A New Look at the Problem of Innate Ideas Nicholas Rescher The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 17, No. 3. (Nov., 1966), pp. 205-218. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28196611%2917%3A3%3C205%3AANLATP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science is currently published by Oxford University Press.
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Brit.]. Phil. Sci. (1966), Volume 17, Number 3, 205-218
Printed in Great Britain
A NEW LOOK AT THE PROBLEM OF
INNATE IDEAS *
I
Introduction
THE mention of innate ideas evokes little responsive sympathy in modern philosophers. When, for example, I inquired of Nelson Goodman regarding publication of a recent symposium on the topic on which he had participated, he wrote in reply that: ' Personally, 1 am rather of two minds about seeing this published since I feel in some ways that the less attention given the matter of innate ideas the better ' (Letter of 22 July 1965). Nevertheless, I cannot help feelmg that here as elsewhere there is truth in the maxim that Where there's sttloke there'sjre. A position which has in the history of the subject been held by philosophers of the very first calibre is not likely to be devoid of merit, and is certain not to be devoid of interest. The problem we have set ourselves here can thus be stated simply: What good reasons (if any) can be found for holding a theory of innate ideas? However, before dealmg with this question, we must first confront the obviously preliminary query: Exactly what are the concepts and the theses that are involved here-just what is at issue in a theory o f ' innate ideas '?
2
The Notion ofan ' Innate Idea ': Some Contrasts
When we speak of ' innate ideas ', two centrally important contrasts must be borne in mind: First, the term ' innate ' involves (I) a contrast with inzportation from without, the idea thus characterised being held not to be learned or in any way acquired; and there is also (2) a contrast with internal tnanuficture, the idea in question being claimed not to be synthesised or in any way generated by oneself. Second, the term ' idea ' itself involves a whole series of significant
* Received 21.x.65 205
NICHOLAS RESCHER
contrasts. It indicates that we have to do with concepts or notions, and not, strictly speaking, (I) knowledge or (2) intellectual capacities or (3) mental propensities. Brief consideration of these last three items is indicated. Innate knowledge. That there are ' innate truths '-items of information or knowledge whose rationes cognoscendi are in a significant way independent of experience-is a position upheld in Plato's Meno and supported by various subsequent philosophers. This position undoubtedly leads naturally into a theory of innate ideas. It is plausible -though not strictly necessary-to maintain that when a truth is innate the ideas with which it deals cannot be a matter of importation (acquisition)or manufacture (generationby oneself). But the contrary implication does not hold. A theory of innate ideas could be upheld without any concomitant doctrine of innate knowledge. The two positions are thus distinguishable. Innate intellectual capacities. These relate to the whole range of man's mental abilities and capabilities. A great many intellectual capacities are unquestionably acquired-the ability to solve calculus problems or to speak French, for example. Others can with legitimacy be described as innate-the ability to learn the calculus or to attain Juency in French, for example. For these are capacities which, in the very nature of the concepts at issue, cannot unqualifiedly be characterised as acquired rather than present ab initio. All of those intellectual capacities (like that for language-learning) in virtue of which we are able to acquire other capacities (like that of conversing in English), are in a basic, if quite unexciting sense to be described as innate. Capacities of this sort appear to be built into our very conception of man as a creature capable of ' human reason '. Nothing mysteriousand, alas, but little of epistemological interest-is at issue here. Innate mental propensities. Here we have to do with the range of tendencies, inchations, and dispositions relating to the functioning of the human mind. These could presumably be of (among other things) a propositional orientation-i.e. be a matter of tendencies to believe certain theses. Or, and from the standpoint of innate ideas more relevantly, they could be of a conceptual orientation-i.e. be a matter of tendencies to conceive, that is, to conceptualise certain things in some one particular manner. The espousal of a theory of innate ideas would thus compel one to accept innate mental propensities (although the reverse implication does not necessarily hold).
N E W L O O K AT P R O B L E M OF I N N A T E IDEAS
3 Historical Considerations T o bring into sharper focus the themes that are at issue in the discussion of innate ideas it is useful to examine briefly some facets of their hist0ry.l Descartes. The doctrine of innate ideas came to prominence in modern philosophy in the system of Descartes. His attention focused principally upon the idea of God, arguing (in Part 111 of the Meditations) that this idea is of such a kind that it (I) cannot be presented to the mind on the basis of sensation, ( 2 ) cannot be presented to the mind on the basis of reflection (i.e. the mind's internal self-perception), and (3) cannot be constructed by the mind out of sensory and reflexive materials. ' Consequently ', writes Descartes, ' the only alternative is that it [i.e. the idea of God] is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me.' Descartes thus reaches his conclusion that the idea of God is innate, not by adducing any positive evidence to this effect, but wholly by preceding along the via negativa of the disjunctive syllogism: W e have the idea in question in the mind; it was not imported there by the usual channels; it could not have been manufactured there; ergo it must have been there from the first. Locke. The brunt of Locke's attack in Book I of the Essay Concerning Hirnzan Understanding is directed at ' innate principles ', innate truths, rather than innate ideas. (His primary target was apparently not the innate ideas of Descartes but the inbred ' self-evident principles ' of the British scholastics and the Cambridge Platonists.) However, Locke leaves no doubt that a theory of ' innate notions ', i.e. ideas, is equally unacceptable to him. The strongest argument for innate ideas would, on his view, be their universal recognition by all mankind. But such universal recognition would-even if actually extant -provide only a weak basis for the theory. And moreover, there is every reason to reject any claim of universal recognition.
Children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions, one might reasonably imagine that in their mind there innate notions should lie open to everyone's view . . . (Essay, Book I , chap. ii, sect. 27). Here, as elsewhere, Locke treats the theory of innate ideas as immediately refutable by straightforwardly empirical considerations. 1 A conspectus of the history of the theory of innate ideas from the Cambridge Platonists to Kant can be found in W . Windelband's History ofPhi1osophy (Part V , chap. i, sect. 33).
2'37
N I C H O L A S RESCHER
Leibniz. In his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding Leibniz in effect rejects Locke's universality-of-recognition construction of innateness and goes back to an essentially Cartesian conception of the matter. It is not requisite that everyone recognise an innate idea-it can lie latent in the mind. We may be-indeed we may have to be-led to an innate idea by a suitable course of experience. (Leibniz explicitly rejects the thesis that Whatever we learn is not innate.1) What renders the idea innate is a matter of content not of heuristics; the key consideration is that the idea cannot be constructed out of the deliverances of experience: be it external perception or internal reflection. The ' cannot ' here is of an intricate kind-neither strictly logical nor strictly factual, but functional. Its force is roughly this: Given the nature of the mechanisms ofhuman experience (an essentially empirical matter) it is then logically impossible (but only conditionally impossible with respect to this assumed empirical basis) to construct from such elements an idea with the characteristics in question. (This is like saying-' Given the characteristics of my typewriter, it is impossible (now physically impossible) for me to write Chinese with it.') The force of such an essentially hypothetical ' cannot ' is logical, but is nevertheless such that it essentially involves factual considerations: Given a description of the mode of functioning, of the task at issue, and of the relevant principles of operation (i.e. natural laws), the performance of the task can be shown to be logically impossible. Kant. One Kantian version of an innate idea is a ' pure concept ' of the understandmg-a concept not derived from experience as contents thereof, but as essentially structural in representing mindimposed preconditions for the having of experiences. Moreover, particular importance attaches to the ' Transcendental Ideas ', equal in number of the modes of relationship of which the mind is capable through the mediation of the categories of thought. They ' transcend the limits of possible experience ' in that they cannot possibly occur withexperience but rather relate toits limits-they have no constitutive applicability to the contents of experience, but only a regulative applicability: ' den Verstand zu einem gewissen Ziele zu richten, in Aussicht auf welches die Richt~n~slinien aller seiner Regeln in einem Punkt zuzarnrnenlaufen.'2 The mode of analysis is not so much functional, as in Leibniz, but rather presuppositional: Given that a Philosophische Schrijen (ed. C. I. Gerhardt), vol. v, p. 70
Kritik d. reinen Vernunft
N E W L O O K A T P R O B L E M O F I N N A T E IDEAS
conscious experience of a mind is the sort o f t h g it empirically is, what sorts of ideas must be inevitably applicable to its deliverances? The direction of the analysis is reversed from that of the functional approach. Liizguistic Neo-Kantiatzism. In Cassirer's variety of neo-Kantianism, the a priori concepts are located not in the human intellect as such, but in the particular linguistic apparatus it employs (and some form of which it must perforce employ). W e are to look for imposed conceptpreconditions not in the mind that assimilates experience, but in the conceptual system of the languages by means of which a given mind organises its experiences. There is no reference to a generic mechanism for ' having experience '; it is the concrete machinery available for the communicable characterisation of experiences in natural languages that provides the functional locus o f ' innate '-or rather now simply a priori (in a language-relativistic sense)-concepts. The fundamental ' categories ' inhere not in human thought as such but in the ' forms of human life ' that provide the ecological matrices for the development and utilisation of natural languages: The ascent to lugher levels of abstraction, to more general and cornprehensive names and ideas, is a difficult and laborious task. The analysis of language provides us with a wealth of materials for studying the character of the mental processes which finally led to theaccomplishment of this task. . . . Every classification is directed and dictated by special needs, and it is clear that these needs vary according to the different conditions of man's social and cultural life. In primitive civilisations the interest in the concrete and particular aspects of things necessarily prevails. Human speech always conforms to and is commensurate with certain forms of human life. (An Essay orr Man, chap. viii, ad Pn.1 Another version of Neo-Kantianism is operative in the h e of thought presented in an interesting article by P. H. Nowell-Smith.l Taking a functional view of language as a purposive instrument for communication among rational beings : Since making a statement is a purposive activity, the concept of making a statement can only be understood in the light of the purposes for which statements are made; and since it is a rational activity it must be governed by rules which together constitute necessary and sufficient ' Co~ltextualImplication and Ethical Theory ', Proc. Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol. X X X V I (London, 1962), pp. 1-18
NICHOLAS RESCHER
conditions of anything's being used for these purposes. Prominent among these . . . is the communication of beliefs . . . ; so that the rules for making statements are rules to which any device must conform if it is to be capable of being used for the communication of beliefs. Given this approach, it would seem to be a natural step-although it is one which Nowell-Smith himself does not take-to make a ' transcendental deduction ' of those concepts which, on the view advanced, are inherently underlying the use of ' any possible language '. This would presumably underwrite certain ideas as ' innate ' (in the technical sense of necessarily rather than contingently ' language-inherent '). The obvious candidates would be such ideas as those of ' truth ', ' believing-to-be true ', ' asserting-to-be true ', and perhaps such a derivative as ' lying ' (i.e. ' asserting-to-be true but believing-not-to-be true '). Moreover, the concepts of ' rule ', ' rule-conformity ', and ' rule-violation ' would also appear to be eminently qualified candidates. 4 The Issue Reformulated
In the light projected against the backdrop ofthis historical excursus, we can now reformulate the question of innate ideas in the way in which it is preposed that it be regarded here. W e shall assimilate the controversial issue of innate ideas to the rather more inocuous issue of innate propensities, but propensities of a very special type-viz. propensities to arrive at and utilise certain ideas. Three sorts of propensities are specifically at issue here: I. Propensities on the part of men to arrive-regardless of environmental factors-at a certain idea. Here we have an absolute conceptual tendency of an environmentally invariant character. (The idea of self may be an example.) 2. Propensities on the part of men to arrive at a certain idea under suitable environmental circumstances. Here we have a conditional conceptual tendency of an environmentally dependent kind. (E.g. ideas of up/down for us Earthlings living in a strong gravitational field.)
3. Propensities on the part of men relating not to the acquisition of ideas, but to their processing-i.e. propensities to work with ideas in a certain way and to make certain kinds of conceptual moves. (Think for example of the suggested propensities basic to the associationistic psychology.)
N E W L O O K A T PROBLEM O F I N N A T E IDEAS
Our question can be put thus: Has man a propensity to introduce certain ideas-or certain types of ideas, or certain mechanisms for handhg ideas-into the conceptual scheme he employs in structuring his thought in language? When the question is put in this LeibnizINeoKantian framework, it is apparent that its answer resides in a search for linguistic unifornlities of conceptually significant variety. The method of investigation at issue here must be considered in detail. 5 The Methodology of Investigation
The search for significant ulliformities in the way in which concepts are embedded and put to work in the languages which provide the ' conceptual schemes ' for our thmking is by no means a simple and straightforward matter. When we enter into this complex arena, various prospects and possibilities lie before us, of which the following three are especially prominent:
Spurious Uniforntities. It is easy to convince ourselves of such conceptual regularities as: Men everywhere-regardless of linguistic environment-count by the use of nuntbers or In all linguistic settings subjccts are capable of bearing predicates or Everyone who has a conception of a machine thinks of it as an artifact. The sources of the compelling plausibility of such uniformities lies at the surface. They are straightforwardly spurious uniformities: although they have the seeming air of resulting from a careful survey of the cases, they are actually not discovered uniformities at all, but imposed ones. They in fact shed no light whatsoever upon the various language-systems with whlch they purport to concern themselves, but are immediate reflections of our own linguistic apparatus. W e would not call a process ' counting ' if it did not involve the use ofnunlbers; we would not call a term a ' subject ' that was not capable of bearing predicates; we wozrld not call an object a ' machine ' if it were not an artifact. The regularities at issue thus reflect only the applicability-criteria of our own languages in general. One might as well tout it as a discovery that everyone's forks have tymes. (Accidental) Empirical Unijrntities. It is certainly possible, and indeed likely, that human languages in general share certain empirical features in common. It might be-let us assume it is-the case that all languages that have verbs vary them by person st, znd, 3rd; singular or plural). What of it? And indeed given the high degree of generality of many of the categories of modern linguistics it is
N I C H O L A S RESCHER
readily conceivable that certain (genuinely empirical) features capturable within the categorical scheme are shaped in commonly all known natural languages. Assuming this so in some specific instance it would be definitely premature to conclude anything from it that bears relevantly on the issue of ' innate ideas '. In the first place, the regularity might be a merely accidental or fortuitous one. (Suppose, say, that in all languages adjectival descriptors lend themselves to the formation of comparative and superlative counterparts.) In the second place, the regularity might reflect some strictly utilitarian consideration. (Suppose, e.g. that in all languages the equivalent of ' mother ' and ' father ' are relatively short.) An empirical uniformity in the applicability of certain concepts-could well be a wholly (fortuitous) matter that in no way makes manifest any underlying conceptual concentrations. Functional Uniformity. The starting-point (but only that !) for the discovery of a functional uniformity is provided by the finding of an empirical regularity. But for reasons now to be explained, for such a uniformity to be conceptually significant the circumstances of the case should be such that the regularity is capable of being provided with a rationale of a particular sort, namely afunctional rationale. The regularity must be rendered plausible (i.e. ' only to be expected ') by an exposition of the fact that-by virtue of the particular range of concepts at issue-the regularity is a purposive one, that is to say, one which serves the interests of effectiveness and efficiency in the relevant conceptual domain. (And of course we should study these uniformities not as isolated items, but with a view to their coherence-the extent and manner in which they hook up with one another in mutually supporting patterns.) The considerations involved here are difficult and far from selfexplanatory. The best way to expound the ideas at issue is to develop in some detail a significantly helpful illustrative analogy. 6 The Computer Analogy
In order to clarify the idea of a functional uniformity, let us once again draw and exploit the nowadays hackneyed analogy between the human mind and the modern electronic computers-not in the usual direction from man to machine to argue the existence of ' thinking machines ', but in the reverse direction to draw attention to certain features of human thought.
N E W L O O K A T P R O B L E M O F I N N A T E IDEAS
A computer has three importantly distinguishable aspects? (I) Its
' hardware ': the physical gadgetry constituting the computer as
a particular piece of equipment. (2)
Its ' logic ': the mode of functioning of the computer. This set of capabilities and tendencies is not a physical part of the computer at all, but can be embodied in very different collections of hardware. It has to do with the modus operatzdi of the computer: the generic character and inevitable patterns of its functional responses under various kinds of relevant circumstances (if you like, the ' concepts ' and the ' modes of thought ' it brings to bear).
(3) Its 'programnze ' : the specific data inputs of its ' memory banks ' and the operating instructions for its working procedures-with which the computer is specifically equipped in the course of being deployed upon a particular problem, i.e. its ' empirical experience ' within a given area.
Forgetting for the present about the ' hardware ', we note that the functional features relating to the computer's activities can be two sectors : (I) the first of which (its ' programme ') is clearly a matter of acquired data and procedures, but ( 2 ) the second of which (its 'logic') is equally clearly a matter of modes of functioning which pertain to the computer by virtue of the characteristics of the ' hardware ' make-up, and which remains essentially unaffected by changes of acquired materials (i.e. data and instructional inputs). It is this set of features of the computer's ' mental ', that is to say computatiotzal make-up-features that may or may not be brought to the fore in the course of the group of problem-tasks set to a particular computer in the course of its particular history-that represent the ' innate ' modes of ' conceptualization ' and o f ' reasoning ' on the part of the computer. What is being proposed, on our cybernetic approach to the issue, is that it is in the light of these features mherent in the a priori ' logic ' of a computer-in contrast to its a posteriori ' programme '-that the conception of innate ideas be construed on the human side of the man/ computer analogy. This analogy is not to be viewed as an ' existence argument ' that demonstrates the actuality of ' innate ideas ' in the sense at issue, but only as a ' feasibility argument ' that demonstrates their possibility. 1 For a good, nontechcal account of the nature and capabilities of modem computers see D. G. Fink, Computers and the Human Mind (New York, 1966).
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NICHOLAS RESCHER
But what is the special significance of functional uniformities in the context of our problem: (I) Is there warrant for taking functional efficiency as a mark of innateness? ( 2 ) And conversely, should the innate be expected to prove functionally efficient? (Understand innateness now in the strict sense of the ' logic of the macline '.) In briefest outline the line of reasoning here is to rest an affirmative response to (2) on the assumption of an evolutionary development, and then to hedge with respect to (I). For in this evolutionary light, we must regard functional efficiency of an environmentally invariant conceptual disposition not as a proof, but merely as a presunlptive rtrark of innateness1: functional efficiency is not part of the meaning of innateness, but is here cast in the role of a symptomatic indicator for testing its presence. The argument to innateness is fraught with the same sort of difficulties that arise with respect to the ' black-box problem ' of attempting to infer the intrinsic ' logic ' of a computing machine from knowledge solely of its output." Taking a somewhat traditional view of the subject, the following objection might be raised: ' Even if there is such a thing as a " logic " (in yotrr sense) of human thought, we humans shall not be in a position to discover it, because we cannot contrast it with any other possible L' logic ".' The computer analogy is important here for this reason, among others, that it affords at least one plausible basis for a reply, viz. that in the area o f ' computer logics ' a contrast-group has become available. 7 The Project of Investigation
The exploitation of this line of approach would call for a manyfaceted investigation involving the following components : There is obviously no necessary connection between the functional and the innate-any more than psychological tendencies deep-rooted in man's make-up need necessarily be of positive value from the adaptive standpoint. In fact there is merit in the suggestion offered rather jokingly by one colleague of mine (Martin Tweedale) that one promising method for identifying a uniformity as innate when it is-its generality notwithstanding-from the angle of purposive considerations, highly irrational and adaptively negative. The man-machine analogy upon which we have drawn for our purposes is not rendered an illicit one in this context by the fact that a machine is a purposive artifact precisely because the quasi-finalistic atmosphere that prevails on the human side of the analogy in virtue of evolutionary considerations.
N E W L O O K A T PROBLEM OF I N N A T E I D E A S
There is first the jointly conceptual and empirical sector of the problem to delineate those kinds of ' conceptualising ' activities that have a bearing upon the area o f ' innate ideas ' in the sense of relating to the ' logic ' of the human ' thmking machine (I)
'.
( 2 ) There is secondly, the purely empirical (primarily psychological and brain-physiological) initial investigation of the functional uniformities that represent modes of operation o f ' the human computer ', i.e. the characteristicfeatures ofits ' logic '. (We may think here of the sort of information that comes now and again from such diverse enterprises as structural-and especially transformational-linguistics, learning theory, and problem-solving theory.)
(3) Finally, there is the primarily logico-analytical enterprisebeginning when one certain element of the ' logic ' of the human computer has been determined-of determining which of these features can be characterised as more than merely empirical regularities : that is to say as functional regularities. Such regularities are certified as being presumptively better than merely accidental in not simply representing a possible way of accomplishing a given task, but a functionally eficient or efective way of accomplishing this task. It might be remarked parenthetically that it would seem that the best prospects for a useful contribution on the part of philosophers are to be looked for in the context of this third, nonempirical but analytical and normative part of the problem-the conceptual analysis of functions and the specification of appropriate criteria of efficiency in their discharge. One of the main merits of our approach resides in its sharper discrimination between on the one hand the factual and empirical issues that are involved, and on the other those which are of a strictly conceptual and analytical character. It should, moreover, be stressed that the problem in the proposed reformulation maintains an unbroken h k with the historical tradition. In Plato, certain ideas are innate on ontological grounds, because they conform perfectly,to a pre-existent paradigm. In Kant certain ideas are innate on episteinological grounds because they correspond to inevitable requisites for thought about things. In this light, the enterprise envisaged here has a markedly empirical foundation: dealing not with ideas as such, but with our language-embedded modes of ' working with ' ideas, we seek to isolate those functional patterns that are brought to light in a strictly empirical inquiry into the tnodus operandi of human thought.
N I C H O L A S RESCHER
8 An (In2perfect)Example
T o mitigate a significant limitation of the discussion to this pointits primarily methodological and programmatic character-we turn now to the examination of a specific example for the sake of concreteness and illustrative force. The example is imperfect because its empirical basis is in some degree speculative (i.e. is less than solidly established). Nonetheless, the example is a very useful one, becauseeven if it fails (as it well may) to establish its particular result-it dustrates graphically the kind of result that can be attained on the amroach we have been concerned to Lmesent. L L
Our starting-point here is provided by a significant empirical discovery relating to the t e c h q u e s of human problem-solving-both on the side of (I) the informal problem-solving of individuals in the psychological laboratory, and on the side of ( 2 ) the attempts to create systematic means of solving- whole classes of problems on electronic computers (the so-called ' problem-solving programs '). From the former we learn of the central importance of (i) the search for sinzilarities-and above all for regularities-in the situations (' pattern recognition '), and (ii) the use of analogies to exploit such regularities by finding techniques successful in respect o f ' old ' problems as ways to tackle the ' new ' ones. The underlying line of attack is the exploitation of structural regularities by means of analogical reas0ning.l The fundamental procedures involved in human problem-solving -namely comparison, sidarity-noting, structural-pattern discernment, trial-and-error search, and ' means-end analysis '-are all basic to the ' mode of operation' of the human ' thinking machine '. Indeed, there is good reason to thmk that the number of basic information-handling processes involved in even the most creative forms of human thought is very small. O n the other hand, the effectiveness, efficiency, and fruitfulness of these concept-utilising processes is evidenced by their equal prominence in deliberately optimised problemsolving programs for electronic computers. The capacity to compare and contrast and the corresponding wealth of concepts relating to the conceptual region covered by such English words as ' likeness ', For a fuller description of the relevant issues see H. A. Simon and A. Newell,
' Information Processing in Computer and Man ', American Scientist, 196453,281-300; and the first author's paper ' GPS: A Program that Stimulates Human Thought ', in E. A. Feigenbaum and S. Feldman (eds.), Computers and Thought (New York, 1964).
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' sirmlarity ', ' uniformity ', ' pattern ', ' regularity ' together with their corresponding opposites1-represents the functional setting characteristic of the approach to the problem of ' innate ideas ' that is at issue in our analysis. Again, another example is provided by the notions basic to means-end analysis, belonging to the conceptual region covered by such phraseologies as ' in order to ', ' . . . needed for-', and the like. In both of these cases, the finding of rle$cto use is backed by the warrant of demonstrable effectiveness in just the way characteristic of the ' innate ideas ' of the functional variety with which we have chosen to concern ourselves. Note here, incidentally, a significant difference between the relevantly conceptual modes of performance and nonconceptual ones. o n e can, f i r example, be able to ' do ' a dance without being able to conceptualise this-e.g. have vocabulary to characterise what goes on. Man, on the other hand (though not, of course, the higher mammals) standardly carries out such procedures as ' means-end analysis ' and ' sidarity-discernment ' by overt employment of the appropriate concepts. The propensities at issue are thus ones not only to make use of certain conceptual processes, but also to arrive at the concepts by which man, as ' a rational animal ', standardly carries out these processes. Having drawn my illustrative example from the area of problemsolving, I hasten to add that this area is by no means to be thought of as the only potential sphere of application for our approach to the problem of innate ideas. The method can almost certainly be implemented in other contexts. For example, the powerful techniques of modern grammatical analysis-especially transformation grammar -represent another hopeful sphere of application. Suggestive evidence is coming to hand that certain grammatical categories represent functional conceptual uniformities of-just the kind with which we are concerned, so that (crudely speaking) children do not purely and simply learn to work with grammatical structures, but in some degree come to discover them lying prefabricated to the hand (or rather tongue) of the human language user.2 In the case of such functional regularities of linguistic provenience it should in principle prove possible to bring The list is reminiscent of some of Kant's ' regulative ideas ', and our construction of itrnnte idens has a certain kinship with this fantian conce~tion.Speclficallv. ,. the metaphysical (ontological) aspects of the innate idea tradition have been cast aside. Cf. N. Chomsky, Aspects of tlre Theory of Sytztax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), see especially chap. i, sect. 8. Because of the generality of the ' grammatical ' concepts involved here, the prospect remains somewhat clouded.
NICHOLAS RESCHER
to bear the method for the analysis of' innate ideas ' with which we have been dealing. g Conclusion
In approaching our conclusion, it may be useful to cast a brief retrospect over the ground that has been covered. The problem of innate ideas was reformulated in terms of an inquiry into innate human propensities to arrive at and make use of certain ' ideas ' or mechanisms in handling ' ideas '. These propensities are to be sought in the first analysis in those empirical uniformities in human thought processes (or-if you prefer-in the conceptual schemes inherent in natural languages). But such regularities are germane to our interests only if they prove in the final analysis to be not merely accidental or haphazard uniformities, but firnctional uniformities-i.e. features of the ' logic ' of the human ' thinking machine ' that reflect the attainment of demonstrably efficient and effective modes of functioning in the context of the conceptual problems that confront us. The endeavour was made to illustrate this mode of analysis with reference to the fundamentally analogical structure of human problein-solving processes. In closing, then, it can be said that we have sought to restate the problem of innate ideas in such a way that the link with the hstoric forms of the issue remains unbroken, while at the same time exploiting a purely modern perspective-the man/computer analogy-both to elucidate the conceptual anatomy of the issues, and to resolve the question into a more meaningful and tractable f0rm.l University of Pittsburgh In writing this paper I have profited substantially from the comments and criticisms of my colleagues in the Philosophy Department of the University of Pittsburgh.
