan, p r o m p t e d b y m e m o r a n d a f r o m C l a y t o n and S t o r r s , a n d had b e e n c h a m p i o n e d by the officers who later f o r m e d the A r a b B u r e a u (see Chapter 22). B y J a n u a r y 1918, however, the A r a b B u r e a u , which now held H u s s e i n in low e s t e e m , had c o m e a r o u n d to the o p p o s i t e view. Cornwallis, a t t e m p t i n g to d i s c o u r a g e H u s s e i n , pointed out to him that serious p r o b l e m s would arise if he a t t e m p t e d to a s s u m e the caliphate. On receipt of Cornwallis's news, the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate, sent off a d i s p a t c h to the F o r e i g n Office saying that he h o p e d for an o p p o r t u n i t y of "checking p r e m a t u r e or ill-considered action" b y H u s s e i n . T h i s was the s a m e G e n e r a l Wingate who on 17 N o v e m b e r 1915 h a d i n d u c e d an A r a b religious leader to tell H u s s e i n that he w a s "the right m a n to take over his rightful heritage a n d verify the h o p e s of his people—the M o h a m m e d a n s and A r a b s to recover their stolen K h a l i f a t e " and calling u p o n the H a s h e m i t e leader to establish "the H a s h e m i t e Arabian Khalifate." 4 0

41

K i t c h e n e r ' s followers found it inconvenient to r e m e m b e r that once they a n d their chief had e n c o u r a g e d H u s s e i n to claim the c a l i p h a t e ; erasing it from their m i n d s , they w o u l d later ignore it in their b o o k s and edit it out of official d o c u m e n t s . In m e m o i r s p u b l i s h e d three d e c a d e s later, S i r R o n a l d S t o r r s deleted the caliphate section from K i t c h e n e r ' s historic c a b l e i n 1914 t o H u s s e i n . T . E . L a w r e n c e wrote that K i t c h e n e r a n d his followers h a d believed in A r a b nationalism from the b e g i n n i n g — w h e n in fact they did not believe in it at all. T h e y believed instead in the potency of the caliphate; that H u s s e i n could c a p t u r e it for t h e m ; a n d that in the E a s t nationalism was nothing while religion w a s everything.* I n d e e d , in 1918 politics a n d the desire to rewrite history both dictated a shift in e m p h a s i s : F e i s a l , not H u s s e i n , b e g a n to e m e r g e as Cairo's preferred A r a b leader, for F e i s a l s h o w e d a disposition, lacking in his father, to accept British counsel a n d g u i d a n c e . By the a u t u m n of 1918, the a r m i e s c o m m a n d e d by H u s s e i n ' s sons were reckoned by British s o u r c e s to total only a few t h o u s a n d trained troops. In p u b l i c the British c l a i m e d that vast n u m b e r s of A r a b s h a d flocked to the s t a n d a r d of the Hejazi p r i n c e s ; in private they h a d a

If their purpose had been to raise a nationalist revolt, they would not have sought out Hussein, the Turkish-appointed guardian of the Holy Places, who employed Turkish troops to quell Arab discontent. They would have sought out a nationalist warlord. That indeed is the way Lawrence later told the story in his book Seven Pillars of Wisdom, portraying Feisal, rather than his father, as such a leader.

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different story to tell. Secret British g o v e r n m e n t d o c u m e n t s filed in 1919 a d m i t that " T h e followings q u o t e d d u r i n g the war were grossly e x a g g e r a t e d . " A report f r o m the British A g e n c y in J e d d a h in 1919 pictured K i n g H u s s e i n as militarily inconsequential: his following was estimated at only 1,000 regulars, 2 , 5 0 0 irregulars, a n d possibly several t h o u s a n d m o r e f r o m B e d o u i n tribes, a n d their fighting qualities were rated as "poor." A c c o r d i n g to the report, K i n g H u s s e i n "indulged in wild d r e a m s of c o n q u e s t , " but the withdrawal of British s u p p o r t would leave h i m "at the mercy of I b n S a u d a n d the rising wave of W A H H A B I S M . " 42

43

An A r a b B u r e a u report on the H e j a z revolt in 1918 stated that " T h e real i m p o r t a n c e of this revolt has only m a d e itself felt in the c o u r s e of the last few m o n t h s a n d it is s p r e a d i n g from d a y to d a y . At the s a m e time it m u s t be said that 9 0 % of the Sherif's t r o o p s are nothing m o r e than r o b b e r s . . . " A c c o r d i n g t o the report, A r a b s rose up against the T u r k s only when British forces had already arrived, so that "In a w o r d , the extent of the Sherif's revolt d e p e n d s entirely on the ability of the British to a d v a n c e . " Colonel Meinertzhagen, the head of Allenby's intelligence, wrote that "It is safe to say that L a w r e n c e ' s D e s e r t C a m p a i g n h a d not the slightest effect on the main theatre west of J o r d a n . " 44

4 5

B u t others d i s a g r e e d . S y k e s , continuing to stand by the alliance with H u s s e i n a n d believing that F e i s a l a n d his brothers were m a k i n g a significant contribution to the war effort, a r g u e d that in A r a b i a a n d elsewhere, by 1918 the H e j a z revolt was o c c u p y i n g the attention of 3 8 , 0 0 0 O t t o m a n t r o o p s . T h e m e m o i r s o f the enemy c o m m a n d e r , L i m a n von S a n d e r s , show that in 1918 when his a r m i e s turned to f l e e , they found themselves painfully h a r a s s e d b y A r a b B e d o u i n s . T h e tone of G i l b e r t Clayton's m e m o r a n d a show that he believed Feisal and L a w r e n c e were a c c o m p l i s h i n g important objectives on Allenby's right flank. Other evidence, too, s u g g e s t s that the A r a b forces in T r a n s j o r d a n s u c c e e d e d in s p r e a d i n g disorder in T u r k i s h held areas. 4 6

4 7

M i r e d in politics then a n d ever since, the question of how m u c h Feisal contributed to the Allied s u c c e s s remains u n r e s o l v e d ; at the time it raised the q u e s t i o n of whether Britain should back H u s s e i n and Feisal against i n d i g e n o u s S y r i a n A r a b leadership, a n d whether Britain should s u p p o r t F e i s a l against H u s s e i n . Within the Sherifian c a m p there were strains, as F e i s a l , physically cut off f r o m the H e j a z a n d his family, m o v e d into the British orbit. In cables that the British military authorities secretly intercepted and read, H u s s e i n c o m p l a i n e d that "they have turned my son against me to live u n d e r other countries, who is rebellions & dishonest to his F a t h e r [original e m p h a s i s ] . " H e c o m p l a i n e d that " L i v i n g u n d e r the 4 8

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o r d e r s of a disobedient son a n d a traitor has b u r d e n e d my shoulder with this m i s e r y . " He threatened that "If F e i s a l still persists in destroying his g o o d fortune his nation a n d his honour" it would be necessary to a p p o i n t a war council in his p l a c e . M e a n w h i l e , a c c o r d ing t o A r a b B u r e a u r e p o r t s f r o m C a i r o , S y r i a n s p o k e s m e n indicated that they w o u l d be willing to accept F e i s a l as their constitutional m o n a r c h , b u t only in his own right, a n d not if he acted as d e p u t y or representative o f H u s s e i n . 4 9

5 0

VI A l t h o u g h British leaders f r o m 1914 o n w a r d h a d p r o f e s s e d faith in the leadership of H u s s e i n within the A r a b world, in 1917 a n d 1918 they felt driven to reassess the validity of that belief. As Britain m o v e d to c o m p l e t e her c o n q u e s t of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world of the M i d d l e E a s t , British officials b e g a n to worry a b o u t the local o p p o s i t i o n that they might encounter. Clayton's e n d e a v o r s , beginning in 1914, to arrive at an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with separatist leaders from B a g h d a d and D a m a s c u s h a d f o u n d e r e d on their objection to being ruled by n o n - M o s l e m s . N o w that D a m a s c u s was on Britain's line of m a r c h the q u e s t i o n was how D a m a s c e n e s could be w o n over to the Allied c a u s e a n d to the Allied s c h e m e for the future of the M i d d l e E a s t . T h a t F e i s a l had a g r e e d t o the Allied p r o g r a m might carry no weight with t h e m . In the s u m m e r of 1918 William O r m s b y - G o r e told the Zionist Political C o m m i t t e e in L o n d o n that " T h e S y r i a n 'Intelligentzia' lawyers a n d t r a d e r s constituted the m o s t difficult a n d thorny p r o b l e m of the N e a r E a s t . T h e y h a d no civilisation of their own, a n d they had a b s o r b e d all the vices of the L e v a n t . " 5 1

Sir M a r k S y k e s s e e m s to have started worrying a b o u t the S y r i a n p r o b l e m the year before in the context of p l e d g e s he intended Britain to keep to her a l l i e s — a n d her allies to keep to her. H i s concern was that S y r i a n s might not accept the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t and the terms outlined by S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n to the Sherif H u s s e i n . In 1917 he asked the A r a b B u r e a u to set up a meeting for h i m with Syrian A r a b s leaders in C a i r o , apparently in order to arrive at an agreement with t h e m that would be consistent with the secret a c c o r d s with F r a n c e a n d with the H e j a z — a c c o r d s whose existence, however, he could not reveal to t h e m . He c l a i m e d he h a d s u c c e e d e d ; in his own hand he noted that " T h e main difficulty was to m a n o e u v r e the delegates into a s k i n g for what we were p r e p a r e d to give them, without letting t h e m know that any precise geographical a g r e e m e n t h a d been c om e t o . " T h e "precise geographical agreement" m u s t have 5 2

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meant the D a m a s c u s - H o m s - H a m a - A l e p p o line that was to be the westward frontier of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e in S y r i a u n d e r the agreement with a l - F a r u q i in 1915 a n d with F r a n c e in 1916. B u t reports arrived f r o m various q u a r t e r s that the O t t o m a n government m i g h t b e p l a n n i n g t o p r e - e m p t A r a b nationalism b y g r a n t i n g a u t o n o m y to S y r i a immediately. T h a t w o u l d leave Britain in the awkward position of s p o n s o r i n g the c l a i m s of K i n g H u s s e i n as against an indigenous A r a b i c leadership in D a m a s c u s that threatened to be far m o r e p o p u l a r in the S y r i a n p r o v i n c e s . T o w a r d the end of 1917 S y k e s cabled C l a y t o n : "I am anxious a b o u t A r a b m o v e m e n t . L e t t e r s indicate difficulty of c o m b i n i n g M e c c a n Patriarchalism with S y r i a n U r b a n intelligensia." Q u ic k as always to invent a new expedient, S y k e s p r o p o s e d to create an A r a b executive c o m m i t t e e to p r o m o t e unity. Clayton m u s t have said it could not be d o n e , for S y k e s r e s p o n d e d : "Agree as to difficulty but military s u c c e s s s h o u l d m a k e this easier." S y k e s said that Picot s h o u l d be p e r s u a d e d to r e a s s u r e the S y r i a n s that F r a n c e w a s in favor of their eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e s a m e a r g u m e n t s were to be u s e d on Picot on behalf of the A r a b s that h a d been u s e d on him on behalf of Z i o n i s m : that it was better to give up s o m e t h i n g in the far-off M i d d l e E a s t than to risk losing the war, a n d with it a chance to regain A l s a c e a n d L o r r a i n e — p r o v i n c e s closer t o h o m e . 5 3

S y k e s was a r g u i n g that Britain c o u l d honor all p l e d g e s , a n d acc o m m o d a t e the S y r i a n s as well, if only reasonable concessions were m a d e all a r o u n d . C l a y t o n , as always, pictured Britain's wartime c o m m i t m e n t s as e m b a r r a s s m e n t s to be shed, a n d replied to S y k e s that " T h e r e is no d o u b t a very real fear a m o n g s t S y r i a n s of finding themselves u n d e r a G o v e r n m e n t in which patriarchalism of M e c c a is p r e d o m i n a n t . T h e y realize that reactionary principles f r o m which Sherif of M e c c a cannot break loose are incompatible with p r o g r e s s on m o d e r n lines." P r o p o s i n g to m o v e away from the alliance with H u s s e i n , he said that Feisal as an individual might be a c c e p t a b l e as head of a S y r i a n confederation, but only with a spiritual, not a political, role for his father. No s u c h plan, however, a n d no c o m mittee or a n n o u n c e m e n t or p r o p a g a n d a would be of any effect, Clayton continued, if the b a s i c p r o b l e m were not a d d r e s s e d . A n d that p r o b l e m , he hinted ( t h o u g h he did not put it in these w o r d s ) , was p o s e d by the p l e d g e s S y k e s h a d m a d e to the F r e n c h a n d to the Zionists. As against the p r o b a b l e T u r k i s h maneuver of setting up an a u t o n o m o u s S y r i a n g o v e r n m e n t , nothing would be of any avail, he a r g u e d , b e c a u s e of the general fear in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g world that Britain planned to turn S y r i a over to F r a n c e . T h i s was c o m p o u n d e d , he claimed, by the p u b l i c p l e d g e just m a d e to Z i o n i s m . T h e only solution was to obtain from F r a n c e a clear public a n n o u n c e m e n t denying that she intended to annex any part of S y r i a . 5 4

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A n o t h e r a p p r o a c h was u r g e d by O s m o n d Walrond, a former m e m ber of L o r d Milner's staff who knew E g y p t f r o m before the war a n d who h a d c o m e out to serve in the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o . As Walrond saw it, Britain was neglecting the A r a b secret societies, a n d a c c o r d ingly he set out to cultivate their s u p p o r t . W a l r o n d wrote to Clayton in the s u m m e r of 1918 to d e s c r i b e his conversations with m e m b e r s of these societies. He said that he h a d asked t h e m to elect a small c o m m i t t e e to represent t h e m so that he could deal with t h e m . T h e y had elected a c o m m i t t e e of seven m e m b e r s . A p p a r e n t l y Walrond's intention was to repeat Sykes's m a n e u v e r of the year before with another g r o u p of C a i r o A r a b s s u s p i c i o u s of H u s s e i n : a r r a n g e for t h e m to accept a statement of Britain's plans for the M i d d l e E a s t so that they, like H u s s e i n , w o u l d be tied into acceptance of those plans. 5 5

In m i d - 1 9 1 8 S i r M a r k S y k e s accordingly a d d r e s s e d a declaration of British intentions to Walrond's c o m m i t t e e of seven S y r i a n s in answer to q u e s t i o n s ostensibly raised by t h e m . It was an official declaration, a p p r o v e d by Sykes's s u p e r i o r s at the F o r e i g n Office, but did not break new g r o u n d . L i k e so m u c h that c a m e from the pen of Sir M a r k S y k e s , it restated the s a m e intentions for the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t b u t in different w o r d s . O u t s i d e the A r a b i a n peninsula, the A r a b world was to fall u n d e r v a r y i n g degrees of E u r o p e a n influence or control. In effect, Sykes's D e c l a r a t i o n to the S e v e n — l a t e r to be a subject of m u c h c o n t r o v e r s y — r e c o g n i z e d c o m p l e t e A r a b indep e n d e n c e only within the A r a b i a n peninsula, for it offered s u c h recognition only to areas that h a d been independent before the war or that h a d been liberated by the A r a b s by themselves as of the date of the declaration. S y k e s could go no further in a s s u a g i n g A r a b s u s p i c i o n s of F r e n c h intentions in S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n without securing F r a n c e ' s cooperation in i s s u i n g a joint p l e d g e . In the a u t u m n of 1918 the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t was finally p e r s u a d e d to join the British F o r e i g n Office in issuing a new statement of Allied intentions designed to allay A r a b f e a r s — a n d A m e r i c a n s u s p i c i o n s . T h e A n g l o - F r e n c h declaration o f 8 N o v e m b e r 1918 was b r o a d l y p h r a s e d to s u g g e s t full s u p p o r t for the creation of i n d i g e n o u s g o v e r n m e n t s in the M i d d l e E a s t ; b u t it was designed to m i s l e a d , for, on F r e n c h insistence, it did not refer specifically to A r a b " i n d e p e n d e n c e . " F r e n c h officials s e e m e d as unlikely as their British c o u n t e r p a r t s to follow the idealistic p a t h that S i r M a r k S y k e s — w i t h an eye t o w a r d a c c o m m o d a t i n g the views of Wilson a n d the A m e r i c a n s — h a d m a r k e d out for t h e m . 56

37 T H E B A T T L E FOR SYRIA i As the s u m m e r of 1918 drew to a close, S i r E d m u n d Allenby g a v e the order to a d v a n c e on S y r i a , a n d foresaw that L i m a n von S a n d e r s would expect him to repeat the strategy he had e m p l o y e d in southern Palestine. In the J e r u s a l e m c a m p a i g n , Allenby had feinted at the coast but lunged eastward to deliver his attack in the interior. In attacking northern Palestine, he therefore did exactly the reverse: he feinted inland, while launching his m a i n attack along the coast. H i s p u r p o s e was to achieve o v e r w h e l m i n g local numerical superiority along the coast so as to break t h r o u g h the T u r k i s h lines at the m o s t favorable point for his A u s t r a l i a n a n d N e w Z e a l a n d ( A N Z A C ) cavalry. A l t h o u g h he held an overall two-to-one a d v a n t a g e in effectives ( 6 9 , 0 0 0 against 3 6 , 0 0 0 , a c c o r d i n g to his e s t i m a t e s ) , he boldly left m u c h of his roughly 65-mile-long line undefended in order to concentrate the m a x i m u m n u m b e r of t r o o p s on the coast; he relied on control of the air a n d on brilliantly effective intelligence o p e r a t i o n s to keep the e n e m y away from the g a p s in his own defensive line. By night the bulk of Allenby's forces silently m o v e d west to concentrate in the olive a n d citrus g r o v e s of the lightly defended coastal plain, where they were c a m o u f l a g e d and remained undetected. By day small units m a r c h e d east, a n d then returned to m a r c h east over a n d over again, raising great c l o u d s of d u s t which p e r s u a d e d the T u r k s that a vast a r m y was on the m a r c h to attack inland. In the east, too, small British units threw up what a p p e a r e d to be large c a m p s , stabled with what a p p e a r e d to be horses. E a s t of the J o r d a n , British agents allowed it to be discovered that they were b a r g a i n i n g for large quantities of forage. D e c e i v e d , L i m a n von S a n d e r s concentrated his forces inland in eastern Palestine, a n d when the attack c a m e his a r m i e s were caught off balance. So effective was Allenby's offensive that it was not until days after it had b e g u n that the O t t o m a n c o m m a n d e r s c a m e to appreciate the real situation. 332

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At 4:30 in the m o r n i n g of 19 S e p t e m b e r 1918 nearly 400 British cannon s u d d e n l y o p e n e d f i r e o n the s u r p r i s e d a n d o u t n u m b e r e d ( 4 5 , 0 0 0 against 8,000) O t t o m a n d e f e n d e r s of the coastal plain. Fifteen m i n u t e s later the infantry attack c o m m e n c e d . British, F r e n c h , and I n d i a n t r o o p s p u s h e d the o v e r w h e l m e d d e f e n d e r s a s i d e , as the cavalry p o u r e d through the g a p i n g hole in the O t t o m a n lines to win the battle of M e g i d d o — t h e " A r m a g e d d o n " of the B i b l e . At d a w n , special b o m b e r s q u a d r o n s of the R o y a l Air F o r c e attacked telephone a n d telegraph e x c h a n g e s b e h i n d e n e m y lines, effectively cutting off all c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . Other R . A . F . w a r p l a n e s g u a r d e d the skies over e n e m y a i r p o r t s , keeping G e r m a n reconnaissance planes on the g r o u n d . L i m a n a n d his field c o m m a n d e r s were cut off from information a n d f r o m one another. As O t t o m a n units reeled b a c k w a r d , they found their lines of retreat blocked by British units which had raced before a n d behind t h e m t o s e c u r e control o f the key r o a d s . T h e A N Z A C cavalry galloped northward for thirty miles along the coastal plain, b u t then cut inland, threatening to cut off the O t t o m a n line of retreat toward D a m a s c u s . British military aircraft b o m b e d and strafed the retreating T u r k s . M e a n w h i l e the few units Allenby had d e p l o y e d in the east finally attacked inland. In the p r e d a w n d a r k n e s s of 23 S e p t e m b e r battalions of the J e w i s h L e g i o n seized control of the crucial U m m esh S h e r t ford across the J o r d a n river. T h e S e c o n d A u s t r a l i a n L i g h t H o r s e B r i g a d e went a c r o s s it, a n d by evening the O t t o m a n forces east of the river found themselves enveloped in a giant pincer. At M a ' a n , in the s o u t h of T r a n s j o r d a n , a b o v e A q a b a , the T u r k i s h garrison which h a d been beseiged by Feisal's forces ever since their arrival f r o m A q a b a the year before, held out until A u s t r a l i a n cavalry arrived to accept their s u r r e n d e r a n d protect them against the m a s sacre threatened by the A r a b besiegers. F u r t h e r north, Feisal's C a m e l C o r p s d i s r u p t e d the railroad lines u p o n which the m a i n T u r k i s h forces d e p e n d e d . On 25 S e p t e m b e r Allenby o r d e r e d an a d v a n c e on D a m a s c u s , while the r e m n a n t of the O t t o m a n forces b r o k e a n d fled. T h e occupation of the principal towns of the S y r i a n provinces was i m m i n e n t ; decisions a b o u t occupation policy were m a d e rapidly. T h e r e is still controversy as to who m a d e t h e m a n d why. 1

II In the s u m m e r Allenby had told L o n d o n that, subject to his own s u p r e m e military authority, he would accept F r e n c h a d v i s e r s to deal with civil a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in areas of special interest to F r a n c e , so long as L o n d o n would tell him what areas these were a n d whether

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2

they were still defined by the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t . A l t h o u g h the C a b i n e t a n d its E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e strongly favored d i s c a r d i n g the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , the F o r e i g n Office reaffirmed the agreem e n t by directing Allenby to follow its territorial outlines. L e o A m e r y , of the War C a b i n e t secretariat, bitterly b l a m e d the political chiefs of the F o r e i g n O f f i c e — B a l f o u r a n d C e c i l — f o r t h i s . A m e r y ' s colleague, S i r M a r k S y k e s , however, w a s the F o r e i g n Office official directly responsible for policy in S y r i a a n d , p r e s u m a b l y , the person who m a d e or r e c o m m e n d e d the decision in the first instance. 3

On 25 S e p t e m b e r the War Office instructed Wingate in C a i r o a n d Allenby at h e a d q u a r t e r s that if S y r i a were to fall within the s p h e r e of any E u r o p e a n power, that power w a s t o b e F r a n c e . T h e t e r m s o f that instruction left o p e n the possibility that it might not fall within the s p h e r e of a E u r o p e a n p o w e r — t h a t Feisal m i g h t achieve his i n d e p e n d e n c e . H o w e v e r , Allenby w a s instructed to e m p l o y F r e n c h officers for all areas of civil (as distinct f r o m military) a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g to the War Office cables, if Allenby were to take D a m a s c u s , "it would be desirable that in conformity with A n g l o F r e n c h a g r e e m e n t of 1916 he s h o u l d if possible work t h r o u g h an A r a b administration by m e a n s of a F r e n c h liaison." 4

5

F l a g s were to indicate the d e s i g n a t e d a r e a s of t e m p o r a r y a d m i n i s tration. T h e hoisting o f H u s s e i n ' s f l a g over D a m a s c u s a n d other i m p o r t a n t S y r i a n cities once they were c a p t u r e d was authorized, a n d indeed o r d e r e d , b y the F o r e i g n O f f i c e . T h e f l a g was the black, white, green, a n d red one that S y k e s h a d designed (see p a g e 315) a n d it served two political p u r p o s e s : it b o o s t e d H u s s e i n ' s claim to leadership in A r a b S y r i a , * a n d it r e m i n d e d F r a n c e that inland S y r i a was designated for at least nominal A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . 6

At a conference in the Palestinian town of J e n i n on 25 S e p t e m b e r , Allenby a p p r o v e d the p l a n s of A u s t r a l i a n General H a r r y C h a u v e l — who was in charge of the o p e r a t i o n — f o r the a d v a n c e on D a m a s c u s . C h a u v e l , a c c o r d i n g to his later notes, raised the issue of occupation policy. D a m a s c u s , he s a i d , was a city of 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 p e o p l e ; it was too b i g to be h a n d e d over to a military governor a n d a m e r e handful of a s s i s t a n t s . A l l e n b y replied that C h a u v e l should retain the O t t o m a n governor a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , a n d s u p p l y them with whatever extra military police they m i g h t need to keep o r d e r . C h a u v e l asked a b o u t r u m o r s that the A r a b m o v e m e n t w a s to have the g o v e r n m e n t of S y r i a , but Allenby replied that any decision would have to wait until

* In early 1918 Gilbert Clayton had written to Sykes that "If Feisal makes good in a military sense he may well carry Syria with him" but that if he did not, nobody from Mecca would matter in Syrian politics. T h e raising of the flag constituted a symbolic affirmation of Feisal's military success that could pave the way for his political leadership. 7

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he c a m e to D a m a s c u s himself. He a d d e d that, "if Feisal gives you any t r o u b l e , deal with h i m t h r o u g h L a w r e n c e who will be your liaison officer." T h e r e w a s a flurry of cables between L o n d o n , P a r i s , a n d the M i d d l e E a s t . A l t h o u g h Allenby h a d told C h a u v e l to keep the Turkish administration in D a m a s c u s in place for the t i m e being, the F o r e i g n Office told the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t that Allenby w o u l d deal with a provisional Arab administration in D a m a s c u s — i n line with the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t — t h r o u g h a F r e n c h liaison officer. In t u r n , the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d that the Allies s h o u l d recognize the A r a b s as a belligerent p o w e r — i n other w o r d s , as an a l l y . T h e s e c o m munications between Britain a n d F r a n c e show that the F o r e i g n Office expected Allenby to replace the T u r k i s h administration in D a m a s c u s with an A r a b one sooner or later; but that it believed the S y k e s - P i c o t a r r a n g e m e n t s w o u l d not c o m e into play until then. 8

9

10

A r m e d with these a g r e e m e n t s , the F o r e i g n Office got the War Office to s e n d Allenby new a n d i m p o r t a n t instructions, developing policy t h e m e s that had been hinted at before. T h e S y r i a n l a n d s that Allenby w a s in p r o c e s s of o c c u p y i n g were to be treated as "allied territory enjoying the s t a t u s of an i n d e p e n d e n t state" rather than as occupied e n e m y territory. It w a s in this connection that the F o r e i g n Office issued its m u c h - d i s c u s s e d directive that "It would be desirable to m a r k the recognition a n d establishment of native A r a b rule by s o m e c o n s p i c u o u s or formal act s u c h as the hoisting a n d saluting of the A r a b flag at i m p o r t a n t c e n t r e s . " 11

S y k e s (if that is who it was) went on in the cable to outline a characteristically ingenious s c h e m e . T h e existing a g r e e m e n t with F r a n c e was that wherever in the S y r i a n provinces Britain established a military administration, F r a n c e w a s entitled to have her officers exercise all civilian administration on behalf of the Ailies. In the telegram of 1 O c t o b e r , Allenby was instructed to limit his area of military administration to the b a r e m i n i m u m , limiting the F r e n c h role c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y . T h e F o r e i g n Office also told him to r e d u c e British military administration in T r a n s j o r d a n as well, so that the F r e n c h c o u l d not say that Britain's action in inland S y r i a was part of a plot to r e d u c e F r a n c e ' s role there—which of c o u r s e it w a s . Wingate, who had read the c a b l e s , wrote to Allenby that "it will be very interesting to see how the Sherifian F l a g a n d the F r e n c h liaison is taken by all a n d s u n d r y . " In effect, the F o r e i g n Office had instructed Allenby to carry out the formal r e q u i r e m e n t s of the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , while (as a d v o c a t e d by M a r k S y k e s ) revising the spirit of the a g r e e m e n t . T h i s was a solution satisfactory neither to the F r e n c h , who wanted m o r e , nor to Feisal or the A r a b B u r e a u , who wanted F r a n c e to have nothing at all. 1 2

As required by the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , F r a n c e was to be given

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direct control of the coastline. I n l a n d S y r i a was to be i n d e p e n d e n t — not independent in n a m e only, as envisaged by the a g r e e m e n t — b u t substantively i n d e p e n d e n t ; b u t F r a n c e would have her official liaison officer, as r e q u i r e d , a n d later w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y have her official adviser at Feisal's court. Syria's ruler, as, indicated in the M c M a h o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , would be a H a s h e m i t e . T h e hoisting of S y k e s ' s flag over D a m a s c u s a n d the towns o f H o r n s , H a m a , a n d A l e p p o thus would s y m b o l i z e the weaving together of all the s t r a n d s of British M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy along the lines that S y k e s h a d always a d v o c a t e d . He h a d said all along that he h a d s h a p e d Britain's c o m m i t m e n t s to be consistent with one another, and that all would fit within the formal framework of the agreement that he h a d devised. Meanwhile on 29 S e p t e m b e r it was d e c i d e d at G e n e r a l Allenby's field h e a d q u a r t e r s that Feisal's A r a b s s h o u l d be the only Allied troops to enter a n d o c c u p y D a m a s c u s — p r e s u m a b l y to forestall resistance by a possibly hostile M o s l e m metropolis to a Christian occupation.* Feisal was three d a y s away, so in the m e a n t i m e the A N Z A C cavalry units p u r s u i n g the f l e e i n g T u r k s were instructed t o ride a r o u n d , rather than t h r o u g h , D a m a s c u s . B u t in the confusion of a d v a n c e a n d retreat, the actors in the d r a m a of D a m a s c u s ' s liberation did not follow the script that Allenby a n d Clayton had written for t h e m . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t did not remain in the city; it fled with the retreating T u r k i s h a r m y at a b o u t noon on 30 S e p t e m b e r , leaving d i s o r d e r b e h i n d . L o c a l A r a b notables, the E m i r A b d el K a d e r a n d his brother S a i d , d e s c e n d a n t s of the Algerian warrior who h a d fought the F r e n c h a century before and h a d been s u b s i d i z e d to live in exile, m o v e d at s o m e point into s o m e sort of control of the city. T h e A b d el K a d e r b r o t h e r s , w h o m L a w r e n c e r e g a r d e d a s personal enemies a n d , p e r h a p s , a s s u p p o r t e r s of H u s s e i n a n d I s l a m rather than of Feisal and nationalism, claimed

* Evidence is scanty as to who made the decision and why. A report to the Foreign Office from Allenby's chief political officer, General Gilbert Clayton, suggests that Clayton must have feared there would be unrest in the city if the Australians occupied it, presumably because Damascenes would guess that Britain intended to turn them over to France. Clayton had expressed fears all along that Britain—by allowing herself to be associated with France—might excite the hostility of Syrian Arabs. Clayton later reported to the Foreign Office that "Our permitting the occupation of Damascus by the Sherifians has allayed some of the suspicions of French intentions." Nobody knows for sure what the quarrel between Lawrence and the Abd el Kaders was about, though a number of possibilities have been suggested. T h e Abd el Kaders may have feared that Hussein was being duped by the British or that Feisal was under Lawrence's influence; while Lawrence may have considered them to be pan-Islam, anti-Christian chauvinists. Or Lawrence may have believed them to be pro-French or pro-Turk. It has also been suggested that the quarrel was mainly or entirely personal, and that perhaps the Abd el Kaders were about to reveal damaging information about Lawrence's personal life. 13

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to have raised the H e j a z flag on the afternoon of 30 S e p t e m b e r in the n a m e of H u s s e i n . T h u s when the A r a b flag w a s finally hoisted, it had nothing to do with the F o r e i g n Office's p l a n ; D a m a s c e n e A r a b s did it on their own. At first light on the m o r n i n g of 1 O c t o b e r , an Australian cavalry b r i g a d e that had been ordered to cut the O t t o m a n retreat a l o n g the Horns road north of D a m a s c u s , d e c i d e d to go t h r o u g h D a m a s c u s to reach the H o m s r o a d , a n d entered the city; whereupon S a i d A b d el K a d e r , s u r r o u n d e d b y notables, officially welcomed t h e m . T h u s the honor of b e i n g the first Allied t r o o p s to enter D a m a s c u s fell to the A u s t r a l i a n s , contrary to plan. An hour later G e n e r a l C h a u v e l and his staff joined M a j o r - G e n e r a l S i r G e o r g e B a r r o w , the local divisional c o m m a n d e r , a few miles south of the city. L a w r e n c e was s u p p o s e d to be staying with B a r r o w , and C h a u v e l wanted to see him in order to start m a k i n g a r r a n g e m e n t s for p r e s e r v i n g the existing civil administration of the city. To his chagrin, C h a u v e l discovered that L a w r e n c e had s l i p p e d away early in the morning, without p e r m i s s i o n a n d without informing anyone, to follow the F i f t h C a v a l r y D i v i s i o n into D a m a s c u s . C h a u v e l borrowed a car a n d drove into D a m a s c u s himself to find out what was happening. By now the Allenby-Clayton plan for Feisal to liberate the city was in tatters. Feisal w a s still d a y s away, while the British and Australians were in D a m a s c u s , either trying to m o v e t h r o u g h the streets or h o p i n g to find out what was going on. C h a u v e l , who had been ordered not to lead his m e n into the city, now followed them in instead. T . E . L a w r e n c e , Chauvel's A . W . O . L . staff liaison officer, had taken his favorite battered old R o l l s - R o y c e a r m o r e d car that m o r n i n g and—-with a fellow British officer, W. E. Stirling, and N u r i el-Sa'id, an e x - O t t o m a n officer who was a chief F e i s a l loyalist—had driven to the city a n d found that s o m e of Feisal's tribal allies, who had arrived earlier, had accepted the A b d el K a d e r s as D a m a s c u s ' s g o v e r n o r s . E x e c u t i n g a swift coup d'etat, N u r i o r d e r e d the A b d el K a d e r s to withdraw and a p p o i n t e d his own p r o - F e i s a l candidate as governor. T h e n an irate G e n e r a l C h a u v e l arrived, d e m a n d i n g explanations. L a w r e n c e , m a k i n g excuses, said h e had a s s u m e d C h a u v e l wanted him to scout out the situation, a n d claimed that he had been on the verge of returning to tender his r e p o r t . When C h a u v e l then asked L a w r e n c e to b r i n g the governor to him, L a w r e n c e presented Nuri's c a n d i d a t e , claiming that he was the governor. C h a u v e l called that nonsense, pointing out that N u r i ' s candidate was obviously an A r a b , while the O t t o m a n governor would have been a T u r k . B u t L a w r e n c e replied that the O t t o m a n governor had fled (which was t r u e ) , a n d that the people had elected N u r i ' s candidate to take his place (which was false).

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T a k i n g L a w r e n c e ' s word for it, C h a u v e l confirmed the appointment of N u r i ' s p r o - F e i s a l c a n d i d a t e as governor. A c c o r d i n g to Chauvel's o w n account, he soon learned that N u r i ' s c a n d i d a t e was s u p p o r t e d by only a small p r o - F e i s a l clique, a n d that the population as a whole was d i s t u r b e d by the a p p o i n t m e n t ; but C h a u v e l d i d not see how he could c h a n g e the a p p o i n t m e n t after having a n n o u n c e d it. However, faced with serious d i s o r d e r s , he m a r c h e d his British forces through the city on 2 O c t o b e r in an attempt to overawe opposition. T h i s was exactly what Allenby a n d C l a y t o n had hoped to avoid: the population a r o u s e d , Christian t r o o p s defiling through the streets of a great M o s l e m city to restore order, a n d Feisal's A r a b t r o o p s — w h o s e presence was meant to r e a s s u r e local opinion—still nowhere in sight. It was not until the m o r n i n g of 3 O c t o b e r that L a w r e n c e a n n o u n c e d that F e i s a l a n d several h u n d r e d followers were a b o u t to arrive, a n d asked p e r m i s s i o n to stage a ' t r i u m p h a l entry into the city for t h e m . L a t e r , C h a u v e l g r u m b l i n g l y wrote that " S e e i n g that he, F e i s a l , had had very little to do with the 'conquest' of D a m a s c u s , the s u g g e s t e d triumphal entry did not appeal to me very m u c h but I thought it would not d o h a r m a n d g a v e p e r m i s s i o n a c c o r d i n g l y . " It was arranged for 3:00 that afternoon, b u t G e n e r a l Allenby's schedule would not allow for it. Allenby had only a few h o u r s to s p e n d that afternoon in D a m a s c u s , a n d called on Feisal a n d L a w r e n c e to attend him at the Hotel Victoria, where he had established himself. Allenby's visit was p r o m p t e d by Chauvel's a p p o i n t m e n t of the p r o Feisal A r a b to the g o v e r n o r s h i p which, in turn, activated the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t a n d the inter-Allied a g r e e m e n t that Allenby would deal with an Arab administration in S y r i a through the F r e n c h . H a d Allenby's original o r d e r s been carried o u t — t o retain a T u r k i s h governor for the time b e i n g — t h i s complication would have been p o s t p o n e d , but now it had to be faced. Allenby did not b l a m e Chauvel, but indicated that what he had done had given rise to complications with the F r e n c h which required a meeting with Feisal immediately. 14

Allenby, C h a u v e l , F e i s a l , a n d their respective chiefs of staff were present at the conference, as were officers of the British mission to the H e j a z , an officer of the A r a b B u r e a u from C a i r o , a n d Feisal's chief c o m m a n d e r . L a w r e n c e acted as interpreter. At the meeting the British c o m m a n d e r spelled out in specific detail for the A r a b i a n prince the a r r a n g e m e n t s that had been a g r e e d u p o n by Britain a n d F r a n c e , and a s s e r t e d his determination to enforce them until a n d unless they were modified at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . T h e t e r m s were exactly those that S i r M a r k S y k e s a n d the F o r e i g n Office had instructed h i m to u p h o l d . A n y hopes that L a w r e n c e m a y have entertained, or inspired in F e i s a l , that C l a y t o n a n d Allenby would help them connive at s u b v e r t i n g the F o r e i g n Office's policy

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were d a s h e d that afternoon. Feisal's bitter d i s a p p o i n t m e n t was not that the A r a b confederation w o u l d not include Palestine—he said he accepted t h a t — b u t that it did not include the L e b a n o n (that is to say, the L e b a n o n , or "white," M o u n t a i n s ) , a n d that S y r i a was not to be free of F r e n c h control. A c c o r d i n g to C h a u v e l ' s m i n u t e s of the meeting, Allenby (referred to as "the Chief") plainly told F e i s a l : (a) T h a t F r a n c e was to be the Protecting Power over S y r i a . ( b ) T h a t he, F e i s a l , a s representing his F a t h e r , K i n g H u s s e i n , was to have the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of S y r i a (less Palestine a n d the L e b a n o n Province) u n d e r F r e n c h g u i d a n c e a n d f i n a n c i a l backing. (c) T h a t the A r a b s p h e r e w o u l d include the hinterland of S y r i a only a n d that he, F e i s a l , w o u l d not have anything to do with the L e b a n o n . ( d ) T h a t he w a s to have a F r e n c h L i a i s o n Officer at once, who w o u l d work for the present with L a w r e n c e , who w o u l d be expected to give him every a s s i s t a n c e . Feisal objected very strongly. He said that he knew nothing of F r a n c e in the m a t t e r ; that he was p r e p a r e d to have British A s s i s t a n c e ; that he u n d e r s t o o d f r o m the Adviser w h o m Allenby had sent h i m that the A r a b s were to have the whole of S y r i a including the L e b a n o n but e x c l u d i n g Palestine; that a C o u n t r y without a Port was no g o o d to h i m ; a n d that he declined to have a F r e n c h L i a i s o n Officer or to recognise F r e n c h g u i d a n c e in any way. T h e Chief turned t o L a w r e n c e a n d s a i d : " B u t did you not tell him that the F r e n c h were to have the Protectorate over S y r i a ? " L a w r e n c e s a i d : " N o , S i r , I know nothing a b o u t it." T h e Chief then s a i d : " B u t you knew definitely that he, Feisal, was to have nothing to do with the L e b a n o n . " L a w r e n c e s a i d : " N o , S i r , I did not." After s o m e further discussion, the Chief told F e i s a l that he, S i r E d m u n d Allenby, was C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f a n d that he, Feisal, was at the m o m e n t a L i e u t . - G e n e r a l u n d e r his c o m m a n d and that he would have to obey o r d e r s . T h a t he m u s t accept the situation until the whole matter w a s settled at the conclusion of the War. Feisal accepted this decision a n d left with his ent o u r a g e , except L a w r e n c e . 1 5

Neither Feisal nor L a w r e n c e had been candid with the plainspoken Allenby. T h e t e r m s outlined to them were those of the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , with which all of t h e m were well a c q u a i n t e d . What Feisal meant in denying knowledge of those t e r m s ( L a w r e n c e explained later in L o n d o n ) was that he had not been informed of

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t h e m officially. F o r himself, L a w r e n c e had not even that e x c u s e ; he h a d s i m p l y lied.* As Feisal left the meeting, L a w r e n c e told Allenby that he was unwilling to serve alongside a F r e n c h adviser to F e i s a l . L a w r e n c e said that he h a d a c c u m u l a t e d s o m e leave time and would like to take it i m m e d i a t e l y and return to Britain. Allenby a g r e e d . By all indications, he w a s not at all a n g r y with L a w r e n c e ; far from it, for he e n c o u r a g e d L a w r e n c e to go to L o n d o n to a r g u e his c a s e to the F o r e i g n Office in p e r s o n . F e i s a l , having withdrawn f r o m the meeting, returned to lead his tardy and c o m p r o m i s e d t r i u m p h a l entry into D a m a s c u s , riding at the head of between 300 and 600 m o u n t e d m e n . P e r h a p s with encoura g e m e n t from L a w r e n c e (who later denied it), F e i s a l then sent a c o m m a n d o force of a h u n d r e d of his followers to B e i r u t , which they entered u n o p p o s e d a n d where they raised the A r a b flag of the H e j a z on 5 O c t o b e r . T h e following day the a l a r m e d F r e n c h sent w a r s h i p s into B e i r u t harbor a n d l a n d e d a small contingent of t r o o p s . On 8 O c t o b e r I n d i a n t r o o p s of Allenby's E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e entered the city. Allenby took c o m m a n d of the situation by o r d e r i n g Feisal's force to lower the A r a b flag a n d withdraw; when they did so, the F r e n c h were left in control. L a t e r F r a n c o i s G e o r g e s Picot arrived to act as F r a n c e ' s civil a n d political representative in the area, subject to the s u p r e m e authority of Allenby as commander-in-chief. Clayton a d v i s e d F e i s a l to rein b a c k his followers in L e b a n o n ; on 11 O c t o b e r , he wrote to Wingate that "I have told Feisal . . . that he will only p r e j u d i c e his case before the Peace Conference if he tries to g r a b . . . It is not an easy p r o b l e m . I h o p e that with a certain a m o u n t of give & take on both sides a m o d u s vivendi will be reached . . . " 1 7

T h e F r e n c h a r m e d forces in Beirut in fact p r o v e d too weak to affect the full annexationist p r o g r a m that the colonialist p a r t y in F r a n c e desired, a n d F r e n c h a g e n t s therefore p u r s u e d a fall-back position to p r o v i d e for the possibility that their claim to the whole of S y r i a might fail. * T h e p l a n , conceived by F r e n c h officers in the field, was to carve out of S y r i a an independent state that would include not only the Christian areas of M o u n t L e b a n o n but also a large area of p r e d o m i n a n t l y M o s l e m territories, a n d which w a s to be ruled b y M a r o n i t e C h r i s t i a n s u n d e r F r e n c h s p o n s o r s h i p . Activities 1 9

* In Chapter 101 of Seven Pillars of Wisdom, he admitted that he had known of the agreement and that "Fortunately, I had earlier betrayed the treaty's existence to Feisal . . . " ** Some of the French troops were Armenian refugees who had been conscripted. Others were native troops from North Africa. T h e entire force has been described as "only 3,000 Armenians, 3,000 Africans 'and 800 Frenchmen who had been promised that they would not have to fight.' " 18

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on behalf of this plan further contributed to the fragmentation of political life that h a d already b e g u n to c a u s e unrest behind Allied lines. Beneath the surface of Allenby's orderly a r r a n g e m e n t s of the chain of c o m m a n d , f e u d s , intrigues, a n d factionalism seethed in the wake of the d i s a p p e a r a n c e of O t t o m a n authority. B e d o u i n s clashed with city dwellers. F o r m e r enemies m o v e d to take over Feisal's m o v e m e n t from within. O b s c u r e q u a r r e l s were settled in dark places. In D a m a s c u s , E m i r A b d e l K a d e r was shot and killed b y p r o - F e i s a l police, s u p p o s e d l y while trying to e s c a p e when they c a m e to arrest him. T h e natural environment was even m o r e out of control. T h e British cavalry had been afflicted by malaria as it p a s s e d t h r o u g h T u r k i s h - h e l d territories where sanitation had been neglected; after a fortnight of incubation, the disease struck down whole r e g i m e n t s as the c o n q u e s t of the S y r i a n provinces was b e i n g c o m p l e t e d . M a l a r i a was followed by influenza that p r o v e d to be not just debilitating but massively fatal.

Ill A l l e n b y — f r o m his h e a d q u a r t e r s in the M i d d l e E a s t — a r r a n g e d a w a r m reception for Colonel L a w r e n c e in L o n d o n as he arrived to plead the case against F r a n c e . At the end of O c t o b e r , L a w r e n c e a p p e a r e d before the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t a n d reported that Picot p r o p o s e d to i m p o s e F r e n c h advisers on F e i s a l , b u t that Feisal claimed the right to choose whatever advisers he wanted. M o r e o v e r , he wanted either British o r — o d d l y , in view of the enmities that developed l a t e r — A m e r i c a n Zionist J e w i s h a d v i s e r s . 2 0

F e i s a l , a c c o r d i n g to L a w r e n c e , relied on the provisions of the D e c l a r a t i o n to the S e v e n , the d o c u m e n t in which S i r M a r k S y k e s outlined Allied intentions to anti-Feisal S y r i a n e m i g r e leaders in C a i r o . I n Feisal's n a m e , L a w r e n c e m i s c o n s t r u e d the declaration, claiming that it p r o m i s e d i n d e p e n d e n c e to the A r a b s in any area they liberated t h e m s e l v e s . ( I n context, it is clear that the declaration p r o m i s e d i n d e p e n d e n c e only in areas that had already been liberated by A r a b s as of the date of the declaration in J u n e 1918; areas in O t t o m a n h a n d s as of that date were placed in a s e p a r a t e c a t e g o r y . ) Feisal himself m i s c o n s t r u e d the declaration even further; reportedly, he claimed to have an agreement with the British and F r e n c h a c c o r d ing to which the first one to arrive at any city won the right to g o v e r n it. 2 1

L a w r e n c e b e g a n to maintain that Feisal's troops in fact had been the first to enter D a m a s c u s , declaring that 4 , 0 0 0 tribesmen associated

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with Feisal's cause had slipped into the city d u r i n g the night of 30 September— 1 October a n d thus had been the first Allied t r o o p s to arrive. B u t there was first-hand evidence that the 4 , 0 0 0 t r i b e s m e n were entirely imaginary. N o b o d y saw them there; and n o b o d y saw them enter or leave—even t h o u g h they would have had to p a s s t h r o u g h British lines t o d o s o . In the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e and in the C a b i n e t , L a w r e n c e nonetheless f o u n d a s y m p a t h e t i c audience for his plea that F r e n c h influence or control should not be introduced into the M o s l e m A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t . He also f o u n d i m p o r t a n t allies in the p r e s s . At the end of N o v e m b e r 1918, The Times p u b l i s h e d several anonym o u s articles, written by L a w r e n c e , providing a m u c h e x a g g e r a t e d account of what had been a c c o m p l i s h e d by Feisal's forces a n d stating that the account c a m e from an eyewitness c o r r e s p o n d e n t . L a w r e n c e ' s version of the facts b e g a n to be circulated in other periodicals as well, m u c h to the annoyance of the Australian t r o o p s in S y r i a . T h e official "pool" news c o r r e s p o n d e n t of the L o n d o n n e w s p a p e r s with Allenby's E g y p t i a n E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e wrote that "An article was printed in an official p a p e r circulated a m o n g the troops that the A r a b A r m y was first in D a m a s c u s . T h e credit of winning D a m a s c u s and b e i n g the first in the city belongs to the Australian L i g h t H o r s e , a n d General Chauvel was q u i c k to have the error rectified." 2 2

23

F o r personal as well as political r e a s o n s , L a w r e n c e continued to maintain the pretense that Feisal's forces had liberated D a m a s c u s ; and so great w a s his artistry that he s u c c e e d e d in insinuating at least s o m e of his version into the historical record. Y e t he m u s t have known that sooner or later his fraudulent claim would be e x p o s e d for what it w a s . In the 1920s, when the poet and novelist R o b e r t G r a v e s , a friend who was writing a b i o g r a p h y of L a w r e n c e , p r o p o s e d to b a s e his account of the liberation of D a m a s c u s on that s u p p l i e d by L a w r e n c e in his Seven Pillars of Wisdom, L a w r e n c e cautioned h i m : "I was on thin ice when I wrote the D a m a s c u s chapter a n d anyone who copies me will be through it, if he is not careful. S . P . [Seven Pillars] is full of half-truth h e r e . " 24

IV L a w r e n c e u s e d his version of the D a m a s c u s c a m p a i g n to attempt to p e r s u a d e his g o v e r n m e n t to jettison the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t , which almost all officials with w h o m he spoke wanted to disavow. G i l b e r t Clayton had written to L a w r e n c e in 1917 that t h o u g h Britain was b o u n d in honor to the a g r e e m e n t , it would die of its o w n accord if i g n o r e d : "It is in fact d e a d a n d , if we wait quietly, this fact will

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soon be r e a l i z e d . " In 1918 Clayton told Picot that the agreement no longer could be applied b e c a u s e it was "completely out of d a t e . " T h e E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e hoped t o r e s c i n d — r a t h e r than merely i g n o r e — t h e S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , a n d had thought that the F o r e i g n Office would arrange to modify or rescind it in the context of negotiations with respect to how the o c c u p i e d territories were to be a d m i n i s t e r e d . T h e F o r e i g n Office did no such thing, but took the position that Britain was absolutely b o u n d by the agreement unless F r a n c e a g r e e d to change or cancel it. When L o r d C u r z o n , the chairman of the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e , learned the terms that had been worked out with F r a n c e , he o b s e r v e d with s o m e asperity that " T h e F o r e i g n Office a p p e a r e d now to be relying u p o n the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t from which the C o m m i t t e e had hitherto been doing their best to e s c a p e . " 2 6

27

Sir M a r k S y k e s , who had worked out the terms of the administrative a r r a n g e m e n t s with the F r e n c h , p e r s i s t e d in believing that the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t met current n e e d s . In the s p r i n g of 1917 he wrote to Percy C o x , chief political officer of the British administration in M e s o p o t a m i a , that one of its virtues was that it was f r a m e d in such a way as not to violate the principles that Woodrow Wilson's A m e r i c a a n d the new socialist R u s s i a e s p o u s e d with respect to national self-determination and nonannexation. " T h e idea of A r a b nationalism m a y be a b s u r d , " he wrote, "but our C o n g r e s s case will be g o o d if we can say we are helping to develop a race on nationalist lines under our protection." H u s s e i n m a y not give m u c h help in the war physically, he continued, b u t he gives moral help that F r a n c e ought to recognize, and "I think F r e n c h will be ready to co-operate with us in a c o m m o n policy towards the A r a b speaking p e o p l e . " 28

D a v i d H o g a r t h , head of the A r a b B u r e a u , wrote to G i l b e r t Clayton at that time that n o b o d y both took the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t seriously a n d s u p p o r t e d it, except for S i r M a r k S y k e s . T h i s was a slight exaggeration, b e c a u s e officials of the Foreign Office, which S y k e s joined, also took the pact seriously, but it was not far from the truth. L o r d C u r z o n stated that the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t was not only obsolete "but absolutely i m p r a c t i c a b l e . " As chairman of the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e , which was in charge of defining British desiderata for the postwar M i d d l e E a s t , he m a d e it clear that Britain would like the F r e n c h out of S y r i a a l t o g e t h e r . B u t a War Office representative told the c o m m i t t e e that the only way to break the agreement was to operate behind "an A r a b facade" in a p p e a l i n g to the U n i t e d S t a t e s to s u p p o r t Wilson's theories of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . C u r z o n said that "When the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t was drawn up it was, no d o u b t , intended by its authors . . . as a sort of fancy sketch to suit a situation that had not then arisen, a n d which it was 2 9

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thought extremely unlikely would ever a r i s e ; that, I s u p p o s e , m u s t be the principal explanation of the g r o s s ignorance with which the b o u n d a r y lines in that a g r e e m e n t were d r a w n . " L l o y d G e o r g e also felt that the pact h a d been s u p e r s e d e d by events, but then, he h a d been against it from the start. As w a s his wont with his favorites, he m a d e e x c u s e s for S y k e s , and rewrote history to absolve h i m from b l a m e . He wrote, d e c a d e s later, that 33

It is inexplicable that a m a n of S i r M a r k S y k e s ' fine intelligence s h o u l d ever have a p p e n d e d his s i g n a t u r e to s u c h an a r r a n g e ment. He w a s always a s h a m e d of it, a n d he defended his action in agreeing to its t e r m s by e x p l a i n i n g that he w a s acting u n d e r definite instructions received f r o m the F o r e i g n Office. F o r that reason he hotly resented the constant a n d indelible reminder that his n a m e was a n d always w o u l d be associated with a pact with which he had only a nominal personal responsibility a n d of which he thoroughly d i s a p p r o v e d . 4

In the opinion of L l o y d G e o r g e , the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t "was a fatuous a r r a n g e m e n t j u d g e d from any a n d every point of v i e w . " E v e n S y k e s himself finally c a m e to a g r e e : on 3 M a r c h 1918 he wrote to Wingate and Clayton that the agreement h a d to be a b a n d o n e d b e c a u s e of s u c h events as the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' entry into the war, W o o d r o w Wilson's F o u r t e e n Points, the Bolshevik Revolution, a n d the publication by the Bolsheviks of the terms of the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t to an apparently indignant w o r l d . On 18 J u n e 1918 he told the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e that, while the Sherifians had no right to be indignant a b o u t the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , for he had fully informed H u s s e i n of its t e r m s , Britain s h o u l d ask F r a n c e to agree that the a g r e e m e n t no longer a p p l i e d . A m o n t h later he told the c o m m i t t e e that " T h e A g r e e m e n t of 1916 was d e a d , although the F r e n c h refused to a d m i t it. What w a s required now w a s s o m e m o d i fication of, or s u b s t i t u t e for, that A g r e e m e n t . " When the F r e n c h refused to a g r e e to modify the a g r e e m e n t , however, he went ahead to negotiate t e r m s for the administration of o c c u p i e d territories on the b a s i s that the a g r e e m e n t therefore remained in force. 35

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On 5 O c t o b e r 1918 L e o A m e r y noted in his d i a r y : " T a l k with S y k e s a b o u t what to do with the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t . He has evolved a new a n d m o s t ingenious s c h e m e by which the F r e n c h are to clear out of the whole A r a b region except the L e b a n o n " and in return get all of K u r d i s t a n a n d A r m e n i a "from A d a n a to Persia and the C a u c a s u s . " B u t the F r e n c h did not agree. Picking up on Feisal's protest to Allenby "that a C o u n t r y without a Port w a s no g o o d to him" S y k e s explored a possible c o m p r o m i s e in which the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t would be modified by transferring one coastal port f r o m the area of direct F r e n c h control to the area in 3 9

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which Feisal w o u l d serve as ruler. G e n e r a l Allenby s e e m e d hopeful a b o u t this a p p r o a c h . On 15 D e c e m b e r he wrote to his wife that "Sykes is all for soothing the A r a b s & g i v i n g them a p o r t ; & Picot is less Chauvinist than he w a s . " B u t nothing c a m e of this a p p r o a c h either. T h e F r e n c h refused to waive any of their rights u n d e r the agreement; b u t there was a c h o r u s of opinion f r o m British officers serving in the field to the effect that it would be d i s a s t r o u s to attempt to enforce its t e r m s . T h e followers of the late L o r d K i t c h e n e r , saying the s a m e thing through m a n y voices, as they so often did, had been a r g u i n g for s o m e time that the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t had to be annulled in the interests of J e w i s h - A r a b friendship in Palestine. J e w i s h - A r a b friendship was a c a u s e in which S i r M a r k S y k e s sincerely believed; whether his colleagues who raised the point shared his belief in it is doubtful. 4 0

R o n a l d S t o r r s , governor of J e r u s a l e m , reported that the A r a b s were ready to accept the Zionist p r o g r a m , but only under a British g o v e r n m e n t for P a l e s t i n e . G i l b e r t C l a y t o n reported that the A r a b a n d Zionist c a u s e s were "interdependent," and that both of t h e m could be satisfied a n d would cooperate, b u t only if the F r e n c h could be m a d e to agree that the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t "is no longer a practical i n s t r u m e n t . " C i W e i z m a n n assisted i n the c a m p a i g n by writing to B a l f o u r a l o n g the s a m e lines, and a d d e d that F r e n c h intrigues a i m e d at s e c u r i n g exclusive commercial concessions were o b s c u r i n g the c a u s e of self-determination for J e w s as well as for A r a b s . T . E . L a w r e n c e told the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e that "there would be no difficulty in reconciling Zionists a n d A r a b s in Palestine and S y r i a , p r o v i d e d that the administration of Palestine r e m a i n e d in British h a n d s . " 41

42

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If the a g r e e m e n t were to be a b r o g a t e d with respect to Palestine, there was no reason why it s h o u l d not be a b r o g a t e d with respect to Syria as well—though P r i m e Minister L l o y d G e o r g e repeatedly asserted that Britain had no desire to take over S y r i a for herself, a n d British officers in the field m a d e the s a m e claim. T h e y asserted that they wanted F r a n c e to relinquish her claims, not in favor of Britain, but in favor of an independent A r a b nation led by F e i s a l . T h i s was sheer dishonesty, for the A r a b B u r e a u officers did not believe that A r a b s were c a p a b l e of self-government. By an independent country ruled by F e i s a l they meant a country g u i d e d by themselves as agents of Britain. D a v i d H o g a r t h , the head of the A r a b B u r e a u who s u c c e e d e d Clayton as chief political officer in the field, reported f r o m newly liberated D a m a s c u s that Feisal's A r a b administration was incompetent. He wrote that a E u r o p e a n power must run t h i n g s . If F r a n c e 45

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were to be excluded, it was evident which E u r o p e a n power (in his view) w o u l d be obliged to a s s u m e that responsibility.

V N e a r l y a fortnight after his interview with Feisal at the Hotel Victoria i n D a m a s c u s , S i r E d m u n d Allenby returned t o D a m a s c u s t o b e the dinner g u e s t of Prince F e i s a l . He r e p o r t e d to his wife that "He g a v e me an excellent dinner; A r a b dishes, but all g o o d , served in the ordinary ways of civilization. Water to drink; b u t g o o d , fresh, cool water; not tepid barley water!" A l l e n b y a d d e d that " Y o u would like F e i s a l . He is a keen, slim, highly s t r u n g m a n . He has beautiful h a n d s , like a w o m a n ' s ; a n d his fingers are always m o v i n g nervously when he talks. B u t he is s t r o n g in will, a n d straight in principle." As to politics, "He is n e r v o u s a b o u t the peace settlement; b u t I tell h i m he m u s t trust the E n t e n t e p o w e r s to treat him f a i r l y . " 46

" T r u s t the E n t e n t e Powers": F e i s a l c o u l d not have thought that was a particularly firm foundation on which to b a s e his future p r o s p e c t s . T h e Entente P o w e r s did not even trust one another. T h e F r e n c h did not believe that the B r i t i s h were s p o n s o r i n g J e w i s h a n d A r a b aspirations in g o o d faith, while the British d i s c u s s e d how, rather than whether, to break their a g r e e m e n t s with F r a n c e . Neither Britain nor F r a n c e p l a n n e d to honor wartime c o m m i t m e n t s to Italy. Neither Britain nor F r a n c e was d i s p o s e d to carry out the idealistic p r o g r a m of Woodrow Wilson with which, when Washington was listening, they p r e t e n d e d to be in s y m p a t h y . Feisal was aware that only the year before, British leaders had c o n t e m p l a t e d behind his b a c k a c o m p r o m i s e peace in which the R u s s i a n rather than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would have been p a r t i t i o n e d — t h u s a b a n d o n i n g h i m a n d his father to the mercies of the T u r k s . H e knew, too, that Britain a n d F r a n c e had secretly agreed two years before to divide the A r a b world between t h e m , a n d that they h a d revealed details of their a g r e e m e n t to h i m only when they were forced to do s o . T r u s t was not a part of the a t m o s p h e r e in which Feisal lived. He himself h a d c o r r e s p o n d e d with the T u r k s that year a b o u t his changing sides in the war. H i s father h a d held similar c o r r e s p o n d e n c e with the T u r k s . Neither of t h e m h a d kept faith with Britain, a n d Feisal h a d not kept faith with his father either. H i s only regular t r o o p s were d e s e r t e r s from the enemy c a m p , who m i g h t as easily desert him, in t u r n , if his star w a n e d . T h e B e d o u i n tribes that were his allies were notoriously fickle, often c h a n g i n g sides in A r a b i a even on the field of battle itself; and they were b o u n d to h i m principally by the g o l d that was L a w r e n c e ' s , not his, to

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d i s p e n s e . As for the S y r i a n s , they a c c e p t e d h i m only b e c a u s e he was placed over t h e m by the British a r m y . E v e n his own b o d y betrayed h i m ; his w o r r y - b e a d fingers g a v e him away. He was n e r v o u s — a n d h a d every reason to b e .

PART VIII THE SPOILS OF VICTORY " T h e victor b e l o n g s to the s p o i l s . " — F . Scott Fitzgerald

38 T H E PARTING OF T H E WAYS i G i d d y with fatigue a n d c a u g h t up in the last hysterical convulsions of the war, the O t t o m a n a n d British e m p i r e s launched themselves into far-off deserts a n d inland s e a s to fight a barely r e m e m b e r e d series of final c a m p a i g n s that p r o d u c e d no decisive result. Y e t in the course of the military a n d political m a n e u v e r i n g two new developments arose that were to affect p r o f o u n d l y the future of the twentieth century. Western a r m i e s f o u n d themselves at war with R u s s i a , their former ally; a n d oil b e c a m e a crucial issue in the battle for the Middle East. It all b e g a n b e c a u s e E n v e r P a s h a , instead of a t t e m p t i n g to deal with the losing situation in S y r i a , o p e n e d up a new theater of o p e r a tions against a less f o r m i d a b l e o p p o n e n t . As a result, while the British were m a r c h i n g from s u c c e s s to s u c c e s s in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g provinces of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , O t t o m a n forces to the north were m a r c h i n g f r o m s u c c e s s to s u c c e s s in what u s e d to be the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . In the last half of 1918 T u r k e y a n d Britain were e n g a g e d in what a p p e a r e d to be not so m u c h one war as two parallel w a r s in which they p u r s u e d similar g o a l s : to e x c l u d e their allies f r o m a s h a r e in the winnings. E n v e r P a s h a , like L l o y d G e o r g e , was so captivated by the p r o s p e c t i v e spoils of victory that he could not bear to s h a r e t h e m with other countries. T h e near-dictatorial T u r k i s h leader, like his near-dictatorial British c o u n t e r p a r t , therefore took the risk of e n d a n g e r i n g his alliances for the sake of imperial a m b i t i o n s . L e n i n h a d it the w r o n g way a r o u n d . Imperialism-—defined as the q u e s t for c o l o n i e s — d i d not c a u s e the war; the war e n g e n d e r e d imperialism. T h e i r s t a g g e r i n g losses d r o v e the belligerent p o w e r s to try to c o m p e n s a t e by seeking new g a i n s . T h e collapse of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e a n s w e r e d the need for new worlds to c o n q u e r ; its d o m a i n s were there to be taken. L o r d Milner worried that once R u s s i a was out of the war G e r m a n y might be m o r e difficult to defeat, a n d raised the possibility of a negotiated c o m p r o m i s e peace in which Britain 351

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would be c o m p e n s a t e d by dividing the R u s s i a n rather than the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . G e r m a n y , however, having s m a s h e d the C z a r ' s E m p i r e , was in no m o o d to s h a r e her winnings with the Entente P o w e r s . T h e G e r m a n s continued to p u r s u e their c a m p a i g n s of war and s u b v e r s i o n against R u s s i a . T h e i r postwar goals of a g g r a n d i z e ment grew m o r e far-reaching as the w a r t i m e need for agricultural p r o d u c t s a n d raw materials b e c a m e m o r e p r e s s i n g ; a n d as they p u r s u e d those g o a l s , they collided with their T u r k i s h allies. E n v e r P a s h a had d r e a m e d of one day uniting all the T u r k i s h s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s of A s i a u n d e r O t t o m a n leadership, b u t this b e c a m e his operational political p r o g r a m only when the disintegration of Petrograd's authority dangled that p r o s p e c t in front of h i m . After the war, Winston Churchill, a m o n g others, fostered the legend that the Y o u n g T u r k s h a d been a n i m a t e d b y p a n - T u r k i s h ( " p a n - T u r a n i a n " ) ideology all along a n d h a d b r o u g h t T u r k e y into the war in order to p u r s u e expansionist p l a n s in C e n t r a l A s i a . T h e evidence now available is to the contrary: the d e m a n d s the C . U . P . m a d e of G e r m a n y in 1914 a n d t h r o u g h 1917 show that the O t t o m a n leaders were thinking in essentially defensive t e r m s at that t i m e , h o p i n g at m o s t to shore up their existing frontiers in order to win a m o r e c o m p l e t e independence within t h e m . It w a s only in 1917 that E n v e r seriously planned to e x p a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e e a s t w a r d . Vast territories, no longer held by the C z a r , s e e m e d there for the taking, and could c o m p e n s a t e for what Britain had taken in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g s o u t h . A British Intelligence report on the m o v e m e n t to unite all the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s , the P a n - T u r a n i a n M o v e m e n t , p r e p a r e d by the D e p a r t m e n t of Information in the a u t u m n of 1917, estimated that outside the O t t o m a n E m p i r e m o r e than seventeen million people in A s i a s p o k e one or m o r e of the T u r k i c l a n g u a g e s . A c c o r d i n g to the report, " T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g Central A s i a is one of the largest continuous l a n g u a g e areas in the w o r l d — l a r g e r than the G r e a t R u s s i a n area and almost as large as the E n g l i s h or S p a n i s h - s p e a k i n g area in A m e r i c a . " While disdainful of p a n - T u r a n i a n i s m as an ideology, the report p i c t u r e d it as a d a n g e r o u s i n s t r u m e n t in the h a n d s of the Y o u n g T u r k leaders. " T h e whole population i s T u r k i s h ; the whole population is S u n n i ; a n d the present p o s s e s s o r [i.e. R u s s i a ] is not an ancient M o s l e m S t a t e , b u t a recent Christian c o n q u e r o r . " Were the C . U . P . to create a T u r k i s h - I s l a m i c state there, in alliance with Persia a n d A f g h a n i s t a n , I n d i a w o u l d be directly threatened. "It would create a vast anti-British hinterland behind the anti-British tribes on the N o r t h - W e s t e r n frontier." 1

E n v e r , t h o u g h aware of these possibilities, m a d e no precipitate m o v e but allowed events to evolve favorably on their own. T h e overthrow of the C z a r left a R u s s i a n army of half a million soldiers in northeastern T u r k e y , h o l d i n g s u c h m a j o r towns a s T r e b i z o n d ,

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E r z e r u m , a n d K a r s . T h e t r o o p s , initially a t least, were not Bolshevik in sentiment, b u t suffered from war weariness. As discipline disintegrated, they deserted a n d returned to R u s s i a . In agreement with the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff, the O t t o m a n forces did not attack the thinning R u s s i a n lines but allowed the R u s s i a n a r m y to dwindle to nothing of its own a c c o r d . By the time the Bolsheviks seized power in P e t r o g r a d in the a u t u m n of 1917, practically all that r e m a i n e d was a volunteer force f r o m the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n areas across the frontier a n d a few h u n d r e d R u s s i a n o f f i c e r s . Still E n v e r held b a c k , expecting the Bolsheviks to sue for p e a c e , as they did several weeks later. T h e T u r k i s h military situation on the eastern frontier with Persia also i m p r o v e d of its own a c c o r d . British forces in the south of Persia had been o p e r a t i n g behind the shield of R u s s i a n forces in the north, b u t could no longer do so with a s s u r a n c e . As revolutionary fervor took hold of the R u s s i a n t r o o p s , they b e c a m e increasingly friendly to the Persian nationalists w h o m they h a d hitherto held in check. On 27 M a y 1917 the pro-Allied r e g i m e in T e h e r a n collapsed, and on 6 J u n e was replaced by a g o v e r n m e n t of nationalist hue which a p p r o a c h e d P e t r o g r a d with a view toward r e d u c i n g the R u s s i a n military presence. 2

H i g h - r a n k i n g officials in the War Office in L o n d o n a n d in the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a feared that T u r k e y m i g h t attack t h r o u g h Persia toward A f g h a n i s t a n — a l t h o u g h the Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff did not s h a r e these views. T h e C a b i n e t wavered between m a k i n g concessions to the new Persian r e g i m e or allowing relations to deteriorate; d a n g e r s were a p p a r e n t either way. As the authority of the K e r e n s k y g o v e r n m e n t in P e t r o g r a d evaporated, the R u s s i a n a r m y in the north of Persia a p p e a r e d to British officials to be increasingly unreliable. On 31 O c t o b e r 1917 an interd e p a r t m e n t a l c o m m i t t e e in Whitehall decided to p u t the antiBolshevik s e g m e n t s of the R u s s i a n a r m y in northern Persia on the British payroll; but the R u s s i a n s nonetheless proved unwilling to do Britain's b i d d i n g . 3

O n c e the Bolsheviks seized power in P e t r o g r a d the following week, matters rapidly c a m e to a h e a d . Within m o n t h s , on 29 J a n u a r y 1918, T r o t s k y , as S o v i e t C o m m i s s a r for External Affairs, r e n o u n c e d the Convention of 1907, which f o r m e d the basis of the A n g l o - R u s s i a n occupation of Persia. D i s c l a i m i n g responsibility for any antiBolshevik R u s s i a n t r o o p s remaining on Persian soil, he e x p r e s s e d the hope that the other foreign armies o c c u p y i n g Persian soil—the T u r k s a n d the B r i t i s h — w o u l d withdraw as well. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t feared that the R u s s i a n withdrawal would e x p o s e the I n d i a n A r m y in M e s o p o t a m i a to an attack from b e h i n d by O t t o m a n a r m i e s wheeling t h r o u g h P e r s i a ; for despite the long conflict between the two e m p i r e s in that area, Britain h a d c o m e to rely on

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R u s s i a to hold the line against the T u r k s in northern Persia, a n d was uncertain what course to p u r s u e when that protection was abruptly withdrawn.

II I n M a r c h 1918 G e r m a n y i m p o s e d c r u s h i n g armistice t e r m s o n the defeated R u s s i a n s . As soon as they h a d signed the armistice with R u s s i a , the O t t o m a n a n d G e r m a n e m p i r e s b e g a n t o d i s p u t e p o s s e s s i o n of the provinces that the R u s s i a n E m p i r e had ruled adjoining the T u r k i s h frontier. Christian G e o r g i a a n d A r m e n i a , a n d M o s l e m A z e r b a i j a n — t h e three states collectively called T r a n s c a u c a s i a — w e r e now i n d e p e n d e n t . G e r m a n y urgently needed the agricultural a n d mineral wealth a n d the railroad s y s t e m of G e o r g i a , a n d even m o r e so the oil wells of A z e r b a i j a n , to sustain her war effort. T h i n k i n g ahead to the postwar world, G e r m a n leaders also intended to use T r a n s c a u c a s i a as a s p e a r h e a d into the markets of the M i d d l e E a s t . T h e O t t o m a n leaders also looked to the commercial u s e s of the provinces across their frontier. T h e y thought in t e r m s of restoring the old trade route with I r a n , a n d of reviving their Black S e a a n d C r i m e a n c o m m e r c e . E n v e r , a b o v e all, a i m e d at the creation of a new T u r k i s h e m p i r e that stretched into Central A s i a , to which T r a n s c a u c a s i a would be the link. C o n v i n c e d that G e r m a n y had d i s r e g a r d e d T u r k i s h interests when she negotiated the t e r m s of the armistice with R u s s i a , E n v e r p r o ceeded to d i s r e g a r d G e r m a n interests in T r a n s c a u c a s i a , and sent the flower of his remaining a r m i e s across the frontier to c o n q u e r G e o r g i a a n d A r m e n i a a n d t o m a r c h o n A z e r b a i j a n . F o r the p u r p o s e h e created a special a r m y c o r p s , d e t a c h e d from the regular O t t o m a n a r m y which was p e r m e a t e d with G e r m a n officers. H i s new " A r m y of I s l a m " contained no G e r m a n s : it consisted only of O t t o m a n troops a n d Azerbaijani T a r t a r s . Its o r d e r s were to m a r c h on the Azerbaijani metropolis of B a k u , which had been taken over by a local Soviet. B a k u , an industrialized city of s o m e 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 people on the shores of the C a s p i a n S e a , was only half M o s l e m a n d quite unlike the surr o u n d i n g T a r t a r hinterland. At the time it was the great o i l - p r o d u c i n g city of the M i d d l e E a s t . By 1918 the military i m p o r t a n c e of oil b e g a n to be generally recognized. B e f o r e the war, Churchill's A d m i r a l t y had switched to oil as

* Winston Churchill, who had recognized it before the war and had arranged at that time for the British government to purchase a majority shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, aroused a great deal of opposition, especially within the Government of India, from British officials who did not see the need for it. 4

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fuel for the navy's s h i p s a n d , d u r i n g the war, the Allies c a m e to rely heavily on f u e l - c o n s u m i n g trucks for land t r a n s p o r t . T a n k s a n d aircraft h a d b e g u n to c o m e fully into their own in the last d a y s of the war and they, too, c o n s u m e d quantities of g a s a n d oil. In 1918 C l e m e n c e a u ' s g o v e r n m e n t i n F r a n c e and the U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f the N a v y both c a m e to recognize that oil had b e c o m e of cardinal importance. G e r m a n y , beset by s h o r t a g e s , h a d c o u n t e d on replenishing her resources f r o m the c a p t u r e d s o u t h a n d west of R u s s i a , a n d controlled m u c h of the e c o n o m y of G e o r g i a d u r i n g 1918; b u t in Berlin the resources of G e o r g i a were not r e g a r d e d as sufficient. E n v e r ' s race to B a k u , in A z e r b a i j a n , threatened to deprive G e r m a n y of the oil she so desperately n e e d e d , a n d also threatened to wreck the armistice arr a n g e m e n t with R u s s i a . T h e e n r a g e d h e a d s o f the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff sent a n g r y notes to E n v e r , which he d i s r e g a r d e d . T h e state secretary o f the G e r m a n N a v y D e p a r t m e n t told the leaders of his country's F o r e i g n Office and G e n e r a l Staff that it was absolutely crucial for G e r m a n y to get hold of B a k u ' s oil a n d that the O t t o m a n attack o n the city therefore had t o b e s t o p p e d . T h e G e r m a n leaders told the R u s s i a n a m b a s s a d o r in Berlin that they would take steps to s t o p the O t t o m a n a d v a n c e if R u s s i a gave a s s u r a n c e s that she w o u l d s u p p l y at least s o m e of B a k u ' s oil to G e r m a n y . "Of c o u r s e , we will a g r e e , " L e n i n c a b l e d to Stalin in r e p o r t i n g this d e v e l o p m e n t . 5

6

B a k u was also important strategically. As a m a j o r port it d o m i n a t e d C a s p i a n s h i p p i n g and would enable E n v e r to m o v e his a r m i e s by sea, if he c h o s e , to the eastern shore of the C a s p i a n , where the M o s l e m s of T u r k e s t a n could be e x p e c t e d to rally to his s t a n d a r d a n d where he would avail himself of the railroad network that the R u s s i a n s h a d built there to enable t h e m to reach A f g h a n i s t a n a n d attack I n d i a . T h e British, keenly aware of the d a n g e r , viewed Enver's p r o g r e s s with f o r e b o d i n g .

Ill T w o tiny British military m i s s i o n s in northern Persia watched these events from across the frontier with no clear idea of what role they should play in t h e m . M a j o r - G e n e r a l L . C . D u n s t e r v i l l e w a s appointed chief o f the British m i s s i o n to the C a u c a s u s in early 1918. H a d he ever reached Tiflis, the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n capital, he w o u l d have s e r v e d as British Representative there as well, where his objective w o u l d have b e e n to help stiffen the resistance of the R u s s i a n a r m y in T u r k e y against an Ottoman advance. 7

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Dunsterville's convoy of forty-one F o r d cars a n d vans traveled via M e s o p o t a m i a into Persia a n d h e a d e d toward a Persian port on the C a s p i a n S e a then called Enzeli (later r e n a m e d Pahlevi) on the road to T r a n s c a u c a s i a . By the t i m e the British arrived, m o s t of T r a n s c a u c a s i a had fallen into O t t o m a n or G e r m a n h a n d s . A worried British g o v e r n m e n t o r d e r e d D u n s t e r v i l l e to clear the r o a d to Enzeli of a revolutionary b a n d of Persian nationalists, allied to the Bolsheviks but also acting in the interests of the a d v a n c i n g O t t o m a n A r m y of Islam. A s E n v e r ' s forces a p p r o a c h e d B a k u , the British g o v e r n m e n t d e bated what role Dunsterville's tiny force s h o u l d or could play in the u n e x p e c t e d battle for Central A s i a in which T u r k s , G e r m a n s , R u s s i a n s , a n d others were involved. T h e question also arose of what M a j o r - G e n e r a l Wilfred Malleson's mission ought to be. G e n e r a l Malleson was an officer in the Military Intelligence b r a n c h of the I n d i a n A r m y , who had served for years on the staff of L o r d K i t c h e n e r . S i m l a h a d sent him out with six officers to M e s h e d , in eastern P e r s i a , to watch over d e v e l o p m e n t s in the vast lands of R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n that were believed to be Enver's next objective. D u n s t e r v i l l e was to watch over the l a n d s to the west of the C a s p i a n S e a , a n d Malleson was to watch over the lands to the east. In Malleson's area of responsibility, there were several m a t t e r s that concerned the British military leaders. O n e of these was the large store of cotton which might fall into e n e m y h a n d s . Another was the presence o f s o m e 3 5 , 0 0 0 G e r m a n a n d Austrian prisoners-of-war who might be released either by the B o l s h e v i k s or by E n v e r ' s forces. To the British leaders the intentions of the enemy forces at work west a n d east of the C a s p i a n were o b s c u r e d by the g r o w i n g political fragmentation in those a r e a s . Politically the G e r m a n s a p p e a r e d not only to be hand-in-glove locally with the anti-Bolsheviks in Tiflis, but also to be involved with the Bolsheviks in P e t r o g r a d , while having fallen out with the T u r k s , who were their p u b l i c allies b u t their secret enemies. E n v e r ' s allied force of O t t o m a n a n d Azerbaijani M o s l e m T u r k s a n d T a r t a r s was o n the m a r c h toward B a k u , which was g o v e r n e d by a divided Soviet that reflected a division within the city itself. T h e Azerbaijani half of the population favored the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , while the A r m e n i a n s , fearing m a s s a c r e , were in favor of a n y b o d y b u t the T u r k s . T h e Social Revolutionaries a n d other nonBolshevik R u s s i a n s feared British intervention, b u t in the end grew to fear T u r k e y m o r e . S t e p a n S h a u m i a n , the Bolshevik c h a i r m a n of the Soviet, while leading the resistance to the O t t o m a n - A z e r b a i j a n i allies, even preferred T u r k i s h rule to a British intervention a n d , in any event, h a d received direct o r d e r s from L e n i n a n d S t a l i n not to accept British a i d . In T u r k e s t a n a Bolshevik-controlled R u s s i a n Soviet was in control

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of the oasis town of T a s h k e n t , b u t its forces h a d been beaten by the native T u r k s of B u k h a r a , and had been obliged to recognize the E m i r of B u k h a r a — w h o s e d o m a i n s h a d fallen u n d e r R u s s i a n sway d u r i n g the G r e a t G a m e in the nineteenth c e n t u r y — a s once again an independent ruler. R u m o r s reaching L o n d o n indicated that the newly independent khanates of B u k h a r a a n d K h i v a m i g h t be entering into alliance with the P o r t e . 8

As viewed f r o m L o n d o n , the c h a o s in Central A s i a w a s a s o u r c e of d a n g e r a n d p r o m i s e . T h e d a n g e r was that it might p e r m i t an assault on I n d i a , a n d on the I n d i a n Army in Persia a n d M e s o p o t a m i a , that could ignite flames i m p o s s i b l e to e x t i n g u i s h . A c c o r d i n g to a G e n e r a l Staff m e m o r a n d u m : [ G e r m a n y ] will m a k e u s e of the P a n - T u r a n i a n m o v e m e n t and of M o h a m m e d a n fanaticism to fan into a flame the ever glowing e m b e r s of a religious war, in order to let loose on I n d i a the p e n t - u p tide of a M o s l e m invasion . .. While R u s s i a was healthy a n d while Persia was u n d e r control we were able to deal with this difficulty, but if G e r m a n a g e n t s had free access to the lawless tribes of Afghanistan a n d the frontiers of I n d i a , b r e d as they have been on tales of the legendary wealth of loot which m i g h t be theirs, i n n u m e r a b l e h o r d e s of s a v a g e warriors could s w a r m into the plains, ravaging, m u r d e r i n g , destroying. T h e institutions built by long years of careful g o v e r n m e n t would be swept away in a few short weeks a n d the attenuated g a r r i s o n of the country would have to be largely reinforced f r o m t r o o p s badly needed elsewhere. N o n e b u t White troops could be trusted. 9

S i n c e British policy-makers believed the R u s s i a n Bolshevik government was in the pay of imperial G e r m a n y , a n d were not aware of the extent to which the Porte a n d the Wilhelmstrasse had p a r t e d c o m p a n y , it a p p e a r e d in 1918 that the G e r m a n s had taken control of northern Asia, were in p r o c e s s of taking over the center of A s i a , a n d were p r e p a r i n g to m o u n t an attack on British positions in southern Asia. It fitted in with the wartime view that G e r m a n y a i m e d at a world e m p i r e a n d with the fear that, when the war w a s over, all of A s i a might be left as a vast slave colony in G e r m a n y ' s p o s s e s s i o n , a n d its wealth a n d raw materials w o u l d fuel G e r m a n industry a n d allow it to d o m i n a t e the g l o b e . L e o A m e r y p r o p o s e d to L l o y d G e o r g e that Britain s h o u l d a d o p t a strategy to counter that threat. If Britain were to c a p t u r e the center of A s i a , then the partition of R u s s i a between G e r m a n y a n d Britain, which Milner had p r o p o s e d the year before, would in effect be "White troops": British rather than Indian soldiers of the Indian Army.

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achieved. At the end of 1917 A m e r y noted in his diary that " T h e war is g o i n g E a s t with a v e n g e a n c e a n d we shall find ourselves fighting for the rest of it to decide where the A n g l o - G e r m a n b o u n d a ry shall run across A s i a . " T h e F r e n c h , looking to eastern E u r o p e for their p o s t w a r gains, would fail, he p r e d i c t e d , "while we poor meek British will p r o b a b l y find our n o n - a g g r e s s i v e little E m p i r e at the end of the war including T u r k e s t a n , Persia, a n d the C a u c a s u s ! " T h i s represented yet a further enlargement of the vast section of the globe that A m e r y r e g a r d e d as p r o p e r l y falling u n d e r British h e g e m o n y . L i k e Milner's other associates, his essential focus was on "the whole of the great semi-circle which runs from C a p e T o w n to C a i r o , thence t h r o u g h Palestine, M e s o p o t a m i a a n d Persia to I n d i a a n d s o t h r o u g h S i n g a p o r e t o Australia a n d N e w Z e a l a n d . " Within that area, he wrote to the P r i m e Minister of Australia in late 1917, "What we want . . . is a British M o n r o e D o c t r i n e which should keep that portion of the world free f r o m future interference of a m b i t i o u s powers . . . " 1 0

n

By J u n e of 1918 A m e r y had c o m e to feel (and to advise L l o y d G e o r g e ) that, if G e r m a n expansion in A s i a were not s t o p p e d , this " S o u t h e r n British World" could not "go a b o u t its peaceful b u s i n e s s without constant fear of G e r m a n a g g r e s s i o n . " He wrote that "as soon as this 'little s i d e show' in the West is over . . . we shall have to take the war for the m a s t e r y of A s i a in h a n d s e r i o u s l y . " T h i s harked back to his view that British foreign policy was flawed by giving Britain's interests in E u r o p e priority over her interests elsewhere. He wrote in 1917 that " T h e great d a n g e r to my mind is that the F o r e i g n Office a n d the public .. . take too E u r o p e a n a point of view about peace t e r m s , instead of looking at them from the perspective of an E m p i r e which i s distributed all over the world . . . " H e also thought that they were taking too E u r o p e a n a point of view a b o u t the war. He discerned fresh d a n g e r s in A s i a . 12

1 3

He wrote to S m u t s on 16 O c t o b e r 1917, warning that E n v e r would gain "some five million" T u r k s w h o dwelt in T r a n s c a u c a s i a and then would link up with the T u r k s of T u r k e s t a n . E v e n t s early in the following year s e e m e d to confirm this view. A m e r y , like other British military a n d political leaders in the first half of 1918, was p e r s u a d e d that the G e r m a n a n d O t t o m a n c o n q u e s t of T r a n s c a u c a s i a d e m o n s t r a t e d that G e r m a n y was in process of executing the " G r a n d D e s i g n " outlined in J o h n Buchan's Greenmantle. In B u c h a n ' s adventure novel, the G e r m a n s were planning a sweep t h r o u g h I s l a m i c A s i a to a n d a c r o s s the Indian frontier to destroy the British E m p i r e in the east and replace it with their o w n . T h u s in w a g i n g war as in m a k i n g peace, a c c o r d i n g to A m e r y , British forces should be m o v e d up to a defensive line running all the way a c r o s s the former R u s s i a n E m p i r e from the U r a l s in the west to S i b e r i a in the east. 1 4

1 5

1 6

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Neither the War Office nor the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a was willing to m a k e available the forces for s u c h l a r g e s c h e m e s in distant p l a c e s ; and A m e r y went so far as to p r o p o s e that J a p a n a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d be invited to associate themselves in the enterprise of o c c u p y i n g the U r a l s to S i b e r i a l i n e . British a n d Allied military leaders also u r g e d that J a p a n s h o u l d be asked to s e n d a r m i e s t h r o u g h S i b e r i a a n d across A s i a to join battle with Enver's forces west of the Caspian S e a . 17

1 8

B u t L l o y d G e o r g e a n d L o r d Milner were s o completely occupied with the war in E u r o p e a n d Palestine that A m e r y c o u l d not attract their attention; a n d in the a b s e n c e of their leadership, their s u b o r d i nates failed to develop a coherent policy. Breathtakingly a m b i t i o u s geopolitical g o a l s were outlined by A m e r y a n d by general officers of the high c o m m a n d , but no r e s o u r c e s were allocated a n d no strategy was put in motion to achieve t h e m . S o , without g u i d a n c e and without s u p p o r t , the tiny m i s s i o n s sent out by the British G o v e r n m e n t of India headed into the interior of Asia.

IV B a k u , the oil capital of Central Asia, w a s a focus of activity in the s u m m e r of 1918, as Bolshevik leaders fled the city. A new nonBolshevik g o v e r n m e n t was hastily f o r m e d , which called in the British. Dunsterville asked and received p e r m i s s i o n from his s u p e r i o r s to enter a n d defend B a k u . H i s a d v a n c e g u a r d arrived in B a k u 4 A u g u s t , thwarting G e r m a n h o p e s of obtaining B a k u ' s oil, w h e r e u p o n the G e r m a n s d e c i d e d that T u r k e y was a lesser danger than Britain just a s the Bolsheviks were reaching the o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n . The G e r m a n s asked p e r m i s s i o n of the Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t to launch an attack on British-held B a k u , either alone or in c o m b i n a t i o n with Enver's A r m y of I s l a m . T h e Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t agre.ed to accept a G e r m a n o c c u p a t i o n of B a k u , but not in combination with the A r m y of I s l a m ; for even the British, a c c o r d i n g to P e t r o g r a d , were preferable to the T u r k s . B u t the G e r m a n force in G e o r g i a w a s too weak to s p a r e t r o o p s in time for a c a m p a i g n against B a k u — a n d that left the A r m y of I s l a m a n d the British mission as the only contestants in the field. 19

Dunsterville's force a m o u n t e d to a b o u t 900 officers a n d men according to one s o u r c e , or a b o u t 1,400 according to a n o t h e r . T h e A r m y of I s l a m was estimated to be ten or twenty times greater. When it attacked B a k u , the British were on their o w n ; local forces proved to be of little help. On 14 S e p t e m b e r Dunsterville evacuated his forces from the city and withdrew to Persia, having o c c u p i e d the c i t y — a n d d e p r i v e d the enemy of oil—for six weeks. A British 20

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R e u t e r s ' d i s p a t c h d e s c r i b e d the B a k u evacuation as one of the "thrillingest c h a p t e r s " of the w a r . At a b o u t the time that D u n s t e r v i l l e m a r c h e d to the relief of B a k u , G e n e r a l M a l l e s o n , also by invitation, m a r c h e d to the relief of T u r k e s t a n , whose g o v e r n m e n t h a d been f o r m e d b y anti-Bolshevik R u s s i a n M e n s h e v i k s a n d Social Revolutionaries with the aid of railroad workers. T h e T u r k e s t a n g o v e r n m e n t p r o c l a i m e d its i n d e p e n d ence from the Bolshevik R u s s i a n authorities; a n d , in r e s p o n d i n g to its a p p e a l , Malleson in effect w a s intervening in a R u s s i a n civil war—-an act p r o m p t e d by fears that G e r m a n y would get T u r k e s t a n ' s cotton s u p p l i e s , a n d that the G e r m a n a n d A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n prisoners-of-war would be freed. 2 1

T h e T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g native p o p u l a t i o n o f T u r k e s t a n , while o p p o s e d to both the Bolshevik a n d the anti-Bolshevik R u s s i a n settlers, threw their s u p p o r t behind the latter when forced to choose between the two. It was expected that once Enver's A r m y of I s l a m arrived, they would s u p p o r t it. T h e r e on the plains of T u r k e s t a n — i n the m i d d l e of nowhere, as far as the western world was c o n c e r n e d — t h e confused a r m i e s clashed. On the battlefields of D u s h a k , K a a k h a , a n d M e r v , G e n e r a l Malleson's B r i t i s h - I n d i a n forces fought alongside E n v e r ' s T u r k i s h s u p p o r t e r s against Soviet R u s s i a n s aided b y imperial G e r m a n a n d A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n prisoners-of-war who had been released a n d a r m e d by the Bolsheviks. Alliances had been r e v e r s e d : it was now Britain and Turkey versus Russia and Germany. General Malleson did not withdraw from Central A s i a until April 1919, half a year after the war e n d e d ; a n d he withdrew only when the anti-Bolshevik White a r m i e s of G e n e r a l Denikin o c c u p i e d the area. H i s intervention, which initially was a i m e d at s t o p p i n g the p r o g r e s s of the O t t o m a n a n d G e r m a n e m p i r e s , in the end was directed against the Bolsheviks.* At the time the British authorities did not distinguish clearly a m o n g the three; all of them s e e m e d to be r a n g e d together on the e n e m y side in the world war. T h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a had also sent out a third mission, consisting of three officers who were u n a w a r e of the Dunsterville a n d Malleson forays into former R u s s i a n territory. T h e y were sent to K a s h g a r in C h i n e s e T u r k e s t a n to o b s e r v e d e v e l o p m e n t s from a c r o s s the b o r d e r . O n c e there they decided to cross into R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n

Interventions elsewhere in the Russian Empire by British and Allied troops fail outside the scope of this volume. T h e Government of India did not coordinate its three missions, discussed above with the other interventions, nor did Simla send out the three missions in .the context of some more general plan or pattern of intervention.

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a n d to p r o c e e d to T a s h k e n t — t h e seat of the local S o v i e t government—-in an a t t e m p t to win the cooperation of the Bolshevik authorities in the m a t t e r s of the prisoners-of-war a n d of the cotton. Only when they arrived in T a s h k e n t did they learn that M a l l e s o n had intervened on behalf of the rival g o v e r n m e n t . T w o o f the three officers returned t o K a s h g a r . T h e third, Colonel F r e d e r i c k M a r s h m a n Bailey, d e c i d e d to r e m a i n in T a s h k e n t to represent British interests in the event that the local Bolshevik r e g i m e collapsed. When he learned that the local authorities were p r e p a r i n g to take m e a s u r e s against him, he d i s g u i s e d himself a n d d i s a p p e a r e d . In hiding he took m a n y identities, a m o n g t h e m those of a H u n g a r i a n cook, a R u m a n i a n c o a c h m a n , and an A l b a n i a n butterfly collector. He r e m a i n e d u n d e r c o v e r until 1920, g a t h e r i n g information as events unfolded. At the end he p o s e d as an agent of Bolshevik R u s s i a n counterintelligence. Soviet authorities, greatly e x a g g e r a t i n g , credited him with b e i n g the m a s t e r m i n d of vast intrigues against t h e m . L o n d o n a n d P e t r o g r a d , having been wartime allies not long before, were now enemies. Between 1917 a n d 1918, the political world had turned u p s i d e d o w n .

V As O t t o m a n fortunes p r o s p e r e d in the east, they c r u m b l e d in the south a n d west. A secret report to D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e in 1918 indicated that E n v e r was talking of an O t t o m a n e m p i r e from the Adriatic to I n d i a ; yet at other times he s u p p o s e d l y s p o k e of surrendering. E n v e r was reported to have predicted gloomily that "if the G e r m a n s won this War, T u r k e y would b e G e r m a n y ' s v a s s a l . " L u d e n d o r f f , the p r e s i d i n g g e n i u s of the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff, claimed that the Porte could not be t r u s t e d . T h e oil of B a k u was essential to G e r m a n y , he s t a t e d , but the T u r k s h a d shown that they intended to keep all the resources of T r a n s c a u c a s i a for t h e m s e l v e s . In r e s p o n s e to an inquiry from the Wilhelmstrasse to the G e n e r a l Staff, L u d e n d o r f f reported in S e p t e m b e r 1918 that the military authorities had been s t u d y i n g the c o n s e q u e n c e s s h o u l d T u r k e y betray G e r m a n y a n d g o over t o the Allied s i d e . 2 2

23

2 4

T h e close collaboration between G e r m a n y and Bolshevik R u s s i a infuriated the Porte. A g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d of T u r k i s h p r e s s criticism of G e r m a n m e d d l i n g in T r a n s c a u c a s i a , T a l a a t sent word to Berlin that if G e r m a n y continued to m a k e a r r a n g e m e n t s with R u s s i a — t h e "enemy of y e s t e r d a y a n d the enemy of t o m o r r o w " — a t T u r k e y ' s expense, the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t have to go its own way in the w a r . On 7 S e p t e m b e r 1918 T a l a a t went to Berlin to a r g u e for 2 5

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organizing the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g millions of Central A s i a for a military c r u s a d e against B r i t a i n — a n d R u s s i a . At the s a m e time Britain, too, m o v e d closer to war against R u s s i a . Malleson remained in C e n t r a l A s i a , where the execution of a g r o u p of Bolshevik c o m m i s s a r s by his anti-Bolshevik allies was b l a m e d on Britain by the P e t r o g r a d g o v e r n m e n t . On the other side of the C a s p i a n , a s u d d e n collapse of the Central Powers followed by the s o o n - t o - b e - d i s c u s s e d armistices of a u t u m n 1918, led British forces to return through B a k u to replace O t t o m a n a n d G e r m a n t r o o p s in the independent republics o f T r a n s c a u c a s i a . T h u s the s o u t h e r n stretches of the former R u s s i a n E m p i r e on both sides of the C a s p i a n S e a a p p e a r e d to be in the h a n d s of anti-Bolshevik or separatist g r o u p s u n d e r British protection. 2 6

A significant observation was m a d e by a British participant in the first battle between Malleson's force a n d the Bolsheviks in Central A s i a . B o t h the anti-Bolshevik t r o o p s a n d the Bolshevik t r o o p s , he noted, were wearing the s a m e u n i f o r m s . "At close q u a r t e r s , " he wrote, "it was difficult to d i s t i n g u i s h friend f r o m e n e m y . " By the a u t u m n of 1918 that w a s true not merely in Central A s i a but all across the M i d d l e E a s t . 27

39 BY T H E SHORES OF TROY i In the s u m m e r of 1918 the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff advised the I m p e r i a l War C a b i n e t in L o n d o n that victory in E u r o p e could not be won before the m i d d l e of 1919 a n d was far m o r e likely to be won in the s u m m e r of 1920. C o m m a n d e r s in the field took a m o r e hopeful view of the p r o s p e c t s for an early victory, b u t they h a d frequently been w r o n g in the p a s t , a n d in L o n d o n their cheerful predictions were viewed with c o n s i d e r a b l e s k e p t i c i s m . L u d e n d o r f f ' s powerful offensives of the s p r i n g a n d early s u m m e r , which h a d once again threatened P a r i s , h a d been s t o p p e d , a n d the G e r m a n s were falling b a c k ; b u t b y S e p t e m b e r 1918 L u d e n d o r f f h a d established a s t r o n g defensive line a n d there was no reason to believe that he could not hold it for a long t i m e . T h e war in the E a s t , too, s e e m e d likely to d r a g on, for E n v e r ' s forces driving t o w a r d the C a s p i a n s e e m e d poised to continue their offensive toward Persia, A f g h a n i s t a n , or I n d i a . S u d d e n l y — a n d u n e x p e c t e d l y — a n Allied b r e a k t h r o u g h c a m e in B u l g a r i a , where G e n e r a l L o u i s - F e l i x - F r a n c p i s F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y , the new F r e n c h c o m m a n d e r of the Allied forces in hitherto-neglected Salonika in G r e e c e , launched a lightning offensive at the e n d of the s u m m e r . B u l g a r i a collapsed a n d , on 26 S e p t e m b e r 1918, asked for an armistice. T h e r e q u e s t s h o u l d have been forwarded t o the S u p r e m e War Council of the Allies in P a r i s , b u t F r a n c h e t d'Esperey d a r e d not chance the delay. He c o m p o s e d the t e r m s of an armistice himself, a n d h a d it s i g n e d within a matter of days so that he could turn immediately to m o u n t a devastating offensive on the D a n u b e against the G e r m a n s a n d A u s t r i a n s , t h u s successfully executing the " E a s t e r n " strategy that L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been a d v o c a t i n g in vain ever since the war b e g a n . On 29 S e p t e m b e r L u d e n d o r f f , learning that a B u l g a r i a n armistice * But of course it can be argued that it would not have worked before 1918.

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h a d been c o n c l u d e d that day, a d v i s e d his g o v e r n m e n t that G e r m a n y w o u l d therefore have to s u e for an a r m i s t i c e t o o : he h a d no t r o o p s with which to make a s t a n d on the new southeastern front—the D a n u b e front—that Franchet d'Esperey had opened up. T h e British C a b i n e t had not e x p e c t e d the e n e m y to collapse so soon or so s u d d e n l y , was not p r e p a r e d for it, and did not entirely believe it. A r m i s t i c e t e r m s for the various enemy p o w e r s h a d not been drafted or even c o n s i d e r e d . A d a y after F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y received the B u l g a r i a n request for an armistice, the B r i t i s h Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff i n q u i r e d "what our F o r e i g n Office was g o i n g to do if T u r k e y followed s u i t . " B a l f o u r , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , replied—with c o m p l e t e c a n d o r — t h a t he did not know. 1

B u t the issue h a d to be faced i m m e d i a t e l y : it p r e s e n t e d itself within a matter of d a y s . Between 1 a n d 6 October b o t h the g o v e r n ment of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d several prominent individual T u r k i s h leaders launched peace feelers. On the night of 3—4 O c t o b e r G e r m a n y , too, sent a note to President Wilson, i n a u g u r a t i n g armistice negotiations that were to go on for several weeks, as fighting continued a n d as G e r m a n t r o o p s successfully held on to a defensive line that ran t h r o u g h eastern F r a n c e a n d B e l g i u m . On 1 O c t o b e r the British War C a b i n e t d e c i d e d to convoke a m e e t i n g of the S u p r e m e War C o u n c i l of the Allies in order to a d d r e s s the question of peace t e r m s for T u r k e y . At the s a m e time, however, the War C a b i n e t d e c i d e d to s e n d two British D r e a d n o u g h t class battleships to the A e g e a n to strengthen Britain against F r a n c e in the waters off T u r k e y . T h e C a b i n e t was seized by a panicky fear that the war m i g h t c o m e to an end before the British a r m e d forces could o c c u p y the vital M i d d l e E a s t e r n areas it hoped to d o m i n a t e . A m e r y warned S m u t s and the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff that only actual p o s s e s s i o n of the M i d d l e E a s t before a cease-fire went into effect w o u l d enable the C a b i n e t to b r i n g the region into the British o r b i t . T h e a r m i e s of British I n d i a in M e s o p o t a m i a were still weeks away f r o m strategically important a n d oil-rich M o s u l ; on 2 O c t o b e r its c o m m a n d e r was advised by the War Office to "occupy as large a portion of the oilbearing regions as p o s s i b l e . " 2

3

On 3 O c t o b e r the War C a b i n e t d i s c u s s e d at length the q u e s t i o n of a n armistice o r peace a g r e e m e n t with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e P r i m e Minister, who h o p e d to r e d u c e F r a n c e ' s a n d Italy's share in Britain's winnings in O t t o m a n A s i a , a r g u e d that in all fairness her Allies were not entitled to what they h a d originally been p r o m i s e d . A c c o r d i n g to an extract from m i n u t e s of the meeting, T h e P r i m e Minister said h e h a d been refreshing his m e m o r y a b o u t the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t , a n d h a d c o m e to the conclusion that it was quite inapplicable to present c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,

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a n d was altogether a m o s t u n d e s i r a b l e a g r e e m e n t from the British point of view. H a v i n g been c o n c l u d e d m o r e than two years a g o , it entirely overlooked the fact that our position in T u r k e y had b e e n won by very large British forces, whereas our Allies h a d c o n t r i b u t e d but little to the r e s u l t . 4

It was s p e c i o u s reasoning, b u t B a l f o u r , r e s p o n d i n g as though the P r i m e Minister were sincere in u r g i n g fair play, pointed out the fallacy in his reasoning. Mr Balfour r e m i n d e d the War C a b i n e t that the original idea had been that any territories that the Allies m i g h t a c q u i r e should be pooled and should not be r e g a r d e d as the p r o p e r t y of the nation which had won t h e m . T h e theory had been that the fighting in one theatre of war, where there was little to g a i n , m i g h t be j u s t as i m p o r t a n t a contribution to the c a u s e of the Allies as m u c h easier fighting in other theatres where great s u c c e s s e s were achieved. He believed that s o m e statement of this kind had been m a d e . 5

B o n a r L a w confirmed Balfour's recollection. L l o y d G e o r g e took another a p p r o a c h a n d a r g u e d that Britain a n d T u r k e y o u g h t to conclude a peace a g r e e m e n t immediately, rather than a m e r e armistice. ( I t was evident that, with British a r m i e s in occupation of m o s t of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a peace treaty negotiated immediately was likely to favor Britain as the only power in a position to extract concessions f r o m the P o r t e . ) L l o y d G e o r g e a r g u e d that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was unlikely t o accept a m e r e armistice without knowing what peace t e r m s were to be i m p o s e d later. S u s p i c i o n of F r e n c h a n d Italian a m b i t i o n s , he s a i d , would drive the Porte to refuse such an a r r a n g e m e n t . T h e r e f o r e T u r k e y w o u l d fight on. T h i s , the P r i m e Minister continued, would be intolerable, for it meant that the British w o u l d have to fight on, too, for the s a k e of s e c u r i n g purely F r e n c h and Italian a m b i t i o n s ; and that o u g h t to be out of the q u e s t i o n . He said that he w o u l d present the matter in this light to the F r e n c h and Italian p r e m i e r s in Paris, a n d he e x p r e s s e d confidence that they would let h i m have his way. N o n e t h e l e s s the C a b i n e t drafted the t e r m s of a p r o p o s e d armistice agreement, which the P r i m e M i n i s t e r took with him to Paris to d i s c u s s with the other Allied h e a d s of g o v e r n m e n t t o w a r d the end of the first week in O c t o b e r . In Paris the Allies agreed on an armistice p r o p o s a l b a s e d largely on the British draft a n d a g r e e d that the armistice s h o u l d be negotiated on behalf of the Allies by whichever power was a p p r o a c h e d by T u r k e y in the matter. H o w e v e r the Allied p r e m i e r s d i s m i s s e d out of h a n d L l o y d G e o r g e ' s s c h e m e for an i m m e d i a t e peace treaty.

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A subject of increasing controversy between the Allied leaders was the question of who s h o u l d exercise s u p r e m e military c o m m a n d in the several theaters of war against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e F r e n c h , who exercised s u p r e m e naval c o m m a n d in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , s o u g h t to displace the British c o m m a n d e r of its A e g e a n wing, V i c e - A d m i r a l S o m e r s e t A r t h u r G o u g h - C a l t h o r p e , who claimed that the F r e n c h were "on the whole incapable of r u n n i n g a s o u n d naval c a m p a i g n . " T h e issue was not merely military; for whichever country held the c o m m a n d would be first off the m a r k in getting to the spoils of victory. 6

In F r a n c h e t d'Esperey's c o m m a n d , the eastern flank (which faced T u r k e y ) h a d been led by a British general, G e o r g e F r a n c i s M i l n e . F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y , flushed with s u c c e s s in B u l g a r i a , now p r o p o s e d to break up his British contingent, to entrust the eastern flank to a F r e n c h c o m m a n d e r a n d to p r e p a r e an eventual t r i u m p h a l m a r c h into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , led by himself. L l o y d G e o r g e vetoed the t r i u m p h a l entry, a n d s u c c e e d e d in getting C l e m e n c e a u to order G e n e r a l Milne to be reinstated as c o m m a n d e r of Salonika's T u r k i s h front. With the s u p p o r t o f M a r s h a l F o c h , L l o y d G e o r g e m a n a g e d t o c h a n g e the C l e m e n c e a u - F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y strategy of concentrating all land forces in the Balkan theater on the E u r o p e a n c a m p a i g n . I n s t e a d s o m e forces were detached u n d e r General Milne to m a r c h on C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in s u p p o r t of an Allied naval attack t h r o u g h the Dardanelles. L l o y d G e o r g e p r o p o s e d , in a letter to C l e m e n c e a u dated 15 O c t o b e r , that a British a d m i r a l s h o u l d lead the t r i u m p h a l entry into C o n s t a n t i n o p l e by sea. On 21 O c t o b e r C l e m e n c e a u replied, refusing to a g r e e ; his c o u n t e r p r o p o s a l was that the Allied fleet s t e a m i n g up the straits to the O t t o m a n capital s h o u l d be under F r e n c h c o m m a n d . C l e m e n c e a u a r g u e d that since a British general had been given c o m m a n d of the S a l o n i k a c a m p a i g n against T u r k e y , it was intolerable that a British officer s h o u l d also be given c o m m a n d of the naval c a m p a i g n . He pointed to the i m m e n s e F r e n c h investment in the O t t o m a n p u b l i c debt as a significant national interest that r e q u i r e d F r a n c e to play a leading role in m a t t e r s affecting T u r k e y .

II In hiding, in a G r e e k h o m e in P e r a , the residential section of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , was L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l Stewart F. N e w c o m b e . A British officer active in the A r a b Revolt, he h a d been taken prisoner a year before while leading a d a r i n g diversionary attack d u r i n g Allenby's J e r u s a l e m c a m p a i g n . On his third a t t e m p t , he had s u c ceeded in e s c a p i n g from T u r k i s h captivity, a n d from 22 S e p t e m b e r

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1918 he had been hiding in P e r a , where he soon learned that there were O t t o m a n politicians who were in search of an i m m e d i a t e armistice. O p i n i o n in the O t t o m a n capital was at a turning point. Until m i d S e p t e m b e r , C . U . P . m e m b e r s by a n d large still believed in ultimate victory. Civilian m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t had deferentially accepted Enver's a s s u r a n c e s that all was g o i n g well. L a t e r they claimed to have believed the War Minister when he explained that the a p p a r e n t G e r m a n retreat in F r a n c e was actually a brilliant d e c e p t i o n : a m a neuver by the G e r m a n General Staff to trap the unwary Allied a r m i e s a n d destroy t h e m . E n v e r went so far as to ask C a b i n e t m e m b e r s not to give Berlin's g a m e away, a n d to repeat in p u b l i c — a s though they believed it—that the G e r m a n s h a d been defeated a n d were r e t r e a t i n g . 7

T a l a a t , the G r a n d Vizier, was better informed, knew that the G e r m a n s really were suffering defeats, a n d therefore advocated a G e r m a n - T u r k i s h bid for a c o m p r o m i s e p e a c e ; b u t not even he believed that it h a d to be done urgently, for E n v e r had misled h i m , too, into thinking that the military situation was satisfactory for the m o m e n t a n d that it offered s o m e new g r o u n d s for h o p e . In S e p t e m b e r , T a l a a t went to Berlin a n d Sofia a n d learned s o m e thing of the true situation from his allies there: on his way b a c k he witnessed the collapse of the B u l g a r i a n a r m y a n d was officially notified that B u l g a r i a w o u l d seek a s e p a r a t e p e a c e . B u l g a r i a was the land link t o G e r m a n y ; her defection—in T a l a a t ' s j u d g m e n t — d o o m e d T u r k e y to defeat. He returned determined to seek a peace agreement. In concert with the G e r m a n s , his g o v e r n m e n t p r o m p t l y went a h e a d to s o u n d out the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t on the possibility of s u r r e n d e r i n g to the U n i t e d S t a t e s on the basis of Woodrow Wilson's F o u r t e e n Points. W a s h i n g t o n , not b e i n g at war with the Porte, inquired of Britain how to reply, but received no r e s p o n s e from L o n d o n ; for whatever reason the British reply never reached Washington, which therefore was u n a b l e to r e s p o n d to the Porte. In effect this meant that the benefit of the F o u r t e e n Points was not available to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , for only a power that s u r r e n d e r e d to the U n i t e d S t a t e s c o u l d expect A m e r i c a n peace t e r m s . 8

It was at this point that N e w c o m b e , from his hiding place, took a hand in m a t t e r s . E n v e r , who was d e t e r m i n e d to go on with the war, felt that by continuing to fight T u r k e y could win better t e r m s ; and pointed to T u r k i s h s u c c e s s e s in the C a u c a s u s and on the C a s p i a n as proof that he could win victories in the east that would force Britain to concede favorable peace terms in 1919. T h e s e were the a r g u m e n t s that N e w c o m b e assailed. H e drafted notes for the Y o u n g T u r k leaders in which he a t t e m p t e d to p r o v e that just the reverse w a s t r u e : that Britain would g r a n t more favorable terms in 1918 than in 1919.

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T h r o u g h his T u r k i s h friends, N e w c o m b e ' s notes were circulated at the Porte, and he reported later that they had p r o d u c e d a p r o f o u n d effect. A c c o r d i n g to his informants, the notes had c a u s e d a split in the C . U . P . l e a d e r s h i p . Actually the split h a d been c a u s e d by the Cabinet's realization— b r o u g h t a b o u t by the collapse of B u l g a r i a and by G e r m a n y ' s decision to s u e for p e a c e — t h a t E n v e r h a d been deceiving it. T u r k e y ' s allies were not (as E n v e r had c l a i m e d ) winning the war; they were facing d e s t r u c t i o n — a n d would leave the O t t o m a n E m p i r e isolated, cut off from its s u p p l i e s of fuel, a m m u n i t i o n , money, a n d possible reinforcements, to face the victorious Allied Powers alone. E a r l y in October the F i n a n c e Minister noted in his diary that "Enver Pasha's greatest guilt is that he never kept his friends informed of the situation. If he had said five or six m o n t h s a g o that we were in so difficult a situation, naturally we would have . . . m a d e a favourable separate peace at that time. B u t he concealed everything, .and . . . he deluded himself and b r o u g h t the country to this s t a t e . " 9

10

On the m o r n i n g of 1 O c t o b e r , soon after T a l a a t learned that G e r m a n y was a b o u t to s u e for p e a c e , he called his C a b i n e t together to tell its m e m b e r s that they m u s t resign. T h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e was forced to seek an armistice immediately, he told them, a n d the Allies would i m p o s e far harsher t e r m s if they thought that he a n d his C . U . P . colleagues were still in c o n t r o l . E n v e r and D j e m a l d i s a g r e e d and a r g u e d that the C a b i n e t could s e c u r e better terms by holding on and holding out, but they were in the minority. T a l a a t prevailed, and informed the S u l t a n that he a n d his Cabinet intended to resign. 11

T h e new S u l t a n , M e h m e d V I , who h a d s u c c e e d e d t o the throne several m o n t h s earlier on the death of his brother, was p r o v i d e d with a new G r a n d Vizier a n d C a b i n e t only with the greatest difficulty. T h e S u l t a n preferred a neutral C a b i n e t , or p e r h a p s one d r a w n from the ranks of the political o p p o s i t i o n , but T a l a a t a n d the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party still controlled the Parliament, the police, and the army, and d e m a n d e d representation in the Cabinet to keep watch on the new r e g i m e . It took a week to find a s t a t e s m a n a p p r o v e d by the S u l t a n yet p r e p a r e d to agree to T a l a a t ' s t e r m s . At last the d i s t i n g u i s h e d F i e l d M a r s h a l A h m e t Izzet P a s h a — a m a n believed t o be acceptable to the A l l i e s — f o r m e d a new Cabinet that included several m e m b e r s of the C . U . P . On 13 October T a l a a t and his ministers formally resigned. T h e next day Izzet Pasha d r o v e t h r o u g h silent, g l o o m y c r o w d s to the Porte to take office. T h e O t t o m a n situation was m o r e g r a v e than the Allied Powers realized. T h e fall of B u l g a r i a h a d severed the land route to A u s t r i a and G e r m a n y , cutting off hope as well as s u p p l i e s . Within T u r k e y itself half a million m a r a u d i n g deserters from the O t t o m a n a r m y

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brought c h a o s in their wake. T h o u g h he did not weaken his position by disclosing it, the new G r a n d Vizier felt that it was not p o s s i b l e to go on with the war. T w o d a y s after taking office, Izzet P a s h a att e m p t e d to s e n d Colonel N e w c o m b e to G r e e c e — t h e nearest Allied a r m y h e a d q u a r t e r s — t o try to b r i n g the war to an end, b u t no airplane c o u l d be found in which to fly h i m there. T h e Porte therefore sent an e m i s s a r y by s e a : another British prisoner-of-war, G e n e r a l C h a r l e s T o w n s h e n d . T o w n s h e n d h a d surrendered to the O t t o m a n a r m y at K u t in M e s o p o t a m i a in the s p r i n g of 1916, and h a d lived ever since u n d e r house arrest on an island off C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Entertained and lionized by the O t t o m a n leaders, he m o v e d with relative f r e e d o m in the political society of the capital. T o w n s h e n d b e c a m e aware in the a u t u m n of 1918 of rising peace sentiment a n d , like N e w c o m b e , he d e c i d e d to give events a p u s h . When T o w n s h e n d learned that the T a l a a t ministry had fallen, he a r r a n g e d an interview with the new G r a n d Vizier, a n d on 17 O c t o b e r went to the S u b l i m e Porte carrying s o m e notes that he had sketched out to indicate the sort of peace t e r m s that might be asked by Britain. H i s notes s u g g e s t e d that B r i t a i n would be willing to leave the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in p o s s e s s i o n of S y r i a , M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d perh a p s even the C a u c a s u s , so long as these regions were allowed local a u t o n o m y within a restructured e m p i r e that would r e s e m b l e a confederation of states. 1 2

T o w n s h e n d offered to help T u r k e y obtain g e n e r o u s t e r m s along these lines a n d offered to m a k e i m m e d i a t e contact with the British authorities. T h e G r a n d Vizier told h i m that it was a c r i m e for the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to have m a d e war on Britain, a n d that it was Enver's fault. He accepted T o w n s h e n d ' s offer of help in securing honorable peace t e r m s without letting T o w n s h e n d s u s p e c t that he would accept whatever terms he could get. T h a t evening T o w n s h e n d met with the Minister of the M a r i n e , who was his best friend in the new ministry, a n d who set out T u r k e y ' s armistice t e r m s , which were similar to those outlined in T o w n s h e n d ' s notes. A r r a n g e m e n t s were then m a d e to s e n d T o w n s h e n d out of T u r k e y through the port of S m y r n a . U n d e r cover of d a r k n e s s , he left S m y r n a on a t u g b o a t . Early in the m o r n i n g of 20 O c t o b e r , T o w n s h e n d ' s t u g b o a t reached the G r e e k island of Mitylene, where it encountered a motor vessel of the British navy. F r o m Mitylene, T o w n s h e n d wired the details of the T u r k i s h position to the F o r e i g n Office in L o n d o n . At his request, a fast vessel then took him to the British naval c o m m a n d e r in the A e g e a n , A d m i r a l C a l t h o r p e , whose h e a d q u a r t e r s were at the G r e e k island of L e m n o s . T o w n s h e n d told L o n d o n that the new G r a n d Vizier was willing to

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m a k e peace on the basis of the sort of g e n e r o u s t e r m s that he himself h a d sketched out in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . He g a v e L o n d o n the impression that if such g e n e r o u s t e r m s were not offered, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e would continue to w a g e war. A b o v e all, however, he indicated that the Porte wanted to deal with Britain rather than with the other Allies. ( I n f a c t — t h o u g h T o w n s h e n d did not know it—Izzet's first a t t e m p t h a d been to establish contact with F r a n c e , b u t his emissary had not yet been able to get t h r o u g h to F r e n c h h e a d q u a r t e r s . F o r d e c a d e s afterward the British continued to believe—as have m o s t historians—that T u r k e y h a d insisted on s u r r e n d e r i n g to them rather than to the F r e n c h . ) 13

C a l t h o r p e , on 20 O c t o b e r , also cabled the news to L o n d o n . He stressed (according to the P r i m e M i n i s t e r ) "that the T u r k s particularly wanted to deal with u s , not with the F r e n c h . " At the s a m e time C a l t h o r p e attacked the F r e n c h plan of taking c o m m a n d of the fleet that would s t r e a m toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . A c c o r d i n g to Calthorpe's cable, "the effect of a Fleet u n d e r F r e n c h c o m m a n d g o i n g up to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e w o u l d be d e p l o r a b l e . " Of c o u r s e no Allied fleet could enter the D a r d a n e l l e s safely unless the forts on shore were turned over to the Allies. C a l t h o r p e reported that T o w n shend said the T u r k s would m a k e this concession, not to all of the Allied forces, b u t to Britain, if she would agree to protect them against whatever action m i g h t be taken by the G e r m a n forces rem a i n i n g in the vicinity. "General T o w n s h e n d thinks that the T u r k s would be willing to send pleni-potentiaries now to treat for peace with British representatives a n d that they would allow the British to take over the F o r t s of the D a r d a n e l l e s if they were a s s u r e d of s u p p o r t against the G e r m a n s i n T u r k e y a n d the Black S e a . " 1 4

15

1 6

T h e t e l e g r a m s from T o w n s h e n d a n d C a l t h o r p e led to the longest British C a b i n e t meeting of the war. T h e C a b i n e t , still somewhat fearful that the war against G e r m a n y might d r a g on into 1919 or 1920, wanted to secure sea p a s s a g e for the Royal N a v y t h r o u g h the D a r d a n e l l e s into the Black S e a , where the fleet could m o v e to the R u m a n i a n coast to play a significant role in the final s t a g e s of the war in E u r o p e . T h e C a b i n e t a g r e e d , if necessary, to d i s p e n s e with the rest of the twenty-four terms of the Allied armistice proposal so long as the T u r k s ceased hostilities, turned over the D a r d a n e l l e s forts, a n d did everything possible to e n s u r e safe p a s s a g e for the fleet through the straits a n d into the Black S e a . T h e C a b i n e t authorized C a l t h o r p e to negotiate an armistice rather than a peace agreement b e c a u s e the latter would require consultation with the Allies a n d thus would c a u s e d e l a y s . T h e C a b i n e t told him to accept no less than s u r r e n d e r of the D a r d a n e l l e s forts a n d free p a s s a g e t h r o u g h the straits. T h e C a b i n e t also instructed him to ask for the rest of the twenty-four t e r m s a n d to secure the adoption of as 17

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m a n y of t h e m as p o s s i b l e , b u t to give way if the T u r k s w o u l d not agree to t h e m . T h e F r e n c h F o r e i g n Minister p r o t e s t e d o n the g r o u n d that F r a n c e had not been consulted before the C a b i n e t g a v e C a l t h o r p e authorization to negotiate a n d to d e p a r t f r o m the armistice t e r m s u p o n which the Allies had a g r e e d . C l e m e n c e a u was furious. It was not that the F r e n c h P r e m i e r had changed his opinions a n d now h a r b o r e d d e s i g n s on the M i d d l e E a s t ; it was that he did not want F r a n c e treated as t h o u g h she were a s u b o r d i n a t e or defeated c o u n t r y . T h e C a b i n e t quickly sent L o r d Milner to P a r i s to explain m a t t e r s to C l e m e n c e a u , a n d for the m o m e n t the F r e n c h were mollified. A new c a u s e of contention arose as soon as the F r e n c h b e c a m e aware of the British interpretation of the inter-Allied a g r e e m e n t as to who s h o u l d conduct armistice negotiations. T h e agreement p r o v i d e d that the first m e m b e r of the Alliance a p p r o a c h e d by T u r k e y for an armistice should conduct the negotiations. Britain, having been a p p r o a c h e d b y the T u r k s t h r o u g h T o w n s h e n d , interpreted the agreement to m e a n that she should not merely conduct the negotiations, but should c o n d u c t t h e m alone. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t instructed A d m i r a l C a l t h o r p e t o exclude the F r e n c h f r o m the negotiations s h o u l d they attempt to participate in t h e m . P e r h a p s the British were afraid that the F r e n c h , if allowed to participate, would insist on m a k i n g d e m a n d s on T u r k e y that would delay or prevent the c o n c l u d i n g of an a r m i s t i c e . Or alternatively, it m a y have been (as m a n y in F r a n c e believed) an overt opening m o v e in the British c a m p a i g n to deny F r a n c e the position that had been p r o m i s e d to her in the postwar M i d d l e E a s t . 18

19

Ill T h e armistice conference o p e n e d at 9:30 in the m o r n i n g on S u n d a y , 27 O c t o b e r 1918, a b o a r d the Agamemnon, a British battleship at anchor off the port of M u d r o s on the G r e e k island of L e m n o s . T h e small O t t o m a n delegation was h e a d e d by T o w n s h e n d ' s friend R a u f Bey, the new Minister of the M a r i n e . T h e British delegation was headed by Admiral Calthorpe. C a l t h o r p e showed the O t t o m a n delegation a letter he had received from Vice-Admiral J e a n F . C . A m e t , the senior F r e n c h naval officer in the area, stating his government's desire that he s h o u l d participate in the negotiations. He p r o p o s e d to attend the meetings a b o a r d the Agamemnon as the representative of V i c e - A d m i r a l D o m i n i q u e M. G a u c h e t , the Allied naval commander-in-chief in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a n d , as s u c h , C a l t h o r p e ' s superior officer. T h e O t t o m a n delegates explained that they were accredited only to

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the British, not to the F r e n c h . C a l t h o r p e replied that it would not have been desirable for the F r e n c h to participate in any event. He refused to invite A d m i r a l A m e t a b o a r d the Agamemnon. T h e negotiations were c o n d u c t e d in the captain's after-day cabin on deck. In a seemingly o p e n spirit, C a l t h o r p e b e g a n by r e a d i n g aloud and d i s c u s s i n g the p r o p o s e d armistice t e r m s one at a time. As the O t t o m a n delegates d i d not at first see the d o c u m e n t in its entirety, they did not immediately c o m p r e h e n d the c u m u l a t i v e effect of its twenty-four clauses. M o r e o v e r , C a l t h o r p e a s s u r e d them that Britain meant no h a r m a n d intended only to be helpful. He explained what he s u p p o s e d to be the Allied p u r p o s e in f r a m i n g the various clauses in s u c h a way as to s u g g e s t that they p r o v i d e d r e m e d i e s for contingencies so r e m o t e that it was unlikely they would ever have to be invoked. At the s a m e time, he m a n a g e d to s u g g e s t that there was not m u c h give in the Allied position: that if the T u r k s wanted an armistice, they would have to accept the Allied draft m o r e or less in its entirety. S e e i n g no alternative, on the evening of 30 O c t o b e r the head of the O t t o m a n delegation, R a u f B e y , s i g n e d an armistice little c h a n g e d f r o m the original Allied draft. It p r o v i d e d that hostilities s h o u l d cease as of noon the following day. T h e armistice was in fact a surrender which permitted the Allies to o c c u p y strategic points in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e s h o u l d their security be threatened: in effect the Allies were free to o c c u p y any territory they wanted. When Rauf Bey and his fellow delegates returned to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , they claimed that the armistice did not constitute a s u r r e n d e r a n d pictured its t e r m s as far m o r e lenient than they actually w e r e . In doing so they sowed the s e e d s of later disillusion a n d discontent. While the armistice negotiations were g o i n g on, T a l a a t convened a meeting of close political associates at Enver's villa to f o u n d an u n d e r g r o u n d organization d e s i g n e d t o protect those Y o u n g T u r k e y leaders who were to remain in the country from p o s s i b l e Allied reprisals, in c a s e there s h o u l d be any, a n d also to lay the g r o u n d for a r m e d resistance to Allied t e r m s should that p r o v e necessary. U n d e r g r o u n d cells were organized in Constantinople and thereafter throughout the provinces. 2 0

F o r themselves, Enver, T a l a a t , a n d D j e m a l m a d e a r r a n g e m e n t s (of which the G r a n d Vizier was aware) to e s c a p e ; a n d on 2 N o v e m b e r the ex-rulers of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e fled with their G e r m a n allies. T h e following day, 3 N o v e m b e r , the G r a n d Vizier went through the motions of d e m a n d i n g that the G e r m a n s return the fugitives, but G e r m a n y was disintegrating a n d the fugitives had disappeared. 2 1

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IV C l e m e n c e a u , the F r e n c h P r e m i e r , w a s e n r a g e d at Britain's having m a d e unilateral decisions at M u d r o s , a n d p r o t e s t e d vehemently at a session of the S u p r e m e War C o u n c i l of the Allies at the Q u a i d'Orsay o n 3 0 O c t o b e r . B u t L l o y d G e o r g e , a c c o r d i n g t o o b s e r v e r s , g a v e back better than he g o t . Colonel H o u s e , W o o d r o w Wilson's e m i s s a r y , s a i d of the two p r i m e ministers that "they b a n d i e d w o r d s like fish-wives, a t least L l o y d G e o r g e d i d . " 2 2

L l o y d G e o r g e told C l e m e n c e a u a n d the others that except for G r e a t Britain no one had c o n t r i b u t e d anything m o r e than a handful of black t r o o p s to the expedition in Palestine . . . T h e British h a d now s o m e 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 men o n T u r k i s h soil. T h e British h a d c a p t u r e d three o r four T u r k i s h A r m i e s and h a d incurred h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of casualties in the war with T u r k e y . T h e other g o v e r n m e n t s had only p u t in a few nigger policemen to see that we d i d not steal the H o l y S e p u l c h r e ! When, however, it c a m e to s i g n i n g an armistice, all this fuss was m a d e . 2 3

B a l f o u r p o i n t e d out that F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y had negotiated the B u l g a r i a n a r m i s t i c e without c o n s u l t i n g Britain, and that C a l t h o r p e had been no less entitled to negotiate the T u r k i s h a r m i s t i c e without consulting F r a n c e . C l e m e n c e a u took counsel with his F o r e i g n Minister a n d , in the e n d , a g r e e d that as the A r m i s t i c e of M u d r o s w a s already s i g n e d , there w a s nothing further to be d o n e a b o u t it; he would consider the m a t t e r closed. ' On 12 N o v e m b e r 1918, a l m o s t two weeks after the T u r k i s h armistice w a s signed a n d the day after the armistice on the western front, a s q u a d r o n u n d e r the c o m m a n d of A d m i r a l C a l t h o r p e entered the straits of the D a r d a n e l l e s , p a s s i n g close to the ruined site of ancient T r o y , a n d s t e a m e d i n t r i u m p h toward C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — under the British flag.

V O n e of the British P r i m e Minister's r e a s o n s for acting quickly in the T u r k i s h m a t t e r was that he wanted to settle things before the U n i t e d

* Three thousand years before, Troy had seen another wartime European alliance come to grief when Agamemnon, the leader of the alliance, did what Britain did aboard the Agamemnon: he withheld a victory prize that previously had been awarded to an ally.

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S t a t e s intervened. An entry for 6 O c t o b e r in the diary of M a u r i c e H a n k e y , Secretary to the War C a b i n e t , r e c o r d s an unusually frank statement by the P r i m e Minister of what he intended to d o . LI G took a very intransigeant attitude and wanted us to go b a c k on the S y k e s - P i c o t a g r e e m e n t , so as to get Palestine for us arid to b r i n g M o s u l into the British zone, a n d even to keep the F r e n c h out of S y r i a . He also had s o m e subtle d o d g e for asking A m e r i c a to take Palestine a n d S y r i a , in order to render the F r e n c h m o r e a n x i o u s to give us Palestine, so that they m i g h t have an e x c u s e of [for] k e e p i n g S y r i a . He was also very c o n t e m p t u o u s of President Wilson a n d anxious to a r r a n g e the division o f T u r k e y between F r a n c e , Italy, a n d G . B . before s p e a k i n g to A m e r i c a . He also t h o u g h t it would attract less attention to our e n o r m o u s gains in the war if we swallowed our share of T u r k e y now, a n d the G e r m a n colonies l a t e r . 24

Balfour took a m u c h different point of view. When the F r e n c h s u g g e s t e d doing what L l o y d G e o r g e h a d i n m i n d — s e t t l i n g m a t t e r s before the A m e r i c a n s a r r i v e d — B a l f o u r thought the s u g g e s t i o n little short of insane. " T h e i r deliberate effort to exclude the A m e r i c a n s from any effective share in the world settlement is . . . neither in our interest nor in that of the F r e n c h themselves . . . H o u s e is u n d o u b t edly a n x i o u s to work with us as closely as he can a n d it w o u l d be fatal to give him the i m p r e s s i o n that we were settling or had the least desire to settle great q u e s t i o n s behind his b a c k . " Balfour believed that the stability of the peace settlement would r e q u i r e A m e r i c a n participation. U n l i k e the P r i m e Minister, he was not only sincere in offering the U n i t e d S t a t e s the m a n d a t e for Palestine, b u t believed it vital that she should be m a d e to accept it. 25

L e o A m e r y , of the War Office a n d the War C a b i n e t secretariat, who had b e c o m e politically close to the P r i m e Minister, feared rather than hoped that the U n i t e d S t a t e s m i g h t accept s u c h an offer if it were m a d e . He wrote to the Zionist leader Dr C h a i m Weizmann to ask him to work against a U . S . trusteeship, a n d s e c u r e d a statement from Dr W e i z m a n n that he a g r e e d with A m e r y that Britain would be a better choice as the m a n d a t o r y p o w e r . 2 6

However, M a u r i c e H a n k e y , S e c r e t a r y to the War C a b i n e t a n d Amery's i m m e d i a t e superior, was in favor of a U . S . trusteeship as a way for Britain to secure the strategic benefit of excluding any potential e n e m y from Palestine without a s s u m i n g the b u r d e n of d o i n g so herself. He told L l o y d G e o r g e that he wanted the U n i t e d S t a t e s to have Palestine "with the object of creating a buffer state to cover E g y p t . " Implicit in his suggestion was the old K i t c h e n e r notion that Palestine w a s of no value in herself. L l o y d G e o r g e , of course, disagreed. 2 7

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VI On 1 D e c e m b e r 1918 C l e m e n c e a u m e t in L o n d o n with L l o y d G e o r g e at 10 D o w n i n g S t r e e t . It was a m o n t h after the armistices, a n d a couple of m o n t h s before the peace conferences were to o p e n in Paris. It was not until the end of D e c e m b e r that the President of the U n i t e d S t a t e s was to visit L o n d o n a n d outline his idealistic vision of the f u t u r e ; there was time to reach private a g r e e m e n t s before then. T h e two p r i m e ministers met alone a n d neither took notes. An account of what o c c u r r e d was s u p p l i e d in writing to the British Cabinet s o m e eight m o n t h s later by B a l f o u r , who p r e s u m a b l y h a d it from L l o y d G e o r g e . L a t e r it was confirmed in L l o y d G e o r g e ' s m e m o i r s of the peace treaties. In the c o u r s e of a conversation that b e g a n with E u r o p e a n q u e s tions, the subject of the M i d d l e E a s t was raised. C l e m e n c e a u asked what modifications of the F r e n c h claims were desired by Britain. L l o y d G e o r g e replied: "Mosul."* C l e m e n c e a u said, "You shall have it. A n y t h i n g else?" L l o y d G e o r g e replied, "Palestine." A g a i n C l e m e n c e a u s a i d , "You shall have i t . " A m a n of his word, C l e m e n c e a u kept to it t h r o u g h all the bitter wrangling of the peace conferences, despite the fact that there was no written confirmation of his concessions a n d even though the British did not recognize that he expected to receive c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e m . 28

T h r o u g h o u t his long political life, it had been C l e m e n c e a u ' s policy to defer to Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t in order to s e c u r e her s u p p o r t in E u r o p e against G e r m a n y ; a n d that is what the F r e n c h Premier s e e m s to have believed that he h a d a c c o m p l i s h e d on 1 D e c e m b e r . A p p a r e n t l y C l e m e n c e a u believed—wrongly, as it turned o u t — t h a t he had obtained at least the tacit agreement of L l o y d G e o r g e to s u p p o r t F r a n c e ' s claims in E u r o p e in return for C l e m e n c e a u ' s e x p r e s s agreement to grant Britain's claims in the M i d d l e E a s t . B u t in fact the two p r i m e ministers had not even reached an agreement a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t on 1 D e c e m b e r . It transpired over the course of the next few m o n t h s that L l o y d G e o r g e h a d not presented all of his M i d d l e E a s t e r n claims when asked by C l e m e n c e a u to do so on 1 D e c e m b e r ; in addition to those he mentioned, he also wanted F r a n c e to relinquish her claim to S y r i a . In this L l o y d G e o r g e was not p u r s u i n g a purely personal foreign policy; on 2 D e c e m b e r — t h e day following the L l o y d G e o r g e -

* Mosul, commercial center of the oil-rich region that is now northern Iraq, had been promised to France in the Sykes-Picot negotiations (1916) by Sykes and Kitchener. In French political circles, it was believed that Lloyd George had given assurances in return—though it is not clear what they were supposed to have been.

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C l e m e n c e a u m e e t i n g — L o r d C u r z o n told the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t that he believed it was imperative to exclude F r a n c e from S y r i a . C u r z o n , who was c h a i r m a n of the c o m m i t t e e — w h i c h the C a b i n e t had entrusted with the task of redefining Britain's goals in the M i d d l e E a s t — f e l l back on the logic of the G r e a t G a m e in which he h a d earlier played so c o n s p i c u o u s a role. F o r m e r Viceroy of I n d i a a n d traveler along the t h e n - e x p a n d i n g R u s s i a n frontier, he had b e lieved earlier, and now had c o m e to believe again, that Britain's strategic goal was to prevent any G r e a t Power f r o m cutting the road to I n d i a . T h e r e w a s no reason to believe that F r a n c e , Britain's E u r o p e a n partner, had any intention of interfering with Britain's road to the E a s t . B u t possession of S y r i a would p u t F r a n c e in a position to do s o ; a n d indeed would m a k e F r a n c e the only G r e a t Power that could m o u n t s u c h a threat. As the G e n e r a l Staff a r g u e d in a m e m o r a n d u m of 9 D e c e m b e r 1918, "It is difficult to see how any a r r a n g e m e n t c o u l d be m o r e objectionable f r o m the military point of view than the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t of 1916, by which an enterprising a n d a m b i t i o u s foreign power is placed on interior lines with reference to our position in the M i d d l e E a s t . " T h a t was C u r z o n ' s view, too. L o r d C u r z o n told the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e that 2 9

A g o o d deal of my public life has been spent in connection with the political a m b i t i o n s of F r a n c e in almost every distant region where the F r e n c h have sway. We have been b r o u g h t , for reasons of national safety, into an alliance with the F r e n c h , which I h o p e will last, but their national character is different from o u r s , a n d their political interests collide with o u r s in m a n y cases. I am seriously afraid that the great power from w h o m we have m o s t to fear in future is F r a n c e . 3 0

C u r z o n took an especially s p a c i o u s view of the area from which F r a n c e therefore had to be e x c l u d e d in A s i a . T h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff, S i r H e n r y Wilson, who saw things similarly, wrote that, "from the left bank of the D o n to India is our interest and p r e s e r v e . " B a l f o u r was skeptical; the gateways to I n d i a , he r e m a r k e d , were "getting further a n d further from I n d i a , and I do not know how far west they are g o i n g to be b r o u g h t by the G e n e r a l Staff." 31

32

T h e P r i m e Minister was not of a m i n d to g r o u n d his policies in any s u c h geopolitical theory. So far as one can tell, L l o y d G e o r g e was simply trying to keep as m u c h c a p t u r e d territory as he c o u l d ; in the S y r i a matter, he a p p e a r s to have been merely an opportunist indulging in u n s y s t e m a t i c overreaching.

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VII S u p p o r t for the P r i m e Minister's objectives c a m e from the K i t c h e n e r loyalists in the M i d d l e E a s t , who h a d been saying for m o r e than a year that Britain h a d to have Palestine, u s i n g the pretext that she needed it in order to reconcile A r a b s a n d J e w s . A few m o n t h s after the A r m i s t i c e of M u d r o s , G e n e r a l G i l b e r t Clayton enlarged on this line of a r g u m e n t . In a m e m o r a n d u m that a p p e a r s to have reached the P r i m e Minister's desk, he c l a i m e d that after s o m e m o n t h s of experience in occupation of former O t t o m a n territories, it h a d b e c o m e clear to him that in practice the c o m m i t m e n t s m a d e by Britain to F r a n c e — n o t merely in Palestine, b u t also in S y r i a — h a d b e c o m e incompatible with those m a d e to A r a b i s m a n d Z i o n i s m . Friction was b o u n d to continue a n d to create d a n g e r s for Britain. A choice, he wrote, h a d to be m a d e . C l a y t o n a r g u e d that if S y r i a h a d to be given to F r a n c e , then Britain should renounce interest in Palestine in favor of the U n i t e d S t a t e s or s o m e other country willing to a s s u m e the b u r d e n . T h e better alternative, however, w o u l d be for Britain to take over the g o v e r n m e n t both of Palestine a n d S y r i a , with d u e r e g a r d to both J e w i s h a n d A r a b aspirations, a n d t o reward F r a n c e elsewhere, p e r h a p s b y giving her C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . 33

In the winter of 1919 the office of the P r i m e Minister distributed to the British p r e s s a confidential b a c k g r o u n d m e m o r a n d u m p u r p o r t ing to show that Feisal's forces "materially assisted" G e n e r a l Allenby in the c o n q u e s t of S y r i a a n d that they entered "the four great inland towns of S y r i a [ D a m a s c u s , H o r n s , H a m a , a n d A l e p p o ] ahead of G e n e r a l Allenby's other forces" and did s o , according to the m e m o r a n d u m , not as foreign invaders f r o m the H e j a z , but as a native force. " T h e great majority of the A r a b t r o o p s who thus assisted in liberating S y r i a were natives of the p r o v i n c e . " T h e tendency of the m e m o r a n d u m was t o d e m o n s t r a t e that A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g S y r i a had risen up and freed herself, a n d that it would be contrary to the principles p r of e s s e d by the western democracies to a t t e m p t to rei m p o s e foreign rule. 34

Feisal's A r a b c o r p s in the Palestine a n d S y r i a c a m p a i g n s was c o m posed o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y 3,500 m e n , b u t L l o y d G e o r g e obtained from Feisal a p u b l i c statement that the A r a b s who at one t i m e or another d u r i n g the war h a d served or allied with h i m or his father n u m b e r e d a b o u t 100,000; a n d in his a r g u m e n t against the F r e n c h that is the figure the P r i m e Minister u s e d . L l o y d G e o r g e knew the figure to be wildly inflated ("Eastern arithmetic is proverbially r o m a n t i c , " he later wrote) a n d indeed he believed the A r a b contribution to the conq u e s t of Palestine a n d S y r i a "was almost insignificant." As against the F r e n c h , however, the P r i m e Minister argued that he was placed in a difficult position when asked by t h e m to act against his other 35

PART IX THE TIDE GOES OUT

40 T H E T I C K I N G CLOCK i Victory in the F i r s t World War b r o u g h t the British E m p i r e to its zenith: with the addition of the territories it had occupied in the M i d d l e E a s t and elsewhere, it had b e c o m e larger than it—or any other e m p i r e — h a d ever been before. L l o y d G e o r g e , t h o u g h his country was war-weary and tired of distant and expensive a d v e n t u r e s , sought to hold on to as m u c h as p o s s i b l e of what Britain had gained in the war. T h a t was to be a chief objective in the negotiations he was about to begin with the other Allied and Associated P o w e r s . B u t before t u r n i n g to the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , the P r i m e Minister chose to seek a m a n d a t e from the electorate. On the night that the armistice with G e r m a n y was s i g n e d , the P r i m e Minister asked only two other politicians to dine with him and with the Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, Sir H e n r y Wilson, at D o w n i n g S t r e e t . T h e y were Winston Churchill and Churchill's best friend, the brilliant A t t o r n e y - G e n e r a l , F . E . S m i t h . I n his diary, Sir Henry Wilson noted that "we d i s c u s s e d m a n y things but principally the General Election!" 1

With his keen eye for political a d v a n t a g e , the Prime Minister saw a chance to win at the polls by calling an election in the i m m e d i a t e flush of victory. With a renewed and s e c u r e parliamentary majority, he hoped to gain time to carry through his p r o g r a m s . He sought his new m a n d a t e when his popularity was at its height. At the end of 1918 he was still "the m a n who won the war." T h e leader of the Conservative Party spoke for m a n y in saying that "He can be P r i m e Minister for life if he likes." 2

T h e general election took place on 14 D e c e m b e r 1918, t h o u g h to allow time to receive soldiers' ballots, the votes were not counted until 28 D e c e m b e r . L i b e r a l P r i m e Minister L l o y d G e o r g e and his political partner, the C o n s e r v a t i v e leader A n d r e w Bonar L a w , led the governmental Coalition. A s q u i t h ' s wing of the L i b e r a l s contested the elections; and L a b o u r also d r o p p e d out of the Coalition to do so.

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T h e Coalition scored a n overwhelming victory. Even L l o y d G e o r g e was stunned by its m a g n i t u d e . A l m o s t 85 percent of those who took their seats in the new H o u s e of C o m m o n s were his s u p p o r t e r s . Asquith's L i b e r a l s were crushed by the Coalitionists and A s q u i t h himself lost his seat, as did other prominent leaders of the prewar Liberal Party. T h e A s q u i t h L i b e r a l s were overtaken b y L a b o u r , which for the first time could lay claim to be the official O p p o s i t i o n . T h e nature of the electorate had been radically t r a n s f o r m e d by wartime legislation that for the first time g a v e the vote to women (from the age of thirty) and to all m e n (from the age of twenty-one). T w e n t y - o n e million people were eligible to vote in 1918, as c o m p a r e d with a mere seven and a half million before the war; and both the new working-class and women voters s e e m e d to have radically different ideas about such issues as paying the bills for imperial expansion abroad. F o r L l o y d G e o r g e , a potentially disquieting feature of his spectacular t r i u m p h was that the electoral g a i n s for the most part were m a d e by B on ar L a w ' s C o n s e r v a t i v e s rather than by his own L i b e r a l s . Indeed the Conservatives c o m m a n d e d a majority in the new H o u s e of C o m m o n s . M a n y of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s were new m e n , taking their seats in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s for the first t i m e ; a n d , of these, many were b u s i n e s s m e n who tended toward the right wing of their party. T h e i r political a g e n d a was not the s a m e as the P r i m e Minister's. F o r the m o m e n t , however, the P r i m e Minister received full s u p port from A n d r e w B o n a r L a w and therefore felt politically s e c u r e . L l o y d G e o r g e had formed a close working partnership with the Conservative leader that suited both men well. M o d e s t and shy, Bo n a r L a w was happy to let the exuberant and colorful P r i m e Minister take the lead and the limelight. "I tell you we m u s t never let the little man g o , " said B o n a r L a w to one of his lieutenants, in reference to the diminutive occupant of 10 D o w n i n g S t r e e t . "His way and o u r s lie side by side in the f u t u r e . " 3

II Winston Churchill, a 45-year-old politician trying to live down his past, was asked by L l o y d G e o r g e to serve as Secretary of S t a t e for War and for Air in the postwar C a b i n e t . T h e P r i m e Minister tendered his offer of the two ministries ("Of course there will be but one salary!") on 9 J a n u a r y 1 9 1 9 . Churchill accepted the offer the following day. As Minister of M u n i t i o n s he had not been a m e m b e r of the War C a b i n e t , so his entry into the War Office m a r k e d his return to 4

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the inner circles of g o v e r n m e n t . Predictably, the a p p o i n t m e n t aroused violent o p p o s i t i o n . A C o n s e r v a t i v e n e w s p a p e r c o m m e n t e d that "we have watched his brilliant and erratic c o u r s e in the confident expectation that sooner or later he would make a m e s s of anything he undertook. Character is destiny; there is s o m e tragic flaw in Mr Churchill which determines him on every occasion in the w r o n g c o u r s e . . . It is an a p p o i n t m e n t which m a k e s us tremble for the f u t u r e . " Churchill, who had to o v e r c o m e a r e p u t a t i o n — d e s e r v e d or not— for s q u a n d e r i n g the resources of the country, set out to show that he could be e c o n o m i c a l : he a r g u e d that a m b i t i o u s policies ought to be scaled back if the resources to s u p p o r t them were not available. But when he s u g g e s t e d that Britain might lack the money and the m a n power to back up L l o y d G e o r g e ' s p l a n s for Britain to replace the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the M i d d l e E a s t , the P r i m e Minister pointedly ignored h i m . 5

T h e P r i m e Minister c l a i m e d that Britain was entitled to play the dominant role in the M i d d l e E a s t , recalling that at one time or another two and a half million British t r o o p s had been sent there, and that a quarter of a million had been killed or w o u n d e d ; while the F r e n c h , Gallipoli apart, had suffered practically no casualties in the M i d d l e E a s t , and the A m e r i c a n s had not been there at a l l . At the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , L l o y d G e o r g e a r g u e d that his claim w a s b a s e d on the 1,084,000 British and imperial t r o o p s o c c u p y i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . In the occupation forces, as he pointed out, there were no non-British contingents of meaningful s i z e . 6

7

D u r i n g the war, a c c o r d i n g to the S e c r e t a r y of the C a b i n e t , the P r i m e Minister had "never lost sight of the a d v a n t a g e s he might hope to derive at the eventual peace conference from the acquisition of the territory of our e n e m i e s . " L l o y d G e o r g e had said to a friend that "once we were in military p o s s e s s i o n it would m a k e a great difference." 8

9

What Winston Churchill insistently repeated was that this situation—the o c c u p a t i o n of the M i d d l e E a s t by a million British s o l d i e r s — w a s only t e m p o r a r y ; the t r o o p s d e m a n d e d to be brought h o m e . T h i s w a s the first p r o b l e m with which Churchill had to g r a p p l e as War Minister, and he c o n t e n d e d that it i m p o s e d new priorities on the g o v e r n m e n t as a w h o l e . On 10 J a n u a r y 1919, Churchill's first day in office as Secretary of S t a t e for War, the Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff urgently consulted him a b o u t a crisis in the r a n k s : soldiers had d e m o n s t r a t e d , d e m a n d i n g i m m e d i a t e demobilization. D i s o r d e r was w i d e s p r e a d , and Churchill feared that the unrest m i g h t lead to a Bolshevik u p r i s i n g ; later he wrote that s u c h fears were valid at the time b e c a u s e " S o

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m a n y frightful things had h a p p e n e d , a n d s u c h t r e m e n d o u s collapses of established structures had been witnessed, the nations h a d suffered so long, that a tremor, a n d indeed a s p a s m , shook the foundations of every S t a t e . " Churchill believed that the troops had to be b r o u g h t h o m e as fast as the railroads a n d t r o o p s h i p s could b r i n g t h e m . A fortnight later 5 , 0 0 0 British t r o o p s at C a l a i s mutinied to d e m a n d demobilization, but Churchill w a s ahead of them with his solution, for he h a d already p r e p a r e d a demobilization plan of evident fairness; a n d u n d e r his direction it w a s rapidly carried into effect t h r o u g h o u t 1919. B u t demobilization threatened to p r e j u d i c e Britain's chances of imposing peace terms. Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, Commanderin-Chief of the British E x p e d i t i o n a r y F o r c e in E u r o p e , told Churchill on 15 J a n u a r y 1919 that the existing British a r m y "was rapidly d i s a p p e a r i n g , " a n d unless an a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n was created, "the G e r m a n s would be in a position to negotiate another kind of p e a c e . " T h e s a m e would be true of the T u r k s . A few d a y s later Churchill s u b m i t t e d a m e m o r a n d u m to the P r i m e Minister in which he a r g u e d that " U n l e s s we are to be d e f r a u d e d of the fruits of victory a n d . . . to throw away all that we have won with so m u c h cost and t r o u b l e , we m u s t provide for a g o o d m a n y m o n t h s to c o m e A r m i e s of O c c u p a t i o n for the enemy's territory. T h e s e a r m i e s m u s t b e s t r o n g enough to extract from the G e r m a n s , T u r k s and others" the t e r m s demanded. 1 0

11

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T o give the P r i m e Minister time t o i m p o s e his p e a c e t e r m s , Churchill a t t e m p t e d to maintain a r m i e s of occupation with newly inducted t r o o p s , on the basis of Britain's first peacetime draft; but the P r i m e Minister, mindful of d o m e s t i c political realities, o r d e r e d a reduction in the size of Churchill's a r m i e s . L a t e r Churchill was obliged to p r o m i s e that conscription would c o m e to an end by M a r c h 1920. T h o u g h he warned the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , " D o not d i s b a n d your a r m y until you have got your t e r m s , " political considerations forced a demobilization so r a p i d that, by October 1919, Churchill a d m i t t e d that "the A r m y h a d melted a w a y . " Yet in the E a s t , as will be seen presently, Britain h a d still not got her t e r m s . In 1914 Churchill h a d been the C a b i n e t minister m o s t keenly aware that the timetables of mobilization were d r i v i n g the G r e a t P o w e r s into a world war; in 1919 he w a s the C a b i n e t minister most keenly aware that the timetables of demobilization were forcing the e m p i r e to a b a n d o n the field before victory h a d been secured. 1 3

14

He also saw that, in order for Britain to live within her m e a n s , the g o v e r n m e n t urgently needed to cut e x p e n s e s . Churchill p r o m i s e d the C o m m o n s that "I shall do my u t m o s t to s e c u r e substantial r e d u c t i o n s in military forces, for without those reductions g o o d finance is imp o s s i b l e . " In fact in the years to c o m e he slashed e x p e n d i t u r e s to a 15

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mere 17 percent of what they h a d been, from 604 million p o u n d s in 1919 to 111 million p o u n d s in 1 9 2 2 . Another p r o b l e m , he a r g u e d , h a d to be f a c e d : b r i n g i n g the British troops home left the M i d d l e E a s t in the h a n d s of Indian soldiers. British I n d i a , d u r i n g the 1914 war, h a d sent m o r e t h a n a million troops o v e r s e a s , m a n y of t h e m M o s l e m . At the b e g i n n i n g of 1920 Churchill p o i n t e d out to the C a b i n e t the political c o n s e q u e n c e s of the fact that these p r e d o m i n a n t l y M o s l e m soldiers were the occupation t r o o p s who h a d been left in place, entrusted with the distasteful task of coercing fellow M o s l e m s . Churchill wrote that "All our limited m e a n s of getting the M i d d l e E a s t to settle d o w n quietly are c o m p r i s e d in the u s e of I n d i a n t r o o p s . We m u s t not do anything that will raise I n d i a n sentiment against the use of these t r o o p s or affect their own l o y a l t y . " S i n c e Britain now had to rely on her M o s l e m t r o o p s , her policies in the M i d d l e E a s t w o u l d have to be modified so as not to offend M o s l e m s e n t i m e n t ; a n d he a r g u e d — t h o u g h with little effect on the P r i m e M i n i s t e r — t h a t this pointed toward the need for a friendlier policy toward the T u r k s . 1 6

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Ill D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , flowing with energy despite his a r d u o u s years of wartime leadership, f o r m e d his p o s t w a r Coalition g o v e r n m e n t a week before his fifty-sixth b i r t h d a y . T h e items on his i m m e d i a t e personal a g e n d a were in the realm of foreign policy. He a r r a n g e d to s p e n d m u c h of his time a b r o a d , r e d r a w i n g the political m a p of the world. To free himself to concentrate on foreign policy, he left the m a n a g e m e n t of d o m e s t i c policy a n d the H o u s e of C o m m o n s to Bonar L a w . B u t B o n a r L a w p r o v e d u n e q u a l to the t a s k ; he failed to win time for the P r i m e Minister to concentrate on reconstructing the world u n d i s t u r b e d . It was not only that the war in Ireland h a d r e s u m e d , but that the social a n d economic conflicts within Britain h a d m o v e d out of the polling stations a n d into the streets a n d factories. M a n a g e m e n t a n d labor, each trying to m a i n t a i n its w a r t i m e g a i n s even though the e c o n o m y was shrinking, turned to industrial warfare a m o n t h after the election. Violence b r o k e out. T h e g o v e r n m e n t took counsel with the a r m y a n d naval chiefs of staff on m e a s u r e s to s u p p r e s s what t h e y — h a u n t e d by B o l s h e v i s m — f e a r e d m i g h t be a working-class revolution. In 1920 a n d 1921 the British e c o n o m y collapsed. Prices c o l l a p s e d , e x p o r t s s l u m p e d , c o m p a n i e s went out of b u s i n e s s , a n d the country was g r i p p e d by m a s s u n e m p l o y m e n t on a scale never known before. Politicians b e g a n to q u e s t i o n whether Britain could afford foreign

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policy a d v e n t u r e s in places like Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a a n d b e g a n to question whether she could even afford m e a s u r e s that were designed to b u y social peace at h o m e . T h e P r i m e Minister h a d e s p o u s e d a positive L i b e r a l p r o g r a m of h o u s i n g a n d social r e f o r m — i n large part, it w a s in the h a n d s of his principal parliamentary leader, D r C h r i s t o p h e r A d d i s o n — b u t h e was driven t o a b a n d o n the p r o g r a m , a n d Dr A d d i s o n , in the face of T o r y attacks on g o v e r n m e n t wastefulness. Y e t it h a d always been L l o y d G e o r g e ' s view that "the way to prevent the s p r e a d of-the revolutionary spirit was to e m b a r k at once on large s c h e m e s of social p r o g r e s s . " In his view, to give up s u c h s c h e m e s was to leave the door o p e n for agitation a n d violence; yet that is what he did rather than a b a n d o n his imperial a m b i t i o n s in the M i d d l e E a s t . 1 9

It was against this b a c k g r o u n d of a d i s a p p e a r i n g a r m y , a deteriorating e c o n o m y , a n d a disintegrating society that the P r i m e M i n i s t e r — a m a n who h a d worked miracles d u r i n g the w a r — c o n c e n trated on r e d r a w i n g the m a p of the M i d d l e E a s t a n d of the world, while Winston Churchill, u n h e e d e d , continued to warn that time was r u n n i n g out.

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BETRAYAL i T h e specific t e r m s of the M i d d l e E a s t a g r e e m e n t u p o n which the P r i m e Minister a n d his Allied colleagues finally settled p r o v e d to be less i m p o r t a n t than the p r o c e s s by which they were reached. O n e aspect of that p r o c e s s was that it took a long t i m e , d u r i n g which c i r c u m s t a n c e s , as will be seen, were to c h a n g e for the worse. F r i e n d l y foreign leaders were replaced by others less cooperative; q u a r r e l s developed between former allies; defeated enemies r e g r o u p e d a n d revived; a n d the British a r m y — i t w a s Churchill's constant t h e m e — was dwindling away a n d losing its ability to hold on to its c o n q u e s t s . A n o t h e r aspect of the negotiations that was to weaken the eventual settlement was the general sense that they were c o n d u c t e d in b a d faith. T h e negotiations—to b e d e s c r i b e d p r e s e n t l y — w e r e s h a p e d b y the P r i m e Minister's strategy of playing off the U n i t e d S t a t e s against Italy a n d F r a n c e , while counting on the U n i t e d S t a t e s to protect Britain against p o s s i b l e future threats f r o m Soviet R u s s i a or from a revived a n d r e a r m e d G e r m a n y . It was not until the 1918—19 negotiating s e a s o n h a d given way to that of 1919—20 that L l o y d G e o r g e discovered that the U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s not g o i n g to be B r i t a i n ' s — o r a n y b o d y ' s — a l l y : she was g o i n g to withdraw from world affairs and "entangling alliances." As will be seen, L l o y d G e o r g e was then obliged to reverse c o u r s e , seeking a F r e n c h alliance since an A m e r i c a n one was u n a v a i l a b l e ; a n d that, in t u r n , required him to reverse the c o u r s e of his a n t i - F r e n c h policy in the M i d d l e E a s t . B u t by then the d a m a g e to the A n g l o - F r e n c h alliance h a d already been d o n e . In the e n d the British leaders felt a sense of having been betrayed by the A m e r i c a n s , while the A m e r i c a n s felt that the British had cynically betrayed the ideals for which the world war s u p p o s e d l y had been fought. As a result of L l o y d G e o r g e ' s lack of s c r u p l e a n d Woodrow Wilson's lack of skill, the negotiation of a M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement b e g a n badly a n d e n d e d worse. 389

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II So determined was Woodrow Wilson to play a personal role in formulating the provisions of the peace treaties that he came to Europe to negotiate t h e m h i m s e l f — t h e first A m e r i c a n p r e s i d e n t to leave the western h e m i s p h e r e d u r i n g his t e r m of office. H i s u n p r e c e d e n t e d move m a d e the Allies u n e a s y ; as C l e m e n c e a u o b s e r v e d , he a n d his fellow p r i m e m i n i s t e r s , a s h e a d s o f g o v e r n m e n t , w o u l d b e outranked by the President who also served as head of state. By right of precedence, the President therefore would be entitled to chair the Peace Conference. S u g g e s t i o n s were m a d e in the p r e s s a n d elsewhere that Wilson should stay h o m e to devote himself full time to winning s u p p o r t in the S e n a t e a n d in the country for his peace t e r m s , leaving his adviser, E d w a r d H o u s e , t o represent h i m i n E u r o p e . T h e President rejected s u c h s u g g e s t i o n s a n d , p e r h a p s b e c a u s e of t h e m , b e g a n to question the g o o d faith of Colonel H o u s e . C r o s s i n g the ocean on the liner George Washington in D e c e m b e r 1918, Wilson a n d his m a n y A m e r i c a n a d v i s e r s arrived at B r e s t on F r i d a y the 13th. E v e r y w h e r e he went, Wilson met with a t u m u l t u o u s welcome. J o h n M a y n a r d K e y n e s wrote that "When President Wilson left Washington he enjoyed a prestige a n d a moral influence t h r o u g h o u t the world u n e q u a l l e d in history." N o t h i n g , however, c o u l d have p r o v i d e d a better description of what was g o i n g to h a p p e n at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e than Wilson's s p e e c h e s about what was not g o i n g to h a p p e n . Peoples a n d provinces were indeed "bartered a b o u t from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were chattels or p a w n s in a g a m e . " It was not the case that every settlement was "made in the interest a n d for the benefit of the population concerned"; on the contrary s u c h settlements were m a d e (though Wilson said they w o u l d not be) in order to p r o v i d e an " a d j u s t m e n t or c o m p r o m i s e of claims a m o n g rival states" seeking "exterior influence or m a s t e r y . " N o t even his own country was p r e p a r e d to follow the p a t h that he had m a r k e d out. 1

In N o v e m b e r 1918, at roughly the time the A r m i s t i c e a g r e e m e n t s were signed, the President's party had lost control of the U n i t e d S t a t e s S e n a t e in the m i d t e r m elections. T h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n Relations C o m m i t t e e therefore p a s s e d into the h a n d s of the President's adversaries. E v e n before the P e a c e C o n f e r e n c e began, the President a c cordingly was on notice that he w o u l d face p r o b l e m s in securing ratification of whatever t e r m s he m i g h t negotiate. N o t h i n g in the President's u n b e n d i n g nature d i s p o s e d him to m a k e the concessions or to e n g a g e in the political d e a l - m a k i n g that w o u l d have mitigated these political p r o b l e m s at h o m e . * For Wilson's speeches, see Chapter 31.

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A b r o a d it b e c a m e clear almost i m m e d i a t e l y that he h a d not thought t h r o u g h how he was going to carry into effect the g e n e r o u s and idealistic principles that he had articulated. He arrived in E u r o p e with m a n y general opinions b u t without specific p r o p o s a l s for dealing with the m a t t e r s that were to be d e c i d e d . In his m e m o r a b l e portrait of Wilson, K e y n e s pointed to what followed: "As the President had thought nothing out, the Council w a s generally working on the basis of a F r e n c h or British d r a f t . " L a c k i n g both detailed knowledge a n d negotiating skills, Wilson was r e d u c e d to an obstructive role, often refusing to be carried along by his colleagues, b u t u n a b l e to carry them along with h i m . 2

H o u s e a d v i s e d c o m p r o m i s e — w i t h the Allies a b r o a d , a n d with the S e n a t e at h o m e . Wilson s p u r n e d the advice, a n d t u r n e d against the intimate friend who offered it. T h e President broke with H o u s e ; from m i d - 1 9 1 9 on he refused to see him again.

in L l o y d G e o r g e ' s M i d d l e E a s t e r n strategy was to direct the A m e r i c a n s ' anti-imperialist ire against the c l a i m s p r e s e n t e d by Italy a n d F r a n c e , distracting the President from areas in which he m i g h t m a k e difficulties for Britain. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , British Secretary to the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , recorded in his diary even before the conference convened that L l o y d G e o r g e "means to try a n d get President Wilson into G e r m a n E a s t Africa in order to ride him off Palestine." In fact m u c h of the time no special effort was n e e d e d : E u r o p e a n issues inevitably were given a high, a n d other issues a relatively low, priority. T h e question of R u s s i a and the fear that Bolshevik revolutions would break out t h r o u g h o u t E u r o p e h a u n t e d the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . T h e other great question was the future of G e r m a n y . T h e future of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ranked as a lesser issue a n d Wilson was too p r e occupied to pay full attention to the M i d d l e E a s t . When Wilson did turn to these m a t t e r s , L l o y d G e o r g e adroitly excluded f r o m the conference a g e n d a q u e s t i o n s a b o u t the British-occupied areas of the M i d d l e E a s t , placing t h e m beyond the s c o p e of the President's s c r u tiny. At the s a m e t i m e , the P r i m e Minister diverted the President's anti-imperialist energies into critical scrutiny of the a m b i t i o n s of Britain's rivals in the M i d d l e E a s t — h e r wartime Allies. 3

IV Italy had a g r e e d to c o m e into the war on the Allied side in return for British a n d F r e n c h p r o m i s e s of territorial gain that eventually included a s h a r e in the partition of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e p r o m i s e

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of Turkish territory was embodied and defined in a treaty signed by Italy, B r i t a i n , a n d F r a n c e , known as the A g r e e m e n t of St J e a n de Maurienne, concluded in the middle of 1917. By its terms, the agreement was subject to the assent of the R u s s i a n s . Since the R u s s ia n government had been overthrown by the Bolsheviks, the agreement had never come into effect. T h e Italians claimed the territories nonetheless, asking for equal treatment. As one Italian senator put it, "If the others have nothing, we will d e m a n d nothing." 4

Italy h a d been p r o m i s e d a portion of A n a t o l i a — A s i a M i n o r , as it was s o m e t i m e s called—if she c a m e into the war, b u t there were no Italian c o m m u n i t i e s there for her to protect, and no other c o m m u n i ties whose interests she p u r p o r t e d to s p o n s o r . I n d e e d , in t e r m s of W o o d r o w Wilson's self-determination principles, there was no reason for Italy to o c c u p y any part of A s i a M i n o r at all. P r i m e Minister E m a n u e l e O r l a n d o s e e m e d to recognize the difficulties of his c a s e , but Italian p u b l i c opinion was c a u g h t up in a g u s t of nationalist frenzy, as were Parliament and the C a b i n e t , as represented by F o r e i g n Minister B a r o n S i d n e y S o n n i n o . O r l a n d o a n d S o n n i n o h a d reason to fear that a failure to p e r s u a d e the Allies to honor wartime p r o m i s e s to Italy w o u l d u n d e r m i n e their political position at h o m e , a n d felt driven to take action. 5

S t a r t i n g in the m i d d l e of M a r c h 1919, Italian t r o o p s b e g a n a p r o g r a m of landing in southern Anatolia at Adalia (the present-day A n t a l y a ) , s u p p o s e d l y to restore order, a n d then r e - e m b a r k i n g . E v e n tually they s t o p p e d r e - e m b a r k i n g , a n d after two m o n t h s they had t r o o p s on a m o r e or less p e r m a n e n t b a s i s at A d a l i a a n d also, further u p the coast, a t M a r m a r i s . T h e Allies feared that, having l a n d e d , the Italians were a b o u t to m a r c h inland to o c c u p y the entire section of Anatolia to which they c l a i m e d they were entitled. 6

L l o y d G e o r g e p u s h e d the U n i t e d S t a t e s into the lead o n this q u e s tion. W o o d r o w Wilson a p p e a l e d to Italian p u b l i c opinion to exert a m o d e r a t i n g influence on O r l a n d o ' s territorial d e m a n d s in E u r o p e a n d the M i d d l e E a s t ; w h e r e u p o n , on 24 April 1919, the Italian delegation left the Peace C o n f e r e n c e to return h o m e to seek d o m e s t i c s u p p o r t . In the a b s e n c e of the Italians, the U n i t e d S t a t e s , F r a n c e , a n d Britain turned against t h e m . Italy, t h o u g h yesterday's ally, s u d denly l o o m e d as an imperialist a g g r e s s o r p o s i n g threats to the p e a c e ; a n d as the Allies b a n d e d together against her, C l e m e n c e a u r e m a r k e d : "What a b e g i n n i n g for the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s ! " 7

On 2 M a y 1919, o u t r a g e d by r e p o r t s of Italian s h i p s b e i n g sent to S m y r n a , President Wilson offered to send in the A m e r i c a n navy, a n d s p o k e of the possibility of the U n i t e d S t a t e s g o i n g to war against Italy in order to defeat a g g r e s s i o n . By 5 M a y , as Wilson a n d others told tales of atrocities they c l a i m e d were b e i n g c o m m i t t e d by the Italians, the Allies were at fever pitch, a n d determined to reach a 8

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decision before the Italian delegation returned on 7 M a y . F o l l o w i n g a s u g g e s t i o n by L l o y d G e o r g e , they a g r e e d to ask G r e e c e , which w a s near at hand, to land t r o o p s at S m y r n a , s u p p o s e d l y to keep order, b u t in fact to p r e - e m p t the Italians. T h e G r e e k s landed their t r o o p s on 15 M a y . T h o u g h intended by the Allies as a t e m p o r a r y m e a s u r e directed solely against the Italians, the G r e e k landing a s s u m e d a different— a n d m o r e p e r m a n e n t — c h a r a c t e r from the start. M a u r i c e H a n k e y , head of the British secretariat at the Peace Conference, believed that the S m y r n a enclave, where G r e e k t r o o p s h a d landed, ought to be detached from T u r k e y a n d incorporated into G r e e c e . In this view he was not alone; L l o y d G e o r g e a n d Wilson were enchanted by Eleutherios Venizelos, the G r e e k P r i m e Minister, a n d were won over to his vision of Greece's historic m i s s i o n . 9

Venizelos had established an astonishing hold over the imaginations of his fellow Allied leaders; but even had he not done s o , his case was strong where Italy's was weak. H i s position was intrinsically appealing b o t h to Wilson's sense of America's principles a n d to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s sense of Britain's interests. Venizelos's claims to Anatolia, unlike Italy's, were b a s e d on population as well as history. S m y r n a , the coastal metropolis, was a G r e e k city, a n d had been a center of G r e e k civilization since remotest antiquity. A c c o r d i n g to the then-current (1911) edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, of its population of 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 , "fully a half is G r e e k . " T h e Britannica a d d e d that " M o d e r n S m y r n a is in all but g o v e r n m e n t a Christian town . . . " T h e notion o f transferring its g o v e r n m e n t from M o s l e m T u r k e y to Christian G r e e c e a p p e a l e d strongly to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s Christian a n d Hellenist values. It a p p e a l e d , too, to President Wilson's principles of self-determination. L i k e Italy, G r e e c e had been late in entering the war on the Allied side b u t , unlike Italy, G r e e c e had been r e g a r d e d by the British as a client and p r o t e g e since the early d a y s of the G r e a t G a m e . T h e British navy, at the battle of N a v a r i n o in 1827, had won t h e w a r for G r e e k i n d e p e n d e n c e , a n d the two countries had traditions of friendship for one another. L l o y d G e o r g e saw Venizelos's G r e e c e as Britain's natural ally. Italy a n d G r e e c e had a d v a n c e d conflicting c l a i m s : they eyed essentially the s a m e areas of the e x p i r i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e . In s e n d i n g in G r e e k t r o o p s , Wilson and the Allied leaders intended to keep the Italians from seizing these areas before a decision could be reached as to who should have t h e m . B u t the effect of doing so was to deny the

* It will be remembered that Venizelos offered to bring Greece into the Ottoman war as Britain's ally as far back as the summer of 1914. That was even before Turkey and Britain had definitely decided to go to war. See page 74.

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Italian claim a n d to favor that of G r e e c e . On the British s i d e there were those who were d i s m a y e d by this o u t c o m e , b u t it fitted with L l o y d G e o r g e ' s view of Britain's interests a n d principles. A c c o m p l i s h i n g m a n y p u r p o s e s a t once, L l o y d G e o r g e was able t o divert W o o d r o w Wilson's attention f r o m Britain's d e s i g n s to those of Italy, by letting the A m e r i c a n P r e s i d e n t take the lead in i m p o s i n g what was really Britain's policy in S m y r n a . At the s h o w d o w n with the Italian leaders, Wilson castigated them for their "imperialist a m b i t i o n s . " T a k i n g a friendlier line, L l o y d G e o r g e instead a p p e a l e d to their nobility, in a s p e e c h of s u c h eloquence that it m o v e d O r l a n d o , the Italian P r i m e Minister, to tears. O r l a n d o went to the window a n d s o b b e d emotionally. A c r o s s the street, an observer who caught sight of h i m a s k e d , "What have they been d o i n g to the poor old g e n t l e m a n ? " 10

11

What they were d o i n g to h i m w a s presently m a d e clear. On 19 J u n e 1919, weakened by his failure to achieve Italy's territorial a m b i t i o n s at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , O r l a n d o was obliged to resign as Italy's P r i m e Minister.

V L l o y d G e o r g e ' s s e c o n d diversionary project for Wilson was to turn him against the F r e n c h claim to S y r i a . T h e A m e r i c a n President was allowed to participate in the O t t o m a n negotiations even t h o u g h the U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d never joined in the war against T u r k e y . A l t h o u g h W o o d r o w Wilson's F o u r t e e n Points were not a p p l i c a b l e to the O t t o m a n settlement (unlike G e r m a n y , T u r k e y h a d not been allowed to s u r r e n d e r on the b a s i s that any of the points w o u l d be a p p l i e d ) , they were an e x p r e s s i o n of the political philosophy with which he a p p r o a c h e d p u b l i c issues. L l o y d G e o r g e recognized this; a n d when President Wilson turned to the A r a b i c s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n provinces, the British P r i m e Minister shrewdly diverted his attention from Britain's d e s i g n s to those of F r a n c e by directing his attention to the F r e n c h threat to S y r i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e — a threat that ran counter to Wilson's points and principles. T h e British delegation d i d not go so far as to pretend to the President or to the other delegates that Feisal h a d liberated D a m a s c u s . G e n e r a l Allenby accurately informed the conferees that "Shortly after the c a p t u r e of D a m a s c u s , Feisal h a d been allowed to o c c u p y and administer the c i t y . " T h e British did p r e t e n d , however, that Feisal a n d his followers h a d played a substantial role in the liberation of S y r i a . T h e British c o n t e n d e d that Feisal h a d therefore earned the right to serve as the ruler of a free S y r i a ; a n d specifically 12

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that he s h o u l d be free to reject F r e n c h advice a n d a d v i s e r s if he chose to do s o . As presented by L l o y d G e o r g e , this w a s the issue of the d i s p u t e . A c c o r d i n g to the P r i m e Minister the parties to the d i s p u t e were Feisal's S y r i a a n d C l e m e n c e a u ' s F r a n c e . Britain, h e claimed, was a friend to both parties a n d therefore w o u l d not take sides. Wilson w a s naturally d i s p o s e d to s u p p o r t the S y r i a n s ' right to choose their own g o v e r n m e n t a n d destiny. He also could not help b u t be favorably influenced by F e i s a l ' s willingness to cooperate in achieving a settlement. Feisal m e t with F e l i x F r a n k f u r t e r , a representative of the A m e r i c a n Zionist leader, L o u i s B r a n d e i s ; a n d , after the meeting, F r a n k f u r t e r r e p o r t e d to B r a n d e i s that " T h e A r a b question has c e a s e d to exist as a difficulty to the realisation of our p r o g r a m m e before the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . " I n d e e d , a s A r a b r e p resentative at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , F e i s a l told the conferees that he excluded Palestine f r o m the area he c l a i m e d for A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . Feisal's a p p a r e n t r e a s o n a b l e n e s s in d e a l i n g with J e w i s h claims contrasted sharply with Clemenceau's h a r d line in dealing with A r a b claims to i n d e p e n d e n c e — c l a i m s that C l e m e n c e a u took to be a Britishinspired s h a m . 13

T h e British s a i d that they were ready to allow the F r e n c h whatever influence over F e i s a l that they were able to exert. T h a t , in the F r e n c h view, was thoroughly dishonest, for F e i s a l , as e v e r y b o d y knew, refused to accept F r e n c h direction or influence. It was evident that he was beholden to the B r i t i s h . He was on their payroll; his delegation's e x p e n s e s were p a i d by Britain. At the P e a c e Conference h e went everywhere with his British liaison officer, T . E . L a w r e n c e , who was his friend, adviser, confidant, translator, a n d i n s e p a r a b l e companion. R e c o g n i z i n g that to accept Feisal as Syria's s p o k e s m a n was in effect to c o n c e d e S y r i a to Britain, the F r e n c h p r o d u c e d S y r i a n leaders of their own. T h e m o s t p r o m i n e n t of t h e m h a d lived in F r a n c e for m a n y y e a r s , s o m e of t h e m u n d e r Q u a i d'Orsay s p o n s o r ship. T h e y c l a i m e d that, despite similarities in l a n g u a g e and religion, S y r i a n s were not A r a b s , and d e s e r v e d a country of their own u n d e r French guidance. L l o y d G e o r g e counterattacked by linking British cooperation with F r a n c e against G e r m a n y in E u r o p e to resolution of the S y r i a n q u e s tion. T h e G e r m a n issue was o f o v e r r i d i n g i m p o r t a n c e t o C l e m e n c e a u , as he h a d d e m o n s t r a t e d at the end of 1918 when he conceded Palestine a n d M o s u l to L l o y d G e o r g e in order to cement the A n g l o F r e n c h alliance. C l e m e n c e a u h a d already g o n e a l m o s t to the limit of what was politically p o s s i b l e for him. When he accepted F e i s a l as leader of

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S y r i a , s u b j e c t to Feisal's meeting F r e n c h t e r m s , he went the whole way. In a s k i n g him to accept not merely Feisal b u t also full A r a b independence, the British were asking h i m to go further a n d ruin himself politically; yet he needed Britain's help against G e r m a n y a n d , in c o u p l i n g the issues, L l o y d G e o r g e placed h i m in an agonizing position. D u r i n g the c o u r s e of their conferences the F r e n c h P r i m e Minister often e r u p t e d into frustrated r a g e . O n c e he was driven to s u c h anger that he offered L l o y d G e o r g e the choice of s w o r d or pistols. 14

It was not as though he had not m a d e his position plain. He had told one of L l o y d G e o r g e ' s a d v i s e r s that F r e n c h political opinion would not permit the a b a n d o n m e n t of claims to S y r i a : "he personally was not particularly concerned with the N e a r E a s t , " b u t F r a n c e "always had played a great part there, and . . . F r e n c h p u b l i c opinion expected a settlement which was consonant with F r a n c e ' s position. He could not . . . m a k e any settlement which d i d not c o m p l y with this c o n d i t i o n . " T h i s was no exaggeration, as was d e m o n s t r a t e d when officials of the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Ministry organized a p r e s s c a m p a i g n against their o w n P r i m e Minister in Le Temps a n d Le Journal des Debats, alleging that he was giving away too m u c h to the B r i t i s h . B u t L l o y d G e o r g e went o n p u s h i n g for m o r e concessions, and went on breaking what C l e m e n c e a u had r e g a r d e d as firm British c o m m i t m e n t s to F r a n c e . "I won't give way on anything any m o r e , " C l e m e n c e a u said, " L l o y d G e o r g e is a c h e a t . " ,s

1 6

17

It remains unclear why L l o y d G e o r g e was so determined to exclude F r a n c e from the M i d d l e E a s t . With respect to F r e n c h claims to S y r i a , a n d to Cilicia, the adjacent area just to the north, L l o y d G e o r g e ' s stated position was that British t r o o p s would have to remain in occupation in order to keep the peace between the F r e n c h a n d Feisal's A r a b s ; b u t it was a s o m e w h a t one-sided p e a c e that Britain i m p o s e d . A small F r e n c h force continued to occupy a narrow coastal area centered on Beirut. F r o m Feisal's area, A r a b units continued to m o u n t hit-and-run guerrilla raids against the F r e n c h . T h e p r e s ence of Allenby's British t r o o p s protected Feisal's area f r o m F r e n c h retaliation. 1 8

G e n e r a l Allenby warned that w a r might break out between the A r a b s a n d the F r e n c h . President Wilson a p p e a r e d to take the warning seriously, a n d reacted by m a k i n g a proposal that took L l o y d G e o r g e a n d C l e m e n c e a u by s u r p r i s e : a c o m m i s s i o n should be sent out to the M i d d l e E a s t to ascertain the wishes of its inhabitants. T h e proposal was viewed as childish by F r e n c h a n d British career officials, who did not believe that public opinion, in the E u r o p e a n or A m e r i c a n sense, existed in the M i d d l e E a s t . F o r L l o y d G e o r g e the proposal

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was d i s m a y i n g b e c a u s e s e n d i n g out a c o m m i s s i o n w o u l d take t i m e . N o n e t h e l e s s , the British P r i m e Minister tried to m a k e the best of it by a t t e m p t i n g to get the c o m m i s s i o n to focus exclusively on the claims of F r a n c e — a n d the resistance to those claims by the A r a b s w h o m F r a n c e s o u g h t t o rule. T h e B r i t i s h , like the F r e n c h , h a d s t a k e d out a n e n o r m o u s claim i n the M i d d l e E a s t , b u t L l o y d G e o r g e successfully kept the British claims f r o m b e i n g scrutinized. When President Wilson's C o m m i s s i o n of I n q u i r y went out to ascertain the wishes of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n p e o p l e s , it d i d not go to M e s o p o t a m i a , where British I n d i a h a d instituted direct rule. T h e British, who h a d declared E g y p t a protectorate, also s u c c e e d e d in securing A m e r i c a n recognition for this extension of their rule, which h a d the additional effect of keeping E g y p t off the a g e n d a of the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . In early 1919 Persia was also a d d e d to the British s p h e r e as an informal p r o t e c t o r a t e ; and that, too, w a s a c c o m p l i s h e d o u t s i d e the Peace C o n f e r e n c e by a Convention between the two countries s i g n e d on 19 A u g u s t 1919. Britain's control of the Persian G u l f s h e i k h d o m s , r o u n d e d out a n d regularized d u r i n g the war, was not d i s c u s s e d or contested in P a r i s ; nor was Britain's p a r a m o u n t position in A r a b i a , s e c u r e d by alliances with H u s s e i n a n d with I b n S a u d that m a d e t h e m her p r o t e g e s . It h a d been agreed i n a d v a n c e between L l o y d G e o r g e a n d C l e m e n c e a u that Palestine s h o u l d be a w a r d e d to Britain, so that S y r i a was left as the only contested issue on the c o m m i s s i o n ' s a g e n d a . As the w r a n g l i n g at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e b e c a m e m o r e e m b i t t e r e d , C l e m e n c e a u refused to s e n d out F r e n c h participants to the C o m m i s s i o n ; a n d L l o y d G e o r g e , s u d d e n l y worried that he might have g o n e too far in estranging F r a n c e , decided that the British particip a n t s in that c a s e w o u l d not be sent along either. T h u s the A m e r i c a n c o m m i s s i o n e r s — H e n r y K i n g , the president of O b e r l i n College in O h i o , a n d C h a r l e s C r a n e , a C h i c a g o b u s i n e s s m a n a n d contributor to the D e m o c r a t i c P a r t y — p r o c e e d e d on their mission alone. T h e K i n g - C r a n e C o m m i s s i o n traveled t o S y r i a a n d Palestine, where British officers were often in a position to d e t e r m i n e who should testify a n d who s h o u l d not. T h e F r e n c h were e n r a g e d by the British m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d organization of witnesses a n d testimony. In the e n d it d i d not m a t t e r : the report of the c o m m i s s i o n was never c o n s i d e r e d , it played no official role, a n d its text w a s not m a d e p u b l i c until m o r e than three years later. T h e K i n g - C r a n e inquiry increased the animosity between F r a n c e and Britain, a n d it a r o u s e d s u c h false hopes a m o n g various g r o u p s o f A r a b s that G e r t r u d e Bell, a specialist in M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs, d e n o u n c e d it as a criminal d e c e p t i o n . A b o v e all, its p r o c e e d i n g s h a d taken too m u c h t i m e — a n d L l o y d G e o r g e was r u n n i n g out o f t i m e . 19

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VI Britain had never g o n e ahead with the notion of an A m e r i c a n M a n d a t e for Palestine b u t h a d p r o p o s e d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s s h o u l d a s s u m e the L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s M a n d a t e s t o o c c u p y a n d govern portions of Anatolia, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the D a r d a n e l l e s , A r m e n i a , and the C a u c a s u s . In the end these n a r r o w e d d o w n to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the D a r d a n e l l e s , a n d A r m e n i a . T h e r e were two reasons why Britain wanted the U n i t e d S t a t e s to a s s u m e these M a n d a t e s : it w o u l d implicate the U n i t e d S t a t e s in the M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement so as to insure that she w o u l d help to s u p p o r t its t e r m s ; a n d it w o u l d station the U n i t e d S t a t e s in the front lines if S o v i e t R u s s i a were ever to attack T u r k e y . Wilson a n d the other A m e r i c a n s in Paris m a d e it clear that it would be difficult to p e r s u a d e C o n g r e s s to accept the M a n d a t e s . N o n e t h e l e s s the President u n d e r t o o k t o try. T h a t p r o v e d t o b e L l o y d G e o r g e ' s u n d o i n g ; long after it had b e c o m e clear that Wilson was g o i n g to fail, the P r i m e Minister was obliged to wait for an official A m e r i c a n r e s p o n s e that s e e m e d to be a long time c o m i n g . On 29 J u n e 1919, a bit m o r e than six m o n t h s after he h a d arrived in E u r o p e for the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , the President returned to the U n i t e d S t a t e s for the last time. C a r r y i n g his c a m p a i g n directly to the p e o p l e , Wilson collapsed from exhaustion, a n d went into a state of partial physical a n d political p a r a l y s i s . In the S e n a t e his p r o g r a m , including ratification of the T r e a t y of Versailles a n d A m e r i c a n a d herence to the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , went d o w n to defeat, as the President c o m m i t t e d one political b l u n d e r after another, driving even potential s u p p o r t e r s to o p p o s e h i m . Wilson h a d lost control over the left side of his b o d y , a n d his thinking, too, m a y well have been i m p a i r e d . D e s p i t e his incapacity, he a n d his wife refused to turn over his authority to others. Y e a r s l a t e r — l o n g after Wilson's d e a t h — L l o y d G e o r g e wrote of his illness that " T h e only faculty that r e m a i n e d u n i m p a i r e d t o the end . . . was his a b n o r m a l s t u b b o r n n e s s . " 20

F r o m J u l y to N o v e m b e r of 1919, all O t t o m a n decisions were p u t off until it was learned what position the U n i t e d S t a t e s would take on a s s u m i n g the M a n d a t e s for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d A r m e n i a . B u t , after his partial physical recovery, President Wilson did not get a r o u n d to p r o p o s i n g an A m e r i c a n M a n d a t e for A r m e n i a until 24 M a y 1920. T h e S e n a t e rejected his p r o p o s a l the following week. M a u r i c e H a n k e y noted in his diary that "We cannot get on with the T u r k i s h treaty until we know whether the A m e r i c a n s will accept a m a n d a t e in T u r k e y . " In his note he s u g g e s t e d the possibility that an incident might o c c u r in Anatolia unless a treaty were c o n c l u d e d speedily. L l o y d G e o r g e c o m p l a i n e d that Wilson had placed the Allies "in an i m p o s s i b l e p o s i t i o n . " 2 1

22

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T h e b r e a k d o w n o f his A m e r i c a n ally d r o v e L l o y d G e o r g e t o m a k e his peace with F r a n c e and Italy; b u t the British P r i m e Minister found that he now had to contend with Allied leaders with w h o m it was far less easy to deal. T h e new Italian leaders were inclined to look for commercial rather than territorial concessions in T u r k e y ; they therefore were d i s p o s e d rather to o p p o s e than to participate in L l o y d G e o r g e ' s p r o p o s e d partition of T u r k e y , especially as the new Italian F o r e i g n Minister ( 1 9 2 0 — 1 ) , C o u n t C a r l o S f o r z a , was s y m pathetic to T u r k i s h nationalism. In F r a n c e , C l e m e n c e a u h a d failed to obtain the presidency in 1920; a n d h a d t h e r e u p o n resigned the p r e m i e r s h i p a n d retired f r o m politics. L l o y d G e o r g e a s c r i b e d C l e m e n c e a u ' s defeat in part to his willingness to make concessions to Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t . A l e x a n d r e M i l l e r a n d , who replaced C l e m e n c e a u as Premier, was not d i s p o s e d t o m a k e s u c h concessions. When the Allies finally m e t at 10 D o w n i n g S t r e e t on 12 F e b r u a r y 1920, to start d r a w i n g up an O t t o m a n treaty, L o r d C u r z o n s p o k e for the P r i m e Minister as well as himself in saying that " T h e delay in negotiating the T r e a t y was exclusively d u e to the P o w e r s h a v i n g to await the decision of the U n i t e d S t a t e s . " It w o u l d have been m o r e true to say that the delay was d u e to L l o y d G e o r g e ' s a t t e m p t to play off the U n i t e d S t a t e s against Britain's wartime Allies. 2 3

2 4

VII W o o d r o w Wilson had predicted that the peace would not e n d u r e if its t e r m s were not basically fair to all sides. T h e t e r m s that the Allies i m p o s e d on their defeated enemies after the F i r s t World War were perceived by m a n y at the t i m e , a n d have been perceived by m a n y since, as a failure in that respect. Felix F r a n k f u r t e r later recalled that " M y m o n t h s at the Paris Peace C o n f e r e n c e in 1919 were p r o b a b l y the s a d d e s t of my life. T h e p r o g r e s s i v e disillusionment of the high hopes which Wilson's noble talk h a d e n g e n d e r e d was not unlike the feelings that death of near ones b r i n g s . " P e r h a p s Wilson h a d pitched the world's h o p e s too high; when u p r i s i n g s s u b s e q u e n t l y broke out in the M i d d l e E a s t , M a u r i c e H a n k e y b l a m e d them on W o o d r o w Wilson's F o u r t e e n Points a n d his "impossible doctrine of selfdetermination." 2

26

Over a n d a b o v e any specific decisions there was a general sense that s o m e t h i n g was fundamentally w r o n g with the Peace Conference itself. In a general s e n s e , a n d for the p u b l i c that j u d g e d the Allies by their w a r t i m e p r o m i s e s a n d e x p r e s s e d principles, it w a s the way in which decisions were m a d e that constituted a betrayal. D e c i s i o n s , by all a c c o u n t s , i n c l u d i n g those of the p a r t i c i p a n t s , were m a d e with little knowledge of, or concern for, the lands and p e o p l e s about

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which a n d w h o m the decisions were b e i n g m a d e . T h i s was true even of the peace t e r m s i m p o s e d in E u r o p e , a n d w a s even m o r e so of those i m p o s e d "by E u r o p e a n s u p o n the distant a n d unfamiliar M i d d l e E a s t . A r t h u r B a l f o u r watched Wilson, L l o y d G e o r g e , a n d C l e m e n c e a u in conference—relying for expertise only on M a u r i c e H a n k e y (who was forty-one when the Peace Conference convened, s o m e thirty-five years younger than B a l f o u r ) — a n d pictured t h e m as " T h e s e three all-powerful, all-ignorant m e n , sitting there a n d carving up continents, with only a child to lead t h e m . " An Italian d i p l o m a t wrote that "A c o m m o n sight at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e in Paris was one or other of the world's s t a t e s m e n , s t a n d i n g before a m a p and m u t t e r i n g to himself: 'Where is that d a m n ' d . . . ? ' while he s o u g h t with e x t e n d e d forefinger for s o m e town or river that he had never heard of b e f o r e . " L l o y d G e o r g e , who kept d e m a n d i n g that Britain should rule Palestine from (in the Biblical p h r a s e ) D a n to B e e r s h e b a , did not know where D a n was. He s e a r c h e d for it in a nineteenthcentury Biblical atlas, but it was not until nearly a year after the armistice that G e n e r a l Allenby w a s able to report to him that D a n h a d been located a n d , as it was not where the P r i m e Minister wanted it to b e , Britain asked for a b o u n d a r y further north. 27

28

T h e i m p r e s s i o n was created, too, that most of the interested parties, in the M i d d l e E a s t as elsewhere, were b e i n g excluded from the deliberations. I n s t e a d of all the Allied Powers, only five of t h e m met in the first instance to plan the negotiations. T h e y were then s u p e r s e d e d by the Council of F o u r : the leaders of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Britain, F r a n c e , a n d Italy. D i s a g r e e m e n t s a n d difficulties at h o m e led Italy to w i t h d r a w ; d o m e s t i c politics led the U n i t e d S t a t e s to withdraw. D i s c u s s i n g the M i d d l e E a s t a year after the armistice, the F r e n c h F o r e i g n Minister told the British F o r e i g n Minister, who a g r e e d , that "there r e m a i n e d only two parties whose interests h a d seriously to be considered a n d reconciled, namely, G r e a t Britain a n d F r a n c e " ; a n d together they went on to m a k e the decisions a b o u t the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s . 2 9

Y e t there were dozens of other parties whose interests were at stake, a n d their n u m b e r s were swelled by the n u m b e r of their s p o k e s m e n . In addition to two main rival delegations from A r m e n i a , for e x a m p l e , there were s o m e forty independent A r m e n i a n delegations at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . T e n t h o u s a n d p e o p l e c a m e to Paris for the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . T h e hordes of claimants in the b a c k g r o u n d cast into b o l d relief the n a r r o w n e s s of the interests taken into account by the two g o v e r n m e n t s that remained to m a k e the decisions. M o r a l claims a n d w a r t i m e p r o m i s e s were the stock-in-trade of those who c a m e to plead a c a s e . T h e texts of wartime p l e d g e s by Allied leaders, a n d especially by various British g o v e r n m e n t officials, were scrutinized a n d c o m p a r e d , as indeed they still are by s c h o l a r s ,

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to see whether s u c h pledges could be read in s u c h a way as to be consistent with one another, a n d as t h o u g h s u c h p l e d g e s had given rise to rights that could be enforced in a court of law. T h e C o n s t a n t i n o p l e A g r e e m e n t ( 1 9 1 5 ) , the T r e a t y o f L o n d o n ( 1 9 1 5 ) , the H u s s e i n - M c M a h o n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e (1915 — 16), the S y k e s - P i c o t A g r e e m e n t ( 1 9 1 6 ) , the A g r e e m e n t o f S t J e a n d e M a u r i e n n e ( 1 9 1 7 ) , the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n ( 1 9 1 7 ) , the H o g a r t h m e s s a g e ( 1 9 1 8 ) , the D e c l a r a t i o n to the S e v e n ( 1 9 1 8 ) , a n d the A n g l o - F r e n c h Declaration ( 1 9 1 8 ) , as well as President W o o d r o w Wilson's F o u r t e e n Points (8 J a n u a r y 1918), F o u r Principles (11 F e b r u a r y 1918), F o u r E n d s (4 J u l y 1918), a n d F i v e Particulars (27 S e p t e m b e r 1918), were a m o n g the m a n y s t a t e m e n t s that were p r e s e n t e d by rival claimants to be honored as p r o m i s s o r y notes or contracts at law. D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e , who saw the negotiations as a b a r g a i n i n g rather than a judicial p r o c e s s , was p r o u d of what he had been able to accomplish i n the M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement. H e had m a d e material g a i n s for Britain. Referring to assignats the Prime Minister told an intimate friend: "Well, Wilson has g o n e b a c k h o m e with a b u n d l e of a s s i g n a t s . I have returned with a pocket full of sovereigns in the s h a p e of the G e r m a n Colonies, M e s o p o t a m i a , etc. E v e r y o n e to his t a s t e . " In all the Prime Minister had s u c c e e d e d in a d d i n g nearly a million s q u a r e miles to the British E m p i r e . He was not blind to the moral considerations at i s s u e , but his interpretations of them were fiercely p a r t i s a n . Writing to defend the peace treaties m o r e than a d e c a d e later, L l o y d G e o r g e claimed that " T h e T r e a t i e s of Paris constitute the greatest m e a s u r e of national liberation of s u b j e c t nations ever achieved by any war settlement on record . . . n o p e a c e settlement has ever e m a n c i p a t e d a s m a n y s u b j e c t nationalities f r o m the g r i p of foreign tyranny as did that of 1 9 1 9 . " He was particularly incensed by c l a i m s that he had not honored the pledges m a d e to the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s . 30

31

T h e Allies r e d e e m e d the p r o m i s e s m a d e in these declarations to the full. No race has done better out of the fidelity with which the Allies r e d e e m e d their p r o m i s e s to the o p p r e s s e d races than the A r a b s . O w i n g to the t r e m e n d o u s sacrifices of the Allied N a t i o n s , a n d m o r e particularly of Britain a n d her E m p i r e , the A r a b s have already won i n d e p e n d e n c e in I r a q , A r a b i a , S y r i a , a n d T r a n s - J o r d a n i a , although m o s t of the A r a b races fought t h r o u g h o u t the War for the T u r k i s h o p p r e s s o r s . He a d d e d in particular that " T h e Palestinian A r a b s fought for T u r k i s h rule." P e r h a p s he c o u l d have i m p o s e d his M i d d l e E a s t e r n settlement 3 2

T h e worthless paper currency issued in France during the French Revolution.

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m o r e effectively if he had arrived at it at the end of 1918. B u t the a t t e m p t to go back on Britain's w a r t i m e p l e d g e s h a d taken an imm e n s e a m o u n t of t i m e a n d so h a d lost him that c h a n c e . By the s u m m e r of 1920 it was too late for the P r i m e Minister to i m p o s e his t e r m s u p o n his wartime Allies a n d u p o n an increasingly t r o u b l e s o m e M i d d l e E a s t b e c a u s e — a s Churchill h a d warned r e p e a t e d l y — b y then he no longer h a d the t r o o p s to do s o .

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T H E UNREAL WORLD OF T H E PEACE CONFERENCES i " D i p l o m a c y by Co n f e r e n c e " was a p h r a s e , attributed to M a u r i c e H a n k e y , that d e s c r i b e d L l o y d G e o r g e ' s p r o c e e d i n g s in the postwar y e a r s . It b e c a m e the s t a n d a r d description of the unreal world in which the P r i m e Minister lived. D i v o r c i n g himself as best he could f r o m the other responsibilities of his office, he spent m o r e than three years in attending international m e e t i n g s a i m e d at s h a p i n g the postwar world. T h e m e e t i n g s a m o n g the Allies b e g a n almost a s s o o n a s the armistices were s i g n e d , a n d d e v e l o p e d into a way of life. L l o y d G e o r g e , between 1919 a n d 1922, a t t e n d e d no fewer than thirty-three international conferences; a n d , even before they b e g a n , h a d e n g a g e d in informal m e e t i n g s , s u c h as those with C l e m e n c e a u a n d with Wilson in L o n d o n at the end of 1918. T h e formal preliminaries to the Peace C o n f e r e n c e b e g a n in P a r i s in J a n u a r y 1919, a n d shifted to other locations f r o m time to t i m e . At issue were the t e r m s to be i m p o s e d u p o n the G e r m a n , A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n , a n d O t t o m a n e m pires, a n d their ally, B u l g a r i a . T h e decisions a b o u t the O t t o m a n E m p i r e were a g r e e d u p o n for the m o s t part at the F i r s t C o n f e r e n c e of L o n d o n ( b e g i n n i n g in F e b r u a r y 1920), were confirmed in the Italian Riviera resort town of S a n R e m o (April 1 9 2 0 ) , a n d were e m b o d i e d in a treaty s i g n e d at S e v r e s , a residential s u b u r b of P a r i s , on 10 A u g u s t 1920. 1

With respect to the negotiation of the peace settlement in the M i d d l e E a s t , the decisive fact was that it took so m u c h t i m e . Of all the peace treaties, that with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e was the last to be c o n c l u d e d . B e g i n n i n g with the informal discussions between L l o y d G e o r g e a n d C l e m e n c e a u after the armistice, it took sixteen m o n t h s to reach a g r e e m e n t on s u b s t a n t i v e m a t t e r s , a n d another four m o n t h s to d i s p o s e of r e m a i n i n g issues a n d sign a treaty. In all, it took nearly two years to c o n c l u d e the peace treaty with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; at the outset L l o y d G e o r g e had predicted that it w o u l d take a b o u t a week. 2

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B e c a u s e of the long delay, situations were allowed to develop, a n d decisions were required to be m a d e , that in the end p r o v e d m o r e important than the t e r m s of the treaty itself. T h e Allied s t a t e s m e n thought that they had d e t e r m i n e d the future of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g A s i a by what they did at S a n R e m o , and of the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e by what they did at S e v r e s ; b u t what they did not do in 1918 a n d 1919 p r o v e d to have m o r e influence on the future of b o t h . At the outset L l o y d G e o r g e h a d stated that it would be i m p o s s i b l e for his country to s u p p o r t indefinitely its 1 , 0 8 4 , 0 0 0 - m a n a r m y of occupation in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . Churchill a n d the G e n e r a l Staff, it will be recalled, h a d i m p r e s s e d u p o n h i m the need to reach a settlement while he still h a d the t r o o p s to enforce it. By the s u m m e r of 1919, s o m e six m o n t h s later, the British C a b i n e t w a s told that the army of occupation was down by m o r e than two-thirds to 3 2 0 , 0 0 0 m e n . As the a r m y melted away, its c o m m a n d e r s a d h e r e d to a timetable of withdrawal that i m p o s e d a series of deadlines u p o n the P r i m e Minister at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e , as did the continuing drain of British financial r e s o u r c e s . 3

4

In the north, along the C a u c a s u s frontier with R u s s i a , British t r o o p s h a d r e m a i n e d in place in the hope that the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Italy, or F r a n c e could be p e r s u a d e d to replace t h e m a n d defend newly independent A r m e n i a , G e o r g i a , a n d A z e r b a i j a n if R u s s i a or T u r k e y s h o u l d revive sufficiently to attack t h e m . B u t Britain lacked the m e n a n d m on e y to u n d e r t a k e the j o b , a n d was eventually forced to a b a n d o n her c h a r g e s to their fate. In o r d e r i n g British forces to leave these formerly R u s s i a n territories, the Prime Minister disregarded the strong objections of Winston Churchill. F o r all his recent e n t h u s i a s m for retrenchment, Churchill was a firebrand on the c o m m u n i s t issue a n d was p r e p a r e d to s e n d m e n a n d m o n e y into R u s s i a to overthrow the Soviet r e g i m e . E v e n M a u r i c e H a n k e y , who believed that "in the c o m i n g years B o l s h e v i s m was the greatest d a n g e r to E u r o p e , " d e s c r i b e d Churchill as "quite b a r m y in his e n t h u s i a s m for the a n t i - B o l s h e v i k s " ; Churchill w a s obsessively d e t e r m i n e d to keep British t r o o p s north of the T u r k i s h frontier to help the Whites fight the R e d s in the R u s s i a n Civil War. L l o y d G e o r g e ' s political fears were of a different sort. T h e P r i m e Minister told H a n k e y that he was a n x i o u s to get all British t r o o p s out of all formerly R u s s i a n territories to keep them from b e c o m i n g "restless"; by which he p r e s u m a b l y meant that he wanted to keep them f r o m b e i n g infected with the revolutionary v i r u s . P u r s u a n t to his o r d e r s , British forces north of the R u s s i a n - T u r k i s h frontier were evacuated in the s u m m e r of 1919. 5

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To the south of the old R u s s i a n frontier, in m o u n t a i n valleys where the p r e s e n t T u r k i s h b o r d e r s run with those of S y r i a , I r a q , a n d I r a n , lay the area imprecisely known as K u r d i s t a n , where British

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officials t h o u g h t of s p o n s o r i n g another of their protectorates. T h e area fell within the s p h e r e p r o m i s e d to F r a n c e in the S y k e s Picot A g r e e m e n t , so the British e n v i s a g e d a series of a u t o n o m o u s K u r d i s h s t a t e s , to be a d v i s e d by B r i t i s h political officers, which the F r e n c h were to be asked to concede in the Wilsonian spirit of selfdetermination for the K u r d i s h p e o p l e . T h e K u r d s are a n ancient m o u n t a i n people who have never known unity, and whose energies have been channeled into violent q u a r r e l s with neighbors, especially A r a b s and A r m e n i a n s . A British a t t e m p t to organize them in 1919 resulted in three u p r i s i n g s , as the K u r d s turned against the British n e w c o m e r s ; s o o n afterward, British troops pulled b a c k from K u r d i s t a n , too.

II Within T u r k e y , the British position continued to disintegrate. T h e British authorities still relied on the A r m i s t i c e of M u d r o s . T h e brief armistice d o c u m e n t dealt almost entirely with naval a n d military m a t t e r s , r e q u i r i n g the T u r k i s h authorities to demobilize all their a r m e d forces except those r e q u i r e d to maintain internal o r d e r . O t t o m a n t r o o p s piled u p their w e a p o n s a n d munitions i n d u m p s . British officers s u p e r v i s e d the s u r r e n d e r , riding through the countryside i n twos a n d threes. T h e armistice t e r m s permitted the O t t o m a n authorities to r e m a i n in control of the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g r e m n a n t of their e m p i r e , s u b j e c t to the Allies' right to o c c u p y strategic points should a situation arise that threatened their security. In practice, British naval control of the seacoast, c o u p l e d with control of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d transportation s y s t e m s , took the place of military occupation of T u r k e y . T h e capital city, C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , r e m a i n e d in theory u n o c c u p i e d , although Allied forces were m u c h in evidence. T h e British fleet was anchored there, a n d , in a t r i u m p h a l c e r e m o n y , the F r e n c h G e n e r a l L o u i s F r a n c h e t d ' E s p e r e y , the Allied c o m m a n d e r in O t t o m a n E u r o p e , r o d e into the city on a white charger. T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t formed to negotiate the armistice was d i s m i s s e d s o o n afterward by M e h m e d V I , who had b e c o m e S u l t a n in J u n e 1918 a n d was chiefly concerned with retaining his throne. To this end, his policy was to seek favor with the Allies, a n d when T u r k i s h politicians b e g a n t o o p p o s e Allied claims a n d p r o p o s a l s , the S u l t a n d i s s o l v e d Parliament and ruled by decree. S o o n afterward M e h m e d a p p o i n t e d his brother-in-law to head the g o v e r n m e n t as G r a n d Vizier, t h u s c o m p l e t i n g the c h a n g e back from constitutional to personal rule. T h e S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t was not, however, u n c h a l l e n g e d . Civilian

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a n d military networks of the Y o u n g T u r k e y Party operated t h r o u g h out Anatolia, a n d the War O f f i c e — E n v e r ' s fiefdom—remained largely u n d e r their c o n t r o l . T h e y plotted against the new S u l t a n a n d his ministers, a n d h o p e d to force the Allies to offer milder peace t e r m s . O u t s i d e the capital city, all authority was on the w a n e . In the interior there was an u p s u r g e of b r i g a n d a g e a n d c o m m u n a l strife. T h i s b r e a k d o w n of order t h r o u g h o u t A s i a M i n o r was a c a u s e of concern to the Allies, especially when it resulted in threats to the safety of C h r i s t i a n s . When G r e e k villages behind the Black S e a port of S a m s u n were attacked by T u r k i s h M o s l e m s , the Allies dem a n d e d that the G r a n d Vizier take action. A l a r m e d , the G r a n d Vizier consulted the A c t i n g Minister of the Interior, who advised that there was no way to b r i n g the situation under control f r o m C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — a n officer w o u l d have to be sent into the field to deal with m a t t e r s o n the s p o t . T h e A c t i n g Minister s u g g e s t e d the n a m e of his friend, G e n e r a l M u s t a p h a K e m a l , the hero of Gallipoli, whose opposition to E n v e r h a d kept h i m from receiving the major c o m m a n d a p p o i n t m e n t s d u r i n g the war that were his d u e . T h e suggestion was a d o p t e d a n d K e m a l s u c c e e d e d in obtaining exceptionally b r o a d civil a n d military p o w e r s as I n s p e c t o r - G e n e r a l of the Ninth A r m y , covering m o s t of Anatolia. 8

On the evening of 6 M a y 1919 he e m b a r k e d for S a m s u n . It was the beginning of one of the great political voyages of the twentieth century. A t m i d n i g h t W y n d h a m D e e d e s — t h e British Intelligence expert on O t t o m a n a f f a i r s — s p e d to the S u b l i m e Porte to warn the G r a n d Vizier not to let K e m a l g o , only to learn that he was too late. K e m a l h a d already set off for S a m s u n , a n d his p u r p o s e — a s W y n d h a m D e e d e s s e e m s to have d i v i n e d — w a s to rally forces t h r o u g h o u t T u r k e y to resist Allied peace t e r m s if they p r o v e d too h a r s h . T h o s e forces consisted in large part of O t t o m a n t r o o p s in the u n o c c u p i e d center a n d east of T u r k e y , a n d — a r m e d with the Sultan's c o m m i s s i o n a n d his own f o r m i d a b l e s k i l l s — K e m a l p l a n n e d to put himself at their head.

Ill I n 1918—19 T u r k e y was d a r k — a n d cold. F u e l was scarce, a n d the lights of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e were kept d i m . E l s e w h e r e , too, the l a n d s that at the outset of the war h a d f o r m e d the O t t o m a n d o m a i n s entered into a sort of twilight existence, defined in t e r m s of international law by the R e g u l a t i o n s a n n e x e d to the 1907 H a g u e C o n v e n tion R e s p e c t i n g the L a w s a n d C u s t o m s o f War o n L a n d . A s the o c c u p y i n g power in m o s t of these d o m a i n s , Britain's obligation w a s essentially to keep things as they were u n d e r O t t o m a n law until s o m e final determination as to their fate s h o u l d be m a d e .

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S u c h a determination would take the form of a treaty of peace between the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d its c o n q u e r o r s . On the O t t o m a n side, no difficulty s u g g e s t e d itself; the S u l t a n lived in the s h a d o w of British w a r s h i p s a n d in fear of losing his throne, a n d p r e s u m a b l y would sign almost any d o c u m e n t the British naval c o m m a n d e r placed in front of h i m . All that the Allies had to do was decide a m o n g themselves what t e r m s they wanted to i m p o s e . T h a t situation c h a n g e d fundamentally in M a y 1919 when President Wilson a n d P r i m e Minister L l o y d G e o r g e d e c i d e d to play the G r e e k s off against the Italians in Anatolia. T h e u n i n t e n d e d effect of the decision was to a r o u s e G r e e k h o p e s and T u r k i s h fears that G r e e c e had c o m e back to A s i a M i n o r to s t a y . M o s l e m T u r k i s h hatred of the two large C h r i s t i a n p o p u l a t i o n s in their m i d s t — G r e e k s a n d A r m e n i a n s — h a d always exerted a powerful force, a n d did so again even in T u r k e y ' s e x h a u s t e d state. While the Allied s t a t e s m e n were looking the other way, O t t o m a n soldiers in the interior of Anatolia r e g r o u p e d a n d returned to seize their w e a p o n s from the d u m p s where they were d e p o s i t e d . Within d a y s after the news of the G r e e k landing at S m y r n a b e c a m e known, I n s p e c t o r - G e n e r a l M u s t a p h a K e m a l was o r d e r e d t o return to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e — a n d d i s o b e y e d . I n s t e a d he met with three colleagues, at the ancient provincial capital city of A m a s y a , to draft a declaration of i n d e p e n d e n c e . D i s r e g a r d i n g the Sultan's g o v e r n m e n t as a captive of the Allies, K e m a l attended a regional nationalist c o n g r e s s at E r z e r u m , in the east of T u r k e y ; a n d then a s s e m b l e d a national c o n g r e s s at S i v a s , in the interior of Anatolia, m i d w a y between E r z e r u m a n d A n k a r a . He won the allegiance of a n u m b e r of a r m y officers his own age a n d younger, m a n y of w h o m , like himself, h a d been associated with the military wing of the C . U . P . ; for the m o s t part he carried with h i m the m a j o r s a n d colonels rather than the g e n e r a l s . He also s e e m s to have taken over leadership of the military a n d civilian resistance networks o r g a n i z e d b y the Y o u n g T u r k s , although he p r u d e n t l y disclaimed any connection with the officially d i s b a n d e d C . U . P . D e s p i t e K e m a l ' s s t r o n g secular b i a s , M o s l e m holy m e n p r o v e d to be his strongest a d h e r e n t s . 9

T h e Allied leaders knew little a b o u t M u s t a p h a K e m a l , the lean, t o u g h - m i n d e d , hard-living officer in his late thirties who inspired a n d led the rebellion against t h e m . Neither the British F o r e i g n Office nor British Intelligence was even able to tell the P r i m e Minister whether K e m a l w a s acting for or against the S u l t a n . U n a w a r e of what w a s h a p p e n i n g in T u r k e y , the Allied leaders in E u r o p e continued to meet in conferences that were intended to decide T u r k e y ' s fate. At a conference in L o n d o n on 28 F e b r u a r y 1920, the Allied leaders were a m a z e d by the news that an a r m y of 30,000 T u r k i s h t r o o p s u n d e r K e m a l ' s c o m m a n d had defeated a small F r e n c h contingent at M a r a s h in southern Anatolia. What s u r p r i s e d

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t h e m — L l o y d G e o r g e later c l a i m e d — w a s not s o m u c h the o u t c o m e of the battle (for the F r e n c h were greatly o u t n u m b e r e d ) b u t the revelation that K e m a l ' s a r m y of regulars existed. A c c o r d i n g to L l o y d G e o r g e , this was the first that he a n d his colleagues h a d heard of such an a r m y . "Our military intelligence had never been m o r e thoroughly unintelligent," he later wrote in his m e m o i r s , typically putting the b l a m e on o t h e r s . 1 0

IV As K e m a l ' s revolt s p r e a d t h r o u g h Anatolia, a parallel m o v e m e n t developed in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g south of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , where the token F r e n c h presence along the seacoast at Beirut, T r i p o l i , S i d o n , a n d T y r e presented a t e m p t i n g target to M o s l e m militants in D a m a s c u s . T h e F r e n c h intruders o n the coast o f S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n threatened to overthrow the delicate balance of Christian a n d M o s l e m religious c o m m u n i t i e s , evoking a reaction not unlike that against the G r e e k s in T u r k e y . Britain allowed inland S y r i a , like inland Anatolia, self-rule. In theory the S y r i a n administration was headed by F e i s a l , who was away at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . In practice it was a d m i n i s t e r e d by p e o p l e over w h o m he h a d little control, a n d who f e u d e d bitterly with one another. F o r m o r e than a year after the O t t o m a n retreat, inland S y r i a — w i t h its capital at D a m a s c u s — w a s a d m i n i s t e r e d , if somewhat chaotically, by A r a b s , a n d the novel habit of i n d e p e n d e n c e , once contracted, was not one that they wished to s u r r e n d e r . A British Intelligence chief w a r n e d the F o r e i g n Secretary in L o n d o n in 1919 that the A r a b g o v e r n m e n t in D a m a s c u s a n d K e m a l ' s m o v e m e n t in T u r k e y were p r e p a r i n g to enter into an a l l i a n c e . B u t the A r a b a n d T u r k i s h m o v e m e n t s were not as alike as he s u p p o s e d : K e m a l was a nationalist in the western sense of the w o r d , while in A r a b D a m a s c u s , t h o u g h everybody now s p o k e the fashionable l a n g u a g e of nationalism, it was not a native t o n g u e . Of the A r a b i c s p e a k i n g leaders who governed f r o m D a m a s c u s in 1919, m o s t — p e r h a p s four out of five—had not been adherents of an A r a b national identity or of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e as late as 1 9 1 8 . T h e S y r i a n s a m o n g t h e m were mostly from landowning families, with a stake in maintaining the established o r d e r . An analysis of the occupational g r o u p s from which they were d r a w n shows the leadership m a d e u p in large part of O t t o m a n soldiers and officials, m a n y of t h e m from I r a q a n d Palestine, who were out of a j o b . M o s t of t h e m h a d remained loyal to T u r k e y d u r i n g the war with Britain. 11

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the O t t o m a n A r a b s who h a d o p p o s e d t h e m d u r i n g the war h a d taken back control of the liberated province. T h e O t t o m a n A r a b s , however, were f r a g m e n t e d along geographical lines in their current political concerns. T h o s e from c o m m u n i t i e s like J e r u s a l e m d e n o u n c e d Z i o n i s m in Palestine; those from B a g h d a d c o m p l a i n e d of the British in M e s o p o t a m i a ; and the S y r i a n s w a n t e d to expel the F r e n c h f r o m their seacoast and from L e b a n o n . M e a n w h i l e , leaders of the traditional p r o - O t t o m a n anti-Feisal ruling families were pitted against a m b i t i o u s y o u n g militants seeking their political fortunes. B e h i n d the rhetoric of the political parties a n d the renascent secret societies lay o b s c u r e family a n d local conflicts. It was a confused a n d c o n f u s i n g political situation, in which Feisal's position was s e c u r e d essentially by the s u p p o r t of Britain, visibly r e p r e s e n t e d by G e n e r a l Allenby's a r m i e s , a n d by the c o m m o n A r a b s u p p o s i t i o n that b e c a u s e of F e i s a l , Britain would o p p o s e the colonialist d e s i g n s of F r a n c e . In retrospect it can be seen that Britain entered 1919 with a period of grace of less than nine m o n t h s in which to bluff F r a n c e into backing d o w n ; by the s u m m e r of 1919 financial p r e s s u r e s a n d social unrest forced L l o y d G e o r g e a n d the War Office to recognize that a timetable for British withdrawal from S y r i a could no longer be p o s t p o n e d . On 4 S e p t e m b e r 1919 the P r i m e Minister c o n v e n e d a conference of his a d v i s e r s at the vacation house of his friend L o r d Riddell, near T r o u v i l l e on F r a n c e ' s N o r m a n d y coast, to consider what s h o u l d be done a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t . Only a few d a y s before Riddell had recorded in his diary that L l o y d G e o r g e was "angry with the F r e n c h for their attitude concerning S y r i a . He said that the S y r i a n s would not have the F r e n c h , a n d asked how the Allies could compel t h e m t o accept m a n d a t o r i e s who were distasteful . . . H i s attitude to the F r e n c h has changed greatly . . . He continually refers to their g r e e d . " Y e t he a n d his a d v i s e r s saw no alternative but to a b a n d o n the field to the F r e n c h . 1 4

On 13 S e p t e m b e r 1919 the British g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d that withdrawal would take place in N o v e m b e r , leaving the F r e n c h and Feisal to settle m a t t e r s between themselves. A c c o r d i n g to the British leaders, they thereby honored their c o m m i t m e n t s both to F r a n c e and to the A r a b s . It was a d i s i n g e n u o u s c l a i m . T h e British h a d p r e t e n d e d that Feisal headed a great A r a b a r m y in S y r i a , but g o v e r n m e n t officials were aware that this was a pretense without s u b s t a n c e . F o r the British a r m y to leave was to leave Feisal to the mercy of the F r e n c h . T o K i t c h e n e r ' s followers i n Britain and the M i d d l e E a s t , this meant a betrayal of all they had worked for; while to the F r e n c h , the nine-month a t t e m p t to face t h e m down, even t h o u g h it was a b a n d o n e d , was u n f o r g i v a b l e . F o r F e i s a l , the n e r v o u s prince with the w o r r y - b e a d fingers, the British a n n o u n c e m e n t of withdrawal was another s u d d e n t u r n i n g in

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the labyrinth of deception t h r o u g h which he tried to wend his way. T h e r e was, however, a teasing, tantalizing possibility that briefly o p e n e d up before h i m . C l e m e n c e a u , willing as always to a c c o m m o d a t e British preferences in the M i d d l e E a s t — i f politically p o s s i b l e — w a s p r e p a r e d to let Feisal be king of S y r i a (since that is what Britain w a n t e d ) if Feisal w o u l d meet h i m halfway. T h e F r e n c h Premier a g r e e d to enter once again into negotiations with the A r a b leader, a i m e d at securing recognition of F r a n c e ' s m i n i m u m t e r m s : that F r a n c e would rule a G r e a t e r L e b a n o n , a n d that S y r i a , t h o u g h independent, would b e c o m e a F r e n c h client state. B u t these F r e n c h t e r m s p l a c e d Feisal in the m i d d l e , between colliding forces. T h e militant A r a b s of D a m a s c u s who c l a i m e d to be his followers, b u t who had no particular attachment to him, were p r e p a r e d to allow him to call himself their ruler only so long as he c o u l d keep the F r e n c h out; while the F r e n c h were p r e p a r e d to let h i m rule only if he could s u c c e e d in b r i n g i n g t h e m in. F e i s a l , a stranger in the land of S y r i a , was in no position to do anything but m e d i a t e . All he could do was obtain concessions f r o m C l e m e n c e a u and then try to obtain concessions from the A r a b militants in D a m a s c u s . E a r l y in J a n u a r y 1920, Feisal a n d C l e m e n c e a u arrived at a secret a c c o r d — s e c r e t , b e c a u s e C l e m e n c e a u , seeking to b e c o m e President of F r a n c e , did not want his o p p o n e n t s to be able to claim he h a d been weak on S y r i a — p e r m i t t i n g F e i s a l ' s A r a b state its i n d e p e n d e n c e , b u t with exclusively F r e n c h a d v i s e r s . T h e accord was d e s i g n e d to lead to a F r e n c h M a n d a t e , b u t only of the loosest sort. Feisal then left for D a m a s c u s to see if he could p e r s u a d e the A r a b leadership there to accept its relatively mild t e r m s ; b u t his mission p r o v e d to be another blind turn in the political labyrinth for on 17 J a n u a r y C l e m e n c e a u , rejected in his bid for the presidency, g a v e up his political career. A l e x a n d r e M i l l e r a n d , C l e m e n c e a u ' s s u c c e s s o r as Premier, lacked his inclination to s a v e Britain's face in the M i d d l e E a s t , and therefore saw no need either to allow S y r i a her i n d e p e n d ence or to let F e i s a l m o u n t her t h r o n e .

V At the b e g i n n i n g of 1920, with Britain no longer blocking F r e n c h a m b i t i o n s in S y r i a , the way was clear for the two Allies finally to formulate the t e r m s they w o u l d i m p o s e u p o n the defeated O t t o m a n E m p i r e . T h e t e r m s u p o n which they then agreed were that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g portions of the e m p i r e were to be d e t a c h e d a n d divided between the two E u r o p e a n p o w e r s , with Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a to be kept by B r i t a i n ; A r a b i a was to r e m a i n i n d e p e n d ent under British-influenced m o n a r c h s , E g y p t a n d the G u l f coast

THE UNREAL WORLD

411

already having been taken by B r i t a i n ; a n d S y r i a , including L e b a n o n , was to go to F r a n c e . Palestine, including T r a n s j o r d a n ; S y r i a , including L e b a n o n ; a n d I r a q were all destined for eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e , if one believed the l a n g u a g e of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e s , p u r s u a n t to which the Allies a w a r d e d these territories to themselves. B u t F r a n c e , in particular, r e g a r d e d the p l e d g e of i n d e p e n d e n c e as w i n d o w - d r e s s i n g , and a p p r o a c h e d S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n in an annexationist spirit. A p a r t f r o m the D o d e c a n e s e islands, m o s t of the A e g e a n islands a n d E u r o p e a n T u r k e y (eastern T h r a c e ) were c e d e d t o G r e e c e . S m y r n a , a n d the district of western Anatolia of which it was the leading city, were to be a d m i n i s t e r e d by G r e e c e for five y e a r s , after which a plebiscite would be taken, p r e s u m a b l y leading to incorporation of the area within the K i n g d o m of G r e e c e . T h e D a r d a n e l l e s , where the Royal N a v y could m a k e itself felt, were placed u n d e r international control, and along with C o n s t a n t i n o p l e b e c a m e hostages g u a r a n t e e i n g T u r k e y ' s g o o d behavior in such m a t t e r s as the treatment of C h r i s t i a n minorities. In eastern Anatolia, A r m e n i a was g r a n t e d i n d e p e n d e n c e , and K u r d i s t a n was given a u t o n o m y . T u r k i s h finances were p l a c e d u n d e r British, F r e n c h , a n d Italian s u p e r v i s i o n . Within these limits, a n d subject to these restrictions, what little rem a i n e d of T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g Anatolia was to remain nominally ind e p e n d e n t u n d e r the O t t o m a n S u l t a n . S u c h were the t e r m s , a g r e e d u p o n i n L o n d o n a n d S a n R e m o i n the first half of 1920, that were dictated to the S u l t a n ' s governm e n t — w h i c h reluctantly signed the treaty i m p o s e d u p o n it in A u g u s t 1920, in the F r e n c h s u b u r b a n city of S e v r e s . As only F r a n c e ' s Poincare s e e m s to have noticed, it w a s an inauspicious choice for the site of a treaty u p o n which E u r o p e intended to rely; S e v r e s was known for its china, which was fragile a n d easily broken. L l o y d G e o r g e was the only one of the original B i g F o u r who remained in his position when the final peace treaty was s i g n e d . He was also the only British C a b i n e t minister at the b e g i n n i n g of the F i r s t World War who remained in the C a b i n e t t h r o u g h o u t the war until its conclusion. T h e only British politician to survive the war, he was the only Allied leader to survive the p e a c e ; b u t the O t t o m a n settlement, of which he was so p r o u d , was to prove his u n d o i n g .

PART X STORM OVER ASIA

43 THE TROUBLES BEGIN: 1919-1921 When the British a r m e d forces o c c u p i e d the M i d d l e E a s t at the end of the war, the region was p a s s i v e . B u t s o o n t r o u b l e s b e g a n . T h e y b e g a n in E g y p t , with d e m a n d s for i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1918 followed by rioting in 1919. N e x t — t h o u g h there w a s no immediately a p p a r e n t c o n n e c t i o n — w a r broke out in 1919 in A f g h a n i s t a n , on the I n d i a n frontier. At a b o u t the s a m e t i m e , British policy in A r a b i a b e g a n to c o m e a p a r t . It was p o s s i b l e to believe that it was just b a d luck that c a u s e d one thing after another to go w r o n g for Britain in the M i d d l e E a s t ; a n d one c o u l d have continued to believe that when tribal d i s t u r b a n c e s b r o u g h t d i s o r d e r to T r a n s j o r d a n or, in the s p r i n g of 1920, when A r a b s rioted against J e w s in western Palestine, or in the s u m m e r of 1920, when I r a q flamed into revolt. An o b v i o u s explanation for the d i s o r d e r s , a n d a r g u a b l y the correct one, was that, after the war, Britain's g a r r i s o n s in the M i d d l e E a s t were so u n d e r m a n n e d as to e m b o l d e n Britain's local o p p o n e n t s everywhere to defy her. T h e F r e n c h , weakened i n the M i d d l e E a s t , a s were the B r i t i s h , b y p r e s s u r e s to economize a n d d e m o b i l i z e , were similarly defied by A r a b politicians, against w h o m they finally went to war in S y r i a . R u s s i a , defeated in the war a n d c r i p p l e d by revolutions a n d civil war, also faced M o s l e m revolts and i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s in Central A s i a , her d o m a i n in the M i d d l e E a s t . B u t b o t h the F r e n c h and R u s s i a n s , instead of finding c o m m o n c a u s e with Britain, intrigued to u n d e r m i n e her position in the M i d d l e E a s t , thus c o n f u s i n g the issue by m a k i n g it plausible to s u p p o s e that they were c a u s i n g (rather than merely a d d i n g to) Britain's difficulties. In retrospect, one sees Britain u n d e r g o i n g a time of t r o u b l e s everywhere in the M i d d l e E a s t between 1919 and 1 9 2 1 ; b u t it was not experienced that way, at least not in the b e g i n n i n g . R i o t i n g in E g y p t in 1919, for e x a m p l e , was seen as an E g y p t i a n law a n d o r d e r p r o b l e m that was then b r o u g h t u n d e r control; it was not seen as a p r e l u d e to the riots that broke out in Palestine in the s p r i n g of the next year or to the revolt that s p r e a d in I r a q as s p r i n g g a v e way to s u m m e r . So the c h a p t e r s that follow tell of the s u c c e s s i v e M i d d l e A1

c

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E a s t e r n challenges to B r i t a i n — a n d to the F r e n c h , to w h o m Britain had yielded S y r i a — r o u g h l y in the o r d e r that they o c c u r r e d , and as t h o u g h they a m o u n t e d merely to one s e p a r a t e set of difficulties after another. T h o u g h they were not perceived at the time as c o m i n g together to constitute one large overall event, the individual intrigues a n d revolts against British rule were believed by a great m a n y British officials to be instigated by a single g r o u p of c o n s p i r a t o r s ; and presently it will be seen w h o these were believed to b e . Whether the d i s o r d e r s a n d u p r i s i n g s in the M i d d l e E a s t were indeed planned and coordinated or, on the contrary, s p o r a d i c , w a s a principal question confronting the L l o y d G e o r g e g o v e r n m e n t as the extent of the challenge to British rule in the M i d d l e E a s t e m e r g e d in 1919 a n d 1920 a n d stood revealed to a disenchanted British p u b l i c , p r e s s , a n d Parliament by 1921.

44

E G Y P T : T H E WINTER OF 1918-1919 T h e first postwar challenge to Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n position was in E g y p t , the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g country that she had ruled "temporarily" for d e c a d e s , a n d whose British a d m i n i s t r a t o r s had p e r s u a d e d themselves at the outset that the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g peoples preferred British rule to any other. B u t Britain had repeatedly p r o m i s e d E g y p t her i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d it was not u n r e a s o n a b l e for E g y p t i a n politicians to have believed the p l e d g e s , a n d t h u s to s u p p o s e that once the war was b r o u g h t to a successful conclusion, Britain m i g h t agree to s o m e sort of timetable leading to eventual E g y p t i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e . * At least one g r o u p of local politicians p r o p o s e d to take Britain at her w o r d . On 13 N o v e m b e r 1918, two weeks after the O t t o m a n s u r r e n d e r a b o a r d the Agamemnon, a delegation of out-of-office E g y p t i a n political figures was g r a n t e d an interview with S i r R e g i n a l d Wingate, the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n C a i r o . T h e delegation had been formed a n d was led by S a a d Z a g h l u l , a lawyer of a b o u t sixty, a former j u d g e , a d m i n i s t r a t o r , Minister of E d u c a t i o n , a n d Minister of J u s t i c e , and a leader of the L e g i s l a t i v e A s s e m b l y , which the British had p r o r o g u e d indefinitely at the b e g i n n i n g of the war. Z a g h l u l explained to Wingate that he had r e q u e s t e d the interview in the expectation that martial law a n d the protectorate w o u l d soon be abolished, now that the war w a s over. I n d i c a t i n g that he expected Britain to keep her p r o m i s e t o g r a n t E g y p t i n d e p e n d e n c e , Z a g h l u l a s k e d that E g y p t should b e h e a r d b y the Allies d u r i n g their peace negotiations. H e also asked to go to L o n d o n to negotiate the p r o m i s e d c h a n g e s in E g y p t ' s political s t a t u s . Neither negotiations nor i n d e p e n d e n c e were what British officials had in m i n d at the t i m e . A g u i d e to their thinking w a s p r o v i d e d by

* When Britain went to war against the Ottoman Empire at the end of 1914, the Asquith government formally announced that Egypt had been released from Ottoman suzerainty and had become a British protectorate; but the British authorities also announced that the freedom and independence of Egypt were among the goals for which Britain was fighting. 1

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a British official's account, s o m e t i m e later, of the m e e t i n g with Z a g h l u l . "On N o v . 13 he p a i d a visit to the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r and e x p r e s s e d the desire to go to L o n d o n to p u t forward a p r o g r a m m e of c o m p l e t e a u t o n o m y , a p r o p o s a l which was rejected as calculated to serve n o g o o d o b j e c t . " Receiving no e n c o u r a g e m e n t f r o m Wingate, Z a g h l u l b e g a n that s a m e day to try to force the i s s u e . P e r h a p s acting with the secret s u p p o r t of the new E g y p t i a n S u l t a n , A h m e d F u a d , * he set out to organize a delegation that could win b r o a d s u p p o r t from the g r o u p s and classes within E g y p t whose interests he a s p i r e d to represent; which, in t u r n , drove rival political figures to form a n d head delegations of their own. On 17 N o v e m b e r 1918 Wingate cabled the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y that E g y p t i a n politicians were calling for a "prog r a m m e of c o m p l e t e a u t o n o m y " ; that he had warned t h e m against agitation; b u t that the S u l t a n a n d his ministers did not feel strong e n o u g h to o p p o s e nationalist d e m a n d s . I n d e e d the Sultan's ministers, not wanting to be viewed as Britain's nominees, claimed that they w o u l d refuse to lead a delegation a b r o a d unless Z a g h l u l and his colleagues were also allowed to p r o c e e d to E u r o p e . In the event, Britain did not allow any delegation to go either to L o n d o n or to Paris d u r i n g 1918. 2

3

In J a n u a r y 1919, as the o p e n i n g d a t e of the Peace C o n f e r e n c e a p p r o a c h e d , Z a g h l u l a n d his W a f d ("Delegation") Party s t e p p e d up their activities. T h e y were indignant to learn, on 12 J a n u a r y , that a delegation from S y r i a would be allowed to attend the Peace C o n ference. At a so-called G e n e r a l C o n g r e s s of the Wafd held the next day in the h o m e of one of its m e m b e r s , Zaghlul c l a i m e d the s a m e right for E g y p t , a n d s p o k e in favor of i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e r e a f t e r the British administration prevented Z a g h l u l from s p e a k i n g in p u b l i c ; w h e r e u p o n the Sultan's ministers resigned rather than lead a delegation t o E u r o p e while Z a g h l u l was b e i n g silenced. T h e British military authorities then arrested Z a g h l u l and three of his principal colleagues, a n d , on 9 M a r c h , d e p o r t e d them to M a l t a . A wave of d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d strikes swept the country. T h e British authorities were taken by s u r p r i s e . T h e cables sent from C a i r o to L o n d o n at the time s u g g e s t that the R e s i d e n c y had little u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what had been h a p p e n i n g in E g y p t d u r i n g the wartime y e a r s . It was unaware of the implications of the p r o f o u n d social and economic c h a n g e s b r o u g h t a b o u t by the w a r : the new classes and a m b i t i o n s that h a d e m e r g e d , the new interests, the new r e s e n t m e n t s , a n d the new s o u r c e s of d i s c o r d and disaffection. 4

T h e R e s i d e n c y did know, t h o u g h , that there were m a n y E g y p t i a n s * Ahmed F u a d became Sultan of Egypt on the death of his brother in October 1917.

EGYPT: THE WINTER OF

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who w o u l d have been h a p p y to see Britain lose the war against T u r k e y . Wingate, C l a y t o n , a n d their associates, in a r g u i n g u n s u c cessfully that Britain o u g h t to annex E g y p t a n d rule the country directly, h a d pointed out s o m e of the d a n g e r s that m i g h t arise if s u c h p e o p l e took control of E g y p t ' s destinies. L i e u t e n a n t - C o m m a n d e r H o g a r t h of the A r a b B u r e a u , in a m e m o r a n d u m of 22 J u l y 1917 s u p p o r t i n g Clayton's annexation p r o p o s a l , had claimed that E g y p t "is at present potentially an e n e m y country" and that the danger could be averted only by Britain's taking responsibility for the reorganization of E g y p t i a n s o c i e t y . 5

Within the m u r k y world of E g y p t i a n politics, the new S u l t a n , the Sultan's ministers, a n d s u c h opposition leaders as Z a g h l u l , all were m a n e u v e r i n g , s o m e t i m e s for a n d s o m e t i m e s against one another, u n d e r the cover of their respective nationalist proposals, to win the s u p p o r t of the various disaffected g r o u p s within the E g y p t i a n e c o n o m y a n d E g y p t i a n society. Y e t of these c u r r e n t s , u n d e r m i n i n g the s t r u c t u r e of the protectorate a n d threatening one day to sweep it away, the British authorities evinced little a w a r e n e s s . Zaghlul w a s seen as a m e r e d i s g r u n t l e d office-seeker, u s i n g his political d e m a n d s as leverage to obtain a g o v e r n m e n t j o b . A c c o r d i n g to the R e s i d e n c y in 1917, " H e is now getting old a n d p r o b a b l y desires an i n c o m e . " Y e t within a week of his arrest a n d deportation, d e m o n s t r a t i o n s in C a i r o , A l e x a n d r i a , a n d other towns s p r e a d to the D e l t a , led to violence, a n d were followed by m a s s i v e strikes. R a i l r o a d lines were torn up in key p l a c e s , in a c c o r d , ironically, with a British wartime plan to d i s r u p t the country in the event of an O t t o m a n invasion. T r a n s p o r t workers struck. On 16 M a r c h 1919, a week after Zaghlul's d e p o r t a t i o n , Cairo's railroad a n d telegraph c o m m u n i c a t i o n s with both the D e l t a a n d U p p e r E g y p t were cut, while foreign colonies were b e s i e g e d . T h e flames of d i s o r d e r r a g e d out of control. 6

W i d e s p r e a d attacks on British military personnel c u l m i n a t e d on 18 M a r c h in the m u r d e r of eight of t h e m — t w o officers, five soldiers, a n d an inspector of p r i s o n s — o n a train from A s w a n to C a i r o . T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s administration r e p o r t e d that it retained "no m e a n s of regaining control in U p p e r E g y p t , from whence there is practically no n e w s . " A c c o r d i n g to a recent account, the upheaval "seemed likely for a m o m e n t to lead to a revolt on a scale unparalleled in the E a s t e r n E m p i r e since the I n d i a n M u t i n y . " T h e s e fears were e x a g g e r a t e d — b u t they were sincerely felt a n d widely held. 7

8

What the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s office in the R e s i d e n c y f o u n d so shocking in the rebellion was its "Bolshevik tendency," a n d also that the "present m o v e m e n t in E g y p t is national in the full sense of the w o r d . I t has now the s y m p a t h y o f all classes a n d c r e e d s . . . " C o p t s d e m o n s t r a t e d alongside M o s l e m s . T h e o l o g i c a l s t u d e n t s d e m o n strated a l o n g s i d e s t u d e n t s f r o m the secular schools. W o m e n , albeit 9

420

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1 0

only from the u p p e r classes, d e m o n s t r a t e d alongside m e n . What especially unnerved the British authorities was the involvement of the peasantry in the c o u n t r y s i d e — t h e placid m a s s e s on whose inertia they had c o u n t e d . U n n e r v i n g , too, w a s the s u b s e q u e n t discovery that the u p r i s i n g was o r g a n i z e d . S u d d e n l y the British were faced with a local politician who a p p e a r e d to have a national following— which s u r p r i s e d them a n d m a y have s u r p r i s e d him, too. G e n e r a l Allenby, who was quickly sent out to deal with the situation, arrived in C a i r o on 25 M a r c h a n d declared his intention of putting an end to the d i s t u r b a n c e s . On 7 April he a n n o u n c e d Zaghlul's release. British t r o o p s g r a d u a l l y restored order in the s p r i n g and s u m m e r of 1919, b u t strikes a n d d e m o n s t r a t i o n s continued. At the end of 1919 L o n d o n sent out a C o m m i s s i o n of I n q u i r y under L o r d Milner, which c o n c l u d e d that the British protectorate had indeed to be abolished and replaced by s o m e new relationship, the nature of which Britain a t t e m p t e d to negotiate throughout 1920, 1921, a n d 1922. T h e p r o c e s s p r o v e d t o b e frustrating, a n d d e p o r t i n g Z a g h l u l again p r o v e d to be of little help. T h e principal British fantasy a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t — t h a t it wanted to be g o v e r n e d by Britain, or with her a s s i s t a n c e — r a n up against a stone wall of reality. T h e S u l t a n a n d E g y p t ' s other leaders refused to accept mere a u t o n o m y or even nominal i n d e p e n d e n c e ; they d e m a n d e d full a n d c o m p l e t e independence, which B r i t a i n — d e p e n d e n t u p o n the S u e z C a n a l — w o u l d not g r a n t . T h o u g h British officials tried to reach s o m e kind of agreement with E g y p t ' s leadership, they failed; a n d so in the years to c o m e , Britain was obliged to maintain her a r m e d presence a n d her h e g e m o n y in E g y p t without the consent of the country's politicians. On the other side of the M i d d l e E a s t , however, in A f g h a n i s t a n , a real question arose as to whether Britain could preserve her h e g e m o n y without the consent of local leaders.

45

A F G H A N I S T A N : T H E SPRING OF 1919 E g y p t , with its vital S u e z C a n a l , was one of the key strategic positions on Britain's r o a d to I n d i a ; A f g h a n i s t a n , with its m o u n t a i n p a s s e s leading into the I n d i a n plains, was another. Over the c o u r s e of a century British a r m i e s h a d repeatedly been bloodied in the c o u r s e of their efforts to prevent hostile forces from controlling the fierce m o u n t a i n k i n g d o m . T h e issue was believed b y British s t a t e s m e n t o have been resolved satisfactorily in 1907, when R u s s i a a g r e e d that the k i n g d o m s h o u l d b e c o m e a British protectorate. On 19 F e b r u a r y 1919, however, the E m i r of A f g h a n i s t a n was a s s a s s i n a t e d ; a n d after a short p e r i o d in which rival c l a i m a n t s m a neuvered for the succession, his third son, 26-year-old A m a n u l l a h K h a n , wrote to the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a a n n o u n c i n g his a c cession to the "free a n d independent G o v e r n m e n t of A f g h a n i s t a n . " By the t e r m s of Britain's a g r e e m e n t with R u s s i a in 1907, A f g h a n i s t a n was not, of c o u r s e , fully free a n d independent, for Britain was entrusted with the c o n d u c t of her foreign relations. Y e t on 19 April the new ruler went on to assert his c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e in external as well as internal affairs. 1

A m a n u l l a h secretly p l a n n e d an attack on British I n d i a — t h r o u g h the K h y b e r P a s s — t h a t was to coincide with an I n d i a n nationalist u p r i s i n g in P e s h a w a r , the principal British g a r r i s o n town near the f r o n t i e r . A m a n u l l a h believed that a nationwide I n d i a n u p r i s i n g would then occur. A m a n u l l a h ' s a r m y c o m m a n d e r m o v e d too soon, however, before the P e s h a w a r u p r i s i n g could be o r g a n i z e d , a n d unwittingly alerted the British to their d a n g e r . On 3 M a y 1919 a d e t a c h m e n t of A f g h a n troops c r o s s e d the frontier into British I n d i a at the t o p of the K h y b e r P a s s . T h e y seized control of a b o r d e r village and a p u m p i n g station controlling the water s u p p l y to a nearby I n d i a n military p o s t . On 5 M a y the G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l of I n d i a telegraphed to L o n d o n that it looked as t h o u g h a w a r — t h e T h i r d A f g h a n W a r — h a d s t a r t e d . 2

A c c o r d i n g to A m a n u l l a h , he h a d o r d e r e d his troops to the frontier 421

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in r e s p o n s e to the British repression of d i s t u r b a n c e s in I n d i a . Referring to the A m r i t s a r M a s s a c r e , * a n d to the policy for which it stood, A m a n u l l a h declared that in the n a m e of I s l a m and of h u m a n i t y , he r e g a r d e d the p e o p l e s of I n d i a as justified in rising up against British rule, a n d that his own t r o o p s were at the frontier to keep d i s o r d e r from spreading. T h e British were u n s u r e of his intentions. T h e y were aware that d u r i n g the war a G e r m a n military mission h a d nearly p e r s u a d e d the A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t to launch an invasion of I n d i a , and they believed that Enver's old p a n - T u r k i s h colleagues, a n d also the new Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t in R u s s i a , might influence the A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t in d a n g e r o u s w a y s . A l a r m i n g information reaching the British authorities in M a y , at the time A m a n u l l a h ' s t r o o p s c r o s s e d the b o r d e r , indicated that the A f g h a n s p l a n n e d a s i m u l t a n e o u s attack on three fronts, s p e a r h e a d e d by hordes of religious fanatics, r e s p o n d i n g to the p r o c l a m a t i o n of a H o l y War, a n d s u p p o r t e d by regular t r o o p s in coordination with frontier t r i b e s ; while, at the s a m e time, British forces were to be i m m o b i l i z e d by m a s s rioting within I n d i a . 3

4

Believing that p r o m p t action w a s necessary, British officers in the b o r d e r region attacked A f g h a n positions. Inconclusive c o m b a t took place at scattered points along a w i d e front. F o r the B r i t i s h , the unreliability of their native contingents p r o v e d only one of several unsettling discoveries in a m e s s y , u n p o p u l a r , a n d unsatisfactory c a m p a i g n . At a time when it could ill afford the m o n e y , the British G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a w a s obliged to increase its b u d g e t by an enorm o u s s u m of 1 4 , 7 5 0 , 0 0 0 p o u n d s to cover the costs of the one-month campaign. 5

A l t h o u g h they s u c c e e d e d in expelling the A f g h a n forces from I n d i a a n d , by the end of M a y , h a d g a i n e d the u p p e r h a n d , the British forces were i n a d e q u a t e to the task of invading, s u b d u i n g , a n d o c c u p y i n g the A f g h a n k i n g d o m . What won the day for t h e m w a s the u s e of airplanes, which the t r i b e s m e n , with their primitive w e a p o n s , were u n a b l e to c o m b a t . In particular, it was the b o m b i n g of A f g h a n cities by the Royal Air F o r c e that unnerved A m a n u l l a h and led him to ask for p e a c e . N o n e t h e l e s s , the o u t c o m e of the war, from the Afghans' point of view, was better than a draw. T h e y h a d withdrawn f r o m I n d i a b u t h a d regained their f r e e d o m within their own frontiers. T h e T r e a t y of R a w a l p i n d i , s i g n e d the m o r n i n g of 8 A u g u s t 1919, b r o u g h t the T h i r d A f g h a n War to an end. In the treaty Britain conceded the c o m p l e t e i n d e p e n d e n c e of A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d relinq u i s h e d control over Afghanistan's foreign relations—a control that * On 11 April 1919 a small British military force in the Indian city of Amritsar, the holy city of the Sikhs, opened fire on a group of people who had assembled in a public park for a political meeting, killing 379 of them.

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she had r e q u i r e d in order to exclude hostile foreign p o w e r s , R u s s i a chief a m o n g them, from the strategically important mountain kingd o m . B u t soon after the conclusion of the T r e a t y of R a w a l p i n d i , the A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t m a d e use of its new i n d e p e n d e n c e by entering into a treaty with the Bolsheviks which, a m o n g s t other provisions, allowed the R u s s i a n s to establish consulates within the k i n g d o m . By 1921 the n e r v o u s British authorities were asking the A f g h a n s to alter their a g r e e m e n t with the Bolsheviks, claiming that the R u s s i a n s were setting up consulates at "places so r e m o t e f r o m the s p h e r e of R u s s i a ' s legitimate interests that it was o b v i o u s that the consulates could serve no p u r p o s e b u t that of facilitating hostile intrigue on the I n d i a n frontier." 6

In 1921 the British entered into new negotiations with the A f g h a n r e g i m e . U r g i n g liberal concessions, The Times c o r r e s p o n d e n t wrote on 1 S e p t e m b e r 1921 that "the British C a b i n e t , d e s p i t e the influence of L o r d C u r z o n , whose great knowledge of the E a s t is out of d a t e , " should be convinced that A f g h a n nationalism and i n d e p e n d e n c e had to be recognized, a n d that if they were, the K a b u l regime would show friendship toward Britain. B u t years of British tutelage had fostered not friendship b u t resentment. D u r i n g the 1921 negotiations the British delegation w a s able to p r o d u c e proof that the A f g h a n s h a d joined in a plot against Britain; for British Intelligence had deciphered the Soviet code a n d had learned of p l a n s for joint A f g h a n a n d R u s s i a n military action against the British E m p i r e . D e s p i t e liberal concessions by the British delegation, the K a b u l regime continued to afford facilities to Bolshevik representatives a n d it was soon discovered that R u s s i a n a g e n t s were successfully intriguing with the warlike frontier t r i b e s . 7

8

Of c o u r s e it could be a r g u e d that Afghanistan had always p o s e d difficult p r o b l e m s a n d that the setback to British influence there was an isolated, exceptional event. B u t British policy in A r a b i a , too, was in t a t t e r s — a n d A r a b i a had s e e m e d o p e n to British influence a n d was ruled by m o n a r c h s who p r o f e s s e d friendship for Britain. In the s p r i n g of 1919, while w a g i n g the T h i r d A f g h a n War, Britain s u d d e n l y faced a losing situation in A r a b i a ; a n d while there was no a p p a r e n t connection between the two, or between either of the two a n d the situation in E g y p t , the coincidence of difficulties on the western, eastern, a n d southern e n d s of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n e m p i r e s u g g e s t e d that Britain m i g h t have overextended her imperial commitments.

46

ARABIA: T H E SPRING OF 1919 Of all the M i d d l e E a s t e r n l a n d s , A r a b i a s e e m e d to be Britain's m o s t natural p r e s e r v e . Its l o n g coastlines c o u l d be controlled easily by the Royal N a v y . T w o of its principal lords, H u s s e i n in the west a n d I b n S a u d in the center a n d east, were British p r o t e g e s s u p p o r t e d by substantial regular s u b s i d i e s from the British g o v e r n m e n t . As of 1919 no rival E u r o p e a n powers s o u g h t to intrude themselves into A r a b i a n political affairs. T h e field had been left clear for Britain. Y e t the F i r s t World War was barely over before the C a b i n e t in L o n d o n was forced to recognize that its policy in A r a b i a was in disarray. Its a l l i e s — H u s s e i n , K i n g o f the H e j a z , a n d I b n S a u d , lord of N e j d — w e r e at d a g g e r s d r a w n . H u s s e i n c o m p l a i n e d that he was obliged to s p e n d 12,000 p o u n d s a m o n t h out of his British s u b s i d y to defend against attacks f r o m I b n S a u d , who himself received 5,000 p o u n d s a m o n t h in s u b s i d i e s . T h e British representative who relayed H u s s e i n ' s complaint characterized Britain's financing of both I b n S a u d a n d H u s s e i n — w h e n they were fighting one a n o t h e r — a s a b s u r d . So was the bitter d i s p u t e that broke out within the British g o v e r n m e n t over what to do a b o u t it—which paralyzed the p r o c e s s of m a k i n g a decision, so that none was m a d e . I n s t r u c t i o n s a n d u l t i m a t u m s were drafted b u t not sent. Officials who m a d e decisions were not told that other officials had cancelled those decisions. T h e r e were c h a n g e s of m i n d from one day to the next. 1

2

T h e d i s p u t e centered a r o u n d p o s s e s s i o n o f the small u r b a n oasis centers of K h u r m a a n d T u r a b a , located at the frontier where H u s s e i n ' s h e g e m o n y left off a n d I b n S a u d ' s b e g a n . T h e stakes were larger than they s e e m e d , in part b e c a u s e p o s s e s s i o n of K h u r m a a n d T u r a b a b r o u g h t with it tribal allegiances that also involved substantial areas of g r a z i n g land, b u t mostly b e c a u s e the quarrel was a b o u t religion. In early 1918 the Arab Bulletin had recorded H u s s e i n ' s complaints that his authority was b e i n g u n d e r m i n e d by religious proselytizing c o n d u c t e d b y I b n S a u d ' s a d h e r e n t s ; for the S a u d i claims o n K h u r m a and T u r a b a derived f r o m religious conversion. Ibn

Saud

was

the

hereditary 424

champion

of the

teachings

of

ARABIA: T H E SPRING OF

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425

M u h a m m a d ibn A b d u l W a h h a b , a n eighteenth-century religious leader whose alliance with the H o u s e of S a u d in 1745 had been strengthened by frequent i n t e r m a r r i a g e between the two families. T h e Wahhabis ( a s their o p p o n e n t s called them) were severely puritanical reformers who were seen by their a d v e r s a r i e s as fanatics. It was I b n S a u d ' s g e n i u s to discern how their energies c o u l d be harnessed for political e n d s . At the e n d of 1912 a m o v e m e n t of religious revival h a d b e g u n that was to c h a n g e the nature of A r a b i a n politics in I b n S a u d ' s favor. T r i b e s m e n started selling their h o r s e s , c a m e l s , a n d other p o s s e s s i o n s in the market towns in order to settle in cooperative agricultural c o m m u n i t i e s to live a strict W a h h a b i religious life. T h e m o v e m e n t b e c a m e known as the Ikhzvan: the B r e t h r e n . I b n S a u d immediately p u t himself at the head of i t , which g a v e him an a r m y of true B e d o u i n s — t h e greatest warriors in A r a b i a . In the Brethren, both the authority of each tribe's sheikhs a n d the separation between tribes tended to d i m i n i s h , while the authority of I b n S a u d g r e w . 3

It was the s p r e a d of this u n c o m p r o m i s i n g puritanical faith into neighboring H e j a z that, in H u s s e i n ' s view, threatened to u n d e r m i n e his authority. H u s s e i n was an orthodox S u n n i ; to h i m the W a h h a b i s were doctrinal a n d political enemies. He sent expedition after unsuccessful expedition against K h u r m a a n d T u r a b a t o recall them from their W a h h a b i ways. T h e final expedition was m o u n t e d in the s p r i n g of 1919, in the flush of Allied victory over the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . L e d b y H u s s e i n ' s son A b d u l l a h , the trained H e j a z i a r m y o f 5,000 m e n b r o u g h t along the m o d e r n e q u i p m e n t which the British had s u p p l i e d d u r i n g the war. On 21 M a y 1919 A b d u l l a h ' s t r o o p s occupied T u r a b a , w h e r e u p o n I b n S a u d set out f r o m R i y a d h t o attack t h e m . B u t the pitched battle for which both sides h a d p r e p a r e d never took place. A Brethren force of 1,100 camel-riders, who had g o n e ahead of I b n S a u d ' s forces as s c o u t s , c a m e u p o n Abdullah's c a m p on the night of 25 M a y . A r m e d only with s w o r d s , s p e a r s , and antique rifles, they s w o o p e d d o w n u p o n the sleeping H e j a z i a r m y and destroyed it. A b d u l l a h , in his nightshirt, e s c a p e d ; b u t his t r o o p s did n o t . 4

T h e defeat of H u s s e i n ' s forces was so c o m p l e t e that it b r o u g h t Britain to his r e s c u e . British airplanes were sent to the H e j a z ; British warnings were sent t o I b n S a u d . E v e r the d i p l o m a t , I b n S a u d avoided confrontation, m a d e a show of deferring to Britain's desires, a n d claimed to be trying his best to restrain the h o t h e a d e d B r e t h r e n . H u s s e i n p r o v i d e d a c o m p l e t e contrast, remaining o b d u r a t e ; a n d it was only with difficulty that Britain forced him to accept a t e m p o r a r y armistice in A u g u s t 1920. T h u s it s e e m e d that C a i r o a n d L o n d o n had backed the w r o n g s i d e , especially as I b n S a u d went on to new victories, c a p t u r i n g the m o u n t a i n o u s province of A s i r in 1920, a n d 5

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overthrowing the rival A r a b i a n H o u s e of R a s h i d at the end of 1921. S p e a r h e a d e d by the B r e t h r e n , whose fighting m e n were estimated at 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 , I b n S a u d ' s forces went a b o u t r o u n d i n g out their c o n q u e s t of A r a b i a . On 20 S e p t e m b e r 1920 a special M i d d l e E a s t e r n c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times wrote that the A r a b B u r e a u ' s old proposal that H u s s e i n b e c o m e C a l i p h of I s l a m — i n s p i r e d by L o r d Kitchener's s u g g e s t i o n in the a u t u m n of 1 9 1 4 — w a s p r o v i n g to be a disaster. He p r e d i c t e d that I b n S a u d would invade the H e j a z a n d c a p t u r e it; i n fact I b n S a u d did s o , a n d drove H u s s e i n into exile, four years later. A g a i n s t their will, the British were placed in an a d v e r s a r y position with respect to I b n S a u d by their need to shore up H u s s e i n . British prestige w a s involved; as a F o r e i g n Office official noted, "we shall look fools all over the E a s t if our p u p p e t is knocked off his perch as easily as t h i s . " Yet the British could do little a b o u t it. As in A f g h a n i s t a n , the physical character of the country was f o r b i d d i n g . N o t even a demonstration u s e of force s e e m e d practical; asked what targets along the A r a b i a n coast the Royal N a v y might b o m b a r d , officials along the G u l f coast replied that in fact there were none worth s h e l l i n g . 6

7

8

T h u s on the southern as well as the western a n d eastern frontiers of their M i d d l e E a s t e r n e m p i r e , British officials in 1919 b e g a n to find themselves no longer in control of events for reasons that they could not immediately f a t h o m ; a n d no c o u r s e of c o n d u c t was evident to them that could b r i n g the local populations back into line. B u t p e r h a p s the m o s t serious challenge they encountered was in T u r k e y — t h e heartland of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , which Britain s u p p o s e d l y had c r u s h e d in 1918.

47

T U R K E Y : JANUARY 1920 T h e fate of what r e m a i n e d of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e w a s at the heart of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n question as the Allied P o w e r s — t h r o u g h o u t 1919, 1920, a n d 1921—continued to w r a n g l e a b o u t the disposition of its T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g center in Anatolia. L l o y d G e o r g e c h a n g e d his m i n d several t i m e s a b o u t what s h o u l d be done. In early 1919 he favored a p l a n whereby the U n i t e d S t a t e s w o u l d take C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d A r m e n i a ; G r e e c e w o u l d take a n enclave centered o n S m y r n a ; a n d the rest of the country w o u l d be divided between F r a n c e in the north a n d Italy in the s o u t h . A few m o n t h s later he c h a n g e d his m i n d completely a n d , falling in with the views of his C a b i n e t , declared that "the Allies h a d no m o r e right to split up T u r k e y than G e r m a n y , i n former d a y s , h a d h a d t o split u p P o l a n d . " T h e treaty that he p r o p o s e d to i m p o s e u p o n the S u l t a n the following year nonetheless was h a r s h , a n d i m p o s i n g its t e r m s u p o n the T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t in 1920 p r o v e d m o r e difficult than L l o y d G e o r g e h a d supposed. 1

At the e n d of 1919, elections were held throughout the postarmistice O t t o m a n E m p i r e for a new T u r k i s h C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s ; and T u r k i s h nationalists won a n o v e r w h e l m i n g victory. E v e n before the C h a m b e r c o n v e n e d , newly elected d e p u t i e s converged on A n g o r a (now A n k a r a ) , d e e p in the interior of the country a n d far f r o m the sea a n d the g u n s of the British N a v y , where M u s t a p h a K e m a l , the 38-year-old nationalist general, h a d m o v e d his h e a d q u a r t e r s . T h e r e they s u b s c r i b e d to a K e m a l i s t declaration of political principles that b e c a m e known as the National Pact. T h e National Pact called for the creation o f a n i n d e p e n d e n t T u r k i s h M o s l e m nation-state. T h e pact's w i d e s p r e a d a p p e a l u n d e r s c o r e d a c o m m e n t by the British naval c o m m a n d e r in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to the effect that "the G r e e k occupation of S m y r n a has s t i m u l a t e d a T u r k i s h patriotism p r o b a b l y m o r e real than any which the war was able to e v o k e . " 2

In m i d - J a n u a r y 1920 the new C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s convened in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . On 28 J a n u a r y 1920, in secret session, the d e p u t i e s 427

428

STORM OVER ASIA

voted to a d o p t the National P a c t ; a n d on 17 F e b r u a r y , they ann o u n c e d to the p u b l i c that they h a d d o n e s o . While the leaders of F r a n c e a n d Britain were m e e t i n g in E u r o p e to reach final a g r e e m e n t on the t e r m s of the peace settlement they meant to i m p o s e , the O t t o m a n C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s , without b e i n g a s k e d , h a d defined the m i n i m u m terms they were p r e p a r e d to accept. If the political t h e m e of the twentieth century is seen to be the e n d i n g of E u r o p e ' s rule over its n e i g h b o r i n g continents, then the O t t o m a n C h a m b e r ' s declaration of i n d e p e n d e n c e signalled the dawn of the century. F r e n c h a n d British military leaders w a r n e d their p r i m e ministers that at least twenty-seven a r m y divisions w o u l d be needed to i m p o s e u p o n the rebellious T u r k s the t e r m s on which the two p r i m e ministers were r e s o l v e d . T h i s was well b e y o n d what the Allies c o u l d field. T h e British I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff u r g e d L l o y d G e o r g e t o reconsider his p r o p o s e d peace t e r m s , b u t he refused to do s o . In early 1920 hostilities c o m m e n c e d . F i g h t i n g e r u p t e d in Cilicia, the southern T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g area (adjoining S y r i a ) that Britain h a d allowed F r a n c e t o o c c u p y . F r o m F e b r u a r y t h r o u g h A p r i l , K e m a l i s t forces inflicted repeated defeats on the F r e n c h , c a p t u r i n g positions, inflicting h u n d r e d s of casualties, a n d taking t h o u s a n d s of p r i s o n e r s . T h e F r e n c h Premier, M i l l e r a n d , c a u g h t between p r e s s u r e s for d e mobilization a n d p r e s s u r e s to protect F r e n c h interests in S y r i a , o r d e r e d his local c o m m a n d e r to try to c o m e to s o m e a g r e e m e n t with the T u r k i s h n a t i o n a l i s t s . 3

4

L l o y d G e o r g e was o p p o s e d to conciliation; he m e t force with force. In m i d - M a r c h , Britain led an Allied military occupation of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Allied t r o o p s m o v e d in a n d replaced the O t t o m a n police, declaring martial law a n d dissolving the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s . T h e Allied a r m y of occupation p r o m p t l y arrested 150 O t t o m a n military a n d civil officials, i n c l u d i n g a substantial n u m b e r of the elected d e p u t i e s , a n d d e p o r t e d t h e m to M a l t a , where Z a g h l u l a n d his E g y p t i a n colleagues h a d been sent ( b u t s u b s e q u e n t l y released) the year b e f o r e . F r a n c e a n d Italy hastened to a s s u r e K e m a l that these m e a s u r e s represented British policy, not their o w n . 5

6

7

T h e occupation of the S u l t a n ' s capital at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e did not d a m a g e M u s t a p h a K e m a l . C o n t r a r y t o what s o m e British authorities believed, he no longer acted for the S u l t a n — a n d an u n i n t e n d e d effect of the Allied o c c u p a t i o n was to destroy whatever prestige or legitimacy that r e m a i n e d to the S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t a n d to transfer it to K e m a l ' s r e g i m e . T h i s was illustrated the following m o n t h when 100 m e m b e r s of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s who r e m a i n e d free joined in A n g o r a with 190 others elected f r o m what they t e r m e d resistance g r o u p s to f o r m a new P a r l i a m e n t . T h e y voted to create a g o v e r n m e n t of the G r a n d National A s s e m b l y , of which M u s t a p h a K e m a l was elected p r e s i d e n t . T h e S u l t a n was declared a prisoner of the 8

9

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Allies, a n d his acts invalid. T h e S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t , in occupied C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , replied by b r a n d i n g the leaders in A n g o r a as traitors. K e m a l ' s A n g o r a g o v e r n m e n t p r u d e n t l y c h o s e to leave its relationship to the S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t a m b i g u o u s . T h e conflict in Anatolia was c l o u d e d by the e m e r g e n c e of semia u t o n o m o u s w a r l o r d s a n d outlaw b a n d s , s o m e t i m e s acting for themselves, s o m e t i m e s acting in alliance with one or the other of the g o v e r n m e n t s , or with the British, or with the G r e e k s , or with c o m m u n i s t s ( R u s s i a n and otherwise). T h e r e were local rebellions, in s o m e c a s e s undertaken by great l a n d h o l d i n g families seeking to reassert their interests, b u t there were also m a r a u d i n g g r o u p s of n o m a d s a n d refugees, K u r d s , C i r c a s s i a n s , and T a r t a r s from the C r i m e a a n d Central A s i a . T h o u g h g r o u p s s u c h a s the G r e e n A r m y b e g a n as e x p r e s s i o n s of one or another political c a u s e , they tended to degenerate into no m o r e than glorified b a n d i t s . T o r n by anarchy and civil war, the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g O t t o m a n E m p i r e c a m e increasingly to r e s e m b l e the lands that h a d been C z a r i s t R u s s i a , a n d which in 1918 h a d formed a vast indistinct battlefield on which Whites a n d R e d s , b a n d i t s a n d w a r l o r d s , foreign a r m i e s a n d indige n o u s i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s e n g a g e d in a confusing a n d multisided conflict. T h e frontier between the two ancient e m p i r e s was blurred by local u p r i s i n g s and the m o v e m e n t s of various a r m e d g r o u p s ; while the flow of Bolshevik agents and p r o p a g a n d a into Anatolia m a d e it s e e m that an effective b o r d e r between the two vast a n d confused e x - e m p i r e s no longer existed. 1 0

T h e first decision of K e m a l ' s new g o v e r n m e n t in A n g o r a was to s e n d a m i s s i o n to R u s s i a , where it arrived in M a y 1920, possibly in p u r s u a n c e of earlier a g r e e m e n t s between K e m a l ' s Nationalists a n d L e n i n ' s B o l s h e v i k s . T h e working relationship that e m e r g e d , t h o u g h with s u c h difficulty that it was not solidified for nearly a year (in the treaty of 16 M a r c h 1921), was one that the British authorities misu n d e r s t o o d . T h e R u s s i a n Bolsheviks had given refuge a n d encouragement to E n v e r P a s h a , the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s exiled wartime leader; a n d the B r i t i s h wrongly a s s u m e d that E n v e r was b e h i n d the A n g o r a g o v e r n m e n t . I n fact E n v e r and K e m a l were d ea d ly rivals; when this b e c a m e clear to t h e m , the R u s s i a n s flirted with the idea of u s i n g one against the other b u t , in the end, felt c o m p e l l e d to choose between t h e m . 11

12

W r o n g in believing that K e m a l was secretly acting on behalf of the S u l t a n , a n d w r o n g , too, in s u s p e c t i n g that he was acting for E n v e r , the British were also w r o n g in s u s p e c t i n g that he was acting for the Bolsheviks. K e m a l was in fact an i m p l a c a b l e enemy of R u s s i a n B o l s h e v i s m , a n d as s o o n as he felt a b l e , he s u p p r e s s e d the R u s s i a n inspired T u r k i s h C o m m u n i s t Party, killed its leaders, a n d killed or i m p r i s o n e d its a g e n t s . As a result, m a n y of the R u s s i a n leaders were

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d i s p o s e d t o treat K e m a l a s a n e n e m y . T h e K e m a l i s t s were given the i m p r e s s i o n that it was only as a result of Stalin's powerful intervention, a n d over the objections of the Soviet M i n i s t r y of F o r e i g n Affairs, that R u s s i a agreed to deal with A n g o r a at a l l . Stalin, C o m m i s s a r for Nationalities a n d for S t a t e C o n t r o l , evidently put R u s s i a n national interests a h e a d of Bolshevik ideology, a n d recognized that K e m a l might be able to inflict d a m a g e on the B r i t i s h . D a m a g i n g the British was one of Stalin's chief objectives, a n d the realistic—or c y n i c a l — B o l s h e v i k was willing to s u p p o r t even K e m a l in order to achieve his goal. S o S o v i e t m o n e y a n d s u p p l i e s b e g a n t o p o u r over the R u s s o - T u r k i s h frontier, in a m o u n t s still not known, to aid the anti-Bolshevik N a t i o n a l i s t s . It w a s the first significant military aid that S o v i e t R u s s i a h a d given to a foreign m o v e m e n t . B u t within the Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t , the resistance to s u p p l y i n g aid to T u r k i s h anti-Bolsheviks m u s t h a v e been intense, for it took a y e a r — f r o m the s p r i n g of 1920 when the T u r k i s h mission went to R u s s i a to ask for s u p p o r t — t o c o m p l e t e the a r r a n g e m e n t s . 1 3

M e a n w h i l e , the possibility that T u r k e y w o u l d be thrown into the a r m s of the S o v i e t s reinforced the views of Allied military officials, who believed that L l o y d G e o r g e w o u l d be m a k i n g a mistake in forcing the Sultan's g o v e r n m e n t to sign a harsh treaty. On the British s i d e as well as the F r e n c h , it was the view of the a d m i r a l s and generals m o s t directly concerned that they did not have the m a n p o w e r to i m p o s e t e r m s on the rebellious T u r k s . Venizelos, the G r e e k P r i m e Minister, told the other Allied leaders that G r e e k forces could do it alone, but the British service chiefs did not share his confidence. A close friend asked L l o y d G e o r g e whether he still thought it wise to give S m y r n a to the G r e e k s . "I have no d o u b t a b o u t it," replied the P r i m e Minister. "You m u s t d e c i d e w h o m you are g o i n g to back. T h e T u r k s nearly b r o u g h t a b o u t our defeat in the war. It was a near thing. Y o u cannot trust t h e m a n d they a r e a d e c a d e n t r a c e . T h e G r e e k s , on the other h a n d , are our friends, a n d they are a rising p e o p l e . . . W e m u s t s e c u r e C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s . Y o u cannot do that effectively without c r u s h i n g the T u r k i s h power." Referring to the d o u b t s a b o u t his policy voiced by British military leaders, he s a i d , "Of c o u r s e the military are against the G r e e k s . T h e y always have been. T h e y favour the T u r k s . T h e military are confirmed T o r i e s . I t i s the T o r y policy t o s u p p o r t the T u r k s . " 1 4

O n the night o f 1 4 - 1 5 J u n e 1920, K e m a l ' s T u r k i s h Nationalist troops attacked a B r i t i s h battalion near C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , p o s i n g a threat to the forces o c c u p y i n g the O t t o m a n capital, where the Allies held the S u l t a n as a virtual prisoner. C o m i n g only a m o n t h after K e m a l sent his mission to R u s s i a (though a year before R u s s o T u r k i s h a r r a n g e m e n t s were c o n c l u d e d ) a n d soon after the defeats the Nationalists h a d inflicted on the F r e n c h in Cilicia, the T u r k i s h attack

TURKEY:

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431

c a u s e d a l a r m . T h e British c o m m a n d i n g officer telegraphed for reinforcements. T h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff in L o n d o n reluctantly recognized that the only t r o o p s available were G r e e k , and p r o p o s e d to the C a b i n e t that a G r e e k division be r e q u e s t e d to help defend C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . Venizelos was willing to s u p p l y it, p r o v i d e d that the Allies also authorized G r e e c e to advance f r o m S m y r n a . T h i s would allow the G r e e k a r m y to seize a n d o c c u p y the substantial enclave that Venizelos p r o p o s e d to a n n e x . It would c o m p l e t e the transformation of G r e e k t r o o p s f r o m a t e m p o r a r y policing force into a p e r m a n e n t a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n . L l o y d G e o r g e w a s m o r e than willing. H e had met with Venizelos earlier, had w a r n e d h i m that the other Allies w o u l d not help, had asked G r e e c e to enforce the t e r m s of the T r e a t y of S e v r e s by herself, a n d had a g r e e d with Venizelos that their military advisers e x a g g e r a t e d the difficulty of d o i n g s o . On 20 J u n e 1920 F r e n c h Premier Millerand a g r e e d with L l o y d G e o r g e to authorize a limited G r e e k advance f r o m S m y r n a . On 22 J u n e the G r e e k s launched a successful three-pronged attack which by early J u l y had b r o u g h t t h e m all of A s i a M i n o r as far as the Anatolian plateau. On the far s i d e of the D a r d a n e l l e s , meanwhile, G r e e k t r o o p s drove t h r o u g h eastern T h r a c e . Months before—in occupying Constantinople—the Allies had c r u s h e d resistance in the capital. N o w the G r e e k a r m y s e e m e d to have c r u s h e d resistance outside the capital as well—if the existence of K e m a l was i g n o r e d . " T u r k e y is no m o r e , " an exultant L l o y d G e o r g e a n n o u n c e d t r i u m p h a n t l y . On 10 A u g u s t 1920 the T r e a t y of S e v r e s was s i g n e d by representatives of the virtually captive T u r k i s h S u l t a n a n d his helpless g o v e r n m e n t . 1 5

16

T h e T r e a t y of S e v r e s (see p a g e 4 1 1 ) e m b o d i e d almost all of the t e r m s that L l o y d G e o r g e a n d Venizelos m o s t d e s i r e d . While reducing the O t t o m a n state a l m o s t to a nonentity, it restored to G r e e c e the coastal l a n d s of A s i a M i n o r that G r e e k s had settled nearly 3,000 years before. L i k e A r a b s , G r e e k s were b o u n d together by a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e a n d civilization rather than by political ties, so that what G r e e c e a c c o m p l i s h e d in 1920 with British political backing was to extend her territorial frontier in E u r o p e to her cultural frontier in G r e e k - s p e a k i n g A s i a . It w a s the L i b e r a l d r e a m of t r i u m p h a n t Hellenism a n d Christianity, p r o m o t e d by G l a d s t o n e ' s political heir, David Lloyd George. T h e p r o b l e m , which s e e m s t o have s t r u c k Venizelos a n d L l o y d G e o r g e a l m o s t immediately after the s i g n i n g at S e v r e s , was how to keep the t e r m s of the treaty from being eventually overthrown. T h e British a r m e d forces had already b e e n demobilized, a n d there was considerable d o m e s t i c political p r e s s u r e in G r e e c e , too, to d e m o bilize immediately. Y e t once the Allies d e p a r t e d from T u r k e y , K e m a l m i g h t well d e s c e n d f r o m the Anatolian plateau to retake the coast

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a n d u n d o the treaty. In O c t o b e r 1920 Venizelos raised with L l o y d G e o r g e the question of the other alternative: whether to s e n d his a r m y into the interior to destroy K e m a l ' s Nationalists while G r e e c e still had the a r m e d forces t o d o s o . L i k e N a p o l e o n a m i d s t the b u r n i n g ruins of M o s c o w , Venizelos a n d L l o y d G e o r g e were challenged by an enemy who would neither s t a n d a n d fight nor s u r r e n d e r . I n d e e d , K e m a l ' s plan was to p u r s u e the strategy the R u s s i a n s had u s e d successfully against N a p o l e o n in the war of 1812: d r a w i n g the enemy forces into the interior, while wearing t h e m d o w n . 1 7

What Venizelos a n d L l o y d G e o r g e would have d e c i d e d to do can never be known for s u r e , for one of the m o s t b i z a r r e political accidents in m o d e r n history took the matter out of their h a n d s . On 30 S e p t e m b e r 1920 the y o u n g G r e e k K i n g , A l e x a n d e r , while taking a walk in the g r o u n d s of his palace, w a s bitten by a monkey. A severe fever set in a n d , on 25 O c t o b e r , A l e x a n d e r d i e d . In a f a m o u s p h r a s e , Winston Churchill later wrote that "It is p e r h a p s no exaggeration to r e m a r k that a q u a r t e r of a million p e r s o n s died of this monkey's b i t e " — f o r it was his belief that if A l e x a n d e r a n d Venizelos had continued to rule G r e e c e , the tragic o u t c o m e of the war that G r e e c e was to w a g e against T u r k e y in 1921 a n d 1922 w o u l d have been averted (see C h a p t e r 60 b e l o w ) . 18

T h e immensely c o m p l i c a t e d question of succession to the throne arose at the s a m e time as the G r e e k elections. T h e results were astonishing. A g a i n s t a l m o s t all expectations the s u p p o s e d l y p o p u l a r Venizelos was defeated. B r o u g h t b a c k into power were the p r o G e r m a n , anti-Allied leaders w h o m Venizelos a n d the F r e n c h h a d d e p o s e d a n d exiled d u r i n g the war. C o n s t a n t i n e I, Alexander's father, forced off the throne in 1917, was once again king. B a c k from F r e n c h - i m p o s e d exile, D e m e t r i o s G o u n a r i s , the bitter enemy of Venizelos a n d of the Allies, controlled the g o v e r n m e n t . C o n s t a n t i n e a n d his ministers were eager to p r e s s forward in T u r k e y . B u t for anyone on the Allied side who wanted to a b a n d o n the complexities of the A s i a M i n o r involvement, the turna b o u t in G r e e c e p r o v i d e d the perfect occasion for d o i n g so. T h e F r e n c h a n d the Italians took a d v a n t a g e of the situation by withdrawing their s u p p o r t f r o m G r e e c e a n d , by implication, from the T r e a t y of S e v r e s . B o t h countries had been increasingly u n h a p p y with L l o y d G e o r g e ' s v e n t u r e s o m e policy. F r a n c e , in particular, had felt constrained only by a personal c o m m i t m e n t to Venizelos, f r o m which his defeat at the polls released her. T h e r e a f t e r both Italy a n d F r a n c e looked increasingly to a future K e m a l i s t g o v e r n m e n t of T u r k e y as a source of financial concessions a n d a d v a n t a g e s . In Britain, Churchill and the War Office a r g u e d in favor of concessions to K e m a l in order to detach him from Bolshevik R u s s i a . I n d e e d Churchill u r g e d m a k i n g a peace with K e m a l that would

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re-create that " T u r k i s h barrier to R u s s i a n a m b i t i o n s " that had been the traditional British policy d u r i n g the G r e a t G a m e . But Lloyd G e o r g e resisted all s u c h p r o p o s a l s . M a s s i v e u n e m p l o y m e n t and other severe economic and social p r o b l e m s in B r i t a i n — a s well as p r o b l e m s in E g y p t , A f g h a n i s t a n , A r a b i a , a n d elsewhere in the M i d d l e E a s t — s t i l l did not cause L l o y d G e o r g e to conclude (as Churchill had c o n c l u d e d ) that Britain c o u l d not afford to devote resources to coercing T u r k e y . 1 9

2 0

In an a p p a r e n t effort to settle m a t t e r s , however, the Allies convened a r o u n d - t a b l e conference in L o n d o n to which a K e m a l i s t delegation w a s invited. T h e conference was s c h e d u l e d to meet in L o n d o n , a n d its first full session fell on 21 F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 1 . T h e new G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t a g r e e d to attend the conference, b u t before the conference convened the G r e e k a r m y ' s high c o m m a n d o r d e r e d a p r o b e of K e m a l ' s defenses. E v i d e n t l y thinking in t e r m s of a military rather than a negotiated settlement, the G r e e k c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f sent forward a reconnaissance force toward the K e m a l i s t lines in the interior. M o v i n g over difficult, b r o k e n , high g r o u n d in harsh winter weather, the G r e e k s m e t a n d were repulsed by a T u r k i s h force u n d e r the c o m m a n d of K e m a l ' s colleague, I s m e t , near a little village called I n o n u . F o r the T u r k s the o u t c o m e was a portent of victories t o c o m e . T h e G r e e k s , however, c a m e away f r o m the e n g a g e ment with the i m p r e s s i o n that they h a d tested the fighting qualities of the T u r k s a n d had f o u n d that the T u r k i s h defenses were vulnerable. At the L o n d o n conference in F e b r u a r y , little p r o g r e s s was m a d e toward resolving the d i s p u t e a b o u t Anatolia's fate. T h e G r e e k s had m a d e up their m i n d s in a d v a n c e that they were p r e p a r e d to go to war in order to win a total victory. T h e K e m a l i s t T u r k s , moreover, were not willing to let G r e e c e retain the S m y r n a enclave; yet any G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t would have raised d o m e s t i c political difficulties for itself by s u r r e n d e r i n g it. Venizelos—out of office, b u t still a c t i v e — h a d already told L l o y d G e o r g e that if K i n g Constantine's g o v e r n m e n t a b a n d o n e d S m y r n a , Venizelist leaders in G r e e k Anatolia would p r o c l a i m S m y r n a an i n d e p e n d e n t republic a n d would carry on the war against the T u r k s . "Hellenism," he wrote to the British P r i m e M i n i s t e r , "is a force m u c h b r o a d e r than the confines of the G r e e k K i n g d o m , a n d . . . if the latter does not wish or is u n a b l e to hold S m y r n a with its s u r r o u n d i n g district, it is p o s s i b l e for Hellenism in T u r k e y itself to u n d e r t a k e this duty, provided the allies, or to speak m o r e precisely E n g l a n d , are d i s p o s e d to s u p p o r t this task . . . " In g u a r d e d t e r m s , L l o y d G e o r g e indicated that he might be d i s p o s e d t o tender s u c h s u p p o r t . 2 1

2 2

T h e L o n d o n conference achieved nothing; neither side was willing to c o m p r o m i s e . T h e K e m a l i s t delegation was e n c o u r a g e d , by the

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e a g e r n e s s of F r a n c e and Italy to negotiate separately with it, to believe that it need not m o d e r a t e its d e m a n d s . Similarly, the G r e e k s were e n c o u r a g e d to remain intransigent by the a n t i - T u r k i s h ent h u s i a s m of the British P r i m e Minister. L l o y d G e o r g e was convinced that Venizelos had been p r o f o u n d l y right in o b s e r v i n g that "the m o s t i m p o r t a n t result for humanity of the great war was not the dissolution of the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n E m p i r e nor the limitation of the G e r m a n , b u t the d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f the T u r k i s h E m p i r e . " 2 3

B u t victory over O t t o m a n resistance forces P r i m e Minister. In T u r k e y itself, K e m a l still to the s o u t h — i n S y r i a — O t t o m a n officers, centered in D a m a s c u s also p r o c l a i m e d A r a b

continued to elude the defied the Allies, while officials, a n d notables defiance of the Allies.

48

SYRIA AND LEBANON: T H E SPRING AND SUMMER OF 1920 i T h e nominal ruler of S y r i a w a s F e i s a l , the prince from M e c c a who had led the A r a b striking force on the right flank of the Allied a r m i e s in the Palestine a n d S y r i a n c a m p a i g n s . P e n d i n g negotiation of a peace settlement, G e n e r a l A l l e n b y — c o m m e n c i n g in the a u t u m n of 1 9 1 8 — h a d allowed F e i s a l to a d m i n i s t e r S y r i a ' s affairs f r o m the capital city of D a m a s c u s . Feisal himself spent m u c h of 1919 in E u r o p e negotiating with the Allies; he entrusted the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of S y r i a to others. As the m e t r o p o l i s of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g areas that Britain h a d left provisionally i n d e p e n d e n t , the ancient oasis town of D a m a s c u s was a center u p o n which discontented A r a b political and military figures from m a n y p a r t s o f the former O t t o m a n E m p i r e c o n v e r g e d . C a r e lessly a d m i n i s t e r e d in Feisal's n a m e by feuding rivals, it was in a state of c o n t i n u o u s unrest t h r o u g h o u t 1919 a n d 1920, as traditional ruling families battled against the a m b i t i o n s of a d v e n t u r o u s newc o m e r s , while militants of the principal political c l u b s divided largely along regional lines. 1

A G e n e r a l S y r i a n C o n g r e s s was called into being by F e i s a l and a s s e m b l e d 6 J u n e 1919. Feisal, aware that he was a foreigner in D a m a s c u s a n d mindful of the principles p r o c l a i m e d by W o o d r o w Wilson, s u m m o n e d the c o n g r e s s to e n d o r s e the d e m a n d s he p l a n n e d to present at the Peace Conference a n d to p r o v e to the conference that he was the authentic s p o k e s m a n for the peoples of the S y r i a n provinces. F e i s a l h a d not yet recognized the necessity of placing control of the S y r i a n G e n e r a l C o n g r e s s in the h a n d s of m e n who would be p r e p a r e d to e n d o r s e the extensive concessions that, in the nature of international politics, he would be obliged to m a k e at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e in P a r i s . T h e o l d - g u a r d traditional ruling families i n S y r i a were a m o n g those whose loyalty to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d r e m a i n e d unshaken throughout the war. T h e y h a d remained hostile to F e i s a l , the Allies, 435

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S T O R M OVER ASIA

a n d the militant A r a b nationalist c l u b s ; yet they won congressional seats in D a m a s c u s a n d in the other principal inland towns of Horns, H a m a , and A l e p p o . N o n e t h e l e s s the radical nationalist clubs s u c ceeded in winning control of the G e n e r a l S y r i a n C o n g r e s s , in part by m a k i n g deals with s o m e elements in the conservative o l d - g u a r d . Of the three m a i n nationalist c l u b s , o n e — a l - A h d , the organization of A r a b i c officers in the O t t o m a n a r m y — w a s d o m i n a t e d by m e m bers from the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces, whose chief interest was in the future of their own p r o v i n c e s . Another, the A r a b C l u b , was d o m i n a t e d by m e m b e r s from the Palestinian area a n d was set up as an anti-Zionist organization devoted to forcing Feisal to a b a n d o n his c o m m i t m e n t to Z i o n i s m . Several m e m b e r s of the E x e c u t i v e C o m mittee of the A r a b C l u b o c c u p i e d i m p o r t a n t positions in Feisal's administration, even t h o u g h the Palestinians had largely r e m a i n e d p r o - O t t o m a n a n d anti-Feisal t h r o u g h o u t the war. Palestinians also achieved leadership positions in the b r o a d - b a s e d Istiqlal Party, e s t a b lished by the third a n d m o s t p r o m i n e n t of the nationalist c l u b s , al-Fatat. 2

T h e orientation of the G e n e r a l S y r i a n C o n g r e s s was revealed as s o o n as it met in m i d - 1 9 1 9 , by its call for a completely i n d e p e n d e n t G r e a t e r S y r i a that would include all of the area that is occupied today b y S y r i a , L e b a n o n , J o r d a n , and Israel. T o F e i s a l , who h o p e d for an A m e r i c a n or British M a n d a t o r y regime a n d for A m e r i c a n , British, a n d Zionist s u p p o r t against the d e m a n d s of F r a n c e , it a p peared that m a t t e r s were p a s s i n g out of his control a n d that he w o u l d have to take s t e p s "to take s t e a m out of the S y r i a n C o n g r e s s . " However, he was obliged to r e m o v e himself from the scene in order to attend negotiations with the G r e a t Powers in E u r o p e . 3

At the e n d of the negotiations in E u r o p e in 1919, Feisal s u c c e e d e d in reaching the secret u n d e r s t a n d i n g d e s c r i b e d earlier with the F r e n c h Premier, C l e m e n c e a u . T h e i r a g r e e m e n t allowed Feisal to reign over an independent S y r i a over which F r a n c e would exercise only a loose t r u s t e e s h i p . F r o m the point of view of C l e m e n c e a u , these were g e n e r o u s t e r m s : no other F r e n c h politician would have agreed to let A r a b S y r i a retain a certain m e a s u r e of independence or offered to let the p r o - B r i t i s h F e i s a l remain in D a m a s c u s — l e t alone as Syria's m o n arch. When C l e m e n c e a u fell f r o m power in J a n u a r y 1920, the s t r o n g colonialist bloc in the newly elected F r e n c h Parliament certainly might have balked at honoring s u c h t e r m s . Feisal's only hope was the F r e n c h w o u l d feel themselves b o u n d by the secret agreement once they learned of its e x i s t e n c e — s o long as the S y r i a n A r a b s were willing to be b o u n d by it too. B u t when Feisal returned f r o m E u r o p e to S y r i a on 14 J a n u a r y 1920, he found that A r a b nationalists were unwilling to accept any role at all for F r a n c e in g u i d i n g Syria's affairs. In vain, Feisal warned a c o m m i t t e e of one of the A r a b 4

SYRIA AND

437

LEBANON

nationalist societies in D a m a s c u s that to reject his a g r e e m e n t with C l e m e n c e a u meant war with F r a n c e ; b u t the c o m m i t t e e replied that "We are ready to declare war on both E n g l a n d and F r a n c e . " L a t e r in J a n u a r y , with militant A r a b nationalists in control, the G e n e r a l S y r i a n C o n g r e s s voted d o w n the t e r m s of the F e i s a l — C l e m e n c e a u agreement. 5

U n a b l e to p e r s u a d e the nationalists to follow his policy of conciliating F r a n c e — u n a b l e , in other w o r d s , to lead the n a t i o n a l i s t s — F e i s a l seemingly c h a n g e d course and b e g a n to talk as though he m e a n t to follow t h e m . In F e b r u a r y he w a s r e p o r t e d to be s p e a k i n g of winning full A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e from F r a n c e "by the s w o r d . " B u t this a p p e a r s to have been m e r e d e m a g o g u e r y , designed to rival that of the nationalists in b i d d i n g for p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . F o r u n d e r cover of his violent rhetoric, Feisal reached out to the only significant indigenous force that could be induced to s u p p o r t his policy of c o m p r o m i s e with F r a n c e : his former enemies, the conservative, traditional ruling families of D a m a s c u s a n d the inland towns, who had s u p p o r t e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the world war against the Allies a n d F e i s a l . Feisal p e r s u a d e d t h e m to form a new political p a r t y — t h e National P a r t y — w h i c h e s p o u s e d in public the i n d e p e n d e n c e of a G r e a t e r S y r i a , but in private was p r e p a r e d to accept the F e i s a l - C l e m e n c e a u agreement and a F r e n c h p r e s e n c e . T h e National Party did not in fact insist on full and i m m e d i a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e for S y r i a a n d was also p r e p a r e d to recognize a J e w i s h National H o m e in P a l e s t i n e . * 6

7

R u s h i n g to head off the National Party by acting before it could organize its forces, the militant nationalist clubs called the G e n e r a l C o n g r e s s back into session. T h e second Syrian G e n e r a l C o n g r e s s convened in early M a r c h 1920, a n d immediately p a s s e d a resolution proclaiming S y r i a to be completely i n d e p e n d e n t within her "natural" b o u n d a r i e s , including L e b a n o n a n d Palestine, u n d e r the kingship of Feisal as constitutional m o n a r c h . At the s a m e time an A r a b delegation in Palestine confronted the British military governor with a resolution o p p o s i n g Z i o n i s m and petitioning to b e c o m e part of an independent S y r i a ; while a g r o u p of M e s o p o t a m i a n s met to p r o c l a i m the i n d e p e n d e n c e of their p r o v i n c e s — B a s r a a n d B a g h d a d — u n d e r the kingship of Feisal's brother, A b d u l l a h . T h u s early in 1920, within weeks after the O t t o m a n C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e had publicly defied the Allies and declared the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g part of the e m p i r e , the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g part s e e m e d to be following the s a m e c o u r s e . 8

9

G e n e r a l Allenby, thoroughly a l a r m e d , warned his s u p e r i o r s that if Arab opinion in Palestine and Syria regarded both as part of the same country, so that Zionism was also an issue in Damascus, although it was not the overriding issue that it was in Jerusalem, Jaffa, or Haifa.

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STORM OVER ASIA

Britain a n d F r a n c e "persist in their attitude of declaring null and void the action of Feisal a n d S y r i a n C o n g r e s s , I feel certain that war m u s t ensue. If hostilities arise, the A r a b s will r e g a r d b o t h F r e n c h a n d E n g l i s h as their enemies, a n d we shall be d r a g g e d by the F r e n c h into a war which is against our own interests a n d for which we are illp r e p a r e d . " Britain b l a m e d F r a n c e for this. L o r d C u r z o n s u m m o n e d the F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r to the F o r e i g n Office to point out the mistakes F r a n c e h a d m a d e , and to place on record his opinion that the dire turn of events was entirely F r a n c e ' s f a u l t . 1 0

11

T h e F r e n c h a n d , even m o r e so, the British were startled by the D a m a s c u s p r o c l a m a t i o n s ; and cautioned Feisal that g r a v e conseq u e n c e s would follow any attempt to carry t h e m into e f f e c t . Y e t , carried away by a c o n g r e s s that he c o u l d not control, F e i s a l not only allowed his followers to carry on guerrilla attacks against the F r e n c h a n d C h r i s t i a n s on the c o a s t , b u t m o v e d to establish s u p p o r t for K e m a l i s t T u r k e y , which was successfully inflicting defeats on the F r e n c h in Cilicia, a b o v e the frontier. F e i s a l a n d his partisans denied F r a n c e the use of the A l e p p o railroad line, cutting off reinforcements by land a n d obliging the F r e n c h to s u p p l y their b e l e a g u e r e d garrison in Cilicia by sea i n s t e a d . 12

1 3

1 4

B u t the Syrian nationalists failed to realize how m u c h their position a n d Feisal's h a d d e p e n d e d on British s u p p o r t ; their p r o c l a m a t i o n s , attacking British claims to govern M e s o p o t a m i a a n d Palestine, effectively forced Britain b a c k into the a r m s of F r a n c e , a n d briefly restored the alliance of the two E u r o p e a n p o w e r s in the M i d d l e E a s t . E v e n L l o y d G e o r g e , whose initial reaction was glee at the news that F r a n c e was b e i n g defied, saw no alternative but to reach agreement with the F r e n c h . T h e policies of L l o y d G e o r g e a n d the a r m i e s of Allenby h a d f o r m e d the shield b e h i n d which the S y r i a n s h a d been allowed to indulge in provocative politics with i m p u n i t y . O n c e the shield was withdrawn, the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t — a s its colonialist g r o u p quickly s a w — w a s free to act. F r a n c e ' s main concern was to d e t a c h the S y r i a n s from their dangerous alliance with the forces of K e m a l i s t T u r k e y . R o b e r t de C a i x , the leading p r o p a g a n d i s t of the colonialist society the C o m i t e de l'Asie F r a n g a i s e , who h a d b e c o m e F r a n c e ' s chief political representative in S y r i a , led a delegation to A n g o r a on 20 M a y 1920 to negotiate an armistice with K e m a l in p e r s o n . He s u c c e e d e d in p a t c h i n g up a t e m p o r a r y t r u c e . T h i s , together with an agreement with the British, p a v e d the way for F r a n c e to take military action. On 27 M a y 1920 Paris o r d e r e d its c o m m a n d e r in B e i r u t , G e n e r a l G o i i r a u d , to p r e p a r e to take the field against F e i s a l . On Bastille D a y 1920, G e n e r a l G o u r a u d , p u s h e d by Paris, sent an u l t i m a t u m to F e i s a l , setting forth t e r m s that he c o u l d not have e x p e c t e d the A r a b

SYRIA

AND

439

LEBANON

leader to accept, including the d i s b a n d i n g of the A r a b a r m y . B u t Feisal, evidently losing his nerve, a g r e e d to the F r e n c h t e r m s , whereu p o n the m o b s o f D a m a s c u s rioted against h i m . G e n e r a l G o u r a u d , under o r d e r s from Paris, took the position that the reply Feisal h a d sent h i m — a b j e c t though it was—-was nonetheless unsatisfactory. Feisal r u s h e d to s e n d another, offering unconditional s u r r e n d e r , but G o u r a u d was prevailed u p o n by de C a i x to reply that it was too late, a n d to order his t r o o p s to m a r c h on D a m a s c u s . T h e F r e n c h h a d few t r o o p s available for the c a m p a i g n , a n d m e a n while the b r e a k d o w n of their truce with K e m a l s u d d e n l y e x p o s e d them to d a n g e r s on both s i d e s : K e m a l to the north, Feisal to the east. T h e F r e n c h a p p e a r e d to be t r a p p e d between enemies on two fronts, but they were in luck, for they m e t with no effective resistance f r o m the S y r i a n s . T h e largely S e n e g a l e s e t r o o p s o f F r a n c e ' s A r m y of the L e v a n t a d v a n c e d through twisting g o r g e s in which a c o m p e t e n t o p p o n e n t w o u l d have a m b u s h e d t h e m ; but u n a c c o u n t a b l y , Feisal's partisans waited until the S e n e g a l e s e e m e r g e d before challenging t h e m . At that point, a F r e n c h air s q u a d r o n a p p e a r e d overhead, a n d the d e f e n d e r s of D a m a s c u s panicked, turned, and fled, offering no r e s i s t a n c e . O n 2 6 J u l y 1920 the F r e n c h o c c u p i e d D a m a s c u s ; o n 2 7 J u l y they ordered F e i s a l into exile; a n d on 28 J u l y he left. T h e F r e n c h P r i m e Minister p r o c l a i m e d that S y r i a henceforth would be held by F r a n c e : " T h e whole of it, and f o r e v e r . " ' 1 5

16

1

T h e F r e n c h authorities went ahead t o divide S y r i a into s u b - u n i t s . O n e of these, G r e a t L e b a n o n , was the forerunner of the country today called L e b a n o n . T h e G r e a t L e b a n o n p r o c l a i m e d b y G e n e r a l G o u r a u d on 1 A u g u s t 1920 also c o r r e s p o n d e d roughly to the area of direct rule p r o m i s e d to F r a n c e in the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t . In addition to the old T u r k i s h canton of L e b a n o n — i n which F r a n c e ' s Maronite C h r i s t i a n proteges as well as their traditional enemies, the D r u s e s , were c e n t e r e d — G r e a t L e b a n o n included the coastal cities of Beirut, T r i p o l i , S i d o n , and T y r e , as well as the long Bekaa valley which covered a considerable area in the interior of the country. N o n e of these territorial a d d i t i o n s — B e i r u t , T r i p o l i , S i d o n , T y r e , or the B e k a a — h a d fallen within the canton of L e b a n o n , where C h r i s t i a n power was b a s e d ; indeed they b r o u g h t with them large S u n n i a n d Shi'ite M o s l e m p o p u l a t i o n s . Whether this e x p a n s i o n of L e b a n o n — w h i c h was to lead to so m u c h b l o o d s h e d in the 1970s a n d 1980s, as various g r o u p s attacked the leading position of the M a r o n i t e minority in what had b e c o m e a predominantly M o s l e m c o u n t r y — w a s the result of M a r o n i t e C h r i s t i a n or of F r e n c h political p r e s s u r e cannot be d e t e r m i n e d . M a n y h a n d s p u s h e d G e n e r a l G o u r a u d toward his decision. At the t i m e its risks were not fully a p p r e c i a t e d . 18

440

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II T h e ease with which the occupation of D a m a s c u s h a d been effected s e e m e d to e x p o s e the pretensions of Feisal and A r a b nationalism as s h a m s that h a d been invented by Britain in order to cheat F r a n c e out of her claim to S y r i a . Whenever there were local u p r i s i n g s in S y r i a — a n d there were d i s t u r b a n c e s f r o m time to time t h r o u g h o u t the life of the F r e n c h M a n d a t e — i t was natural for the F r e n c h to b l a m e t h e m o n the B r i t i s h , and they did s o . L l o y d G e o r g e , who had lost F r a n c e ' s g o o d will by a t t e m p t i n g to withhold S y r i a , did not regain that g o o d will by c h a n g i n g his policy so as to let F r a n c e have her. 1 9

H a v i n g withdrawn his t r o o p s in 1919, L l o y d G e o r g e had in fact lost control of events in S y r i a at least as m u c h as he h a d in the interior of Anatolia, in the deserts of A r a b i a , in the m o u n t a i n s of A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d in the p e a s a n t villages of E g y p t . In S y r i a the result was that the British were b l a m e d on all s i d e s . T h e F r e n c h b l a m e d them for p u t t i n g Feisal up a n d the A r a b s b l a m e d t h e m for letting Feisal d o w n . A r a b p a r t i s a n s of Feisal in Palestine and I r a q now r a n g e d themselves a m o n g Britain's e n e m i e s — w h i c h raised the question of why Britain was maintaining a presence in the M i d d l e E a s t . T h e British p u b l i c had been told that one of Britain's goals was to s u p p o r t Feisal's A r a b m o v e m e n t . B u t if Feisal's A r a b s h a d b e c o m e Britain's enemies, why s h o u l d she continue to s u p p o r t t h e m ? M o r e o v e r , Feisal's s u p p o r t e r s j e o p a r d i z e d Britain's relations with F r a n c e — a m o n g other places, in British-held Palestine east of the J o r d a n river. T h e i r activities s e e m e d likely to g o a d F r a n c e into an invasion of T r a n s j o r d a n , which would p l u n g e Britain into an u n w a n t e d a n d d a n g e r o u s international conflict. Relations between Britain and F r a n c e were fragile e n o u g h as it was—especially in r e g a r d to Palestine, a land that F r a n c e h a d coveted for h e r s e l f — a n d the British feared that Feisal's p a r t i s a n s east of the J o r d a n m i g h t p r o v i d e the F r e n c h colonialist g r o u p with an e x c u s e for s e n d i n g troops across the border.

49 EASTERN P A L E S T I N E (TRANSJORDAN): 1920 At about the s a m e time that it o r d e r e d the invasion, c o n q u e s t , and occupation of S y r i a , the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t inaugurated a d i p l o m a t i c a n d p r o p a g a n d a c a m p a i g n d e s i g n e d to prevent n e i g h b o r i n g Palestine from b e c o m i n g "a Zionist s t a t e . " S i n c e Britain was s p o n s o r i n g Z i o n i s m in Palestine, the c a m p a i g n took on an anti-British h u e ; but the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t was even m o r e o p p o s e d to a J e w i s h than to a British Palestine, a n d feared that F r a n c e ' s c o m m e r c i a l a n d clerical interests in the H o l y L a n d m i g h t be e n d a n g e r e d by B r i t i s h - s p o n s o r e d Zionism. 1

T h e l a n g u a g e u s e d by the Quai d'Orsay e x p r e s s e d refined, a n d that used in the p r e s s e x p r e s s e d c r u d e , a n t i - S e m i t i s m . B u t in J u n e 1920—when the two E u r o p e a n allies, Britain a n d F r a n c e , entered into detailed negotiations to draw a frontier between Palestine and S y r i a - L e b a n o n ("Palestine" a n d " S y r i a " were both v a g u e t e r m s , and if was unclear at the time where one e n d e d and the other s t a r t e d ) — the hard stance taken by F r e n c h negotiators e x p r e s s e d F r e n c h selfinterest. F o r the F r e n c h pictured the frontier as between F r a n c e and Britain in the L e v a n t , and took an u n c o m p r o m i s i n g position, u r g e d on by a colonialist g r o u p that bitterly a c c u s e d F r a n c e ' s leaders of having a b a n d o n e d too m a n y of her c l a i m s a n d interests in A s i a . T h e new c h a i r m a n of the C o m m i s s i o n of F o r e i g n Affairs of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s , who also served as president of one of the principal F r e n c h colonialist societies, the C o m i t e de l'Orient, was as ready as was the p o p u l a r p r e s s to b r a n d c o m p r o m i s e as t r e a s o n a b l e . At stake in the negotiation of Palestine's frontiers were the valuable headwaters of the J o r d a n a n d Y a r m u k rivers—which the F r e n c h successfully insisted on o b t a i n i n g for S y r i a - L e b a n o n . 2

T h e O e u v r e d e s E c o l e s d'Orient, which represented F r e n c h C a t h o lic missionaries in the M i d d l e E a s t , pictured the J e w i s h National H o m e as "merely a m e a n s for the E n g l i s h to u n d e r m i n e our p o sition." It also claimed to discern a J e w i s h world conspiracy behind both Z i o n i s m a n d B o l s h e v i s m "seeking by all m e a n s at its disposal 3

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the destruction of the Christian world.' R o b e r t de C a i x , who m a n a g e d F r a n c e ' s political interests in S y r i a , a g r e e d , claiming that " T h e revolutionary a n d prophetic spirit which is so often f o u n d a m o n g J e w s has turned to B o l s h e v i s m " a m o n g the Zionists who were arriving in Palestine from eastern E u r o p e . T h u s the F r e n c h saw their position in S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n as being threatened by a m o v e m e n t that they believed to be at once British, J e w i s h , Zionist, a n d Bolshevik. A c c o r d i n g to the president of the O e u v r e d e s Ecoles d'Orient, it was not merely F r e n c h national interests b u t also religious sensibilities that required action to be taken against the Protestant a n d J e w i s h positions in Palestine. "It is i n a d m i s s i b l e , " he said, "that the ' C o u n t r y of Christ' s h o u l d b e c o m e the prey of J e w r y a n d of A n g l o - S a x o n heresy. It m u s t remain the inviolable inheritance of F r a n c e a n d the C h u r c h . It would be a national infamy a n d an irreparable c r i m e not to r e m o v e this sacred land from the brutal rapacity of our allies." 5

6

At the t i m e , the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t financed an anti-British political club called the L i t e r a r y Society which had b r a n c h e s in J e r u s a l e m a n d other Palestinian towns. H o w e v e r , in 1920, the i m m e d i a t e F r e n c h threat to British interests was p o s e d in the large, a n d largely u n p o p u lated, area east of the J o r d a n called T r a n s j o r d a n , that was to form roughly 75 percent of the territory included in the British M a n d a t e for Palestine. In t e r m s of tribal life a n d s t r u c t u r e , T r a n s j o r d a n was akin to A r a b i a ; in historical t e r m s , m u c h of it was part of the land of the B i b l e , a n d it had also once f o r m e d part of the R o m a n province of A r a b i a . S i n c e the a u t u m n of 1918, when Allenby drove out the T u r k s , it h a d been essentially u n g o v e r n e d , for the British military authorities had left it u n d e r Feisal's ineffective D a m a s c u s a d m i n i s tration. T h i s turned out to have been ( f r o m Britain's point of view) a mistake, for when the F r e n c h s u p p l a n t e d Feisal a n d his ministers as rulers of D a m a s c u s , they put themselves in a position to claim this area as Feisal's s u c c e s s o r s . T r a n s j o r d a n was a d i s o r d e r e d area of tribal conflict. T h e British feared that the lawlessness of the area might be seized u p o n by the F r e n c h as an excuse for o c c u p y i n g it to b r i n g order a n d civilization. A r a b enemies of F r e n c h rule in S y r i a — c l a i m i n g they were fighting to b r i n g Feisal b a c k t o D a m a s c u s — h a d gathered a n d m i g h t m o u n t raids f r o m T r a n s j o r d a n against F r e n c h S y r i a ; a n d these could b e u s e d by the F r e n c h as justification for m o u n t i n g an invasion in retaliation. T h e British administration, centered in western Palestine, p r o p o s e d to s e n d in British t r o o p s , b u t there were none to be h a d , for L o n d o n o p p o s e d the venture; all that L o n d o n would authorize w a s the sending in of a handful of civil a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . A British officer serving in T r a n s j o r d a n , C. D. B r u n t o n , reported to his s u p e r i o r s that p e o p l e were s a y i n g the British would withdraw 7

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PALESTINE

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from the country a n d that "no one s e e m s satisfied with our occup a t i o n . " C a p t a i n B r u n t o n predicted that it would take little to throw the country into c o m p l e t e anarchy. He explained that 8

the p e o p l e here do not form a h o m o g e n e o u s political entity. T h e r e is a s h a r p line of division between the settled population a n d the B e d o u i n . T h e former wish settled g o v e r n m e n t a n d protection from the extortions a n d violence of the latter. T h e B e d o u i n prefer anarchy to order as they live from extortions f r o m the peasantry and rapine as well as from their flocks a n d h e r d s . Y o u cannot expect t h e m to f o r m a g o v e r n m e n t for their common country. 9

H i s i m m e d i a t e concern was that a representative of Feisal's H a s h e m i t e family was raising p a s s i o n s against the F r e n c h . On 9 S e p t e m b e r 1920 B r u n t o n reported that the H a s h e m i t e representative had p r o c l a i m e d a H o l y War against the F r e n c h in S y r i a , h a d recruited volunteers, a n d had released criminals f r o m jail in the town of A m m a n to join his m o v e m e n t . T w o d a y s later, in a calmer m o o d , he was a b l e to report that the H a s h e m i t e representative had s e c u r e d , in all, only fifty v o l u n t e e r s . B u t B r u n t o n remained u n h a p p y a b o u t the British government's a p p r o a c h t o g o v e r n i n g T r a n s j o r d a n : " T h e idea of controlling a country partially inhabited by p r e d a t o r y s a v a g e s by giving it H o m e R u l e a n d a few British advisers m a y s o u n d attractive as an e x p e r i m e n t , " he wrote, b u t in practice it was not working. 1 0

11

12

S i n c e Britain did not maintain an a r m y in T r a n s j o r d a n , she could not defend the territory if F r a n c e were to invade it. To retain T r a n s j o r d a n for herself, Britain w o u l d therefore have to avoid p r o voking a F r e n c h invasion. A r a b r a i d s on F r e n c h positions in S y r i a — if launched f r o m T r a n s j o r d a n — c o u l d p r o v o k e s u c h an invasion, a n d therefore h a d to be s t o p p e d . T h e policy of F. R. S o m e r s e t , a British official in T r a n s j o r d a n , was to s t o p the A r a b tribes f r o m launching raids against F r e n c h S y r i a by playing off one tribe against another. S o m e r s e t ' s policy, if successful, w o u l d deprive F r a n c e of a r e a s o n — or an e x c u s e — f o r invading u n d e f e n d e d T r a n s j o r d a n . B u t what if F r a n c e were to attack the British t r u s t e e s h i p — n o t merely of T r a n s j o r d a n , b u t of the rest of Palestine as well—by other m e a n s : by politics, p r o p a g a n d a , and subversion rather than a r m e d invasion? As of 1920, A r a b nationalists hated F r a n c e ; but what if F r a n c e s h o u l d turn t h e m a r o u n d a n d p e r s u a d e t h e m to hate Britain instead? S o m e r s e t feared that F r a n c e might launch a p r o p a g a n d a c r u s a d e for a G r e a t e r S y r i a , to include T r a n s j o r d a n a n d western Palestine, on an anti-Zionist p l a t f o r m that would be p o p u l a r with A r a b s everywhere in Palestine. F r a n c e might p r o m i s e the A r a b s that if she were allowed to take Palestine (including T r a n s j o r d a n ) away from Britain, she 13

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would put a s t o p to Z i o n i s m — a n d A r a b s might rally b e h i n d F r a n c e on the basis of s u c h a p r o g r a m . S o m e r s e t ' s view, which was shared by a large section of British officialdom, w a s that Z i o n i s t s were c o m p r o m i s i n g the British c a u s e , as well as their own, by m a k i n g their ultimate intentions p u b l i c . "It is the J e w s a n d not us that everyone is a g a i n s t , " he wrote. "If the J e w s w o u l d keep their silly m o u t h s shut they could b u y u p the whole c o u n t r y . " T . E . L a w r e n c e took rather a different view: "He t r u s t e d that in four or five years, u n d e r the influence of a just policy, the opposition to Z i o n i s m would have d e c r e a s e d , if it had not entirely d i s a p p e a r e d . " 14

15

B u t , for the m o m e n t , A r a b o p p o s i t i o n to Z i o n i s m w a s loud a n d lively, and was d i s t u r b i n g the p e a c e of British-held Palestine.

50 PALESTINE—ARABS AND JEWS: 1920 In 1917—18, when G e n e r a l Allenby took Palestine away f r o m the T u r k s , he established a British military administration for the country. E v e r since then, t h r o u g h o u t the military administration, there h a d run a s t r o n g streak of resentment at having been b u r d e n e d by L o n d o n with an u n p o p u l a r a n d difficult-to-achieve policy: the creation of a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine p u r s u a n t to the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n . F r o m the beginning, G i l b e r t C l a y t o n , as chief political officer to G e n e r a l Allenby, and R o n a l d S t o r r s , as governor of J e r u s a l e m , h a d a v o i d e d giving any sign that they p r o p o s e d to s u p port that policy. B o t h m e n privately p r o f e s s e d to believe in Z i o n i s m , t h o u g h C l a y t o n in particular s e e m e d to define it in its narrowest p o s s i b l e s e n s e : the fostering of an e x p a n d e d J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y in Palestine that could serve as a cultural a n d sentimental center for J e w s t h r o u g h o u t the world, but within a British a d m i n i s t e r e d , multinational Palestine that would not b e c o m e a J e w i s h state. Other British officers serving in Palestine were u n s y m p a t h e t i c to Z i o n i s m even in this limited s e n s e , a n d sided with the A r a b s , who o p p o s e d it altogether. As they saw it, L o n d o n ' s policy of Z i o n i s m might have been expressly d e s i g n e d to stir up t r o u b l e , a n d m u s t have been devised by far-off officials who did not have to live with a n d deal with local conditions. To Zionist leaders, on the other h a n d , it a p p e a r e d that the wavering stance or d o w n r i g h t hostility of the British administration h a m p e r e d their effort to s e c u r e A r a b a c c e p t a n c e of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n . T h e y c l a i m e d that, h a d the A r a b population of the country been m a d e to feel that the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n w a s the u n a l t e r a b l e policy of the B r i t i s h g o v e r n m e n t a n d inevitably would be carried into effect, A r a b s w o u l d have a c q u i e s c e d — a n d might even have b e c o m e receptive to its benefits. Dr W e i z m a n n and his colleagues in the Zionist l e a d e r s h i p s t r e s s e d their desire to cooperate with the A r a b c o m m u n i t i e s ; e m p h a s i z e d that the new J e w i s h i m m i g r a n t s would not be taking anything away f r o m the existing inhabitants, b u t would buy, colonize, a n d cultivate land not then being u s e d ; a n d repeated 445

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that J e w i s h colonization w o u l d b r i n g substantial economic benefits to the whole country, a n d indeed to the whole A r a b M i d d l e E a s t . A m o n g the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g c o m m u n i t i e s of Palestine, there was considerable d i s a g r e e m e n t on m o s t i s s u e s , and p e r h a p s even on Z i o n i s m . T h i s was shown in F e b r u a r y 1919, at a c o n g r e s s convened by the anti-Zionist M o s l e m - C h r i s t i a n Society. A majority of the thirty active politicians who a t t e n d e d the c o n g r e s s were able to p a p e r over their differences by agreeing on a p r o g r a m calling for an A r a b federation headed by Feisal a n d centered on S y r i a . T h e r e was s o m e feeling, however, in favor of creating a s e p a r a t e Palestine, s o m e proBritish feeling, s o m e p r o - F r e n c h feeling, a n d e n o u g h d i s c o r d so that five of the thirty delegates did not sign a resolution o p p o s i n g Z i o n i s m . M u c h volatility in political views was d e m o n s t r a t e d by the delegates a n d their colleagues d u r i n g the c o u r s e of the next couple of years, as those who had called for Feisal to b e c o m e king t u r n e d against him, p r o - B r i t i s h a n d anti-British factions c h a n g e d sides, a n d the p r o ponents of G r e a t e r S y r i a were forced, by the F r e n c h c o n q u e s t of D a m a s c u s , to restrict the focus of their views to the territory about to be e m b r a c e d within Britain's Palestine M a n d a t e . A r a b politics within Palestine were f o r m e d by the rivalry between the great u r b a n families. T h r o u g h o u t the British o c c u p a t i o n , the m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s rivalry was that between the J e r u s a l e m families of a l - H u s s e i n i a n d a l - N a s h a s h i b i . A l - N a s h a s h i b i family politics m o v e d f r o m anti-British to p r o - B r i t i s h a n d pro-conciliation in 1920; a n d in the years immediately thereafter the Zionist leadership believed that it h a d arrived at a b a s i s for m u t u a l cooperation with the a l - N a s h a s h i b i that might lead t o A r a b - J e w i s h h a r m o n y . T h e a l - H u s s e i n i , however, who m o v e d at the s a m e time from s u p p o r t e r s to o p p o n e n t s of the British, found themselves favored in the competition to lead the A r a b c o m m u n i t i e s of the area by the s y m p a t h y shown by the British local administration to the anti-Zionist c a u s e . If even British officers a r g u e d that the A r a b s s h o u l d m a k e no concessions, how could p r o conciliation A r a b leaders p e r s u a d e their followers that concessions had to be made? Violence broke out late in 1919 when B e d o u i n tribes attacked J e w i s h settlements in the U p p e r G a l i l e e , in the no-man's land between the British and F r e n c h military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s . E a r l y in 1920, m a r a u d i n g A r a b s entered the Zionist settlements a n d , in the ensuing gun-fighting, several settlers were killed, including the R u s s i a n J e w i s h war hero, C a p t a i n J o s e p h T r u m p e l d o r . T h e r e a f t e r r u m o r s were rife of violence to c o m e in J e r u s a l e m that s p r i n g . I n r e s p o n s e V l a d i m i r J a b o t i n s k y — t h e R u s s i a n - J e w i s h journalist who had o r g a n i z e d the J e w i s h regiment in Allenby's a r m y — secured the a g r e e m e n t of other Zionist leaders to allow h i m to form a

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self-defense g r o u p , to be c o m p o s e d largely of veterans like himself of the J e w i s h L e g i o n in the British a r m y . J a b o t i n s k y informed the British g o v e r n o r of J e r u s a l e m that he was forming s u c h a g r o u p ; a s k e d that his g r o u p b e , in effect, d e p u t i z e d ; and r e q u e s t e d the British administration to issue a r m s to h i m . When the British refused, he b o u g h t a r m s from an A r m e n i a n g u n r u n n e r in the Old C i t y . T h e violence predicted for J e r u s a l e m broke out on 4 April 1920. D u r i n g the M o s l e m s p r i n g t i m e festival of the Prophet M o s e s , fiery orators r o u s e d A r a b m o b s to what b e c a m e three d a y s of rioting against J e w s , o f w h o m s o m e were killed a n d h u n d r e d s w o u n d e d . No casualties were suffered in N e w J e r u s a l e m , however, which was patrolled by J a b o t i n s k y ' s forces. All of the casualties were suffered in the O l d C i t y of J e r u s a l e m , which British a r m y units prevented J a b o t i n s k y ' s forces from entering. 1

A d d i n g an especially o m i n o u s tinge to the bloodletting in the O l d City was the cry of the rioting m o b s that " T h e G o v e r n m e n t is with u s ! " T h a t the m o b s were not unjustified in their cry b e c a m e evident when the British military authorities m e t e d out p u n i s h m e n t . Only a few rioters were p u n i s h e d by serious court sentences; but J a b o t i n s k y a n d his colleagues were swiftly b r o u g h t before a closed court martial, c h a r g e d with distributing a r m s to the self-defense g r o u p , a n d sentenced to fifteen years' hard labor in the fortress-prison of A c r e . T h e s e decisions c a u s e d an outcry that led the British g o v e r n m e n t to order a court of inquiry into how the military were c o n d u c t i n g the administration of Palestine. 2

3

T h e government's court of inquiry held hearings in J e r u s a l e m , at which military officials c l a i m e d that J e w s were at fault, s a y i n g they h a d p r o v o k e d the M o s l e m s , while J e w i s h witnesses c h a r g e d that the British military g o v e r n m e n t had e n c o u r a g e d the rioters. R i c h a r d M e i n e r t z h a g e n , the head of Military Intelligence in C a i r o , had been sent out to Palestine to report on whether L o n d o n ' s pro-Zionist policy was b e i n g carried out, and when he testified in court that the J e w i s h witnesses were correct, the g o v e r n m e n t was shocked into accepting the truth of their t e s t i m o n y . 4

M e i n e r t z h a g e n confided in his diary that "I am not s u r e that the world is not still too selfish to appreciate the worth of the merits of Zionist a i m s . T h e world is certainly too anti-semitic a n d too s u s picious of Jewish brains and m o n e y . In any case I find myself alone out here, a m o n g gentiles, in u p h o l d i n g Z i o n i s m . .. A n d that is the irony of the whole situation, for I am also i m b u e d with antisemitic feelings . . . " S u s p e c t i n g that his fellow officers m i g h t have m o v e d f r o m sentiments to actions, he s p i e d on t h e m while he was in Palestine. L a t e r , he r e p o r t e d to G e n e r a l Allenby that he h a d planted an agent within the military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and had learned that the s

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British colonel who served as chief of staff of the administration was c o n s p i r i n g with the A r a b Mufti of J e r u s a l e m to foment new antiJewish riots. Within weeks after the g o v e r n m e n t had held its court of inquiry, L o n d o n d i s b a n d e d the military a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Palestine a n d installed a civilian administration in its place. L l o y d G e o r g e a p p o i n t e d H e r b e r t S a m u e l to be its h e a d , as the new H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r . S a m u e l , a J e w a n d a leading L i b e r a l , had been the first m e m b e r of the British g o v e r n m e n t — i n 1914, when the war against T u r k e y b e g a n — t o have p r o p o s e d the creation of a B r i t i s h - s p o n s o r e d J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine. H i s a p p o i n t m e n t showed that the P r i m e Minister was u n w a v e r i n g in his Palestine policy; yet the violence which the military administration had e n c o u r a g e d c a u s e d others in L o n d o n to have second thoughts a b o u t s u p p o r t for a J e w i s h h o m e land. E v e n Winston Churchill, who had been an enthusiastic p r o Zionist all his life, wrote, on 13 J u n e 1920, to L l o y d G e o r g e that "Palestine is costing us 6 millions a year to hold. T h e Zionist m o v e ment will c a u s e continued friction with the A r a b s . T h e F r e n c h . . . are o p p o s e d to the Zionist m o v e m e n t & will try to cushion the A r a b s off on us as the real e n e m y . T h e Palestine venture . . . will never yield any profit of a material k i n d . " 6

7

T h e s e d o u b t s were intensified by spectacular u p r i s i n g s in Iraq at a b o u t the s a m e time, that d r a i n e d Britain's resources, a n d w h i c h — c o m i n g after the riots in E g y p t , the war in A f g h a n i s t a n , the religious war in A r a b i a , the nationalist rebellion in T u r k e y , a n d the troubles with F r e n c h S y r i a — s u g g e s t e d to m a n y E n g l i s h m e n that Britain s h o u l d withdraw from the M i d d l e E a s t entirely.

51 MESOPOTAMIA (IRAQ): 1920 In the first heady d a y s of A r a b nationalism in D a m a s c u s after the war, it b e c a m e a p p a r e n t that one of the important regional differences between the various A r a b activists was that those f r o m the M e s o p o t a m i a n p r o v i n c e s — t h e eastern half of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g w o r l d — w e r e for the m o s t part military m e n . A l t h o u g h the M e s o p o t a m i a n soldiers claimed to act in the n a m e of F e i s a l and his b r o t h e r s , m o s t of t h e m were former O t t o m a n officers who had rem a i n e d loyal to the S u l t a n a n d the Y o u n g T u r k s until the very end of the war. Battlefield professionals a n d d e d i c a t e d o p p o n e n t s of Britain, they could have been e x p e c t e d to constitute a m o r e serious potential threat to British plans than did the politicians a n d orators of D a m a s c u s or Jerusalem. At first the British administration in the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces did not see it that way. T e n s i o n s between the diverse p o p u l a t i o n s of the area s e e m e d to p o s e greater p r o b l e m s , a n d the lawlessness of g r o u p s s u c h a s the K u r d s a n d the B e d o u i n tribes s e e m e d t o p o s e greater t h r e a t s . Incoherence, c o m m u n a l strife, a n d habitual diso r d e r — r a t h e r than o r g a n i z e d n a t i o n a l i s m — w e r e perceived as the challenge. T h e talk of national self-government c a m e mostly (according to the local British authorities) from a m b i t i o u s intriguers of s h a d y character who w o u l d s u b s i d e into insignificance if only the Allied leaders w o u l d cease their unsettling Wilsonian p r o p a g a n d a . At the close of the war, the t e m p o r a r y a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the provinces w a s in the h a n d s of C a p t a i n (later Colonel) A r n o l d Wilson of British I n d i a , who b e c a m e civil c o m m i s s i o n e r . H i s f a m o u s a s s i s tant was G e r t r u d e Bell, at that t i m e the best-known B r i t i s h writer a b o u t A r a b countries. S h e t e n d e d toward protectorate, he, toward direct rule, b u t in 1918 they were e n o u g h in a g r e e m e n t for him to forward with a p p r o v a l her m e m o r a n d u m a r g u i n g that the talk of selfdetermination before a n d at the Peace Conference was detrimental. S h e h a d previously written that "the people of M e s o p o t a m i a , having witnessed the successful termination of the war, h a d taken it for g r a n t e d that the country w o u l d r e m a i n under British control a n d 449

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were as a whole content to accept the decision of a r m s . " T h e declarations in favor of national self-determination at the Peace C o n f e r e n c e by W o o d r o w Wilson a n d others "opened up other possibilities which were r e g a r d e d a l m o s t universally with anxiety, but g a v e o p p o r t u n i t y for political intrigue to the less s t a b l e a n d m o r e fanatical e l e m e n t s . " 1

When, in line with the A m e r i c a n principles being a d o p t e d — o r at least affected—in L o n d o n , the C a b i n e t instructed A r n o l d Wilson to ask the p e o p l e s of M e s o p o t a m i a what states or g o v e r n m e n t s they would like to see established in their area, Wilson's reply w a s that there w a s no way of a s c e r t a i n i n g p u b l i c o p i n i o n . While he w a s p r e p a r e d to a d m i n i s t e r the provinces of B a s r a and B a g h d a d , a n d also the province of M o s u l (which, with C l e m e n c e a u ' s consent, L l o y d G e o r g e h a d d e t a c h e d from the F r e n c h s p h e r e a n d intended to withhold f r o m T u r k e y ) , he did not believe that they f o r m e d a coherent entity. I r a q (an A r a b t e r m that the British u s e d increasingly to denote the M e s o p o t a m i a n l a n d s ) s e e m e d to him too splintered for that to be p o s s i b l e . M o s u l ' s strategic i m p o r t a n c e m a d e it s e e m a necessary addition to I r a q , a n d the s t r o n g probability that it contained valuable oilfields m a d e it a desirable one, b u t it w a s part of what w a s s u p p o s e d to have been K u r d i s t a n ; a n d A r n o l d Wilson a r g u e d that the warlike K u r d s w h o h a d been b r o u g h t u n d e r his administration " n u m b e r i n g half a million will never accept an A r a b ruler." 2

3

A f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m , as Wilson saw it, was that the almost two million Shi'ite M o s l e m s in M e s o p o t a m i a would not accept domination by the minority S u n n i M o s l e m c o m m u n i t y , yet "no form of G o v e r n m e n t h a s yet been e n v i s a g e d , which does not involve S u n n i d o m i n a t i o n . " T h e bitterness between the two c o m m u n i t i e s was highlighted when each p r o d u c e d a rival A r a b nationalist s o c i e t y . A l s o to be c o n s i d e r e d w a s the large J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y , which d o m i nated the c o m m e r c i a l life of B a g h d a d , and the substantial Christian c o m m u n i t y that included the N e s t o r i a n - C h a l d a e a n refugees from T u r k e y who had g a t h e r e d in the area of M o s u l . 4

5

Seventy-five percent of the p o p u l a t i o n of I r a q was tribal, Wilson told L o n d o n , "with no p r e v i o u s tradition of obedience to any governm e n t . " A l o n g the s a m e lines, G e r t r u d e Bell wrote to her father that " T h e provincial m a g n a t e s are g o i n g strongly against an A r a b A m i r , I think, a n d even against an A r a b G o v t . T h e y say they don't want to be rid of one tyranny in o r d e r to fall into the clutches of a n o t h e r . " 6

7

* (See page 450.) Nuri el-Sa'id, the Mesopotamian officer who had served as one of the heads of Feisal's Allied army corps during the war, advocated the creation of a single government for Syria and Mesopotamia. T h e Mesopotamian delegates associated with the Syrian General Congress in Damascus instead advocated splitting them between governments in Damascus and Baghdad.

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Unlike A r a b nationalists, who were thinking in t e r m s of political unity on a large scale, there were those who q u e s t i o n e d whether even a t t e m p t i n g to unite the M e s o p o t a m i a n provinces m i g h t not be too a m b i t i o u s to be practical. G e r t r u d e Bell, working on her own p l a n s for a unified I r a q , was cautioned by an A m e r i c a n m i s s i o n a r y that she was ignoring rooted historical realities in d o i n g s o . " Y o u are flying in the face of four m i l l e n n i u m s of history if you try to draw a line a r o u n d I r a q a n d call it a political entity! A s s y r i a always looked to the west a n d east a n d north, a n d B a b y l o n i a to the s o u t h . T h e y have never been an independent unit. Y o u ' v e got to take t i m e to get t h e m integrated, it m u s t be d o n e g r a d u a l l y . T h e y have no conception of nationhood y e t . " 9

A leading A r a b political figure in B a g h d a d cautioned her along different lines. S p e a k i n g to her on 12 J u n e 1920, he r e p r o a c h e d her with the fact that, m o r e than three years after o c c u p y i n g B a g h d a d in the war, Britain continued to talk a b o u t establishing an i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t b u t still did nothing a b o u t it. He contrasted this with the situation in D a m a s c u s , where the British had set up Feisal's independent administration as soon as they h a d arrived. Well aware that she was one of the British officials who were m a k i n g p l a n s for his g o v e r n m e n t , he r e m i n d e d her that " Y o u said in y o u r declaration that you would set up a native g o v e r n m e n t d r a w i n g its authority from the initiative a n d free choice of the people c o n c e r n e d , yet you proceed to d r a w up a s c h e m e without consulting anyone. It would have been easy for you to take one or two leading m e n in your councils a n d this would have r e m o v e d the reproach which is levelled against your s c h e m e . . . " I 0

G e r t r u d e Bell d i s c o u n t e d the d a n g e r of a native u p r i s i n g . H e r chief, A r n o l d Wilson (against w h o m she i n t r i g u e d ) , d i d not. He w a r n e d L o n d o n that demobilization h a d left his a r m e d forces dangerously u n d e r m a n n e d . T h e military d e p l o y e d only a tiny force of mobile troops to patrol an area of 170,000 s q u a r e m i l e s . He pointed to the d a n g e r p o s e d by Feisal's a d h e r e n t s ; although N u r i el-Sa'id a n d other top M e s o p o t a m i a n officers who h a d served in the H e j a z forces with L a w r e n c e a n d the Allies h a d been forbidden to return h o m e , as s u s p e c t e d potential t r o u b l e m a k e r s , a n u m b e r of a c t i v i s t s — m a n y of w h o m had served with the enemy d u r i n g the w a r — h a d s l i p p e d back into the country after the D a m a s c u s p r o c l a m a t i o n s calling for M e s o p o t a m i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e . T h e r e was also talk of agents sent by Kemalist T u r k e y . 1 1

1 2

British nerves were on edge as v a g u e r u m o r s , constant unrest, a n d repeated killings took their toll. In the s u m m e r of 1919 three y o u n g British c a p t a i n s were m u r d e r e d i n K u r d i s t a n . T h e G o v e r n m e n t o f India sent out an experienced official to take their place in O c t o b e r 1919; a m o n t h later he, too, was killed.

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At C h r i s t m a s that year, A r n o l d Wilson sent to L o n d o n to enlist the aid of Colonel G e r a l d L e a c h m a n , an officer whose feats of travel, a d v e n t u r e , a n d war in the eastern d e s e r t s had b e c o m e legendary. L e a c h m a n arrived back in M e s o p o t a m i a , before the s p r i n g of 1920, to find that six British officers had been killed in the ten d a y s before his r e t u r n . M o r e was to c o m e : the next month L e a c h m a n w a s able to rescue a party of British officers attacked by a raiding party in the desert b u t , in the early s u m m e r , he was unable to save two of his political officers who were a b d u c t e d as hostages a n d later m u r d e r e d . T h e desert was alive with A r a b raiding parties a n d , in L e a c h m a n ' s opinion, the only way to deal with the disaffected tribes was "wholesale s l a u g h t e r : " 13

14

In J u n e the tribes s u d d e n l y rose in full revolt—a revolt that s e e m s to have been triggered by the government's efforts to levy taxes. By 14 J u n e the formerly complacent G e r t r u d e Bell, g o i n g f r o m one extreme to another, claimed to be living t h r o u g h a nationalist reign of t e r r o r . S h e e x a g g e r a t e d , but in the M i d d l e E u p h r a t e s , p o s t s were indeed overrun, British officers killed, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c u t . F o r one reason or a n o t h e r — t h e revolts had a n u m b e r of c a u s e s and the various rebels p u r s u e d different goals—virtually the whole area rose against Britain, and revolt then s p r e a d to the L o w e r E u p h r a t e s as well. A H o l y War was proclaimed against Britain in the Shi'ite M o s l e m holy city of K a r b a l a h . On the northwestern frontier, A r a b cavalry, initially led by one of Feisal's ex-officers, swept down on British o u t p o s t s a n d m a s s a c r e d their defenders. 15

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T h e r e was m o r e b a d news: L e a c h m a n , who left B a g h d a d on 11 A u g u s t to attend a meeting with tribal allies at a station on the E u p h r a t e s , was tricked into s e n d i n g away his a r m e d e s c o r t — a n d then was shot in the back a n d killed by order of the tribal sheikh who was his host. " A r a b T r e a c h e r y " w a s the headline of the Reuters' report of the a s s a s s i n a t i o n ; " B a d To Worse In M e s o p o t a m i a " was the headline of The Times. T h e news of L e a c h m a n ' s killing led to further tribal u p r i s i n g s against the British along the E u p h r a t e s . F r e s h uprisings o c c u r r e d north a n d west of B a g h d a d . By m i d - A u g u s t a g r o u p of insurgents felt confident enough to declare a provisional Arab government. l&

19

In a leading article on 7 A u g u s t 1920, The Times d e m a n d e d to know "how m u c h longer are v a l u a b l e lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavour to i m p o s e u p o n the A r a b population an elaborate a n d expensive administration which they never asked for a n d do not w a n t ? " In a similar article on 10 A u g u s t , The Times said that "We are s p e n d i n g s u m s in M e s o p o t a m i a a n d in Persia which m a y well reach a h u n d r e d million p o u n d s this year" in s u p p o r t of what it t e r m e d "the foolish policy of the G o v e r n m e n t in the M i d d l e E a s t . " T h e G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a p o u r e d in reinforcements of m e n a n d

M E S O P O T A M I A ( I R A Q ) : 1920

453

s u p p l i e s to restore order. T h e m a i n p o p u l a t i o n centers quickly were s e c u r e d , b u t regaining control of the c o u n t r y s i d e took t i m e . It was not until O c t o b e r that m a n y of the cut-off E u p h r a t e s towns were relieved a n d not until F e b r u a r y of 1921 that order was restored m o r e or less completely. Before p u t t i n g d o w n the revolt Britain suffered nearly 2 , 0 0 0 casualties, including 450 d e a d . 2 0

T h e British were confused as to the origins of the revolt. A r n o l d Wilson s u b m i t t e d a list of thirteen contributing factors, stressing, a b o v e all, the involvement of Feisal's s u p p o r t e r s a n d K e m a l ' s T u r k e y , p e r h a p s s u p p o r t e d , h e claimed, b y A m e r i c a n S t a n d a r d Oil i n t e r e s t s . An intelligence officer attached to the I n d i a Office p r o d u c e d a chart outlining the conspiracy, implicating Feisal b u t , even m o r e so, the T u r k s , who (he a s s e r t e d ) continued to take orders via M o s c o w a n d Switzerland f r o m B e r l i n . H i s chart was circulated a m o n g C a b i n e t members in London. 21

2 2

T h e m y s t e r i o u s u p r i s i n g s in I r a q threw the normally poised British I n d i a n administration off balance. S i r A r n o l d Wilson told the C a b i n e t at the end of 1920 that "there was no real desire in M e s o p o t a m i a for a n A r a b g o v e r n m e n t , that the A r a b s w o u l d appreciate British r u l e . " If that were s o , then the explosion in M e s o p o t a m i a could not be explained as an A r a b independence m o v e m e n t . "What we are up a g a i n s t , " said Wilson, "is anarchy p l u s fanaticism. T h e r e is little or no N a t i o n a l i s m . " T h e t r i b e s m e n , he s a i d , were "out against all g o v e r n m e n t as s u c h " a n d h a d no notion what they were fighting f o r . I n m i d - A u g u s t h e said that the "revolutionary m o v e m e n t has for s o m e time p a s t ceased to have any political aspect and has b e c o m e entirely a n a r c h i c . " 23

24

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It was not a satisfactory explanation, c o m i n g — a s the I r a q i u p r i s ings d i d — o n t o p of t r o u b l e s everywhere else in the M i d d l e E a s t . Why were the d e s p i s e d T u r k s , u n d e r K e m a l ' s leadership, successfully continuing to defy the Allies? Why was Britain's p r o t e g e , K i n g H u s s e i n , losing the s t r u g g l e for m a s t e r y in A r a b i a ? Why did the E g y p t i a n s continue to refuse to n e g o t i a t e — o n any b a s i s — f o r Britain's forces to r e m a i n in their country? Why were the A f g h a n s c o n s p i r i n g with the R u s s i a n s ? Why did Feisal lose out to F r a n c e and then allow his followers to strike out at Britain? Why did A r a b s riot in Palestine a n d rebel in I r a q — a l l at a time when Britain's e c o n o m y h a d collapsed and when the g o v e r n m e n t ' s time, energy, a n d resources were needed to revive it? In L o n d o n there was no a g r e e m e n t a b o u t what h a d h a p p e n e d in the M i d d l e E a s t , b u t there was a strikingly large b o d y of opinion that held that what h a d occurred was c a u s e d by o u t s i d e r s , a n d that the d i s o r d e r s t h r o u g h the E a s t were s o m e h o w linked with one another. Certain n a m e s continued to recur in the c o u r s e of British speculations as to the origins of the d i s o r d e r s : E n v e r P a s h a , M u s t a p h a K e m a l ,

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Feisal, P a n - I s l a m , the G e r m a n s , S t a n d a r d Oil, the J e w s , a n d the Bolsheviks. With respect to the Bolsheviks, British s u s p i c i o n s in fact p r o v e d to be well f o u n d e d . T h e R u s s i a n s , looking for a chance to u n d e r m i n e the British position in A s i a , d e c i d e d that, by b r i n g i n g p r e s s u r e to b e a r on Britain elsewhere, they might enable the insurgency in I r a q to s u c c e e d . T h e area of British vulnerability they chose to exploit was in Persia, the political battlefield on which Britain a n d R u s s i a had clashed so often in the c o u r s e of the G r e a t G a m e .

52 PERSIA (IRAN): 1920 When the F i r s t World War c a m e to an end, the British P r i m e Minister's attention was too m u c h o c c u p i e d elsewhere for h i m to pay m u c h attention to Persia, the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s eastern neighbor, which was not, in any event, an area of the world in which he took m u c h interest. By default the way w a s left open for G e o r g e C u r z o n , chairman of the E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e of the C a b i n e t a n d , f r o m 1919 o n w a r d , F o r e i g n Minister, t o take c h a r g e . L o r d C u r z o n cared a b o u t Persia m o r e than he cared a b o u t practically anywhere else. C u r z o n ' s tendency was to e x a g g e r a t e the i m p o r t a n c e of areas in which he was expert a n d there was no question that he was an expert on Persia. H i s journey in 1889 to that then little-known land was f a m o u s ; a n d his book Persia and the Persian Question was j u d g e d to be the s t a n d a r d authority on the s u b j e c t in the E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e . H i s view, correspondingly, was that the m a g n i t u d e of British interests in that country was i m m e n s e . F r o m the nineteenth century, L o r d C u r z o n b r o u g h t with him a strategy of creating "a M o s l e m n e x u s of states" in the M i d d l e E a s t as a shield to w a r d off R u s s i a n e x p a n s i o n . R u s s i a n expansionist d e s i g n s had figured prominently in his e x p r e s s e d t h o u g h t s a n d in his writings when he explored C e n t r a l A s i a in the late nineteenth century, a n d had figured prominently in his politics when he b e c a m e Viceroy of I n d i a early in the twentieth century. When the Bolshevik Revolution brought a b o u t R u s s i a ' s withdrawal from her forward positions, C u r z o n p r o p o s e d to take a d v a n t a g e of the situation by p u t t i n g his B r i t i s h - s p o n s o r e d M o s l e m n e x u s of states into place. In the nineteenth century the nexus would have been a line a c r o s s the M i d d l e E a s t f r o m the O t t o m a n E m p i r e t h r o u g h the Persian E m p i r e to the khanates a n d emirates of Central A s i a a n d A f g h a n i s t a n ; b u t C u r z o n was in no position to reconstruct a line that long. 1

D r i v e n to withdraw by Winston Churchill and his policy of radical retrenchment, British forces a l m o s t everywhere in A s i a were being evacuated f r o m positions that L o r d C u r z o n wished to see maintained. Of the n e x u s , only Persia remained-—but there C u r z o n retained his 4 «

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solitary d o m i n a n c e of British policy. E d w i n M o n t a g u , a m e m b e r of the Cabinet's E a s t e r n C o m m i t t e e , o b s e r v e d that the draft m i n u t e s of a meeting of the c o m m i t t e e , f r o m which all m e m b e r s but C u r z o n were absent, recorded that "the C o m m i t t e e a g r e e d with the Chairm a n . " " S u r e l y you will not allow this to s t a n d ? " M o n t a g u wrote to C u r z o n ; "the C o m m i t t e e consisted of the C h a i r m a n : a n d the Chairm a n , of c o u r s e , not unnaturally, a g r e e d with the C h a i r m a n . " Insofar as Persia was concerned, that was the m a n n e r in which he p r o c e e d e d , taking policy entirely into his own h a n d s a n d ignoring t h e reluctance of his C a b i n e t colleagues to follow where he led. 2

" T h e integrity of P e r s i a , " he h a d written two d e c a d e s earlier, "must be registered as a cardinal precept of our I m p e r i a l c r e e d . " S a f e g u a r d i n g that integrity against future R u s s i a n e n c r o a c h m e n t s r e m a i n e d the principal object of his policy. T h e m e a n s at his disposal, however, were few a n d slender. T h e end of the world war found Britain (and British I n d i a ) with small forces in four areas of Persia. In the northeast a n d the northwest, there were the tiny military m i s s i o n s of G e n e r a l s M a l l e s o n and D u n s t e r v i l l e , whose a d v e n t u r e s in R u s s i a were followed earlier (see C h a p t e r 3 8 ) . On the G u l f coast there were a few g a r r i s o n s of I n d i a n t r o o p s . In the south there was a native force recruited d u r i n g the war a n d led by British officers, called the S o u t h Persia Rifles; but m u tinies a n d desertions, triggered before the armistice by a tribal revolt against British rule, had b r o u g h t its effectiveness into question. 3

T h e s e forces were insufficient to L o r d C u r z o n ' s p u r p o s e s , even had there not been p r e s s u r e f r o m the War Office a n d f r o m I n d i a to m a k e further reductions in t r o o p s and s u b s i d i e s . C u r z o n therefore concentrated his energies on the organization of a new Britishs u p e r v i s e d regime in Persia that could t r a n s f o r m the sprawling, anarchic, m u c h - d i v i d e d territory into an efficient, effective country able to s u p p o r t a n d defend itself, a n d thus d i s p e n s e with British subsidies and troops. T h e plan was e m b o d i e d in a treaty between Britain a n d Persia that L o r d C u r z o n i m p o s e d u p o n the g o v e r n m e n t s of both countries. F l a b b y y o u n g A h m e d S h a h , last of the fading K a d j a r dynasty to sit u p o n the throne of Persia, p o s e d no p r o b l e m : he was fearful for his life a n d , in any event, received a regular s u b s i d y f r o m the British g o v e r n m e n t in return for maintaining a p r o - B r i t i s h P r i m e Minister in office. U n d e r L o r d C u r z o n ' s s u p e r v i s i o n , the British Minister in T e h e r a n negotiated a treaty with the Persian Prime Minister a n d two of his c o l l e a g u e s — w h o d e m a n d e d a n d received a secret p a y m e n t of 130,000 p o u n d s from the British in return for s i g n i n g i t . 4

C u r z o n was p r o u d of the A n g l o - P e r s i a n A g r e e m e n t of 9 A u g u s t 1919. "A g r e a t t r i u m p h , " he wrote, "and I have done it all a l o n e . " By the t e r m s of the a g r e e m e n t , British officers were to construct a 5

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national railway network; British e x p e r t s would reorganize the national finances; a British loan w o u l d p r o v i d e the wherewithal for a c c o m p l i s h i n g these p r o j e c t s ; a n d B r i t i s h officials w o u l d s u p e r v i s e the collection of c u s t o m s d u t i e s so as to e n s u r e that the loan w o u l d be r e p a i d . A c c o r d i n g to C u r z o n , the a g r e e m e n t was d e s i g n e d to bolster Persian i n d e p e n d e n c e . He d i d not foresee that others w o u l d put a different construction u p o n it. He m a d e no provision for the p o s s i bility that oil-conscious a l l i e s — F r a n c e a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s — m i g h t react against the a p p a r e n t g r a n t to Britain of a political m o n o p o l y . He s e e m e d u n a w a r e , too, of the direction in which currents of opinion were flowing in Persia itself: he a s s u m e d that, as in times g o n e by, Persians feared R u s s i a n e x p a n s i o n i s m a n d would welcome protection against it. Persian fear of it instead s e e m s to have d i s a p p e a r e d when the R u s s i a n E m p i r e collapsed in 1917. By 1919 Britain represented the only E u r o p e a n threat to the a u t o n o m y of the interest g r o u p s — t h e local, provincial, a n d tribal leaderships in p a r t i c u l a r — that exercised s u c h authority as still functioned in the chaotic Persian territory. As for p u b l i c opinion: in the capital, T e h e r a n , of the twenty-six n e w s p a p e r s a n d other periodicals p u b l i s h e d there at the time, twenty-five d e n o u n c e d the A n g l o - P e r s i a n A g r e e m e n t . 6

A short time after execution of the a g r e e m e n t , it was discovered in L o n d o n a n d T e h e r a n that a provision in the Persian Constitution required that all treaties had to be ratified by the M a j l i s (as the legislature was c a l l e d ) . T h e Majlis h a d not m e t since 1915 a n d h a d been i g n o r e d by both g o v e r n m e n t s in arriving at the a g r e e m e n t . In the closed world of traditional d i p l o m a c y it w a s not then r e g a r d e d as h o n o r a b l e for a legislature to fail to ratify a treaty duly executed by the g o v e r n m e n t ; the r e q u i r e m e n t of ratification, a c c o r d ingly, was r e g a r d e d as a m e r e technicality a n d , as s u c h , was easy for negotiators to overlook. Y e t once the issue was raised it a s s u m e d importance. F o r L o r d Curzon, it became important to demonstrate to his C a b i n e t colleagues a n d to critics in F r a n c e a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s that the a g r e e m e n t was a g e n u i n e e x p r e s s i o n of the will of the Persian nation, which only an affirmative vote of the M a j l i s ( i m p e r fectly representative t h o u g h that b o d y m i g h t be) could p r o v i d e . B u t one Persian P r i m e Minister after another (for ministries in T e h e r a n fell in r a p i d s u c c e s s i o n ) delayed convoking the M a j l i s for fear that its m e m b e r s c o u l d not be controlled. As no m o v e c o u l d be m a d e to i m p l e m e n t the a g r e e m e n t until it was ratified, Persia r e m a i n e d in disorder, vulnerable (British officials feared) to Bolshevik p r o p a g a n d a a n d agitation. All along, the p r o c l a i m e d policy of the Bolshevik r e g i m e with regard to Persia h a d p r o v i d e d an a p p e a l i n g contrast to that of Britain. At the b e g i n n i n g of 1918, the S o v i e t g o v e r n m e n t r e n o u n c e d R u s s i a n

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political a n d military claims on Persia as inconsistent with Persia's sovereign rights. As the s u m m e r of 1919 b e g a n , the Soviet g o v e r n ment also gave up all economic claims belonging to R u s s i a or Russians in Persia, annulling all Persian d e b t s to R u s s i a , cancelling all R u s s i a n concessions in Persia, a n d s u r r e n d e r i n g all R u s s i a n p r o p e r t y in Persia. Of c o u r s e it could be pointed out that the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t was s u r r e n d e r i n g claims it was too weak to enforce; in that sense, it was giving away nothing. Y e t its s u r r e n d e r of economic claims in the s u m m e r of 1919 p l a c e d in stark relief the far-reaching economic concessions that L o r d C u r z o n d e m a n d e d a n d received for Britain in the A n g l o - P e r s i a n A g r e e m e n t s i g n e d that s a m e s u m m e r . F r e e d , at least temporarily, from their fears of R u s s i a , Persian nationalists allowed themselves to resent the s t r o n g m e a s u r e of foreign control central to L o r d C u r z o n ' s plan for their protection. So nationalist opinion h a r d e n e d . T h e winter of 1919—20 p a s s e d , a n d ratification of the A n g l o - P e r s i a n A g r e e m e n t drifted slowly, frustratingly, out of C u r z o n ' s g r a s p . T h e n , in the s p r i n g of the year, events took a new turn. In A u g u s t of 1918 C a p t a i n D a v i d T. N o r r i s of the Royal N a v y h a d organized a small British naval flotilla to control the C a s p i a n S e a for G e n e r a l Dunsterville's military m i s s i o n as it o c c u p i e d a n d then retreated f r o m B a k u (see p a g e 3 5 9 ) . In the s u m m e r of 1919 the British g o v e r n m e n t h a d t u r n e d the flotilla over to the White R u s s i a n forces of G e n e r a l D e n i k i n for use in the R u s s i a n Civil War. When Denikin's forces collapsed, the r e m a i n s of the flotilla, s o m e eighteen vessels, m a n n e d by anti-Bolshevik R u s s i a n s , found refuge in Enzeli, the Royal N a v y ' s b a s e a n d the principal Persian port on the C a s p i a n S e a . T h e r e they were taken into custody by Persian officials a n d by the British a n d I n d i a n g a r r i s o n still in place. As of the s p r i n g of 1920 the British a n d Persian g o v e r n m e n t s h a d not yet d e c i d e d what to do with the flotilla, which still was of a size a n d strength sufficient to affect any contest for m a s t e r y of the C a s p i a n . At d a w n on 18 M a y 1920, thirteen Soviet R u s s i a n w a r s h i p s launched a s u r p r i s e attack on Enzeli. U n d e r cover of a b a r r a g e from their s h i p s , Soviet t r o o p s landed a n d cut off the British g a r r i s o n in its c a m p at the tip of a peninsula. T h e t r a p p e d British c o m m a n d i n g general, after vainly seeking instructions from his s u p e r i o r s in T e h e r a n , accepted the t e r m s dictated to him by the victorious Soviet c o m m a n d e r : the British garrison s u r r e n d e r e d b o t h its military s u p p l i e s a n d the D e n i k i n flotilla to the Bolsheviks, a n d then retreated from Enzeli. Within weeks a Persian Socialist R e p u b l i c was p r o c l a i m e d in G i l a n , the province in which the port of Enzeli was located, a n d a Persian C o m m u n i s t Party was f o u n d e d in the province to s u p p o r t it. A l t h o u g h R u s s i a n s played a key role in these events, Soviet R u s s i a was at pains

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to deny it. M o s c o w even denied having o r d e r e d the attack on Enzeli; a c c o r d i n g to Soviet s p o k e s m e n , it w a s undertaken by the local R u s s i a n naval c o m m a n d e r on his own responsibility. If there were a justification for the A n g l o - P e r s i a n A g r e e m e n t a n d for a c o m m a n d i n g British presence in the country, it was shattered by the chain of events that b e g a n at Enzeli. Britain h a d undertaken to defend Persia against R u s s i a a n d B o l s h e v i s m — b u t w a s visibly failing to do s o . T h e retreat from Enzeli s p u r r e d the War Office to d e m a n d the withdrawal of the remaining British forces f r o m Persia. As Winston Churchill wrote to G e o r g e C u r z o n , there w a s s o m e t h i n g to be said for m a k i n g peace with the Bolsheviks, a n d s o m e t h i n g to be said for m a k i n g war on them, b u t nothing to be s a i d for the current p o l i c y . A c c o r d i n g to the new P r i m e Minister of P e r s i a , the A n g l o Persian A g r e e m e n t was "in s u s p e n s e . " T h e P r i m e Minister of Britain b l a m e d his F o r e i g n Secretary for what had o c c u r r e d , s a y i n g that C u r z o n w a s almost entirely responsible for s a d d l i n g Britain with responsibilities in Persia that s h o u l d never have been a s s u m e d . 7

8

At the e n d of the s u m m e r of 1920, the R u s s i a n Bolshevik representative, L e v K a m e n e v , c a m e to L o n d o n as c h a i r m a n of a peace delegation c h a r g e d with negotiating an end to the conflict between R u s s i a a n d her former wartime allies. K a m e n e v was one of the halfdozen or so principal leaders of the C o m m u n i s t Party of the S o v i e t U n i o n , a n d for m a n y years h a d been one of the closest political associates o f L e n i n . I n L o n d o n , K a m e n e v s e e m s t o have b e c o m e aware of the extent to which the British g o v e r n m e n t h a d been thrown off balance by the u p r i s i n g s in I r a q , and saw a chance for his g o v e r n m e n t to exploit the situation in Persia in o r d e r to increase Britain's difficulties in I r a q . In a secret cable ( d e c o d e d by British Intelligence) from L o n d o n to the S o v i e t F o r e i g n Minister in M o s c o w , K a m e n e v s t a t e d that "pressure on the British t r o o p s in N o r t h Persia will strengthen the position of the M e s o p o t a m i a n i n s u r g e n t s . " A revolution a l o n g a g e o g r a p h i c a l line r u n n i n g from Enzeli in Persia to B a g h d a d in I r a q , he continued, "threatens the most vital interests of the British E m p i r e and b r e a k s the s t a t u s q u o in A s i a . " H e r e was the linkage between one u p r i s i n g a n d another, in which British officials believed with s u p e r s t i t i o u s fervor; but, contrary to what they believed, only the events in northern Persia ( a n d to s o m e extent those in A f g h a n i s t a n ) were directly inspired by Soviet R u s s i a . 9

In the a u t u m n of 1920 a new British c o m m a n d e r , M a j o r - G e n e r a l E d m u n d I r o n s i d e , arrived to take c h a r g e of the situation in northern Persia. H i s views a b o u t what s h o u l d be done were considerably at variance with those of L o r d C u r z o n . An overwhelming figure, six feet, four inches tall a n d weighing 275 p o u n d s , I r o n s i d e d i d not hesitate to i m p o s e his own policy. L i k e Churchill, he thought it foolish to o p p o s e the Bolsheviks if one were not allowed to e n g a g e in 0

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an all-out war to defeat t h e m . T h e best that c o u l d be h o p e d for, in his opinion, was for Britain a n d R u s s i a to withdraw their forces—if a Persian g o v e r n m e n t could be left in place that could hold its own. In the whole of northern Persia there was only one more-or-less indigenous force available to I r o n s i d e that was of s o m e c o n s e q u e n c e — the Persian C o s s a c k Division, which h a d been created in 1879 by the R u s s i a n C z a r as a b o d y g u a r d for the Persian S h a h . B u t it suffered f r o m being R u s s i a n - i n s p i r e d a n d R u s s i a n - l e d : its c o m m a n d e r a n d a n u m b e r of its c o m m i s s i o n e d a n d n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers were R u s s i a n , a n d t h r o u g h the years it had been heavily s u b s i d i z e d by the R u s s i a n g o v e r n m e n t . After the R u s s i a n revolutions, the British g o v e r n m e n t had taken over the p a y m e n t of the s u b s i d y ; yet in 1920 its c o m m a n d i n g officer, a R u s s i a n colonel n a m e d S t a r o s s e l s k i , refused nonetheless to c o m p l y with British d e m a n d s a n d , t h o u g h an antiBolshevik, insisted on u p h o l d i n g " R u s s i a n i n t e r e s t s . " 11

G e n e r a l I r o n s i d e eyed the Persian C o s s a c k s as a vehicle for the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of his p r o g r a m . T h e Persian element in it was large a n d the R u s s i a n g r o u p was s m a l l : 6 , 0 0 0 Persian soldiers a n d 237 Persian officers, v e r s u s 56 R u s s i a n officers and 66 n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d o f f i c e r s . T h e R u s s i a n c o m m a n d e r , S t a r o s s e l s k i , was in a vulnerable position: after scoring initial s u c c e s s e s against the Persian Socialist R e p u b l i c , he had failed dismally. I r o n s i d e p r o m p t l y a r r a n g e d to have Starosselski d i s m i s s e d ; later he also a r r a n g e d for Starosselski's replacement to be sent away. In their place, I r o n s i d e p u t R e z a K h a n , a t o u g h , bullet-headed Persian colonel w h o m I r o n s i d e later d e s c r i b e d as "the m o s t m a n l y Persian" h e had m e t . 12

1 3

A w a r e of War Office plans to complete the evacuation of British forces f r o m Persia in 1921, I r o n s i d e went a b o u t a r r a n g i n g for R e z a K h a n to rule the country as Britain d e p a r t e d . On 12 F e b r u a r y 1921 I r o n s i d e told R e z a K h a n that the r e m a i n i n g British forces would not o p p o s e h i m if he carried out a coup d'etat, so long as he would a g r e e — a s he d i d — n o t to d e p o s e the B r i t i s h - s u b s i d i z e d m o n a r c h , Ahmed Shah.* On 15 F e b r u a r y I r o n s i d e met with the S h a h but failed to p e r s u a d e him to a p p o i n t R e z a K h a n to a position of power; s o , on 21 F e b r u a r y , Reza K h a n m a r c h e d into T e h e r a n at the head of 3,000 C o s s a c k s a n d seized power, installing himself as commander-in-chief of the a r m e d forces. " S o far so g o o d , " Ironside c o m m e n t e d when he h e a r d the news. "I fancy that all the people think that I engineered the c o u p d'etat. I s u p p o s e I d i d , strictly s p e a k i n g . " 14

Nonetheless in 1925 Reza K h a n placed himself on the throne as Reza Shah Pahlavi, deposing Ahmed Shah, who by then resided in Paris. In 1935 Reza Shah changed the name of his kingdom from Persia to Iran.

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In fact, Ironside's role in these events was q u i t e u n k n o w n , a n d r e m a i n e d u n k n o w n until discovered a n d revealed by an A m e r i c a n scholar m o r e than half a century l a t e r . In L o n d o n — w h e r e officials were u n a w a r e of Ironside's i n v o l v e m e n t — t h e c o u r s e of events in Persia was g r e e t e d first with p u z z l e m e n t a n d then with d i s m a y . On 26 F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 1 , only five d a y s after achieving power, the new g o v e r n m e n t in T e h e r a n formally r e p u d i a t e d the Anglo-Persian A g r e e ment. T h e s a m e d a y it directed the Persian d i p l o m a t i c representative in M o s c o w to sign a treaty (its first treaty since taking office) with Soviet R u s s i a . T h e twin events of 26 F e b r u a r y m a r k e d a revolution in Persia's position, as the country t u r n e d from British protection against R u s s i a t o R u s s i a n protection against Britain. T h e s e events occurred j u s t as R u s s i a also signed a treaty with M o s l e m A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d only a m o n t h before the final conclusion of R u s s i a ' s treaty with K e m a l i s t T u r k e y . I n T u r k e y , Persia, a n d A f g h a n i s t a n — t h e three crucial countries that Britain h a d been d i s p u t i n g in the G r e a t G a m e with R u s s i a for m o r e than a c e n t u r y — t h e new rulers h a d each negotiated a treaty with M o s c o w as his first m o v e in foreign policy. Moreover, K e m a l i s t T u r k e y ' s first treaty with an I s l a m i c nation was c o n c l u d e d with A f g h a n i s t a n ; it was negotiated in M o s c o w with Russia's e n c o u r a g e m e n t . All of M o s c o w ' s new I s l a m i c p r o t e g e s were joining h a n d s u n d e r R u s s i a ' s aegis against Britain. By their t e r m s , the treaties were directed against i m p e r i a l i s m , a n d their l a n g u a g e left little d o u b t that it was British i m p e r i a l i s m that they m e a n t . A g a i n , British officials were left with a sense that the m a n y revolts against Britain in the E a s t were linked together. 15

L o r d C u r z o n , who in 1918 had said that "the g r e a t power from w h o m we have m o s t to fear in future is F r a n c e , " c l a i m e d in 1920 that "the R u s s i a n m e n a c e in the E a s t is i n c o m p a r a b l y greater than anything else that has h a p p e n e d in my time to the British E m p i r e . " It was not that R u s s i a was particularly powerful; war, revolution, and civil war h a d taken too great a toll for that to be t r u e . R a t h e r it was that the Bolsheviks were seen to be inspiring d a n g e r o u s forces everywhere in the E a s t . With R u s s i a n e n c o u r a g e m e n t , D j e m a l P a s h a , Enver's colleague in the Y o u n g T u r k g o v e r n m e n t , went out to Afghanistan in 1920 to serve as a military adviser; and his mission illuminated what the British g o v e r n m e n t m o s t feared. T h e C . U . P . , the continued influence of G e r m a n y even in defeat, p a n - I s l a m , B o l s h e v i s m , R u s s i a — a l l h a d c o m e together a n d were p o i s e d t o s w o o p down u p o n the British E m p i r e at its greatest points of vulnerability. 1 6

T h u s the S o v i e t s were s u p p o r t i n g Persian nationalism against Britain. T h e y were d o i n g so b e c a u s e K a m e n e v believed that bringing p r e s s u r e to bear on the British position in Persia m i g h t help rebel g r o u p s in n e i g h b o r i n g I r a q to resist British rule in that country. Meanwhile S o v i e t - s u p p o r t e d T u r k i s h nationalism, led b y K e m a l and

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inspired (the British believed) b y the Y o u n g T u r k e y m o v e m e n t , threatened t o tear u p the peace treaty that L l o y d G e o r g e h a d i m p o s e d u p o n the O t t o m a n E m p i r e . A t the t i m e A r a b rioters i n E g y p t a n d Palestine h a d taken to the streets, a n d I b n S a u d in A r a b i a a n d Feisal in S y r i a h a d taken to the field with their a r m i e s , to contest the dispositions that Britain h a d m a d e of their destinies. F o r B r i t a i n — flat on her b a c k economically, a n d in no position to c o p e with foreign d i s t u r b a n c e s — t h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n t r o u b l e s were overwhelming, a n d looked as t h o u g h they h a d been p u r p o s e f u l l y incited by a d e d ic a t e d enemy: Soviet Russia.

PART XI RUSSIA RETURNS TO THE MIDDLE EAST

53 U N M A S K I N G BRITAIN'S ENEMIES i It was true that the S o v i e t s e n c o u r a g e d Persian nationalism, s u p ported T u r k i s h nationalism, a n d s o u g h t to aid rebellion in I r a q ; b u t the R u s s i a n s h a d not i n s p i r e d — a n d did not d i r e c t — a n y of these m o v e m e n t s . T h e g r o w i n g British conviction that Bolshevik R u s s i a was involved in a far-reaching international conspiracy that had incited rebellion t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e E a s t was a delusion. What had o c c u r r e d was a series of u n c o o r d i n a t e d u p r i s i n g s , m a n y of them s p o n t a n e o u s , that were rooted in individual, local c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A l t h o u g h the S o v i e t s tried to m a k e use of these local m o v e m e n t s , neither B o l s h e v i s m nor Bolsheviks played any significant role in them. Yet there was an e d g e of truth to the British perception that Britain had m o v e d into conflict with the new R u s s i a n state a n d that the Bolsheviks—-hoping to exploit local opposition to British r u l e — viewed the M i d d l e E a s t as a theater of operations in that conflict. A m o n g British a n d other Allied officials, it had been a c o m m o n belief that a i d i n g the G e r m a n war effort was not a mere incidental effect of the Bolshevik coup d'etat, but its driving p u r p o s e . T h e G e r m a n s , u r g e d o n b y A l e x a n d e r H e l p h a n d , h a d financed the Bolsheviks a n d had sent L e n i n back to lead t h e m . It m a y have been a matter of indifference to L e n i n whether the achievement of his p r o g r a m helped or h a r m e d either of the contending capitalist alliances; b u t to m a n y Allied officials at the time, the evidence of G e r m a n financial involvement d e m o n s t r a t e d that helping G e r m a n y was L e n i n ' s desire and his intention. S u c h officials therefore viewed Bolsheviks as enemy a g e n t s , a n d r e g a r d e d the Bolsheviks' c o m m u n i s t theories as mere c a m o u f l a g e , or p r o p a g a n d a , or as an irrelevance. In turn, this view of B o l s h e v i s m fitted in with s u s p i c i o n s that had been formed and harbored by British officials, especially in the M i d d l e E a s t , since long before the w a r — s u s p i c i o n s that placed G e r m a n - i n s p i r e d B o l s h e v i s m in the context of an older conspiracy theory: a p r o - G e r m a n international J e w i s h plot.

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Confirmation that J e w s were p r o - G e r m a n s e e m e d to be p r o v i d e d by events in the O t t o m a n E m p i r e in the early p a r t of the twentieth century. As seen earlier (see p a g e s 41 — 3 ) , G e r a l d F i t z M a u r i c e h a d reported to his g o v e r n m e n t that the Y o u n g T u r k s were tools in J e w i s h h a n d s ; a n d t h o u g h F i t z M a u r i c e ' s report, a s historians now know, was false, it was believed at the time to be t r u e . When the C . U . P . , once i n power, m o v e d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the G e r m a n orbit, its policy was seen as an e x a m p l e of the effectiveness of the J e w i s h alliance with G e r m a n y . T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n old h a n d s who s u b s c r i b e d t o this v i e w — m e n like Wingate and C l a y t o n — b e l i e v e d that I s l a m was a w e a p o n that could be wielded at will by the S u l t a n - C a l i p h of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . When the s u p p o s e d l y J e w i s h Y o u n g T u r k s took control o f the S u b lime Porte, British officialdom therefore a s s u m e d that I s l a m , as well a s the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d the p a n - T u r k i s h m o v e m e n t , h a d p a s s e d into the h a n d s of the G e r m a n - J e w i s h c o m b i n e . It was in this context that the s e c o n d R u s s i a n Revolution was seen by British officials as the latest manifestation of a b i g g e r conspiracy. J e w s were prominent a m o n g the Bolshevik l e a d e r s ; so the Bolshevik seizure of power was viewed by m a n y within the British g o v e r n m e n t as not merely G e r m a n - i n s p i r e d b u t as J e w i s h - d i r e c t e d . When the u p r i s i n g s in the M i d d l e E a s t after the war o c c u r r e d , it was natural for British officials to explain that they f o r m e d part of a sinister design woven by the long-time c o n s p i r a t o r s . B o l s h e v i s m a n d international finance, p a n - A r a b s a n d p a n - T u r k s , I s l a m and R u s s i a were p i c t u r e d by British Intelligence as agents of international J e w r y and P r u s s i a n G e r m a n y , the m a n a g i n g p a r t n e r s of the great cons p i r a c y . In the m i n d of British officialdom, bitter enemies s u c h as E n v e r and K e m a l were playing on the s a m e s i d e ; a n d so, they believed, were A r a b s a n d J e w s . British officials of course were aware that significant n u m b e r s of Palestinian A r a b M o s l e m s , reacting against Zionist colonization, exp r e s s e d violent a n t i - J e w i s h feelings; but this observation did not necessarily negate their view that I s l a m was controlled by J e w r y . I s l a m , in the sense that B r i t o n s feared it, was the pull a n d power of the C a l i p h , w h o m they viewed as a pawn m o v e d by Britain's a d v e r s a r i e s — a view that, oddly, they continued to hold even after the S u l t a n - C a l i p h b e c a m e their virtual prisoner in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . As they saw it, it was evident that A r a b s could not govern t h e m s e l v e s ; so that the question c a m e d o w n to whether the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t s h o u l d b e governed b y G e r m a n s a n d J e w s , acting through the agency of T u r k s , or whether it s h o u l d be g o v e r n e d by Britain. T h e appeal of British g o v e r n m e n t , they felt, was that it was decent a n d honest; the appeal of Britain's adversaries was that T u r k i s h g o v e r n m e n t was M o s l e m g o v e r n m e n t . I s l a m was thus being

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u s e d , as was B o l s h e v i s m , and as were T u r k s a n d R u s s i a n s , by a cabal of J e w i s h financiers and P r u s s i a n generals to the detriment of Britain. While in the clear light of history this conspiracy theory s e e m s a b s u r d to the point of lunacy, it was believed either in whole or in part by large n u m b e r s of otherwise s a n e , well-balanced, a n d reasonably well-informed British officials. M o r e o v e r , it could be s u p p o r t e d by one actual piece of evidence: the career of A l e x a n d e r H e l p h a n d . H e l p h a n d was a J e w who c o n s p i r e d to help G e r m a n y and to destroy the R u s s i a n E m p i r e . H e was closely associated with the Y o u n g T u r k r e g i m e in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . He did play a significant role in selecting L e n i n a n d in s e n d i n g h i m into R u s s i a to foment a Bolshevik revolt with a view to helping G e r m a n y win the war. He did continue to weave his conspiratorial w e b s after the war. He was what Wingate a n d C l a y t o n believed a J e w to b e : rich, s u b v e r s i v e , a n d p r o - G e r m a n . A g a i n s t this b a c k g r o u n d , the trend of British Intelligence a s s e s s m e n t s in the i m m e d i a t e postwar years a p p e a r s less irrational than would otherwise be the c a s e . On 5 M a y 1919, only half a year after the armistices had b r o u g h t hostilities in the F i r s t World War to an end, a British intelligence agent filed a report with the A r a b B u r e a u b a s e d o n extensive conversations with Y o u n g T u r k leaders who had f o u n d safety in S w i t z e r l a n d . A c c o r d i n g to the A r a b B u r e a u ' s intelligence operative, the Allied victory h a d not b r o u g h t e n e m y antiBritish agitation to an e n d . On the contrary, the work of the w a r t i m e P a n - I s l a m i c P r o p a g a n d a B u r e a u in Berlin was being continued in I n d i a , E g y p t , T u r k e y , Persia, a n d elsewhere with the goal of inciting " T h e Revolt of I s l a m . " " T h e E a s t e r n enemies of G r e a t Britain have united with a v o w e d object of overthrowing British rule in the E A S T , " he r e p o r t e d . " T h e y can rely u p o n the s u p p o r t of G e r m a n y a n d of the R u s s i a n Bolsheviks . . . " ' T h e intermediary between the M i d d l e E a s t e r n rebels a n d the Bolsheviks, the report continued, was Alexander H e l p h a n d . T h e eruption of violence in M e s o p o t a m i a the following year elicited other intelligence reports along similar lines, notably f r o m M a j o r N. N. E. B r a y , a special intelligence officer attached to the Political D e p a r t m e n t of the I n d i a Office. It was B r a y whose chart of the alleged conspiracy w a s circulated to the C a b i n e t at the end of the s u m m e r of 1920 (see p a g e 4 5 3 ) . B r a y a r g u e d that in M e s o p o t a m i a , "both the Nationalist a n d P a n - I s l a m i s t m o v e m e n t s derive their inspiration f r o m B e r l i n — t h r o u g h Switzerland and M o s c o w . T h e situation is further c o m p l i c a t e d with Italian, F r e n c h a n d Bolshevist i n t r i g u e s . " 2

B r a y u r g e d the g o v e r n m e n t to track d o w n the secret "comparatively small central organization" at the center of the far-reaching international c o n s p i r a c y . S i n c e it did not exist, it was never f o u n d . Nonetheless the p r e p o n d e r a n t opinion within the g o v e r n m e n t , at least for a t i m e , was that the rebellions breaking out in Britain's 3

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M i d d l e E a s t e r n d o m a i n s were the result of coordinated hostile forces from o u t s i d e . Within the F o r e i g n Office there were several officials who a r g u e d that the s o u r c e of the various M i d d l e E a s t e r n troubles was to be located within the M i d d l e E a s t e r n countries themselves; b u t these officials represented a minority point of view. In fact there was an o u t s i d e force linked to every o n e of the o u t b r e a k s of violence in the M i d d l e E a s t , b u t it w a s the one force whose presence r e m a i n e d invisible to British officialdom. It was Britain herself. In a region of the g l o b e whose inhabitants were known especially to dislike foreigners, a n d in a p r e d o m i n a n t l y M o s l e m world which could a b i d e b e i n g ruled by almost a n y b o d y except nonM o s l e m s , a foreign Christian country ought to have e x p e c t e d to encounter hostility when it a t t e m p t e d to i m p o s e its own rule. T h e s h a d o w s that a c c o m p a n i e d the British rulers wherever they went in the M i d d l e E a s t were in fact their own. What Britain faced in the M i d d l e E a s t was a long a n d p e r h a p s endless series of individual a n d often s p o n t a n e o u s local rebellions against her authority. T h e rebellions were not directed by foreigners; they were directed against foreigners. P e r h a p s if the British E m p i r e had maintained its million-man a r m y of occupation in the M i d d l e E a s t , the region's inhabitants m i g h t have resigned themselves to the inevitability of British rule and to the uselessness of a t t e m p t i n g to defy it; b u t once Britain had demobilized her a r m y , the string of revolts in the M i d d l e E a s t b e c a m e p r e d i c t a b l e . T h e agents of British policy in the M i d d l e E a s t , however, continued to b l a m e their t r o u b l e s — a s K i t c h e n e r a n d his colleagues had b l a m e d all their M i d d l e E a s t e r n failures since 1908—on the s u p p o s e d l y Jewish-controlled, G e r m a n - i n f l u e n c e d Y o u n g T u r k leadership a n d its international ramifications, chief a m o n g which were I s l a m and now B o l s h e v i s m in a line that ran f r o m E n v e r t h r o u g h A l e x a n d e r H e l p h a n d to L e n i n .

II A sensationalist e x p o s e was p u b l i s h e d in L o n d o n for the first time in 1920 that p u r p o r t e d to disclose the origins of this worldwide conspiracy. Entitled The Jewish Peril, the book was an E n g l i s h translation of the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. A F r e n c h translation was p u b l i s h e d in Paris at the s a m e t i m e . T h e Protocols p u r p o r t e d to be a record of meetings held by J e w s and F r e e m a s o n s at the end of the nineteenth century in which they plotted to overthrow capitalism a n d Christianity a n d to establish a world state u n d e r their joint rule. T h e Protocols had originally a p p e a r e d in R u s s i a , in a n e w s p a p e r in 1903 a n d in book form in 1905, a n d had allegedly been discovered by Sergei N i l u s , a C z a r i s t official. T h e y attracted little attention until

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the R u s s i a n revolutions of 1917, when it was widely r e m a r k e d that m a n y of the Bolshevik leaders were J e w s and that c o m m u n i s t doctrine bore a certain r e s e m b l a n c e to that d e s c r i b e d in the Protocols. T h e r e fore there were those in L o n d o n a n d Paris in 1920 who accepted Nilus's revelations as g e n u i n e . As s u c h , the Protocols e x p l a i n e d — a m o n g other t h i n g s — t h e m y s t e r i o u s revolts against Britain everywhere in the E a s t . It was not until the s u m m e r of 1 9 2 1 — a year after they a p p e a r e d in L o n d o n and P a r i s — t h a t the Protocols were proven to be a forgery by Philip G r a v e s , C o n s t a n t i n o p l e c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times, who revealed that they had been concocted by the C z a r i s t secret police. T h e police had not even bothered to c o m p o s e the forged d o c u m e n t s themselves; they had plagiarized them, as G r a v e s was informed by a White R u s s i a n refugee n a m e d Michael Raslovleff (whose n a m e was not revealed until 1978). Raslovleff, who p a r t e d with the information only b e c a u s e of a "very urgent need of m o n e y , " showed G r a v e s that whole sections of the Protocols were p a r a p h r a s e d from a satire on N a p o l e o n I I I written by a F r e n c h lawyer and p u b l i s h e d in G e n e v a (1864) a n d B r u s s e l s ( 1 8 6 5 ) . It was an o b s c u r e work, of which few copies were still in existence; Raslovleff showed G r a v e s the copy he had b o u g h t from a former R u s s i a n secret police official, a n d The Times in L o n d o n f o u n d a c o p y in the British M u s e u m . Raslovleff said that if the work had not been so rare, s o m e b o d y w o u l d have recognized the Protocols as a p l a g i a r i s m immediately u p o n their publication. ( S u b s e q u e n t l y it has been learned that p a s s a g e s in the Protocols were plagiarized from other b o o k s as well, including a fantasy novel p u b l i s h e d at a b o u t the s a m e time as the F r e n c h satire.) 4

Ill F o r the i m p o r t a n t b o d y of British opinion represented by The Times, those responsible for Britain's s e t b a c k s in the M i d d l e E a s t were not foreign c o n s p i r a t o r s b u t British officials—British A r a b o p h i l e s chief a m o n g t h e m . Particularly a l a r m e d by the u p r i s i n g s in I r a q , a special M i d d l e E a s t e r n c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times filed a d i s p a t c h , p u b lished on 20 S e p t e m b e r 1920, in which he wrote that " M y conviction, b a s e d on careful s t u d y , is that the A r a b B u r e a u at C a i r o , the G . H . Q . a t C a i r o , and our O c c u p i e d E n e m y T e r r i t o r i e s A d m i n i s trations in Palestine a n d last year in S y r i a , bear a heavy load of responsibility for the present waste of British lives a n d m o n e y in M e s o p o t a m i a . " H e c h a r g e d that "British P a n - A r a b p r o p a g a n d a i s one of the m o s t serious existing d a n g e r s to the world's p e a c e . " P u t t i n g aside the few British officials who genuinely believed in A r a b ind e p e n d e n c e , he d e n o u n c e d the "extremely d a n g e r o u s officials who

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have no great belief in the A r a b s ' own capacity for g o v e r n m e n t , but an intense belief in our I m p e r i a l M i s s i o n " to run A r a b affairs behind a facade of nominal A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e . He did not mention Wingate, Clayton, or H o g a r t h by n a m e , b u t the description fitted t h e m ; and they, in his account, a n d not the Bolsheviks, were the c a u s e of the d i s o r d e r s throughout the M i d d l e E a s t . In a leading article the next d a y , The Times d e n o u n c e d the A r a b B u r e a u ' s long-held belief in an A r a b confederation of the M i d d l e E a s t presided over by K i n g H u s s e i n : ". . .the delusive d r e a m of a h u g e A r a b i a n F e d e r a t i o n should no longer be entertained in any official q u a r t e r . " A year later, on 27 S e p t e m b e r 1921, The Times rejected the A r a b B u r e a u ' s old notion of a special British mission in the M o s l e m world. D i s c e r n i n g a c o m m o n theme in the m a n y M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t e r n revolts against E u r o p e a n Christian rule, The Times was of the opinion that " T h e p r o b l e m is far too b i g for any one E u r o p e a n nation t o cope with alone . . . " T h e principal d a n g e r , as The Times pictured it, lay in British o v e r c o m m i t m e n t . T h e principal challenge to the country, in its view, was at h o m e a n d was economic. Britain needed to invest her money in renewing herself economically a n d socially, and was threatened in her very existence by a governmental disposition to s q u a n d e r money instead on M i d d l e E a s t e r n a d v e n t u r e s . In an editorial p u b l i s h e d on 18 J u l y 1921 The Times d e n o u n c e d the g o v e r n m e n t for this, saying that "while they have spent nearly £ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 since the A r m i s t i c e u p o n s e m i - n o m a d s in M e s o p o t a m i a they can find only £ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 a year for the regeneration of our s l u m s , a n d have had to forbid all e x p e n d i t u r e u n d e r the E d u c a t i o n A c t of 1918." B u t while The Times a r g u e d that the d a n g e r to Britain c a m e from British officialdom, m u c h of British officialdom continued to focus on the Soviet threat to the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d on the question of how to r e s p o n d to that threat.

54 T H E SOVIET C H A L L E N G E IN T H E MIDDLE EAST T h e h e a d s of the three great d e p a r t m e n t s of the British g o v e r n m e n t c h a r g e d with dealing with the R u s s i a n question in the M i d d l e E a s t — the F o r e i g n Office, the War Office, a n d the I n d i a O f f i c e — d i s a g r e e d a m o n g themselves a b o u t the nature of the Soviet challenge and a b o u t how to r e s p o n d to it. L o r d C u r z o n , g u a r d i a n of the flame of the G r e a t G a m e who b e c a m e F o r e i g n Secretary in 1919, a r g u e d for a forward British military position in the M i d d l e E a s t to g u a r d against R u s s i a . He u r g e d the B r i t i s h army to take up positions defending T r a n s c a u c a s i a (which had b r o k e n away f r o m R u s s i a ) a n d northern Persia. He and the P e r m a n e n t U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y at the F o r e i g n Office, L o r d Hardinge-—both of t h e m former viceroys of I n d i a — c l a i m e d that the loss of any one area in the M i d d l e E a s t to R u s s i a n a g g r e s s i o n would, in t u r n , lead to the loss of the area b e h i n d it, in a d o m i n o reaction that might lead eventually to the loss of I n d i a . 1

T h e Secretary of S t a t e for I n d i a , E d w i n M o n t a g u , and the Viceroy o f I n d i a , F r e d e r i c J o h n N a p i e r T h e s i g e r , 3rd B a r o n C h e l m s f o r d , d i s a g r e e d . M o n t a g u and C h e l m s f o r d believed that Bolshevik R u s s i a p o s e d a political rather than a military threat to Britain's position in the M i d d l e E a s t . T h e y a r g u e d that Britain ought to be c o m p e t i n g against R u s s i a to win the s u p p o r t of nationalist forces t h r o u g h o u t I s l a m i c A s i a . I n s t e a d , as they saw it, Britain was p u r s u i n g politics that might have been expressly d e s i g n e d to drive these forces into the a r m s of M o s c o w ; a n d the presence of British a r m i e s m i g h t be expected to alienate these forces still further. M o n t a g u wrote to C u r z o n at the b e g i n n i n g of 1920 that " T h e danger of the B o l s h e v i k s to Persia and to India" was largely the result of the British government's own policies, which he characterized as a n t i - M o h a m m e d a n . "We could have m a d e P a n - I s l a m i s m friendly to G r e a t B r i t a i n , " he wrote, b u t instead "We are m a k i n g it hostile." I n d i a , o f c o u r s e , h a d o p p o s e d L o n d o n ' s M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy ever since L o r d K i t c h e n e r took charge of it in 1914; a n d what M o n t a g u wrote in 1920 w a s consistent with the criticisms he had 2

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levelled all along against his g o v e r n m e n t ' s p r o - A r a b a n d pro-Zionist policies a n d against the school of K i t c h e n e r view that I s l a m was a force m a n a g e d and directed by Britain's enemies. C h e l m s f o r d , in t e l e g r a m s to M o n t a g u at the b e g i n n i n g of 1921, put the matter in historical p e r s p e c t i v e by pointing out that until 1914 the British had been the " c h a m p i o n s of I s l a m against the R u s s i a n O g r e . " N o w , however, the harsh T r e a t y of S e v r e s that L l o y d G e o r g e had i m p o s e d o n the helpless O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d the one-sided treaty that C u r z o n had i m p o s e d on the prostrate Persian E m p i r e a p p e a r e d to Indian M o s l e m s as e x a m p l e s of "Britain's crushing of I s l a m . " In R u s s i a , on the other h a n d , the war had b r o u g h t into power a new r e g i m e t h a t — a t least in the M i d d l e E a s t — s p o k e the l a n g u a g e of national i n d e p e n d e n c e . In the long r u n , according to the Viceroy, the "real defence" against R u s s i a n Bolshevik expansion in the M i d d l e E a s t lay not in installing forward military positions but in s u p p o r t i n g a "nationalist spirit" a m o n g the M o s l e m peoples of the region whose basic religious tenets were hostile to B o l s h e v i s m a n d whose nationalism would lead them to o p p o s e R u s s i a n a d v a n c e s . It would be a mistake for Britain to maintain a military presence in the M i d d l e E a s t , he continued, or even a merely economic one, for it might lead native leaders to conclude that the real threat to their independence c a m e from L o n d o n . 3

4

5

M a j o r - G e n e r a l S i r E d m u n d I r o n s i d e , d u r i n g the time he served as c o m m a n d e r of the British t r o o p s remaining in northern Persia, strongly believed that his troops should not be there. As he saw it, the r u g g e d terrain on the I n d i a n northwest frontier p r o v i d e d so effective a defensive line that a forward defense of I n d i a w a s u n necessary, while the long line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s required in order to conduct a forward defense of I n d i a f r o m Persia rendered such a strategy i m p r a c t i c a l . 6

In the end the a r g u m e n t between the F o r e i g n Office a n d the I n d i a Office was settled by the War Office. S i r H e n r y Wilson, Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff, decisively ruled against the F o r e i g n Office on the g r o u n d s that he did not have the t r o o p s to carry out the forward policy in the M i d d l e E a s t that L o r d C u r z o n a d v o c a t e d . In 1920 he s u b m i t t e d a p a p e r to the C a b i n e t reporting that Britain had no reserves whatsoever with which to reinforce g a r r i s o n s anywhere in the world should the need a r i s e . T h e only feasible policy, in his view, was to h u s b a n d resources a n d to concentrate Britain's military forces in those areas of greatest i m p o r t a n c e a n d c o n c e r n — a n d neither Persia nor the C a u c a s u s frontier w a s a m o n g t h e m . 7

Winston Churchill, the War Minister a n d Secretary for Air, a r g u e d in early 1920 that if t r o o p s were available for Persia a n d the C a u c a s u s frontier, they should be u s e d instead in R u s s i a — t o s u p p o r t the Czarist generals in their bid to unseat the Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t . 8

THE

SOVIET

CHALLENGE

IN

THE

MIDDLE

EAST

473

Churchill took the new rulers of the K r e m l i n at their w o r d : he pictured them as internationalists and revolutionaries. He believed that m o s t of them were not R u s s i a n at all—that they were J e w s . Churchill therefore did not believe that they p u r s u e d R u s s i a n g o a l s , whether nationalist or imperialist. He failed to explain why their objectives in the M i d d l e E a s t were so uncannily similar to those of the czars. M i n u t e s of a 1920 conference of C a b i n e t ministers underlined the particular m e n a c e Churchill a n d s o m e of his colleagues felt the Bolsheviks p o s e d in M o s l e m A s i a . "Every day they were m a k i n g great strides t o w a r d s the E a s t , in the direction of B o k h a r a and A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e y were c a r r y i n g out a regular, scientific, a n d c o m prehensive s c h e m e of p r o p a g a n d a in Central A s i a against the B r i t i s h . " T h e Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff warned the ministers that "the C a s p i a n would fall into the h a n d s of the Bolsheviks who could . . . create d i s t u r b a n c e i n N o r t h Persia. T h e unrest would s p r e a d to A f g h a n i s t a n , which was already very unsettled, a n d also to India which was r e p o r t e d to be in a m o r e d a n g e r o u s state to-day than it had been for the last thirty y e a r s . " E c h o i n g these fears, Winston Churchill wrote to the P r i m e Minister a s k i n g "what are we to do if the Bolsheviks overrun C a u c a s i a a n d join with the T u r k i s h Nationalists; if they obtain the c o m m a n d of the C a s p i a n and invade N o r t h e r n Persia; if they d o m i n a t e T u r k e s t a n a n d join with A f g h a n i s t a n in m e n a c i n g I n d i a f r o m without a n d e n d e a v o u r i n g to raise up a revolution w i t h i n ? " 9

1 0

11

T h e B r i t i s h - s u b s i d i z e d White R u s s i a n c a m p a i g n i n the R u s s i a n Civil War that b r o k e out between the Bolsheviks a n d their adversaries was seen by the p u b l i c as Churchill's private war, a n d when the White a r m i e s faltered in late 1919, a n d then fell a p a r t early in 1920, it was seen as yet another of his costly failures. T h e P r i m e Minister wrote to h i m that "I have f o u n d y o u r m i n d so o b s e s s e d by R u s s i a that I felt I had g o o d g r o u n d for the a p p r e h e n s i o n that your abilities, energy, a n d c o u r a g e were not devoted to the reduction of e x p e n d i t u r e . " S p e a k i n g a b o u t Churchill a n d R u s s i a a few m o n t h s later, the P r i m e Minister was less restrained; the Chief of the I m perial G e n e r a l Staff noted in his diary that " H e thinks Winston has gone mad . . . " 12

1 3

As a Liberal Prime Minister dependent on a right-wing Conservative majority in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , L l o y d G e o r g e nonetheless felt obliged to allow his War Minister to s u p p o r t the White R u s s i a n s until it was plain that they h a d failed. B u t when the Whites c o l l a p s e d , the P r i m e Minister felt free to seek an agreement with the R e d s . He did not fear their imperial a m b i t i o n s in the M i d d l e E a s t . F o r that matter he h a d not feared those of the c z a r s . In believing that an a c c o m m o d a t i o n with R u s s i a could be reached,

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the P r i m e Minister carried on the traditions of the L i b e r a l Party to which h e b e l o n g e d . H i s former colleagues, A s q u i t h a n d G r e y , had believed the R u s s i a n s to have legitimate grievances in the M i d d l e E a s t , such as lack of access to a w a r m water port, which, if satisfied, would leave them content not to a d v a n c e any further. In the s a m e vein, L l o y d G e o r g e a r g u e d that the alleged R u s s i a n threat to India was a fantasy. Bolshevik R u s s i a lacked the resources to p o s e s u c h a threat, he believed, a n d even "When R u s s i a was well e q u i p p e d , the R u s s i a n s could not c r o s s the m o u n t a i n s . " He agreed that Bolshevik p r o p a g a n d a in I n d i a might be a d a n g e r , b u t o b s e r v e d that "you can't keep ideas out of a country by a military c o r d o n . " ' 14

5

D u r i n g 1920 a n d early 1921 L l o y d G e o r g e e n g a g e d in the negotiation of a trade agreement with M o s c o w that was to give the Bolshevik r e g i m e de facto recognition a n d b r i n g R u s s i a b a c k into the family of nations. He told Riddell that as a condition preliminary to negotiation he would insist that all Bolshevik p r o p a g a n d a a b r o a d in Persia, A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d elsewhere in the E a s t s h o u l d c e a s e ; a n d Riddell noted in his diary that " L . G . thinks L e n i n will a g r e e . " Quite the contrary p r o v e d to be t r u e . T h e Soviet g o v e r n m e n t , in a cable of instructions to its representative, indicated that "We can only agree to concrete concessions in the E a s t at a political conference with E n g l a n d a n d on condition that we receive similar concessions from E n g l a n d also in the E a s t . What these concessions are to consist of will be d i s c u s s e d when the time c o m e s . " T h i s hinted at continuing R u s s i a n imperial a m b i t i o n s in the M i d d l e E a s t that were considerably m o r e far-reaching than L l o y d G e o r g e h a d s u p p o s e d . 1 6

17

55

MOSCOW'S GOALS i While Britain's leaders were d i s a g r e e i n g with one another a b o u t the relationship between Bolshevik c o m m u n i s m a n d R u s s i a n i m p e r i a l i s m , the Bolshevik leaders themselves were d e b a t i n g the n a t u r e of that relationship, with all of its implications for their postwar policy in the M i d d l e E a s t . Until the d e c a d e before the F i r s t World War, the R u s s i a n E m p i r e h a d been e x p a n d i n g at the e x p e n s e of its neighbors at a p r o d i g i o u s rate and for a long t i m e . It has been calculated that, at the t i m e , the R u s s i a n E m p i r e h a d been c o n q u e r i n g the territory of its n e i g h b o r s at an average rate of 50 s q u a r e miles a d a y for 4f)0 y e a r s . With the acquisition of foreign territories c a m e foreign p e o p l e s . At the time of the first scientific c e n s u s in 1897, m o s t of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e ' s s u b j e c t s were not R u s s i a n s . T h e T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s alone were m o r e than 10 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n , a n d M o s l e m s were at least 14 p e r c e n t . 1

N o w , L e n i n ' s R u s s i a h a d to decide whether to try to r e c o n q u e r the M o s l e m a n d other n o n - R u s s i a n p e o p l e s w h o m the czars h a d s u b j e c t e d to their rule. L e n i n , for years, had a r g u e d that the n o n - R u s s i a n p e o p l e s s h o u l d enjoy the right of self-determination. In theory he was a firm o p p o n e n t of what he called G r e a t R u s s i a n c h a u v i n i s m . In 1915 he wrote that "We G r e a t R u s s i a n workers m u s t d e m a n d that our g o v e r n m e n t s h o u l d g e t out of M o n g o l i a , T u r k e s t a n , a n d Persia "2

In 1917 he o v e r c a m e the resistance of his colleagues at the S e v e n t h Social D e m o c r a t i c C o n g r e s s a n d p u s h e d through a resolution declaring that the n o n - R u s s i a n p e o p l e s of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e s h o u l d be free to s e c e d e . T h e colleague w h o m he p l a c e d in charge of the nationalities issue was, however, of a different f r a m e of m i n d . He was the T r a n s c a u ^ casian Bolshevik J o s e p h D z h u g a s h v i l i , who, after calling himself by m a n y other aliases, h a d given himself the R u s s i a n n a m e of S t a l i n . 475

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A l t h o u g h for a time he outwardly deferred to L e n i n ' s views on the nationalities question, Stalin did not s h a r e t h e m ; indeed he was fiercely at o d d s with L e n i n over the nationalities issue a n d the constitution of the Soviet U n i o n . L e n i n ' s p r o p o s a l was for each of the Soviet countries-—Russia, the U k r a i n e , G e o r g i a , a n d the various o t h e r s — t o be i n d e p e n d e n t ; they were to cooperate with one another as allies d o , on the basis of treaties between t h e m . Stalin's plan, on the other h a n d , was for the U k r a i n e , G e o r g i a , a n d all the others to adhere to the R u s s i a n s t a t e — a n d S t a l i n prevailed. On 30 D e c e m b e r 1922, the F i r s t C o n g r e s s of S o v i e t s of the U n i o n of S o v i e t Socialist R e p u b l i c s a p p r o v e d the formation of a Soviet U n i o n d o m i n a t e d by Russia.

II H o w significant in practice were the differences between L e n i n a n d Stalin? L e n i n a r g u e d that the E u r o p e a n nations within the R u s s i a n E m p i r e s h o u l d be allowed i n d e p e n d e n c e — a n d , in that, he certainly d i s a g r e e d with Stalin. T h e r e is s o m e evidence, however, that he privately believed that the M i d d l e E a s t e r n nationalities s h o u l d not be allowed i n d e p e n d e n c e until a m u c h later date — w h i c h was different from Stalin's belief that they s h o u l d never be independent, but in the short run c a m e to the s a m e thing. A l t h o u g h he was o p p o s e d to c o m p e l l i n g n o n - R u s s i a n s to s u b m i t to R u s s i a n rule, L e n i n , like S t a l i n , h a d n o q u a l m s a b o u t compelling non-Bolsheviks to s u b m i t to Bolshevik r u l e — a n d here, too, L e n i n ' s policy in practice did not a p p e a r as widely different f r o m Stalin's as it d i d in theory. U n d e r L e n i n ' s leadership, Soviet R u s s i a c o n q u e r e d n o n - R u s s i a n portions of the former R u s s i a n E m p i r e a n d i m p o s e d local Bolshevik Soviet r e g i m e s u p o n t h e m by force of a r m s . In each case a political police force, acting as a b r a n c h of Soviet R u s s i a ' s secret police, w a s established by L e n i n ' s g o v e r n m e n t to help maintain the local S o v i e t r e g i m e . T h i s was entirely in line with what L e n i n had done in R u s s i a : his was a minority r e g i m e that had seized power

T h e Bashkir leader, Zeki Velidi T o g a n , wrote (years later) that in 1920 Lenin had told him that the problem in the colonial countries was that they lacked a proletariat. In communist theory the proletariat was to dictate and to lead, but the peasantry of the East did not have an industrial working class to do that for them. In effect this meant that the peoples of the East were not yet ready to exercise their right to be free. According to T o g a n , Lenin said that even after the socialist revolution had succeeded everywhere in the world, the former colonies of the European Great Powers would have to remain in tutelage to their former masters until such time as they developed an industrial working class of their own. 3

MOSCOW'S GOALS

477

by force a n d that held on to power by e m p l o y i n g as m a n y as a q u a r t e r of a million secret policemen. B u t in R u s s i a n Central A s i a , the Bolshevik minority consisted of R u s s i a n s , while the non-Bolshevik majority consisted of natives; for Bolsheviks to rule non-Bolsheviks (which was L e n i n ' s policy) was, in practice, for R u s s i a n s to rule n o n - R u s s i a n s (which was Stalin's policy).

Ill In the b e g i n n i n g , the Bolshevik g o v e r n m e n t p r o m i s e d the native p o p u l a t i o n s of C e n t r a l A s i a their f r e e d o m . At the end of 1917, after seizing power in P e t r o g r a d , the S o v i e t s issued an appeal for s u p port, u n d e r the s i g n a t u r e s of L e n i n a n d S t a l i n , recognizing the M o s l e m population's right to "Organize y o u r national life in c o m p l e t e freedom." W o u l d the Bolshevik leaders nonetheless try to r e c o n q u e r the C z a r ' s M i d d l e E a s t e r n colonies? T h e i r policy in this r e g a r d w o u l d offer L o n d o n an i m p o r t a n t clue as to whether they were c o m m u n i s t revolutionaries or R u s s i a n imperialists. 4

T h e R u s s i a n M i d d l e E a s t — R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n — w a s a colonial e m p i r e that the czars had carved out of the previously independent M o s l e m world. L i k e Algeria, M o r o c c o , the S u d a n , or a score of other tribal areas in Africa a n d A s i a , it h a d been s u b d u e d by force of m o d e r n E u r o p e a n a r m s . L i k e other s u c h colonies, it found that its e c o n o m y was exploited for the benefit of its E u r o p e a n m a s t e r s . L i k e t h e m , too, it resented b e i n g settled by colonists from E u r o p e ; there was n o b o d y that a T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g M o s l e m hated m o r e than a R u s s i a n who c a m e to take p o s s e s s i o n of his soil. L o c a t e d d e e p in the heart of E u r a s i a , T u r k e s t a n is an area that r e m a i n s little known to the o u t s i d e world. T h e R u s s i a n - r u l e d part of it is a b o u t half the size of the continental U n i t e d S t a t e s : a b o u t one a n d a half million s q u a r e miles. Vast m o u n t a i n r a n g e s on its eastern frontier block the m o i s t u r e - l a d e n c l o u d s f r o m the Pacific, so that m o s t of its territory is an arid, largely unforested, plain. At the time of the F i r s t World War, a b o u t 20 to 25 percent of its population could be classified as n o m a d s or s e m i - n o m a d s , while the rest of its nearly ten million, largely T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g , people lived in clusters a r o u n d the fertile oasis towns. T h e 1914 war a n d the revolutions of 1917 brought confusion a n d anarchy to C e n t r a l A s i a . In part this was d u e to the extent a n d * Turkestan is used here in its broad geographic sense, rather than in its technical sense as the governor-generalate ruled from Tashkent under the czars.

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t o p o g r a p h y of the country a n d to its mixed p o p u l a t i o n . It was a frontier country, a n d , even in the best of t i m e s , tribal conflicts, as well as the opposition of the i n d i g e n o u s peoples to R u s s i a n colonization, kept the area in d i s o r d e r . While T u r k e s t a n was r e m o t e from the war, it h a d been the scene of a tribal revolt against wartime m e a s u r e s ; a n d it had suffered a b r e a k d o w n in g o v e r n m e n t as a result of the two revolutions in P e t r o g r a d . Social conflicts e m e r g e d , as a small u r b a n m i d d l e class resisted an a t t e m p t by feudal leaders to reassert authority. T o o m a n y leaders a n d too m a n y c a u s e s raised their b a n n e r s and took to the field. A r m i e s , a r m e d b a n d s , and raiding parties swept across the d e s e r t s a n d vast e m p t y plains, a p p e a r ing out of nowhere a n d as s u d d e n l y d i s a p p e a r i n g . War a n d revolution had thrown up their h u m a n w r e c k a g e : refugees seeking a way out a n d a d v e n t u r e r s seeking a way in. F r o m the d i s b a n d e d prisoner-of-war c a m p s , G e r m a n s , H u n g a r i a n s , C z e c h s , a n d soldiers of a dozen other nationalities s t r e a m e d out in search of one goal or another. In the c a r a v a n s a n d in the rickety railroad carriages that lurched a c r o s s the treeless l a n d s c a p e of Central A s i a were to be found an a s s o r t m e n t of h u m a n types whose identities, m i s s i o n s , a n d motives were difficult to f a t h o m ; a n d the Soviet r e g i m e b e l i e v e d — o r affected to believe—that foreign-inspired conspiracies were flourishing a n d ripening everywhere in the semi-tropical s u n shine. D u r i n g the years of post-revolutionary c h a o s , new i n d i g e n o u s r e g i m e s p r o c l a i m e d their existence throughout the region; a n d M o s c o w treated them as challenges to be o v e r c o m e . At the end of 1917 M o s l e m s in Central A s i a set up a regime in K h o k a n d , seat of what h a d once been a khanate in the western F e r g a n a valley, in opposition to the T a s h k e n t S o v i e t (which was c o m p o s e d of R u s s i a n settlers a n d d i d not include a single M o s l e m a m o n g its m e m b e r s ) . L a c k i n g m o n e y a n d a r m s K h o k a n d looked for allies b u t found none. Stalin curtly d i s m i s s e d its c l a i m s to function as a r e g i m e . On 18 F e b r u a r y 1918 the R e d A r m y c a p t u r e d a n d sacked K h o k a n d , destroying m o s t of the city a n d m a s s a c r i n g its inhabitants. F r o m its ruins, however, a r o s e a loosely organized m o v e m e n t of m a r a u d i n g guerrilla b a n d s called B a s m a c h i s who p l a g u e d the R u s s i a n s for years afterward. D u r i n g the next few years S o v i e t R u s s i a destroyed one center of resistance after another. As the p e o p l e of the K a z a k h country learned in 1918, no s u p p o r t w a s to be o b t a i n e d from the White R u s s i a n s , for they, too, were o p p o s e d to native a s p i r a t i o n s . T h e K a z a k h s of the Central A s i a n plains h a d p r o c l a i m e d their a u t o n o m y a n d asked the aid of the C z a r i s t c o m m a n d e r , A d m i r a l K o l c h a k , in d e f e n d i n g themselves against the B o l s h e v i k s — o n l y to find that he, too, was their enemy.

MOSCOW'S GOALS

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T h e m o s t serious threat to S o v i e t a m b i t i o n s was p o s e d by the "Native S t a t e s " of K h i v a and B u k h a r a , two former C z a r i s t protectorates in Central A s i a . As frontier states neighboring on Persia, A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d C h i n a , they enjoyed contact with the outside world and c o u l d serve as a focus of anti-Soviet alliances. M o s c o w took a d v a n t a g e of internal strife in K h i v a ; the R e d A r m y c a p t u r e d it on 13 S e p t e m b e r 1920, and installed a r e g i m e that allied itself with the S o v i e t s . T h e r e a f t e r M o s c o w o r d e r e d a series of liquidations of the K h i v a n leadership that p a v e d the way for K h i v a ' s eventual incorporation into the S o v i e t U n i o n . T h a t left only B u k h a r a ; and in dealing with the last bastion of native T u r k i s h resistance, it o c c u r r e d to the S o v i e t s to m a k e u s e of the Y o u n g T u r k e y leader E n v e r P a s h a — w h o m British Intelligence had p i c t u r e d as a m e m b e r of the conspiracy directing the Bolshevik m o v e m e n t all along.

56 A DEATH IN BUKHARA i A c c o r d i n g to British Intelligence, the Y o u n g T u r k e y leaders were m e m b e r s of the G e r m a n a n d J e w i s h conspiracy that controlled the Bolshevik r e g i m e . Y e t from 1918 to 1922, as Britain's leaders tried to fathom the intentions of the Bolshevik leaders, so d i d the fugitive leaders of the Y o u n g T u r k s — w h o did not control the Bolsheviks or even know very m u c h a b o u t t h e m . I n N o v e m b e r 1918, E n v e r P a s h a , D j e m a l P a s h a , a n d T a l a a t Bey e s c a p e d from the ruins of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e with the aid of the retreating G e r m a n s a n d f l e d across the Black S e a t o w a r d O d e s s a . Eventually E n v e r and T a l a a t found their way to Berlin a n d there, in the late s u m m e r of 1919, they visited the Bolshevik representative K a r l R a d e k in his jail cell. R a d e k h a d been one of the intermediaries between the G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff a n d L e n i n in the H e l p h a n d inspired f u n d i n g of the Bolshevik P a r t y . In 1919 he was i m p r i s o n e d by the new G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t in connection with the s u p p r e s s i o n of the c o m m u n i s t u p r i s i n g in G e r m a n y ; but he was treated as a person of c o n s e q u e n c e a n d transacted political b u s i n e s s from his cell. T h e startling political p r o p o s a l that R a d e k m a d e t o the Y o u n g T u r k leaders was that E n v e r s h o u l d proceed to M o s c o w to negotiate a.pact between R u s s i a n B o l s h e v i s m a n d T u r k i s h nationalism directed against Britain. E n v e r was a lifelong foe of R u s s i a a n d no friend to B o l s h e v i s m ; b u t R a d e k a s s u r e d him that "in Soviet R u s s i a everyone was welcome who would s u p p o r t the offensive against E n g l i s h imperialism." 1

A close friend of Enver's in Berlin was General H a n s von Seeckt, the brilliant creator a n d head of the new G e r m a n a r m y — t h e m u c h reduced a n d limited military force that the Allies p e r m i t t e d G e r m a n y to maintain p u r s u a n t to restrictions contained in the T r e a t y of Versailles. With his monocle a n d his rigid features, the 53-year-old von Seeckt was the p r o t o t y p e of the professional G e r m a n officer to 480

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w h o m the Y o u n g T u r k s f i n a l l y h a d turned for g u i d a n c e d u r i n g the war; a n d indeed d u r i n g the final m o n t h s of the war, von Seeckt h a d served as chief of staff of the T u r k i s h a r m y . Von Seeckt now agreed to help E n v e r m a k e the difficult and d a n g e r o u s trip to M o s c o w across chaotic eastern E u r o p e , where nationalist forces i n P o l a n d , L a t v i a , E s t o n i a , L i t h u a n i a , a n d H u n g a r y battled against c o m m u n i s t revolutionaries or R u s s i a n Bolsheviks, as the R u s s i a n Civil War continued to r a g e . E n v e r g a v e von Seeckt a new a p p r e c i a t i o n of the possibilities afforded by the Bolsheviks for striking at the Allies. K a r l R a d e k later wrote that E n v e r "was the first to explain to G e r m a n military m e n that Soviet R u s s i a is a new and g r o w i n g world Power on which they m u s t count if they really want t o f i g h t against the E n t e n t e . " T h e s e ideas, p a s s e d o n b y E n v e r to von Seeckt, b o r e fruit when von Seeckt, several years later, m o v e d toward an alliance between the G e r m a n military machine a n d Soviet Russia. 2

An officer on von Seeckt's staff a r r a n g e d for E n v e r to be flown to M o s c o w in O c t o b e r 1919 in the c o m p a n y airplane of an aircraft m a n u f a c t u r e r . B u t the a r r a n g e m e n t s m i s c a r r i e d ; there was engine trouble, a n d the plane was forced to m a k e an emergency landing in L i t h u a n i a . E n v e r carried false p a p e r s , a n d his true identity was not d i s c o v e r e d ; nonetheless, he was kept prisoner for two m o n t h s in L i t h u a n i a — w h i c h , along with L a t v i a and E s t o n i a , was at war with Soviet R u s s i a — a s a s u s p e c t e d s p y . O n c e released, he returned to Berlin, and started out on a second effort to reach M o s c o w , this time b e i n g arrested a n d i m p r i s o n e d in L a t v i a . A c c o r d i n g to his later account, he was q u e s t i o n e d repeatedly by intelligence officers b u t s u c c e e d e d in p e r s u a d i n g t h e m that his n a m e was A l t m a n a n d that he was "a J e w i s h G e r m a n C o m m u n i s t of no i m p o r t a n c e . " By the s u m m e r of 1920 E n v e r finally reached M o s c o w , almost a year after first leaving Berlin. 3

H i s political o d y s s e y away f r o m a n t i - c o m m u n i s m a n d antiR u s s i a n i s m s e e m e d to have been c o m p l e t e . E n v e r wrote f r o m M o s c o w to von Seeckt on 26 A u g u s t 1920 u r g i n g him to help the S o v i e t s . He claimed that T h e r e is a party here which has real power, a n d T r o t s k y also belongs to this party, which is for an agreement with G e r m a n y . T h i s party w o u l d be ready to recognize the old G e r m a n frontier of 1914. A n d they see only one way out of the present world c h a o s — t h a t is, cooperation with G e r m a n y a n d T u r k e y . I n order to strengthen the position of this party a n d to win the whole Soviet G o v e r n m e n t for the c a u s e , would it not be p o s s i b l e to give unofficial help, a n d if p o s s i b l e sell a r m s ? 4

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At the s a m e time E n v e r r e p o r t e d to von Seeckt that " T h e day before yesterday we c o n c l u d e d a T u r k i s h - R u s s i a n treaty of friends h i p : u n d e r this the R u s s i a n s will s u p p o r t us with gold a n d by all m e a n s . " ( I f the Bolshevik leaders really intended at the time to s u p p o r t Enver's bid to a s s u m e the leadership of the T u r k i s h rebellion, however, they later c h a n g e d their m i n d s when they were m a d e aware of the complexity of the T u r k i s h political situation.) 5

II On 1 S e p t e m b e r 1920 the Bolsheviks convened the "first c o n g r e s s of p e o p l e s of the east" in B a k u , the capital of recently c a p t u r e d M o s l e m A z e r b a i j a n . T h e c o n g r e s s b r o u g h t together 1,891 delegates of various A s i a n p e o p l e s , o f w h o m 235 delegates were T u r k s . T h e c o n g r e s s was s p o n s o r e d b y the T h i r d (or C o m m u n i s t ) International—the C o m i n t e r n , as it was c a l l e d — b u t a significant percentage of the delegates were not c o m m u n i s t s . E n v e r attended the c o n g r e s s as a g u e s t of the C o m i n t e r n , whose representatives at the c o n g r e s s were K a r l R a d e k , G r i g o r i Zinoviev, a n d the H u n g a r i a n Bela K u n . Zinoviev, the leader of the C o m m u n i s t International, acted as president of the c o n g r e s s . A l t h o u g h E n v e r claimed to have been received by L e n i n a n d was s p o n s o r e d at the c o n g r e s s by Zinoviev, he was best known as the partner of imperial G e r m a n y and the killer of the A r m e n i a n s ; there was substantial opposition a m o n g the delegates to his b e i n g allowed to p a r t i c i p a t e . A c o m p r o m i s e was reached a c c o r d i n g to which a statement by E n v e r was read to the c o n g r e s s rather than delivered in p e r s o n ; even so it was p u n c t u a t e d by boos a n d p r o t e s t s . In his statement E n v e r claimed to represent a "union of the revolutionary organizations o f M o r o c c o , Algiers, T u n i s , T r i p o l i , E g y p t , A r a b i a , a n d H i n d u s t a n . " M o r e to the point, he a s p i r e d to r e s u m e the leadership o f T u r k e y ; b u t T u r k i s h delegates who s u p p o r t e d K e m a l m a d e it plain to the S o v i e t s that M o s c o w would antagonize them if it backed E n v e r . 6

A l t h o u g h the invitation to the c o n g r e s s had been p h r a s e d in the c o m m u n i s t l a n g u a g e of world revolution, Zinoviev, once at the cong r e s s , s e e m e d to be calling on the a s s e m b l e d delegates for aid in a national s t r u g g l e between R u s s i a a n d Britain. In his o p e n i n g a d d r e s s he cried out " B r o t h e r s , we s u m m o n you to a holy war, in the first place against E n g l i s h i m p e r i a l i s m ! " S i n c e m a n y of those who were called u p o n to join in the c r u s a d e were n o n - c o m m u n i s t or even antic o m m u n i s t , the C o m i n t e r n felt obliged to defend itself against the accusation that it was cynically u s i n g them as instruments of Soviet foreign policy. K a r l R a d e k told the c o n g r e s s that " T h e eastern policy 7

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of the S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t is thus no d i p l o m a t i c m a n o e u v r e , no p u s h i n g forward of the p e o p l e s of the east into the firing-line in order, by b e t r a y i n g t h e m , to win a d v a n t a g e s for the S o v i e t republic . . . We are b o u n d to you by a c o m m o n destiny . . . " E n v e r ' s presence as the C o m i n t e r n ' s g u e s t belied this; that, at least, is what was said in E u r o p e a n socialist circles within the next few weeks. T h e C o m i n t e r n , a c c o r d i n g to a former colleague of L e n i n ' s , had s u c c u m b e d to a t e m p t a t i o n "to r e g a r d the p e o p l e s of the east as pieces on the c h e s s b o a r d of the d i p l o m a t i c war with the E n t e n t e . " A Social D e m o c r a t a r g u e d that at B a k u the B o l s h e v i k s had given up socialism in favor of power p o l i t i c s . 8

9

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A m o n t h after the B a k u c o n g r e s s , E n v e r returned to Berlin. He b e g a n to p u r c h a s e a r m s — p e r h a p s on his own behalf, for he h o p e d to return to Anatolia to p u s h K e m a l aside a n d a s s u m e c o m m a n d of the forces resisting the Allies. He still retained s u p p o r t a m o n g former C . U . P . militants, a n d he also controlled an organization on the T r a n s c a u c a s i a n frontier; his hopes of returning to power within T u r k e y were not entirely unrealistic. T h r o w i n g its s u p p o r t behind E n v e r was an alternative with which M o s c o w c o u l d eventually threaten M u s t a p h a K e m a l , if a n d when it b e c a m e necessary to do s o ; b u t for the m o m e n t the Bolsheviks h a d nothing for E n v e r to do.* As will be seen presently, it w a s to be a year before the S o v i e t s found a mission on which to s e n d h i m — a mission to B u k h a r a in turbulent T u r k e s t a n . Awaiting an a s s i g n m e n t , E n v e r settled in M o s c o w in 1921 as a guest of the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t . A p i c t u r e s q u e figure in the streets of the R u s s i a n capital, he attracted attention by w e a r i n g an e n o r m o u s tarboosh that offset his tiny s t a t u r e . He b e c a m e the social lion of M o s c o w , a c c o r d i n g to the A m e r i c a n writer L o u i s e B r y a n t , who lived next door to h i m for half a year a n d saw h i m every d a y . S h e wrote

* However, his colleague Djemal Pasha proved to be of immediate use. In 1920, at the suggestion (or at any rate with the encouragement) of Moscow, Djemal went to Afghanistan, where he helped to dispel Afghan suspicions of Russia. Reportedly, in a letter to Lenin at the end of 1920, the Afghan monarch remarked that "His Highness Jemal Pasha has told us of all the noble ideas and intentions of the Soviet republic in regard to the liberation of the whole eastern world . . . " " As adviser to the monarch, Amanullah Khan, Djemal helped draft a new constitution and worked on reorganizing the army. Djemal told a Moslem colleague that his purpose in reorganizing and strengthening the Afghan army was to add to the Soviet threat against I n d i a . In addition to his work with the army, the Turkish leader also founded an organization called the Islamic Revolutionary League, devoted to freeing India from British rule. His intrigues with the warlike frontier tribes helped to keep them in a state of anti-British ferment. Over and above these activities, Djemal's mere presence in Kabul, overlooking the troubled Indian Empire from a strategic location about which the British were especially nervous, caused anxiety and concern in Simla and Whitehall. 12

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that he "certainly has c h a r m , in spite of his very o b v i o u s o p p o r t u n i s m , . . . cruelty . . . a n d lack of c o n s c i e n c e . " S h e s e n s e d that, despite all the lionizing, he was b o r e d . Enver's star was on the wane in M o s c o w , b e c a u s e that of his r i v a l — M u s t a p h a K e m a l — w a s o n the rise. T h e working a r r a n g e ment that the K r e m l i n arrived a t with M u s t a p h a K e m a l ' s T u r k i s h Nationalist g o v e r n m e n t allowed Soviet R u s s i a to c r u s h G e o r g i a , A r m e n i a , a n d A z e r b a i j a n . K e m a l ' s overt a n t i - c o m m u n i s m — o n 2 8 J a n u a r y 1921 K e m a l i s t s killed seventeen T u r k i s h c o m m u n i s t leaders by d r o w n i n g t h e m in the Black S e a — w a s not allowed by L e n i n or Stalin to stand in the way of a g r e e m e n t . In entering into a series of interlocking p a c t s with the a n t i - c o m m u n i s t nationalist M o s l e m leaders o f T u r k e y , Persia, a n d A f g h a n i s t a n , M o s c o w s e e m e d to be traveling along the path m a r k e d out at the B a k u c o n g r e s s : a b a n d o n i n g revolutionary g o a l s in favor of p u r s u i n g traditional R u s s i a n objectives i n the G r e a t G a m e . T h e S o v i e t s e n c o u r a g e d revolutionary K e m a l i s t T u r k e y to enter into a pact of her own, in M o s c o w , with traditionalist A f g h a n i s t a n , the p u r p o s e of which (as indicated in Article T w o ) was to join h a n d s in o p p o s i n g a g g r e s s i o n and exploitation by the British E m p i r e . 13

1 4

In the s u m m e r of 1921 M u s t a p h a K e m a l won the first in a series of s t u n n i n g s u c c e s s e s against the British-backed G r e e k a r m y . T h e tide was r u n n i n g with him a n d , in the a u t u m n , the S o v i e t s m o v e d further toward alliance with h i m . E n v e r saw himself losing out to Kemal. In the s u m m e r of 1921, the S o v i e t s , at Enver's r e q u e s t , provided him with transportation to the C a u c a s u s . E n v e r a s s u r e d the S o v i e t F o r e i g n Minister that he was not g o i n g there to work against K e m a l , but broke his w o r d . On arrival in T r a n s c a u c a s i a , he established himself in B a t u m , in G e o r g i a , on the T u r k i s h frontier. T h e r e he held a c o n g r e s s of s u p p o r t e r s , a n d tried to cross into T u r k e y ; b u t the Soviet authorities forcibly detained him. Enver's continued presence on the T u r k i s h frontier b e c a m e an e m b a r r a s s m e n t to the Soviet leaders, who sent E n v e r a w a y ; either at their request or his, he was entrusted with a mission to Central A s i a . In Central A s i a , M o s c o w was a t t e m p t i n g to c o m p l e t e its rec o n q u e s t of the native T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g M o s l e m p o p u l a t i o n s , a n d asked E n v e r to help. Enver's mission was contrary to everything for which he had stood in politics: his goal had been to liberate the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g peoples f r o m R u s s i a n rule. T h e mission also ran contrary to what the Bolsheviks had p r e a c h e d before c o m i n g to power: they h a d claimed that they were in favor of allowing the n o n - R u s s i a n p e o p l e s of the R u s s i a n E m p i r e freely to go their own way. C o m i n g after the R u s s i a n

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reconquest of G e o r g i a , A r m e n i a , a n d A z e r b a i j a n , and after the u n veiling of M o s c o w ' s alliance with a n t i - c o m m u n i s t leaders of I s l a m , the Soviet instructions to E n v e r raised the question of whether the Bolsheviks h a d s u b o r d i n a t e d , p o s t p o n e d , or even a b a n d o n e d altogether the revolutionary ideals they h a d once e s p o u s e d . E n v e r u n d o u b t e d l y had his own views a b o u t this, b u t he hid t h e m from his Bolshevik hosts as he set out for B u k h a r a in Central A s i a .

Ill By the s u m m e r of 1 9 2 0 — a year before E n v e r was sent t h e r e — B u k h a r a w a s the last r e m a i n i n g bastion of T u r k i c i n d e p e n d e n c e in Central A s i a . O c c u p y i n g a b o u t 8 5 , 0 0 0 s q u a r e miles on the right b a n k of the O x u s river, in the southeast corner of R u s s i a n T u r k e s t a n , back against the m o u n t a i n o u s southern and eastern frontiers that r u n with A f g h a n i s t a n a n d C h i n a , its p o p u l a t i o n of roughly two a n d a half to three million raised it a b o v e the level of its sparsely p o p u l a t e d T u r k i s h n e i g h b o r s . T h e s t r u c t u r e of its R u s s i a n protectorate h a d melted away d u r i n g the revolutions of 1917, a n d its emir, A b d u l S a i d M i r Alim K h a n , last of the M a n g i t line, reasserted the i n d e p e n d e n c e of B u k h a r a a n d the autocratic p o w e r s that h a d been exercised by his ancestors. T h e S o v i e t s heard r u m o r s of British complicity in the E m i r ' s defiance of their authority; a n d in fact British I n d i a did s e n d a h u n d r e d camel loads of s u p p l i e s to aid the e m i r a t e . Bolshevik R u s s i a attacked B u k h a r a in 1918, but the E m i r ' s tiny a r m y , officially n u m b e r e d at 11,000 m e n , was able to win the brief war. At the t i m e of the Bolshevik attack, B u k h a r a was still wealthy and well s u p p l i e d . T h e emirate had always been known for the fertility of its o a s e s , a n d its capital city—also called Bukhara—-remained the m o s t important t r a d i n g town in Central A s i a . In the city's seven-mile h o n e y c o m b of covered b a z a a r s , b u s i n e s s ( a c c o r d i n g to at least one traveler's r e p o r t ) went on as u s u a l . T h e r e was a lively traffic in the p r o d u c t s of c r a f t s m e n , in p r e c i o u s metals, jewels, r u g s , leather, silks, currencies, a n d all m a n n e r of food-stuffs. A center of the c o m m e r c e in rare m a n u s c r i p t s a n d libraries in m a n y oriental l a n g u a g e s , B u k h a r a continued to be the principal b o o k market in Central A s i a . 1 5

B u t after his victory over the Bolsheviks in 1918, the E m i r b r o u g h t this commercial p r o s p e r i t y to an end by cutting off all t r a d e with R u s s i a . At the s a m e time he allowed irrigation projects to be discontinued. By the s u m m e r of 1920 B u k h a r a ' s economic situation was grave a n d the country was u n a b l e to feed i t s e l f . P o p u l a r discontent and social strife e r u p t e d as a Y o u n g B u k h a r a m o v e m e n t (which was o p p o s e d to S o v i e t intervention) a n d a smaller C o m m u n i s t Party 16

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(which welcomed it) p r o t e s t e d against the unenlightened policies a n d medieval w a y s of the ruler. T h e E m i r , in s o m e ways, had indeed b r o u g h t b a c k the M i d d l e A g e s . T h e twelfth-century K a l y a n M i n a r e t , or T o w e r of D e a t h , f r o m the top of which c o n d e m n e d criminals were thrown, was back in u s e . F r o m his p a l a c e s , a m o n g his b o y a n d girl h a r e m s , the E m i r ruled in as arbitrary a way as h a d any of his ancestors. T a k i n g a d v a n t a g e o f the E m i r ' s u n p o p u l a r i t y , the R e d A r m y intervened. In the s u m m e r of 1920 the R e d A r m y attacked again, a n d R u s s i a n t r o o p s u n d e r the c o m m a n d o f Mikhail F r u n z e b o m b a r d e d B u k h a r a . As the Y o u n g B u k h a r a n s launched an u p r i s i n g in the city, the R e d A r m y , with its airplanes a n d a r m o r e d vehicles, m o v e d forward on 2 S e p t e m b e r , b r i n g i n g B u k h a r a ' s medieval r e g i m e to an e n d ; the library, containing possibly the greatest collection of M o s l e m m a n u s c r i p t s in the world, went up in flames. T h e E m i r , alerted by a telephone call to his p a l a c e , fled, along with his h a r e m s a n d three w a g o n - l o a d s of g o l d a n d p r e c i o u s stones f r o m his t r e a s u r y . A story was told later that, at points along the way, he left one or another of his favorite d a n c i n g b o y s , in the hopes of diverting a n d thus slowing his p u r s u e r s . H i s initial s t o p p i n g point was the hill country of the east. F r o m there he s o u g h t , and f o u n d , s a n c t u a r y a c r o s s the frontier in A f g h a n i s t a n . After c a p t u r i n g the city of B u k h a r a , S o v i e t R u s s i a recognized the absolute i n d e p e n d e n c e of a B u k h a r a n People's R e p u b l i c ; b u t the recognition was in f o r m only. F r u n z e ' s t r o o p s r e m a i n e d , a n d i m p o s e d requisitions on the country. Soviet interference in B u k h a r a ' s affairs pointed toward its eventual incorporation into Soviet R u s s i a . L e a d e r s of the Y o u n g B u k h a r a m o v e m e n t resisted the trend toward R u s s i a n control a n d a t t e m p t e d to assert their i n d e p e n d e n c e . In the hills of eastern B u k h a r a , B a s m a c h i g r o u p s loyal to the E m i r b e g a n to h a r a s s the R u s s i a n c o n q u e r o r s . As yet no real links had been forged between the various B a s m a c h i g r o u p s ; nonetheless the B a s m a c h i s p o s e d a challenge to Soviet rule that, even by the e n d of 1921, the R e d A r m y h a d been u n a b l e t o c r u s h .

IV E n v e r P a s h a reached B u k h a r a on 8 N o v e m b e r 1921, entrusted by the R u s s i a n s with a role in the pacification of T u r k e s t a n . As he a p p r o a c h e d the city t h r o u g h g a r d e n s of fruit trees, melons, g r a p e v i n e s , roses, p o p p i e s , a n d t o b a c c o plants, he entered the E d e n of his p a n - T u r k i s h ideology: the historic h o m e l a n d of the T u r k i s h peoples. S u r r o u n d e d by eight miles of high crenellated stone walls, with 11 g a t e s a n d 181 watch-towers, centuries-old B u k h a r a was an architectural e m b o d i m e n t of the M o s l e m past in which he gloried.

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O n c e the holiest city of Central A s i a , its 360 m o s q u e s reflected his f a i t h — a faith s h a r e d by its inhabitants, whose m e n lived their religion a n d whose w o m e n wore the veil. T h e m e n of B u k h a r a wore t u r b a n s a n d the traditional striped r o b e s called khalats, while E n v e r arrived with his E u r o p e a n - c u t military tunic; b u t between him a n d them there was a b o n d of b r o t h e r h o o d . E n v e r ' s affinities extended even to the new g o v e r n m e n t of B u k h a r a . T h e Y o u n g B u k h a r a Party was not dissimilar t o the Y o u n g T u r k s w h o m E n v e r had led in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e ; a n d reformist leaders like Zeki Velidi T o g a n of Bashkiria had c o n g r e g a t e d there. When E n v e r left the city, only three d a y s after entering it, he took with him the key figures in the g o v e r n m e n t : its C h a i r m a n , a n d its C o m m i s s a r s of War a n d Interior. T h e story he told the R u s s i a n s w a s that they were going hunting. In fact they m a d e their way to the hill country of eastern B u k h a r a , where E n v e r m a d e contact with p a r t i s a n s of the E m i r . T h e r e , a p p o i n t e d commander-in-chief by the E m i r , he a s s u m e d the leadership of the B a s m a c h i war for i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m Russia. With the s u p p o r t b o t h of the E m i r a n d of the Y o u n g B u k h a r a leaders, he was in a position to b r i n g all factions together. H i s envoys sought out B a s m a c h i b a n d s t h r o u g h o u t T u r k e s t a n to unify them under his banner. H i s p r o c l a i m e d goal was the creation of an independent M o s l e m state in Central A s i a . As always he stressed the unity of the M o s l e m peoples. H i s s t r o n g Islamic m e s s a g e won him the s u p p o r t of the m u l l a h s , who rallied strongly to his c a u s e , a n d of his i m p o r t a n t neighbor, the M o s l e m E m i r of A f g h a n i s t a n . However E n v e r ' s personal weaknesses reasserted themselves. H e was a vain, strutting m a n who loved u n i f o r m s , m e d a l s , a n d titles. F o r use in s t a m p i n g official d o c u m e n t s , he ordered a golden seal that described him as " C o m m a n d e r - i n - C h i e f of all the A r m i e s of I s l a m , S o n - i n - L a w of the Caliph and Representative of the P r o p h e t . " S o o n he was calling himself E m i r of T u r k e s t a n , a practice not conducive to g o o d relations with the E m i r whose c a u s e he s e r v e d . At s o m e point in the first half of 1922, the E m i r of B u k h a r a broke off relations with him, d e p r i v i n g him of t r o o p s a n d m u c h - n e e d e d financial s u p p o r t . T h e E m i r of Afghanistan also failed to m a r c h to his aid. 17

Enver's revolt scored s o m e initial s u c c e s s e s . He launched a d a r i n g raid on the city of B u k h a r a which unnerved his o p p o n e n t s . B u t the extent of his successes remains a s u b j e c t of d i s p u t e . A c c o r d i n g to s o m e accounts, he c a m e to control m o s t of the territory of B u k h a r a . A c c o r d i n g to others, E n v e r was merely one of a n u m b e r of chiefs, who led a b a n d of no m o r e than 3,000 followers (out of an estimated 16,000 B a s m a c h i s r o a m i n g the c o u n t r y ) . What is clear is that, however effective or ineffective, his activities were a c a u s e of d e e p concern to the K r e m l i n . 1 8

In the late s p r i n g of 1922, E n v e r wrote to the g o v e r n m e n t of

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S o v i e t R u s s i a asking it to withdraw R u s s i a n t r o o p s a n d to recognize the i n d e p e n d e n c e of his M o s l e m state in T u r k e s t a n . In return he offered peace a n d friendship. M o s c o w refused his offer. T h e R e d A r m y , assisted by the secret police, launched a c a m p a i g n of pacification in the s u m m e r of 1922. In this they were a i d e d by Enver's w e a k n e s s e s . As a general he continued to be G o d ' s gift to the other side. As a politician, he was equally m a l a d r o i t : he alienated the other B a s m a c h i leaders, m a n y of w h o m turned against h i m . By m i d s u m m e r , the R u s s i a n s h a d r e d u c e d his following to a tiny b a n d of fugitives. R u s s i a n agents a n d patrols s e a r c h e d the narrow m o u n t a i n ravines for traces of him, a n d eventually tracked him d o w n to his lair in the hills, where R e d A r m y t r o o p s quietly s u r r o u n d e d his forces. Before dawn on 4 A u g u s t 1922, the Soviet soldiers attacked. E n v e r ' s men were cut d o w n . T h e r e are several accounts of how E n v e r d i e d . A c c o r d i n g to the m o s t p e r s u a s i v e of t h e m , when the R u s s i a n s attacked he g r i p p e d his pocket K o r a n a n d , a s always, c h a r g e d straight a h e a d . L a t e r his decapitated b o d y was found on the field of battle. H i s K o r a n was taken from his lifeless fingers a n d was filed in the archives of the Soviet secret police. 1 9

V Soviet R u s s i a ' s liquidation of the last of the T u r k i s h i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s in Central A s i a c o m p l e t e d the p r o c e s s by which the Bolshevik authorities revealed that they would not keep their p r o m i s e to allow n o n - R u s s i a n peoples to secede from R u s s i a n rule. It was now evident that they intended to retain the e m p i r e a n d the frontiers achieved by the c z a r s . S i r Percy C o x , who h a d recently returned to L o n d o n f r o m the M i d d l e E a s t , told the C a b i n e t in the s u m m e r of 1920 that the Bolsheviks would hold to the old R u s s i a n imperial f r o n t i e r — b u t that they were not a n x i o u s to send their a r m i e s across it in search of new conquests. Winston Churchill was c o n s p i c u o u s a m o n g those in L o n d o n who believed that C o x was w r o n g ; but events at the time shed little light on the matter one way or the other. Certainly the K r e m l i n was active in s u b v e r t i n g the British E m p i r e in the M i d d l e E a s t , b u t there is as little a g r e e m e n t today as there was d u r i n g the L l o y d G e o r g e administration as to the long-run intentions with which the K r e m l i n did s o . 20

E n v e r Pasha's postwar a d v e n t u r e s d i d , however, s h e d light on a n u m b e r of other issues that British officials had raised d u r i n g a n d just after the F i r s t World War a b o u t the opposition they faced in the

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M i d d l e E a s t . British officials h a d conceived of E n v e r as the sinister and potent figure who s u s t a i n e d M u s t a p h a K e m a l in his opposition to the Allies; b u t events h a d s h o w n that E n v e r a n d K e m a l were deadly rivals, a n d that it was K e m a l — n o t E n v e r — w h o c o m m a n d e d the m o r e powerful following within T u r k e y , a n d who therefore could obtain a r m s from Soviet R u s s i a . British officials had also pictured E n v e r as a creature of the G e r m a n military m a c h i n e , b u t , while he could call on personal friends like von Seeckt for favors, in his R u s s i a n years he acted entirely on his o w n ; a n d as E n v e r fought his last c a m p a i g n in 1922, von Seeckt's new G e r m a n a r m y was secretly working with the Bolsheviks, not with E n v e r . F o r y e a r s E n v e r h a d threatened Britain a n d R u s s i a with a p a n T u r k u p r i s i n g , b u t when he finally i s s u e d his call to revolt there was no a p p r e c i a b l e r e s p o n s e to it. E v e n within the guerrilla b a n d s that he led, the M o s l e m religion rather than feelings of T u r k i s h n e s s p r o v i d e d the unifying b o n d . P a n - I s l a m , a b o u t which British officials continued to write with a l a r m , w a s also revealed as an e m p t y s l o g a n by the B u k h a r a n c a m p a i g n : the clannish p e o p l e s of the M i d d l e E a s t were not given to wider loyalties, and not one M o s l e m l a n d — n o t even friendly A f g h a n i s t a n — m a r c h e d to E n v e r ' s aid. It was true that in various p a r t s of T u r k e s t a n , M o s l e m natives reacted against R u s s i a n settlers, even as in Palestine M o s l e m s reacted against J e w i s h settlers, but each g r o u p of M o s l e m s r e s p o n d e d locally and only for itself: t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e E a s t , M o s l e m s were acting alike rather than acting together. When E n v e r j o u r n e y e d to M o s c o w , the British view was that he and his new R u s s i a n associates were elements of a l o n g - s t a n d i n g political c o m b i n a t i o n , a n d that they w o u l d work toward the s a m e political g o a l s . In fact their g o a l s were far a p a r t . E n v e r a n d the Bolsheviks tried to use each other, b u t neither s u c c e e d e d . T h e Bolsheviks p r o v e d a d e p t at swiftly picking up anyone they thought might do t h e m good—-and at quickly d i s c a r d i n g t h e m when their usefulness was at an e n d . L o n d o n continually m i s u n d e r s t o o d , and interpreted as long-term c o m b i n a t i o n s , these e m p h e m e r a l tactical alliances into which the K r e m l i n entered with s u c h cynical ease. It might have a m u s e d E n v e r , in the last minutes before his head was cut off by the R u s s i a n s , to know that British Intelligence h a d m a r k e d him d o w n as M o s c o w ' s m a n . Enver's a d v e n t u r e s — h a d British Intelligence known the full story of them at the t i m e — w o u l d have s h o w n the British that they were mistaken in their several views of who was in charge of Bolshevik R u s s i a . A prevalent British view was that the Bolsheviks were run from Berlin by the G e r m a n g e n e r a l s ; but when E n v e r arrived in Berlin in 1919 he found that the G e r m a n army was out of touch with R u s s i a a n d took no interest in the new rulers of the K r e m l i n . It was

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E n v e r who s u g g e s t e d that the G e r m a n a r m y m i g h t profit f r o m e s t a b lishing a relationship with the Bolshevik r e g i m e , not vice v e r s a ; a n d it w a s a s u g g e s t i o n that von Seeckt d i d not begin to i m p l e m e n t until 1921. I n d e e d what E n v e r found was that L e n i n a n d his colleagues were m e n who set their own a g e n d a : that, a b o v e all, is where British Intelligence officers were w r o n g a b o u t t h e m . T h e m e n in the K r e m l i n were e n g a g e d in giving o r d e r s , not in taking t h e m . T h e y were not a r m s of s o m e b o d y else's c o n s p i r a c i e s ; when it c a m e to conspiracies, they wove their own. Winston Churchill, who had correctly o b s e r v e d as m u c h , then spoiled his analysis by g o i n g on to claim that the S o v i e t leaders were neither R u s s i a n nor p r o - R u s s i a n . A l o n g with so m a n y other British fantasies a b o u t the forces at work against t h e m in the M i d d l e E a s t , it was a theory that o u g h t to have died with E n v e r P a s h a at B u k h a r a .

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WINSTON C H U R C H I L L T A K E S CHARGE i R u s s i a , then, troubled after the war by the a p p e a r a n c e of independence m o v e m e n t s in M o s l e m A s i a on her southern frontier, c r u s h e d t h e m , a n d while d o i n g so defined herself by charting her future relationship with the n o n - R u s s i a n peoples of what had once been the e m p i r e of the c z a r s . So far as she was able, she w o u l d b r i n g them u n d e r the rule of the R u s s i a n s t a t e — a policy formally a d o p t e d on 30 D e c e m b e r 1922, when the F i r s t C o n g r e s s of S o v i e t s of the U n i o n of Soviet Socialist R e p u b l i c s a p p r o v e d the formation of the Soviet Union. F r a n c e , too, was troubled after the war by the a p p e a r a n c e of i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s in the a r e a s of the M o s l e m M i d d l e E a s t she s o u g h t to control, a n d c r u s h e d t h e m , as seen earlier, in 1920. C l e m e n c e a u had wanted to preserve F r a n c e ' s position as a power in E u r o p e , a n d had always pictured the pursuit of overseas e m p i r e as a d a n g e r o u s distraction; but his s u c c e s s o r s , by invading S y r i a , defined F r a n c e ' s role in postwar world politics in other, m o r e a m b i t i o u s a n d less realistic, t e r m s . F r a n c e ' s occupation of S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n was formally validated by a L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e on 24 J u l y 1922. At the outset of the F i r s t World War, the three Allies had agreed to partition the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t between t h e m ; b u t , in the postwar years, having lost unity of p u r p o s e , each went its own way in overc o m i n g p o s t w a r d i s t u r b a n c e s in M o s l e m A s i a , a n d each defined its own vision of its political destiny in d o i n g so. E a c h followed its own road to 1922—for Britain's position in her sphere in the M i d d l e E a s t , like R u s s i a ' s a n d F r a n c e ' s , was formally e m b o d i e d in d o c u m e n t s p r o m u l g a t e d in that year. Of the three Allies, Britain faced the m o s t w i d e s p r e a d challenges across the face of the M i d d l e E a s t after the war. S h e met the challenges while in the g r i p of an economic crisis a n d at a t i m e of p r o f o u n d social a n d political c h a n g e at h o m e . M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy on the r o a d to 1922 was to severely test Britain's m o s t colorful a n d 493

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creative politicians, L l o y d G e o r g e a n d C h u r c h i l l . F o r , as a result the postwar troubles recounted earlier, everywhere f r o m E g y p t A f g h a n i s t a n , Britain's M i d d l e E a s t policy was in t a t t e r s — j u s t Winston Churchill had said all along that it w o u l d b e — i n the face native resistance, c o m m u n a l strife, a n d local d i s o r d e r s .

of to as of

II E v e r since the end of the war, C h u r c h i l l — i n s i d e the g o v e r n m e n t — had been the m o s t severe critic of the P r i m e Minister's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy, warning that p e a c e t i m e Britain d i d not have the t r o o p s and that Parliament would refuse to s p e n d the mo n e y to coerce the M i d d l e E a s t . H e a r g u e d that Britain s h o u l d therefore settle for t e r m s that the T u r k s were willing to accept. On 25 October 1919 he presciently e x p r e s s e d concern that G r e e c e m i g h t ruin herself in her S m y r n a venture, a n d that Britain's alliance with F r a n c e m i g h t be injured by a F r e n c h invasion of S y r i a with h o r d e s of Algerian t r o o p s . H e worried a b o u t the Italians "disturbing the T u r k i s h World" a n d a b o u t "the J e w s , w h o m we are p l e d g e d to introduce into Palestine and who take it for g r a n t e d that the local population will be cleared out to suit their convenience." A r g u i n g that Allied policy in the M i d d l e E a s t o u g h t to be completely reversed, he u r g e d that the O t t o m a n E m p i r e be restored to its prewar frontiers a n d s u g g e s t e d that the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s renounce their claims to S y r i a , Palestine, and other s u c h territories. " I n s t e a d of dividing up the E m p i r e into s e p a r a t e territorial s p h e r e s of exploitation," he a r g u e d , "we s h o u l d c o m b i n e to preserve the integrity of the T u r k i s h E m p i r e as it existed before the war b u t s h o u l d s u b j e c t that E m p i r e to a strict form of international control . . . " ' K e e n l y aware of the p u r p o s e s served by Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n strategy d u r i n g the nineteenth century, Churchill maintained that a similar strategy should b e a d o p t e d b y the L l o y d G e o r g e g o v e r n m e n t . "We o u g h t to c o m e to t e r m s with M u s t a p h a K e m a l a n d arrive at a g o o d peace with T u r k e y , " he a r g u e d , in a m e m o r a n d u m to the C a b i n e t on 23 N o v e m b e r 1920, so as to s t o p e s t r a n g i n g "powerful, d u r a b l e a n d necessary T u r k i s h and M o h a m m e d a n forces. W e s h o u l d thus re-create that T u r k i s h barrier to R u s s i a n a m b i t i o n s which has always been of the u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e to u s . " 2

In a letter to the P r i m e Minister written shortly thereafter, Churchill underlined his d e e p resentment at being obliged as War Minister to ask Parliament for vast s u m s to s u b d u e the M i d d l e E a s t when it was only L l o y d G e o r g e ' s "vendetta against the T u r k s " that m a d e the e x p e n d i t u r e necessary. He wrote that "We s e e m to be b e c o m i n g the m o s t Anti T u r k & the m o s t pro-Bolshevik power in the

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w o r l d : whereas in my j u d g e m e n t we o u g h t to be the exact o p p o s i t e . " Pointing out that it was only b e c a u s e of the s u p p o r t of the C o n s e r v a tive Party that the g o v e r n m e n t r e m a i n e d in office, he r e m i n d e d the P r i m e Minister that the C o n s e r v a t i v e s were associated with the traditional nineteenth-century policy of s u p p o r t i n g T u r k e y against Russia. All yr great s u c c e s s & overwhelming personal power have c o m e from a junction between yr L i b e r a l followers & the Conservative party . . . B u t surely a t this t i m e — w h e n w e Coalition L i b e r a l s are vy weak in the C o n s t i t u e n c i e s — i t is a d d i n g to our difficulties to p u r s u e policies t o w a r d s the T u r k s & the Bolsheviks both of wh are fundamentally o p p o s e d to C o n s e r v a t i s m [sic] instincts & traditions. 3

M o v i n g f r o m d o m e s t i c to foreign policy, Churchill wrote his m o s t broadly reasoned criticism of British M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy s o m e twelve d a y s later in a m e m o r a n d u m to the C a b i n e t maintaining that " T h e unfortunate c o u r s e of affairs has led to our being simultaneously out of s y m p a t h y with all the four P o w e r s exercising local influence" in the M i d d l e E a s t : R u s s i a n s , G r e e k s , T u r k s , and A r a b s . A s u c c e s s ful policy w o u l d consist rather in "dividing up the local Powers so that if we have s o m e o p p o n e n t s we have also at any rate s o m e friends. T h i s is what we have always done in the whole of our past history. When R u s s i a was our e n e m y the T u r k was our friend: when T u r k e y was o u r e n e m y R u s s i a was o u r f r i e n d . " A c c o r d i n g t o Churchill's analysis, L e n i n ' s R u s s i a w o u l d not, and K i n g Constantine's G r e e c e could not, help Britain to achieve her g o a l s ; the only practicable c o u r s e , he a r g u e d , was to ally with T u r k s a n d Arabs. 4

S i r H e n r y Wilson, Chief of the Imperial G e n e r a l Staff, noted approvingly in his diary that Churchill h a d "written a g o o d p a p e r for the C a b i n e t s h o w i n g that we are now hated by the Bolsheviks, T u r k s , G r e e k s , & A r a b s & this must be b a d policy & that we ought to make friends with T u r k s & A r a b s & enemies with Bolsheviks & ignore G r e e k s . T h i s has been my view all a l o n g . " On an administrative level, Churchill c h a r g e d (as had S i r M a r k S y k e s in the early d a y s of the world war) that Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy was rendered incoherent by the n u m b e r of g o v e r n m e n t d e p a r t m e n t s r u n n i n g their s e p a r a t e territories and o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s i m p e d e d p r o g r e s s toward c u r b i n g costs, he repeatedly told the Cabinet F i n a n c e C o m m i t t e e . On 31 D e c e m b e r 1920, at Churchill's s u g g e s t i o n , the C a b i n e t decided to set up a special M i d d l e E a s t D e p a r t m e n t within the Colonial Office to be in charge of the t r o u b l e d m a n d a t e d territories, Palestine (including T r a n s j o r d a n ) , a n d I r a q . 5

L o r d Milner, the Colonial S e c r e t a r y , in failing health and spirits,

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was unwilling to a s s u m e s u c h heavy new responsibilities a n d p r o m p t l y resigned f r o m the g o v e r n m e n t . O n 1 J a n u a r y 1 9 2 1 , L l o y d G e o r g e offered the Colonial M i n i s t r y to Churchill who, after s o m e hesitation, a g r e e d to accept it. It was a r r a n g e d that Milner s h o u l d hand over the ministry on 7 F e b r u a r y ; b u t Churchill immediately b e g a n involving himself in M i d d l e E a s t d e p a r t m e n t a l a r r a n g e m e n t s and affairs. Churchill at once b e g a n trying to e x p a n d the p o w e r s of his new ministry, seeking military as well as full civil p o w e r s a n d a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g all of A r a b i a within the a m b i t of his d e p a r t m e n t . He also e x p r e s s e d d e c i d e d views a b o u t the future o f E g y p t . T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , L o r d C u r z o n , protested repeatedly at Churchill's encroachm e n t s on his perogatives. C u r z o n c o m p l a i n e d that "Winston . . . wants to g r a b everything in his new D e p t & to be a sort of Asiatic F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y . " A War Office official claimed that Churchill's idea was to set up "a sort of War Office of his o w n . " 6

7

T h e P r i m e Minister, at Churchill's s u g g e s t i o n , a p p o i n t e d a special interdepartmental c o m m i t t e e u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p of Sir J a m e s M a s t e r s o n S m i t h (a career official who h a d served u n d e r Churchill) to c o n s i d e r — a n d , Churchill h o p e d , to e x p a n d — t h e p o w e r s of the Colonial Office's new M i d d l e E a s t D e p a r t m e n t . Churchill, who no longer s p o k e of restoring the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , a p p r o a c h e d his new responsibilities with an open m i n d and with an evident desire to obtain g u i d a n c e from the government's ablest officials in a p r o g r a m a i m e d at cutting costs while trying to keep commitments.

Ill By 1921 the G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a , u n d e r the influence of G e r t r u d e Bell in B a g h d a d , had c o m e over to the views of C a i r o . I n d i a , like C a i r o , now believed in protectorate rather than direct g o v e r n m e n t , a n d s u p p o r t e d the sons of K i n g H u s s e i n as Britain's c a n d i d a t e s for A r a b l e a d e r s h i p . T h i s b r o u g h t an end to the long civil war within British ranks and Churchill's luck was that Britain's M i d d l e E a s t old h a n d s now s p o k e with one voice; unlike previous ministers, he would not be c a u g h t in an official crossfire. Churchill drew on the resources of other ministries to recruit an experienced a n d well-balanced staff to deal with his new M i d d l e E a s t e r n responsibilities. In the interim, while his staff was being a s s e m b l e d , Churchill relied u p o n the information, a d v i c e , a n d p r o fessional g u i d a n c e of S i r A r t h u r Hirtzel, Assistant U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e for I n d i a , a career official who had served in the India Office since 1894. Hirtzel declined Churchill's offer to head the new M i d d l e E a s t D e p a r t m e n t ; in his place he sent another career official, J o h n

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Evelyn S h u c k b u r g h , who had w o r k e d u n d e r h i m a n d who had s e r v e d in the I n d i a Office since 1900. Hirtzel wrote to Churchill that S h u c k b u r g h was "really first-rate—level h e a d e d , always cool, very accurate & u n s p a r i n g of himself: his only fault p e r h a p s a tendency to excessive c a u t i o n . " Churchill chose H u b e r t Winthrop Y o u n g of the F o r e i g n Office to b e S h u c k b u r g h ' s assistant. A n a r m y m a j o r d u r i n g the war, Y o u n g had been in c h a r g e of transport and s u p p l i e s for Feisal's A r a b forces. H i s a p p o i n t m e n t , a n d S h u c k b u r g h ' s , were e n d o r s e d i n w a r m t e r m s b y the M a s t e r s o n S m i t h c o m m i t t e e . T h e c o m m i t t e e found S h u c k b u r g h to be "the best m a n " for the j o b and Y o u n g ' s services to b e "essential." T h e c o m m i t t e e e x p r e s s e d s t r o n g reservations, however, a b o u t another a p p o i n t m e n t Churchill p r o p o s e d t o m a k e : T . E . L a w r e n c e , who was t o b e a n adviser o n A r a b affairs. T h e c o m m i t t e e cautioned Churchill that L a w r e n c e was "not the kind of m a n to fit easily into any official m a c h i n e . " 8

9

10

L a w r e n c e indeed had earned a reputation for insubordination and for g o i n g over the h e a d s of his official s u p e r i o r s to higher authorities. He was also the leading public critic of British policy t o w a r d the A r a b s of M e s o p o t a m i a — a policy of which Churchill was now in c h a r g e . In the s u m m e r of 1920 L a w r e n c e had written of I r a q in the Sunday Times that O u r g o v e r n m e n t i s worse than the old T u r k i s h s y s t e m . T h e y kept fourteen t h o u s a n d local c o n s c r i p t s e m b o d i e d , and killed a yearly average of two h u n d r e d A r a b s in maintaining p e a c e . We keep ninety t h o u s a n d m e n , with aeroplanes, a r m o u r e d cars, g u n b o a t s a n d a r m o u r e d trains. We have killed a b o u t ten t h o u s a n d A r a b s in this rising this s u m m e r . We cannot hope to maintain s u c h an a v e r a g e : it is a poor country, sparsely peopled . . . 1 1

L a w r e n c e , a one-time junior officer in the A r a b B u r e a u in C a i r o , had by now b e c o m e a celebrity, d u e to the efforts of an A m e r i c a n n a m e d L o w e l l T h o m a s . T h o m a s , a 25-year-old fledgling s h o w m a n from O h i o who until then had knocked a b o u t N o r t h A m e r i c a in search of f a m e , fortune, a n d a d v e n t u r e , had been working at a parttime j o b teaching p u b l i c s p e a k i n g at Princeton when, at the end of 1917, he raised e n o u g h money to go to E n g l a n d a n d then to send himself a n d a c a m e r a m a n to the M i d d l e E a s t war front in search of a salable story with r o m a n c e a n d local color. T h e r e he found L a w r e n c e , wearing A r a b r o b e s , a n d d e c i d e d to m a k e him the hero of a colorful story he was a b o u t to w r i t e — a story a b o u t the A r a b followers of H u s s e i n a n d Feisal a n d the role they had played in the war against T u r k e y . T h e story was to f o r m the basis of a show, in which—sacrificing truth to entertainment v a l u e s — T h o m a s would

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p i c t u r e L a w r e n c e as the inspirer a n d leader of an A r a b revolt that d e s t r o y e d the T u r k i s h E m p i r e . T h o m a s ' s show was a lecture with p h o t o s . It w a s entitled The Last Crusade a n d T h o m a s o p e n e d it at the C e n t u r y T h e a t e r in N e w Y o r k in M a r c h 1919, with the b a c k i n g of the N e w Y o r k Globe. A few weeks later he m o v e d it to the old M a d i s o n S q u a r e G a r d e n , a vast a u d i t o r i u m in which to a c c o m m o d a t e the c r o w d s that T h o m a s h o p e d to attract. An E n g l i s h i m p r e s a r i o then a r r a n g e d to b r i n g the show to L o n d o n , where it played to the largest halls: the Royal O p e r a H o u s e at Co vent G a r d e n a n d the A l b e r t H a l l . It w a s a m a s t e r p i e c e of ballyhoo a n d it set show b u s i n e s s r e c o r d s . It played in L o n d o n for six m o n t h s a n d was seen there by p e r h a p s a million p e o p l e . T h o m a s then took the show on a road tour a r o u n d the w o r l d . I t m a d e y o u n g L o w e l l T h o m a s rich a n d f a m o u s ; a n d i t converted " L a w r e n c e of A r a b i a " into a world hero. L a w r e n c e , t h o u g h e m b a r r a s s e d b y the c r u d e n e s s o f T h o m a s ' s account, gloried in its bright glow. When The Last Crusade played in L o n d o n , L a w r e n c e frequently c a m e up from O x f o r d to see it: T h o m a s ' s wife s p i e d him in the a u d i e n c e on at least five different occasions, c a u s i n g him to "flush c r i m s o n , laugh in confusion, a n d hurry a w a y . " l s

T h e p u b l i c believed T h o m a s ' s a c c o u n t ; s o that when L a w r e n c e b e c a m e an adviser to Winston Churchill, his a p p o i n t m e n t overs h a d o w e d all others. H i s reputation g r e w . He p a s s e d off his fantasies as h i s t o r y , a n d , in the years to c o m e , L a w r e n c e w a s to claim far m o r e credit for his share in Churchill's achievements as Colonial S e c r e t a r y than was his d u e . 16

B u t L a w r e n c e ' s indirect influence on policy w a s c o n s i d e r a b l e , for his account of the A r a b u p r i s i n g w a s believed by Churchill, who lacked personal knowledge of the matter, not having been involved in M i d d l e E a s t e r n affairs d u r i n g the war after 1916. U n a w a r e of the * A few years later Thomas wrote a book called With Lawrence in Arabia, based on the show, repeating the story he had told to his mass audiences of millions around the world. It was an immensely readable, high-spirited write-up of Lawrence's service career—much of it untrue—that made its points through hyperbole. T h e Arab Bulletin, which appeared in twenty-six copies, in Thomas's account appeared in only f o u r . Feisal's corps of 3,500 men, added to the several thousands serving under Feisal's brothers during the war, when added up by Lowell Thomas produced an Arab army of 200,000. Pushing Kitchener, Wingate, Clayton, Hogarth, Dawnay, Joyce, Young, and other important British officials into the shade, Thomas showed young T. E. Lawrence single-handedly igniting and leading the Hejaz revolt. Thomas placed Lawrence in the Arabia desert fomenting the Hejaz revolt in February 1916; in fact, Lawrence had a desk job in Cairo at that time, and visited Arabia for the first time the following October. 12

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extent to which L a w r e n c e a n d L l o y d G e o r g e ' s staff h a d e x a g g e r a t e d the role of Feisal's A r a b s in winning the war, Churchill was p r e p a r e d to accept L a w r e n c e ' s thesis that Britain owed a great deal to Feisal and his followers.

IV S i n c e 1918 m a n y of Britain's leaders h a d entirely reversed their views a b o u t the M i d d l e E a s t . In the heady d a y s when the war was being b r o u g h t to a t r i u m p h a n t conclusion, it had s e e m e d i m p o r t a n t to seize and to hold on to every corner of the M i d d l e E a s t that offered strategic a d v a n t a g e ; b u t , after 1919, Parliament a n d the p r e s s clamored for withdrawal from these r e m o t e positions that cost so m u c h to maintain. Churchill r e s p o n d e d to the c h a n g e d political m o o d f r o m the day that he took over the War a n d Air Ministries at the b e g i n n i n g of 1919; a n d when he m o v e d to the Colonial Office at the beginning of 1921, he o n c e m o r e m a d e cost cutting his top priority. As Colonial S e c r e t a r y , Churchill a n n o u n c e d "that everything else that h a p p e n s in the M i d d l e E a s t is secondary to the reduction in e x p e n s e " ; he tested all p r o p o s a l s a n d p r o g r a m s against that one overriding criterion. T h e final figures p r o v i d e the m e a s u r e of his s u c c e s s : by S e p t e m b e r 1922, Churchill h a d eliminated 75 percent of Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n e x p e n d i t u r e s , r e d u c i n g t h e m f r o m forty-five million p o u n d s t o eleven million p o u n d s per a n n u m . 19

2 0

Churchill favored conciliating F r a n c e — i n order to s a v e the mo n e y it would cost to o p p o s e h e r — a n d he inclined t o w a r d installing Feisal and his b r o t h e r s — t h e Sherifians, or H a s h e m i t e s — a s local rulers of

* Sir Hugh Trenchard, the head of the Royal Air Force, wrote to the R . A . F . Middle East commander on 5 September 1919 that "I am afraid from your many telegrams that you have not got the atmosphere that is reigning here. That atmosphere is, economy at all cost . . . " His program was to cut commitments ruthlessly in order to cut costs. Indeed he cut the military budget so radically that his top professional army adviser took alarm. T h e Chief of the Imperial General Staff confided to his diary the following year that Churchill's program "consists in arbitrary reduction of garrisons for financial reasons wholly regardless of whether or not the residue are liable to be scuppered." He concluded that "Winston . . . is playing the fool & heading straight for disasters." Actually, Churchill was doing no more than keeping in tune with the political temper of his times in insisting on cutting expenses, cost what it might in nonmoney terms. Churchill put financial considerations above all others, except when it came to dealing with Bolshevik Russia—the one area where Churchill, by his opinions and conduct, reminded the political world of his past excesses and extravagances. I7

18

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m u c h of the A r a b world b e c a u s e to do so would p r o v i d e Britain with an economical strategy: it w o u l d enable "His Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t to b r i n g p r e s s u r e to bear on one A r a b s p h e r e in order to obtain their own e n d s in another. " By a p p l y i n g p r e s s u r e on just one m e m b e r of the family, he believed, Britain c o u l d extract concessions from all of t h e m ; if each m e m b e r of the family ruled a k i n g d o m , Britain w o u l d need to threaten only one k i n g d o m in order to b r i n g all the A r a b k i n g d o m s b a c k into line. 2 1

F r o m time to t i m e he considered partial or c o m p l e t e withdrawal f r o m the M i d d l e E a s t a n d , on 8 J a n u a r y 1 9 2 1 , he cabled the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in M e s o p o t a m i a that unless the country could be governed m o r e cheaply Britain w o u l d have to withdraw from it to a coastal e n c l a v e . At another point, taking up what he believed to be a s u g g e s t i o n of L l o y d G e o r g e ' s , he p r o p o s e d to a b a n d o n Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a altogether by g i v i n g t h e m to the U n i t e d S t a t e s . 22

2 3

When he a c c e p t e d a p p o i n t m e n t to the Colonial Office, Churchill wrote to the P r i m e Minister that "I feel s o m e m i s g i v i n g s a b o u t the political c o n s e q u e n c e s to myself of taking on my s h o u l d e r s the b u r d e n & the o d i u m o f the M e s o p o t a m i a entanglement . . . " H e was wary of being b l a m e d , as he had been over the D a r d a n e l l e s expedition, for the failure of a policy that h a d been initiated by others. On the other h a n d , it ran counter to his nature to order a retreat u n d e r fire; his inclination was to remain in Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a b e c a u s e to do otherwise would be to default on c o m m i t m e n t s that, wisely or unwisely, Britain h a d already m a d e . 2 4

Churchill, when he took office as Colonial Secretary, b r o u g h t with him a b r o a d strategic concept of how to hold d o w n the M i d d l e E a s t inexpensively. While he was still Secretary of Air a n d War, Churchill h a d p r o p o s e d t o cut M i d d l e E a s t costs b y g o v e r n i n g M e s o p o t a m i a b y m e a n s of airplanes a n d a r m o r e d c a r s . A few well-protected air bases (he wrote at the time) would enable the Royal Air F o r c e "to operate in every part of the protectorate a n d to enforce control, now here, now there, without the need of maintaining long lines of c o m m u n i cations eating u p troops a n d m o n e y . " 25

Churchill recognized that this strategy would not defend M e s o p o t a m i a against invasion; its sole p u r p o s e was "maintaining internal s e c u r i t y . " Churchill's d i a g n o s i s of Britain's troubles in the M i d d l e E a s t therefore m u s t have been that the d i s t u r b a n c e s were c a u s e d locally. In p r o p o s i n g to a d o p t a military p o s t u r e that would be of little use against R u s s i a n s , resurgent G e r m a n s , or T u r k s , he 26

* As Secretary for Air since 1919, Churchill—in collaboration with Sir Hugh Trenchard, Chief of the Air Staff and father of the Royal Air Force—had played a leading role in exploring the revolutionary implications of air power for postwar British policy.

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implicitly ac k n o wl e d g e d that the threat to Britain in M e s o p o t a m i a did not c o m e f r o m them.* Churchill's strategy implied an old-fashioned concept of e m p i r e m u c h at variance with the idealistic vision of S m u t s , A m e r y , H o g a r t h , and T . E . L a w r e n c e that i n part h a d inspired w a r t i m e Britain t o seek control of A r a b A s i a . L a w r e n c e still c l u n g to the vision of a free A r a b M i d d l e E a s t e r n D o m i n i o n voluntarily joining the British C o m m o n wealth as an equal partner. In a m u c h - q u o t e d p h r a s e , he wrote in 1919 that "My own a m b i t i o n is that the A r a b s s h o u l d be our first brown d o m i n i o n , a n d not our last brown c o l o n y . " Churchill's strategy, which was a i m e d at p u t t i n g d o w n native revolt, s u g g e s t e d that Britain w o u l d rule her A r a b s u b j e c t s by coercion rather than consent. It harked b a c k to his experiences in K i t c h e n e r ' s S u d a n c a m p a i g n , a n d the ease with which m o d e r n E u r o p e a n w e a p o n s could s u b d u e natives a r m e d only with traditional w e a p o n s . 27

In i m p o s i n g his strategy, he was g u i d e d by a m o r e recent experience: the c a t a s t r o p h e at the D a r d a n e l l e s , where his policies had been u n d e r m i n e d by his d e p a r t m e n t a l s u b o r d i n a t e s in L o n d o n a n d by his officers in the field. It led Churchill to go to considerable trouble to m a k e his chief officials feel that his p r o g r a m originated with t h e m — a precaution all the m o r e p r u d e n t given the s t r o n g opposition from the War Office a n d the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in M e s o p o t a m i a to the replacement of t r o o p s by a i r p l a n e s . T o S i r Percy C o x , British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r i n M e s o p o t a m i a , Churchill cabled on 7 F e b r u a r y 1921 that " T h e q u e s t i o n s at issue cannot be settled by interchange of t e l e g r a m s . I cannot .. . find time to visit M e s o p o t a m i a . I p r o p o s e therefore a conference in E g y p t beginning d u r i n g first or s e c o n d week of M a r c h . .. C o n f e r e n c e would take a week . . . I shall be a c c o m p a n i e d by principal officers of new M i d d l e E a s t e r n D e p a r t m e n t of Colonial O f f i c e . " 28

Churchill then s u m m o n e d his field officers from Palestine a n d the Persian G u l f to attend him at the conference. On 18 F e b r u a r y 1921 he sent his own notes on M e s o p o t a m i a to J o h n S h u c k b u r g h , a n d entrusted him with the pivotal responsibility for establishing a conference a g e n d a for M e s o p o t a m i a a n d for Palestine.

V E g y p t , which Churchill chose as the m e e t i n g place, w a s g e o g r a p h i cally convenient but inconvenient politically: the E g y p t i a n s knew

* Churchill was in constant fear that Lloyd George's anti-Turkish policies would bring about a Turkish attack in Iraq, which British forces were not equipped to meet.

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that Churchill felt that E g y p t s h o u l d not be g r a n t e d i n d e p e n d e n c e . On 21 F e b r u a r y 1921 he wrote to his wife that " T h e p e o p l e in E g y p t are getting rather excited at my c o m i n g , as they s e e m to think it has s o m e t h i n g to do with t h e m . T h i s is, of c o u r s e , all w r o n g . I have no m i s s i o n to E g y p t a n d have no authority to deal with any E g y p t i a n question. I shall have to m a k e this quite clear or we shall be pestered with d e m o n s t r a t i o n s a n d d e l e g a t i o n s . " 29

Allenby, now British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t , issued an official denial that Churchill w a s c o m i n g to consult a b o u t E g y p t i a n affairs. T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , L o r d C u r z o n , wrote Churchill a confidential letter on 24 F e b r u a r y u r g i n g him to transfer the venue of the conference to J e r u s a l e m . C u r z o n claimed that Churchill's p r e s ence in C a i r o might c o m p r o m i s e the efforts of Allenby a n d the E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t to reach agreement at a critical m o m e n t . Churchill, however, declined to alter his a r r a n g e m e n t s . 3 0

T h u s the C a i r o Conference went forward as p l a n n e d , but its location b r o u g h t into s h a r p contrast the policies p u r s u e d by Churchill a n d those a d v o c a t e d by Allenby: Churchill was p l a n n i n g to hold the line against A r a b nationalism a n d Allenby was not. A g a i n s t the weight of C a b i n e t opinion, against the wishes of the P r i m e Minister a n d of Churchill, A l l e n b y — i n line with the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s m a d e earlier by L o r d M i l n e r — p e r s i s t e d in his efforts to give E g y p t a m e a s u r e of i n d e p e n d e n c e by b r i n g i n g the British protectorate in E g y p t to an e n d . By the threat of resignation he eventually prevailed a n d , on 28 F e b r u a r y 1922, the British g o v e r n m e n t unilaterally issued the so-called Allenby D e c l a r a t i o n c o n c e d i n g formal i n d e p e n d e n c e to E g y p t (subject to far-reaching reservations which, a m o n g other things, enabled Britain to s u p e r v i s e E g y p t i a n foreign policy a n d to m a k e unrestricted use of E g y p t i a n territory for military m o v e m e n t s ) . Allenby would have preferred a treaty to a unilateral declaration, but no E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d agree to sign a d o c u m e n t that reserved so m a n y p o w e r s to Britain. Churchill apparently feared that Allenby's concession of even nominal E g y p t i a n i n d e p e n d e n c e would u n d e r c u t his own policy, in other A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g countries, of continuing to withhold it. By an accident of g e o g r a p h y , in 1921, both Allenby's a n d Churchill's contrary policies were elaborated in the city of C a i r o ; a n d in fact there was a s u b s t a n t i v e similarity between them, for both represented unilateral British decisions a b o u t how the A r a b world s h o u l d be r u n — a n d A r a b leaders did not agree to either one of t h e m . VI T h e C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e formally convened at the S e m i r a m i s Hotel on the m o r n i n g of S a t u r d a y , 12 M a r c h 1921. D u r i n g the following

WINSTON CHURCHILL TAKES CHARGE

503

d a y s s o m e forty or fifty sessions were held. A c c o r d i n g to one count there were forty officials in a t t e n d a n c e ; " E v e r y b o d y M i d d l e E a s t is here . . . , " wrote T. E. L a w r e n c e to his oldest b r o t h e r . T h e initial—and p r i n c i p a l — c o n f e r e n c e topic was how to cut the c o s t s of o c c u p y i n g M e s o p o t a m i a . T w o c o m m i t t e e s , one political and one military, were established to consider the matter. B o t h c o m mittees worked on the b a s i s of a g e n d a s that Churchill a n d his staff h a d drafted on b o a r d ship on their way over. T h e c o m m i t t e e s devoted their first four d a y s to arriving at a p l a n for M e s o p o t a m i a . Churchill a n d his staff had skillfully anticipated the advice that m i g h t be t e n d e r e d by officers in the field. G e r t r u d e Bell, who c a m e in from B a g h d a d with her chief, S i r Percy C o x , wrote afterward that " M r . Churchill was a d m i r a b l e , m o s t ready to meet everyone half-way a n d masterly alike in g u i d i n g a b i g political meeting a n d in c o n d u c t i n g the small c o m m i t t e e s in which we b r o k e u p . N o t the least favourable c i r c u m s t a n c e was that Sir Percy a n d I, c o m i n g out with a definite p r o g r a m m e , found when we c a m e to o p e n our packet that it coincided exactly" with what Churchill p r o p o s e d . 31

3 2

On the evening of 15 M a r c h Churchill d i s p a t c h e d a telegram, which arrived in L o n d o n the following d a y , reporting to the P r i m e Minister that "All authorities . . . have reached a g r e e m e n t on all the points, both political a n d m i l i t a r y . " In itself this was a c o n s i d e r a b l e achievement. Essentially there were four elements in the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e p l a n . Feisal was to be offered the throne of M e s o p o t a m i a , b u t every effort would be m a d e to m a k e it a p p e a r that the offer c a m e from the indigenous p o p u l a t i o n rather than from Britain. In m a i n t a i n i n g a British presence in the country, the military would shift to Churchill's airforce-based s t r a t e g y ; b u t — a s the h e a d of the Royal Air F o r c e , S i r H u g h T r e n c h a r d , estimated that the strategy would require a b o u t a year to i m p l e m e n t — B r i t a i n would have to rely all the m o r e heavily on Feisal to keep the country quiet in the interim. A l t h o u g h British experts d i s a g r e e d intensely a m o n g themselves as to whether the K u r d i s h * a r e a s in the northwest s h o u l d be a b s o r b e d into the new state of I r a q , or instead s h o u l d b e c o m e an i n d e p e n d e n t K u r d i s t a n , it was a g r e e d that for the time b e i n g they s h o u l d continue to form a s e p a r a t e entity within the jurisdiction of the British H i g h C o m missioner in M e s o p o t a m i a . In addition to the K u r d s , there were 03

T h e K u r d s are a scattered, tribal people who inhabit the plateaus and mountains where Iraq, Iran, Russian Armenia, and Turkey now overlap. They are mostly Sunni Moslems, speak a language of the Iranian group, and are believed to be of Indo-European descent. There were perhaps two arid a half million of them in 1921; there are no reliable figures. There may be seven million of them today. They continue to fight for autonomy and are a subject of current concern to the governments of Iraq and Turkey.

504

THE MIDDLE EASTERN S E T T L E M E N T OF

1922

other g r o u p s whose identity was distinct a n d whose n e e d s posed p r o b l e m s . In the northwest particularly there were small g r o u p s with no place to g o , a m o n g t h e m the A s s y r i a n (or N e s t o r i a n ) Christian refugees, driven from their h o m e s in T u r k e y d u r i n g the war b e c a u s e of their pro-Allied s y m p a t h i e s ; a n d a b o u t these homeless g r o u p s , s t r u g g l i n g for survival, the C a i r o conferees felt that there was little that could be done. H a v i n g o p t e d for a H a s h e m i t e solution in I r a q , the conference did the s a m e — t h o u g h on a t e m p o r a r y b a s i s — f o r T r a n s j o r d a n . D i s o r d e r was e n d e m i c in that territory, a n d the Chief of the I m p e r i a l G e n e r a l Staff was of the view that Britain could not hold onto it without s e n d i n g in two m o r e battalions "which of c o u r s e we have not g o t . " E v e n as the conference was taking place in C a i r o , a l a r m i n g news w a s received that Feisal's brother A b d u l l a h , a c c o m p a n i e d by 30 officers a n d 200 B e d o u i n s , had arrived in the T r a n s j o r d a n city of A m m a n , a p p a r e n t l y en route to S y r i a to attack D a m a s c u s . A b d u l l a h claimed that he had c o m e to A m m a n for a c h a n g e of air in order to regain his health after an attack of j a u n d i c e . N o b o d y believed his explanation. 3 4

Churchill's solution was, in effect, to b u y off A b d u l l a h : to offer him a position in T r a n s j o r d a n if he would refrain from attacking F r e n c h S y r i a . (It will be recalled that Britain feared that if A r a b s f r o m the territory of British Palestine were to attack the F r e n c h in S y r i a , F r a n c e would retaliate b y invading British Palestine.) T h e position Churchill thought of offering A b d u l l a h was t e m p o r a r y governor, c h a r g e d with restoring order. In p r o p o s i n g to m a k e use of A b d u l l a h to restore order east of the J o r d a n , Churchill hoped to a c c o m p l i s h other objectives too. Churchill b r o u g h t with him to the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e a m e m o r a n d u m that his staff had p r e p a r e d at the end of F e b r u a r y that dealt with the claims of A r a b s a n d J e w s to Palestine. T h e m e m o r a n d u m , p r e p a r e d b y S h u c k b u r g h , Y o u n g , and L a w r e n c e , construed the g e o g r a p h i c a l t e r m s e m p l o y e d in the M c M a h o n — H u s s e i n c o r r e s p o n d e n c e of 1915 as m e a n i n g that the area of A r a b i n d e p e n d e n c e was to stretch no further west than the J o r d a n river. S i n c e the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n contained no geographical definition, Churchill's advisers c o n c l u d e d that Britain could fully reconcile a n d fulfill her wartime p l e d g e s by establishing a J e w i s h National H o m e in Palestine west of the J o r d a n a n d a s e p a r a t e A r a b

* T h u s Churchill's aides accepted the view that meaningful pledges had been made to Hussein's Arabs during the war. This was an important about-face for British officialdom; McMahon, Clayton, and other wartime officials who had been involved in making the supposed promises to Hussein believed at the time that they were phrasing the promises in such a way that Britain was not committed to anything. In their view the pledges were meaningless.

505

WINSTON CHURCHILL TAKES CHARGE

3 5

entity in Palestine east of the J o r d a n . A b d u l l a h , if installed in authority in T r a n s j o r d a n , could p r e s i d e over the creation of s u c h an A r a b entity. Several i m p o r t a n t objections to Churchill's T r a n s j o r d a n s c h e m e were voiced at the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e . S i r H e r b e r t S a m u e l , the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r for Palestine, a n d his Chief S e c r e t a r y , W y n d h a m D e e d e s , pointed out that since T r a n s j o r d a n had been included by the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s in the territory of Palestine (for which the L e a g u e was offering Britain a M a n d a t e ) , it was not open to Britain unilaterally to s e p a r a t e it f r o m the rest of Palestine. What S a m u e l feared was that a s e p a r a t e A r a b T r a n s j o r d a n could serve as a b a s e for anti-Zionist agitation a i m e d at western P a l e s t i n e . A parallel fear was e x p r e s s e d b y L l o y d G e o r g e , who worried that the F r e n c h — t o w h o m Feisal was persona non grata—would r e g a r d British p a t r o n a g e of two H a s h e m i t e b r o t h e r s — o n e in M e s o p o t a m i a , a n d the other in T r a n s j o r d a n , both on their S y r i a n d o o r s t e p — a s a provocation. On 22 M a r c h the P r i m e Minister sent a t e l e g r a m to Churchill, in which he r e m a r k e d : "Cabinet . .. d i s c u s s e d your p r o p o s a l s for T r a n s j o r d a n i a , as to which considerable m i s g i v i n g s were entertained. It was felt that a l m o s t s i m u l t a n e o u s installation of the two brothers in regions c o n t i g u o u s to F r e n c h s p h e r e of influence w o u l d be r e g a r d e d with great s u s p i c i o n by them a n d w o u l d be interpreted as a m e n a c e to their position in S y r i a , deliberately plotted by o u r s e l v e s . " 36

37

T h e P r i m e Minister a p p r e c i a t e d the reasons that had led Churchill to p r o p o s e "an A r a b rather than a Palestinian solution" to the p r o b l e m of T r a n s j o r d a n , b u t feared that any attempt to establish a s e p a r a t e A r a b entity east of the J o r d a n might involve Britain in costly new engagements and entanglements. Churchill s u c c e e d e d in p e r s u a d i n g the C a b i n e t that without sending at least a small British military force into T r a n s j o r d a n , no government could be established there at all. He indicated that A b d u l l a h would not be e x p e c t e d to stay in the country for m o r e than a few m o n t h s , b u t that on a trial b a s i s A b d u l l a h could help establish order a n d then help choose a local p e r s o n to serve as governor. Churchill agreed to accept L l o y d G e o r g e ' s c o m p r o m i s e concept of T r a n s j o r d a n : "while p r e s e r v i n g A r a b character of area a n d administration to treat it as A r a b province or a d j u n c t of P a l e s t i n e . " 3 8

39

In Churchill's view, A b d u l l a h w o u l d help to restrain both the antiF r e n c h a n d the anti-Zionist m o v e m e n t s that otherwise m i g h t e s t a b lish their h e a d q u a r t e r s east of the J o r d a n . T h e H a s h e m i t e solution, in his view, w o u l d help to solve these p r o b l e m s rather than ( a s critics had s u g g e s t e d ) t o create them. A c c o r d i n g t o T . E . L a w r e n c e , A b d u l l a h m a d e an ideal British agent in the area, b e c a u s e he was "a p e r s o n who was not too powerful, a n d who was not an inhabitant of

506

T H E M I D D L E E A S T E R N S E T T L E M E N T O F 1922

T r a n s - J o r d a n i a , but who relied u p o n H i s Majesty's G o v e r n m e n t for the retention of his office." , A final p r o b l e m was the reaction of the rival H o u s e of S a u d to the p r o p o s e d elevation of the H o u s e of H a s h e m to new honors. Churchill's p r o p o s e d solution was to raise I b n S a u d ' s s u b s i d y to 100,000 p o u n d s a y e a r . On 22 M a r c h the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e c a m e to an end a n d , at midnight on 23 M a r c h , Churchill left C a i r o by train for Palestine. O n c e arrived, he met four times in J e r u s a l e m with A b d u l l a h a n d arrived at an a g r e e m e n t with him. Abdullah's "attitude was m o d e r a t e , friendly, a n d s t a t e s m a n l i k e , " wrote Churchill in a m e m o r a n d u m to the C a b i net. T o A r a b anti-Zionist d e m o n s t r a t o r s , A b d u l l a h "maintained a n absolutely correct attitude, r e p r o v e d the d e m o n s t r a t o r s , stated that the British were his friends, a n d that the British G o v e r n m e n t would keep their p r o m i s e s to J e w s and A r a b s a l i k e . " A b d u l l a h agreed to govern T r a n s j o r d a n for six m o n t h s , with the advice of a British chief political officer a n d with a British financial s u b s i d y , b u t without British t r o o p s . He a g r e e d also to help establish the air b a s e s u p o n which, in Churchill's p l a n , British control would ultimately be centered. 40

41

42

Britain's i m m e d i a t e h o p e s of pacifying T r a n s j o r d a n rested as heavily u p o n A b d u l l a h as her h o p e s of pacifying I r a q d e p e n d e d u p o n F e i s a l . F r o m C a p d'Ail on the F r e n c h Riviera, where he s t o p p e d on the way h o m e , Churchill wrote to L o r d C u r z o n that "Abdullah turned a r o u n d completely u n d e r our treatment of the A r a b p r o b l e m . I hope he won't get his throat cut by his own followers. He is a most polished & agreeable p e r s o n . " U p o n his return to L o n d o n , Churchill secured the s u p p o r t both of the C a b i n e t a n d of the C o m m o n s for his M i d d l e E a s t policy. S i n c e at C a i r o he had s e c u r e d the s u p p o r t of Britain's officers in the field, the Colonial S e c r e t a r y had his own country's leadership b e h i n d h i m — a t least t e m p o r a r i l y — a s he a t t e m p t e d to i m p o s e his new design on the M i d d l e E a s t . B u t The Times, o b s e r v i n g on 15 J u n e 1921 that there was "a disconcerting air of t o p s y - t u r v y d o m a b o u t his s t r u c t u r e , " presciently pointed out that his ingenious attempt to reconcile rival claims and to validate claims without having the r e s o u r c e s to do so had led h i m to a s s u m e contingent liabilities on Britain's behalf that could not be r e d e e m e d if they were ever presented for p a y m e n t . 43

M e a n w h i l e , as the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e drew to a close, British officials p r e p a r e d to s t a g e - m a n a g e the selection of Feisal as m o n a r c h of the about-to-be-created state of I r a q , planning to remain behind the scenes a n d m a k e it a p p e a r that Feisal had been freely a n d s p o n taneously chosen by the peoples of I r a q . T h e y had received a s s u r a n c e s that F e i s a l was p r e p a r e d to be cooperative.

WINSTON

CHURCHILL

TAKES

CHARGE

507

VII

Before he took office as Colonial S e c r e t a r y , Churchill h a d taken a d v a n t a g e o f the close relationship between T . E . L a w r e n c e and Feisal to s o u n d out Feisal's views. L a w r e n c e had r e p o r t e d to Churchill's Private Secretary in m i d - J a n u a r y that F e i s a l was p r e p a r e d to enter into d i s c u s s i o n s with Britain without any reference to F r e n c h occupied S y r i a ; a n d that Feisal also a g r e e d to a b a n d o n all his father's claims to Palestine. L a w r e n c e wrote that " T h e a d v a n t a g e of his taking this new g r o u n d of d i s c u s s i o n is that all q u e s t i o n s of p l e d g e s & p r o m i s e s , fulfilled or b r o k e n , are set a s i d e . Y o u b e g i n a new d i s c u s s i on on the actual positions today & the best way of d o i n g s o m e t h i n g constructive with t h e m . " 4 4

A t the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e , L a w r e n c e , C o x , G e r t r u d e Bell, a n d others in the Political C o m m i t t e e h a d established a timetable for Feisal's c a n d i d a c y for the throne of I r a q . T h e i r plan was for Feisal to travel to M e c c a , and f r o m there to s e n d t e l e g r a m s to leading p e r s o n alities in I r a q . In his cable Feisal was to say he h a d been u r g e d by friends to c o m e to I r a q a n d that, after d i s c u s s i n g the matter with his father a n d b r o t h e r s , he had d e c i d e d to offer his services to the p e o p l e of I r a q . When the C a i r o C o n f e r e n c e d i s b a n d e d , L a w r e n c e sent an urgent m e s s a g e to F e i s a l , who was in L o n d o n . " T h i n g s have g o n e exactly as h o p e d . Please start for M e c c a at once by quickest p o s s i b l e route . . . I will meet you on the way a n d explain the details. S a y only you are g o i n g to see your father, a n d on no account put anything in p r e s s . " At a b o u t the s a m e t i m e , S i r Percy C o x received a d i s q u i e t i n g m e s s a g e from the officer he had left in charge of B a g h d a d . "Since your d e p a r t u r e the situation has c h a n g e d considerably," ran the m e s s a g e . S a y y i d T a l i b , the d o m i n a n t local political leader of B a s r a , had reached an a g r e e m e n t with the N a q i b , the elderly leading notable of B a g h d a d , by the t e r m s of which the former w o u l d s u p p o r t the candidacy of the latter in return for a chance at the s u c c e s s i o n . T h e two "put forward the claims of an I r a q i ruler for I r a q . T h e r e are indications that this claim receives a considerable m e a s u r e of s u p p o r t , and there is I think no question but that Feisal's c a n d i d a t u r e will be strongly resisted . . . " C o x hurried back t o B a g h d a d t o p e r s u a d e rival c a n d i d a t e s to withdraw f r o m the c o n t e s t — a m o n g t h e m , I b n S a u d , who objected to a H a s h e m i t e c a n d i d a c y , but was mollified by cash a n d other British favors. 4 5

4 6

Meanwhile S a y y i d T a l i b toured the country, meeting with tribal leaders a n d s p e a k i n g in p u b l i c , affirming the need for cooperation with Britain b u t p r o c l a i m i n g as his slogan, " I r a q for the I r a q i s ! " 4 7

508

THE MIDDLE EASTERN

S E T T L E M E N T OF

1922

British intelligence officers reported with alarm that T a l i b was meeting with "a magnificent reception e v e r y w h e r e . " S a y y i d T a l i b had a l o n g - s t a n d i n g invitation to take tea with S i r Percy C o x at the R e s i d e n c y in B a g h d a d in m i d - A p r i l . When he arrived, he found that C o x had e x c u s e d himself, leaving L a d y C o x to entertain the g u e s t s . As he left the R e s i d e n c y after the tea party, T a l i b w a s arrested by one of his fellow g u e s t s , by o r d e r of S i r Percy C o x , his a b s e n t host. T a l i b w a s then d e p o r t e d to the island of C e y l o n i n the I n d i a n O c e a n . T h e day following T a l i b ' s arrest, S i r Percy C o x a n n o u n c e d in a c o m m u n i q u e that he had o r d e r e d the deportation to p r e s e r v e law and o r d e r in the face of T a l i b ' s threat to incite violence. 48

N o n e t h e l e s s resistance to Feisal's c a n d i d a c y p e r s i s t e d , t h o u g h it took other f o r m s . P r o p o s a l s were m a d e in favor of a r e p u b l i c , in favor of a T u r k i s h ruler, in favor of leaving the p r o v i n c e of B a s r a s e p a r a t e from the province of B a g h d a d , and in favor of leaving m a t t e r s as they were, u n d e r the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of S i r Percy C o x as High Commissioner. G u i d e d (at his own r e q u e s t ) by British a d v i s e r s , F e i s a l meanwhile j o u r n e y e d f r o m L o n d o n to the H e j a z , where he settled m a t t e r s with his father, a n d thence o n w a r d at B r i t i s h e x p e n s e to B a s r a , where he d i s e m b a r k e d on 24 J u n e . While a b o a r d ship he received the w e l c o m e news that the official native l e a d e r s h i p — t h e Council of M i n i s t e r s in B a g h d a d , p r e s i d e d over by the N a q i b — h a d invited him to be a g u e s t of the nation. In p u b l i c the British g o v e r n m e n t continued to m a i n t a i n the official fiction that it w a s neutral a n d i m p a r t i a l ; privately, C o x told F e i s a l to go out a n d c a m p a i g n for p o p u l a r s u p p o r t so that Britain could claim t o h a v e a c c e p t e d the people's v e r d i c t . 49

On 11 J u l y the Council of M i n i s t e r s u n a n i m o u s l y a d o p t e d a resolution declaring F e i s a l to be the constitutional m o n a r c h of I r a q . On 16 J u l y the Council authorized a plebiscite to ratify its choice. On 18 A u g u s t the Ministry of the Interior a n n o u n c e d that F e i s a l h a d won an o v e r w h e l m i n g victory in the yes-or-no plebiscite. On 23 A u g u s t Feisal's coronation w a s c e l e b r a t e d ; a n d in official u s a g e I r a q ("wellrooted country") r e p l a c e d M e s o p o t a m i a as the n a m e of his new kingdom. E v e n before his coronation, however, Feisal b e g a n to t r o u b l e the British by insisting on formal i n d e p e n d e n c e and objecting to the It is questionable whether he ever uttered such a threat. What happened is this: at a private dinner party he gave for the correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, Talib said something to the effect that if Britain were not fair and impartial in dealing with the rival candidacies, the tribes might again rise in revolt. Accounts of the actual words he used differ. Cox received his account from Gertrude Bell, who was not present at the dinner herself.

WINSTON CHURCHILL TAKES CHARGE

509

L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e , which w a s a t r u s t e e s h i p ; he p r o p o s e d that relations between I r a q a n d Britain should instead be defined by a treaty between the two countries. T h e British claimed that they had no legal right to alter the status of I r a q without authorization from the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s ; but consented to negotiate a treaty so long as it referred to the M a n d a t e . F e i s a l objected to including any s u c h reference in the treaty. N e g o t i a t i o n s that often c a u s e d anger and a n g u i s h in L o n d o n went on for m o r e than a year. In the late s u m m e r of 1922, Churchill wrote to L l o y d G e o r g e that "Feisal is playing a very low & treacherous g a m e with u s . " Churchill told the P r i m e Minister that he and his C a b i n e t colleagues ought to meet to d i s c u s s whether to d e p o s e Feisal or whether to evacuate I r a q . A few days later, at a conference of C a b i n e t ministers, Churchill r e p o r t e d that s o

K i n g Feisal had been m a k i n g great difficulties a n d confusing the situation in I r a q . He had m a d e objections to the M a n d a t e b u t had stated his willingness to agree to a T r e a t y . He was not, however, p r e p a r e d to recognize the m a n d a t o r y b a s i s as he thought that the m a n d a t o r y s y s t e m was a slur on I r a q . No a r g u m e n t had been of any effect with him. He had recently taken up the E x t r e m i s t s who now r e g a r d e d him as their p a t r o n . 5 1

Shortly afterward Churchill wrote to the Prime Minister that "I a m deeply concerned a b o u t I r a q . T h e task you have given m e i s b e c o m i n g really i m p o s s i b l e . " He wrote that there was "scarcely a single n e w s p a p e r — T o r y , L i b e r a l , or L a b o u r " — t h a t was not "consistently hostile" to Britain's remaining in I r a q . He a d d e d that "in my own heart I do not see what we are getting out of i t . " He p r o p o s e d to send F e i s a l an u l t i m a t u m ; if it were not accepted, "I would actually clear o u t . " 52

53

T h e P r i m e Minister replied that "On general principles, I am against a policy of scuttle, in I r a q as elsewhere . . . " He referred, too, to the widely held belief that large reserves of oil might be discovered in the a r e a : "If we leave we m a y find a year or two after we d e p a r t e d that we have handed over to the F r e n c h a n d A m e r i c a n s s o m e of the richest oilfields in the world . . . " S i r Percy C o x therefore persevered in his negotiations. After several d r a m a t i c political crises had run their course he s u c c e e d e d in concluding a treaty, on 10 O c t o b e r 1922, that incorporated m a n y of the substantive t e r m s of the M a n d a t e . T h e treaty was to last for twenty years b u t , as a result of opposition in I r a q , a half year later it was a m e n d e d so as to reduce its t e r m from twenty years to four years. E v e n s o , I r a q i agitation for fuller independence continued, while in L o n d o n The Times c o m p l a i n e d that the treaty w a s unfair to Britain b e c a u s e it i m p o s e d too heavy a b u r d e n of obligations. 5 4

s s

510

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I n d e e d , Britain was called u p o n immediately to shield I r a q from the g r o w i n g power of I b n S a u d . T h e A r a b i a n m o n a r c h , a dynastic e n e m y of the H a s h e m i t e s , threatened Feisal as well as his brother A b d u l l a h ; a n d the British g o v e r n m e n t felt obliged to protect them both. At the end of 1922, in a m e e t i n g at a port called ' U q a i r , S i r Percy C o x i m p o s e d u p o n I b n S a u d a n agreement defining the S a u d i kingdom's frontiers with K u w a i t a n d I r a q . D e s p i t e their need for British protection, I r a q i politicians m o v e d to assert themselves. T h e A n g l o - I r a q i T r e a t y of 1922, like the Allenby Declaration of formal i n d e p e n d e n c e for E g y p t the s a m e year, m a r k e d a c h a n g e in the political a t m o s p h e r e of the A r a b E a s t . * Neither I r a q nor E g y p t w a s g r a n t e d m o r e than limited a u t o n o m y , yet both had been recognized as entities p o s s e s s i n g the attributes of s t a t e h o o d . In b o t h countries, political leaders agitated for i n d e p e n d e n c e , while B r i t i s h - a p p o i n t e d m o n a r c h s could only maintain their position by d o i n g the s a m e .

VIII L i k e I r a q , T r a n s j o r d a n continued to be a subject of concern at the Colonial Office. B u t where Feisal s e e m e d too i n d e p e n d e n t , A b d u l l a h s e e m e d too inactive; the H a s h e m i t e solution to T r a n s j o r d a n ' s p r o b l e m s w a s not taking hold. O n e reason for e m p l o y i n g A b d u l l a h in Britain's service h a d been the a r g u m e n t that it would restrain h i m from attacking F r e n c h S y r i a . T . E . L a w r e n c e later c l a i m e d t o have r e a s s u r e d Churchill that " I know A b d u l l a h : you won't have a shot f i r e d . " T h e shrewd a n d indolent A r a b i a n prince was usually not inclined to e n g a g e in risky trials of strength. I n d e e d , within weeks of A b d u l l a h ' s e m p l o y m e n t as t e m p o r a r y g o v e r n o r , British o b s e r v e r s b e g a n to c o n c l u d e that he w a s 58

* A sign of the times was a proposal by Sir Percy Cox early in 1922 to send the excavated antiques of Samarra, an ancient town on the Tigris river, to the British Museum before a native government could take office in I r a q . For more than a century, European consuls, travelers, and archaeologists had been taking back with them ancient objects, structures, and works of art from Middle Eastern sites without hindrance. Suddenly, in 1922, Cox feared this situation was coming to an end in Iraq. Similarly, and at roughly the same time, when Howard Carter, in the Valley of the Kings in Egypt, made the archaeological find of the century in locating the tomb of K i n g Tutankhamun, he did what archaeologists had not been driven to do before. On the night of 26 November 1922, Carter and his associates entered the tomb secretly and took their selection of objects in it for themselves. They then resealed it and staged what they claimed was their first entry into the tomb for the benefit of the authorities of the new Egyptian kingdom the following day. From 27 November onward there was an official of the Egyptian Service of Antiquities on guard at all times and no further portions of the King T u t treasure could be removed by the foreigners. 56

57

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too weak to g o v e r n . In April, Abdullah's authority was challenged when delegates he h a d sent to m e d i a t e an intertribal d i s p u t e were m u r d e r e d ; instead of c r u s h i n g the revolt, A b d u l l a h a p p e a l e d to the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r t o d o i t for h i m . T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r r e s p o n d e d by authorizing the use of British airplanes a n d a r m o r e d c a r s , but it h a d been precisely in order to obviate the need for u s i n g British a r m e d forces that A b d u l l a h h a d been installed in A m m a n . A t a b o u t the s a m e t i m e , F r a n c e ' s a m b a s s a d o r i n L o n d o n protested that A b d u l l a h ' s presence in T r a n s j o r d a n acted as an incitement to violence against the F r e n c h in S y r i a . T h e British contention was that, on the contrary, A b d u l l a h would prevent such violence. S o o n it a p p e a r e d that he was u n a b l e or unwilling even to do this. In late J u n e , four m e n a m b u s h e d a n d a t t e m p t e d t o a s s a s s i n a t e G e n e r a l Henri G o u r a u d , the F r e n c h c o n q u e r o r a n d governor of S y r i a . "It is on the T r a n s j o r d a n i a n s that s u s p i c i o n falls," Churchill w a s informed by his H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in P a l e s t i n e . T h e F r e n c h authorities lodged a protest against the failure of Britain a n d A b d u l l a h to prevent s u c h attacks. T h e y protested further when the alleged a s s a s s i n s were o b s e r v e d m o v i n g a b o u t freely in T r a n s j o r d a n . 59

T h e British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r was u n h a p p y with the results o f the A b d u l l a h e x p e r i m e n t , a n d told Churchill so in J u n e . He r e p o r t e d to Churchill that one of the m a n y c a u s e s of p o p u l a r discontent was that native T r a n s j o r d a n i a n s looked u p o n Abdullah's S y r i a n associates as wasteful a n d i n c o m p e t e n t . At the s a m e time, the c o m m a n d i n g general of the British a r m y in E g y p t a n d Palestine wrote that "in T r a n s - J o r d a n i a A b d u l l a is a fraud . . . If anything is to be m a d e of him he m u s t be given a g o o d s t r o n g E n g l i s h m a n who will run him entirely a n d British troops to back him u p . " A bit later H u b e r t Y o u n g told S h u c k b u r g h that "What we have got to face is either continued e x p e n d i t u r e on A b d u l l a h , whose influence has g o n e down almost to vanishing point, and who is no longer a s u b s t i t u t e for even a section of Infantry, or to take our c o u r a g e in both h a n d s a n d s e n d a small force over, i f only temporarily . . . " 60

6 1

6 Z

Practically alone in the British g o v e r n m e n t at the time, T. E. L a w r e n c e continued to discern u s e s — a l b e i t t e m p o r a r y o n e s — f o r A b d u l l a h in T r a n s j o r d a n . "His total cost is less than a battalion; his r e g i m e p r e j u d i c e s us in no way, whatever eventual solution we wish to carry out, p r o v i d e d that it is not too p o p u l a r a n d not too efficient." As the British g o v e r n m e n t still could not decide whether to detach T r a n s j o r d a n permanently from Palestine—either by e s t a b lishing it as a s e p a r a t e entity, or by allowing K i n g H u s s e i n to annex it to the H e j a z — t h e notion that A b d u l l a h ' s t e m p o r a r y r e g i m e would p o s t p o n e the day of decision was an attractive one. H o w e v e r , L a w r e n c e ' s claim that the A b d u l l a h solution cost the least mo n e y was the a r g u m e n t best calculated to appeal to Winston Churchill. 63

A b d u l l a h d e m o n s t r a t e d that he intended to be helpful to Britain

512

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by s i g n i n g an A n g l o - H a s h e m i t e treaty that L a w r e n c e b r o u g h t out with him to the M i d d l e E a s t . L a w r e n c e c a m e as Churchill's plenipotentiary, a n d had spent m o n t h s in the H e j a z a t t e m p t i n g to p e r s u a d e K i n g H u s s e i n to sign the treaty. T h e treaty was to be a c o m p r e h e n sive settlement of all the claims a d v a n c e d by H u s s e i n for himself a n d the A r a b s ever since the early d a y s of the F i r s t World War. Its t e r m s included confirmation that Britain recognized h i m as K i n g of the H e j a z and would pay him an annual s u b s i d y of 100,000 p o u n d s ; b u t he, in turn, was required to recognize the F r e n c h M a n d a t e for S y r i a and the British M a n d a t e for Palestine. At times H u s s e i n said he would sign the treaty, but then he w o u l d c h a n g e his m i n d . At one point, a c c o r d i n g to L a w r e n c e , H u s s e i n d e m a n d e d "recognition of his s u p r e m a c y over all A r a b rulers e v e r y w h e r e . " L a w r e n c e believed that the old m a n of M e c c a h a d b e c o m e i m p o s s i b l e to deal with. He s e c u r e d A b d u l l a h ' s signature on the treaty; in view of Hussein's rejection of it the s i g n e d d o c u m e n t was rendered m e a n i n g l e s s , but L a w r e n c e s e e m s to have a p p r e c i a t e d A b d u l l a h ' s a t t e m p t to be helpful. 64

After a few m o n t h s as g o v e r n o r of T r a n s j o r d a n , A b d u l l a h b e g a n to change his m i n d about future p l a n s . At the beginning he h a d allowed the British to u n d e r s t a n d that he intended to stay in T r a n s j o r d a n only for a short time b e c a u s e the territory was relatively u n i m p o r t a n t to him in view of his large a m b i t i o n s elsewhere. In any event, T. E. L a w r e n c e was s u r e he could talk A b d u l l a h into leaving when the time c a m e . In O c t o b e r 1921, however, L a w r e n c e r e p o r t e d that A b d u l l a h intended to stay on. A b d u l l a h aspired to a s c e n d the throne of S y r i a a n d , a p p a r e n t l y , new d e v e l o p m e n t s had e n c o u r a g e d him to believe that within a short time F r a n c e m i g h t be ready to negotiate a reconciliation that w o u l d allow h i m to achieve his g o a l ; so his inclination was to remain in the vicinity. At the s a m e t i m e , the need to replace A b d u l l a h by a m o r e effective ruler s e e m e d to b e c o m e less u r g e n t . H. St J o h n Philby, a forceful British f i g u r e — o n e of the great e x p l o r e r s of A r a b i a — b e c a m e the new official adviser to A b d u l l a h ; a n d , even more i m p o r t a n t , L a w r e n c e ' s friend Colonel F. G. Peake began w h i p p i n g into s h a p e a B e d o u i n force of regular t r o o p s u n d e r British c o m m a n d , which l a t e r — u n d e r his s u c c e s s o r , J o h n G l u b b — b e c a m e the f o r m i d a b l e A r a b L e g i o n . T h e law a n d order situation s e e m e d to be i m p r o v i n g a l o n g the lines L a w r e n c e h a d a d v o c a t e d , that is to say, without s p e n d i n g a significant a m o u n t of additional money. L a w r e n c e b e g a n to believe it might be a g o o d idea for A b d u l l a h to stay on after all. B u t to maintain A b d u l l a h — a n A r a b i a n — a s ruler of T r a n s j o r d a n , and to maintain T r a n s j o r d a n as an A r a b preserve, in which J e w s could not settle to build their h o m e l a n d , was to d e p a r t from the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n policy of fostering a J e w i s h N a t i o n a l H o m e . If the British were indeed planning to m a k e Palestine into a J e w i s h

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country, it was hardly a u s p i c i o u s to begin by f o r b i d d i n g J e w s to settle in 75 percent of the country or by h a n d i n g over local a d m i n i s tration, not to a J e w , but to an A r a b i a n . T h e B a l f o u r Declaration policy was e m b o d i e d in the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e entrusting Palestine to Britain, and in 1921—2 the M a n d a t e — c o m m i s s i o n i n g Britain as trustee of Palestine with the mission of creating a J e w i s h National H o m e while protecting the rights of n o n - J e w s as well—was in the p r o c e s s of being offered by the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s to the British Parliament for acceptance. S i n c e Churchill's t e m p o r a r y decision not to e n c o u r a g e — o r even allow—the b u i l d i n g of a J e w i s h National H o m e in eastern Palestine ran counter to the provisions of the M a n d a t e , he decided to change the t e r m s of the M a n d a t e , which was redrafted to provide that Britain was not obliged to p u r s u e the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n policy east of the J o r d a n river. T h e Zionist leaders worried that shrinking their eastern frontiers would c r i p p l e their p r o g r a m , the m o r e so b e c a u s e , in negotiating with F r a n c e to fix a b o u n d a r y between Palestine a n d S y r i a - L e b a n o n , Britain h a d also s u r r e n d e r e d territory on their northern frontier. C h a i m W e i z m a n n wrote to Churchill early in 1921 that the a g r e e m e n t with F r a n c e "cut Palestine off from a c c e s s to the L i t a n i , d e p r i v e d her of p o s s e s s i o n of the U p p e r J o r d a n a n d the Y a r m u k a n d took from her the fertile plains east of L a k e T i b e r i a s which h a d heretofor been r e g a r d e d as one of the m o s t p r o m i s i n g outlets for J e w i s h settlement on a large s c a l e . " T u r n i n g to T r a n s j o r d a n , he wrote "that the fields of G i l e a d , M o a b a n d E d o m , with the rivers A r n o n a n d J a b b o k . . . are historically a n d geographically a n d economically linked to Palestine, a n d that it is u p o n these fields, now that the rich plains of the north have been taken f r o m Palestine a n d given to F r a n c e , that the s u c c e s s o f the J e w i s h National H o m e m u s t largely r e s t . " J u s t i c e B r a n d e i s , the leader of A m e r i c a n Z i o n i s m , sent a cabled m e s s a g e to Balfour toward the end of 1921 m a k i n g the s a m e point, d e p l o r i n g the loss of the waters of the L i t a n i river (in what is now L e b a n o n ) and calling attention to the economic i m p o r t a n c e of the T r a n s j o r d a n plains. 65

6 6

Y e t the Zionist leaders did not c a m p a i g n strongly against the administrative separation of T r a n s j o r d a n ; they r e g a r d e d it—not without r e a s o n — a s a merely provisional m e a s u r e . So did the Colonial Office. Views of the leading officials differed, b u t S h u c k b u r g h s u m m a r i z e d the a g r e e m e n t he a n d his colleagues had reached by s a y i n g that it had been d e c i d e d not to allow Z i o n i s m in T r a n s j o r d a n for the present b u t also not to b a r the door against it for all t i m e . 6 7

Churchill had not foreseen that by leaving A b d u l l a h in T r a n s j o r d a n he would embroil Britain in the fierce A r a b i a n religious war between the H o u s e of S a u d a n d the H o u s e of H a s h e m ; b u t , in 1922, only a b o u t a year after A b d u l l a h ' s arrival, the fanatical Wahhabi

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Brethren, the s p e a r h e a d of I b n S a u d , rode a c r o s s the undefined desert frontier to attack A b d u l l a h . An estimated 3 , 0 0 0 to 4 , 0 0 0 Brethren raiders c a m e within an h o u r ' s camel ride of A m m a n (now the capital of J o r d a n ) before b e i n g c r u s h e d by British airplanes and a r m o r e d c a r s . In s u c c e e d i n g years Britain w a s drawn into playing a far m o r e direct role in g o v e r n i n g a n d defending T r a n s j o r d a n than Churchill had intended and British officials soon c a m e to look u p o n A b d u l l a h as a p r o b l e m rather than as a solution. N e v e r t h e l e s s the Colonial Office's t e m p o r a r y and merely a d m i n i s trative set of a r r a n g e m e n t s for T r a n s j o r d a n in time h a r d e n e d into an e n d u r i n g political reality. T h e A r a b i a n prince with his foreign retinue settled in A m m a n and b e c a m e a p e r m a n e n t new factor in the c o m p l e x politics o f the Palestine M a n d a t o r y r e g i m e . T h e recurring s u g g e s t i o n that Palestine be partitioned between A r a b s and J e w s ran up against the p r o b l e m that 75 percent of the country had already been given to an A r a b d y n a s t y that w a s not Palestinian. T h e newly created province of T r a n s j o r d a n , later to b e c o m e the i n d e p e n d e n t state of J o r d a n , gradually drifted into existence as an entity separate from the rest of P a l e s t i n e ; indeed, today it is often forgotten that J o r d a n was ever part of Palestine.

* By sheltering and shielding Abdullah, Britain in effect partitioned the world of desert Arabians between the two contending royal houses, with the Jordanian frontier marking a dividing line. T h e only two countries whose names in 1988 still designate them as family property are the K i n g d o m of Saudi Arabia and the Hashemite K i n g d o m of J o r d a n ; the international border between them still divides the two Arabian royal houses.

30 A street s c e n e in B a g h d a d , which B r i t i s h t r o o p s entered in M a r c h 1917

33 G e n e r a l A l l e n b y ' s official entry into A l e p p o in M a r c h 1919

3 4 O t t o m a n s o l d i e r s s u r r e n d e r i n N o v e m b e r 1918 36 A d m i r a l C a l t h o r p e ' s flagship off C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in D e c e m b e r 1918

38 L l o y d G e o r g e (right)

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A p e a s a n t in a T u r k i s h field with u n b u r i e d b o d i e s of G r e e k soldiers,

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Mustapha Kemal of Turkey

49 S o n s of K i n g H u s s e i n of the H e j a z ( s e a t e d , left to r i g h t ) : F e i s a l , K i n g o f I r a q ; A b d u l l a h , E m i r o f T r a n s j o r d a n and later K i n g o f J o r d a n ; a n d Ali, briefly K i n g o f the H e j a z b e f o r e its c a p t u r e b y I b n S a u d

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C H U R C H I L L AND T H E QUESTION OF P A L E S T I N E i As Colonial Secretary in 1921—2, Churchill encountered even greater difficulty in dealing with the vexing p r o b l e m s of Palestine west of the J o r d a n river than with those of T r a n s j o r d a n and I r a q . T h e issue in Palestine was Z i o n i s m , and so intense were the p a s s i o n s it a r o u s e d that it was not always easy to r e m e m b e r what was really at i s s u e . T h e Zionists pictured Palestine—correctly, as we now k n o w — a s a country that could s u p p o r t at least five or ten t i m e s m o r e p e o p l e than lived there at the t i m e ; so that without d i s p l a c i n g any of the p e r h a p s 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 A r a b inhabitants, there was r o o m to bring in millions of J e w i s h settlers. At the time nothing like that m a n y J e w s were p r e p a r e d to settle as pioneers in Palestine, but Zionists h o p e d and A r a b s feared that they would do s o , and the unrestricted right of J e w s to enter the country b e c a m e the central issue in Palestinian politics. F r i e n d s of Z i o n i s m c l a i m e d — a n d later d e m o n s t r a t e d — t h a t J e w i s h enterprise could enrich the country, but i m p o v e r i s h e d A r a b peasant f a r m e r s were pers u a d e d that they were b e i n g asked to s h a r e what little they p o s s e s s e d with foreigners. As seen earlier, there had been A r a b anti-Zionist riots in Palestine a year before Churchill b e c a m e Colonial Secretary in F e b r u a r y 1 9 2 1 . N o t long after he a t t e m p t e d to solve the p r o b l e m s of the M i d d l e E a s t at the C a i r o Conference that M a r c h , Palestine e r u p t e d a g a i n . In J a f f a , on M a y D a y 1 9 2 1 , rioting broke out, beginning with looting, but g o i n g on to m u r d e r : d u r i n g the first day the A r a b m o b s killed thirty-five J e w s . In the c o u r s e of a blood-soaked week, fighting s p r e a d to the entire country as A r a b s besieged J e w i s h farm colonies outside the principal towns. T h e original A r a b riots in J a f f a were an explosion of anger against a small g r o u p of J e w i s h c o m m u n i s t s who m a r c h e d through the center of town to rival an earlier demonstration by a larger g r o u p of J e w i s h socialists. T h u s the i m p r e s s i o n gained g r o u n d a m o n g s t the British that the d i s o r d e r s were Bolshevik in 515

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origin. C a p t a i n C. D. B r u n t o n , who had served in the military administration for s o m e time, claimed that the riots had been caused by "Bolshevist J e w s " and a r g u e d that "the o u t b r e a k s of today m a y b e c o m e a revolution t o m o r r o w . " T h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , S i r H e r b e r t S a m u e l , r e s p o n d e d t o the A r a b attacks by temporarily s u s p e n d i n g J e w i s h i m m i g r a t i o n into Palestine. Zionist leaders feared that by rewarding A r a b violence, S a m u e l had g u a r a n t e e d that it would be renewed and that the history of the British M a n d a t e for Palestine would be a s t o r m y one. S a m u e l ' s administration was slow to restore o r d e r ; on 10 A u g u s t 1921 The Times reported that "Public security, particularly in the north, is for all practical p u r p o s e s , non-existent. R a i d s take place almost daily from T r a n s j o r d a n i a . . . " The Times c o r r e s p o n d e n t claimed that "neither J e w s nor A r a b s have any confidence in the authorities." He a d d e d that " T h e older inhabitants say that public security was far better maintained u n d e r the T u r k s . " A l t h o u g h A r a b riots s e e m e d likely to recur, Zionist leaders continued to seek a c c o m m o d a t i o n with the A r a b s a n d to e x p r e s s confidence that m o s t A r a b s were in favor of peace a n d cooperation. 1

II As Churchill recognized, one of his greatest p r o b l e m s in quelling the A r a b riots while g o i n g ahead with a pro-Zionist p r o g r a m was that the British forces u p o n w h o m he relied were unwilling to enforce his policy. T h e anti-Zionist case was easy for the British in Palestine to u n d e r s t a n d : A r a b s had lived in the country for ages and did not want their life a n d l a n d s c a p e c h a n g e d . British soldiers and officials worked every day a m o n g A r a b s who told t h e m so. Of c o u r s e J e w s lived in Palestine too, a n d their connection with the land was even m o r e l o n g - s t a n d i n g ; but m u c h of the c a s e for Z i o n i s m , s t r o n g though it was, was not entirely tangible: it was partly historical, partly theoretical, a n d partly visionary (in the sense that it was only in the future that J e w i s h enterprise would b r i n g a m u c h higher s t a n d a r d of living * Opening the Twelfth Zionist Congress in the summer of 1921, Nahum Sokolow said that Jews "were determined to work in peace with the Arab nation." Stressing the historical links between the two peoples, he argued that by cooperating they could "create a new life of the highest perfection for the people of the East" and that "Their interests were identical . . . " Dismissing the recent Arab riots as the work of a small group of criminals, he assured the Arab community that Jews "were not going to the Holy Land in a spirit of mastery. By industry and peace and modesty they would open up new sources of production which would be a blessing to themselves and to the whole East." z

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to all the peoples of the c o u n t r y ) . T h e Zionist case w a s also b a s e d on the suffering of J e w s in s u c h p l a c e s as R u s s i a a n d P o l a n d ; b u t m e m b e r s of the British Palestine a d m i n i s t r a t i o n h a d never witnessed that suffering a n d were not necessarily aware of it. A c c o r d i n g to Vladimir J a b o t i n s k y , the militant Zionist who h a d f o u n d e d the J e w i s h L e g i o n in Allenby's a r m y , the British military found Z i o n i s m to be a "fancy" theory, far-reaching a n d a i m i n g to repair the world's ills, and therefore u n s o u n d . A c c o r d i n g to J a b o t i n s k y , s u c h fancy s c h e m e s for i m p r o v i n g the world ran counter to all the instincts of the a v e r a g e E n g l i s h m a n of the ruling c l a s s e s . J a b o t i n s k y p o i n t e d out, too, that the administration w a s staffed by professional A r a b i s t s . T h e s e were p e o p l e (he wrote) so attracted to the A r a b w o r l d (as they conceived it to b e ) that they u n d e r w e n t the discipline of learning the A r a b l a n g u a g e a n d qualifying themselves for the Civil S e r v i c e , a n d were willing to leave Britain to s p e n d their professional lives in the A r a b M i d d l e E a s t ; a n d it w a s natural that they w o u l d not want to see the A r a b character of Palestine c h a n g e d . 3

J a b o t i n s k y t o u c h e d on, b u t did not s t r e s s , what m a y have been the principal reason for British opposition to the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n policy: it c a u s e d trouble. It w a s u n p o p u l a r with the A r a b s who constituted the bulk of the p o p u l a t i o n , while the j o b of the British colonial a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s to keep the p o p u l a t i o n quiet a n d satisfied. British civil a n d military personnel in Palestine had reason to believe that they could have enjoyed an easy a n d peaceful tour of duty in a contented country, if it were not for L o n d o n ' s policy, a d o p t e d for reasons not readily g r a s p e d , that excited c o m m u n a l tension a n d violence a n d e x p o s e d the local British administration to difficulty a n d even d a n g e r . H o w e v e r disaffection in the British ranks led ironically to an increase in the difficulty and d a n g e r , by e n c o u r a g i n g A r a b resistance a n d intransigence at a time when L o n d o n w a s not yet p r e p a r e d to yield. A particular e p i s o d e that w a s to have lasting c o n s e q u e n c e s was the intervention of the Palestine administration in the selection of a new religious leader for the M o s l e m c o m m u n i t y . T h e e p i s o d e b e g a n with the death, on 21 M a r c h 1 9 2 1 , of the Mufti of J e r u s a l e m . A mufti was an official who e x p o u n d e d the M o s l e m religious laws, a n d the Mufti of J e r u s a l e m w a s the chief s u c h jurist in his province. T h e British a d m i n i s t r a t i o n — b e s t o w i n g a title a p p a r ently of its own invention—also d e s i g n a t e d him as the G r a n d Mufti a n d as the leader of the M o s l e m c o m m u n i t y in P a l e s t i n e . A c c o r d i n g to the O t t o m a n law, which the British incorporated into their own, the g o v e r n m e n t w a s to select the new G r a n d Mufti f r o m a m o n g three c a n d i d a t e s n o m i n a t e d by a M o s l e m electoral college. 4

Although he w a s not a m o n g the three candidates n o m i n a t e d , A m i n a l - H u s s e i n i , a political agitator in his mid-twenties who h a d been

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sentenced to ten years' i m p r i s o n m e n t (though later p a r d o n e d ) for his leadership role in the 1920 riots, was n a m e d as the new G r a n d Mufti as a result of an intrigue by a violently anti-Zionist official n a m e d E r n e s t T . R i c h m o n d , a m e m b e r o f the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r ' s secretariat. R i c h m o n d was an architect who h a d served before the war in the E g y p t i a n Public Works A d m i n i s t r a t i o n a n d owed his j o b in Palestine to R o n a l d S t o r r s , a close friend with w h o m he s h a r e d a h o u s e for a time in J e r u s a l e m . In the Palestine administration he served as a liaison with the M o s l e m c o m m u n i t y , acting ( a c c o r d i n g to G e n e r a l G i l b e r t C l a y t o n ) "as to s o m e extent the counterpart of the Zionist O r g a n i s a t i o n . " A c c o r d i n g to an official of the Colonial Office in L o n d o n , R i c h m o n d was "a declared e n e m y of the Zionist policy" of the British g o v e r n m e n t . H e c r u s a d e d against that policy, a n d several years later—in 1924—wrote to the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in Palestine that in p u r s u i n g Z i o n i s m , the H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r a n d his officials, the M i d d l e E a s t D e p a r t m e n t of the Colonial Office in L o n d o n , a n d the Zionist C o m m i s s i o n in Palestine "are d o m i n a t e d a n d inspired by a spirit which I can only r e g a r d as evil." 5

6

7

When he s e c u r e d the position of G r a n d Mufti a n d leader of the Palestinian M o s l e m s for A m i n a l - H u s s e i n i in 1921, R i c h m o n d m u s t have believed that he was striking a blow against Z i o n i s m . As time would show, he h a d s t r u c k a c r u d e r , m o r e destructive blow against Palestinian A r a b s , w h o m the G r a n d Mufti was to lead into a bloody blind alley. An all-or-nothing a d v e n t u r e r , the G r a n d Mufti placed A r a b l a n d s a n d lives at risk by raising the stakes of the A r a b - J e w i s h conflict s u c h that one or a n o t h e r — J e w s or A r a b s — w o u l d be driven out or destroyed. Eventually the G r a n d Mufti's road was to lead him to N a z i G e r m a n y a n d alliance with A d o l p h Hitler. While A m i n a l - H u s s e i n i did not control A r a b P a l e s t i n e — h e had m a n y rivals for l e a d e r s h i p — h i s position as G r a n d Mufti g a v e h i m an a d v a n t a g e in the contest for the allegiance of the deeply divided A r a b c o m m u n i t i e s in Palestine. Whether Palestinian M o s l e m s w o u l d have followed other leaders h a d the B r i t i s h administration u s e d its power and influence in other ways can never be known; b u t to the extent that R i c h m o n d ' s antiZionist initiative had an effect, it was not helpful to the A r a b c a u s e — or to that of Churchill a n d the British g o v e r n m e n t in a t t e m p t i n g to b r i n g peace a n d p r o g r e s s to t r o u b l e d Palestine.

Ill Churchill a p p r o a c h e d the c o m p l e x , emotion-laden and m u d d l e d q u e s tion of Palestine with a s i m p l e , rational, and clear p r o g r a m . He

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believed in trying the Zionist e x p e r i m e n t , a n d thought that it w o u l d benefit everyone. When he visited Palestine after the C a i r o Conference, he told a Palestinian A r a b delegation on 30 M a r c h 1921 that it is manifestly right that the scattered J e w s s h o u l d have a national centre and a national h o m e to be re-united a n d where else b u t in Palestine with which for 3,000 years they have been intimately a n d profoundly a s s o c i a t e d ? We think it will be g o o d for the world, g o o d for the J e w s , g o o d for the British E m p i r e , b u t also g o o d for the A r a b s who dwell in Palestine a n d we intend it to be s o ; . . . they shall share in the benefits and p r o g r e s s of Z i o n i s m . 8

Churchill h a d always shown s y m p a t h y for J e w i s h aspirations and for the plight of J e w s p e r s e c u t e d by the c z a r s . L i k e B a l f o u r , he felt that the persecution of J e w s in R u s s i a a n d elsewhere h a d created a p r o b l e m for the entire world, which the creation of a J e w i s h h o m e l a n d in Palestine w o u l d solve. In Churchill's view, there were three kinds of politically active J e w s : those who participated in the political life of the country in which they lived; those who t u r n e d to the violent a n d s u b v e r s i v e international creed of B o l s h e v i s m ; a n d those who followed Dr C h a i m Weizmann a l o n g the path of Z i o n i s m . F o r the majority of the world's J e w s , who h a d g r o w n up in countries s u c h as R u s s i a which -refused t h e m full a n d equal citizenship, the q u e s t i o n (as he saw it) w a s whether they w o u l d b e c o m e Bolsheviks or Zionists. An ardent patriot himself, he considered J e w i s h nationalism a healthy p h e n o m e n o n that o u g h t to be e n c o u r a g e d . If, as m a y well h a p p e n , there s h o u l d be created in our own lifetime by the b a n k s of the J o r d a n a J e w i s h S t a t e u n d e r the protection of the British C r o w n which might c o m p r i s e three or four millions of J e w s , an event will have occurred in this history of the w o r l d which would from every point of view be beneficial a n d w o u l d be especially in h a r m o n y with the truest interests of the British E m p i r e . 9

So Churchill had written—before taking office as Colonial S e c r e t a r y — e a r l y in 1920. Churchill w a s not u n m i n d f u l of the opposition to Z i o n i s m a m o n g Palestinian A r a b s , but he believed that it could be o v e r c o m e by a p r o g r a m that c o m b i n e d basic firmness with attractive i n d u c e m e n t s and c o m p r o m i s e s . As Colonial Minister, he a t t e m p t e d to a p p e a s e Palestinian A r a b sentiment by scaling down Britain's s u p p o r t of Z i o n i s m . As indicated earlier, he d e c i d e d that Z i o n i s m w a s to be tried first only in the quarter of Palestine that lay west of the J o r d a n river, a n d nothing w a s to be d e c i d e d for the m o m e n t a b o u t extending

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it later into the other t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of the c o u n t r y — T r a n s j o r d a n . M o r e o v e r , Churchill a t t e m p t e d to redefine the British c o m m i t m e n t : he p r o p o s e d to establish a J e w i s h National H o m e in Palestine rather than a t t e m p t to make Palestine herself into a J e w i s h entity, a n d he claimed that that was what the l a n g u a g e of the Balfour Declaration meant. ( I n a private conversation at Balfour's house in the s u m m e r of 1921, both Balfour a n d the P r i m e Minister contradicted h i m a n d told Churchill that "by the Declaration they always meant an eventual Jewish S t a t e . " ) 1 0

Churchill further a t t e m p t e d to allay A r a b suspicions by d e m o n strating that their economic fears were g r o u n d l e s s . J e w i s h immig r a n t s , he a r g u e d repeatedly, would not seize A r a b j o b s or A r a b land. On the contrary, he s a i d , J e w i s h i m m i g r a n t s would create new j o b s a n d new wealth that would benefit the whole c o m m u n i t y . In J u n e 1921 Churchill told the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that " T h e r e really is nothing for the A r a b s to be frightened a b o u t . . . No J e w will be b r o u g h t in b e y o n d the n u m b e r who can be p r o v i d e d for by the e x p a n d i n g wealth a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of the r e s o u r c e s of the c o u n t r y . " In A u g u s t he repeated to an A r a b delegation that had c o m e to L o n d o n that 11

I have told you again and again that the J e w s will not be allowed to c o m e into the country except insofar as they build up the m e a n s for their livelihood . . . T h e y cannot take any man's lands. T h e y cannot d i s p o s s e s s any m a n of his rights or his p r o p e r t y . . . If they like to buy people's land and p e o p l e like to sell it to t h e m , and if they like to develop and cultivate regions now barren a n d m a k e them fertile, then they have the right . . . [to d o s o ] . 1 2

1 3

" T h e r e is r o o m for all . . . , " he told t h e m . "No one has h a r m e d you . . . T h e J e w s have a far m o r e difficult task than you. Y o u only have to enjoy your own p o s s e s s i o n ; b u t they have to try to create out of the wilderness, out of the barren places, a livelihood for the people they b r i n g i n . " In the s a m e statement he c o m p l a i n e d to the A r a b s that it was not fair of them to refuse to negotiate: "it is not fair to c o m e to a discussion thinking that one side has to give nothing a n d the other side has to give large a n d i m p o r t a n t concessions, a n d without any security that these concessions will be a m e a n s of p e a c e . " 14

IV Churchill had spent a lifetime i m m e r s e d in the political culture of E u r o p e , in which it was normal when p u t t i n g forth a p r o p o s a l to take

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account of the needs and desires of all interested parties, including a d v e r s a r i e s . T h u s when Kitchener, C l a y t o n , a n d S t o r r s in 1914—15 c o n t e m p l a t e d e x c l u d i n g F r a n c e f r o m the postwar A r a b M i d d l e E a s t , they noted that Britain w o u l d have to c o m p e n s a t e F r a n c e for doing so by seeing that she obtained territorial g a i n s elsewhere in the w o r l d ; a n d while this m a y not have been a realistic appreciation of what F r a n c e w o u l d accept, it was a realistic recognition that if Britain m a d e territorial g a i n s F r a n c e w o u l d insist on m a t c h i n g t h e m . S i m i l a r l y , in postwar T u r k e y , K e m a l — a s t a t e s m a n with a E u r o p e a n cast of m i n d — f o r m u l a t e d territorial d e m a n d s for T u r k i s h nationalism not merely on the basis of his appreciation of what T u r k e y needed but also on his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what T u r k e y ' s neighbors could accept. T h i s was the sort of s t a t e s m a n s h i p to which Churchill was accust o m e d ; but he did not find it in the Palestinian A r a b delegation in L o n d o n , which d i d no m o r e than repeat its d e m a n d s . Palestine was and is an area of c o m p l e x a n d c o m p e t i n g claims, b u t the A r a b delegation took account of no claims, fears, needs, or d r e a m s other than its own. U n l i k e the Zionist leaders, who sought to c o m p e n s a t e A r a b nationalism b y s u p p o r t i n g A r a b v e r s u s F r e n c h claims t o S y r i a , who envisaged areas of A r a b a u t o n o m y within Palestine, and who planned e c o n o m i c a n d other benefits for A r a b s who chose to live within the confines of the J e w i s h h o m e l a n d , the A r a b leaders m a d e no effort to a c c o m m o d a t e J e w i s h aspirations or to take account of J e w i s h needs. D e a l i n g with M i d d l e E a s t e r n e r s s u c h as these was far m o r e frustrating than had been i m a g i n e d in w a r t i m e L o n d o n when the p r o s pect of a d m i n i s t e r i n g the postwar M i d d l e E a s t was first raised. In Churchill's eyes, the m e m b e r s of the A r a b delegation were not d o i n g what politicians are s u p p o s e d to d o : they were not a i m i n g to reach an a g r e e m e n t — a n y a g r e e m e n t . A p p a r e n t l y unwilling to offer even 1 percent in order to get 99 percent, they offered no incentive to the other side to m a k e concessions. Churchill remonstrated with the A r a b l e a d e r s — t o no effect.

V T h e A r a b delegation t o L o n d o n , which was h e a d e d b y M u s a K a z i m P a s h a a l - H u s s e i n i , president of the A r a b E x e c u t i v e , apparently refused to u n d e r s t a n d what Churchill was saying. M e m b e r s of the delegation would ask a question, and then when Churchill had answered it, would ask the s a m e question again, as t h o u g h they had * Not to be confused with his relative, the youthful Grand Mufti.

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not heard Churchill's reply. Churchill s h o w e d s i g n s of frustration and anger at this tactic, but continued to repeat his a n s w e r s in the evident hope of finally m a k i n g himself u n d e r s t o o d . It was in this spirit that he repeated that land was not being taken away from A r a b s ; that A r a b s sold land to J e w s only if they chose to do so. In the M i d d l e E a s t , things rarely were what they s e e m e d to be, a n d the land issue in Palestine w a s a case in point. T h e A r a b delegation to L o n d o n did in fact u n d e r s t a n d what Churchill meant a b o u t A r a b s wanting to sell land to J e w s , for M u s a K a z i m P a s h a , the president of the delegation, was himself one of those who h a d sold land to the J e w i s h s e t t l e r s . So h a d other m e m b e r s of the A r a b delegations that he b r o u g h t with him to L o n d o n in 1921—2 and in succeeding years. 15

Prince Feisal a n d Dr C h a i m W e i z m a n n had a g r e e d in 1918 that there was no scarcity of land in P a l e s t i n e : the p r o b l e m , rather, was that so m u c h of it was controlled by a small g r o u p of A r a b landowners and u s u r e r s . T h e great m a s s of the p e a s a n t r y s t r u g g l e d to eke out a b a r e living from low-yielding, m u c h - e r o d e d , poorly irrigated plots, while large holdings of fertile lands were being a c c u m u l a t e d by influential families of absentee l a n d l o r d s . 1 6

T h e Zionist plan, as outlined by W e i z m a n n to Feisal in 1918, was to avoid encroaching on land being worked by the A r a b peasantry and instead to reclaim u n u s e d , uncultivated land, a n d by the use of scientific agricultural m e t h o d s to restore its fertility. T h e large A r a b l a n d h o l d e r s , however, turned out to be eager to sell the J e w i s h settlers their fertile l a n d s , t o o — a t very considerable profits.* I n d e e d J e w i s h p u r c h a s e r s bid land prices up so that, not untypically, an A r a b family of Beirut sold plots of land in the Jezreel valley to J e w i s h settlers in 1921 at prices r a n g i n g from forty to eighty times the original p u r c h a s e p r i c e . F a r from being forced by J e w s to sell, A r a b s offered so m u c h land to J e w s that the only limiting factor on p u r c h a s e s b e c a m e m o n e y : the J e w i s h settlers did not have e n o u g h m o n e y to b u y all the land that A r a b s offered to t h e m . 1 7

1 8

N o t merely non-Palestinian A r a b s but the Palestinian A r a b leadership class itself was deeply implicated in these land sales that it publicly d e n o u n c e d . Either personally or through their families, at

* For a variety of reasons, the economic yield on Palestinian agricultural landholdings had sunk to low levels during the First World War and just afterward, and the Arab propertied classes were enabled to maintain their level of income only because of the bonanza provided by Jews purchasing land at inflated prices. Jewish settlement was a boon to wealthy Arabs, whatever they said in public to the contrary, and their claim that Jews were forcing them to sell was fraudulent. T h e genuine grievance was that of the impoverished Arab peasantry. As socialists, the Jewish farmers were opposed to the exploitation of others and therefore did all their own work; when Jews bought Arab farms the Arab farm laborers therefore lost their jobs.

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least a q u a r t e r of the elected official leadership of the A r a b Palestinian c o m m u n i t y s o l d land to J e w i s h settlers between 1920 a n d 1 9 2 8 . T h e Zionist leadership m a y have been misled b y s u c h dealings into u n d e r e s t i m a t i n g the d e p t h of real local opposition to J e w i s h settlement. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t , o n the other h a n d , m i s j u d g e d not merely the d e p t h but also the n a t u r e of the A r a b r e s p o n s e : in treating the land issue as if it were valid rather than the f r a u d it w a s , Churchill a n d his colleagues either m i s u n d e r s t o o d or p r e t e n d e d to m i s u n d e r s t a n d the real basis of A r a b o p p o s i t i o n to Z i o n i s m . A r a b opposition to J e w i s h settlement w a s rooted in emotion, in religion, in x e n o p h o b i a , in the c o m p l e x of feelings that tend to o v e r c o m e people when n e w c o m e r s flood in to c h a n g e their n e i g h b o r h o o d . T h e A r a b s of Palestine were defending a threatened way of life. T h e A r a b delegations that went to see Winston Churchill did not articulate this real b a s i s for their objection to Z i o n i s m . I n s t e a d they a r g u e d that the country c o u l d not sustain m o r e i n h a b i t a n t s ; and Churchill took them at their w o r d . He accepted their s t a t e m e n t that they were objecting on e c o n o m i c g r o u n d s ; a n d then he went ahead to prove that their e c o n o m i c fears were unjustified. 1 9

VI In a decision that h a d lasting i m p a c t — a n d that s h o w e d that A r a b e c o n o m i c fears were u n j u s t i f i e d — C h u r c h i l l in 1922 a p p r o v e d a concession for hydro-electric s c h e m e s in the A u j a a n d J o r d a n river valleys to Pinhas R u t e n b e r g , a J e w i s h engineer from R u s s i a . T h i s put into m o t i o n a far-reaching plan to p r o v i d e power a n d irrigation that w o u l d m a k e possible the reclamation of the land a n d its economic d e v e l o p m e n t along twentieth-century lines. It was the first giant step along the r o a d t o w a r d p r o v i n g the Zionist claim that Palestine could s u p p o r t a p o p u l a t i o n of millions a n d n o t — a s A r a b s p o k e s m e n c l a i m e d — m e r e l y of h u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s . Churchill was especially i m p r e s s e d by the fact that the s c h e m e was put forward a n d financed on a n o n c o m m e r c i a l b a s i s , a n d w a s m o v e d to tell the H o u s e of C o m m o n s that only Zionists were willing to undertake s u c h a project on s u c h a b a s i s . I am told that the A r a b s w o u l d have done it for themselves. Who is g o i n g to believe that? L e f t to themselves, the A r a b s of Palestine w o u l d not in a t h o u s a n d years have taken effective s t e p s t o w a r d the irrigation and electrification of Palestine. T h e y w o u l d have been quite content to dwell—a handful of philos o p h i c p e o p l e — i n the wasted s u n - s c o r c h e d plains, letting the waters of the J o r d a n continue to flow unbridled and u n h a r n e s s e d into the D e a d S e a . 2 0

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Churchill continued to warn the A r a b s — a s he did f r o m the very b e g i n n i n g — t h a t they had better m a k e the best of it b e c a u s e Britain was g o i n g to carry t h r o u g h on her c o m m i t m e n t s in any event. In the s u m m e r of 1921 he had told the recalcitrant Palestinian A r a b delegation in L o n d o n that " T h e British G o v e r n m e n t m e a n to carry out the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n . I have told you so again a n d again. I told you so at J e r u s a l e m . I told you so at the H o u s e of C o m m o n s the other day. I tell you so now. T h e y m e a n to carry out the Balfour Declaration. T h e y d o . " 2 1

B u t , in Palestine, officers of the British administration e n c o u r a g e d A r a b leaders to believe otherwise. Churchill gloomily estimated that 90 percent of the British a r m y in Palestine was arrayed against the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n p o l i c y . O n 2 9 O c t o b e r 1921 G e n e r a l W . N . C o n g r e v e , the c o m m a n d e r of the British a r m i e s in E g y p t and Palestine, sent a circular to«all t r o o p s stating that, while "the A r m y officially is s u p p o s e d to have no politics," it did have s y m p a t h i e s , and "In the case of Palestine these s y m p a t h i e s are rather obviously with the A r a b s , who have hitherto a p p e a r e d to the disinterested observer to have been the victims of an unjust policy forced u p o n them by the British G o v e r n m e n t . " Pointing to Churchill's m u c h narrowed interpretation of the B a l f o u r D e c l a r a t i o n , C o n g r e v e exp r e s s e d confidence that " T h e British G o v e r n m e n t would never give any s u p p o r t to the m o r e g r a s p i n g policy of the Zionist E x t r e m i s t , which a i m s at the E s t a b l i s h m e n t of a J e w i s h Palestine in which A r a b s w o u l d be merely t o l e r a t e d . " In p a s s i n g the circular on to Churchill, J o h n S h u c k b u r g h noted "It is unfortunately the case that the a r m y in Palestine is largely anti-Zionist a n d will p r o b a b l y remain so whatever m a y be said to i t . " 22

23

24

S h u c k b u r g h ' s d e p u t y , H u b e r t Y o u n g , wrote a m e m o r a n d u m in the s u m m e r of 1921 that Churchill circulated to the C a b i n e t , a d v o cating "the removal of all anti-Zionist civil officials, however highly placed." T h i s did not get at the p r o b l e m of military officials, however; a n d even the presence of S i r H e r b e r t S a m u e l a n d W y n d h a m D e e d e s at the head of the civil administration did not s e e m to affect the political orientation of officials lower down. In the J e w i s h c o m m u n i t y , too, there were those who d e s p a i r e d of obtaining s u p p o r t from the British authorities. Vladimir J a b o t i n s k y , founder of the J e w i s h L e g i o n , a r g u e d that J e w s were g o i n g to have to protect themselves b e c a u s e the police a n d the a r m y were not going to do the j o b . On 27 M a r c h 1922 the N e a r E a s t e r n c o r r e s p o n d e n t of The Times r e p o r t e d that "certain of the m o r e extreme Zionists have c o m m i t t e d the criminal error of s m u g g l i n g a r m s into the country and forming a secret defence force called the ' H a g a n a ' . " In turn, as time wore on, influential figures in Britain b e g a n to wonder whether their country could afford to continue o c c u p y i n g 25

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Palestine in s u p p o r t of a Zionist p r o g r a m that had c o m e to s e e m so difficult of realization. The Times had been an enthusiastic backer of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n policy, which it had t e r m e d (on 27 April 1920) "the only s o u n d policy the Allies could a d o p t toward the J e w i s h p e o p l e , " b u t its ardor waned as the difficulties multiplied. In the s p r i n g of 1922, The Times ran a six-part series of articles by Philip G r a v e s , who had served in the A r a b B u r e a u d u r i n g the war, to explain Britain's g r o w i n g u n p o p u l a r i t y in Palestine; a n d G r a v e s •blamed Palestine's J e w s for b e i n g rioted against rather m o r e than he b l a m e d the a r m y for s y m p a t h i z i n g with the rioters. He a r g u e d that the British a r m y w a s war-weary. S o , in fact, w a s the British p u b l i c . In the issue of 11 April 1922, in which the G r a v e s series was c o n c l u d e d , The Times ran a leading article f r o m the point of view of "the British t a x p a y e r , " in which it recalled the value of the Zionist experiment in Palestine, b u t w o n d e r e d whether Britain could afford to continue s u p p o r t i n g it. "It is an interesting e x p e r i m e n t , b u t the question is whether we have c o u n t e d the cost." T h u s the Colonial S e c r e t a r y found that his government's Palestine policy was b e i n g u n d e r m i n e d in Britain herself, where it had formerly enjoyed w i d e s u p p o r t . On 21 J u n e 1922 a motion was introduced in the H o u s e of L o r d s declaring that the Palestine M a n d a t e (which e m b o d i e d the policy of the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n ) was u n a c c e p t a b l e ; it was carried by sixty votes to twenty-nine. T h e n o n b i n d i n g H o u s e of L o r d s motion served to focus attention on the Colonial Office debate in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , which took place on the evening of 4 J u l y . Churchill was attacked by a n u m b e r of s p e a k e r s for a t t e m p t i n g to carry the Balfour Declaration into effect. M a n y of those who attacked Churchill had formerly s u p p o r t e d the Balfour Declaration, a n d he u s e d their earlier statements against them with telling effect. Churchill read out a dozen s t a t e m e n t s s u p p o r t i n g the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n that h a d been m a d e at the time of its i s s u a n c e . He told the H o u s e that he could p r o l o n g the list by reading out m a n y m o r e s u c h s t a t e m e n t s . He told his o p p o n e n t s that, having s u p p o r t e d the m a k i n g of a national c o m m i t m e n t , they had no right to turn a r o u n d a n d attack h i m for endeavoring to fulfill that c o m m i t m e n t . 26

As he d i d on a n u m b e r of other occasions, Churchill s p o k e warmly of the need for Britain to honor her p l e d g e s . He told the H o u s e that the Balfour D e c l a r a t i o n had been issued "not only on the merits, t h o u g h I think the merits are c o n s i d e r a b l e , " but b e c a u s e it was believed at the time that J e w i s h s u p p o r t "would be a definite palpable a d v a n t a g e " in Britain's struggle to win the w a r . He pointed out that he had not been a m e m b e r of the War C a b i n e t at the t i m e a n d had played no role in the deliberations f r o m which the Balfour Declaration had e m e r g e d . H o w e v e r , like other M e m b e r s of Parliament (he cont i n u e d ) , he had loyally s u p p o r t e d the policy of the War C a b i n e t a n d 2 7

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the o p p o s i t i o n to the official Zionist leadership throughout the 1920s a n d then—in the late 1 9 3 0 s — s e c e d e d to found his own rival ZionistRevisionist organization, d e n o u n c i n g Churchill's decision in 1922 to r e m o v e T r a n s j o r d a n f r o m the territory of the J e w i s h National H o m e and d e m a n d i n g the establishment of a J e w i s h state on both sides of the J o r d a n . T h e s c h i s m persists to this d a y in the politics of the state of Israel, in which the L a b o r P a r t y claims the heritage of B e n G u r i o n and the H e r u t Party, that of J a b o t i n s k y . What also persists in Israel, especially in H e r u t r a n k s , is the view that J o r d a n either is or s h o u l d be an A r a b Palestinian s t a t e : that Churchill's separation of T r a n s j o r d a n i a (as it was then called) from the rest of the Palestine M a n d a t e in 1922 was not legitimate.

VIII T h e A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g section of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e h a d now been politically r e d e s i g n e d . T h e T u r k s no longer ruled it. In the east, K u r d i s h , S u n n i , Shi'ite, and J e w i s h populations had been c o m b i n e d into a new M e s o p o t a m i a n country n a m e d I r a q , u n d e r the rule of an A r a b i a n p r i n c e ; it looked like an independent country, b u t Britain r e g a r d e d it as a British protectorate. S y r i a a n d a greatly enlarged L e b a n o n were ruled by F r a n c e . A new A r a b entity that was to b e c o m e J o r d a n h a d been carved out of Palestine; a n d west of the J o r d a n river was a Palestine that was to contain a J e w i s h National H o m e . It was far from the restored O t t o m a n E m p i r e Churchill had once e s p o u s e d . Churchill h a d , however, achieved the principal objectives that he had set for himself in the M i d d l e E a s t when he b e c a m e Colonial S e c r e t a r y . H i s overriding goal had been to cut costs, and he had done so drastically. M o r e o v e r , he believed that he h a d created a s y s t e m that could be o p e r a t e d economically in the future. H i s line of air b a s e s stretching from E g y p t to I r a q allowed him to keep the M i d d l e E a s t e r n countries u n d e r control with a m i n i m u m of e x p e n s e . H i s other goal had been to d e m o n s t r a t e that Britain kept her p l e d g e s . He h a d not fully achieved this with respect to Z i o n i s m , but he h a d done so in r e g a r d to whatever m i g h t have been owing to the dynasty o f K i n g H u s s e i n . T . E . L a w r e n c e , formerly the government's severest British critic on this score, j u d g e d that he h a d m o r e than done s o . At the end of 1922, referring back to the wartime corres p o n d e n c e between H u s s e i n a n d S i r H e n r y M c M a h o n , then British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in E g y p t , concerning the frontiers of A r a b indep e n d e n c e , L a w r e n c e wrote that "He (Churchill) executed the whole M c M a h o n u n d e r t a k i n g (called a treaty by s o m e who have not seen it) for Palestine, for T r a n s j o r d a n i a a n d for A r a b i a . In M e s o p o t a m i a he

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went far b e y o n d its provisions . . . I do not wish to m a k e long explanations, b u t m u s t p u t on record my conviction that E n g l a n d is out of the A r a b affair with clean h a n d s . " B u t it was not the A r a b affair that was Churchill's principal concern in the M i d d l e E a s t , even t h o u g h it was his principal responsibility. H i s m a i n concern was for the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g r e m n a n t of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; L l o y d G e o r g e ' s policy in that area w a s — i n Churchill's v i e w — d a n g e r o u s l y w r o n g , a n d threatened to b r i n g down in ruin the entire British position in the M i d d l e E a s t . 3 4

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T H E A L L I A N C E S COME APART i Churchill's m i s g i v i n g s a b o u t L l o y d G e o r g e ' s T u r k i s h policy went u n h e e d e d , for the P r i m e Minister, in the p r i d e of his position, of his victories, of his record of h a v i n g been proven right when all the experts a r o u n d him h a d said he was w r o n g , did not pay d u e attention to the opinions of his colleagues. L l o y d G e o r g e played a lone a n d lordly h a n d , without a c c o m m o d a t i n g the diverse political g r o u p i n g s a t h o m e a n d a b r o a d f r o m w h o m his power s t e m m e d . F o r years L l o y d G e o r g e h a d been the star of a solar s y s t e m of coalitions. As head of a p a r l i a m e n t a r y coalition of C o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d his own g r o u p of L i b e r a l s , he continued to c o m m a n d the s u p p o r t of a majority in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s , which sustained h i m in office as leader of a coalition C a b i n e t . As P r i m e Minister of Britain he also exercised leadership of a diverse coalition that included the e m p i r e a n d the self-governing D o m i n i o n s of C a n a d a , N e w f o u n d l a n d , S o u t h Africa, A u s t r a l i a , and N e w Z e a l a n d — a coalition that h a d joined the continental E u r o p e a n Allies to o p p o s e the Central P o w e r s in the F i r s t World War. As of 1921, L l o y d G e o r g e was the sole leader of the wartime alliance who still r e m a i n e d in office. It was in the still u n s u b d u e d d o m a i n s of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e that this s y s t e m of coalitions started to c o m e a p a r t . R u s s i a h a d been the first of the E u r o p e a n Allies to withdraw from the w a r t i m e coalition—and then to fight against it. E v e n before the war e n d e d the new Bolshevik r e g i m e had m o v e d into conflict with R u s s i a ' s former Allies all along a southern tier in the M i d d l e E a s t a n d Central A s i a . Conversely, the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t m o v e d into a working alliance with a w a r t i m e enemy, T u r k e y , in the years immediately following the armistices, collaborating both with Enver P a s h a a n d with M u s t a p h a K e m a l . I t s u p p l i e d a r m s a n d money that helped K e m a l continue his s t r u g g l e against the Allies. In 1921 the Soviet governm e nt s of R u s s i a and its satellite r e g i m e s entered into c o m p r e h e n s i v e 530

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a g r e e m e n t s with K e m a l ' s T u r k i s h r e g i m e , establishing a frontier and a working relationship between t h e m . In 1921, too, Soviet R u s s i a also m o v e d into a working relationship with another of the former e n e m y s t a t e s . A c t i n g u p o n E n v e r Pasha's s u g g e s t i o n , the leaders of the new G e r m a n a r m y entered into a secret p a r t n e r s h i p with the Soviet r e g i m e . T h e h e a d of the a r m y , E n v e r ' s friend G e n e r a l von Seeckt, established "Special B r a n c h R" in the War Ministry to administer the relationship, which e n c o m p a s s e d war p r o d u c t i o n , military training, a n d the d e v e l o p m e n t of new w e a p o n r y . G e r m a n officers were p e r m i t t e d to s t u d y w e a p o n s f o r b i d d e n to t h e m by the victorious A l l i e s — t a n k s a n d airplanes, in p a r t i c u l a r — o n R u s s i a n s o i l . G e r m a n industrial enterprises established factories in R u s s i a to m a n u f a c t u r e poison g a s , explosive shells, a n d military aircraft. T h e G e r m a n a r m y established training a c a d e m i e s for its tank c o m m a n d e r s a n d fighter pilots on Soviet territory. At the s a m e t i m e , Soviet R u s s i a sent officers to G e r m a n y to be schooled in the m e t h o d s that h a d been developed by the feared a n d a d m i r e d G e r m a n G e n e r a l Staff. T h e s e clandestine a r r a n g e m e n t s were sanctioned b y the G e r m a n g o v e r n m e n t in secret provisions of the T r e a t y of Rapallo* in 1922. It was s y m b o l i c of the new state of affairs that G e n e r a l H a n s von Seeckt, who served in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e as chief of staff of the O t t o m a n a r m y at the end of the war, a n d who h a d served as head of the G e r m a n a r m y since 1919, was r e p o r t i n g to the R u s s i a n G e n e r a l Staff on the military situation in the D a r d a n e l l e s in 1922. It was a m e a s u r e of how far R u s s i a had traveled since her 1914 war against G e r m a n y a n d T u r k e y ; all three nations were now r a n g e d together against Britain. 1

II Italy was the next to c h a n g e s i d e s . As soon as the armistice was s i g n e d , she b e g a n to show s y m p a t h y for the plight of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , influenced p e r h a p s by the tradition of c o m r a d e s h i p between nationalist m o v e m e n t s that s t e m m e d from the teachings of the nineteenth-century Italian patriot G i u s e p p e M a z z i n i , as well as a desire to p r e s e r v e a n d e x p a n d the p r e w a r Italian economic presence in T u r k e y . C o u n t C a r l o S f o r z a , who was a p p o i n t e d Italian H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e at the end of 1918, was a practical s t a t e s m a n of w i d e a n d h u m a n e principles who immediately took the initiative in establishing a working relationship with M u s t a p h a K e m a l a n d in e n c o u r a g i n g the T u r k s to resist the m o r e e x t r e m e d e m a n d s of * An agreement between Russia and Germany on 16 April 19Z2, that provided for the building up of political and consular contacts between the two countries.

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the Allies. T h e Italians m a d e no secret of this opposition within Allied councils to the peace t e r m s p r o p o s e d by Britain a n d F r a n c e . In 1920, when the S u l t a n , forced by Britain a n d F r a n c e , was on the verge of s i g n i n g the T r e a t y of S e v r e s , a high-ranking official of the British War Office reported that Italy was m o v i n g to s u p p o r t K e m a l , who rejected the treaty. A m o n t h before the T r e a t y of S e v r e s was s i g n e d , L o r d C u r z o n reproached C o u n t S f o r z a with the "unloyal attitude" of Italy in the M i d d l e E a s t . F r o m the time of the armistice o n w a r d , the divergence between Italy's goals in the M i d d l e E a s t and those of her Allies widened. As a practical m a t t e r there was little incentive for her to s u p p o r t their p r o g r a m , especially after they sent the G r e e k a r m y into the S m y r n a enclave to p r e - e m p t the Italian claim. To successive Italian governm e n t s , Allied policy s e e m e d d e s i g n e d chiefly to profit G r e e c e — a p u r p o s e that R o m e had no interest in serving. Especially after C o u n t S f o r z a b e c a m e F o r e i g n Minister in 1920, Italy treated G r e e c e as a rival whose gains had to be matched rather than an ally whose claims had to be s u p p o r t e d . In asserting her own claims, Italy received no help from the Allies. A clash with K e m a l i s t forces at K o n y a in central Anatolia left the Italian authorities with the feeling that in their sector of occupied T u r k e y they w o u l d be left to face a K e m a l i s t a d v a n c e by t h e m s e l v e s — a n d that they m i g h t be beaten. D e t e r i o r a t i n g economic, financial, and social conditions at h o m e finally led Italy to a b a n d o n her claims to T u r k i s h territory a n d evacuate her forces from A n a t o l i a : her hope was that K e m a l ' s A n g o r a regime w o u l d reward her for d o i n g so by agreeing to economic concessions. S f o r z a entered into a secret accord with the K e m a l i s t s whereby Italy w o u l d s u p p l y t h e m with substantial s h i p m e n t s of military e q u i p m e n t if s u c h concessions were forthcoming. 2

As F o r e i g n Minister, C o u n t S f o r z a continued to p r e s s the British and F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t s for revision of the T r e a t y of S e v r e s and warned L o r d C u r z o n that unless the Allies s u c c e e d e d in c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with K e m a l , the A n g o r a regime would be driven into alliance with M o s c o w — a possibility, he said, fraught with p e r i l . F o r a n u m b e r of reasons, then, the Italian g o v e r n m e n t continued to dissent from the policy e m b o d i e d in the T r e a t y of S e v r e s , yet m a d e no overt m o v e to o p p o s e it, not d a r i n g to risk an o p e n confrontation with Britain. 3

Within Italy there were d e m a n d s for a m o r e forceful a p p r o a c h to the realization of the country's a m b i t i o n s . T h e rapt e n t h u s i a s m that had greeted G a b r i e l e D'Annunzio's seizure of the D a l m a t i a n port of F i u m e in 1919—the f a m o u s author and nationalist had led his s u p porters to take over the t o w n — s h o w e d the wellsprings of sentiment that were there to be t a p p e d . Benito Mussolini u s e d his n e w s p a p e r , the Popolo d'Italia, to exploit the bitterness of those who felt cheated

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out of the r e w a r d s of victory. An agitator who, in turn, had advocated the e x t r e m e positions of almost all sections of the left a n d the right—in his own w o r d s , "an a d v e n t u r e r for all r o a d s " — h e c h a r g e d that Italy was b e i n g cheated out of the "booty" in the M i d d l e E a s t . Proclaiming a "great imperial destiny" for his country, he asserted that it had a right to b e c o m e the d o m i n a n t power in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . T h e G r e a t Power that stood in the way, a c c o r d i n g to him, was B r i t a i n ; Mussolini p r o p o s e d to help insurgent forces in Egypt, India, and Ireland. 4

5

When M u s s o l i n i , s u p p o r t e d by his political followers, known as fascisti, b e c a m e P r i m e Minister of Italy in 1922, Italy's local disagreem e n t s with Britain a b o u t territorial claims in T u r k e y a n d the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n evolved into a m o r e general a n d p e r m a n e n t estrangement. Mussolini's political p r o g r a m called for Britain to be chased out of the Mediterranean a l t o g e t h e r . U n d e r his l e a d e r s h i p , Italy, like R u s s i a , m o v e d from ally to enemy of the British E m p i r e . 6

Ill T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s withdrew f r o m the Allied coalition in 1919—20, when the S e n a t e rejected the T r e a t y of Versailles and m e m b e r s h i p in the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s a n d refused to accept a M a n d a t e to govern A r m e n i a . In reply to a note from the F r e n c h a m b a s s a d o r , the S e c retary of S t a t e , on behalf of President Wilson, set forth the new A m e r i c a n position in a note of 24 M a r c h 1920: the U n i t e d S t a t e s would not s e n d a representative to the Peace Conference a n d would not participate in or sign the peace treaty with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , but it e x p e c t e d the peace treaty to take account of A m e r i c a n views. In addition to President Wilson's views on specific M i d d l e E a s t e r n m a t t e r s mentioned in the note, the U n i t e d S t a t e s insisted on an O p e n D o o r policy, on nondiscrimination against nonsignatories of the treaty, a n d on the maintenance of existing A m e r i c a n rights in the area. In 1919 the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e c o m m e n c e d a p r o g r a m of legally asserting A m e r i c a n rights in the o c c u p i e d O t t o m a n territories, inc l u d i n g not only those deriving from the Capitulation a g r e e m e n t s governing the rights a n d privileges of A m e r i c a n s in T u r k e y , b u t also freedom of navigation of the D a r d a n e l l e s , protection of A m e r i c a n missionary colleges a n d endeavors, a n d a d e q u a t e o p p o r t u n i t y to carry out archaeological activities a n d commercial activities. T h e most c o n s p i c u o u s interests asserted by the U n i t e d S t a t e s were those of * Which is to say that markets in the region were to be fully open to American businessmen.

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A m e r i c a n oil c o m p a n i e s . It was these that b r o u g h t the U n i t e d S t a t e s and Britain into collision. T h e oil issue was raised for the first time on behalf of the S t a n d a r d Oil C o m p a n y of N e w Y o r k ("Socony"), which had been e n g a g e d in oil exploration in the M i d d l e E a s t before the war and held (from the O t t o m a n r e g i m e ) c o n c e s s i o n s — t h a t is to say, exclusive licenses to explore for oil in designated a r e a s — i n Palestine a n d S y r i a . It held no concessions in I r a q , however, a n d wanted to establish concessions there b e c a u s e it was the principal s u p p l i e r of petroleum p r o d u c t s in the a r e a ; the c o m p a n y ' s m a r k e t i n g strategy called for it to obtain s u p p l i e s for its m a r k e t i n g organization at or near the point of sales. In S e p t e m b e r 1919 S o c o n y sent two geologists to p r o s p e c t for oil in I r a q . O n e of t h e m incautiously sent a letter to his wife telling her "I am g o i n g to the biggest r e m a i n i n g oil possibilities in the world" a n d "the pie is so very big" that whatever h a d to be done s h o u l d be done to "gain us the rights which properly belong to A m e r i c a n C i t i z e n s . " T h e letter was intercepted in Allied-occupied C o n s t a n tinople by British censors, who f o r w a r d e d a copy of it to the British g o v e r n m e n t i n L o n d o n . L o n d o n immediately sent o r d e r s t o S i r A r n o l d Wilson, H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r in I r a q , to forbid the geologists to p r o s p e c t . At Socony's r e q u e s t the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e protested, b u t L o r d C u r z o n , the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , put the A m e r i c a n s off with a plausible but not entirely true tale: w a r t i m e restrictions applicable to all nationalities f o r b a d e s u c h activities until peace was c o n c l u d e d . 7

T h e S t a n d a r d Oil C o m p a n y of N e w J e r s e y was the next to enter the p i c t u r e . In 1910 its head geologist h a d c o n c l u d e d that there was oil potential in I r a q ; b u t until after the war, N e w J e r s e y S t a n d a r d did nothing a b o u t it. In F e b r u a r y 1919 the c o m p a n y ' s president s u g g e s t e d to the b o a r d of directors that an effort be m a d e to look for oil in I r a q ; a n d a m o n t h later the c o m p a n y ' s h e a d of foreign p r o duction was sent to Paris to take up the question with the A m e r i c a n delegation to the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . L a t e r the c h a i r m a n of the b o a r d of N e w J e r s e y S t a n d a r d , A. C. B e d f o r d , went to E u r o p e to deal with the matter personally. T h e various w a r t i m e a r r a n g e m e n t s negotiated between Britain and F r a n c e to s h a r e the postwar oil wealth of the M i d d l e E a s t r e m a i n e d s e c r e t — the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t h a d been p u t off with false a s s u r a n c e s that nothing h a d been d e c i d e d u p o n that excluded the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' i n t e r e s t s — a n d these were matters that he looked into. On 27 April 1920, at the C o n f e r e n c e of S a n R e m o , Britain a n d F r a n c e finally c o n c l u d e d a secret oil b a r g a i n , agreeing in effect to m o n o p o l i z e the whole future o u t p u t of M i d d l e E a s t e r n oil between t h e m . B e d f o r d obtained a copy of the agreement from a m e m b e r of the F r e n c h delegation, a n d turned it over to the A m e r i c a n e m b a s s y . In view of the m a g n i t u d e of the p r o p o s e d A n g l o - F r e n c h m o n o p o l y ,

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the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t looked upon the S a n R e m o agreement as harmful, not merely to one or m o r e A m e r i c a n c o m p a n i e s , but to the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' interests as a nation. T h e war had focused attention for the first time on the vital military a n d naval i m p o r t a n c e of p e t r o l e u m , a n d in the aftermath of the war the U n i t e d S t a t e s had u n d e r g o n e an oil-scarcity s c a r e . T h e price of c r u d e oil rose, a n d fears were e x p r e s s e d widely that domestic oil reserves were b e i n g depleted. T h e economic adviser to the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e wrote that "It is economically essential . . . to obtain a s s u r e d foreign s u p p l i e s of petroleum" in order to a s s u r e s u p p l i e s of bunker oil to the merchant marine and the navy, and in order to p e r p e t u a t e the U n i t e d S t a t e s ' position as the world's leading oil and oil p r o d u c t s s u p p l i e r . 8

In the s u m m e r of 1920, the S a n R e m o agreement was m a d e public and the U n i t e d S t a t e s — a b l e finally to acknowledge that it knew of the a g r e e m e n t — p r o t e s t e d . F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y C u r z o n replied that Britain controlled only 4.5 percent of world oil p r o d u c t i o n while the U n i t e d S t a t e s controlled 80 p e r c e n t — a n d that the U n i t e d S t a t e s excluded n o n - A m e r i c a n interests from areas u n d e r its c o n t r o l . S e c retary of S t a t e B a i n b r i d g e C o l b y countered that the U n i t e d S t a t e s p o s s e s s e d only one-twelfth of the world's known oil reserves, that d e m a n d for p e t r o l e u m exceeded s u p p l y , a n d that only u n h a m p e r e d d e v e l o p m e n t of existing resources could meet the g r o w i n g need for 9

C o n s c i o u s of having estranged the U n i t e d S t a t e s , British officials s u s p e c t e d that A m e r i c a n oil interests were behind the anti-British insurrection in I r a q and the K e m a l i s t m o v e m e n t in T u r k e y . Allegedly an insurrectionary leader arrested by British security officers in I r a q was found to have in his possession a letter from one of the S t a n d a r d Oil c o m p a n i e s s h o w i n g that A m e r i c a n f u n d s were b e i n g d i s p e n s e d by the A m e r i c a n consul in B a g h d a d to the Shi'ite rebels centered in the holy city of K a r b a l a . 1 1

T h e A m e r i c a n consul in B a g h d a d was indeed o p p o s e d to British rule in I r a q , but Washington was not. Quite the reverse was t r u e : both the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e and the oil c o m p a n i e s were in favor of British h e g e m o n y in the area. T h e oil c o m p a n i e s were p r e p a r e d to e n g a g e in exploration, development, a n d p r o d u c t i o n only in areas governed by what they regarded as stable a n d responsible r e g i m e s . T h e president o f N e w J e r s e y S t a n d a r d reported t o the S t a t e D e p a r t ment that I r a q was a collection of w a r r i n g tribes; a c c o r d i n g to him an Iraqi g o v e r n m e n t d o m i n a t e d by Britain offered the only hope of law and o r d e r . Allen D u l l e s , chief of the N e a r E a s t e r n Affairs Division of the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e , was one of the m a n y officials who e x p r e s s e d d i s m a y at the thought that Britain and F r a n c e might relinquish control of their M i d d l e E a s t e r n c o n q u e s t s , a n d who exp r e s s e d fear for the fate of A m e r i c a n interests s h o u l d they do s o . 1 2

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D u l l e s r e p o r t e d that G u y Wellman, attorney for the A m e r i c a n oil c o m p a n i e s that were seeking a s h a r e in Iraqi d e v e l o p m e n t , was of the opinion that his clients would be m u c h better off negotiating a partnership with British interests rather than a t t e m p t i n g to operate o n their o w n . A solution to the conflict between Britain a n d A m e r i c a b e g a n to e m e r g e in the s u m m e r of 1920 when geologists a d v i s e d the British g o v e r n m e n t that oil p r o s p e c t s in I r a q were m o r e speculative than h a d been s u p p o s e d . A t the s a m e t i m e the F o r e i g n Office was advised that the p r o s p e c t s — i f they did materialize—were so vast that Britain lacked the capital r e s o u r c e s to develop t h e m by herself a n d would have to invite A m e r i c a n p a r t i c i p a t i o n . F o r these, a n d for political r e a s o n s , Sir J o h n C a d m a n , an important figure in the British oil industry, was delegated to go to the U n i t e d S t a t e s to initiate d i s c u s s i o n s . O n 2 2 J u n e 1922 A . C . B e d f o r d o f the S t a n d a r d Oil C o m p a n y of N e w J e r s e y called on the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e to report that on behalf of seven A m e r i c a n oil c o m p a n i e s he p r o p o s e d to negotiate a participation in the British-owned concessionary c o r p o ration in I r a q . T h e D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e r e s p o n d e d that it h a d no objection to his d o i n g s o , p r o v i d e d no qualified A m e r i c a n oil c o m panies that wished to participate were e x c l u d e d . N e g o t i a t i o n s thereu p o n went forward. 1 4

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T h u s the d i s p u t e with the U n i t e d S t a t e s was resolved. B u t the b u r d e n of i m p o s i n g E u r o p e a n control over the M i d d l e E a s t was left by A m e r i c a to Britain, u n a i d e d .

IV F r a n c e , Britain's closest major ally, was the last to desert the alliance. T h e long quarrel a b o u t whether the Sykes-Picot A g r e e m e n t would be honored had taken its toll, as h a d Britain's s p o n s o r s h i p of the H a s h e m i t e family's political c l a i m s . With the retirement of C l e m e n c e a u , Aristide B r i a n d , a veteran left-wing politician who had served several times as Premier, was r e g a r d e d as the leader of those who were loyal to the British alliance; yet, when he b e c a m e Premier again in J a n u a r y 1921, the r u p t u r e between the two countries finally occurred. It occurred b e c a u s e B r i a n d saw no way to maintain his country's position in Cilicia, the southern province of T u r k e y which then was still occupied by F r a n c e . F r a n c e ' s 8 0 , 0 0 0 occupation t r o o p s were a T h e final accord, the so-called Red Line agreement, was not reached until 31 July 1928.

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drain on r e s o u r c e s that could no longer be a f f o r d e d ; the F r e n c h Parliament was unwilling to continue p a y i n g for t h e m . Cilicia p r o v e d to be an a w k w a r d location for a F r e n c h a r m y to occupy, caught as it was between K e m a l i s t T u r k s a n d t r o u b l e s o m e S y r i a . I n the s p r i n g of 1921, Premier B r i a n d therefore sent the T u r k o p h i l e S e n a t o r H e n r i F r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n on a mission to A n g o r a to negotiate a way out. F r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n , a former president of the F o r e i g n Affairs C o m m i s s i o n of the C h a m b e r of D e p u t i e s , was a leader of the colonialist g r o u p a n d strongly believed in the i m p o r t a n c e of T u r k e y as a M o s l e m ally. On his second mission to A n g o r a , in the a u t u m n of 1921, F r a n k l i n Bouillon s u c c e e d e d in arriving at an a g r e e m e n t . It b r o u g h t the war between F r a n c e a n d T u r k e y to an end, a n d effectively recognized the Nationalist A n g o r a r e g i m e as the legitimate g o v e r n m e n t of T u r k e y . F o r the Nationalists, the A n g o r a A c c o r d was the greatest of diplomatic t r i u m p h s . A c c o r d i n g to M u s t a p h a K e m a l , it "proved to the whole world" that the T r e a t y of S e v r e s was now "merely a r a g . " T h e British saw it as a betrayal: it was a s e p a r a t e peace, a n d it freed the T u r k s t o attack Britain's c l i e n t s — G r e e c e and I r a q . A s the British s u s p e c t e d , the F r e n c h also turned over to the A n g o r a r e g i m e q u a n tities o f military s u p p l i e s . T h u s T u r k s s u p p l i e d b y F r a n c e were a t war with G r e e k s b ac k e d by Britain a n d the former E n t e n t e Powers found themselves r a n g e d on o p p o s i t e sides of the O t t o m a n war that they h a d entered together as allies in 1914. 1 7

1 8

On 26 O c t o b e r 1 9 2 1 , in a m e m o r a n d u m to the C a b i n e t alerting t h e m to news of the aid F r a n c e w o u l d provide the K e m a l i s t s , Churchill c o m m e n t e d that "It s e e m s scarcely possible to credit this information, which, if true, would u n q u e s t i o n a b l y convict the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t of what in the m o s t d i p l o m a t i c application of the p h r a s e could only be d e e m e d an 'unfriendly a c t ' . " It should be u n d e r s t o o d that, a c c o r d i n g to a s t a n d a r d reference book, in the d i p l o m a t i c lexicon "When a S t a t e wishes to warn other S t a t e s that certain actions on their part m i g h t lead to war, it is u s u a l to state that s u c h action 'would be r e g a r d e d as an unfriendly a c t ' . " T h u s Churchill was m a k i n g a very s t r o n g statement i n d e e d ; his w o r d s implied that the A n g o r a A c c o r d m i g h t lead to a war between F r a n c e a n d Britain. 19

20

Churchill h a d feared for s o m e time that Nationalist T u r k e y would turn east to attack Feisal's fragile r e g i m e in I r a q , a n d believed that F r a n c e — b y allowing T u r k e y to use the B a g h d a d Railway section in C i l i c i a — w a s now a b o u t to facilitate s u c h a m o v e . A c c o r d i n g to Churchill's m e m o r a n d u m , "clearly the F r e n c h are negotiating, through M F r a n k l i n - B o u i l l o n , a treaty d e s i g n e d not merely to safeg u a r d F r e n c h interests in T u r k e y , b u t to secure those interests wherever necessary at the e x p e n s e of G r e a t Britain. T h e y apparently

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believe that we have a similar a n t i - F r e n c h a r r a n g e m e n t with the G r e e k s . T h e y are, o f c o u r s e , very angry a b o u t K i n g Feisal" having been placed by Britain on the throne of I r a q . A c c o r d i n g to Churchill, F r a n c e would have liked nothing better than to have seen the collapse of Feisal and of British policy in the area, which also w o u l d have meant the destruction of his own handiwork. Premier B r i a n d failed to a p p r e c i a t e how strongly the A n g o r a A c c o r d would affect British policy in E u r o p e . In 1921 B r i a n d t u r n e d to Britain to g u a r a n t e e F r a n c e against a revival of the G e r m a n challenge, having b e c o m e aware that the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t was fundamentally out of s y m p a t h y with the whole trend of postwar F r e n c h policy r e g a r d i n g G e r m a n y . * F e a r f u l that F r a n c e m i g h t be isolated, he a p p r o a c h e d L l o y d G e o r g e and C u r z o n with a p r o p o s a l for a bilateral alliance between Britain a n d F r a n c e to p r o v i d e the latter with security against G e r m a n y . T h e British leaders refused to consider forming s u c h an alliance unless F r a n c e resolved the q u a r r e l in the M i d d l e E a s t s t e m m i n g from the A n g o r a A c c o r d . F o l l o w i n g the British refusal, the B r i a n d g o v e r n m e n t fell. 2 1

F o r m e r President R a y m o n d Poincare took office as the new P r e mier. He represented the o p p o s i t e pole f r o m B r i a n d ; he was not a great friend of Britain. H i s d i p l o m a c y p r o p o s e d doing without Britain and instead g o i n g it alone as a G r e a t Power by creating a network of alliances with less powerful countries in central a n d eastern E u r o p e that included Poland, R u m a n i a , Y u g o s l a v i a , and Czechoslovakia. It e s t r a n g e d Britain further, by s u g g e s t i n g to Britain's leaders that F r a n c e a i m e d at establishing h e g e m o n y on the continent of E u r o p e , a s she had done u n d e r L o u i s X I V a n d N a p o l e o n . T h e p r o s p e c t o f a n alliance between Britain a n d F r a n c e died in J u n e 1922, when Britain s u s p e n d e d the negotiations; a n d the b r e a c h between the two countries widened thereafter.

V To s o m e extent the diplomatic isolation of Britain was the result of M u s t a p h a K e m a l ' s adroit d i p l o m a c y . T h e A n g o r a r e g i m e h a d deliberately played off one ally against another. F u n d a m e n t a l l y , however, it was Britain's decision to i m p o s e * In the immediate aftermath of the armistice, Marshal Foch had counted on moving the French boundary with Germany to the Rhine, so that natural frontiers would provide France with security. In the face of Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points, France had been obliged to surrender this claim in return for a treaty of guarantee by her principal Allies. T h e treaty never took effect; it was rejected by the U . S . Senate on 19 November 1919. Moreover, the likelihood that France in fact could look to the United States for future support began to dim.

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E u r o p e a n rule on the former O t t o m a n E m p i r e that led to the breakup of the alliance o r — t o the extent that there were other contributing f a c t o r s — a t any rate c a u s e d the b r e a k - u p to lead in s u c h d a n g e r o u s directions. It is here that the contrast between Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy before a n d after 1914 can be g l i m p s e d m o s t vividly. It was not merely that in the nineteenth century Britain had often kept conflict f r o m flaring up between the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s by s e c u r i n g m u t u a l agreement that none of t h e m would encroach on the M i d d l e E a s t . It w a s also the p r o c e s s by which she did so that contributed to the maintenance of international stability. T h e freq u e n t reference of issues to the concert of the powers of E u r o p e , a n d the habit of multilateral consultation a n d cooperation that it b r e d , helped to m a k e world politics m o r e civilized. In that s e n s e the M i d d l e E a s t e r n question, despite its inherent divisiveness, contribu t e d to international h a r m o n y . B u t once the A s q u i t h g o v e r n m e n t agreed to R u s s i a n territorial d e m a n d s in 1915, the M i d d l e E a s t b e c a m e a s o u r c e of d i s c o r d . If the C z a r were to control the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g northern part of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , then B r i t a i n — a c c o r d i n g t o L o r d K i t c h e n e r — w o u l d have to a s s u m e h e g e m o n y in the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g s o u t h . In t u r n , that b r o u g h t into play F r e n c h claims t o S y r i a a n d Palestine. T h u s one claim led to another, each power believing the others to be overreaching. E v e n if Britain, after the war, had immediately partitioned the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a m o n g the Allies, along the h a r d - b a r g a i n e d lines of the p l e d g e s she had m a d e to t h e m , there w o u l d have been s o m e risk of future conflict a m o n g t h e m if any of t h e m p u r s u e d future expansionist d e s i g n s . B u t conflict w a s m a d e inevitable when, instead, L l o y d G e o r g e a t t e m p t e d not merely to renege on the p l e d g e s b u t to take everything for the British E m p i r e . It w a s worse still that he tried to do so without having the r e s o u r c e s to back up his m o v e . Alliances tend to break up at the e n d of a war. M o r e o v e r , the partners with w h o m Britain h a d worked toward international h a r m o n y before the war were losing control of w o r l d politics. Y e t it w a s the M i d d l e E a s t e r n q u e s t i o n at the end of the war that led to the first clashes between Britain a n d her former allies, R u s s i a , Italy, F r a n c e , a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s . I t was bitterness e n g e n d e r e d b y M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy that h a m p e r e d British efforts to find c o m m o n g r o u n d with her former allies on policy elsewhere in the world, a n d that eventually led to the alliances falling a p a r t .

60 A G R E E K TRAGEDY

i L l o y d G e o r g e had been too p r o u d in 1919 a n d 1920 to r e m e m b e r that his power derived from alliances and coalitions over which he presided, b u t which he did not control. E v e n t s now p r o v i d e d him with a reminder, and in 1 9 2 1 , as his foreign alliances fell a p a r t , the P r i m e Minister found himself increasingly isolated within his own g o v e r n m e n t in his war policy against T u r k e y . B o n a r L a w , after the change in m o n a r c h a n d g o v e r n m e n t in G r e e c e , in which the proAllied Venizelos was overthrown, was in favor of c o m i n g to terms with the T u r k s . B o n a r L a w could not be ignored; he led the party with a majority of seats in Parliament, and had he r e m a i n e d in the g o v e r n m e n t he might have s u c c e e d e d in forcing a c h a n g e in policy. H i s s u p p o r t e r s were p r o - T u r k a n d , so long as he served in the g o v e r n m e n t , he r e m i n d e d L l o y d G e o r g e of their views. B u t B o n a r L a w retired f r o m public life in the winter of 1921 d u e to ill health, d e p r i v i n g the P r i m e Minister of a political partner who could keep him in line. With B o n a r L a w ' s d e p a r t u r e , the Prime Minister drifted increasingly out of touch with sentiment in the H o u s e of C o m m o n s . A w a r e that C a b i n e t colleagues, the F o r e i g n Office, a n d the War Office were also o p p o s e d to his G r e e k - T u r k i s h policy, he disreg a r d e d their views. As the L o n d o n Conference a d j o u r n e d in M a r c h 1921—the conference at which the Allies, the G r e e k s , and the K e m a l i s t s failed to arrive at any a g r e e m e n t — L l o y d G e o r g e sent M a u r i c e H a n k e y r o u n d to C l a r i d g e ' s Hotel to tell the G r e e k leaders, who were staying there, that if they felt impelled to attack K e m a l ' s forces, he w o u l d not stand in their w a y . T h e G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t took this as p e r m i s s i o n to r e s u m e the war, a n d launched a new offensive on 23 M a r c h 1921. D e s p i t e faulty staff work a n d stiff opposition, the G r e e k a r m y m o v e d up from the plain to the plateau. 1

A r n o l d T o y n b e e , the historian a n d scholar of international relations, a c c o m p a n i e d the G r e e k a r m y as a reporter for the Manchester Guardian. He reported that as his vehicle m o v e d up from

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the plain "I b e g a n to realise on how narrow a m a r g i n the G r e e k s had g a m b l e d for a military decision in Anatolia, and how adverse were the c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r which they were playing for victory over K e m a l . " At the end of the week, the G r e e k s were r e p u l s e d by K e m a l ' s G e n e r a l I s m e t at the village of I n o n u and retreated. T h e G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t b l a m e d its military c o m m a n d e r s a n d o n 7 April G o u n a r i s — n o w P r i m e M i n i s t e r — a n d his colleagues m e t with Ioannis M e t a x a s , G r e e c e ' s o u t s t a n d i n g military figure, to ask M e t a x a s to lead the next offensive in Anatolia. M e t a x a s refused a n d told the politicians that the war i n T u r k e y c o u l d not b e won. T h e T u r k s h a d de v e l o p e d a national feeling, he s a i d , "And they m e a n to fight for their f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n c e . . . T h e y realize that A s i a M i n o r is their country a n d that we are invaders. F o r t h e m , for their national feelings, the historical rights on which we b a s e our claims have no influence. Whether they are right or w r o n g is another q u e s t i o n . What matters is how they feel." 2

3

T h e politicians told M e t a x a s that it would now be politically i m p o s s i b l e for their r e g i m e to a b a n d o n the war: with eyes o p e n to the risk they would run, they felt c o m p e l l e d to g a m b l e everything on the s u c c e s s of one last offensive, s c h e d u l e d for the s u m m e r . On 22 J u n e the Allies sent a m e s s a g e to the G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t offering mediation in the war, b u t G r e e c e replied with a polite refusal. P r e p a r a t i o n s for an offensive were so far along, wrote the G r e e k s , that it w o u l d be impractical to call t h e m off. K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e a n d G o u n a r i s h a d left themselves with no option but to launch their c r u s a d e , a n d L l o y d G e o r g e ' s fortunes rode with t h e m . T h e British leader could do no m o r e than watch and wait as foreign a r m i e s clashed in the o b s c u r e interior of A s i a M i n o r . H i s secretary a n d m i s t r e s s noted that he has h a d a great fight in the C a b i n e t to b a c k the G r e e k s (not in the field but morally) and he and B a l f o u r are the only p r o G r e e k s there . . . [ H e ] has got his way, but h e i s m u c h afraid lest the G r e e k attack s h o u l d be a failure, a n d he s h o u l d have p r o v e d to have been w r o n g . He says his political reputation d e p e n d s a great deal on what h a p p e n s in A s i a M i n o r . . . [I]f the G r e e k s succeed the T r e a t y of Versailles is vindicated, a n d the T u r k i s h rule is at an end. A new G r e e k E m p i r e will be f o u n d e d , friendly to Britain, a n d it will help all our interests in the E a s t . He is perfectly convinced that he is right over this, a n d is willing to stake everything on i t . 4

On 10 J u l y 1921 the G r e e k army launched a brilliantly successful t h r e e - p r o n g e d offensive. T h e G r e e k c o m m a n d e r s h a d learned f r o m the mistakes c o m m i t t e d in J a n u a r y a n d in M a r c h , a n d did not repeat t h e m . T h e offensive was crowned with the c a p t u r e of E s k i s h e h i r , a rail center considered to be the strategic key to western Anatolia.

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L l o y d G e o r g e , jubilant, unleashed his p o w e r s of rhetoric a n d wit against his o p p o n e n t s . T o his War Minister h e w r o t e : I hear from G r e e k q u a r t e r s that E s k i Shehir has been c a p t u r e d and that the T u r k i s h A r m y is in full retreat. Which ever way you look at the matter this is news of the first i m p o r t a n c e . T h e future of the E a s t will very largely be d e t e r m i n e d by this s t r u g g l e , and yet as far as I can see, the War Office have not taken the slightest trouble to find out what has h a p p e n e d . . . T h e Staff have displayed the m o s t a m a z i n g slovenliness in this m a t t e r . T h e i r information a b o u t the respective s t r e n g t h a n d quality of the two A r m i e s t u r n e d out to be hopelessly w r o n g when the facts were investigated, at the instance of the d e s p i s e d politicians. T h e P r i m e Minister s a v e d his best salvo for last: " H a v e you no D e p a r t m e n t which is known as the Intelligence D e p a r t m e n t in your Office? Y o u m i g h t find out what it is doing. It a p p e a r s in the E s t i m a t e s at quite a substantial figure, b u t when it c o m e s to information it is not v i s i b l e . " N e a r Eskishehir the o v e r w h e l m e d T u r k i s h c o m m a n d e r , G e n e r a l I s m e t , c o u l d not b r i n g himself to retreat. K e m a l took the b u r d e n from his s h o u l d e r s . "Pasha is c o m i n g , " I s m e t , relieved, told a c o m panion, as a grey-faced M u s t a p h a K e m a l arrived to take personal responsibility for o r d e r i n g the r e t r e a t . K e m a l a c k n ow le d g e d that his p e o p l e w o u l d feel a "moral shock" when they learned that he was g o i n g to a b a n d o n western Anatolia to the e n e m y . In the event, there was an u p r o a r in the National A s s e m b l y , as political enemies, personal rivals, Enver's followers, a n d defeatists joined h a n d s against him. After a t i m e , K e m a l called the National A s s e m b l y into secret session, a n d p r o p o s e d a R o m a n c o u r s e of action: the delegates s h o u l d elect h i m dictator for a period of three m o n t h s , a n d that should he then fail as s u p r e m e c o m m a n d e r , the b l a m e would fall entirely on h i m . T h e p r o p o s a l b r o u g h t together those who believed in victory a n d those who were certain of defeat, a n d was a d o p t e d . 5

6

7

K e m a l pulled his forces b a c k to within fifty miles of his capital at A n g o r a , a n d deployed t h e m b e h i n d a great b e n d in the S a k a r y a river. In the t i m e available to h i m he requisitioned r e s o u r c e s from the entire p o p u l a t i o n , c o m m a n d e e r i n g 40 percent of h o u s e h o l d food, cloth, a n d leather s u p p l i e s , confiscating horses, a n d p r e p a r i n g for total war. He o r d e r e d his t r o o p s to entrench in the ridges a n d hills that rose steeply up f r o m the near b a n k of the river toward A n g o r a . By m i d - A u g u s t his a r m y had d u g into this powerful natural defensive position, circling A n g o r a for sixty miles behind the loop in the S a k a r y a , d o m i n a t i n g from high g r o u n d the p a s s a g e of the river.

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On 14 A u g u s t 1921 the G r e e k a r m y started its t r i u m p h a l m a r c h on A n g o r a . At staff h e a d q u a r t e r s , the chief of the s u p p l y b u r e a u had warned that the G r e e k army's long line of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and transportation would break down if it a d v a n c e d b e y o n d the S a k a r y a river; b u t his colleagues c o n c l u d e d that there was no c a u s e for concern in as m u c h as they d i d not intend to a d v a n c e m u c h further than t h a t . T h e G r e e k c o m m a n d e r s believed that they h a d beaten the enemy a n d were now a b o u t to finish h i m off. T h e y invited the British liaison officers who a c c o m p a n i e d t h e m to attend a victory celebration in A n g o r a after the battle. 8

T h e a d v a n c i n g G r e e k a r m y m a d e first contact with the enemy o n 23 A u g u s t a n d attacked all along the line on 26 A u g u s t . C r o s s i n g the river, the G r e e k infantry fought its way foot-by-foot up toward the heights, driving the e n e m y from one r i d g e - t o p line of e n t r e n c h m e n t s to another a b o v e it. T h e s a v a g e c o m b a t went on for d a y s a n d then for weeks, with the G r e e k s g a i n i n g g r o u n d on the average of a mile a day. Eventually they gained control of the key heights, b u t victory eluded t h e m ; they were cut off f r o m their s u p p l i e s of food a n d a m m u n i t i o n b y T u r k i s h cavalry r a i d s , a n d s u c c u m b e d t o exhaustion. U n a b l e to continue fighting, the G r e e k s d e s c e n d e d f r o m the heights and c r o s s e d b a c k over the S a k a r y a river on 14 S e p t e m b e r a n d retreated b a c k to Eskishehir, where they h a d started their m a r c h a m o n t h b e f o r e . T h e c a m p a i g n was over. I n A n g o r a the grateful National A s s e m b l y p r o m o t e d M u s t a p h a K e m a l to the rank of field m a r s h a l and endowed him with the title of " G h a z i " — t h e T u r k i s h M o s l e m equivalent of "warrior for the F a i t h " or " C r u s a d e r . "

II Between the s u m m e r of 1921 a n d the s u m m e r of 1922, a lull prevailed on the battlefield, d u r i n g which P r i m e Minister G o u n a r i s a n d his F o r e i g n Minister journeyed west to seek aid from the Allies. On the continent of E u r o p e they met with little s y m p a t h y . In L o n d o n they sat in the a m b a s s a d o r s ' waiting r o o m at the F o r e i g n Office, hat in h a n d , waiting for L o r d C u r z o n s o m e h o w to solve their p r o b l e m s . L l o y d G e o r g e told t h e m "Personally I am a friend of G r e e c e , b u t . . . all my colleagues are against m e . A n d I cannot be of any use to you. It is i m p o s s i b l e , i m p o s s i b l e . " 9

T h e British P r i m e Minister no longer had anything to offer the G r e e k s , b u t exhorted t h e m to fight on nonetheless. H i s policy (such as it was) was for G r e e c e to stay the course in the h o p e that things would c h a n g e for the better. In the s p r i n g of 1922 he told Venizelos

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(who was in L o n d o n as a private citizen a n d h a d c o m e to see him in the H o u s e o f C o m m o n s ) that, when K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e eventually d i s a p p e a r e d from the scene, p u b l i c opinion in the Allied countries w o u l d s w i n g b a c k toward s u p p o r t of G r e e c e . "Meanwhile G r e e c e m u s t stick to her policy," said L l o y d G e o r g e , a d d i n g that, "this was the testing time of the G r e e k nation, and that if they persevered now their future was a s s u r e d . . . G r e e c e m u s t go t h r o u g h the wilderness, she m u s t live on m a n n a picked up f r o m the stones, she m u s t s t r u g g l e t h r o u g h the stern trial of the present t i m e . " He said that he "would never s h a k e h a n d s with a G r e e k again who went b a c k u p o n his country's a i m s in S m y r n a . " 1 0

L l o y d G e o r g e found himself increasingly isolated, even within his own g o v e r n m e n t , and the F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , L o r d C u r z o n , took effective control of British efforts to resolve the crisis; in collaboration with the Allies, he m o v e d toward an a c c o m m o d a t i o n with Nationalist Turkey. F e a r i n g that the Allies were a b o u t to betray him that s u m m e r , K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e withdrew three r e g i m e n t s a n d two battalions from the G r e e k a r m y in Anatolia a n d sent t h e m to T h r a c e , the E u r o p e a n province of T u r k e y o p p o s i t e C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . H i s g o v e r n m e n t then a n n o u n c e d that G r e e c e would o c c u p y C o n s t a n t i n o p l e in order to b r i n g the war to an e n d . H i s d e s p e r a t e calculation was that this threat would impel the Allies to take s o m e action to resolve the G r e e k - T u r k i s h conflict, p r e s u m a b l y in a m a n n e r favorable to G r e e c e . He g a m b l e d that, at the very least, the Allies w o u l d consent to let his forces in T h r a c e p a s s t h r o u g h C o n s t a n t i n o p l e to link up with a n d rejoin his weakened a r m i e s defending the Anatolian coast. B u t , instead, the Allied a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e b a r r e d the road to the G r e e k s . Constantine's withdrawal of the G r e e k units from the Anatolian coast meanwhile p r o m p t e d K e m a l to hasten an attack on the weakened a n d overextended G r e e k defensive line there. M a s s i n g his forces in great secrecy, he launched an attack on the southern front at dawn on 26 A u g u s t . After two d a y s of fierce fighting the G r e e k s retreated in d i s o r d e r . T h e commander-in-chief of the G r e e k a r m y in A s i a M i n o r "was almost universally s a i d to be m a d " ( a c c o r d i n g to a British report from A t h e n s ) a n d later was t e r m e d a "mental case" by L l o y d G e o r g e ; whether or not these were e x a g g e r a t i o n s , he was incapable of c o p i n g with the s i t u a t i o n . On 4 S e p t e m b e r the G r e e k g o v e r n m e n t a p p o i n t e d a new commander-in-chief in his place, but so c o m p l e t e h a d been the b r e a k d o w n in c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that it did not know that the general it now p l a c e d in s u p r e m e c o m m a n d was already a prisoner in T u r k i s h h a n d s ; he is said to have heard the news of his a p p o i n t m e n t from K e m a l . 11

1 2

L o r d Riddell w a s with L l o y d G e o r g e o n S u n d a y , 3 S e p t e m b e r ,

A GREEK

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545

when the P r i m e Minister received a c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m friends of Greece b e g g i n g L. G. to do s o m e t h i n g for the G r e e k s . He explained . . . at length the impossibility [of d o i n g anything] a n d strongly criticised the action of K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e , who, he said, was r e s p o n s i b l e for what had h a p p e n e d . A m o n g other things he had a p p o i n t e d a m o s t inefficient a n d unsuitable general. L . G . further said that as far as he could m a k e out, he, B a l f o u r , a n d C u r z o n were the only three p e o p l e in the country who were in favour of the G r e e k s . He d e p l o r e d the situation, but could do nothing. 13

G r e e c e a s s e m b l e d a fleet to evacuate her a r m y from A s i a M i n o r , a n d along the coast t h r o n g s of soldiers headed t o w a r d the s h i p s in hopes of finding p a s s a g e . T h e m a s s a t t e m p t at e s c a p e w a s a race against t i m e : against the c o m i n g S e p t e m b e r rains a n d against the a d v a n c i n g , vengeful T u r k i s h a r m y . T h e ancient G r e e k c o m m u n i t y o f A s i a M i n o r was seized with d r e a d . T h e A r c h b i s h o p of S m y r n a wrote to Venizelos on 7 S e p t e m b e r that H e l l e n i s m in A s i a M i n o r , the G r e e k state a n d the entire G r e e k N a t i o n are d e s c e n d i n g now to a Hell from which no power will be able to raise t h e m up a n d s a v e t h e m . . . I have j u d g e d it necessary . . . out of the flames of catastrophe in which the G r e e k p e o p l e of A s i a M i n o r are s u f f e r i n g — a n d it is a real q u e s tion whether when Y o u r Excellency r e a d s this letter of m i n e we shall still be alive, destined as we are . . . for sacrifice a n d m a r t y r d o m . . . t o direct this last a p p e a l t o y o u . 1 4

A p p e a l s , however, were in vain. Venizelos was powerless to give aid, and two d a y s later the a r c h b i s h o p was sent to the m a r t y r e d death that he foresaw: the local T u r k i s h c o m m a n d e r turned him over to a m o b of several h u n d r e d knife-wielding M o s l e m s who took h i m to a barber's s h o p a n d mutilated him before killing h i m . A l l - c o n s u m i n g religious and national tensions met their r e n d e z v o u s with history in S m y r n a , the greatest city of A s i a M i n o r , at s u m m e r ' s end in 1922. H a t r e d ignited into flame in the A r m e n i a n q u a r t e r of * Since the beginning of the war the atrocities between the Moslem and Christian communities had escalated. When the Greek army first landed in Smyrna in 1919, soldiers butchered unarmed Turks. Arnold Toynbee reported that in visiting Greek villages that had been destroyed by the Turks, he noticed that the houses had been burned to the ground one by one, deliberately; it appeared that the T u r k s had savored the doing of i t . K i n g Constantine claimed that Greek corpses had been skinned by the other s i d e . Toynbee charged that in the 1921 campaign the Greek army deliberately drove whole villages of Turkish civilians from their homes. 15

16

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the city on W e d n e s d a y , 13 S e p t e m b e r . L a t e r the fires s p r e a d — o r were s p r e a d — t o the G r e e k a n d E u r o p e a n q u a r t e r s . Between 5 0 and 75 percent of the ancient m e t r o p o l i s w a s d e s t r o y e d ; the T u r k i s h q u a r t e r , however, r e m a i n e d u n t o u c h e d . H u n d r e d s of t h o u s a n d s of p e o p l e h a d lived in the C h r i s t i a n city, a n d it p r o v e d i m p o s s i b l e to calculate how m a n y of t h e m died in its final a g o n y . A c o r r e s p o n d e n t of the C h i c a g o Daily News was the first to p o u n d out the story on his p o r t a b l e typewriter a m i d s t the r u i n s : " E x c e p t for the s q u a l i d T u r k i s h q u a r t e r , S m y r n a h a s c e a s e d t o exist. T h e p r o b l e m o f the minorities is here solved for all time. No d o u b t r e m a i n s as to the origin of the fire . . . T h e torch was a p p l i e d by T u r k i s h regular s o l d i e r s . " ProT u r k i s h s c h o l a r s to this day continue to deny this widely believed accusation. 18

19

A m e r i c a n , F r e n c h , B r i t i s h , a n d Italian naval vessels e v a c u a t e d their respective nationals f r o m the b u r n i n g q u a y . At first the A m e r i c a n s a n d the British refused to aid anyone else, while the Italians accepted on b o a r d anyone w h o could reach their s h i p s and the F r e n c h a c c e p t e d anyone who s a i d he w a s F r e n c h — s o long as he c o u l d say it in F r e n c h . E v e n t u a l l y , t h o u g h , the British and A m e r i c a n s c a m e to the aid of refugees without r e g a r d to nationality. In the next few weeks G r e e c e a n d the Allies, in r e s p o n s e to a threat by K e m a l to treat all G r e e k a n d A r m e n i a n m e n of military age as prisoners-of-war, organized the evacuation of m a s s e s of civilians as G r e e c e c o m p l e t e d her military evacuation as well. By the end of 1922 a b o u t 1,500,000 G r e e k s had fled or been driven out of T u r k e y . E r n e s t H e m i n g w a y , then a war c o r r e s p o n d e n t for the T o r o n t o Star, wrote that he had watched a procession of destitute G r e e k refugees that w a s s o m e twenty miles long a n d that he c o u l d not get it out of his m i n d . H i s C r o a t i a n landlady, who w a s m o r e familiar with s u c h s i g h t s , q u o t e d a T u r k i s h p r o v e r b to h i m : "It is not only the fault of the a x e b u t of the tree as w e l l . " It w a s an easy saying, a n d in the weeks to c o m e it was followed by a n u m b e r of others, equally easy, as Allied s t a t e s m e n searched their consciences and d i s c o v e r e d , each in his own way, that b l a m e for the c a t a s t r o p h e s h o u l d be p l a c e d on s o m e b o d y else. 20

In Britain, it w a s c o m m o n to b l a m e F r a n c e , Italy, a n d Bolshevik R u s s i a , but, a b o v e all, the U n i t e d S t a t e s . A s the British a m b a s s a d o r in W a s h i n g t o n explained to the A m e r i c a n S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e in O c t o b e r , the Allies h a d a g r e e d to partition the M i d d l e E a s t in the novel a n d t i m e - c o n s u m i n g f o r m of receiving M a n d a t e s f r o m the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s — a n d had d o n e so solely in order to please the

T h e atrocities at Smyrna provided him with the background for "On the Quai at Smyrna," one of the memorable stories in his first collection, The Fifth Column and the First Forty-Nine Stories.

A

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U n i t e d S t a t e s , which then h a d withdrawn from the M i d d l e E a s t peace p r o c e s s entirely. T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d also a g r e e d t o accept M a n d a t e s t o o c c u p y a n d s a f e g u a r d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the D a r d a n e l l e s , a n d A r m e n i a , a n d then had gone b a c k on her w o r d two years later. By implication, the a m b a s s a d o r indicated that the Allies could have i m p o s e d their own kind of settlement in 1919 a n d w o u l d then have h a d done with it; b u t to a c c o m m o d a t e a n d s e c u r e the cooperation of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , Britain had waited for years, a n d h a d a s s u m e d novel responsibilities, and now was left entirely on her own to carry the heavy b u r d e n of having to defend the A m e r i c a n idea of Mandates. 2 1

S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e C h a r l e s E v a n s H u g h e s replied that he would say that he could not for a m o m e n t assent to the view that this G o v e r n m e n t was in any way responsible for the existing conditions . . . T h e U n i t e d S t a t e s h a d not s o u g h t to parcel out s p h e r e s of influence .. . had not e n g a g e d in intrigues at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . . . was not r e s p o n s i b l e for the c a t a s t r o p h e of the G r e e k a r m i e s d u r i n g the last year a n d a half . . . d i p l o m a c y in E u r o p e for the last year a n d a half was responsible for the late d i s a s t e r . 22

B e h i n d the m u t u a l recrimination was the fundamental shift in A m e r i c a n foreign policy that o c c u r r e d when President W o o d r o w Wilson was replaced by Warren G a m a l i e l H a r d i n g . A principal object of President Wilson's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy h a d been to s u p p o r t Christianity a n d , in particular, A m e r i c a n missionary colleges and missionary activities; but President H a r d i n g did not share these interests. When the T u r k s a d v a n c e d o n S m y r n a , s u c h A m e r i c a n church g r o u p s as the conference of the M e t h o d i s t E p i s c o p a l C h u r c h called for the A m e r i c a n g o v e r n m e n t to s e n d t r o o p s to s t o p the m a s s a c r e of C h r i s t i a n s ; b u t President H a r d i n g told S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e H u g h e s , " F r a n k l y , it is difficult for me to be consistently patient with our g o o d friends of the C h u r c h who are p r o p e r l y and earnestly zealous in p r o m o t i n g peace until it c o m e s to m a k i n g warfare on s o m e o n e of the contending religion . . . " 2 3

T h e other principal object of W o o d r o w Wilson's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy h a d been to e n s u r e that the p e o p l e s of the region were ruled by g o v e r n m e n t s of their choice. President H a r d i n g did not share these concerns either. He limited his administration's efforts to the protection of A m e r i c a n interests. In the M i d d l e E a s t , that mostly meant the protection of A m e r i c a n c o m m e r c i a l interests which were primarily oil interests. In T u r k e y the K e m a l i s t g o v e r n m e n t was p r e p a r e d to g r a n t oil concessions to an A m e r i c a n g r o u p , a n d s e e m e d likely to be able to p r o v i d e the internal security a n d stable b u s i n e s s environment that oil c o m p a n i e s r e q u i r e . T u r k i s h willingness to open

548

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the door to A m e r i c a n c o m p a n i e s was welcomed by the D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e and m a y well have colored its perception of the K e m a l i s t regime. T h e plight of G r e e k , A r m e n i a n , a n d other C h r i s t i a n s in the wake of S m y r n a ' s destruction was a d d r e s s e d by the Secretary of S t a t e in a speech he delivered in B o s t o n in O c t o b e r . "While nothing can excuse in the slightest degree or palliate the b a r b a r i c cruelty of the T u r k s , " he s a i d , "no just a p p r a i s e m e n t can be m a d e of the situation which fails to take account of the incursion of the G r e e k a r m y into Anatolia, of the war there w a g e d , a n d of the terrible incidents of the retreat of that a r m y , in the b u r n i n g of towns, a n d general devastation a n d cruelties." H a v i n g noted that atrocities had been c o m m i t t e d by both sides, the S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e rejected the contention that the U n i t e d S t a t e s should have intervened. He pointed out that the entire situation was the result of a war to which the U n i t e d S t a t e s had not been a p a r t y ; if the Allies, who were closely connected to the situation, did not choose to intervene, it certainly was no responsibility of America's to do s o . He told his audience that the U n i t e d S t a t e s quite properly had limited its efforts to the protection of A m e r i c a n interests in Turkey. 2 4

Ill C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d E u r o p e a n T u r k e y — e a s t e r n T h r a c e — w e r e the next a n d final objectives on K e m a l ' s line of m a r c h . T h e s u p p o s e d l y neutral Allied a r m y of occupation stood between him a n d his objectives. As the Nationalist T u r k i s h a r m i e s a d v a n c e d to their positions, the Allies panicked. Hitherto the w a r had been far away from t h e m ; but if K e m a l attacked, they themselves would have to fight. In Britain the news was startling for the s a m e reason. As late as 4 S e p t e m b e r , The Times had reported that " T h e G r e e k A r m y u n q u e s tionably sustained a reverse, but its extent is u n d u l y e x a g g e r a t e d . " B u t on 5 S e p t e m b e r , a headline r e a d " G R E E K A R M Y ' S D E F E A T " ; on 6

S e p t e m b e r , a headline read "A G R A V E S I T U A T I O N " ; a n d f r o m m i d S e p t e m b e r on,

the h e a d l i n e s " N E A R E A S T P E R I L " a n d " N E A R E A S T

C R I S I S " a p p e a r e d with terribly insistent regularity. Photos of b u r n i n g S m y r n a took the place of society w e d d i n g s , theater o p e n i n g s , a n d golf c h a m p i o n s h i p s . B r i t o n s , four years after the armistice, were shocked to be s u d d e n l y told that they might have to fight a war to defend far-off C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . It w a s the last thing in the world that m o s t B r i t o n s wanted to do, a n d an i m m e d i a t e inclination was to get rid of the g o v e r n m e n t that had got t h e m into s u c h a situation. B u t C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s , b e c a u s e of their world i m p o r t a n c e for s h i p p i n g , a n d eastern T h r a c e , b e c a u s e it is in E u r o p e ,

A GREEK

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were positions that o c c u p i e d a special s t a t u s in the m i n d s of British leaders. Winston Churchill, hitherto p r o - T u r k i s h , again c a m e to the r e s c u e of L l o y d G e o r g e ' s policy a n d told the C a b i n e t in S e p t e m b e r that " T h e line of d e e p water s e p a r a t i n g A s i a f r o m E u r o p e w a s a line of great significance, a n d we m u s t m a k e that line s e c u r e by every m e a n s within our power. If the T u r k s take the Gallipoli Peninsula a n d C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , we shall have lost the whole fruits of our victory . . . " L l o y d G e o r g e voiced his s t r o n g a g r e e m e n t , s a y i n g that "In no c i r c u m s t a n c e s c o u l d we allow the Gallipoli Peninsula to be held by the T u r k s . It w a s the m o s t i m p o r t a n t strategic position in the world, a n d the closing of the S t r a i t s h a d p r o l o n g e d the war by two years. It w a s inconceivable that we s h o u l d allow the T u r k s to g a i n p o s s e s s i o n of the Gallipoli Peninsula a n d we s h o u l d fight to prevent tfieir d o i n g s o . " 2 S

2 6

By m i d - S e p t e m b e r the last G r e e k t r o o p s s t a n d i n g between the T u r k s a n d the Allies h a d d i s a p p e a r e d a n d a direct a r m e d clash s e e m e d i m m i n e n t . T h e C a b i n e t met in a series of e m e r g e n c y s e s s i o n s c o m m e n c i n g 15 S e p t e m b e r , when Churchill told his colleagues that " T h e m i s f o r t u n e s of the Allies were p r o b a b l y d u e to the fact that owing to the delay on the part of A m e r i c a in declaring their position, their a r m i e s h a d a p p a r e n t l y melted a w a y . " A r m i e s were n e e d e d , in his view, for he "was wholly o p p o s e d to any a t t e m p t to carry out a bluff without f o r c e . " He s t r e s s e d the necessity of s e c u r i n g s u p p o r t from the D o m i n i o n s a n d from F r a n c e in reinforcing the British t r o o p s facing K e m a l ' s a r m i e s . 27

On 15 S e p t e m b e r 1922 the C a b i n e t instructed Winston Churchill t o d r a f t — f o r L l o y d G e o r g e ' s s i g n a t u r e — a t e l e g r a m t o the D o m i n i o n s informing t h e m of the British decision to defend the N e u t r a l Z o n e in T u r k e y a n d asking for their military aid. Shortly before midnight the t e l e g r a m , in cipher, was sent to each of the D o m i n i o n p r i m e ministers. T h e C a b i n e t d e c i d e d that the p u b l i c also o u g h t to be i n f o r m e d of the s e r i o u s n e s s of the situation; a n d to this end Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e p r e p a r e d a p r e s s release on 16 S e p t e m b e r that a p p e a r e d that

* T h e need for securing support from the Dominions arose from the change in their position that had come about after—and as a result of—the First World War. At the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, J a n Christian Smuts of South Africa, Prime Minister Robert Borden of Canada, and Prime Minister William Hughes of Australia successfully asserted the claim of their Dominions to be seated as sovereign nations on a plane of equality with Britain and the other Allies. When, at that time, Britain offered France a treaty of guarantee, Smuts and South African Prime Minister Louis Botha had wrung from Lloyd George a concession that such a treaty would not be binding upon them. They wrote that, from then on, it would be theoretically possible for Britain to go to war while one or more Dominions remained neutral. In 1922 the theoretical possibility was put to the test. 28

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evening in the n e w s p a p e r s . No m e m b e r s of the C a b i n e t other than L l o y d G e o r g e a n d Churchill had seen it prior to publication. T h e c o m m u n i q u e expressed the desire of the British g o v e r n m e n t to convene a peace conference with T u r k e y , b u t stated that no s u c h conference c o u l d convene u n d e r the g u n of T u r k i s h threats. It e x p r e s s e d fear of what the M o s l e m world m i g h t do if comparatively weak M o s l e m T u r k e y could be seen to have inflicted a m a j o r defeat on the Allies; p r e s u m a b l y the rest of the M o s l e m world would be e n c o u r a g e d to throw off colonial rule. T h e c o m m u n i q u e m a d e reference to British consultations with F r a n c e , Italy, a n d the D o m i n i o n s with a view t o w a r d taking c o m m o n military action to avert the K e m a l i s t threat. 29

T h e belligerent tone of the c o m m u n i q u e a l a r m e d p u b l i c opinion in Britain. T h e Daily Mail ran a b a n n e r headline: " S T O P T H I S N E W W A R ! " T h e c o m m u n i q u e also c a u s e d a l a r m a b r o a d . F u r i o u s that the British g o v e r n m e n t a p p e a r e d to be s p e a k i n g for h i m , F r e n c h Premier Poincare o r d e r e d his t r o o p s to be withdrawn f r o m the front line of the N e u t r a l Z o n e ; the Italians followed forthwith, a n d the British forces were left alone to face the enemy. T h e D o m i n i o n p r i m e ministers were also offended. The c o m m u n i q u e — w h i c h was of c o u r s e written in plain E n g l i s h — w a s p u b l i s h e d in C a n a d i a n , A u s t r a l i a n , a n d N e w Z e a l a n d n e w s p a p e r s before the p r i m e ministers had a chance to d e c o d e the ciphered cables they had received. It s u g g e s t e d that Churchill a n d L l o y d G e o r g e were trying to r u s h them into s o m e t h i n g without giving them time to think. In reply, C a n a d a a n d Australia refused to send t r o o p s . A revolution had occurred in the constitution of the British E m p i r e : it was the first time that British D o m i n i o n s had ever refused to follow the mother country into war. S o u t h Africa remained silent. Only N e w Z e a l a n d a n d N e w f o u n d l a n d r e s p o n d e d favorably. 3 0

O n 2 2 S e p t e m b e r L l o y d G e o r g e called u p o n Churchill t o take charge as c h a i r m a n of a C a b i n e t C o m m i t t e e to oversee military movements in T u r k e y . Churchill's brilliant friend, F . E . S m i t h , now L o r d B i r k e n h e a d a n d serving a s L o r d Chancellor, had previously been critical of Churchill for c h a n g i n g over to an a n t i - T u r k i s h position, b u t at the end of S e p t e m b e r joined L l o y d G e o r g e a n d Churchill as a leader of the belligerent faction. It was a question of prestige, Birkenhead felt; Britain m u s t never be seen to give in to force. 3 1

3 2

In Britain the p r e s s c a m p a i g n against the war continued. Public protest meetings were held. T r a d e union delegates went to D o w n i n g Street to deliver their protest to the P r i m e Minister personally. T h e F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , L o r d C u r z o n , crossed over t o Paris t o attempt to concert a strategy with the Allies. On 23 S e p t e m b e r he finally agreed with Poincare a n d S f o r z a on a c o m m o n p r o g r a m that

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yielded to all of K e m a l ' s d e m a n d s — e a s t e r n T h r a c e , C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , a n d the D a r d a n e l l e s — s o long as a p p e a r a n c e s could be p r e s e r v e d ; it was to a p p e a r to be a negotiated settlement rather than a s u r r e n d e r . It was not a h a p p y meeting for the British F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y ; after b e i n g e x p o s e d to Poincare's bitter denunciations, C u r z o n b r o k e down a n d retired to the next r o o m in t e a r s . Meanwhile, the British a n d T u r k i s h a r m i e s confronted one another at C h a n a k (today called C a n a k k a l e ) , a coastal town on the Asiatic side of the D a r d a n e l l e s that today serves as the point of d e p a r t u r e for t o u r s to the ruins of T r o y . T h e F r e n c h and Italian contingents having retired to their tents, a small British contingent stood g u a r d behind b a r b e d wire, with o r d e r s not to fire unless fired u p o n . T h e first detachment of T u r k i s h t r o o p s a d v a n c e d to the British line on 23 S e p t e m b e r . T h e T u r k s did not o p e n fire, b u t stood their g r o u n d a n d refused to withdraw. A few d a y s later m o r e T u r k i s h t r o o p s arrived. By the e n d of S e p t e m b e r , there were 4 , 5 0 0 T u r k s in the N e u t r a l Z o n e , talking t h r o u g h the b a r b e d wire to the British, a n d holding ^ their rifles b u t t - f o r w a r d to d e m o n s t r a t e that they w o u l d not be the first to fire. It was an eerie a n d unnerving confrontation. On 29 S e p t e m b e r British Intelligence reported to the C a b i n e t that K e m a l , p u s h e d on by Soviet R u s s i a , planned to attack the next day. T h e report, t h o u g h false, w a s believed. With the a p p r o v a l of the C a b i n e t , the chiefs of the military services drafted a stern u l t i m a t u m for the local British c o m m a n d e r to deliver to K e m a l , threatening to o p e n fire. T h e local British c o m m a n d e r , d i s r e g a r d i n g the instructions from L o n d o n — w h i c h could have led Britain into w a r — d i d not deliver the u l t i m a t u m . I n s t e a d he reached an a g r e e m e n t with K e m a l to negotiate an a r m i s t i c e — a n d so b r o u g h t the crisis to an e n d . F o r m a n y r e a s o n s — including fear of what L l o y d G e o r g e a n d Churchill in their recklessness might d o — K e m a l was p r e p a r e d to accept a f o r m u l a that allowed the Allies to save face by p o s t p o n i n g T u r k e y ' s occupation of s o m e of the territories s h e was eventually to occupy. H a d K e m a l invaded E u r o p e it w o u l d have meant war. T h e belligerent p o s t u r e of the British leaders a p p e a r e d to have s t o p p e d him. G i v e n the actual weakness of their position, this represented a brilliant t r i u m p h for L l o y d G e o r g e a n d Churchill. After m u c h h a r d b a r g a i n i n g , negotiations for an armistice were c o n c l u d e d at the coastal town of M u d a n y a on the m o r n i n g of 11 O c t o b e r , to c o m e into effect at m i d n i g h t , 14 O c t o b e r . Significant substantive issues r e m a i n e d ; consideration of them was p u t off until a peace conference could convene. Essentially, K e m a l obtained the t e r m s he had outlined in the National Pact a n d had a d h e r e d to ever since: an independent T u r k i s h nation-state to be established in Anatolia a n d eastern T h r a c e . B e f o r e long, K e m a l ' s T u r k e y took

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physical possession of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e , the D a r d a n e l l e s , a n d eastern T h r a c e f r o m the d e p a r t i n g Allies. In N o v e m b e r 1922, the K e m a l i s t National A s s e m b l y d e p o s e d the S u l t a n . T h e S u l t a n fled from C o n s t a n t i n o p l e into exile. T h u s in 1922 the centuries-old O t t o m a n E m p i r e c a m e to an e n d ; a n d T u r k e y , which for 500 years had d o m i n a t e d the M i d d l e E a s t , d e p a r t e d from M i d d l e E a s t e r n history to seek to m a k e herself E u r o p e a n .

IV T w o a s p e c t s of the crisis a n d of the armistice negotiations m a d e an especially m a r k e d i m p r e s s i o n in Britain. O n e was that the F r e n c h representative at the armistice conference had played an adversary role b y u r g i n g the T u r k s t o resist British d e m a n d s . T h i s p r o v e d t o be the climax of a line of F r e n c h c o n d u c t throughout the T u r k i s h crisis that was r e g a r d e d in Britain as treacherous. J u s t as Britain's M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy h a d led F r a n c e to re-evaluate a n d eventually to repudiate her alliance with B r i t a i n , so now F r a n c e ' s policy c a u s e d the leaders of the British E m p i r e to look at F r a n c e t h r o u g h new a n d a p p r e h e n s i v e eyes. A short time later the P r i m e Minister of S o u t h Africa wrote to the then P r i m e Minister of Britain that " F r a n c e is once m o r e the leader of the Continent with all the b a d old instincts fully alive in her . . . T h e F r e n c h are out for world p o w e r ; they have played the m o s t d a n g e r o u s anti-ally g a m e with K e m a l ; a n d inevitably in the c o u r s e of their a m b i t i o n s they m u s t c o m e to realise that the British E m p i r e is the only remaining e n e m y . " 33

Another u n n e r v i n g aspect of the crisis was the apparently reckless conduct of the inner g r o u p in the C a b i n e t : L l o y d G e o r g e , Birkenhead, Churchill, Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r S i r R o b e r t H o m e , a n d the Conservative leader A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n . N o t merely to the p u b l i c a n d to the p r e s s , b u t also to their political colleagues, they g a v e the i m p r e s s i o n of being a n x i o u s to provoke another war. T h e F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y said that he had the feeling that " L . G . , Winston, Birkenhead, H o m e , a n d even A u s t e n positively want hostilities to break o u t . " M a u r i c e Hankey, S e c r e t a r y to the C a b i n e t , recorded in his diary on 17 O c t o b e r 1922, that Winston Churchill "quite frankly regretted that the T u r k s had not attacked us"; L l o y d G e o r g e agreed with Churchill a b o u t this, H a n k e y believed. 34

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Attacking the C a b i n e t ministers as " R a s h a n d vacillating a n d inc a p a b l e , " The Times on 2 O c t o b e r had warned that "if this country once begins to s u s p e c t them, or any a m o n g them, of any disposition to m a k e political capital at h o m e out of a c o u r s e which would land us in war, it will never forgive t h e m . "

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S t a n l e y B a l d w i n , a junior C o n s e r v a t i v e m e m b e r of the g o v e r n m e n t who privately h a d c o m e to view the P r i m e Minister as "demoniacal," confided t o his wife that "he h a d f o u n d out that . . . L . G . h a d been all for war a n d h a d s c h e m e d to m a k e this country go to war with T u r k e y so that they s h o u l d have a 'Christian' . . . war v. the M a h o m e d a n . . . On the strength of that they would call a G e n e r a l Election at once . . . which, they calculated, would return t h e m t o office for another period of y e a r s . " B o n a r L a w e x p r e s s e d the o p posite fear: that the P r i m e Minister w o u l d m a k e peace in order to win the elections, b u t that once he h a d been re-elected he w o u l d go back t o m a k i n g w a r . 3 6

3 7

L l o y d G e o r g e ' s friend L o r d Riddell told the P r i m e Minister "that the country will not stand for a fresh w a r . " "I d i s a g r e e , " s a i d the P r i m e Minister. " T h e country will willingly s u p p o r t our action reg a r d i n g the S t r a i t s by force of a r m s if need b e . " D e c a d e s later, writing of the C h a n a k crisis in his m e m o i r s , L l o y d G e o r g e avowed that "I certainly meant to fight a n d I was certain we s h o u l d w i n . " 3 8

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V As the C h a n a k crisis m o v e d toward its d e n o u e m e n t , a military revolution b r o k e out in G r e e c e , launched by a triumvirate of officers in the field: two a r m y colonels a n d a naval captain. T h e r e was m u c h confusion b u t , in the end, no resistance. T h e g o v e r n m e n t resigned o n 2 6 S e p t e m b e r . K i n g C o n s t a n t i n e a b d i c a t e d the following m o r n i n g ; his son m o u n t e d the throne a s G e o r g e I I that afternoon. T h e main b o d y of revolutionary troops m a r c h e d into A t h e n s on 28 S e p t e m b e r . T h e t r i u m v i r a t e of revolutionary officers a s s u m e d authority, and at once o r d e r e d the arrest of the leaders of the p r e v i o u s g o v e r n m e n t . G o u n a r i s a n d several other ex-ministers were b r o u g h t before a military court martial on 13 N o v e m b e r , despite protests f r o m the British g o v e r n m e n t . T h e lengthy c h a r g e s , t h o u g h clothed in legalistic l a n g u a g e , were of little legal validity. Essentially, they a m o u n t e d to a political indictment of G o u n a r i s a n d his associates for h a v i n g b r o u g h t about a national c a t a s t r o p h e . At dawn on 28 N o v e m b e r the president of the court martial a n n o u n c e d its verdict. All eight of the a c c u s e d p e r s o n s were convicted of high t r e a s o n . T w o of t h e m were sentenced to life i m p r i s o n m e n t . T h e other six, including former P r i m e Minister G o u n a r i s , were sentenced to d e a t h . T h e six c o n d e m n e d m e n , within h o u r s , were driven to an execution g r o u n d east of Athens, in the s h a d o w of M o u n t H y m e t t u s . S m a l l burial holes h a d already been d u g at intervals of twelve m e t r e s . In front of each of the c o n d e m n e d m e n , at a distance of fifteen p a c e s , stood a firing s q u a d of five soldiers. T h e

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execution took place before noon. H a v i n g refused to wear b a n d a g e s , G o u n a r i s a n d his associates went to their death with their eyes

VI On 8 O c t o b e r 1922 A n d r e w B o n a r L a w , the retired leader of the U n i o n i s t — C o n s e r v a t i v e Party, wrote a letter to The Times a n d the Daily Express—published the next d a y — i n which he a p p e a r e d to e x p r e s s s u p p o r t for the strong s t a n d the L l o y d G e o r g e g o v e r n m e n t had taken against T u r k e y at C h a n a k . On the other h a n d , he pointed out that the interests that Britain a p p e a r e d to be defending, s u c h as the freedom of the D a r d a n e l l e s a n d the prevention of future m a s sacres of C h r i s t i a n s , were not uniquely British interests but world interests. T h e r e f o r e , he wrote, "It is not . . . right that the b u r d e n of taking action should fall on the British E m p i r e alone." He claimed that "We are at the S t r a i t s a n d in C o n s t a n t i n o p l e not by our own action alone, b u t by the will of the Allied Powers which won the war, a n d A m e r i c a is one of those P o w e r s . " In m u c h - q u o t e d sentences, B o n a r L a w a r g u e d that if the U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d the Allies were not p r e p a r e d to s h a r e the b u r d e n of responsibility, Britain s h o u l d put it d o w n . "We cannot alone act as the policeman of the world. T h e financial a n d social conditions of this country m a k e that i m p o s s i b l e . " H e p r o p o s e d t o warn F r a n c e that Britain might walk away f r o m enforcing the settlement with G e r m a n y , a n d might imitate the U n i t e d S t a t e s in retiring into an exclusive concern with her own national interests, if F r a n c e failed to recognize that a s t a n d had to be taken in A s i a as well as in E u r o p e . 4 1

R e a d as a whole, B o n a r L a w ' s letter did not call into question the policy p u r s u e d until then by the g o v e r n m e n t ; it merely offered advice for the future. Its isolationist tone, however, a n d the sentence a b o u t not b e i n g the world's p o l i c e m a n — w h i c h was often q u o t e d out of c o n t e x t — s t r u c k a responsive c h o r d in the ranks of those who found L l o y d G e o r g e ' s policies d a n g e r o u s a n d overly a m b i t i o u s . M o r e o v e r , B o n a r L a w ' s willingness to take a public stand s u g g e s t e d that, with his health a p p a r e n t l y restored, he might be p e r s u a d e d to re-enter politics—which threatened to alter the delicate balance of forces within the C o n s e r v a t i v e Party a n d endanger the Coalition. B o n a r L a w had chosen his foreign policy issue shrewdly. T o r y sentiment w a s traditionally p r o - T u r k a n d had been alienated by the P r i m e Minister's p r o - G r e e k c r u s a d e . "A good understanding with Turkey was our old policy a n d it is essential . . . " (original e m p h a s i s ) , wrote the chief of the recalcitrant T o r i e s on 2 O c t o b e r . It was yet another instance in which rank-and-file Conservatives found that 4 2

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their principles a n d p r e j u d i c e s were being d i s r e g a r d e d by the Coalition g o v e r n m e n t . C o m i n g after the concession of i n d e p e n d e n c e to Ireland a n d after the recognition of Bolshevik R u s s i a , L l o y d G e o r g e ' s a n t i - T u r k i s h policy threatened to be one instance too m a n y . T h e P r i m e Minister had d i s s i p a t e d his credit with t h e m . H e had done so at a t i m e when the collapse of the economy, m a s s u n e m ployment, a s l u m p in e x p o r t s , s c a n d a l s concerning the sales of honors a n d titles to political contributors, a n d a series of foreign policy fiascos culminating in the C h a n a k crisis had left h i m a m u c h diminished electoral asset. T h e C o n s e r v a t i v e s no longer felt c o m p e l l e d to follow him in order to survive at the polls. T h e P r i m e Minister viewed m a t t e r s differently. H i s g o v e r n m e n t ' s firmness at C h a n a k had b r o u g h t T u r k e y ' s armies to a halt; it was, in his view, a personal t r i u m p h for h i m a n d for Churchill, a n d he mistakenly believed that the electorate recognized it as s u c h . On this erroneous a s s u m p t i o n he p r o p o s e d to call a s n a p election in the flush of victory, as he had done at the e n d of 1918 after the F i r s t World War had been won. A u s t e n C h a m b e r l a i n a n d L o r d Birkenhead, the C o n s e r v a t i v e leaders in the government, agreed to join with L l o y d G e o r g e in fighting the elections once again on a coalition b a s i s . To d e f e n d that decision, C h a m b e r l a i n , as leader of the p a r t y , s u m m o n e d the C o n servative m e m b e r s of the H o u s e of C o m m o n s a n d of the g o v e r n m e n t to a meeting the m o r n i n g of T h u r s d a y , 19 October, at the Carlton, the leading T o r y c l u b . B o n a r L a w was the person best placed t o o p p o s e C h a m b e r l a i n , b r i n g d o w n the Coalition, a n d replace L l o y d G e o r g e a s P r i m e Minister. He hesitated; yet there was a s t r o n g p r e s s c a m p a i g n u r g i n g him on, led by The Times a n d by the B e a v e r b r o o k n e w s p a p e r s . L o r d B e a v e r b r o o k was B o n a r L a w ' s m o s t intimate political friend. H e w a s largely responsible for having created the L l o y d G e o r g e Coalition g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g the w a r ; now he acted to b r i n g it down. On 11 O c t o b e r B e a v e r b r o o k wrote to an A m e r i c a n friend that We are now in the throes of a political crisis. T h e failure of the P r i m e Minister's G r e e k policy had resulted in a c o m p l e t e collapse of his prestige with the C o n s e r v a t i v e s .. . T h e i m m e d i a t e future will decide whether the C o n s e r v a t i v e Party is to remain intact, or whether the P r i m e Minister is strong e n o u g h to split it. It will have been a great achievement to have s m a s h e d two parties in one short administration. Yet that is what he can claim if he s u c c e e d s in destroying the T o r i e s . 4 3

B e a v e r b r o o k s u c c e e d e d in o v e r c o m i n g B o n a r L a w ' s d o u b t s a n d in m a k i n g s u r e that the former T o r y leader actually attended the decisive meeting at the Carlton C l u b . At the meeting, L a w s p o k e against the

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Coalition, a n d though he s p o k e b a d l y his intervention p r o v e d decisive. By an overwhelming vote of 187 to 87, the c a u c u s decided to contest the c o m i n g elections on a straight party b a s i s . U p o n receiving the news, D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e i m m e d i a t e l y tend e r e d his resignation t o K i n g G e o r g e . S o o n afterward A n d r e w B o n a r L a w took office as P r i m e Minister • a n d called elections for 15 November. T h e p o p u l a r vote on 15 N o v e m b e r was close, b u t in the winnertake-all British parliamentary s y s t e m the results were a t r i u m p h for the C o n s e r v a t i v e s , who won a majority of seats in the new H o u s e of C o m m o n s . L l o y d G e o r g e was r e p u d i a t e d ; neither h e nor A s q u i t h c o m m a n d e d a large enough following to qualify even as L e a d e r of the O p p o s i t i o n , for L a b o u r h a d beaten the L i b e r a l s to take s e c o n d place. D u r i n g the electoral c a m p a i g n , the B e a v e r b r o o k p r e s s m o u n t e d a fierce attack on the M i d d l e E a s t e r n policy of the Coalition government, a n d d e m a n d e d that Britain withdraw from her new a c q u i sitions: I r a q , Palestine, and T r a n s j o r d a n . A l t h o u g h B e a v e r b r o o k ' s c r u s a d e was in fact launched without B o n a r L a w ' s sanction, it s e e m e d to implicate the new administration in a blanket c o n d e m n a t i o n of Britain's postwar policy in the M i d d l e E a s t . It also called into question Britain's c o m m i t m e n t to continue to s u p p o r t A r a b a n d J e w i s h aspirations there. As a result, d u r i n g the election c a m p a i g n the Colonial S e c r e t a r y Winston Churchill was d r a w n into p u b l i c controversy with L o r d C u r z o n (who had deserted to B o n a r L a w ) over the record of the past few years in the M i d d l e E a s t . Churchill c h a r g e d that C u r z o n w a s "as responsible as any m a n alive for the p r o m i s e s that were given to the J e w s a n d t o the A r a b s . " T . E . L a w r e n c e wrote t o the editor o f the Daily Express in s u p p o r t of his former chief that "If we get out of the M i d d l e E a s t M a n d a t e s with credit, it will be by Winston's b r i d g e . T h e man's a s b r a v e a s six, a s g o o d - h u m o u r e d , shrewd, self-confident, & considerate as a s t a t e s m a n can b e : & several times I've seen him chuck the statesmanlike c o u r s e & do the honest thing i n s t e a d . " 4 4

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In the general ruin of Coalition fortunes, Churchill was defeated for re-election i n his constituency o f D u n d e e . T . E . L a w r e n c e wrote "I'm m o r e sorry about Winston than I can say. I hope the P r e s s C o m m e n t is not too malevolent. It's s u r e to have hurt h i m t h o u g h . What bloody shits the D u n d e a n s m u s t b e . " Alone a m o n g the Coalition L i b e r a l leaders, D a v i d L l o y d G e o r g e retained his p a r l i a m e n t a r y s e a t ; b u t he never held C a b i n e t office again. L i k e L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d Winston Churchill a t the D a r d a n e l l e s , he saw his political position ruined by the M i d d l e E a s t . F o r nearly a q u a r t e r of a century after 1922 the once all-powerful minister who had p r e s i d e d over the destinies of the world lingered on 4 6

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in political i m p o t e n c e a n d isolation, feared a n d m i s t r u s t e d by m e n of lesser abilities, a n d looked down u p o n by t h e m for having c o n d u c t e d a morally s h a b b y administration. In part d u e to his o w n flaws, he was denied a chance to a p p l y his fertile g e n i u s to the political challenges of the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n , the a p p e a s e m e n t y e a r s , a n d the S e c o n d World War. H i s political d e v i o u s n e s s a n d his m o r a l a n d financial laxness were never forgotten. It was not sufficiently r e m e m bered that s i n g l e - h a n d e d he h a d kept Britain f r o m losing the F i r s t World War, a n d that his colleagues h a d once claimed that they were content to let h i m be P r i m e Minister for life. He died in 1945. In his later y e a r s L l o y d G e o r g e devoted himself to re-fighting the old battles in his highly slanted, far f r o m factual, b u t beautifully written m e m o i r s . As he p r e s e n t e d it, his last, lost c r u s a d e in the M i d d l e E a s t was intended to m a k e the world a fundamentally better place. Of the decision reached at the C a r l t o n C l u b , he w r o t e : " S o the G o v e r n m e n t fell, a n d with it went first the liberation of A r m e n i a and Asiatic G r e e c e , a n d in the sequel the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s a n d all the projects for s u b s t i t u t i n g conciliation for a r m a m e n t s . " * 47

* Lloyd George and the Coalition Conservatives fell from power because they had failed to pay attention to political sentiment amongst the Parliamentary rank and file. To make sure that on their side there would be no such failure again, the Conservatives thereafter established an organization of backbench Members of Parliament to make their views known to the leadership. It exists to this day, and is called the 1922 Committee.

61 THE SETTLEMENT OF THE M I D D L E EASTERN QUESTION i E a s t of S u e z , L l o y d G e o r g e a n d his colleagues were the a u t h o r s of a m a j o r chapter in history. T h e establishment of Allied control in the M i d d l e E a s t m a r k e d the climax of E u r o p e ' s c o n q u e s t of the rest of the world. It was the last c h a p t e r in a tale of high a d v e n t u r e — o f sailors d a r i n g to cross uncharted o c e a n s , of explorers tracking rivers to their s o u r c e , a n d of small b a n d s of soldiers m a r c h i n g into the interior of u n k n o w n continents to do battle with the vast a r m i e s of r e m o t e e m p i r e s . T h e venture had b e g u n centuries before, i n the wake of C o l u m b u s ' s galleons, as E u r o p e a n s s t r e a m e d forth to s u b j u g a t e a n d colonize the lands they had discovered in the A m e r i c a s a n d in the waters to the east a n d west of t h e m . It continued t h r o u g h the nineteenth century, as Britain a s s u m e d the e m p i r e of I n d i a , a n d as the G r e a t P o w e r s divided the continent of Africa between t h e m . By the d a w n of the twentieth century, E a s t A s i a a p a r t , the M i d d l e E a s t was the only native bastion that the E u r o p e a n s had not yet s t o r m e d ; a n d , at the end of the F i r s t World War, L l o y d G e o r g e was able to p r o u d l y point out that his a r m i e s had finally s t o r m e d it. F o r at least a century before the 1914 war, E u r o p e a n s had r e g a r d e d it as axiomatic that s o m e d a y the M i d d l e E a s t would be occupied by one or m o r e of the G r e a t Powers. T h e i r great fear was that d i s p u t e s a b o u t their respective s h a r e s m i g h t lead the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s to fight ruinous wars against one another. F o r the g o v e r n m e n t of Britain, therefore, the settlements arrived at by 1922 were a d o u b l y crowning achievement. Britain had won a far larger s h a r e of the M i d d l e E a s t (and Britain's rival, R u s s i a , a m u c h smaller one) than had s e e m e d possible b e f o r e h a n d ; b u t even m o r e i m p o r t a n t , the p o w e r s s e e m e d p r e p a r e d to accept the territorial division that had e m e r g e d in the early 1920s without further recourse to a r m s . T h u s the t r o u b l i n g a n d potentially explosive M i d d l e E a s t e r n Q u e s tion, as it h a d existed in world politics since the time of B o n a p a r t e ' s 558

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E g y p t i a n expedition, was successfully settled by the p o s t w a r a r r a n g e m e n t s arrived at by 1922. A m a j o r issue that h a d been at stake was where R u s s i a ' s political frontier in the M i d d l e E a s t w o u l d be d r a w n . By 1922 the q u e s t i o n was s o l v e d : the R u s s i a n frontier was finally d r a w n to run with a northern tier of states that stretched f r o m T u r k e y to I r a n to A f g h a n i s t a n — c o u n t r i e s that m a n e u v e r e d to remain i n d e p e n d e n t both of R u s s i a a n d the West, along a line that continued to hold firm for d e c a d e s . T h e other g r e a t issue at stake since N a p o l e o n i c t i m e s h a d been what w o u l d eventually b e c o m e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e — a n issue that was resolved in 1922 by the termination of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n a t e a n d the partition of its M i d d l e E a s t e r n d o m a i n s between T u r k e y , F r a n c e , a n d Britain. S u c h was the settlement of 1922.

II T h e settlement of 1922 was not a single act or a g r e e m e n t or d o c u m e n t ; rather, it was the design that e m e r g e d from m a n y s e p a r a t e acts a n d a g r e e m e n t s a n d d o c u m e n t s that date mostly f r o m that year. R u s s i a ' s territorial frontier in the M i d d l e E a s t was established by the draft constitution of the U . S . S . R . p r o m u l g a t e d at the end of 1922, while her political frontier e m e r g e d from the treaties she s i g n e d with T u r k e y , Persia, a n d A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d , to s o m e extent, f r o m the t r a d e a g r e e m e n t she s i g n e d with Britain in 1 9 2 1 . T h e d e p o s i n g of the O t t o m a n S u l t a n a n d the establishment of a T u r k i s h national state (confined to the T u r k i s h - s p e a k i n g portion of the dissolved e m p i r e ) were effected by u n a n i m o u s votes of the T u r k i s h G r a n d National A s s e m b l y on 1 a n d 2 N o v e m b e r 1922. T u r k e y ' s eventual frontiers in large part grew out of the armistice she s i g n e d with the Allies in the a u t u m n of 1922, followed by a peace treaty with the Allies s i g n e d at the S w i s s city of L a u s a n n e the following year. T h e rest of the former O t t o m a n d o m a i n s in the M i d d l e E a s t were partitioned between Britain a n d F r a n c e b y s u c h d o c u m e n t s a s F r a n c e ' s L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s M a n d a t e t o rule S y r i a a n d L e b a n o n ( 1 9 2 2 ) , Britain's L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e to rule Palestine including T r a n s j o r d a n ( 1 9 2 2 ) , a n d the treaty of 1922 with I r a q which Britain intended to serve as an affirmation of a M a n d a t e to rule that newly created country. Within her own s p h e r e of influence in the M i d d l e E a s t , Britain m a d e her d i s p o s i t i o n s in acts and d o c u m e n t s that also, for the m o s t * S o m e frontier questions remained unresolved. Turkey's frontier with Syria, example, was established only at the end of the 1930s.

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part, date from 1922. S h e placed F u a d I on the throne of E g y p t in that year, a n d m a d e E g y p t a nominally independent protectorate by the t e r m s of the Allenby D e c l a r a t i o n of 1922. S h e established a protectorate in I r a q by her treaty that year with that c o u n t r y : a country that she h a d created a n d u p o n whose throne she h a d placed her own n o m i n e e , F e i s a l . By the t e r m s of the Palestine M a n d a t e of 1922 a n d Churchill's White P a p e r for Palestine in 1922, T r a n s j o r d a n was set on the r o a d to a political existence s e p a r a t e from that of P a l e s t i n e — A b d u l l a h , a p p o i n t e d by Britain, was to p e r m a n e n t l y p r e side over the new entity by a decision m a d e in 1922—while west of the J o r d a n , J e w s were p r o m i s e d a National H o m e a n d n o n - J e w s were p r o m i s e d full rights. I n d e p e n d e n c e or a u t o n o m y for the K u r d s , which h a d been on the a g e n d a in 1 9 2 1 , s o m e h o w d i s a p p e a r e d from the a g e n d a in 1922, so there was to be no K u r d i s t a n : it was a nondecision of 1922 that was, in effect, a decision. In 1922, too, Britain i m p o s e d frontier a g r e e m e n t s u p o n I b n S a u d that established b o u n d a r i e s between S a u d i A r a b i a , I r a q , a n d K u w a i t . T h u s B r i t a i n — l i k e F r a n c e in her s p h e r e of the M i d d l e E a s t , a n d R u s s i a in h e r s — e s t a b l i s h e d s t a t e s , a p p o i n t e d p e r s o n s to g o v e r n t h e m , a n d drew frontiers between t h e m ; a n d d i d so mostly in a n d a r o u n d 1922. As they h a d long intended to d o , the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s had taken the political destinies of the M i d d l e E a s t e r n p e o p l e s in their h a n d s — a n d they did so by the t e r m s of what I have called the settlement of 1922.

Ill E v e r y w h e r e else in the w o r l d — e v e r y w h e r e outside of A s i a — E u r o p e a n occupation h a d resulted in the destruction of native political s t r u c t ur e s a n d their replacement by new ones of E u r o p e a n d e s i g n . T h e A m e r i c a s , A u s t r a l i a , N e w Z e a l a n d , a n d Africa were no longer divided in t e r m s of t r i b e s ; they were divided, as E u r o p e was, into countries. G o v e r n m e n t a l administration of m o s t of the planet was c o n d u c t e d in a E u r o p e a n m o d e , a c c o r d i n g to E u r o p e a n p r e c e p t s , a n d in a c c o r d a n c e with E u r o p e a n c o n c e p t s . Still, there was s o m e reason to question whether E u r o p e a n occupation would p r o d u c e quite so d e e p or lasting an i m p r e s s i o n in the M i d d l e E a s t as it h a d elsewhere. It was not only that the M i d d l e E a s t was a region of p r o u d a n d ancient civilizations, with beliefs deeply rooted in the p a s t , b u t also that the c h a n g e s E u r o p e p r o p o s e d to introduce were so p r o f o u n d that generations would have to p a s s before the c h a n g e s could take root. T h e s e matters take time. Ancient R o m e s h a p e d E u r o p e , and renascent E u r o p e s h a p e d the A m e r i c a s , b u t in both cases it was the work of centuries; a n d in 1922 western

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E u r o p e was in no m o o d — a n d in no condition—to e m b a r k on an u n d e r t a k i n g of s u c h m a g n i t u d e . T h e long-expected E u r o p e a n imperial adventure i n the M i d d l e E a s t had therefore b e g u n too late; E u r o p e a n s could no longer p u r s u e it either with a d e q u a t e resources or with a whole heart. E u r o p e itself, its antebellum world swept away in the c a t a c l y s m of 1914—18, was c h a n g i n g m o r e rapidly in weeks or m o n t h s than it had before in d e c a d e s or centuries, a n d to a g r o w i n g n u m b e r of E u r o p e a n s , imperialism s e e m e d out of place in the m o d e r n a g e . In the first years of the war it had still s o u n d e d acceptable openly to avow an intention to annex new colonies; b u t as Wilson's A m e r i c a a n d L e n i n ' s R u s s i a , with their anti-imperialist rhetoric, challenged old E u r o p e , m i n d s a n d political v o c a b u l a r i e s b e g a n to c h a n g e . Sir M a r k S y k e s , ever sensitive to shifts in the current of opinion, recognized in 1917 that the imperial c o n c e p t s he a n d Picot had e m p l o y e d only a year before in their M i d d l e E a s t pact already b e l o n g e d to a b y g o n e era. By the t i m e that the war c a m e to an end, British society was generally inclined to reject the idealistic c a s e for i m p e r i a l i s m (that it w o u l d extend the benefits of a d v a n c e d civilization to a b a c k w a r d region) as q u i x o t i c , a n d the practical case for it (that it w o u l d be of benefit to Britain to e x p a n d her e m p i r e ) as u n t r u e . Viewing imperialism as a costly drain on a society that needed to invest all of its r e m a i n i n g r e s o u r c e s in r e b u i l d i n g itself, the bulk of the British p r e s s , p u b l i c , a n d Parliament a g r e e d to let the g o v e r n m e n t c o m m i t itself to a p r e s e n c e in the A r a b M i d d l e E a s t only b e c a u s e Winston Churchill's ingenious strategy m a d e it s e e m p o s s i b l e to control the region inexpensively. T h u s the belief, widely shared by British officials d u r i n g and after the F i r s t World War, that Britain had c o m e to the M i d d l e E a s t to s t a y — a t least long enough to r e - s h a p e the region in line with E u r o p e a n political interests, ideas, a n d i d e a l s — w a s b a s e d on the fragile a s s u m p t i o n that Churchill's a i r c r a f t - a n d - a r m o r e d - c a r strategy could hold local o p p o s i t i o n at bay indefinitely. In turn, that a s s u m p tion was another expression of the u n d e r e s t i m a t i o n of the M i d d l e E a s t that had typified British policy all along. It h a d shown itself when G r e y d i s d a i n e d the offer of an O t t o m a n alliance in 1 9 1 1 ; when A s q u i t h in 1914 r e g a r d e d O t t o m a n entry in the war as b e i n g of no great c o n c e r n ; a n d when K i t c h e n e r , in 1915, sent his a r m i e s to their d o o m against an entrenched a n d forewarned foe at Gallipoli in an attack the British g o v e r n m e n t knew w o u l d be suicidal if the defending troops were of E u r o p e a n q u a l i t y — K i t c h e n e r ' s fatal a s s u m p t i o n b e i n g that they were not. In 1922 the British g o v e r n m e n t had arrived at a political c o m p r o mise with British society, by the t e r m s of which Britain c o u l d assert

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her m a s t e r y in the M i d d l e E a s t so long as she c o u l d do so at little cost. T o B r i t i s h officials who u n d e r e s t i m a t e d the difficulties Britain w o u l d encounter in g o v e r n i n g the r e g i o n — w h o , i n d e e d , h a d no conception of the m a g n i t u d e of what they had u n d e r t a k e n — t h a t m e a n t Britain w a s in the M i d d l e E a s t to stay. In retrospect, however, it w a s an early indication that Britain w a s likely to leave.

IV F r o m a British point of view, the settlement of 1922 h a d b e c o m e largely out of d a t e by the t i m e it w a s effected. It e m b o d i e d m u c h of the p r o g r a m for the p o s t w a r M i d d l e E a s t that the B r i t i s h g o v e r n ment h a d f o r m u l a t e d (mostly t h r o u g h the agency of S i r M a r k S y k e s ) between 1915 a n d 1917. B u t the British g o v e r n m e n t h a d c h a n g e d , B r i t i s h official thinking h a d c h a n g e d , a n d in 1922 the a r r a n g e m e n t s arrived at in the M i d d l e E a s t did not accurately reflect what the g o v e r n m e n t of the d a y w o u l d have w i s h e d . G i v i n g F r a n c e a L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e in 1922 to rule S y r i a ( i n c l u d i n g L e b a n o n ) w a s a c a s e in point. In 1915 a n d 1916 F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y S i r E d w a r d G r e y a n d the British negotiator S i r M a r k S y k e s had viewed with s y m p a t h y F r a n c e ' s claim t o S y r i a — a n d had a c c e p t e d it. B u t in 1922 Britain's P r i m e Minister, F o r e i g n S e c r e t a r y , a n d officials in the field were all m e n who h a d said for years that to allow F r a n c e to o c c u p y S y r i a w a s to invite disaster. E v e n within its own s p h e r e in the M i d d l e E a s t , the British g o v e r n m e n t w a s u n h a p p y a b o u t the dispositions it w a s m a k i n g in 1922. In 1914, 1915, a n d 1916, L o r d K i t c h e n e r a n d his lieutenants h a d chosen to s p o n s o r the H a s h e m i t e s — H u s s e i n of M e c c a a n d his s o n s — a s leaders o f the p o s t w a r A r a b M i d d l e E a s t . B y 1918 British officials h a d c o m e to r e g a r d H u s s e i n as a b u r d e n , who w a s involving t h e m in a losing conflict with I b n S a u d . By 1922 British politicians a n d officials h a d c o m e to view H u s s e i n ' s son Feisal as t r e a c h e r o u s , a n d H u s s e i n ' s son A b d u l l a h as lazy a n d ineffective. Y e t , in I r a q and T r a n s j o r d a n , F e i s a l a n d A b d u l l a h were the rulers w h o m Britain had installed; Britain h a d c o m m i t t e d herself to the H a s h e m i t e c a u s e . Palestine w a s another case in p o i n t : in 1922 Britain accepted a L e a g u e of N a t i o n s M a n d a t e to carry out a Zionist p r o g r a m that she h a d vigorously e s p o u s e d in 1 9 1 7 — b u t for which she h a d lost all e n t h u s i a s m in the early 1920s. It was no wonder, then, that in the years to c o m e B r i t i s h officials were to g o v e r n the M i d d l e E a s t with no great sense of direction or conviction. It w a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of a peculiarity of the settlement of 1922: h a v i n g destroyed the old o r d e r in the region, a n d having

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d e p l o y e d t r o o p s , a r m o r e d c a r s , a n d military aircraft everywhere from E g y p t to I r a q , British policy-makers imposed a settlement upon the Middle East in 1922 in which, for the most part, they themselves no longer believed.

V T h e M i d d l e E a s t b e c a m e what it is today both b e c a u s e the E u r o p e a n p o w e r s undertook to r e - s h a p e it a n d b e c a u s e Britain a n d F r a n c e failed to ensure that the d y n a s t i e s , the states, a n d the political s y s t e m that they established would p e r m a n e n t l y e n d u r e . D u r i n g and after the F i r s t World War, Britain a n d her Allies d e s t r o y e d the old order in the region irrevocably; they s m a s h e d T u r k i s h rule of the A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g M i d d l e E a s t b e y o n d repair.* T o take its place, they created countries, n o m i n a t e d rulers, delineated frontiers, and introd u c e d a state s y s t e m of the sort that exists everywhere else; b u t they did not quell all significant local opposition to those decisions. As a result the events of 1914—22, while b r i n g i n g to an end E u r o p e ' s M i d d l e E a s t e r n Question, g a v e birth to a M i d d l e E a s t e r n Question in the M i d d l e E a s t itself. T h e settlement of 1922 ( a s it is called here, even t h o u g h s o m e of the a r r a n g e m e n t s were arrived at a bit earlier or a bit later) resolved, as far as E u r o p e a n s were concerned, the question of w h a t — a s well as w h o — s h o u l d replace the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ; yet even today there are powerful local forces within the M i d d l e E a s t that remain unreconciled to these a r r a n g e m e n t s — a n d m a y well overthrow t h e m . S o m e of the d i s p u t e s , like those elsewhere in the w o r l d , are a b o u t rulers or frontiers, but what is typical of the M i d d l e E a s t is that m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l claims are also a d v a n c e d , d r a w i n g into question not merely the d i m e n s i o n s a n d b o u n d a r i e s , b u t the right to exist, of countries that immediately or eventually e m e r g e d from the British a n d F r e n c h decisions of the early 1920s: I r a q , Israel, J o r d a n , a n d L e b a n o n . So at this point in the twentieth century, the M i d d l e E a s t is the region of the world in which w a r s of national survival are still b e i n g fought with s o m e frequency. T h e d i s p u t e s g o deeper still: b e n e a t h s u c h a p p a r e n t l y insoluble, but specific, issues as the political future of the K u r d s or the political destiny of the Palestinian A r a b s , lies the m o r e general question of whether the t r a n s p l a n t e d m o d e r n s y s t e m of politics " Which is not to deny that the T u r k s also played a role in the destruction of their empire, and that, in any event, there were forces within the Middle East making for change.

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invented in E u r o p e — c h a r a c t e r i z e d , a m o n g other things, by the division of the earth into independent secular states b a s e d on national citizenship—will survive in the foreign soil of the M i d d l e E a s t . In the rest of the world E u r o p e a n political a s s u m p t i o n s are so taken for g r a n t e d that n o b o d y thinks a b o u t them a n y m o r e ; but at least one of these a s s u m p t i o n s , the m o d e r n belief in secular civil g o v e r n m e n t , is an alien creed in a region m o s t of whose inhabitants, for m o r e than a t h o u s a n d y e a r s , have avowed faith in a Holy L a w that g o v e r n s all of life, including g o v e r n m e n t a n d politics. E u r o p e a n s t a t e s m e n of the F i r s t World War era d i d — t o s o m e e x t e n t — r e c o g n i z e the p r o b l e m a n d its significance. As soon as they b e g a n to plan their annexation of the M i d d l e E a s t , Allied leaders recognized that Islam's hold on the region was the m a i n feature of the political l a n d s c a p e with which they would have to contend. L o r d K i t c h e n e r , it will be r e m e m b e r e d , initiated in 1914 a policy d e s i g n e d to b r i n g the M o s l e m faith u n d e r Britain's sway. When it looked as t h o u g h that m i g h t not w o r k — f o r the Sherif H u s s e i n ' s call to the Faithful in 1916 fell on deaf e a r s — K i t c h e n e r ' s associates p r o p o s e d instead to s p o n s o r other loyalties (to a federation of A r a b i c - s p e a k i n g p e o p l e s , or to the family of K i n g H u s s e i n , or to about-to-be-created countries s u c h as I r a q ) as a rival to p a n - I s l a m . I n d e e d they f r a m e d the postwar M i d d l e E a s t settlement with that object ( a m o n g others) in view. H o w e v e r , E u r o p e a n officials at the time had little u n d e r s t a n d i n g of I s l a m . T h e y were too easily p e r s u a d e d that M o s l e m opposition to the politics of m o d e r n i z a t i o n — o f E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n — w a s vanishing. H a d they been able to look a h e a d to the last half of the twentieth century, they w o u l d have been astonished by the fervor of the Wahhabi faith in S a u d i A r a b i a , by the passion of religious belief in warring A f g h a n i s t a n , by the continuing vitality of the M o s l e m B r o t h e r h o o d in E g y p t , S y r i a , a n d elsewhere in the S u n n i world, a n d by the recent K h o m e i n i upheaval in Shi'ite I r a n . C o n t i n u i n g local opposition, whether on religious g r o u n d s or others, to the settlement of 1922 or to the fundamental a s s u m p t i o n s u p o n which it was b a s e d , explains the characteristic feature of the region's politics: that in the M i d d l e E a s t there is no sense of legitimacy—no a g r e e m e n t on rules of the g a m e — a n d no belief, universally s h a r e d in the region, that within whatever b o u n d a r i e s , the entities that call themselves countries or the m e n who claim to be rulers are entitled to recognition as s u c h . In that sense, successors to the O t t o m a n sultans have not yet been permanently installed, even t h o u g h — b e t w e e n 1919 a n d 1922—installing them was what the Allies believed themselves to be doing. It m a y be that one day the challenges to the 1922 s e t t l e m e n t — t o the existence of J o r d a n , Israel, I r a q , a n d L e b a n o n , for e x a m p l e , or to the institution of secular national g o v e r n m e n t s in the M i d d l e

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E a s t — w i l l be withdrawn. B u t if they continue in full force, then the twentieth-century M i d d l e E a s t will eventually be seen to be in a situation similar to E u r o p e ' s in the fifth century A D , when the collapse of the R o m a n E m p i r e ' s authority in the West threw its s u b j e c t s into a crisis of civilization that obliged t h e m to work out a new political s y s t e m of their own. T h e E u r o p e a n experience s u g g e s t s what the d i m e n s i o n s of such a radical crisis of political civilization might be. It took E u r o p e a millennium a n d a half to resolve its postR o m a n crisis of social a n d political identity: nearly a t h o u s a n d years to settle on the nation-state f o r m of political organization, a n d nearly five h u n d r e d years m o r e to determine which nations were entitled to be states. Whether civilization w o u l d survive the r a i d s a n d conflicts of rival warrior b a n d s ; whether church or state, p o p e or e m p e r o r , would rule; whether Catholic or Protestant would prevail in C h r i s t e n d o m ; whether dynastic e m p i r e , national state, or city-state w o u l d c o m m a n d fealty; and whether, for e x a m p l e , a t o w n s m a n of D i j o n belonged to the B u r g u n d i a n or to the F r e n c h nation, were issues painfully worked out t h r o u g h ages of searching a n d strife, d u r i n g which the l o s e r s — t h e A l b i g e n s i a n s of southern F r a n c e , for e x a m p l e — w e r e often annihilated. It was only at the end of the nineteenth century, with the creation of G e r m a n y a n d Italy, that an accepted m a p of western E u r o p e finally e m e r g e d , s o m e 1,500 years after the old R o m a n m a p started to b e c o m e obsolete. T h e continuing crisis in the M i d d l e E a s t in our time m a y p r o v e to be nowhere near so p r o f o u n d or so long-lasting. B u t its issue is the s a m e : how diverse peoples are to r e g r o u p to create new political identities for themselves after the collapse of an a g e s - o l d imperial order to which they had g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d . T h e Allies p r o p o s e d a p o s t - O t t o m a n design for the region in the early 1920s. T h e continuing question is whether the p e o p l e s of the region will accept it. T h e settlement of 1922, therefore, d o e s not b e l o n g entirely or even mostly to the p a s t ; it is at the very heart of current wars, conflicts, a n d politics in the M i d d l e E a s t , for the q u e s t i o n s that K i t c h e n e r , L l o y d G e o r g e , and Churchill o p e n e d u p are even now being contested by force of a r m s , year after year, in the ruined streets of B e i r u t , along the b a n k s of the s l o w - m o v i n g T i g r i s E u p h r a t e s , a n d by the waters of the Biblical J o r d a n .

VI British politicians a n d officials of the early 1920s did not foresee the problematical future of the 1922 settlement. T h e y did not even

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foresee the i m m e d i a t e political future of those personally involved in i t — a m o n g t h e m , Winston Churchill, a principal architect of the s e t t l e m e n t — a l t h o u g h these were m a t t e r s closer at h a n d , a n d with which they were m o r e intimately familiar than the politics of the Middle East. In 1922 it was almost universally a g r e e d in Britain that Churchill was politically finished. Churchill, who had lost his seat in the C a b i n e t in O c t o b e r and his seat in the C o m m o n s in N o v e m b e r , a p p e a r e d c r u s h e d . While he did not d o u b t that he could re-enter Parliament at s o m e point, it s e e m e d unlikely that he w o u l d ever again be invited to serve in a g o v e r n m e n t — a t least in any m a j o r capacity. A dinner c o m p a n i o n of Churchill's at the end of N o v e m b e r later r e m e m b e r e d that "Winston was so d o w n in the d u m p s he could scarcely speak the whole evening. He t h o u g h t his world had c o m e to an e n d — a t least his political world. I thought his career was over." T h e new Parliament a s s e m b l e d o n 2 7 N o v e m b e r 1922, b u t Churchill was not a m e m b e r of it, so there was nothing to keep him in Britain. At the b e g i n n i n g of D e c e m b e r , he sailed for the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . It w a s only a d e c a d e since, in the early s u m m e r of his career, he had cruised the M e d i t e r r a n e a n a b o a r d Enchantress with y o u n g Violet A s q u i t h a n d her father; b u t that earlier cruise had taken place, politically s p e a k i n g , in another c e n t u r y — i n d e e d , in another world. 1

O n c e he had arrived in the south of F r a n c e , Churchill settled in a rented villa near C a n n e s a n d r e s u m e d work on his war m e m o i r s — a project that he had c o m m e n c e d earlier. He was far e n o u g h along with it so that he believed the o p e n i n g sections would be ready for newspaper serialization in a b o u t a m o n t h . It was to be a work in many volumes. In the c o u r s e of c o m p o s i n g his m e m o i r s , he reflected on the u n a c c o u n t a b l e r u n of b a d luck he h a d encountered in all that touched and concerned the T u r k i s h E a s t . He recalled the accidents, confusions, a n d b l u n d e r s that had allowed the Goeben to reach C o n s t a n t i n o p l e a n d help p u s h the O t t o m a n E m p i r e into the w a r — a war for which he, Churchill, had been personally b l a m e d . He reflected on the a l m o s t unbelievable behavior of his a d m i r a l s at the D a r d a n e l l e s in fleeing the N a r r o w s — t h e day before they m i g h t have won the T u r k i s h war, a n d earned h i m the laurels of victory, instead of d i s g r a c e a n d d i s m i s s a l . He told his readers how a monkey bit the K i n g o f G r e e c e a n d c a u s e d the renewed T u r k i s h war that b r o u g h t down the L l o y d G e o r g e g o v e r n m e n t — a n d himself with it. O n c e he had completed and p u b l i s h e d the first v o l u m e of these m e m o i r s , Churchill returned to Britain, in the m i d d l e of 1923, to

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the a p p a r e n t l y hopeless political w a r s . In the late a u t u m n he stood for Parliament once again, was continuously heckled a b o u t the wartime D a r d a n e l l e s failure, and w a s defeated by the L a b o u r c a n d i d a t e . In late winter he stood for election again, in another constituency, a n d was again defeated, this time by a C o n s e r v a t i v e . B u t Churchill's situation was c h a n g i n g . In late 1924 he returned to P a r l i a m e n t ; a n d the political world was a s t o u n d e d to hear that Winston C h u r c h i l l — f a r from b e i n g politically finished—had b e c o m e Chancellor of the E x c h e q u e r , a position usually d e e m e d to be the second m o s t i m p o r t a n t in the C a b i n e t . T h e c l o u d s b e g a n to part, a n d a former colleague on the L i b e r a l benches, G e o r g e L a m b e r t , writing to congratulate him on the new a p p o i n t m e n t , foresaw an even m o r e astonishing eventuality. "Winston my b o y , " he w r o t e , "I have got a fair instinct for politics. I think I shall live to see you P r i m e M i n i s t e r . " 2